Vocalize to Localize
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Vocalize to Localize
Benjamins Current Topics Special issues of established journals tend to circulate within the orbit of the subscribers of those journals. For the Benjamins Current Topics series a number of special issues have been selected containing salient topics of research with the aim to widen the readership and to give this interesting material an additional lease of life in book format.
Volume 13 Vocalize to Localize Edited by Christian Abry, Anne Vilain and Jean-Luc Schwartz These materials were previously published in Interaction Studies 5:3 (2004) & 6:2 (2005), under the guidance of Editor-in-Chief Harold Gouzoules.
Vocalize to Localize
Edited by
Christian Abry Anne Vilain Jean-Luc Schwartz
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam / Philadelphia
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TM
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vocalize to localize / edited by Christian Abry, Anne Vilain, Jean-Luc Schwartz. p. cm. (Benjamins Current Topics, issn 1874-0081 ; v. 13) Previously published in Interaction studies 5:3 (2004) & 6:2 (2005). Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Oral communication. 2. Visual communication. I. Abry, Christian. II. Vilain, Anne. III. Schwartz, Jean-Luc. IV. Interaction studies. P95.V63 2009 302.2'242--dc22 isbn 978 90 272 2243 5 (hb; alk. paper) isbn 978 90 272 8951 3 (eb)
2009003060
© 2009 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
Table of contents Foreword: Vocalize to Localize: How to Frame a Framework for two Frames? Introduction: Vocalize to Localize? A call for better crosstalk between auditory and visual communication systems researchers Christian Abry, Anne Vilain and Jean-Luc Schwartz
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Vocalize to Localize: A test on functionally referential alarm calls Marta B. Manser and Lindsay B. Fletcher
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Mirror neurons, gestures and language evolution Leonardo Fogassi and Pier Francesco Ferrari
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Lateralization of communicative signals in nonhuman primates and the hypothesis of the gestural origin of language Jacques Vauclair
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Manual deixis in apes and humans David A. Leavens
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Neandertal vocal tract: Which potential for vowel acoustics? Louis-Jean Boë, Jean-Louis Heim, Christian Abry and Pierre Badin
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Interweaving protosign and protospeech: Further developments beyond the mirror Michael A. Arbib
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The Frame/Content theory of evolution of speech: A comparison with a gestural-origins alternative Peter F. MacNeilage and Barbara L. Davis
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Intentional communication and the anterior cingulate cortex Oana Benga Gestural-vocal deixis and representational skills in early language development Elena Pizzuto, Micaela Capobianco and Antonella Devescovi
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Building a talking baby robot: A contribution to the study of speech acquisition and evolution Jihène Serkhane, Jean-Luc Schwartz and Pierre Bessière
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Aspects of descriptive, referential and information structure in phrasal semantics: A contruction-based model Peter F. Dominey
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First in, last out? The evolution of aphasic lexical speech automatisms to agrammatism and the evolution of human communication Chris Code
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Name index
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Subject index
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foreword Vocalize to Localize How to Frame a Framework for two Frames?
Vocalize to localize? Meerkats do it for specific predators… And babies begin to vocalize and point with their index finger toward located targets of interest at about nine months. Well before using language-specific demonstratives. Such that-type units correlated with what-interrogatives are universal and, as relativizers and complementizers, revealed powerful in grammar construction. Even among referential calls in nonhuman primates, some use more than mere localization: semantics and even syntax. Instead of just telling a new monomodal story about language origin, advocates of representational gestures (semantically transparent), with a problematic route toward speech, meet here advocates of speech, with a problematic route toward the lexicon. The present meeting resulted in the contributions of 23 specialists in the behaviour and brain of humans, including comparative studies in child development and nonhuman primates, aphasiology and robotics. The next future will tell us if this continuing crosstalk – between researchers in auditory and visual communication systems – will lead to a more integrative framework for understanding the emergence of 7-month babbling and 9-month pointing. Two types of neural control whose coordination (Abry & Ducey, Evolang7, 2008) could pave the “royal road to language” (Butterworth, in Kita, Pointing, 2003), up to one-year first words, with their semantics and phonology, and their syntax, emerging “on the heels of pointing” (Tomasello et al., Child. Dev., 2007), and beyond, when pointing could be dissociated from the joint word, how it would lead to two-word speech (Goldin-Meadow & Butcher, in Kita, 2003), etc. These are the main unescapable targets presently known of a puzzling route, still to be traced. Instead of a full-blown theory we chose, in the famous legacy of the late Francis Crick for consciousness, a framework approach, including testable proposals. Framed at the beginning of this century, some years ahead of our first meeting (in Grenoble, January 2003, before the second one, VOCOID, May 2007), this Vocalize to localize framework was not
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explicitly developed in the resulting publication of the two Interaction Studies issues (2004–5), now updated for this Benjamins Current Topics. Since, three publications all issued in 2008 will help weighing this framework. The framework flow diagram itself (see Figure 1. A Framework for two Frames) was finally made available for the first time in English by Abry and Ducey in the above mentionned Evolang7 conference book (Barcelona, March 2008, pp. 3–9), in coincidence with the publication of Emergence of Linguistic Abilities (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008, pp. 80–99), held in Lyon (dec. 2005). Meanwhile, we entrusted the test of our core proposal to the issue of a satellite workshop to the XVth International Conference of Phonetic Sciences, held in Barcelona (August, 2003), in honour to Peter MacNeilage, which appeared finally in The Syllable in Speech Production (Lawrence Erlbaum, 2008, pp. 409–427). Evolang7 gives a scope of recent researches in the field; and the VOCOID oncoming publication will contain work in progress for the Vocalize to localize framework. Figure 1 shows that at about one year of age, the Speech Frame will be embedded into the Sign Frame: one-two… Syllables in a Foot template for the first “Prosodic Words”. For the Speech Frame, after Canonical Babbling, say “Syllable” rhythm emergence, two additional controls have to be mastered: Closance control for the “Consonant”, and Coarticulation (Coproduction) for the “Vowel” Postural control, within the “Consonant”. For the Sign Frame, three maturating brain streams become recruited: occipito-parietal event detection (When), which enters the now classical dorsal (Where) and ventral (What) pathways. Their outcomes are
Figure 1. A Framework for two Frames
Foreword
Objecthood permanence and Agentivity (Who-system), while the ventro-parietal How-system affords Shape Affordance, before the objecthood Color What-system. Classically the Sharing Attention-Intention cooperative Mechanisms (SAM-SIM) develop later than Eye Direction Detection (EDD). Among the corresponding “answers” (Then/There/That) to the Wh-systems, the most relevant stream for linguistic pointing (imperative, declarative, cooperative) is our fronto-parietal That-Path (Broca-SMG), together with our Stabil-Loop, the verbal working memory under articulatory gesture phasing control, stabilizing linguistic forms in learning (see Introduction). Given 2-syllable first words, and once we measured a mean of 3Hz for babbling cycles (in agreement with the literature, old and new), the prediction of this framework was a 2:1 Babbling/Pointing ratio. The empirical outcome was that, knowing the distribution of the babbling cycles of six babies, video-recorded from 6 to 18 months each fortnight, we could predict successfully the range of durations of their pointing strokes: in-between 2–3 syllables in a metrical Foot-Point (Emergence of Linguistic Abilities, 2008, pp. 80–99). That is a universal trend for the prosodic Word-Point. At this stage we can state that, if neuro-biomechanical models are still lacking for ultimately giving the bandpasses (modes) of the child babbling jaw and pointing arm, one can already consider that the production of a word each 2/3 of a second is better explained by this cognitive embedded, embodied, embrained arm deixis, than by pure mental or brain lexical encoding chronometry. What we dubbed: “The phonological foot dwells on the arm stroke”! This encouraging achievement was recently acknowledged in the conclusions drawn by MacNeilage for his book The Origin of Speech (Oxford University Press, 2008), where he comments his meeting points with Steven Wise’s chapter on “the primate way of reaching”, atop of The Evolution of Nervous Systems (Elsevier, 2007, vol. 4, pp. 157–166). The development of the pyramidal tracts in primates afforded, from the cortical homologue of Broca region (“mirror-neuronal” F5) downward to cervical spinal and bulbar centers, direct control of head and arm, together with laryngeal and supralyngeal articulators (jaw, lips, velum and tongue). According to Wise, “If […] the human homologue of PFv [prefrontal ventral cortex] maps meanings to communicative gestures, including vocal ones, then perhaps the homologue of PMv [premotor ventral F5] underlies computations that achieve the motor goals of such gestures” (Cortex, 2006, pp. 523–524), i.e. laryngeal-mandibular babbling, eye-head orientation and arm pointing during social signaling (Wise, pers. comm. for this important PF-PM link). MacNeilage (2008, p. 328): “With Wise’s work, we begin to see the promise of an evolutionary cognitive neuroscientific basis for the young child’s triadic declarative pointing acts, in which she points at an object (typically with the right
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hand) while looking at the parent, and simultaneously vocalizing [say babbling]. In this context it is of interest to note that Abry et al. [The Syllable in Speech Production, 2008] make an evolutionary argument for a fundamental semantics/action coupling based on the fact that an infant’s pointing movement takes about the same amount of time that it takes to produce two syllables (about two-thirds of a second).” In the line of such an evolutionary tracking of our cortical endowment, we would claim that the directed scratch (me there!) in grooming among wild chimps (Pika & Mitani, Current Biology, 2006, vol. 16, n° 6, R191–2) was the most recent important missing-link discovery (leaving aside controversies about ape pointing in the wild) for social signaling in non-human primates… Ever since the wiping or scratch reflex of spinal frogs and cats! Inside our framework and beyond (see Abry & Ducey, Evolang7, 2008, pp. 6–7), we would like to continue MacNeilage’s quotation: “It’s also interesting to note, in the light of the depth of the evolutionary perspective provided by Wise, that Lashley (1951 [The problem of serial order in behavior]) suggested that our understanding of reaching and grasping might eventually make a contribution to the physiology of logic – a far cry indeed from Descartes’ position.” Thus challenging cartesian Chomsky’s minimalism (see Interfaces + Recursion = Language?, Mouton de Gruyter, 2007), we would boldly phrase our language origin programme as Babbling + Pointing = Language, i.e. speech and not only monomodal “Language within our Point”, with Pointing including eye-hand proto-demonstratives (giving That-recursion), together with eye-head Gaze-shifting (“looking”) as the root of the face proto-predicative attitude. Again, to be continued. Christian Abry, Grenoble, Christmas 2008
Acknowledgements Thanks to John Benjamins for offering this opportunity to make a broader diffusion to the Vocalize to Localize proposal. To Marie-Agnes Cathiard for her help in the establishment of the indices. And to Anke de Looper and Martine van Marsbergen for their editing assistance and their patience.
introduction Vocalize to Localize? A call for better crosstalk between auditory and visual communication systems researchers From meerkats to humans Christian Abry, Anne Vilain and Jean-Luc Schwartz ICP-Grenoble
Vocalize to Localize: Just a speech scientist’s bias? In the last two days of January 2003, the Vocalize-to-Localize conference was held in Grenoble, organized by the Institute of Speech Communication (ICP-Stendhal-INPG, CNRS UMR 5009) and sponsored by a European Science Foundation Project (COG-Speech: From Communication by Orofacial Gestures in Primates to Human Speech), launched in 2002 within OMLL (Origin of Man, Language, and Languages), and presented at the 5th Evolution of Language Conference (Leipzig 2004). The aim was clearly not to suggest seamless continuity between meerkat or vervet alarm calls and full-fledged languages, or even the babbling-pointing, deictic behaviour of human infants. Who would dare tell such a “meerkat-that” story? The story of the English deictic that, demonstrative → relativizer → complementizer, has been perfectly retold by our colleague Elizabeth Traugott. It is seen as a part of a Chomskyan recursion syntactic story: the ball that hit the ball that hit the ball… and Chimpsky sees that Chompsky sees that…(see the heterogeneous joint proposal by Hauser, Chomsky, Fitch, 2000 vs Pinker & Jackendoff, 2005). We know that this evolution is not at all restricted to English: e.g., jumping overseas, this story happened to ken ‘here’, a locative adverb → demonstrative → ‘relativizer’, found in the Buang language, in field work by Gillian Sankoff ’s Montreal team in Papua New Guinea (pers. comm.). Elaborating on Greek deixis, deiktikos — in the tradition of Apollonios Dyskolos in Alexandria (2nd Century), and Maximos Planudes, in the late medieval Byzantium (13–14th Century) — the famous pioneer ‘localists’ of the sixties (just to mention John Lyons), who remain linguists fond of space
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and scene analysis in semantic-conceptual representations, would prefer not to be hailed by meerkat calls! The same for mind philosophers, like Zenon Pylyshyn, recently reviving a long scholar tradition about indexicals — now viewed as ‘objecthood’ trackers, backed by Alan Leslie’s and others’ studies on developmental naive ontologies. And perhaps nobody would be able to tell anything more empirically fleshed out about an evolutionary link in the near future. So we did not expect that any participant, whether or not they worked in speech science, — ethologists, developmentalists, neuropsychologists, neuroscientists, and roboticians attending the conference — could bring more to the table than anyone else in what we called in French, our Spanish albergo, a potluck, snowy winter gathering. And they brought and debated well enough, as can be read from the lines printed here and in a following issue of this new hospitable journal Interaction Studies, successor to Evolution of Communication. We extend our thanks to Harold Gouzoules and the reviewers.
Vocalizing to localize predators by conspecific calls Emitting sounds that can be used to localize things in the world, e.g., echolocation with ultrasounds like bats, is not so widespread. The more common situation is that the emitter will be localized by others, as when distress calls of youngsters are detected by their mothers … or by predators. Emitting sounds that can be used by others to localize things in the world — apart from the emitter itself — is achieved by referential speech in all its informational complexity, which sets humans apart from the rest of the animal kingdom. In fact, among human intentional linguistic signals, including those that are the most neglected by linguists (like interjections, Ameka, 1992), some utterances like “Watch it!” or “Timber!” are not so precise — regarding its object for the former, or its directionality for the latter. But when embedded in a situation, they may nonetheless increase one’s chance to stay alive. The same is true for vervet monkeys, suricates (meerkats), and dwarf mongooses. Ground squirrels, prairie dogs and (farm) chickens also differentiate predators by calls. For chickens this is simply a convergence, as interesting as any product of morpho-functional pressure, e.g., streamlining in otherwise unrelated sharks and dolphins. But contrary to what is often said and repeated (from Cheney & Wrangham, 1987 to Tomasello, 2003a), it seems not so difficult to track this faculty throughout the primates, via Barbary macaques, Diana monkeys, ‘up to’ chimpanzees in the wild (Crockford & Boesch, 2003). So what can comparative biology tell us about this faculty in order to better ground language evolution? Deflationists — philosophers, psychologists — have
Introduction
argued against the referential, not to speak of the deictic, character of alarm calls (e.g., Tomasello, 2003a). Some of these calls simply convey — as evidenced by replicated experimental field results — information about the different spatial range of avian, mammalian, reptilian predators, and a certain proximity of the danger (emergency level). This audible augment is comparable to a wartime air raid warning — not to an all-purpose siren recruiting the firemen of my village for any type of accident — and it makes meerkats flee or scan the sky, with no more or less need to check up on conspecifics’ gazes than I would have to do in detecting the planes myself before hurrying toward a shelter. It is thus specific enough, without requiring that meerkats or monkey minds demonstrate intentionality for such localizing information about a presence. Our meeting stance was that, without inflating alarm calls as directly relevant to human deixis and predicate faculties, one could tell something worthwhile about primate ways of pointing and human grammaticalization of deictic tools for getting words. For those who do not reject such a notion from the first call, we hope that readers of these two joint issues will find reasons to keep all these questions open, i.e. track human precursors and not insulating boundaries. Moreover, stimulated by a revival, i.e. the multi-voiced proposal that signers could be given the first place in language evolution, readers will probably enjoy a new version of this now popular debate, once they have realized what could be the core insights offered by the crosstalk between the still significant gestural medium for referencing and the now dominant verbal medium for predicating.
First gestural references with vocal/gestural predicates? Prior to our meeting, no more than the beginning of such a story was told at the 3rd Evolution of Language conference (Paris, 2000) by Bickerton (2002, pp. 218– 221), a professional linguist and pioneer in language evolution, who has long been positing a proto-language stage before language, and later an ecology-based theory of proto-language origin. (For our present argument we need not endorse his global proposal, nor his rejection of social intelligence versus foraging as a selective pressure on language emergence.) Note that the first linguistic communications need not have been mono-modal, nor need their units have been arbitrary in the Saussurean sense. Directional gesturing with the hand, accompanied by the imitation of the noise made by a mammoth, could easily have been interpreted as meaning ‘Come this way, there’s a […] mammoth’. […] Although the two symbolic units (the ‘come’ gesture and the ‘mammoth’ noise) might seem disjoint — two separate, single-symbol utterances, like the one-word utterances of to 15–18-months-old humans — they could easily
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have been reinterpreted (just as infant utterances at the one-word stage can often be reinterpreted predicatively, Bloom, 1973) as ‘[…] mammoth thataway’, in other words, as the first true predication. And as pointed out above [p. 210], predication — focusing on something, then making a comment about that something — is one of the most basic characteristics of human language, one that clearly distinguishes it from all other animal systems. […] with a minimum of units [hominids] could convey messages regarding the location and nature of available food supplies that would have a direct and immediate impact on the survival of those who heard and correctly interpreted those messages […]. (Bickerton, 2002, pp. 219–220)
Notice that vocal or gestural predication makes no difference for Bickerton and others, whereas vocal localizing is not envisaged in the least bit, even in the case of the meerkat.
Integrating prelinguistic calls into proto-language: Vocal alarm predicates + gestural references? Bickerton’s foraging theory ends with this transitional proposal: Note that under [the threats of predators] (and perhaps only under these circumstances) units from pre-linguistic communication systems might have been absorbed into the proto-linguistic system; Cheney and Seyfarth (1990: 144–9) have shown that, whether or not such calls come under limbic control, their utterance is subject to voluntary modification. Assume that some ancestral species had warning calls that related to major predators, as vervet alarm calls do today. Such calls (perhaps with a different inflection), if coupled with pointing at a python-track, pawprint, bloodstain, or other indication of a possible nearby predator, could very likely have been understood as a warning that did not require immediate reaction, but rather a heightened awareness and preparedness for action. (Bickerton, 2002, pp. 220–221)
The missing link: A ‘referential and conceptual feces’? Suricates (Manser et al., 2002), apart from general alerting calls, display one type of call specific for terrestrial predators, primarily jackals, and another specific for avian predators, including the martial and tawny eagles, and the pale chanting goshawk. In addition: They give a third alarm call type to snakes, such as the Cape cobra, the puff adder and the mole snake. Snake alarm calls are also given to fecal, urine or hair samples of predators and/or foreign suricates [our italics]. Because snake alarm calls to all of
Introduction
these stimuli cause other animals [conspecifics] to approach the caller, give alarm calls themselves, and either mob the snake or investigate the deposit, they are collectively termed recruitment alarm calls. (Manser et al., 2002, pp. 55–56)
This mobbing behaviour is not unique to the suricates, converging in crows as well as in primates. What seems interesting to mention is less the generalizing scope of the call for very different stimuli, than what is empirically new. Unexpected and unpredictable was the link between a snake and various external threats, including those posed by foreign conspecifics and those from terrestrial predators, since suricates have a separate call for the latter. But even more essential is the evidence of the ‘conceptual’ similarity, among these cooperatively breeding mongooses (with sentinels and nannies), of a present snake predator and an absent terrestrial predator or foreign conspecific. This offers a first progressive, incremental, answer to the supposed gap between humans and other animals, typically deemed unable to ‘think’ beyond the hic et nunc. This is empirically remarkable if one wants to track the continuity of these calls toward any “other indication of a possible nearby predator”, long before pointing, and not just as imagined above by Bickerton (2002: 210). Traces, here olfactory ones, are the most obvious possible links between hic et nunc occurring situations, with their specificity, and animal-human neural memories, through exemplarity (see the taste of the overquoted Proust madeleine).
A Sign Language case of reference lumped with the predicate (and beyond) Engberg-Pedersen (2003), a specialist of Danish Sign Language, begins her contribution to Pointing (Kita, 2003) with this seminal anecdote: Once a deaf mother signed charlotte where (‘where is Charlotte?’), Charlotte being her daughter standing right next to her. Charlotte responded by pointing energetically to herself. She did not point to the ground where she was standing as a way of answering the request for a location. Neither did she point first to herself and then to the location to indicate who was where. A point to an entity X in a location Y as a response to the question Where is X? can be seen as a condensed way of saying X is at Y; the point has the same communicative function as a simple proposition used to refer to X and predicate of X its existence at Y. But while the pointing gesture simply links two entities, X and Y, Y is predicated of X in the linguistic expression X is at Y, and in this sense Y is subordinate to X […]. When we point to entities in locations, we do exactly that: we point to the entity not the location. We focus on entities, but use space to keep track of them. The indexical aspect of a pointing gesture is its use of a location in space, but in a pointing gesture the two functions, reference and predication, are expressed by one form. (p. 269)
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Philosophers are still discussing whether deixis includes location or not. Linguists know that a locative adverb can be grammaticalized as a demonstrative (see above Buang ken). What is less known is that a locative adverb can become a predicate of existence, like Gothic hiri, hirjith, hirjats (‘come!’ 2nd pers. sg, pl, dual; from hêr, compare German hier ‘here’; and see Fillmore 1966, as a pioneer of deixis in verbs). Now linguists have become clearly aware that not all languages display an overt subject-verb predication (see, among others, the illuminating example of ‘omnipredicative’ Classical Nahuatl, as exposed by Launey, 1994).
Commands = predicates with implicit references, and ‘fossils’ Meerkat alarm calls are not statements and they do not predicate. “Note that even commands imply a subject-predicate distinction — ‘[you] do so-and-so’ — and that in any case commands are of little use for doing what language uniquely does: transmitting (purportedly) factual information.” Bickerton (2002, p. 210) reiterates here that his foraging theory fosters a survival pressure and does not need ‘socially intelligent’ commands as precursors of language, even if they do exist among apes, like the most often quoted ‘arm-raise’, an invitation–initiation gesture to chimpanzees’ rough-and-tumble play. Bickerton (2003, p. 85) does not hedge: “[…] if, say, initial utterances were things like Give that to me! […] — you wouldn’t need language to express them”; “Body language is much more reliable for most animal purposes” (p. 83, and n. 4). If, for our purpose, we just take advantage of his acknowledgement that predication is implicit in some existing primate commands, one surely cannot credit Bickerton to be an inflationist on this point (unlike Bloom whom he quoted above for the child one-word stage). He simply joined language philosophers and logicians who have been interested for a long time in finding how to cope, in addition to statements, with commands, questions, etc., say speech acts. Jackendoff (2002, pp. 255–256), elaborating on the proto-language/language stages, strangely puts “questions, commands and exclamations” into Bickerton’s second stage, whereas he acknowledges that they can be universally conveyed by intonation (word order, inflections, function words, depend upon further language-specific grammaticalizations). Some pages ahead (p. 240), he gathered his “ ‘fossils’ of the one-word stage of language evolution” which contain exclamations and even the reputedly human ‘proto-command’ no. “Their semantic and pragmatic diversity suggests that they are island remnants of a larger system, superseded by true grammar.” From the beginning (pp. 131–132) he has exemplified such English-specific “ ‘defective’ lexical items”, as oops! and goodbye!, the latter being a grammaticalization of God be with you. Hence it seems that all that can be said is that there are different
Introduction
‘streamlining’ pressures (pace Bickerton, 2003, p. 89), not ‘fossils’, but basic functions, that compact word constructions into the same integrated templates, as for interjections, exclamations, vocatives, calls… Hail Virgin Mary or hail-fellow-wellmet! French oui (‘yes’) is such a case coming from Latin demonstratives hoc ille (lit. ‘this he (does)’; for hoc only, cf. South Gallo-Romance, so-called Occitan or Langue d’Oc). Another interesting French case — which illustrates the transfer from a command-predicate to a deictic — is the example of voici, voilà, (‘behold’ or ‘here is, there is’), two presentative demonstratives issued from voi(s) imperative, or bare-stem (‘see! look!’), with a locative adverb (locational adposition), proximal (i)ci (‘here’) or distal là (‘there’).
Coupling with pointing, and without leaving the ‘royal road to language’ unpaved “[…] although human infants vocalize and babble from soon after birth, it is gestures that for many children seem to be the first carriers of their communicative intentions. And it is gestures that seem to pave the way to early language […]”. Tomasello (2003b, p. 35) converges here on an important point with the late George Butterworth (2003), who wrote ultimately that, among gestures, pointing opens ‘the royal road’ towards language. The stories they told about the evolution of pointing do not resemble all in all the one proposed even by a functionalist linguist like Givón (1998, p. 85): going from object grabbing to emitting a “specific lexicalised vocal cue alone”, say that! — via reaching, pointing, and adding a general, then a specific vocal cue. But once ape and human so-called ‘imperative’ pointing is superseded by the little man’s ‘declarative’ stance, both authors seem to offer no constraining device in order to derive language from non-language: hence the way is not really paved to shape words and other larger constructions. Butterworth gives general correlational evidence of pointing and language skills. Tomasello relies on pattern-finding, for perceptive as well as for motoric metrical templates. But why are first words one-two syllable long? And why syllables? If not a copy of motherese, this is at least an evolutionary issue. Our answer (Abry et al., 2008) takes the issue that, after the 7-month babbling — say, MacNeilage’s mandibular frame as the origin of proto-syllables — another frame is the 9-month (‘imperative’) pointing. Some data (including ours, but still too sparse), indicate that, while [bababa…] or [dadada…] babbling runs at a 3Hz rhythmic mode, the control of a discrete point arm-stroke is about 1.5Hz. The pointing stroke can thus chunk the babbling flow into one long or two shorter syllables. Identified with the control of the metrical unit known as the foot — manifest after one year for the first prosodic words — this ‘point-foot’ could ensure a crosstalk between a semiotic, symbolic
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unit, the word, and phonological rhythmic units, the syllables, thus making control resources available for a template, otherwise miraculous. This is not to say that working memory has nothing to constrain into such a template/frame, but just that the precise span for one-year old children is still unknown.
Neural ‘that-path’ and ‘stabil-loop’: Two pieces in the puzzle of language evolution Extrapolating backwards, from increasingly available adult neural-behavioural data, a possible developmental scenario could be the following. 1. Pointing, whether performed with the right index or the left, is a left dominance, as recently evidenced by Astafiev et al. (2003), recruiting the frontoparietal circuits for the eye and the hand; Cantalupo and Hopkins (2001) can add that left anatomical ‘Broca’ dominance in chimps corresponds to a righthand bias, when they vocalize and gesture. 2. This could be linguistically what we call now the left dominant ‘that-path’, fleshing out a bit more the classical and too general dorsal ‘where way’, Hurford (2004) proposed to recruit for deixis: and this is what a neuro-imaging experiment on deixis, via intonation (focus) vs. syntax (extraction), gave as a first result (Loevenbruck et al., 2002, 2005), recruiting a left fronto-parietal circuit for the ‘linguistic laryngeal-oro-facial mouth’, BA47-BA40. 3. Since we finally evidenced that the stabilizing neural circuit for multi-stable verbal percepts (the asymmetric life → fly effect) was actually the phonological loop (Abry et al., 2003, Sato et al., 2004), we now view this input memory device as sensitive to motor control, favouring first long-term winning of more in-phase articulatory gestures (Sato et al., 2002). Thus, e.g., ma, mama win over am, amam, because the lowering tongue gesture for the open phase of the cycle, the vowel, can be anticipated, is in fact set, within the closing phase, the consonant gesture. And this as early as the first words, a remarkable coincidence with such a major step in speech control as coarticulation, or coproduction (Sussman et al., 1999). Therefore the two gestures can be set in-phase in ma, whereas in am the closing gesture obviously cannot be completed simultaneously, in synchrony, with the open vowel. 4. Taken together, our neuro-imaging results show that the left fronto-parietal attentional ‘that-path’ for speech deixis is part of the phonological-loop = verbaltransformation-effect stabilizing circuit: which we dubbed the ‘stabil-loop’. 5. While uniquely intonational deixis (focus: “MADELEINE did it”) activates both frontal and parietal loci, syntactic deixis (with cleft function words entrenched
Introduction
from a former presentative deixis “It’s Madeleine who did it”) deactivates the supramarginal area. Since, meanwhile, Broca’s area remains active, we interpreted this parietal deactivation as a grammaticalization step, for which the elaborated sensory parietal information corresponding to the expected feedback of one’s own action goal (here feeling your voice showing, say pointing) is no longer necessary once the stored deixis packaging is being used. 6. Finally when phonology becomes fluent you just need the perisylvian cortex, without Broca (as evidenced by different groups, e.g. Wise, Ackerman, and ourselves). Coming back to the ‘that-path’, which needs at least part of Broca’s area, we will finally notice that it fits well with what we learned from the empirical construction approach to syntax acquisition up to 4 years, along the remarkable collaboration of Tomasello with Lieven and Diessel, in particular. The use of presentational constructions — Babybot! → That’s Babybot! → That’s Babybot (that is) naughty! → That’s Babybot (that) sai(d) (that) you (are) naughty! — is in straight line with deixis use in syntax, in fact a perfect that-that-that story. But surely more behavioural and neural knowledge is needed on babies that point.
The ultimate lesson from meerkats: No more pure armchair stories! Surely more behavioural and neural knowledge is needed too on animal vocalizations that localize. But aware as we are now of the bulk of tangible field work that has already been done, one should remember that armchair theorists would not have: (1) predicted that different alarm calls for different predators existed in vervets or meerkats; (2) imagined the precise acoustic shape of these calls. So why should linguists, including speech scientists and any other people, have the slightest chance to correctly posit the first word or ‘language fossil’, in-between animal and child data which, together with (paleo-) genetics, will probably be the main growing empirical fields for our phylogenetic quest? The division of the conference contributions in two issues is of course just a matter of convenience. The first issue contains meerkats, monkeys, apes and humans, including Neandertal, ending with a dismissal of any acoustic charge against this related vocal-tract. The second issue deals more specifically with babies, babybot systems, ending with a ‘first-in/last-out’ nascent-remnant view of aphasia. It opens by offering a thread for crosstalk, with a proposal of ‘interweaving proto-sign and proto-speech’ (not to speak of our present introductory motto: put a foot into the arm!). And it is particularly welcome as a link with the first issue, articulating a hot debate… which rebounds as soon as the second issue opens. To be continued!
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References Abry, C., Sato, M., Schwartz, J. L., Lœvenbruck, H. & M.-A. Cathiard (2003). Attention-based maintenance of speech forms in memory: The case of verbal transformations. (Commentary on Ruchkin, D. S., Grafman, J., Cameron, K. & R. S. Berndt, Working memory retention systems: A state of activated long-term memory, pp. 709–777), Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26, 728–729. Abry, C., Ducey, V., Vilain, A. & C. Lalevée (2008). When the babble syllable feeds the foot in a point. In: B. Davis & K. Zajdó (Eds.), The Syllable in Speech Production (pp. 409–427). Mahwah NJ:Erlbaum. Ameka, F. ed. (1992), Interjections. Special issue of Journal of Pragmatics, 18 (2/3). Astafiev, S. V., Shulman, G. L., Stanley, C. M., Snyder, A. Z., Van Essen, D. C. & M. Corbetta (2003). Functional organization of human intraparietal and frontal cortex for attending, looking, and pointing. The Journal of Neuroscience, 23(11), 4689–4699. Bickerton, D. (2002). Foraging versus social intelligence in the evolution of protolanguage. In: A. Wray (Ed.). The transition to language (pp. 207–225). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bickerton, D. (2003). Symbol and structure: A comprehensive framework for language evolution. In: M. H. Christiansen & S. Kirby (eds). Language evolution (pp. 77–93). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Bloom, L. (1973). One word at a time: The use of single-word utterances before syntax. The Hague: Mouton. Butterworth, G. (2003). Pointing is the royal road to language for babies. In: S. Kita (Ed.). Pointing. When language, culture, and cognition meet (pp. 9–33). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Cantalupo, C. & W. D. Hopkins (2001). Asymmetric Broca’s area in great apes. Nature 414, 505. Cheney, D. L. & R. Seyfarth (1990). How monkeys see the world: inside the mind of another species. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Cheney, D. L. & R. W. Wrangham (1987). Predation. In: B. B. Smuts, D. L. Cheney, R. M. Seyfarth, R. W. Wrangham & T. T. Struhsaker (Eds.). Primate societies (pp. 227–239). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Crockford, C. & C. Boesch (2003). Context specific calls in wild chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes verus: Analysis of barks. Animal Behaviour, 66, 115–125. Engberg-Pedersen, E. (2003). From pointing to reference and predication: pointing signs, eyegaze, and head and body orientation in Danish Sign Language. In: S. Kita (Ed.). Pointing. When language, culture, and cognition meet (pp. 269–292). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Fillmore, C. J. (1966). Deictic categories in the semantics of “come”. Foundations of Language, 2, 219–227. Givón, T. (1998). On the co-evolution of language, mind and brain. Evolution of Communication, 2 (1), 45–116. Hauser, M., Chomsky, N. & T. Fitch (2000). The faculty of language: What is it, who has it, and how did it evolve?, Science, 298, 1569–1579. Hurford, J. R. (2003). The neural basis of predicate-argument structure. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 26(3), 261–316. Jackendoff, R. (2002). Foundations of language. Brain, meaning, grammar, evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Launey, M. (1994). Une grammaire omniprédicative. Essai sur la morphosyntaxe du nahuatl classique. Paris: CNRS Editions.
Introduction
Lœvenbruck, H., Baciu, M., Segebarth, C. & C. Abry (2002). Prosodic deixis (focus) and syntactic deixis (extraction) in LIFG and LSMG. 8th International Conference on Functional Mapping of the Human Brain, Sendai, Japan. Lœvenbruck, H., Baciu, M., Segebarth, C. & C. Abry (2005). The left interior frontal gyrus under focus: An fMRI study of the production of deixis via syntactic extraction and prosodic focus. Journal of Neurolinguistics, 61, 237–258. Manser, M. B., Seyfarth, R.M & D. Cheney (2002). Suricate alarm calls signal predator class and urgency. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 6 (2), 55–57. Pinker, S. & R. Jackendoff (2005). The faculty of language: What’s special about it? Cognition, 95, 201–236. Sato, M., Schwartz, J.-L., Cathiard, M.-A., Abry, C. & H. Loevenbruck (2002). Intrasyllabic articulatory control constraints in verbal working memory. Proceedings of the VIIth International Congress of Speech and Language Processes, Sept. 16–20, Denver, USA, 669–672. Sato, M., Baciu, M., Loevenbruck, H., Schwartz, J.-L., Cathiard, M.-A., Segebarth, C. & C. Abry (2004). Multistable representation of speech forms: A functional MRI study of verbal transformations. Neuroimage, 23, 1143–1151. Sussman, H., Duder, C., Dalston, E. & A. Cacciatore (1999). Acoustic analysis of the development of CV coarticulation: A case study. Journal of Speech, Language, and Hearing Research, 42, 1080–1096. Tomasello, M. (2003a). On the different origins of symbols and grammar. In: M. H. Christiansen & S. Kirby (Eds.). Language evolution (pp. 96–110). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tomasello, M. (2003b). Constructing a language. A usage-based theory of language acquisition. Boston: Harvard University Press.
About the authors Christian Abry, Docteur d’État of the University Stendhal, Grenoble (France), Professor of Experimental Phonetics in 1998. Since Head of the Department of Linguistics (1998–2008). In the last 20 years he has led at the Institute of Speech Communicaton (ICP-INPG-Stendhal CNRS UMR 5009) three groups: Articulatory Modelling, Linguistic Anthropology of Speech, and founded Speech, Multimodality and Development. Principal investigator in several national and international research projects (1993–1995: Prime, with P. Badin, of ESPRIT-BR Speech Maps, coordinating 14 European Labs in speech inversion and robotics). Main interests in speech production, control and robotics, perceptuo-motor interactions, speech working memory, bimodal speech, speech development, speech evolution, and narratives. Now at CRI (Center for Research on the Imaginary), Stendhal. Jean-Luc Schwartz, a member of the French CNRS, lead the Speech Perception Group at ICP (Institut de la Communication Parlée) from 1987 to 2002, and has now been leading the laboratory since 2003. His main research areas involve auditory modelling, speech perception, bimodal integration, perceptuo-motor interactions, speech robotics and the emergence of language. He has been involved in various national and European projects, and has authored or co-authored more than 30 publications in international journals such as IEEE SAP, JASA, Journal of Phonetics, Computer Speech and Language, Artificial Intelligence Review, Speech Communication, Behavioural and Brain Sciences, Hearing Research, Cognition, NeuroImage, about 20 book chapters, and 100 presentations in national and international Workshops. He is the co-editor of a book on speech communication, of a special issue of the Speech Communication and the Primatologie
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journals, and a co-organiser of the last Audio-Visual Speech Processing conference in 2003. Now at GIPSA-LAB, INPG - Stendhal. Anne Vilain, completed a PhD in Phonetics in 2000, and has been Maître de Conférence in Experimental Phonetics of the University of Grenoble since 2001. Her research is lead within the Linguistic Anthropology of Speech group at the Institut de la Communication Parlée (ICP), and her main research interests are speech motor control, the emergence of language, and the ontogeny of speech production. Now at GIPSA-LAB, INPG - Stendhal.
Vocalize to localize A test on functionally referential alarm calls Marta B. Manser and Lindsay B. Fletcher Verhaltensbiologie, Zoologisches Institut, Universität Zürich, Switzerland / Dept. of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, USA
In this study of the functionally referential alarm calls in the meerkats (Suricata suricatta), we tested the hypothesis that the ability to refer to a specific location was an important factor in the evolution of discrete vocalizations. We investigated what information receivers gained about the location of the predator from alarm calls with high stimulus specificity compared to alarm calls with low stimulus specificity. Furthermore, we studied whether visual cues about the localization of the predator may be available from the posture of the caller. We described the general behaviour of the caller, the caller’s posture, and in particular its gaze direction. We then observed receivers responding to the different call types, to determine whether the acoustic structure of the calls was enough for them to respond in the appropriate way, or whether they used additional visual cues from the caller. We tested this with specific manipulation experiments, using three set ups of playback experiments: (1) no caller visible; (2) model guard with specific gaze direction; and (3) live sentinel. Natural observations and experiments confirmed that in high urgency situations the meerkats have enough information from the acoustic structure of the call to respond appropriately. When hearing low urgency calls that are less stimuli specific, meerkats used visual cues as an additional source of information in a few cases. This may indicate that functionally referential calls evolved to denote the location of the predator, rather than the predator type or its velocity of approach. However, when discussing this result in comparison to other functionally referential calls, such as the food associated calls and recruitment calls, this localization hypothesis does not appear to apply to the functionally referential calls in general. Keywords: evolution, vocalization, Suricata suricatta (meerkat), localization
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Introduction Human speech includes information about a person’s emotional state as well as about external objects. One of the recent discussions on the evolution of language has emphasized the importance of the localization function in the development of vocalization (see Abry et al., introduction to this issue; Abry & Schwartz, 2004). This suggests that discrete acoustic signals evolved when individuals have been selected to denote external objects rather than just express their emotional state. To test this hypothesis one approach is to investigate the calls in animal species that denote to external objects, so called functionally referential vocalisations (Evans et al., 1993). If functionally referential calls contain all the information about the location of an object or an event this could support that the ability to refer to a specific location in the environment was a main selective factor to develop discrete call types. However, it may be that receivers use additional cues on the location of external subjects from the gaze of the caller. It has been shown for several primate species that animals are able to follow the gaze of conspecifics (Tomasello et al. 1998). Seyfarth and Cheney (1980) showed that the alarm calls of the vervet monkeys, Cercopithecus aethiops refer to different predator types. Since then it is commonly accepted that some of the animal vocalizations also denote to external subjects, and are not just the expression of the motivational state of the caller, as had been generally assumed previously (for a review see Hauser, 1996). In the meantime functionally referential calls have been described in alarm calls of several other primate species (Fischer, 1998; Zuberbühler, 2000; Crockford & Boesch, 2003), meerkats Suricata suricatta (Manser, 2001), prairie dogs Cynomis guinnisoni (Slobodchikoff, 1986), and chickens Gallus g. domesticus (Evans et al., 1993). Functionally referential calls have also been found in the context of food acquisition, such as in rhesus macaques Macaca mulatta (Hauser & Marler, 1993) and Capuchin monkeys Cebus capucinus (Di Bitetti, 2003; Gros-Louis, 2003). Discrete call types have been described for different types of predators. However, whether this was specifically predator type, and not the way of approaching, e.g., speed, or the location of the predator is still unclear (Macedonia & Evans, 1993). Since eagles approach from the air at high speed, and terrestrial predators move much slower on the ground, the discrete call types may in fact denote to the direction of the approaching predator, and to a lesser extent to the specific predator type. For example, in dwarf mongoose Helogale parvula the alarm calls convey information on the predator type as well as on its distance and height above ground (Beynon & Rasa, 1989). In meerkats, while call types vary depending on aerial and terrestrial predator, the level of urgency (risk and distance of the predator) explains a large proportion of the variation in the acoustic structure (Manser,
A test on functionally referential alarm calls
2001). Furthermore, meerkats not only emit functionally referential calls, but also emit alert calls to a variety of stimuli in less urgent situations. Meerkats are therefore ideal subjects to investigate whether functionally referential alarm calls allow receivers to extract accurate information on the location of the approaching predator, and whether in less urgent situation visual cues, such as gaze direction of the caller are also important. Meerkats, cooperative breeding mongooses, live in groups of 5 to 40 members. They occur in the dry open parts of southern Africa, and show a high division of labour (Clutton-Brock et al., 1998). The group forages together from one shelter place to the next, and they emit contact calls continuously. They have also evolved a variety of calls to coordinate their vigilance behaviour, including several different alarm calls depending on predator type, and level of urgency to respond (Manser, 2001). The receivers respond immediately to these calls and with different escape strategies to different predator types (Manser et al., 2001). However, meerkats also use three types of alarm calls not highly stimulus specific. They emit a so called ‘panic call’ in highly urgent situations elicited by nearby terrestrial or aerial predators, or bird alarm calls. This results in receivers running immediately to the next bolthole. In low urgency situations, meerkats emit two different alarm calls that result in receivers scanning their environment. The ‘alert call’ is mainly given to aerial predators that are far away, or non-dangerous animals nearby. The ‘moving call’ is given mainly to terrestrial animals, but also to non-dangerous birds flying close above the group, or perched raptors moving their wings. This call type appears to be elicited by the movement of an approaching or leaving animal, and is often followed by the predator specific alarm call. In this paper we investigate whether meerkat alarm calls contain enough information for receivers to locate an approaching predator, or whether they use additional cues of the alarmer’s gaze direction. In particular, we compared the functionally referential calls with the less stimuli specific call types elicited by predators. We used natural observations as well as several different set ups of playback experiments to investigate these questions. We first investigated whether the general behaviour and the posture of callers differ when emitting alarm calls to different predator types, and also in comparison to the less stimuli specific calls. We then asked whether the response to alarm calls by receivers differed when they only heard the call by itself, without a visible caller, and compared it to when they saw the caller, and were able to use visual cues of the gaze direction of the alarm calling individual. Here we used two different approaches: (1) a cardboard model of a guard looking in a specific direction; and (2) a live guard on sentinel duty. We then discuss the results in relation to functionally referential calls in other contexts, such as the food associated calls.
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Methods Data were collected from June to December, 2000, February to April, 2002, and March to June, 2003 on a wild population of meerkats on a ranch in the southern part of the Kalahari, 30 km west of Van Zylsrus, in South Africa (Clutton-Brock et al., 1998). We followed 6 groups with a total of 82 adult individuals along the dry riverbed of the Kuruman. All individuals were easy to identify by haircuts or natural marks, and were habituated to a degree that allowed us to follow them within 0.5 m.
Posture of alarm caller depending on context We analysed the posture of the alarm caller, in particular the direction of its gaze depending on the context, to investigate whether meerkat alarm caller enhance the meaning of the vocalisations by specific gestures. We divided the context depending on: (1) the predator type approaching: (a) aerial, and (b) terrestrial predator; and (2) the urgency of the situation: high and low urgency (for detail on this categorization see Manser, 2001). We first described the posture of the alarmer by distinguishing three positions of its head, and therefore its gaze direction: (a) horizontal (± 20 degrees) position; (b) partly up (45 ± 20 degrees); and (c) vertically (± 20 degrees) up (see Figure 1). Because we had few observations with the individual looking vertically, we pooled the gaze direction (b) and (c) as looking towards the sky. We also recorded the general behaviour of the caller, and in particular whether it scanned the area, or moved to another location, and the time delay prior to moving. We collected data on 20 predator encounter events per alarm call type (except for the terrestrial medium call category, where we only had 12 observations) in 6 different groups. We avoided recording the response of the same individual to the same call type, by using different subjects in each group
a.
b.
c.
Figure 1. Posture of meerkats explaining the different gaze directions: (a) down to horizontal position; (b) >30 degrees up to the sky; and (c) towards the sky.
A test on functionally referential alarm calls
(2 to 4 different individuals per group). However, some of the individuals were used repeatedly for the different alarm call types (1 to 4 times in total).
Response to different alarm call types We observed the response of the meerkats to the different alarm call types during natural predator encounters. We described the general behaviour of the meerkat, its immediate response, its total (including immediate and delayed) response, and the time frame within which the delayed response happened. In particular, for the immediate response we recorded whether receivers: (1) moved immediately for shelter; (2) scanned the area; (3) looked to the caller, and (4) followed its gaze direction; (5) scanned the sky; or (6) did not respond at all. On the total response we were interested whether receivers: (7) looked at the caller, and (8) then followed the caller’s gaze; (9) scanned the sky; and (10) gathered together. We collected data on 20 different events of alarm calling for each call type. As above, for each call type, the response of the same individual was only recorded once, but the responses of some individuals were recorded for more than one call type (1 to 4 times).
Response to playback experiments In addition to natural observations, we used playback experiments to find out how much information the meerkats gained from the acoustic structure of the calls, and how much they got from the posture of the alarm caller. We analyzed 18 playback experiments of each, medium urgency aerial, medium urgency terrestrial, panic, alert and moving calls. Some of these experiments had been conducted for other reasons (Manser et al., 2001), and were reanalyzed for this study. In addition, we performed two different types of playback experiments, in each of 6 groups, each playback experiment with a different individual. In the first set of playback experiments (A) calls were played from a hidden loudspeaker, without a caller visible. In the second set up (B) we played medium urgency aerial calls from a hidden loudspeaker beneath a model guard (cardboard with a meerkat picture of natural body size placed on a shrub of 1 to 1.5 m height). The model guard had its head directed in a specific position (90 degrees up into the sky). To ensure that the response was not unusual because of the model meerkat, we tested the playbacks with a live meerkat on guard. We also decided to play alert calls back, rather than medium urgency aerial calls, because our observational data showed that low urgency calls were more likely to draw the attention to the loudspeaker. In this third set up (C) we played the calls from a hidden loudspeaker beneath a live meerkat on sentinel duty. For this experiment we recorded
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the behaviour of the live guard on video throughout the entire experiment to compare whether the caller gave additional visual signals which the receivers might have used. For the playback experiments we used high quality calls (six different examples per call type) that had previously been recorded with a directional Sennheiser microphone MKH 816 and a digital audio tape (DAT) walkman recorder Sony PCMM1 (see also Manser, 2001). We edited the calls using Canary 1.2.1 on a MacIntosh Powerbook G3-series. The calls were then played back with a DAT walkman connected to a Sony walkman loudspeaker SR A60. Call amplitude was adjusted to what we had observed during naturally occurring alarm calls. Playbacks were only conducted on foraging groups and when the subject was at least 10 m away from the closest bolthole. Furthermore, we did not play a call if there had been an alarm call or another disturbance that had caused the group to run to a bolthole within the last 15 min. We recorded the response of the subject to the played alarm call with a digital video camera Panasonic PV-DV910. We began filming the subject 30 sec. before the call was played, and continued until the animal resumed its previous behaviour, or relaxed otherwise. Typically we only conducted one playback experiment per week in the same group.
Statistics We analysed the responses of the meerkats by conducting a logistic regression model of SPSS v. 11.0 in order to test the influence of location and level of urgency on the frequency of specific responses. For the comparison of the different playback set ups we performed Fisher’s exact test because of the small sample sizes. The delay to respond was analysed with an ANOVA after a logarithmic transformation of the data to fulfill the requirements of the data being normally distributed (Sokal & Rolf, 1995).
Results Posture of alarm caller depending on the call type elicited by the predators The gaze direction of the alarm caller only depended on the direction of the predator approaching, and not on the urgency of the situation (Table 1). Alarm callers emitting calls to mainly aerial predators (medium urgency aerial and alert call) looked in 25% of events horizontally, and in the other 75% at an angle > 30 degrees towards the sky. They looked in a horizontal direction in all medium urgency terrestrial calls elicited by terrestrial predators. Predators eliciting a moving
A test on functionally referential alarm calls
call caused the alarmer to look horizontally in 85% of events, in the other 15% of events they looked at an angle > 30 degrees up into the sky. In the case of the high urgency panic call given to terrestrial and aerial predators as well as for bird alarms, they looked in 90% horizontally, and in two events (10%) towards the sky. Whether the alarm caller moved its position depended on the location of the predator approaching, and on the urgency of the situation (Table 1). In the high urgency context, including the medium urgency aerial and medium urgency terrestrial calls, and the non-predator specific panic call, in 92% the alarmer emitted the alarm call and ran immediately for shelter. In the less urgent situations, including the alert and moving call, alarm callers emitted the alarm call, looked towards the approaching predator, and only in 33% of the events they run for shelter. Alarm callers who changed their positions differed in their time delay to run for shelter depending on the location of the predator (F2,60 = 36.22, p ≤ 0.001), but not on the urgency of the situation (F1,60 = 0.17, p = 0.68) (Figure 2a). They moved immediately, on average within less than one second, when emitting the high urgency panic call. When giving medium urgency aerial or alert calls, independent of urgency alarm callers that ran for shelter did this within less than two seconds. When emitting medium urgency terrestrial and moving calls the alarm caller often delayed their movement, on average for about three seconds.
Table 1. (a) Behaviour and posture of alarm calling individual depending on the location of the predator and level of urgency of situation during natural predator encounter events. (b) Statistics for the different response categories of the alarm calling individual, posture and 2nd response moving. responses observed
location
level of urgency
total n observations
scan hori- moving zontally n (%) n (%)
air
high
20
4 (20)
call type medium urgency aerial
17 (85)
alert
air
low
20
6 (30)
4 (20)
moving animal
ter
low
20
17 (85)
9 (45)
medium urgency terrestrial
ter
high
12
12 (100)
11 (93)
panic
both
high
20
18 (90)
20 (100)
Statistics (logistic regression)
location
Chi-square
41.01
13.78
Significance
df = 2
p value
< 0.001
< 0.001
urgency
Chi-square
0.60
36.2
df = 1
p value
0.44
< 0.001
overall
Chi-square
df = 3
41.01
39.36
< 0.001
< 0.001
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Marta B. Manser and Lindsay B. Fletcher
3.5 3
time in sec.
2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0
medium urgency aerial
alert
moving
medium urgency terrestrial
panic
medium urgency terrestrial
panic
Call types
a. 4.5 4
natural observations playback experiments
3.5 3
time in sec.
20
2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 0 medium urgency aerial
b.
alert
moving
Call types
Figure 2. Time delay in the response to move by: (a) the alarm caller after emitting the alarm call, and (b) the receivers to alarm calls emitted during natural predator encounters and playback experiments depending on the different alarm call types (graph shows mean and SE values).
both
location Chi-square
panic
Statistics (logistic regression)
p value
high
high
low
20
20
20
p value
Chi-square p value
df = 1
overall df = 3
urgency Chi-square
df = 2
ter
Significance
ter
medium urgency terrestrial
20
moving animal
low
air
20
alert
high
level of total n urobgency servat ions
air
location
medium urgency aerial
call type
responses observed
34.50 <0.001
<0.001
33.66
0.006
18.32 <0.001
<0.001
16.01 3.15 0.40
0.09
2.93
0.78
0.49
0.04
1 (5)
6.62
10.26
16 (80) 1 (5)
14 (70) 4 (20) 1 (5)
2 (10) 9 (45) 3 (15)
3 (15) 11 (55) 3 (15)
13 (65) 3 (15) 1 (5)
2.08 0.43
0.41
0.67
0.47
1.51
0
0
0
0
1 (5)
5.55 0.13
0.02
5.32
0.86
0.31
2 (10)
0
6 (30)
3 (15)
2 (10)
n (%)
5.28 0.17
0.03
4.64
0.55
1.2
0
0
2 (10)
1 (5)
0
n (%)
9.61 0.04
0.16
1.96
0.02
8.43
1 (5)
9 (45)
7(35)
9 (45)
6 (30)
n (%)
3.30 0.34
0.7
0.15
0.2
3.22
0
4 (20)
2 (10)
3 (15)
2 (10)
n (%)
n (%)
n (%)
n (%)
Scan loudspeaker Follow gaze
n (%)
full response
Moving Scan area
Follow gaze
Scan Scan sky loudspeaker
1st response No response
8.92 0.04
0.78
3.1
0.04
6.68
0
0
1 (5)
4 (20)
2 (10)
n (%)
Scan sky
53.2 <0.001
0.03
4.83
<0.001
47.37
0
19 (95)
5 (25)
0
0
n (%)
gather
Table 2. (a) Behaviour of receivers depending on alarm call type and the context it was emitted during natural occurring predator encounters, when predator and alarm calling individual were visible. (b) Statistics for the different response categories of the receivers.
A test on functionally referential alarm calls 21
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Marta B. Manser and Lindsay B. Fletcher
Response to naturally occurring alarm calls Receivers showed clear differences in their response to alarm calls occurring during natural predator encounters, depending on the call type and the urgency of the situation. In high urgency contexts when a panic or medium urgency aerial call had been given, receivers in 73% of events ran immediately to the next bolthole, without scanning the surrounding (Table 2). When the medium urgency terrestrial call was given, subjects began to move towards the caller in 70% of events, but in a less high speed than for the other urgent calls (Figure 2b). They often gathered together with the other group members to move to a burrow system, or another part of their home range. When hearing the low urgent alert or moving call, the subjects interrupted their current activity and scanned their surrounding in 50%, and only ran in 15% for shelter. 23% of the subjects did not show a response to these alarm calls elicited in low urgency contexts. The delay in the response to move depended on the location of the predator approaching (F2,56 = 11.18, p ≤ 0.001), and not the urgency of the situation (F1,56 = 2.78, p = 0.1). Receivers rarely looked at the caller and followed its gaze. As a first response, they looked at the caller in 5% of emitted high urgency calls, and 15% of emitted low urgency alert and moving calls. Only in the events of the low urgency calls did receivers consequently look in the same direction as the caller did (alert calls 33%, moving calls 67%). As the total response, receivers looked at the caller as frequently for the medium urgency aerial and medium urgency terrestrial calls (38%) as for the alert and moving call (40%). At this stage they were as likely to follow the gaze of the caller (48%) when they looked at the caller, as a first response. However, this means that in all responses to alarm calls receivers only followed the gaze of the alarm caller in 3% of all events as a first response, and in 11% as the total response.
Response to playback experiments of alarm calls A. Relying only on the acoustic structure of the call (no alarm caller around) When the different alarm call types were played from a hidden loudspeaker without a visible caller the receivers showed immediately the appropriate response as observed during natural predator encounters (Table 3). When we played the medium urgency aerial call the subjects ran in 60% of events for shelter as a first response. In 38% of events they scanned the area, and in 11% they looked to the loudspeaker. When the medium urgency terrestrial calls were given, subjects first scanned the area in 50% of events, or looked at the loudspeaker in 28%. Only one subject moved immediately. Most of them moved as a second response (Figure 2b) and then gathered together with the other group members in 89% of events. When the panic call was played, the subjects ran in 78% of events to the next bolthole
low
low
high
high
air
ter
alert
moving animal
medium urgency ter terrestrial
panic
5 (28) 1 (6)
10 (56) 9 (50) 2 (11)
0 2 (11)
0.01
Chi-square
overall
0.01
<0.001
0.001
p value
df = 1
6.38
0.01
11.20
11.23
Chi-square
urgency 32.12
<0.001
p value
df = 2
Significance
9.16
5 (28)
11 (61)
5 (28)
14 (78)
2 (11)
7 (38)
0.03
9.08
0.90
0.02
0.01
8.63
0
n (%)
n (%)
11 (60)
n (%)
29.11
df = 3
Follow gaze
0.009
11.51
0.01
6.28
0.04
6.28
0
0
0
4 (22)
0
n (%)
0.12
5.85
0.03
5.03
0.88
0.27
1 (6)
0
3 (17)
2 (11)
0
n (%)
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
0
0
0
0
0
n (%)
0.004
13.22
0.055
3.69
0.01
9.11
2 (11)
6 (33)
11 (61)
3 (17)
3 (17)
n (%)
N.A.
N.A.
N.A.
0
0
0
0
0
n (%)
Scan loud- Follow speaker gaze
No response
full response Scan loud- Scan sky speaker
Moving
Scan area
1st response
Chi-square
18
18
18
18
18
total n observations
Statistics (logistic location regression)
both
high
level of urgency
medium urgency air aerial
call type
responses location observed
Table 3. Behaviour of receivers depending on alarm call type to playback experiments without model or visible caller.
0.001
16.30
0.23
1.46
<0.001
16.21
0
0
3 (17)
6 (33)
8 (44)
n (%)
Scan sky
0.001
50.22
0.015
5.88
<0.001
36.13
0
16 (89)
3 (17)
0
0
n (%)
gather
A test on functionally referential alarm calls 23
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Marta B. Manser and Lindsay B. Fletcher
immediately. When we played the alert and moving calls the subjects interrupted their foraging behaviour to scan the surrounding in 58%, and only moved in 14% of all events as a first response. These playback experiments confirmed the natural observations that the delay of time to move depended on the location of the predator (F2,48 = 6.45, p = 0.003), but not on the urgency of the situation (F1,48 = 0.27, p = 0.6) (Figure 2b). Very seldom did the receivers look at the loudspeaker as a first response. When the aerial and panic calls were played subjects looked at the loudspeaker in 6%, more often in the case of terrestrial calls in 28% of events. They often looked at the loudspeaker with some delay, which resulted in the total response for aerial and panic calls in 15%, and for terrestrial calls in 47% of all playback experiments. B. Relying on the acoustic call structure and visual cues of a model guard When we played the medium urgency aerial calls beneath a model guard, the receivers did not change their behaviour much compared to when the same call type was played without a visible caller (Table 4, set up a). In four of the six playback experiments the subjects interrupted their foraging behaviour, and scanned their surrounding. In three events (50%) the subject moved, and in one event the subject looked immediately to the loudspeaker with the model guard. As a second response, in three of the six playbacks (50%) the subjects looked at the loudspeaker and consequently also at the model guard. Two of them (33%) then followed the gaze direction of the model guard. C. Relying on the acoustic call structure and visual cues of a live guard When we played the alert calls beneath a live sentinel, the receivers did not change their response in comparison to when only the call was played from a hidden loudspeaker (Table 4, set up b). As a first response, none of the six subjects moved for shelter, four (67%) scanned the area, and two (33%) looked at the loudspeaker. None of these subjects followed the gaze of the live sentinel on guard. As the total response, three subjects (50%) looked at the loudspeaker and consequently at the live guard, but none of them followed the guard’s gaze. This might have been because the live sentinel did not look in a specific direction, but instead moved its head all the time.
Discussion The alarm calling individual and the receiver in meerkats behaved differently according to the alarm call type elicited by approaching predators. In this study natural observations and playback experiments showed that meerkats respond
Statistics (Fisher’s exact test)
air
Life sentinel
p value
low
low
air
no alarm caller visible
high
p value
air
Model
high
level of urgency
Statistics (Fisher’s exact test)
air
Call type
no alarm caller visible
PB set up
responses observed
6
18
6
18
total n observations
0.20
0
5 (28)
0.17
0.60
4 (67)
11 (61)
0.40
3 (50)
1 (17)
n (%) 6 (33)
10 (55)
n (%)
0.055
2 (33)
0
0.60
1 (17)
2 (11)
n (%)
0.29
0
4 (22)
n.a.
0
0
n (%)
0.55
0
2 (11)
0.055
2 (33)
0
n (%)
n.a.
0
0
n.a.
0
0
n (%)
0.14
3 (50)
3 (17)
0.14
3 (50)
3 (17)
n (%)
n.a.
0
0
0.055
2 (33)
0
n (%)
full response Follow gaze
Scan loud- Follow speaker gaze
No response
Moving
Scan loud- Scan sky speaker
1st response Scan area
0.14
1 (17)
6 (33)
0.51
2 (33)
8 (44)
n (%)
Scan sky
n.a.
0
0
n.a.
0
0
n (%)
gather
Table 4. Comparison of the behaviour of receivers to playback experiments of: (a) medium urgency aerial calls without visible caller and a model guard above the loudspeaker; (b) alert calls without visible caller and a live guard above the loudspeaker.
A test on functionally referential alarm calls 25
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Marta B. Manser and Lindsay B. Fletcher
immediately to the different alarm call types in the appropriate way depending on predator type and level of urgency. While visual cues as a result of the posture, and in particular the gaze of the alarm calling individual is unimportant in more urgent calls, it is sometimes used as secondary cue in less urgent situations. It appears that meerkats use specific information of the acoustic structure of urgent alarm calls to determine the direction of the approaching predator (aerial or terrestrial). Only in less urgent situations do meerkats look for additional cues from the alarm caller’s posture or direction of gaze. Meerkats do not rely more on the visual cues of the alarm caller, because of their open habitat and the location of their eyes, it may be possible for them to scan a huge part of the horizon. Consequently, they may be very likely to spot the approaching predator in the sky or on the ground as fast as looking at the alarm calling individual, to gain information about the direction of the approaching predator. The behaviour of the meerkats in the context of predator avoidance, in particular alarm calls, may indeed support the hypothesis that the localization function of vocalizations was important in the evolution of functional referential calls. In the most urgent situations meerkats only evolved one alarm call, the so called panic call, where they immediately run to the closest shelter (Manser, 2001). In medium urgency and high urgency contexts they use clear discrete call types for aerial and terrestrial predators, and the receivers show the appropriate response. In low urgency situations they emit alert calls, which are not as accurate in terms of functionally referential to predator type or location. However, by using visual cues from the alarm calling individual, though only as a secondary act, this additional information could easily be gained if necessary. One could argue that the selection pressure in the high urgency situations was so strong that the evolution of functionally referential signals is not surprising. It is an obvious advantage for a meerkat to know whether to run for the closest shelter to be safe immediately, or move with the group to another area of their home range. However, whether these functionally referential alarm calls denote to predator types or to the way of the predator approaching, be it speed or location, still is an open question. Although we found some support to the hypothesis that discrete vocalizations evolved to denote specific locations of subjects in the external environment from the functionally referential alarm calls in meerkats, the functionally referential food associated calls do not support this. Food calls have been described for few primate species (Hauser, 1998; Di Bitetti, 2003; Gros-Louis, 2003) and chickens (Evans & Evans, 1999), and these vocalisations in general appear to denote preferred kinds of food. When playing the food calls without visible caller or food source, the subjects approach the loudspeaker, as if they expected to find food. However, these vocalisations denote to an external object next to the caller, and not in a different direction
A test on functionally referential alarm calls
away from the caller, as in the case of the alarm calls. This is similar to the situation of the snake calls in vervet monkeys (Seyfarth & Cheney, 1980), or the recruitment calls in the meerkats (Manser, 2001; Manser et al., 2001). For both call types, the content of the signal is not about location, but rather specific characteristics of external objects. Therefore, these calls, described as functionally referential, do not support the localization hypothesis. It may suggest that other factors, such as specific categorizations in specific contexts are more important. This also brings back the discussion on what we define as functionally referential, and what the different animal species take as functionally referential. Until we can understand how animals categorise their ecological or social environment, it will be difficult for us humans to distinguish between more accurate functionally referential calls than others. One productive way to find out is to design specific experiments to recognize how animals categorise their environment and what kind of concepts they use.
Acknowledgement We thank T. H. Clutton Brock for being able to collect the data at his study site of the Cambridge Meerkat Project at Van Zyl’s Rus. We are grateful to Mr and Mrs H. Koetzee for permission to work on their farm. The members of the Mammal Research Institute, University of Pretoria, including J. Du Toit, and M. Haupt, were a big help in logistical questions. Many thanks to all the assistants and volunteers working on the farm at the Meerkat project. We are grateful to B. König and K. McComb for discussions, and A. McElligot for improvements on the manuscript. The research was funded by a grant given to MM from the Swiss Nationalfonds Nr. 823A–53475. The research was conducted under the ethical laws of the University of Pretoria.
References Abry, C. & J.‑L. Schwartz (2004). Language origins: A puzzle with many pieces. In: J.‑L. Schwartz (ed.). Special issue of Primatologie, 6, 355–368. Beynon, P, & Rasa, O. A. E. (1989). Do dwarf mongoose have a language?: warning vocalizations transmit complex information. South African Journal of Science, 85, 447–450. Clutton-Brock, T. H., Gaynor, D., Kansky, R., MacColl, A. D. C., McIlrath, G., Chadwick, P., Brotherton, P. N. M., O’Riain, J. M., Manser, M. & Skinner, J. D. (1998). Costs of cooperative behaviour in suricates (Suricata suricatta). Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B., 265, 185–190. Crockford, C. & Boesch, C. (2003). Context specific calls in wild chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes verus: Analysis of barks. Animal Behaviour, 66, 115–125. Di Bitetti, M. S. (2003). Food associated calls of tufted capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella nigritus) are functionally referential signals. Behaviour, 140, 565–592.
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Evans, C. S., Evans, L. & Marler, P. (1993). On the meaning of alarm calls; functional reference in an avian vocal system. Animal Behaviour, 46, 23–28. Evans, C. S. & Evans, L. (1999). Chicken food calls are functionally referential. Animal Behaviour, 58, 307–319. Fischer, J, (1998). Barbary macaques categorize shrill barks into two call types. Animal Behaviour, 55, 799–807. Hauser, M. D. & Marler, P. (1993). Food associated calls in rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta): I. Socioecological factors influencing call production. Behavioral Ecology, 4, 194–205. Hauser, M. D. (1996). The evolution of communication. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Macedonia, J. M. & Evans, C. S. (1993). Variation among mammalian alarm call systems and the problem of meaning in animal signals. Ethology, 93, 177–197. Manser, M. B. (1998). The evolution of auditory communication in Suricates (Suricata suricatta). Ph.D. thesis, Cambridge University. Manser, M. B. (2001). The acoustic structure of suricates’ alarm calls varies with predator type and the level of response urgency. Proc. R. Soc. London Ser. B, 268, 2315–2324. Manser, M.B., Bell, M. B. & Fletcher, L. (2001). The information that receivers extract from alarm calls in suricates. Proc. R. Soc. London Ser. B, 268, 2485–2491. Seyfarth, R. M., Cheney, D. L. & Marler, P. M. (1980). Vervet monkey alarm calls: Semantic communication in a free-ranging primate. Animal Behaviour, 28, 1070–1094. Slobodchikoff, C. N., Fischer, C. & Shapiro, J. (1986). Predator-specific alarm calls of prairie dogs. American Zoologist 26, 557–571. Sokal, R. R. & Rohlf, F. J. (1995) Biometry, 3rd edn. New York: W. H. Freeman & Co. Tomasello, M., Call, J. & Hare, B. (1998). Five primate species follow the visual gaze of conspecifics. Animal Behaviour, 55, 1063–1069. Zuberbuehler, K, (2000), Referential labelling in Diana monkeys. Animal Behaviour 59, 917–927.
About the authors Marta Manser took her PhD at the Zoological Institute, Cambridge University, UK on the ‘Acoustic Communication in Meerkats’. She then moved for a Postdoc in the Department of Psychology, University of Pennsylvania, USA, to continue the work on ‘Cognition and Communication on Meerkats’. She presently leads a research group continuing her work on Cognition and Communication on the Meerkats and some other social mammals at the Verhaltensbiologie, Zoologisches Institut, University of Zurich, Switzerland. She is also co-director of the Kalahari Meerkat Research Project. Lindsay Fletcher took her undergraduate studies in biology at the University of Pennsylvania, USA. She then spent half a year working on the Kalahari Meerkat Project collecting field data and performing experiments on the meerkats. Presently, she conducts a PhD in Clinical Psychology, University of Nevada, Reno, USA on ‘Combining Elements of Mindfulness from Eastern Meditation Practices with Behavioural Psychology’.
Mirror neurons, gestures and language evolution Leonardo Fogassi and Pier Francesco Ferrari Dipartimento di Neuroscienze, Università di Parma / Dipartimento di Psicologia, Università di Parma
Different theories have been proposed for explaining the evolution of language. One of this maintains that gestural communication has been the precursor of human speech. Here we present a series of neurophysiological evidences that support this hypothesis. Communication by gestures, defined as the capacity to emit and recognize meaningful actions, may have originated in the monkey motor cortex from a neural system whose basic function was action understanding. This system is made by neurons of monkey’s area F5, named mirror neurons, activated by both execution and observation of goal-related actions. Recently, two new categories of mirror neurons have been described. Neurons of one category respond to the sound of an action, neurons of the other category respond to the observation of mouth ingestive and communicative actions. The properties of these neurons indicate that monkey’s area F5 possesses the basic neural mechanisms for associating gestures and meaningful sounds as a pre-adaptation for the later emergence of articulated speech. The homology and the functional similarities between monkey area F5 and Broca’s area support this evolutionary scenario. Keywords: mirror neurons, monkey, language evolution, gesture, Broca’s area
Introductory remarks In this article we will provide neurophysiological evidence and hypotheses on the possible evolution of language from a neural motor system involved in action recognition. There are different theories about language evolution. Some authors claim that language evolved from monkey vocalization (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990; Mac Lean, 1993; Hauser, 1996; Ghazanfar & Hauser, 1999), others from gestural communication (Corballis, 1992, 2002, 2003; Amstrong et al., 1995; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).
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Leonardo Fogassi and Pier Francesco Ferrari
Others even deny a direct evolution of language from some monkey precursor, considering the former as a completely new acquisition of the human gender, with characteristics that are completely different from any other animal cognitive function (Chomsky, 1986). In the next sections we will examine the possible mechanisms and processes that might have been involved in the evolution of a vocal communicative system so complex as the human speech. We will attempt to draw an evolutionary scenario in which gestures and speech emerged, supported by specific neurophysiological mechanisms.
Vocal communication in primates and its limitations for language evolution In the past few decades, several studies have attempted to compare vocalizations of nonhuman primates with human speech (Ghazanfar & Hauser, 1999) in order to find the possible common ground from which human speech could have evolved. These investigations were aimed to search commonalities between the two forms of vocalizations. One of the main features of monkey vocal communication that parallels human language is the possibility to be referential. Referential communication has a representational value, as vocalization is used as a symbol for referring to object or events external to the signaler. The work by Cheney & Seyfarth (1982) showed how different alarm-calls in vervet monkeys provide listening conspecifics with information about the type of predator approaching. Data regarding referential aspects of vocalization in primates have been accumulated in the last decade (see Ghazanfar & Hauser, 1999 for a review). Despite some encouraging data, however, several reasons argue against nonhuman primate vocal calls as precursor to humans speech (see also Hauser et al., 2002). First, vocal calls are largely related to an emotional state. This observation is also supported by neuroethological studies which show that monkey vocalization is under the neural control of the primitive mesial cingulate circuit, that is mainly involved in emotional behavior (Jürgens, 1995; Jürgens, 2002). Even in our closest relative, the chimpanzee, it has been suggested that vocal calls seem impossible to be produced without the appropriate emotional state (Goodall, 1986). Thus, the voluntary control of vocal production, so typical of human speech, seems to be unlikely present in non-human primates. These findings are also in accord with the observations that there is very little evidence of intentional vocal communication in nonhuman primates (Corballis, 2003). Second, monkeys’ vocal calls show very little flexibility in terms of the possibility of creating new sounds other than those already present in their vocal repertoire. Lastly, the number of vocal signals used for referential communication is very small, mainly restricted to objects or present events (Hauser et al., 2002).
Mirror neurons, gestures and language evolution
Gestural communication as a suitable substrate for language evolution Before introducing an hypothesis on language evolution from gestures, we need to clarify that the term gesture is used here and in the following sections for indicating both goal-related actions (e.g. grasping an object with the hand) and communicative oro-facial and brachio-manual movements. A number of old and new comparative anatomical and neurophysiological data seem to support a gradual evolution of language from gestural communication (Paget, 1963; Corballis, 1992, 2000, 2002; Kimura, 1993) rather than from vocalization. The evolution of facial communicative gestures in non-human primates has been largely investigated in the pioneering studies of van Hooff (1962;, 1967) by comparing in several species the functional role of each facial expression and its meaning. Only more recently, communication through brachio-manual gestures in apes have been documented (de Waal, 1982; Tomasello et al., 1997; Tanner & Byrne, 1996). Interestingly, it has been shown that chimpanzees extensively use brachiomanual gestures with the purpose to communicate to each other. Overall, the studies on gestural communication in monkeys and apes revealed that the production of most gestures, especially oro-facial, probably is not only a hard-wired phenomenon, but can be the result of processes of individual and social learning (Parr & Maestripieri, 2003). This latter aspect suggests that nonhuman primate gestures might reflect not only emotional states but also the cognitive processes underlying their production. Why then gestural communication seems more suitable as a substrate for building up a human-like communicative system? Several lines of research support this hypothesis. First, differently from vocal communication, gestures are often used for dyadic social interactions. Second, it has been shown that gestural communication involving brachiomanual actions is very flexible and combinatorially richer than vocal communication (Corballis, 2003). Studies on chimpanzees showed that the same brachio-manual gesture can be used for different purposes and different gestures can be used for indicating the same goal (see Parr & Maestripieri, 2003 for a review). Third, gestural communication can convey a relational content less endowed with strong emotional involvement. This content is expressed both with brachio-manual and oro-facial gestures (see Van Hooff, 1962, 1967; Parr & Maestripieri, 2003). Fourth, gestures can be intentional as Ploji first described in chimpanzees (1978, 1984). Further studies by Tomasello and colleagues (1985, 1989) identified several intentional gestures in chimpanzees such as, for example, to gather other’s individual attention and to communicate information on impending behavior.
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How the brain codes gestures Communication between two individuals requires two basic properties, strictly linked one with the other: the capacity to emit a gesture and the capacity to recognize it. These two capacities must rely on neural circuits, at least part of which must belong to the cerebral cortex, because of its pivotal role in voluntary behavior. It is well known that in humans the main cortical areas involved in language production and perception are located in the frontal and temporal cortices. Although in monkeys we cannot speak of a language function, we can however look for the presence of neural circuits involved in gesture production and recognition. To do this, we must consider that gestures belong to the field of meaningful actions. In particular, communicative gestures, although often devoid of a target object, are strongly endowed with a meaning. We will first try to demonstrate in monkeys which are the areas linked to action production and perception. Subsequently we will propose, on the basis of recent findings, that production and perception of communicative actions can derive from the primitive system for action execution/perception.
Action vs. movement To use the word action when referring to neural circuits of cerebral cortex is by no means obvious. This because of the assumption, kept until no long ago, and for some researchers still valid, that the sector of frontal cortex devoted to motor control has, as its main aim, the function of coding movements, that is joints displacements. According to this view the main scientific problem has been, for many years, that of finding whether motor cortex neurons could, at the single or the population level, code parameters of the movement, such as force, amplitude and direction. Differently from this, another view maintains that the main function of the motor cortex is that of coding goal directed actions (see Rizzolatti et al., 2000). This type of code renders easier the task of the motor cortex that, in this case, would consist in defining a limited number of motor goals and not an exponential number of movements. Once goals are coded, they can be implemented by executive areas. The neurophysiological and neuroanatomical data of the last twenty years show that this latter view can be actually applied to many areas of the motor cortex. Actions are coded in several areas of premotor cortex, and, more extensively, in the parieto-frontal circuits linking specific premotor and parietal areas (see Rizzolatti et al., 1988, 1998, Rizzolatti & Luppino, 2001). Coding of goaldirected actions at the single neuron level was studied in more detail in the ventral
Mirror neurons, gestures and language evolution
premotor cortex of the macaque monkey, namely in area F4 and F5. Microstimulation and neuron recording of area F4 show that this area is mainly involved in axial and proximal actions toward spatial targets (Gentilucci et al., 1988; Fogassi et al., 1996). Microstimulation and recording experiments carried out in area F5 show that this area contains a partially overlapped representation of hand and mouth movements. Single neuron recording experiments show that in F5 different types of hand and mouth actions are coded such as grasping, manipulating, holding, tearing. Inside these categories of purely motor neurons there are also subcategories whose neurons code a more specific goal, such as the way in which an object is grasped (for example precision grip or whole hand prehension) (Gentilucci et al., 1988; Rizzolatti et al., 1988).
Mirror neurons and gestural communication In area F5 there are also visuomotor neurons that become active not only when the monkey performs hand actions, but also when it observes another individual making similar actions (Gallese et al., 1996; Rizzolatti et al., 1996; see also Fogassi & Gallese, 2002). These neurons have been named “mirror neurons”. These neurons do not respond either to simple object presentation or to the vision of a hand mimicking an action without the target object. They do not respond also to actions mimicked by using tools, such as pliers. Thus the optimal visual stimulus that triggers mirror neurons response is a hand-object interaction, that is the observation of a goal directed action. A further demonstration that these neurons code the goal of the action, and not simply a pictorial representation of a biological motion, was given by a study in which only the first part of the hand action could be seen by the monkey, the final, crucial part being performed behind a screen (Umiltà et al., 2001). Half of mirror neurons tested during this ‘hidden’ condition responded even during the period in which the hand-object interaction was not visible. These neurons seem to be able to keep in memory the presence of the object and internally reconstruct the not visible part of the action. The most interesting property of mirror neurons consists in the fact that in most of them there is a good congruence between the seen and the executed actions effective in activating them. Because of this congruence it was hypothesized that mirror neurons, by matching action observation with action execution, allow understanding of actions made by others. This latter capacity is not simply limited to a recognition of motor patterns, but it extends also to the goal of the observed action. Every time we observe an action made by another individual, we are able to understand its goal because the observed action is matched on our internal
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representation of it, that, in turn, is endowed with the knowledge of the goal. The presence of this matching system is strongly suggestive of its possible role in interindividual communication, accepting that this latter was originally based on gestures. In fact, a communicative gesture made by an actor (the sender) retrieves in the observer (the receiver) the neural circuit encoding the motor representation of the same gesture. This allows the receiver to understand the message of the observer and, perhaps, to begin a response (see Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998). The question now arise on whether there are data indicating the possibility of the above mentioned link between the action observation/execution system and the communication system. Two recently discovered categories of mirror neurons in monkey could explain the transition from a basic action understanding neural system to a system endowed with features typical of language. These two categories are represented by audio-visual mirror neurons and mouth mirror neurons. – Audio-visual mirror neurons become active when monkeys not only observe, but also hear the sound of an action (audio-visual mirror neurons) (Kohler et al., 2002). The response of these neurons are specific for the type of action seen and heard. For example, they respond to peanut breaking when the action is only observed, only heard or both heard and observed, and do not respond to the vision and sound of another action, or to unspecific sounds (see Figure 1). Note that often the neuron discharge to the simultaneous presentation of both the visual and the acoustic inputs is higher than the response to either of the inputs, when presented alone. These data have two important implications: (a) the acoustic input reaching the motor cortex of a listener allows him to retrieve the action representation present in this area, thus accessing to action meaning. This is probably the process occurring during listening to spoken language; (b) audiovisual mirror neurons code actions independently of whether these actions are seen, heard or performed. The capacity of representing action content independently of the modality used to access this content is typical of language. – Mouth mirror neurons are a category of mirror neurons that activate when a monkey observes and execute mouth ingestive actions or, in some neurons, communicative actions (see Figure 2) (Ferrari et al., 2003). Most mouth mirror neurons respond to observation of ingestive actions such as biting, tearing with the teeth, sucking, licking, etc. An example of an ‘ingestive’ mouth mirror neuron is shown in Figure 3a. They show the same specificity of hand mirror neurons. They do not respond to simple object presentation or to mouth mimed actions. Their visual response is often very specific. When the congruence between the visual and the motor response is analysed, most of these neurons (about 90%) show a very good congruence. A smaller but significant percent
Mirror neurons, gestures and language evolution
Figure 1. Example of mirror neuron responding to the sound of an action. Rastergrams are shown together with spike activity function. Text above each rastergram describes the sound or action used to test the neuron. Vertical lines indicate the time when the sound occurred. V + S: vision and sound condition. The monkey observes and hears the experimenter ripping a sheet of paper; S: sound condition. The monkey only hears the experimenter ripping a sheet of paper; CS1 and CS2: control sounds. Traces under the spike density functions in S and in CS conditions are oscillograms of the sounds used to test the neurons (modified from Kohler et al., 2002).
of mouth mirror neurons respond specifically to the observation of mouth communicative actions belonging to the monkey repertoire, such as lips-smacking, lips protrusion or tongue protrusion. Mouth mirror neurons of this sub-category do not respond, or respond very weakly, to the observation of ingestive actions. Figure 3b and c show two examples of ‘communicative’ mouth mirror neurons. Note that all these actions have an affiliative meaning. Mouth communicative mirror neurons with a response to observation of threatening or aggressive gestures were never found. The motor response of mouth communicative mirror neurons is more complex. In those neurons in which it was possible to test the motor response during monkey execution of communicative actions, there was a clear activation. However, most neurons responded also when the monkey executed ingestive actions. Thus there is an apparent incongruence between the visual and the motor response or, at least, the motor response seems more unspecific than the visual one. However, when compared with the effective observed communicative actions,
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Figure 2. Examples of ingestive and communicative actions performed by the experimenter in front of the recorded monkey (left column); same gestures made by the monkey (right column). From top to bottom: grasping of a piece of food; lips-protruded face. (Modified from Ferrari et al. 2003)
the effective executed ingestive actions appeared motorically similar to the observed ones. For example, a neuron responding to the observation of lips-smacking responded also to execution of a sucking action. In both cases an alternation between lips protrusion and retraction and between jaw opening and closure is observed. These visuo-motor properties of communicative mouth mirror neurons suggest that during evolution part of the motor structures of ingestive behavior could have been exploited in order to be used for communicative behavior. This transition, probably ‘photographed’ in the properties of communicative mouth mirror neurons, occurs in a region (ventral premotor cortex) endowed with the apparatus controlling the execution of ingestive behavior (see Ferrari et al., 2003). The hypothesized evolution of the communicative lateral system from an ingestive motor repertoire seems witnessed by ethological studies conducted in several non-human primates. These studies suggest that some communicative gestures such as lips-smacking and pucker face very likely evolved from movements aimed to remove and eat particles, such as skin parasites, from the fur of group mates during grooming sessions. This suggestion is corroborated by the observation that
Mirror neurons, gestures and language evolution
Figure 3. Examples of mouth mirror neurons. In each panel the rasters and the histograms represent the neuron response during a single experimental condition. The histogram represents the average of ten trials. Rasters and histograms are aligned with the moment in which the mouth or the hand of the experimenter (observation conditions) or the mouth of the monkey (motor conditions) touched the food or when the food is abruptly presented (presentation conditions). During observation of communicative actions the rasters and histograms alignment was made with the moment in which the action was fully expressed. Ordinates: spikes/sec; abscissae: time; bin width: 20 ms. A. Ingestive mouth mirror neuron. Top. The experimenter approaches with his mouth the food held on a support, grasps it with the teeth and holds it. Middle. The experimenter grasps with the hand a piece of food placed on a support and holds it. Bottom. The experimenter moves a piece of food to the monkey’s mouth; the monkey grasps and holds it with its teeth. B. Communicative mouth mirror neuron. Top. The experimenter makes a lip-smacking action looking at the monkey. Middle. The experimenter protrudes his lips looking at the monkey. Bottom. The experimenter moves a piece of food toward the monkey’s mouth; the monkey protrudes its lips and takes the food. C. Communicative mouth mirror neuron. Left. The experimenter protrudes his lips looking at the monkey. Right. During the experimenter lips protrusion the monkey responds almost simultaneously to the experimenter gesture by making a lip-smacking action. (Modified from Ferrari et al. 2003)
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the beginning of a grooming session can be preceded or accompanied by a lipssmacking action without ingestion (see Van Hooff, 1962, 1967; Maestripieri, 1996). Interestingly enough, this latter lips-smacking produces a more pronounced sound than that associated to ingestion, as to underline a different meaning. Thus, lipssmacking appears to be a ritualization of an ingestive action, losing its behavioral meaning related to feeding and achieving an affiliative meaning. The transformation of part of the ingestive system in a communicative system is also in agreement with the proposal by Mac Neilage (1998) of an evolution, inside the lateral cortical system, of the syllabic frame from the cyclic mandibular open-close alternation typical of food ingestion. In his view the precursor of human syllables are monkey lips-smacks and tongue-smacks. A further, although still preliminary, support to the appearance, in the monkey, of a lateral communicative system, is represented by mouth communicative mirror neurons responding to sounds. The example reported in Figure 4 shows a communicative mirror neuron that responds to the vision of a communicative gesture such as lips protrusion accompanied by a vocalization made by the experimenter. This neuron activates also when the monkey only sees the same gesture or only hears the vocalization. The presence of mouth mirror neurons suggests that in ventral premotor cortex the action understanding system has been exploited to evolve in an oro-facial communicative system that, differently from that controlled by the mesial cortex, is not linked anymore to strong emotional behavior, but to affiliative behavior. These findings also favor the view that a gestural communicative system has probably preceded the vocal-based communicative system in the human evolution.
Homology between F5 and Broca’s area The discovery in area F5 of audio-visual mirror neurons and of mouth communicative mirror neurons is in good agreement with the proposed homology between F5 and Broca’s area. This homology is based on several data. (1) Cytoarchitectonically, both area 44 (part of Broca’s area) and area F5 are dysgranular (see Petrides & Pandya, 1994). (2) Both Broca’s area and F5 have a mouth and hand representation. Infact several brain imaging experiments demonstrated that Broca’s area, beyond its classical role in speech production is also involved in hand movement tasks. For example it is activated by the execution of hand movements, mental imagery of grasping actions and hand mental rotation tasks (Bonda et al.1994, Parsons et al., 1995, Chollet et al., 1991, Grafton et al., 1996, Iacoboni et al., 1999). (3) Area F5 is endowed with a system for the control of laryngeal muscles and of oro-facial synergisms (Hast et al., 1974). (4) Both area F5 and Broca’s area are activated
Mirror neurons, gestures and language evolution
Figure 4. Example of a communicative mouth mirror neuron responding to sound. During listening to the experimenter vocalization rasters and histograms are aligned with the moment in which the experimenter begun to vocalize. During observation of the communicative action rasters and histograms are aligned with the moment in which the action was fully expressed. Top. The experimenter protrudes his lips looking at the monkey and emitting a vocalization. The type of vocalization emitted by the experimenter was a prolonged and deep ‘uuh’ call, similar to the ‘coo’ calls of macaques. Middle. The experimenter protrudes his lips looking at the monkey. Bottom. The experimenter emits the same vocalization as in the first condition standing 1 m behind the monkey.
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during observation of hand and mouth actions. Many EEG, TMS, MEG and brain imaging experiments demonstrated an activation of inferior frontal cortex when subjects were required to observe goal related actions made by another individual (see for refs. Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Thus, it is confirmed the existence, also in humans, of a mirror system for action understanding. In particular recent fMRI experiments demonstrated that the inferior frontal gyrus is activated both when subjects observe biting action (Buccino et al., 2001, 2004) and when they observe other individuals performing silent speech (Campbell et al., 2001; Buccino et al., 2004; Calvert & Campbell, 2003). In accordance to the idea of a gradual evolution of human’s speech area from a monkey precursor, it is noteworthy that recently a left anatomical asymmetry in the ventral premotor area 44, similar to that present in humans, has been described in apes (Cantalupo & Hopkins, 2001).
Gestures and sound association for the evolution of human speech All these observations strongly suggest that the cortical region precursor of Broca’s area was initially endowed with the capacity to execute and understand hand and mouth actions, together with elements that could indicate primitive forms of dyadic communication. Although in the monkey we have evidence only of a limited number of neurons involved in oro-facial communicative actions, we cannot ignore the fact that these neurons are found in an area in which both oro-facial and brachio-manual gestures are motorically coded, and often strictly associated. Clearly, the brachio-manual gestures described in macaques premotor area F5 are not strictly communicative. In addition, it is known that in macaques the brachiomanual gestural repertoire is not particularly rich. However, on the basis of the visuomotor properties of F5 neurons previously described, it is reasonable to hypothesize that in the emergence of a primitive use of brachio-manual gestures for communication, area F5 was already endowed with the features necessary for controlling this type of communication (i.e., voluntary motor control of hand actions and hand mirror neuron system), and for integrating it with the oro-facial visuo-motor system. However, an important gap to be filled in the route leading to human language evolution is that of the incorporation of sound production into the gestural communicative system. We propose that an early step of this process consisted in a casual production of a sound during the expression of a communicative gesture. Individuals displaying this casual association would have benefit from it because the sound can give more salience to the gesture, so to improve the transfer of information to other
Mirror neurons, gestures and language evolution
group members. Beyond the salience, the possibility to use several oro-facial and brachiomanual gestures in association with utterances represents a big advantage because allow to combine them in a flexible manner, thus creating a richer vocabulary. In this respect monkey area F5 could have some evolutionary advantage, since it is endowed with a large population of neurons controlling both mouth and hand actions. Looking at our closest relatives, the chimpanzees, it is clear that in this species there is a new achievement in the communicative brachiomanual repertoire (see Parr & Maestripieri, 2003), paralleled by a more complex control on the vocal communicative system (Arcadi, 1996, 2000). However, the gesture/vocalization association is largely unexplored in apes. In parallel with the evolution of a more complex motor output, as proposed above, also perceptual representations became more sophisticated. In fact a newly acquired combination of gesture and sound necessarily produces a new motor representation. At this point the mirror neuron matching mechanism should come into play, allowing understanding of the meaning of the new gesture-sound combination. This process would not start from scratch, but it would originate from an already established gesture recognition system. This system, for example, allows a monkey to recognize that another monkey is performing an affiliative gesture (e.g. pout face). If, however, the agent produces a sound together with the pout face, in the brain of the observer a perceptual association between gesture and sound can be easily created if the two stimuli are repetitively associated. This ‘new’ gesture would be endowed with the meaning previously provided by the observation of the gesture alone. This capacity of extending the meaning of a gesture to new gestures through a process of generalization has been recently discovered in a new category of F5 mirror neurons (Ferrari et al., 2005). The demand of an efficient communicative system is not only relying on the increased complexity of the motor output, but also on the parallel development of more sophisticated perceptual representations. A parsimonious cortical system that achieves this correspondence is well exemplified by the F5 mirror system, in that it generates motor representations of hand and mouth actions that can be used for acting, perceiving and understanding. Once a primitive communicative system based on an association between gestures and vocalization took place, a further step in both the motor and sensory development of this system probably occurred through the acquisition of a more sophisticated phonatory mechanism, which allowed the association of a gesture with a specific sound. At this stage of language evolution the possibility of creating a theoretically infinite set of combinations rendered the phonatory system alone more efficient than the previous vocal-gestural system. This stage was crucial for the development of a speech-based communicative system (see Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).
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Although it is obviously very hard to mark when the transition to a highly independent phonatory system did occur, it is noteworthy that also in modern humans, spoken language is commonly accompanied by gestures that enrich the communicative message (McNeill, 1992; Goldin-Meadow, 1999). This favors the idea that in humans the control of speech and gestures can partially overlap in the same cortical areas (e.g., Broca’s area). A strong evidence of this overlap is given by brain imaging studies showing an activation of the inferior frontal cortex in deaf people during production of meaningful signs (Petitto et al., 2000). In conclusion, we have drawn a hypothetical evolutionary pathway from monkey communication toward human language starting from neurophysiological data. The tenet of this hypothesis is that the mirror system although evolved originally in a non communicative system as a mechanism for action understanding, enhanced its capacity to convey information by combining brachio-manual and oro-facial gestures with vocalization. Monkey area F5 appears to be the strongest candidate for the convergence of these functions in the same brain region, also in the light of its anatomo-functional homology with human Broca’s area. The crucial step in this evolutionary scenario would have been a reorganization of the mirror system for the intentional control of gestures and vocalization.
Acknowledgement This work was supported by MIUR, Italian CNR, French CNRS and ESF Programme Eurocores (OMLL, 01‑FOS).
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Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2000). Cortical mechanisms subserving object grasping and action recognition: a new view on the cortical motor function. In Gazzaniga, M. S. (Ed.) The new cognitive neurosciences, 2nd edition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 539–552. Rizzolatti, G., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2001). Neurophysiological mechanisms underlying the understanding and imitation of action. Nature Neuroscience Reviews, 2, 661–670. Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Gallese, V., & Fogassi L. (1996). Premotor cortex and the recognition of motor actions. Cognitive Brain Research, 3, 131–141. Rizzolatti, G., Camarda, R., Fogassi, L., Gentilucci, M., Luppino, G. & Matelli, M. (1988). Functional organization of inferior area 6 in the macaque monkey: II. Area F5 and the control of distal movements. Experimental Brain Research, 71, 491–507. Tanner, J. E., & Byrne, R. W. (1996). Representation of action through iconic gesture in a captive lowland gorilla. Current Anthropology, 37, 162–173. Tomasello, M., Gorge, B. L., Kruger, A. C., Farrar, M. J., & Evans, A. (1985). The development of gestural communication in young chimpanzees. Journal of Human Evolution, 14, 175–186. Tomasello, M., Call, J., Warren, J., Frost, G. T., Carpenter, M., & Nagell, K. (1997). The ontogeny of chimpanzee gestural signals: A comparison across groups and generations. Evolution of communication, 1, 223–259. Tomasello, M., Gust, D. & Frost, G. T. (1989). A longitudinal investigation of gestural communication in young chimpanzees. Primates, 30, 35–50. Umiltà, M. A., Kohler, E., Gallese, V., Fogassi, L., Fadiga, L., Keysers, C. & Rizzolatti, G. (2001). I know what you are doing. a neurophysiological study. Neuron, 31, 155–65. Van Hooff, J. A. R. A. M. (1962) Facial expressions in higher primates. Symposium of the Zoological Society of London, 97–125. Van Hooff, J. A. R. A. M. (1967) The facial displays of the catarrhine monkeys and apes. In Morris, D. (Ed.), Primate Ethology. London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, pp. 7–68.
About the authors Leonardo Fogassi is Associate Professor of Neuroscience at the Department of Psychology, University of Parma and he carries out his research at the Department of Neuroscience of the University of Parma. He is a biologist and he was then trained in neurophysiology. He received a PhD in Neuroscience at the University of Parma (Italy), during which time he spent also one year in the neurophysiology lab of R. Andersen in M.I.T., Cambridge MA. He has published many papers on the neurophysiological properties of monkey premotor cortex, concentrating his interest on the neuronal bases of visuomotor transformation for action and on the cognitive aspects of motor and parietal cortex. Pier Francesco Ferrari is a research fellow at the Department of Neuroscience, University of Parma, Italy. He is a biologist and received a PhD in Ethology in 1997 at the University of Parma (Italy) before moving to the United States as a post-doc at Tufts University in Boston. He taught Neuroscience in the school of Psychology at the University of Parma. He has published on behavioral, cognitive and neurophysiological basis of social behavior in rodents and macaque monkeys.
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Lateralization of communicative signals in nonhuman primates and the hypothesis of the gestural origin of language Jacques Vauclair Research Center in Psychology of Cognition, Language and Emotion, University of Provence
This article argues for the gestural origins of speech and language based on the available evidence gathered in humans and nonhuman primates and especially from ape studies. The strong link between motor functions (hand use and manual gestures) and speech in humans is reviewed. The presence of asymmetrical cerebral organization in nonhuman primates along with functional asymmetries in the perception and production of vocalizations and in intentional referential gestural communication is then emphasized. The nature of primate communicatory systems is presented, and the similarities and differences between these systems and human speech are discussed. It is argued that recent findings concerning neuroanatomical asymmetries in the chimpanzee brain and the existence of both mirror neurons and lateralized use of hands and vocalizations in communication necessitate a reconsideration of the phylogenic emergence of the cerebral and behavioral prerequisites for human speech. Keywords: evolution, communication, primates, gesture, language, vocalization, mirror neurons
The gestural hypothesis of speech origin and animal models The idea that nonhuman primates are as efficient in producing gestures as in vocalizing was proposed long ago. In 1661, a British gentleman, Samuel Pepys, wrote in his diary about an animal he called a “baboone,” which was more likely a chimpanzee: “I do believe it already understands much English; and I am of the mind it might be taught to speak or make signs” (cited by Wallman, 1992, p. 11). In more recent times, Hewes (1973) championed the view that gestural communication played a crucial role in human language evolution. He suggested that very early in
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the history of the human species, gestures were under voluntary control and thus became an easy way to communicate long before the emergence of speech. Several researchers have since endorsed this view (e.g., Armstrong, Stokoe, & Wilcox, 1995; Kendon, 1991, 1993; Kimura, 1993). The thesis is also central to the propositions made by Corballis (1989, 1991, 2003), for whom manual gesturing was the mediating factor in the evolution of handedness and speech in humans. Corballis has emphasized that during the course of evolution, the left cerebral hemisphere acquired a general capacity for “generativity.” As this capacity is understood to be one of the hallmarks of language, it would serve as common substratum for image generation as well as an organizer of actions and pre-adaptations for speech production. A left hemispheric control for gestural acts would thus represent a feature much older than speech. Moreover, such control by the left hemisphere is viewed as the origin of the left cerebral lateralization for language in humans. According to a slightly different view, vocal as well as gestural communication would imply a sequential and temporal organization of movements (Bradshaw, 1988). Evolutionary pressures could thus have favored both functions in relation to the control of gestures and speech within the same cerebral hemisphere (the left). Note that this latter view presents the advantage of tracing an evolutionary path from animal to human communication without referring to animal vocalizations. This article aims to show that several features of the brain and of communicatory behaviors (gestural and vocal) of nonhuman primates, especially apes, can provide useful clues for discussing the issue of the origins of speech and language. Since the question of gestures and speech and their cerebral control is central for the debate concerning the origins of language, I will first summarize the current state of knowledge in humans in this area. I will then introduce the question of cerebral and functional asymmetries in nonhuman primates with an emphasis on the perception and production of vocal and gestural signals in cases of spontaneous and induced communication. I will then review other kinds of evidence which support the gestural origin hypothesis, namely the existence of mirror neurons in the monkey brain, and the characteristics of primate communication compared with those of human communication and language. Finally, I will pinpoint the implications and limitations of the primate model for discussing the question of the origin of speech, language and handedness.
Gestures, speech and hemispheric control in adults, children, infants and fetuses Studies carried out with deaf people are useful to show the close relation between gestures and the left hemisphere. Firstly, it has been demonstrated that similar
Lateralization of gestures in primates and origin of language
areas within the left hemisphere are involved in the comprehension and in the production of signs by deaf people (Corina, Vaid, & Bellugi, 1992; Grossi et al., 1996). Moreover, the acquisition of sign language and that of speech present strong similarities in human infants that can be exemplified by the presence of “silent babbling” among hearing infants born to profoundly deaf parents during the course of their acquisition of natural signed languages (Petitto et al., 2001). Furthermore, Holowka and Petitto (2002) discovered that babies babble with a greater mouth opening on the right side of their mouths, indicating left brain hemisphere control for this activity. The authors conclude that babbling engages the language processing centers in the left hemisphere of the brain. Other findings support the role of the left cerebral hemisphere in the simultaneous control of vocal and gestural communication in humans. Such a relation is clear in the preferential usage of the right hand in situations in which participants are asked to recall lists of words or narratives (Kimura, 1973). It has also been observed that the complexity and frequency of gestures made by adults and children are highly related to the complexity and frequency of their spontaneous language. Thus, it is not surprising to observe that stuttering people interrupt their gestures until speech goes on (Mayberry, Jaques, & DeDe, 1998). The relation between gestures and speech is very strong during human ontogeny, with an increasing involvement of the right hand for gestural communication (Blake, O’Rourke, & Borzellino, 1995). This association is reinforced when vocalizations and speech intervene simultaneously (Locke et al., 1995). As far as human ontogeny is concerned, two sets of data favor the predominance of manual and gestural activities over oral activity. Firstly, in human infants, intentional control of the hands and arms is present at around three months of age (e.g., grasping an object placed in the hands and bringing it to the mouth: Rochat, 1989) and precedes the full coordination of vision and prehension by three to four weeks. By contrast, the development of infant intentional vocal control takes much longer (till the end of the first year: Iverson & Thelen, 1999), and remains imperfect for a much longer period of time (sounds substitutions, reversals and omissions are frequent in young children’s language). Secondly and complementarily, the control of the forelimbs (arms and hands) seems to be lateralized long before vocal asymmetry. Thus, newborns have been reported to show predominant right side biases in head-turning and Moro responses (Michel, 1981; Rönnqvist & Hopkins 1998). Motor asymmetries favoring the right side for arm activity (Hepper, MacCartney, & Shannon, 1998) and thumb sucking (Hepper, Shahidullah, & White, 1991) have even been reported in 10- to 15-week old fetuses. Altogether, these ontogenetic data suggest that asymmetries of the forelimbs develop before vocal asymmetry. Of course, this advance does
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not implicate this development occurred during the evolution from nonhuman primates to humans. However, the fact remains that these features highlight the early maturation of motor functions and their later cerebral control in our species. In particular, it is very likely that speech and gesture have their developmental origins in early hand-mouth linkages, such that as oral activities become gradually used for meaningful speech, these linkages are maintained and strengthened. For Iversen and Thelen (1999), hand and mouth are tightly coupled in the mutual cognitive activity of language, and these authors argue that these systems are initially linked together as these sensorimotor linkages form the bases for their later cognitive interdependence.
Evidence of structural and functional asymmetries in nonhuman primates It appears that recent neuropsychological and behavioral findings in great apes are of significant interest because they pertain to basic theories on the origin of language and speech in humans. There is now a growing body of evidence that challenges the long-held view that brain asymmetries and handedness are exclusively human traits (e.g., Warren, 1980; Corballis, 1991). This section will thus be devoted to summarizing the major findings in support of the view that both at the cerebral and behavioral levels, nonhuman primates show clear patterns of asymmetric processing of information, some of which are of obvious importance for the theory of language and for its evolution (Vauclair, Fagot, & Dépy, 1999). I will examine, in turn, demonstrations of hemispheric asymmetries in great apes and functional lateralized processing of information in relation to audition and to the motor systems within the context of intentional communication.
Evidence for neuroanatomical asymmetries in the brain of apes Two areas of the brain which are crucial for speech and language (namely Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area) have been studied in apes, in search of possible size differences between the left and the right cerebral hemispheres. Using magnetic resonance imaging, Gannon et al. (1998) found that the planum temporale of great apes (gorillas, chimpanzees and orangutans) was larger in the left than in the right cerebral hemisphere (this was true for 17 of 18 chimpanzee cadaver specimens studied). More recently, Cantalupo and Hopkins (2001) used an MRI technique to measure Broadman area 44 (roughly corresponding to Broca’s area) in a sample of 27 great apes. These researchers found that 20 of the apes had a left hemisphere asymmetry, six had a right hemisphere asymmetry and one ape (a bonobo) had no
Lateralization of gestures in primates and origin of language
bias. It remains to be shown that this strong similarity in asymmetrical organization of the brain between humans and apes is related to functional asymmetries. This issue will be touched upon below in the discussion of the production of intentional gestures and associated vocalizations in the chimpanzee. It can be observed that some asymmetries in the Sylvian region have also been found in non-ape species. For example, the length of the left Sylvian fissure has been found to be significantly longer than its right counterpart in the rhesus monkey (Falk et al., 1986).
Behavioral evidence of asymmetries in the perception and production of auditory communications I will now review some of the main findings obtained in relation to the processing of communicatory information in nonhuman primates. Asymmetries in the perception of auditory communication. A widely cited study by Petersen et al. (1978) used the dichotic technique to examine lateralized processing in the perception of species-specific vocalizations in macaques. Japanese macaque vocalizations were presented either to the left or the right ear of the subjects (Japanese macaques and other macaque species). The authors reported that all five Japanese macaques responded faster in the task when the stimuli were presented to the right ear, whereas only one of the remaining five monkeys showed the same right ear advantage. None of the subjects showed a significant left ear advantage. Since right ear information predominantly reaches the left hemisphere, the authors concluded that the left hemisphere of the Japanese macaque was specialized to process meaningful (i.e., species-specific) vocalizations. Using the same technique, Heffner and Heffner (1984) further demonstrated that monkeys with a left hemisphere lesion of the posterior temporal lobe showed a greater decrement in post-operative performance and took longer to re-learn the discrimination task than did right hemisphere-lesioned monkeys. This set of studies suggests that vocalizations in monkeys are controlled by the left hemisphere. In a more naturalistic context, Hauser and Andersson (1994) examined orienting asymmetries to different auditory stimuli in rhesus monkeys living as a social group on the island of Cayo Santiago. While feeding at a food dispenser, individual monkeys were presented with different types of vocalizations. The stimuli (played over a concealed loudspeaker 4 to 10 meters behind the monkey) were presented to the subject. The experimenters recorded which direction (left or right) the monkeys turned to orient toward the sound. Hauser and Andersson (1994) reported that significantly more monkeys oriented to the right compared to the left for conspecific calls but not for a heterospecific call (that of a songbird). These authors interpreted their findings as evidence that the left hemisphere is dominant in
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processing species-specific calls in rhesus monkeys. In a more recent study, Hauser, Agnetta, and Perez (1998) tested the same monkeys with an identical procedure and manipulated the interpulse interval for three different types of rhesus monkey vocalizations, such as grunts and alarm calls. Variations in the interpulse intervals were either longer or shorter than the population mean pulse interval for each of the call types. The main results indicate that manipulations of the interpulse intervals outside the range of natural variation either eliminated the orienting bias or caused a shift from right- to left-ear bias. Altogether, the above results show that a) temporal properties such as interpulse interval provide significant information to listeners about whether or not the signal is from a conspecific, and that b) the orienting bias is controlled by left hemispheric asymmetries. In a final experiment, Ghazanfar, Smith-Rohreberg, & Hauser (2001) studied orienting responses of rhesus monkeys to time-reversed vocalizations. The monkeys in the study oriented to the left, behaving as if these stimuli were novel to them. These results suggest that rhesus macaques use temporal cues to recognize conspecific vocal signals and that, at least for the kind of response used in this set of studies, it is the left hemisphere that is predominantly involved. Interestingly, the relation between the temporal features of the rhesus monkey vocalizations and cerebral organization appears to be similar to what is observed in humans (Belin et al., 1998). Asymmetry in the production of auditory communication. Only one study is available concerning lateralization in the production of vocalizations in nonhuman primates. Hauser and Akre (2001) videotaped the timing asymmetry of both facial and vocal expressions in Cayo Santiago rhesus monkeys. They observed that for both adults and infants, the left side of the face initiated the expression before the right, thereby implicating a right hemisphere specialization. As some of the recorded expressions were related to positive/approach emotions while others were associated with negative/withdrawal emotions, emotional valence did not appear to influence the direction of this motor asymmetry. Such results are somewhat difficult to interpret, as they stand in sharp contrast with the data reported for the perception of vocalizations in macaques, a species for which a left hemispheric advantage has been systematically reported. They are also difficult to explain with respect to the laterality of the mechanisms controlling both speech perception and production in humans, which are mostly underlain by structures located in the left cerebral hemisphere (see Hauser & Akre, 2001 and Weiss et al., 2002 for hypotheses concerning potential differences between these mechanisms in human and nonhuman primates; see also the section below on the cortical control of nonhuman primate vocalizations).
Lateralization of gestures in primates and origin of language
Animal communication and intentions A crucial issue for establishing a valid nonhuman primate model of human communication, including speech, concerns the status of the signals (vocalizations, gestures) used by primates in their spontaneous communication as well as those used in trained situations in which apes are taught forms of human language. To make a long story short, this question amounts to asking if these signals are referential and thus could be more or less equivalent to linguistic signs or if these signals exclusively convey emotionally-based information. This matter is controversial among primatologists and comparative psychologists. Some consider that these signals (vocalizations) convey information with semantic content concerning, for example, the presence of predators (Seyfarth, Cheney, & Marler, 1980), food (Dittus, 1984) or social relationships (Gouzoules, Gouzoules, & Marler, 1984), while others call for more cautions interpretations of these communications and suggest that they are likely to combine both emotionally and referentially based information (e.g., Hauser, 2000; Vauclair, 2003). Interestingly, the difficulties in interpreting nonhuman primate communicative signals culminate in discussions about auditory signals because of the implicit or explicit relation that exists between these signals and linguistic signs (Vauclair, 1996). The question of the symbolic or semantic status of gestural signals seems to be less decisive because, as Leavens explains in his article (this issue), gestures rarely if ever stand for the event or object to which attention is being drawn. Thus, it is easier to propose an operational definition of gestures as referential signals in the sense of behaviors serving to direct attention. Moreover these gestures can also be viewed as intentional because (a) they are produced in a social context, (b) they imply visual contact between the partners engaged, and (c) they imply some changes in the behavior of both the signaler and the partner. For Leavens (this issue), these criteria are met for the gestures used by apes, especially for pointing.
Laterality and manual gestures in intentional communication An interesting and novel field of inquiry has recently emerged in the comparative literature concerning the functional use of gestures in great ape communication. Wild chimpanzees are known to use communicative gestures in various contexts such as begging for food, courtship, intimidation, greetings, etc. (Goodall, 1986; Plooij, 1978). In contrast with vocalizations, the use of these gestures requires close visual contact between partners. In addition, the gestures are usually performed between only two individuals. In this respect, communicative gestures are more
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appropriate than vocal signals in the search for the evolutionary precursors of speech, because the latter are typically not directed to specific individuals. A number of independent observations carried out on captive apes have shown that these communicative gestures are preferentially performed with the right hand (in gorillas: Shaffer, 1993; in bonobos: Shafer, 1997; in chimpanzees: Hopkins & Leavens, 1998). The referential and intentional status of these gestures has also been convincingly established (Leavens, this issue). Captive apes are regularly observed using manual gestures when food is placed out of their reach. If an audience is present, the apes increase the frequency of their gestures and alternate their gaze between the food object and the social agent. These behaviors suggest that the apes monitor the effect of their gestures on the social partner (a human) to whom they direct their communicative acts. In a unique study, Hopkins and Cantero (2003) examined the spontaneous production of gestures and vocalizations in a captive group of 73 chimpanzees. The study was prompted by observations that right hand use in gestural communication was significantly higher when the gestures were accompanied by a vocalization. The procedure was simple: an experimenter stood approximately one meter from the chimpanzees’ home cage and directly in front of the chimpanzee subject. The experimenter approached the cage and offered the chimpanzee a banana. Since the banana was out of the immediate reach of the ape, this condition stimulated the production of communicative behaviors by the chimpanzee subject. Note that the experimenter maintained eye contact with the subject throughout the duration of the trial in order to increase the probability that the ape would produce a communicative behavior. Begging gestures accompanied or non-accompanied by vocalizations toward the experimenter were recorded for one minute. The data showed that each chimpanzee produced on average 29 gestures (over ten trials), about seven of which were accompanied by a vocalization. Concerning laterality, right-hand population biases were found for gestures alone and for gestures associated with vocalizations. Within the entire sample of chimpanzees, 51 subjects produced gestures both with and without vocalizations. An analysis conducted on this subsample revealed that gesture + vocal right handedness scores were significantly higher than the gesture + no-vocal handedness scores (Figure 1). It is important to establish whether the use of the right hand within a communicative context generalizes to other motor tasks or is specific to gestural communication. Since the chimpanzees tested in the study are being reared in a human-designed, right-handed world, it needs to be shown that the preferential use of the right hand for gestural communication is not correlated with other measures of hand use and therefore does not reflect a bias associated with other motor functions. Hopkins and Cantero (2003) verified that this was not the case, finding that the use of
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Gestures + Vocal
Mean HI values
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Total Gestures + No-vocal
20 10 0
Groups
Figure 1. Mean handedness indices (HI) for the overall number of gestures, the gestures produced with a vocalization (Gesture + Vocal) and the number of gestures produced without a vocalization (Gesture + No-Vocal).
Mean handedness indices (HI) were derived by subtracting the number of left hand responses from the number of right hand responses and dividing by the total number of responses HI=[(R-L)/(R+L)]. Indices < 0 indicate a left bias; indices > 0 indicate a right bias. The figure shows HI values for the overall number of gestures (Total), the number of gestures produced with a vocalization (Gesture + Vocal) and the number of gestures produced without a vocalization (Gesture + No-Vocal). All were significantly different from zero. In addition, the HI values for the Gesture + Vocal responses were significantly higher than the HI values produced for the Gesture+ No-Vocal responses. (Adapted from Hopkins & Cantero, 2003)
the right hand in communicative contexts was independent of other measures of handedness such as hand use in simple reaching, and in bimanual feeding. The findings from this study thus indicate that the preferential use of the right hand for gestures is significantly enhanced when the gestures are accompanied by a vocalization. Taken together, these results suggest that the neurobiological substrates for nonvocal intentional, referential gestural communication are lateralized to the left hemisphere. Moreover, these results further imply that the production of vocalizations used by chimpanzees may be lateralized to the left hemisphere because they have a facilitative effect on right but not on left hand use in gestural communication. This set of data thus shows a remarkable convergence with the behavior of humans (children: Blake et al., 1994, and adults: Kimura, 1973) when they simultaneously produce speech and manual gesticulations. A fascinating extension of these findings was reported by Hopkins and Cantalupo (2003). Based on their report that Brodmann’s area 44 (BA44) was larger
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in the left compared with the right hemisphere in the great apes (Cantalupo & Hopkins, 2001), these authors looked for a possible association between the anatomical asymmetries observed in Broca’s area and asymmetries in gestural communication, as well as in hand use for simple reaching. Using a subsample of the 20 chimpanzees previously examined with MRI techniques (see above), Hopkins and Cantalupo (2003) found negative correlations between the handedness index values for gestures and BA44. This result indicates that increased right hand use is associated with larger left hemisphere in Broadman 44 values. When the correlation coefficients are adjusted for simple reaching, the index values for communicative gestures were significantly associated with the medial portion of BA44 and close to statistical significance for the total BA44. These findings need to be investigated further with a larger sample of apes to more completely establish the association. Nevertheless, these data reveal for the first time that structural asymmetries in the brain of the great ape have functional counterparts in the asymmetry of hand use and notably with respect to the production of intentional vocal and gestural communications.
Other kinds of evidence in nonhuman primates Mirror neurons in the monkey brain The discovery of neurons in the monkey’s premotor cortex that discharge both when the monkey makes a particular action and when it observes another individual, monkey or human, making a similar action (Gallese et al., 1996) offers converging evidence of the importance of manual actions and gestures in understanding actions made by others. The existence of such mirror neurons that map perception onto execution could provide one of the keys for understanding the origin of language. Note that these mirror neurons are located in area F5, a homologue of Broca’s area in the monkey brain. Such mirror neurons have also been described in Broca’s area in humans (e.g., Nishitani & Hari, 2000), suggesting that the representation of actions and speech is processed by the same cerebral structures. In a recent study, Kohler et al. (2002) reported that in area F5 of the macaque brain, there are not only visual mirror neurons but also auditory mirror neurons. These neurons discharge when the animal performs a specific action, as well as when it hears the sounds produced by such an action (e.g., ripping a piece of paper or dropping a stick). It thus seems that area F5 of the monkey brain is predisposed to managing not only visuo-gestural but also auditory-visual systems of communication.
Lateralization of gestures in primates and origin of language
From the above findings, the perspective proposed here is that the development of the human lateral speech circuit resulted from the fact that the precursor of Broca’s area was endowed, before the appearance of speech, with a mechanism for recognizing actions made by others. This mechanism was the neural prerequisite for the development of inter-individual communication and finally of speech. In this respect, language needs to be viewed in a more general setting than one that considers speech as its complete basis, as it is involved in both action recognition (including gestures) and speech processing (Rizzolati & Arbib, 1998).
Some functional differences between animal communication and human language A consideration of the specific modalities underlying speech and a comparison between these modalities and nonhuman communication may also help shed light on the question of the gestural origin of language. Developmental psychologists distinguish two main modalities or functions in linguistic as well as prelinguistic communication among humans (Bates, 1979). The primary function of language is to exchange information about the world. Such an informative function takes two forms: a declarative form used in representing states of the world (e.g., “John is coming”) and an interrogative form. The other function is injunctive (imperative) and exclamatory and mostly expresses itself with requests and demands (e.g., “Come here!”). Developmental studies with young children have shown that the use of declaratives (see references in Vauclair, 2003) becomes the dominant mode of communication between one and two years of age (about 60% of all utterances). It happens that a major difference between humans and nonhuman primates lies in the fact that the use of signals and learned symbols by the nonhumans is largely restricted to their imperative function, whereas humans use them predominantly for declarative purposes. These declaratives can be words or gestures, and they function not primarily to obtain a result in the physical world, but to direct another individual’s attention (his or her mental state) to an object or event, as an end in itself. Thus, a human toddler might say “Bird!” apparently to mean, “It’s a bird!” or, “Look! A bird,” and so on. In such cases, the child communicates simply to share interest in something that he or she sees, that this object is a bird and that the child has identified it and finally that he or she wants the partner to look at it. It can be asserted with some confidence that the use of protoimperative signals is the exclusive mode of communication by animals of different phyla. When, for example, your cat meows at you in the vicinity of the window and at the same time glances back and forth from the window to you, the cat is using a protoimperative
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signal that can be interpreted as “I want to go out.” But it is very unlikely that your cat would use these same communicative signals to let you know that it has noticed something interesting in the garden and that it wants to share its discovery with you. I have claimed (Vauclair, 1982, 1984, 1996, 2003; see also Tomasello & Camaioni, 1997) that this imperative function also appears to be the predominant (if not exclusive) mode used by “linguistically” trained apes. For example, an analysis of the combinations of visual productions made by the famous bonobo Kanzi (Savage-Rumbaugh, Rumbaugh, & McDonald, 1985) reveals that 96% of this ape’s productions were requests. Interestingly, these productions mostly consisted of combinations of visual signals (lexigrams punched on a keyboard) and gestures directed to the human partner. Thus, the difference between Kanzi’s modality of communication and the typical declarative mode observed by humans is striking. In effect, communication in apes has essentially an imperative function. This appears to be the rule for all animal species and this mode fulfills biological requirements, for example warning against predators, as in vervet monkey alarm calls (Seyfarth et al., 1980). By contrast, humans use not only speech but also prelinguistic communication means such as gestures (e.g., pointing) for both imperative and declarative purposes (for example, two persons sharing an interest toward a third person, an object, or an event). Place (2000) has argued that there was in humans an ontogenetic primacy of the use of the system of “mands” in the sense of Skinner (1957) compared to the system of “tacts.” Mands can be broadly defined as commands, requests or questions that the speaker addresses to a listener. A mand serves to specify an action to be performed by the listener, the realization of which operates primarily for the benefit of the speaker. By contrast, tacts constitute more complex forms of behaviors in the sense that “they are reinforced, not, as in the case of the mand, by the behavior they call for from the listener, but by a variety of specialized reinforcers, responses such as gratitude for information supplied, agreement with opinions given, sympathy for troubles told, surprise at and interest in news reported, or laughter at jokes” (Place, 2000, II.iii). It follows from this distinction that “in the evolution of language it [the tacts] must have developed later [than the mands], as it does in the child. Moreover, since interrogative mands presuppose the availability of the tacts they solicit from the listener, it follows that the first sentences must all have been imperatives” (Place, 2000, II.iii). The parallel between mands and tacts with imperatives and declaratives and their respective functions is striking. It is thus tempting to speculate that the mands and protoimperative actions are the dominant actions both in the nonhuman primates and in the developing human infant and child. It is also likely that these
Lateralization of gestures in primates and origin of language
systems function best by means of mimed movements and by pointing gestures. This view is reminiscent of the scenario offered long ago by Condillac (1746) in his theory of a “language of action.” He stressed that man’s first efforts at communication required signals (gestural, pantomimes and then vocal signs) produced in a context in which they unambiguous and self-explanatory.
Cortical control of nonhuman primates’ vocalizations In the section devoted to the presentation of asymmetries in the production of auditory communications in nonhuman primates, I reported that these productions were lateralized to the right cerebral hemisphere in the macaque (Hauser & Akre, 2001). This finding is somewhat troubling in light of the human data concerning speech control. Steklis and Harnad (1976) wrote some years ago that that “the neural control of the vocal activity of nonhuman primates is somehow not adapted to the kind of activity involved in language. These vocalizations are controlled by evolutionarily primitive regions of the brain which are involved in stereotyped species-typical communicative behaviors and emotion” (p. 447). They added that “primate calls are a relatively restricted and predictable set for a particular species, and even if they depend upon experience for acquisition, the amount of variation in the final product is negligible compared to the variety of learned complex behaviors of which the limbs, the most qualified candidates of all, are capable” (p. 445). What explanations could be offered to explain the findings on comprehension/production systems and their lateralization in nonhuman primates? First we must dissociate comprehension from production in terms of the evolutionary pressures that have acted on the processes and on their cerebral organizations. As observed by Hauser (1996), the cortical component in primate vocalization may be more pronounced with respect to perception than with respect to production. In the former case, several demonstrations mentioned earlier in this paper suggest that the cortical system for the perception of species-specific calls in nonhuman primates is lateralized to the left. For production systems which appear to be lateralized to the right side of the brain in monkeys, a simple explanation is to consider that the production of these calls occurs in emotional situations, such as danger to the group. In this respect, it is not surprising, given the content and nature of the information conveyed, to observe a control by the right hemisphere. In addition, the lack of intentional control over these calls may be adaptive because it makes them impossible to fake (Knight, 1998). The picture is very different for chimpanzees and possibly for other great apes. In chimpanzees, there is good evidence for the existence of both structural asymmetries in Broca’s area and Wernicke’s area (see above) and functional lateralization
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in the association of gestures and vocalizations during intentional communicative actions (see Hopkins & Cantero, 2003 and above). It is noteworthy that, to my knowledge, only one study is available concerning cerebral control of vocalizations in apes. Bernston, Boysen, and Torello (1993) recorded ERP measures in chimpanzees during the presentation of simple non-signal stimuli as well as conspecific and human vocalizations and found a right hemisphere laterality in the processing of the significant vocal stimuli. This study concerned only a single chimpanzee and in no way permits us to draw a definite conclusion. Data on volitional control of vocalizations both for comprehension and production are thus badly needed. Such data will help us to better understand the neural systems involved in higher cognitive and communicative abilities in chimpanzees and other ape species.
Theoretical implications I wish to point to the implications of the results reviewed here to the use of a primate model in support of the gestural theory of the origin of speech. Firstly, there is now some evidence that chimpanzees not only possess brain asymmetries in speech-related areas but also use gestures in an intentional and referential way. Such findings offer clear support for theories proposing gestural origins of human language and speech (e.g., Kendon, 1995; Corballis, 2003). A safe hypothesis is to consider that this asymmetry was also present in the common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees, at least 5 million years ago when the ape-human lineage split. Secondly, given the available evidence, it might be wise to distinguish handedness from a lateralized hand use within a communicative context. The argument can be described with respect to two issues. The first point concerns the systematic report of left hemispheric control of vocalizations in an impressive range of animal species (from frogs to mice, and from birds to dolphins and monkeys: for reviews, see Rogers & Andrew, 2002). This robust coherence of left hemispheric control in vocal communication in the animal kingdom most likely reflects the necessity to fulfill basic needs in relation to the acoustical relevant features of the calls. In this respect, this left hemisphere control in vocal animals might be similar to its involvement, in humans, in the temporal and spectral analysis of speech (Fitch, Miller, & Tallal, 1997; Schwartz & Tallal, 1980). Thus, vocal communication in animals also relies heavily on the use of small and rapid changes in the sound produced. For example, Charrier, Mathevon, and Jouventin (2001) have reported that frequency modulation appears to be a key component for individual recognition in the sub-Antarctic fur seal. Similarly, Hauser et al. (1998, and see above) manipulated interpulse interval in rhesus monkey calls and showed that this change
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provoked either an elimination of the left hemispheric bias or a shift from left to right bias. Aside from monkeys and apes, the species mentioned above do not possess limbs equivalent to hands but nevertheless show a left hemispheric control of the reception and sometimes of the production of their vocal communications. A second argument envisions that the relation between handedness and language is not total. This view comes from the obvious fact that about 70% of left-handers are also left-cerebrally dominant for language. From a brain imaging study of word generation on a large sample of right-handed participants, Knecht et al. (2000) concluded that the association between handedness and language dominance “is not an absolute one” (p. 78). These facts and the finding that about 65% of individuals belonging to large groups of chimpanzees exhibit right-hand preferences during bimanual coordination tasks (e.g., Hopkins, 1994) led Hopkins and Cantalupo (2003) to suggest that “from an evolutionary perspective, righthandedness may have evolved after the emergence of asymmetries associated with gestural communication, as Corballis [2003] has proposed, but handedness may not have been a direct consequence of selection for motor systems associated with language and speech in modern humans” (p. 225). In the article “From mouth to hand: Gesture, speech, and the evolution of right-handedness,” Corballis (2003) responds to the commentaries on his article. He defends the view that language has its origins in the gestural system, writing, “I also think it likely, despite the doubts of some commentators, that there is indeed a link between handedness and the left-cerebral control of speech, and the balance of evidence still seems to me to support the idea that it was an asymmetry in the control of the organs of speech that provided the nudge. Whether this asymmetry originated in the lateralized control of vocalization itself and whether it has ancient roots, now seem more problematic [my italics]. I think we need more evidence about the control of vocalization, from both evolutionary and neurological perspectives” (p. 250). I believe that the kind of evidence Corballis (2003) asks for is exactly what the recent ape studies on neuroanatomical asymmetries and on laterality in gestures suggest, namely that the neurobiological basis for intentional, referential communication was present prior to hominid evolution. Of course, a number of important issues need to be resolved to establish solid ground for the nonhuman primate model of speech and language origins. Although apes appear to represent particularly appropriate phylogenetic models for addressing these issues, there are still two serious problems that limit their use in the debate over the question of the origin of language. The first main problem, as I have stressed above, concerns the urgent need to obtain detailed information on the neural systems involved in the processing of communicative and cognitive abilities in these species. The introduction of novel
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brain imaging techniques for investigating animals, including nonhuman primates, while they are awake (Logothetis, 2003), is very promising in this respect. The second main problem that cannot be solved by technical progress only relates to the determination of the nature of the vocal signals used by nonhuman primates. As I have noted earlier, the question of whether these vocalizations refer only to emotional states or convey semantic information is still controversial. In addition to the demonstrations offered earlier in this article, recent studies on Diana monkeys reinforce the view that the alarm calls of these monkeys are modulated in such a way that they provide information related not only to the class of predators signaled (the leopard or the crowned eagle) but also to the distance of the predator from the caller (Zuberbuhler, 2000). A detailed analysis of the calls of free-ranging Diana monkeys has also revealed that the modulation of the formants of the monkey calls results from an active vocal filtering (Riede & Zuberbuhler, 2003). Riede and Zuberbuhler argue that this filtering is used by the monkeys in order to encode semantic information. Of course, the underlying neural systems controlling this kind of signal in this species must still be explained.
Acknowledgments I thank William D. Hopkins for providing material and relevant references and for discussions on the question of the origins of language and speech. The writing of the ideas presented in this article was supported by the European Science Foundation EUROCORES-OMLL program “The Origin of Man, Language and Languages” and by the French program OHLL (CNRS) “L’Origine de l’Homme, du Langage et des Langues.”
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Vauclair, J. Fagot, J., & Dépy, D. (1999). Nonhuman primates as models of hemispheric specialization. In: M. Haug & R. E. Whalen (Eds.), Animal models of human emotion and cognition (pp. 247–256). New York: APA Books. Wallman, J. (1992). Aping language. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. Warren, J. M. (1980). Handedness and laterality in humans and other animals. Physiological Psychology, 8, 351‑359. Weiss, D., Ghazanfar, A., Miller, C. T., & Hauser, M. D. (2002). Specialized processing of primate facial and vocal expressions: Evidence for cerebral asymmetries. In: L. Rogers & R. Andrews (Eds.), Cerebral vertebrate lateralization (pp. 480–530). New York: Cambridge University Press. Zuberbuhler, K. (2000). Referential labelling in Diana monkeys. Animal Behavior, 59, 917–927.
About the Author Jacques Vauclair is Professor of Developmental Psychology at the University of Provence, and Director of the Research Center in Psychology of Cognition, Language and Emotion, Aix-enProvence (France). He previously worked at the Research Center for Cognitive Neuroscience at the CNRS in Marseilles on laterality and comparative cognition in human and nonhuman primates. His most recent research interests concern issues related to laterality and the development and origin of language. He is Chief editor, jointly with Jean-Paul Caverni, of the e-journal Current Psychology Letters: Brain, Behavior and Cognition.
Manual deixis in apes and humans David A. Leavens University of Sussex
Pointing by apes is near-ubiquitous in captivity, yet rare in their natural habitats. This has implications for understanding both the ontogeny and heritability of pointing, conceived as a behavioral phenotype. The data suggest that the cognitive capacity for manual deixis was possessed by the last common ancestor of humans and the great apes. In this review, nonverbal reference is distinguished from symbolic reference. An operational definition of intentional communication is delineated, citing published or forthcoming examples for each of the defining criteria from studies of manual gestures in apes. Claims that chimpanzees do not point amongst themselves or do not gesture declaratively are refuted with published examples. Links between pointing and cognitive milestones in other domains relating means to ends are discussed. Finally, an evolutionary scenario of pointing as an adaptation to changes in hominid development is briefly sketched. Keywords: pointing, hominoidea, apes, communication, manual gestures, deixis, nonverbal reference
One of the most striking human developmental transitions is the dawn of manual deixis, or pointing, around the end of the first year of life (Bates, Camaioni, & Volterra, 1975; Butterworth, 2001; Carpenter, Nagell, & Tomasello, 1998; Franco & Butterworth, 1996). Deixis is the ability to locate, for an observer, a specific entity or location. Despite sporadic published reports of pointing by apes in captivity (reviewed by Leavens & Hopkins, 1999), until recently most developmental psychologists believed that pointing was a uniquely human behavior (e.g., Butterworth & Grover, 1988; Povinelli & Davis, 1994). Pointing is how one organism manipulates the visual attention of another to some distant entity; it is therefore a manifestly referential act, insofar as it co-ordinates the visual attention of two separate organisms (e.g., Bates, O’Connell, & Shore, 1987). At present, the evidence is as follows: (a) human infants in Western societies commonly point to distant objects or events by the beginning of the second year of life, (b) apes in the wild only rarely
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Table 1. Phylogenetic patterns in manual deixis Characteristics of pointing Imperative?
Declarative?
Western civilization, Japan (Homo sapiens)a
Yes
Yes
Autismb
Yes
Rare
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)c
Yes
Yes
Bonobos (Pan paniscus)d
Yes
Yes
Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla)e
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)g
Yes
No
Bonobos (Pan paniscus)h
Yes
No
Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla)i
No
No
Yes
N/A
Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes)k
N/A
Yes
Bonobos (Pan paniscus)l
N/A
Yes
Gorillas (Gorilla gorilla)
N/A
N/A
Orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus)
N/A
N/A
Rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta)m
Yes
N/A
Capuchin (Cebus apella)n
Yes
N/A
Humans
Great apes (captive, language-trained or home-reared)
Orangutans (Pongo
pygmaeus)f
Great apes (captive, neither language-trained nor homereared)
Orangutans (Pongo
pygmaeus)j
Great apes (feral, in natural habitats)
Monkeys (captive)
Monkeys (feral, in natural habitats):
No reports of pointing to date.
Notes. N/A = insufficient data. Representative references: aBates et al., 1987 bBaron-Cohen, Cox, Baird, Swettenham, Nightingale, Morgan, Drew, & Charman, 1996 cGardner & Gardner, 1971; Kellogg & Kellogg, 1933; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986 dSavage-Rumbaugh et al., 1998 eBonvillian& Patterson, 1999 fCall & Tomasello, 1994; Furness, 1916; Miles, 1990 gLeavens & Hopkins, 1998; Leavens et al., 1996, 2004a; hSavageRumbaugh, Wilkerson, & Bakeman, 1977 iPika, Liebal, & Tomasello, 2003; Tanner & Byrne, 1999 jCall & Tomasello, 1994 kInoue-Nakamura & Matsuzawa, 1997 lVeá & Sabater-Pi, 1998 mHess et al., 1993 nMitchell & Anderson, 1997
point, (c) apes in captivity point very frequently, usually in the complete absence of explicit training, (d) monkeys in the wild have not been reported to point, and (e) monkeys in captivity only rarely point spontaneously, but they can be readily trained to point (Table 1). Because pointing is rare in wild ape populations, yet commonplace in captive ape populations, in the complete absence of explicit training (e.g., Leavens
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& Hopkins, 1998; Leavens, Hopkins, & Bard, 1996; Leavens, Hopkins, & Thomas, 2004a), then this has clear implications for our understanding of the heritability of deixis. If pointing is the phenotype of interest, then variance in the expression of that phenotype (VP) is
VP = VG + VE + VGxE
where VG is variance attributable to genotype, VE is variance attributable to the environment, and VGxE is variance attributable to the interaction between the genotype and the environment. It is implausible that in the decades-long procurement of apes from the wild for display in zoos and for research and other purposes, hunters have somehow managed to select only those apes with ‘pointing genes’ or ‘pointing gene complexes.’ That is, apes in captivity are genotypically representative of apes in the wild. Therefore, VG can be dropped from the equation and, with respect to pointing,
VP = VE + VGxE
Thus, the heritability of pointing is nil; that is, the contribution of purely genetic variance to phenotypic variance is negligible. It follows that any account of the development of pointing in captive apes must invoke exogenous environmental factors. (See Danchin, Giraldeau, Valona, & Wagner, 2004, for an elaboration of the components of VE.) Hence, if we are to understand the development of pointing in captive apes, we must understand which of the multitudinous environmental differences between wild and captive apes are most relevant. This is not a straightforward task, chiefly because, like humans, apes are extraordinarily longlived and experience very long juvenile and adolescent epochs (Fragaszy & Bard, 1997; Tutin, 1994). This means that by the time researchers come to interact with or observe any particular ape, that ape may have experienced several decades of poorly-documented life experience. If we document pointing in, say, a 40-year-old chimpanzee, what can we say about how that chimpanzee might have acquired the behavior? In truth, very little. However, it is still not universally accepted that apes point (cf. Baron-Cohen, 1999; Povinelli, Bering, & Giambrone, 2003a). Therefore, before turning to a consideration of a candidate explanation for the development of pointing in captive apes and its implications for understanding the evolution of manual deixis, considerable discussion is warranted on the question of what I mean when I assert that apes in captivity point.
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Nonverbal reference defined Because ‘reference’ is a term with both general and specialized meanings, a brief denotative digression is warranted. In symbolic reference, symbols are produced (e.g., “dog”) which, by virtue of a shared lexicon between speaker and listener, coordinates the attention of the interactants to a conceptual entity. That is, no dog needs to be immediately present for reference to occur. Symbolic reference therefore allows communicators to transcend the immediate sensory environment (a property called ‘displacement’). For some people, particularly linguists, ‘reference’ invokes a representational architecture in which a symbol ‘stands for’ a real or imaginary object, or ‘referent.’ For these researchers, who use the term ‘reference’ in this specialized sense, it is nonsensical to refer to pointing as ‘referential’ because in no meaningful sense does the gesture ‘stand for’ the event or object to which attention is being drawn. In the interest of clarity, therefore, it is important to emphasize that in the present paper, as in our previous articles (Leavens & Hopkins, 1998; Leavens et al., 1996, 2004a), I use the more general definition of reference, which means simply “to direct attention.” Manual deixis, or pointing, is thus an act of nonverbal reference (Adamson, 1996; Bates et al., 1987; Leavens et al., 2004a). It should be obvious that this use of the term ‘reference’ differs also from that used in studies of nonhuman primate vocal communication, in which evidence for semantic reference is offered; i.e., different vocalizations seem to be emitted in response to different types of predators or threats (e.g., Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990).
What is intentional communication? A second preliminary consideration concerns the definition of intentional communication. For the sake of brevity, in current usage there are essentially two ways to define it. In one camp, intentional communication is defined with reference to the exercise of will; a signaler intends to influence a social partner in a certain way. Intentional communication is, thus, defined with reference to the motivational state of signaler (which is unverifiable, in practice). The alternative definition emphasizes what we can objectively measure in a signaler or context. The operational definition of intentional communication that we use has been elaborated from that originally developed for the study of preverbal communication in human babies (e.g., Bates et al., 1975; Golinkoff, 1986; Sugarman, 1984; see Bard, 1992, for more extensive discussion, and see Rolfe, 1996). The first criterion is that it is used socially; that is, that it requires an audience. This criterion has been met in studies of the gestural communication of orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) and chimpanzees,
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in samples of from two to 101 subjects (Call & Tomasello, 1994; Hostetter, Cantero, & Hopkins, 2001; Leavens et al., 1996; Leavens et al., 2004a). The second criterion is that the visual orienting behavior of the signaler is under the stimulus control of the locations of the object or event of apparent interest and the social partner (i.e., that the signaler looks back-and-forth between the social partner and a distant event or object). This criterion has been met by virtually all reported studies of the gesture use of apes in captivity, including samples of from two to 115 apes (Call & Tomasello, 1994; Krause & Fouts, 1997; Leavens & Hopkins, 1998; Leavens et al., 1996; Leavens et al., 2004a). The third criterion is that the signaler exhibits putative attention-getting behavior when the social partner is not looking at the signaler. Again, this criterion has been met in studies of from two to 57 apes (Krause & Fouts, 1997; Hostetter et al., 2001; Leavens, Hostetter, Wesley, & Hopkins, 2004b; Pika, Liebal, & Tomasello, 2003; Tomasello, Call, Nagell, Olguin, & Carpenter, 1994). Finally, intentional communication is defined by persistence and elaboration in the face of apparently failed communicative bids. Small-scale studies have established this criterion in chimpanzees (e.g., Menzel, 1999; Leavens et al., 1996) and forthcoming work will establish the same finding in a larger sample of chimpanzees (Leavens, Russell, & Hopkins, 2005). Hence, pointing by apes meets all the objective criteria for intentional communication originally defined with reference to the preverbal communication of human infants.
What is a point? A third preliminary consideration concerns the structure of pointing. Povinelli and Davis (1994) suggested that anatomical differences between apes and humans account for alleged species differences in the shape of the pointing gesture. But we know that chimpanzees who have received language training tend to point relatively frequently with the index finger (e.g., Krause & Fouts, 1997; Menzel, 1999; reviewed by Krause, 1997; Leavens & Hopkins, 1999). In contrast, non-languagetrained apes tend to point to objects with the whole hand, with all fingers extended, though there are individual differences and some pointing with the index finger is exhibited by some language-naive chimpanzees in virtually all of our studies (e.g., Leavens & Hopkins, 1998; Leavens et al., 1996, 2004a; see Call & Tomasello, 1994, for similar findings with orangutans). Whether language-training directly or only incidentally influences the number of fingers extended while pointing is currently an open question (Call & Tomasello, 1994; Krause & Fouts, 1997; Leavens & Hopkins, 1999).
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There is evidence that pointing with the whole hand serves a different function for young humans from pointing with the index finger: Butterworth (e.g., 2003; Franco & Butterworth, 1996) suggested that pointing with the whole hand serves to request objects or actions on objects, whereas pointing with the index finger serves to “comment” upon something in the world. In a cross-sectional study, Franco and Butterworth (1996) found that whole-handed gestures did not change in relative frequency from 12 to 18 months of age, whereas the incidence of index-finger pointing increased dramatically over the same age range. Thus, in that study, only pointing with the index finger seemed subject to developmental change in frequency of use. Blake, O’Rourke, and Borzellino (1994) reported that no less than 87% of the gestures exhibited by one-year-old human infants to outof-reach food comprised what they called ‘reach-outs’ (extension of all fingers of the hand), again suggesting a requesting function to whole-handed gestures. Iverson and Goldin-Meadow (1997, 2001) reported that when sighted children from 9 to 18 years of age were blindfolded and required to give verbal directions or re-tell a story, they exhibit strikingly less pointing with the index finger, compared to sighted children who are not blindfolded, and exhibit relatively more pointing with the whole hand. Wilkins (2003) has noted the cross-cultural variability with which people indicate distant objects. Taken together, these findings suggest that the form of pointing in humans is sensitive to contextual manipulations. Thus, if some apes (and humans) exhibit an overwhelming reliance on the index finger for pointing, and if others seem to prefer to indicate distant objects with their whole hands extended, then on what basis can anatomical differences between human and chimpanzee hands (and there are many such differences) be invoked to account for differences in the structure of pointing?
What does pointing do? A fourth preliminary consideration concerns the function of pointing. In human developmental research it has been well-established that human infants, after approximately one year of age, point with two distinctly different apparent goals. Sometimes, they point to objects in requestive contexts — this is frequently referred to as protoimperative or imperative pointing (e.g., Bates et al., 1975; Baron-Cohen, 1999). Protoimperative gestures seem to function to request others to act on the world in some way, for example, to deliver otherwise unreachable food or toys. On other occasions, children seem to point as though merely sharing attention to some distant object or event with a social partner is the end in itself. This latter kind of gesture is typically referred to as protodeclarative or simply,
Manual deixis in apes and humans
declarative (e.g., Bates et al., 1975; Baron-Cohen, 1999). These terms were used by Bates and her colleagues to describe the preverbal communication of infants. Imperative speech serves to demand or request things of a social partner, hence Bates et al. (1975) termed apparent requests by preverbal humans “protoimperatives,” suggesting continuity in humans between preverbal and later verbal requests. Correspondingly, declarative speech serves to comment upon the world, and preverbal communication with the same apparent goal was termed “protodeclarative,” again implying continuity in preverbal and later verbal commenting. Because it is not coherent to write of “proto-” imperatives or declaratives in animals who will never exhibit symbolic communication (Leavens & Hopkins, 1998), I will refer to apparent nonverbal requests as “imperatives” and apparent bids to establish shared attention to some distant event or object as “declaratives.” More recently, these terms have been used in ways which imply that the distinction between imperative and declarative communication may mark a human developmental transition to a nascent theory of mind (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1999; Legerstee & Barillas, 2003; Tomasello, 1999). According to this perspective, declarative communication implies that the signaler is attempting to manipulate another’s state of mind, implying further that the signaler recognizes, at some level, that their social partners have perspectives and mental contents which differ from the signaler’s. Imperative communication, on the other hand, implies only that the signaler is attempting to manipulate a social partner’s behavior. It is empirically true that apparent preverbal requests, or imperative gestures, do seem to develop in humans prior to apparent declarative gestures (e.g., Bates et al., 1987). Hence, pointing to share attention, or declarative pointing, may index greater maturity and sophistication in the communication of developing infants near the end of the first year of life. The implication which is typically drawn for comparative psychology is that because apes allegedly do not gesture declaratively, but only imperatively (e.g., Baron-Cohen, 1999; Butterworth, 2001; Povinelli, Theall, Reaux, & Dunphy-Leli, 2003b), therefore they do not recognize the mentality of their social partners. There are at least four grounds on which this generalization can be questioned. First, there are several reports of apparent declarative pointing by apes. SavageRumbaugh, Shankar, & Taylor (1998) wrote of Matata, a female bonobo (mother of Kanzi, Pan paniscus): “when she heard unusual sounds in the forest, she would direct my [Savage-Rumbaugh’s] attention toward them by looking and gesturing in that direction” (p. 11). Miles (1990) described several instances of apparent declarative pointing by a language-trained orangutan, Chantek. Ape language researchers report numerous allegedly declarative acts by apes using sign language or other non-vocal languages (e.g., Gardners & Gardner, 1971; Miles, 1990; Savage-
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Rumbaugh, 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1998). Strikingly, the only published report of pointing by a wild bonobo appears to be a quintessentially declarative gesture: this bonobo pointed to the location of (not so very well) hidden observers and alternated his gaze between these human observers and the rest of his troop, following behind him (Veá & Sabater-Pi, 1998). With the exception of the report by Veá and Sabater-Pi (1998), what differentiates these particular apes from other apes in captivity is that they have experienced unusually close emotional bonding with human caregivers, usually (but not always) in the context of language training. Although reports of apparently declarative communication are relatively scarce, so are rearing histories in which captive apes experience intensely close emotional bonding with trained human observers. Thus, a substantial proportion of those few apes who experience these unusually intimate and emotionally rich relationships with human caregivers also exhibit declarative pointing. Hence, although the evidence for declarative pointing in apes is based on very small samples and relatively little systematic study; because these behaviors are so commonly reported in these special populations, I will tentatively accept the evidence at face value, acknowledging that future research in this domain is warranted. The relevance of emotionality to understanding declarative gestures is highlighted by the second basis for doubting the human species-specificity of declarative gestural communication: humans who have experienced profound early social deprivation also exhibit deficits in communication at rates far above that seen in the general population (Rutter, Andersen-Wood, Beckett, Bredenkamp, Castle, Groothues et al., 1999; see also Hobson, 2002; Hobson & Bishop, 2003). What these findings suggest is that what we conceive of as normal human communicative development depends in no little part on the quality of babies’ early emotional bonding. If deprivation can adversely influence communicative development in humans, then it is not implausible to suggest that the kinds of institutional rearing conditions experienced by most captive apes would adversely influence their motivation to share attention with humans. It is at least plausible that the apparent paucity of observations of declarative gesturing by apes is attributable, in part, to a rearing history influence of deprivation on motivation rather than a primary cognitive deficit. Third, imperative communication about distant objects is a more behaviorally complex activity than is declarative communication, traditionally defined. The usual portrayal of a declarative act (e.g., “look at that”) goes something like the following: a signaler captures the attention of a social partner and re-directs the partner’s attention to some distant object or event. Imperative gestures (e.g., “give me that”) require the further elaboration that the signaler expects the observer to manipulate the world in some way. In early human infancy and in chimpanzee
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communication, what action is expected is often signaled by context, in relation to the specific interactional histories of the individuals involved; that is, meaning seems to be co-constructed over a history of interactions between specific individuals (e.g., Shankar & King, 2002; Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello & Call, 1997; Tomasello et al., 1994). Hence, from a strictly behavioral perspective, imperative nonverbal communication subsumes the dynamic mechanics of declarative nonverbal communication and requires a bit more elaboration. If, on the other hand, signalers exhibit declarative communication with some expectation that there will be a response from the social partner over and above the mere contemplation of the distant object or event (e.g., Brinck, 2001; Liszkowski, Carpenter, Henning, Striano, & Tomasello, 2004), then both imperative and declarative acts reduce to the same level of behavioral complexity. Both are triadic and they differ only with respect to the putative ends (“give me that” vs. “engage with me”), with essentially no meaningful difference in the cognitive prerequisites for these two kinds of communicative act (Moore & Corkum, 1994). Finally, as also noted by Povinelli et al. (2003a), we have no observational or experimental evidence that young human babies who point, apparently declaratively, also discriminate or recognize mental states in their social partners (cf. Moore & Corkum, 1994). Some writers argue that because declarative pointing is accompanied by gaze alternation between a social partner and a distant object or event of interest, that this implies the awareness on the part of the baby that others have attentional states which differ from their own (e.g., Franco & Butterworth, 1996; Tomasello, 1995). Adolescent and adult chimpanzees who gesture also exhibit concomitant gaze alternation between unreachable food and human experimenters during 80% to 100% of their gestures, which is a much higher rate than displayed by human infants before about two years of age (Leavens & Hopkins, 1998; Leavens et al., 2004a; reviewed by Leavens & Hopkins, 1999). If visual monitoring of a social partner is a ‘smoking gun’ that implicates the awareness of the signaler that the social partner is a mental being, then either (a) chimpanzees also recognize mental states or (b) some compelling argument has to be made that gaze alternation implicates nascent mental state reasoning in human children, but not other animals (e.g., Povinelli et al., 2003a). Previously, we argued that gaze alternation implicated mental state reasoning in both humans and chimpanzees (Leavens et al., 1996). Since that time, we have come to the view that gaze alternation accompanying gestural behavior does not implicate mental state awareness in any species, including humans (Leavens et al., 2004a, although it is consistent with such an interpretation, e.g., Tomasello, 1995). We cannot directly measure the hypothetical motivational or volitional components of communicative behavior in any species, including humans, independently of their overt behavior (Bergmann,
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1962; Leavens, 2002; Leavens et al., 2004b), including verbal behavior. Whether this is a mere technical limitation that will be overcome with advances in medical imaging technology (cf. Bergmann, 1962) or an indictment of the currently widespread assumption that folk psychologies accurately reflect psychological processes is an open question (Leavens, 2002; Leavens et al., 2004a,b; cf. Thompson, 1997). Hence, the empirical fact that both human infants and adolescent and adult chimpanzees frequently accompany their manual gestures with successive visual orienting between objects or events of apparent interest and their social partners, in both declarative and imperative contexts, does not uniquely implicate the possession by the signaler of abstract representations of their social partners’ mental functioning (see also Brinck, 2001).
Environmental correlates of pointing in apes and humans Which, among the many environmental factors that differ between wild and captive apes might account for the ubiquity of pointing in captive populations? We may be decades away from a truly inductive approach to this question. This is because we lack sufficient experimental control over the pre-experimental life histories of chimpanzees and to gain adequate experimental control will take extraordinary resources and time not heretofore deployed in the study of the development of manual gestures in apes. As noted above, there are striking differences in how language-trained apes and non-language-trained apes point, most obviously in the former’s frequent use of the index finger and apparent declarative behavior. Hence, for these reasons, because at the current level of empirical knowledge an inductive approach to this question is not feasible, then a deductive approach is necessitated by the paucity of data. Call and Tomasello (1996) outlined a hierarchy of ‘enculturation’ in which captive apes can be categorized according to their degree of intimacy with their human caregivers. Some captive apes, particularly those raised in biomedical research institutions, might experience as little as four minutes per day of positive face-to-face interaction with humans (Bard, unpublished data) whereas others, particularly language-trained and home-reared apes, experience many frequent daily, intense, affect-laden interactions with humans (e.g., Kellogg & Kellog, 1933). Thus, in terms of rearing histories, it is naive to characterize any particular captive ape population as being representative either of all captive apes or, worse, all apes of that species. Examples are legion in which researchers, having studied a chimpanzee, or a handful of chimpanzees, subsequently expound upon the behavior of ‘The Chimpanzee’; as though their particular subjects, with their particular rearing histories, were meaningfully representative of the species.
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Table 2. Pointing in apes and humans with respect to three environmental variables Barrier? History of Emotional Imperative Declarative delivery? responsivity? pointing? pointing? Apes Wild
No
No
Yes
Rare
Rare
Captive (institutional)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Rare
Captive (home-reared) Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yesa
Humans (6–15 months) Impoverished
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
Delayed
Typical Western
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
aAlthough
there are relatively few observations of home-reared or language-trained apes exhibiting protodeclarative behaviors, weight is given here to the fact that these few observations constitute a very large fraction of the relatively few apes who have experienced these unusual rearing histories.
However, because apes subject to the entire range of possible rearing histories in captivity exhibit pointing in the absence of explicit training, it is not unreasonable to consider possible similarities across the range of captive rearing conditions for clues to the advent of pointing. As a first approximation, I will consider three factors or dimensions of life experience: barriers, history of delivery, and emotional responsiveness (see Table 2). The term barriers refers to obstacles to free movement; these can be exogenous barriers, such as cage mesh, or endogenous barriers, such as locomotor immaturity (Leavens et al., 1996). The effect of these endogenous and exogenous barriers on communicative development is that, in the presence of desirable, but unreachable objects, organisms are put into a problem space that is not characteristic of the natural habitats of wild apes. Chimpanzees, for example, exhibit independent quadrupedal locomotion by 4 to 5 months of age (van LawickGoodall, 1968). In captivity, but not in the wild, apes face a frequent problem in which desirable objects are visible, but unreachable, due to intervening cage mesh or bars. Human children, who do not develop mature bipedal locomotion until a year of age, and who are frequently restrained in high chairs, cribs, and the like, face a very similar problem space with both endogenous and exogenous factors constraining them from directly attaining objects of interest. When captive apes and humans face these barriers, they also frequently experience circumstances in which caregivers deliver items to them. To the degree that delivery is contingent on the signaling behavior of the ape or human infant, then a means becomes established, through interaction, or ontogenetic ritualization (see, e.g., Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello & Call, 1997). If barriers coupled with histories of delivery can account for the development of pointing, then why don’t human infants tend to start pointing earlier than the
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10–12-month average age of pointing onset? In Piagetian terms, this would be explained by the pattern of development of coordinated secondary circular reactions (Stage 4 in the sensorimotor period), the ability to relate means (caregiver) to specific ends (unreachable objects), which develops from 8 to 12 months of age (cf. Sugarman, 1984). Harding and Golinkoff (1979) found relationships between intentional vocalizations and Stage 5 sensorimotor intelligence, but 31% of the children adjudged to be Stage 4 with respect to the object concept and 36% of the children adjudged to be transitional between Stage 4 and Stage 5 in terms of their understanding of physical causality also exhibited intentional vocalizations. Harding and Golinkoff therefore argued that “attainment of a specific level of development of the object concept does not appear either to be necessary or sufficient for the transition into [intentional communication]” (1979, p. 37). Sugarman (1984) reported that children in Stage 4 began to exhibit “coordinated person-object interaction” at 8–10 months of age. Bates, Thal, & Marchman (1991) noted that tool use, causal understanding, and deictic gestures all development in roughly the same epoch, the 9 to 10 month period (see their Table 2.1). Hence, across a variety of human developmental studies relating communication to sensorimotor cognition, there is striking temporal congruity between the age at onset of intentional communication and display of late Stage 4/early Stage 5 sensorimotor intelligence. In feral apes, retrieval of distant objects by caregivers is obviated by infant apes’ ability to independently locomote to within reach of objects of interest, and this locomotor independence precedes the cognitive milestone of coordinated secondary circular reactions in apes (e.g., Gibson, 1996; Parker, 1999; Potì & Spinozzi, 1994). In the case of human infants, the precipitating condition of prolonged confinement extends through the latter half of the first year of life, when the ability to co-ordinate actions on objects with actions on social agents first develops. Hence, heterochrony, or changes in the timing of development, in humans creates a problem space for humans which wild apes do not experience, or experience rarely. As noted above, captive apes experience this problem space frequently (e.g., Leavens et al., 1996). Two observations of pointing by captive apes for other apes illustrate these points (and, further, serve to refute incorrect claims that apes do not point amongst themselves, e.g., Butterworth, 2001; 2003; Povinelli et al., 2003a). Savage-Rumbaugh (1986) reported 37 instances in which Sherman and Austin, two language-trained chimpanzees, pointed in communication between themselves. What distinguishes Sherman and Austin from most other captive apes is that they were explicitly raised in a food-sharing culture; that is, they were trained to share and to take turns from an early age. Hence, they were often placed in experimental circumstances in which their training required them to await the actions of the other. In these circumstances, they frequently pointed, apparently to draw the
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attention of the other to the correct response, or to items of fallen food. Both the inhibition to act directly (barrier) and history of delivery (food-sharing) were explicitly trained. The second observation, by de Waal (1982) at the Arnhem Zoo, can be summarized as follows: two chimpanzee juveniles were playing together, when the play descended into an angry brawl. One mother, Tepel, prodded the matriarch of the group, Mama, who was napping nearby, and then pointed in the direction of the fighting juveniles. Mama subsequently waded between the antagonists and separated them. De Waal’s interpretation of this event was that because Tepel feared reprisal from the mother of the other juvenile, a female named Jimmie, her fear of reprisal (barrier) prevented her from directly intervening in the fight, so she enlisted Mama’s assistance (Mama being the dominant female, hence not subject to negative consequences). Tepel thus experienced the problem space in which a desired outcome required the capture and re-direction of the attention of an ally. According to this argument, then, imperative pointing develops in the context of barriers to direct retrieval of desirable objects given histories of delivery by caregivers. Why, then, don’t captive monkeys, who experience similar problem spaces, also point? In fact, some monkeys apparently do spontaneously point (Hess, Novak, & Povinelli, 1993; Mitchell & Anderson, 1997), but it seems to be much rarer than pointing by apes. Because the impact of barriers on the efficacy of humans, apes, and monkeys to act on their environments are similar, more research into the communicative interactions between captive monkeys and their human caregivers is warranted. A number of studies that explicitly trained pointing in monkeys have noted that this training seems to lead to some generalized facility in other domains of social cognition, including comprehension of pointing, the production of declarative pointing, and imitation (Blaschke & Ettlinger, 1987; Kumashiro, Ishibashi, Itakura, & Iriki, 2002; Kumashiro, Ishibashi, Uchiyama, Itakura, Murata, & Iriki, 2003). Thus, on the one hand it would be premature, given the paucity of data on the subject, to conclude that there is a fundamental difference between apes and monkeys in their capacities for manual deixis, whereas, on the other hand, there are very few reports of spontaneous pointing by monkeys (two, to my knowledge: Hess et al., 1993; Mitchell & Anderson, 1997). The evidence tentatively suggests that once monkeys have a certain competence in following and manipulating attention in humans, then this may facilitate performance in other domains of social cognition. This may also be true for both apes and humans. Perusal of Table 2 reveals that captive apes who exhibit apparently declarative pointing are distinguished by rearing histories of close emotional bonding with and emotional responsiveness by human caregivers. Examples of humans who experience profound early social deprivation are rare, but Rutter et al. (1999) described profound communicative deficits in their sample of 111 orphans raised
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in such deprived circumstances (see Hobson, 2002; Hobson & Bishop, 2003 for extended discussions of the impact of social factors on communicative development in humans). The suggestion put forward here is that unless apes or human infants experience rearing histories in which the affective exchange that accompanies shared attention to distant objects (gleeful vocalizations, smiling, hugs, etc.) become reinforcing, through experience, the motivational basis for exhibiting declarative gestures is undermined. Thus, I hypothesize that gesturing imperatively may provide a foundation for later generalization of pointing in declarative contexts; that is, gesturing to get somebody to act on objects provides a behavioral template for later gesturing to get somebody to engage in positive, shared emotional states. Because wild apes virtually never experience a problem space conducive to the development of imperative pointing, this obviates its later generalization to contexts eliciting emotional engagement. The ‘driving force’ for the development of declarative communication being offered here is the motivational basis for sharing attention and this is seen as being subject to the emotional consequences of sharing attention to distant objects or events with another. According to this view, naming behavior, which is a frequent activity in the lives of human infants and language-trained apes, and which involves shared attention to distant objects, is accompanied by high rates of positive affective signaling on the part of the caregiver. Joint attention is thus socialized and the reinforcing effects of caregivers’ smiles, gleeful vocalizations, etc., are manifested in no little part on a foundation of emotional exchanges. Or in other words, for apes and humans in these social circumstances, affective exchange becomes desirable as an end in itself (see, e.g., Adamson, 1996; Adamson & Bakeman, 1985; Gómez, 1998; Moore & Corkum, 1994).
Implications for the evolution of manual deixis Given that similar problem-solving capabilities, particularly the ability to use an object to obtain otherwise unreachable items, develop in most humans and both wild and captive apes (see, e.g., Bard, 1990; Parker & Gibson, 1977), then manual deixis can be seen as a problem-solving behavioral adaptation to the ubiquitous problem space posed for hominids once the development of independent locomotion became so protracted that it extended into stages of infancy in which agentobject coordinative skills were simultaneously developing. Hence, manual deixis became a human epigenetic consequence of the adaptation to bipedalism. When, in hominid evolution, bipedalism became an obligate, rather than facultative, mode of locomotion is subject to considerable current debate, with controversial
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claims for the first origins of bipedal locomotion in excess of 6 million years ago (Senut, Pickford, Gommery, Mein, Cheboi, & Coppens, 2001). From the standpoint of human linguistic evolution, because joint attention is foundational to such early precursors of language use as naming of objects (cf. Butterworth, 2003; Baldwin, 1995), then the following evolutionary scenario assumes some plausibility under a loosely recapitulationist view. First, the period of locomotor immaturity extended, sometime between 6 and 4 million years ago, into later stages of cognitive development, particularly coordinated secondary circular reactions and tertiary circular reactions. Infants during this time would have increasingly been forced to tactics of manipulation of their caregivers by their inherent inability to retrieve objects for themselves. Then, between 4 and 2.5 million years ago, as the hominid ontogenetic environment became ever more rich in artifacts, basic lexicons developed. The assumption here is that there is a rubicon of artifactual complexity above which efficient communication becomes subject to selection (see, e.g., Tomasello, 1999). (I.e., some means of communicating “No, not the chopper, the spear lying next to the chopper” becomes selected for as the complexity of material culture increases beyond some, currently ill-defined, minimum). As hypothesized by Corballis (2002), this may have been initially in the visual domain, through iconic gestures. However, in part because chimpanzees in captivity use vocal signals tactically in attention-getting functional contexts (Hostetter et al., 2001; Leavens et al., 2004b), I have argued that the emergence of language was probably multimodal (visual and vocal) from its inception, involving simultaneous use of vocal and gestural components (Leavens, 2003; see also Gibson, 1996; Lock, 1983). It is manual deixis, the ability to capture and redirect the visual attention of a social partner to some specific entity through manual gestures, that is shared by humans and their nearest living relatives, given certain commonalities in their social environments, including exposure to the problem space in which manipulation of others is the only viable solution to the problem (as in the retrieval of otherwise unreachable objects). To summarize, because apes point in captivity, and because they don’t require explicit training to do this, pointing is not necessarily derived from the neurobiological or cognitive adaptations for symbolic communication in the human lineage. The epigenetic scenario sketched here, speculative though it is, does account for the near-ubiquity of pointing in captive apes and in humans (but see Wilkins, 2003), as well as its apparent scarcity in wild ape populations.
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Acknowledgement I would like to thank the following people for discussion of issues raised in this manuscript: Kim A. Bard, University of Portsmouth, the late George Butterworth, University of Sussex, Dorothy M. Fragaszy, University of Georgia, Fabia Franco, Middlesex University, William D. Hopkins, Yerkes National Primate Research Center, Jana Iverson, University of Missouri, Mark A. Krause, University of Portland, Chris Moore, Dalhousie University, Ed Mulligan, University of Georgia, Roger Thomas, University of Georgia, Nicholas S. Thompson, Clark University, an anonymous reviewer, and the other participants in the Vocalize to Localize conference, University of Grenoble, January 30–February 2, 2003.
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Legerstee, M., & Barillas, Y. (2003). Sharing attention and pointing to objects at 12 months: Is the intentional stance implied? Cognitive Development, 18, 91–110. Liszkowski, U., Carpenter, M., Henning, A., Striano, T., & Tomasello, M. (2004). Twelve-montholds point to share attention and interest. Developmental Science, 7, 297–307. Lock, A. (1983). “Recapitulation” in the ontogeny and phylogeny of language. In E. de Grolier (Ed.), Glossogenetics: The origin and evolution of language (pp. 91–114). Paris: Harwood Academic Publishers. Menzel, C. R. (1999). Unprompted recall and reporting of hidden objects by a chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes) after extended delays. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 113, 426–434. Miles, H. L. (1990). The cognitive foundations for reference in a signing orangutan. In S. T. Parker & K. R. Gibson (Eds.), “Language” and intelligence in monkeys and apes: Comparative developmental perspectives (pp. 511‑539). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mitchell, R. W., & Anderson, J. R. (1997). Pointing, withholding information, and deception in capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 111, 351–361. Moore, C., & Corkum, V. (1994). Social understanding at the end of the first year of life. Developmental Review, 14, 349–372. Parker, S. T. (1999). The development of social roles in the play of an infant gorilla and its relationship to sensorimotor intellectual development. In S. T. Parker, R. W. Mitchell, & H. Lyn Miles (Eds.), The mentalities of gorillas and orangutans: Comparative perspectives (pp. 367–393). Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Parker, S. T., & Gibson, K. R. (1977). Object manipulation, tool use and sensorimotor intelligence as feeding adaptations in Cebus monkeys and great apes. Journal of Human Evolution, 6, 623–641. Pika, S., Liebal, K., & Tomasello, M. (2003). Gestural communication in young gorillas (Gorilla gorilla): gestural repertoire, learning, and use. American Journal of Primatology, 60, 95–111. Potì, P., & Spinozzi, G. (1994). Early sensorimotor development in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes). Journal of Comparative Psychology, 108, 93–103. Povinelli, D. J., & Davis, D. R. (1994). Differences between chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and humans (Homo sapiens) in the resting state of the index finger: Implications for pointing. Journal of Comparative Psychology, 108, 134–139. Povinelli, D. J., Bering, J., & Giambrone, S. (2003a). Chimpanzee ‘pointing’: Another error of the argument by analogy? In S. Kita (Ed.), Pointing: Where language, culture, and cognition meet (pp. 35–68). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Povinelli, D. J., Theall, L. A., Reaux, J. E., & Dunphy-Lelii, S. (2003b). Chimpanzees spontaneously alter the location of their gestures to match the attentional orientation of others. Animal Behaviour, 66, 71–79. Rolfe, L. (1996). Theoretical stages in the prehistory of grammar. In A. Lock & C. R. Peters (Eds.), Handbook of human symbolic evolution (pp. 776–792). Hove, U.K.: Blackwell. Rutter, M., Anderson-Wood, L., Beckett, C., Bredenkamp, D., Castle, J., Groothues, C., Kreppner, J., Keaveney, L., Lord, C., O’Connor, T. G., & the English and Romanian Adoptees (ERA) Study Team. (1999). Quasi-autistic patterns following severe early global privation. Journal of Child Psychology, 40, 537–549. Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S. (1986). Ape language: From conditioned response to symbol. New York: Columbia University Press. Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S., Shankar, S. G., & Taylor, T. J. (1998). Apes, language, and the human mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S., Wilkerson, B. J., & Bakeman, R. (1977). Spontaneous gestural communication among conspecifics in the pygmy chimpanzee (Pan paniscus). In G. H. Bourne (Ed.), Progress in Ape Research (pp. 97–116). New York: Academic Press. Senut, B., Pickford, M., Gommery, D., Mein, P., Cheboi, K., & Coppens, Y. (2001). First hominid from the Miocene (Lukeino Formation, Kenya). Comptes Rendus de l’Académie de Sciences, 332, 137–144. Shankar, S. G, & King, B. J. (2002). The emergence of a new paradigm in ape language research. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25, 605–656. Sugarman, S. (1984). The development of preverbal communication: Its contribution and limits in promoting the development of language. In R. L. Scheifelbush & J. Pickar (Eds.), The acquisition of communicative competence (pp. 23‑67). Baltimore: University Park Press. Tanner, J. E., & Byrne, R. W. (1999). The development of spontaneous gestural communication in a group of zoo-living lowland gorillas. In S. T. Parker, R. W. Mitchell, & H. Lyn Miles (Eds.), The mentalities of gorillas and orangutans: Comparative perspectives (pp. 211–239). Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press. Thompson, N. S. (1997). Communication and natural design. In D. H. Owings, M. D. Beecher & N. S. Thompson (Eds.), Perspectives in Ethology, Vol. 12 (pp. 391–415). New York: Plenum. Tomasello, M. (1995). Joint attention as social cognition. In C. Moore & P. J. Dunham (Eds.), Joint attention: Its origins and role in development (pp. 103–130). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Tomasello, M. (1999). The cultural origins of human cognition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Tomasello, M. & Call, J. (1997). Primate cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Tomasello, M., Call, J., Nagell, K., Olguin, K. & Carpenter, M. (1994). The learning and use of gestural signals by young chimpanzees: A trans-generational study. Primates, 35, 137–154. Tutin, C. E. G. (1994). Reproductive success story: Variability among chimpanzees and comparisons with gorillas. In R. W. Wrangham, W. C. McGrew, F. B. M. de Waal, & P. G. Heltne (Eds.), Chimpanzee cultures (pp. 181–193). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. van Lawick-Goodall, J. (1968). The behavior of free-living chimpanzees in the Gombe Stream Reserve. Animal Behaviour Monographs, 1, 161–311. Veá, J. J. & Sabater-Pi, J. (1998). Spontaneous pointing behaviour in the wild pygmy chimpanzee (Pan paniscus). Folia Primatologica, 69, 289–290. de Waal, F. B. M. (1982). Chimpanzee politics: Power and sex among apes. New York: Harper & Row. Wilkins, D. (2003). Why pointing with the index finger is not a universal (in sociocultural and semiotic terms). In S. Kita (Ed.), Pointing: Where language, culture, and cognition meet (pp. 171–215). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
About the author David A. Leavens. PhD (Psychology) in 2001 from University of Georgia (USA). Worked sporadically at the Yerkes National Primate Research Center (USA) from 1994 to 1999. Since 2000, Lecturer in Psychology and Director of the Infant Study Unit, University of Sussex (UK).
Neandertal vocal tract Which potential for vowel acoustics? Louis-Jean Boë, Jean-Louis Heim, Christian Abry and Pierre Badin Université Stendhal, Institut de la Communication Parlée, Grenoble (Boë, Abry, Badin) / Musée de l’Homme, Paris (Heim)
Potential speech abilities constitute a key component in the description of the Neandertals and their relations with modern Homo Sapiens. Since Lieberman & Crelin postulated in 1971 the theory that “Neanderthal man did not have the anatomical prerequisites for producing the full range of human speech” their speech capability has been a subject of hot debate for over 30 years, and remains a controversial question. In this study, we first question the methodology adopted by Lieberman and Crelin, and we point out articulatory and acoustic flaws in the data and the modeling. Then we propose a general articulatory-acoustic framework for testing the acoustic consequences of the trade-off between oral and pharyngeal cavities. Specifically, following Honda & Tiede (1998), we characterize this trade-off by a Laryngeal Height Index (LHI) corresponding to the length ratio of the pharyngeal cavity to the oral cavity. Using an anthropomorphic articulatory model controlled by lips, jaw, tongue and larynx parameters, we can generate the Maximal Vowel Space (MVS), which is a triangle in the F1 / F2 plane, the three point vowels /a/, /i/, and /u/ being located at its three extremities. We sample the evolution of the position of the larynx from birth to adulthood with four different LHI values, and we show that the associated MVS are very similar. Therefore, the MVS of a given vocal tract does not depend on the LHI: gestures of the tongue body, lips and jaw allow compensations for differences in the ratio between the dimensions of the oral cavity and pharynx. We then infer that the vowel space of Neandertals (with high or low larynx) was potentially no smaller than that of a modern human and that Neandertals could produce all the vowels of the world’s languages. Neandertals were no more vocally handicapped than children at birth are. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the lowering of the larynx and a concomitant increase in pharynx size are necessary evolutionary pre-adaptations for speech. However, since our study is strictly limited to the morphological and acoustic aspects of the vocal tract, we cannot offer any definitive answer to the question of whether Neandertals could produce human speech or not. Keywords: speech, evolution, Neandertals, morphology, vocal tract
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1. A largely widespread but controversial theory Lieberman & Crelin (1971), henceforth L&C, followed up by Lieberman et al. (1972) and Lieberman (1972, 1973, 1984, 1991, 1994) startled paleontologists and anthropologists, as well as the speech science community, when they inferred the shape of the vocal tract from the fossilized skull of La Chapelle-aux-Saints Neandertal, and estimated the extent of his /i/, /a/, and /u/ vowel space. The associated vowel space turned out to be highly reduced with respect to that of a modern human male. They concluded that Neandertals could not have possessed “the full range of human speech” and that this was probably the cause of their mysterious extinction about 30,000 years ago. According to L&C, in order for human speech production to become possible during the course of evolution, it was necessary that the skull be sufficiently flexible (Laitman, 1983; Laitman et al., 1979; Lieberman & McCarthy, 1999), and that the larynx descend to enlarge the pharyngeal cavity for the vowel space to be large enough to realize the contrasts observed in current human vowel. In their revolutionary proposal, L&C grouped chimpanzees, Neandertals, and human newborns in the same class, all having a short pharyngeal cavity relative to the oral cavity. According to L&C, this articulatory configuration prevented them from producing the full range of human speech, namely the /i/, /a/ and /u/ maximal vowel contrasts. Indeed these contrasts are present in a vast majority of the world’s languages (Crothers, 1978; Maddieson, 1986, 1991; Vallée, 1994; Schwartz et al., 1997a). In spite of numerous criticisms formulated by anthropologists (Man & Trinkaus, 1973; Carlisle & Siegel, 1974; Morris, 1974; Falk, 1975; LeMay, 1975; Burr, 1976; Houghton, 1993; Schepartz, 1993; Trinkaus & Shipman, 1993; McCarthy & D. Lieberman, 1997) the thesis proposed by Lieberman and Crelin has been presented as undisputable in numerous publications, encyclopedias, and works of reference (e.g. Chaline, 1994; Leakey, 1994; Lewin, 1984; Lumley, 1998; Reichholf, 1990; Segui & Ferrand, 2000; Shreeves, 1995; Vauclair, 1992). In this article, we first pinpoint that L&C used the unlikely anatomical skull reconstruction established by Boule at the beginning of the 20th century. Next, we demonstrate that L&C’s methodology to infer vocal tract shapes for vowels was inadequate and resulted in a reduced acoustic vowel space. Then, based on standard vocal tract acoustics knowledge and associated simulations tools, we show that it is possible to produce a human-like acoustic vowel space whatever the larynx position. We will note that this implies that in fact the erroneous skull reconstruction should not have prevented L&C from establishing vocal tract shapes that could produce a human-like vowel space.
Neandertal vocal tract
1.1 An unlikely skull reconstruction L&C employed a cast of the skull of La Chapelle-aux-Saints Neandertal that had been reconstructed by Boule (1911–1913, 1921). At the beginning of the 20th century, Boule could only rely on very few elements to reconstruct accurately the skull base. In addition, Neandertals were considered to be closer to the chimpanzee than to modern man and therefore were featured with a forward tilted head position (Figure 1). In this context, Boule assigned a much too anterior location to the head center of gravity, resulting in a much too posterior position of the foramen and of the basion. Much later, Heim (1986, 1989, 1990) proposed a more realistic skull reconstruction of this Neandertal, taking into account the most recent anatomical knowledge (Figure 2). In particular, he found that the Landzert angle that characterizes the skull base was 150° for Boule’s reconstruction, whereas it was 137° for his own reconstruction. This new value is more consistent with the values measured for the Gibraltar Neandertal (142°) and La Ferrassie 1 (135°; Heim, 1976). Recall that the range of the Landzert angle is [126–143°] for the modern Man (Heim, 1989). Heim showed therefore that the shape of the skull base and its position relative to the backbone did not differ from that of Modern man, and that the Neandertal’s larynx was presumably located in the same position as that of modern Man.
Figure 1. The head and neck reconstruction of La Chapelle-aux-Saints Neandertal directed by Boule and realized by the sculptor J. Durand (1921). Note the head forward tilt close to that of chimpanzee.
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Figure 2. La Chapelle-aux-Saints Neandertal reconstructed by J.L. Heim (1984)
1.2 Unrealistic vocal tract shapes and thus unrealistic vowel triangle Standard vocal tract acoustics knowledge shows that for producing the main extreme point vowels /i a u/, whatever the anatomical size of the vocal tract, whatever the model being used, whether oversimplified or highly sophisticated: – there is only a unique solution to generate a vowel with the highest third resonance as the typical /i/: to control a constriction tube by fronting the grooved tongue against the hard palate; as a direct consequence, the length of the back cavity will always be appropriate to produce a second resonance at a sufficiently high frequency; moreover, this configuration ensures the resonance of the “Helmholtz resonator” formed by the back cavity and the front constriction low enough to be typical of the first resonance of /i/; – the two remaining point vowels can be produced with no difficulty with two Helmholtz resonators for /u/, and with a horn-shaped open vocal tract for /a/. All these resonance frequencies are naturally normalized respective to the frequency of the vocal fold vibration (for babies, adults, men and women) in order for these vowels to be perceived with their proper acoustic qualities. To prove that newborns and Neandertals could not produce the /i/, /a/, and /u/ vowel contrasts, L&C started from reconstructions of the supralaryngeal vocal tract. Then they measured the cross-sectional area at 0.5 cm intervals. These measurements gave a “neutral area function” that they “perturbed towards area
Neandertal vocal tract
/i/
14 12
12
10
10
Area
8
Area
8
(cm )
6
(cm )
6
2
2
4
4
2
2
0 20
15
10
lips (cm) glottis
5
0
5
0
/a/
14
/u/
14
0 20
15
10
lips (cm) glottis
5
0
12 10
Area
8
(cm )
6
2
4 2 0 20
15
10
lips (cm) glottis
Figure 3. Area functions presented by L&C as the “best match” for Neandertal trying to produce the human /i/, /a/, and /u/ contrasts with a small pharyngeal cavity (solid lines). Superimposed the corresponding Fant’s (1960, p. 115) area functions (staircase).
functions that would be reasonable if a newborn or a Neandertal vocal tract attempted to produce the full range of human vowels” (Lieberman & Crelin, 1971), namely the human /i/, /a/, and /u/. In this attempt, they worked with the area functions proposed by Fant (1960). Figure 3 presents Fant’s area functions and those proposed by L&C by decreasing the volume of the pharyngeal cavity and its length. Note that limiting the cross-sectional area of the first 6 centimeters of the vocal tract to an area close to that of the larynx tube, L&C assumed that the tongue root of newborns and Neandertals could not move forward. Note also that they did not take into account the Neandertal prognatism and accordingly did not increase the palatal distance: the resulting overall vocal lengths were therefore limited to a range from 14.2 cm to 16 cm. We calculated the formant frequencies associated with the three area functions proposed by L&C using a frequency domain simulation (Badin & Fant, 1984) (see Table 1). Figure 4 displays, in the F1/F2 space, the L&C Neandertal /i/, /a/, and /u/ triangle, as well — for reference — as the /i/, /æ/, /"/, and /u/ quadrilaterals for males, females and children published by Peterson & Barney (1952). As expected, it appears that the estimated vowel triangle for Neandertal is reduced.
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Table 1. Vocal tract lengths and F1-F2 values for /i a u/ proposed by L&C for Neandertal (male adult) /i/
L (cm)
F1 (Hz)
F2 (Hz)
14.4
524
2038
/a/
14.2
846
1650
/u/
16.0
462
807
200 300
i
u
400 500
F1 (Hz)
92
600 700 800 900
æ
1000 1100 3500
3000
2500
" 2000
1500
1000
500
F2 (Hz) Figure 4. The L&C Neandertal /i/, /a/, and /u/ triangle (in black); (in grey) the /i/, /æ/, /"/, and /u/ quadrilaterals for adult male (upper right), adult female (middle), and children (lower left) (from Peterson & Barney, 1952).
It so happens that vowel /a/ is the only realistic vowel, as it is naturally characterized by a pharyngeal constriction. As a matter of fact, its area function matches roughly the one proposed by Fant. Due to its reduced length, it is typical of a female /a/ vowel. The small dimensions of the triangle obtained by L&C are due to the fact that they modified the three area functions without taking into account the basic knowledge of the acoustic theory of speech production (Fant, 1960). In fact their strategy for establishing the area functions optimally matching the /i/, /a/, and /u/ curiously resulted in the inverse effect on F1:
Neandertal vocal tract
– for /i/: they should have increased the constriction length and decreased the constriction area; – for /u/: they could have increased lip protrusion and decreased lip area in order to lower F1; the too low value of F2 is due to a too narrow velar constriction. In conclusion, the area functions proposed by L&C produce vowels corresponding to /6/ and /o/, rather than the extreme point vowels /i/ and /u/. We show in the next section that it is indeed possible to find area functions producing /i a u/ and corresponding to plausible vocal tracts whatever the larynx position.
2. A flexible articulatory-acoustic vocal tract model The ratio between the oral and pharyngeal cavity lengths is — in addition to vocal tract overall length — one of the important factors to characterize globally the vocal tract morphology. This is why Honda & Tiede (1998) proposed an index based on palatal distance (PD) and laryngeal height (LH). PD is the distance between the anterior nasal spine (ANS) and the posterior nasopharyngeal wall (PNW). PNW is defined as the intersection point of a standard palatal line (specified by ANP and the posterior nasal spine) with the posterior nasopharyngeal wall. LH is the distance from the arytenoid apex to the palatal line. LH, therefore, represents the pharyngeal cavity length and thus the vertical position of the larynx. LHI = LH/PD is thus an interesting articulatory parameter, as it reflects growth differences from birth to adulthood and gender differences, as well as differences between modern Man, Neandertal and chimpanzee. In order to assess the effects of this LHI factor on the vowels, we used a vocal tract model that we had already designed to study human growth. It seemed appropriate to study the acoustic correlates of the trade-off between pharyngeal and oral cavity dimensions as specified by the LHI parameter (Boë & Maeda, 1998; Ménard & Boë, 2000; Ménard, 2002; Ménard et al., 2002; Serkhane et al., 2002). At birth, the heads of newborns are approximately hemispherical in shape. Increases in the volume and shape of the skull and of the size of the inferior maxilla modify the relative proportions of horizontal and vertical dimensions. The process does not therefore involve a simple uniform scaling, but rather an anamorphosis in which the vertical dimension is emphasized. For the vocal tract, this phenomenon is further accentuated by the lowering of the larynx. The growth of the pharynx is therefore approximately twice as large as that of the front cavity.
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Vocal tract growth simulation has thus been implemented in the Variable Linear Articulatory Model (VLAM) by Maeda (cf. Boë & Maeda, 1998). This model is based on Maeda’s anthropomorphic linear articulatory model proposed in 1989. The basic assumption of the model is that any vocal tract midsagittal contour can be decomposed into a weighted sum of linear components representing the effects of individual articulator parameters. Note in particular that any tongue shape (from the apex to the root) can be adequately described by four components consisting of an extrinsic parameter, jaw position, and of three intrinsic parameters, tongue-body position, tongue-body shape and tongue-tip position. The lip horn is represented by a uniform tube controlled by two parameters (lip height and lip protrusion) in addition to the jaw position effect. Finally, the laryngeal region is controlled by a parameter that sets the larynx height. Note that the upper incisors, the hard palate, and the posterior pharyngeal wall are represented by a fixed exterior outline. The vocal tract contours are in a semi-polar coordinate system. The growth process is implemented in our articulatory model by modifying the longitudinal dimension of the vocal tract according to two scaling factors applied to three regions: (1) the anterior part of the vocal tract using the first scaling factor kmouth, (2) the pharynx scaled by the second factor kpharynx, and (3) an intermediate region scaled by a factor continuously interpolated between the two fixed factors. We made sure that length variations in the midsagittal dimension corresponded to data available in the literature (Kasuya, et al., 1968; Goldstein, 1980; Yang & Kasuya, 1994; Story et al., 1996; White, 1998; Fitch & Giedd, 1999). In particular, we have verified (Boë et al., 2002; Ménard, 2000) that VLAM predicts vocal tract lengths compatible with the limits established by Fitch & Giedd (1999). This assessment is of great importance, as vocal tract length determines the absolute position (along the frequency axis) in the maximal acoustic vowel F1/F2/F3 space. Our vocal tract model does not allow the recovery of the same landmarks as those used by Honda & Tiede (1998). Therefore, we defined an LHI ratio adapted to our model. To estimate the palatal distance PD, we used the incisors (instead of the anterior nasal spine), and the top of the pharyngeal wall, and larynx height LH was estimated in reference to glottis position (instead of arytenoid apex position) (Figure 5). Table 2 displays the values of the vocal tract length, of the larynx height and palatal distance, and of the larynx height index for a male adult and a newborn models.
Neandertal vocal tract
Figure 5. The landmarks used to calculate palatal distance PD, larynx height LH, hence larynx height index LHI = LH/PD. Table 2. The values of vertical larynx height (LH), horizontal palatal distance (PD), larynx height index (LHI), and length of the vocal tract calculated with the articulatory model (VLAM) LH (cm)
PD (cm)
LHI
Length (cm)
21-year-old male
8.70
8.70
1.00
17.45
0-year-old newborn
2.63
4.34
0.60
7.70
3. Maximal Vowel Space and the point vowels /i a u/ We can define the Maximal Vowel Space (MVS) of a given speaker as the n‑dimensional space of the first n‑formants of all possible vocalic sounds that can be produced by that speaker. Obviously, the use of an articulatory model allows an exhaustive determination of the borders of that space, and in particular the point vowels /i a u/.
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This MVS represents a global acoustic characterization of a given vocal tract, and can thus be used to compare the speech capabilities from birth to adulthood. 3.1 The Maximal Vowel Space and compensation phenomena It is possible to produce the maximal F1-F2-F3 acoustic space of a model by scanning the entire input space of each articulatory control parameter, while satisfying the conditions necessary for vocalic production. The fact that all vowels are necessarily located in the F1/F2 triangle is due to basic acoustic properties of a single tract (Bonder, 1982; Boë et al., 1989). Determining the MVS in such a way is more reliable than simply using three unique examples of the point vowels /i/, /a/, and /u/ which are not guaranteed to be located at the real limits of the triangle. When the number of control parameters is larger than the number of output parameters, a given output could be then generated by a manifold in the input space, i.e. a continuous subset of the input space. In the case of our articulatory model with seven control parameters, a five dimensional manifold can be associated to any given point in the F1/F2 acoustic two-dimensional space. This property, well known and used in robotics, has been pinpointed for speech by Atal et al. (1978). Thus, it possible to explore the potential compensation strategies that are related to a given acoustic product. Figure 6 shows a simplified representation of a manifold in a 3D control space associated with a single point in the F1/F2 space.
F1 P3
P2 P1
F2
Figure 6. Example of the acoustic Maximal Vowel Space generated by exploring the whole articulatory parameter (P1–P2–P3) space corresponding to a hypercube. The acoustic output is the well known F1/F2 triangle. The manifold in the input space associated with a single point in the acoustic output space is depicted as a surface in this example.
Neandertal vocal tract
3.2 Prototypes for /i a u/ in the MVS The MVS allows then a precise description of all the possibilities for maximal distinctiveness and permits an optimal choice of prototypical realizations. If one considers, following Liljencrants & Lindblom (1974), that the vowels /i a u/ are located within that space in such a way as to maximize the distances between vowels, it is possible to characterize in the F1-F2-F3 acoustic space the three point vowels in the following way (Schwartz et al., 1997b): – The vowel /i/ is characterized by a maximal F3, resulting in a minimum F1 and a maximal F2; – The vowel /a/ corresponds to a maximal F1; – The vowel /u/ is produced with a minimal F2, resulting in a minimum F1 value. In a systematic study, Ménard (2002) has generated Maximal Vowel Space and selected vocalic prototypes for various age values using VLAM. The resulting formant values were found to be consistent with the data available in the literature (Peterson & Barney, 1952; Fant, 1973; Eguchi & Hirsh, 1969; Hillenbrand et al. 1995; Lee et al., 1999; Huber et al., 1999).
4. Influence of the Larynx Height Index on the Maximal Vowel Space The main question motivating this study was to establish the influence of the Larynx Height Index on the Maximal Vowel Space. Therefore, articulatory and acoustic vocal tract simulations were carried out to generate MVS for four different values of LHI (from 1.0 to 0.60). In order to overcome the acoustic normalization problem related to resulting length variation, the vocal tract length was maintained constant (17.4 cm for the neutral articulation) by choosing the appropriate kmouth and kpharynx factors for each value of LHI (Figure 7). We determined the input space by generating 20,000 vocalic articulations using a random uniform distribution for each of the seven articulatory parameters. We imposed minimum thresholds of 0.3 cm2 (cf. e.g., Fant, 1960; Catford, 1977) for constriction area which is the standard value discussed above. For the lips, this threshold was lowered to 0.1 cm2, a value commonly observed during speech production, especially for closed vowels such as /u/ and /y/ in French (Abry & Boë, 1986). The minimum cross-sectional area requirement, therefore, constitutes the necessary condition for a specified vocal-tract configuration to be considered as that of a vowel. Formants were finally computed from the generated area functions
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Figure 7. Neutral position of the vocal tract for four values of LHI (constant length of 17.4 cm).
using a frequency domain acoustic simulation of the vocal tract (Badin & Fant, 1984). The resulting MVS are displayed in Figure 8 for the four LHI values. These results clearly show that, no matter what the ratio between oral and pharyngeal cavities is, vowel spaces are rather similar. This can be explained by the possibility of compensations, as will be shown.
5. Proposals for /i/, /a/, and /u/ prototypes for different Larynx Height Indexes Now, we are able to propose /i/, /a/, and u/ prototypes for the two extremes LHI (1.00 and 0.60). Therefore, we selected the representative point vowels in each MVS according to criteria defined above, and determined the associated articulatory
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Figure 8. Maximal vowel spaces for four values of LHI (1.00, 0.80, 0.70, 0.60).
control parameters, and thus the corresponding midsagittal sections and area functions (Figure 9 & 10). What are the differences that can be observed between the articulatory strategies used to produce the acoustic outputs with the two extremes LHI? For /i/, achieving approximately the same acoustic goals with a small pharyngeal cavity requires (i) a narrower constriction, (ii) a fronting of the tongue body. For /u/, a small pharyngeal cavity requires (i) a more anterior tongue body, and (ii) an increased lip protrusion. This is in agreement with Fant (1975) who reports, from cineradiographic data, that a female subject, compared to males, produces a more fronted /u/. Finally, /a/ is produced with quite the same strategy in the two cases.
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Figure 9. Midsagittal contours of /i/, /a/, and u/ prototypes, for LHI = 1.00 and 0.60. LHI = 1.00
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Figure 11. The two /i/, /a/, and /u/ triangle corresponding to the extreme values of LHI (o : 1.00 and • : 0.60) ; the /i/, /æ/, /"/, and /u/ quadrilateral for adult male from Peterson & Barney (1952) ( ).
In order to verify the consistency of the selected /i/, /a/, and u/ prototypes, we have plotted them in Figure 11, together with the Peterson & Barney (1952) data. We observe that they match rather well with male adults data, as expected.
6. Discussion and conclusion We have shown that modeling the growth of the vocal tract enables a better understanding of the phenomena governing anatomical differences between neonates, babies, adolescents, and male and female adults as quantified by a Larynx Height Index. This approach allows discussion of the consequences of variation in vocal tract dimensions during evolution with the aim of establishing distinctive sounds for speech. Our simulations show that the Maximal Vowel Space of a given vocal tract does not actually depend on the Larynx Height Index: gestures of the tongue body, lips and jaw allow compensations for differences in the ratio between the dimensions of the oral cavity and pharynx. This is fully consistent with the existing data
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that have been collected: as far as we know, nobody to date has claimed that adolescents and women — who have shorter pharynges than men — have more difficulty than men in realizing vowel contrasts. These results confirm the conclusions of Goldstein for newborns (1980 p. 214): “Since the vowels /i/, /"/, and /u/ can be synthesized by a model which is anatomically correct for infants, one can postulate that newborns are not prevented from speaking because of the anatomy of their vocal tracts”. Recently, Meltzoff (2000) showed evidence for the antero-posterior mobility of the pharynx of the newborn: a few hours after birth, newborns can perform tongue protrusion by imitation of an adult, thus moving their tongue roots forward. In 1971, when they estimated very small cross-sectional areas for the pharynx cavity for /i/ and /u/ in the newborn, these findings were not available to L&C. As for chimpanzees tongue root mobility, Takemoto (2000) performed comparative microscopic and macroscopic analyses of the human and chimpanzee tongue musculature. His dissections revealed that the human and chimpanzee tongues share a topologically identical musculature. If this result is confirmed, the inability of chimpanzees to produce speech would then have to be ascribed to limitations in higher neural levels. If Neandertals could not produce maximal vowel contrasts, it is unlikely that it was for the articulatory acoustic reasons advocated by L&C. However, since our study is strictly limited to the morphological and acoustic aspects of the vocal tract, we cannot offer any definitive answer to the question of whether Neandertals could produce human speech or not. Finally, a low larynx and a large pharynx cannot be considered to be the “anatomical prerequisites for producing the full range of human speech” and for constituting a necessary evolutionary pre-adaptation to speech.
Acknowledgements This research was funded by the CNRS program Origine de l’Homme du Langage et des Langues, managed by Jean-Marie Hombert; it is an ongoing research in the OMLL program (Origin of Man Language and Languages) funded by ESF-EUROCORES, Orofacial control in communication in human and non human primates project (managed by Jean-Luc Schwartz).
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