What's the Use of Truth?

What's the Use of

TRUTH?

Richard Rorty & Pascal Engel Edited by Patrick Savidan Translated by W i l l i a m McCuaig

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

NEW YORK

g*£htlen Univp'tftv

Columbia University Press Publishers Since 1893 New York, Chichester, West Sussex A quoi bon la verite? © 2005 Editions Grasset et Fasquelle Copyright © 2007 Columbia University Press All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Contents

Rorty, R i c h a r d (A quoi bon la verite. English) What's the use of truth? / R i c h a r d R o r t y and Pascal Engel /

Introduction

Patrick Savidan

ix

edited by Patrick Savidan ; translated by William M c C u a i g . p. cm.

Translator's N o t e

Includes bibliographical references.

xiii

I S B N - 1 0 : 0 - 2 3 1 - 1 4 0 1 4 - 2 (alk. paper) ISBN-33: 978-0-231-14014-0

M a i n Statement by Pascal Engel

1.Truth. I. Engel, Pascal, 1 9 5 4 - II. Savidan, Patrick, 1 9 6 5 III.Title.

M a i n Statement by Richard R o r t y Discussion

BD171.E5313 121

47

2007

dc22

2006029199

Appendix Notes

61

67

Casebound editions of Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent and durable acid-free paper. Printed in the United States of America c 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

1

Bibliography

77

INTRODUCTION

Patrick Savidan

T h e public debate from which this book results was held at the Sorbonne in N o v e m b e r 2002, organized by the College de philosophic It could not have been more lively. What provided the spark was the extent of the divergence between the points of v i e w of our two guests, especially with regard to their conceptions of truth as well as their ideas of what we should expect from it. O n e is indeed tempted to review the respective trajectories of Richard R o r t y and Pascal Engel with the idea of fundamental divergence in mind, for the reader will find the subject of truth illuminated vividly from two very different angles in this debate. T h e American philosopher Richard R o r t y

I N T R O D U C T I O N

I N T R O D U C T I O N

was trained in the discipline of analytic philoso-

possible to escape from the Cartesian problematic

phy and pragmatism; but he soon began to de-

of the subject and the object and to break free

fend the work of authors like Heidegger, Foucault,

of the ancient one of appearance and reality. As

and Derrida. In contrast, Pascal Engel received his

R o r t y writes i n " A Pragmatist V i e w o f C o n t e m -

early philosophical formation within a system that

porary Analytic Philosophy," "We shall no longer

was, to say the least, unreceptive to the virtues of

be tempted to practice either epistemology or on-

analytic philosophy, and yet, as a philosopher, he

tology." This radical thesis does not affect philo-

has engaged exclusively in high-level work on the

sophical specialisms alone; it also induces a pro-

themes and the works, and made use of the meth-

found transformation of philosophical practice.

ods, of analytic philosophy.

1

We must ponder carefully what is at stake in

T h e interest of this debate obviously exceeds

this challenge to the philosophy of representation,

this topologico-intellectual background. It arises

philosophy as the "mirror of nature," as R i c h a r d

mainly from the point at issue: what is truth?

R o r t y puts it in the title of his celebrated b o o k .

What value should we see in it or attribute to it?

For him, the attitude of those w h o remain in thrall

Starting from the pragmatist premises that he

to the demands of a naive natural ontology—

has made his own, R i c h a r d R o r t y conducts a de-

those w h o feel a sort of devotion to realism—is

termined campaign against realism, relying espe-

analogous to that of the religious believer. As he

cially on the work of Arthur Fine, the philosopher

has written in this connection, "Reality as it is in

of science, and on that of Donald Davidson and

itself, apart from human needs and interests is, in

R o b e r t Brandom. His thesis is, roughly speaking,

my view, just another of the obsequious Names of

the following: the realism-antirealism debate is

G o d " ; this "heartfelt devotion to realism" is "the

passe because we are progressing toward a con-

Enlightenment's version of the religious urge to

ception of thought and language that accepts that

b o w down before a non-human power."- In this

these may be considered as not containing repre-

sense, then, the pragmatism of Richard R o r t y lies

sentations of reality. As realism subsides, it will be

in combating the residues of servility still left in

2

1

xi

I N T R O D U C T I O N

place by the Enlightenment. It is necessary, in his view, to go beyond the critique of superstition and subject the realist presuppositions and pretensions of modern representationist philosophy to critique as well. Hence he proposes to renounce the notions of "philosophical method" and "philosophical problems," w h i c h for him are no more than the "unfortunate consequence of the over-professionalization of philosophy which

Translator's Note

has disfigured this area of culture since the time of Kant."

4

T h e question is of course to determine to what

T h e translation was made in collaboration with the

extent this charge is legitimate. Might it only be

editor and both authors. Pascal Engel and R i c h a r d

"true"? Let us turn to our two philosophers. Pas-

R o r t y have each checked and made revisions to

cal Engel speaks first.

their portions of the text for this English version of their debate.

W H A T ' S THE USE OF T R U T H ?

M A I N S T A T E M E N T BY

Pascal Engel

As Bernard Williams remarks at the start of his recent book, Truth and Truthfulness, two currents that appear to clash with one another coexist in con1

temporary society. On one hand, there has never been so much distrust of the values of rationality, scientific progress, truth, and objectivity, either in advanced intellectual circles or in the media and society generally. On the other, never has the impression that we are being deceived by the authorities (political and scientific) that are supposed to guarantee precisely these values, and the need 2

for trust, been so great. Why, if we no longer believe in truth, is there such a longing for it? Is it one of those familiar paradoxes, by which, having

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L

abandoned religion, we continue to search for a

speak in the name of Truth, but we pay attention

substitute or by which, w h e n we no longer accept

to everyday truths, like the ones in the periodic

authority, we still shrink from getting rid of it en-

statement of our bank balance. B u t , then, what is

tirely? It always used to astonish me, w h e n I was

the concept of truth we are meant to reject, and

attending Michel Foucault's courses at the C o l -

what is the one we are meant to cling to? Should

lege de France in the 1970s, to hear him explain-

we reject both? Or should we hold on to both?

ing to us that the notion of truth was no more

Is it really coherent to say that one doesn't want

than an instrument of power, and that, since all

Truth but is ready to accept that there are theo-

power was bad, truth could only be the expression

ries, statements, or beliefs, that are true?

of some malign intent, and then see him march-

There is a wrong way to put these questions,

ing in demonstrations under banners bearing the

which is simply to set the postmodernists, the rela-

slogan Truth and Justice. W h y do journalists, w h o

tivists, and all w h o believe that truth is an empty

claim that their professional code of ethics and

w o r d — w e could call them veriphobes —on one

their duty not to spread untruths are important to

side and the defenders of the ideals at which the

them, so often show indulgence toward thinkers

veriphobes scoff on the other. T h e result is predict-

w h o tell them that truth and rationality are empty

able: not only does each side dig in its heels, they

words? A n d yet—are these necessarily examples

w i n d up resembling each other. Those w h o attack

of incoherence and cynicism? Perhaps people

truth and reason as oppressive values (as male val-

mistrust truth as an abstract ideal, in the name

ues, for example, in some feminist polemics) end

of which many authorities claim to exert their

up being just as puritan as those w h o m they op-

sway, but aspire to it in their daily lives. Maybe

pose. In fact, it is not the rationalists w h o provoke

they don't believe in truth as an intrinsic value,

a reign of terror and censorship. It is those w h o

an ultimate goal, while still believing in truth as

cultivate a systematic suspicion about words like

an instrumental value serving other purposes, like

truth, reason, or objectivity ("cachez ces guillemets

happiness or freedom. We dislike preachers w h o

que je ne saurais voir"). T h e same opponents of

3

i

MAIN

STATEMENT

BY

PASCAL

ENGEL

MAIN

STATEMENT

BY

PASCAL

ENGEL

rationalism pose as victims unjustly attacked by a

see R o r t y simply as a staunchly relativistic post-

dogmatic and reactionary establishment.The Sokal

modernist would be to misunderstand totally his

hoax furnished us with examples of a conflict of

work and the interest of his analyses. His position

4

this type, always on the verge of degenerating

in these debates is entirely individual and o r i g i -

into rhetoric on both sides. Contemporary anti-

nal. For one thing, even though it is a long time

rationalism and its political correctness have had

since he claimed to be an analytic philosopher,

such success in dramatizing these oppositions that

he was one at the outset of his career and still

whoever ventures to recall the existence of certain

debates on an equal footing with philosophers

cognitive values w h e n faced with palpable viola-

in this tradition, argument for argument. Unlike

tions of them is immediately accused of being a

authors such as Derrida, w h o give the impression

puritanical censor or a moralizer.

3

R i c h a r d R o r t y has often been seen, by post-

that analytic philosophy is perfectly alien to them, R o r t y knows exactly what he is talking about

modernism's crustier adversaries, as the villain

w h e n he discusses the theses of analytic philoso-

of the piece, all the more so in that he has e x -

phers. For another thing, R o r t y sees himself as

pressed—with the clarity and simplicity that char-

the scion of American pragmatism, and his analy-

acterize his prose—ideas that authors like F o u -

ses of the notion of truth belong in the lineage

6

cault, Deleuze, Derrida, and Latour (to cite only

of James and D e w e y in particular. M a n y of his

French examples) have expressed in a more florid

arguments are derived from Quine, Davidson,

or abstruse style and has explicitly defended their

and Sellars (even though he interprets them in his

works and their thematic ideas in the face of the

o w n w a y ) . Unlike the relativistic postmodernists,

hostility of analytical philosophers. At a certain

he has put forward arguments aiming to show

7

point he started to look like the official philoso-

that truth does not have the importance usually

pher of veriphobia, becoming the philosophical

attributed to it. These arguments are very much

illustration of Alfred Hitchcock's maxim "the

worthy of study. B u t let me try to state w h y they

better the villain, the better the movie." B u t to

do not convince me.

MAIN

STATEMENT

BY

PASCAL

MAIN

ENGEL

STATEMENT

BY

PASCAL

ENGEL

R i c h a r d R o r t y claims a place in the American

5. T h e concept of truth being empty, truth can-

pragmatist tradition. But his pragmatism is very

not be a norm of scientific or philosophical in-

different from that of the founder of this current,

quiry or an ultimate goal of our search. A fortiori, neither can it be a value.

8

C . S . Peirce. I hope that the following is not an unfair sketch of Rorty's positions on truth.

6. From the fact of having rejected these myth-

9

1. T h e notion of truth has no explanatory use

ical notions of truth, it does not follow that there

and does not cover any essence or substance or

is nothing to say about the world: there are causal,

designate any profound substantial or metaphysi-

natural relations between the world and ourselves

cal property or any object (theTrue).

which we can study. But, all the same, it would be

2. In particular, the traditional realist notion of truth as the correspondence between our statements, judgments, or propositions and reality, or

vain to hope to obtain a naturalistic, reductionist theory of representation and intentionality. 7. T h e fact that objectivity and truth do not

of

matter does not signify that there are not certain

thought as representation of reality are devoid of

values to defend; the values in question are those

meaning.

habitually promoted by the pragmatist tradition—

"the

facts,"

and,

in

general,

any

theory

3. In consequence, the debates between realism

those of solidarity, tolerance, liberty, and the sense

and antirealism, which still unsettle much of con-

of community. These values make it a great deal

temporary analytic philosophy, are hollow.

more feasible to promote democracy than the

4. T h e problem is not to make our statements

Kantian and utilitarian reconstructions of justice

true but to justify them, and there is no distinc-

that have dominated the moral and political phi-

tion to be made between truth and justification.

losophy of the last thirty years. R o r t y is too well

Justification itself is nothing other than agreement

aware of the difficulties of James's pragmatism in

among the members of a group or a community,

this area to claim to assimilate truth to utility: that

and there is no ultimate, final agreement or ideal

which is useful may be false and that which is

convergence of statements.

false may be useful.

6

10

B u t this does not shake his

7

MAIN

STATEMENT

BY

PASCAL

ENGEL

MAIN

STATEMENT

BY

PASCAL

ENGEL

conviction that the values of social utility should

true, our caution simply expresses the fact that P

predominate over the values of truth.

cannot be adopted as a rule of action, and that

In arguing for these positions, R o r t y relies to

we might encounter an audience w h o would re-

a large extent on what is called a deflationist or

fuse P. (Thus the cautionary use does not in the

minimalist theory of truth. There are many ver-

least acknowledge that reality might disprove the

sions of this view, and it is not possible to discuss

justification for our belief.) As the fourth of the

all of them here.

11

R o r t y s version consists in the

positions outlined above states, there is no differ-

claim that there is nothing more to truth (nothing

ence for R o r t y between truth and justification,

more fundamental, explanatory, or "metaphysical")

and no difference between objective justification

than the following ways of using the word true:

and justification for a given community (this is what might be called, following Williams, the the-

1. an endorsing or performative use: true serves to express endorsement of a statement;

sis of the indistinguishability of truth and justification).

2. a cautionary use, as when one says,"your belief

12

Truth is neither rational acceptability at

the limit of inquiry, as C . S . Peirce, Hilary Putnam, and Crispin Wright all maintain to varying de-

that P is justified, but it is not true"; 3. a disquotational use, resting on the equivalence

grees, nor the ideal convergence within a c o m -

that warrants the move from asserting " P " to

municational community, as in Habermas. Finally,

asserting " 'P' is true'" as well as the reverse.

the disquotational use signals that true is simply a device we use to speak about statements and

According to R o r t y , there are no other uses,

approve them, not a term designating an objec-

and no other hidden meanings, of the word true.

tive world that transcends the approval we express

W h e n we say that P is true, all we are doing, he

to our audience and our o w n community. Given

tells us, is concurring with P, "giving it a little

that the concept of truth is so slender and in-

rhetorical pat on the back" or a "compliment."

substantial, it follows that the epistemic role nor-

W h e n we say that P is perhaps justified, but not

mally assigned to truth—to be the norm or goal

8

MAIN

STATEMENT

BY

PASCAL

ENGEL

MAIN

STATEMENT

BY

PASCAL

E N G E L

of our inquiries, especially scientific inquiry—is

altogether and banish it from our vocabulary.What

quite simply impossible to fulfill. Truth is neither

he does do is to try to scrub away the illusions and

a norm nor an ultimate g o a l .

13

It cannot be a

norm in the sense of that which regulates inquiry

myths that cling to it. This is w h y he generally prefers to be called an ironist or a quietist.

because it is unknowable. A n d it cannot be an ul-

My reaction to Rorty's theses is much like that

timate goal in the sense of being an intrinsic value

of some of his critics, w h o are attracted to the

(although it can have an instrumental value).Thus

themes he develops, but w h o find that he carries

there is no point in invoking it, either in science,

them to extremes. Let me begin by stating the

in philosophy, in ethics, or in politics.

points on which I agree with him.

These positions have a certain skeptical and ni-

I agree with R o r t y that the word true has a

hilistic ring; often they are characterized as rela-

minimal meaning, which is roughly given by the

tivist. B u t R o r t y denies being a relativist with re-

disquotational schema illustrated in Tarski's cel-

spect to truth, for w h e n the relativist says "There

ebrated equivalence—"Snow is w h i t e " is true if

is no truth other than what is true for me," he

and only if snow is white. T h e whole question

is using the word true in a descriptive sense. N o w

turns on whether the meaning of true boils down

R o r t y maintains that this word has no descriptive

to this disquotational use. I likewise agree on the

meaning, only an expressive one: it communicates

fact that the classical theory of truth as correspon-

a state of the speaker and her approval to her audience.

14

dence runs up against considerable difficulties

Still, I do not believe that R o r t y is an

and that none of the contemporary conceptions

eliminativist with respect to truth, like certain de-

that attempt to revive it (like those of the Austra-

flationists w h o defend a "redundancy" theory of

lian metaphysicians) is satisfactory.

truth: since there is nothing more to P than "it is

a good deal of sympathy for certain pragmatist

true that P" there is no need to retain the predicate true, which becomes superfluous.

15

16

I also have

themes put forward by R o r t y and by the tradition

Rorty

to which he belongs, and I have even defended

in contrast does not propose to jettison this word

certain pragmatist positions myself, notably those

10

11

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

M A I N

E N G E L

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L

I also think

bring it about that philosophers and all those w h o

that his attempts to demythologize the notion of

speak as they do should gradually cease to express

truth are salutary and useful. W h e n we reflect that

themselves in a certain way. Thus—for h i m — w e

truth is the favorite word of religious sects and

ought to stop speaking of truth as the representa-

of authors like Peirce and R a m s e y .

17

fundamentalists of every kind, we can only concur

tion of the real, as an ultimate goal, and so on, and

with R o r t y on the need to be wary of it.

try to redescribe what we usually describe using this

B u t , for all that, the area of my agreement with

vocabulary by means of a different one stripped

R o r t y is still rather small. I do not believe that,

clean of these mythologies. My principal question

because the correspondence theory of truth en-

is this: can we actually accomplish this w h e n it

counters difficulties that are perhaps insurmount-

comes to truth? In other words, can our ordinary

able, it follows that we must surrender any realist

way of employing the vocabulary of truth really

conception of truth, nor, contrary to thesis 2 above,

be redescribed in such a way as to rid this notion

that we can totally rid philosophy of oppositions

of its "objectivist" implications?

between realism and antirealism in every field. I

Question 1. Let us begin with the uses of the

The

word true. According to the deflationist position,

sense in w h i c h it is a n o r m has to be spelled out

true is no more than a device of assertion that

carefully, but this is not the place to argue these

makes it possible to quote an utterance or disquote

points.The fact is that, although he is anything but

it and that, according to the performative concep-

a philosopher w h o refuses debate, R i c h a r d R o r t y

tion, also makes it possible to show approval. B u t

has often defended a highly therapeutic vision of

there is more to our use of the word true. There are

philosophy, quite close to the one often attribut-

certain highly specific conceptual relations between

ed to Wittgenstein. He maintains that interesting

assertion, belief, and truth, which characterize what

philosophy is rarely the analysis of the pros and

I would call the belief-assertion-truth triangle:

also think that truth is a norm of inquiry.

18

cons of a thesis, but rather that it consists in an at-

a. To affirm something or to make an assertion

tempt to replace one vocabulary with another and

by means of a statement, is to express one's belief

12

1i

MAIN

STATEMENT

BY

PASCAL

ENGEL

MAIN

STATEMENT

BY

PASCAL

ENGEL

close connection, roughly described by the con-

ceive of our beliefs as rational? A n d , if he thinks

ditions a—c, by which truth, belief, and assertion

that a deflationist theory of truth can account for

are mutually bound.

the normative role of the word true, how does he

Certain philosophers—with w h o m I agree—

account for it?

go farther still in spotlighting this normative ele-

Question 2. I wish to maintain further that the

ment proper to the belief-assertion-truth triangle,

implicit norm of the belief-assertion-truth trian-

by maintaining that the norm of belief and as-

gle is equally a n o r m of objectivity for our state-

sertion is not simply correct belief but knowledge.

ments and beliefs. No doubt it is because R o r t y

Someone w h o says that P doesn't just represent

admits that the approving and disquotational uses

herself as believing that P; she is also representing

of true are not sufficient to account for what true

herself as knowing that P, such that her hearers can

signifies in our current vocabulary that he accepts

ask her " H o w do you k n o w that?" N o w the n o -

the idea that there is a "cautionary" use of the

tion of knowledge, just like that of correct belief,

word. B u t for him, this use signifies no more than

is a normative notion.

the fact that our assertions might be rejected by

21

Therefore my first question to R i c h a r d R o r t y

our hearers. N o w , for Rorty, justification is always

goes like this: does he think that one can describe

"relative to an audience." B u t to that one may

the current practice of assertion, and account for

object: when someone affirms, in relation to any

its link with the ordinary concept of belief, w i t h -

statement whatsoever, "it is justified, but it isn't

out recourse to the concept of truth and without

true," is she really saying "it is justified for this au-

recourse to a concept of truth that implies that

dience, but not for that audience"? It seems to me,

there is a n o r m of our assertions and our beliefs?

on the contrary, that the contrast is between the

In other words, does he intend to deny that the

reasons we have to believe or justify a statement

notion of truth plays a central role in the over-

and the way things are "in reality." Even if one

all system that allows us to express our beliefs

does not believe in an absolute, "external" reality

through linguistic communication and to c o n -

that transcends all our assertions—and it is not

16

17

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

M A I N

E N G E L

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L

necessary to hold this belief in order to use true

inquiry": w h e n we (we, our community) are in

in this sense—it seems to me that we are indeed

agreement on the fact that snow is white, we may

establishing a contrast between the reasons for our

very well say to ourselves "That's true," but say-

belief and the facts or reality. R o r t y will reply, I

ing so does not, in all rigor, add anything more to

imagine, that he does not have this intuition and

the content of that on which we are agreed; our

that he can express it simply as the contrast b e -

agreement suffices, and it is perfectly idle to add

tween justification before one audience and j u s -

that when we acknowledge that snow is white

tification before a different audience. B u t I am

we are aiming at something external to this state-

unable to grasp h o w that can be an acceptable

ment, the true.

description of the sense that we give to "true" and

An initial response to the argument from indis-

not a redescription that leads to a revision, pure

tinguishability might be that it is false to say that

If the lat-

the words true and justified (or warrantedly assertible)

ter is the case, so be it. B u t what is there to justify

mean the same thing. If that were the case, the n e -

this revision?

gation of a statement would be the same thing as

and simple, of the sense of this w o r d .

22

Here I suspect that R o r t y will reply that my

the affirmation that it is not warrantedly assertible.

reasoning amounts to a circular argument against

B u t to say that the L o c h Ness monster does not

the "pragmatist" assimilation of justification to

exist is not the same thing as saying that it is not

truth: once we have said that a community agrees

warrantedly assertible that the L o c h Ness monster

on a statement, or considers it justified in the sense

does not e x i s t .

that it gives its assent to this statement, the ques-

close link between justification and truth, but this

tion of knowing whether this statement is true no longer

link is not that of identity. W h e n one has reasons,

applies since "warranted assertibility" and "truth"

guarantees, or justifications for believing that P,

mean the same thing. It is precisely this argument

these are justifications for believing that P is true.

from indistinguishability that leads R o r t y to re-

B u t this does not entail that saying "I am justified

ject the (Peircean) thesis that "truth is the goal of

in believing that P" and saying "P is true" signify

18

19

23

N e x t , I concede that there is a

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L

the same thing. On the contrary, this shows that,

very risk to which R o r t y continually points: g i v -

when one has reasons to assert or believe a propo-

ing the impression that there is a sort of obligation

sition, one has reasons to believe that it is true.

or duty to look for the truth, that it is an intrinsic

O n e cannot therefore maintain that true and justi-

value or goal of inquiry. B u t saying that there is a

fied convey the same thing, since 'justified" pre-

norm of truth for everyday speech does not sig-

supposes the very notion of truth. In other words,

nify that we must always state the truth or that it

it seems to me that, despite what R o r t y maintains,

is the supreme goal of our inquiries. There is, in

the disquotational use, the endorsing use, and the

other words, no obligation to say or to believe that

cautionary use are not equivalent. Third, and last,

which is true. I am perfectly ready to agree with

let us suppose that we are the victims of a collec-

R o r t y that the ordinary concept of truth has nothing

tive brainwashing. Would we want to say in that

"normative" about it in the proto-ethical sense of

case that our beliefs were justified in relation to

normative that he decries. What I want to say is

one audience but not in relation to another? N o .

simply that truth is a norm of assertion (and of

It seems to me that we would say that our beliefs

belief) in the sense in which, for any belief what-

are justified but false.

24

soever, it is an objection against this belief to say

Question 3. For the reasons I have indicated

that it is false and that it is normal (in the sense that

above, I am prepared to maintain that the role

it is the rule) to try to revise it. It is, if you like, a

played by the concept of truth in the belief-asser-

conceptual norm and not an ethical or epistemic

tion-truth triangle, as well as the fact that this con-

norm. This does not mean that it is a psychologi-

cept habitually expresses the possibility of a con-

cal necessity: self-deception and wishful thinking

trast between our notions and (what I see nothing

are possible, but we must recognize that these are

improper in calling) objective reality, make the

abnormal behaviors. I am unable to account for

concept of truth into a normative concept. I am

these features within a R o r t y a n framework, that

prepared to speak of a norm of truth in this sense

is, within a framework in which the assertion that

and am fully aware that this vocabulary runs the

P is approval that P and in which to believe that

20

21

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

M A I N

E N G E L

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L

P might aim not at truth but at utility, at what is

are not seeking to attain a certain objective. T h e

practical, interesting, or conversationally relevant.

notion of a norm does not presuppose the exis-

So my question is: if one strips the word norm of

tence of the property in question or its reality. Of

its "moral" sense while retaining the sense of "rule

course, the discovery that this objective is unat-

constitutive of a practice," is R o r t y prepared to

tainable or hollow may make us lose all desire to

admit the idea that the true might be the norm

strive for it. B u t in the relatively innocent sense in

of our discursive practices, as much in daily life as

which we say that our beliefs aim at truth because

in the sciences?

it forms part of the concept of belief that if we

In fact, I often have the impression w h e n read-

discover that one of our beliefs is false we try to

ing R o r t y that he is developing an argument of

change it, it seems to me that there is nothing in

the following kind in modus tollens (this corre-

the least problematic in saying that truth is a n o r m

sponds to point 5 in my list above):

of belief (and of k n o w l e d g e ) .

25

A if there is a truth as norm or goal of inquiry,

Question 4. My reason for putting the previ-

then there must be a real property in it such as

ous question is that I often have the impression

"the truth of our assertions."

that what R o r t y is attacking is a species of tran-

B there is no real property of this kind.

scendental argument which supposedly concludes

C thus there is no truth as norm or goal of

that, because truth has this normative or conceptual role in our ordinary system of concepts, truth

inquiry. B u t it seems to me that premise A is false, not,

15 a norm in the more "profound" sense of the

as R o r t y all too frequently suggests, because one

goal of inquiry or Supreme Value. B u t I readily

believes in truth as correspondence or representa-

concur with him that there is no argument of this

tion in the realist sense but because the fact that

kind. From the fact that truth normatively regu-

there does not exist a property such as the corre-

lates assertion it does not at all follow that there

spondence between our utterance and reality does

exist values such as trust, truthfulness, sincerity,

not entail,/rom the point of view of inquiry, that we

or the sense of exactness which are supposed to

22

23

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L

M

A

I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L

characterize those w h o respect the truth. In sum

the notion of truth. Foucault and his followers

there is no necessary link between the concept of

confuse truth with the concept of truth, or with

truth and the concepts of truthfulness or sincerity.

what is believed about truth, and they also confuse

It is one thing to say what truth is, to specify the

truth with the manner in which it is valorized. As

manner in which it functions in our system of

soon as one escapes from the grip of this confu-

belief and assertion, and it is another to say what

sion, one perceives the full extent of the differ-

attitude we ought to adopt in relation to it, or to

ence between the normative conditions for using

say what value it ought to have, g o o d or bad. W i l -

the concept of truth—which in my v i e w are u n -

liams puts the matter well: " T h e internal role of

changing —and its use by human individuals or

truth in the belief-assertion-communication sys-

groups, which vary socially and historically. T h e n

tem gets us no further at all in delivering the values

the analysis may begin of what Williams calls the

of truthfulness.

26

It is just this type of confusion

28

"virtues of truth," like sincerity and exactness, and

that veriphobes introduce w h e n they attack the

the practices that sustain them (or that flout them,

ordinary idea of truth; in the thesis that truth is

like secrecy and lying). We may also envisage de-

a n o r m of assertion they see a form of moralism.

fending these virtues for themselves. There is, of

This, once again, is the confusion generated by

course, a close link between the belief-assertion-

Foucault w h e n he spoke of "the will to truth,"

truth triangle and the possibility, for example, of

and studied social mechanisms like avowal and

lying, since lying could not occur if the triangle

confession by which truth was valorized. These

did not exist. B u t that does not mean that the

mechanisms, Foucault proclaims, belong to "the

practice of lying, or the practice of sincerity, are

history of truth" and reveal something about the

entailed by the conceptual triangle in question.

notion of truth, i.e., how it is the product of a

It is therefore necessary to make a sharp dis-

certain history, that of the subjectivation and then

tinction between the conceptual thesis, according

But in

to which truth is a constitutive norm within the

fact these mechanisms reveal nothing at all about

belief-assertion-truth triangle, and the ethical thesis,

24

25

the objectivation of the concept of truth.

27

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L A

according to which it is an intrinsic value and must

| N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L

fact that one recognises it as being false or because

be respected and sought under all circumstanceso

n

and between these two and the epistemological theaS

e

wishes i t were true. Someone might claim,

R o r t y generally does, that utility is often more

sis according to w h i c h it is the goal of inquiry

important than truth as a criterion of the value of

the supreme epistemic value. O n e may perfectly

a concept. But h o w can one say that a conception

well accept the first thesis without accepting the

is useful if one doesn't k n o w whether it is true?

other two. Nevertheless, it ought to be equally

The ostrich may find it useful to plunge its head

clear that there is indeed a link between the norm

into the sand. B u t will that be useful to it "in the

of truth, the ordinary concept of truth, and the

long r u n " ?

question of our attitudes, ethical or otherwise,

deduction of the intrinsic value of the true on the

concerning truth. W h e n one understands the be-

basis of the n o r m of truth, but the latter is incom-

lief-assertion-truth conceptual linkage, and when

prehensible if one fails to grasp what is at stake in

one reflects critically on what the fact of having

the former. On that basis my fourth question for

rational beliefs and of revising them in light of

Richard R o r t y is this:

29

In sum, there is no transcendental

available data signifies, it seems very difficult not

Let us assume, like him and contrary to what

to admit that truth is also a value and that there

I have just maintained, that there is only a c o n -

are certain virtues of truth. By this I do not mean

tingent connection—or even no connection at

that the conceptual role of truth necessarily entails

all—between the conceptual role of truth and

or justifies ethical principles like "one should not

the virtues of truth (veracity, sincerity, exactness,

lie" or epistemic principles like "one should only

trust). Assuming that, h o w do we analyze these

believe a proposition if it is true." Truth can be

virtues? Are they, as R o r t y seems to think, purely

one thing and the desire for truth can be another.

instrumental (they are useful) and fully exposed to

B u t whoever understands the conceptual role of

competition from other virtues such as creativity,

truth cannot fail to understand how bizarre it is,

interest, and relevance? What conception will a

for example, to believe a proposition despite the

pragmatist in R o r t y s sense have of these virtues?

26

27

MAIN

STATEMENT

BY

PASCAL

MAIN

ENGEL

STATEMENT

BY

PACAL

E N G E L

Will he consider, like Nietzsche in The Geneal-

ent language and other commitments more in line

ogy of Morals, that they are the values of priests or

with what pragmatism intends; and in conceding

clerics, of men afflicted with ressentimenP?® That

that the notions of truth, sincerity, and so on have

they are not virtues at all? That they have little

merely instrumental value, that they are means to

importance and ought to be replaced by other

other ends (such as democracy, conversation, soli-

virtues, like Emerson's self-reliance? In particu-

darity, the improvement of our social intercourse

lar, does he consider that these virtues are not

and our life as a community)—what is there to

(this

say that the values and virtues of truth would still

question pertains to point 7 in the list of the-

survive in our midst? In other words, if everyone

ones that democracy ought to e n c o u r a g e

31

ses above)? Would we even have the nonalethic

came to the conclusion that truth is not an intrin-

virtues of solidarity and social utility that R o r t y

sic value to be sought for its o w n sake and that

recommends in place of the alethic virtues if the

its value is only instrumental, would truth survive

alethic virtues did not exist?

even as a mere means to other ends? In my opin-

Question 5. This leads me finally to another

ion, it would vanish altogther. I have already said

question, which sums up my reservations about

that I do not believe R o r t y is an eliminativist pure

the strategy of replacing vocabularies and about

and simple with respect to truth and the values of

the liberation to which R o r t y a n pragmatism is

truth and that I think he wishes above all to rela-

supposed to lead us by detaching us from obses-

tivize them, to shake off the myths that cling to them. But would the notion of truth still exist if we

sive w o r r y about the truth. Should we succeed, both as philosophers and

succeeded in abandoning the distinction between

as ordinary individuals and citizens (a distinction

truth and justification? A n d if we did succeed in

R o r t y would dislike!), in overcoming our fascina-

abandoning these ideals and embracing solidarity,

tion with a language of truth, sincerity, and exact-

how would that be possible in the absence of in-

ness, along with our practical commitment to the

dividual and collective engagements like trust and

values and virtues of truth; in adopting a differ-

sincerity, which certainly seem to presuppose the

28

29

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

P A S C A L

E N G E L

notion of truth? This leads me back to the point with which I began. W h y is it that citizens desire trust and sincerity while at the same time they mistrust appeals to sublime and ideal forms of Truth? My answer, which I think is the same as the answer R o r t y would give, is that they object to seeing Truth (with a capital T) utilized as a handy way to ignore the need for truth (with a lowercase f).To put it another way, they are still prepared to think

M A I N S T A T E M E N T BY

Richard Rorty

that truth has its uses, just as a lot of other things (especially falsehood) have their uses too. But is that all it comes down to? And, if so, does it follow

As Patrick Savidan has remarked, Pascal Engel's

that people would just as soon that truth (with a

philosophical trajectory has been the inverse of

lowercase f) disappear and that the surrender of this

my o w n . E n g e l was taught the philosophy of

humble truth is desirable? But if truth has no more

Heidegger and Deleuze in school and has ended

than instrumental value, as R o r t y maintains, how

up w o r k i n g on Tarski and R a m s e y . I began with

could the virtues of truth even exist?

32

Ayer and Carnap and I ended up w r i t i n g on

In conclusion, and without reverting one more

Heidegger and praising Derrida. T h e r e was in-

time (enough is enough) to the division between

deed a time w h e n I thought that analytic p h i -

the style of philosophy k n o w n as continental vis-

losophy was the wave of the future. B u t n o w I

a-vis the one called analytic, what is the point of

think that it has run out of gas. E x c e p t for the

the often creditable and praiseworthy efforts made

w o r k of a handful of iconoclastic geniuses—I

by R o r t y in his dialogue with his contemporaries

am thinking of K r i p k e , Davidson, and B r a n -

in the analytic camp if even truth (with a lower-

dom—the analytic philosophy of recent decades

case t) is devoid of meaning?

appears to me rather rebarbative and pointless. to

31

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

R O R T Y

M A I N

So it is understandable that Engel and I do not see eye to eye.

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

R O R T Y

In his book Truth Engel cites a description of pragmatism given by Simon Blackburn, w h i c h

E n g e l says that my attitude toward the real-

appears to me entirely correct. Blackburn writes

ism-antirealism debate derives from my c o n v i c -

that pragmatism is characterized by the "denial of

tion that the "notion of truth does not designate

differences, the celebration of the seamless web

any substantial property." B u t I w o u l d not use

of language, the soothing away of distinctions,

the expression "designate a substantial property."

whether of primary versus secondary qualities,

In my view, all descriptive expressions designate

fact versus value, description versus expression, of

properties. T h e expression square circle, the term

any other significant kind.What is left is a smooth,

infinite number, the term democratic, the expres-

undifferentiated v i e w of language." Blackburn goes

sion being the moon or George Bush—all of them

on to say that this v i e w may easily lead to "mini-

designate properties. In order to indicate the

malism, deflationism, quietism."

property that a term designates, all y o u have to

33

This is exactly what I take language to be like.

do is add the suffix -ite in French, -heit in G e r -

It is indeed a seamless web, w h i c h can best be

man, or -ness in English. O n e can say Wahrheit

understood if we abandon the traditional distinc-

or goodness or being-the-moon-or-George-Bush-ness.

tions. A conception of language as smooth and

This procedure will w o r k for any descriptive e x -

homogeneous is just the right one to have, and

pression whatever.

adopting it does indeed lead to quietism.

In my opinion it is useless to ask w h i c h adjec-

Engel says that, if this is the pragmatist concep-

tives have a purely expressive function and which

tion of language, then a pragmatist is the last thing

designate a property. It is also useless to ask which

we should be. I will come back to his arguments

properties are substantial. All properties, one might

for this claim. For the moment, I simply wish to

say, have the same ontological status. B u t I should

emphasize that, for a quietist like me, there is no

also prefer to abandon expressions like ontological

discourse, debate, theory, or vocabulary that is

status. Pragmatists do not employ this term.

devoid of meaning. I try to avoid the expression

}2

13

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

M A I N

R O R T Y

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

R O R T Y

devoid of meaning. A n y linguistic expression, even

the twentieth century was devoted to questions

an expression like ontological status, has a meaning

of this type.

if you give it one. To give meaning to an expres-

At the beginning of his b o o k Truth, Engel

sion, all you have to do is use it in a more or less

rightly says that "most of the history of twentieth-

predictable manner—situate it within a network

century analytic philosophy is a sort of battlefield

of predictable inferences.

opposing various 'realist' and 'anti-realist' concep-

T h e question that matters to us pragmatists is

tions of truth."

34

B u t w h e n one contemplates not

not whether a vocabulary possesses meaning or

just the history of analytic philosophy alone but

not, whether it raises real or unreal problems, but

that of philosophy in general, one can discern

whether the resolution of that debate will have an

another sort of battle. This one is between those

effect in practice, whether it will be useful. We ask

w h o think it important to discuss realism versus

whether the vocabulary shared by the debaters is

antirealism and those w h o do their best to show

likely to have practical value. For the fundamental

that it is time to leave such questions behind. I am

thesis of pragmatism is William James's assertion

thinking here of Dewey, Davidson, and Brandom,

that if a debate has no practical significance, then it

but also of most of the philosophers in the tradi-

has no philosophical significance.

tion running from Nietzsche to Heidegger, Sartre,

So my objection to the "realism versus anti-

and Derrida. My o w n preference for this tradition

realism" debate is not that the debaters are de-

rather than for analytic philosophy arises from my

ploying sentences that are devoid of meaning,

conviction that it is less exposed to the risk of

nor that they are using terms that do not desig-

scholasticism.

nate substantial properties. Rather, it is that the

Engel explains in his b o o k that is it possible

resolution of these debates will have no bearing

to feel "that some of the most sophisticated lin-

on practice. I v i e w debates of this sort as e x -

guistic and logical analyses produced by present-

amples of sterile scholasticism. I regret that such

day analytic philosophers come very close to the

a large part of English-language philosophy in

post-modernist idea that truth is just a word of

)4

35

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

R O R T Y

M A I N

approval, or a device of assertion of the claims that we like most, and in no way a genuine property."

35

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

R O R T Y

Thus the dispute between Engel and m y self does not bear on the question of knowing

I imagine that he was thinking especially of D a -

whether there is something that we call objec-

vidson and Brandom. It is important, however, to

tive knowledge. That we use this term is obvi-

note that neither Davidson nor Brandom employs

ous. What divides us is the question whether we

the notion of substantial property or relies on the

should say that certain areas of inquiry attain such

distinction between description and expression.

knowledge, whereas others unfortunately cannot.

These two philosophers share the "smooth," "un-

I do not like the metaphor of "representing the

differentiated,""homogeneous" conception of lan-

w o r l d " or the one that consists of saying that cer-

guage described by Blackburn. T h e y both attempt

tain propositions can be "validated" by the world.

to dissolve traditional distinctions. In my opinion,

Yet such metaphors are harmless if we employ

what links the so-called postmodern philosophers

them in a nondiscriminatory manner. O u r dispute

to Davidson and Brandom, as well as to the later

thus has to do with the fact that we give different

Wittgenstein, is a rejection of the idea that some

answers to the question whether or not we should

discourses, some parts of the culture, are in closer

divide the language up into different parts and

contact with the world, or fit the world better, than

assert that some have a representational function

other discourses. If one gives up this idea, then

that others lack.

one will v i e w every discourse—literary criticism,

In addition, our dispute revolves around a re-

history, physics, chemistry, plumbers' talk—as on a

lated question: what profit can we derive from a

par, as far as its relation to reality goes. T h e same

description of a part of the culture that, instead of

relations between thought, language, and reality

simply explaining its social utility, or determin-

obtain in every cultural domain. If one discourse

ing the degree of consensus that obtains within it,

has the capacity to represent the world, then all

goes on to consider its relation to reality? For the

discourses have that capacity. If one of them "fits"

"postmodern" philosophers and the pragmatists

the world, then they all do so equally.

(among w h o m I number myself) the traditional 36

37

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

M A I N

R O R T Y

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

R O R T Y

questions of metaphysics and epistemology can be

not think that using the one term rather than the

neglected because they have no social utility. It

other makes any great difference.

is not that they are devoid of meaning, nor that

Consider an analogy. W h e n Kant and other E n -

they rest on false premises; it is simply that the

lightenment thinkers detached moral obligations

vocabulary of metaphysics and epistemology is of

from divine commands, they did not think that

no practical use.

they were revising our moral concepts but that

So far I have simply been trying to rectify the

they were describing them more clearly.They were

description E n g e l gave of my position. Let me

helping us to clarify our conception of morality.

n o w attempt to reply to the questions he put

T h e enemies of the Englightenment attacked this claim, accusing these thinkers of revising morality.

to me. I agree with him that one of the main questions

Well, which is it? D i d Kant clarify our moral v o -

that divide us is this: can our ordinary use of the

cabulary, or did he revise it? My feeling is that it is

term true really be redescribed in such a way as to

not worth the trouble to try to answer that ques-

rid this notion of its objectivist presuppositions?

tion. If we adopt the standpoint suggested by the

If asserting that there are such presuppositions en-

later Wittgenstein and by Quine, we do not need

tails that discriminations between discourses can

to determine whether a suggested alteration in

be made by reference to their ability to produce

our linguistic practice counts as a clarification or a

correspondence to reality, then I think that we

revision. T h e change Kant suggested has contrib-

should make no such assertion.

uted to the evolution of our moral discourse. T h e

Engel says that he is "unable to grasp h o w that can be an acceptable description of the sense that

only question that we need to ask ourselves is this: was this change socially useful, or was it not?

we give to 'true,' and not a redescription that leads

T h e argument in favor of the modifications

to a revision, pure and simple, of the sense of this

that the pragmatists wish to introduce into p h i -

word." I have no hesitation in saying that I prefer

losophers' ways of speaking about truth is that

revision to redescription. On the other hand, I do

we might thereby put an end to some purely

38

39

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

R O R T Y

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

R O R T Y

scholastic, and by n o w quite boring, debates be-

our responsibilities are exclusively toward other

tween philosophers. T h e social utility of such a

human beings, not toward "reality."

change is obvious.

But Engel then poses this question:

T h e most important point, as Savidan has suggested, concerns the question of our responsibili-

when someone affirms, in relation to any state-

ties. If we do things the pragmatist way, we will

ment whatsoever, "it is justified, but it isn't true,"

no longer think of ourselves as having responsi-

is she really saying "it is justified for this audience,

bilities toward nonhuman entities such as truth

but not for that audience"? It seems to me, on the

or reality. I have often suggested that we regard

contrary, that the contrast is between the reasons

pragmatism as an attempt to complete the project

we have to believe or justify a statement and the

c o m m o n to the Renaissance humanists and the

way things are "in reality."

Enlightenment. T h e pragmatists think that it is time to stop believing that we have obligations

I would maintain that a person w h o says "that

either to G o d or to some some G o d surrogate.

belief is justified, but is perhaps not true" should be

T h e pragmatism of James, like the existentialism

taken to be distinguishing not between something

of Sartre, is an attempt to convince us to stop

human and something nonhuman but rather b e -

inventing such surrogates.

tween two situations in which human beings may

Engel is quite right that I interpret the contrast

find themselves: the present situation, in which the

between the truth and those beliefs that appear

belief appears to be justified, and a hypothetical

justified to us in terms of the contrast between

situation in the future, where it will no longer ap-

future audiences and present-day audiences. T h e

pear justified. I do not claim that this distinction is

latter will presumably have at their disposal more

an accurate analysis of the concepts of justification

data, or alternative explanations, or simply greater

and truth as they are currently employed. I just

intellectual sophistication. This way of looking

want to suggest a way to think about these notions

at the matter chimes with my conviction that

that may have certain advantages. B u t I have no

4(1

41

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

R O R T Y

,

S T A T E M E N T

BY

R I C H A R D

R O R T Y

demonstrable thesis to offer. I am offering either

-ing a climate of trust, it matters little which n o -

a clarification or a revision and (as I said earlier) I do not care which it is called. Engel, by contrast

tion one deploys. I do not believe that people will become less

is suggesting that we revert to the classical philo-

sincere or less concerned to be precise because

sophical tradition, which contrasts human consen-

they have become pragmatists. M o r e generally, I

sus with the way nonhuman reality is in itself.

do not think that the fact of speaking as I do,

Where does that leave the question of the rela-

rather than according to the guidelines recom-

tion between the concept of truth and the moral

mended by Engel, would make any difference in

virtues mentioned by Engel: truthfulness, sincer-

the ways people behave w h e n they are not engag-

ity, exactness, and trust? I believe that it is just

ing in philosophical discussions. W h e n the think-

as easy to inculcate these virtues by reference to

ers of the Enlightenment dissociated moral delib-

our practices of justification as by insisting on the

eration from divine commands, their writings did

importance of truth. A person is sincere when she

not provoke any notable increase in the amount

says what she thinks she is justified in believing.

of immorality. So I do not see w h y the separation

This will, automatically, be what she believes to

of the notion of "truth" from that of "reality in

be true. So I think that we could promote the

itself" should produce either increased insincerity

relevant virtues without ever needing to contrast

or a willingness to be deluded.

truth with mere justification. On the other hand,

A n d so to the last question: is truth a norma-

I do not believe, contrary to what Engel suggests,

tive concept? I am not sure I understand Engel's

that warranted assertibility and truth are the same

use of normative concept. If he simply means that

thing. In certain contexts the two are interchange-

we should try to have only true beliefs, then we

able, but in others they are not. O n e cannot, for

do not disagree. If, on the other hand, he means

example, use warranted assertibility to describe the

that truth is an intrinsic good, that it possesses an

property preserved in valid inference. B u t when it

intrinsic value, then the question seems to be u n -

comes to inculcating habits of exactness, or creat-

discussable. I do not have the faintest idea how to

42

43

M A I N

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

M A I N

R O R T Y

S T A T E M E N T

B Y

R I C H A R D

R O R T Y

go about determining which goods are the intrin-

not to have practical consequences. That is w h y

sic ones and w h i c h are the instrumental ones. N o r

pragmatists think it is not worth pondering.

do I see the point of raising the question. Intrinsic

In conclusion, I would remark that since Plato

is a word that pragmatists find it easy to do w i t h -

the meanings of normative terms like good, just

out. If one thinks that sincerity and exactness are

and true have been problems only for philosophers.

g o o d things, I do not see w h y we should w o r r y

Everybody else knows h o w to use them and does

about whether they are means to something else

not need an explanation of what they mean. I am

or good in themselves. Which reply one gives to

perfectly ready to admit that one cannot identify

such questions will have no bearing on practice.

the concept of truth with the concept of justifica-

Trying never to have anything but true beliefs will

tion or with any other. B u t that is not a sufficient

not lead us to do anything differently than if we

reason to conclude that the nature of truth is an

simply try our best to justify our beliefs to our-

important or interesting question.

selves and to others. Consider, in this connection, the analogy b e tween beliefs and actions. James notoriously said that "the true" is what is " g o o d in the way of b e 36

lief." Trying to do the right thing will lead us to do just the same things we would do w h e n we try to justify our actions to ourselves and others.We do not have any way to establish the truth of a belief or the Tightness of an action except by reference to the justifications we offer for thinking what we think or doing what we do. T h e philosophical distinction between justification and truth seems

44

45

Discussion

Pascal Engel No doubt I may have portrayed R i c h a r d Rorty's positions inadequately in some respects, and I regard the clarifications he has proposed as highly constructive. Nonetheless, I do wish to return to certain difficulties, but with a slight shift of perspective, so as not to simply reiterate the points of disagreement. I am a little surprised that R o r t y endorses the characterization of pragmatism that I had quoted from Simon Blackburn, w h o depicts this school as having a "seamless" conception of reality and language. As far as I know, we normally regard

47

D I S C U S S I O N

D I S C U S S I O N

the task of philosophy as that of detecting, even

of discourse. Let us leave science aside and take

producing, differences. O n e thinks of the famous

the case of moral discourse. There is a concep-

words in King Lear, "I'll teach you differences," to

tion called expressivism, which defends the v i e w

which Wittgenstein refers in criticizing H e g e l .

37

that, w h e n I say "torture is evil," all I am doing

I have the feeling that, for R o r t y s part, he is say-

is expressing my mental (or other) state. T h e o p -

ing, "I'll teach you sameness." What he claims is "I

posing conception consists in the affirmation that

am going to show you the similitude, the identity,

this is a properly formed statement expressing a

between things."

belief that may be true or false. R o r t y regards this

T h e debates to which R o r t y alludes, the one

problem as pointless, if I follow him correctly. He

on realism-antirealism for example, are admitted-

takes the v i e w that, whatever answer we give, it

ly technical matters, to which philosophers have

w o u l d make no difference to our practice. I o b -

dedicated a great deal of effort, and in certain cases

viously feel, on the contrary, that it is extremely

the law of diminishing returns does indeed apply:

important in this domain and in others to be able

some of these debates have turned into sterile e x -

to grasp differences.

ercises in scholasticism. Still, I find that the remedy

What R o r t y is proposing is really revolutionary.

R o r t y proposes is worse than the disease. His pro-

In fact, a good part of what literary criticism and

posal to ignore distinctions like the ones between

the philosophy of science do is to ask whether there

instrumental and intrinsic or between expression and

are different degrees of objectivity to discourses. If

description also has significant drawbacks.

we say that all discourses are equally valid, then a

No doubt R o r t y will not agree with me on

certain number of philosophers will indeed be out

this point, but it does seem to me that some of the

of a job. But that is not really the heart of the prob-

debates about whether certain types of statement

lem. To state that there is no difference between

or affirmation really have truth value are impor-

discourses entails consequences that we may regard

tant ones, if we wish to grasp the distinctions that

as detrimental. For instance, R o r t y often says that

have to be made between the different modes

science is "a kind of writing," and he does not see

48

49

D I S C U S S I O N

D I S C U S S I O N

much difference between philosophical writing

tinction is necessary, but the fact that we make use

and literature. I may be old-fashioned, but I do see

of it does not mean that we are relapsing into the

differences. A n d I do see the dangers of teaching

errors of Platonism. So I perceive a certain form

Spinoza and Russell in literature departments or

of hypostasis in R o r t y s way of proceeding.

Proust in philosophy departments. In this connec-

Let me now turn to the second difficulty to

tion I have a question I would like to put to Rorty,

w h i c h Rorty's concept of redescription seems

which seems to me really very important for his

to me to give rise. There are certainly many re-

thought: I am talking about the question of rede-

descriptions that turn out to be inoffensive and

scription. R o r t y has offered us a rather deflationist

insignificant. For example, the students w h o o c -

version of this notion of redescription, indicating

cupied the Sorbonne in 1968 tended to call what

that the important thing about it is the nature of

they were doing a revolution. Quite soon after, this

the change it would introduce into practices.

revolution came to be called an event. Here we are

This raises two problems from my perspec-

dealing with a relatively correct redescription.

tive. First, is R o r t y himself not committing the

B u t a redescription can have quite serious conse-

mistake of which he accuses his adversaries? In

quences from the point of v i e w of values. W h e n

other words, doesn't he make too much of the

J e a n - M a r i e Le Pen calls the Shoah a detail, that

opposition

too is a redescription. But it seems to me a rede-

between

a

representationist, realist

conception of truth, on one hand, and a pragma-

scription of a quite different kind from the pro-

tist conception of it, like his o w n , on the other?

ceeding one. So my question is this: does R o r t y

Do persons w h o use the word true, w h o speak

think the fact that there is a change of vocabulary

of objectivity, w h o distinguish between justification

will have no effect on the values in question? I

and truth, subscribe to a correspondentist theory

see no objection to getting rid of the word true.

of truth by doing so? Do they need to subscribe

We could perfectly well decide to replace it with

to the truth-making idea? I do not think so. I am

the word frue. Thus I would refer to a statement

ready to defend the v i e w that some sort of dis-

of what I took to be the case as frue rather than

50

51

38

D I S C U S S I O N

D I S C U S S I O N

as true. B u t that is not the problem, as R o r t y will

on questions of bioethics, applied ethics, and so

agree. T h e problem is not the description as such

on. W h e n I read works of this kind, I confess that

but the kinds of impact certain redescriptions may

I quite often find them boring and scholastic; they

have on values.

introduce all kinds of quite useless distinctions or

For that matter, as regards the kind of debate

they ignore absolutely fundamental distinctions

that R o r t y invites us to set aside as being scho-

that have been marked out in the domain of m e -

lastic and without practical consequences, I am

taethics. I often find them tiresome and theoreti-

inclined to think that his argument depends a

cally stunted. A n d yet, paradoxically, as soon as you

great deal on what one understands by "practical

start doing applied ethics, it is understood that

consequences." With respect to almost any kind

others may possibly draw practical consequences

of pure theorising, there are no practical conse-

from what you have to say. So should we do away

quences. B u t certain debates do have consequenc-

with departments of logic and metaphysics, of the

es on certain styles of theorizing. T h e opposition

kind that exist in Scotland, and replace them with

between realism and antirealism does play a role

departments of applied ethics? If that is R o r t y s

in certain areas, even within the development of

prescription, I find it a little dangerous.

knowledge. In mathematics, for example, the o p position between intuitionism and Platonism is an extremely lively debate. Does R o r t y really think

Richard Rorty

that this debate is entirely hollow? With regard to the scholastic character, or not,

I think that Engel is right: on one hand, I defend

of these debates, it becomes extremely difficult to

a deflationist conception of redescription, but, on

assess that as soon as we start to look at practical

the other, I suggest that redescribing things in

consequences. This objection was already being

my way is not very important. I think that rede-

raised in the time of William James. In the field

scription is an important task, carried out not by

of ethics, for example, there are numerous debates

philosophers but by all sorts of intellectuals. T h e y

52

53

D I S C U S S I O N

D I S C U S S I O N

change the way we use words, and by doing so

is grounded, in general, in the notion that there

they build new intellectual worlds. This has been

is something important that can be called "the

going on ever since Plato and Socrates. Descartes,

search for truth" and that the paradigm of this

for example, transformed and partially replaced

search is empirical science, the area of culture that

the

thereby

supposedly is in closest contact with reality. T h e

helped bring a new way of doing philosophy into

positivists proposed various redescriptions that

being. Another example is the way in w h i c h the

w o u l d make the paradigmatic status of empirical

thinkers of the Enlightenment transformed moral

inquiry more evident.

vocabulary

of scholasticism.

He

discourse. It is not my intention to say that a rede-

T h e tendency to promote certain areas of cul-

scription is without importance. B u t I do want to

ture to a position of dominance is entirely natural.

insist that what analytic philosophers call concep-

I simply want to emphasize that, w h e n consid-

tual clarification or conceptual analysis is never

ering the hierarchies proposed by those making

anything more than disguised redescription. A n a -

such attempts, we should not think of them as

lytic philosophers often compliment themselves

anything more than parts of a particular cultural-

on being "more scientific" than other philoso-

political initiative. We ought not to imagine that

phers, but they are doing no more than what in-

philosophers possess a particular technique allow-

tellectuals have always done: suggesting new ways

ing them, for example, to discover whether the

of speaking, proposing linguistic practices that are

sentence "torture is an evil" can be either true or

different from those that currently prevail.

false. Philosophers have pretended that the ques-

T h e positivists w h o , having adopted a non-

tion whether it can be—whether moral j u d g -

cognitivist theory of ethics, claimed that the as-

ments are candidates for the status of objective

sertion "torture is an evil" was neither true nor

knowledge—is a profound and important one.

false, were suggesting that we needed to change

My own feeling is that the question was raised

our linguistic habits. B u t this redescription was

only in order to suggest that certain areas of cul-

not an invitation to engage in torture. Positivism

ture should be privileged over others.

54

55

D I S C U S S I O N

D I S C U S S I O N

Engel has adduced the distinction between

tinction he makes between questions that have

intuitionism and Platonism in mathematics, ask-

practical incidence and purely empty and scho-

ing me whether I think that this distinction is

lastic questions reminds me of the contrast the

"hollow." S o m e mathematicians take this topic

positivist R u d o l f Carnap used to posit between

seriously, while others regard it as a problem for

"internal" questions and "external" questions. For

philosophers of mathematics and not for "real"

Rorty, obviously, questions about the ontology

mathematicians—the latter being the people w h o

of mathematics are typically "external" questions.

do not give the question a second thought. I do

He said at the start that he makes no distinction

not k n o w w h i c h mathematicians are right. B u t I

between that w h i c h is devoid of meaning and

suspect that if we were to consign the question of

that w h i c h is not. I wonder whether the fact of

the ontological status of mathematical entities to

distinguishing between that which has practical

oblivion, the progress of mathematics w o u l d not

consequences and that which does not have them

be affected.

doesn't amount in a way to reintroducing a criterion of the meaningfulness of concepts. Perhaps, in the end, R o r t y is just as much a positivist as K i n g Carnap.

Pascal Engel Does R o r t y not agree, first of all, that the philosophers w h o have counted for him, like Quine and

Richard Rorty

Davidson, have discussed these problems of ontological status at length? A n d that consequently

As regards Carnap, I would simply say that his

the debt he owes to their work, and thus to work

distinction between what is internal and what

of this type, is not negligible? O n e might also

is external to a system presupposes a distinction

wonder whether they have definitively resolved

between analytic and synthetic truths. B u t after

these questions. I have my doubts. N e x t , the dis-

Quine there was not much left of the latter dis-

56

57

D I S C U S S I O N

D I S C U S S I O N

tinction. So the distinction proposed by Carnap was no longer of much use. We do not have any clear way to locate the boundary between the internal and the external.

Finally I am tempted to say that we have given many of these traditional distinctions their chance. We have debated them ad infinitum, without that having had any practical upshot. So I propose that

We can employ the contrast between ques-

from now on we focus on other distinctions.

tions that are worth tackling and those that make no difference without ever utilizing notions like meaning or sense. There is no need to insult people w h o are engaged in discussing traditional philosophical distinctions by declaring that their reflections are empty of meaning or that the expressions they use are devoid of sense. We can dispense with such positivist insults and ask simply: " W h y go to so much trouble?" Engel is right to point out that Quine devoted much thought to the opposition between Platonism and intuitionism. B u t many other philosophers, such as Davidson and B r a n dom, see no reason to do so. On this point, I think they are wiser than Quine. Brandom adheres to the conception of language we saw characterized by Blackburn. His great merit lies in the fact that he doesn't bother trying to recapture the traditional distinctions. Y o u will find plenty of distinctions in his work, but they are not the ones that philosophers have traditionally discussed.

58

59

APPENDIX

Pascal Engel: Truth

Richard Rorty Pascal Engel, w h o teaches at the Sorbonne, is one of the leading figures in the ongoing attempt to make the disciplinary matrix of French philosophy more like that of A n g l o - A m e r i c a n philosophy and to get French philosophers to take seriously the problems discussed by their A n g l o phone colleagues. In this book he offers a clear, succinct, and very useful review of discussions of

Review by Richard Rorty of Pascal Engel, Truth (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002; published in Britain by Acumen Press). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2003: http://ndpr.nd.edu/.

61

A P P E N D I X

A P P E N D I X

the concept of truth by such figures as Moore,

(89). So we have to "reconcile our epistemology

Ramsey, Strawson, Davidson, Wright, Rorty, H o r -

of the concepts involved in each domain with the

wich, and Putnam.

account of the truth of propositions involving

Engel thinks it important to acknowledge the

them" ( 1 2 3 ) .

advantages of deflationist v i e w s — v i e w s that take

Engel says, "deflationism about truth pays a lot

truth as a primitive and unanalyzable notion—but

of dividends, but it has to pay the price" (56). O n e

equally important to block the road from defla-

such price is being unable to account for "the

tionism to positions (such as Foucault's, Latour's,

fact that truth is the point of assertion." He cites

and Rorty's) that smack of "nihilism," "skepti-

Dummett as saying that omitting the fact that as-

cism," and "relativism." So he formulates and de-

sertion and belief aim at truth is "like omitting

fends a compromise position that he calls "mini-

the fact that the purpose of playing a game is to

mal realism."

w i n it" (58). Another price is leaving us unable to

Engel agrees with Wright, " i f we described the

compare the status of truths in one domain (say

practice of a community w h o had a device of as-

science) to that of truth in another domain (say

sertion without mentioning that assertions aim at

ethics or fiction). Still another is an inability to

truth, or if we described people as having beliefs

handle the distinction between metaphorical and

without these aiming at truth, our description

literal truth. " I f some sentences fail to be literally

would be incomplete and inadequate" (92).

true or to be apt for truth, the deflationist should

B u t he differs from Wright in insisting, "the

give us an account of this" (59).

norm of truth is the n o r m of realist, recognition-

Engel grants that some deflationists, such as

transcendent truth" (93). For "a minimalism about

Rorty, are willing to "bite the bullet," claiming

truth does not imply a minimalism about truth-

that it is a virtue of their v i e w that it sweeps aside

aptness." In each domain of inquiry, "truth-aptness

these and other traditional distinctions, thereby

is to be j u d g e d after the realist criterion of the

dissolving many traditional philosophical prob-

independence of a domain from our responses"

lems. B u t he rightly points out, "the sophisticated

62

63

A P P E N D I X

A P P E N D I X

attempts of analytic philosophers at constructing

a hardened bullet biter will always try to make a

minimalist theories of truth" do not "automati-

virtue of necessity. He will urge that letting go of

cally lead to the kind of nihilism and skepticism

certain intuitions, or letting certain debates lapse,

illustrated by Rorty." " T h e r e is," he rightly says, "a

is the price of intellectual progress. Arguments

theoretical ambition in the former that is absent

about what does and does not constitute such

from the latter" (63).

progress are about as inconclusive as philosophi-

Engel has two sorts of arguments against defla-

cal arguments can get.

tionism.The first consists in pointing out that de-

This inconclusiveness is best illustrated by re-

flationists cannot accept certain familiar platitudes,

flection on the upshot of the metaphilosophical

such as that inquiry converges to truth or that true

portions of Engel's book, particularly chapter 4,

sentences have a relation called "correspondence"

" T h e Realist/Anti-realist Controversies." Here

to their subjects that false sentences do not. T h e

Engel points out h o w many of the controversies

other sort is metaphilosophical: " T h e reason w h y

between analytic philosophers presuppose that

you need to have a robust conception of truth

some parts of culture are more truth-apt than

condition is . . . that minimalism about truth-apt-

others. T h e blithe indifferentism of Arthur Fine's

ness robs all sorts of debates o f any sense" (119).

" N O A " (the Natural Ontological Attitude, which

If those debates are held to be pointless, any

many deflationists adopt) "threatens to undercut

"theoretical ambition" one might have had in this

all epistemological questions about scientific the-

area of inquiry will quickly drain away.

ories" (105). Again, " i f there is no way of distin-

T h e first set of arguments relies on the reader

guishing description of matters of fact from e x -

agreeing that it would be absurd to abandon a

pression of attitudes, any sort of meta-ethical view,

certain intuition. T h e second relies on her agree-

be it realist or anti-realist, is absurd" (109).

ing that it would be absurd to claim that a certain

Engel's French colleagues w h o doubt that c o n -

long-lasting philosophical debate should never

temporary Anglophone philosophy is a model

have been begun. Neither can be conclusive, since

worthy of imitation can accept everything Engel

64

65

A P P E N D I X

says about the need for a notion of truth-aptness if we are to keep epistemology and metaethics going. B u t they will then reverse the argument. Since those subdisciplines have degenerated into terminal dreariness, they will say, it w o u l d be a good idea to get rid of truth-aptness, thereby hastening their demise. Skeptics of this sort can happily agree with Engel that "most of the history of twentieth-century analytic philosophy is

Notes

a sort of battlefield opposing various 'realist' and 'anti-realist' conceptions of truth" (4). B u t they think that the battlefield has been trampled into

INTRODUCTION

a quagmire. 1. Unpublished manuscript: http://www.stanford.edu/~rrorty/pragmatistview.htm. 2. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 3. Unpublished manuscript: http://www.stanford.edu/~rrorty/pragmatistview.htm. 4. Ibid.

WHAT'S THE USE OF TRUTH?

1. Williams makes this observation, with which I agree, in Truth and Truthfulness, p. 1. R o r t y s review

66

67

N O T E S

N O T E S

of Williams's book appeared in the London Review of Books for October 3 1 , 2002.

6. In saying this, I am bound to give the impression of believing that it is G O O D to be an ana-

2. T h e English words true and trust have the

lytic philosopher and B A D not to be one and so

same etymology, which makes the contrast more

of committing the type of petitio principii of which

piquant in this language.

R o r t y has often accused me; cf. his text in response

3. See Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World, pp.

to Jacques Bouveresse in Cometti, Lire Rorty, pp.

5 - 7 and p. 370, where he draws a contrast between

1 5 4 - 1 5 5 , in which he takes to task my article " T h e

veriphobia and veritism.

Analytic-Continental Divide." Readers may rest

4. Cf. Alan D. Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Fashion-

assured: I think that being an analytic philosopher

able Nonsense. Postmodern Philosophers' Abuse of Sci-

provides no immunity against bad philosophy. B u t

ence ( N e w York: Picador, 1998); and Alan D. Sokal,

that is not what matters here. What does matter

The Sokal Hoax. The Sham that Shook the Academy

is that R o r t y is someone w h o is capable of u n -

(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2000). For

derstanding a number of different philosophical

my part I preferred to deal with the affair ironi-

vocabularies and finding the c o m m o n ground b e -

cally; cf. Pascal Engel, "L'affaire Sokal concerne-t-

tween them. In this he is highly unusual, as Jacques

elle les philosophes francais?" in J . - F . Mattei, Phi-

Bouveresse remarks in Lire Rorty, p. 25.

losopher en francais (Paris: PUF, 2000).

7. He is open to the imputation of systemati-

5. "Solatium miseris socios habuisse malorum,"

cally reading these authors in ways that suit his

Jacques Bouveresse, Alan Sokal, and Jean Bricmont.

o w n purposes. I have stated my reservations about

Two examples of accusations of this kind addressed

R o r t y s manner of reading Davidson in Davidson

to the present author specifically are C. Chauvire,

et la philosophic du langage, pp. 262—264.

"Faut-il moraliser les normes cognitives?" and Sandra Laugier, "Pourquoi des theories morales?" in Cites 5 (2001), and my reply, cowritten with Kevin Mulligan, "Normes ethiques et normes cognitives."

68

8. For an analysis of the differences, cf. C. T i e r celin, " U n pragmatisme consequent?" 9. On these positions, see especially Rorty's "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth."

69

N O T E S

N O T E S

1 0 . Bertrand Russell's analyses of the pragmatist theory of truth in his Philosophical Essays (1910)

of truth to warranted assertibility, compel us to modify our logic? 1 5 . T h i s v i e w is often attributed to Ramsey- cf

remain unsurpassed. 1 1 . T h e y are set out in my books La verite and

Ramsey,"Facts and Propositions." For reservations

Traf/z.These are distinct works, despite the similar-

about this reading of Ramsey, see Dokic and E n -

ity of the titles.

gel, Ramsey, Truth, and Success.

12.Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, pp. 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 .

1 6 . Especially on the basis of the "slingshot"

13 . R o r t y has defended this idea forcefully against

argument; cf. Engel, The Norm of Truth, pp. 2 6 27; and, in the original French, La norme du vrai,

Crispin Wright in "Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry?" 1 4 . O n e may compare the debate about the

p. 1 8 . In his book Facing Facts, Neale maintains that

distinction between expressivism and emotivism

although this argument does not succeed in refut-

in ethics. Cf. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings;

ing theories about facts, it does constrain them in

and Blackburn, Ruling Passions. If R o r t y means

an important way. Cf. as well D o d d , An Identity

to defend an expressivist conception of truth and

Theory of Truth.

say that true does not denote a real property but

1 7 . Cf. Dokic and Engel, Ramsey, Truth, and Success.

is simply an ejaculation, then he runs up against

1 8 . Cf. Engel, "Is Truth a N o r m ? " and Truth,

the objections classically raised by Peter Geach (in "Assertion") with regard to the expressivist posi-

chapter 5. 1 9 . I have analyzed the sense in which to b e -

tion: if the premises of an argument are neither

lieve is to aim at truth in "Truth and the A i m of

true nor false, h o w can the argument be valid in

Belief," in Gillies, Laws and Models in Science.

the classic sense in which the truth of the premises is supposed to be preserved in the conclusion? This

20. This idea was very clearly advanced by Dummett in "Truth."

raises another, more technical, question, which I

2 1 . This is the thesis ofWilliamson, in particular, in

would like to put to R o r t y : to what extent does

Knowledge and Its Limits, although he rejects the classi-

he consider that pragmatism, and the assimilation

cal assimilation of knowledge to justified true belief.

70

71

N O T E S

N O T E S

22. See the dialogue between McDowell and R o r t y in Brandom, Rorty and His Critics, pp. 1 0 8 - 1 2 8 .

property, and maintains that the arguments of R o r t y (and on this point, of Davidson) do not in the least

2 3 . T h e line of reasoning is of the kind given by Wright in Truth and Objectivity, chapter 1.

undermine the description of the first of these viewpoints as aiming at truth.

24. In his review ofWilliams's Truth andTruthfulness in the London Review of Books, R o r t y replies

26. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, p. 85. 27. Foucault, L'Hermenetique du sujet, pp. 1 9 - 3 1 -

that this argument commits a petitio principii against

in English in Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Sub-

him by taking for granted that there exists a way

ject, pp. 1 4 - 3 0 .

of comparing our representations to an external

2 8 . 1 agree with G E . M o o r e w h e n h e says that

reality. To me it seems that the point being made

there is no history of truth, although doubtless

here is simply that the two terms cannot have the

there is a history of our beliefs regarding truth; see

same meaning. In his extremely interesting reading

"Truth and Falsity," p. 2 2 . T h e historicist concep-

of George Orwell's 1984 in Contingency, Irony, and

tion of truth owes a great deal to Detienne's The

Solidarity, R o r t y maintains that O'Brien's famous

Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece, which, although

statement "freedom is the freedom to say that 2 +

it is often utilized to justify the confusion between

2 = 4" does not show that Orwell defends an o b -

truth and our conceptions of the truth, contains

jectivist ideal.There is just one party w h o engages

no trace of such confusion.

in brainwashing and another w h o is the victim of

29.This is an argument of classic pragmatism, that

it, but nothing to separate them objectively. This is

of R a m s e y for example: useful beliefs are true in the

a fascinating reading, but once again I find that

long run, and they are useful because they are true.

R o r t y carries things a little too far.

Cf. Dokic and Engel, Ramsey, Truth, and Success.

25. Cf. the exchange, in Brandom, Rorty and His

30. Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, chapter 2,

Critics, between Akeel Bilgrami and Rorty. Bilgrami

makes a laudable, but not totally convincing, effort

contrasts the first-person viewpoint of the inquir-

to propound the v i e w that Nietzsche was really a

er to the third-person viewpoint of truth as a real

defender of these virtues.

72

73

N O T E S

N O T E S

3 1 . As I have already noted, this is an essential

nite, assignable reasons!' William James, Pragmatism,

component of R o r t y s pragmatism. In his book

lecture 2, "What Pragmatism Means" (1907), in

Achieving Our Country. Leftist Thought in Twentieth-

Pragmatism and Other Writings, p. 38 (emphasis in

Century America (Cambridge: Harvard University

the original).

Press, 1998), he takes the American left to task for having adopted a purely intellectual and "on-

37. This remark by Wittgenstein is reported in R h e e s , Recollections of Wittgenstein, p. 157.

looker" attitude and ceding the values of action

38.This was the word proposed byTarski in his

to the right. He correctly charges this left with

classic piece " T h e Semantic Concept of Truth"

having become sardonic and "Foucauldian." But,

(1940), in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, p. 66.

even allowing for the fact that objectivist ideals and the virtues of truth are currently preached in the United States by the right, and the administration of George W. Bush, is that a reason for the left to shun them? T h e events of 2003, among others, show to what extent a defense of the virtues of truth can go hand in hand with the utmost hypocrisy. Does that mean we have to renounce them? 3 2 . This is the question posed by Williams in Truth and Truthfulness, p. 59. 33. Engel, Truth, p. 1 4 1 , quoting Blackburn, Ruling Passions, p. 157. 34. Ibid., p. 4. 35. Ibid., p. 6. 36. "The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief and good too for defi-

74

75

Bibliography

Blackburn, Simon. Ruling Passions. Oxford: O x ford University Press, 1998. Brandom, R o b e r t , ed. Rorty and His Critics. O x ford: Blackwell, 2000. Cometti, J . - R , ed. Lire Rorty. Combas: L'Eclat, 1992. Detienne, Marcel. The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece. Trans. Janet Lloyd. N e w York: Zone, 1996. Dodd, J. An Identity Theory of Truth. London and N e w York: M c M i l l a n - S t . Martin's, 2 0 0 1 . Dokic, J e r o m e , and Pascal Engel. Ramsey, Truth, and Success. London: Routledge, 2002. Dummet,Michael."Truth." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959): 1 4 1 - 1 6 2 ; rpt. in Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas. London: Duckworth, 1978. Engel, Pascal. Davidson et la philosophic du langage. Paris: PUF, 1994. "Is Truth a N o r m ? " In P. Pagin, P. Kotatko

77

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

and G. Segal, eds., Interpreting Davidson. Stan-

Gros, trans. Graham Burchell. London: Palgrave-

f o r d : C S L I , 2000, pp. 3 7 - 5 1 .

Macmillan, 2005.

La norme du vrai. 3d ed. Paris: Gallimard,

Geach, Peter. "Assertion." Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 449-465-

2003 [1989]La verite. Paris: Hatier, 1998.

Gibbard, Alan. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. Harvard:

" T h e Analytic-Continental Divide." Stanford French Review 17 (1993).

Harvard University Press, 1 9 9 1 . Goldman, Alvin I. Knowledge in a Social World. O x -

The Norm of Truth. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1 9 9 1 .

ford: Oxford University Press, 1999. James, William. Pragmatism and Other Writings. E d .

Truth. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2002.

Giles Gunn. N e w York: Penguin, 2000. M o o r e , G E . "Truth and Falsity." In G. E. Moore,

"Truth and the A i m of Belief." In D o n ald Gillies, ed., Laws and Models in Science, pp. 7 9 - 9 9 . London: King's College, 2004.

Philosophical Writings. E d . T. Baldwin. London: Routledge, 1993. Neale, Stephen. Facing Facts. Oxford: Oxford U n i -

R e v i e w of Charles Guignon and David Hiley, eds., Richard Rorty. Cambridge: C a m -

versity Press, 2002. Ramsey, F. "Facts and Propositions." In Philosophi-

bridge University Press, 2003. Notre Dame Philo-

cal Papers. Cambridge: Cambridge University

sophical Reviews, 2004: http://ndpr.nd. edu/

Press, 1990.

Engel, Pascal, and Kevin Mulligan. "Normes ethiques et normes cognitives." In Cites 15 (2003): 1 7 1 - 1 8 6 . Foucault, Michel. L'Hermenetique du sujet. Cours au

R h e e s , R u s h . Recollections of Wittgenstein. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984. Rorty, Richard. Achieving Our Country. LeftistThought

College de France, 1981-1982. Ed. Frederic Gros.

in Twentieth-Century America. Cambridge: Harvard

Paris: Gallimard-Le Seuil, 2 0 0 1 .

University Press, 1998.

The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France, 1981-1982. E d . Frederic

78

Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. C a m bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

79

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

"Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry? Davidson vs. Wright." Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 281-300. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979. "Pragmatism, Davidson, and Truth." In E. LePore, ed., Truth and Interpretation. Oxford: Blackwell, 1985. R e v i e w of Williams, Truth and Truthfulness, in London Review of Books, October 3 1 , 2002. Tarski, Alfred. " T h e Semantic Concept of Truth." In H. Feigl and W. Sellars, ed., Readings in Philosophical Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N J . : Prentice-Hall, 1949. Tiercelin, C. " U n pragmatisme consequent?" In C. Chauvire, ed.,facques Bouveresse, parcours d'un combattant, special ed. of Critique, nos. 567-568, pp. 642-660. Paris: Minuit, 1994. Williams, Bernard. Truth and Truthfulness. An Essay in Genealogy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002. Williamson, T. Knowledge and Its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. Wright, Crispin. Truth and Objectivity. Oxford: O x ford University Press, 1992.

HO