War in Iraq
This volume brings together a group of essays on all phases of the Iraq War: both U.S.-led major combat op...
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War in Iraq
This volume brings together a group of essays on all phases of the Iraq War: both U.S.-led major combat operations to defeat the Ba’athist regime as well as efforts to reconstruct the country and defeat the insurgency. The chapters were written by some of the leading scholars on the Iraq war, many of whom have practical first-hand experience, with a conclusion by leading U.S. strategic thinker Eliot Cohen. It is also the first work on the Iraq War to incorporate an understanding of the Iraqi side, based on a systematic analysis of captured Iraqi archives. This volume will be of great interest to students of the Iraq War, small wars and insurgencies, international security and strategic studies in general. Thomas G. Mahnken currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. At the time this book was written, he was a Visiting Fellow at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC, and a Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. He is author/editor of nine books, including the forthcoming Routledge Strategic Studies Reader (2007). Thomas A. Keaney is the Executive Director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. He is author/editor of six books.
Series: strategy and history Series Editors: Colin Gray and Williamson Murray ISSN: 1473-6403
This new series will focus on the theory and practice of strategy. Following Clausewitz, strategy has been understood to mean the use made of force, and the threat of the use of force, for the ends of policy. This series is as interested in ideas as in historical cases of grand strategy and military strategy in action. All historical periods, near and past, and even future, are of interest. In addition to original monographs, the series will from time to time publish edited reprints of neglected classics as well as collections of essays 1 Military Logistics and Strategic Performance Thomas M. Kane 2 Strategy for Chaos Revolutions in military affairs and the evidence of history Colin Gray 3 The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam C. Dale Walton 4 Astropolitik Classical geopolitics in the space age Everett C. Dolman 5 Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933–1939 Imperial crossroads Greg Kennedy 6 Pure Strategy Power and principle in the space and information age Everett C. Dolman 7 The Red Army, 1918–1941 From vanguard of world revolution to US ally Earl F. Ziemke
8 Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1942–2002 Jeremy Stocker 9 The Nature of War in the Information Age Clausewitzian future David J. Lonsdale 10 Strategy as Social Science Thomas Schelling and the nuclear age Robert Ayson 11 Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies Disguising innovation Terry Pierce 12 The Fog of Peace and War Planning Military and strategic planning under uncertainty Edited by Talbot C. Imlay and Monica Duffy Toft 13 US Army Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq Richard Lock-Pullan 14 German Disarmament After World War I The diplomacy of international arms inspection 1920–1931 Richard J. Shuster 15 Strategy and History Essays on theory and practice Colin S. Gray 16 The German 1918 Offensives A case study in the operational level of war David T. Zabecki 17 Special Operations and Strategy From World War II to the war on terrorism James D. Kiras 18 Science, Strategy and War The strategic theory of John Boyd Frans P.B. Osinga 19 US Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom Military innovation and the new American way of war, 1973–2003 Robert R. Tomes
20 US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam Military innovation and institutional failure, 1961–63 Christopher K. Ives 21 War in Iraq Planning and execution Edited by Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney
War in Iraq Planning and execution
Edited by Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney
First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2007 Selection and editorial matter, Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney; individual chapters, the contributors All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data War in Iraq: planning and execution / Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Iraq War, 2003–Campaigns. 2. Insurgency–Iraq. 3. Postwar reconstruction–Iraq. I. Mahnken, Thomas G., 1965–II. Keaney, Thomas A. DS79.764.U6W37 2007 956.70443–dc22 ISBN 0-203-08895-6 Master e-book ISBN
ISBN10: 0-415-42075-X (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-08895-6 (ebk) ISBN13: 978-0-415-42075-4 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-08895-1 (ebk)
2006034194
To the memory of Philip Merrill
Contents
List of figures List of contributors Acknowledgments Introduction
xi xii xviii 1
THOMAS A. KEANEY AND THOMAS G. MAHNKEN
PART I
Defeating the regime and occupying Iraq
1 America’s anabasis
7
9
ISAIAH WILSON
2
Iraqi military effectiveness
22
KEVIN M. WOODS, WITH MICHAEL R. PEASE, MARK E. STOUT, WILLIAMSON MURRAY, AND JAMES G. LACEY
3
The Afghan model in northern Iraq
52
RICHARD B. ANDRES
4
Deep attack against Iraq
69
RICHARD B. ANDRES
5
Doomed execution
97
KEVIN M. WOODS, WITH MICHAEL R. PEASE, MARK E. STOUT, WILLIAMSON MURRAY, AND JAMES G. LACEY
6 Mission not accomplished NORA BENSAHEL
129
x
Contents
PART II
Reconstructuring Iraq and countering the insurgency 7 The Iraqi insurgency, 2003–2006
145 147
AHMED HASHIM
8 The first battle for Fallujah
163
CARTER MALKASIAN
9 Counterinsurgency in Karbala
187
PETER R. MANSOOR
10 Civil affairs engagement in Iraq
198
JOHN R. BALLARD
11 The U.S. Army and counterinsurgency in Iraq
206
KALEV I. SEPP
12 Rediscovering the way of Lawrence
227
ISAIAH WILSON
Conclusion: historian’s leapfrog and the war in Iraq
246
ELIOT A. COHEN
Index
257
Figures
1.1 1.2 3.1 12.1
Evolution of the CFLCCC CONPLAN and OPLAN Phase IV: concept and nesting Attacking the enemy across the Green Line AO North First 30 Days
16 18 58 234
Contributors
Richard B. Andres is a Professor of Political and Security Studies at the U.S. Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies. His current research focuses on the use of air power and new cyber technology in the recent wars in Serbia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. His most recent publication appeared in the June 2006 edition of The Journal of Strategic Studies. Colonel John R. Ballard is currently assigned as the chief of staff of the combating terrorism directorate within the office of the Secretary of Defense in the Pentagon. His office specializes in special operations and low intensity conflict issues pertaining to the war on terrorism. His previous assignments included command of the Marine Corp’s 4th Civil Affairs Group in Iraq during operation Iraqi Freedom. Colonel Ballard earlier served as a Professor of Joint Military Operations at the U.S. Naval War College and as the Director of Plans and Policy on the Marine Forces Pacific Staff in Camp Smith, Hawaii. Colonel Ballard is a 1979 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy. He holds a Master’s degree from California State University and a Doctorate from Catholic University. He is the author of two books and numerous professional journal articles. Nora Bensahel is a Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation, specializing in military strategy and doctrine. She is also an Adjunct Assistant Professor in the Security Studies Program at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. Her recent work has examined stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, post-conflict reconstruction, military coalitions, and multilateral intervention. Her recent publications include The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Europe, NATO, and the European Union (RAND, 2003) and The Future Security Environment in the Middle East (RAND 2004). She has held fellowships at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University, and the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. She is a member of the Executive Board of Women in International Security, and frequently appears as a commentator in the news media. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University.
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Eliot A. Cohen is the Robert E. Osgood Professor of Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University and founding director of the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies there. A graduate of Harvard College, he received his Ph.D. in Political Science at Harvard in 1982. He subsequently taught there and at the Department of Strategy, in the Naval War College. After serving on the policy planning staff of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, he came to SAIS in 1990. He has written books and articles on a variety of military and national security-related subjects, including, most recently Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (Free Press, 2002). He has written or co-authored other books including Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (Free Press, 1990), and directed the U.S. Air Force’s official multi-volume study of the Gulf War, The Gulf War Air Power Survey (Government Printing Office, 1993). He has an extensive background in executive education, to include programs for general officers in the American armed forces and senior executives in the private sector. He has served as an intelligence officer in the United States Army Reserve, and as a member of the Defense Policy Advisory Board of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Ahmed S. Hashim is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies in the Naval War College. He specializes in Middle Eastern and South Asian strategic issues, with a particular emphasis on Iraqi and Iranian affairs. He explores functional security issues such as the Revolution in Military Affairs, Asymmetric Warfare, and Terrorism. Previously he worked at the Center for Naval Analyses for four years on issues such as the Revolution in Military Affairs and Asymmetric Warfare. Between 1994 and 1996 he was Senior Fellow at the Center for International and Strategic Studies in Washington, DC, where he worked on Middle East security issues. He was a Research Associate at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London between 1993 and 1994 where he wrote a monograph titled The Crisis of the Iranian State. He received his Ph.D and M.Sc from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and his B.Sc. from Warwick University in Coventry, England. His latest publications are “Saddam Husayn and Civil–Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and Power” (Middle East Journal, Winter 2003); “The World According to Usama Bin Laden” (Naval War College Review, Autumn 2001); “Iraq’s Chaos” (Boston Review, October 2004); “Iraq: From Insurgency to Civil War” (Current History, January 2005). Forthcoming studies include: “Al Qaida’s Grand Strategy” (Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, Cornell University Press, Fall 2005). Thomas A. Keaney is the Executive Director of the Foreign Policy Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. He also serves as the Executive Director of the Merrill Center for Strategic Studies and Senior Adjunct Professor of Strategic Studies at the school. Until 1998 he was a Professor of Military Strategy at
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the National War College, Washington, DC, and Director of its core courses on military thought and strategy. During a career in the U.S. Air Force, he served in positions including: Associate Professor of History at the U.S. Air Force Academy; planner on the Air Staff; forward air controller in Vietnam; and B-52 squadron commander. He retired as a colonel in 1991. He is author of Strategic Bombers and Conventional Weapons: Air Power Options (National Defense University Press, 1983) and (with Eliot A. Cohen) Revolution in Warfare?: Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Naval Institute Press, 1995). His other publications include (edited with Barry Rubin) US Allies in a Changing World (Frank Cass, 2000) and Armed Forces in the Middle East, Politics and Strategy (Frank Cass, 2002). He is a graduate of the National War College. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Air Force Academy and M.A. degree and Ph.D. in History from the University of Michigan. Thomas G. Mahnken currently serves as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning. At the time this book was written, he was a Visiting Fellow at the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University and a Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. He served on the staff of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, in the Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment, and as a member of the Gulf War Air Power Survey, commissioned by the Air Force to examine the performance of U.S. forces during the war with Iraq. He is the author of Uncovering Ways of War: U.S. Intelligence and Foreign Military Innovation, 1918–1941 (Cornell University Press, 2002), of Technology and the American Way of War, 1945–2005 (Columbia University Press, 2007) and (with James R. FitzSimonds) of The Limits of Transformation: Officer Attitudes toward the Revolution in Military Affairs (Naval War College Press, 2003). He is editor (with Joseph A. Maiolo) of Strategic Studies: A Reader (Routledge, 2007), (with Emily O. Goldman) of The Information Revolution in Military Affairs in Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) and (with Richard K. Betts) of Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel (Frank Cass, 2003). He is also the co-editor of the Journal of Strategic Studies. He was a summa cum laude graduate of the University of Southern California with Bachelor’s degrees in History and International Relations (with highest honors) and a Certificate in Defense and Strategic Studies and holds M.A. degree and Ph.D. in International Affairs from SAIS. Carter Malkasian is a civilian advisor assigned to the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) from the Center for Naval Analyses, a federally funded research and development center in Alexandria, Virginia. He deployed with I MEF to Iraq from March to May 2003, February 2004 to February 2005, and February 2006 to June 2006. His publications include: “The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2005–2006” in Small Wars and Insurgencies (Routledge, volume 17, issue 3,
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2006); “Toward a Better Understanding of Attrition: The Korean and Vietnam Wars’ in The Journal of Military History (2004); and A History of Modern Wars of Attrition (Praeger, 2002). He completed his Doctorate in the History of War at Oxford University. Colonel Peter Mansoor, has served in a variety of command and staff positions in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East during his career. He commanded the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Iraq and Germany from July 1, 2003 to June 30, 2004, to include 13 months in combat in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Under his command, the 1st Brigade Combat Team was awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for extraordinary heroism in combat during the three-month period leading up to the transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government on June 28, 2004. Previously he served as G-3 (Operations, Plans, and Training Officer) of the 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Hood, Texas, from 2001–2002, a period which included multiple deployments in support of homeland defense in the wake of terrorist attacks on 9/11. He commanded the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry from 1999–2001, to include a deployment to Kuwait in support of Operation Desert Spring and two counter-drug deployments along the U.S.–Mexican border in support of Joint Task Force 6. He has served on the Joint Staff as the Special Assistant to the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5). A distinguished graduate and recipient of a B.S. degree from the United States Military Academy in 1982, he holds a M.A. and Doctorate in Military History from The Ohio State University and a Master’s degree in of Strategic Studies from the Army War College. Kalev Sepp is an Assistant Professor in the Naval Postgraduate School’s Department of Defense Analysis and a former U.S. Army Special Forces officer who served in the United States, Europe, Asia, and Latin America for 24 years. He has direct experience in counter-insurgency, urban warfare, psychological operations and civil affairs, drug interdiction, interagency coordination, nuclear-chemical-biological defense, and strategy formulation. As an assistant professor at the U.S. Military Academy, he taught courses on insurgency and civil wars, and military and international history. He was also a resident scholar at Harvard University, and a commentator on military affairs on National Public Radio. Most recently, he co-wrote an official study of U.S. Army special operations in the Afghanistan expedition. Kalev Sepp has earned degrees from The Citadel (B.A. in English, 1975), the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (M.M.A.S., 1992), and Harvard University (A.M. in History, 1994, and Ph.D. in American Diplomatic History, 2002). Major Isaiah (Ike) Wilson III, United States Army, is an Academy Professor with the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy, West Point, New York. He is an Army aviator, military historian, and strategist, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s School of Advanced
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Military Studies (SAMS), a postgraduate program that focused on the strategic and operational levels of war policy and planning. His portfolio includes military command in Germany and the Balkans, and research and publication in the areas of public policy, security and defense strategy, conventional arms procurement and sales (force modernization), and professional military education. He holds a B.S. in International Relations from the United States Military Academy, Master’s degrees in Public Policy and Government from Cornell University, Master’s degrees in Military Arts and Sciences from the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College and School of Advanced Military Studies, and a Ph.D. from Cornell University. Major Wilson is a combat veteran of Operation Iraqi Freedom, where he served as the chief of war plans for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) in Northern Iraq, and later upon return from Iraq as the Division’s chief architect for the 101st Airborne reorganization under Army Transformation. Ike is currently serving with the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) as an International Affairs Fellow-In Residence (2005–2006) where he is writing a book on his war planning experiences and directing The Beyond War Project, a multi-year, interdisciplinary and multi-agency collaborative research initiative dedicated to the reformation of the American way of war commensurate with the post-9/11 security environment. Major Wilson is married to Lauren Ann Lee of Toronto, Canada. They have three children, David, Spenser, and Mae. Kevin Woods is a research staff member with the Joint Advanced Warfighting Program at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He has led the Iraqi Perspectives Project since its inception in the Fall of 2003 and continues to supervise research into the former regime of Saddam Hussein. Mr. Woods retired from the U.S. Army in 2004 after completing many worldwide operational and joint assignments including Operation Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom. Mr. Woods received his Bachelor’s degree from Auburn University and a Master’s degree from the U.S. Naval War College. He is currently working toward a Ph.D. in Military History. Other contributing authors on the Iraqi Perspectives Project: Professor Williamson Murray is an adjunct research staff member at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is currently the Class of 1957 Distinguished Visiting Professor of History at the U.S. Naval Academy and a Professor Emeritus of History at Ohio State University. Professor Murray is a widely published historian who has taught at the Air War College, the United States Military Academy, the Naval War College, and the Marine Corps University. Professor Murray has a Bachelor’s degree and Ph.D. from Yale University. Jim Lacey is a member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a retired U.S. Army officer with extensive experience as a researcher, business writer, and journalist. He served as an embedded reporter with the 101st Airborne Division during the opening phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Mr. Lacey is a graduate of The Citadel. Mike Pease is a member of
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the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He is a retired U.S. Navy officer with experience in joint operations, electronic warfare, and defense arms cooperation. Mr. Pease has a Bachelor’s degree from the U.S. Naval Academy and a Master’s degree from the Naval War College. Mark Stout is a member of the research staff at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He has previously held a variety of positions at the Department of Defense, Department of State, and Central Intelligence Agency. Mr. Stout has a Bachelor’s degree from Stanford University and a Master’s degree from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He is presently a Doctoral candidate with the University of Leeds. Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney Washington, D.C. August 2006
Acknowledgments
This book grew out of a conference on “U.S. Military Operations in Iraq: Planning, Conduct, and Occupation,” which was sponsored by the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) and organized and conducted by the Philip Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at The Paul H. Nitze’s School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, DC on November 2, 2005. Many of the chapters in this volume originated in presentations at that conference. We sought out other contributors in an effort to round out the volume by addressing topics that did not receive enough attention in the original conference, such as the role of air power and the Iraqi side of the war and the insurgency that followed it. Earlier versions of Chapters 3, 4 and 7 previously appeared in The Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 4 (October 2006). Chapters 2 and 5 first appeared in Kevin M. Woods, with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam’s Senior Leadership (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2006). This project, undertaken under the sponsorship of U.S. Joint Forces Command, made use of dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders and thousands of official Iraqi documents to analyze the forces and motivations that drove Iraqi decisions and actions in the Iraq War of 2003. Kevin Woods was project leader and principal author of these and other chapters of the report. Co-authors were James G. Lacey, Williamson Murray, Michael R. Pease, and Mark E. Stout. All are presented here with permission. This book would not have been possible without SSI’s sponsorship of the original conference. In particular, we would like to thank SSI’s Director, Professor Douglas Lovelace, its Director of Academic Engagement, Dr. Dallas D. Owens, and Research Professor, Dr. W. Andrew Terrill. Their cooperation in the conference and in supporting the publication of papers were essential parts of this project. At SAIS, this volume could not have been completed without the assistance of Courtney Mata, the Merrill Center Program Administrator. Ms Mata not only managed all aspects of the conference but also took on the task of formatting and proofing this entire volume, which went far beyond the call of duty. Her efficiency, initiative and good cheer have been invaluable in completing this project, and we appreciate this opportunity to thank her publicly.
Acknowledgments
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Finally, we wish to thank the Philip Merrill Center and its Director, Eliot Cohen, for giving us the latitude and encouragement to pursue this project. The Center’s commitment to excellence in research, writing, and teaching has provided a superb atmosphere in which to work. It is to the Center’s founding sponsor, Mr. Philip Merrill, who died this year, that we dedicate this volume. Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney Washington, DC August 2006
Introduction Thomas A. Keaney and Thomas G. Mahnken
A book on a war still underway must accept a number of limitations. Many of its aspects remain secret or unknowable. More broadly, we lack the perspective necessary to judge which events or issues will retain their importance in the longer term. Yet the value of understanding more about the war in Iraq, underway for more than three years as these words are written, argues for analysis, imperfect though it may be, of what has occurred. The war’s outcome is far from clear at this point, with even its name being uncertain, beyond the term “Operation Iraqi Freedom.” Analysis of the war has nevertheless begun both within and outside of the U.S. and allied military forces, and this volume seeks to add to that examination. The book has as its focus the planning and execution of U.S. and coalition military operations from 2003 until the summer of 2006. Its chapters focus on the military aspects of the war rather than the reasons for it or the debate in the United States or abroad about its rationale or prosecution. That said, our scope extends well beyond the actions of the U.S. Defense Department. As the individual chapters make clear, an understanding of warfare in Iraq requires a clear understanding of the several elements of national power. The authors of the chapters in this volume bring a great deal of credibility to their analyses. Most are, or have been, active duty military officers, many of whom served in Iraq in planning or operational positions, and thus speak with first hand experience. And although their criticisms are often severe, they include specific recommendations of what systems need adjustment and suggestions for undertaking those adjustments in doctrine and planning. Although this book’s thirteen chapters look at a number of aspects of the war, the present volume’s scope is nowhere complete. First, excluding the two chapters on the Saddam Hussein regime’s planning and execution of the 2003 Iraq War and the chapter on the Iraqi insurgency, attention is directed mainly on actions of the U.S. Army. Although coalition forces figure in the chapter on operations in Karbala, there is otherwise no consideration of British or other allied forces. The chapters by Richard Andres deal with the employment of air power, particularly in Northern Iraq, but otherwise this book focuses on the ground war. Finally, we recognize that perspectives on this war vary from province to province and from rotation to rotation, so any analysis must be seen
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with this limitation. For these reasons, readers will note differences of opinions and perspectives among the chapter authors. The book is organized chronologically into two parts, Defeating the Regime and Occupying Iraq and Reconstructing Iraq and Countering the Insurgency. However, and inevitably, each chapter contains elements that transcend each of these periods and address one or more themes. The first and most common theme and item of criticism is the failure of planning: the failure to anticipate the next steps after the fall of the regime and to recognize the resulting insurgency. LTC Isaiah Wilson makes the failure to plan beyond major military operations, neglecting what he terms Phase IV, the central topic of his first chapter. Wilson points out that the campaign plan, which was directed toward combat operations to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime, stopped well short of dealing with any sort of reconstruction effort. Wilson attributes this failure to a propensity of American planners toward “the methodical battle syndrome” a trait ever less applicable in the new form of warfare that American forces face. Nora Bensahel cites the same lack of planning for the post-major combat operations, but identifies assumptions made by the U.S. political leadership as the main failing. To Bensahel, the assumptions that coalition forces would be greeted as liberators and that the Iraqi government would continue to function obviated any need to plan for a major reconstruction or occupation effort. Additionally, she cites the lack of interagency cooperation that hampered the establishment and operation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) as fundamental flaws in the ability of the CPA to function. Bensahel would have the military take a more active role in stabilization and reconstruction in the post-conflict phase, even though that would involve what are typically thought of as civilian tasks. The chapters by Kevin Woods et al. provide a picture of the Iraqi command structure and the dysfunctional nature of its operation. The picture is fascinating in itself, but also shows how ignorance of the nature of the opposing military can lead to the mis-assessment of enemy actions. Woods, relying on numerous interviews with senior Iraqi leaders and on Iraqi documents, gives details on two vital aspects of the nature of the Iraqi Army: the effect of its emphasis on regime survival and population control, not war fighting; and the climate of fear that pervaded the senior officer corps, leading to a poorly motivated and poorly coordinated fighting force. The picture is of an army whose commanders did not trust one another, lied in their combat reporting, and who remained generally unaware of the actions of the coalition forces they faced. Saddam Hussein himself is shown as just as ignorant of the strength, direction, and success of the coalition attack until it was far too late to respond in any coherent manner. Richard Andres addresses the role of air power in the war in several aspects. Drawing heavily on the research of Woods et al on the brittle nature of the Iraqi high command and its climate of fear and suspicion, Andres details how coalition air forces’ concentration on the brittle command and control structure, along with key individuals and locations, unhinged the Ba’athist regime. He links the reports of Iraqi leaders avoiding their offices and communications centers
Introduction
3
because of fear of being targeted with the effects of a paralyzed Iraqi Army capable of only days-old battlefield reporting. Andres in addition points to what he describes as an invisible cyber war that began as early as 2002, targeting the Iraqi political elites and military leadership. The tools of these attacks – faxes, emails and phone calls urging officers to stage a coup, commanders to surrender their units, or other cooperation with coalition forces – proved particularly effective on an Iraqi command structure already in the grip of fear under the tight control of Saddam Hussein. Andres shows how some of the first-order effects, such as a drastic tightening of control by security forces and replacement of commanders, had the second-order effects of further reducing the willingness and ability of military commanders to operate in the face of the coalition attack. In an earlier chapter, Andres enters the debate of the relative effectiveness of air and ground power heavily on the side of air power. In his view, the use of air delivered precision weapons, working in coordination with Special Operations Forces (SOF) and lightly armed indigenous forces, was in many ways a replay of the 2001 experience in Afghanistan. Andres discusses the debate and conditions that led to the use of aircraft, SOF, and Kurdish forces, their success, and the future efficacy of employing local forces in place of U.S. land forces. Whether the hollowed out Iraqi Army provided a true test of the “Afghan model” and how successful the air power, SOF, and indigenous forces combination would be fare against a well trained regular army are, as Andres admits, open questions, but this experience in Northern Iraq is sure to take its place alongside the Afghan experience in the continuing discussion of the nature of future combat and the air and ground systems that will support it. Several authors look at the source, conditions and growth of the insurgency. The Woods et al chapter finds no evidence of a plan by Saddam Hussein’s regime to transition to guerilla warfare. By contrast, the Ba’athists appear to have thought of nothing more than remaining in power right through the collapse of the bureaucracy, government, and army. Bensahel and Wilson amply demonstrate how the power vacuum in the summer of 2003 and beyond as well as heavy-handed occupation policies made fertile ground for an insurgency’s growth. The most complete assessment of the insurgency comes in the chapter by Ahmed Hashim, who finds the roots of what he sees as an inevitable clash in Iraq’s twentieth-century history. Hashim points to an insurgency launched by the previously privileged but now dispossessed Sunni Arabs as early as April 2003 in the Sunni Triangle, the area bounded by Baghdad, Ramadi and Fallujah. Hashim describes an insurgency begun based on politics, not religion, which became several, often unrelated, insurgencies with the addition of foreign fighters, youth angered by occupation conditions and policies, and in combination with actions by a politically active clergy. To Hashim, the Sunni Arabs, faced with the loss of their positions in society and under the leadership of a still-active Ba’ath Party, had all the motivation they needed to resist U.S. occupation. Foreign terrorist brought the tactic of suicide bombing and linked easily with local Sunni Arab Salafis who emerged in cities such as Ramadi, Fallujah, and Mosul.
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A further complexity in the country’s politics emerged with the rise of the Shi’ite insurgency in 2004, and Hashim identifies the key role that Muqtada alSadr played in this process. Here the combination of resistance to occupation, the recruitment of previously dispossessed Shi’ite youth into the Mahdi Army, and assistance from Iran have created what Hashim sees as all the elements necessary for civil war within Iraq. Several chapters address how to combat the Iraq insurgencies, based on the authors’ experiences and observations. Isaiah Wilson recounts his experiences in Northern Iraq around the city of Mosul in 2003–04; Peter Mansoor describes his experience as the commander of U.S. forces combating Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army in Karbala in the spring of 2004; Carter Malkasian analyzes combat in the Sunni city of Fallujah in the spring of 2004 and its aftermath; and John Ballard argues for the importance of a civil affairs component in dealing with insurgency based on his experience in Fallujah in late 2004 and his observations of civil affairs actions in other Iraqi cities. Wilson organizes his discussion of planning around four concepts, or planning observations, derived from his experience as chief of plans for the 101st Airborne Division under then-Major General David Petraeus. The four planning observations become Wilson’s strategy for counterinsurgency. These observations include, first, determine the situation being faced, by which he describes as a post-modern age warfare in which the aim must include creating a new regime, not just removing the old one. Second, the military command must organize according to the mission; in this case it meant bringing in military personnel who were subject matter experts on the local culture and conditions and not just adept on military planning. Third, the military effort had to focus on establishing an efficient public administration, or state building, to deliver the goods to the local population. And, finally, he cautions that the strategy requires patience in building relationships in order to develop trust and new sources of intelligence. Peter Mansoor’s experience in Karbala outlines the several stages of combating an insurgency, in line with Wilson’s experience, but in Mansoor’s case it began with an intense period of combat. Mansoor had first to break the Mahdi Army’s hold on the city of Karbala. For these actions Mansoor emphasizes the value of firepower and armored protection during the three weeks of combat. Following the combat phase, however, Mansoor points to the importance of putting Iraqi government officials in charge, particularly with a police presence, with other coalition forces in the background. Like Wilson, he points out the necessary element of civic actions that can deliver services to the population. Mansoor’s account includes treatment of the coalition aspects of the Karbala actions: he operated under the tactical control of a Polish officer and alongside Polish and Bulgarian troops. Carter Malkasian, like Mansoor, looks at active combat against insurgents and does so as a cautionary tale concerning the ill effects of military action not coordinated with political support. Malkasian looks at the issue of signaling resolve and examines its components. The scene is the spring of 2004 and the city of Fallujah where four Blackwater security contractors had been killed and
Introduction
5
their bodies hung up over the Euphrates, a gruesome event recorded and widely televised. Looking to take immediate action against this outrage, and to remove the insurgent sanctuary that Fallujah had become, U.S. forces began a major military offensive into the city. However, Malkasian explains that because the offensive began without gaining political support and emphasized firepower without seeking to minimize civilian casualties, collateral damage and the unfavorable publicity engendered caused the Iraqi governing body to call off the offensive in mid-stream. Malkasian notes that the attempt to signal resolve resulted in just the opposite, encouraging further resistance in the city and the surrounding region. He then details the later successful preparation done for a later military offensive into the city in November 2004, which included the organization of political support and measures to minimize casualties. John Ballard’s chapter concerns Fallujah and its surrounding area during and after this second offensive into the city. Ballard’s subject and military background is in civil affairs, and he describes the employment of civil affairs measures during the second battle for Fallujah in the fall of 2004, elaborating on the process advocated by Carter Malkasian in his chapter. Ballard speaks in terms of “clear, hold, build” strategy for Iraq. In describing the “clear” phase, Ballard outlines civic affairs actions taken in Fallujah, which he identifies as those designed to lessen the impact of military operations. Those measures included negotiating with civic leaders of Fallujah to restrict the use of firepower in areas of cultural or economic facilities. In the “hold” phase, he emphasizes the inclusion of Iraqi forces to provide security as well as developing better civil–military relations in the community, a particularly difficult task given the previous relationship with Saddam Hussein’s security forces. His “build” phase addresses the building of national institutions within the country, at this point a necessary goal but one that must look beyond the current crises. Dealing with the present insurgency in Iraq is the subject of Kalev Sepp’s chapter. He addresses that subject by laying out a doctrine for U.S. Army forces, but one that would be applicable for all military forces involved in counterinsurgency operations. Sepp writes based on his evaluations of U.S. Army units during his visits to Iraq. Though he advocates many of the counterinsurgency measures suggested by Wilson, Ballard, and Mansoor – building state institutions, training Iraqi forces to supplant coalition forces, and engaging other agencies of the U.S. government in the effort – he does so after noting the wide variety of techniques and differing levels of success of the military units. His aim is to provide a doctrine common to all units. His doctrinal recommendations are radical ones for the Army, for he calls for what he sees as a basic reorientation of that organization: away from a focus on mass, firepower, and speed and toward operations requiring patience; away from a centralized hierarchical structure to fighting in decentralized formations; and acting with allies rather than unilaterally. Sepp’s strongest message is for the United States to recognize that it is not trying to stabilize Iraq, it is in the process of fundamentally attempting to change the country, destabilizing it from what it had been, and all that entails. Finally, Eliot Cohen’s concluding chapter proposes some techniques for
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analyzing a conflict still underway. His contribution is to look to the future and imagine the varying perspectives of future historians and how they might frame the issues of the war. That exercise provides a different construct for evaluating the trends and important aspects of the war that are not now distinct or well understood. Looking at the origins of the war, Cohen sees historians developing schools of thought that essentially continue the present debate: the war as part of a Neoconservative plan to remake the Middle East, or as a reaction to the attacks on 9/11, or as an action to settle more permanently the war that ended in a cease fire in 1991. In evaluating military operations during the intense combat phase of the war, he links the experience to the more general debate on how or how much conventional warfare has changed by the “Revolution in Military Affairs.” Here, Cohen suggests that historians will find evidence to support varying judgments, examples of both the effectiveness of high technology weaponry and networked systems and of the inadequacy of the Iraqi Army as a test of that effectiveness. Cohen devotes a major portion of his chapter to assessments of American counterinsurgency efforts. As historians reflect on the Iraqi insurgency and how that conflict fits within the more general history of American counterinsurgency efforts, Cohen sees two singular aspects being identified: first, that Iraqi society was comprised of an unusual amalgam of ethnic and religious groups brutalized by a generation of internal and external conflicts, a landscape of which military planners had little understanding; and second, how the nearly unlimited supply of weapons available to insurgents presented significant challenges to a counterinsurgency campaign. In assessing American performance in these operations, he sees historians focusing on the personalities of the individual political and military leaders to a much greater degree than do contemporary accounts. Specifically, the character of the individual military commanders had large consequences for the success of the operations. Ending this volume with questions of how historians, policymakers, and the public in the future will view the Iraq war provides a fitting end to this volume and serves as an apt description of the motivations that prompted this study. This volume is far from the last to be written about the war in Iraq. It will have served its purpose, however, if it enlightens students of the war and informs the debate over the U.S conduct of the war, and indeed of U.S. military planning and operations more broadly.
Part I
Defeating the regime and occupying Iraq
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America’s anabasis Isaiah Wilson
While a young man, the Greek historian Xenophon participated in the expedition led by Cyrus the Younger against his older brother, the emperor Artaxerxes II of Persia, in 401 BC. The Greeks were victorious in battle, but with the death of their leader, Cyrus, found themselves in a strategically precarious situation. The Greek Ten Thousand found themselves deep in hostile territory, near the heart of Mesopotamia, far from the sea, without a plan for the war that was now upon them, and without leadership. They finally fought their way north through hostile Persians, Armenians, and Kurds to Trapezus on the coast of the Black Sea and then sailed westward and back to Greece.1 Xenophon recorded this expedition and the journey home in his work entitled The Anabasis (“The Expedition” or “The March Up Country”), a reference to an expedition from a coastline into the interior of a country. The work was an expression of the difficulties of waging expeditionary wars, and more specifically, of waging war in Mesopotamia. The parallels between Xenophon’s anabasis, then, and our own anabasis that began back in March 2003 are intriguing: • • • • •
each was an expedition, a march up country; each began as an unequivocal tactical victory, but each devolved into a strategic quandry, to say the least; our own march up country traversed much of the same ground – literally and figuratively – as the Greek Ten Thousand’s; both fights were in the heart of Mesopotamia; and, Xenophon’s anabasis lasted close to ten years . . . our own katabasis (march out of country), many have proposed, may take just as long.
The Iraq War – America’s Anabasis – is giving witness every day not only to the challenges of expeditionary warfare in Mesopotamia, but also of the rise of what seems to be a new-age of war and peace; an era of long wars to which the United States seems to have a record of failures – incomplete wins. The Iraq
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experience follows in a long tradition of falling short of achieving “complete victory” in our intervention policies. This chapter focuses on planning – the planning (and in some cases, the apparent lack thereof) that laid the path to war upon which the United States and its coalition of the willing embarked in the third week of March 2003, a path that has, thus far, left our war policy far short of its grand objectives (a safe and secure Iraq embracing liberty and with no threat to its neighbors), and the inheritor of a Long War of insurgency and counter-insurgency. If, as Clausewitz wrote, the first, the supreme act of policy judgment is to decide upon the kind of war upon which one is embarking, then the second is to plan accordingly.2 Did the war we embarked upon in Iraq, beginning in March 2003, defy the post-modern realities of what war – regardless of its catalyst – was destined to be? If we got the purpose and aims of the war wrong, did we also get the approach to the war – our calculus for the intervention – wrong? Did the former beget the latter? Regarding the Iraq War, is our current policy anemia (our failure to “win the peace”) the result of our determining the wrong political objectives, or, did we have the right objectives, but merely fail to achieve them? Were we wrong in our cause, or simply in the effectiveness of our approach? The war in Iraq is the latest in a long debate over how much manpower and materiel, not to mention time, is required to win decisively in our nations’ wars and interventions. The debate is the offspring of the traditional “guns versus butter” calculus that is a vitally important debate for any democratic nation to undertake prior to, and throughout, a war. This latest war in Iraq, however, has raised this discussion to a new level of relevance and importance. This is the case, in part, because of the elusiveness of the decisive victory that defense and military planners were convinced would come with the collapse of the Saddam Hussein regime on April 9, 2003, and the “bog” of insurgency and antiinsurgency in which the United States and its military forces have found themselves since the President declared “mission accomplished” on May 1, 2004. Was there a plan for the peace? Some say yes, others no. As an official early recorder of the war, serving from March to June 2003 as an historian and combat observer/interviewer for U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki’s Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group (OIFSG),3 part of my duties were to collect data and first-hand soldier accounts of the war’s progress – to conduct an initial assessment of how well the plan was measuring up against the realities of the warfight on the ground. What I observed first-hand was the absence of an operational plan for that part of the war that came after the collapse of the Ba’athist regime on April 9, 2003. From this vantage point, I was also able to confirm what I had recorded as a historian months earlier: there was no operational plan for Phase IV operations in the U.S. war-plan for Iraq. The rest of this chapter will focus on the way in which this planning for the war developed.
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The planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom A campaign plan “Flawed By Design” 4 There are two dictums that are commonly understood by those in the planning communities. The first is that planning does not occur in a vacuum. The second is that no plan survives first contact with the enemy. The planning that led to the execution of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) violated the first dictum and relied far too heavily on the latter. The result was an Iraq War campaign plan that wasn’t. A campaign plan by name only, one that was more reflective of a major combat operational plan than a holistic war plan and one where the actions and outcomes of the majority of its activities were left to hope (and the vote of the enemy) instead of to deliberate prior preparation. Dr. Conrad Crane of the U.S. Army War College refers to the flawed planning process behind OIF as yielding “many plans, but not one.”5 This author has referred to this condition as an anemia of U.S. operational planning, resulting in the campaign plan that wasn’t.6 Overall, the campaign planning for the Iraq War suffered then, and continues to suffer to this day, from three major flaws. Incomplete planning regarding purpose and political aim The Iraq War is not a modern war, but rather a post-modern one. As an exemplar of a Clausewitzian modern war, the Iraq War would have been considered an unlimited war – a war devoted to the overthrow of an enemy regime. Once that political aim expanded beyond the aim of regime change to the aim of nation-building (change “of” regime7), the purpose and intent of the war went beyond the defining parameters of the modern paradigm. With this new aim, the Iraq War became a post-modern war, beyond Clausewitz’ wildest imagination. With the modern parameters (art and science) for determining whether a limited or unlimited war providing little to no relevance to this war in Iraq, the planning and decision making for the war fell suspect to subjective judgment. The Iraq War, consequently, has become a war of limited (scarce) resourcing, despite its absolute unlimited aim. The result of this policy mismatch is now an out-ofbalance U.S. strategy, which loses more and more of its legitimacy both with the American and the Iraqi publics of concern. Incomplete planning regarding timing The Iraq War was initially a forward-planned intervention resourced and directed toward the attainment of a limited military object (toppling of Saddam) instead of a more comprehensive political objective. We essentially planned our way into a fight with Saddam instead of planning a way toward a better state of peace with the Iraqi people. As such, the timing of the campaign plan (i.e. when diplomacy would end and major combat operations begin) was arrived upon with an eye toward a pre-emptive military timetable instead of a more protracted
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and preventive “holistic” timetable. Political pundits, and devoted rejectionists of the war, have argued that peace was not given enough of a chance prior to the U.S. initiation of major combat. Despite the popular sound bite (“give peace a chance”), there is a grain of practical truth to this argument. If the initial parameters of the war campaign had been calculated and constructed with the broader, “change of regime” (reconstruction of a stable, safe, and secure Iraq), political aim instead of the much more limited change-in-regime (toppling of Saddam) endstate, the planning calculus for this more complex and Long War would have suggested a radically different staging and timing of the campaign plan and strategy for the prosecution of the intervention. Based on the more limited “topple Saddam” objective, the calculus of war centered on Saddam Hussein and his state apparatus as both the military and political/strategic center of gravity – the source of all power of the adversarial regime, that if destroyed, would cause the regime to collapse, thereby leading most directly to the attainment of the political objective (change in regime). Seeing this war as “this kind of war,” biased military planning toward more military, offensive, and rapid options. In an effort to obtain the most cost-effective option to end Saddam’s rule, planning came to privilege options that offered rapid and decisive results. Launching whatever lethal attacks it would take to disable and destroy those parts of the state regime feeding the power of Saddam (i.e. critical governing infrastructure; the army) and finally to eliminate Saddam himself sooner than later. The concept of Rapid Decisive Operations8 was a planning and execution construct that best fit this conception of the war aim and the set of options deemed best for attaining the political objective with the least cost to the nation’s resources (blood, treasure, international reputation). Since the political aim of the war defines the set of feasible, acceptable, and suitable options for carrying it out, that linkage remains of primary importance. However, separated from its proper political objective, military force (or any other type of force) becomes pointless.9 In Iraq, although military force did not prove “pointless” (it effectively ended Saddam’s rule over Iraq, and his threat to the region and the West), it did prove inadequate as a tool for rebuilding a new country after destroying the Hussein State. Although the timing was adequate and effective for the toppling goal – an early and swift launch of combat operations – it is proving with every year that passes without an attainment of the political goal to have been the wrong timing from the beginning. If planned based on a Long War’s requirements, it is highly unlikely that the United States would have initiated combat on March 19, 2003; it is even less likely that this initiation would have been accelerated by 24 hours in an attempt at a quick decapitation attack – such an attempt, especially if successful, while winning the military objective of ridding the world of the nuisance of Saddam, would have left the Iraqi nation in political chaos. Ironically, and tragically, it now appears that despite what were the best of intentions, getting the political aim wrong for an Iraq War may be contributing to insecurity, instability, declines in prosperity, and overall political and societal chaos in Iraq.
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Incomplete planning regarding allocation and distribution of forces The Iraq War was in fact a war that America would end up waging with the forces it had available rather than the force it needed. Limiting the war short of its natural parameters has left the United States poorly and inadequately positioned, strategically, operationally, and tactically, to fight the war to a complete win, never having the right amount of force on the ground, the right mix of forces on the ground, nor the right array of forces on the ground in Iraq.
Drawing limited lessons from total wars – OEF and OIF-1 The failure-to-plan story begins much earlier than 2001, but a snapshot from the U.S. war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, October 2001, is an appropriate starting point. Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) set several bad precedents that contributed to the delinquency of planning for and the execution of war in Iraq in 2003 and since. The United States expedition in Afghanistan in 2001 was a limited operation of primarily military objectives – dissolution of the Taliban regime, disruption and if possible the destruction of the Al Qaeda terrorist organization, and the capture or killing of terrorist mastermind Osama bin Laden. Afghanistan was a major military operation to achieve a military objective. It was a combat action born of the mother of necessity – the attacks of 9/11. There was no original intention for a U.S. reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, and therefore no original Phase IV plan. In fact, there was no Phase IV planning of any kind, and little of what could be considered as campaign planning.10 The command, control, and execution was as ad hoc as the war itself. While tactical actions during OEF proved the unmatched innovativeness and adaptability of the American soldier, the U.S. modern forms of warfare, and the capacity for the United States to combine the old (i.e. modern; even pre-modern) ways of warfare with those of the present and the future (i.e. post-modern, fourth-generational) yielded less than a decisive victory. In spite of the battle victory, the effort has only attained a strategic stalemate. The tactical approach from Afghanistan was adopted, almost in total, and transposed to the situation in Iraq – an entirely different and more complex situation than Afghanistan. To some, the tactical and operational successes of OEF all but validated the Special Operations Forces (SOF) “plus” precision guided munitions (PGM) “plus” indigenous ground forces (IGF) design as the U.S. Government preferred strategy of choice.11 This interpretation of OEF (that the operation was “won” through tactical, ground level innovations) seems to have been interpreted as an adequate proxy for a military strategy for OIF, perhaps even for the entire war policy in total. The poverty of the Iraq War campaign plan – the denial of the real and broader war that a war in Iraq was by its nature destined to be – perhaps finds some of its causal roots in the lessons rightly gathered from Afghanistan but wrongly applied to the situation that would become the Iraq War.
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The evolution of a war plan12 The evolution of military planning began in earnest in late 2001 with initial guidance coming from the Joint Staff (at the time in the heat of OEF planning and operation management) that control of Phase IV operations in Iraq would fall to the leadership of either the U.S. State Department or Iraq’s exiled government (the Iraqi National Congress, or INC). By June 2002, and in the aftermath of the tactical success of OEF, this original Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance was changed – the lead agency for campaign planning for the Iraq War, to include Phase IV planning, would fall to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.13 Central Command (CENTCOM) planning began in June 2002, with ECLIPSE II as the eventual base concept plan for OIF, and its successor OPLAN COBRA II (which evolved into OPLAN 1003V) actually serving as the precursor that led to the execution order initiating major combat operations. The bulk of this planning was conducted at Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) levels – Third Army Headquarters initially in Tampa, Florida and then Camp Doha, Kuwait. Among the key factors affecting the planning, and later the execution, of OPLAN 1003V was the determination of how many units would deploy before combat operations were to begin and how many axes of advanced ground forces would to be used to execute the major combat operation. This consideration proved highly political and, as a consequence, toxic to the hopes of creating, resourcing, and executing a holistic campaign plan that was reflective of the complete complexity of the operations, activities, challenges, and opportunities that would define the entire domain of the Iraq War. Part of the early planning considerations for how many forces would be deployed prior to the initiation of major combat operations rested on the traditional tension between the historic American penchant for large-scale, deliberate deployments of overwhelming force and the more efficient approach of “just-intime” operations. There were at least two factors that weighed on the decision to deploy a heavier and more full-spectrum complement of forces or a lighter and more agile force. The first major factor was purely operational – logistical requirements for large-scale Army and Marine Corps formations and the availability of relatively limited strategic lift capacity (due to competing requirements in Afghanistan and other operational theaters around the globe) stiffened those arguments for a deliberate (protracted) deployment. A strong operational counter argument was the potential gains in operational surprise over enemy forces that could possibly be gained by a quick no-notice strategic deployment. The second major factor influencing the force-generation decision was a political one. By the fall of 2002, U.S. diplomatic efforts in the United Nations demonstrated to the world that an American-led campaign to remove Saddam Hussein from power was becoming a probability rather than simply a possibility.14 The administration in Washington, DC by this time, saw a grave and growing danger to the United States and its friends and interests within the wider Middle East region festering in Iraq with every moment of delay in offen-
America’s anabasis
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sive preventive action. The need for a pre-emptive military intervention against this grave and growing threat by the fall of 2002 had become the political agenda undergirding all intervention planning. These two key factors set the course for America’s intervention policy toward Iraq – an intervention derived from a limited political/military objective of ending the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq. From this tension developed three options of planning courses of action: a deployment scheme similar to Desert Shield/Storm (1990–91); an almost nonotice deployment in which the war would start with very few forces on the ground in Kuwait; and a hybrid that combined elements of both former approaches.15 Most official accounts that have appeared since the beginning of the war in 2003 have argued that few, if any, of the operational planners, particularly those on the military side of the planning, thought that the Saddam regime would immediately collapse under the pressure of simultaneous attacks along multiple lines of operation (avenues of advance). Much planning and rehearsal time and resources were nevertheless expended on developing plans for this remote possibility. The option of simultaneous attack for a rapid decisive effective regime collapse was, again, reflective of both a political desire for an immediate addressing of the grave and growing threat posed by the Hussein regime as well as an American tradition for quick (and if possible, costless) decisive victories in its war-fights and interventions. Three iterations of planning took place, each reflecting of different sets of operational conditions, but all were influenced by the political intent for a quicker than later resolution of the Hussein problem. Each included the idea of simultaneous attack from the air and on the ground, with the number of units available serving as the key variable in those calculations. Figure 1.1 lays out the evolution of the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) concept plan (CONPLAN) and operational plan (OPLAN) development process.16 This CFLCC planning sequence paralleled that of Central Command with the intent of ensuring an effective integration and synchronization of these two key echelons of planning and theater-strategic intervention policy implementation (execution) – a process in the military known as “nesting.” The first iteration (OPLAN BLUE, war gamed through simulation, March–April 2002) was regarded as the “generated start option,” which assumed a build-up of forces until all the forces required had arrived in theater before the initiation of major combat operations (i.e. before initiation of the “war” as it was to be seen by planners and decision makers alike). Planners then developed a second option – the “running start” (OPLAN IMMINENT BADGER, war gamed April–July 2002) – which reflected assumptions of launching combat operations with minimum forces and continuing to deploy forces and employ them as they arrived in theater.17 The final option derived from the war-gaming that took place in regard to the running start option. During simulation trials of the “running start” plan, planners determined that the minimum force required
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VIGILANT GUARDIAN SEP. 01–MAR. 02 One corps limited objective attack to create battlespace and secure the southern Iraqi oil fields TPFDL
Continuous tension regarding amount of force required “on the ground” to begin the ground operation
OPLAN BLUE MAR. 02–APR. 02 Two corps simultaneous attack to isolate Baghdad Generated Start Force TPFDL
IMMINENT BADGER APR. 02–JUL. 02
Two corps sequential attack to Isolate Baghdad Running Start Force TPFDL/Force Packages
Northern line of operation • Hea vy/light BCT – demonstration • Hea vy/light BCT – limited objective attack • Two division (Coalition) – supporting attack • Division combat team – suppor ting attack
COBRA II JUL. 02–MAR. 03 Two corps simultaneous attack to remove regime TPFDL/force modules/RFF’s ? ? ? No TPFDL ? ? ? ECLIPSE II JAN. 03–APR. 03 Initially two corps restore stability planning began JUN. 02
Figure 1.1 Evolution of the CFLCCC CONPLAN and OPLAN.
under the running start option was inadequate. As a result, a “hybrid plan” was developed that better reflected the forces required to effectively meet the objectives of the war – collapse of the Hussein regime. This hybrid plan eventually evolved into OPLAN Cobra II – the plan directing the invasion and ground campaign that led to the collapse of the Hussein regime on April 9, 2003. This plan, unlike its predecessor plans, had no confirmed and formalized time-phased force deployment list (TPFDL) – that is, no detailed and dedicated assignment, or mobilization and deployment scheduling, of units devoted to the plan, the lack of which only adding to the ambiguities of OPLAN Cobra II regarding scope of the mission and whether or not troops deployed and assigned were adequate for the full scale campaign lying ahead. An inadequate plan The hybrid plan that was developed by military planners in response to their realizations through simulation and war-gaming that more forces were required – demanded – by the anticipated conditions on the ground during the intervention was not the decided plan for resourcing, nor for eventual execution. What did ultimately become the campaign plan for OIF was a “compromise” of the running start and hybrid options. In the end the plan reflected a compromise
America’s anabasis
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solution between the hybrid and running start options that provided more forces than planned under running start scenarios, but fewer than estimated as required for the hybrid plan. This compromise plan reflected little to none of the force requirements of the first and original “generated start” courses of action. Most of the officers taking part in this planning process preferred the simultaneous attacks afforded by the hybrid plan, once the decision process relegated the options to a zero-sum calculation between this alternative versus the paucity of the running start option. Nevertheless, the policy implemented was one that reflected the desires and determination of what was acceptable by the administration. The number of forces required was the single most important variable around which all planning variants revolved. The question of how much force is required to either stay the present course, or change the course but stay the fight in Iraq to win, continues to define the war in Iraq and the U.S. future role in it.18 The official U.S. Army “early” history of ground war in Iraq, On Point, acknowledged the pre-eminent importance of this question and also noted the persistent operational and strategic ambiguity that derived from an inability of force planners, operational planners, and decision makers alike to come to an agreement on the right approach to executing the strategy. As On Point puts it, “the end was never in question – remove the regime; but the specific method, or way, required to achieve this strategic goal was the subject of contentious debate. Without agreement on the way – simultaneous or sequential – there rarely was agreement on the amount of force or means required.”19 Though accurate in its own context, this early assessment is incomplete to say the least. This assessment reflects an assumption that the end driving the intervention policy planning (“remove the regime”) reflected the correct or appropriate political objective of the intervention. The fact of the matter has proven to be this: removal of the Hussein regime, though a necessary condition to victory was insufficient in, and of, itself as the means toward the greater end of achieving a sustainable and legitimate quality of stability and peace in Iraq. Moreover, the chosen method, or way, of intervention – major combat operations by use of military force – was to prove not only insufficient, but in hindsight a likely contributing cause to the rise in insurgent and anti-American (anti-occupation) sentiment and condition in Iraq today. Although On Point, and similar early histories like it, correctly acknowledge the errors in the military planning for major combat operations against Saddam Hussein, all either ignored, or simply failed to recognize, the wider failures of planning and execution: the failure to plan for and execute an intervention policy and the civil–military plans and strategy for that policy, that reflected and addressed the complete array of objectives, requirements, responsibilities, challenges, threats, and opportunities of the war that was to be “at-hand” in Iraq. Figure 1.2 once again graphically represents the military approach to concept, operational planning, and execution of OIF. It reflects, as noted in the white text boxes, where effective and robust operational planning began, existed, and stopped – ending far shy of the actual political object of the war-policy.
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Decisive maneuver
C F C
PHASE III
Regime Removal/Transition
IVa Stabilization
IVb Recovery IVc Transition CJTF – IRAQ
DP
DP
Interim administration
C F L C C
CFLCC exercises military authority on regional basis Decisive maneuver
DP
DP
Regime removal/ transition
PHASE III
PHASE IV Baghdad Regime collapse/ isolated military defeat
CFLCC redeployed
Independent Iraqi Govt
OFFENSE STABILITY
SUPPORT
The Nature of Operations
Figure 1.2 Phase IV: concept and nesting.
What this particular graphic shows is why there was a plan to win the war but none to win the peace, from the perspective of the mechanics of the campaign. Focusing on the ground (division-level) effort, the chart shows a linear conception to operations, with offensive operations taking place predominately during what is to be regarded as “decisive operations” (Phases I–IIIb of OPLAN 1003V). Phase IV then follows, after completion of regime collapse, dominated by operations falling under the rubric of “stability” and then “support operations.” The graphic shows an effective, well-planned, well-coordinated, and adequately resourced (i.e. effectively “nested”) operational campaign plan for the major combat operation phases of the war contrasting with an impoverished plan (“un-nested”) for the “rest of the war” – Phase IV, or what is today regarded as the stability and reconstruction phases of the campaign. This imbalance of resourcing and planning gives an indication of the mal-alignment of aims and action in the Iraq campaign. The plan for the major combative operations to bring about the end of Hussein’s state regime was not a plan for peace, or for the winning of the whole war – it was, as planned, nothing more than a military plan for destruction and annihilation.
History is written by the victors What will our contemporary Xenophon eventually record about this Iraq War? We are years, and more than likely decades away from real historical account-
America’s anabasis
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ings of the war. Until that time, however, the recordings of our early historians are important as they can help us to avoid some of the more tragic elements of what is clear, even this close to the war still in progress, confirming what did not work – and perhaps what will not work in interventions of this day and age. Phases I through III of OIF was a “march up country” of a traditional and conventional sort. America’s anabasis was not all that different from Xenophon’s 3,000 years earlier. But this “reality” and condition set, dramatically changed on April 9, 2003, when the Saddam regime came tumbling down. U.S. and coalition forces, however, remained on the original anabasis, directing preparations for the “march” out of the country. The dramatic change of the situation in Iraq (from dynamic and rapid major combat operations to a condition of steady-state, protracted combat, stability, and support operations) brought with it a whole new set of numbers and equations that needed to have been added to the modern correlations of forces and means. America is suffering from a form of methodical battle syndrome.20 Ours is a unique and particularly virulent form of the sickness. Planning for interventions must reflect the realities of the contemporary operating environment. At present, our concept of, and approach to, war and peace does not match with the contemporary realities. Rigid adherence to past plans and planning processes is a path that leads to the bane of methodical battle. The fact that we could have planned and carried out the initial battles against the Iraqi state so expertly, only to squander that initial success in the absence of a plan for winning the wider war – the peace that was to follow – may indicate that we are closer to falling into the trap of methodical battle than we might wish to admit. Our ability and willingness to thinking beyond our past ways of war and peace, and forward toward a new approach to intervention planning will surely decide how effective our future actions will be, both in war and in peace.
Notes 1 Xenophon, Anabasis, translation by Carleton L. Brownson (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998). Also accessible online at, classics.mit.edu/Xenophon/ xen.anab.html. 2 Wilson III, Isaiah, “What Kind of War?” unpublished paper, February 2005, (under review with Proceedings, Naval Institute Press). 3 The Operation Iraqi Freedom Study Group (OIFSG) was a history-recording and Army Strategic Planning Board-related research initiative formed and missioned by General Eric Shinseki, at the time the chief of staff of the United States Army. The OIFSG was formed in early April 2003, a week after the initiation of ground combat in Iraq. The group was tasked with following U.S. and coalition forces during their historic march up country, conduct interviews with soldiers and their generals along that long hazardous expedition, record and chronicle what was observed first-hand, to include flaws in operational planning and materiel failings and shortfalls that hampered the pure and noble courage of the soldiers in the efforts on the ground. Most of the accounts written on the major combat operation phase of the war, to date, have made use of over 4,000 gigabytes of data collected and coded by the OIFSG. 4 See, Amy Zegart, Flawed By Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).
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5 Conrad Crane, presentation delivered at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) Conference on the Iraq War, November 2, 2005. 6 See, Wilson III, Isaiah, “Thinking Beyond War: Civil–Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq,” presentation delivered to the American Political Science Association (APSA) Annual Conference (Washington, DC, September 2–5, 2004), and the Cornell Peace Studies Program (PSP), Cornell University (October 17, 2004). Accessible online at, www.einaudi.cornell.edu/PeaceProgram/calendar/index.asp? id3989. 7 For this political science definition and description of “regime change,” see Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983). 8 Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) relates to compelling an adversary to undertake certain actions or denying the adversary the ability to coerce or attack others. Although many RDO principles will apply to larger-scale, longer-lasting operations, the RDO concept is not intended as a preliminary phase of a protracted campaign. This RDO concept is founded in the key constructs of Joint Vision 2010, a Joint Staff document that looked to the development of U.S. military capabilities. The concept has also been outlined by the May 1997 Capstone Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO). The RDO concept focuses on how a highly deployable, lethal, agile, survivable, and supportable joint force can rapidly defeat an adversary’s operational and strategic centers of gravity. The essence of the concept emphasizes situational understanding, immediate response capability, speed, and massing of effects rather than forces. Distinguished from traditional operations, this approach usually will not focus on seizing and occupying territory in the battlespace except for a limited purpose; that purpose being to generate an otherwise unobtainable opportunity for precision engagement, to secure a key decisive point, or to protect the civilian populace. Forces inserted for these purposes would have the capability to be withdrawn quickly and employed elsewhere. An RDO campaign typically will be characterized by immediate, continuous, and overwhelming operations to shock and paralyze the adversary, destroy their ability to coordinate offensive and defensive operations, fragment their capabilities, and foreclose their most dangerous options (accessed online at, www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/rdo.htm). 9 The exact Clausewitz quotation states, “Wars cannot be divorced from political life; and whenever this occurs in our thinking about war, the many links that connect the two elements are destroyed and we are left with something pointless and devoid of sense.” Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 605. 10 Wilson, “Thinking Beyond War: Civil–Military Operational Planning in Northern Iraq.” 11 Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Military and Defense Policy” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002). 12 The majority of my data on prewar planning was obtained during my personal research while serving with the OIF Study Group (OIFSG), as well as from the OIFSG publication, On Point: The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2004). 13 Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degan, and David Tohn, On Point: The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2005), p. 44. 14 Ibid. Also see, Tommy Franks, American Soldier (New York: Regan Books, 2004). 15 Fontenot, Degan, and Tohn, On Point: The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, p. 45. 16 The “Northern Line of Operation” box describes the attack options that were under consideration and war gaming back in 2002 – plans for the opening of a second front, in the north, facilitated by the opening of a line of operation and deployment through Turkey. This “second front” was largely thwarted by a refusal on the part of the government in Ankara to allow U.S./Coalition forces land bases and transit authorities through Turkey.
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17 Ibid. 18 Casie Vinal, “US Will Stay the Course in Iraq, Bush Says,” accessed online at, www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2003/n07102003_200307101.html. Also, see this author’s contribution to the “Should we stay or should we go?” debate, “Are We Winning Yet?” Council on Foreign Relations Term Member Conference debate notes, accessible via www.cfr.org. 19 Fontenot, Degan, and Tohn, On Point: The U.S. Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, p. 46. 20 Methodical battle tends to utilize rigidly centralized command structures that require little or no creativity or initiative from lower-level leadership (also called “top-down” or “command push” tactics). The semi-static, large scale battles of the American Civil War and World War I are classic examples of methodical warfare. See Thomas Donnelly and Sean Naylor, Clash of Chariots (New York: Berkeley Publishing, 1996) and Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat (New York: W.W. Norton, 1968).
2
Iraqi military effectiveness Kevin M. Woods, with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey
Yes, the guards play a very important role, and we thank Allah. In history when they write about Napoleon’s guard, they will arrange them next to the Republican Guard of Iraq. Saddam Hussein (Captured media file, [approximately 1993] “Saddam discussing issues related to the war in 1991”)
Any evaluation of Iraqi military effectiveness must first take cognizance of the often-pathological behavior of most Iraqi generals and senior officers.1 Saddam’s Iraq, however, was a world apart from a Western conception of military professionalism. Iraqi officers rarely expected to give professional advice. Instead, they understood that their role was to ensure Saddam’s dictates were followed to the letter, often no matter how infeasible or irrelevant to the military problem. They also expected and accepted intrusions into even the most mundane military affairs. For example, in a meeting in 1995 on the readiness state of the Republican Guard, a senior officer reported to Saddam: May God protect you sir. Despite all the moral considerations, there is another subject that should be brought up to you, sir, with complete honesty. We, the Republican Guard, feel prouder day after day. We are in better shape when it comes to training and accuracy in our job. The truth is we could not have achieved this without accurate follow up and the supervision of our honorable supervisor [Qusay Hussein]. He didn’t leave any place of the Republican Guard without visiting it, whether at training or during normal daily activities. He visited the soldiers, their sleeping places, and the kitchens . . . All the guards are now talking about the visit of the honorable Qusay, and they declare it proudly in front of all people.2 In such an atmosphere, it is almost useless to judge Iraqi military effectiveness by the standard measures of equipment, organization, and doctrine. In Iraq, internal political concerns infused every aspect of the military and its employment. Simply put, the Iraqi military’s main mission was to ensure the internal security of the Ba’ath dictatorship. Its second was to fight wars.
Iraqi military effectiveness 23
Assessing Iraqi tactical capabilities Before the war, the U.S. Central Command had developed a fairly accurate assessment of Iraq’s tactical capabilities.3 Nevertheless, the way the Iraqis employed those capabilities during the war often surprised U.S. combat commanders. They found it a constant challenge to try and fathom future Iraqi military moves: so little of what they were witnessing on the battlefield made sense to soldiers trained in the Western tradition. However, within the context of Saddam’s regime, even apparently logic-defying moves made perfect sense. None of this should suggest that reasonable courses of action were actually open to the Iraqis that could have changed the war’s outcome. Coalition forces had prepared to meet an army that would fight tenaciously but in a style more familiar to their own outlook on the employment of military forces. That the Coalition fought a force focused on internal affairs and bedeviled by political interference was so much the better. However, to develop an understanding of Iraqi decision-making and actions on the battlefield, it is vital to understand all of the factors within their political-military system that limited military effectiveness. By 2003, the Iraqi military was reeling from 13 years of almost continuous engagement with Coalition air forces, the accumulating effects of sanctions, and the insidious impact of dysfunctional regime policies. These pressures had all helped to propel the Iraqi military into a state of chronic decline. Concerned about everything except fighting wars, the cultural and organizational dynamics of the Iraqi military, which once aspired to a Western-like profession of arms, became focused on militarily irrelevant – but for them life or death – issues. The foremost example of declining Iraqi military effectiveness lay in the condition of the Iraqi Air Force, which failed to launch a single sortie against the Coalition invasion force. According to the commander of Iraq’s Air Force and Air Defense Force, failure to launch was the result of Saddam Hussein’s decision that the Air Force would not participate in the war. Apparently, Saddam reasoned that the quality and quantity of the Iraqi Air Force’s equipment would make it worse than useless against Coalition air forces. Consequently, he had decided to save the Air Force for future needs, ordering his commanders to hide their aircraft.4 This decision is yet another indication that he did not believe Coalition ground forces would reach into the heart of Iraq and that his regime would survive whatever conflict ensued. To implement the decision to preserve the Air Force, which Saddam decided only two months before the war, the Iraqis moved most of their aircraft away from operational airfields and camouflaged them in palm groves. They also buried other aircraft literally in sand to hide them from prowling Coalition air forces, where American forces dug them up after the war. The refusal of the Iraqi Air Force to engage is reminiscent of Desert Storm when Saddam ordered a significant portion of the Air Force to flee to Iran. This time, however, Saddam ruled out the option of seeking Iranian sanctuary. He remarked, “The Iranians are even stronger than before; they now have our Air Force.”5 Even with his
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regime under dire threat, Saddam’s thoughts were never far away from the regional power balance.
Schemes and “bureaucratic eloquence” Besides the regime’s political calculus, which constantly worried senior officials and focused on almost everything except resisting a Coalition invasion, another factor reduced military effectiveness: sanctions. For more than 12 years, United Nations sanctions had attacked the very fiber of the Iraqi military by making it difficult to purchase new equipment, procure spare parts, or fund adequate training. Attempts to overcome the effects of the sanctions led Saddam to the Military Industrial Commission as a means to sustain the military.6 The Commission and a related series of special organizations steadily promised new capabilities to offset the effects of poor training, poor morale, and neglected equipment. Saddam apparently waited for the delivery of wonder weapons that would reverse the tide of defeat.7 One Republican Guard officer described the insidious effect of sanctions on the military in the following terms: The government made rapid efforts to limit the negative direct and indirect effects of the savage sanctions on the weapons and activities of the military forces. Unfortunately, they were the wrong kind of efforts. The army continued to fight the schemes of the Military Industrial Commission, which played an important role in promising secret weapons it would never deliver while most types of things we needed were neglected. These people received large amounts of financial support, but the army could not get simple things. As time passed, President Saddam Hussein set aside many resources for the commission departments that were difficult to afford and led to a large amount of administrative corruption in the commission directorates to keep the money coming to them.8 The Iraqi naval forces fared no better. According to a former commander of the Iraqi Navy: The best we could ever hope to do was defend the beaches with light infantry, artillery, and light weapons. We had a regiment of infantry, which we could only man at a level of 60 percent, maximum. Between 1991 and 1998, the navy’s personnel strength dropped from approximately 25,000 to 9,000. We no longer had much equipment, so our need for high numbers of personnel was gone. At one point we tried to get boats made for us. We went to the Military Industrial Commission to get a private company to make boats for us. The commission also promised to get missiles as well. They made the launchers, but were late in making the missiles because some essential equipment was caught in so-called “procedural delays.” After the two years of this project we still had no boats, and by the end of the third year, the war came and interrupted the plans.9
Iraqi military effectiveness 25 A captured Military Industrial Commission annual report for 2002–2003 investments showed more than 170 research projects with an estimated value of more than 320 million Iraqi dinars. The Commission divided projects among areas such as equipment, engineering, missiles, electronics, strategic weapons, artillery, and air forces. One senior Iraqi official alleged that the Commission’s leaders were so fearful of Saddam that when he ordered them to initiate weapons programs that they knew Iraq could not develop, they told him they could accomplish the project with ease. Later, when Saddam asked for progress reports, they simply faked plans and designs to show progress when no program existed. This constant stream of false or at best optimistic, reporting, undoubtedly accounts for why many of Saddam’s calculations on operational, strategic, and political issues made perfect sense to him. According to Tariq Aziz: The people in the Military Industrialization Commission (sic) were liars. They lied to you, and they lied to Saddam. They were always saying that they were producing or procuring special weapons so that they could get favors out of Saddam – money, cars, everything – but they were liars. If they did all of this business and brought in all of these secret weapons, why didn’t they work?10 However, the Military Industrial Commission members were not the only ones lying. This was particularly true of the most trusted members of the inner circle – especially if negative news reflected poorly on their responsibilities or reputation.11 In the years before Operation Iraqi Freedom, everyone around Saddam understood that his need to hear only good news was constantly growing and it was in their best interest to feed that need. As noted earlier, honest reporting of military readiness and capabilities became the exception, not the rule. Many commanders simply became afraid to put their positions, possibly their livelihoods, or even lives at risk by challenging the given truth.12 One senior minister noted, “Directly disagreeing with Saddam Hussein’s ideas was unforgivable. It would be suicide.”13 Another official said that there existed an almost reflexive tendency to pass on good news and to never contradict what they had previously told Saddam. According to one former high-ranking Ba’ath official: Saddam had an idea about Iraq’s conventional and potential unconventional capabilities, but never an accurate one because of the extensive lying occurring in that area. Many reports were falsified. The ministers attempted to convey a positive perspective with reports, which were forwarded to Saddam’s secretary, who in turn passed them up to Saddam.14 In another instance, Saddam commissioned a series of reviews and studies of lessons learned after the 1991 Gulf War with the Coalition. One might assume this would have represented a singular opportunity for the military to bring some
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reality into Saddam’s conception of the world. Just the fact he was calling for, a lessons-learned discussion could be interpreted that perhaps Saddam recognized something had gone wrong. However, these reviews and studies started from the assumption that Saddam’s decision to invade Kuwait was militarily sound. Therefore, the “lessons learned” efforts did not take into account the complete scope of Gulf War experiences. The opportunity was too much for the military commanders to handle. Presented with a one-of-a-kind opportunity to tell the truth, they passed. During one recorded review of a post-Desert Storm study, the Commander of the Republican Guard strode to the podium with confidence and listed the “great” accomplishments of his forces during the “Mother of All Battles,” among them were: • •
•
creating impenetrable and perfectly camouflaged command bunkers; analyzing the battlefield and deploying in such a way as to make the American nuclear-tipped Pershing missiles useless (no mention of the facts that the United States did not deploy Pershing missiles during the war, or that by dispersing their forces to avoid nuclear attack, the Iraqis became easy prey for the massed Coalition armor); determining the specific method and timing of U.S. operations so that “once the attack began, we were clearly expecting it.” (Nothing was in the presentation about how the Iraqis were helped by President Bush giving them an ultimatum and countdown.)15 According to the then-Republican Guard Commander, As a result of all these successful preparations, our losses were not as devastating as the arsenal that was used against the Iraqi Army during the period should suggest. So this clearly shows that the Republican Guard and the other Iraqi armed forces were able to dig in and deploy wisely, and thus minimize the damage of the aerial power . . .16
In Saddam’s conception of victory, the ability to escape total annihilation equated to military success. Fear of Saddam’s reaction to bad news was not the sole prerogative of his ministers and soldiers. Its pernicious tentacles even reached into Saddam’s immediate family. One former high-level official related the following story about Qusay Hussein and an opportunity for at least a modicum of honest readiness reporting: At the end of 2000, it came to Saddam’s attention that approximately seventy military vehicles were immobile. Saddam told Qusay to resolve the problem. Republican Guard mechanics claimed they could repair the vehicles if the funds were made available. Qusay agreed to the work and funds were provided for the task. Once the work was completed, Qusay sent a representative to inspect the vehicles and he found them lined up on a
Iraqi military effectiveness 27 vehicle park thirty-five vehicles on each side. The vehicles looked like new, having been freshly painted and cleaned. After Qusay’s representative inspected them, a second inspection was conducted to verify that they were now operational. The staff was told to supply drivers to move all vehicles to the opposite side of the vehicle park to ensure they were in working order. None of the seventy vehicles would start. When this was reported to Qusay, he instructed that Saddam not be informed, as Qusay had already told Saddam that the vehicles were operational.17 In the end, Qusay did not order mechanics to fix the vehicles – it appears that he was only eager to have this failure be hidden from his father. As if lying were not enough, there were further impediments to the flow of information within the regime. One such impediment was the requirement to embellish even the simplest fact with fawning over Saddam, as evidenced by the Minister of Defense’s relation that a training exercise called Golden Falcon took place: In reference to your Excellency’s instructions regarding the large exercises at the Public Centre, having strong faith in the only God of our hearts, and God’s permanent support to the believers, the faithful, the steadfast, and with great love that we have for our great homeland and our Great Leader, our Great Leader has won God’s favor and the love of his dear people in the day of the grand homage. Your enthusiastic soldiers from our courageous armed forces have executed Golden Falcon Exercise number 11. In this exercise we have tested our readiness and confrontation plans against any who attempt to impure the lands of civilization and the homeland of missions and prophets. This exercise is the widest and most successful in achieving the required results. Soldiers from the III and IV Corps have participated in this exercise. And, on this occasion, and on behalf of your heroic men in the great army of Iraq, I have the pleasure and the honor to reaffirm the manhood pledge to confront plans of conspiracy and aggression, and in the name of God, we shall not bargain the truth for vanity, neither let depravity prevail against mortality, nor shall we fear anyone save God, and we shall bow-down only before God. The curse and the entire curse shall be put upon Washington, London, and Tel-Aviv, who are the supporters of the devil, depravity, and corruption and upon whom ever supports them. And, God willing, The Great Iraq shall achieve victory, and with God’s help this victory is very near.18 More notable was the fact that the Iraqis conducted Golden Falcon in anticipation of an Iranian invasion just months before the Coalition invasion. This was one more indicator of how Saddam actually considered Iran to be the real threat and how little he regarded the potential finality of decisive American action. There was no indication that the two corps actually conducted any significant maneuver or field training exercise during this period.
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This kind of bureaucratic “eloquence” extended to every level of military organization. Some documents show that flowery language replaced actual orders to units. One example is a March 9, 2003 instruction marked as a movement order from the Al-Hussein brigade to one of its combat groups: The Third Group, al-Quds Army . . . and other formations attached to it are fighting valiantly, placing their trust in God Almighty, until the end that He proscribes, which God willing will be the enemy’s defeat and his withdrawal, and a victory for us that will please our friends and grieve our enemies . . .19 After the war, several of the more capable military commanders commonly noted four other factors that seriously affected military readiness, each of which is discussed in greater detail in the following sections. • • • •
The mostly irrelevant military guidance passed from the political leadership to the lowest level of military operations. The creation and rise of private armies. The tendency for relatives and sycophants to rise to the top national security positions. The combined effects of the onerous security apparatus and the resulting limitations on authority.
Many senior Iraqi military officers blamed this “coup-proofing” of the regime for most of what befell the Iraqi Army during Operation Iraqi Freedom.20
Irrelevant guidance According to one Iraqi general, “All military planning was directed by Saddam and a selected few. It was much like Hitler and his generals after 1944.”21 After 1991, Saddam’s confidence in his military commanders steadily eroded, while his confidence in his own abilities as a military genius strengthened. Like a number of other amateurs in history who dabbled in military affairs, Saddam began to issue a seemingly endless stream of banal instructions. He could not resist giving detailed training guidance at the same time he became fascinated with the ethereal military capabilities promised by the Military Industrial Commission. Dozens of surviving memoranda mirrored the 2002 Iraqi top secret document “Training Guidance to the Republican Guard” (described below). They all hint at the guidance military officers received from Saddam on a regular basis. One chapter from the Training Guidance document, “Notes and directions given by Saddam Hussein to his elite soldiers to cover the tactics of war,” charged them to train in the following ways: • •
train in a way that allows you to defeat your enemy; train all units’ members in swimming;
Iraqi military effectiveness 29 • •
train your soldiers to climb palm trees so that they may use these places for navigation and sniper shooting; and train on smart weapons.22
Similar instructions were repeated in almost every training manual issued to the armed forces. In time, Saddam’s wisdom became a substitute for real training. In Saddam’s view, such simple guidance was necessary to keep his commanders focused on what he considered the important issues in combat. For him, the key to all things military was violence of execution. In discussing the proper employment of the Republican Guard, he reminded his generals that it should be kept away from skirmishes. I mean, if it is sent in, I want it to be decisive. The Republican Guard will consider anyone on the battlefield an enemy. I don’t want to complicate things for them.23 For most Western military organizations, a key to effectiveness rests on its ability to absorb and profit from past battlefield experiences; and one thing Iraq was not short of was recent battlefield experience. However, even if they understood the lessons, the senior leaders in the Iraqi military appeared incapable of either applying them or else extrapolating from their own experiences to deal with future contingencies. For instance, the Iran–Iraq war (1980–1988) appeared to have conditioned Iraq’s generals to fight bloody, slow-tempo, slugfests over prolonged periods. Therefore, when the high-tempo Coalition forces smashed into Iraqi forces in Desert Storm, the Iraqi operational command structure became overloaded and largely collapsed. Whatever lessons Iraq’s generals took away from Desert Storm did nothing to prepare them for the speed and tempo that Coalition forces imposed on them in Operation Iraqi Freedom. As usual, this problem started at the top. In the aftermath of the 1991 war, the Iraqis made extensive efforts to “learn” from their experiences on the battlefields in Desert Storm. These attempts were hampered by Saddam’s conviction that his ground forces had performed well in the fighting. This forced officers compiling Iraqi lessons-learned analyses to avoid issues that might involve Saddam’s prestige or questioned Iraqi fighting abilities. Instead, they focused on peripheral issues that were almost totally irrelevant to winning wars. We have already seen how these self-imposed restrictions led to such perverse claims as the Republican Guard actually won the war by avoiding annihilation: If it were not for these precautions, we would have suffered great loss, but when we compare our losses with the large number of fighter aircraft, missiles, and artillery bombing that the Iraqi Army was subject to we find these losses trifling. That proved that the Republican Guards and the armed forces managed to reduce the danger from air strikes.24 This was just one of dozens of briefings on Desert Storm that drove home the point that in the issues that mattered, Iraq had done well in that conflict. In a
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short time, the constant repetition of these lessons – dispersing, digging deep bunkers, and hiding the Iraqi Army – became the de facto operational doctrine. Little evidence exists that any of the politicized Iraqi generals understood the advantages in maneuverability, speed, exploitation, command and control, or the training that the U.S. forces enjoyed.25 However, by the time the military was ready to brief Saddam on the lessons of the Gulf War, they fully understood the danger of presenting Saddam truths other than those of which he had already convinced himself. Truthful analyses, therefore, gave way to belittlement of the American victory and discounting that America had any advantage over Iraq other than in military technology. This comment from a mid-1990s conference is typical: After the liberation of our land in Kuwait, and despite the fact that more than thirty countries headed by the occupation forces of the U.S. rushed madly upon our Republican Guard, our performance was heroic.26 One author captures well the reality behind these revisions of Gulf War history: From the ruins, Baghdad radio spoke of the war as “a great achievement” and called the withdrawal “heroic.” Baghdad’s official version of the events reminded some Iraqis of the story of an Italian general defeated at AlAlamain by General Montgomery. When reproached for having allowed his forces to flee the battle, he solemnly remarked, “Yes, we ran away – but like lions.”27
The rise of private armies It is hard to overestimate the effects that the Shi’a and Kurd uprisings in 1991 had on Saddam’s outlook. The threat of another uprising consistently remained his top security concern. One of the precautions he took to prevent and, when necessary, quell a future disturbance was to create private armies made up of politically reliable troops: the Saddam Fedayeen, the Al-Quds Army, and the Ba’ath militia. Most Western analysts have argued that Saddam created these (and spin-off organizations) to help defend Iraq from external attack. This was indeed the case, but only much later in their development and after Saddam’s growing fascination with the success of the Palestinian intifadas and with the American experience in Somalia. However, documents emerging after Operation Iraqi Freedom indicate that the original and primary purpose of the paramilitaries had little to do with defending Iraq from invasion. Because these organizations had a dramatic effect on army recruiting and stripped the military of needed equipment, they actually had negative impacts on conventional elements of national security. Worse still, when they eventually were committed to battle against the onrushing Coalition forces, they were obliterated in short order.
Iraqi military effectiveness 31 The Al-Quds Army The Al-Quds Army was a regional militia created to control specific areas, and after the experience of 1991, to crush as rapidly as possible any disturbance that did occur. Always conscious of Iraq’s “historic” mission, Saddam created the Al-Quds (named after the Arabic word for “Jerusalem”) and claimed the liberation of Jerusalem as its purpose. Its actual size could not be determined at the time of this writing, but it was likely an order-of-magnitude less than the seven million strong Saddam’s advisors claimed it to be. The best estimate is that close to 500,000 joined the Al-Quds, but coming with widely varying degrees of commitment. Currently available documents on the Al-Quds organization indicate that its leaders never seriously considered marching to liberate Jerusalem. Rather, they exclusively focused on defending specific Iraqi locales listed in various Ba’ath “emergency” plans. For example, the August 2002 emergency plan for the city of Kirkuk, located 50 miles north of Baghdad, described the friendly forces as including the various Governate and local Ba’ath militia commands as well as the Al-Quds force. This detailed planning document described the mission AlQuds “fighters” as follows: The Ba’ath Governate Forces Command – Al Quds, supported by subordinate troops, shall fight the enemy rebels boldly. With deep belief in the Mighty God, our forces shall achieve an earth shaking triumph on that enemy, and will prevent that enemy from achieving any despised goals. We shall keep stability and security.28 The specified tasks that flowed from this less-than-specific mission statement provides a glimpse of the national security utility of various Ba’ath military capabilities: •
• • •
defend the sector of responsibility from Al-Hurriyyah playground east to the Laylan Bridge south and . . . prevent the enemy rebels from occupying it, no matter what it may cost; protect vital establishments within responsibility limits by assigning a proper force and identifying the commandant and the assistant; prevent rebels from infiltrating into the town to achieve their goals, maintain security and stability in town; keep all possible village routes and roads under surveillance to prevent saboteurs infiltrating into town.29
One finds the same tone in contingency planning for the Al-Quds in southern Iraq, where the Shi’a represented the main threat. The Commander of the Al-Quds Karbala Division issued a detailed plan on March 9, 2003 for dealing with internal and external threats. His plan took the form of protecting against what he termed “agent-inspired spontaneous disorder against vital targets in order to destroy the
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infrastructure of Iraq and create pressures against the nation.”30 This commander also worried that this time the Coalition might assist the rebels with “a media and psychological war meant to affect morale” and possibly “a push towards vital targets with the use of infantry supported by air force and helicopters.”31 In response to the anticipated threats, the order spelled out the following tasks: • • • • •
prepare alternative methods to deal with the possibility of an interruption in communication; combat rumors and hostile propaganda; keep the main roads open at all times and adopt flexible and effective measures if bridges are destroyed; move, camouflage, and hide all weapons, equipment and vehicles to their assigned holes, disperse and evacuate, move to alternative headquarters; avoid using the entire force in the early stages until after the most serious threat has been identified.32
As to their value as a military force in time of war, the Minister of Defense best expressed the conventional military evaluation of their capabilities: The Quds Force was a headache, they had no equipment for a serious war, and their creation was a bad idea. The Ministry of Defense was required to give them weapons that were taken from the real Army. But the Army had no control of them. Their instructions came only from the President’s office and not from normal military channels.33 According to another senior Iraqi general, the Al-Quds was not a serious combat force: “It never had anything to do with the liberation of Jerusalem or fighting the Zionists, and was merely another organ of regime protection.”34 During the war, the system crafted by Saddam continued to pass a stream of boasts, half-truths, and of lies about the abilities and performance of the AlQuds. Because he fully expected its members to fight like lions and bleed the Americans dry, no one was courageous enough to tell him the truth. A typical report from early in the war was captured by a public release from the Iraqi Army General Command: A hostile force backed by jets fighters and helicopters attempted to approach the outskirts of the Al-Muthanna Governate. Our unrivaled men of the Al-Quds Army confronted it and forced it to stop and then retreat. They inflicted on it huge human and equipment losses. This included the destruction of seven vehicles of various types. Congratulations to the Al-Quds Army on its absolute victory over the allies of the wicked Zionists.35 That the event never happened as described was immaterial to the Ba’ath Command. It closely mirrored the stream of Al-Quds reporting throughout late
Iraqi military effectiveness 33 March 2003. For the military high command, reality was whatever Saddam expected it to be. The military advisor to the Commander of the Central Euphrates Region presented a more realistic assessment of the Al-Quds martial spirit on the same day as the above report: According to the leadership, the Ba’ath party members were to fight inside the city and had built some sandbagged positions, while the Al-Quds Force was to remain outside. During my inspection I could not find even 10 percent of the 30,000 Al-Quds that they assured me were ready. When I asked where they were, I was told they were all locals and at that moment they were either at home or changing shifts – but I was assured that they would be right back. In the Al-Quds fighting positions, where I should have found approximately 200 soldiers, there were not even 50 present.36 The reality that Saddam’s inner circle refused to tell him was that the AlQuds started dissolving as American tanks approached. By the time Coalition tanks arrived at many Al-Qud defensive positions, Saddam’s vaunted warriors had vanished. As another military advisor to the Central Euphrates region noted after the war: The Quds Force numbers were not fixed. Before the war (in normal times) each regiment had 300 fighters. These numbers started dropping to zero during the war. Some were wounded in action, but most deserted.37 This same advisor went on to state that virtually every professional military officer in the field knew what the Ba’athists chose to ignore: All of these Al-Quds were not prepared to fight because their commanders were civilians who had no military experience . . . The military advisors to the Al-Quds had no role, because the Ba’ath commanders made the decisions and wouldn’t listen to the advisor. But Ba’ath commanders, especially Saddam Hussein, lived an illusion. Commanders told him that we have seen millions in the Quds Army and Saddam Hussein would depend on them.38 The Fedayeen Saddam The Fedayeen Saddam is an even more interesting example than the Al-Quds of Saddam’s growing infatuation with popular forces. If the Al-Quds was viewed as a part-time territorial defense force to be used in times of crisis, the Fedayeen Saddam was a permanent force tasked with a number of state security missions. Before the war, Coalition planners believed the Fedayeen Saddam was a paramilitary group with wide ranging missions from counter-insurgency, domestic direct action, and surveillance operations. They also understood that the
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Fedayeen Saddam served as a backup to the regular army and Al-Quds in case of a local uprising.39 Such assessments were generally correct, but the real significance of the Fedayeen Saddam and its sometimes bizarre evolution only became clear after the war. Saddam formed the Fedayeen Saddam in October 1994 in reaction to the Shi’ite and Kurdish uprisings of March 1991. As previously mentioned, these uprisings, which Saddam called “Page of Treason and Treachery,” seared the soul of the regime. Together the Shi’a in the south and the Kurds in the north revealed to Saddam the potentially fatal flaws in his internal security concepts.40 • •
•
First, the local Ba’ath organs were not capable of crushing an uprising by local populations without external support. Second, the Iraqi army, and to a lesser extent the Republican Guard, was unable to act with sufficient speed and ruthlessness to suppress any rebellion. And finally, the tribes of Iraq still represented a significant threat even after more than 25 years of Ba’athist pan-Arabic, socialist indoctrination.
The post-Desert Storm 1991 uprisings as the seminal event in Saddam’s rule cannot be overstated. As with the creation of the Al-Quds, he moved rapidly to create other military capabilities to prevent a recurrence – even at the risk of further weakening Iraq’s military capabilities to defend against an external attack. The fanatically loyal Fedayeen Saddam was the perfect tool to ensure any future revolt would be rapidly crushed. A growing challenge that drove Saddam to expand the powers of the Fedayeen Saddam was maintaining civil order as the effects of the United Nations sanctions began to unravel the social contract of the nation. While many in the West may find it difficult to understand how criminal groups could function effectively in a police state, the tribal culture of Iraq made the formation of secret criminal gangs an easy and often lucrative enterprise. After 1991, criminal gangs became involved in a burgeoning black market, growing steadily in power, influence, and, above all, riches. It is ironic that while the Fedayeen Saddam was charged with controlling a growing lawlessness, its members were heavily involved in large-scale criminal activity.41 It would be easy to view the Fedayeen Saddam as a particularly ruthless state police force, but that would be a mistake. According to Fedayeen Saddam planning documents captured by the Coalition, the mission of the Fedayeen Saddam was to protect Iraq “from any threats inside and outside.”42 To accomplish this mission, the Fedayeen Saddam was to defeat any enemy, defined as whoever sought to sabotage, destroy, or threaten the safety, security, and sovereignty of Iraq, whether from inside or outside, including those involved in the following activities: • •
the destruction of Iraq’s economic environment; smuggling and forging;
Iraqi military effectiveness 35 • • •
spying and being agents; corruption in the armed forces; spreading negative rumors.43
Meticulous Fedayeen Saddam records listed numerous operations conducted in the decade after the creation of the Fedayeen Saddam: • • • •
“extermination operations” against saboteurs in Al-Muthana; an operation to “ambush and arrest” car thieves in Al-Anbar; the monitoring of Shi’ite civilians at the holy places of Karbala; a plan to bomb a humanitarian outpost in Irbil, which the Iraqi secret police suspected of being a Western intelligence operation.44
The Fedayeen Saddam also took part in the regime’s terrorism operations, which they conducted inside Iraq, and at least planned for attacks in major Western cities. In a document dated May 1999, Uday Hussein ordered preparations for “special operations, assassinations, and bombings, for the centers and traitor symbols in London, Iran and the self-ruled areas (Kurdistan).”45 Other captured documents indicated that preparations for a regime-directed wave of terror, codenamed “Blessed July,” against targets outside of Iraq were well underway. Evidence exists that the Fedayeen Saddam had already conducted a number of early operations, particularly against the Kurds and Shi’a. Evidence supporting this contention comes in a letter to Uday Hussein from a Fedayeen Saddam widow who requested help to secure her husband’s pension benefits. According to the letter, her husband, a long-time operative with the security services, had died in July 2000 carrying out a suicide operation for the Fedayeen Saddam against Kurdish opposition parties.46 In the final months before Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Fedayeen Saddam actively began planning operations against the Coalition, including suicide missions aimed at crossing into Kuwait to “explode volcanoes under the feet of the invaders,” if Coalition forces were to reach Baghdad.47 While it appears that they never crossed into Kuwait, a number of Fedayeen Saddam suicide attacks did take place during the war. Equipping and training the Fedayeen Saddam was a priority mission for the regular Iraqi Army and for the fast-growing bureaucracy of the Fedayeen Saddam. The organization also became a hobby for Uday Hussein when he was not running Iraq’s Olympic Committee or the Iraqi Youth Union. Saddam’s support and Uday’s involvement ensured that the Fedayeen Saddam remained near the top of the priority list for men and materiel. Thus, it became just one more organization sapping the strength and morale of the regular Iraqi Army and focusing the security energy at the internal threat. Fedayeen Saddam’s training focused primarily on small arms, small-unit tactics, sabotage techniques, and military surveillance and reconnaissance tasks. The Fedayeen Saddam also became a primary consumer for many of the “niche” military capabilities that proliferated throughout the regime. One such project
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was the Iraqi Intelligence Service’s “Division 27” that supplied the Fedayeen Saddam with silencers, equipment for booby-trapping vehicles, special training on the use of certain explosive devices, special molds for explosives, and a variety of explosive timer.48 The only apparent use for all of this Division 27 equipment was to conduct commando or terrorist operations. The Military Industrial Commission also got into the business of supplying – or at least promising to supply – the Fedayeen Saddam with a surprising array of special capabilities. According to a December 2000 memorandum, these capabilities included specially armed helicopters, unmanned aerial vehicles, and specially modified fishing boats capable of firing rockets with a range of ten to 20 kilometers and torpedoes in international waters.49 Beginning in 1994, the Fedayeen Saddam opened its own paramilitary training camps for volunteers, graduating more than 7,200 “good men racing full with courage and enthusiasm” in the first year.50 Beginning in 1998, these camps began hosting “Arab volunteers from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, ‘the Gulf,’ and Syria.” It is not clear from available evidence where all of these non-Iraqi volunteers who were “sacrificing for the cause” went to ply their newfound skills. Before the summer of 2002, most volunteers went home upon the completion of training.51 But these training camps were humming with frenzied activity in the months immediately prior to the war. As late as January 2003, the volunteers participated in a special training event called the “Heroes Attack.” This training event was designed in part to prepare regional Fedayeen Saddam commands to “obstruct the enemy from achieving his goal and to support keeping peace and stability in the province.”52 Less than 30 days prior to the start of the war, the Directorate of General Military Intelligence’s Special Mission Unit took charge of the training of a group of Fedayeen Saddam volunteers. They were to form “small kamikaze combat groups, equipped with weapons and munitions suitable for use behind enemy lines and on the flanks, by causing additional damage in the enemy’s armor and helicopters.”53 The volunteers attended a condensed 30-day course, which included physical training, weapons training, planning, map reading, recognizing enemy weapons, using communications devices, military engineering, combat in rough conditions, and swimming, then topped off with a practical exercise.54 Assuming this group started training in the first week of March 2003, some of them were undoubtedly available to test their new skills against the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division during its “Thunder Runs” into the heart of Baghdad. Not atypically, corruption soon worked its way into the Fedayeen Saddam. Despite regular showers of cash, on-the-spot bonuses for successful missions, educational benefits, military privileges if injured, martyr privileges if killed, and free land just for volunteering, a number of Fedayeen Saddam still joined the growing underground economy.55 In 2001, reports surfaced that members of the organization were smuggling weapons to the Saudi border for cash and establishing road-blocks in order to shake down travelers unlucky enough to be caught on the roads.56 These failures of discipline elicited a strong response from the regime. After all, the Fedayeen Saddam was the regime’s private army – therefore Saddam
Iraqi military effectiveness 37 expected it to possess the highest standards of personal honor and virtue. Beginning in 1996, harsh penalties in some cases resembling the harshest examples of Sharia (Islamic) law became the norm for the Fedayeen Saddam. These punishments included amputating hands for theft, being tossed off towers for sodomy, being whipped 100 times for sexual harassment, stoning for various infractions, and cutting out tongues for lying.57 Given the mixed missions, it was only a matter of time until military failure also became punishable as a criminal offense. In typical Iraqi bureaucratic fashion, a table of specific failures and the punishment to be meted out was created and approved. In 1998 the Secretariat of the Fedayeen Saddam issued the following “regulations for an execution order against the commanders of the various Fedayeen”: • • • • • •
Any section commander will be executed if his section is defeated. Any platoon commander will be executed, if two of his sections are defeated. Any company commander will be executed, if two of his platoons are defeated. Any regiment commander will be executed, if two of his companies are defeated. Any area commander will be executed if his Governate is defeated. Any Fedayeen Saddam fighter including commanders will be executed, if he hesitates in completing his duties, cooperates with the enemy, gives up his weapons, or hides any information concerning the security of the state.58
No wonder the Fedayeen Saddam often proved the most fanatical fighters among the various Iraqi forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. On numerous occasions, Fedayeen forces hurled themselves against armored columns rushing past the southern cities of As Samawah, An Najaf, and Karbala; and finally even trying to bar entry into Baghdad itself, long after the Republican Guard had mostly quit the field. In the years preceding the Coalition invasion, their leaders became enamored with the belief that the spirit of the Fedayeen “Arab warriors” could overcome rapid maneuver and precision fires that were the major attributes of military doctrine.59 In any event, they proved totally unprepared for the kind of war they were asked to fight, dying by the thousands.
Relatives and sycophants Saddam only truly trusted one person – himself. As a result, he concentrated more and more power directly in himself. The list of leadership positions he had assumed by the early 1990s illustrates this lack of trust: President, Prime Minister, Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, General Secretary of the Ba’ath Party, and Commander of the Armed Forces.60 However, no single man could do everything. Where he was forced to enlist the help of others to handle operational details, Saddam pursued a unique set of hiring criteria. As one senior Iraqi leader noted, Saddam focused on selecting the
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“uneducated, untalented, and those who posed no threat to his leadership for key roles.”61 The ability or talent to do the assigned job was never high on Saddam’s list of attributes for a new hire. As one of Saddam’s closest confidants, Ali Hassan Al-Majid (“Chemical Ali”) noted, “Saddam was always wary of intelligent people. While Saddam liked having men around him with strong personalities, he did not like for those men to show off.”62 Describing Saddam’s approach for choosing those charged with making decisions that directly affected the military, one Republican Guard corps commander commented after the war: Saddam Hussein was personally a brave and bloody man. But, by his decisions he threw out the clever men, or the clever men learned not to involve themselves in any decision-making. They were then replaced by hypocrites who cared not for the people or army, but only cared about pleasing Saddam. This was clear in the last war when many relatives of Saddam said they would stay and fight for the honor of Saddam, but they did not. This is the nature of any dictatorship.63 Always wary of a potential coup, Saddam remained reluctant to entrust military authority in anyone too far removed from his family or tribe. To Western observers, the Republican Guard represented bulwark of the regime, but for Saddam, it was the military force best positioned to overthrow him. Consequently, in 2001 he placed his youngest son Qusay at its head. According to members of the inner circle, Qusay gradually became the major player in national security after 1995. His rise culminated in his being named “honorable supervisor” of the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard. In addition, Qusay maintained varying degrees of control over the Special Security Organization (SSO) and other internal security organizations.64 Qusay now commanded the elite combat units of the Iraqi military, but his military experience was limited to a short stint at the Iranian front in 1984, where he had little, if any, real combat. According to the Minister of Defense: My working for Qusay Hussein was a mistake; Qusay knew nothing – he understood only simple military things like a civilian. We prepared information and advice for him and he’d accept it or not. As the ultimate Commander of the Republican Guard, Qusay could take advice from professional military officers in the Ministry of Defense and the Republican Guard or ignore it to make decisions.65 Despite his lack of expertise, Qusay exuded confidence and attempted to play a dominant role in the final planning of Iraqi deployments against a Coalition invasion. During a December 18, 2002 Republican Guard planning meeting, Qusay presided over the presentation of a new defensive concept before the corps commanders and their staff. When several officers gently probed the plan’s underlying assumptions, Qusay’s lack of military experience forced him
Iraqi military effectiveness 39 to rely on the intellectually weak but very effective retort: “The plan is already approved by Saddam and it is you who will now make it work.” He soon followed up with the equally reassuring “there will be no changes to the plan because Saddam has signed it already.”66 As the “honorable supervisor” and son of Saddam, Qusay had the final say in significant military decisions unless Saddam himself chose to intervene. His purview included such fundamental matters as what key terrain to defend and when and how to shift the remaining Iraqi forces during the war. Several senior officers privately questioned many of his decisions, but few were willing to do so in such an open forum. After the war, senior military officers constantly remarked on Qusay’s lack of military knowledge and his unwillingness to take their “good” advice. However, this is too simplistic a formulation to explain everything that went wrong. The evidence shows that many who were in a position to advise Qusay were, in fact, unqualified to do so, while those who were qualified were often silent even when given an opportunity to speak. One of those at the heart of the regime who proved incapable of providing sound military advice to Qusay was a Major General Barzan ‘Abd al-Ghafur, the Commander of the Special Republican Guard. Before the war, Coalition planners generally assumed that the quality – and loyalty – of Iraqi military officers improved as one moved from the militias to the regular Army, to the Republican Guard, and then on to the Special Republican Guard.67 It stood to reason that the Commander of the Special Republican Guard would then be a highly competent, loyal, and important personality in Iraq’s military system. After all, the regime was entrusting that individual with the duty of conducting the final defense of the homes and offices of the regime’s elite. Coalition planners considered the Special Republican Guard the elite of the elite; and by logical extension, their commander would surely be the best Saddam could find. This piece of conventional wisdom was wrong.68 After the war, the peers and colleagues of the Special Republican Guard commander were all openly derisive of Barzan’s performance as an officer and commander. Saddam had selected Barzan, as one general noted, because he had several qualities that Saddam held dear, “He was Saddam’s cousin, but he had two other important qualities which made him the best man for the job. First, he was not intelligent enough to represent a threat to the regime and second, he was not brave enough to participate in anyone else’s plots.”69 As the Special Republican Guard commander, Barzan was well aware of the tenuous nature of his position. He recalled in a post-war interview: I was called to Baghdad from holiday and told that I would be taking command of the Special Republican Guard. I was on a probationary status for the first six months. I was ordered by Saddam to take the command; I had no choice. I was sick at the idea of being the Special Republican Guard commander. It was the most dangerous job in the regime.70
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This general, the man who was to command the last ditch stand of Saddam’s Guards, spent most of the war hiding. The selection of such a man for an important military position appears counter-intuitive, but given the imperatives of Iraqi politics, it was the only possible rational decision Saddam could make. The case of the Minister of Defense, General Sultan Hashim Ahmad al-Ta’i, is strikingly different. Here, by all accounts, was a competent military commander who, upon reaching the pinnacle of power, apparently decided silence was the better part of valor. A number of senior Iraqi leaders identified General Sultan as one of the best and brightest among Iraq’s military leaders. His peers described him as a “mountain of morals” and compared him to Jafar al Askari, Minister of Defense in the 1930s and considered the “father of the Iraqi Army.”71 Judging just the scope of his military record, he appears to have been an impressive soldier. During his 40-year career, Sultan commanded two brigades, three divisions, and at least two corps of regular army troops. In so doing, he fought in every war after 1968 and developed a reputation as a creative, dynamic military leader. However, Sultan’s elevation to Minister of Defense changed him as well as his colleagues’ opinions of him. The specific reasons for the change are no doubt complex, but his actions during the meetings and planning conferences prior to the Coalition invasion suggest an explanation. In one telling event during the final planning, he remained silent when more junior officers voiced concerns over Saddam’s new plan for the defense of Iraq. As one corps commander who was present later noted, “Some of the senior military leaders present only competed to please Saddam. The Minister of Defense was an honorable man but he gave up his strategic vision in order to keep Saddam’s favor. This, “in his opinion,” was very unfortunate for Iraq.”72
Security and command limitations While most senior military leaders found themselves caught up in the corrupting influences surrounding the regime’s inner circle, other factors combined to undermine the effectiveness of subordinate leaders and units. While actual warfighting units at corps and division level also possessed their share of “trusted” officers, many still exhibited a level of professional competence during post-war interviews that seemed inconsistent with their general reputation. They provided two reasons for this incongruity: the limits Saddam imposed on their exercise of authority and the effects of the pervasive internal security apparatus. The commander of the Baghdad Republican Guard Infantry Division provided an example of the effects of stripping division commanders of authority necessary to make decisions. The division’s mission from 1998 until the Coalition invasion was to defend the area around the city of al-Kut, located southeast of Baghdad. This area has traditionally been the key terrain for defending Iraq against an Iranian invasion from the east; it remains one of the most critical areas in Iraqi defense planning:
Iraqi military effectiveness 41 In the Republican Guard, division and corps commanders could not make decisions without the approval of the staff command. Division commanders could only move small elements within their command. Major movements such as brigade-sized elements and higher had to be requested through the corps commander to the staff command. This process did not change during the war and in fact became more centralized.73 Such a lack of trust had a direct effect not only on the commander’s ability to lead his unit but also the unit’s ability to take advantage of its knowledge of the ground to prepare an optimal defense. In many cases, staff officers in Baghdad who had never visited the area still managed to forward precise deployment locations for even the smallest units directly to division commanders. The Baghdad commander continued: Only the Republican Guard staff command directed maneuvers and it did not allow subordinate commanders to make suggestions. If a commander made a decision without the Republican Guard chief of staff’s approval, he would be punished. The only commanders who had any protection were those from Tikrit. They were allowed to make their own decisions because the government trusted them more.74 The Commander of the II Republican Guard Corps echoed the problems described by the Commander of the Baghdad Division. He reported a constant struggle with higher headquarters regarding disposition of “his” units. As the commander of the II Republican Guard Corps noted, “I had to ask for permission from the Republican Guard staff in Baghdad to move brigade-size units and was still doing so up until April 2 and 3.”75 By then Coalition forces were making their final drive on Baghdad. The gulf between Iraqi and Coalition approaches to battlefield command and control could not have been wider. Coalition doctrine emphasized distributed operations and battlefield autonomy (or decentralized command and control), while the focus of Iraq’s military was on template solutions and centralized control. The nature of Saddam’s regime made it impossible to tolerate any other approach. Saddam personally advising a group of senior commanders on how they should react to an enemy helicopter assault offered an example of where the regime’s emphasis on centralized control bounded all but the most aggressive commanders’ authority: If we assume that X is a commander of an armored brigade according to ordinary standards and there was a landing by helicopters 20 km [kilometers] away from him, what are the checks he should make? What should he wish to know about the landing? . . . What are the sources of information he can depend on? . . . What are the issues? In all events you have one or two guns near the headquarters brigade. Therefore, the first thing you should do is an immediate reaction by artillery. At the same time, you call by phone
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K.M. Woods and say: Maximum attention. And then you prepare the entire brigade to be ready for a later order and then you report this to the higher headquarters and tell it: A landing at a depth of so-and-so took place in front of us . . . This will enable the headquarters to operate its artillery. At the same time, as a higher headquarters, it will help you by offering proper advice, orders, or instructions.76
Not every operational commander had to endure the restrictions that impeded the Baghdad Division commander and others. In sharp relief to these restrictions were those imposed on the Al-Nida Division. The Al-Nida was a Republican Guard armored division tasked to defend Baghdad’s eastern approaches against possible Iranian attacks along the Dialya River from the northeastern shoulder of Baghdad up to Baquba. This sector was the critical terrain in the conventional defense of Baghdad against an enemy attacking from the east.77 The division’s position would make it the “last-line of defense” for any serious Iranian attack. Given the relatively short 120 kilometers to the Iranian frontier, the readiness of the Al-Nida Division was a national priority. Both Iraqi and Coalition intelligence organizations considered the Al-Nida Division to be the “best of the best” in the Republican Guard. As described by the Al-Nida’s chief of staff, the division’s materiel readiness was the best in the Iraqi military: The brigades were at 100 percent strength or better. The tanks were between 99 percent or 98 percent ready for war. The brigades had all the most modern equipment in the Iraqi armed forces, T-72 tanks, and BMP-2 armored personnel carriers, 130 mm artillery cannons . . . and 155 mm cannons. Every battalion had 18 cannons.78 According to his chief of staff, the division commander planned and conducted training virtually independent of any higher authority. Such autonomy was unheard of in his sister unit, the Baghdad Division.79 For example, before the Coalition invasion the division moved one of its brigade garrisons and conducted a series of “urban warfare” training drills. The division’s chief of staff also described adjusting its defensive posture to create a series of “false” brigade fighting positions, while a robust series of new survivability positions were hastily dug along the Diyala River with little or no direction – or interference – from higher headquarters.80 The Al-Nida Division’s commander stated that during the war he often made direct contact with other division commanders to receive battlefield updates and build a picture of what was occurring. For most Iraqi commanders, contacting other commanders even during war-time remained a risky enterprise. When asked in a post-war interview to explain the disparity between the authority he exercised and that exercised by other divisional commanders, the commander answered in an incredulous tone, “I am a Tikriti and other commanders were not.”81 In Saddam’s military, tribal or familial relationships trumped
Iraqi military effectiveness 43 the actual documented authority necessary for effective command at any particular echelon. Another critical inhibitor of Iraqi tactical performance lay in the effects of the regime’s pervasive internal security environment. The almost-Orwellian security environment of the Ba’athist regime stretched from the central offices of the regime’s inner circle down to tactical units. According to one senior minister: Each ministry or any other government establishment had a security chief who reported to the agency to which he belonged. His section kept an eye on all affairs and actions, encouraging disgruntled individuals to provide information on what was going on. The Ba’ath party members and “aspirants” also wrote reports to the leader of the sector or cell. Rivalries and backbiting were encouraged.82 Military officers executed their duties under the constant, intrusive, and, more often than not, uncoordinated supervision of multiple security services.83 One knowledgeable source claimed, “One officer in five reporting on his peers was the ‘desirable’ state of affairs, but the Special Security Office often achieved higher ratios.”84 Every senior commander interviewed after hostilities emphasized the psychological costs of constantly looking over their shoulders as a significant constraint on their military effectiveness. At any one time, each of these commanders had to contend with at least five major security organizations: the Special Security Office, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, the Directorate of General Security, the General Directorate of Military Intelligence, and various “security service” offices within the Republican Guard’s bureaucracy.85 Moreover, the number of security personnel in each of these organizations increased dramatically after 1991. In many cases, new spies were sent to units to report on the spies already there, even those from their own organizations. One former senior commander described the Republican Guard’s Security Office as growing from a small office to a battalion-sized element in response to finger-pointing after the 1991 Gulf War and the regime’s increasing fears about internal security.86 In a rambling tirade, this officer outlined the nature of the surveillance from this one organization and the corroding effect this spying had: The main function of the Republican Guard Security Office was to monitor and ensure the loyalty of Republican Guard forces. All phones in Republican Guard offices were monitored and all meetings were recorded. Highranking officers were subjected to constant technical monitoring and surveillance in and out of their homes. The Republican Guard Security Office monitored all aspects of senior Republican Guard officers’ lives, including their financial affairs and diet. Republican Guard Security Office personnel even questioned the guards at senior officers’ houses to see what they could learn about the officers’ life styles. Republican Guard security officers were generally despised by the regular Republican Guard personnel. The Special Security Office knew how many times I went to the bathroom.
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K.M. Woods Requesting retirement was impossible because the regime would assume one opposed them politically, and one would be arrested and jailed. Republican Guard Security Office monitoring was thorough; for example, one officer was given six months in jail for telling a joke about the Republican Guard Security Office. This was supposed to ensure that Republican Guard personnel would never become involved in politics. This had a powerful negative affect on Republican Guard morale. Republican Guard commanders were not trusted to conduct any movement or even so much as start a tank without permission.87
The II Republican Guard Corps commander described the influence of the internal security environment on a typical corps-level staff meeting: First a meeting would be announced and all the corps-level staff, the subordinate division commanders and selected staff, as well as supporting or attached organizations and their staffs would assemble at the corps headquarters. The corps commander had to ensure then that all the spies were in the room before the meeting began so that there would not be any suspicions in Baghdad as to my purpose. This kind of attention to my own internal security was required. I spent considerable time finding clever ways to invite even the spies I was not supposed to know about. Failure by the “target” of all of this internal spying to coordinate the surreptitious activities of the various persons spying on him could easily have left one out and resulted in unwarranted and possibly dangerous suspicion by the senior leadership in Baghdad based on his report of being excluded from a “secret” meeting.88 This corps commander describes what he believed the impact of all this spying had on military effectiveness: You must understand that the Republican Guard internal security process was very compartmented, even in normal times. For example, in some cases a subordinate unit could be moved by the Republican Guard headquarters without my permission. In some cases, I would find out just prior to the execution of the move. I could not question it. In fact, security measures like this killed the flexibility in units and made commanders into very “small soldiers.” My long experience in the Republican Guard allowed me some flexibility but I was having trouble because the regime security people were always trying to set me up and find some mistake. This is why I always invited all the spies to my meetings. The security situation in the last few years reached the point of incredible. We could have no relationships with fellow commanders. This prevented even friendships. Thank God for my books or I would have felt otherwise a man alone in a cave. During this critical period I was completely uninformed about other unit plans around me. I had the Al Nida and the Baghdad Divisions but officially I could not ask
Iraqi military effectiveness 45 them about any of their missions and plans that were sent to them directly from Republican Guard headquarters in Baghdad.89 There were two common reactions to the pervasive security apparatus. The first, taken by the commander of the II Republican Guard Corps, was to work through the fog of suspicion and maintain as open a process as possible, while still attempting to command a military unit on the brink of war. Operating in this manner often required extreme precautions. The II Corps commander, for instance, held most of his private meetings in the walled garden of a private home where he was relatively assured the regime’s spies could not eavesdrop on him.90 The second reaction, the one more commonly followed by senior leaders, was to avoid any actions, activities, or circumstances that might bring suspicion from the various “eyes” of the regime. During interviews with the commander of the I Republican Guard Corps, it was obvious he selected the second method as his preferred way of dealing with the security forces: One of the biggest weaknesses of the Iraqi military was that, units were not allowed to independently coordinate with each other for defensive integration. All orders came from the chief of staff of the Republican Guard, which ultimately came from Qusay or Saddam Hussein . . . In order to know where units were located on our flanks, we had to use our own reconnaissance elements because we were not allowed to communicate with our sister units.91 The net effect of such reactions to the threat imposed by the security services was that corps-level operational command and control disappeared from the battlefield. This atmosphere of fear and its resulting impact on the performance of the Iraqi leadership explains much about the actions of Iraq’s military forces on the battlefield. The restrictions imposed on them in peacetime made it impossible to coordinate plans or action during war. The regime had consistently sacrificed military effectiveness for the more important needs of internal security. In effect, it had neutered its military force, which was now incapable of standing up to a disciplined and competent military force.
Reflections At the conclusion of Iraqi military operations, one of the most thoughtful senior officers in the Iraqi armed forces provided a list of what he regarded as the major contributing factors to the stunningly sudden collapse of Iraq’s military organizations:92 • The persistence of the Commander in Chief (Saddam Hussein) until a very late time in insisting that every branch of the armed forces, in their organizational differences, make independent plans for the defense of their areas of responsibility.
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In the end, Saddam determined that the most important factor for military success lay in the spirit of the warrior. Saddam considered the ideological commitment to the Ba’athist cause as the fundamental basis of this spirit and the foundation for preparing Iraq’s soldiers for war. Because he perceived the Ba’athist spirit of the “Iraqi warrior” was far superior to anything American soldiers were capable of bringing to the battlefield, he overlooked the many forces eroding the foundations of true military effectiveness. The conclusion of an Iraqi training manual sums up the regime’s attitude: Military power is measured by the period in which difficulties become severe, calamities increase, choices multiply, and the world gets dark and nothing remains except the bright light of belief and ideological determination . . . If [the soldier] ignores [his] values, principles, and ideals, all military foundations would collapse. He will be defeated, shamed, and [his] military honor will remain in the same place together with the booty taken by the enemy. The President, the Leader Saddam Hussein asks, “Would men allow for their military honor to be taken by the enemy as booty from the battle?”94 In March 2003, the regime ordered its military to stop the Coalition invasion. It was not the first army to place “spirit” over the reality of firepower and steel, and it is unlikely to be the last.
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Notes 1 This is not meant to be a clinical description but is intended to capture the dramatically different definitions of professional competence at work in Iraq. Some generals were purely Ba’athist and political while others displayed a clear understanding of what in the West would be considered military competence. But even this latter group was adept at acting with the former when circumstances demanded it. 2 Captured media file (August 10, 1995), “Saddam Hussein Meeting with Leaders of the Republican Guard Regarding Readiness of the Guard.” Note: Whenever possible a full citation to the original material is used in footnotes. In some cases footnotes refer to a “Classified Intelligence Report” and a date. These “reports” are, for the most part, interviews of senior personnel from the former regime of Saddam Hussein conducted by personnel not associated with the Iraqi Perspectives Project. The record copy of some of this material remains classified for reasons unrelated to the specific topics contained in this study. All materials derived from these classified reports were cleared for public release by the appropriate U.S. Government agency. 3 For example, “The RGFC [Republican Guard Forces Command] maintains a significant capability by regional standards. The size and experience of the RGFC are key advantages over other regional armies in the absence of U.S. support. However, thirteen years of sanctions have prevented Iraq from replacing the massive equipment losses suffered in Operation Desert Storm, and Iraqi forces remain much weaker than they were in 1990.” U.S. Central Command CONPLAN 1003-V. 4 Classified Intelligence Report, June 2003. 5 Classified Intelligence Report, July 2004. According to Kenneth Pollack, some 115 frontline Iraqi aircraft sought security in Iran during Operation Desert Storm. Kenneth Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. Lincoln, NB and London (U.K.), University of Nebraska Press, 2002, p. 243. 6 For a detailed description of the history and organization of the Military Industrial Committee, see the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD. Vol. I. Central Intelligence Agency, September 30, 2004, p. 17. 7 Captured document, (February 25, 2003) Military Industrialization Commission Annual Report for 2002–2003 Investments, Projects, and Plans. 8 Unpublished draft memoirs of LTG Raad Hamdani, Commander II Republican Guard Corps. 9 “Perspectives Assistant Senior Military Advisor.” General Taha was commenting about his experiences as the senior naval officer in Iraq before he retired in the fall of 2002. 10 Classified Intelligence Report, May 2003. 11 According to one senior Iraqi source, “The rumor circulating was that if one said no to Saddam, one would be summarily executed; this was particularly true in the year prior to the lead-up to Operation Iraqi Freedom in April 2003.” Classified Intelligence Report, September 2003. 12 Classified Intelligence Report, March 2004. 13 Classified Intelligence Report, July 2004. 14 Classified Intelligence Report, March 2004. 15 Captured document (approximately 1993), “9th Session on the Role of the Republican Guard.” 16 Captured document (approximately 1993), “9th Session on the Role of the Republican Guard.” 17 Classified Intelligence Report, March 2004. 18 Captured document (November 8, 2002), “Letter Addressed to Saddam and Signed by the Minister of Defense Referring to the Summer 2002 Military Exercise ‘Golden Falcon.’ ” 19 Captured document (March 9, 2003), “Movement Order No. 3 for 2003, al-Hussein Brigade General Staff Headquarters.”
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20 Evidence of Saddam “coup-proofing” his regime through the manipulation of military assignments, rewards, and implementing strict controls over military organizations is clear in a large cross-section of interviews, debriefs, and interrogations. For an accurate description of the underlying civil–military relationship, see Ahmed Hashim, “Saddam Husayn and Civil–Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and Power,” Middle East Journal, 2003, vol. 57. 21 “Perspectives II Republican Guard Corps.” 22 Captured document (August 25, 2002), “Soldiers of the Republican Guards Headquarters of Offensive Mission as Noted in Republican Guards Training Guidance.” 23 Captured media file (February 29, 1992), “Saddam Meeting with Military Commanders Discussing 1991 Uprisings.” 24 Captured media file (dated approximately 1993), “Iraqi Command Meeting Regarding the Coalition Attack on Iraq and the 1991 Uprising.” 25 The project noted a distinction between most senior officers and a small but surprising group of two- and three-star commanders who possessed a lucid understanding of the capabilities of the Coalition and the qualitative gulf between forces on the eve of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 26 Captured document (dated approximately 1993), “Iraqi Command Meeting Regarding the Coalition Attack on Iraq and the 1991 Uprising.” 27 Faceh Abd Al-Jabbar, “Why the Uprisings,” Middle East Report, May–June 1992, p. 8. 28 Captured document (August 29, 2002), “Correspondence Issued from Al-Ta’mim Branch Command under the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party to Emergency Regiment Command Secretary.” Many similar examples are archived in the captured documents database from areas such as Fallujah, Basra, Al Nasiriyah, and Karbala. They all generally follow the tone and specificity of the Al-Ta’mim Branch document. 29 Captured document (August 29, 2002), “Correspondence issued from Al-Ta’mim Branch Command under the Arab Socialist Ba’ath Party to Emergency Regiment Command Secretary.” 30 Captured document (March 9, 2003), “Plan by al-Quds for Defending District Issued by Karbala Division Commander.” 31 Captured document (March 9, 2003), “Plan by al-Quds for Defending District Issued by Karbala Division Commander.” 32 Captured document (March 9, 2003), “Plan by al-Quds for Defending District Issued by Karbala Division Commander.” 33 Project interview of Sultan Hashim Ahmed Al Hamed Al-Tai, Minister of Defense, November 13, 2003. 34 Classified Intelligence Report, December 2002. 35 Foreign Broadcast Information Service (March 24, 2003), “Iraqi Army General Command Issues Statement on Military Operations 23, 24 March.” Baghdad Iraqi Satellite Channel Television. 36 “Perspectives Assistant Senior Military Advisor.” 37 Project interview of LTG Kenan Mansour Khalil al-Obadi, Senior Military Advisor to RCC Member Mizban Khudr Al-Hadi, November 30, 2003. 38 Project interview of LTG Kenan Mansour Khalil al-Obadi, Senior Military Advisor to RCC Member Mizban Khudr Al-Hadi, November 30, 2003. 39 See U.S. Central Command CONPLAN 1003-V. 40 Starting in late March 1991 and continuing through at least November 1995, Saddam participated in numerous conferences, sponsored studies, and directed analyses of both the 1991 Gulf War and the rebellions that followed. See captured audio tape (May 5, 1991), “Saddam Hussein’s Meeting with High-Ranking Iraqi Officials, Evaluating the Iraqi Military Performance on the Battlefield during the First Gulf War 1991.” 41 A large volume of captured Fedayeen Saddam documents deal with internal criminal investigations for activities ranging from smuggling to armed robberies.
Iraqi military effectiveness 49 42 Captured document (November 2, 1995), “Military Directorate Correspondence Reports About Fedayeen Saddam Troops and Their Organizational Structure.” 43 Captured document (November 2, 1995), “Military Directorate Correspondence Reports About Fedayeen Saddam Troops and Their Organizational Structure.” 44 Captured documents: (July 11, 1999), “Plans and Analysis Reports by the Fedayeen Saddam Secretariat”; (March 14, 2000), “Memo from Office of the Fedayeen Saddam Chief of Staff about Special Operations Against Car Thieves”; (March 20, 2002), “Security Plan for Karbala Force of Fedayeen Saddam from Fedayeen Secretariat”; (November 16, 2000), “Military Orders for Fedayeen to Blow Up a Building.” 45 Captured document (May 25, 1999), “Fedayeen Saddam Instructions.” 46 Captured document (July 1, 2001), “Correspondence Between Fedayeen Saddam and Iraq National Olympic Committee Regarding a Letter from a Widow.” The widow’s letter goes on to note her husband’s many successful missions, including the July 6, 1992 car bomb attack against a convoy near Halabjah carrying the wife of a former French president. 47 Captured documents: (March 25, 2003), “Correspondence from Fedayeen Saddam to Uday Regarding Fedayeen Saddam Suicide Mission Team”; (March 15, 2003), “Letter from Qusay to Saddam Regarding the Preparation of Fedayeen Forces to Strike Deep Within Kuwait if American Forces Converge on Baghdad.” 48 Captured document (approximately 1999), “1999 IIS Plan for Training Fedayeen Saddam Using IEDs.” 49 Captured document (December 23, 2000), “Fedayeen Saddam UAV and Special Boat Plans.” 50 Captured document (November 2, 1995), “Military Directorate Correspondence Reports about Fedayeen Saddam Troops and Their Organizational Structure.” 51 Captured document (October 7, 2000), “Correspondence from Presidential Office to Secretary General of the Fedayeen Saddam Regarding Foreign Arab Volunteers.” 52 Captured document (January 16, 2003), “Training Exercise ‘Heroes Attack’ Plan for Kadhima Command, Al-Muthana Force of the Fedayeen Saddam.” 53 Captured document (February 23, 2003), “Special Unit in Fedayeen Organization Formation Orders from Military Intelligence Director.” 54 Captured document (February 23, 2003), “Special Unit in Fedayeen Organization Formation Orders from Military Intelligence Director.” 55 Captured document (June 14, 1995), “RCC Decision About Fedayeen Saddam Rights and Privileges Forwarded to MIC.” 56 Captured document (May 9, 2002), “Correspondence Issued by Secretariat of Fedayeen Saddam Regarding Cutting Off Hands of the Fedayeen Saddam Members Who Were Smuggling Weapons to the Saudi Side During 2001.” 57 Captured documents: (August 21, 1996), “Reference File of the Laws of the Fedayeen Saddam”; (October 11, 2002), “Memos Within Fedayeen Saddam General Secretariat Regarding Disciplinary Actions and Punishment Orders.” 58 Captured document (January 15, 1998), “Memos Issued by the Head of the Fedayeen Saddam Passing Down Regulations for Executions.” 59 In a 1995 discussion with senior military commanders, Saddam requested a study of such non-Arab struggles, “especially their military sides . . . [w]e can gain a lot from . . . Rommel and De Gaulle.” However, Saddam cautioned them to “avoid propaganda books” and above all do “not concentrate on the leaders.” In this context, perhaps examining operational and tactical decision-making cut too close to Saddam’s exclusive domain. After all, military history is as much a review of mistakes made as it is successes achieved. Captured document (October 8, 1995), “Saddam Meeting with Senior Military Leaders.” 60 Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD. Vol. I. Central Intelligence Agency, September 30, 2004, p. 5. 61 Classified Intelligence Report, April 2004.
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62 Classified Intelligence Report, August 2003. 63 “Perspectives II Republican Guard Corps,” p. 37. 64 Classified Intelligence Report, April 2004. Also Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD. Vol. I. Central Intelligence Agency, September 30, 2004, pp. 87–88. 65 Project interview of Sultan Hashim Ahmed Al Hamed Al-Tai, Minister of Defense, November 13, 2003. 66 “Perspectives II Republican Guard Corps,” p. 7. 67 The Special Republican Guard: The Special Republican Guard was a division-sized internal security force of approximately 15,000 men. Its primary mission was to protect Saddam and control the civilian population of Baghdad. The Special Republican Guard troops were organized into approximately 12 battalions, but were normally deployed in platoon- and company-sized elements. 68 There was an exception to the conventional wisdom. A Central Intelligence Agency study, The Iraqi Senior Officer Corps: Shaped by Pride, Prejudice, Patrimony, and Fear, was released on March 18, 2003 (one day prior to the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom). It noted the following about the Special Republican Guard commander: “He reportedly drinks heavily and has sexual relationships with numerous women,” p. 27. 69 Project interview of Sultan Hashim Ahmed Al Hamed Al-Tai, Minister of Defense, November 13, 2003. 70 Project interview of Barzan Abd Al-Ghafur Sulayman Al-Tikriti, Commander, Special Republican Guard, November 16, 2003. 71 Iraqi Survey Group Notes (September–October 2003). 72 “Perspectives II Republican Guard Corps,” p. 8. 73 Project interview of Salih Ibrahim Hammadi Al Salamani, Commander, Baghdad Republican Guard Division, November 10, 2003. 74 Project interview of Salih Ibrahim Hammadi Al Salamani, Commander, Baghdad Republican Guard Division, November 10, 2003. The correlation between political power and the town of Tikrit goes back to the 1968 Ba’ath revolution. Men from Tikrit, two of them relatives, dominated the new Revolutionary Command Council. The deputy to the new President was Saddam Hussein who spent the next decade ensuring men from Tikrit (al-Tikriti) held the critical positions of trust. 75 Project interview of LTG Raad Hamdani, Commander of the II Republican Guard Corps, November 17, 2003. The contrast in command and control authority between the commanders of the U.S. V Corps and I MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force), and their opponent, the II Republican Guard commander, cannot be overstated. 76 Foreign Broadcast Information Service, “Saddam Discusses Possible ‘Enemy’ Landing Operations with Military Commanders,” Republic of Iraq Television, February 1, 2003. 77 Historically this enemy was always the Persians (modern day Iran). In the past decade, it included the significant threat posed by the Badar Corps (Iraqi Shi’a expatriates supported by Iran) based in southwestern Iran. 78 Project interview of Staff Brigadier General Muhammad Sattam Abdullah Al Hamdani, former chief of staff, Al Nida Division, November 19, 2003. This officer insisted that these were not inflated readiness numbers but reflected the priority enjoyed by his division. 79 According to Intelligence information, no significant training occurred in the Baghdad Division during the fall of 2002. By contrast, one armored brigade of the Al Nida Division trained for a period that was several weeks longer than previous training cycles, and another brigade of the Al Nida Division conducted urban warfare training. 80 It should be noted that based on their actions the priority for this division, despite its orders, reputation, and location, was on survivability and not defense. In some cases, up to four survivability positions were prepared for every one fighting position.
Iraqi military effectiveness 51 81 Project interview of Abd Al-Karim Jasim Nafus Al-Majid, Commander, Al Nida Armored Division, November 21, 2003. According to open source and intelligence reporting, Al-Karim’s father is Saddam’s cousin. 82 Classified Intelligence Report, April 2004. 83 One captured document describes a directive from Saddam in 1996 forbidding employees of the various security organizations from communicating with each other without a “direct order” from Saddam Hussein or his secretary. Captured document (July 13, 1997), “Letter from Secretary of the Presidential Office to SSO Director and Others Ordering Security Employees not to Address Secretary.” 84 Classified Intelligence Report, May 2004. The source was a high-level official of the Iraqi regime with direct access to the reported information. 85 The SSO within the Republican Guard was extensive and included one SSO officer and 15 to 20 support staff at divisional headquarters; and one officer at each brigade and at the regimental level. Republican Guard military intelligence officers reported directly to SSO and not their operational commanders. While SSO did not “infiltrate undercover officers into the RG [Republican Guard],” it did rely on “informal” sources within the commands. Classified Intelligence Report, April 2004. 86 Classified Intelligence Report, June 2004. 87 Classified Intelligence Report, June 2004. 88 “Perspectives II Republican Guard Corps.” 89 “Perspectives II Republican Guard Corps.” 90 Classified Intelligence Report, September 2003. The source was a senior Iraqi officer who had direct knowledge of Iraqi war planning, operations, and information reported. 91 Project interview of Majid Hussein Ali Ibrahim Al Dulaymi, Commander, I Republican Guard Corps. 92 Unpublished draft memoirs of LTG Raad Hamdani, Commander, II Republican Guard Corps. 93 Unpublished draft memoirs of LTG Raad Hamdani, Commander, II Republican Guard Corps. Additionally, thousands of captured documents and personnel files attest to the treatment repatriated Iraqi prisoners of war received from numerous security services. Actions included things such as arrest, constant surveillance, denial of employment, and even denial of marriage permits. 94 Captured document (date unclear; from late 1980s), “Handbook on Ideology and Requirements on Being an Iraqi Soldier.”
3
The Afghan model in northern Iraq Richard B. Andres
In March of 2003, as 250,000 Coalition troops poured across Iraq’s southern border to defeat the ten divisions Saddam had positioned in the South, a small group of highly trained special operations forces (SOF) working with U.S. air power and Kurdish rebels attacked the thirteen divisions Saddam had stationed in the north of the country. Not only did the SOF forces in the North engage a larger force than the heavy divisions in the South, they took fewer casualties (U.S. SOF suffered no fatalities) and did it with only days of preparation and highly constrained air power resources. What is more, when the war ended, because northern Iraq was mainly controlled by Kurdish Iraqis who had fought with Americans, stability operations in that area were initially significantly more successful than in the central region of the country. On the face of it, the operations in northern Iraq are fascinating simply in terms of the sheer audacity involved in pitting forty-eight U.S. Army twelveman A-teams and small groups of unskilled Kurdish militia against three Iraqi corps. More importantly, however, the operations signal the role new precision air power technology can play on the battlefield and in U.S. foreign policy. For some time, a debate has raged in military circles about the extent to which advances in air- and space-based sensors and precision standoff weapons technology have reduced the need for highly skilled ground forces.1 Operations in northern Iraq suggest that current thinking puts too much weight on ground forces. Beyond this, the success of the air-heavy model in northern Iraq suggests a new way of war in which weak indigenous forces, supported by the United States, can defeat much stronger conventional armies. Because such a capability leaves indigenous forces in control on the ground, it has the potential to overcome much of the vulnerability to insurgencies the U.S. experiences during nation-building operations by decreasing the cost and risk involved in such endeavors.2 This chapter examines Coalition operations in northern Iraq. Existing military models suggest that the successes achieved by SOF and air heavy operations should not have been possible.3 The main purpose of the article is to describe the operations and explain why they worked. Beyond this, however, the operations in the North provide a useful test for questions about air power’s new efficacy on the battlefield. Because of the massive use of U.S. ground forces in opera-
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tions in the southern theater during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), it is difficult to disentangle the independent contribution of any particular set of arms or methods. In the North, however, because of the paucity of ground forces, it is easier to distinguish the independent effects air power contributed to battles and to the war. The article is divided into four sections. The first describes the debate that preceded the use of the new model in Iraq. The second describes operations in the North. The third describes post-war stability operations in the North. The final section describes the study’s implications for future operations.
The debate over the Afghan model and troop requirements In 2002, as a war with Iraq began to look likely, a debate began over whether the United States should go heavy (using hundreds of thousands of its own ground troops) or go light by following the example set in Afghanistan, where a handful of special forces working closely with air power and local militias overthrew the Taliban regime in two months of heavy fighting.4 Under normal circumstances, there would have been no debate. The existing plan for invading Iraq, OPLAN 1003-98, called for using half a million highly skilled U.S. ground troops, and the notion that this mission could be accomplished with a handful of special operators working with unskilled and underequipped Iraqi rebels would not have been considered. The U.S. military has a long track record of working with SOF and rebel groups against conventional armies. While these types of operations have been useful for selectively attacking lightly defended high-value assets, they have never been particularly useful for rapidly destroying armies or controlling territory.5 Certainly, the notion that SOF and air power could replace several U.S. corps would have required a great deal of optimism. In 2002, however, circumstances were not normal. First, on a political level, the United States faced resistance from allies to its plans to conquer and occupy Iraq; France went so far as to organize an active political campaign in the United Nations to block a U.S. invasion.6 Opinion polls demonstrated that the vast majority of the world’s population opposed a U.S. invasion and anti-invasion sentiment throughout the world continued to build over time.7 Planners for the Iraq war also had to face the possibility that their plans would face reaction in the Arab world. Throughout the 1990s, Osama bin Laden, citing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as a precedent, had repeatedly argued that Al Qaeda should encourage a U.S. invasion of the Middle East in order to inspire an insurgency. He, and some Western analysts, believed that a large U.S. occupation force in a Middle Eastern country would galvanize noncommitted Muslims to swell Al Qaeda’s ranks. If such an insurgency could demoralize the United States, as the Afghan insurgency had disheartened the Soviets in the 1980s, bin Laden believed it would result in a massive victory for Al Qaeda.8 Under these circumstances, a long campaign followed by a heavy occupation was not attractive.9 A plausible alternative to the traditional plan fresh in the minds of the
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National Security Council (NSC) principals and the American public was suggested by the U.S. victory in Afghanistan. In a campaign that had stunned experienced Pentagon planners, approximately fifty special forces ground troops, working with small groups of Northern Alliance rebels, and U.S. air power had crossed hundreds of miles of terrain, defeated the 50,000-man Taliban and Al Qaeda armies, and overthrown the government in a little less than two months.10 If a small rebel group in northern Afghanistan could go from controlling 10 percent of the country to controlling a nation larger and more populous than Iraq in two months, it seemed plausible that the far more powerful and well organized Kurdish groups in northern Iraq could do something similar in that country. What is more, although it was still early in the nation building process, the Coalition government formed by victorious rebel groups in Afghanistan suggested a relatively inclusive and stable environment that would require few U.S. peacekeepers.11 Thus, the Afghan precedent suggested reasons to be optimistic about this new way of war.12 The vast majority of those who looked at the possibility of using the Afghan model in Iraq, however, came away opposed to the idea.13 For this group, the debate broke down into two questions. First, could the Afghan model work against Iraq’s large army? Second, would the United States be better off with indigenous Iraqi rebel groups or its own ground forces controlling Iraq after the war? As regards the first question, most military analysts believed that the Afghan model would not work against Iraq’s large and experienced military. This argument had strong foundations. Realistically, the United States could only tap the two Kurdish Coalitions that occupied northern Iraq.14 These groups were severely outnumbered by the Iraqi Army and were light on equipment and training; throughout their wars with Iraq during the twentieth century the Kurds had repeatedly proven themselves tactically inferior to the regular Iraqi Army.15 Decades of experience using militarily inferior rebel groups to fight conventional armies in other countries reinforced the pitfalls of such operations. As a rule, such troops are able to carry on guerrilla operations but are nearly worthless when set directly against conventional armies.16 Against these historical precedents only Afghanistan stood out as a counterexample – and one case makes for a bad precedent. Pessimism about precision air power’s new capability to destroy armies also plagued planners. Unlike traditional combined arms operations, which rely almost entirely on the combination of artillery, armor, and infantry to destroy opposed ground forces, the type of warfare used in Afghanistan depended nearly exclusively on precision air power to destroy opponents. In the new model, SOF called in air strikes on enemy locations and indigenous infantry located enemy troops, screened U.S. SOF while they called in strikes, and mopped up enemies that survived aerial attacks.17 However, this new form of war depended on precision air power for the vast majority of its effects. Unfortunately, from most planners’ points of view, precision air power was a relatively new tool, having made its debut in war only a decade before during the Gulf War, and had not been
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tested against a major power opponent.18 Also, despite a great deal of media hype, its effectiveness on the battlefield remained a subject of debate. As recently as 1999, in Operation Allied Force, air power had proven incapable of destroying Serbian fielded forces despite weeks of bombing targets with few air defenses. If thousands of hours of bombing in Kosovo had only managed to destroy fourteen of Serbia’s 1,000 tanks, it seemed irresponsible to ask U.S. SOF and Kurdish allies to rely on air power for minute to minute protection against divisions of Iraqi armor.19 During the 1990s, war planners had argued that invading Iraq would require 500,000 highly skilled and superbly equipped U.S. troops; the notion that air power would allow 50,000 untrained and poorly equipped Kurds to replace this force appeared preposterous. Contributing to the pessimism about air power was Stephen Biddle’s analysis of the Afghan model. In the most comprehensive analysis of the Afghan campaign available, Biddle concluded that the fighting in Afghanistan did not represent a revolutionary change; indeed he argued that the war had been a battle between two fairly evenly matched ground forces in which air power had given one side the winning edge.20 His analysis decried the much-hyped new sensor and precision technology. In fact, according to Biddle, high tech standoff sensors regularly failed to find the enemy, precision guided munitions (PGM) often failed to kill their targets and, most importantly, the new model had worked only when indigenous allies had possessed approximately the same level of skill as their opponents.21 In short, although precision air power helped indigenous Afghanis during the war, the outcome of the war was mainly determined by the relatively balanced tactical skill of the ground troops.22 Given these dynamics, he argued that relying on Kurdish troops in Iraq would be a mistake.23 It is probably fair to say that Biddle’s analysis gave voice to the intuition of most experienced military planners. Like the strictly military question, the notion that indigenous allies would do better at stabilizing Iraq after the war than American troops also gained little traction among war planners. Again, there were good reasons to hold with the conventional answer. First, Turkey, the United States’ strongest ally in the region, was in a de facto war with the Kurds. Any gains by the Kurds would be seen by the Turks as threats to their interests; a Kurdish controlled Iraq would be anathema to Turkey.24 Beyond this, however, Iraq consists of three often antagonistic groups: the Kurds predominantly in the North, Sunni Arabs in Central Iraq, and Shi’ites in the South. It was widely believed that, if the Kurds won on the battlefield, Iraq would, at best, break up along ethnic lines and, quite likely, fall into civil war.25 In addition, optimism about the situation the United States would face after the war pervaded the pre-war planning. Based on the favorable nation building experience in Germany and Japan after World War II, the well known dissatisfaction of the Iraqi people with the Ba’athist system, and reports from high-level refuges, occupation-optimists argued that a U.S. occupation of Iraq would be relatively short and cost free.26 Thus, with few exceptions, pundits preferred the seeming surety of a U.S.-led occupation to the unpredictability of a Kurdish-led government.
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In the end, the debate over whether to use the Afghan model in Iraq concluded in a one-sided victory for proponents of going in heavy.27 Thereafter, the question focused on “how heavy” or how many hundreds of thousands of U.S. ground troops to send to Iraq.28 After a bitter, and often acrimonious, debate between the NSC, which preferred to use fewer ground forces, and Army planners, who generally preferred to use more, around 250,000 troops were settled upon.29 To the immense satisfaction of almost everyone, the conventional plan had won and the Afghan model was forgotten. Although the final plan for invading Iraq did not call for anything like the SOF-only campaign that had defeated the Taliban in Afghanistan, it did call for unusually heavy use of special forces. According to the plan, as hundreds of thousands of heavy Coalition forces simultaneously invaded Iraq from the North and South, SOF would perform a number of important ancillary operations. In northern Iraq, SOF would link up with Kurdish rebels and attack the Ansar alIslam terrorist haven along the Iranian border. In the West, special forces would support the air-denial operation by seizing key airfields, disrupting lines of communication, and hunting for SCUD missiles to secure Jordan and Israel from attack. In the South, they would support conventional forces in their attack and conduct stability operations with Iraq’s Shi’ite population.30 In addition, special operators would attempt to seize control of oil fields before Iraqi saboteurs could destroy them and conduct attacks against Iraqi political and military leaders.31 Although such special operations may appear limited in comparison to those in Afghanistan, their scale required many times the number of SOF troops used in the earlier war. More than that, the heavy use of SOF demonstrated a new confidence in special operations that conventional planners had seldom displayed in past wars.32 A few days before the war was scheduled to begin, a crisis occurred that made the planned use of SOF heavier yet. By mid March, after months of wrangling with Turkey, it became clear that the Turkish government would not join the Coalition or allow a northern front to be launched from its territory. Turkey’s legislators had a number of reasons for reaching this decision, but their choice came both as a surprise to planners and a hard blow to the invasion plan, which depended on the northern front for much of its striking power. Equally bad, Saddam, believing that the 4th ID, America’s premier heavy division, was being deployed to Turkey, had stationed the bulk of his army along Iraq’s northern frontier. When the attack in the North did not materialize, these three corps would be free to move south, more than doubling Saddam’s defenses against Coalition troops invading from Kuwait.33 In desperation, the Coalition hit upon the idea of rapidly deploying SOF to northern Iraq and using the Afghan model to pin down the Iraqi corps in the North, which they hoped would give the Iraqis the impression that, in spite of Turkey’s refusal, General Franks still intended to send the 4th ID into northern Iraq.34 Thus, despite all plans to the contrary, in the end the Coalition pitted the new model against what turned out to be the bulk of Iraq’s Army.
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Operations in the North On March 23, with virtually no time to plan or equip for combat, the 10th Special Forces Group (10th SFG) deployed into Iraq. The story of the group’s infiltration is harrowing. Despite aggressive diplomatic attempts to induce Turkey to allow the group to infiltrate through its territory, Turkey refused and the 10th was forced to enter through a circuitous route that involved flying at low altitude over hundreds of miles of Iraq territory and taking heavy fire from Iraqi air defenses.35 Immediately after landing, the group linked up with Kurdish forces and began maneuvering to attack enemy units. Northern orders of battle As is often the case in situations involving special operations and indigenous forces, the friendly order of battle defies easy explanation. From the Coalition’s side, the portion of the 10th SFG and 3rd SFG that deployed into northern Iraq consisted of forty-eight Operational Detachment-Alphas (ODAs), each consisting of twelve men. Because of the rush in deploying them, however, they entered without much of their equipment.36 The Coalition forces in the North were designated Joint Special Operations Task Force-North (JSOTF-N).37 Calculating the number of Kurds requires an understanding of the groups involved and their political goals. In the period between the first Gulf War and 2003, the Kurds had formed two groups, both wholly autonomous from the rest of Iraq. The first, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), fielded around 62,000 militia troops; the other, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), controlled around 40,000 more, for an apparent total of 102,000 troops.38 These numbers, however, are deceptive. Engaged in a sometimes-violent dispute with one another for control of the Kurdish population in the North, the KDP and PUK were generally unwilling to work together. Only after intense negotiations between the opposing factions and U.S. envoys did the two groups agree to cooperate. Together they sent a combined total of 60,000 Peshmerga troops to work with the Coalition under a unified command. Of course these numbers were nominal, and the actual number of troops these groups used against Iraq depended on the situation along the Turkish border, the danger posed by the other Kurdish group, and the number of fighters willing and able to show up at given places and times.39 These militia troops, although personally tough and courageous, had virtually no military training.40 Against these hodge-podge forces stood eleven Iraqi regular army divisions, various division- and brigade-sized units of Saddam Fedayeen and Special Police, and two Iraqi Republican Guard divisions. Again, calculating the fighting ability of these units is difficult. First, although the regular divisions were adequately equipped in terms of armor and artillery, their morale was low and they were numerically under strength. Equally important, although significantly better trained than their Kurdish opponents, their training was inferior to that of U.S. forces. The Fedayeen and Special Police, on the other hand, had extremely
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Figure 3.1 Attacking the enemy across the Green Line.42
high morale (often fighting suicidally) but demonstrated little tactical skill. They were, however, valuable assets for the Iraqis in that during engagements in the North, they stayed behind the regular troops and executed deserters, considerably improving the regular units’ willingness to fight. Unlike the regular divisions, the two Republican Guard divisions combined adequate equipment, training, and morale. However, the combat power of even these troops is not easy to calculate. Both divisions were placed behind the line held by regular troops as reserves and to prevent desertion. At some point in the fighting, at least one of these divisions (the Nebuchadnezzar) simply abandoned its artillery, armor, and logistical units in order to avoid air strikes, vastly diminishing its battlefield power.41 The northern mission JSOTF-N troops faced a difficult mission. Using a combination of ground operations, information operations, and air interdiction, JSOTF-N planned to disrupt the movement of the thirteen Iraqi divisions in the North as they attempted to shift South. Although straightforward in concept, pitting a handful of lightly armed ODAs against three Iraqi corps appeared almost suicidally risky.43 When
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the SOF entered northern Iraq they divided into forty-eight ODAs and linked up with Peshmerga fighters. The newly formed groups dispersed along the enemy’s front calling in air strikes.44 Their operations, however, quickly ran into serious problems. Overcoming these obstacles was challenging and goes a long way toward demonstrating the resiliency of the type of warfare used in the North. The first problem the ODAs faced was lack of equipment. When Turkey disallowed the use of its territory, it did more than block the approach route for the U.S. 4th ID. As it happened, the 10th SFG’s had pre-positioned their vehicles in Turkey. Turkey’s refusal to join the Coalition blocked the movement of the high technology equipment that their tactics relied upon. After entering Iraq, one of the task force’s biggest problems was finding vehicles to cross Iraq’s vast northern reaches. Lacking their own vehicles the team pulled together whatever they could find on the fly, including school buses, dump trucks, the personal vehicles of Kurdish leaders, and eventually even leased United Nations vehicles.45 The rushed entry also affected the communication equipment available to the task force. Unlike the SOF teams inserted into western Iraq, which enjoyed state of the art computerized equipment for working with aircraft, JSOTF-N was generally forced to rely upon simple voice communication.46 A second significant problem was lack of robust air support. In the beginning of the campaign, Turkey refused to allow U.S. aircraft to enter the war zone from its territory. Given Iraq’s geography, this posed a serious problem for air support. For land-based aircraft and naval aircraft based in the Persian Gulf, which made up the vast bulk of the Coalition’s resources in the theater, this meant flying from Kuwait, across the length of some of Iraq’s heaviest air defenses, delivering munitions and returning along the same route. As had been the case in Afghanistan, this access problem was initially resolved by using carrier-based aviation.47 However, the small number of carrier aircraft based in the Mediterranean was a weak substitute for the naval- and land-based air assets that had originally been slated to support the 4th ID’s planned maneuvers. Additionally Coalition ground forces in the South and West absorbed the vast majority of allied air assets, diminishing those available for operation in the North. Thus air power’s contribution to the fight was much less than it could have been in the early stages of operations and did not firm up until Coalition attacks had knocked out air defenses over Central Iraq and Turkey allowed overflight. A third problem involved Turkey’s intense apprehension about the Kurds gaining too much from their participation in the war. For decades, the Kurdish population in Turkey and Iraq had been in what amounted to a low level war against the Turkish government. In this war, Kurdish separatist groups, such as the Kurdish Workers’ Party, sporadically employed terrorism against Turkey, and the government in Ankara retaliated with various measures including occasional military incursions into the territory of Kurdish held Iraq.48 On the eve of the war, as the U.S. plan to use Kurdish troops became apparent, Turkey threatened to occupy the city of Kirkuk rather than allow it to fall into Kurdish hands; during the war, on March 27, the United States parachuted the 1,000-man 173rd Airborne Brigade into Bashur Airfield at least partly to deter a Turkish invasion.49
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The problems with the Turks went further than recriminations and deterrent forces. In the process of negotiations between the Coalition and Turkey, various agreements were reached that seriously undermined operations in the North. After the first few days of the war, the Turks believed the Kurdish operations were too successful and demanded that the Coalition limit the number of Kurds involved in the fight. The Turkish request resulted in a ceiling being placed on the number of Kurds that could accompany a Coalition ODA. Initially placed at 300, the number was later reduced to 150. Thus, at the height of the fighting, when Kurdish support was most needed, Coalition rules of engagement effectively prevented the vast majority of available Peshmerga fighters from participating in the campaign.50 Throughout the sixteen days of the operation, the Turks also consistently attempted to force the Coalition to restrain JSOTF-N’s advances, resulting in a see-saw series of attacks and withdrawals. On numerous occasions, Coalition teams would defeat Iraqi units and move forward to occupy territory only to be ordered to withdraw because of Turkish demands. Iraqi troops would then reoccupy the ground, forcing the Coalition teams to dig them out once more.51 At the end of the campaign, as the task force began its final assault on Kirkuk, the Coalition flatly ordered the Kurds to withdraw. They refused and took the city’s remaining defenses by storm, defeating the remaining Republican Guard defenders.52 Northern operations Aside from their lack of essential equipment, adequate air support, and strong political backing, JSOTF-N also faced robust enemy forces. In the decade since the first Gulf War, the Kurdish population in northern Iraq had developed a de facto border with Iraq known as the Green Line. The line consisted of a twokilometers wide swath of no man’s land that followed the contours of the mountains and foothills separating northern and central Iraq and had evolved over the years from a combination of the Coalition’s willingness to bomb Iraqi forces that crossed the line and the Kurdish fighters’ ability to defend the rugged mountainous terrain against incursions. Holding the Iraqis on the line would not be easy. The plan focused SOF and air power efforts on the strongest Iraqi units in the North – the Nebuchadnezzar and Adnan Republican Guard Divisions, and the 3rd Armor Division.53 If air power could disrupt the enemy’s movement, then the task force could envelope the Iraqi forces and cut off their lines of communication with Baghdad. Saddam’s plan called for his forces to fall back on Baghdad.54 For the Coalition, the possibility of having to dig armies out of the heavily populated capital in house-to-house fighting was grim indeed. Fortunately, operations went better than planned and this eventuality never came to pass. On a tactical level, combat looked much as it had in Afghanistan, except on a vastly larger scale. At the beginning of operations JSOTF-N dispersed its ODAs and their Kurdish allies along the Green Line. Teams were generally composed of twelve special forces personnel, a U.S. Air Force combat
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controller, and between 100 and 300 Peshmerga.55 The Kurds, using their hard won knowledge of the Iraqi positions, communicated their locations to SOF teams. The teams, sometimes located as far as eighteen kilometers away, but often as close as two, called in air strikes on the identified Iraqi positions.56 Major Mark Grdovic described the tactics employed in one such encounter: We put JDAMS [Joint Direct Advanced Munitions] through rows of 20 fighting positions, one at a time. We destroyed an entire battalion. Then on foot or in pickup trucks, we would meander to the next hill. We found lots of dead Iraqis and equipment.57 Throughout the sixteen days of operations the Iraqi’s never managed to find a method of hiding or protecting themselves from air strikes. After a position had been bombed, Peshmerga ground troops would move forward to kill or take prisoner any stunned survivors and take possession of the territory.58 Units engaged in combat almost continually between March 24 and April 10.59 During this period, the teams’ main weapon was air power.60 The relationship between the Peshmerga and air power was synergistic. If the Iraqis dispersed and abandoned their equipment to such an extent that they were protected from air power, they became vulnerable to the Kurds. If they concentrated to defend against the Kurds, they became vulnerable to air strikes. Although they attempted various levels of concentration across the theater, no adaptation both protected them and allowed them to hold territory. Not all battles went smoothly. Early in the campaign, air assets were scarce in the North and, consequently, close combat between Coalition and Iraqi ground forces was more common. In such encounters, skill at combined arms became increasingly important. Captain Eric Carver describes one such encounter between his small force of 100 Peshmerga and a much larger and more skilled group of Iraqi troops: Advanced with local Peshmerga forces 8 km into enemy division area with one battalion of Saddam Fedayeen and one battalion Republican Guard. Engaged in heavy ground combat . . . with enemy battalion-sized element61 supported by 120 mm, 82 mm, 60 mm mortars and heavy machine guns and various small arms. Enemy forces tried to launch a counter-attack; members of the team were in direct combat with the enemy. Enemy attack in the morning was fought off with small arms and close air support. Enemy reorganized and mounted another battalion-sized attack in the afternoon again. ODA and Peshmerga forces fought off attack with crew served weapons and small arms. The element was in the process of being flanked when close air support of bombers and strafing runs by F-14s forced the enemy to withdraw to original positions.62 Such encounters go some way toward showing that airpower can even the odds between skilled and unskilled opponents and that it is not particularly brittle in
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the face of limited air power resources. In this battle, the Iraqi Republican Guard employed their superior skill, numbers, and equipment in a counterattack by attempting to flank the smaller unit under cover of artillery. Though air power was slow to enter the fight, the weaker Coalition force was able to hold the attackers off until air power could disrupt the Iraqi maneuver and force them to abandon the field. This pattern was repeated many times in Afghanistan and Iraq.63 Tactically, the new model repeatedly allowed small unskilled forces to defeat larger and more skilled forces. The mission in the North also went well on an operational level. At the start, fighting was extremely difficult. Initially, because of the limited amount of Coalition bombing in the North, Iraqi soldiers in this theater were slower to desert their units than was the case in the rest of Iraq. However, after a week of bombing, the Iraqis lost heart and the trickle of desertions became a steady stream.64 Between deaths and desertions, the Iraqi front began to collapse. SOF–Peshmerga teams destroyed the Iraqi 4th ID on March 30, the 2nd ID on March 31, the 8th ID, and the 38th ID on April 2.65 As the front collapsed, the teams raced south capturing towns and villages as they went.66 The enveloping maneuver was also largely successful, cutting off the 1st and 2nd Corps’ lines of communication with Baghdad and causing them to retreat west toward Tikrit, greatly lowering the chances of the nightmare scenario involving a prolonged siege of Baghdad.67 On April 10, the Iraqi 5th Corps surrendered to 10th SFG and Kirkuk fell as the last Republican Guard units were driven from the city.68 The operation was not, however, entirely successful. First, Coalition intelligence was not up to the task of tracking Iraqi units under such chaotic conditions. Throughout the fighting Iraqi units dispersed, camouflaged, abandoned their armor and artillery, and dug in to avoid air attack, making detection more difficult. The withering air attacks not only spurred desertions, but also made tracking individual units tricky as they simply melted away and ceased to exist as coherent units. Moreover, Coalition commanders focused the vast majority of Coalition sensors on operations in the South. The net result was that the Coalition lost track of a number of divisions in the North. The loss of two of these divisions – regular army units belonging to Iraq’s 1st Corps – was inconsequential, as they made it only halfway to Baghdad before disintegrating. More troubling was Iraq’s elite Nebuchadnezzar division, which also eluded Coalition surveillance. Parts of this division made it to central Iraq where they helped to oppose the Coalition’s main attack through the Karbala Gap. Even this was not very significant, though, as it was forced to divest itself of its armor, artillery, and logistical units, in order to elude coalition surveillance, and in doing so greatly reduced its ability to conduct combined arms warfare.69 In short, against all pre-war expectations, SOF operations in northern Iraq enjoyed enormous success. Despite numerous logistical and political obstacles, a small SOF group working with unskilled indigenous allies and highly constrained air power defeated a significant portion of Iraq’s Army. Moreover, it did so without suffering a single American death.
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Conclusion In the three years since the end of major combat operations in Iraq, the southern campaign has received a good deal of scholarly attention while operations in the North have received almost none. This is unfortunate. The model used in the North proved superior in several ways to the traditional combined arms model used in the South. Against a larger enemy force, northern operations proved less expensive in U.S. blood and treasure. They pitted the United States’ greatest asymmetrical strength, its air power, against Iraqi ground forces. Most importantly, it left friendly, pro-democratic Iraqis in charge on the ground after combat ceased. Operations in northern Iraq go a long way toward showing that pessimism about the Afghan model is overstated. According to Stephen Biddle, the model’s main opponent, the central reason not to employ the model is that it only works when the indigenous ground forces allied with the U.S. are approximately equal in tactical skill to the enemy’s ground forces; air dominance cannot make up for this gap. Yet, this gap existed in northern Iraq. As Biddle points out: Kurdish skills, though mixed, were certainly no match for the Republican Guard on their own. A decade of actual combat experience gives ample evidence of this: the Guard repeatedly crushed peshmerga resistance whenever Kurdish uprisings without American military protection gave Saddam cause and opportunity.70 Further: If SOF-directed precision strikes were sufficient to drive the [Republican] Guard from the field in support of a peshmerga advance, this would thus provide at least some significant support to a claim that the Afghan Model capabilities can overturn otherwise very unfavorable local military balances without significant U.S. ground strength.71 Operations in Iraq clearly passed this test. Republican Guard units put up more of a fight than regular army but were destroyed or chased from the field almost as quickly.72 Only fragments of the two Guard divisions stationed in the North survived to head South.73 This experience, combined with experience gained in similar operations in Afghanistan, suggests that the model can work even when the skill level of friendly ground troops is inferior to that of their opponents. Besides being effective, the operations did not turn out to be risky for U.S. personnel. Apart from in a few exceptional cases, the SOF involved in these operations did not believe the scores of battles they fought in Iraq were close run events.74 The Afghan model decisively defeated regular forces across sixteen days of heavy fighting. Moreover, it did so with few U.S. casualties and no U.S. deaths.75
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How many of the lessons learned in northern Iraq can be applied as general lessons of war is, of course, an open question. Most Iraqi troops were poorly trained and equipped. Even Iraq’s elite Republican Guard were not well prepared by Western standards. Nevertheless, all of these troops were substantially better trained and equipped than their Kurdish opponents, and Iraq’s troops were probably about as skilled as those of most developing countries. Moreover, severe logistical and political obstacles plagued operations in northern Iraq. Many of these could have been reduced or eliminated if the Coalition had given SOF planners more than a few days to prepare and if most air assets had not been assigned to support operations in the South. In short, operations in northern Iraq demonstrate that the air-heavy tactics developed in Afghanistan are a robust method of waging war. The lessons gleaned in Afghanistan and Iraq are likely to be valuable across a significant number of potential future conflicts.
Notes 1 For arguments that the new technology has not gone far toward changing the dynamics of modern war see: Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 2004; idem, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare,” Foreign Affairs 82/2, March/April 2003; idem, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare: Will SOF Predominate in 2020?, Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College 2004; and idem, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Carlisle, PA, Strategic Studies Institute: U.S. Army War College 2002. For works arguing that precision technology has changed the dynamics of war see: John A. Warden III, “Employing Air Power in the Twenty-first Century,” in Richard H. Schultz Jr. and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr. (eds.), The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press 1992, pp. 57–83; Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 2000. For related work see: Tony Mason, Air Power: A Centennial Appraisal, Washington, DC: Brassey’s Publishing 1994; and Robert A. Pape, “The True Worth of Airpower,” Foreign Affairs 83/2, March/April 2004, pp. 116–130. 2 See: Richard Andres, Craig Wills, and Thomas Griffith, “Winning with Allies: The Strategic Value of the Afghan Model,” International Security 30/3, Winter 2005. 3 For arguments on why the new model should not work in most situations see Biddle, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare; Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare. For more positive analyses see: Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” Foreign Affairs 82/4, July/August 2003, pp. 41–58; Andrew Krepinevich, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A First-Blush Assessment, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments 2003, pp. 13–24. 4 For a detailed discussion of the debate see Bob Woodward, Bush at War, New York: Simon & Schuster 2002. For an overview see Thomas Donnelly, Operation Iraqi Freedom: A Strategic Assessment, Washington, DC: AEI Press 2004, Ch. 2. 5 For work on this subject see, for instance, John M. Newman, JFK and Vietnam: Deception, Intrigue, and the Struggle for Power, New York: Warner Books 1992, p. 160; William Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets: Lessons from Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 2001; John L. Plaster, SFG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam, New York: Simon & Schuster 1997; and “Project CHECO: USAF Support of Special Forces in SEA,” United States Air Force, March 1969. For work on air power SOF
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8
9 10 11
12
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operations in the European and Mediterranean theaters during World War II see Robert Jackson, The Secret Squadrons, London: Robson Books Ltd. 1983, pp. 112–119; Bernard V. Moore II, “The Secret Air War Over France: USAAF Special Operations Units in the French Campaign of 1944” thesis, School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 1992. For work on World War II’s Pacific theaters see Philip D. Chinnery, Any Time, Any Place: Fifty Years of the USAF Air Commandos and Special Operations Forces, 1944–1994, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press 1994, pp. 14–59; and David M. Sullivan, “From Burma to Baghdad: Enhancing the Synergy between Land-Based Special Forces and Combat Air Operations,” thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 2003, pp. 28–34. John Tagliabue, “Threats and Responses: Europe; France and Germany Agree on Iraq,” The New York Times, October 3, 2002, p. A16. See for instance, Will Lester, “Poll suggests a growing majority doesn’t think the United States has enough international support for Iraq war,” Associated Press Release, February 21, 2003, accessed through Lexis-Nexis; Judy Woodruff, Dana Bash, Candy Crowley, Bruce Morton, Rhonda Schaffler, Andrea Koppel, and Jonathan Karl, “United States Clashes With Allies Over War,” CNN Inside Politics Transcript #012300N.V15, January 23, 2003; Gustavo Gonzalez, “Latin America: Public Support Weak for U.S. on Afghan and Iraq,” Inter Press Service/Global Information Network, September 9, 2002, accessed through Lexis-Nexis. See Ronald E. Zimmerman, “Strategic Provocation: Explaining Terrorist Attacks on America” thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 2002. The strategy was articulated by bin Laden in a speech: “Osama bin Laden vs. the U.S.: Edicts and Statements,” Frontline, April 1995. Richard B. Andres, “The political consequences of a potential war with Iraq,” a presentation given at the RAND Corporation, Washington DC, December 2003. Andres, Wills, and Griffith, “Winning with Allies”; Benjamin S. Lambeth, Air Power Against Terror: America’s Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2005. After major combat operations in Afghanistan, the country’s major urban areas were largely under the control of Afghan groups allied with U.S. forces. The country had also stabilized to the point where NATO and the United Nations had sent in large contingents of peacekeeping forces and relief workers. For work comparing stability operations in Iraq to Afghanistan see Andres, Wills, and Griffith, “Winning with Allies” (note 2). After Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, analysts, searching for a label for the new tactics, termed the operations the “Afghan model” and “the new way of war.” Boot, “The New American Way of War”; Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare.” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld noted: “It is hard for me to imagine another Afghanistan. If you think about that situation, it is kind of distinctive. Now it doesn’t mean that some of the things that are working there won’t work elsewhere, but the totality of it is distinctive.” Quoted in Rowan Scarborough, “Air Force Resists More Bombers, Prefers Fighters,” Washington Times, December 26, 2001, p. 1. See also Donald Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs 81/3, May/June 2002, pp. 20–32, particularly p. 22; Kim Burger and Andrew Koch, “Afghanistan: The Key Lessons,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 2, 2002; Tony Capaccio, “Afghan Lessons Don’t Apply to ‘Axis,’ Generals Say,” Bloomberg.com, February 20, 2002; Michael O’Hanlon, “A Flawed Masterpiece,” Foreign Affairs 81/3, May/June 2002, pp. 47–63. Although the Shi’ite majority in southern Iraq was also opposed to Saddam’s rule, a decade of severe repression had broken the back of the resistance and no large armed rebel group existed by 2003.
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15 Kurdish troops faced-off against Iraqi troops in a number of wars throughout the twentieth century. Although their guerrilla tactics were often successful, when they used conventional tactics the results were disastrous. For an analysis of Kurdish tactical capability in combined arms warfare see Kenneth M. Pollack, Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press 2002, pp. 156–157 and 176–182. In discussing the possibility of using Kurdish troops against Iraq in 2003, Stephen Biddle points out that Kurdish troops have shown themselves in multiple actions against Saddam’s Republican Guard to be even less adept than the Iraqis. Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare. 16 See for instance, Rosenau, Special Operations Forces and Elusive Enemy Ground Targets. 17 For a description of operations in Afghanistan, see: Andres, Wills, and Griffith, “Winning with Allies”; Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare. 18 On the importance of testing new military techniques against major power opponents, see: Emily Goldman and Richard Andres, “Systemic Effects of Military Innovation and Diffusion,” Security Studies 8/4, Summer 1999, pp. 98–99. 19 Bruce R. Pirnie, Alan Vick, Adam Grissom, Karl P. Mueller, and David T. Orletsky, Beyond Close Air Support: Forging a New Air-Ground Partnership, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation 2005, p. 46. The situations in Operation Allied Force (OAF) in Kosovo and Operation Iraqi Freedom in northern Iraq were different in important ways. In OAF the United States was more constrained by allies in how it could apply force. Rules of engagement also prevented aircraft from flying at low altitude and the topography was more suited to hiding armor and artillery. Most importantly, the NATO air power did not possess “eyes on the ground” in Kosovo until the very end of the war. 20 Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare.” Biddle’s analysis was widely propagated through the military community via briefings before the publication date of the article. For a more detailed explanation of this argument, see Biddle, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare, p. 14; and Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare. 21 Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare, pp. 24–41. 22 Ibid. p. iv. 23 Ibid. p. 55. 24 Fikret Bila, “Turkey’s Gul Says US, Kurds Told Clearly of Turkey’s Position Vis-àvis N. Iraq,” Global News Wire, March 31, 2003. 25 See for instance, Harry Dunphy, “Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds could battle to take power in Iraq if Saddam toppled,” Associated Press, October 5, 2002. 26 “Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld Holds New Briefing,” FDCH Political Transcripts, March 21, 2003. 27 Donnelly, Operation Iraqi Freedom, p. 34. 28 For a summary of the debate, see Donnelly, Operation Iraqi Freedom, p. 38. 29 The total number of ground troops including the U.S. Army and Marines and the troops of other Coalition countries amounted to around 350,000. Although, after the war, the debate over the war plan came to center on the number of troops that would be needed for peacekeeping operations, before the war, the main debate was about the number of troops needed to defeat the Iraqi Army. A few particularly prescient individuals did, however, base their arguments for more troops on the need for more peacekeepers. Army chief of staff Erik Shinseki suggested “several hundredthousand” peacekeepers might be needed. See Vernon Loeb, “Cost of War Remains Unanswered Question,” Washington Post, March 1, 2003, p. A13. Professor Peter Schifferle of the Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies conducted an analysis suggesting that around seven divisions would be needed. Peter Schifferle, “Modern Ground Warfare: Operations, Logistics, and Population Control,” a presentation given to the faculty and students of the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, October 2002.
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30 Williamson Murray and Major General Robert H. Scales Jr., The Iraq War: A Military History, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2003, pp. 69–70 and 186–190. See also “Global Scouts,” a PowerPoint presentation by USASOC at the NDIA Symposium, February 5, 2004; and Armando Ramirez, “From Bosnia to Baghdad: The Evolution of U.S. Army Special Forces From 1995 to 2004,” thesis, Naval PostGraduate School, Monterey, CA, September 2002). 31 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack, New York: Simon & Schuster 2004, particularly chs. 33–35. See also Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces, New York: Public Affairs 2004. 32 For an analysis of the debate about using special forces in Operation Desert Storm, see Rick Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Persian Gulf War, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company 1993. 33 Saddam deployed ten divisions in the South and thirteen in the North. See “Global Scouts,” slide 7. 34 Tommy Franks, American Soldier, New York: Regan Books 2004. 35 Some elements of 10th SFG had been deployed since February. For more on the group’s infiltration, see Ramirez, “From Bosnia to Baghdad,” p. 43. 36 Ramirez, “From Bosnia to Baghdad,” p. 44. 37 JSOTF-N consisted of conventional combat and support units as well as special forces. Most significantly, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, containing two light infantry battalions and an armored and mechanized force, arrived late in the operation. However, the operations described in this paper were conducted almost entirely by SOF ODAs. Although it played an important strategic role, by establishing a significant conventional presence in northern Iraq, the 173rd did not engage in significant combat during major combat operations. Gregory Fontenot, E.J. Degen, and David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Leavenworth, Ks: Combat Studies Institute Press 2004, p. 230. 38 Patrick Cockburn, “US Special Forces Prepare Way for Invasion in Northern Iraq,” London, The Independent, Internet Version, March 7, 2003 (accessed through the Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS) portal EUP20030307000177). 39 Exact numbers are elusive. See Aysla Aydintasbas, “The Kurdish Dilemma,” Salon.com, September 6, 2002 www.salon.com/people/interview/2002/09/06/salih/; and “Kurdish Resistance Forces Must Decide Role in New Iraq,” Washington Post, May 13, 2003 www.charleston.net/stories/051303/ter_13kurds.shtml. ODA Team 391 and 392, for example, were expecting 200 Kurds for an operation, and approximately 80 showed up. See Sean D. Naylor, “Nightmare at Debecka,” Army Times, September 29, 2003 www.armytimes.com/archivepaper.php?f0-ARMYPAPER-2212087. 40 Major Mark Grdovic, S-3 for 3rd Battalion 10th Group, in interview with author, November 15, 2005. 41 For more on the Iraqi order of battle, see Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, Washington, DC: The CSIS Press 2003, pp. 36–56; Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, pp. 77–85. 42 “Global Scouts,” slide 11. 43 Their orders read: “Conduct Unconventional Warfare and other Special Operations in JSOA (Joint Special Operations Area) North to disrupt Iraqi combat power, IOT [in order to] prevent effective military operations against CFLCC [Combined Forces Land Component Command] forces.” “Global Scouts,” slide 6. 44 The first operation, Viking Hammer, involved attacking the Ansar al-Islam terrorist group. See Murray and Scales, The Iraq War, Ch. 6. 45 Grdovic interview. 46 Ibid. 47 As time went by, long range land-based bombers were increasingly used in the North. 48 Denise Natali, The Kurds and the State: Evolving National Identity in Iraq, Turkey, and Iran, New York: Syracuse University Press 2005, Chs. 2–3.
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49 Daniel Williams, “US Troops Working With Kurdish Fighters: Groups May Help Special Forces Plan Airstrikes for Advance Into Northern Iraq,” Washington Post and Kurdistan Observer, March 17, 2003 home.cogeco.ca/~dbonni1/18-3-03-us-to-coordinateswith-kurds.html. See also Ramirez, “From Bosnia to Baghdad,” p. 49. 50 Grdovic interview. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. See also Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, p. 230. 53 Ramirez, “From Bosnia to Baghdad,” p. 51. 54 Mark Grdovic, “Task Force 103 During Operation Iraqi Freedom,” a synopsis of training and operations conducted by 3rd Battalion, 10th SFG (A) in OIF, p. 15. 55 Naylor, “Nightmare at Debecka.” 56 Grdovic interview. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Naylor, “Nightmare at Debecka.” 60 Capt. Eric Carver, U.S. Army, Commander, ODA 065, Memorandum for Record, Subject: Historical Documentation of ODA 065 Operations During Operation Iraqi Freedom, April 16, 2003. Available from the U.S. Army Center for Army Lessons Learned. 61 An Iraqi battalion-sized element is approximately 1,000 troops. 62 Carver MFR. 63 For a more thorough description see Andres, Wills, and Griffith, “Winning with Allies.” 64 Grdovic interview. 65 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, p. 250. 66 Ramirez, “From Bosnia to Baghdad,” p. 51. 67 Grdovic interview. 68 Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, p. 230; Grdovic, “Task Force 103,” p. 15. 69 For more on how much of the Nebuchadnezzar Division made it to the vicinity of Baghdad, see Fontenot, Degen, and Tohn, On Point, Chs. 2–3. 70 Biddle, Special Forces and the Future of Warfare: Will SOF Predominate in 2020?, p. 12. 71 Ibid. p. 12 fn. 27. 72 See for instance, Carver MFR. 73 The remnants of the two Republican Guard divisions in the north attempted to move south to cut off the U.S. 3rd ID from its drive on Baghdad. “No cohesive unit of any brigade of any Republican Guard division” made it to the South. See William Branigin, “It was a brief, bitter war for Iraq army: self-deception a factor in defeat,” Washington Post, Sunday, April 27, 2003, p. A25. 74 Grdovic interview. Carver MFR. 75 Special Forces are not always forthcoming with casualty data, however, numerous special operators interviewed for this article repeated this statistic.
4
Deep attack against Iraq Richard B. Andres
In 2003, as Coalition forces rolled across the desert toward Baghdad a coterie of military commentators, in a series of well-publicized interviews, pronounced the plan unworkable. According to these analysts, at the urging of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, CENTCOM Commander, General Tommy Franks had placed too much faith in air power’s ability to weaken Iraq’s Army and had used too few ground troops. These mistakes, they said, would lead to a costly stalemate that would last months or years.1 Less than two weeks later, after a war that cost fewer U.S. lives than even optimists had thought possible, Coalition troops had routed the Iraqi Army and occupied Baghdad.2 In the wake of the unexpectedly rapid victory in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), military theorists have attempted to explain the precipitate collapse of Iraq’s defenses.3 There is a good deal of consensus on some things. The collapse had three main facets. As Coalition troops approached Baghdad, Iraqi Army divisions deployed and maneuvered across the theater in a haphazard manner that displayed a near absence of operational art.4 Tens of thousands of desertions badly weakened the Iraqi forces.5 And, when Iraqi troops came into contact with Coalition ground forces they proved unable to conduct the sort of tactical combined arms warfare that is necessary to survive on a modern battlefield.6 The military commanders’ explanation is also well known. In planning OIF, General Franks had argued that new air power technology would transform OIF into a new type of war.7 Whereas earlier wars had been characterized by linear fronts and decisive combat between ground troops, in OIF, airpower would bypass enemy lines to blind and paralyze Saddam’s inner leadership circle and destroy the Iraqi Army.8 Such an approach, he argued, would require only a fraction of the ground troops necessary for a regular campaign.9 Perhaps because the Franks–Rumsfeld approach so clearly opposes the combined arms paradigm that has shaped thinking on conventional war for the last century, theorists have been reluctant to accept his explanation.10 Few studies of the war have even addressed the collapse of Iraq’s defenses or seriously examined the air campaign.11 Of those that have examined the collapse, two particular explanations have garnered attention. The first involves the innate weaknesses of dictatorial regimes. John Keegan, for instance, argues that Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical policies had exhausted the will of the population before the war
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began; most troops simply refused to fight. Thus, Iraq’s political weakness rather than air power’s new technological capabilities explain its rapid defeat.12 The second explanation focuses on the Iraqi Army’s relative lack of combined arms skill in comparison to Coalition ground troops. Stephen Biddle, for instance, argues that the Coalition’s unexpectedly rapid success in the war resulted directly from the Iraqi Army’s inferior infantry tactics.13 Neither of these explanations is wholly satisfying. While Iraq’s population had little love for Saddam in 2003, it is not clear that he was more popular during the First Gulf War in 1990 or during the Iran–Iraq War during the 1980s. Under Saddam’s Stalinist rule, soldiers fought, and citizens obeyed, out of fear.14 Police states have seldom had trouble inducing obedience or preventing desertion while they possess the tools of repression.15 Lack of popular will offers only a partial explanation; the larger question is why, in 2003, Saddam’s minions stopped fearing him enough to disobey his orders. Similarly, the notion that Iraq’s defenses disintegrated because of soldiers’ lack of skill does not go far toward explaining the collapse. Not only did the vast majority of Iraq’s troops desert long before coming into contact with Coalition ground forces, when they did trickle into the path of advancing Coalition troops they had lost their heavy equipment and were in such a state of disarray that, skilled or not, they were unable to conduct combined arms operations. In this article, I examine the effects of the Coalition’s deep attack on Iraq’s defenses during OIF. Using a combination of Coalition and Iraqi sources, I ask how Saddam Hussein’s attempts to maintain control of his forces and prevent their destruction interacted with the Coalition’s strategy of cyberwar and precision attack to produce the collapse of Iraq’s military capability.16 I conclude that Franks and the air planning staff were substantially correct; deep attack in conjunction with the presence of Coalition ground forces caused Iraq’s defenses to crumble long before Coalition troops made contact with the enemy. Moreover, this process had little to do with lack of Iraqi will or skill. Rather, the process that led to the collapse was a dynamic game played out at the strategic and operational levels of war. Saddam, using much the same explanatory paradigm of war employed by pessimistic U.S. military news commentators, responded intelligently to the Coalition’s attacks on his regime, command and control (C2), and fielded forces. Yet his counters to each type of attack weakened his defenses against others. In the end, he proved unable to prevent his top commanders from staging a coup, while also giving them enough freedom to fight effectively, and simultaneously keeping them sufficiently committed to employ their troops effectively in the field. The disintegration of Iraq’s military was a direct result of deep attack. The Rumsfeld–Franks approach worked in OIF and presages an effective new way to employ cyber and air power. The chapter is laid out in three sections. In the first, I describe the development of the plan to invade Iraq and how this evolution fit into the larger debate over air power’s role in modern war. In the second, I examine deep attack operations and how they contributed to the collapse of Iraq’s military. In the third, I assess the contribution of deep attack to the outcome of the war and discuss its
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implications for the use of air power in future campaigns. Data for the analysis comes from a variety of sources but depends heavily on interviews with senior Iraqi leaders conducted by journalists and U.S. military interrogators after the war.
Debating the plan For almost a century, one of the most debated issues in military theory has centered on how to use air assets in conventional war. Air theorists have long contended that air power is best used against high value targets deep behind enemy lines, while ground planners have generally thought of air power as ancillary to ground forces, most useful for shaping enemy ground forces and providing close air support (CAS) to friendly troops.17 Over the past decade, as new precision air power technology has become available, this debate has become particularly heated. Air planners have argued that precision weapons fundamentally change what air power can do on a conventional battlefield. By one calculation, a single modern guided bomb is as likely to destroy its target at 9,000 bombs dropped during World War II.18 As Colonel Gary L. Crowder, one of the architects of air operations in OIF pointed out during the planning stages of that war: “In the first day of Desert Storm, we struck more targets than were struck in all of 1942 and 1943 by 8th Air Force during the combined bomber offensive.”19 When this capability is married with other tools of information age warfare, such as high-powered sensors and cyber warfare tools, the results can be startling.20 In response to these arguments, some military theorists have argued that precision weapons have not gone far toward changing what air power can do against regime targets or on the battlefield. Robert Pape, for instance, maintains that even with precision weapons, deep attack by air power is unlikely to be able to cause coups or revolutions, or seriously degrade enemies’ C2.21 Biddle argues not only that air power cannot play a significant role against regime targets, it is also unable to do much direct damage to an army’s fielded forces.22 Outside U.S. Air Force planning staffs, these opinions have often predominated among U.S. campaign planners.23 In November of 2001, the theoretical argument over the role of precision air power in modern war became a practical matter when Rumsfeld ordered Franks to update the plan for invading Iraq.24 While Franks came from a traditional Army background, his recent experience in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) had changed his perspective on the air power debate. In that war, precision air power and a small Afghan militia had achieved, in a few weeks, what mainstream planners had argued would require 50,000 U.S. ground troops months or years to accomplish, and this had fundamentally changed his outlook on what air power could do in war.25 Given this experience, Franks determined that the existing plan for invading Iraq was troop-heavy and did not account for advances in precision-guided munitions or “the lessons we were learning in Afghanistan.”26 In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist bombing, the old plan also did
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not account for the perceived need to act quickly given the fear that, with enough warning, Iraq might supply terrorists with weapons of mass destruction.27 In response to his tasking from the Secretary of Defense, Franks worked closely with his staff of air planners to develop a new plan that would substitute information age speed and precision for industrial age mass and attrition.28 The plan used air power in two particular ways. First, in conjunction with an information operation, it targeted the institutions that kept Saddam in power – the Mukhabarat, the Special Security Organization, the Al Amn al-Khas, and the Special Republican Guard, focusing particularly on the individuals who led these organizations.29 Franks and his air planners saw several ways that targeting these organizations and individuals could affect the war. First, they believed Ba’athist leaders might use a coup, or threat of a coup, to force Saddam to yield to UN resolutions.30 Similar air-operations in Operation Allied Force (OAF) appear to have caused Serbian politicians to pressure Slobadan Milosevic to yield to NATO’s demands regarding Kosovo.31 Even if this did not occur, however, they believed that “destroying these structures would blind and paralyze Saddam’s inner leadership circle.”32 Given Saddam’s tyrannical power structure, Franks held that the regime’s institutions of oppression were the country’s center of gravity.33 The second way the plan employed air power in a deep attack role was against Saddam’s army. This attack would rely on two mechanisms. First, it would use a massive psychological operation to induce surrenders and desertions from Iraqi troops. Similar operations had caused tens of thousands of troops to surrender or desert in Operation Desert Storm (ODS) a decade before, and might have a similar effect in the coming war.34 Second, the plan anticipated using air power directly against Iraq’s deep forces, particularly Republican Guard divisions.35 In a repetition of the tactics used in OEF the year before, rather than using Coalition ground troops to destroy the enemy, the plan called for using land forces to shape the enemy so that air power could destroy them. Used this way, the mere existence of Coalition ground forces would cause Iraqi divisions to come out of their dispersed positions and maneuver in the open under lethal fires from the air.36 Franks’ confidence in precision fires was so great that the first revision of the OPLAN his office published, called for less than a fifth of the ground troops designated by the previous plan.37 Part of his willingness to use so few troops came from necessity. As he points out, it was not possible to deploy 500,000 troops before Iraq’s summer heat made an invasion impractical.38 Another part of his reasoning, however, was that on “the twenty-first-century battlefield, strength would derive from the mass of effective firepower, not simply the number of boots or tank tracks on the ground” and that “the days of half-million strong mobilizations were over.”39 Whatever Frank’s reasons for developing an air-heavy plan, the arrangement did not long withstand contact with the Washington planning bureaucracy. When the air-heavy nature of the plan became known, a ferocious debate
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commenced in planning circles, sometimes spilling into the media.40 Under pressure from Washington’s planning establishment, and under relaxed time constraints as the date of the potential invasion was pushed from 2002 to 2003, increasingly the plan began to look like a traditional twentieth-century ground campaign. First, the number of ground troops steadily increased. In the initial plan, deep-bombing operations had been followed by an invasion utilizing only 80,000 ground troops.41 Fifteen months later, however, the total number of ground troops increased to 350,000.42 Next, planners reduced the percentage of air attacks against regime targets, originally the heart of the plan, in order to divert air assets to CAS missions designed to support the ever-increasing number of Coalition ground forces. Finally, planners shortened the weeks of planned pre-invasion air strikes to days and eventually removed them from the plan entirely.43 In the end, ground forces attacked almost twenty-four hours before the air campaign began.44 By all appearances, ground-centric military theory had triumphed; OIF would be mainly a combined arms ground campaign. Yet if conservative planners managed to transform Franks’ planned air war into a ground campaign, the unexpected success of deep attacks quickly turned the actual war into something else entirely.
Deep attack A quick look at the plan for using air power in OIF would provide a mostly erroneous picture of how air was actually used in the war. On the surface, the relatively small percentage of sorties dedicated to striking regime targets (9 percent) and the massive number of sorties allocated to CAS (79 percent) gives the impression that air power played a mainly supporting role in the war.45 This was not the case. In fact, due to economies derived from precision weapons, the small percentage of sorties dedicated to regime targets crippled Saddam’s government, and the vast majority of sorties labeled as CAS struck and destroyed or demoralized enemy troops deep within Iraq. Creating coups and decapitating the regime For the last century, the United States has attacked non-military enemy targets during most of its wars. In World War II, it employed the combined bomber offensive against Axis; in the Vietnam War, it used Operation Rolling Thunder against the North; and in ODS, it employed precision attack against government and military targets in downtown Baghdad.46 While these operations had dissimilar target sets and were planned based on different theories of war, each focused on causing widespread destruction in the enemy’s interior.47 In the late 1990s, the development of cyber tools and precision weapons radically changed the way the United States attacked enemy regimes. Against Serbia, in 1998, the U.S. first employed a new precision strategy that used information age methods to locate and target assets belonging to the regime’s most important leaders. In Serbia, this meant targeting Slobadan Milosevic’s top
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political supporters with threats and bribes via faxes, emails, and phone calls; and then targeting their personal assets with economic sanctions and precision munitions.48 Although the subject has not received much academic attention, there is some evidence that the targeted politicians played a significant role in persuading Milosevic to concede to NATO’s demands.49 Franks describes taking a similar approach in Iraq in 2003. According to the CENTCOM commander, a few Gestapo-like pillars propped up Saddam’s unpopular regime.50 These props included: Iraq’s communications infrastructure; buildings such as Ba’ath Party headquarters and the command center of the Mukhabarat Special Security Organization; and senior Ba’ath leaders and the officers of the Special Republican Guard.51 If these “pressure points” could be influenced, air planners believed Saddam might “comply with U.N. Security council resolutions.”52 If he failed to yield, he might be toppled in a coup.53 Even if neither of these things came about, destroying the regime’s political infrastructure “would blind and paralyze Saddam’s inner leadership circle.”54 In practice, the Coalition’s deep attack began in 2002 with a cyber attack aimed at Iraq’s political elite. Using sophisticated cyber tools, the Coalition penetrated Iraq’s electronic information networks and located and contacted Ba’ath Party leaders and military commanders with faxes, emails, and phone calls urging them to stage coups, betray secrets, order troops to desert, and otherwise act in ways that would disrupt Saddam’s political and military C2.55 Once the war began, Coalition aircraft attacked the institutions and individuals on the regime-targets list with precision munitions.56 Unlike in the First Gulf War, where precision munitions had been used to shut down Iraq’s communications, in this case, jamming and counter C2 attacks purposely left some channels open as avenues for eavesdropping and influence.57 The invisible cyberwar against regime targets appears to have achieved quite a few of their intended effects. After the War, a number of senior Iraqi leaders complained to the press that the CIA had not paid them as much as they believed they had been promised and the international press was full of accounts of Iraqi military commanders accepting Coalition bribes.58 One story widely cited by the international media alleged that the head of the Special Republican Guard, General Maher Sufian al-Tikriti, ordered his forces not to defend Baghdad after making a deal with the United States.59 A month after the war, Franks pointed out that “before the U.S. invasion of Iraq, U.S. Special Forces had gone in and bribed Iraqi generals not to fight. . . . I had letters from Iraqi generals saying, ‘I now work for you.’ ”60 However damaging this campaign’s first order effects were to Iraq’s defenses, its second order consequences were probably worse. Given the nature of the Ba’athist regime, one of Saddam’s chief fears had always been military coups.61 Because many of the individuals targeted by cyber attack turned the messages over to the police, Saddam was aware of the pre-war information campaign and this appears to have magnified his fears.62 In response, in the days before the war, he drastically increased the Soviet style mechanisms employed
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within his military to weaken or expose plotters. For instance, new orders forbade division and corps commanders from communicating with one another. When the war began, in order to confound plotters, he immediately shifted his senior military leaders to new commands. As final insurance, he placed Ba’ath Party leaders over his military commanders with orders that no unit above company size could move without direct permission from its Ba’ath Party minder.63 The anti-coup processes Saddam put into place to counter the Coalition’s cyber attack worked. Coalition special forces involved in psychological operations described the effects of the safety measures as undermining their campaign. Coalition handlers often could not locate Iraqi commanders who had agreed to work with them, and who had subsequently been transferred to new commands. Coalition messages that targeted friendly Iraqi commanders were received by their replacements, betraying the friendly commander’s cooperation.64 None of this should be surprising; the methods Saddam used had been taught to him by Russian advisors who drew on a body of knowledge perfected across decades of experience by the Soviet Empire and its client states.65 Yet, while anti-coup defenses worked, implementing them carried a stiff price. As might be expected, the measures that increased Saddam’s security against internal threats by constraining Iraqi commanders – increasing the hierarchy of the C2 system, and injecting politicians into the chain of command – impaired Iraq’s ability to fight an outside invader. After the war, Iraqi senior military commanders loyal to Saddam described their immense frustration with the negative effect the Stalinist precautions had on combat effectiveness.66 The Iraqi minister of defense pointed out that the inability of commanders to communicate with each other: Dramatically reduced the quality of battlefield reporting and leadership situation awareness [and that] because the regional commands were under Ba’athist leadership, Baghdad received reports on the course of events in the fighting . . . from politicians, not professional military officers. Moreover, the arrangement effectively cut key military leaders and staffs out of the chain of command.67 Asked to explain the catastrophic collapse of Iraq’s defenses by U.S. interrogators, a group of senior Iraqi leaders listed tyrannical internal security measures as among the most important reasons for the failure of their country’s defenses.68 Thus, even before the war began, cyber attack made an already hierarchical Stalinist command structure even more brittle. It was against this brittle C2 structure that the Coalition commenced its attacks on leadership with GPS and laser-guided bombs.69 Although the main counter-regime attack did not occur until after the ground assault had begun, the day before the war, the Coalition launched a stealthy attack on a bunker near Baghdad believed to contain Saddam Hussein.70 If Iraqi leaders were not already aware of the danger precision munitions posed to them personally, this attack
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certainly provided a glimpse of the future. When the main attack began, their dilemma became even clearer, not only did the Coalition destroy official buildings such as headquarters and bunkers; it also made a concerted effort to destroy the homes of senior Ba’ath Party leaders.71 While the precision campaign killed few senior Iraqi leaders, the countermeasures these leaders employed to avoid danger drastically distorted the high commands’ situational awareness and ability to control its forces.72 Across the theater of combat, Iraqi leaders would not go to their offices, stayed away from telephones and radios and avoided contact with military personnel.73 Under any circumstances this would have made it difficult for the Ba’ath Party security apparatus to do its job – preventing disloyalty and defeatism – but since Saddam had recently placed this same group of leaders in central leadership positions in his military chain of command, the effects of their retreat was magnified throughout the country’s C2 system. After the war, military commanders bitterly complained about the dilemma in which the missing politicians placed them. Taking military action without the consent of their minders would incur a death sentence from Saddam, but failing to do so would result in destruction by the Coalition.74 Interviews with Iraqi commanders reveal harrowing stories of courageous officers taking rudimentary defensive actions, such as unilaterally ordering a bridge to be destroyed, knowing that their orders would result in their death if the regime survived.75 Undoubtedly, the most damaging affects of the attacks resulted from precautions Saddam took to protect himself. Security conscious under the best of circumstances, as the war commenced Saddam went into deep hiding. Constantly moving from one safe house to the next, Saddam would not allow any electronic equipment near him and would only permit party leaders and military commanders to contact him after having them driven in a car with blacked out windows through a series of cleaning points.76 Because of these procedures, even his highest commanders could only seek Saddam’s guidance after hours or even days of attempting to arrange meetings.77 Compounded with the fact that Saddam demanded personal control over any military decision of importance, the effects on the high command’s ability to act was debilitating. One of the most important examples of the effects of the interaction between Coalition attacks and Iraqi defenses occurred as the Coalition’s main thrust approached Baghdad through the Karbala Gap. On April 2, the high command recalled Iraq’s senior leaders to Baghdad to reorganize the country’s defenses.78 At the meeting, the minister of defense conveyed Saddam’s order to deploy the army north to block what he believed was the Coalition’s attack from the western front. In fact, the real attack was coming from the south and had already begun, but Saddam’s intelligence had misread both the location and the timing of Coalition movements.79 At the meeting, Lt. General Raad Al-Hamdani, the commander of the Republican Guard divisions south of Baghdad, had firsthand knowledge that the attack was coming from the south, and vehemently opposed sending Baghdad’s defending troops north away from the city. He explains:
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I objected, because I was in contact with the enemy [in the south]. So I spoke with the defense minister. He said that no discussion is permitted, because it is a message from the president, and we should start moving the troops starting on 5 a.m. next day, which was April 3.80 Hamdani goes on to explain that Saddam’s son Qusay agreed with his analysis, but even he was afraid to disobey Saddam. Saddam could not be apprised of the situation because he was incommunicado as a precaution against attacks on his person. When he returned to the front, General Hamdani used subterfuge to place as many troops as he could in the Karbala Gap to oppose the real attack while sending the rest of the army north to fight Saddam’s phantoms.81 Devastated Iraqi C2 caused mistakes, such as those made on April 2, to take place across various levels of operations. Throughout the war, Saddam’s knowledge of the locations of U.S. troops was limited. Although he often received accurate intelligence of Coalition movements, this information was generally days old by the time it reached him, often making it worse than useless in a fast moving ground campaign.82 A post-war U.S. Army analysis of Iraqi operations in central Iraq provides some insight into how Iraq’s lack of situational awareness affected its operations. The Iraqis misread the Coalition’s main thrust: They were apparently unsure of the coalition’s true direction of attack and when the main assault would actually start. . . . Additionally, expecting the main effort from between the two rivers, they oriented in the wrong direction.83 Meanwhile, the Coalition ground attack on Baghdad flushed the Baghdad, Adnan, Hammurabi, and Nebuchadnezzar Republican Guard divisions from their various dispersed positions around Central Iraq. As they concentrated to move, air power swept in to maul them.84 Only a small fraction of these units made it to their destination. Interestingly, however, these flushed divisions were rushing to the wrong locations, attempting to block phantom coalition attacks while ignoring the actual push toward Karbala.85 After the war, both coalition and Iraqi commanders shared a common perception of the effects the decapitation campaign had on Iraq’s ability to coordinate its defenses. In the opinion of CENTCOM Commander General Tommy Franks, once operations began, Iraq’s command and control system was not effective, “no one was in charge in Iraq.”86 According to the Coalition’s Land Component Commander, General David D. McKiernan: “The regime’s situational awareness was destroyed. . . . They didn’t know where we were; they didn’t know where their own forces were.”87 Iraqi General Hamdani described the situation at the operational level: “The regular army, Republican Guard, Quds army, and Ba’ath Party militias were all fighting in a separate pattern, as if there are no unified armed forces. . . . Everybody was just waiting for orders.”88 Iraqi General Huwaysh-Fadani Al-Ani’s describes the complete confusion at the capital. Even
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as coalition ground forces closed in on the capital, “the authorities in Baghdad had little sense of what Iraqi forces were confronting along the Euphrates River.”89 Perhaps the Iraqi information minister, Mohammed Saeed al-Sahaf, better known as “Baghdad Bob,” best symbolized the confusion when, as coalition troops stormed the city, he pronounced that Iraq was winning and that the enemy was nowhere near the capital.90 Retrospectively, describing the causes of Iraq’s rapid defeat, General Hamdani put much of the blame on Iraq’s organizational defenses against coups. In his opinion, high-ranking officers did not have enough authority to wage war effectively because of Saddam’s precautions. However, he went on to say, there were good reasons for limiting officers’ authority. The regime faced genuine internal threats.91 The combination of Iraq’s authoritarian political structure and the Coalition’s decapitation campaign put Saddam in an impossible position. To survive internal enemies, he was forced to take measures to weaken his defenses against external threats. While the Coalition’s attacks on the regime did not achieve their most ambitious goal, Saddam’s overthrow by an internal coup, they did achieve their secondary goal of decimating Iraq’s C2 and blinding its forces. Psychological warfare The second way Franks and the air planners envisioned using deep strike was to induce desertions in Iraq’s Army. The plan involved using propaganda and targeted messages, in combination with precision bombs to cause Iraqi soldiers to leave their units.92 Military theorists lack consensus about why troops desert under air attack.93 The explanation that militaries have traditionally applied to this process does not seem to work well where precision air power is concerned. According to the time-honored theory, soldiers refuse to desert either when their morale is high, or when their fear of military police exceeds their fear of the enemy. The problem is that air power, even precision air power, is not particularly good at destroying rear area troops that have dispersed and taken cover.94 For instance, even in OIF, bombs only destroyed around 1 or 2 percent of rear area troops.95 Nevertheless, in this war, as in other recent wars involving precision air power, enemy troops deserted in large numbers. In OIF, air planners used a combination of psychological operations and kinetic attacks to induce desertions. First, the Coalition engaged in one of the most intense psychological operations in U.S. history. In a relatively brief period of time, aircraft dropped tens of millions of leaflets and scores of solar-powered and hand-cranked short-wave radios onto Iraqi troops. Simultaneously, aircraft broadcast television and radio messages intended to undermine the regime.96 Next, the Coalition began a concentrated bombing campaign against Iraq’s rear area troops.97 State of the art air- and space-based sensors located troop positions and precision weapons subsequently systematically targeted them.98 Against these attacks, Iraq employed three primary defenses. First, although
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Iraq had only limited air defenses, its army had developed considerable skill at concealing and protecting its forces from aerial sensors and precision weapons.99 Even as early as ODS, the army had shown substantial ability to mask its position from U.S. sensors.100 By 2003, it had perfected many of these techniques. Interviews with Iraqi commanders show that, in preparing for the war, Saddam’s main concern had been a long bombing campaign.101 Consequently, he deployed his best divisions deep in Iraq and used overlapping techniques to conceal and protect them: troops dispersed and deployed to safe-houses; equipment was hidden in orchards; troops dug redundant protective bunkers and randomly circulated between them to throw off Coalition intelligence; and extensive use was made of camouflage and decoys.102 Iraq’s second defense involved the use of policing institutions to prevent troops from deserting. Throughout Saddam’s reign, Iraqi troops possessed abysmal morale and Ba’ath Party officials viewed officers as dangerous competitors. To preserve discipline, Iraq employed a Stalinist command structure involving multiple layers of secret police and harsh discipline for deserters.103 Just as this system had allowed Stalin’s army to absorb enormous casualties without breaking during World War II, it had allowed Iraq’s Army to hold up under high casualties during the Iran–Iraq War. In the battle of the Al Fao Peninsula, for instance, the army absorbed over 50,000 casualties without breaking.104 During the First Gulf War, however, although it suffered less concentrated casualties than it had in its war with Iran, the army broke and desertions became rampant.105 During the 1990s, Saddam responded by developing Special Police and fedayeen divisions tasked specifically with preventing army desertions. Along with Republican Guard units, these forces often deployed behind or alongside other units, their main mission to shoot fleeing Iraqis.106 Iraq’s third defense involved a sort of internal information operation. According to post war interviews with officers in his high command, Saddam’s greatest fear was internal, not external, security.107 One of his highest priorities was preventing anti-regime information from falling into the hands of troops. Not surprisingly, the regime censored and suppressed information. However, the Iraqi regime took censorship to an extreme. To prevent rebellion Saddam instigated a policy of compulsory internal deception. From the enlisted ranks through the high command, the regime harshly punished individuals who spread negative information. Individuals were literally expected to lie to their leaders if the truth involved unwanted news.108 Far from an exception, Baghdad Bob’s daft optimism was the rule among members of the regime during the war. Just as the Coalition’s psychological operations’ propaganda attempted to exaggerate the danger to soldiers of obeying the Iraqi regime, Saddam’s optimism campaign attempted to screen out negative information in order to create the opposite impression. The idea was that, for a regime afraid of desertion, pessimism is a self-fulfilling prophecy. If troops believe the regime will fall, they will stop fearing the judicial consequences of desertion and leave the ranks, resulting in actual defeat. The Iraqi Army’s defenses and the Coalition’s deep attack interacted in
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interesting ways. If the purpose of propaganda leaflets was to communicate the specific information that was written on them, Saddam’s defenses appear to have succeeded. Interviews with Iraqi troops suggest that few read the leaflets as they rained from the sky since viewing them carried a death penalty from Saddam and because the Special Republican Guard quickly collected and destroyed them.109 Yet troops also reported that seeing the leaflets fall telegraphed their vulnerability to Coalition bombs, and seeing the priority Saddam put on destroying them undermined their belief in the invulnerability of the regime.110 Saddam’s defenses against the cyber campaign also had unintended consequences. Security policies required officers who received personal communications from the Coalition to turn them over to their superiors. Yet this process simply increased the number of officers exposed to the information. As an Iraqi colonel explained: Faxes and emails to commanders had a big impact. . . . If one commander receives a fax and gives it to his senior, in this simple way the officer knows of the U.S. technical superiority. Imagine him thinking: “If the Americans are able to get into the mind of a senior commander this way, how can I protect a whole division?”111 The corrosive effect of messages targeted at leaders also helps to explain one of the most unusual aspects of desertion in OIF. While desertions in most previous wars have been initiated by enlisted soldiers and hindered by officers, in this war, most desertions appear to have originated when officers ordered their men to “go home.”112 Procedures designed to protect troops from bombs also sometimes backfired. The army’s static defenses largely preserved the lives of dispersed troops. Intent on destroying the army from a distance, the Coalition employed one of the most intense rear area bombing operations in air power history.113 Approximately 67 percent of the bombs and missiles used in the war targeted troops in deep areas. By contrast, a decade earlier in ODS only around 7 percent of air strikes aimed at this type of target.114 Operations were also more intense. In ODS, attacks slowly increased in intensity allowing Iraqi forces to adapt; in OIF, the attacks were relentless from the start.115 However, the first order effects of these strikes on Iraqi personnel were somewhat disappointing. While the attacks annihilated many divisions’ artillery and armor brigades, static troops largely survived.116 Across all rear areas, these attacks killed only 1 or 2 percent of the soldiers targeted.117 Nevertheless, Iraqi security police proved incapable of monitoring dispersed and hidden troops, largely undermining Saddam’s defenses against desertion. The outcome of this interplay between defenses and bombs was remarkable. For the first week, Iraq’s defenses held and few troops deserted. After ten days, desertions increased and by the end of the second week, the vast majority of Iraqi forces had deserted.118 Iraq’s high command estimates that 85 percent of Iraq’s troops deserted or were killed by deep air attacks.119 This estimate is con-
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sistent with other sources.120 In the end, Saddam was unable to employ Stalinist techniques to prevent his troops from deserting and also prevent them from being destroyed from the air.
Shaping the deep battlefield with ground forces The third way the Coalition employed air power against deep targets involved using ground-air synergy to destroy Iraqi troops that would not desert. In practice, this use of air power directly overlapped with attacks designed to induce desertions, however, the more nuanced idea behind this strategy was to use the threat of ground invasion to force Iraqi troops to leave their redoubts and maneuver and concentrate in the open where they would be vulnerable to air strikes.121 Throughout most of its history, air power has been highly effective against troops moving in the open. As early as World War II, armies attempting to move under enemy air supremacy have been forced to disperse, travel at night, and employ other defensive stratagems.122 In the era of modern night and all-weather sensors and precision weapons, the task of moving under enemy air power has become substantially more difficult. Nevertheless, some countries have managed to do so. In OAF, the Serbian army escaped destruction from NATO air power by dispersing into small units and traveling in civilian vehicles.123 However, these tactics appear to have limitations. In OEF, when Taliban troops attempted to emulate Serbia’s dispersion tactics, the United States countered by employing indigenous rebel militias; if Taliban troops remained dispersed, the militias defeated them in ground combat and through close air support, if they concentrated in groups large enough to resist ground forces, aircraft located and destroyed them.124 In OIF, Franks intended to employ something like the Afghan model on a much larger scale.125 As long as Saddam believed he was only fighting air power, he could leave his troops dispersed and hidden in rear areas. However, once he detected approaching ground troops, he would be forced to concentrate his forces and move them to the locations where they would be useful.126 Before the war, Iraqi commanders had also been aware that, in the event of a ground invasion, rear area troops would have to maneuver in the open to block the invasion and that these troops would be extremely vulnerable to Coalition air power.127 To overcome this problem, the army pre-positioned logistical supplies throughout the country so that when they moved they could abandon trucks and other equipment that generated large sensor signatures. They also developed methods of dispersing divisions and moving them as individual battalions as well as shifting units from the same divisions to separate fronts to confuse observe