Who Gets What?: Domestic Influences on International Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources (Suny Series in Global Politics)

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Ásgeirsdóttir

Who Gets What? Domestic Influences on

International Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources

Who Gets What?

During international bargaining, who gets the better deal, and why, is one of the questions at the heart of the study of international cooperation. In Who Gets What? Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir analyzes seven agreements signed throughout a twenty-year span between Iceland and Norway to allocate shared fish stocks. While the Law of the Sea regime provides specific solution concepts for negotiators, it does not dictate the final outcome. Looking at the actual negotiation process and the political and economic constraints negotiators operate under, Ásgeirsdóttir examines how domestic interest groups can directly influence the negotiating process, and thus affect international agreements over scarce resources. Who Gets What? demonstrates empirically that a nation with more domestic constraints on its negotiators gets a better deal.

Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir

SUNY STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS www.sunypress.edu

SUNY

P R E S S

CMYK

Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Bates College

Who Gets What?

SUNY series in Global Politics James N. Rosenau, editor

Who Gets What? Domestic Influences on International Negotiations Allocating Shared Resources

Áslaug Ásgeirsdóttir

For my parents—you have always been an inspiration.

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Contents

List of Illustrations

ix

Acknowledgments

xi

Chapter 1. Explaining Distributional Outcomes The Importance of Distributional Conflicts Theoretical Framework Who Matters, How, and When Marginal, Monitoring, and Information Costs Norway and Iceland and the Global Capture Industry Conflict over Common Fish Stocks Tragedy of the Commons The Fisheries and the Quest for International Cooperation Summary

Chapter 2. Role of the Law of the Sea and the Straddling Stocks Agreement in Determining Distributive Outcomes Law of the Sea Prior to 1982 The Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Rights and Duties Imposed by the 1982 Law of the Sea The Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Role of International Law in the Negotiating Process Regional Fisheries Bodies and the Role of Science Summary

vii

1 6 7 14 14 16 17 19 19 29 31 32 35 36 38 41 43 46

Contents

viii

Chapter 3. The Decline of Norwegian Fishing Interests Norway’s Place in the International System The Actors: Government, Scientists, and Interest Groups Structure of the Norwegian Fishing Industry Interest Group Organization Summary

Chapter 4. Dictating Policy and Influencing Outcomes in Iceland Icelandic Fisheries Policy before the 200-Mile EEZ Policy after the 200-mile Extension The Actors: Government, Scientists, and Interest Groups Structure of the Icelandic Fishing Industry The Interest Groups Summary

Chapter 5. Interest-Group Power and its Impact on the International Allocation of Shared Fish Stocks Capelin Herring Cod Oceanic Redfish Summary Chapter 6. Conclusions Broadening the Research Question Same Issue Area and Changes over Time The International Arena Further Analysis of International Cooperation

47 48 55 62 65 79 81 82 85 90 98 99 110 113 115 123 128 135 139 141 141 142 143 144

Notes

145

Bibliography

157

Index

167

SUNY Series in Global Politics

177

Illustrations

Maps Map of the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea.

2

Tables Table 1.1.

Allocation of fish stocks.

4

Table 1.2.

Initial negotiating preferences.

5

Table 3.1.

Changes in the composition of Norwegian exports.

72

Table 5.1.

Interest group strength and distributional outcomes.

114

Figures Figure 1.1. Capelin catches.

21

Figure 1.2. Herring catches.

23

Figure 1.3. Cod catches.

25

Figure 1.4. Oceanic redfish catches.

28

Figure 1.5. Oceanic redfish catches for participating states.

28

Figure 3.1. Changes in the number of full-time and part-time fishermen in Norway.

71

Figure 3.2. Annual subsidies to the Norwegian fishing industry.

74

Figure 3.3. Total number of fisheries related items discussed in the Norwegian parliament.

76

Figure 3.4. General propositions before the Norwegian parliament.

77

Figure 3.5. Questions posed about the fishing industry in the Norwegian parliament.

78

ix

x

Illustrations

Figure 4.1. Proportion of Icelandic fish exports.

100

Figure 4.2. Changes in the number of fishermen in Iceland.

105

Figure 4.3. Number of cabinet proposals in the Icelandic parliament.

107

Figure 4.4. Changes in the proportion of cabinet proposals in the Icelandic parliament.

108

Figure 4.5. Number of resolutions passed by the Icelandic parliament. 109 Figure 4.6. Questions posed about the fishing industry in the Icelandic parliament.

110

Acknowledgments

Ultimately all research is a collective effort and this book is no exception. I owe a depth of gratitude to several people who I have encountered along the path of developing an idea into completed research. Your assistance, advice, willingness to listen to me, and companionship were crucial. I am, however, to blame for any errors and misunderstandings. This research was partially funded by several grants, without which I could not have done fieldwork in Iceland and Norway. This research benefited from grants from the Science Fund of the Icelandic Research Council (Rannís), a NATO Basic Fellowship, a Graduate Student Grant from the Agricultural Bank of Iceland, a grant from the American-Scandinavian Foundation, and a fellowship from Washington University in St. Louis. This work has benefited greatly from comments from my advisors at Washington University, especially Andy Sobel, Jack Knight, and Roger Petersen. John Sprague, Sunita Parikh, and Gary Miller also gave useful advice along the way. I also thank Alf Håkon Hoel at the University of Tromsø, whose assistance during my stay in Norway and subsequent friendship were invaluable. Several people also commented on parts of this work and discussed ideas and issues along the way. This group includes Jennifer Seely, Anna Broome, Fran Hooker, Shelley Deane, Orit Kedar, Robert Klotz, Jim Richter, Oran Young, Elizabeth DeSombre, Gary King, Amy Douglass, Heather Lindkvist, Peter Rogers, and Heidi Chirayath. Emilie Swenson and Jodie Clark patiently edited the manuscript. I also thank Matt Duvall, manager of the Bates College Imaging and Computing Center, for his generosity in making the map of the maritime boundaries in the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea. It is an invaluable addition to the book. Finally I have to mention the anonymous reviewers whose comments have greatly improved this work. Several friends provided housing and wonderful company during my research trip to Norway. Ine Bjølseth in Oslo, Guðrún Finnsdóttir and Orri Ormarsson in Trondheim, and Anne Katrine Normann, Eigill Hallset, and Kolbrún Ragnarsdóttir in Tromsø. I appreciate their hospitality, and hope I did not overstay my welcome. xi

xii

Acknowledgments

Finally, this work would not have been completed had I not had encouragement and support from family and friends. Mom, Ólafur, Palli, Agni, Lára, Eyja, Villa, Össi, and Gurrý deserve special mention. They—and several others— patiently endured stories of international cooperation and straddling fish stock, fisheries, and fishermen. Throughout it all they have never wavered in their belief in me and this research project. My deepest thanks to all of you.

Chapter 1

Explaining Distributional Outcomes

D

istributional conflicts—where a better bargain for one party leads to another party or parties getting less1—are at the heart of international cooperation. Solutions to these types of conflicts at the international level usually require domestic adjustment in order for a country to fulfill agreed upon obligations. Which sector of the state is asked to adjust their behavior depends on the issue being negotiated, with the key difference being whether private or public actors are the ones who have to bear the cost of the international agreement. Commercial fish stocks that straddle political boundaries in the ocean present an important distributional challenge for international cooperation. While stocks found wholly within the boundaries of a state’s 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are managed domestically, straddling fish stocks require cooperation among the states that harvest the stock to prevent their overutilization. For example, the highly migratory Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock is widely distributed in the area shown on the map, where it moves between the EEZs of five states in addition to being found in the “Loop Sea”. The stock hatches in the waters of Northern Norway. Its search for food drives it further north into Russian waters, where it stays for a couple of years before beginning a mad dash back through the Norwegian EEZ, into international waters labeled the “Loop Sea”. Depending on where the stock is feeding, the stock can also be found partially in the Fisheries Protection Zone around Jan Mayen, as well as the EEZs of Iceland, Faroe Islands, and the European Union. Without any international management of the catch, this migration results in the transfer of the right to fish from the stock between Norway and Russia, as well as in the stock being a common pool resource in international waters. In addition, when parts of the stock are found within the EEZs of Iceland, the Faeroe Islands and the European Union, these countries also gain exclusive access to the stock inside their respective EEZs. 1

This map shows the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of Norway, Iceland, and Russia as well as the location of international waters—the “Loop Sea” and “Loophole”. Norway has 200-mile Fisheries Protection Zones (FPZs) around Jan Mayen and Svalbard.

Data: Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries; Icelandic Coast Guard; United Nations; ESRI Projection: Lambert Azimuthal Equal Area; Latitude of Origin: 30N Central Meridian: 0

Map of the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea

Explaining Distributional Outcomes

3

In the absence of cooperative management among all the parties that claim rights to migratory stocks, they are likely to become depleted. But as is the case with the sharing of all valuable resources, the question of how to allocate fish stocks that travel between international and domestic waters is a contentious issue among states that share these stocks.2 The decision of how to allocate the available resources among the participants presents an opportunity at looking at how states reach purely distributive outcomes, in this case a proportional share of an existing fish stock. This book focuses on the question of how nations reach distributive outcomes, and in the process discusses the role of international regimes as well as the role of domestic politics when explaining the final outcome as well as changes in the distribution over time.3 The question of how to allocate straddling fish stocks among states who participate in the fishery is especially prominent in the North Atlantic, where states lie close together, possess large and sophisticated fishing fleets, and are faced with resource depletion in domestic waters. Declining catches at home have led to an increased fishing effort outside the 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone, with conflict ensuing over how best to prevent shared stocks from becoming depleted. Conflict has eventually given way to cooperation around shared fisheries in order to collectively manage these stocks. In the North Atlantic, Iceland, Norway, and other states signed seven agreements between 1980 and 1999, covering four different stocks. The Icelandic-Norwegian capelin stock has been collectively managed since 1980. In the 1990s, the countries reached agreements to manage AtlanticScandinavian herring (also known as Norwegian spring-spawning herring), oceanic redfish, and the Barents Sea cod stock. These agreements are purely distributive in nature, that is, they allocate a preset Total Allowable Catch (TAC) among states party to the negotiations. The TAC represents maximum amount of the stock the fishermen can fish annually. The TAC is usually lower than the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY ), which is calculated by scientists as being the average highest yield that can be taken from a stock under existing environmental conditions without negatively affecting the stock. However, the allocation of these four stocks amongst the negotiating partners—that is, who gets what—varies across stocks and over time, as Table 1.1 shows.4 Two questions initially arise in looking at the outcome of negotiations between Norway and Iceland from 1980 to 1999. First, why does the allocation differ depending on which stock is being negotiated? For example, what accounts for Norway getting 62% of the herring stock in 1996, while getting only got 4% of the oceanic redfish stock that same year? And why does Iceland get 1.8% of the cod stock in 1999, but a whopping 81% of the capelin stock in 1998? Second, why does the allocation within the same stock change over time? This is the case for both capelin and herring. Iceland’s share of the capelin stock increased in 1989 and again in 1998, while the Norwegian share shrank. Likewise the allocation of the herring stock changed in 1997, one year after the first agreement.

Who Gets What?

4

Table 1.1. Allocation of fish stocks between Iceland and Norway between 1980 and 1999. Total Stock Allowable Percentage Percentage Percentage Being Year of Catch (TAC) of TAC of TAC of TAC Negotiated Agreement (in tons) to Iceland to Norway to Others Capelin 1

1980

775,000

85

15

0

Capelin 2

1989

1,058,000

78

11

11

Capelin 3

1998

1,420,000

81

8

11

Herring 1

1996

1,107,000

17

62

21

Herring 2

1997

1,498,000

15

57

28

Oceanic Redfish

1996

158,000

29

4

67

Cod

1999

440,000

1.8

43

55.2

Source: Compiled by author.

The answer to these questions is found at two levels, the international and the domestic. First, the international institutional environment—or regime— embodied in the 1982 Law of the Sea Agreement and the 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement,5 emphasizes the rights of coastal states and duties of high seas fisheries states, and by extension determines who has the right to the largest share of the stock. A coastal state, defined as a state that has a share of the stock within its own EEZ, will get a larger share than a high-seas-fishing state, defined as a state that has no traces of the particular stock within its waters, but participates in the fishery nonetheless. However, the Law of the Sea regime does not specify how straddling stocks should be allocated among participating states beyond giving us a way to say who should get the largest share. Hence the states that are party to the Law of the Sea regime have great leeway in how they apply the law to solve distributive conflicts. Since the Law of the Sea regime cannot explain the distributive outcome of the negotiations, it is important to analyze how the nations involved choose a baseline for the allocation of the common resource. Choosing the baseline is one of the most important tasks of the delegations during the negotiations. Before the negotiations start, each state determines through a domestic process which baseline will result in the largest share for them. There are basically two different solution concepts: historical rights and zonal attachment, which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2. Historical rights allocate a resource on the basis of prior fishing experience, while zonal attachment allocates the resource based on where the fish stock is found. The solution

Explaining Distributional Outcomes

5

concepts provide a starting point for negotiations and the initial positions taken by each delegation. These initial positions are then modified as the negotiations proceed until one solution concept emerges as the dominating baseline through the give and take of the negotiations. Table 1.2 shows the baselines chosen for the seven agreements analyzed here. It is clear from Table 1.2 that in most cases Iceland and Norway prefer different initial baselines, but, as the third column shows, the baseline chosen is usually Iceland’s preference rather than Norway’s. The question then arises as to why Iceland, which is the smaller and less powerful actor, has no military, is less populated and slightly less wealthy per capita than Norway, always manages to negotiate a baseline that gives Iceland a larger share compared to other options. The Law of the Sea regime cannot explain which baseline is chosen, which leads to the second question addressed by this research: What factors influence the selection of the baseline for allocation, and by extension why is the chosen baseline usually closer to Iceland’s preference than Norway’s preference? The answer to this question lies at the domestic level, specifically in how domestic factors constrain the negotiators and how these constraints influencethe final allocation. A domestic constraint on a negotiator influences her

Table 1.2. This table shows the initial preferences of Iceland and Norway at the outset of each negotiating round as well as the final baseline chosen in the negotiations. Iceland’s Preference

Norway’s Preference

Baseline Chosen

1980

Zonal Attachment and Historical Catches

Historical Catches

Mixture of of Both

Capelin 2

1989

Zonal Attachment

Historical Catches

Zonal Attachment

Capelin 3

1998

Zonal Attachment

Historical Catches

Zonal Attachment

Herring 1

1996

Historical Catches

Zonal Attachment

Historical Catches

Herring 2

1997

Historical Catches

Zonal Attachment

Historical Catches

Oceanic Redfish

1996

Zonal Attachment

Historical Catches

Zonal Attachment

Cod

1999

Mixed

Zonal Attachment

Mixed

Agreement

Year

Capelin 1

6

Who Gets What?

ability to make and accept offers. A state with significant constraints on its negotiators will have a reduced ability to make and accept offers, hence narrowing that state’s bargaining space. On the other hand, a state with little or no constraints on its negotiators will have a wider leeway in making and accepting offers, thus a wider bargaining space. This idea of how constraints influence the distributive outcome will be discussed in more detail in the “Theoretical Framework” section of this chapter. The key constraints for both Iceland and Norway are the domestic interest groups who are active participants in the international negotiating process, both before the negotiations start and as members of the delegation. However, the ability of these groups to constrain the negotiators differs and changes over time. The power of the Icelandic interest groups has remained strong throughout the twenty years examined here, which has given them an ability to constrain negotiators during the negotiations. Norway’s key interest group Norges Fiskarlag (the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association), on the other hand has lost a significant amount of power vis-à-vis the government, and hence its ability to constrain negotiators has been diminished. As a result, Iceland usually has an upper hand in these distributive negotiations.

The Importance of Distributional Conflicts As mentioned above distributional conflicts lie at the heart of international cooperation. In addition to the allocation of shared fish stocks, where private actors are usually required to diminish their fishing effort as a result of international agreements around management measures, there are other examples of distributive conflicts in the international arena that share the characteristics of conflicts allocating straddling fish stocks. For example, the implementation of successful international negotiations to lower tariff barriers and negotiations to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases both require private actors at the domestic level to adjust their behavior in order for the state to comply with the international agreement reached. Hence, these private actors who have to bear the cost of policy change have an incentive to try to influence the negotiations by constraining the alternatives available for negotiators. To what extent interest groups can constrain negotiators depends on the permeability of domestic institutions and actors to interest group demands as well as the power configuration of the groups domestically. Tariffs on manufactured goods have declined significantly since the end of World War II, mostly through multilateral negotiations. These reductions, which were negotiated in the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade and then continued in the World Trade Organization, have resulted in costs and benefits for different domestic groups. Import-competing industries have faced stiffer competition at home as they are no longer protected by tariffs from competition against cheaper manufactured goods from abroad. At the same time, exporting

Explaining Distributional Outcomes

7

industries have gained as they have more markets for their goods. Hence these actors have incentives to try to influence to what extent tariffs are cut. The negotiations over reduction in tariff levels are essentially distributive conflicts, as countries have to agree on who should lower their trade barriers and by how much. This conflict is currently being fought within the Doha Round of WTO negotiations that partially focuses on the reduction on barriers to trade in agricultural goods. The sticking point in these negotiations has been to what extent developed countries need to cut subsidies for agriculture in exchange for lower tariffs on agricultural goods in developing countries. Lower subsidies in developed countries would mean higher agricultural prices at home and abroad, resulting in these goods being less competitive at the international level. Lower tariffs in developing countries would mean increasing competition for domestic farmers, some of whom would go out of business. Hence the cost of adjustment is borne by domestic farmers, who are well organized and thus a formidable lobby group, especially in the European Union and in the United States. Similarly, the Kyoto Protocol has stalled as there is considerable difference between nations as to who should be responsible for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. Developed countries, especially the United States, have been pressured to proportionally reduce carbon emissions to a greater extent than the developing world, which has argued it should not have to reduce emissions as that would slow development. But at the same time some of the emerging developing countries are increasingly responsible for increasing greenhouse gas emissions. Reducing greenhouse gas emissions is costly and the cost is born differently by different economic actors. Hence these domestic actors, who are faced with the greatest cost to change their practices to reduce pollution, will seek to pressure their governments not to accept a large cut in greenhouse gases in international negotiations.

Theoretical Framework In explaining how nations reach an agreement to distribute a shared resource, this research argues that the final allocation can be explained by looking first at the international level and the role regimes play, and then, secondly, at the domestic level to explain the choices negotiators can make based on the constraints they have from domestic factors. Hence the explanation proceeds on two fronts. At the international level, the Law of the Sea regime explains who will get the largest share in the allocation. At the domestic level, constraints on negotiators— in this case powerful interest groups—put limits on negotiators and thus influence the selection of the final baseline of the allocation. In doing so, this research adds to the almost purely theoretical literature on two-level bargaining models by providing a rich empirical study of seven negotiations between Iceland and Norway.6 I will first discuss the international level, before proceeding to elaborate on the theoretical framework provided by the two-level-games literature.

8

Who Gets What?

The International Level The explanation over the variation in distributive outcomes evident in Table 1.1 lies partially at the international level. Scholars studying international cooperation have argued that the existence of international regimes—defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”7—fosters cooperation.8 The Law of the Sea regime governs agreements around straddling fish stocks. The regime is based on two key international agreements: the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention and the 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks Agreement.9 Iceland and Norway were important actors during the Law of the Sea and the Straddling Stock Agreement negotiations. Both have signed and ratified the two conventions, and are thus bound by them. The Law of the Sea regime gives states guidelines as to what they should consider when reaching an agreement over a straddling stock. For example, the 1982 Convention and the subsequent Straddling Stocks Agreement lay out broad ideas that states can use to solve conflicts over common resources. However, while the Law of the Sea mandates cooperation, it does not dictate which solution concept should be adopted, and therefore the Law of the Sea regime cannot explain the variance in the choice of a baseline and the change in distribution of two of the stocks over time. Participating states have absolute power to decide how they apply the guidelines found in the Law of the Sea during negotiations. The only outcome the Law of the Sea can explain is the determination of which nation gets the largest share of the straddling stocks given the designation of states as either coastal or high-seas fishing states. States therefore use the law in an instrumental fashion, focusing on the solution concepts that will give each state the largest share of the resource being divided amongst them. This argument is supported by interviews with bureaucrats and interest group leaders in Norway and Iceland. The interviews indicate that the role of international law emerges as providing solution concepts for cooperation and thus narrowing the number of possible outcomes.10 That is, the states act instrumentally to maximize their share of the predetermined total allowable catch. The interviews reveal three primary solution concepts that have reference in the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea and the recent Straddling Stocks Agreement signed in 1995. First, Article 63 of the Law of the Sea calls for cooperation among coastal states and high-seas fishing states in managing straddling fish stocks. This duty to cooperate is reinforced in Article 5(a) of the Straddling Stocks Agreement. Taken together, these two agreements provide for the rights and responsibilities of coastal states and high-seas fishing states in managing straddling stocks. If a fish stock is found partially within the waters of a coun-

Explaining Distributional Outcomes

9

try, that country is a coastal state. If a country has no traces of a stock in its waters, but its ships partake in the fishery in international waters, it is labeled a high-seas fishing state. The overarching principle of these two agreements is that coastal states are responsible for the maintenance of stocks, while highseas fishing states have an obligation not to deplete a particular stock. Interviews reveal that in practice this principle means that in most agreements, coastal states have the right to a larger share of the stock than a high-seas fishing state. But neither agreement dictates how the states should reach a distributive solution. Instead, the agreements provide a framework for the negotiations by giving states solution concepts, such as consideration of fishing history and science, that can serve as baselines for the negotiations. In addition, Article 5 of the Straddling Stock agreements argues that management measures should be based on the best scientific evidence available. In the North Atlantic, the concept of zonal attachment has been used on occasion by states to allocate common resouces. The calculation of zonal attachment is a scientific construct which estimates how much of the stock is found within a particular economic zone at any given time. Ideally, using zonal attachment to divide a stock reduces the politics involved in the allocation if everyone party to the negotiations agrees with the calculations. That is, if governments accepted scientific calculations where stocks reside as basis for distribution, there would really be no need for negotiations. However, zonal attachment often complements the coastal state provision, that is, who should get the largest share, but is rarely strictly applied, because goverments like to have the flexibility to negotiate a different allocation. Finally, provision 62(3) of the 1982 Law of the Sea suggests that states have to repsect historical rights to fisheries. This provision is the most politically malleable provision in the negotiations being studied here, and as such enjoys vast popularity. The ability to rely on the provision that allows for more negotiations, allows negotiators to bargain harder and try to get more of the resource than strict zonal attachment would dictate. ‘Historical rights’ is an elastic concept, as there are often heated discussions about when history should begin and to what extent such right should matter in the final allocation. Hence, historical rights have emerged as a key concept in almost all of the negotiations in this study. The role of the Law of the Sea and its specific provisions will be discussed in more detail in chapter 2.

The Constraints of Domestic Politics The explanation for the initial choice of a baseline for allocation—either historical rights or zonal attachment—for each country prior to the negotiations lies at the domestic level, specifically in the constraints interest groups put on negotiators’ ability to make and accept offers. Negotiated solutions to distributional conflicts which result in private actors—such as firms or labor

10

Who Gets What?

unions—bearing the cost of these international agreements give such organizations an incentive to influence the negotiating process. These organizations’ success in influencing the distributive outcome depends on the ability of the affected parties to influence the process. Hence, in explaining the final allocation of a stock, it is imperative to look at the relevant actors, be they political parties, labor unions, individual companies, and so forth, and the domestic institutional structure that determines how these actors can influence what the delegation can offer and accept in international negotiations. For example, in negotiations seeking to reduce trade barriers, required Senate ratification of international agreements in the United States can be used to get a better deal in the negotiations. The chief negotiator can use the required ratification as a threat in the negotiations to argue that certain bargains would never be approved by the Senate, and hence get a better bargain for the United States. The idea of constraints on negotiators is not new and increasingly scholars have been showing that domestic institutions can constrain negotiators, and under certain conditions provide a bargaining advantage for the country, that is more constrained by domestic factors than its opponent. In 1960, Schelling observed that “the power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself.”11 For example, if the United States was negotiating a trade agreement where its negotiators had no constraints and were free to take any negotiating position to get an agreement, the negotiators might have a difficult time in making any position stick. If, on the other hand, the United States executive was negotiating under legislative authority, this constraint would be visible to the adversaries, and the executive branch would have a firm position that was accepted by the adversaries.12 In this way, the legislative constraint would lend credibility to the US position. Putnam expanded this notion by arguing that international negotiations are essentially a two-level game.13 The ‘two-level’ game refers to the fact that as the chief negotiator is negotiating an international agreement, she is simultaneously negotiating with domestic actors to make sure any agreement will be accepted at home. According to Putnam, every country has a domestic winset, which consists of all bargaining outcomes which would “win” approval of the majority of the constituency at home. Win-sets are important for two reasons. First, countries will only reach an agreement if their win-sets overlap. Hence large, overlapping win-sets facilitate cooperation. Second, the size of the win-set will influence the distributive outcome of the negotiations in such a way that a country with a large win-set (that is, with fewer constraints in what it can demand and offer) can be pushed around by a country with a narrower and more constrained win-set.14 This idea of win-sets guides this research. The explanation for the choice of a baseline for allocation—either historical rights or zonal attachment— which significantly influences the distributive outcomes lies at the domestic level. In discussing possible reasons for a large or small win-set, Putnam men-

Explaining Distributional Outcomes

11

tions the distribution of power and preferences domestically, domestic political institutions, and the strategies of the chief negotiator.15 Broadly speaking, constraints can be any institutional feature or domestic agent that can tie the hands of negotiators and give him a bargaining advantage. In the context of this work, the key argument is that corporatism—or systematic domestic policy coordination involving key interest groups—as the chief institutional arrangement in Iceland and Norway, allows interest groups direct access to international negotiations, both through pre-negotiation meetings as well as including interest group representatives as members of the delegation. Specifically, domestic interest groups put constraints on negotiators’ ability to make and accept offers, and hence influence the size of the win-set. But the ability to influence the negotiations varies over time and influences the choice of the baseline for resource allocation. Scholars such as Iida, Mo, and Tarar16 have used game theory to build on Putnam’s work to further refine how domestic constraints matter in international negotiations. While this work has provided important theoretical insights, it lacks empirical support. Iida shows that when one state has some domestic constraints and is negotiating with a state that is assumed to have no constraints, the constrained state has a bargaining advantage that results in a more favorable distributive outcome.17 Tarar builds on Schelling’s and Iida’s work and shows how domestic constraints influence the distributive outcome of international agreements when both states are assumed to have different levels of constraints.18 Tarar’s model is directly applicable to explaining the distributive outcomes reached between Iceland and Norway. His predictions for the impact of bargaining constraints on the negotiating outcome, relative to the case where neither side is constrained, show that a highly constrained state usually has a bargaining advantage over a state that is less constrained. This results in a more favorable outcome for the state with the greater constraints, that is, it gets a bigger share of the pie. Tarar does not specify what the constraints on negotiators are, but notes his model can be applied to any situation where a domestic group can block an agreement, such as the legislature through formal ratification, the military, powerful domestic interest groups, or an important business.19 Essentially, we can think of the domestic constraints on negotiators as a variety of veto players, defined as individual or collective actors whose agreement is required for a change of the status quo.20 If a veto player refuses to accept an agreement, the status quo is not going to change. In the case of straddling stocks, no agreement means there will not be collective management of these stocks. The strength of domestic level explanations is that they incorporate the private sector, domestic political processes, and institutions at work in policy formation. They add an entirely new set of dimensions to our understanding of the forces at work when states cooperate, as well as the terms of their

12

Who Gets What?

cooperative agreement. So what are the possible constraints on negotiators in international negotiations? Recent years have seen the proliferation of theories of what domestic factors influence the likelihood of cooperation.21 But a generalizable theory has not emerged as to who and what helps or hinders states in the bargaining process. Scholars have pointed to an electoral connection,22 ratification procedures,23 and the role of domestic constraints, specifically veto players,24 as influencing the outcome. In the case of Iceland and Norway, electoral considerations have not influenced the distributive outcome of the negotiations. Elections in Iceland seem to have made an agreement in the conflict over cod fishing possible in 1999. Just prior to the election there was a push to end the conflict so as to not have to deal with a different government afterward. However, the elections did not influence the actual distributive outcome, only the timing of the agreement. Formal ratification by the legislature cannot explain the variance in the distributive outcomes of the negotiations between Iceland and Norway either. Formal ratification procedures are thought to constrain the bargaining space, as the negotiator has to make sure the agreements she reaches will be ratified by the legislatures.25 Hence, ratification procedures narrow the bargaining space the negotiator has to reach an agreement. As a result, if two states are negotiating and only one of them has formal domestic ratification procedures, the state that must have the agreement ratified domestically by the legislature will have a leg up in the negotiations. In the case of Iceland and Norway there is no evidence that legislative ratification influences the distributive outcomes of agreements. In Iceland, international agreements are presented to the parliament as resolutions for the legislature to vote up and down. Given that Iceland is usually governed by a majority coalition, it is inconceivable for the members of the legislative majority to vote against the government on international agreements. In Norway, most international agreements do not have to go through the legislature. Of the seven agreements explored here, only two were voted on by the legislature: the 1980 Capelin Agreement and the 1999 Cod Agreement. There is no evidence that ratification helped the Norwegians at all during the negotiations. For example, the 1999 cod agreement can be said to be the worst agreement the Norwegians reached with Iceland. If neither electoral considerations nor ratification issues constrain negotiators, what constraints do they face? The empirical study shows that in Iceland and Norway the most important constraints are the interest groups representing the fisheries.26 Their relationship with the government across stocks and over time plays an integral role in explaining the choice of a baseline in the negotiations, and their high level of involvement in the negotiating process makes the interest groups the key domestic veto player.

Explaining Distributional Outcomes

13

Role of Interest Groups Economically, interest representation in Iceland and Norway is decidedly corporatist.27 The corporatist nature of these countries means that the state essentially functions as a mediator between opposing interests within the state. The classic example is the role of the state in wage negotiations between employer organizations and labor unions. The rich literature on corporatism has focused almost exclusively on negotiated settlements between labor, business, and the government, but this way of policy making is visible throughout other sectors of the economy, including the fishing sector. Owners of fishing boats and ships, fishermen, producers, and exporters are all highly organized and represented by powerful interest groups. In both Iceland and Norway, domestic interest groups negotiate policy outcomes with the government with regard to domestic fisheries management. These similarities between Iceland and Norway make them ideal to study the process of negotiating agreements over shared resources. In Iceland and Norway, negotiators consider the will of the fishing interests when negotiating an international allocation agreement. In both countries interest groups are consulted before each negotiating round, and they have a representative on the actual delegation. Hence interest groups are integral in forming the negotiating strategy, and are able to veto and amend proposals as they are presented during each negotiating round. By involving interest groups in the negotiating committee, both Iceland and Norway restrict their alternatives. But the constraints the two states face from their domestic constituents differ among stocks and change over time. The ability of the fishing industry in Iceland and Norway to influence policy outcomes is quite different and has changed over time. In Iceland, fishing provides about 75% of export earnings, giving interest groups representing the industry a disproportionate voice in the policy process. This is evident in the government’s willingness to cater to the fishing industry during the period studied here, especially by adopting the system of individually transferable quotas to manage the domestic fisheries and the willingness of the government to devalue the Icelandic currency to help fisheries exporters. The evidence shows that at minimum, Icelandic interest groups have retained their power over time. The Norwegian fishing industry derives its power from the regional importance of the fishery to Norway’s peripheral regions, and from being one of Norway’s largest industries, where 90% of the production is exported. In Norway, three factors have influenced declining willingness of the government to cater to Norges Fiskarlag, the key interest group in Norway. First, the rise of the oil industry to Norway’s most important export industry over the past thirty-five years has shifted the focus away from fisheries. In addition, the end of the Cold War and the declining number of fishermen has

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further marginalized the industry, and allowed the government to increasingly ignore Norges Fiskarlag’s preferences. These processes will be detailed in chapters 3 (Norway) and 4 (Iceland).

Who Matters, How, and When The actors involved in the negotiations are government representatives and sometimes cabinet ministers, scientists, and members of various interest groups representing the fisheries. While negotiating fishing rights, the governments entering into agreements must consider the will of its fishermen who, by and large, are private actors. If the government fails to accommodate the fishing industry, fishermen have an incentive to cheat, and they have great opportunities to do so. Cheating in this case can, for example, include fishing over the preset limit, or discarding fish that is considered less valuable. Because of the low marginal costs of fishing, the high costs of monitoring and enforcing, and the lack of information about the resource, cheating is always going to be a threat to any negotiated agreement. Therefore, any agreement that fails to consider the will of the domestic interest groups will be rendered useless. Because public officials are in charge of negotiating the allocation of straddling stocks conducted by private operators, the preferences of both groups are important to the strategies pursued. Both the government and the fishermen are trying to maximize their utility. Having to fight with the fishermen at home over international agreements is time-consuming and can have adverse political effects. Hence, the government has to balance the twin objectives of reaching an agreement and getting a share of the fishery the domestic fishermen will accept. This motivation of maximizing fishing and minimizing domestic political conflict at home provides the basis for any interaction between a government and interest groups involved and constrain the government in its range of choices of management regimes negotiated with other states. Specifically, fishermen want to catch as many fish as possible, while the government wants to ensure re-election and peace around international and domestic resource allocation. Given the preferences of the actors, these factors create different incentives among the players to cooperate around international management of fisheries resources.

Marginal, Monitoring, and Information Costs The likelihood of cooperation among states around migrating fish stocks is diminished by the unique structural costs of ocean fishing. The low marginal cost of fishing, coupled with high monitoring, enforcement and information costs, make cooperation unlikely. These structural conditions reduce the

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incentive for fishermen to bear the cost of rebuilding a depleted stock, and thus make cooperation at any level difficult. Because monitoring, enforcement, and information costs are higher in international waters than in domestic waters, it reduces the likelihood of cooperation around straddling fish stocks. These costs also mean that fishermen have a vested interest in the outcome of international negotiations aimed at distributing a straddling stock amongst states participating in these fisheries.

Low Marginal Costs Once the initial investment in vessel, gear, and fixed costs are met, the cost of catching each additional fish is minimal. The more you fish, the better off you will be. Vessel owners have to pay for wages, fuel, and supplies, and these costs are high and largely inelastic. The low marginal cost of fishing makes it highly unlikely that fishermen are going to cull fishing on their own accord in the face of resource depletion. Instead, they are more likely to travel farther in the search for a good catch, thus compounding the problem of overfishing.

High Monitoring and Enforcement Costs High monitoring and enforcement costs increase the likelihood of cheating once a cooperative agreement is reached. There are essentially two ways to monitor ocean fishing. The primary way of monitoring fishing is to weigh and observe what is brought to harbor. While this is the most efficient way of monitoring the total catch, there are ways around it. For example, a ship can choose to sell the catch abroad, which makes monitoring harder for local authorities. Another well-known practice is the throwing away of fish. In an ideal world fishermen would increase the value of their catch by trying to increase the value of the fish that happens to be caught in their nets. Reality is often much different. There is an incentive to bring back the most valuable size of fish, thus the practice of throwing away less valuable catch increases the value of the catch. Fishermen often discard smaller, less valuable fish; the very same fish that a few years later will be spawning and contributing to the increasing fish stocks. The vastness of the high seas makes monitoring costs prohibitively high. It is therefore hard to prove wrongdoing and prevent this practice. Secondly, the coast guard can observe fishing by air or at sea. Most coastal states with extensive EEZs have an official coast guard that monitors the domestic fishing banks and makes sure that local fishermen follow allocation rules. But, given the vastness of most EEZs combined with constrained budgets, active monitoring of fishing is often minimal. Active monitoring also becomes less and less effective the further you go from the shore, because of the vastness of the space which increases the distance between individual trawlers. Outside the EEZ, governments lack authority and legitimacy to

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monitor fishing directly. For example, if a state decides to monitor fishing in international waters, it could be interpreted by other states as claiming ownership of the resource, which would increase the potential for conflict.

High Information Costs The final structural factor affecting the incentive to cooperate around ocean fishing is the lack of scientific information about the fisheries. Limited information affects cooperation through disputes over the abundance or scarcity of the resource. While both Iceland and Norway have fisheries research institutes that gather information about the fishing banks, this information is shrouded in uncertainty. For example, one fisheries scientist told me that fisheries researchers report their estimates with a least ⫾15% margin of error. Therefore, there is a great deal of room for the fishermen to challenge research findings, and they repeatedly do. The incentive to gather information and do research outside the 200-mile EEZ is none. Limited resources to investigate what the ocean holds are almost exclusively spent researching what the 200-mile EEZ contains. Thus, the knowledge about straddling stocks is very limited. In addition, scientific research is disproportionately focused on the most valuable stocks and the most established fisheries. Existing knowledge about levels for straddling stocks are often based on observations taken when the stock is within one state’s EEZ. While the aforementioned factors hinder cooperation, existing cases of cooperation demonstrate that they can be overcome.

Norway and Iceland and the Global Capture Industry The global capture-fisheries industry is a large and often a troubled one. The worldwide capture-fishing industry is enormous and provides a significant portion of food to the world’s population. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the global catch reached about ninety million metric tons in 2003. The organization estimates that the percentage of overexploited and depleted stocks has risen from about 10% in the mid 1970s to about 25% in 2000. Hence, the problem of declining fish stocks is by no means insignificant.28 Declining yields usually indicate overexploitation of the resource, while fully exploited fisheries cannot bear more fishing effort without showing signs of decline. In addition, landings of demersal species,29 such as cod and ocean perch, have remained constant since the 1970s. This is especially true of the Northeast Atlantic, where catches have been stagnant for the past three decades. Landings of the two main pelagic species in the Northeast Atlantic, capelin and herring, have fluctuated greatly since the 1950s.30

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Globally, the capture industry employs nearly thirty million fishermen, the bulk of them living in Asia and Africa. About 700,000 fishermen are found in Europe, including 18,000 in Norway and 6,000 in Iceland. The fishing industry utilizes about 1.3 million decked vessels and 2.3 million open vessels (not decked) to capture about 90 million tons of fish. A significant portion of the catch goes to human consumption, which averages about 16 pounds a person a year worldwide.31 This industry is by no means insignificant. At the global level, Iceland’s and Norway’s size and population belies their impact on global fisheries politics, where both countries are significant players. According to the Food and Agricultural Organization, in 2002 Norway ranked 11th while Iceland ranked 12th of all capture-fisheries states, with the catch reaching 2.7 million tons and 2.1 million tons respectively. They are the biggest capture-fisheries states in Europe, with the exception of Russia, which ranks 9th (however, geographically, Russia only partially belongs to Europe). In addition, most of Russia’s fishery takes place on the country’s east coast. In terms of exporting, Norway is the third biggest fisheries exporter in the world, while Iceland ranks 13th, no small feat for states that have populations of about four million in Norway and about three hundred thousand in Iceland. Given Iceland’s and Norway’s importance at the global level, their regional importance in the Northeast Atlantic is also large. As the two biggest capturefisheries states in the Northeast Atlantic, their cooperation is key to any successful negotiation on the allocation of straddling fish stocks in the area. Hence, their cooperation warrants close scrutiny and it provides a stepping stone to explore the other conflicts over allocation of straddling stocks in other parts of the world, for example, between the United States and Canada.

Conflict over Common Fish Stocks The political problem of allocating fish stocks involves solving three different but closely related collective action problems. These problems are differentiated by the location of the stocks being allocated. Fish stocks can be found exclusively in international waters, exclusively within the 200-mile EEZ, and can straddle international waters and EEZs. The location of the stocks determines the actors involved. Stocks found exclusively inside the 200-mile EEZ do not require international negotiations to manage the stocks. The need for cooperation arises around so-called straddling fish stocks, which migrate between international waters and EEZs, or between different EEZs, and around highly migratory species that are found exclusively in international waters. Stocks classified as straddling include some of the most valuable fish species in the world, such as cod, herring, capelin, and ocean perch. This section gives an overview of the global capture fishery, the inherent conflicts over cooperation around common pool resources, setting the stage for the final section of this

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chapter, which discusses the four fisheries Iceland and Norway have cooperated on: capelin, herring, cod, and oceanic redfish. To insure the sustainability of the resource over the long run, straddling stocks can only be successfully managed through international cooperation. If there is no international cooperation around the management of straddling stocks, distant-water trawlers and factory ships can scoop up the fish and leave nothing for the domestic fishing sector of the nearby coastal state. Alternatively, the domestic fleet can deplete the stock within its own EEZ, leaving nothing for those fishing in international waters or adjacent EEZs. International management agreements limit fishing amongst the participating states and hence limit the quantity domestic fishermen can catch. Reduction in the share a state’s fishing fleet is allowed to catch has both economic and political consequences, providing governments with the incentive to try to prevent stock depletion. In reaching allocation agreements the amount each state gets to catch is invariably less than what their fishermen were able to do before the agreement. Hence, successful negotiations have direct negative consequences for the fishermen involved, who are usually private actors. Following the extension of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) to 200 miles in the late 1970s, the salience of high-seas fishing—defined here as fishing outside the EEZ—declined in the 1980s. Fishing states focused their efforts on fishing within their own newly created and seemingly abundant EEZs. However, with the decline of fish stocks within EEZs, high-seas fishing efforts increased again in the 1990s as fishermen tried to make up for declining catches at home. The starting point of this research is the expansion of the EEZ to 200 miles in the late 1970s. This expansion fundamentally altered the institutional structure of the fishing industry by putting about 90% of the most valuable fish stocks under domestic management. Heralded as a solution of the uncontrollable fishing on the high seas, the change was thought to solve all problems of overfishing. A few years later it became clear that individual governments were having problems with depletion of stocks within their boundaries. In fact, the problem of overfishing had not been solved in the late 1970s, only transferred to a different domain. The push into the high seas led to increasing conflict among fishing states, evident in 1995 when the Canadian Coast Guard seized the 210-foot Spanish trawler “Estai” about twenty miles outside the Canadian EEZ and charged the crew with illegal fishing.32 The Falkland Islands’ Coast Guard chased Taiwanese ships, Scottish fishermen attacked and destroyed the catch of a Russian trawler,33 and relations within the European Union are notoriously conflicted regarding the common management of the European EEZ.34 In addition, Iceland and Norway fought bitterly over Icelandic trawlers fishing in the Barents Sea during the 1990s.

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Tragedy of the Commons Within the broader field of cooperation, the problem of managing global commons has emerged in recent years as one of the most perplexing problems facing states in the international arena.35 The problem traps governments and societies in a social dilemma of how to allocate scarce resources, both globally and locally. Here, ‘global allocation’ refers to stocks found in international waters as well as stocks that straddle international boundaries. Any management of straddling stocks involves negotiations among states to properly manage the stock and prevent overutilization. ‘Local allocation’ refers to the domestic management of stocks within the 200-mile EEZ, which is the exclusive jurisdiction of individual governments. This social dilemma of managing the global commons has its roots in the “tragedy of the commons,”36 with the solution resting on overcoming the problem of collective action.37 Individuals utilizing common pool resources cause degradation, because no one has an incentive to protect the resource for future use, which ultimately hurts the users’ long-term interests. Overcoming this problem requires collective action on behalf of the participants. If only one fisherman decides to protect the resource, by either limiting his own catch or by protecting young fish, others will catch what he left behind and reap the profit. Solving this problem is the central issue in domestic and international management of fisheries within the 200-mile EEZ. Theoretically, the tragedy of the commons should be avoidable within the EEZ because governments can determine national fisheries policy and enforce agreements, but empirically this has not been the case. Mismanagement of stocks within the EEZ has been pervasive, and during the 1980s both Iceland and Norway were faced with a collapse of the cod and capelin fisheries. Domestic management is complicated by the fact that some stocks straddle across boundaries. That is, they travel between nationally managed local commons and global commons, where anyone is allowed to catch the fish. Hence, complete management of straddling fish stocks requires international cooperation.

The Fisheries and the Quest for International Cooperation The problem of management of straddling fish stocks has been pervasive in the North Atlantic since the early 1980s, where Iceland and Norway are key players. This section reviews the fisheries around which Iceland and Norway cooperate. It details the history of these fisheries as well as discusses the need for international cooperation. It thus provides the necessary background for the rest of the book.

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Who Gets What?

The Capelin Fishery Capelin is a relatively small, pelagic species found in the North-East Atlantic, the Barents Sea, Southwest of Greenland, off the coast of Labrador, and around Newfoundland. It is also found in the Northern Pacific, along the entire Alaskan coastline, across the Bering Sea to the coast of Russia. While the distribution is great, individual capelin stocks are quite different. The focus here is on the allocation of the Icelandic stock. It spawns along the south coast of Iceland and in its second year it travels west and north between Iceland and Greenland, later entering the fisheries zone around Jan Mayen before entering the Icelandic EEZ in January. Iceland has been harvesting Icelandic capelin since the mid-1960s and Norway’s fishery around Jan Mayen began in the late 1970s. Apart from fishing from the Icelandic stock, Norway has a substantial fishery in the capelin stock in the Barents Sea—the world largest capelin stock—since 1960s. Capelin is an important stock for two related reasons. First, it is valuable when processed into fishmeal, oil, and roe (caviar). The first two products are mainly sold as low-priced animal feed, while the roe is the most valuable product because it is sold for human consumption. Second, capelin is the dietary staple for Atlantic cod, the most valuable fishing resource for the states in and around the North Atlantic. About a third of the cod’s food intake is capelin. Therefore, during times when the capelin stock is low, cod is only partially able to compensate for the loss of capelin by feeding on other prey.38 Fluctuations in the capelin stock will therefore later be reflected in the cod stock, which has profound economic consequences for the communities dependent on cod. As a result, any agreement to preserve capelin has to balance two objectives: to maintain the level of the stock so it can be safely harvested while leaving enough behind for other fish to feed on. This task is compounded by the stock’s extremely short life span, a peculiar biological feature of Icelandic capelin. In its third year, capelin spawn and then suffer mass mortality. Spawning mortality is virtually complete, which results in a highly volatile stock that has been difficult for scientists to predict. Through twenty-five years of research and trial and error, fishery scientists have converged on allocating about 400,000 tons for spawning each year and allowing fishermen to catch the rest.39 In 1958 the Technical Laboratory of the Icelandic Fisheries Association initiated an experimental capelin fishery for the production of meal and oil. Even though the results were promising, the Icelandic capelin fishery did not begin until 1964. Initially, the fishery took place in February and was confined to the southwestern part of the Icelandic coast. Then in the late 1960s, the Norwegian spring-spawning herring stock collapsed and the capelin fishery gained importance. By 1969, most of the Icelandic herring fleet had become involved in the winter fishery for capelin.

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Capelin is currently fished in the summer, fall, and winter. The winter fishery takes place exclusively within the Icelandic EEZ and is predominantly conducted by Icelandic vessels. In the late 1970s, and again in the late 1990s, the Faeroe Islands were allowed to catch a small amount of capelin within the Icelandic EEZ, and from 1986 onward Norway was allowed to fish capelin off north and east Iceland in January and February. When Greenland was added to the bilateral Norwegian and Icelandic agreement, it too got permission to fish within the Icelandic zone.40 The summer capelin fishery started in 1976 after a failed attempt the year before. Due to the success of the 1977 Icelandic summer fishery, Norwegian fishermen began an experimental capelin fishery in the Jan Mayen area in 1977. Their first search for capelin in the area was inconclusive, but they were more successful in 1978, leading to pressure for negotiations on the management of the stock. Figure 1.1 shows catch levels for Iceland and Norway. It is clear from this figure that Iceland dominates the fishery, with Norway fishing between 10% and 15% annually over the past twenty years. After 1989, Greenland was also allocated an 11% share of the fishery, which is caught mostly by the Faeroese, the European Union, and Iceland. In addition,these figures demonstrate quite well the remarkable volatility of the Icelandic capelin

Figure 1.1. Icelandic and Norwegian capelin catches in the area between Iceland, Greenland, and the Norwegian possession of Jan Mayen 1965–1966.

Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries and the Icelandic Fisheries Association.

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Who Gets What?

stock. The capelin fishery collapsed because of overfishing in 1982, and was closed for 18 months before fishing resumed. The fishery collapsed again in the early 1990s, which illustrates that strict management measures are not always enough to ensure stock survival. A great deal of uncertainty still surrounds stock levels, making scientific advice imprecise, which can lead to TACs being set too high.

The Herring Fishery Until its collapse in the late 1960s, the Atlantic-Scandinavian herring stock was the second most important fishery in both Iceland and Norway, exceeded in value only by cod. The fishery caused an economic boom in both countries when catches peaked in the 1960s. The importance of herring to the Icelandic economy can be seen in its some of its nicknames: “ocean’s silver,” “Iceland’s gold,” and “the national savior.”41 The herring fishery in the 1960s was a great boon to the Icelandic economy. It allowed for new vessels being built and led to substantial changes in the composition of the Icelandic fishing fleet. Vessel owners invested in numerous highly efficient steel ships, replacing older and smaller wooden vessels. Following record-years in 1966 and 1967, the stock collapsed in 1969, resulting in a multilateral ban on the fishery of Atlantic-Scandinavian herring. During the two decades that followed, the stock was only found within the Norwegian and Soviet/Russian EEZs. The stock’s sudden disappearance, followed by two decades of stock rebuilding with very limited fishing in Norwegian waters, made its exponential growth and sudden reappearance in international waters in the early 1990s headline news. The catches of Norwegian-Icelandic herring in Icelandic waters are shown in Figure 1.2. The graph shows the dramatic ups and down of the fisheries during the past 40 years. These highs and lows can be attributed to herring being a fickle and somewhat unpredictable species. In addition, there is more than one stock of herring in Icelandic and Norwegian waters. Within the Icelandic EEZ there is spring-spawning herring and fall-spawning herring, and Norwegian fishermen share the North Sea herring with the countries of the European Union, specifically Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands. Most importantly though, there is the Atlantic-Scandinavian herring stock, which at high stock levels is a typical straddling and highly migratory stock, crossing the borders of several EEZs as well as international waters. This is the herring stock that will be discussed here, as its sudden appearance in international waters called the “Loop Sea” in the early 1990s presented a common management problem for the states around the Atlantic. The stock’s travel pattern is dictated by the search for food, but the pattern changes frequently. This unpredictability has made the management of the stock difficult both domestically and internationally. For example, by the

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Figure 1.2. Quantity of herring (in tons) caught by Iceland and other nations around Iceland 1944–1946.

Note: This is the same stock the nations sought to allocate in 1996 and 1997. The figure shows clearly the sudden rise and fall in the fishery in the 1960s. Source: The Icelandic Fisheries Association.

end of the 1950s, fisheries scientists had documented the travels of the herring stock as beginning in Norway and ending up close to the north-east coast of Iceland in the summer and winter. But already in the 1960s, the pattern changed again. Part of the stock spawned off the coast of the Lofoten Islands in Norway, its feeding grounds were far north in the Norwegian Sea, and it spent the winter off the coast of Northern Norway. In addition, there have been times during the past thirty years when herring was abundant in Norwegian fjords one year, with no herring in sight in the following year.42 Following the collapse in the late 1960s, the stock began a new travel pattern. Grown herring now spent the winter in Norwegian waters close to the coast, and only briefly in the spring did it feed farther from the shore. In the 1970s, traditional areas for the adolescents in the Barents Sea were empty. In 1983, the travel pattern changed, and young herring again began to spend its adolescence in the Barents Sea, within the Soviet EEZ. This led to an agreement between Norway and the USSR over utilization of the stock where the Soviet Union agreed not to fish young herring in exchange for catch quotas of more valuable adult herring in Norwegian waters. Young herring can only be used for inexpensive meal and oil production, while adult herring fetches

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Who Gets What?

higher prices as it is used for human consumption. In 1986 this herring left the Barents Sea, and by 1995 the travel pattern had changed drastically to resemble that of the 1960s, with the exception that the herring still does not spend the winter in Icelandic waters as it had done then. But with the stock size still increasing, there is indication now that the stock is starting to spread into the Icelandic EEZ.43

The Barents Sea Cod Fishery Cod is historically the single most important fishery in both Norway and Iceland, for example, in 1993 the cod fishery contributed more than 30% to the value of fish exports in Iceland and Norway. But cod comprised only 11% of the total catch by weight in Iceland and nearly 15% in Norway. History has shown that any conflict over the cod fishery, regardless of whether the conflict is domestic or international, has been highly political and fierce. This applies to conflicts within Iceland and Norway as well as between them. In addition, this fishery has a long history, and interest groups representing the cod fishery are highly organized and entrenched. Over the past twenty years, the cod fishery in Iceland and Norway has been problematic because of resource depletion due to overfishing taking its toll. Despite increased scientific knowledge and stricter governmental regulations, there has been substantial overfishing in both states. During the 1980s, both Icelandic and Norwegian fishermen faced a collapse of their respective cod stocks. Iceland’s collapse came in the early 1980s, while Norway’s cod stock in the Barents Sea collapsed in the late 1980s. Since then neither stock has fully recovered. The TAC for North-Atlantic cod fished by Norwegians was determined in annual bilateral discussions with the Soviet Union until the early 1990s, when Russia became Norway’s negotiating partner following the demise of the Soviet Union. The Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission each year determines the TAC and then divides it among the states. As in the other negotiations, Norges Fiskarlag is an important participant in the Norwegian delegation, and once the TAC is set it is divided among different vessels and regions according to domestic allocation rules in Norway. In 1993, following a decade of restricted cod catches in Icelandic waters, Icelandic ships began to fish in international waters between the economic zones of Norway and Russia, the so-called “Loophole,” and also in the Barents Sea. This development was a direct response to lower TACs and quotas within the Icelandic EEZ, which had led the owners of the larger fishing vessels to search for catches and profits outside the Icelandic EEZ. This first year of fishing in the “Loophole” and the Barents Sea was considered a success, with forty-two ships catching 9,700 tons of fish, mostly cod.44 The fishery was even more successful the following year, which escalated the conflict between

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Figure 1.3. Icelandic catches of Arctic cod in the Barents Sea and the Loophole from 1993 to 1998.

Source: The Icelandic Fisheries Association.

Iceland and Norway. But following three successful years in a row, the fishery has never really reached the same levels. The amount of cod caught since 1993 is shown in figure 1.3. The fishery in the Loophole was not the only venture into international waters and the economic zones of other states. Additionally, Icelandic vessels began a prawn fishery in the Flemish Cap off the eastern Canadian coast, a halibut fishery off the coast of Greenland, and the oceanic redfish fishery off the southwest coast of Iceland. The Icelandic vessel owners themselves initiated this push into the high seas, not the Icelandic government. The fact that the vessel owners themselves began fishing in international waters is indicative of their position within the Icelandic economy. Most changes in fisheries policy originate within the industry, not the government. This increased emphasis on high-seas fishing represented a change for the Icelandic fishing fleet, which had until then focused almost solely on fishing in the Icelandic EEZ. When asked by a journalist in 1993 about whether or not this represented a change of policy for the Icelandic government, then foreign minister Jón Baldvin Hannibalsson said the right of Icelandic fishermen to fish in international waters could not be taken

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away from them.45 In general, the Icelandic government was very reluctant to interfere with the fishery in the Loophole, and it was also unable to do so as it lacked a domestic legal framework governing the conduct of Icelandic fishing vessels in distant waters.

The Oceanic Redfish Fishery The Oceanic Redfish fishery is the newest fishery discussed here. It began in 1982, when the Soviet Union started the fishery in international waters southwest of Iceland. Iceland joined in 1989, and Norway in 1990. While oceanic redfish is gaining in economic importance, it still lacks the economic and thus political importance of the traditional demersal and pelagic fisheries. This is evident in the handling of negotiations concerning the catch levels of the stock and its allocation to the different states interested in the fishery. The negotiations were conducted fully within the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) by a Working Group led by a Norwegian lawyer employed at the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. Oceanic redfish is found within Icelandic and Greenlandic waters as well as international wasters southwest of Iceland. Several states have participated in the fishery that takes place off the southwest coast of Iceland. The two coastal states involved are Iceland and Greenland. As defined by the Law of the Sea, this classification gives Iceland and Greenland greater interests in and responsibility to manage and ensure sustainability of the stock. Everyone else involved is a distant-water fishing state. These states include Russia, Poland, and Norway, and vessels from European Union states. Lack of knowledge about the stock has made management decisions problematic. When the Soviet Union began the fishery in 1982, very little was known about the stock, and although scientific knowledge has improved, there are still gaps in this knowledge. Initially, the crucial question that had to be determined before any negotiations could begin was whether or not oceanic redfish was a separate stock from redfish, a longstanding fishery within the Icelandic EEZ. In addition to uncertainty about what stock was being fished, there was also uncertainty surrounding its characteristics, such as its distribution and migration pattern. The Soviet Union had already begun researching the stock in 1982. The states that have contributed to research alongside Soviet Union/Russia are Iceland, Germany, Norway, and the Faeroe Islands.46 Over the past 15 years research has shown that there are two different species of redfish, sebastes mentella and sebastes marinus. Within the sebastes mentella species there are two different stocks that play a role: redfish and oceanic redfish. Oceanic redfish closely resembles redfish, which is harvested within the Icelandic EEZ. Oceanic redfish is generally not found in international waters until spawning, it is found at shallower depth than redfish, and it is significantly smaller when it spawns.47

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The fishery takes place in April and May each year, around spawning time, when its population is densest above the Reykjanes Ridge and in the western part of the Irminger Sea. After spawning, adults move further west towards East Greenland. The larvae drift toward the coast of West Greenland. Initially, the fish was mostly caught at depths of 350–450 meters, but since the 1990s, oceanic redfish has increasingly been caught at depths of greater than 500 meters (1500 feet). Uncertainty still surrounds the oceanic redfish stock. In a 1998 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) report, two Icelandic marine researchers warned that there was uncertainty about whether or not there were one or two oceanic redfish stocks in the Irminger Sea, one found at depths greater than 500 meters (1500 feet) and one found at depths shallower than 500 meters. They concluded that there were many questions that were unanswered regarding the biology of the redfish in the Irminger Sea and adjacent waters, and that there needed to be a great deal of research effort to improve knowledge.48 This uncertainty poses a significant problem, as all the research has focused on the stock found above 500 meters, while the fishery is increasingly being conducted at greater depths. That is, the current management measures could be based on scientific information about a different stock. Iceland and Norway have harvested redfish within their respective EEZs for decades, but the oceanic redfish fishery did not begin until 1982, when the Soviet Union and Poland began the fishery in international waters between Iceland and Greenland. In 1984 Bulgaria and East Germany joined in. Iceland began fishing oceanic redfish in 1989, and in 1990 was joined by vessels from Norway and Japan.49 In 1994 Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Ukraine also reported catches. Despite increased interests in the stock in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the total catch, in tons, diminished. The Soviet Union caught 61 thousand tons in 1982, the catch increased to 105 thousand tons in 1986, and then fell to 23 thousand tons in 1990. The main reason for this drastic reduction in the total catch was reduction in effort in the late 1980s, especially by the Soviet Union.50 Figure 1.4 shows the development of the oceanic redfish fishery since 1982. Russia and Iceland have been the most active states in the fishery since Iceland joined it in 1989. In comparison, the Norwegian share of the fishery has been considerably smaller than the Icelandic share, peaking at only 15,000 tons in 1993.51 In the years before the agreement was reached in 1996, only three Norwegian factory trawlers participated in the fishery and their success in catching oceanic redfish has varied. Preliminary figures for 1998 showed that the three Norwegian trawlers engaged in the fishery managed to catch about 760 tons of the 6,000 that were allocated by NEAFC, and all indicators of stock size spelled decline and overutilization.52 Distribution of the catch among Iceland, Russia, and Norway is shown in figure 1.5.

Figure 1.4. Development of the oceanic redfish fishery off the southwest coast of Iceland, 1982–1997.

Source: The Icelandic Fisheries Association.

Figure 1.5. The amount of oceanic redfish caught by Iceland, Russia, and Norway southwest of Iceland between 1982 and 1997.

Source: The Icelandic Fisheries Association.

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It is evident that Russian fishery has declined significantly since its peak in 1986, when Soviet vessels caught nearly 85,000 tons. Their fishery bottomed out in 1990 and 1991, during the collapse of the Soviet Union, but has since increased again to around 40,000 tons a year. The Icelandic oceanic redfish fishery took off in 1995, when Icelandic vessels caught 53,000 tons, and peaked in 1996 at 63,000 tons. Since then the fishery has remained within the 45,000-ton limit imposed by NEAFC. The Norwegian catch has also come down from its peak, and now Norway barely manages to catch its quota.

Summary Distributive conflicts lie at the heart of international cooperation. While the question of why nations cooperate has dominated the literature, a body of work focusing on the domestic level has helped us understand theoretically how constraints influence distributive outcomes of international negotiations. This research contributes to our understanding of distributive outcomes by providing a detailed study of seven agreements signed by Iceland and Norway seeking to allocate straddling fish stocks in the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea. It thus advances the emerging literature on domestic sources of international cooperation by analyzing a prominent and difficult conflict between two advanced industrial democracies. Second, a systematic comparative study of the fishing industries in Iceland and Norway is long overdue. While political scientists have attempted to model the effect of domestic politics on international agreements, there is no consensus on how domestic politics matter. In addition, the literature on international cooperation focuses almost exclusively on economic issues, such as trade or monetary cooperation. By using the concept of domestic constraints in the form of strong interest groups participation, this research advances the international political economy literature on international cooperation theoretically and empirically. There exists a large literature on the fishing industries in Iceland and Norway, but there exists no systematic comparative study of the different institutional structures of the fishing industry and how they might affect outcomes of international negotiations. Instead, most of the existing work seeks to analyze policies within each state separately, which reduces its theoretical usefulness. This study of negotiations between Iceland and Norway over fishing resources in the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea seeks to fill this void and provide a systematic study of the role of the fishing industry in the two states in international and domestic politics over the past twenty years. The book is organized in the following manner. Chapter 2 discusses the development of the Law of the Sea and how it frames international negotiations over resource allocation. It also discusses the role of key regional organizations that matter for the negotiations over resource allocation. Specifically, the focus is on the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) and

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the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ISES). Chapters 3 and 4 discuss the fishing industries in Norway and Iceland respectively. These chapters mirror each other by outlining how the two countries have participated in creating the Law of the Sea regime, actions each country took to expand their EEZ, and how they dealt with countries that had been fishing in the area before the extension. It then discusses the key actors to consider for international negotiations, before delving into the nature of the relationship between key interest groups representing the fisheries and the government, and how this interaction influences the outcome of international negotiations. Chapter 5 discusses the negotiations for the different stocks in detail and how the interest groups in Iceland and Norway constrain their negotiators and thus influence the size of the win-set. Chapter 6 is the conclusion and gives an overview of the key findings as well as possible further research into the role of domestic constraints on international negotiations.

Chapter 2

Role of the Law of the Sea and the Straddling Stocks Agreement in Determining Distributive Outcomes

T

he institutional structure governing the ocean and its use has been transformed since the end of World War II, with major changes taking place in the 1970s. During this time, coastal states have expanded their territorial sea and gained sovereignty over ocean and seabed resources up to 200 nautical miles. The current Law of the Sea regime has its roots in two major international agreements negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations. The first agreement is the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was signed in 1982 following nine years of complex negotiations. UNCLOS is described by some as the most far-reaching international agreement ever negotiated.1 It soon became evident, however, that UNCLOS did not effectively address the problem of straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks. This led to a new convention in 1993, resulting in a second major international agreement: The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks— hereafter referred to as the Straddling Stocks Agreement—signed in 1995. Together, these conventions form the Law of the Sea regime which, broadly speaking, frames cooperation regarding the ocean and its resources. The Law of the Sea regime has resulted in the creation of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and has increased the responsibility of coastal states and high-seas fishing states to protect straddling stocks through negotiations. It is now up to states, either bilaterally or multilaterally, with or without the 31

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help of regional fisheries bodies, to make sure straddling stocks are not depleted and can continue to sustain a domestic and high-seas fishing industry. In addition to establishing EEZs and setting guidelines for establishing fishing rights, the Law of the Sea addresses other aspects of ocean usage. These include rights to navigation, rights to lay cables, and protection of highly migratory species, to name a few. Here, the focus is on the articles of the Law of the Sea regime that deal directly with the co-management of straddling fish stocks. This chapter will begin with a brief history of the Law of the Sea negotiations and the Straddling Stock Agreement negotiations. It will then discuss the rights and duties that the Law of the Sea imposes on states, as well as the articles that deal with enforcement, monitoring, and conflict resolution. The chapter will also discuss the provisions of regional management bodies, and finally how the Law of the Sea frames negotiations between Iceland and Norway over straddling stocks. As discussed in chapter 1, provisions of the Law of the Sea regime help states decide roughly who should get the biggest share of a particular stock. Beyond that, the regime provides only guidelines for states negotiating distributive agreements. Hence the presence of the Law of the Sea regime roughly explains the division of resources. But what the regime cannot do is explain changes in allocation over time, or more specifically why Iceland seems to increasingly have the upper hand in negotiations with Norway. The Law of the Sea regime narrows the set of possible solutions available to each negotiating party by suggesting specific points of departure. At the most extreme, if two states are negotiating a distributive agreement in the absence of any international rules, a shared history, or norms of cooperation, an infinite number of solutions are possible. The task facing negotiators is to figure out how to limit the number of possible solutions in order to solve the conflict. The Law of the Sea narrows the set of feasible solutions, and thus simplifies the negotiating process by suggesting baselines for allocation that states can use as a starting point. In general, international laws are neither necessary nor sufficient to produce an agreement, let alone able to dictate the specifics of agreements reached through bilateral or multilateral negotiations. More specifically, the Law of the Sea is too general in its scope, allows for few specifics on how to solve conflicts over straddling stocks, and lacks enforcement and monitoring power to make it effective. The Law of the Sea leaves it up to individual states to monitor and enforce fishing conduct on the oceans. States differ in interests and ability to take on the prescribed responsibilities, resulting in the implementation the Law of the Sea regime being a mixed bag.

Law of the Sea Prior to 1982 Until 1982, the high seas were essentially global commons.2 Fishermen could fish on the high seas, whenever, wherever, and however much they wanted. Most states only had a small territorial sea—either 3 or 4 nautical miles—

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and nearly all valuable fish stocks were found outside these limits. As a result, virtually all fishing was unregulated, and took place on the high seas. There was little concern about overfishing, as fishing efforts were still too limited to cause large-scale resource depletion. The level of scientific knowledge of the state of the stocks was limited, which increased uncertainty about how much was safe to catch. Fishing was mostly a small-scale industry with small, technologically unsophisticated boats catching most of the fish close to shore. The regime governing the ocean was basically the ‘freedom of the seas.’ Everyone had the freedom to safely navigate the high seas in peacetime, subject only to the rules of the road.3 The exception was that coastal states could exclude hostile and warring vessels of other states from territorial seas adjacent to their coasts.4 In general, though, customary law governing the oceans was ill-defined and imprecise, setting the stage for increasing conflicts among states surrounding these rights. Prior to World War II, the Law of the Sea had been relatively stable. This changed when President Harry Truman set the wheels of change in motion by issuing two presidential proclamations on 28 September 1945. In the first proclamation, the United States claimed jurisdiction and control over the resources on the subsoil and seabed below the high seas, contiguous to the country’s continental shelf.5 The second proclamation introduced the need for conservation of fishing resources, while simultaneously maintaining the freedom of navigation on the high seas, and thus had direct impact on fishing interests. This became a crucial point later, as states were not likely to accept abandoning the freedom-of-the-seas concept. The proclamations also set the tone for the coming expansions of coastal states’ waters. With regards to ocean fisheries, the Proclamation stated: In the view of the pressing need for conservation and protection of fishery resources, the Government of the United States regards it as proper to establish conservation zones in those areas of the high seas contiguous to the coasts of the United States wherein fishing activities have been or in the future may be developed and maintained on a substantial scale. Where such activities have been or shall hereafter be developed and maintained by its nationals alone, the United States regards it as proper to establish explicitly bounded conservation zones in which fishing activities shall be subject to the regulation and control of the United States.6 The Proclamation is vague on a number of points, especially with regards to the size and location of the conservation zones, and says little about the rights of foreign ships in these zones. The United States did not encounter much international opposition to these proclamations, despite their indeterminable unilateral extension of United States jurisdiction over oceanic resources. Given the

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timing of these proclamations, combined with the enormous influence the United States had on establishing the post-war world order, this is not entirely surprising. Instead some state states—primarily in Latin America—were quick to claim jurisdiction over their seabed resources, and from 1945 to 1958 a number of states claimed larger fishing zones or territorial seas. Most notably, the Santiago Declaration of 1952 declared that coastal states should get a 200-mile fisheries jurisdiction governing the seabed and the subsoil, including both living and mineral resources for Chile, Peru, and Ecuador. In the North Atlantic, Iceland extended its jurisdiction from three to four miles in 1952.7 These extensions did not proceed without conflict and opposition. The United States protested the claims of Latin American states, arguing that their 200-mile fisheries jurisdiction went beyond the ideas set forth in the Truman Proclamations. Chile, Peru, and Ecuador stuck to their decision, and eventually Mexico followed suit. In the North Atlantic, Iceland’s relatively modest expansion (compared to the 200 miles claimed by Latin American states adjacent to the Pacific) provoked strong reactions from the United Kingdom and West Germany, as both had substantial fleets fishing cod off the coast of Iceland. Eventually, Iceland agreed to postpone the extension until after the first Law of the Sea Convention in 1958, which only served to postpone the conflict between these nations.8 The increasing demands of coastal states for larger jurisdiction and more rights over resources in the late 1940s and early 1950s led to the First and Second United Nations conventions of the Law of the Sea in Geneva in 1958 and 1960 (UNCLOS I and II, respectively). These conventions did not solve the problems of extended jurisdiction. Instead, they only reaffirmed four conventions that were thought to be the basis of international law at the time: freedom of the seas, state sovereignty over the territorial sea, ancillary rights in contiguous zones, and sovereign rights to resources in the continental shelf. The width of the territorial sea remained undefined, with a general view being that it was to be no more than 12 miles.9 In short, the Law of the Sea that emerged from these first two conferences reaffirmed established tradition. The conventions were convened to discuss pressures on this traditional law, but neither convention eased the pressure for systemic change, and left the most important issues unresolved. Burke argues that the major shortcoming of these negotiations was their subsequent irrelevance to the critical questions facing the fisheries. The main proposals emerging from the conventions were too limited in geographic scope and subject-matter to affect the increasing level of conflict over ocean resources.10 UNCLOS I and II did little to quell the growing demands of coastal states for larger economic zones and increased sovereignty over marine and seabed resources. As a result, several states unilaterally extended their jurisdiction. Iceland extended its fisheries limit from 3 to 4 miles in 1952, from 4 to 12 miles in 1958, from 12 to 50 miles in 1972, and in 1975 established a 200-mile EEZ, claiming that the fishing resources in the waters around Ice-

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land would otherwise be destroyed. This led to conflict with other states already exploiting these rich fishing banks, primarily Great Britain and West Germany, culminating in three Cod Wars with Britain.11 Norway extended its limit before World War II to 4 miles and drew straight lines across fjords and bays to prevent foreign fishing there, under strong protests from Britain. The Anglo-Norwegian case eventually ended up in the International Court of Justice in The Hague in 1952, where the court found in favor of Norway, and allowed it to draw straight baselines across bays and thus closing them off. But the court did not settle the issue of the legality of the 4-mile limit, arguing that it was not a part of the British case.12 In 1961, 38 out of 59 states claimed a territorial sea less than 12 miles, while 21 states claimed a territorial sea of 12 miles and larger. In 1971, 39 states out of 95 claimed a territorial sea less than 12 miles, while 56 states claimed a 12-mile or larger territorial sea. In addition, an increasing number of states claimed extended fisheries zones in this period, rising from 22 in 1961 to 38 states in 1971.13 Three other factors also contributed in putting pressure on the Law of the Sea. First, fishing fleets were becoming more sophisticated and efficient, resulting in a tremendous increase in the distant-water fleet in the 1960s. Improved efficiency and larger fleets—a development which has continued to this day—increased the fishing effort and the issue of over fishing and resource depletion gained prominence. Finally, decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s led to a growth in the number of independent states, most of which were eager to gain sovereignty over their resources. By the early 1970s, the traditional Law of the Sea had been thrown into disarray after being relatively stable for two hundred years, forcing the international community to find an acceptable solution. The solution came in the form of the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

The Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea began in 1973, and concluded in an agreement in 1982, after eleven sessions. UNCLOS did not enter into force until 16 November 1994 when the sixtieth state signed the Convention. As of May 2007, 153 of the original 157 signatories had ratified the agreement, acceded to the agreement, issued a formal confirmation or issued a declaration, solidifying it as an international regime governing the oceans.14 UNCLOS is described as the best developed body of international law, however a general critique of the regime is that it is too vague and that it lacks enforcement power to make it an effective legal document. A second significant criticism is that UNCLOS is mainly concerned with securing the rights of individual states to EEZs, not with managing the fisheries themselves.15

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UNCLOS significantly changed the regime governing the Law of the Sea by making a large part of the ocean the private concern of individual states. Today about 36% of the world’s oceans are demarcated as EEZs, but these zones contain about 90% of the most valuable fisheries.16 By creating the 200mile EEZs for coastal states, UNCLOS moved the conflict over diminishing resources from the international to the domestic arena. The hope was that individual states would be better suited than the anarchic international system to ensure conservation of the most valuable fish stocks. In the international system, no state has an incentive to protect marine resources from depletion, but because states want to maximize their resources so as to maximize catches for domestic fishermen, they have an incentive to manage stocks within their EEZs. The creation of the EEZs thus fundamentally altered the institutional context of ocean fishing.

Rights and Duties Imposed by the 1982 Law of the Sea The rights, duties, and monitoring mechanisms set up by UNCLOS in 1982 have important implications for negotiations involving distribution of straddling fish stocks, as it demarcates the size of the EEZ, and assigns rights and duties to coastal states and to high-seas fishing states.17 But it does not give states any hard-and-fast rules regarding how states should apply the provisions in the agreement. Instead, countries seeking to cooperate can use concepts found in the agreement as baselines for their agreements. Both Iceland and Norway have ratified the agreement and are therefore bound by its framework. This section discusses the rights, duties, and monitoring mechanisms laid out in the Law of the Sea to show how the regime influences the negotiated outcome.

Rights UNCLOS for the most part settled the question of the size of the territorial sea and the EEZ. According to UNCLOS, sovereignty of a coastal state extends 12 miles (territorial sea) beyond its land territory, internal waters, air space, and bed and subsoil (Article 2).18 The limit of the contiguous zone is 24 miles from the territorial sea (12 miles). Within the 12–24 mile belt the coastal state has the right to prevent and punish infringement of customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary regulations (Article 33). The limit of the EEZ is 200 miles, and within it a coastal state has sovereign rights to explore, exploit, conserve, and manage natural resources in the water, seabed, and subsoil (Articles 56 and 57). In managing the EEZ, coastal states are empowered to enforce the rules laid out in the Law of the Sea by boarding and inspecting foreign ships suspected of violating the regime, arresting violators, and con-

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ducting judicial proceedings (Article 73). The right to enforce the Law of the Sea, however, does not extend to the high seas, outside the 200-mile EEZ. The goal of creating the 200-mile EEZ was to enhance the rights of coastal states in the belief that individual states could overcome the pervasive tragedy of the commons, and thus ensure the sustainability of the various fish stocks.19 In reality, it allowed states to limit access to their fisheries, but the tragedy of the commons remained. Foreign fishermen were excluded from domestic fishing banks, which meant that the domestic fishing industry had sole right to the resource, and fishing in many cases remained lightly controlled and regulated.

Duties Increased rights also came with increased duties on behalf of coastal and highseas-fishing states. Article 58 addresses the rights and duties of other states. In short, states have a right to innocent passage on sea or in air through EEZs, and can lay submarine cables or pipelines through them. In return they have to regard the rights of coastal states. Coastal states are required to determine the TAC, using scientific methods. It is a function of the scientific calculation of the maximum sustainable yield, which represents the highest possible catch that would not harm the resource. If a stock is over-utilized, a coastal state must take measures to build it up again to be able to produce maximum sustainable yield (Article 61). UNCLOS also places a burden on high-seas-fishing states. They must take into account domestic management efforts when fishing in the EEZ of other countries (Article 56). UNCLOS deals particularly with the issue of straddling stocks (Article 63). It says that the states that have claims to a particular stock (coastal states and high-seas-fishing states) must cooperate either directly or through regional organizations to manage these stocks. But the agreement says nothing about what the principles of cooperation should be or how the states involved should determine if a state has the right to a stock in the case of a high-seas fishery. In short, the UNCLOS regime sets the goals, but provides no guidelines for cooperation or solutions for enforcement. As for managing fishing on the high seas, coastal states and high-seas-fishing states now have the duty to collectively conserve and manage marine resources (Article 117), and to this effect they must negotiate on how to manage shared stocks to prevent overexploitation of a particular stock (Article 118).

Resolution of Conflict The problem with the provisions for conflict resolution in UNCLOS is that they are general and non-binding for participants. Article 59 only states: “Conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity and in the light of all the

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relevant circumstances, taking into account the respective importance of the interests involved to the parties as well as to the international community as a whole.”20 If states actually carried out these obligations, it might well resolve many high-seas management difficulties. But with limited resources for enforcement and monitoring, states have little incentive and ability to carry them out. Thus, the mere existence of these obligations has been insufficient to deal with problems of straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks. The 200-mile EEZ is an artificial border not respected by the individual fish stocks. As overfishing within the EEZ became more prevalent, trawlers and factory ships started traveling further, resulting in clashes between international and domestic management. The issue of straddling fish stocks made cooperation necessary for the survival of the stocks, but it did not guarantee that nations began negotiations as to how to manage straddling stocks. Several factors contribute to the inadequacy of the 1982 Law of the Sea. The single greatest weakness was that the obligation to conserve only applied to individual fishing states, which meant they could only prescribe measures for their own fishing fleets. Hence, absent an agreement, no other state or entity has the competence to enforce obligations to adopt these measures or to implement them. Each high-seas-fishing state is the judge of its own performance.21

The Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks Following the signing of UNCLOS in 1982, it became increasingly clear that it did not adequately address the management of straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks. The main problem was that the regime governing the utilization of resources that straddle boundaries or are found exclusively in the high seas remained similar to what it had been under the 1958 Convention. In the decade long negotiations, little had been done to effectively address the problem of unregulated fishing on the high seas, be it straddling stocks or highly migratory fish stocks. High-seas-fishing states could still undermine the conservation efforts of coastal states by harvesting a straddling fish stock outside the 200-mile limit. These developments increased the pressure on straddling stocks, and created many conflicts around straddling stocks and highly migratory species. In addition, scientific information on the state of different fish stocks was increasing, the number of ships and their size was increasing, and fishing technology became more effective. For example, the high-seas-fishing fleet increased from about 19,500 fishing vessels over 100 Gross Registered Tons (GRT) in 1980, to about 24,000 vessels in 1992. The size of the fleet has since leveled off.22 A number of major conflicts involving straddling stocks and highly migratory species arose in the 1980s, highlighting the 1982’s agreements shortcom-

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ings to effectively deal with these problems. In the Northwest Atlantic, conflicts arose around the Canadian cod stock found within the Canadian EEZ and in the area of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland beyond the 200-mile limit, where an international distant-water fleet was also engaged in the fishery. The matter was discussed within the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), but members were unable to reach an agreement. In the Northeast Pacific there was a problem surrounding overfishing of straddling pollock in the so-called “Doughnut Hole,” an area completely surrounded by the EEZs of the United States and the Soviet Union, now Russia. States such as China, South Korea, Japan, and Poland fished there regularly and were not inclined to stop doing so despite evidence of serious resource depletion. In addition, there were problems with the management of jack mackerel off the coast of Peru and Chile, squid in the South Atlantic, orange roughy off the coast of New Zealand, and with several species off the coast of West Africa.23 In the early 1990s, it had become clear that the international community had to address specifically the issue of managing straddling stocks and highly migratory species. The United Nations convened a conference in 1993 to improve the UNCLOS provisions dealing with multilateral management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory species. Six sessions later, in December 1995, the participants signed the Straddling Stocks Agreement. The objective of the Straddling Stocks Agreement was to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, thus complementing UNCLOS. It set guidelines for international cooperation around straddling stocks, and entered into force on 11 December 2001, when the 30th signatory ratified the agreement. As of May 2007, sixty-six states have ratified or acceded to the Straddling Stocks Agreement.24

Rights The Straddling Stock Agreement does not give either coastal states or highseas-fishing states increased rights, but instead strengthens the right of coastal states to manage straddling fish stocks. High-seas-fishing states still have the right to fish on the high seas and coastal states keep their rights within their EEZs. The agreement redefines the high-seas regime to make it more conducive to managing straddling stocks and highly migratory species through international cooperation (Straddling Stocks Agreement 1995, Articles 1 and 2).

Duties While the rights stay the same, the agreement increases the duties leveled on both high-seas-fishing states and coastal states to manage straddling stocks. This agreement is by far the most binding agreement on international management of

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fisheries, as the signatory states undertake the duty of managing straddling and highly migratory stocks. According to Article 5, coastal states and high-seasfishing states have a duty to cooperate and any cooperative agreement should be based on scientific advice. The Straddling Stocks Agreement also advocates using a precautionary approach when making management decisions on stocks where information is limited. In Article 6, it makes clear that absence of information on the state of the stocks cannot be used to avoid conservation and cooperation. Both coastal states and high-seas-fishing states have a duty to cooperate. In undertaking cooperation, states have to consider coastal states’ management efforts, efforts of regional organizations, and the dependence of the coastal state on the resource when reaching an agreement. According to the Straddling Fish Stock Agreement, the cooperation can be accomplished either through direct negotiations or through regional organizations (Article 7). Any state can initiate cooperation, and high-seas-fishing states must become members of regional organizations that have jurisdiction in the fisheries they participate in (Article 8). Only members of organizations can participate in the fishery (Article 9). The states have a duty to collect scientific data (Article 14), and strengthen existing regional organizations (Article 13). States should work to avoid disputes (Article 28), but when they arise states have an obligation to resolve them peacefully (Article 27), and to prevent disputes in the first place. The agreement also sets up a binding procedure for the settlement of disputes (Article 30). Even though the agreement is an improvement over the 1982 UNCLOS, the Straddling Stocks Agreement does not specify the basis of cooperation, or give clear guidelines as to how states should determine the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) of a particular stock or how to divide it among states participating in the fishery. In addition, it does not give any guidelines on how to determine who has a legitimate interest in participating in a particular fishery, apart from the right of the coastal state. In short, the nature and the basis of negotiations are left up to the negotiating states. They can choose whether to enter negotiations, what baseline they will use to allocate the TAC, and can decide to submit the management of a particular stock to a regional fishing organization or decide not participate at all.

Enforcement and Monitoring The agreement is a step ahead of UNCLOS on the issues of enforcement and monitoring. Flag states shall ensure compliance of their ships (Article 19),25 and states have to cooperate to ensure compliance (Article 20). In addition, the agreement also allows for boarding of ships of other states for inspection (Article 21). But, in doing so, they must notify the flag state of its intention and follow other established procedures.

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While the Straddling Stocks Agreement improves the provisions of UNCLOS—by dealing with the management of stocks that straddle boundaries by increasing the duties on the signatories—there is no central authority that monitors whether or not members are complying with it. Enforcement and monitoring are left to the states themselves. The participating states possess varying ability and interest in monitoring fisheries and managing these stocks. The effectiveness of the agreement to manage straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks is therefore questionable.

Role of International Law in the Negotiating Process Iceland and Norway were active participants in the UNCLOS negotiations during the 1970s as well as during the negotiations of the Straddling Stocks Agreement in the early 1990s. Iceland ratified UNCLOS in 1985, while Norway did so in 1994. As for the Straddling Stocks Agreement, Iceland ratified the agreement in 1997, while Norway did so in 1996. It is clear that the Law of the Sea regime has influenced the negotiations allocating straddling fish stocks between the two countries, specifically by providing solution concepts—such as historical rights, or by emphasizing the role of science in resource allocation—to the negotiators. The regime narrows the number of possible solutions participants consider, but the law does not dictate which concept should be adopted, or how to weigh the importance of different factors in deciding the final allocation. It is also clear that the Law of the Sea cannot explain the variance in the distributive outcome of the agreements analyzed here. As discussed before, specific provisions of UNCLOS and the Straddling Stocks Agreement are too vague and therefore give individual states enormous power to decide how best to manage straddling stocks. The agreements reached between Iceland and Norway are based on three main conventions that derive from the regime on the Law of the Sea. While the 1982 Law of the Sea and the 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement provide a framework for negotiations, the participating states are on their own in how they interpret these provisions. Nonetheless, these three conventions emerged through my interviews, where several interviewees discussed the rights of coastal states, the importance of the role of science, and the role of historical rights.

Rights of Coastal States Article 63 of the Law of the Sea calls for cooperation among coastal states and high-seas-fishing states in managing straddling fish stocks. This duty to cooperate is reinforced in Article 5(a) of the Straddling Stocks Agreement. Countries

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with interests in a particular stock are either coastal states or high-seas-fishing states, depending on where the fishery is located. The overarching principle in the Law of the Sea is that coastal states have sovereign rights over their EEZs, but these rights come with the responsibility of properly managing resources found there. In the case of straddling fish stocks, states that claim rights to a fish stock have to cooperate with other states to fully manage the stock. Highseas-fishing states have the responsibility not to deplete stocks. The general rule that has emerged is that coastal states have a greater right to stocks that straddle their maritime boundaries, and will thus get a bigger share than highseas-fishing states. In the case of capelin in 1980, Iceland was a coastal state while Norway was engaged in a high-seas fishery. Because Norway got a 200-mile Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around Jan Mayen subsequent to the 1980 negotiations, both states were coastal states in 1989 and in 1998. But this convention does not explain why Iceland was allocated a much larger share than Norway in all three negotiations. In the case of herring in 1996 and 1997, Norway, Iceland, Faroe Islands, and the European Union all claimed status as coastal states. In the cod negotiations, Norway and Russia were classified as coastal states, while Iceland was a high-seas-fishing state. In the case of oceanic redfish, Iceland and Greenland claimed coastal state status, while Norway was a high-seas-fishing state.

Zonal Attachment Article 5 of the Straddling Stocks Agreement emphasizes the role of science in the management of straddling fish stocks. Calculating zonal attachment is one method of determining scientifically what rights a state has to a stock. Scientists calculate how much of the stock is found within a particular economic zone at any given time, and then compute a number representing the distribution of the stock in general. This number is then used to allocate the fish stocks among states laying claim to the stock. In practice, zonal attachment is often used as a baseline for division, that is, who should get the largest share, but is rarely strictly applied. Though none of the negotiations discussed here have been determined solely on zonal attachment, the ones closest to fitting that model are the capelin negotiations. Iceland does not have a zonal attachment of Arctic cod, and Norway has about 90% zonal attachment in the case of herring, but only gets about 54% of the quota. Finally, Norway has no zonal attachment in the oceanic redfish case.

Historical Rights According to provision 62(3) of the 1982 Law of the Sea, states have to respect the historical rights to fisheries. That is, states that have fished a particular

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stock over time have a historical right to continue the fishery. In negotiations between Iceland and Norway, the application of this provision has been very uneven, and the definition of where history begins is contentious. For example, during the conflict over cod in the 1990s, Iceland claimed to have historical fishing rights in the Barents Sea based on a few trawlers fishing there in the mid-1950s. Norway dismissed this claim outright, and has always maintained that Iceland does not have historical fishing rights in the area. During the herring negotiations in 1995 and 1996, Iceland also emphasized historical rights, since the stock had been found around Iceland before it collapsed in the late 1960s. This resulted in Iceland getting a larger share of the stock than it would have been allocated had the agreement been based on zonal attachment. Norway was awarded an oceanic redfish quota based on historical rights, even though its history of fishing this stock was only about ten years old. These suggested baselines have not been uniformly applied to the different stocks being discussed here and often carry different weights in negotiations. Which baseline is chosen is a political decision based on the domestic constraints negotiators face which determine the size of the win-set for each country. Historical rights in general are the most easily manipulated to achieve political ends and have been most widely used. For example, one Norwegian official lamented that it was hard to get negotiators to be consistent over time and across cases. “I am trying to have a model and that model is Zonal Attachment,” he said. “Then there is the need to have a solution.”26 In general, scientists have advocated using the zonal attachment model because it would lead to management decisions based solely on science, with little room for negotiations. But historical rights are attractive as a solution concept as they can be more easily manipulated during the negotiations.

Regional Fisheries Bodies and the Role of Science The Straddling Stocks Agreement emphasizes the role of science and proposes an increased role for regional fisheries bodies in the management of straddling stocks. Regional fisheries organizations have existed in many parts of the world, most of which were established after World War II. The effectiveness of these organizations has been quite limited, as they have to get a mandate from member states to manage a particular stock. When UNCLOS was signed, many organizations were either reinvented or reestablished and a number of new organizations have been created. In the North Atlantic, there are three regional organizations that play a role in the management of straddling stocks: the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) and Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO). NEAFC and NAFO are regional fisheries

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organizations charged with increasing cooperation around fisheries management in the North Atlantic, while ICES is a scientific organization that partially serves as a clearing house for scientific research on the fisheries and oceans. For my purpose here, the organizations that matter in the negotiations between Iceland and Norway are ICES and NEAFC. NAFO does not have any say in the management of the four stocks discussed here. Its area of emphasis is off the coast of Canada and west of the southern part of Greenland, which is west of where any of the four stocks discussed here are found. The following discussion is thus limited to the role of ICES and NEAFC.

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) was established in Copenhagen, Denmark in 1902, where it also is headquartered. It has grown from eight member states to having twenty members from both sides of the Atlantic.27 It is the oldest intergovernmental organization in the world concerned with marine and fisheries science. Since the 1970s, a major area of ICES work as an intergovernmental marine science organization has been to provide information and advice to member states and international regulatory commissions, including NEAFC.28 The role of ICES is to promote, develop, and encourage marine research, publish and disseminate research findings, and provide scientific advice to member governments. It is this last role that is relevant to the negotiations between Iceland and Norway. ICEC provides scientific advice on fisheries conservation through peer-reviews of scientific reports in the Advisory Committee on Fisheries Management (ACFM) and Advisory Committee on the Marine Environment (ACME). As ICES is a scientific body, it strives to maintain political independence in its advice by having a separate committee review the scientific advice of ACFM and ACME. According to one Icelandic interviewee, the fact that all peer-review decisions are made by consensus has increased confidence in the advice the organization distributes.29 Other interviewees confirmed this view and no one directly criticized the organization and its advice. The general view was that the organization facilitated cooperation by removing some sources of potential conflict: the state of the particular stock being negotiated, the maximum sustainable yield for the stock, and the total allowable catch. When negotiators do not have to argue about the biology of a stock, the conflict over the size and condition of the stock is eliminated, and the negotiators can focus on how to distribute the total allowable catch. The role of ICES in the negotiations between Iceland and Norway varies according to which stock is being discussed. It plays no role in the negotiations over Icelandic capelin, as the stock does not migrate into international waters at all. For the negotiations on cod, herring, and oceanic redfish, ICES serves as a clearinghouse for national scientific data and thus provides a baseline for the

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state of the stocks. ICES has an important indirect role in the negotiations between Iceland and Norway, but the advice the organization issues does not explain the final distribution of national quotas.

North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission The North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) was established in 1963, following a realization that an organization called the “Permanent Commission” needed a broader mandate than determining mesh size to regulate high-seas fishing in order to manage stocks and prevent overfishing. Headquartered in London, the convention applies to the area north of 36⬚N latitude (north of Gibraltar) and between 42⬚W (southern tip of Greenland) and 51⬚E longitude (slightly west of the Russian possession of Novaya Zemlya in the Barents Sea), excluding the Baltic Sea and the Mediterranean. Until 1982, NEAFC’s mandate was to regulate high-seas fishing in the Northeast Atlantic Ocean through mesh size and closed areas.30 The effectiveness of the organization in the 1960s and 1970s was questionable, as there were usually severe differences among its members, and the organization lacked broad powers to enforce agreements. According to an Icelandic interviewee familiar with the organization in the early years, NEAFC in the 1960s and 1970s was basically an organization where the members fought a great deal without accomplishing much of anything.31 The future of the organization was jeopardized in the late 1970s, following the extension of the EEZ, and again when the member states of the European Economic Community (EEC) resigned from the organization in 1980. The remaining members got together and established a new convention, which entered into force in 1982 and member states of the EEC joined again. The purpose of the revamped NEAFC is to encourage a regional approach to the conservation and utilization of fishery resources in the North East Atlantic, and to encourage international cooperation and consultation as called for in UNCLOS.32 There are six contracting parties to NEAFC: the European Union, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, Iceland, Norway, Poland, and the Russian Federation. According to NEAFC’s convention, the member states can choose whether or not the organization has a role in managing the fisheries.33 That is, NEAFC cannot manage a straddling stock unless the coastal states involved in the particular fishery agree to give it a mandate to do so. If the organization gets this mandate it can, for example, regulate fishing gear, size of fish caught, establish areas closed to fishing, determine the fishing season, establish TACs, and regulate fishing effort (Article 7). So far, the only stock the commission has permission to regulate fully is oceanic redfish. Greenland and Iceland are coastal states in this case, and they agreed to give the mandate to NEAFC in the mid1990s, resulting in a management agreement in 1996. NEAFC has also gotten

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an increased role in managing the Icelandic-Norwegian herring stock once the contracting parties had agreed on the initial distribution of the stock in the negotiations in 1996 and 1997. NEAFC does not play any role in the management of Icelandic capelin, as the stock never straddles into international waters, or in the case of cod, probably because it is too political of an issue for Norway, Iceland, and Russia to hand over to an international organization.

Summary This chapter has provided an overview of the development of the Law of the Sea regime since the end of World War II. The regime governing the oceans has been transformed during this time, resulting in a 200-mile EEZ for coastal states. Although the Law of the Sea has changed, and it has become more binding for members, the states that have ratified the agreements still have great leeway in interpreting provisions of UNCLOS and the Straddling Stocks Agreement, which together form the Law of the Sea regime. This undermines the effectiveness of the regime to manage straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks, putting them at risk for overutilization. While the agreements do narrow the range of possible solutions when negotiating the management of straddling stocks, the domestic politics of the participating states determines whether or not states will reach an agreement on the management of straddling stocks, and how the agreements reached will determine the resource distribution.

Chapter 3

The Decline of Norwegian Fishing Interests

T

he extension of the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone to 200 miles in 1977 gave the Norwegian government ownership of rich fish banks and substantial oil deposits. In addition to extending the country’s EEZ, Norway also declared a Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ) around the Norwegian possessions of Svalbard in the Arctic Ocean, and around Jan Mayen in the Norwegian Sea.1 While Norwegians have sole ownership of their oil deposits, this is not the case with their fisheries. The geography of Norwegian waters, as displayed on the map of the area in chapter 1, is such that almost all of the stocks found within the Norwegian EEZ are straddling stocks shared with other states. Measured by weight caught, about 80% of the Norwegian fisheries are shared with other states.2 As discussed in chapter 1, managing these stocks in order to maintain catch levels and ensure future survival requires bilateral or multilateral allocation agreements. Early on, Norway set out to do just that, and within few years of the extension of their EEZ, the country had signed structural agreements with all the states concerned.3 One bureaucrat I interviewed put the Norwegian problem bluntly, saying: “Our ecosystem is such that we have to be on good terms with the EU in the south and the Russians in the north. Otherwise everything would go to hell.”4 To this day, most of the Norwegian fisheries are managed through annual negotiations with neighboring states. This chapter discusses the international and domestic realities that have influenced the ability of the Norwegian delegation to get a good agreement when negotiating the sharing of straddling stocks with Iceland. The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section addresses the role of Norway in the Law of the Sea, its history of cooperation with other nations, and Norway’s ambiguous relationship with the European Economic Community (EEC) in the 47

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1970s and the European Union (EU) in the 1990s. The picture that emerges is one of a key actor in the Law of the Sea, a country that is experienced in negotiations when it comes to its fisheries resources, but who has also twice rejected membership in the EEC/EU in order to protect its fishing resources. The second section discusses the three key actors that are relevant in the management of the Norwegian fisheries, both domestically and internationally. This section shows how the government, scientists, and interest groups— especially Norges Fiskarlag (the Norwegian Fishermen’s Association) as the key interest group—interact domestically, and how this interaction influences international negotiations. The third section discusses the structure of the Norwegian fishing industry, focusing on the history of centralized decision making and regional cleavages, showing how these factors enhanced the political importance of the fishing industry. It focuses on the nature of interest group organization and how the role of Norges Fiskarlag has changed since the mid-1970s. The reduction in the number of fishermen, the end of the Cold War, and the rise of the oil sector have all profoundly altered the relationship between Norges Fiskarlag and the Norwegian government. These three changes have allowed the government to eliminate subsidies aimed at putting fishermen’s incomes on par with those employed in comparable occupations. The political and economic changes are reflected in the lessening interest of the Storting (The Norwegian Parliament) to discuss fisheries issues and the lessening weight of regional politics that originally gave the fishing industry great political leverage. In short, the government is less and less willing to cede to industry demands, and it exercises that shift in power without suffering significant political costs. The main argument of this chapter is that the declining bargaining power of the fishing industry—represented by Norges Fiskarlag—has influenced the negotiations with Iceland by giving the Norwegian government increasing freedom to solve distributive conflicts with other nations without having to worry about incurring significant political costs if the government goes against the wishes of the fishermen. As discussed in chapter 1, the expectation is that a state with a less constrained bargaining position is less likely to be able to negotiate a favorable distributive agreement for domestic interests. Hence, the declining importance of the Norwegian fishing sector and its key representative has led to a larger win-set for Norway. As the chapter on Iceland will show, Iceland’s winset has remained much narrower by comparison, increasingly giving Iceland the upper hand in the negotiations over distribution of straddling fish stocks.

Norway’s Place in the International System Norway is a major fishing nation, with a considerable fleet of merchant ships, both of which make it important at the international level. At the international

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level, there are three major external considerations to discuss when looking at the Norwegian fisheries prior to the extension of the 200-mile EEZ on 1 January 1977. First, it is important to look at the role Norway played during the Law of the Sea conferences. Second, following the creation of the EEZ, Norway signed structural agreements with its neighboring states to ensure management of straddling stocks. Finally, Norwegian voters twice rejected in referenda the government’s proposal to become a member of, first the European Economic Community in 1972, and later the European Union in 1994. In both referenda, the issue of giving the European fishing fleet access to the Norwegian EEZ was a crucial issue in the defeat. These issues shed light on Norwegian behavior in the international system, and on the role of the fishing industry in the Norwegian economy and how it has changed over time.

Norway and the Law of the Sea Norway took the back seat to Iceland in extending its fisheries limit to 200 miles in the early and mid-1970s. In 1961, Norway established a 12-mile fishing zone, following Iceland’s lead from 1958. Iceland extended its fisheries limits twice in the 1970s, first to 50 miles in 1972 and then to 200 miles in 1975. The extension of Icelandic waters ignited two fierce “Cod Wars” with the United Kingdom, prompting Norway to adopt a more cautionary approach, as it wanted to avoid direct confrontation with the United Kingdom and other neighboring states. During this time, consensus-seeking and caution marked Norwegian policy, as the government emphasized the need for an international agreement on the size of the Exclusive Economic Zone. Despite strong pressure from the fishing industry to extend the economic zone to 200 miles, the government decided to wait and see what would emerge from the Third Law of the Sea Conference before creating a 200-mile EEZ. This decision reflected the different and often opposing interests that the Norwegian government sought to balance. As Norway shares most of its fishing resources with neighboring states, any extension could have meant serious conflict with the nations fishing in what is now the Norwegian EEZ. While the government was under intense pressure from the coastal fisheries sector that would have benefited the most from extension, Norway also had a substantial distant-water fleet that could have faced difficulties if other states had extended their economic zones. There were also concerns about Soviet reaction to a Norwegian extension, and Norway wanted to ensure freedom of passage through the world’s oceans for its large merchant fleet.5 Norway played an important role during the Third UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, where it sought to ensure the rights of coastal states. Despite being a small country, Norway substantially influenced the final outcome of the Law of the Sea because of its unique interest structure. It is a coastal state with substantial coastal and distant-water fisheries, and a NATO member with

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a large merchant fleet. In addition, Norway was experienced in Law of the Sea issues and negotiations. For example, the bureaucracy included a specific government department to deal with the Law of the Sea Conference. Finally, Jens Evensen, who was one of the world’s foremost specialists on the Law of the Sea, led the Norwegian delegation and wielded considerable influence.6 The Norwegian government finally extended Norwegian waters to 200-miles in January 1977, when it had become clear that any new Law of the Sea agreement would include a 200-mile EEZ. This decision was hotly contested within the government, pitting those who wanted to proceed with care against those who wanted extension, especially the coastal fishermen.7 This decision meant that Norway had to negotiate agreements to share straddling stocks with the Soviet Union and the European Economic Community—both of which were against Norwegian extension. The negotiations succeeded in the late 1970s. While the extension of the Norwegian EEZ was relatively smooth, Norway’s creation of 200-mile Fisheries Protection Zones around its island possessions of Svalbard (a.k.a. Spitsbergen) and Jan Mayen were controversial. Norway was awarded sovereignty over Svalbard with the Svalbard Treaty in 1920.8 Under the treaty, Norway was to preserve the no-man’s-land (terra nullius) status of the island through nondiscriminate access of treaty signatories to its resources (fishing, hunting, and mining), as well as ensure peaceful utilization of the area. Soon after Norway extended its EEZ to 200 miles, Norway created a 200-mile Fisheries Protection Zone around the island cluster. The goal was to control fishing in the area without confrontation. The Soviet Union protested Norway’s 200-mile zone, thereby rejecting Norway’s unilateral fisheries management. Other signatories to the treaty, except Canada and Finland, have accepted Norway’s position. Norway claims that all regulations governing fishing are nondiscriminatory.9 Norway also ran into conflict with Iceland and Denmark (representing Greenland) about its creation of a 200-mile fisheries zone around the largely uninhabited island of Jan Mayen. As part of the first capelin agreement in 1980, Iceland and Norway came to an agreement about the dividing line between the two zones through the help of Elliot Richardson, a noted United States statesman, who was brought in as mediator. The final division resulted in Iceland getting the full 200-miles EEZ in the direction of Jan Mayen. When it came to creating a dividing line between Greenland and Norway, Greenland wanted the same treatment as Iceland, that is, a full 200-mile zone. Norway rejected the proposal, insisting on dividing the area into two equal parts, and in the end Denmark referred the matter to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. The Court’s ruling in 1993 drew the dividing line between the 200-mile Greenlandic zone and the median line claimed by Norway, giving Greenland a larger share of the disputed area.

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Cooperation with Neighboring States Soon after the extension of the EEZ, Norway set out to negotiate resourcesharing agreements with the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea, and the European Economic Community in the North Sea. As discussed earlier, the geography and biology of the Norwegian EEZ is such that most of the stocks found around Norway are straddling stocks. By 1974 the Norwegian government had already determined how it wanted the future of fisheries management to look following the extension of the 200-mile EEZ. As a rule, foreign nationals were forbidden to fish in the Norwegian EEZ and in the Fisheries Protection Zone around Jan Mayen, except through negotiations.10 The government did not want Norwegian actions in fisheries management to upset other countries sharing stocks with Norway. Fisheries policy was to be conducted through cooperation with the states that were affected by the eventual extension of Norwegian waters. The government emphasized reaching agreements with coastal states over management of common stocks, and the gradual reduction of foreign fisheries in Norwegian waters.11 This was the reason the government set out to negotiate structural agreements with the Soviet Union and the EEC. These agreements govern the annual allocation of quotas among the signatories, as well as provide a framework for cooperation in the area of fisheries. In the years following the extension of the Norwegian EEZ, Norway signed three different types of agreements with neighboring states concerning the management of its fisheries resources: long-term reciprocal agreements, agreements giving unilateral fishing rights, and phasing-out agreements. Below is a summary of agreements Norway reached with other states following the extension of the Norwegian Exclusive Economic Zone to 200 miles. It is based on reports from the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries, published in 1978, 1982–1990, 1995, 1996 and 1999.12 This discussion shows that Norway has had a long, and mostly successful, history of sharing straddling fish stocks with its neighboring states. Long-term Agreements on Reciprocal Fishing Rights. These kinds of agreements were signed with the USSR for the Barents Sea, with the European Economic Community for the North Sea, and with the Faroe Islands in the late 1970s for the Norwegian Sea. The first two are by far the two most important structural agreements Norway has signed that deal with shared fisheries. From a Norwegian standpoint, the objective of these agreements was to gain reciprocal fishing rights in other zones. These agreements had an initial duration of ten years, but they have all been renewed, and are still in force. Norway signed a fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union in 1975, establishing the Joint Soviet-Norwegian Fisheries Commission. When Norway created the 200-mile EEZ, it ignited a conflict with the Soviet

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Union as to where to draw the line between the two countries’ EEZs in the north. Differences about a dividing line between two adjacent EEZs had often been solved by dividing the disputed area in half. The Soviet Union refused this solution, their reason being that a median line would extend the Norwegian EEZ too close to the Kola Peninsula, a sensitive area militarily, and hub of the Soviet Union’s submarine fleet. A straight median line could potentially give the West too much information about the Soviet military. The maritime boundary between Norway and Russia has not yet been settled, but fishing in the area, the so-called “Grey Zone” (see map in chapter 1), has been governed by a bilateral agreement for thirty years. The Grey Zone Agreement of June 1977 was politically divisive when it was finalized, and although it was only intended to be a temporary measure, it seems to have gained permanent status. The Norwegian government was accused of having caved to Soviet pressures, as the largest part of the Grey Zone (67,599 square kilometers) lies within the undisputed Norwegian EEZ (23,000 square kilometers), but only a small part lies within the undisputed Soviet EEZ (3,000 square kilometers). The Grey Zone Agreement is still in force, and annual negotiations in the Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission allocate the fish stocks found in the area between the two states, primarily arctic cod, haddock, and Barents Sea capelin. The other important structural agreement is with the EEC/EU. It dictates the management of North Sea herring, coalfish, mackerel, sprat, Norway pout, saithe, sandeel, haddock, cod, whiting, and plaice. But despite the existence of a reciprocal agreement with the EEC/EU, there are sometimes serious differences in the management of stocks. In 1984 for instance, there was a disagreement between the two parties over the management of North Sea herring, and the parties were unable to reach an agreement for the latter part of 1984 and all of 1985. Instead, Norway and the EEC instituted unilateral catch limits for their own fishermen. In general, cooperation with the EEC/EU over fishing rights for North Sea herring has been difficult, mainly because of the scarcity of the stock and its importance as a fishery. These two main agreements with the EU and Russia prescribe annual negotiations over the allocation of quotas based on total allowable catch recommendations from the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). The decision of the size of the total allowable catch in the reciprocal fishing agreements was to be based upon a recommendation from ICES, or other qualified scientific institution. ICES gets scientific reports form its member states, which are then discussed in scientific meetings of the fisheries scientists of the individual countries. Next, the quota allocated to Norway is divided domestically by the government, often based on recommendations from the Regulation Council that includes members from the Directorate of Fisheries and various interest groups.

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Unilateral Access for Sweden and Finland. The second kind of agreement, which gave unilateral fishing rights to Sweden and Finland for ten years, were mainly intended to be used to fish North Sea herring. But the agreements never had any practical application, as the two countries did not get quotas to fish within the Norwegian EEZ.13 The three states agreed in theory on the right of Sweden and Finland to fish within the Norwegian zone, but with no quotas attached to the agreement, these agreements were empty. Phasing-out/Surplus Stocks Agreements. Most states that had been fishing within what became the Norwegian 200-mile EEZ got continual rights to fish within the Norwegian zone, but few of these agreements remain in force. Phasing-out agreements were signed with former East Germany, Poland, Portugal, and Spain to allow them to continue to fish in Norwegian waters for four years after the extension of the EEZ. Once the agreements expired in 1981, they were changed to allow these states access to surplus stock in Norwegian waters until the end of 1986. In 1987, Norway cancelled these agreements for Spain and Portugal, who had by then joined the European Economic Community (EEC). These agreements were renewed for five years with Poland and East Germany. Following the reunification of Germany, Poland is the only country left with fishing rights in Norwegian waters. In addition to the three agreements discussed above, Norway signed a tripartite agreement with Sweden and Denmark in 1966 that expired in 2001. This agreement allowed the fishermen of the signatories to fish up to four nautical miles from baselines in the waters between Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, irrespective of fisheries zones in the area. Fishing in this area was regulated by the three states together. Following Sweden’s entry into the European Union in 1996 this issue was to be settled through bilateral negotiations with the EU. In the early 1990s Norway also signed an agreement with Canada, which allows Norwegian vessels to fish surplus stocks in Canadian waters. The agreement has not yet had any practical implications, as there are no surplus stocks in Canadian waters.

Europe Rejected Twice Despite Norway’s cooperative agreements with the EEC/EU that entail annual negotiations to allocate fish quotas in the North Sea, Norway’s relationship with Europe has been ambiguous since the early 1970s. The government has twice negotiated a membership agreement with Europe, first to join the EEC in 1973 and then to join the European Union in 1995. Each membership agreement was put to a public referendum and rejected by the voting public. In each case, the primary industries of fishing and agriculture led the

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opposition to membership, fearing for their own survival if Norway joined the EEC in 1973 and the EU in 1995. Norway applied for membership to the EEC in the early 1960s, along with Denmark and Great Britain, but negotiations soon stalled. In 1967, Norway renewed its application, and in 1972 the government was satisfied enough with the membership agreement to put the issue of membership to a public referendum. But on September 26, 1972, Norwegian voters defeated the proposal with 53.49% voting against joining the EEC. The referendum was a crucial loss for the Labor government, which promptly resigned. After the failed referendum, Norway focused on expanding its oil industry, and the European issue lay dormant for the next 20 years. One of the crucial issues in these membership negotiations was the fisheries question and what access a European fishing fleet would have to Norwegian waters. The primary industries, such as fishing and agriculture, were opposed to EEC membership, the strongest opposition registering in the fishing areas of Northern Norway,14 where more than 70% of voters rejected membership. The fishermen’s opposition was based on two different fears, both related to the loss of influence they held in Norway. First, Norwegian fishermen did not want to risk having to give up their monopoly to set prices for fish. Second, there was uncertainty surrounding whether or not the EEC fleet would be able to fish within the then 12-mile Norwegian limit.15 Fishermen did not want to give fishing boats from the EEC access to Norwegian waters and markets, even though membership would give them full access to European markets for their exports. Powerful interest groups and organizations within the fishing sector campaigned hard against membership, especially Norges Fiskarlag and the Norwegian Fresh Fish Association (Norges Råfisklag), the centralized fish buyer in Norway. But the fishing industry was not united in its opposition: distantwater fishing interests supported membership, as did the Norwegian Vessel Owners Association (Fiskebåtredernes Forbund ) and the Norwegian Herring Sales Organization (Norges Sildsalgslag) who were hoping for better market access for Norwegian fish products in Europe. The split reflected the geographical and scale divisions evident in the Norwegian fisheries. In the end, the small-scale coastal fishing interests prevailed, and Norway decided to stay out of the EEC. Ultimately the referendum showed that the votes of smallscale fishermen and their supporters were crucial in the defeat of the membership application.16 Norway applied for membership to the European Union for the second time in the early 1990s, this time seeking to join at the same time as Sweden, Finland, and Austria. The negotiating process was difficult, and again the fisheries proved to be a sticking point. Norway tried to keep sovereignty over its fishing resources, but was only able to negotiate for an adjustment period.

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Following the adjustment period, Norway would have become a part of the EU’s Common Fisheries Policy, which governs fishing in EU waters, and the EU fishing fleet would have gotten full access to the Norwegian EEZ. Again, Norges Fiskarlag fought hard against membership, arguing that the Norwegian government was negotiating away Norway’s sovereignty. The organization argued that centralized control of the Norwegian fishing industry had worked as a stabilizer on an unstable industry, and that this centralized organization would be lost if Norway joined the EU. To voice its opposition to membership, Norges Fiskarlag printed brochures distributed to Norwegian homes, held workshops and conferences, and lobbied parliamentarians. Most of the fishing sector, led by Norges Fiskarlag, was united in its opposition to the membership application. Even those who favored Norwegian membership were skeptical of the agreement, though they eventually sided with the pro-EU camp because they thought free access to European markets was worth the price of membership. In this camp was the Norwegian Seafood Federation (Fiskeri- og havbruksnæringens landsforening), for example.17 In addition, the fishing industry got support from the oil industry, which did not see EU membership as being beneficial to them.18 The effort of Norges Fiskarlag and others succeeded, and again Norwegian voters rejected membership in a referendum in November 1994, with 52.5% voting against. Norwegian actions in two crucial areas prior to the extension of the 200mile EEZ suggest a cautious and somewhat xenophobic state in international affairs. During the Law of the Sea conference it successfully fought to extend fishing limits and to ensure rights of coastal states. The power of the Soviet Union/Russia in the area prevented Norway from pushing forward and extending its economic zone until it was clear that the international community was in agreement. In the south, the relationship with Europe has also been an uneasy one, with Norway proving to be both a difficult negotiator during membership negotiations and a reluctant European. The two failed European membership applications illustrated the primary industries’ fear of losing their influence within Norway. During the referendum process, these sectors were still influential enough to mobilize voters to reject an EU membership supported by the Norwegian government.

The Actors: Government, Scientists, and Interest Groups The actors that play a crucial role in negotiating international agreements in Norway that divide straddling fish stocks are the government (that is, the cabinet and bureaucrats and fisheries scientists) and the interest groups, most notably Norges Fiskarlag. This section will discuss the role of each of these

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actors, as well as explain the small role of the Norwegian parliament—called the “Storting”—in international negotiations. In Norway most delegations are led by bureaucrats from the Ministry of Fisheries, in some cases from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the case of a particularly politicized conflict, such as the cod conflict with Iceland, government ministers will have a large role. The role for interest groups—particularly Norges Fiskarlag—is also large, both in drawing up the negotiating strategy beforehand as well as having a member on the actual delegation.

The Government Two sectors of the government—defined as the bureaucracy, the cabinet, and the parliament—participate directly in international negotiations. The political importance of the negotiations dictates who participates, as well as the division of duties between the bureaucracy and politicians. The more politically important the negotiations are, the greater the level of involvement by the relevant cabinet ministers. Political importance also influences whether the Ministry of Fisheries or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of the negotiations. In particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is more likely to lead politically sensitive negotiations, whereas more routine negotiations are handled by the Ministry of Fisheries. During the past twenty years, the locus of who leads negotiations has shifted from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Fisheries. This change reflects two interrelated developments. First, the specialized ministries in Norway—such as the Ministry of Fisheries—have generally become more knowledgeable about international affairs, and have been entrusted to a greater extent with negotiations. Second, many of the negotiations, such as annual negotiations over TACs, have become routine and no longer require the lead of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Bureaucrats interviewed said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was usually in charge of structural agreements, while the Ministry of Fisheries handled annual negotiations over issues within the boundaries of the structural agreements. Representatives from the Ministry of Fisheries attend negotiations led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and vice versa. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is only absent from straight technical negotiations, such as discussions about stock levels and allowable mesh size within a particular fishery. According to one bureaucrat, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attends negotiating meetings led by the Ministry of Fisheries mainly to ensure that any agreement reached is consistent with general Norwegian foreign policy objectives. This convention began following the 200-mile extension when there was a great deal of antagonism between the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Fisheries over where responsibility lay, which has since withered away. “Now these two departments work well together,” the bureaucrat said.19

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The ability of the interest groups to influence the two ministries is not equal. As expected, the fisheries interest groups have a strong connection to the Ministry of Fisheries, but less so to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It might therefore seem that Norges Fiskarlag would be better able to influence delegations led by the Ministry of Fisheries than those led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet empirically this does not seem to be the case. For example, the Ministry of Fisheries led the herring negotiations in 1996, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs led the negotiations over cod fishing in the Barents Sea that concluded in 1999. The Norwegian interest groups were extremely dissatisfied with both agreements, arguing in both cases that the government was giving away Norwegian resources, indicating that both ministries now have the ability to resist pressure from Norges Fiskarlag. Bureaucrats form a bridge between politicians running the relevant ministries and the interest groups, and as such they try to balance the interest group demands with the political realities at home. They represent the ministries in charge of the negotiations, or more specifically, individual ministers. In negotiations over fisheries management, the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Fisheries are the most powerful individuals in international negotiations. This remains the case regardless of whether or not they are physically present during the actual negotiations. In issues that sit low on the scale of political priorities, their functionaries handle negotiations. At times, they are kept abreast of negotiations, and in some instances consulted via telephone in case of serious disagreements within the Norwegian delegations. However, according to interviewees, this is very rare. The bureaucrats also try to balance the wants of interest group with the desires of the government to reach an agreement. As one interest group interviewee admitted: “[The interest groups] are always more extreme in the demands than what is feasible to get and the bureaucrats have to compromise to reach an agreement.”20 This view was echoed on the government side: “We think we [the government] must have a broader responsibility in preserving the fishery than the interest organizations have,” said a bureaucrat.21 In negotiations, the government is generally more risk averse than the interest groups. The Norwegian parliament plays a peripheral role in negotiations over the allocation of fishing rights to straddling stocks, including those between Iceland and Norway. Of the seven agreements discussed here, only the first capelin agreement in 1980 and the cod agreement in 1999 qualify as structural agreements, and had to be ratified by the Storting. The other five agreements did not have to go through a formal ratification procedure. Instead they were presented to the parliament only for review, not approval. This eliminates the Storting as a potential veto player that can explain differences in outcomes, leaving us with the bureaucrats and the politicians as the only members of the government that directly influence negotiation outcomes.

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The Scientists Scientific information has played an increasingly important role in international negotiations. First, since the 1970s the amount of scientific research has increased tremendously, and the quality of research has improved. This development has bolstered the credibility of scientists, and made their advice less controversial. Second, some of my interviewees mentioned that because of the repeated collapse of different stocks, fishermen themselves have begun to see the value in scientific research. Fishermen have over time become more supportive of its use as a base for the determination of the TAC and subsequent quota allocation. There are two governmental organizations that deal with collection, evaluation, and dissemination of scientific information: The Institute of Marine Research (Havforskningsinstituttet) and The Directorate of Fisheries (Fiskeridirektoratet). The former collects scientific data on the fisheries, while the latter is involved in setting fisheries policy and is in charge of its implementation and enforcement. The Storting, the Ministry of Fisheries, and relevant interest groups use the Directorate’s advice to set domestic policy. In international negotiations, the Directorate of Fisheries gives legal advice to the Norwegian negotiators and is in charge of implementing the agreements once they are reached. While the Directorate of Fisheries cannot directly veto possible agreements, its advice is not easily ignored, and therefore it has considerable leverage. The scientists, and by extension ICES, in agreements that involve stocks that straddle international waters, have information on the state of a particular stock, and thus recommend the maximum sustainable yield for the stock, and based on that the total allowable catch that is deemed safe to catch. The scientists’ role is mainly to make sure that harvesting does not unnecessarily tax a stock, their role is purely advisory and cannot be used to explain the level of constraints on the Norwegian delegation.

The Interest Groups Interest groups are an integral part of the negotiating process in Norway, both domestically and internationally. All decisions regarding the domestic management of the fishing industry are negotiated between the government and the interests groups, and this form of cooperation spills over into the international arena, where Norges Fiskarlag represents interests of fisheries in the Norwegian delegation. Norwegian fishing interests have had one or more representatives in five of the seven negotiations discussed here. During the negotiations over herring in 1996, Norges Fiskarlag withdrew from the Norwegian delegation in protest. During the negotiations between Iceland, Norway, and Russia over cod fishing in the Barents Sea in the late 1990s, interest groups were kept out of the process. This shows that interest groups, as strategic actors, cannot

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make or break an agreement, but they can profoundly influence the terms of agreements by rejecting proposals and suggesting alternative ones. The role of interest groups in the international negotiating process shows a system where the interest groups—especially Norges Fiskarlag—are co-opted into the process to ensure their compliance later on. But despite being integrated into the negotiating process, Norges Fiskarlag’s position is vulnerable. In the case of the 1996 and 1997 herring agreements, as well as the 1999 cod agreement, the group was especially incensed at the size of the Icelandic share, but in the end they had to accept the agreement. Interviewees in Norway were in agreement on the three main features of interest group participation in international negotiations. 1. Bureaucrats look to interest groups for advice on the practical aspects of the different fisheries, for example which fishing banks are more productive than others, as well as advice on what the interest groups will think is an acceptable agreement. 2. Interest group representatives in Norway believe their participation is important. They conceded, though, that their influence had decreased, and complained that they were increasingly being left out of the process, with the government pursuing its own goals. 3. In exchange for a seat on a negotiating committee, interest groups must ensure their members accept the agreement once it is reached. This list warrants further discussion. First, the government carefully plans for Norwegian participation in international negotiations. The planning process also involves fisheries scientists and a wide array of interest group leaders, even though only Norges Fiskarlag, and in rare cases The Norwegian Sailors League (Norges Sjømannsforbund ), provide representatives to the actual delegation. For example, in order to prepare for annual quota negotiations with the European Union and Russia, the Norwegian government meets with scientists and interest groups once a year, usually in November. The fishery begins January 1st each year for stocks shared between Norway, EU, Norway, and Russia, therefore allocation agreements have to be negotiated before then. The mandate negotiators follow is discussed and decided during this meeting, balancing input from numerous interests. Once the mandate is set, negotiations with other states can begin. One bureaucrat said that during negotiations the Norwegian delegation builds from the mandate it is given to negotiate, and the leader of the delegation takes the wishes of the interest groups into account during the negotiations.22 While the structure of domestic interests is diverse, groups are often at odds with each other. The interviewees all said that the groups maintain unity when it came to participating in international negotiations, as this was the only way to be heard since their influence is limited to discussions before the

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negotiations start and whatever they can achieve during the negotiations. Bureaucrats told me that once in the delegation, the interest group representatives from Norges Fiskarlag are loyal to the process. One bureaucrat attributed that to the fact that the interest groups are present at all levels of the decision making process: They are members of the Norwegian delegation. As such they give us advice and it makes them see what the situation is during the negotiations so they can explain and they will understand why things are as they are. You also have this other aspect. In many cases when you get all these bureaucrats sitting together, the fishermen might say: “Listen to me: You can’t fish in this area because of this and this, and when you fish you need to do this.” So you also get practical advice and they can inform you what they see in the sea. You also have the scientists going with you and so you get a better picture of what is going on and understand both the practical and the scientific.23 There are of course occasions when the interest groups do not like the way the negotiations are going, and protest during the meetings. If the disagreement cannot be solved within the delegation, the lead negotiator will call the Ministry of Fishery for advice. In the case of serious disagreement, the fisheries minister might be consulted or even the whole cabinet. According to interviewees, this is rare. Norwegian bureaucrats say having interest group representatives on the delegation is helpful during the negotiations, and that this was a two-way street. “It is a great help for us and it is also helpful for them [the interest groups] to influence negotiations but also when you are part of something you are in a different position than when you get presented with conclusions that have already been drawn,” said one bureaucrat.24 In general, the bureaucrats were more positive about the interest groups’ ability to influence the process than were the members of the interest groups interviewed. “The interest groups feel they have influence, especially when they compare themselves with interest groups in other countries, except Iceland, which does like Norway [to include leaders of prominent interest groups in the delegation]. I am sure they would like to have more influence, but I think this is a fairly balanced system and it is difficult to find a workable system that would give interest groups more influence,” said one bureaucrat.25 Active participation in the delegation is in stark contrast with the role such groups play in the delegations of Norway’s negotiating partners. According to one bureaucrat, there is no rule whether or not interest groups are represented in the Russian delegation during meeting in the Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission.26 In its dealings with the European Union, another bureaucrat said that European interest groups attend international negotiations, but are

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never an official part of the EU delegation as they are in Norway. Instead, they wait in the hallways for the results.27 Second, despite a great deal of involvement in the international process, the interest groups are not always happy with agreements reached. One bureaucrat pointed out that fishermen rarely applauded agreements; they protested when their quota went down, but seemed to think that quota increases were the norm.28 In general, the feeling among interest group representatives interviewed was that they felt as if their participation was becoming less and less valued, and that their wishes were increasingly ignored. Third, once an agreement is negotiated there is little room for the interest groups to seek changes. As a Norwegian official put it, “It does not matter if they [the interest groups] do not like an agreement. They have to accept what the government does.”29 In the case of annual agreements that do not go through parliament, there is no official venue for the fishermen to protest negotiated agreements. In the case of structural agreements that do go through the Storting, interest groups can try to influence individual parliamentarians. However, they are seldom able to do so. In the case of the cod agreement of 1999, the agreement passed through the Storting, despite intense lobbying and opposition by the interest groups. A bureaucrat indicated that in general the fishermen were in a vulnerable position. “They can’t go on strike, they can’t stop fishing,” the official said. “They can voice their dissatisfaction with the government or with the ministers, which they do. But it does not really change anything, and these protests are rare.”30 The few avenues that exist for protests are usually ineffective to initiate change. Theoretically, one possible avenue for the fishermen would be to ignore their allocated quota and fish more in protest. Provided that collective action problems could be overcome, any such action would have dire consequences for their permission to fish within Norwegian waters. On average, Norwegian fishermen comply with government regulations, and do not go fishing where the government does not want them to fish. For example, Norway has only once started a protest fishery, which took place during a conflict over mackerel with the European Union in the mid-1980s. In that case, the government initiated the protest fishery, not the interest groups. Hence, fishermen generally seem to accept, albeit grudgingly at times, the negotiated agreements, and adhere to the quota allocated to Norway. Another avenue for interest groups would be to weather their dissatisfaction in the media and create problems for political leaders. Alternatively, the interest group could get a member of the Storting to ask either the minister of foreign affairs or fisheries a question during designated question times in the parliament. These questions are often used to put the spotlight on a particular issue and put a cabinet member on the defensive. “Of course they can create political problems for the minister by getting members of parliament to raise questions in parliament. But the point of including them in the process is to ensure they do not disagree much,” said a bureaucrat.31

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Overall, Norges Fiskarlag thinks its participation in delegations is important, but the organization is increasingly unable to influence the terms of agreement as will be discussed later.

Structure of the Norwegian Fishing Industry The key institutional features of the Norwegian fishing industry are its diverse organizational structure and centralized decision-making. The industry is also marked by the significant involvement of interest groups in all matters relating to the industry. There are numerous domestic factors that are unique to Norway which must be examined when discussing the Norwegian fisheries and the ability of different groups to influence international negotiations. This section explains the organizational structure of the fishing industry and the prevalent regional differences that exist within Norway. In doing so, it sets the stage for the discussion about the role of Norges Fiskarlag, and how the decline of the number of fishermen, the end of the Cold War, and the rise of the oil industry has influenced the organization’s ability to secure private benefits from the government as well as the decline in interest in the Norwegian parliament. Overall, these changes have lessened the ability of Norges Fiskarlag to influence policy, and have increasingly marginalized fisheries interests. Interest organization in Norway is decidedly corporatist.32 Hence, interest groups play a large role in decisions that affect them. Traditionally, authors writing about corporatism in Northern Europe have focused on the close cooperation between government, labor unions, and business organizations when negotiating labor and wage contracts, but the tenets of corporatism also reach into other parts of the economy, including the fishing sector. Generally, fishing interests have great influence on most domestic decisions affecting the industry, and to a certain degree on international issues as well. Organized fishing interests cooperate closely with the government on issues such as domestic resource allocation, controlling the size of the fishing fleet, what gear can be used for fishing, and so on. These interests are also represented directly in Norwegian delegations in international negotiations by the inclusion of Norges Fiskarlag as a member of the Norwegian delegation. Norges Fiskarlag is the most important interest organization when discussing international negotiations over allocation of straddling fish stocks. The organization encompasses everyone from the owners of small fishing boats to operators of large factory trawlers, as well as the fishermen themselves. Because of its diverse membership, it has been described not as a traditional interest group with focused goals, but rather as a federation of opposing interests.33 Such organizational structure is difficult to manage, especially domestically, and requires skillful leadership and selective incentives to bind the organization together. But according to my interviewees—bureaucrats and interest group representatives alike—Norges Fiskarlag shows a united front in international negotiations.

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Centralized Decision Making Decision-making in the fishing industry is highly centralized and governed through a complex maze of laws. The four most prominent laws are the Fresh Fish Laws (Råfiskloven) and the Export Laws (Eksportloven), both written in the 1950s, and the Processing Laws (Tilvirkarloven) and the Participation Laws (Deltakerloven), which date from the early 1970s. The Fresh Fish Laws were passed in 1951, and set up regional sales associations that have a monopoly on buying all fish landed in Norway. These regional associations belong to the Norwegian Fresh Fish Association (Norges Råfisklag), which sets minimum prices for fish. The only exception to this law is the buying of farm-raised fish, mainly salmon. According to the law, the fishermen could organize sales associations, which were granted a monopoly on buying fish brought ashore. The organizations dictate the terms of business, usually paying market price for landed fish, unless the price falls below the set minimum. The Export Law went into effect in 1955, and mandated that all exports go through centralized export organizations. Different rules for different fish products led to different organizations handling the export of the various species. For example, there is a separate organization that sells all dried and salted cod, and a different organization that exports herring and herring related products.34 The law practically eliminated damaging competition for foreign markets among exporters. Taken together, these two laws centralized two crucial features of the market for fish by giving a monopoly to those who sold fish firsthand and exporters. The second round of laws was enacted in the early 1970s, and their central goal was to deal with the recurring crisis of resource depletion in the fisheries. The Participation Law was passed in 1972. Together with laws governing ownership of fishing vessels passed in the early 1950s, it set rules as to who could participate in the fisheries. The goal was to limit entry into the profession, and therefore ease the pressure on endangered resources. The Processing Law took effect in 1971 and regulated the relationship between producers of fish products and exporters. The processors got the right to form sales organizations to sell their products to exporters, but there was little interest among them to do so, except for the processors that sell dried or salted cod to export organizations.35 Individually, and combined, the purpose of these laws was to increase the efficiency of the fishing sector through regulated competition. By doing so, the government wanted to make the industry self-sufficient, wean it off everincreasing government subsidies and government interference in times of crisis. It became clear in the late 1980s, however, that this goal had not been achieved, and that changes were needed.36 Throughout the 1980s, the value of the catch declined and efficiency diminished, setting off another round of lawmaking. The solutions proposed were marked by the political winds blowing in Western Europe and the United States at the time: increased privatization and reduced government interference. In addition to internal pressures for change, external factors also forced change.

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At the international front during the 1980s and 1990s, Norway signed numerous international agreements aimed at reducing barriers to trade. Specifically, Norway signed the GATT treaty in 1985, the EFTA agreement on free trade in fish in the early 1990s, and the European Economic Area agreement in 1993. Prior to 1993, the pending second EU membership application restricted the use of subsidies. There is still a great deal of centralization in Norwegian fisheries management, even though two of the four laws discussed above have changed. The Export Law was altered in 1990. The change eliminated the monopoly on exports and increased competition. The Processing Law was changed in 1992 and 1998 to eliminate the monopoly on selling fish products. But The Fresh Fish Law is still pretty much intact, which indicates that power relationships within the industry remain intact.37 There have been three main changes to the law, though. The first change increased rights of foreign trawlers to land fish in Norway, the second was that subsidies were reduced significantly, and finally public financing of the industry was reduced. The Participation Law has not been changed, and it continues to prevent entry into the industry, which lessens the number of fishing vessels, which in turn helps in the battle against overexploitation of fishing resources.38

Regional Cleavages The Norwegian fisheries are also marked by regional cleavages that influence decision making at the domestic level. Two interrelated cleavages within Norwegian fisheries have a profound impact on the politics of fishing in Norway. There is a division between large-scale and small-scale fishing interests, which is reinforced by geographical cleavages that have existed for a long time within Norway.39 The two regions that stand out from the rest of the country are Northern Norway and the west coast. The north has been a laggard industrially, with a large share of the population involved in primary industries such as fishing. Electorally, this area has always been the most radical part of Norway. The first parliamentarian elected from the Labor Party came from the north, and the area has traditionally been a Labor Party stronghold.40 Considering the prevalence of Labor Party governments since the end of World War II, this has put fisheries interests in the north in a particularly influential position. Of the eighteen cabinets that served between 1945 and 1999, eleven have been Labor Party cabinets. Of the remaining seven center- and right-wing governments, none has lasted the full four-year term, with the longest lasting about three years in the early 1980s. The west coast, on the other hand, has been much more conservative in voting patterns, usually voting for center- and right-wing parties. These traditional electoral divisions have weakened a bit in the past fifty years, but are still observable.41

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The pattern of political influence wielded by fishermen can be gauged by looking at where the fishermen live in Norway. More than 50% of all fulltime Norwegian fishermen live in the north, while about 24% live in Møre and Romsdal, the center for Norway’s distant-water fishing fleet. The proportion of part-time fishermen living in the north is also above 50%, while about 14% live in Møre and Romsdal. With around 70% of all Norwegian fishermen concentrated in four different regions, it is clear that any policy dealing with the fishing industry will have regional implications. These traditional cleavages are reinforced by patterns of fishing in Norway. Large-scale fishing is conducted with either trawlers or large factory ships, and takes place far off the coast. This kind of fishery is highly efficient, with large catches caught by relatively small crews. Large-scale fishing is especially prominent in the pelagic fisheries, such as capelin and herring, but also to a lesser extent in the demersal fisheries, such as cod. This industry is concentrated on the west coast of Norway, around Ålesund in the Møre and Romsdal regions.42 A concentration of small-scale fisheries is found in the north, in the regions of Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark. Small-scale fishing is conducted on small boats with small crews that do not go far from shore. It is, to a certain degree, seasonal, as these small boats have a hard time fishing in the winter, in bad weather, and when the day is short. Small-scale fishing is primarily concerned with demersal fishing, such as cod and haddock.43 These geographical differences permeate the policy process and all discussion of the fisheries in Norway. The result is that the fishing industry has greater political influence than mere economics can explain.

Interest Group Organization The Norwegian Fishing industry is highly organized. To date, the industry is represented by seventy-plus organizations, grouped, among other things, along geographical lines, gear, and boat size. These smaller associations are then organized into larger peak organizations, such as Norges Fiskarlag, that represent their interest vis-à-vis the government. Norges Fiskarlag was established in 1926, on the basis of geographical units. That is, all fisheries in a certain area belong to local organizations which then collectively make up Norges Fiskarlag. This organizational structure has continued to the present day. The opposing interests that make up Norges Fiskarlag are divided along the lines of size of vessel and gear used, such as between trawlers versus boats with line. There is also a division between owners of capital and those who work on fishing vessels.44 Finally, there is the division between coastal fisheries versus distant-water fishermen.45

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Early Organization In his classic work published in 1982, Abraham Hallenstvedt analyzed the organization of the fishing industry that began in the late 1800s. The crucial feature of this organization was that once established, organizations were given special status through government laws that protected them and assigned them privileges; a development that has centralized decision-making over time.46 The degree of centralization continued to increase until the 1980s, when the development was reversed. Organization of the Norwegian fishing industry was tumultuous. Until the late 1800s the fishing industry (fishing, processing, and sales) was to a large extent unorganized and decentralized. The organizational drive began in earnest in the early 1900s, with the formation of associations mainly concerned with the education and development of the fisheries. That is, they were not created to represent the interests of fishermen vis-à-vis the government or any other group. The main organizational push in the fishing industry took place in the 1930s and 40s, when traditional interest organizations were created. One noticeable feature of this organizational push was that it took place much later in the fishing sector than in other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture or industry. Fishermen had substantial collective-action problems, much more so than other sectors. The organizational effort was frustrated by the seasonal nature of the fishery, which meant that participants moved around, and by the difficulty of organizing an industry with often diametrically opposing interests. Moreover, as a result of late organizing, special interests were organized over common interests.47 These features still influence domestic political decision-making within the fishing industry, making any policy a balancing act among the different interests.

Achieving Influence The power of the Norwegian fishing industry is largely political. Fishing is primarily an export industry with about 90% of the products exported. This figure may sound impressive, but fisheries products only comprise about 7% of Norwegian exports.48 The regional importance of the fisheries has given the industry a disproportionate amount of political influence. As discussed earlier, the majority of the fishing industry in Norway is concentrated in northern Norway and on the west coast. Importantly, the government has invested huge sums to keep these regions populated, especially the north, including direct subsidies to insure fishermen’s incomes. The emphasis on keeping Northern Norway populated has roots in the Cold War. Any significant depopulation of the north would have made Norway more vulnerable to Soviet influence, and maybe even invasion. This concern for settlement is echoed in governmental reports that set forth goals for

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the industry. In a report to the Storting during the 1977–1978 session, the Labor government set out major goals for fisheries policy in Norway and the expected development of the industry.49 This was the first such report to be presented to the Storting, and the involvement of the industry in making the report was substantial. In all, thirty organizations sent in reports discussing the specifics of their interests and what needed to be done. The final document emphasized the importance of the industry in creating employment in northern Norway, and set forth three policy goals. First, it emphasized the importance of keeping the current level of settlement in coastal regions; second, the importance of protecting fishing resources from overexploitation; and finally, that the government should ensure stable employment in coastal regions. Making the industry self-sufficient and profitable was not high on the list of priorities: the goals were social and political, not economic. The report says with respect to the first point: “It should be the main goal of the fisheries policy to stabilize employment and settlement in economically vulnerable coastal districts and coastal district where there is depopulation.”50 This policy of putting settlement and employment at the forefront increased the political importance of peripheral regions and their main industry—fishing—thus increasing the political influence of the fishing industry. The Norwegian government commissioned a second report on the state of the fishing industry during the 1982–1983 parliamentary session. This time around it was a right-wing government, led by more market-oriented Conservative Party (Høyre), that presented the report, and the change in emphasis is evident. The report reiterated the goals of the first report and added six others. First, fishing advice should be based on biology; next, the industry should try to use most of its raw materials for human consumption; and third, the quality of Norwegian fishing products should increase; fourth, the industry should be organized in the best possible way and the government should increase the level of knowledge and develop vibrant local fishing areas; and, finally, the government should adjust social programs to match those in other industries.51 With this report, the government shifted from focusing on purely societal goals to incorporating economic goals as well, especially increased efficiency and profitability. This was a clear departure from the previous report. The new goals were also to a certain degree conflicting. For example, the goal to adjust social programs—that is, lessen subsidies—that helped keep settlement stable in the North would have threatened the pattern of settlement. The government acknowledged this, and set forth a blueprint for solving these conflicts. Any solution was to be balanced, “between the demands of profitability and efficiency demanded of an industry on one hand and other societal goals on the other hand.”52 These years of right-wing governments in Norway marked a turning point for the Norwegian fisheries, and coincided with a tumultuous period in relations between the government and the fishing industry. Not surprisingly, the right wing government wanted to increase efficiency

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and profitability of the industry by reducing subsidies, as opposed to the Labor government that had emphasized social and political goals. This shift in priorities created serious conflicts with the fishing industry, most notably evident in annual negotiations between the government and Norges Fiskarlag over subsidies to the fishing industry. The issue of subsidies to ensure fishermen incomes was a cornerstone of governmental policy from the late 1950s on. The goal was to aid the fishing industry and to protect its members from extreme income fluctuations due to changes in catch levels and, accordingly, the change in the price of fish. The fisheries are often quite volatile and a boom year can easily be followed by a complete bust, which then leads the fishing industry to request for help from the government. In the late 1950s, the Norwegian government began to subsidize the fishing industry. Until 1957, buyers’ organizations set a minimum price on fish brought ashore. If there was a difference between the minimum price and the market price, the difference was put into a price regulation fund to even out natural fluctuations in the industry and ensure fishermen’s incomes. The fund ran dry in 1957, and from 1958 on various organizations in the fishing industry began negotiating directly with the Norwegian government for subsidies to ensure fishermen’s incomes. This lasted until 1962, when Norges Fiskarlag was given a monopoly by the government to negotiate the subsidies on behalf of the whole fishing industry. This arrangement was cemented in 1964 with an agreement called the Main Agreement (Hovedavtalen). The purpose of the subsidies was twofold. First, they were supposed to make sure fishermen did not lag in wages compared to other professions; that is, to even out natural and unpredictable fluctuations in the fishing industry due to changes in catch levels or in the price of fish. Second, subsides were supposed to make the industry more efficient and eventually to reduce its dependence on government assistance. Norges Fiskarlag was allowed to demand negotiations on subsidies whenever profitability threatened the incomes of the fishermen as compared to other similar occupational groups such as farmers.53 In reality, however, these negotiations became an annual event, and fostered a close relationship between the Norwegian government and Norges Fiskarlag. The monopoly on negotiations with the government put Norges Fiskarlag at the helm of the fishing industry, and gave the organization enormous power. The monopoly meant that anyone in the Norwegian fishing industry who wanted to influence the annual negotiations had to belong to the organization. As a result, an already diverse organization became even more so, encompassing small-scale fishermen, owners of large trawlers, and crews employed on the fishing vessels. Over the years, the annual negotiations increased Norges Fiskarlag’s influence on the domestic policy making process. Its power manifested itself in different ways, such as voting power in governmental fisheries and the ability

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of the organization to influence who got key positions within the government. For example, Norges Fiskarlag has substantial voting rights on the Regulatory Council, an advisory body to the government on fisheries regulations in Norwegian waters. Of the eleven members in the Council, five represent Norges Fiskarlag, five come from four other interest groups in the fishing industry, and the eleventh member is the Director of Fisheries.54 Norges Fiskarlag has also put great emphasis on getting “their” people into key bureaucratic and political positions within the Norwegian government, and in this effort they have been quite successful. For example, most of my interviewees on the bureaucratic side had worked for Norges Fiskarlag previously in their careers. There has also been movement of people from the government to Norges Fiskarlag. This movement of people from Norges Fiskarlag into key positions in the Ministry of Fisheries and vice versa gives both sides insights into how policy is made and what views are represented more than others, which can be valuable for the organization. According to my interviewees on the government side, it has been considered an asset for the government to have people aboard that have previously worked for Norges Fiskarlag. Norges Fiskarlag’s position has also been helped by its perceived political alliance. Even though Norges Fiskarlag is officially a politically independent organization, it has traditionally been seen as a Labor Party ally.55 Until 1994, for example, all of its chairmen were Labor Party members from Northern Norway who represented the northern coastal fisheries. Oddmund Bye, elected in 1994, was the first Right Party member to be elected to the post, signifying a major change. As one magazine article put it when he was elected: “[Norges Fiskarlag’s] chairman should preferably be from the Labor Party, in a pinch a Center Party member will do.”56 In addition, Bye was also a former trawler captain, representing more the large-scale fishing interests on the west coast of Norway. This was also a first, as the foremen were traditionally chosen from the north. This development is indicative of shifting power within the organizations, from small-scale to large-scale fishing. While the percentage of all fishermen in Norway living in the north has decreased from 53% in 1984 to 48% in 1998, the percentage of all full-time fishermen living in Møre and Romsdal on the west coast has increased from 20% in 1984 to about 24% in 1998. The position of Norges Fiskarlag is thus well established in Norway, tracing its roots to the Main Agreement of 1964. The organization has had considerable political influence on the domestic policy process, and its representatives on delegations in international negotiations have at times wielded considerable influence on the terms of agreements. Yet this ability to influence policy has not been constant during the past twenty years, but rather has declined, resulting in diminished ability to influence policy decisions, both domestically and internationally.

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Losing Influence This section discusses the changes in Norges Fiskarlag’s position since the establishment of the 200-mile EEZ and shows how its position domestically has weakened. Until the late 1980s, the glue that held Norges Fiskarlag together was subsidies, but as they have practically been eliminated, the task of keeping the organization together has become more difficult. The elimination of the subsidies has been aided by three key developments that have reduced the political power of Norges Fiskarlag. First, the number of fishermen declined significantly in the 1980s and 1990s. Second, the fishing industry has suffered a relative loss of importance as the Norwegian oil industry grew and gained prominence. Finally, the geopolitical importance of Northern Norway diminished due to the end of the Cold War. These changes have given the government the room to cut subsidies, even though Norway’s increasing oil wealth means that the government could have afforded them. This lessened influence is reflected by the fact that there is less interest in fisheries issues in the Norwegian parliament, meaning that ups and downs in the industry are less and less politically important. The perception that the industry is losing influence is supported by interviews. Interviewees mentioned the diminished role of the annual negotiations over subsidies called for in the Main Agreement, as well as the declining economic importance of the fishing industry. An interest group interviewee agreed, and said: “We have influence, but we feel we have been sidelined.”57 Another interest group representative pointed out that despite the government’s dependence on advice from Norges Fiskarlag and other fisheries organizations, Norges Fiskarlag’s influence on the process had been reduced. The representative also mentioned that other fisheries organizations had entered the process, increasing competition for the attention of politicians.58 Other interviewees also mentioned the fact that the number of fishermen had decreased significantly since 1945, leaving fewer votes for the fisheries to mobilize. A final point that was mentioned about the diminishing power of Norges Fiskarlag was that since the elimination of the subsidies, internal conflicts among the fishermen had become more visible. The subsidies could no longer be used for side payments and to even out natural fluctuations in the industry that hit different fisheries at different times. Taken together these developments mean less influence for Norges Fiskarlag on the policy process, which then translates into less influence in the Norwegian delegation. As a result of these three changes, the Norwegian delegation’s win-set has become larger and less constraining over time.

The Number of Fishermen There has been a steady reduction in the number of fishermen in Norway since the end of World War II. At the same time the increase in catch has been significant. In 1962, about 56,900 fishermen caught 1.3 million tons of fish. In 1995, the number of fishermen had halved to about 23,600, and the catch

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doubled to 2.5 million tons of fish.59 The number of fishermen was at its peak just after World War II, when there were about 98,000 fishermen in Norway.60 The reduction in the raw number of fishermen translates into fewer votes they can use to influence policy. Technological advances combined with bigger vessels have increased efficiency. The industry has frequently faced declining resources, and stringent entrance requirements into the industry have made it easier to exit rather than enter the industry. Difficulty in making a living as a fisherman has also affected these numbers, especially when combined with the reduction in subsidies. Figure 3.1 shows the reduction in the number of part-time and full-time fishermen in Norway between 1983 and 1998. The total number of fishermen has decreased by about 30%, from more than 22,000 in 1983 to about 15,000 in 1998. The number of part-time fishermen has also gone down 9%, from 6,700 to 6,100. It is not entirely surprising that the number of full-time fishermen has diminished more than the number of part-time fishermen. For the part-timers, fishing is often a supplement to another occupation. When full-time fishermen find it harder to make ends meet, it may be easier to find another full-time job than become a parttime fisherman.

Figure 3.1. Changes in the number of full-time and part-time fishermen in Norway 1983–1998.

Source: Directorate of Fisheries.

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The reduction in the number of fishermen has hit the fishing regions of Norway differently, contributing to the decline of importance of the Northern regions. The reduction in the number of full-time fishermen has been especially rapid in Northern Norway, from about 12,000 in 1984 to 7,300 fourteen years later. This is a reduction of almost 40%. The reduction has not been nearly as steep on the west coast, the center for the distant-water trawling fleet. There the number of full-time fishermen has fallen 15%, from 4,600 in 1984 to 3,900 in 1998. Northern Norway, the traditional Labor stronghold and the center of the Norwegian fishing industry, has lost ground against the west-coast fleet, which has also lost people. The change in the number of part-time fishermen has been less drastic in both areas. In the North, the number went down from 3,700 to 3,100 or by 16%. The comparative figure for Møre and Romsdal is an increase of 40%, from 700 to 1000 fishermen. This reduction in raw numbers means fewer votes to cast for allied parties, which should reduce the political impact of the fishermen. This is acknowledged by the members of the interest groups interviewed. Norges Fiskarlag now has less clout to use the voting power of fishermen and their supporters as a bargaining point to pressure politicians.

Oil Makes a Splash The composition of Norwegian exports has undergone a fundamental change since the early 1970s. During this period, Norway has become a major oil producer and exporter, with oil overtaking traditional industries as the leading source of export earnings, as shown in Table 3.1. Table 3.1. Exports of fish products and oil from Norway between 1970 and 1995 as a percentage of total exports of goods. Fish and Fish Products

Fish Meal

Fish Oil

Fish and Fish Products Total

1970

7.7%

NA

NA

NA

2.2%

1975

5.5%

NA

NA

NA

12.6%

1980

4.2%

1.1%

0.3%

5.6%

48.3%

1985

4.1%

0.5%

0.2%

4.8%

53.3%

1990

5.6%

0.2%

0.07%

5.9%

42.2%

1995

7.7%

0.3%

0.09%

8.1%

48.7%

Oil and Natural Gas

Note: This table shows how the oil industry has quickly become the dominant Norwegian export. Source: Yearbook of Nordic Statistics 1970–1997.

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The exports of crude oil and natural gas have increased from 2.2% of total exports in 1970 to about 48% in 1995.61 Meanwhile, fishing exports have remained relatively constant at about 5% to 8% of total exports. As discussed earlier, although fish and fish products are not a large share of total exports, regional politics have increased the political importance of the fishery. Development of the oil industry has had a profound impact on the Norwegian economy, and helped push the fishing industry further toward the margins. The rise of the oil industry has also had another impact: it has provided a number of well-paying jobs that compete with other industries, among them fishing. One interest group representative said that the increase in oil production had taken potential labor force from the fisheries and made labor more expensive, contributing to the decline of the fishing industry in general.62

End of the Cold War During the Cold War, Norway pursued a policy of avoiding close cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea, and at the same time Norway kept its Western allies from entering the area.63 This dual policy in the north had to be reconsidered following the end of the Cold War and the creation of Russia. The fall of the Soviet Union had important consequences for the Norwegian fisheries. One aspect of the Norwegian government’s policy of ensuring habitation in the remote areas of the country was the threat of Soviet invasion into Finnmark, Norway’s northernmost region, which bordered the Soviet Union. According to the logic of this policy, by keeping the area inhabited, Norway reduced the chance of a Soviet Union invasion into Northern Norway. Once the dust settled after the collapse of the Eastern Block, the risk of Russian invasion seemed slim and the northern regions of Norway lost some of their political importance. The exact impact of the collapse of the USSR is hard to measure, but it is clear that it helped push already peripheral regions further into the periphery.

Role of Subsidies The elimination of subsidies has been facilitated by the decline in the number of fishermen, the rise of the oil industry, and the end of the Cold War. The elimination of subsidies has also weakened the power of Norges Fiskarlag during the past twenty years, for the organization now wields less power than it did while the annual negotiations were in their heyday. An interest organization that is increasingly unable to secure private benefits for its membership is a weakening organization. While the original reason for the elimination of subsidies was a domestic decision, their eventual abolishment was cemented in 1993, when Norway signed the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement with the European Union. This treaty banned all subsidies that favored

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Figure 3.2. Amount of annual subsidies to the Norwegian fishing industry from 1964 to 1995.

Note: The graph shows the nominal amount and the real amount, in 1980 NKR, of the subsidies during the period. Source: Norsk Fiskerinæring 1996.

that favored domestic industries and skewed competition, including those within the fisheries.64 As is to be expected of an interest organization, Norges Fiskarlag fought this development tooth and nail, especially in the 1980s, when for the first time the Main Agreement negotiations between the government and Norges Fiskarlag broke down five times.65 The decline in subsidies can be seen in Figure 3.2. There was a steady increase in subsidies until the early 1980s. This began to change in 1983 when, for the first time, Norges Fiskarlag broke off the negotiations with the market oriented right-wing government, dissatisfied with what the fishermen were being offered. When negotiations broke down again in 1984, it stunned and infuriated the fishing industry. During twenty years of negotiations with the government, they had never broken down. This breakdown indicated that the government’s attitudes towards subsidies had changed. The right-wing government in power wanted to make the fishing industry selfsufficient and cut down the government aid that kept increasing. Negotiations broke down again in 1984, and then again in 1986, 1989, and 1995. In all but one case, Norges Fiskarlag left the negotiations. In 1986, it was the Labor government that broke off the negotiations.

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In the context of Norwegian political preferences, I expected the breakdowns of the negotiations only when right-wing governments were in power. The fishing regions in the north have traditionally been Labor Party strongholds, and the party has been generally more supportive of subsidies to ensure social and political goals than right-wing parties. But looking at government composition during these breakdowns reveals that in 1982, 1983, and 1989, there was a right-wing coalition governing Norway, while the Labor Party was in government in 1986 and 1995. One interpretation is that this may indicate that even the Labor Party counts less on the “fishing” vote than it used to, showing a further decline of the political influence of the fishing industry. When annual negotiations broke down, the Storting decided the level of subsidies for the industry. The first two times the negotiations broke down, the opposition Labor Party opposed this procedure, wanting the government to restart negotiations. That did not happen, and it was left to the Storting to decide the level of subsidies, and with the exception of the first year the decision of the parliament always put the amount of subsidies closer to governmental preference than interest group preferences. Overall, the diminishing importance of the annual negotiations and the practical elimination of direct subsidies has weakened Norges Fiskarlag, as well as changed the dynamics between the organization and the government. Specifically, the government has become increasingly able to go against the wishes of the interest group without risking significant political costs.

Diminishing Interest in the Storting The decrease in the number of fishermen, the increased importance of the oil sector, and the end of the Cold War has made it easier for the government to wean the fishing industry off direct subsidies, and this declining importance of the fishing industry is reflected in diminished interest in fisheries issues in the Storting. Domestically the Storting plays a significant role in setting fisheries policy, but the interest in fishing issues seems to have faded in the past two decades. Figure 3.3 shows that since 1977, there has been a steady decline in the number of items relating to the fisheries that come up before the Storting every parliamentary session. The figure shows a clear downward trend in the number of items discussed by the Storting from the mid 1970s to the late 1990s. There was a slight increase in the late 1970s in the number of items, which can probably be attributed to the expansion of the 200-mile EEZ. The new zone required changes in numerous domestic regulations and laws to ensure governmental control over the economic zone, to allow the government to manage the domestic fisheries. In the 1980s the number of issues leveled off and reduced slightly, but in the late 1980s the reduction increased at a faster rate.66

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Figure 3.3. Total number of general propositions, laws, budget items and questions coming before the Storting 1975–1997.

Note: A Lowess smoother is a smoothing function for scattered data that helps show the general trend in the data. The acronym stands for “locally weighted least squares,” and the line represents a locally weighted regression based on neighboring values to each point in the graph. Source: Ásgeirsdóttir 2007.

There are two ways to interpret this data. On one hand, it can be a proxy measure for the importance of the fisheries to the Norwegian parliamentarians. On the other, the reduction can indicate that most of the issues pertaining to domestic fisheries policy have been settled, and there is thus no need to discuss fishing. Given the declining catches and frequent crisis situations in the industry, the first interpretation carries greater weight as fishing has been a troubled industry for the past couple of decades, which should keep the Storting involved and interested. The total number does not tell the whole story though. Breaking down the information in Figure 3.3 and separating out general propositions and questions posed shows interesting trends. The number of general propositions tends to reflect the interest of the cabinet, while the questions posed show to a certain degree the interest of the opposition parties. General propositions discussed by parliament includes discussion on government subsidies, regulations of the fishing industry—including aquaculture and whaling—as well as appointments to posts in the governmental arm of the fishing sector. Most of these issues originate in the cabinet, and reflect the wishes of the government. The propositions are therefore a good indicator of

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importance of the fishing industry to the ruling cabinet. As Figure 3.4 shows, there was a dramatic decline in the number of propositions in the early 1980s, beginning with a Labor Party government and continuing with the right-wing coalition governments that ruled from October 1981 to September 1986. But once the Labor Party was back in power, there was no marked increase in the propositions discussed. Although we might have expected an increase in general propositions, as the Labor Party has traditionally been sensitive to fishing interests, this is not the case. Instead, the pattern in figure 3.4 indicates a shift in interest within the Labor Party, the traditional ally of the fishing interests. While the propositions better reflect the interests of ruling parties, questions posed to ministers shown in Figure 3.5 usually reflect the interests of the opposition. The Storting holds a question and answer period each week where members of the government answer both spontaneous questions from representatives and written questions submitted a couple of days in advance. Usually these questions are short and relate to concrete issues.67 The opposition uses the question and answer period to get individual ministers to answer questions on issues important to the opposition, and to stir controversy. According to one study, members of small parties are more likely to pose questions than are members of large parties, and opposition members are more likely to ask questions than are members of governing parties. Each of these

Figure 3.4. Number of general propositions pertaining to the fisheries discussed by the Storting between 1975 and 1997.

Source: Proceedings of the Norwegian Parliament. Data compiled by author.

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two groups also poses a higher number of questions per parliamentary session than members of large parties and members of the governing party.68 Rasch also shows that there is a phenomenal increase in questions asked during the 1970s and 1980s, which could explain some of the increase in questions asked until 1985. But while the number continues to rise throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, the number of questions asked that pertain to the fisheries goes down significantly, indicating that the proportion of questions pertaining to the fisheries is decreasing dramatically. Taken together, figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that while the numbers of propositions and resolutions declined rapidly in the early 1980s, the number of questions increased. This is not entirely surprising, as one would expect the opposition (in this case the Labor Party) to voice concerns when they perceive the fishing industry as under attack. The other interesting feature of this comparison is that once the Labor Party resumed power in 1986—a position it held until 1997 with the exception of one year of right-wing government in 1989–90—the number of issues did not increase at all. In addition, the opposition does not seem to care much about the issue as the number of questions declines. This supports the notion that center- and right-wing parties are less interested in fisheries issues than is the Labor Party.

Figure 3.5. Questions pertaining to the fishing industry posed by members of the Storting, the Norwegian parliament, to the cabinet in regular question sessions.

Source: Proceedings of the Norwegian Parliament. Data compiled by author.

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Summary Does fewer fishermen, the end of the Cold War, the advent of Norway as an oil exporter, the elimination of subsidies despite the increasing oil wealth, and the diminishing interest in the Storting mean that Norges Fiskarlag’s influence on the policy process is diminishing? Without question Norges Fiskarlag is still an important organization in the setting of domestic fisheries policy, and to a certain extent the agenda in international negotiations. However, its influence has been challenged by domestic and international changes. As a number of my interviewees pointed out, so long as Norges Fiskarlag negotiated subsidies with the government, its position was strong. Yet with the importance of the annual negotiations dwindling, the organization has weakened. Combined with structural changes in the industry, it is clear that Norges Fiskarlag is no longer as important as it used to be. This chapter has discussed Norway’s role in the Law of the Sea, its cooperation with other nations when it comes to sharing fisheries resources, and the country’s ambivalent relationship with the EEC/EU. This discussion showed that Norway is quite used to sharing resources with other nations, and being experienced negotiators should give Norway the upper hand. But that does not seem to be the case. The chapter has also discussed the role the government, scientists, and interest groups play in the Norwegian negotiating process. The focus has been on the role of interest groups, especially Norges Fiskarlag, and how its position has changed during the past twenty years. It shows that as the importance of the Norwegian fisheries has dwindled, the position of Norges Fiskarlag has weakened, which in turn has influenced its ability to influence domestic and international policy processes. When interest groups lose power, they lose their ability to influence outcomes by constraining negotiators by threatening to veto certain policy solutions. This makes governments freer to make decisions without consulting the interest groups. Because the government is in charge of balancing different interests in reaching international agreements, fewer domestic constraints on the delegation translate into a larger win-set. The increasing size of the winset gives the government more flexibility in solving conflicts without having to worrying of a potential political threat from fisheries organizations.

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Chapter 4

Dictating Policy and Influencing Outcomes in Iceland

I

celand and Norway have similarities as well as differences when it comes to fisheries politics. The similarities lie in the fact that Icelandic interest groups are also consulted on all major domestic policy decisions pertaining to the industry. The differences lie in the respective industries’ ability to influence the policy process and secure outcomes favorable to fishing interests. While the Norwegian fishing industry has been declining in power over the past twenty years, resulting in the weakening position of Norges Fiskarlag, the Icelandic fishing industry is by far the most influential industry in Iceland. This difference in the ability of interest groups to constrain negotiators results in Iceland having a smaller win-set than Norway. This benefits Icelandic fishermen in the form of larger share of the allocation of a particular stock than they would have gotten had the size of the win-sets been more equal. Like its Norwegian counterpart, the Icelandic fishing industry is primarily an export industry, with about 90% of all fish caught by Icelandic vessels being exported. The powerful position of the Icelandic fishing industry has its roots in the industry’s economic importance. Fish and fish-related products make up about 75% of Iceland’s export earnings. Any industry with that large of a share is bound to be influential in policy making, especially with regards to setting domestic policy. The prominent position of the industry can be seen in the willingness of the Icelandic government to cater to fishing interests in its policy making. More specifically, this includes setting exchange rate policy to aid the key export industry and in the influence of Icelandic interest groups on fisheries management policy. At minimum the Icelandic fishing industry has retained its enormous ability to influence policy over the past twenty years. This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section discusses Iceland’s role in the Law of the Sea and Iceland’s history of protecting 81

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its resources, as well as the country’s reluctance to allow other nations access to its fishing banks. Unlike Norway, the boundaries of Iceland’s EEZ are such that Iceland has for the most part not been forced to share its resources. The second section discusses the relevant actors involved in international negotiations, which are, as in Norway, the government, scientists, and interest group representatives. The final section delineates the structure of the Icelandic fishing industry, and discusses the relationship between the interest groups and the government and how the government has shown extreme willingness to cater to interest group demands. This ability of Icelandic interest groups— especially the powerful Federation of Fishing Vessel Owners—to influence domestic decision-making, spills over into the international arena and puts significant constraints on Icelandic negotiators, which gives Iceland an upper hand in the negotiations.

Icelandic Fisheries Policy before the 200-Mile EEZ The fishing banks around Iceland are some of the richest in the world. The area contains an important cod stock, in addition to haddock, capelin, herring, and redfish, to name a few. This resource wealth has been common knowledge for centuries, resulting in foreign fishing vessels traveling to the waters around Iceland in search of catches and profits. Despite the rich resources around the country, Icelanders themselves did not begin to utilize this vast resource until the first decade of the 20th century, but soon the country became dependent on the fishing industry as its main source of export earnings. Because of this dependence, Iceland has for a long time been advocating for increasing the rights of coastal states, arguing that they should exercise strict conservation measures within their own fisheries jurisdiction. It has also fought for regional and international cooperation for conservation measures and rational utilization of the living resources on the high seas.1 Iceland participated in discussions about the development of the Law of the Sea as early as during the 1930s at the Hague Conference, where the Icelandic delegate, and future president of Iceland, Sveinn Björnsson, tried unsuccessfully to get conservation measures on the ballot. In 1937, Iceland, still a Danish colony, became a part of the London Convention to regulate mesh size and size limit for fish, and in 1938 Iceland joined the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). In 1946, ICES passed a resolution which recommended the experimental closure of Faxa Bay (Faxaflói) from fishing for ten years. Faxa Bay is on the south west coast of Iceland, and one of the most important nursing areas for demersal fish in the world, especially cod. This effort was unsuccessful, especially because of British opposition, and Iceland abandoned the effort.2

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As discussed in chapter 2, following the Truman Proclamations of 1945, there was an accelerated trend to extend fishing limits, especially in Latin America. In the 1950s Iceland aligned itself with Latin America in the quest for larger fishing limits, and the Icelandic parliament used the proclamations as a basis for a law passed in 1948, emphasizing the rights of Iceland to conserve its fisheries. The government maintained, as did the Latin American states, that the proclamation did not violate any international law. Hence, all boundary extensions have been based on it.3 Iceland has extended its fishing limit four times since gaining independence from Denmark in 1944. In 1952 it extended its limits from three to four miles and in 1958 the Icelandic government declared a 12-mile limit. The government argued that the extension was vital to the country’s survival. The foreign fleet fishing around Iceland caught about half the total catch in the area and the Icelandic government argued that the only way to protect these important fishing banks was to close them off to foreign ships and bring them under exclusive Icelandic control. The 1958 extension evoked strong opposition from Belgium, France, the Netherlands, and especially the United Kingdom, which sent Royal navy vessels to protect British ships fishing in the area, beginning what was to be the first of three “Cod Wars” between Iceland and the United Kingdom. After three years of conflict, Iceland and Britain finally reached an agreement in 1961 that allowed Iceland to extend its fishing limits to 12 miles. As part of the agreement, Iceland agreed to give Britain and Germany a six-month notice of any further extensions. This clause was a clear indication that the Icelandic government intended to extend Icelandic waters even further, but these plans were put on hold for about a decade.4 Domestic politics put the further extension of Icelandic waters on the back burner. The coalition government that governed Iceland from 1963–1970 wanted to proceed with caution and act according to international law, which at the time was basically the traditional law of a three-mile territorial limit. The coalition included the Independence Party (right), which led the government, and the Social Democratic Party (center-left). These parties were less belligirent than the Progressive Party (center) and especially the socialist People’s Alliance (left), both of which were in opposition and wanted to pursue a more aggressive expansion policy. By the early 1970s there was a significant split over the issue of extension in the Althing, the Icelandic parliament, between the government and the opposition. Following the 1971 parliamentary elections, there was a change of government. The Progressive Party and the People’s Alliance formed a coalition, and in 1972 announced the establishment of the 50-mile fisheries zone. Again the extension was justified by citing protection of fisheries resources. As with the conflict over the 12-mile extension, Britain and West Germany opposed the extension and refused to acknowledge Iceland’s argument of resource protection. The United Kingdom again responded by force by sending its Royal Navy to protect British vessels fishing within the 50-mile

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zone. Britain also took the case to the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Since Iceland refused to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the court in the matter, it absolved Iceland of its duty to adhere to the Court’s decision. The Court decided the matter in 1974, finding that Iceland could not unilaterally exclude Britain from the 50-mile limit or restrict the actions of these vessels. It also found that Britain and Iceland were under mutual obligation to begin negotiations to solve their differences.5 In 1975 Iceland declared a 200-mile EEZ, encountering again strong opposition from the United Kingdom and West Germany. Both countries had substantial fleets fishing in the waters around Iceland, and the 200-mile extension threatened to cut off all fishing in the area. The 200-mile Icelandic EEZ covers almost the entire area in which the most valuable stocks were found. For the third time, Britain sent the Royal Navy to Icelandic waters to protect the British fleet fishing within the 200-mile EEZ. Iceland’s answer was to have the Icelandic Coast Guard cut off the British trawls, which resulted in a significant monetary loss for the vessel owners. The conflict was finally solved in the late 1970s, when it became obvious that under UNCLOS all coastal states would be allowed to establish a 200-mile EEZ.6 Iceland’s fierce extension policy is understandable considering that at the time fisheries products provided about 80% to 90% of export earnings for the recently independent state. Iceland’s goal in extending its waters was to protect vital interests by gaining control over the fishery with the idea that it could then prevent overfishing. It claimed that otherwise, valuable fishing resources would be destroyed.7 Iceland’s strategy in pursuing its policy of extension in the international arena, especially in the United Nations, was two-fold. First, Iceland sought approval from the international arena for the extension of the fishing limit, and, second, it sought to emphasize putting into international law the responsibility of coastal states to preserve fishing resources. During the first two extensions in the 1950s, Iceland justified its action by citing the necessity of protecting domestic fisheries resources from overfishing. During the two subsequent fishing conflicts, this attitude changed. In the 1970s, Iceland believed it was not only fighting for its own rights to manage fish stocks, but also the rights of the costal communities in general. By becoming the most belligerent country in the North Atlantic, Iceland aligned itself with progressive states in this fight, such as Chile, Mexico, Peru, Canada, Norway, and various Third World Countries. Iceland pursued this agenda within the United Nations, and over time the right of coastal states to fishing resources became the most prominent issue within Icelandic politics, especially when left-wing governments were in power. In order to further its agenda in matters pertaining to the Law of the Sea, Iceland traded votes at international forums to get support for its positions. Iceland also used voting in the United Nations to show displeasure toward the Western Block when it felt it was unsupportive.8 Iceland was an active participant during

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UNCLOS in the 1970s, where it emphasized the rights of coastal states and the rights of states heavily dependent on fishing, and pushed for more emphasis on regional cooperation. During UNCLOS, Norway was one of Iceland’s closest allies, as the commitment of both states to the rights of coastal states was practically identical. But as discussed in chapter 3, Norway was much more cautious in extending its maritime jurisdiction. During the conferences leading up to the 1995 Straddling Stocks Agreement, Iceland was again an active participant who cooperated closely with Norway and other coastal states to ensure their rights. During the Straddling Stocks conference, Iceland emphasized that TACs and quotas should be based on the principles of sustainable development, quotas should be decided through regional cooperation, the rights of coastal states should be ensured, and that the international community should establish rules and procedures to enforce regional management decisions.9 It is clear from the Straddling Stocks Agreement that, for the most part, Iceland and its allies got their wishes.

Policy after the 200-mile Extension Since the creation of the 200-mile EEZ in 1975, Iceland’s policy has displayed two distinct trends. First, Iceland has been very reluctant to allow other states access to fish in its waters. Unlike Norway, Iceland does not share many of its fish stock with other nations. Hence Iceland is not forced to negotiate with its neighbors as Norway is. Second, Icelandic vessel owners and the Icelandic government completely ignored the fishing banks outside the country’s EEZ until the early 1990s. The change of heart followed several years of declining cod catches in Icelandic waters that had created difficulties for a number of vessel owners. Following the establishment of the 200-mile EEZ, the attitude among the Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners (hereafter the Vessel Owners) and government officials was that now the country had an enormous economic zone, containing valuable resources that would sustain a growing fishery. While Norway pursued a policy of establishing reciprocal fishing rights with other states, Iceland stuck to its own waters, and did not seem to realize the possibilities of coalition building through reciprocal fishing rights or the importance of establishing historical fishing rights. As one bureaucrat said, “before that we were too busy focusing on the very large economic zone we now possessed.”10 This is echoed by an Icelandic interest group leader who said: “We concentrated on thinking about our own waters and forgot to think about fishing elsewhere.”11 The creation of the 200-mile zone was supposed to solve the problem of overfishing by giving individual governments the power to control fishing within their own waters. As discussed in chapter 1, this idea did not work as planned because the the tragedy of the commons had only shifted from the

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international level to the domestic level. The fish were still free for all to fish. As states were increasingly unable to prevent resource depletion within their EEZs, interest in high-seas fishing increased. It took off in the 1990s, when states increasingly began to explore and utilize straddling stocks and highly migratory stocks found outside the 200-mile limit. This trend is evident in Iceland, where only in the early 1990s did Icelandic fishermen begin to seriously look for catches outside the EEZ. The exclusive focus on domestic waters can be observed in annual or biannual reports published by Icelandic interest groups, as well as the limited interest shown by the Althing. The annual reports of the four key interest groups are a good indicator of the issues these organizations find most important every year. In the published annual reports for the Vessel Owners, the Merchant Navy and Officers Guild (henceforth the Officers Guild), the Icelandic Seamen’s Federation (henceforth the Seamen’s Federation), and The Association of Icelandic Marine Engineers (henceforth the Marine Engineers), there is no mention of high-seas fishing or related issues until the early 1990s. Of these four Icelandic interest groups, three hold annual membership meetings to discuss fisheries policy, labor issues, and other matters pertaining to their organizations. The fourth organization, the Seamen’s Federation, holds membership meetings every other year. The reports are published in conjunction with the organizations’ regular meetings. These meetings are an important forum for the interest groups to discuss policy preferences with their constituents as well as with the government. In the annual proceedings from 1983 to 1997 (with the exception of 1984, 1987, 1988, and 1989) for the Vessel Owners, the most powerful organization within the Icelandic fishing industry, there is no mention of distant-water fishing and management problems associated with straddling stocks until the 1995 annual report.12 Instead, these reports usually include discussions of the state of the fisheries, of various representatives of the organization in different governmental organizations that deal with fishing issues, and of the domestic management of fisheries. In the annual reports of the Marine Engineers from 1980 to 1998, excluding the 1989 proceedings, the first mention of the management of straddling stocks is in 1996, when the report includes a short paragraph on the agreements on oceanic redfish and herring.13 Until then, the annual proceedings discuss only domestic policy, and labor matters and problems associated with management issues for the Icelandic EEZ. As for the Officers Guild, in reports published between 1988 and 1998, there is no mention of international cooperation over straddling fish stocks until the 1992 report.14 In the 1992–93 proceedings, there is a discussion of the treaty with the EU and a brief discussion on the annual trilateral capelin negotiations between Iceland, Norway, and Greenland. Before, the only foreign issues discussed concern cooperation with international organizations

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such as the International Maritime Organization. After the 1992 report there is an increase in the discussion of utilization of straddling fish stocks. Finally, in the biannual reports for the Seamen’s Federation for the years 1986, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998, there is no mention of international issues until 1994.15 Then the report mentions Icelandic vessels fishing outside Icelandic waters more frequently, as well as the ongoing conflict with Norway over the cod fishery in the Barents Sea and pending negotiations over oceanic redfish and Norwegian-Icelandic herring. The picture that emerges from these reports is that, until Icelandic vessels encountered Norwegian hostility because of Icelandic vessels fishing in the Barents Sea, there was not much discussion about the possibilities and challenges of Icelandic vessels fishing outside the Icelandic EEZ. It therefore seems that interest groups themselves did not consider fishing outside domestic waters a viable option until overexploitation of Icelandic waters led vessel owners to begin looking for catches and profits elsewhere. They did not take interest in the issue until after these fisheries began and conflicts arose. This observation is further supported by the fact that Iceland signed two capelin agreements with Norway in the 1980s, neither of which is mentioned in these reports. On the government side, the situation is not much different. The Althing did not show any initiative in encouraging distant-water fishing. During the 1980s, there is only one issue brought up to encourage fishing outside the Icelandic EEZ, either on the high seas or by trying to get fishing permits within the EEZs of other states. Several opposition members from the Social Democratic Party introduced a resolution during the 1981–82 parliamentary session encouraging the government to investigate the possibilities of Icelandic ships fishing within the economic zones of other states.16 The Althing did not fully debate the resolution, and it was reintroduced during the 1982–83 session. It was finally passed during the 1983–84 parliamentary session. In a statement supporting the resolution, the parliamentarians argued that the increase in the number of fishing vessels, combined with stock collapse, especially of capelin, made this necessary. The parliamentarians cited that Poland had permission to fish within the United States’s economic zone and the Soviet Union engagement in a substantial fishery off the coast of West Africa.17 When the resolution was introduced for the second time, the Minister of Fisheries, Steingrímur Hermansson, said that the issue had been discussed with Vessel Owners, but interest had been low. He also added that he thought the fleet had enough to do within the Icelandic EEZ.18 Hence, both on the interest group side and on the government side, it seems that once the issue of the 200 mile EEZ was settled, Iceland looked inward and remained relatively oblivious to developments of high-seas fisheries until the early 1990s. This xenophobia is also evident in agreements Iceland made with nations who had previously fished around Iceland.

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Cooperation with Other Nations Despite the focus on harvesting the bounty found within the Icelandic EEZ and the domestic management of different stocks, Iceland did enter a few cooperative agreements with other states. These agreements indicate a reluctance to give other states access to Icelandic waters by setting strict limits on the amount of cod other states could fish within Icelandic waters. As the map in chapter 1 shows, Iceland borders Greenland to the west, the Faeroe Islands in the east and Jan Mayen to the north, but only the Faeroese have had consistent fishing rights within Icelandic waters since the EEZ was extended to 200 miles. The reason Greenland has not gotten fishing rights within Icelandic waters is because it does not have a large fishing fleet; most of its fishing resources are utilized by other states which buy fish quotas in Greenland’s waters. Iceland has signed agreements with three states and the EU that allow fishing within Icelandic waters. What characterizes these agreements is their restriction on the cod fishery, the most important fishery for the Icelandic economy. Faeroe Islands. Iceland signed an agreement with the Faeroe Islands in 1976 that allowed it to fish a total of 17,000 tons of fish, with the amount of cod restricted. In 1979 the Faeroese were allowed to fish a maximum of 6,000 tons of cod from a total of 17,000 tons.19 Iceland cancelled the agreement in 1984, and in subsequent negotiations Iceland and the Faeroe Islands agreed that the maximum catch for the Faeroes would be 17,000 tons, but that in the future Iceland would unilaterally decide the TAC for the islands. In 1984 the Faeroese were thus permitted to fish 8,500 tons, with a cap on cod at 2,000 tons.20 This was increased to 9,000 tons in 1986 and then to 11,000 tons in 1987.21 The share was reduced again in 1991 to 9,000 tons and in 1992 to 6,500 tons. The quota was reduced further to 6,000 tons in 1993.22 Until 1992, the Faeroese did not grant reciprocal fishing rights in their waters, when Iceland got permission to fish herring and mackerel within Faeroese waters.23 In general, changes in the allocations of quotas to the Faeroese have followed changes in the level of fish stocks in Icelandic waters. The reduction in the quota is due to significant reduction of the level of cod around Iceland. Iceland and the Faeroe Islands also signed an agreement granting reciprocal fishing rights for up to 20,000 tons of blue whiting, which was increased to 30,000 tons in 1983.24 In 1984, Iceland got to exchange 5,000 tons of the blue whiting fishery for mackerel.25 This was done because Icelandic vessels are not well suited for the blue whiting fishery, and thus have not pursued the blue whiting fishery with any seriousness. In 1997 and in 1998, the Faeroese also got permission to fish capelin within the Icelandic EEZ, 30,000 tons and 15,000 tons respectively. This agreement stipulated that the catch had to be landed either in Iceland or, if it was landed outside Iceland, it could only be smelted. This provision was

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aimed at keeping the near monopoly Iceland has on the industrial processing of capelin for human consumption—especially the manufacturing of capelin roe for the lucrative Japanese market. It is clear that Iceland’s cooperation with the Faeroe Islands was and is much closer than with other states, explained primarily by the close proximity of the two islands. The states have exchanged fishing rights, and continue to cooperate on managing common stocks. In negotiations with other states, especially with regard to the herring negotiations, the two states have also cooperated closely. Belgium. Iceland signed an access agreement with Belgium in 1975 to solve problems deriving from the extension of Icelandic waters in 1972 to 50 miles.26 The original agreement limited access to certain Belgian fishing vessels and allowed Belgians to fish 6,500 tons of fish. This amount was reduced to 5,000 tons in 1979. The cod catch could not exceed 15% of the total, or 750 tons.27 In June of 1981, the agreement was changed, and the quota for 1982 was reduced to 4,400 tons with a cap on the proportion of cod not to exceed 25%. In addition, Iceland placed restrictions on the fishing areas and on landings of the catch in Iceland.28 As the original agreement was restricted to specific ships, over time they became fewer, and by 1995 all these ships had retired and Belgium no longer had any rights to fish around Iceland.29 Norway. Iceland gave Norway permission to fish in Icelandic waters in 1976, presumably to repay Norwegian support during the Cod Wars with the United Kingdom. The Norwegian share was set at 2,000 tons, with a 300-ton cap on cod.30 In addition, Iceland and Norway signed the capelin treaty in 1980, but for the first few years of that agreement Norway was not allowed to fish within the Icelandic EEZ at all. That changed in 1985, when Norway got temporary permission to fish within the Icelandic EEZ, a permission that was renewed annually until the tripartite capelin agreement was signed in 1989, and Norway got permanent permission to catch part of its capelin quota within Icelandic waters.31 Iceland cancelled the agreement in 1984 and gave Norway permission to fish 1,000 tons within its waters, with a 15% maximum cod catch. The cancellation was later withdrawn when Iceland got permission to fish within the Norwegian EEZ.32 In 1987 the Norwegian quota was reduced to 400 tons.33 Between 1991 and 1999 Norway did not have any demersal fish quota within Icelandic waters. The 1999 cod agreement again opened the possibility for a Norwegian fishery. Iceland also signed a treaty with Norway in 1982, agreeing on reciprocal fishing permits for the blue whiting fishery, up to 20,000 tons, but as with the blue whiting fishery with the Faeroe Islands, this fishery is of small consequence to Iceland, as its vessels are ill equipped to conduct this fishery.

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EEC/EU. Iceland began negotiations with the EEC in 1980 to discuss sharing of fish stocks that straddled Greenlandic and Icelandic waters. At the time, Greenland belonged to the EEC as a Danish colony, which put the EEC in charge of negotiations. These negotiations did not lead anywhere, especially with regard to sharing quotas of common stocks such as capelin, redfish, and prawns. The parties were far apart in their ideas and the negotiations were postponed indefinitely. The talks never resumed because in 1985 Greenland exited the EEC following a referendum.34 In 1992, Iceland and the European Union signed an agreement in connection with the agreement between EFTA and the EU with regard to establishing the European Economic Area. The agreement deals with the management of the ocean and its ecological preservation, and also involves the exchange of fishing permits. According to the agreement, Iceland gets 30,000 tons of the Greenlandic capelin quota, which the EU buys from Greenland. In exchange, the EU gets access to Icelandic waters to fish 3,000 tons of redfish.35 The disparity between the tons of fish is due to the fact that redfish is a much more valuable fish per ton than capelin. Allowing the EU to catch redfish within Icelandic waters reduced the cost of the fishery for the EU, as it reduced travel distance. Iceland’s policy of protecting its fisheries from foreign fleets has thus continued following the extension of the EEZ to 200 miles. In granting fishing quotas to other states, the Icelandic government has been restricted by the wishes of interest groups, especially the Vessel Owners, who loudly protest any permission to allow foreign fishing within Icelandic waters. In general interest groups have opposed any foreign influence of the industry. In 1992 the government suggested easing of rules that prevented foreign investment in the fishing industry. The Vessel Owners opposed this provision, and there are still strict limits on foreign investment.36 In sum, these agreements show a trend toward Iceland’s protection of its EEZ from other states, especially with regard to the cod fishery. The most generous exchange of fishing permits in Icelandic waters has been with the blue whiting fishery, a fishery that has never really taken off in Iceland, but that the Faeroese and Norwegians have successfully engaged in.

The Actors: Government, Scientists, and Interest Groups As previously mentioned, the policy process in Iceland and Norway can be labeled as corporatist. That is, governments in both countries negotiate policy changes with the relevant interest groups throughout the domestic policy process. As in Norway, the three groups of actors involved in international negotiations over sharing of fishing resources are the government, scientists, and interest groups.

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The relationship between these actors differs from Norway, however, in four important ways. First, four interest groups participate as Icelandic delegates in international negotiations, compared to one in Norway. But because one of these interest groups, the Vessel Owners, dominates the domestic policy process, there is a certain similarity to Norges Fiskarlag’s dominance in Norway. Second, within the government sector, the relationship between the ministries of foreign affairs and fisheries is more symbiotic than in Norway, and the division of duties much less clear-cut. Third, the relationship between interest groups and the government is also different. The Icelandic interest groups are better able to influence policies that affect the industry, domestically as well as internationally. In comparison to Norway, policy decisions in Iceland are usually much closer to the preferences of the interest groups, especially the Vessel Owners, if not identical. This implies that the interest groups have more power to influence policy outcomes, and that the government is more willing to cede to interest group demands. Finally, Icelandic interest groups have a strong connection with both the Ministry of Fisheries and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Norway, there is no strong interest group connection with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But while these differences are important, the key difference between the countries lies in the fact that the Vessel Owners have retained their influence, while the influence of Norges Fiskarlag has declined during the time period the seven agreement studied here were negotiated.

The Government Officially, the Icelandic Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of all international negotiations dealing with resource allocation, and seeks advice from the Ministry of Fisheries. In reality, the division of duties is much less clear, with the ministries cooperating closely on these issues. There is one exception to this rule, though. When regional associations such as the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) are charged with negotiating a management agreement, the Ministry of Fisheries is in charge. In the context of the seven agreements discussed here, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has led six negotiations, the exception being the negotiations to manage the oceanic redfish fishery. A Working Group created by NEAFC and led by a Norwegian bureaucrat negotiated the oceanic redfish agreement. But who leads the negotiations does not seem to affect the distributional outcomes, as leadership does not change the level of constraints the government has in negotiations. In the late 1990s, a third governmental actor was added, and the Office of the Prime Minister began sending a delegate to observe negotiations. Interviewees did not agree on the role of the Office of the Prime Minister, with some indicating that it is mostly observatory. But one bureaucrat said that at the height of the conflict with Norway over the fishing of cod in the Barents

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Sea, the Office of the Prime Minister was deeply involved.37 Before most negotiating rounds, the lead negotiator often met with all three ministers. The exact role of the delegate representing the Office of the Prime Minister remains unclear, as interviewees emphasized the roles of the ministries of fisheries and foreign affairs as the crucial governmental actors. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Fisheries work closely together on straddling stock issues, and the division of duties between them is often blurred. One bureaucratic interviewee said that in general the Ministry of Fisheries dealt more with the interest groups and made sure they supported the agreements reached. Another bureaucrat said that the Ministry of Fisheries supplied technical information, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had more knowledge of the negotiating process. Referring to the unclear division of duties, a third bureaucrat said it could be explained by the smallness of Icelandic society, where the division of duties depended more on the individual in charge of negotiations than which ministry was in charge. In general, interviewees on both the bureaucratic and the interest group side agreed that cooperation between the two ministries was good. If there were serious differences of opinion within the delegation, either the minister of fisheries or foreign affairs would make the final decision on whether or not to finalize an agreement. One bureaucrat said that if an agreement came down to a minister making the final decision, the ministers of fisheries and foreign affairs would discuss the matter together before making a final decision.38 This is different from the decisionmaking process in Norway, where the division of duties is much more clearcut, and political leaders are less inclined to get involved. Once an agreement is signed it is put to the Althing, the Icelandic parliament. Any agreement is first discussed in the Fisheries Committee of the Althing, where committee members invite leaders of interest groups to submit an opinion on the agreement, and the committee then votes on the agreement. This procedure is a formality, as the agreements are never amended in the committee. Doing so would violate the agreement reached and essentially render it void. After the vote in the Fisheries Committee, the agreement is presented in the form of a resolution for the parliament to approve. These resolutions direct the cabinet to formally accept and sign the agreement. Of the seven agreements discussed here, only the first capelin agreement in 1980 passed the Fisheries Committee with a split vote; all other agreements have had unanimous committee support. In general, the role of the Althing is a formality, not a ratification procedure. In a parliamentary democracy where the cabinet has a majority in parliament, a vote against an agreement would in all likelihood indicate a serious rift within the government and possibly lead to a new election. Hence, subsequent parliamentary vote on the resolution to accept an agreement does not constrain the delegation, as the formal ratification required by the US Senate has been shown to do.39

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As in Norway, the Icelandic government holds preparatory meetings prior to all international negotiations. Usually, at least two meetings are held before each negotiating round. The number varies depending on what negotiations are being prepared and discussed. The ministries of Foreign Affairs and Fisheries usually call these meetings, which are attended by bureaucrats from the two ministries as well as scientists and interest group members. Often these meetings are quite large, with the number of participants sometimes reaching fifty or sixty. During these meetings, the attendees discuss how much quota Iceland should try to get, what Iceland can realistically expect, what scientific information says about the stock in question, and what basis for allocation Iceland should advocate. Often the discussion is quite heated. As one bureaucrat said: “We hold a number of meetings before negotiations and people are not shy about voicing their opinion.”40 The role of the bureaucrats is to bridge the wants of the interest groups with the need for an agreement. “We [the bureaucrats] are first and foremost looking after the interests of the Icelandic economy,” said an interviewee. “Therefore we discuss management of high-seas fishing with the interest groups.”41 This is similar to the role of the bureaucrats in Norway, except that there seem to be more interactions between the government (bureaucrats and politicians) and interest groups in Iceland than in Norway. Referring to the general relationship with the interest groups on domestic and international policy issues, the bureaucrat added that there were very few weeks of the year when people did not meet in one way or another to discuss fisheries policy. “Our strength in [international] negotiations is solid interactions with interest groups,” said a bureaucrat. “We have never signed an agreement they did not like.”42 Another bureaucrat concurred and said, “interest groups have a great deal of influence on the Icelandic policy making process. This can be seen in the fact that they rarely protest negotiated agreements.”43 There has been broad support for the agreements Iceland has made with Norway, with the exception of the 1997 herring agreement. Three of the four Icelandic interest groups involved in the negotiating process protested the agreement, arguing that the share given to EU was too large. But this protest died down, and when the quotas for the 1998 season were decided none of the groups mentioned the issue again.

The Scientists As in Norway, Icelandic fisheries scientists present scientific information and advice on the estimated safe TAC levels for different stocks. This information is collected and processed by the publicly funded Marine Research Institute. The role of the Institute is to advise the government on the level of a particular stock. According to a couple of bureaucrats, scientists present scientific information and advice on stock levels during the preparatory meetings.

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The role of science has become more influential over the past twenty years. “The science is more credible these days than it was before, and it is especially so when scientists from different states agree on stock levels,” said a bureaucrat. “In the 1950s and 1960s, scientists often disagreed, but increasing levels of agreement have made their position more influential.”44 The relationship between interest groups and scientists has changed during the past decades. Until 1970, the job of the Marine Research Institute was mostly to investigate new stocks and advise the fleet on how to conduct new fisheries. Soon after the 200-mile extension, the Institute’s role changed, and it began to advise the government on TAC levels. This new role led to a conflict between the Institute and the fishermen, especially during times of resource crisis, since recommending a reduction in TAC from one year to another is highly unpopular. During the 1980s, relationships between interest groups and the Marine Research Institute were fraught with difficulty, with the interest groups publicly questioning the science behind the Institute’s reports and recommendations. But the Marine Research Institute’s recommendations got backing from the Ministry of Fishery, which strengthened the institute’s position. A bureaucrat pointed out that the minister of fisheries usually backed the Institute, which helped its position. “Only two people have served as minister of fisheries during this time [1983–1999] and neither has ever doubted the Institute’s advice,” he said.45 In the late 1980s, relations between the scientists and interest groups sunk to a new low, and the government stepped in to try to remedy the situation. In the early 1990s, the Icelandic government hired foreign consultants to write a report on the Institute, its practices, and inner workings. The report gave the Institute good marks for scientific integrity, thus lending credibility to the work of the fisheries scientists. According to my interviewees, the report led to a turnaround in 1991 and 1992 in the attitudes of fishermen and their organizations to fisheries scientists and science. “Now everyone seems to agree that science is the best way to go,” one bureaucrat said, adding that “the few that still question the science never argue that you have to fish less.”46 The attitude toward scientific information was not uniform among the interest groups during the dissenting years. According to a bureaucrat, The Federation of Vessel Owners have supported the scientists most of the time, especially after they hired their own fisheries scientist in the mid-1990s. The Seamen’s Federation and the Marine Engineers have usually been supportive of the Marine Research Institute, while the Officers Guild has been more critical of scientific advice.47 Despite the difference of opinion between the interest groups and the scientists, there is a great deal of interaction between these actors regarding the domestic management of the fisheries. For example, representatives from the Marine Research Institute attend annual meetings with all these groups and often engage in heated discussions there.

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Delegations to negotiate sharing agreements usually include scientists for advisory purposes. As in Norway, their role is supposed to be impartial and based on the best available scientific information. As such scientists cannot be considered veto players on the negotiating committees in both Iceland and Norway, but rather as informational agents, and therefore their participation does not influence the size of the win-set available for negotiations.

The Interest Groups The interest group structure of the Icelandic fishing industry differs greatly from the group structure in Norway. Organization of interests is along the lines of owners of the vessels in one camp and the employees in the other. Employees, or labor, are then organized according to different employment groups on the vessels. Hence, interest groups are not organized regionally as in Norway, and there is no one big umbrella organization where all groups come together. The result of this more heterogeneous organizational structure is that four interest groups are represented in Icelandic negotiating delegations. The Vessel Owners represent the owners of large fishing vessels, and the other three organizations include the Officers Guild, the Seamen’s Federation, and the Marine Engineers, labor unions who represent the different groups of employees on fishing vessels and freighters. In the early 1990s the three labor unions decided to cooperate by sending one one or two delegates to international negotiations to represent all three groups.48 Because of the similarity of the political systems in Iceland and Norway, the role of the interest groups in international negotiations is remarkably similar in two out of the three features discussed in chapter 3. Subtle differences exist though, especially in regard to how the interest groups themselves view their role and influence. 1. As in Norway, bureaucrats look to interest groups for advice on the practical aspects of different fisheries, as well as advice on what the interest groups will think is an acceptable agreement. There is a considerable level of cooperation between the government and interest groups on all aspects of the fishing industry. 2. Interest group representatives in Iceland think their participation in international negotiations is important and that they have a great deal of influence on the process. Unlike their Norwegian counterparts, they did not indicate they feel left out of the process. 3. As in Norway, in exchange for a seat on the negotiating committees, the interest groups’ role is to support the international agreement in the domestic policy debate and to ensure that their members accept the agreement once it is reached.

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These three roles warrant closer inspection. First, bureaucrats look to interest groups for advice on the fisheries. “Our role in negotiating committees is primarily to give advice to governmental officials,” an interest group leader said. “Issues that they are not familiar with will often come up in these negotiations. Our influence lies primarily in deciding how much we should request from each stock and what access other states should have to our economic zone.”49 A bureaucrat concurred with this view, saying: “often it is useful to have them [the interest groups] along as they know the fishing banks and the fishery and therefore we use them as advisors.”50 In this respect, the relationship between the interest groups and the government is similar between Norway and Iceland. The interest groups provide information the government cannot get through other channels, and thus enhance the negotiating position of the country. According to a bureaucrat, during the preparatory meetings the government lays out its initial position, and then the interest groups were asked their opinion. “The officials are definitely in charge,” the bureaucrat said, “but usually there is broad agreement before beginning negotiations.”51 In general, the Icelandic interest groups are content with the level of influence they have on international negotiations, and none of the interest group leaders interviewed mentioned that they felt left out of the process or that their power was diminishing. Their influence seems to be most pronounced during the preparatory meetings, but also spills over to the actual negotiations, especially when participants discuss the specifics of access to Icelandic waters. Second, the Icelandic interest group leaders thought they had influence in international negotiations and that their opinion mattered. Their level of confidence in the ability of the interest groups to influence the negotiations is significantly higher than displayed by their counterparts in Norway. “We do influence the initial demands,” an interest group representative said. “But it is difficult if the political arm goes against what the interest groups want.”52 Another interest group representative agreed that the level of influence was great. “We have a great deal of influence on what happens during the negotiations,” he said. “We emphasize practical matters and we have brought new ideas to the negotiations. We have also taken part in the discussion on how to support our position [in international negotiations] and we support the policies of the Icelandic government.”53 A third interest group representative was even more confident of the level of influence, saying: “We expect the government to consider our views. Otherwise we would not participate in the delegation.”54 One interest group leader also suggested that the role of interest group representatives on the delegations was to pose as a threat to other states, which supports the argument that interest groups in Iceland reduce the size of the win-set in negotiations. “The leader of the Icelandic delegation uses us as a threat to get a better agreement by saying that he cannot offer us this or that,” he said. “Often we talk with our colleagues in other delegations

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and give a bleak view of the future, and emphasize how small Iceland is and how dependent it is on fisheries.”55 There is a great deal of cooperation between the interest groups in matters relating to international negotiations, both among the unions and between the unions and the Vessel Owners. On matters of domestic policy they meet regularly, both formally and informally. While the Vessel Owners and the three labor unions are often at odds domestically, especially when it comes to contract negotiations, they make sure they agree on a position to follow in international negotiations. Entering the negotiating process, the interest groups coordinate their views and seek to speak with one voice on what they want from international negotiations. “It is our strength that we are in agreement,” an interest group representative said. “When large interest groups work together like this, the nation supports us.”56 The interest groups also coordinate their views in the meetings with the government. The three labor unions have common interests because they represent those working on the fishing vessels. As these are organizations with a small bureaucracy, the unions always make sure they have at least one representative in delegations, preferably two. Their cooperation is undoubtedly helped by the fact that these three groups share the same floor in an office building in Reykjavík. The cooperation between the three unions and the Vessel Owners is close on international issues, according to my interviewees and, as in Norway, they speak with one voice. They stressed that there is no real conflict of interest in these matters. “We have a common interest that is the national interest,” said one interest group representative. “Even though we disagree fiercely domestically, it does not affect international matters.”57 There is also a great deal of cooperation between the interest groups and the Ministry of Fisheries and with the minister of fisheries. The four interest groups often meet with the minister of fisheries, and some of the interest group leaders estimated the number of meetings to be at least twenty or thirty a year. In addition, they also meet often with bureaucrats from the Ministry of Fisheries. Most of these meetings concern domestic policy questions and, in general, international negotiations are not discussed systematically. Finally, as in Norway, in return for a seat in the delegation, the interest groups are expected to accept the agreement and to make sure that their members adhere to it. As in Norway, this is a form of coalition-building on behalf of the government and a way to reduce conflict domestically. “It is crucial to have the interest groups involved,” said a bureaucrat. “It is impossible to have to fight them at home about the [negotiated] outcome.”58 For the most part, the interest groups also support the final agreements, even though they always think Iceland should have gotten a larger share in the final allocation. The only major example of dissatisfaction was in 1996, when three of the four interest groups opposed the share the EU got in the herring negotiations. Generally, the disagreement does not run very deep.

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Once an agreement is negotiated the interest groups do not have the ability to change the outcome post hoc. “The cabinet wants our approval,” an interest group leader said. “Otherwise the opposition [in parliament] would utilize the disagreement. We have seen that happen.”59 Another interest group leader concurred that “we have no power to change what we do not like. But it is good for the government to have support from organizations representing the fishermen. They have great knowledge of the ocean and the government wants their support.”60 The evidence suggests that there is a much stronger relationship among the interest groups in Iceland than in Norway. In addition, the interest group leaders in Iceland are much more content and confident about their ability to influence the process of negotiations and force outcomes close to their preference. The relationship between the Icelandic government and the interest groups is very close, as it is in Norway. But the Icelandic interest groups— especially the Vessel Owners—have better access to the policy process and much more influence in getting policies passed that benefit the industry than Norges Fiskarlag. The result is that the interest groups in Iceland usually get what they want, and this level of influence puts constraints on the Icelandic delegation in international negotiations. This significant policy influence is evident when looking at two key policies in Iceland, the policy of manipulating the value of the Icelandic currency until 1993, and the introduction of the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system in 1984, which was heavily influenced by the Vessel Owners. In analyzing these two policy arenas, it is not always clear whether or not the government even has separate policy preferences from the interest groups, especially the Vessel Owners.

Structure of the Icelandic Fishing Industry There are important similarities and differences between fisheries management in Iceland and Norway. In both countries, fisheries administration is highly centralized, and key interest groups are consulted during the policy process, where they have great influence. Until 1986, the price of fish was decided by a committee made up of government officials and interest group representatives, as it was in Norway. The Icelandic government then allowed a small part of the catch to be auctioned off in specially created fish markets, while the governmental pricing committee still decided the price for the rest of the catch. This practice stopped in 1993, when the pricing of fish was liberalized and the pricing committee dissolved. This change went hand in hand with other measures to make the Icelandic economy more market oriented. There are two major differences between Icelandic and Norwegian fisheries politics. The Icelandic government has never directly subsidized the fishing industry by, for example, purchasing vessels or gear, or by directly guaranteeing incomes of fishermen. This does not tell the whole story though, as local com-

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munities have at times invested heavily in the processing industry to keep up employment in the area. They have done so mainly through debt reduction or by buying parts of the processing plants.61 The second important difference between Iceland and Norway is Iceland’s absence of regionalism. With the exception of Reykjavík and the surrounding area, the share of the fisheries in employment and industry is great everywhere. The share is greatest on the West and East Fjords, where in 1991 it was 36% and 30% respectively. In the western and northern regions the share was about 17%, and in the southern and the southwest regions it was about 22%. The share in the Reykjavík area was only 4%, which can be explained by the fact that it is the most populous area in the country, more than half the population lives in and around Reykjavík. This area thus has a more diverse employment and industrial base.62 Icelandic fishing interests are not organized geographically like fishing interests in Norway. Overall, the economic importance of the fisheries permeates the economy as well as the political system, and this feature has not changed during the period studied here.

The Interest Groups The power of organized fishing interests in Iceland is large. But it is difficult to pinpoint their power precisely, since Icelandic interest groups do not have to interact with the government in the same way as in Norway, that is, their interaction is not structured around annual negotiations over subsidies. Interviews indicated that the interaction in Iceland is more informal and less bureaucratic than in Norway. The power of the Vessel Owners is great. They are consulted on all major policy changes, and for the most part the changes made meet their approval. Some have gone as far as to say that what the Vessel Owners want, they get. For example in 1983, when the Icelandic government adopted the ITQ system, the change and the terms were dictated by the Vessel Owners and reflected its core interests, those of the owners of large fishing vessels.63 The other groups that have delegates in the international negotiations process are the three labor unions mentioned above, which represent the different groups working on fishing vessels. These groups are also consulted on all matters pertaining to the fishing industry, but their influence does not match the influence of the Vessel Owners, who control all the capital. In addition, Kristján Ragnarsson, the long-time chairman of the Vessel Owners until his retirement in 2003, sat on the board of some of the most powerful companies in Iceland, giving the organization unique access to decisionmaking. The labor unions have fought to change some of the provisions of the ITQ system, especially the provisions that allow the selling and renting of quotas, but so far the opinion of the Vessel Owners has prevailed.

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Achieving and Maintaining Influence The power of the Icelandic fishing industry stems from its economic dominance. Fish and fish-related products comprise the majority of Iceland’s export earnings. This dominance has given the industry access to policy making and, according to some scholars, enabled it to dictate policy.64 During the 1970s and especially the early 1980s, the Icelandic government was quite willing to pursue economic policies to benefit the industry, especially policy measures that improved export earnings. Any change in catch levels, up or down, had major implications for the national economy and made the government quite willing to cede to industry demands. Figure 4.1 shows the share of fish-related products as a percentage of the total value of exports 1960–1997. Fish exports have declined from about 95% of the total value of Icelandic exports in 1960 to averaging about 75% for the past twenty-five years. This decline is partially a result of government policy. Since gaining independence from Denmark in 1944, all Icelandic cabinets have sought to diversify the economy and reduce Iceland’s dependence on fishing. Such dependence on one export sector makes any economy vulnerable, especially given the volatility of

Figure 4.1. The value of fish exports as a percentage of the value of all Icelandic exports 1960–1997.

Note: Fisheries still provide the bulk of Iceland’s export earnings. Source: Statistics Iceland (Hagstofa Íslands).

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the fishing resource. This volatility can be inferred from the graph, as in the past twenty-five years the percentage of the value of fish products has varied from about 65–70% in 1984 and 1985 to more than 80% in 1991. The early 1980s were a period of resource crisis when the cod stock collapsed, significantly affecting the national economy. The Icelandic government showed a great willingness to cater to the fishing industry during the time period discussed here. First, the government has shown great willingness to aid the industry during difficult times, especially when it comes to increasing its export earnings. During the late 1970s, the 1980s, and into the 1990s, the Icelandic government manipulated the price of the Icelandic currency, the Króna, which directly influenced domestic earnings of the industry. Second, the government consults the interest groups on all major policy questions pertaining to the industry. The interest groups are involved in designing policy proposals that affect the industry and are then asked to give their opinion on laws and regulations under discussion in the Althing. The penetration of fishing interests is evident in the major policy change in the Icelandic fisheries during the past twenty years: the adoption of the ITQ system. During the process of deciding which management regime to adopt in the early 1980s, interest groups—especially the Vessel Owners—played an important role. They were involved in designing the system, implementing it, and later adjusting it to iron out the quirks of the new system. The power of the interest groups was especially pronounced in the 1980s. Increased liberalization and privatization during the 1990s has translated into increasing resistance of the government to respond to pressures to bail out the industry. But despite these changes, the Icelandic fishing industry has kept its powerful position in Iceland and continues to significantly affect domestic and international fisheries policy. This is in part because that the number of fishermen has not declined significantly, and the Althing still shows a great deal of interest in fisheries issues.

The Political Economy of Currency Valuation The 1970s and 1980s were a tumultuous time economically in Iceland. Inflation was high, posing significant problems for the fishing industry. Its export earnings were eaten up by inflation, which averaged about 40% to 50% per year in the late 1970s, peaking at 84% in 1983 and then dropping to about 20% to 25% per year in the late 1980s. In the early 1990s, the government finally got inflation under control, and between 1991 and 1999 inflation ranged between 1.5% and 4% per year. The problem inflation created for the fishing industry was partially solved by currency manipulation, specifically by using devaluations to increase the value of fisheries exports. Until 1993, the price of the Icelandic currency was

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decided by the cabinet and carried out by the Central Bank of Iceland, when the price of the currency was finally allowed to float. In manipulating the currency to help the fishing industry, the government devalued the Króna during slow economic times in the fishery and let the value appreciate during good times. Devaluations increased the export earnings of the industry, but at the same time increased the potential for inflation and hurt those who owed money abroad, such as vessel owners who bought new ships. This policy of devaluation generated money for the government. The money was then put in a fund to aid those buying ships and who were hurt by devaluations, to even out the effect of price changes on the national economy, and to pay for industry reorganization.65 The policy of devaluation to aid the fishing industry was one of the main tools the Icelandic government used to manipulate the economy, and from 1977 to 1993 the Icelandic currency was devalued twenty-one times. The most active year of this policy was in 1989, when the currency was devalued eight times.66 This policy was pursued solely to benefit the fisheries as the key exporting industry, without regard for the disastrous impact on overall economic health. For example, devaluations increased the price level in the country, as all imports became more expensive. The resulting inflation also hurt regular wage earners, who had to contend with their wages buying less this month than the last. That is, fishing interests were the primary concern of the government, despite the great cost to the rest of society because of the resulting high inflation.

The System of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) The second issue that can be used to gauge the impact of the interest groups on the Icelandic policy-making process is related to the enormous changes in the management of the Icelandic fisheries. Since the early 1980s, the biggest change in Icelandic fisheries’ management has been the establishment of the ITQ system in 1984 to regulate the catch levels for the most important resource— cod—as well as other demersal species. Interest groups representing the various aspects of the Icelandic fishing industry participated fully in the process of designing the new policy; they had representatives on the governmental committee established to design policy changes and were being asked to comment on the final result. ITQs essentially converted the resource into private property by giving individual vessel owners sole ownership of a quota. When quotas are transferable, they are treated like any other private property in that they can be bought, sold, or rented. They are also property that can be inherited, and a quota share has even been considered a divisible asset in divorce proceedings. But quota differs significantly from other types of property that can be freely bought and sold. Only those who own a fishing vessel licensed to fish within

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the Icelandic EEZ can buy it. That is, there is no new entry into the industry. Essentially, the adoption of the ITQ system has closed off the fishery to new entrants, but freely allowed parties to exit the system. The ITQ system fundamentally altered fisheries management in Iceland. Before, the government had experimented with controlling the catch of overutilized stocks by reducing the number of days fishing was allowed. But this system did not work well, and with the increasing over-utilization of important stocks, the number of days when fishing was prohibited increased. In 1977 trawlers were prevented from fishing for forty-two days, and by 1983 the number had increased to 110. So for nearly a third of the year, trawlers were prevented from fishing. With the adoption of the ITQ system, Iceland abandoned this system of banning fishing for a certain number of days. Instead the government set the total allowable catch, which was then divided amongst the fishing fleet. These quotas were made fully transferable. The herring fishery was the first fishery to get individual quotas in 1975, and in 1979 these quotas were made transferable.67 Individual quotas were introduced into the capelin fishery following the Icelandic-Norwegian capelin agreement of 1980, and in 1986 these quotas were made transferable. In 1983 and 1984, ITQs were introduced in the demersal fisheries, including the most valuable ones of cod, haddock, and redfish. Initially, small boats less than ten Gross Registered Tons (GRT) in size were excluded from the system, allowing them to continue to fish according to the old system. This led to a substantial growth in the number of small boats, and the amount of fish they caught that was not included in the TAC. In 1984 there were 1,128 boats under 10 GRT, but in 1990 their number had increased to 2,023, or by 79%. Comparatively, the number of trawlers increased from 103 in 1984 to 115 in 1990, or by 11.6%. During the next six years the quota system was refined and adjusted to include the whole fleet, and in 1990 the transformation was complete: all ships and boats had been allocated individual transferable quotas. This phenomenal growth was finally stopped in 1991, when all boats between 6 and 10 GRT got ITQs, and any new purchase of a boat had to mean the retirement of another boat.68 The Vessel Owners played an important role during the process of deciding which management regime to adopt. They were deeply involved in designing, implementing, and adjusting a new system of ITQs.69 Interest groups representing the various aspects of the Icelandic fishing industry also participated in the process, but the Vessel Owners were the crucial interests in the adoption of the ITQ system, and their role was indicative of their power in the development of fisheries policy in Iceland. Steingrímur Hermannsson, prime minister during the period when the ITQ system was established, confirms the enormous power of the Vessel Owners in his autobiography, saying that the ITQ system was almost entirely designed by the Vessel Owners with the full support of the Minister of Fisheries.70 There is little indication that the power of the Vessel Owners has diminished since the 1980s.

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Number of Fishermen As discussed above, the power of fisheries interest in Icelandic political life derived from their economic importance. Unlike Norway, there exists very little evidence on voting behavior of the fishermen as a group, and in general the expectation is that with so much at stake economically, political parties cannot afford to alienate the fishermen. The total number of fishermen employed on all vessels has changed considerably between 1977 and 1997 as shown in Figure 4.2. In 1977 there were 5,319 fishermen employed in Iceland. In 1997 the number was down to 4,582, or a reduction of 14%. But as Figure 4.2 shows, their numbers have changed significantly as a result of how the ITQ system was implemented. In the early and mid 1980s there was a phenomenal increase in the number of people employed on boats and larger vessels, peaking at 6,920 in 1986, an increase of 30% from the number in 1977. The steady decrease since the mid-1980s measures nearly 34% by 1997.71 This peak in the mid-1980s is explained by the institutional changes made in the early 1980s, when vessels larger than ten GRT were put under the ITQ system. In effect, there was a limit put on all larger vessels, while fishing with boats less than ten GRT remained essentially free and open to all, and were the only way to enter the fishing industry. This led to an enormous increase in the number of small boats and the amount of fish they caught. The increase in the number of boats caused an increase in the number of fishermen. The number of small-boat operators soared from 1977 until 1986. In 1977, an average of 179 fishermen worked on small open boats, but in 1986 the number had reached 1,745, an 874% increase in nine years. In order to stem the increase in small boats and limit small-boat catches of mainly cod and haddock, the government, in 1986, passed a law which limited the fishing season to forty-nine days in 1986 and sixty-four days in 1987.72 Since 1986, there has been a steady reduction in the number of small-scale fishermen, reflecting changes in policy aimed at stemming the growth of small boats and their catches. By 1991 these boats had been put under the ITQ system, making new entry into the fishing industry impossible. The number of fishermen has increased on two other vessel types since 1977: on vessels over one hundred GRT and on trawlers. Since the introduction of the ITQ system, there has been increased investment in large, more efficient vessels. One of the benefits of the ITQ system is that it allows more planning on the behalf of owners of the fishing vessels. Before the establishment of the ITQ system, each vessel owner’s income would fluctuate greatly because the fishing effort determined income. Factors such as bad weather, not finding fish, and problems with vessels and gear could disrupt fishing and therefore diminish one’s income potential. With the ITQ system, each vessel has an allocated quota that changes only when the TAC changes. There is thus no longer a race to catch as much as possible while the different fisheries are open, and so vessel owners now can plan ahead and try to maximize income by better controlling when and how each vessel conducts fishing. Most notable

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Figure 4.2. Changes in the number of fishermen in Iceland 1977–1997.

Note: The increase in their numbers until the mid-1980s mostly reflects a sudden increase in the number of small-scale fishermen who initially were exempt from the system of individual transferable quotas. Source: Compiled by author.

has been the growth in factory trawlers, vessels that process the catch on board. The first such vessel began operation in 1982, and by 1992 the number had grown to twenty-six ships. There has not been a real big growth in the number of trawlers though, because regulations dictate that in order to buy a new ship, an old ship must be retired. But the new ships that have been bought are generally bigger, more powerful, and more efficient than the older ones. The number of fishermen working on trawlers increased from 1,100 in 1977 to its peak of 1,761 in 1991, an increase of 60%. It has since declined by 16% to 1,483 fishermen. The increase from the 1977 level is 35%. On vessels larger than one hundred GRT, the number of fishermen working on trawlers also peaked in the early 1990s, but has since declined to a level below the 1977 level, again indicating a shift in the fleet toward bigger trawlers and factory ships. In 1977 there were 1,759 fishermen working on vessels in this category. The numbers peaked at 2,015 in 1988, but dropped to 1,486 in 1997. This is a decline of 26% since 1988, and 15% from 1977 levels. The only vessel size that has shown a steady decline in the number of fishermen employed since 1977 is the category of fishermen working on vessels under one hundred GRT (excluding small open boats). In 1977 an average of 2,281 fishermen were employed on these vessels, but in 1997 only 981 fishermen were employed on vessels in this category, a 57% decline.

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The declining number of fishermen from 1977 to 1997 does not tell the whole story. The period from 1984 to 1991 marked an extremely active period in changing rules and regulations governing the management of the 200-mile EEZ. As with any institutional change of this magnitude, there is an adjustment period when people are getting used to the new system. It is clear when looking at the phenomenal growth of small boats that fishermen took advantage of the loophole the new system provided. Initially, boats less than ten GRTs were excluded from the ITQ system, hence entry into the industry was only possible by buying a small boat. Since most loopholes have been closed and every fishery and boat size is now governed by the ITQ system, there is a steady decline in the number of fishermen. Some of this decline probably can be attributed to the difficult resource situation in Icelandic waters, but most of it seems to be a reaction to institutional changes. The quota system has been controversial from the start, and the controversy has increased over the years. Critics charge that by giving vessel owners permanent individual quotas for free, the Icelandic government has given them a great deal of wealth. The system of individual quotas, combined with a diminishing annual TAC and strict entrance requirements, has increased the price of per ton of cod quota tremendously, making those who possess it very wealthy after getting the quota for free in 1984. The main demand set forth by critics was to charge the owners of the quota a fee, which was eventually instituted in 2004.

Role of the Althing The continued importance of the fishing industry can also be seen in the proceedings of the Icelandic parliament, where for the most part changes in the number of fisheries issues has kept pace with changes in the size of the docket. As with Norway, I created a database to examine the changes in the interest of the Althing in fisheries issues. Due to the prominence of the fishing sector in the Icelandic economy, most ministries in Iceland deal with issues that pertain to the fisheries in one way or the other. In the Index to the Proceedings of the Icelandic Parliament, items pertaining to the fisheries are listed under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Fisheries, but also under the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Industry, the Ministry of Transportation, the Office of the Prime Minister, and the Ministry of Social Affairs. Practically the only ministry that has nothing to do with the fisheries is the Ministry of Church Affairs. Unlike the Index to the Norwegian Storting proceedings, the Icelandic Althing does not sort its proceedings according to issue area, but rather by type of issues (that is, laws, regulations, resolutions or questions). To construct the database of fisheries related issues coming up before parliament, I went through all issues and selected those having to do with the fisheries, broadly defined. While it is always going to be difficult to compare the Icelandic and the Norwegian count directly because of institutional differences, this method makes the

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counts somewhat comparable. In addition, the Icelandic index provides the total number of all issues brought fourth in the different categories, thus allowing me to show the proportion of fisheries related issues to all issues in the same category over time. There is an important institutional difference between the Norwegian Storting and the Icelandic Althing. Both countries are usually ruled by coalition governments, but different rules dictate what happens when a coalition loses its majority. In Norway, elections are only held every four years, so if a coalition government collapses either a new majority is formed or the country is ruled by a minority government until the next parliamentary session. If a coalition loses its majority support in Iceland, the prime minister calls new elections. As coalition governments are sometimes quite volatile, few have lasted very long. During the 1976–1997 period, there were three extremely short parliamentary sessions, lasting only a few weeks, which are excluded from this graph. That is, I only include parliaments that lasted the full session, from fall to late spring. The sessions excluded are in 1979, 1991, and 1995. Including them would skew the general trend in the discussion of the fisheries in the Althing. Figure 4.3 shows the trend in the number of cabinet proposals dealing with the fisheries. Figure 4.4 shows the trend in the number of fisheries issues as a proportion of the number of all propositions originating in the cabinet and passed by the Althing. Figure 4.3. Number of cabinet proposals dealing with the fisheries approved by the Althing—the Icelandic parliament—from 1976 to 1997.

Source: Ásgeirsdóttir 2007.

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Figure 4.4. Changes in the proportion of all cabinet proposals passed through the Althing, the Icelandic parliament, dealing with fisheries related issues from 1976 to 1997.

Source: Proceedings of the Althing, the Icelandic parliament 1976–1997.

Figure 4.3 shows that the overall trend in the number of cabinet proposals is upward, indicating that the cabinet is increasingly preoccupied with fisheries issues. However, there is a dip in activity in the late 1980s, following the flurry of changes that accompanied the introduction of the ITQ system. The increase in the 1990s is related to further adjustment of Icelandic fisheries management, combined with proposals liberalizing the economy, including the fishing sector. This process began in 1992, when a coalition government led by the right-wing Independent Party came to power. The 1980s were a period of liberalization for the Norwegian fisheries, but this development did not begin in Iceland with any seriousness until the 1990s, when the Independence Party got into government and where it has remained since. Figure 4.4 shows that the number of fisheries issues, as proportion of all propositions originating in the cabinet, grew until the early 1980s, declined slightly, and has since then remained about the same. Thus after the increase in activity around the introduction of the ITQ system, the interest in the cabinet has remained roughly constant. The number of parliamentary resolutions passed shows a trend similar to the number of propositions passed. Resolutions are recommendations to the cabinet to take a specific action, for example, sign to an international treaty or investigate the possibility of getting fishing rights within the EEZs of other states. The resolutions are thus a good indicator of what action parliamentari-

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ans want the cabinet to take. The number of parliamentary resolutions dealing with fisheries issues is shown in Figure 4.5. Again there is an increase in the early 1980s, during the adoption of the ITQ system, and then the number drops, and in the early 1990s it increases again, which indicates that the parliament is increasingly preoccupied with fisheries issues. As in Norway, Icelandic parliamentarians can pose questions to the ministers and, as in Norway, the opposition generally uses questions to shed light on certain issues or to put members of the cabinet on the defensive. Figure 4.6 shows that over time the number of questions asked regarding fisheries has increased during the past twenty-five years, reflecting the continual importance of this sector to the Icelandic economy and by extension to parliamentarians, most of whom have extensive fisheries interests in their districts. The Icelandic parliamentary data show that politicians pay a lot of attention to the fishery, with about 10% of all cabinet proposals passed dealing with fisheries related issues. The overall number of issues relating to the fisheries increased in two of the three issue types. All the parliamentary indicators for Norway showed a downward slope, whereas the indicators used for Iceland all show an upward trend. This supports the thesis that the Icelandic fisheries have, at minimum, retained their influence on Icelandic policy making. In comparison with Norway, it is clear that the Icelandic fisheries play a much larger role in parliamentary affairs. Figure 4.5. Number of resolutions passed by the Althing dealing with fisheries issues from 1976 to 1997.

Source: Proceedings of the Althing, the Icelandic parliament 1976–1997.

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Figure 4.6. Number of questions posed by parliamentarians in Iceland regarding the fisheries in the Althing from 1976 to 1997.

Source: Proceedings of the Althing, the Icelandic parliament 1976–1997.

Summary Overall, Iceland’s ocean policy has been aggressive when it comes to the extension of the EEZ, and it has been reluctant to enter into agreements with other nations that would allow access to the Icelandic EEZ. As in Norway, the key actors to consider in international negotiations are the governmental officials, scientists, and interest group representatives. Given the economic importance of the fisheries for Iceland, the Icelandic interest groups have shown an uncanny ability to penetrate the domestic policy process in Iceland, especially with the adoption of the ITQ system in 1984. In addition, the Icelandic government has shown great willingness to cater to the industry, as made evident by the currency policy Iceland pursued until 1993 that favored fishing interests. The question now becomes if and how the influence on the domestic policy process will translate into an ability to influence the outcome of international negotiations. The interest group leaders themselves seem to think so, and the Icelandic bureaucrats interviewed seem to support this view. There is no doubt that interest groups representing the Icelandic fisheries wield an enormous level of influence in domestic policy matters, and this influence will likely extend into the international arena. As members of Ice-

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landic delegations in international negotiations, these powerful groups have the ability to influence the outcome of the negotiations. The powerful influence of the Icelandic interest groups, especially the Vessel Owners, narrows the bargaining space—or the win-set—for the Icelandic negotiators. This gives Iceland the upper hand in its negotiations with Norway, which becomes especially evident in the 1990s. The Norwegian interest groups were quite powerful in the 1970s and into the mid 1980s, which allowed them to constrain the Norwegian negotiators to a greater extent than they have been able to in the 1990s. This will be discussed in detail in chapter 5.

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Chapter 5

Interest-Group Power and its Impact on the International Allocation of Shared Fish Stocks

T

he Law of the Sea regime gives nations involved in allocating straddling fish stocks guidelines to help solve distributive conflicts around straddling fish stocks. As discussed in chapter 2, the regime emphasizes the rights of coastal states, calls for consideration of historical rights, and emphasizes the use of science in reaching allocation decisions. In the negotiations between Iceland and Norway, these guidelines have been applied in different ways across stocks and over time. The states rely on scientific advice to determine the size of the stock and how much is safe to catch. However, the regime does not give any specifics on how to apply these solution concepts to actual conflicts over the allocation of straddling stocks, and states are left to work out the details on their own. As a result, the application of the rights of coastal states, historical rights, and zonal attachment as a baseline for allocation is wholly up to the participants in negotiations. While coastal status explains the broad distribution of the resource, the final allocation agreements discussed here have either historical rights or zonal attachment as their basic solution concept. The solution concept that succeeds is derived through complex domestic and international policy processes that allow plenty of room for liberal interpretation of the regimes’ provision, especially of historical rights. In the case of Iceland and Norway, the role of interest groups is crucial in explaining which solution significantly influences the final outcome. In general, Iceland’s negotiating position has been helped by the strong position of their interest groups, especially the Vessel Owners, resulting in the outcomes of the negotiations usually being 113

1989

1998

1996

1997

1999

1996

Capelin 2

Capelin 3

Herring 1

Herring 2

Cod

Oceanic Redfish Strong

Strong

Strong

Strong

Strong

Strong

Strong

Weak

Weak

Weak

Weak

Weak

Medium

Strong

Interest Group Interest Group Strength Strength (Iceland) (Norway)

Possibly Iceland This fishery is of minor economic importance for Norway as well as Iceland. There is really not much information about the role of interest groups during the negotiations, and hence it is difficult to evaluate this one.

Iceland This is possibly the most unfavorable agreement for the Norwegians as it allowed Icelandic fishing vessels access to the cod fishery in the Barents Sea where Iceland had—at best— a weak historical rights and no claims to zonal attachment.

Iceland Norway’s share was further reduced in order to pay for an agreement that would include the European Union, which Iceland vehemently opposed.

Iceland Zonal attachment for Norway for this stock is about 90%. Despite heavy opposition from Norges Fiskarlag, the Norwegian only managed to secure 62% of the TAC, while Iceland’s emphasis on historical catches succeeded.

Iceland Iceland cancelled the 1989 agreement due to interest group pressure. While there were doubts within the bureaucracy about this move, Iceland successfully negotiated for a lower share of capelin for Norway.

Iceland for the most part, but Norway did gain a bit While Norway’s share was reduced significantly to add Greenland into the agreement, Norway won rights to fish within the Icelandic EEZ. This helped Norway meet their quota.

Equitable agreement This is the most equitable agreement between the two nations given zonal attachment and historical catch levels.

Who Got a Fairer Share in the Negotiations

Note: This table shows the strength of the interest group in Iceland and Norway, vis-à-vis their respective governments, and the outcome of the negotiations. It illustrates how change in constraints—and thus the size of the win-set—influences the allocation of stocks to Icelandic and Norwegian fishermen.

1980

Year of Agreement

Capelin 1

Stock Being Negotiated

Table 5.1. Interest group strength and distributional outcomes.

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closer to Iceland’s preferences for a baseline. In Norway, the weakening power of Norges Fiskarlag has allowed the Norwegian government to ignore the constraints the interest group once put on the government and sign agreements despite often fierce interest group opposition. This relationship between interest group strength and the outcome of the negotiations is summarized in Table 5.1. This chapter describes negotiations leading up to the seven agreements, presents the key issues, and discusses how interest groups influenced the final outcome. The key argument is that the relationship between the domestic policy process and the international process contributes to explaining the divergence in the final allocation of straddling fish stocks between stocks and within stocks over time. The chapter first discusses the three capelin agreements and the influence interest groups had on these negotiations. It then discusses the two herring agreements and how the interest groups shaped these agreements before moving on to the case of cod, where interest groups were largely kept out of the delegations. The chapter finally discusses the negotiations surrounding oceanic redfish.

Capelin Norwegian and Icelandic negotiators reached the first agreement over fishing of capelin in the Jan Mayen area on May 10th 1980, and it entered into force on June 17th of the same year. This agreement was more than a year in the making, often with tempers flying and harsh words exchanged among the main participants in the negotiations. In 1984 it was time to go back to the negotiation table, this time to add Greenland to the agreement and achieve complete management of the stock. It took more than six years to hammer out an agreement, partially because during the 1980s, Greenland—a Danish colony—gained self-rule and opted out of the European Economic Community. The third agreement was negotiated in 1998 after Iceland cancelled the 1989 agreement. The subsequent negotiations resulted in a smaller share for Norway, whose share went from 15% in 1980 to 11% in 1989, and finally down to 8% in 1998. Iceland and Greenland have been improving their position in the agreements, while Norway has been losing ground. This development can be explained by the changing power relationship between the Norwegian government and Norges Fiskarlag. Part of the change in allocation can be explained by changes in the migration pattern of the Icelandic capelin, which rarely goes into the fisheries zone around Jan Mayen any more. But that tells only part of the story, as domestic politics, especially in Iceland, have had a profound impact on the outcome of the agreements, as the following discussion will show.

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The 1980 Capelin Agreement The negotiations between Iceland and Norway took place in an institutional vacuum with regard to international laws. Only a few years before, Iceland had successfully fought its last Cod War with Britain, resulting in the expansion of the Icelandic EEZ to 200-miles. The United Nations had convened the Third Law of the Sea Conference but it had yet to result in an agreement. It was clear at that time, though, that the 200-mile EEZ would become a norm for coastal states and that they would get enhanced rights to manage straddling fish stocks.1 Norway claimed title to Jan Mayen by an act of the Norwegian Parliament in 1929. The island is not populated, but Norwegian meteorologists and scientists live there and altogether about 40 people reside year-round on the island.2 Norway established a 200-mile EEZ around its mainland coast in 1977, but did not claim a 200-mile zone around Jan Mayen at the same time because the Norwegian government did not want to provoke Iceland. The Norwegians preferred to negotiate a solution for a fisheries protection zone around Jan Mayen, alongside the capelin negotiations. When Norwegian fishing vessels began fishing for capelin in the area around Jan Mayen in 1978, it was unclear at first what capelin stock they were fishing from. Systematic research on the stock was in its infancy and knowledge of its behavior limited. The uncertainty centered on whether the Icelandic capelin stock migrated into the waters around Jan Mayen or if Jan Mayen had its own different stock altogether. In addition there were speculations that the stock could be capelin that had migrated from the Barents Sea, where the Norwegians had been fishing capelin since the early 1960s. Biological tests finally confirmed in 1979 that the Norwegians were fishing from the Icelandic capelin stock, making it necessary for the two states to agree upon a way to manage the stock successfully, to prevent overfishing and eventual collapse.3 The suggestions for division of the catch were different between the two states. Icelandic interest groups did not want Norway to get more than 10% of the TAC. One Norwegian interviewee said Norges Fiskarlag pushed to get 20% of the TAC. For two years previous to the agreement, Norway had averaged about 12–15% of the total catch of Icelandic capelin in the area around Jan Mayen. The Icelandic delegation also pressed to get access to the fishery within the Jan Mayen zone, while the Norwegians did not want to ask for permission to fish within the Icelandic zone. The reason was that the Norwegian government did not want to push the issue with Iceland, as it had just won its last Cod War against the British, indicating a strong preference for no foreign fishing in Icelandic waters. The Icelandic interest groups were generally opposed to any sort of an agreement with Norway. In addition, the Icelandic coalition government was not united behind the negotiations, with the socialist party vehemently opposing any agreement that did not give Iceland rights to unilaterally determine the TAC for capelin each year.4 This political reality

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narrowed the bargaining space for Iceland, giving it a stronger hand. But the position of Norges Fiskarlag in Norway was strong. The organization was negotiating high subsidies from the government, the Cold War made the fishing regions of Norway important and the oil industry was still developing. Following the agreement between the two countries, Norway established a 200-mile fisheries zone around Jan Mayen, with the exception of the area that overlaps with the Icelandic EEZ. There Iceland got a full 200-mile limit and Norway relinquished the median-line principle. In general, interest groups in Iceland were happy with the agreement, while their Norwegian counterparts were less pleased. They especially disliked the provision that gave Iceland the full 200-mile limit toward Jan Mayen. As for the division of the TAC, Norway got 15% of the total allowable catch while Iceland got 85%. Another provision allowed Iceland to catch up to 15% of its quota inside the Jan Mayen zone, allowing Icelandic ships important access to Norwegian waters. Trying to determine who got a better deal is difficult, but the 15% Norway got can be said to be a fair share, based on their prior fishing in the area.

The 1989 Capelin Agreement The ink was barely dry on the bilateral agreement between Iceland and Norway in 1980 when it became clear that complete management of the capelin stock was impossible without incorporating Greenland. The Icelandic capelin stock migrates into the Greenlandic EEZ where ships from the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Faeroe Islands participate in the fishery. Vessel owners in Greenland did not have any ships suitable for catching capelin until the mid-1990s, their catch being caught by high-seas fishing fleets from other states. The 1989 trilateral agreement was 6½ years in the making, in part because the players changed during the course of the negotiations. Greenland got home rule and opted out of the EEC in 1985. Afterward the negotiating team included Danish and Greenlandic members. The changes in Greenland lengthened the process, as Norway and Iceland had to wait for the Greenlandic EEC decision before negotiations could proceed. In order to get Greenland to become a part of the agreement, Icelandic and Norwegian fishermen had to agree to give up a share of the capelin fishery, and the delegations negotiated a new percentage distribution of the TAC. Thus, one of the main issues in the negotiations was how much of their respective quotas the Norwegian and Icelandic fishermen had to relinquish. Delegations representing the three countries agreed that the division of the stock should be based upon scientific data on zonal attachment. This agreement is the first agreement in which zonal attachment provides the baseline for the agreement on the share of the TAC. A 1985–86 scientific report supported by all participants showed that between 75% and 80% of the capelin stock was in the Icelandic zone. The report did not attempt to allocate a percentage to the

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Norwegian and Greenlandic zones, leaving that issue to the negotiators. On the basis of this report, Iceland demanded 80% of the quota. The point of departure for Norway in 1982, when the negotiations first started, was that Norway and Iceland should give proportional amounts of their respective quotas to Greenland. This plan called for Norway and Greenland getting 13% each, leaving Iceland with a 74% share.5 During the first few years of the trilateral negotiations, the Norwegian delegation did not bring up the question of access to the Icelandic zone. This changed after 1986, when Iceland, in agreement with domestic interest groups, granted Norway a temporary permission to fish within the Icelandic EEZ during the winter fishery, due to the difficulty in the capelin fishery around Jan Mayen. This permission was renewed in 1987 and 1988, and allowed Norwegian fishermen an increased chance to fill their quota. During the final phase of the negotiations, the Norwegian delegation was prepared to agree on TAC only, and not access. The Greenlandic delegation, however, did not want an agreement without access, arguing that without access an agreement would be of little worth. The Icelandic delegates still clung to getting 80% of the catch. In a final attempt to force an agreement in January 1989, the Icelandic delegation put forth a draft agreement. It wanted to base the division of the TAC on the amount each state had contributed to scientific research, which would have given Iceland 79.3% of the stock. Neither the Norwegian nor the Greenlandic delegations accepted this and questioned Iceland’s calculations. Recalculation of scientific contribution showed that Iceland’s share was 78.38%.6 The Norwegian delegation argued that any agreement that had at its basis a complicated model of scientific contribution was bad, and said that Greenland and Norway had to get at least 23% of the quota. The Norwegian delegates also signaled to Greenland that it would be generous in sharing these 23%. After a lengthy pause, the Icelandic delegation indicated that 78% of the TAC would be acceptable. The demand that Norway and Greenland would get 23% of the total was based on an equal sharing of 11.5% each. After another lengthy pause, Greenland indicated that it would be happy with 11%. Soon afterward Norway also agreed to an 11% share, and the agreement was concluded after difficult negotiations, giving Iceland the 78% it wanted.7 As expected, the Icelandic capelin fishermen kept their dominant share. More interestingly, however, Iceland did not give up much from the previous allocation. Its share of the TAC was cut only about 9%, while the Norwegian share went down 27%. The 1989 agreement also expanded the provisions to fish in each other’s waters, and gave Iceland the right to finish the quotas of the other countries if they had not been able to catch them before February 15th of each year. After this date, the stock is found exclusively south of Iceland, when the capelin is filled with roe and is at its most valuable. Iceland has historically been reluctant to grant access to the fishery after this time.

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The years it took for the 1989 agreement to be negotiated were tumultuous for Norges Fiskarlag, and it saw its influence on the domestic policy process wane. Oil was becoming an increasingly important resource, and the negotiations over subsidies were increasingly difficult. These factors weakened the organization, and gave the government more leeway to pursue an agreement. The Icelandic interest groups on the other hand, were very strong, evident by their influence on new management rules, as well as the willingness of the Icelandic government to set exchange rates to help this vital export industry.

The 1998 Capelin Agreement In 1998, the Icelandic government cancelled the 1989 agreement because of pressure from domestic interest groups. The difficult relations between Iceland and Norway, due to the conflict over the cod fishery in the Barents Sea, contributed to the cancellation. The Icelandic interest groups became especially upset when Norwegians, in 1997, arrested an Icelandic trawler in the fisheries zone around Jan Mayen, ordering the ship to sail to Norway. There the captain and the owner of the ship were charged with failing to declare the vessel to be in the area around Jan Mayen, and for not keeping proper records of catches. The ship had permission to fish in the area but its captain and owner were later found guilty at a trial in Norway. Following the verdict, the interest groups successfully pushed the government to cancel the capelin agreement when it came up for renewal in the spring of 1998. Since 1993, Iceland and Norway had been engaged in a serious conflict over Icelandic vessels fishing cod in the so-called “Loophole”, the international waters between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea shown on the map in chapter 1. Interviews in Iceland reveal that the agreement was cancelled because the Icelandic interest groups were fed up with difficult relations with Norway in the fisheries sector, specifically because of the difficult conflict regarding Icelandic fishermen catching cod in the Barents Sea. An Icelandic bureaucrat said that the Vessel Owners and the fishermen’s unions pressured the government to cancel the agreement, arguing that Norway’s share of the capelin stock and access to Icelandic waters was too generous. They supported their claim by arguing that since there was very limited capelin fishery within the Jan Mayen zone, Norway should not have rights to an 11% share. “Of course no one could predict what would happen,” the bureaucrat said. “When we began the process, we had to evaluate the risk of cutting down Norwegian access and quota as we could expect retaliation from them. But we got what we wanted from the negotiations.”8 Another bureaucrat interviewed indicated he thought canceling the agreement was risky. “I did not think we could get a better agreement,” he said. “I thought we had a good agreement before and I thought the risk of not having an agreement was bad.”9

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The interest groups’ goal of pushing for new negotiations was to reduce the share of the TAC reserved for Norwegian fishermen and increase the Icelandic share. This was successful, but the victory was mostly psychological, as the agreement did not change much in terms of the actual share Iceland got each year. For a few years Norwegians had not managed to catch their entire capelin quota, partially because of changes in the distribution of the capelin stock, and also because of the solution of the conflict between Norway and Greenland over the dividing line between the EEZs of the two countries. With the International Court of Justice favoring Greenland and awarding it a larger share of the disputed area, the Norwegian ability to catch capelin in the waters around Jan Mayen diminished. Thus for a number of years Icelandic fishermen got to finish fishing the share of the quota Norwegian fishermen had not been able to catch. On paper, Iceland increased its share to 81%. Greenland’s share remained 11%, while the Norwegian share shrank to 8% of the TAC. While the Norwegian share diminished by three percentage points, one Icelandic bureaucrat said the bigger victory was that the rights of Norwegian fishermen to fish within the Icelandic EEZ were significantly reduced, making it even harder for them to catch their annual quota. By comparison, Greenlandic fishermen got increasing rights to fish inside the Icelandic zone. Of paramount importance for them was that they got the right to catch capelin south of 64⬚30' north, an area where Icelandic negotiators had always refused to let Norwegians fish, as this is where the more valuable capelin for human consumption is caught. It is important to note, however, that Greenland has only one ship capable of catching capelin and no factory to process it, so its catch is sold and processed in Iceland. The cost of the agreement for Iceland is thus minimal. This agreement reflects the fact that Icelandic interest groups have at minimum retained their influence, while the Norwegian interest groups have lost significant amount of power.

The Role of Interest Groups in the Capelin Negotiations Interest group influence on the capelin negotiations has changed over time, reflecting the changes in the relationship between the government and interest groups in the domestic arena. Most notably, the Norwegian interest groups have lost power over the past twenty years, and are as a result less and less able to achieve policy decisions favorable to their own interests. On the other hand, the Icelandic interest groups have remained powerful, and their influence is clearly felt among the negotiators, which has resulted in a smaller win-set for the Icelandic delegation compared to Norway. In 1980, interest groups in Iceland and Norway were extremely powerful, which should have resulted in a bargaining outcome balancing the demands of the two groups. This seems to have been the case for the division of the TAC, the final outcome giving Norway 15% of the TAC, a figure that falls between

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the 10% the Icelandic interest groups thought was appropriate and the 20% Norges Fiskarlag was demanding. The issue of where each state was allowed to fish favored Iceland, as its fishermen got to fish within Jan Mayen’s fisheries protection zone, whereas the Norwegians were not allowed to catch capelin within the Icelandic EEZ. But the Norwegian delegation never asked to be allowed to catch capelin within the Icelandic zone, realizing that permission would never have been granted given the political climate in Iceland at the time. The coalition government was made up of a splinter group from the Independence Party, in addition to the Progressive Party and the People’s Alliance. The cabinet was divided on the issue of negotiations, with the socialist People’s Alliance vehemently opposed to any agreement with Norway. Following the agreement, Lúðvík Jósepsson, leader of the People’s Alliance, described the agreement as awful. “I think Norway got what they wanted all along,” he said. “I think we could have gotten much more had we continued negotiations and increased the pressure.”10 The Progressive Party’s leader and fisheries minister, Steingrímur Hermannsson, said he was dissatisfied with the agreement, as the Norwegians had gotten too large a share of the capelin stock. But the foreign minister, Independence Party member Matthías Bjarnason, who led the Icelandic delegation, was a bit more generous toward the agreement. “When two states enter into an agreement, both need to adjust their demands,” he said. “I think the current agreement is acceptable to Icelanders.”11 While individual members of the coalition government were dissatisfied, the Icelandic interest group leaders largely supported the agreement. While they thought the Norwegian share was too high, they thought negotiating an agreement was of utmost importance to ensure survival of the stock. The leader of the Seamen’s Federation supported the agreement, saying he did not think it would have been possible to get the Norwegians to agree on less than a 15% share. “The Seamens’ representatives in the delegation in Oslo indicated that a better agreement was not possible,” he said. “Accordingly I think we should ratify the agreement.”12 This view was echoed by Kristján Ragnarsson, leader of the Vessel Owners. “Ever since the conflict surrounding Jan Mayen began,” he said, “I have realized the importance of negotiating an agreement with the Norwegians. It should be obvious to all what our situation would have been [unregulated fishing of capelin] if we had not reached an agreement.”13 Judging by the general dissatisfaction of both the Icelandic and the Norwegian delegations, the 1980 capelin treaty can be considered a balanced agreement influenced on both parts by the powerful interest groups. It seems, though, that the Norwegian government was better able to distance itself from the demands of the interest groups, as Iceland was successfully able to demand a full 200-mile EEZ where the two economic zones overlapped. Knut Frydenlund, the Norwegian minister of foreign affairs, defended the agreement in an interview with an Icelandic newspaper. He said that while both

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parties were dissatisfied with the agreement reached, both parties agreed it was important to agree on the management of capelin.14 The Norwegian interest groups opposed the full 200-mile zone for Iceland, and argued that the agreement would result in vastly reduced fishing for the Norwegian fishing fleet and that the unilateral extension of the Icelandic EEZ toward Jan Mayen set a bad precedent for future agreements with other nations.15 As discussed in chapter 3, the 1980s were a contentious decade for Norges Fiskarlag, while in Iceland interest groups were at the height of their power, especially the Vessel Owners. Norges Fiskarlag was repeatedly unsuccessful in annual negotiations with the government, and saw their subsidies cut. To the benefit of the Norwegian fishermen, the Cold War was still going on, giving fisheries interest in the North some leverage with the government. By comparison, the Vessel Owners were to a large extent able to dictate the domestic allocation policy, for example, with the adoption of the ITQ system in 1984. By 1989, the difference in the ability to permeate the policy process had widened between the two countries, and Iceland’s narrower bargaining space—or win-set—is evident in the outcome. Iceland gave up only 9% of its substantially larger quota, while Norway gave up 27%. Norwegians had originally demanded that both states give up an equal share. Norway gained permanent access to Icelandic waters to catch capelin, instead of the temporary access they had been getting since 1986. The access gave them an increased chance to catch their allocated quota, as sometimes capelin spends only a brief time within the fisheries zone around Jan Mayen. But Iceland got a provision that if Greenland and Norway could meet their quota before February 15th each year, Iceland could catch the rest of the Norwegian quota until the TAC was reached. By the time the Icelandic government cancelled the capelin agreement in 1998, the power of the interest groups in Norway was severely challenged, while in Iceland they were still very powerful. The Norwegian government was better able to go against the wishes of its key interest than was Iceland. The political realities for Norges Fiskarlag had changed. The Cold War was long over, and the regional politics that guaranteed the organization’s influence have become less pronounced. At the same time, the oil industry has become Norway’s largest export industry. Iceland cancelled the 1989 capelin agreement because of the demands from the interest groups, who wanted Iceland to get a larger share of the fishery. This strategy was successful, as Iceland increased its share at the expense of the Norwegians, and was able to limit their access to the Icelandic EEZ, thus limiting even further the ability of the Norwegians to catch their share. While the evidence at this point is not conclusive it seems to indicate that the Icelandic negotiators are more constrained by the interest groups than Norwegian negotiators, resulting in better agreements for Iceland.

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Herring As discussed in chapter 1, the Atlantic-Scandio herring stock collapsed in the late 1960s, and was only found in Norwegian waters and to a limited degree in Russian waters until the 1990s. But suddenly in 1994 the herring was found in the Loop Sea, international waters that lie between the Norwegian, Icelandic, Faeroese EEZs, and the fisheries zone around Jan Mayen. As the herring stock was now found in international waters, vessels from Iceland, the Faeroe Islands, and the European Union could enter the fishery and harvest the stock. This change led to a weakening of the strict Norwegian management measures that had allowed the stock to grow for more than two decades, and forced the states participating in the fishery to seek a common management regime. With the herring being found in international waters, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands entered the fishery, with Denmark, Greenland, the Netherlands, Germany, and the UK reporting catches in 1995. In 1996 Ireland and Sweden also took part in the fishery.16 When negotiations began in 1995, it was the position of the Icelandic government that the herring fishery should be limited to the four coastal states with interest in the stock—Iceland, Norway, the Faeroe Islands, and Russia. But the 1995 negotiations failed, and according to Icelandic delegates this was because of lack of cooperative effort on behalf of the Norwegians. It was clear from the beginning that Icelandic interest groups representing the fisheries would not be satisfied with a small share, despite the fact that Iceland barely has any zonal attachment at all. In order to strengthen the future position of Iceland in these negotiations, the Icelandic government directed Icelandic ships to fish only within the Icelandic and Faeroese EEZs. By doing this, Icelanders wanted to avoid accusations of destructive behavior by preying on the herring stock in unregulated international waters. Other states also tried to strengthen their negotiating position in the months leading to the negotiations in the spring of 1995. To this effect the Icelandic and the Faeroese delegations presented a unified front, and the Russians threatened to begin fishing young herring in its waters. These strategic maneuvers sought to isolate the Norwegians who had the largest claim to the stock.17 During the negotiations in late 1995, initiated by the Norwegian government, the Icelandic delegation demanded 27% of the total quota while the Faeroese wanted 8.5%. Before the negotiations, the Norwegian government, in close cooperation with Norges Fiskarlag, had set a unilateral TAC of one million tons for herring. In comparison, the total demanded by the Faeroese and Icelandic delegations in the negotiations was 355,000 tons of herring. In addition, the Russians wanted to increase its quota.18 Following a breakdown of the negotiations in late January 1996, the Icelandic and the Faeroese governments set a unilateral common quota for their fisheries of 330,000 tons in

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1996, and exchanged permissions to fish within each other’s zones. This quota never became a reality, however, as the negotiations finally succeeded later that spring.

The Herring Agreements It is clear from the eventual quota distribution that historical fishing rights weighed heavier than zonal attachment in the herring agreements. This decision gave Norway a substantially smaller share in the final allocation of the stock. The Norwegian zonal attachment of Atlantic-Scandio herring stock is close to 90%. However, the 1996 agreement gives Norway only about 62% of the stock, a share that was further reduced to 57% in 1997 when the European Union was included in the agreement so as to achieve complete management of the stock. Hence, most of the cost of including the European Union in the 1997 agreement was borne by Norway. This observation is supported by my interviews and other information that indicates that the Norwegian delegation put great emphasis on including the European Union, and ended up paying for its addition to the management agreement by accepting a diminished quota than in 1996.

The 1996 Herring Agreement The negotiations over the herring stock really took off in the spring of 1996, as none of the four countries were eager to conduct a practically unregulated fishery of the stock for the second year in a row. The history of the stock collapse in the late 1960s was still fresh in the delegates’ minds, combined with the knowledge of the length of time it took to rebuild the stock. None of the participants—neither government nor the fishermen—was willing to risk the rebuilding by endangering the stock again. As a result, there was a great deal of pressure to get an agreement before the fishing season got underway. The first agreement was signed in May of 1996 to govern the 1996 fishery. One major point during the negotiations was that the Icelandic delegation demanded that if the migration pattern of the stock changed—presumably by traveling in greater numbers into the Icelandic EEZ—Iceland could demand new negotiations to account for that fact, and thus better its share of the fishery. “We believe and the fisheries scientists believe that the herring stock will grow and eventually spend the winter here [around Iceland],” an Icelandic bureaucrat said. “Thus, we did not want to risk unlimited fishing of the stock.”19 This view was supported by an Icelandic interest group representative. “We were able to negotiate a development clause which stated that the division of the stock would be renegotiated if the migration of herring into Icelandic waters increased,” he said. “We knew all along that the stock would begin migration into international waters as soon as it grew, and we thought it was unfair to distribute the stock according to a small stock size.”20

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The 1996 agreement gives Norwegian fishermen a considerably smaller share than Norway’s 90% zonal attachment would have. The Norwegian share of the TAC set by the four states is about 63%. The Norwegians got about 30,000 tons less than the unilateral quota of 725,000 tons they had set for themselves in case negotiations would not succeed in 1996, or 4% less. Russian fishermen got 15% of the total. With the agreement, the parties also signed bilateral access agreements designed to make it easier for the parties to catch their quota when it is most valuable. The most coveted places to fish herring are within the Norwegian EEZ, the fisheries zone around Jan Mayen, and within the Faeroese EEZ. If caught in these areas, the herring fetches the highest price when it is at its fattest and ideal for human consumption. Not much of the herring travels into the Icelandic zone, which makes it risky for Icelandic vessels to wait for the herring stock to show up in any great numbers in Icelandic waters. Thus, these provisions are especially important for the Icelandic fishing fleet. This can be seen from the fact that in 1998, about 32% of the Icelandic quota was caught in Faeroese waters, almost 40% was caught in the fisheries zone around Jan Mayen, and only 13% was caught in Icelandic waters.21 Under these bilateral agreements, the Norwegian delegation agreed to let Icelandic fishermen fish its entire herring quota within the fisheries zone around Jan Mayen. This is in line with the Jan Mayen agreement of 1980 where Norway and Iceland agreed to share resources found within the fisheries zone. In return, Norwegian ships can fish a share of the Norwegian quota, the equivalent of two-thirds of the Icelandic quota, in Icelandic waters. In 1996, Iceland could thus fish all 190,000 tons around Jan Mayen while Norway could fish up to 127,000 tons inside the Icelandic EEZ. The Faeroese got permission to fish up to 20,000 tons inside the Norwegian EEZ (north of 62⬚ latitude) of a total of 25,000 tons it could fish in the Norwegian EEZ and around Jan Mayen. Norwegian vessels did not get permission to fish within the Faeroese EEZ. The two states negotiated access for Norwegians in the 1997 negotiations. Russian vessels were permitted to fish 120,000 tons within the Norwegian EEZ and an additional 10,000 tons in the fisheries zone around Jan Mayen outside its 12-mile territorial sea. Additionally, Iceland allowed Russian vessels to fish up to 5,000 tons of herring within a limited area in Icelandic waters. Finally, the Icelandic and the Faeroe Islands delegations agreed on unlimited permission to fish within each other’s zones.

The 1997 Herring Agreement The second Norwegian-Icelandic herring stock agreement was signed in December of 1996 to allocate the 1997 fishery. The most contentious issue in these negotiations was the issue of whether or not the European Union was to be considered a coastal state with an inherent right to the stock. The

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Norwegian delegation supported that view, citing scientific data the EU presented, while the Icelandic delegation vehemently opposed this distinction. A Norwegian interest group representative said that it was important to get the EU into the agreement, especially after they presented evidence that the stock migrated briefly into EU waters, giving it the designation of a coastal state. The representative added that Iceland was against labeling EU as a coastal state and that Iceland did not think the EU was entitled to as large a share as it got in the 1997 negotiations.22 In conjunction with the five-party agreement, the countries again signed bilateral access agreements granting access to each other’s resources. These agreements changed slightly from the year before. Iceland got a provision to fish 10,000 tons in Norwegian waters, north of 62⬚ north, in addition to still being able to catch its entire quota with in the Jan Mayen fisheries zone. Norwegian fishermen kept their access to Icelandic waters, and could catch up to 166,000 tons there. Vessels from the Faeroe Islands were allowed to catch a maximum of 30,000 tons of herring in the Norwegian zone north of 62⬚ north or around Jan Mayen with the total reaching 37,000 tons for both areas. In exchange, Norwegian fishermen got permission to fish 37,000 tons of herring in Faeroese waters. The Russians were allowed to fish 120,000 tons in the Norwegian EEZ and an additional 12,000 tons around Jan Mayen. In exchange, Russia transferred 2,500 tons of herring quotas to Norway. The Faeroese delegation agreed to transfer 5,000 tons of its quota to the EU, and in addition EU vessels were allowed to catch up to 12,500 tons of herring within the Faeroese EEZ. In exchange, the Faeroese were allowed to fish 12,500 tons in EU waters. Again, Icelanders allowed the Russians limited access to its zone. In 1997, Russia was allowed to fish 6,500 tons in a restricted area of the Icelandic EEZ. Russia also got permission to fish 7,500 tons in Faeroese waters. And as the year before, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands exchanged fishing rights in each other’s waters. As had been done in the previous negotiations to allocate the stock for the 1996 fishery, Iceland and the Faeroe Islands got a common quota that they then divided amongst themselves. According to an Icelandic bureaucrat, this was done to pacify the Russians who did not want Iceland to get a larger share on paper than they themselves got.23

The Role of Interest Groups in the Herring Negotiations Initially, interest groups in Iceland and Norway were very involved in the process of the herring negotiations. During the negotiations for the first agreement in 1996, Norges Fiskarlag became increasingly frustrated with what they perceived as being the government giving away a largely Norwegian resource, and refused to send a delegate to the negotiations. Following the conclusion of the negotiations, the Norwegian government faced relentless criticism from the organization because of the agreement. Norges Fiskarlag claimed that the government

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had sold out and that the cost of agreement had been too high. Norges Fiskarlag was especially critical of the Icelandic and the Faeroese quotas. The dissatisfaction of Norges Fiskarlag grew, and in March 1996 it withdrew from the Norwegian delegation. Chairman Oddmund Bye said, “Norges Fiskarlag can not participate in negotiating an agreement that results in a substantial loss for Norwegian Fishermen.”24 The organization was especially dissatisfied with the size of the Norwegian quota being discussed, pointing to the fact that the Norwegian zonal attachment of Atlantic-Scandio herring was around 90%. As a Norwegian interest group representative said: “[W]e thought that Norway should have gotten about 80 or 90% [of the TAC]. In international negotiations there is always give and take, but we got less than 60%. That was too little. The government went too far. There is a big difference in getting 80% versus 56% and we wondered if we should not have an agreement for another year as the first division is important.”25 Norges Fiskarlag’s resignation from the Norwegian delegation gave the government a freer reign in negotiating an agreement, which was clearly its priority. As the above quote indicates, Norges Fiskarlag was prepared to go another year without a management scheme in order to gain a better negotiating position, while the government preferred to negotiate an agreement and not risk the stock size. The Icelandic interest group leaders were also disappointed with how little Norwegians wanted to offer in the negotiations. According to Kristján Ragnarsson, chairman of the Icelandic Vessel Owners, Norway offered Iceland and the Faeroese 100–130 thousand tons, less that what they fished the previous year.26 The Icelandic interest groups were also accusatory toward the Norwegians. For example, Kristján Ragnarsson accused the Norwegians in an interview of trying to split Icelandic-Faeroese unity in the negotiations by offering the Faeroese unlimited herring fishery from the disputed stock.27 The two agreements on allocation of the Norwegian-Icelandic herring stock are the only agreements the Icelandic interest groups have protested, and where there has been a split in their ranks. In the first agreement, the interest groups thought Iceland should have gotten a much larger share, but the 1997 agreement incensed all the interest groups except the Marine Engineers, because of the share given to the EU. The chairman of the Vessel Owners said in a newspaper interview that he agreed with the view that the states with rights to the stock had to control the total fishery. “It is in our interest that the stock will grow and that the older years make their way into Icelandic waters,” Kristján Ragnarsson was quoted as saying. But he did not like the large EU share, saying it deserved only 15–20,000 tons of the stock. Two of the other three interest groups involved in the process also argued that the European share was too big. Sævar Gunnarsson, chairman of the Seamen’s Federation, said in the same article that he supported the political decision to sign an agreement. Not doing so could have hurt Iceland, as its vessels would may not

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have been allowed to fish herring in Faeroese waters or in the fisheries zone around Jan Mayen.28 The Norwegian interest groups did participate in the delegation to negotiate the 1997 agreement, when the European Union was given a share of the quota. Norges Fiskarlag’s leaders did think the share given to the EU was too large and that the government had again given away valuable Norwegian resources. Norges Fiskarlag said that the agreement was too generous toward the EU and feared it would negatively affect other dealings with the organizations. Considering the strong opposition from the Icelandic interest groups, the 1997 agreement is a pure political solution of the problem of resource division among states. “This is a political solution,” said Jóhann Sigurjónsson, the leader of the Icelandic delegation in the Norwegian fisheries newspaper, Fiskaren. “Our main objective was to prevent ruthless overfishing of herring,” he said.29 As the discussion on the cod fishery will show, once negotiations become more politicized, the views of the interest groups are more easily discounted, and hence the size of the win-set for each delegation becomes larger.

Cod The Icelandic fishery of cod in the Loophole north of Norway began in 1993, and set Iceland and Norway on a collision course, leading to the most difficult conflict these two states have been involved in. From the beginning, the conflict was highly political. Meetings to try to find a solution to the conflict were conducted at the ministerial level, with the bureaucratic level taking the back seat. These meetings involved both the Icelandic and Norwegian ministers of fisheries and foreign affairs. The distance between the two parties was obvious during the first round of talks in August 1993. The Norwegian ministers of fisheries and foreign affairs accused the Icelandic government of duality in matters relating to oceanic fishing. They complained that Iceland advocated the rights of coastal states in managing straddling stocks in the United Nations, while at the same time it ignored joint Norwegian and Russian management of the cod fishery in the Barents Sea as the two coastal states in the region.30 The Icelandic ministers insisted that Icelandic fishermen were entitled to a share of the Barents Sea cod fishery, pointing out that Norway had negotiated with other states about fishing quotas in the Barents Sea on the basis of the Svalbard Treaty. Therefore, Icelandic fishermen also wanted their share. The Norwegian delegation refused any claims Iceland made to the lucrative Barents Sea fishery, emphasizing that Icelandic vessels did not have any history of fishing in the area. Iceland could not use claims of zonal attachment to force the issue, as its EEZ does not border the Barents Sea and the cod stock in the Barents Sea is a different stock from the one fished in the waters around Iceland.

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The first round of negotiations, in August 1993, failed completely, with the two countries holding firm to their positions. According to the then Icelandic minister of fisheries, Thorsteinn Pálsson, there was a wide gap between the parties at the initial meeting in August of 1993.31 Johan Jørgen Holst, the Norwegian foreign minister, was even more critical, saying there was no platform for future discussions, as the Norwegian government did not intend to discuss or negotiate fishing rights for cod in the Barents Sea. “These permits have only been allocated on the basis of historical rights and the concept of reciprocal fishing rights,” he said.32 Iceland insisted it did have historical fishing rights in the Loophole, illustrating the malleability of historical claims for political purposes. In order to successfully use the concept of historical fishing rights, the parties involved have to agree on when history “begins”, that is how far back in time catch history should be applicable. Icelandic vessels do have a history of fishing in the Barents Sea, but this was a long time ago, and the fishery was never extensive or prolonged. Icelandic vessels fished in the Barents Sea first in the 1930s, and then later in the late 1940s and early 1950s. In 1946 Icelandic trawlers caught 2,900 tons of cod in the area around Svalbard. The fishery peaked in 1950, when a few Icelandic trawlers caught 6,500 tons of cod. The fishery continued off and on for a few years and then stopped, with only a few fishing vessels going to the Barents Sea in the years between 1956 and 1961. This distant water fishery then stopped completely. New fishing banks were discovered closer to home in the area between Iceland and Greenland, which were much more economical because they had not been harvested at all. There is also a brief history of Icelandic vessels chasing Atlantic-Scandio herring into the Barents Sea in 1967 and 1968, but the year after that the fishery collapsed completely.33 The Norwegians rejected this fishery in the 1950s and early 1960s as a proof of history. When asked about this issue, a couple of my Norwegian interviewees indicated that in signing reciprocal fishing agreements, following the 200-mile extension, Norway usually cut off claims to history in the mid1960s. Two other factors explain the Norwegian intransigence toward Iceland in the beginning. Norwegian scientists and officials believed that the successful fishery in 1993 in the Loophole was a fluke. They doubted that Icelandic vessels could repeat the success of the first season, saying that the Loophole very seldom was a good place to fish. First, it had very limited zonal attachment of cod, estimated to be about 2% of the cod stock in the area. Second, the Norwegians said that the cod found in the area also tended to be too small and thus of less value. Thus, the reasoning went, nature would eventually take care of the problem, as fishing in the Loophole would not be profitable in the long run.34 The other factor narrowing Norway’s room to maneuver was the European Union. The EU has substantial cod quotas in the Barents Sea where France, Britain, Germany, and Spain caught 30–40 thousand tons a year in the

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1990s. The EU used any opportunity to press for increased cod quota, and Norwegians worried that any concession to Iceland would increase EU demands for quotas.35 In 1993, the Icelandic and Norwegian governments tried various ways to improve their bargaining position in the Barents Sea conflict. For example, they tried to link solution to the cod conflict to other unsolved issues in highseas fishing. The linkages explored included the Norwegian-Icelandic herring fishery in the Loop Sea or the oceanic redfish fishery southwest of Iceland. But these ideas never went very far, as linking negotiations over different stocks is very difficult. A Norwegian bureaucrat summed up the difficulties in the following way: “It is hard to link different stocks because different stocks have different participants. There are also different zonal attachments, the conflicts differ and the ownership of the resource is different.”36 An Icelandic bureaucrat concurred, saying that while it could be beneficial to link different species, it quickly became complicated as different fisheries often had different states participating.37 Norway also tried to link the Icelandic capelin fishery and the Loophole conflict, trying to get to fish more capelin in Icelandic waters in exchange for Barents Sea cod quotas, especially south of 64⬚ north, where capelin used for human consumption is caught. This seems to be the only successful linkage. In the final agreement, Norwegians did get to fish more capelin in Icelandic waters, but not south of 64⬚ north. Iceland dominates the market for capelin used for human consumption internationally and has generally refused other states access to the area. Given the initial success of the fishery in 1993, more ships entered the Loophole area and the Barents Sea in 1994. As a result, the conflict between Iceland and Norway peaked in June 1994 when Icelandic trawlers provoked the Norwegian Coast Guard, which retaliated with force. This did not deter the Icelandic fishermen, and the 1994 fishery was also highly successful. The catch reached 37,000 tons, again mostly cod, with seventy-three ships participating in the fishery. This second year Norwegians tried different ways to stop the Icelandic fishery. They banned all foreign fishing in the 200-mile fisheries protection zone around Svalbard. Two Icelandic ships fishing in the area were arrested in September 1994 and ordered to sail to Norway where they were fined.38 This led to the Icelandic ships fishing only in the Loophole, to avoid further arrests. The 1993 negotiations were bilateral between Iceland and Norway. In 1994 the Norwegian government invited the Russians to join, and the first formal trilateral negotiations were conducted in March 1995.39 It is clear that the main line of conflict in this struggle was between Iceland and Norway, even after the addition of Russia. As discussed in chapter 3, Norwegians have had a long history of cooperation in the Barents Sea with Russia, and before that the Soviet Union, while Icelanders did not have any history. Adding Rus-

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sia to the process clearly benefited Norway in the conflict, as the Icelandic vessels were now provoking conflict with the two states that have the most at stake in the area. While the cod fishery in the Loophole continued to be a success in 1994 and again in 1995, the trilateral negotiations went nowhere. There was however a change in Norwegian policy in 1995, when Norwegian and Russian delegates, for the first time, offered Icelandic vessels cod quotas in the Barents Sea in exchange for fishing rights within Icelandic waters. The offer extended was around 10,000 tons, which was rejected by Iceland as far too little. Considering that, in the 1999 negotiations, Iceland walked away with 8,900 tons, the Icelandic rejection of 10,000 tons in 1995 was based on the initial success of the fishery. As discussed before, the fishery in the Loophole declined dramatically in 1996, which changed the bargaining position for Iceland. Formal and informal meetings continued in 1995, usually at the ministerial level, but without result. In 1996 the negotiations broke down completely, due to the refusal of the Icelandic delegation to give reciprocal fishing rights in Icelandic waters for Norway or Russia.40 Despite the collapse, already in 1996 the lines for the future agreement were set. The 1.8% share Icelandic eventually got was already being discussed, but the demands for reciprocal fishing rights in Icelandic waters fell on deaf ears in Iceland, and the negotiations collapsed. A new administration took power in Norway in September 1997, and following preparatory meetings, negotiations resumed at the ministerial level in late 1997. The new minister of foreign affairs, Knut Vollebæk, put the solution of the conflict between Iceland and Norway at the top of his agenda. According to one Norwegian bureaucrat, the new foreign minister began a dialogue with his Icelandic colleague that eventually led to an agreement. Throughout the conflict, Iceland and Norway tried various ways to improve their respective bargaining positions. In 1997, the idea was floated in Iceland to set a unilateral quota on the cod fishery, and the number mentioned was 30,000 tons.41 But this never became a reality. Once the fishery in the Loophole began in 1997, it soon became clear that the season was going to be a disappointing one. The catch for 1997 reached only a disappointing 4,200 tons. Norway also tried to improve its bargaining position, and in 1997 it added a powerful tool in the battle to get the Icelandic delegation to the negotiating table. The government wrote regulations that banned all trawlers that had at any point fished in the Loophole from fishing within the Norwegian EEZ, no matter who owned them. This essentially made Icelandic vessels that had taken part in the fishery worthless as the largest buyers of used Icelandic vessels were Russia and the Faeroe Islands. Both the Faeroese and the Russians have permission to fish within the Norwegian EEZ. This made it much more difficult for the new owners of the vessels to recoup their investment and hence destroyed the market for used Icelandic vessels.

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The Icelandic government tried to improve relations with Russia and thus better Iceland’s bargaining position against Norway. A small victory was won in 1997, when the states agreed on a comprehensive fisheries treaty.42 But Russia did not ratify the agreement, leading my interviewees to speculate that Russia did not want to create difficulties with Norway. The trilateral negotiations broke down in 1996, and following the resumption of the negotiations it took a year and a half to solve the conflict. The final agreement was reached in a meeting of the foreign ministers of Iceland, Norway, and Russia in March of 1999.

The Cod Agreement According to the agreement, Iceland now recognizes the authority of the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission to manage the fish stocks in the Barents Sea. The Icelanders also agreed not to demand higher quotas than decided in the agreement, and not to begin a capelin fishery in the Barents Sea. Finally, the agreement stipulates that the Icelandic government should help with efforts to prevent ships sailing under a flag of convenience from fishing in the area by banning landings from such ships as well as refusing to service them with fuel or necessary repairs. Under the agreement, the Icelandic cod quota each year is calculated as 1.86% of the TAC decided by the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission. In 1999 that number was 8,900 tons of the 480,000 total catch. In addition, Iceland would not get any fishing quotas in years the TAC falls under 350,000 tons. The catch was to be caught within the Russian or the Norwegian EEZs in equal amounts. The ability to fish half the share within the Norwegian EEZ cuts down on costs of the fishing, while having to go all the way to the Russian EEZ is going to be a much more expensive proposition. But this also made it much easier for the Icelandic vessel operators to catch the cod than the already proven unstable Loophole area. In addition, Icelandic vessels are also permitted to buy additional quota from the Russians. In exchange for cod quota, Norwegian vessels were allowed to fish 500 tons of three demersal species: cusk, ling, and blue ling. Norwegian vessels also got permission to fish 17,000 tons of capelin in 1999, a number that was to be adjusted in accordance to the cod quota allocated to Iceland each year. Russian vessels did not get any fishing rights in Icelandic waters. Finally, the agreement also stipulated the number of ships allowed into the fishery. At most, fifteen Icelandic vessels may be fishing in the Norwegian EEZ at any given time. Three Norwegian vessels may at any given time be engaged in the 500-ton demersal fishery and five vessels at any given time in the capelin fishery. There is no question that this was a good agreement for Icelandic vessel owners. In exchange for getting to catch valuable cod quotas in Norwegian

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and Russian waters, Norwegian vessels are allowed to fish small amounts of minor demersal species in Icelandic waters. According to my interviewees, one Norwegian interest group estimated that Iceland got about double the value of fish compared to what they gave away in the exchange. Norges Fiskarlag took an even bleaker view of the agreement, saying Iceland’s compensation amounted to only 10% of the value of cod it got. Most of my interviewees agree with the former calculations, but these vastly different estimates illustrate the dissatisfaction the Norwegian interest groups felt following the conclusion of the negotiations.

The Role of Interest Groups in the Cod Negotiations The role of interest groups in the negotiations to solve the conflict over cod fishing in the Barents Sea was much more restricted than in all the other negotiations discussed here. Before the 1996 breakdown of the negotiations, the interest groups were kept informed of the negotiations, even though they were never invited to negotiating meetings. This may have been because of the nature of the meetings. According to Icelandic interviewees, most of the meetings were preparatory in nature, aimed at finding any common ground among the participants. Following the breakdown and the resumption of the negotiations in 1997, interest groups were kept out of the process altogether. Interviewees indicated this was because the negotiations were so politically sensitive, and therefore the delegations were very small. Tempers ran high on both sides during the entire duration of the conflict. During the annual meeting of the Vessel Owners in 1995, the organization emphasized that the quota share discussed in 1995 of 10,000 tons was too little. This amount would not benefit Icelandic vessel owners, and the meeting concluded that any reciprocal fishing rights in Icelandic waters were out of the question.43 The Norwegian interest group leaders were furious when the agreement was signed in 1999, while the Icelandic interest groups leaders were much more content with the result. On the Norwegian side the reaction was fierce. One Norwegian bureaucrat who opposed the agreement said it indicated that the prevailing view among the Oslo bureaucrats seemed to be that giving away 5–10,000 tons of fish was insignificant in the context of the vast Norwegian resources.44 This view is supported by a Norwegian interest group interviewee who said that although the 1.8% of Barents Sea cod Iceland was allocated did not seem like much, it was about a third of what Norwegian factory trawlers were allocated of that fishery.45 Another interest group interviewee said the agreement was pure politics. “It had nothing to do with fisheries management,” he said.46 Quoted in a Norwegian news-paper, Norges Fiskarlag’s chairman was furious. “This is an unbelievable performance,” he said. “I am

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in shock. Now the government has given a green light to anyone wishing to begin fishing in the Loophole to gain fishing rights.”47 Reacting to the agreement, Norges Fiskarlag protested the agreement when testifying before a parliamentary committee, but to no avail, and the agreement passed the Storting easily. Reactions in Iceland were somewhat more favorable. When interviewed in 1998, before the agreement was signed, the Icelandic interest group leaders seemed much less dissatisfied than their Norwegian counterparts about being left out of the negotiations. One interest group leader said that of course they wanted to be consulted, and that he thought it was to Iceland’s detriment that the interest groups were excluded.48 In general, however, it seemed that the Icelandic interest groups were better informed though through the process than their Norwegian counterparts. While the Icelandic interest group leaders were dissatisfied that the Icelandic negotiators gave Norway access to Icelandic waters, it was clear that this was an agreement favorable to Icelandic interests. The chairman of the Vessel Owners said in a newspaper interview that Iceland paid too much for the cod quotas. “The agreement does not measure up to the expectations we had,” he said. “Especially when considering the enormous cost we have incurred by conducting the Barents Sea fishery.” But he added that his organization would nevertheless support the agreement, as they understood that the government wanted to put an end to the conflict with Norway.49 At the beginning of the conflict, the preferences of the Norwegian government and the interest groups were identical: neither thought Iceland had a justifiable claim to the Barents Sea cod stock. But once the Norwegian government changed its position in 1995, and began negotiating quotas for Iceland, the preferences of these two actors diverged. One can argue that once the negotiations were resumed in 1997, these preferences were too far apart for negotiations to proceed smoothly, and therefore the interest groups were kept out of the process. I have not been able to find out whether or not Iceland or Norway suggested keeping the interest groups out of the delegation, but it is clear that the Norwegian government had more to gain from excluding them. Once the decision was made that one of the participants should exclude the interest groups, the delegations mirrored each other. In the context of the argument that interest groups are crucial veto players in the negotiating process, it seems that if their preferences diverge too far from the preferences of the government, they lose their veto power. This has been shown to be the case using game theory, but examples have been few.50 With the Norwegian interest groups having lost their power during the past twenty years, the cost for the government in alienating them is minimal. This could also explain the fact that the Icelandic interest groups, especially the Vessel Owners, were usually kept informed about negotiations in order to ensure their cooperation when the negotiations finished.

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Oceanic Redfish As the oceanic redfish catch increased in the early 1990s and scientific knowledge of the stock improved, it became increasingly clear that the states conducting the fishery would have to begin negotiations to manage the fishery and avoid its depletion. The negotiating process was unique in this issue area as the governments of Greenland and Iceland, the two coastal states represented, agreed to refer the management of the stock to the North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC). Oceanic redfish is the only stock where this has been done. One bureaucrat said that since Iceland and Greenland were coastal states they had the right to decide how the negotiations were to be conducted, and early on these two governments decided to refer the total management of the stock to NEAFC. This included the share found in Icelandic and Greenlandic waters. “This is quite unique,” the bureaucrat said. “Iceland and Greenland asked NEAFC to regulate the stock because it was impossible to find how much of the fish was found in international waters.”51 The agreement was the most important undertaken in international negotiations by NEAFC, and is considered a milestone for the organization. There was a great deal of worry among the contracting states that without a treaty an unregulated fishery would deplete the stock, and this fear made an agreement possible.52 Norway did not play a large role in these negotiations, except that the Working Group was led by a Norwegian official from the Directorate of Fisheries, Terje Løbach. During the negotiations, there was great deal of conflict, especially between the Icelandic and Russian delegations. Iceland and Denmark (on behalf of Greenland and the Faeroe Islands) put forth a joint proposal as coastal states.53 The Icelandic delegation wanted to base any proposal on zonal attachment, which would have given the largest share of the fishery to Iceland and Greenland, reserving only 17,000 tons for Russian vessels. The Icelandic delegation’s proposed division according to zonal attachment was problematic because of the uncertainty surrounding the stock, which meant that there were really no good indicators of zonal attachment. According to one bureaucrat, the lack of scientific knowledge made a scientific solution impossible. Russia on the other hand, as the instigator of the fishery in 1982 and the one with the longest fishing history, wanted to base any division of the fishery on historical factors.54 Before the start of the official negotiations, the Icelandic government sought to establish contact with the Greenlandic government, mainly to make sure that the two countries shared a goal for the negotiations. In 1994, an Icelandic delegation—including Icelandic interest group leaders—met with a delegation from Greenland to discuss the management of the oceanic redfish stock. NEAFC had for a few years been discussing how best to manage the stock, without being able to agree on a plan. By calling the meeting, with

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Greenland, the Icelandic delegation sought to enhance the unity of coastal states before the annual NEAFC meeting. During the meeting, the Greenlandic delegation suggested utilizing NEAFC to negotiate the agreement and later manage the stock, and the parties agreed to this. The delegations also discussed possible TAC levels of the stock and agreed that the higher it was the more likely an agreement was. In allocating the TAC among the participants in the fishery, the Icelanders preferred to look at historical catches after 1990, when many new entrants entered the fishery. The delegations also wanted to reward states for scientific contribution.55 Iceland’s position would have hurt the Russian case, as the state with the longest tradition of conducting the fishery in international waters. In 1994, NEAFC created a Working Group to negotiate a management regime for oceanic redfish. At a meeting in October the same year, the Working Group began discussing the different options available to manage the stocks and settled on three guidelines. The Working Group agreed to use zonal attachment (based on the best available science) to allocate the TAC between Greenland, Iceland, and international waters. It also agreed to make sure that newcomers to the fishery would get quotas in the fishery, and finally that contribution to research of the stock should be rewarded through quota allocation.56 Based on these options, the Working Group discussed four different ways to allocate the resource. The first option was to set the TAC and not allocate it any further, but to have the fishery a free-for-all until the TAC was met. This solution has the disadvantage of creating a rush for fish that increases the potential for conflict among the participants in the fishery. The second solution was to allocate a TAC to each country. This solution makes the contracting parties responsible for monitoring catches of their ships, but could create a potential conflict with coastal states. The third solution was to set a TAC based on zonal attachment for coastal states, while leaving unallocated oceanic redfish in international waters. This management scheme considered the rights of coastal states, but had the possibility of leading to a rush for fish in international waters, and was considered difficult to enforce. The fourth and final suggestion was to allocate TAC based on zonal attachment for coastal states, while allocating the share in international waters based on different criteria. This scheme had the advantage of respecting the rights of coastal states, posing no risk of a rush for fish, and simplifying the control of the fishery. The only drawback was that allocating the stock based on zonal attachment required better scientific data.57 The Working Group preferred the fourth solution, and the final agreement most closely resembles this option. In the end, zonal attachment did not provide a base for the allocation, but rather the rights of coastal states and historical rights. In 1995, NEAFC discussed different criteria for allocating quotas of oceanic redfish. The five proposed solution concepts were: historical

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catches, scientific contribution, distribution of the stock biomass (zonal attachment), dependency on the fishery, and current fishing patterns. In addition, the Working Group recognized the need to take account of the activities of new participants and noncontracting parties.58 At a NEAFC meeting in late March 1996, Norway, Sweden, Iceland, Denmark, and the EU agreed on a management proposal suggested by Iceland and Greenland, while Russia and Poland voted against the proposal. Russia also announced that it would table a formal objection to the majority.59 During the 15th annual NEAFC meeting in November, Russia reiterated its opposition to the management agreement and indicated that it would stop fishing oceanic redfish when its fleet had reached 50,000 tons. During that meeting, the Norwegians suggested a way to get Russia to accept the agreement. According to the Norwegian plan, the TAC was to be raised by 7,000 tons, and the increase would be allocated to Russia, making its share 44,000 tons. The Norwegian delegation sought to ensure Russian cooperation, and at the very lest prevent the Russian government from officially protesting the agreement.60 At the NEAFC meeting in early March 1996, the different countries’ propositions were discussed. It is clear from these different ideas that the furthest distance was between the joint proposal of the Icelandic and the Greenlandic delegations on one hand, and the Russians on the other. Iceland and Greenland emphasized zonal attachment and the right of coastal states, while the basis for the Russian proposal was historical rights. The Icelandic and Greenlandic delegations sought 35.7% and 36.4% respectively, while proposing to give Russian fishermen 12.7% of a 150,000-ton TAC. The Russian delegation, on the other hand, wanted 36.9% and thought Icelandic fishermen should get 23.5%, Greenlanders 11.1%, and the Faeroese 2.7%.61

The Oceanic Redfish Agreement The negotiations were finally concluded in March 1996, with Russia and Poland entering reservations about the allocation scheme. By doing so, these states are not bound by the agreement and can choose to ignore management procedures, which other participants in the fishery have agreed to. As the Polish share of the catch is small, the reservations of Russia are much more serious, and the signatories of the agreement have tried various ways of securing Russia’s cooperation. The final solution was a compromise suggested by Iceland and Greenland. As Greenlanders did not own vessels suitable for the oceanic redfish fishery, they sold their share of the TAC, the biggest buyers being the Faeroese and the European Union. Even though Greenland did not participate in the fishery, as a coastal state it did have an inherent right to the stock. Greenland wanted a share of the stock, to either sell to third states or to exchange for other fish species they can catch elsewhere.

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Iceland got the largest share of the fishery, or 45,000 tons. The Russians got 36,000 tons or 5,000 tons less than they had caught in 1995.62 As discussed above, the states that supported the agreement tried to get Russia to agree on the distribution of catch by increasing the TAC in 1997. The final suggestion was to raise the TAC from 153,000 tons to 158,000 tons, bumping the Russian share from 36,000 tons to 41,000 tons. This did not work, and again the Russians voted against the sharing agreement, and have yet to sign it. Between 1997 and 1999, the TAC was set at 153,000 tons, and the allocation has remained the same as it was the first year. The European Union fleet was also allocated less than it had fished before the agreement. In 1995 ships from Spain and Portugal fished about 30,000 tons, but the agreement gave them only 23,000 tons. The 2,000-ton cooperative quota is reserved for states that acknowledge NEAFCs management decisions and wish to participate in the fishery. The problem of how to properly manage the oceanic redfish stock is still not fully solved. As mentioned above, scientific knowledge of the stock is still lacking. Most of the knowledge of the stock comes from research at depths to 500 meters, where most of the oceanic redfish was caught until the early- and mid-1990s. Since then, fishermen have increasingly taken their catches at depths greater than 500-feet, which genetic and population research is identifying as a different stock.63 Thus management procedures manage a stock that is being harvested less and less, and the fishery has shifted to a possibly new stock about which there is even less knowledge. If it turns out that there are two different stocks in the area, this will undoubtedly mean a new round of negotiations among the different states.

Role of Interest Groups in the Oceanic Redfish Negotiations The interest groups were included in the negotiations on the oceanic redfish stock, but at this point their preferences and actions remain unclear. Not much is written about their participation in the negotiations. This is not entirely surprising in the case of Norway, since the oceanic redfish fishery is of minor importance to these groups. As for the Icelandic interest groups, they were in general satisfied with the agreement. The Vessel Owners were satisfied with the agreement, while a recently formed interest group, Association of High Seas Fisheries protested the resolution, complaining that the Icelandic share was too small. But this group was not a part of the Icelandic delegations and is not influential in the process.64 The lack of information about the negotiations makes it hard to draw any inferences about the role of interest groups. The fishery has a short history, hence interest groups are less invested in it than for example either cod or herring. Only a handful of my interviewees discussed these negotiations, and those who did usually mentioned them in passing. The Norwegian information from the Norwegian weekly The Fisherman (Fiskaren) does not contain

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any reaction from the Norwegian fishermen to the agreement. The Icelandic ministers of fisheries and foreign affairs declared they were satisfied with the agreement, especially the fact that Iceland and Norway had managed to agree, as it showed that these two states could agree.65

Summary Interest groups have had a great deal of access to the international negotiating process over straddling fish stocks in Iceland and Norway, and have had direct representation on eleven out of the fourteen delegations (seven delegations for each country). Because of the politicized nature of the negotiations over cod, interest groups were kept out of the negotiations and Norges Fiskarlag resigned from the negotiating committee that was in charge of negotiating herring quotas in 1996. Access does not automatically equal influence, however. Given the corporatist nature of the two countries, access does to a certain degree mean influence, but the level of influence varies between stocks and over time. As chapter 3 on Norway and chapter 4 on Iceland showed, the position of Norges Fiskarlag in Norway has weakened while interest groups in Iceland— especially the Vessel Owners—have retained their dominant position. Over time this has lead to lessening of constraints and widening of the win-set for Norway vis-à-vis Iceland, whose negotiators have had significant constraints on their ability to make and accept offers, and hence a narrower win-set. As summarized in Table 5.1, this chapter has argued that with the exception of the first negotiations to distribute capelin between Iceland and Norway, the narrower win-set for Iceland than for Norway has lead to Iceland getting a bigger share of the resources being negotiated than it would otherwise have gotten. This is no trivial issue, as each additional ton of fish that a country gets in negotiations translates in to direct economic benefit for the fishermen involved in the fishery, and hence the economy of the country.

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Chapter 6

Conclusions

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nternational agreements are usually not concluded until all participating states are equally satisfied (or dissatisfied) with the outcome, and when the negotiators think domestic stakeholders can be convinced to accept the agreement. Successful distributive negotiations rarely result in an agreement where everyone gets an equal share of the resource or incurs an equal cost domestically by signing an agreement. Hence the question of why nations sign such agreements begs explaining, as that will expand our understanding of how domestic factors influence of international cooperation beyond being able to explain the absence or presence of cooperation. While the focus of this book is on the distribution of straddling fish stocks in the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea, the analysis of the seven agreements signed by Iceland and Norway has broader implications. First, by broadening the question of international cooperation to include explaining the actual outcomes reached, we enhance our understanding of the factors that bring about international cooperation in the first place. Second, analyzing the distributive outcome also allows us to examine how nations conduct negotiations within the same issue area as well as over time, be they tariffs for agricultural goods, actions to curb transboundary pollution or division of common resources. Finally, by focusing on the distributive outcome, we also gain a better understanding of how international regimes may or may not influence the negotiations.

Broadening the Research Question So far, the literature on international cooperation has focused primarily on analyzing why nations cooperate at the expense of analyzing the actual outcomes reached. The implication of focusing on the absence or presence of cooperation thus skirts one of the key issues in most negotiations: the actual distribution of 141

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goods (or bads) amongst participating nations and the resulting economic costs for domestic constituents and political costs for the government. For example, focusing on the absence and presence of cooperation in the case of capelin would have shown us that Iceland and Norway reached three agreements dividing this stock over an eighteen-year period. This fact does not, however, capture the most important aspect of these agreements: that the allocation of the resource changed two times, resulting in a reallocation of the resource internationally. Any change in allocation has profound economic consequences for the fishermen involved in a particular fishery, which gives them a strong incentive to influence the distributive outcome. Outside of the area of fishing for straddling stocks, in tariff negotiations each country has to consider the balance of opposing domestic interests in deciding how much to cut tariffs on a particular good. Domestically, importcompeting domestic industries have opposing preferences from exporting industries when it comes to tariff levels. Import-competing industries will want the government to keep tariffs high, while export industries will want to lower them so as to try to win lower tariffs in the countries they export to. The nature of interest organization and the institutional structure of the state in terms of a formal ratification procedure will determine the ability of interest groups to demand concessions from the government, and thus provide constraints for negotiators and influence the size of the win-set. For example, during the NAFTA negotiations, United States negotiators used the threat of Senate ratification to get a better deal for the United States, as well as the fact that labor unions and environmental groups were opposed to this free trade agreement between Canada, the United States, and Mexico.1

Same Issue Area and Changes over Time The focus on the absence and presence of cooperation also obscures the fact that countries can reach vastly different outcomes within the same issue area, and sometimes repeated negotiations within the same issue area results in a different outcome over time. For example, in trade negotiations, countries regularly reach agreement where different manufactured goods will have different levels of protection from international competition. Hence analyzing the factors of what countries agree to, and how they go about doing so, reveals the importance of the domestic institutional structure and how it gives voice to the particular domestic interests, broadly defined, which will be affected by the distributive outcome of the international agreement. By broadening the study of international cooperation to explaining different distributional outcomes, this study captures differences between stocks as well as addressing change over time. The analysis provides empirical support to findings of scholars using game theory to model the bargaining process. Putnam’s work on two-level games set the stage for game theorists to model how constraints influence the outcome of international negotiations.2 The key finding has been

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that constraints on the chief negotiator influences her ability to make offers during the negotiations and accept offers from opponents. Empirical works on explaining the likelihood of cooperation have suggested several variables that influence the likelihood of cooperation, but a generalizable theory has not yet emerged.3 Scholars have shown that the imminence of elections can increase the likelihood of cooperation,4 stringent ratification procedures decrease the likelihood of cooperation,5 and veto players whose acquiescence is necessary for an agreement to be reached can reduce the likelihood of cooperation.6 This research shows that the factors that can constrain negotiators and hence determine the size of the win-set are broader than the empirical research on the domestic sources of international cooperation have shown. By expanding the idea of constraints to include relevant domestic groups, we gain a greater understanding of the possible factors that can constrain negotiators and determine the size of the win-set for all countries involved. The research also shows that the size of the win-set can change over time. The analysis presented here on the influence of domestic interest groups on the terms of international agreements suggests a subtle and brittle influence. It is subtle in that interest groups which directly participate in negotiations mainly constrain specifics of terms of agreements, rather than preventing an agreement altogether. Interest-group influence is brittle because in return for influence, interest groups guarantee domestic acceptance of agreements, thus weakening the groups’ ability to reject the agreements once they are finalized. Throughout the international negotiating process, however, the Norwegian government increasingly gets an upper hand vis-à-vis the interest groups, while in Iceland, the key interest group remains very powerful during the 1980s and 1990s. But ultimately, as was shown in the exclusion of the groups from the cod negotiations, the governments can exclude the groups so as to facilitate an agreement. Returning to the example of international trade, in explaining the actual outcomes of trade negotiations, a focus on the key actors, their internal relationship as well as the relationship they have with the government, is crucial. For example, important questions include whether interest groups representing import-competing industries have an upper hand over export interests. And what access do these two groups have to the government? Does their ability to constrain the negotiator depend on what political party is in power? Answers to these questions will give us a much fuller understanding of the important factors that influence the outcome of any international negotiation.

The International Arena But the domestic arena cannot be divorced completely from the international arena. In entering any negotiations, governments have to consider the international legal environment the particular negotiations operate in. In negotiating straddling stocks, the Law of the Sea regime provided solution concepts

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for the negotiators and thus reduced the number of available options to the negotiators. And this research shows that countries have a great deal of leeway in interpreting specific provisions of applicable laws and regimes. This has implications for other areas of international cooperation. For example, negotiations to reduce tariffs on agricultural goods are not conducted in a void, but take as a point of departure the historical process that began with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and was later codified in the World Trade Organization.

Further Analysis of International Cooperation In a world of an increasing number of international agreements, the study of the factors that influence the absence and presence of cooperation as well those that influence the distributive aspects of the final agreement will give us a fuller understanding of the complexities of cooperation. Furthering the ideas presented in this work, there are a few different ways that domestic actors and institutional arrangements can constrain a negotiator’s bargaining space, and hence determine the win-set for each country. First, the more actors that can veto the agreement along the way results in a smaller win-set for a negotiator.7 Second, the internal cohesion of the actors involved is also important, that is, the more cohesion within a groups of actors, the smaller the win-set for the negotiators. Alternatively, when negotiators have to contend with domestic groups with opposing preferences at home, the negotiator can use this discord to increase the size of the win-set and facilitate an agreement. And when the preferences of the actors with the ability to veto an agreement differ too greatly from the preferences of the negotiator, whether or not this impacts the negotiated outcome depends on the distribution of power domestically, the latter can more easily discount the former.8 Overall, increasing attention to the distributive aspects of international agreements is warranted, as that will give us a better understanding of international cooperation. In a world of conflict and cooperation, the ability to pinpoint specific factors that constrain negotiators and influence their ability to make and accept offers is important, as that can lead the way better analysis of why particular instances of cooperation succeeded or failed.

Notes

1. Explaining Distributional Outcomes 1. Schelling 1970 [1960], p. 21. 2. I differentiate between stocks and species of fish. A stock is a component of a species and resides in a particular area (VanderZwaag 1983). The different negotiated agreements between Iceland and Norway discussed here refer to different stocks. 3. An exerpt from this research appeared in Ásgeirsdóttir “Oceans of Trouble: Domestic Influence on International Fisheries Cooperation in the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea.” Global Environmental Politics 7, no. 1 (2007). 4. There are three types of international agreements with regards to the division of straddling stocks. Initial agreements represent the first allocation of the resource. Second, there are agreements that significantly change the allocation. Finally, there are automatic renewals. This research does not discuss automatic renewals, but instead focuses on initial agreements for each stock, or agreements where there was a significant change in the allocation outcome. The seven agreements analyzed here represent all such agreements reached between Iceland and Norway from 1980 to 1999. 5. “The United Nations Law of the Sea Conference” concluded in 1982 and became effective in November 1994, when the 60th signatory state ratified it. “The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks” was signed in 1995, and went into effect in December 2001. It was negotiated to fill in the gaps regarding the management of straddling fish stocks left by the 1982 Convention of the Law of the Sea. For simplicity, it will henceforth be called the Straddling Stocks Agreement. 6. Putnam 1988; Iida 1993; Mo 1994,1995; Tarar 2001. 7. Krasner 1983, p. 2. 8. Krasner 1983; Young 1989; Young 1999. 9. As mentioned earlier, the full name of the agreement is, “The Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.”

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10. This study draws on interviews with twenty-seven individuals with first hand knowledge of each of the negotiations. Eleven were interviewed in Iceland in the fall of 1998 and sixteen in Norway during the summer of 1999. Interviewees included bureaucrats, scientists, and interest groups leaders who collectively have been part of all the negotiations between Iceland and Norway for the past twenty years. Most interviewees requested confidentiality, and to respect that no names are given, only whether or not the person is a bureaucrat, scientist, or an interest group representative, as well as the date of the interviews. The questions focused on the negotiating process, how states decided their bargaining positions, who got to participate, what the relationship between the different actors was, and so forth. In summarizing the interviews, care was taken to focus on answers to questions that were echoed by two or more interviewees. One feature of Norwegian interest group politics is also worth mentioning. In Norway, it is common for individuals to move from government employment to interest group employment and back. Most of the bureaucrats interviewed had at one time worked for Norges Fiskarlag, and the interest group representatives usually had a stint at the Department of Fisheries on their resume. This is not the case in Iceland. 11. Schelling 1970 [1960], p. 22. 12. Ibid, p. 28. 13. Putnam 1988. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Putnam 1988; Mo 1994, 1995; Tarar 2001. 17. Iida 1993. 18. Tarar 2001 19. Ibid. 20. Tsebelis 1995, 1999, 2002. 21. Putnam and Bayne 1987; Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993; Mo 1994, 1995; Milner 1997. 22. Putnam and Bayne 1984. 23. Milner 1997; Martin 2000. 24. Mo 1994, 1995; Tarar 2001. 25. Milner 1997. 26. This book refers to the interest groups representing fisheries as being primarily focused on the interest of the capture fisheries themselves, not the processing part which is usually based on land. 27. Rokkan 1966; Katzenstein 1985; Ingebritsen 1998. 28. Food and Agricultural Organization 2004. 29. One of the main distinctions made between species of fish is whether it is demersal or pelagic. Demersal species are bottom-dwelling species, such as cod, while pelagic species often travel in large schools, near the surface of the ocean. Examples include capelin and herring.

Notes to Chapter 2

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30. Food and Agricultural Organization 1996. 31. Food and Agricultural Organization 2002. 32. Electronic Telegraph, March 13–18, 1995. 33. Parfait 1995. 34. Gray 1998. 35. Ostrom 1990; Keohane and Ostrom 1995; Ostrom et. al. 1999. 36. Hardin, G. 1968. 37. Olson 1965; Hardin, R. 1982; Ostrom 1990. 38. Vilhjálmsson 1994. 39. Ibid. 40. Icelandic Capelin Commission 1979–1996. 41. Sigurðsson 1989. 42. Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, Ressursoversikt 1996. 43. Marine Research Institute 2007. 44. Icelandic Fisheries Association, Annual Report 1993. 45. Thórhallsson 1993. 46. Troyanovsky and Shibanov 1995. 47. Magnússon 1991; North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) 1994. 48. Sigurðsson and Reynisson 1998. 49. Magnússon 1991. 50. Sigurðsson and Reynisson 1998. 51. Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, Ressursoversikt 1996. 52. Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, Ressursoversikt 1999.

2. Role of the Law of the Sea and the Straddling Stocks Agreement in Determining Distributive Outcomes 1. De Marffy-Mantuano, 1995. 2. Until mid-1970s, the ‘high seas’ referred to the area outside the territorial sea or in a few instances to the fisheries or economic zones adjacent to the territorial sea. Most of these claims were less than twelve nautical miles. Following the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982, the term high seas now refers to the area outside the 200 mile EEZ that most coastal states have established. 3. Henkin 1974. 4. Jónsson, Hannes 1982. 5. United States Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, 1945. 6. United States Presidential Proclamation No. 2668, 1945. 7. United Nations 1992a.

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8. Jónsson, Hannes 1982; Burke 1994. 9. Henking 1974. 10. Burke 1994. 11. Jónsson, Hannes 1982. 12. Ibid. 13. Burke 1994. 14. United Nations 2007. 15. Bailey 1997. 16. Ibid. 17. The designation of a coastal state vs. a high-seas fishing state depends on the stock being utilized. Coastal states are states that have a coastline adjacent to the body of water where a particular stock is being utilized. A high-seas state is defined as a state that does not have coastal access to the waters the stock it is harvesting is found. 18. United Nations 2000a, Article 2 and United Nations 2000b. The discussion of the specific treaty articles within each subsection refers to the agreement being discussed in that subsection, here UNCLOS. This also applies to the section on the Straddling Stocks Agreement and the section or regional organizations. 19. Burke 1994. 20. United Nations 2000a, Article 59. 21. Burke 1994. 22. Food and Agricultural Organization 2004. 23. United Nations 1992c. 24. United Nations 2007. 25. A flag-state identifies the state where a particular vessel is registered. For example, Norway is the flag-state of all ships registered in Norway. As the flag state, Norway has the responsibility to ensure that ships registered in Norway comply with both domestic laws and regulations as well as with international obligations Norway has undertaken. 26. Interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat conducted in Norway, 26 May 1999. 27. The member countries of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea are: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. 28. International Council for the Exploration of the Sea 2006. 29. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 10 December 1998. 30. North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 1997. 31. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 10 December 1998. 32. North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 1997. 33. North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 1997, Article 6.

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3. The Decline of Norwegian Fishing Interests 1. As shown on the map in chapter 1, Svalbard is a group of islands in the Arctic Ocean, between Greenland and Franz Joseph Land. Its largest island is Spitsbergen. Jan Mayen is a small island north of Iceland. Norway gained possession of Svalbard in 1920 and of Jan Mayen in 1929. 2. Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries 1995. 3. Structural agreements define the nature of cooperation, and the protocol for the setting and allocation of quotas among the contracting states. 4. Interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat conducted in Norway, 26 May 1999. 5. Tamnes 1997. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. The original signatories to the Svalbard Treaty were: the United States, Great Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Currently there are forty-one signatories. Iceland signed the treaty in 1994, at the height of the conflict over Iceland’s fishery of cod in the Barents Sea. 9. Ulfstein 1995. 10. Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries 1982. 11. Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries 1995. 12. Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries. Quota Allocations to foreign Fishing vessels in the Norwegian Economic Zone 1978, 1982–1990; Stortingsmelding, nr. 49. Om dei årlige fiskeriavtalene Noreg ingår med andre land, published in 1996; Stortingsmelding, nr. 49. Om dei årlige fiskeriavtalene Noreg ingår med andre land for 1996 og fisket etter avtalene i 1994 og 1995, published in 1996; Stortingsmelding, nr. 48. Om dei årlige fiskeriavtalene Noreg ingår med andre land for 1998 og fisket etter avtalene i 1997 og 1998, published in 1999. 13. Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries 1995 14. The term Northern Norway refers here to the three northern-most districts (fylke) in Norway: Nordland, Troms, and Finnmark. These districts stretch along the narrowest part of the Norwegian coast. 15. Allen 1979. 16. Ibid. 17. Norsk Fiskerinæring 1996, p254. 18. Ingebritsen 1998. 19. Interview with a Norwegian Bureaucrat conducted in Norway, 4 May 1999. 20. Interview with a Norwegian interest group representative conducted in Norway in May, 1999. 21. Interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat conducted in Norway, 7 June 1999. 22. Interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat conducted in Norway, 5 May 1999. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid.

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25. Interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat conducted in Norway, 4 May 1999. 26. Interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat conducted in Norway, 26 May 1999. 27. Interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat conducted in Norway, 4 May 1999. 28. Interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat conducted in Norway, 5 May 1999. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Rokkan 1987; Katzenstein 1985; Ingebritsen 1998. 33. Sagdahl 1982. 34. Jakobsen 1999. 35. Ibid. 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. Rokkan 1966 [1987]. 40. Rokkan 1966 [1987]; Jentoft 1993; Hallenstvedt 1982. 41. Valen and Urwin, 1985. 42. Fløistad 1982. 43. Sagdahl 1982. 44. Hallenstvedt 1982. 45. Fløistad 1982. 46. Hallenstvedt 1982. 47. Ibid. 48. Nordic Council of Ministers and the Nordic Statistical Secretariat 1976–1998. 49. Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries 1977–78. 50. Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries 1977–78, p. 14. 51. Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries 1982–83. 52. Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries 1982–83, p. 9. 53. Norsk Fiskerinæring 1996. 54. Directorate of Fisheries, Ressursoversikt 1999. 55. Sagdahl 1982. 56. “Bye, Bye happiness,” 1995. 57. Interview with a Norwegian interest group representative conducted in Norway, 16 June 1999. 58. Interview with a Norwegian interest group representative conducted in Norway, 16 June 1999. 59. Norsk Fiskerinæring 1996. 60. Fløistad 1982. 61. Nordic Council of Ministers and the Nordic Statistical Secretariat 1999.

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62. Interview with a Norwegian interest group representative conducted in Norway, 26 June 1999. 63. Tamnes 1997. 64. The EEA Agreement banned all direct subsidies, such as the ones used in Norway to even out fishermen’s incomes. There are still annual negotiations between the government and Norges Fiskarlag though, with the negotiated sum mostly going toward pension funds for fishermen. 65. The negotiations for subsidies generally take place in November or December for the coming year. For the sake of simplicity I will refer to the 1983 negotiations as the negotiations over the 1983 subsidies, even though technically they took place toward the end of 1982. 66. Parliamentary interest was measured by looking at parliamentary proceedings and counting the different items discussed by the parliament that pertain to the fisheries. In order to estimate whether or not the interests have changed over the past two decades I counted general issues, questions posed, laws passed, and budget items dealing with the fishing industry that came before the parliament each year. I counted the number of items pertaining to the fisheries in the index of the Norwegian Parliamentary Proceedings from the 1975–76 parliamentary session to the 1997–1998 session. Until the 1985–86 parliamentary session, the proceedings included all items pertaining to the fisheries under the heading ‘Fisheries.’ After that, the organization of the index changed slightly, and fishing issues were itemized under different headings such as ‘Capture,’ ‘Fishing Regulations’ and ‘Fishermen’ in addition to the ‘Fisheries’ heading. The items found there are also included in the count. 67. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1998 68. Rasch 1994.

4. Dictating Policy and Influencing Outcomes in Iceland 1. Jónsson, Hannes 1982. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Thorsteinsson 1976; Jónsson 1982. 5. Evans 1975. 6. Jónsson, Hannes 1982. 7. Ibid. 8. Valdimarsson et. al. 1993. 9. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report 1993. 10. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 13 October 1998. 11. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 12 November 1998. 12. Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners. 1983, 1985, 1986, 1990–1997. Annual Reports. 13. Association of Icelandic Marine Engineers. 1980–1997. Annual Reports.

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14. Merchant Navy and Fishing Vessel Officer Guild. 1988–1997. Annual Reports. 15. Icelandic Seamen’s Federation. 1988, 1990, 1992, 1996, 1998. Biannual Reports. 16. Icelandic Parliamentary Proceedings A 1981–1982, p. 1999. 17. Ibid. 18. Icelandic Parliamentary Proceedings B 1982–83, p. 184. 19. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1979–80. 20. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1984. 21. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1987, 1988. 22. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1992, 1993. 23. Committee for Formation of Fisheries Policy 1993. 24. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1983. 25. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1984. 26. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1985. 27. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1979–80. 28. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1982. 29. Icelandic Fisheries Association, Útvegur 1995 and 1996. 30. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1979–80. 31. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1986; Paulsen 1989. 32. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1986. 33. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1987. 34. Icelandic Minister of Foreign Affairs, Annual Report to Parliament 1982. 35. Committee on the Formation of Fisheries Policy 1993. 36. Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners, Annual Report 1993. 37. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 13 October 1998. 38. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 3 December 1998. 39. See for example Milner, 1997. 40. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 10 November 1998. 41. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 27 November 1998. 42. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 10 November 1998. 43. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 2 October 1998. 44. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 10 December 1998. 45. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 10 December 1998. 46. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 2 October 1998.

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47. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 10 December 1998. 48. Merchant Navy and Fishing Vessel Officers Guild, Annual Report 1996. 49. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 2 December 1998. 50. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 3 December 1998. 51. Ibid. 52. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 2 December 1998. 53. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 12 November 1998. 54. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 2 December 1998. 55. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 23 November 1998. 56. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 16 November 1998. 57. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 12 November 1998. 58. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 13 October 1998. 59. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 2 December 1998. 60. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 16 November 1998. 61. Committee on the Formation of Fisheries Policy 1993. 62. Ibid. 63. Jónsson 1990. 64. Ibid. 65. Thjóðhagsstofnun 1988; Committee on the Formation of Fisheries Policy 1993. 66. Thjóðhagsstofnun 1988, 1993, 1996. 67. Árnason 1997. 68. Committee on the Formation of Fisheries Policy 1993. 69. Jónsson 1990. 70. Eggertsson 1999. 71. The number of fishermen is an average for the whole year. There is great variance in the number of fishermen employed according to season. The number of fishermen is highest in the summer because of the small-boat fishery. The number then drops in the winter, when mostly large trawlers with small crews brave the weather in search of catches. 72. Committee on Formation of Fishing Policy 1993.

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5. Interest-Group Power and its Impact on the International Allocation of Shared Fish Stocks 1. Apart from the two main issues of division of the TAC and where each state got to fish each share, the other big debate centered on the question of a Norwegian two-hundred-mile zone around Jan Mayen. The debate between the negotiating committees of Iceland and Norway centered on whether Jan Mayen should be considered an island with the right to its own economic zone, or whether it was a rock in the ocean with a right to minimal fishing area around it. Norges Fiskarlag had, since its annual meeting in 1978, demanded that Norway establish an economic zone, around the island, a demand the Norwegian government resisted. The Norwegians wanted such an extension to take place through negotiations with Iceland. During the negotiations, conflict arose about an area between Iceland and Norway where the two economic zones overlapped. In 1979, under intense pressure from interest groups, Iceland laid claim to its full 200-mile zone toward Jan Mayen, including the area where the two zones overlapped, and threatened to arrest all foreign ships, including Norwegian ships, which tried to fish within the zone. The conflict was eventually solved in 1981, after Elliot Richardson worked out a compromise. 2. Richardson 1988. 3. Icelandic Capelin Commission, Annual Report 1980. 4. Morgunblaðið, 13 May 1980b. 5. Paulsen 1989. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Interview with and Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 3 December 1998. 9. Interview with and Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 13 October 1998. 10. Morgunblaðið, 13 May 1980d. 11. Morgunblaðið, 11 May 1980, p. 1. 12. Morgunblaðið, 13 May 1980c, p. 28. 13. Morgunblaðið, 13 May 1980a, p. 29. 14. Morgunblaðið, 11 May 1980, p. 1. 15. Fiskaren, 13 May 1980, p. 1. 16. Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, Annual Report 1999. 17. Falch, Kjetil, and Nils Torsvik 1996. 18. Falch, Kjetil. 1996a. 19. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 2 October 1998. 20. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 2 December 1998. 21. Icelandic Directorate of Fisheries 1998.

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22. Interview with a Norwegian interest group representative conducted in Norway, 26 June 1999. 23. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 27 November 1998. 24. Fiskaren, 22 March 1996. 25. Interview with a Norwegian interest group representative conducted in Norway, 16 June 1999. 26. Fiskaren, 6 March 1996, p. 4. 27. Aanstad 1996. 28. Stephensen and Gíslason 1996. 29. Falch 1996c. 30. Thórhallsson 1993. 31. Morgunblaðið, 25 August 1993. 32. Stephensen 1993. 33. Ormarsson 1994. 34. Stephensen 1993. 35. Stephensen 1996. 36. Interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat conducted in Norway, 5 May 1999. 37. Interview with an Icelandic bureaucrat conducted in Iceland, 13 October 1998. 38. Morgunblaðið, 27 September 1994. 39. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1998–1999. 40. Ibid. 41. Morgunblaðið, 15 February 1997. 42. Morgunblaðið, 22 August 1997. 43. Morgunblaðið, 15 November 1995. 44. Interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat conducted in Norway, 26 May 1999. 45. Interview with a Norwegian interest group representative conducted in Norway, 16 June 1999. 46. Interview with a Norwegian interest group representative conducted in Norway, 26 June 1999. 47. Moy 1999. 48. Interview with an Icelandic interest group representative conducted in Iceland, 2 December 1999. 49. Árnason 1999. 50. Mo 1994. 51. Interview with a Norwegian bureaucrat conducted in Norway in May 1998. 52. Falch 1996b. 53. Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries 1996.

Notes to Chapter 6

156 54. Falch 1996d.

55. Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries 1994. 56. North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 1994. 57. North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 1994. 58. North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 1995. 59. North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 1996. 60. Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries, Feb. 6, 1996. 61. Icelandic Ministry of Fisheries, Mar. 3, 1996. 62. Falch 1996b. 63. Sigurðsson and Thórarinsson 1998. 64. Morgunblaðið, 24 April 1996. 65. Morgunblaðið, 22 March 1996.

6. Conclusions 1. Cameron and Tomlin 2000. 2. Putnam, Mo, Iida, and Tarar. 3. Putnam and Bayne 1987; Putnam 1988; Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993; Mo 1994, 1995; Milner 1997. 4. Putnam and Bayne 1984. 5. Milner 1997, Martin 2000. 6. Mo 1994, 1995; Tarar 2001. 7. Tsebelis 2002. 8. Mo 1994.

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Index

Africa, 17, 39, 87 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, The. See Straddling Stocks Agreement Alaska, 20 Althing (Iceland): consultation with interest groups and 101; EEZ extension and 83; high-seas fishing and 86, 87; ratification of agreements in 92; role of 106–110 Anglo-Norwegian case, 35 Asia, 17 Association of Icelandic Marine Engineers. See Marine Engineers Atlantic-Scandinavian Herring. See herring stock Austria, 54 Barents Sea: allocation of cod in 133; bargaining positions in 130; capelin stock in 20; cod conflict in 18, 87, 91–92; cod fishery in 134, 141; cod quotas in 130, 131; cod stock in 24; herring stock in 23, 24; historical fishing rights in 129, 134; Icelanders fishing in 128, 130; impact of cod conflict on capelin negotiations 119; Joint RussianNorwegain Fisheries Commission

in 132; negotiations over cod in 29, 51, 58, 129; role of interest groups in 133 bargaining constraints, domestic factors and 5, 7, 11, 29; domestic interest groups as 6, 9, 13–14, 30, 79, 143, 144; elections as 12; impact of 11; institutional factors and 11; level of 6; Norges Fiskarlag and 70, 139; ratification as 12;Vessel Owners and 139; veto players as 11, 12 bargaining space, 6 baseline for allocation, 4; emergence of 5; explaining choice of 9; historical rights as 43, 113; influence of relevant actors on 10; Law of the Sea and 32; rights of coastal states as 113; zonal attachement as 42, 113, 136 Belgium, 84, 89 Bering Sea, 20 Bjarnason, Matthías, 121 Björnsson, Sveinn, 82 Britain: Barents Sea fishery and 129; Cod Wars and 35, 49, 83, 89, 116; herring fishery and 22, 123; Iceland and 34, 84; International Court of Justice and 35, 84; Norway and 35, 54 Bulgaria, 27 Canada, 17; agreement between Norway and 53; cod stock off Newfoundland 39; Estai and 18; Flemish Cap and

167

168

Index

Canada (continued ) 25; Law of the Sea and 84; North American Free Trade Agreement and 142; Svalbard Treaty and 50 Capelin Agreement, 12, 89, 103; 1980 agreement 116–117; 1989 agreement 117–119; 1998 agreement 119–120; role of interest groups 120–122 capelin stock: Barents Sea 52, 132; collapse in Iceland of 87; collective management of 3, 18; cooperation and 142; Faeroe Islands allowed to fish 88; failed negotiations with EU/EEC over 90; Greenlandic quota for 90; history of fishery, 20–22; individual transferable quotas and 103; linkage between cod stock and 130; migratory nature of 17; need for cooperation 115; Norwegian quota for 89; right of coastal state and 42 Central Bank of Iceland, 102 Chile, 34, 84 China, 39 Cod Agreement: 1999 agreement 59, 61, 89, 132–133; ratification of 12; role of eletions in Iceland on 12; role of interest groups 133–134 cod stock: Belgian fishing of 89; capelin as a source of food for 20; collapse of 101; collective management of 3, 18; conflict over fishing of 91, 119; Faeroe Islands allowed to fish 88; fishery of 24–26; Icelandic fishery of 87; individual transferable quotas and 103; Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission and 52; migratory nature of 17; need for cooperation 128–132; negotiations over 42; Norwegian fishing of 89; right of coastal state and 43; value of 22, 82; zonal attachment and cod 43 Cod Wars, 35, 49, 83, 89

Cold War: capelin negotiations and 122; end of 48, 62, 70, 73, 75, 79; and the impact on Norges Fiskarlag 117; influence of 13, 66 collective action problems, 19 Common Fisheries Policy, 55 common pool resources, 17 Conservative Party (Norway), 67, 69 contiguous zone, 34, 36 continental shelf, 33, 34 corporatism, 11, 13, 62, 139 Deltakerloven. See Participation Laws Denmark: Greenland as a colony of 50, 90, 115, 135; herring fishery and 22, 123; Iceland’s independence from 83, 100; International Council for the Exploration of the Sea and 44; oceanic redfish negotiations and 137; ratification of EEC and 54 devaluations in Iceland, 101–120 Directorate of Fisheries (Fiskeridirectoratet), 26, 52, 58, 135 distributional conflict, 1, 6, 9, 29 distributive outcomes: analyzing 3, 141; bargaining advantage and 11; domestic interests and 142; Law of the Sea and 4; leadership of negotiations and 91; win-sets and 10 Doha Round, 7 East Germany, 27, 53 Ecuador, 34 enforcement costs, 14, 15 Estonia, 27 Europe, 17, 63 European Economic Area (EEA), 64, 73 European Economic Community (EEC): agreements between Iceland and 90; agreements between Norway and 50, 51, 52; capelin fishery and 117; Greenland’s exit from 90, 115, 117; as a member of North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 45; Norway’s

Index application to join 54; Norway’s rejection of membership in the 48, 53, 54; Norway’s relationship with 47, 79; opposition in Norway to membership in EEC 54; Portugal and 53; Spain and 53 European Union: access to Icelandic waters by 90; agreement between Iceland and 86, 88; agreements between Norway and 52, 59; agricultural interests in 7; capelin fishery and 21; cod quotas in the Barents Sea and 129, 130; Common Fisheries Policy and 55; European Economic Area and 73, 90; herring agreement and 93, 97, 124, 125, 126; herring fishery and 1, 22, 123; herring migration and 126; management of exclusive economic zone and 18; as a member of North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 45; Norway’s rejection of membership in 48, 53, 55; oceanic redfish agreement and 138; oceanic redfish fishery and 26, 137; opposition in Iceland to herring quota gotten by 127; opposition in Norway to herring quota gotten by 128; opposition within Norway to membership in 54; relationship between Norway and 47, 48, 79; role of interest groups in 60–61; scientific data on herring and 126 Evensen, Jens, 50 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ): access by European Union to Faeroe Island’s 126; access by European Union to Norway’s 49; access by Faeroe Islands to Iceland’s 88; access to Iceland’s 85; access to Norway’s 53; access by Norway to Faeroe Island’s 125; access by Norway to Iceland’s 89, 118, 125; access by Russia to Norway’s 126, 131; artificial nature of 38; biology

169 of Iceland’s 82; biology of Norway’s 51; British fishing and Iceland’s extension of 84; Canada’s 18, 39; capelin within Iceland’s 20–21; coastal states and 4, 15; cod agreement and Norway’s 132; cod agreement and Russia’s 132; conflict between Norway and Soviet Union over creation of 51–52; creation of 200-mile 31, 36, 37; domestic management of 1, 19; duty to manage fisheries and 37; enforcement of rules and 26; European Union’s 1, 18; extension to 200 miles of 18; Faeroe Island’s 1, 123; fishing outside of 3, 18; Grey Zone and 52; herring migrating through 1, 22, 124; herring within Iceland’s 124, 125; herring within Norway’s 125; high seas and 37; Iceland’s 1, 22, 24, 25, 26, 123; Iceland’s catches outside 86; Iceland’s extension to a 200-mile 34, 84, 116; Iceland’s extension toward Jan Mayen 50, 117, 121–122; Iceland’s fishing outside 87; Iceland’s management of 85, 86, 106; Iceland’s policy toward foreign fishing within 90, 110; individual transferable quotas in Iceland and 103; Kola Peninsula and Norway’s 52; Law of the Sea and 32, 35, 46, 50, 84; Loop Sea and 123; Loophole and Norway’s 131; management of fisheries and 19; management outside 15; mismanagment of stocks within 19; Norges Fiskarlag and 70; Norway avoids conflict over creation of 49; Norway’s 1, 22, 53; Norway’s capelin fishery within Iceland’s 120, 121, 122; Norway’s extension 50, 51, 116; Norway’s extension to 200–mile 47, 49; Norwegian management of 51; overfishing within 38, 86; redfish within Iceland’s 27;

170

Index

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) (continued ) redfish within Norway’s 27; research outside 16; resource abundance within Iceland’s 87, 88; right of innocent passage and 37; rights and duties associated with 36; Russia’s 22; size of 15; sovereign rights within 36, 42; Soviet Union’s 22, 23; stock depletion within 18; Storting and 75; straddling stocks and 17; tragedy of the commons and 19; West German fishing and Iceland’s extension 84; zonal attachment of cod and Iceland’s 128 Export Laws (Exportloven), 63, 64 Exportloven. See Export Laws Faeroe Islands: capelin fishery and 21; cooperation between Iceland and 88–89; cooperation between Norway and 51; exchange of fishing rights within 125, 126; herring agreement and 123, 125, 126; herring fishery around 1, 123, 127–128; herring negotiations and 127; oceanic redfish agreement and 137; oceanic redfish fishery and 26; oceanic redfish negotiations and 135 Farmanna- og fiskimannasamband Íslands. See Officers Guild Faxa Bay, 82 Faxaflói. See Faxa Bay Federation of Icelandic Fishing Vessel Owners (Landssamband íslenskra útvegsmanna). See Vessel Owners Finland, 50, 53, 54 Finnmark, 65, 73 Fisheries Protection Zone (FPZ), 1, 42, 47, 50, 51, 130 fishing industry, 14, 48, 68, 101 Fiskebåtredernes Forbund. See Norwegian Vessel Owners Association Fiskeri- og havbruksnæringens landsforening. See Norwegian Seafood Federation

Fiskeridirectoratet. See Directorate of Fisheries Flemish Cap, 25 Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), 16, 17 France, 83, 129 freedom of the seas, 33, 34 Fresh Fish Laws (Norway), 63, 64 Frydenlund, Knut, 121 General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT), 6, 64, 144 Germany, 26, 53, 83, 123, 129 Gunnarsson, Sævar, 127 Greenland: access to capelin fishery around Iceland 21, 118; access to Iceland’s EEZ by 88; allocation of capelin between Norway and 118; capelin agreement and 115, 117; capelin fishery and 20; capelin negotiations and 86, 115, 117, 118; cooperation between Iceland and 135–136; halibut fishery and 25; herring fishery and 123; home rule in 117; Iceland’s proximity to 129; International Court of Justice and 120; Jan Mayen and 50; maritime boundaries between Jan Mayen and 120; negotiations over straddling stocks between Iceland and 90; North Atlantic Fisheries Commission and 45; oceanic redfish and coastal state status of 45; oceanic redfish fishery and 26, 27, 135; oceanic redfish negotiations and 135, 137; overlapping boundaries between Norway and 50 Grey Zone, 52 Haddock, 53, 103 Hafrannsóknastofnun. See Marine Research Institute Hague Conference, 82 Hannibaldsson, Jón Baldvin, 25 Havforskningsinstituttet. See Institute of Marine Research

Index Hermannsson, Steingrímur, 87, 103, 121 Herring Agreement: 1996 agreement 124–125; 1997 agreement 125–126; interest groups in Iceland and 93; Marine Engineers and 86; Norges Fiskarlag and 59; role of interest groups 126–128 herring stock: Barents Sea 129; coastal status claims and 42; cod conflict and 130; collective management of 3, 18; cooperation between Faeroe Islands and Iceland over 88; fishing of 22–24; fluctuation of 16; historical rights to 43; individual transferable quotas and 103; interest groups in Iceland and 87, 97; International Council for the Exploration of the Sea and 44; migration of 1; need for cooperation 123–124; Norges Fiskarlag and 139; North Sea 53; straddling nature of 17; zonal attachment of 42 historical rights: as baseline for allocation 10; explanation of 4; Iceland’s claims of 128, 129; Law of the Sea and 42–43, 113; migration of herring and 124; oceanic redfish and 135, 136, 137; use of 9, 41 Holst, Johan Jørgen, 129 Hovedavtalen. See Main Agreement Høyre. See Conservative Party in Norway Icelandic Fisheries Association, 20 Icelandic Parliament. See Althing Icelandic Seamen’s Federation. See Seamen’s Federation ICES. See International Council for the Exploration of the Sea Independence Party (Iceland), 83, 108, 121 Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs): adoption of 13, 101, 109, 110, 122; Althing and 108; controversy surrounding 106; implimentation of 104; infuence of Vessel Owners on

171

98, 99, 122; investment trends and 104; labor opposition to 99; small boats and 104, 106; system of 102–103 information costs, 14, 15, 16 Institute of Marine Research (Havforskningsinstituttet), 58 international cooperation: absence and presence of 141, 142; broadening the study of 142; distributional conflicts and 1, 29; domestic factors and 9–12, 141; fisheries and 19; implications for the study of 144; straddling stocks and 18, 19; study of 8, 29 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), 22, 30, 43, 44–45, 52, 58 International Court of Justice, 35, 50, 84, 120 Ireland, 123 ITQs. See Individual Transferable Quotas Jan Mayen: access to fisheries around 51, 117, 121, 125, 128; agreement over capelin fishing around 115; arrest of Icelandic trawler around 119; capelin agreement and 125; capelin fishery around 1, 20, 116, 119, 120, 126; conflict surrounding fishing and 122; controversy surrounding fisheries protection zone 50; fisheries protection zone around 47, 50, 117, 123; herring fishery around 125; Iceland’s proximity to 88; migration pattern of capelin around 115; Norway’s claim to 116; Norway’s fishery around 20, 21; settling maritime boundaries around 50 Japan, 39, 89 Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission, 24, 51, 52, 60, 132 Jósefsson, Lúðvík, 121 Kola Peninsula, 52 Kyoto Protocol, 7

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Index

Labor Party (Norway): cabinets led by 64; EEC referendum and 54; fishing industry as an ally of 69; goals for the fishing industry set by the 67, 68; Main Agreement and 75; negotiations over subsidies and 74, 75; Norges Fiskarlag and 69; Northern Norway as a stronghold for 64, 72, 75; popularity of 64; Storting and 77, 78 Labrador, 20 Landssamband íslenskra útvegsmanna. See Vessel Owners Latin America, 34, 83 Latvia, 27 Law of the Sea: Article 2, 36; Article 33, 36; Article 56, 36, 37; Article 57, 36; Article 58, 37; Article 59, 37; Article 61, 37; Article 62, 9, 42; Article 63, 8, 37, 41; Article 73, 37; Article 117, 37; Article 118, 37; development of 29; Iceland and 30, 81, 82–85; Norway and 30, 47, 48, 49–50, 55, 79; regime of 4, 116; rights of coastal states and 26; role of 4, 8–9, 31–36, 113; straddling stocks and 143 Lithuania, 27 Løbach, Terje, 135 London Convention, 82 Loop Sea, 1, 22, 123, 130 Loophole: arrest of ships in 130; cod agreement and 132; conflict in the 119; historical rights in 129; Icelandic fishery in 24, 25, 26, 128–132; linkage between capelin and 130; Norway’s strategy in 129; reaction to agreement on fishing in 134 Main Agreement (Hovedavtalen), 68, 69, 70, 74 marginal costs, 14 Marine Engineers, 86, 94, 95, 127 Marine Research Institute (Iceland), 93, 94 Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY), 3, 44 Merchant Navy and Officers Guild. See Officers Guild

Mexico, 34, 84, 142 Ministry of Fisheries: in Iceland, 90, 92, 93, 94, 97, 103, 106, 128; in Norway, 51, 56, 57, 60, 69, 128 Ministry of Foreign Affairs: in Iceland, 90, 92, 93, 106, 128; in Norway, 56, 57, 128 monitoring costs, 14, 15 Møre and Romsdal, 65, 69, 72 NAFO. See Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization NEAFC. See North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission negotiating constraints. See bargaining constraints Netherlands, 22, 83, 123 Newfoundland, 20, 39 New Zealand, 39 Nordland, 65 Norges Fiskarlag: capelin negotiations and 115, 116, 117, 121–122; changing role of 48; cod negotiations and 133–134; Cold War and 73; declining influence of 13–14, 48, 70–78, 79, 119; herring negotiations and 126–128; interest group power in Iceland vs. 81, 90, 98; Labor Party and 69; Main Agreement and 68, 69; make-up of 65; number of fishermen and 70–72; oceanic redfish and 138–139; oil industry and 72–73; opposition to EEC membership 54; oppositon to EU membership 55; participation in negotiations 24; relationship between government and 68, 69; role of 6, 48, 56, 58–62; Storting and 75–78; subsidies and 68, 73–75; voting rights and 69 Norges Råfisklag. See Norwegian Fresh Fish Association Norges Sildsalgslag. See Norwegian Herring Sales Organization

Index Norges Sjømannsforbund. See Norwegian Sailors League North Atlantic: capelin in 16, 20; cod in 24; herring in 16; Iceland’s EEZ expansion in 34, 84; Iceland’s importance in 17; level of catches in 16; Norway’s importance in 17; straddling stocks in 3, 19, 29, 141; zonal attachment in 9 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 49 North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC): Ministry of Fisheries in Iceland and 91; oceanic redfish and 26–29: and oceanic redfish negotiations, 135–139; role of 43, 44, 45–46 North Sea, 51, 52, 53 Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO), 39, 43 Norwegian Fishermen’s Association. See Norges Fiskarlag Norwegian Fresh Fish Association (Norges Råfisklag), 54, 63 Norwegian Herring Sales Organization (Norges Sildsalgslag), 54 Norwegian parliament. See Storting Norwegian Sailors League (Norges Sjømannsforbund), 59 Norwegian Seafood Federation (Fiskeriog havbruksnæringens landsforening), 55 Norwegian Spring-Spawning herring. See herring stock Norwegian Vessel Owners Association (Fiskebåtredernes Forbund), 54 Novaya Zemlya, 45 Oceanic Redfish Agreement, 91; 1996 agreement, 137–138, role of interest groups, 138–139 oceanic redfish stock: agreement on allocation of 3; cooperation over 18; Euroepean Economic Community and 90; European Union and 90; the fishery 26–29; historical rights

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and 43; individual transferable quotas 103; need for negotiations, 135–137; North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission and 45; straddling nature of 17; zonal attachment and 42 Oddmund Bye, 69, 127 Office of the Prime Minister (Iceland), 91, 92, 106 Officers Guild (Iceland), 86, 94, 95 oil industry (Norway): European Union referendum and 55; growth of 13, 54, 63, 70, 72–73; importance of 119; Norway’s 48 Pálsson, Þorsteinn, 129 Participation Laws (Deltakerloven), 63, 64 People’s Alliance (Iceland), 83, 121 Peru, 34, 39, 84 Poland: Barents Sea fishery and 39; cooperation between Poland and 53; North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission and 45, 137; oceanic refish fishery and 26, 27; United States and 87 Portugal, 53 precautionary approach, 40 Processing Laws (Tilvirkarloven), 63, 64 Progressive Party (Iceland), 83, 121 questions in parliament, 77, 78, 109 Råfiskloven. See Fresh Fish Laws Ragnarsson, Kristján, 99, 121, 127 ratification of agreements, 12 referendum, 53–55 regimes: definition of 8; freedom of the sea and 33; international institutional environment as 4; Law of the Sea as a 7, 35–38; role of 3, 113, 141 Reykjanes Ridge, 27 Richardson, Elliot: 50 Right Party. See Conservative Party (Norway) rights of coastal states, 41–42

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Index

Santiago Declaration, 34 Scotland, 18 Seamen´s Federation (Iceland), 86, 87, 94, 95, 121 Seðlabanki Íslands. See Central Bank of Iceland Sigurjónsson, Jóhann, 128 Sjómannasamband Íslands. See Seamen´s Federation Social Democratic Party (Iceland), 83, 87 solution concepts, 41, 113, 143 South Korea, 39 Soviet Union: cod fishery and 24; Cold War 66, 73; conflict with Norway 51–52; cooperation with Norway 50, 130; demise of 24; demise of the 73; Doughnut Hole 39; Grey Zone 52; herring fishery and 23; Joint Fisheries Commission 51; Kola Peninsula 52; Norway’s EEZ extension 49; oceanic redfish fishery and 26, 27, 29; power of 55; researh of oceanic redfish 26; straddling stocks 50; United States and 87. See also Russia Spain, 53, 129 Spitzbergen. See Svalbard Straddling Stocks Agreement: about 4, 8, 84; Article 1, 39; Article 2, 39; Article 5, 8, 40, 41, 42; Article 6, 40; Article 7, 40; Article 8, 40; Article 9, 40; Article 13, 40; Article 14, 40; Article 19, 40; Article 20, 40; Article 21, 40; Article 27, 40; Article 28, 40; Article 30 role of 31–46 subsidies to the fishing industry, 68, 70, role in Norway, 73–75, 98, 117, 119 Svalbard, 47, 50, 129, 130 Svalbard Treaty, 50, 82 Sweden, 22, 53, 54, 123, 137 Taiwan, 18 tariffs, 6, 142 territorial sea, 32, 34, 35, 36

Tilvirkarloven. See Processing Laws tragedy of the commons, 19, 37 Troms, 65 Truman, Harry, 32 Truman Proclamations, 32, 34, 83 two-level bargaining games, 7, 10, 142 Ukraine, 27 UNCLOS I, 34, 38 UNCLOS II, 34 UNCLOS III. See Law of the Sea United Kingdom. See Britain United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). See Law of the Sea United States: agricultural interests in 7; conflict over straddling stocks 17; Doughnut Hole 39; foreign fishing around 87; negotiating constraints on 10; North American Free Trade Agreeemnent 142; privatization policy and 63; protests of EEZ extensions in Latin America 34; reaction to 33; reduced government interference 63; treaty ratification in 10, 92; Truman Proclamations 33 USSR. See Soviet Union Vélstjórafélag Íslands. See Marine Engineers Vessel Owners (Iceland): annual reports 86; capelin agreement and 119, 121; cod conflict and 133; foreign fishing around Iceland and 90; foreign investment in fishing industry 90; herring agreement and 127; highseas fishing and 85, 87; individual transferable quotas and 101, 103; oceanic redfish agreement and 138; reaction to cod agreement 134; relationship with the government 134; role of 82, 91, 95–98, 99, 103, 111, 113, 122

Index veto players, 11, 12, 57, 79, 134, 143 Vollebæk, Knut 131 West Germany, 34, 35, 83, 84 win-sets: as constraints, 143, 144; definition of 10; domestic constraints as determinants of 11; importance of 10; interest group influence on size of 120; Norway’s 79; size of Iceland’s 122; size of Norway’s 122; size of Norway’s vis-à-vis Iceland’s 139 World Trade Organization (WTO), 6, 7, 144 World War II: decline of tariffs after 6; establishment of regional fisheries

175 bodies after 43; Labor Party governance since 64; Law of the Sea after 31; Law of the Sea before 33; Norway’s extendions before 35

zonal attachment: capelin agreement and 117; as choice of baseline for allocation 10, 42, 113; cod and 128; explanation of 4; herring and Iceland’s 123; herring and Norway’s 124, 125, 127; Law of the Sea and 9; in Loophole 129; oceanic redfish and 136, 137; oceanic redfish and Iceland’s 135; uncertainty and 135; use in the North Atlantic 9; use of 130

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SUNY series in Global Politics James N. Rosenau, Editor

List of Titles American Patriotism in a Global Society—Betty Jean Craige The Political Discourse of Anarchy: A Disciplinary History of International Relations—Brian C. Schmidt Power and Ideas: North-South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust—Susan K. Sell From Pirates to Drug Lords: The Post–Cold War Caribbean Security Environment—Michael C. Desch, Jorge I. Dominguez, and Andres Serbin (eds.) Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics—Joseph Lepgold and Thomas G. Weiss (eds.) Zones of Peace in the Third World: South America and West Africa in Comparative Perspective—Arie M. Kacowicz Private Authority and International Affairs—A. Claire Cutler, Virginia Haufler, and Tony Porter (eds.) Harmonizing Europe: Nation-States within the Common Market—Francesco G. Duina Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations—Paul J. D’Anieri Leapfrogging Development? The Political Economy of Telecommunications Restructuring— J. P. Singh States, Firms, and Power: Successful Sanctions in United States Foreign Policy—George E. Shambaugh Approaches to Global Governance Theory—Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair (eds.) After Authority: War, Peace, and Global Politics in the Twenty-First Century—Ronnie D. Lipschutz Pondering Postinternationalism: A Paradigm for the Twenty-First Century?—Heidi H. Hobbs (ed.) Beyond Boundaries? Disciplines, Paradigms, and Theoretical Integration in International Studies—Rudra Sil and Eileen M. Doherty (eds.)

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International Relations—Still an American Social Science? Toward Diversity in International Thought—Robert M. A. Crawford and Darryl S. L. Jarvis (eds.) Which Lessons Matter? American Foreign Policy Decision Making in the Middle East, 1979–1987—Christopher Hemmer (ed.) Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: Transaction Costs and Institutional Choice—Katja Weber Counter-Hegemony and Foreign Policy: The Dialectics of Marginalized and Global Forces in Jamaica—Randolph B. Persaud Global Limits: Immanuel Kant, International Relations, and Critique of World Politics— Mark F. N. Franke Money and Power in Europe: The Political Economy of European Monetary Cooperation— Matthias Kaelberer Why Movements Matter: The West German Peace Movement and U. S. Arms Control Policy—Steve Breyman Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention—Anthony F. Lang, Jr. Life After the Soviet Union: The Newly Independent Republics of the Transcaucasus and Central Asia—Nozar Alaolmolki Information Technologies and Global Politics: The Changing Scope of Power and Governance— James N. Rosenau and J. P. Singh (eds.) Theories of International Cooperation and the Primacy of Anarchy: Explaining U. S. International Monetary Policy-Making After Bretton Woods—Jennifer Sterling-Foiker Technology, Democracy, and Development: International Conflict and Cooperation in the Information Age—Juliann Emmons Allison (ed.) Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia—Nazih Richani The Arab-Israeli Conflict Transformed: Fifty Years of Interstate and Ethnic Crises— Hemda Ben-Yehuda and Shmuel Sandier Debating the Global Financial Architecture—Leslie Elliot Armijo Political Space: Frontiers of Change and Governance in a Globalizing World—Yale Ferguson and R. J. Barry Jones (eds.) Crisis Theory and World Order: Heideggerian Reflections—Norman K. Swazo Political Identity and Social Change: The Remaking of the South African Social Order— Jamie Frueh Social Construction and the Logic of Money: Financial Predominance and International Economic Leadership—J. Samuel Barkin What Moves Man: The Realist Theory of International Relations and Its Judgment of Human Nature—Annette Freyberg-Inan Democratizing Global Politics: Discourse Norms, International Regimes, and Political Community—Rodger A. Payne and Nayef H. Samhat

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Landmines and Human Security: International Politics and War’s Hidden Legacy—Richard A. Matthew, Bryan McDonald, and Kenneth R. Rutherford (eds.) Collective Preventative Diplomacy: A Study of International Management—Barry H. Steiner International Relations Under Risk: Framing State Choice—Jeffrey D. Berejikian Globalization and the Environment: Greening Global Political Economy—Gabriela Kutting Sovereignty, Democracy, and Global Civil Society—Elisabeth Jay Friedman, Kathryn Hochstetler, and Ann Marie Clark United We Stand? Divide and Conquer Politics and the Logic of International Hostility— Aaron Belkin Imperialism and Nationalism in the Discipline of International Relations—David Long and Brian C. Schmidt (eds.) Globalization, Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition—Ersel Aydinli and James N. Rosenau (eds.) Identity and Institutions: Conflict Reduction in Divided Societies—Neal G. Jesse and Kristen P. Williams Globalizing Interests: Pressure Groups and Denationalization—Michael Zürn (ed., with assistance from Gregor Walter) International Regimes for the Final Frontier—M. J. Peterson Ozone Depletion and Climate Change: Constructing A Global Response—Matthew J. Hoffmann States of Liberalization: Redefining the Public Sector in Integrated Europe—Mitchell P. Smith Mediating Globalization: Domestic Institutions and Industrial Policies in the United States and Britain—Andrew P. Cortell The Multi-Governance of Water: Four Case Studies—Matthias Finger, Ludivine Tamiotti, and Jeremy Allouche, eds. Building Trust: Overcoming Suspicion in International Conflict—Aaron M. Hoffman Global Capitalism, Democracy, and Civil-Military Relations in Colombia—Williams Avilés Complexity in World Politics: Concepts and Methods of a New Paradigm—Neil E. Harrison Technology and International Transformation: The Railroad, the Atom Bomb, and the Politics of Technological Transformation—Geoffrey L. Herrera The Perils and Promise of Global Transparency: Why the Information Revolution May Not Lead to Security, Democracy, or Peace—Kristin M. Lord Global Liberalism and Political Order: Towards a New Grand Compromise?—Steven Bernstein and Louis W. Pauly, eds. Well-Oiled Diplomacy: Strategic Manipulation and Russia’s Energy Statecrafi in Eurasia— Adam N. Stulberg

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Cooperating Rivals: The Riparian Politics of the Jordan River Basin—Jeffrey K. Sosland When Leaders Learn and When They Don’t: Mikhail Gorbachev and Kim Il Sung at the End of the Cold War—Akan Malici [ January 2008] Water Resources and Inter-Riparian Relations in the Nile Basin: The Search for an Integrative Discourse—Okbazghi Yohannes [April 2008] The United Nations Security Council in the 1990s: Resurgence and Renewal—Juergen Dedring [August 2008]