cSUR-UT Series: Library for Sustainable Urban Regeneration Volume 8 Series Editor: Shinichiro Ohgaki, Tokyo, Japan
cSUR-UT Series: Library for Sustainable Urban Regeneration By the process of urban development in the 20th century, characterized by suburban expansion and urban redevelopment, many huge and sophisticated complexes of urban structures have been erected in developed countries. However, with conventional technologies focused on the construction of structures, it has become difficult to keep urban spaces adaptable to environmental constraints and economic, social and cultural changes. In other words, it has become difficult for conventional technologies to meet social demands for the upgrading of social capital in a sustainable manner and for the regeneration of attractive urban space that is not only safe and highly efficient but also conscious of historical, cultural and local identities to guarantee a high quality of life for all. Therefore, what is needed now is the creation of a new discipline that is able to reorganize the existing social capital and the technologies to implement it. For this purpose, there is a need to go beyond the boundaries of conventional technologies of construction and structural design and to integrate the following technologies: (1) Technology concerned with environmental and risk management (2) Technology of conservation and regeneration with due consideration to the local characteristics of existing structures including historical and cultural resources (3) Technologies of communication, consensus building, plan making and space management to coordinate and integrate the individual activities initiated by various actors of society Up to now, architecture, civil engineering, and urban engineering in their respective fields have, while dealing with different time-space scales and structures, accumulated cutting-edge knowledge and contributed to the formation of favorable urban spaces. In the past, when emphasis was put on developing new residential areas and constructing new structures, development and advancement of such specialized disciplines were found to be the most effective. However, current problems confronting urban development can be highlighted by the fact that a set of optimum solutions drawn from the best practices of each discipline is not necessarily the best solution. This is especially true where there are relationships of trade-offs among such issues as human risk and environmental load. In this way, the integration of the above three disciplines is strongly called for. In order to create new integrated knowledge for sustainable urban regeneration, the Center for Sustainable Urban Regeneration (cSUR), The University of Tokyo, was established in 2003 as a core organization of one of the 21st Century Centers of Excellence Programs funded by the Ministry of Education and Science, Japan, and cSUR has coordinated international research alliances and collaboratively engages with common issues of sustainable urban regeneration. The cSUR series are edited and published to present the achievements of our collaborative research and new integrated approaches toward sustainable urban regeneration. Editorial board of the cSUR series Chair: Department of Urban Engineering, The University of Tokyo Prof. Shinichiro Ohgaki Members: Prof. Keisuke Hanaki Department of Urban Engineering, The University of Tokyo Prof. Yuzo Sakamoto Department of Architecture, The University of Tokyo Prof. Yozo Fujino Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Tokyo Prof. Hiroshi Naito Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Tokyo Prof. Hitoshi Ieda Department of Civil Engineering, The University of Tokyo Prof. Takeshi Ito Department of Architecture, The University of Tokyo Prof. Shuichi Matsumura Department of Architecture, The University of Tokyo Assoc. Prof. Takafumi Noguchi Department of Architecture, The University of Tokyo Prof. Atsuyuki Okabe Department of Urban Engineering, The University of Tokyo Assoc. Prof. Yukio Sadahiro Department of Urban Engineering, The University of Tokyo Director: Prof. Junichiro Okata Department of Urban Engineering, The University of Tokyo
T. Kidokoro, J. Okata, S. Matsumura, N. Shima (Eds.)
Vulnerable Cities: Realities, Innovations and Strategies
Tetsuo Kidokoro, Ph.D. Associate Professor Department of Urban Engineering The University of Tokyo 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku Tokyo 113-8656, Japan
Junichiro Okata, Ph.D. Professor & Secretary General Center for Sustainable Urban Regeneration The University of Tokyo 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku Tokyo 113-8656, Japan
Shuichi Matsumura, Ph.D. Professor Department of Architecture The University of Tokyo 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku Tokyo 113-8656, Japan
Norihisa Shima Assistant Professor Department of Civil Engineering The University of Tokyo 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku Tokyo 113-8656, Japan
Cover photo: Kabul, Afghanistan; © Tetsuo Kidokoro
ISSN 1865-8504 ISBN 978-4-431-78148-6
e-ISBN 978-4-431-78149-3
Library of Congress Control Number: 2008923166 © 2008 to the complete printed work by Springer, except as noted. Individual authors or their assignees retain rights to their respective contributions; reproduced by permission. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in other ways, and storage in data banks. The use of registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Springer is a part of Springer Science+Business Media springer.com Printed in Japan Typesetting: Camera-ready by the editors and authors Printing and binding: Hicom, Japan Printed on acid-free paper
Preface
The Center for Sustainable Urban Regeneration, the University of Tokyo (cSUR) has undertaken research on the improvement of vulnerable urban space with a focus on community-based approaches. The objective of the research is to examine present situations of vulnerable urban space as well as post-disaster rehabilitation processes. Indeed, a third of the world’s urban population are reported to live in substandard informal settlements. These substandard settlements are vulnerable, physically, socially and economically. There is, therefore, a growing awareness that an integrated approach is needed in order to improve such vulnerable urban areas. The International Workshop on Improving Vulnerable Urban Space: Making Community Work was held in order to make a comparative study of Asia and Latin America on 1–3 March 2007. The commonalities as well as differences of selected case cities were discussed intensely and many useful insights and ideas were expressed during the workshop. All contributors to this book presented their papers in the workshops and expanded their initial analysis and ideas based on the deliberations in the workshops and the following correspondence among the participants. This book has combined empirical and comparative analysis on improvement of vulnerable urban space and post-disaster rehabilitation in Asian and Latin American countries. We hope that the discussions conceived in this book will serve as a useful and thoughtful resource for researchers, practitioners and students and those who are working on alleviating the vulnerability of urban space. Tetsuo Kidokoro Acknowledgments We would like to thank all of the contributors to this book, as well as those who directly or indirectly participated in the comparative case studies for their contributions to the final results of the projects. We would like to give special thanks to Ann Tomoko Yamamoto for her dedicated work as an English editor of this book.
Contents
Preface
v
Tetsuo Kidokoro
List of Contributors
xi
Part I. Introduction 1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space………………………………………………………3 Tetsuo Kidokoro 2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters……………….15 Banasopit Mekvichai 3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting for Existing Low Earthquake Resistant Structures: The Most Important Issue for Earthquake Disaster Reduction……………………………..29 Kimiro Meguro
Part II. Improvement of Urban Vulnerability 4. Growing Vulnerability Crisis “Will Slums Ever Reduce or Improve?”: A Case from India………………………………77 Vijay Neekhra 5. Identifying Housing Conditions in Bogota, Colombia: A Strategy to Deal with Risks…………………………………105 Francesco Ambrosi Filardi
viii
6. Methodology for Intervention in Vulnerable Settlements in Medellin, Colombia: Urban Destructuralization in Relation to the Topography of the Territory………………………….119 Juan Ricardo Mejía B. 7. From Wood Huts to Buildings of Seven Floors: An Analysis of the Process of Housing Production in the Slum of Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, over a Fifty-Year Period…………...141 Gerônimo Leitão 8. The Incremental Improvement of the Area Densely Built-up with Old Wooden Houses in Tokyo…………………………169 Hitoshi Nakamura 9. Thailand Urban Environmental Management: Case of Environmental Infrastructure and Housing Provision in Bangkok Metropolitan Region………………………………………...187 Vilas Nitivattananon and Chalika Noonin
Part III. Management of Natural Disasters 10. Seismic Vulnerability of Peruvian Houses: Current Issues and Solution Attempts……………………………………...211 Paola Mayorca 11. Improving Vulnerable Urban Space in Postdisaster in Yogyakarta and Central Java, Indonesia: Participatory and Comprehensive Approach……………………………………….225 Suprayoga Hadi 12. Community Empowerment Program on the Revitalization of Kotagede Heritage District, Indonesia Post Earthquake….241 Laretna T. Adishakti 13. A Review of the 921 Post-earthquake Community Rehabilitation of the Urban Disaster Area in Taiwan….………….257 Kuang-Hui Peng and Yao-Chi Kuo
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14. Earthquake as a Fact of Istanbul: Risk-based Strategy and an Action Plan for the Vulnerable Zeytinburnu Area……275 Aye Sema Kubat, Engin Eyübolu, Özhan Ertekin and Frat Sari 15. Structural Viewpoint……………………………………….299 Mikio Koshihara 16. Vulnerability to Earthquake Disaster and Countermeasures in Tokyo……………………………………………………...317 Takaaki Kato
List of Contributors
Laretna T. Adishakti
Gerônimo Leitão
Lecturer & Researcher Center for Heritage Conservation Department of Architecture and Planning Gadjah Mada University
[email protected]
Professor Adjunto School of Architecture and Urbanism Fluminense Federal University
[email protected]
Francesco Ambrosi Filardi Vicegerent Social Interest Housing Group Popular Housing Fund (Bogotá City)
[email protected]
Özhan Ertekin Research Assistant Department of City and Regional Planning Istanbul Technical University
[email protected]
Engin Eyübolu Lecturer & Researcher Department and City and Regional Planning Istanbul Technical University
[email protected]
Suprayoga Hadi Director Regional Development II National Development Planning Agency
[email protected]
Takaaki Kato Assistant Professor Department of Urban Engineering The University of Tokyo
[email protected]
Tetsuo Kidokoro Associate Professor Department of Urban Engineering The University of Tokyo
[email protected]
Mikio Koshihara Associate Professor Institute of Industrial Science The University of Tokyo
[email protected]
Aye Sema Kubat Professor Department of City and Regional Planning Istanbul Technical University
[email protected]
Yao-Chi Kuo Ex-Executive Director The 921 Earthquake Post-Disaster Recovery Commission
[email protected]
xii
Shuichi Matsumura
Vilas Nitivattananon
Professor Department of Architecture The University of Tokyo
[email protected]
Assistant Professor School of Environment Resources and Development Asian Institute of Technology
[email protected]
Paola Mayorca Research Associate Institute of Industrial Science The University of Tokyo
[email protected]
Chalika Noonin Sanitary Technician Department of Environment Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
[email protected]
Kimiro Meguro Professor Institute of Industrial Science The University of Tokyo
[email protected]
Juan Ricardo Mejía B. Director of Research Group - Integral Improvement of Settlements Faculty of Architecture Bolivariana Papal University
[email protected]
Banasopit Mekvichai Deputy Governor Bangkok Metropolitan Administration
[email protected]
Hitoshi Nakamura Project Assistant Professor Center for Sustainable Urban Regeneration The University of Tokyo
[email protected]
Vijay Neekhra Ph.D. Candidate Department of Urban Engineering The University of Tokyo
[email protected]
Junichiro Okata Professor & Secretary General Center for Sustainable Urban Regeneration The University of Tokyo
[email protected]
Kuang-Hui Peng Professor & Dean Graduate Institute of Architecture and Urban Design National Taipei University of Technology
[email protected]
Frat Sari Project Responsible on Urban Planning YEM - Building Information Centre (Istanbul, Tuekey)
[email protected]
Norihisa Shima Assistant Professor Department of Civil Engineering The University of Tokyo
[email protected]
Part I INTRODUCTION
1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space
Tetsuo Kidokoro
1.1 Introduction According to the statistics of UNHABITAT, about one billion people, onethird of the world’s 3.2-billion urban population, live in substandard informal settlements as of 2005, and this population is increasing by 2.2% annually (Fig. 1-1). The improvement of urban slum areas is one of the critical issues in the 21st century. As much as 40% of the population are estimated to live in substandard informal settlements in Manila. Even in Bangkok, which has achieved remarkable economic growth, the resident population in slum areas is estimated to exceed one million, and the number has not decreased.
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These substandard informal settlements are definitely the most vulnerable areas in the city (Fig. 1-2). Many of them are developed informally without applying formal planning procedures. Residents have often occupied the underused land without formal land rights. They are often under the threat of eviction. Those underused places are a city’s most vulnerable areas in terms of natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes and fires, and temporary building structures are quite weak once hit by disaster. They are generally poor communities, and are thus economically vulnerable. Slum areas lack basic infrastructure such as water supply, sewage, drainage and solid waste collection, and thus health risks are particularly high (Fig. 1-3 and 1-4). Physical -
vulnerability to natural disaster lack of basic infrastructure health risks
Social -
threat of eviction inadequate access to social/public service loss of cultural diversity
Economic -
inadequate opportunity to materialize potential capability (access to education/training, labor market, financial resources, etc.)
Fig. 1-2. Vulnerability of informal settlements
Fig. 1-3. Slum in Bangkok, Thailand. Children’s play area; full of disposed garbage, which causes serious health risks.
Fig. 1-4. Informal settlements, Kabul, Afghanistan. Vulnerable urban space
1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space
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1.2 From Public Supply to Self-help Housing In the early 1970s, improvement of slum areas where the urban poverty class is concentrated became an important issue in many developing countries, and efforts were made to provide housing for the urban poverty class through establishing housing corporations. It became immediately clear, however, that it is not at all possible to provide housing at rents payable by the urban poor, and that such a public housing strategy is possible only through vast government subsidies. Further, public housing with low rents due to subsidies became a profit opportunity for a very limited number of lucky people, and the tenants were soon replaced by people in the middleincome class, which also became a big problem (Fig. 1-5). On the other hand, self-help-type housing (occupying land without official rights, build a house through self-help efforts, without taking official procedures, such as acquisition of a building permit, and start living) in slum areas in developing countries came to attract attention as a form of housing, under the influence of advocacy planning in the 1960s. In such a trend, the World Bank, which has influential power in policy making in developing countries, started housing sector financing for the urban poor. As a result, in the late 1970s and thereafter, self-help-type housing became the mainstream concept.
Fig. 1-5. Sites and services: Innovative, but not replicable. The government provided sites and basic services in suburban areas to make the land affordable to the poor. But it became difficult to publicly supply enough land for the rapidly increasing population; thus it was generally not replicable, except for some model projects.
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1.3 From Self-help Housing to Urban Management In the process of slum improvement projects (minimum living environment improvement projects, such as establishment of water supply and drain conduits, and simple pavement of passages, in existing slum areas), which have been conducted with the Word Bank’s financial help in many developing countries, the importance and effectiveness of establishing a basic infrastructure in respective areas according to needs, through community participation methods, under support of government and NGOs, became clear. A well-known example is KIP (Kampung Improvement Program), which has been widely implemented in many cities in Indonesia. In KIP, in residential districts with poor living infrastructure that spontaneously developed in existing urban areas, pavement of alleys, drainage, public toilets, etc., are established and improved through the involvement of residents in construction works and with technical and financial support from government agencies. KIP has successfully shown that it is possible to incrementally implement improvement of informally developed areas at the city scale through the involvement of residents, if there is a political will. Similar slum up-grading projects have been conducted in many cities in developing countries with financial support from international aid agencies such the World Bank, with a certain level of success (Fig. 1-6 and 1-7). On the other hand, there is much criticism that government leadership has become stronger, and resident participation has been reduced to a shell, after project scale rapidly expanded. Based on such experiences, it
Fig. 1-6. Improved slum, Manila, Philippines. Importantly, the provision of basic infrastructure in slum areas by the government with the involvement of residents stimulates investment in housing by residents themselves, because residents feel the threat of eviction is gone.
Fig. 1-7. Improved slum, Bankok, Thailand. A strong sense of community is an important asset for slum communities, and building capacity of the community in the process of implementing physical improvement projects is a key to the sustainable improvement of vulnerable urban slums.
1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space
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gradually became recognized, in the 1980s and thereafter, that improvement of slum areas based on the idea of self-help requires improvement of various institutional frameworks, such as the regularization of land use rights and enhancement of efficiency of public projects related to water supply, electricity, housing, etc. In countries that achieved considerable economic growth under economic globalization, such as Thailand, private housing developers grew, and developed housing became attainable for those with upper lower-level incomes. It became recognized that strengthening urban management to appropriately form such a private housing market, which means improvement, etc., of the land system and the home financing system, is an important subject. Under expansion of such recognition, the United Nations Human Settlements Programme (HABITAT) and the World Bank presented an ‘enabling strategy’ in the late 1980s. The strategy was based on the idea that government should enable the private sector, NGOs, resident organizations, etc., to provide housing and improve the housing environment, instead of directly providing housing, which means government should engage in establishing necessary conditions and strengthen its capacity in urban management (Fig. 1-8).
Fig. 1-8. Low-cost housing, Manila, Philippines. The deregulation of building codes, zoning ordinances as well as the provision of housing finance have to some extent enabled social enterprises to provide affordable low-cost housing to lower middle-income people in Manila since the 1990s. Initial investment is lowered as much as possible and buyers furnish houses after they start living, in self-help style.
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Tetsuo Kidokoro
1.4 From Urban Management to Community Management Though the basic urban management approach itself may not be wrong, there are lots of difficulties ahead. In particular, it was proved that the improvement of the land management system certainly takes time and need enormous efforts for government to rouse itself and tackle the issues, because it often necessitates fundamental reforms that affect the basis of the country. Although institutional improvement is important, it becomes effective only with enhancement of communities’ capabilities to develop themselves; and further, that it is important to connect institutional improvement to communities’ capabilities to develop themselves. Nowadays, there is a growing consensus that in order to improve slum areas, it is essential to conduct community-based projects through collaboration with the voluntary sector such as community-based organizations (CBOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Conceptually, community-based slum improvement projects can be classified into three types: empowerment approach, community development approach and community management (Fig. 1-9). The empowerment approach will be effective when representative community organizations are not generated or the governments are not positive about the improvement of slum areas. In these cases, intermediary NGOs or other organizations support the organization of community-based groups to conduct community-based activities. Through these activities, it is expected that community-based organizations possibly acquire the capacity to improve their areas themselves and to negotiate with the government to respond to their voices. Capacity of community (leadership, organization, representation, social network, financial sustainability)
Community Management Approach
Community Involvement Approach
Empowerment Approach
Level of the capacity of the government (Efficiency, Transparency, Responsiveness, Participation)
Fig. 1-9. Community-based formalization process
1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space
9
A good example of the empowerment approach is the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP), implemented in the Orangi district, in Karachi, Pakistan. In this project, residents themselves construct low-cost sewage and drainage facilities through low-cost technology development. The OPP, an NGO, conducts community organization support activities through organizing residents lane by lane, and eventually organizing representative community organizations through the federations of lane neighborhood organizations. The motivation for residents is that the self-help construction of sewage in the lane in front of their houses dramatically improves the physical environment, but it requires collaboration with other lane neighborhood organizations, simply because they need to be connected to make sewage effective (Fig. 1-10 and 1-11). In the case of Orangi, people themselves promoted the establishment of necessary infrastructure under the support of an NGO. An important point here is that the OPP supported the formation of a neighborhood organization, and strengthened it, by using a specific goal (construction of sewage) as means, instead of simply promoting construction of sewage/drainage facilities with resident participation, in an informally developed area where representative community organizations had not been formed. In other words, improvement of the physical environment was just a means, and the goal was to improve the social environment. It is also noted that formation of representative community organizations strengthened their voices to the city government, which started to support OPP through connecting the sewage in Orangi to the city drainage systems. By using the OPP as a model, projects in many developing country cities are being promoted, mainly by NGOs, to connect improvement of the community’s physical environment with improvement of the social
Fig. 1-10. Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi, Pakistan (Photo by Maki Morikawa). People themselves plan, finance and construct simple sewers on the basis of neighborhood organizations created lane by lane.
Fig. 1-11. Orangi Pilot Project, Karachi, Pakistan (Photo by Maki Morikawa). OPP, an NPO, provides technical as well as organizational support to residents’ neighborhood organizations.
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Tetsuo Kidokoro
environment, that is, the formation of social networks among residents. The community development approach refers to styles such as conducting slum improvement projects in areas where a certain kind of representative community organizations exists. In these cases, capacity building of community organizations as well as the efficient and equitable conduct of slum improvement projects will be pursued largely by the supporting government agencies. Notably, successful cases are often conducted in collaboration with intermediary NGOs, who coordinate the needs and specific conditions of communities and the intentions and limitations of the government agencies. A good example is KIP, mentioned above. The community management approach is a more advanced model in terms of community initiative. The government devolves necessary power and financial capability for community-based organizations to conduct improvement projects. On that basis, improvement projects are conducted and managed under the initiative of community-based organizations in collaboration with relevant government agencies and intermediary NGOs. Most importantly, continuous improvement projects should be conducted towards the overall improvement of the community’s quality of life. Of course, these approaches should be understood as ideal types. Actual slum improvement projects are conducted through combinations of these different approaches, and there are few cases in which only one of the three approached is dominantly observed. In the San Antonio community, which is a slum community in Manila, Philippines, waste-recycling activity is conducted on a large scale as voluntary activity by a community organization (Fig. 1-12 and 1-13). Initially, the activity was started by an NGO called SPM (Save the Pasig River Movement). SPM supported organizing a resident organization in charge of recycling activity
Fig. 1-12. San Antonio, Manila, Philippines (Photo by Maiko Nishi). Community-based waste collection and recycling in a slum community can become sustainable as a community-based social enterprise.
Fig. 1-13. San Antonio, Manila, Philippines (Photo by Maiko Nishi). Partnership with supportive local governments is essential to link the community activity with the city service.
1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space
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through discovering leaders from various existing volunteer activities, implementing community development training for leaders, etc., and it also played an important role in starting recycling activities through providing technical support for recycling methods, contributing temporary storage for recycling goods, and coordinating with the local government for waste collection that is done alongside recycling (Nishi and Kidokoro et al. (2000)). It is noted that collecting wastes and recycling not only considerably improve the physical environment, but also generate income for those who participate in waste collection. Thus, waste collection can become a kind of community-based social enterprise so that recycling can become a sustainable activity in San Antonio. Since the late 1990s, micro finance, as well as networking and partnership, have emerged as important aspects of poverty issues. A well-known example of micro finance is the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. The Grameen Bank, established in 1976, gives out small loans without collateral to poor women in rural areas. A small group, consisting of five people, is formed under close instruction by staff, and the entire group has joint responsibility for the loan. Members use small loans for income generating activities, and it has been shown that they can successfully repay loans. Presently, the Bank has expanded to entire rural areas in Bangladesh, and has grown to provide loans to 2.3 million poor women. Using the Grameen Bank as a successful model, micro finance for the urban poor has expanded as effective empowerment means since the 1990s. A well-known successful example of micro finance in the urban residential field is the Community Mortgage Program (CMP) of the Philippines. The CMP, started in 1989, is a system in which the government loans money to slum area residents for land acquisition, basic infrastructure provision such as water supply/drainage facilities, and housing construction, for a long term (15 years) at low interest with subsidy from the government. As a characteristic feature, NGOs or the local governments give support for the formation of community organizations and clerical procedures. Loans are given to community organizations. During the first two years, a community organization, instead of an individual, retains rights to the land, and has responsibility for repaying the loan, and thereafter land rights are transferred to individuals. The average repayment rate is reported to be as high as 90% or more, particularly when NGOs are loan originators. This reflects the fact that NGOs conduct various activities to support building the capacity of community organizations, not just clerical work to provide loans to the community. Using CMP as a precedent, in Thailand the Urban Community Development Office (UCDO: currently reorganized as the Community Organizations Development Institute (CODI)) started as a partnership-type project by government and NGOs and representatives of CBOs. The UCDO
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was established in 1992 under the National Housing Authority (NHA), a government agency in charge of providing housing to low- and middleincome people, through funds from the Thai government (US$50 million). It merged with Rural Community Development in 2000 and was renamed CODI (Community Organization Development Institute). Its board of directors, which is a decision-making body, is a partnership-type organization independent from the government, consists of related government agencies, NGOs, professionals and representatives of CBOs, from an equal standpoint. Using its funds, the CODI provides loans to community-based saving groups that they help to organize in low-income communities according to the Cooperative Law. Then, the saving groups provide loans to the respective group members. Though the CODI provides loans at lower interest than the market rate, the community-based saving groups give out loans to respective group members at a level similar to the market rate. The split of interest rates are kept by the community-based saving groups, and the funds can be used for community projects, thus creating a system for the community to be financially capable. When the CODI provides a loan to a saving group, a project to be financed is decided based on both parties’ agreement. Eligible projects are not limited to housing or basic infrastructure improvement activities in communities, but can also include incomegenerating activities. The CODI not only implements micro finance but also provides support so that communities can develop themselves, such as organizing saving groups, support for networking among these groups, training programs, etc. According to the CODI report, about half of the poor urban communities (1,271 communities) had been benefited as of 2005.
1.5 Conclusion This chapter overviews improvement projects in substandard informal settlements of cities and introduces specific examples. As shown by these examples, a shift to community-initiative-type approaches is a major trend, and the importance of the following elements have become widely recognized: the role of NGOs to support such projects; networking among government, NGOs, CBOs, etc., as an institutional system to enable community-based projects; and partnership-type organizations independent from government agencies. Huge investment is generally needed for conventional urban infrastructure development projects such as water supply, sewage, waste management, and flood protection. Of course, these are of-
1. Community-based Approach for Improving Vulnerable Urban Space
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ten not affordable for the urban poor, and thus low-income informal settlements are not covered. Structural reinforcement measures to increase the preparedness for natural disaster such as earthquakes and floods are also often not the first priority for low-income people. As discussed above, the progress of the community-based approach is key, and requires capacity building both at the community and local government levels as well as partnership-building among different levels of governments, NGOs, CBOs and the private sector.
References Abbot, J. (1996) “Sharing the City: Community Participation in Urban Development”, in Arrossi, S. et al. (eds) Funding Community Initiatives, Earthscan Hamdi N. and Goethert R. (1997) Action Planning For Cities: A Guide to Community Practice, Willey Kidokoro, T. (2004) “Formation of Sustainable Urban Development Strategy in Asia” in Sasaki, T. (ed) Nature and Human Communities, Springer Kidokoro, T. (2000) “Roles of ODA at the Intersection of Urban Environment Improvement and Poverty Alleviation”, JBIC Review, Special Issue: Infrastructure for Development in the 21st Century Kidokoro, T., Nguyen, T.A. and Tran, M.A. (2007) “Improving Spatial Planning Systems and Development Control Mechanisms Towards Sustainable Urban Development in Asian Cities” (Proceeding of 4th Urban Research Symposium, 14-16, May 2007, World Bank, Washington DC) Sanoff, A. (2000) Community Participation Methods in Design and Planning, JohnWiley & Sons Schubeler, S. (1996) Participation and Partnership in Urban Infrastructure Management (Urban Management Programme Policy Paper 19, the World Bank) Nishi, M., Kidokoro, T. and Onishi, T. (2000) “A study on community-based recycling activities in a slum community in Manila, Philippines”, Papers on City Planning, 35 (in Japanese)
2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters
Banasopit Mekvichai
2.1 Introduction When we look at the question of vulnerable cities and how they cope with disasters, we need to look at three closely linked issues: (1) the rapid urbanization throughout the world, and in particular in developing countries, (2) the impact of these fast-growing cities on the environment, and (3) how major environmental changes, in particular global warming, affects our cities. It is important to know then what we can do, or try to do, to ameliorate at least some of the causes of disasters. It is also critical for those who look after our cities to be aware of the potential disasters, and to be well prepared to cope with those types of disasters that are more likely to occur in their cities. For this article, I first discuss a few issues concerning the vulnerability of cities to natural and man-made disasters in general. This is followed with a discussion of what city administrations can do to prepare for disasters. Finally, I look at what the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration does to help mitigate disasters, with specific discussion of measures to control Bangkok’s perennial problem of flooding.
2.2 The Urbanization of the World The rate of urbanization in recent years is astounding. As can be seen in Fig. 2-1, about 50 years ago, only three out of ten people in the world lived in cities. Most of these were in the developed countries. Now about 50% of the world’s population lives in cities, and by 2030 it is expected that six out of ten people will live in cities. Most of the new urban growth is in the less developed and least developed countries.
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Banasopit Mekvichai 90.0% 80.0% 70.0% 60.0% 50.0% 40.0% 30.0% 20.0% 10.0% 0.0%
1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
World
29.8% 31.7% 33.7% 35.5% 36.8% 37.9% 39.6% 41.5% 43.5% 45.3% 47.2% 49.3% 51.5% 53.7% 55.9% 58.1% 60.2%
More Developed
54.9% 58.0% 61.4% 64.6% 67.7% 70.0% 71.5% 72.7% 73.7% 74.6% 75.4% 76.3% 77.4% 78.6% 79.9% 81.3% 82.6%
Less Developed
17.8% 19.6% 21.6% 23.6% 25.1% 26.8% 29.3% 32.1% 35.0% 37.7% 40.4% 43.1% 45.9% 48.6% 51.3% 53.9% 56.4%
Least Developed
7.4%
8.4%
9.5%
11.1% 12.9% 14.7% 17.3% 19.0% 20.8% 23.1% 25.6% 28.4% 31.4% 34.5% 37.6% 40.7% 43.7%
Fig. 2-1. Rate of world urbanization, 1950 to 2030 (2005 to 2030 estimates) (Source: United Nations Population Division)
9,000,000,000
8,000,000,000
7,000,000,000
6,000,000,000
5,000,000,000
Total population Urban population Rural population
4,000,000,000
3,000,000,000
2,000,000,000
1,000,000,000
0 1950
1955 1960
1965
1970
1975 1980
1985
1990 1995
2000
2005 2010 2015
2020 2025
2030
Fig. 2-2. World population: total population, urban population, and rural population, 1950 to 2030 (2005 to 2030 estimates) (Source: United Nations Population Division)
What does this mean? For the first time in world history, more people now live in cities than in villages (Fig. 2-2). Nearly all the future human population growth will be in cities. This is through a combination of people moving from the countryside into the cities, and the growth of population within the cities themselves. Most of this urban growth will also be concentrated in megacities --- cities of five million people or more.
2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters
17
Fig. 2-3. Megacities of the world, by size, in 2000 (Source: Department of Geography, University of Cologne)
Fig. 2-4. Megacities of the world, by size, in 2015 (Source: Department Geography, University of Cologne)
Fig. 2-3 and 2-4 show the number and size of the megacities of the world in 2000 and the expected number and size of megacities in 2015, respectively. In 1950, only nine cities had five million residents or more. Only two were in Asia: Tokyo (then the second largest city after New York) and Shanghai. Four were in Europe, two in the US, and one (Buenos Aires) in Latin America. By 2000, Europe added only two more megacities, and the US added but one, while Asia added 17 new megacities. By 2015, the total number of megacities in Asia Europe is expected to remain at six, while North America will have just four. Asia, in contrast, is expected to have 34, and Latin America nine, including the second largest megalopolis, Mexico City.
18
Banasopit Mekvichai
2.3 Vulnerability to Disasters This growth of highly concentrated urban areas has crucial implications for the vulnerability of the cities and their residents. To begin with, the concentration of population means that when a disaster does strike these sites, it will affect many more people. Flooding, earthquakes, and extreme storms do not of course specifically target cities, but they will have much greater impact on human life and property when they hit large settlements rather than the fairly dispersed and less populated rural areas. Cities, though, are often built on sites vulnerable to particular natural disasters. Port cities along coasts in the tropics and subtropics are exposed to tropical storms. Many other cities built along rivers, for water supply or also for defense, are now susceptible to floods. How these fast-growing cities expand can leave them even more vulnerable to disasters. Older cities nestled in valleys have newer settlements built up along hillsides. Slum housing on hillsides, such as the shantytowns perched on the slopes around Rio de Janeiro, are especially susceptible to land and mudslides. The high concentration of population and of built area makes these cities prone as well to man-made disasters such as fires and toxic spills. 2.3.1 Megacities and the Environment Although megacities take up only 2% of the Earth’s land surface, they account for 60% of human water use. The world’s biggest cities use 75% of all the electricity. With most motor transport in and around cities, and most industries in and around cities, nearly 80% of all human produced carbon emissions come from cities. Thus megacities make the biggest contributions to climate change, in a strange way contributing to their own increased vulnerability to natural disasters, as global warming leads to more frequent and powerful tropical storms and to greater extremes of rainfall and drought and of course higher temperatures. With their appetite for water, the huge amounts of liquid and solid waste produced, and the pollution from factories and motor vehicles, the large cities of the world create the conditions that make them so unhealthy and ever more at risk to man-made disasters.
2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters
19
2.3.2 Preparing for Disaster Cities administrators and managers must be aware of and seek ways to mitigate the different types of natural disasters that can affect their communities. Cities in Japan and Indonesia, and elsewhere along the Pacific Ring of Fire must be particularly concerned with earthquakes. Earthquakes cannot of course be prevented: but the disastrous effects can be mitigated through improved building construction and effective disaster management. With earthquakes there sometimes come tsunamis: coastal communities prone to tsunamis must have effective evacuation and relief procedures. Nature’s fury is often seen in powerful storms: hurricanes and typhoons, tornadoes, sandstorms, windstorms, heavy rain and floods, and severe snow, ice, and sleet storms. Then there are landslides and mudslides, sinkholes, fires (some from natural causes, most from humans) and the manmade disasters of toxic spills and pollution. There was even river so polluted, the Cuyahoga River passing through Cleveland, Ohio, that the oils and effluent floating on top of it caught fire several times since the 1930s, the most recent and famous fire on June 22, 1969. Fortunately for city managers and administrators, not every city will face each type of disaster. Otherwise human, financial, and material resources would be stretched too thinly. Tokyo must be well prepared for earthquakes and an occasional typhoon, but not so much for severe winter weather and nor for tornadoes. Bangkok must be concerned mostly with rain, tropical storms and flooding, and with the usual urban problems of fire, accidents, and pollution. Still, Bangkok’s administrators should not ignore the possibility --- no matter how slight --- of earthquakes, at least in the construction of public works and buildings. How can city administrators deal with disasters? There are four main types of activities depending on the stage of disaster: mitigation and preparedness before disasters occur, response to the disaster, and recovery from the disaster. Mitigation measures should include: -
-
City planning to identify vulnerable parts of the city, to assure any development of the vulnerable areas will be done is such a way as to reduce the risk of disaster, and to make sure that rescue operations can easily reach all parts of the city. Building codes that reduce the risks of disasters, such as designs for buildings to tolerate certain magnitudes of earthquakes, to reduce the risk of fire, and to avoid obstructing water or flood drainage.
20
Banasopit Mekvichai -
-
Insurance --- both public and private --- that will provide the financial resources to rebuild after a disaster. Laws and regulations to help prevent man-made disasters, to reduce the risk of natural disasters, and to protect citizens from the effects of these disasters. The creation and maintenance of disaster rescue units. The development of coordinated disaster management.
Preparedness involves: -
-
-
Installing warning systems so people can avoid or take shelter from the impending disaster. Structural adjustments to buildings and to public works that are found to be vulnerable. Stockpiling supplies, such as food and other materials that would be needed if disaster strikes. Resource inventory, to make sure sufficient supplies and materials are available for an adequate response Enforcing laws and regulations, in particular by means of o Building and landuse permits, and o Building and landuse inspections. Monitoring conditions: whether it is monitoring the potential disasters (such as pending floods in Bangkok) or monitoring the levels of preparedness. Emergency drills, so the rescue units are well prepared and city residents are aware of what they need to do. Public education to help city residents understand what might occur when various types of disasters strike and what they should do to reduce the risks to their person and property.
Disaster response needs to have both: -
Immediate and effective rescue operations, and Provision of resources to residents affected by the disaster.
Finally, after the disaster has passed, recovery efforts are needed. These should be: -
Restoration of facilities and services, and Reconstruction of the community if it was damaged or destroyed by the disaster.
2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters
21
2.4 The Case of Flooding in Bangkok As with any other large city, Bangkok faces a variety of natural and manmade disasters, among them fires, accidents, and buildings collapsing from land subsidence or poor construction. The one natural disaster that occurs regularly, and that requires constant disaster management planning and implementation, is flooding. Floods in Bangkok are unavoidable. The city was built on a flood plain. It was a swampland before being settled. A system of natural and manmade canals during the first 180 years after its founding in 1782 not only provided the main means of transportation, but also helped to drain the floodwaters. And they gave Bangkok its nickname among Westerners as the ‘Venice of the East.’ For nearly two centuries, Bangkok residents lived with or at least tolerated the floods: they traveled by boat, many in the first decades of the city lived in houseboats, and later people lived in houses that were built to withstand floodwaters. Only after the 1950s and 1960s, when many canals were filled in to build roads, and people began to depend upon land rather than water transportation, that flooding became more of a problem for the city residents. The rapid expansion of Bangkok in recent decades has contributed in several ways to the problems of flooding. As seen in Fig. 2-5, the expansion of Bangkok from 1900 until the 1950s was in a fairly concentrated
Fig. 2-5. Expansion of Bangkok, 1900-1989 (Source: Kraas (1995))
22
Banasopit Mekvichai
and limited area. Since then, the city has sprawled in all directions, though most extensively to the north and east and southeast. The two decades since have seen even more extensive urban sprawl in all directions, particularly along the major transportation arteries to the north, southeast, and west. All of this new construction further converts what had been floodplains and natural drainage systems into built areas. It is not surprising, then, that many of Bangkok’s problems are water related. Aside from the problem of flooding, Bangkok suffers from land subsidence, mainly caused by the extraction of ground water. This has slowed considerably, with strict regulations controlling ground water use. However, as parts of the city sink, they become more susceptible to flooding. Bangkok’s flood risk is greatest during September to November of each year, when three phenomena combine to raise the water levels: 1. Rising water levels in the Chao Phraya River from increased runoff from rains in Thailand’s northern provinces. Almost all of the northern hills and much of the central region drains into the Chao Phraya and its tributaries.Heavy rains and floods in North Thailand in September and October eventually reach Bangkok in a month or so later. 2. High tides pushing seawater up the Chao Phraya, and raising the level of the river into Bangkok. The higher sea level slows the amount of water that can flow out of the river, forcing the waters up and sometimes over the embankments. 3. Heavy rains at the end of the monsoon season. Even under the best of conditions, it takes time to drain some of the heaviest rains. Bangkok is now able to handle a river flow of 3,000 m3/sec, along with drainage of rainfall of 60 mm per hour, with dykes built along the riverbanks at a height of 2.5 m above sea level. Of course when it rains more than 60 mm in an hour, as is often the case in heavy monsoon downpours, it will take time to drain; and when water flows from the north at a rate over 3,000 m3/sec, there is a clear risk of the river flowing over its embankments. What does the city administration do to deal with these specific, yet expected, vulnerabilities? The city has taken a multi-pronged approach. At the recommendation of His Majesty the King, the city and neighboring provinces have introduced the ‘Monkey Cheeks’ network: a system of water retention fens and reservoirs. Currently able to hold 12.8 million m3 of water, additional sites are to be added this coming year that will hold another 1.8 million m3. The city has also developed an extensive system of water polders on both sides of the river.
2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters
23
To keep the river from overflowing, the city is building 86 km of flood embankments (77 km completed as of early 2007) along the river and major canals. A wall of flood dikes have been built to protect the much of the city, while extensive drainage canals are used to drain areas in the eastern parts of the city outside the flood dikes. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and the Royal Irrigation Department jointly manage this effort. To help drain the city from heavy rains, a system of pumping stations have been set up along the river and major canals, and a network of drainage canals are also being built. Floodgates help keep excessive water out of the canals, allowing some capacity for drainage even when Bangkok faces higher water levels. Regular inspections of the facilities and of vulnerable areas, and regular monitoring of all the related conditions (river flow, rainfall, tides) make sure the system works as planned. The past year, 2006, saw some of the highest waters from the North, combined with very heavy rains and very high tides. Fortunately, the preparation and the concerted efforts of the city administration, other government agencies, and help from people in provinces just north of the city helped to prevent the extensive flooding that could have been a serious disaster for the city. Special thanks must be given to the people of Ayutthaya and Ang Thong Provinces who sacrificed their farmland to serve as additional water retention areas for the excessive river flow (nearly 5,000 m3/sec), and to the staff of the Water Drainage Department of the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration who worked unceasingly through day and night building temporary embankments to further raise the river banks, manning the pumps and watergates, to prevent the river from overflowing and to keep the city drained after heavy rains. A few low lying areas along the inner part of the city, as well as many places outside the flood dikes, did end up getting flooded. For these places, the city had to carry out its rescue activities. Food and other supplies, and in particular fresh drinking water and dry blankets and clothing, were distributed to residents in these areas. Once the waters drained, the city worked with the communities in their recovery. Preparations for the next wet season began months before the first rains. Canals were dredged and cleared, the drainage system cleaned, and the drainage facilities inspected and kept in good working order.
24
Banasopit Mekvichai
2.5 Lessons Learned What are some of the lessons learned from the floods of 2006? We found that it was the man-made environment that tends to cause the most problems. The completion and opening of Bangkok’s new international airport to the southwest of the city is an excellent example. The airport has its own flood protection and drainage system to keep the runways dry. This obstructed what had been some important drainage passages for the eastern suburbs of the city, thus exacerbating the floods in these areas. We also know that preparation is absolutely necessary. All the equipment and the personnel must be ready to face the potential disasters when they come. Higher embankments must be put up before the increased river flow. Water levels in canals must be reduced before heavy rains. Canals and drainage pipes must be cleaned and cleared well before the first rains come. Monitoring is crucial. This allows for advance action, to solve problems before they occur or become even more serious, and to send manpower and resources to where they are needed most. Finally, cooperation is essential. The Bangkok Metropolitan Administration works with the Royal Irrigation Department, the Interior Ministry, neighboring provinces, and many others to make sure its flood and drainage system work effectively. Convenient or Inconvenient?
The flooding and drainage problems of Bangkok will likely worsen in coming years, as global warming leads to higher sea levels and more extremes in weather. Our conveniences are now becoming, as former Vice President Al Gore so rightly puts it, inconvenient. Global warming is an inconvenient truth, because it is our conveniences, those things that make our lives and especially our urban lives so comfortable: cars, electricity, air conditioning and heating, all contribute to the carbon emissions that are warming our planet. What can we expect from our polluting the earth? -
Rising oceans, with many coastal areas under water. Bangkok is one of the cities that is most vulnerable. More frequent and more powerful storms. More extreme weather: heavier rains, more flooding The more extreme weather will also lead to more drought and increasing temperatures, contributing to greater fire risk, and to greater health risks.
2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters
25
What is needed of course is a significant reduction in our production of greenhouse gases. To do this, we need to change our approach to development. It cannot be simply a matter of rapid industrialization and economic growth. Development ethics are needed to balance the environment with our needs. Sustainable development must be realized. Thailand has turned away from the goal of economic growth to greater social equity and now, as its target for the 10th National Economic and Social Development Plan, to attaining sufficiency economy. Based on Buddhist teachings, sufficiency economy presents a ‘middle path’ or moderation in production and consumption, depending as much as possible on what can be produced locally. The City Must Change Its Role
Cities need to stop being destructive consumers of resources. Instead they should start being productive regenerators of the environment through green measures: more public transportation, more green area, reduced use of electricity, ‘cleaner’ factories, and more use of local resources and production. Most of the participants at this symposium are from the academic community. What can academics do to help reduce our vulnerability to disasters? Their most important role is to provide tools to help combat vulnerability. They can help to identify vulnerable spaces, conditions, and activities; and help to understand and explain the vulnerabilities. They can help plan to prevent or to control or to respond to different types of disasters or vulnerabilities. They can help plan activities and procedures for rescue, relief, and recovery. And they can help develop tools and methods for monitoring and analysis. What should city managers and administrators, and city residents, do? We know what to expect: there will be fire, earthquakes, tsunami, floods, storms, and accidents. We cannot avoid them. But we can plan for disasters. With planning and preparation, some disasters might be prevented, others can be protected against, and those that cannot be prevented or protected against might have their impact reduced. And just as critical, we should be ready to provide rescue, relief, and recovery whenever disasters do occur. We as individuals need to act collectively at all levels: community, city, nation, and world. To do so, we need to ‘Act Locally, Think Globally.’ Our individual actions, multiplied at the community, city, national, and world levels, can have major and lasting impacts. Each person reducing electric consumption, each person driving less, each person using more local goods that do not need to be shipped from afar. Individually and collec-
26
Banasopit Mekvichai
tively, we need to reduce the bad aspects of our lives, our activities that harm the environment, and we need to increase those aspects and activities that either do less harm or can in fact help the environment. Remember: the world’s population continues to grow. All the new population growth is in cities. Soon six of ten people will live in cities. Most of them will live in megacities. Population is in and of itself not the problem, but how we act and how we live now is a problem. How we act and live in the future will either increase or decrease our vulnerability.
Appendix
2. The Vulnerable City: Coping with Disasters
Fig. 2-A2. Flood in Bangkok
зјѠкѝѧэ
эѩкдѠкёјъўѥієҖѥъѨѷ 2 Ѱјѣ дѠкёѤь 1 іѠ. эѩкѯіѪѠьлѼѥзјѠкѯюіє
щ ді ььм ѫк ј Ѡк
к 12. ьмјѠэѩ кеҖѥк і.ё.эѫімѤшіѳнѕѥді щь ѫк 13. ді эѩкѯѝѪѠчѼѥ 14. эѩкюѬьоѨѯєьшҙѳъѕ (эѩкѐіѤѷк) 15 эѩкѯѠдєѤѕ 16. эѩкѝњьѝѕѥє 17.юізјѣѯњѠк эѩкѲьдієъўѥііѥэъѨѷ 11 іѠ.
ёҕк
щь ьћ іѨь зіѧ ьъ іҙ
зјѠкэ ѥкьѥ
зј Ѡкѝ Ѽѥѱі к
зј Ѡкў јњк Ѱ
ієѕҙ
18. 19. 20.
щь шіѥ ьэѥк ьѥ ч -
ћэѫі Ѩ
эѩкѝѨдѤь эѩкеҖѥкѱікѯіѨѕьѰѠьѯьдоҙ
ѰдҖєјѧкзјѠкєўѥнѤѕ-зјѠк ѝьѥєнѤѕ (ѲьёѪь Ѹ ъѨѷ дъє.) Total
No щььѯ ъёѥіѤд ќҙ
зјѠкѝѼѥѱік
зјѠк нјюіѣъ ѥь
Ѡҕѥњѳъѕ
щььѝѫеѫєњѧъ
Pond
эѩкєѣеѥєѯъћѰјѣэѩкѝѣѰд щььэ кѥєѝѥєѯчѪ Ѡь ѯешзјѠк ѥкьѥ шіѥч щььѯъё ѥіѤдќҙ ѝѥєњѥ 2 эѩкѲьѝьѥєўјњк 2 ѯешъњѨ њѤхьѥ 3. эѩкѝњьјѫєёѧьѨ ѯешюъѫєњѤь 1.
4.
ҙ
ѱн
щьь јѥчдіѣэѤк
щььњ ѰдҖњ Ѥчдѧѷк
1
зј Ѡк ѯч
зјѠкюіѣѯњћэѫіѨієѕҙ н щььѠҕѠььѫ
эѩкўєѬҕэҖѥьѯћіудѧл ѯеш эѥкѰз Total
зј Ѡк чҕѥь
зјѠкеѫьіѥн њѧьѧлмѤѕ
іц ўд
10.
зјѠкѰѝь Ѱѝэ зј ѯь Ѡкь ѪѷѠк з ѯе і ш
зјѠкёі ѣѠкзҙѯлҖ ѥ ѳнѕѥьѫн ѧш
15 іѣ Ѡкё зј к ь ѱе
є
зјѠк ѝѥєѧш ѝііё
эѩкшѥѯдшѫ
зј ѳн Ѡ к ѕѥ ёі ьѫн ѣѠ ѧш кзҙѯ лҖѥ
зјѠкѝѥєњѥ
ѧ ьъі ҙ щььь њє
3
њѧъ
щьью ѬҐѯ ёіѥѕ лҖѥѝєѧк
эѩкдѫҕєзјѠкѰѝь Ѱѝэ эѩкѝьѥєдѠјҙђіщѳђ
9.
щь ьѯ ѝѤє нѪѷѠє ёѤь ыҙ
щь ёў ь јѱѕ ыѧь
зјѠкюі
зј Ѡк юіѣ ѯюіє нѥді
щь ьњ іѤкѝѧш ѧѓѥњ чѨ
щььюіѣ нѥ нѪѷь
д Ѳў рҕ ѥкд Ѡ зј Ѡкэ
2 іѥ є щь ьё іѣ
щ ді ььѯл ѫк іѧр
щььдѥрльѥ ѓѧѯќд
ѧл уд щь ьѯћі ќ
дн Ѥѕ щь ьѯѠ
щь ьѝ ѫеѫє
7. 8.
щььіҕњє ёѤхьѥ
4
эѩкёіѣіѥє 9 эѩкёѧэѬјњѤхьѥ эѩкјѼѥёѤкёњѕ эѩкъікдіѣѯъѨѕє
11.
13 є
3. 4. 5. 6.
щььѝѫњѧьъ њкћҙ
ѝь
ѫеѫєњѧъ щььѝ
In 2008, 5 location of 1,862,000m3 will be founded. Ѡкѝ зј
5
6
ѠкѰ зј э Ѱѝ
щььіҕєѯдјҖѥ
20 ьѥє
Ѥѕ
зјѠк ѯѝьѲь ѝѥє зјѠкѰѝ ь Ѱѝэ
ъѕ ѝіѨѳ 2) щььѯѥѓѧэѥј (ѝѫе ўк ѼѥѰ єз 3) ьіѥ ѥј щь ѥѓѧэ (ѝѫе
7
зіѧьъіҙ щььћіѨь
Ѥѕ дн
9 16
5
ѧѻ Ѥѝч ѝњ
ўѥн
щььё іѣіѥ 3
ѥ іѣн ью щь Ѳл ќсіҙ іҕњєььіѥ щ ѧћ Ѡѫъ
ѫе ьѝ щь
кє
12 щььё іѣіѥ 4
3
щьь јѥч ёіҖ ѥњ
зјѠклѤѷь
зјѠкѝьѥєѳн ѕ
Ѡ зј
2
ҕѠк Ѡкн зј іѨѕҙ ььъ
єьшіѨ
щььѯ ћіќу дѧл
є2 іѣіѥ ьё щь
10
4
щььіѥ эѬіцѣ ќсіҙ
ѝ Ѡк зј ѕ ѳн
4
кд Ѡд ьҖѠ ѕ
зјѠк ѣьѠк чѥњз
зјѠкіѥн
ьѯѠ щь
зјѠкэѥкоѪѷѠ зј ѯѝь Ѡкѝѥє
з д і јѠк ѫкѯд я ќ чѫк є
іҖѥњ зјѠкјѥчё
щььёѫъыєцфј ѝѥѕ 2
Ѥх ьѥ ъњѨњ зјѠк
щььёѫъыєцфј ѝѥѕ 4
щььёѫъыєцфј ѝѥѕ 5
ліѧр ѓѥќѨѯ зјѠк
эѩкѝњьјѫєёѧьѨ
зјѠк ўьѤк эѥкѯнѪѠд
5
щььѯёніѯдќє
3
зј Ѡк эѥ
щьь іѤнчѥѓѧѯќд
щѳђ ъѥкі шҖ ѝѥѕѲ іѤр ҙ ьл щь ѧъњкћ ѝь
щььшјѧѷкнѤь --ьзі ьзі нѤѕћіѨ
2
14
щь ью іѣн ѥѠѫъ зј ѧћ ѠкѰ лк іҖѠ ь
2
1
8
к з ді јѠк њѕ эѥ
зјѠкєўѥѝњѤѝчѧѻ
щьь Ѡѧь іѥ є ъ іѥ
17
ћҙ
эѩкўьѠкэѠь эѩкєѤддѣѝѤь
щььѠѕѬҕњѧъ ѕѥ
11
з эѥ јѠк кѯе ь
Ѥхьѥ
щь њѥь ькѥє њк
эѤњ ѥк
щь ёў ь јѱѕ ыѧь
ѯќд щььдѥрльѥ ѓѧ
іҙ
зјѠк ѠҖѠ є щььэ ьҖѠѕ ѥкдіњѕ -ѳъ зј - ѳъі Ѡкэ ѥкд Ѡд ьҖѠ ѕ
кѲўрҕ зјѠкэѥ
Ѡкэ зј
щьььѧєѧші Ѳўєҕ
ъ њѨњ зјѠк
ыѧѯэћ
ьъҙ ѧњѥь щььш
зјѠк эѥкш јѥч
щььі Ѥшьѥ
19 18
щььѰ њѤхьѣ лҖк
Capacity (mil m3)
Pond
зјѠкўдњѥ ѝѥѕјҕѥк
1. 2.
зјѠкѝѧэѝѨѷ
ѧњѥ ьш щь ьъ ҙ ь
к
No
щььјѼѥјѬд дѥ
щььюіѣнѥ ѝѼѥіѥр
зјѠк эѥкэ ѤњъѠ
зјѠкўдњѥѝѥѕ јҕѥк
зјѠкѝѧэѝѥє
1
ѣюѥ
-
є іѣѠѫч Ѡ кё зј
іѣё ѧєј
зјѠкўд
зјѠкѝѠк
Fig. 2-A3. Vulnerable area, Bangkok
щььэѥкэѤњъѠк эѥкзѬњѤч
зј Ѡ кё
27
5,000,000 261,600 10,875 48,000 200,000 81,000 148,000 107,000 5,500 94,000 68,000 12,800 22,750 78,000 3,500 228,000 288,000 40,000 8,400 6,000,000 12,705,425 Capacity (mil m3) 150,000
12,000 200,000 1,500,000 1,862,000
Fig. 2-A4. Royal Initiated Water Retention Projects (Monkey Cheeks) (Source: Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA))
3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting for Existing Low Earthquake Resistant Structures: The Most Important Issue for Earthquake Disaster Reduction
Kimiro Meguro
3.1 Introduction Much attention has been paid recently to a scandal involving faulty designed and constructed apartments in Japan. This situation is highly regrettable and it is needless to say that it is important to take measures to prevent the recurrence of these problems. These circumstances have put the public’s attention on the issue of structural seismic resistance. In Japan, besides the faulty apartments in the news recently, there are many existing buildings that were designed and constructed following the former structure code, and do not have enough strength as required by the current code. These structures are called pre-code revision weak structures. They are widely spread throughout the country and used for apartments, offices and hotels, etc. The number of these structures is approximately 1.5 million, which is 10,000 times more than faulty apartments. If we consider wooden houses, the most typical residential houses in Japan and more vulnerable, the number of pre-code revision weak houses is over 10 million and the situation is even worse. Imagine what would happen when an earthquake occurs. Obviously not only the faulty apartments will be affected, but other many pre-code revision weak structures will also be damaged. Seismic reinforcement of such structures is urgently needed for earthquake disaster reduction. In Japan, the seismic design code has been revised several times after earthquake disasters. As a result, it has been reported that the structures designed, constructed, and maintained according to the “new standard,” which was enforced in 1981, sustained little damage under earthquakes
30
Kimiro Meguro
such as the 1995 Kobe Earthquake (Meguro (2003a)). The standard was reviewed again in 2000 and stronger structures have been built. However, the largest problem in Japan is the many buildings which were built before the “new standard,” that is existing pre-code revision structures (including buildings which were built after the “new standard” but do not have enough seismic resistance due to improper construction/maintenance), that are expected to cause great damage when the next earthquake hits. In order to reduce the damage immediately after an earthquake, the only way is to identify the weak structures and promote their reinforcement/replacement. However, this policy has not been promoted successfully, especially for general residences. What is the reason for this? In this article, I will introduce my new idea on the system for promoting reinforcement/replacement of weak structures, considering current seismic conditions and the number of existing pre-code revision weak structures in Japan. This scheme is fundamental for sustainable urban regeneration and the development of a sounder urban environment.
3.2 Slow Progress of Seismic Retrofitting
3.2.1 Seismic Retrofitting Importance Recent earthquakes, including the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, have taught us many lessons, the most important of which is that it is absolutely necessary to retrofit existing pre-code revision weak structures. Fig. 3-1 shows the disaster management cycle. Among the seven countermeasures, the major
3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting
31
ones are Disaster Mitigation, Preparedness/Disaster Response and Recovery and Reconstruction Strategies. Mitigation makes an effort not to connect the Hazard, a physical phenomenon, to disaster, a negative impact on society, through taking optimal measures beforehand. Preparedness/Disaster Response prevents wide spread impact after the hazard occurs. Recovery/Reconstruction Strategy minimizes the negative influence due to the hazard by quick recovery and reconstruction. Among these major countermeasures, Disaster Mitigation is essential to reduce human and property losses immediately after the earthquake. In the case of the Kobe Earthquake, 250,000 buildings and houses were completely collapsed or partially destroyed, and mainly because of this damage 5,500 people were killed (Nishimura et al. (1995)) and problems occurred involving fire (Meguro (2003b)), temporary housing, waste disposal, victims’ mental suffering, lonely death, economic decline, various problems during reconstruction, etc. These problems might have been smaller or even prevented by reducing the structural damage. Japan is now facing a period of high seismic activity, and it is estimated that within 30 to 50 years, earthquakes with magnitude 8 or more will occur 4 to 5 times, and M7 class (same as the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, and the expected Tokyo earthquake level), 40 to 50 times. Total damage will be 2 million completely collapsed and/or burned out structures, meaning that 3.5 to 4 million families will loose their homes. Although the Japanese government has set the goal to complete 90% of the retrofitting of existing pre-code revision weak structures within 10 years, under the present conditions, the goal will be difficult to achieve. How can we create a good environment to promote seismic retrofitting? 3.2.2 Why Does Seismic Retrofitting Not Progress? Many people, including specialists, believe that the economic situation of residents and insufficient support from the government are the main reasons for the slow progress of seismic retrofitting in Japan. However, I think that there are some other and more fundamental issues. The standard cost of retrofitting a wooden house is 15,000yen/m2, which is about 1.5 million yen per house. Lately, even cheaper options have been made available. According to the statistics --- although there is some controversy in these numbers --- 400,000 to 700,000 households spent between 4 and 7 million yen on reforms every year in Japan. If retrofitting is carried out while reforming, the costs drastically decrease. Consider the cost of a car, which is similar to or even much more than retrofit costs. People buy a car without considering that it is expensive and also pay the
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compulsory and optional insurance premiums. The reason why they are eager to spend money on insurance is because they can imagine a tragic car accident. Even in high income districts, you can see luxurious cars parked in what are clearly pre-code revision weak houses. How can this be explained? I think that the most important issues for promoting seismic retrofitting is the improvement of “Disaster Imagination” capacity and the preparation of “technology” and “policy”. Let me focus later on the “Disaster Imagination.” As mentioned earlier, there are over 10 million existing pre-code revision weak structures, even considering only wooden houses. Therefore, “technology” must be cheap enough to promote seismic reinforcement but expensive enough to encourage businesses, which pursue profits, to get involved. When solving a problem, it is important to consider a solution which benefits all stakeholders. In addition, it is necessary to prepare an environment with reliable information which enables the client to understand the effect of the reinforcement. This means that evaluation methods to assess the seismic strength before and after the reinforcement, both from blueprints and insitu, are necessary. When evaluating strength, it is important to take into account the structure usage because the positions of rooms with heavy weight such as a study room with lots of books or a bathroom, which generate eccentric loads, affect the seismic resistance of the whole structure. ͆Policies” must give strong incentives to house owners and simultaneously consider the uncertainty of the “technology” cost and reliability. Is it right not to strengthen your house and just wait for the large support that you will get from the government when your house is destroyed by an earthquake? If we consider the current conditions, the number of weak structures and seismic activity in Japan, and the extent of the estimated earthquake damage, it is financially impossible for the government to pay for the “seismic reinforcement supporting policy,” which is a public assistance, and the “support for the victims after the earthquake,” which is currently being revised to simplify the procedures, extends limitation of use, and increase the amount of compensation. In addition, this kind of support generates secondary problems. For instance, the former encourages dishonest businesses to get involved whereas the latter discourages house owners to strengthen. In the long run, both are insufficient to contribute to Japan’s disaster reduction and do not use the government money wisely. A system like this is a result of the poor “disaster imagination” capacity of politicians and bureaucrats. In order to solve the above mentioned problems, I have proposed the “Meguro set” for promoting seismic reinforcement, which consists of three
3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting
33
elements: New “Public assistance,” “Mutual assistance,” and “Self assistance.” With this system, which I will introduce in detail later, we can drastically reduce expenditures by both citizens and the government, and the damage caused by future earthquakes. If we reinforce/replace weak structures by ourselves before the event, we can get enough financial support to build a new house in case that house is damaged by shaking or fire during a future earthquake. House makers can start a new business model in which if their constructed house is collapsed in the future by an earthquake, they can guarantee that they reconstruct or repair a house without any charge. Based on my study results, several of these proposals are currently being implemented. I am not suggesting that we should leave the weaker citizens behind. However, considering Japan’s critical situation, I hope that you can understand that it is impossible to support such weaker citizens unless many people can improve their own disaster resilience capacity to reduce future damage by methods such as the “Meguro set.”
3.3 A True Lesson Learnt from Recent Earthquake Disasters According to the medical examiner’s investigation of the Kobe Earthquake (Table 3-1 and 3-2), 87% of the victims were killed in their houses and apartments. The majority were over 60 years old. This was because of their physical weakness and because most of their houses were old. In addition, due to the former, many of them lived and slept in the first floor, which collapsed. Also, a great number of youngsters (between 20 and 25 years old) were killed, too (Fig. 3-2). Most of them were university students or young workers from outside of Kobe City, who lived in weak apartments, which collapsed too. There were cases in which company’s dormitories for singles were destroyed. Youngsters living in weak apartments are common in many other cities in Japan. This situation will cause many deaths among the young, who are supposed to support the next generation. 83.3% of the victims were killed by structural damage such as suffocation or crash, and 10% of them were affected directly and indirectly by furniture overturning. Most of the remaining (15.4/16.7=92%) were found in the fire scene, but the majority were killed because they were buried under collapsed structures and could not escape from fire. 92% of the victims presumably died within 14 minutes immediately after the earthquake. This shows that the main reason for the considerable number of deaths was not problems with early communication to the Prime Ministry, or the late
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Table 3-2. Time of casualties due to the Kobe Earthquake (in Kobe City) (Source: Nishimura et al. (1995)) Time of death Jan 17
-6:00 -9:00 -12:00 -23:59 Unidentified
Jan 18 Jan 19 Jan 20 Jan 21 Jan 22 Jan 24 Jan 25 Jan 26 Jan 27 Jan 28 Feb 4 No record Total number
Number of casualties Total number By medical examiners By ordinary doctors 2,221 2,221 (91.9%) 719 719 (58.2%) 2,940 (80.5%) 16 2,237 (92.6%) 58 777 (62.9%) 3,014 (82.6%) 47 2,284 (94.5%) 61 838 (67.9%) 3,122 (85.5%) 12 2,296 (95.0%) 212 1,050 (85.0%) 3,346 (91.6%) 110 2,406 (99.6%) 84 1,134 (91.8%) 3,540 (97.0%) 5 2,411 (99.8%) 62 1,196 (96.8%) 3,607 (98.8%) 2,411 (99.8%) 13 1,209 (97.9%) 3,620 (99.2%) 2 2,413 (99.9%) 8 1,217 (98.5%) 3,630 (99.4%) 1 2,414 (99.9%) 6 1,223 (99.0%) 9,637 (99.6%) 1 2,415 (100.0%) 1 1,224 (99.1%) 3,639 (99.7%) 2,415 (100.0%) 1 1,225 (99.2%) 3,640 (99.7%) 1 2,416 (100.0%) 1 1,226 (99.3%) 3,642 (99.8%) 2,416 (100.0%) 2 1.228 (99.4%) 3,644 (99.8%) 2,416 (100.0%) 1 1,229 (99.5%) 3,645 (99.8%) 2,416 (100.0%) 1 1,230 (99.6%) 3,646 (99.9%) 2,416 (100.0%) 1 1,231 (99.7%) 3,646 (99.9%) 2,416 (100.0%) 4 1,235 (100.0%) 3,651 (100.0%) 2,460 1,235 3,651
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(by Hyogo Medical Examiners)
400
Many aged people were killed and at the same time….
Female Male Unidentified
300 200
100 Unidentified
䚷0
䠌 / 䠑
10 / 15
20 / 25
30 / 35
40 / 45
50 / 55
60 / 65
70 / 75
80 / 85
90 / 95
Age
Fig. 3-2. Age distribution of casualties due to the 1995 Kobe Earthquake (in Kobe City)
arrival of fire fighters or Self Defense Forces (SDF), or the lack of food and water, but the weakness of the structures. The most important lesson from the Kobe Earthquake is that immediate collapse of the weak structures causing many deaths was the main reason for the entire damage, even during the reconstruction period. The Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake occurred on October 23, 2004 and caused relatively little damage in spite of the strong shake, because the seismic resistance of the houses in the area was high. Although the ground motion due to the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake was very strong, similar or more than the Kobe Earthquake ground motion, the number of completely destroyed structures in the areas with Japan Meteorological Agency seismic intensity (JMA) 6+ or 7 was much smaller in the former compared with the latter. The destroyed structures were mainly old and had a store or a garage in the first floor, which created a soft story. Houses in regions with cold weather and heavy snowfalls in winter tend to have thick columns and beams, strong foundations, small windows resulting in high wall density, light roof made of steel plates, and are little affected by termite attacks. As a result, they had good seismic resistance. Therefore, in the case of the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake, the main problem was not the structural damage, but rather the victims’ mental sufferings. Neither the Kobe nor the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake caused tsunamis, but if a Tokai, Tonankai or Nankai earthquake occurs, a tsunami may occur. The Great Sumatra Earthquake and Indian Ocean Tsunami on December 26, 2004 terrified the world. As a result, tsunami awareness has been raised and some measures are being taken. This is extremely important, but we must not forget the problem of little seismic resistance, because no
Kimiro Meguro
(number of fire the outbreak until 7:00am/100,000 households)
Rate of immediate fire outbreak
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Higashinada-ku
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㻡 Ozaki city
す༊
Nishi-ku
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ᆶỈ༊Tarumizu-ku
Kita-ku Rate
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of completely destroyed structures
Fig. 3-3. No collapse, no fire! (Source: The Fire Defense Agency HP)
matter how much we prepare an evacuation route, it is of no use if people are killed by structure collapse. The same is true for fire. High seismic resistance will reduce the probability of fire outbreak (Fig. 3-3) and fire spreading. This is because structure collapse causes various problems such as concentrating human resources in rescue operations, difficulty in extinguishing fire under collapse structures, and access blockade by destroyed structures which hinders early actions to extinguish fires (Meguro (2003b)). Table 3-1 shows, during the Kobe Earthquake, approximately 15.4% of the total death toll was found in the fire scene. This is a sum of “burnt to death” which accounts for 12.2%, and “highly-charred body” which accounts for 3.2%. The latter is a dead body burnt so much that medical examiners cannot judge whether the body was burnt before or after death. On the other hand, the 12.2% who were “burnt to death” are known to have been burnt while they were still alive. Then, the question is, why they could not escape? The answer is clear. Most of them (except for a few of them who were caught by fires while searching for something or some other reasons) were buried under the destroyed structures and could not escape. I do not mean that there were no problems in fire extinguishing activities, but if the structures had not collapsed, they could have escaped and survived. That is, the structural problem was primary also for the victims killed by fire. From the above facts, the victims killed by the structure collapse (including overturning furniture) accounted for 95.5% (=83.3+12.2) of the total deaths. We tend to describe “emergency food and water” issues when arguing
3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting
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㻡㻜
Time of earthquake occurrence: 5:46am Total number of fires in Kobe city: 109
㻠㻜 㻟㻜
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time
Fig. 3-4. Fire outbreak in Kobe city on the day of the earthquake (1/17/1995) (Source: Kobe City Fire Department)
about disaster mitigation. However, statistics show that “weakening, frozen to death” only accounts for 0.2% of the casualties. Besides, these people were buried under collapsed structures and could not have food/water and died. We can see that here too, there is a problem of weak structures. When talking about the spreading of fire in the Kobe Earthquake, some people say, “It is a pity that hydrants didn’t work. If they had worked, we could have saved more lives.” But this is wrong. Specialists think differently. In the case of the Kobe Earthquake, we are absolutely sure that it would have been impossible to change the situation even if hydrants worked sufficiently. Why? Kobe is a city with 1.5 million citizens, and under normal conditions there are around 2 fires everyday. An official firefighter can handle 4 or 5 fires (of course, it depends on the fire scale) at the same time. With the help of local fire parties, it is possible to handle more. However, in the case of the Kobe Earthquake, more than 100 fires occurred in one day. Especially in the first 14 minutes, 53 fires occurred within Kobe City (Fig. 3-4). Some people may say, “Then, we should prepare enough official fire stations to handle 50 or 100 fires.” But, this is impossible. Who can afford to have such a fire fighting system for a fire that occurs once in 50 or 100 years? We must find another way. As shown in Fig. 3-5, we know how to handle fire according to its scale. Citizens are very effective in putting out a fire smaller than 3m2. For a fire spreading from 100m2 to 300m2 (about the size of 1-2 houses), fire fighters are more suitable. For a fire in a larger scale, it is a matter of fire resistance of the structure and urban planning. The fire occurring immediately after an earthquake is small, so citizens’ reactions are important. At ordinary times, fire officers can afford to extinguish such small fires, but after an earthquake, it is impossible for them to extinguish them all. It is at this time when citizens’ power is
38
Kimiro Meguro Cause of fire spread 䕺Priority on life saving 䕺Fire outbreak due to collapsed structures 䕺Road obstruction by destroyed structures 䕺Low disaster mitigation awareness
Investment effect
Put out by citizens
Extinguishing devices Fire resistant materials inside the building
Fire department response Initial extinguishing by the fire department Fire resistant structure City planning measures Urban planning measures
㻟㻚㻟 㻞㻜 㻝㻜㻜 㻟㻜㻜 㻝㻜㻜㻜 㼙㻞 㼙㻞 㼙㻞 㼙㻞 㼙㻞
㻡㻜㻜㻜 㼙㻞
㻝 㼗㼙㻞
Fire extent, scale
Fig. 3-5. Limitations and combination of fire prevention measures (Kenjio Hono, retouched)
needed, but in case of the Kobe Earthquake, it did not work. There are four reasons for this, three of them due to structure collapse. First, many structures collapsed, burying people and therefore citizens had to put priority to rescue operations. Rescue is also an important role of citizens, who saved more than 3 times as many buried people as fire officers and SDF. However, prioritizing rescue was one of the reasons to postpone the extinguishing of fire. Second, fires broken out under the collapsed structures are difficult for a layman to extinguish. Third, many structures collapsed, obstructing roads so that no one could get close to the scene of fire. The fourth reason is that citizens failed to put out fires at early stages since they thought fire officers would extinguish them, as in a normal situation. Only this factor might be changed by education, but the rest are due to structural problems.
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3.4 The Effect of Seismic Resistance on Fire Outbreak and Spreading
3.4.1 The Great Kanto Earthquake and Fire The biggest earthquake disaster in Japan is The Great Kanto Earthquake (M7.9) that occurred on 11:58am, September 1, 1923. While the epicenter was located northwest of Sagami Gulf, the earthquake affected the whole Kanto region, Shizuoka, and Yamanashi Prefectures (total 10 prefectures). 105,000 people were killed or went missing, 447,000 houses were burnt down, 254,000 houses were completely or partially destroyed and the total amount of damage was 6.5 billion yen, over 40% of GDP at the time. In former Tokyo City, located in Tokyo downtown, many fires occurred simultaneously after the earthquake and spread through the city, burning for more than 43 hours. In the end, 43% of the city was burnt (Fig. 3-6 and 3-7). Since this was the worst fire disaster ever, many organizations have investigated the fire cause and the fire spreading timeline. According to these investigations, contemporary specialists came up with lessons (Imamura (1925)); (Ogata (1925)); (Nakamura (1925); (Inoue (1925)), as shown in Fig. 3-8, such as: preparation of sufficient fire defenses and shelters, improvement of fire resistance of houses, and so on. These produced the fire-focused disaster mitigation system used in later earthquake disasters in Japan.
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After 1 hour
After 3 hours
After 6 hours
After 12 hours
After 24 hours
After 36 hours
Fig. 3-7. Fire spreading due to the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake
x Akigaki Imamura: Earthquake disaster mitigation investigation manager “What impressed me most in this earthquake disaster was the fire resistance of houses.”
x Iichiro Ogata: Metropolitan Police Department Fire Fighting Section Leader “Importance of urban reconstruction and sufficient fire fighting”
x Seiji Nakamura: Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Investigation Conference “Fire is more dreadful than earthquake. Preparation for disaster mitigation is of most importance.” x Kazuyuki Inoue: Metropolitan Department Security Section Architectural Section “Besides waterworks, preparation of wells, reservoir, parks, and wide area for evacuation is necessary.” Fig. 3-8. Lessons from the Great Kanto Earthquake
The specialists in those days, standing in front of the burnt out areas, must have felt as shown in the figures, but I can not agree with them. This is because their statements are only based on the results and do not sufficiently consider that the essential method to solve a problem is analyzing the cause/effect relation.
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3.4.2 Are the Great Kanto and the Kobe Earthquakes Different? What I have mentioned before might suggest that the Great Kanto Earthquake was a matter of fire and the Kobe Earthquake was a matter of existing pre-code revision weak structures. But is this understanding right? In short, I believe that “the lessons we learned from the two earthquakes are the same. Both of them were a matter of existing unqualified structures.” Fire is an important issue. But in order to prevent fire, it is essential to improve seismic resistance. I will elaborate this based on substantial data. Our study group focused on the difference of wooden house damage between burnt areas and not-burnt areas in former Tokyo city (The Metropolitan Police Department Architectural Section Security Section (1923)), and tried a detailed analysis of the relationship between fire spreading and structure collapse. First, we prepared an investigation report, data map and social environmental data of those days and put them all on a Geographic Information System (GIS) database for quantitative analysis. The GIS data consists of spreading fire layer, fire outbreak point layer, structure collapse layer, and so on. The first two were made based on the nine fire dynamic maps (Nakamura (1925)) prepared by Seiji Nakamura. Also, we made the structure collapse layer by adding the intensity data estimated by Takemura (2003) for 1,400 address polygon data of former Tokyo city. Takemura (2003) estimated the seismic intensity from various damage data based on the collapse ratio of wooden houses as shown in Fig. 3-9. This intensity distribution matched structure collapse distribution. Intensity
Rate of completely destroyed wooden structures: Y
+ + Outbreak point of spreading fire Extinguished immediately
Fig. 3-9. Seismic intensity distribution and fire outbreak point distribution during the Great Kanto Earthquake. Takemura estimated the seismic intensity distribution from the rate of completely destroyed wooden structures. Therefore, intensity distribution can be considered as structure damage distribution.
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3.4.3 The Analysis over Spreading Fire and Structure Collapse The result of the analysis of the fire outbreak point and structure collapse (seismic intensity distribution) relation is shown in Fig. 3-10 and 3-11. These figures show that areas with large structure collapse have a larger number of fire outbreak points, and that in such areas it is more likely to have fire spreading. On the other hand, areas with little structure collapse not only have a smaller number of outbreak points but also have high probability of extinguishing fire at early stages. The reason for this difference is that in areas with large structure collapse, it is necessary to put priority on rescuing buried people, and is difficult to extinguish fire in such areas because roads are obstructed by destroyed structures which hamper fire extinguishing activities. Fig. 3-11 shows that the structure collapse is responsible for the
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䠒ᙅ 䠄KD䠅
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䠑ᙅ 䠄KD䠅
Outbreak point of ᘏ↝ⅆඖ spreading fire
ಽ ቯ destroyed not destroyed ಽቯ 䛷䛺䛔 unknown ᫂ Immediately
༶extinguished ᾘ䛧Ṇ 䜑
Fig. 3-10. State of fire outbreak for each intensity
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Number of the fire outbreak points/ha 㻯㼛㼙㼜㼘㼑㼠㼑㼘㼥㻌㼐㼑㼟㼠㼞㼛㼥㼑㼐 㻺㼛㼠㻌㼐㼑㼟㼠㼞㼛㼥㼑㼐
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Fig. 3-11. Number of fire outbreak/ha and the cause of fire spreading
3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting
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increasing fire in the high intensity area. Improving seismic resistance and reducing structure collapse is equivalent to reducing the shaking intensity level from 6~7 to 5. That is, seismic reinforcement not only reduces the number of fire outbreaks but also increases the probability to promptly
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extinguish fire (Fig. 3-12) This shows that fires breaking in high intensity areas, or areas with large structure collapse, are more likely to lead to big fires. Fires leading to larger fire, though they originally outbreak in small intensity areas, progress later, according to Fig. 3-13. These fires spread because they were not extinguished at an early stage since everyone was busy coping with the fires in the large intensity areas. 3.4.4 Comparison between Great Kanto and Kobe Earthquakes Fig. 3-14 and 3-15 show the comparison between the fire spreading in the Great Kanto and Kobe Earthquakes, respectively. Similarly as with the Great Kanto Earthquake, in the case of the Kobe Earthquake, the ratio of collapsed structures and immediate fire outbreaks has a strong correlation. In both cases, the number of fires is especially large in areas where intensity level is 7. Fig. 3-15 shows that the tendency of fire spreading occurrence rate per area for each seismic intensity is similar. The difference observed in the number of fires/hectare is due to the difference in earthquake time occurrence (Great Kanto: 11:58am, Kobe: 5:46am), which affected the use of fire such as cooking.
3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting
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㼀㼔㼑㻌㻳㼞㼑㼍㼠㻌㻷㼍㼚㼠㼛㻌㻱㼍㼞㼠㼔㼝㼡㼍㼗㼑
45
㻣 㻢㻗
㻢㻙 㻡㻗
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Fig. 3-15. The relationship between fire outbreak point and intensity: Comparison of the Great Kanto Earthquake and the Kobe Earthquake
3.4.5 A Trial Calculation of the Changes of Fire by Improving Seismic Resistance
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In order to evaluate the influence of seismic resistance on fire spreading, I tried a simulation assuming that the structures were stronger during the Great Kanto Earthquake. That is, I supposed that the seismic resistance of the former Tokyo city was the same as: (1) structures built during 19721981 in Kobe, and (2) structures built during 1982-1994 (after the “new standard”) in Kobe, and then calculated the changes in the fire situation. Concretely, I made a damage function (Fig. 3-16) of the collapsed wooden
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Fig. 3-16. The relationship between structure strength today and at the time of the Great Kanto Earthquake
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Table 3-3. The effect of seismic reinforcement on fire spreading reduction Fire spread Immediately extin- Completely Not deguished destroyed stroyed The Great Kanto Eatquake 53 45 31 1972-81 55 21 32** Code revision 57 7 33** ** Not including the effect of fire extinguishing action
Total 76 53 40
houses based on the damage function of the collapsed wooden house during the Great Kanto and Kobe Earthquakes (Yamaguchi and Yamazaki (1999)); (Kobe Earthquake Investigation Report (1998)), and assumed that the ratio of structure collapse, fire spreading source, and fire source extinguished immediately were the same as those of the Great Kanto Earthquake, and calculated the fire situation. Table 3-3 shows the result. You can see that if the seismic resistance is high, the amount of fire spreading due to structure collapse will decrease considerably. However, since the number of destroyed structures decreases and the number of safe structures increases due to the seismic reinforcement, the number of fires spreading from safe structures increases a little as a result. But this is inaccurate. The reason for this result is that in the calculation we did not consider the effect of preventing fire spreading by fire extinguishing activities because we lacked data of fire fighters and citizens. In reality, if the number of destroyed structures decreases, people will put priority on fire extinguishing rather than rescue activities, and, therefore, though the number of fires from safe structures may increase, most of them would be small and possible to extinguish promptly.
3.5 Seismic Activity in Japan Japan is now facing a period of high seismic activity, and it is estimated that within 30 to 50 years, an earthquake with magnitude 8 or more will occur 4 to 5 times, M7 class (same as the 1995 Kobe earthquake or expected Tokyo earthquake level), 40 to 50 times (Fig. 3-17). Total damage will be 2 million completely collapsed and/or burned out structures, meaning that 3.5 to 4 million families will lose their homes. Although the Japanese government has set the goal to complete 90% of the retrofitting of existing pre-code revision weak structures within 10 years, under the present conditions, it will be difficult to achieve this goal. How can we create a good environment to promote seismic retrofitting?
3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting
Recently occurred event
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will be a little shorter than usual. If you add 50 years, half of 100 years, it becomes 1995, when the Kobe Earthquake occurred. After that earthquake, some people said that Kansai will be safe for a while since the distortion energy was released, but this is inaccurate. The probability of earthquake occurrence is higher and, in fact, the Tottori Seibu Earthquake occurred after the Kobe Earthquake. It is expected that several M7 class earthquakes will occur in the Kansai area from now on, especially in Shiga, Kyoto, Osaka and Nara. The Central Disaster Management Council also expected that the Tokyo Metropolitan Earthquake will occur with a probability of 70% within 30 years. How much will the estimated damage by these earthquakes be? The Central Disaster Management Council has reported the estimated damage. If the “earthquake brothers” occur simultaneously, 40 million people (which is 1/3 of Japan’s total population) will be exposed to a shaking intensity 5 or more, nealy 30,000 people will be killed (Fig. 3-18), and 1 million structures will be completely destroyed or burnt down. In the case of the Metropolitan Earthquake, 80,000 to 90,000 structures will be completely destroyed or burnt down. Economic damage will be, in the worst case, 80 trillion yen for Nankai through earthquakes, 110 trillion yen for the Tokyo Metropolitan Earthquake, 200 trillion yen in total. The damage changes according to the season and time, and specialists’ estimates are different, but my total estimation including some damage which is not discusses by the Council and some other earthquakes such as Kansai Inland earthquakes and Miyagi-Oki Earthquake, is more than 300 trillion yen. The damage of the Great Kanto Earthquake (M7.9, 1923) was
Population: 37,000,000 Casualty: 28,300
Fig. 3-18. The distribution of intensity of Tokai, Tonankai and Nankai earthquakes. Total number of people living in the area with JMA’s intensity scale 5 or more is 37 million. Death toll estimated is 28,300.
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105,000 deaths and missing people, 447,000 burnt down houses, 254,000 completely or partially destroyed structures, and the total amount of damage was over 40% of GDP in those days (equivalent to 200 trillion yen today). The estimated damage of 300 trillion yen within the next 30 years is equivalent to an average of 10 trillion yen every year, which equals the amount of damage in the case of the Kobe Earthquake.
3.6 How to Promote Seismic Reinforcement Based on my experiences of seeing many earthquake disasters around the world, I strongly insist that the fundamental of disaster protection is to increase the number of people who can concretely imagine the changing situation when a disaster occurs. Efficient disaster mitigation requires “ability to imagine the changing situation during the disaster,” “understanding of current issues,” and “judgment and response ability to take proper actions at each point of time.”(Meguro (2003a)) It is impossible to prepare for a situation which you cannot imagine. The problem of disaster mitigation we have today is that the various stakeholders in society, namely politicians, government, scholars, engineers, mass media and citizens, lack the ability to imagine the disaster situation, and as a result ideal measures to take before/during/after the disaster do not take shape. In order to improve this imagination ability, it is important to understand the main problems by singling out the problems that you may face in the disaster changing situation, considering conditions such as season, weather, day and time of the event occurrence. Doing this highlights the importance of preparation and improves the total disaster mitigation ability including damage deterrent. As mentioned earlier, in areas with chances of frequent earthquake occurrence, like Japan, the most important problem is the promotion of seismic reinforcement/replacement of existing low earthquake resistant structures. But even over 10 years after the Kobe Earthquake, this is not progressing. In order to promote seismic reinforcement of existing precode revision weak structures, appropriate “Technology” and “Policy” must be prepared as discussed in Section 3.2.
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3.7 ͆Public Assistance,” “Mutual Assistance” and “Self Assistance” for Disaster Mitigation In disaster mitigation, “Public Assistance,” “Mutual Assistance” and “Self Assistance” are important. However, among them “Self Assistance” is fundamental and “Public Assistance” and “Mutual Assistance” must be conceived so that they trigger “Self Assistance.” Otherwise, they will not lead to disaster reduction and may even deter it. The most important action of “Self Assistance” is seismic reinforcement/replacement by the house owner. In order to put these into practice, I propose the following systems called “new incentive system by the government (Public Assistance),” “mutual assistance system for those who have finished seismic reinforcement (Mutual Assistance)” and “new earthquake insurance for earthquake damage not caused by ground shaking (Self Assistance).” With these 3 systems, which I call the “Meguro Set,” it is possible to provide enough money for a new house for those who live in houses with sufficient seismic resistance or who have finished seismic reinforcement before the event, but in spite of this effort had their houses collapsed or burnt down by the earthquake. 3.7.1 Meguro’s “Public Assistance” System In Japan, self-reconstruction is the principle for recovery from natural disasters. But actually, victims receive various official supports. In the case of the Kobe Earthquake, over 10 million yen were used per household with completely or partially destroyed houses for rubble cleaning, temporary dwelling, apartment reconstruction and so on. Of course, this money was used for victims support. But most of the money would have not been needed if the structures would not have collapsed, and, this public money could have been spared. So, I am proposing a “new incentive system by the government (Public Assistance).” For those who live in houses with sufficient seismic resistance and those who have finished seismic reinforcement in advance, the government will give preferential treatment after the earthquake depending on the damage level. If this system is to be put into practice, the number of destroyed structures will decrease. As a result, the government can afford 10 million yen to 15 million yen for each completely destroyed house (3 million yen for those partially destroyed), and still the total expense will be much smaller. The current government seismic reinforcement promoting policy with public funds is not realistic considering the large number of existing pre-
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code revision weak structures. Reinforcing all of them before the earthquake would cost hundreds of billion yen per prefecture. Even if the number of structures to retrofit is limited, this system lacks a controlling mechanism to prevent dishonest builders from getting involved in the seismic reinforcement business. Furthermore, in regions where local governments have relatively high subsidies, citizens often postpone seismic reinforcement until their income decreases and they become eligible for higher subsidies, or construction businesses take advantage of the system and charge considerably more for the reinforcement work. In my proposal, the government does not need to spare an enormous sum of money before the event. In addition, it considerably reduces earthquake damage and expenditures of both the government and citizens, resulting in good use of taxes. A system for checking the seismic resistance is also introduced to contribute to sustainable quality control of structures as social stock. Eventually dishonest builders are removed from the market and responsible businesses are brought into the region, contributing to its activation. In this system, it is possible to use “reverse mortgage.” The results of the investigation of the households who cannot reinforce due to economic reasons showed that, in many cases, they just do not have cash right now, but they do own a house, the land and life insurance. We could let such people borrow money for seismic reinforcement using their land or insurance as collateral. If monthly payments are difficult, the government may provide support. The repayment can be done in a lump sum when the house owner dies. By doing this, citizens’ lives will be protected and the government’s expense for earthquake mitigation can be considerably reduced. Citizens can reduce damage, and, if their houses are damaged, they can receive sufficient support from the government. 3.7.2 Meguro’s “Mutual Assistance” System I am proposing a “Mutual Assistance” system, which is a nationwide mutual association for those who have finished seismic reinforcement. Generally, seismic intensity that may cause damage to seismic reinforced houses and ones built following new code is JMA scale 6 or more, and the ratio of damaged structures under such intensity is a few percent (Fig. 3-19). However, such high structures are rare. Even if the expected earthquake occurs, only a few percent of all the structures in Japan will be exposed to intensity level of 6 or more (Fig. 3-20). Therefore, the probability of the seismic reinforced structures being damaged is much less than 1%. So, there will
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be some few hundred households who will support 1 completely destroyed and 2 to 3 partially destroyed houses.
JMA intensity 7
Damage rate
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Fig. 3-19. Fragility function for wooden houses
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5.4%3.3% 2.6% 87.5% 1.1% 48,171km2 䠄12.5䠂䠅 Area 㠃✚
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2.4% 3.7% 0.2% 33,798,867㼜㼑㼛㼜㼘㼑 ே 䠄26.7䠂䠅 Population ேཱྀ Number of wooden houses ᮌ㐀ᘓ⠏≀Ჷᩘ
Ratio of the houses exposed to intensity level 6 or more is less than 7%
Fig. 3-20. Area supposed to be exposed to the Tokai and Nankai Earthquake occurring simultaneously
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3.7.3 Meguro’s “Self Assistance” System Finally, I would like to introduce the “Self Assistance” system of my proposal, or “new earthquake insurance.” The probability that seismic reinforced structures collapse is extremely low. In addition, with the “Public Assistance” and the “Mutual Assistance” system that I introduced above, it is possible to receive 20 million yen to 30 million yen, which is sufficient to build a new house if the house collapses. It may be concluded that there is no need to rely on earthquake insurance; however, the problem is fire after earthquake. The “new earthquake insurance” covers structures with sufficient seismic resistance which are damaged by fire after the earthquake. That is, it is an insurance for houses which endured the shake but were burnt down. In the case of the Kobe Earthquake, though the influence of wind was small, 250,000 structures were completely or partially destroyed, 390,000 were slightly damaged by shake, and around 7,500 structures were burnt down. The damage caused by fire was much smaller than that of the shake. Seismic reinforcement will reduce the fire damage even more due to the decline of fire outbreak and the improvement of fire extinguishing activities. In my calculation, the number of structures to be compensated will be
Tokai + Tonankai + Nankai
premium/household/year (10,000 yen)
present premium
ಖ㝤ᩱ䛜⌧⾜䛾 㻼㼞㼑㼙㼕㼡㼙㻌㼞㼑㼐㼡㼏㼑㼟㻌㼠㼛㻌㻝㻌㻑 1 䠂⛬ᗘ䛻䛺䜛
Exceeds the limit of present insurance
new premium (before 1961)
new premium (before 1981)
Insurance/household (10,000 yen)
Fig. 3-22. The effect of the new earthquake insurance
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decreased to a small percentage (about 1%) if damage due to shaking is not considered. That means the insurance premium may decrease from 100,000 yen/year to 1,000 yen/year (Fig. 3-22). This will make earthquake insurance cheaper and remove the existing compensation limit, which is 50% of fire insurance.
3.8 Understandings to be Changed As mentioned in Section 3.2, the standard cost for seismic reinforcement of an average-sized wooden house is about 1.5 million yen/house, which is equivalent to, or less than, the cost of a car. You can protect your family and property with this amount of money. When buying a car, everyone joins both compulsory and optional insurances, which cost more than seismic retrofitting, because they can imagine tragic accidents. Unfortunately, their ability to understand the importance of seismic reinforcement is poor. In the case of car insurance, the economic ratio or (expected compensation/investment) is smaller than 1, that is the money paid for insurance is more than the compensation obtained if the insurance is activated. However, in the case of the effect of retrofitting, the current seismic activities in Japan, or the long-term earthquake prediction information, shows that in many areas, the economic ratio (expected decrease of cost needed after future earthquake/retrofit cost) is 5 to 15 times (Meguro (2007a)) In areas with high seismic activity like Japan, it is necessary to prepare a system for mitigating damage through citizens’ efforts before the event and preparing sufficient resources to support those who become victims in spite of their efforts. A system that supports victims because they are just pitiful, but with no self-effort before the event, does not work financially and does not reduce damage. We should learn a lesson about such systems from Turkey, which is recurrently suffering from earthquake disasters causing large life and economic losses. In Turkey, around 18,000 people were killed due to collapse of weak structures during the earthquake in 1999. In spite of this, seismic reinforcement is not progressing, mainly because of one improper system. Although they have a seismic structural code, because of the poor implementation system for the code, there are many weak houses and buildings in the country. The improper system, which hinders the promotion of seismic retrofit of weak structures, consists of the national government constructing new houses and giving them for free to the owners of all collapsed houses after an earthquake. According to a recent study on the seismic activity at the North Anatolia fault, the occurrence of an earthquake that will
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hit Istanbul, the largest city in Turkey, is just a matter of time. The damage estimated is around 30% of the country Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (This ratio of Japanese GDP corresponds to 150 trillion yen). Besides this huge damage, 4% to 5% of GDP money (20 to 25 trillion yen) is needed to reconstruct collapsed houses. These numbers show that it will be practically impossible for the Turkish government to implement this system and to support earthquake victims. Nevertheless, the existence of this system discourages Turkish citizens from retrofitting their homes, and as a result expected damage is increasing. Recently, the Turkish government has finally recognized the problem and is considering creating earthquake insurance, which will only be available for seismic resistant structures.
3.9 Now Is the Time for a Change Japan is now in the same direction as Turkey. A system by which the government supports some part of the reconstruction of destroyed households, called “victims’ life recovery support policy,” came into existence. Although I am not denying the need for a system to support earthquake victims, I believe that the current one must be revised. The current system may cause more damage and increase of public money use because there is no preferential treatment for those who made an effort to retrofit their homes, thus eliminating the incentive for “Self Assistance.” The present system provides 3 million yen for completely destroyed houses, which is insufficient for reconstruction. In the case of the Kobe Earthquake, over 10 million yen was spent to support one victim family, including all costs for demolishing the collapsed house, preparation of open space for temporary shelter, construction of shelter, demolition of shelter, construction of apartment buildings for victims, compensation, etc.. Will such a system work in Japan, where the estimated damage is huge? What I have repeatedly pointed out, even before the Niigata Chuetsu Earthquake, is that from now on people will have support by this system. Imagine the following scenarios, which I do not wish to happen but which I believe are very likely to occur. An earthquake hits, some 100,000 structures are completely destroyed, and there are not enough resources to support all the victims. In this situation, people will finally understand that a system that does not encourage “Self Assistance” is fundamentally flawed because damage is not reduced and the available resources are not enough. Another scenario is that in which fewer damaged structures require support. The press will surely ask the victims about the government compensation system, and they will most likely say that it has saved them (at this
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point, these people are consumers of tax payers’ money). The press will continue asking whether they have any demand or request. Then, they will say that the 3 million yen is good but not enough, that they would want more. What will the press, society, or politicians do regarding this? Only a few people have enough understanding of the present seismic conditions and the earthquake disaster mechanism to stand for the tax payers’ position. Unfortunately, it is likely that public opinion will encourage increasing support. Arguing about these matters with victims around you or changing public opinion is virtually impossible.
3.10 Risk Management/Disaster Management Information Station The “Risk Management/Disaster Management Information Station” is an innovative system which systematically integrates a common platform with: 1.Simulation module (S-module), 2.Data Archiving module (DAmodule), 3.e-Learning module (eL-module), and 4.Web3D-GIS module. 1. S-module is a system for creating the disaster information and standardizing the information so that it is used more efficiently. S-module is a universal disaster environment simulator combining various numerical analysis models. It aims at simulating earthquake ground motion, structural behavior, evacuation behavior, and the economic situation after an earthquake, and so on. 2. DA-module is a system for efficiently storing and administrating disaster information. It includes reports on past disaster investigations, newspaper articles, books as well as the data created with the Smodule. In addition, as accuracy of the latter improves and characteristics of the area change (inputted in Web-GIS-module), the DAmodule is dynamically and interactively updated. 3. eL-module is a learning system from the learner’s side, and a data obtaining system from the system administrator’s side. It is an interface for presenting information obtained through the S-module and the DA-module data to users, as well as to grasp the users’ consciousness level. 4. Web-GIS-module is a spatial and temporal urban information database of the target area, using a Web-GIS environment, which contains data of citizens and area characteristics and their variations in time. The main elements of each module are:
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For 1: Collapse Simulation of Wooden Structures due to Earthquakes and Simulation of the Effect of Retrofitting (Yanagada and Meguro (2005)), Simulation of the Efficiency of Furniture Overturning Protection Devices during Earthquake (Meguro (2006a)), Collapse Simulation of Buildings due to Earthquakes (Meguro and Hatem (2000)); (Meguro and Hatem (2000)), Collapse Simulation of Viaducts due to Earthquakes (Ito and Meguro (2005)), Simulation of Behavior of Passengers in Railroad Vehicles due to Earthquakes (Okamoto and Meguro (2005)), Simulation of Evacuation Behavior during a Tsunami and Simulation of the Effect of Evacuation Guidance (Oda and Meguro (2005)), Simulation of Evacuation Behavior in Underground Space due to Disasters and Simulation of the Effect of Evacuation Guidance (Meguro (2005a)), Simulation of Evacuation Behavior in High Rise Buildings due to Disasters and Simulation of the Effect of Evacuation Guidance (Oda and Meguro (2005)), Disaster Imagination Method (Meguro Method (Meguro (2006b)), Meguro-Maki (Meguro (2006c)), Disaster Response Simulation (Disaster Mitigation Next Generation Manual (Kondo and Meguro (2001); (Kondo et al. (2001)), Simulation of the Situation Before, During and After Implementing a Retrofitting Promotion System (Meguro (2003a); (Yoshimura and Meguro (2003)), Economic Situation Simulation, and so on. For 2: Lessons and records from the Kobe Earthquake, news articles related to the World Trade Center terrorist attack, disaster investigation reports and articles of past disasters, analysis of risk areas, and damage estimation results are put into the database. Also, “The Great Kanto Earthquake Photo Library,” in which you can compare past and present pictures of damaged areas, is included. For 3: We prepared a touch panel which is an easy interface for children and the elderly who have no special computer knowledge. In addition, we made an interface making use of a 3D Virtual Reality terminal in order to experience virtual disaster. For 4: We used 3D-GIS data of each structure in the urban area, such as Tokyo’s 23 districts (Meguro (2006c)) as a common platform. The combination of simulation models and databases of various physical and social phenomena by this system not only collects and adjusts examples of past risk management, but also allows simulating hazardous situations occurring at different times, natural conditions, disaster prevention abilities of the area, and social conditions, so as to store and update the results as “imaginary disaster examples.” Mass distribution and utilization of these “imaginary disaster examples” as textbooks helps
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DA-module Web-GIS-module
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Fig. 3-23. Risk/Disaster Management Information (Earthquake Disaster Version). Visualizing the disaster phenomena and the effect of responses, adjusting the facts and lessons of past disasters, and preparing effective environment for studying will improve the imagination ability of many people. In addition, improved understanding and response ability based on suitable imagination will make an environment which reduces the damage of urban disaster. This system will (1) simulate, (2) stock, (3) distribute the disaster mitigation information and (4) integrate them on 3D urban GIS space as a platform.
complement the deficiency of actual disaster situation examples, and improves public’s disaster imagination ability. In addition, in case a disaster has actually occurred, this system can support crisis decision making by predicting the situation in the near future based on the physical and social conditions. This system functions ordinarily as a “risk management/disaster management education supporting” system and extraordinarily, during an emergency, as a “risk management/disaster management supporting” system. It improves the users’ ability to imagine a disaster, understand the present situation and what measures to take, as well as to evaluate quantitatively the effect of the measures taken, thus, contributing to improvement the total disaster management ability. Let me introduce some of the sub systems from the “Risk Management/Disaster Management Information Station” which are related to seismic reinforcement in the next sections.
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3.11 “Meguro Method” and “Meguro-Maki” In order to easily improve the disaster imagination ability, I have designed a training method called “Meguro Method”(Meguro (2006b)) and a simplified tool of this method called “Meguro-Maki” (Meguro (2006c)) ͆Meguro Method” uses a table as shown in Fig. 3-24. When thinking of the actions of a day, think about the surrounding situation, seismic resistance of the house, furniture arrangement, actions and locations of your family members, and so on. In addition, suppose that traffic is paralyzed and estimate the time you need to move around on foot. Then, assume that an earthquake occurs in various situations such as different seasons, weather, days, and, write down the things that you think would happen to you and the actions that you should take as time passes. Most people cannot imagine the situation and cannot write anything. That means that they cannot implement good countermeasures.
Earthquake
咆咇咈咋 12 咆咇 咆咇咈咋 3 1030咆咇咊1030 咆咇咈㐌㐌 呌呌呌呌 咆咇咈咊 10 ⛊⛊⛊ศศศศศ㛫㛫㛫㛫 㛫᪥᪥᪥㛫㛫 ᭶᭶᭶᭶ ᖺᖺᖺᖺᖺ 卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮 卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮卮
Typical daily life activity a b c d e f g h i j 0䠖00 㻭㻝 㻭㻝䡄 㻭㻝 sleeping 㻭㻝㼍 3䠖00 㻭㻞 䞉 6䠖00rising 䞉 commuting㻭㼚 Business 9䠖00 㻮㻝㼑 㻮㻝 In AM 㻮㻝
k l
m n o p q r s t u v w x y z z’
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㻮㻞 Business㻮㻟 15䠖00 in PM 䞉 䞉 00 18䠖commuting 㻼㻝 䞉 䞉 21䠖00 䞉 㻼㼚 24 00
second
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Fig. 3-24. Chart used in “Meguro Method.” “Meguro Method” consists of image training of the disaster situation using a chart in which the vertical axis is the actions of daily life and the horizontal axis is time since the event. When thinking of actions, you should consider the environment of your house and office, seismic strength of the building, arrangement of furniture, and your family’s actions. You should also estimate the time it will take to return home from your office on foot in case the traffic paralyzes. In addition, decide the season, weather, day and time so that you can imagine the actual situation and the actions to take as time passes when the earthquake hits. The aim is to prepare an environment of concrete disaster mitigation responses by understanding the situation which changes by various conditions such as weather and time, and preparations you take.
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3.11.1 Understanding Various Aspects as an Individual The most important point of “Meguro Method” is to carefully think about your own lifestyle. This is the difference between “Meguro Method” and previous TV programs, lessons, reports and tools which generally considered other people’s concerns. Through “Meguro Method,” you realize the various roles you play in your life, such as “information provider/information receiver,” “caregiver/in need of care,” etc. For example, a young housewife who thought she would be “protected” realizes that she must “protect” her children if an earthquake occurs when she is alone with them. A disaster management staff member realizes that his or her time as a staff member is only 20% of his or her whole time (work 8 hours a day, 5 days a week), so there is higher probability that he himself or herself will become a victim, and that he or she will have to move as an individual when disaster occurs. “Meguro-Maki” is a time-along-disaster-story making tool aimed at 㻵㼙㼍㼓㼕㼚㼑㻌㼥㼛㼡㼞㻌㼟㼕㼠㼡㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼍㼒㼠㼑㼞㻌㼐㼕㼟㼍㼟㼠㼑㼞㻘㻌㼍㼚㼐㻌㼙㼍㼗㼑㻌㼍㻌㼟㼠㼛㼞㼥㻌㼛㼒㻌㼥㼛㼡㼞㼟㼑㼘㼒
㼃㼞㼕㼠㼑㻌㼕㼚㻌㼥㼛㼡㼞㻌 㼟㼕㼠㼡㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚㻌㼣㼔㼑㼚㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌 㼐㼕㼟㼍㼟㼠㼑㼞㻌㼛㼏㼏㼡㼞㼟䚷
㻲㼕㼤㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼠㼥㼜㼑㻌 䚷䚷䚷 㼛㼒㻌㼐㼕㼟㼍㼟㼠㼑㼞䚷 㻱㼍㼞㼠㼔㻙 㼝㼡㼍㼗㼑
㻹㼑㼓㼡㼞㼛㻙 㻹㼍㼗㼕 㻚㻿㼡㼚㻚
㻝㻌 㼙㼕㼚㻚
㼥㼛㼡㼞㻌 㼟㼕㼠㼡㼍㼠㼕㼛㼚
㻳㼍㼠㼔㼑㼞㻌 㼍㼚㼐 㼟㼡㼞㼞㼛㼡㼚㼐㻌 㼣㼕㼚㼠㼑㼞 㼒 㼍㼕㼞 㼎㼍㼎㼕㼑㼟 㼃㼑’㼞㼑㻌 㼜㼘㼍㼥㼕㼚㼓㻌 㻯㼍㼘㼘㻌 㼚㼡㼞 㼣㼕㼠㼔㻌 㼎㼍㼎㼕㼑㼟㻚 㼎㼥㻌 㼙㼛㼎 䠄 㼀㼑㼍㼏㼔㼑㼞㼟㻦㻌 㻞 㻮㻭㻮㻵㻱㻿 㼜㼔㼛㼚㼑 㻭㻮㻱㻚㻌 㻹㼍㼞㼕㼗㼛 㻜㻙㻝㻌 㼥㼑㼍㼞㼟㻌 㼛㼘㼐㻌 ே 㻺㼡㼞㼟㼑㼞㼥㻙 㻭㻰㼁㻸㼀㻿 㼜㼍㼞㼑㼚㼠 㼎㼍㼎㼕㼑㼟㻦㻌 㻢䠅 㼣㼛㼞㼗㼑㼞
㻯㻻㻺㻰㻵㼀㻵㻻㻺㻿 㼃㻱㻭㻙 㼀㻴㻱㻾
㻿㻱㻭㻿㻻㻺
㼀㻵㻹㻱 㼃㻾㻵㼀㻱㻾厑
㻿㼑㼠㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼏㼛㼚㼐㼕㼠㼕㼛㼚
㻰㻭㼀㻱
㻱㼍㼞㼠㼔㼝㼡㼍㼗㼑㻌 㻻㼏㼏㼡㼞 㻢㻙㼛㼐㼐 㟈ᗘ䠒ᙉ 㻝㻜㻌 㼟㼑㼏㻚
㻿㻱㻵㻿㻹㻵㻯㻌 㻵㻺㼀㻱㻺㻿㻵㼀㼅
㼠㼑㼍㼏㼔㼑㼞
Fig. 3-25. An example of “Meguro-maki.” “Meguro-maki” is a simplified “Meguro Method” for use in nursery schools, kindergartens, elementary schools and families through writing a disaster situation story. In the process of writing “Meguro-maki,” you will gain understanding of the situation and identify various problems. In addition, by comparing your “Meguro-maki” with others, you can find various misunderstandings and difficulties of communication. Disaster mitigation starts with discussions and examining such things. It is important to think about ways to achieve a happy ending for your story. What is needed to change the story? The importance of preparation becomes clear, and response ability improves. “Meguro-maki” enables both individuals and communities to improve disaster mitigation capabilities, and is effective to do in the new school term and after you move.
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being used in kindergartens, elementary schools, home, and so on. It looks like a maki-mono, an ancient Japanese “book” made of rolled paper, and that is why it is called “Meguro-Maki” (Fig. 3-25). Through the process of making stories using “Meguro-Maki,” you can understand the present situation and come up with various problems. By comparing “Meguro-Maki” written by others, you can discover your misunderstandings. Examine and think together how to make a happy ending story. What action is needed before and after the event to change the story? It helps to understand the importance of preparation and improves the ability of individuals and the community to take countermeasures. It is encouraged to do this exercise at the beginning of a semester/season or after moving. 3.11.2 Understanding that Ordinary People Can Easily Become Disaster Handicapped and Imagining the Story after Your Own Death Many people take for granted that they will be safe and healthy during an emergency. Fill out the “Meguro Method” table supposing you get injured or lose your glasses when an earthquake occurs while you are sleeping. You will soon realize that you can easily become disaster handicapped. Without understanding this possibility, you can not realize the problems you may face. However, if you can understand this, you will realize that it is efficient to jointly carry out disaster mitigation and welfare. How about the case when you die? In “Meguro Method,” you will think about the situation after you die: how your close ones will feel, live, and so on. This will help you to recognize that you are supported by many people, you should not be killed and should take care of yourself. With this feeling, you will begin thinking and taking measures for disaster prevention spontaneously. 3.11.3 Efficient Use of Time before the Earthquake Occurrence Previous disaster mitigation education, such as “do A, do B, don’t do C,” is not effective. What we should do now is improve disaster imagination ability. There is more time before the earthquake than immediately after the earthquake. Those who have disaster imagination ability can make use of the time before the earthquake occurrence to prepare and take measures (Fig. 3-24 and 3-26) that will help reduce damage. Preparation for what to do in the few seconds before the earthquake, a period of time that is now available thanks to the Earthquake Early Warning, is also needed.
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Up to the time of the earthquake, you have to prepare to reduce the problems that you will face when an earthquake strikes. When it actually hits, you can act to mitigate impact that you will face based on your disaster imagination with read condition. This is how you reduce total damage. Tools like “Meguro Method” and “Meguro-Maki” show the importance of preparation, such as seismic reinforcement/replacement of existing precode revision structures. Earthquake ᆅ㟈䛾Ⓨ⏕
10 咊 咈 咇 咆 咋 呌 ᖺ ᖺᖺᖺᖺ ᭶ 卮 卮卮卮卮 卮
12 咋 咈 咇 咆 咈咇咆 咇 咆 呌 呌 呌 㐌 㐌 咈 咇 咆 30 10 咊 咇 咆 30 10 3 ᭶᭶᭶ 㛫 㛫 ᪥ ᪥᪥ 㛫 㛫 㛫 㛫 㛫 ศศ ศศ ศ ⛊ ⛊ ⛊ 卮卮卮 卮 卮 卮 卮卮 卮 卮 卮 卮 卮 卮卮 卮卮 卮 卮 卮 卮
䛒 䛔 䛖 䛘 䛚 䛛 䛝 䛟 䛡䛣 䛥 䛧 䛩 䛫䛭 䛯 䛱 䛴 䛶 䛸 䛺 䛻 䛼䛽䛾 䛿䜂
day day
month/week month/week
Industry/Company/User
12 咋 咈 咇 咆 ᪥ 㛫㛫㛫 㛫 卮 卮卮卮 卮 Typical daily life activity
0䠖00 3䠖00
㻭㻝 sleeping
咆 30 10 咊 咇 咆 30 10 3 㛫ศ ศ ศ ศ ศ ⛊ ⛊ ⛊ 卮卮 卮 卮 卮 卮 卮 卮 卮
minute minute 㻮㻝䛛 hour hour
second second
㻮㻞
䞉 䞉 18䠖00commuting㻼㻝 䞉 䞉 21䠖00 䞉 㻼㼚
Earthquake
Your typical daily life activity
In AM
㻮㻟 15䠖00 Business in PM
second second
㻭㻝䛟
㻭㻝䛒
9䠖00 Business㻮㻝 lunch
hour hour
䛒 䛔 䛖 䛘 䛚 䛛䛝 䛟 䛡䛣 䛥 䛧 䛩 䛫 䛭
㻭㻞 䞉 6䠖00 rising 䞉 㻭㼚 commuting
12䠖00
minute minute
㻮㻟䛔
㻮㻟䛥
㻼㻝䛚
Day/Season/Weather
year year
24䠖00
Fig. 3-26. How to make use of the time before the earthquake (above: long time span, below: time provided by Earthquake Early Warning)
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3.12 3D Hazard Map of Your City It is important that citizens know about the area in which they live in order to promote seismic retrofitting. Knowing the risks of structure collapse or fire and location of shelters are required to take good measures. Area hazard maps provide such basic information. For example, in Tokyo, probability of “structure collapse” or “fire” and “evacuation conditions” are evaluated in every district, ranked in 5 levels, and inputted in a map. However, this map is difficult for citizens to understand. Therefore, we made a 3D area hazard map with a touch panel interface, which is easy to understand and can be used by everyone, including children and the elderly (Fig. 327). By selecting your address, the area’s risk level will be displayed in different colors and the evacuation route to the nearest evacuation center will be shown. Showing the risk level at a structure unit level by 3D map improves citizens’ awareness. As a result, disaster mitigation ability of the area is expected to improve (Meguro et al (2003)). We also developed a system that shows past and present pictures of the areas which were damaged in the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 (Fig. 328). After 80 years, the Great Kanto Earthquake is just an historical event separated from the lives of citizens who are now living in the same places. With this system we aimed at preparing an environment in which citizens ☜ㄆ䛧䛯ఫᡤ䜢㑅䜆䛣䛸䛜䛷䛝䜎䛩 You can select your address below.
㑅ᢥ䛧䛯ᆅᇦ䛛䜙᭱ᐤ䛾㑊㞴ᡤ䜎䛷䛾⤒㊰䛸㊥ 㞳䜢ᆅᅗୖ䛻♧䛩䚹 Shortest path from user’s selected area to evacuation space is shown on the map with its distance.
ᆅᇦ䛾ᆅ㟈༴㝤ᗘ䜢ⅆ⅏ᘏ↝䛾༴㝤ᛶ䛛䜙ホ ౯䛧䛯䜒䛾(┿ୖ䛻㏆䛔⨨䛛䜙䛾═䜑) Vulnerable rank in terms of fire spreading potential of the area.(View from just above the area)
Fig. 3-27. 3D hazard map of your city. By choosing the area, the evacuation route and risk level are shown. This system enables each citizen to understand the risks and problems.
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Fig. 3-28. The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake Photo Library showing the same location in 1923 and now
permanently consider past earthquake disasters, and considered them as their own problem.
3.13 Behavior of Houses during an Earthquake and Simulation of the Effect of Reinforcement I stored data from past shaking-table tests in the “Risk /Disaster Management Information Station” to give an idea on how you would feel in the face of a collapsing structure. However, these tests were not carried out on people’s actual houses, so the level of involvement is still sometimes low. I have developed a system which shows the dynamic behavior of your own house during an earthquake using 3D-EDEM (3D-Extended Distinct Element Method), an analysis method which was developed in my research group. 3D-EDEM is a numerical method capable of analyzing the behavior of continuous and non-continuous bodies. The accuracy of the analysis at the material level (Fig. 3-29) and structural level (Fig. 3-30) was verified. The house behavior is shown to the owners. Fig. 3-31 and 3-32 show one result example. The difference of the house behavior during the earthquake before and after the seismic reinforcement is obvious. Seeing the effect of seismic reinforcement in their own house has greatly changed people’s mind (Yanagida and Meguro (2005)).
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load Ⲵ㔜䠄䡇㻺㻕
㻞㻜
㍈⤌ ㍈⤌ Frame
㻝㻡
ゎᯒ ᐇ㦂
experiment
㻝㻜 㻡 㻜 㻞㻜
load 䡇㻺㻕 Ⲵ㔜䠄
➽䛔 Brace
analysis
㻜
㻜㻚㻜㻞
㻜㻚㻜㻠
㻜㻚㻜㻢
㻜 㻜㻚㻜㻤
㻝㻡
㻜㻚㻜㻠
㻜㻚㻜㻢
㻜㻚㻜㻤
Plaster board ▼⭯䝪䞊䝗
㻝㻜
Mortar wall 䝰䝹䝍䝹እቨ
㻡 㻜
㻜㻚㻜㻞
㻜
㻜㻚㻜㻞 㻜㻚㻜㻠 㻜㻚㻜㻢 ᒙ㛫ኚᙧゅ㻔㼞㼍㼐㻕 Story drift (rad)
㻜 㻜㻚㻜㻤
㻜㻚㻜㻞 㻜㻚㻜㻠 㻜㻚㻜㻢 ᒙ㛫ኚᙧゅ㻔㼞㼍㼐㻕 Story drift (rad)
㻜㻚㻜㻤
Fig. 3-29. The accuracy of analysis of 3D-EDEM method at material level
Fig. 3-30. The accuracy of analysis of 3D-EDEM method at structure level (Above: shaking table test, below: simulation)
3. Promotion of Seismic Retrofitting ᐇఫᏯ䜈䛾ᒎ㛤
Before retrofitting ⿵ᙉ๓
༡ഃ䛾 ቨ䛜㊊ ᮌ㐀䠎㝵ᘓ ᘓ⠏ᖺ䠗1960ᖺ
Wooden, 2-story, ᒇ᰿䠖㔜䛔 built in 1960 Heavy⪏㟈デ᩿Ⅼ roof Seismic resistance ⿵ᙉ๓䠖0.25 Before: 0.25䠄ಽቯ༴㝤䛒䜚䠅 (dangerous) After: 1.24 (safe) ⿵ᙉᚋ䠖1.24
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After retrofitting ⿵ᙉᚋ
➽䛔䛸 ྜᯈ䛷⿵ᙉ
䠄ಽቯ༴㝤䛿ᑡ䛺䛔䠅
Before retrofitting ⿵ᙉ๓
After ⿵ᙉᚋ retrofitting
Fig. 3-31. Seismic risk of your house (before and after retrofitting)
VHF
VHF
VHF
VHF
(a) Before retrofitting
(䠾) After retrofitting
Fig. 3-32. Behavior of your house (comparing (a) before retrofitting and (b) after retrofitting). Input motion is the Kobe Earthquake ground motion
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3.14 Behavior of Furniture inside the Room during an Earthquake In addition to promoting seismic retrofitting of structures, it is important to take care of your room conditions, furniture layout and attachments. What I introduce in this section is a simulator which shows the behavior of furniture related conditions such as layout and furniture overturning protection devices, using 3D-EDEM (Fig. 3-33). Using this system, people can understand furniture dynamic behavior during an earthquake and the effects of overturning protection devices on the behavior. This simulator is expected to improve citizens’ awareness of disaster mitigation and promote the use of furniture overturning protection devices so that the damage inside the house is reduced. I expect these citizens to also start thinking about seismic reinforcement.
(a) Simulation system flowchart
(b) An example of simulation Fig. 3-33. Simulation dynamic behavior of furniture during earthquakes
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3.15 Simulation of Economic Effect of Seismic Reinforcement The systems I have introduced so far will promote understanding of the situation of your room, house and city during an earthquake. However, by realizing the economic benefits of seismic reinforcement, the probability of carrying it out will be even higher. Here, I would like to introduce a system for evaluating the economic effect of seismic reinforcement, based on the long-term earthquake prediction information. Earthquake prediction consists of scale, location, and time occurrence prediction. We already have highly precise methods for estimating scale and location. Although short-term time prediction is still elusive, long-term prediction, in the order of 10 years, can be done with acceptable accuracy. I think that this long-term earthquake prediction information is effective to promote seismic reinforcement. Even if the time of earthquake occurrence is unknown, it is possible to estimate the seismic intensity level of the area from the epicenter location and ground conditions (Fig. 3-34). With this information and the seismic resistance of structures, it is possible to statistically estimate house damage as shown in Fig. 3-35. By showing such data to house owners, many people will change their minds (Meguro et al (2003)).
㻭㼜㼜㼘㼥㼕㼚㼓㻌㼠㼔㼑㻌㼜㼞㼛㼜㼛㼟㼑㼐㻌㼙㼑㼠㼔㼛㼐㻌㼠㼛㻌㻿㼔㼕㼦㼡㼛㼗㼍 㟼ᒸ┴ୗ䛾ఫᏯ䜈䛾ᥦᡭἲ䛾㐺⏝ 㟼ᒸ┴ୗ䛾ఫᏯ䜈䛾ᥦᡭἲ䛾㐺⏝ 4┠ 䐠㟼ᒸᕷᮏ㏻ 䐠 㻿㼔㼕㼦㼡㼛㼗㼍㻌㼏㼕㼠㼥 㻼㻳㼂㻩㻟㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑 㻼㻳㼂㻟㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑
㻹㼠㻚㻌㻲㼡㼖㼕 ᐩኈᒣ
䐟㻲㼡㼗㼡㼞㼛㼕 㼏㼕㼠㼥 䐟⿄ᕷୗ⏫ 㻼㻳㼂㻡㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑 㻼㻳㼂㻩㻡㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑 0-20 㻺㼡㼙㼍㼦㼡㻌㼜㼛㼞㼠 ὠ 20-25 25-30 30-35 35-50 50-77 㻔㼗㼕㼚㼑㻕
Fig. 3-34. Ground motion distribution estimated in case expected Tokai Earthquake
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Probability of earthquake occurrence (%)
㻱㼒㼒㼑㼏㼠㻌㼛㼒㻌㼞㼑㼠㼞㼛㼒㼕㼠㼠㼕㼚㼓 ✀䚻䛾ఫᏯ䜈䛾⪏㟈⿵ᙉ䛾㈝⏝ᑐຠᯝ
㻝㻜㻜
㻝㻠㻚㻠
㻝㻥㻢㻜
㻡㻜
䐟㻲㼡㼗㼡㼞㼛㼕 㼏㼕㼠㼥 㻼㻳㼂㻩㻡㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑
㻝㻥㻤㻡 㻢㻚㻞㻤
㻝㻚㻤㻜
㻜 㻝㻜㻜
㻡㻚㻥㻢
㻝㻚㻢㻡
㻝㻥㻢㻜
㻡㻜 㻜
㻠㻚㻝㻞
㻝㻥㻤㻡 㻞㻚㻡㻢
㻜
㻝㻡
䐠㻿㼔㼕㼦㼡㼛㼗㼍㻌㼏㼕㼠㼥 㻼㻳㼂㻩㻟㻜㼗㼕㼚㼑
㻜㻚㻣㻞 㻟㻜 㻜
㻝㻡
㻟㻜
year
Fig. 3-35. Retrofitting cost-effectiveness (for house owner’s easy understanding)
3.16 Conclusions The principal problem of earthquake disaster mitigation in Japan, now facing a period of high seismic activity, is seismic retrofitting/replacement of existing low earthquake resistant structures, such as mainly pre-coderevision structures. In order to promote this, “improvement of disaster imagination,” “suitable technology” and “suitable social system” are needed. In this text, I have only introduced the first and third due to space limitations. Discussion on the second issue may be found in other reports. Recently, I have been publishing many books about disaster mitigation for popular use, especially picture books and comics for children and women (Fig. 3-36). They play an important role in disaster mitigation and therefore it is important to change their minds. From the rapid economic growth period to recent times, we have been increasing residential areas which are developed by cutting mountains hills or filling valleys and assuming concentration of population in urban area. This has created many residential areas with poor soil conditions. And in these
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Fig. 3-36. Books about earthquakes published for children (above) and general audience (below). The picture book on the top left is written in both English and Japanese explaining the importance of retrofitting. Beaver is the main character and it is aimed at changing the mind of mothers. Second to left: disaster mitigation hand book (Civil Engineering Society (2006)) aimed at nursery schools, elementary schools and families, containing the “Meguro-maki.” Second to right: picture book (Nagoya, Y. (comic), Kunisaki, N. (story), Meguro, K. (supervision) (2006)) for elementary school earthquake disaster mitigation education. Top right: comic book (Fukuda, I. (pictures), Kunisaki, N. (story), Meguro, K. (supervision) (2006)) for elementary school which is helpful to imagine the earthquake situation. Bottom left (Meguro (supervision) (2006)) explains the “preposterous common sense” of earthquakes, aimed at correct understanding of earthquakes. Second to left: shows potential earthquake risk maps in Tokyo and explains the problems in daily life (Meguro (2005b)). Second to right: explains many problems of current earthquake disaster countermeasures in Japan (Meguro 2007b)). Bottom right: explains the earthquake early warning system, which started operation on October 1, 2007 (Meguro, K. and Fujinawa, Y. (supervision) (2007)).
areas, we have been constructing houses with average life spans of 26 to 27 years, although it takes more than 30 years to pay for them. I think this is the main reason why the Japanese living style does not look as wealthy as other countries in spite of similar high incomes. In Europe and America, house costs are being cut down by constructing high quality structures that last for long periods and change owners. Japan is now facing declining birthrate with increasing elderly proportion and decreasing population. It is estimated that the number of inhabitants will decrease by 10 million by 2035. By 2055, 40% of the population will be elderly and total population will be smaller than 90 million, a 30 million decrease from today’s numbers. This means that many of the exist-
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ing houses and residential areas will be unnecessary, so we can select only good soil condition areas. It will be possible to construct 100-year life span high quality houses on those good areas. By changing owners of the house, costs can be reduced and an incentive will emerge to maintain such high quality houses. The essence of what I have discussed so far may be summarized as follows: “construct a good quality house in a good place, maintain it well, and use for a long time.” This is the way to ensure the quality of residences as a social stock, and, as a result, mitigate earthquake disaster and make Japanese life wealthier. It is wasteful and socially unacceptable to live in a house that deteriorates even before payment has been finished. The essential solution is ensuring a fine space for residences and increasing open spaces considering active faulting and flooding as well as good soil condition. I truly wish that everyone will understand the importance of disaster imagination ability and that the various systems I have introduced in this text book will spread and improve the total disaster mitigation ability of individuals, society and the whole country. Seismic retrofitting of low earthquake resistant structures as well as a sound urban regeneration is the only way to reduce damage by earthquake in the future.
References Civil Engineering Society (2006) Don’t get Defeated by an Earthquake!: Disaster Mitigation Handbook for Kindergarten, Elementary and Home: Disaster Mitigation Manual for Children’s Life Security, Gakushu Research Com. (in Japanese) Fukuda, I. (pictures), Kunisaki, N. (story), Meguro, K. (supervision) (2006) A Picture Book for Earthquakes: What Shall I do?, Popura Com. (in Japanese) Hatem, T.D. and Meguro, K. (2000) “Applied Element Method for Dynamic Large Deformation Analysis of Structures”, Structural Eng./Earthquake Eng. (JSCE), 17(2) Imamura, A. (1925) “The Great Kanto Earthquake Investigation Report”, Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Investigation Conference Report, 100 (in Japanese) Inoue, K. (1925) “Teito Great Fire Journal”, Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Investigation Conference Report, 100 (in Japanese) Ito, D. and Meguro, K. (2005) “3D Simulation of Collapse Behavior of Elevated Bridge by Applied Element Method” (60th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting, 1-230, Civil Engineering Society) (in Japanese) Kobe Earthquake Investigation Report (1998) “Kobe Earthquake Investigation Report Editorial Conference”, Kobe Earthquake Investigation Report, 4 (in Japanese)
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Kondo, S. and Meguro, K. (2001) “A Proposal of the Next Generation Disaster Mitigation Manual for Contributing to Total Disaster Mitigation Ability” (56th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting) (in Japanese) Kondo, S., Hamada, S. and Meguro, K. (2001) “A Proposal of the Next Generation Manual Which Enables the Total Disaster Mitigation Response”, 26th Earthquake Engineering Research Presentation Conference Meeting Monographs (in Japanese) Meguro, K. and Hatem, T.D. (2000) “Applied Element Method for Structural Analysis: Theory and Application for Linear Materials”, Structural Eng./Earthquake Eng. (JSCE), 17(1) Meguro, K. (2003a) “A Practical Approach to Earthquake Disaster”, science (Special Issue: Earthquake Disaster and Risk Management), 73(9) (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2003b) “The Effect of Seismic Reinforcement for Fire Extinguishing Activity after the Earthquake”, Fire Disaster Mitigation, 5 (summer number) (in Japanese) Meguro, K., Yoshimura, M., Takase, Y., Goh, B. and Sone, A. (2003) “Development of Integrated Information System for Total Disaster Management”, Proceedings of the 2nd International Symposium on New Technologies for Urban Safety of Mega Cities in Asia Meguro, K. (2005a) “Security Design and Disaster Mitigation Response of Urban Space from the Point of View of Evacuation Security of Users”, 54th NCTAM monographs (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2005b) Survival Map for the Great Earthquake in Tokyo, Junpo-sha Com. (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2006a) “Visualizing the Mystery, Visualizing the Furniture Behavior during Earthquake”, Architectural Journal, 1541 (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2006b) “For Earthquake Disaster Mitigation”, Natural Disaster and Manmade Disaster (Seibutsu Research Com.) (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2006c) “Practice of Disaster Mitigation Work Shop: Try MeguroMaki and Improve Disaster Mitigation Ability, Don’t get Defeated by an Earthquake!”, Disaster Mitigation Handbook for Kindergarten, Elementary and Home: Disaster Mitigation Manual for Children’s Life Security (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (supervision) (2006d) The Great Earthquake, Don’t Die!, Asucom (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2007a) “The Opening Article: Imagination Training for Promoting Seismic Reinforcement”, Fire Disaster Mitigation, 21 (summer number) (in Japanese) Meguro, K. (2007b) A Wrong Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures, Junpo-sha Com. (in Japanese) Meguro, K. and Fujinawa, Y. (supervision) (2007) Earthquake Early Warning, Tokyo-horei Shuppan Com. (in Japanese) Nagoya, Y. (comic), Kunisaki, N. (story), Meguro, K. (supervision) (2006) An Earthquake Occurred in My Town:Earthquake Disaster Simulation Comic, Popura Com. (in Japanese)
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Nakamura, S. (1925) “The Great Tokyo Fire due to The Great Kanto Earthquake”, Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Investigation Conference Report, 100 (in Japanese) Nishimura, A., Iziri, I. and Ueno, Y. (1995) <Special Issue> Collective Disaster Emergency: From Postmortem Inspection (Emergency Medical Science (separate volume), Health publish (in Japanese) Oda, K. and Meguro, K. (2004) “Evacuation Behavior Simulation in High Buildings” (59th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting, 1-802, Civil Engineering Society) (in Japanese) Oda, K. and Meguro, K. (2005) “Development of Evacuation Behavior Simulation Model of Tsunami Disaster” (60th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting, 2-178, Civil Engineering Society) (in Japanese) Ogata, I. (1925) “The Great Tokyo Fire due to The Great Kanto Earthquake”, Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Investigation Conference Report, 100 (in Japanese) Okamoto, A. and Meguro, K. (2005) “Research of Risk Evaluation in Railway Vehiclesb by Ellipse Distinct Element Method”, (60th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting, 1-220, Civil Engineering Society) (in Japanese) Seo, M. (story), Fujita, K. (pictures), Meguro, K. (supervision) (2004) Let’s Talk About an Earthquake (picture book), Jiyu-Kokumin Com. (in Japanese) Takemura, M. (2003) “Intensity Distribution Map and Ground Surface Structure of in Center of Tokyo due to The Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923”, Japan Earthquake Engineering Conference Monographs, 3(1) (in Japanese) The Metropolitan Police Department Architectural Section Security Section (1923) Wodden Structure Damage Distribution Map (in Japanese) Yamaguchi, N. and Yamazaki, F. (1999) “The Intensity Estimation by Structural Damage Ratio in Kobe Earthquake in 1995”, Civil Engineering Society Monographs, 612(I-46) (in Japanese) Yanagida, M. and Meguro, K. (2005) “Construction of Dynamic Behavior Simulator of Wooden Structures in Earthquake” (60th Civil Engineering Society Annual Academic Meeting, 1-196, Civil Engineering Society) (in Japanese) Yoshimura, M. and Meguro, K. (2003) “About Seismic Reinforcement Promotion of Existing Pre-Code Revision Structures using Long Term Earthquake Prediction”, Civil Engineering Monographs (in Japanese)
Part II IMPROVEMENT OF URBAN VULNERABILITY
4. Growing Vulnerability Crisis “Will Slums Ever Reduce or Improve?”: A Case from India
Vijay Neekhra
4.1 Introduction The 21st century is expected to witness not only sustained population growth but also more urbanization. Within a generation, it has been estimated that the majority of the developing world’s population will live in urban areas, and that the number of urban residents in developing countries will double, increasing by over two billion inhabitants (World Bank (2000)). India is no exception. Some 50% of the population, or around 600 million people, may be residents in urban areas by 2020. These figures suggest that we need to know more about the process of urban development and its effect on urban residents’ lives, especially the impact of urbanization on poverty and slums. Although urban centers present real opportunities for poor people, they also create and feed the conditions within which poverty spreads. On the negative sides, if not planned in better way, it leads to rural-urban migration as people seek new employment and livelihood opportunities in urban centers. Many poor people, however, have not benefited from these opportunities. Current statistics suggest that poverty in urban areas is rising, and that the number of poor people in urban areas in some countries is now increasing at a faster rate than in rural areas. It is estimated that up to 60% of the urban population in some developing countries is poor (UNCHS (1996)); the figure for India is around 40% (NIUA (1998)). The sheer scale of the challenge in India is to reduce poverty and slums in the country, as majority of urban centers are unable or unwilling to address these conditions. Economic vibrancy of large urban centers in offering diverse employment opportunities and means of livelihood is the chief cause of migration and formation of vulnerable urban spaces in the form of slums in megaci-
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ties. Rural migrants are attracted to the urban areas for economic reasons regardless of the fact that physical infrastructure in terms of housing, drinking water supply, drainage etc. is not adequate in the cities. Cities have been the hubs of economic growth. However, planned urbanization has been marred to an extent by the excessive demand for basic amenities resulting in deterioration in the physical environment. The quality of life has thus suffered due to continuing influx of migrants and, consequently, the widening gap between demand and supply of essential services and other infrastructure in these areas. Low profile jobs, high rents and housing problems forcing the poor to settle for informal solutions result in mushrooming of slums and squatter settlements. The problem of urban slums has at some point confronted almost all the major cities throughout the developing world and various policies have been attempted. Indian cities have not been an exception. During the postcolonial period, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s, the issue of slums in developing countries emerged as an important area for urban research and policies (Pugh (1997)). As a result, various slum strategies were implemented to (at least) mitigate the socio-economic, physical and health well being of slums and their residents. During the tolerance period in the 1950s and 1960s, urban authorities in developing nations turned a ‘blind eye’ to slums and focused on public housing (Farvacque and McAuslan (1992)); (Rakodi (2001)). Slums were considered ‘relics of traditional villages’ in the process of being absorbed by the new urban planning scheme inherited from Western societies --- with little consideration of local and cultural realities (Gaskell (1990)); (Njoh (2003)). This period failed in allocating housing to slum dwellers. In fact, the main beneficiaries of formal public and planned housing schemes were civil servants and middle- and upper-income earners (Fekade (2000)). In the 1970s, most governments in developing nations opted for direct and centralized (state) intervention, executed through World Bank instigated programs such as the site and service scheme. This particular scheme advocated the clearance of centrally located slums and their relocation to newly serviced plots often outside the existing urbanized areas. This policy was driven by affordability and cost-recovery strategies (van der Linden (1986)). The implementation of the site and service scheme was heavily criticized, especially its demolition and eviction components. In some cases evicted slum dwellers were relocated to other parts of the city. In many other instances, slum dwellers were left in ‘limbo’ without alternative housing and land arrangements or compensation (Butcher (1986)). During the 1980s, the upgrading strategies emphasized the improvement of communal infrastructure and services within the established slums (Banes et al. (2000)). In particular, the upgrading projects targeted the im-
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provement of basic services (e.g. sewage, water, sanitary, garbage collection, electricity) and infrastructure (e.g. road, market, healthcare and education centers) that were lacking or decaying in slum areas (Pugh (2000)). The upgrading program aimed to achieve three main goals: affordability, cost recovery and replicability. There were some instances of success in India, Bolivia, Brazil, Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru, Indonesia, etc. as mentioned by researchers and reports (Abelson (1996)); (World Bank (1994)); (Santiago (1987)); (Kessides (1997)); (World Bank (1995)); (World Bank (2003)). However, despite these specific successes, upgrading programs failed to meet expectations. Generally, they were criticized at four main levels: failed financial commitment, negative socio-economic impacts, insecurity of tenure and the non-replicability of ‘best practices’ (Brennan (1993)); (Amis (2001)); (Durand-Lasserve (1996)); (Sehgal (1998)); (Werlin (1999)). During the 1990s, the security of tenure and enabling approach was promoted (World Bank (1993)). The enabling approach advocated seven major points: development of housing financing systems, targeting of subsidies, encouraging property rights (including security of tenure), improving infrastructure, auditing and removing barriers, restructuring building industries and reforming institutions (Pugh (2001)). Apart from a few successes in general, it failed to address major issues. First, this policy advantages land grabbers and informal ‘conquistadors,’ rather than those who reside there. So, when regulation does occur, the slumlords (who do not necessarily live in the settlement) will resell or rent the land to city dwellers, eventually at a higher price because the land value has increased with the security (Payne (2004)). Therefore, slum settlers who failed to claim their land rights, or who were renting, will seek another site to develop or create slum-like settlements (Fernandes (1999)). This strategy also failed in providing any long-term solution to the expansion of emerging and future slums. It seems as discussed above, sociologists, economists, environmentalists and town planners have perceived slums and problems of slum dwellers from their own point of view. But there is no denying the fact that slums have become an integral part of the phenomenon of urbanization and are, in a way, manifestations of overall socioeconomic policies and planning in the states and in the country. But this should not discount the fact that the slum dwellers have been contributing significantly to the economy of the city by being a source of affordable labor supply for production both in the formal and informal sectors of economy. Comprehensive information on slums is essential for formulation of an effective and coordinated policy for their improvement/rehabilitation as they have not received due attention in urban planning and have remained an area of neglect. Piecemeal ef-
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forts in the past, specifically in case of India, have brought about some improvement in the lives of slum dwellers, but this is not enough. A lot more is required to be done to improve the quality of life in slums. The following paragraphs will be an attempt to give an overview of vulnerable spaces, i.e. slums and poverty level in India. The chapter will give an overview of slums in India and in megacities. Later, the chapter discusses the programs related to slum improvement and highlights the lack of sustainable and effective approaches for slum improvement and control that finally leads to growing vulnerability crisis in the nation.
4.2 Poverty in India Although India’s economy is one of the world’s fastest growing, with a GDP growth rate of 9.2% (2005) (World Development Indicators database, 2007), it is in the top 20 of the world’s countries, it is still a poor country. Its GNI per capita in 2006 is $880 (World Ranking-161) and PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) is $3,800 (World Ranking-145) (World Development Indicators database); (World Bank (2007)), placing it far below the comparable developing nations {Brazil: GNI- $8,800(rank-91), PPP-$4730 (rank-92); Russian Federation: GNI- $11,620 (rank-78), PPP-$5,780 (rank79); China: GNI-$7730 (rank-102), PPP-$2,010 (rank-29)} in the world and is just above the least developing nations. The low per capita income reflects the poverty level and large slum population in India. In India, total population increased to about 21.30% in 1991-2001, whereas urban population grew by 31.36% during the same period. According to the NSSO (55th Round) 30-day Recall period, 23.62 (67.1 million) % of India’s urban population is living below the poverty line. The number of urban poor living below the poverty line is 67 million (Table 41). Table 4-1. The poor and their ratio in India (Source: Planning Commission (2003)) Year 1973-1974 1977-1978 1983 1987-1988 1993-1994 1999-2000
Poverty ratio Rural Urban 56.4 49.0 53.1 45.2 45.7 40.8 39.1 38.2 37.3 32.4 27.1 23.6
Combine 54.9 51.3 44.5 38.9 36.0 26.1
No. of poor (million) Rural Urban 261.3 60.0 264.3 64.6 252.0 70.9 231.9 75.2 244.0 76.3 193.2 67.1
Combine 321.3 328.9 322.9 307.1 320.3 260.3
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Analysis shows that poverty reduction has been uneven between the states[1] (Tenth Five Year Plan, India). The most important point about the inter-state variation in poverty is that it shows no correlation with per capita income or other development indicators levels of industrial and infrastructure development, etc. in urban areas during the nineties. It may be seen that the dynamics of development in the urban areas of the states during the past two decades has been such that rapid economic growth has not led to a corresponding decline in poverty and finally it led to growth of the slum population in the country, from 25 million slum population in 1981 to 60 million in 2001 (NSSO (2002)). In fact the poverty ratio in urban areas is 23.6 (Table 4-1), corresponding with the slum population ratio in 640 cities i.e. 23.1, thus establishing a very close relationship between poverty level and slum population in the nation.
4.3 Definition of Slum The concept of slums and their definition vary considerably across the depending upon the socio-economic conditions or local perceptions prevailing in the society. There are regional differences in the names by which these slums are known in India. In Delhi, slums are commonly called jhuggi-jhonpari, whereas in Mumbai jhopadpatti or chawls are the names for slums. It is ahatas in Kanpur, bustees in Kolkata, cheris in Chennai and keris in Bangalore. But physical characteristics in most of these slums are essentially the same. They are usually a cluster of hutments with dilapidated and infirm structures having common toilet facilities, suffering from lack of basic amenities, inadequate arrangement for drainage and for disposal of solid wastes and garbage. These inadequacies make the living conditions in slums extremely sub optimal, unhygienic and results in usually higher incidence of air and water borne diseases for the dwellers. For the Census of India 2001, following definitions of slums have been adopted:
1. All specified areas in a town or city notified as ‘Slum’ by state, UT Administration or Local Government under any Act including a ‘Slum Act.’ 2. All areas recognized as ‘slum’ by state, union territory administration or local government, housing and slum boards, which may have not been formally notified as slum under any act. 3. A compact area of at least 300-person population or about 60-70 households of poorly built congested tenements, in unhygienic environment usually with inadequate infrastructure and lacking in proper sanitary and drinking water facilities.
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4.4 Slums and Urbanization in India India is a part of the global trend towards increasing urbanization. As per the Census of India, 2001, 27.8% of India’s population (285 million) live in urban areas and 72.2% live in rural areas. Though percentage decadal growth (1991-2001) of population in rural and urban areas during the decade is 17.9 and 31.2% respectively, in absolute number the net addition of population in rural areas (113 million) during 1991-2001 is much higher as compared to urban areas (67 million) (Table 4-2). Though rapid urbanization is welcomed for its positive effects, it has also imposed increasing pressures on the level of services in the urban centers and attracted a high migration to big cities from rural and small cities, finally resulting into the formation of slum settlements in the cities. As per the 2001 Census, a total of 42.6 million people living in 8.2 million households are living in slums of 640 cities/towns spread across 26 states and union territories. The slum population constitutes 23.1 % of the population of the 640 cities/towns reporting slums. Among the states (refer Table 4-2. Rural and urban population (in millions) growth in India (Source: National Institute of Urban Affairs (NIUA) (2001)) Year
Total pop.
Rural pop.
1981 1991 2001
682.9 846.4 1027.4
523.5 628.8 742.0
% Rural pop. 76.7% 74.3% 72.2%
Urban pop. 159.4 217.6 285.4
% Urban pop 23.3% 25.7% 27.8%
Fig. 4-1. Location of States in India (Source: Census of India (2001))
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Fig. 4-1 for location of states in India), Andhra Pradesh has the largest number of cities and towns (77) reporting slum population, followed by Uttar Pradesh (69), Tamil Nadu (63), Maharashtra (61), West Bengal (59), Madhya Pradesh (43) and Gujarat (41). On the other hand, in seven states/union territories, namely, Jammu and Kashmir, Chandigarh, Tripura, Meghalaya, Andaman and Nicobar Islands, Pondicherry and Goa, slums have been reported from less than six towns each. In the remaining states/union territories, the number ranges from six in Uttaranchal to 35 in Karnataka. Fig. 4-3 shows spatial distribution of towns in India having slum population more than 100,000 (1 lakh) in 2001. Slums in the 61 towns of Maharashtra account for 11.2 million people, which is more than one-fourth of the total slum population in the country (Fig. 4-2). This is followed by Andhra Pradesh (5.2 million), Uttar Pradesh (4.4 million), WestBengal (4.1 million) and Tamil Nadu (2.9 million). In fact, these five states account for about two-thirds (65.3%) of the total slum population of the country. Among other states/union territories, in terms of percentage of slum population to the total population of cities/towns reporting slums, Meghalaya has the highest proportion (65.0%), followed by Maharashtra (33.3%), Haryana (33.1%), Andhra Pradesh (32.2%) and Chhattisgarh (31.4%). In Punjab, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, Orissa and Madhya Pradesh, more than 20% of the urban population
Others Tamil Nadu
8%
Punjab
Haryana
3%
3%
Delhi 5%
7%
Rajasthan
Karnataka
3%
3%
Uttar Pradesh 10%
Andhra Pradesh West Bengal
12%
10% Madhya Pradesh 6% Maharashtra
Gujarat
26%
4%
Fig. 4-2. Distribution of slums in different states (Source: Census of India (2001))
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Fig. 4-3. Cities with slum populations exceeding 100,000 people (Source: Census of India (2001))
lives in slums. Kerala (2.0%) has the lowest proportion of urban population living in slums, with Goa (8.3%) and Assam (6.0%) being the only other states with less than 10% of the urban population living in slums.
4.5 Slums in Megacities in India A total of 42.6 million people live in slums of 640 cities spread across the different states and union territories in India. Table 4-3 gives an overview of the distribution of slum population in various sizes of cities. The large urban cities are centers of economic growth and contribute significantly to the GDP of the country. It has been reported that approximately 42% (17.6 (with a population exceeding one million). Rapid and concentrated growth million) of the total slum population in India is living in the megacities of these cities in the post-independence period resulted in regional
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Table 4-3. City population and slum population (Source: Census of India (2001)) City pop㧚 Slum pop. 4 M+ 11.0 M 2-4 M 3.76 M 1-2 M 2.88 M .5 – 1 M 5.81 M .1- .5 M 13.9 M .05 - .1 M 5.1 M TOTAL 42.6 M
Slum pop. share % 26% 8.80% 6.80% 13.70% 32.70% 12.00% 100%
Slum pop. per city 2.20 0.47 0.21 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.07
Table 4-4. Slum Population in Megacities (million plus) (Source: Census of India (2001)) City
Total citySlum population Pop.
Greater Mumbai Delhi Kolkata Chennai Meerut Faridabad Hyderabad Surat Other Million Plus cities TOTAL
12.0 9.9 4.6 4.3 1.1 1.1 3.6 2.4 34.4 73.3
6.5 1.9 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.5 5.0 17.7
Slum Pop. Percentage of City Pop. 54.1% 18.7% 32.5% 18.9% 44.1% 46.5% 17.2% 20.9% 14.4% 24.1%
inequalities that resulted the poor’s migration to these mega centers from small urban centers, especially rural areas, in search of job and livelihood. This along with various other factors resulted in the emergence and growth of slum and squatter settlements, characterized by overcrowding and lack of sanitation and basic infrastructure. On analyzing the megacities situation in the nation, it is in megacities (one million plus cities) where about 41.6% (17.7 million) of the total slum population in the country resides. In absolute numbers, Greater Mumbai has the highest slum population of around 6.5 million, followed by Delhi (1.9 million) and Kolkata (1.5 million) (Table 4-4). The slum areas of Surat, Hyderabad, Chennai and Nagpur have more than half-a-million population each. The concentration of slum population in the large cities is evident from the fact that the Greater Mumbai Municipal Corporation alone accounts for about one-seventh (15.2%) of the total slum population of the
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country and more than one-third (36.6%) of the total slum population of the million-plus cities. Four Municipal Corporations, namely, Greater Mumbai, Kolkata, Delhi and Chennai together account for 25% of the total slum population of the country and around 60% of the total slum population of the million-plus cities. However, slums can be found in every major city of India. Refer to Fig. 4-3 for the location of cities with more than 100,000 slum population. 4.5.1 Caste and Slums In the past, Indian people were classified into castes based on occupational status. With the passage of time, despite the occupational change of a citizen, unfortunately, his/her caste didn’t changed. The same caste system exists today, and scheduled caste (SC) and scheduled tribes (ST) are the two most socio-economically backward castes in India. In spite of special government policies and efforts, the majority of the SC and ST are still living below the poverty line. The majority of the slum dwellers in megacities belong to these castes. Delhi and Mumbai have a combined population of these castes of 0.48 million and 0.44 million respectively. In most of the megacities, the population of the SC and ST exceeds 100,000. In the cities like Nashik, Bangalore, Nagpur, Chennai, Bhopal, more than 30% of the total slum dwellers belongs to these two caste categories (Table 4-5). Table 4-5. Scheduled Caste (SC) and Scheduled Tribe (ST) population (in millions) in slums of million-plus cities (Source: Census of India (2001)) City
SC pop.
Nashik Nagpur Bangalore Bhopal Chennai Jaipur Pune Delhi Meerut Kanpur Hyderabad Surat Faridabad Greater Mumbai Kolkata
0.04 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.27 0.09 0.13 0.48 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.39 0.09
Total ST pop. 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 NST 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 NST 0.06 0.00
SC+ST pop. 0.06 0.26 0.15 0.04 0.27 0.11 0.13 0.48 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.44 0.10
Total slum % pop. SC+ST pop. 0.14 43.9% 0.74 35.1% 0.43 34.1% 0.13 33.3% 0.82 33.1% 0.37 30.0% 0.49 26.5% 1.85 26.1% 0.47 23.6% 0.37 23.1% 0.63 15.8% 0.51 13.0% 0.49 11.8% 6.48 6.8% 1.49 6.4%
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Fig. 4-4. Percentage of child population in slums in million-plus cities (Source: Census of India (2001))
4.5.2 Child Population in the Slums In the majority of the cities a large percentage of the child population is living in unhygienic and unhealthy conditions, exposed to environmental and social hazards. More than six million children are living in slums nationwide, and they constitute 16.4% of the total child population of the urban areas. In other words, every sixth urban child in the country in the age group 0-6 is a slum dweller. Around 2.5 million children aged 0-6 are living in the slum areas of the megacities, which constitutes 27.3% of the total child population of these cities. In Greater Mumbai alone there are 0.86 million slum dwelling children aged 0-6, and another 0.3 million in Delhi and 0.15 million in Kolkata (Fig. 4-4). More than half the child population of Greater Mumbai (62.8%) and Faridabad (50.6%) are living in slum areas, and just below half in Meerut (48.5%) and Kolkata (38.3%). Such a situation raises the question what will be fate of the city be, when the majority of the next generation is living in such deprivation? 4.5.3 Employment in Slums Nationwide about one-third of the slum dwellers have work, which is close to the urban work participation rate (WPR) of 32.3%. Male WPR is high in the megacities, suggestive of excessive male migration for employment. But despite relatively high employment rates, especially in slum areas, the slum dwellers still live in poverty. The reason is that most of them have a
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low literacy level and few technical skills, and so end up in low wage jobs. The low wage jobs include daily labor, domestic help, sweepers, dish cleaners, rickshaw/cart pullers, hawkers, etc. Despite the recognition that slums dwellers are the service providers to non-slum citizens and support them in their daily life, still no effective attempt has been made to improve their quality of life. This issue is discussed next.
4.6 Living Conditions and Infrastructure Status in Slums The following paragraphs will give an overview of the living conditions of slums in India. The analysis below reveals that a majority of slum dwellers are still deprived of basic services. However, the major reasons for such status will be discussed in later paragraphs, which deal with the programs for slum improvement nationwide. 4.6.1 Ownership of Slum Land At the all-India level, about 36% of the notified slums were on private land and 64% on public land. The corresponding estimates for the non-notified slums were very similar, that is, 35% were situated on the private land and 63% on public land. Almost all the slums in urban Orissa and Rajasthan were built on public land. This is also true for the non-notified slums in Punjab and Delhi. On the other hand, all the notified slums in Jammu and authorities. Other public authorities like state governments held the ownership of about 25% of the land (Fig. 4-5). The majority of slums are on public land owned by % notified slums & land ownership
% of non-notified slums & land ownership
not know n 1%
not know n 2%
private 36% private 35% public 63%
public 63%
Fig. 4-5. Land ownership in slums in India (Source: National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (2002))
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government, giving an impression that development projects may be easy to implement; however, this is not the case. The situation is too complex, as land is owned by various departments and agencies within the government framework. For any improvement work, consensus and permission, which is too complex and consumes a lot of time, is required from various departments prior to implementing the program on a specific patch of land. In most cases, due to this complex process and various reasons (such as over ambitious land allocated for another use), development program could not take off. As a result, these land parcels are kept unutilized and vacant, thus providing an opportunity for majority of dwellers to settle down on these vacant public or local government land parcels. The weak management, control of urban land, and over ambitious landuse plan are other major reasons for the formation of slums. 4.6.2 Housing Conditions/Structure The type of structure was classified into three categories, viz., pucca[2], semi-pucca and kutcha[3]. It may be mentioned here that similar information was also collected in the 49th round (1993). The results reveal that improvements in respect to type of slum housing structure have been pronounced during the period from 1993 to 2002. The percentage of slums that had majority of pucca houses, were 30 in 1993, which climbed to 47 in 2002. Again, the said percentage is further higher in the case of notified slums. In about 65% of notified slums and 30% of non-notified slums, the majority of households were living in pucca structures. The variation in the distribution of slums by structures is quite significant across the states. % of notified slums by structure of houses Serviceabl e Katcha 5%
Semi Pucca 30%
Unservicea ble Katch 1%
Pucca 64%
% of non-notified slums by structure of houses Unservice able Katch 10%
Serviceabl e Katcha 20%
Pucca 30%
Semi Pucca 40%
Fig. 4-6. Housing structure in slums (Source: National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (2002))
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In some states like Delhi, Gujarat, West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Maharastra, the proportion of slums with the majority of houses built with pucca materials were very high. On the other hand, urban slums of Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, and Jammu and Kashmir were far behind and the majority of slum houses were either semi-pucca or kutcha (Fig. 4-6). Despite improvement compared to 1993, still 53% of the slum population are living in poor housing. The condition is much worse in non-notified slums. Often tenure rights are considered as a major reason for low investment by dwellers in improving the quality of housing. However, this doesn’t seem to be completely true in the case of India, as the same is observed in many cities. Despite having tenure rights, still the majority of slum dwellers are living in poor housing; however, some have also improved their housing conditions. Another major drawback of poor housing is the ‘Rent Control Law’ in India that often discourages landowners from investing in housing. For example in Mumbai, this has been one the major reasons of poor housing and the mass of slum population (Bertaud et al (2003)). 4.6.3 Major Source of Drinking Water Supply of safe drinking water to all has been one of the commitments in several five-year plans. In 1993 (NSS 49th round survey), about 8% of the urban slums in the country reported ‘well’ and ‘other source’ as the major source of drinking water and the situation did not change much over the period of nearly ten years since then. However, a larger number of slums than in 1993 had the privilege of having drinking water from tap (83%
% of notified slums by source of drinking water
% of non-notified slums by source of drinking water Others 5%
Well 2% Handpump 10%
Others 4%
Well 2%
Handpump 22%
Tap 84%
Tap 71%
Fig. 4-7. Source of drinking water in slums (Source: National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (2002))
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for notified slums and 70% for non-notified slums). State-wise variations is being observed and the situation in slums in the states like Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh and Punjab were much below the national level, where they solely or mainly depended on the sources other than the ‘tap’ (Fig. 4-7). No doubt the status of drinking water is comparatively better than other basic services, but it is doubtful if dwellers are getting enough water supply at convenient timings from conveniently located sources. In general it has been observed that a dweller has to devote almost two to three hours daily in fetching water. 4.6.4 Availability of Toilet/Latrine Facilities In the case of toilet (latrine) facilities, over time the conditions have improved significantly in the slums and the percentage of slums not having any latrine facility dropped sharply from 54% in 1993 to 17% for notified slums and to 51% for non-notified slums in 2002. However, considering the mass of the slum population in the nation, a valiant effort is still required to provide toilets to all. Worst is the case of Orissa (state of India) where none of the slums had any latrine facility, even in 2002. (Fig. 4-8). Non-notified slums are still being neglected and not considered under development program (as discussed in the analysis of policies/programs) where approximately 51% of the population lacks any toilet facilities. Are they not human beings, or do they differ from other notified slum dwellers?
% of notified slums with types of toilets
% of non-notified slums with types of toilets
None 17% Flush 35%
Other 6% None 50% Service 9% Pit 2%
Flush 66%
Other 3%
Pit 7% Service 5%
Fig. 4-8. Toilet dependency in slums in India (Source: National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (2002))
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4.6.5 Roads within Slums and Approach Roads to Slums The structure of the roads/lanes/paths within the slums reveals that about 71% of the notified slums and 37% of the non-notified slums reported having pucca roads within the slums. The corresponding number was 47% in 1993 --- showing a development during the intervening period. This aside, the proportion of slums with pucca approach road/lane/constructed paths to the slum was observed to be 86% for the notified slums and 67% for the non-notified slums, as compared to 74% in 1993 (49th round). The urban slums in many states, viz., Rajasthan, Punjab, Bihar and Orissa, were deprived of this facility. 4.6.6 Availability of Electricity As per the National Sample Survey Organization Report 486, electricity connection in the slums may be of different types, viz. for household use, streetlights, or both. In case of some slums, street lighting was available only in some locations inside or at the boundary of the slums. Such slums were also considered as having electricity connection. It was found that almost all the urban slums were electrified. In fact, electricity connection was not available only in 1% of the notified slums and about 16% of the non-notified slums. Note that in 1993, about 75% of slums had electricity (Fig. 4-9). However, the report does not mention the legality of the electricity connection, as in general it has been observed that the majority of slum dwellers have an illegal connection that is loose, faulty and dangerous and is one of the major causes of fire outbreaks in the slums. % of notified slums with types of None roads in slums
% of non-notified slums with types of roads in slums
Street Only 4%
None 16%
1%
HH & Street 53%
Street Only 6%
HH only 11% HH & Street 84%
HH only 25%
Fig. 4-9. Electricity status in slums in India (Source: National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) (2002))
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4.6.7 Sewerage System and Drainage Facility As the 49th round survey shown in 1993, there was underground sewerage system in 17% of the urban slums and there was no drainage facility in 30% of slums. In 2002, the underground sewerage system did improved and about 30% and 15% of the notified and non-notified slums respectively were estimated to have underground sewerage systems. But still 15% and 44% respectively reported the non-existence of drainage systems in the slums, stating non-development in this sector. In some states, these facilities were practically absent if ‘open’ drains were ignored.
4.7 Poverty Alleviation and Slum Improvement Programs Government urban poverty alleviation initiatives can be summarized and termed in three ‘waves’ (Ramanthan (2005)). Housing was the first wave that started in the 1950s and still continues to be a priority. Social welfare programs constitute the second wave that started with the Urban Community Development program in 1958 and became more popular in the 1960s and 1970s. Credit and employment programs started in 1977 with the extension of the differential rate of interest scheme to the urban poor and became increasingly popular in the 1990s. None of these waves has stopped flowing. All three types of schemes continue to coexist today and are briefly overviewed below: 4.7.1 The Housing Wave x Subsidized Industrial Housing Scheme (SIHS) started in 1952. Provided subsidy on house construction cost to industrial workers with the cooperation of their employers, who were also encouraged to build townships and construct housingfor their workers. x Since all urban poor could not be covered by the SIHS, a separate housing scheme was started for the Economically Weaker Section (EWS) in the same year, and Low Income Group Housing Scheme (LIGHS) was started in 1954. x In 1956, the government introduced the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Programme in six major cities. It could be called more of a beautification programme for the cities where slums were cleared instead of improvement.. The perception of slums and their inhabitants was that they bred unwanted elements. The government activated its power of eminent domain by introducing the Land Acquisition and
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x
x
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Development Scheme (LADS) in 1959 to legitimize clearance of slums, among other reasons. In 1986, the Twenty Point Programme (20PP was primarily a rural program with small urban components) started a trend of merging housing schemes with other schemes like education, sanitation, and water supply in larger programs. The Nehru Rozgar Yojana–Scheme for employment through Housing and Shelter Upgradation (NRY-SHASU (1989)), Prime Minister’s Integrated Urban Poverty Eradication Programme (PMI-UPEP (1995)), National Slum Development Programme (NSDP (1996)), and Valmiki Ambedkar Malin Basti Awas Yojana (VAMBAY (2001)) followed this trend by having a housing component among other objectives. Soon after International Year of Shelter for the Homeless (IYSH) in 1987, the UN adopted the Global Shelter Strategy (GSS) in November 1988. This strategy urged governments of all nations to prepare a detailed national housing policy. The Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) prepared a draft policy that was discussed at the Urban Development and Housing Minister’s Conference in October 1990, endorsed by the state governments and the Parliament to be finalized and adopted in August 1994 as the National Housing Policy (NHP). The earlier housing policy of 1988 aimed at providing ‘adequate’ shelter to all, as compared to this policy that aimed at providing ‘access’ to shelter for all. It recognized the shortfall in government efforts to provide housing and thus invited the private sector to actively participate in facilitating access to housing through various fiscal and other incentives. This policy was further modified and presented in 1998. The new policy treats housing on par with infrastructure. It introduces a National Shelter Fund to be set up for housing the urban poor and a Risk Fund to cover risks in financing the rural and urban poor. It recognizes the needs of single and working women with regard to housing. Currently, all housing related policies are aligned with the 1998 National Housing and Habitat Policy (NHHP)
4.7.2 The Welfare Wave The initiation of the Urban Basic Services (UBS) program in 1986 was a major step towards change in the perception of urban poverty. From being viewed as a single sector problem of housing, urban poverty began to be perceived as a multi-sector problem. At the behest of the National Commission on Urbanisation (NCU (1988)), this program was revised and
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launched as Urban Basic Services for the Poor (UBSP) with three main objectives: 1. Effective achievement of social sector goals by introducing innovations to be cost effective. 2. Community organization, mobilization and empowerment. 3. Convergence of all urban poverty programs like EIUS, Nehru Rozgar Yojana, and Low Cost Sanitation (LCS) through sustainable support systems. 4.7.3 The Credit Wave x The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) expanded the coverage of its Differential Rate of Interest (DRI) scheme to include the urban poor. As part of this scheme, commercial banks were expected to advance 0.33% of their total advances as subsidized credit on easy terms to the urban poor. Women were declared as beneficiaries for an income generating scheme of the Urban Community Development program in 1958. x The economic contribution of women and their role as income generators is recognized only in 1986 in programs like Support to Training and Employment Programme for Women (STEP) or the Urban Basic Services program. x This was then followed by the Report of the National Commission for Self-Employed Women and Women in the Informal Sector (1988), Nehru Rozgar (employment) Yojana (Scheme/program) (1989), Urban Basic Services for the Poor (UBSP), Prime Minister’s Rozgar (employment) Yojana (PMRY (1993)), Prime Minister’s Integrated Urban Poverty Eradication Programme (PMI-UPEP (1995)), National Slum Development Programme (NSDP (1996)), and Swarna Jayanti Shahari Rozgar Yojana (SJSRY (1997)).
4.8 Programs towards Slum Improvement As per the discussion above, the majority of programs focused on employment and poverty eradication. However, since 1986 onwards attention was given to slum improvement, and in 1996 a specific program was drafted towards slum improvement. The following paragraphs will analyze the two major programs/policies that deal with slum dwellers in India, and conclude that the programs need to be more effective and sustainable if slums are really to be improved or controlled at a national level.
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4.8.1 The National Slum Development Program (NSDP)
The National Slum Development Program (NSDP) was launched in 1996. Annually, the program provides about Rs. 300 crores in assistance. The objective of NSDP is to provide adequate and satisfactory water supply, sanitation, education facilities, health care, housing and environmental improvement through the creation of sustainable support systems. Though the scheme is ‘slum-sensitive’ and targets funds to those states with the most pressing slum clusters, but it is highly subsidized without much or any contribution from beneficiaries. The one of major drawbacks of NSDP is that it does not target illegal slums or non-notified slums in cities. The non-notified slums settlements as per the National Sample Survey Organization (NSS) 58th Round Report, 2002 are 25,000, as compared to notified slums which are approximately 27,000 settlements. This means in actuality, the NSDP program is targeting only 50% of the slum settlements. Under this program, until 2004 approximately Rs. 2475 corers has been released for the development of slums. The investment did not correspond to slum population and varies per year in the nation. The investment seems to be on an ad-hoc basis that reflects the lack of systematic approach for any slum improvement (Fig. 410). Considering the 42.6-million slum population (in actuality it may be more, as these figures are from 640 cities in India), it comes to an investment of approximately Rs.[4] 580 per slum dweller for development purposes. This amount has been disbursed over eight years, meaning Rs. 72 per slum dweller per year has been invested for development purposes (Fig. 4-11). The actual amount per slum dweller is much less, as the funds also include administrative and others expenditures. With the government’s limited financial resources, such a low level of investment will not be able to tackle the problems of 42 million slum dwellers. Actually, whatever efforts are made using the government’s limited resources to reduce the slum population or development slums is nullified by the rapid growth of slum population. As a program is also highly subsidized (free land, free basic amenities etc), it raises questions about its sustainability and replicablity. It is therefore required to look for some other sustainable approaches that may benefit all. A financial contribution approach, i.e. contributions from beneficiaries, local governments and the private sector need to be mobilized.
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㪈㪋㪇 㪈㪉㪇
㫀㫅㩷㪤㫀㫃㫃㫀㫆 㫅
㪈㪇㪇 㪏㪇 㪍㪇 㪋㪇 㪉㪇 㪇 㪇㪋㪄㪄㪇㪌
㪇㪊㪄㪄㪇㪋
㪇㪉㪄㪄㪇㪊
㪇㪈㪄㪄㪇㪉
㪇㪇㪄㪄㪇㪈
㪐 㪐㪄 㪄 㪇 㪇
㪐㪏㪄㪄㪐㪐
㪐 㪎㪄 㪄 㪐 㪏
㪐㪍㪄㪄㪐㪎
㪰 㪼 㪸㫉
㪠㫅㫍㪼 㫊㫋㫄 㪼 㫅㫋㩷㩿㪙 㫌 㪻㪾㪼㫋㪀㩷㫀㫅 㩷㫄 㫀㫃㫃㫀㫆㫅 㩷㪬 㪪㩻
㪪㫃㫌㫄 㩷㪧㫆 㫇㫌㫃㪸㫋㫀㫆㫅 㩷㫀㫅㩷㪤 㫀㫃㫃㫀㫆㫅 㫊
㪬㪪㩻㩷㩿㪈㪬㪪㩻㪄㩷㪩㫊㪅㪌㪇㪀
Fig. 4-10. Investment and slum population growth in India (Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Town and Country Planning Organisation (TCPO) (1996)) 㪉㪅㪇㪇 㪈㪅㪏㪇 㪈㪅㪍㪇 㪈㪅㪋㪇 㪈㪅㪉㪇 㪈㪅㪇㪇
㪇㪋㪄㪄㪇㪌
㪇㪊㪄㪄㪇㪋
㪇㪉㪄㪄㪇㪊
㪇㪈㪄㪄㪇㪉
㪇㪇㪄㪄㪇㪈
㪐㪐㪄㪄㪇㪇
㪐㪏㪄㪄㪐㪐
㪐㪎㪄㪄㪐㪏
㪐㪍㪄㪄㪐㪎
㪇㪅㪏㪇 㪇㪅㪍㪇 㪇㪅㪋㪇 㪇㪅㪉㪇 㪇㪅㪇㪇
㪰㪼㪸㫉㩷
Fig. 4-11. Investment per slum dweller (Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation)
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Constraints and Recommendations
x Technical: NSDP is infrastructure-oriented, which leads to alienation of individuals and poor community participation. The scheme has a spatial concept, but does not correctly identify the urban poor. Non-notified, that is, illegal slums, are not included, and there is insufficient technical staffing. There is a need to develop an accurate database for slums with agreed ‘slum indicators,’ and develop a fair policy for improvement and de-notification of slums. x Managerial and Institutional: There is limited technical, managerial and financial capacity, and too many schemes overburden urban local bodies. There is confusion between implementing ministries, and a lack of effective monitoring. It is required to develop comprehensive micro/macro slum plans at local levels and improve governance and transparency of decision making, and establish effective inter-agency coordination for all urban poor schemes. x Financial: Cost recovery as conceived is not happening, and there is inadequate financial management and infrequent audits. The gaps in funding cause frustrations in active urban local bodies, and allocations do not match requirements. There is a need to introduce a concept of user charges for quality services and schemes for cost recovery need to be an integral part of project design. The loan/grant component must be adjusted to the status of slums, and in no case should there be less than 30% contribution from the worst slums or poorest dwellers. 4.8.2 Valmiki Ambedkar Awas Yojana (VAMBAY) Valmiki Ambedkar Awas Yojana (VAMBAY), initiated in 2001, was designed to address housing deficits for the urban poor. It provides about Rs. 300 crores[5] of annual assistance to designated state agencies, who then determine beneficiaries and monitor implementation. This is a centrally sponsored scheme with a matching contribution from state government, though in general for housing purposes, beneficiaries are expected to contribute approximately 10% of the total cost. However, this contribution is also very limited and in most cases due to lack of administrative will and negligence, this meager contribution is never made. One of the drawbacks of the VAMBAY program is that it is also meant for notified slums only. Though this program is based on the matching funds, still it is highly subsidized as 50% is granted as a subsidy to the beneficiaries plus land is also provided by the state government. With limited financial resources and such a high subsidy, it is nearly impossible to target the country’s 42-
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million slum population. This scheme also targets notified slums only, thus neglecting a majority of slum dwellers living in non-notified slums. As per the NSS 58th Report in 2002, out of the total houses, approximately four million of the houses in slums (notified and non-notified slums) are either semi-pucca or kutcha and need immediate improvement. From 2001 through 2006 approximately 0.44 million dwelling units were targeted under the VAMBAY scheme, i.e. approximately 0.1 million targets per year (Table 4-6). With this target rate, and assuming that there will not be any rise in the slum population, which is unlikely to happen, it will take more than 35 additional years to improve the condition of the dwelling units. Apart from the issues mentioned above, the non-utilization of allocated resources by state government is another major factor of slow progress. States like Punjab and Bihar did not utilize funds as allocated during 200206 for housing improvement (Fig. 4-12). Such meager efforts and noninitiative approaches will backlash the hopes of any slum improvement in the nation. Table 4-6. Subsidies for housing (VAMBAY) (Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation) Subsidy released (Rs. in Lakhs*1)) 6867.4 19329.3 23518.0 26935.7 16713.4 93363.7
Year 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 Total
No. of DUs targeted for construction/upgradation 25280 105444 108172 112143 91330 442369
1) 1 Lakh = 100,000, 1US$= Rs. 43 (approx)
㪊㪌㪇㪇
㫀㫅㩷㪣㪸㫂㪿㫊㩷㪩㫊㪅
㪊㪇㪇㪇 㪉㪌㪇㪇 㪉㪇㪇㪇 㪈㪌㪇㪇 㪈㪇㪇㪇 㪌㪇㪇 㪇 㪙㫀㪿㪸㫉㩷 㪘㫃㫃㫆㫋㪼㪻㩷㪇㪉㪄㪇㪍
㪠㫅㪻㫀㪸㫅㩷㪪㫋㪸㫋㪼㫊
㪧㫌㫅㫁㪸㪹㩷 㪬㫋㫀㫃㫀㫑㪼㪻㩷㪇㪉㪄㪇㪍
Fig. 4-12. Non utilization of funds by States (VAMBAY) (Source: Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation)
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Recently a study conducted to evaluate programs for the poor and slums based on five parameters, i.e. target, efficiency, transparency, administrative simplicity and sustainability, gave a the lowest rating to NSDP and VAMBAY as compared to other programs nationwide (Buckley et al (2007)).
4.9 Conclusion Approximately 23% of the urban population (640 cities) live in slum areas, of which 42% live in million-plus cities. This higher concentration of slum population in the large urban centers reflects the possible outcome of regional disparity among the various regions. 9.8 million persons over age seven (3.8 million males and 6 million females) are illiterate, giving literacy rates of 80.7% for males and 64.4% for females. This is indicative of the types of human resources in the slums. However, if a formal education of 10 to 12 years is considered the standard for literacy, or say reasonable education, than very small numbers will fall into this group. Another characteristic of the slum population is that the proportion of the Scheduled Castes population is quite high in the slums and reflects the negative effect of the caste system, as Scheduled Castes and Schedule Tribes are considered to be the most backward caste in India. There are over six million children (0-6 age group) living in the nation’s slums in unhealthy hygienic conditions, which are not conducive for their growth and development. The scenario of children in the large metropolitan cities of Greater Mumbai, Delhi and Kolkata is that every second or third child in the city is a slum dweller. With such a scenario, it is nearly to impossible to achieve a target of becoming a developed nation by 2020, as stated in the national document Vision 2020. The infrastructure status in the slums reflects comparatively a slightly better situation as compared with 1993. However, the results still seem unsatisfactory, as the majority of slums lack access to basic amenities. Though a majority of the slums have access to safe water sources, still it is doubtful whether access is enough, as it has been observed that lot of effort and time is consumed in fetching water from these sources. Women and children suffer in the majority of the cases. Toilet facilities are still very severe, as the majority of slum dwellers employ open defecation, or are still dependent on the evil practice of hand collection of human waste (scavengers). Most of the slums report having access to electricity, but the method of tapping electricity is doubtful as in general illegal tapping (free) from major electric lines passing along the slums is a common practice.
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Drainage conditions are also poor in the majority of slums. Housing conditions are also non-habitable, as the majority of the housing structures are non-pucca, or in other words are not able to meet minimum structural requirements. However, the conditions of notified slums are found to be much better as compared to non-notified slums, which reflects the consideration for improvement once slums are notified. Non-notified slums are still not recognized, and are often ignored for improvement/development by major programs. Another critical aspect is land management, as the majority of slums exist on vacant government (central, state or local government) land, reflecting weak administration and land management. In general, the non-utilization of these vacant lands and weak management provides free spaces and promotes poor migrants to establish themselves at no cost. With such a huge mass of population reported living in slums in India, there is an urgent need to reconsider our approach toward these slum settlements. As discussed, the majority live in megacities, which calls for a better and more effective approach. Large numbers of dwellers are still deprived of minimum basic services and are living without access to safe water, sanitation, housing and other amenities, especially the dwellers living in non-notified slums. The past polices/programs and approaches as discussed above were not able to provide a complete solution to this gigantic problem. To add to it, the programs did not focus on non-notified slums, which are significant in numbers and need to be addressed. The programs for slum improvement were non-effective and are non-sustainable, as these programs are highly subsidized and were only able to target a very limited number of slums. With limited financial resources, there is a need to look for better approaches. Public and private sector participation in slum improvement programs, along with contributions from beneficiaries, will assist in combating and improving the dwellers’ lives. This will take away some burden from government and may be able to resolve the mammoth issue of slums in a developing nation like India.
Notes [1] [2]
India is divided into various regions comprising 28 States and 7 Union Territories (Ref. Fig. 4-1). A pucca structure was one having walls and roofs made of “survey, cement, concrete, oven burnt bricks, hollow cement/ash bricks, stone, stone blocks, jack boards (cement plastered reeds), iron, zinc or other metal sheets, timber, tiles, slate, corrugated iron, asbestos cement sheet, veneer, plywood, artificial wood of synthetic material and poly vinyl chloride (PVC) material.
102 [3] [4] [5]
Vijay Neekhra A structure having walls and roof made of non-pucca materials like unburned bricks, bamboo, mud, grass, leaves, reeds, thatch, etc. Indian Currency denoted as Rupees (Rs) 1US$= Rs. 43 (approximately) 1 Crore =10 million and 1 Lakh = 100,000
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Payne, G. (2004) “Land tenure and property rights: an introduction”, Habitat International, 28(2) Planning Commission (2003) Report of the Steering Committee on Urban Development, Urban Housing and Urban Poverty for the Tenth Five Year Plan (2002-2007) Pugh, C. (1997) “Poverty and progress? Reflections on housing and urban policies in developing countries, 1976-96”, Urban Studies, 34(10) Pugh, C. (2000) “Sustainability of squatter settlements” in Pugh, C. Sustainable cities in developing countries. Earthscan Pugh, C. (2001) “The theory and practice of housing sector development for developing countries”, Housing Studies, 16 (4) Rakodi, C. (2001) “Forget planning, put politics first? Priorities for urban management in developing countries”, International Journal of Earth Observation and Geoinformation, 3 Ramesh, R. (2005) Urban Poverty Alleviation (National Conference, Srinagar, India) Robert, B.M., Mahavir, S. and Jerry, K. (2007) “Strategizing Slum Improvement in India: A Method to Monitor and Refocus Slum Development Programs”, Global Urban Development, 3(1) Santiago, A.M. (1987) “San Martin de Porres: a case study of squatter settlement upgrading in Metro Manila”, Regional Development Dialogue, 8(4) Sehgal, R.L. (ed) (1998) Slum upgradation. Emerging issue and policy implementation's. Bookwell Publications Town and Country Planning Organisation (TCPO) (1996) A Compendium on Indian Slums 1996 United Nations Center for Human Settlements (UNCHS) (1996) An Urbanizing World: Global Report on Human Settlements 1996, Oxford University Press van der Linden, J. (1986) The sites and services approach reviewed. Gower Publishing Co. Werlin, H. (1999) “Slum Upgrading Myth”, Urban Studies, 36(9) World Bank (1993) Housing: Enabling Market to Work World Bank (1994) Twenty years of lending for urban development, 1972-92 Report No 13117 World Bank (1995) Indonesia: impact evaluation report: enhancing the quality of life in urban Indonesia: the legacy of Kampung Improvement Program Report 4747-IND World Bank (2000) World Development Report World Bank (2003) Slum upgrading and participation: Lessons from Latin America Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, http://mhupa.gov.in/programs/upa/nsdp/vambay.htm (Accessed in 2007)
5. Identifying Housing Conditions in Bogota, Colombia: A Strategy to Deal with Risks
Francesco Ambrosi Filardi
5.1 Location, Population and Political-Administrative Organization The Special District of Bogota, capital of the Republic of Colombia, was founded in 1538 and is located in the western branch of the Andean range of mountains, on a plateau 2,600 m above sea level. Bogota's total area amounts to 201,966 ha (8% of the whole Savannah of Bogota), 23.4% of which is urban territory with 6,763,325 inhabitants that represent 16.3% of Colombia's total population, according to the 2005 official census. Since the 1993 census, the population has grown 37%. A significant part of this growth is due to the gradual and persistent arrival of new forcefully displaced people from rural areas. These people see in the capital city the possibility of finding a better standard of living. In the forthcoming 20 years an increase of 4,500,000 million inhabitants has been estimated in the Savannah of Bogota. About 2,500,000 of them will settle down in Bogota. Furthermore, most of these people will not have enough economic means to survive and, therefore, will occupy marginal areas of the city. Administratively speaking, the city is divided into 20 localities. Each one of them is run by a local mayor, appointed by the main city mayor, and counts with a popularly elected local council. Only one of these localities is exclusively rural.
5.2 Urban Growth In 1919, Bogota occupied 892 ha, with a density ratio of 149 people/ha. Today, the urban territory comprises 47,269 ha with 143 people/ha.
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Fig. 5-1. Occupation in 1990
Bogota grew from 56 ha per year in the first 40 years of the 1900s to 581 ha per year in the last decade of the 20th century. Thus, land in Colombia's capital city has suffered an irrational occupation, privileging individual decisions as opposed to official urban planning. The use of land for commerce, services, and industry has displaced people to both relegated and privileged outskirts of the city. Problems linked to urban marginalization are reflected in an uneven distribution of income and a rapidly growing density of the urban population. These problems are worsened by the system's own restrictions to guarantee access to land, housing, and employment. Therefore, 18% of the urban land (8,500 ha) has been developed illegally, and 1,415 neighborhoods have 415,000 lots at various and often unfinished stages of construction. As a result of this illegal urbanization and spontaneous growth, about 134,000 families do not hold any title of land ownership and around 14,000 families have settled themselves in high-risk areas. Furthermore, popular sectors have become physically and spatially segregated, as they have found difficulties to access and connect with urban services. In addition, this sector of society has had to spend more time and pay higher costs for transportation to their working places than people who occupy officially recognized sectors of the city. Moreover, there is a notorious lack of
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public spaces for recreation, green areas, and public infrastructure such as schools, health centers, nurseries, etc. In short, all these pitfalls can be translated as follows: -
Lack of public utility services Indicators of a very low standard of living. Long and cumbersome processes of legalization to become part of the officially recognized city and its infrastructure. Settlement of urban developments in high-risk areas. Harm to strategic ecosystems. Generation of risks out of inappropriate procedures in urbanization processes.
Additionally, the increasing construction of housing in these spontaneously developed neighborhoods has had, and still carries, negative effects, first of all, on the stability of such houses, and second, on urban regulations of territorial organization. The city intends to implement such regulations in the following cases: -
Residential sectors in constant process of consolidation. Construction processes out of formal technical parameters. Tendency to irrational density. Increasingly vulnerable housing to seismic activity. Higher fiscal and budgetary vulnerability of the city.
Since the 1970s and 1980s, the city took large-scale actions such as the Integrated Program of Urban Development in the Western Section of Bogota (IPUDWSB) and Bolivar Citadel neighborhood. With resources mainly gained from foreign credits, these programs were carried out in peripheral territories, recognizing the problems of marginalization and social segregation.
5.3 The Territorial Organization Plan (TOP) “...The TOP recognizes and understands two simultaneous conditions of urban quality in the built city. The planned, organized, and efficient city on the one hand, and the spontaneous, disarticulated, and underequipped city on the other, became the Administrative Department of District Planning's (ADDP) pivotal point reflection in Bogota as such Department proposed the Territorial Organization Plan (TOP). Such plan held as a hypothesis that the positive effects generated by the efficient city should permeate and change the precarious conditions of the
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informal city when the initiatives and efforts of citizens and their organizations were put into effect...”[1] When TOP recognized this reality, it established the following: -
Citizens' participation processes. Opportunities to reach consensus through joining efforts and unifying wills. Construction of public spaces and infrastructure as the basis of a collective project. Creation of a well balanced, just, and efficient city. Planning processes at different scales to develop the city and take care of it.
In the year 2000, after some programs had been implemented in order to solve the problems and seek comprehensive improvement of marginal sectors of the city, TOP adopted a polycentric model for Bogota. This model intended to shorten distances for access to jobs and services. It also sought an organized growth of the periphery, and the densification of residential areas in the northern and southern ends of the city. TOP then establishes projects in the medium and long run, as well as procedural norms regarding (1) patrimony, (2) housing, (3) urban restoration, (4) ecologically efficient production, and (5) structuring programs such as housing and strategic operations. Specifically, for the housing program, TOP establishes the following objectives to guarantee attention to demand and to quantitative and qualitative urban housing deficit for the poorest population: -
Facilitate good quality for urban land. Propose alternative markets. Carry out the comprehensive improvement program. Run a Living Policy from the District.
and in it, to run the collateral program of improvement. This subprogram seeks inclusion, efficiency and productivity as part of its major objectives. Such objectives are achieved through urban programs such as those of Comprehensive Improvement of Neighborhoods, and Identification and Improvement of Housing and Resettlement. Thus, vulnerable and peripheral areas can obtain the expected standard of living for the city. All of the above was possible thanks to three fundamental State Laws: (1) The Urban Reform Law 9 from 1989, (2) the Law 152 from 1994 through which the Development Plan's Organic Law was established, and (3) especially the Law 388 from 1997, known as the territorial organization law, through which municipalities have been demanded to enact their
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respective Territorial Organization Plans. In Bogota, particularly, this measure is enforced through Decree 190 from 200, successively modified by Decree 469 from 2003. Since Bogota has recognized its own problems in marginalized neighborhoods, the last four administrative periods of mayors in office (13 years) have permanently invested funds in the improvement of such territories. Thus, substantial steps have been taken to learn how to face problems: From the territorially marked solutions given in the 1970s and 1980s, Bogota moved to define the areas where it would implement its actions. In TOP, these areas were identified as Units of Zonal Planning or UZP's of Comprehensive Improvement, where the various entities from the district need to prioritize and coordinate action plans. The number of improvements has kept growing in the last few years. For example, the city has moved from programs to public policies; from counter-marginalization of neighborhoods to the Comprehensive Improvement Plan (CIP); from individual assistance in every lot to largescale real estate operations; from neighborhood assistance to Comprehensive Urban Operations, related to Zonal Planning; from Uncoordinated Institutional Actions to Coordinated Policies in various sectors of the territory. All of the above is encompassed within an action framework that seeks to accomplish the following objectives: -
To reduce vulnerability To provide assistance in the built city. To regenerate a propitious habitat. To maintain the city's sustainability.
Fig. 5-2. Actions, policies, programs and projects by TOP
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The actions, policies, programs, and projects that TOP establishes can be summarized in Fig. 5-2. A quite representative example of a scheduled growth can be found in New Usme Urban Operation. It is part of the Territorial Organization Plan as a strategic and comprehensive urban operation. It is important for the following reasons: 1. It aims at a definite construction of a city borderline in the southwestern side of Bogota. Such an urban boundary would serve as a transition point to obtain a new and not concentrated pattern of territorial occupation. Thus, illegal urbanization would be halted, and farmers, as well as areas with a special ecological value for the supply and regulation of water in the region and other environmental services, would be protected.[2] 2. This objective should be accomplished in one of the areas of the city that is most vulnerable to illegal urbanization. Thus, the main strategy intends to improve the design of operational mechanisms to tackle and solve once and for all the actions promoted by pirate developers. The strategy also recognizes the logic under which the popular city functions so that better living conditions and social cohesion are achieved. The incidence of this strategy would not be as great in the district's budget as it would be in that of the programs of legalization and neighborhood improvement. 3. It comprises improving regional road networks (with Orinoquia and Venezuela) and promoting the localization of industrial, agricultural, and services activities in order to generate employment along with housing supply. 4. Lastly, the operation has already been conceived, and it is being developed by the district's administration as a pilot model to apply in a comprehensive way the land-management instruments to which the Law 388 from 1997 refers. The pilot model would help qualify urbanization practices of public and private actors in the region, demonstrating that the same urban operations may generate resources to provide infrastructure, public services, and public spaces by reallocating generated added values. The main element of the operation lies in the application of a number of planning and managing instruments which guarantee that the urban projects themselves become responsible for the costs of land, road infrastructure, public services and spaces, as well as local urban costs, charging land owners, public or private investors, or both, as a retribution for having assigned to the land its respective urban use according to the law. In this way, urbanization processes will significantly reduce its pressures upon
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Fig. 5-3. Landuse plan (New Usme Urban Operation)
public budgets, and the land market will be increasingly regulated. As a result, the real estate and construction businesses will be more seriously involved in these urban projects. In the particular case of New Usme Operation, focused on priority lowincome housing supply and its basic complementary public services, the strategy gets ahead of the illegal urbanization through public investment in road networks and utility services[3] in order to avoid future overcharges such as the ones that occurred in programs such as the Comprehensive Improvement of Neighborhoods, and to obtain land for housing programs, in exchange of such investments and the allocation of land for urban development, especially urbanized lots for better housing. Thus, an important transformation is being proposed for urbanization processes. The state strengthens its role as a regulator of the land market while controlling in an effective way the illegal supply of pirate urban developers. The state can accomplish these conditions when offering competitive urbanized land, both in price and quality, optimizing public investments in infrastructure as a key ingredient of social policy on housing. As a result, people can attain a sense of belonging and build community with better living conditions. On the other hand, through its operational strategies, TOP seeks to connect “…urban actions, instruments of urban management, economic interventions, and social measures in special areas of the city. These areas are considered essential to consolidate in the short, medium, and long run the organization strategy….In addition, their purpose is to channel investment
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resources so that they can be included in the respective executive program of each administration.”[4] In this way, for instance, in the Macro-Project of the Tunjuelo River, measures to be taken in ecological circuits are defined in detail, as well as the projects to repair and construct the local road network -especially in the Corridors of Local Mobility-, the identification of public infrastructure systems, and the measures taken in the central points that identify such portions of territory, complying to TOP mandatory regulations.
5.4 The Comprehensive Improvement of Neighborhoods Program The Comprehensive Improvement of Neighborhoods Program works at two levels: one social, and the other one territorial. In turn, these two fronts are tackled under two linked strategies. First, the strategy of civil participation aims to increase the social capital, the democratic awareness, and the capacity of collective involvement in people's own processes. The second strategy, of inter-institutional and strengthening of local measures, promotes the improvement of already-built houses in order to take care of the qualitative deficit related to structural conditions, infrastructural deficiencies, family one-room overcrowding, and poor housing and living conditions. The program defines the following objectives: -
Urban organization Improvement of physical, environmental, and legal deficiencies. 㨚Inhabitants' accessibility to the urban standard of living defined for the entire city.
Likewise, the District's Planning Department (DPD) adopts by decree the model of urban structure and regulations for the 28 Units of Comprehensive Improvement of Zonal Planning. Furthermore, the DPD defines strategies of housing and urban planning, institutional coordination and operation, participation, prevention, and control. At the same time, the entities in charge of operational actions in each program are assigned. For example, the institutional function of the Popular Housing Fund is to develop, coordinate, and manage urban projects that would improve the living conditions of the population from the informal city, and is in charge of the following projects: - Re-settlement of the population intends (1) to assist the population that inhabits high risk areas identified by the Board of Emergency Prevention and Assistance, (2) to safeguard their lives, and (3) to
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Fig. 5-4. Houses without complying with construction regulations (Source: Caja de Vivienda)
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strengthen the district's measures to prevent and control the growth of illegal developments. Legal documentation of land ownership in legal developments. In addition to complying with urban obligations, it will allow to move forward safely and efficiently in the improvement of urban life standards for popular sectors of society. Improvement of housing conditions in order to develop permanent processes of technical assistance to the population on the living and constructive quality of housing. Thus, people's right to enjoy a decent life and shelter would be guaranteed.
The houses that were built in Bogota without complying with construction regulations were first identified in 2001.[5] The design of technical procedures facilitated the characterization and standardization of structural solutions for houses built up to two floors with a light roof.[6] To start with, it was recognized that whatever was built by the people without governmental support required a specific set of regulations. Hands are put on the mitigation of housing vulnerability, trying to update precariously built houses to the Colombian code of anti-seismic constructions from a technical point of view, following procedures and studies that begin assessing the level of vulnerability of houses and figuring out how to reduce such vulnerability gradually[7]. Initiatives arise from these procedures and technical proposals in order to establish applicable norms in which the identifi-
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cation of perilous houses as part of the strategies of risk management in the city, keeping in mind the following priority[8]: -
To protect the life and the patrimony of the most vulnerable population and reduce the fiscal risk of the city if a seismic event may occur[9].
Aside from this, other measures are also taken in order to improve the living conditions of inhabitants that acknowledge the social incidence of housing. To fulfil these objectives, a normative and institutional framework was designed in order to (1) assist families technically and socially in their constructive process; (2) develop methodologies to diagnose and determine technical solutions; (3) create training and wide-spread communication processes for the population that would become the recipient of institutionalized and safe construction practices. A fundamental part of the project used systems of information that allowed establishing proper conditions of already built lands. Building conditions were identified at four levels: empty territories, territories with some type of construction, territories with one-floor and light roof construction, with solid roof, with walls up to a second floor, with light roof, and so on and so forth up to the identification of territories with five slabs. This information is geo-referenced in more than 500,000 private lots and, depending on such conditions, we are designing technical alternatives to gradually reduce housing vulnerability. These technical alternatives depend on the conditions of each house; however, a unique methodology of assessment and diagnosis was created. In addition solutions for structural elements were unified to reduce housing vulnerability. GIS allows one to plan interventions by sectioning out the territory with cross information about -
threat zones micro-zoning capacity to afford assistance in networks of public utility services, mobility, public space, and infrastructure.
Furthermore, GIS facilitates the incorporation of planning practices in order not only to take actions on the land itself, but also to widen the range of action of technical assistance at higher levels such as blocks, neighborhoods, or bigger areas, allowing as a result: -
to re-adjust territories to take better advantage of potential building conditions according to regulations.
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To incorporate state agents in order to establish real estate projects with inhabitants, thus facilitating the consolidation of houses in a safer and more efficient way. The poorest population would, therefore, profit itself from urban rents. To reduce pressures over rural areas by generating opportunities and consolidation policies in the areas that the population itself constructs.
Another aspect of the project is focused on the development of a construction standard to recognize this reality, taking as a starting point people's right to allege that whatever is built by themselves cannot be considered vulnerable only because it does not follow the parameters of formal construction --- construction standards that are being developed with the support of the seismic national commission. Thanks to this process of housing identification it has been possible to realize the real scope of the problem, prioritizing assistance in houses up to two floors with light roofs, which represent approximately 44.61% of such housing. Then assistance would focus on two-floor constructions with roofed slab, representing 24.15%. The idea is to improve at least 70% of the existing houses.
Fig. 5-7. Level of consolidation of comprehensive urban operations related to zonal planning
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Complying with Architectonical Conditions - Light, Ventilation, Quality of spaces: Depend on area and minimum side of patio Complying with Urban Conditions - Minimum area of private land: Meets 94.98% of conditions - Minimum side of private land: Meets 96.59% of conditions - Minimum area of patio: Meets 31.53% of conditions - Minimum area of private land: Meets 94.98% of conditions - Minimum side of patio: Meets 22.69% of conditions - Uses: Housing 86.35% Complying with Structural Conditions - Vertical structure: Meets 2.61% - Diaphragm: Meets 2.61% - Level of vulnerability: Low 8.86%, medium 22.16%, medium low 0.28%, medium high 8.03%, high 39.98%, very high 1.39% Fig. 5-8. Goals for the present period in office (2004-2008)
The public administration is making efforts to invest in these houses. Insufficient resources have been the only great limitation. Thus, the objectives in mind have not been enough to solve the problem quickly. For the present period in office (2004-2008), the goal is to assist 10,000 houses. This situation is worrisome because the level at which houses in popular sectors are consolidated grows progressively. Along with the availability of utility services and infrastructure, the delay in housing intervention does not allow owners to make rapid and economically viable changes to their dwellings. The actions that the administration has taken recognize the architectural (i.e., light, ventilation, quality of spaces, etc.) state of housing in the first place, but they also recognize the acceptance of urban laws (i.e., minimum area of land, minimum side lengths, and minimum length of internal patios, cantilever, etc.) and the observance of structural regulations: vertical structure, diaphragm, and their level of vulnerability. Due to these conditions, adjustments to the existing norms have had to be made in order to facilitate housing interventions to gradually reduce risks before natural threats (floods, seismic activity, avalanches, etc.) to recognize the legal status of houses. The structural actions that have been taken recognize in the first place the criteria of technical and social assistance to the community depending on the conditions and level of vulnerability of each house. The assistance determines (1) how to reduce risks gradually, (2) the costs of interventions and how to finance them, and (3) the duration of such financial and techni-
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cal assistance. Priority is given to empty lots, to empty houses, and to twofloored houses with light roofs. The other types of housing (two-floors and slab-roof or more) have only received normative guidelines and instruments to facilitate legalization. The community has also been trained and instructed as to how to ask for and receive financial aid and technical assistance in order to improve housing conditions. A lot still has to be done. This is a process in which, unfortunately, the informal development of housing keeps growing without being able to stop it despite all the policies and instruments of land management that the administration has given to the economically depressed sectors of society.We must continue forward, defining new housing standards. From a structural point of view, 'acceptable' levels of vulnerability and anti-seismic standards ought to be defined. From the urban and architectural point of view, we need to be prone to implement the new regulations and establish new parameters to be able to recognize the reality of popular developments. All these normative actions need to be revised to make some city rights effective.
Notes [1]
[2]
[3]
[4] [5] [6]
[7] [8]
Workshop on Urban Procedures in Peripheral areas. Bogota, DC, 2001. Memoirs. Clemencia Escallon, vice director of ADDP's Regional Expansion and Organization. T.O.P.'s initial calculations on population for this zone, about 500,000 inhabitants, have been reduced to a maximum of 300,000. The expansion land has been reduced from 1,000 ha to 794 ha. In the case of illegal occupations, owners do not tend to assume charges on urbanization processes. For example, owners do not give back the illegally occupied land for public use, nor do they invest in infrastructure even though they are legally obliged to do it. Clause No. 25 from Decree 190 from 2004. T.O.P. compiled. This project began as part of a program of international cooperation between the European Union and Bogota's main mayor office. These houses are identified with a special code: "E" in the Colombian code of anti-seismic constructions, called NSR/98 allows masons with no technical supervision, to construct houses up to two floors high with a light roof. The Manual of 1-and 2 Floor House Mending from the Colombian Association of Seismic Engineering was used. The identification of land is an objective of the Development Plan of the present city administration.
118 [9]
Francesco Ambrosi Filardi El decreto 624 de 2006, establece las competencias, alcances objetivos y componentes del proyecto de mejoramiento de condiciones de vivienda. Las metas asociadas a este proyecto forman parte de un Proyecto financiado por el BIRF, para disminuir la vulnerabilidad fiscal del Estado frente a eventos naturales.
6. Methodology for Intervention in Vulnerable Settlements in Medellin, Colombia: Urban Destructuralization in Relation to the Topography of the Territory
Juan Ricardo Mejía B.
6.1 Elements of the Analysis of Urban Destructuralization Urban destructuralization may be approached from various aspects, of which we are interested in analyzing the physical, social, environmental and economic aspects. At the same time we intend to extract measurable variables of each aspect that would allow us to establish a scientific basis for characterizing this phenomenon in any territory. Post earthquake, a revitalization program of the Kotagede Heritage District, has been initiated by Pusaka Jogja Bangkit! (Jogja Heritage Revival!). Collaborative parties consist of the Jogja Heritage Society, the Center for Heritage Conservation, the Department of Architecture and Planning at Gadjah Mada University, the Indonesian Network for Heritage Conservation, ICOMOS Indonesia, and other supporting institutions including the local community. This program focuses on building the local economy through strengthening both tangible and intangible heritage for economic and sustainable development. x Measurable variables The urban physical destructuralization (Dp) is given in the analysis and classification of the topography (Tp), on which the vulnerability and the planning index (Ip, medium or, low), represented in part by a morphological pattern (Mp) (patron). Dp = Tp + Ip Mp
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6.1.1 Physical Aspect In analyzing a territory on the basis of the inadequacy of the infrastructure or its topography, it can be seen that the ease of construction in the flatter areas leads to the evolution of the city in these flat areas, leaving the hilly areas and depressions as residues of the development. These residual areas are very susceptible to spontaneous settlement, giving rise to massive slum areas. 6.1.2 Social Aspect The processes of violence or economic needs force the displacement of people from the rural to urban areas or within the urban area itself. Together with the emerging necessity of settlements, economic needs and also the psychological impacts cause groups to settle in the lower planned areas or the residual space of the formal city. For the purposes of this investigation, these spaces are referred to as abrupt topographical areas. x Measurable variables The social destructuralization (Ds) is reflected in the displacement phenomena (d) summing a number of factors such as ethnic groups (Et), the topographical classification (Tp), and a planning index of medium or low (Ip), which gives an indication of how the mixed social structures in the marginal environment were formed, and which are not consistent with the processes of evolution within the city. Ds = d + Et + Tp + Ip
6.1.3 Environmental Aspect We can speak about two aspects, the deterioration of the flora and fauna ecosystems and the marginality context itself. The first aspect deals with the problem of the environmental load that the natural system is exposed to as a result of the lack of planning of human settlements. Specifically in the case of rivers and ravines, an unstructured social dynamic system without internal control processes - in contrast with the intact natural ecosystem undergoes a progressive degeneration in terms of mutual impacts and alters the function, thereby giving rise to many problems. The meeting of these two dynamic systems, the social and the natural, in the abrupt topographic areas without the minimum of planning, produces a marginal environment understood as a lack of integration of the normal collective processes of the formal planned city.
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x Measurable variables The environmental urban destructuralization (De) is equal to the sum of the natural ecosystem (En), the social system (Ss) and the level of planning, indicating the origins of the progressive degeneration of both systems associated with the problems that are created in the process of the meeting of both. Da = En + Ss
6.1.4 Economical Aspect Destructuralization can be understood by looking at the isolation of the social system from the dynamic commercial activities and formal jobs, caused many times by factors such as the lack of education and training, the long distances from the peripheral areas to the center, and social stigma, among others. x Measurable variables The economic urban destructuralization (De) is related to the quantity of business (money) together with the types of work (formal or informal) and the unemployment rate in the marginal community (low possibility of finding a job due to social factors).
Fig. 6-1. Analysis of Urban Destructuralization
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All the proposed equations attempt to give a mark for focusing on the areas of urban destructuralization and establish a system of measurement.
6.2 Methodology for the Systematization of the Destructuralization Components The complex processes presented by any real phenomenon require a constant interaction of a diverse nature of elements, which makes it impossible to treat it from one study or area of knowledge. As a result, the interdisciplinary approach plays an important role as a tool for understanding such processes. In the first instance, the case of the complex phenomenon of urban destructuralization requires coordinating the efforts of diverse disciplines in order to understand the processes and later formulate tools for treating them. It becomes necessary to generate a methodology that allows the understanding and treatment of such complexity in a systematic manner. Since this phenomenon is generally associated with very extensive areas within the city, the methodology in the first instance focuses on the definition of such phenomenon in smaller areas, called 'urban micro systems' that are easier to manage in a study, and allows the formulation of models that can be applied in other zones with similar characteristics and problems.
6.2.1 Stages in Methodology The methodology consists of: 1. Delineation of the study area (urban micro system) 2. Identification and classification of the different components. 3. Quantification and qualification of the components. 4. Identification of relations between the components for analysis and later the definition of hypothesis and action plans. 5. Definition of action plans for the study area. 6. For each plan, the formulation of standards and models necessary to get an adequate balance between the components. Items 2, 3, 4, and 5 are the base for the collection of information on each discipline. In contrast, item 6 requires the interaction of the action plans suggested by the different disciplines to obtain an intervention model.
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6.3 Urban Destructuralization in Northeastern Medellin Northeastern Medellin is chosen as a pilot area for applying the methodology because of the existence of abrupt topography comprising river basins and hills with high slopes and clayey soils. In addition, within the historical process of the formation of the neighborhoods, many processes of rural-city migration caused by factors related to economy and violence can be seen. This resulted in a conglomeration of unplanned settlements, which over the passage of time have consolidated and achieved a certain level of planning. Although the areas of river basins and hills constitute residual areas of such planned developments, these also suffer later from the processes of settlement aggravated by its topographical condition, and difficult accessibility defined by the limited access to the normal development processes and evolution of the city. You can get a clear view of this in the topographically abrupt areas, where the environmental impacts (deterioration in the environmental axes, contamination of water resources) are accentuated, and the physical destructuralization can be seen (overcrowding in the slum areas caused by the absence of planning). The specific case of the La Herrera River Basin is a good example since is has high indices of marginality, over population, low economic resources, inadequate sewage and garbage disposal systems and unstable soils. It is also chosen because of its large extension, variety of the relief, and the interest demonstrated in recent years by the administration through a series of important civil works, including the massive metro cable transport system.
Fig. 6-2. Northeastern Medellin
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6.4 Urban Destructuralization in Northeastern Medellin Following the process, it is necessary to delineate an area that allows for a more detailed and deeper understanding of the components that appear with the phenomenon of destructuralization. For this there are two criteria: -
Ways perpendicular to the environmental axis that generally are not interrupted. Streets on the borders whose form results from meeting with the break in topography.
In applying these criteria to the northeastern zone, it is possible to define the limits and the number of urban micro systems that form part of this zone, giving rise to a new reference of the possible system that would allow for the restructuring and improvement of living conditions in this region. In La Herrera ravine it is necessary to select an area that would allow the development of the greatest number of components and variables. The area chosen is the urban micro system, bounded by 107th and 110th Streets and 46th and 47th Avenues. The selection of this micro system is based on physical topography associated with the maximum break, and also has direct relation to the possible development of the Andalucia Station of the metro cable transport system, which gives it a very strategic character.
Fig. 6-3. Quantification and qualification of elements in Northeastern Medellin
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6.4.1 Components of the Urban Micro System Once the study area is selected, the components of the urban micro system can be identified. - Linear housing - Isolated constructions - Consolidated blocks - Topography - Roads and sidewalks - Commercial infrastructure - Equipment - Inhabitants - Employment - River Basins - Arts and Offices - Flora and fauna species - Vehicular and pedestrian streams The same components of the urban micro system (UMS) can be found in other UMS of the zone, with similar conditions in all the analyzed levels. It is possible to foresee the high levels of marginality and problems of the zone, as well as the opportunity - once a model is developed for UMS for it to be adopted for other situations in the zone. Beside this, it gives a clear understanding of the potential urban structuring system in northeastern Medellin based on the environmental axis, connected to the integrated improvement processes.
Fig. 6-4. Elements of the microsystem and delimitation in the study area
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6.4.2 Classification Criteria In order to get a precise definition of the conceptual and physical level of the UMS, some classification criteria are defined that allow analysis of areas with the same parameters in order to clearly identify relevant characteristics, their differences, and potential. For this reason, such criteria can be studied based on quantitative and qualitative characteristics. Consolidation levels
Here, the quantity and general conditions of existing housing within the UMS are identified and defined, with a view to deciding on the most adequate strategies for treating these components. In this way, we define these criteria as the following components: -
Consolidated housing Border housing Row or linear housing and Non-consolidated housing
Free space
This criterion is defined from the physical component as the types of spaces existing in the interior of the UMS that are different from the built up spaces. (Possible available spaces for closed housing or public spaces). In this way we define these criteria as comprising the following: -
River basin space Closed interior blocks Open interior blocks Building space Lots
Mobility
This comprises of the identification, classification and quantification of the mobility systems, understood as the road network, streets and sidewalks of the UMS. It also analyzes the degree of continuity or discontinuity of the network. The following classes of roads and streets are identified: -
Border Roads Dead end and end roads Interrupted streets Footpaths, sidewalks and steps (interiors)
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Topography
This comprises the analysis of the graphics of the surface topography in the UMS, quantifying aspects such as depths and opening of gorges, slopes and heights. Also, it analyzes specific aspects of the soil, such as soil types, risks associated with the type of soil, bearing capacity of the soil, suitability for cultivation and reforestation, etc. Four schemes of topographical relief are established, which are used as the basis for analyzing the housing situation in terms of quantity and location, the most appropriate form of action in such zones, and the suitability for the establishment of a project in various schemes. These schemes are: -
Topography of crests or summits Topography of valleys Topography of inclinations Topography for sightseeing
Services
It is also necessary to know the type of services that support the UMS, as much in the interior as in its surroundings. Once the quantity and variety of services and the degree of articulation between them are known, it is possible to find out the degree of coverage of such services and gain a little understanding of the deficiencies confronting the diversity that these can offer in supporting an environment in the optimum manner. In identifying the large quantity of services that exist in the northeastern region, it can be seen that although there isn't quantitative deficit, the small variety of services offered suggests it is critical to provide other services of a cultural, ludic and recreational character. Also, the lack of articulation between the services is evident, due in a large part to the interruptions in the roads caused by the broken topography. However, these breaks, approximately 40% located in the interior, present a great opportunity for generating important systems of connectivity and articulation between such services through the axes that form the valleys of the basins. We define then the following equipment according to the represented services: -
Sports Education Health Institution Culture Religion Commerce
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Fig. 6-5. Consolidation levels in the study area
Fig. 6-6. Free space in the study area
Fig. 6-7. Mobility in the study area
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Fig. 6-8. Topography in the study area
6.4.3 Diagnosis of UMS La Herrera The elements are analyzed through a relation matrix, in which, for each relation, the following three components are established: 1. Description 2. Database 3. Morphologic pattern Based on the analysis, the diagnostics for each element are established.
Fig. 6-9. Relation analysis between the elements
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Consolidation Level
It is necessary to establish some housing growth limits towards the interior of the river basin because of the high risk and the damage produced inside the natural system. Beside this, it is necessary to recover these areas as part of the public space to get equilibrium in the conditions of the environment of this territory. Also, it can be concluded that it is necessary to define the existing blocks in such a way that the deterioration that is generated at the borders caused by the abrupt topographic change does not continue to accentuate the phenomenon of unplanned marginal settlements and unstructured urbanization. Free Space
It is necessary to recover the river basin as a vital component of the environment of these housing developments and as a part of the environmental system formed by the river basins of the northeastern region of the city. Also, the interiors of the blocks are resources that could be developed in the most appropriate manner, preserving always the memories that they represent to the inhabitants based on the concept of neighborhood systems. Mobility
The transportation network in the zone exhibits an imbalance between pedestrians and cars. In some zones, there is imminent danger to pedestrians due to the small size of the sidewalks or their absence altogether. In some streets without vehicular traffic there is under utilization of the public space, resulting in the unnecessary asphalting of less than 5% of the total surface. Some improvements have been made to the footpaths, but there are still many problems related to sewage and connection of the network. Topography
According to the criteria for classification, the microsystem presents two large canyons with depths between 26 m and 28 m, with slopes varying between 40 and 70%. The topography is formed by 7 cresta and 4 terraces, the importance of which lies in the fact that these spaces form the great majority of marginal settlements within the urban microsystem. The soil in the stream bed is composed of strata of dunite and amphibole, which are associated with the steep slopes in certain sectors and establishe these settlements as a high risk area.
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Services
In terms of services, the microsystem is well supported due to the amount of services and equipment within and surrounding the area, although there is a large deficit in complementary services such as childcare centers, cultural and recreational centers, workshops etc., which these communities require to strengthen their social networks. Access to services is made difficult, as most are not functioning or are at an inconvenient distance, which limits their use.
6.4.4 Defining the Hypotheses Defining the hypotheses is the result of quantifying, qualifying and correlating the diversity of elements found within the urban microsystem. The hypothetical projects for each situation are based on the relationships as defined and the diagnosis made. Because the morphological patterns are repetitive structures in all the microsystems, defining one framework related to one of these becomes a projection process which can be replicated.
Fig. 6-10. Plan definition for the study area
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Action Plan 1
To generate complementary activities within the urban microsystem through small or large endowments of equipment. -
Studies of the established housing in the terraced topographical zones to evaluate their possible relocation. Studies of the needs for complementary activities for the inhabitants of the urban microsystem and its surrounding neighborhoods to determine if the necessity for a new infrastructure of equipment.
Action Plan 2
Starting with the streets on the crests, to structure, organize and create a continual flow of attention to the existing homes and possible projects. -
A general study of the variables which act upon the streets on the hillcrests such as kinds of mobilization, the physical and spatial characterization of the specific area, and questions related to employment and business.
Action Plan 3
To create new pathways following the elevation and connecting to existing pathways in order to facilitate longitudinal movement (crossing the stream). Action Plan 4
To create a system for containment which would restrict occupation and the building of new homes on the inner side of the stream bed, at the same time generating an alternate walkway for pedestrians which would permit movement over the stream. -
Studies of the established housing in topographical zones (valley) V to ascertain the possibility of their relocation. Studies of slopes to define which mechanisms can be brought into use for a system of containment (steps, sidewalks, dikes, etc.)
Action Plan 5 -
To use the existing terraces in the consolidated homes as a medium for redensifying the neighborhood. To generate a new housing system on the edges of the city blocks following the topography and using the interiors of the city blocks as
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Fig. 6-11. Definition of the project subsystems for the study area
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spaces for access and production. Through the system of containment of housing and public space, to generate small housing systems which will create new dynamics in the crossing of the stream and will allow for new markets and housing. To finish the consolidation of the streets along the hillcrests by defining housing units which will allow for generating businesses on the ground floors and offer greater access to services and equipages available on the terraced areas.
6.4.5 Pilot Project for Recomposition for the Ends of City Blocks After carrying out an exhaustive review of the diverse elements located within the microsystem and identifying the existing relationships as well as possible hypotheses and feasible plans, we then look to the application of Plan 5, which has as its goal the resolution of existing needs related to housing. At this point we are interested in resolving the housing system at the edges in order to change the terminations of the existing city blocks where they meet abrupt topography.
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Fig. 6-12. Development of the plan and laws formulation
The system to change or reform the street endings is structurally based on four important concepts: -
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Restructuring the natural system using methods that allow for evaluation all of the internal components and definition of the strategies necessary to regulate both conditions and activities within the system. The major problem caused by human settlements on stream banks is the deterioration of the natural system of flora and fauna, which then rebounds on the inhabitants. By analyzing the slopes, areas for carrying out different activities can be chosen. In this way the social system around the stream can be orderly and integrated positively. Restructuralization of the environmental system through a scheme of sustainability and maintenance, with the principal objective being improvement of conditions in the surrounding area both by recycling resources and opening the possibility for training and/or productive sectors for the community. The basic achievement to be sought here is a joining of new projects with the existing consolidated houses through networks and systems to recycle rainwater and drainage water, taking positive advantage of
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garbage for productive ends and the sale of compost, as well as using biologically created gases and masses for alternative energy sources. Insofar as the community has a tendency toward specific crafts or trades, or requires certain apprenticeships, areas will be established for training and productive activity to generate self-sustaining community cycles. The restructuring of the social system based on a plan for regeneration and consolidation of the marginalized part of the community, to be developed through recognition of the individual and tied to the process of the architectural urban project. The occupation of edifices for housing shall be defined from slabs as lots at certain heights, with characteristics similar to those of ground level terrain to be used for progressive occupancy according to the needs of the inhabitants. Restructuring of the physical system shall be established from the point of conformation of an end or border construction as a support for different activities relating to production, commerce, education and housing, as well as giving shape to the block's continuity of streets or roadways. Building development will be based on four components: the modules for housing, businesses or offices, terraces, and the interior street, which shall complete the configuration of the restructuring of the final edge of the streets and make buildings a link between nature and the human social system.
Housing Modules
The housing modules arise from a process which begins in what we have called lots at certain heights. Management of this type will allow for the progressive occupation of the slabs or 'terrains,' to which the construction techniques of the module will be adapted, based as they are on two general criteria: firstly, that the construction in itself be light weight and changeable, meaning that at a given moment some parts of the module may change, either in terms of materials or placement, and secondly, that a large percentage of the materials used for unions or joining and interior divisions may also be produced through recycling processes. In this way, we also seek to involve the dynamics of the community economy in both the construction materials and in the process of producing these materials. The areas for each module are of 25 m2, 37.5 m2 and 50 m2, in accordance with the growth process of the families and the average home size seen in the sector. In terms of spaces, one part includes bedrooms and living areas while the other part is made up of service areas and balconies; in
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Fig. 6-13. Housing module
the latter area there are sub-modules for services in the form of compartments which provide the basic service areas of bathrooms, laundry and kitchen which can be acquired by the inhabitant to be adapted to the housing module according to need. The facades will be established through a structural matrix to which will be added panels either for joinings or for windows, which can be modified or acquired as required in time. The possibility of changing a module through a change of materials and format generates numerous spatial possibilities which can be adapted for different types of inhabitant. Commerce
Located at the lowest level of the building, these businesses are in direct relation to the streambed and the stream, in the interest of attracting formal activities. One of the greater problems affecting maintenance of the streambeds has been the perception, at the cultural level, of these waters - within the marginalized neighborhoods, streams have always been understood as a system to evacuate residue and rubble because there has been no infrastructure for these purposes and very little in the area of garbage disposal by those related enterprises.
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The new paradigm is to understand these environmental axes, apart from their condition as natural reservoirs, as a new place for socializing and amusement for the communities which have found shelter therein, to generate awareness and the mechanisms which would allow the community to understand how to make the best use of the streams. Thus, business ventures introduce a new social dynamic complemented by methods and strategies to further good maintenance in the surroundings of the stream. At the same, time new formal businesses make up part of the proposed chain of production for the building, a chain which particularly seeks to generate cycles of self-sustainability in the community through products generated by the community itself which may then be sold at the same place and in doing so may establish a way to become part of the economic processes of the city proper. Terraces
In the neighborhoods built on the slopes, the terraces have always constituted a characteristic element in their construction traditions. They are an extension of the house, but while they are an 'almost' finished element, there always exists the possibility that they may grow or change over time. The terrace is the grandmother's flower garden, the children's play area, the place where the laundry is hung up to dry. It represents future air for the children and it is also like a tower from which one can observe the rest of the city from one's own viewpoint.
Fig. 6-14. Commerce and terraces
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Due to these social factors, we must think again about terraces as an important constituent in the buildings on the edges of the stream borders. Unlike the tradition, terraces establish the growth limits for a home through activities and uses to which it is put, activities which favor its appropriation by part of the inhabitants of the building. The terrace becomes a new collective public space for the enjoyment and relaxation of all the community members involved and is closely linked to access paths and building circulation to avoid its appropriation by a small group of persons, and on the contrary is always open to the members of the renewed social group. Therefore, terraces constitute an architectural potential for the new housing and for the relationship of the surroundings with the landscape, as well as offering a solution to the great lack of public spaces in these places. The interior street
Physically the interior street arises as an answer to the need to define a system for moving about which is interrupted by broken topography. The houses on the banks, like a destructured organism, have a strong relationship with the interrupted streets because of the broken topography. This is why they are part of the plans to determine and define the systems for mobility, conforming the city block as a finishing point in accordance with its shape. The lack of infrastructure and access to a diversity of public services is behind the proposal that the inner street provide for a series of activities
Fig. 6-15. The interior street
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through coordinating and designing spaces for sales and informal commerce, aware as we are of the great value these spaces for the economy of these neighborhoods. These interior streets also represent pedestrian mobility, the system through which people can have easy access to different parts of the building, as well as training areas, workshops, production areas and areas for community living.
References Alexander, C. (1980) A pattern language. Gustavo Gili Conferencia Asentamientos Humanos Habitat II (1996) Plan de Acción Mundial, Estambul Fritjof, C. (2001) La Trama de la vida,Una nueva perspectiva de los sistemas vivos. Anagrama Habraken, N.J. (1980) El diseño de soportes. Gustavo Gili. Harold, M.E. (2001) La relación cultura naturaleza en la arquitectura occidental. Universidad del Valle. Hough, M. (1998) Naturaleza y ciudad. Planificación urbana y procesos ecológicos. Gustavo Gili Toro, G., Ricardo, J., Yepes, R. and Luis, E. (1986) Fundamentos de medicina y siquiatría. CIB Uribe, M. and Augusto, I.E. (1978) Notas elementales sobre el enfoque sistémico. Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana.
7. From Wood Huts to Buildings of Seven Floors: An Analysis of the Process of Housing Production in the Slum of Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, over a Fifty-Year Period
Gerônimo Leitão
7.1 Introduction This work is the result of the current reflections of our professional and academic activities. Over the last 20 years, we have been working in several slum dwellers communities located in the metropolitan area of Rio de Janeiro, developing urbanization projects dealing with social dwelling units and community facilities. Accompanying the poorest population on a daily basis, we concluded that the study of the process of housing production in those communities, promoting the analysis of the actions of the different involved agents, could contribute to a better characterization of the dynamics of production of the built environment in the slums in Rio de Janeiro. In order to develop that work we chose the slum of Rocinha, located in the south area of the city of Rio. Besides the particular characteristics that it presents, Rocinha was chosen for the development of our research due, also, to the fact that we worked there for five years, between 1985 and 1989. During that period, we participated in the implantation of XXVII Região Administrativa/Rocinha, and we acted in the coordination of the different municipal organs that rendered services in that community, which allowed us to actively participate in the daily lives of the inhabitants. Ever since, we have been maintaining regular contact with the technicians of that administrative area, as well as with community leaders of the different associations, thanks to the development of our doctorate research the educational activities in the School of Architecture and Urbanism of the Fluminense Federal University (Universidade Federal Fluminense).
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In this paper we present a brief analysis of the evolution of the process of housing production in Rocinha during the period between the mid 1930s --- when occupation of the area began --- and the end of the 1990s --- when many point to the community as the largest slum in Latin America. We intend to demonstrate in this study that the practices of the production of space in the slum were transformed during this period, as also were the products generated by those practices. In that sense, we intend to demonstrate the following: -
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From a predominantly residential space, Rocinha developed into more and more complex space, when considering the use and occupation of the land. The constructive patterns of housing were also modified: precarious constructions of wood are now side by side with buildings of concrete and bricks with six floors. Changes in the process of housing construction occurred: there are still houses built exclusively by the residing family, but, more and more, contracted workers build inside the slum for clients that pay them. During the past two decades, the formation of an expressive informal real estate market in the slum has been observed - a market that both resembles and differs from that practiced in the official city. Finally, starting from the end of the 1970s, the occurrence of a growing internal social differentiation in the occupation of the space in the slum can be observed.
In the first part of this work, we highlighted the expressive character of the informal production of housing in Third World countries, particularly in Latin America and Brazil. Still in that part, we present a brief history of the expansion of the slums in the city of Rio de Janeiro from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 21st century, pointing to the significant morphologic transformations that happened during this period, when the slums went from being a ‘precarious and temporary home of the migrants newcomers’ to becoming a city with its own rules and norms of spatial organization. The description and analysis of the different stages of the process of the occupation of Rocinha, starting from the mid 1920s, constitute the second part of our work. This focuses also on the role of public authority in this process of habitat production. This part still presents the forms of housing production in Rocinha from the time when precarious wood huts prevailed to the present, when buildings of four, five and even six floors are common in the local landscape.
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In conclusion, we present a synthesis of the subjects covered previously regarding the transformations that happened in the process of housing production in Rocinha and the challenge represented by the attempt of extending town planning’s norms and building laws of the so-called ‘official city’ to the slums --- norms that seem to oppose the peculiar characteristics of the production of the habitat in these informal areas. We also call attention to the relevant role that new agents --- who started to act in the slums from the beginning of the 1990s --- can play in overcoming this challenge, which consists of reconciling the peculiarity of the manners of housing production in the slum with the maintenance of minimum patterns of satisfactory habitability and sustainable urban development. With this work, we intend to contribute to a better understanding of the logic that orders the spatial structure of the slums --- a structure seemingly chaotic, but that possesses its own order (surprising in several aspects). We believe that the relevance of this study is associated, also, to the expression that the slums assumed, in recent decades, in the process of urbanization of the great cities of the Third World --- and, in particular, of Brazil.
7.2 A Brief Overview of Informal Housing in Latin America and Brazil The report The Challenge of the Slums, published in October 2003 by the Program of Human Establishments of the United Nations Organization (UN-Habitat), points out that one-sixth of the world’s population lives in slums --- approximately 924 million inhabitants. In agreement with the executive director of that entity, Anna Tibaijuka, there are estimates that in 2050 the world population will be nine billion people, with six billion of them living in the cities. In their estimates, Tibaijuka highlights that 38% of that urban population will be living at slums, “if we don't do some radical thing to solve that problem.” The report elaborated by UN-Habitat reveals, also, that in the beginning of the 21st century, of the 527 million inhabitants from Latin America and the Caribbean, 127.567 million live in slums. Twenty years before the report The Challenge of the Slums, other UN studies pointed out that about 50% of the existent houses in the great Latin American cities were produced by self-construction mechanisms or through mutual help. Those constructions use the most varied materials, including waste from consu