Without Any Doubt: Gersonides on Method and Knowledge

“Without Any Doubt”

Supplements to The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy Edited by

Elliot Wolfson (New York University) Christian Wiese (University of Frankfurt) Hartwig Wiedebach (University of Zurich)

VOLUME 13

“Without Any Doubt” Gersonides on Method and Knowledge

By

Sara Klein-Braslavy

Translated and edited by

Lenn J. Schramm

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2011

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Klein-Braslavy, Sara. Without any doubt : Gersonides on method and knowledge / by Sara Klein-Braslavy. p. cm. — (Supplements to the journal of Jewish thought and philosophy, ISSN 1873-9008 ; v. 13) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-90-04-20652-6 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Levi ben Gershom, 1288–1344—Knowledge—Methodology. 2. Jewish philosophy—Methodology. 3. Philosophy, Medieval—Methodology. 4. Levi ben Gershom, 1288–1344. Milhamot ha-Shem. 5. Jewish philosophers—France. I. Title. II. Series. B759.L4K54 2011 181’.06—dc22

2011008041

ISSN 1873-9008 ISBN 978-90-04-20652-6 Copyright 2011 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Global Oriental, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.

For my beloved children, Yaron and Tammy

CONTENTS Introduction: “Without any Doubt”: Gersonides on Method and Knowledge .......................................................................

1

The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord ........................................................................

13

The Solutions of the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord .................

45

Dialectic in Gersonides’ Commentary on Proverbs ..................

73

The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm in Gersonides’ Writings ...................................................................................

117

The Introductions to the Bible Commentaries .........................

151

Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes .................................

181

Determinism, Contingency, Free Choice, and Foreknowledge in Gersonides ..........................................................................

221

Gersonides on the Mode of Communicating Knowledge of the Future to the Dreamer and Clairvoyant .........................

297

Bibliography ................................................................................ Index of Topics and Names ....................................................... Index of Sources and Citations ..................................................

325 337 345

INTRODUCTION

“WITHOUT ANY DOUBT”: GERSONIDES ON METHOD AND KNOWLEDGE Gersonides—Rabbi Levi ben Gershom (Provence, 1288–1344)—was a multifaceted and fascinating thinker, a unique figure among Jewish thinkers of the Middle Ages. He devoted his entire career to philosophy and science and was well-versed in every branch of the science of his time. The scope of his oeuvre reveals him to have been perhaps the most prolific polymath of all medieval Jewish philosophers. He wrote supercommentaries on many of Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle, but was also an original thinker in his own right; in his philosophical masterpiece, the Wars of the Lord, he conducted an independent inquiry into philosophical problems and philosophical-theological questions that had not been fully resolved (to his mind) before his day. He was also an exegete who wrote an essentially philosophical commentary on almost all of the books of the Bible, as well as a halakhist who devised an interesting and original plan (never carried out) for legal codes in which he would employ logical inference to derive the law from the biblical text. Gersonides did not shut himself up in his study, reading and writing and conducting theoretical deliberations about scientific questions, on the basis of the philosophical and scientific texts he knew. Instead, he was an experimental scientist, an empiricist—a rare phenomenon in the Middle Ages. He spent many years observing the stars; drawing on his documentation of these observations he prepared new astronomical tables and elaborated his own astronomical theory. To make his stellar observations more precise he invented a new instrument, the Jacob’s staff, and improved other astronomical devices that helped him determine the position of the stars in the sky and measure their diameters. As a result he is considered to be one of the most important and original astronomers of the Middle Ages, among Jews and Christians alike. Gersonides’ singularity lies in the way in which he viewed the several facets of his scholarly work as a unified whole, with all parts interrelated, complementing and illuminating one another. There is an obvious link between his practical astronomy—his celestial observations, the instruments he invented or improved, and the new astronomical tables he composed—and his new astronomical theory; but there is

2

introduction

also a strong link among his supercommentaries on Averroes on Aristotle, his own masterpiece the Wars of the Lord, and his Bible commentaries. His writings contain frequent cross-references from one work to another, noting parallel discussions of the same topics elsewhere in that corpus and advising readers to supplement the present discussion with what he had already expounded at greater length elsewhere. There is an impressive unity to this enterprise. The image that emerges from the corpus of his writings is of a person with an original and critical mind who did not accept the authority of his predecessors, philosophers and scientists, but investigated every matter for himself. He made an original contribution in every area to which he turned, in philosophy, in biblical exegesis, and in the sciences. As I engaged myself with Gersonides’ thought, one of the things that stood out most boldly was his extraordinary attention to methods of inquiry and composition, in his own works and in his reading of certain biblical books. The present volume collects eight articles on Gersonides’ thought and method, published between 1989 and 2007. Two of them were written in English, but have been revised for the present volume; the others have Hebrew or French originals and the translation-revision here represents their first English publication. The original publications were as follows: • “The Opinions that Give Rise to the Aporias in Gersonides’ Wars of the Lord,” pp. 317–340 in Me ah She arim: Studies in Medieval Jewish Spiritual life in Memory of Isadore Twersky, ed. E. Fleischer, G. Blidstein, C. Horowitz, and B. Septimus. Jerusalem, 2001 (Hebrew). • “The Solutions of the Aporias in Gersonides’ Wars of the Lord,” Da at 50–52 (2003): pp. 499–514 (Hebrew). • “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Commentary on Proverbs,” Tarbi 75(3–4) (2007): pp. 467–499 (Hebrew). • “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm in Gersonides’ Writings,” Jewish Quarterly Review 95(2) (2005): pp. 257–289. • “Les commentaires bibliques: Les introductions,” pp. 193–215 in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, ed. C. Sirat, S. Klein Braslavy, and O. Weijers, Paris: Vrin, 2003. • “Gersonide commentateur d’Averroès,” ibid., pp. 59–90. • “Gersonides on Determinism, Possibility, Choice and Foreknowledge,” Da at 22 (1989): pp. 5–53 (Hebrew).

introduction

3

• “Gersonides on the Mode of Communicating Knowledge of the Future to the Dreamer and Clairvoyant,” pp. 171–199 in A. L. Ivry, E. R. Wolfson, and A. Arkush, eds., Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism. Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998. I gratefully acknowledge the permission granted by the original publishers and editors to include these articles here.1 In some cases the texts printed here incorporate corrections to the original versions, based on what I have learned over the years: some sections have been extensively rewritten, and new notes and references have been added. These revisions are indicated in the introductory note to each article. For the convenience of readers without Hebrew I have provided dual page references, to standard versions of the Hebrew texts as well as to existing English translations (on the use of existing translations and the versions cited, see below). I have also inserted internal cross-references within this volume, to afford readers a fuller picture of the ideas presented here and the links among them. These articles address four main topics: (1) Gersonides’ methods of inquiry and composition; (2) his use of introductions; (3) his method in the supercommentaries on Averroes; and (4) his methods of biblical exegesis. Methods of Inquiry and Composition Gersonides’ Methods in his own Inquiries and Writing My close study of Gersonides’ thought led me to the realization that a grasp of his methods of inquiry and composition provides the key to understanding his ideas, inasmuch as there is an essential link between his methods and his conclusions. The methods he employed influenced

1 I hoped to include “Gersonides’ Methods of Inquiry in the Discussion on the Material Intellect in the Wars of the Lord,” in M. C. Pacheco and J. F. Meirinhos, eds., Intellect et imagination dans la philosophie médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto e imaginaçao na Filosofia Medieval (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), pp. 641–651, but was unable to receive permission to do so.

4

introduction

his solutions to the philosophical and philosophical-theological problems he addressed and how he formulated those solutions. Consequently, no study of his thought can afford to separate his methods of inquiry and writing from the doctrines themselves. Gersonides’ key method is the diaporematic method, which is one version of the dialectic method. He fashioned it on the basis of the latter as he learned it from Aristotle’s Metaphysics and from Averroes’s commentaries on the Metaphysics and the Topics. It allowed him to solve philosophical and theological problems whose true answers, he asserted, had eluded his predecessors. It is important to note that Gersonides attached a practical purpose to the discovery of the truth. For him, as for all Aristotelian philosophers of the Middle Ages, the pursuit of philosophical truth is not just a matter of intellectual curiosity. Its role is to make it possible for human beings to fulfill their purpose, which is the attainment of intellectual perfection and, thereby, immortality of the intellect and felicity in this world and the next. According to his Bible commentaries, and especially the introduction to the commentary on the Pentateuch, the acquisition of intellectual perfection and immortality of the intellect are the ultimate purpose, God’s goal when He created the world. The Torah is a providential instrument that God revealed to permit realization of this goal; it guides those who observe it along the path to intellectual perfection. In Gersonides’ reading, the books that Jewish tradition ascribes to King Solomon—Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and Song of Songs—are also intended to guide their readers to acquisition of intellectual perfection. For Gersonides, intellectual perfection, or what he sometimes calls “felicity” (ha la ah) depends on both the quantity and quality of the knowledge acquired by a human being in his life; a person’s felicity grows as he accumulates ever-increasing varieties of knowledge in more and more important categories. Consequently it is important to master as many disciplines as possible, especially the loftiest among them, notably astronomy, celestial physics, and metaphysics. The purpose of the Wars of the Lord parallels that of the Pentateuch; it seeks to help readers achieve intellectual perfection and the felicity that accompanies it. He writes that in this book he will examine “several important yet difficult questions on which many of the fundamental principles [ pinnot] that lead man to his intellectual felicity are based.”2

2

Wars, Introduction, p. 6 / 1:91.

introduction

5

He saw himself as a link in the chain of the Aristotelian philosophical tradition, and his role as going beyond and supplementing the truths achieved by his predecessors so that he could help his readers ascend to a higher level of felicity than they could reach by relying on his predecessors. He aspired to achieve the truth “without any doubt,” because this is the only way to guarantee the acquisition of intellectual perfection. As a result, it was not enough merely to present solutions to problems; he also had to demonstrate that these solutions are true “without any doubt.” The diaporematic method, he believed, could lead him to this level of the truth. The diaporematic method has another aspect, which is essentially didactic. Gersonides used it to show readers how he reached his conclusions and to persuade them of their veracity. There is a strong link between the diaporematic method as a method of inquiry and as method of pedagogy that exposes readers to the inner workings of his inquiry. The first two pieces in the present volume—“The Opinions that Produce the Aporias” and “The Solutions of the Aporias”—address the diaporematic method in general, its implementation, and its importance for molding Gersonides’ opinions in the Wars of the Lord. In “Gersonides on Determinism” I consider Gersonides’ application of this method to a specific topic and how it led him to an answer to the vexing problem of determinism, contingency, free choice, and foreknowledge (both God’s and the prophets’), presented in his supercommentary on Averroes’s epitome of the Parva naturalia and in the Wars of the Lord. Gersonides employed another method in the Wars of the Lord, which I have designated his “applicative method” (or “analogical method”). This method applies the answer found for a question in one domain, generally already addressed by Gersonides earlier in the Wars, to solve a problem in some other domain. Drawing on the common lineaments of the two problems, Gersonides applies the solution of the former to the latter. This method and its application are addressed chiefly in “Gersonides on the Mode of Communicating Knowledge of the Future” and in the discussion of the agent of miracles in “The Solutions of the Aporias.” In the Wars of the Lord, Gersonides includes a discussion of the presentation of his ideas and structure of the work. In this preliminary remark, or ha a ah, he lists eight reasons for the order in which issues are expounded in that work. In the body of the book, by contrast,

6

introduction

he does not explain the grounds for the precedence of some topics to others, expecting his readers to apply the principles enumerated in the introduction. I consider this aspect in the Wars of the Lord and its application to the problem of determinism, contingency, free choice, and foreknowledge in “Gersonides on Determinism.” Methods of Inquiry in Biblical Books Gersonides identified the methods of inquiry he himself employed with those he detected in biblical books. He held that the diaporematic method, which he developed and used in the Wars of the Lord, was recommended by Solomon in two of the three books ascribed to that monarch—the Song of the Songs and Proverbs—and actually employed by him in Ecclesiastes. In his commentaries on the three Solomonic books, Gersonides demonstrated that their author employed yet another variant of the dialectic method to guide readers in their inquiry: dialectic as a method of verification. Solomon explained to his readers that dialectic syllogisms can substitute for demonstrative syllogisms and can lead to the attainment of truth in sciences where demonstrative proofs are not possible. Part of my study of dialectic as a method of verification and examination and its role, according to Gersonides’ commentaries on the Solomonic books, appears in “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Commentary on Proverbs.” Introductions Gersonides paid special attention to introductions. Inasmuch as introductions prepare readers for the text that follows, they are a key to understanding it. In addition, introductions may illuminate the personality of the author or, in the case of a commentary, of the commentator. I have addressed several aspects of Gersonides’ attitude toward and use of introductions. In “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm” I show that Gersonides was familiar with the tradition of the Alexandrian prologue and applied it in his own work. As with the diaporematic method, Gersonides asserted that this tradition was represented by his philosophical-theological work the Wars of the Lord as well as by

introduction

7

the Solomonic books. At the end of the introduction to the Wars, he maintains that his introduction contains all the key points of the Alexandrian prologues; in his commentaries on Proverbs, Song of Songs, and Ecclesiastes he asserts that Solomon included several of them in the introductory sections of those books. Gersonides also wrote introductions to his Bible commentaries and to his supercommentaries on Averroes. I consider the former in “The Introductions to the Biblical Commentaries”; the latter are addressed in the first section of “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes.” “The Introductions to the Biblical Commentaries” shows that Gersonides focused on two main topics in these introductions: the book being commented on and his exegesis thereof. With regard to the former he expounded his most important ideas about the nature of those works; as for the latter, he reviewed his method of interpreting the book. I pay special attention to the species of introduction called a ha a ah, found in his Bible commentaries, and its several types. In “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” I survey all of Gersonides’ introductions to his supercommentaries on Averroes. These are short prologues that do not deal with the underlying texts but only with Gersonides’ reading thereof. Here I have shown what we can learn from them about the goals and nature of his commentaries and consequently about Gersonides’ personality as a critical, original, and independent thinker. There are also a few remarks here about the epilogues to the supercommentaries. Gersonides’ Method in his Supercommentaries on Averroes The second half of “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes” looks at Gersonides’ method in that department of his work. First I look at the several exegetical approaches that Gersonides employed in his supercommentaries on Averroes’s epitomes of the physical sciences and on some of the middle commentaries. These considerations lead me to insights about the purpose of the supercommentaries, their intended audiences, and how readers were expected to study and learn from them. I show that Gersonides was not merely trying to elucidate Averroes’s text for potential reader-students; in addition, as he promised in his introduction, he included his own opinions, thereby manifesting his originality of thought, and incorporated

8

introduction

his own ideas into the supercommentary. In the second and longer part of this article I look at the discursive notes, introduced “Levi said,” which Gersonides interpolated into the running commentaries on Averroes. This survey casts additional light on Gersonides’ method of interpreting Averroes’s commentaries and his philosophical thinking. For Gersonides, these notes had a dual purpose: not only to provide a deeper explanation of Averroes’s text, but also to present his critical and close reading of the underlying text, the background knowledge he drew on in his explanations, and his method of applying them. Some of the discursive notes illuminate Gersonides’ own personality. He comes across as a brilliant philosopher who does not blindly accept the views of authorities without investigation and who criticizes them, sometimes quite fiercely, and offers alternatives when he cannot accept their views. The discursive notes in the supercommentaries on Averroes are further evidence that Gersonides was an original and interesting philosopher who made a significant contribution to the annals of Aristotelian thought. His originality is manifested not only in his theological-philosophical masterpiece, the Wars of the Lord, in which he conducted an independent inquiry into the questions that preoccupied him, but also in his exegetical works like the supercommentaries on Averroes. In “Gersonides on Determinism” I offer a deep analysis of Gersonides’ independent inquiry into the philosophical issue of determinism and choice in one of the discursive notes in the supercommentary to Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva naturalia. Gersonides’ Methods of Biblical Exegesis Various aspects of Gersonides’ methods of biblical exegesis are addressed in “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Commentary on Proverbs.” Existing Translations It would have been impossible (or at least extremely difficult) to produce this volume in English had various scholars not invested years of effort in rendering Gersonides and other classical and medieval texts into English—notably Seymour Feldman in his three-volume translation of the Wars. We owe them all a profound debt.

introduction

9

However, I found that I could not use these translations uncritically and without revision. (1) Sometimes I disagree with a translator’s interpretation of the text (and, as is well known, every translation is an interpretation) or believe that he misread the text. (2) With regard to technical terms, where different translators employed different English words to render the same source term (or concept, since behind Gersonides’ Hebrew there is a tradition in Greek and Arabic), it was felt that readers of the present volume would be better served by the choice of one term to be imposed on all the texts. (3) Finally, Lenn Schramm, the translator and editor of this volume, often proposed revising an existing translation to make it more comprehensible; in many cases I accepted his emendation. Of all these categories, however, only (2) has been noted regularly. Acknowledgements I owe especial thanks to Ruth Glasner, for all of her enlightening comments over these many years, including proposals for additions or solutions to problems that perplexed me, and our countless discussions that always stimulated my thinking. My thanks to Colette Sirat, who invited me to take part in the seminar on Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide,” held in Paris at the École Pratique des Hautes Études–IVe Section in 1999. Although I had already worked on the use of the dialectic method in the Wars of the Lord, the need to talk about other aspects of Gersonides’ work—his supercommentaries on Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle and his biblical commentaries—pushed me to study those as well. The discussions with the other participants in the seminar, especially Colette Sirat, Olga Weijers, Gilbert Dahan, and Ruth Glasner, found their way into the articles I wrote subsequently, which appeared in the volume that I co-edited with Sirat and Weijers, Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques. My editorial collaboration with Sirat on that book made another major contribution to my study of these topics. I am grateful to the Center for Jewish Studies at Harvard University, where I was a Harry Starr Fellow in Judaica in the spring of 2005 and a visiting scholar in the winter of 2006. The fellowship and the access to the resources of the Widener Library at Harvard made it possible for me pursue my investigations into Gersonides’ use of the

10

introduction

dialectic method in his biblical exegesis. These were consolidated in “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Commentary on Proverbs” (in this volume) and in “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Biblical Commentaries,” in Studies in the History of Culture and Science: A Tribute to Gad Freudenthal (Brill, 2011). I would also like to thank: Alfred Ivry, who edited the original version of “Gersonides on the Mode of Communicating Knowledge of the Future to the Dreamer and Clairvoyant” (of which a revised version appears in this volume) and made helpful comments to improve it; Seymour Feldman, for his comments on “Gersonides on Determinism, Possibility, Choice and Foreknowledge”; and Steven Harvey, for his observation about “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm in Gersonides’ Writings.” Last, but without any doubt, I owe a profound debt to Lenn Schramm, who translated (from Hebrew or French) all of the articles included here (except for “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm” and “The Mode of Communicating Knowledge,” which he edited) and revised them for publication in a single volume. His devoted labors, his close reading of my work and of the texts cited in them, and his many comments and proposals to improve old translations and clarify my ideas have left their mark throughout this book (but are explicitly credited in only a few places). This book was made in possible by the Dorith and Meir Shalom Yaniv Fund at Tel Aviv University and Brill Publishers. Forms of Reference I have cited Gersonides in the following texts and translations. Unless otherwise specified, the references are to the Hebrew version, followed by a slash and the page in the English translation used (where one exists). Gersonides Wars of the Lord Mil amot ha-Shem. Leipzig: C. B. Lorck, 1866. Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides), The Wars of the Lord, trans. S. Feldman. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1984–1999.

introduction

11

Bible commentaries Pentateuch B. Braner and E. Freiman, eds., Rabbinic Pentateuch with Commentary on the Torah by R. Levi ben Gerson (Gersonides, 1288– 1344). Jerusalem, 1993 [no published English translation]. Proverbs Miqra ot gedolot. Jerusalem: Am Olam, 1961, corrected on the basis of MS Paris BNF héb. 247 (IMHM 4284) [no published English translation: references are to Miqra ot gedolot, followed by a slash and the page in the MS]. Preliminary remark (ha a ah) and commentary on Proverbs 1:1–19: B. Braner, “Gersonides’ Introduction to the Commentary on Proverbs and the History of the Versions of the Text,” Tarbi 73 (2004): pp. 288–291 [transcribed from MS Paris BNF héb. 247; no published English translation]. Job Commentary: Miqra ot gedolot. Jerusalem: {Am {Olam, 1961. Introduction to the commentary: Miqra ot gedolot. New York: Pardes, 1961. The Commentary of Levi ben Gerson (Gersonides) on the Book of Job, translated from the Hebrew with introduction and notes by Abraham L. Lassen. New York: Bloch, 1999 (1946). Ecclesiastes Gersonides’ Commentaries on the [Five] Scrolls, ed. J. L. Levy. Jerusalem, 2003 [no published English translation], pp. 15–64. Song of Songs Commentary on Song of Songs by Rabbi Levi ben Gershom, ed. M. Kellner. Ramat Gan, 2001. Commentary on Song of Songs. Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides), trans. M. Kellner. New Haven and London, 1998. Supercommentaries on Averroes Epitome of De anima J. S. Mashbaum, “Chapters 9–12 of Gersonides’ Supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of the De Anima; The Internal Senses,” Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University, 1981.

12

introduction Epitome of the Parva naturalia “Gersonides’ Commentary on Averroes’ Epitome of Parva Naturalia II, 3,” ed. Alexander Altmann. Jerusalem, 1980; reprinted from Jubilee Volume of the American Academy for Jewish Research 46–47 (1979–1980).

Other Authors Moses Maimonides Dalālat al- ā irīn (The Guide of the Perplexed), ed. Salomon Munk and Y. Joel. Jerusalem, 1930–31. The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines. Chicago, 1963. Samuel Ibn Tibbon, Commentary on Ecclesiastes Preliminary note (ha a ah) and commentary on Ecclesiastes 1:1 James T. Robinson, “Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes and the Philosopher’s Prooemium,” Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature 3 (2000), pp. 83–146 [Hebrew text with English translation]. Rest of the commentary James T. Robinson, “Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes,” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2002 [Hebrew]. James T. Robinson, Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes: The Book of the Soul of Man. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007 [English]. Sara Klein-Braslavy “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur,” in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, ed. C. Sirat, S. Klein-Braslavy, and O. Weijers. Paris: Vrin, 2003, pp. 105–134.

THE OPINIONS THAT PRODUCE THE APORIAS IN THE WARS OF THE LORD Introduction As is known, in the Wars of the Lord Gersonides pursues solutions to theological and philosophical questions that had troubled his predecessors and for which, he believes, the “truth” had eluded all of them.1 Because he engaged in philosophical inquiry “so that the truth in these matters will be achieved in an indubitable manner”2 and because of his special interest in logic, Gersonides attached special importance to method. The dialectical method3 and, more specifically, one of its variants—the diaporematic method4—play a key role in the Wars of the Lord. Gersonides believed that using it would allow him to work out problems that his predecessors had solved incorrectly or had been unable to solve, as well as to persuade his readers that his solution was the correct one. The Diaporematic Method in the Wars of the Lord One characteristic of Aristotle’s dialectical method is that, like the method of demonstration of the Posterior Analytics, it is a formal and hence universal technique that can be applied to any topic and is not 1 See the introduction to Wars of the Lord, p. 6 / 1: 97. See also VI.1 (p. 29 / pp. 3:406–407). 2 Wars, p. 6 / 1:97. 3 For a short description of Gersonides’ use of the dialectic method and the problems involved, see C. Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide (Paris, 1973), pp. 80–81. I have elaborated on this topic in my “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur,” in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, ed. C. Sirat, S. Klein-Braslavy and O. Weijers (Paris: Vrin, 2003), pp. 105–134. 4 On the term “diaporematic method” see: La Métaphysique, trans. J. Tricot, rev. ed. (Paris, 1974), p. 119 n. 2; P. Ricœur, “La philosophie et ses ‘apories,’ ” in P. Ricœur, Etre, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote (Paris, 1982), p. 181; F. Pironet, “Aristote: Aporia, euporia et les mots étymologiquement apparentée,” in A. Motte and Chr. Rutten, eds., Aporia dans la philosophie grecque, des origines à Aristote (Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 2001), pp. 183–186.

14

the opinions that produce the aporias

limited to a single scientific discipline. Gersonides, who was aware of this point and states it explicitly in his commentary on Ecclesiastes,5 could accordingly apply it in his discussions of diverse philosophical and philosophical-theological topics. In the Wars of the Lord he uses it to treat of the nature of the hylic intellect (I.1–5), the immortality of the rational soul (I.8–13), God’s knowledge of particulars (III), divine providence (IV), the generation of the animate substances (ba alei nefesh) (V.3), the creation of the world (VI.1),6 and the identity of the agent of miracles (VI.2.10). As Ruth Glasner has shown, he also employs it in his astronomical section of the Wars of the Lord.7 Gersonides’ use of the diaporematic method has four main characteristics. The Systematization of Aristotle’s Diaporematic Method In Metaphysics III.1 Aristotle provides a clear exposition of his diaporematic method and its three stages:8 The first stage is the presentation of the aporia, in other words, the philosophical difficulties and the perplexity9 caused by the existence of two contrary answers—thesis and antithesis—to the same question, each of which seems to be solidly rooted in arguments of equal weight and consequently equal plausibility.10 According to the Topics, the possible or plausible opinions (anadoxa) addressed by dialectic are those we accept on the basis of authority—whether the authority of the many (that is, opinions accepted by every human being or by most human beings) or the authority of wise men (“by all, by the majority, or by

5 See below, on the fourth characteristic of Gersonides’ discussions of the dialectical method, under “explicit reliance on Aristotle in the development of the method.” 6 The discussion of the created or eternal status of the world is extremely complex and Gersonides must employ other methods as well. The diaporematic method is used in the first stage of that inquiry. See (in this volume) “The Solutions of the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” pp. 67–71. 7 See: R. Glasner, “Gersonides’ Lost Commentary on the Metaphysics,” Medieval Encounters 4 (1998), pp. 144–145. Glasner cites examples from V.1, chapters 20, 21, 24, 26, 35, and 39–46. Here I will not be dealing with the astronomical section of the Wars of the Lord. 8 Here I am relying on P. Aubenque, “Sur la notion aristotélicienne d’aporie,” in his Aristote et les problèmes de méthode (Louvain and Paris, 1961), p. 4. 9 For these two aspects of the aporia see ibid., pp. 4–6. 10 For a definition of the aporia as “an equality between contrary reasonings,” see Topics VI.6 (145b17). See also O. Hamelin, “La dialectique et la science,” in O. Hamelin, Le système d’Aristote (Paris, 1976), p. 233.

the opinions that produce the aporias

15

the most notable and reputable of them”).11 Because the opinions addressed by dialectic have been stated by authorities, for Aristotle they are not merely possible opinions, but plausible ones that make sense.12 Nevertheless, from Metaphysics III.1 (995a25–26) we see that the opposing theses or opinions advanced in an aporia do not have to be historical; they can also be opinions that happen to have been overlooked in the past and which the philosopher himself is raising for the first time in the context of his diaporematic inquiry.13 The next stage is the diaporia, in which the contrary opinions that constitute the aporia are investigated. The third stage is the euporia, in which the problems raised by the aporia are resolved.14 Drawing on Metaphysics III.1 and Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics, Gersonides develops a method with a detailed structure that goes beyond anything that can be found in either Aristotle himself or Averroes, although it is extremely faithful to Aristotle’s method. It has more stages than the diaporematic method presented in Metaphysics III.1, involving four and sometimes five steps. In extremely schematic fashion these stages can defined as follows: The first stage is collecting and presenting the contradictory or different opinions that can be given to answer the question. These create the aporia. This step parallels Aristotle’s presentation of the aporia and provides the “matter of the aporia.”15 The second and third stages parallel the Aristotelian diaporia,16 which Gersonides splits in two. In his second stage, the arguments that support each of the opinions introduced in the first stage are reviewed, followed by their refutations.17 In practice, he usually emphasizes the

11 Topics I.1 (100b21), I.14 (105a35–105b1) (trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes [Princeton, 1984], 1:167). 12 J. M. Le Blond, Logique et méthode chez Aristote: étude sur la recherche des principes dans la Physique aristotélicienne, 4th ed. (Paris, 1996), pp. 9–11. Aubenque (P. Aubenque, “Dialectique et ontologie,” in Le problème de l’être chez Aristote [Paris, 1966], pp. 258–259) argues that the wise are presented here as reputable authorities, such that all are inclined to accept their views. The reference to them stresses the universal nature of the dialectical theses and their acceptance by most human beings. 13 See Aubenque, “Sur la notion aristotélicienne,” pp. 8–12. 14 See Metaphysics III.1 (995a28–29). 15 For this phrase see Aubenque, “Sur la notion aristotélicienne,” pp. 8–9. 16 On the second and third stages of the diaporematic method see Klein-Braslavy, “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur,” pp. 116–121. 17 The formally most complete example of the second stage is found in the discussion of the agent of miracles (VI.2.10: pp. 445–449 / 3:475–481). Here Gersonides presents, one by one, the arguments in support of the various opinions, along with

16

the opinions that produce the aporias

arguments that support the opinions; sometimes he totally omits the counter-arguments.18 Sometimes he contends that the arguments supporting one opinion simultaneously refute its antithesis.19 In the third stage Gersonides investigates whether the arguments pro and con (if the latter have been presented) really do support or refute the opinions under consideration.20 Sometimes he breaks this into two: whether the arguments are correct and whether they actually imply what their proponents believe they do.21 In this way he winnows out the various correct arguments advanced in the second step from the incorrect ones.22 The fourth stage parallels the Aristotelian euporia. Aristotle does not always resolve the aporia presented at the outset,23 but Gersonides finds a solution to every aporia; and that solution, he maintains, is the truth.24 To these stages Gersonides sometimes adds what may be seen as a fifth stage, completing the diaporematic inquiry: he advances objections to the solution reached and responds to the challenges he has

their refutations. The discussion of miracles may offer the most systematic use of the diaporematic method in the Wars of the Lord, evidently because it was developed by Gersonides himself and is not based on the opinions and arguments of earlier thinkers. But see below for the reference to one earlier opinion—that of Abraham Ibn Ezra—in his presentation of the arguments that support the anthropological view of miracles. 18 Thus in the discussions of providence and of the generation of animate substances. 19 For example, in the discussion of the essence of the material intellect (I.2). In the discussion of the immortality of the intellect Gersonides first (I.9) presents only the arguments in support of different views; in the next chapter he states that those that support one view disprove the contrary opinion. In the discussion of God’s knowledge (III.2: p. 124 / 2:96) he examines the arguments that support and refute the opinions. Those that support Aristotle’s view are also those that contradict the opposing view, that is, that God has knowledge of particulars. Later he brings Maimonides’ arguments that refute the philosophers’ contentions and thus their opinion. In III.3 he inquires whether they really do disprove these arguments. 20 See the discussion of the essence of the material intellect (I.3) and of the immortality of the intellect (I.10). 21 See V.3.3. 22 Note that the structure of the second and third stages is not as schematic as in this exposition of their format. As we shall see, in addition to the thesis and antithesis Gersonides presents other, intermediate views, and must accordingly follow a more complex procedure than that which he has announced. The schematic presentation of arguments pro and con for each opinion is breached in various ways, dictated by the material available for the discussion of each issue and by its nature. This, for example, is the case in his discussions of the essence of the material intellect and of providence. 23 See Aubenque, “Sur la notion aristotélicienne,” pp. 16–17. 24 For a broad discussion of the solution of the aporias in the Wars of the Lord see “The Solutions of the Aporias in Gersonides’ Wars of the Lord,” pp. 45–71.

the opinions that produce the aporias

17

raised.25 In this way he corroborates the conclusion of his inquiry and guarantees that it is correct “in an indubitable manner.” This stage is not part of Aristotle’s diaporematic method.26 Gersonides may have been influenced here by the questio disputata of Christian scholasticism, which was widespread in the fourteenth century: when the master summed up the disputation in his determinatio magistralis he presented the solution to the question raised at the beginning of the debate, followed by objections to the solution and his replies to them.27 The Rigorous, Systematic, and Clear Manner in which Gersonides Applies his Diaporematic Method Whereas Aristotle’s use of the method is not rigorous—for example, we cannot always determine where the aporia begins or concludes— Gersonides always conducts his inquiry in a clear and systematic fashion. The method of inquiry provides the skeleton of his text: each stage in the inquiry is clearly distinguished from the others and assigned its own chapter.28 The Theoretical Discussions about the Method that Accompany each Stage of the Inquiry Whereas Aristotle says little about his methodology,29 Gersonides is acutely aware of the question of method and of the didactic nature of the Wars of the Lord. This awareness is reflected not only in his use of the diaporematic method in his inquiry, but also in the fact that the inquiry is punctuated with clear and detailed theoretical statements about the method being applied. In the introduction to the Wars of the Lord he announces the method to be employed in his book, sketching out its main lines and advantages. A similar discussion intervenes when he addresses the identity of the agent of miracles (VI.2.10).30 Throughout

25 For the fifth stage of Gersonides’ diaporematic method see Klein-Braslavy, “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur,” pp. 128–133. 26 See ibid., pp. 132–133. 27 See L. M. De Rijk, “La méthode scolastique,” in L. M. De Rijk, La philosophie au Moyen Age (Leiden, 1985), p. 101; O. Weijers, “Questions disputées et dispute scolastique à la faculté des arts,” in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide, pp. 139, 144, 147. 28 See below, n. 32. 29 See Aubenque, “Sur la notion aristotélicienne,” p. 4. 30 Introduction (p. 6 / 1:97); VI.2.10 (p. 444 / 3:475).

18

the opinions that produce the aporias

the book, in fact, whenever he employs the diaporematic method he highlights the theoretical aspect of each stage of the inquiry. Every chapter or discussion that employs the diaporematic method begins with a methodological statement, generally presenting the procedure to be followed in the chapter in question, and its utility. At advanced stages of the inquiry he also summarizes the methodological advance made in the previous stage as the basis for proceeding to the next step.31 Only after expounding the theoretical aspect of that stage of the inquiry does Gersonides actually apply it to the issue in question. This systematic incorporation of methodological notes into the diaporematic inquiry reveals that Gersonides does not employ this method merely in order to extract philosophical truths from a situation of aporia. The procedure has a didactic element as well. Gersonides wants to teach his readers and explain to them just how he conducted his investigation. He wants them to understand the stages in the inquiry and follow every step he takes so that they will understand how and why he reached his solution.32 Gersonides’ emphasis on his methodology is a means to persuade readers that the solution he has reached is the truth. Readers can retrace his path and critique it. If they find it persuasive they will accept the solution proposed.33 It seems to me, all the same, that Gersonides’ diaporematic method is not just a matter of teaching and persuading. It is not a method for expounding theories already known to Gersonides in a manner that will persuade readers of their truth, but a way to discover truth; or, as Ross said about Aristotle’s Metaphysics, “the adventures of a mind in its 31 See, for example, the discussion of the essence of the material intellect: I.1 (p. 12 / 1:109); I.2 (p. 13 / 1:111); I.3 (p. 19 / 1:120); I.4 (p. 25 / 1:130). 32 We can accept the argument by Husik (I. Husik, A History of Mediaeval Philosophy [New York and Philadelphia, 1960], pp. 331–332) that the didactic aspect of his method brings Gersonides close to the Scholastics, especially Aquinas, who developed their methods while teaching in university. Husik also emphasizes the clear and technical formulation of the exposition, characteristic both of Gersonides and of Christian scholasticism. See also above, in the main text near note 27, about the possible influence of the questio disputata on Gersonides method of writing. To me, however, it seems no less plausible that in his emphasis on the method of inquiry employed in his book, and the systematic explanations of the method and its procedures, Gersonides is following Averroes in his long commentaries on Aristotle. That is, he applies to his own book the exegetical method that Averroes used to explicate Aristotle. Gersonides knew Averroes’s long commentaries on the Metaphysics and the Physics. 33 In his commentary on Ecclesiastes 1:1 Gersonides offers a similar explanation of the benefit of Solomon’s declaration at the start of the book of how he composed it—that is, the method he employed. See (in this volume) “The Alexandrian Prologue paradigm in Gersonides’ Writings,” pp. 144–145.

the opinions that produce the aporias

19

search for truth.34 Gersonides himself is on a quest for the truth, which he finds at the end of the dialectic process. The Explicit Reliance on Aristotle in the Development of the Method When Gersonides presents the diaporematic method in his discussion of the agent of miracles in Wars VI.2.1035 he cites Aristotle’s Topics36 and Metaphysics as his sources for the second stage of the method.37 He also mentions them in preliminary remark (ha a ah) to his commentary on Ecclesiastes38 and in his commentary on Proverbs 1:439 and 24:7–8.40 In his commentary on Ecclesiastes he even incorporates a precise reference: “the third book of the Metaphysics.”41 It is clear from

34 W. D. Ross, “Introduction,” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics I (Oxford, 1924), p. lxxvii. As for Aristotle himself, scholars cannot agree. Contra Ross, Tricot argues in a note to his French translation of the Metaphysics (p. 119 n. 2) that the method is a way to expound a dogmatism that Aristotle endeavors to justify by reason and not by pursuing the truth. 35 Wars, p. 444 / 3:475. 36 Gersonides knew Aristotle’s Topics by way of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on it. He himself wrote a commentary on it in 1323. He refers readers to his commentary on the Topics in the preliminary remark to his commentary on Ecclesiastes (p. 15). When he draws on the Topics in the discussion of the agent of miracles, he identifies what he read in Averroes with Aristotle’s own views. He does this in other places in his writings as well, where his references to Aristotle are really to Averroes’s middle commentaries on Aristotle. When he presents the diaporematic method in the discussion of the agent of miracles he is apparently relying on the first mode of utility of dialectic in the sciences, according to Averroes’s commentary. See Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 933 [IMHM 30917], fol. 3r. 37 He does not mention them in the first presentation of the diaporematic method in the introduction to the Wars (p. 6 / 1:97). 38 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 15. 39 Comm. on Proverbs, p. 288. 40 Miqra’ot gedolot ( Jerusalem: Am Olam, 1961), p. 123a; Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247 (IMHM. 4284), fol. 122r. In his commentary Gersonides considers Proverbs to be a work that teaches the theory of the dialectic method. See (in this volume) “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Commentary on Proverbs,” pp. 73–115. Touati (La pensée philosophique p. 80 n. 142) refers in this context only to Gersonides’ commentary on Ecclesiastes. 41 The reference is to Metaphysics III.1, chiefly 995b2–4. Here too Gersonides refers readers to his own commentary on the work. Although lost, the commentary is mentioned in the catalogue of his library, which he seems to have written in 1323, as “part of a commentary to the Meta[ physics] by myself, Levi” (See G. E. Weil, La bibliothèque de Gersonide d’après son catalogue autographe [Paris and Louvain, 1991], p. 48). From the way it is listed in the catalogue we may infer that when he drew up the list Gersonides’ commentary was incomplete. He refers to it several times in the Wars of the Lord—sometimes to material already written (III.3, p. 136 / 2:119; V.3.12, p. 281 / 3:177), and sometimes to what he says he is planning to write in the future (I.6, p. 48 / 1:163). It is clear from what he writes in V.3.12 that he has already

20

the opinions that produce the aporias

all of this that he saw himself as applying the Aristotelian method in his inquiry and not as the inventor of the method.42 Of course he applies it in keeping with his own interpretation of the method as presented in his two source texts.43 In the preliminary remark to his commentary on Ecclesiastes Gersonides shows that he is quite aware of the universal nature of the dialectic method for Aristotle. He notes that Aristotle recommended applying the method to expositions of scientific subjects as well—to “demonstrative questions” and not only to questions of political philosophy, which, in his reading, is the subject of Ecclesiastes.44 In matters of political philosophy, notes Gersonides (following Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics), the dialectical method is the only possible way to conduct an inquiry,45 because its premises fall into the category of generally accepted premises (haqdamot mefursamot).46 He supplements written a commentary on Metaphysics IV.3 (1103b23–35). He cites the entire passage from the translation of Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics by Moses ben Solomon of Beaucaire (see Paris—BNF, MS héb. 887 [IMHM 31656], fol. 32r), followed by an explanation of this passage that he has himself advanced in his commentary on the Metaphysics. In my reading, we can infer from this that the unfinished commentary on the Metaphysics is on the Aristotelian text itself and not on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on it, as maintained by Touati (La pensée philosophique, p. 75), evidently relying on Steinschneider (M. Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher [Berlin, 1893], §86, p. 167). Note, too, that in the Wars of the Lord (V.3.3, pp. 240–243 / 3:111–116) he quotes a passage from Metaphysics XII ( λ) 9 in the same translation, alongside Averroes’s Long Commentary on this passage, and offers an interpretation that differs with Averroes’s. He does not refer to his own commentary on the Metaphysics, since he had apparently not yet reached Book Lambda; instead, he writes that “this is how we interpret this passage” (p. 240 / 3:112). This indicates that he wanted to write a commentary on the Metaphysics itself. See also (in this volume) “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” pp. 181–219, on p. 181 n. 1. 42 This shows that Gersonides takes Aristotle himself as a model to be emulated in the use of the dialectic method. 43 As we have seen, in his commentary on Ecclesiastes he refers readers both to his commentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics and to his own alreadywritten commentary on Metaphysics III 1. See above, n. 41. 44 He is alluding to Metaphysics III.1 (995b2–4). See Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 887 (IMHM 31656), fol. 17r. 45 “The Philosopher explained that this topic cannot receive full verification, but only what can be explained by means of generally accepted premises (p. 15). Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1 (1094b19–27). Gersonides knew the Ethics through Averroes’s Middle Commentary on it, in the Hebrew translation by Nissim of Marseilles (1321). See Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in the Hebrew Version of Samuel ben Judah, ed. Lawrence V. Berman ( Jerusalem, 1999), pp. 60–61. 46 See the introduction to the commentary on Ecclesiastes, p. 15; and cf. Gersonides’ commentary on Genesis, pp. 5–6. There he states explicitly that “the Philosopher explained this in the Ethics” and adds another relevant reference to Aristotle—“the

the opinions that produce the aporias

21

and explains this from the Topics: generally accepted premises “are those such that one may find explanations based on them for one thing and its contrary, as explained in the Topics”;47 hence they create an aporia. To prove that Aristotle used the dialectical method in scientific inquiry as well, Gersonides refers readers to the Physics: “Therefore you will find that in natural science the Philosopher prefaced to every problem a presentation of the generally accepted premises relating to it.”48 There is no doubt that what he has in mind is the first book of the Physics.49 He advances a similar argument in the introduction to his commentary on Job. Here he explicitly mentions that Aristotle discusses the method he employs, that is, the diaporematic method, in matters of both natural science ( iv iyyot) and divine science ( elohiyyot). Here he refers, in addition to the Physics, mentioned in his commentary on Ecclesiastes, to the Metaphysics as well. Evidently he has in mind Metaphysics I and III.50 The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord In this article I want to examine the opinions that produce the aporias in the first stage of the diaporematic method in the Wars of the Lord.51 Like Aristotle, Gersonides has two criteria for selecting the opinions that produce the aporia: on the one hand he assembles the historical views, that is, solutions raised in the past to the problems under discussion (what he calls “the opinions of earlier thinkers”); on the other hand, because his goal is the truth, he also introduces every answer first [book] of the Metaphysics” (i.e., α 3, 995a13–20 [in the Arabic translations book a precedes book Α, which is thus book II]). 47 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 15. 48 Ibid. 49 Gersonides knew Averroes’s Middle commentary on the Physics and wrote his own supercommentary on it (1321). In the Middle Commentary Averroes emphasized Aristotle’s use of the diaporematic method in Physics I–IV and described the different stages of its applications there. 50 See Averroes’s Long Commentary on Metaphysics III.1 (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 887 [IMHM 31656], fol. 17v), where he explains that Aristotle applied the diaporematic method to both Metaphysics and physics. 51 Other aspects of the diaporematic method, Gersonides’ theoretical statements about the method, and its other stages in the expositions of the Wars of the Lord are addressed in my “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur”.

22

the opinions that produce the aporias

that is logically and logico-philosophically possible, even if it has never been advanced in the prior history of thought. After surveying these two categories I will attempt to discover the relationship between them as indicated by Gersonides’ diaporematic inquiries. The Historical Opinions Following Aristotle in the Metaphysics, Gersonides almost always emphasizes that several different answers to the question he is dealing with have been given in the past; that is, there have been “diverse (mit alfot) opinions.”52 Once, in the discussion of the creation of the universe, he even explains why there are diverse historical opinions on this matter: Now it is obvious that this diversity is caused either by the diverse aspects of the nature of existents, on which they established their proof, or because the Torah constrained them, or for both reasons together.53

Like Aristotle, in the first stage of the diaporematic inquiry Gersonides usually (though not always) presents the opinions of those whom he considers to be authorities on the matter, such that there is great likelihood that every one of them is indeed the correct solution to the question at hand.54 The contradictions or differences among them create an aporia, that is, a theoretical difficulty and existential perplexity.55 The authorities whose opinions he presents fall into two groups: (1) the philosophers, meaning Aristotle and the Hellenistic commentators and Arab philosophers who followed him; (2) Jewish scholars, whom he refers to variously as “the great sages of our Torah,”56 “the sages of

52 Compare the Hebrew translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics: “We must first study the profound questions that we ought to mention concerning the knowledge required here, namely, those about which people have had different ideas” (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 887 [IMHM 31656] fol. 17v). 53 Wars VI.1.2, p. 294 / 3: 219. 54 Here he follows Aristotle’s Topics I.1 (100b21) and I.14 (105a35). See Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 933 [IMHM 30917], fols. 7v and 113v). 55 Gersonides places special emphasis on the existential perplexity in the preliminary remark to his commentary on Ecclesiastes, p. 15. 56 Wars III.1, p. 120 / 2:90.

the opinions that produce the aporias

23

our Torah,”57 “sages of the Torah,”58 “most of the followers of our Torah,”59 and “the outstanding scholars of our Torah.”60 For each topic the assortment of opinions presented depends on the matter at issue (whether it is philosophical or philosophicaltheological ) and the way in which Gersonides chooses to treat it. Three of the issues to which Gersonides applies the diaporematic method— the nature of the hylic or material intellect (I.1–5), the immortality of the intellect (I.8–14), and the generation of the animate substances (V.3.1–13)—are treated as purely philosophical inquiries to be considered in the context of Aristotelian philosophy; consequently the authorities whose views are cited are the Hellenistic commentators on Aristotle and the Arab Aristotelians. In the discussion of the nature of the material intellect Gersonides presents the views of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, Averroes, and “some of the moderns,” evidently meaning Christian thinkers. Here he refers to all of these under the general rubric “earlier thinkers.” With regard to the question of how animate substances are generated, he also offers the views of the philosophers who interpreted Aristotle on this matter—Themistius, Ibn Bajja, Avicenna, al-Farabi, and Averroes (the last-named advanced three different opinions in three different works). Gersonides sees the immortality of the intellect, too, as a purely philosophical rather than a theological issue. He knows that Aristotle did not really address this matter and that accordingly his works offer no answer to it.61 Accordingly, the question he asks is a philosophical one set in the context of Aristotelian philosophy and based on its postulates: Can the intellect be immortal? If so, how? He presents the opinions of the Aristotelian philosophers who addressed the

Wars III.2, p. 124 / 2:96. Wars III.1, p. 120 / 2:90. 59 Wars IV.1, p. 151 / 2:155. 60 Ibid. 61 He says this explicitly in VI.1.29: “What we find in the Philosopher (= Aristotle) concerning the immortality of the soul does not clearly explain whether or not it is possible. Indeed, what he said (in De Anima and in the Metaphysics) is that it is proper that this matter be investigated, but we do not find that he ever did so” (p. 416 / 3:408). The references are to De anima III.7 (431b19) and to Metaphysics XII.3 (1070a24). On the former, see Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima in the Translation of Moses Ibn Tibbon, ed. Alfred L. Ivry ( Jerusalem, 2003), p. 120; Averroes’s Middle Commentary of Aristotle’s De anima, ed. and trans. Alfred L. Ivry (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2002), p. 122; on the latter, see Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 887 (IMHM 31656), fol. 148v. 57 58

24

the opinions that produce the aporias

problem: Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and Averroes (whom he considers to share the same opinion on this matter), Avicenna, and al-Farabi.62 On the other hand, when he comes to the issues of God’s knowledge (Book III) and providence (Book IV), questions that are both theological and philosophical, his presentation of the historical views includes those of the Jewish sages. With regard to God’s knowledge he contrasts the view of “the philosophers,” by which he means “Aristotle and his followers,”63 with those of the “Torah sages” (or, alternatively, “the outstanding scholars of our Torah”),64 thereby emphasizing that these are major authorities. He explicitly cites Maimonides as the most prominent among them. Influenced by Maimonides’ discussion in Guide III.17, he allows more space for the opinions of the Jewish sages in his treatment of divine providence over particulars. Here he contrasts Aristotle’s view with two opinions advanced by Jewish sages: that of “most of the followers of our Torah” and that of the “outstanding scholars of our Torah.”65

He totally ignores Maimonides here. One could argue that Maimonides did not take a clear and unambiguous position on this issue in the Guide of the Perplexed; but Gersonides also passes over what Maimonides wrote in the introduction to Pereq eleq and especially his remarks in the Mishneh Torah (Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 4:8–9; Hilkhot Teshuvah 8:2–3), which coincide with the first view presented by Gersonides, that of Alexander, Themistius, and Averroes. Evidently he preferred to leave the discussion on the purely philosophical plane and leave out a sage whom he viewed as one of “the outstanding scholars of our Torah” rather than as a philosopher who solved problems without reference to theological issues. 63 Wars, p. 120 / 2:90. In his presentation of Aristotle’s opinion he also considers the commentators on Aristotle. He offers two views held by “his followers,” which are in fact two different commentaries on Metaphysics XII (and in practice also on book VII). These commentaries, which he expounds at length in Wars V.3.3, are in fact Averroes’s and his own commentaries on the passage. But the key aporia of the discussion here is not one raised by the commentaries on Aristotle or by Hellenistic and Arab Aristotelians; rather, it is produced by the confrontation between the opinions propounded by Aristotelian philosophy and by Jewish philosophy. See below in the main text, at n. 82. 64 Wars, p. 120 / 2:90. 65 Wars, p. 151 / 2:155. “The outstanding scholars of our Torah” no doubt alludes to Maimonides. At the end of the discussion, however, he includes himself among those who hold this view. We should recall that here the breakdown of the views about providence is purely formal (there is no individual providence; there is providence over each and every individual human being; there is providence but it relates only to some individuals), and the views grouped together may vary in their details. In the formal presentation of the third opinion (there is providence over some but not all individuals) Gersonides proceeds to advance his own solution, which can be seen as a development or commentary on Maimonides’ stand, as it fits into Gersonides’ 62

the opinions that produce the aporias

25

It is important to note that all of these Jewish sages—“the sages of our Torah,” “the sages of the Torah” who are “the outstanding scholars of our Torah.” whose opinions are cited in the discussion of Providence in Book III, as well as “most of the followers of our Torah” and “the outstanding scholars of our Torah,” mentioned in his treatment of God’s knowledge in Book IV—are depicted as faithful adherents to the principles of Aristotelian philosophy, even as they attempt to solve these problems in the light of the additional constraints imposed by Scripture. Because they accept the principles of Peripatetic philosophy, they can conduct a dialogue and dialectical disputation with the Hellenistic and Arab Aristotelians.66 As we have seen, in his discussion of the diaporematic method in the Wars of the Lord Gersonides presents historical views, the opinions of “earlier thinkers.” But he does not introduce all of the historical views known to him. Instead, Gersonides selects only those opinions he deems to merit consideration. He states this explicitly in Book III, in his discussion of God’s knowledge, and in V.3.1, in the discussion of the generation of the animate substances. In the former case Gersonides maintains that he is presenting “the main views on this topic among earlier thinkers that are worthy of discussion”;67 in the latter case, he says that he is offering “the views of earlier thinkers which should be examined in this investigation.”68 Gersonides does not advance his criteria for deeming opinions worthy or inclusion and says nothing about those he has omitted. On the other hand, in his discussion of providence (IV.1) Gersonides does enumerate the historical views he leaves out of the discussion: those of Epicurus, the Asharites, and the Mutazilites, surveyed

worldview. See also “The Solutions of the Aporias in Gersonides Wars of the Lord,” pp. 48–49, 53–55. 66 Hence the view of “most of the followers of the Torah” parallels the first view presented by Maimonides as part of the fifth theory about providence in Guide III.17: “our opinion, I mean the opinion of our Law . . . and [which] is believed by the multitude of our scholars” (Guide of the Perplexed, trans. S. Pines [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963], p. 469). Although this is the view that there is providence over all individuals, it should really be taken as Gersonides’ interpretation of that opinion. For Gersonides, “most of the followers of the Torah” also accept the principles of Aristotelian philosophy. 67 Wars III.1, p. 120 / 2:90. 68 Wars V.3.1, p. 220 / 3:81.

26

the opinions that produce the aporias

by Maimonides in his discussion of this question in Guide III.17.69 Here he makes it plain that their opinions are irrelevant to his readers: “We have not troubled ourselves to mention the view of Epicurus or the ravings of the Asharites and the Mutazilites, for these views are defective, as is obvious to our readers. Thus an examination of their views would be superfluous.”70 “Our readers” have, of course, been educated in Aristotelian philosophy and accept its principles, and Gersonides has already recommended, in the introduction to the Wars, that they study the mathematical sciences, physics, and metaphysics before reading his own work.71 Epicurus’ view, which denies providence of any sort in the sublunar world, is incompatible with Aristotle’s position (as Gersonides understands it, following Maimonides in Guide III.17) that there is providence over the species in the sublunar world. The views of the Asharites and the Mutazilites he dismisses as “ravings.” In so doing Gersonides is certainly alluding to Maimonides’ criticism of the Kalam in Guide I.71, namely, that the Kalam, unlike Aristotelian philosophy, does not proceed from postulates that “conform with what exists,”72 but constructs a physical theory to correspond to the beliefs it wishes to demonstrate. Gersonides accordingly excludes from his discussion the views of these two sects of Mutakallimun, because, unlike himself and his readers, they do not start from Aristotelian philosophy—the common denominator that makes the dialogue possible.73

69 This chapter is the foundation of Gersonides’ treatment of providence, which can be seen as a sort of rethinking of Maimonides’ position in the context of his own worldview. 70 Wars IV.1, p. 152 / 2:156. 71 Wars, Introduction, p. 3 / 1:92–93. Cf. I.12 (p. 85 / 1:219), where Gersonides expects readers to be versed in medicine, so that they will realize that complete knowledge of human anatomy is impossible. Here, too, he says that “this is evident to anyone who reads this book.” 72 Maimonides, Guide, p. 179. 73 He says this more clearly in his commentary on Job 8, under “The General Principle to be Learned from the Text” (ha-kelal ha- oleh min ha-devarim): “It is, however, evident that the opinions which belong to the Mutazilite and the Asharite sects are based on the reality of the existents according to the Mutakallimun, by which they established their opinions about the creation of the world, and these opinions should not be counted among the parts of the contradictory, because thought cannot arrive at these opinions at first glance and true philosophy ( iyyun) would reject them” (p. 11a / p. 57). Not only are these views incompatible with Aristotelian philosophy, which is the “true science,” they are never entertained by human beings in a prephilosophical situation, “at first glance”: that is, these views are incompatible with common sense. Otherwise, it would be appropriate to include them in the dialectic discussion, since they

the opinions that produce the aporias

27

While omitting certain historical views from his aporia, in his discussion of providence in Book IV Gersonides incorporates opinions that he derives exegetically from the Bible: the views of providence held by Job’s friends. It is quite likely that in fact he saw these as historical opinions. In the introduction to his commentary on Job, which seems to have been composed before Wars IV,74 he accepts the view that the book of Job is a historical account and not an allegory.75 In his commentary on Job 2 he writes: “I think that these friends were renowned sages at the time, who studied philosophy with him”76—that is, the book presents views of those whom Aristotle defined as authorities who can be drawn on for a dialectic discussion—famous sages. Because he believes the book of Job is a historical account, in the Wars Gersonides can cite the views of Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zofar as those of historical authorities and present them as subcategories of the second view about providence, not only in the context of philosophical exegesis of the Bible, as in his commentary on Job, but also as part of a philosophical inquiry conducted by the diaporematic method.77 In this way we find him applying philosophical exegesis of the Bible in a context that is philosophical rather than exegetical.78 would be views held by all human beings or most human beings, who are the authorities with whose opinions the dialectic discussion agrees, as per Topics I.1 (100b21). 74 See Touati, La pensée philosophique, pp. 50–51. 75 In the introduction to the commentary on Job he maintains that the exegetical assertion that the book recounts a diaporematic debate about providence is independent of a verdict as to whether it is a literary fiction or a true story. He comes down on the side of the view that it is a historical account for reasons that have nothing to do with the argument that its structure is based on the diaporematic method. 76 Comm. on Job, p. 3a / p. 14. 77 Even though, according to his commentary on Job 7, under “The General Principle to be Learned from the Text” (p. 10a/ p. 49), Job’s friends were not “men of our Torah.” The justification for citing them as representatives of the subcategory of “most of the followers of our Torah” is apparently to be found in Wars IV.2, where, after presenting the friends views he adds, “It is clear that many statements of our rabbis agree with one or another of these opinions, as they are understood. But this is not the place to mention all these statements, lest it make our discussion longer than it should be” (p. 155 / 2:161–162). Hence, although he is aware that Job’s friends were not Jewish sages, it can be shown that Jewish sages held these same views, so that the friends’ opinions can be presented as a subcategory of those of “most of the followers of our Torah.” 78 Like Maimonides before him, he too ascribes Aristotle’s opinion to Job. In practice, he does not need Job’s opinion in the philosophical exposition in the Wars, because he learned Aristotle’s view from philosophical texts. But his inclusion of the friends’ opinions in the philosophical discussion requires that he also address Job’s position and identify it with Aristotle’s, thereby filling in the exegetical picture of the book of Job.

28

the opinions that produce the aporias

The Logically and Philosophically Possible Answers to the Problem Now we turn to Gersonides’ second principle for the collection of the opinions that produce the aporia—answers that are logically and philosophically possible. In the introduction to the Wars, when he first presents the diaporematic method he will employ in it, Gersonides says nothing about assembling the views of his predecessors, i.e., the historical opinions about the issue in question, but only “all possible opinions on a given issue of the various problems I shall discuss,”79 which could mean all logically tenable answers to the question, or all answers that can be advanced within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy and in keeping with its principles, or all answers that are compatible with his own philosophy or a combination of the logical and philosophical options. The opinions that Gersonides offers as possible solutions to a given problem may be the classical answers that produce an aporia according to Aristotle’s definition in Topics VI.6 (145b17): two contradictory views, thesis and antithesis—or, as Hamelin puts it in his definition of Aristotle’s dialectic, “yes or no” answers.80 Such an aporia constitutes the foundation of the discussion of God’s knowledge in Wars III. Here Gersonides begins by asking “whether or not God knows particular, contingent things in the sublunar world,”81 which he answers by offering two historical views, thesis and antithesis: no, God has no knowledge of contingent particulars—Aristotle’s view; and yes, God does have knowledge of contingent particulars—the opinion maintained by the “sages of the Torah.” But he develops this aporia by subdividing Aristotle’s opinion to construct a more complex system of theses and antitheses.82 The implicit question addressed by these two possible readings of Aristotle is whether, according to him, God has any form of knowledge of sublunar particulars. The two answers are again in the classical form of the dialectic: no, “God (may He be Blessed) has no knowledge of these things in the sublunar world, either universals or particulars”;83 yes, “God (may He be Blessed) knows the things in the sublunar world with respect to their general natures, i.e., their essences, but not insofar as they are particulars, i.e., contingents.”84 79 80 81 82 83 84

Wars, Introduction, p. 6 / 1:97. Hamelin, “La dialectique et la science,” p. 226. Wars III.1, p. 120 / 2:89. See above, n. 63. War III.1, p. 120 / 2:90. Ibid.

the opinions that produce the aporias

29

We find a more complex structure of theses and antitheses in his discussion of the creation of the universe in VI.1. Although in Chapter 2 Gersonides does not develop the logical division of the possible answers to the same extent, in Chapter 1 he argues that they are “each part of the contradictory”;85 that is, they are all the possible answers to this question. We can indeed see that the answers he presents to these questions constitute a series of contradictory theses and antitheses, yes and no answers. We can diagram the possible answers to the question of whether or not the world was created, as found in VI.1.2,86 as follows:

A. The implicit question: The answers:

Was the world created? 1. Yes, the world was created

Historical attribution:

2. No, the world is eternal Aristotle and his followers

B. The postulate

1a. The world was created

The implicit question:

Was the world created many times or only once?

The answers:

1a1. “The Universe was created and destroyed infinite times.”

Historical attribution:

The advocates of this opinion are not identified.

Postulate:

“The universe was created only once.”

The implicit question:

Was the world created from something or from nothing?

The answers:

1.a.2.1 “The universe was 1.a.2.2 “The universe created from something.” was created from absolutely nothing.”

1a2. “The universe was created only once.”

Wars, p. 293 / 3:217. Although, strictly speaking, a “contradictory” in logic refers to two mutually exclusive possibilities, Gersonides sometimes employs the Hebrew soter when there are more than two possibilities (e.g., in I.2, the opinions about the material intellect; IV.1, the opinions about God’s providence; and V.2.10, about the agent of miracles). (Feldman renders elqei ha-soter as “each of the rival theories.”) 86 Wars, p. 294 / 3:219. 85

30

the opinions that produce the aporias

Historical attribution:

“Plato and his more recent followers”

“The first Mutakallimun, such as John the Grammarian,”87 after them the [other] Mutakallimun, and after them Maimonides “and many of the sages of our Torah” also “inclined towards this view.”88

In his discussion of providence Gersonides advances not only a thesis and antithesis, but a third possibility as well. This trio, he says, “exhaust[s] the possible alternatives on this question and constitutes “the parts of the contradictory.”89 Because, for him, the “parts of the contradictory” comprise not just the contrary views, but the subcontraries as well, there are three possible answers to the question of whether there is individual providence in the sublunar world, and these theories, according to Gersonides, “exhaust the parts of the contradictory [that make up] this problem.”90 These are the two contraries—(1) there is no individual providence whatsoever (Aristotle’s view)—a negative proposition; (2) there is individual providence (the opinion of “most of the followers of our Torah”)—a positive proposition; and a view that combines the two sub-contraries: (3) there is providence over some individuals but not over others (the opinion of “the outstanding scholars of our Torah”)—a combination of a partial positive and a partial negative proposition (A;E;O+I).91 When he presents these three opinions about providence, which he says are “the parts of the contradictory,” Gersonides sees himself as following Aristotle rather than as inventing something new. In his introduction to the commentary on Job he explicitly attributes this mode of exposition of the opinions that constitute the aporia to Aris-

87 I.e., John Philoponus. Gersonides reports that his source for Philoponus’ views was Averroes’s commentary on the Metaphysics. 88 Wars, p. 294 / 3:219. 89 Ibid., IV.1, pp. 151–52; 2:155, 154. In his commentary on Job he uses this expression as well as “all the parts of the contradictory.” See the introduction to the commentary on Job and the commentary on Job 11, under “The General Principle to be Learned from the Text” (p. 14b / p. 82). 90 Wars IV.3, p. 159 / 2:166. 91 The two subcontraries can be combined into a single opinion because they can be true at one and the same time.

the opinions that produce the aporias

31

totle: “the Philosopher [Aristotle] has already mentioned many problems, some of them in natural science [ physics] and some of them in divine science [metaphysics], where the opinions of the earlier thinkers are found to coincide [in number] with the number of parts that this argument may yield.”92 It is clear from this that he does not believe that Aristotle restricted his discussion to contraries—thesis and antithesis only; instead, he advanced all the possible answers to a given question. The answers proposed by Gersonides can also be those that are possible in the context of his own philosophy and not merely as a matter of pure logic. In the discussion of the identity of the agent of miracles (VI.2.10) he advances three possible answers to the question, which are compatible with his world view and are based on the assumption, which he has already proved, that the agent of miracles must know the laws of the sublunar world. Consequently that there are three possible agent of miracles: God, the Active Intellect, and the prophet.93 Here too he says that “these are the various arguments on behalf of each part of the contradictory in this inquiry,”94 (where “the parts of the contradictory” designate the different possible answers to the question within his philosophy, and not the purely logical relations among them). Even when he does introduce the logically possible answers to a question, they are subordinated to the philosophically tenable answers. For Gersonides the totality of the logical possibilities is the totality of the logical possibilities that are compatible with the principles of Aristotelian philosophy and with his own philosophy. As we have seen, for example, Epicurus’ opinion about providence—there is no providence whatsoever in the sublunar world, which is the antithesis of all the other views that maintain that there is providence in the sublunar world, and hence is a logical possibility and not merely a historical opinion—is excluded from consideration because Gersonides begins his discussion of this question from the assumption (which, as noted, he understands to be Aristotle’s) that there is providence over species in the sublunar world. In Wars IV he is inquiring only 92 Introduction to the Comm. on Job, n.p. /p. 6 (the introduction is not found in the {Am {Olam edition of Miqra’ot gedolot, but only in the [unpaginated] Pardes [ New York] edition). As we have seen, in Wars IV.2 he uses the expression “the number of parts that this division may yield” as an alternative for “the parts of the contradictory.” 93 See below for the proof of the argument that only these three are possible. 94 Wars, p. 447 / 3:478.

32

the opinions that produce the aporias

whether providence in the sublunar world extends to particulars as well. Epicurus’ argument, despite being a logically possible answer to the question of providence, is not relevant in this context. On the other hand, the logical possibilities latent in the views of the Asharites and the Mutazilites, that there is providence over all particulars as such, which are also based on non-Aristotelian principles and are also rejected out of hand, are not excluded from the logical classification, because this possibility is also represented by a different historical view, which he does present—that of “most of the followers of our Torah.” As I have already noted, this group accepts the principle of Aristotelian philosophy; consequently their opinion can be part of Gersonides’ logical classification. The Relationship between the Two Principles for Assembling the Opinions that Produce the Aporia What is the relationship between presenting the aporia as stemming from the existence of different historical opinions about a given matter and presenting it as stemming from the problem itself, and thus as a set of logically and logico-philosophically possible answers to it? In general Gersonides expounds the historical views. As we have seen, however, in the case of the agent of miracles (VI.2.10) he does not base the aporia on the historical views but only on the answers that are compatible with his own philosophy.95 Gersonides follows Aristotle even when he presents opinions that were never raised in the past. As we have seen, in Metaphysics III.1 (995a25–26) Aristotle states that he will use the diaporematic method to present not only historical opinions but also those that were overlooked by his predecessors. We must understand that here Aristotle is saying that when a scholar employing the diaporematic method has no historical opinions to draw on, he 95 Nevertheless, later (p. 447 / 3:477) he argues that one of the elements of the anthropological theory of miracles, which he offers as a third possible version of the idea that the prophet effects a miracle when he isolates his intellect from the other forces of the soul and perceives a large part of “the law of the existents,” was already held by Abraham Ibn Ezra. Ibn Ezra’s view is not identical with the third opinion about the agent of miracles, which Gersonides develops independently from elements of the anthropological theory of miracles maintained by Avicenna and Ibn Ezra and which has no precedent in the history of philosophy. For Gersonides’ version of the anthropological theory of miracles, see Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Anthropological Theory of Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature 2 (1984), pp. 255–259.

the opinions that produce the aporias

33

must himself look for those that produce the aporia, since his real goal is not to test historical opinions but to solve the philosophical problem that those opinions sought to answer. In other words, what engages him is the philosophical problem and its corollaries, and not the history of philosophical thought.96 In all of the other discussions of the diaporematic method Gersonides begins with the historical attempts to answer the question. This makes it seem that the discussion to follow will be historical and philosophical, reviewing answers already advanced in the past to the questions he is discussing, and an attempt to offer a new solution to problems raised by thinkers of the past. But a closer look shows that even when Gersonides does not say so explicitly there is almost always a correspondence between the historical views he lists and the logically and philosophically possible answers to the question at hand.97 When he works out a correspondence between the historical answers and the logical and logico-philosophical answers Gersonides is consciously following Aristotle’s lead. This is evident from the introduction to his commentary on Job. The central methodological argument of that commentary is that the book was written in accordance with the diaporematic method. In the introduction he draws on the passage in B Bava Batra 15a and Maimonides’ remarks on the subject to consider whether the story of Job is fact or fiction (mashal ). His answer takes it for granted that the talmudic sages recognized that the book was structured according to the diaporematic method: those sages who 96 On this see Aubenque, “Sur la notion aristotélicienne,” p. 9. Aubenque argues that if we scrutinize the diaporematic passages in Aristotle we will discover that many of them are based on prior opinions, while others deal with problems that Aristotle conjured up himself and raised for the first time. 97 See above, the discussion about God’s knowledge and the creation of the world, and below, the discussions of providence, the agent of miracles, and the immortality of the intellect. To this we can add that the discussion of the generation of the animate substances, which is distinctly historical and exegetical in nature, is based on all of the answers that are philosophically possible within the framework of Aristotelianism. The scheme that emerges from the presentation of these views is the question, is that which generates the animate substances a separate intellect? To which the answers are: (1) yes, it is the Active Intellect; (2) no, it is the seed created by the seed-bearer (ba al ha-zera ) and by the heavenly bodies (Averroes’s opinion in his commentary on Metaphysics 7). The affirmative answer is then broken down further into two logical possibilities: (1a) the Active Intellect itself (the opinion held by Ibn Bajja, Avicenna, al-Farabi in his On the Intellect, and Averroes in his Epitome of De anima); (1b) the intellect operates through an intermediary—by means of the powers it gives to seeds (the opinion of Themistius and of Averroes in his commentary on the Book of Animals [= De animalibus].

34

the opinions that produce the aporias

believed that Job was fiction98 assumed that it was composed according to that method and deemed it unlikely that all the logically possible answers to the problem would be advanced in a single historical encounter. A real-life discussion that applies the diaporematic method so perfectly is implausible.99 Because the book of Job does exhaust the logical answers to the matter at hand, these sages thought it was a literary fiction whose author composed a diaporematic exposition of the question of providence, and not a historical account. Gersonides rejects this argument; there is no reason why the existing historical views on some topic should not exhaust all of the logical answers to it. He relies on the Aristotelian precedent: “the Philosopher [Aristotle] has already mentioned many problems, some of them in natural science [ physics] and some of them in divine science [metaphysics], where the opinions of the earlier thinkers are found to coincide [in number] with the number of parts that this argument may yield.”100 It follows that the fact that Job’s friends advance all of the logically possible answers does not strengthen the argument that the story is a fiction and that its author carefully devised the perfect dialectic process.101 Here Gersonides shows his awareness that in Aristotle’s discussions using the dialectical method in the Physics and Metaphysics, too, there is an overlap between the historical arguments and the logical answers to the questions raised. Even though Gersonides’ point of departure is almost always the historical opinions on a given subject, he prefers the logical or philosophical division of possible answers to the question. When he matches the historical opinions with the possible answers to a certain problem it is clear that he bases the former on the latter. Here Gersonides is following Aristotle himself, for whom, as Hamelin puts it “for Aristotle, the historian is subject to the dialectician: he expounds his

“A certain Rabbi was sitting before R. Samuel b. Nahmani and in the course of his expositions remarked, ‘Job never was and never existed, but is only a typical figure’ ” (B Bava Batra 15a). 99 “Because he deems it unlikely that people who just happen to come together and participate in a discussion should express all the possible opinions on the subject.” 100 Introduction to the Comm. on Job, n.p / p. 6. 101 Here Gersonides answers the question of how it is possible for historical views to exhaust all the logical answers to a given question, but not really the argument that it is improbable for all of these arguments to be advanced in a single historical encounter. The various prior views presented by Aristotle were not advanced all in the same time and place; it was Aristotle who collected and juxtaposed them as possible answers to the questions he raised. 98

the opinions that produce the aporias

35

predecessors’ opinions only to extract from them the aporias he needs in order to lay the ground for his own solutions.”102 Gersonides gives primacy to the logical and logico-philosophical answers because he can arrive at the correct answer to the problem at hand only if he considers all of these possibilities. If he does not present all possible answers he faces the risk that the one omitted is the correct opinion; this means that he would not arrive at the indubitable truth that is the goal of his inquiry in the Wars of the Lord. Consequently, when he discusses particular providence he is at pains to note the correspondence between the historical opinions on this point and the logically possible answers: “After having listed the views of the earlier thinkers on this question, which, as we have already explained, are the parts of the contradictory that it produces, let us examine the arguments for each of them.”103 What is more, in IV.1 he does not merely point out the correspondence between the historical opinions on individual providence and the logically possible answers; he also emphasizes that the historical opinions do in fact exhaust the possible answers: It is evident that there cannot be a fourth view, for all the theories just mentioned exhaust the number of parts that this argument may yield in this question. The following division is necessary: divine providence does not apply to individual human beings; it extends over every individual human being; or it extends over some of them but not others.104

For the same reason, in his discussion of the agent of miracles in VI.2.10 Gersonides goes to some length to demonstrate that his proposed identifications of the agent of miracles—God, the Active Intellect, and the Hamelin, “La dialectique et la science,” p. 233. Wars IV.2, p. 152 / 2:157. 104 Ibid., p. 151 / 2:155. It is definitely possible that in his presentation Gersonides was influenced by Averroes. In the Epitome of De anima, Averroes’s exposition of the possible answers concerning the disposition for intellection is quite similar to what we find here: “Now since it (i.e. the substratum of the disposition) is something in actu, it must be either a body, a soul or an intellect; because it will become clear later that there is no fourth (type of existence)” (p. 121) [quoted from J. S. Mashbaum, “Chapters 9–12 of Gersonides’ Supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the De Anima; The Internal Senses,” Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University, 1981]. Gersonides was quite familiar with this text: in 1323 he wrote a commentary on it; his discussion of the disposition to intellection (I.5) is clearly influenced by Averroes’s exposition. See my “Gersonides’ Methods of Inquiry in the Discussion on the Material Intellect in the Wars of the Lord,” in M. C. Pacheco, J. F. Meirinhos, eds., Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in the Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto e imaginaçao na Filosofia Medieval (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), pp. 641–651. 102 103

36

the opinions that produce the aporias

prophet—are the only ones possible within his philosophy; hence only they can stand as the starting point of the search conducted by the diaporematic method. He does this by offering two other possible identities that meet the criterion he has set—namely, the requirement that the agent of miracles know the natural law that prevails in the sublunar worlds: the agent of miracles may be the separate intellects, or some other intellect that is neither the separate intellects nor the Active Intellect. But he rejects both possibilities.105 Similarly, with regard to second opinion about providence, that held by “most of the followers of our Torah,” that “divine providence extends to each individual human being qua individual,” he explicitly presents its subcategories, which he attributes to Eliphaz, Zofar, and Bildad, Job’s friends (and which, as noted, he most likely considered to be historical ), as the totality of the logico-philosophical possibilities. “Know that these three opinions, into which the second opinion is divided, represent all of the possible alternatives [lit. parts] that can be entertained at the outset by those who hold this [second] opinion.”106 He goes on to explain that these constitute the only possible answers to the problem of theodicy, that is, why the righteous suffer and the wicked prosper. He tacitly bases the three logical possibilities embodied by the friends’ disquisitions on paired views. First he implicitly presents a classical aporia: two contradictory answers, yes and no, to the question of whether everything that happens to individuals in the sublunar world is a matter of divine providence. The first answer is “no”: not everything that happens to an individual is the result of divine providence. Sometimes bad things do happen to good people, or good things to bad people, for some unknown cause, and not as

105 He rejects the possibility that the separate intellects can be the agent of miracles because in his cosmology separate intellects have only incomplete knowledge of the laws of the sublunar world: every separate intellect that moves a sphere knows only those natural laws that pertain to that sphere. He rejects the possibility that some other intellect could be the agent of miracles on the basis of his doctrine that it is the Active Intellect that directs the lower world. Attributing miracles to another intellect would mean that it effects actions that supplement or correct the providence of the Active Intellect in the lower world. To do this, it would have to know the laws of nature as found in the Active Intellect or share the full providential knowledge of the Active Intellect. Because Gersonides accepts the principle that knowledge is a cause of action it would then be this other intellect, rather than the Active Intellect, that affects the sublunar world. But this is not the case, for he has already shown elsewhere in the Wars (I.6; II.3; IV.5) that it is the Active Intellect that directs the sublunar world. 106 Wars IV.2, p. 156 / 2:162.

the opinions that produce the aporias

37

a result of divine providence (this is the view maintained by Eliphaz). The second answer is “yes”: everything that happens is the result of divine providence. When we think we see bad things happening to good people we are the victims of a misapprehension. This negative answer is again subdivided into the two logical possibilities for misperceiving a concrete instance as a case of the righteous suffering and the wicket prospering. These possibilities are based on the syntax of the proposition: one can mistakenly identify the subject—that is, a person we believe to be righteous or wicked is not really so (Zofar’s view); or one can mistakenly identify the predicate—what we judge to be suffering and prosperity are not truly so (Bildad’s view). In either case we can argue that what we are witnessing is not a case of the righteous suffering or the wicked prospering. Our judgment about these instances is mistaken, a misperception of the true state of affairs. The problem does not exist on the ontological level, but only on that of human knowledge and judgment. Because Gersonides deems the categorization of opinions according to the logically possible answers to be more important, he sometimes organizes the historical views so that they can be made to correspond with that arrangement and groups several historical views in a single group. This is conspicuous in his discussion of the immortality of the intellect. In Wars I.8 Gersonides enumerates the historical views on this question. Although he does not argue explicitly that there is a correspondence between them and the answers that are logically possible within the framework of Aristotelianism, it is easy to demonstrate that his presentation of the opinions is based on a classification into the logically and logico-philosophically possible answers. The first implicit question here is whether “it is possible for the material intellect to become immortal.”107 The answers are: (1) yes, it is; (2) no, it is not. The affirmative answer is in turn divided into two subcategories that implicitly answer the question—if the intellect is immortal, what kind of apprehension makes it such? Aristotelian philosophy allows two possible answers to this question: the intellect may survive by apprehension of the separate intellects; or it may survive by apprehension of the intelligibles of the sensible objects in the sublunar world. Consequently here Gersonides offers three opinions about the immortality of the intellect, which he matches with the corresponding

107

Wars, p. 51 / 1:170.

38

the opinions that produce the aporias

historical views. Because of the importance he attaches to the logical division, he groups the views of Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius, and Averroes as a single opinion; as he understands them, they all “maintain that the material intellect is capable of immortality and eternal existence when it reaches that level of perfection where the intelligibles that is apprehends are themselves intellects.”108 The other two opinions are those of Avicenna, who believes that the immortal intellect is the intellect that apprehends the intelligibles of the sublunar world, and of al-Farabi in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, namely, that the intellect is not immortal.109 Gersonides’ preference for a classification of the opinions by the possible logical and logico-philosophical answers to the question at hand is especially prominent in his discussion of the essence of the material intellect. In Wars I.1 he presents the various opinions about this topic as four historical views: (1) that of Alexander of Aphrodisias, according to which the material intellect is a disposition “in a subject, i.e. in the soul in its entirety or in one of its parts, like the imaginative soul or the phantasms that are present in it”110—i.e., pure potentiality; (2) the view of Themistius and his followers, that the material intellect is “a separable intellect that is neither generated nor corruptible” (ibid.)— i.e., is eternal; (3) the opinion of Averroes in his Middle Commentary on De anima, that the material intellect is on the one hand a separate intellect, that is, the Active Intellect, but on the other hand, when embodied in a human being, is a disposition for the apprehension of the intelligibles that are derived from sensible objects; (4) the view of “the more recent thinkers in our time,” according to which the material intellect is a separate intellect, but one that is generated “not from something else,”111 i.e., ex nihilo. At the end of I.2 he explains that he

Ibid. Nevertheless, the case of al-Farabi’s view reveals a certain preference for the historical presentation. Gersonides presents in sequence two different views held by alFarabi: one found in his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, according to which it is quite impossible for the intellect to be immortal; and that propounded in his Letter Concerning the Intellect, according to which the intellect is immortal insofar as it apprehends “things that are themselves intellect” (p. 52 / 1:171). The latter opinion is in essence identical with the first opinion about the immortality of the intellect presented at the start of the chapter, where Gersonides offers a logical classification of the historical views on this question. Following the logical scheme, it should have been mentioned there; but Gersonides defers it until he introduces al-Farabi’s other opinion. 110 Wars, p. 13 / 1:110. 111 Ibid. 108 109

the opinions that produce the aporias

39

has brought arguments to support the various opinions, because the only way to judge which is correct is to “try to establish each of the parts of the contradictory as far as possible.”112 From this we may infer that he considers these historical opinions to constitute all of the logical possibilities for the essence of the material intellect in the context of Aristotelian philosophy. In I.4, after rejecting the second, third, and fourth opinions about the essence of the material intellect—that is, all of those that would make it a substance, he summarizes his discussion of them. Whereas in I.1 he presents the opinions about the essence of the material intellect as historical views, here he prefers to present them by their logical categorization. He maintains that the three opinions he has rejected “in some way” represent all of the logical possibilities of the argument that the subject of the disposition to intellection is a separate intellect;113 or, as he puts it, they “correspond to the number of possible divisions of the hypothesis that the subject of this disposition is a separate and selfsubsistent intellect.”114 In the way Gersonides inserts all of the possible theses as to the nature of the material intellect into the classical structure of the Aristotelian aporia, thesis and antithesis, or a question with yes and no answers only. Here the implicit question is whether the material intellect is a disposition in a separate intellect. The answers are: yes, the material intellect is a disposition in a separate intellect (the opinions of Themistius, Averroes, and “the more recent thinkers in our time”); no, the material intellect is not a disposition in a separate intellect (Alexander). If he is correct that the historical views enumerated truly represent all of the logically possible ways in which the subject of a disposition to intellection may be a separate intellect, now that he has refuted them one by one in his discussion in the earlier chapters only one historical view remains unchallenged—Alexander’s, which is their antithesis: and it is necessarily the true opinion. Accordingly Gersonides investigates whether these three historical views really do exhaust all of the logical possibilities for a “subject that is a separate intellect.” To this end he breaks down the shared view into subcategories, along two different axes: (1) the subject is related

Wars, p. 18 / 1:119. Sometimes Gersonides presents these opinions as if they asserted that the material intellect is a separate intellect; sometimes, that it is a disposition in a separate intellect. 114 Wars, p. 34 / 1:142. 112 113

40

the opinions that produce the aporias

to the disposition essentially or the subject is related to the disposition accidentally. Is the subject related to the disposition essentially, that is, is it an essential subject that is joined to a person at birth and carries his disposition to intellection? Or is it an accidental subject, that is, a separate object with an independent existence outside the soul, which when joined with a human being—and only then—supports the disposition to intellection? (2) Generated or not generated: is the subject not generated, i.e., eternal, or is it generated, i.e., created in time? Gersonides assigns the historical views he has presented along each of the two axes to produce the following schemata: Classification of the views by essence and accident 1. The subject of the material intellect is a separate and self-subsistent intellect. The logical division:

Related to the disposition essentially

Related to the disposition accidentally

Historical attribution:

Themistius and some of “the more recent thinkers”

Averroes

Classification of the views by generated and not generated 2. The subject of the material intellect is a separate and self-subsistent intellect Logical classification:

Not generated

Generated

Historical attribution:

Themistius and Averroes

Some of “the more recent thinkers”

Each mode of classification produces two groups of historical opinions. In the first classification, the views of Themistius and “the more recent thinkers,” which have in common the assertion that the subject of the material intellect has an essential relationship to the disposition to intellection, form one group, as against Averroes’s opinion that the relationship is accidental, which constitutes its own category. In the second mode, the views of Themistius and Averroes, which agree that the subject of the intellectual disposition is a separate object that is not generated, form one group, opposed to the view of “the more recent thinkers,” that the separate object that is the subject of the intellectual disposition is generated. We may infer that the historical views exhaust all of the logical possibilities of Aristotelian philosophy with regard to the thesis that the “subject of the material intellect is a separate and self-subsistent intellect” no matter how we subdivide it. Because all of them were refuted previously, as part of the diaporia, the inexorable

the opinions that produce the aporias

41

conclusion is that the subject of the disposition, that is, the subject of the material intellect, is not a self-subsistent separate intellect. But here Gersonides adds another stage to his argument. He notes that the historical opinions that the subject of the human intellect is a self-subsistent separate intellect do not in fact exhaust all of the logico-philosophical possibilities. Each mode of classification allows for another option—one that has no historical parallel. For we could also posit that a separate intellect that is not the Active Intellect is the subject for a disposition to intellection. With this step, as in his discussion of the agent of miracles, Gersonides continues to follow Aristotle’s stance in Metaphysics III.1 (995a25– 26). As we have seen, there Aristotle notes that an aporia may include opinions bearing on the problem at hand even though they have never been raised in the past, opinions that the philosopher discovers by means of his diaporematic inquiry. When Gersonides re-examines the question from the logicophilosophical perspective and tries to divide the thesis that “the subject of the material intellect is a separate and self-subsistent intellect” into subcategories, based on the previous parameters, he makes a discovery: (a) When the division is based on how the subject is related to the disposition, essentially or accidentally, the accidental category can be further subdivided. Not only can the Active Intellect accidentally become human intellect (the view of Averroes); some other intellect could also play this role.115 In this way we obtain the following breakdown: 3. The subject of the material intellect is a separate and self-subsistent intellect. Classification Related to the parameter: disposition essentially

Related to the disposition accidentally

The subject:

the Active Intellect Some other intellect

Historical attribution:

Themistius and some of “the more recent thinkers”

Averroes

No historical precedent

115 To judge by what comes next (pp. 34–35 / 1:143), here he seems to be taking into account the possibility of an intellect located above the Active Intellect, rather than that suggested by Averroes in his Long Commentary on De anima (a commentary that Gersonides did not know), namely, that there is a separate intellect below the Active Intellect, which, when joined to a human being, becomes the material intellect, the disposition to intellection. For Averroes’s opinion in his Long Commentary on De anima, see H. A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect (New York and Oxford, 1992), pp. 292, 295.

42

the opinions that produce the aporias

(b) There is another possible categorization, based on whether or not the subject is generated, that can be applied to an intellect whose subject is related to the disposition accidentally. This admits an intellect that is generated and is not eternal, like the Active Intellect in Averroes’s doctrine. This division can be linked to the previous one, creating the following picture: 4a. The subject of the material intellect is a separate and self-subsistent intellect. First logical categorization:

Related to the disposition essentially

Related to the disposition accidentally

Second logical categorization:

Not generated

Generated

Not generated

Generated

Historical attribution:

Themistius

Some of “the more recent thinkers”

Averroes

No historical precedent116

Because a generated intellect cannot be the Active Intellect, the actual classification is as follows: 4b. The subject of the material intellect is a separate and self-subsistent intellect. First logical categorization:

Related to the disposition essentially

The subject:

Related to the disposition accidentally The Active Intellect

Some other intellect

Second logical categorization:

Not generated

generated

Not generated

Generated

Historical attribution:

Themistius

Some of “the more recent thinkers”

Averroes

No historical precedent117

116 Touati (La pensée philosophique, p. 410) writes that the additional option here is that an eternal intellect might be generated in us contingently. But this is not so. Gersonides explicitly notes that “it could be suggested that this disposition has an intellect for its subject in an accidental sense but that it is generated” (p. 34 / 1: 142). 117 If this interpretation is correct, Gersonides left out another possible classification. Not only might “some other intellect” be generated, as he notes; it could be “some other intellect” that is not generated, meaning eternal. Gersonides was not aware of any historical precedents for either interpretation (some other eternal intellect is the additional intellect mentioned by Averroes in his Long Commentary on De anima, which, as already noted, Gersonides did not know. See above, n. 115.

the opinions that produce the aporias

43

Because Gersonides prioritizes the logical classification over the historical one, for his proof to be complete and lead him to the truth by means of the diaporematic method he must also take into account the possibility that has no historical precedent. Consequently, after this logical discussion he advances another argument, not included in his earlier presentation of the historical opinions about the nature of the material intellect; this new argument refutes the general thesis that the subject of the human intellect is a self-subsistent separate intellect. It refutes both the historical opinions as well as the additional possibility advanced here, which was not refuted in the earlier exposition, which focused on the historical opinions and not on the philosophical argument itself. The only possibility that remains unchallenged is that the material intellect is not a disposition in a separate substance, which, in his presentation of the historical opinions he ascribed to Alexander of Aphrodisias. Confounding our expectations, Gersonides does not identify the remaining possibility with the historical opinion he did not reject, that of Alexander, but proceeds to discuss the remaining possibility, namely, that the subject of the material intellect is not a separate intellect, asking, again, about the identity of the subject of the disposition to intellection. This he resolves with an answer that is indeed very close to Alexander’s, though not identical to it.118 Thus the first stage of the diaporematic method as constructed by Gersonides involves building the foundation for its use as a scientific method. By establishing the correspondence between the answers offered by Aristotelian philosophy and Jewish theology to the philosophical and theological-philosophical problems he addresses in the Wars of the Lord and all of the logically possible answers to each of the problems he deals with, he ensures that the second and third stages of his diaporematic inquiry into these opinions will resolve problems that had not been solved before his time and lead him to the “indubitable truth.”

118 On this point see my “Gersonides’ Methods of Inquiry in the Discussion on the Material Intellect in the Wars of the Lord.”

THE SOLUTIONS OF THE APORIAS IN THE WARS OF THE LORD * Gersonides’ Wars of the Lord is designed as a set of “questions.” Rather than expounding a complete and carefully structured philosophical system, he focuses on selected philosophical and scientific issues about which his predecessors (so he avers) failed to find the “truth.” The fact that earlier philosophers and scientists had offered different and even contradictory answers to these questions means that in each of them a scholar of his own era faces an aporia; in the resulting confusion he cannot know the “truth.” Gersonides’ goal, stated clearly in the introduction to his book, is to resolve these aporias by means of methods that satisfy the criteria of scientific inquiry—or, as he puts it, methods such that “the truth in these matters will be achieved so that no doubt remains (be-xofen she lox yishaxer bo safeq).”1 At the end of the introduction to the Wars he asserts that he has achieved this goal: “. . . what is found in [this book], is the result of a thorough investigation, so that no doubt remains [on any of the topics] included in this book.”2 In the introduction, Gersonides presents six philosophical and philosophical-theological questions and two theological questions that he will address. The architecture of the Wars is based on this framework of six philosophical and philosophical-theological questions: each of its six parts deals with one of them.3 Gersonides, who wrote for reader-students, employs a classic didactic method. Rather than provide authoritative answers to these questions, he engages in a step-by-step investigation that leads his readers to

* The present chapter is a revised and expanded version of “The Solutions of the Aporias in Gersonides Wars of the Lord,” Da{at, 50–52 (2003), pp. 499–514 [Hebrew], which was itself an expansion of “The Solutions of the Aporias in Gersonides’ Wars of the Lord,” 4th EAJS/ECUTJC Colloquium: Issues in Jewish Philosophy, Yarnton Manor, Oxford, 23–25 July, 2001, and of the abridged French version thereof, published as part of “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur,” in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, ed. C. Sirat, S. Klein-Braslavy, and O. Weijers (Paris, 2003), pp. 121–128. 1 Wars, p. 6 / 1:97. 2 Ibid., p. 10 / 1:104. 3 He does not devote separate parts to the theological questions. Instead, he considers them as quasi-appendices at the end of the second part of Book V (chapters 9–14).

46

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

the solution presented at its conclusion. In this way Gersonides makes them active participants in the inquiry and persuades them that his answers are correct. The method employed in his investigation of the main questions of the book, as well as some of the secondary issues, is the “diaporematic method,” a branch of Aristotle’s dialectic method.4 Gersonides also relies on Averroes’s exposition of the method in his Middle Commentary on the Topics I.1 and Metaphysics III.1, as well as its actual implementation in Aristotle’s writings, especially in the Physics. As he applies it, the method has four (sometimes five) distinct stages. Frequently each receives its own chapter. In the first stage he summarizes all prior answers to the question being addressed. These historical solutions create the aporia or perplexity that serves as the starting point of his inquiry.5 The second and third stages constitute the body of the inquiry.6 In the second stage Gersonides systematically marshals the arguments that support each of the views presented in the first stage and also, sometimes, the counter-arguments to them. In the third stage he examines and evaluates the arguments presented in the second stage. Here Gersonides determines which of those arguments are valid and which of them are false.7 He also notes any arguments that do not in fact prove what their proponents thought they did or that prove hypotheses that are “weaker” than what their proponents wanted them to demonstrate.8 Because the arguments that support the historical views are in practice the premises on which those views are based, this critique makes it possible to judge the soundness of the opinions themselves. In the fourth stage Gersonides arrives at the “truth” and provides his solution to the question posed at the outset. Sometimes he rounds off the diaporematic structure with an additional, fifth stage

4 On the use of the term “diaporematic method,” see: La Métaphysique, trans. J. Tricot, rev. ed. (Paris, 1974), p. 119 n. 2; P. Ricœur, “La philosophie et ses ‘apories,’ ” in P. Ricœur, Etre, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote (Paris, 1982), p. 181; F. Pironet, “Aristote: Aporia, euporia et les mots étymologiquement apparentée,” in A. Motte and Chr. Rutten, eds., Aporia dans la philosophie grecque, des origines à Aristote (Louvain-laNeuve: Peeters, 2001), pp. 183–185. 5 For an extensive discussion of this stage, see (in this volume) “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias,” pp. 13–43. 6 For an extensive discussion of these stages, see my “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur,” pp. 116–121. 7 I.10 (pp. 62, 68, 69, 70, 74, 75, 78, 89, 81 / 1:184, 195, 196, 197, 202, 204, 207, 210, 211); III. 4 (p. 143 [eighth argument] / 3:123); V. 2.10 (pp. 449–450 / 3:482). 8 I.10 (pp. 79–80 / 1:209–210).

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

47

in which he poses “difficulties” (sefeqot) with his solution and answers them. This buttresses the conclusion reached in his inquiry and guarantees that it is true in a manner “that no doubt remains.”9 The present article focuses on the fourth stage of the diaporematic method as implemented in the Wars of the Lord—the solution of the aporias.10 Here I will answer two questions: (1) What types of solutions does Gersonides propose for the aporias? (2) How does the diaporematic inquiry—stages two and three—contribute to the solution of the aporia in the fourth stage? The Different Types of Solutions to the Aporias According to the theory of the diaporematic method expounded in the introduction to the Wars and in the introduction to the discussion of the agent of miracles,11 the most important stage of the diaporematic method is the second, which provides the raw material for the inquiry; namely, the assumptions on which the opinions presented in the first stage are based. When these opinions are evaluated in the third stage, the investigator is in an advantageous position for discovering the truth, because he has already examined all of the assumptions that brought the proponents of the various opinions to hold them. But the third stage, that of examining and evaluating the arguments, is not itself the solution of the aporia; it merely paves the way for the solution presented in the fourth stage. In the first stage of the discussion Gersonides reviews the historical opinions that constitute the aporia, along two axes: historical and logical. He assembles all of the opinions that have been advanced to the question at hand and classifies them according to the possible logical or logical-philosophical answers to them. His own solutions for the aporias can also be classified in this way: from the perspective of the history of thought and from the perspective of logic.

9 For a discussion of these stages, see “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur,” pp. 128–133. 10 The fourth stage, the solution of the aporias, is more clearly demarcated than the others and frequently occupies one or more separate chapters: I.5, 12–13; IV.5; V.3.4–5; VI.1.5–17. 11 Wars, Introduction, p. 6 / 1:97; VI.2.10, p. 443 / 3:475, respectively.

48

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

Types of Solutions from the Perspective of the History of Thought Two types of solutions are possible from the perspective of the history of thought: (1) solutions that have been proposed in the past and (2) new solutions. 1. A solution that has been proposed in the past 1a. Sometimes Gersonides’ own solution is one of the opinions already proposed in the history of thought to answer the question at hand. Here the diaporematic method leads the investigator to identify the true opinion among those enumerated in the first stage rather than to the discovery of some new solution.12 This may be called an “identification solution” and can be found in the treatment of Divine Providence (Wars IV). 1b. Even when Gersonides’ solution can be found, more or less, in the history of thought, he may present it not as an identification solution but rather as the conclusion of his own independent inquiry—as a “discovery solution.” This is the case with regard to the agent that generates the animate substances (ba{alei nefesh) in the sublunar world (Wars V.3.1–5). 2. A new solution Another possibility is that Gersonides answers his question with a totally new solution never advanced by any of his predecessors. This is a genuine “discovery solution.” Such a solution can be found in the discussions of the nature of the hylic (or material ) intellect (I.1–5),13 the immortality of the soul (I.8–13), God’s knowledge of particulars (III), the creation of the world (VI.1), and the identity of the agent of miracles (VI.2.10).14

12 Aristotle writes about this type of solution in the Nicomachean Ethics VII.1 (1145b2– 6). See also P. Aubenque, “Sur la notion aristotélicienne d’aporie,” in Aristote et les problèmes de méthode (Louvain and Paris, 1961), pp. 8–9, 14. 13 The nature of the hylic intellect is one of the secondary or subordinate issues in the consideration of the immortality of the soul, which is the focus of Wars I (p. 2 / 1:91). 14 But see also above, the identification of the agent that generates the animate substances.

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

49

Types of Solutions, from the Perspective of Logic Logical classification also yields two main types of solutions:15 1. One of the logical or logical-philosophical options for answering the question This type of solution overlaps what, in the historical classification, is a solution already advanced in the history of thought. It includes the solution to divine providence over individuals and the identity of the agent that generates the animate substances. 2. A “compromise solution” between two contrasting views advanced at the start of the inquiry This is a solution that, from the historical perspective, belongs to the category of “a new solution.” Instead of weighing in on the side of either of two contradictory opinions previously reviewed, Gersonides elaborates a new solution that represents a sort of compromise between them. He argues that both thesis and antithesis are true, but each from a different aspect. His solution draws on the true elements of each. A compromise solution is based on rejecting the law of excluded middle, according to which only two contradictory answers to a question are possible—“yes” or “no”16—and accepting the possibility of a middle way, which is that both answer a and answer b are correct, each from a different aspect. This middle-ground solution complies with the law of contradiction17 and is, consequently, logically admissible. Gersonides seems to believe that his predecessors did not arrive at the truth on these matters because, hewing to the law of excluded middle, they thought they had to decide for either the thesis or the antithesis and did not allow for the possibility of a middle way. His innovation is his willingness to do so, identifying those elements or aspects in which each of the opinions is true and elaborating a new solution based on them. Gersonides explicitly refers to his new way of looking at the logical distribution of possible answers to a disjunctive question, as opposed to his predecessors, when he writes about the creation of the world:

15 16 17

The discussion of the immortality of the soul does not fit into this classification. See De interpretatione 7 (17b26–27). See Metaphysics IV.3 (1005b19–20).

50

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD Since this creation (havayah)—whose necessity has been demonstrated by many proofs—must necessarily be either from something or from nothing [ex nihilo], and it has been demonstrated that it cannot be either of these alternatives, the [only possibility] that remains is that it is in one sense [created] from nothing and in another sense [created] from something. This division [into three possible alternatives] eluded the early thinkers.18

The compromise solution, in its various forms, is the most common type in the Wars. It is offered as a solution to the following problems: the nature of the hylic intellect (I.5); determinism, contingency, and free choice (II.2);19 God’s knowledge (III.4); the creation of the world (V.1.17); and the agent of miracles (VI. 2.10).20 In the discussions of the questions of determinism, contingency, and choice, of God’s knowledge, and of the creation of the world, the solution is presented in a logical form, using a recurrent formula that is a variation on “on the one hand . . . on the other hand.”21 It is important to note that Gersonides proposes compromise solutions to aporias that emerge from his own independent or semi-independent inquiry and not to those that derive directly from contradictory historical answers reviewed in the first stage of inquiries based on the diaporematic method. His treatment of the hylic intellect does begin 18 Wars VI. 1.17, p. 367 / 3:333. Although here Gersonides conducts his own independent inquiry into these two possibilities, they are also—as he noted in the first stage of the discussion—two different historical solutions. Consequently he can incorporate this aside about his predecessors into his own independent presentation. 19 The discussion of this question does not follow the diaporematic method. See (in this volume) “Determinism, Contingency, Free Choice, and Foreknowledge,” pp. 247–264. 20 Gersonides also proposes compromise solutions in his philosophical commentaries on the writings of Averroes, in comments introduced by “Levi said.” See, for example, his commentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1 (IMHM 31361), 31v–32r (on the accidental and chance [qeri ve-hizdammen]), and his commentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia II.3, discursive note 3, dealing with free choice, which parallels Wars II.2 (see Altmann, “Commentary on the PN,” pp. 17–18). On the latter see (in this volume) “Determinism, Contingency, Free Choice, and Foreknowledge,” pp. 235–241. Such a solution can also be found in his Bible commentary, in his interpretation of Isaac’s blessing (Genesis 27). See Commentary on Genesis, pp. 353–355. See also my article “Prophecy, Clairvoyance, Dreams, and the Concept of Hitbodedut in Gersonides’ Thought,” Da{at 39 (1997): pp. 55–95, on p. 65 (Hebrew). 21 Determinism, contingency, and free choice, II.2 (p. 96/ 2:34); God’s knowledge, III.3 (p. 138/ 2:117); the creation of the world, VI.1.17 (p. 367/ 3:330. This formula is not used when Gersonides deals with the nature of the hylic intellect and with the agent of miracles, but in both cases the solution is a compromise between two opinions presented earlier in the discussion.

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

51

with a presentation of the historical views about its nature; but the last part, in which Gersonides offers his own solution, is based on a sort of compromise between two possible answers to the question in the context of Aristotelian philosophy and not between two possibilities suggested by his predecessors.22 The discussion of God’s knowledge is based on earlier opinions; but when he reaches the solution Gersonides substitutes his own arguments for the historical arguments that support the view that God has knowledge of particulars. Here the compromise solution harmonizes Aristotle’s opinion—which is supported by arguments drawn from the history of philosophy—with the idea that God has knowledge of particulars, which Gersonides defends with his own original arguments. The discussion of the creation of the world, too, begins with a review of historical opinions; but all of them are rejected after their supporting arguments are refuted in the third stage of the inquiry. At the end of this stage Gersonides launches his own independent philosophical discussion. Here he proves that the world was generated (his word is hithawwah ‘came into being’) and then asks about the manner of its creation. He phrases the issue as a dialectic question with two possible logical-philosophical answers: either the world was created from pre-existing matter or it was created ex nihilo. He investigates each of these possibilities and refutes them before arriving at a compromise solution that in this case is not a compromise between two antithetical views, both of which have been proven by supporting arguments, but between two antithetical views, both of which have been shown to be false. Because Gersonides has already demonstrated that the world was created, he is compelled to offer an answer to the question of how it was created. Because there are only two logical-philosophical possibilities, he must find a solution that is compatible with the main arguments that refuted them. The discussion of the agent of miracles is formulated in the classical format of the diaporematic method, where the aporia that they are meant to answer is created by the historical solutions to the question. Here, however, the views presented in the first stage are not historical opinions but ideas worked out by Gersonides himself; consequently the See my “Gersonides’ Methods of Inquiry in the Discussion on the Material Intellect in the Wars of the Lord,” in M. C. Pacheco and J. F. Meirinhos, eds., Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in the Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto e imaginaçao na Filosofia Medieval (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), pp. 641–651. 22

52

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

arguments pro and con are also his own inventions.23 The compromise solution is not derived from the use of the diaporematic method but from an inquiry that employs a different method, the “applicative method,” which Gersonides interweaves with the diaporematic method.24 As Aubenque has shown,25 the compromise solution can be traced back to Aristotle. Aristotle presents his theory in the Eudemean Ethics (VII.2 and VI.12) and applies it in some of his treatises. Although Gersonides could not have been familiar with the theory of this solution, because the Eudemean Ethics had not been translated into Hebrew,26 he might have been acquainted with its application to the question of infinity in Physics III.2 (194b11) through Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Physics.27 He also knew a solution of this nature from Averroes’s treatment of the nature of the hylic intellect in his Middle Commentary on De anima,28 which Gersonides mentions in his supercommentary on the Epitome of De anima. In his own commentary on the Epitome of De anima, Gersonides specifically refers to the inquiry by which Averroes reached his conclusion as a dialectic process.29 The compromise solution was also widespread in Christian disputatio, where it was used in the stage of rendering a verdict on the question at hand, the determinatio. Considering, however, that Gersonides is confident that the questions he raises can be answered and that the compromise solution emerges from the course of his inquiry, it is more likely that he discovered the method independently and did not borrow it from external sources.

23 On his reference to one historical view, that of Abraham Ibn Ezra, as part of the arguments that support the anthropological theory of miracles, see “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias,” n. 95. 24 See further below, n. 63. 25 Aubenque, “Sur la notion aristotélicienne d’aporie,” p. 51. 26 See M. Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters (Berlin, 1893), §110, p. 209. 27 Paris—BNF, MS hébr. 938 (IMHM 31972), 42v–43r. 28 See Averroes’ Middle Commentary of Aristotle’s De anima, ed. and trans. Alfred L. Ivry (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2002), p. 112. 29 See Mashbaum, “Supercommentary on the De Anima,” p. 134.

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

53

The Contribution of the Diaporematic Inquiry Method to the Solution of the Aporias The relationship between the second and third stages of the diaporematic method, on the one hand, and the solution, on the other, falls into two main categories: 1. The diaporematic method is an integral part of the inquiry and leads to or contributes to a solution. 2. The diaporematic method is only a preface to Gersonides’ inquiry, rather than part of it, and does not contribute to the solution. The Diaporematic Method is an Integral Part of the Inquiry In most of Gersonides’ solutions to the principal issues raised in the Wars the diaporematic method makes a direct contribution and is thus an essential part of his inquiry. We can distinguish several roles that it plays in these inquiries. The Identification Solution (Divine Providence) As noted, Gersonides’ solution to the problem of providence over individuals is an identification solution. The second and third stages of the diaporematic inquiry lead to it directly. Gersonides begins his inquiry into divine providence by asking about its scope: “Does it [divine providence] extend over individual members of the human species or just over the human species, as is the case with the other species?”30 Next he reviews three historical solutions, which also constitute the full range of logically possible answers to the question: yes, “divine providence applies to each and every individual human being in respect of his individual nature”—the view of “most of the followers of our Torah”;31 no, “divine providence does not apply to individual members of the human species but only in respect of the nature of the species, as for the other species”—Aristotle’s view;32 and, a middle

Wars IV.1, p. 151f. / 2:155. Ibid. 32 In order to emphasize the logical hierarchy I have changed the order of presentation. Gersonides begins with Aristotle’s view and follows it with the opinion of “most of the followers of our Torah.” 30 31

54

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

view, “divine providence applies to only some individuals but not to all of them”—the view of “the outstanding scholars of our Torah” (he means especially Maimonides). Because he has presented all of the historical answers to the question and has also classified them as covering all of the logically possible answers to the question, no fourth solution is possible. The truth must necessarily be one of these three. The manner in which he presents them allows Gersonides to turn the diaporematic method into a scientific demonstration that yields absolutely certain results—a method that reveals the truth “so that no doubt remains.” He does not employ an absolute demonstration or a demonstratio per signum, but a logical proof—a proof by negation or indirect proof. In the third stage of the discussion (IV.3) Gersonides probes the two antithetical answers—divine providence applies to each and every human being or divine providence applies to the species and not to individual human beings33—and rejects both of them. Because there are only three logical possibilities he is perforce left with the third one: that providence applies to some individuals but not to others.34 This is necessarily true. Historically this is the answer he ascribed to “the outstanding scholars of our Torah.” But Gersonides does have a methodological innovation to offer here. Maimonides, when he presents his own view of providence in Guide III.17, states explicitly that he has not demonstrated that his view is correct. He does, however, note its advantage; namely, that it can solve the problem of providence in the framework both of the Jewish religion as reflected in biblical texts and in the context of Aristotelian philosophy. According to him, his opinion is “the intention of the book of God and of the books of our prophets,”35 on the one hand, and “less disgraceful than the preceding opinions [those just presented by Maimonides as solutions to the problem of divine providence] . . . and nearer than they to intellectual reasoning,” on the other. By contrast, even though his solution, too, is not the outcome of a demonstration, Gersonides does provide a logical proof of one aspect of his solution of the problem—the scope of providence. Thus he endows this one aspect of the theory of providence with the status of a verified scientific solution that is true in a manner “that no doubt remains.” We must emphasize, however, that this is a fairly narrow aspect of the theory of 33 34 35

Wars, p. 159 / 2:166. Ibid., p. 164 / 2:174. Guide, p. 471.

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

55

providence. He does not fully exhaust this doctrine through an inquiry based on the diaporematic method. As we have seen, Gersonides’ starting point in his consideration of divine providence is a formal question: what is the scope of divine providence? Similarly, the indubitable answer at which he arrives by means of the diaporematic method and a proof by negation is a formal answer, the determination of the scope of this providence. Then, however, he adduces further arguments, the fruit of his independent inquiry, to support the idea whose truth he has proven and (in IV.5) answers a different question: how does God exercise His providence over those human individuals to which it applies? In other words, what is the mechanism of this providence?36 The answer to this question provides a content to the answer to the first question, reached using the diaporematic method. He explains the mechanism of providence in the context of Aristotelian philosophy and by developing the answer to the question of foreknowledge that he reached in the second book of the Wars,37 and not by means of the diaporematic method. Here, then, the diaporematic method provides only the formal armature for the solution of the aporia, around which Gersonides could develop his own theory of providence. The Discovery Solution When the solution is a discovery solution the diaporematic method plays several roles in achieving it. In each example the second and third stages make different contributions. God’s Knowledge The type of relationship between stages two and three, on the one hand, and the compromise solution in the fourth stage of the discussion of God’s knowledge, on the other, resembles that in the identification solution to the question of divine providence. Here too the

36 The answer about the mechanism of individual providence also explains why it does not apply to some human beings. Here too the development of the answer to the question of providence affords an explanation of sorts of the formal solution that was reached using the diaporematic method. 37 There he asserts that “this question [ prediction of the future by clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy] is one of the most important questions, either by virtue of its own nature or because many of the other important questions that we intend to explain in this book can be clarified through it” (II.1, p. 92 / 2:27). The discussion of divine providence is one of these.

56

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

diaporematic method is an integral part of the inquiry and its second and third stages lead directly to the answer. But the inquiry proceeds in a different fashion and the solution is new rather than a pre-existing historical one. In the second stage of the inquiry, aimed at supporting the two antithetical answers that have been given to “whether or not God knows particular, contingent things in the sublunar world,”38 Gersonides presents arguments that support the view of Aristotle and his followers that “God (may He be blessed) does not know particular things [in the sublunar world]” and others that support the view of “the great sages of our Torah” that “God (may He be blessed) does know all particular and contingent things in so far as they are particular.”39 In the third stage of the inquiry, though, he is not content with merely examining and evaluating these arguments. Instead he replaces the Torah sages’ second argument—which was not refuted by the philosophers40—with his own arguments to corroborate the notion that God has knowledge of individuals.41 These arguments are clearer than those attributed to “our sages” and also are compatible with his own cosmology and metaphysics. Consequently the arguments he examines in the third stage of the inquiry are the philosophical assertions that refute the idea that God has knowledge of individuals and his own arguments that support that view. His conclusion is that both sets of arguments are true: Maimonides failed to refute the philosophers’ position;42 as always, though, he considers his own arguments to be valid. We are forced to accept both of the antithetical arguments based on them. To avoid running afoul of the law of contradiction we must allow that each of these views is true in some aspects but not in others. Thus the diaporematic method necessarily leads to a compromise solution. As in the identification solution, here too it is employed as a method of scientific inquiry and proves that the compromise solution to the aporia of God’s knowledge of particulars is the correct one. The proof is based on the arguments advanced to support each of the contrasting views; this is why Gersonides is careful to include as Wars III.1, p. 120 / 2:89. Ibid., p. 121 / 2:90. 40 The first argument is refuted by the arguments of the philosophers. See Wars III.2, p. 125 / 2:97. 41 For the arguments offered in the name of “the sages of our Torah,” see III.2, p. 124–125 / 2:96–97. 42 See III.3 and the beginning of III.4. 38 39

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

57

many arguments as possible in support of each opinion. Because these arguments represent the premises that underlie the answers proposed to his question, scrutiny of as many of them as possible affords greater confidence that the solution achieved is indeed the truth.43 Like the identification solution to the question of divine providence, the compromise solution with regard to God’s knowledge of particulars, achieved by means of the diaporematic method, is a formal one. On the one hand it is true that God has knowledge of particulars; but it is also true that God does not have knowledge of particulars. Gersonides fills this formal solution with content in a way similar to that employed for the identification solution of divine providence, by explaining the aspects from which it is true that God has knowledge of particulars and those from which it is not true. In this way he answers the second question raised at the beginning of the discussion, “and if He knows them, how He knows them?”44 The explanation is relatively short (23 lines), because it is based on a solution already developed and proven in the second book of the Wars with regard to astral determinism and human choice.45 Here he only has to review its main points briefly.46 The Immortality of the Soul A different relationship between the second and third stages of the diaporematic method, on the one hand, and the solution advanced in the fourth stage, on the other, can be found in the discussion of the 43 Gersonides believes that in this way he has reached the absolute truth. It is nevertheless conceivable, in principle, that someone might later find arguments he did not present and consequently did not take into account, and that this would have led him to reach a different conclusion. By sharing the entire process with his readers he invites them to undertake a critical review of his proof. 44 Wars III.1, p. 120 / 2:89. 45 See (in this volume) “Determinism, Contingency, Free Choice, and Foreknowledge,” p. 284. 46 This method of writing is reviewed under the heading of the eighth reason that one topic is discussed before another in the Wars (Introduction, p. 10 / 1:103–104). The tendency to abbreviate the treatment of issues previously addressed in the same or another work is typical of Gersonides’ writings. Instead of repeating lengthy expositions already found elsewhere he refers readers to the full discussion, whether in the same or in a different work. See, for example, the list of references from his supercommentaries on Averroes’s commentaries on the Physics to the Wars in Ruth Glasner, “The Early Stages in the Evolution of Gersonides’ The Wars of the Lord,” JQR 87 (1996): 42–46. In our own case he does not explicitly refer readers to the discussion in Wars II but assumes that they remember it, because they are reading his book in sequential order.

58

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

immortality of the soul (I.8–13). Here Gersonides’ answer is something new, not a compromise solution. The examination of his predecessors’ arguments, in the third stage of the inquiry (I.10), reveals that none of the historical answers is correct. The arguments adduced by their proponents are not really successful; nor are the arguments they employed to refute opposing views. So Gersonides must find his own original answer to the question. He launches an independent inquiry, which he designates as being “to the point” (le-fi ha-{inyan be-{aÉmo)47—that is, focused on the difficulty itself rather than being a review of the history of philosophy. But even though the solution is the outcome of an independent inquiry that discards the material of the second and third stages of the process, they nevertheless play two important roles in it. First of all, they provide Gersonides with true premises that he can employ to build his own solution. The third stage, in which he examined and evaluated (and rejected) the historical opinions enumerated in the second stage, revealed which of their proponents’ premises were true; namely, that “intelligibles are generated in the material intellect” and that “the acquired intellect is separate.” He adopts them as part of his own new solution. By themselves, however, they are insufficient to construct a full answer. Consequently Gersonides supplements them with his own philosophical investigation, which builds on the epistemology and the theory of the concept he developed in the third stage (I.10). This means that his answer is based in part on true premises that were integral to his predecessors’ solutions and which he discovered through the diaporematic method, and in part on the results of his own independent inquiry. So even though the diaporematic method does not lead to the full solution, it is part of the inquiry that leads to it and makes a material contribution to it. The second role of the diaporematic method here is to guide Gersonides’ own inquiry by pointing him to the question he must deal with in order to solve the problem of the immortality of the soul. The question left open by his predecessors, which is the starting point for his own process, is whether the postulate stated by Aristotle in De caelo I.12 and universally accepted since then—namely, that everything generated is destructible—is true. Gersonides phrases it dialectically: is it necessarily the case that “everything generated is destructible”?48

47 48

Wars I.11, p. 81 / 1:212. Ibid.

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

59

He adds a second question that aims at a threefold logical structure like that encountered in the case of providence: everything is corruptible, nothing is corruptible, and some things are corruptible and some are not: “And if this is not necessary, is this generated thing, i.e., the intelligible that the material intellect apprehends, necessarily corruptible? Or is it impossible for it to be corruptible? Or is there something in it that is corruptible and something that is incorruptible?”49 After refuting this postulate50 and relying, as stated, on his own epistemology and theory of the concept, Gersonides arrives at the solution that the human intellect, which is identical with the intelligibles of the sublunar world that it perceives, is eternal. The Agent of Miracles51 The role played by the diaporematic method in resolving the identity of the agent of miracles resembles its role in the problem of the immortality of the soul. Here, however, the discussion is much more complex. As I have already noted, the identification of the agent of miracles does not begin with historical opinions but with the answers that are tenable within the context of Gersonides’ philosophy. He himself fashions the several possible solutions to his question as well as the arguments pro and con. In the first stage he lists the three agents of miracles that are conceivable in his system: God, the Active Intellect, and human beings. When he examines and evaluates them he rejects two of these ideas—that human beings are the agent of miracles and that God is. Because in the first stage of the inquiry he presented all answers to the question that are compatible with his philosophy,52 the rejection of two of them entails that the third, which was not ruled out in the third stage of the discussion, is the true one: the Active Intellect must be the agent of miracles. But Gersonides does not reach this conclusion on these logical grounds. He also scrutinizes the arguments 49 He has already raised this question earlier (I.8, p. 52 / 1:170; I.9, p. 57 / 1:177; I.10, pp. 74, 80 / 1:202, 210), but deferred the discussion until now. 50 Here Gersonides relies on his discussion of this Aristotelian postulate in VI.2.27. This passage is part of the first edition of the Wars, written in 1317–1321, which dealt only with the creation of the world. He refers readers of his commentaries on the Epitome of De caelo and on the Middle Commentary on De caelo to it. See Glasner, “The Early Stages,” pp. 44–45. 51 This section has been entirely rewritten for the present version of this article. 52 Later he offers another possibility—a separate intellect that is not the Active Intellect—but rejects it as well. In this way he guarantees that there are only three possible answers to the question. See VI.2.10, p. 446 / 3:476–477.

60

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

for and against the identification of the Active Intellect with the agent of miracles and concludes that the supporting arguments are true and that the ostensible refutations are invalid. There remains, however, one possible refutation that he has not rejected; hence he cannot declare with certainty that the Active Intellect is the agent of miracles, even though this is the only possibility remaining after the other options—human beings and God (or some other intellect that is not the Active Intellect)—have been eliminated. This argument must be addressed further in the investigation: “Nevertheless, [the argument] that would refute [the opinion] that the Active Intellect is the agent of the miracles, in that it entails either new knowledge and a new will in it [the Active Intellect] or a denial of the nature of the contingent, merits examination.”53 But, he goes on, “it is evident that something must be wrong in this argument” that there are only two possibilities: namely, that if the Active Intellect is the agent of miracles, either it must possess new knowledge and new volition, so that it can effect a miracle in any situation, as a function of the need for it; or, because there can be no change in the knowledge and will of the Active Intellect, the advent of the miracle is predetermined along with the situation that requires it. The latter is tantamount to a strong determinism that applies equally to natural events in the sublunar world and to miracles. Gersonides does not explain what is wrong with this argument. But the exposition in the second stage of the discussion rules out both possibilities. The refutation of the idea that God is the agent of miracles54 also eliminates the possibility that the Active Intellect can have any new knowledge or volition, because there can be no change in a separate intellect. At the same time, the occurrence of the miracle cannot be predetermined, since that would entail strong determinism; and strong determinism is incompatible with the principle of free choice, which is axiomatic for Gersonides and therefore beyond question.55

Wars VI. 2.10, p. 451 / 3:483. Wars, p. 447/ 3:479. 55 Wars, p. 448 / 3:479. Gersonides discusses the principle of free choice when he discusses foreknowledge by clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy in Wars II. There, however, he deals with the relationship between astral determinism and free choice, whereas here he is opposing the principle of free choice to a view that requires predetermination of the miraculous event and thus also determinism of supernatural occurrences. With regard to free choice and determinism of natural events in the 53 54

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

61

Even though he does not say it in so many words, the falsity of these counter-arguments is entailed by the conclusion of the diaporematic process as well. Because there were only three possible answers to the question of who is the agent of miracles, and two of them—God and human beings—have been ruled out, the third possibility, that the Active Intellect is the agent of miracles, must be true and cannot be refuted. Consequently this counter-argument must be examined closely, since it is the impediment to accepting the conclusion reached through the negative path of the diaporematic method. Thus far the diaporematic method has chalked up two achievements. First, it has ruled out the possibility that human beings or God is the agent of miracles; that is, it has eliminated the incorrect identifications of the agents of miracles and thereby pointed the inquiry towards the remaining possibility, the Active Intellect. Second, it has focused the inquiry on the issue of determinism and free choice and on whether the Active Intellect can have new knowledge and new desires. This has now become the key to identifying the agent of miracles.56 Moreover, the diaporematic method provides the materials for pursuing the investigation further. It was in the course of weighing the arguments for and against the possibilities that human beings or God is the agent of miracles that the issue of whether the possible agents of miracles can have some new desire came up repeatedly.57 It was further asserted that if the Active Intellect has foreknowledge of the miracle, then, according to the law of correspondences it must take place.58 In practice these issues were the hidden axis of the second stage of the diaporematic method; only now do they come to the surface. Thus it was the arguments in the second and third stages of the

sublunar world, see (in this volume) “Determinism, Contingency, Free Choice, and Foreknowledge,” pp. 251–264. 56 As we saw with regard to Gersonides’ treatment of the immortality of the soul, the diaporematic method steers the discussion to the question that leads to the solution. 57 See, for example, the first argument to support the view the God is the agent of miracles (p. 445 / 3:475); the first argument to support that idea that the Active Intellect is the agent of miracles (p. 445 / 3:476); the first argument to support the view that human beings can be the agent of miracles (p. 446 / 3:477); the fourth argument against the view that God (or the Active Intellect) is the agent of miracles (pp. 447–448 / 3:477); and the first argument against the view that human beings are the agents of miracles (pp. 448–449 / 3:480). 58 See the arguments that support the view that the Active Intellect is the agent of miracles (p. 445 / 3:476).

62

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

diaporematic method that brought Gersonides to understand that he must clarify these points in order to identify the agent of miracles. The arguments pro and con provided additional material for identifying the agent of miracles. The most important points are: the Active Intellect effects miracles because it knows how they coincide with natural law.59 Although God is not the direct agent of miracles or their proximate cause, He can be their distant cause.60 Miracles are the result of the law that God planted in creation; they derive “from the essence of the law that God may He be blessed, has ordered for the existents.”61 The most important conclusion is that presented in the third stage, namely, that human beings have “some effect” on the occurrence of miracles although they do not actually work them.62 Gersonides develops this solution, a “discovery solution,” in a brief and almost allusive fashion by employing a different method of inquiry that he occasionally employs in the Wars—the applicative method63— and not directly from the materials contributed by the second and third stages of the inquiry. But these materials are part of the solution, which takes them into account. Thus the solution he offers here is appropriate to the results of the inquiry through the diaporematic method up to this stage, although it does not follow from it directly. The applicative method is intended to solve the problem of how one can avoid strict determinism in the sublunar world, one that includes miraculous events, without having to postulate a change of will and

Ibid. The only view refuted is that God is the proximate cause of miracles (p. 447 / 3:348; p. 450 / 3:482). 61 P. 450 / 3:482. But we must not understand from this that a miracle is part of the natural order and takes place on account of the heavenly bodies, like all natural events. Miracles take place according to a supernatural order that is found in the Active Intellect alongside and that supplements the order of astral causality. 62 At this stage Gersonides leaves open the question of the prophets’ influence on the occurrence of miracles. 63 In the applicative method, Gersonides applies a solution to a problem that arose in one domain—generally, though not always, one already addressed in the Wars—to a different domain in which he is seeking a solution to a new problem. This method is grounded on the assumption that when we face two similar problems that have something in common it is quite likely that the solution to one is valid for the other as well. Although this method is not verified scientifically, it is extremely plausible and compatible with the principles and system of his thought. For a broad discussion of this method and Gersonides’ use of it in his discussion of foreknowledge by means of dreams and clairvoyance, see (in this volume) “Gersonides on the Mode of Communicating Knowledge of the Future to the Dreamer and Clairvoyant,” pp. 299–303, 305–306, 314. 59 60

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

63

knowledge in the Active Intellect. Gersonides applies two solutions developed elsewhere in the Wars: the explanation in Book II of the prophet’s knowledge of future events64 and the theory of divine providence expounded in III.5.65 This is not the place for an analysis of these two solutions and how they are transferred, by means of the applicative method, to identify the agent of miracles.66 For the nonce, it is important to note that the identity of the agent of miracles provided by the applicative method is a compromise solution between the hypothesis that the Active Intellect is the agent of miracles and the assertion that human beings are the agent of miracles. For even though the Active Intellect is the agent of miracles, human beings, and more precisely prophets,67 are an essential factor in their occurrence. Without a prophet the miracle will not take place. The Active Intellect grounds the miracle in the natural order and predetermines its occurrence; the prophet is the contingent element and effects the realization of this natural order in a concrete situation when there is a need for it.68 This solution leaves room for foreknowledge of the miracle by the Active Intellect and by the prophet, to whom it proclaims the future miraculous event, but leaves room for human choice. By exercising their free choice human beings can alter the situation predetermined by astral determinism. Hence, if the exercise of human choice modifies

See my “Prophecy, Clairvoyance and Dreams,” pp. 24–27. Many have written about Gersonides’ theory of providence. Here I will cite only a small fraction of the literature: Charles Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide (Paris, 1973), pp. 364–365 and 382–392; idem, ed. and trans., Les Guerres du Seigneur, livres III et IV (Paris, 1968); “Synopsis of Book Four” in Feldman, The Wars of the Lord, vol. II, pp. 139–159; R. Eisen, Gersonides on Providence, Covenant and the Chosen People (New York, 1995), pp. 14–22. 66 I hope to do so at length elsewhere. 67 In Chapter 11 he asserts that scholars who have achieved the highest rung of wisdom are capable of influencing miraculous events, just like prophets. 68 This solution also responds indirectly to a counter-argument that was not refuted but in which “something must be wrong”: there is no need to posit a change of volition in the Active Intellect in order for a miracle that meets the needs of a given situation to take place. The natural order of the miracle is in the Active Intellect; but it is the prophet and not the Active Intellect that causes it to be realized at a particular place and particular time. On the other hand, there is no need to argue that the occurrence of the miracle is absolutely predetermined, leaving no room for free choice to create the situation in which it is required. Free choice may play a role in creating a situation in which the miracle is required; then it is the prophet’s presence that causes the miracle to take place. Hypothetically one could argue that if the exercise of free choice modified the predetermined situation of astral determinism the miracle would become superfluous and the prophet would not be the agent of its realization. 64 65

64

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

the situation that would have required the miracle of which the Active Intellect has knowledge, the miracle will not take place.69 The Hylic Intellect70 Gersonides considers his solution of the question of the hylic intellect to be a “discovery solution.” Here, though, the diaporematic method used to address this question in I.1–4 does not make any real contribution that can be incorporated into the solution. Instead, it plays a part similar to its second role in the inquiry about the immortality of the soul: in the third stage, that of investigation and evaluation, it eliminates the false arguments of the thinkers listed in the first stage and thus the opinions based on them. As such it permits him to focus the inquiry on the question whose solution will lead to the truth.71 In the second and third stages of the inquiry about the hylic intellect, Gersonides successively refutes all of the historical views that the bearer of the hylic intellect is a separate intellect, as well as another logical possibility, with no precedent in the history of philosophy, that also proposes that the bearer of the hylic intellect is a separate intellect.72 By refuting all of these views Gersonides effectively rules out their common denominator—namely, that the hylic intellect is borne by a separate intellect. One of the historical views presented in the first stage of the investigation is that the bearer of the hylic intellect is not a separate intellect. This is the opinion of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who, according to Gersonides, identified the bearer of the hylic intellect with the soul or one of its parts, such as the imaginative soul, or with the forms found in the imaginative soul.73 Had Gersonides believed that the historical views exhausted all of the logical-philosophical possibilities for iden-

69 Here the applicative method supplies not only an answer to the question raised at the beginning of the discussion—the identity of the agent of miracles—but also (although Gersonides does not say so explicitly) the question of how the miracle is effected. 70 There is extensive attention to Gersonides’ methods in the discussion of the hylic intellect in the Wars in my “Gersonides’ Methods of Inquiry in the Discussion on the Material Intellect in the Wars of the Lord.” Here I merely summarize the general course of the fourth stage of the inquiry. 71 Here Gersonides applies the method of refuting an opinion before verifying its contrary, an approach he highlights in the third reason that one topic is discussed before another in the Wars (Introduction, p. 9 / 1:102). 72 See “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias,” pp. 41–43. 73 Cf. Wars I.1, p. 13 / 1:109–110.

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

65

tifying the bearer of the hylic intellect, at this point he would have propounded an identification solution, which, as we have seen, is a necessary and true solution: all of the views listed in the first stage of the inquiry have been refuted except for one—Alexander’s—and it is necessarily the correct one.74 But here Gersonides suspends the progress of the proof by negation, which would have been based on the first stage of the inquiry. Instead of deciding in favor of Alexander’s view, at the beginning of I.5 he introduces two other identifications of the bearer of the hylic intellect that are possible within the framework of Aristotelian philosophy: the bearer of the hylic intellect is a substance (i.e., body) and the bearer of the hylic intellect is the soul. In the history of philosophy, the second possibility was advanced by Alexander; the former, though, has no historical parallel.75 In another dialectic move, extremely concise, he arrives at a compromise solution,76 namely, that the bearer of the hylic intellect is the body, but by means of the imaginative soul and, in a certain fashion, by means of the sensitive soul.77 Who Generates the Animate Substances? With regard to the agent that generates the animate substances, Gersonides asks two questions: Is it a separate intellect? If so, how is this accomplished? He introduces the diaporematic method at the start of his inquiry as a means to help him find the indubitable answer to these questions: “For this procedure will help us find the truth in this inquiry, so that no doubt remains.”78 He classifies the historical answers to this question under the rubric of two logical contraries: the animate substances are generated by a 74 He accepts this view in one of the “Levi said” notes in his commentary on the Epitome of De anima (Mashbaum, “Supercommentary on the De Anima,” pp. 135–144). For his method of inquiry into this question in the commentary on the Epitome of De anima, see (in this volume) “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” pp. 215–216. 75 This inquiry rests on the threefold division of the possible bearers of the hylic or material intellect—the intellect, the soul, or the body—as expounded by Averroes in his Epitome of De anima (Mashbaum, “Supercommentary on the De Anima,” p. 121). See H. A. Davidson, “Gersonides on the Material and Active Intellects,” Studies on Gersonides, a Fourteenth-Century Jewish Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Gad Freudenthal (Leiden and New York, 1992), pp. 203–205. 76 The solution is not stated using any of the standard formulas for a compromise solution: from one perspective, Option A is true; from another perspective, Option B is true. 77 Wars I.5, p. 36 / 1:145. 78 Wars V.3.1, p. 220 / 3:81.

66

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

separate intellect; the animate substances are generated by something other than a separate intellect. In the second stage of the inquiry, he presents the arguments alleged by the supporters of those two opinions, but also those potentially contained in their arguments.79 In the third stage, that of examination and evaluation, he rejects the view, maintained by Averroes in his commentary on the Metaphysics, that the agent that generates the animate substances is not a separate intellect. This leads him to the conclusion that one must accept the other logical possibility, held by a number of philosophers, notably Themistius, that the agent that generates the animate substances is a separate intellect. But Gersonides is not satisfied with the outcome of the diaporematic process. He does not say that he accepts the opinion of Themistius or of any other proponent of that thesis; nor does he present it as the solution to his question. He merely sees the method as having provided the starting point of his inquiry, pointing him towards the correct solution but not proving it conclusively. As he noted at the beginning of this inquiry, he believes that the method helps him reach the solution, but no more. Consequently, at this point Gersonides launches an independent investigation in which he adduces a series of proofs that employ the methods of logical diaeresis and proof by negation (V.3.4) to prove his solution scientifically. The answer at which he arrives is that the animate substances in the sublunar world are generated by a separate agent.80 This was the opinion held by Themistius, al-Farabi, and Ibn Bajja, as well as by Averroes in the Epitome of De anima and the commentary on the Animalia. As for the second question, “the manner in which this [ process] is derived” from this agent,81 he concludes that the separate agent generates the animate substances directly, without an intermediary.82 As implied by Wars V.3.1, this was the view of Ibn Bajja, Ibn Sina, and al-Farabi, as well as of Averroes in the Epitome

79 Ibid., p. 222 / 3:33. These are arguments that were never made by the proponents of these views, although they could have been, inasmuch as they are consistent with their principles and theories. Consequently one can say that they are potentially present in their opinions. Gersonides does not consider that he invented them himself and relates to them as if they were historical arguments. 80 Wars V.3.4, p. 252 / 3:129. 81 Wars V. 3.1, p. 220 / 3:81. 82 Wars V.3.4, p. 256 / 3:135.

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

67

of De anima.83 The third question answered here is the identity of that separate agent. Gersonides concludes that it is the Active Intellect. In the enumeration of the historical opinions in V.3.1, this view is maintained by al-Farabi in his On the Intellect and by Averroes in the Epitome of De anima and the commentary on the Animalia, as Gersonides interprets it.84 He adds that this agent is “the law, order, and rightness of these existents.”85 Perhaps he believes that this supplements the answers provided by earlier thinkers. We could argue that here the diaporematic method makes no direct contribution to the solution. The answer is reached through an independent inquiry that would have been possible without the preliminary use of the diaporematic method. Gersonides himself, though, relates to his independent inquiry as no more than the completion of the inquiry he began using the diaporematic method, and not as freestanding. He considers the inquiry conducted by the diaporematic method to be part of a longer process that his independent investigation is intended to supplement. I believe that he ascribes a dual contribution to the diaporematic method here. First off, the method points him towards the correct solution, which he must then demonstrate; that is, it shows him his goal and thus steers his inquiry. On the other hand, by refuting the antithesis—the opinion expressed by Averroes in his commentary on the Metaphysics—it ensures that his answer is the correct one. As we have seen, Gersonides is not satisfied with finding the true answer to his question; he wants to achieve the truth “so that no doubt remains.” This goal is best served by following the diaporematic method. The Diaporematic Method is used only as a Preface to the Inquiry In another form of relationship between the first and the second stages of the inquiry by the diaporematic method, Gersonides employs the method only as a preliminary stage; it is not an integral part of the inquiry and does not lead to the solution. This is the case in his treatment of creation.

83 But it is not the opinion of Themistius, who agreed with them that the agent is a separate intellect but held that it activates souls through the power it places in seeds. See V.3.1, p. 221 / 3:81. 84 Wars V.3.3, pp. 221–222 / 3:82. 85 Wars V.3.4, p. 257 / 3:135.

68

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

Gersonides begins his discussion of creation by summarizing the method to be adopted and its underlying principle: It is proper that we first indicate the enormous difficulty pertaining to this inquiry. This will guide us to some extent toward completing our inquiry into this question, for when we know the difficulty associated with a question we are guided to the path that will lead us to attaining the truth concerning it.86

After this general methodological statement that identification of the problems facing the inquiry can guide the investigator towards the truth, he devotes the rest of Wars VI.1.1 to an exposition of the problems associated with the inquiry into the creation of the universe, so that they can guide him. We are concerned with the first problem he raises here; namely, the proliferation of opinions about creation. Their existence, he says, is evidence that there are many arguments for and against each of these opinions; in other words, that there are many grounds for each of them and many premises on which they are based. It is this glut of views and arguments that makes the inquiry so complicated. Because of it, Gersonides begins his inquiry into creation with the diaporematic method. He constructs the discussion in the format developed and implemented in his book: first (VI.1.2) he lists the various historical opinions about creation (the first stage of the inquiry). Here he uses logical diaeresis to structure a system of questions and possible answers to them, in which he assigns the historical opinions he has identified to the various possible logical-philosophical answers.87 Next (VI.1.3) he expounds at length the arguments that support each of these views (the second stage of the inquiry). Finally (VI.1.4) he criticizes them (the third stage of the inquiry). This stage is very short indeed. Gersonides rejects all the arguments advanced by his predecessors on the grounds that they do not “really corroborate” the views they claim to support. Gersonides infers part of this conclusion from Aristotle himself. Because Aristotle had already refuted the views of his predecessors, Gersonides can rely on him instead of providing his own analysis.88 As for Aristotle’s arguments in favor of his own Wars VI.1.1, p. 293 / 3:217. For an analysis of this stage see “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias,” p. 000. 88 Gersonides follows a similar course in his discussion of God’s knowledge. He investigates historical rebuttals (Maimonides’ contentions) of the philosophers’ arguments and holds that if these are correct it has already been demonstrated that God 86 87

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

69

position, here Gersonides rejects them only provisionally. He returns to them later, in greater depth and breadth, in the fifth stage of the inquiry, where he presents the challenges to his proposed solution and his rebuttal to them.89 Having eliminated all of the arguments that support the historical views, Gersonides finds himself in a situation where his predecessors’ arguments cannot make any positive contribution to his inquiry. Their refutation also undermines the opinions they support. Consequently he must launch an independent inquiry, unrelated to his predecessors’ views and arguments, and find a new solution to the question never before advanced in the history of philosophy. At the end of the third stage Gersonides is in the state of euporia described in Metaphysics III.1: by refuting all of the arguments and eliminating them from his scholarly agenda he has loosed the bonds that chained him and solved the aporia created by the multiplicity of opinions about creation and the many arguments that support them. Thus the diaporematic method plays what Aubenque calls a “cathartic” role:90 it operates negatively, eliminating difficulties and his predecessors’ false arguments, and thus also the mistaken opinions built on them. In this way it clears the decks for Gersonides’ own independent investigation, in which he will not fall into their errors. But this does not exhaust the role of the diaporematic method in Gersonides discussion of creation in the Wars. In Metaphysics III.1 (995a35), Aristotle writes that “people who inquire without first stating the difficulties are like those who do not know where they have to go.”91 In the Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, which Gersonides knew, Averroes explains this as follows:

has knowledge of individuals; so there is no need for a further inquiry into this matter (see III.3). There, however, because Gersonides does not decide that Maimonides’ arguments are correct, he must go back and refute the philosophers’ arguments himself (III.4). 89 Although some of the opinions presented—historical opinions in favor of creation ex nihilo—postdate Aristotle, Gersonides could have argued that they were already refuted by Aristotle, who, maintaining the eternity of the world, rejected its antithesis, namely, that the world is created, and thus rejected all subcategories thereof. Nevertheless Gersonides does go back and consider Philoponus’ view in a later stage of his own inquiry into the problem of creation (VI.1.14). 90 See P. Aubenque, “Science, culture et dialectique chez Aristote,” Association Guillaume Budé, Actes du congrès de Lyon Budé 1958 (Louvain and Paris, 1961), p. 144; idem, “La dialectique chez Aristote,” L’Attualità della problematica aristotelica (Padua, 1970), p. 20. 91 Metaphysics (trans. Ross).

70

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD What he means by this is that one should first present the dialectic statements that support one thing itself and refute it in all the profound questions in this science, because it is part of the perfection of reaching knowledge of the matter (I mean demonstrated knowledge) for a person to first know the contradictory statement in the matter and afterward he will make known their solution because of the demonstration of that matter. This is Aristotle’s way in all sciences (I mean the deep questions in them), namely, that through these questions in which they find doubtful statements, and one cannot know how profound they are if one does not first know them through dialectic statements. But in physics he saw that for those who endeavor to ground the demonstration on a certain question it is better to conduct the dialectic inquiry into the question first.92

Thus Averroes recommends that, in physics, an inquiry based on the diaporematic method be conducted before the specific demonstration. I believe that Gersonides accepted this recommendation and prefaces a discussion based on the diaporematic method to those that rely on a demonstratio per signum.93 The exposition of the aporia in the first stage of the discussion guides his own inquiry, providing the questions to be asked about creation and even its structure, which derives from the logical order of the opinions presented there by diaeresis (VI.1.1). But what may the most important role of the diaporematic method in the discussion of creation is the fact that it guarantees finding the truth “so that no doubt remains.” Even though the method does not lead to the solution itself, after it has been used to disprove all of the historical opinions in the third stage of the inquiry it buttresses the conclusion that Gersonides’ independent and original solution, which is unlike those of all his predecessors, is the undoubted truth. Without the prior refutation of the other solutions Gersonides might have 92 From the Hebrew translation of the Metaphysics by Moses ben Solomon of Beaucaire, as found in Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Paris—BNF, MS hébr. 887 (IMHM 31656), fol. 17v, corrected on the basis of Paris—BNF, MS hébr. 886 (IMHM 31655), fol. 16r. 93 In the introduction to the Wars, Gersonides states explicitly that this is the type of proof to be applied to the question of whether the world is eternal or generated (Introduction, pp. 2–3 / 1:92). Gersonides assigns the different types of proofs as appropriate to the various sciences in the preliminary remark (haÉÉa{ah) to his commentary on Song of Songs. See Commentary on Song of Songs, pp. 62–63 / pp. 9–10. A discussion based on the diaporematic method is prefaced to a demonstration per signum in the solutions to “whether the world is eternal or generated” (VI. 1.5–13, 15) and whether a plurality of worlds is possible (VI. 1.19). The compromise solution to “how this creation was possible . . . whether creation from something or creation ex nihilo” (VI.1.17, p. 362 / 3:322) is achieved by means of the dialectic method.

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

71

retained some misgivings that one of the answers advanced by his predecessors might be tenable.94 Summary We have seen that Gersonides offers two different types of solutions to his aporias: solutions that have a previous history and his own original solutions. He offers the former with regard to the problems of divine providence and the agent that generates the animate souls in the sublunar world. In these cases, each of the possible solutions is also one of the logical or logical-philosophical answers to the question raised at the start of the investigation. But most of Gersonides’ solutions are new ones and almost all of them—except in the case of the immortality of the soul—are compromise solutions: the nature of the hylic intellect, God’s knowledge of particulars, the manner of the creation of the universe, and the agent of miracles. Even in the first type of answer, though, Gersonides makes a new contribution to the history of thought and further develops the historical solution he adopts. In general, Gersonides views the diaporematic method as essential for reaching the true answer to the questions he addresses. It is not a “ladder” that can be taken away after the solution has been reached, but part of the solution itself. Gersonides’ proposed solution is generally very concise; he takes for granted that his readers have carefully followed each stage in the diaporematic inquiry and remember the discussion based on it. In most cases the method contributes directly to the solution. In the discussion of divine providence the inquiry is used to identify a formal solution; in the consideration of God’s knowledge it leads to the discovery of the solution. In the case of the inquiry into the immortality of the soul, which leads to a discovery solution, the diaporematic method provides several but not all of the elements needed to devise a new solution. Another role played by the diaporematic method is ruling out false historical opinions presented in the first stage of the inquiry. The refutation of mistaken views plays two roles. First, it eliminates errors associated with the question at hand and thereby also vouches for the truth

94 Another way in which the diaporematic method guarantees the truth of the solution reached and certifies it as indubitable is found in the fifth stage of the inquiry.

72

the solutions of the aporias in the WARS OF THE LORD

of the solution that is reached (the discussions of the nature of the hylic intellect, the agent of miracles, and the creation of the world). Second, it steers the inquiry towards the correct answer (the nature of the hylic intellect and the agent of miracles). In the discussions that focus on the immortality of the soul, the agent of miracles, and the nature of the hylic intellect the diaporematic method plays another role as well: it points the inquiry towards a question whose answer will provide the solution. It plays a similar role with regard to the agent that generates the animate substance in the sublunar world; here it presents the solution that is to be proven by the scientific investigation—the goal of the inquiry—and thus guides it. Although the investigation of whether the world is generated or eternal is not based directly on the inquiry conducted according to the diaporematic method and does not construct the solution from solid evidence discovered in that inquiry, here too this method plays an important role, by framing the questions to be asked in Gersonides’ own independent inquiry and structuring that discussion. In all of the inquiries conducted under the shadow of the diaporematic method, its use guarantees that the solution reached by Gersonides is not only the truth but certain truth, “achieved so that no doubt remains.”

DIALECTIC IN GERSONIDES’ COMMENTARY ON PROVERBS* Gersonides accepted the Aristotelian concept of man, in which the distinctive characteristic of human beings is that they possess an intellect. But the intellect that human beings receive at birth, which is their differentia specifica, is merely a passive (or material ) intellect, a potential for acquiring knowledge. According to the teleological worldview of Aristotelian philosophy, it is incumbent upon human beings to perfect themselves and attain the purpose for which they were created. Because their specific difference is intellect, human beings must acquire knowledge of the intelligibles in order to turn their intellect from potential to actual and achieve their perfection, which, according to Aristotle’s successors of the Aristotelian school, is the acquired intellect. Intellectual perfection leads to happiness in this world and to the survival of the intellect after the death of the body, and thus to eternal bliss. Consequently, human beings must aspire to intellectual perfection not only in order to realize themselves fully as human beings, and not just to achieve the happiness that accompanies intellectual apprehension in this world, but also to render their intellect immortal and thereby to pass from the transient mode of existence in this world to eternal existence and eternal bliss. Gersonides wove this concept of man into his religious philosophy. The world, which is oriented toward its final causes, was created this way by the will of God. Because human beings must focus on perfecting themselves in order to realize the final cause of nature, insofar as it related to them, God assists them in this endeavor by providing them with a guide for the attainment of intellectual perfection. For Gersonides, the Torah is a mode of divine providence and can guide human beings to attain human perfection. As he wrote at the very beginning of his commentary on the Pentateuch: “God does not refrain from extending * The present chapter derives from a larger research project into the use of dialectic in Gersonides’ biblical exegesis, still in progress. It was made possible by a Harry Starr Fellowship at the Center for Judaic Studies at Harvard University during the spring semester 2005, followed by a visiting professorship at the Center for Judaic Studies at Harvard University during my sabbatical from Tel Aviv University (until the end of February 2006).

74

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

providence to [human beings], guiding them to the true perfection, which is the whole fruition of every human being. . . . He did this by giving this divine Torah; which is a law that moves those who conduct themselves in perfect accord with it to achieve the true felicity (ha la ah).”1 This guide to the attainment of intellectual perfection comprises not only the Torah but also the other books of the Bible. According to Gersonides, two of the books traditionally ascribed to King Solomon, the Song of Songs and Proverbs, are in fact such propaedeutics. Maimonides had shown that the prophetic books teach true knowledge, mainly in physics and metaphysics; Gersonides demonstrates that Scripture teaches us epistemological and logical concepts as well. The Torah guides its readers by means of its content: its precepts, political philosophy, and “the science of existents” ( okmat ha-nim a ot; i.e., physics and metaphysics). Solomon—whom Gersonides, like Maimonides before him, considers to be a philosopher—advises his readers on the correct use of the various methods of scientific investigation, which make it possible to acquire knowledge of both the speculative sciences (mathematics, physics, and metaphysics) and the practical sciences (political philosophy, including ethics). The Song of Songs is a manual only for individuals with the capacity to attain intellectual perfection, whereas Proverbs, like the Torah, can guide readers both to moral perfection and to intellectual perfection: it guides the masses, who are incapable of intellectual perfection, to moral perfection only, and superior individuals to both types of perfection, inasmuch as moral perfection is a precondition for intellectual perfection and consequently a stage on the road to achieving it.2 For Gersonides, his role as a biblical commentator includes elucidating this instruction. Gersonides’ commentaries on the biblical books attributed to Solomon show that he believed that Solomon’s ideas about scientific methods parallel those held by Aristotle3 and can accordingly be clarified Comm. on Genesis, p. 1. See the preliminary remark (ha a ah) to Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs (p. 61 / p. 8). See also the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 4:22 (96b/83v). 3 It should be stressed that, according to Gersonides, Solomon’s ideas correspond to Aristotelian logic but are not learned from it. As I have shown elsewhere, Gersonides held that the book of Job, too, was written according to the diaporematic method. See (in this volume): “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” pp. 21, 27, 36–37; “The Introductions to the Biblical Commentaries,” p. 162. The theory of the diaporematic method is not expounded in the commentary on Job but is applied there. In his introduction to that commentary, Gersonides supports his case that the book is a historical narrative rather than a parable as follows: “It is not impossible that the opinions of men on a single question correspond to the number of parts that [logical] judgment discerns, for the Philosopher [Aristotle] has 1 2

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

75

using the books of the latter’s Organon. Consequently, his commentary on these aspects of the biblical texts is ipso facto an exposition and exegesis of Aristotelian theories of logic. Gersonides knew these theories chiefly through Averroes’s middle commentaries on the books of the Aristotelian Organon and from the Metaphysics itself.4 Hence it is specifically from his biblical exegesis that we can infer what elements of Aristotelian logic he applied to scientific investigation and how he understood them. It is conventional to view Aristotelian dialectic as the art of debate; that is, a method of argument based on disputation. In three of his works, however—the Topics, the Metaphysics, and the Ethics—Aristotle notes other applications or “utilities” of dialectic.5 The usefulness of dialectic was discussed extensively and developed in Arabic philosophy, starting with al-Farabi in his commentary on the utility of dialectic in the Topics,6 and later by Averroes in his Middle Commentary on same chapter of the Topics.7 already mentioned many questions, some of them in natural science [ physics] and some of them in divine science [metaphysics], where the opinions of earlier thinkers are found to coincide [in number] with the number of parts that this argument may yield” (Comm. on Job, n.p. / p. 6). Thus there, too, he noted the parallel between the diaporematic method of inquiry in Job and Aristotle’s use of the same method. 4 Gersonides knew Aristotle’s Metaphysics in two Hebrew versions: that by Moses ben Solomon of Beaucaire, incorporated into Solomon’s translation of Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, and an anonymous translation he referred to as the “new translation.” See Charles Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide (Paris, 1973), p. 40 n. 50. In the Wars of the Lord he quotes and comments on the text of the Metaphysics in the translation by Moses ben Solomon, because there he was dealing with and criticizing Averroes’s Long Commentary on that work. See Wars V.3.3 (pp. 240–244 / 3:109–117). We must assume, then, that it is Moses’ translation to which he relates in the commentary on Proverbs and perhaps in his other biblical commentaries as well. But in the commentary on Song of Songs (p. 73 / p. 20) he used the “new translation.” In several passages that I checked, the “new translation” seems to me to be more faithful to Averroes’s Arabic, but a closer study of the matter is required. 5 Topics I.2; Metaphysics III.1; Nicomachean Ethics VII.1. 6 Al-Farabi’s commentary on Topics I.2 (101a25–101b4). See al-Fārābī, “Kitāb aljadal,” in R. al- Ajam, ed., al-Man iq inda al-Fārābī, vol. 3 (Beirut, 1986), pp. 29–38. Ruth Glasner has demonstrated that Gersonides knew Arabic, but there is no evidence that he read entire books in that language; see Ruth Glasner, “On Gersonides’ Knowledge of Languages,” Aleph 2 (2002): 235–257. According to Mauro Zonta, there was a Hebrew translation of al-Farabi’s Epitome of the Organon as early as the thirteenth century; some of its component works were quoted and used by Jewish scholars of the fourteenth century. See Mauro Zonta, La filosofica antica nel Medioevo ebraico: Le traduzioni ebraiche medievali dei testi filosofici antichi (Brescia, 1996), p. 162. Thus Gersonides could have been familiar with al-Farabi on the Topics, but I have found no evidence of this anywhere his writings. I would like to thank Ruth Glasner for calling Zonta’s book to my attention. 7 Averroes, Talkhī Kitāb al-Jadal, ed. C. E. Butterworth and A. A. Haridi (Cairo, 1979), pp. 31–34. Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics was translated into Hebrew by Qalonymus ben Qalonymus (1313). I quote the Hebrew according to Be ur

76

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

The discussion of dialectic and its uses occupies a major place in Gersonides’ writings. His commentaries on Averroes’s middle commentaries on Aristotle’s Organon (written around the year 1323) include one on the Middle Commentary on the Topics; he deals with this subject in two other genres as well: in his original philosophical and theological work the Wars of the Lord and in his biblical commentaries. In the Wars, Gersonides surveys dialectic as a method he employs in his own philosophical investigations and actually makes use of it.8 In his biblical commentaries he credits Solomon both with an exposition of the role of dialectic in philosophical inquiry (in the Song of Songs and in Proverbs) as well as with the actual use of the diaporematic method (in Ecclesiastes and in Proverbs),9 and explains both of them. In the introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes, Gersonides himself develops the theory of the dialectic method, in order to explain and justify his exegetical assertion that the book employs the diaporematic method. He also holds that the book of Job was written according to this method, as he demonstrates in his commentary on it.10 Here I would like to examine the theory of the application of the dialectic method to scientific inquiry, as expounded in Gersonides’ commentary on Proverbs,11 the last of his biblical commentaries (written in 1338),12 and thereby shed light on several aspects of how Gersonides perceived Aristotelian dialectic. I will focus on two aspects of the presentation of dialectic in Proverbs: the theoretical aspect, which can be inferred from his comments on individual verses; and the exegetical method he applies to these verses. With regard to the theoretical aspect I will consider several questions: how did Gersonides understand and interpret Aristotelian dialectic and its use in philosophical inquiry? What can the dialectic method achieve, according

Sefer obiqi ve-hu Sefer ha-Ni ua , Paris—BNF, MS héb. 933 (IMHM 30917). For the passage on the uses of dialectic, see there, fols. 2v–4r. 8 See (in this volume) “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” pp. 13–43; “The Solutions of the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” pp. 45–72. See also my “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur,” pp. 105–134. I deal with the use of dialectic in the Wars of the Lord more extensively in a long study currently in progress. 9 See below, Gersonides’ explanation of the name “Agur son of Jakeh.” 10 See above, n. 3. 11 I hope to address the use of the dialectic method in philosophical inquiry in Gersonides’ commentaries on Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes in a future publication. 12 See Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 70.

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

77

to him, and what disciplines is it appropriate for? With regard to the exegetical aspect I will show how Gersonides glossed words and verses in Proverbs as exemplifications of these theoretical points. Explanations of Words In Gersonides’ reading, the author of Proverbs frames the ideas he wishes to teach his readers in two ways: in parables13 and in “scientific” language meant to be understood according to its plain sense. Because he holds that Solomon usually expressed his views on appropriate methods of inquiry in precise, technical language, Gersonides focuses on philological exegesis and glosses the words of the biblical text that refer to scientific methods of investigation. In his elucidation of the first three of the nine sections into which he divides the book (1:1–19; 1:20–2:22; 3:1–6:19), he begins with the “Explanation of the Words” (be ur ha-millot), a gloss on the difficult words in the text, followed by the “Explanation of the Text” (be ur ha-devarim), in which he provides a running commentary on the verses of that section, based on the preceding glosses. In the later sections of the book he drops the separate “Explanation of the Words”14 and launches at once into 13 For Gersonides’ definition of the mashal or parable, see the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1:1–9 (quoted below, n. 94). 14 After the fourth section he also stopped enumerating the utilities, a procedure that struck him as superfluous because of the peculiar character of the book of Proverbs. The book presents ideas and moral virtues itself, whether directly or through parables, obviating the need to draw conclusions in the form of “utilities”—as Gersonides wrote at the end of some sections; e.g.: “the utilities derived from it are clarified by what we have written” (124a/123v); “the utilities derived from it are clear from a brief consideration of what we have written” (131b/134r). The Torah and Former Prophets incorporate historical narratives; because Gersonides believes that these were intended to teach speculative philosophy and political and ethical behavior, he found it necessary to extract the general lessons to be derived in these disciplines and to formulate them in precise language as “utilities.” But he did not bother to list any “utilities” for the first pericope of Genesis, which, he holds, deals with cosmology, psychology, and epistemology, on grounds similar to those stated here in Proverbs, but which he expands there: “But we have already pointed out the utilities to be derived from this section in our exegesis; even if we wanted to list them, there are too many of them to count. For there is nothing in it that does not have a marvelous utility for doctrines; consequently the number of utilities would make our text twice as long—and there is no reason for that” (Comm. on Genesis, p. 143). It seems plausible that when Gersonides began the commentary on Proverbs he followed the method to which he was accustomed in his other biblical commentaries, but at some point realized that the structure he followed in his other commentaries on the Bible was not essential

78

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

the “Explanation of the Text,” although from time to time he embeds glosses of individual words into it.15 One feature of Gersonides’ glosses on words in Proverbs is that he understands some of them as designating forms of knowledge or cognition16 and others as standing for various aspects of Aristotelian dialectic. His verbal glosses are not based on the conventional lexicon of Hebrew or the biblical usage of these words; that is, he does not infer their meaning from the context in which they appear elsewhere in the Bible, as Maimonides did in the biblical-philosophical lexicon in the

for Proverbs and accordingly dropped the “utilities.” In the ha a ah or preliminary remark he writes that in this commentary he will refrain from listing the “utilities to be derived from it “for moral virtues or doctrines or both of them” (“Ha a ah to Comm. on Proverbs,” p. 278); in fact, he did not do so in the first four sections. It is possible that he wrote this part of the preliminary remark later, to justify the omission of the utilities, but retained those he had already written rather than deleting them during his final revision. Braner (ibid., p. 283 and n. 65) notes that the omission of the utilities starts from the fifth section. 15 In the “Explanation of the Text” as printed in Miqra ot gedolot, the comments on each verse are preceded by a transcription of the key words, which leaves the impression that Gersonides expounded each verse separately. But these incipits are not found in the “Explanation of the Text” in Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247. Instead, it takes the form of a running commentary on the biblical text, a series of paraphrases in which the original words are sometimes embedded and are sometimes replaced by other words and expressions that elucidate their meaning. This is also the format of the “Explanation of the Story” or “Explanation of the Pericope” in Gersonides’ commentaries on the Pentateuch. I believe that this is also the format he employed for the “Explanation of the Text” on Proverbs and that the incipits were added by a later editor to make it easier for readers to follow. According to Braner (“Gersonides’ Ha a ah to the Commentary on Proverbs,” pp. 282–283), the incipits were added to the “Explanation of the Text” by the printer. It is possible that the “Explanation of the Text” in the commentary on Proverbs and the “Explanation of the Story” or “Explanation of the Pericope” in the commentaries on the Pentateuch are where Gersonides adopted the exegetical method of Averroes in some of his middle commentaries on Aristotle (for example, the Middle Commentary on the Meteorology): writing a text that more or less replaces that being glossed and which blends the original text and the commentary to such an extent that it becomes impossible to distinguish one from the other. Readers of the “Explanation of the Text,” like readers of Averroes’s middle commentaries on Aristotle, have no need of the original work and can make do with the commentary alone. I call this method “exegetical paraphrase.” Nevertheless, for readers’ convenience I note the verses to which the passage refers whenever I quote the “Explanation of the Text.” 16 This phenomenon is found in Gersonides’ early commentary on Job (1325). There, for example, he explained the words okmah and tevunah (commentary on the Lord’s response from the whirlwind [ Job 38–39]) as well as tushiyyah ( Job 5:12). He does this again in his commentary on Proverbs. The glosses on okmah and tevunah in Job are much broader than those in the commentary on Proverbs.

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

79

first part of the Guide of the Perplexed.17 In the biblical philosophical lexicon he offers here Gersonides, unlike Maimonides before him, neither justifies his definitions nor supports them in any way before applying them in his commentary on the verse in which the words appear. As in many of his biblical commentaries, Gersonides attaches a preliminary remark, which he designates by the Hebrew term ha a ah, to the running commentary on the biblical text.18 The ha a ah is a genre based on the Greek eisagôgê, which is a brief overview of the main topics discussed in the book to which the commentary applies and provides readers with a background for understanding that book or some of its main themes.19 Gersonides related to this aspect of the ha a ah to Proverbs in its opening lines:20 “To condense what is stated in more than one place and avoid redundancy, we considered it appropriate to state first what is conducive to understanding many of the things in this book and that this book will comment on, because this will make our remarks more intelligible [emphasis mine] and avoid redundancy in many places where the comments would be on the same issue [as in other places].”21 Hence Gersonides employs the ha a ah to gloss

17 On Maimonides’ philosophical lexicon see my Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Story of Creation, 2nd ed. ( Jerusalem, 1987), p. 54 (Hebrew); more recently, and in English, “Bible Commentary,” in K. Seeskin, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 247–250. 18 On Gersonides’ introductions to his biblical commentaries see (in this volume) “The Introductions to the Biblical Commentaries,” pp. 151–179. Although Miqra ot gedolot omits the ha a ah to the commentary on Proverbs, I wrote about several aspects of it (ibid., pp. 153, 167–168, 172–173, 178), relying on Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247 (IMHM 4284), 74a–b. Now that Braner has printed the ha a ah on the basis of several manuscripts, I quote here from his edition, pp. 278–281. 19 On the ha a ah as a literary genre and it characteristics in Gersonides’ biblical commentaries, see “Introductions to the Biblical Commentaries,” pp. 165–171. 20 But he also explains the nature of his commentary in the ha a ah, before offering a concise survey of the ideas that can help readers understand the book being interpreted. It may be, as I have written elsewhere (ibid., p. 165), that Gersonides also used the ha a ah in the broader sense of an introduction, as in the commentary on Song of Songs, which is also prefaced by a ha a ah. The ha a ah to the commentary on Proverbs, like that of the commentary on Song of Songs, should be viewed as an introduction that includes a ha a ah in the narrower sense of the term. 21 Ha a ah to the Comm. on Proverbs, p. 278. This statement of intentions highlights another characteristic of Gersonides’ writing: concision. See (in this volume): “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” pp. 188–190; and “The Introductions to the Biblical Commentaries,” pp. 176–178. Similarly, Gersonides offers a similar reason for the concentration of the explanations of the recurrent metaphors in Song of Songs in “one comprehensive Ha a ah” (p. 64 / p. 11) (see “Introductions to the Biblical Commentaries,” p. 178). Despite the assertion that elucidating certain topics in a Ha a ah makes it possible to avoid redundancy in the commentary and therefore

80

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

several words that he takes to be keys for understanding the entire book; by explaining them in the ha a ah he prepares readers to understand the running commentary. The words in question are those he glosses as designating the types of “human knowledge and notions (ha-yedi ot ve-ha-haśśagot ha enoshiyyot).”22 As with the ha a ot prefaced to his commentaries on other books of the Bible, the bulk of what he states concisely in the ha a ah is repeated in various guises in the body of the commentary, in both the “Explanations of the Words” and the “Explanations of the Text.” The words that he glosses in the ha a ah, and then again in the “Explanation of the Words” on the first chapter of Proverbs (supplemented by the content of the “Explanation of the Text” on the verses of that chapter), are mezimmah, da at, okmah, and binah or tevunah— rendered in normal parlance as, respectively, “discretion/scheme,” “knowledge,” “wisdom/science,” and “understanding/discernment.”23 In various parts of the commentary Gersonides sometimes employs slightly different formulations; this variation provides us with better insight into the meaning he assigned to each of these words. Although the terms relevant for us are those that designate aspects of the dialectic method, in order to understand them and the verses in which they occur we shall have to consider the meaning of other words that Gersonides explains here. These key words for understanding Proverbs fall into two categories: terms that refer to knowledge acquired directly and terms that refer to knowledge acquired indirectly, by means of syllogisms. The furthers the goal of concision, Gersonides repeats glosses found in the Ha a ah in the “Explanation of the Words” and sometimes in the “Explanation of the Text,” thereby producing the very repetition he claimed he wanted to avoid. 22 Ha a ah to the Comm. on Proverbs, p. 280. 23 Gersonides glosses other terms and phrases related to knowledge in the body of the commentary: tushiyyah (“Explanation of the Words” on 1:20–2:22; “Explanation of the Text” on 2:7 and 8:14), gevurah (“Explanation of the Text” on 8:14), and several terms related to moral conduct: ormah (“Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1), yir at Ha-shem ‘the fear of the Lord’ (ibid. and “Explanation of the Text” on 1:7 and 8:13), and e ah (“Explanation of the Text” on 8:14). Note that, in the MS, the gloss on tushiyyah and the explanation of be-tahpukot ra ‘in the perverseness of evil’ (2:14) are included in the “Explanation of the Words” that precedes the “Explanation of the Text” on 1:20–2:22, whereas in Miqra ot gedolot the explanation of tushiyyah is part of the “Explanation of the Words” that follows the “Explanation of the Text” on 1:20–2:5. In the MS there is no “Explanation of the Words” after the “Explanation of the Text” on 1:20–2:5; the comment on 1:6 follows directly after that on v. 5 (in the “Explanation of the Text”) and completes it. The MS version seems to be the correct one.

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

81

former category consists of da at, in its first sense, and mezimmah; the second category includes da at in its second sense, okmah, and binah or tevunah. According to Gersonides, the word da at is polysemic.24 At the start of the ha a ah he explains that da at means “the first intelligibles that apply to each problem”;25 that is, the premises of the demonstrative syllogism. Later in the ha a ah, however, he assigns another meaning to the word—metaphysical knowledge, and in practice the highest level of metaphysical knowledge: “This is the knowledge achieved in this way [i.e., by means of dialectic syllogisms] of the separate intellects and of God;26 it is also referred to as the ‘knowledge of the holy ones.’ ”27 In the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1, Gersonides offers a broader definition of da at in its first sense: “Da at designates the first intelligibles or something close to them, to reveal the truth in it.”28 He expands on “what is close to them” later in the commentary on Proverbs, with regard to “by his knowledge the deeps broke forth, and the clouds drop down the dew” (Prov. 3:20): That God made the deeps break forth and caused the clouds to drop down [dew] is an important precondition for the existence of this lower world, because plants and animals cannot survive without it. It also maintains a balance between the element of water and the other elements that correspond to it. Now the emergence of this new thing in

24 In the commentary on Ecclesiastes he gives this word a different sense. See Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 53. 25 Ha a ah to the Comm. on Proverbs, p. 280. Compare the commentary on Proverbs 8:12: “Da at, which means the first intelligibles” (– / 90v). This is also the sense of da at according to Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s “Explanation of Foreign Words.” Mena em Me iri, in his commentary on Proverbs, agrees: “Even though the word da at normally refers to the first intelligibles that men know by divine grace and not through study, as stated by Men of the Great Assembly: ‘You graciously endow man with da at’ . . . ” (Mena em Me iri, Commentary on Proverbs, ed. M. M. Meshi-Zahav [ Jerusalem, 1969], p. 11 [Hebrew]). According to Me iri this is the most common meaning of this word. 26 Me iri offers a similar explanation in the introduction to his commentary on Proverbs: “Da at sometimes refers to first intelligibles and sometimes to the acquired intellect” (p. 11). Thus Me iri, too, held that da at designates both the first intelligibles and the pinnacle of intellectual knowledge, but he identified the latter with the acquired intellect, whereas Gersonides refers to the branch of knowledge that is acquired by the intellect, which he identifies with metaphysics. 27 Ha a ah to the Comm. on Proverbs, p. 281. Me iri explains that “in the word da at he included the world of the separate intellects,” but adds that the term also refers to the world of the spheres. See his commentary on Proverbs 33 (ed. MeshiZahav, p. 280). 28 Ha a ah to the Comm. on Proverbs, p. 288.

82

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs God’s knowledge and apprehension thereof is similar to the first intelligibles. For the moist exhalation forms in the bowels of the earth: when something prevents it from rising and it must descend, it condenses and turns to water; or when it rises and comes into contact with the cold place the coldness condenses it and water is produced from it. This type of knowledge is called da at.29

According to this interpretation, da at is knowledge of the natural processes that belong to the domain of Aristotelian meteorology, which one learns through syllogisms, i.e., explanatory demonstrations (mofetei sibbah, demonstrationes propter quid). One of these processes is the condensation of the moist exhalation into water. When this occurs inside the earth, the seas and rivers are produced; when it takes place in the air, the result is dew.30 For Gersonides, the conclusions of these syllogisms are close to primary concepts or first intelligibles; that is, they are similar to notions that are patently obvious, such as the fact that the whole is greater than any of its parts.31 In his commentary on Proverbs 1:4 Gersonides says that propositions that incorporate such knowledge are the “starting point of the inquiry,” that is, they can serve as the first premises of the syllogism, like the first intelligibles. Mezimmah designates a generally accepted opinion,32 which can be employed as a premise in a dialectic syllogism. In the ha a ah, GerComm. on Proverbs, 95a/82r. For the explanation of the formation of dew, see Meteorology I.10; for the explanation of the formation of seas and rivers, ibid., II.1–2. Gersonides knew these passages through Averroes’s Epitome and Middle Commentary on the Meteorology. Gersonides wrote his own commentary on the Epitome as part of his series of supercommentaries on Averroes’s epitomes of Aristotle’s treatises on natural science (1322). He also knew the Middle Commentary on the Meteorology and quotes it in the Wars of the Lord (V.3.9, p. 218 / 3:75); see Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 75. There are eleven explicit references to it in his commentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the Meteorology. See “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” n. 4. 31 I have not found any other premises like this in Gersonides. Textual considerations led him to distinguish between three creative actions by God and three forms of knowledge that parallel them: okmah and tevunah, in 5:19, and da at, in 5:20. An anonymous reader of this article suggested that this definition of da at parallels alGhazali’s distinction between first intelligibles and propositions “whose inference is in their nature,” i.e., propositions that are generated by such rapid and natural inferences that they seem to involve no inference at all, as if they were first intelligibles. That reader relied on G. B. Chertoff, “The Logical Part of al-Ghazali’s Makā id al-Falāsifa, Anonymous Hebrew Translation with the Hebrew Commentary of Moses of Narbonne,” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1952, part 2, pp. 85–86. I would add that Gersonides knew al-Ghazali’s treatise and quoted it in his commentary on Song of Songs 1:9, so he may have been influenced by it. 32 “Generally accepted premises” are propositions taken to be correct because everyone or most people or all scholars or most scholars or the most eminent scholars 29 30

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

83

sonides offers a terse explanation of this word: “This is the supposition that applies to the matter in question.”33 In the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1 he explains the term at greater length and notes its use in dialectic: “Mezimmah is the supposition that is the starting point (hat alah) of knowledge [da at, in the sense of ‘metaphysical knowledge’] and leads to it. When a person wants to determine the truth of the matter he takes the suppositions that apply to it, and takes those among them that are correct, and sets aside those that are incorrect, as is mentioned in the Topics and in the Metaphysics.”34 In both the ha a ah and the “Explanation of the Words” Gersonides relates mezimmah to ma shavah/ma shavot rather than to haqdamot mefursamot, which is the standard term for “generally accepted premises.”35 According to the Posterior Analytics, “supposition” has the epistemological status of “a proposition which is immediate and not necessary.”36 In his short commentary on the Logic, Averroes defines “supposition” as follows: “In general, supposition is believing that something exists in a particular kind of way, while it is possible for it to be different than it is believed to be.”37 Gersonides repeats this definition, slightly modified, in his supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Posterior Analytics:38 “ ‘Supposition’ means that we think that something is a certain way, even though it is possible for it to be the other way.”39 The use of ma shavah ‘supposition’ to designate generally hold them to be true. See: Aristotle, Topics I.1 (100b21–23); I.14 (105a35–37); Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 933, fol. 8v; Averroes, Kol meleket higgayon (Riva di Trento, 1560), 57b; English translation (from the Arabic): Averroës’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics, Rhetoric, and Poetics, ed. and trans. Charles E. Butterworth (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977) [short commentary on the Topics, p. 47]. According to Averroes, they are held to be true on the basis of “testimony of all or most people” (ibid.). 33 Ha a ah to the Comm. on Proverbs, p. 280. Similarly, in the “Explanation of the Text” on Proverbs 8:12: “and mezimmot, which are the suppositions that enable the study of each problem” (– / 90v). 34 “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1, p. 288. 35 Thus he identifies ma shavah/ma shavot with generally accepted premise(s). In support of this interpretation see also below, nn. 41, 74, and 92. 36 Posterior Analytics I.33 (89a4), trans. with a commentary by Jonathan Barnes, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Barnes writes “opinion” for what seems to be the same concept that Butterworth denominates “supposition.” 37 Kol meleket higgayon; Topics 57b; trans. Butterworth, p. 47. 38 This passage of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Posterior Analytics corresponds to Posterior Analytics I.33. See Sefer ha-Mofet le- Aristo be ur Ben Rushd, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 931/1 (IMHM 30916), fol. 62v. 39 Be ur Sefer ha-Mofet, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958 (IMHM 32608), fol. 121v.

84

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

accepted premises highlights the epistemological status of such propositions: we believe they are true but know that they may not be; that is, we are not fully confident that they are true. This is inherent in what follows from Gersonides’ gloss on mezimmah in the “Explanation of the Words”: not all generally accepted premises are true and some of them are false. Because at this stage of the inquiry we do not yet know which are true and which false, all generally accepted premises are for the moment only “suppositions.” With regard to mezimmah, in the “Explanation of the Words” Gersonides adds an explanation of how propositions of this type are employed in inquiry. Metaphysical inquiry is conducted by means of the dialectic method. The “suppositions” are the premises of the syllogisms that make it possible to discover the truth about the separate intellects and God (that is, da at). But because there is no certainty that they are correct, if we would employ them to discover the truth we must apply another form of the dialectic method—the dialectic method as a means of testing; i.e., the diaporematic method40—and use it to verify that these premises are correct. Gersonides describes this method clearly: the investigator must first collect all of the “suppositions,” that is, all the generally accepted propositions that can serve as the premises of syllogisms related to the question he is investigating. After that he must examine them, selecting those that are true and discarding those that are false. Only then he can construct syllogisms based on true premises and arrive at a true conclusion.41 40 In order to distinguish dialectic as a method of examination from dialectic as a method of debate and dialectic as a method of proof (the dialectic syllogism), I refer to the first of these as the “diaporematic method.” Various Aristotelian scholars have employed this term to designate dialectic in this sense. See: La Métaphysique, new edition, comm. J. Tricot (Paris, 1974), p. 119 n. 2; P. Ricœur, “La philosophie et ses ‘apories,’ ” in idem, Etre, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote (Paris, 1982), p. 181; F. Pironet, “Aristote: Aporia, euporia et les mot étymologiquement apparentée,” in A. Motte and Chr. Rutten, eds., Aporia dans la philosophie grecque, des origines à Aristote (Louvain-la-Neuve, 2001), pp. 183–186. According to the ha a ah of Gersonides’ commentary on Ecclesiastes, the starting point of this examination is “perplexity” (mevukah), which is the subjective aspect of the aporia—the psychological state of the researcher that confronts the aporia. The generally accepted premises that are assembled by thought are contradictory and hence cause “perplexity.” The examination of the premises makes it possible to identify the correct ones and refute the false ones and thus to overcome the perplexity. See Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 15. 41 A parallel description of the diaporematic method can be found in the first ha a ah of Gersonides’ introduction to the commentary on Ecclesiastes. Here he highlights the use of this method in the study of political philosophy, which also relies on dialectic syllogisms. In the introduction to the commentary on Ecclesiastes, Gersonides uses

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

85

In other words, the dialectic method, in the sense of the dialectic syllogism, which is a deductive syllogism, is a form of inquiry that can be used to discover metaphysical truth. But the possibility of finding the truth by this method depends on the prior use of diaporematic verification. The diaporematic method is thus an auxiliary to scientific inquiry by means of dialectic; it provides this inquiry with generally accepted premises that are true and can be used as a foundation for its syllogisms.42 In his description of the diaporematic method here Gersonides explicitly refers to two works in which Aristotle introduces this method: the Topics43 and the Metaphysics.44 He notes that, in Proverbs, Solomon recommended the use of the same investigative method employed by Aristotle in these two treatises.45 According to the ha a ah, okmah and binah or tevunah are forms of knowledge acquired indirectly, through scientific inquiry or syllogisms. Gersonides distinguishes these several forms of knowledge as a function of the type of premises on which the syllogisms are based and lists the sciences that employ them. okmah46 refers to demonstrative knowledge ( okmah moftit). Gersonides defines its premises in keeping with the two main features of the

haqdamot mefursamot ‘generally accepted premises’ instead of ma shavot ‘suppositions’: “It is appropriate that one first collect all of the generally accepted premises that may apply to each problem and afterwards winnow out the correct ones from the incorrect, because in this way one can easily arrive at the premises that lead to the truth in each problem” (p. 15). This parallel suggests that ma shavot are “generally accepted premises.” That ma shavah/ma shavot are “generally accepted premises” is also obvious in the explanation of mezimmah in Proverbs 1:4. See below, pp. 90–91 (the section that deals with the commentary on the verses that refer to mezimmah). 42 Gersonides offers a clearer exposition of this idea in the introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes. He repeats it in his description of the diaporematic method as that to be employed in the Wars of the Lord (Introduction, p. 6 / 1:97; VI.2.10, p. 444 / 3:475). In all of these places Gersonides introduces the diaporematic method but does not explain how the true premises are selected from among all the generally accepted premises about the matter at hand. 43 See Topics I.2 (101a34–36). Gersonides was not acquainted with the Hebrew translation of the Topics, but only with Averroes’s Middle Commentary on it. Here he relied on the first manner of the third utility of dialectic, according to Averroes. See Paris—BNF, MS héb. 933, fol. 3r. 44 The reference is to Metaphysics III.1. For Gersonides’ knowledge of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, see above, n. 4. 45 In the introduction to the commentary on Ecclesiastes (p. 15) he mentions only the Metaphysics as the source of the method. 46 In the commentary on Ecclesiastes he glosses okmah in a different way (see pp. 47, 53). See also S. Feldman, “The Wisdom of Solomon: A Gersonidean Interpretation,”

86

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

premises of the demonstrative syllogism, as stated in the Posterior Analytics (which he knew from Averroes’s Middle Commentary on it). These premises must be inherent47 and appropriate:48 “This is the knowledge ( yedi ot) that can be acquired by means of inherent and appropriate premises, that is, apodictic sciences like the mathematical sciences and natural science [= physics].”49 Building on this definition of okmah, Gersonides explicates the expression la-da at okmah ‘to know [or learn] wisdom’ in his “Explanation of the Text” on Proverbs 1:2. Here he expands his explanation of

in G. Dahan, ed., Gersonide en son temps: science et philosophie médiévale (Louvain and Paris, 1991), p. 69. Feldman notes that in the commentary on Ecclesiastes Gersonides uses this word informally rather than with a technical sense. 47 Inherent premises (haqdamot a miyyot) are those in which the predicate relates to the subject in an inherent way. For the four different senses of the inherent relationship of predicate to subject see Posterior Analytics I.4 (73a34–73b24). According to Averroes, the first sense is that of “predicates that are included in the definition of their subjects are complete definitions or partial definitions” (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 932/1 (IMHM 30916), fol. 5r. The second sense is that of “predicates that include their subjects in their definition” (ibid., fol. 5v); that is, a predicate that is attached to another predicate that is included in its definition, or, as Gersonides puts it, “this happens in the accidents that are inherent to the subject” (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958, fol. 89r). The third sense is that of “individual substance” (ibid.). The fourth sense is that of “the effects that are always entailed by the causes that work them, that is, that they follow them in every case because it is said of them that their effects are entailed by them per essentia” (ibid.). For Gersonides’ explanation of these four senses see Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958, fols. 88v–90r. 48 “Appropriate premises” are those that are germane to the subject of the inquiry. According to the Posterior Analytics, every science has its own specific postulates and methods. Nothing can be proved in one branch of science by means of the postulates of a different branch. See: Posterior Analytics I.2 (72a6, 72a7, 75a38, 75b5); Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 932/1, fol. 2v, which corresponds to Posterior Analytics I.2 (71b23); and Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary, MS Paris 958, fol. 78r–v. Averroes explains that because demonstration yields true knowledge, which is knowledge of a thing and its cause, its premises must be appropriate: “Because they [the premises] are the cause of something that is produced of itself, they must be appropriate to the thing that is explained by them, because this is the inference of the cause from the effect” (ibid., fol. 2v). 49 Ha a ah to Comm. on Proverbs, p. 280. In the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1, Gersonides offers a different definition of okmah: “ okmah is the knowledge of things derived from things that are inherent and appropriate to them.” (p. 289) He repeats this definition with a slight variation in the Wars of the Lord, commenting on Proverbs 3:19: “The term [ okmah] in our language [i.e., Hebrew] connotes the knowledge of things by means of the essences of these things themselves ( a mut hadevarim ha-hem be- a mam [i.e., ‘that is inherent in them’]” (Wars V.2.1, p. 192 / 3:33). In both places he does not refer to the inherent and appropriate premises on which okmah is based but to what okmah is derived from. For a possible explanation of this see below, n. 60.

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

87

the term okmah, which, as we have seen, he understood to be demonstrative knowledge, and explains the types of proofs by which okmah can be acquired:50 “The utility of [the proverbs in the book] is for learning the demonstrative knowledge that is acquired through a demonstration by observation (mofet re iyyah, demonstratio per signum), or an explanatory demonstration (mofet sibbah, demonstratio propter quid ), or an explanatory and factual demonstration (mofet sibbah we-me i ut, demonstratio propter quid et quia).”51 In other words, okmah is knowledge acquired through the three types of demonstration:52 demonstrations by observation, explanatory demonstrations, and the combination of explanatory and factual demonstrations. Demonstrations by observation are a posteriori. They move from effect to cause and afford us knowledge of the cause of our knowledge of the conclusion but not knowledge of the cause of the conclusion.53 Explanatory demonstrations and explanatory and factual demonstrations are a priori, moving from cause to effect. The explanatory demonstration leads to knowledge of the conclusion,54 whereas the explanatory and factual demonstration leads to knowledge both of the cause of the conclusion and of the cause of our knowledge thereof.55 All three types are based on inherent and appropriate premises. According to the ha a ah, okmah pertains to mathematics and physics. The word may designate one or all of these sciences. In the commentary on Proverbs Gersonides usually applies it to physics. Although here he does not enumerate the types of demonstrations employed in each of these sciences, we can fill in the blanks from the ha a ah to the commentary on the Song of Songs: in mathematics one uses absolute

50 Here Gersonides seems to have relied on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Posterior Analytics I.13 (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 932/1, fols. 13v–14v), or on the Epitome of that treatise (in Kol meleket higgayon, p. 35a). Gersonides knew Kol meleket higgayon and quoted it in his works. See Charles Manekin, The Logic of Gersonides: A Translation of Sefer ha-Heqqesh ha-yashar (The Book of the Correct Syllogism) of Rabbi Levi ben Gershom (Dordrecht and Boston, 1991), p. 32. 51 “Explanation of the Text” on Proverbs 1, p. 289. This division into three types of proofs is found in the Epitome of the Posterior Analytics (Kol meleket higgayon, p. 35a). According to this explanation only the causal demonstration is to be employed when the object is already known to exist. 52 “Causal demonstration” is missing from the text in Miqra ot gedolot. In his commentary on Song of Songs Gersonides lists only two types of proofs: causal and factual demonstrations and demonstrations by observation. 53 See Kol meleket higgayon, pp. 36a and 40b. 54 Ibid., p. 40b. 55 Ibid., p. 36a.

88

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

demonstrations (i.e., explanatory and factual demonstrations), whereas in physics one relies chiefly on demonstrations by observation. Gersonides holds that binah and tevunah are synonyms that designate the knowledge obtained by means of dialectic syllogisms. In the ha a ah to the commentary on Proverbs Gersonides defines them, as he does okmah, according to the types of premises on which they are based. They turn out to be the exact opposite of the premises of okmah: binah or tevunah “are the ideas reached by means of non-inherent and inappropriate premises and by generally accepted opinions, as in divine and political philosophy.”56 Thus binah or tevunah are ideas consolidated deductively, by means of syllogisms whose premises are non-inherent and inappropriate, unlike those of okmah, which are inherent and appropriate, and by means of generally accepted premises. Gersonides states the matter somewhat differently in the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1:57 “Binah is knowledge of things that is arrived at from non-inherent things; as when we say that the sun warms and the moon cools58 even though these qualities do not inhere in them. This is also referred to as tevunah.”59 The wording and example suggest that we are to understand that binah/tevunah also designates propositions derived inductively from experience, from observation of objects in nature that do not operate through inherent causes, and not only deductive knowledge acquired by means of syllogisms based on non-inherent premises. In other words, binah includes the premises of these deductive syllogisms as well.60 Gersonides identifies non-inherent operations in nature with the stars’ influence on the sublunar world: the stars do not act through inherent causes; their influence on the sublunar world is not by means of the qualities that constitute their own essence; the sun warms even though the quality of heat is not inherent to it, and the moon cools

Ha a ah to Comm. on Proverbs, p. 280. “Divine philosophy” designates metaphysics or theology (the latter is a part of metaphysics). 57 Just as he gave a different definition of okmah. See above, n. 49; below, n. 60. 58 Thus in Miqra ot gedolot. The MS reads “and Saturn will cool,” but I think that the printed text is correct. 59 “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1, p. 288. 60 To judge by the parallel in his explanations of binah and tevunah, we are meant to understand that okmah as defined in the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1—“knowledge of things that is arrived at from inherent and appropriate things” (p. 280)—also means premises acquired by induction from experience of phenomena whose causes are inherent, and not only the conclusions of deductive syllogisms based on inherent and appropriate premises. 56

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

89

even though the quality of coolness is not inherent to it. We are meant to contrast this to fire, which warms because of its inherent heat, and to snow, which cools because of its inherent coldness. The qualities of heat and cold are the inherent causes of the heat and cold they generate in other things: the quality of heat generates heat and the quality of cold generates cold. In the “Explanation of the Text” on Proverbs 1:2, Gersonides explains the expression imrei vinah ‘words of discernment’ on the basis of the sense he assigned to binah in the second part of its definition in the ha a ah: imrei vinah are the generally accepted premises employed in the dialectic syllogisms that lead to knowledge in metaphysics and evidently also in political philosophy: “ ‘To understand imrei vinah’, meaning the generally accepted premises that lead to knowledge in the divine science and in what is similar to it (u-ve-mah she-yinhag minhagah), where the premises that lead to it are not inherent.”61 U-ve-mah she-yinhag minhagah evidently alludes to political philosophy.62 Both in the ha a ah and in the body of the commentary63 Gersonides states explicitly that in political philosophy knowledge is based on generally accepted premises. Thus the domains of binah and tevunah are, according the ha a ah and the “Explanation of the Text” on Proverbs 1:2, metaphysics and politics; according to the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1, natural astrology is included as well. Explanation of Phrases and Verses Gersonides’ running commentary on the text expounds Solomon’s guide to the attainment of intellectual perfection, which is formulated in two ways: by direct address to readers, and indirectly, through the depiction of several human types and their behavior. According to 61 According to this, generally accepted premises, too, are not inherent and appropriate, and hence have a common denominator with the non-inherent premises derived from experience and from observation of actions that do not stem from the essence of things. 62 MS: “. . . the divine science, such that (she-yinhag minhagah) the premises that lead to it are generally not inherent” (p. 75r). That is, the generally accepted premises apply only to “divine science” (metaphysics), and there is no allusion to other areas where knowledge is tevunah. 63 See the commentary on Proverbs 2:9 and 8:14. According to the ha a ah to the commentary on Ecclesiastes, too, political philosophy is based on generally accepted premises (see Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 15).

90

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

Gersonides, Solomon’s prescriptions for right conduct are based on a theory of scientific methods of investigation and intellectual cognition, a theory that Gersonides explains in his commentaries. Most of the verses in which Solomon offers such guidance to his readers include the words we have already scrutinized; Gersonides explains them on the basis of the meanings he assigned to them in the ha a ah to the commentary on Proverbs and in the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1. He also explains several verses that do not contain these words as referring to the diaporematic method, and points out several other verses that present similar information in figurative language.64 Verses that Contain the Word Mezimmah The most interesting comment on the verses that contain the word mezimmah is that on Proverbs 1:4–5. The first seven verses of Proverbs are Solomon’s introduction to the book. According to Gersonides, vv. 2–7 present one of the themes included in the Alexandrian prologue: the utility of the book.65 One of the utilities of Proverbs is “that prudence ( ormah) may be given to the simple, da at and mezimmah to the youth” (Prov. 1:4). In Gersonides’ paraphrase, this becomes “giving the young those things that are the beginnings of inquiry, namely supposition (ma shavah) [= mezimmah] and the first intelligibles or something resembling them [= da at]” (p. 289). Both da at and mezimmah are premises that underlie rational thought. The book of Proverbs makes them available to the young, who are just beginning their study of

64 For lack of space I cannot deal here with the theological aspect of the dialectic method in the commentary on Proverbs, that is, the link between the dialectic method and the Torah as a guide to dialectic inquiry. On this see my “Dialectics in Gersonides’ Biblical Exegesis” (in progress). 65 The Alexandrian prologue paradigm—a formal introduction to the commentaries on Aristotle and Plato, elaborated in particular in the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria in the sixth to eighth centuries—developed into what was almost an independent literary genre. The introductions to commentaries on Aristotle dealt with six to eight points—the work’s aim or subject, utility, authenticity [the author], place in the order of learning; the reason for its title; division into chapters, the branch of philosophy to which it belongs, and the method of instruction used in the work—which the commentator explained before proceeding to comment on the book itself. In these prefaces the commentator laid the groundwork so that readers could understand the commentary itself. These prefaces exerted a major influence on Arabic, Jewish, and Christian literature in the Middle Ages. On the prologues and their influence on Gersonides see (in this volume) “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm in Gersonides’ Writings,” pp. 117–150, and the literature cited there.

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

91

philosophy, so that they can base their inquiry on them. Mezimmah refers to the premises of dialectic inquiry; namely, generally accepted premises. Da at means the premises of demonstrative syllogisms; here Gersonides defines it, as in the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1, as “the first intelligibles or something resembling them.” Gersonides also notes that the order in which these two types of premises are mentioned is significant: “He mentioned da at first, because it is nobler than supposition (ma shavah)” (ibid.). This note presents a hierarchy of the types of premises employed in inquiry, and thus indirectly of the sciences based on them, as a function of the level of verification that is possible.66 The “first intelligibles or something resembling them” are the premises of demonstrative syllogisms, employed in the study of mathematics and physics, where a high level of verification is possible; generally accepted opinions are the premises of dialectic syllogisms, employed in metaphysics and political philosophy, and have an inferior degree of verification.67 Gersonides discusses the hierarchy of the sciences in the commentary on Proverbs 16:16: “To get wisdom ( okmah) is better than gold; to get understanding (binah) is to be chosen rather than silver.” Here he likened okmah to a possession more valuable than binah, because what is apprehended through okmah is more perfect than the acquisition of binah, as we have explained, even though binah may study a loftier subject [i.e., metaphysics]. Furthermore, binah may also apply to ethics, meaning political philosophy.68

66 According to Black, “the Arabic philosophers link assent [verification, Arab. ta dīq] to the affirmation or to denial of the existence of the thing conceived or to the judgment that it exists in a certain state, with certain properties.” See D. Black, Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy (Leiden, 1990), p. 73; eadem, “Logic in Islamic Philosophy,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5 (London, 1998), p. 709. Only verification has a truth value. Verification is achieved by means of syllogisms. This was stated explicitly by Avicenna (see A. Sabra, “Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,” Journal of Philosophy 77 [1980], pp. 761–762) and Averroes. As the latter wrote in Kol meleket higgayon, “the syllogism produces it [verification]” (Kol meleket higgayon, p. 2b). 67 There is a correlation between the methods of proof and the level of certainty they can attain. Each type of proof, and thus each type of verification, has its own level of certainty. Gersonides discussed the methods of verification to be employed in each of the sciences in the ha a ah to the commentary on Song of Songs (pp. 61–63 / pp. 9–10), where he classified the sciences in descending order of their possible level of verification. See Feldman, “The Wisdom of Solomon,” p. 76. 68 Comm. on Proverbs, 112a/105v.

92

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

Drawing on the commentary to 1:4 we understand that what is apprehended by means of okmah is more perfect than what is grasped through binah, because it is based on “first intelligibles or something resembling them,” whereas binah rests on “suppositions.”69 Gersonides also explains several other verses in Proverbs that refer to mezimmah in accordance with his understanding of the word. Some of them offer instructions for right conduct; others depict human types as reflected by their mode of behavior. Here I want to look at the two passages that are the most important for understanding Gersonides’ notion of the uses of dialectic. 1. In the “Explanation of the Text” on 3:1–6:9, Gersonides offers an exegetical paraphrase of the first two verses of chapter 5: “My son, be attentive to my wisdom ( okmah); incline your ear to my understanding (tevunah); that you may keep mezimmot and your lips may guard knowledge (da at).” This, he explains, is the conduct appropriate to a scholar:70 “My son, listen to my wisdom and incline your ear to my insight, so as to have the suppositions (ma shavot)71 that guide you to find tevunah; and let your lips guard the knowledge that leads you to find wisdom, so that the truth will always be with you in these things, with its causes and methods.”72 He makes this clearer in the Fifteenth Utility of the list that follows the commentary on 6:19: “It makes known that those who acquire okmah and tevunah should always keep them in their mind with the things that were the cause of their discovery of this knowledge; or, as you might say, they should keep the secondary intelligibles with the first intelligibles inferred from them, and keep the insights with the suppositions [i.e., the generally

69 The assertion that okmah is more perfect than binah is another formulation of the hierarchy of the sciences according to the method of verification applicable to each of them, as expounded in the ha a ah to the commentary on Song of Songs. See previous note. 70 In the Fourteenth Utility that follows the commentary on 1:19 Gersonides explicitly names the “scholar” as the addressee of the injunctions on conduct in this chapter: “. . . to make known to the scholar . . .” (98a/87r). 71 This is his restatement of “that you may keep mezimmot” in v. 2. Mezimmot is replaced by ma shavot ‘suppositions’, in keeping with his gloss on the word in the ha a ah to the commentary on Proverbs and the “Explanation of the Words” on chapter 1. 72 Comm. on Proverbs, 96b/84r. In the commentary on 15:8 Gersonides explains that if someone does not acquire the truth using the appropriate methods, what he arrives at “does not fall into the category of knowledge” (111b/104v).

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

93

accepted premises] that led them to them.”73 In Gersonides’ reading, these verses juxtapose the two forms of knowledge available to human beings: okmah, which is knowledge acquired from demonstrations, and tevunah, which is knowledge acquired by means of dialectic syllogisms. Mezimmot in v. 2 means ma shavot [suppositions] (that is, premises that are generally accepted as truths), whereas da at denotes first intelligibles.74 The verse enjoins scholars to retain these two types of premises even after they have advanced, by means of syllogisms based on them, to knowledge, that is, to okmah and tevunah.75 Gersonides also explains the reason for this injunction; his explanation is based on the concept of “true knowledge” as explained by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics:76 “true knowledge” is knowledge of a thing and its causes. If a scholar would always possess “true knowledge” he must retain, alongside his conclusions, their causes (meaning the premises, which are the “material” component of syllogisms and give the causes in their middle term) and the ways (the methods or types of syllogisms) by which he arrives at these conclusions.77 It follows that knowledge acquired by means of dialectic syllogisms is knowledge in every respect. 2. Among Gersonides’ explanations of verses that describe human types as a function of the manner in which they conduct their scientific inquiries, the most important is the exegetical paraphrase of Proverbs 24:7–8: “The sciences ( okmot) are too lofty for a fool; he does not open his mouth in the gate. He who lays plans to befriend it (le-harea lo), [i.e.,] a possessor of mezimmot (ba al mezimmot), is summoned by them [the sciences].”78 Although Gersonides omits the phrase ba al mezimmot 73 Comm. on Proverbs, 98b/87r. He advances the same idea in the “Explanation of the Words” on 3:1–6:19, on “keep sound wisdom (tushiyyah) and discretion (mezimmah)” (3:21) (– / 79v), and in the “Explanation of the Text” on that verse (95a/82r). 74 Here too the parallel between da at and ma shavot demonstrates that the latter are the premises of the inquiry, that is, generally accepted premises. 75 These conclusions may be theoretical or practical, relating to ethical conduct. 76 Posterior Analytics I.2. See Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 932/1, fol. 2r–v. 77 Here Aristotle wrote about the causes of apodictic knowledge. Gersonides also considered generally accepted opinions to be causes of knowledge. 78 Gersonides’ rendering of the second verse is very different from that of most commentators and translators; e.g., RSV: “He who plans to do evil will be called a mischief-maker.” That is, the conventional understanding of le-harea is “to do harm or mischief ” (from ra ); but Gersonides associates it instead with rea ‘fellow, friend’. Similarly, most take ba al mezimmot in the sense of “schemer” or “mischief-maker” rather than as the “possessor of generally accepted premises.” Because okmot is a plural he takes it to mean “the sciences,” rather than the abstraction “wisdom.” Finally, for Gersonides the subject of yiqre u ‘they call’ is okmot ‘sciences’ (a tenable construal

94

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

from his commentary, it is quite clear that he has it in mind in his exegetical paraphrase: The sciences ( okmot) are very lofty [i.e., too high] for a fool, who does not imagine that he can attain them; consequently he does not open his mouth when he is in the gate with wise men. Next he explains the reason for this: is someone lays plans to befriend suppositions and attach them to himself [i.e., a ba al mezimmot ] and thereby endeavors to master the suppositions that apply to this problem, the sciences (ha- okmot) will summon him to acquire them, because this is the way that a man can attain them, as the Philosopher stated in the Topics and the Metaphysics; for in this he will be prepared ( yukan lo)79 to winnow the correct ones from the incorrect ones and will thus acquire knowledge without any doubt, as explained there.80

This explanation, like that of the word mezimmah, presents the dialectic method in two guises: as an inquiry conducted by means of a dialectic syllogism and as a method for verifying the premises of that syllogism. The fool does not know how to master the sciences. The “possessor of mezimmot,” who wields the generally accepted premises that can be used as the basis for his inquiry, wants to assist the fool by providing him with the generally accepted premises relevant to the question at hand so that he can proceed with his investigation. In Gersonides’ reading, the sciences beckon someone who has access to the generally accepted premises—the ba al mezimmot—to acquire them. Here Gersonides emphasizes the first stage of inquiry, which is conducted using the diaporematic method: the collection of the generally accepted premises on which dialectic syllogisms about the subject of interest can be based. The sciences invite those who have collected these premises to acquire them, because their collection is a preliminary to the diaporematic investigation. When a scholar has amassed the generally accepted premises that are appropriate to the issue he is investigating, he can employ dialectic examination to winnow out the true premises and reject the false ones. He can then proceed with the scientific inquiry and employ the generally accepted premises that have been verified in order to construct the dialectic syllogisms that because of the plural form okmot), rather than an implicit “people” that is equivalent to the passive “will be called.” Although it is not clear whether the object of this summons by the sciences is the fool or the ba al mezimmot, I tend to believe that Gersonides opts for the latter. 79 Miqra ot gedolot: “he will be able” ( yukal ). 80 Comm. on Proverbs, 123a/122r.

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

95

lead to knowledge of the truth in the matter at hand. But the fool does not possess these premises and therefore cannot master the sciences. Here Gersonides provides a clear explanation of this use of the diaporematic method, just as he does in his gloss on mezimmah in the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1. As he does there, he notes that Aristotle refers to this method in the Topics and the Metaphysics. Here, though, he supplements the description of the diaporematic method in the gloss on mezimmah with an explanation of the utility of this method according to the Topics and the Metaphysics: use of the diaporematic method leads not only to the discovery of the truth, but to acquisition of truth “without any doubt”; that is, to certain knowledge that leaves no aporia about the matter at hand. The diaporematic method leads to knowledge that cannot be challenged; there is no way that it might not be the correct answer to the research question raised or that its contrary might be possible. Gersonides explains this utility and stresses its importance by noting that he himself employed the diaporematic method in the Wars of the Lord, especially as the preliminary to his discussion of the agent of miracles.81 As he wrote there, the diaporematic method makes it possible to discover the truth “in a way that no doubt remains,” because, thanks to it, the premises on which the dialectic inquiry is based have already been verified. Not only have the true premises been identified; those that are false have been weeded out. The discarding of the false premises leads to the rejection of the opinions based on them and consequently to the elimination of alternative solutions to the question. In this way the aporia that was the starting point of the inquiry is resolved. Not only does the diaporematic method lay the foundation for the scientific inquiry, by providing it with true premises; it also guarantees that its conclusions are true, by eliminating those generally accepted premises that are false. In this way it turns the dialectic syllogism into a syllogism whose degree of certainty is identical to that of the demonstrative syllogism. It is important to note that the idea that the diaporematic method leads to knowledge of undoubted truth can also be found, according to Gersonides, in the Topics and the Metaphysics. He does not see it as his own innovation. Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics, the text of the Metaphysics available to Gersonides, and Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, which he also read, do not seem to

81

Wars VI.2.10 (pp. 444–445 / 3:475).

96

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

include this. Nor did Gersonides expound this notion in his supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Topics. Because his commentary on the Metaphysics has been lost, we cannot know whether he derived this conclusion from the Aristotelian text. It is plausible, though, that this is how he understood Averroes and Aristotle after he had completed his own commentary on the Topics. Verses about Tevunah or Binah The most interesting comment dealing with tevunah or binah is that on Proverbs 2:1–22. This is the passage in the commentary on Proverbs where Gersonides offers the fullest picture of the use of dialectic in scientific inquiry. In his reading, not only do these verses present the dialectic method as one of inquiry and the diaporematic method as one of examination; they also discuss the weakness of the dialectic method for the purpose of verification and offer the diaporematic method as one that makes it possible to overcome this drawback and find the truth by means of dialectic arguments. The main topic of 2:2–5 is tevunah or binah, which, according to Gersonides, is knowledge acquired by means of dialectic syllogisms. According to him, vv. 1 and 6–22 fill out the guidance presented here. The commentary on 2:1–22 employs two methods: an exegetical paraphrase in the “Explanation of the Text” on these verses and a short and systematic presentation, in precise language, in the Third Utility that follows the commentary on Chapter 2. This utility summarizes one of the key lessons to be learned from these verses. According to Gersonides in the “Explanation of the Text” on 2:2, the book of Proverbs asserts that the dialectic method is appropriate for inquiries to determine the truth and encourages its use. Gersonides offers an exegetical paraphrase of “incline your heart to tevunah,” namely, “incline your heart to know tevunah”;82 that is, he understands it as an injunction to engage in inquiry related to tevunah. Underlying this precept is the idea that dialectic syllogisms can lead to knowledge. Scholars must be encouraged to seek out tevunah because Solomon’s readers might believe it impossible to achieve it. With their philosophical education, they know that truth is to be discovered by means

82

Comm. on Proverbs, 93a/77v.

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

97

of inherent premises. According to the Prior Analytics and the Posterior Analytics, the main condition that apodictic premises must satisfy is that the predicate bear an inherent relationship to the subject. Only such premises necessarily lead to true conclusions. Dialectic syllogisms, by contrast, are based on generally accepted premises, in which the predicate does not always inhere in the subject. One might think, accordingly, that such syllogisms cannot lead to true conclusions. Gersonides holds that Proverbs 2:2 refutes this misconception and that it is possible to reach true conclusions on the basis of non-inherent premises: “You should not think that you cannot acquire it [tevunah, to which v. 2 refers] because you do not attain knowledge thereof from inherent premises.”83 He does note, however, that because the premises of dialectic syllogisms are not inherent premises that lead necessarily to true conclusions, one cannot be certain of finding the truth through them: “Because it does not employ inherent premises, one cannot be confident that the premises it uses at the beginning of the inquiry will lead to the truth.”84 In the Third Utility, where, as noted, he summarizes the lesson to be learned from the biblical verses, Gersonides phrases the matter somewhat differently and adds an explanation not found in the “Explanation of the Text”:85 “Because there is some evident danger in what is acquired through binah, inasmuch as one does not come to it by means of apodictic premises, in the manner of the verification that is achieved in the mathematical sciences [by means of both explanatory and factual demonstration], nor by means of demonstrations from observation, as in natural science, but by means of generally accepted premises. And they often propose an explanation and a contrary explanation for the same thing.”86 In the running commentary on the biblical text, Gersonides begins in an optimistic tone, entailed by his commentary on 2:2 and stressing Ibid., 93a–b/77v. Ibid., 93b/77v. 85 The argument here is very close to that in the ha a ah to the commentary on Ecclesiastes (p. 15). There Gersonides himself presented the dialectic method, its weaknesses, and ways of overcoming it, whereas here he derives it from the biblical verses. 86 Comm. on Proverbs, 94a/79r. Syllogisms that are based on generally accepted premises may lead to contradictory conclusions, because some of these premises are false. Consequently, in the Third Utility Gersonides invokes the assertion that generally accepted premises may lead to mutually contradictory conclusions to explain the causes of error. On these causes see below, n. 103. 83 84

98

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

the recommendation that one pursue tevunah even on the basis of noninherent premises. In the Third Utility learned from 2:2–5, by contrast, he emphasizes the weakness of the dialectic method for an inquiry that seeks tevunah or binah and explains the nature of this weakness. As I will show, this emphasis is a corollary of the function of the exposition of the drawbacks of the dialectic method in the argument developed in the Third Utility; the explanation there of the weakness of the dialectic method is part of Gersonides’ justification of the principle he learns from vv. 1–2, namely, that one must learn okmah before tevunah; the precedence of okmah over tevunah is intended to overcome the weakness of the dialectic method as a mode of inquiry.87 In his explanation of the weakness of the dialectic method in the Third Utility, Gersonides refers to the premises of the apodictic sciences and of dialectic in different terms than those employed in his running commentary on these verses; instead of enumerating the premises on the basis of their characteristics he lists them by their names. Thus “apodictic premises” replaces “inherent premises” and “generally accepted premises” replaces “non-inherent premises.” Here the accent is on the difference between investigations in mathematics and physics and inquiry based on binah. Gersonides accepts the Aristotelian notion that dialectic syllogisms (except for the inductive syllogism) have the same formal pattern as demonstrative syllogisms and consequently are logically valid.88 The disadvantage of the dialectic method for inquiry is inherent in its matter—in its premises and not in its form. Whereas investigations in mathematics and physics are based on apodictic premises that necessarily lead to the truth—since, as he notes in the “Explanation of the Text,” they are inherent premises—

87 The Third Utility is an interesting example of a type that is not common in Gersonides’ biblical commentaries. In general, in the utilities he presents ideas learned from the verses of the pericope just explained, or some precept that can be learned from them. Here he merges a number of ideas derived from the verses just explained into a single philosophical argument. 88 See Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics: “The syllogism, with regard to its form, is one of the three arts that deal with general problems, namely: demonstration and dialectic and most sophistical arguments. But they differ with regard to their matter: the demonstrative syllogism works from true premises, the dialectic syllogism from generally accepted premises, and the sophistical syllogism from premises that are considered to be generally accepted premises but are not generally accepted premises, or are considered to be true but are not true” (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 933, fol. 9v).

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

99

inquiries carried out by binah are based on generally accepted premises, which are non-inherent and do not necessarily lead to the truth.89 The additional explanation of the intrinsic problem of an inquiry based on the dialectic method notes the implications for the conclusion of the use of generally accepted premises. In the running commentary Gersonides argues only that inasmuch as the premises of a dialectic inquiry are non-inherent, one cannot be certain that they will lead to true conclusions. Here the argument is even stronger: the conclusions derived from generally accepted premises are frequently mutually contradictory.90 Though Gersonides does not say so here, it follows that, inasmuch as both of two contradictory propositions cannot be true at the same time, one of them is necessarily false.91 Hence syllogisms based on these premises, rather than on apodictic premises, may lead to error, that is, to false conclusions The book of Proverbs demonstrates that it is possible to overcome the weakness of the dialectic method by means of the method of examination, i.e., the diaporematic method. When pursuing truth one must first collect all of the generally accepted premises that relate to the

89 In his commentary on Song of Songs 2:17, Gersonides explains that in metaphysics, as in physics, one uses demonstration by observation (demonstratio par signum) (p. 103 / p. 47). In the ha a ah to the commentary on Song of Songs he maintains that the difference between proofs in physics and proof by dialectic has to do with the type of premises they employ: in physics one uses “special and appropriate” premises, whereas in metaphysics one uses “remote generally accepted premises” (p. 63 / p. 10). This is also how we should understand him here; the premises of physics, like those of mathematics, are certain; but physics differs from mathematics in the type of syllogisms it employs. On the other hand, binah employs different premises than do mathematics and physics, even though its syllogisms have the same formal structure. 90 In his two earlier commentaries on books ascribed to King Solomon—the commentary on Song of Songs (written in 1325 or 1326) and the ha a ah to the commentary on Ecclesiastes (1328)—Gersonides noted that generally accepted premises may lead to contrary or contradictory conclusions. The wording there is almost identical to that in the commentary on Proverbs. In the commentary on Song of Songs he wrote “that they lead to two contraries or contradictories” (p. 63 / p. 10); and “one may find demonstrations on their basis for both a thing and its opposite” (p. 151 / p. 91). In the commentary to Ecclesiastes he wrote that “one may find explanations based on them for one thing and its contrary” (p. 15). 91 But see Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics: “ ‘Or the contrary syllogisms’—meaning that this problems is not generally accepted as either affirmative or negative; but there are syllogisms based on generally accepted premises that produce both affirmative and negative answers to the same problems” (Munich—Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. hebr. 26/3 [IMHM 1162], fol. 324v).

100

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

matter at hand, select those that are true, and employ only them in his inquiry. The investigative method proposed by the book of Proverbs is based on the notion that contradictory conclusions are the result of incompatible generally accepted premises and that the false premises among them lead to erroneous conclusions. According to Gersonides, vv. 3–4 present the diaporematic method as the way to surmount the flaw of the dialectic method: Know truly that if you have a strong desire to acquire binah and “call” and “cry aloud” (v. 3) to binah, just as a man calls to someone he wants and desires, and if you “seek” it (v. 4), just as people seek silver and search for it or search for treasures, digging here and there until they find them, in the same way you will find tevunah; that is, you should collect all of the generally accepted premises that apply to the problem you are investigating and then separate the correct ones from the incorrect ones.92 This is how you should “seek it as you do silver and treasures” (v. 4); for people dig in a place to see if there is a silver lode there, and if it turns out that digging there will not lead them to find silver, they do this again until they find a place where there is a silver lode.93

In his gloss on the word mezimmah Gersonides explains the diaporematic method rather than deriving it from the verses. Here, by contrast, he shows that Proverbs itself proposes this method; it does so in figurative language, by means of a metaphor—what Gersonides calls a mashal:94 “Seek it as you do silver and treasures.” Pursuit of the truth by means of the diaporematic method is compared to prospecting for silver or other buried treasure underground, that is, to mining. Miners look for a lode of silver, a place from which it can be dug out. They dig in various places. Although no silver is found in some, ultimately they are successful. Similarly, scholars are searching for knowledge, tevunah, which is compared to silver. They hunt for the mother lode— 92 Here Gersonides writes haqdamot mefursamot ‘generally accepted premises’ instead of ma shavot, which corroborates my interpretation of mezimmah above. 93 Comm. on Proverbs, 93b/77v. Maimonides, too, related this verse to speculation that aims at metaphysical knowledge—knowledge of God. But Gersonides associates the inquiry with tevunah, and accordingly with the dialectic method, whereas Maimonides refers it to okmah, cited at the start of 2:2, and not tevunah, cited in 2:3. See the start of Guide III.54. 94 According to the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1, “a mashal is something said by way of similarity, sometimes to provide a representation ( iyyur) of the thing about which one wishes to speak; sometimes to point out some aspect of the thing intended because it is unfamiliar (meru aq) or intended or similar to it; for he likens an unfamiliar thing to something a little similar to it that will make the unfamiliar thing clear. And so too what is intended and whatever resembles it,” (p. 288).

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

101

the source of knowledge, the premises by which it can be acquired. They do so by verifying all of the generally accepted premises appropriate to the topic at hand. When assayed, some of them are found to be fallacious; their use in syllogisms cannot lead to true conclusions. Ultimately this process of examination leaves only those generally accepted premises that are true and that are the only basis of true knowledge or tevunah.95 In his exposition of the diaporematic method Gersonides insists that one must collect the generally accepted premises in order to winnow out the true ones. Here (as well as in the Third Utility)96 he emphasizes that only if the examination by means of dialectic is applied to all of the generally accepted premises related to the matter at hand can it identify the true premises to be employed in the dialectic inquiry. Because we cannot be certain that non-inherent premises will lead to true conclusions, only an examination of all the premises can ensure that no premise that could possibly be used as the basis for the investigation has been omitted, so that the examination necessarily leads to identification of the true premises. What is more, because generally accepted premises may be mutually contradictory, each member of a pair of contraries must be scrutinized in order to determine which of them is true: “It is appropriate to make an effort to find tevunah [verifying the premises by means of the diaporematic method, which is compared to excavation] because it cannot be attained through inherent premises; consequently one must not be confident that the premises held at the beginning of the inquiry will yield truth until after one has verified all of them, as we mentioned.”97 This idea recurs emphatically in the commentary on Proverbs 25:2: “It is the glory of God to conceal things, but the glory of kings is to search things out.” “But the glory of kings is the opposite of this [the opposite of the glory of God, which is to conceal], that is, to investigate 95 The assertion that the diaporematic method can overcome the drawback of dialectic as a method of inquiry can also be found in the commentary on Song of Songs (p. 152 / p. 91) and in the ha a ah to the commentary on Ecclesiastes (p. 15). In the commentary on Ecclesiastes Gersonides states explicitly that this idea comes from Metaphysics III. There he offers an interesting interpretation of the dialectic method as understood by Aristotle; he connects what Aristotle wrote in the Topics with what he wrote in the Metaphysics and argues that the diaporematic method introduced in the Metaphysics is meant to overcome the weakness of the dialectic method presented (in his reading) in the Topics. 96 Comm. on Proverbs, 94a/79v. 97 Ibid., 93b/77v.

102

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

a matter that comes before them completely, in order to render a true judgment.”98 Later he explains what “a complete investigation is”: an investigation based on collecting all of the opposing generally accepted premises appropriate to the topic: “It is the glory of kings to investigate each and every thing separately in a complete manner that all of the opposing suppositions will be eliminated (she-yusru).”99 The discussion of the weakness of the dialectic method as a method of inquiry and of the way to overcome it is preceded by Wisdom’s lecture: “My son, if you receive my words and treasure up my commandments with you, making your ear attentive to wisdom ( okmah) and inclining your heart to understanding (tevunah)” (Prov. 2:1–2). Gersonides explains that this specifies the sequence of the inquiry in these disciplines: the scholar must first learn okmah, which he identifies in the commentary on 1:20–33 with “the science of existents” (i.e., physics), and only then tevunah, identified here with metaphysics and politics: “After you know wisdom, ‘incline your heart’ to know tevunah.”100 In the Third Utility, he presents the precedence of okmah over tevunah in philosophical inquiry as the key idea of the pericope 2:1–22: “The Third Utility is that it makes known that the path to acquiring binah comes after the full acquisition of okmah.”101 According to the Third Utility, okmah should be studied before tevunah in order to overcome the weakness of the dialectic method as a method of inquiry. As we have seen, Gersonides explains that this weakness is latent in the syllogisms on which this inquiry is based. Because tevunah relies on generally accepted premises, the syllogisms built on them may lead to opposed conclusions and hence to error.102 okmah, which is knowledge in the domain of physics and is achieved by means of proofs, can help one overcome these errors; and this is the reason for studying it before studying tevunah: “When a person studies okmah first, as is appropriate, and masters it fully, it will help guard him from the error caused by the problems mentioned above.”103 Ibid., 124a–b/123v. Ibid., 124b/124r. Thus in Miqra ot gedolot; MS: “will be arranged (she-yesuddar). 100 Ibid., 93a/77v. Gersonides reiterates the assertion that okmah must precede tevunah elsewhere in the commentary. See the “Explanation of the Text” on 8:14 (100b/90v) and on 9:1 (101b/91v). 101 Ibid., 94a/79r. 102 Here Gersonides associates this statement with the explanation of the causes of erroneous ideas. See next note. 103 Ibid., 104a/79r. “The things mentioned” are the errors occasioned by the three causes that Gersonides has just listed in the Third Utility: “Error may emerge here 98 99

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

103

Gersonides wrote of the role played by okmah in guarding against error in the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 2:10–11, as well: “For wisdom ( okmah) will come into your heart, and knowledge (da at) will be pleasant to your soul; it [wisdom] will watch over mezimmah for you and guard tevunah for you.”104 By construing “wisdom” in v. 10 as the subject of the verbs in v. 11, Gersonides learns that wisdom watches over mezimmah (generally accepted premises) and protects tevunah (the knowledge acquired by means of generally accepted premises): “Wisdom will guard supposition (ma shavah [i.e., mezimmah]) for you so that supposition does not lead you to any error in the matters concerning okmah105 and of divine science and political philosophy. [Wisdom] will guard tevunah for you, so that you do not fall into error concerning it, whether with regard to supposition (ma shavah [i.e., mezimmah]), as mentioned, or on account of other things that he mentions later.”106 whether because of the premises adopted at first glance [lit., at the beginning of the thought], or because of an error produced by the imagination, or because a person grew up with contemptible opinions on this matter or learned them from mistaken persons and inclines toward them as a result of study or custom, or because of an appetite that leads him to select the idea that is better suited to quenching his thirst” (94a/79r). Space does not allow me to analyze these causes here. Note that Gersonides adds another factor that can help surmount error: “Divine Providence.” This phrase is a theological formulation of the intellectual knowledge acquired through the influence of the Agent Intellect on the human intellect. Here we are speaking of guiding the human intellect to make correct use of the principles of logic through selection of the arguments and syllogisms that are appropriate to metaphysical speculation. It follows from what he writes here that okmah eliminates the errors that stem from the material of the syllogisms, that is, the premises, whereas Divine Providence removes the errors that derive from their formal structure. 104 Here too Gersonides’ rendering is very far from that of most translators and commentators; e.g., “For wisdom will come into your heart, and knowledge will be pleasant to your soul; discretion will watch over you; understanding will guard you” (RSV). 105 okmah also protects other matters appropriate to it—other topics in physics— against error. According to Aristotle, Averroes, and Gersonides (who followed them), in physics, too, one must use the diaporematic method and eliminate the untrue premises. See Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 887 (IMHM 31656), fol. 17v, and the ha a ah to the commentary on Ecclesiastes (p. 15). 106 Comm. on Proverbs, 93b/78r. He has in mind errors caused by human appetites. The scholar accepts erroneous opinions because they are compatible with his appetites and provide an ideological basis for satisfying them. See the “Explanation of the Text” on 2:19 (94a/78v). Gersonides offers a similar explanation in the Tenth Utility to the pericope 3:1–6:19: “It is to inform [us] that okmah is acquired with the beginning of okmah, because the premises of the inquiry are inherent to okmah, whereas binah is acquired with all [sorts of] premises ( im kol ha-qinyanim) that are not inherent. Its acquisition must be preceded by what is acquired from the other forms of apprehension, because they lead one to know its truth, as we have mentioned” (98b/86v; emphasis added).

104

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

Nowhere in his several statements that study of okmah must precede tevunah, does Gersonides explain how okmah makes it possible to overcome the errors of tevunah. But given that right after this passage, in the Third Utility, Gersonides presents the diaporematic method as a way to verify the initial premises, I believe that we are to understand that what he has in mind is verification of the generally accepted premises by means of a proof per impossibile. In such a proof, the premise to be tested is taken as the major premise of the syllogism, followed by a minor premise whose truth is known and certain. If the syllogism produces a true conclusion, the generally accepted premise is also true; but if the conclusion is false then this premise, too, is false. Gersonides may have held that okmah provides the true minor premises in such syllogisms. But it is also possible that he thought that okmah is the touchstone for judging the conclusions reached through these syllogisms. When these conclusions cannot be reconciled with okmah, the generally accepted premises from which they were inferred must be false. Averroes proposed this form of verifying generally accepted premises in his commentary on the first manner of the third utility of dialectic.107 Gersonides could have learned from him that this method is applied in dialectic to verify premises, and not only by the questioner in a dialectic disputation in order to triumph over his adversary.108 In his comments on other verses that deal with tevunah Gersonides add an explanation of the fields of knowledge to which it is germane. As we have seen, in the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1 Gersonides defines binah as “knowledge of things that is acquired from non-inherent things.”109 He further develops the notion of tevunah in the commentary on 3:19: “The Lord by wisdom ( okmah) founded the earth; by understanding (tevunah) He established the heavens.” He draws a parallel between natural causality and the type of knowledge acquired through it. Both the types of natural causation and the types of knowledge thereof are designated okmah and tevunah. On the ontological plane okmah is inherent natural causality. Knowledge of this causality, too, is denominated okmah:

Paris—BNF, MS héb. 933, fol. 3r. In light of this analysis of Gersonides’ understanding of the terms okmah and tevunah, I believe we must reject Feldman’s interpretation and his explanation of Gersonides’ reason for assigning okmah priority over tevunah; see Feldman, “The Wisdom of Solomon,” p. 70. 109 “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1, p. 288. 107 108

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

105

He said that God (may He be blessed) founded the earth by wisdom; this foundation is what he embedded and set in the nature of the natural existents that He caused to exist on earth. And through wisdom God (may He be blessed) emanated their existence on the day of their creation and [in this way] their properties were instituted. What a man can acquire through this inquiry is referred to as okmah, because everything in it is generated by inherent and appropriate causes, as if you were to say that heat heats and that a human being is begotten by a human being.110

Gersonides goes on to offer an ontological explanation of tevunah, but does not address its epistemological significance, as he does for okmah. Tevunah applies to natural phenomena that take place on account of non-inherent actions—that is, stellar influences on the sublunar world: And with tevunah he established the heavens as they are, at a distance from us and the magnitude of the stars that they move, and the different patterns of the spheres that move the star, and the different motions in longitude and latitude until the many differences in the movements of the stars that are apparent to us are generated, and consequently it generates different actions in this lower world [= the sublunar world], as we explained in the fifth book of the Wars of the Lord [V.2.1]. Now this is called tevunah, because what is generated by them is not generated in the same fashion as what is generated by the inherent or appropriate causes;111 for they heat even though there is no heat in them and they cool even though there is no cold in them, and so too for everything else that emanates from them.112

Comm. on Proverbs, 95a/81v. Cf. Comm. on Proverbs 30:4 (132b/134v). 112 Comm. on Proverbs, 95a/81v. In the Wars of the Lord Gersonides offers a slightly different reading of Proverbs 3:19. There he explains the epistemological sense of tevunah as well and defines it as “the ability to derive from one thing information about something else quite different from it” (Wars, p. 192/ 3:33). This definition allows him to understand tevunah as “philosophy” (that is, metaphysics), based on generally accepted premises that are not necessarily inherent. He interprets tevunah as in the first definition of this word in the ha a ah to the commentary on Proverbs: “The notions that can be apprehended by means of non-inherent and non-appropriate premises and by suppositions that are generally accepted, as in divine philosophy [metaphysics] and political philosophy” (ha a ah to Comm. on Proverbs, p. 280). Again, “the word ‘discernment’ [tevunah] in our language [i.e., Hebrew] connotes the ability to derive from one thing information about something else quite different from it. Thus in our language [Hebrew] Philosophy [i.e., metaphysics] is called ‘discernment’ [tevunah], as is made clear in many places in the book of Proverbs. For [discernment] involves analogical reasoning and employs generally accepted principles that one cannot stipulate as inherent” (Wars V.2.1, p. 192 / 3:33–34). Here I have adopted Feldman’s 110 111

106

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

We can complete the epistemological explanation of tevunah by comparing it to the explanation of the epistemological sense of okmah: just as what human beings understand of the phenomena caused by inherent causes is called okmah, so what human beings learn through inquiry into phenomena that do not have inherent causes is known as tevunah. Thus tevunah is knowledge of the influence of the stars on the sublunar world,113 or knowledge of natural and juridical astrology.114 In light of this it is plausible that the haśśagot to which Gersonides referred in the ha a ah, where he writes that binah or tevunah are “the notions reached by means of non-inherent and inappropriate

emendation; according to the printed text, “this is why philosophers are called ‘masters of tevunah.’ ” 113 This follows clearly from the summary of the lesson of this verse found in the Fifth Utility on 3:1–6:19: “The Fifth Utility is to make known that just as we may derive okmah from the objects in the lower world when we study why they exist in the mode of existence they have, so we may derive tevunah from the heavenly bodies when we study them appropriately; thus their existence emanates from the okmah of the Lord, may He be blessed, and from his tevunah” (Comm. on Proverbs, 98a/86v). 114 “So too for everything else that emanates from them” seems to imply that tevunah does not apply only to natural astrology, as might be inferred from the examples Gersonides offers here, but also to juridical astrology. A clear exposition of this activity is found in Gersonides’ commentary on the book of Daniel, in the Fifteenth Utility after the commentary on Chapter 4: [The fifteenth utility] is to inform us of the superiority of some of this to other lore. Consequently the natural scientists held that theirs is more complete than the lore of the sorcerers, inasmuch as their knowledge of natural philosophy is more complete than the astrologers’ lore about the influence of the stars, for so many reasons that telling them will last [too] long. But here we will explain one of these reasons. This is that what follows necessarily according to natural philosophy are things that are inherent and appropriate to that from which they follow necessarily—as anger is derived from black bile or yellow ( adom) bile or that the sanguine person ( adummi ) dreams that he is flying, and so on for each humor. But what necessarily follows from the influence of the stars is not appropriate to them, because they do not [themselves] have the qualities that are emanated by them. (Miqra ot gedolot [ Jerusalem: Hama’or, 2001], p. 60; emended on the basis of Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247, f. 221v) Here Gersonides states explicitly that juridical astrology is a lore that is not based on inherent and appropriate premises, whereas sublunar physics is based on such premises. (In the theory of humors anger is almost always derived from yellow bile. Although Gersonides writes that it is derived from “red” bile, in medieval Hebrew literature adom frequently means what we call “yellow.” Hence it is plausible that Gersonides means yellow bile. As for adummi, in medieval dream theory neither red bile nor yellow bile caused a person to dream he was flying. Nor did a surfeit of blood; but since it was thought to inspire dreams of pleasant experiences and even dancing, “sanguine” can be shoehorned in here. I would like to thank Lenn Schramm for pointing out the red/yellow problem, and Hagar Kahana-Smilansky for confirming his caveat and providing information about dream theory.)

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

107

premises,”115 refer to natural and juridical astrology. Here Gersonides understood inherency the same way as in his explanation of the fourth sense of “inherent” in the Posterior Analytics:116 “Inherent” pertains to what is linked to its effective cause inherently and derives from its definition. Non-inherent premises are those that present natural phenomena that do not follow inherently from their efficient causes. Another explanation of the discipline to which tevunah applies can be found in Gersonides’ commentary on Proverbs 8:14: “I have insight (binah), I have strength (gevurah)”: which means that okmah can apprehend phenomena that are produced by the natural order. And whatever is generated that is contrary to this order, such as miracles, and is referred to as gevurah, for which there are no inherent causes, inquiry into it is effected by binah. In addition, binah is knowledge in political philosophy, in which the laws for political affairs, [which prescribe] how people should conduct themselves to establish political groups in the best way, are made.117

According to this interpretation, investigation of miracles, too, is the province of binah, because it deals with natural phenomena that do not have inherent causes.118 Thus we learn from the commentary on Proverbs that tevunah and binah pertain to metaphysics, political theory, natural and juridical astrology, and miracles. All of these are to be studied by means of the dialectic method.119 Introduction to Comm. on Proverbs, p. 280. Posterior Analytics I.4. 117 Comm. on Proverbs, 100b/90v. Here Gersonides uses the term “political philosophy” for politics, meaning the principles of social conduct. In many other places in the commentary on Proverbs it refers to ethics. In fact, both are part of political philosophy. 118 In Wars VI.2.10 Gersonides employs the dialectic method to identify the agent of miracles. 119 The gap between non-inherent premises, which are the premises of the syllogisms employed in natural and juridical astrology and with regard to miracles, and generally accepted premises, which are used for the syllogisms of political philosophy and metaphysics, is not that large. According to Gersonides’ exposition of Proverbs 3:19 in Wars V.2.1 (p. 192 / 3:33–34), generally accepted opinions do not have to be inherent premises. On the other hand, the non-inherent premises presented in the “Explanation of the Text” on Proverbs 1—“the sun warms and the moon cools”—are evidently premises derived from experience, which Averroes, in the Middle Commentary on Topics I.10 (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 933, fols. 7v–8r), categorized as generally accepted opinions. That non-inherent premises of this sort are generally accepted may also be inferred from the way in which Gersonides presents the stars’ influence on the sublunar world in the Wars (V.2.1), where he relies on the fact that knowledgeable authorities—philosophers and prophets—agreed on this point: “The philosophers 115 116

108

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

Gersonides believes that the dialectic method, when used correctly, that is, when prefaced by a diaporematic examination of the premises, can lead to the truth. So in his commentary on other verses in Proverbs he asserts that tevunah, in the sense of knowledge of how the stars influence the sublunar world and knowledge of metaphysics and political theory, can generate the acquired intellect just as okmah does, and that it too can make the intellect immortal. According to him, “they will be life for your soul” (Prov. 3:22) refers to the okmah and tevunah mentioned three verses earlier (“The Lord by wisdom [ okmah] founded the earth; by understanding [tevunah] He established the heavens”): “ okmah and tevunah will be life for your soul because they are themselves the acquired intellect that survives a person after death, as we explained in the first book of the Wars of the Lord.”120 In his reading of 23:23, “Buy truth, and do not sell it; buy wisdom ( okmah), instruction (musar), and understanding (binah),” the reference is to the acquisition of the political okmah and the divine okmah that produce an immortal acquired intellect:121 “He has acquired knowledge of agreed that they [heavenly bodies] act on objects here [in the sublunar world]; and the prophets, peace be upon them, and the Torah also agreed with this” (p. 191 / 3:32). On the prophets’ agreement see the continuation there (p. 192 / 3:33). 120 Comm. on Proverbs, 95a/82r. 121 According to this, the acquisition of political philosophy, too, can produce the acquired intellect. Gersonides’ meaning here is somewhat unclear. Political philosophy is a practical science; but in his supercommentary on Averroes’s commentary on the Topics, on the Second Utility of dialectic, Gersonides writes that true and false do not pertain to political philosophy, but only “the bad and the excellent (megunneh we-niv ar)” (Munich, MS 26/3, fol. 319v). In the ha a ah to his commentary on the Eden pericope, Gersonides states explicitly that “from these things [ perception of the different types of good and evil, of which the bad and fine (megunneh we-na eh) is one type] . . . human beings cannot acquire the immortality of the soul that was intended for them” (Comm. on Genesis, p. 85). Thus it is clear that the ability to make judgments about the bad and the excellent or other types of good enumerated by Gersonides in his commentary on the Eden story (ibid.) cannot produce the acquired intellect. Nor would that be compatible with Gersonides’ view that political philosophy is only a preparation for attaining okmah and binah, and in particular with his remark on “cease, my son, to hear instruction (musar)” (Prov. 19:27): “He cautioned that the son [i.e., any person] must not waste his days in political philosophy, inasmuch as what guides him to acquire moral discipline (musar), which is the preliminary to the acquisition of okmah, is sufficient. So he said, ‘my son, do not listen to the okmah of moral discipline all the time and do not devote yourself to it more than to ‘words of da at,’ because it is not appropriate for a person to waste his time studying it, as we expounded on the weekly portion of Bereshit [explanation of the Eden story]. But you should always devote yourself to the love of ‘words of da at’ after acquiring whatever of moral discipline is appropriate and sufficient to serve as a preliminary to the acquisition of wisdom” (Comm. on Proverbs, 117a/112r). Perhaps we should understand Gersonides here in the light of the notion of political philosophy propounded in the

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

109

truth; and even though he is generated, in this respect122 he is not corruptible, as the Philosopher thought that every generated being is corruptible. For you cannot hand on and remove from yourself any possession you have acquired in wisdom and political philosophy and divine wisdom, which is called binah, because the acquired intellect is eternal, as we have stated.”123 Here we see the great importance that Gersonides attached to the dialectic method as a method of investigation. A dialectic inquiry, like investigation based on demonstration, can perfect the intellect and render it immortal. Readers of the commentary are to infer from this that in order to reach the final goal we must engage in both dialectic inquiry and demonstration. Gersonides propounds the same opinion in his explanation of Proverbs 8:20–21: “I walk in the way of righteousness, in the paths of justice, endowing with wealth ( yesh) those who love me, and filling their treasuries.” He explains this as the continuation of the speech by tevunah that begins in the second half of 8:14, “I am binah, I have strength”: I walk in the way of righteousness and uprightness, on the many paths of judgment (mishpa ) that lead to verification of a statement or its contrary. There are suppositions that corroborate each of these paths. And

introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes. In the first ha a ah there he writes that “study of good and evil is part of political philosophy and it investigates in a certain aspect the existent qua existent” (Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 15). In the “first comprehensive ha a ah” there, however, he explains that the purpose of inquiring into good and evil is aimed at identifying the good: whether it is the pleasant or the beneficial, and if the beneficial, whether it is “the pursuit many possessions,” “the pursuit of practical ability,” or “the pursuit of speculative knowledge” (p. 16). I believe that we can understand that Solomon’s verdict about what is good, which he arrives at (according to Gersonides’ commentary on Ecclesiastes) by means of the dialectic method—namely, that good is “the pursuit of okmah”—is a matter of political philosophy, knowledge of which can produce the acquired intellect according to the commentary on Proverbs. There, in the Third Utility on 1:20–2:21, Gersonides describes the dialectic method as one by which “the truth can be found in political philosophy as well” (Comm. on Proverbs, 94a/79v). Because knowledge of the truth produces the acquired intellect, it follows that knowledge of political philosophy can produce the acquired intellect. An anonymous reader of this article in its original form suggested that this difficulty could be resolved by means of a distinction between judgments of what is good and evil for human beings and the state, on the one hand, and the theoretical foundations of political philosophy—the nature of purpose of human beings and society, the relations between individuals and society, and so on—on the other. It is knowledge of this theoretical foundation that can produce the acquired intellect. 122 MS: “And because he is generated, in this respect he is not corruptible.” 123 Comm. on Proverbs, 122a/121r.

110

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs it will be useful if I [tevunah ] winnow out the truth in this in order to endow those who love me with yesh, namely, the view that corresponds to reality, because through it one attains human felicity; and the opposite [unhappiness] is produced by the view that does not correspond to reality.124

Here Gersonides has tevunah employing the diaporematic method and completes the picture given by his commentary on 23:23: inquiry by means of the dialectic method leads to human felicity if it is preceded by an inquiry that applies the diaporematic method, which guarantees that the premises of a syllogism, and consequently the conclusions based on them, are true. Other Verses that Deal with the Diaporematic Method As the preliminary to an inquiry by the dialectic method, the diaporematic method has special importance for Gersonides. As we have seen, he describes it in his gloss on mezimmah and in his explication of the verses in which that word appears and offers it as a method for overcoming the weakness of the dialectic method in his comments on verses that involve binah or tevunah. But remarks that relate to the diaporematic method can also be found in his exposition of verses that do not use these three words. In the two most interesting of them, Proverbs 15:19 and 20:18, Gersonides discusses other facets of the diaporematic method. Some of the human types brought on stage by the book of Proverbs are meant to serve as positive and negative exemplars of proper and improper moral and intellectual conduct. In this respect the lesson taught by Proverbs resembles those of the narratives of the Pentateuch and Former Prophets. But whereas the latter depict historical figures as the basis for drawing inferences about proper and improper behavior, Proverbs offers character types. Proverbs 15:19—“The way of a sluggard is overgrown with thorns, but the path of the upright is a level highway” (Prov. 15:19) is one such verse. According to Gersonides, both of these types—the sluggard and the upright—employ the dialectic method in their inquiries. The sluggard, however, does not employ the diaporematic method to lay the groundwork for his inves124 Ibid., 101a/91r. According to the Aristotelian definition of truth, the opinion that corresponds to reality is the true opinion. Consequently yesh in this verse actually means the true opinion.

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

111

tigation. He does not collect all of the generally accepted premises related to the issue at hand and then select out the true ones. Because he does not know which of the premises available to him are true, the sluggard will always be prey to doubts and uncertainties. He does not know whether his conclusions are true, rather than their contraries, which are based on the premises antithetical to those he employed. The upright are those who do employ the diaporematic method before they launch their inquiry using the dialectic method, winnowing out the true premises from among all of the generally accepted premises and basing their syllogisms on them. Consequently they can discover the truth: Or his [Solomon’s] meaning (and this is the correct one)125 may be that the way of one who is too lazy in intellectual inquiry to conduct an appropriate investigation of them is difficult, like walking on thorns. For anyone who conducts his inquiry in this way will always run into doubts and confusions and cannot escape them, because he did not first examine all those suppositions and distinguish the correct from the incorrect. But the way of the upright who proceed in their inquiries properly, and consequently first look at all of the suppositions that apply to the problem and winnow out the correct from the incorrect, is paved and trodden, and their feet will not be harmed nor will they be tripped up.126

Gersonides propounds another facet of the use of the diaporematic method in his interpretation of Proverbs 20:18. Here he builds on the discussion of the aporia in the Metaphysics127 and presents the diaporematic method as one that can resolve the aporia that confronts the investigator at the outset. According to him, the verse presents the subjective or psychological aspect of the aporia described by Aristotle in the Metaphysics—the perplexity of those confronted by an aporia in the epistemological sense of this term, that is, a situation where they are confronted by opposing opinions that seem to rest on arguments of equal weight and consequently cannot choose between them. According to Gersonides, Proverbs shows how investigators can free themselves from this perplexity. As he reads the verse, the perplexity stems from the fact that they are dealing with opposing suppositions

I.e., the correct reading of the verse: here Gersonides is proposing a second interpretation of the text and notes that it is the correct one. 126 Comm. on Proverbs, 110b/103r. 127 Metaphysics III.1. 125

112

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

and cannot determine which of them is true.128 Here the diaporematic method is presented, not as an auxiliary for finding the truth through dialectic syllogisms, but as a way to overcome the investigator’s perplexity. He must collect all of the opposing suppositions and employ stratagems (ta bulot ), that is, the methods of dialectic verification,129 to identify the true ones: Now when someone encounters opposing suppositions and is perplexed by them, a full consideration that resolves it for him will establish the correct supposition for him; this happens when he collects all of these suppositions and winnows the correct from the incorrect by a full investigation and great deliberation. Should there be two opposing suppositions, fight with stratagems against the supposition that distances a man from his perfection [= the false supposition or error], and in this way he will escape perplexity in these weighty matters where the opposing suppositions that apply to them lead to confusion about them.130

Finally, according to Gersonides, the importance that Proverbs assigns to the diaporematic method is emphasized by the very name that Solomon adopts for himself at the end of the book: “Agur son of Jakeh” (Prov. 30:1). This name, he holds, indicates that Solomon employed the diaporematic method in the book of Proverbs.131 Solomon referred to himself as “Agur” (a participial form of .g.r ‘collect, accumulate’) because in the book he collected the opposing suppositions—the first stage of the diaporematic method; just as, at the beginning of Ecclesiastes, he calls himself “Qohelet” (an agent noun from q.h.l ‘assemble, bring together’), which means “the opinion that brings together contradictories.”132 In his explanation of the name “Qohelet,” Gersonides emphasizes that the suppositions assembled in that book are those found at the start of the process and not the ideas that are the result of an inquiry. It was important for Gersonides to justify the fact that the book expounds contradictions as well as ethically incorrect ideas. According to Gersonides, the book of Proverbs offers guidance 128 The use here of ma shavot indicates that the investigator knows that he is dealing with opinions that are thought to be true but may not be. 129 In the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1, Gersonides glosses ta bulot as “means that employ the subtlety of thought” (“Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1, p. 288), that is, sophisticated methods. From the context here one may infer that this is the method of dialectic examination. 130 Comm. on Proverbs, 118a/114r–v. 131 There is no corroboration of this claim in Gersonides’ commentary on Proverbs. Nowhere does he demonstrate that the book employs the diaporematic method. 132 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 15.

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

113

on the method of inquiry conducive to finding the truth and achieving ultimate felicity. Collecting the generally accepted premises is part of the philosophical process, the first stage of the diaporematic method that lays the groundwork for the dialectic inquiry; there is nothing apologetic in its presentation. In the book of Proverbs, Solomon refers to himself by a second name, the son of Jakeh. According to Gersonides, this may stand for the second stage of the inquiry employing the diaporematic method, namely, the stage of examination of the opposing suppositions collected in the first stage. He explains that Jakeh derives from the root q.y. ‘vomit’ and means that in this book Solomon wished to vomit out or reject the untrue suppositions and retain only those that are true, those on which scientific investigation should be grounded: It would seem that Solomon called himself Agur on account of the things that he includes in this book, just as he calls himself Qohelet on account of the things included in the book of Ecclesiastes. Now Agur is related to collection and gathering, and he himself is the son of Jakeh, that is, a son who vomits out. The meaning is that it is collected in him and gathered from the major opposing suppositions on the major problems, and he wants to vomit out the burden and load of the incorrect suppositions so that the correct ones remain.133

Conclusion Gersonides’ commentary on the book of Proverbs reflects his view of the nature of dialectic inquiry and its essential role for scientific investigation and the acquisition of intellectual perfection. In his explanations of the key words in the biblical text and of the verses that he reads as Solomon’s guide to scientific inquiry, Gersonides demonstrates that the dialectic method can lead to the truth that is beyond any doubt, chiefly in metaphysics and politics, even though it is based on generally accepted premises rather than on apodictic premises. He mentions two uses of the dialectic method: as a method of inquiry, through the dialectic syllogism, and as a method of examination, through the diaporematic method. As a method of inquiry that seeks the truth, the dialectic method suffers from the latent weakness of its premises; namely, that they are only generally accepted premises. 133

Comm. on Proverbs, 131b/134r.

114

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

Because not all such premises are true, syllogisms based on them may lead to false conclusions and error. The dialectic method as used for examination—the diaporematic method—serves as an auxiliary to the dialectic method of inquiry. It examines the generally accepted premises, identifies those that are true, and weeds out and rejects those that are false. In this way it provides true premises for dialectic syllogisms and guarantees the truth of their conclusions. This conception of the dialectic method made it possible for Gersonides to argue that the knowledge achieved by means of dialectic can produce the acquired intellect and make it immortal. This statement is especially important for understanding the place of metaphysical inquiry in his system. Gersonides contradicts himself on this point in the commentary on Song of Songs. On 8:8 he writes: “It is also proper that he not delve as deeply into this [metaphysics] as he delves into the other sciences which may be delved into, for it is proper that the way of research in each science accord with the level of verification achievable in each.”134 From this one may infer that metaphysical inquiry is nugatory, because its truth level is very low and it does not lead one to certain truth; the generation of the acquired intellect and its immortality must rely exclusively on knowledge in physics. But in the commentary on 8:14 Gersonides does encourage the study of metaphysics: “that she [who ‘dwells in the gardens,’ i.e., the faculty of imagination] had already prepared for him what he needs from this and that he should endeavor to ascend with diligence and the greatest possible speed upon the mountains of spices—which is metaphysics, as above—and that he not be negligent about this”135 We should understand this injunction to study metaphysics as based on the notion that such knowledge too, is certain and can therefore lead to intellectual perfection and the immortality of the acquired intellect. This is why Solomon, in the Song of Songs, counsels the intellectual elite on the way to achieve it. From the commentary on Proverbs it is clear that Gersonides encourages dialectic inquiry in metaphysics and believes that it can contribute to the production and immortality of the acquired intellect, and thus to felicity in this world and the next. I believe that Gersonides’ notion of dialectics, as expounded here, casts light on the importance of his original philosophical and theologi-

134 135

Comm. on Songs of Songs, p. 152 / p. 91. Ibid., p. 155 / p. 94.

dialectic in gersonides’ commentary on proverbs

115

cal masterpiece, the Wars of the Lord. In that work Gersonides pursues his inquiry by means of the diaporematic method and dialectic modes of argument (without formalizing them in dialectic syllogisms). He believes that there he reaches the truth “so that no doubt remains [on any of the topics] included in this book.”136 Given his promise that in that book he will investigate “several important yet difficult questions on which many fundamental principles ( pinnot) that lead man to his intellectual felicity depend,”137 we should understand that he believed that the truth he found through his inquiry does indeed contribute to the acquisition of “intellectual felicity”: whence the importance of this book.

136 137

Wars, p. 10 / 1:104. Ibid., p. 2 / 1:91.

THE ALEXANDRIAN PROLOGUE PARADIGM IN GERSONIDES’ WRITINGS* Introduction The introductions to books are one of the keys to understanding and interpreting them. When authors write an introduction they are telling readers what to expect and directing them toward how they should read and understand the book. The introduction to a commentary on a book by another author explains how the commentator views the work being glossed. Consequently the introduction is already a part of the interpretation and provides a lens through which readers should see the book.1 The Alexandrian Prologue Tradition and its Transmission The introductions provided by medieval Jewish philosophers are informal. Every author composes his introduction according to the “needs” of the book he is writing or explicating, and those of his readership as well. Some philosophers were also aware of the conventions of traditional of formal introductions, which they applied in various ways. The tradition originated in the oral teaching of the schools of Athens and Alexandria and culminated in the school of Alexandria in the fifth and sixth centuries—the period of Ammonius and his disciples Olympiodorus, Simplicius, Philoponos Elias, and David, for whom such formal introductions became a convention or even a literary genre.2

* An earlier version of a part of this paper was presented under the title, “The Neoplatonic Tradition of the Prologue in the Writings of Samuel Ibn Tibbon and Gersonides,” at The Dibner/Israel Conference on the History of Science, “Medieval Hebrew Science—The Context,” Jerusalem, July 5–8, 1999. An earlier version of another part was presented at the AJS conference in Boston, December 2000, under the title “The Tradition of the Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm in Gersonides’ Writings.” In this version I have modified some of the references (see below, n. 16), corrected several, and added a few new ones. 1 On this function of the preface, see E. Riad, Studies in the Syriac Preface ( Uppsala, 1988), p. 186. 2 On this subject see: I. Düring, Aristotle in the Ancient Bibliographical Tradition (Göteborg, 1957); Illstraut Hadot, Simplicius Commentaire sur les Catégories ( Leiden, 1990);

118

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

These Alexandrian prologues preceded commentaries on the works of Aristotle and Plato and were intended to prepare students for the study of philosophy in general and of Aristotle and Plato in particular. For our purpose it is important to note that the prefaces to Aristotle had a fixed scheme of points or questions to be investigated before further study of a particular work. Initially, the prologues of the Alexandrian school included six points:3 (1) The aim or subject of the work; (2) its utility; (3) its authenticity; (4) its place in the curriculum; (5) the reason for its title; (6) its division into chapters. Simplicius added a seventh point: the branch of philosophy to which the work belongs.4 David and Elias, the last commentators of the school, added an eighth point: the method of instruction used in the work.5 In the course of time this tradition spread. Through Simplicius6 and Paul the Persian (sixth century)7 it was transmitted to Syriac literature8 and from there to Arab philosophy (al-Kindi, Ibn ayyib, al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes),9 on the one hand, and to the Ph. Hoffmann, “La fonction des prologues exégétiques dans la pensée pédagogique néoplatonicienne,” Entrer en matière—les prologues, ed. J. D. Dubois and B. Roussel ( Paris, 1998), pp. 209–243; K. Praechter, “Review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca,” in Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence ( London, 1990), pp. 31–54; R. Sorabji, “The Ancient Commentators on Aristotle,” Aristotle Transformed, pp. 1–30; L. G. Westernik, “The Alexandrian Commentators and the Introductions to their Commentaries,” Aristotle Transformed, pp. 325–348; idem, Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, introduction, text, translation and indices (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1962). 3 These points were introduced by Proclus in his book Sunanagnōsis [= reading a text with a master] and were followed by the members of the Alexandrian school. 4 See Hadot, Simplicius, p. 138. 5 See: Westernik, “The Alexandrian Commentators,” p. 345; Düring, Aristotle, p. 447. 6 Düring, Aristotle, p. 450. 7 See D. Gutas, “Paul the Persian on the Classification of the Parts of Aristotle’s Philosophy: A Milestone between Alexandria and Baghdad,” Der Islam 60 (1983), p. 255. 8 See: A. Vööbus, History of the School of Nisibis ( Louvain, 1965), pp. 182–183; Riad, Studies. 9 See M. Steinschneider, “Über das was dem Studium der Philosophie des Aristoteles vorausgehen muss,” in Al Farabi (Alfarabius), des arabischen Philosophen Leben und Schriften, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Geschichte der griechischen Wissenschaft unter den Arabern (Mémoires de l’Académie Impériale des Sciences de St.-Pétersbourg, series 7, vol. 13, no. 4) (St. Petersburg, 1869), pp. 124–132; F. E. Peters, Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam ( New York and London, 1968), pp. 79–92; M. Grignaschi, “Didascalia in Rethoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alpharabi,” in Al-Farabi—Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique, ed. J. Langhade and M. Grignaschi ( Beirut, 1971), pp. 22– 23, 25, 36; F. W. Zimmermann, Alfarabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione ( London, 1981; repr. with corrections 1991), p. xciii; C. A. Hasnawi,

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

119

Latin West, on the other,10 generally with the seven- or eight-point scheme. The Alexandrian Prologue Tradition in Medieval Jewish Philosophy before Gersonides The Alexandrian prologue paradigm was transmitted to some Jewish thinkers as well. It was adopted by three Jewish philosophers before Gersonides: Isaac Ibn Ghiyāth (Spain, 1038–1089), Samuel Ibn Tibbon ( Provence, d. 1232), and Jacob Anatoli ( Italy, thirteenth century).11 They applied it in the introductions to their biblical commentaries as well as in their interpretations of the first verses of the biblical books attributed to Solomon and their commentaries on the opening verses of some Psalms, which they considered to be introductions written by their authors, Solomon and David. The first to make use of the tradition seems to have been Isaac Ibn Ghiyāth.12 In the introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes,13 written in an informal style, Ibn Ghiyāth inserted a preface, which he calls a muqaddima. Following the tradition of prefaces to the commentaries, he states that he intends to present some considerations that will serve as an introduction (madkhal ) to the book,14 in a brief way and an “easy” style, in order to facilitate its comprehension. Then he

“Farabi et la pratique de l’exégèse philosophique (remarques sur son Commentaire au De Interpretatione d’Aristote),” Revue de synthèse, 3rd series, 117 (1985), p. 35, n. 18; K. Gyekye, Arabic Logic: Ibn al- ayyib’s Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge (Albany, 1979). 10 See E. Quain, “The Medieval Accessus ad Actors,” Traditio 3 (1945), pp. 215– 264; R. W. Hunt, “Introductions to the Artes in the Twelfth Century,” Studia Mediaevalia, Festschrift for R. J. Martin ( Bruges, 1948), pp. 85–112; A. J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the later Middle Ages, 2nd ed. (Aldershot, 1988). 11 Ibn Ghiyāth wrote in Arabic, Ibn Tibbon and Anatoli in Hebrew. 12 I would like to thank S. Harvey for calling this to my attention. Ibn Ghiyāth’s acquaintance with the Alexandrian prologue tradition is also attested by the fact that he cites some of the definitions of philosophy mentioned in the first part of the Alexandrian prologues—the general introduction to philosophy. See: Isaac Ibn Ghiyāth, Sefer ha-Perishut (Commentary on Ecclesiastes), in amesh Megillot, trans. with introduction and notes by Y. Qāfi ( Jerusalem, 1962) [there erroneously attributed to Saadia Gaon], pp. 190, 195. 13 Isaac Ibn Ghiyāth, Ghiyāth Commentary on Ecclesiastes, pp. 161–296. 14 Introductions to biblical commentaries containing seven of the points can already be found in the writings of the Nestorian School of Nisibis in the sixth century. Cf. Vööbus, History of the School, pp. 182–183; Riad, Studies.

120

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

lists eight “knowledges” (ma arif ) that serve as the axis (al-qu ab) around which the book is constructed, and applies them to it.15 Ibn Tibbon, who was acquainted with Ibn Ghiyāth’s commentary, applies the tradition in his own commentary on Ecclesiastes. Like Ibn Ghiyāth, he used points of the paradigm in his introduction to the commentary; but he did not list them as themes to be examined before reading the book nor claim to be applying the prologue paradigm tradition. Ibn Tibbon refers to six of the traditional points: the name of the book, the name of the author, the aim or subject matter of the book, the mode of instruction used, its utility, and its division into parts.16 Ibn Tibbon’s innovation lies in the application of the Alexandrian prologue tradition to biblical exegesis. He explicitly claims that philosophers since Aristotle have followed the eight-point prologue paradigm in the introductions to their own books.17 David and Solomon, whom he considers to be philosophers, wrote prefaces to their works in 15 It is worth noting that the list of “knowledges” corresponds only partially to the eight points of the Alexandrian school. It contains the conventional points of the Alexandrian prologue paradigm: the author of the book, the name of the book, its degree (martaba), and its relation to other books in the Holy Scriptures, along with four points that are not found in the prologue paradigm and are related to the subject of the book—which, according to Ibn Ghiyāth, is abstention (al-zuhd ). 16 See Comm. on Ecclesiastes, pp. 92–94 / pp. 104–108. In the original version of this article I referred to Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes on the basis of Parma—Biblioteca Palatina, MS 2182 [ De Rossi 272, II ] ( IMHM 13354) and James T. Robinson’s translation of Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Ecclesiastes 1:1 in his article “Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes and the Philosopher’s Prooemium,” Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature 3 (2000), pp. 83–146. In the meantime Robinson has published a critical text of the commentary and English translation, which I use here. Thus I cite the rest of the Hebrew text according to James T. Robinson, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes” ( Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2002), which includes a critical edition of the Hebrew text of the entire Commentary on Ecclesiastes, and Robinson’s Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes: The Book of the Soul of Man (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), which includes an English translation of the text. Hence references to Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Ecclesiastes 1:1 are to Robinson’s article, first the Hebrew and then his translation (cited as Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium”). References to the rest of the commentary are to the Hebrew text in Robinson’s dissertation and the English in his book (cited together as Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes). In both cases I give the reference to the Hebrew text, followed by a slash and the reference to Robinson’s English translation. 17 Ibn Tibbon attributes this type of introduction to Aristotle himself and his successors. See Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 92 / p. 104. See also Robinson’s commentary there, p. 85 and p. 131 n. 109. As Riad has shown, the influence of the Alexandrian prologue paradigm tradition on an author’s own book is already found in Syriac literature. See Riad, Studies, pp. 53–54.

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

121

the same way. The first verses of Psalm 49 (vv. 2–5),18 and the opening verses of Ecclesiastes, Proverbs, and Song of Songs are, according to his interpretation, prefaces written according to the prologue paradigm.19 Ibn Tibbon generally precedes his commentary on biblical verses with a survey of the theory that underlies it.20 Consequently, his application of the Alexandrian tradition in his biblical exegesis is prefaced by a survey of the theory of prologue paradigm,21 which he calls haqdamah or ha a ah.22 He lists and explains all eight points and illustrates each with examples taken from various Arabic sources, mainly al-Farabi and Averroes.23 His son-in-law, Jacob Anatoli, followed him. In his book of homilies, Malmad ha-talmidim, he applies the prologue paradigm to another psalm, Psalm 45, maintaining that its first verse is a preface that includes three points of the paradigm: the name of the poet, the name of the psalm, and its aim.24

Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 688 / p. 404. According to Ibn Tibbon, Psalm 49 is a philosophical hymn that employs demonstration as its mode of verification. He considers its first four verses to be a prologue and identifies two points in it: “the aim of the book” (v. 2) and “the mode of instruction” (v. 4). It speaks “in the way of wisdom . . . which is a branch of the mode of instruction” ( Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 688 / p. 404) For the points he found in Solomon’s prefaces, see below, pp. 129, 134–135. 20 See, for example, his “survey of the species of discourse that the sages use in their books” ( Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 94 / pp. 108–109) and “a summary introduction to some of the things discussed in the science of logic,” especially about the theory of syllogism ( Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, pp. 574–578 / pp. 212–219). Ibn Tibbon says explicitly that he explains the four types of syllogism here because he will need them in order to interpret the book (ibid., p. 578 / p. 219). 21 This type of theoretical exposition originated in the isagogic literature and is a development of the skopos. Hoffmann (“La fonction des prologues,” p. 226) cites Simplicius as having formulated a theoretical statement on the subject. See Hadot, Simplicius, pp. 38–39, for two examples of such developments on the skopos. For its use in Arabic literature, see A. Chraïbi, “L’émergence du genre muqaddima dans la littérature arabe,” in: Entrer en matière, ed. Dubois and Roussel, (Paris 1998) pp. 97–98. 22 The word ha a ah is the translation of the Arabic taw i a, which means both “introduction” and “preparation.” The ha a ah is a preliminary remark that contains a concise presentation of the main ideas of the subject that will be discussed in the book or in the chapter that follows or of the method that will be employed there, thereby preparing the reader to understand the book or chapter. See also n. 21 above. See further (in this volume) “The Introductions to the Bible Commentaries,” pp. 165–171. 23 See Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” text, pp. 92–94 / pp. 104–108; nn. 107–182, pp. 131–137. 24 Malmad ha-talmidim, ed. L. Silberman ( Leiden, 1866), p. 19b. 18 19

122

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings Gersonides and the Alexandrian Prologue Tradition: Possible Sources

Gersonides, in the next century, also adopted this prologue paradigm. He does not mention his sources, but his main debt is clearly to Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle and especially the long commentary on the Physics,25 which discusses all eight points. The Hebrew translation of the book was in his private library;26 and, as we shall see later, when he refers to the paradigm in the Wars he designates “the name of the book” by the awkward “what the name of the book indicates.” Given that the Hebrew translation of Averroes’s commentary on the Physics uses this latter phrase, I believe that Gersonides had read the long commentary on the Physics and used the expression he found there. Ibn Tibbon had called it ve- otamo (“its title”), explaining that what he meant was “the name of the book.”27 Gersonides was acquainted not only with the long commentary on the Physics but also with Averroes’s other commentaries that invoked the prologue paradigm28 as well as with al-Farabi’s long commentary on the De Interpretatione.29 Thus he was aware that the paradigm was a common convention in philosophical commentaries and that the prefaces to these works did not always contain the full list of points.

25 See S. Harvey, “The Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ Prooemium to his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics,” PAAJR 52 (1985), pp. 55–84. 26 See G. E. Weil, La bibliothèque de Gersonide d’après son catalogue autographe ( Louvain and Paris, 1991), p. 47. 27 Cf. Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 92 / p. 105 and p. 133 n. 132. 28 Gersonides read Averroes’s Epitome on the Metaphysics ( Paris—BNF, MS héb. 956 [ IMHM 32606]); as Manekin has shown, he mentioned it in his commentary on the Categories (see C. Manekin, “Preliminary Observations on Gersonides’ Logical Writings,” PAAJR 52 [1985], p. 98 n. 42), where the list has seven points. He wrote a supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics and Epitome of the Physics, each of which contained four points, and on the Epitome of De generatione et corruptione (two points) and explained the points. He also explicated other commentaries that contain some of the points, though he did not explain them there: the Epitome of the Meteorology and the Epitome of the Parva naturalia (three points each), the Middle Commentary on the Prior Analytics, and the commentary on De animalibus (two points each). 29 See: Manekin, “Preliminary Observations,” p. 98; R. Glasner, “On Gersonides’ Knowledge of Languages,” Aleph 2 (2002), pp. 243–244 and pp. 252–254. Manekin shows that the work was twice translated into Hebrew in the thirteenth century; as Glasner remarks, however, no Hebrew version is extant and we do not know whether the full text was ever translated. She suggests that Gersonides may have read it in Arabic (“On Gersonides’ Knowledge,” pp. 253–254).

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

123

Even if he was acquainted with Ibn Ghiyāth’s commentary on Ecclesiastes, as Ben Meir claims,30 he was not influenced by the list of points presented there.31 He was probably familiar with Ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Ecclesiastes32 and, as we shall see, was influenced by it in the application of the prologue paradigm in his biblical exegesis. The Conception Like Ibn Tibbon and Anatoli before him, Gersonides regards the prologue paradigm as a literary convention and believes it should be used in an author’s introduction to his book.33 In his commentary on the first verse of Song of Songs he states explicitly that Solomon wrote its preface according to this convention: These matters to which he [Solomon] made reference in this verse are those matters with which every author ought to begin, before taking up the subject matter of the book itself.34

This conception enables him to consider the prologue paradigm not only as a model for biblical prefaces, such as “Solomon’s books” (as Ibn Tibbon had done), but also for his own philosophical-theological work, The Wars of the Lord. Gersonides was the first Jewish philosopher to state that he followed the prologue paradigm in an introduction to his own work.

30 See R. Ben Meir, “Gersonides’ Interpretation of the Book of Ecclesiastes: An Analysis and Text” [ Part 1: an analysis of the text; Part 2: the text], doctoral dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1993, Part 1, pp. 117–152 ( Hebrew). Because the commentary was not translated into Hebrew, Ben Meir, following M. Joel and E. Renan, supposed that Gersonides knew Arabic and read it in the original language. She also suggested that there may have been a Hebrew translation, now lost because it was executed only for Gersonides’ needs and never circulated. (See ibid., Part 1, p. 118 and n. 17). That Gersonides did know Arabic has now been proved by Glasner, “On Gersonides’ Knowledge.” 31 The points Gersonides mentions are those common to the authors who adopted the Alexandrian tradition and not those particular to Ibn Ghiyāth. See also n. 122 below. 32 This is the view of Weil, La bibliothèque, pp. 60–61, and Ben Meir, “Gersonides’ Interpretation,” Part 1, pp. 179–202. 33 See Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 92 / p. 104; Malmad ha-talmidim, p. 19b. 34 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 70 / p. 18 [emphasis mine].

124

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm in the Introduction to The Wars of the Lord

Gersonides does not begin his introduction to the Wars with the statement that he will apply some or all of the eight points of the prologue paradigm. In fact, the eight points do not serve as the framework organizing the prologue, as they do in Averroes’s prologue to his Long Commentary on the Physics. In fact, the introduction to the Wars is informal and includes other topics, such as a response to his predecessors, especially Maimonides. Much of the introduction can be read as an implicit response to Maimonides’ introduction to The Guide of the Perplexed. Nevertheless, at the end of the introduction Gersonides claims that he has employed six points of the prologue paradigm: Here was explained the aim of this book, its utility, what the name of the book indicated, its order, its necessary parts, and its rank (u-madregato). This is what was intended here.35

This apologetic statement indicates that Gersonides felt it important to present his introduction as modeled on the prologue paradigm tradition.36 He seems to be saying that even though the introduction is informal and not constructed strictly according to the prologue paradigm, it nevertheless includes most of the topics of the paradigm and satisfies the convention for an author’s introduction to his own philosophical work.37 The closing remark is supposed to make readers return to the start of the introduction in search of the points Gersonides mentioned. Here

Wars, p. 11 / 1:104. Gersonides also wrote a special introduction to the astronomical part of Wars ( V.1). Although there he does not claim that he is employing the prologue paradigm, he explains the aim of this part of the book and its subjects and announces its division into three parts. See B. R. Goldstein, The Astronomy of Levi ben Gerson ( New York, 1985), p. 308. 37 Gersonides wrote brief introductions to his supercommentaries on the works of Averroes. None of them follows the prologue paradigm convention. Because some of the commentaries had introductions by Averroes that employed this pattern, there was no need for Gersonides to add his own. On these introductions see (in this volume) “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” pp. 184–197. Although Gersonides’ introductions to his biblical commentaries are written in a nonformal way, they contain some of the traditional points of the prologue paradigm, as was often the case with nonformal introductions in Arabic and Jewish literature: the aim of the book or its subject, its utility, and its method. On these introductions, see (in this volume) “The Introductions to the Bible Commentaries,” pp. 151–179. 35 36

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

125

we shall do likewise and try to identify the places where Gersonides complies with the paradigm. The aim of the book is announced at the beginning of the introduction, although the “technical” word “aim” (kavanah) is not used: We would like to examine in this book some very important yet obscure questions on which many crucial foundations among the foundations that lead man to his intellectual felicity (ha la ah) are based.38

After this Gersonides lists six main questions that will be covered in his book. The utility of the book is not stated explicitly, but Gersonides seems to have included it in the explanation of the aim. We can infer that the book’s utility is that it can help readers attain intellectual felicity, and, according to the explanation given to the sixth question, political felicity as well.39 What the name of the book indicates. The book takes its name from Numbers 21:14, but Gersonides ascribes to it another significance, related to his method of inquiry on the one hand and his conception of the relationship between Torah and philosophy on the other: “For we have fought the battles of the Lord in so far as we have refuted the false views of our predecessors.”40 Its order. It is not clear what Gersonides means by its order. This expression is not found in the enumeration of the points in the introductions to Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle, al-Farabi’s introduction to the long commentary on De interpretatione, or Ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Ecclesiastes. But in his commentary on the eleventh book of De animalibus (on which Gersonides wrote his own commentary), Averroes speaks of three methodological questions (baqqashot) covered in the book. The third includes “the mode of the order of instruction ( ofen seder ha-limmud ) used in it [in the science dealt with in this book]”; i.e., the order of presentation of the topics in zoology.41 Wars, p. 2 / 1:91. Simplicius had said that one should not deal with all the points in a rigorous way. He refers explicitly to the “the utility of the book” and says that sometimes it appears together with the aim of the book. See Hadot, Simplicius, pp. 30 and 157. This observation also seems to hold for Gersonides, although he does mention “utility” as a separate item in the list of points of the prologue paradigm. 40 Wars, p. 6 / 1:98. 41 Cf. De animalibus, Oxford—Bodleian, MS Heb.1370 / 1 ( IMHM 22394), fols. 81r and 83r–86v; Gersonides’ commentary on De animalibus, Vatican Ebr. 42 / 1 ( IMHM 681), fols. 2r–v and 4v–10v. 38 39

126

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

Averroes does not say that this “question” is one of the points of the prologue paradigm but it is plausible that Gersonides understood it to pertain to “the method of instruction.” In fact, in the introduction to the Wars he writes at length about the order of presentation of the topics, providing eight reasons for it and insisting on its utility for understanding the book. Though he does not use the expression “its order” and speaks rather of “ha-siddur badevarim” (the order of the subject-matters),42 he may have this part of the introduction in mind when he says he has discussed “its order.” It seems strange that Gersonides speaks only of the order of presentation of the book’s subject matter and omits other aspects of the “mode of instruction,” even though he explicitly deals with them in the introduction. Near the beginning he announces the kinds of demonstrations employed in the book.43 Later he declares that he will employ the dialectical method and offers a theoretical survey thereof.44 Its necessary parts. The expression used by Averroes in the long commentary on the Physics and several other commentaries (and Ibn Tibbon as well ) is “its division.” Nevertheless, Averroes uses terms similar to that used by Gersonides in two commentaries that the later knew: the Middle commentary on the Topics (“the parts of this science”)45 and the Epitome of the Metaphysics (“and its parts”).46 The application of this point is very clear. At the end of his introduction Gersonides explicitly states that the book contains six parts and names them.47 Its rank (madregato). In the prologue tradition this point generally means the book’s place in the curriculum.48 This was also how Ibn

42 Wars, Introduction, pp. 7–10 / 1:99–104. Gersonides provides only the theory of the order of presentation of the materials in the Wars. He does not apply it to the subjects he deals with in the book and leaves this task to the reader. 43 See Wars, p. 3 / 1:93. 44 See ibid., p. 6 / 1:97. Gersonides does not name the method but only describes it. For a description of the method and its application in the Wars, see (in this volume) “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” pp. 13–43; “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur,” pp. 105–134. 45 See Paris—BNF, MS héb. 920 [ IMHM 31961], fol. 109v. 46 See Paris—BNF, MS héb. 956 [ IMHM 32606] fol. 916v. 47 Wars, p. 11 / 1:104. 48 See Hadot, Simplicius, p. 155. For Arabic philosophy, see (e.g.): Averroes’s prologue to the Long Commentary on the Physics, in Harvey, “Averroes’ Prooemium,” p. 68 / 79 ( Hebrew text / English translation); Averroes’s prologue to the Epitome of De generatione et corruptione, in Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Medium & Epitome in Aristotelis de Generatione et Corruptione Libros, Textum hebraicum recensuit et adnotationi-

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

127

Tibbon understood it.49 It is possible that Gersonides’ claim that “its rank” is covered in the introduction refers to a passage where he writes that “it is without doubt that the reader of this book should study previously mathematics, physics and metaphysics.”50 In the order of instruction, the Wars comes after the study of mathematics, physics, and metaphysics.51 As we shall see, Gersonides offers another interpretation of “rank” in his commentary on Song of Songs, equating it with the book’s “exalted degree” (ma alato).52 Hence he may have understood “rank” in the same way in the Wars.53 If so, Gersonides is offering a new interpretation of “rank” and “rank” refers to the relative importance of the topics examined in this book. In fact, in his introduction to the Wars Gersonides insists that the book will examine “some very important questions.”54 Later, in the context of the sixth question—“is the universe eternal or created”—he claims that “there is no more important topic than the topic that we investigate here.”55 At the end of Book V, Gersonides uses the term madregah in the sense of “value,” claiming that what he discusses in this part of his work outranks all the sciences. The value of Book V, he says, is that it covers the last stage of these sciences, their “fruit” and “purpose” (ta lit). The first part of the book—astronomy—is the “fruit” and “purpose” of bus illustravit Samuel Kurland, Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, vol. 4:1–2 (Cambridge, MA, 1958), p. 101. 49 Ibn Tibbon uses the Hebrew word madregato, which renders the Arabic martabatuhu. He distinguishes between two cases of “rank.” The first is the book’s place in the order of instruction of the same science; to wit: “If the book is one part of the parts of a science, one should announce its place in this science; if it is the first the last or the middle book in this science if there are three parts. When there are many parts, it should announce after which part it comes and before which part it comes.” ( Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 93 / p. 107). This point was emphasized by the Neoplatonic commentators. See Hadot, Simplicius, pp. 155–156. This explanation is also found in al-Farabi’s Kitāb alfā (al-Farabi, Kitāb al alfā al-musta malah fi al-man iq, ed. M. Mahdid [ Beirut, 1968], p. 95) and in Didascalia (Grignaschi, Deux ouvrages, p. 128). The second kind of “rank” mentioned by Ibn Tibbon is when the book represents a science of its own. Here, one has to indicate the place of this science in the curriculum of the various sciences. See Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 93 / 107. 50 Wars, Introduction, p. 3 / 1:92. 51 If this interpretation is correct, Gersonides may have understood madregato according to Ibn Tibbon’s second explanation. See n. 49. 52 See below, p. 000. 53 This seems to be how Feldman understood it when he rendered madregato as “its value” (Wars, 1:104). 54 Ibid., p. 2 / 1:91. 55 Ibid.

128

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

mathematics; the second—nonmathematical astronomy—of physics; and the third—the movers of the spheres and God—of metaphysics. Hence the degree indicates also the place it occupies in the order of the subjects these sciences deal with. When he writes about “its rank” (madregato) in the introduction to the Wars, Gersonides may also be referring this meaning, and combining the two concepts of value and place in the order of learning. Gersonides omits “the name of the author” and “its relation” (i.e., the branch of philosophy to which the work belongs)56 from his list, because they are unnecessary. The name of the author is known.57 As for “its relation” (a translation of the Arabic nisbatuhu), Gersonides did not feel this was important, since the Wars deals with several disciplines. What was important for him was not the branch of philosophy to which the questions he discusses belong, but the fact that they had not been resolved before his time. Because knowledge is essential for the attainment of the ultimate felicity, the Wars seeks definitive solutions for these diverse problems. The Application of the Prologue Paradigm in Gersonides’ Biblical Exegesis: Interpretations of Biblical “Prologues” Like Ibn Tibbon before him, Gersonides treats King Solomon as a philosopher and his books as philosophical books. Like Ibn Tibbon, and perhaps also under his influence, he contends that the opening verses of each of Solomon’s books—Song of Songs, Ecclesiastes, and Proverbs—are prefaces written according to the prologue paradigm convention of philosophical works. In his interpretation of the first verses of the Solomonic books he deals with two issues: the identification of the prologues in the texts and the points contained there, and the utility of mentioning these points there.

56 See, for example: al-Farabi’s introduction to his commentary on De Interpretatione (Zimmermann, al-Farabi’s Commentary, p. 4); Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Physics ( Harvey, “Averroes’ Prooemium,” p. 65 / 72); Ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Ecclesiastes ( Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” pp. 92–93 / pp. 105–107). Ibn Tibbon also provides another interpretation of this point, on which he elaborates at much greater length. 57 In fact, the name of the author is announced at the beginning of the introduction.

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

129

Like Ibn Tibbon, Gersonides affirms that the verses that constitute the prologues to these books contain some58 of the traditional points of the conventional scheme.59 His interpretations, however, differ from those of his predecessor. The Prologue to Song of Songs The most elaborate interpretation of a Solomonic preface as embodying the prologue paradigm relates to Song of Songs. Like Ibn Tibbon, Gersonides considered the first verse of that book to be a preface. But whereas Ibn Tibbon thought that it presented only the three points he found in all of Solomon’s prefaces—the name of the book, the name of the author, and the species of discourse used in it60—Gersonides finds six points: Ibn Tibbon’s three, plus three more.

58 In his theoretical introduction to the interpretation of the first verses of Ecclesiastes, Ibn Tibbon states that philosophers do not always mention all the points of the prologue paradigm in their introductory prefaces. Sometimes the author applies only some of them and leaves it to the reader to glean the rest ( Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 93 / p. 108). This statement may well follow al-Farabi’s Kitāb al-alfā , whose author says that “Aristotle and his earlier followers confine their preliminary remarks to the requisite minimum and sometimes omit them altogether” (Kitāb al-alfā , p. 95; trans. Zimmermann, Al-Farabi’s Commentary, p. xciii, n. 5). Al-Farabi criticizes the later commentators, i.e., the late Neoplatonic commentators of the Alexandrian school, for taking the preliminary remarks “too seriously” (ibid.; trans. Zimmermann, pp. xciii–iv, n. 5). He seems to be unaware that they held the same view, having written that one should not always mention all the points in prefaces to commentaries on Aristotle or Plato. In his commentary on the Prior Analytics, Philoponus speaks of six points that one should mention in the preface to any Aristotelian text, except when a certain point is self-evident. Simplicius says that one should not deal with all the points in a rigorous manner. Sometimes the utility of the book appears together with the aim of the book (cf. n. 39 above) and the title is self-evident, as in De anima, for example. One should elaborate on the authenticity of the author only when there is a special reason for doing so. Cf. Hadot, Simplicius, pp. 30 and 157. On the prefaces to Plato’s dialogues, see ibid., p. 34. Averroes often presents only a partial list of points. Cf. n. 28 above. 59 For the idea that the two first verses of Ecclesiastes are a preface written according to the tradition of philosophical prefaces, see Ben Meir, “Gersonides’ Interpretation,” Part 1, p. 42. Ben Meir (ibid., p. 63 n. 53) refers only to Ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Ecclesiastes, Parma—Biblioteca Palatina, MS 2182 [ De Rossi 272, II ] ( IMHM 13354), fol. 20r (= Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 92 / p. 104) as the source of this tradition. My identification and description of the sources and my analysis of Gersonides’ interpretation of Solomon’s preface to this book differ from hers. In a footnote to his translation of Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs, Kellner suggests that Gersonides was influenced by Averroes’s preface to his Long Commentary on the Physics (Kellner, Commentary on Song of Songs [English], p. 110 n. 80). Kellner refers only to the first verses of the Song of Songs and offers no evidence to support his idea. 60 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, pp. 585–586 / p. 231.

130

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

He mentions the points twice in his commentary—in its introduction and in his commentary on the first verse, though his terminology in the two places is not uniform. In the introduction to the commentary he merely lists the points: Included here also is the name of the book, the name of the author and his rank, his method of approaching the subject, the subject under investigation,61 and its purpose (ta lito).62

In his commentary on Song of Songs 1:1 he goes deeper, explaining the points and showing how they can be derived from the verse. Gersonides’ treatment of what he reads as the “preface” of Song of Songs is particularly interesting because of the way in which he derives the points from the verse. He contends that all of them are included in two semantic units found in the verse: shir ha-shirim (the song of songs) and li-shelomoh ([which] is Solomon’s). Each unit contains three points. The expression shir ha-shirim indicates, first of all, “the name of the book.” Gersonides maintains that the title is “Song of Songs” and not “The Song of Songs that is Solomon’s,” as Ibn Tibbon held. This point replaces “the aim of the book” (kavvanat ha-sefer). The word skopos literally means “aim,” but it is also used in the sense of “subject” ( prothesis). See Praechter, “Review of the Commentaria,” p. 45, n. 45 (ed. note). In the introductions to Plato’s dialogues, the first point is sometimes the general subject and sometimes the aim of the book. See Hadot, Simplicius, pp. 33 and 46. For the interpretation of this point as the subject of the book by Calcidius and Origen, see ibid., p. 38. In the introduction to his Epitome of the Metaphysics (see n. 28 above), Averroes explains both the “aim of the metaphysics and its subject” (fol. 917r). Boethius says that the intention of a book cannot be understood unless its subject has been explained first. According to Hunt “the medieval commentators made this into a separate head, which they called materia” ( Hunt, “Introductions,” p. 95). 62 Ibn Tibbon, Prooemium, p. 64 / p. 10. Here Gersonides finds points that Ibn Tibbon explicitly excluded from the preface of the Song of Songs. Since Ibn Tibbon believed that Solomon had written prefaces to his books according to the prologue paradigm tradition, he also commented on the omission of some points in the introductions. Neoplatonic commentators did likewise. Quain (“The Medieval Accessus,” p. 247) remarks that when the Neoplatonic commentators omit a point, they explain why it was not necessary. Quain argues that this shows that the commentators thought that the formula of the points was obligatory and hence felt compelled to explain why they omitted a point. Ibn Tibbon suggests three reasons for this omission, all of them interrelated and based on the style and content of the book: (1) Solomon did not mention the aim of the book and its usefulness because the Song of Songs is not a textbook; “he did not set it down by way of instruction” (Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 586 / p. 231). Song of Songs is an esoteric book addressed to the few, to the intellectual elite, and not to the masses. Esoteric content is transmitted by allusions only and should not be fully explained. (2) The book does not contain a multiplicity of subjects so there is no need to explain its aim, this being self-evident. (3) The subject of the book is esoteric and should be hidden. Therefore Solomon wanted to conceal its aim. 61

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

131

Second, it indicates “its exalted degree” (ma alato). This is an unusual term and not included in the list of points in Gersonides’ introduction. There he employs the standard term used in Hebrew translations of Arabic commentaries and by Ibn Tibbon: “its rank” (madregato). As we have seen, the term indicates the book’s place in the curriculum. Even though he knew the conventional meaning of the point from Arabic sources translated into Hebrew and apparently also from Ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Ecclesiastes, here he gives it a new and different meaning63 and understands it as referring to the book’s value.64 Probably following Song of Songs Rabbah 1:11, Gersonides relies on 1 Kings 5:12 (RSV 4:32)—“He composed three thousand proverbs, and his songs numbered one thousand and five”—to ground the assertion that Solomon not only “[arranged] proverbs with great care” (Eccles. 12:9) in order “to find pleasing words” (v. 10), but also wrote poetry (“songs”). He understands “pleasing words” as those that “guided one toward the perfection intended for man whether to the first perfection (= ethical perfection) or to the ultimate perfection (= intellectual perfection) or to them both together.”65 According to this interpretation, all of Solomon’s poems are intended to guide man toward his perfection. Following up another statement in Song of Songs Rabbah 1:11, he maintains that the expression “song of songs” indicates that the poems in the book are not all of those composed by Solomon to guide man to perfection,66 but only “the choicest” of them.67

As we have seen, though, he may have already given it a similar meaning in the introduction to The Wars of the Lord. See above, pp. 127. 64 The Hebrew word madregah can have two meanings: (1) rank or degree; (2) value. Interpreting the first verse of the Song of Songs, Gersonides takes it in the second sense and replaces it with ma alato. The change of terminology and meaning enables him to interpret the first verse as containing the point “its rank.” 65 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 69 / p. 17. 66 It is interesting to note that Origen bases his interpretation of the title of the Song of Songs on the fact that “song” here is in the singular. He notes that this is so because we do not know of other poems by Solomon in the canon. Cf. Hadot, Simplicius, pp. 43–44. 67 In his commentary on 1 Kings 5:12 (RSV 4:32), written more than twelve years after that on the Song of Songs, Gersonides interprets the content of Proverbs in a similar way. He claims that the book consists of those proverbs that are useful for “acquiring wisdom and morality,” etc. The other maxims composed by Solomon do not have this beneficial effect and are accordingly not written in the books he composed by virtue of the holy spirit—Song of Songs, Ecclesiastes, and Proverbs. The date of composition of Gersonides’ commentary on 1 Kings is not known, but we know that the commentary on 2 Samuel was completed in January 1338. Since Gersonides writes, in his introduction to the commentary on the Former Prophets, that 63

132

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

According to Gersonides, there are two types of useful poems: theoretical poems that teach difficult philosophical issues by means of imitation and allegory, and poems that have a rhetorical function, persuading men to behave well, “to love what ought to be loved and to reject what ought to be rejected.”68 The poems in Song of Songs are “the choicest” not because of their literary form but because of their content. They are the worthiest poems of both types69 because “it is clear that the more the poem represents worthy matters which are ever more useful to the attainments of felicity, it is itself more worthy” and “the more a poem is crafted to draw one to love worthier things and those things useful for the attainments of felicity, the worthier it is itself.”70 The poems in Song of Songs describe worthier matter—the ultimate human felicity—and urge readers to strive for and attain it.71 The third point indicated by “song of songs” is “the form of speech in it”; that is, its literary form. Like Ibn Tibbon,72 Gersonides holds that the book conveys its ideas by means of the literary form of poetry (be-derek ha-shir).73 By “the literary form of poetry” Gersonides means poetic speech that presents abstract ideas or concepts in figurative lan-

he intends to compose the commentaries on these books in their biblical order, one after the other, we may infer that his commentary on 1 Kings was not written before 1338. For the date of composition of the commentary on 2 Samuel, see Ch. Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide ( Paris, 1973), p. 69. 68 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 70 / p. 18. 69 Ibn Tibbon, too, interprets “Song of Songs” as “the choicest of his [Solomon’s] poems” ( Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 96 / p. 112). He explains that it is the choicest because it deals with the most important subject matter, namely, the philosophical subject of “the conjunction with God which is the purpose of man” (ibid.): i.e., with ultimate felicity. Ibn Tibbon does not say that the poems in the Song of Songs are the choicest of all poems that persuade their readers to strive for the ultimate felicity; he refers only to their “subject.” Nevertheless, writing about the genre “poetry” in his theoretical survey of the points of the prologue paradigm, Ibn Tibbon cites “the logicians” who explained that poems have a rhetorical or persuasive function and inspire listeners to love certain things and to hate and avoid other things ( Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 94 / p. 109). See also Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 140, n. 206. Here Gersonides uses this definition of poetry for the second type of poems. 70 Comm. on Song of Songs, pp. 70–71 / p. 18. 71 See Kellner, Commentary on Song of Songs [English], p. 114 n. 17. 72 See Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” pp. 94–95 / pp. 108–110; Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, pp. 585–586 / p. 231. 73 Comm. on Song of Songs p. 70 / p. 18. This is the translation of the Arabic alā al arīqa al-shi rīya. Ibn Tibbon renders it dere meli at ha-shir ( Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 94 / p. 109 and p. 139 n. 197). Because Gersonides uses a different translation of this expression, he must have known it from another source and not only from Ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Ecclesiastes.

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

133

guage and images.74 He states explicitly that the book does not use ordinary language and does not express its ideas through “discourse and narrative couched in clear words and speech.”75 The most interesting and innovative part of Gersonides’ interpretation of the first verse is his understanding of li-shelomoh. Relying on the third point he read into shir ha-shirim, he considers that the first verse, too, is “poetic” and understands li-shelomoh as a symbol to be interpreted. According to Gersonides, li-shelomoh can be understood in three different ways, each referring to a different point of the traditional prologue paradigm. He avers that the three meanings coexist, so that li-shelomoh conveys all three points simultaneously. Li-shelomoh can be understood literally, as “which is Solomon’s.” Here shelomoh is taken as the historical Solomon and indicates the author’s name. Gersonides notes that Solomon announces the name of the author at the start of his other books as well, so that this point is characteristic of all of Solomon’s prefaces. But li-shelomoh can also be read as having a figurative meaning, based on the etymology of shelomoh:76 shelomoh is derived from shalem (“perfect”). From this etymology Gersonides derives two meanings of shelomoh and two further points of the prologue paradigm. Shelomoh indicates two states of the human intellect that are related to perfection: the material intellect and the acquired intellect. The material intellect is not itself perfect, but can be called shelomoh because it is disposed to receive perfection. The acquired intellect, on the other hand, is called shelomoh because it is the perfect intellect. The preposition li- has several meanings, too. It can indicate the owner of the book: the book belongs to shelomoh. It can indicate the topic addressed by the book: the book is dedicated to the subject

74 In the Islamic-Jewish philosophical tradition this was the lowest (furthest from truth) form of argumentation. I thank the anonymous reader of this paper for this observation. 75 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 70 / p. 18. “Clear words” can be opposed to metaphor and figurative language, while “clear speech” may be opposed to allegory. 76 This method of interpretation has been very common in Jewish literature since the Bible itself. Maimonides refers to it in Guide II.43 and applies it to the interpretation of the names śa an, samma el, and na ash. As we shall see, qohelet, too, is etymologically interpreted in Jewish literature. Gersonides justifies this type of interpretation by the literary genre to which the Song of Songs belongs—poetry. For Maimonides’ etymological method and its application on the interpretation of the names śa an, samma el, and na ash, see S. Klein-Braslavy, “Interpretative Riddles in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2007), pp. 153–155.

134

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

shelomoh. It can mean “for the purpose of ” or “for the sake of ”: the book is written for shelomoh or to be useful for shelomoh. Gersonides associates each sense of the preposition li- to a meaning of shelomoh and thereby extracts three points of the prologue paradigm. The first sense of li- should be attached to the plain meaning of shelomoh, the person Solomon. Li-shelomoh means the book that belongs to shelomoh or the book that Solomon has written. Thus it provides “the name of the author.”77 The second sense of li- should be attached to the first figurative meaning of shelomoh. Hence, li-shelomoh means that “the subject which he will investigate in this book”78 is shelomoh or the material intellect. The third meaning of li- should be attached to the second figurative meaning of shelomoh. Hence li-shelomoh indicates the usefulness of the book (to alto):79 it is useful for the attainment of shelomoh or the acquired intellect. The Prologue to Ecclesiastes In his commentaries on Solomon’s two other books Gersonides merely indicates the points found in the opening verses and does not explain how they are embodied there. According to Ibn Tibbon, Ecclesiastes has the longest Solomonic prologue—eleven verses—but only the first two contain points of the prologue paradigm. The other nine constitute a ha a ah that explains the main ideas of the book.80 Gersonides, by contrast, does not say which verses he reads as a preface. Because he treats the first two verses as a single unit that contains three things that Solomon wanted to “inform us,” we can assume that he considers that these, at least, are a preface.81

Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 69 / p. 17. Ibid., p. 70 / p. 18. 79 Ibid. In the introduction to the commentary he uses another term to indicate this point: ta lito ‘its purpose’. 80 According to Ibn Tibbon, a traditional preface ( peti ah) comprises two main parts: the prologue paradigm of the traditional eight points and a ha a ah. Since he considered King Solomon to be a philosopher and his books to be philosophical works, he attributed such a preface to Ecclesiastes and considered Ecclesiastes 1:1–11 to be its preface. See Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 556 / pp. 179–180; p. 596 / pp. 247–248. He also declares that his own introduction to the commentary on Ecclesiastes is written in such a way (ibid., p. 556 / p. 180). On ha a ah, see n. 22 above. 81 Like Ibn Tibbon, Gersonides treats verses 3–11 as one unit, but I do not believe that he regards them as another section of the preface, as Ibn Tibbon did. 77 78

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

135

Ibn Tibbon identified four points of the prologue paradigm in these two verses: the three points common to all of Solomon’s prefaces (the name of the book, the name of the author, and the species of discourse used in it) plus the aim of the book. Here, as in the other Solomonic books, he locates the first three points in a single semantic unit—including the name of the book, which, he says, is Divrei Qohelet—in verse 1;82 the fourth point is in verse 2.83 Gersonides does not explicitly say that Solomon mentions points from the traditional prologue paradigm at the start of Ecclesiastes.84 But it seems to me that the way he introduces them indicates that he considers the two points he finds in the preface—“the name of the author of the book” and “the way in which this book was composed”85—to be taken from the prologue paradigm: “Here he informed us, first, who was the author of this book . . . and informed us, second, about the manner in which the book was composed.”86 Though he does not say so explicitly, it is evident that he derives both points from the word Qohelet in the first verse.87

82 Cf. Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 99 / pp. 117–118; Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 578 / p. 219. 83 Ibid. 84 He uses the expression “informed us” [hodi anu] before every point he mentions. This expression is also used by Ibn Tibbon in his commentary on Ecclesiastes, where he says that “we have found that when the sages from Aristotle until the present would compose a book of wisdom [ philosophy] they would preface it with a prooemium ( peti ah). They would generally make known [ yodi u] all or some of the eight things” ( Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 92 / p. 104). Gersonides himself uses it again, as we shall see, in his commentary on Proverbs to indicate the points of the prologue paradigm. 85 This is a slight modification of the conventional formulation of the point “the mode of instruction,” adapted to suit the text he is explicating. 86 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 17. 87 The list of things that Solomon “informed us” in the two first verses of the book includes a third item, which Gersonides derives from the expression “vanity of vanities” in the second verse. Gersonides does not name it and it does not seem to be one of the conventional points of the prologue paradigm, but rather a preliminary piece of information that guides the reader to the apprehension of the book: “Thirdly, he informed us (ve-hodi anu) that most of his [Qohelet’s] speeches are not true, in order that a man not learn from them to choose the improper. That is why he said that what Qohelet has said is ‘vanity of vanities.’ But from his words, when he assembles these premises, the difference between the proper and the improper was made clear” (ibid., p. 18). It is also possible, though less plausible, that Gersonides considered this information to fall under the heading of “its utility” and thus considers the introduction of Ecclesiastes to contain three points of the prologue paradigm.

136

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

The Prologue to Proverbs With regard to Proverbs, Ibn Tibbon believes that the prologue comprises the first seven verses, which contain five points of the prologue paradigm: the three common to all of Solomon’s prefaces (v. 1)—the name of the book, the name of the author and the species of discourse used in it88—as well as the aim of the book (vv. 2–3)89 and its utility (vv. 4–6).90 For Gersonides, the prologue is limited to the first verse, from which he derives three points: the book’s author and utility and “the degree of instruction used in it.” He announces the three points in the section on the “utilities” or “lessons” (to alot) to be derived from the first section of the book (following his comments on Prov. 1:19) rather than in the running commentary on the text, as in his commentaries on the other two Solomonic books: “The first utility is to inform who composed this book and its usefulness and the degree of instruction used in it.”91 Gersonides does not explain how he derived the points from the verse. In addition to showing that the prefaces of the Solomonic books are written according to the tradition of the prologue paradigm and contain some of its points (as Ibn Tibbon had done), Gersonides also explains the “utility” or “benefit” (to elet) of mentioning the points. Here lies his innovation. He shows that these points are important keys to interpreting the books and explains why this is so. These explanations are particularly interesting because they go beyond the scope of a mere interpretation of biblical texts written according to the Alexandrian prologue tradition. They also shed light on Gersonides’ notion of how philosophical works should be read and on his personality. The most interesting and elaborate explanations of the utility of the points are in the commentary on Ecclesiastes. In the introduction to the commentary Gersonides justifies its writing. Because Ecclesiastes contains “perplexity and doubt [= difficulty]” it deserves a commentary that can explain them. He states that the “perplexity and doubt” are found on two levels: the book’s methodology and its content.92 With

Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 579 / p. 221. Ibid. This point is also found in the prologue to Ecclesiastes. 90 Ibid., pp. 582–584 / pp. 225–228. This point is found only in the prologue to Proverbs. 91 Comm. on Proverbs, p. 92b. 92 “Perplexity and doubt” do not refer to a third difficulty, a “theological difficulty,” as Ben Meir has contended ( Ben Meir, “Gersonides’ Interpretation,” Part 1, p. 8). 88 89

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

137

regard to methodology the book lacks coherence: “It contains words (devarim), some of which contradict each other.”93 Gersonides presupposes that Solomon is a philosopher and his book is a philosophical book. Because a good philosophical book should be consistent, the fact that the book contains contradictions is a source of perplexity and difficulty. As for the book’s content, Ecclesiastes contains “words that attract man to love of what is improper,” that is, to inappropriate conduct.94 Gersonides notes that the Sages, too, had made this observation and accordingly sought to suppress the book.95 The benefit of the two points of the prologue paradigm included in Solomon’s preface to Ecclesiastes is that they explain away these difficulties. Thus Gersonides’ explanation of the “utility” of the points in the preface serve an apologetic function, defending Ecclesiastes against attacks and explaining why he must write a commentary on it. I propose that we also consider these explanations from the perspective of their contribution to our understanding of Gersonides’ theory of interpretation and of his attitude towards the reading of philosophical books, including his own philosophical-theological Wars of the Lord. As I shall show, the explanations given in the commentary on Ecclesiastes are also found, in brief, in his commentaries on Song of Songs and Proverbs, where they do not play an apologetic role. This suggests that they also have another role in Gersonides’ thought, namely, to present certain exegetical principles and to indicate the way one should read philosophical books. I will also argue that they suit the spirit of his works, especially his critical attitude toward the texts he interprets and the philosophical-theological questions he treats. The Author’s name For Gersonides, the most important point mentioned in the introductions is the author’s name. What is the utility of mentioning the author’s name in the preface to the book? Why should readers need to

Gersonides explains that the fact that the book contains contradictions and that it draws man to the love of improper things provokes “perplexity and doubt.” 93 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 15. See B Shabbat 30b. As Ben Meir remarked, this observation was also made by Abraham Ibn Ezra in his commentary on Ecclesiastes 7:3 ( Ben Meir, “Gersonides’ Interpretation,” Part 1, p. 9). 94 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 15. This is Gersonides’ interpretation of divrei minut in Leviticus Rabbah 28:1. 95 He is referring in all likelihood to B Shabbat 30b and Leviticus Rabbah 28. See Ben Meir, “Gersonides’ Interpretation,” Part 1, pp. 7–8.

138

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

know the author’s identity? He replies that this knowledge can help us understand the work and grasp “the meaning of the author’s discourse (kavvanat ha-devarim)”96 or the “true intention of the discourse.”97 In fact, the name can be useful in two ways: First, as Gersonides explains in the commentary on Ecclesiastes, knowledge of the author’s name leads us to consult his other writings as well and compare them with the book we are reading. When we find an apparent contradiction between this text and his other works we must find a way to reconcile them. As a result, knowing the author’s name causes us to study the work with greater depth and precision. We make a much greater effort to understand it and consequently attain a better apprehension of its true meaning: When his [the author’s] opinions become clear to us from other places, and it seems that some of his words (devarav) [here] contradict his opinions in some way, we can study his words further until we understand what this sage meant [by those words].98

Gersonides bases this contention on two assumptions: that there are no real contradictions in an author’s works and that we can identify the author’s true opinions and use them to reconcile contradictory passages.99 This exegetical method clearly can be used to defend Solomon. As we have seen, one of the “difficulties” in Ecclesiastes is that the book contains statements that may lead human beings to inappropriate conduct. According to Gersonides’ interpretation, Solomon’s other works do not profess the same ideas. Since Gersonides assumes that Solomon expresses his true opinions in Song of Songs and in Proverbs and that he never contradicts himself, we must understand Ecclesiastes in the light of what Solomon says in these books. This method can resolve any apparent “difficulties” about the content of the book. I believe that we should expand this into a general exegetical principle. In his commentary on Proverbs, Gersonides explains the usefulness of stating the author’s name in a similar way. There the explanation is intended to elucidate the way one should interpret the book Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 17. Comm. on Proverbs, “Explanation of the Text” on Proverbs 1, p. 291. 98 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 17. 99 Though he does not say so explicitly, he explains the criterion of recognition of the author’s true opinions in his explanation of the second way by which knowledge of the point “the name of the author” is useful. For this explanation see below. 96 97

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

139

and has no apologetic function. Gersonides claims that knowledge of the author’s name directs us to a true apprehension of his discourse because we can understand it in the light of his opinions known to us “from other places.” He does not speak about apparent contradictions among the author’s works. It is plausible that here he is referring to a wider exegetical principle: elucidating an author’s ideas in one work on the basis of those advanced in another work from his hand. But the benefit (to ele ) of knowing the author’ identity is that when the opinions of this man are familiar to us from other places or another place it serves as guidance to understanding the true intention of the discourse.100

Though he does not say so explicitly, I believe that we can be guided by this idea not only for reading and understanding philosophical works in general, but also for understanding Gersonides’ own works. Gersonides’ writings constitute a “whole” in which one work elucidates the ideas in another work. Readers who want to fully understand one work must consult the passages in his other works where he deals with the same issues and understand his ideas within the context of his entire corpus.101 In the commentary on Ecclesiastes Gersonides offers another reason why it is important to know the author’s name: When we realize that the author is perfect, although his propositions seem to be, at first consideration (lit. “at the beginning of thought”) improper, we will continue studying what he has to say until we understand his true intention, which is undoubtedly proper.102

Here, too, Gersonides suggests that knowing the author’s identity is indispensable for understanding the meaning of his work. The underlying assumption is that “the author’s purpose” is a hermeneutical key and that the author’s personality sheds light on his purpose. Gersonides distinguishes, as Maimonides often does, between two stages of understanding: that attained “at first consideration,” that is, before any

100 Comm. on Proverbs, “Explanation of the Text” on Proverbs 1, p. 291. [ The text in Miqra ot gedolot has been corrected according to Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247 ( IMHM 4284), fol. 76v.] 101 In his writings, Gersonides often refers to the elaboration in his other works of ideas mentioned briefly in the current text. 102 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 17.

140

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

deep investigation,103 and that attained after intensive investigation. Reading Ecclesiastes “at the beginning of thought,” without knowing who wrote it, leads us to misunderstand its meaning and believe that the book recommends “improper” conduct. We read it in a different way when we know that it was written by Solomon. Solomon was a “perfect” man, that is, a man who had attained intellectual perfection (as well as moral perfection). Because a “perfect” author always has good intentions, it is impossible that Ecclesiastes directs us to “improper” behavior. We must conclude that our initial interpretation of his words was mistaken and look for a different interpretation. In this way, knowledge of the author’s identity encourages a more profound study of his work and leads to its true meaning. Gersonides adds another interesting remark, one that presupposes a certain notion of the purpose of books in general; namely, that every book is written for the benefit of its readers.104 Had we not known who wrote Ecclesiastes we would have put it down as soon as we noticed, “at first consideration” that it contains “improper propositions,” believing it not worth further study. As a result, we would not have derived any benefit from it.105 Here again, knowledge of the author’s identity spurs us on to the greater intellectual effort required to understand his work and hence to benefit from it.106 This explanation too, serves as an apology: it defends Ecclesiastes against the old charge that it professes improper ideas. Gersonides maintains that it is impossible to attribute such ideas to it and guides his readers toward the correct understanding by explaining how the book should be read.

103 Bi-t ilat ha-ma ashavah translates the Arabic fi bādi al ra y, which means “what is perceived before considering well or thoroughly” ( Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon I, p. 164). 104 Compare Ibn Tibbon’s explanation of “its utility”: “For what is aimed at [by the book] is to make known and to teach something that is aimed only to benefit he who studies it. For if the student did not hope to gain some utility in what he studies, he would not have studied it because he would have considered it a vain activity.” ( Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 92 / p. 105). I have emended Robinson’s translation. 105 The “usefulness” of Ecclesiastes, according to Gersonides, is that it permits us to distinguish between what is “proper” and what is “improper.” See above, n. 87, the third thing that “[Solomon] informed us.” 106 A similar idea was held by Ammonius, who wrote, in his preface to the Isagoge: “We will not believe that it is useful before we know if the book of the old ( philosopher) whom we know was famous like Aristotle or Plato is an authentic work. For about those we presume that all which they told was useful. Therefore we also mention the authenticity” (cited and translated by Riad, Studies, p. 44).

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

141

The explanation also points to a general exegetical principle that recurs, in another variation, in Gersonides’ commentary on Song of Songs. As in his commentary on Ecclesiastes, there too Gersonides insists that the author’s personality is a key to understanding his work and characterizes Solomon, not as “perfect,” but as someone who speaks “by virtue of the holy spirit.”107 Like Maimonides before him,108 he believes that all the sayings and writings of those who speak “by virtue of the holy spirit” are a guide to human perfection. Hence, readers know that: It is not according to the nature of those who speak by virtue of the holy spirit to write poems crafted so as to attract one to despicable actions or to write poems of vanity and falsehood that do not attract one to the things that ought to be loved or to the rejection of things that ought to be rejected.109

Because Song of Songs was written by Solomon, who speaks by virtue of the holy spirit, there is no doubt that all of them [= of Solomon’s poems] guide one toward the perfection intended for man, whether to the first perfection or to the ultimate perfection or to both of them together.110

This is the book’s utility and the light in which it should be interpreted. Here again, the author’s identity is an important key to the meaning of his work. The explanations of the usefulness of the point “the author’s name” show that Gersonides does not consider a text—here a biblical text— to be independent and self-sufficient. He believes that a correct grasp of it also depends on certain extra-textual information, including information about the author. Knowing who wrote a work leads us to read his other books and to understand the work we are reading in the wider context of his entire oeuvre. Knowledge of the author’s personality helps us understand his purpose and thus leads toward a correct reading and comprehension of his work.

107 This had already been stated by the Sages. See, for example, Song of Songs Rabbah 1:6–9. 108 See: Guide II.45; S. Klein-Braslavy, King Solomon and Philosophical Esotericism in Maimonides’ Thought ( Jerusalem, 1996), pp. 164–188 ( Hebrew). 109 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 69 / p. 17. 110 Ibid.

142

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

“The way in which the book was composed”111 Commentary on Ecclesiastes Ibn Tibbon believed that Ecclesiastes is a philosophical book whose subject matter is the immortality of the soul and that it uses the syllogism, mostly the inductive syllogism, as its method of inquiry. Gersonides, too, believes that Ecclesiastes is a philosophical book. In his mind, though, it deals with an ethical and not a theoretical question; namely, the question of “good and evil.” Hence Solomon uses here the diaporematic or dialectical method,112 which is the appropriate method for dealing with this subject matter.113 In their interpretation of the method of inquiry used in the book, both Ibn Tibbon and Gersonides rely on the etymology of the word qohelet. Etymological interpretations of words in general,114 and of qohelet in particular, are widespread in Jewish literature. According to the midrash: “Why was Qohelet’s name so called? Because his words were uttered in public (hiqqahel ).”115 Some medieval authors derived qohelet from qihel and explained that the word indicates “assembling”—that is, assembling science (Rashi, Ibn Ezra, and Joseph Qara) or sciences (Rashi, Rashbam).116 On the basis of etymology, Ibn Tibbon offered a new and original interpretation for this word. He took qohelet to mean “assembling,” not with reference to the book’s content—not an assembly of knowledge— but with its methodology: qohelet means “syllogism.” Syllogism he says, is an “assembling of things”: assembling the propositions that constitute the two premises of the syllogism or assembling the three terms that constitute the syllogism—the major term, the minor term, and

This expression is equivalent to the expression “the mode of instruction.” Following J. Tricot (La Métaphysique, [ Paris, 1974], vol. 1, p. 119 n. 2). I apply “diaporematic” to the dialectical method employed according to its third function, as described by Aristotle in the Topics I.2—its usefulness in the philosophical sciences. Gersonides developed this method in his own way and applied it to two biblical books—Ecclesiastes and Job. For a description and analysis of the method as it is applied in the Wars, see Klein-Braslavy, “La méthode diaporématique,” pp. 105–134. See also (in this volume) “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” p. 13 n. 4. 113 For the method appropriate for dealing with each subject matter, see below pp. 146–147 and n. 129. 114 See also n. 76 above. 115 Ecclesiastes Rabbah 1:2 (Soncino translation). 116 See Ben Meir, “Gersonides’ Interpretation,” Part 1, pp. 11–12, 153. 111 112

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

143

the middle term. Ibn Tibbon suggests a third aspect of his interpretation: qohelet may mean the assembling of the sense data from which we derive general judgments by induction. As most syllogisms are based on premises that are constituted by induction, a syllogism was called qohelet.117 Like Ibn Tibbon, Gersonides believes that qohelet indicates the method of instruction used in the book.118 Though he does not say so explicitly, there is no doubt that, like his predecessors, he interprets qohelet on the basis of its etymology and derives it from qihel (“assembled”). But he understands this “assembling” in a novel fashion, as “the thought that assembles contradictories.”119 The statements collected in Ecclesiastes are what “appears at the beginning of thought, which is qohelet, and which assembles the contradictories.”120 “The beginning of thought” is the first stage of philosophical inquiry using the diaporematic or dialectical method—the stage when the philosopher collects the contradictory opinions given as answers to the dialectical problem he poses in order to examine them and decide which is true. Hence, the assembling of opinions is not just the accumulation of knowledge, as some of his predecessors’ thought, but part of the scientific method that aims at the attainment of truth.121

117 See Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 552 / p. 173. According to Ibn Tibbon, Solomon used the pseudonym Qohelet because he wanted to indicate that the method employed in this book is syllogism, which he did not use in his other books (ibid.). He contends that the “species of instruction,” in the sense of the method of the book, is announced in the second verse of the preface, in the expression “vanity of vanities.” “Vanity of vanities” is a deductive syllogism, the type used by Solomon in this book. See Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 578 / p. 219. This interpretation is compatible with the presentation of this point in the general survey of the prologue paradigm. See Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 93 / p. 107. 118 According to Gersonides, only the word qohelet indicates the mode of instruction, and not the expression divrei Qohelet [= “the words of Qohelet ”], as Ibn Tibbon contended. Neither does he explain “vanity of vanities” as referring to the method of instruction. 119 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 15. 120 Ibid., p. 17. 121 I do not accept Feldman’s interpretation (S. Feldman, “The Wisdom of Solomon: A Gersonidean Interpretation,” in Gersonide en son temps: Science et philosophie médiévale, ed. G. Dahan [ Louvain and Paris, 1991], p. 63), according to which Solomon gathers these premises because he wrote Ecclesiastes when he was young and without experience. According to the commentary on Ecclesiastes, Solomon is “perfect” (shalem). He applies the diaporematic method because this is the only method that permits him to deal with the subject matter of this book—ethics—and he does it as a mature philosopher. This is obvious from Gersonides’ introduction to the commentary ( p. 15)

144

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

Gersonides goes on to explain that qohelet is not simply the process of assembling the premises but also the thought that gathers them. Because the Hebrew word for “thought” is feminine, qohelet is construed in the feminine in Ecclesiastes 7:27.122 As in his explanation of the first point, “the author’s name,” here too Gersonides inquires about the utility of this point. Why did Solomon mention it in his preface? He offers two answers. First, when we know what method the author used we can read in a critical way and examine how he applied the method. The diaporematic method requires that at the beginning of his inquiry the scholar adduce all the opinions that have been offered as answers to the problem he poses. Only then can he distinguish the true opinions from the false ones and reach a conclusion that is the truth “in a way that will leave no doubt.” Critical readers must examine whether the author has indeed completed his research and in fact considered all possible opinions. This may lead them to one of two conclusions. If they decide that the author did not take into account all answers to the question raised, his solution may be false; that is, an opinion or part of an opinion that he did not take into account may be true and support another solution

and from its end ( p. 63). Ben Meir’s interpretation (“Gersonides’ Interpretation,” Part 1, pp. 15–16) is similar to mine. 122 Gersonides remarks here that his predecessors explained that the book was called Qohelet because it gathered “wisdom,” but they did not explain why it was referred to in the feminine. He regards his explanation as an innovation. As Ben Meir remarked, his wording is that of Qara’s interpretation of the word qohelet (“Gersonides’ Interpretation,” Part 1, p. 153). But it is possible that he had Ibn Ezra and/or Rashbam in mind (ibid., p. 12). Gersonides cites Abraham Ibn Ezra in other writings (Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 39), so he may be doing so here as well. In fact, not all his predecessors ignored the fact that Qohelet is construed in both the masculine and feminine. Ibn Ghiyāth, Rashi, and Ibn Tibbon all offer explanations for this. Ibn Ghiyāth’s interpretation of the word qohelet is actually quite similar to that cited by Gersonides as that of his predecessors who did not explain why the word is in the feminine. Perhaps Gersonides did not read Ibn Ghiyāth’s commentary ( Ben Meir thinks he did) or was acquainted with only parts of it. See also n. 31 above. As for Ibn Tibbon, Ben Meir shows many similarities between Ibn Tibbon’s and Gersonides’ commentaries (“Gersonides’ Interpretation,” Part 1, pp. 179–197). Moreover, the similarity between Ibn Tibbon’s and Gersonides’ interpretation of the first verses of Solomon’s books is striking, so it is quite plausible that he was acquainted with this commentary. It may be that because Ibn Tibbon does not explain Qohelet as the assembling of sciences, Gersonides does not refer here to his interpretation. It should be noted that for brevity’s sake Gersonides generally makes few references to his predecessors’ interpretations. (On this subject see [in this volume] “The Introductions to the Bible Commentaries,” pp. 177–178.)

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

145

of the problem. It is then their task, as critical readers, to complete the research and supply the missing opinions, after which they will be able to arrive at a true solution of the problem posed by the author.123 But if readers find that the author has exhausted all possible options, they can be sure that his conclusion is true. In this case they will learn the answer from the book, enrich their knowledge, and have a more perfect apprehension of its subject matter than before: If we notice that the author did not complete his discourse in the way he intended and that some premises that, pursuant to his intention should have been mentioned have been omitted from his discourse, we may be able to complete the inquiry in that way and select the true premises, till we arrive at the complete truth in this problem (derush), pursuant to the mode of verification possible for it. . . . And if we realize that he has completed his discourse as he should have, according to his intention, we will recognize the excellence of his discourse and our comprehension of these problems will consequently be more perfect.124

I think that this attitude about examining the application of the diaporematic method in a philosophical book explains why Gersonides implemented it so meticulously in the Wars. He was addressing not only students, whom he had to persuade that his solution was the truth, but also critical readers who might scrutinize his application of the method. He expected his readers to read his own book in the same way as he recommends, in his commentary on Ecclesiastes, they read Solomon’s. This explanation of the utility of knowing “the way in which the book was composed” plays an apologetic role in the preface of Ecclesiastes. It responds to the methodological “difficulty” of the book mentioned in Gersonides’ introduction to the commentary; namely, that the book contains contradictions. The answer is that the opinions presented in the book are not Solomon’s own opinions,125 but those he examines by 123 A similar methodological consideration underlies Gersonides’ discussion of the essence of the material intellect in Wars I.4. Here he adds a nonhistorical opinion to the list of his predecessors’ views about the nature of the material intellect, in order to offer all logically possible answers to this question. See (in this volume) “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” pp. 41–43. 124 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 17. 125 Ibn Tibbon, too, claimed that Solomon does not present his own opinions in Ecclesiastes. According to him, however, these were the opinions that philosophical inquiry yielded concerning the immortality of the soul. Ibn Tibbon holds that Solomon presented these opinions in order to show that the question of the immortality of the soul cannot be decided in a philosophical way; there are no perfect demonstrations

146

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

the diaporematic method. This is why they also include inappropriate ideas. The diaporematic method entails that the premises presented at the beginning of the inquiry be contradictory. Hence Ecclesiastes indeed contains contradictions, but their existence is required by his methodology. Gersonides adds a reservation about the completion of the inquiry by critical readers. The truth should be reached “according to the possible verification in it.” Following Aristotle in the Metaphysics and the Nicomachean Ethics,126 he alludes to the methodological principle that every subject matter has its own mode of verification. Hence, the inquiry should be completed using the mode of verification appropriate for the subject matter. The same idea underlies the second advantage he finds in announcing the method of inquiry in the preface to a work. Gersonides argues that knowing the method of inquiry enables readers to adopt a critical attitude toward the author’s choice of method and hence a critical attitude towards the solution arrived at using it. In the introduction to the commentary on Song of Songs, Gersonides notes that there are three levels of verification in the sciences.127 The most perfect is absolute demonstration, which is used in mathematics. Such demonstration proceeds from the prior to the posterior, from causes to effects. Demonstratio per signum, which proceeds from effects to causes, is inferior to absolute demonstration and is used in

for the immortality of the soul or for its corruptibility. He contends that in Ecclesiastes Solomon behaved like Maimonides in his discussion on the creation of the world in the Guide of the Perplexed. See Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 551 / p. 172. 126 Metaphysics II.3 (995a12–15); Nicomachean Ethics I.1 (1094b12–14). Gersonides does not refer explicitly to these texts. As we shall see, though, he does refer to them in his commentary on the Pentateuch. Gersonides was acquainted with Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, which includes the Aristotelian text, so he knew Aristotle’s Metaphysics and not just Averroes’s commentary on it. (See [in this volume] “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” n. 1). For the Hebrew translation of Aristotle’s text, see Paris—BNF, MS héb. 886 [ IMHM 31655], fols. 9v–10r. Gersonides also was acquainted with Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics I.1 (1094b12–14) is cited. See Averroes Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in the Hebrew version of Samuel Ben Judah, critical edition with an introduction, notes and glossary by Lawrence V. Berman ( Jerusalem, 1999), pp. 60–61. 127 It is possible that he is following here Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Metaphysics, where Averroes speaks of two levels of verification: verification in mathematics and verification in physics. Cf. Paris—BNF, MS héb. 886 [ IMHM 31655], fol. 10r.

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

147

physics.128 The lowest level of verification is that used in metaphysics,129 which starts from commonly accepted premises.130 In his explanation of the benefit of knowing “the way in which the book was composed” Gersonides states that critical readers should be guided by the methodological principle that one should always use the highest mode of verification compatible with the subject matter of the inquiry. When readers know what method is used in the book and are convinced that no higher mode is appropriate, they will accept the author’s conclusion and not strive for a superior form of verification. If, on the other hand, they think that the method is not the best that can be applied to the subject matter, they must continue the research on their own, using a higher mode of verification: When the author explains the mode of verification that he will use for the subject-matter he is studying and we realize that no better mode of verification is in keeping with the nature of this subject-matter, we realize that a more complete inquiry is impossible here; hence our desire to know these problems will end with what we understand from his words. But if we find that there is a better mode of verification for this subject we shall consider those problems from that aspect and will not be satisfied with this author’s inquiry into them.131

Thus Gersonides does not consider a book to be a “closed text” that offers readers the ultimate results of philosophical investigations that must be accepted as the authoritative truth. He believes that readers should be active, independent, and critical, judging the author’s method of inquiry and hence its results. Moreover, if necessary they must complete the inquiry for themselves and find the “truth” that the author did not. The benefit to be derived from the book depends on this activity. 128 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 63 / pp. 9–10. See also Kellner, Commentary on Song of Songs [English], pp. 108–109 nn. 67, 71. 129 In the introduction to the commentary on Ecclesiastes, Gersonides follows Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics I.1 (1094b12–14) and states that this is the mode of verification used in ethics. See above, n. 126 above. In his commentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics, Gersonides says that both metaphysics and ethics are “composed of true commonly accepted [premises]” and that is why dialectic is useful in these sciences. See Munich-Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. hebr. 26 / 3 ( IMHM 1162), fol. 320r. 130 In the commentary on the Song of Songs, Gersonides does not speak of syllogism or proof as the mode of verification used in metaphysics. In the introduction to the Wars, however, he calls this mode of verification “philosophical (metaphysical )” demonstrations, by which he means “dialectical syllogism.” Cf. Wars, p. 3 / 1:93. 131 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, pp. 17–18.

148

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

In fact, Gersonides himself is such a critical reader of Ecclesiastes. Aware that the diaporematic method is the highest applicable to the book’s subject matter, good and evil (for neither absolute demonstration nor demonstratio per signum is relevant here), he declares at the beginning of his introduction that the use of the diaporematic method is “necessary” here.132 Even though Solomon was “perfect,” he “was obliged” to use it in this book because, according to Aristotle, a perfect method of verification cannot be employed in ethics. Gersonides adds that Aristotle himself recommends the use of the diaporematic method as suitable for this subject matter.133 The implication is that one should not look for another method in Ecclesiastes. Thus, this explanation of the utility of knowing “the way in which the book was composed” justifies the method used in Ecclesiastes. In his commentary on the Pentateuch,134 Gersonides uses the same Aristotelian principle of the method appropriate to each science as an apology for himself and to justify his explications of the rationales of the precepts (mi wot). Relying explicitly on the Nicomachean Ethics and the Metaphysics,135 he says that in this matter one cannot expect an absolute demonstration, as in mathematics, or the type of demonstration used in physics (demonstratio per signum), because “the nature of this religious matter is not such as can support such verification.”136 He hints that, like ethics, the rationales of the precepts can be studied only by the dialectical (or diaporematic) method. Gersonides does not leave it to critical readers to judge the method he employs here. Rather, he announces the method he employs is the only possible way of explaining the rationales of the precepts. Hence his readers must be satisfied with it—just as they must be satisfied with Solomon’s diaporematic method in Ecclesiastes, because that is the only method appropriate to the ethical subjects dealt with there.137 The recommendation that readers exert their critical faculties, made in his second explanation of the utility of this point, conforms to the

In the introduction to the Wars he similarly declares that “some of them (of the demonstrations used in the Wars) will be necessarily mathematical [i.e., absolute demonstrations], others physical [i.e., demonstratio per signum], and others philosophical [= metaphysical, i.e., dialectical syllogism]” ( Introduction, p. 3 / 1:93). 133 See above, n. 129. 134 Introduction to the Comm. on the Pentateuch pp. 5–6. 135 See n. 126 above. 136 Introduction to the Comm. on the Pentateuch, p. 5. 137 See also (in this volume) “The Introductions to the Bible Commentaries,” p. 000. 132

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

149

spirit of Gersonides’ own philosophical writings and to his personality. When we read his commentaries on Averroes’s works and his philosophical-theological Wars of the Lord we are impressed by his independence of thought and by his critical approach to his predecessors, especially Aristotle and Averroes. Gersonides does not accept their opinions as authoritative; he always examines them and corrects them if he deems it necessary. He also examines the logical procedures by which they reach their conclusions and criticizes them when necessary. Commentary on Proverbs The commentary on Proverbs invokes “the mode of instruction” in another sense and explains its utility in a different way. Like Ibn Tibbon,138 here Gersonides understands that “the degree of instruction” (i.e., the mode of instruction) is the type of discourse used in the book— its literary genre, not its method of inquiry.139 He explains that knowing that Solomon used “parables and figurative expressions” in this book is another key to understanding it, because it steers readers toward the mode of interpretation to be employed to grasp the meaning of every passage. Readers know that the book cloaks a hidden meaning in figurative language and will not give the verses a literal interpretation. The “Usefulness of the Book” In his commentary on Proverbs, Gersonides also explains the benefit of a third point: “the usefulness of the book.” He believes that knowing this provides the same benefit as knowing the author’s name: it helps us understand the meaning of the discourse. When we know its “usefulness” we interpret the book in a way that shows that it really achieves this “usefulness.” Hence, knowing the book’s usefulness is a 138 Ibn Tibbon interprets all Solomon’s prefaces as containing the point “the mode of instruction,” in the sense of the species of discourse used in the book. See Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 99 / pp. 117–118; Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, pp. 578 / 219; 579 / 220; 585–586 / 231. Nevertheless, he interprets “vanity” in Ecclesiastes 1:2 as indicating the book’s method and identifies it with the deductive syllogism (see n. 117 above). As we have seen, he also interprets the word Qohelet as indicating the book’s method of inquiry but not, according to him, one of the points of the prologue paradigm. He explains it in answer to the question he poses in the introduction to his commentary— why Solomon used the pseudonym Qohelet instead of his real name. See Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 552 / pp. 172–173. According to Gersonides, Qohelet indicates one of the points of the prologue paradigm, the method of inquiry used in the book. 139 This is also his interpretation of this point in the introduction to the commentary on Song of Songs and in his commentary on Song of Songs 1:1.

150

the alexandrian prologue paradigm in gersonides’ writings

key to interpreting and understanding it. It prescribes the direction that readers should take to understand the book. Conclusion We have seen that Gersonides is a link in the history of philosophy and was influenced by his predecessors. Under the influence of Arabic texts that he read in Hebrew translation, and, probably, of Ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Ecclesiastes, he adopted the tradition of the prologue paradigm in his own philosophical-theological work and also applied it to Solomon’s books—Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, and Proverbs. On the other hand, he does not apply the prologue paradigm in the short introductions to his supercommentaries on Averroes but merely interprets points mentioned by Averroes in three of those supercommentaries: the Middle Commentary on the Topics, the Epitome of the Physics, and the Epitome of De generatione et corruptione. Nor does he apply the prologue paradigm to the introductions to his own biblical commentaries, though these introductions do contain some of the points. The manner in which he applies the prologue-paradigm tradition in his writings manifests his originality and his independent way of thinking. His originality lies first of all in the application of the prologue paradigm to his own book, The Wars of the Lord, and in the explicit statement that its introduction follows this literary convention. Second, though Ibn Tibbon preceded him in applying the prologue paradigm to Solomon’s books, here too Gersonides innovates, deriving six points of the prologue paradigm from the first verse of Song of Songs. The interpretation takes into account the literary character and figurative language of the book. That is, Gersonides derives the points of the prologue paradigm not only from the plain language of the first verse but also from what he considers to be figurative language, the expression li-shelomoh. He also provides alternative interpretations to Ibn Tibbon’s regarding the points mentioned in Solomon’s prefaces. His most interesting innovation is his comments on the utility of mentioning the points in biblical prefaces. In his commentary on Ecclesiastes these comments serve as apologetic devices. There too, as in is other commentaries, they express his opinions on the theory of interpretation and the method of reading philosophical books, as well as his critical spirit. He further applies such a critical approach to reading texts in his own writings, as well, which he appears to be written in a manner so as to obviate such criticisms.

THE INTRODUCTIONS TO THE BIBLE COMMENTARIES Introductions are a major key for understanding both books and commentaries. They are where authors survey the subjects they deem necessary for comprehending their book or the book they are commenting on and as such prepare readers to study them. In the ancient world, a fixed format emerged for introductions to commentaries on Plato and Aristotle and came to constitute almost an independent literary genre, which reached its apogee in the School of Alexandria in the sixth century. The introductions to commentaries on Plato and Aristotle followed a defined list of points that the commentator had to address before beginning his exegesis. The introductions laid the foundation so that students could grasp philosophy in general and understand certain philosophical works, especially those by Aristotle, in particular. The introductions to individual treatises were arranged in a set format of six to eight points.1 This tradition of introductions to philosophical works was transmitted to Syriac literature2 and thence to Arabic3 and Jewish4 literature on the one hand and to the Latin West on the other.5 It exerted a major influence on all introductions to various work and even on informal introductions, which borrowed several points from the traditional paradigm. The scheme was also used in Christian biblical commentaries. As early as the third century we find several points of the paradigm in the introduction to Origen’s commentary on Song of Songs.6 Syriac authors followed suit in their biblical commentaries, 1 The Alexandrian prologues included six points: (1) the aim or subject of the work; (2) its utility; (3) its authenticity; (4) its place in the curriculum; (5) the reason for the title; (6) its division into chapters. Simplicius added a seventh point: the branch of philosophy to which the work belongs. David and Elias, the last representatives of the school, added an eighth point: the method of instruction used in the work. On this subject see (in this volume) “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm in Gersonides’ Writings,” pp. 117–118, and the literature cited there in n. 2. 2 See ibid., p. 118, and the literature cited there in n. 8. 3 E.g., al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Ibn al- ayyib, Avicenna, and Averroes. See ibid., p. 118, and the literature cited there in nn. 7 and 9. 4 E.g., Isaac Ibn Ghiyāth, Jacob Anatolio, and Samuel Ibn Tibbon. See ibid., pp. 119–121 and notes. For Gersonides, see ibid., pp. 122–123. 5 See ibid., p. 119 n. 10. 6 Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories, ed. Ilsetraut Hadot ( Leiden and New York: E. J. Brill, 1990), pp. 36–44. We also find it in an introduction to Psalms, according to Hadot.

152

the introductions to the bible commentaries

starting in the sixth century. In the Latin West, Boethius (sixth century) knew a variant of the model.7 Later, in the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, introductions to works on theology, philosophy, grammar, and law, as well as biblical commentaries, became widespread in the Latin West and took the form of accessus ad auctores. These were strongly influenced by the Alexandrian model, especially in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.8 Medieval Jewish literature did not employ formal introductions to philosophical treatises and biblical commentaries. Instead, their authors freely addressed the subjects they deemed important for understanding their books or the works on which they commented. Nevertheless, there are traces of the influence of the Alexandrian prologue paradigm9 and of informal Arabic introductions. 7 Edwin Quain, “The Medieval Accessus ad Auctores,” Traditio 3 (1945), p. 193 n. 5; James Shiel, “Boethius’ Commentaries on Aristotle,” Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958), pp. 217–244; repr. in Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, ed. Richard Sorabji ( London: Duckworth: 1990), pp. 349–372; Simplicius, Commentaire, ed. Hadot, Part 1, p. 193 n. 1. 8 Starting in the first half of the thirteenth century, there was another type of introduction, patterned on the four Aristotelian causes. See Alastair J. Minnis, Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the Later Middle Ages (Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1988), p. 5; Gilbert Dahan, “L’exégèse des livres prophétiques chez Pierre de Jean Olieu,” in Alain Boureau and Sylvain Piron, eds., Pierre de Jean Olieu (1228–1298): Pensée scolastique, dissidence spirituelle et société ( Paris, 1999), p. 266; Gilbert Dahan, “Les commentaires bibliques dans le monde chrétien,” in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, ed. C. Sirat, S. Klein-Braslavy, and O. Weijers ( Paris, 2003), p. 269. 9 I have addressed this topic in “The Neoplatonic Prologue Tradition in the Writings of Samuel Ibn Tibbon and Gersonides,” a paper read at the Dibner/Israel Conference in the History of Science: Medieval Hebrew Science—The Context,” Jerusalem, July 5–8, 1999, and in “The Tradition of the Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm in Gersonides’ Writings,” a paper read at the 32nd Annual Conference of the AJS, Boston, December 17–19, 2000. In the original ( French) version of this article I referred to Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes on the basis of Parma—Biblioteca Palatina, MS 2182 [ De Rossi 272, II ] ( IMHM 13354) and James T. Robinson’s translation of Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Ecclesiastes 1:1 in his article “Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes and the Philosopher’s Prooemium,” Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature 3 (2000), pp. 83–146. In the meantime Robinson has published a critical text of the commentary and English translation, which I use here. Thus here I cite the rest of the Hebrew text according to James T. Robinson, “Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes” ( Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 2002), which includes a critical edition of the Hebrew text of the entire Commentary on Ecclesiastes, and Robinson’s Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes: The Book of the Soul of Man (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), which includes an English translation of the text. Hence references to Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s commentary on Ecclesiastes 1:1 are to Robinson’s article, first the Hebrew and then his translation (cited as Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium”). References to the rest of the commentary are to the Hebrew

the introductions to the bible commentaries

153

Gersonides’ cultural milieu was influenced by three traditions: • The Jewish tradition (the Mishnah, Talmud, and medieval Jewish philosophy) • The Arab philosophical tradition • Latin literature. Gersonides could have read the works of Arab philosophers that were available in Hebrew translation, especially Averroes, and could also have been familiar with literary conventions of the Christian world. Hence the list of influences on the introductions to his biblical commentaries may include the Talmud and the post-talmudic literature, the Arab literary tradition, the Alexandrian prologue tradition as transmitted by Arab philosophers, and finally the Latin accessus ad auctores tradition. Gersonides wrote commentaries on most of the books of the Bible— the Pentateuch, the Former Prophets, and the Hagiographa (except for Psalms and Lamentations)—but not on the Later Prophets, except for a lost commentary on Isaiah. There are introductions to eight books or groups of books: general introductions to the commentary on the Pentateuch and the commentary on the Former Prophets, and individual introductions to the commentaries on Proverbs, Job, Song of Songs, Ecclesiastes, Esther, and Daniel.10 Gersonides did not write introductions to his commentaries on Ruth, Ezra-Nehemiah, and Chronicles. The introductions vary widely in length.11 That to the Pentateuch is the longest (308 lines plus a list of all the tractates of the Talmud, pp. 1–28), followed by those on Song of Songs (322 lines, pp. 51–68), Job (68 lines, no pagination), Ecclesiastes (56 lines, pp. 15–17), Proverbs (54 lines in Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247 [ IMHM 4284], fol. 207v; 51 lines in the printed edition, pp. 278–271), and Esther (28 lines, text in Robinson’s dissertation and the English in his book (cited together as Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes). In both cases I give the reference to the Hebrew text, followed by a slash and the reference to Robinson’s English translation. 10 Christian commentaries produced at the universities also feature general introductions to groups of books and specific introductions to individual books. See Gilbert Dahan, L’exégèse chrétienne de la Bible en Occident médiéval, XIIe–XIVe siècles ( Paris, 1999), p. 113; idem, “Les commentaires bibliques dans le monde chrétien,” p. 267. 11 Though the lines in the different editions and manuscripts are different in length I will mention the number of lines in each introduction so as to give readers some idea of their relative length. For the editions used, see in the introduction of this volume, “Forms of Reference,” p. 111.

154

the introductions to the bible commentaries

pp. 133–134). The introduction to the Former Prophets is only six lines long (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 246/1 [IMHM 4272], fol. 1r,12 while that on Daniel has four lines (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247, fol. 214r). Gersonides wrote his longest introductions on those books whose subject, as he read them, is theological and philosophical, and especially those that aim to guide readers toward supreme felicity.13 He did not write introductions to the historical books or to Ruth, which is a straightforward narrative. This seems to indicate that his chief interest in biblical books was their theological and philosophical doctrines. Gersonides’ introductions to his biblical commentaries are informal. He does not follow some fixed model; the introductions have different structures and arrangements of the matters treated. But certain elements do recur in several of them. Three of the introductions begin with a doxology, a type of opening characteristic of introductions in Arabic literature.14 The convention was taken over by medieval Jewish authors and philosophers.15 The introduction to the commentary on the Pentateuch begins with a fairly long doxology (ten lines). Those at the start of two other commentaries, on the Former Prophets and on Daniel, are identical and much shorter: “After praise to God and the request that He direct us straight in His path, we shall explain the words of all the prophets and recount their utilities”16 None of the other commentaries has a prefatory doxology.

12 The introduction to the Former Prophets is shorter because the commentary draws on the commentary on the Pentateuch. To avoid repetition Gersonides makes only brief reference to several elements found in the later, “as was our habit in our commentary on the words of the Pentateuch.” 13 Esther is an exception to this generalization. 14 See A. Chraïbi, “L’émergence du genre muqaddima dans la littérature arabe,” in Entrer en matière—les prologues, ed. J. D. Dubois and B. Roussel ( Paris, 1998), p. 89. 15 For example, Saadia Gaon’s introductions to his commentaries on Sefer Ye irah, Job, and Psalms; Ba ya Ibn Paquda’s introduction to ovot ha-levavot; Abraham Bar iyya’s introductions to Megillat ha-megalleh and Hegyon ha-nefesh ha- a uvah; Shem ov Falaquera’s introduction to Re shit o mah; and, after Gersonides, Moses Narboni’s introduction to his commentary on al-Ghazali’s Intentions of the Philosophers (see G. B. Chertoff, “The Logical part of al-Ghāzali’s Maqā id al-Falāsifa,” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1952, part II, p. 1). Abraham Bar iyya states explicitly that “it is a duty and commandment to begin” with the praise of God “and to make it precede every subject and matter” (Sēfer Megillat ha-Megalleh, ed. A. Poznanski [ Berlin, 1924], p. 1). 16 Introduction to the commentary on the Former Prophets, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 246, fol. 1r; introduction to Daniel, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247, fol. 214r.

the introductions to the bible commentaries

155

Unlike the Alexandrian prologues, the introductions to Gersonides’ biblical commentaries refer not only to the works commented on but also to the commentary itself. Consequently, the introductions can serve as keys not only to understanding the books as Gersonides reads them, but also to understanding the method he followed when he composed his commentaries. We shall accordingly divide the points that he elaborates in his introductions into two categories: 1. Those that refer to the biblical book or books commented on; 2. Those that refer to the commentary itself. Points that Refer to the Biblical Book(s) Commented On In his introductions to the biblical commentaries, we find traces of the Alexandrian prologue paradigm with its six to eight points. As we have seen, such traces are characteristic of the informal introductions of medieval Arabic and Jewish literature and Gersonides may simply have been following its lead. But given that he was familiar with the Alexandrian tradition and applied it in his introduction to the Wars of the Lord17 as well as in his exegesis of the opening verses of Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, and Proverbs,18 it is also possible that he was conscious that these points derive from that tradition. He may also have been acquainted with the Christian accessus ad auctores, which incorporate some points of the Alexandrian paradigm into introductions to biblical commentaries.19 When points of the Alexandrian paradigm had already been addressed in the Talmud, Gersonides develops them according to the latter rather than the Alexandrian tradition. When he develops a point included in the prologue paradigm as part of his exegesis of a specific biblical verse, he treats it as a textual datum, a topic suggested by the biblical text itself, rather than as one to be addressed in the introduction.

Wars, p. 11 / 1:104. See “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm,” pp. 124–128. Gersonides read these three as philosophical tracts, each with an introduction constructed according to the tradition of the Alexandrian prologue paradigm. See ibid., pp. 128–136. 19 See Dahan, “Les commentaires bibliques dans le monde chrétien,” p. 268. 17 18

156

the introductions to the bible commentaries

The “purpose of the book” is an important item in the Alexandrian prologues, where it always comes first.20 Here “purpose” generally means the topics treated by the author—what we could call the book’s “subject.” The Alexandrian commentators sometimes insist that knowledge of the book’s purpose is the key to interpreting it.21 This point is often found in informal Arabic and Jewish introductions. In a ha a ah-type note22 in his commentary on Ecclesiastes, Samuel Ibn Tibbon explains this point in the same way but adds that here the author also wants to make his readers aware of “what it is that he wishes to make known and teach through it [the book]. For there is no doubt that every author intends that it teach and make something known to those who come after him.”23 Explaining the intention (kawwanah) of Proverbs,24 Ibn Tibbon goes further: Solomon’s aim in this book—which is entirely or mostly allegorical—is to exhort people to know wisdom and ethics, so that they can understand words of understanding. They might also mean that Solomon’s aim in this book, and in some of its allegories, is that a man learn from them and come to know because of them wisdom and ethics.25

Thus according to Ibn Tibbon, who probably influenced Gersonides, a book’s “intention” transcends the theoretical explanation of its subject and includes a practical role: exhorting human beings to do something, encouraging them to study and learn the content of the book.26

See Simplicius, Commentaire, ed. Hadot, Part 1, pp. 139–141. See, for example, Simplicius’ introduction to his commentary on the Categories, ibid., p. 16; and Philopon’s introduction to his commentary on the same work, cited by Hadot, ibid., p. 139. 22 On the ha a ah see below, pp. 165–171. 23 Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 92 / p. 105. 24 Here the kawwanah or “intention” represents the “purpose of the book” in the Alexandrian paradigm. This rendering is found in the Hebrew translations of Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle (see, for example, Averroes’s introduction to the Long Commentary on the Physics [S. Harvey, “The Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ Prooemium to his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics,” PAAJR 52 (1985), p. 65]); in Samuel Ibn Tibbon, who lists all its points in his commentary on Ecclesiastes ( Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 92 / pp. 104–105); and in Gersonides’ own introduction to the Wars, where he enumerates the points of the Alexandrian paradigm that he includes there ( p. 11 / 1:104). 25 Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 579 / p. 221; see also ibid., p. 582 / p. 225. 26 See “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm,” p. 140, n. 104. 20 21

the introductions to the bible commentaries

157

A book’s intention is similar to its utility and may even be confounded with it.27 Gersonides always states the intention of a book in a single brief sentence. Like Ibn Tibbon before him, he conceives of it as a practical goal—teaching readers something or guiding them to some objective. In the introductions to his commentaries on Job and the Pentateuch Gersonides employs the technical term kawwanah. The intention of the book of Job, which determined its composition, is “to establish the truth in this question for those who excel at philosophical inquiry ( iyyun)”;28 namely, to lead such readers to the correct answer to the dialectic question, “whether God (may He be blessed) does or does not extend His providence to the individuals of the human species, as follows from the fundamental principles of the Torah, and calls them to account for all their acts.”29 The intention of the Torah is to bring “those who observe it fully to obtain true felicity.”30 The book of Esther was written in order31 to publicize the great miracle that the Jews commemorate by the feast of Purim—the delivery of the Jewish people from a genocidal massacre.32 Here Gersonides has in mind either the goal of the book or the utility of the book. In the introductions to the commentaries on Job and Proverbs Gersonides uses to elet ‘utility’ for what he called the kawwanah ‘intention’ in the introduction to the commentary on the Pentateuch. For him, the intention and the utility are interchangeable. The book of Job has “a great utility for man’s attainment of political and scientific felicity.”33 Proverbs “has great utility for directing human beings toward scientific and political felicity.”34 27 In the introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes, Ibn Tibbon applies the term to elet or “utility” to the doctrine that a book teaches. He explains that books are useful for those who cannot meet the author face to face and learn directly from him, as well as for later generations Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 544 / p. 157). 28 Comm. on Job, n.p. / p. 5. 29 Ibid., n.p. / p. 3. 30 Introduction to the Comm. on the Pentateuch, p. 1. 31 Here Gersonides does not employ the technical term kawwanah. 32 Because the miracle is a providential act, the subject of the book of Esther is divine providence. The book does not address the topic from a theoretical perspective, however, but instead presents it in the form of a narrative from which readers must infer the doctrine. 33 Comm. on Job, n.p. /p. 3. 34 Ha a ah to the Comm. on Proverbs, p. 278.

158

the introductions to the bible commentaries

In the introduction to Song of Songs he describes the same intention or utility without applying either term to it. This book “directs only the select few ( ye idim) toward the path that leads to the achievement of felicity.”35 Gersonides generally does not explain the names of the biblical books on which he comments.36 Seeing, though, that he considered Ecclesiastes, Song of Songs, and Proverbs to be philosophical books that are themselves introduced by Alexandrian-type introductions,37 he does explain the title of Song of Songs in his comment on the first verse of the book, which effectively concludes his own introduction to the book.38 We find something similar in Christian biblical commentaries. Gilbert Dahan notes that “the start of the commentary may play the role of the introduction, especially when it addresses the title of the biblical book in question.” He gives the example of the commentary on Ecclesiastes by Hugh of St. Victor, “which develops a variable accessus with regard to it [the title Verba Ecclesiastae].”39 In his introductions, Gersonides does not address the question of the author of the book, except for Job, which he attributes to Moses. This, however, is not an example of the “author of the book” item of the prologue paradigm, but the echo of a traditional Jewish debate.40 Gersonides quotes the baraita (B Bava Batra 14b) that assigns the book to Moses and explains that the Sages did so because the Torah, written by Moses, is based on the principle that the book of Job explains, namely, divine providence. According to his introduction to the Pentateuch, the Torah directs human beings toward “true perfection,” meaning intellectual perfection, and that is a manifestation of a providential act.41 Like the explanation of the title of the book, the author’s identity is addressed, sometimes at length, in his commentaries on the first

Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 61 / p. 8. In his commentary on Ecclesiastes he glosses the word qohelet but does not say that this is tantamount to explaining the title of the book as well. 37 See “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm,” pp. 128–136. 38 See Comm. on Song of Songs, pp. 69–70 / pp. 17–18. 39 G. Dahan, “Les Prologues des commentaires bibliques (XIIe–XIVe siècles),” in J. Hamesse, ed. Les prologues médiévaux (Turnhout, 2000), p. 432. 40 Christian commentators, too, ask about the attribution of Job to Moses. See Dahan, “L’exégèse des livres prophétiques chez Pierre de Jean Olieu,” p. 266. 41 See the introduction to the commentary on the Pentateuch, p. 1. 35 36

the introductions to the bible commentaries

159

few verses of the books attributed to Solomon. Gersonides does not address the authenticity of the attribution but rather the utility of mentioning the author’s name in the introduction to a book.42 In general, Gersonides does not deal with the book’s location within the biblical canon. The exception involves the Former Prophets. In his introduction to these books, he writes that the first book of the Former Prophets, Joshua, comes “after the words of the Torah.”43 In his introduction to Ecclesiastes, however, he considers an analogous question addressed by traditional Jewish exegesis—the order in which Solomon wrote the three books attributed to him.44 This question is first raised in Song of Songs Rabbah 1:10, where Rabbi Jonathan states that Solomon wrote Song of Songs in his youth, Proverbs in his prime, and Ecclesiastes in his old age. The question was taken up later by several Jewish authors of the Middle Ages, including Rashi, Menahem Hame’iri, and Samuel Ibn Tibbon.45 Gersonides is not interested in how old Solomon was when he wrote each book,46 but only in the order of their composition. He proposes a philosophical interpretation and explains that the order corresponds to the logical presentation and sequence of subjects taken up by these books. According to him, all three Solomonic books deal with the same question: “How should a man conduct himself in order to obtain the different kinds of this good, which is what is useful, and to distance himself 47 from its contrary in each of the kinds of good, according to its own mode” ( pp. 15–16).

42 I have dealt with this question in “The Tradition of the Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm in Gersonides’ Writings,” and in “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm,” pp. 137–141. 43 Comm. on Former Prophets, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 246, fol. 1v. 44 See also the end of the commentary, where he writes that “Ecclesiastes was written before Proverbs” ( p. 63). 45 See Ruth Ben Meir, “Gersonides’ Interpretation of the Book of Ecclesiastes: An Analysis and Text” ( Hebrew), Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1993, part I, pp. 15–16. 46 I do not agree with Seymour Feldman (“The Wisdom of Solomon: A Gersonidean Interpretation,” in Gersonide en son temps. science et philosophie médiévale, ed. G. Dahan [ Louvain and Paris, 1991], p. 62), who holds that Gersonides believed that Solomon wrote Ecclesiastes in his youth. But neither does Gersonides follow the Sages who maintained that all of Solomon’s books were written in his old age, as suggested by Ruth Ben Meir (“Gersonides’ Interpretation of the Book of Ecclesiastes,” Part 1, p. 20). Gersonides is silent as to Solomon’s age when he wrote these books and considers only the order in which he wrote them. 47 Correcting the text on the basis of Ben Meir’s edition (“Gersonides’ Interpretation of the Book of Ecclesiastes,” Part 2, p. 3).

160

the introductions to the bible commentaries

Ecclesiastes addresses this question in a general fashion, whereas Proverbs investigates it in greater detail and considers specific cases of human behavior. Inasmuch as the universal precedes the particular in philosophical inquiry, Solomon must have written Ecclesiastes before Proverbs. The methodological principle whereby the general necessarily precedes the particular is introduced by Aristotle in Physics I.1 (184a23– b 14). Averroes applies it to each of Aristotle’s treatises in the physical sciences48 as well as to the order of those works.49 In his Epitome of the Meteorology he writes that Aristotle placed the Physics first in the series of the treatises on natural science because it is the most general.50 He repeats this idea in the introduction to the Epitome of De caelo, where he writes that because Aristotle wrote of general matters concerning natural objects in the previous book—the Physics—he now turns to consider specific objects.51 Gersonides himself notes this ordering principle in his supercommentary on Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Topics, where he explicitly refers to Physics I.1: “And this is the order that is appropriate, namely, that in study we preface universals to particulars, as is explained in the first book of the Physics.”52 Gersonides adduces this argument to determine the chronological order of the Solomonic books, thereby combining the Jewish tradition with philosophical arguments about the rational order for their composition. Song of Songs is the last of Solomon’s books. Its place is determined on the basis of a different criterion—the subject. All three books by Solomon deal with categories of the good. Inasmuch as Song of Songs deals with intellectual perfection, which is the most eminent human good of all, it must be the last book in the series. So even though

See the introduction to the Epitome of the Meteorology, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 956/8 [ IMHM 32606], fol. 398v, and the text of Meteorology IV, cited by S. Kurland, Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Medium & Epitome in Aristotelis de Generatione et Corruptione Libros, in Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, vol. 4, 1–2 (Cambridge, MA, 1958), p.185, n. 101.9. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 See ibid., p. 185 n. 101.7; Paris—BNF, MS héb. 956/6, fol. 376r. 52 Munich—Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. hebr. 26/3 [ IMHM 1162], fol. 321v. He also deals with this subject in a discursive note in his supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Physics. See Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1 [IMHM 31361] fols. 3r–v. 48

the introductions to the bible commentaries

161

Gersonides sees himself as a link in the Jewish exegetical tradition, he offers a philosophical interpretation that seems to merge the question raised by Jewish tradition with one item of the prologue paradigm, namely, the location of the book in the order of studies.53 The point of the prologue paradigm that considers the division into parts is found in the introduction to Song of Songs. The composition of the book is explained by its goal, which is to “make known the way to achieve felicity.”54 It is divided into six parts, corresponding to the subjects treated; understanding them can lead readers to achieve this goal. Each part consists of several chapters of the biblical text: (1) resolution of the doubts about the possibility of attaining felicity as well as a preface that incorporates six points of the prologue paradigm (1:1–8); (2) “the effort necessary to overcome the impediment [to perfection] caused by moral deficiency” (1:9–2:7); (3) “the efforts necessary to overcome the impediments [to perfection] caused by imagination and thought” (2:8–17); (4) attainment of knowledge of the mathematical sciences (3:1–4:7). (5) attainment of knowledge of physics (4:8–8:4); and (6) attainment of knowledge of metaphysics (8:5–14).55 In his introduction to the Pentateuch, Gersonides does not relate to the books’ division into sections composed of chapters (a Christian invention) or of parshiyyot or pericopes (the Jewish tradition), but to a thematic division into (1) the commandments (the mi vot); (2) ethics and politics; (3) physics and metaphysics. As in his introduction to Song of Songs, he maintains that the book’s goal or intention of the book explains this division: Because the intention (kawwanah) of the Torah is precisely what we have just mentioned [to guide human beings toward true perfection or true felicity], its topics are necessarily (be-he ra ) divided into three parts.56

Next he explains why these three categories are essential: Torah law must necessarily be composed of these three parts because human perfection cannot be complete without the attainment of moral perfection and speculative inquiry in the most perfect way.57

53 See Ben Meir, “Gersonides’ Interpretation of the Book of Ecclesiastes,” Part 1, pp. 19–20. But see also above, n. 46. 54 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 63 / p. 10. 55 Ibid., p. 64 / p. 10–11. 56 Introduction to the Comm. on the Pentateuch, p. 2. 57 Ibid., p. 3.

162

the introductions to the bible commentaries

The point about the division into sections is interpreted in the same way in Averroes’ introduction to the Epitome of the Metaphysics, where he proposes a threefold thematic division of metaphysics.58 In his commentary on Job Gersonides takes up in addition the question of the method of instruction used in that book. He does not present his methodological considerations as one of the points that must be dealt with before one begins to study the book, but as part of his commentary on the text. According to him, the diaporematic method is appropriate for answering the question of “whether God (may He be blessed) does or does not extend His providence to the individuals of the human species, as follows from the fundamental principles of the Torah, and calls them to account for all their acts?”59 The opinions held by Job and his friends constitute all the logically possible answers to this dialectical question. The debate between Job and his friends is precisely a diaporematic inquiry aimed at discovering the truth.60 Later he links the book’s method to its aim: Because the intention of its composition is to establish the truth in this question for those who excel at philosophical inquiry ( iyyun), it is clear that the opinions mentioned in it should exhaust the contradictories for the knowledgeable; otherwise verification could not be obtained through this book.61

Another question found under the rubric of the method of instruction used in the book is its literary genre. Gersonides address this only in his introduction to the commentary on Job, where he asks whether Job is fiction or true history. Here again he is not following one of the points of the Alexandrian prologue paradigm but drawing on Jewish sources that raise this question, as found in the Talmud (B Bava Batra 15a) and summarized by Maimonides.62 His new contribution to the Jewish exegetical tradition is the philosophical explanation and refutation of the notions that underlie the several views held by the Sages. He suggests that the Sages who held that the book of Job is fiction (mashal ) believed that the book was constructed according

See Paris—BNF, MS héb. 956/12, fol. 917r. Introduction to Comm. on Job, n.p. / p. 3. 60 On the diaporematic method in the book of Job see (in this volume) “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” pp. 27, 33–34, 36–37. On the term “diaporematic method,” see ibid., n. 4. 61 Comm. on Job, n.p. / p. 5. 62 Guide III.22, pp. 351–352 / p. 486. 58 59

the introductions to the bible commentaries

163

to the diaporematic method and deemed it implausible that all possible logical answers to some dialectic question would be raised in a single historical setting. Consequently they thought that Job was only a fiction invented to present the diaporematic inquiry into the question of divine providence over individual human beings in narrative form. Gersonides refutes this argument, asserting that there are cases in which all of the logically possible answers to a dialectic question coincide with the historical opinions on the subject. He refers specifically to Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics, where, in his opinion, such congruence exists:63 It is not impossible that [all] the opinions held by men about a particular question correspond to the number of views that logic discerns; for the Philosopher [Aristotle] mentioned many questions, some on physical and some on theological subjects, in which the opinions of the ancients exhaust all the views that logic discerns.64

Finally, in his introduction to Song of Songs, Gersonides deals with the point that relates to the persons addressed by the book. He tackles the subject here because he holds that Song of Songs is meant only for the elite. Its aim is to direct them toward the attainment of intellectual felicity. He notes that, unlike Song of Songs, the Pentateuch and Proverbs are meant both for the elite, who are capable of understanding true felicity, and for the masses, who can comprehend only “imaginary felicity.” Thus those books direct their readers toward moral perfection, which is important for both the masses and for the elite (for whom it is a condition for achieving supreme felicity), but also toward the intellectual perfection that only that latter can achieve.65 This point resembles the ninth of Proclus’ ten points: “What qualities are required of the listener?”66 When Gersonides raises it, however, we must interpret it in the context of the Jewish philosophical tradition

63 The passages in question are Physics I and Metaphysics I.3. In fact, Gersonides deals only with the possibility that all of the answers may have been advanced in the history of thought; he does not demonstrate that they actually coexisted in a single historical situation. The opinions cited by Aristotle are not those of philosophers who all lived at the same time. 64 Comm. on Job, n.p. / p. 6. He adds other arguments to support the opinion that Job is a true story. See ibid., n.p. / pp. 6–7. 65 See the introduction to Song of Songs, pp. 60–61 / pp. 7–8. 66 See Simplicius, Commentaire, ed. Hadot, Part 1, p. 26.

164

the introductions to the bible commentaries

that goes back to Maimonides and the need for ad hoc exegesis.67 The Jewish tradition, heir to the Arab philosophical tradition, distinguished between what is appropriate only for the elite and what is suitable for the masses, and opted for philosophical esotericism.68 According to this notion, philosophical concepts meant only for the elite are contained in biblical texts in a form that hides them from the masses. According to Gersonides, Song of Songs is addressed exclusively to the elite and conforms to the principles of philosophical esotericism. Its subject— supreme felicity, along with the obstacles to achieving it and the way to acquire it—is appropriate only to the elite; consequently it presents these topics in metaphors and allegories that conceal them from the masses. This definition of the book’s intended audience supports his reading of its text. Given that it is addressed only to the elite, its literal or apparent meaning does not contain any wisdom or message for the masses. In other words, Song of Songs is not a collection of “perfect allegories” of the sort referred to by Solomon in Proverbs 25:11, according to Maimonides.69 According to Gersonides, “this book, Song of Songs, guides only the elite ( ye idim) to the way of achieving felicity, and thus its apparent meaning (nigleh) was not made to be useful to the masses.”70 Although Gersonides allows that Song of Songs is an esoteric book and that its true sense is camouflaged by the metaphors and allegories of its plain meaning, he believes that the plain meaning of the book is only a literary work, a story. Only the elite, who are able to interpret these metaphors and allegories, can understand the hidden meaning to which it alludes. Thus by specifying the readers for whom the book is intended Gersonides is able to justify the fact that the subject of Song of Songs is limited and to state what it is. It also allows him to justify the literary character of the text and thus the mode of exegesis he employed to uncover its true meaning. The definition of the intended audiences of the Torah and Proverbs is a key for the interpretation of these books, too. Readers know that 67 Maimonides himself includes this point in the introductory epistle and introduction to the Guide ( pp. 1, 2, 6 / pp. 4, 5, 10). 68 On this question see Sara Klein-Braslavy, King Solomon and Philosophical Esotericism in the Thought of Maimonides ( Hebrew) ( Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1996; repr. 2008) and the bibliography there. 69 Introduction to the Guide, pp. 7–8 / pp. 11–12. See Sara Klein-Braslavy, Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Adam Stories in Genesis: A Study in Maimonides’ Anthropology (Hebrew) ( Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1986), pp. 187, 303–305. 70 Introduction to Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 61/ p. 8.

the introductions to the bible commentaries

165

they must look for two levels of meaning: the sense that is appropriate for the elite only and the sense that can be understood by the masses as well. Thus these two books incorporate teaching about ethics and politics and not only philosophical ideas (de ot). The Preliminary Remark or Ha a ah In addition to the relatively brief treatment of several of the traditional points of the prologue paradigm, Gersonides’ introductions include another element that also goes back to the Isagoge literature—the preliminary remark or ha a ah. Ha a ah is a Hebrew rendering of the Arabic taw i a, which means both “introduction” and “preparation.” Thus the ha a ah is an introduction meant to prepare readers for understanding the book that follows. The word could be translated as “preliminary remark”71 or “preparation.”72 For Gersonides, the word ha a ah has two senses. (1) In the broad sense it designates simply an introduction, in this case the introductions to the biblical commentaries. He refers to the introductions to the commentaries on Song of Songs and on Proverbs as ha a ot.73 (2) In the more restricted sense, Gersonides applies the term to sections of the general introductions to books on which he commented or to the introduction to particular chapters, stories, or pericopes in the Pentateuch. He often refers to this as a ha a ah a at maqqefet ‘single comprehensive preliminary remark’.74 71 E. Ben-Yehuda, The Dictionary of the Old and New Hebrew Language ( Hebrew) ( Jerusalem, 1948), III 1167. 72 J. Klatzkin (Thesaurus Philosophicus Linguae Hebraicae et Veteris et Recentioris [ Leipzig, 1928], I 202) offers “Propädeutik” as one definition of the word. The word is found in this sense in the Guide, too; e.g., pp. 1, 6, 49 / pp. 3, 10, 76–77. Munk, in his French translation (S. Munk, Maïmonide. Le Guide des égarés [ Paris 1856–1866], I 4 and 16), uses “préparation” ( p. 119) and “préparatoires.” Pines has “introduction” ( p. 3), “preparatory” ( p. 10) and “preparation” ( pp. 76–77). 73 In the Königsberg edition, the term is applied to the introduction to the commentaries on Esther and Ecclesiastes as well. But I have not been able to locate these designations in the manuscripts of the Esther and Ecclesiastes commentaries that I consulted (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247; Paris—BNF, MS héb. 248), in Ben Meir’s critical edition of the commentary on Ecclesiastes, or in the texts printed in Gersonides’ Commentaries on the [Five] Scrolls, ed. J. L. Levy ( Jerusalem, 2003). 74 For example, in the introductions to Song of Songs and Ecclesiastes and in the introductory notes to several pericopes or sections of pericopes: in the commentary on Genesis, p. 86 (note before the Eden pericope, Gen. 2:4–3:24) and p. 116 (before Genesis 4:1–26 [“The man knew his wife”]). In the introduction to Job, he uses the locution haqdamah a at maqqefet, where haqdamah corresponds to the Arabic muqaddima

166

the introductions to the bible commentaries

Here we are interested in the latter, restricted sense. Gersonides applies the term to the concise exposition of a topic that needs to be explained in order to understand the book or to understand an idea that underlies several verses on which he comments (in the case of a biblical episode or pericope). In such cases this topic is addressed before the start of the commentary per se; that is, before the glosses of words and running commentary on verses. This preliminary remark lays the groundwork so that readers can understand the comment that follows.75 Some of them are developments of traditional points of the prologue paradigm. Here I will look only at the preliminary remarks in the introductions to the commentaries on biblical books, supplemented by a few observations about the preliminary remarks before sections of these texts. The preliminary remarks deal with four types of theoretical questions: (1) thematic issues, (2) historical issues, (3) exegetical issues, and (4) methodological issues. Some introductions to biblical books include preliminary remarks of two different types. For example, the introduction to Song of Songs contains both a thematic note and an exegetical note; the introduction to Ecclesiastes addresses both thematic and methodological questions. Toward the end of the introduction to his commentary on Song of Songs, Gersonides states that the preliminary remark exhausts the underlying idea of the book: That is what we have seen fit to present as an introduction concerning the symbolic representations and allegories found in this book. Through this, coupled with the previous introduction,76 all the subjects dealt with in this book have almost been made perfectly clear.77

and is synonymous with ha a ah—e.g., in Maimonides’ introduction to the Guide ( p. 11 / p. 17). Munk renders it “observation préliminaire” ( I 26). In his commentary on Ecclesiastes, Samuel Ibn Tibbon employs haqdamah with the sense of ha a ah. See, for example, Ibn Tibbon, “Prooemium,” p. 92 / p. 104, where he designates his preliminary remark on the eight points of the prologue paradigm a haqdamah. 75 For several examples, see the previous note. Ha a ah in the restricted sense also appears in the Wars (e.g., Introduction, p. 7 / 1:99; II.6, p. 106 / 2:52; VI.1.18, 371 / 3:336–337). 76 Which discusses the theory of knowledge propounded by Song of Songs. 77 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 68 / p. 71. The same is true of the preliminary remarks on biblical pericopes and stories. For example, toward the end of the introductory note to the commentary on Genesis 2:4–3:24, Gersonides writes that “almost all the subjects dealt with in this pericope are made clear in it [the preliminary remark]” (Comm. on Genesis, p. 86).

the introductions to the bible commentaries

167

Thematic Issues Most of the preliminary remarks are clear and brief expositions (though some are rather long) of a central idea of the book, pericope, or story that follows. They hardly ever refer to or gloss the text itself, but merely explain the idea that underlies the text. For instance, the preliminary remarks in the introduction to the commentary on Job address the origin of evil; the first preliminary remark in the introduction to the commentary on Song of Songs deals with three subjects—human knowledge, the obstacles to its attainment, and the different sciences and their modes of verification. The second preliminary remark in the introduction to the commentary on Ecclesiastes summarizes the content of the book. It observes that the book deals with the problem of good and evil, lists the problems raised by the book, reviews how it solves them, and presents the general lesson to be derived from it. The introductory note in the introduction to the commentary on Proverbs addresses the role of the Torah in the acquisition of moral and intellectual perfection.78 Historical Issues The introduction to Esther does not deal with the subject of the book but instead establishes the chronology of the kings of Babylon and the kings of the Medes and Persians, based on passages from Jeremiah, Daniel, Haggai, Zechariah, and Ezra. Gersonides reconciles the data from these several sources in order to establish a consistent chronology. This preliminary remark provides the chronological framework in which Ahasuerus is to be situated and prepares readers to understand the historical situation evoked in the book.79 Exegetical Issues In two introductions, those to Proverbs and Song of Songs, Gersonides introduces and explains the most important exegetical themes related to the book in order to prepare reader to understand his commentary. In the introduction to Proverbs, which he reads as book on “human knowledge and perception,”80 he offers a list of the key notions found

Here he does not call these issues a ha a ah. For Gersonides, Ahasuerus seems to be the main character of the book. In the manuscripts I have examined ( Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247 and 248 [ IMHM 4273]), the title is “Commentary on Ahasuerus” (be ur A ashverosh) rather than “Commentary on Esther” (be ur Esther)! 80 Ha a ah to the Comm. on Proverbs, p. 280. 78 79

168

the introductions to the bible commentaries

in the book and designates each as a different mode of human knowledge: mezimmah (supposition), da at (knowledge), o mah (wisdom or science), and binah or tevunah (understanding or discernment).81 Mezimmah “is the supposition that applies to the matter in question.”82 According to the “Explanation of the Words” (be ur ha-millot) it is a generally accepted opinion, which can be employed as a premise in a dialectic syllogism. Da at has two meanings. It is “the first intelligibles that apply to each problem”83—that is, the premises of the demonstrative syllogism—as well as the highest level of metaphysical knowledge, the knowledge of the separate intellects and of God.84 o mah designates demonstrative knowledge ( o mah moftit), knowledge achieved by means of demonstration: “This is the knowledge ( yedi ot) that can be acquired by means of inherent and appropriate premises, that is, apodictic sciences ( o mot) like the mathematical sciences and natural science [= physics]” (ibid.). Binah and tevunah are synonyms that designate the knowledge obtained by means of dialectic syllogisms. They are “the ideas reached by means of non-inherent and inappropriate premises and by generally accepted opinions, as in divine and political philosophy.”85 Similarly, the preliminary thematic note in the introduction to the commentary on Song of Songs is followed by an exegetical note in which he “explains in general terms many of the symbolic representations and allegories found in this book.”86 For example, Jerusalem represents man, the daughters of Jerusalem stand for the faculties of the soul, Solomon is the intellect, etc.87 Gersonides observes that these explanations prepare readers to understand the book, and that by including them in the introduction

81 He elaborates on these terms in the “Explanation of the Words.” See (in this volume) “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Commentary on Proverbs,” pp. 3–7. 82 Ha a ah to the Comm. on Proverbs, p. 280. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid., p. 281. 85 Ibid. Gersonides explains expressions to which he assigns a methodological sense in the introduction to the commentary on Ecclesiastes, too ( p. 16). There he explains that “vanity and pursuit of the wind” (1:14) and “pursuit of the wind” (v. 17) mean “mere opinion and something that is not true and does not exist.” He distinguishes among “I said to myself ” (v. 16), “I observed” (v. 14), and “I learned” ( yada ti; v. 17) as designating different degrees of truth attaching to the opinions that follow. The most true are introduced by “I learned.” These explanations are part of the preliminary methodological remark. 86 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 64 / p. 11. 87 Ibid., pp. 64–65 / pp. 11–15.

the introductions to the bible commentaries

169

he avoids having to repeat them in the body of the commentary every time they are relevant. Methodological Issues The introduction to the commentary on Ecclesiastes contains a methodological remark.88 Although this remark is effectively a development of the point in the prologue paradigm that relates to the method of instruction used in the book, Gersonides viewed it from the perspective of the Jewish exegetical tradition. It is an attempt to answer the exegetical crux that “the words of the perfect man are contradictory,”89 which had already been addressed by the talmudic sages and medieval commentators.90 Gersonides’ solution is philosophical: the contradictions in Ecclesiastes are the result of its method. Ecclesiastes deals with ethical issues, which entail use of the diaporematic method.91 Solomon, the author of this book, used it here. First he enumerated the several contradictory answers that had been given to the dialectic questions he raised, and then examined them in order to determine which are true and which are false.92 In support of this solution, Gersonides offers a very brief overview of the diaporematic method and its advantages referring explicitly to the passages in Aristotle that deal with the method: Topics I.2 (101a34) and Metaphysics I.3.93 88 See also my “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Biblical Commentaries,” Studies in the History of Culture and Science: A Tribute to Gad Freudenthal (Brill, 2011), pp. 305, 307–308, 310, 314–315, 320. I have dealt with other aspects of this introduction in “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm,” pp. 136–137, 143–144. 89 Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 16. 90 B Shabbat 30b; Ibn Ezra on Ecclesiastes 7:3. See also Ben Meir, “Gersonides’ Interpretation of the Book of Ecclesiastes,” Part 1, p. 9. 91 See Nicomachean Ethics I.1 (1094b12–14, 19–20). Gersonides was acquainted with Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, in which the first of these two passages is quoted. See Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in the Hebrew Version of Samuel Ben Judah, ed. Lawrence V. Berman ( Jerusalem, 1999), pp. 60, 61. 92 As we have seen, Gersonides held that Job, too, is structured by the dialectic method. This was also the view of his contemporary Pierre Auriol. In his Principium biblicum Auriol presents a typology of the modes of style (modi docendi ) and assigns them to the various biblical books. The fourth mode, dialectic and disputation, is associated with Job and Ecclesiastes. See Dahan, “L’exégèse des livres prophétiques chez Pierre de Jean Olieu,” pp. 268–269. 93 Gersonides knew the Topics through Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the work. For his knowledge of the Metaphysics see (in this volume) “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” n. 1. Gersonides refers to both of these texts in his description of the diaporematic method when he explains the word mezimmah in the “Explanation of the Words” on Proverbs 1 (p. 288) and in the commentary on Proverbs 24:7–8 (123a/122r). See also Klein-Braslavy, “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Biblical Commentaries.”

170

the introductions to the bible commentaries

In his preliminary thematic and methodological remarks Gersonides is following a tradition that goes back to the Alexandrian prologues and the Isagoge literature. Thematic remarks develop the point that relates to the subject (skopos) of the book. Hadot gives as examples two such discussions of the skopos.94 One is in Origen’s commentary on Song of Songs (third century); the other, in Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus (fifth century). Origen focuses briefly on love, which, he holds, is the main theme of Song of Songs. Proclus offers a systematic discussion of nature. Hoffman quotes Simplicius, who says: . . . since knowledge in outline form (entupois) must always be taken up before that which is exact, and knowledge grasped in summary form (enkephataiois) must precede that which transmitted in an expository way, . . . he who has already obtained an overall notion will easily be able to follow expository developments [that are provided later].95

In Arabic literature of the tenth and eleventh centuries, the introduction (muqaddimāt) took over the role of introductory volumes (madkhal ) They contain several other points of the prologue paradigm, theoretical considerations about the content of the book and its methodology.96 For example, al-Ghazali’s preliminary remark to the logical treatise in his Intentions of the Philosophers (Maqāsid al-falāsifa) explains the notions of ta awwur (conception) and ta dīq (assent).97 This tradition came down to Jewish authors of the Middle Ages. Saadia Gaon applied it in the introduction to his biblical commentaries, though without employing the technical term “preliminary remark.”98

Simplicius, Commentaire, ed. Hadot, pp. 38–39. Simplicius, In Cat. p. 60, lines 20–23, in Ph. Hoffmann, “La fonction des prologues exégétiques dans la pensée pédagogique néoplatonicienne,” in Entrer en matière—les prologues, ed. Dubois and Roussel, p. 224. The English is that in Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Categories 1–4, trans. Michael Chase (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 74. Chase (p. 140 n. 640) explains that entupois and enkephataiois, when used of knowledge, mean approximately the same thing—the rough “first draft” that is later filled in with detail. 96 See Chraïbi, “L’émergence du genre muqaddima dans la littérature arabe,” p. 97. 97 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 956, fol. 99v. 98 Goodman refers to the entire introduction, which, he maintains, was influenced by the Greco-Arabic literature of the Isagoge. See Saadiah ben Joseph al-Fayyūmī, The Book of Theodicy: Translation and Commentary on the Book of Job, trans. and comm. Lenn Evan Goodman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988, p. 191). In his commentary on Proverbs, Saadia explicitly mentions the Isagoge literature as the source of thematic expositions that serve as introductions to scientific works (commentary on Proverbs 24:23; see Saadia Gaon, Commentary on Proverbs [Arabic and Hebrew], ed. and trans. Y. Qāfi [ Jerusalem, 1976]). I would like to thank Sara Stroumsa for this reference. On Saadia’s introductions to his biblical commentaries see now S. Stroumsa, “A Literary 94 95

the introductions to the bible commentaries

171

Abraham Ibn Ezra’s introduction99 to his commentary on the Pentateuch consists of a long remark on the various methods of interpreting the Torah.100 In his introduction to the Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides wrote a preliminary remark, which he calls a muqaddima, on the causes of “the contradictory or contrary statements to be found in any book or compilation.”101 Samuel Ibn Tibbon explains Ecclesiastes 1:4 as a preliminary remark, which he calls a haqdamah (introduction).102 He states explicitly that such a preliminary remark is a literary convention and that “philosophers are in the habit of prefacing each science with introductions that are the premises of the demonstrations [used in] that science.”103 Preliminary remarks that precede sections, pericopes, or groups of verses can be found in Ibn al- ayyib’s commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge104 and in Averroes’ long commentaries on Aristotle.105 Of the last-named, Gersonides knew at least those on the Physics and the Metaphysics. The question, then, is whether Gersonides applied to his biblical commentaries a method employed by Averroes in his philosophical commentaries?106 Model as a Historical Document: On Saadia Gaon’s Introductions to his Biblical Commentaries” ( Hebrew), in A Word Fitly Spoken: Studies in Medieval Exegesis of the Hebrew Bible and the Quran, ed. Meir M. Bar-Asher, Simon Hopkins, Sarah Stroumsa, and Bruno Chiesa ( Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2007). According to Stroumsa, Saadia was influenced by the Syriac Christian paradigm. See also: H. Ben Shammai, “Saadia’s Introduction to Daniel: Prophetic Calculation of the End of Days vs. Astrological and Magical Speculation,” Aleph 4 (2004) pp. 11–87; idem, “Saadia Gaon’s Introduction to Isaiah,” Tarbi 60(3) (1991), pp. 371–404. 99 He calls it a haqdamah. 100 Abraham Ibn Ezra, Commentary on the Torah, ed. A. Weiser ( Jerusalem, 1976), pp. 1–10. 101 Guide, p. 11 / p. 17. 102 Ibn Tibbon, Comm. on Ecclesiastes, p. 595 / p. 246. 103 Ibid., p. 596 / pp. 247–248. 104 See K. Gyekye, Arabic Logic: Ibn al- ayyib’s Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge (Albany, 1979). 105 “In their developed form, Averroes’s [long commentaries] are generally composed of two parts: a summary followed by an explanation of the text commented on. In the summary, Averroes briefly indicates Aristotle’s objective in the text commented on and gives the main elements of Aristotle’s argument. In the explanation that follows this summary, Averroes offers a sentence-by-sentence running explanation of what, according to him, Aristotle meant in that passage” ( H. Hugonnard-Roche, “Méthodes d’argumentation et philosophie naturelle chez Averroès,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. 17, Orientalische Kultur und Europäisches Mittelalter [ Berlin and New York, 1985], p. 241). 106 Gersonides could not have been familiar with Saadia’s biblical commentaries, which were written in Arabic. On the other hand, the remarks found in Scholastic biblical exegesis correspond not to the ha a ah but to the digressions that Gersonides

172

the introductions to the bible commentaries Points Concerning the Commentary Itself

In his introductions Gersonides often writes about the commentary itself and how he wrote it. These elements may be points of the Alexandrian prologue paradigm or points often found in the tradition of Syriac, Arab, and Jewish introductions, which he applies and adapts to his own commentary. The Author’s Name The author’s name is found at the start of the introductions to the commentaries on the Pentateuch, the Former Prophets, Proverbs, Song of Songs, and Ecclesiastes. All begin with “Levi ben Gershom said.”107 Why He Wrote the Commentary A section explaining “why the author wrote his commentary” is typical of introductions to works in Arabic108 and Jewish literature.109 Gersonides begins four introductions—those to the commentaries on Job, Proverbs, Song of Songs, and Ecclesiastes—with such an explanation. All of them begin, “we have found it appropriate to explain this book/scroll . . . because. . . .” The reason that follows may be (1) the utility of the book on which he comments or (2) the great need for a commentary on it. (1) In the introductions to the commentaries on Job and Proverbs he explains that he has written his commentary because the book is useful, inasmuch as can lead human beings to political and scientific

inserts in his biblical commentaries, introduced by “and you should know,” to draw his readers’ attention. For a description of these notes see Dahan, “L’exégèse des livres prophétiques chez Pierre de Jean Olieu,” pp. 129–133. The expression “and you should know” is also found in Hebrew translations of Averroes’s commentaries; for example, in the Middle Commentary on the Topics ( Paris—BNF, MS héb. 933 [ IMHM 30017], fol. 9v). Hence it is possible that Gersonides is applying the Aristotelian tradition in his biblical commentaries. 107 The digressions in his philosophical commentaries begin with a similar formula: “Levi said.” 108 See P. Freimark, Das Vorwort als literarische Form in der Arabischen Literatur ( Münster, 1967), pp. 36–48. 109 For example, Saadia’s introduction to The Book of Belief and Opinions, Ba ya Ibn Paquda’s introduction to the Duties of the Heart, Maimonides’ introductions to the Guide of the Perplexed and the Mishneh Torah, and asdai Crescas’ introduction to Or Hashem.

the introductions to the bible commentaries

173

felicity. That is, his commentary will help readers derive maximum benefit from the biblical texts. In his commentary on Job he adds that the theme of the book, divine providence, is of cardinal importance, because it is the principle that underlies the entire Torah.110 That is, a commentary is in order because of the importance of the theme. Clearly Gersonides sees himself as a mediator between the biblical text and his readers and writes his commentary so that he can be of service to them. (2) In his commentaries on Job and Song of Songs, Gersonides says that he has written because no one has ever explained the book satisfactorily.111 He views his work as filling a lacuna in the Jewish exegetical literature. A commentary on Ecclesiastes is needed, he writes, because of the two difficulties presented by this book: the contradictions it contains and the fact that it urges human beings to pursue goals that ought to be avoided. Gersonides sets out to resolve these two difficulties in his commentary. Here we must understand that he believes that none of his predecessors did so successfully and that here, too, he is plugging a gap in the Jewish exegetical literature. The Method Employed in the Commentary It is only in the commentary on Job that Gersonides presents the method he is going to follow. He writes that his commentary consists of three parts: an explanation of the words, an explanation of the sense, and the lessons to be drawn from the text. He justifies this approach inasmuch as it will facilitate interpretation of the book and “place readers in a position to readily grasp the truth of its words.” This structure corresponds to the structure of Christian commentaries on the Bible. Given that Gersonides wrote his commentary on

110 In the introduction to his commentary on the Pentateuch, Gersonides explains that the giving of the Torah was a providential act because the Torah “is a law that guides those who observe it perfectly to attain true happiness.” ( p. 1). 111 Comm. on Job, n.p. / p. 4; Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 51 / p. 3. See also Kellner’s translation of the Comm. on Song of Songs, pp. 100–101 n. 1. He offers a similar explanation of his decision to write the Wars of the Lord (Introduction p. 4/ 1:93), and, separately, in its section on astronomy ( V.1.1; B. R. Goldstein, The Astronomy of Levi ben Gerson, 1288–1344 [ Berlin and New York, 1985], p. 305).

174

the introductions to the bible commentaries

Job in Avignon it is quite likely that he was under the influence of the scholastic lectio, with its three parts: littera, sensus, and sententia.112 In his introduction to the Pentateuch113 as well as in his introductions to the Former Prophets114 and to Daniel115 he mentions only the third part of the commentary—the utilities or lessons about ethics, philosophy (de ot), and the commandments that can be derived from the underlying text. He evidently believes that this is the most important part of his commentary; perhaps, as Colette Sirat has suggested, it contains biblical “theology.”116 Methodological Considerations The Guiding Principle of Biblical Exegesis Criticizing his predecessors in the introduction to the commentary on Job, Gersonides presents the method he deems appropriate for exegesis of a biblical text. He says that understanding the author’s intention is the key to interpreting the text and must come before explaining the words. His predecessors’ interpretations were wrong because they glossed the words without first penetrating the ideas. He returns to a similar idea in the commentary on Song of Songs. Here he criticizes his predecessors for having interpreted the biblical text by the midrashic method. He disapproves of this approach because a midrashic interpretation does not take account of the meaning of the text and thus cannot lead to a correct understanding and to the essential ideas that the text wishes to convey. The hermeneutic rule he professes here is that the text must be interpreted according to the intention. This hermeneutic rule determines his attitude towards midrashim and towards his own readings of the biblical text.

112 See Colette Sirat, “Les commentaires bibliques: B. La méthode d’exégèse,” in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide, ed. C. Sirat, S. Klein-Braslavy, and O. Weijers, p. 223; M. D. Chenu, Introduction à l’étude de Saint Thomas d’Aquin ( Montreal and Paris, 1993 [1950]), p. 70. 113 Introduction to the Comm. on the Pentateuch, p. 13. 114 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 246, fol. 1v. 115 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247, fol. 214r. 116 Sirat, “Les commentaires bibliques,” p. 245.

the introductions to the bible commentaries

175

The Method for Deriving Precepts from the Text In his introduction to the Pentateuch, Gersonides makes an important innovation regarding another aspect of the principles of biblical exegesis: the appropriate method for deriving the precepts from the literal sense of the verses. Gersonides holds that the study of the rationale of the precepts is a science that must rely on the dialectic method, like ethics.117 He applies Aristotle’s dialectic method to this science and provides a series of hermeneutic rules or logical principles118 that can be used to derive the precepts logically from the biblical verses, and follows this with some examples of their application.119 The discussions of the basic principle of hermeneutics and of the method for deriving the precepts can also be considered to be relics of the Alexandrian prologue paradigm. Attitude Towards Midrash In two introductions—those to Song of Songs and the Pentateuch— Gersonides criticizes and rejects midrashic interpretations of the biblical text.120 As we have seen, he believes that this method cannot provide a true understanding thereof. Some midrashic interpretations even propound ideas quite different from those intended by the author.

117 Introduction to the Comm. on the Pentateuch, pp. 5–6. Here Gersonides relies explicitly on the Metaphysics and the Nicomachean Ethics. See “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm,” p. 146 and n. 126. 118 He calls them meqomot (lit. “places”), which is a calque on the Greek topoi. Gersonides took the term from Aristotle’s Topics, as he knew it from the Hebrew translation of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on it. But see the interesting article on the possible influence of the Christian jurists on Gersonides’ topos: Colette Sirat and Olga Weijers, “Droit et logique: Gersonide et les juristes chrétiens,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 75 (2008), pp. 7–41. 119 For the explanation of the topoi and examples of their applications in Gersonides’ commentary on the Pentateuch, see Carmiel Cohen, “ ‘Straightforward’ Halachic Exegesis in Gersonides’ Commentary on the Torah,” Ph.D. dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2007 ( Hebrew). 120 Introduction to the commentary on Song of Songs, p. 51/ p. 3; introduction to the commentary on the Pentateuch, p. 4; Comm. on Song of Songs, trans. Kellner, p. 101, nn. 6 and 8; Charles Touati, “Les idées philosophiques et théologiques de Gersonide (1288–1344) dans ses commentaire bibliques,” Revue des sciences religieuses 28 (1954), pp. 339–340 (commentary on Genesis); Sirat, “Les commentaires bibliques,” p. 219; S. Feldman, “Gersonides and Biblical Exegesis,” Appendix to his English translation of The Wars of the Lord, vol. 2, p. 216.

176

the introductions to the bible commentaries

Thus, unlike Maimonides,121 he generally does not use midrashim to interpret biblical texts.122 But Gersonides does not reject midrashim totally. Although one must not consider them to be faithful readings of the biblical text, they may expound important ideas that are valuable for their own sake. This is one of the reasons why he planned to write a separate treatise on the homilies on Song of Songs and the other scrolls.123 The Pursuit of Concision and the Composition of the Commentaries Gersonides is always aware that his readers expect to find certain elements in a commentary, whether because they are accustomed to a particular approach to explaining biblical texts, because they are familiar with other commentaries by Gersonides himself and assume that he will always proceed in the same way, or because they think that certain elements are de rigueur in biblical commentaries. To defend himself against readers’ criticisms, then, he warns them at the outset that some elements and expositions will not be found in his commentaries.124 He frequently alleges concision as the justification for their omission as well as for his general approach. The pursuit of brevity is a legacy of classical rhetoric and is typical of the introductions to works

For Maimonides’ interpretation of the Bible by means of midrash, see: S. Klein-Braslavy, “Bible Commentary,” in The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides, ed. Kenneth Seeskin (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 259–268; eadem, “Interpretative Riddles in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008), pp. 141–158; eadem, “Maimonides’ Interpretation of Jacob’s Dream of the Ladder,” Annual of Bar-Ilan University, Studies in Judaica and Humanities, Moshe Schwarcz Memorial Volume, 22–23 (1987), pp. 329–349 (Hebrew) (English translation in Maimonides As Biblical Interpreter [ Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, forthcoming]). 122 However, Gersonides does cite midrashim in his biblical commentaries to show that his interpretation, based directly on the biblical text, conforms to that of the Sages. See, for example, in the commentary on Genesis: the “Explanation of the Words” on Genesis 1:26 (p. 70); the “Explanation of the Pericope” on Genesis 2:7 ( p. 105); the “Explanation of the Words” on Genesis 2:7. I elaborate on this subject in my book on Gersonides’ interpretation of the creation of man and the Garden of Eden (in preparation). Sometimes Gersonides also relies on midrashim in his biblical interpretations, as Touati has shown (“Les idées philosophiques et théologiques de Gersonide,” pp. 339–340). 123 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 51/ p. 4. 124 According to Riad, proactive rebuttal of criticism is a topos of introductions since Antiquity. See E. Riad, Studies in the Syriac Preface ( Uppsala, 1988), p. 207. 121

the introductions to the bible commentaries

177

in Syriac and Arabic as well as in Maimonides.125 It is manifest in all of Gersonides’ works, including the philosophical commentaries.126 Gersonides seems to have attached special importance to concision. What matters for him is not style per se but the advantages of brevity for readers (this is equally the case in the Syriac introductions).127 On more than one occasion he adds that readers would decline to read his commentary were it too long ( Job, Proverbs, the Pentateuch);128 we are to understand that, as a result, they would not profit from it. Sometimes he says that a long commentary would plunge readers into confusion (Song of Songs).129 Thus brevity serves a didactic end. Let us consider the most important examples: in the introduction to Proverbs, Gersonides states that he will not enumerate the utilities to be derived from the text because he has already done so in his commentary on the Pentateuch and wishes to avoid repetition.130 He adds that the commentary itself is as concise as possible and avoids repetition when the same ideas are expressed in different places.131 In his commentary on Song of Songs, he justifies the omission of midrashic interpretations by his pursuit of concision; had he included midrashim in his commentary, he writes, it would have become too long and readers would tire of it. This is also why he declares his intention of writing a separate work on the midrashim of Song of Songs and the other scrolls. In general, Gersonides does not conduct a dialogue with his predecessors in his introductions.132 In the preface to the commentary on Job he states explicitly that he will not explain why he rejects some of the

Ibid., pp. 226–228. See “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” pp. 181–220. 127 See above, n. 125. 128 Introductions to Job (n.p. / pp. 5–6), Proverbs ( p. 279), and the Pentateuch ( p. 4). 129 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 51 / p. 3. In his introduction to the Wars he explains the need for concision in a similar way: an overly long discussion of difficult subjects would distract readers (Wars, p. 3 / 1:93). 130 Ha a ah to the Comm. on Proverbs, p. 278. See also “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Commentary on Proverbs,” n. 14. 131 Gersonides refrains from repetition in his philosophical commentaries as well. See the introduction to his commentary on the Letters; “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” p. 189. 132 The exception is the introduction to the commentary on Ecclesiastes, where he engages in a dialogue with earlier commentators about the meaning of qohelet, though without quoting them by name. In the commentaries themselves, by contrast, he does refer to his predecessors (such as Ibn Ezra, Rashi, and David Kim i). See Charles Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonides ( Paris, 1973), p. 39. 125 126

178

the introductions to the bible commentaries

glosses of earlier exegetes. Readers can understand this on their own from his interpretation. What is more, doing so would be unnecessarily long-winded. In the commentaries on Job and Proverbs he writes that he has selected the interpretations that strike him as most appropriate, although there are other correct interpretations of the same text. He adds that commentators should not enumerate every possible interpretation of a text. Here his tone is apologetic. He seems to be apprehensive of readers’ criticisms and defending himself in advance. In these two introductions he explains his procedure as motivated by his preference for brevity.133 The meaning of the biblical text derives from philosophy. Nevertheless, in the introduction to his commentary on the Pentateuch Gersonides states explicitly that he will refrain from philosophical debates so as not to make the text too long.134 He promises a succinct exposition of the principles (shorashim) found in works of philosophy.135 This is also why his commentary is intended for readers who already have knowledge of philosophy. Thus the definition of his intended readers is also associated with his pursuit of concision. Concision explains the preliminary remarks in the introductions, too. The prior explanation of metaphors and allegories (Song of Songs)136 or key notions (Proverbs),137 as well as a brief presentation of the ideas in the book, makes it possible to avoid repeating them in the commentary, which can thus be shorter. When he discusses the diaporematic method in his introduction to Ecclesiastes, he writes that he will not expatiate on the subject there because he has already done so in his commentary on the Topics138 and in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics.139

133 Introduction to the Comm. on Job, n.p. / pp. 5–6; ha a ah to the Comm. on Proverbs, p. 279. 134 Introduction to the comm. on the Pentateuch, p. 4. In the running commentaries on the text he often refers readers to philosophical passages in the Wars and in his supercommentaries on Averroes. 135 This same attitude toward philosophy can be found in the introduction to the Wars, p. 3 / 1:33. 136 Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 64 / p. 11. 137 See the start of the ha a ah to the commentary on Proverbs, p. 278. 138 Meaning the supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics. 139 Now lost. See (in this volume) “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias,” n. 41.

the introductions to the bible commentaries

179

Books not yet Written Sometimes Gersonides writes that he plans to write another work to complement his biblical commentaries. In the introduction to the commentary on the Pentateuch he announces two such books: Sefer ha-Mi vot (the Book of the Precepts) and a commentary on tractates of the Talmud.140 In his commentary on Songs of Songs he says that he plans to write a book to explicate the Sages’ remarks—meaning both midrashim and glosses on the text—about Song of Songs and the other scrolls.141 He never seems to have written these books, but their general plan is clear and should be taken into account when we evaluate Gersonides’ works and personality.142

Introduction to the Comm. on the Pentateuch, p. 14. Comm. on Song of Songs, p. 52 / p. 4. 142 It is interesting that Maimonides, too, promised to write a book on talmudic midrashim, to be called the Book of Harmony, but never carried through. See the introduction to Pereq eleq and the seventh Article of Faith (Maimonides, Introductions to the Mishnah [Arabic Text and Hebrew Translation], ed. and annot. I. Shailat [ Jerusalem: Ma’aliyot, 1992], pp. 140, 143; introduction to the Guide, p. 5 / p. 9). 140 141

GERSONIDES AS COMMENTATOR ON AVERROES* Introduction Gersonides wrote supercommentaries on Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle rather than commentaries on Aristotle’s own works (the latter was the practice in Latin Europe).1 As we shall see, however, he considered his supercommentaries on Averroes’s middle commentaries to be commentaries on Aristotle himself. Gersonides wrote supercommentaries on two different categories of works by Averroes: the epitomes (or short commentaries) and the middle commentaries. The series covers all of Averroes’s epitomes on the physical sciences (the Physics, De generatione et corruptione, De caelo, the Meteorology, books 11–19, De animalibus,2 De anima, and the Parva

* In this version I have corrected errors in the original French, including misnumbering of the notes, and added several additional references. I would like to thank Ruth Glasner for her comments on the first draft of this work and also for loaning me photocopies or facsimiles of manuscripts of Averroes’s commentaries and Gersonides’ supercommentaries, which greatly facilitated my work. 1 The now-lost commentary on the Metaphysics is an exception. Gersonides knew the text of Aristotle’s Metaphysics through Averroes’s Long Commentary, in the translation by Moses ben Solomon of Beaucaire, as well as in an anonymous “new translation” (see Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide [Paris, 1973], p. 40 n. 50). I believe that his commentary, which was never completed, was based on the translation by Moses ben Solomon. According to Wars V.3.12 ( p. 281 / 3:177) he got at least as far as Metaphysics IV.3. Only a few fragments survive, in the form of references in the Wars. For the commentary on the Metaphysics, see Ruth Glasner, “Gersonides’ Lost Commentary on the Metaphysics,” Medieval Encounters 4 (1998), esp. pp. 130–134. Steinschneider (Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters [Berlin, 1893] p. 167) believes that the supercommentary in question was on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Metaphysics, because it is quoted in the introduction to Gersonides’ commentary on Ecclesiastes alongside the commentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Topics. Touati (La pensée philosophique, p. 75), and Weil (G. E. Weil, La bibliothèque de Gersonide d’après son catalogue autographe [Paris and Louvain, 1991], pp. 111–112) follows him in this. In “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord ” (this volume, p. 19, n. 41), I show that it was indeed a commentary on Aristotle’s own text. Glasner, who rejects the view of Steinschneider and Touati, is inclined to accept my conclusion, although she also advances the possibility that Gersonides wrote his commentary on Averroes’s Long Commentary (Glasner, “Gersonides’ Lost Commentary,” p. 134). If I am correct, Gersonides wrote at least one commentary on an original Aristotelian treatise, as was the norm in the Latin world. 2 This work comprises the four books of De partibus animalium and the five books of De generatione animalium.

182

gersonides as commentator on averroes

naturalia),3 as well as two supercommentaries on Averroes’s middle commentaries on the physical sciences:4 a supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics and an unfinished supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on De caelo.5 As for the works on logic, he wrote supercommentaries only on Averroes’s middle commentaries and not on the epitomes;6 specifically, the middle commentaries on the seven books of the Organon (including Porphyry’s Isagoge)—the Isagoge,

3 We know that he also wrote a commentary on the De plantis of pseudo-Aristotle, but this too has been lost. See Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 75. 4 But he also knew other middle commentaries on the physical sciences. He uses them or quotes them in his supercommentaries on the epitomes: the Middle Commentary on De anima is quoted in several places in the supercommentary on the Epitome of that work (see, for example, Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” pp. 6, 14, 132, 124), in his commentary on the Three Letters (Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1373/4, fols. 256v and 263v), and in Wars I.10 ( p. 79 / 1:209; see Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 40). The Middle Commentary on De generatione et corruptione is quoted in Wars III.4 ( pp. 144–145 / 2:124; see ibid.) as well as in the supercommentary on the epitome of that same treatise, where Gersonides uses it to explain the text of the epitome (see: S. Kurland, Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Medium & Epitome in Aristotelis de Generatione et Corruptione Libros, in Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, vol. 4, 1–2 [Cambridge, MA, 1958], who quotes Paris—BNF, MS héb. 963, fols. 64v5–7; Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, p. 130) and in the supercommentary on De caelo (ibid., p. 127). The Middle Commentary on the Meteorology is quoted in Wars V.2.9 ( p. 218 / 2:75) (see Touati, La pensée philosophique), at least 11 times in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Meteorology, mainly in the notes beginning “Levi said” (see E. Meiron, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of Meteorology 1–3: A Comparative Analysis of the Optical-Physical-Mathematical Aspects of the Theories of the Halo and the Rainbow with an Appendix Containing an Annotated Critical Edition” [Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2003] [Hebrew], pp. 22, 70, 78, 96, 99, 106, 107, 108, 109, 120, and 164), as well as in the supercommentary on the Epitome of De caelo (see Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, p. 127). The Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is quoted in the Introduction to the commentary on the Pentateuch, pp. 5–6 (see Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 40), in the ha a ah of the commentary on Genesis 2:4–3:24 ( pp. 85, 86), in the commentary on Deut. 6:5 ( p. 41), and in “The General Principle to be Learned from the Text” (ha kelal ha- oleh min ha-devarim) on Job 3 ( p. 4b / p. 20). Gersonides also uses it in the introduction to his commentary on Ecclesiastes, though he refers only to its author, whom he calls “the Philosopher” ( p. 15), without specifying the name of the treatise. On this issue see Ruth Glasner, “On the Writing of Gersonides’ Philosophical Commentaries,” in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, ed. C. Sirat, S. Klein-Braslavy, and O. Weijers (Paris, 2003), p. 95. 5 As far as De caelo I.8.5. See Ruth Glasner, “An Unknown Commentary by Levi ben Gershom,” Qiryat Sefer 64 (1992/93), p. 1101 (Hebrew). 6 According to Manekin, he did know the epitomes of the treatises on logic. See Charles Manekin, “Preliminary Observations on Gersonides’ Logical Writings,” PAAJR 52 (1985), p. 90 n. 19.

gersonides as commentator on averroes

183

the Categories, De interpretatione, the Prior and Posterior Analytics, the Topics, and the Sophistics.7 Gersonides began this project in 1321, after completing the first version of the Wars of the Lord (1317–1321) and before taking up its second version (1325–1329).8 He finished it in 1324, having devoted four years to the task.9 These supercommentaries were almost certainly the first of this sort written by a Jewish philosopher in the Middle Ages.10 They also constitute the most complete series of supercommentaries on Averroes’s work in physics and logic in medieval Jewish thought. In them Gersonides focuses exclusively on philosophical issues; he is not interested in reconciling philosophy with religion or the Jewish literary tradition with Aristotelian philosophy.11 In this he fits perfectly in the long philosophical tradition of commentators on Aristotle. When he wrote these supercommentaries, Gersonides evidently wanted to encourage readers to study philosophy so that they would be able to understand the Wars of the Lord. It may also be, however, that he wanted to delve more deeply into the philosophical issues he would later deal with in the Wars or address questions he had to

7 Gersonides wrote about the smaller Organon rather than the expanded version; i.e., he did not comment on the Poetics and the Rhetoric (ibid.) For the two traditions of the Organon, see A. Hasnawi, “Fārābi et la pratique de l’exégèse philosophique (remarques sur son commentaire au De interpretatione d’Aristote,” Revue de synthèse III, Vol. 106 (No. 117) (1985), p. 28. 8 See Touati, La pensée philosophique, pp. 49–51. He continued to work on several chapters in the section on astronomy after 1334 and until 1340. See: B. R. Goldstein, “Preliminary Remarks concerning Levi ben Gerson’s Contributions to Astronomy,” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 3 (1969), p. 253; J. L. Mancha, “Levi ben Gerson’s Astronomical Work: Chronology and Christian Context,” Science in Context 10(3) (1997), pp. 472–473. All the same, it is possible that Gersonides began working on the second version of the Wars before he completed all of the supercommentaries. We know the dates of completion of the individual books of the Wars (see Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 51), but not when he began them. In any case, as Touati has shown, the book on divine knowledge was still not written in 1324, when he finished the commentary on the Parva naturalia, even though Gersonides was already planning to write a book about religious (toraniyyim) subjects. See Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 50. 9 Here we will not consider two other commentaries on Averroes: that on Quaesita V and IX of the Quaesita in Libros Logicae Aristotelis, nor the commentary on the three letters about union with the separate intellect. 10 See Ruth Glasner, “Levi ben Gershom and the Study of Ibn Rushd in the Fourteenth Century,” Jewish Quarterly Review 86 (1995), pp. 51–90. 11 Several notes in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia are an exception to this generalization.

184

gersonides as commentator on averroes

investigate so that he himself could understand the issues to be covered in the Wars. Prologues and Epilogues Gersonides wrote three general introductions to groups of Averroes’s works:12 a very short general introduction to the supercommentaries on the epitomes of the treatises on the physical sciences, prefaced to his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Physics; and general introductions to the supercommentaries on the two sets of Averroes’s middle commentaries—one on the physical sciences, which precedes the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics, and the other on the books of the Organon, which precedes his supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Isagoge.13 He also wrote very brief introductions to three of the middle commentaries on the logical treatises—those on the Isagoge, on the Prior Analytics,14 and on the Posterior Analytics15—as well as a longer introduction to the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics, which immediately follows the general introduction to the supercommentaries on the physical sciences. All of these introductions (except for the Middle Commentary on the Physics) begin, like his discursive notes, with the formula “Levi ben Gershom said.” Gersonides also wrote very short epilogues to the Middle Commentary on the Posterior Analytics and to his supercommentaries on the epitomes of the Physics, De anima, De animalibus, and the Parva naturalia. The Prologues Averroes was among the Arab authors who adopted the eight-part prologue paradigm of the Alexandrian school of the sixth century. 12 We find something similar with regard to his Bible commentaries: he wrote general introductions to the commentaries on the books of the Pentateuch and to those on the Former Prophets. See (in this volume), “The Introductions to the Bible Commentaries,” p. 153. 13 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958 (IMHM 32608), fol. 1r; trans. Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, p. 67. See also ibid., p. 69. 14 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958, fol. 59v; trans. Steinschneider, ibid., p. 69. 15 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958, fol. 69r; trans. Steinschneider, ibid., p. 70.

gersonides as commentator on averroes

185

Several of his philosophical commentaries are preceded by introductions that include all or some of the eight points.16 Gersonides, who was familiar with this scheme, employed it in the introduction to the Wars as well as in his interpretation of the opening verses of Ecclesiastes, Proverbs, and Song of Songs, which he took to be introductions to these books.17 Because Averroes had already applied this scheme in his commentaries, Gersonides did not have to provide similar introductions to his supercommentaries. Gersonides’ prologues and epilogues generally relate to his own supercommentary and not to the treatise commented on. In contrast to his Bible commentaries, here he does not expatiate on the treatise commented on; his introductions are generally quite short, explaining mainly the goal, utility, and structure of his supercommentary. In two of the prefaces—to the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries on the Physics and on the Organon—he also refers to the underlying works as well. As stated, Gersonides wrote on two types of Averroes’s commentaries, the middle commentaries and the epitomes. Averroes’s middle commentaries are running glosses on Aristotle’s text. Averroes cites only the incipits from Aristotle, preceded by “he said” (qāla); then he paraphrases the rest of the passage and adds his own explanations and expansions.18 The epitomes are more like freestanding treatises. Averroes does not quote Aristotle’s text or even incipits. Rather than offering explanations or paraphrases, as in the middle commentaries, he summarizes Aristotle’s theses while eliminating the dialectic discussions, providing only the outcome of the Aristotelian inquiry and its proofs. The order of the topics is not always that of the original Aristotelian work; frequently it is one chosen by Averroes as more logical or more systematic. Averroes also adds his own ideas, or those advanced by Greek commentators or Arab philosophers, when he believes they

As Steven Harvey has demonstrated, only the introduction to the Long Commentary on the Physics includes all eight points. Those to the other commentaries have only some of them. We should add that in the introduction to the Epitome of the Metaphysics, Averroes proposed a seven-point list that leaves out only “the author’s name” (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 956/12 [ IMHM 32606], fols. 916v–917r). All the other introductions contain a smaller subset. For several examples, see Hasnawi, “Fārābi et la pratique de l’exégèse philosophique,” p. 35 n. 18; S. Harvey, “The Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ Prooemium to his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics,” PAAJR 52 (1985), p. 72 n. 4. 17 See (in this volume) “The Alexandrian Prologue Paradigm in Gersonides’ Writings.” 18 See S. Munk, Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe (Paris, 1857), p. 431. 16

186

gersonides as commentator on averroes

cast light on Aristotle’s intention. Hence the epitomes can serve as excellent textbooks for students of philosophy.19 Gersonides had different conceptions of his two sets of supercommentaries, on the middle commentaries and on the epitomes. He views the middle commentaries not as compositions by Averroes but as “the books of Aristotle.”20 Given that he did not know Aristotle’s works themselves (except for the Metaphysics), he had to rely on Averroes’s middle commentaries in order to study Aristotle’s works and thought.21 Given that is hard to distinguish the basic Aristotelian text from Averroes’s interpretation thereof in the middle commentaries, Gersonides could not know whether the ideas he explained or criticized were Aristotle’s or Averroes’s. Being an extremely scrupulous scholar, he says as much in his two general introductions to the middle commentaries as well as in the introduction to the Prior Analytics and writes with great caution. In the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics he states explicitly that “our intention is to explicate Aristotle’s works on nature according to what we have of them, based on Averroes’s middle commentaries (be urim).22 In the introduction to the books

Ibid., p. 432. In the notes to his supercommentaries on the middle commentaries on De caelo and on the Physics he refers to Aristotle and not to Averroes; see, for example, De caelo, Parma—Biblioteca Palatina, MS ebr. 2723 (De Rossi 805; IMHM 13659), fols. 13r, 26r, 26v, 30v, and 32r; Physics, Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1 (IMHM 31361), fols. 7v, 8r, and 16r. When he quotes Averroes’s Middle Commentary on De anima, which he knew but did not comment on, he attributes the citation to Aristotle himself. In his supercommentary on the Epitome of De anima he writes: “As we can see, Aristotle has already explained this perfectly in the Intermediate Commentary on the de anima in saying that . . .” (trans. Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” p. 6). The pages of the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary of De caelo are not numbered in MS Parma. I have supplied my own numbering, beginning with the first page of the commentary. 21 This attitude toward Averroes’s middle commentaries explains how, in the introduction to the Wars, Gersonides can cite Aristotle directly: “For in time the truth will be forthcoming, as Aristotle says in book two of the Physics” ( p. 4 / 1:95). In practice, as Touati noticed (La pensée philosophique, p. 165 n. 13), the statement is in the Nicomachean Ethics (I.7 [1098b23]) and not in the Physics. Touati also notes that Averroes borrowed it in his Middle Commentary on the Physics. Because Gersonides treated the middle commentaries as if they were Aristotle’s own works, he attributes it to the Greek philosopher; and because he took it from the Middle Commentary on the Physics he ascribed it to that treatise. 22 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1, fol. 1v. Gersonides wrote only a supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics and an unfinished supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on De caelo. Nevertheless, he precedes his supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics with a general introduction to the middle commentaries on the physical sciences, on the model of his introduction 19 20

gersonides as commentator on averroes

187

of the Organon he refers to the content of his own supercommentary and says that he is going to criticize Aristotle “according to what Averroes understood of his words.”23 He repeats this same observation in the introduction to the supercommentary on the Prior Analytics, adding that this is “because we do not have any of these books of Aristotle’s but only what Averroes understood of them.”24 Thus he states explicitly that he does not have access to Aristotle’s text and could consult only Averroes’s commentaries and knew only how Averroes had understood them.25 On the other hand, like Averroes himself, he considered the epitomes to be works by the latter and refers to him when he describes the object of his supercommentaries. As he states in the general introduction to the supercommentaries on the epitomes of the treatises on the physical sciences, “our intention is to explain, in our brief manner, Averroes’s epitomes of the books on natural science. And even though most of what he says is very clear, some of it is very deep but he did not explain it adequately because of his love of brevity.”26 Often he introduces Averroes’s statements into the running commentary with

to the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries on the Organon. Steinschneider wondered what other books were involved, given that the supercommentary on De animalibus is on the epitome (Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, p. 119). Perhaps Gersonides planned to write supercommentaries on Averroes’s middle commentaries on other treatises in the physical sciences but later abandoned the idea. He wrote supercommentaries only on the first two books in that category, following the traditional order, and did not complete the second one, on De caelo. The date of the latter is not known. The supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics was completed one month after the supercommentary on the Epitome. It may be that Gersonides set out to write parallel sets of commentaries on the epitome and the middle commentary on the same book. If so, he may have written the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on De caelo shortly after the supercommentary on the Epitome of this work, as in the case of the Middle Commentary on the Physics. Zonta believes that this supercommentary was written in 1321, when Gersonides wrote his other supercommentaries on the physical treatises. He notes that the copy of this work in Gersonides’ own library was bound with the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics, written in June–July 1321, and that it quotes the latter (see M. Zonta, “Gersonides, ‘Philosopher-Scientist’: Some Recent Books,” Henoch 16 [1994], pp. 335–345, on p. 343). 23 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958 [IMHM 32608], fol. 1r. Toward the end of this introduction, he refers explicitly to the texts as “the books by Aristotle.” 24 Ibid., fols. 59v and 151r. There are two copies of the Prior Analytics in this manuscript; the better reading of the introduction is on fol. 151r. 25 On this subject, see also Manekin, “Preliminary Observations,” p. 92. 26 Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1 [IMHM 431], fol. 390r.

188

gersonides as commentator on averroes

“and Averroes said.”27 But on many occasions he does refer to Aristotle, when Averroes quotes him explicitly or writes about an idea that he attributes to Aristotle. In the general introductions to the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries on the Organon and to the supercommentaries on the epitomes of the treatises in the physical sciences, as well as in the introduction to the supercommentary on the Prior Analytics, Gersonides write that he will explain Averroes’s commentaries according to “our/ my brief manner” (lefi qi urenu or lefi qi uri ).28 Thus he describes his own style in the supercommentaries as one of concision.29 These expressions may refer to either of two prominent features of his supercommentaries. As we shall see, in some of the supercommentaries on the epitomes he quotes only those passages of Averroes’s texts that need to be clarified and omits everything else. He follows a similar procedure in the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Topics. In the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries on De animalibus, the Categories, and De interpretatione he quotes only Averroes’s incipits or the incipits and explicits of passages that he comments on, followed by “etc.,” after which he adds comments, introduced by “Levi said,” that clarify the text to which he refers but has not quoted in full.30 Thus “brief manner” may mean Gersonides’ method of quoting Averroes in these two sets of supercommentaries.

27 For example, in the supercommentary on the Epitome of De anima; see Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” pp. 39, 54, 82, 83, 86, 87, 98, 120, 130, and 133. 28 “According to our/my brief manner” in the introduction to the supercommentaries on the epitomes of the treatises in physical science and the introduction to the supercommentary on the Prior Analytics. The same expression appears in the epilogue of his supercommentary on De animalibus (see Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1 [IMHM 681], fol. 168r). In the introduction to the supercommentary on the Organon he wrote “according to my brief manner.” In the introduction to the supercommentary on the epitomes of physical science, Steinschneider renders the former as “in seiner kurzen Weise zu erläutern” (Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, p. 118); in the introduction to the supercommentary on the Organon he translates the latter as “in meiner compendiösen Manier” (ibid., p. 69). Manekin adopts this interpretation and has “according to my abridgment” (“Preliminary Observations,” p. 95). 29 In his introduction to the supercommentaries on the epitomes of physical science, Gersonides attributes Averroes’s laconic style to his “love of concision” (Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1, fol. 1r). 30 Manekin’s description (“Preliminary Observations,” p. 96) is inexact. Gersonides quotes Averroes’s text but leaves out the phrases that he does not gloss, adding “etc.” just as he does in several of the epitomes of the physical treatises. See below, “The Structure and Method of the Commentaries.”

gersonides as commentator on averroes

189

Sometimes, though, he uses lefi qi urenu to designate his laconic style when treating a topic31 or resolving a difficulty.32 Here it means the concision of his commentaries as a whole and not just his mode of quoting Averroes.33 Gersonides does not use these expressions in the introduction to his commentary on the Letters, but he does state that he will write concisely. Whenever he finds repetitions (kefel devarim) in the Letters he will leave them out of his glosses, “because there is no utility in repetition.”34 His aversion to redundancy is also reflected in the fact that he does not repeat arguments advanced in his supercommentary on the Epitome of De anima, but instead refers readers to that work.35 So his concise style may also involve the avoidance of duplication.36 “Short” commentaries constitute a quasi-independent genre within the commentary tradition. In the introduction to his commentary on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, Maimonides describes the concise approach to writing a commentary.37 He notes two features thereof: leaving out explanations of passages that do not need one and succinct elucidation of passages that do. According to Maimonides, commentators, like the authors of treatises, come in two species: those who want

31 According to Manekin, who refers to the first three commentaries on the Organon, the concise style “may refer to his practice of placing the beginning and the end words of a particular passage of Averroes before his own comment which begins, ‘Levi said’ ” (“Preliminary Observations,” p. 95). 32 See the Middle Commentary on the Physics (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1, fols. 35v and 99v). I would like to thank Ruth Glasner for this reference. 33 See the supercommentary on the Epitome of De animalibus, Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, fol.12v: “We wanted to resolve the difficulties in our brief manner and corroborate our statements.” 34 Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1373/4, fol. 255r. This penchant for concision marks all of Gersonides’ works. He proclaims it in his introduction to the Wars, p. 3 / 1:93, as well as in the introduction to his Bible commentaries. For this topos in the Bible commentaries and its sources, see (in this volume) “The Introductions to the Bible Commentaries,” pp. 176–178. 35 See the note “Levi said” (Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1373/4, fol. 263r), where he refers readers to the absurdities that follow from Averroes’s view about the material intellect. 36 The emphasis on avoiding repetition can also be found in his Bible commentaries. See “The Introductions to the Bible Commentaries,” p. 177. Gersonides attributes this, too, to Aristotle himself. See the supercommentary on the Epitome of De generatione et corruptione ( Vatican, MS ebr. 342/3 [ IMHM 431], fol. 176v). 37 Maimonides, Commentary on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, Heb. trans. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. S. Muntner ( Jerusalem, 1961), pp. 4–5; idem, “Introduction to the Commentary on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates,” in Iggerot ha-Rambam, ed. and trans. Y. Qāfi ( Jerusalem, 1972), pp. 145–146 (Arabic and Hebrew).

190

gersonides as commentator on averroes

to write as tersely as possible—they never write 101 words when 100 words will do—and those given to prolixity who produce extremely heavy tomes. In parallel, some commentators explain only what is absolutely necessary and pass over the rest of the text in silence, while others explain even those matters that do not require a comment or expound matters that do need some explanation, but at greater length than is essential for understanding them. Maimonides assigns Galen to the second class and himself to the first. He promises to follow the concise method in his comments on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates and to explain only what needs to be explained.38 Gersonides, like Maimonides, is a member of the first sect. In his general introductions Gersonides first states the objective of the supercommentaries on the relevant group of treatises39 and then explains why he wrote them.40 The latter point is closely related to his explanation of the method he will adopt in the supercommentary. The introductions to the set of supercommentaries on the middle commentaries on the Organon and to the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries on the physical treatises are very similar. The former consists of two parts: the first addresses the purpose of the commentaries; the second considers the sciences treated by the treatises in question, locates them in the hierarchy of the sciences, and defines their objects. The general introduction to the middle commentaries on the treatises on the physical sciences includes only the first of these; but it is followed immediately by the introduction to the supercommentary on the Physics, which corresponds to the second part of the introduction to the Organon. In the introduction to the supercommentary on the Organon,41 Gersonides begins, as in the introduction to the supercommentaries on the epitomes of the physical sciences, by declaring that his purpose is to explain Averroes’s commentaries. Nevertheless, he adds, it is Aristotle’s own logical treatises that he is focusing on, not Averroes’s

For other aspects of Maimonides’ ideal of brevity see Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (Mishne Torah) (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 337–339. 39 The object of the book is one point of the prologue paradigm, often found in the introductions of medieval Arabic and Jewish literature, even those that are not formal introductions based on the Alexandrian pattern. See also “The Introductions to the Bible Commentaries,” pp. 155–156. 40 This point comes up frequently in Gersonides’ introductions to his Bible commentaries. See ibid. 41 On this introduction see Manekin, “Preliminary Observations,” pp. 92–93. 38

gersonides as commentator on averroes

191

commentaries on those works. What is more, his goal is not to produce a written text that explains Aristotle’s treatises and teaches them to students, but to compose a philosophical treatise that offers a critical and independent exposition of issues in logic raised by Aristotle’s works. First he will indicate those passages where he disagrees with Aristotle42 (we are to understand that he will replace them with his own views); next he will fill in the gaps in Aristotle’s presentations by adding what he believes to be missing. As in his own Wars of the Lord, Gersonides’ paramount interest is discovering the truth about the philosophical issues he deals with; here this means finding the truth about questions of logic. This, he says, is what has led him to write his commentary; we may infer that he was not motivated by a desire to comment on the texts themselves. He observes that this intention determined the literary genre of his commentary: it is a ibbur (composition), meaning a freestanding treatise, and not a be ur (commentary).43 Nevertheless, his commentary also belongs to the literary genre of commentaries and thus is also a be ur:44 I will also mention the places where our opinion is different from that of Aristotle in this science, according to what Averroes understood of his words. In some places, too, I will investigate matters that Aristotle did not speak of, according to what Averroes mentioned of his words, but which should be covered in this science. This alone is what brought me to this commentary, inasmuch as there is no need for an explanation of what is said in those books, in my opinion. This being the case, my commentary (be ur) on this book is a secondary intention, while the composition ( ibbur) is the primary intention.45

42 He also mentions this goal in the introduction to the commentary on the Prior Analytics (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958, fol. 59v / 151r). 43 This distinction can already be found in Maimonides’ introduction to his commentary on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates. There he defines perush ‘explanation’ and distinguishes it from “another treatise” ( ibbur a er) (a treatise other than that of the author whose text is being commented on); that is, a new work by the commentator in which he expresses his own ideas on the topics treated by the underlying text. See Maimonides, Commentary on the Aphorisms, p. 3; Maimonides, “Introduction to the Commentary on the Aphorisms,” p. 144. See also Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, p. 67 n. 152. 44 A similar statement is made by Shem ov ben Joseph Shem ov (fifteenth century) at the end of his commentary on the Guide. He states that he wrote not just a commentary (be ur) but rather a commentary and a composition (be ur ve- ibbur) See his commentary on the Guide in Moreh nevu im im perushei Efodi, Shem ov, Crescas, Abravanel, ed. I. Goldman (Warsaw, 1861; repr. Jerusalem, 1960), part 3, p. 71a. 45 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958, fol. 1r. The last sentence is missing in Rosenberg’s critical edition (S. Rosenberg, “Gersonides’ Commentary on Ha-Mavo,” Da at 22

192

gersonides as commentator on averroes

According to Charles Manekin, however, “for the most part commentary is independent of criticism, and, indeed, commentary makes up the bulk of the work.”46 Manekin holds that the only critical commentary is that on the Prior Analytics, which was written at almost the same time as Sefer ha-Heqqesh ha-yashar.47 This means that the general introduction to his supercommentaries on the Organon does not really tell us anything about their true character. Gersonides has similar goals in his supercommentaries on Averroes’s middle commentaries on the physical sciences and presents them in the same order as in the introduction to the supercommentary on the Organon. As he writes in his general introduction to those supercommentaries: And in those places where our opinion does not agree with Aristotle’s opinion, we will mention our opinion and refute Aristotle’s opinions. This alone is what led us to this commentary (be ur), in addition to the utility that this commentary (be ur) may have for those studying on their own (mitlammedim) to understand a few passages that present some difficulty.48

Here too it is the philosophical challenge that interests Gersonides, not expounding the texts to readers. His interlocutor is Aristotle himself. As in the introduction to the supercommentaries on the Organon, he proclaims that he was motivated to write by his desire to deal with the problems raised in the commentaries. Like the supercommentaries on the logical treatises, those on the physical treatises provide him with an occasion to express his own ideas and his criticisms of Aristotle.49 He presents himself as an independent philosopher and critic rather than as a teacher seeking to instruct his student-readers and to explain the scholarly authorities’ texts and thought to them. Nevertheless, as in his supercommentaries on the logical treatises, here too he takes account of readers who want to tackle Averroes’s middle commentaries on the [1989], p. 90), but is translated by Steinschneider (Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, p. 67). See also Manekin, “Preliminary Observations,” p. 93 and n. 28. 46 Manekin, “Preliminary Observations,” p. 93. For the fulfillment of this promise in the Categories, too, see Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, p. 69. 47 Charles Manekin, The Logic of Gersonides: A Translation of the Sēfer ha-Heqqēsh hayashar (Dordrecht, 1992), introduction, pp. 14–15. For the nature of the objections against Aristotle in the supercommentaries on the logical works, see Manekin, “Preliminary Observations,” pp. 93–94. 48 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964, fol. 1r. 49 A thorough study of the supercommentaries on Averroes’s middle commentaries on the physical treatises, especially the Physics, would have to determine the extent to which he realized his intention.

gersonides as commentator on averroes

193

physical sciences on their own. He avers that his supercommentary will also be of use to them and help them understand difficult passages; as such, it can be used as a textbook. In his supercommentaries on the epitomes, Gersonides envisions a different goal than in his supercommentaries on Averroes’s middle commentaries. In the general introduction to the supercommentaries on the epitomes of the physical treatises he writes that his goal is “to explain in our brief manner Averroes’s epitomes on the physical treatises.”50 Then he explains why he has undertaken this project: “Even though most of [Averroes’s] words are very clear, there are also some deep things that he has not explained properly because of his love of brevity.”51 Thus Averroes’s commentaries themselves require elucidation, which Gersonides will provide in his supercommentaries. As we have seen, the epitomes are philosophical works that sum up the lessons of the Aristotelian project. They make it possible for those unwilling or unable to study Aristotle’s own works to master the essential points of Aristotelian philosophy. According to his introduction, Gersonides has students of this type in mind and has written a supercommentary that will help them study and understand the epitomes. Nevertheless, although he declares that the goal of his supercommentaries is to explain Averroes’s text, Gersonides includes (as we shall see) notes in which he criticizes Averroes’s ideas and arguments, offers his own explanations of issues described by Averroes, resolves philosophical difficulties, adds his own arguments to support the hypotheses presented by Averroes or Aristotle, expresses his own opinions, and expounds the results of his own inquiries into the subjects treated in these commentaries.52 Such original developments can be found in the running commentary on the text and not only in his discursive notes.

50 Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1, fol. 1r (quoted by Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, p. 118 n. 73). 51 Ibid. Gersonides explains that Averroes is sometimes unclear because of his “love of brevity.” I have learned from Ruth Glasner that Averroes himself explains Aristotle’s lack of clarity by the concision of his treatises, for example in Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentariis, vol. 4 (Venice, 1562), fol. 23, I 12–14. According to Glasner, Averroes attributes this brevity to Aristotle in order to justify the explanations he presents in Aristotle’s own name. 52 A thorough study of these supercommentaries would have to answer the question of how the supercommentaries on the epitomes of the Physics and De caelo differ from those on the middle commentaries on the same works.

194

gersonides as commentator on averroes

In both sets of supercommentaries Gersonides expresses his own ideas and does not restrict himself to explaining Averroes and Aristotle. He employs the supercommentaries as an occasion to practice philosophy and to add his own contributions to the history of thought. Whereas, according to Gersonides, the epitomes on the physical treatises are not sufficiently clear and consequently require elucidation, when it comes to the Organon he holds that “what is stated in these books does not require any explanation, in my opinion.”53 Nevertheless, in the introduction to the Prior Analytics he declares that the first part of the book “contains many difficulties (sefeqot), as will be seen from our words, and there are a few places where his [Averroes’s] words are hard to fathom.”54 This is also the case of the epitomes on the physical sciences. Such passages, at least, need to be explained. Thus the state of the texts determines the manner in which Gersonides proceeds in his supercommentary. He declares that he will explain Averroes’s words first and only then offer his own ideas on the matter.55 Gersonides attaches special significance to the Posterior Analytics.56 In the introduction to the supercommentary on that work he stresses its utility: “This book is of very great utility, especially because, through it, a man may acquire apodictic knowledge”—that is, scientific knowledge.57 As we have seen, in the general introduction to his supercommentary on the Organon Gersonides states that his first goal is to criticize Aristotle and to express his own ideas about the logical issues raised. In his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, however, he seems to want to elucidate the text: the commentary, like that on the other parts of the Organon, deals with Aristotle’s own thought. Gersonides justifies his project both by the special utility of this book and by the fact that Averroes’s commentary is inadequate. Because this Aristotelian treatise merits extensive explanation and Averroes had commented on

Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958, fol. 1r. Nevertheless, he wrote about these passages as well. 54 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958, fol. 151r. 55 The syllogism engaged Gersonides at length. The commentary on the Prior Analytics (1319) was preceded by the first version of Sefer ha-Heqqesh ha-yashar. Later, after 1323, he wrote a supercommentary on Averroes’s fifth and ninth questions on the Prior Analytics, and then decided to write a second version of ha-Heqqesh ha-yashar. See Manekin, “Preliminary Observations,” pp. 87–88. 56 See also Glasner, “Gersonides’ Lost Commentary,” p. 135. 57 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958, fol. 69r. The utility is one point of the Alexandrian prologue paradigm; it is frequently included in informal introductions in medieval Jewish and Arab philosophy. 53

gersonides as commentator on averroes

195

only a few points in it, Gersonides felt bound to complete the job and write his own commentary.58 Gersonides never fully realized his project, however. He wrote a fairly long commentary only on the first two parts. The rest is glossed rather tersely. In the epilogue to this commentary,59 he explains that he failed to keep his promise because he had learned, after commencing work, that “there exists in my country [Provence] an extended commentary on this book by one of the philosopher-commentators.”60 A detailed commentary to explain the text no longer being necessary, he dropped this plan and returned to his normal procedure when writing supercommentaries on Averroes’s commentaries on the Organon and to his original goal. In the second part of the general introduction to the Organon Gersonides explains where logic fits in the hierarchy of the sciences and defines its place in the order of study. Adopting the Aristotelian notion, traceable to Alexander of Aphrodisias, about the place of logic in the system of the sciences61 and the Aristotelian conception of the role of logic, he remarks that logic is not a science per se but a tool, an organon (keli ) of study that can be applied to the various sciences, because its goal is to guide the intellect toward the distinction between the true and the false in each science.62 Logic does not deal with the essence of things, as the sciences do, and does not even pursue it. Inasmuch as logic is a preliminary or beginning (hat alah), it precedes the individual scientific disciplines in the order of study; it does not depend on them and is not to be explained by them. The introduction to the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics, which follows immediately after the general

58 Glasner has informed me that, in several places, Averroes declares that Aristotle expressed himself too tersely and that his text needs to be fleshed out. 59 According to Glasner, the epilogue is found in only a few manuscripts. 60 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958, fol. 149v. Touati (La pensée philosophique, p. 73 n. 108), following Renan-Neubauer, suggests that the philosopher in question was probably Samuel of Marseilles. Manekin (“Preliminary Observations,” p. 95 n. 35) believes that the reference is to Averroes’s Long Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, translated into Hebrew by Qalonymus ben Qalonymus in 1313. Because Gersonides had heard of this book but had never seen it, he did not know who the author was. 61 See I. Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote dans le monde arabe: ses traductions, son étude et ses applications (Paris, 1934), p. 49. This notion was also taken over by Maimonides; see Maimonides, Maimonides’ Introduction to Logic in the Hebrew Version of Moses Ibn Tibbon, ed. L. Roth ( Jerusalem, 1965), p. 108 (Hebrew). 62 For this definition in al-Farabi, see Madkour, L’Organon d’Aristote, pp. 50–51.

196

gersonides as commentator on averroes

introduction to the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries on the physical treatises, begins as follows: “We shall begin with his first book, which is known as the Physics (Sefer ha-shema ).”63 This introduction consists of elaborations, paraphrases, and quotations from the first chapter of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Physics. Gersonides, like Averroes himself,64 takes this chapter to be an introduction to the Physics. He also deals with the topics addressed in this chapter before launching a running commentary on the first chapter. In the latter he cites only brief incipits from the text, followed by concrete examples to elucidate them. This introduction is the longest of all Gersonides’ introductions to Averroes’s commentaries, because it includes a commentary on the first chapter of the Physics. Gersonides begins with a paraphrase of the opening sentence of Averroes’s first chapter, noting that physics is a theoretical science and that its object65 is “existents that change insofar as they are changeable.”66 But whereas Averroes employs this sentence as an introduction to the main theme of the chapter, which is the aim of the Physics, Gersonides writes at length about its subject. He distinguishes the object of physics from that of mathematics, including its component disciplines, optics and music. Then he lists the types of changes that occur in the categories of substance, quality, quantity, and motion in space. This part of the introduction, which deals with the theme of the hierarchy of the sciences as a function of their subjects, corresponds to the second part of the general introduction to the Organon. Thus the two introductions have a similar structure. The second topic addressed here is the four causes. Whereas Averroes writes of four causes that explain objects in every theoretical

Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1, fol. 1v. Averroes holds that Physics I.1 is an introduction to the entire book and interprets it as such in the first kelal of the first book. See S. Harvey, “Averroes on the Principles of Nature: The Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics I–II,” doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1977, pp. 179–182; Eng. trans. pp. 242–246. Averroes concludes this kelal as follows: “These are the things which are contained in the beginning of this treatise” (ibid., p. 182 [Hebrew] and 246 [ Eng.]). I would like to thank Ruth Glasner for calling this remark to my attention. 65 Averroes adds this subject to the first chapter. It is not found in the first chapter of Aristotle’s Physics but rather in the discussion of the system of the sciences in Metaphysics VI (1025b18–21) and XI (1059b17–1061b29–30). See Harvey, “Averroes on the Principles of Nature,” p. 327 n. 1. 66 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1, fol. 1v. Averroes writes of “beings which move” (Harvey, “Averroes on the Principles of Nature,” p. 179; Eng. trans. p. 242). 63 64

gersonides as commentator on averroes

197

science and the causes of natural objects, Gersonides speaks of four causes that explain motion. He rewrites the first chapter, mixing paraphrases with quotations from Averroes’s text, as he continues to do in the running commentary on the text itself. The Epilogues In several of his commentaries Gersonides adds short epilogues, in which he apologizes for his failure to address certain issues or the imperfect state of his commentary and explains the reasons for it. In the epilogue to the supercommentary on the Posterior Analytics, as we have seen, he apologizes for not having written the commentary in the way he had originally intended. In the epilogue to his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Physics67 he explains that he did not deal with those sections of the work that discuss the eternity of the world, because he has already done so in his own book on that subject, namely the Wars (first version). There he showed that Aristotle’s arguments do not prove the eternity of the world. As we have seen, he avoids repetition because of his preference for concision. Thus when he has covered in issue in his own book he omits it from his commentary and refers readers to the Wars. But he does explain this omission at the end of the commentary. In the epilogue of the supercommentary on De animalibus68 he apologizes for the imperfect way in which he glossed that work. He says that he has completed the explanation as best he could (lefi ma she- efshar lanu), given his laconic style,69 the complexity of several parts of the book, and the fact that Averroes himself does not offer any explanation. At the end of the supercommentary on De anima70 he writes that Averroes’s book, on which he has written, is quite defective and that he had often had to rephrase it in his own language. Gersonides accordingly begs his readers’ forgiveness should they find anything in his commentary that does not correspond to Averroes’s thought. By way of self-justification, though, he adds that his goal was not to understand Averroes’s meaning but to present the truth. Hence understanding

Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1, fol. 90r. Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42, fol. 168r. 69 Touati understands this to mean, “to the extent of my poor ability” (La pensée philosophique, p. 73). 70 Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” p. 184. 67 68

198

gersonides as commentator on averroes

what Averroes thought about various topics is of secondary importance. I think this epilogue is important, in that it demonstrates once again that Gersonides’ primary goal in his commentaries is the search for truth rather than elucidation of the text or thought of an authority (in this case Averroes). His commentaries provide Gersonides with an occasion to pursue and find the truth about the issues they address. Thus their main goal is the same as that of his own book, the Wars. The epilogue to the Parva naturalia is very short and effectively serves as an epilogue to the supercommentaries on the physical sciences. Averroes ends his commentary with the observation that “the completion of this treatise completes what is extant of Aristotle on science.”71 Gersonides adds a similar epilogue: “This completes this commentary (be ur) and its completion also completes what we have of Averroes’s epitomes on this natural science.”72 The Structure and Method of the Commentaries73 Here I would like to make several observations about the structures and methods employed in Gersonides’ supercommentaries on Averroes’s commentaries on the physical sciences,74 examine their characteristics, and provide several examples. A more precise description of their structures and characteristics would require a deeper study. Such a study is an essential adjunct to the thematic analysis of each commentary and would also make it possible to define and evaluate Gersonides’ contributions to philosophical exegesis and the history of thought.

71 Averroes, Commentary on the Parva naturalia, p. 70; Eng. p. 53 (quoted from H. Blumberg, ed., Averrois Compendium librorum Aristotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur, Textum hebraeicum recensuit et adnotationibus illustravit Henericus Blumberg, Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, versionem hebraeicarum, vol. 7 [Cambridge, MA, 1954]; Eng. Epitome of Parva Naturalia, trans. Harry Blumberg [Cambridge, MA, 1961]). 72 Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1373, fol. 298v. 73 On the structure of Gersonides’ commentaries, see Steinschneider, Die hebräischen Übersetzungen, pp. 66–69; Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 75; Manekin, “Preliminary Observations,” pp. 95–96 (on the structure of the supercommentaries on Averroes’ middle commentaries on the Organon); “Gersonides’ Commentary on Averroes’ Epitome of Parva Naturalia II, 3,” ed. Alexander Altmann, PAAJR Jubilee Volume, Part I ( Jerusalem, 1980), p. 4. 74 I leave out the commentaries on the Organon, which have already been described by Manekin. See previous note.

gersonides as commentator on averroes

199

All of Gersonides’ commentaries on the physical sciences (except for the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics) have the same basic structure, which consists of two strata: a running commentary on the text and additional notes that are usually introduced by “Levi said.” The Structure of the Running Commentaries The approach to all of Averroes’s epitomes is similar. Gersonides does not break down Averroes’s text into smaller units of meaning, as Averroes does in his middle commentaries,75 and refers only to the original divisions into books as reflected in the commentaries. The attitude towards Averroes’s text varies from one supercommentary to another. In those on De animalibus, De anima, and the Parva naturalia Gersonides quotes Averroes word for word, although (as we shall see later) he does not quote the text in full. In the commentary on De generatione he usually quotes the text word for word, but sometimes replaces a word used by Averroes with one or two of his own in order to make the meaning clearer.76 Sometimes he replaces the pronoun “he” in Averroes’s text with “Aristotle.”77 In his commentary on the Physics he often discards Averroes’s text in favor of paraphrases mixed with explanations and his own digressions on the topics covered there. In the supercommentaries on De caelo and the Meteorology he frequently quotes Averroes’s text word for word, but sometimes he replaces it with a paraphrase. In the supercommentary on the Meteorology he sometimes skips over entire sentences, neither quoting nor paraphrasing them. A reader who does not have Averroes’s text in front of him cannot tell the difference, because the text and its ideas are perfectly comprehensible without these sentences.78 In the supercommentary on De caelo he leaves out even more, including a rather long section on the prime mover. He may have skipped this passage because its subject really pertains to

Averroes breaks up the text by inserting “he said” (qāla) to introduce each unit. It is possible, though, that in some cases the text in front of him differed from that available to us in Kurland’s edition (Kurland, Averrois Commentarium in Aristotelis de Generatione et Corruptione). 77 For example, Vatican, MS ebr. 342/3, fol. 177r. 78 This is also the case of the supercommentary on the Epitome of De caelo. 75 76

200

gersonides as commentator on averroes

metaphysics and he wanted to deal only with topics that fall under the rubric of physics.79 The supercommentaries on De animalibus, De anima, and the Parva naturalia80 constitute a separate group.81 They do not incorporate Averroes’s text in full. When Gersonides has nothing to add to his source or when he does not think that the text requires explanation he quotes either the first few words or one or two sentences, followed by “etc.”82 Then he leaves out sentences and even entire paragraphs of Averroes’s text and continues his own commentary with expressions that he glosses or by developing the idea on his own. To give some idea of just how much of Averroes’s text Gersonides leaves out, consider the supercommentary on the Parva naturalia II.3. In Altmann’s edition, it runs to 16 pages and a few odd lines. The passages that Gersonides omitted, collected at the end of Gersonides’ text, come to another five printed pages. Gersonides believed that all of that material was clear enough for readers to understand unaided. Thus to know and study these epitomes it is not enough just to read Gersonides’ commentary. One must also have recourse to Averroes’s own text.83 I believe that this style indicates that the supercommentaries on Averroes were intended for readers who were already interested in philosophy and had some knowledge of the subject. They had access to copies of Averroes’s commentaries and wanted to study them in greater depth. Note that most of Averroes’s epitomes as well as several of his middle commentaries had been translated into Hebrew by the first half of the fourteenth century and seem to have aroused great interest among the Jews in Provence.84 Because the Jews, unlike the Christians, had neither schools nor universities, and,

Paris—BNF, MS héb. 918/3 (IMHM 31960), fols. 54c–55c. For the method and style of the commentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, see Altmann, “Gersonides’ Commentary,” p. 4. That description is equally applicable to the other commentaries in this group as well. 81 The supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Topics is of this type, too. 82 In De animalibus XI and XII he does not indicate these omissions by “etc.” 83 This also the case with Gersonides’ supercommentary on the Topics. 84 The list of works that Gersonides loaned to others includes several philosophical commentaries by Averroes: the epitomes on the Physics and the De anima, the middle commentaries on the Isagoge, the Categories, De interpretatione, the Topics, the Sophistics, the Physics, De generatione, the Meteorology, and De anima, and the Long Commentary on the Physics (see Weil, La bibliothèque de Gersonide). The fact that he loaned these books to his brother and two other local residents demonstrates that there were other people in town who were interested in Averroes’s commentaries. 79 80

gersonides as commentator on averroes

201

living in scattered communities, could not always avail themselves of a private tutor, Gersonides replaced oral instruction by a written mode, embodied in his supercommentaries. Gersonides’ supercommentaries may have been the spur for the members of the circle that composed the commentaries collected in BNF MS héb. 964 to delve more deeply into the study of the epitomes, under his direction. This group pursued their studies under Gersonides’ tutelage, especially in the letters they exchanged with him, and probably on the basis of his supercommentaries.85 Those on the epitomes of De animalibus, De anima, and the Parva naturalia could have been meant for students of this sort. The omission of passages not deemed to require clarification can also be explained by two features of Gersonides’ style (not necessarily to the exclusion of the first explanation). As we have seen, Gersonides, like Maimonides, chose to write his commentaries in the form of pithy observations. The suppression of passages that are self-explanatory can be explained by his preference for brevity. What is more, Gersonides wrote only when he had something new to contribute. He was not interested in repeating what others had already said, unless he applied their ideas in his own inquiry or wanted to criticize them. Consequently he does not copy over Averroes’s text into his own unless he has something to add to it by way of elucidation or disagreement. What he presents is his own contribution to the understanding of the text and the search for truth. Where he does quote Averroes’s text Gersonides interpolates words and sentences, and sometimes even several explanatory sentences, in order to make them clearer and more comprehensible.86 He also inserts explanations of ideas presented by Averroes, criticism thereof, or his own further development of topics discussed by him.87

85 Solomon of Urgul knew at least Gersonides’ supercommentary on the Epitome of De generatione (Ruth Glasner, “Levi ben Gershom and the Study of Ibn Rushd in the Fourteenth Century,” Jewish Quarterly Review 86 [1995], p. 67); ha-Levi certainly knew the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Physics and the supercommentary on the Isagoge (ibid., p. 72). According to Ruth Glasner, ha-Levi even discussed the opinions advanced in Gersonides’ supercommentaries with him and “corrected” them (ibid.). He worked with Gersonides’ supercommentary in front of him (ibid., p. 73). 86 In the supercommentary on the Epitome of De generatione he inserts fairly long explanations that sometimes stretch to two pages. See, for example, Vatican, MS ebr. 342/13, fols. 178v–179v. In the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia the explanations are generally shorter. 87 For examples of textual exegesis in the commentary on De generatione, see Kurland, Averrois Commentarium in Aristotelis de Generatione et Corruptione, pp. 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, and 203.

202

gersonides as commentator on averroes

In many cases Gersonides does not introduce his independent contributions by a formula that makes it easy for readers to distinguish them from Averroes’s text. In other instances, however, he states explicitly that he is about to present his own ideas or developments or add an argument or explanation to the underlying text.88 Sometimes he introduces his own notions by the formula, “in my opinion” (lefi da ati )89 or marks the end of his own contribution with “and this is what we wanted to explain.”90 Occasionally he confesses that he is digressing from the underlying text and adds, towards the end, “but this is not the place for this inquiry.”91 The digressions and explanations he adds to Averroes’s text may be quite long,92 running to 10–18 lines.93 Some explanations that are not introduced by “Levi said” are really discursive notes and make an original contribution to issues addressed by Averroes.94 In various places Gersonides marks the end of these digressions with the formula that concludes his own discursive notes: “let us now return to where we were” or “to where we were in the explanation.”95 The start of the second book of his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Physics (fols. 10r–12v) differs from the rest of this commentary and from the other epitome supercommentaries. It is written in the same style as most of his supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics and of the supercommentaries on the first three

88 See, for example, in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Meteorology, the explanation of Averroes’s introduction (Meiron, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of the Meteorology, p. 4; commentary on the third treatise [explanation of the rainbow], ibid., p. 131). 89 For example, the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Meteorology (ibid., pp. 4, 151, 153). 90 For example, ibid., pp. 133, 135, 136, 138, and 151. 91 For example, ibid., p. 141. 92 In the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, the explanations are generally shorter. 93 For example, the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Physics (Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1, fols. 23r–24r) includes a discussion of the infinite and of the eternity of the world. In his supercommentary on the Epitome of De generatione he devotes ten lines to Averroes’s explanation of the name of the book (Vatican, MS ebr. 342/3, fol. 177v). In this same commentary we find a discussion of the role of the Active Intellect as the giver of forms (ibid., fol. 212r). 94 This is the case, for example, of the explanation of the rainbow in his supercommentary on the third treatise of the Epitome of the Meteorology (ed. Meiron, pp. 118–170). 95 See, for example, the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Physics, Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1, fols. 24r, 31v, 38r; Epitome of the Meteorology, ed. Meiron, pp. 151 and 160.

gersonides as commentator on averroes

203

middle commentaries on the Organon (on the Isagoge, the Categories, and De interpretatione). There Gersonides quotes a short incipit from Averroes, followed by “etc.,” and proceeds to explain the text in a note introduced by “Levi said.” But these notes are scarcely different from the paraphrases—mixed in with his own explanations and developments—that replace Averroes’s text in the rest of the supercommentary and that are not introduced by “Levi said.” To sum up, the running commentary on the text of the epitomes is really what Gersonides calls a ibbur: a new work that combines Averroes’s text, as Gersonides understood it, with elucidation of that text and his own additions. Readers of these supercommentaries cannot always know whether Gersonides is rewriting Averroes’s text to make it clearer or adding his own explanations or new ideas. The only way to recognize Gersonides’ paraphrases of and additions to the underlying text is to consult the Hebrew translation of Averroes.96 The structure of the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries on the Physics and De caelo is similar to that of the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries on the first three books of the Organon. Gersonides quotes the incipit (or incipit and explicit) of the passage in Averroes on which he is commenting, followed by “etc.,”97 and then explains it.98 This method demonstrates that here too, as in the supercommentaries on the epitomes of De animalibus, De anima, and the Parva naturalia, he assumes that his readers own a copy of Averroes’s text and are following along while reading the supercommentary. They must first peruse Averroes’s text and only then look at Gersonides’ explanation.99 These comments often take the form of glosses on words in the text, which are useless if one has not read Averroes first.100 As we saw in his introduction to the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries on the physical sciences, Gersonides had in mind independent

See Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 75. In his commentary on De caelo, the explanations follow quoted incipits (or incipits and explicits). In the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics, however, the explanations take the form of notes. On explanatory notes see below, pp. 206–207. 98 This structure is not always followed rigorously. (I would like to thank Ruth Glasner for this observation.) 99 As an interesting aside, the copyist of Paris—BNF, MS héb. 937 (IMHM 31971), evidently wanting to make it easier for readers to use the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics, transcribed both texts on the same page, employing the glossed layout familiar from the Talmud: Averroes’s commentary in the center of the page, surrounded by Gersonides’ supercommentary. 100 See the examples given below, p. 206. 96 97

204

gersonides as commentator on averroes

students of these treatises who needed explanations of difficult passages. The approach adopted here suits this intention. Discursive Notes The running commentary on the epitomes is interrupted from time to time by notes that begin “Levi said” and that frequently, but not always, conclude with formulas such as “and to return to where we were” or “let us now return to where we were in our explanation.”101 Gersonides uses this formula to indicate that these notes are in fact digressions. It is especially in these notes that Gersonides expounds his own ideas and offers criticisms of Averroes or Aristotle. For him, neither Averroes nor Aristotle was an authority who had already resolved all problems in philosophy and science, leaving later thinkers nothing to do beyond explaining their texts and thought. The philosophic quest for truth is an ongoing process in which Gersonides sees himself, as in the Wars, as a critical and independent thinker who has new concepts to contribute to the history of ideas. These digressions may be very short, but sometimes they go on for several pages. Their frequency varies from one supercommentary to another and even within the same supercommentary. For example, the first two books of the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Meteorology are interrupted by many such digressions, but the third and fourth books have very few. The supercommentary on the Epitome of De generatione contains only four discursive notes of this sort. The supercommentary on the Epitome of De anima does not have a single discursive note in the chapters on the sensitive faculty, the imagination, and the appetitive faculty; but there is one in the chapter on the nutritive faculty, one in the chapter on the auditive faculty, two in the chapter on the sense of touch, three in the chapter on the sense of taste, three in the chapter on the common sense, five in the chapter on the visual faculty, and ten in the chapter on the intellect. This makes sense, inasmuch as the intellect is the subject that most interested Gersonides and that he would explore in depth in the Wars. In the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics, the notes offer explanations that are usually embedded in the running

101 For example, three of the four notes in the supercommentary on the Epitome of De generatione conclude with this formula.

gersonides as commentator on averroes

205

commentary in the supercommentaries on the epitomes, as well as criticisms and Gersonides’ own inquiries of the sort related to discursive notes in the latter. Up to the end of the second book,102 these notes are introduced by the formula “Levi said,” which clearly demarcates the boundary between the underlying text and the explanation. In the third book, Gersonides inserts notes but often does not specify where they begin and end: he simply continues his commentary on the text and quotes another incipit from Averroes, followed by “etc.” Once again we must have Averroes’s text in front of us in order to recognize the end of the note and the beginning of the new quotations from Averroes’s text. The explanatory notes frequently begin with a formula indicating that what follows will explain the quoted text: “this means,”103 “he intended to explain further,”104 “here Aristotle means,”105 “this is selfevident,”106 and “this is clear.”107 In notes where Gersonides expresses his own opinions he frequently employs the first-person plural, “we”: “we would say,”108 “but its validity has not been proven for us.”109 In the surviving portion of the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on De caelo, the explanations are not introduced by “Levi said.” Instead, as in the supercommentaries on the epitomes, that formula indicates a discursive note. All 14 of them are clearly distinguished from the running commentary and introduced by “Levi said”; all but one end with “and now we return to where we were in the commentary.” The “Levi said” notes resemble the discursive notes in the supercommentaries on the epitomes and for the most part discuss problems in the text or criticize it.110 The notes fall into several categories and are frequently most interesting. The sample that follows hardly exhausts their variety.

102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110

Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1, fol. 38v. E.g., Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1, fols. 5r, 8r, 8v, 9r, 10r, and 11v. E.g., ibid., fol. 5v. E.g., ibid., fols. 16r and 28v. E.g., ibid., fol. 4r. E.g., ibid., fols. 8r, 13r, 14r, 15v, and 18r. E.g., ibid., fols. 19v, 45r, 54r, 68r, 119v. E.g., ibid., fol. 105v. E.g., ibid., fols. 13v, 22v, 32r–32v.

206

gersonides as commentator on averroes

The Explanatory Notes in the Supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics Gersonides often glosses terms or ideas employed by Averroes by means of concrete examples that illustrate them. For example, in the first note of the first chapter Gersonides explains the terms “elements” and “simple bodies” in this passage: For in any thing, we think that we know it perfectly when we know its first causes and first principles so that we reach its elements and the simple bodies of which it is composed.111

as follows: An example for “its elements” is oxymel, which is composed of four elements, and an example of “simple bodies” is when we say that oxymel is composed of vinegar and honey. But it seems more likely that “elements” and “simple bodies” are synonymous.112

The second note, too, explains terminology in the same way. Sometimes Gersonides elucidates the text by means of what Averroes wrote elsewhere. For example, in the note on the second chapter he draws on the Posterior Analytics and on the Epitome of the Physics.113 A More Extensive Interpretation of Averroes’s Thought in the Supercommentaries on the Epitomes In a supercommentary on an epitome, a note may offer a more elaborate interpretation of Averroes’s thought. For example, the fifth note in the chapter on the intellect in the supercommentary on De anima, which runs to ten lines, begins, “I believe Averroes means here that. . . .”114 Sometimes Gersonides suggests two interpretations of Averroes’s text or idea, criticizes and rejects one of them, and explains why the other is preferable. This is exemplified by the first note in the chapter on the common sense in the supercommentary on the Epitome of De anima. Averroes proves the existence of a common sense: because there are sensible entities that are known to all the senses, there must exist a common sense that can perceive them. In a rather long note (28 lines) Gersonides explains the proof in two ways. The first is that there is 111 Harvey, “Averroes on the Principles of Nature”: Heb. pp. 179–180; Eng. pp. 242–243. 112 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1, fol. 2v. 113 See ibid., fol. 2v. 114 Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” pp. 83–84.

gersonides as commentator on averroes

207

correspondence between the sense and the sensible entities. If common sensibles exist, there must also exist a common sense that perceives them. He begins this explanation, “I believe the way to explain this [statement] is as follows.” But, he adds, “it may seem that this explanation is weak,” and proceeds to demonstrate that this is indeed the case. However, “another possible way of explaining this (statement) is to say that. . . .”115 The second explanation is that, inasmuch as we can judge that what we perceive by means of one sense is the same object that we perceive by means of another sense, there must necessarily be some sense that can make this judgement, a common sense that employs the five individual senses as its tools. Here Gersonides may be retracing his own thought process: a first attempt to understand the text, which seemed tenable, but which he then rejected as weak; and a second attempt that seemed stronger. But it is also possible, although the text does not bear explicit witness to this, that the first explanation had been proposed by someone else—perhaps a student who had read Averroes’s text, or a friend—and this is why he mentions it in his commentary and then demonstrates its frailty.116 An Explanation of the Epitome by Reference to the Middle Commentary on the Same Work by Aristotle117 For example, in the Epitome of De anima, Averroes supports the existence of the common sense on the grounds that without it we cannot explain the simultaneous existence of the apprehension of the sensible and of our apprehension of this apprehension. In a long note (17 lines in Mashbaum’s edition), Gersonides explains this argument on the basis of the Middle Commentary on De anima. As he does in similar cases in the supercommentaries on Averroes’s middle commentaries, he attributes the explanation to Aristotle himself: “Aristotle explained this perfectly well, according to what we see in Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the De anima, saying. . . .”118

Ibid., pp. 1–3. See also the fourth discursive note in the chapter on the intellect, which discusses how it can be shown that the intelligibles contemplated by the intellect are not material forms (Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” pp. 76–79). Gersonides offers two interpretations of Averroes’s text but rejects the second; if it is correct, he says, “there must certainly be a scribal error here” ( p. 77). He explains why he believes this to be the case and explicitly says that he prefers the first explanation. 117 Note that such explanations are also found in the running commentaries. 118 Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” pp. 6–7 (quotation on p. 6). Gersonides refers his readers to the text of the Middle Commentary on De anima in the 115 116

208

gersonides as commentator on averroes

Notes that Highlight Errors in the Version of the Underlying Text Sometimes the discussion of a passage or an argument in the text leads to the conclusion that the text is corrupt. In such cases Gersonides writes, “and it seems to us that this is an error that has crept into the books.”119 There are many such notes in his supercommentary on De animalibus.120 They begin, “and this expression is confused because of an error that has crept into this book or that originates with the translation.” Then Gersonides emends and explains the text. His explanation begins, “and I think that here it means. . . .”121 These notes are evidence of Gersonides’ critical mind and of his close reading of the text. Discussions of “Doubts” in the Text Discussions of doubts (sefeqot)122—i.e., difficulties or problems—are perhaps the most common type of note in the supercommentaries on the

running commentary as well (ibid., pp. 14, 132, 134), but there he cites Averroes and not Aristotle himself. For the last example, see below on Averroes’s explanation of the nature of the material intellect, p. 215. Another example: in his supercommentary on the Epitome of De caelo (Berlin, MS Heb. 110/2, fol. 52a), Gersonides writes that in his Middle Commentary Averroes explained the same thing in a different and more suitable manner. 119 Supercommentary on the Epitome of De caelo, Berlin, MS Héb. 110/2, fol. 50a. 120 In the colophon to this book, Averroes begs his readers’ indulgence, because he has written his commentary hastily in a trying period and because the text in his possession was corrupt and lacked a commentary. See Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1370/1 (IMHM 22394), fol. 196r: “May those who examine this book judge me favorably, for I wrote it quickly, in this time when we face so many vexations, and the book I copied from was corrupt and there is no commentary on this book by any author. But should God give me the opportunity I will endeavor to come back to check it more closely.” Thus Gersonides knew that the text employed by Averroes was problematic, but he also suggests the possibility that the translation of Averroes’s text is bad. 121 Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, fol. 101v. For similar notes see also ibid., fols. 85rv, 125r, 126rv. He also refers to such an error in the running commentary (e.g., fol. 133r). On Gersonides as a textual critic, see Ruth Glasner, “Textual Criticism in Hebrew Supercommentaries on Aristotle,” Ecriture et réécriture des textes philosophiques médiévaux: Volume d’hommage offert à Colette Sirat, ed. J. Hamesse and O. Weijers (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), pp. 190–194. 122 Safeq ‘doubt’ is a technical term in medieval Hebrew philosophy, corresponding to the Latin dubitatio or dubium and the Arabic shakk. In the introduction to the Wars of the Lord Gersonides writes: “doubts (sefeqot) arise on a given matter when we have contrary view concerning it” ( p. 6 / p. 97), thus defining “doubt” as aporia. In his supercommentaries on Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle and in his biblical commentaries, though, he frequently employs safeq in the sense of “difficulty” or “problem.”

gersonides as commentator on averroes

209

epitomes. Gersonides frequently introduces them with “and here there is some doubt,”123 “one who would raise a doubt will say,”124 or “and here there is a doubt of no small importance.”125 After explaining the doubt he may refer to earlier attempts to resolve it, which he sometimes rejects126 and sometimes accepts.127 In other cases, he substitutes his own solution for that proposed by Averroes.128 In still other cases, he does not mention his predecessors’ solutions but straightaway offers his own.129 There are similar notes in the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries. There Gersonides resolves doubts not solved in the underlying text130 or that he had raised himself.131

123 For example, the supercommentary on the Epitome of De generatione, Vatican, MS ebr. 342/3, fols. 199v and 211r. 124 For example, the supercommentary on the Epitome of De animalibus, (Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, fols. 33r, 141v, and 151r). Compare the similar formula in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Physics (Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1, fol. 87r); the supercommentary on the Epitome of De caelo (Berlin, MS Heb. 110/2, fol. 48a); the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia (Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1373/5, fol. 273r); and the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on De caelo (Parma—Biblioteca Palatina, MS ebr. 2723, fol. 24v). 125 For example: supercommentary on the Epitome of De animalibus (Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, fol. 109r); the supercommentary on the Epitome of De caelo (Berlin, MS Heb. 110/2, fol. 83c); and the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia (Altmann, “Gersonides’ Commentary,” p. 17). 126 For example, the supercommentaries on the Epitome of De generatione (Vatican, MS ebr. 342/3, fols. 199v–200v) and on the Epitome of the Physics (Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1, fols. 74r–76r). 127 For example, the supercommentary on the Epitome of De generatione (Vatican, MS ebr. 342/3, fol. 211r), where he quotes an explanation of the doubt that he raised here and that had been expressed by Averroes elsewhere. 128 For example, the supercommentary on the Epitome of De caelo (Berlin, MS Heb. 110/2, fols. 83c–d). 129 See the supercommentary on the Epitome of De animalibus (Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, fols. 10r–12v). In this rather long note Gersonides reviews several doubts and answers them. The answer begins with “and we say” and ends with “we have thought that it was appropriate to resolve these doubts in our concise manner and to support his thesis; now let us return to where we were in the commentary” (fol. 12v). See also: ibid., fols. 79v–80r, 109r; the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia (Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1373/5, fols. 271v, 273r–v, 274r). 130 For example, in the supercommentary on the Physics (Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1, fol. 102v). 131 For example, ibid., fols. 19r–20v (on the created status of the world); fol. 79r (the vacuum); fols. 99r–v and 102v; the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on De caelo (Parma—Biblioteca Palatina, MS ebr. 2723, fols. 5v–6r, 12v, 21v–22r, 24v–25r, 29v–30v).

210

gersonides as commentator on averroes

Critical Notes There are several notes in the supercommentaries on the epitomes in which Gersonides criticizes Averroes and refutes his theses,132 sometimes in rather strong language.133 For example, one of the discursive notes in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Meteorology begins, “one can only laugh if one devotes a little study to the argument that led to this cause—and this for two reasons.”134 In the supercommentary on the Epitome of De caelo he begins a critical note as follows: “This is how one has to understand Averroes’s argument here, and it is weak. But if one understands it as I am going to propose,. . . it is even weaker and, what is more, it is also untrue.”135 Then he explains his criticism of Averroes. Sometimes he writes “and this proof is very weak”136 or “but the reason that has been given on the subject is very weak.”137 In other cases his criticism is introduced by “and in general the explanation that has been given on this matter is inadequate.”138 Sometimes he criticizes Averroes’s logic. For example, in the supercommentary on the Epitome of De animalibus, referring to a discussion about language, he writes: “Someone who raises a doubt will object to this proof, saying that its premises are not true or that the conclusion does not follow from it essentially.”139 Sometimes he writes, “and this conclusion is not necessary,”140 or “it is clear that this conclusion is not true.”141

See, for example, the first note in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia II.3 (Altmann, “Gersonides’ Commentary,” pp. 23–24). Here Gersonides bases himself on his own experience in order to refute Averroes’s thesis that one must first know the subject about which one wishes to predict the future. 133 Charles Manekin has noted similar expressions in the supercommentaries on the Organon. See Manekin, “Preliminary Observations,” p. 9. 134 Ed. Meiron, p. 81. Manekin has found the same expression in the supercommentary on the Prior Analytics (“Preliminary Observations,” p. 9 and n. 32). 135 Berlin, MS 110/2, fol. 52d. 136 For example, the supercommentary on the Epitome of De animalibus (Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, fol. 64r). 137 For example, the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Meteorology ed. (Meiron, p. 160). 138 Supercommentary on the Epitome of De caelo (Berlin, MS Heb. 110/2, fol. 48a). 139 Vatican, MS ebr. 42/1, fol. 33r. 140 Supercommentary on the Epitome of De caelo (Berlin, MS Héb. 110/2, fol. 47c). 141 Supercommentary on the Epitome of De animalibus (Vatican, MS ebr. 42/1, fol. 34r). 132

gersonides as commentator on averroes

211

Gersonides also criticizes some of the commentators quoted by Averroes, such as Alexander of Aphrodisias. He devotes a long discursive note in the supercommentary on the Epitome of De generatione to refuting Alexander’s theses. He shows that the idea that there is something in matter that survives from its generation until its destruction entails a number of doubts and that Alexander cannot resolve them. What is more, Alexander’s thesis is not even necessary to explain the separation between natural form and matter.142 In the supercommentary on the Epitome of De animalibus, he writes, with regard to a description of arterial blood, “this is what we have found in the books, but I hold that it is erroneous.”143 Then he explains at length why it is mistaken and offers his own ideas on the subject. In the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries, too, there are notes in which Gersonides criticizes arguments or opinions advanced by Aristotle or by Averroes.144 For example, in his supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics he criticizes Aristotle’s argument for infinite time and dismisses it as weak.145 In some places he writes that the consequence drawn by Aristotle from his premises is not true.146 Sometimes he refers his reader to a criticism he has already expressed in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Physics or to explanations given there.147 In several cases he sends readers to the Wars (first version) and refrains from repeating its arguments in the supercommentary.148 Notes that Introduce Gersonides’ own Arguments to Corroborate a Thesis in the Text Where Gersonides is adding his own argument to support a statement in the underlying text he says so at the beginning of the note. For example, in his supercommentary on the Epitome of De generatione,

See Vatican, MS ebr. 342/3, fol. 183v. Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, fol. 45r. 144 For critical notes in his supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on De caelo see, for example, Parma—Biblioteca Palatina, MS ebr. 2723, fols. 13v, 22v, 32rv. 145 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1, fol. 45r. See also fol. 54r, where he criticizes the idea of infinite magnitude. 146 For example, ibid., fol. 66rv, where Gersonides offers several arguments to support his position. 147 For example, ibid., fols. 54r, 83r, 119v, 120r. 148 Ruth Glasner, “The Early Stages in the Evolution of Gersonides’ The Wars of the Lord,” Jewish Quarterly Review 87 (1996), appendix, pp. 43–44. 142 143

212

gersonides as commentator on averroes

he writes: “and this can be proved in a different and more essential way,”149 followed by an explanation of his supplementary argument. In the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Physics he writes, “we have another explanation to support what Aristotle meant here.”150 Sometimes he introduces his own argument with a simple “and furthermore,” as in the fifth note of his supercommentary on the Parva naturalia II.3.151 Notes Explaining a Natural Phenomenon Described in the Text In the supercommentary on De animalibus Gersonides inserts notes to explain, on Aristotelian principles, natural phenomena described in the underlying text. For instance, in the treatise on the liver Averroes writes that it is said that in some people the liver is on the left side and the spleen on the right side. Gersonides, being very cautious, notes: “if this story is true then. . . .”152 Then he explains it. He devotes two discursive notes to the phenomena of eunuchs and explains why they have a weak voice153 and no beard and why their temperament is similar to that of women.154 Presentation of his Own Inquiries In a few notes in the supercommentaries on the epitomes Gersonides reports the results of his own investigations into questions raised by the underlying texts. These notes are short treatises of their own and may stretch to one or even several pages. In them he sometimes explicitly rejects a hypothesis maintained by Aristotle or Averroes in favor of his own or criticizes his predecessors’ idea. One such note, about whether earth or water is colder, appears in the supercommentary on the Epitome of De generatione.155 Gersonides rejects Aristotle’s thesis that water is colder than earth and advances arguments to support his own theory that earth is colder than water. Vatican, MS ebr. 342/3, fol. 198v. Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1, fol. 56r. See also the long note in Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1, fol. 71rv, where Gersonides offers several arguments to support Averroes’s thesis. 151 See Altmann, “Gersonides’ Commentary,” p. 23. 152 Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, fol. 52r. He uses similar language in other notes. See, for example, the supercommentary on the Epitome of De animalibus, Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, fols. 50v and 87r. 153 Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, book 15 (fol. 72r) and book 19 (fol. 167v). 154 Ibid., book 15 (fol. 72r). 155 Vatican, MS ebr. 342/3, fols. 199v–200r, quoted and analyzed in Ruth Glasner, A Fourteenth-Century Scientific Philosophic Controversy: Jedaiah ha-Penini’s Treatise on Opposite Motions and Book of Confutations ( Jerusalem, 1998), pp. 72–73, p. 69 (Hebrew). 149 150

gersonides as commentator on averroes

213

The note is introduced by the formula, “and there is a certain doubt (safeq) here [in the theses presented in the text].”156 A discursive note may take the form of a true philosophical “question” to which the diaporematic method is applied.157 In his supercommentary on the Epitome of De animalibus Gersonides conducts a full-fledged, albeit brief, inquiry of this sort.158 He presents the following question: do the elements have forms other than their qualities, or are the qualities the forms of the elements? The thesis (“yes”) is that the qualities are the forms of the elements; the antithesis (“no”) is that the qualities are not their forms.159 Then he cites two arguments that support the antithesis and seven that support the thesis. Finally he states the aporia. Given that these demonstrations [the seven arguments that support the thesis] have established that the elements have no forms other than the qualities, and that the previous arguments established that they have another form, it is appropriate that we inquire what that might be. And we say . . .160

In the inquiry that follows he refutes the arguments that support the antithesis and consequently concludes that it is false. This entails that the thesis is true. Here Gersonides does not offer a new solution to the question. Instead, his own investigation confirms Aristotle’s thesis. He justifies his pursuit of this inquiry—even though this is not its proper place—by the doubts that have been raised on this subject: ever since Aristotle, some thinkers have maintained the antithesis and he deems it important to resolve the resulting aporia: It is clear that this inquiry does not belong here, but as we have observed that the text of the Philosopher here shows that his opinion is indeed that the form of the elements is this form [the qualities], we thought it appropriate to resolve the doubts [i.e., difficulties or problems] in keeping with our customary brevity, and prove our point.161

156 For another example, see the beginning of the discursive note in the supercommentary on the Epitome of De caelo (quoted by Glasner, Jedaiah ha-Penini, p. 42). 157 For this term, see (in this volume) “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Commentary on Proverbs,” n. 40. 158 Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, fols. 11r–12v; quoted by Glasner, Jedaiah haPenini, pp. 72–73; described ibid., pp. 67–68. 159 In a different order. First he states the thesis, then the question, and only then the antithesis, which is maintained by “some persons” and is what led him to deal with this question. 160 Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1, fol. 12r. 161 Ibid., 12v.

214

gersonides as commentator on averroes

Notes like this are especially common in the last two supercommentaries on epitomes, those of De anima and of the Parva naturalia II.3. The notes in these supercommentaries anticipate the more elaborate discussions about the same issues in the Wars. Their common characteristic is that Gersonides does not conduct them according to the diaporematic method, as he often does in the Wars, and consequently does not allow readers to follow the stages of his quest for truth, as in that work. Instead he states the truth he has discovered, explains it, and advances several arguments to corroborate it. In a rather long discursive note in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia II.3,162 Gersonides deals with the aporia of astral determinism and human choice. For him, this aporia is closely linked to the problem of foreknowledge. His solution for it is something new, his own contribution to the history of thought. He states and explains the aporia and then resolves it by means of a compromise solution that resembles many of the solutions of aporias found in the Wars.163 The thesis and antithesis are both true; that is, each is true from a particular point of view. On the one hand, there is astral determinism, but on the other hand, human choice that depends on the intellect also exists. There is foreknowledge of events that are determined by astral determinism, but there is no foreknowledge of events occasioned by human free choice. Gersonides returns to this subject in Wars II.2, where it is incorporated into a broader and more systematic study of the problem of human foreknowledge. But this note is the most complete treatment he ever wrote on the issue of human choice, offering a clear and concise statement of almost all of the elements of this problem in his thought, as well as of his own solution to it.164 In another discursive note (the sixth) in the same supercommentary, he reports on his private inquiry into a theme that had been addressed by Averroes. In the Epitome of the Parva naturalia II.3, 58.4–8, Averroes writes that a sleeping person cannot master the theoretical sciences because in order to have theoretical knowledge one must have already grasped the first premises. Gersonides accepts the thesis that 162 Discursive note 3; Altmann, “Gersonides’ Commentary,” pp. 17–18 (he uses the term “excursus”). 163 For this type of solution in the Wars, see (in this volume) “The Solutions of the Aporias in Gersonides’ Wars of the Lord,” pp. 49–52. 164 For an analysis of this note, see (in this volume) “Determinism, Contingency, Free Choice, and Foreknowledge in Gersonides,” pp. 235–246. On the discussion of the question of human choice in the Wars, see ibid., pp. 247–264.

gersonides as commentator on averroes

215

one must have already understood the first premises in order to have theoretical knowledge, but believes that even in a dream one can achieve theoretical knowledge based on first premises. In Wars II.4 he employs the diaporematic method in a rather extensive treatment of this problem (three and a half pages). In the note, by contrast, Gersonides states and explains his solution and provides several supporting arguments, but does not trace the stages of his inquiry. Another interesting example of a personal investigation summarized in the discursive notes is found in the supercommentary on De anima, in two notes on the intellect. The first note—more than nine pages in Mashbaum’s edition—looks at the nature of the material intellect.165 The second note, on the acquired intellect and the immortality of the soul, covers 16 pages in that same edition.166 Averroes had treated the nature of the material intellect as an aporia, which he resolved by means of a compromise between the thesis and antithesis. On the one hand the thesis is true: the material intellect is a disposition that does not possess material forms, as Alexander had maintained. But the antithesis is also true: the intellect is a separate substance that cloaks itself in this disposition when it is joined with a human being. Averroes does not explain this thesis in his epitome. Gersonides interprets the text of the Epitome of De anima on the basis of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on that work and cites the latter explicitly.167 In the note that follows this comment he rejects Averroes’s hypothesis on several grounds before presenting the “true solution” of this aporia. Unlike Averroes, he opts for one of the two contradictory views that constitute the aporia—Alexander’s. Whereas in the Wars he pursues the quest for the truth by means of the diaporematic method, here he makes do with a concise summary of such an inquiry, or rather its

Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” pp. 135–144. Ibid., pp. 150–165. 167 Ibid., p. 134. For this interpretation see also Herbert Davidson, “Gersonides on the Material and Active Intellects,” in G. Freudenthal, ed., Studies on Gersonides, a Fourteenth-Century Jewish Philosopher-Scientist (Leiden, 1992), pp. 201–202. In a note in the commentary on the Letters, too, Gersonides explains the text on the basis of the Middle Commentary on De anima: “I believe that this argument (ma amar) of Averroes’s is the middle way between that of Alexander and that of the other commentators whom he [Averroes] mentioned in his Middle Commentary on De anima” (Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1373/4 (IMHM 22397), fol. 263r). 165 166

216

gersonides as commentator on averroes

results, and defends them. He begins by dismissing the contrary opinion, held by commentators other than Alexander: it cannot be true, he writes, because it entails absurdities, five of which he then proceeds to enumerate. Next he presents Alexander’s view and admits that it raises certain doubts (i.e., difficulties), which he lists and responds to. Having refuted them, Gersonides comes to the conclusion that Alexander’s opinion is the true one. That is, rather than offering a new solution he returns to a “historical” view on the issue, one that had been maintained before Averroes proposed his own solution.168 In the second discursive note, he addresses the nature of the acquired intellect and the immortality of the soul. The question is whether the acquired intellect, which is “the intelligibles that accrue by abstraction of the material forms from their matter,”169 disappears, as several commentators had maintained. In the discussion that follows, Gersonides offers several of his own notions about the destruction of intelligibles and about the nature of the Active Intellect. This note is not as well organized as that on the material intellect. Gersonides does not explain the order of the topics he takes up. He jumps from one idea to another and the transitions are not always clear. It seems to be a first draft of his inquiry on these subjects, a preliminary to the systematic investigation on which he reports in Wars I.8–13.170 Here, as in the note on the nature of the material intellect, he first advances his theses and then defends them. Although he does not recapitulate the process of the inquiry that led to his hypothesis, as he does in the Wars, he does raise several objections to his theses, which he answers and thereby validates. What strikes me as particularly interesting is this note’s location in the supercommentary—at the end of the chapter on the intellect, after the closing formula, “the discourse on the rational faculty is now

In the Wars he modified his conclusion about the material intellect. For an analysis of the discussion there, see “Gersonides’ Methods of Inquiry in the Discussion on the Material Intellect in the Wars of the Lord,” in M. C. Pacheco and J. F. Meirinhos, eds.. Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in the Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto e imaginaçao na Filosofia Medieval. Actes du XIe Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale (Brepols: Turnhout, 2006), pp. 641–651. 169 Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary,” p. 150. 170 Mashbaum (ibid., p. 13) suggests two possible explanations for the relations between the Wars and the two discursive notes on the intellect: either these discursive notes are drafts for the analysis to be undertaken later in the Wars, or they are an abridgment of the exposition he was then putting into definitive form as part of the Wars. 168

gersonides as commentator on averroes

217

complete.”171 In other words, the note on the acquired intellect was attached to the chapter on the intellect, although its “natural place” would have been in proximity to the discussion of the intelligibles and the possibility of their destruction, which is where Averroes holds that some intelligibles are destructible.172 Instead of inserting this note in its proper place, however, Gersonides inserts a different discursive note, in which he explains why he cannot deal with this question there: an inquiry on the subject will be possible “only after we know the nature of our disposition [= the material intellect] (to receive intelligibles) and what brings it from potentiality to actuality [= the Active Intellect].”173 He promises to return to this question later. When he does so, at the end of his commentary on this chapter, it is in a discursive note: “This [= the commentary on the chapter on the intellect] being now complete, we must—as we promised—investigate the nature of this acquired intellect.”174 It is obvious that when he wrote his commentary Gersonides had already completed at least the first version of his own inquiry into the topics discussed in these two notes and had worked out the essential points of his own ideas about the nature of the material intellect, the nature of the agent of human knowledge (the Active Intellect) and its identification with the soul (which is emanated from the spheres), the nature of the acquired intellect, and the immortality of the soul and its felicity.175 The fact that he offers his notes in the logical order of his own inquiry, rather than following the order in which the topics are addressed in Averroes’s Epitome,176 is further evidence that Gersonides viewed his supercommentary not only as an explanation of the text but also as an 171 Ibid., p. 150. This is the end of the first version of the Epitome. Averroes later appended a note to the effect that he had changed his opinion about the nature of the material intellect and now rejected Ibn Bajja’s idea about it. Gersonides’ supercommentary also deals with this final note by Averroes. 172 Ibid., p. 116. 173 Ibid., pp. 116–117. 174 Ibid., p. 150. 175 In his introduction to the commentary on the Letters, Gersonides says that he has written this commentary based on what he wrote in the commentary on the Book of the Soul, where he explained his own opinion about the immortality of the soul, “which is the felicity to which we are destined” (Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1373/4, fol. 255r). 176 This is the same order that he later followed in the Wars, where he justifies it by more sophisticated arguments. See Wars I.1 ( p. 12 / 1:109), on why study of the material intellect must precede study of the immortality of the soul; and Wars I.6

218

gersonides as commentator on averroes

occasion for expounding his own ideas and the results of his inquiries. His book is simultaneously a commentary, a be ur, and an independent work, a ibbur. Gersonides also incorporates his own ideas into the supercommentaries on Averroes’s middle commentaries. For example, in a note on the proof of the eternity of the world177 he addresses his readers directly, admonishing them not to believe that Aristotle’s exposition is a certain proof of the eternity of the world.178 Other notes incorporated in the supercommentaries on the middle commentaries present his own developments of topics suggested by the underlying text. For example, in the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics he distinguishes between hinnies and mules (the former, with a stallion for father, have more of the “equine form”). This note is a digression, which Gersonides introduces by saying that he will treat such “marvels” “in our concise manner, even though this is not its place in the inquiry.”179 The Supercommentaries and the Wars of the Lord In his philosophical supercommentaries, as in his biblical commentaries, Gersonides frequently refers readers to his theological-philosophical magnum opus, the Wars of the Lord, for a fuller discussion of certain issues.180 When this means a section of the Wars that had not yet been written at the time, he promises that he will deal with the problem in a work he is planning to write. Thus in the supercommentary on the Parva naturalia II.3 he promises to expand his thoughts on a subject to which he has only alluded in his discursive note—the problem of divine science—in the religious treatises (ha- ibburim ha-toriyyim) that have not yet been written. He offers two justifications for this procedure: first,

( p. 36 / 1:146), on why study of the Active Intellect must come before that of the immortality of the soul. 177 See the supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on the Physics (Paris— BNF, MS héb. 964/1, fols. 19r–20v). 178 There is a similar note in his supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on De caelo (Parma—Biblioteca Palatina, MS ebr. 2723, fol. 13v). 179 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1, fol. 35v. 180 See Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 50 and n. 5. For a list of the references to the Wars in the supercommentaries on Averroes’s commentaries on the physical sciences, see Glasner, “The Early Stages,” appendix, pp. 42–46.

gersonides as commentator on averroes

219

the subject is too vast to be dealt with in a discursive note; second, it is better suited to a religious treatise than a philosophical work. Perhaps he had already resolved to write the second version of the Wars; this question is addressed in its third book.181 But it is also possible that he had not yet thought about modifying the structure of the Wars and was intending to write another book that would deal with religious problems only. When his supercommentaries predate still-unwritten parts of the Wars, a discursive note may be a first version of a treatment that he would later develop further in that work or that he was already working on in preparation for it.182 The references to the Wars, the notes that report on his own investigations, and the introductions to his supercommentaries are evidence that Gersonides considered the supercommentaries to be a part of his own original work. It is not merely a matter of explicating the texts of Averroes or the ideas of Aristotle so that students could master them, but of dealing with philosophical issues and resolving them. Thus all of his works, including the Bible commentaries, constitute an organic whole.

181 182

See Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 50. See above, “The Structure of the Running Commentaries,” pp. 74–78.

DETERMINISM, CONTINGENCY, FREE CHOICE, AND FOREKNOWLEDGE IN GERSONIDES* One of the most important features of Gersonides’ thought is his close attention to method. Rather than pontificating, Gersonides grounds his opinions on investigative methods (of which the most important is the dialectic method) and retraces with his readers the stages of his inquiry. He applies these methods in order to arrive at the “truth” with regard to philosophical and philosophical-theological issues about which past thinkers had not achieved a consensus. In his writings it is almost impossible to distinguish the “path to truth” from “the truth” discovered at the end of the path. In fact, it is the “path to truth” that largely determines the nature and formulation of the solution he reaches. Here we will look at Gersonides’ treatment of the complex of problems posed by determinism, contingency, free choice, and foreknowledge in two of his works: the supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva naturalia, completed in 1324, and books II and III of his theological and philosophical magnum opus, the Wars of the Lord, which were written in 1324–1325.1 The emphasis will be on the methods of inquiry he employs and the stepwise logical structure of the discussion. Our scrutiny of his methods of inquiry and the stages of the discussion will achieve three ends: (1) It will illuminate the structural principles of the Wars of the Lord, which in books I–IV corresponds (as I will demonstrate) to the logical progression of his treatment of the set of problems we are addressing here. (2) It will help us understand and evaluate Gersonides’ stand on the issues of determinism, free choice, and foreknowledge. In particular it will cast light on his discussion of the problem of God’s knowledge, locate it in his thought, and evaluate his solution to it. (3) It will uncover the new departure represented

* This chapter is a revised version of an article published in Da at 22 (1986). Some of the changes derive from Prof. Seymour Feldman’s observations on the Hebrew article, which he conveyed to me in 1994. I would like thank him for those comments. 1 For the dating of Gersonides’ works see Charles Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide ( Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1973), pp. 49–75.

222

determinism, contingency, free choice

by Gersonides’ treatment of these problems and his contribution to medieval Jewish philosophy. Medieval Jewish philosophers before Gersonides addressed several of the issues addressed here—notably the problem of free choice. They advanced three key arguments in support of the view that free choice exists: 1. An argument based on personal experience: Our own experience provides evidence that we have a faculty of discretion and that this discretion is the cause of our action. From this it follows that human beings have free choice. This argument is advanced by Saadia (Book of Beliefs and Opinions IV.4), Judah Halevi (Kuzari V.20) and Maimonides (Eight Chapters 8). 2. A theological argument: If everything is necessary, there is no place for commandments or for reward and punishment. Inasmuch as human beings were given commandments and were promised reward and punishment we must assume that free choice exists. Another variety of the theological argument relies on the postulate that God is a just God. Only if there is free choice can we say that God who requites human beings according to their deeds is indeed just. This argument is advanced by Saadia (Beliefs and Opinions IV.4), Ba ya Ibn Paquda (Duties of the Heart III.8), Abraham Ibn Daud (Book of the Exalted Faith),2 and Maimonides (Eight Chapters 8). 3. A philosophical argument: Aristotle had refuted the doctrine of determinism. Before Gersonides, this argument is found only in Maimonides, who evidently draws on the Nicomachean Ethics or on another Aristotelian source: “You, however, should know that our Law and Greek philosophy agree that all of man’s actions are in his power, as has been verified by true proofs” (ibid.).3

2 Abraham Ibn Daud, Sefer ha- Emunah ha-ramah [cited below as Exalted Faith, first from the Hebrew edition by S. Weil ( Frankfurt a.M., 1852) and then from the English translation: Abraham Ibn Daud, The Exalted Faith, trans. Norbert M. Samuelson, ed. Gershom Weiss ( Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1986)], p. 96 / p. 248. I have silently modified Samuelson’s English on occasion. 3 Raymond L. Weiss, Maimonides’ Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), p. 84. See A. Altmann, “The Religion of the Thinkers: Free Will and Predestination in Saadia, Bahya, and Maimonides,” Religion in a Religious Age, ed. S. D. Goitein (Cambridge, MA: Association for Jewish Studies, 1974), p. 37.

determinism, contingency, free choice

223

Medieval Jewish philosophy contrasted the arguments for the existence of free choice or for the reality of contingency and choice to the doctrine of predestination and to the two forms of determinism: causal determinism and theological determinism. This led to three problems: 1. Predestination vs. choice. Jewish philosophers who were influenced by or wrestled with the Kalam dealt with the question of whether everything that happens to a human being occurs by God’s will, by His decree, or whether, on the contrary, human beings possess free choice and are consequently responsible for their actions. In other words: does God determine all human actions by His will or are a man’s deeds in his own power? This problem was addressed by Ba ya Ibn Paquda (Duties of the Heart III.8) and Maimonides (Eight Chapters 8; Laws of Repentance 5:2 and 4). Ba ya holds that both predestination and free choice exist and argues that the reconciliation of the two is “a mystery” beyond the grasp of the human intellect. He also offers a theological solution: we must rely on the Lord, on whom all our deeds depend, but at the same time we must act as if we believe that our actions are in our own power. By contrast, Maimonides accepts free choice and rejects predestination. 2a. Causal determinism, contingency, and choice. This is the problem of reconciling free choice with Aristotelian physics, which asserts that the law of causality rules the world—i.e., that all events in the world are determined by causes that are in turn the results of other causes, and so on, until this regress reaches the first cause or God. Another formulation of the question is whether Aristotelian physics, being deterministic, leaves any room for contingency, which is the essential quality of contingents (i.e., contingent objects/events)4 in the sublunar world.5

4 The Arabic expression used by medieval Jewish philosophers is bi ah al’imkan (rendered into Hebrew as eva ha- efshar). This is translated by Pines, perhaps following Sharples (see next note) as “the nature of the possible” (Guide III.20). Michael Schwarz translates it into Hebrew as eva ha- efsharut, i.e., the “nature of possibility” or the “nature of contingency” (note that the Hebrew does not have different words for contingency and possibility). I have adopted Schwarz’s approach to bi ah al’imkan and replaced eva with “the essential quality of . . .” to make the sense clearer to modern readers. Hereafter I will use simply contingency to translate this expression. 5 This formulation of the problem can be traced back to Alexander of Aphrodisias: Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate, ed. and trans. R. W. Sharples (London: Duckworth, 1983). Sharples renders Alexander of Aphrodisias’ expression ή τοῦ δυνατοῦ φῦσις as “the nature of the possible.” See also Emmanuel Amand de Mendieta, Fatalisme et liberté dans l’antiquité grecque: recherches sur la survivance de l’argumentation morale antifataliste de

224

determinism, contingency, free choice

Medieval Jewish philosophy before Gersonides proposed two solutions to this crux: (1) There is absolute causal determinism and human will is subject to the general law of causality (hard determinism). (2) Causal determinism has only limited scope and not everything in the sublunar world is subject to the law of causality. Human beings can exercise choice, which then serves as a “primary cause” or “fresh start” (libertarianism). Among the proponents of the first solution we can number, according to one interpretation, Maimonides, based on Guide II.48.6 Although in that chapter Maimonides does not raise the issue of causal determinism and choice as a problem to be solved, he does present a theory of causation that can be understood in context as a doctrine of causal determinism, in which a choice is a link in the chain of causes that goes back to God. (Note that this is only one possible interpretation of the passage.) Abraham Ibn Daud advocates the second solution. In his Exalted Faith he argues that “God created contingents as contingent (ha- efshariyyim ke- efshariyyim).”7 If we do not assume this—that is, if we do not acknowledge the existence of choice—it would lead to “the destruction of the world and the breakdown (hefsed ) of civilization in this world.”8 Human beings would make no effort to build and plant, because they would think that all their efforts and hard work are for naught, since everything is predestined. It would also vitiate the doctrine of the world to come: human beings would not strive to serve God, believing their labors in vain, inasmuch as their prosperity or poverty has been foreordained.9 Events that result from the conjunction of natural or random causality and human choice are contingent. Human

Carnéade chez les philosophes grecs et le théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles (Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1973). For Alexander’s influence on Arab and Jewish philosophy, see Julius Guttmann, “Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei asdai Crescas und den islamischen Aristotelikern,” in Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut, 1874–1933, ed. Salo W. Baron and Alexander Marx ( New York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1935), p. 330 n. 9 and pp. 347–349 (repr. in Selected Writings of Julius Guttmann, ed. Steven T. Katz [ New York: Arno Press, 1980]). 6 For this interpretation of this chapter, see: Shlomo Pines, “Studies in Abul-Barakāt al-Baghdādi’s Poetics and Metaphysics,” Studies in Philosophy, Scripta Hierosolymitana 6 (1960), pp. 195–198; Altmann, “The Religion of the Thinkers,” pp. 41–45. 7 Exalted Faith, p. 96 / p. 248. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibn Daud does not state explicitly that this means that free choice must not be denied; but this conclusion certainly can be inferred from his argument.

determinism, contingency, free choice

225

beings can protect themselves against unhealthy foods and lethal drugs (natural causes and choice) and against dying in battle (random causes and choice); obviously, too, their actions are in their own power and everything that depends on their choice is contingent. 2b. Astral determinism and choice. This is another version of causal determinism and choice and involves two related questions. Is a person’s fate predetermined by the configuration of the stars at the moment of his birth? Are human beings subject to astral causality, such that the stars influence their actions and destiny at each and every moment of their lives, or do they have free choice and are responsible for their deeds? Maimonides addresses these questions in the last of the Eight Chapters. He does not present astral determinism and choice as a problem to be resolved; instead, he rejects astral determinism out of hand on the basis of all three arguments—the theological, the philosophical, and the empirical experience of free will. He emphatically dismisses astrology as a doctrine of predestination. For him, the problem of astral determinism is analogous to that of God’s decree vs. human choice. By contrast, Abraham Ibn Ezra and Abraham ben David of Posquières acknowledge the reality of astral determinism but set strict limits to it. They hold that human beings can modify their destiny, at a given moment or in a particular case, by means of an action that originates within themselves, an exercise of intellectual choice. In Sefer ha-Miv arim (first version) Ibn Ezra holds that “the human superior soul has the power to annul some judgments about individuals and to augment or reduce anything signified by the stars, but it does not have power to annul judgments about the collective.”10 Abraham ben David employs Aristotelian terminology in his critical annotations on Maimonides’ Laws of Repentance 5:5 “It is known that the Creator entrusted every event that befalls a man, great or small, to the power of the constellations, but He gave him an intellect to give him the strength to escape from under the [control of the] constellation, and this is the power given to a man to be good or bad.”11 3. Theological determinism or God’s knowledge, contingency, and choice. This is the key problem that engaged medieval Jewish philosophers who

10 Ed. J. L. Fleischer ( Jerusalem, 1969), p. 9; English translation from Abraham Ibn Ezra on Elections, Interrogations, and Medical Astrology ( provisional title), ed., trans. and annot. Shlomo Sela ( Brill, forthcoming). 11 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Madda ve-haśśagot ha-R VD, annot. Nahum Eliezer Rabinovich (Ma aleh Adummim and Jerusalem, 1987), p. 946.

226

determinism, contingency, free choice

thought about the subject of determinism and choice. How can the tenet that God is omniscient and consequently knows all human actions be reconciled with the existence of contingency and choice? The underlying assumption is that God is unchanging; hence His knowledge, which is identical with His essence, cannot change. Saadia solved this conundrum by asserting that God’s foreknowledge does not cause things to happen (Beliefs and Opinions IV.4). Consequently it is possible both for God to know things from all eternity and also for human beings to have free choice. Judah Halevi, too, held that God’s knowledge is not a cause of events (Kuzari V.20). Maimonides proposes a totally different solution in the last of the Eight Chapters and in Guide III.20. His solution is anchored in the limited character of the human intellect. In the Eight Chapters he argues that God’s knowledge is identical with His essence and that the latter cannot be known by human beings. Consequently, man cannot know how God knows things, and free choice exists. In the Guide he employs philosophical terminology and presents the issue as the problem of God’s knowledge and “the contingent” or “the nature of contingency.” Here too he emphasizes the absolute difference between human knowledge and divine knowledge. When applied to God and human beings, the word knowledge is a homonym. We can infer nothing about divine knowledge from human knowledge and cannot know how God’s knowledge of the contingent is compatible with the existence of the “nature of contingency”: “Knowledge concerning what contingent things will be produced does not entail one of the two contingencies’ becoming necessary.”12 What Saadia, Judah Halevi, and Maimonides have in common is that none of them challenge the theological postulate of divine omniscience. Abraham Ibn Daud offers a totally different solution. In his defense of free choice he asserts that God created contingent things. He defines the scope of divine knowledge on the basis of this solution to the problem of causal determinism, contingency, and choice and argues that because God created things as contingent he also knows them only as contingent. That is, Ibn Daud limits God’s omniscience to the necessary; with regard to the

12 Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed ( p. 349/ p. 482). ( I have modified Pines’ translation, substituting “contingent” and “contingency” for his “possible” and “possibility.”) This is not the place to consider whether this passage reflects Maimonides’ authentic belief or only his exoteric view, or how this solution relates to what he writes about God’s knowledge in Guide III.21.

determinism, contingency, free choice

227

contingent, God knows the contingency but does not know which of the contingent alternatives will be realized.13 Gersonides does not deal with the theological question of predestination and choice,14 but he does consider the other problems we have raised here: proving that choice exists, resolving the clash between causal determinism (which he identifies with astral determinism) and choice, and reconciling divine knowledge with human choice. Influenced by Averroes’s treatment, in his Epitome of the Parva naturalia, of knowledge of the future by means of clairvoyance, dreams, and prophesy,15 Gersonides adds another perspective to the topic of determinism and choice: that of human foreknowledge (in the special case of the prophet), determinism, and choice. When it comes to the scope of the topics addressed, Gersonides displays the greatest breadth of any Jewish thinker from the Middle Ages to the present day. Unlike most of his predecessors, Gersonides introduces all of these topics as problems that require a solution and pursues them by means of the methods of investigation we shall examine below. As a result, his treatment is much more rigorous and elaborate than any earlier one in Jewish philosophy. But Gersonides’ greatest innovation is that his exposition of the interlinked problems of determinism, contingency, choice, and foreknowledge is anchored in Aristotle’s treatment of the nexus of logical determinism, contingency, and choice (De interpretatione 9).16 Gersonides draws on Aristotle for the key methodological tool he uses to solve

Exalted Faith, p. 96 / p. 248. Gersonides addresses the dilemma of God’s primordial will vs. choice in his discussion of miracles. He considers it separately from the philosophical exposition, as part of his discussion (Wars VI.2) of “two very difficult questions of a theological nature” (Wars, introduction, p. 3 / 1:92). His discussion of miracles and how Gersonides applies his solution to the problem of foreknowledge, determinism, and choice there goes beyond the scope of the present discussion (as does the second theological issue raised by Gersonides, that of the prophet proclamations). 15 Averroes notes the problem of knowledge of the future in all three forms, but develops the discussion only with regard to dreams. 16 Gersonides’ contemporary, Joseph Ibn Kaspi, also built on De interpretatione 9 in his treatment of God’s knowledge of contingent futures in his volume of homilies, Tam ha-kesef. This work was written after 1332, that is, after Gersonides had completed his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia as well as books II and III of the Wars of the Lord (for the date of Tam ha-kesef, see Barry Mesch, Studies in Joseph Ibn Caspi: Fourteenth-Century Philosopher and Exegete [Leiden: Brill, 1975], p. 54). Moses Narboni’s Ma amar ba-ve irah, which also draws on De interpretatione 9, is later than these works by Gersonides. 13 14

228

determinism, contingency, free choice

these problems, the principle of correspondence between propositions and the state of things outside the mind. Here we should note that although Gersonides seems to have been the first medieval Jewish philosopher to draw on De interpretatione in order to investigate the topic of determinism and free choice, medieval philosophy often relied on that text, especially with regard to the problem of divine knowledge vs. human choice. Among Muslim thinkers, al-Farabi, in his commentary on De interpretatione, applied Aristotle’s logical exposition of the question to God’s knowledge.17 In the Christian world, the application of the Aristotelian tradition to theological questions begins with Boethius (fifth-sixth century) and continues with thinkers such as Anselm (eleventh-twelfth century), Abelard (twelfth century), Bonaventure (thirteenth century), and Thomas Aquinas (thirteenth century).18 The early fourteenth century saw a new wave of attention to the problem of future contingents by Christian philosophers and theologians. Contemporaries of Gersonides such as William of Ockham, Pierre Auriol, and Durandus of Saint-Pourçain employ syllogisms they derive from Aristotle in their discussions of God’s knowledge.19 Two Christian thinkers who dealt with the question of God’s knowledge of future contingents—William of Ockham and Pierre Auriol— spent several years in Avignon. Ockham was there at the same time as Gersonides, but because he secluded himself in a Franciscan monastery and did not visit the papal court it seems unlikely that Gersonides would have known him personally.20 Pierre Auriol’s time in Avignon

17 See Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, trans. F. W. Zimmermann (London: British Academy / Oxford University Press, 1981), pp. 92–96. For al-Farabi’s discussion of divine knowledge, see M. E. Marmura, “Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents in Alfarabi and Avicenna,” in Tamar Rudavsky, ed., Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Perspectives ( Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1985), pp. 885–86. 18 For this tradition up to the time of Aquinas, see Jean Isaac, Le peri Hermeneias en Occident de Boèce à Saint Thomas ( Paris: Vrin, 1953). 19 On future contingents in the fourteenth century, see: Konstanty Michalski, “Le problème de la volonté à Oxford et à Paris au XIVe siècle,” La philosophie au XIVe siècle: Six études, ed. Kurt Flasch (Frankfurt: Minerva, 1969), pp. 344–350, 360–370; Léon Baudry, The Quarrel over Future Contingents (Louvain, 1465–1475), trans. Rita Guerlac (Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer, 1989), p. 5; Gordon Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians: A Study of his “De causa Dei” and its Opponents (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957); idem, William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), pp. 447–454. 20 See Feldman, “Introduction,” Wars 1:47–48.

determinism, contingency, free choice

229

may also have coincided with Gersonides’ presence there.21 But even if Gersonides never encountered these two thinkers in the flesh, he could certainly have heard about their interest in the question of God’s knowledge of future events and learned their views from the members of the papal court with whom his astronomical pursuits brought him into contact. Around 1320 there was a public disputation about divine foreknowledge in Avignon. According to Thomas Bradwardine, in his book De causa Dei, a famous philosopher from Toulouse (whom Michalski identified as Pierre Auriol ) defended the notion of threevalued logic. According to Michalski this is evidence that philosophers of the day were engaged with the topic of future contingents.22 Gersonides could have been present at this disputation, if he was already in Avignon, or could have heard about it from members of the papal court. Gersonides does seem to have known al-Farabi’s commentary on De interpretatione, in addition to Averroes’s on the same treatise.23 It is extremely likely that he was acquainted in some fashion with the debates about future contingents that were prominent in the philosophy and theology of his day.24 We may even conjecture that it was these debates that prompted him, at least in part, to address the problem of foreknowledge, contingency, and free choice and to apply Aristotle’s 21 We know for certain that Gersonides was in Avignon in 1325, when he completed his commentary on Job. We do not know if he was there the previous year, when he was writing his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, or even earlier. On the possibility that he could have known Auriol personally see now Christopher Schabel, “Philosophy and Theology across Cultures: Gersonides and Auriol on Divine Foreknowledge,” Speculum 81(4) (2006), pp. 1102–1103. (Schabel’s article was published 20 years after the first version of the present chapter; see also below, n. 155.) 22 See Michalski, “Le problème de la volonté,” pp. 286–287 and 368–369. 23 See Charles Manekin, “Preliminary Observations on Gersonides’ Logical Writings,” PAAJR 52 (1985), p. 98. 24 Shlomo Pines maintained this view in three of his articles: (1) “Scholasticism after Thomas Aquinas and the Teachings of asdai Crescas and his Predecessors. Appendix B: God’s Knowledge in the Theories of Abraham ibn Dā ud and Gersonides, and in Christian Thought,” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities ( Jerusalem, 1967), pp. 90–101; repr. in Shlomo Pines, Studies in the History of Jewish Thought, ed. Warren Zev Harvey and Moshe Idel ( Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1997), pp. 578–579; (2) “The Likelihood of the Rebirth of a Jewish State, according to Joseph Ibn Kaspi and according to Spinoza,” in Studies in the History of Jewish Philosophy ( Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1977) (Hebrew); (3) “Some Views Put Forward by the 14th Century Jewish Philosopher Isaac Pulgar and Some Parallel Views Expressed by Spinoza,” in Studies in Jewish Mysticism, Philosophy, and Ethical Literature ( Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986), pp. 396–397, 447–449, 455–457 (Hebrew).

230

determinism, contingency, free choice

logical approach in De interpretatione in his own work. From this perspective, as well as the extensive use that he makes of the dialectic method, Gersonides is strongly embedded in his age.25 Nevertheless, it is difficult to pin down a clear and relevant influence of any these Christian sources on Gersonides’ thought. What is more, the sequence of his exposition of the issues of determinism, contingency, choice, and foreknowledge indicates that Gersonides was following an original path and reaching his own solutions to these problems—solutions that are inextricably linked to his methods of inquiry. It is at this original treatment of the issues at hand that I want to look now. De Interpretatione 9 and Gersonides’ Inferences From It In the ninth chapter of De interpretatione Aristotle tries to reconcile twovalued logic with the fact that some future events are contingent. He assumes that logical necessity is also ontological necessity, so that there is a correspondence between propositions that have a truth value (true or false) and the real world outside the mind. A true proposition is one that states what exists outside the mind or denies the existence of what does not. Hence if propositions about future particulars are true we must say that the referents of these propositions are necessary. In other words, Aristotle asserts that the assumption that propositions about future particulars always have some truth value leads, by the principle of correspondence, to strict determinism. However, he goes on, experience demonstrates that choice and contingency are real (a coat may wear out before it is cut in two, or vice versa). This means that propositions about contingent future particulars cannot have a truth value. According to the traditional reading of De interpretatione, Aristotle resolves the logical problem by opting for a three-valued logic and holds that the law of excluded middle does not apply to propositions about contingent future particulars. Such propositions are neither true nor false, but neutral or indifferent, and are subject only to the law of contradiction. Consequently they do not entail determinism

25 On the spread of dialectic in the fourteenth century, see: Konstanty Michalski, “Le criticisme et le scepticisme dans la philosophie du XIVe siècle,” La philosophie au XIVe siècle, pp. 82–98; Emile Bréhier, La philosophie du Moyen Age ( Paris, 1971), p. 329.

determinism, contingency, free choice

231

and are compatible with our experience of the reality of choice and contingency. Medieval Arabic philosophers understood Aristotle’s solution in a different way.26 Al-Farabi thought that Aristotle retained two-valued logic and held that the law of excluded middle does apply to propositions about contingent future particulars. In al-Farabi’s reading, such propositions do have a truth value—either true or false. But al-Farabi assigned a temporal sense to their truth values. He distinguished propositions about particulars in the past and present, as well as propositions about necessary future particulars, from propositions about contingent future particulars. Propositions about particulars in the past and present and about necessary future particulars are wholly true or false when uttered; that is, they are always true or false. By contrast, propositions about contingent future particulars are not completely true or false when uttered, but become true or false in the future, when the event to which they apply does or does not occur. Their truth values depend on the event itself. This interpretation was adopted by Averroes, who expounds it succinctly in his Middle Commentary on De interpretatione. In Christian philosophy it was advocated by Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and William of Ockham.27 Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes’s commentary on De interpretatione 9 seems to draw on al-Farabi’s commentary on the same text. Where Averroes speaks of “past things [i.e., events] and . . . necessary matters whose existence has no time stipulation.”28 Gersonides writes about propositions concerning “matters existing in the past or matters existing in the present as well as necessary future matters [i.e., events], such as the occurrence of a lunar eclipse at some future time or its non-occurrence, or the Sun’s location at the head of Aries on some future day, or not.”29 That is, Gersonides, like al-Farabi, emphasizes

On Arab explanations of De interpretatione, see: Nicholas Rescher, “Truth and Necessity in Temporal Perspective,” in The Philosophy of Time, ed. Richard M. Gale (London, 1968), pp. 187–194; Marmura, “Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents,” pp. 82–84. 27 On this, see Nicholas Rescher, “An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Doctrine of Future Contingency and Excluded Middle,” Studies in the History of Arab Logic ( Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963), pp. 43–54. 28 Paris—BNF, MS héb. 920 ( IMHM 31961), fol. 22r. The translation is from Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories and De interpretatione, trans. and annot. Charles E. Butterworth ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 142, modified on occasion in the interest of clarity or precision. 29 Vatican Urbinati, MS ebr. 35.3 [ IMHM 674], fol. 41v. 26

232

determinism, contingency, free choice

the distinction between necessary and contingent future events. “The former are divided into truth and falsehood in a completely definite manner”; but the latter—here Gersonides quotes Averroes—“do not divide into truth and falsehood in a completely definite manner.”30 Gersonides adds to Averroes’s text the clarification that propositions about future contingents do not divide into truth and falsehood in a completely definite manner “at the time when the propositions are uttered,” which he explains as follows: “for it is possible that one of these propositions was true, but it is not possible that it will be known now which of them is completely true.”31 Next he explains the sense of “divide into truth and falsehood in a completely definite manner” and “do not divide into truth and falsehood in a completely definite manner”: “ ‘in a completely definite manner’ means that the true will be distinguished when the utterances are uttered; ‘not in a completely definite manner’ means that whichever is realized is true, but the true cannot be distinguished from the false when the utterances are uttered, for at that time each of them may come into being, but when that time comes one of the utterances will be found to be true and the other false.”32 Here Gersonides follows the tradition of al-Farabi and Averroes on De interpretatione 9 and opts for two-valued logic.33 He does not use this reading to criticize the Aristotelian doctrine; nor does he postulate the three-valued logic that had begun to play a major role in the discussions of God’s knowledge of future contingents by thinkers of the early fourteenth century (beginning, it would seem, with Pierre Auriol ).34 Knowledge is the epistemological correlative of true propositions. Consequently one can replace “a true proposition about future contingents” with “prior knowledge of future contingents” and apply the logical dilemma of De interpretatione—the truth value of propositions about contingent future particulars—to the problem of prior knowledge of future contingents. This yields two problems: (1) human precognition: how can our experience of human foreknowledge of future 30 Ibid. See Al-Farabi’s Commentary, trans. Zimmerman, p. 76. Al-Farabi had used an eclipse to exemplify a necessary future event; the Sun at the head of Aries is evidently Gersonides’ own contribution. 31 Ibid. 32 Vatican Urbinati MS ebr. 35.3, fol. 41v; Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958, fol. 958. 33 Schabel, “Philosophy and Theology,” p. 1106, misunderstands the text here. 34 See: Michalski, “Le problème de la volonté,” pp. 365–369; Baudry, The Quarrel over Future Contingents, p. 5; and Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians, pp. 211–216.

determinism, contingency, free choice

233

events be reconciled with the reality of choice and contingency in the sublunar world? This applies especially to the prophets’ knowledge of the future, which has important theological implications. (2) God’s knowledge: how can one reconcile the argument that God is omniscient, and consequently that He knows future contingents, with the existence of contingency and choice in the sublunar world? Even though Gersonides seems to have known al-Farabi’s long commentary on De interpretatione 9, in which the latter writes about God’s knowledge of future contingents,35 in his supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on De interpretatione he chooses to stick close to the latter’s text and addresses only the logical problem raised there. He does not consider (not even implicitly) how divine or human foreknowledge can be reconciled with the existence of contingency in the sublunar world.36 He does deal with these two issues, however, in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, in books II, III, and VI of the Wars of the Lord, and in his biblical commentaries. When he considers the question of determinism, contingency, and choice, and the problem of human and divine foreknowledge, Gersonides makes implicit use of two syllogisms that can be derived from De interpretatione 9: 1. If there is foreknowledge of future events (p), then future events exist necessarily (q). There is foreknowledge of future events (p). Hence future events exist necessarily (q). 2. If there is foreknowledge of future events (p), then future events exist necessarily (q). Future events are not necessary, but contingent (~q). Hence there is no foreknowledge of future contingents (~p).

35 For Gersonides’ knowledge of this work, see Manekin, “Preliminary Observations,” p. 98. For the treatment of God’s knowledge in the Long Commentary on De interpretatione, see Al-Farabi’s Commentary, trans. Zimmerman, pp. 92–96. 36 Averroes alludes to the prophet’s knowledge of future events and argues that there can be foreknowledge of “what is usually possible”; see De interpretatione, Paris— BNF, MS héb. 920, fol. 23r. See also: Averroes’ Middle Commentaries, trans. Butterworth, pp. 100 and 148 (Eng. translation); B. S. Kogan, “Some Reflections on the Problem of Future Contingency in Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes,” in Rudavsky, ed., Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence, p. 98. Gersonides has nothing to say about this passage in his supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on De interpretatione.

234

determinism, contingency, free choice

The principle of correspondence between knowledge and the world outside the mind allows us to formulate a third syllogism: 3. If events exist necessarily (p1) they can be known in advance (q1). Events exist necessarily (p1). Hence events can be known in advance (q1). Because, as we shall see, Gersonides combines Aristotle’s logical determinism with causal determinism, the principles expressed by these syllogisms support the transition from the ontological domain of causal determinism vs. contingency in the sublunar world to the cognitive domain of foreknowledge of future events. But this process also works in the other direction, to move from the cognitive domain (foreknowledge of future events) to the ontological domain (natural causation and contingency in the sublunar world). He uses the principles expressed by these syllogisms to ground his doctrine of choice, solve the problem of determinism and contingency, explain prophetic precognition, and establish his view of divine knowledge. He builds a coherent conceptual structure in which the solution of one problem serves as the basis for the solution of another problem, drawing on the principle of correspondence to progress from one solution to the next. If we want to examine the entire structure and its function for each of the problems we are studying, we need to follow the full sequence of his exposition rather than deal with each problem separately. As we shall see, Gersonides combines the application of the syllogisms taken from De interpretatione 9 to the questions of foreknowledge, determinism, contingency, and choice with another method that was very much in vogue with Christian philosophers of his age, the dialectic method, or, more precisely, the diaporematic method.37 It is this combination that drives him to his unique answers to these questions.

On the diaporematic method, see my “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur.” See also (in this volume): “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” pp. 13–43; “The Solutions of the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” pp. 45–72. 37

determinism, contingency, free choice

235

Determinism, Choice, and Foreknowledge in Gersonides’ Supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia Gersonides first treats of these questions in a passage of his supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva naturalia II.3.38 Here, as in his other supercommentaries on Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle, Gersonides sometimes interrupts his running commentary on the text with notes that begin “Levi said,” in which he develops his own thought on some issue that arises from the text just commented on.39 The third of the six discursive notes in the supercommentary of the Epitome of the Parva naturalia offers a philosophical treatment of the problems of free choice and of foreknowledge of future events. This discursive note has two parts, which are also the two logical stages of the inquiry: the first deals with determinism and choice (and also, indirectly, with contingency in the sublunar world); the second, with the foreknowledge of future events by human beings in general and by prophets in particular, supplemented by an allusion to a solution of the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents. Determinism and Choice The problem that engages Averroes in the section that provides the occasion for the third discursive note40 is how the Active Intellect endows human beings with knowledge of particular things if, qua intellect, its knowledge is exclusively of “universal natures,” meaning generic essences. Averroes begins by explaining how the Active Intellect knows events in the sublunar world. He illustrates the relationship between

38 Moses Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew version of Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva naturalia is cited from Qi ur Sefer ha- ush we-ha-mu ash le-Ibn Roshd, ed. Zevi [ Harry] Blumberg (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1954). The English translation is from Averroes, Epitome of Parva naturalia, trans. Harry Blumberg (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1961). References (“Epitome of the PN”) are given first to the Hebrew version, which is what Gersonides had in front of him, and then to Blumberg’s English. Gersonides’ supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia is cited according to “Gersonides’ Commentary on Averroes’ Epitome of Parva Naturalia II, 3,” ed. Alexander Altmann ( Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 1–31; repr. from Jubilee Volume of the American Academy for Jewish Research 46–47 (1979–1980) [cited as “Commentary on the PN”]. 39 On the discursive notes in his supercommentaries on Averroes, see (in this volume) “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” pp. 204–218. 40 “Epitome of the PN,” 48:8–52:10 / pp. 43–46.

236

determinism, contingency, free choice

the Active Intellect and the sublunar world with the metaphor of the artisan, borrowed from Aristotle’s De generatione animalium.41 The artisan imposes a form he holds in his mind on matter, using tools. These tools manipulate the matter in a certain way so that it will assume the form that the artisan wishes to give it. The Active Intellect, Averroes argues, is like the artisan, inasmuch as it has within it the forms it imposes on matter directly—the essences of things in the sublunar world—as well as intellectual knowledge of the causes of the accidents of material objects, inasmuch as it endows material objects with the accidents by means of its tools, the celestial bodies. The celestial bodies move matter so that it will take on the form found in the Active Intellect. As the agent of the sublunar world, directly and through its tools—the celestial bodies—the Active Intellect knows everything that has “determinate causes,” i.e., final causes. It conveys this knowledge to human beings. The Active Intellect has no knowledge of anything that lacks determinate causes that bring it into being. Particular substances in the sublunar world have determinate causes; this is why they can be known in advance by the Active Intellect. The accidents of such substances can be divided into two groups, as a function of their causes: accidents that have determinate causes and consequently can be known in advance by the Active Intellect, and accidents that do not have determinate causes and cannot be known in advance by the Active Intellect. According to Averroes, the first group includes accidents caused by nature and accidents caused by choice. The second group is that of accidents that occur “by chance.” In his running commentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia Gersonides has nothing to say about foreknowledge of random accidents and does not explain what Averroes wrote about it. But he does add a gloss on what his author wrote about accidents that result from the exercise of volition and free choice. Here he emphasizes that, according to Averroes, all events that are ascribed to choice are in fact “determined by the stars”; that is, Averroes accepted the deterministic doctrine that underlies astrology as a practical science, which holds that the configurations of the stars determine the customs and opinions of human beings in different societies and consequently also the characteristics that the members of those societies acquire through

41 De generatione animalium 1.22 (730b13–31). See Altmann, “Commentary on the PN,” p. 16 n. 45.

determinism, contingency, free choice

237

those customs and opinions, as well as their natural characteristics. He concludes with the general assertion that Averroes “believes that all these customs and opinions and all the matters that we ascribe to choice are determined by the stars.”42 In Gersonides’ reading, Averroes denied free choice as the original cause of an action and saw the choice as a link in the chain of natural causes. This conclusion leads Gersonides to digress into the third discursive note of the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, in which he ponders the problem of choice.43 The first problem he addresses here is free choice. Although the discussion is very brief, it encapsulates—perhaps more clearly than any other passage in his writings—almost all of the elements of the problem of choice and of his solution to it. Gersonides formulates his exposition of determinism and choice as a dialectic investigation of the difficulty, “no small doubt”44 or uncertainty in the history of philosophy, produced by the juxtaposition of Averroes’s and Aristotle’s views of choice. He starts with an aporia that consists of those philosophers’ contradictory views. This is followed by counter-arguments to refute each view, and finally by his solution of the aporia.45 Gersonides extracts Averroes’s opinion from the Epitome of the Parva naturalia: “According to this [Averroes’s] assumption, all matters of choice that are ascribed to volition exist of necessity, and there are no things of which volition and choice are the first cause of their existence.”46 In his running commentary on Averroes,47 Gersonides explains the sense of “accidents that derive from volition” on the basis of his supercommentary on the Middle Commentary on De interpretatione 9 (19a23–26):48 “This is clear in the case of accidents found in agents of choice. But accidents whose first cause is volition can also be

“Commentary on the PN,” p. 17. Ibid., pp. 17–18. 44 Ibid. 45 For the structure of the dialectic investigation in Gersonides see Klein-Braslavy, “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide.” 46 “Commentary on the PN,” pp. 17–18. 47 Averroes, “Epitome of the PN,” p. 49, line 13 / p. 44. 48 Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on De interpretatione, Vatican Urbinati, MS Ebr. 35.3, fol. 43r: “This means that an agent endowed with choice has the potential [to realize] both contradictories and that what is acted on has potential in that it is acted on by the agent of choice and each of the two contradictories; as an example, an agent with choice has the potential to tear the garment 42 43

238

determinism, contingency, free choice

found in what is not an agent of choice, and these accidents are found in them because of the agents of choice, just as a seam is found in a garment on account of a human being.”49 Thus Gersonides understands that Averroes advocated strict causal determinism, denying all contingency in the sublunar world, both in the accidents found in those endowed with choice, meaning human beings, and in the accidents found in objects affected by human beings who are endowed with choice.50 Gersonides contrasts this to Aristotle’s position in De interpretatione 9, which asserts the existence of contingency and free choice in the world and consequently rejects determinism: “And this is the falsehood that Aristotle fled from in De interpretatione.”51 From his use of “falsehood” here we see that Gersonides posits the existence of contingency and free choice as beyond challenge and consequently rejects the idea that the sublunar world is strictly determined. He offers another argument against Averroes. Either Averroes’s concept of free choice embodies an internal contradiction, or he used the term but emptied it of content. Choice presupposes possibility; or, as Gersonides puts it, “choice exists when both parts of the contradictory are possible.”52 If it is necessary that a person choose one of the two contradictories, such as A, then the other contradictory, not-A, is impossible. Here there is no choice, because the essential condition for the existence of choice—possibility—does not exist. Against Aristotle’s position that matters of choice are contingent, Gersonides argues that if we accept the indeterminist line we will find it difficult to account for two givens of our experience: foreknowledge of “matters of choice” in dreams and the evident fact that many “matters of choice” have determinate causes—which explains astrologers’ generally successful prediction of what are ostensibly matters of choice.53

or not to tear it, so it is possible that the garment will be torn by the agent and possible that it will not be torn but will wear out before the act of tearing happens to it.” 49 “Commentary on the PN,” p. 15. 50 Neither Aristotle nor Averroes associates contingency in objects with human choice. The idea that contingency as it applies to objects stems from human choice is Gersonides’ interpretation of Averroes. 51 “Commentary on the PN,” pp. 17–18. 52 Ibid., p. 18. 53 Both here and later in the Wars Gersonides is aware of the limitations of astrology and of its mistaken prognostications. But the large number of true forecasts it provides permits him to argue that these successes are not “accidental” and, consequently, that the physical theory that underlies astrology as a practical science is valid.

determinism, contingency, free choice

239

Gersonides’ first argument rests on the logical argument taken from De interpretatione 9. Gersonides relies on the principle of correspondence, as expounded there by Aristotle, and constructs an implicit syllogism: If there is foreknowledge of future events (p), these events must occur of necessity (q). There is foreknowledge of future events (p), Consequently these events are necessary (q).

He replaces “future events” in the major premise of this syllogism with “matters of choice” and applies the Aristotelian argument to future events that are caused by choice. He bases the minor premise on experience, which includes true dreams that provide foreknowledge of events that take place through choice. Consequently, events that take place through choice are necessary, contrary to Aristotle’s view in De interpretatione. Here Gersonides has employed Aristotle’s argument in De interpretatione 9 in order to attack Aristotle’s conclusion in that same treatise. We have a similar experience, Gersonides continues, with the prognostications of astrologers. The ability of astrology, despite its limitations, to forecast events that result from choice means that these events are necessary. What is more, astrology is based on the postulate that all events in the sublunar world are caused by the stars. So our experience of astrological forecasts that come true demonstrates that matters of choice are necessary, in the sense of having determinate causes. Thus causal necessity, based on astral determinism, applies to matters of choice. Gersonides resolves this aporia by means of a synthetic or compromise solution, of the sort typical of the inquiries in the Wars conducted by the dialectic method: both of the opposing views about free choice are true, but each in a different respect. Consequently we can accept both of them without violating the law of contradiction: “We can say that he had already envisioned that to resolve this difficulty it would be said that in one respect matters of choice have determinate causes and that in another respect they depend on volition and choice [as a new start].”54 Gersonides builds his solution from the two views that constitute the aporia. On the one hand, he argues, Averroes is correct: there is choice “that is consequent upon temperament,” that 54 Ibid. This compromise solution reconciles the causal determinism implied by the success of astrology with the existence of free choice.

240

determinism, contingency, free choice

is, choice that opts for the one of the two given possibilities to which an individual’s temperament inclines him (today we would say he is “following his disposition”). Such a choice has “determinate causes”— namely the spheres and the stars, which influence an individual’s temperament. But Aristotle, too, is correct, inasmuch as an individual’s intellect can steer him toward an action other than that determined for him by the system of natural causes; that is, to the possibility to which his temperament does not incline him. As such the intellect is “another originating principle” or primary cause, a source of action in its own right that makes a person aware of the object for which he longs. When an individual implements such an intellectual choice, the matters of choice that result from this choice do not have determinate causes.55 The decision to follow one’s disposition is a decision made by choice. An individual could just as well not have followed it. When an individual chooses to be led by his temperament he is choosing to subordinate himself to the rule of astral determinism, because his temperament is determined by the influence of the stars.56 Consequently, when human beings choose to be drawn after their temperament, their actions have determinate causes post factum.57 But when choice decides against going where the temperament would lead, the human intellect functions as a primary or original cause. Hence Aristotle was right: there is choice that is the prime cause of action. But Averroes

55 See Manekin’s emendation of the text of third discursive note as published by Altmann: Charles Manekin, “Freedom within Reason? Gersonides on Human Choice,” in Charles H. Manekin and Menachem M. Kellner, eds. Freedom and Moral Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives ( Bethesda: University Press of Maryland, 1997), p. 179 n. 34. 56 By “decision made by choice” I do not mean to imply that human beings freely choose the possibility of choosing what their temperament inclines them to—a possible interpretation of my Hebrew text to which Manekin objected: “If she means that a person freely chooses to follow his temperament in the voluntarist sense I have outlined above, then that interpretation is unsupported by the passage. Nowhere does Gersonides say that one freely chooses to be drawn after one’s temperament. Rather he says that one’s choice itself is ‘drawn’ after temperament” (ibid., p. 180 n. 36). What I meant was that choice exists here as a situation in which human beings are confronted by two possibilities (here, doing or not doing what their temperament inclines them to) and can choose between them. 57 It should be emphasized that, for Gersonides, choice influenced by one’s temperament is not the same as being drawn after one’s appetites and doing “evil.” A choice influenced by one’s temperament is a decision for what was predetermined by astral causality; what that ordains may be good or evil. A choice influenced by the intellect is a decision for what was not predetermined by astral causality and is based on the judgment that an action counter to that favored by one’s temperament is “good.”

determinism, contingency, free choice

241

was also right: there is choice in which human decision and the necessary causality of nature are intertwined. Because this sort of choice is also between two alternatives, subjecting oneself to natural causality or not, Gersonides’ solution cannot be undermined by his own argument against Averroes, namely, that he has used the term “choice” but emptied it of meaning. Gersonides’ solution to the problem of free choice is a new departure in medieval Jewish philosophy. His predecessors’ answers were similar either to Averroes’s, which subordinates choice to the system of natural causality, or to Aristotle’s, according to which choice is a primary cause of action and totally independent of natural causality. Gersonides is the first to postulate two distinct types of choice: one that is subject to the causal system and another that can serve as a primary cause of action. He is the only medieval Jewish philosopher who arrives at a solution to the problem of free choice by means of a purely philosophical exposition that totally omits theological axioms about free choice. Nevertheless, we must emphasize that even though Gersonides presents his solution to the problem of free choice as a synthetic solution of the two historical views, in which each has equal weight, in practice he accepted Aristotle’s ontological indeterminacy. Free choice presupposes contingency; without it, as he demonstrates in his counter-argument to Averroes, there cannot be any choice. There are two alternatives, one of which is subjection to natural causality. Only when a human being opts for this alternative does choice seem to be rooted in this necessary causality, producing a situation of “actual determinism” or “practical determinism.” But this determinism is spurious; what exists in nature is what might be called “conditional determinism” and not absolute determinism. This determinism is realized only if there is collaboration between human choice and natural causality, a collaboration that depends on an individual’s choice to act in accordance with or counter to his disposition. Gersonides leaves many questions open here, such as the circumstances and frequency with which this condition is satisfied. An answer to this would make it possible to determine the extent to which the world, according to Gersonides, really is quasi-deterministic. Nor does he say why human beings sometimes follow their intellect and sometimes their temperament, and in what conditions. His sole interest here is to define the nature of choice; the limits of causal determinism follow from this.

242

determinism, contingency, free choice

Free Choice and Foreknowledge Free Choice and Human Precognition In the second part of the third discursive note in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, Gersonides addresses a question that had hardly been touched on by previous Jewish philosophers: human foreknowledge of future events.58 Here his conclusions about determinism and free choice serve as the basis for defining the possible scope of human prescience. His solution to the problem of free choice is that human beings may exercise two different kinds of choice: “temperamental choice” and “intellectual choice.” In the former, human beings are subject to the system of natural causes; in the latter, they are liberated from its influence and impelled to a different action than it would have determined. According to the principle of correspondence, only events caused by temperamental choice can be known in advance, because only they have post factum determinate causes. Events caused by intellectual choice cannot be known in advance because they do not have determinate causes; rather, the intellectual decision is their primary or original cause. Consequently, Gersonides argues, foreknowledge is possible only when human beings follow their natural disposition and do what their temperament inclines them to do. In other words, just as natural determinism is conditional determinism, human precognition is conditional knowledge of future events, true only if human beings choose to submit to the system of natural causes, but false if they do not.59 Here Gersonides’ conclusion differs from that reached by Averroes in the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, although he employs the same methodical principle as Averroes did with regard to the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect: not all events caused by choice can be known in advance. Gersonides relies on logic only to reach his conclusion about the scope of the prior knowledge of future events that human beings can

Maimonides offers brief remarks on the subject in Guide II.37–38. In the Wars Gersonides goes on to explain that knowledge by dreams and clairvoyance is not complete knowledge of the order entailed by the stars; this is another reason why human predictions of future events may not come true. As we have seen, astrology, too, may make erroneous forecasts, because human knowledge of the celestial system is imperfect. Here, though, Gersonides is interested in the conclusions entailed by application of the correspondence principle to foreknowledge and not in a full explanation of the phenomenon; consequently the picture he paints here is incomplete. 58 59

determinism, contingency, free choice

243

have. He then corroborates it by the experience of prophecy and dreams: “this is made clear by prophecy and dream.”60 Contrary to what we might infer from his argument against Aristotle, here Gersonides holds that experience does not show that predictions about the future are always correct. So we must understand that when he cited human foreknowledge to refute Aristotle he had in mind the many cases in which the future is predicted accurately. The argument from frequent cases suffices to demonstrate that reliable predictions of the future are not random or accidental. Such an explanation is particularly important for understanding the phenomenon of prophecy, which is why Gersonides amplifies on that topic. He does not introduce the experience of prophecy as evidence that human beings can have advance knowledge of the future, but, on the contrary, as evidence that predictions of the future are not always borne out. Some future events announced by prophets never took place. Gersonides draws on experience to corroborate the conclusion he reached through logic alone, but also employs that conclusion to explain the experience. The future events foretold by prophets but which never came to pass involved cases in which people were motivate by their intellect to choose something other than what the prophet had predicted, that is, not the alternative determined by the system of natural causes and to which their temperament inclined them.61 Not only does the experience of prophetic foreknowledge support the conclusions of the preceding logical discussion; it also allows Gersonides to derive further insights into the role of free choice in the system of natural causes and into the nature of the intellect as impelling human beings to act contrary to what was ordained by the determinate causes. The annals of prophecy show that prophecies that are not realized generally refer to future disasters. From this Gersonides concludes that the existence of free choice anchored in the intellect, which can serve as the original cause of an action, has its own final cause: human beings were endowed with choice to guide them, to save them from the evils that nature might wreak on them, and to steer them toward the good. As such, free choice is embedded in the natural

“Commentary on the PN,” p. 18. There is a circularity here, which seems to be the product of two competing interests: grounding the conclusions of the previous discussion as well as explaining why the event predicted by a prophet, whose knowledge is perfect, does not always take place. I believe, however, that the first interest is predominant here. 60 61

244

determinism, contingency, free choice

providence that is designed to benefit human beings and is not antithetical to it. Gersonides also concludes that the intellect inclines free choice toward the good. Human beings do not “choose” evil. Consequently, when something bad lurks for them their intellect inclines them toward an action other than that ordained by the system of natural causes. Gersonides’ line of thought evidently runs as follows: if their intellect impels human beings to an action other than that ordained by the system of natural causes, and if this impulse is found especially when the outcome of those causes would be bad for them, it is plausible that the intellect impels human beings only toward the good and that it is an instrument of special providence with which human beings have been gifted. Although Gersonides derives the Platonic notion that the intellect aspires to the good from the experience of prophecy alone, he notes that “this is also necessary when considered by reason.”62 Here Gersonides does not develop this discussion of the prophet’s knowledge of future events beyond this point. But from the first discursive note in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, where he writes that “prophecy, when it makes future events known, makes them known in order to lead to felicity (ha la ah); that is, [the prophets] say that this evil impends if they do not examine their actions and return to God,”63 we may infer that when he wrote the supercommentary he had already worked out a clear and complete doctrine of prophetic foreknowledge. Prophets know what is to be expected according to the stars, but they also know that human beings have free choice and can redirect themselves onto a path other than that preordained by astral causality. They know that the future events they announce will not necessarily take place. What is more, their proclamation of future events is not meant to inform human beings what will happen, but to guide them to the appropriate conduct that will lead them to felicity, that is, to material good in this world. Thus prophets are another channel of providence over human beings, alongside the astral system and free choice. The right way is worship of the Lord and observance of the commandments. This is one of the points of contact between philosophy and theology in Gersonides’ system: the philosophical discussion adumbrates the place that will be

62 63

Ibid. Ibid., p. 11.

determinism, contingency, free choice

245

assigned to the theological solution within his philosophical worldview. Gersonides does not develop this aspect here, where the context is philosophical, but there is no doubt that he had already defined all its elements. Free Choice and God’s Knowledge At the end of his treatment of the knowledge of future events Gersonides adds an interesting observation: “It is possible to speak in the same manner of God’s knowledge of the matters even though they are contingent. But this would require a longer exposition than this; such an exposition would be more appropriate in theological treatises, which is where we will complete this question, with God’s help.”64 This brief aside makes several points clear: 1. The third part of the Wars of the Lord had not yet been written in February 1324. To judge by what Gersonides writes here, he probably had not yet decided to address this issue there, but perhaps in some other theological tract. It may be that it was only later that he modified the original plan of the Wars to include a treatment of God’s knowledge, perhaps when he decided to add to its original four books.65 2. Gersonides had already solved the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents when he wrote his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia. Like Ibn Daud before him, Gersonides resolves the problem of divine foreknowledge on the basis of his prior solution to the problem of determinism and contingency (or, as he puts it here, of determinism and choice), rather than starting from the theological postulate of divine omniscience and trying to reconcile it with the existence of contingency and choice in the sublunar world. 3. When he wrote his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, Gersonides already appreciated how the logical discussion in

Ibid., p. 18. We may even conjecture that this is what led Gersonides, in part, to modify the original plan of the Wars of the Lord, which in its first edition referred only to the issue of the creation of the world. For the evolution of the work see: Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique, p. 48; idem, Les Guerres du Seigneur, livres III et IV, trans. [into French] Charles Touati ( Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1968), p. 10. According to Touati, Wars III was written between February 1324 and December 1325. For a comment about God’s knowledge in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, see Touati, La pensée philosophique et théologique, p. 49. 64 65

246

determinism, contingency, free choice

De interpretatione 9 could be applied to determining the scope of foreknowledge and thus to explain two theological-philosophical questions: the prophets’ announcements of future events and God’s knowledge of future contingents. Linking the two, he realized that he could resolve the question of divine knowledge along the same lines as he explained the prophets’ announcements of future events. He would later expand the treatment of both issues in the Wars of the Lord. Foreknowledge, Determinism, Contingency, and Free Choice in the Wars of the Lord In the third discursive note in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia Gersonides addressed two topics: determinism and free choice and the scope of the prior knowledge of future contingents by human beings, especially prophets. He also suggested that the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents could be resolved in the same manner as the prophet’s knowledge of future events. The order in which Gersonides took up the various topics in this discursive note was not random, but mandated by the nature of the inquiry. His investigation of determinism and free choice provided the foundation for his treatment of foreknowledge. From his solution to the problem of determinism and free choice he made an inference about the possible scope of knowledge of future events. Precisely the same sequence, and for the same reasons, is found in the Wars. In II.1–2 Gersonides deals with determinism, contingency, and free choice. In II.6 he explains the prophets’ announcement of future events. In Book III he addresses divine knowledge. Here too he bases his explanation of the prophets’ announcements of future events and his solution to God’s knowledge of future contingents on his solution of the problem of determinism, contingency, and free choice. Thus the sequence of Wars II and III follows the logical order of his treatment of determinism, contingency, and prior knowledge of future contingents and is entailed by it.66

66 As I will show below, there are other sequences in Wars I–II and III, and between III and IV, that are anchored in the order of the inquiry. See below, nn. 68 and 118.

determinism, contingency, free choice

247

Knowledge of Future Events, Determinism, Contingency, and Free Choice in Wars of the Lord II Book II of the Wars of the Lord focuses on advance knowledge of future event by means of clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy. Here Gersonides returns to his independent philosophical treatment of the issues raised by Averroes in the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, criticizing the latter, supplementing his discussion, and developing ideas that he himself had already raised in his supercommentary on that work.67 As noted, the first two chapters of Wars I, which consider determinism, contingency, and free choice, parallel the first part of the third discursive note in the supercommentary. The core of both chapters is not an explanation of the phenomenon of foreknowledge of future events, but rather a solution of the problem of determinism, contingency, and free choice. Human foreknowledge of future events through clairvoyance, dreams, or prophecy, which is a datum of human experience, is applied to solve the problem that concerns him here. Indirectly, the content of these chapters also serves to elucidate the phenomenon of precognition. As we have seen, Averroes’s main aim in the Epitome of the Parva naturalia was to explain foreknowledge through dreams as an example of foreknowledge that is acquired by means of disclosure (as opposed to the types of foreknowledge that draw on the interpretation of sense data, such as astrology). He starts from physics—specifically, from the doctrine of causes—and draws conclusions about the scope of the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect and thus, indirectly, about the prior knowledge that human beings can have of future events. In the third discursive note in the supercommentary on the Epitome

67 See above, n. 15. Gersonides also expands on revelation based on clairvoyance and prophecy. For him, clairvoyance is an empirical fact characteristic of the period and environment in which he lives (“This phenomenon is well known in our own day, for some people predict the future concerning many things and frequently, and they are called ‘clairvoyants’ ” (Wars II.1, p. 92 / 2:27). Prophecy, too, is a fact of experience—past experience, in this case—attested to by Holy Scripture, and a phenomenon known among all nations (ibid.). It engages Gersonides for two reasons. First, the Bible provides extensive information about prophecy, information on which he can rely to develop his ideas about foreknowledge, determinism, and contingency. Second, prophecy, as a major theological tenet of Jewish thought, requires explanation and justification. In Wars II, Gersonides emphasizes the philosophical aspects of prophecy—prophecy as a natural form of foretelling the future. See also Daniel Lasker, “Gersonides on Dreams, Divination and Astrology,” WCJS 8(3) (1982): 47–52.

248

determinism, contingency, free choice

of the Parva naturalia Gersonides did not challenge Averroes’s method of inquiry, but only one of his conclusions. He challenged the argument that absolute determinism applies to events caused by choice, inasmuch as human choice is not a primary or original cause of the event but only a link in the chain of natural causes. When Gersonides juxtaposed the two contrasting historical views, those of Averroes and Aristotle, he offered his own synthetic or compromise solution to the problem of free choice. The discussion in Wars II has a different character, because Gersonides has discovered the latent power of the logical approach of De interpretatione 9. He now realizes that the principle of correspondence can serve not only for the transition from the ontological to the epistemological realm, and thus indicate the nature and scope of knowledge of future events, but also as a principle for a move in the reverse direction, from the epistemological realm of the knowledge of future events to the ontological realm of causality in the sublunar world. This method has two advantages: first, it allows Gersonides to establish his conclusions by mean of philosophical principale and not by dialectic. He begins from undoubted experience and advances toward his conclusions by means of logical inference. He does not base his solution on views advanced in the history of philosophy. Second, this new method permits him to postulate, already in the first stage of his inquiry, a determinism that is more comprehensive than that posited by Averroes, and thus to a further refinement of the aporia of determinism and contingency (and choice). In the course of this exposition, a problem arises that Gersonides had not addressed in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia: the ontological status of events caused by “chance and accident.” In Wars II Gersonides starts from the three types of experience of foreknowledge of future events—clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy—in order to resolve the question of whether there is absolute determinism in the sublunar world. Aware of the new departure represented by his conclusions, and also perhaps of their strangeness, he moves the discussion forward in stages. His method is intended both to persuade readers that the conclusions he has reached, which may be strange to readers, are correct and to induce them to accept these conclusions.68

68 The order of composition is very important to Gersonides. In the ha a ah found in the introduction to the Wars he offers eight (seven plus one) reasons why one point of an argument should precede another. The seventh reason is that

determinism, contingency, free choice

249

In Wars II.1 Gersonides draws on the experience of foreknowledge through clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy in order to argue that in all three cases the knowledge of future events is “necessary” and not “chance.” Here he relies on Aristotle’s definition of chance, which holds that chance is rare and applies to only a few phenomena.69 Because experience demonstrates that foreknowledge through clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy applies to many events and is in fact frequent, it cannot be “chance,” according to the Aristotelian definition. Hence it must be a phenomenon that can be explained by the system of final causes in nature. From this Gersonides derives two conclusions, one about the events of which there can be foreknowledge and the other about the agent of this knowledge. It is the first conclusion that interests us here. Gersonides evidently builds it on Averroes’s argument in the Epitome of the Parva naturalia about knowledge of chance events. He writes: The future events about which this communication is concerned are determined and ordered, i.e., it is [already] determined that they will turn out the way that they have [in fact] occurred. For if their occurrence were not determined and ordered, it would not be possible to have

“when the author realizes that some of his explanations are strange to students because of certain opinions they are accustomed to and grew up on, so that they reject what he says, even though, using philosophical speculation, they cannot find any contradiction in them, and this would keep them from understanding what is in that book; then the author should arrange what he says in a way that is appropriate to what he wants to convey to them. He can do this by first presenting the things that have less strangeness for them, and in this way gradually expel them from their share of his heritage [after 1 Sam. 26:19], so that what those opinions imprinted on them will not deprive them of the truth on that question. . . . Therefore, when an author realizes that students have opinions that are contrary to what he is about to demonstrate, he must uproot these opinions from them step by step. . . . Hence the author should try to starve those roots [shorashim; i.e., opinions] before he tries to uproot them. Even [when he is removing] their nourishment the author should adopt a certain order, i.e., the nourishment that students will miss the least should be removed first. . . . Then it will be easy for the author to eradicate that root; indeed, the root may be eradicated by itself ( p. 9 / 1:102–103). The method followed in II.1–2 clearly applies the guideline presented here. 69 See Physics II.5. Here Gersonides refers explicitly to “Book II of the Physics” ( p. 92/1:27). He may be relying on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Physics II.3.2 (see Steven Harvey, “Averroes on the Principles of Nature: The Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics I–II” [doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1977], Heb. p. 229, Eng. p. 309) or on Averroes’s Epitome of the Physics ( Paris—BNF, MS héb. 965/5 [ IMHM 32606], fol. 353v).

250

determinism, contingency, free choice knowledge of them prior to their occurrence, except by mere chance. This is quite obvious.70

In the Epitome of the Parva naturalia Averroes deals with the connection between the essence of knowledge and the things to which the knowledge refers: As for that which belongs to those things, which exist by accident, it has no intelligible nature because it has no determinate causes. It is therefore impossible for man to have knowledge of them [i.e., of what may arise by accident] except in an accidental manner. But as for the second class of accidents that have determinate causes, they necessarily have a universal nature, which is the Primary Cause of their existence; and it necessarily follows that that of which knowledge is essentially encompassed must have causes existing essentially, and when there are causes existing essentially, they must necessarily be comprehended by the universal nature [which, as said before, is the Prime Cause of their existence], and this whether we ourselves can comprehend them or not.71

From this argument Averroes derives the conclusion that there can be no foreknowledge of what exists by accident. Gersonides proceeds in the opposite direction. He begins with the incontrovertible experience of foreknowledge and moves toward the possibility of knowledge of future events, arguing that inasmuch as the experience of clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy demonstrates that future events can be known in advance, such events cannot take place by chance and must have determinate causes. Here Gersonides is more or less retracing the chain of thought that underlay his criticism of Aristotelian indeterminism in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia. There he rejected Aristotle’s indeterminism with the argument that knowledge of future events demonstrates that the incidents to which it applies are “determinate and ordered.” Here in the Wars, though, he uses the Aristotelian theory of chance to reach a conclusion about the events to which foreknowledge applies and not about the experience of astrological forecasts of future events. Whereas in the supercommentary he dealt with one type of future event, events that are a matter of choice, in the first stage of the discussion in Wars II Gersonides states only the formal principle that events we know in advance by means of clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy are “determinate and ordered.” For

70 71

Wars, p. 93 / 2:28–29. “Epitome of the PN,” p. 50 / p. 45.

determinism, contingency, free choice

251

the moment he has nothing to say about the content of foreknowledge. Readers who follow the course of the discussion are persuaded of the validity of the inference and accept the formal principle derived from the experience of the revelation of future events. It is only in the second chapter of Wars II that Gersonides turns to a discussion of the content of the foreknowledge achieved by means of clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy. Here too his starting point is our experience of these three types of precognition. This time, however, he draws on experience as evidence not of the fact of foreknowledge but of its content. He amasses empirical data about specific cases of human knowledge of future events, classifies them, and derives by induction the general characteristics of the events and objects to which this foreknowledge applies.72 He reaches the conclusion that such foreknowledge rarely involves necessary futurity (such as a solar eclipse) but almost always future contingents.73 The future contingents to which the revelation applies are always associated with individual human beings; they are events that take place to particular human beings or to nonhuman objects in association with particular human beings. At this point of the discussion Gersonides goes back to classifying objects according to their causes—the same classification presented by Averroes in the Epitome of the Parva naturalia.74 But Gersonides presents it as a classification derived from the experience of prior knowledge of future events. As such it applies only to particular human beings, the events that happen to them or because of them, or to what is associated with them, because foreknowledge by clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy applies only to them. Experience shows that the “contingent matters” of which there is foreknowledge are of two types: the generation of substances and the generation of events. Gersonides, like Averroes before him, divides events into two main types, as a function of their causes: events that have determinate causes and those that do not. The former group includes events that are caused by nature (Gersonides’ example is that 72 Gersonides employs the exact same methodology when he deals with miracles in Wars VI.2.9. 73 On the basis of experience, Gersonides arrives at the same distinction that he made in his commentary on De interpretatione 9 (following al-Farabi); namely, between propositions about necessary future events and those about contingent future events. He bases knowledge of future events on knowledge of contingent future events, so that the problem of prophetic foreknowledge parallels the problem of propositions about contingent futures. 74 “Epitome of the PN,” p. 50:7, 10–11 / p. 44.

252

determinism, contingency, free choice

rain will fall on a certain day) or by choice (Gersonides’ example is which side will win a battle). The second group involves events that take place “by chance and accident (be-qeri u-vehizdammen),”75 which, according to Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Physics, means by “a random cause.”76 Gersonides’ example is Samuel’s statement to Saul that he will encounter three men on the road, who will offer him two loaves of bread, and the statement, made by the prophet from Samaria to the prophet from Judah, that on his way home from Bethel he will encounter a lion who will maul him.77 Experience reveals another important characteristic of prior knowledge of the future: it usually relates to events whose cause is chance and accident; that is, to those without determinate causes.78 At this stage in his exposition Gersonides brings together the formal discussion of the conclusions about foreknowledge, presented in Wars II.1, with the discussion of the content of such knowledge, found in Wars II.2, and projects the conclusions of the former onto the latter. If everything that is foreknown through clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy has determinate causes, then all of the substances and events in each of the categories enumerated here must be “determined and ordered.” If so, examination of the content of foreknowledge through clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy leads to the conclusion that absolute determinism applies to everything related to particular human beings and whatever is associated with them: the birth of each and every individual human being is preordained, and so too are all of their traits, thoughts, experiences, and effects on others. Because the conclusions of the discussion in II.1 are valid, inasmuch as experience is an indubitable source of knowledge, we must also admit this conclusion, which would seem to be quite unreasonable were it not for

On this expression see Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 139 n. 48. See Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964 ( IMHM 31361), fol. 33r. 77 For the idea that the prophet who lived in Bethel came originally from Samaria, see Gersonides’ commentary on 1 Kings 13:31. The reading that the prophet from Samaria informed the prophet from Judah that he would be mauled by a lion on the road may be Gersonides’ interpretation of 1 Kings 13:20–22. In the biblical account, the former tells the latter only that his corpse will not be buried in his ancestral tomb (v. 22). 78 Because knowledge of future events applies only to what befalls individual human beings and what is associated with them, we should understand that the chance and accident of which Gersonides speaks refer to events that include choice as one of their causes. 75 76

determinism, contingency, free choice

253

Gersonides’ investigative method. Thus the philosophical discussion leads him here to the same problem as in the third discursive note on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia: how to reconcile determinism with the existence of contingency in the sublunar world. But Gersonides’ independent investigation in Wars II.1–2 has led him to a much more severe determinism than that championed by Averroes in the Epitome of the Parva naturalia. Gersonides has come to the conclusion that not only events caused by nature and choice are determined and ordered; so are events caused by chance and accident. Gersonides conducts the debate between determinism and contingency by means of three “doubts.” In each of them he finds there is indeed contingency in events that befall individual human beings, contradicting the conclusion he has just reached. The first difficulty has to do with the “the nature of contingency” as it applies to events that befall individual human beings. Here Gersonides argues by means of a reductio ad absurdum that is implicitly p¤q . If we know in advance which of the based on the syllogism p ∴q alternatives will be realized (p), then it is “determined and ordered that [that alternative] be realized”; that is, it is “necessary” and not “possible” (q). Precognition demonstrates that, with regard to events that occur to individual human beings, there is indeed foreknowledge of which possibility will be realized (p). Hence “it follows that contingency [lit. the nature of contingency] would be abolished for events pertaining to individual human beings”79 (q). But, Gersonides argues, denying the “the nature of contingency” means that choice would be “in vain” (le-va alah); and this cannot be. Hence contingency (“the nature of contingency”) must exist. There are several implicit assumptions here: (1) Gersonides, like Aristotle, believes that the existence of choice is undeniable. (2) Gersonides sees choice as inherent in the natural order; human beings are born with an intellect and consequently with choice. (3) Choice assumes the reality of contingency. Only if contingency exists is there room for choice that can decide between two alternatives. (4) Gersonides adopts the Aristotelian principle that nature does nothing in vain. His reasoning goes as follows: If nature has endowed human beings with choice, but contingency

79

Wars, p. 94/2:31.

254

determinism, contingency, free choice

does not exist in nature, then this endowment is in vain. But this conclusion is absurd, according to presupposition (4). Hence contingency must exist. This conclusion contradicts the conclusion of the previous argument, namely, that absolute determinism rules nature. This produces an aporia that must be resolved. In his second difficulty Gersonides deals with existence of contingency in general in the sublunar world. Here he advances another reductio ad absurdum: the experience of precognition and the application of the principle of correspondence to the content of this experience lead to the conclusion that nothing in the sublunar world is contingent. This conclusion is based on the discussion of the τοῦ δυναtoῦ φῦσις / mumkin / efshari in Averroes’s Middle Commentary on De interpretatione 13 (22b16–23a17).80 According to this text, these expressions in Greek, Arabic, and Hebrew can designate what is not impossible but is also not necessary (the “contingent”); but they can also indicate that which is merely not impossible (the “possible”).81 These two senses, which are to be distinguished by induction, apply both to agents and to effects. First Averroes expands on possibility in the power of the agent and argues: “. . . the things that are said to be agents are of two types: either powers linked with reason (dibber), which are expressed as choice; or powers not linked with reason, like the heat of fire and the cold of snow.”82 In a power linked with reason there is possibility of the first type, which can effect contraries, whereas “in a power that is not linked with reason” there is possibility of the second type, “the power [to do] of one of two contraries only,” and nothing in its nature prevents it from performing a certain action. Following Aristotle, Averroes exemplifies possibility/contingency in this sense by the actions of the inanimate: fire has the possibility to heat and snow the possibility to cool. When he writes about fire he states, in more detail, “it only has the power of heating, not that of not heating—except accidentally. The latter occurs either when it finds no subject to receive the heat or whenever an impediment prevents it from doing what it naturally does to that subject” (ibid.). With regard to power that is not linked with reason, the first type of possibility does not exist; it cannot effect or not

80 Hebrew: Shalom Rosenberg, “Necessary and Possible in Medieval Philosophy,” Iyyun 29 (1978), appendices, pp. 132–143; English: Averroes’ Middle Commentaries, trans. Butterworth, pp. 174–179. 81 For Averroes’s understanding of this homonymy, see Shalom Rosenberg, “The Possible and the Real in Medieval Logic” (Hebrew), Iyyun 28 (1978): pp. 58–61. 82 Rosenberg, “Necessary and Possible,” p. 135; Butterworth, p. 178.

determinism, contingency, free choice

255

effect an action by virtue of its nature. When its action is prevented this is an accident, whether because the recipient cannot receive it or because there is some external impediment to its natural action. In the supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on De interpretatione Gersonides explains what Averroes meant by “a power linked with reason”: “by the power linked with reason he means the human intellect, because actions that stem from choice are attributed to it.”83 He ascribes the second type of contingency/possibility to animals: “But the actions of the other animals are ascribed to nature, not to choice, as is explained by natural science ( iv iyyot).”84 The second difficulty raised by Gersonides in Wars II.2 draws on this passage in Averroes’s Middle Commentary. Here Gersonides writes about possibility as related to the agent and uses the word efshar in the sense of what is neither necessary nor impossible (“contingent”). He expands and explains the note in the supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on De interpretatione and adds inanimate objects (as did Aristotle and Averroes) and plants to the category to which the first type of efsharut (i.e., contingency) does not apply: If there is any contingency it occurs in the domain of the accidental events pertaining to individual human beings, since in other things there is no contingency except on account of human beings. For by their nature the movements of animals are determined, as are the movements of plants and inanimate objects—in and of themselves [they can realize] only one of the possible alternatives. For example, an animal moves toward food when it sees it; it has no originating principle of its own [i.e., its own choice] such that it might not move toward it.85 Human beings, however, can make this motion [by the animal] contingent, for they can prevent the animal from moving toward it or move the food from this place and [thus] prevent the [animal’s] movement from taking place.86

To Averroes’s idea that fire may “accidentally” fail to heat, Gersonides adds the argument that this sort of contingency can exist for all objects that have “powers not linked with reason,” “on account of human beings”—i.e., as the result of human action. Human beings are the external cause that can prevent the realization of the “possible” action (in the second meaning of “possible,” i.e., contingent).

83 84 85 86

Rosenberg, “Necessary and Possible,” p. 141. Ibid. I have corrected the text according to Feldman (2:250). Wars, p. 94 /2:32.

256

determinism, contingency, free choice

Because, according to Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes, contingency pertains to the nonhuman only on account of human action, here he can reach the conclusion that “if there is no contingency in the affairs of human individuals, there is no contingency at all here [in the sublunar world], but everything is necessary.”87 But this conclusion is absurd. Although Gersonides does not explain why it is absurd, we are evidently meant to understand that this absurdity is anchored in the previous absurdity, related to the purposeless existence of choice. There, as we saw, Gersonides demonstrated that if contingency exists in nature, it is contingency on account of human choice.88 The third difficulty raised by Gersonides here has to do with a third type of possibility—“chance and accident.” Here he comes into direct and open confrontation with Averroes in the Epitome of the Parva naturalia. As we have seen, Averroes began from the ontological level and reached conclusions on the epistemological level. He inferred from the doctrine of causes to the knowledge of particulars that the Active Intellect can have and thus, in practice, to the foreknowledge that human beings can have. Gersonides moved in the opposite direction: he began from perception and the experience of precognition and let this lead him to conclusions on the ontological level. From the experience of precognition he reached the conclusion that everything that happens to individual human beings is “determined and ordered.” In other words, there is strict determinism in the sublunar world. This conclusion leads Gersonides to another aporia of determinism and contingency in the sublunar world. Gersonides knows from experience that most of the advance information provided by clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy pertains to things that happen to human beings and whose cause is “chance and accident.” The p¤q , as applied to foreknowledge of events caused by syllogism p ∴q chance and accident, leads to an absurd conclusion: if what can be known in advance is determined and ordered, and chance events are

Ibid. Gersonides’ discussion here is philosophical. He does not advance the theological argument for the existence of free choice. As we have seen, Maimonides, too, held that the existence of choice can be proven “by means of reason”; but he evidently relied on Aristotle’s Ethics (or another Aristotelian source) and not on De interpretatione, as Gersonides did. See above, n. 3. 87 88

determinism, contingency, free choice

257

known in advance, then “chance” events, too, are determined and ordered!89 This conclusion contains an internal contradiction, inasmuch as chance events are precisely those that do not have determinate causes. On the other hand, we cannot explain the empirical datum that human beings have foreknowledge of chance events if we hold that they have no determinate causes. Only after Gersonides resolves this third aporia does he go back to deal with the first two problems. According to Gersonides, Averroes himself had seen this problem, but solved it using the methodological assumption that intellectual reasoning takes precedence over experience. Because chance and accidental events have no determinate causes, Averroes concluded that they cannot be known in advance. Here Gersonides implicitly p¤q ascribes to Averroes the syllogism – q , and applies this syllogism to –p interpret Averroes: “As for that which belongs to those things which exist by accident, it has no nature which can be comprehended by the intellect because it has no determinate causes. It is therefore impossible for man to have knowledge of that which may arise from these accidental things, except in an accidental manner.”90 As we have already seen, Gersonides ignores this idea in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia and has nothing to say about it. Here, though, he expands on the supercommentary and attacks Averroes’s methodological principle: “It is not proper to deny sense-experience just because of these objections.”91 He replaces Averroes’s methodological principle with his own, namely, that experience takes precedence over intellectual reasoning. Because Gersonides is not willing to reject experience in favor of reason, the experience of foreknowledge of future events caused by chance and accident requires him to find a philosophical theory that can explain this experience; astral determinism serves the purpose for him.

89 This argument is a variation on the argument Gersonides raised against Aristotle, with regard to free choice, in the third discursive note of his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia. 90 “Epitome of the PN,” p. 50, lines 12–13 / p. 45. 91 Wars, p. 95 / 2:33.

258

determinism, contingency, free choice

Gersonides’ adoption of astral determinism is a two-stage process: first he demonstrates that astral determinism can fit into the Aristotelian world picture; then, from our experience of successful astrological forecasts of future events, that this determinism does indeed exist. Gersonides bases the argument that astral determinism is compatible with Aristotelianism on a principle he found in De animalibus, which he knew through Averroes’s commentary: “Investigation seems to show that to the extent that these sublunar phenomena are nobler, nature is more concerned with their preservation.”92 The extent of nature’s “concern” for existents in the sublunar world corresponds to the natural hierarchy. The higher an object’s rank therein, the more providential concern nature displays for it. It follows logically that human beings, the most perfect creatures of the sublunar world, enjoy much more natural providence than do other existents. But the principle alone does not allow Gersonides to identify the manner of this providence. Gersonides draws on astrology to explain the mode by which this providence operates. Astrology as a technique for forecasting the future rests on the theoretical assumption that all human actions and thoughts are determined by the stars; i.e., they are “determinate and ordered.” Using the same procedure by which he had previously shown that events foretold by clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy are determined, Gersonides now demonstrates the truth of astral determinism from experience—our experience that astrology makes accurate predictions. Astrologers’ forecasts are often borne out. According to Aristotle’s definition of chance, their forecasts are not “chance” and such forecasts of future events must have essential causes. Hence, Gersonides concludes, the theory on which the astrologers’ calculations are based is true; all incidents that happen to individual human beings are determined and ordered by the stars, including those events we habitually include in the category of incidents caused by chance and accident. This conclusion reinforces the determinism inferred from the investigation of the experience of foreknowledge and the application of the

92 Ibid. Gersonides knew Averroes’s commentary on De animalibus and wrote a supercommentary on it, but I have not identified a statement of this principle anywhere in Averroes’s commentary. Gersonides would seem to have derived it independently from the explanations of providence over animals by means of their limbs and the powers of their souls, which serve as tools for their preservation.

determinism, contingency, free choice

259

principle that whatever is known in advance must be necessary. The aporia of the third difficulty now seems to be extremely grave. Gersonides has demonstrated that events we hold to happen by chance and accident actually have determinate causes. On the other hand, our experience of events that are uncommon and do not take place in a fixed sequence leads to the conclusion that such events do not have essential, determined and ordered causes. Gersonides proposes a synthetic or compromise solution for this problem, on the model of what he does in his dialectic as well; the answer to the aporia is that each of the contradictory arguments is true, in some respect, such that admitting both of them does not violate the law of contradiction. Events caused by chance and accident can be viewed from two different perspectives. The conclusion derived from astrologers’ accurate predictions of future events is correct; but so is the definition of the nature of chance and accidental events proposed by Aristotelian physics. In the astral perspective, chance and accidental events are indeed necessary, already inherent in their causes, inasmuch as the configuration of the stars at the moment of birth is the determinate cause of all events that befall an individual. From the human perspective, these events are perceived as chance and accident, because we do not know their determinate causes (the individual’s natal horoscope). Human beings acts with the intention of achieving a particular result, but attain an additional or even different result, which is unexpected and unplanned. Here Gersonides offers the classic example of chance: a person who digs a pit and finds a treasure. So far as the man is concerned, his good fortune is a matter of chance and accident. He had no intention of excavating a treasure when he picked up his shovel, and it is rare for ditch-diggers to find buried treasure. But with regard to the overall causal system of nature, the discovery was absolutely necessary. We can even say that, in the context of the overall causal system of nature, the impression that the unearthing of the treasure was a matter of chance and accident is an illusion, because human beings judge events by relation to “the causes that we know”93 rather than by relation to their true causes. With respect to the astral configuration, the discovery is ordained and determined: there are fortunate men to whom good things happen frequently through natural causality, and there are unfortunate men to

93

Wars, p. 96 / 2:34.

260

determinism, contingency, free choice

whom bad things happen frequently.94 That their good and bad experiences are common indicates that we are dealing, not with chance, but with a “frequent” event. When the person who is digging the ditch finds a treasure, it just one more fortunate event in the sequence of fortunate events that he experiences because of the astral configuration at the time of his birth. Thus the discussion of chance and accidental events leads to a much stricter determinism for human beings than that acknowledged by Averroes in the Epitome of the Parva naturalia: in fact, everything that happens to human beings, including events that, in the Aristotelian classification, fall into the category of chance and accident, have determinate causes in the astral configuration. Against the background of this strict determinism, the aporia raised by Gersonides in his first two doubts—the aporia of determinism and contingency and, in practice, of determinism and choice—is even more problematic. Gersonides resolves it in the same way as he resolved the ontological status of events that take place by chance and accident: both of the arguments are correct, each in a certain respect. On the one hand, there is astral determinism and events that befall individual human beings are “determined and ordered by the heavenly bodies.”95 On the other hand, because human beings have intellect and free choice, there is contingency in the sublunar world; events in the sublunar world “are contingent and not determined and ordered.”96 Reprising the explanation in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, here too Gersonides writes that “intellect and choice have the power to move us in a different way than that determined by the heavenly bodies.”97 What Gersonides has done is to invert the conclusion of the previous discussion, namely, that individual human beings are subject to strict causal determinism in the sublunar world. The fact that a man’s intellect can lead him to something other than what the heavenly bodies determine for him indicates that human activities are contingent rather than necessary. A person can perform or not perform the action ordained by the astral configuration. But even when he realizes the alternative ordained by the astral configuration he does so by choice 94 95 96 97

Ibid., p. 95 / 2:33. Ibid., p. 96 / 2:34. Ibid. Ibid.

determinism, contingency, free choice

261

and not by necessity: for he could equally well have not done it. So even though Gersonides present this answer as a compromise solution— human events are “determined and ordered” in one respect but “contingent” in another respect—the very assertion that free choice exists implicitly prioritizes contingency over strict determinism in the sublunar world. Nevertheless, when human beings act in accordance with the choice to which they are predisposed by their temperament, they are subordinated post factum to astral causality; their voluntary actions, or the events in which voluntary human actions are involved, have “determined and ordered” causes, even though the subjection to astral causality is itself a matter of choice and not of necessity. The implication of what Gersonides writes here, as well as of his solution in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, is that we have only an illusion of determinism and of free choice that can break through it. On the ontological level we are in a state of “conditional determinism”: determinism exists on condition that human beings collaborate with the causal system of nature, choosing to do what their temperament disposes them to. This conclusion also turns upside down the conclusions of his previous discussion of chance and accidental events. Choice plays a part in all events that befall human beings through chance and accident. When a man digs a pit and finds a treasure, his digging the pit was a voluntary act. But even when nature is the cause of the action, human choice plays a role in events that take place by chance and accident. When a brick falls by its natural motion and shatters Reuben’s skull, human free choice is involved, because Reuben is standing where he chose to stand. He could have chosen to stand elsewhere.98 Consequently, all chance and accidental events are contingent rather than necessary. But when a man chooses what his temperament inclines him to, such events are “determined and ordered” by the astral configuration, post factum. It is not only from the perspective of the knowledge of the ditch-digger who happens on buried treasure, but also from that of natural causality, that chance and accidental events lack “determinate

98 This is the basis of Abraham Ibn Ezra’s example of the citizens who were going to be washed away or drowned in a flood when the river overflowed its banks, but left the city after the prophet warned them to repent. The flood indeed took place, but the people were saved (comm. on Exod. 33:21). Nevertheless, according to Ibn Ezra, the people did not choose to leave the city because they had advance knowledge of the flood.

262

determinism, contingency, free choice

causes.” In the context of natural causality, such events have only “conditional determinate causes”—with the condition being the man’s voluntary decision and his choice of what his temperament disposes him to do. Gersonides’ proposed solution to the aporia of determinism and contingency, which is in practice his doctrine of free choice, makes it possible for him to preserve choice as a decision between two alternatives (and thus the existence of contingency in the sublunar world and the existence of contingent matters in the sublunar world) while also explaining how there can be prior knowledge of events that pertain to individual human beings even when they are caused by choice or by chance and accident. Foreknowledge is possible when a man chooses to subject himself to astral causality, in which case the events that take place by his choice, wholly or (by chance and accident) in part, are both voluntary and “determined and ordered.” With regard to foreknowledge, it is unimportant whether these events are “determined and ordered” absolutely, or only post factum, because the condition for their being “determined and ordered” is satisfied. What is more, the very existence of prior knowledge of future events, attested to by experience, indicates that human beings do indeed preferentially opt for the alternative to which they are predisposed by their temperament and are thereby generally subject, albeit by their choice, to the natural system of determined and ordered causes. Gersonides states this explicitly with regard to a specific case of choice—one’s choice of a vocation. The heavenly bodies influence what craft a man takes up; and “even though choice which stems from reason has the power to upset this order, this occurs rarely. For since this order bestows upon the craftsman a desire for that which is decreed by this order, a craftsman does not leave his craft for another.”99 We are to understand that this applies to other voluntary human actions as well. Human beings generally choose what their temperament inclines them to and decide in favor of the appetite produced by the stars’ influence on their temperament. But this does not contradict the assertion that contingency exists on the ontological level. Thus Gersonides is in principle an indeterminist, but acknowledges the practical existence of a quasi-deterministic order. Gersonides supplements his solution of the problem of determinism and contingency with an explanation of the nature of choice. Here he

99

Wars, p. 97 / 2:36.

determinism, contingency, free choice

263

more or less repeats the explanation given in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia: the faculty of choice, which makes it possible for human beings to act contrary to the determinations of the system of natural causes, has a final cause: God100 has given it to human beings to complement the natural providence of the stars. By exercising this faculty, human beings can save themselves from the ills that might befall them “by chance” on account of the astral configuration. Although Gersonides does not explicitly repeat the argument he made in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia— namely, that the intellect inclines choice only toward the good—it is implicit here as well.101 The crux of Gersonides’ solution of the problem of astral determinism versus choice could already be found in Abraham Ibn Ezra and Abraham Ibn Daud. As we have seen, both of them maintained that although astral determinism exists, the human intellect (for Ibn Ezra, the higher human soul ) can break through its shackles, because it serves as an original cause of action. Like Ibn Ezra before him, Gersonides sees the escape from astral determinism as a form of providence over human beings; but, unlike Ibn Ezra in his commentary on Exodus 23:25 and 33:23, Gersonides does not make this providence depend on observance of the Torah and pious submission to God. And whereas Ibn Ezra and Ibn Daud presented this solution only in brief, Gersonides expands on it in order to resolve the aporia produced by a comprehensive philosophical discussion of both astral determinism and choice and includes it as part of his own solution to the problem of free choice itself. Another feature that makes Gersonides’ solution of

100 In his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia ( p. 18), Gersonides writes that it is “nature” that endows human beings with intelligence. Here he rises to the final cause, to God, perhaps because he is writing a work of philosophical theology rather than of straight philosophy. 101 In this discussion, Gersonides ultimately deviates from Averroes on two points: (1) He holds for a stricter determinism than Averroes does and annexes to the system of determinate causes events that take place by chance and accident, insofar as they are determined by the astral configuration. (2) He confutes determinism by means of an argument that Averroes does not accept, namely, that intellectual choice can be the original cause of action. In his commentary on Job 3 (“The General Principle to be Learned from the Text”), Gersonides faults Job for the error of assuming strict astral determinism, even though in practice this is the same conclusion that he himself reached on the basis of our experience of foreknowledge. According to the commentary, however, Job did not take the next step and arrive at the solution presented by Gersonides in the Wars because he did not know that intellectual choice can alter the determinations of astral causality.

264

determinism, contingency, free choice

the problem of astral determinism versus choice stand out is the way in which he intertwines this problem with that of human foreknowledge and (as we shall see below) links it to problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents. Prophetic Foreknowledge in Wars of the Lord II As in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, so too in the Wars of the Lord, after resolving the problem of determinism, contingency, and free choice, Gersonides deals with prophetic foreknowledge and, more precisely, with a prophet’s announcement of future events based on his knowledge of future contingents. In Wars II.6, when he answers the eighth doubt associated with knowledge of future events by means of clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy, he notes briefly the special nature of a prophet’s revelation of future events. The discussion here, as in the supercommentary, is philosophical rather than theological. Gersonides’ conclusions about prophetic precognition are those entailed by his solution of the question of determinism and choice and of the nature of free choice. As for the theological implications of these conclusions, Gersonides addresses them only in several chapters at the end of the Wars (VI.2.9–14), which are devoted, according to the introduction to the work, to “two very difficult theological problems,”102 namely, miracles and verification of the truth of prophecy.103 Prophetic revelation of future events can be looked at from two perspectives: (1) Prophecy is always true if taken as a statement of the order of things as determined and ordered by the celestial bodies, inasmuch as the prophet is a “sage” or accomplished philosopher. (2) But the picture is different if we look at prophecy as the revelation of future events to individuals qua individuals. In that case, the prophets’ forecasts will not always be realized. Here Gersonides does not rely on our experience of prophecy, as he does in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, but draws the conclusions that are logically entailed by the outcome of his discussion of determinism, contingency, and free choice in Wars II.2. He builds on the two conclusions he reached there: (1) Human beings have free choice, which

102 103

Wars, p. 3 / 2:92. See above, n. 14.

determinism, contingency, free choice

265

can incline them to an action other than that determined by the configuration of the stars. (2) Free choice is a mode of providence over human beings and motivates them only toward the good. On the basis of these two stipulations, Gersonides argues that, with regard to the realization of the forecast, there must be a difference between two types of revelation of future events to individuals. An evil forecast may not come to pass, because human beings, forewarned by the prophet, can exercise their rational free choice in order to incline toward the good and avert the disaster. By contrast, a good future announced by the prophet will always take place, because it is inconceivable that human beings who know what the stellar configuration holds in store for them will exercise their free choice to modify it. Because his immediate focus in this section of the Wars is on other matters, Gersonides does not carry the issue of prophetic knowledge further and does not draw other conclusions. From what he writes about the first way of looking at prophetic statements, we are to understand that the prophet knows that his revelation of future events depends exclusively on the astral order, but that in the sublunar world there is contingency based on human free choice: “Everything that a prophet makes known is true, i.e., the order obtaining among these events, insofar as it is determined by the heavenly bodies, is exactly the same as the prophet makes it known, although such events are contingent with respect to choice.”104 It follows that prophets also know when their predictions are likely to be realized and when they are not likely to be realized. That is, prophets have perfect knowledge of the natural order as determined by the astral configuration, along with the knowledge that this order is not necessary, because of human free choice, and probabilistic knowledge of what will actually befall individuals in the sublunar world. This probabilistic knowledge depends on two other characteristics of a prophetic revelation and the conditions in which it operates: (1) The prophet who receives a revelation about the order prescribed by the stars applies it to individuals whom he knows from experience. This means that the prophet’s message applies to the individual or group as individuals, to a particular human being or a particular nation. (2) Not only does the prophet have advance knowledge of what will happen to an individual or group as a result of the astral configuration, he also informs this individual or individuals of

104

Wars, p. 111 / 2:59.

266

determinism, contingency, free choice

what he knows and makes it possible for them to use the information he conveys to them when they make their voluntary decisions. Thus the prophet knows that the individual or nation to whom his message applies knows the future determined by the stars and will always opt for the good. Consequently the prophet can know in advance that it is likely that the object of an evil forecast will make a different rational choice than that ordained by astral causality, whereas if a good future awaits him he will choose to submit to the astral causality from which this good ensues. God’s Knowledge, Determinism, Contingency, and Free Choice105 In the Wars, just as in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, Gersonides turns to the problem of God’s knowledge after he has resolved the problem of determinism, contingency, and free choice and after he has explained prophetic foreknowledge. Here he keeps the promise made in the supercommentary that he will complete the inquiry into God’s knowledge in his religious treatises. Whereas the exposition in Wars II, like that in the supercommentary, is based only on Averroes’s treatment of the issue,106 in Wars III Gersonides develops his treatment of God’s knowledge on the basis 105 On Gersonides’ treatment of God’s knowledge, see Touati, La pensée philosophique, pp. 129–160; idem, Les Guerres du Seigneur; Gersonides, The Wars of the Lord, Treatise Three: On God’s Knowledge, trans. and annot. Norbert M. Samuelson (Toronto, 1977); idem, “Gersonides’ Account of God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 10 (1972), pp. 399–416; idem, “On Knowing God: Maimonides, Gersonides and the Philosophy of Religion,” Judaism 18 (1969), pp. 64–77; idem, “The Problem of Free Will in Maimonides, Gersonides and Aquinas,” CCAR Journal (1970), pp. 2–20; idem, “The Problem of Future Contingents in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Studies in Medieval Culture 6–7 (1976), pp. 72–82; Tamar M. Rudavsky, “Individuals and the Doctrine of Individuation in Gersonides,” New Scholasticism LVI (1982), pp. 33–50; eadem, “Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents in Gersonides,” Journal of the History of Philosophy (1983), pp. 513–536; eadem, “Divine Omniscience, Contingency and Prophecy in Gersonides,” in Tamar M. Rudavsky, ed. Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy ( Dordrecht, 1985), pp. 161–181; Seymour Feldman, “Crescas’ Theological Determinism,” Da at 9 (1983), pp. 7–10; idem, “The Binding of Isaac: A Test-Case of Divine Foreknowledge,” in Rudavsky, ed., Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy, pp. 105–133; Charles H. Manekin, “On the Limited-Omniscience Interpretation of Gersonides’ Theory of Divine Knowledge,” in Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism, ed. A. L. Ivry, E. R. Wolfson, and A. Arkush (Amsterdam: Harwood, 1998), pp. 135–170; and the articles by Pines cited above in n. 24. 106 Although there is also a short comment on Guide II.38.

determinism, contingency, free choice

267

of two underlying texts: Metaphysics XII with Averroes’s commentaries thereon,107 and the chapters on knowledge in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed.108 From the Guide he derives not only the view that he will oppose to the philosophers’ opinion in the dialectic inquiry conducted here, but also some of the arguments that reinforce the “the views of Aristotle and his followers.” The question raised by Gersonides in Wars III is broader than merely whether and how God knows future contingents. It is a more general question: does God know contingent particulars in the sublunar world, that is, particulars that may or may not come into existence? This is broken down into two subsidiary questions: (1) Can God have any knowledge of particulars in the sublunar world in their particularity? (2) Can God have foreknowledge of particulars that come to be in the sublunar world, that is, of particulars that still do not exist but may exist in the future? The answer to the second question is based on and completes the answer to the first question.109 Gersonides conducts his inquiry into God’s knowledge of particulars using the dialectic method characteristic of much of the Wars of the Lord: he begins by stating the several solutions that have been advanced by earlier thinkers. He offers the “opinion of Aristotle and his followers,” according to which God does not know contingent particulars, as well as “the opinion of the great sages of our Torah,” whose most prominent representative is Maimonides, that God does know particulars in their particularity. Next he reviews the arguments actually employed by each of the two parties, as well as arguments that, though never 107 Gersonides knew Aristotle’s Metaphysics from Averroes’s Long Commentary, in the translation by Moses ben Solomon of Beaucaire, but also from another translation, the “new translation” to which he refers readers in his commentary on Song of Songs 1:2 (see Touati, La pensée philosophique, p. 40 and n. 50). He also knew Averroes’s short and middle commentaries on the Metaphysics. On this see at greater length (in this volume): “Gersonides as Commentator on Averroes,” n. 1; “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” n. 41. 108 Guide III.16 and 19–21. 109 According to Averroes’s Middle Commentary on De interpretatione 13, the word “possible” is a homonym. It can denote the ontological status of existents—the fact that in and of themselves they can exist or not exist (“possibility”); but it can also denote existents as coming into being, that is, as not yet existing but with the potential to exist in the future (“contingency”). Thus the first question relates to particulars as “possible”; the second, to particulars as “contingent.” The way in which Gersonides frames the general question shows that here he means “possible”; only later does he move on to “contingent.” ( For the Hebrew translation of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on De interpretatione 13, see appendix 3 in Shalom Rosenberg, “Necessary and Contingent in Medieval Philosophy,” Iyyun 28 [2–3] [1978], p. 135 [ Hebrew].)

268

determinism, contingency, free choice

alleged by them, can be derived from and reinforce their opinions. In the third stage he juxtaposes these arguments and shows that some of the arguments of each side are refuted by those of the other party. He considers those arguments not disproved by this juxtaposition to be true. This leaves him with an aporia: mutually contradictory but true arguments about the issue at hand. At this point Gersonides often searches for a compromise or synthetic solution that can reconcile the opposing true arguments.110 Here, though, with regard to God’s knowledge, the structure of the third stage is somewhat muddled. He does state explicitly that the first argument made by the “great sages of our Torah” is refuted by some of the philosophers.111 But as for the philosophers’ arguments, he writes that “only some of them” are refuted by the second assertion made by the “great sages of our Torah,” without enumerating which of them he has in mind.112 Instead of formulating the aporia that results from the assertions of each party that have not been refuted by the counter-arguments of the other party, and resolving it, Gersonides offers a new line of reasoning to bolster the view that God knows particulars as particulars—an argument presented by Maimonides in Guide III.20 but which Gersonides did not include in his list of those that support the view of the Torah sages. Even after he rebuts Maimonides’ argument, Gersonides does not go back and continue the exposition from the point where he left off; instead, he presents his own arguments, rather than those of the Torah sages, in support of the view that God has knowledge of particulars. Next he offers his solution to the question of God’s knowledge, without having provided a clear statement of the aporia it is meant to resolve. The solution itself is formulated in a manner typical of Gersonides’ solutions of aporias in the Wars. In one respect one side is correct, and in another respect the other side: “There is no alternative but to say that God knows them [the particulars] in one respect but does know not them in another respect.”113

110 For the resolution of aporias, see (in this volume) “The Solutions of the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” pp. 45–72. For the “compromise solution,” see ibid., pp. 49–52. 111 He means the first group of philosophers, that is, Averroes. In Wars V.3.3 Gersonides quotes Averroes, who argued that “divine knowledge cannot be described in terms of human knowledge or ignorance, its contrary” ( p. 243 / 3:116). 112 I think that the arguments refuted by the “great sages of our Torah” in their second argument are precisely those that, as I will show below, are refuted by Gersonides’ own arguments in favor of the view that God has knowledge of particulars. 113 Wars, p. 138 / 2:117. See also “The Solutions of the Aporias,” pp. 56–57.

determinism, contingency, free choice

269

The structure of the discussion in Wars III.1–3 deserves to be studied separately. What is important for us now is to understand the aporia that Gersonides resolves with a typical compromise solution and see how it results from the course of the discussion that leads up to it. For this we must go back to the arguments that Gersonides offers in his own name in support of the view that God has knowledge of particulars and try to understand their meaning and place in the discussion of God’s knowledge in chapters 1–4, before the compromise solution is introduced. Gersonides advances three arguments to bolster the view that God has knowledge of particulars. The first two are very close to the second argument advanced by “the great sages of our Torah”, which is none other than Maimonides’ explanation of God’s knowledge in Guide III.21, and the view of God’s knowledge held by the second group of philosophers, as presented by Gersonides in Wars III.1. The third argument is quite different in character and is clearly rooted in Gersonides’ own method. The first argument is based on the metaphor of the craftsman, also employed by Averroes in his Epitome of the Parva naturalia to explain the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect.114 The source of this metaphor is Aristotle in De animalibus: inasmuch as the craftsman’s tools move only with his knowledge, for they move in order to impress on the matter the idea found in his mind, the craftsman must know everything that his tools make. Here Gersonides likens God, rather than the Active Intellect, to the craftsman and identifies His “tools” with the Active Intellect and the heavenly bodies.115 In his cosmology,

114 “Epitome of the PN,” p. 51, lines 6–7 / p. 48. See above, n. 41. Whereas Averroes applies the metaphor of the craftsman to explain the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect, Maimonides (Guide III.19) employs a variation thereof to explain God’s knowledge. It is certainly possible that here Gersonides was influenced by the Guide. Nevertheless, the formulation is closer to Averroes than to Maimonides. The latter’s emphasis, too, is different. Maimonides wields the metaphor to show that God does not need to have sensory perception of things in order to activate them through tools, because he has a priori intellectual knowledge of the actions of the tools He makes. I do not think that Gersonides was influenced here by Averroes’s commentary on Metaphysics XII, with its analogy between God and the craftsman, because there Averroes is not dealing with this variation of the metaphor of the craftsman, but emphasizes that just as what is made by crafts or artificial forms are found in the soul that produces them, so too all the relationships and forms in the sublunar world actually exist in God. Gersonides uses this formulation several times in Wars V.3.3. 115 His use of Averroes’s metaphor of the craftsman in his discussion of God’s knowledge in the Epitome of the Parva naturalia may be additional proof of the strong

270

determinism, contingency, free choice

it is the Active Intellect that endows objects with their essences. God’s knowledge of what the Active Intellect does, as His “tool,” is knowledge of the essences of objects in the sublunar world and knowledge of the qualities that stem from these essences. The heavenly bodies, according to his cosmology, produce the temperaments of sublunar particulars. Thus knowledge of the actions of the heavenly bodies is equivalent to knowledge of the temperaments of particulars and of the qualities that derive from these temperaments.116 As he showed in Wars II.2, the stars exert a stronger influence on individual human beings than on other objects in the sublunar world: they influence not only an individual’s qualities, but also his thoughts and actions. Knowledge of the heavenly bodies’ action on the sublunar world is thus knowledge of human thoughts and actions as well. Gersonides’ second argument adds to the first one. God must know His own essence with the degree of reality that pertains to it. God’s essence is to influence all existents, level by level. Consequently, perfect knowledge of His essence must also be knowledge of all of the existents that emanate from Him. Because all objects and all accidents emanate from God, the fact that God knows His own essence means that He also knows all these particulars. The core of this argument is that God knows not only Himself but also the objects outside Himself that flow from Himself.117 The third argument is perhaps the most interesting of all, at least methodologically. Gersonides asserts that God must know everything that the Active Intellect knows. Thus he bases God’s knowledge on that possessed by the Active Intellect, established earlier in the Wars (I.6–7 and II.3).118 According to Wars I.6, the Active Intellect knows link that Gersonides forged between the discussions of foreknowledge in the Parva naturalia and divine knowledge. 116 Here Gersonides presumes the cosmology that he will prove only in Wars V. See Touati, Les Guerres du Seigneur, livres III et IV, p. 79 n. 2. 117 In the debate that he conducts with Averroes in Wars V.3.3, concerning the commentary on Metaphysics XII 9 (1075a5 ff.), Gersonides maintains the argument that God perceives what emanates from Him, in opposition to Averroes, who believed that God could know only Himself. Here Gersonides builds on the view of Themistius, cited by Averroes in his Long Commentary on the Metaphysics. See Touati, Les Guerres du Seigneur, livres III et IV, p. 137. 118 What is manifested in this argument is chiefly a principle of another order, expounded by Gersonides in the preface to the Wars and explained in the “Eighth Cause”: “Sometimes, when it is possible, an author bases a later passage in his book on what he has established earlier; hence he does not elaborate on his explanation in that place. Were he to do so, it would be repetitious, superfluous, and unnecessary”

determinism, contingency, free choice

271

the forms in the sublunar world because it is the giver of the forms. According to I.7, it knows the “orders” emanated from heavenly bodies, namely, the mixtures they generate and give to the various existents. These mixtures are the dispositions for the reception of the forms that the Active Intellect imparts to these mixtures. Gersonides bases this statement on two arguments: 1. The mixture is “the tool by virtue of which the form [of a sublunar substance] that is derived from the Active Intellect attains [the sublunar existents].” The Active Intellect knows the “tool” through which it gives form to particulars in the sublunar world.119 2. Inasmuch as it emanates from the movers of the celestial bodies, the Active Intellect is related to them as is form to matter.120 Because form, according to Aristotle, is the perfection and end of matter, the “order” inherent in the Active Intellect is the perfection and end of the “order” imposed by the celestial bodies and as such contains all subordinate perfections, as the end contains the means for its attainment: “Anyone who knows the perfection completely also knows that whose perfection he knows.”121 To exemplify his argument Gersonides employs an image employed, in several variants, in his discussions of the Active Intellect,122 of the knowledge possessed by the separate intellects that move the spheres,123 and of God’s knowledge,124 each time

(Wars, p. 10 / 1:103). We should understand the argument as Gersonides instructs us there: “It is therefore appropriate, reader, if you want to understand this book, to proceed in your study following the order that we have ourselves followed; if you do not do this, you will be greatly confused by most of its topics” (ibid.). On this principle of arrangement and its importance for understanding the Wars see Pines, “Some Views Put Forward by the 14th Century Jewish Philosopher Isaac Pulgar,” pp. 448–449; see also above, n. 66. Gersonides considers the inquiry into the nature of the Active Intellect to be his own original development: “We shall not mention the opinion of the ancients about this [the nature of the Active Intellect], for we have not seen anything of theirs on this topic” (Wars I.6, p. 37 / 1:146). 119 Wars, p. 50 / 1:168. Here Gersonides seems to be employing the image of craft found in Physics II.2 (194a34–194b8). In this image, the craft knows the material from which its wares are made. 120 See above, n. 116. 121 Wars, p. 50 / 1:168. For an explanation of this form of knowledge, see Touati, La pensée philosophique, pp. 131–133. Touati focuses on God’s knowledge and does not view its constitution as based on the prior constitution of the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect. 122 Wars I.6–7 and II.3. 123 Wars V.2.7. 124 Wars III.4.

272

determinism, contingency, free choice

emphasizing different aspects of such knowledge: the metaphor of the house: “For example, he who knows the essence of a house must also know the boards, bricks, and stones of which the essence of the house is the perfection.”125 In Wars II.3, where he deals with prior knowledge of future events, Gersonides advances further in his explanation of the content of the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect. Instead of limiting it to knowledge of the particular forms and mixtures of existents in the sublunar world, as might be inferred from Book I, he extends that knowledge to all incidents that occur to individual human beings.126 Gersonides offers a number of arguments to buttress this assertion. The most interesting one recycles the metaphor of the craftsman from Book 1: because the Active Intellect knows every sequence of events that stems from the heavenly bodies, inasmuch as they are its tools, and because, as demonstrated in Wars II.2, all incidents that befall individual human beings are “determined and ordered” by the heavenly bodies, it follows that the Active Intellect must also know all such incidents. Here Gersonides begins from human knowledge of the future through clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy, and from the accurate forecasts of astrology, to infer the existence of astral determinism. Building on the metaphor of the craftsman, who must know his tools, Gersonides turns to the plane of cognition and argues that inasmuch as the “orders” of the heavenly bodies are the tools wielded by the Active Intellect, the latter must know them. The experience of human knowledge led Gersonides to define the scope of the heavenly bodies’ influence on the sublunar world. The metaphor of the craftsman made it possible for him to ascend from natural causality to knowledge—not human knowledge, this time, but the knowledge possessed by a metaphysical entity, the Active Intellect. Now he rises another step, from the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect to the knowledge possessed by an even higher metaphysical entity—the highest of all—God’s knowledge. In this way, the definition of the mode and scope of the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect

Ibid. In Wars I.6, Gersonides mentions the foreknowledge possessed by the Active Intellect. But there he uses it for a different purpose, namely, to demonstrate that the Active Intellect has knowledge of existents, which it conveys to the material intellect, but not through the imaginary form in which they have potential existence. 125 126

determinism, contingency, free choice

273

serves as the link between the experience of human knowledge and the conclusion concerning God’s knowledge. To ascend from the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect to God’s knowledge Gersonides employs the same principle he used in Wars I.7 to establish the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect. Just as the Active Intellect relates to the heavenly bodies as does form to matter—meaning that it is their perfection and end—so God relates, in Aristotelian metaphysics, to the separate intellects. Consequently, the same principle previously applied to the Active Intellect applies to God: God, as the end and perfection of the separate intellects, knows His own perfection, and consequently knows everything known by the separate intellects, including the Active Intellect. To clarify this line of reasoning Gersonides returns to a variation of the house metaphor he used to explain the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect in Wars I.7. This time he speaks about knowledge of the craft of house-building—the primary craft—and knowledge of the crafts of making its component parts—knowledge of the crafts that serve the primary craft.127 This variation of the house metaphor allows Gersonides to emphasize two aspects of God’s knowledge—its content and its mode—which he first mentioned in Book I as aspects of the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect: 1. Whoever knows the form of the house necessarily knows the forms of the bricks and boards that are known by the artisans of the crafts that serve the primary craft, which is building the house. That is, God, as the ultimate perfection, knows all perfections lower than Himself, and their relation to Him is that of matter to form. Consequently, God must know the essence of the Active Intellect, which is identical to the content of His knowledge. In his discussion of God’s knowledge, Gersonides is applying the second argument he invoked to support the assertion that the Active Intellect knows the new mixtures generated by the heavenly bodies in the sublunar world. 2. God as the master craftsman (who builds the house) has a more perfect knowledge of the subordinate crafts (making the boards and

127 He has already employed this variation in Wars I.6 (p. 37 / 1:147), where he proves that there is only one Active Intellect that makes things known to the material intellect (there he writes about shipbuilding).

274

determinism, contingency, free choice

bricks) than do the craftsmen who actually engage in the latter. Here too Gersonides returns to an argument he has already made about the Active Intellect, but this time on a higher ontological level. In Wars I.6 he argued that it does not follow from this merely that it [the Active Intellect] has knowledge of all these orders [in the sublunar world]; rather, I will say, that it follows from this that also it possesses knowledge of all these orders of the existents of the sublunar world in the most perfect aspect, i.e., in the aspect in which they are one. As the craftsman knows the boards, bricks, and stones, from which the house is to be constructed, not as boards, bricks, and stones, but from the aspect of the unity they obtain through their assembly—that is, the form of the house, of which the materials are parts. This is the most perfect aspect of their existence.128

Here he employs the very same argument with regard to God: “the master craftsman knows them [the forms] in a more perfect manner, i.e., insofar as they are parts of the [complete] house, as we have explained previously.”129 God’s greater perfection is manifested in the fact that He knows the content of the Active Intellect as part of His own perfection, as an element of a higher perfection, whereas the Active Intellect knows its content as such (although, as stated, this perfection includes the lower perfections as well, in a unity that is their perfection).130 In Wars II.6 Gersonides also explains the mode of the Active Intellect’s knowledge. He lists eight doubts about prophetic revelation. Some of them relate to the Active Intellect, because it is impossible to reconcile the revelation of future events as entailed by the nature of the Active Intellect with the revelation of future events as we know it through experience. The first doubt is, “how is it possible for the Active Intellect to make known a particular qua particular, as is the case in this [kind of] disclosure, when in fact it imparts that which is similar to itself, i.e., the general order.”131 Because it is an intellect, the Ibid., p. 40 / 1:151. Ibid., p. 138 / 2:117. 130 Gersonides offers a more comprehensive and clearer statement of this idea in Wars V.3.7, where he deals with perception by separate intellects and explains how a cause can perceive its effect. He does not allude here to the idea, advanced in Wars V.3.13, that God’s knowledge is more perfect than that possessed by the Active Intellect, because God has perfect comprehension of the system (nomos) of the heavenly bodies and of how the law of existents derives from them, whereas the Active Intellect has only imperfect knowledge of them, the knowledge that the effect has of its cause. 131 Wars, p. 104 / 2:49. 128 129

determinism, contingency, free choice

275

Active Intellect can know only universals and essences, which are sets of laws of individuation of the “order” that derives from them. It cannot know particulars qua particulars. This makes it difficult to explain the revelation of future events to a human being, which involves foreknowledge of particulars qua particulars. This problem had already been raised by Averroes in the Epitome of the Parva naturalia (48:8–11; p. 43), but Gersonides offers a different answer: Because what is received from the Active Intellect is knowledge of the order that applies to this individual on account of the heavenly bodies, not insofar as he is an individual, but insofar as he is an arbitrary individual alive at the same time as [all] the people who were born when the heavenly bodies were in the configuration they were in when that individual was born, at the latitude in which he was born. And because all of those people will have the same attributes and the same accidents, on account of the order prescribed by the heavenly bodies, the material intellect apprehends this individual, with all the accidents pertaining to this individual, as some arbitrary individual among those persons with these attributes.132

The Active Intellect knows the “order” for someone born under a particular configuration of the stars. It does not know the identity of any individual born in that particular configuration, to whom the events occasioned by that astral configuration will occur. It does not know who is a member of the class of individuals that is defined by the configuration of the stars at the time they were born; hence it does not know who is the individual subject to the accidents caused by the configuration of the stars at a certain moment. Because God’s knowledge includes the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect, we may infer, based on Gersonides’ third argument in support of the notion that God knows particulars, that God knows particulars in the mode that Gersonides previously ascribed to the Active Intellect; that is, God knows an individual “as some random individual among those persons with these attributes.” Thus Gersonides’ argument that God knows particulars does not support the view of “the great sages of our Torah,” who hold that God knows particulars qua particulars, but the alternative opinion that God knows particulars from the perspective of their general order, that is, from the perspective of their causes.

132

Ibid., p. 105 / 2:50–51.

276

determinism, contingency, free choice

The same conclusion follows from the first two arguments invoked by Gersonides to support the idea that God knows particulars, arguments derived from cosmology. In Gersonides’ cosmology, the matter composing the sublunar world, what he calls “prime matter,” was not created by God. Rather, sublunar matter is “body that does not preserve its shape,” which has always existed alongside God as His counterpole. It is intrinsically three-dimensional, with no limit, determination, or form. It serves as the substrate for the forms of the sublunar world and receives all forms through the forms of the four elements. These forms also limit its original unbounded three-dimensionality.133 Because sublunar matter does not derive from God and has no intrinsic form, God cannot know it. This means that God cannot know particulars as the fusion of three-dimensional matter with the forms that do derive from Him.134 He can know only the intellectual order of particulars, the forms that derive from Him and that are the causes of the order of particulars. Nevertheless, Gersonides’ arguments imply that God’s knowledge distinguishes particulars conceptually. God knows not only the essences of particulars and the qualities that derive from these essences, but also the specific temperament of particulars—the form of that temperament and the qualities attracted to it—and consequently an individual person’s thoughts and actions. The stars, which are God’s “tools,” determine a person’s temperament, and consequently his thoughts and deeds; and God knows the actions of the stars. According to the theory that underlies practical astrology, two human beings cannot be absolutely identical in their traits, thoughts, and deeds. Consequently, knowledge of the actions of the stars in the sublunar world makes it possible to distinguish particulars conceptually. Nevertheless, for Gersonides God does not have conceptual knowledge of each particular per se. He knows all particulars, in a single a priori intellectual knowledge, as they are parts of His

133 On Gersonides’ theory of matter see: Touati, La pensée philosophique, pp. 243–267; J. J. Staub, “The Creation of the World according to Gersonides,” Brown Judaic Studies (1982), esp. pp. 205–206; Gad Freudenthal, “Cosmogonie et physique chez Gersonide,” REJ 145 (1986), pp. 295–304. 134 Because matter, in Gersonides’ theory, is the principle of evil and deficiency (see Wars VI.1.18), it does not always receive the form perfectly. This is how creatures with missing limbs or extra limbs come to be. Because God does not know matter and the way in which matter is joined to form, He does not know these phenomena. Gersonides does not raise this issue explicitly with regard to God, but does address it in other contexts with regard to the Active Intellect; see Wars V.3.4 (pp. 255–56 / 3:134).

determinism, contingency, free choice

277

own perfection, as lower perfections than His own, and that relate to Him as matter to form. If we take a closer look at Gersonides’ arguments in support of the view that God knows particulars, we see that they entail the same strict determinism as is entailed by the experience of foreknowledge through clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy, which Gersonides discusses in Wars II. God’s knowledge is knowledge that actuates things. Consequently, if God knows particulars inasmuch as He is their cause, these particulars must be “limited and ordered”; hence there is strict determinism in the world. Here Gersonides has no need to invoke logic, as in his consideration of foreknowledge through clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy, in order to move from the fact of God’s knowledge to the conclusion that particulars in the sublunar world are limited and ordered. The strict determinism follows from the fact that God’s knowledge is the cause of the existence of things.135 The solution offered here to the problem of God’s knowledge— “God knows them [the particulars] in one respect but does know not them in another respect”136—and Gersonides’ subsequent explanation reveal that the aporia resolved here is the same aporia of strict determinism and contingency raised in Wars II. But in the context of God’s knowledge, the aporia is translated into the terms appropriate to that issue. The “true” arguments that create this aporia are: (1) God has foreknowledge of particulars—Gersonides’ contention; and (2) God does not have foreknowledge of particulars—as the philosophers maintain. The argument that God does not have foreknowledge of particulars is one aspect of the philosophers’ sixth argument to buttress their view that God does not know particulars. In general, Gersonides constitutes aporias from the arguments of each contending party that have not been refuted by the arguments of the other party. So the fact that the present aporia is created by his own arguments in support of

135 Here his approach is diametrically opposed to al-Farabi’s. Al-Farabi addressed the question of God’s knowledge in logical terms only. He maintained that God has foreknowledge of future contingents; then, applying the principle of correspondence, he argued that if God knows future events these events take place of necessity. But he did not maintain that God’s knowledge is the cause of these events. This allowed him to resolve the crux of God’s foreknowledge versus free choice with the argument that even though God’s knowledge of future contingents entails that it is necessary that what God knows will take place, this is not the same as saying that they take place of necessity. For al-Farabi’s treatment of God’s knowledge, see above, n. 17. 136 Wars, p. 138 / 2:117.

278

determinism, contingency, free choice

the opinion that God knows particulars and by only one element of one of the philosophers’ arguments indicates that he believes that only these theses have not been refuted in his debate with the philosophers. That is, he believes that none of his three arguments are refuted by the philosophers and that all of them are therefore true; and that of the philosophers’ assertions, he has failed to rebut only argument 6.1.2. In other words, he holds that he has refuted all of their other arguments in support of the opinion that God does not know particulars.137 If we go back and examine Gersonides’ arguments in support of the view that God knows particulars, we see that they also refute most of the philosophers’ arguments to support the view that God does not know particulars. The arguments that Gersonides set forth in the name of the philosophers to support the view that God does not know particulars, in Wars III.2, focus on particulars as compounded of matter and form, such that they cannot be known by God. Speaking on behalf of the philosophers, Gersonides alleged that particulars are known only through sense perception (argument 1), exist in time (argument 2), constitute multiplicity (argument 4), are infinite (arguments 5 and 8), do not exist at one time but are come into being at a later time and thus are mutable (argument 6.1.1 and argument 6.2), and that their ontological status is inferior to God’s (argument 3). Working from the Aristotelian concept of God, on the one hand, and from the assumption that the principles of Aristotelian epistemology apply to Him as well, on the other hand, the philosophers rejected any possibility that God could know particulars. The Aristotelian God is immaterial; consequently He lacks sense perception (argument 1). He is not in time, so He cannot perceive particulars that are in time (argument 2). Starting from the Aristotelian epistemological principle that the knower is the same as the known and is completed by it, the philosophers advanced other arguments: God cannot grasp multiplicity because if He did He would Himself be multiple, contradicting the postulate of Aristotelian theology that God is one in the sense of simple (not composite) (argument 4). He cannot conceive of existents whose degree of perfection is less than His, because if He could He would be completed by something that is less than Himself (argument 3). He cannot know what does not yet exist, because if He did He would be identified with non-existence

137 As we shall see below, however, Gersonides also fails to refute the philosophers’ seventh argument.

determinism, contingency, free choice

279

(argument 6.1.1). And He cannot know new creations, because that would mean that He Himself changes, contravening the postulate of Aristotelian theology that God is immutable (argument 6.2). Because knowledge applies by definition only to the finite, and there is an infinity of particulars, God cannot know them (arguments 5 and 8). According to Gersonides’ arguments to support the view that God knows particulars (although, as stated, not qua particulars), God’s knowledge is different from human knowledge in that it is knowledge that actuates things and not knowledge derived from their existence. It is conceptual knowledge, a priori and numerically one. Consequently, God can know particulars even without sense perception; He can know multiplicity (argument 4) and the infinite (arguments 5 and 8) with a knowledge that is numerically one. His knowledge of particulars from the perspective of their causes is not in time (argument 2).138 Because this knowledge actuates things, God is not constituted by knowledge of lesser perfections (argument 3). God’s knowledge is knowledge of Himself as a perfection that includes lesser perfections, and consequently does not apply to non-existence (argument 6.1.1). Because it is a priori it does not change when particulars change (argument 6.2). But Gersonides’ arguments to support the view that God knows particulars do not disprove one element of the philosophers’ sixth argument (6.1.2) or their seventh argument. The sixth argument is based on the assumption that God’s knowledge, like human knowledge, can be localized on the time axis. Consequently, as a matter of logic we can speak of two temporal situations in which God may have knowledge of particulars: God can know them before they come into existence—prior knowledge of the future; or God can know them simultaneously with their coming into existence. Gersonides advanced two arguments against the idea that God can know things before they come into existence. The second of these (6.1.2) is not refuted by his arguments to support the opinion that God has knowledge of particulars. Argument 6.1.2 is based on the principle of correspondence presented in De interpretatione 9. Here Gersonides, on behalf of the philosophers, translates the discussion of propositions concerning future The question of how an intellect can know time is broached by Gersonides in Wars II.6, with regard to the Active Intellect (the second doubt). There he also provides a detailed answer, which applies equally to the question of how God can know time. 138

280

determinism, contingency, free choice

contingents into the language of the debate about God’s knowledge of future contingents. The argument he propounds for the philosophers raises the same problem that engaged Gersonides himself in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia and in Wars II: the knowledge of future contingents. But whereas in both of these places Gersonides dealt with the problem in the context of human cognition,139 as applied to knowledge of future events through clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy, here, speaking for the philosophers, he elevates it to the plane of divine knowledge. The “philosophers’ dilemma” is as follows: if God knows generated things before they are generated, there are two possibilities for his knowledge thereof: (1) He knows future things as contingent; that is, He knows in advance that either A will be realized or not-A will be realized, but He does not know in advance which of the two alternatives will be realized. (2) He “knows perfectly” which of the two alternatives will be realized. If so, the unrealized alternative is not “contingent” but “impossible.” The expression “knows perfectly” indicates that when Gersonides formulated this dilemma he had in mind the discussion of propositions about future contingents in De interpretatione 9, as he explained it in his supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on that work, here translated into the language of divine knowledge. The first possibility is simply Averroes’s solution to the problem of propositions about future contingents, at least as Gersonides interprets Averroes. Propositions about future contingents are neither wholly true nor wholly false when uttered. Rendered into the language of divine knowledge, this means that God does not have perfect foreknowledge as to which of the two alternatives will be realized. He knows only the proposition N(Ā ∨ ~Ā); that is, that one of them will necessarily be realized. The second possibility is the one rejected in De interpretatione: propositions about future contingents are wholly true or false when uttered. In the language of divine knowledge, God knows in advance which one of the two possibilities will be realized. But, Gersonides adds on behalf of the philosophers, neither of these possibilities can hold for God. If we opt for the first, which parallels

He had already suggested the pertinence of this question to the problem of God’s knowledge, and a way to resolve it, in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia. 139

determinism, contingency, free choice

281

Aristotle’s solution to the problem of propositions about future contingents (as understood by Averroes and Gersonides), we must say that the propositions receive their truth value when the events to which they refer take place. In the language of divine knowledge, God knows which of the two alternatives will be realized only after the event takes place. According to the principle of Aristotelian epistemology that identifies the intellect with what it knows, we are compelled to say that God is constituted as substance by His knowledge of this incident, which means that His essence changes. God’s essence is modified every time that He comes to know the emergence of a particular or of an event related to a particular. But this conclusion is incompatible with Aristotelian theology, which holds that God’s essence is immutable.140 The discussion of the second possibility is merely a recapitulation of the logical argument in De interpretatione 9, which we have already encountered in the third discursive note in the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia. It can be formulated as the disjuncp¤q . For the propositions that “are divided into truth tive syllogism p ∴q and falsehood in a completely definite manner,” Gersonides substitutes God’s perfect knowledge of generated things before they are generated. He formulates the major premise as follows: if God has perfect knowledge of things that are generated before they are generated (that is, which of the two alternatives will be realized), then these things are necessary (“it follows that here there is nothing contingent that comes to pass or does not come to pass, and thus that everything is necessary.”)141 On behalf of the philosophers he argues that if we append to this major premise the minor premise that God has perfect knowledge of things that are generated before they are generated, we arrive at the conclusion that whatever comes into being is necessary. But this, he insists, is absurd. Gersonides does not explain why this conclusion is absurd, but it is quite clear that he is thinking about Aristotle’s argument in De interpretatione that it is certain that human beings have free choice and that there is contingency in events. 140 Maimonides (Guide III.16) offers a simpler argument in the name of the philosophers. We may assume that Gersonides built on it, too, here. Gersonides could not have been familiar with Averroes’s al-Damima when he wrote this text, because it was not translated into Hebrew (by Todros Todrosi) until 1340 (see Paris—BNF, MS héb. 989 [ IMHM 33990]). 141 Wars III.2, p. 123 / 2:94.

282

determinism, contingency, free choice

We cannot maintain that there is absolute necessity in the sublunar world, as might be inferred from the conclusion of this syllogism, because it contradicts the fact that human beings have free choice and that contingency exists. Because neither of these alternatives about God’s knowledge of generated things before they are generated can be allowed, the philosophers concluded that God does not know them. The philosophers’ seventh argument is taken from Guide III.16. This is the argument based on the absence of divine providence in the sublunar world. If God knows particulars in the sublunar world, there are three ways in which He may relate to them: (1) God regulates them in the best order. (2) God cannot regulate them. (3) God does not regulate them because He considers them to be inferior or because he envies them. Possibilities 2 and 3 are absurd. Hence if God knew particulars he would regulate them in the best fashion. But experience shows that the world is not regulated for the best and that injustice exists; hence God does not know particulars. Continuing to pursue the topic of God’s knowledge, in Wars III.4, Gersonides explains that the discussion of providence will be deferred until the next book. In this respect we should see Wars IV, which focuses on divine providence, as completing the treatment of God’s knowledge of particulars and as answering the philosophers’ seventh argument. In Wars III.4 Gersonides addresses only argument 6.1.2. As we have seen, the philosophers framed a dilemma with two alternatives for God’s knowledge of things before they are generated: (1) God knows future contingents before they are generated, but only as contingent. (2) God has perfect knowledge of which of the contingent alternatives will be realized in the future. Contra the first possibility they argued that if God has knowledge of particulars we must say that He knows which of the contingent alternatives was realized only after the event, entailing a change in God because of the change in His knowledge. Gersonides’ arguments to support the opinion that God knows particulars showed that this cannot be the case. God has knowledge of particulars through an a priori knowledge that actuates them and not through knowledge that depends on their existence. The second possibility, that God has perfect knowledge of which of the two possibilities will be realized, is identical to the conclusion entailed by Gersonides’ arguments in support of the view that God does know particulars. The philosophers opposed this with the Aristotelian argument from experience: experience teaches that free will

determinism, contingency, free choice

283

exists and that there is contingency in nature. This is totally incompatible with Gersonides’ arguments in support of the view that God knows particulars—whence the aporia Gersonides seeks to resolve in Wars III.4. On the one hand, Gersonides’ arguments in support of the view that God has knowledge of particulars are true; consequently, strict determinism prevails in the sublunar world. On the other hand, the philosophers’ assertion that experience shows that free choice exists and that there is contingency in the sublunar world is also true. The problem of God’s knowledge has thus led Gersonides to the same aporia he encountered in II.2, the aporia of determinism and contingency: but now phrased in terms of divine knowledge. But Gersonides has already solved the aporia of determinism and contingency on the ontological plane in Wars II. There he applied, as we have seen, the principle of correspondence from the logical exposition of De interpretatione 9 and inferred from the cognitive level—human foreknowledge—to the ontological level—causality in the sublunar world. Now he proceeds in the opposite direction, invoking the principle of correspondence to move from ontology—his solution for natural causality and contingency—to epistemology—defining the nature and scope of divine knowledge. This correspondence enables him to resolve the aporia of God’s knowledge on the basis of his solution to the aporia of determinism and contingency. Gersonides had followed a similar procedure in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia; but there he applied it to human foreknowledge. In that supercommentary, too, he first resolved the dilemma of determinism and contingency and only then proceeded to draw conclusions about the possible scope of human foreknowledge. Then he applied the conclusion attained by logic alone in order to explain the experimental fact of prophetic knowledge of future events. Here Gersonides repeats this train of thought, but applies it to divine foreknowledge rather than human foreknowledge, just as he had promised in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia. His discursive note in that supercommentary was based on the assumption—which he later proved in Wars III, when he tackled Maimonides’ solution to the problem of God’s knowledge (in Guide III.20)—that God’s knowledge is analogous to human knowledge and that the same rules apply to both. As Maimonides asserted, knowledge is said of God and of human beings “according to priority and posteriority” and not “homonymously.” Thus Gersonides totally ignores the theological problem of God’s knowledge versus human free choice. He does not ask how we can

284

determinism, contingency, free choice

reconcile the theological assumption that God is omniscient with the theological imperative that human beings are endowed with free choice, because, if they were not, there would be no point to the precepts and no justification for reward and punishment related to obeying or flouting God’s word.142 Gersonides expounds and resolves the problem of determinism and free choice in a philosophical context. He grounds the argument that God has foreknowledge of particulars on philosophical arguments rather than on the theological premise that God is omniscient. Similarly, his arguments for the reality of free choice are philosophical in nature. He follows Aristotle and holds that the existence of free choice and contingency is given by experience and beyond doubt. Consequently he also resolves the problem of determinism, contingency, and free choice before he raises the question of God’s knowledge, and independently of the latter. When he turns to the problem of divine knowledge he does not start from any prior assumptions as to the nature of this knowledge, but asks what God can know on the basis of the solution he has already found for the problem of determinism, contingency, and free choice. Thus the ontological solution determines the answer as to the scope and field of application of God’s knowledge. At the start of his presentation of the solution of the aporia of God’s knowledge Gersonides reviews the conclusion of the discussion of determinism and contingency in Wars II: “It has been previously shown [in II.2] that these contingent things [= particulars] are ordered and determined in one respect, but contingent in another respect.”143 This alludes to the earlier passage: “But the respect in which they are determined and ordered has been explained earlier; that is, it has already been explained that they are determined and ordered by the heavenly bodies. But the respect in which they are contingent and not determined and ordered is the intellect and choice that are in us. For the intellect and choice can move us to something other than that which is determined and ordered by the heavenly bodies.”144

142 Only in Wars III.6, when he sets out to demonstrate that the conclusions he reached through reasoning are precisely the view of the Torah, does he invoke the argument based on the precepts in order to corroborate the interpretation that “it is a fundamental and pivotal belief of the Torah that there are contingent events in the world” (p. 149 / 2:135). 143 Ibid., p. 138 / 2:117. 144 Ibid., p. 96 / 1:34.

determinism, contingency, free choice

285

Gersonides applies the principle of correspondence taken from De interpretatione 9 to this solution of the problem of determinism and contingency, replacing “true proposition” with “foreknowledge.” According to the principle of correspondence he can state his case as two disjunctive syllogisms: 1. If there are things that are ordered and determined, then they can be known in advance. Things are ordered and determined (in one respect). Consequently things can be known in advance insofar as they are ordered and determined. 2. If things are not ordered and determined, then they cannot be known in advance. Things are not ordered and determined (in one respect). Consequently things cannot be known in advance insofar as they are not ordered and determined. Gersonides concludes as follows: Accordingly, it is evident that the aspect from which God knows them [= these particulars] is the aspect in which they are ordered and determined, as is the case of the Active Intellect, according to what was previously established. For from this aspect there can be knowledge of them.145

145 In the first two books of the Wars, when he wrote about the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect, Gersonides did not deal with the limits of that knowledge, but only with its constitution, and employed epistemological and cosmological arguments. Consequently he draws on his prior demonstration about the Active Intellect only when he argues that God knows things insofar as they are ordered and determined. Nevertheless, the same limitation on God’s knowledge that follows from his solution of the problem of determinism and contingency must also apply to the Active Intellect, whose knowledge is established in book I on the basis of its cosmological role. The same conclusion can also be derived from the argument based on human foreknowledge of future events. Because of the immediate needs of the discussion in Wars II.3, Gersonides assumes there that human beings have foreknowledge of all events that befall human particulars and does not consider the conclusion (supported by experience) that he reaches later (in II.6 and again in VI.2.13) that prophets (and everyone who knows the future through revelation, as well as astrologers) know only what is liable to take place as determined by the stars, but not what will actually take place, because free choice can dispose a man to act in a way other than that ordained by the astral configuration. The transfer of the argument from human foreknowledge of future events to the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect would lead to the same conclusion, namely that the Active Intellect knows only what would happen to human beings as determined by the astral order, but not what will actually take place. Although Gersonides omits this link in his argument, it exists there potentially.

286

determinism, contingency, free choice And the aspect from which God does not know them [= these particulars] is the aspect from which they are not ordered, i.e., the aspect from which they are contingent, for from this aspect knowledge of them is not possible. However, from this [aspect] [God] does know that these events may not occur because of the choice that He, may He be exalted, has placed in man to compensate for the deficiencies of the protection (shemirah) by the heavenly bodies, as has been explained in the previous book [book II ]). But He does not know which of the two alternatives will be realized in so far as they are [genuinely] contingent.”146

This is to be understood on the basis of his arguments to support the view that God has knowledge of particulars and of his solution to the problem of determinism, contingency, and free choice. The former explains what is meant by God’s knowledge of particulars. The latter makes it possible to understand what this knowledge of particulars applies to. From Gersonides’ arguments in support of the view that God has knowledge of particulars we learn that God’s knowledge of particulars relates to their causes and is a priori intellectual and single. He does not know particulars qua particulars, as a compound of matter and form, and his knowledge of them is not derived from their actual existence. Gersonides’ solution to the problem of determinism, contingency, and free choice holds that particulars are “limited and ordered” in one respect but not in another. Because knowledge applies only to what is necessary, that is, determined and ordered, God can have a priori intellectual knowledge of particulars only insofar as they are ordered and determinate; he cannot know them as not ordered and determinate, insofar as they are contingent. Gersonides’ most trenchant formulation of this conclusion, which follows from his solution, is found in his commentary on the Bible, in the 16th Utility on Genesis 18–19, referring to Genesis 18:21: “I will go down to see whether they have acted altogether according to the outcry that has reached Me; and if not, I will know.” He sees his interpretation as something quite new in the history of thought: This comes to teach us about the knowledge possessed by God (may He be Exalted), something extremely marvelous which has escaped all earlier thinkers whose words have reached us, namely, that what God (may He be exalted) knows of actions in the sublunar world is something other than what people do. For He knows what people are supposed to do according

146

Wars, pp. 138–139 / 2:117–118.

determinism, contingency, free choice

287

to what has been set for them from the date of their creation by the heavenly bodies assigned by God (may He be exalted) to exercise general providence over the individual members of the human species. But human choice overrules the ordained sequence [siddur, lit. “order” or “sequence”] of their [ human beings’] activities fixed (mesuddar) by the heavenly bodies, and therefore it is possible that what people do is other than what God (may He be exalted) knows from the ordained sequence of their activities. For He knows their actions in the aspect in which they are knowable, the aspect in which they are ordered and determined. But they are not knowable in the aspect in which they are contingent. For if we assume that they are knowable they cannot be contingent.147

Gersonides returns to this conclusion in his exegesis of the Binding of Isaac: God (may He be exalted) knows what a person ought to do, according to what is ordained for him by the heavenly bodies; but his choice dominates this order. Thus it is clear that not everything a person does is what is ordained for him by the actions of the heavenly bodies, but it is possible that he will do those actions or will not do them. In this way the Torah is confirmed, the nature of possibility found in things is confirmed, and it is confirmed that God (may He be exalted) knows these low things [i.e., objects and events in the lower world], as we explained there [Wars V.3.4].148

In the Sixth Utility he derived from the Binding pericope, Gersonides phrased it in similar terms as in his explanation of God’s knowledge of the actions of the people of Sodom: “It teaches that whatever a human being does, it could be other than what is known to God (may He be exalted), as we mentioned above [in the Explanation of the Words].149 God’s knowledge relates to the ordained sequence of particulars in the sublunar world, which is known intellectually. This sequence is necessary and immutable. But what actually transpires in the sublunar world does not necessarily correspond to this intellectually known sequence. Because human beings are endowed with choice they can deviate from the sequence ordained by the stars. God cannot know whether an individual acted in a way other than that determined by 147 Comm. on Genesis 18:21, Utility 16 ( pp. 272–273). The translation here is slightly modified from that by Charles Manekin in his “Freedom within Reason? Gersonides on Human Choice,” in Freedom and Moral Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives, ed. Charles H. Manekin and Menachem M. Kellner ( Bethesda: University Press of Maryland, 1997), p. 188. 148 Comm. on Genesis, “Explanation of the Words” on Genesis 22:1, p. 295. 149 Ibid., p. 302.

288

determinism, contingency, free choice

astral causality or how in fact he acted then.150 That is, God knows what ought to happen, according to astral causality, but not what actually took place in the sublunar world. In Wars III Gersonides adds that God knows not only what ought to take place according to the astral configuration, but also that this sequence may not be realized if and when a human being chooses to deviate from this order. It is God who gave human beings choice, as a mode of providence in the sublunar world that supplements the providence of the stars. God, who endowed human beings with free choice, knows the nature of this choice. He knows that choice can steer human beings to act in a way other than that ordained by the astral configuration. We are to understand that God, having given human beings their essence—their intellect—knows how this essence is expressed and what it can do, and consequently has knowledge of the choice that depends on it. God’s knowledge that it is “possible” that events foreordained by the stars will not take place is knowledge in the strict sense of the word: knowledge of what is necessary, knowledge of the natural order, knowledge of the essence of human beings as endowed with choice. Thus God does not know things insofar as

150 This idea seems to be very problematic, as Lenn Schramm noted in the margins of his translation of this paper: “The implications of the past-tense acted are mindboggling! After centuries in which human beings have deviated from the astral order, such a deity would be ‘living in a fantasy world’ that has nothing in common with the real sublunar world.” Although I have not been able to come up with a really good answer to this, I can suggest several replies that Gersonides might make. He could answer that at every moment the stars determine afresh the conduct of the human beings who are members of the class of particulars to which an individual belongs and which is defined by their configuration at his birth. Hence human actions at a given moment do not entail long-term consequences. But this, too, is problematic. It is absurd to think that an act once performed, rather than another, does not entail another chain of possibilities and does not change the course of the life of the individual or the history of the people of Israel (see n. 152). Another possible answer is that God does not know a particular qua particular, that is to say the identity of the individual ( Reuben or Simeon), but He does know that an arbitrary individual who is the member of a certain class of individuals will act in a certain way. By choosing another way, that individual human being ( Reuben or Simeon) becomes a member of a different class of particulars, after which his actions and thoughts are determined by the configuration of the stars that govern that new class. God can know the acts of an arbitrary individual who is a member of this new class, though He also knows that this arbitrary individual can act in a different way, by exercising his free choice. But God does not know whether the arbitrary individual acted according to the astral order that governs this new class, or deviated from it. In this case, however, Gersonides cannot maintain the idea that the classes of particulars are defined by their nativity. This answer is particularly problematic for God’s knowledge of the people of Israel.

determinism, contingency, free choice

289

they are contingent, but he knows of the existence of the contingent as part of the natural order of the sublunar world. The knowledge that human beings can choose to act in a way other than that ordained by the stars is tantamount to knowledge that even though that order is itself necessary and fixed, for individuals it is merely contingent. God’s knowledge of individual human beings is thus a priori intellectual knowledge of the system of concrete contingencies within which human beings act. This system of contingencies is foreordained by the stars and does not apply to particulars qua particulars, does not distinguish Reuben or Simeon; rather, it applies to the set of those who “fall under this [general] ordering of events”—a set that, by definition, can have only a single member, if any. Consequently Gersonides can write, in Wars III.6: “God’s knowledge does not decide that a particular event will occur to this man, but it decides that it may occur to anyone who falls under this [general] ordering of events, insofar as these events are ordered, but He knows that it is possible that this event may not occur because of human choice. However, if we were to assume that He knows this affair with respect to this particular man as a definite individual [lit. qua particular], it would follow that His will is mutable.”151 Human beings do not themselves invent the system of contingencies within which they act. They do not set up, on their own, the possibility of A or not-A. They can only decide between two possibilities given to them. When facing the possibility of A or not-A they can choose A or they can choose not-A. After they have chosen one or the other, they face another possibility, B or not-B; and here too they merely decide between two given possibilities; and so on. God knows this system of possibilities, which is what distinguishes each individual, but not the concrete actions taken by individuals—their decision concerning each and every possibility.152 If this interpretation of Gersonides’ understanding of God’s knowledge is correct, his solution to the problem, when translated into

Wars, p. 150 / 2:136. This too is most problematic. It means that God’s knowledge is of a very complex system of possibilities and not of the real acts of human beings. To borrow again from Schramm’s marginalia, “a man may take the left or right fork in the road (A or ~A). If he chooses A, then at the next fork he has B/~B; but if he chooses ~A, the next fork is C/~C. So if God knows B/~B, He can ‘work back’ and know that the man chose A, because otherwise there would be no possibility of B/~B; etc. But if God knows both B and C, whatever the individual chose at A, we are back to the divine fantasy world mentioned above.” 151 152

290

determinism, contingency, free choice

logical terms, accepts three-valued logic. Ultimately, Gersonides’ version of God’s knowledge is that of knowledge of indifferent propositions, propositions that are neither true nor false and are subject to the law of contradiction only. However, Gersonides does not “translate” his solution to the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents into the terms of three-valued logic. He does not argue that God knows the proposition N(Ā ∨ ~Ā); in other words, that God’s knowledge is knowledge of the system of contingencies in the sublunar world. Adhering to two-valued logic, he formulates his solution by means of the principle of correspondence.153 God’s knowledge is of the sequence ordained by the heavenly bodies. This order is necessary; hence God’s knowledge is of the necessary and not of the contingent. God also knows that, thanks to their intellect, human beings have free choice that can induce them to do something other than what is ordained by the astral configuration. That is, God knows of the existence of contingency. This knowledge, too, is knowledge of the necessary—knowledge of the laws of nature. By the combination of these two types of knowledge, both of which are knowledge of what is necessary, God knows that it is possible that what is ordained by the system of necessary causality will not take place. Thus Gersonides does not renounce the solution presented in his supercommentary on De interpretatione 9, in the context of his discussion of God’s knowledge of contingencies; a fortiori he does not base his solution of the problem of divine knowledge on acceptance of three-valued logic. Nevertheless, as we have seen, Gersonides’ solution does imply that God knows the system of contingencies within which individuals act. So even though the Gersonides’ conclusion to the problem of divine knowledge argument resembles that reached by Ibn Daud—God knows contingents qua contingent—it has a totally different sense. What is more, Ibn Daud does not accept astral determinism and does not have a theory of choice resembling Gersonides’. Consequently the system of contingencies that God knows, according to Ibn Daud, is not the same as that intended by Gersonides.154 Nevertheless, as we

153 Because of his theological approach to God’s knowledge, William of Ockham, by contrast, rejects the Aristotelian theory of truth. See William Ockham, Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, trans. and annot. Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann ( New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), p. 14. 154 For a comparison of Gersonides and Ibn Daud, and the latter’s possible sources, see Pines, “Scholasticism after Thomas Aquinas,” pp. 253–262.

determinism, contingency, free choice

291

have seen, Gersonides is very close to Ibn Daud in the structure of his argument: solving the problem of determinism and free choice before the problem of God’s knowledge, and basing the solution of the latter on the solution of the former. One might argue, further, that there is some resemblance between Gersonides’ theses and the arguments of two Christian thinkers of his generation whose treatment of God’s knowledge of future contingents preceded his by several years—Pierre Auriol155 and William of Ockham.156 Both of them follow a line of reasoning that begins from Aristotle’s exposition in De interpretatione 9 and derive the logical conclusions as to God’s knowledge of future contingents. Although Gersonides, like Auriol and Ockham, employs the syllogisms he derives from De interpretatione in order to resolve the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents, he incorporates them into a treatment of the problem of astral determinism and free choice. He sees God not only as knowing things, but also as actuating the order that stems from the stars and consequently as the cause of this order. So his solution of the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents reflects his solution of the problem of astral determinism and free choice and is not a direct outgrowth of the Aristotelian discussion of the truth values of propositions about contingent future particulars.157 There are also other differences between Gersonides and the two Christian thinkers. Auriol (1280–1322)158 bases his solution to the problem of God’s knowledge on a reading of De interpretatione 9 that 155 In his 2006 article, “Philosophy and Theology across Cultures,” Christopher Schabel offers a lengthy comparison of Gersonides and Auriol, in contrast to my brevity here. Given, however, that Schabel does not read Hebrew and had only secondhand and incomplete knowledge of the contents of this article as originally published, he could not address much of what is written here and respond appropriately. In this revision I have left the section on Auriol unchanged, but have added a few notes referring to Schabel’s article. 156 Pierre Auriol died in 1322, meaning that what he wrote and said about the subject predated the composition of Gersonides’ supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia. Ockham’s discussion of predestination also seems to have been written before 1324 (on this see Gordon Leff, Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to Ockham [Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1958], p. 280). 157 I do not accept Schabel’s arguments (“Philosophy and Theology across Cultures,” p. 1106), which are based on a misunderstanding of Gersonides’ supercommentary on De interpretatione. As I have shown (above, p. 232), Gersonides’ explanation of Aristotle there is based on two-valued and not three-valued logic. 158 For Auriol’s ideas, see: Michalski, “Le problème de la volonté,” pp. 365–368 and appendix 5, pp. 397–398; Baudry, The Quarrel over Future Contingents, p. 5; Leff, Bradwardine and the Pelagians, pp. 211–216; Christopher David Schabel, Theology at Paris,

292

determinism, contingency, free choice

differs from Gersonides’. According to Auriol, Aristotle postulated a three-valued logic; that is, he held that, in addition to true propositions and false propositions there are also indifferent propositions that are neither true nor false. Auriol argues that if we allow that God knows true propositions about future contingents we are forced to acknowledge the existence of determinism and to reject free choice and contingency. But Aristotle demonstrated that choice and contingency exist. The only solution is that the future contingent propositions known by God are indifferent and do not have a specific true value. It follows that God knows that future events are contingent but not which of two alternatives will be realized. We know that Gregory of Rimini attacked a philosopher who maintained that God has foreknowledge of future actions of human volition but not of which alternative will be realized. His target was evidently Pierre Auriol.159 As we have seen, Gersonides does not accept three-valued logic. The import of his conclusion that God knows the system of possibilities of future contingents is utterly different from Auriol’s conclusion in this respect, too, and not only because, for Gersonides, God knows things that are ordered and determined as well as the possibility of the intervention of human choice to change what was determined and ordered in advance. We should also emphasize that Auriol’s treatment of the problem of God’s knowledge did not lead him to conclude his discussion with the idea that God knows only indifferent propositions about future contingents. Instead, he went further and formulated the notion that God has intuitive knowledge of future contingents. That God knows indifferent propositions about future contingents is only his reading of De interpretatione 9. Here there is an essential difference between Gersonides and Auriol.160 Because Gersonides does not submit to theological constraints, his bottom line derives from a philosophical discussion of God’s knowledge and his final word is that God’s knowledge is limited. A similar conclusion about divine knowledge is advanced by William of Ockham in his commentary on De interpretatione 9 and in his

1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents (Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2000), and the bibliography cited there. 159 See Michalski, “Le problème de la volonté,” p. 368. 160 See now also Schabel, “Philosophy and Theology across Cultures,” pp. 1108– 1109. He notes this difference and supports it with quotations from Auriol.

determinism, contingency, free choice

293

Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris contingentibus,161 on behalf of the disputant who contests the idea that God knows future contingents. Ockham reads De interpretatione 9 the same way that Gersonides does, as maintaining two-valued logic, and offers a temporal interpretation of the truth value of propositions about future contingents: propositions about future contingents are neither wholly true nor wholly false when spoken. In his commentary on De interpretatione, Ockham asserts that inasmuch as neither of the two alternatives is wholly true, and for Aristotle only what is true can be known, Aristotle would have argued that God knows neither of them.162 In the Tractatus de praedestinatione the disputant who denies that God knows future contingents derives the same conclusion from the Aristotelian treatment of propositions about future contingents in De interpretatione 9.163 These arguments do not reflect Ockham’s own view of the problem of God’s knowledge, however, but only the conclusions to be derived from its philosophical treatment in De interpretatione 9. In his own commentary on De interpretatione Ockham argues that, in reality as well as according to the theologians, God does know which of the two alternatives will be realized, but theology must explain how God can know it.164 In the Tractatus de praedestinatione Ockham writes that the naysayer’s argument is to be rejected in the name of faith.165 When Ockham develops his own view of the problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents he follows a course diametrically opposed to that adopted by this disputant: rather than beginning from logic in order to solve the theological problem of God’s knowledge of future contingents, he starts from theology, with its assumption of divine omniscience, to draw the logical implications of this postulate and presents a theory of truth different than Aristotle’s in order to satisfy the theological requirement of an omniscient God.166 This procedure is totally foreign to Gersonides who, as we have emphasized, adheres to a purely philosophical approach in his treatment of this subject. So it seems to me that even if Gersonides had read Ibn Daud’s Exalted Faith (although he never refers either to the book or its author) 161 The English translation cited above (n. 153) includes a translation of Ockham’s commentary on De interpretatione 9 in an appendix ( pp. 96–109). 162 Ibid., p. 105. 163 Ibid., pp. 54–55. 164 Ibid., pp. 105–106. 165 Ibid., p. 55. 166 See Leff, William of Ockham, pp. 449–450.

294

determinism, contingency, free choice

and even if he was acquainted in some fashion with the contemporary Christian debates about God’s knowledge of future contingents, his treatment of the problem of divine knowledge is an original development that bears his personal stamp. Gersonides’ solution to the problem of God’s knowledge is very much a direct consequence of the modes of investigation he employed. Even though each of these methods— empiricism, the dialectic method, and the application to the problem of God’s knowledge of the logical discussion of propositions about future contingents in De interpretatione 9—is found in the Christian thought of his age, the way in which he integrates and employs them in pursuit of his own solution to the problem is definitely original.167 Gersonides’ conclusion about God’s knowledge gives rise to a thorny theological problem. Like the Aristotelian philosophers and Maimonides, Gersonides assumes that God is “perfect” and thus must also have perfect knowledge. The conclusions that God does not know particulars insofar as they are not foreordained and that God does not know which of two contingent alternatives will be realized are tantamount to ascribing a grave deficiency—ignorance—to God. Gersonides draws on the Aristotelian concept of knowledge to avert this absurdity: “Perfect knowledge of something is the knowledge of what that thing is in reality.”168 Here Gersonides assumes, of course, that God’s knowledge of particulars in the sublunar world is a priori only; His knowledge of “what that thing is in reality” is knowledge of a thing as it is at the time when it is known, that is, before it exists. Because, according to the principle of correspondence, contingents cannot be known in advance (were they known in advance they would be nec-

167 Hence I reject the assertion by Schabel (“Philosophy and Theology across Cultures,” p. 1104) that had I read Auriol directly I would have arrived at different conclusions than those I reached here. Nor do I accept his conclusion that, “as all the great thinkers do, Gersonides incorporated what he accepted [from Auriol] in an original way, making modifications where needed” ( p. 1117). As I have shown, Gersonides’ conclusions with regard to God’s knowledge are a direct outgrowth of the structured and graded methodological process that he begins in Wars II, in his discussion of prophetic foreknowledge and of the knowledge possessed by the Active Intellect. I see no reason to assume that he borrowed here from Auriol. It should be reiterated that Gersonides’ solution to the problem of God’s knowledge can be read as acceptance of three-valued logic, although Gersonides never explicitly says that he accepts it himself. His supercommentary on De interpretatione assumes two-valued logic (see above, n. 157). It was the unique method he adopted to find a solution to the problem of God’s knowledge that led him to this conclusion, and not his supercommentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary on De interpretatione. 168 Wars, p. 139 / 2:118.

determinism, contingency, free choice

295

essary rather than contingent), God’s ignorance of contingents is not a defect in his knowledge. To put it another way, God cannot know what cannot be known as a matter of principle, and his ignorance of what cannot be known is not a deficiency of knowledge. Rather, he concludes, “God knows all these things in the most perfect way possible.”169 Ibn Daud, in his discussion of God’s knowledge in Exalted Faith, raised the quandary that God’s ignorance of which of two alternatives will be realized could lead to ascribing imperfect knowledge to Him. Like Gersonides after him, he rejects this argument, but only because ascribing knowledge of one of the two possibilities to God would entail strict determinism: “someone who says this [i.e., asks whether God, may He be exalted, is ignorant of how the matter will turn out] would make all accidents (te arim) like eclipses [which are necessary future events], either necessary or impossible in all respects, and [claims that] God did not create anything whose attribute or contrary is possible.”170 Ibn Daud does not link his rejection of the ascription of ignorance to God to the Aristotelian concept of knowledge, certainly not explicitly. After offering a philosophical resolution of the problem of human knowledge of future events in his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, Gersonides cites the experience of dreams and prophecy to corroborate his solution. A similar procedure is not possible with regard to God’s knowledge of future contingents, since we have no empirical experience of the existence of God’s knowledge. Gersonides, who sticks to the structure he followed in the third discursive note of the supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia in his discussion of the problem of God’s knowledge, nevertheless finds a way to wind up the latter with an argument based on experience that can support the conclusions reached through philosophical arguments. He employs an indirect proof from experience, that of prophets’ revelation of future events, and formulates the argument in theological rather than philosophical language. The revelation of future events by prophets is merely a realization of a divine decree (a theological formulation). Consequently, we can infer from the actions of prophets, of which we have historical experience, to God, who gives the command.

169 Ibid. Here too Schabel notes the similarity between the positions taken by Gersonides and Auriol (“Philosophy and Theology across Cultures,” pp. 1107–1108). 170 Exalted Faith, p. 96 / p. 248.

296

determinism, contingency, free choice

Speaking in God’s name, the prophets call on those to whom they were sent to follow the upright path in order to be saved from the evil fate that otherwise awaits them. Because their message is uttered by divine injunction, it is to be seen as an imperative issued by God himself. If God demands that human beings improve their conduct in order to avoid the evil that will otherwise overtake them, this is because He knows what is ordained by the astral configuration—a catastrophe; but He also knows that there is no strict determinism in nature, that nature includes contingency based on human choice, and consequently that the evil ordained for human beings by the causal system may not take place, if those whom the calamity was going to strike act in a different way than is dictated by the stars. Consequently He commands prophets to warn human beings and exhort them to return from their evil ways, meaning the actions they perform under the influence of the stars. Thus the experience of prophecy indicates that Gersonides’ solution for the problem of God’s knowledge, arrived at on philosophical grounds, is correct, just as, according to Gersonides’ supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia, the experience of prophecy indicates that his conclusion about the problem of human knowledge of future events is correct.

GERSONIDES ON THE MODE OF COMMUNICATING KNOWLEDGE OF THE FUTURE TO THE DREAMER AND CLAIRVOYANT* One of Prof. Alexander Altmann’s last published works was an annotated critical edition of Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of Parva naturalia II.3. The chapter in question deals with the prediction of the future by means of dreams, clairvoyance, and prophecy. I would like to dedicate my contribution to the volume of essays in his memory to a related issue in Gersonides’ thought: namely, the mode of communicating knowledge of the future to the dreamer and clairvoyant. In Book II of his philosophical-theological work, The Wars of the Lord, Gersonides deals with the prediction of the future through dreams, clairvoyance and prophecy—a threefold subject that was suggested to him by Averroes’s Epitome of Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia. While influenced by Averroes, Gersonides also criticizes his positions and elaborates new solutions to the problems he posed.1 While Averroes (and Gersonides himself, in his supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of Parva Naturalia) states that veridical dreams, clairvoyance and prophecy all belong to the same “genus”2—that is, are essentially one and differ only in “degree,” in the quantity of true predictions attained by each method3—Gersonides (in the Wars) holds that there is an essential

* I have revised the original article in various ways and added several new reference. Following H. A. Davidson in “Gersonides on the Material and Active Intellects,” Studies on Gersonides, A Fourteenth-Century Jewish Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Gad Freudenthal (Leiden, 1992), I translated qesem as clairvoyance and qosem as clairvoyant. H. Blumberg, in his translation of Averroes’s Epitome of Parva Naturalia, and S. Feldman, in his translation of the Wars, wrote “divination” for qesem and “diviner” for qosem. The terms are interchangeable. 1 See (in this volume) “Determinism, Contingency, Free Choice, and Foreknowledge in Gersonides’ Thought,” pp. 246–296. 2 See also Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed II.36 (p. 261; p. 370), in a manner very similar to that of Averroes. It is plausible that Maimonides and Averroes received the same tradition concerning this issue. 3 Such is Gersonides’ interpretation of Averroes in his supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva Naturalia pp. 9–10. See also the first discursive note (Altmann’s “Excursus I”), where it seems too that Gersonides accepts Averroes’s opinion. Gersonides’ supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva naturalia is cited

298

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

difference between dreams and clairvoyance, on the one hand, and prophecy, on the other. According to Gersonides, this difference is manifested on two levels— the psychological and the cosmological. On the psychological level, the faculty of the soul that receives prophetic knowledge is the intellect (although imagination also plays a role), while dreams and clairvoyance are received by the imagination. On the cosmological level, the immediate agent producing prophetic knowledge is the Active Intellect, while in veridical dreams and clairvoyance the heavenly bodies are the immediate agent. I will deal here with the cosmological aspect of predicting the future through veridical dreams and clairvoyance. Gersonides arrives at the conclusion that the celestial bodies communicate knowledge of future events to the imaginative faculty of the dreamer and the clairvoyant by two methods: the diaporematic method, which is a variation of the method that he uses most widely in his philosophical debates in the Wars4 and the applicative method. The diaporematic method often consists of providing two solutions to a given problem. While each one of them is a true contention, the two of them conflict and relate to each other as thesis and antithesis. Hence they form an aporia, which Gersonides often overcomes by creating a synthesis of the two solutions. He argues that each of the conflicting contentions is true, albeit each one from a different viewpoint. As this solution takes into account the rule of contradiction, it is logically valid.5 In the present discussion, the thesis is that the communication of future events in clairvoyance and dreams is not given by the Active Intellect,6 whereas the antithesis is that the Active Intellect is the agent according to “Gersonides’ Commentary on Averroes’ Epitome of Parva Naturalia II, 3,” ed. Alexander Altmann ( Jerusalem, 1980), pp. 1–31; repr. from Jubilee Volume of the American Academy for Jewish Research 46–47 (1979–1980). Averroes’s commentary is cited from H. Blumberg, ed., Averrois Compendium librorum Aristotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur, Textum hebraeicum recensuit et adnotationibus illustravit Henericus Blumberg, Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, versionem hebraeicarum, vol. 7 (Cambridge, MA, 1954). 4 For the diaporematic method in the Wars of the Lord, see my “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur”; and (in this volume) “The Opinions that Produce the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord ” and “The Solutions of the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord.” 5 For this type of solution see “The Solutions of the Aporias in the Wars of the Lord,” pp. 49–52. 6 Gersonides arrives at this thesis by an argument based on experience: namely, that the faculty of the soul that receives communications in clairvoyance and dream is the faculty of the imagination. As there cannot be any direct connection between

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

299

of all of the communications of future events in the human soul.7 The solution to this aporia suggested by Gersonides is a compromise between the thesis and the antithesis: each one of them is right, but from a different point of view. On the one hand, as contended by the antithesis, the source of the communication imparted to the imaginative faculty is indeed the Active Intellect; on the other hand, it is not imparted directly to the human faculty of imagination, but is conveyed by an intermediary; hence, it fits the thesis. Gersonides identifies this intermediary with the heavenly bodies. The solution arrived at by the diaporematic method is generally a very formal one: it is a “structure” that needs to be “filled in” by some “content.” The diaporematic method cannot provide this “filling” by itself; thus Gersonides needs to use another method in order to complete his solution. In our case, such a “structure” consists in the conclusion that the communications are imparted to the imaginative faculty of the dreamer and the clairvoyant by an intermediary, and not directly by the Active Intellect. Gersonides needs to “fill” it by the identification of this intermediary. He must also justify this identification within the framework of his philosophical system and explain how this intermediary functions. That is, he needs to explain why he thinks that the heavenly bodies are the intermediaries that communicate this knowledge to the dreamer’s and the clairvoyant’s faculty of imagination, how this solution is possible within his physics and metaphysics, and in what way the heavenly bodies can serve as such an intermediary. In order to answer these questions, he must use another method commonly used in the Wars: the applicative method. This method consists in the application of a solution derived in one area, generally one already dealt with in the Wars, to a new area in which Gersonides is seeking a solution to another problem. We may also call this method the analogical method, because the application of a solution of one problem to another presupposes that there is an analogy between the two. The typical structure of the argument in this method is usually the following: if a certain model is correct for the solution of matter No. 1,

the faculty of the imagination and the Active Intellect—since the Active Intellect communicates directly only with the material intellect—another agent must be responsible for this communication. 7 This is the conclusion reached in his discussion of the functions of the Active Intellect in Wars II.3.

300

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

it should be applied to matter No. 2 as well. In this way, Gersonides is able to propose solutions that are not proved scientifically, but that fit into the framework and principles of his thought. They fit into his cosmology, especially his theory of the Active Intellect and the ways in which it affects the sublunar world; and also fit his astrology, which he has made an integral part of his physics. They also fit into the explication of the way in which the celestial bodies affect the sublunar world and into his epistemology. Gersonides believes that by explaining a new matter by models and by philosophical and scientific principles already found in his system, he makes his new solution plausible to a far greater extent.8 Gersonides uses this method in Wars II.3 to establish the contention that the Active Intellect imparts knowledge of future events to the clairvoyant and the dreamer through the intermediacy of the celestial bodies. He uses the effect of the Active Intellect on the sublunar world on the ontological level as a model and applies it to the epistemological level, to the communication of future events to the clairvoyant and dreamer. The key-term in this discussion is “instrument” (keli). Beginning in Wars I.6, Gersonides proceeds through a number of stages to apply the solution arrived at in the former stage to the next one. In Wars I.1 he explains that the Active Intellect causes the emergence of the existents by giving them their forms. He uses the mixture (mezeg) of the four elements as an instrument preparing the different matters to receive the forms9 given them by the Active Intellect.10 Because the 8 See, for example: the argument to support Bildad’s thesis of providence, according to which anything bad that occurs aims at something good. This opinion is based on a natural model: in nature, hunger, which is an unpleasant sensation, causes the hungry creature to supply himself food, which is good for him; eating keeps him alive (Wars IV.2); the solution of the aporia of the agent of miracles, (VI.2.10, p. 158 / 2:164). And see “The Solutions of the Aporias in Wars of the Lord,” pp. 52, 62–64. 9 Compare: “[T]his order [in this influence] acts as an instrument by means of which the Agent Intellect performs the operations it intends to do. For the heavenly bodies generate the mixture [of the sublunary substances] and give it to the various existents of the sublunar world, as has been shown in the physical sciences. This [mixture], then, is the instrument by virtue of which the form [of a sublunar substance] derives from the Agent Intellect, as has been explained” (Wars I.7; p. 50 / 1:167–168). 10 According to one possible interpretation, this occurs simply by the emanation of form on the mixtures disposed to receive it. According to Davidson, however, “the Active Intellect does not emanate forms directly from itself, but brings them forth by somehow manipulating properly disposed matter through physical heat, which is present in matter and serves as the Active Intellect’s tool [= instrument]” (“Gersonides on the Material and Active Intellects,” p. 239).

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

301

stars bring about the mixture of the existents of the sublunar world by the effect of their rays on matter, one can say that the Active Intellect uses the stars as its instrument,11 in the sense of intermediaries for bringing about the substances in the sublunar world. This argument is explicitly stated by Gersonides in Wars II.3: “Since it has been previously demonstrated that the heavenly bodies serve as instruments for the Active Intellect insofar as they produce the mixtures for the sublunar world. . . .”12 In the same chapter (II.3), Gersonides goes on to apply his conclusion about the operations of the Active Intellect to the emergence of substances and accidents in the sublunar world—i.e., natural astrology—to juridical astrology. He takes the general cosmological principle that the Active Intellect uses the stars as its “instruments” for its operations in the sublunar world and applies it to the “accidents”—that is, the “events” that befall human individuals and are communicated by clairvoyants, dreamers, and prophets. He argues that the Active Intellect also affects these events through the intermediacy of the celestial bodies as its “instruments.” Gersonides does not consider the arguments he puts forward to establish his claim about the way in which the Active Intellect operates as a scientific proof. Rather, he thinks that his conclusion is very plausible: since the stars are the “instrument” of the Active Intellect in producing the “mixture” or composition of each thing, “it is ‘proper’ (ra ui she- . . .) that this will be so [i.e., that they are also instruments] in producing the order inherent in these events.”13 Hence, the Active Intellect does in fact activate the events that occur to human beings, but it does so through the intermediacy of the stars. Here Gersonides has already moved from an argument on the ontological level to one on the epistemological level and says that, since

Feldman: “instruments.” Wars, p. 98 / 2:38. Compare: “In this manner God performs many activities by means of the movers of the heavenly bodies, since the movers possess an instrument, i.e., the star, by virtue of which these acts are accomplished” (I.6; p. 44 / 1:158). 13 Ibid., II.3, p. 98 / 2:38. Arguments based upon the high probability of the proposed solution, whose key word is ra ui she-. . . (“it is proper that . . .”), are characteristic of Gersonides in other places as well. See, for example, the support for Eliphaz’s view of Providence in Wars IV.2 (p. 156 / 2:162). In Wars II.3, Gersonides strongly advances the thesis that the Active Intellect brings about “accidents,” in the sense of the events that sometimes occur in this world, on the basis of the argument that it has already caused other events in the world. Gersonides’ arguments are not always convincing and some of them seem extremely forced. This is not the place to analyze or criticize them. 11 12

302

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

the Active Intellect affects the order14 of the sublunar world, it should also cause knowledge of this order in men.15 The passage from natural astrology to juridical astrology is characteristic of his discussions in the Wars, especially his discussion of the stars’ influence on the sublunar world in V.2. In all these passages, Gersonides emphasizes that the physical theory underlining juridical astrology is a development and enlargement of natural astrology. Hence, juridical astrology is as much a science as Aristotelian physics itself. It applies the same principles used by natural astrology to explain natural events to a far wider range of phenomena, to man and the events that occur to him, and hence fits perfectly within the framework of Aristotelian cosmology.16 In Wars II.6 (solution to the eighth problem), Gersonides takes another step forward. This time he does not apply the principle by which the Active Intellect operates in the sublunar world, through the intermediary of the celestial bodies as his “instruments,” to another cosmological area, but rather applies it to the epistemological domain and its operation in “communicating” future events—that is to say, to the operation that communicates those same events (“accidents”) that, according to Wars II.3, were brought about by the Active Intellect using the stars as its “instruments.” Gersonides’ argument is the following: “Since we observe that the Active Intellect makes use of the heavenly bodies in many of its activities in the sublunar world,17 it appears that they are the intermediaries in this type of communication.”18

Heb. siddur. Feldman’s translates the term as “pattern,” but “order” strikes me as more apt and I have used it throughout (including in citations of his translation of the Wars). 15 In this chapter Gersonides has not yet decided whether this communication is given by an intermediary or not, because he does not yet distinguish between the modes of predicting the future by prophecy and of predicting the future by clairvoyance and dream. 16 In a similar manner, in his discussion of the cause of evil in Wars IV.3, Gersonides moves from the claim, also accepted by Maimonides, that nature contains evils that are “accidental,” an unintentional side effect of an activity generally intended for good, in the sense of sustaining the existence of the sublunar world (i.e., natural astrology), to the claim that the evils that befall human beings are caused in an accidental manner by the activities of the stars, whose purpose is to cause good to man (i.e., juridical astrology). The two phenomena are explained by the same principles. 17 The activities are: the coming-into-being of objects by the preparation of their mixture (Wars I.6) and the determination of the specific composition of things from it. According to Wars II.3, most of the accidents of things are thereby ordered, including the ordering of accidents (i.e., events), which are communicated by those who tell the future by means of clairvoyance, dream, or prophecy (ibid.) 18 Wars, p. 114 / 2:64. For a criticism of this conclusion, see Davidson, “Gersonides on the Material and Active Intellects,” p. 259. 14

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

303

Here too the solution, while perceived as very plausible, is not seen by Gersonides as deduced by apodictic proof or by dialectical method, methods that he considers to provide the truth. We remain with the problem of the mode in which the celestial bodies serve as intermediaries or instruments of the Active Intellect on the epistemological level, i.e., in communicating knowledge of future events to the clairvoyant and dreamer. The accepted interpretation of Gersonides’ view on this matter is that here he introduces a new mode of influence exercised by the heavenly bodies on the sublunar world. While the stars generally act on the sublunar world through the influence of their rays on matter, communication of future events is a function of the influence of the souls of the spheres on human souls, by transmitting “images and thoughts” directly to the imaginative faculty of the clairvoyant and dreamer. Such an interpretation has been suggested by H. Kreisel,19 who posits that Gersonides is here influenced by Avicenna. The difficulty in this interpretation is that, according to Avicenna, the souls of the spheres have imagination, and consequently can impart knowledge of future events, that is, communication of the particular, to man’s imaginative faculty. According to Gersonides’ cosmology, however, the spheres have rational souls and do not have material souls and hence do not have imagination.20 A similar explanation is offered by H. A. Davidson.21 who claims that the rational souls of the spheres communicate intelligibles directly to the human imaginative faculty. Given that, unlike the Active Intellect, they are not separate intellects, but rational souls inherent in the spheres,22 they can have a direct relationship with the human imaginative faculty. In this way Davidson overcomes Kreisel’s difficulty and also frees us from his supposition that Gersonides’ theory was influenced 19 Cf. H. Kreisel, “Veridical Dreams and Prophecy in the Philosophy of Gersonides,” Da at 22 (1989): pp. 81–82 (Hebrew). 20 See Wars V.3.6 (p. 263 / 3:144). Kreisel himself admits this difficulty, but this awareness does not cause him to forgo his thesis that Gersonides’ approach is influenced by Avicenna’s. He resolves the difficulty by the statement that “inconsistency in discussion pertaining to things existing in the supernal world is characteristic of Gersonides’ teaching” (ibid., p. 82). However, this answer, as well as the assumption that in Gersonides, too, the souls of the spheres have the imaginative faculty, seems to me unacceptable. 21 Davidson, “Gersonides on the Material and Active Intellects,” p. 211 n. 48; p. 259 n. 210; and p. 261. 22 Cf. Wars V.3.6 (pp. 261–263 / 3:141–144, esp. p. 263 / 3:144).

304

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

by Avicenna. Davidson implicitly claims that here Gersonides invented a new solution to the issue of the conveyance of knowledge of future events to the imaginative faculty of the human soul, a solution that fits in well with his own cosmology. But this interpretation is not plausible, because when Gersonides explains why the Active Intellect cannot be the source of communications to the clairvoyant’s and dreamer’s faculty of imagination, he states that the imagination is not capable of receiving the activity of the [Active] Intellect except through the material intellect by virtue of the intimacy between it and the material intellect, insofar as the soul is a unit.23

The Active Intellect (or possibly any separate intellect) cannot directly affect the imaginative faculty of the human soul. The reason why the rational faculty can impart the intelligibles to the imaginative faculty is that the human soul is one; hence there is a sort of “union” between its imaginative faculty and rational faculty, inasmuch as both of them are part of the same soul. This condition is not fulfilled in the case of the rational souls of the spheres, since they exist outside the human soul and do not form a “union” with it, as the rational human faculty does with the imaginative faculty. Hence, it seems to me that Gersonides could not have maintained that the souls of the spheres communicate future contingents in clairvoyance and in dreams. The same holds true for the Active Intellect and the intellects that move the spheres.24 I would like to suggest another interpretation of the mode of Gersonides’ concept of the conveyance of future events to the dreamer and clairvoyant by the celestial bodies. According to this interpretation, the “images and thoughts” of the clairvoyant and the dreamer do not emanate directly to the faculty of imagination from the souls of the spheres, but, like all other things that occur to human beings, are caused by the stars, which affect them by their rays. The stars affect the human “mixture” or temperament, which in turn produces the “images and thoughts” in the imaginative faculty of the clairvoyant and the dreamer.25

Ibid., II.6 (p. 112 / 2:61). The proximate movers of the spheres are their rational souls, and their remote movers are the separate intellects. The same conclusion is valid in both cases. 25 On the possibility of understanding “emanation” in this way, see Davidson, “Gersonides on the Material and Active Intellects,” pp. 236–239, 247–248. 23 24

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

305

I would like to show that there are two keys for understanding this issue in Gersonides’ thought: the method he used in elaborating his solution and his attitude towards astrology. I base my arguments primarily on Wars II, but will also refer to Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva Naturalia and to his commentaries on the Bible, especially on Daniel. Already in the previous discussion, in which Gersonides establishes the claim that the Active Intellect informs the clairvoyant and dreamer of future events by means of the heavenly bodies, it follows that the stars, rather than the souls of the spheres, are the source of the clairvoyant’s and the dreamer’s knowledge of future events. The high probability that the heavenly bodies are the “instrument” of the Active Intellect in conveying knowledge of the future is based upon the analogy to a very specific type of activity of the heavenly bodies: the activity of the stars upon the mixture of the sublunar world. For Gersonides, the manner in which the heavenly bodies serve as an “instrument” of the Active Intellect in the cognitive realm is no different than that in which they serve as an “instrument” in the cosmological realm. Indeed, his use of the applicative method indicates that it is most likely that the model of activity of the Active Intellect in all those cases that he surveyed is the very same model: the Active Intellect always uses the stars as its “instruments.” But the most important explanation of the mode of communicating future contingents to the clairvoyant and dreamer, by the intermediacy of the heavenly bodies, is found in Wars II.6 (solution to the eighth problem), which may be completed and elucidated by means of Wars II.7.26 In Wars II.6 Gersonides writes: Moreover, it has been shown that the orders that this communication reveals are derived from the heavenly bodies, and since the heavenly bodies are endowed with intellect (ba alei śekel), they necessarily apprehend the order that derives from them. This point will be completely explained in Book Five of this treatise.27 Here we shall merely introduce this subject, which will be explained later in full, in a preliminary form. The basic notion is that whatever is ordered by one of the heavenly bodies differs from what is ordered by another [heavenly body] and that 26 Wars, pp. 116–117 / 2:68. He speaks here only about clairvoyance, because he is dealing with a concrete case, that of a boy of six or seven who “can make known what his questioner knows” (p. 115 /2:66). But since dreams and clairvoyance belong to the same genus, his content is also valid for dreams. 27 Wars V.3. 7, 9.

306

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge each mover of the heavenly bodies apprehends the actions ordered from it and not those from the other movers [of the heavenly bodies].28 On the basis of this principle, we now claim that just as images and thoughts are ordered from them to each individual man by the ascendant degree or the dominant [star] at this time, so too, the imagination when it is isolated from the other faculties of the soul, will then be prepared to receive the order inherent their souls [the souls of the heavenly bodies]29 from that which emanates from them. And since all the heavenly bodies do not cooperate perfectly in this communication, as will be evident to any one who studies astrology, and all the heavenly bodies are involved in the orders deriving from them, the knowledge that is conveyed by this means is defective knowledge. And so falsehood frequently occurs in these communications.30

The key for understanding this text and Wars II.7 is, once again, the applicative method. In his discussions of the conveyance of knowledge of future events through dreams and clairvoyance, Gersonides established an analogy between the effect of the Active Intellect in nature (natural astrology) and its effect on human actions (juridical astrology); here he establishes an analogy between the astrological theory concerning the transmission of “thoughts” or “images and thoughts” to men and the communication of future events in clairvoyance and dreams. The significance of this analogy must be understood in terms of the place and role played by astrology in Gersonides’ system. Gersonides’ attitude towards astrology is complicated. On the one hand, he considers astrology to be just as valid a science as Aristotelian physics; the theory underlying juridical astrology is as much a science as that which underlies natural astrology. On the other hand, as a practical science, a technique for predicting the future, astrology is unreliable and subject to many errors. His reservations concerning astrology as a technique for predicting the future do not refute his claim about the truth of the basic theory underlying juridical astrology—namely, the theory according to which the stars determine the events, actions, and

28 This idea is repeated frequently in Wars V.3. See, for example, chaps. 8 (p. 273 / 3:162), 9 (p. 275 / 3:165), 11 (p. 278 / 3:170), 12 (p. 285 / 3:184), and 13 (p. 286 / 3:185). 29 Hebrew be-nafsham. Feldman translates “inherent in the intellects of the heavenly bodies.” In the next chapter, Gersonides repeats the same claim. There, instead of be-nafsham, he writes “be-nefesh of the heavenly bodies,” which Feldman translates as “in the souls of the heavenly bodies” (II.7 [p. 116 / 2:68]). In the first passage his translation seems to refer to the rational souls of the spheres. 30 Wars II.6; p.114 / 2:64.

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

307

the thoughts of human beings. Astrology as a technique for predicting the future is unreliable because of the limitations of human knowledge, not because the theory on which it is based is erroneous. The physical distance of the stars from the sublunar world makes it difficult to observe them. The fact that they occupy a higher ontological degree than the sublunar existents makes it more difficult to understand them than phenomena in the sublunar world. In addition, astronomy is not a perfect science; we do not know all the movements of the stars. Moreover, the different conjunctions among those stars, which, according to the astrologers, affect the sublunar world, especially man’s destiny, character, actions, and thoughts, repeat themselves rarely; at times, there may be an interval of thousands of years between two identical conjunctions. Hence it is impossible to construct by induction perfect laws showing their influence on the sublunar world.31 There is yet another difficulty: according to Gersonides, the celestial bodies are not the only cause of events in the sublunar world. Human choice, rooted in the intellect, also plays a role. Astrologers, who attempt to discover the laws of stellar influence on the sublunar world from their observations of nature—or as Gersonides puts it, on the basis of “experience”—cannot distinguish events that were caused only by the stars and their different aspects from events that occur because of human choice or in which human choice is involved. They may base their inductions on phenomena caused by the latter as well and hence arrive at erroneous astrological laws.32 In his discussion of astrology, Gersonides tries to have it both ways. On the one hand, he argues that true prediction of future events by means of astrology is a fact given by experience. Hence, these predictions may be used to prove that the underlying theory is valid; the stars do affect the events (i.e., accidents) that befall human beings in the sublunar world, causing their thoughts and actions; hence there is astral determinism.33 On the other hand, he claims that practical

31 For explanations of the limitations of astrology, see Wars II.2 (p. 95 / 2:33) and V.2.1 (pp. 189–190 / 3:30). On the limitations of astrology, see Gersonides’ supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva Naturalia, pp. 16 and 17, and the third discursive note, p. 18; comm. on Genesis, “Explanation of the Words of the Pericope” (be ur millot ha-parashah), p. 56. 32 This argument appears only in Wars V.2.1 (p. 190 / 3:30). 33 See Wars II.2; and (in this volume) “Determinism, Contingency, Free Choice, and Foreknowledge in Gersonides’ Thought,” pp. 258–264.

308

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

astrology may often be mistaken in its concrete predictions; hence it is not a reliable science.34 In the present discussion, Gersonides refers to the theory underlying juridical astrology as a technique of prediction. As he holds this theory to be a science, like natural astrology, he can rely on it in his pursuit of a solution to the problem of the mode by which clairvoyance and dreams communicate future events. He thus applies the astrologers’ explanation of the manner in which the celestial bodies transmit “images and thoughts” to human beings to the communication of knowledge of future events to the clairvoyant and the dreamer.35 He argues that such communication is effected in the same way in which the celestial bodies transmit “images and thoughts” to the human soul. The key for understanding communication of future events is therefore the astrological explanation for the emanation of “images and thoughts” to human beings. It is important to note that, in the present context, for Gersonides “thought” does not generally mean conceptual thought, intellectual perception, but thought with sensible images, thought of particular things, people, acts or events. “Images” and “thoughts” belong to

34 It follows indirectly from this that astrology cannot serve as a means of providence over man, as this purpose is served by knowledge of the future through prophecy. His attitude towards clairvoyance and dreams as a means of providence is problematic; on the one hand, following Averroes in the Epitome of the Parva Naturalia, (in II.5 and IV.2), he argues that all three manners of foretelling the future —clairvoyance, dreams, and prophecy—are forms of providence on man. Knowledge of the future makes it possible for a man to employ his intellective choice to flee from the evil intended for him by the system of the stars and to achieve greater good than that was destined for him by it. On the other hand, it follows from what he says that since there are numerous errors in both of these modes of foretelling the future, man may receive inaccurate information about the future he anticipates. If he relies on this information and chooses (with intellective choice) certain activities, he is liable to bring evil on himself rather than good. 35 This being the case, I cannot accept Kreisel’s view “that Ibn Sina is the main source of Gersonides’ approach to the connection between the souls of the stars and knowledge of the future” (Kreisel, “Veridical Dreams,” p. 81). Here Gersonides conducts an independent study, basing his claim on an accepted astrological theory that the stars affect human thoughts in general. In contrast to Kreisel (ibid., p. 82), I think we can understand Gersonides’ approach without assuming that he adopted Avicenna’s theory of the communication of future events to the human soul by the heavenly bodies. In itself, of course, this argument is inadequate to refute the interpretation that, for Gersonides, the communication of future contingents is an influence of images from the souls of the spheres on the human imaginative faculty. But in order to accept such an interpretation of Gersonides’ thought, it needs to be supported by arguments derived solely from his writings.

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

309

the same genus; thus, in similar contexts, Gersonides is able to speak sometimes of “images and thoughts” and at other times of “thoughts” alone.36 The astrological theory concerning the influence of “images and thoughts” on human beings appears in Wars II.6 and 7, cited above, as well as in other places in Gersonides’ writings. In all these sources, it is obvious that it is the stars rather than the souls of the spheres that affect “images and thoughts” in the human soul. According to Wars V.2.6, the stars have “divine power,” which they emanate to the world through the intermediacy of their rays.37 We thus need to understand that the stars, by means of their rays, also affect human “images and thoughts.” As we shall see below, this action affects the human mixture or temperament, which in its turn creates these “images and thoughts.” The most widely accepted view of astrology in the ancient world was that the position of the stars at the moment of a person’s birth, i.e., his natal horoscope, determined his physical and spiritual characteristics and his destiny. Consequently, these may be predicted by observing the position of the stars at the moment of a person’s birth (and calculating their positions at later times in his life). But in addition to the belief in astral determinism, as fixed by the natal horoscope, there was also a doctrine that the dominant stars at each moment affect a person’s fate at that moment. There are three kinds of dominant stars: the star that dominates at a given hour, the star that dominates on a given day, and the star that dominates in a given year. This doctrine is combined with the theory of astral determinism, fixed by the natal horoscope; astrologers understood that the influence of the dominant stars upon a person at a given moment also depended on his natal horoscope, which is the consistently dominant influence in his life. The link between the natal horoscope and the influence of the dominant 36 Thought apprehends particular things as a combination of matter and form, whereas the intellect comprehends and confirms only the “general,” the form. See Epitome of the Parva Naturalia and Gersonides’ supercommentary thereon: “Gersonides’ Supercommentary to Averroes’s Epitome of the De Anima,” in J. S. Mashbaum, “Chapters 9–12 of Gersonides’ Supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the De Anima: The Internal Senses,” doctoral dissertation, Brandeis University, 1981, pp. 26–29. See ibid., p. 24, where Gersonides brings examples of “thoughts”: “like our supposing that this is good, or that is bad, or that this does or does not have a given characteristic, or our supposing that such-and-such an event did occur.” 37 See Wars, pp. 203–204 / III: 53–54. Here he refers to the effect of the stars on the sublunar world by their rays as “influence” (hashpa ah).

310

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

stars explains the difference in the influence of the dominant stars on different people in the same place and at the same time. According to the astrological theory presented by Gersonides in Wars II.6 and 7, the heavenly bodies determine not only the events that occur to men and their acts, but also their “images and thoughts.” What determines the individual’s “images and thoughts” at a given moment is the ascending sign of the zodiac or the star or stars that are dominant at that time.38 In Chapter 7, Gersonides adds to the dominant stars, that is, the stars that belong to the transient constellation,39 the natal constellation. Even if a person’s thoughts at a particular moment are influenced by the stars that are dominant then, they are also subject to the influence of natal constellation.40 The same idea is expressed later on, in Wars II.7: Hence, the thought [about the future] emanates from the dominant [star] in the particular proper aspect in which it has dominance, but not from any of the attending planets And if the latter do have some part in this, it is minor [and] is a function of their power at that time in this part of the earth and with respect to this particular individual. This is evident to anyone familiar with astrology.41

We may understand from this passage that the influence of a dominant star in a transient constellation depends on its power at a certain time,42 in a certain place, and on a certain human being—i.e., it also depends on that person’s natal constellation. Moreover, the dominant stars are not the only ones that determine man’s thoughts; other stars likewise participate in this process, each one according to its power in that place and time. But inasmuch as their power is weaker, they exert less influence on men’s thoughts than do the dominant stars. The

38 For the theory of the dominant stars, see Gersonides’ commentary on Genesis 1:14 (comm. on Genesis, pp. 57–58, 60). See also Wars V.2.8. 39 These are the stars that determine present events or those events that will occur shortly after the time of their dominance. 40 Concerning the history of belief in dominant stars, see A. Bouché-Leclercq, L’astrologie grecque (Paris, 1899), pp. 489–497. 41 Wars, p. 118 / 2:69–70. 42 According to Wars V.2.8, the strength of a star depends upon a number of factors: the duration of its stay in a particular sign—the greater the duration, the greater its influence; the greater the height at which the star passes through the hemisphere, the stronger its activity; the stronger its rays, the stronger its activity; and the closer it is to the earth, the greater its activity. The nature of the star’s influence also depends upon the sign in which it is found at that time: the same star can have different influences when found in different signs of the zodiac.

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

311

creation of one thought by several stars can be explained only by the hypothesis that this thought is caused by the effects of the stars on the human disposition, which in turn creates the person’s thoughts. A person’s disposition is actually the result of the simultaneous effect of several different stars, each of which influences another element of the mixture according to its power. In his supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva naturalia (and in Wars II.2), Gersonides also mentions the astrological theory that the stars transmit thoughts to men: And the example is that the choice that is consequent upon the mixture, and also the thought and opinion that are ordered from the spheres and the stars, as the astrologers show it, have determined causes. For the mixture of each person is already given by the spheres and the stars, as we previously learned from this wisdom, and likewise the thought and the opinion, if that which the astrologers say concerning this is correct.43

In Wars, he merely mentions the fact that the stars influence human thought.44 In neither of these places does he describe the mode whereby, according to the astrologers, the stars emanate “images and thoughts” on human beings, beyond a vague reference; neither text mentions “the soul of the heavenly bodies.” In the Wars, however, Gersonides speaks in a general way of the “heavenly bodies” (meaning the spheres and stars) as those that cause human thoughts. In his supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva naturalia, he says that “the spheres and the stars” are what “give” thought and opinion” (ma shavah u-sevarah) as well as human mixture. I think that this explicit reference to the stars indicates that, for Gersonides, human thoughts are affected by the stars and not by the souls of the spheres. If the stars affect thoughts, they can only do so by the influence of their rays on human mixture. Further confirmation of the view that thoughts are caused by the stars and are not emanated from the souls of the spheres is found in a ha a ah that follows Gersonides’ commentary on the weekly portion

43 “Commentary on PN,” p. 18. In his supercommentary on the Epitome of the Parva Naturalia, Gersonides is not yet certain about the claim of the astrological school that man’s thoughts are also arranged by the heavenly bodies; but in the Wars he no longer expresses any doubts of this. 44 See Wars, p. 95 / 1:33.

312

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

of av (Leviticus 6:1–8:36), where he explains the seven sprinklings performed by the priest on the covering of Ark of the Covenant: For you, who have studied our commentary, already know that appetites and choices and opinions45 are affected by the heavenly bodies, sometimes suitably and sometimes unsuitably, and that the human intellect controls these appetites and choices and opinions when it wishes to do so and takes from them whatever is suitable and rejects the unsuitable, as we explained all this in The Wars of the Lord. . . . [A man’s] intellect should attempt in every possible way not to make use of what is emanated on him by the heavenly bodies—[namely, his] appetites, choices, and opinions, except in for the service of God, may He be praised. He will thereby be strengthened so that he can withstand whatever may entail leaving His service. He should be meticulous about his opinions, [to make sure] that they entail only what is intended for the service of God. In this way he may escape those errors that arise from the influence of the heavenly bodies. And these sprinklings were seven [in number], for such is the number of the planets, by which these things are influenced, according to their location in the Zodiac and according to their several aspects, as we have explained in the Wars of the Lord.46

Here Gersonides explicitly claims that the effect on the appetites, the choices entailed by human mixture, and the opinions, come from the planets themselves, depending upon their location in the zodiac,47 and according to their aspects. We also know that the source of the appetites lies in a person’s mixture, and that the choices to which Gersonides refers here are also “choices according to his mixture.” He speaks in one breath of “appetites, choices, and opinions” as being affected by the stars, indicating that they are created in the very same manner—namely, by the activity of the stellar rays on the human mixture. Moreover, these influences take place by means of the “aspects” of the stars; that is, they are a combination of the influence of several stars. Such a combination can influence a person’s mixture, which in turn produces “images and thoughts.” However, it is difficult to assume that such a combination of the influence of “images and thoughts” by the souls of different spheres is involved in creating a single thought within an individual.

From Gersonides’ remarks, it follows that here he uses the term de ot in the sense of thoughts or opinions, and not of intellectual apprehensions. 46 Comm. on Leviticus, pp. 198–199. 47 See above, n. 40. 45

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

313

The same conclusion can be derived from the beginning of Gersonides’ statements about the limitations of astrology in Wars II.2.48 He asserts on empirical grounds that astrologers “predict the thoughts and actions of men.” As with clairvoyance,49 here too he relates to a phenomenon known from his cultural milieu. Because experience is a valid source of knowledge, one may rely on it to confirm the theory underlying the technique of predicting the future by astrology; namely, that the stars do in fact influence human thoughts. Moreover, Gersonides’ contention that astrologers can predict human’s thoughts but may also be mistaken, due to the limitations of human knowledge, can be understood only if we accept the postulate that thoughts are affected by the stars’ rays, and not by the souls of the spheres. Astrologers have no communication with the souls of the spheres and cannot know the “order” that is found in them. They base their claims on observation of the stars and their different states and derive rules concerning their influence on the sublunar world by induction, based on these observations. Moreover, from the way in which he presents the astrological thesis in his supercommentary on Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva naturalia, and in Wars II.7, it seems that Gersonides relies upon a known astrological theory and not only on the experience that attests that astrologers can predict human thoughts. We know that already in antiquity there was tradition of “questions” addressed to astrologers, concerning human actions and thoughts.50 Abraham Ibn Ezra, who might have influenced Gersonides, informs us in his Sefer ha-She elot that some astrologers extend astrology to human thoughts and maintain that, because the stars also affect human thoughts, they can discern them. According to Ibn Ezra, these include modern astrologers. Ibn Ezra’s Sefer ha-She elot itself is based on this theory, which he maintains in his other writings as well.51 Another Jewish source that Gersonides might have known is the letter on astrology sent to Maimonides by Jews of Provence. Its authors give an explanation of the “mechanism” by which this knowledge is See Wars, p. 95 / 1:33. See “Commentary on PN,” p. 9; Wars II.1 (p. 92 / 2:27) and IV.6 (p. 178 / 2:194). 50 See Bouché-Leclercq, L’astrologie grecque, pp. 471–474, especially p. 472. 51 Cf. Y. T. Langermann, “Some Astrological Themes in the Thought of Abraham ibn Ezra,” in Rabbi Abraham ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, ed. I. Twersky and J. M. Harris (Cambridge, MA, 1993), pp. 55–58. 48 49

314

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

obtained: thoughts depend on changes in the body, which are in turn affected by the stars. That is why we can know them: And there are other sages who said that such questions [have substance], and this is their reason: because the thoughts of the soul change according to the physical constitution received at birth, and the power of the soul follows the vicissitude of the body, And since the stars indicate the physical constitution received at birth and its vicissitude, we may know the thoughts and questions.52

On the basis of this understanding of the influence of thoughts on human beings, according to astrology, we can understand Gersonides’ solution to the question of knowledge of the future by means of clairvoyance and dreams. As I have already argued, in his explanation of the mode by which a clairvoyant or dreamer may tell the future by means of stars, in Wars II.6, Gersonides employs the applicative method. He applies the explanation of the influence of “thoughts and images” on man’s soul by means of the stars to the prediction of the future by means of clairvoyance and dreams. His calculation proceeds as follows: since we already know that in the natural course of events a man’s “images and thoughts” are “ordered” by the ascending signs of the zodiac or by the stars that dominate at that time (and, based on his statement in II.7, one should add: also in accordance with the arrangement of the stars at the moment of his birth); and because we know that the separate intellects (and parallel to them: the souls of the spheres) know the “orders” that were influenced by the stars in the spheres which they move (and on the basis of his words at the start of II.6, one might add: and they operate in the sublunar world by means of the stars), it is quite logical to argue that the clairvoyant and dreamer receive “communication” of the “order”, found in the “intellects that move the spheres” or, parallel to this, in “the soul of the heavenly bodies,”53 “from that which is influenced from them.” By

52 A. Marx, ed., “The Correspondence between the Rabbis of Southern France and Maimonides about Astrology,” HUCA 3 (1926), p. 346. 53 One may interpret the term ba alei śekel (“those endowed with intellect”) in Wars II.6 as referring to the intellective souls of the spheres, just as in V.3.6, where he writes: “[T]he heavenly bodies which we see moving are in themselves endowed with intellect” (p. 263 / 3:144). But later in II.6 he speaks of the “movers of the heavenly bodies,” a term generally attributed to the separate intellect that moves the spheres. In the discussion in Book V, to which Gersonides here refers the reader, he indeed deals with the separate intellects, which he calls there “the movers of the spheres,” and scarcely at all with the intellects of the spheres, whose existence he recognizes, in

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

315

the phrase, “from them,” one should understand “from the heavenly bodies,” i.e., from the stars.54 This interpretation is corroborated by Gersonides’ commentary on Daniel. Here, Gersonides deals explicitly with both thoughts and dreams, explaining the two phenomena similarly, just as he does in the Wars, but adding an explanation of the mode by which they are created. According to the commentary on Daniel, both thoughts and dreams are affected by human mixtures, which are in turn affected by the rays of the stars. In his commentary on Daniel 4, Utility 14, he writes: Mixtures have influence in the case of dreams and thoughts. Therefore Nebuchadnezzar called for the magicians of the stars, because the mixtures emanate also from the emanation of the stars’ rays, as their Creator has constituted them on the day they were created.55

In his commentary on Daniel 2:2, however, he explains that Nebuchadnezzar called upon the magicians to interpret his dream: “because they know the true mixture, they shall surely be guided to know the [meaning] of the dream.”56 Knowledge of a person’s mixture makes it possible to understand his dream, because the dream is caused by the mixture. Thus the passages from the commentary on Daniel not only confirm the interpretation that the stars effect the transmission of knowledge by clairvoyant means through the human imaginative faculty, they also explain the mode by which they do so. The stars act upon man’s

addition to the separate intellects (Wars V.3.6, pp. 261–263 / 3:141–144). We may perhaps understand that the intellects of the spheres apprehend the order found in the separate intellects and thereby move their spheres. This being so, they know this order just as the separate intellects know it; hence the discussion of the separate intellects in Wars V, to which Gersonides refers the reader, is valid with regard to the intellects of the spheres as well. 54 One may also interpret here, although less probably: from the separate intellects, the movers of the spheres, or from the souls of the spheres; but then one needs to complete: by the intermediary of the stars, as in the case of the effect of “images and thoughts” upon man. 55 Comm. on Daniel, p. 5b. See also on Daniel 1:20 (p. 1b), where he insists on the relationship between human mixture and “images and dreams.” 56 Ibid., p. 2b. But Gersonides does not claim here that astrologers know the thoughts of human beings and can understand their dreams; rather, he attributes such knowledge to the magicians who are expert in physics and know the substantive connection between the bodily mixture and the thoughts it creates. He even sees the knowledge of the sages of nature as superior to that of the astrologers (see 15th Utility, p. 5b), but here too he adheres to the opinion that the mixture creates the dream.

316

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

nature through their rays, which create “images and thoughts” and in parallel, dreams. Since dreams and clairvoyance are of the same “genus,” we should understand that the same mechanism explains the communication of the future through clairvoyance. As we have seen, there was a theory of the influence of bodily states on thoughts (and, one must understand, of the influence of bodily mixture), known to Ibn Ezra and the sages of Provence in the twelfth century and accepted by Ibn Ezra himself. One still needs to ask the question: if Gersonides indeed thought that knowledge of the future by means of clairvoyance and dreams is produced by the influence of the rays of the stars on a person’s mixture, how is one to understand his remarks in Wars II.6 and 7 about foretelling of the future? There he seems to say that knowledge of the future is brought about by the direct effect of the souls of the spheres on the imaginative power of the clairvoyant or dreamer. It seems to me that here we need to pay attention to the precise formulation of Gersonides’ words. In Wars II.6 (solution of the eighth problem), he writes: “The imagination, when it is isolated from the other faculties of the soul, will then be prepared to receive the order inherent in their souls [i.e., the souls of the heavenly bodies] and that emanates from them.”57 In the next chapter he writes: “so that he apprehends the order in the souls of the heavenly bodies with respect to what emanates from them.”58 Gersonides does not argue here that the images flow directly into a man’s imaginative faculty from the souls of the spheres, but that the dreamer or the clairvoyant attains the order that is in the separate intellects or in the souls of the heavenly bodies by means of “what emanates from them.” Later in Chapter 6, Gersonides formulates matters in a slightly different way, thereby explaining the somewhat vague term, “that which emanates from them”: “Since clairvoyance and dreams, on the other hand, derive from powers emanating from the heavenly bodies in the manner previously mentioned.”59 This formula is parallel to that in I.1, which speaks explicitly of the fact that the powers that flow from the spheres determine the mixture of things: “Accordingly, since it is evident that the spheres supervise the sublunary world in so far as

57 58 59

Wars, p. 114 / 2:64. Ibid., p. 116 / 2:68. Ibid., p. 114 / 2:65.

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

317

they produce the mixture by the powers which simultaneously derive from the spheres. . . .”60 It is therefore clear that “that which emanates from them” refers to the effect of the stars on the bodily mixture, by means of their rays. The conclusion of the passage from II.6 cited above clearly indicates that he is speaking of the influence of the stars, and not of the souls of the spheres, on the clairvoyant and the dreamer: And since all of the heavenly bodies do not cooperate perfectly in this communication [i.e., communication of the future by means of clairvoyance and dreaming], as will be evident to anyone who studies astrology, and all the heavenly bodies are involved in the orders deriving from them, the knowledge that is conveyed by this means is defective. And so error frequently occurs in their communication.61

Here Gersonides explicitly confirms his thesis by means of astrology, dealing with the effect of the stars upon the sublunar world, and also speaks explicitly of the heavenly bodies and not of the souls of the spheres. The same conclusion follows clearly from Gersonides’ answer (Wars II.7) to the question: Why do waking dreams generally apply only to those events which are to take place during a brief period after the time they are made known? Gersonides’ answer is based on an astrological explanation. Here he constructs the fullest analogy I have found in his writings among three phenomena caused by the influence of the stars: events in the sublunar world, man’s thoughts,62 and knowledge of the future. In practice, the analogy is between the activity of the stars in causing events (i.e., accidents) that occur in the present, their activity in causing human thoughts, and their activity in providing knowledge of the immediate future, i.e., in communication through a waking dream of events “that will take place immediately.” The explanation for all of these phenomena is the same: the stars that dominate during a particular period are responsible for events in the 60 Ibid., p. 45 / 1:159. Maimonides offers a similar formulation as accepted by the astrologers: “It also is said with regard to the forces of the spheres that they overflow toward that which exists. Thus the overflow of the sphere is spoken of, though its actions proceed from a body. Hence the stars act at some particular distances; I refer to their nearness to or remoteness from the center or their reaction to one another. From there astrology comes in” (Guide II.12, p. 195 / p. 280). 61 Wars II.6, p. 114 / 2:64. 62 I have already analyzed Gersonides’ words here about the star’s effect on thoughts.

318

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

present and during a short span of time after it. They have the greatest power to affect the sublunar world. Other stars have very little power at that time, so their influence over present events is small. At any given moment, the dominant stars cause not only present events but also human thoughts; they also have the greatest power to cause the communication of immediate future events to man’s imaginative power. The power of the stars that are not dominant at that time is smaller, and thus their influence over present events is smaller, their participation in causing human thoughts is small, and the effect of their communication is also weaker.63 When a star that is not dominant communicates the order of its influence, it does so primarily by causing events in the more distant future in the sublunar world, when it becomes a dominant star. This explanation of the influence of the stars over the sublunar world is completed by the psychology of the communications of the future: the more perfect the faculty receiving the communication (in this case, the imaginative faculty), the better it is able to absorb weaker influences and thereby to receive communication, not only from the dominant stars, but also from those stars that are not dominant at that particular moment. Thus the more isolated the receiving faculty (in this case, the imaginative faculty) from the other cognitive faculties of the soul, the more receptive it is to communication from stars whose power is weaker at that time. When the receptive faculty is weak or its isolation is slight, or both these factors combine together, a man can receive communication of “only what emanates from the attending planets that are then dominant, which are specified [from other heavenly bodies] by their force. . . .”64 This communication is a partial communication of the events anticipated, communication only of those events that are to take place within a short time, which Gersonides designates as “defective communication.”65 Since it is received only from the dominant stars, it applies only to that which is affected by them, namely, proximate events. 63 The analogy between causing events and communication of the future appears in the following formula of Gersonides: “For it seems that a heavenly body that is too weak to bring about the events on earth that are attributed to its power is [also] too weak to transmit the knowledge [about such events]” (Wars, p. 117 / 2:69). 64 Ibid., p. 118 /2:70. 65 “Perfect communication” is communication whose source is all the stars, both dominant and not dominant. As such, it is also communication of things that will happen in both the near future and the distant future.

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

319

Gersonides’ explanation here is compatible with his interpretation that knowledge of the future in a dream takes place by means of the star’s effect on the person’s mixture. He argues: It is evident that when the recipient is well prepared [for some operation], a weaker agent is sufficient to bring about the realization of that which he had in potentia as compared to the agent that would be required by a recipient not prepared in this way.66

The description of the effect as a process of actualization matches the interpretation that communication of future events is an act of the stars upon the person’s mixture, which causes the creation of images by the imaginative faculty, thereby bringing about their actualization.67 In Wars II.8, Gersonides employs this very same astrological theory to explain the levels of clairvoyance. The levels of clairvoyance refer to the degree of correctness of the clairvoyant’s predictions. This degree of correctness is explained in the same manner as the extent of knowledge of one who dreams while awake (in II.7). The degree of clairvoyance depends on the extent of the knowledge that the clairvoyant receives from the stars. This in turn depends on the stars from which the clairvoyant receives his knowledge. On the lowest level is one who receives knowledge from the “dominant” stars alone, and consequently knowledge only of the effect that these stars have on events in the sublunar world. Since he does not know the influence of the other, weaker stars on the world during that same time, his knowledge of future events is apt to be mistaken. On the highest level is one who also receives knowledge from “all the attendant planets

Wars, p. 117 / 2:69. This is consistent with Davidson’s interpretation of the action of the Active Intellect in the creation of the objects in the sublunar world and the apprehension of intelligibles. Davidson claims that the action of the Active Intellect is not an emanation of form on matter in the cosmological realm, or an emanation on the human intellect in the cognitive realm, but an activity that causes the creation of the forms in matter and in the human intellect. The interpretation I have proposed for communication of the future by clairvoyance and dream is very similar; we are not speaking here of a direct flow of images onto the prophet’s imaginative faculty, but of the stars’ activity on the mixture of the body, which leads to the creation of images in the soul of the clairvoyant and the dreamer. If Davidson’s interpretation is correct, here Gersonides applies to the influence of the stars the same type of solution he developed with regard to the influence of the Active Intellect in the ontological and cognitive realms. Nevertheless, the validity of this interpretation does not depend upon accepting Davidson’s interpretation. 66 67

320

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

that are not dominant”68 and hence also knows their influences on the sublunar world, even though these are very weak. His knowledge of the stars’ effect on the sublunar world is perfect, so whatever he says is correct.69 On the intermediate level is one who “receives [the emanation] from some of the non-dominant heavenly bodies but not from others; i.e., he receives the emanation from those among them that have a greater power.”70 Here too, as in the discussion of waking dreams, the picture is completed by the psychology of telling the future: receiving an effect from the stars depends on the clairvoyant’s psychological state: the degree of perfection of his imaginative faculty and the degree of isolation of the imaginative faculty from the other cognitive faculties of the soul. Gersonides explicitly speaks there of the effect of the “dominant” stars and of the “non-dominant attendants,” making this communication dependent on the simultaneous influence of several stars. As I have already argued in my discussion of the influence of thoughts on human beings, one cannot argue that communication of thoughts could be effected simultaneously from the souls of several spheres. That would require an explanation of the synthetic mechanism in the imaginative faculty of the clairvoyant or dreamer that enables it to relate to the thoughts that are affected by the various stars—an explanation that does not appear in Gersonides and is not in itself logical. Similarly, the argument that the effect depends on the power of the star indicates that one is speaking of the effect of the star itself.71 The assumption that here we are speaking of the influence of the souls of the spheres forces us to introduce a forced and unlikely interpretation of the text; namely, that Gersonides speaks of the stars but in fact alludes to the souls of the spheres in which those same stars are located. The souls know the power of the star found in their sphere, as well as the changes that take place in its power because of he changes in its location in the size of its ray. Gersonides takes great care to explain his views clearly. Were such his theory, he would state it plainly. One must still ask how we should understand Gersonides’ claim in Wars II.6 (solution of the eighth problem) that the dreamer and the

Wars, p. 119 / 2:69. The clairvoyant’s knowledge of the future is thus proportional to the number of stars whose influence he receives. 70 Wars, p. 119 / 2:69. 71 For the causes that determine the power of the star, see above, n. 42. 68 69

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

321

clairvoyant receive from the heavenly bodies the order that exists in “their soul” (that is, in the soul of the spheres). The reference to the intellects that move the spheres here and in II.7 (evidently also referring to the souls of the spheres) is not intended to teach that they effect their communication on the imaginative faculty of the clairvoyant or the dreamer in a direct way, but to explain why the clairvoyant or the dreamer can know the future by means of the effect of the stars on their mixture and why this knowledge is a “deficient knowledge” and therefore liable to be false. The influence of thoughts on a man is the effect of part of the “order” found in the separate intellects that move the spheres, and in the souls of the spheres; as such it is analogous to the effect of accidents on the sublunar world. On the other hand, communication of the future through clairvoyance and dream is communication of a different type than the communication of thoughts to human beings.72 The latter is communication of the “order” found in the separate intellects, which move certain spheres, and parallel to the communication of the “order” found in the souls of those same spheres, which is brought down into the sublunar world by means of the stellar rays. This “order” includes the birth of certain individuals, the events that occur to them (“the accidents”), and their activities and thoughts. In order to justify the argument that it is possible to attain the order found in the separate intellects (or in the souls of the spheres), and in order to explain the extent of the knowledge received, Gersonides needs to briefly mention his doctrine of the content of the knowledge of each one of the separate intellects (and of each of the souls of the spheres) and the manner in which the “order” found therein affects the sublunar world. Here he adapts the astrological doctrine to the cosmological doctrine that he will develop in Wars V. According to his cosmology, each sphere has a separate intellect that moves it and a soul that serves as an immediate mover. Every separate intellect, and, in parallel, every intellective soul of the sphere, attains only part of the general order of the world, precisely what relates to the effect on the sublunar world for which the intellect is responsible, and it affects it by means of its sphere and star. The stars are the “instruments” by which the separate intellects and their spheres effect “order” on the sublunar world. He mentions this doctrine at the beginning of his remarks here,

72

See Wars II.7 (pp. 116–117 / 2:68).

322

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

noting a number of points: (a) The “orders” to which the communication of the future applies are affected by the heavenly bodies, that is, by the stars. (b) The movers of the heavenly bodies—and here it is not entirely clear whether he is referring to the separate intellects or to the souls of the spheres, which are their immediate movers— know the “order” that is caused by the heavenly bodies they move. (c) One can also say that the movers of the heavenly bodies “activate” the “order” in the sublunar world, because in practice the source of the “order” that affects the sublunar world is the separate intellects; but they activate it by means of the spheres and the stars. (d) Every separate intellect (and, in parallel, the soul of each sphere) knows only part of the general order of the sublunar world, that same part which is affected by the star in the sphere that it moves. Since the separate intellects (and the souls of the spheres) know the “order” that is affected by them, and since, generally speaking, they act on the sublunar world by means of the stars, one may argue that they also act on a man’s imaginative faculty in the same manner: they convey to it the “order” that is found in them by means of the stars that act on the person’s mixture through their rays. Since every separate intellect, and parallel to it every soul of the sphere, knows only part of the general order of the sublunar world, that portion which they themselves affect, the dreamer and the clairvoyant receive only partial knowledge and not full knowledge of the events, actions, and thoughts caused by the stars. Here we should note that the passages from Wars II.6 and 7 cited and referred to at the beginning of this article are the only two texts in which Gersonides mentions the separate intellects or the souls of the spheres as a source of knowledge of the “order.” In all other passages in which he deals with this question, both in the Wars of the Lord and in the biblical commentaries, he suffices with only part of the thesis: namely, the claim that it is the stars or the heavenly bodies that convey knowledge of the future to the dreamer and the clairvoyant. Davidson, who argues that this knowledge is conveyed to the clairvoyant and dreamer directly, by means of the souls of the spheres, is forced to add the word “soul” in square brackets throughout, because, according to his theory, this word is lacking. But it is illogical that Gersonides, who unlike Maimonides before him was certainly no esotericist, and whose writing was extremely precise, would delete every mention of the souls of the spheres, had he indeed thought that they are the direct source of thoughts or of knowledge of the future.

gersonides on the mode of communicating knowledge

323

To summarize: relying on the applicative method that Gersonides uses to develop the idea of conveyance of knowledge of the future to the imaginative faculty of the clairvoyant and the dreamer by means of the heavenly bodies; and drawing on his understanding of the way in which the heavenly bodies affect human thoughts according to astrological doctrine, which Gersonides accepts; and relying on his commentary on the book of Daniel, I believe we must accept the conclusion that Gersonides, in his interpretation of the mode by which the future becomes known to human beings by clairvoyance and dream, applied principles from the astrological doctrines that he knew and held to be true. He thought that communication of future events to a man’s imaginative faculty, by means of clairvoyance and dream, is effected by the action of the stars on his bodily mixture through their rays, causing the mixture to produce knowledge in his imaginative faculty in the form of sensory images. The conceptual order of these images is found in the Active Intellect, which affects man in the same way it affects all accidents in the sublunar world, i.e., by its “instruments,” the heavenly bodies. A partial knowledge of the pattern of the sublunar world is found in each of the separate intellects and in each of the souls of the spheres that use the stars’ rays as their “instruments.” These conceptual patterns are translated by the stars’ rays into physical effects. The same patterns can be translated into accidents (i.e., events) in the sublunar world, meaning on the ontological level, and into the bodily mixture, which in its turn creates “images and thoughts,” on the psychological level. But the latter effect of the stars’ rays depends also on the receiver, that is, on the faculty of the soul that translates these physical effects into “images and thoughts.” The stars always have an effect on the bodily mixture, but only a perfect imagination isolated from all other faculties of the soul is sensible of it and translates it into images.73 An imperfect imagination and/or an imagination that is occupied with other activities ignores it.

73 I have elaborated on this last point in “Prophecy, Clairvoyance and Dreams and the Concept of ‘Hitbodedut ’ in Gersonides’ Thought,” Da at 39 (1997): 23–68 (Hebrew).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources Works by Gersonides Bible Commentaries Genesis: B. Braner and E. Freiman, eds., Rabbinic Pentateuch with Commentary on the Torah by R. Levi ben Gerson (Gersonides, 1288–1344): Genesis, 2nd ed. Jerusalem, 1993. Leviticus: B. Braner and C. Cohen, eds., Rabbinic Pentateuch with Commentary on the Torah by R. Levi ben Gerson (Gersonides, 1288–1344): Leviticus, part 1. Jerusalem, 2003. Deuteronomy: The Torah Commentaries of Gersonides, ed. Y. L. Levi, vol. 5: Deuteronomy. Jerusalem: Mossad Harav Kook, 2000. Former Prophets: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 246/1 [IMHM 4272]. Song of Songs: (1) Commentary on Song of Songs by Rabbi Levi ben Gershom, ed. Menahem Kellner. Ramat Gan, 2001. (2) Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides), trans. Menahem Kellner. New Haven and London, 1998. Esther: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247 [IMHM 4284]; 248 [IMHM 4273]. Proverbs: (1) Miqra ot gedolot. Jerusalem: Am Olam, 1961. (2) Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247 [IMHM 4284]. (3) Ha a ah, in B. Braner, “Gersonides’ Introduction to the Commentary on Proverbs and the Avatars of the Text of the Work,” Tarbi 73 (2004), pp. 278–280. (4) On Proverbs 1: 1–19, in B. Braner, “Gersonides’ Introduction to the Commentary on Proverbs and the Avatars of the Text of the Work,” Tarbi 73 (2004), pp. 288–291. Job: (1) Miqra ot gedolot. New York: Pardes, 5711 [1961]. (2) Miqra ot gedolot. Jerusalem: Am Olam, 1961. (3) The Commentary of Levi ben Gersom (Gersonides) on the Book of Job, trans. Abraham L. Lassen. New York: Bloch, 1999 [first published 1946]. Ecclesiastes: Commentaries on the [Five] Scrolls, ed. J. L. Levy. Jerusalem, 2003, pp. 15–64. Daniel: (1) O ar ha-Perushim al Nevim ve-Ketuvim, Vol. II. Tel Aviv: Pardes, 1970. (2) Paris—BNF, MS héb. 247 [IMHM 4284]. Wars of the Lord Levi ben Gershom, Milhamot ha-Shem. Leipzig, 1866. Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides), The Wars of the Lord, 3 vols., trans. with intro. and notes by S. Feldman. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1984–1999. Touati, Charles. Les Guerres du Seigneur, livres III et IV, trans. [into French] Charles Touati. Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1968. Gersonides, The Wars of the Lord, Treatise Three: On God’s Knowledge, trans. and annot. Norbert M. Samuelson. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1977. Supercommentaries Middle Commentary or Averroes’ books on Aristotle’s Logic: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958 [IMHM 32608]. Middle Commentary on the Isagoge: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958 [IMHM 32608]. Rosenberg, Shalom, “Gersonides’ Commentary on the Ha-Mavo,” Da at 22 (1989), pp. 85–98.

326

bibliography

Middle Commentary on the Prior Analytics: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958 [IMHM 32608]. Middle Commentary on the Posterior Analytics: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958 [IMHM 32608]. Middle Commentary on De interpretatione: MS Vatican Urbinati ebr. 35.3 [IMHM 674]. Middle Commentary on the Topics: Munich-Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod, hebr. 26/3 [IMHM 1162]. Epitome of the Physics: Vatican MS ebr. 342/1[IMHM 431]. Middle Commentary on the Physics: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1 [IMHM 31361]. Epitome of De caelo: MS Berlin Héb. 110/2 [IMHM 1801]. Middle Commentary on De caelo: MS Parma Biblioteca Palatina ebr. 2723 (De Rossi 805) [IMHM 13659]. Epitome of De generatione: MS Vatican ebr. 342/3 [IMHM 431]. Epitome on the Meteorology, in E. Meiron, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of Meteorology 1–3: A Comparative Analysis of the Optical-PhysicalMathematical Aspects of the Theories of the Halo and the Rainbow with an Appendix Containing an Annotated Critical Edition.” Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2003. Epitome of the Parva Naturalia: Alexander Altmann, “Gersonides’ Commentary on Averroes’ Epitome of Parva Naturalia II, 3,” annotated critical edition. Jerusalem, 1980, pp. 1–31; repr. from Jubilee Volume of the American Academy for Jewish Research 46–47 (1979–1980). Epitome of De anima: J. S. Mashbaum, “Chapters 9–12 of Gersonides’ Supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of the De Anima: The Internal Senses.” Ph.D. Dissertation, Brandeis University, 1981. Commentary on the Three Letters: MS Oxford Bodleian Heb. 1373/4 [IMHM 22397]. Commentary on the De Animalibus: MS Vatican urbinati ebr. 42/1 [IMHM 681]. Works by Averroes Averroes’ Middle Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, trans. with notes and introductions by C. E. Butterworth. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983. Middle Commentary on De interpretatione: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 920 [IMHM 31961] (Hebrew). Middle Commentary on the Posterior Analytics: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 932/1[IMHM 30916] (Hebrew). Middle Commentary on the Topics: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 920 [IMHM 31961]; ParisBNF, MS héb 933/1 [IMHM 30917] (Hebrew). Talkhī Kitāb al-Jadal, ed. C. E. Butterworth and A. A. Haridi. Cairo, 1979. Kol meleket higgayon. Riva di Trento, 1560. (Hebrew). Averroës’ Three Short Commentaries on Aristotle’s Topics, Rhetoric, and Poetics, ed. and trans. Charles E. Butterworth. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977. Epitome of the Physics: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 965/5 [IMHM 32606] (Hebrew). Middle Commentary on the Physics: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 938 [IMHM 31972]; Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1 [IMHM 31361] (Hebrew). Epitome of De caelo: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 918/3 [IMHM 31960] (Hebrew). Epitome of De generatione et corruptione: MS Vatican ebr. 342/3 [IMHM 431] (Hebrew). Averroes’s prologue to the Epitome of De generatione et corruptione, in Averrois Cordubensis Commentarium Medium & Epitome in Aristotelis de Generatione et Corruptione Libros, Textum hebraicum recensuit et adnotationibus illustravit

bibliography

327

Samuel Kurland, Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, vol. 4:1–2. Cambridge, MA, 1958. Epitome of the Meteorology: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 956/8 [IMHM 32606] (Hebrew). Averroes’ Middle Commentary of Aristotle’s De anima, ed. and trans. Alfred L. Ivry. Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Press, 2002. Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima in the Translation of Moses Ibn Tibbon, ed. Alfred L. Ivry Jerusalem, 2003 (Hebrew). Epitome of the Parva naturalia: (1) Averrois Compendium librorum Aristotelis qui Parva naturalia vocantur, Textum hebraeicum recensuit et adnotationibus illustravit Henericus Blumberg, Corpus Commentariorum Averrois in Aristotelem, versionem hebraeicarum, vol. 7. Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America 1954 (Hebrew). (2) Epitome of the Parva naturalia, trans. from the original Arabic and the Hebrew and Latin version with notes and introduction by Harry Blumberg. Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1961. Epitome of the Metaphysics: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 956 [IMHM 32606] (Hebrew). Long Commentary on the Metaphysics: Paris—BNF, MS héb. 886 [IMHM 31655] (Hebrew). Averroes Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in the Hebrew version of Samuel Ben Judah, critical edition with an introduction, notes and glossary by Lawrence V. Berman. Jerusalem, 1999. Epitome [?] of De animalibus: Oxford Bodl. MS Heb.1370/1 [IMHM 22394] (Hebrew). Other Primary Sources Abraham Bar iyya. Sēfer Megillat ha-Megalle , ed. A. Poznanski. Berlin, 1924; photoreproduction Jerusalem, 1968. Abraham Ibn Daud. Emunah Ramah (The Exalted Faith) ed. S. Weil. Frankfurt a.M., 1852. Abraham Ibn Daud. The Exalted Faith, trans. Norbert M. Samuelson, ed. Gershom Weiss. Rutherford. NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1986. Abraham Ibn Ezra. Commentary on the Torah, ed. A. Weiser, 3 vols. Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1976. ——. Sefer ha-Miv arim, ed. J. L. Fleischer. Jerusalem, 1969. ——. English translation: Abraham Ibn Ezra on Elections, Interrogations, and Medical Astrology (provisional title), ed., trans., and annot. Shlomo Sela (Brill, forthcoming). Alexander of Aphrodisias: Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate, ed. and trans. R. W. Sharples. London: Duckworth, 1983. Anatoli, Jacob. Malmad ha-talmidim, ed. L. Silberman. Leiden, 1866; photoreproduction, Israel 1968. Aristotle. La Métaphysique, nouvelle édition entièrement refondue, avec commentaire par J. Tricot. Paris: Vrin, 1974. ——. Metaphysics, trans. W. D. Ross, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, 1984. ——. Topics, trans. W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes. Princeton, 1984. ——. Posterior Analytics, trans. with a commentary by Jonathan Barnes, 2nd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press; New York: Oxford University Press 1994. al-Farabi, Alfarabi. Kitāb alf ā al-musta malah fi al-man iq, ed. M. Mahdi. Beirut, 1968. ——. Al-Farabi’s Commentary and Short Treatise on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione, trans. with an introduction and notes by F. W. Zimmermann. London: British Academy / Oxford University Press, 1981. ——. Al-Fārābī, “Kitāb al-jadal,” in R. al- Ajam, ed., al-Man iq inda al-Fārābī, vol. 3. Beirut, 1986.

328

bibliography

——. “Didascalia in Rethoricam Aristotelis ex Glosa Alpharabi,” Al-Farabi—Deux ouvrages inédits sur la rhétorique, ed. J. Langhade and M. Grignaschi. Beirut, Dar el-Machreq, 1971. Isaac Ibn Ghiyāth. Sefer ha-perishut (Commentary on Ecclesiastes), in amesh Megillot, trans. with introduction and notes by Y. Qāfi . Jerusalem, 1962. Maimonides (Moshe ben Maimon). Dalālat al- ā irīn (The Guide of the Perplexed ) Original Arabic text redacted by Shlomo Munk and edited with variant readings by Y. Joel. Jerusalem, 1930–31. ——. The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. from the Arabic, introduction and notes by Shlomo Pines. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963. ——. “The Correspondence between the Rabbis of Southern France and Maimonides about Astrology,” ed. A. Marx, HUCA 3 (1926), pp. 312–358. ——. Moreh Nevukhim le-Rabbenu Moshe ben Maimon, trans. with notes, addenda and indexes by Michael Schwarz. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2002. ——. Sefer ha-Madda ve-haśśagot ha-r vd, annot. Nahum Eliezer Rabinovich. Ma aleh Adummim and Jerusalem, 1987. ——. Commentary on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, Heb. trans. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ed. S. Muntner. Jerusalem, 1961. ——. “Introduction to the Commentary on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates,” in Iggerot She elot u-Teshuvot, ed. and trans. Y. Qafi . Jerusalem: Mossad ha-Rav Kook, 1972, pp. 145–146. ——. Maimonides’ Introduction to Logic in the Hebrew Version of Moses Ibn Tibbon, ed. L. Roth. Jerusalem, 1965. ——. Introduction to Pereq eleq in Maimonides, Introductions to the Mishnah [Arabic Text and Hebrew Translation], ed. and annot. I. Shailat. Jerusalem: Ma’aliyot, 1992. Me iri, Mena em. Commentary on Proverbs, ed. M. M. Meshi-Zahav. Jerusalem, 1969. Ockham, William. Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, trans. and annot. Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1969. Saadia Gaon. Saadiah ben Joseph al-Fayyúmī, The Book of Theodicy: Translation and Commentary on the Book of Job, trans. and comm. Lenn Evan Goodman. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. ——. Commentary on Proverbs [Arabic and Hebrew], ed. and trans. Y. Qafi . Jerusalem, 1976. Samuel Ibn Tibbon: Robinson, James T. “Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes and the Philosopher’s Prooemium,” Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature 3 (2000), pp. 83–146. ——. Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes. Ph. D. Dissertation, Harvard University 2002. ——. Samuel Ibn Tibbons’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes—The Book of the Soul of Man. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007. Shem ov ben Joseph Shem ov. Commentary on the Guide of the Perplexed, in Moreh nevukim im perushei Efodi, Shem ov, Crescas, Abravanel, ed. I. Goldman. Warsaw, 1861; repr. Jerusalem, 1960. Simplicius. On Aristotle’s Categories 1–4, trans. Michael Chase. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003. Secondary Sources Altmann, Alexander. “The Religion of the Thinkers: Free Will and Predestination in Saadia, Bahya, and Maimonides,” Religion in a Religious Age, ed. S. D. Goitein (Cambridge, MA: Association for Jewish Studies, 1974), pp. 25–52.

bibliography

329

Amand de Mendieta, Emmanuel. Fatalisme et liberté dans l’antiquité grecque: recherches sur la survivance de l’argumentation morale antifataliste de Carnéade chez les philosophes grecs et le théologiens chrétiens des quatre premiers siècles. Amsterdam: A. M. Hakkert, 1973. Aubenque, Pierre. “Sur la notion aristotélicienne d’aporie,” in Aristote et les problèmes de méthode. Louvain and Paris, 1961, pp. 3–19. ——. “Science, culture et dialectique chez Aristote,” Association Guillaume Budé, actes du congrès de Lyon Budé 1958. Paris: Les Belles letters, 1960, pp. 144–149. ——. “La dialectique chez Aristote,” L’Attualità della problematica aristotelica. Padua, 1970, pp. 9–31. ——. Le problème de l’être chez Aristote: essai sur la problématique aristotélicienne. Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1966. Baudry, Léon. The Quarrel over Future Contingents (Louvain, 1465–1475), trans. Rita Guerlac. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer, 1989. Ben Meir, Ruth. “Gersonides’ Interpretation of the Book of Ecclesiastes: An Analysis and Text,” 2 vol. Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 1993 (Hebrew). Ben Shammai, Haggai. “Saadia’s Introduction to Daniel: Prophetic Calculation of the End of Days vs. Astrological and Magical Speculation,” Aleph 4 (2004) pp. 11–87. ——. “Saadia Gaon’s Introduction to Isaiah,” Tarbi 60(3) (1991), pp. 371–404 (Hebrew). Bréhier, Emile. La philosophie du Moyen Age. Paris, 1971. Ben-Yehuda, E. The Dictionary of the Old and New Hebrew Language. Jerusalem, 1948. Black, Deborah L. Logic and Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics in Medieval Arabic Philosophy. Leiden: Brill, 1990. ——. “Logic in Islamic Philosophy,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5. London, 1998, pp. 706–713. Bouché-Leclercq, A. L’astrologie grecque. Paris 1899. Braner, Baruch. “Gersonides’ Introduction to the Commentary on Proverbs and the Avatars of the Text of the Work,” Tarbi 73 (2004): pp. 288–291 (Hebrew). Chenu, Marie-Dominique. Introduction à l’étude de Saint Thomas d’Aquin. Montreal: Institut d’études médiévales, 1950; Paris: Vrin, 1993. Chraïbi, Aboubakr. “L’émergence du genre muqaddima dans la littérature arabe,” in: Entrer en matière—les prologues, ed. J. D. Dubois and B. Roussel. Paris: Le Cerf, 1998, pp. 89–101. Chertoff, Gershon B. “The Logical part of al-Ghāzali’s Maqā id al-Falāsifa.” Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1952. Cohen, Carmiel. “ ‘Straightforward’ Halachic Exegesis in Gersonides’ Commentary on the Torah.” Ph.D. dissertation, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2007, (Hebrew). Dahan, Gilbert. “L’exégèse des livres prophétiques chez Pierre de Jean Olieu,” in Alain Boureau and Sylvain Piron, eds., Pierre de Jean Olieu (1228–1298): Pensée scolastique, dissidence spirituelle et société. Paris, 1999, pp. 91–114. ——. “Les commentaires bibliques dans le monde chrétien,” in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, ed. C. Sirat, S. Klein-Braslavy, and O. Weijers. Paris: Vrin, 2003, pp. 259–280. ——. L’exégèse chrétienne de la Bible en Occident médiéval XIIe–XIVe siècle. Paris: Le Cerf, 1999. ——. “Les Prologues des commentaires bibliques (XIIe–XIVe siècle),” in J. Hamesse, ed. Les prologues médiévaux. Turnhout: Brepols, 2000, pp. 427–470. Davidson, Herbert A. “Gersonides on the Material and Active Intellects,” Studies on Gersonides, a Fourteenth-Century Jewish Philosopher-Scientist, ed. Gad Freudenthal. Leiden and New York: Brill, 1992, pp. 195–265. ——. Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

330

bibliography

Düring, Ingemar. Aristotle in the Ancient Bibliographical Tradition. Göteborg, 1957. Eisen, Robert. Gersonides on Providence, Covenant and the Chosen People. New York: State University of New York Press, 1995. Feldman, Seymour. “Crescas’ Theological Determinism,” Da at 9 (1983), pp. 7–10. ——. “Introduction,” in Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides): The Wars of the Lord, trans. S. Feldman, vol. 1. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1984, pp. 3–67. ——. “The Binding of Isaac: A Test-Case of Divine Foreknowledge,” in Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish, and Christian perspectives, ed. Tamar Rudavsky (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1985), pp. 105–133. ——. “Synopsis of Book Four” in Levi ben Gershom (Gersonides): The Wars of the Lord, trans. S. Feldman, vol. 2. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1987, pp. 139–159. ——. “Gersonides and Biblical Exegesis,” Appendix to his English translation of The Wars of the Lord, vol. 2. Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1987, pp. 213– 247. ——. “The Wisdom of Solomon: A Gersonidean Interpretation,” Gersonide en son temps—science et philosophie médiévale, ed. G. Dahan. Louvain and Paris: E. Peeters, 1991, pp. 61–80. Freimark, Peter. Das Vorwort als literarische Form in der Arabischen Literatur. Münster, 1967. Freudenthal, Gad. “Cosmogonie et physique chez Gersonide,” REJ 145 (1986), pp. 295–304. Glasner, Ruth. “An Unknown Commentary by Levi ben Gershom,” Qiryat Sefer 64 (1992/93), p. 1101 (Hebrew). ——. “Levi ben Gershom and the Study of Ibn Rushd in the Fourteenth Century,” JQR 86 (1995), pp. 51–90. ——. “The Early Stages in the Evolution of Gersonides’ The Wars of the Lord,” JQR 87 (1996), pp. 1–47. ——. “Gersonides’ Lost Commentary on the Metaphysics,” Medieval Encounters 4 (1998), pp. 130–157. ——. On Gersonides’ Knowledge of Languages,” Aleph 2 (2002), pp. 235–257. ——. “On the Writing of Gersonides’ Philosophical Commentaries,” in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, ed. C. Sirat, S. KleinBraslavy, and O. Weijers. Paris: Vrin, 2003, pp. 90–103. ——. “Textual Criticism in Hebrew Supercommentaries on Aristotle,” Écriture et réécriture des textes philosophiques médiévaux: Volume d’hommage offert à Colette Sirat, ed. J. Hamesse and O. Weijers. Turnhout: Brepols, 2006, pp. 185–194. Goldstein, Bernard R. “Preliminary Remarks concerning Levi ben Gerson’s Contributions to Astronomy,” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 3 (1969); pp. 239–254. ——. The Astronomy of Levi ben Gerson (1288–1344): A Critical Edition of Chapters 1–20 with translation and commentary by Bernard R. Goldstein. Berlin and New York: Springer, 1985. Guttmann, Julius. “Das Problem der Willensfreiheit bei asdai Crescas und den islamischen Aristotelikern,” in Jewish Studies in Memory of George A. Kohut, 1874–1933, ed. Salo W. Baron and Alexander Marx. New York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1935 (repr. in Selected Writings of Julius Guttmann, ed. Steven T. Katz [New York: Arno Press, 1980]), pp. 326–349. Gutas, Dimitri. “Paul the Persian on the Classification of the Parts of Aristotle’s Philosophy: A Milestone between Alexandria and Baghdad,” Der Islam 60 (1983), pp. 231–267. Gyekye, Kwam. Arabic Logic: Ibn al- ayyib’s Commentary on Porphyry’s Eisagoge. Albany, 1979. Hamelin, Octave. “La dialectique et la science,” in O. Hamelin, Le système d’Aristote. Paris: Vrin, 1976, pp. 226–235.

bibliography

331

Harvey, Steven. “Averroes on the Principles of Nature: The Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics I–II.” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1977. ——. “The Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ Prooemium to his Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics,” PAAJR 52 (1985), pp. 55–84. Hasnawi, Ahmad. “Farabi et la pratique de l’exégèse philosophique (remarques sur son Commentaire au De Interpretatione d’Aristote),” Revue de synthèse, third series, vol. 106, no. 117 (1985), pp. 27–59. Hoffmann, Ph. “La fonction des prologues exégétiques dans la pensée pédagogique néoplatonicienne,” Entrer en matière—les prologues, ed. J. D. Dubois and B. Roussel. Paris: Le Cerf, 1998, pp. 209–243. Hugonnard-Roche, H. “Méthodes d’argumentation et philosophie naturelle chez Averroès,” Miscellanea Mediaevalia, vol. 17, Orientalische Kultur und Europäisches Mittelalter. Berlin and New York, 1985, pp. 240–253. Hunt, R. W. “Introductions to the Artes in the Twelfth Century,” Studia Mediaevalia, Festschrift for R. J. Martin. Bruges, 1948, pp. 85–112. Husik, Isaac. A History of Mediaeval Philosophy. New York and Philadelphia, 1960. Isaac, Jean. Le peri Hermeneias en Occident de Boèce à Saint Thomas. Paris: Vrin, 1953. Klatzkin, Jacob. Thesaurus Philosophicus Linguae Hebraicae et Veteris et Recentioris, 4 vols. Leipzig, 1928. Klein-Braslavy, Sara. Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Story of Creation, 2nd ed. Jerusalem: Rubin Mass 1987 [ Jerusalem: The Bible Association, 1978] (Hebrew). ——. Maimonides’ Interpretation of the Adam Stories in Genesis: A Study in Maimonides’ Anthropology. Jerusalem: Rubin Mass, 1986 (Hebrew). ——. “Maimonides’ Interpretation of Jacob’s Dream of the Ladder,” Annual of Bar-Ilan University, Studies in Judaica and Humanities, Moshe Schwarcz Memorial Volume, 22–23 (1987), pp. 329–349 (Hebrew); English translation in Maimonides As Biblical Interpreter. Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, forthcoming. ——. “Prophecy, Clairvoyance, Dreams, and the Concept of Hitbodedut in Gersonides’ Thought,” Da at 39 (1997), pp. 55–95 (Hebrew). ——. “La méthode diaporématique de Gersonide dans les Guerres du Seigneur,” Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, C. Sirat, S. Klein-Braslavy et O. Weijers, eds. Paris: Vrin 2003, pp. 105–134. ——. “Bible Commentary,” in The Cambridge Companion to Maimonides, ed. Kenneth Seeskin. Cambridge, 2005, pp. 245–272. ——. “Gersonides’ Methods of Inquiry in the Discussion on the Material Intellect in the Wars of the Lord,” M. C. Pacheco, J. F. Meirinhos, eds., Intellect et imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale / Intellect and Imagination in the Medieval Philosophy / Intelecto e imaginaçao na Filosofia Medieval. Turnhout: Brepols, 2006, pp. 641–651. ——. King Solomon and Philosophical Esotericism in the Thought of Maimonides. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1996; repr. 2008 (Hebrew). ——. “Interpretative Riddles in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008), repr. in Maimonides As Biblical Interpreter. Brighton, MA: Academic Studies Press, forthcoming. ——. “Dialectic in Gersonides’ Biblical Commentaries,” Studies in the History of Culture and Science: A Tribute to Gad Freudenthal. Brill, 2011, pp. 303–321. Kogan, Barry S. “Some Reflections on the Problem of Future Contingency in Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes,” in Tamar Rudavsky, ed., Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Perspectives. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1985, pp. 95–101. Kreisel, Howard. “Veridical Dreams and Prophecy in the Philosophy of Gersonides,” Da at 22 (1989), pp. 73–84 (Hebrew). Lane, Edward William. An Arabic-English Lexicon, 8 vols. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968.

332

bibliography

Langermann, Y. Tzvi. “Some Astrological Themes in the Thought of Abraham ibn Ezra,” Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, ed. I. Twersky and J. M. Harris. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, pp. 28–85. Lasker, Daniel. “Gersonides on Dreams, Divination and Astrology,” WCJS 8(3) (1982), pp. 47–52. Le Blond, Jean Marie. Logique et méthode chez Aristote: étude sur la recherche des principes dans la Physique aristotélicienne, 4th ed. Paris: Vrin, 1996. Leff, Gordon. Bradwardine and the Pelagians: A Study of his “De causa Dei” and its Opponents. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957. ——. William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975. ——. Medieval Thought: St. Augustine to Ockham. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1958. Madkour, Ibrahim. L’Organon d’Aristote dans le monde arabe: ses traductions, son étude et ses applications. Paris, 1934. Mancha, José Luis. “Levi ben Gerson’s Astronomical Work: Chronology and Christian Context,” Science in Context 10(3) (1997), pp. 471–433. Manekin, Charles. “Preliminary Observations on Gersonides’ Logical Writings,” PAAJR 52 (1985), pp. 85–113. ——. “Freedom within Reason? Gersonides on Human Choice,” in Charles H. Manekin and Menachem M. Kellner, eds. Freedom and Moral Responsibility: General and Jewish Perspectives. Bethesda: University Press of Maryland, 1997, pp. 165–204. ——. “On the Limited-Omniscience Interpretation of Gersonides’ Theory of Divine Knowledge,” in Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism, ed. A. L. Ivry, E. R. Wolfson, and A. Arkush. Amsterdam: Harwood, 1998, pp. 135–170. ——. The Logic of Gersonides: A Translation of the Sēfer ha-Heqqēsh ha-yashar. Dordrecht, 1992. Marmura, Michael E. “Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents in Alfarabi and Avicenna,” in Tamar Rudavsky, ed., Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish, and Christian Perspectives. Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1985, pp. 81–94. Meiron, Eyal. “Gersonides’ Supercommentary on Averroes’ Epitome of Meteorology 1–3: A Comparative Analysis of the Optical-Physical-Mathematical Aspects of the Theories of the Halo and the Rainbow with an Appendix Containing an Annotated Critical Edition.” Ph.D. dissertation, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2003 (Hebrew). Mesch, Barry. Studies in Joseph Ibn Caspi: Fourteenth-Century Philosopher and Exegete. Leiden: Brill, 1975. Michalski, Konstanty. “Le problème de la volonté à Oxford et à Paris au XIVe siècle,” in La philosophie au XIVe siècle: Six études, ed. Kurt Flasch. Frankfurt: Minerva, 1969, pp. 281–391. ——. “Le criticisme et le scepticisme dans la philosophie du XIVe siècle,” in La philosophie au XIVe siècle, pp. 82–98. Minnis, Alastair. J. Medieval Theory of Authorship: Scholastic Literary Attitudes in the later Middle Ages, 2nd ed. Aldershot: Scholar Press, 1988. Munk, Shlomo. Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe. Paris, 1857. ——. Maïmonide. Le Guide des Égarés, 3 vols. Paris, 1856–1866. Peters, Francis E. Aristotle and the Arabs: The Aristotelian Tradition in Islam. New York: New York University Press, 1968. Pines, Shlomo. “Studies in Abul-Barakāt al-Baghdādi’s Poetics and Metaphysics,” Studies in Philosophy, Scripta Hierosolymitana 6 (1960), pp. 120–198. ——. “The Likelihood of the Rebirth of a Jewish State, according to Joseph Ibn Kaspi and according to Spinoza,” in Studies in the History of Jewish Philosophy. Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1977, pp. 277–305 (Hebrew).

bibliography

333

——. “Some Views Put Forward by the 14th Century Jewish Philosopher Isaac Pulgar and Some Parallel Views Expressed by Spinoza,” in Studies in Jewish Mysticism, Philosophy, and Ethical Literature. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1986, pp. 395–457 (Hebrew). ——. “Scholasticism after Thomas Aquinas and the Teachings of asdai Crescas and his Predecessors. Appendix B: God’s Knowledge in the Theories of Abraham ibn Dā ud and Gersonides, and in Christian Thought,” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 1(10) ( Jerusalem, 1967); repr. in Shlomo Pines, Studies in the History of Jewish Thought, ed. Warren Zev Harvey and Moshe Idel. Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1997. Pironet, F. “Aristote: Aporia, euporia et les mots étymologiquement apparentée, §1 Organon, Rhetorique, Physique” in A. Motte and Chr. Rutten, eds., Aporia dans la philosophie grecque, des origines à Aristote. Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 2001, pp. 151–198. Praechter, Karl. “Review of the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca,” Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence. London, 1990, pp. 31–54. Quain, Edwin. “The Medieval Accessus ad Actors,” Traditio 3 (1945), pp. 215–264. Ravitzky, Aviezer. “The Anthropological Theory of Miracles in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature 2 (1984), pp. 231–272. Rescher, Nicholas. “Truth and Necessity in Temporal Perspective,” in The Philosophy of Time, ed. Richard M. Gale. London, 1968, pp. 187–194. ——. “An Interpretation of Aristotle’s Doctrine of Future Contingency and Excluded Middle,” Studies in the History of Arab Logic. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1963, pp. 43–54. Riad, Eva. Studies in the Syriac Preface, Acta Universitatis upsaliensis, studia semitica upsaliensia 11. Uppsala, 1988. Ricœur, Paul. “La philosophie et ses ‘apories’,” in P. Ricœur, Être, essence et substance chez Platon et Aristote. Paris: Société d’édition d’enseignement supérieur, 1982, pp. 181–187. Rijk, Lambertus Marie de. “La méthode scolastique,” in L. M. De Rijk, La philosophie au Moyen Age. Leiden: Brill, 1985, pp. 82–105. Robinson, James T. “Samuel ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes and the Philosopher’s Prooemium,” Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature 3 (2000), pp. 83–146. ——. “Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes.” Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University. 2002. ——. Samuel Ibn Tibbons’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes: The Book of the Soul of Man. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007. Rosenberg, Shalom. “The Possible and the Real in Medieval Logic,” Iyyun 28 (1978), pp. 58–61 (Hebrew). ——. “Necessary and Contingent in Medieval Philosophy,” Iyyun 28 (2–3) (1978), pp. 103–155 (Hebrew). Ross, William David. “Introduction,” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary by W. D. Ross, vol. I. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924, pp. xiii–clxvi. Rudavsky, Tamar M. “Individuals and the Doctrine of Individuation in Gersonides,” New Scholasticism LVI (1982), pp. 33–50. ——. “Divine Omniscience and Future Contingents in Gersonides,” Journal of the History of Philosophy (1983), pp. 513–536. ——. “Divine Omniscience, Contingency and Prophecy in Gersonides,” in Tamar M. Rudavsky, ed. Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy. Dordrecht, 1985, pp. 161–181. Sabra, Abdelhamid I. “Avicenna on the Subject Matter of Logic,” Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), pp. 746–764.

334

bibliography

Samuelson, Norbert M. “Gersonides’ Account of God’s Knowledge of Particulars,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 10 (1972), pp. 399–416. ——. “On Knowing God: Maimonides, Gersonides and the Philosophy of Religion,” Judaism 18 (1969), pp. 64–77. ——. “The Problem of Free Will in Maimonides, Gersonides and Aquinas,” CCAR Journal (1970), pp. 2–20. ——. “The Problem of Future Contingents in Medieval Jewish Philosophy,” Studies in Medieval Culture 6–7 (1976), pp. 72–82. Schabel, Christopher David. Theology at Paris, 1316–1345: Peter Auriol and the Problem of Divine Foreknowledge and Future Contingents. Aldershot and Burlington: Ashgate, 2000. ——. “Philosophy and Theology across Cultures: Gersonides and Auriol on Divine Foreknowledge,” Speculum 81(4) (2006), pp. 1102–1103. Shiel, James. “Boethius’ Commentaries on Aristotle,” Medieval and Renaissance Studies 4 (1958), pp. 217–244; repr. in Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, ed. Richard Sorabji. London: Duckworth, 1990, pp. 349–372. Simplicius, Commentaire sur les Catégories, trans. and annot. Ilsetraut Hadot. Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill, 1990. Sirat, Colette. “Les commentaires bibliques: B. La méthode d’exégèse,” in Les méthodes de travail de Gersonide, ed. Colette Sirat, Sara Klein-Braslavy, and Olga Weijers. Paris: Vrin, 2003, pp. 215–259. Sirat, Colette and Weijers, Olga. “Droit et logique: Gersonide et les juristes chrétiens,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge 75 (2008), pp. 7–41. Sorabji, Richard. “The Ancient commentators on Aristotle,” in Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, ed. Richard Sorabji. London: Duckworth, 1990, pp. 1–30. Staub, Jacob J. The Creation of the World according to Gersonides. Brown Judaic Studies 24. Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1982. Steinschneider, Moritz. “Über das was dem Studium der Philosophie des Aristoteles vorausgehen muss,” in Al Farabi (Alfarabius), des arabischen Philosophen Leben und Schriften, mit besonderer Rücksicht auf die Geschichte der griechischen Wissenschaft unter den Arabern (Mémoires de l’Académie Impériale des Sciences de St.-Pétersbourg, series 7, vol. 13, no. 4). St. Petersburg, 1869, pp. 124–132. ——. Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher. Ein Beitrag zur Literaturgeschichte des Mittelalters, meist nach handschriftlichen Quellen. Berlin: Kommissionsverlag des Bibliographen bureaus, 1893. Stroumsa, Sarah. “A Literary Model as a Historical Document: On Saadia Gaon’s Introductions to his Biblical Commentaries,” in A Word Fitly Spoken: Studies in Medieval Exegesis of the Hebrew Bible and the Quran, ed. Meir M. Bar-Asher, Simon Hopkins, Sarah Stroumsa, and Bruno Chiesa. Jerusalem: Ben-Zvi Institute, 2007, pp. 193– 204 (Hebrew). Touati, Charles. “Les idées philosophiques et théologiques de Gersonide (1288–1344) dans ses commentaires bibliques,” Revue des sciences religieuses 28 (1954), pp. 335– 367. ——. Les Guerres du Seigneur, livres III et IV, trans. [into French] Charles Touati. Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1968. ——. La pensée philosophique et théologique de Gersonide. Paris: Minuit, 1973. Twersky, Isadore. Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (Mishne Torah). New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980. Vööbus, Arthur. History of the School of Nisibis. Louvain: Secrétariat du Corpus SCO, 1965. Weijers, Olga. “Questions disputées et dispute scolastique à la faculté des arts,” in Les méthodes de travail de et le maniement du savoir chez les scolastiques, ed. C. Sirat, S. KleinBraslavy, and O. Weijers. Paris: Vrin, 2003, pp. 135–149.

bibliography

335

Weil, Gérard E. La bibliothèque de Gersonide d’après son catalogue autographe. Louvain and Paris: E. Peeters, 1991. Weiss, Raymond L. Maimonides’ Ethics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991. Westernik, L. G. “The Alexandrian Commentators and the Introductions to their Commentaries,” in Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and their Influence, ed. Richard Sorabji. London: Duckworth, 1990, pp. 325–348. ——. Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy, introduction, text, translation and indices by L. G. Westernik. Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub., Co., 1962. Zonta, Mauro. “Gersonides, ‘Philosopher-Scientist’: Some Recent Books,” Henoch 16 (1994), pp. 335–345. ——. La filosofia antica nel Medioevo ebraico: le traduzioni ebraiche medievali dei testi filosofici antichi. Brescia: Paideia, 1996.

INDEX OF TOPICS AND NAMES

Abraham bar iyya, 154 nn. 14, 15 Abraham ben David of Posquières, 275 Abelard, 228 Accessus ad auctores, 153, 155 Accidents, 236, 237, 238, 250, 255, 257, 275, 295 Active Intellect, 31, 33 n. 97, 35, 36, 38, 41, 42, 59–64, 202 n. 93, 215 n. 167, 216–217, 218, 235, 236, 242, 247, 256, 269–275, 276 n. 134, 279 n. 138, 285 and n. 145, 294, 298, 299–305, 319 n. 67, 323 Agent of miracles, 5, 14, 16 n. 17, 17, 19, 29 n. 85, 31, 32, 33 n. 97, 35–36, 41–47, 48, 50, 51–52, 58–64, 95, 107 n. 118, 300 n. 8 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 23, 24, 37, 39, 43, 64, 191, 195, 211, 215, 216, 223–224 n. 5 Alexandrian prologue paradigm, 6, 7, 90, 118–150, 151, 152, 153, 155–156, 158, 161, 162, 165, 166, 169, 170, 172, 175, 184, 190 n. 39, 194 n. 57 Altmann, Alexander, 200, 224 n. 6, 297 Anatoli, Jacob, and Alexandrian prologue paradigm, 119, 121, 123, 151 n. 3 Anselm, 228 Aporia, 14, 15, 18, 21, 22, 24 n. 63, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 35, 36, 39, 41, 46, 47, 50, 51, 69, 70, 84 n. 40, 95, 111, 208 n. 122, 213, 214, 215, 237, 248, 254, 256, 257, 259, 260, 262, 263, 268, 269, 277, 283, 298 See also Solution, solution of the aporia Allegory, 27, 132, 133 n. 75, 156, 164, 166, 168, 178 Ammonius, 117, 140 n. 106 Aquinas, Thomas, 18 n. 32, 228, 231 Arab philosophers, 22, 23, 24 n. 63, 25, 153 Arabic literature/texts, 90 n. 65, 121 n. 21, 124 n. 37, 150, 151, 154, 155, 170, 172, 177

philosophy/philosophers, 75, 91 n. 66, 231 language, 75 n. 6, 119 n. 11, 121 n. 22, 122 n. 29, 123 n. 30, 127 n. 49, 128, 132 n. 73, 140 n. 103, 165, 171 n. 106 Aristotle, 13, 14–23, 27, 28, 30–34, 41, 46, 48 n. 12, 51, 52, 53, 56, 58, 68, 69, 70, 74, 75, 85, 93, 95, 101 n. 95, 103 n. 105, 111, 118, 120, 129 n. 58, 135 n. 84, 140 n. 106, 142 n. 112, 146, 148, 149, 151, 160, 163, 169, 171 n. 105, 175, 186, 193 n. 51, 195 n. 58, 222, 227, 228, 229–231, 234, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 243, 248, 249, 258, 253, 254, 255, 257 n. 89, 258, 267, 269, 271, 281, 284, 291, 292 De interpretatione, 227–234 Aristotelian Philosophy, 5, 23, 25, 26, 28, 32, 37, 38, 43, 51, 54, 55, 65, 73, 183, 193 Astrology, 14, 89, 106, 107, 225, 236, 238, 239, 242 n. 59, 247, 250, 258, 259, 300, 301, 302, 305–315, 317, 319, 320, 321, 323 Astronomy, 1, 4, 14, 124 n. 36, 127, 128, 173 n. 111, 183 n. 8, 229, 307 Asharites, 24, 26, 32 Astral causality, 225, 240 n. 57, 244, 261, 262, 263 n. 101, 266, 288 astral configuration, 225, 236, 259, 260, 261, 263, 265, 275, 285 n. 145, 288, 296 See also Determinism, astral determinism Averroes, 7, 8, 15, 21, 23, 24, 33 n. 97, 37, 39–42, 46, 52, 65 n. 74, 66, 67, 69–70, 75, 78 n. 15, 83, 85 n. 43, 86 nn. 47, 48, 91 n. 66, 104 n. 105, 104, 107 n. 119, 118, 121, 124 and n. 37, 125, 126, 129 n. 58, 130 n. 61, 146 n. 127, 160, 162, 177 and n. 105, 181–219, 227 and n. 15, 231, 232, 235–242, 247–249, 251, 253–257, 260, 263 n. 101, 266, 267 n. 109, 268

338

index of topics and names

n. 111, 269, 270 n. 117, 275, 280, 287, 308 n. 34 and Alexandrian prologue paradigm, 118, 122, 185 n. 16 Gersonides supercommentaries on Averroes’s commentaries, 149, 153, 177, 181–219 Avicenna, 23, 32 n. 95, 33 n. 97, 37, 91 n. 66, 118, 151 n. 3, 303, 308 n. 35 Avignon, 174, 228, 229 Aubenque, Pierre, 14 n. 8, 15 n. 12, 16 n. 23, 17 n. 29, 33 n. 96, 52, 69 Auriol, Pierre, 169 n. 92, 228–229, 232, 291, 292, 294 nn. 167, 169 Author, Authors of a book/books, 117, 120 n. 17, 123, 124, 129 n. 58, 142, 147, 151, 152, 154, 156, 157 n. 27, 159, 170, 172, 182 n. 4, 184, 189, 191 n. 43, 208 n. 20, 249 n. 68, 270 n. 118 of the book of Job, 34, 158 David, 119 intention, 174, 175 the method he uses, 146, 147 “the name of the author”—a point of the Alexandrian prologue paradigm, 90 n. 65, 120, 128, 129, 130, 133–136, 137–141, 158, 159, 172, 184 n. 16 of Proverbs, 77 Solomon, 119, 169 the usefulness of knowing the author’s name, 138–141, 144–145, 149, 159 Authority, 14–15, 22, 23, 24, 27, 107 n. 119, 198, 201 Ba ya Ibn Paquda, 154 n. 15, 172, 222, 223 Ben Meir, Ruth, 125 and nn. 30, 32, 129 n. 59, 136 n. 92, 137 n. 93, 142 n. 116, 144 nn. 121, 122, 159 n. 46, 161 n. 53 Benefit. See Utility Bible, biblical Gersonides’ Bible commentaries 75, 208 n. 76, 77 n. 14, 79, 98, 132 n. 67, 170, 172, 176, 179 Gersonides’ introductions to the Bible commentaries, 151–179 Gersonides’ commentary on Proverbs, 73–115 Bible, exegesis, 8, 73–115, 120, 121, 123, 128, 159, 174–175

explanation of words, 77–79, 81–89 explanation of verses, 89–113 interpretation of human types, 92, 93–95, 110–11 Interpretation based on etymology, 133, 142, 143 Bible, text, 54, 75, 77, 78 n. 15, 79, 97, 113, 132, 141, 161, 164, 172 n. 106, 173–176, 178 Boethius, 130 n. 61, 152, 228 Bonaventure, 228 Braner, Baruch, 78 nn. 14, 15 Brevity. See Concision Chance, 236, 248, 249, 250, 257, 258, 259, 260, 263 Chance and accident (be-qeri u-vehizdammen), 248, 252, 254, 256–263 Choice, 5, 6, 8, 50 57, 60, 61, 63, 214, 221–296, 307, 308 n. 34, 311, 312 Christian, Christians. See under Scholasticism; Commentaries on Bible; Philosophers, philosophy, thinkers, thought Commentaries on Bible, Christian, 151, 153 n. 10, 158, 173 Clairvoyant, clairvoyance. See Foreknowledge Concision, 57 n. 46, 71, 79–89 n. 21, 144 n. 122, 176–178, 188–190, 193, 201, 213 Contingency, 5, 6, 50, 221–296 Contradiction, 112, 137, 138, 139, 145, 146, 169, 173, 230, 238, 239, 249 n. 68, 257, 259, 290, 298 Law of contradiction, 49, 56, 230, 239, 259 Contradictory, 49, 50, 70, 84 n. 40, 97 n. 86, 99, 100, 101, 112, 137, 138, 143, 146, 162, 169, 171, 215, 237, 238, 259, 268 parts of the contradictory, 26 n. 73, 29 and n. 29, 30, 31, 35, 38 Creation of the world, 14, 22, 29–30, 33 n. 97, 48, 49–50, 51, 59 n. 50, 62, 67, 68–72, 105, 146 n. 125, 245 n. 65, 287 Crescas, asdai, 172 n. 103 Dahan, Gilbert, 9, 158 Davidson, Herbert A., 297, 300 n. 10, 302 n. 18, 303–304, 319 n. 67

index of topics and names Demonstration, 13, 54, 70, 86 n. 48, 87, 93, 98 n. 88, 99 n. 89, 109, 121, 126, 145 n. 125, 147 n. 130, 168, 171, 213, 285 n. 145 absolute demonstration, 54, 87–88, 146, 148 demonstratio per signum (demonstration by observation), 54, 70 n. 94, 87, 88, 97, 99 n. 89, 146, 148 explanatory demonstration (demonstratio propter quid ), 82, 87 explanatory and factual demonstration (demonstratio propter quid et quia), 87, 88, 97 See also Proof Determinism, 5, 6, 8, 50, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 214, 221–296, 307, 309 astral determinism, 225, 237, 240, 257, 258, 260, 263, 264, 272, 290, 291, 307, 309 Dialectic, 14, 15, 19, 26, 75, 76, 78, 83, 84 nn. 40, 41, 85, 147 n. 129, 168, 169 n. 92, 230 n. 25, 248, 259 dialectic question, 51, 157, 162, 163, 169 dialectic process, 34, 52 dialectic statement, 70 utility of dialectic, 19 n. 36, 75, 85 n. 43, 108 n. 121 See also under Method Dialectical syllogism. See Syllogism Diaporia, 15, 40 Didactic, 5, 17, 18 and n. 32, 45, 177 Doubt, 111, 113, 136–137, 141, 143, 144, 156, 161, 208–209, 210, 211, 213, 216, 237, 253, 260, 264, 274 n. 138 “without any doubt”, 5, 94, 95, 127 no doubt remains, 45, 47, 54, 65, 67, 70, 72 n. 115, 95 Dream, dreamer. See Foreknowledge Duns Scotus, 231 Durandus, 228 Epicurus, 25, 26, 31, 32 Epilogue/s, 7, 184, 185, 188 n. 28, 195, 197–198 Error, 69, 70, 97 n. 86, 99, 102, 103, 104, 112, 114, 207 n. 116, 208, 263 n. 101, 306, 312, 317 Ethics, 74, 91, 107 n. 117, 143 n. 121, 147 n. 129, 148, 156, 161, 165, 174, 175

339

Euporia, 15, 16, 69 Experience, 222, 225, 230, 231, 232, 238, 239, 243, 244, 247–252, 254, 256–260, 265, 272, 273, 274, 277, 282, 283, 284, 295, 296, 298 n. 6, 307, 313 al-Farabi, 23, 24, 33 n. 97, 38, 66, 67, 75, 118, 121, 122, 125, 127, 128 n. 56, 129 n. 58, 151 n. 3, 195 n. 62, 228, 229, 231–233, 251 n. 73, 277 n. 135 Felicity (ha la ah), 4, 5, 7, 74, 110, 113, 114, 115, 125, 128, 132, 154, 157, 158, 161, 163, 164, 173, 217, 244 See also Happiness Feldman, Seymour, 10, 27 n. 85, 85 n. 46, 104 n. 108, 105 n. 112, 143 n. 121, 127 n. 53, 159 n. 46, 221, 297, 302 n. 14, 306 n. 28 Foreknowledge, 221, 227, 229, 230, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238, 247 Human, 227, 232, 233, 247, 250, 251, 253, 256–258, 262, 263 n. 101, 264, 277, 285 by clairvoyance dreams and prophecy, 55 n. 37, 60 n. 55, 227, 247–252, 256, 258, 264, 272, 277, 280, 294, 298, 302 nn. 15, 17, 308 n. 34 by dream, 227 n. 15, 238, 239, 243, 247, 295 of the dreamer and the clairvoyant, 297–323 prophetic, 34, 264–266, 294 n. 167 of the Active Intellect, 272 n. 126, 275, 294 n. 167 divine/God’s, 226, 229, 233, 234, 245, 246, 267, 277 See also God’ knowledge Former Prophets, 77 n. 14, 110 Future contingents, 228, 229, 232, 233, 235, 245, 246, 251, 264, 268, 277 n. 134, 280, 281, 282, 290–295, 304, 305, 308 n. 35 al-Ghazali, 82 n. 31, 170 Galen, 190 Generally accepted premises. See Premises Generation of animate substances, 14, 16 n. 18, 21, 23, 25, 33 n. 97, 48, 49, 65–87 Gregory of Rimini, 292

340

index of topics and names

Gersonides Alexandrian prologue paradigm (in the Wars), 124–28 on Aristotle, 187–194, 197, 198, 199, 204, 205, 207, 211, 212, 213, 218, 238, 219, 240 on Averroes supercommentaries on Averroes’s commentaries, 149, 153, 177, 181–219 introductions to the supercommentaries, 184–197, 203, 219 supercommentaries on the commentaries on physical sciences, 190, 198–204 Bible commentaries, 75, 208 n. 76, 77 n. 14, 79, 98, 132 n. 67, 170, 172, 176, 179 introductions to the Bible commentaries, 151–179 commentary on Proverbs, 73–115 own inquiry/ideas, 48, 50, 51, 55, 58, 67, 69, 70, 72, 191–194, 198, 201–202, 212–218 own arguments, 51, 52, 56, 193, 211–212, 257 own solution/answers, 47, 48, 51, 56, 58, 70, 71 Glasner, Ruth, 9, 14 and n. 7, 57 n. 46, 75 n. 6, 122 n. 29, 123 n. 30, 181 n. 1, 189 n. 32, 193 n. 51, 194 n. 56, 195 nn. 58, 59, 196 n. 64, 201 n. 85, 203 n. 98, 218 n. 180 God, 31, 35 God’s knowledge, 14, 16 n. 19, 24, 25, 28, 33 n. 97, 48, 50, 51, 55–57, 68 n. 88, 71, 82, 221, 225, 226, 227 n. 16, 228–229, 232, 233, 235, 245–246, 264, 266–296 agent of miracles?, 31, 55, 60, 61, 62 God’s will, 73, 223, 227 n. 14 Goodman, Lenn Evan, 170 n. 98 Hadot, Ilsetraut, 170 Halevi, Judah, 222, 226 Hamelin, Octave, 14 n. 10, 28, 34–35 Happiness, 73 See also Felicity Harvey, Steven, 10, 119 n. 12, 185 n. 16 Ha la ah. See Felicity Ha a ah. See Preliminary remark

Hellenistic commentators, 22, 23, 24 n. 63, 25 ibbur, 191, 203, 218 Hugh of St. Victor, 158 Hugonnard-Roche, Henri, 171 n. 105 Husik, Isaac, 18 n. 32 Ibn Bajja, 23, 33 n. 97, 66, 217 n. 117 Ibn Kaspi, Joseph, 227 n. 16 Ibn Daud, Abraham, 222, 224, 226, 263 Ibn Ezra, Abraham, 16 n. 17, 32 n. 95, 52 n. 23, 137 n. 93, 142, 144 n. 122, 169 n. 90, 171, 177 n. 132, 225, 261, 263, 313, 316 Ibn Ghiyāth, Isaac, and Alexandrian prologue paradigm, 119, 120–121, 123, 151 n. 4 Ibn ayyib, 118, 151 n. 3, 171 Ibn Tibbon, Samuel, 81 n. 25, 119, 120–121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 127 nn. 49, 51, 128–132, 135, 136, 140 n. 104, 142–145, 149, 150, 151 n. 4, 156, 157, 159, 166 n. 75, 171 and Alexandrian prologue paradigm, 120–121, 129–130, 132, 134–136 Imagination. See Imaginative faculty Imaginative faculty, 38, 64, 103, 114, 161, 204, 298, 299, 303, 304, 306, 308 n. 35, 315, 316, 318–323 Imaginative soul. See Imaginative faculty Intellect Human intellect, 59, 73, 103 n. 103, 133, 168, 195, 204, 206, 207 n. 116, 208 n. 118, 214, 215, 223, 225, 226, 240, 241, 243, 244, 255, 257, 260, 263, 281, 284, 288, 290, 298, 307, 309 n. 36, 312, 319 n. 67 hylic/material intellect, 14, 16 nn. 19, 20, 22; 18 n. 31, 23, 37–43, 48, 50, 52, 54, 58, 59, 64–65, 71, 72, 73, 133, 134, 145 n. 123, 189 n. 35, 215–216, 217, 273 n. 127, 275, 299 n. 6, 304 acquired intellect, 58, 81 n. 26, 108, 109 n. 121, 114, 133, 134, 215, 216–217, 319 separate intellect/s, 33 n. 97, 36–43, 81, 84, 168, 271, 273, 303, 304, 314, 315 nn. 53, 54, 316, 320 n. 68, 321, 322 intellects of the heavenly bodies, 305, 306 n. 29, 314, 315 n. 53, 321

index of topics and names Intellectual perfection, 4, 5, 73, 74, 89, 113, 114, 131, 140, 158, 160, 163, 167 Immortality the soul, 4, 14, 16 nn. 19, 20, 23 and n. 61, 33 n. 97, 37–38, 48, 57–59, 61 n. 56, 64, 71, 73, 108 n. 121, 114, 142, 145 n. 125, 146, 215–218 Intelligibles, 37, 38, 58, 59, 73, 207, 216, 217, 303, 304, 319 n. 67 first intelligibles, 81, 82, 90–93, 168 Intention (kawwanah), 54, 79 n. 21, 145, 156, 157, 161, 170, 174, 177, 191, 192, 204 Introduction, introductions, 3, 4, 6, 7, 21, 24 n. 62, 117 to Averroes’s commentaries on Aristotle, 184–185 to Maimonides’ commentary on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates, 189–190, 191 n. 43 to Solomon’s own books, 90, 128–150 Syriac introductions, 171 n. 88, 172, 177 See also Alexandrian prologue paradigm; Gersonides; Wars of the Lord Ivry, Alfred L., 10 Job book of, 27, 34, 74 n. 3, 76, 153, 157, 158, 162, 169 n. 92, 172 the story of Job, 33, 34, 162–163 the man, 27 n. 78, 162, 163 Job’s friends, 27, 34, 36–37, 162 Kahana-Smilansky, Hagar, 106 n. 114 Kalam, 26, 223 Kawwanah, See Intention Kellner, Menachem, 129 n. 59, 173 n. 111 al-Kindy, 118, 151 n. 3 Klatzkin, Jacob, 165 n. 72 Kreisel, Howard, 303, 308 n. 34 Logic, 1, 13, 74 n. 3, 75, 103 n. 3, 121 n. 20, 163, 182, 183, 191, 195, 210, 229, 242, 243, 277, 279, 283, 293 three-valued logic, 229, 230, 232, 290, 291 n. 157, 292, 293, 294 n. 167 two-valued logic, 230, 231, 232, 290, 291 n. 157, 294 n. 167

341

logical, 149, 159, 175, 185, 194, 217, 221, 228, 230, 232, 233, 235, 239, 243, 245, 246, 248, 258, 264, 281, 283, 290, 291, 293, 294, 298, 314, 320 logical treatise, 175, 184, 190 logical determinism, 227, 228, 234 logical possible answers, 28–32, 32–43, 47, 49, 51, 53, 54, 64, 65, 66, 68, 71, 145 n. 123, 162, 163 Ma shavah. See Supposition Madkour, Ibrahim, 195 n. 62 Maimonides, 16 n. 19, 24 and nn. 62, 65, 25 n. 66, 26, 27 n. 78, 33, 54, 56, 68 n. 88, 74, 78, 79, 100 n. 93, 124, 133 n. 76, 139, 141, 146 n. 125, 162, 164, 166, 171, 172 n. 109, 176, 177, 179 n. 142, 189–190, 181 n. 43, 195 n. 61, 201, 222, 223, 224, 225–226, 242 n. 58, 256 n. 88, 267–269, 281 n. 140, 283, 294, 297 n. 2, 302 n. 16, 313, 317 n. 60, 322 Manekin, Charles, 87 n. 50, 122 nn. 28, 29, 182 n. 6, 188 nn. 28, 30, 189 n. 31, 192 and n. 47, 195 n. 60, 198 n. 74, 210 nn. 133, 134, 240 nn. 55, 56 Mashal (fiction), 33, 34, 77, 100, 162 Mathematics, 26, 74, 87, 91, 98, 99 n. 89, 127, 128, 146, 148 Mashbaum, Jesse. S., 35 n. 104, 207, 215, 216 n. 170 Medicine, 26 n. 71 Metaphysics, 4, 18, 26, 31, 34, 74, 81 n. 26, 89, 89, 91, 99 n. 89, 102, 105 n. 112, 107, 108, 113, 114, 127, 128, 130 n. 61, 147, 161, 162, 200, 273, 299 Metaphor, 79 n. 21, 100, 133 n. 75, 164, 178, 236, 269, 272, 273 Method, Methods, 13, 15 applicative method/analogical method, 5, 62–63, 65 n. 69, 298, 299–300, 305–306, 314, 323 dialectic method, 13, 14 n. 5, 19 n. 40, 20, 28, 37, 46, 70 n. 93, 76, 84, 90 n. 64, 91, 94, 95, 96, 97 n. 85, 98–111, 113, 114, 142, 143, 169 n. 92, 175, 221, 230, 234, 237, 239, 267, 294, 303 See also diaporematic method; Wars of the Lord, order of the topics.

342

index of topics and names

diaporematic method, 4–6, 13–14, 17–28, 32–33, 36, 41, 43, 45–72, 74–75 n. 3, 76, 84, 85, 90, 94, 95–96, 99, 100–101, 103 n. 105, 104, 108, 110–115, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 148, 162–163, 169, 213, 214, 215, 234, 98, 299 first stage, 14 n. 6, 15, 21–43, 46, 47, 48, 50 n. 18, 51, 59, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 71, 94, 112, 113, 143 second and third stages, 15, 16 n. 22, 43, 46, 47, 53, 55, 56, 57, 64 second stage, 15–16 and n. 17, 19, 46, 56, 60, 66, 68, 113 third stage, 15, 16, 46, 47, 51, 54, 56, 58, 59, 64, 66, 68, 69, 70 fourth stage, 16, 46, 47, 55, 57, 64 n. 70 fifth stage, 16–17, 47, 69, 71 n. 94 utility, 95 Mezimmah. See Supposition Michalski, Konstanty, 229, 230 n. 25 Midrash/Midrashim, 142, 174, 175–176, 177, 179 Me iri, Mena em, 81 nn. 25, 26, 27, 159 Miracle, 14–15, 116 n. 17, 32, 60–64, 107, 157, 227 n. 114, 251 n. 72, 264 Anthropological theory of miracles, 16 n. 17, 32, 52 n. 23 See also Agent of miracles Mofet re iyyah. See Demonstration, demonstratio per signum Mofet sibba. See Demonstration, demonstratio propter quid Mofet sibbah we-me i ut. See Demonstration, demonstratio propter quid et quia Moses Narboni, 227 n. 16 Mutakallimun, 26, 30 Munk, Shlomo, 165 n. 72, 166 n. 74 Note, discursive, 8, 50 n. 20, 160 n. 52, 184, 193, 202, 204–218, 218–219, 235–246, 214, 247, 253, 257 n. 89, 281, 283, 295, 297 n. 31 Opinion/opinions, 112 n. 128, 168 n. 85 Alexander’s, 216 Aristotle’s, 163, 211, 213, 267 Author’s opinions, 138, 139 Averroes’s, 211, 217 n. 171, 237, 249 n. 68, 297

determined by the stars, 236, 237, 311, 312 erroneous, 103 nn. 103, 106 Gersonides’, 149, 150, 191, 192, 193, 194, 201 n. 85, 202, 205, 217 n. 175, 221 historical opinions, 21, 22–43, 47, 48, 51, 59, 64, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 163, 271 n. 118 logical and historical possible opinions, 28–43, 162 of Job and his friends, 162 of the great sages of our Torah, 267 that produce aporias, 14, 15, 16, 21–43, 47, 48, 49, 51, 74 n. 3, 95, 111, 143, 144, 145, 162, 163, 216, 267–268, 275–279, 282 Origen, 130 n. 61, 131 n. 66, 151, 170 Parable, 74 n. 3, 148 See also Allegory; Mashal Pentateuch. See Torah Perplexity, 14, 22, 46, 84 n. 40, 111, 112, 136, 137 Philoponus, 30 n. 87, 69 n. 89, 129 n. 58, 117, 156 n. 21 Philosophers/philosophy/thinkers, thought, Christian, 23, 38–42, 228, 230, 231, 234, 291, 294 Pines, Shlomo, 165 n. 72, 223 n. 4, 224 n. 6, 229 n. 24, 271 n. 118 Pironet, R., 13 n. 4, 46 n. 4, 84 n. 40 Plato, 30, 90 n. 65, 118, 130 n. 61, 140 n. 166, 151 Political philosophy, 20, 74, 84 n. 41, 88, 89, 91, 103, 105 n. 112, 107, 108 n. 121, 109, 168 Precepts, 74, 148, 175, 179, 284 Preliminary remark (ha a ah), 5, 7, 19 and n. 36, 20, 70 n. 93, 74 n. 2, 78 n. 14, 79, 121 n. 22, 129 n. 58, 165–171, 178 Premises, 20, 46, 57, 58, 68, 81–114, 135 n. 87, 142–147, 168, 171, 210, 211, 215 appropriate premises, 86, 87, 88 n. 60, 99 n. 89, 101, 106 n. 114 generally accepted premises, 20 and n. 43, 21, 82–85, 88, 89, 91, 93–95, 97–105, 107 n. 119, 111, 113, 114, 168 inherent premises, 86, 87, 88, 97, 98, 101, 103 n. 106, 106 n. 114, 107

index of topics and names non inherent premises, 88, 89, 97, 98, 99, 101, 103 n. 106, 105 n. 112, 107 Principle of correspondence, 61, 228, 230, 234, 239, 242, 248, 254, 277 n. 135, 279, 283, 285, 290, 295 Proclus, 118 n. 3, 163, 170 Prologues. See Introduction Prophecy, 243, 244, 247 n. 67, 264, 296 See also Foreknowledge, by clairvoyance dreams and prophecy Prophet, 31, 32, 36, 62 n. 62, 63, 107 n. 119, 227, 233, 234, 235, 243, 244, 246, 251 n. 73, 252, 261 n. 98, 264–266, 274, 283, 285 n. 145, 294 n. 167, 295, 296, 298, 301, 319 n. 6 Proof, 22, 31 n. 95, 42, 50, 54, 56, 57 n. 89, 70 n. 93, 84 n. 40, 87, 91 n. 67, 99 n. 89, 102, 147 n. 130, 206–207, 210, 218, 222, 295, 301, 303 by negation, 54, 55, 65, 66 per impossibile, 104 Proverbs, book of. See under Gersonides; Utility Providence, 14, 16 nn. 18, 22, 24 n. 65, 25, 26, 24, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33 n. 97, 34, 35, 36, 37, 48, 49, 53–55, 57, 59, 63, 71, 73–74, 103 n. 103, 157, 158, 162, 173, 244, 258, 263, 265, 282, 287, 288, 300 n. 8, 301 n. 13, 308 n. 34 Physics, 26, 31, 34, 70, 74, 86, 87, 88, 91, 98, 99 n. 89, 102, 103 n. 105, 106 n. 114, 127, 128, 146 n. 127, 147, 148, 161, 168, 196, 200, 223, 247, 259, 299, 300, 302, 306, 315 n. 56 Qara, Joseph, 142, 144 n. 122 Qohelet (the author of Ecclesiastes), 112–113, 133 n. 76, 135, 142, 143, 144, 149 n. 138, 158 n. 36, 177 n. 132 Quain, Edwin, 130 n. 62 Questio disputata, 17 Rashbam (r. Samuel ben Meir), 142, 144 n. 122 Rashi, 142, 144 n. 122, 177 n. 132, 159 Reader, 4, 5, 6, 7, 13, 18, 19 n. 40, 20 n. 41, 21, 26 and n. 71, 45, 46, 57 nn. 43, 46, 58 n. 50, 71, 77, 78 n. 15, 79, 80, 89, 90, 96, 109, 117, 121 n. 22, 124, 125, 126 n. 42, 127, 129 n. 58, 132, 135 n. 87, 137, 140, 141, 144, 145–148, 149, 150, 151, 154,

343

156, 157, 161, 163, 164, 166, 167, 172 n. 106, 173, 176, 177, 178, 183, 189, 192, 197, 200, 202, 203, 207 n. 118, 208 n. 120, 211, 214, 314 n. 53, 315 Ricœur, Paul, 13, n. 4, 46 n. 4, 84 n. 40 Robinson, James. T., 132 n. 75 Rosenberg, Shalom, 191 n. 45, 254 n. 81 Ross, William David, 18 Saadia Gaon, 119 n. 12, 154 n. 13, 170, 171 n. 98, 172 n. 106, 222, 226 Safeq. See Doubt Sages, Jewish, 22, 24, 27 n. 77 the great sages of our Torah, 22, 56, 267, 268, 269, 275 the sages of the Torah, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28, 30 most of the followers of our Torah, 23, 24, 25 n. 66, 25, 27 n. 77, 30, 32, 36 the outstanding scholars of our Torah, 23, 24 and n. 63, 25, 30 Samuel of Marseilles, 195 n. 60 Schabel, Christopher David, 229 n. 21, 232 n. 33, 291 nn. 155, 157, 294 n. 167, 295 n. 169 Schramm, Lenn, 10, 106 n. 113, 288 n. 150, 289 n. 152 Scholasticism, Christian, 17, 18 n. 32, 171 n. 106, 174 Schwarz, Michael, 223 n. 4 Separate intellect/s, See Intellect Sharples, Robert W., 223 nn. 4, 5 Shem ov ben Joseph Shem ov, 191 n. 44 Simplicius, 117, 118, 121 nn. 20, 21, 125 n. 39, 129 n. 58, 151 n. 1, 156 nn. 20, 21, 17 Sirat, Colette, 9, 174 Solomon (King), 4, 6, 7, 18 n. 33, 74, 76, 77, 85, 89, 90, 96, 99 n. 90, 109 n. 121, 111, 112, 113, 119, 120, 123, 128–150, 156, 159–160, 164, 168, 169 and Alexandrian prologue paradigm 128–136 See also under Author; Introduction; Utility Solution compromise solution, 49–52, 55, 57, 58, 63, 65, 70 n. 93, 71, 214, 215, 239, 248, 259, 261, 268, 269, 299 discovery solution, 48, 55–67 identification solution, 48, 53–55, 57

344

index of topics and names

solution of the aporia, 3–4, 16, 17, 28, 33, 45–72, 213, 214, 215, 237, 239, 262, 268, 277, 283 solution of the problem, 95, 128, 144, 145, 146, 209, 221, 224, 226, 227, 230, 231, 234, 247, 248, 262, 263, 264, 267, 268, 281, 283, 284, 285, 286, 289, 290, 291, 292, 294, 295 See also Method, diaporematic method, fourth stage; solution of the problem Souls of the spheres/the heavenly bodies, 303–306, 308 n. 35, 309, 312–314–317, 320–323 Stage. See Method Steinschneider, Moritz, 20 n. 41, 181 n. 1, 187 n. 22, 188 n. 28 Stroumsa, Sarah, 170–171 n. 98 Supposition, 82–3, 84, 85, 90–94, 102, 103, 105 n. 12, 111–113, 168 Syllogism, 6, 80, 82, 84, 85, 88, 91 n. 66, 93, 97 n. 86, 98 n. 88, 99, 101, 102, 103 n. 103, 104, 107 n. 119, 110, 111, 114, 121 n. 20, 142, 143, 147 n. 30, 194 n. 55, 228, 233, 234, 239, 253, 256, 257, 281, 282, 291 deductive syllogism, 85, 88, 149 n. 138, 143 n. 117 demonstrative syllogism, 6, 81, 86, 91, 95, 98, 168 dialectic syllogism, 81, 84 nn. 40, 41, 85, 88, 89, 91, 93–97, 98 n. 88, 112–115, 148 n. 132, 147 n. 130, 168 disjunctive syllogism, 285 inductive syllogism, 98, 142 Syriac literature, 118, 120 n. 17, 151 See also under Introduction Thesis and antithesis, 14, 16 n. 22, 28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 49, 213, 214, 215, 298, 299 Themistius, 23, 24, 33 n. 97, 37, 39–42, 66, 67 n. 83, 270 n. 117 Thomas Bradwardine, 228 Torah, 4, 22, 73, 74, 77 n. 14, 90 n. 64, 108 n. 119, 125, 157, 158, 159, 161,

162, 164, 167, 171, 173, 263, 284 n. 142, 287 Touati, Charles, 13 n. 3, 19 n. 40, 20 n. 41, 42 n. 116, 126 n. 122, 181 n. 1, 183 n. 8, 186 n. 21, 195 n. 60, 197 n. 69, 245 n. 65, 271 n. 121 Tricot, Jules, 13 n. 4, 19 n. 34, 46 n. 4, 84 n. 40, 142 n. 12 Truth, 4, 5, 6, 13, 16, 18, 19 and n. 34, 45, 46, 47, 49, 54, 55, 57, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 72, 81, 83, 84, 85, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96–101, 103 n. 106, 104–115, 133 n. 74, 143–147, 157, 162, 168 n. 85, 173, 186 n. 21, 191, 197, 198, 201, 204, 214, 215, 221, 230, 231, 232, 249 n. 68, 258, 264, 281, 290 n. 153, 291, 293, 303, 306 Twersky, Isadore, 190 n. 38 Utility, (benefit) of the Alexandrian prolog paradigm, 118, 129 n. 58 of the Wars, 124, 125, 126 of the points in the prefaces of Solomon’s books, 128, 135 n. 87, 136, 137–141, 144, 145–150 of Proverbs, 27 n. 14, 87, 90–91, 98 n. 87, 149 Verification, 20 n. 45, 85, 91, 92 n. 69, 96, 97, 104, 109, 112, 114, 121 n. 19, 145–148, 162, 167 Wars of the Lord Introduction, 124–128 book II, 247– 266 book III, 266–296 order of the topics in the Wars, 5, 57 n. 46, 64 n. 71, 126, 248 n. 68, 270–271 n. 118 Weijjers, Olga, 9 Weil, Gérard E., 123 n. 32, 182 n. 1 William of Ockham, 228, 231, 290 n. 153, 291, 292–293 Zonta, Mauro, 75 n. 6, 187 n. 22

INDEX OF SOURCES AND CITATIONS

Ammonius preface to the Isagoge, 140 n. 106 Anatoli, Jacob Malmad ha-talmidim, 121 Aristotle De anima III.7, 23 n. 61 De generatione animalium 1.22, 236, 269 De interpretatione 7, 49 n. 16 9, 227, 228, 230, 232, 233, 234, 238, 239, 246, 248, 279, 280, 281, 283, 285, 291, 293, 294 Eudemean Ethics, 52 Metaphysics, 4, 18, 19, 21 n. 46, 22, 34, 75, 83, 85, 95, 171, 175, 178, 186 I, 21 I.3, 21 n. 46, 163 n. 63 II.3, 146, 148, 169 III, 19, 21, 101 n. 95 III.1, 14–15, 19, 20 nn. 41, 43, 43, 32, 41, 46, 69, 75, 111 IV.3, 20 n. 41, 49 n. 17 VI, 196 n. 65 VII, 24 n. 63 XI, 196 n. 65 XII, 24 n. 63, 267 XII.3, 23 n. 61 XII.9, 20 n. 41, 270 n. 117 Meteorology I.10, 82 n. 30 II.1–2, 82 n. 30 Nicomachean Ethics, 222, 256 n. 88 I.1, 20 n. 43, 146, 147 n. 129, 148, 169 n. 91, 175 n. 117 I.VII, 186 n. 21 VII.1, 48 n. 12, 75 n. 5, 186 n. 21 Physics, 21, 34, 21, 34, 46, 163, 181 I, 163 I.1, 160 II.2, 271 n. 119 II 5, 249 n. 69

Posterior Analytics, 86, 97, 194 I.13, 87 n. 50 I.33, 83 n. 38 I.2, 86 n. 48, 93 I.4, 86 n. 47, 107 Prior Analytics, 97 Topics, 19, 21 75, 83, 94, 95, 101 n. 95 I.1, 14–15, 22 n. 54, 27 n. 73, 46, 75, 83 n. 32 I.2, 75, 43, 142 n. 112, 169 I.10, 107 n. 119 I.14, 22 n. 54, 83 n. 32 VI.6, 14, n. 10, 28 Averroes al-Damima, 181 n. 140 Epitome of De anima, 33 n. 97, 35, 38, 65 n. 75, 66–67 Epitome [?] of De animalibus, 33 n. 97, 122 n. 28, 257 [Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1370/1] fol.196r, 208 n. 120 Epitome of De caelo, 160 Epitome of De generatione et corruptione, 126 n. 28, 150 Epitome of the Metaphysics, 122 n. 128, 126, 130 n. 61, 162, 185 n. 18 Epitome of the Meteorology, 82 n. 30, 122 n. 28, [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 956/8] 398v, 160 Epitome of the Parva naturalia [Blumberg edition] p. 70, 198 II.3, 122 n. 28, 235–237, 242, 247, 249–250, 251, 256, 257, 260, 263 n. 101, 269, 275, 214 II.5, 308 n. 34 IV.2, 308 n. 34 Epitome of the Physics, 150 [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 918/3] fols. 54c–55c, 200 Kol meleket higgayon, 182 n. 6 2b, 91 n. 66 35a, 87 nn. 50, 51

346

index of sources and citations

37b, 83 36a, 87 nn. 53, 55 40b, 87 nn. 53, 55 Long Commentary on De anima, 41 n. 115, 42 n. 117, 215 Long commentary on the Metaphysics, 4, 18 n. 32, 20 n. 40, 30 n. 87, 66–67, 146 n. 126, 156 n. 24, 181 n. 1, 267 n. 107, 269 n. 114, 270 n. 117 VII, 33 n. 97 [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 886] fol. 10r, 146 n. 127 [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 887] fol. 17r, 20 n. 44, 21 n. 50, 22 n. 52 fol. 17v, 103 n. 105 fol. 32r, 20 n. 41 fol. 148v, 23 n. 61 Long commentary on the Physics, 18 n. 32, 20 n. 43, 122, 124, 126, 128 n. 56, 129 n. 59, 156 n. 24, 171, 185 n. 16 Long commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 195 n. 60 Middle Commentary on De anima, 23 n. 61, 182 n. 4, 215 Middle Commentary on De generatione et corruptione, 182 n. 4 Middle commentary on De interpretatione 9, 231, 23, 280 [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 920] fol. 22r, 231 fol. 23r, 233 n. 36 13, 254 [Rosenberg, “Necessary and Possible”] p. 135, 254, 267 n. 109 p. 141, 255 Middle commentary on the Metaphysics, 181 n. 1 Middle Commentary of the Meteorology, 78 n. 15, 82 n. 28, 182 n. 4 Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, 20 n. 45, 182 n. 4 Middle commentary on the Physics, 196 n. 65 II.3.2, 249 n. 69 III.2 [Paris—BNF, MS hébr. 938] fols. 42v–43r, 52 [Harvey, “Averroes on the Principles of Nature”]

p. 179, 196 n. 66 p. 179–180, 206 n. 111 p. 182, 196 n. 94 Middle Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 87 n. 50 I.13, 86 [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 931/1] fol. 2v, 86 n. 48, fol. 2r–v, 93 n. 76 fol. 5r, 86 n. 47 fol. 13v–14v (on I.13), 87 n. 50 fol. 62v, 86 Middle Commentary on the Prior Analytics, 122 n. 28 Middle Commentary on the Topics, 15, 19 n. 36, 21, 75, 76, 85 n. 43, 95, 96, 150, 169 n. 93, 175 n. 118 [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 933] fol. 3r, 19 n. 36, 85 n. 43 fol. 7v, 22 n. 54 fol. 7v–8v, 107 n. 119 fol. 8v, 82 n. 32 fol. 9v, 98 n. 88, 172 n. 106 fol. 109r, 126 n. 45 fol. 113v, 22 n. 54 Auriol, Pierre Principium biblicum, 169 n. 92 Ba ya Ibn Paquda Duties of the Heart, 154 n. 15, 172 n. 109 III.8, 222, 223 al-Farabi Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, 38 Kitāb al-alfāz, 127 n. 47, 128 n. 58 Kitāb al-jadal (commentary on the Topics), 75 Letter concerning the Intellect, 33 n. 97, 38 n. 109, 67 Long commentary on De interpretatione, 122, 125, 229, 233 Short commentary on De interpretatione, 128 n. 56, 228, 231, 232 al-Ghazali Intentions of the Philosophers [Makā id al-Falāsifa], 82 n. 31, 170 Gersonides Bible commentaries on the Pentateuch, 78 n. 15, 110, 146 n. 126, 153, 163

index of sources and citations Introduction, 4, 20 n. 46, 73, 74, 148, 154, 157, 158, 161, 165, 172, 173 n. 110, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 182 n. 4, 184 n. 12 on Genesis, 20 n. 46 Ha a ah to 2:4–3:24, 108 n. 121, 165 n. 74, 182 n. 4 Ha a ah to 4:1–26, 165 n. 74 1, 307 n. 31, 310 n. 38 1:14, 307 n. 31, 310 n. 14 1:26, 176 n. 122 2:27, 176 n. 122 18:21, 286–287 22:1, 287 on Leviticus 6:1–8:46, 312 on Deuteronomy 6:5, 182 n. 4 on the Former Prophets Introduction, 131–132 n. 67, 153, 154, 159, 172, 174, 184 n. 12 on I Kings 5:12, 131 13:31, 20–22, 252 n. 77 on Proverbs, 4, 6, 7, 19 n. 40, 73–115, 121, 128, 131 n. 67, 135 n. 84, 136, 138, 149– 150, 153, 155–160, 163, 164, 165, 167, 172, 177, 178 ha a ah, 78 nn. 14, 15, 79–83, 85–90, 105 n. 112, 106–107, 157, 167, 168, 172, 177, 178 1, 81, 83–84, 86 n. 49, 8–95, 104, 107 n. 119. 112 n. 129, 138, 139, 149–150, 169 1:1–9, 100 n. 94 1:2, 86–87, 89 1:2–7, 90 1:4–5, 90 1:4, 82, 90, 92 1:20–33, 102 2:1–22, 96–103 2:9, 89 2:10–11, 103 2:19, 103 n. 106 3:1–6:9, 92, 93 n. 73, 103 n. 106, 106 n. 113 3:19, 104–106 3:20, 80–82 3:22, 108 5:1–2, 92 5:2, 93 8:4, 89

347

8:12, 81 n. 25 8:14, 102 n. 100, 107, 109 8:20–21, 109–110 9:1, 102 n. 100 15:8, 32 n. 72 15.19, 110–111 16:16, 91 19:27, 108–109 n. 121 29:18, 111–112 23:23, 108–109, 110 24:7–8, 93–95, 169 n. 93 25:2, 101–102 30:1, 112–113 30:4 105 on Job, 27, 169 n. 92, 229 Introduction, 21, 27, 30, 31, 33–34, 74–75 n. 3, 76, 153, 157, 158, 162–163, 165–166 n. 74, 167, 172–174, 177–178 2, 27 3, 182 n. 4, 263 n. 101 5:12, 78 n. 16 7, 27 n. 77 8, 26 n. 73 11, 30 n. 89 38–39, 78 n. 16 on Song of Songs, 76, 137, 150 Introduction, 70 n. 93, 74, 79 nn. 20, 21, 87–88, 91 n. 67, 92 n. 69, 99 nn. 89, 90, 129–130, 14–147, 149 n. 139, 153, 158, 161, 163–168, 172–179 1:1, 121, 123, 127, 128, 130–134, 141, 149 n. 139, 150, 155 1:2, 75 n. 4, 267 n. 107 1:9, 82 n. 31 2:17, 99 n. 89 8:8, 101 n. 95, 114 8:14, 114 on Ecclesiastes, 20, 153, 158 Introduction/Preliminary remark/ ha a ah, 14, 19, 20, 22 n. 55, 21, 76, 84 nn. 40– 41, 85 nn. 42, 44, 89 n. 63, 97 n. 85, 99 n. 90, 101 n. 103, 103 n. 105, 109 n. 121, 112, 113, 128, 134–138, 143–145, 147, 158, 159–160, 165 n. 74, 166, 167, 168 n. 85, 169, 172, 173, 177 n. 132, 178 1:1, 18 n. 33 139–140, 143–148 1:1–2, 155, 185 1:14, 168 n. 85

348

index of sources and citations

1:16, 168 n. 85 1:17, 168 n. 85 7:25, 85 n. 46 9:1, 81 n. 24, 85 n. 46 12:9, 159 on Daniel, 323 1, 315 n. 55 2, 315 4, 106 n. 113, 315–316 on Esther Introduction, 153, 154 n. 13, 157, 165 n. 72, 167 Catalogue of his library, 19 n. 41 Commentary on the Metaphysics, 19–20 n. 41, 20 n. 43 96, 181 n. 1 Commentary on Leviticus Rabbah 28, 137 nn. 94–95 Commentary on the Three Letters 189 [Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1373/4], 177 n. 131 fol. 255r, 217 n. 175 fol. 263r, 215 n. 167 Supercommentaries on the epitomes, 7, 82 n. 4, 181, 184, 193 on the epitomes of the physical sciences, introduction to, 188 [Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1] fol. 390r, 187 n. 26 on the Epitome of De anima, 182 n. 4, 184, 186 n. 20, 189, 198, 199, 200, 203, 204 [Mashbaum, “Gersonides’ Supercommentary”] pp. 1–3, 206–207 pp. 6–7, 207 pp. 39, 54, 82, 83, 86, 87, 98, 120, 130, 133, 188 n. 27 pp. 76–79, 207 n. 116 pp. 83–84, 206 pp. 116–117, 217 pp. 133–144, 215 pp. 150–165, 215 p. 150, 216–217 p. 184, 197 on the Epitome of De animalibus, 184, 188, 189, 198, 200, 203 XI, 200 n. 82 XII, 200 n. 82 [Vatican urbinati, MS ebr. 42/1] fols. 10r–12v, 209 n. 129 fols. 11r–12v, 213 fol. 12r, 213 fol. 12v, 213

fol. 33r, 210 fols. 33r, 141v, and 151r , 209 n. 124 fol. 34r, 210 fol. 45r, 211 fol. 52r, 212 fol. 50v, 87r, 212 n. 152 fol. 64r, 210 n. 136 fol. 72r, 212 fols. 79v–80r, 109r, 209 n. 129 fols. 85rv, 125r, 126rv, 133r, 208 n. 121 fol. 109r, 209 n. 125 fol. 101v, 208 fol. 167v, 212 fol. 168r, 188 n. 28, 197 on the Epitome of De caelo, 182 n. 4, 186–187 n. 22 [Berlin, MS Héb. 110/2] fol. 47c, 210 fol. 48a, 209 n. 124, 210 fol. 50a, 208 fol. 52d, 210 fol. 83c, 209 n. 125 fols. 83c–d, 209 n. 128 on the Epitome of De generatione et corruptione, 182 n. 4, 204 [Vatican, MS ebr. 342/3] fol. 177r, 199 n. 77 fol. 177v, 202 n. 93 fols. 178v–179v, 201 nn. 86, 87 fol. 183v, 211 fol. 198v, 212 fols. 199v and 211r, 209 n. 123 fols. 199v–200v, 209 n. 126, 212–213 fol. 212r, 202 n. 93, 209 n. 127 on the Epitome of the Meteorology, 82 n. 30, 182 n. 4, 199, 204 [Meiron edition] p. 4, 202 nn. 88, 89 p. 81, 210 pp. 118–170, 202 n. 94 p. 131, 202 n. 88 pp. 133, 135, 136, 138, 202 n. 90 p. 141, 202 n. 191 pp. 151, 153, 202 n. 89, 202 nn. 90, 95 p. 160, 202 n. 95, 210 n. 137 on the Epitome of the Parva Naturalia, 5, 8, 183 n. 11, 184, 198, 200, 203, 221, 233, 297

index of sources and citations II.3, 50 n. 20, 200, 201 n. 86, 209 n. 125, 210 n. 132, 212, 214, 218, 235–246, 247–248, 250, 253, 260, 261, 263, 264, 266, 280, 283, 291 n. 156, 295, 296, 297, 307 n. 31, 311, 313 [Oxford Bodleian, MS Heb. 1373] fols. 271v, 273r–v, 274r, 209 n. 129 fol. 273r, 209 n. 124 fol. 298v, 198 on the Epitome of the Physics, 181, 184, 199 [ Vatican, MS ebr. 342/1] fols 10r–12v, 202 fols. 23r–24r, 202 n. 93 fol. 24r, 202 n. 95 fol. 31v, 202 n. 95 fol. 38r, 202 n. 95 fol. 56r, 212 fol. 71rv, 212 n. 150 fol. 74r–76r, 209 n. 126 fol. 87r, 209 n. 24 fol. 90r, 197 on the Middle commentaries, 7, 82 n. 4, 184, 193 on the Middle Commentary on De caelo, 182, 186–187 n. 22, 199, 203 [ Parma—Biblioteca Palatina, MS ebr. 2723] fols. 5v–6r, 12v, 21v–22r, 24v–25r, 29v–30v, 209 n. 131 fols. 13r, 26r, 26v, 30v, and 32r, 186 n. 20 fols. 13v, 22v, 32rv, 211 n. 144 fol. 13v, 218 n. 178 fol. 24v, 209 n. 124 on the Middle Commentary on the Categories, 188, 203 on the Middle Commentary on De interpretatione, 183, 188, 200 n. 84, 203, 233, 255, 280, 290 De interpretatione 9, 231, 251 n. 73, 253 n. 73, 256 [Vatican urbinati, MS Ebr. 35.3] fol. 41v, 231, 232 fol. 43r, 237 n. 48 [Rosenberg, “Necessary and Possible”] p. 141, 255

349

on the Middle Commentary on the Isagoge Introduction, 184, 203 on the Middle Commentaries on the Organon, General introduction to, 186 n. 22, 188, 190–191, 192, 195 [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958] fol. 1r 184, 191, 194 on the Middle Commentaries on the physical sciences, General introduction to, 188 [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1] fol. 1r, 190, 192, 193, 196 on the Middle Commentary on the Physics, 182, 202, 203, 204–205 Introduction, 184, 185, 186, 195–197 [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 964/1] fol. 1v, 186 n. 22, 187 n. 23, 196 fol. 2v, 206 fols. 3r–v, 160 n. 52 fol. 4r, 205 n. 106 fols. 5r, 205 nn. 103, 104 fols. 7v, 8r, 16r, 186 n. 20 fol. 8r, 205 nn. 103, 107 fols 9r, 10r, and 11v, 205 n. 103 fol. 13r, 205 nn. 107, 110 fols. 14r, 15v, 18r, 205 n. 107 fols. 16r, 28v, 205 n. 105 fols. 19v, 45r, 54r, 68r, 119v, 205 n. 108 fols. 19r–20v, 209 n. 131, 218 n. 177 fols. 22v, 32r–32v, 205 n. 110 fols. 31v–32r, 50 n. 20 fol. 33r, 252 fol. 35v, 218 fol. 38v, 205 n. 102 fol. 45r, 54r, 211 fols. 54r, 83r, 119v, 120r, 211 n. 147 fol. 66rv, 211 n. 146 fol. 79r, 209 n. 131 fol. 99r–v, 209 n. 131 fol. 102v, 209 nn. 130, 131 fol. 105v, 205 n. 109 on the Middle Commentary on the Posterior Analytics, 197 [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958] fol. 69r, 184, 194 fols. 78r–v, 86 n. 48 fol. 89r, 86 n. 47

350

index of sources and citations

fols. 88v–90r, 86 n. 47 fol. 121v, 83 n. 39 fol. 149v, 195 n. 60 on the Middle Commentary on the Prior Analytics, 183 introduction, 184, 186, 188, 191 n. 42, 192, 194, 197, 210 n. 134 [Paris—BNF, MS héb. 958] fols. 59v/151r, 184, 187, 191 n. 42, 194 n. 54 on the Middle Commentary on the Topics, 19 n. 36, 96, 122 n. 28, 178, 181 n. 1, 183, 188, 200 nn. 81, 83, 84 [Munich—Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Cod. hebr. 26/3] fol. 319v, 108 n. 121 fol. 320r, 147 n. 129 fol. 321v, 160 n. 52 fol. 324v, 99 n. 91 Wars of the Lord, 45, 47, 50, 122, 123, 137, 149, 150, 183–184, 191, 197, 198, 204, 214, 216, 218, 219, 221, 233, 239, 242 n. 39, 245 n. 65, 246, 298, 299, 312 Introduction, 4 n. 2, 13, 17 n. 30, 19 n. 37, 26, 28, 45, 47, 57 n. 46, 64 n. 71, 70 n. 73, 124–128, 131 n. 63, 148 n. 132, 155, 156 n. 24, 166 n. 75, 173 n. 111, 177 n. 19, 178 n. 135, 185, 186 n. 21, 189 n. 34, 208 n. 122, 227 n. 14 I, 48 n. 13 I.1–2, 247 I.1–4, 64 I.1–5, 14, 23, 217 n. 176 I.1, 18 n. 31, 38, 39, 64, 300, 316–317 I.2, 16 n. 19, 18 n. 31, 38 I.3, 16 and n. 20, 18 n. 31 I.4, 18 n. 31, 39, 41, 145n. 123 I.5, 35 n. 104, 47 n. 10, 50, 65 I.6, 19 n, 41, 36 n. 105, 217 n. 176, 270–275, 300, 301 n. 12, 3–2 n. 17, 317 I.7, 271–273, 300 n. 9 I.8–13, 14, 23, 37, 48, 58, 59 n. 49, 216 I.9, 16 n. 19, 52 n. 49, 309 n. 37 I.10, 16 n. 20, 46, 58, 59n, 49, 182 n. 4

I.11, 47 I.12–13, 47 n. 10 II, 63, 233, 247–266, 277, 283, 286, 297, 305 II 1–2, 246, 253 II.1, 55 n. 37, 247, 249, 252, 313 n. 49 II.2, 50, 214, 247, 249–264, 272 n. 126, 283, 284, 307 nn. 31, 33, 311, 313 II.3, 36 n. 105, 270, 271, 272, 285 n. 145, 269, 300, 301, 302 II.4, 215, 271 II.6, 246, 265, 274–275, 279 n. 138, 285 n. 145, 302, 304–306, 310, 314, 316, 317, 321, 322 II.7, 305, 306, 309, 310, 313, 314, 316, 318–322 II.8, 319 III, 24, 28, 48, 233, 245, 246, 266–296 III.1–3, 269 III.1, 22 n. 56, 23, 24, 28, 29, 56 nn. 40, 41, 57, 269 III.2, 16 n. 19, 23, 56, 278, 280–282 III.3, 19 n. 41, 50 n. 21, 56 n. 42, 69 n. 88, 294 III.4, 46, 50, 56 n. 42, 69 n. 88, 268–286, 288 III.14, 25 III.2, 16 n. 19 III.3, 16 III.6, 284 n. 142, 289 IV, 14, 25, 27, 31, 48, 282 IV.1, 24, 26, 30, 35, 53 IV.2, 27 n. 77, 35, 36, 300 n. 8, 301 n. 13 IV.3, 30, 53, 302 n. 16 IV.5, 36 n. 105, 47 n. 10, 55 IV.6, 373 n. 49 V, 127, 314, n. 53, 321 V.1, 20, 21, 24, 26, 35, 39–46. 23, 24, 25 V.1.17, 50 V.2, 302 V.2.1, 307 n. 31, 32 V.2.6, 309 V.2.7, 271 V.2.8, 310 nn. 38, 42 V.2.9, 182 n. 4 V.2.10, 46

index of sources and citations V.3, 14 V.3.1–5, 48 V.3.1, 25, 65, 66, 67 V.3.3, 16 n. 21, 20 n. 41, 24 n. 63, 67, 268 n. 111, 269 n. 114 V.3.4–5, 47 n. 10 V.3.4, 67, 276 n. 134, 287 V.3.6, 303 nn. 20, 22, 314 n. 53 V.3.7, 274 n. 130, 305, 306 V.3.9, 305, 306 n. 28 V.3.11, 306 n. 28 V.3.12, 19.n. 41, 181 n. 1, 306 n. 28 V.3.13, 274 n. 130 VI.1, 13 n. 1, 14, 23 n. 61, 29, 48 VI.1.1, 68, 70 VI.1.2, 22 29, 30 VI.1.3, 68 VI.1.4, 68 VI.1.18, 27 n. 134 VI.2, 27, 59 n. 50, 227 n. 14 VI.2.9–14, 264 VI.2.9, 251 n. 72 VI.2.10, 14, 15 n. 17, 17, 19, 31, 32, 35, 47, 48, 50, 59 n. 52, 60, 61 nn. 57, 58, 300 VI.2.11, 63 n. 67 VI.2.13, 285 n. 145 Halevi, Judah Kuzari V.20, 222, 226 Hugh of St. Victor Commentary on Ecclesiastes, 158 Ibn Daud, Abraham Exalted Faith, 222, 224, 226–227, 290–291, 293, 295 Ibn Ezra, Abraham Commentary on the Pentateuch, Introduction, 171 Commentary on Exodus 23:25, 263 33:21, 261 n. 68 33:23, 263 Commentary on Ecclesiastes 7:3, 137 n. 93, 169 n. 90 Sefer ha-She elot, 313

351

Ibn Ghiyāth, Isaac Commentary on Ecclesiastes, Introduction, 119–120 Ibn Tibbon, Samuel commentary on Ecclesiastes, 120–121, 125, 128 n. 56, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134, 135, 140 n. 104, 142–143, 145–146 n. 125, 149 n. 138, 156–157, 166 n. 74 1:4, 171 Maimonides Commentary on the Aphorisms of Hippocrates Introduction, 189–190, 191 n. 43 Correspondence with Rabbis of Southern France on Astrology, 314 Eight Chapters, 222, 223, 225, 226 Guide of the Perplexed, 145, 164 n. 72, 166 n. 74 Introduction, 124, 164 n. 67, 171, 172 n. 109, 179 n. 142 Part I, 79 I.71. 26 II.12, 317 n. 60 II.36, 297 n. 2 II.37–38, 242 n. 58, 252 n. 58 II.38, 266 n. 106 II.43, 133 n. 76 II.45, 141 n. 108 II.48, 224 III.16, 267 n. 108, 281 n. 140, 282 III.17, 24, 25 n. 66, 26, 54 III.19–21, 267 n. 108 III.19, 269 n. 114 III.20, 223, 226, 268, 283 III.21, 226, 269 III.22, 162 III.54, 100 n. 193 Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah 4:8–9, 24 n. 61 Hilkhot Teshuvah, 24 n. 61 Introduction to Pereq Heleq, 24 n. 62 Origen Commentary on Song of Songs, 151, 170 Philoponus Commentary on the Prior Analytics, 129 n. 58

352

index of sources and citations

Proclus Commentary on the Timaeus, 170 Saadia Gaon Book of Beliefs and Opinions, 172 n. 79, 222 IV.4, 226 Commentary Job, 154 n. 15 Commentary on Proverbs, 170 n. 78 Commentary Psalms, 154 n. 15 Commentary on Sefer Ye ira, 154 n. 15 Simplicius On Aristotle’s Categories I–4, 170 Talmud and Midrash B Bava Batra 14b, 158 15a, 33, 34 n. 98

B Shabbat 30b, 169 n. 90, 137 n. 92, 169 n. 90 Ecclesiastes Rabbah I:2, 142 Song of Songs Rabbah 1:6–9, 141 n. 107 1:10, 159 1:11, 131 1:6–9, 141 n. 107 William of Ockham Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei et de futuris contingentibus, 290 n. 153, 293 Commentary on De interpretatione 9, 292, 293