Why Does Policy Change?
The tension between policy stability and change is a key political phenomenon, but its dynamic...
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Why Does Policy Change?
The tension between policy stability and change is a key political phenomenon, but its dynamics have been little understood. In particular, there is the fascinating paradox of how, from conditions of apparent long-term stability, radical policy change may suddenly erupt with great force. To understand these processes involves a study of prevailing interests and established institutions, and also of more three-dimensional processes involving the potent interrelationships between ideas, individuals, multiple policy arenas and time. Why Does Policy Change? examines and explains these dynamics of major policy change by employing longitudinal case studies from British transport policy since 1945. Geoffrey Dudley and Jeremy Richardson point out that there is a significant contrast between road and rail, in that whilst road policy was dominated by a hegemonic policy community which perceived road building as the ideal policy ‘solution’, rail policy on the other hand has been characterised by a ‘hollow core’. In the case of roads, this book reveals the making of a hegemonic policy, but then the series of dramatic challenges to the dominant paradigm by environmentalists which eventually resulted in the destruction of the roads ‘solution’. In the case of rail, the ‘hollow core’ was notably invaded when British Rail Chairman, Dr Beeching, injected the concept of the ‘commercial railway’. More recently, however, the privatisation idea has imposed itself as one of the most unlikely candidates. Written for researchers in political science and policy analysis, including postgraduates on policy analysis courses, and those in the transport policy community, Why Does Policy Change? is a highly topical book which applies all the latest public policy theories to British transport policy. Geoffrey Dudley is a Research Fellow in the Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society at the University of Oxford. He is the author, with Jeremy Richardson, of Politics and Steel in Britain 1967–88. Jeremy Richardson is the Nuffield Professor of Comparative European Government, Director of the Centre for European Politics, Economics and Society, University of Oxford, and is a Fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford. He has published many books including most recently editing European Union: Power and Policy-Making, and co-authoring Managing Policy Change in Britain: The
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Politics of Water Policy. He is the founder and editor of the Journal of European Public Policy, also published by Routledge.
Routledge Studies in Governance and Public Policy
1 Public Sector Ethics Finding and implementing values Edited by Charles Sampford and Noel Preston with Carol-Anne Bois 2 Ethics and Political Practice Perspectives on legislative ethics Edited by Noel Preston and Charles Sampford with Carol-Anne Bois 3 Why Does Policy Change? Lessons from British transport policy 1945–99 Geoffrey Dudley and Jeremy Richardson 4 Social Relations and Social Exclusion Rethinking political economy Peter Somerville
Why Does Policy Change? Lessons from British transport policy 1945–99
Geoffrey Dudley and Jeremy Richardson
Londonand New York
First published 2000 by Routledge 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC4P 4EE Simultaneously published in the US and Canada by Routledge 29 West 35th Street, New York, NY 10001 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2005. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2000 Geoffrey Dudley and Jeremy Richardson All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Dudley, Geoffrey, 1945– #8211; Why does policy change?: lessons from British transport policy, 1945–1999/Geoffrey Dudley and Jeremy Richardson. p.cm.—(Roudedge studies in governance and public policy) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Transportation and state—Great Britain—History. I. Richardson, J.J. (Jeremy John) II. Title. III. Series. HE243.A2 D83 2001 388′.0941′ 09045–dc21 00–062788 ISBN 0-203-64587-1 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN 0-203-67354-9 (Adobe eReader Format) ISBN 0-415-16918-6 (Print Edition)
For Flo Dudley
Contents
Preface
viii
1
Government, interest groups and policy change
2
The dynamics of the rail ‘hollow core’: theprelude to Beeching
24
3
Occupying the ‘hollow core’: the Beeching era at British Rail 1960–5
43
4
Roadbuilding as a policy idea and a weak advocacy coalition 1900–54
66
5
Ministers and motorways: the making of a hegemonic policy community 1954–9
79
6
Undermining a hegemonic policy community: trunk roads and the first wave of environmentalism 1973–9
107
7
‘Roads for prosperity’ versus ‘sustainable mobility’: new challenges and confrontations 1989–93
136
8
The destruction of Roads for Prosperity: from hegemony to ignominy 1993–9
157
9
The ‘hollow core’ revisited: rail privatisation 1987–92
189
Why does policy change?: the ‘Four Is’ and the significance of time
220
Bibliography
232
Index
243
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1
Preface
This book represents the outcome of a research project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council, entitled Policy Communities and Policy Networks Over Time: British Transport Policy 1945–1995 (Ref. No. R00023482801). Essentially, we were interested in the relationship between policy arenas and policy change, and more precisely in exploring the question: how do we explain radical policy change when most public policy literature—and especially that of policy communities and networks —#8212;places emphasis on inertia and incrementalism? By taking a longitudinal approach and the two (related) sectors of road and rail, we attempted to identify different explanations over time and sector, highlighting the complex interrelationship between exogenous and endogenous factors. As our research developed, we became increasingly impressed by the vital importance of the conditions under which fresh policy ideas or ‘images’ enter a sector. For example, we found that in the case of trunk roads, policy activity in a number of arenas by the environmental lobby can have a significant effect on policy change, even when the central policy community, dominated by road interests, remains unchanged. Consequently, what we termed the rival adversarial communities of the road and environmental lobbies can have varying influence in different policy process arenas. The reward for an adversarial community in adopting the appropriate strategy within a particular arena can be domination of that arena, and also the ability to send influential messages to government and to the wider world beyond a given policy sector. Thus, in the 1970s the environmental lobby took the initiative in the public inquiry arena, while in the 1990s the environmentalists had a similar impact on the road construction sites and in the public arena generally. In contrast to trunk roads, where for forty years the sector was dominated by a hegemonic policy community which successfully imposed road building as the principal transport policy ‘solution’, the rail policy network (or lack of it) has been characterised by a ‘hollow core’ with no dominant interest, resulting in long periods of inertia and indecision. Nevertheless, even this paralysis of interests has occasionally given way to the invasion of powerful ideas which, at least for a period, successfully occupied the ‘hollow core’. Most notably, in the 1960s the British Rail Chairman, Dr Beeching, became synonymous with the policy ‘solution’ of the commercial railway. More recently, in the 1980s and 1990s, the
ix
privatisation idea, from unpromising beginnings, by degrees inserted itself as the new policy ‘solution’. The answer to the key question of how ideas may bypass a hegemonic policy community or occupy a ‘hollow core’ appears (to our surprise) to relate to the role of individuals. The significance of a Beeching may be easily spotted, but we were impressed by the degree to which, at key moments during periods of radical change, individuals, often acting in an idiosyncratic and unpredictable manner, decisively turned the course of events in their favour. Although these individuals could appear in any policy arena, Ministers appeared to be in a particularly powerful position to bring about radical policy change. Thus they could not only act as network leaders, but could also shape and even recreate networks for their own purposes. We believe that our longitudinal study also suggests that we can only understand the conditions of radical policy change if we also understand the conditions of policy stability. For much of the period under study, the two sectors exhibited considerable stability and continuity. Hence, at least in this respect, policy communities and networks are a significant element in our account, despite our scepticism concerning the utility of network approaches in explaining change. Our understanding of policy change was immeasurably assisted by the many former and current Ministers, officials and representatives of groups who agreed to be interviewed for the project. We are extremely grateful for the degree to which they all gave so freely of their time and knowledge. We would also particularly like to thank Ashridge College for access to the personal ministerial files of Harold Watkinson. We are especially indebted to Carol Phillips for her invaluable help and constant good humour in typing and preparing the manuscript. We would also particularly like to thank Lorraine Banks, Flo Dudley and Julie Lord for their help in preparing and typing earlier draft chapters.
1 Government, interest groups and policy change
Organised interests, political parties, and policy experts do not simply ‘exert power’; they acquire power in part by trying to influence the political discourse of their day. To the degree they are able to do so, they may have a major impact on policy without necessarily acquiring the formal trappings of influence. The resultant flow of ideas is an important dimension of the process in which policy is made. (Peter Hall, ‘Policy paradigms, social learning and the state’, p. 290) Policy communities and policy networks Concepts and models in political science probably reflect the politics of the period in which they were first formulated. This is both unsurprising and desirable, as their utility is to help understand, explain, and even predict events in the real world. An ambition to develop concepts more applicable to the realities of post-war British politics was the foundation of the British origins of what is now termed the network approach. Humble British origins: analysing stability Until the late 1970s, the study of interest groups in Britain, though very well established from the 1950s onwards, tended to play a relatively minor role in British political science (Richardson 1999). This all began to change in the late 1970s, however, with a shift in focus from the study of traditional institutions, towards a different world of power—essentially a post-parliamentary polity (Richardson and Jordan 1979). As Judge later commented, the ‘postparliamentary’ thesis was, for over a decade, a characterisation which was largely unchallenged and found reflection in other important commentaries (Judge 1993:123). The core argument in the post-parliamentary thesis was that policy change generally took place only when the relevant ‘policy community’ agreed it was necessary and a consensus existed on the direction of change. As Judge noted, the policy community concept was descriptive rather than
2 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
definitional (Judge 1993); similarly Dowding has suggested that it was a metaphor rather than a model (Dowding 1995). In fact, it had no great pretensions to being a new theory of British politics. Its purpose, as Judge observed, was to contrast established models of parliamentary and cabinet government with a new reality of governing (Judge 1993). The strength of the empirical tradition in British political science carried the simple, unrefined, concept forward. As Judge comments: ‘the concern for descriptive accuracy has led a whole generation of British scholars to follow’ (Judge 1993:121). This concern was still very much alive in the 1990s but was reflected in more systematic attempts to build theories around the network concept. (For British examples see Rhodes 1986, 1988, 1990, 1996; Marsh and Rhodes 1992; for other, more quantitative examples, see Knoke et al. 1996; Pappi and Henning 1998). Whatever the merits of subsequent attempts to theorise on the basis of network analysis (for an excellent review see Thatcher 1998), current empirical descriptions of British policy-making seem to have changed rather little. Back in 1979, the new emphasis was on the shift of public policy-making away from conventional democratic institutions towards a somewhat hidden world where those deemed to be the legitimate ‘stake-holders’ met and decided both what the problems were and how they should be resolved: In describing the tendency for boundaries between government and groups to become less distinct through a whole range of pragmatic developments, we see policies being made (and administered) between a myriad of interconnecting, interpenetrating organisations. (Richardson and Jordan 1979:73–4) Nearly twenty years later, the current emphasis on the notion of ‘governance’ appeared to stress the very same tendencies. ‘Governance’ is seen as signifying: a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by which society is governed. I employ a stipulative definition; it refers to self-organising, interorganisational networks. (Rhodes 1997:35, emphasis in the original) The Achilles heel of these closely related concepts of policy community, policy networks and new governance is the implication of stable policies, as well as stable relationships and a stable membership. Thus, it was argued that: The logic of negotiation also suggests that policy-makers in both government and groups will share an interest in the avoidance of sudden policy change. Working together they will learn what kind of change is feasible and what would so embarrass other members of the ‘system’ as to be unproductive.
GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY CHANGE 3
(Jordan and Richardson 1982:93–4) Jordan later further emphasised both the stability of policy communities and the existence of shared views. He sees policy communities as: A special type of stable network, which has advantages in encouraging bargaining in policy resolution. In this language the policy network is a statement of shared interests in a policy problem: a policy community exists where there are effective shared ‘community’ views on the problem. Where there are no such shared views no community exists. (Jordan 1990:327, original emphasis) The explicit assumption of stability of relations and stability of actor participation (almost exclusiveness) is evident in most attempts to refine the original policy community and policy network concepts. Thus, as Judge points out, Rhodes repeatedly states (Rhodes 1985:15; 1988:78; 1990: 204; Rhodes and Marsh 1992a:182; 1992b:13) that: policy communities are networks characterised by stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restrictive membership, vertical interdependence based upon shared delivery responsibilities and insulation from other networks and invariably from the general public (including Parliament). (quoted by Judge 1993:122) More recently, Rhodes has stressed that, among the six reasons that policy networks are important is the fact that ‘they decide which issues will be included and excluded from the policy arena’ (Rhodes 1997:34). Our central thesis in this chapter is, however, that the picture of order and especially control which these characterisations of the policy process imply is at variance with the changing nature of policy-making at both the national and supranational levels in Europe. Policy-making within European states and at the European Union level is often much more fluid and unpredictable—and less controllable—than seems to be implied by enthusiasts of the network approach. Whilst there are undoubtedly policy communities and networks which exhibit both stability and exclusiveness and do control policy agendas, there appear to be counter-tendencies which lead to lack of control, policy instability, and unpredictable outcomes. Incentives and costs of group participation The emphasis on stable relationships and shared views fails to capture the reality of many cooperative arrangements between policy stakeholders. In many cases the ‘glue’ which enables the stakeholders to cooperate is often a recognition that,
4 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
despite conflicting values and objectives, joint gains can result from cooperation either in the short or long run. Indeed, at the EU level (see below) the development of short-term ad hoc coalitions of extremely strange bedfellows— who certainly do not have common values —#8212;is now quite common. As Sebenius suggests, uncertainty is an important feature of policy-making for all participants. Cooperation, even with enemies, can reduce that uncertainty. He argues that alongside uncertainty in the policy process, there are opportunities for mutual learning and joint problem solving. By combining the politics of uncertainty and the politics of learning, Sebenius probably captures the core meaning of ‘policy community’ as a concept. Thus, he states that ‘beyond understanding technical uncertainties, finding joint gains also requires that each party learn about the other’s priorities in order to craft mutually beneficial trades’ (Sebenius 1992:329). Sebenius quotes Raiffa as follows: In complicated negotiations where uncertainties loom large, there may be contracts that are far better for each negotiating party than the non-contract alternative, but it may take considerable skill and joint problem solving to discover these possibilities. Without the right atmosphere and without some reasonably trustful communication of values, such jointly acceptable contracts might never be discerned. (Raiffa quoted by Sebenius, 1992:329, emphasis added) There may be considerable and bitter disputation, yet the cooperative game continues to be played in order to secure mutual gains or to reduce individual losses. Lax and Sebenius have emphasised that the bargaining process indeed exhibits both conflict and consensus. Thus: the competitive and co-operative elements are inextricably entwined. In practice they cannot be separated…. There is a central, inescapable tension between co-operative moves to create value jointly and competitive moves to gain individual advantage. This tension affects virtually all tactical and strategic choice. (Lax and Sebenius 1986) Participating in joint policy-making activity either on a temporary or more permanent basis has the potential to maximise benefits to the parties involved. Using concepts from negotiation analysis, Sebenius points out that outcomes can be influenced by favourably affecting the zone of possible agreement between the parties. The ‘zone of possible agreement’ means ‘a set of possible agreements that are better for each potential party than the non-co-operative alternatives to an agreement’ (Sebenius 1992:333). Participation in cooperative policy-making institutions is, however, not exclusively about securing direct public policy gains for the participants or maximising the zone of possible agreement. It is also concerned with
GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY CHANGE 5
straightforward information gathering. As Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) argue ‘lobbying is a two-stage process in which the first stage involves the acquisition of specialised information’ (p. 231). Thus, it is perfectly rational to participate alongside opponents and enemies if this delivers useful information about their positions and possible policy outcomes—even if neither can be influenced. Knowing what is coming, however unattractive that might be, is much better than being surprised. At the European level, especially (see pp. 14– 15), the need to acquire information seems a driving force behind much so-called ‘lobbying’ and the frenetic merrygo-round of committees, seminars, conferences and other meeting opportunities that now characterises politics in Brussels. All of this helps explain why actors will construct cooperative institutions of various types, in the face of uncertainty. The very success of policy community politics might, however, be the cause of its erosion over time. As Heinz et al. observed in the US, interest groups became more active in order to reduce their uncertainty. However, interest group activity begets yet more interest group activity thus increasing, not decreasing, uncertainty as the number of stakeholders increases. Interest groups ‘by creating structures to control or adapt to uncertainty…have contributed to the development of a more complex and rapidly changing policy environment’ (Heinz et al. 1993:371). Thus, ‘although greater numbers of organisations of all types…actively monitor and participate in the making of national policy, and although the scope and intensity of their efforts has increased significantly, the returns on these efforts are not at all clear’ (Heinz et al. 1993:369). Uncertainty is also increased for all stakeholders by the tendency for closer linkages between policy problems across different policy sectors. The current Labour Government of Mr Blair is keen on what it calls ‘joined-up government’, but the reality of joined-up government is that even larger numbers of policy stakeholders are brought together round the bargaining table. This can result in a degree of ‘overcrowding’ of each, hitherto autonomous, policy sector as stakeholders from other policy communities demand and get entry. Policy communities and networks may become linked in a rather messy and unpredictable chain of actors, who do not know each other well and who do not speak the same ‘language’. Of special importance is that they may bring quite different ‘policy frames’ to the table, i.e. they have very different policy or cultural frames through which they view the real world (Schön and Rein 1994; Fligstein 1997). This leads them to make sense of reality in quite different and conflicting ways. Such large and diverse collections of stakeholders may be a ‘network’ only in the very loosest of senses. They inhabit the same policy area or domain but only minimal interaction occurs. This shift—from a world of policy-making characterised by tightly knit policy communities and/or well-structured and stable networks, to a more loosely ‘organised’ and therefore less predictable collection of stakeholders — #8212;was noted in the US as early as the 1970s. In 1978 Heclo noted that policy problems often escape the confined and exclusive ‘worlds’ of professionals and
6 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
are resolved in a much looser configuration (if indeed such a structured term can be used) of participants in the policy process. Heclo argued that the nature of power in Washington had begun to change. Exercising power was not as much fun as it used to be in the ‘clubby’ days of Washington politics (Heclo 1978:94). Politics was less ‘clubbable’ because more and more groups had entered the policy process. Thus ‘as proliferating groups have claimed a stake and clamoured for a place in the policy process, they have helped diffuse the focus of political and administrative leadership’ (Heclo 1978:94–5). In a now classic formulation, he argued that: Looking for the few who are powerful, we tend to overlook the many whose webs of influence provoke and guide the exercise of power. These webs, or what I will call ‘issue networks’, are particularly relevant to the highly intricate and confusing welfare policies that have been undertaken in recent years…. An issue network is a shared-knowledge group having to do with some aspect (or, as defined by the network, some problem) of public policy…. But knowledge does not necessarily produce agreement. Issue networks may or may not, therefore, be mobilised into, second, a shared-notion group (creating a coalition) or, third, a shared-belief group (becoming a conventional interest organisation). Increasingly, it is through networks of people who regard each other as knowledgeable, or at least as needing to be answered, that public policy issues tend to be refined, evidence debated, and alternative options worked out—though rarely in any controlled, well-organised way. (Heclo 1978:102–3, emphasis added) We dwell on Heclo’s analysis simply because it focuses our attention so clearly on the core motivation for interest group participation—the need to acquire and share knowledge about both the real world and the political opportunities for changing it. Following the assumption that interest organisations are rational actors (Christiansen and Rommetvedt 1999:210), we have argued that participation in cooperative structures—be they policy communities, issue networks, or even looser configurations—is perfectly rational, even though its consequences may not necessarily reduce uncertainty. However, interest groups also have to deal with other actors in the policy process—especially governments. As Christiansen and Rommetvedt argue, ‘powerful actors may choose to change institutions if they have the power to do so and if they calculate change to be in their favor’ (Christiansen and Rommetvedt 1999:210). Governments can seize power over established institutions such as policy communities and networks. The British case, post-1979, seems to be such an example.
GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY CHANGE 7
Challenging policy communities and networks Heclo’s emphasis on lack of control and organisation, and greater unpredictability in policy-making, was based on empirical observation. He had noticed that Washington politics was different by the 1970s. However, the typical ‘European polity’ (Heisler and Kvavik 1974) was, at that time, still relatively unaffected by the erosion of policy communities which he described. Old style politics based on policy communities and neocorporatist arrangements appeared to continue for most of the Western European states. Yet this established policy style has shown signs of change in Western Europe in the 1980s and 1990s. We have seen two decades of sometimes radical policy reform, leaving no Western European nation untouched and few policy sectors undisturbed. After this wave of reform, at least two outcomes can be observed. First, actors in many policy sectors now operate under radically changed rules of behaviour. Labour market policies are an obvious specific sectoral example, although many other policy areas have been greatly affected by the deregulatory and privatisation fashion which has swept Europe. Second, the distribution of power within and across policy sectors has seen major changes. The mix of winners and losers has changed amongst traditional stakeholders as a result of public policy change. Also, new stakeholders have sometimes been introduced—either by importation from cognate (but hitherto excluded) policy areas or the emergence of completely new sets of actors (environmentalists and women’s organisations being obvious examples) and institutions. Many deeply entrenched interests, who had been granted the ‘franchise for public policy’ seem to have been challenged by more assertive governments. For once, Britain is the first mover, rather than the laggard, in Europe. As an extreme example, it is an important test case of the capacity of network approaches to explain the process of policy change. Britain: the shift from ‘governing under pressure’ to ‘policy communities under pressure’ In the British case it seems reasonable to argue that the consensual policy style was a clear enough feature of post-war politics (Beer 1956, 1965). This is not to say that groups were never challenged by governments (the clash between the Heath Conservative Government and the coal miners in 1972/3 being an obvious example). However, confrontation and imposition was not the preferred policy style. As Wyn Grant has noted, the policy community ‘model’ caught on because it seemed to be a good fit with reality (Grant 1989). It took Margaret Thatcher’s succession of Conservative governments to give policy community politics a real jolt as the new policy style unfolded. It is quite true, as Jordan and Maloney argue, that consultation with interest groups continued under the Thatcherite ‘revolution’. However to argue, as they do, that ‘consultation is the predominant policy-making routine in British politics—a pattern scarcely touched by supposed Thatcherite antipathy to groups’ (Jordan and Maloney 1997), is
8 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
misleading. It places insufficient emphasis on the extent to which the Conservatives systematically changed the underlying bases of the consultations which they continued to conduct with the ‘affected interests’. The consultations were often only after the extensive re-writing, by government, of old public policy ‘franchises’. Consultation yes, but after what and on whose terms? A hidden assumption of much of the policy community approach (less so of the network literature) is that the interests of the state and groups often coincide. However, as Dowding suggests, we need to look at the beliefs and desires of state actors to understand state interests (Dowding 1991:124). This is very relevant to understanding the trajectory of British policy-making post-1979, after Mrs Thatcher’s election in that year. Rhetoric is that this introduced a retreat of the state, but this so-called retreat can be understood only in terms of ‘state actor interests’ or ‘state actor autonomy’. Mrs Thatcher and her leading Ministers had their own ideas, policy frames and policy preferences. The 1979 election was the start of a period of party and ministerial (though still post-parliamentary) government, not seen since the post-war Labour victory. Relatively few of the new policy ideas emanated from the plethora of embedded policy communities around Whitehall that had grown up in the post-war years. Some ideas were imported (e.g. the idea of an internal market in publicly funded healthcare) from thinkers or policy watchers in the US, and others were generated by UK-based think tanks such as the Adam Smith Institute. Yet others were drawn from a seemingly worldwide intellectual fashion for deregulation and privatisation, the origins of which are difficult to specify clearly. Thus, in many ways, the Thatcher Government’s preference formation process became detached from the traditional post-war institutions of British policy-making. The eighteen years (as it turned out) of Conservative rule saw major policy change across a very wide range of policy areas. It is difficult to accommodate this within any policy community or network ‘model’. Hitherto stable and well ‘regulated’ (via public or private regulation) policy sectors were systematically destabilised by the Thatcher government, with resultant dissent from typically insider groups such as the British Medical Association and even the Confederation of British Industry. In essence, the old policy communities lost control of policy framing and agenda setting and had to react to agendas set by others. As in Canada, the British medical profession ‘faced with external challenges and cut off from their traditional points of access to the decision-making process…resorted to classic lobbying and public relations strategies’ (O’Neill 1998:15). However, there was no escaping the fact that, as Klein argues, ‘the introduction of the reforms advertised the impotence of the profession in the national policy area’ (Klein 1995:245). Post-1979, two broad categories of governmental response to policy reform can be identified. First, there was a definite shift in the policy style of government (Richardson 1982, 1993). There was a conscious attempt to move from a consensual to an impositional style of governing. Second, and to a lesser degree, there was also an attempt to move to a more anticipatory approach to problem
GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY CHANGE 9
solving. The former is best illustrated by the Prime Minister’s public pronouncement of her own distaste for the post-war traditions of consensual policy-making. To Mrs Thatcher, the politics of compromise was the politics of ‘fudging’ issues—by which she meant that many if not most issues could not be resolved by agreement. Solutions had to be imposed on recalcitrant interests if change was to take place. In this simple diagnosis lay the origins of the conflictual politics that emerged post-1979 (most notably, of course, between the Conservative Government and the coal miners in 1985, but also in the health service, local government, education and many other sectors). This conflict became a key element in external perceptions of Britain post-1979. If the British experiment in rolling back the state is unique, it is in the willingness of its government to withstand the high decibels of protest (or whinging as Mrs Thatcher would describe it, no doubt) when the Olsonian ‘distributional coalitions’ were challenged (Olson 1982). In popular British parlance, Mrs Thatcher took her famous large handbag and beat various entrenched interests into submission with it—a new policy style which can be described as ‘serial handbagging’ of policy communities. Evidence of a more anticipatory approach to problem solving is less reliable, but it can be argued that the Conservative governments, post-1979, finally developed a long-term strategy for changing the nature of British society, and the shape of the state itself. A more competitive and flexible society, alongside a much reduced role for the state in industry emerged as the goal. The goal could not be achieved, it was thought, without a change in government/interest group relations and a change in the relative power of established stakeholders. The greatest paradox in these shifts in style and purpose is that Britain witnessed a large increase in direct state intervention. The Thatcherite years were years of more government, not less. Most policy sectors were eventually put under the governmental microscope, destabilised, and then radically reformed. This is not to suggest that there was always a clear plan or a clear policy outcome in mind. Sometimes, the government had only a general notion that all was not well, that change was necessary— #8212;that there was a reform deficit—and only a rudimentary idea of what might be achieved. The new policy style is aptly described by Wistow, who quotes a newspaper report as follows: Mr Willets, the closest of the ‘outsiders’ to the NHS review, said that he asked a senior civil servant what he would do to the NHS if he were Minister. The reply was ‘I’d leave it entirely alone because it is too politically dangerous or I’d destabilise it and see what happened’. (Wistow 1982) Thus, as Peters suggests, governments may challenge existing networks (and create new ones) because existing networks may approximate the world of the ‘joint decision trap’ described by Scharpf (Peters 1997:57; Scharpf 1988). Networks can easily produce decisions which are sub-optimal for society. In the
10 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
face of lowest common denominator decisions, ‘the role of government then becomes providing the leadership to shape the debate and move decisions away from that lowest common denominator realm into a more socially desirable space’ (Peters 1997:57). In Britain, as the existing rules of the game were generally sub-optimal ‘peace treaties’ agreed in the past after long and difficult negotiations (the outcome of policy community politics, in fact), there was considerable resistance to these major ‘perturbations’ (Sabatier 1998:118). The Thatcherite style was to stand firm on the principles (e.g. the internal market for health) embodied in the reform proposals, but to offer concessions at the margin and over implementation. At some point in the trajectory of these dirigiste reform initiatives, the Conservatives, therefore, reinstated the old consultative style. Thus, after initial destabilisation and conflict, there would follow a more familiar phase of consultation and even negotiation between government and groups, in order to allow the interests to have their say (and real influence) on the detailed points of implementation. Technically Jordan and Maloney are correct—consultation did continue as before. Indeed, so glad were interests (such as doctors) to be back in the policy process that they often found themselves actively helping the government to make new policies work, despite their earlier bitter and public opposition. An added incentive to rejoin the consultation process was that many interests had been starved of resources since the early 1980s. The Government’s simple strategy of announcing what was going to happen and then attaching some ‘new’ (often re-allocated) public money to the new proposal was sufficient to cause a stampede of hitherto hostile groups anxious to get their heads in the meagre trough. This technique, though cynical, may help maintain some degree of legitimacy and support from affected interests. As Della Salla notes in the Italian case, ‘the question remains, however, of whether a hollow state with a hard shell can mobilise support and maintain cohesion in a period of economic and political transition’ (Della Salla 1997:31). By not totally excluding interests, the British Conservatives ameliorated some of the opposition it encountered on the reform process. The really significant change, post-1979, was, therefore, not so much less government as the emergence of strong government (see Smith 1993). Government became a more self-confident institution willing to act against what it saw as vested interests. Faced with this new style of governing, groups had little practical option but to re-enter the policy process on the government’s own terms. Whilst in earlier decades governments may have seemed weak actors— certainly not particularly strong when compared with the big economic and professional interest groups—by the mid-1980s the balance of power had shifted decidedly in favour of government in terms of setting the agenda and initiating policy change. Thus, the policy process could often take on an episodic character —bouts of an impositional style as new policy ideas were introduced by the Government, followed by old style consultation via (often reconstructed) policy communities and networks (Maloney and Richardson 1995). The episodic nature of British policy-making is, in fact, a recurring theme in our study.
GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY CHANGE 11
Alternative venues as an interest group resource When interest groups who are members of an existing policy community lose out, they have two basic choices. They can accept defeat on the issue at hand, hoping to win on another issue at some future date. This, after all, is the underlying logic of exchange relationships which sustain policy communities over time. In a continuous game, there is always hope of future gains which can balance current losses. However, other strategies are available if it appears that reliance on policy community politics is not delivering sufficient gains over time. A common strategy is to seek alternative Venues’ where policy-making can be influenced. Public policy-making is often carried out in several venues, each presenting a different package of costs and benefits to groups. Thus, there are incentives to abandon reliance on one stable and restricted policy community or network. We deal first with alternative national venues, as they are of special relevance to our study. Alternative national venues As Baumgartner and Jones have demonstrated from their US case studies, established insider groups, well entrenched in long-standing policy communities which have delivered high returns for their investment in insider status, can eventually lose out to other groups who choose to operate in different ‘venues’ and who manage to construct a new ‘image’ of existing policy problems (Baumgartner and Jones 1991). They argue that political actors are capable of strategic action by employing a dual strategy as follows: On the one hand, they try to control the prevailing image of the policy problem through the use of rhetoric, symbols and policy analysis. On the other hand, they try to alter the roster of participants who are involved in the issue by seeking out the most favourable venue for consideration of their issues. (Baumgartner and Jones 1991:1045) Baumgartner and Jones see the interaction between image and venue as producing ‘punctuated equilibrium’, whereby a period of stability is replaced by one of rapid, dramatic and non-incremental change (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:18). Policy change can result from a conscious rejection of the policy community approach to policy-making— #8212;either by choice or necessity— on the part of interest groups. Fritschler’s much earlier study of the politics of smoking in the US produced similar findings. He argued that ‘public interest politics uses the policy-making powers of legislators, bureaucracies, and the courts in patterns of conflict inducing strategies’ (Fritschler 1975:3). The net result of this type of antipolicy community politics was that the tobacco subsystem in the US was ‘changed completely in eight years. The small group of
12 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
people in Congress, in the agencies, and in the tobacco groups lost control of policy-making processes’ (Fritschler 1975:3). Our longitudinal study of trunk roads policy in Britain uncovers a similar phenomenon—namely, of the loss of power by an entrenched policy community. As we shall see, the pro-road lobby had the ideal stronghold in dominating the core policy-making arena centred on the Department of Transport (DTp). Beyond this apparently key venue, however, lay a potentially hazardous arena in the form of the Public Inquiry process for highways. In the 1970s, the environmental lobby was able to combine with local protest groups to embarrass the DTp at a number of Highway Inquiries. Not only did the opposition to major road schemes disrupt the DTp’s specific plans, it also led to a public debate on the values underlying the trunk roads programme. For the first time, roads policy became public business, rather than the private management of public policy. The Highway Inquiry process became the venue where the two ‘adversarial policy communities’ fought. By selecting a more favourable venue, the environmental lobby exposed a weakness in the road lobby’s historical domination of the policy process, and directed public attention to alternative transport policies. The environmental lobby was able to influence the policy system by at least changing the ‘image’ or ‘framing’ of transport policy problems, without gaining admittance to the core policy-making arena. Essentially, the discourse had shifted from a 1950s/60s’ perception of trunk road building as a solution to a problem, to a perception that trunk roads had become a problem to which we needed a solution. As in the case of smoking and nuclear energy policy in the US, the changing politics of trunk roads policy in the UK took place outside (and despite) established policy communities which were thought to be hegemonic in their respective policy areas. A similar example is provided by the 1999/2000 campaign against genetically modified (GM) foods in Britain. The use of direct protest, on the roads model, has successfully shifted the debate from the closed world of scientific advisory bodies to the public domain. Not only has there been a venue shift, but the opponents of GM foods have begun to change the image of the GM issue. GM crops are increasingly seen not as a solution to many food supply and environmental problems of the world, but as a threat to both. The use of alternative national venues is not confined to what may be seen as outsider groups, however. The Countryside Alliance, in Britain, consists of some deeply entrenched interests (such as farming and land-owning) who have chosen to shift the focus of the campaign against the proposed ban on foxhunting from traditional forms of lobbying to a French-style programme of demonstrations and events. As Christiansen and Rommetvedt noted from the examples of Denmark and Sweden, even established interests may be forced to explore alternative arenas. Thus, if access to traditional corporatist institutions is restricted (for whatever reason), interest organisation will exploit other channels of influence (Christiansen and Rommetvedt 1999:212).
GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY CHANGE 13
The Countryside Alliance is also engaged in an attempt to shift the image of countryside interests from that of a rather privileged land-owning class to a somewhat oppressed and threatened minority, trying to defend a traditionally English way of life. The French case, of course, is the classic example of groups using alternative venues as a means of influencing public policy. Agricultural interests have traditionally used direct action successfully and have been joined more recently by lorry drivers who have used similar strategies to force policy concessions by governments. However, as Cole points out, the French tradition of direct action does not necessarily mean that groups are excluded from more conventional, lobbying strategies. He notes that ‘for groups such as farmers, direct action tactics go alongside private negotiations between interest group representatives and state officials’ (Cole 1998:200). Similarly, in Britain, Lord Melchett, Executive Director of Greenpeace, has argued that direct action and working within the system have always gone hand in hand (Financial Times 15 February 2000). Other European examples of the successful use of alternative venues in the form of direct action include the ecology movement in Germany in the 1980s (Rüdig 1988) and the so-called ‘battle of the elms’ in Stockholm in the early 1960s where environmental groups picketed the location of a new underground station in one of the city’s main squares. By-passing existing structures in order to gain attention for new ideas and issues is, of course, a key part of the repertory of actions used by social movements (Tarrow 1988; Rootes 1999a, b). The ecology movement seems particularly adept in its innovative approach to venues. For example, ecology groups are finding that their skill in using the Internet —#8212;both to acquire information and to coordinate lobbying nationally and cross-nationally—is often greater than their traditional opponents. They are also increasingly adept at using the courts. For example, the Financial Times recently described a new breed of ‘eco-yuppie’. The ecoyuppies can achieve in pinstripes what others do in combat boots. As one of them (a thirty-eight year old Oxford-educated barrister) remarked ‘we are palpably respectable, we know our rights, we know the law, and we’re not going to go away’ (Financial Times 15 February 2000). An increasingly common phenomenon, however, is the extension of venue shopping beyond national borders. This is especially the case within the European Union. The EU as an alternative venue Our discussion so far has focused on national policy-making. For the fifteen member states in the European Union, however, the locus of policy-making for many policy areas has shifted to the European Union (EU). We need not delve into the somewhat sterile debate between neo-functionalists and intergovernmentalists (see Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 1998; Moravcsik 1998). Suffice to say that amongst scholars of the European Union almost all accept it as given that the EU policy process is best characterised as a multi-level, multiarena, multi-venue game. Rather like the US, the EU provides a multitude of
14 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
access points for policy professionals and interest groups of all kinds. Interest groups from EU member states have some very effective alternative arenas or venues in which to play. These venues are attractive to those excluded (for whatever reason) from national policy communities, to those who receive insufficient pay-offs from their participation, and even to those who remain active and successful participants in them. As we suggested earlier, interest groups are capable of making rational calculations concerning the allocation of lobbying resources as between possible lobbying targets—deciding which public institutions to lobby (Coen 1997, 1998; Bennett 1997, 1999) or deciding which individual legislators to bribe (Snyder 1991). Increasingly, groups are aware of the potential gains from transnational lobbying. Indeed, in their study of what they term ‘activists beyond borders’, Keck and Sikkink lay great emphasis on the autonomy from states which transnational action can deliver to activists and interest groups (Keck and Sikkink 1998:4). They are at pains to emphasise the open access to the international system that groups and activists have gained. In many policy sectors in the EU, a ‘push-pull effect’ has been at work. The ‘push’ has come from the kinds of changes in national policy styles —#8212;a more active and impositional policy style from some national governments, often accompanied by a relentless resource squeeze. The ‘pull’ has been provided by the logic of the shift in the locus of power from national capitals to Brussels. One does not need to accept the old neo-functionalist argument about the transfer of loyalty to the supranational level to accept the empirical fact that the centre of gravity of lobbying has shifted to Brussels (Mazey and Richardson 1993, 1996). This is not equally true for all policy sectors. Indeed, for much of the long period under study in this volume, transport policy remained anchored in national politics and is still relatively un-Europeanised. However, the EC/EU has impinged as a relevant venue from time to time, both in rail and road transport. Moreover, the tendency appears to be that all sectors eventually become ‘Europeanised’, albeit at quite different rates. Increasingly, transport policy seems to be subject to the same processes of Europeanisation as in other policy areas. Whilst Europeanisation has presented a relatively subdued challenge in transport policy, the impact of new ideas has played a major role. Thus, not only interest groups have to adjust their position and tactics according to the prevailing climate of opinion and new ideas—so do public bureaucracies and national governments. In the end, they are all vulnerable to ‘shifts in policy fashion’ as new ideas gain good currency. It is to this topic that we turn in our attempt to identify some further causes of policy change. Ideas as ‘policy viruses’: policy communities die or mutate? John Kingdon, in his study of agenda setting, quotes a Washington official who observed that the origin of public policies was difficult to determine. As he put it ‘this is not like a river. There is no point of origin’ (Kingdon 1984:21). If this is true (as surely it is) then identifying the origins of new policy fashions or policy
GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY CHANGE 15
frames is likely to be extremely difficult. Yet, clearly, there are major changes, periodically, in the way that public and private actors view policy problems. Moreover, as we suggested on pp. 7–11, actual policy changes too. New problems and solutions can become fashionable and cut across sectoral and national boundaries. This is not to suggest that even profound change (what Hall would term ‘third order’ change—see Hall 1993) cannot come about endogenously in policy communities and networks. However, exogenous changes in policy fashion, ideas, or policy frames presents a very serious challenge to existing policy communities and networks. New ideas have a virus-like quality and have an ability to disrupt existing policy systems, power relationships and policies. As Reich suggests, public preferences and support for policies grow and change ‘as people have come to understand and engage with the ideas underlying them’ (Reich 1988:4). Such exogenous shifts in preferences, influenced by new ideas and knowledge, are rather like viruses present in the atmosphere we breathe. Policy systems, particularly when they are engaged transnationally, contain a plethora of ideas at any given time. Thus, as Kingdon suggests: many ideas are possible in principle and float around in a ‘policy soup’ in which specialists try out their ideas in a variety of ways…proposals are floated, come into contact with one another, are revised and combined with one another, and floated again…the proposals that survive to the status of serious consideration meet several criteria, including their technical feasibility, their fit with dominant values and the current national mood, their budgetary workability, and the political support or opposition they might experience. Thus the selection system narrows the set of conceivable proposals and selects from that large set a short list of proposals that is actually available for serious consideration. (Kingdon 1984:21) Extending our ‘virus’ analogy, national policy stakeholders are increasingly internationalised—they, literally, travel a lot and meet all sorts of other policy stakeholders from foreign systems. They bring new ideas and policy frames back home. Thus, like natural viruses, policy viruses spread too. For well-established policy communities who have long held the ‘franchise’ for a policy area, new ideas are a potential threat, unless they emanate from the community itself or can be adapted to suit the existing needs of the community. A key issue for the entrenched interests is the degree to which the new ideas and knowledge can be accommodated in existing and agreed ‘policy frames’ (Schön and Rein 1994) or whether completely new frames emerge, backed by new ‘adversarial coalitions’ (Dudley and Richardson 1998). Examples of the effect of policy viruses abound in the post-war period. Thus, why is it that so many cities throughout the world adopted similar high-rise, highdensity, housing policies to deal with the problem of an outdated housing stock, only to find that this policy ‘virus’ caused untold damage to urban communities
16 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
and created more policy problems than it solved? Similar effects can be seen in the field of transport policy, with the universal adoption of massive road construction schemes to deal with the problems of increased car ownership and growth of the trucking industry, again only to find that this fashionable solution appeared to create more problems than it solved. Both the housing and transport cases seem to illustrate Reich’s observation of ‘how much the critical definition of problems and choices influences the subsequent design and execution of public policies’ (Reich 1988:5). Thus, as Moore argues, in institutional settings ‘ideas seem to guide public action in the same way that Kuhn’s “paradigms” guide “normal” scientific inquiry’ (Moore 1988:72). To Moore, ideas establish: the context within which public policy is debated and executed. That is, the ideas simultaneously establish the assumptions, justifications, purposes, and means of public action. In doing so, they simultaneously authorise and instruct different sections of the society to take actions on behalf of public purposes. (Moore 1988:75) He goes on: ideas matter because they establish the contexts within which policy debates are conducted, organisational activities are rendered coherent and meaningful, and people’s actions are animated and directed… although related to existing political forces and institutions, they seem to follow a logic of their own, which sometimes unbalances or rebalances existing forces (Moore 1988:78, emphasis added) Moore’s reference to the unbalancing of existing forces is especially apposite to our consideration of the relationship between policy communities and policy change—hence our resort to the ‘virus’ analogy. Of course, ideas, institutions and interests become entwined. As Jacobsen correctly observed, the pervasive flaw in ‘power of ideas’ arguments is the fact that ideas and interests cannot be separated (Jacobsen 1995:309). Similarly, Moore also notes that it is possible that ‘particular ideas are nothing more than a smokescreen for the institutional and personal interests that are really animating and guiding action’. He concedes that it is difficult, empirically, to disprove this (Moore 1988:71). However, it does seem reasonable to argue, for example in the British case post-1979, that new ideas, such as de-regulation, privatisation, contracting-out, marketisation, did indeed spread virus-like across policy sectors, ‘unbalancing’ existing forces (policy communities) as they did so. Existing policy communities faced three basic choices in the face of this exogenous change. First, they could accept their own demise in the face of the new ‘virus’. Second, they could adapt or ‘mutate’ the virus itself. Third, they could themselves mutate in order to survive. In Mrs
GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY CHANGE 17
Thatcher’s Britain, the latter generally proved to be the easiest option. Thus, actors learned to adapt to de-regulation, privatisation, internal markets, and even externally imposed research and teaching quality exercises in universities. A key aspect of this adaptiveness was the acceptance of completely new rules of the game and the admittance of new stakeholders. The notion of an adaptive stakeholder is described as part of an evolutionary process by John. He argues that the evolutionary process in public policy ‘is different to the classic Darwinian selection mechanism in that human actors are capable of consciously adapting to their environment’ (John 1998:185, 1999:43–5). In contrast to the thrust of the argument here, John appears to see the evolutionary process in public policy as largely intramural activity—‘thus it is better to see the emergence of policy as an evolution of ideas and interests within generally preset institutions, patterns of group politics and socioeconomic constraints’ (John 1998:186). Our resort to the virus analogy is meant to convey the importance of exogenously generated ideas as a shock to both existing institutional arrangements and the actors which benefit from them. Ideas are, of course, anchored in institutions and interests, at some point, as Jacobsen implies. Ideas are also anchored, more or less, to knowledge of some kind. Indeed, it might be argued that knowledge often precedes ideas in the policy process. Whether knowledge precedes or follows ideas, there is no doubt that knowledge is a powerful ‘change agent’ (either endogenous or exogenous) for policy communities and networks. As Radaelli points out, various writers have suggested that ‘knowledge is an independent and highly significant variable in the investigation of the policy process’ (Radaelli 1995:161). Space precludes a review of the large body of literature concerned with knowledge in the policy process, but it is sufficient for our purposes to posit knowledge as a major ‘perturbation’ (Sabatier 1998:118) which can lead to change. Again, there are some obvious empirical examples, such as knowledge about the effects of smoking on health, the effects of diet on heart disease, the depletion of the ozone layer, all of which lead to major changes in public policy and to the power and composition of existing policy communities and networks. Similar examples can be found in the field of drug addiction, education, crime prevention, water treatment etc. As we shall see, the politics of trunk road building has been especially characterised by the emergence of new knowledge, concerning environmental and health damage, for example. Thus, change is often knowledge-driven, albeit via a very political process such as competing advocacy coalitions, each of whom claims ownership of the truth. For example, in the US, Laird argues, ‘the system of policy making encourages partisans to buttress their cases by claiming that they are grounded in valid scientific and technological knowledge’ (Laird 1999:4).
18 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
Why does policy change? Chief themes and structure of the book A key contemporary challenge, therefore, is to provide some effective answers to the question: Why Does Policy Change? If models of policy communities and networks appear to be more efficient at describing stability and incremental policy change, then it seems to be a logical proposition to focus attention chiefly on determining the dynamics of radical policy change. Consequently, in this book the emphasis will be on identifying the causes of what Hall terms, ‘third order’ policy change. First and second order change can be seen as cases of ‘normal policy-making’, namely of a process that adjusts policy without challenging the overall terms of a given policy paradigm, much like normal science. ‘Third order’ change, by contrast, is likely to reflect a very different process, marked by the radical changes in the overarching terms of policy discourse associated with a ‘paradigm shift’. If first and second order changes preserve the broad continuities usually found in patterns of policy, ‘third order’ change is often a more disjunctive process associated with periodic discontinuities in policy (Hall 1993:279). Hall goes on to emphasise that an implication of this analysis is that first and second order changes in policy do not automatically lead to third order changes (Hall 1993:279). In other words, we should not fall into the trap of assuming that a paradigmatic shift involves only a more intense version of the ‘normal’ policymaking dominated by policy communities and networks. ‘Third order’ policy change is likely to encompass more three-dimensional and spatial dynamics, involving a range of variables. These dynamics can be complex, but certain elements, and the interrelationships between them, appear to be crucial. In this book, we will concentrate particularly on a comparative analysis of the ‘Four Is’ as key determining variables of ‘third order’ policy change: ideas, interests, institutions and individuals (Peters 1996). These four variables provide a powerful framework on which to build our analysis. There is, however, one further key element in determining the dynamics of ‘third order’ policy change—that of time. Notwithstanding its pervasive influence, time is often overlooked as a vital variable, and yet in a longitudinal study its importance becomes clear. In developing the advocacy coalition framework (ACF), Sabatier stresses that understanding the process of policy change—and the role of policy-oriented learning therein —#8212;requires a time perspective of a decade or more (Sabatier 1993:16). Once time is absorbed into the policy change equation, then it too becomes a variable which must be taken into account. The various analytical strands will be developed within the case studies themselves, but here we will briefly summarise the chief policy process questions to be dealt with in the context of the ‘Four Is’ and time. In the final chapter, for each of the variables, we will assess the extent to which it tends
GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY CHANGE 19
towards being an independent or a dependent variable in ‘third order’ policy change processes. Thus the chief analytical themes of the book are: • the relationship between ideas and interests and the status of each as an independent or dependent variable of ‘third order’ policy change; • the role of separate policy arenas as institutions; • the role of individuals as key agents of ‘third order’ policy change; and • the significance of time as an independent or a dependent variable. The relationship between ideas and interests and the status of each A key element in our analysis here is the manner in which ideas may mutate, and so be transplanted (Dudley 1999) in a particular sector. As John observes, the evolutionary process is different to the classic Darwinian selection mechanism in that human actors are capable of consciously adapting to their environment (John 1998:185). The mutation of policy ideas may therefore involve not only the chance element emphasised by Kingdon’s policy streams model (Kingdon 1995), but also a more deliberate choice implied by the ACF (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). This latter, more deliberate, mutation of ideas is of particular importance here because it provides an insight into the crucial relationship between the transplanting of ideas and processes of ‘third order’ policy change. Interests may play an important role in transplanting ideas but, if these same interests are also in fact value based advocacy coalitions, sharing deep core beliefs (Sabatier 1993: 16), then they too will ultimately be shaped and driven by ideas. In disentangling causality between ideas and interests, it is vital to identify the extent to which key interests may also be ‘framed’ by contemporary policy ideas and values. The evolution of an idea may therefore provide us with not only an explanation of ‘third order’ policy change dynamics, but also the timing of that change through processes of policy learning. In fact, the mutation of ideas may be signified by periods of discontinuous or ‘development’ learning (Laird 1999). The role of separate policy arenas as institutions which act as instruments of ‘third order’ policy change The ‘image and venue’ model quoted earlier (Baumgartner and Jones 1991, 1993) is particularly valuable here in indicating how institutional restructuring can be synonymous with periods of ‘punctuated equilibria’ which produce processes of ‘third order’ policy change. New institutional models emphasise the role of institutions as islands of imperfect and temporary organisation in potentially inchoate political worlds (March and Olsen 1989: 16). This concept has much in common with policy networks and communities, i.e. they both operate on a large foundation of implicit and voluntary trust, and unofficial rules
20 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
of appropriateness. As such, they are more effective in describing periods of policy stability rather than change. Instead, by inverting institutional and community models, it could be said that change is more likely when institutions possess no rules, criteria of appropriateness or communities. These ‘arenas without rules’ can be powerful instruments of change, as illustrated by our roads case study when, at various times, both the public inquiries and the road construction sites were employed for this purpose (Dudley and Richardson 1996a, 1998). The ‘image and venue’ model nevertheless implies that some kind of transmission process is taking place, whereby ideas are being transmitted from one arena and received in another, such as a policy core. This involves the vital process, as indicated by Hall, of organised interests acquiring power by trying to influence the political discourse of the day. He concedes that it is difficult to model the transmission of ideas, but notes that shifts in the locus of authority seem to be a critical component of the process whereby paradigms shift (Hall 1993:291). These shifts, often leading to multi-arena games, are therefore vital elements in ‘third order’ change processes, but are themselves a function of the transmission of ideas. In this respect, institutional processes are dependent variables of the dynamics of ideas. Similarly, policy networks, as exemplified by (in the case of roads) a hegemonic policy community, or (in the case of rail) a ‘hollow core’, are important in determining the trajectory of ideas, but are also, ultimately, dependent variables of those ideas. The role of individuals as key agents of ‘third order’ policy change Kingdon stresses the importance of policy entrepreneurs in coupling the separate policy streams of problems, policies and politics (Kingdon 1995: 20), while the ACF also emphasises the role of policy brokers, whose principal concern is to find some reasonable compromise that will reduce intense conflict (Sabatier 1993:18–19). Both of these models thus envisage the individual as an agent who, to a significant extent, not only stands apart from established networks and communities, but also plays an important role in shaping ideas and advocacy coalitions, and so determining policy outcomes. In the dynamics of ‘third order’ policy change, our case studies suggest that individual Ministers appear to be particularly influential agents of these processes. The implications of this distinctive perspective for the study of policy networks are that Ministers may have a view of the policy process markedly different from that of other actors (Dudley 1994). Not only do they have more formal power than other network actors—they may often have a different set of values and almost always a different timescale. Consequently, the old adage of ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’ could be adapted to become, ‘where you stand depends on what you see from where you sit’. Where the vision of
GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY CHANGE 21
officials may be restricted to the principal producer interests within a policy subsystem, a Minister may be aware of a whole range of actors operating in different policy sectors and different policy-making arenas. Thus Ministers are often acutely aware of those who are not directly participating—in particular party members, party activists and, especially, voters. Filling the ‘empty chair’ of public opinion can be a crucial element in processes of ‘third order’ policy change. Consequently it could be said that a Transport Minister may ‘see’ millions of motorists disgruntled at the slow progress in building new roads; or thousands of angry rail commuters upset because their trains are persistently late and overcrowded; or local groups protesting at plans to build a trunk road through their neighbourhood. None of these interests may be involved directly as the regular clients of the Ministry, but Ministers are likely to take into account the electoral consequences of alienating a potentially significant proportion of the population. Yet Ministers are not pre-programmed or blank sheets of paper, but, like all of us, possess a unique set of conceptual lenses, with a personality to match. Thus Ministers are in situations of choice when dealing with national policy communities and networks. In our terms, they can choose to be ‘promiscuous’ with a range of other policy actors, or can be ‘celibate’, making lonely or internalised policy decisions, according to their own beliefs and principles, or in response to other external pressures, i.e. they are mobile rather than static policy actors. Within a relatively short period of time, they can act as leaders and shapers of advocacy coalitions, policy entrepreneurs, or policy brokers. This inherent mobility places a Minister in a position to introduce policy innovations and to produce change in the composition of the policy network itself (Dudley and Richardson 1996b, c). Notwithstanding the particular importance of Ministers, key individuals generally can appear in any policy arena, and can possess the mobility and flexibility to act as vital agents of ‘third order’ policy change, particularly in the transmission and reception of new ideas. The significance of time as an independent or a dependent variable A longitudinal study, in itself, highlights the importance of time. Although we are studying the dynamics of ‘third order’ policy change, which may take place over a relatively short period of time, the foundations of that change may lie in events which took place many years previously, or in conditions of stability which have persisted for many years. For example, established interests can rely on time not only to fulfil their longterm objectives, but also to hope that any challenge to their authority will dissipate itself through campaigns running out of energy and ideas. On the other hand, ‘policy windows’ (Kingdon 1995:20) can provide limited periods of time when circumstances permit major policy change to take place. Time therefore
22 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
highlights particularly the often complex relationship between the conditions of policy stability and policy change, which a longitudinal study allows us to analyse. Thus, although a ‘snapshot’ approach may be necessary in order to satisfactorily analyse intense periods of ‘third order’ policy change, it is likely that this change can only be properly understood if we also appreciate the dynamics of possibly many years of relative stability and only incremental policy change. In this context, concepts such as policy communities and policy networks can also form an integral (if subsidiary) part of ‘third order’ policy change studies. In the light of our case study analyses, we conclude that, in the dynamics of ‘third order’ policy change, ideas and individuals are probably best characterised as independent variables, while interests and institutions are probably best characterised as being the dependent variables. There is an ambivalence about time which makes it in some respects a dependent variable, but also the ultimate independent variable. Our case studies of five turning points in UK road and rail policy since 1945 are intended to analyse and illustrate the conditions necessary for ‘third order’ policy change. There is a clear contrast between the network structures in road and rail. For nearly forty years the trunk roads sector was dominated by a hegemonic policy community which succeeded in imposing road building as the principal transport ‘solution’. In contrast, the rail sector has been notable for the persistent lack of an established policy community or even policy network, giving it the character of a ‘hollow core’. For roads, therefore, new and alternative ideas, particularly those propounded by the environmental advocacy coalition, have largely been forced to bypass the established community in order to penetrate the policy core. In the case of rail, it has been possible to inject new ideas more directly, but the paradox of the ‘hollow core’ is that it is not necessarily easy for ideas to take hold, and ‘third order’ policy change to take place. For both road and rail, however, key individuals appear to be essential agents of a shift in dominant paradigms. The two rail case studies concern periods when new ideas penetrated the ‘hollow core’ and brought about ‘third order’ policy change. First (Chapters 2 and 3) in the early 1960s, Dr Richard Beeching, as Chairman of the British Transport Commission and then the British Railways Board, introduced the concept of ‘the commercial railway’. In this process, Beeching was assisted and supported particularly by the Minister of Transport, Ernest Marples. The Beeching plan involved radical large-scale line and station closures, and carried obvious political risks and costs. Nevertheless, much of the Beeching plan was eventually implemented, even after he and Marples had departed the scene. Even up to the present day, the name ‘Beeching’ has become a powerful symbol of particular policy ideas. The second rail case study (Chapter 9) concerns the years 1987–92, when the idea of privatisation was transplanted. The economic problems and the political status of the rail industry made it an unlikely candidate for privatisation, but the continued existence of the ‘hollow core’ allowed a succession of individual
GOVERNMENT, INTEREST GROUPS AND POLICY CHANGE 23
privatisation advocates to advance the idea. Progress was spasmodic, and at times unpredictable, but eventually the privatisation advocates won the day. The first roads case study (Chapters 4 and 5) concerns the period when the road lobby was transformed from a weak advocacy coalition into a hegemonic policy community. This ‘third order’ policy change took place over a surprisingly short period of time (1954–9), and was brought about particularly by two influential Transport Ministers. In transplanting the policy idea, however, a mutation took place in the form of the concept of ‘popular consumerism’ attaching itself to roads as the policy ‘solution’. The power of the new policy idea was such that, by the time the first major stretch of motorway was opened in 1959, a previously sceptical government was enthusiastically embracing road building as a key element in its election winning strategy. The hegemonic roads policy community ruled unchallenged through-out the 1960s, but by the early 1970s environmental ideas were at least beginning to gain some ground. The second roads case study (Chapter 6) describes the period 1973–9 when the environmentalists, and particularly a handful of key individuals, challenged the roads community with some success. In particular, the disruption of a number of public inquiries sent messages to government which were acted on by sympathetic Ministers. There were also some effective challenges to the expertise of the knowledge-based roads epistemic community (Haas 1992). Nevertheless, the environmentalists lacked a strong policy idea which could unite a wide advocacy coalition, and also centrally placed policy entrepreneurs who could organise a collective action strategy. Consequently, true ‘third order’ change was not brought about. In the 1980s, the fortunes of the roads policy community revived, with the result that in 1989 a new large-scale road building plan was published. The third roads case study (Chapters 7 and 8) describes the period 1989–99 when this road building plan was eventually destroyed by a coordinated environmental advocacy coalition employing an effective multi-arena campaign. Skilful policy entrepreneurs organised this strategy, which could unite under the mutated policy idea of sustainable mobility. Consequently, unlike the 1970s, ‘third order’ policy change took place when road building as the principal policy ‘solution’ was destroyed.
2 The dynamics of the rail ‘hollow core’ The prelude to Beeching
Trevithick, Stephenson, Brunel—these names and possibly a handful more still signify railways to a majority of the British public. But neither in their owners’ lifetimes nor since have they become part of the language. This is the unique achievement, as a railwayman, of Dr Richard Beeching. In this century, certainly, no-one else involved in railways (unless one includes in this category the Minister who appointed the Doctor, Ernest Marples) has been similarly known by name to every man, woman and child of—say—ten-plus in the Kingdom…. And all this on the basis of four years’ absorption with railways, no more. (G.Freeman Allen, British Railways After Beeching, p. 1) The paradox of the ‘hollow core’ The concept of the ‘hollow core’ provides an effective image to describe a sectoral policy network with no strong central community. Heinz et al. perceive the ‘hollow core’ as cases where networks of policy makers lack central actors who stand in the middle of the system and have the ability to shape winning coalitions. That is, the ‘hollow core’ might be an image that is something like the opposite of the power elite (Heinz et al. 1993: xvi). Nevertheless, there is an important paradox at the heart of this image, for if the core really is hollow, then why is it so difficult to occupy? i.e. why does a ‘hollow core’ stay hollow, and what are the conditions which are required to occupy it? This chapter and the next concern a sector, that of rail policy in Britain, which has indeed been a network ‘hollow core’ for much of the last fifty years, but which, on a handful of occasions, and for relatively short periods of time, has been penetrated by powerful agents of change. Consequently, we are centrally concerned here with the years 1960–5 when Dr Richard Beeching, in various capacities, acted as a ‘change champion’ in rail policy (Pitt 1990:68–69). This case study provides some important explanations of the conditions under which the ‘hollow core’ is actually occupied. We will see that it was ideas, riding in on the back of influential individuals acting as agents and entrepreneurs of
THE DYNAMICS OF THE RAIL ‘HOLLOW CORE’ 25
policy change, which successfully penetrated the policy network ‘hollow core’. To some extent, the ideas’ survival depended on the continued presence of these advocates in order to hold political control of the ‘hollow core’, and the network gradually reverted to type after they departed. Nevertheless, the ideas, together with distinctive policy ‘images’, have achieved a sort of immortality in the public consciousness. Thus the name ‘Beeching’ lives on through the ideas and values which he promoted. A key element in understanding how the ‘hollow core’ is occupied is to once more appreciate the degree of discontinuity in the policy process. Over the past two decades, a number of key policy process and change models have depended to a significant extent on stressing the importance of ‘the spaces between things’. For example, the garbage can model of Cohen et al. describes organisations as ‘organised anarchies’ having the properties of problematic preferences, unclear technology and fluid participation. Running through the organisation are four separate streams: problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities (Cohen et al. 1972:1–35). As Kingdon notes, each of the streams has a life of its own, largely unrelated to the others (Kingdon 1995:85). To Cohen et al. therefore, the ‘organised anarchy’ is a collection of choices looking for problems, issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they might be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they might be the answer, and decision makers looking for work (Cohen et al. 1972:2). To only a limited extent, the garbage can model complements the explanation for the ‘hollow core’ provided by Heinz et al. For example, the Heinz et al. model emphasises the extent to which national policy-making is shaped by the distinctive structure of the interests that make up specific policy domains (Heinz et al. 1993:22). Thus, their findings suggest that structure and uncertainty are mutually reinforcing processes. In the attempt to deal with bigger stakes and rising uncertainty in the policy-making process, interests have organised their representational activities to reinforce control over their agents, to increase the amount of policy-relevant information they process, and expand their capacity to participate in policy deliberations. Yet, in the process of creating structures to control or adapt to uncertainty, they have contributed to the development of a more complex and rapidly changing policy-making environment. Interest representation has thus become a self-producing organisational field (Heinz et al. 1993:371). Heinz et al. therefore see the ‘hollow core’ chiefly as the result of an increasing complexity of interests. In this sense, the model is analogous with Heclo’s concept of the issue network, as characterised by a large number of participants with minimum stability and continuity (Heclo 1978). The emphasis on complexity and uncertainty clearly strikes a chord with the garbage can concept of the ‘organised anarchy’, but there are also important differences. Of particular relevance here is the concentration of Heinz et al. on the structure of a sectoral policy network. Consequently, it lacks the breadth and threedimensional quality of the garbage can model as an explanation of sectoral
26 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
change processes. For example, in the case of rail policy in Britain, we need to understand not only the structure of the interests, but also how new ideas and values can enter and dominate a sectoral network. On the one hand, rail does confirm the ‘hollow core’ model in the close link between structure and uncertainty. In particular, the typical Morrisonian (named after the Minister who developed the concept) arm’slength relationship between the government and the state owned rail industry had the effect of creating a policy vacuum which no interest, or combination of interests, could occupy. On the other hand, it could not be said that the ‘hollow core’ was attributable to a growing complexity of interests. Instead, it was caused by a paralysis of interests, which in its turn could be attributed chiefly to a lack of political leadership and the failure to build a stable policy community. Beeching proved to be the agent through which new ideas entered the sector; and it is in explaining this multi-dimensional change process where models which emphasise discontinuities come into their own. Ideas, policy streams and policy windows The rail policy network (such as it was) lacked a coherently organised core of actors, brought together by agreement on values and goals. Superficially, therefore, it was structurally weak and vulnerable to outside pressures and intrusions. Nevertheless, the introduction of new ideas required particular agents and instruments of change. In itself, the policy network was unlikely to initiate radical change, and so the ideas had to bridge the discontinuities separating the network from the outside world. As Majone argues, public policy cannot be understood solely in terms of concepts like power, influence, interest pressure and decision. Ideas and arguments, far from being mere rationalisations or rhetorical embellishments, are integral parts of policy-making (Majone 1991:290). Nevertheless, as Radaelli points out, once accepted by policy-makers, ‘an economic paradigm undergoes a process of institutionalisation’ (Radaelli 1995:167, original emphasis). Thus institutions give stability to shared causal beliefs, set up structures of meaning, create networks of actors, and constrain the perception of interests and of socioeconomic change (Radaelli 1995:178). It is this penetration by ideas, and their subsequent and attempted institutionalisation, which we are chiefly concerned with here. The garbage can model provides a vital insight of the separate dynamics of policy process elements such as problems, solutions, participants and choice opportunities. Kingdon utilises this model to place the emphasis more on ‘organised’ rather than ‘anarchy’, and to discover structures and patterns in the process (Kingdon 1995:86), i.e. Kingdon also emphasises the discontinuities between elements, but then seeks to explain how these largely independent ‘policy streams’ can be brought together to describe the phenomenon of ‘an idea whose time has come’ (Kingdon 1995:1). Kingdon defines three policy streams
THE DYNAMICS OF THE RAIL ‘HOLLOW CORE’ 27
flowing through the system—those of problems, policies and politics. Although these streams are separate and have their own dynamics, at some critical juncture they are joined, and the greatest policy changes grow out of that coupling. Thus ideas float around in a ‘policy primeval soup’, in which the strongest come to the forefront by a process of natural selection. At certain critical times, however, the policy streams come together. This coupling is most likely when policy windows—opportunities for pushing pet proposals or conceptions of problems—are open. These windows are opened either by the appearance of compelling problems or by happenings in the political stream (Kingdon 1995: 20), In essence, therefore, Kingdon is attempting to describe the process whereby ideas as policy solutions attach themselves to sectoral problems in the appropriate political climate. In the case of rail, the policy problem had an economic and a political dimension. From the economic perspective, during the 1950s rail had suffered mounting deficits, so that by 1960 there was increasing concern within government that these losses could not be staunched by the sole use of traditional instruments such as raising fares. From the political viewpoint, rail was beginning to experience tough competition from the motor vehicle. As we described in the previous chapter, after a slow start in the early post-war years, by the late 1950s the road building programme was gaining an increasing momentum, and had become the favoured policy ‘solution’ of Ministers to the transport problem (e.g. see Starkie 1982; Hamer 1987; Dudley and Richardson 1996a). In contrast, rail was perceived as a first class policy ‘problem’. By the early 1960s, the contrasting fortunes of these two modes gave rail a highly vulnerable appearance. It could be said, therefore, that any policy ‘solution’ for rail was viewed from the perspective that this was a sector in secular decline, which could not recover from the effects of ever increasing vehicle ownership and the generally cheaper rates charged by road haulage. The chosen ‘solution’ introduced by the ‘outsider’ businessman Beeching, involved a ruthless closures programme. Thus the policy ‘problem’ and the ‘solution’ did indeed have their own separate dynamics. As Kingdon acknowledges, however, the coupling of the policy streams can require the services of an entrepreneur, who will take responsibility not only for prompting important people to pay attention, but also for coupling solutions to problems and for coupling both problems and solutions to politics (Kingdon 1995:20). In the case of rail, this particular entrepreneurial role was assumed by the Minister of Transport 1959–64, Ernest Marples. Earlier, we have noted that Ministers are mobile rather than static policy actors. Consequently, they can choose to be ‘promiscuous’ with a range of other policy actors, or can be ‘celibate’ making lonely or internalised policy decisions, according to their own beliefs and principles, or in response to other exogenous pressures (Dudley and Richardson 1996b). Hennessy observes that transport is one of the most highly politicised subjects. The department which embodies it in Whitehall is, by extension, probably the most vulnerable ministry in terms of
28 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
swinging political fashions and the application of ideology to policy and administration. It is also a department where reputations can be made and a kind of immortality achieved (Hennessy 1990:451). This was certainly true in the case of Marples—a livewire minister with a great talent for self-promotion. It was Marples who not only introduced Beeching to the rail sector, but promoted and championed his ideas, enlisted the support of the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, and initiated a large-scale restructuring of the nationalised transport industries. Marples’ five year tenure at the Ministry of Transport, itself highly unusual in a job generally noted for its high casualty rate, enabled him, with Beeching, to couple the policy streams and to occupy the ‘hollow core’. It is highly significant that, when Marples did finally leave Transport at the defeat of the Conservative government in the general election of 1964, Beeching’s position was fatally undermined. He never enjoyed a harmonious rapport with Labour Ministers who, apart from having serious doubts about his policy ‘solutions’ (although they were not averse to adopting some of them), also regarded him as a figure personally identified with a Conservative government. When Beeching resigned as British Rail Chairman in 1965, he apparently had few regrets about leaving an industry where the political climate had turned hostile towards him. As Radaelli shrewdly notes, Kingdon’s model of policy change breaks with a long tradition in political science, dedicated to structural variables: by contrast, in Kingdon’s model ‘individuals’ (i.e. policy entrepreneurs) are placed into the limelight (Radaelli 1995:169, original emphasis). Nevertheless, he notes also that the crucial theme of ‘knowledge transmission’ as the key element of the agenda setting process also appears in Kingdon’s analysis (Radaelli 1995:169, original emphasis). Marples and Beeching did indeed try to transmit their ideas throughout the policy network, but with decidedly mixed results. Beeching brought in his own men to fill many of the senior rail management positions, and a large-scale closures programme did take place. On the other hand, there were also some influential managers who were sceptical of his policy. Although not an extrovert showman, such as Marples, Beeching did value the importance of presentation and public relations. This was particularly evident in his Reshaping of British Railways report in 1963. At the same time, he was not a natural manager or motivator, and so ultimately there were limitations to his powers of communication to the railways and beyond. Advocacy coalitions as instruments of radical change This insight about the coupling of the policy streams provides the key to understanding the conundrum posed at the beginning of the chapter of why the ‘hollow core’ can be so difficult to occupy. This is particularly so in the case of rail where, unlike the Heinz et al. model, there was not any increasing complexity of interests. Crucial as the role of individuals was, it was ‘the idea whose time has come’ which was coupled with the political stream and, for a
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period, dominated the sector. Ironically, this conclusion is highlighted by the very survival of the name of ‘Beeching’. Thirty years after he left the rail industry, and over a decade after his death, the name ‘Beeching’ still has a deep resonance in rail policy. Hence, in the 1990s, a rail union leader could refer to potential line closures as a result of privatisation as: ‘raising the spectre of Dr Beeching once again stalking the land to close rural and loss-making lines’ (Guardian 8 April 1992). Nevertheless, the work of Beeching and Marples illustrates an important analytical problem which is never quite resolved by Kingdon in his model of separate policy streams, policy windows and coupling by entrepreneurs. This is the extent to which new policy ideas may emerge by a process of natural selection, or alternatively how much they are manipulated to the top of the agenda by skilful policy advocates and entrepreneurs. Kingdon himself refers to the process as ‘softening up’, whereby entrepreneurs try to ‘educate’ inertiabound policy communities and also larger publics into accepting new ideas (Kingdon 1995:128). At the same time, he continues to argue that the policy streams flow along largely on their own, each according to dynamics not much related to the others, and that the critical event to understand is how these largely independent streams come together (Kingdon 1995:228). A model which to some extent counters that of policy streams is the concept of advocacy coalitions proposed by Sabatier (Sabatier 1988, 1993). Significantly, Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, like Kingdon, emphasise the degree of discontinuity in the policy process. Consequently, they claim that the stages model, which stresses process, is not really a causal model at all. They believe that it lacks identifiable forces to drive the policy process from one stage to another and generate activity within any given stage. Thus, they argue, it does not specify the linkages, drives and influences that form the essential core of theoretical models (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993:3). In addition, like Kingdon, they argue that policy evolution often involves multiple interacting cycles involving multiple levels of government (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993:4). Sabatier acknowledges that Kingdon is one of the few political scientists to deal seriously with the role of ideas and analysis in policy-making (Sabatier 1993:36–7). On the other hand, he differs from Kingdon by arguing that the ‘analyt ical’ stream is much more integrated with the ‘political’ stream than is claimed by the latter (Sabatier 1993:37). Instead, Sabatier proposes that: Within the subsystem, it is assumed that actors can be aggregated into a number of advocacy coalitions composed of people from various government and private organisations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often work in concert. At any particular point in time, each coalition adopts a strategy envisaging one or more institutional innovations that members feel will further policy objectives. (Sabatier 1993:18)
30 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
Sabatier does not believe that ideas necessarily just evolve in a separate policy stream by a process of natural selection, but argues that they are appropriated by coalitions of actors holding common values and seeking certain objectives. The breadth of an effective advocacy coalition allows it to campaign in a wide range of policy arenas. In order of decreasing resistance to change, advocacy coalitions will share a deep core of fundamental beliefs, a policy core of basic strategies and policy positions, and a set of secondary aspects comprising a multitude of instrumental decisions and information searches necessary to implement the policy core in the specific policy area (Sabatier 1993:30). A great strength of Sabatier’s model is that it demonstrates how ideas and interests may be integrated to become a powerful instrument of radical policy change. In certain circumstances, therefore, advocacy coalitions may ‘short circuit’ the system and create their own ‘policy windows’. In this interpretation, Beeching and Marples can be seen as leaders of an advocacy coalition which ‘made its own luck’ in order to occupy the ‘hollow core’. The case study tends to, at least partly, bear this out, for although there were serious economic and political problems in the rail sector in the early 1960s, it was Beeching and Marples who forced through radical change, rather than a momentary ‘policy window’ which presented itself. Advocacy coalitions also allow us a greater understanding of radical change processes. As Baumgartner and Jones point out, the generation of new ideas makes many policy monopolies unstable in the long run (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:4). They argue that major political decisions affecting the political system for decades to come are often made in the absence of counter-mobilisation. Rather, waves of enthusiasm sweep through the political system as political actors become convinced of the value of some new policy. They create the institutions to pursue the policy, often in the absence of serious opposing voices (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:5). Following Schattschneider’s famous dictum that ‘organisation is the mobilisation of bias’, they contend that the right connection between institution and idea provides powerful support for the prevailing distribution of political advantage (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:16). Nevertheless, through the mechanisms of agenda access and issue definition, the broader forces of political control may intervene from time to time, changing policies from what the self-interested may prefer. These periodic turbulent disruptions can produce conditions of what they call punctuated partial equilibria (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:20–1). Access to the agenda, and resetting the terms in which policy is debated, provides a further important insight into the conditions required for successfully occupying the ‘hollow core’. For the advocacy coalition led by Beeching and Marples, it was not enough just to have a new policy idea, the agenda also had to be ‘framed’ in a fresh way. Thus ‘framing’ an issue can involve not only resetting the policy agenda, but also what Rein and Schön term the whole policy discourse (Rein and Schön 1991:263). Schön and Rein provide a useful definition of policy ‘framing’ as a way of selecting, organising, interpreting, and making sense of a complex reality so as to provide guideposts for knowing,
THE DYNAMICS OF THE RAIL ‘HOLLOW CORE’ 31
analysing, persuading and acting. A ‘frame’ is, therefore, a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined problematic situation can be made sense of and acted upon (Schön and Rein 1994:26). The importance of ‘framing’ is illustrated in the case of rail where, as Henshaw points out, Beeching and Marples had to convey the message to the public and the political community that the only realistic policy ‘solution’ to the mounting losses of the railways was the closure of apparently unprofitable lines. It had to be demonstrated, therefore that these lines had become a public liability, and that their sacrifice was required in the interests of the nation as a whole (Henshaw 1994:118). For Baumgartner and Jones, the question of changing the issue ‘frame’ is interpreted in terms of policy ‘image’. Hence each policy ‘image’ has two components: an empirical and an evaluative. They refer to the evaluative component of a policy image as its tone. As an example they cite the case of civilian nuclear power in the US, which once was positively associated with economic progress, but today is more likely associated with danger and environmental degradation (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:26). In the case of Beeching, there is some ambivalence over this question of ‘image’, which goes a long way to explaining the controversy surrounding his name even today. For Beeching himself the Reshaping report was intended as a highly ‘rational’ plan, intended to indicate where the railways should concentrate their resources, and so become more profitable and competitive. Instead of this positive ‘image’, however, his policy of mass closures instilled in the public imagination the ‘image’ of Beeching as the ‘Butcher of the Railways’, and of the railways themselves as an old and dying industry withering away against unstoppable competition from the new and expanding trunk roads network. Successfully ‘framing’ an issue is a key factor in achieving agenda change, but Baumgartner and Jones add an institutional element when they argue that images and venues are closely related. They define venue as the location where institutions or groups in society have the authority to make decisions concerning an issue. Thus policy-makers attempt both to manipulate the dominant understanding of the issues with which they deal, and to influence the institutions that exert jurisdiction over them (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:35). In the case of Beeching, the 1962 Transport Act abolished the established British Transport Commission, and set up a British Railways Board, which Beeching was able to build as his power base. The rail ‘hollow core’ and the lack of any dominant ideology and interests also assisted him in this process, although, as we have noted, his ability to project the defined ‘image’ was to prove limited. In the image and venue model we see again the importance of discontinuities, but this time expressed in another form to that set out in such models as the garbage can, policy streams and, to some extent, advocacy coalitions. In the latter, policy change comes about through a coupling or bridging of disparate process elements. In the case of image and venue, it is the institutional
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separateness of a venue which can make it a powerful instrument of change. In fact, as we have noted elsewhere, it is important to see institutional venues not only as rival loci of power, but as fortresses from which those who control them can transmit the desired message or ‘image’ (Dudley and Richardson 1996a). Dunsire’s notion of ‘orders of comprehension’ as clusters of activities separated by their characteristic ‘universe of discourse’ is useful here. Thus, institutions can exhibit separate ‘orders of comprehension’ permitting discontinuities between them (Dunsire 1978:161). Consequently, Beeching and Marples not only controlled the locus of power, but could transmit their ideas from the occupied ‘hollow core’ to the wider world beyond. It is important to note also that alternative policy arenas can be appropriated by rival interests in order to transmit messages which undermine the prevailing orthodoxy. For example, as we will see in Chapters 7 and 8, in the case of British trunk roads policy, the environmental lobby gained control of the public inquiry process in the 1970s in order to transmit the image of roads as a policy ‘problem’ rather than a policy ‘solution’. As we will see in Chapter 7, in the 1990s the environmentalists have appropriated the construction sites themselves in order to transmit their chosen messages, with apparently significant success in shifting the policy ‘frame’ of the issue (Dudley and Richardson 1998). There is only limited evidence of this in the case of rail. Although the rail unions publicly opposed the Beeching plan, there was no systematic campaign to challenge his ‘framing’ of the issue. Individual line closures were challenged through the statutory process, and Ministers were undoubtedly sensitive about electorally damaging closures and service reductions, but the rail lobby never achieved the type of coordinated campaign seen in the case of roads. Frustrating a ‘clear home run’ As Kingdon emphasises, managing the policy agenda is not in itself a guarantee of ensuring policy change (Kingdon 1995:54). Peters notes that very few issues come to government already neatly wrapped and identified. Rather, they become defined through a complex process of contending ideas, advocacy, learning and ultimately either political domination or synthesis. In this process information and ideas may be as important as power, and policy entrepreneurship becomes a process of marshalling evidence as well as counting votes (Peters 1994:13). Significantly, Sabatier believes a study of policy change requires a time perspective of a decade or more, and sees advocacy coalitions working throughout policy subsystems at all levels of government (Sabatier 1993: 16). From this perspective, Marples and Beeching needed to find allies throughout BR and in the public arena beyond in order to win long-term acceptance for their ideas. In the term employed by Héritier to analyse European regulatory policymaking, Beeching and Marples could then achieve a ‘clear home run’ (Héritier 1996:151).
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In the event, however, this ‘clear home run’ was frustrated, at least for Beeching and Marples personally, by a mixture of endogenous and exogenous forces. Endogenously, elements of BR management were reluctant to accept the Beeching ‘frame’ and advocated a different policy of cutting costs to save threatened lines, rather than Beeching’s favoured policy of outright closures. Exogenously the key factor was the onset of the 1964 general election and the ensuing defeat of the Conservative government. This defeat ensured the departure of Marples and in the following year a disillusioned Beeching resigned as BR Chairman. Ironically, many of Beeching’s policy ideas were implemented by the Labour government, including the large majority of the proposed line closures, although the idea of the commercial railway was mitigated by the introduction of subsidies. Nevertheless, although Beeching was himself not particularly sympathetic to the road lobby (unlike the keen roads advocate Marples), implementation of the Beeching Plan implied a settlement and accommodation with the (as they had become by the 1960s) hugely powerful road interests. For rail, the exogenous fact of the expansion of roads added another dimension to the ‘hollow core’. Beeching and his ideas dominated rail policy in the 1960s, but the core of the roads community, and in particular the close relationship between the MoT and the road lobby, remained an impenetrable fortress. Before describing and analysing this period in more detail, however, it is important to understand the evolution in the 1950s of the fragmented and politically messy rail ‘hollow core’. The dynamics of the rail ‘hollow core’ The rail sector has a wide range of key interests, including operators, government, unions and passengers, but no real sense of a policy com munity or common culture. As we outlined earlier, there is a vivid contrast here with roads, where for many years from the later 1950s, the tightly knit relationship between government and trunk road construction ensured that policy was ‘framed’ in a particular way. Rail interests, on the other hand, have encountered great difficulty in forming any sort of stable alliance with government which could succeed in projecting a more positive image of rail as a mode of transport with a positive future. A brief examination of the policy developments up to 1960 will illustrate the political weaknesses which hampered the development of the industry up to the advent of Beeching in that year. Regulation and nationalisation When the Liverpool and Manchester railway was opened in 1830 as the first substantial line to rely completely on steam power, it heralded not only a transport revolution, but also signified an irrevocable break with the past in terms
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of industrial, commercial and political life. Dyos and Aldcroft graphically describe its impact: Here, then, was a major railway between the two most important industrial and commercial cities in the provinces, solidly engineered despite great difficulties, completely mechanised, creating a demand that had not been thought to exist, working to full capacity with unparalleled efficiency, and distributing to the shareholders year after year with the same measured power that drove its engines a dividend of 9.5 per cent. (Dyos and Aldcroft 1974:124–5) The rapid development of the railways in the 1830s and 1840s inevitably made them a matter of political salience, with a boom in Parliamentary Acts authorising the building of lines. As McLean and Foster point out, although the Victorian era is generally portrayed as a triumph of laissezfaire, from the early days the government took action to control the companies (McLean and Foster 1992:313). For example, although there continues to be considerable controversy about its true significance, the 1844 Regulation of Railways Act signified the government’s concerns about the potential monopoly power of the railway companies (e.g. see Dyos and Aldcroft 1974:142–3; McLean and Foster 1992: 313–31; Foster 1992:21–36). The government continued to take an increasingly interventionist approach towards the railway companies, particularly in limiting the system of charging, so that by 1914 it could be said that the railways were the most regulated form of economic activity in Britain (Dyos and Aldcroft 1974: 163). Even in what is generally thought of as the heyday of the railways, therefore, we see the ability of the government to ‘frame’ policy in terms of the railways serving a wider economic interest. Significantly, the companies lacked the political strength or guile to break away from their controls, and project a more commercial ‘image’. After the First World War, the companies were in a depressed state, and it was clear that a considerable degree of rationalisation was required. The government had taken control of the companies during the war, and was empowered to retain this control for two years after it. Nationalisation seemed the most likely option, but in the event the government imposed a rationalisation into four companies based on the regional main lines. Prices were still controlled through a legalistic Railway Rates Tribunal, and during the inter-war years the companies remained in a generally depressed state. By now, competition from motor vehicles was intensifying, and road haulage and coach operators could be much more flexible in their pricing. After the Second World War, therefore, there was a general acceptance that the old structure was beyond repair. Consequently, nationalisation of the railways was swept up in the giant 1947 Transport Act, which not only nationalised the railways, but also the hotels owned by the railway companies; the London passenger transport system; the canals and inland waterways; the road
THE DYNAMICS OF THE RAIL ‘HOLLOW CORE’ 35
haulage industry; and gave the new British Transport Commission (BTC) the power to reorganise and transfer to public ownership the principal trade harbours and the road passenger services throughout the country (Robson 1960:95). Five executives were given functional control of railways, road haulage, road passenger transport hotels and catering, and docks and inland waterways. The sixth executive took over London passenger transport. Over all of this the BTC was designed to determine overall policy and coordinate the various executives. From the outset, it became clear that the massive and unwieldy structure of the BTC was not conducive to achieving the objective of an integrated and efficient transport system for Britain. In the event, when the Conservatives returned to power in 1951, they set about a process of denationalisation, so that the 1953 Transport Act provided for the return to the private sector of the road haulage industry and the repeal of the BTC’s powers relating to road passenger services and trade harbours. As Robson emphasises, by far the most important question which now faced the BTC was the modernisation of the antiquated railway system (Robson 1960:96). Here we have one important indicator, therefore, for the existence in the early post-war years of the ‘hollow core’ on railway policy. The BTC, overwhelmed by its massive and complex responsibilities, and besieged by the political and practical problems of nationalisation and then denationalisation, was totally incapable of addressing its collective mind to devising a long-term strategy for the railways. In recognising the severe limitations of the BTC and the railway executive, the government decided that a much more decentralised system was required. Consequently, the country was divided into six Area Boards, which were given general supervision of the railways within their areas, although the BTC remained in overall control. This removed one tier of management, the Railway Executive, where relations with the Commission had never been good (e.g. see Gourvish 1986:47). The 1955 modernisation plan: coupling problems and policies By the mid-1950s, the persistent railway deficits were becoming a major policy headache for the BTC and the government. The BTC did not disaggregate its figures, but from 1953 the sell-off of the generally profitable road haulage operations threw into stark relief the position of the railways. In 1954 the deficit was £11.9 1.9 million, but by 1955 this had shot up to £30.6 million. The BTC itself had no doubt that the main explanation for the deficit of £70 million accumulated during the previous eight years was the persistence of inflation (BTC Annual Report 1955, para. 35). The Commission was understandably aggrieved that it had to present applications for price rises before the Transport Tribunal (the successor of the Railway Rates Tribunal), which placed it at a great disadvantage against competition from road transport, and also caused serious
36 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
delays in gaining revenue which was failing to keep pace with inflation. The 1953 Transport Act had attempted to give the BTC more freedom on charging, and proposed that the Tribunal should have powers in deciding only on the maximum charges, and should allow the industry to charge as it felt fit below these maxima. In the event, however, the BTC was slow in providing a charging structure, and the measure was not implemented until July 1957 (Reid and Allen 1970:114–15). Even so, the continued existence of the Transport Tribunal emphasised the by now unrealistic public controls under which the rail industry was labouring. By the mid-1950s the BTC was also struggling to keep down labour costs, and had been involved in a number of damaging disputes with the three main rail unions: the National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF) and the Transport and Salaried Staff Association (TSSA). Traditionally, there was considerable rivalry between the general railway workers, who belonged to the NUR, and the drivers who belonged to ASLEF, with the latter regarding themselves as an elite, and jealously guarding differentials. For example, in 1955 negotiations on differentials between the BTC and ASLEF broke down, and the union called a damaging strike which lasted sixteen although the NUR refused to join the dispute. Gourvish emphasises (1986: days, and involved ministerial intervention (Boyd-Carpenter 1980:112–14) 228–31) that nobody could take much comfort from the 1955 strike: In short, the Commission’s policy was confused. It was torn between resisting union claims, in the face of its financial problems, and yielding to demands which a number of officers inside the organisation felt were fair and reasonable. (Gourvish 1986:231) The 1955 strike offers another good illustration of the existence of a policy network ‘hollow core’. Rivalry between the unions prevented a coordinated approach not only to wages, but also to applying concerted pressure for an investment policy. The BTC was indecisive, and veered between seeking to do the bidding of Ministers and a reluctance to take on the unions. The government itself had no clear strategy on industrial relations for the railways, encouraging BTC management to take on ASLEF, but then fearing the political impact of a strike, particularly as the stop-page took place during the period of a general election. Ironically, however, 1955 was finally the year when the BTC attached a policy ‘solution’ to the rail ‘problem’. The answer to the growing deficits was to be a large-scale and expensive investment plan, which should be implemented as quickly as possible. An important clue to the policy ‘frame’ of this period comes, significantly, not from the government, but from a barrister, Sir John Cameron, who in 1954–5 chaired a government appointed inquiry into an NUR claim for a significant pay increase. In his report Cameron came down in favour of the
THE DYNAMICS OF THE RAIL ‘HOLLOW CORE’ 37
NUR, and concluded that having willed the end (of a nationalised railway system) the Nation must will the means (Cmnd. 9352, 1955:4–7). Although Cameron was referring to wage comparability, his comment could be taken as a good summary of the values then underlying rail policy. Even for a Conservative government, the railways were a natural case for public ownership, and the arguments for major capital investment could no longer be ignored politically. By 1954, the BTC was sure that Britain was falling well behind other European countries in the development of diesel and electric services and the continued reliance on steam. Henshaw starkly puts the position that the railways had become victims of their own heritage, and the Victorian infrastructure was regarded as anachronistic and outmoded (Henshaw 1994:86). The plan for the Modernisation and Re-equipment of British Railways (BTC 1955) was published in January 1955, and envisaged the expenditure of £1,240 million over fifteen years (although it is important to note this period just to maintain the existing equipment. BTC Annual Report that the BTC estimated about £600 million would have to be spent over 1954, para. 117). The modernisation plan included the expenditure of £365 million on freight services, including a drastic rationalisation of inefficient marshalling yards; £285 rnillion on passenger carriages and stations; and £345 million on electrification and dieselisation. Of the major modernisation plans, it was decided that priority should be given to the electrification of the London Midland Region main line from London to Birmingham, Liverpool and Manchester. Unfortunately, this well intentioned plan was to hit a large number of operational economic and political obstacles, i.e. the ‘problem’ and ‘policy’ streams might be coupled but, as so often in the post-war history of the railways, transplanting into the ‘political’ stream was to prove much more wayward. In operational terms, as Henshaw points out, the extraordinary speed of the dieselisation programme proved to be a major economic blunder, for expensive diesels were put into service before prototypes had even completed trials (Henshaw 1994:79). More fundamentally, for many parts of the Modernisation Plan, costs and expected receipts had not been estimated, and implementation of the Plan would not boost profits to the extent hoped for by the BTC (Reid and Allen 1970:116). Gourvish describes how the Ministry of Transport put pressure on the BTC to produce a plan quickly, and ‘Modernisation Policy’ rather than ‘Plan’ would have been a more apt description of what was put together (confirming the extent to which ‘problems’ and ‘policies’ occupied separate policy streams) (Gourvish 1986:265). This haste limited the opportunity to pursue sophisticated traffic forecasts and financial calculations. There also appeared to be a strong element of presentational gloss on the BTC’s assertion in the Plan that its implementation would make it economically self-supporting for many years to come (see Gourvish 1986:266–7). Although there was some internal scepticism about the validity of the plan within both the BTC and the Treasury, the government gave its blessing for the Commission to proceed. There was a growing economic expansionist mood by
38 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
the mid-1950s, and it could be said that it was no coincidence that the rail Modernisation Plan coincided with the government’s commitment in February 1955 to commence construction of a motorway network and spend more on roads generally. After the austerity and restrictions of the early post-war years, there was a lighter and more optimistic public mood which the politicians wished to lead and reflect. Ironically for rail, it was to be the motor vehicle and roads which would be the chief beneficiaries of this public mood, with rail acquiring the ‘image’ of a transport mode whose halcyon days lay in the past. Another important problem in implementing the Plan, and also one more important explanation for the existence of the political ‘hollow core’ was, as Gourvish points out, that Ministers and officials lacked the expertise to truly evaluate and possibly challenge the analysis which lay behind the investment proposals of the Plan (Gourvish 1986:272). This was a problem which bedevilled relationships between many of the nationalised industries and government over a long period of time (e.g. see Foster 1971; Hannah 1982; Dudley and Richardson 1990). For some of these industries, however, such as electricity and steel, their central strategic importance gave their managements considerable political strength, which Ministers were reluctant to challenge, i.e. the managers asserted themselves politically, and prevented the occurrence of a ‘hollow core’. In contrast, the declining ‘image’ of rail, combined with a generally unassertive management, left the door open for a resourceful Minister, such as Marples, to take charge. Departments might lack the expertise to challenge the BTC, but business ‘experts’ could be hired to fill this gap, and if necessary supplant the status quo. Perhaps the biggest weakness of the 1955 Modernisation Plan, however, was its construction by an insular management who were generally back-ward looking, and had little awareness of the new threats from other modes of transport. This insularity is summarised by Allen: The (Modernisation)… Plan was permeated with an assumption that the railways had a God-given right to passengers and freight. It would still come their way automatically so long as trains travelled faster, and the railways could make a profit from it so long as they were lavishly reequipped with every known device that promised more economic working. (Allen 1966:6) Even by the late 1950s, therefore, the BTC stuck to the idiosyncratic policy ‘frame’, that new investment in itself would turn around the increasing deficits. In this respect, it was not just competition from the roads which threatened the railways. The rundown of the industries which traditionally provided the major customers for rail freight was also a serious, but unanticipated, problem. Thus Reid and Allen note that in 1956 the railways were carrying 168 million tons of coal and coke but only 122 million tons in 1967, and that the greater part of this
THE DYNAMICS OF THE RAIL ‘HOLLOW CORE’ 39
fall was a result of the diminished size of the coal industry rather than competition from alternative transport modes (Reid and Allen 1970:110). In any case, any financial benefits from the Modernisation Plan were going to take several years to come through and meanwhile the railway deficits were mounting. The 1947 Transport Act had required the BTC to balance their revenue account ‘taking one year with another’. Now, however, ‘taking one year with another’ the railways were facing an everaccumulating deficit. If the Modernisation Plan was to be financed, then this situation could not be allowed to continue. Consequently, between 1956 and 1958, £221 million was advanced under the Finance Act of 1956, which gave the Minister of Transport powers to lend money to the BTC as an alternative to the issuing of British Transport Stock (Gourvish 1986:296). Second, the Transport (Railway Finances) Act of 1957 gave the BTC authority to borrow from the Consolidated Fund a sum required to meet the deficits on revenue account of British Railways during the years up to 1962—up to a total of £250 million (later raised to £400 million) plus the interest on those advances. The BTC was also authorised to borrow moneys required to meet the interest on capital spent on the modernisation programme in the period before it was expected that it could become revenue earning (Jenkins 1959:117). In other words, the railways had now become a ‘special case’, with the government covering their losses. The problem was that they now also had a target of breaking even by 1962, and an expectation that all the money borrowed would eventually be paid back. In the event, this was to prove an entirely unrealistic objective. The other side of the coin to the government agreeing to prop up the railways was a requirement in 1956, and again in 1959, for the Commission to reassess its economic and financial future. On each occasion, the Commission produced a White Paper (Cmnd. 9880, 1956 and Cmnd. 813, 1959). Although in 1957 the BTC lifted the cost of the Modernisation Plan to £1,500 million, basically the government accepted the Commission’s arguments. It could be said that this acceptance reflected another facet of the ‘hollow core’. As we will describe in Chapter 5, the Minister of Transport 1955–9, Harold Watkinson, was primarily interested in the roads programme, and became integrally involved in the policy of constructing the first section of the M1 (see Watkinson 1986:67–92). In contrast, his Permanent Secretary, Sir Gilmour Jenkins, was an expert on merchant shipping. Although neither was particularly hostile to the railways, both had other priorities, and so there was a sense of drift at the centre. This sense of drift tended to be exacerbated by the character of the BTC Chairman since 1953, Sir Brian Robertson. A former Army General, Robertson was a keen advocate of the Modernisation Plan, but developed an overcomplicated administrative structure at the THC, and generally lacked the political stature to challenge the ever growing influence of the road lobby at the Ministry of Transport. By 1959, therefore, although investment in the railways had increased (net investment rose from £16.2 million in 1955 to £45.4 million in 1959) (Gourvish
40 WHY DOES POLICY CHANGE?
1986:602), the BTC lacked either the organisational skill to the impact on their industry of changes in society as a whole. For its part, implement its Modernisation Plan smoothly, or the vision to appreciate the government was now bankrolling the railways, but had little sense of strategic leadership. Meanwhile, the other element in the equation of railway finances—the possibility of extensive line closures—remained largely a matter of low political salience. The line closures problem and policy ‘frames’ Given the monopoly position held by the majority of the nationalised industries, the Labour government of 1945–51 was anxious to accommodate the interests of the consumer, which might otherwise be overlooked. Consequently, a range of statutory consumers’ councils was set up for the various industries. In the case of transport the 1947 Transport Act provided for the establishment of several consultative committees, including a Central Transport Consultative Committee (CTCC) and area Transport Users’ Consultative Committees (TUCCs) for passenger and goods traffic, so that the whole country should be covered. The committees were to consist of an independent chairman, with members appointed to represent agriculture, commerce, industry, shipping, labour and local authorities, but with members also appointed by the BTC (Robson 1960:247). This BTC input inevitably threw into doubt the true independence of these committees, given that their membership included representatives of the principal transport operator. Their independence was dubious also because, ultimately, all the appointments were made by the Minister after consultation with the interests concerned. As Tivey notes, a high proportion of members were drawn from local authorities, and hence from local political parties. In addition, some interests, such as railway passengers, were not naturally organised, while some of those who did sit on the committees had no particular specialised knowledge or interest in rail policy (Tivey 1973:153–4). Consequently, the way could be left open for the committees to be dominated by professionals such as BTC representatives. Officially, the Consultative Committees were given the responsibility to make recommendations in regard to any matter (including charges) affecting the services and facilities afforded by the Commission which had been the subject of representations made to the committee by users of those services or facilities, or which appeared to be a matter to which consideration ought to be given, or which the Minister or Commission might refer to the committee for consideration (Robson 1960:247). In reality, although the CTCC and TUCCs were consulted by Ministers on most major policy issues, the Minister had no obligation to act on their recommendations, and indeed rarely did so. The generally infrequent meetings of the committees (Robson 1960:248) added to their image as political lightweights.
THE DYNAMICS OF THE RAIL ‘HOLLOW CORE’ 41
One important function they did perform, however, was in holding hearings on proposed closures of lines. In many respects, these hearings are analogous with the public inquiries held in the case of proposed road schemes, i.e. over time, they have acquired a quasi-judicial image, although their true role is basically consultative, as we will see in Chapter 6. Briefly, however, in the 1970s public inquiries into a number of controversial trunk road schemes became matters of high political salience when the environmental lobby exploited them by means of a number of well publicised disruptions of proceedings. Essentially the environmental lobby was seeking to change the manner in which the issue was ‘framed’, so that government would see roads as a policy ‘problem’ rather than a policy ‘solution’. At least for a period they succeeded in this aim. In the case of rail, although there was opposition to line closures, there was only limited success in changing the policy ‘frame’, i.e. to project an image of the lines as essential components of a total network rather than an expendable drain on railway resources. In the 1950s the principal opposition to line closures came from the Railway Development Association (RDA) founded in 1951. The RDA fought a number of campaigns against line closures, most notably on the Isle of Wight in 1953, where the BTC had proposed closing almost half the network. Henshaw describes how the RDA had become convinced that the Railway Executive had been providing false figures to TUCC inquiries so as to smooth the flow of closures, and so was determined to force a public debate on the issue (Henshaw 1994:66). The RDA hired a well known barrister and later High Court judge, Melford Stevenson, to fight its case, and also called a number of expert witnesses who threw considerable doubt on the figures produced by the railway executive. Nevertheless, when the decision came, the CTCC backed the BTC, and closure went ahead after the Minister of Transport promised road improvements for the island (Henshaw 1994:66–71). It could be said that the RDA was ahead of its time in its campaigning technique of hiring expertise, but that, unlike the environmentalists at road inquiries in the 1970s, it made the strategic mistake of fighting to the ‘rules’ constructed by the BTC itself. The Isle of Wight case also illustrates how the CTCC and the TUCCs had largely been ‘captured’ by the BTC. For example, in its 1954 Annual Report the BTC noted with satisfaction that, since they were set up, the Consultative Committees had examined closure schemes for 102 branch services, and that the resultant net economies were estimated at a minimum figure of £900,000 a year (BTC Annual Report 1954, para. 40). Notwithstanding the work of the RDA, there was little hope that any nominal consumers’ interest would be willing or able to challenge the policy ‘frame’, and so the Consumers’ Councils were one more key component in the rail policy network ‘hollow core’. A highly revealing comment was made by a senior BTC official in 1957 who thanked the Consultative Committees for their thoroughness and impartiality at hearings on controversial closure cases. He concluded:
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They have established facts and then reached conclusions on the basis not of who is right but what is right in the national interest. In the process they have done much to educate public opinion on the issues involved in branch line cases. (quoted in Robson 1960:251) By a fortunate chance, therefore, the national interest coincided with that of the BTC, and the Consultative Committees were doing their bit by convincing the public at large that those in charge had the correct policy ‘frame’. Nevertheless, compared with what was to come later, the 1950s was not a period when line closures generally achieved high political salience. As Henshaw comments, there were plenty of contenders for the title of ‘least remunerative branch line’ (Henshaw 1994:84), and some of the closures were uncontested. It could also be argued that the political mood of the 1950s generally was against radical action in this field. As we have seen, successive Ministers of Transport were reluctant to take a hard line with the BTC, and generally settled for a quiet life. In addition, although rail passengers were not an organised interest, they did have votes, and so held an important ‘empty chair’ at discussions on rail policy (in the 1960s even Marples was to discover this hard political reality). As the 1950s progressed there was also a change of thinking within the BTC itself. Henshaw describes how, in the early 1950s, there was tension within the Railway Executive between the Branch Line Committee, which sought closures, and the Light Weight Train Committee which pushed for light railcars to be introduced on the branch lines (Henshaw 1994:59–63). From the mid-1950s, and the development of the Modernisation Plan, senior officials within the BTC were converted to the view that a number of unremunerative branch lines should be supplied with new diesel multiple units and railcars, in the hope that business would pick up. Consequently, closures were postponed (see Henshaw 1994:100– 5). By the end of the 1950s, therefore, the policy ‘solution’ of the Modernisation Plan was underway, but with little control over its development. Meanwhile, the rail deficits continued to grow. Consequently, by 1960 this ‘solution’ was rapidly becoming decoupled from the ‘problem’. In addition, as we have seen, throughout the middle to late 1950s there was no sense of a policy community of rail interests, with the result that the political stream was never truly coupled to the other two. The unions were divided; BTC management passive; Ministers indecisive or even indifferent; and consumers quiescent. At the heart of this political ‘hollow core’ lay the lack of political leadership to direct the industry and introduce new policy ideas. Into this political void stepped Beeching and Marples, to ‘frame’ policy issues in a fresh way and to commandeer the ‘hollow core’.
3 Occupying the ‘hollow core’ The Beeching era at British Rail 1960–5
The thought underlying the whole Report is that the railways should be used to meet that part of the total transport requirement of the country for which they offer the best available means, and that they should cease to do things for which they are ill suited. To this end, studies were made to determine the extent to which the present pattern of the railways’ services is consistent with the characteristics which distinguish railways as a mode of transport, namely: the high cost of their specialised and exclusive route system, and their low cost per unit moved if traffic is carried in dense flows of well-loaded through trains. As a result, it is concluded that, in many respects, they are being used in ways which emphasise their disadvantages and fail to exploit their advantages. (British Railways Board, The Reshaping of British Railways, p. 57) The Stedeford Committee and coupling the policy streams By 1960 ‘the inexorable march of problems’ was advancing rapidly on the government. Thus the railways’ mounting deficits, and the apparently escalating costs of the Modernisation Plan, were assuming alarming proportions. Thomson and Hunter summarise the position: The recession in 1958, which badly affected the heavy industries on which rail freight largely depended, caused the operating deficit to reach almost £50 million, and although the trend was temporarily broken the following year, the three years 1960–62 each added almost £20 million to the operating deficit, so that in the last of these years it topped the £100 million mark. (Thomson and Hunter 1973:134) In addition, problems were mounting up for the future through the cost of the Modernisation Plan. Thus, at constant 1948 prices, gross investment in British Railways rose from £46.9 million in 1955 to £98.4 million in 1959 (Gourvish
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1986:595). As we have seen, the government had deferred the interest charges on capital for the Modernisation Plan, but this only increased the sense of foreboding about how the railways would ever be in a position to pay this money back. The government itself, of course, had been partly responsible for the deficits by its refusal to lift price controls, but in 1960 Ministers were inclined to look elsewhere when apportioning the blame! In response to this crisis, the government adopted a new ‘frame’ for policy, and an alternative ‘solution’. No longer was there to be talk of ‘the Nation has willed the ends, and so must will the means’. The railways would remain in public ownership, but would be subjected to a much harsher regime. Replacing investment as the policy ‘solution’ would be an emphasis on a commercially viable network, with the implication of closures on a large scale. The first major public intimation of policy change came with a Commons statement in March 1960 by the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan. Officially, Macmillan was commenting on the findings of the Guillebaud inquiry into pay comparability between the railways and other industries. After sitting for fifteen months, Guillebaud had decided, in essence, that rail workers should receive an 8 per cent increase to make them comparable with other industries. In commenting on the report, Macmillan accepted the Guillebaud findings, apparently echoing the words of Cameron five years earlier. He went on, however, to put these higher wages in a very different policy ‘frame’: First, the industry must be of a size and pattern suited to modern conditions and prospects. In particular, the railway system must be remodelled to meet current needs, and the Modernisation Plan must be adapted to this new shape. Those working in the industry must accept this. This is the only way of bringing about conditions in which a fair reward, not only in terms of money, but of satisfaction with their job, can be secured. Secondly, the public must accept the need for changes in the size and pattern of the industry. This will involve certain sacrifices of convenience, for example, in the reduction of uneconomic services. It will also be necessary to examine urgently the question of relieving the industry of restrictions and obligations which limit the Commission’s earnings and prevent them from making the best use of their resources. Thirdly, the Commission must accept a radical alteration of its structure, so as to secure a more effective distribution of functions and a better use of all its assets. (H.C.Debates 10 March 1960, cols. 642–4) The Prime Minister had therefore put the official stamp of approval on the new policy ‘frame’. The railways were no longer to be seen as providing a national public service, i.e. a ‘special case’ bound by regulatory control on matters such as charging, but also with the nation ‘willing the means’ to provide this service. Henceforth, it would be construction of the motorway network which would
OCCUPYING THE ‘HOLLOW CORE’ 45
assume the mantle of a political ‘special case’, and the railways must take their place as just another mode of transport in a hard and competitive world. In addition, Macmillan’s statement intimated that the concept of an overarching BTC was to be ditched. It was this policy of a commercial railway which fitted so well with the introduction into the industry of Beeching, the rational and hard headed businessman, who had been bound by the competitive pressures of the private sector, and would not be swayed by public pressure for a return to the sentimental old days of the railways as a public service. Beeching, therefore, was to represent the perfect human embodiment of the new policy idea. As we will see, however, in some sectors the government was not so averse to policies embodying central planning, and so Beeching would not fit comfortably into these other meta-policy values. It could nevertheless be argued that, particularly for those sympathetic to road interests, the idea of a commercial railway could be a euphemism for its decline and destruction. As we will see, the evidence suggests that Beeching did not regard himself as a tool of the road lobby, but genuinely wished to apply a rational plan which would give a viable future for the railways. Nevertheless, in time Beeching was to acquire the popular ‘image’ of the ‘axe-man’ of the railways, with lines and services radically pruned in order to accommodate the ever growing number of motor vehicles and the rapidly expanding motorway network. Beeching as the embodiment of a policy idea brings us to the third separate policy stream, that of politics, and in particular the ambivalent figure as policy entrepreneur of Ernest Marples, the Minister of Transport. It was Marples who played a decisive role in coupling the three policy streams, and in particular skilfully manoeuvred the political system in his favour. Unlike Beeching, it could not be said that Marples had no special interest in policy outcomes on transport. As Hamer describes, even after he was appointed Transport Minister, Marples continued to own 64,000 out of 80,000 shares in Marples Ridgeway, a civil engineering firm which specialised in roads. Eventually, these shares were sold to his wife, but Marples was inevitably identified politically with road interests (Hamer 1987:50). As we will see in Chapter 5, however, Marples’ championing of roads as a policy ‘solution’ to a large extent reflected the growing influence of ideas concerning popular consumerism. The number of motor vehicles on Britain’s roads doubled between 1952 and 1961, and for many families the experience of owning a car for the first time chimed in excellently with Macmillan’s astute discourse of ‘you never had it so good’ in the general election of October 1959. The Hall Report on road transport, commissioned by the Ministry of Transport (MoT 1963) and published around the same time as Beeching’s key 1963 report on The Reshaping of British Railways, emphasised the problems of congestion which would ensue from the huge increases in the number of vehicles, but in the early 1960s it was more roads rather than public transport which was seen as the
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‘solution’. For millions of people, therefore, buying a car was commensurate with casting aside the ‘second class status’ of a public transport user. The rail passenger might continue to occupy one of the Minister’s ‘empty chairs’, particularly when elections drew near, but now the ‘empty chair’ of the car owning voter had moved up to the head of the table. In this emerging political climate it was perhaps inevitable that, regardless of the Minister in charge, the railways would struggle to hold their position against the apparently inexorable progress of road development. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to see the radical policy for rail which was established in 1960 as merely an extension of what had gone before. As we have seen, even in 1959 the government still had a largely passive approach to rail policy and was basically content to let the BTC get on with the job. It was Marples’ skill in pulling together the three policy streams of the rail ‘problem’ caused by mounting deficits; the policy ‘frame’ of a commercial railway; and the political weakness of the BTC itself, which was instrumental in bringing about radical policy change. In the 1950s this vital political stream was not coupled, but Marples was not to be so naïve. It was the addition of this political element which truly constituted occupation of the ‘hollow core’. Marples’ position was also strengthened by events within the Ministry of Transport. As we remarked earlier, the Permanent Secretary, Sir Gilmour Jenkins, had taken little interest in railways, but this position changed with his retirement in 1959. His successor, James Dunnett, soon made it clear that he was keen on the idea of moving towards a much smaller but cost effective railway system. With these objectives in mind, he secured the transfer of David Serpell from the Treasury as Deputy Secretary (Gourvish 1986:299). Serpell shared Dunnett’s views and both men were much less sympathetic to the existing BTC management. We can therefore see how a policy ‘window’ appeared and provided the foundations within the MoT of a potentially powerful advocacy coalition which would establish a bridgehead in occupying the ‘hollow core’. The inexorable march of problems (Kingdon 1995:94–6) is well illustrated by the Cabinet minutes during the crucial early months of 1960. In particular the conclusions of the Guillebaud Committee, and the implications for higher wages for railway workers, was particularly influential in concentrating minds on the railway ‘problem’. For example, in February the Cabinet was given advance notice of the Guillebaud conclusions, and it was pointed out that if the recommendations were to be met in full, and if the BTC’s current deficit was to be met, then it would be necessary to raise an additional £100 million in taxation. The Cabinet demonstrated its lack of faith in the BTC management by not ruling out the possibility of placing the BTC under direct ministerial control for a period, although this would increase the risk of a direct conflict between the unions and the government. In the circumstances, it was not surprising that the Cabinet encouraged the Minister of Transport to push ahead with his plan to separate the Commission’s various activities and also change its capital structure (CAB 128/34). Within the Cabinet, therefore, there was a barely suppressed state
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of panic that railway finances were running out of control, and that the government would probably need to bail out the BTC, both financially and politically. Later in the month, and after a number of meetings with Marples, the Prime Minister announced to the Cabinet that although the government would have to decide the broad lines of the reorganisation of the BTC, the details should be worked out by a planning committee composed of representatives of the Commission, officials of the Treasury and the Ministry of Transport and probably some independent advisers. It would be desirable to appoint an independent person as special adviser to the Minister of Transport, who could also be chairman of the planning committee. At the same time, Macmillan there and then sketched quite a detailed plan of what form the BTC reorganisation would take. A Transport Council would act as trustees of the assets, but each undertaking would become a separate organisation, with an independent board. With regard to the railways, restrictions on their commercial freedom would be removed, and they would be divided into autonomous groups, although coordination would be entrusted to a central body which might be composed of the general managers of the autonomous groups (CAB 128/34). Although the Prime Minister considered that a financial reconstruction of the BTC would have to await further study, Macmillan’s in fact quite detailed vision of BTC reorganisation suggests that the independent planning committee was likely to have other political purposes than merely filling in policy details. It is also significant that although Macmillan’s March 1960 statement to the House of Commons, quoted above, referred to the need for a reduction in uneconomic rail services, at no time during this period was the matter discussed in Cabinet. Discussion of such a politically sensitive topic could be postponed until another day! Macmillan’s House of Commons statement nevertheless indicated that he had been recruited to the advocacy coalition in favour of a new policy ‘frame’ for the railways. As Lamb points out, Marples had been a great help to Macmillan as his Under-Secretary when Macmillan was Minister of Housing in the early days of Churchill’s 1951 government, enabling him to achieve a target of 300,000 houses a year (Lamb 1995:434). This personal debt placed Marples in a strong ministerial position to convert the Prime Minister to his views. Marples lost little time in recruiting the members of the advisory group, and on 6 April announced its membership to the Commons. The true political purpose of this group became evident when, contrary to Macmillan’s earlier Cabinet statement, the BTC was excluded from the group. When questioned about this by the Labour Transport spokesman, Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Marples gave the not very convincing reply that the government had decided the group should be small, and that neither the BTC nor the unions should be on it because the latter should be able to put their views in evidence without inhibitions (H.C.Debates 6 April 1960, cols. 394–5). In reality, both the BTC and
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the unions, for different motives, would decidedly not form part of the emerging advocacy coalition, and their presence on the group would not be welcomed. Instead, the group was dominated by four businessmen from the private sector. Appointed Chairman was Sir Ivan Stedeford, Chairman and Managing Director of Tube Investments Ltd. The other three were Frank Kearton, joint Managing Director of Courtaulds; Henry Benson, a partner in the chartered accountants, Cooper Bros; and Dr Richard Beeching, the Technical Director of Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI). The group was later completed by Matthew Stevenson, an Under-Secretary at the Treasury and, significantly, Dunnett’s appointee, David Serpell, from the Ministry of Transport. Reflecting Macmillan’s wishes, the Stedeford Committee was given the task of examining the structure, finance and working of the organisations at present controlled by the BTC, and to advise the Minister of Transport and the British Transport Commission as a matter of urgency how effect could best be given to the government’s intentions as indicated in the Prime Minister’s March statement. The day after Marples’ announcement, a leader in The Times asked the key question that, as the government had, rightly, taken the responsibility of setting a reorganisation plan, why did it not set out to decide the details too? (The Times 7 April 1960). In this context, to a certain extent, the Stedeford Committee fits the definition of an epistemic community as: a network of professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area. (Haas 1992:3) Opportunities to apply this knowledge are created through uncertainties amongst policy-makers when confronted with fresh problems which require novel solutions. Change comes about when policy-makers tap into the expertise within an epistemic community. Consequently, it could be argued that Ministers were tapping into the business expertise of the Stedeford Committee, but in fact there was too great an element of political expediency for the committee to be defined as an epistemic community in its purest form. Instead, it served an important function for the government by bypassing both the BTC and the unions, and legitimising a decision which to a large extent had been made already. The approval of leading businessmen would confirm the government’s actions in constructing a new policy ‘frame’ for the railways, and emphasise also the extent to which the current management was falling down on the job. In the event, the Stedeford Committee developed a dynamic of its own, and became deeply split. As Gourvish describes, the heart of the problems lay in the alternative approaches to the Committee’s remit adopted by Stedeford and Beeching. To some extent, however, the difficulties could also be attributed to the personalities of the two men. On the one side, Stedeford was keen to keep the
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Committee strictly within the remit of examining the details of BTC reorganisation. He was also sympathetic towards the BTC Chairman, Sir Brian Robertson. Consequently, he put forward a plan which proposed retention of a coordinating British Transport Council, but with an executive Central Railways Board and relatively autonomous Regional Railway Boards. Beeching, on the other hand, favoured merely an advisory central Transport Council, and a much stronger British Railways Board, with the regions very much subordinate to this authority (see Gourvish 1986:310–16). In reality, the differing views on reorganisation were only symptoms of far deeper differences between Stedeford and Beeching. Stedeford could be classed as one of the ‘great and the good’, who had earlier served on a Committee of Inquiry into the BBC, and had also recently retired as a member of the Atomic Energy Authority. As something of an ‘Establishment’ figure, he was keen to get the job done with the minimum of fuss and controversy, i.e. he wished to create a community of interests where all the chief actors could arrive at a consensus. In a sense, he epitomised the British policy style—construct a consensus and avoid policy imposition. Beeching, on the other hand, was much more the ‘outsider’ figure who was not prepared to play this game. From his perspective, the railway ‘problem’ was much more complex, and so the ‘solution’ required a fundamental appraisal of its services, investment strategy and finances. Consequently, he proposed to the Committee that its chief priority should be a consideration of the size and pattern of the railway system (Gourvish 1986:310), and began his own calculations on this subject for which he was later to become famous (or, as some would argue, infamous). Beeching’s distinctive ‘frame’, therefore precluded the construction of a policy consensus. In more normal times, and even as late as 1959, the government might have been expected to side with Stedeford, but 1960 was not a normal year for the railways, and change was in the air. The proceedings of the Stedeford Committee were not helped by one of its members, Kearton, usually siding with Stedeford, while the other business figure, Benson, tended to side with Beeching. When the time arrived for the Committee to present its conclusions to the Minister in October 1960, it was still hopelessly split, and so both the Stedeford and Beeching plans for reorganisation were put forward. Although great pressure was put on the government, the conclusions of the Stedeford Committee were never published. Henshaw comments that, according to available records, the conclusions were fairly innocuous and included the politically expedient recommendation that another body should be set up to consider the size and pattern of the railway system required to meet current and foreseeable needs (Henshaw 1994:128). For the government, however, the Committee’s split on reorganisation plans must have been a great political embarrassment, and would certainly account for their reluctance to publish. After all, the government had appointed the Committee specifically to sort out the details of reorganisation, but in this task it had signally failed. This would account for Marples’ remarks to the Cabinet in
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November 1960 that the government intended to resist any suggestion that the reports of Sir Ivan Stedeford’s Special Advisory Group (as it had become known) should be published. He added, somewhat cryptically: It would be easier to carry out this intention if it were emphasised that responsibility for policy in respect of nationalised transport lay with the government, and not with any other body, and that the proposals which were now being put forward were in fulfilment of the government’s responsibility. (CAB 128/34) In fact, as Marples knew, Stedeford had dumped the problem of reorganisation back in the lap of the government. In this official sense, therefore, the Stedeford Committee had been a failure, and confirmed the wisdom of Wedgwood Benn’s earlier question to the Minister that, if the government had already decided the form of organisation, then why could it not work out the policy details for itself? In another, and politically unexpected, sense, however, the Committee had proved to be a great success for the government. The ‘outsider’ Beeching, in ‘framing’ the railway problem in his own distinctive style, had not only moved the policy debate on, but had identified himself as a policy entrepreneur who would couple, at least intellectually, the three policy streams of problems, policies and politics, and so provide the vital link in the occupation of the ‘hollow core’. Building an advocacy coalition As the end of 1960 approached, events moved with gathering speed, but all confirmed the triumph of Beeching, and the new policy ‘frame’. In addition to the work of Beeching, a few months earlier the government had received support from an unexpected source. In July, the Select Committee on Nationalised Industries had published a report (SCNI 1960) on the railways which was highly critical of BTC management, particularly in its lack of expertise on implementation of the Modernisation Plan. Although the Committee was also critical of the government for its lack of supervision over the BTC, its report was another powerful weapon for Ministers seeking to discredit the BTC. It also indicated that the new policy ‘frame’ had been taken up by influential actors in an alternative arena, so providing another element in building an advocacy coalition for change (Gourvish suggests that the SCNI was heavily influenced by evidence given to it by officials such as Dunnett of the MoT and Stevenson of the Treasury (1986:301)). When the government produced its White Paper outlining the proposals for reorganisation of the nationalised transport industries (Cmnd. 1248, 1960), it largely (if not quite entirely) sided with the Stedeford Committee proposals put forward by Beeching. The BTC was to disappear, and be replaced by a merely
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advisory Nationalised Transport Advisory Council (in the event this body proved to be totally ineffective and was abolished by the 1968 Transport Act). Instead, each of the five main activities of the BTC’s undertakings would have its own separate board, vested with its own assets and responsible for its own capital debt. The five were: British Railways; the London Passenger Transport Board; British Transport Docks; the Inland Waterways Authority; and a Transport Holding Company for road haulage, buses and other activities. The government’s intention was that there should now be a soundly based and viable nationalised transport industry, which it considered was the only way efficient and economic services could be provided, and also secure jobs in the industry (Cmnd. 1248, para. 3). At the heart of the problem, however, was the serious financial plight of the railways, and in addition to modernisation the White Paper emphasised that there would have to be a streamlining of services (Cmnd. 1248, paras. 5–8). Macmillan had ensured that all references to actual closures were removed from the White Paper (Lamb 1995:435), but the emphasis on a viable railway indicated the direction policy would take. Indeed, in 1961 the government was to produce a White Paper on the nationalised industries as a whole, which set a target for all of them to be breaking even within five years (Cmnd. 1337, 1961). The British Railways Board (BRB) would be given the task of running the railways as an effective national system. The White Paper stated that the new Regional Boards would be autonomous in all matters of regional concern and would have the character of company boards (Cmnd. 1248, 1960, para. 25). Beeching, however, was to insist on holding greater authority in the BRB, and so the Regional Boards had much less authority than intended originally. The government also bowed to the inevitable, and £400 million of the railways’ accumulated losses, financed by the Exchequer, were written off. In addition, out of £1,200 million of capital debt, £800 million was to be placed in a suspense account, with the possibility that this money too would eventually be written off. Nevertheless, it was pointed out that the railways would still be borrowing large sums of money to pay for the Modernisation Plan (in January 1961 Marples renewed permission for work to continue on London-Manchester electrification), and so the government would review the financial progress of the railways year by year, with a special review at the end of five years, and so targets would be set (Cmnd. 1248, 1960, paras. 43–53). In return, all regulatory control over charging and other matters would finally be removed. After much hesitation and deliberation, therefore, the 1950s’ ‘solution’ of modernisation and investment was to continue, but now placed under much stricter official control. Nevertheless, it is an important reminder that at least a degree of policy succession is incorporated, even when new ‘solutions’ assume priority. Likewise, as we will see, important elements of Beeching’s plan survived his departure from BR. Almost simultaneously with publication of the White Paper, the government was acting to place Beeching at the head of the new railway organisation. The
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‘policy’ stream had been coupled with the ‘problem’ stream, but there remained the coupling of the ‘political’ stream. Just before Christmas, Marples met Macmillan and Lord Mills, the Paymaster General, who advised the Prime Minister on industrial matters. Marples told them that he intended to appoint Beeching as Chairman of the BTC at the then unprecedented public sector salary of £25,000 a year (as BTC Chairman, Robertson was earning only £10,000 a year), commensurate with his earnings at ICI. Mills expressed significant doubts about Beeching’s qualities, but was overruled by the Prime Minister (Lamb 1995: 433–4). Beeching therefore accepted the job, although at the slightly lower figure of £24,000 a year. He had a five-year contract from 31 May 1961, and would take over as Chairman of the BRB when the BTC was wound up. There was a predictable public and political furore about Beeching’s salary, and it says much about the government’s new found faith in Beeching’s ‘solution’ that Ministers were content to ride out the storm. In a sense, it could be said that the salary itself was part of the new policy ‘frame’ and ‘image’. A top businessman had been recruited who would bring the market disciplines of the private sector to an ailing nationalised industry. Consequently, it could not be expected that such high quality expertise would come cheap. From this perspective, Beeching’s appointment, although controversial, did give the railways a higher public profile as an industry with a ‘Star’ Chairman. In turn, the faith the government placed in Beeching tended to give greater political authority to his ‘solution’ for the railways. There was, of course, also a strong institutional element in this ‘punctuated equilibrium’. As outlined in the 1960 reorganisation White Paper, and eventually made statutory by the 1962 Transport Act, the BTC was abolished and with regard to the railways, its powers transferred to the new BRB. As Baumgartner and Jones argue, if the structures are changed, then dramatic changes in the mobilisation of bias may result (Baumgartner and Jones 1993:12). Beeching could therefore use the BRB as his power base, and mould it to his own policy ‘frame’. In the case of Beeching, we can see these punctuated equilibria in two senses. First, in the purely institutional sense, the BRB was a new organisation which could recruit outside personnel and evolve its own distinctive culture. Beeching took full advantage of this opportunity, and brought in many of his own choices from outside the railway industry. Inevitably, these outsiders were given a mixed reception by the established order. For example, Gerard Fiennes, BR’s Chief Operating Officer, described his response to one particular Beeching appointment: Dr Beeching had pressed Dr Russell Currie on us. Russell was a great gift to work study and to ICI, but he didn’t manage to teach railways to do it properly. (Fiennes 1967:31)
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This was an indicator that Beeching’s values could not necessarily be transplanted into the operational culture of the railwayperson. Nevertheless, although Beeching’s appointments enjoyed mixed success, at least the new Chairman could be reassured by having his own people in key positions. At Beeching’s insistence, the 1962 Transport Act dropped any impression the earlier White Paper had given about the significance of decentralisation, and the Chairman grasped the opportunity to build his own power base. Consequently, three key full-time board members were Leslie Williams from Shell, Philip Shirley from Unilever and Sir Stewart Mitchell, an official from the Ministry of Aviation (Gourvish 1986:326). It was also significant that Beeching recruited a new Public Relations Adviser from Shell. As Gourvish perceptively comments, for a man who was at first unnerved by the glare of publicity surrounding his job, Beeching quickly came to appreciate the value of good public relations and improved industrial relations (Gourvish 1986:336). The importance Beeching attached to public relations indicates a second facet of punctuated equilibria in this case, i.e. the ‘hollow core’ as a political vacuum, where no interest is able to gain supremacy. Beeching saw the importance of widening the commercial railway advocacy coalition beyond government into the public arena, and was anxious to hold the high ground in the politically salient debate which would inevitably accompany his policies. The ‘Reshaping of British Railways’ report: the policy ‘solution’ made manifest The whole period of Beeching’s Chairmanship, first of the BTC, then of the British Railways Board, revolved around the preparation, publication and implementation of the two-part report The Reshaping of British Railways (BRB 1963). Published in March 1963, this report attracted huge public interest at the time, and in the years since has acquired an almost legendary status as a document which starkly set out the policy ‘problem’ and offered a radical ‘solution’. Written largely by Beeching himself, its style undoubtedly reflects the dispassionate and rational personality of its author. Nevertheless, it is also a document of its time, and so demonstrates the political and economic climate in which it was written. Politically, there-fore, it is an excellent example of a distinctive policy ‘frame’ of reality, and how Beeching personally, at least for a period, was able to occupy the ‘hollow core’ which had previously existed in rail policy. Inextricably entwined with the content of the ‘Reshaping’ report is the popular public ‘image’ of Beeching as a large man, both physically and intellectually, who demonstrated little human emotion, and who harboured few doubts about the need to shut down as quickly as possible railway lines and stations which were not paying their way.
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His work on the finances of the railways also gave Beeching the popular image of the dry accountant, although in fact he was trained as a physicist, and had risen through the ranks of ICI to become Technical Director largely through his ability to solve complex engineering problems. Beeching therefore approached the problems of the railways with the eye of the scientist, rather than that of the business entrepreneur or commercial manager. In a sympathetic portrait of Beeching, Hardy, himself a railwayperson, gives a good explanation of why the Chairman, although in private quite human, in public lacked a certain warmth: The answer, I think is that he had a certain intellectual arrogance which prevented him, at times, from understanding why he was creating an immense furore, an Olympian touch perhaps, also a civilised and deeply veiled disdain for people in the abstract who could not understand. To convince the great majority, the thousands of railwaymen, never mind the public, that what he was doing was in their long-term interests required a more outward-going personality and more obvious drive. (Hardy 1989:52) Hardy acknowledges that this did not make Beeching an obvious ally of the politician, but that he formed a powerful alliance with the extrovert Marples because he realised that the astute Marples could get things done (Hardy 1989: 54). Hardy is nevertheless critical of Beeching for only having three professional railwaypersons on the original board of eight, and that he did not draw his general managers extensively and regularly into central policy-making, preferring to work through a small circle of tried and trusted people (Hardy 1989: 61). Adapting the ministerial model, therefore, Beeching was the epitome of the ‘celibate’ policy-maker, basically cutting himself off from outside influence. The passage of the 1962 Transport Act meant that the new BRB did not officially come into being until 1 January 1963. In reality, however, Beeching had been operating with a ‘shadow’ Railway Board since April 1962. As we noted earlier, the Regional Boards were much more tightly controlled from the centre than the old Area Boards, and reflected Beeching’s determination to keep a strong personal hold over strategic policy (see Gourvish 1986:341). From 1961, therefore, Beeching took charge of a series of traffic studies which were to form the basis of his plan. With an eye to softening up and moulding public opinion, towards the end of 1962 Beeching ‘trailed’ an outline of the Plan, but without its closure detail, and also set out his appraisal of the railway situation in a televised speech to the annual conference of the Institute of Directors (Allen 1966:19). Again we see that, although he lacked an extrovert public personality, the ‘celibate’ policy-maker Beeching understood the importance of at least attempting to persuade influential and general public opinion that his ‘frame’ was the correct one, i.e. he perceived the importance of seeking to influence the ‘empty chair’ of public opinion.
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Such an objective could also be attributed to one of the most idiosyncratic features of the 1963 Reshaping of British Railways report. This was that Part Two consisted entirely of a set of twelve maps. Each of these maps was designed to illustrate powerfully a particular aspect of Beeching’s argument. Consequently, the maps literally presented the Beeching policy ‘image’. For example, Map Number One depicted British Railways Density of Passenger Traffic over Britain as a whole. Thick black lines show the lines with over 200, 000 passengers per week, and these emanate from London like the tentacles of an octopus and connect with the chief cities and commuter routes such as Brighton and Reading. Where traffic was less dense, however, the lines become thinner, culminating in a dotted line for 0–5,000 passengers per week. These dotted lines criss-cross the map, forming a complex patchwork, and provide a vivid contrast with the relatively few thick black lines. To follow up this argument, Map Number Three illustrates British Railways Distribution of Passenger Traffic Station Receipts. Stations with receipts of £25, 000 per annum and over are signified with green dots, while those with receipts of only £0–5,000 per annum are shown as red dots. Here, the eye is hit by a rash of vivid red dots covering large parts of Britain. Suitably ‘softened up’ by these images, the reader is therefore prepared for Map Number Nine, which shows the large number of proposed line closures (around 5,000 route miles from a 1961 passenger total of around 13,700 route miles). On the other hand, Map Number Twelve shows routes covered by stage and express bus services. This time, apart from Northern Scotland, the whole of Britain is covered by a bewilderingly intricate network of lines (there is no attempt here to show differing densities with different colours —#8212;the whole map is a uniform black). The obvious policy ‘image’ is that people who lost their local train service should have no fears, for there was bound to be a bus service which could do the job just as well, and probably more efficiently and cheaply. This view betrays the ‘solution’ of both Beeching and the government that the bus operators would automatically fill the gaps left by the railways. In reality, by the 1960s the bus companies themselves were in financial decline, and were not in a good position to provide the policy resource favoured by Beeching, particularly in the rural areas. Only in the 1970s was a national system of bus subsidies put in place. Instead, it could be argued that ‘the spectre at the feast’, and the missing map, was the one which would have shown the increasing densities of vehicle ownership and the proposed network of motorways! Nevertheless, without reading a word of the report, the maps convey the policy ‘image’ desired by Beeching. The archetypal railwayperson Fiennes believed that Beeching had not many outward and visible signs of human frailty, but one was his love of maps and another his love of publishing them (Fiennes 1967: 101). An even more politically powerful policy ‘image’ than the publication of the maps, however, was Beeching’s decision to publish as an appendix to the report
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the full list of lines and stations due for closure as a result of his findings. In particular, the list of over 2,000 stations to be closed in England, Scotland and Wales, stretching for twenty pages, epitomises the ruthless logic which Beeching applied to the rail ‘problem’. This was the other side of the coin to Beeching’s ‘solution’, and conveyed starkly to Ministers and MPs the full political cost to be paid in the political stream for the commercial railway. Even the arch rationalist Beeching recognised the political limits of his plan, particularly in the case of suburban services. Here, he advocated greater coordination between rail and bus operators and the local authorities, with subsidies if necessary (an idea which was taken up later in the decade by the Labour government which set up a number of Passenger Transport Authorities in the largest conurbations outside London) (BRB 1963:20–3). Significantly in this context, Marples was him-self a Merseyside MP, and locally played a prominent part in coordinating the local authorities and the railways in order to prevent a suburban closure recommended by Beeching (Hardy 1989:76). Marples may have been a keen roads and commercial railway advocate, but he was not averse to adopting the ‘promiscuous’ ministerial style in order to ensure the even higher priority of being re-elected as an MP! We will see that, as the 1964 general election approached, Marples also adopted this role at the national level. Notwithstanding Beeching’s attitude to suburban services, there is an unvarnished simplicity about the maps and lists of closures which is sustained throughout the report, and gives it a distinctive symbolic niche in British political history. It is argued, correctly, that many of the solutions suggested by Beeching were not in themselves original, and had their origins in thinking within the BTC in the 1950s (e.g. Gourvish 1986:402). The Reshaping report, however, is undoubtedly a watershed in rail policy, not only for the radical closures proposals themselves, but also for the manner in which Beeching packaged these ideas in the form of the concept of the commercial railway. For example, as a first principle Beeching chose to consider what are the basic characteristics of railways, and under what circumstances these characteristics are likely to make railways the best available form of transport: Railways are distinguished by the provision and maintenance of a specialised route system for their own exclusive use. This gives rise to high fixed costs. On the other hand, the benefits which can be derived from possession of this high cost route system are very great. Firstly, it permits the running of high capacity trains, which themselves have very low movement costs per unit carried. Secondly, it permits dense flows of traffic and, provided the flows are dense, the fixed costs per unit moved are also low. Thirdly it permits safe, reliable, scheduled movements at high speed. (BRB 1963:4)
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Having established these basic principles, Beeching concluded that we should expect the provision of railways to be limited to routes over which it is possible to develop dense flows of traffic, with trainload quantities, and which benefit from the speed and reliability which the railways are capable of achieving. Consequently, the report was concerned entirely with showing, as quantitatively as possible, how far the existing system departed from this condition, and to decide what changes were necessary to put matters right (BRB 1963:5). For Beeching, therefore, solving the rail ‘problem’ was a matter of ensuring that trains operated to their commercial strengths, and jettisoned those parts which failed to fulfil these conditions. Having examined the figures, on the passenger side it was clear to Beeching that stopping-trains were by far the worst loss-maker, and often ran on routes which carried little traffic of any kind. On the other hand, fast and semi-fast services, provided with through trains, had much greater prospects of paying their way. On the freight side, wagon-load general merchandise was hopelessly unprofitable, while minerals and coal showed the best margins over direct cost (BRB 1963:7). Remarkably, the traffic surveys on which Beeching based his calculations were taken from only one week—that ending 23 April 1961, because the massive recording effort could not be sustained for a longer period. From these, he produced the apparently damning statistic that one-third of the route mileage carried only 1 per cent of the total passenger miles, and 1 per cent of the freight ton miles of BR (BRB 1963:10). Similarly, one-third of stations produced less than 1 per cent of total passenger receipts and half of the stations produced only 2 per cent (BRB 1963:11). On the freight side, Beeching recommended that the over 900 stations and depots should be reduced in number, and that BR should concentrate more on inter-city flows. In addition, BR should speedily develop the Liner Train concept, where large containers would be easily transferable between road and rail (BRB 1963:142). Beeching believed that, if his whole plan was implemented with vigour, then much (but not necessarily all) of BR’s deficit should be eliminated by 1970 (BRB 1963:60). A full analysis of the Reshaping report lies beyond the scope of this study. There is no doubt, however, that a wide range of criticisms can (and have been) directed at Beeching’s highly distinctive ‘framing’ of reality. For example, to base such radical conclusions on just one particular April week was no doubt too restrictive (see Henshaw 1994:148). Perhaps the most perceptive comment, however, is made by Pryke, who believes that Beeching was too preoccupied with those lines and activities on which the most spectacular losses were being incurred and, perhaps because he came from ICI which is extremely capital intensive, his principal aim was to improve the utilisation of equipment rather than to use manpower more productively (Pryke 1981:74). This point illustrates that, just as Beeching had a scientific rather than an entrepreneurial mind, so
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private companies develop their own particular functional cultures and values. For the government, it was not just a matter of buying a homogeneous expertise, but an individual policy ‘frame’ based on character and experience. As Hardy comments, the Reshaping report did not specify a need to examine working practices, or analyse how unit costs could be reduced (Hardy 1989:105). As we will see, some of the most significant early opposition to Beeching’s plans came from within BR itself, from managers who judged that some of the lossmaking lines could be made viable with a more flexible attitude towards reducing costs. The publication of the Reshaping report represented a high water mark for Beeching personally in his rail career. In the event, the ideas he initiated were to live on after his own demise from the BRB. After publication of the report, it is important to distinguish Beeching the individual from the implementation of his ‘solution’. With some significant modifications, the Beeching plan was largely executed, even by the Labour government which came to power in 1964. On the other hand, Beeching the individual was to become progressively uncoupled from the political stream, and eventually departed a disillusioned man. Even the close relationship with Marples became soured when it became clear that the Minister was somewhat more ‘promiscuous’ in his policy style than Beeching had hoped. Individuals such as Beeching may act as key agents of policy change, but their essentially ‘celibate’ style may not be conducive to a long life in the more flexible and dynamic political stream. Implementing the Beeching ‘solution’ while uncoupling Beeching the individual The initial media response to the Reshaping plan was generally sympathetic, reflecting the careful way in which Beeching had prepared the ground (Hardy 1989:83). Not surprisingly, the government was highly sensitive about the public reaction to such radical proposals, and confidential briefings were held with a number of national newspapers (Lamb 1995:438). The rail unions, although critical, were ultimately not prepared to launch a concerted campaign against the report. Beeching took care that the rail workers generally received either relatively generous redundancy terms or pay increases, and this effectively ensured their ultimate compliance. The ever active Marples was also concerned about the union attitude to closures, and so arranged a dinner between Beeching and the General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress, George Woodcock. As it turned out, Beeching and Woodcock got on well (see Lamb 1995:436). In the case of the unions, therefore, there was at least the hint of the formation of a policy community based on resource dependencies, if not shared core values. It could also be argued, however, that the unions did not possess the expertise to challenge Beeching’s deceptively simple ideas, i.e. they lacked a powerful epistemic community, around which a counter expertise could coalesce.
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One group which did at least attempt to challenge Beeching on his own ground was the National Council on Inland Transport (NCIT), founded in 1962. As Henshaw describes, this consortium of pro-rail groups employed the technical expertise of such figures as Professor Hondelink, an eminent transport economist and consultant, and Roger Calvert, who had previously been a senior railway manager. At a number of inquiries held into proposed line closures, the NCIT did quite effectively challenge BR’s figures, and on one occasion employed a QC to put its case (Henshaw 1994:157–63). The NCIT represented an emerging epistemic community, but lacked the resources to consistently challenge BR. In addition, like the RDA in the 1950s, it was unable to exploit the inquiry process as the environmental lobby was able to do in the case of highway inquiries in the 1970s (see Chapter 6). Consequently, the NCIT was unable itself to shift Beeching’s policy ‘frame’ of reality. The government had also made highly significant changes to inquiry procedures as a result of Section 56 of the 1962 Transport Act. The regional Transport Users Consultative Committees now only had the responsibility of assessing the degree of hardship caused by a closure, and how this could be dealt with, i.e. the TUCCs now had no say on the actual principle of closures. The Central Transport Consultative Council was effectively bypassed, and the final decision on closure and hardship was vested in the Minister. This clause had clearly been introduced into the Act with the aim of speeding up the closures in the wake of the expected rush of proposals after publication of the Reshaping report. By placing responsibility for sometimes politically sensitive closures overtly in the hands of the Minister, however, there was a real risk that the ‘promiscuous’ ministerial style, sensitive to electoral considerations, might gain ascendancy over the more ruthlessly ‘celibate’ style of decision making. At least to some extent, this was to occur in the case of Marples. Marples himself was clearly concerned about how the new inquiry procedures would be received, particularly with regard to the amount of information made available. This was a sore point with groups such as the NCIT, as BR was reluctant to give detailed explanations for closures when only hardship was being judged officially. Consequently, Marples invited the accountant, Sir William Carrington, to examine whether accounts should be provided to the Consultative Committees. As with the Stedeford Committee, Marples was largely employing expertise for a political purpose, and Carrington duly endorsed the new methods. The onus was truly on the government to direct the pace of the closures programme. Ministers, however, had placed themselves in something of a cleft stick over Beeching. On the one hand, having hired him at great expense to solve the railway ‘problem’, they had little choice but to accept his ‘solution’ and take the ‘doctor’s medicine’. On the other hand, the timescale for such a course of action was politically wrong. By the time the Reshaping report was published, a general election was at most nineteen months away, and so a string of unpopular closures might be in the pipeline when the voters went to the polls. The Prime Minister exhibited this concern at the time of Marples’ statement to the Commons
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giving the government’s reaction to the report. Macmillan, advised by the Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend, insisted that Marples should insert into his speech references to the fact that the Beeching Plan was only a first step towards an integrated plan for transport as a whole, and that it was intended to supplement it by the end of the year with further studies on the improvement of the roads and road transport services (Lamb 1995:439). Macmillan was clearly sensitive to the electoral consequences of the closures, while it could be said that his emphasis on road building was the ‘missing link’ in the presentation of the Reshaping report. The closures programme had been in abeyance while Beeching prepared his report, but from June 1963 it began again in earnest. Some cracks would appear in the advocacy coalition, but Marples was prepared to back Beeching, at least where the less contentious closures were concerned. Unlike the preparation of the Reshaping report, implementing the closures was left largely in the hands of the Regional Managers. This is a good example of the narrow perspective of Beeching, who applied himself singlemindedly to providing a rational ‘solution’ to the railway ‘problem’ (and on its initial presentation), but was reluctant to become involved in the messy business of its implementation. Gourvish calculates that Marples accepted, or part-accepted, 141 closure proposals, and rejected seven, between June 1963 and October 1964, when he left office. During this period, 1,436 miles of track were closed, with an estimated saving of £5,265,294 (it is interesting to note, however, that under Marples’ Labour successor, Tom Fraser, 819 miles of track were closed between October 1964 and December 1965. Although to some extent this reflects an inevitable time lag in implementing closures, it does illustrate that, despite Labour’s differences with Beeching, they were by no means averse to accepting his ‘solution’ (Gourvish 1986:642)). By the election year, 1964, there was nevertheless some divergence between the ‘promiscuous’ style of the Minister, Marples, and the still ‘celibate’ style of BR Chairman Beeching. It was not just a matter of Marples turning down a few closure proposals, but of delaying a final verdict on a range of controversial cases. Beeching became increasingly irritated by these delays, and in July BR released a list of thirty outstanding cases, of which seventeen had been awaiting a decision for six months or more (Gourvish 1986:443). Marples was still active in approving a relatively large number of closures, but the electoral cycle ensured that the very heart of the advocacy coalition, the close Beeching-Marples relationship, was significantly weakened. At bottom, Marples had a somewhat different policy ‘frame’. Apart from his ministerial perspective, he was basically a roads advocate, who saw the severe rationalisation of the railways as the natural complement to his ambitious plans for expanding the motorway network. Beeching, on the other hand, was more committed to the long-term future of the railways, and saw his ‘solution’ as a painful but necessary step along the way to a viable and successful railway. In this context, it could be said that, even at the height of the Beeching-Marples axis, there were differences in at least some secondary values. They shared a commitment to the core principle of the
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commercial railway, but had differing perspectives not only about the timing of its implementation, but also the importance of the railways in the transport network as a whole. There was also evidence within BR itself that, although Beeching’s ‘solution’ had gained a strong hold, it was not universally accepted. Complementing the Reshaping report, BR management prepared a study of The Development of the Major Railway Trunk Routes, published in 1965 (BRB 1965). As Gourvish points out, a change of emphasis can be detected from the Reshaping analysis, with more attention given to scaling down route costs to meet the traffic offered rather than opting for instant closures. This reflected the view of some senior BR managers that Beeching had placed too much emphasis on track costs (Gourvish 1986:424–5). Although it occurred just after the departure of Beeching from the railway scene, one BR man who publicly adopted a different ‘frame’ was Gerard Fiennes, General Manager of the Eastern Region. Fiennes’ actions illustrate that there were real limits to the extent Beeching was capable of building an advocacy coalition, even within the ranks of his own management. Here, the East Suffolk line was going through the closure procedures amidst much protest. Fiennes decided that, by adapting the line to basic railway standard, a loss could be turned into a profit. After lobbying by councillors and MPs, the Minister eventually agreed to reprieve the line (Fiennes 1967:144–7). Fiennes, therefore, was overtly challenging the policy ‘frame’ propounded by Beeching, and instead sought a more conciliatory approach. In doing so, at least at the local level, he was constructing a politically effective advocacy coalition very different to that envisaged by Beeching, where a wide range of interests had a real commitment to the long term survival of the line. In addition to Ministers and managers, another key factor in limiting Beeching’s personal influence was that his ‘frames’ to some extent ran against the grain of the political fashions and values of the time. Neither his advocacy of the market model, nor of public transport as the long-term ‘solution’ to the crisis in traffic congestion, held sway in the wider political agenda of the early 1960s. Although it would be too simplistic to say that the Reshaping report would have looked more in place in the Thatcherite 1980s (for example, neither Beeching nor Marples seriously contemplated denationalisation of the railways), Beeching’s faith in a commercial railway and the laws of the market was not a particularly fashionable view, even within the Conservative government of the early 1960s. For example, in 1962 Macmillan set up the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) designed to conduct joint planning of the economy between the government, the trade unions and the employers. The NEDC was seen as one means of halting Britain’s relative economic decline and, as Middlemas states, had its parentage in a mixture of memories of wartime tripartism and administration of the French Commissariat du Plan (see Middlemas 1983:1). In addition, the arch policy entrepreneur and opportunist Marples was himself not averse to seeking planned solutions generally sympathetic to the motor car
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where the situation appeared to demand it. In 1961 he commissioned Colin Buchanan from the planning inspectorate to examine the long-term development of roads and traffic in urban areas and their influence on the urban environment. Buchanan’s report on Traffic in Towns (Buchanan 1963), published eight months after Beeching’s Reshaping report, also attracted great public interest. Reflecting the values of the time, Buchanan adopted the policy ‘frame’ of the need to adapt the urban environment to the growth of motor traffic, but his emphasis on planning and design instigated a phase of large-scale planning as the ‘solution’ to the urban traffic ‘problem’. Ironically, as we have seen, Beeching himself recommended a more public transport orientated ‘solution’ to urban transport ‘problems’. It could be said that only in the late 1990s was the political debate on the urban transport ‘problem’ being resolved in favour of the Beeching rather than the Buchanan ‘solution’ (see Chapter 8). A further factor weakening Beeching was that, particularly through his relationship with Marples, he had become politically identified with the Conservative government. This was not a comfortable position to be in when Labour triumphed in the general election of October 1964. The departure of Marples, despite their value differences, left Beeching politically isolated and vulnerable. Even before Marples’ departure, some degree of the uncoupling of Beeching from the political stream had taken place, but now that process became more politically visible. For example, there was the matter of the Labour government’s close links with the trade unions. Although, as we have seen, the rail unions did not systematically obstruct the Beeching strategy, they saw the change of government as an opportunity to remove the BR Chairman from the scene. In policy terms, however, the Labour government made no concerted attempt to change the Beeching ‘solution’. Marples’ successor as Transport Minister, Tom Fraser, did place some restrictions on closure procedures, such as an ‘early sift’ which required the Board to submit closure proposals for ministerial vetting before they were published, and also for all closures to be submitted to the newly created Regional Economic Planning Councils and Boards. As we noted earlier, however, closures continued at a lively rate during Fraser’s period at the MoT. It was highly ironic, therefore, that Beeching’s chief differences with the Labour government should occur over a matter which reflected his sympathies for rail as a long-term policy ‘solution’! In 1964 the BRB had given evidence to the Geddes Committee on carriers’ licensing which argued that road haulage was not paying the true costs of using roads, and that a fairer system should be devised for equalising the costs of road and rail. This illustrated again that, at least on freight matters, Beeching was more prepared to be pro-rail than is suggested by his popular image. The Labour government took up the theme of this evidence, and in November 1964 invited Beeching to conduct a study on the future direction of inland transport policy as a whole. The choice of Beeching, however, caused great controversy within the Labour party and the unions with the result that the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, was compelled to insist that
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Beeching should be assisted by advisers. Beeching was not prepared to accept this restriction, and withdrew. As Hardy comments, it was perhaps the final irony that the influential leaders of the road transport unions feared Beeching would be too pro-rail in his conclusions! (Hardy 1989:98). Beeching resigned as BRB Chairman at the end of May 1965, with a year still to run of his five year contract, and returned to ICI. In addition to his differences with Labour, his willingness to take on the inland transport study provides another explanation for his premature departure. As an individual, he was more temperamentally suited to devising policy ‘solutions’ rather than actually implementing them. He took little direct part in the closures programme and, despite his emphasis on the importance of presentation, lacked the everyday political skills to build a long-term power base for himself. Significantly, Hardy, a former BR manager, refers to Beeching as acting in a consultancy role for BR (see Hardy 1989:98). As BTC and BRB Chairman, Beeching was of course much more than a consultant, but it is true that the dominant impression is of a man who immersed himself totally in the rail ‘problem’ and devised what he saw as a rational plan for its ‘solution’, but who had only a limited capacity to touch the people who worked in the industry. The ‘hollow core’ and the Beeching legacy The departure of Beeching did not end ‘the inexorable march of problems’ for rail. In particular, the deficits did not go away. As Reid and Allen argue, the Reshaping report had been looked upon as a blueprint for salvation, but hindsight suggests that even the complete implementation of the report would still have left the railways in a difficult financial position (Reid and Allen 1970: 123). Consequently, the overall BR deficit of £134 million in 1963, by 1967 had risen to £153 million, with no prospect that the railways would be viable by Beeching’s target date of 1970. Ironically, therefore, although the Labour government had seen the departure of Beeching, Ministers could not afford to jettison his ‘solution’. Particularly on freight policy, there was a good deal of continuity from Beeching. For example, Barbara Castle, the energetic and resourceful Minister of Transport 1965–8, gave a great deal of time and energy to implementing the Liner Train concept which Beeching had placed such faith in (see Castle 1984:226–31). In addition, although Barbara Castle herself was sympathetic to the rail interest, ‘Beeching’ line closures continued, some of them controversial. Thus Gourvish calculates that 505 route miles were closed under Castle from December 1965–April 1968 (compared with 1,436 for Marples, June 1963– October 1964 and 819 for Fraser, October 1964–December 1965) (Gourvish 1986:642). Consequently, by 1967 some 72 per cent of stations specified for closure by Beeching had closed, and 84 per cent of passenger services identified were withdrawn (Wistrich 1983:34).
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As we noted earlier, one further point of continuity was Beeching’s recommendation for greater coordination between BR and the local authorities in the largest urban areas, with at least the implicit assumption that a subsidy would be required. Castle adopted this proposal and set up Passenger Transport Authorities in four of the largest conurbations outside London. These were given the duty to provide a properly integrated and efficient system of public transport to meet the needs of that area. In the 1970s the PTAs were expanded to seven areas with, as Beeching suggested, BR acting as an agent for subsidised rail services operated by the PTAs. Consequently, Barbara Castle agreed to subsidise from public funds unremunerative rail services in both urban and rural areas which were considered to be socially necessary. As Thomson and Hunter comment, the services covered went well beyond the Reshaping report, amounting to virtually the whole passenger network outside the inter-city services, and not a few of the latter were also included. When combined with increased revenue, in 1969 BR reported an overall surplus for the first time since 1952 (Thomson and Hunter 1973:139). It could be said that, with these subsidies, a large element of political realism had been grafted on to the Beeching ‘solution’. Even a Labour Minister such as Barbara Castle had gone a long way down the line to implementing his closure proposals, but goodwill in the public arena could not be tested too far. The problem was that these subsidies tended to develop in an ad hoc manner, and acquired the ‘image’ of protecting rail from the more popular and efficient road transport. As Lamb perceptively observes, the issue of whether each family should have a measure of public transport available has never been resolved, and so the system of subsidies to bus and rail has developed in a haphazard manner (Lamb 1995:442). Beeching’s radical ideas occupied the ‘hollow core’ of rail policy, although he himself generally lacked the skills to construct networks and communities for their implementation. In this context, Beeching was an ideas entrepreneur rather than a policy entrepreneur. The ‘promiscuous’ Minister Marples was more skilful in creating the conditions in the political stream so that the Beeching ideas could be successfully transplanted, particularly through the institutional ‘punctuated equilibrium’ of abolishing the BTC and setting up the BRB. Ironically, however, once implementation of the report began, Beeching himself gradually became disillusioned and a rather politically isolated figure. Beeching the individual eventually departed the political stream, but his ideas continued to effectively occupy the ‘hollow core’. It could be said that the ideas survived because the sense of crisis surrounding rail, which had opened the ‘policy window’ in the first place, also persisted. A Labour government might not explicitly accept Beeching’s ideological concept of a commercial railway, but the ‘inexorable march of problems’ could be met with many of the ideas taken from the Beeching ‘solution’. The behaviour of Ministers such as Barbara Castle reminds us that the ‘promiscuous’ Minister does not have to share the core values of an advocacy coalition to adopt its policy ideas.
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Consequently, although Beeching and his ideas were not loved, either in the political or public arenas, they could be presented as a necessary price to be paid to save the railways financially and to accommodate the apparently inexorable growth in vehicle ownership and the development of the roads network. In the 1960s, the generally inward looking rail industry was unable to challenge these sometimes implicit assumptions in a politically effective way. Road and rail generally existed in separate policy networks, and the latter interests could not influence the former. On the other hand, developments within the roads community which had consolidated itself since the mid-1950s, had profound, if indirect, effects on rail policy. Consequently, a pro-road policy entrepreneur such as Marples could set the organisational framework in place which would radically reduce the size of the rail network. Events in rail demonstrate, therefore, that the development of ideas and networks within one arena can have profound effects on events in a complementary arena, even when the direct overlap of interests is relatively small. The dynamics of change here depend instead on spillover effects between networks. Events in roads encouraged the occupation of the ‘hollow core’ in rail even though Beeching himself was not an agent of the road lobby. In this context, the ideas of Beeching did not couple themselves with the political stream by chance, but were a component in a wider process of change. Paradoxically, the ‘celibate’ policy-maker Beeching possessed the necessary potential political stature to promote himself as the ‘champion of the railway’. Instead, in the manner of ‘policy as its own cause’ (Wildavsky 1979:62–85), the Beeching ‘solution’ eventually became another rail ‘problem’. The reduction of the network encouraged the political ‘image’ of rail as an industry in secular decline, and of Beeching as the hatchet man in chief. This was an ‘image’ which to some extent persisted into the 1990s, and complemented that of roads as the policy ‘solution’. Ironically, however, it could also be said that the 1960s proved to represent the zenith of the road lobby’s power. From the early 1970s, the lobby was progressively undermined by the work of an emerging environmental advocacy coalition (although we will see that there was at least an indirect rail influence in this process). Change was discontinuous, but in the mid-1990s the systematic work of an organised environmental advocacy coalition succeeded to the extent that roads themselves became widely perceived as the policy ‘problem’.
4 Roadbuilding as a policy idea and a weak advocacy coalition 1900–54
There are votes in roads The more traffic increases and thus the more the complete inadequacy of our present road system is disclosed, the more this statement will become painfully apparent. No doubt my predecessors had all this in mind when they brought forward their road programmes. As far back as 1954 it was the view of the then Minister of Transport that a £60 million payments ceiling on the road programme was essential even without any motor roads. In the end this programme was cut to £40 million and some motor roads were put in. It thus became quite inadequate. Our present ceiling of expenditure without Scotland (which is not now my responsibility) is about £35 million. (Memorandum to the Cabinet by the Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, 5 June 1957, CAB129/87) The making of a hegemonic policy community The above extract, written by Transport Minister Harold Watkinson in a confidential memorandum to the Cabinet, is an excellent illustration of policy at a watershed through a potent coupling of ideas, values and interests. Watkinson himself was a highly influential policy entrepreneur who, soon after arriving at the MoT in 1955, decided that roads and road traffic seemed to be the most urgent sector for his attention. For this Minister, the policy ‘solution’ was clear: Punch published a full-page cartoon about this time entitled ‘Road Race’, showing the Minister desperately unrolling the Macadam carpet in front of a bevy of snarling motor cars. This expressed my feelings with considerable accuracy. (Watkinson 1986:69) A national plan for road building had been set out by the Labour government immediately after the Second World War, but financial constraints, and lack of
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political will, meant that a decade later almost nothing of this plan had been implemented. The idea of road building as a policy ‘solution’ existed, but it was an idea in waiting, whose time had not yet come. There were road interests but no effective advocacy coalition, let alone a policy community, to coalesce around the idea and shift it into the core policy arena. There is no doubt that the formation of an enormously powerful hegemonic roads policy community in the mid- to late 1950s can be at least partly attributed to the ‘inexorable march of problems’ (Kingdon 1995: 94–6) in the form of the growth of motor traffic. In 1945 the vehicles in use in Britain totalled 2.5 million, but by 1958 this number had more than trebled to almost 8 million (Plowden 1973:482). Ministers could not afford to ignore the evidence of increasing congestion and consequent discontent on the part of the motorist, with the inevitability that things could only get worse if nothing was done. At the same time, this powerful exogenous factor does not properly explain the rapid speed with which the roads programme gathered momentum in the late 1950s, and the equally rapid development of a dominant roads policy community. Road building could have proceeded in an incremental fashion, while other policy ‘solutions’, such as the development of public transport, or rationing of road space by price, also gained currency. Instead, the massive dominance of road building brings us to a crucial point in tracing the dynamics of the birth of a powerful policy community, i.e. although resource dependencies may be a sufficient condition for the formation and maintenance of a policy community, it does not explain its political hegemony. Consequently, resource dependencies may hold a community together, but it is the powerful policy idea, based on a common ‘frame’, which produces the hegemonic community. Communities need, therefore, to rest on a firm foundation of common ideas and values if true dominance within a sector is to be attained. Prior to the mid-1950s, the road lobby was fragmented, and consisted of epistemic communities of civil engineers, together with a variety of motoring and lobbying organisations. This fragmented structure highlights a key puzzle in that the various elements of the road lobby may have basically shared core values, but for many years it could not be said that they constituted an effective advocacy coalition, i.e. an aggregation of actors composed of people from various governmental and private organisations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs and who often act in concert (Sabatier 1993:18). Until the mid-1950s, the road lobby may have shared some normative and causal beliefs, but they did not bring about policy change. A key element in our analysis of the dynamics of policy change, therefore, is to understand how an advocacy coalition may become an operational reality, and how that advocacy coalition may in turn be transformed into a hegemonic policy community.
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Ministers as policy and ideas entrepreneurs In the case of the road lobby, the principal agents of change appeared to be ‘promiscuous’ and ‘celibate’ Ministers acting as policy (and ideas) entrepreneurs. In fulfilling this role, it was not so much that successive Transport Ministers necessarily set out deliberately to act as unofficial leaders of advocacy coalitions (although they were not averse to occupying this position), but that they acted as a focus for ideas around which an advocacy coalition could form. Thus the image of Watkinson unrolling the macadam carpet expresses not only his executive function as the chief road builder, but also his symbolic position as the political embodiment of roads as the policy ‘solution’. In turn, the Minister was in a unique position to construct an organisational structure which could eventually form a powerful policy community. In this respect, it should be borne in mind that a hegemonic policy community may not be restricted to one central policy-making arena. In the case of roads, the community also included all the implementation arenas. Consequently, the MoT’s executive responsibility for building the trunk roads, (which it had actually held since 1936) meant that as the trunk roads programme achieved exponential growth, so this activity came to dominate the MoT organisationally. In the middle to late 1950s, successive Ministers took a personal interest in not only developing the knowledge and expertise of the epistemic community of highway engineers, but also in ensuring that road building became the dominant policy ‘frame’ within the MoT generally. The Minister therefore has the authority and means to transform a collection of lobbying groups into an effective advocacy coalition. Thus, Ministers can play a key role in forming alliances with a range of actors and groups in order to bring about policy change. On the other hand, Ministers are also free to participate in a range of alliances— #8212;hence our use of the term ‘ministerial promiscuity’. For example, John Boyd-Carpenter, Transport Minister, 1954–5, played a significant role in instigating the road building programme, but at the same time he refused to allow motor taxes to be hypothecated for roads expenditure, a cause long dear to the road lobby’s heart. Instead, he allied himself with the Treasury in maintaining the status quo that motor taxes should be made available for public expenditure generally. There is also the functional point that Ministers must give attention to a range of problems and policy areas, and cannot only focus their attention on one subject, such as roads (Dudley 1994). Consequently, a Transport Minister in the 1950s had also to give attention to a wide range of nationalised transport industries within the British Transport Commission, including the railways, road haulage and London Transport. Crucially, however, at a vital moment in the policy change process Ministers may become entirely ‘celibate’ for a period, isolating themselves from other actors in order to construct a radical policy ‘reframing’. As we will see in the next chapter, a particularly good example of this occurred when Watkinson
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became impatient with the various lobby groups and also the officials within his Department, and withdrew in order to devise his own future strategy for roads. The outcome provided the trunk roads blueprint for the next decade. The mobility of Ministers (in the sense of being able to move between sets of actors or to ignore all of them) therefore provides a key potential explanation in the dynamics of major policy change. Notwithstanding the vital entrepreneurial role played by Ministers in bringing about radical policy change, however, it is important to bear in mind the conditions under which these essentially endogenous processes take place. In particular, the role of Ministers not only in forming advocacy coalitions, but also in coupling formerly separate policy streams is important. The essence of Kingdon’s policy streams model is that problems, policies and politics are coupled at crucial times to bring about policy change (Kingdon 1995:19). It is important to understand, however, that the process may also include a coupling and hence a ‘mutating’ of policy ideas themselves. For example, Sabatier lists a typology of values which holds an advocacy coalition together. These include basic deep core beliefs, such as the relative valuation of individual freedom versus social equality; second order policy core beliefs, which represent a coalition’s basic normative commitments, and are somewhat less rigid than deep core beliefs; and third order secondary aspects, which are more easily adjusted in the light of new data, experience, or changing strategic considerations (Sabatier 1998:103–4). In the formation of advocacy coalitions, it should not necessarily be assumed that policy core beliefs will be ‘nested’ in deep core beliefs. The two sets of ideas may be initially discontinuous, and coupled together by a politically skilful entrepreneur. It could be said that this was the case with roads, and that a key factor in understanding the rapid growth of a hegemonic roads policy occurred when the core belief of road building as the transport ‘solution’ per se was successfully coupled with the deep core belief in popular consumerism. Thus road building as a policy idea had existed for many years, but in order to achieve exponential growth it needed to be rooted (at least apparently) in a wider meta-policy idea. By the middle 1950s, Britain was emerging from the shortages and rationing of the immediate post-war world into a period of greater economic prosperity and a more plentiful supply of consumer goods. This culminated in the slogan popularly attributed to Prime Minister Harold Macmillan at the 1959 general election (although never actually said by him in that form) of ‘you neverhad it so good’. To an opportunistic ‘promiscuous’ Transport Minister, implementation of the long-standing plans for a motorway network offered an ideal way of expressing this commitment to popular consumerism. For example, when Transport Minister John Boyd-Carpenter announced the government’s commitment to an expanded road building programme in 1955, the question of whether the new motorways might be tolled was left open. Boyd-Carpenter however, was determined that the motorways should be free at the point of use. In particular, he perceived that, politically, the motorways would act as potent
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symbols of the Conservative government’s commitment to the modernisation of Britain. This image would be diluted if these roads were restricted to only those able to pay to use them. Instead, if the roads were free at the point of use to the ever expanding army of vehicle owners, then the correct message would be conveyed of a government prepared to service the needs of a consumer boom (interview 28 June 1995). Boyd-Carpenter’s successor as Transport Minister, Harold Watkinson, also understood the importance of building the motorways for the project of ‘you never had it so good’, and took a close executive interest in the construction of the first section of the M1 between London and Birmingham. The Transport Minister 1959–64, Ernest Marples, was even more of a zealot for the virtues of road building than his two predecessors. Combined with a great gift for publicity and self-promotion, Marples became personally identified with the rapid expansion of the motorway network and the consolidation of the hegemonic roads policy community. Ministers, therefore, were not only crucial agents in the formation of a roads advocacy coalition, and its transformation into a hegemonic policy community, but also in coupling policy core beliefs in transport to deep core beliefs in a wider political community. In doing so, they were assisted by the road lobby’s growing awareness, which mirrored that of Ministers such as Boyd-Carpenter, that the cause of road building had to be popularised if it was to successfully capture the public imagination. Here, one further important turning point was the formation of the Roads Campaign Council (RCC) in 1955. The RCC was specifically given the responsibility of carrying the campaign for roads into the new venue of the public arena, rather than just concentrating pressure on the central arenas of Whitehall and Westminster. It was therefore adopting the ‘empty chair’ principle of influencing Ministers through the indirect means of organising and harnessing popular opinion (Dudley 1994). Thus the RCC assisted in fulfilling the Ministers’ aim of projecting the policy image of road building as an instrument of popular consumerism. Chapter 5 will examine the dynamics via which road building became the overwhelmingly dominant policy idea within the MoT between 1955 and 1959, particularly in the context of the vital role played by successive Ministers in transplanting this idea and finding the means to sustain it. Prior to this, however, we will examine briefly the relative lack of success of the road building lobby during the first half of the twentieth century. In order to understand the rapid speed with which the hegemonic roads policy community was formed during the second half of the 1950s, it is important to appreciate the factors which led to the failure of the road lobby in the earlier years of the century. The road lobby and policy failure 1900–39 The plight of the road lobby until the mid-1950s was summed up well in 1949 by W.Rees Jeffreys, a life-long and fanatical roads lobbyist, whose single-minded
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devotion to this cause brought him into frequent collision with the authorities (Plowden 1973:19). This devotion included, from 1901, being Secretary, and then Chairman, of the Roads Improvement Association (RIA), a leading lobbying group. Looking to the future, but also with a hint of despair about past events, Rees Jeffreys complained that: Scepticism exists as to how far finance will be provided for the new motorways. The last word is still with the Treasury. In the struggle for such capital funds as are available for transport, are the Railway Executive or the Road Authorities likely to prevail? Hitherto (1920–48) the Railways have won easily. Road programmes have been largely paper programmes, but the railways raised many millions of capital for railway development, while road interests cried out to the Treasury in vain. (Rees Jeffreys 1949:271) Rees Jeffreys’ lament sums up the road lobby’s frustration at what it perceived to be the government’s preferential treatment of the railways, and the refusal of the Treasury to release funds raised from motoring taxes for building roads. The deficit between aspiration and achievement had begun early in the century for the road lobby, with the total failure of an officially constituted Road Board. In 1905 the government, concerned about the safety problems presented by the growing number of motor vehicles, appointed a Royal Commission to investigate, amongst other things, whether motorists should in some way be required to pay for the alleged injury done to roads by motor vehicles and, if so, how the money raised should be applied. Acting on evidence from the Automobile Club, the Commission concluded in their 1906 report that dust from the roads was a great hazard, and that the only answer was dustless roads. Consequently they recommended that motor taxation revenue should be devoted to road improvement (Plowden 1973: 58–62). Echoing the conclusions which were to be drawn half a century later, therefore, road improvement had been identified as the principal policy ‘solution’ to the motoring ‘problem’. In particular, the Commission recommended that money raised from motor taxation should go to a central department, which should make grants to local authorities, not for mere repairs, but for improvements aimed at producing better and less dusty surfaces (Plowden 1973:62). The government did not act immediately on the Royal Commission’s conclusions, but in his 1909 budget Chancellor of the Exchequer David Lloyd George announced that all the proceeds of the new petrol tax and a graduated vehicle tax were to be spent on the roads. Following on from this decision, in 1910 a Road Board was set up not only to distribute road fund revenues to the local authorities for road maintenance and improvements (significantly central government had no direct control of roads) but also to build new roads itself. Ostensibly, the creation of the Road Fund and the Road Board represented a great political triumph for the road lobby. A consensus had emerged that road
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improvement and construction represented the policy ‘solution’ to the motoring ‘problem’ and, against opposition from the Treasury, the key principle was established that the revenues from motoring taxation should be hypothecated directly to expenditure on roads. In the event, however, this was to prove a pyrrhic victory for the road lobby. Between 1909 and 1920, when the Road Board was wound up, the motoring community paid just over £23 million, only £7 million of which was actually spent on the roads. Improvements were made in reducing the dust problem, but only two important schemes of arterial road construction were initiated by the Board, neither of which were finished during the Board’s tenure of office. Crucially, the Board could not spend any money without Treasury approval, which was only grudgingly forthcoming. At the same time, the Board exhibited little political commitment to the cause of road building. Indeed, the Chairman was a prominent railway magnate! (Dyos and Aldcroft 1974:394–5). The road lobby might have persuaded the government to introduce an important policy change, but membership of an advocacy coalition did not extend deep into the official and ministerial ranks of government, and so policy implementation was frustrated. Rees Jeffreys was appointed Secretary of the Road Board in 1910, and in addition to lack of commitment from the membership and Treasury control, significantly he attributed the Road Board’s failure to its inability to instruct and interest the local authorities, road users, the press and the general public in its activities. In 1918, therefore, Rees Jeffreys resigned his post as Secretary in order to campaign for roads as a free agent (Rees Jeffreys 1949:76–82). When the Road Board was wound up in 1920, its powers were transferred to the newly created Ministry of Transport. The Minister of Transport could utilise the Road Fund for improving or constructing roads either directly or by way of grants to local authorities. During the 1920s a number of major schemes of trunk road improvements and reconstruction were instituted, but these largely came to a halt with the financial crises of the early 1930s (Dyos and Aldcroft 1974:395–6). The Ministry of Transport had been set up with the intention of improving coordination between road and rail. In particular, it was intended that the largely ailing railway companies would be nationalised. In the event, however, the railway companies were rationalised into four companies in 1923, but remained in the private sector. As the roads were still controlled by the local authorities, the infant Ministry was left without any significant strategic role and with little political status. (In 1928 the Roads Department disappeared and was integrated with the rest of the Ministry (Charlesworth 1984:5).) Its position was further undermined in 1926 when Chancellor of the Exchequer Winston Churchill raided the Road Fund for general expenditure, and repeated the exercise a year later (Hamer 1987:31). The most significant milestone for road interests in the pre-war years, however, was achieved as a result of the 1936 Trunk Roads Act. From 1937 the MoT took direct control over some 4,500 miles of the most important national
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through routes, which were now legally defined as ‘Trunk Roads’. The MoT was reorganised in 1937 on ‘Divisional’ lines; and the old Roads Department was split into four Divisions of which one dealt exclusively with trunk roads (CPRE 1992:16). The MoT had now at last found a role for itself in taking executive responsibility for the trunk roads. Implicit in these responsibilities was also the inference that the MoT should assume responsibility for a national roads strategy. Consequently, by 1939 the MoT had published over 200 ‘line orders’ (indicating MoT approval for a route had been obtained) only to discover that the cost, at over £190 million, of the approval programme represented over fifty years’ expenditure at current levels (CPRE 1992:17). Once again, this disparity between aspiration and reality demonstrated the financial and political problems inherent in implementing the roads ‘solution’. These weaknesses were exacerbated when, from 1937, the Road Fund finally lost its independence. Henceforth, it would submit annual estimates, like any department, and would receive its income from annual votes (Plowden 1973:302). The principle of hypothecation, so crucial to the road lobby’s plans, had in effect been abolished, and roads expenditure would now be entirely dependent on the political will of government and the generosity of the Treasury. Notwithstanding its success in persuading the government to introduce the 1936 Trunk Roads Act, the road lobby generally continued to have a largely arm’s-length relationship with the MoT. This was illustrated in the case of the 1937 ‘German Roads Delegation’. This was organised by the British Road Federation (BRF) an umbrella group founded in 1932 to campaign for more road building and to provide a forum for the road lobby (Hamer 1987:9). The German Delegation consisted of some 225 MPs, County Surveyors and County Roads Chairmen who were treated by the BRF to an expenses-paid tour of the German autobahns. The BRF had hoped to include a number of Ministry staff too, but this was vetoed by the Minister (CPRE 1992:18). The road lobby may have lacked MoT support for this delegation, but the sight of the extensive system of autobahns opened the eyes of the epistemic community of highway engineers and surveyors, and galvanised them into action. This was an example, therefore, of how technical experts are susceptible to processes of transnational learning, with consequent political effects. After the visit, the County Surveyors’ Society (CSS) passed a resolution in favour of the construction of a motorway system instead of the Ministry’s plans to upgrade the existing trunk roads, and in May 1938 they published a plan for a 1,000 mile network which was destined to form the basis of the motorways later built (CPRE 1992:18). (In 1936 the Institution of Highway Engineers had devised a more ambitious plan for a network of 2,826 miles, but at this time the concept of a motorway network was totally rejected by the Minister of Transport, HoreBelisha (Charlesworth 1984:13).) Representatives from the German Roads Delegation did meet the Minister of Transport in 1938, to press their case for motorways. Officials, however, advised the Minister to keep an ‘open mind’ and warned of the danger of diverting traffic
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from rail to road because if the railways lost money they would have to be subsidised. Nevertheless, after visiting Germany in 1938 the Minister, Leslie Burgin, did have some sympathy for the plan, and proposed to the Cabinet a scheme submitted by Lancashire County Council for a north—south motorway (as we will see, Lancashire continued to be strong motorway advocates into the 1950s). The political status of the motorways programme, however, was perhaps best summed up by the Surveyors’ plan being first published by the magazine Tit-Bits, a publication best known for the photographs of scantily clad females strewn across its pages (Hamer 1987:43–4). An idea in waiting 1945–54 Although the Second World War inevitably placed in abeyance any firm government commitment to a motorway network, the strains which the war effort placed on the transport system had the effect of opening up the minds of officials to the potential advantages of a motorway network. Thus an MoT official, in a 1942 memorandum, speculated that: The possibility of increasing the loading gauge of the railway to any material extent is all but impossible. The construction of systems of motorways would not be hindered by any limitations as to clearances and this would enable large loads to be moved from one part of the country to another with the minimum of trouble. A means of communication such as this during the present war would have been invaluable. (MT 39/657) This official suggested a network of about 735 miles, which could be built at a total cost of £58,800,000 (MT 39/657). The government was beginning to accept the need for motorways, but was still reluctant to identify itself politically with the road lobby. In 1943 a highly significant meeting took place at which the various factions of the road lobby united behind the County Surveyors’ Society (CSS) plan for a 1,000 mile motorway network. The meeting included representatives from the BRF, the CSS, the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT), the Royal Automobile Club (RAC) (represented on this occasion by Rees Jeffreys who characteristically pressed for a commitment to a larger network), the Institution of Highway Engineers, the Institution of Municipal and County Engineers and the Royal Institute of British Architects (Hamer 1987:37). The new consensus between the various elements of the epistemic community of road builders and key lobbying groups suggested that the road lobby was sowing the seeds of a more united advocacy coalition. On the other hand, when the BRF held a ‘motorways for Great Britain’ exhibition in London in December 1943, the Minister was advised not to attend because of the lack of a definite Ministry view on the subject (CPRE 1992:19). In 1944, however, the Chief Engineer of the
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Ministry of War Transport, A.J.Lyddon, recommended a national motorway plan, and survey work was begun on priority routes (Drake et al. 1969:43). With the end of the war, the new Labour government finally committed itself to a large-scale road construction plan. For Labour, building roads chimed in well with its larger strategy of industrial regeneration, particularly in the more depressed regions, and the County Surveyors’ plan offered a ready-made policy ‘solution’. (Building roads to assist regional development illustrated how the ideas underpinning road building were expanding, but in the 1940s this idea in itself was not sufficient to provide the impetus for policy implementation.) In May 1946, Transport Minister Alfred Barnes announced to the House of Commons a road plan which was intended to set the strategy for the following decade. The benefits listed by the Minister which this new system would bring included assisting the development areas, particularly better access to ports and markets; improved communications; the rehabilitation and improvements of town and countryside; the redevelopment of devastated areas; improved access from home to work; a reduction in traffic congestion; and to promote the efficiency of agriculture (H.C.Debates 6 May 1946, col. 590). A Times leader made the significant point that one omission by the Minister was for new roads to cater for the probable increase in pleasure traffic. By the mid-1950s, Ministers were much more aware of the political value of new roads in satisfying the needs of a consumer society, but in the austere early post-war days this connection was much less clear. Hence there was an important link missing in the mutation of effective policy ideas (The Times 7 May 1946). Barnes emphasised that the programme would be spread over ten years. In the first two years, there would be a concentration on arrears of maintenance. In years three to five, maintenance arrears would be completed together with activity in the elimination of ‘black spots’. During this period, new roads would include a limited number of motor roads (the then word for motorways) for the development areas. In the final five years, there would be a comprehensive reconstruction of the principal national routes. Many of these would be motor roads, and the Minister would exhibit the government’s plans for these roads in the members’ tea room. No estimates were given of the final cost of this ambitious plan, but in the first year it was intended that the expenditure would be anything up to £80 million (H.C.Debates 6 May 1946, cols. 591–3). The policy idea for a motorway network had graduated, therefore, from TitBits to the somewhat loftier heights of the Commons’ tea room. The tea room plan followed an ‘hour glass’-shaped network of motorways of roughly 800 miles in total length (Starkie 1982:2). This was somewhat shorter than the CSS plan, but retained its chief features. In the event, however, the government was compelled to abandon any plans for major road development. This was partly through exogenous circumstances. From 1947 the exhaustion of post-war credits led to an urgent need to increase exports substantially, and with skilled labour, coal, steel and other materials in short supply, capital investment was cut back. This was done selectively, so that
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although many of the ‘new towns’ schemes continued, the roads element in the de facto national plan collapsed. Consequently, expenditure on new and improved roads, instead of outpacing that of the pre-war period, continued to languish at levels barely a quarter of those reached in the late 1930s (Starkie 1982:2–3). There were also more endogenous factors at work in the frustration of the road lobby’s hopes. Notwithstanding the MoT’s executive responsibility for trunk roads, other sectors held the chief attention of Ministers. In particular, the plans for an integrated British Transport Commission (BTC) involved the nationalisation of the railways together with sections of the bus and road haulage industries. The immense problems of the rail industry, as we saw in Chapter 2, remained matters of enormous political salience throughout the 1940s and 1950s. Eventually, the financial and commercial decline in the railway’s fortunes would assist in the process of the motorway plan becoming the policy ‘solution’ to the transport ‘problem’, but in the 1940s it was the massive (and eventually unworkable) BTC which held the hopes of Ministers. There was also the question of the Minister himself. In a government full of powerful personalities such as Prime Minister Clement Attlee, Herbert Morrison, Ernest Bevin, Aneurin Bevan, Sir Stafford Cripps and Hugh Dalton, Alfred Barnes cut rather an anonymous figure as Transport Minister, and left little lasting impact as a figure of political substance. The fate of Barnes is a reminder that, regardless of whether a Minister adopts a ‘promiscuous’ or ‘celibate’ style, he or she needs also to have, or acquire, political authority and credibility within the government as a whole. In the case of traditionally less politically salient departments such as Transport, a flair for publicity and self-promotion can also be of considerable assistance. Barnes lacked these qualities, with the result that capital expenditure such as the roads programme represented a politically soft option for cuts. In addition to publication of the tea room plan, the road lobby did enjoy one other notable success in the 1940s in the form of the 1949 Special Roads Act. This allowed for motorways to be built by restricting their use to motor vehicles. The BRF was influential in lobbying the Minister in this instance (CPRE 1992: 19), but the lobby remained totally ineffective in weaning a financial commitment from the government to actually begin constructing new roads. Nevertheless, Rees Jeffreys took some heart at this time that the state itself, being the largest single owner of road transport, through nationalisation of sections of the road haulage and bus industries, would have a direct interest in securing road facilities for the economic working of that transport. He also believed that railway nationalisation would, paradoxically, reduce the influence of rail in Parliament, as the railway directors and shareholders would disappear (Rees Jeffreys 1949:272). The political status of the motorways in the 1940s can be gauged by the fate of the official put in charge of a new motorways section within the MoT after the announcement of the tea room plan. In 1947 he was moved to become the
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Divisional Road Engineer in Wales (in the 1950s this same official, J.F.Baker, returned as Chief Engineer, and was a major actor in the early development of motorways) (Charlesworth 1984:25). The reluctance of the government to spend money on roads was an act of enormous frustration to the road lobby. The BRF in particular sought to influence the government and public opinion generally with a whole series of films, exhibitions and publications. By 1950 the BRF had 104 national trade organisations as members, but in policy terms it amounted to very little. The almost total failure of the road lobby to influence either public opinion or the government was acknowledged at this time by Gresham Cooke, Director of the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders: The public have shown surprisingly little interest in these conditions, hardly being conscious that their own frustrations could be relieved by something that was man made. The British public seem to accept our system of roads as if it was an Act of God, immutable, unchangeable. By this time we might have had a system of motorways up and down the country besides the road system as a whole greatly improved. The lack of interest in this subject by the public allows the government this year to collect £230 million in taxation from motor users and to spend only £27 million on the roads, another £20 million being found by the ratepayers. (BRF Bulletin, September 1950) As Finer commented, writing in the late 1950s, organisations with a special interest in roads form a vast complex of great social and industrial importance. Yet, for all this, the sums spent on roads since 1945 had been by any standard quite negligible (Finer 1958:470). To illustrate his argument, Finer listed several prominent sections of the road lobby including the road haulage interests represented in particular by the Road Haulage Association (RHA); road passenger transport organisations representing the bus operators; motorists’ associations such as the Automobile Association (AA) and the Royal Automobile Club (RAC); and suppliers’ groups represented in particular by the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) and the Motor Agents’ Association (MAA) (Finer 1958:48–51). The road lobby may have united behind a plan for a 1,000 mile motorway network, but the ideas and values expressed by this apparently economically powerful advocacy coalition were not echoed at the centre of government. It was not only a matter of economic restrictions, but also that key Ministers and officials failed to see problems and their solutions through the same policy ‘frame’ as the road lobby. Thus in 1953 the Permanent Secretary at the MoT, Sir Gilmour Jenkins, told a Commons’ Select Committee that he personally was not in favour of a system of roads on the lines of the German Autobahnen although he did think that there was a considerable amount of major improvement work, such as building bypasses, the improvements of bridges and a new Severn bridge, which would improve the flow of traffic (quoted in Charlesworth 1984:34).
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Even in 1953, therefore, seven years after the publication of the tea room plan, there was little indication that motorways as a policy ‘solution’ had penetrated into the core of the MoT. Right at the end of the year, however, there was at last some suggestion that road building was winning the key support of Transport Ministers, and that the momentous political journey from incomplete advocacy coalition to hegemonic policy community was finally beginning. In the next chapter we will describe and analyse the dynamics of this ‘third order’ policy change process.
5 Ministers and motorways The making of a hegemonic policy community 1954–9
Though Britain was late into the motorway age, the men from the Ministry pulled their fingers out when the M1 London to Leeds motorway was finally approved in 1956. Progress was as speedy as a Bentley Continental. A mile of concrete roadway was completed every eight days, a concrete bridge (to the design of the M1’s chief engineer, Sir Owen Williams of Wembley Stadium fame) every three. The M1 was completed on time and more or less on budget at a cost of £28.5 million. Two days before the official opening, Stirling Moss, the grand prix and Mille Miglia legend, led a va-vavroooooom parade up and down the new road as some of the 5,000 £17—and £19-a-week workers, who had cleared 20 million tonnes of earth and stone over the past 584 days, stood on the side and cheered in their £2.15s.9d donkey jackets. Ernest Marples was said to be appalled at the speed and noise. (Jonathan Glancey, the Guardian, commemorating the fortieth anniversary of the opening of the first section of the M1, 19 October 1999) Completing the advocacy coalition 1954–5 Starkie argues that secular economic and social trends, which on the whole were of a fairly smooth nature, do not by themselves explain one important feature of post-war road and traffic policies, namely the tendency towards distinct, quite sudden but infrequent change. However, by combining the forces of circumstance with the role of pressure groups, we are able to explain more easily such marked changes in policy. In these circumstances, alteration to policies is unlikely to be brought about by gradual modification. On the contrary, the tendency is for a firm change of policy to take place only when a sufficient head of steam has been produced by lobbyists capitalising upon favourable pressures from economic, social and intellectual forces (Starkie 1982:152–3). This interpretation suggests an image of radical policy change being akin to a great weight of water bursting through a dam and flooding a valley. Thus the tea
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room plan had been around for many years, the road lobby had applied consistent pressure on government, and so, in the light of this pressure, and the ever-growing numbers of vehicles on the road, the government finally gave way and started building roads. This explanation, however, gives insufficient attention to the role of ideas, the authority of government (and in particular Ministers), and the endogenous processes within it. Rather than the image of a bursting dam, therefore, a more effective metaphor may be of Ministers harnessing the power of the river in order to bring about change. As we have suggested, the policy stream of road building (epitomised by the tea room plan) was coupled by Ministers to the mutated idea of road building as a tool of popular consumerism. The election of a Conservative government in 1951 did not of itself signify a major shift in policy. The BTC would remain in being until the early 1960s (although sections of the road haulage industry were returned to the private sector) and the deepening problems of the railways, as we saw in Chapter 2, ensured that this sector held the attention of Ministers. Nevertheless, the new government had less ideological commitment to an integrated transport structure than its predecessor. Ministers, using their initiative, could search for fresh policy solutions. In May 1952 Alan LennoxBoyd was appointed Minister of Transport. Although he was not to have the same impact as his successors at the MoT in the 1950s in terms of policy change, he did at least initiate a process that suggested a divergence from the views expressed in 1953 to the Select Committee by the Permanent Secretary (quoted earlier). Consequently, in December 1953 Lennox-Boyd announced to the Commons that the country could no longer afford to delay an extended programme of major road improvements without serious damage to the economy. Thus annual payments from the road fund should rise from £5 million a year in 1953–4 to between £14 million and £15 million in 1957–8, and should continue at that level for a number of years. Over the next three years, Exchequer expenditure of schemes totalling £50 million would be approved. Of particular political significance, these would include the Preston bypass at an estimated cost of £2 million (the Preston bypass proved to be the first section of motorway opened in Britain) (H.C. Debates 8 December 1953, cols. 1810–4). The road lobby was decidedly unimpressed by the Minister’s announcement. For example, the SMMT described it as ‘a feeble gesture’ (The Times 9 December 1953). For its part, a Times leader suggested that roads perhaps suffered through there being no central authority with commercial responsibility for building up plans for such roads, and able relentlessly to push them (The Times 10 December 1953). This echoed a BRF policy idea for a national highway authority, and indicated a lack of faith in the MoT’s commitment to building roads. Nevertheless, the roads advocates failed to pick up the political message that a Minister was committing himself much more firmly to promoting the benefits of roads expenditure. More ominously for the road lobby, in February 1954 the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Transport, Hugh
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Molson, told the Commons that there were not the numbers of surveyors and engineers necessary to carry out a sudden expansion in new roads construction (H.C.Debates 15 February 1954, col. 1663). It was not only a matter of spending money, therefore, but also a question of building up the strength of the necessary epistemic communities. A key figure in preparing the MoT for its future priorities and in finally completing an effective roads advocacy coalition was John Boyd-Carpenter, Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation 1954–5. Although at the MoT for only approximately eighteen months, Boyd-Carpenter’s approach signified the new direction for the MoT where trunk road construction would become the dominant policy ‘frame’. Boyd-Carpenter also denoted a significant ideological break with the previous Transport Ministers. A decade after the end of the war, the long period of post-war austerity and rationing was being replaced by a greater sense of prosperity characterised by consumer choice. Boyd-Carpenter was politically astute enough to understand that if the Conservative government could harness and lead the new public mood, then the electoral dividends could be immense. In particular, the construction of motorways, or at least the commitment to finally implement the tea room plan, could project a modern image for the Tories while catering for the ever-growing army of motorists and assisting economic growth (interview 28 June 1995). The development of motorways could also act as a political antidote to the problems of the nationalised transport industries, and in particular the railways. By the mid-1950s, it had become clear that the BTC had failed to come to grips with severe problems of investment, rationalisation and industrial relations in the railways (Boyd-Carpenter’s tenure at the MoT included a damaging rail strike) and that there was no simple ‘solution’ to be found to the rail ‘problem’. In contrast, the tea room plan, although now nearly two decades old, offered the perfect ‘solution’ to the transport image ‘problem’. For an ambitious Minister, therefore, roads offered a much more politically upbeat ‘frame’ for policy success than the seemingly never ending and insoluble problems of rail. There was also the ‘empty chair’ factor in the Minister’s perception of the transport outlook. In addition to established sectoral networks, the Minister was aware of the expanding number of motoring voters (in 1955 there were nearly 6. 5 million vehicles in use, up from 2.5 million in 1945). Each new vehicle owner represented a potential convert to the road lobby, regardless of whether he or she was a member of a motoring organisation. The Minister, therefore, had an awareness of trends beyond the transport policy networks which were as significant, if not more so, than anything which occurred in Westminster and Whitehall. At the same time, Boyd-Carpenter emerged as a Minister more prepared to ally himself openly with the road lobby’s values and objectives. In real political terms, his advocacy of the roads ‘solution’ placed him in the position as an unofficial leader of the lobby. It was in this sense that the Minister and his ideas finally completed the crucial missing link in the roads advocacy coalition. Hamer
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describes how, in the early 1950s, the road lobby became much more aware of the need to coordinate and encourage grassroots lobbying for new roads. For example, in 1949 James Drake, county surveyor of Lancashire, and a longstanding motorways advocate, drew up revised plans for a north-south motorway through Lancashire. In the early 1950s, the BRF helped to organise support for these roads within local authorities and organisations such as chambers of commerce, so that the MoT received an impression of wide local support for the new roads (Hamer 1987:47–8). The road lobby, after repeated failures, was therefore able to undergo a process of policy learning, and began to understand that a systematic multi-arena approach was necessary in order to bring about a paradigm shift within the MoT (a lesson ironically copied by the environmental lobby forty years later). It was also crucial, however, that the Minister himself led this shift in fundamental values. Grassroots campaigning could assist this process on the ‘empty chair’ principle, but it was also necessary for the Minister to make a policy decision in favour of building roads. As we have seen, Boyd-Carpenter was the first Minister of Transport to make the required commitment. Once the initial policy decision was made, the Minister could ally himself with the road lobby. Nevertheless, Boyd-Carpenter was also to disappoint the road lobby in some of its objectives. In the field of trunk roads, John Boyd-Carpenter could be described, in terms of Headey’s classification of ministerial types, as chiefly a Policy Initiator, who also exhibited the characteristics of an Ambassador and an Executive (Headey 1974:65–79). After serving as a Conservative Junior Minister in the Treasury for three years, Boyd-Carpenter was appointed Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation in July 1954. Prior to becoming head of a Department, therefore, he had gained useful inside knowledge about the mechanics of government (Dudley and Richardson 1996c: 15–16). The Policy Initiator role involved principally connecting the tea room plan to specific plans for its implementation; the Policy Ambassador role involved acting as an unofficial leader of the roads advocacy coalition; while the Policy Executive role involved chiefly preparing the MoT for its future road building tasks. In taking these personal initiatives, Boyd-Carpenter was assisted by divisions within the MoT which generally had the effect of allowing a resourceful Minister to shape his own agenda. Hence in 1953 the MoT had absorbed the Ministry of Civil Aviation, and when Boyd-Carpenter took over the amalgamated Ministry he found that the senior aviation officials resented their loss of independence and were unwilling to become integrated within the new Ministry. As we have seen, the Permanent Secretary, Sir Gilmour Jenkins, was no advocate of motorways, and Boyd-Carpenter found him to be an expert in merchant shipping who refused to interest himself in any of the other transport sectors (Boyd-Carpenter 1980:108). Boyd-Carpenter took advantage of this general official disunity and passivity by acting unilaterally to promote the road building profile of the MoT. As we
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described earlier, it was acknowledged by Ministers that the MoT lacked the necessary expertise to undertake a major road construction programme, while Boyd-Carpenter himself considered that Britain had lagged well behind other European countries, such as Germany and Italy, in the construction of motorways, and was most anxious that the engineers should acquire the necessary knowledge (interview 28 June 1995). Consequently, he sent delegations of engineers to Germany, the United States, France and Italy and so provided leadership to what became a key epistemic community, whose expertise would be required if the roads construction programme was to be accelerated (Boyd-Carpenter 1980:110). In order to expand the trunk roads programme, Boyd-Carpenter was involved in some tough negotiations with the Treasury. An advantage for the Minister here, however, was that the initial move was to introduce authorisations for roads rather than to immediately commit expenditure. For the Treasury, therefore, the actual expenditure would come later rather than sooner. A further advantage for Boyd-Carpenter was that not only nationally, but also internationally, there was a trend in favour of constructing large-scale motorway networks. For example, in 1954–5 in the US, recommendations were made to Congress by President Eisenhower for the construction of a national system of interstate highways consisting of some 37,000 miles of controlled access highways to be built during the next ten years. It was argued that an adequate highway system was vital to the continued expansion of the economy and that projected figures for gross national product would not be realised if the highways were allowed to continue to deteriorate (Charlesworth 1984:34–5). In France, on the other hand, the government passed a law in 1955 to allow toll financing of autoroutes under special conditions. Public control was maintained by granting concessions only to local organisations in which public interests were upheld, while toll rates had to be approved by the Council of State after consultation with local authorities. The concessions could last for thirty-five years, at which time they would revert to the state (Gomez-Ibanez and Meyer 1993:109). Internationally, therefore, the mid-1950s was a fertile period for fresh policy ideas and solutions to the problem of expanding the roads programme. It could be said that the increasing political salience of roads was indicated by the manner in which the growth in the roads programme was first announced to the House of Commons. In the debate on the Queen’s Speech in November 1954 the Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, stressed that it was essential, if Great Britain was to compete effectively in world markets, that there should be an adequate road system. It was now far behind modern needs, but everyone accepted the need to have as large a programme of road works as the nation could contrive and afford. This would mean that when the programme was fully under way the Chancellor of the Exchequer would be paying out each year as much as two or three times the amount allowed under the present programme laid down last year (the December 1953 announcement) (H.C.Debates 30 November 1954). This endorsement of the expanded programme by a senior
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Minister (and who would become Prime Minister only five months later) exemplified that, for the first time, Ministers were identifying themselves fundamentally with the values of the roads advocacy coalition. In February 1955 Boyd-Carpenter put flesh on the bones of Eden’s announcement when he told the Commons that the government proposed to authorise an ultimate Exchequer expenditure on roads of £147 million during the next four years. (The significance of the word ‘ultimate’ should be noted. Hence it was not proposed that the government would necessarily spend £147 million over the next four years, but that roads to this value would be authorised.) Included in this new programme would be the first section of a LondonYorkshire motor road (way), a motor road through Lancashire from Preston to Birmingham, and a crossing of the Firth of Forth. The Minister also announced that in order for them to proceed rapidly, the government was considering charging tolls in suitable cases (H.C.Debates 2 February 1955, cols. 1096–100). The political significance of Boyd-Carpenter’s announcement, there-fore, lay not so much in the sums of money stated, but rather that the government was finally committing itself politically to implementing the tea room plan. There was also a public relations aspect. Boyd-Carpenter realised that a general election lay not too far in the future, and some definite news about building the motorways could please the growing army of motoring voters. In the event, the election took place in May 1955, and the Conservative Campaign Guide (1955) could announce that ‘the rebuilding of Britain goes on apace, including a farsighted programme for the construction of new and safer roads’ (p. vi). Under the new Prime Minister, Sir Anthony Eden, the Conservatives won a convincing victory, which at least suggested that the ‘rebuilding Britain’ slogan had popular support. The inclusion of road building as a key element in ‘rebuilding Britain’ had taken place, however, almost despite the activity of the road lobby rather than because of it. For Ministers such as Boyd-Carpenter, it was the coupling of policy ideas, or the image of road building nesting in the larger image of industrial prosperity, modernisation and popular consumerism, which hammered home the message that ‘there are votes in roads’. The road lobbying groups such as the BRF had battled to influence government since the publication of the tea room plan, with almost no success, but now the tide had turned. Ironically, on the day that Boyd-Carpenter made his Commons’ announcement of an expanded roads programme in February 1955, the road lobby set up an organisation which not only consolidated the advocacy coalition, but also crucially carried the lobby into the arena of public opinion, which it had previously almost ignored. The means for achieving these objectives was the Roads Campaign Council, an organisation consisting of twelve members which included the BRF, the SMMT, the AA, the RAC, the Motor Agents’ Association and road passenger transport groups. At its launch the Chairman, Wilfrid Andrews, also Chairman of the RAC, declared that this was the first time these organisations had come together to speak with one voice on a matter of vital
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national importance (The Times 3 February 1955). As Hamer describes, the RCC was set up largely at the initiative of the SMMT, which was keen to involve the AA and RAC more closely, neither of which was then a member of the BRF (Hamer 1987:18). Of greater long-term significance, however, was the role of the RCC in helping to turn road building as the principal transport policy ‘solution’ into a hegemonic policy community. In his perceptive study of the dynamics of the road lobby in the 1950s, Finer describes the operational strategy of the RCC. Up to this time, the road lobby (including the BRF) had generally focused its lobbying on the people or groups it deemed influential, such as Ministers and MPs, rather than on the general public. In future, the BRF would continue its work lobbying Parliament and the ‘selected’ public, but to this was added the ingredient of a mass public campaign. For this purpose, the RCC hired a right-wing professional agency, Aims of Industry, which since the 1940s had organised a number of high profile antinationalisation campaigns (Finer 1958:52–4). Thus: As the RCC sees it, to make MPs build more roads their constituents must be made to tell the MPs that this is what they want. The task is to put votes into roads. (p. 54) As its principal propaganda weapon, in 1956 Aims of Industry organised ‘The Roads Crusade’. Twenty-four towns were visited, one town each week. The ‘crusade’ was announced by a stage-coach (to symbolise the lack of road building since their heyday), and in the centre of town exhibitions and cinema shows were set up. Thousands of pamphlets were disseminated, and everywhere signatures were canvassed for petitions to Parliament. By September 1956, hundreds of thousands of people had seen the shows and the exhibitions, and half-a-million people had signed the petition (Finer 1958:55). Finer summed up the problem for the road lobby in seeking to influence government as being rather like trying to cut a cushion with a fish-knife (Finer 1958:56). Yet, as we have seen, Ministers were being persuaded by the roads policy ‘solution’, and the ‘Roads Crusade’ operated on the vulnerability of Ministers through the ‘empty chair’ principle. Finer, how-ever, also emphasises the importance of the more orthodox National Production Advisory Council (NPAC), which included representatives from the Trades Union Congress, the peak employers’ associations and the nationalised industries, with the Chancellor of the Exchequer as Chairman. This body repeatedly pressed for an expanded road construction programme throughout the 1950s. Finer concluded that, added together, the RCC and NPAC pressures meant that every substantial organised group interested in roads was exercising some kind of pressure, which was consequently operating at all levels simultaneously—ministerial, parliamentary, and public (Finer 1958:58).
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By the late 1950s, therefore, the road lobby had developed a highly efficient multi-arena lobbying machine, which recognised the importance of influencing ‘outsiders’ as well as ‘insiders’. It is important to stress again, however, that this lobbying in itself would not have been sufficient to bring about third order change and create a hegemonic policy community. For this to occur, Ministers themselves had to become convinced personally of the value of the roads policy ‘frame’ and make the ideas a hegemonic policy ‘solution’. Yet, simultaneously with this commitment, there lies also the enigma of the mobile and ‘promiscuous’ Minister. Here, Boyd-Carpenter fits particularly well as someone who at one moment acted as one of the primary members of the roads advocacy coalition, yet at other moments could cast off that role and become a policy broker, with outcomes not welcomed by the road lobby. In the former role, Boyd-Carpenter welcomed the formation of the RCC, and was a keen supporter of its activities (interview 28 June 1995). The Minister made his commitment to road building still more manifest in July 1955 when he called a special press conference to announce that motorways, 345 miles in total length, would be built by the government in ‘five years but certainly less than ten’ at a total estimated cost of £85 million. For example, the first 53 miles of London-Yorkshire motorway would probably be ready in 1959 (a prediction which proved to be correct). In addition, it was hoped that during this period work would commence on another length of motorway from north of Birmingham to the Preston bypass, a total of about 94 miles. (The Times 6 July 1955). On the other hand, Boyd-Carpenter was not so pliable on the question of two of the RCC’s chief policy proposals—those of setting up a national highways authority and the raising of a £750 million loan, to be repaid over thirty years. (The Times 11 March 1955). The Minister firmly resisted these demands, for here he had another coalition which had to be taken into account. He realised he owed a political debt to the Treasury for allowing authorisation of the new roads, and so supported the latter’s insistence that the government should retain direct control over highways expenditure (interview 28 June 1995). Boyd-Carpenter’s period at the MoT also saw officially the demise of the Road Fund. Although it had been moribund since the 1930s, its final abolition was of symbolic importance in rejecting the road lobby’s long-standing demand that motor taxes should be hypothecated for roads expenditure. In addition, as we noted earlier, and despite the hints in his February 1955 announcement, Boyd-Carpenter rejected the idea of road tolls chiefly on the political calculation that the motorways should be free at the point of use to all who owned a vehicle. Henceforth, therefore, the massive cost and administrative resources required to implement the tea room plan would be carried entirely by central government. When Boyd-Carpenter left the MoT in December 1955, a sea change was taking place within government from a largely symbolic and generally lukewarm commitment to building motorways, as exemplified by the Permanent Secretary’s 1953 statement, to an almost evangelic faith in the political and
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economic value of the tea room plan. Boyd-Carpenter’s successor now took on the responsibility of laying the foundations for a hegemonic policy community. Harold Watkinson: Transport Minister and ‘roads doctor’ In June 1957, the annual conference of the Institution of Municipal Engineers debated the state of Britain’s roads. They were addressed by James Drake, Lancashire County Surveyor and, as we have seen, one of the principal advocates since the late 1940s of the benefits to be gained from building motorways. Drake, although declaring himself to be a long-time critic of government roads policy, congratulated the government on sticking to the national motorways plan designed ten years earlier, and received an enthusiastic response when he appealed to all the engineers to pull together to get things done. With regard to building the motorways, he called Harold Watkinson, the Minister of Transport: ‘the doctor who can pull the patients round’. The Times noted that the response to Drake’s remarks indicated that Mr Watkinson’s stock as an exponent of road improvements was high among the ranks of the municipal engineers (The Times 21 June 1957). The image of Watkinson as the ‘roads doctor’ is a highly appropriate one, for it was he who assumed unofficial leadership of the roads advocacy coalition, and took a direct interest in nursing the first motorways to their birth. In addition, he worked tirelessly and successfully to persuade the Treasury to release greater funds for the trunk roads construction programme. His relatively long tenure at the MoT (December 1955– #8211;October 1959) enabled him not only to employ skills as a policy entrepreneur in constructing the necessary networks of epistemic communities required to implement the future huge expansion in the trunk roads construction programme, but also to build up his own personal expertise in quite detailed aspects of road construction. Such was his success that, around the time of his retirement from the MoT in 1959, the Permanent Secretary, Sir Gilmour Jenkins, could state: There is today more sustained interest in highways than in any other of the Department’s activities. Thus the amount of money devoted by the government to road improvements and the choice of individual schemes on which to start work, together with the wastefulness of traffic congestion and the problems of road safety evoke the liveliest criticism and comment in Parliament and elsewhere. Yet only fifty years ago a Parliamentary Question on highways—except one in the most general terms—was not admitted. (Jenkins 1959:123) There is an obvious irony in Jenkins’ comments, given his own earlier opposition to building motorways, and indicating the speed with which roads had risen in political salience in barely more than half a decade. In stark financial terms,
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roads expenditure by central government rose from £39.5 million in 1955 to £83. 9 million in 1959 (Plowden 1973:479). At the beginning of the previous chapter, we illustrated Watkinson’s anxiety to impress upon the Cabinet that ‘there are votes in roads’ and his enthusiasm for rolling out ‘the macadam carpet’. Politically, Watkinson gained from the post of Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation being upgraded to Cabinet status when Harold Macmillan became Prime Minister in January 1957. As Watkinson himself noted he now had the force of Cabinet membership behind any ministerial proposals that he made (Watkinson 1986:72). At the same time, correspondence from the period illustrates also that other influential Cabinet members were encouraging Watkinson to press for expansion of the trunk roads construction programme. For example, immediately after Watkinson’s appointment he received a letter of congratulations from Lord Salisbury, the Lord President of the Council and an influential figure in Conservative party circles. By an administrative quirk, Salisbury was in charge of the Road Research Laboratory, and he left the new Minister in no doubt as to his attitude to road building: I am one of those who feel that a really big road programme is an economic necessity for our country. It is, I know, very difficult to push such a programme ahead on the necessary scale in our present economic difficulties—but I should like to assure you that the services of my scientists will always be at the disposal of your Department, and also that you can look to me for support on the wider policy issues. (Letter 22 December 1955) In his reply, Watkinson told Salisbury that he would like to talk to him about roads before long (Letter 28 December 1955), and a meeting was arranged for early in January 1956. At this meeting, Lord Salisbury expressed his support for both road loans serviced from road taxes and also tolls for specific purposes, namely bridges and tunnels. As we have seen, although the concept of loans was supported by sections of the road lobby such as the BRF and RCC, it was totally opposed by the Treasury, and so was a political non-starter. More significantly, however, Salisbury also told Watkinson that he very much liked the idea of a national road plan looking ahead ten years. He thought this might very well help to bring into line some local authorities who he felt spent government money without always paying too much attention to the right kind of roads for the future (Record of conversation with Lord Salisbury 9 January 1956). Salisbury’s remarks indicate not only the degree to which this influential figure had become part of the roads advocacy coalition, but also that a mood shift was taking place within elite government circles for a more visionary long-term plan for roads. Significantly, a few days later when Watkinson wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Harold Macmillan, asking for more money to be spent on smaller works of improvement, he also informed the Chancellor that he had put in hand a general study of a roads plan over the next ten years (Letter 17 January 1956).
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Nevertheless, the early evidence of Watkinson’s tenure at the MoT suggests that his thinking was still heavily influenced by the long-held consensus for incremental change within the Ministry. Thus in February 1956 Watkinson issued a memorandum on roads policy which stated that the basis of his immediate policy for roads was to improve traffic flow including the elimination of bottlenecks and black spots. There would have to be a number of sizeable ‘set pieces’ but the main emphasis must be on better traffic flow generally by means of a greater number of more modest and related schemes likely to bring comparatively large and early dividends in reduced congestion and increased safety (Memorandum 14 February 1956). Such words were hardly calculated to give much encouragement to the long-held hopes of the road lobby for implementation of the tea room plan. By the Summer of 1956, however, real change was in the air. This new mood