Visual Culture and the Holocaust
Visual Culture an d the Holocaust Edited by Barbie Zelizer The purpos e of this volu...
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Visual Culture and the Holocaust
Visual Culture an d the Holocaust Edited by Barbie Zelizer The purpos e of this volume is to enhance our understanding of the visua l representation o f the Holocaust—i n films , television , photographs , ar t an d museu m installations an d cultura l artifacts—an d to examin e th e way s i n whic h thes e have shaped public consciousness. Th e areas covered include the Eichmann Tria l as reported on American television , th e impac t o f Schindler's List, th e Jewis h Museum in Berlin, the Israeli Heritage Museums, Wome n and Holocaust Photography, Internet Holocaus t site s and tattoos and shrunken heads , the bodies of the dead and o f the survivors . Contributors includ e Barbie Zelizer, Lilian e Weissberg, Andreas Huyssen, Erns t van Alphen , Lis a Saltzman, Jeffre y Shandler , Geoffre y Hartman , Miria m Bratu Hansen, Yosef a Loshitzky , James E. Young, Tamar Katriel, Marianne Hirsch, Lawrence Douglas, Dora Apel, Anna Reading and Elizabeth Legge. Barbie Zelizer i s Associate Professo r o f Communication, Annenber g School for Communication, Universit y o f Pennsylvania . He r recen t publication s includ e Holocaust Memory through the Camera's Eye (1998).
Edited an d wit h a n Introduction b y
Barbie Zelize r
Visual Cultur e and the Holocaust
THE
ATHLONE PRESS LONDON
First published i n Great Britain 2001 by THE ATHLONE PRESS 1 Park Drive, London NW11 7SG This collection copyrigh t © 2001 by Rutgers, The Stat e University. For copyrights to individual pieces, please see first page of each essay. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 0 485 30097 4 All rights reserved. No part of this publication ma y be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted i n any form o r by any means, electronic , mechanical , photocopying or otherwise, without prior permission i n writing from th e publisher . Manufactured i n th e Unite d States of America
Contents Introduction: O n Visualizing the Holocaust Barbie Zelizer
1
HIGH CULTURE , LO W CULTURE , AND TH E D O M A I N S O F TH E VISUA L
In Plain Sight 1
3
Of Mice and Mimesis : Reading Spiegelman with Adorno 2
8
Liliane Weissberg
Andreas Huyssen
ART
Deadly Historians: Boltanski's Intervention in Holocaust Historiography 4 Ernst van Alphen Lost in Translation: Clement Greenberg , Anselm Kiefer , and th e Subjec t of History 7 Lisa Saltzman
5
4
T E L E V I S I O N AN D V I D E O
The Man in th e Glass Box: Watching the Eichmann Tria l on American Television 9
1
Tele-Suffering an d Testimon y in th e Dot Co m Era 11
1
Jeffrey Shandler
Geoffrey Hartman
vi
Contents
FILM
Schindler's List Is Not Shoah: Second Commandment , Popular Modernism, and Public Memo
127
Miriam Bratu Hansen
Hybrid Victims: Second-Generation Israeli s Screen th e Holocaust 15 Yosefa Loshitzky
2
ARTIFACTS
Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museu m in Berlin: The Uncann y Arts of Memorial Architecture 17
9
"From Shor e to Shore": The Holocaust, Clandestine Immigration , and Israel i Heritage Museums 19
8
James E. Young
Tamar Katriel
PHOTOGRAPHS
Surviving Images: Holocaust Photographs and the Work of Postmemory Marianne Hirsch
215
Gender and Atrocity: Women in Holocaust Photographs
247
Barbie Zelizer
THE BOD Y
The Shrunke n Hea d o f Buchenwald: Icons o f Atrocity at Nuremberg 27
5
The Tattooed Jew 30
0
Lawrence Douglas
Dora Apel
INTERNET AN D TH E WEB
Clicking o n Hitler: The Virtual Holocaust @Hom e 32 Anna Reading
3
vii
Contents
Analogs of Loss: Vera Frenkel's Body Missing (http://www.yorku.ca/BodyMissing) 34
0
Contributors 35
1
Index 35
5
Elizabeth Legge
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Visual Cultur e and the Holocaust
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Barbie Zelizer
Introduction: On Visualizing the Holocaust The visualizatio n o f the Holocaus t remain s on e o f the quandarie s of Holocaust representation. Through films, television, cultura l artifacts, art, comic books, and photographs, the Holocaust's visualizatio n i s so prevalent that it has become an integral part of our understanding and recollection o f the atrocitie s of World War II. It i s difficul t t o contemplat e th e Holocaus t withou t trace s o f familiar visua l images coming to mind. Yet we do not kno w enough about our capacity to visualize those atrocities. Althoug h w e kno w tha t visualizatio n work s bes t whe n i t play s t o th e schematic, iconic, and simplistic feature s of a representation, we have not yet figured out the ways in which those dimensions facilitate our understanding of reallife events in certain ways and not others. Visual Culture and the Holocaust aims to enhanc e our understanding of the Holocaust' s visua l representation . It examines the shap e of the Holocaust's visual representation and considers the impac t of tha t representatio n o n collectiv e understandin g o f the phenomeno n o f Nazi atrocity. Given tha t generations o f individuals wer e not aliv e t o experienc e th e Holocaust firsthand, its visual representation thereby possesses a critical importance in the shapin g of public consciousness . This book considers the visualizatio n o f the Holocaus t throug h its various domains of visual representation. Expanding on the traditiona l forms o f representation that have been associated with th e Holocaust, it explores a wide and increasing number o f settings b y which th e Holocaus t ha s come to be visually represented—in film , photography , comic books, art an d artistic installations , museum artifacts , th e human body , television an d video, and the Internet . In so doing, it gives pause to the surplus of visual material that has proliferated over the past half-decad e o r so in orde r to conside r what i t mean s t o visualize th e Holo caust, why doing so makes sense, for whom and under which condition s it works most effectively . When thinking about visual representation and its emergence and sustenance as a way of representing the Holocaust, one is struck by the extent to which Western epistemology has always been ocular-centric or vision-based. With "th e seen" taken as a primary ground of knowledge in Western thought, "seeing " has Copyright © 2001 by Barbie Zelizer.
2 Barbie Zelizer
become in many cases a metaphor for perspective. In this sense, the ways in which the Holocaus t i s visually represente d have become a concrete corollary for our sense of how the Holocaust means. Yet we have at our disposal more ways of "seeing'' th e Holocaust tha n we realize a t firs t glance . This boo k provides one attemp t t o conside r the arra y of existing visual representational forms by which we have come to "see" th e Holocaust. Using the convention s tha t ar e available within each domain of representation, th e translatio n o f Nazi atrocity int o visual form i n itself is seen not onl y as an act of expression but a s an act of negotiation with the arra y of meanings by which the Holocaust presents itself to us. What doe s i t mea n t o visualiz e th e Holocaust ? T o capture al l tha t i t entailed? T o captur e par t o f what i t entailed ? T o captur e th e cor e o f what i t entailed? We have long assumed that eac h of these propositions is doubtful, for, as Saul Friedlander (1992) reminded us a t th e beginnin g of the 1990s , the Holocaust lie s beyond the limit s of representation. Ye t if we view representation a s translation wor k rathe r tha n mer e reportage, a s metaphor rathe r tha n index , as incomplete rathe r than comprehensive , the n w e admit th e frailt y o f representational codes into our own expectations of what each representational code can and should do . In so doing, we take the conversation about Holocaust representatio n beyond its "preferred " template , tha t which ha s tended t o privilege th e factual over the represented, and silence th e alarm bells that tend to ring when representation tugs at reality. In visual representation, these alarm bells have encouraged evaluations that ar e of two minds: first, to steadfastly uphol d the underprivileging of the visual alongside the verbal; and second, to valorize visual forms like th e filmed testimony, archiva l photograph, or documentary film more than representations that track reality in a less manifest fashion. This book, then, contemplates a rnultivalent jum p forward: i t leap s into terrai n tha t utilize s th e visua l a s the simultaneous high and low ground of Holocaust representation, a default setting for considerin g th e Holocaust no t onl y through high modes of visual representation but als o through recent phenomena such as virtual reality or tattoos, its socalled low modes. Each domain boasts its own shadows and reflections, and each needs to be considered on its own terms. It is against thes e frailtie s that this book is set in place. Eac h domain of visual representation outlined her e translates som e aspect of the Holocaust int o another code by which it ca n be made differently meaningful . Whethe r it be the sharp juxtapositions of Judy Chicago's vases of flowers and survivors' pained faces or th e façad e o f a Holocaust monumen t i n German y tha t disappear s a s it dip s underground, the translation work involved in visualizing the Holocaust borrows from othe r codes of meaning to lend shape to the horrific and the atrocious. And, as with al l translation work , each act o f representation succeed s by overstating certain aspects of that which is being represented and understating others. No act of translation succeed s by reproducing the original event in its entirety .
3 Introduction
At heart in much of this discussion lies a recognition of the uneasiness set in plac e by each o f these domain s surroundin g th e popularizatio n of the Holocaust. When Schindler's List was released in 1993, we asked ourselves whether Stephen Spielber g had matured sufficiently a s a filmmaker t o leav e behind E.T. and Jaws and do the Holocaust justice (Loshitzky, 1997). When the artist Robert Morris affixed neo n lights and dashes of red paint across a dead naked woman in Bergen-Belsen and turned her into a contemporary Sleeping Beauty, we wondered about the appropriateness of recycling such an atrocious image into the realm of erotic art (Zelizer , 1998) . When th e U.S . Holocaust Memoria l Museu m playe d with th e ide a of generalizing the Holocaust beyon d the Nazi experience to additional, more contemporary atrocities, we concerned ourselves with whether and how t o retain th e separat e category of Nazi horror (Linenthal, 1995). And when Roberto Begnini won award upon award from the filmmaking community for his film Life Is Beautiful, we caustically wondered how it was possible to render the Holocaust comedic . At th e hear t o f each o f these question s was a n attemp t t o wrestle wit h expectation s tha t visua l representatio n could , should , an d would provide us with an altered glimpse of the horrific nature of Nazi atrocity . But are we asking the right questions about these domains of representation? Might we not be better served by asking what these modes of representation do differently fro m eac h other than by focusing on where they each fall shor t i n comparison with some honorific standard? In other words, by admitting the frailt y of eac h visual cod e of representation, we ma y fin d ourselve s better abl e t o g o beyond that frailty an d locate the strength s of each code. It is upon these premise s tha t thi s book emerges. In separating out each domain of representation, Visual Culture and the Holocaust tackles the codes and conventions by which th e differen t mode s of Holocaust visualization have been independently set in place. Significantly, none of these domains of representation is mutuall y exclusive . Photograph s appea r as the groundin g of artwork, monu ments reproduce the distinctive lines of familiar paintings, and films incorporate familiar televise d sequences . Visua l representation i s always at som e level concerned with transformations, and the visuals of the Holocaust have been recycled, reclaimed, and refashioned to fit the codes and conventions of the mode of visual representation tha t is at hand. Yet each depends in some sense on our familiarity with an aesthetic throug h which we first saw visual evidence of Nazi atrocity . This book is both wide-ranging in its trackin g of visual domain s o f representation a s well as broad in its inclusion o f major scholar s from differen t geographic location s an d academi c disciplines . Scholar s fro m th e Unite d States , Britain, th e Netherlands , Israel , Canada , and Germany have used th e academi c tools of film, fine art, comparative literature, German, art history, Jewish studies, English, communications, philosophy , law, and museum studie s to provide here a variegate d loo k a t ho w w e "see " th e Holocaus t i n th e contemporar y era . Through this variegated setting, Visual Culture and the Holocaust aims to advance
4
Barbie Zelizer
our understanding o f how th e differen t domain s o f the Holocaust' s visua l repre sentation hel p us see. The book begins with two essays that tackle the general realm of the Holocaust' s visual representation. In her essay "In Plain Sight," German and comparative literature scholar Lilian e Weissberg explores what it mean s to visually accommo date a Holocaust aesthetics. Most recently editor of Hannah Arendt's Rahel Varnhagen: The Life o f a Jewess (1997) and coeditor (wit h Dan Ben-Amos ) of Cultural Memory and the Construction of Identity (1999), Weissberg argues for an aesthetic sensibility tha t admits both silence and absence as its formulating principles, because it suggests a different understanding of visual culture and the Holocaust tha n tha t accorde d other events . I n trackin g differen t example s o f th e Holocaust's visual representation, including the placement of objects in the U.S. Holocaust Memoria l Museu m an d a recently publishe d photographi c album of concentration camps , Weissber g discusses no t onl y th e aesthetizatio n o f th e Holocaust bu t also its ethical an d political consequences . Following upon his important work in Holocaust memory (Twilight Memories: Marking Time i n a Culture o f Amnesia, 1996) , critica l schola r Andreas Huyssen addresse s the genera l domain o f visual representatio n b y considerin g Maus, Ar t Spiegelman' s second-generatio n account o f th e Holocaust , throug h Theodor Adorno's concept of mimesis. Huyssen demonstrates that mimesis offer s a way of offsetting th e long-hel d distinction betwee n mass culture an d high culture by allowing us to approach the unapproachable and imagine th e unimagin able through representation s tha t employ mimesis. B y reading Maus i n terms of its mimetic dimension (th e personal, historical, and traumatic), Huyssen takes us beyond an existin g stalemat e i n debate s abou t ho w to represen t th e Holocaus t properly. The concept of mimesis invalidates the lingering effects o f the high culture versus mass culture debate that was influentially articulated by Adorno himself ove r fift y year s ag o and tha t ha s bee n s o centra l i n discussion s o f Claude Lanzmann's Shoah and Stephen Spielberg's Schindler's List. Mimesis also couples Spiegelman and Adorno in a way that allows us to read them against the grain of both their own basic convictions an d those of long-standing Holocaust scholarship . Importantly, Huysse n raise s the question whether Adorno's ow n writing helped block certain representational possibilities o f the Holocaust until now. These essays set the stage for the fundamental concern that lies at the core of the book's remaining chapters. They raise the question of how we can best understand, evaluate, and appreciate all fields of the Holocaust' s visual representation. Pushing us beyond ou r defaul t assumptio n tha t th e visua l migh t loo k differen t from its nonvisual counterpart, these essays encourage us to evaluate the differen t domains of visual representation agains t their own strengths an d weaknesses . The remainder of the book considers the visual representation of the Holocaust domain by domain. First on the agenda is art, the ways in which the Holocaust
5 Introduction
has been represented in artistic installations. Lon g heralded as a fertile domain for visualizing the Holocaust, art and artistic installations have wavered in the degree to which they have made the Holocaust explicit. In these essays, two scholars take the issue of artistic representation further, by interrogating the boundaries between artistic representation an d other modes of engagement with the Holocaust . Following upon his recent book Caught by History: Holocaust Effects i n Contemporary Art, Literature, and Theory (1997), Dutch museum director and comparative literatur e schola r Erns t van Alphen tackle s th e crossin g between artistic and historical representation. H e discusses installations by French artist Christian Boltansk i that adopt those modes of representation tha t are supposed to provide an objective, truthful account o f past reality. Hi s essay, "Deadly His torians: Boltanski' s Interventio n i n Holocaus t Historiography, " contends tha t Boltanski's installations—whic h consis t o f vitrines, collection s of photographic portraits, and inventories—are privileged archival genres that attempt to represent the historica l paradigm and embody a promise of the presenc e of the past . However, Van Alphen argues that Boltanski's return to these historical genre s reveals an awareness that what is being reconstructed is also lost. Boltanski's collections, archives, and inventories have a direct impact on historical recording, in that they underscore th e disciplinin g o f history a s a scholarly field. Reenacting the Holocaust i n unexpected and uncanny ways, Boltanski forces u s to realize that th e disciplining o f history was exactly what th e Nazi s di d as they made history an d practiced genocide. Art historian Lis a Saltzman similarly considers the intersection betwee n art an d history, but sh e adds poetry into th e consideration . Extending upon her recent work on the postwa r German painter Anselm Kiefe r (Anselm Kiefer an d Art after Auschwitz, 1999) , she pursues th e possibilitie s an d impossibilities of painterly representatio n in th e aftermat h of postwar abstraction and historica l trauma. Her essay, "Lost in Translation: Clemen t Greenberg, Anselm Kiefer, and the Subjec t o f History," addresse s a series o f Kiefer's works from th e 1980 s tha t are conventionally understood to translate poetry (Paul Celan's "Fugue of Death") and, concomitantly, histor y (th e historical traum a of the Holocaust) into the visua l field o f postwar painting. Capturing the intertwinin g o f different mode s of representation that bear upon the visual, she pursues the very specificity of Kiefer's act of translatio n an d representatio n i n th e aftermat h o f historical trauma , whil e exploring another act of translation, that performed by the reigning critic of modernist painting, Clement Greenberg. He, too, translated Celan's "Fugue of Death/' in this case, from German to English, for the pages of Commentary in 1955, producing i n poeti c for m tha t whic h h e denie d t o th e pictoria l field of modernist painting. Thus , as much as the essay explores the very specificity of Kiefer's proj ect, it also considers the subjec t of history in postwar aesthetics and painting. Following its consideration of art, Visual Culture and the Holocaust tackles the controversia l yet increasingly popular domain of televisual an d video representation of the Holocaust. A growing field over the past four decades that boasts
6 Barbie Zelizer
distinct formulas , genre of programming, and predictable schedules, th e intersec tion o f television, video, and the Holocaust i s one of the mos t widel y accessibl e domains o f visual representation . Th e tw o essay s here isolate tw o moment s a t either sid e of the tempora l continuum i n which televisio n an d video Holocaust representations situate themselves—early uses of television i n the 1960 s and the most recent trend in video testimonies. Expanding upon his recent book, While America Watches: Televising th e Holocaust (1999) , Jewish studies scholar Jeffre y Shandle r addresses the televisual relay of the war crimes trial of Adolf Eichmann by the Israeli government, held in Jerusalem in the spring and summer of 1961. In the essay, "The Man in The Glass Box: Watching the Eichman n Trial on American Television," Shandle r demonstrates that th e tria l was not onl y a major watershe d of Holocaust remembrance but als o a landmark of communications history—th e first major tria l t o be televised internationally, anticipatin g Cour t TV by a full three decades. Championed as a technological marve l that enabled "th e whol e worl d to have a seat" in th e courthouse, th e televised coverag e of the trial in fact proved to have a more complex impact on the trial's reception, particularl y in the United States . While the medium promised viewers an unprecedented opportunity to scrutinize and judge a man regarde d as the embodimen t of evil, television actuall y offere d a frustrat ingly unsatisfying spectacle. "Watching Eichmann," which emerged as the central activity for many trial observers, became an exercise in confronting the performative limitations of public trials and of television's ability t o reveal and enlighten. Indeed, the inscrutable, undemonstrative presence of Eichmann on television may have validated Hannah Arendt's explanation of the case as a lesson in the "banal ity o f evil." Literary scholar Geoffrey Hartma n of Yale University moves to the othe r side of the temporal continuum t o consider yet another role of television and video in representing the Holocaust—video testimonies. Coming directly from his experience a s a founder and project director of Yale's Fortunoff Vide o Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Hartma n utilizes the considerable time he has spent with this audiovisual genre to raise questions about memory, pedagogy, and cultural transmission. Expandin g on som e o f his mos t recen t work , includin g Th e Longest Shadow: In the Aftermath o f the Holocaust (1996), Hartman uses his essay, "TeleSuffering an d Testimony i n a Dot Co m Era," to discuss th e importanc e of video testimonies for memory and the ways in which thi s new genre has changed th e communicative environment . The essay also addresses certain problems that have emerged as video has become an increasingly fashionable mode of representing the Holocaust. One of the oldest domains of visual representation of the Holocaust is that of film , an d hundreds o f cinematic representation s hav e appeared over the pas t half-decade, rangin g from th e documentar y to the tragi-comedic . Visual Culture and th e Holocaust explores the domain o f film, by first reproducing film and literary scholar Miriam Hansen's semina l essay, "Schindler's List Is Not Shoah: The
7
Introduction
Second Commandment , Popula r Modernism , an d Public, " whic h appeare d in Critical Inquiry (Winter 1996). In this essay, Hansen tracks the critical and controversial reception of the fil m an d the wa y in which visual Holocaust remem-
brance connect s t o a more general linkage with th e cinema , television , an d
American intellectual life. Hanse n identifies thre e levels of public reception t o
Schindler's List and connects them to broader issues concerning cinematic subjectivity, the question of representation, and the problem of narrative.
The nex t essa y considers one o f the mos t productiv e settings o f film s concerning the Holocaust—Israel. In "Hybrid Victims: Second-Generation Israelis Screen the Holocaust," film scholar Yosefa Loshitzky, author of Conflicting Projections: Identity Politics on the Israeli Screen (2000) and editor of Spielberg's Holocaust: Critical Perspectives o n Schindler's List (1997), discusses how art has preceded purely political debat e in Israeli cinematic representations of the Holocaust. Loshitzky argues that Holocaust films made by second-generation Israelis show more openness toward the more contradictory and disturbing aspects of the event , openin g a new spac e in Israeli public discours e to th e formerl y suppressed plight of the diaspor a survivors and to the effec t o f their lived experience on their sons and daughters. Circumstances as wide-ranging as the emergenc e of the Israel i "ne w historians " an d thei r revisionis t readin g of the histor y o f th e Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the corrosive effect of the Intifada (the Palestinian popular uprising ) on th e Israel i public, and the star t an d continuation o f the peace process with the Palestinians and other Arab neighbors, have all impacted upon the Holocaust's visual representation, synthesizing the concern s of Israel's artistic, intellectual, an d academic communities an d encouraging the Israeli public at large to reexamine the space occupied by the Shoah in the grand narrative of Zionism. As contemporary museums have become increasingly variegated and interactive environments fo r assessing an d engaging artifacts, the materialit y o f th e Holocaust's visual representation, manifested in artifacts, has come under increasing degrees of public attention. Two essays discuss the employment of visual artifacts in two museum settings, one in Berlin and one in Israel. In "Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin: The Uncanny Arts of Memorial Architecture," literary scholar James Young, author most recently of At Memory's Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture (2000), considers the fundamental question of how a city "houses" the memory of a people no longer at home in that city. Analyzing Daniel Libeskind's Jewish Museum in Berlin, Young recounts the story of Libeskind's attempt to help Berlin reintegrate its lost Jewish past. That story, he argues, begins with the establishment o f the original Jewish Museum in 1933 and situates itself in Libeskind's redesign of a place to house Jewish memory in Berlin. Via its antimodernist design, the museum articulates the dilemma Germany faces whenever it attempts to for-
malize the self-inflicted void at its center—the void of its lost and murdered Jews.
Communications schola r Tama r Katrie l take s th e Holocaust' s visua l
8 Barbie Zelize r
representation int o th e Israel i museum. Followin g her mos t recen t book , Performing the Past: A Study of Israeli Settlement Museums (1997), Katriel explores the phenomenon of Israeli heritage museums and the role that the Holocaust plays in lending them a coherent theme. Focusing on the immigration of Jewish refugees from Naz i persecution, her essay, "From Shor e to Shore": The Holocaust, Clandestine Immigration, and Israeli Heritage Museums," demonstrate s how the story of the Holocaust has been incorporated within the broader story of Jewish national struggle. Katrie l explores a range of representational practices, both verbal and visual, by which the story of clandestine immigration from Nazi Europe has found its clima x i n a Palestine tha t narrativel y emerge s as a haven for persecuted an d homeless Jews. Combining the core themes of victimage and heroism, she inventories th e museu m settin g by which th e Holocaus t serve s as background to th e story of clandestine immigration . Photography o f the Holocaust , whic h ha d its beginnin g i n documentar y images of the atrocities , has had a long afterlife i n the images ' recycling from th e time o f Nazi persecution. Th e tw o essay s here consider the boundaries of photographic authority in conjunction with larger meaning systems about the Holocaust. In "Survivin g Images : Holocaus t Photograph s an d th e Wor k o f Postmemory," French and comparative literature scholar Marianne Hirsch, author of Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory (1997), tackles the dilemma o f repetitive an d recycled Holocaust photos . Tracking their appearance in venues as wide-ranging as the Tower of Faces in the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum an d th e wor k o f cultural criti c Susa n Sontag , Hirsch argue s tha t th e Holocaust's visual landscape has been limited and reduced to a repetitive stock of the sam e photos seen in endless settings. Sh e contends that th e compulsive and traumatic repetitio n o f such photos fill s a recuperative functio n o f connectin g across generations, forcin g later generations t o work through the traumatic pas t of their forebears . I adopt a slightly differen t tak e on Holocaust photos in my discussion of the photo s o f the liberatio n o f the concentratio n camp s of World War II. Following upon my recent book, Remembering t o Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera's Eye (1998), here I examine th e wa y in which th e visualizatio n of the atrocity story has accommodated the issue of gender. In "Gender and Atrocity: Women in Holocaust Photographs/ ' I argue that th e atrocity narrative is unable to accommodate the issue of gendered experience within th e broader visual representation o f atrocity. Instead, the gender of women in Holocaust photos is simplified, either overgendered in ways that play to stereotypical notions of gender or rendered genderless. This suggests disturbing findings concernin g the inabilit y of atrocity to reflect the nuances, complications , an d contradictions that exist in gendered experience . Visual Culture and the Holocaust also tackles a controversial, if increasingly recognized, domain of visual representation—the human body. Emerging as the embodied articulation of numerous rituals and taboos concerning its "appropriateness" a s a vehicle of representation, th e body is discussed in two essays as a
9 Introduction
terrain for mnemonic impulses, bot h at the tim e of the Nuremberg trials and in contemporary instances of remembering the Nazi atrocities. In hi s essay , "Th e Shrunke n Hea d o f Buchenwald: Icons o f Atrocity a t Nuremberg," reprinted from Representations (Summer 1998) , legal scholar Lawrence Douglas demonstrates tha t th e shrunke n hea d of Buchenwald which wa s displayed during the Nuremberg trials possesses not only instrumental bu t symbolic importance. By serving as an icon of atavism, the shrunken head presents an image of atrocity familiar to liberal jurisprudence that facilitate d the trial's progression. It visually reminds th e public of the efficac y o f the la w as civilization's bulwark agains t barbarism an d help s underscor e Naz i aggressio n as a barbaric assault against civilization . Art historian Dora Apel addresses an equally controversial site of visual memory an d the body—tattooed Jews. In "The Tattoe d Jew, " Apel analyzes th e form of full-body tattoo s of graphic concentration camp imagery, as embodied by 24-year-old California photographer Marina Vainshtein. Apel argues that the photographer defie s th e scriptura l ba n o n cutting o r marking th e bod y and instea d physically inscribes herself into a history for which she was born too late. Her tattoos must thereby be read as a personal testimonial t o the events of the Holocaust, a reenactment o f memory performed by a surrogate witness in whom trauma has also been induced. Visual Culture and the Holocaust concludes its exploratio n of the Holocaust's visua l representatio n b y attending t o on e of its newes t venues—virtual reality, exemplified by the Internet and the Web. Fast becoming the most prolifi c setting for information relay, the domain of virtual representation is new enough to requir e significan t scholarl y attention . Th e tw o essay s her e conside r tw o instances o f the Holocaust's virtual representation, creating a template by which the Holocaust i s brought into interactive, domesticated , an d personal space. In "Clickin g o n Hitler: Th e Virtua l Holocaust @Home, " media schola r Anna Readin g explores th e shap e of the Holocaust' s virtua l representation . She considers materials provided on the Internet, the World Wide Web, and CD-ROM and argues that th e interactive experience s with these documents , photographs, film footage , commentaries , an d multimedi a CD-ROM s suggest a n encounte r with Holocaust materials that may be qualitatively different fro m tha t offered b y more traditiona l visual forms . Readin g consider s how suc h interactiv e forms narrativize Holocaust memory in a nonlinear manne r and raises questions concerning the particula r ways in which cyberspac e and interactive media shape a topic such as the Holocaust . Alongside Reading's essay, fine arts scholar Elizabeth Legge examines th e Internet installations of Vera Frenkel's website Body Missing. In "Analogs of Loss: Vera Frenkel's Body Missing (http://www.yorku.ca/BodyMissingl." Legge demonstrates how Frenkel uses the Internet illusio n of infinite space and time t o situate the installation in a number of imagined times and places simultaneously—in a 194 1 war zone, a downtown bar in th e present , an d th e Vienn a Academie für Bildenden Kunst, which refused Hitler admission. Through it all, Frenkel recycles
10
Barbie Zelizer
artworks originally pillaged by the Nazis. Legge shows how Frenkel takes on th e problem o f representatio n b y turnin g conceptua l art' s lov e o f documentatio n inside out : the rigorou s documentation an d coding of the transporte d work s of art stan d for the bureaucracie s of the Holocaust . Legge argues that loss must be unhomogeneous, implying instead multiple possibilities, shiftin g categories, and relative and infinitely malleable truths. Visual Culture and the Holocaust is a book about crossing boundaries— boundaries o f time, o f space, o f issue, an d ultimatel y o f discipline. I n adopting such a malleable stance on the Holocaust, the book expands what we think of as the visual domain of the Holocaust's representation. Against the broad intersection of foca l point s offere d here , Visual Culture and th e Holocaust aims to substan tially enhance what we know of the Holocaust's visual representation. The eclecticism a t the cor e of this book will hopefully len d its signature to advancing our understanding of what it mean s to "see " th e Holocaust , no t onl y in accordance with the usual suspects of the Holocaust's visua l representation but with its novel and provocative agents as well. REFERENCES Ben-Amos, Dan, an d Liliane Weissberg (eds.). 1999 . Cultural Memory an d th e Construction of Identity, Detroit : Wayne State University Press . Friedlander, Sau l (ed.). 1992. Probing the Limits o f Representation: Nazism an d th e "Final Solution." Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Hartman, Geoffrey . 1996 . The Longest Shadow: In the Aftermath o f the Holocaust. Bloomington: Indiana University Press . Hirsch, Marianne . 1997 . Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory. Cam bridge: Cambridge University Press. Huyssen, Andreas. 1996 . Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia. New York: Routledge. Katriel, Tamar. 1997. Performing th e Past: A Study of Israeli Settlement Museums. Mahwah, N.J.: Erlbaum, Linenthal, Edwar d T. 1995 . Preserving Memory: The Struggle t o Create America's Holocaust Museum. Ne w York: Viking. Loshitzky, Yosefa (ed.) . 1997 . Spielberg's Holocaust: Critical Perspectives on "Schindler's List." Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Loshitzky, Yosefa . 2000 . Conflicting Projections: Identity Politics on th e Israeli Screen. Austin: University o f Texas Press. Saltzman, Lisa. 1999. Anselm Kiefer an d Art after Auschwitz. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press . Shandler, Jeffrey. 1998 . While America Watches: Televising the Holocaust. Oxford: Oxford University Press . Van Alphen, Ernst. 1997. Caught by History: Holocaust Effects i n Contemporary Art, Literature, and Theory. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Weissberg, Liliane (ed.). 1997. Hannah Arendt's Rahel Varnhagen: Life o f a Jewess. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press . Young, James E. 2000. At Memory's Edge: After-Images o f the Holocaust in Contemporary Art an d Architecture. Ne w Haven: Yale University Press . Zelizer, Barbie. 1998. Remembering t o Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera's Eye. Chicago : University o f Chicago Press.
High Culture , Low Culture, and th e Domains of the Visual
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Liliane Weissberg
In Plain Sight Did not our man himself, quickly after his war ended, see in the first books of photographs of Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen and Buchenwald naked, skeletal men and women alive and staring in the camera, corpses lying in disorderly piles, warehouses of eyeglasses, watches, and shoes? —Louis Begley , Wartime Lies
I. Beauty's Image There is , no doubt, a new obsessio n wit h beauty . Just at th e en d of one millen nium an d th e beginnin g o f another, literar y critics , ar t historians , an d philoso phers have been less concerned with the postmodern world, or with issues of multiculturalism, tha n wit h th e reviva l of aesthetics. "Aesthetic s i s returnin g to the academy," declared Craig Lambert in a recent article for the Harvard Magazine that cited English professor Emory Elliott, who organized a large conference on aesthetics an d the return of beauty at the University o f California at Riverside in 1998. 1 Speakin g of his students , Elliot t explained , "The y wan t t o hear abou t more than race and politics" (46) . While Elliott may regard beauty as the extensio n of an y discussio n o f race and politics, i f not a s its alternative , Elain e Scarry has reserved beaut y fo r individua l contemplation . Fo r her, beaut y encourage s it s repeated representation—"it makes us draw it, take photographs of it, or describe it to other people"2—and serves as "a call" (109) for our attention. Ou r fascination with beauty may have been ongoing, but i t ha s moved to the background of our discussion—not th e leas t becaus e beauty has occupie d a peculiar plac e withi n philosophical discourse, as Scarry explained: The sublim e (an aesthetic of power) rejects beaut y on the ground s that it i s diminutive, dismissible, not powerful enough. The political rejects beauty on the ground s tha t it i s to o powerful , a power expresse d both in it s abilit y to visit harm on objects looked at and also in its capacity to so overwhelm our attention that we cannot free ou r eye s fro m i t lon g enough to loo k at injustice. Berate d fo r its power , beaut y i s simultaneousl y belittled for it s powerlessness. (85)
Copyright © 2001 by Liliane Weissberg.
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Lilians Weiss berg
"Beauty is the most discredited philosophical notion," Alexander Nehamas agreed.3 Scarry, who wanted to rescue beauty from its victim position, insisted on its relationship t o justice. A close bond between both is already expressed in language itself, as the word "fair" exemplifies: it refers to the beautiful and to the just. Moreover, Scarry saw the relationshi p betwee n aesthetics an d ethics as a causal one. Citing philosopher Stuart Hampshire and economist Amartya Sen, she explained: "beautiful things give rise to the notion of distribution, to a lifesaving reciprocity, to fairness not jus t in the sense of loveliness of aspect but i n the sens e of 'a symmetry of everyone's relation to one another"' (95). If Scarry' s insistenc e o n th e relationshi p betwee n beaut y an d justice , between aesthetics an d ethics seems provocative here, she claimed nothin g els e but t o restore beauty's importance. Thus, he r study achieved a certain nostalgic air. Within any social or political context , beauty became irrelevant, its notion a luxury good in the academic trade of images and words. By introducing the notion of justice, and, with it, the ethical realm, Scarry featured beauty as representative of an Utopian social order, offering a pedagogical impact as well. She tried to establish a need for the perception and production of beauty, offering a n argument that spoke against beauty's strongest counterclaim . A critic could argue, for example, that beaut y is dangerous, that i t coul d blind and disengage a person from hi s or her surroundings, and trivialize th e horrors of a not-too-perfect world. If one would exchange the notion of beauty with that of poetry, this strong claim ca n be ascribed to a specific historical moment , namely, the en d of World War II. In 1949, shortly after his return to Germany from American exile, Theodor W. Adorno concluded that to write poetry after Auschwitz would be barbaric—if it woul d b e possible a t all. 4 N o othe r statemen t b y Adorno has bee n s o ofte n repeated as his announcemen t of, or perhaps demand for, the deat h of poetry. As Adorno explained later , hi s cal l for the en d of poetry was not a s much linke d t o its representational failings as to its irrelevanc e in the fac e of torture and death. Moreover, poetry effected pleasure . Pleasure, in turn, seemed not onl y untimel y in view of the recent historical events , it als o seemed impossible t o derive fro m any accurat e depiction o f reality. "The so-calle d artistic rendering of the naked physical pain of those who were beaten down with rifl e butts contains, howeve r distantly, the possibility that pleasure can be squeezed from it," Adorn o wrote in his Notes to Literature. "'Does living have any meaning when men exist who beat you until your bones break?' is also the question whether art as such should exist at all."5 Whereas Scarry seemed to find beauty in the natural and common objects of he r surroundings , Adorn o concentrated o n th e productio n of art. For Scarry , beauty gave evidence for a balance of thought an d justice; for Adorno, art turne d into an unjustifiable li e in the fac e of a reality that had excluded all ethical concerns. Pleasure, a goal that poetry and art may strive for, seemed for him antitheti cal to the historica l even t of the Holocaust , a n event that Dan Diner described, quite simply, as a "break with civilization." 6 While art may strive to create some
15 In Plain Sight
meaning, no meaning can possibly be derived from the event of the Holocaust. But whereas Adorno's injunction has often been cited, his own revision of his stanc e a Adorno's later statement in her recent book on post-Holocaust German literature: "The endurin g suffering has as much right to expression as does the tortured man to scream; therefore it may have been wrong that after Auschwitz poetry could no longer be written," Adorno wrote in 1966. 7 In the 1960s—an d already at work on his ow n magnum opu s o n aesthetic theory 8—he envisione d a n ar t tha t would , quite clearly , paralle l a scream. T o save art, Adorno severed its ties with beauty, and introduced instead an aesthetics o f pain.
II. Birthing Pains An aesthetic s o f pain i s nothing new , o f course. On e coul d argu e that pai n a s much a s pleasure—understood as bodily sensations—lies at aesthetics' very origin and core. Aesthetics becam e a discipline in 1735 , when Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten published his treatise on poetry, Meditationes philosophicae de nonnullis adpoema peitinentibus. Baumgarten coined the term "aesthetics" by referring to its roots in the Greek notion of aistheta. Aisthesis referred to perception, and the new field was to concentrate on the perception of the human senses. Baumgarten understood aesthetics as a philosophical discipline, but it was also closely related to medicine and, as Hans Adler has persuasively shown, the newly emerging study of anthropology. 9 Aesthetics offered yet another study of the self . In Baumgarten's Meditationes, moreover , aesthetic s did not relat e to art or beauty. Indeed, the author did not mention "beauty " anywher e in this earl y treatise. Concentrating on the human senses as a means to learn about the world, Baumgarten bypassed any discussion o f the distinctio n betwee n objects of nature and objects of art tha t would later occupy Immanuel Kant in his Critique of Judgment (1790), for example—and most aesthetician s in Kant's time and after him . Baumgarten's goal can be summarized easily: "Aesthetics is to be the science which will investigat e perception fo r the purpose of describing th e kind of perfection whic h i s proper to it. It will have its counterpart in the science of logic which will perform the same office for thought."10 Thus, Baumgarten distinguished between rational reflection and sensual perception, and posed them side by side. In his later lectures, published as Aesthetica (1750/1758), Baumgarten still focused o n th e experienc e of the huma n body , bu t increasingl y insisted o n th e question of the "perfection" of the sensatory experience.11 With this notion of perfection, described as perfectio cognitionis sensitivae, aesthetics changed to become the science of the beautiful—a step that would ultimately trigger the decline of the field's importance in relationship t o "traditional " philosoph y (i.e. , logic) , as
16 Liliam Weissberg
Georg Buhr and Manfred Klaus speculate.12 But the number of its practitioners grew rapidly. "Our time seems to be teeming with aestheticians , more than anything else/' wrote the poet Jean Paul in his own treatise on the subject at the beginning of the ne w century. 13 While Baumgarten's aesthetics concentrate d on "representation/' insofa r as an individual's sense s inform him o r her about the outsid e world, Kant placed his stress on judgment. With Kant, an individual decided whether something was beautiful. The subject, moreover, performed this judgment with the help of his or her imagination (Einbildungskraft), evaluating feelings of pleasure or displeasure. For Kant, aesthetics wa s therefore a field much differen t fro m tha t o f logic, an d removed from any objective realm. The individual contemplated an object , and perceived beauty with disintereste d pleasure . Onl y with Karl Philipp Moritz did the discussio n o f beauty shift fro m th e subjec t to the objec t itself. This new aesthetics wa s later elaborated by Hegel, who established a system that ordere d all artistic genres and offered a place to art itself. In his Lectures on Aesthetics, Hegel imagined a particular closure to this system. He did not demand an end to poetry, but predicted the end of art in a process of sublimation (Aufhebung] that subsumed art to philosophy and religion in its historical path of progression. Still, thi s history o f aesthetics a s a turn toward beauty—be it a s simply perceived or judged by the subject , o r stated o f an objec t itself—wa s intricatel y linked not only to the experience of pleasure, but als o to its opposite. Already in his Meditationes, Baumgarte n left roo m for the sensor y experience of pain, and this pain seeme d inscribe d i n on e o f the prim e examples of eighteenth-century aesthetics, th e statu e of Laocoon. At issue here was not th e pain experienced by the subject, but by the figure rendered. The sculpture showed Laocoon struggling with a snake that was ready to bite his thigh at the moment of depiction. Laocoon's face and body were contorted. The sculptur e wa s discovered in 150 6 just outside Rome, and was soon regarded as a masterpiece of Roman art. Hailed by the art historian Johann Joachim Winckelmann as a work of "noble simplicity an d quiet grandeur," it became an emblem for German classicism 14 and received a much wider European reception as well. Lessing's essay on the Laocoon, published in 1766 , was one of the earliest pieces to follow Winckelmann's mid-century work on Greek art, and gained instant fame . In his essay, Lessing discussed the differences between painting and poetry, and concentrated on nothing else but Laocoon's painful struggl e with th e snake. Painting froze Laocoon' s scream in time, Lessing wrote, while poetic narrative was able to tell the pain's story and restore the sculpture t o movement. As painting or sculpture could not incorporate time, th e viewer had to add temporal changes via his or her imagination. Thus, it was important for the artist to choose a "pregnant moment" tha t would encourage this imagination: If the artist can never make use of more than a single moment in everchanging nature, and if the painter in particular can use this moment only with ref-
17 In Plain Sight
erence to a single vantage point, while the works of both painter and sculptor are created not merely to be given a glance but to be contemplated—contemplated repeatedly and at length—then i t i s evident that this single moment and the point from which it is viewed cannot be chosen with too great a regard for it s effect . Bu t only that which gives free rei n to imagination is effective . The more we see, the more we must be able to imagine. And the more we add in our imaginations, the more we must think we see. In the ful l cours e of an emotion, no point is less suitable for this than its climax . There is nothing beyond this, and to present the utmost to the eye is to bind the wings of fancy and compel it, since it cannot soar above the impression made on the senses, to concern itself wit h weaker images, shunning the visibl e fullness alread y represented as a limit beyond which it cannot go.15 The viewer' s abilit y t o us e hi s o r her imagination , t o reconstruc t th e even t by unfolding th e pregnant moment int o a temporal sequence , finally lent credenc e to the visual artwork's success . Herder, Goethe, Moritz, and others dedicated essays to the Laocoon sculpture as well, hailing thi s artwork as beautiful, ironically because of its contorted figure, the snake' s bite , th e depicte d grimace , th e imagine d scream . As Simo n
Richter has convincingly shown in his study on Laocoon's Body,16 the eighteenth-
century construction of beauty—and hence our modern notion of it—rested on an aesthetics o f pain as well.
III. Beauty and Sufferin g But how is one to reconcile the tradition of Baumgarten and Lessing with Adorno's remarks on the possibilities of art afte r th e Holocaust? With Lessing, the artist was asked to depict a scream but to leave room for the viewer's imagination, - the viewer had "to complete" th e event by envisioning its motion. Thus , the screa m too k place in her or his mind; i t was the viewer' s imagination (Einbildungskraft] that finally appreciated the work of art. Nehamas pointed at something simila r when he stated that "aestheti c pleasur e is the pleasure o f anticipation, an d therefor e of imagination, no t o f accomplishment" (5) , although h e di d no t reflec t o n th e reconstructio n o f a tempora l sequence , bu t rather pointed to an unknown future. But while imagination was able to perceive a depiction o f suffering a s an objec t o f beauty, Lessing's explanatio n fel l shor t i n regard to th e choic e of the scream . Why should beauty emerge from ( a depiction of) suffering ? Adorno was not concerne d wit h th e viewer's imagination , bu t with th e object represented . For him, the searc h for a language of art afte r th e Holocaust , the ultimate event of suffering, coul d only lead to one of two results. The first still insisted o n a bond between ar t and beauty, and denied art after the Holocaust any
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legitimacy. Th e post-Holocaus t worl d neede d t o b e encountere d with artisti c silence an d an insistence on the void and gap that had marked (and in some way continues) the "break with civilization." The second option was to deny the link of art with beauty and to define art as a mode of expression instead. Thus, art had to be made to rende r the scream , t o giv e words and images t o a sufferin g tha t denied any listener or viewer the experience of pleasure. Perhaps art had to express suffering rathe r tha n tr y t o depic t it . I t i s interestin g t o not e tha t thi s optio n a abstraction often replaced figurativ e representation, and, more radically perhaps, representational art was replaced by performance art that redrew the boundaries between art and life, time and experience. Indeed, in West Germany, where politicians and the media have engaged in an ongoing discussion o f the Holocaust an d German fascism, these new forms of abstraction thrived, while in East Germany, which di d not view the recent fascis t pas t as its own political history, figurativ e painting—socialist realism i n its most generous interpretations—flourished. In either option, the bond between pain and beauty, suffering and pleasure, which gave birth to aesthetics in the first place, was seemingly broken by an event whose "completion " exceede d human imagination . Ar t lost it s innocence , an d artists began to reject or question traditional mode s of "representation." Adorno's problem o f conceiving o f an ar t afte r th e Holocaus t seeme d intensifie d by an y artistic endeavo r to deal with th e even t directly . Holocaust memorials that represented th e pas t b y reproducing contorted huma n figures—many of which ar e
reproduced in James Young's encyclopedic work17—seemed hopelessly naive, too comforting even in their limitedness. There was no place for a Laocoon sculpture anymore. New attempt s were made to searc h fo r a different languag e and other forms o f expression. And , like the retur n o f the repressed , th e dange r of beauty continues t o haunt art , even in those works that questio n representation , insis t on the void, counter the tradition of art. Is it possible at all to create a work of art that does not offe r som e sense of pleasure? And is one permitted t o feel this aesthetic satisfaction in viewing a work of art about the Holocaust?
IV. Exhibiting the Holocaust The questio n o f the relationshi p o f the Holocaus t t o art no t onl y emerge s wit h each work dedicated to this event and historical period, but also with the museums that ar e built t o displa y the Holocaust' s residue: photographs, clothing, object s gathered from concentration camps. "The Holocaust in its enormity defies language and art, and yet both mus t b e used to tell the tale, th e tale that must b e told," wrote Elie Wiesel. 18 Again, a relationship betwee n art an d narrative was forged , and a tradition of aesthetics both denied and insisted upon. Wiesel was a driving force behind the construction o f the U.S. Holocaust
19 In Plain Sight
Memorial Museum, and the occasion for his statement was the announcement of the selection of the museum's architect, James Ingo Freed, in 1986 . The museum opened in 1993 . Much has been written o n the museum' s design, and Freed has been widely celebrated for his building. Quite obviously, Wiesel wrote only of the "use" of art, but th e differenc e betwee n the us e o f art fo r the documentatio n of the Holocaus t an d the artisti c expression o f the Holocaus t i s a subtle one . In a review published in the New York Times, Herbert Muschamp praised the building as defyin g u s t o separat e "esthetics fro m morality , ar t fro m politics , for m from content " (32), thus confirming, an d at the sam e time challenging, Scarry's thoughts on the relationship between beauty and the ethical realm. The museum offers a n overwhelming visual experience, even if the objects displayed tell a horrible tale. In the U.S . Holocaust Memoria l Museum, names o f places that hav e lost al l or most o f their Jewis h population are engraved in alphabetica l order in straight line s o n th e glas s wall s o f a corridor ; th e firs t name s o f victims ar e engraved into the glass wall of another. These corridors evoke the Vietnam memorial with its seemingly endless row of victims' names. Rendered in glass, however, the museum' s inscription s d o not bea r th e heavines s o f any gravestone. Lik e smoke from chimneys , these names seem to dance in air and, at the sam e time, diffuse th e ligh t an d provid e an obliqu e vie w o f the floo r below . Bridges evoke those built to connect parts of the Warsaw ghetto, but they are crafted in perfectly rendered steel . Th e buildin g itsel f offer s multipl e angles , an d th e glas s panels refract light . Thus , th e architecture alludes not only to the architectural model s of th e ghetto and concentration camp, but als o to the refractio n i n which we are now forced to view the historical events . The Architectural Record laude d the desig n a s a challeng e t o "litera l architectural interpretations of history." For this journal's critic, however, another separation coul d be made. The Holocaus t Museu m coul d function without it s objects: At first glance, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum . . . appears to mirror the built symbols of American democracy that surround it. PCF design partner Jame s Ing o Freed , however , organize s thes e elements into a catharti c evocation, even without exhibits, of the physically and psychically disturbed world.19 Freed's building, praised for a design that woul d allow multiple point o f views and interpretations, wante d to tell the stor y of the Holocaust already , as well as the ambiguit y of the symbol s of American democracy that surroun d it and that it transforms . The museu m structure itself may suffic e a s a memorial, withou t offering an y of the "authentic " objects of the Holocaus t tha t it s room s want t o display, an d i t ca n becom e such a memoria l becaus e of its artisti c success . A brochure about th e museum , publishe d by Freed's architectural firm , i s distributed at the museum's entrance . It gives minute detail s of the museum's plan and the stor y of its construction, and is a description of an object fully mastered by its
20 Liliane Weissberg
creators. It is longer, and more extensive, than an y descriptions of the displayed exhibits. Ne w museum buildings have been praised elsewhere for their appropri ateness, innovative design, and visual gratification. But Freed's building attempted an unusual effort . It s steel and glass construction o f corridors not onl y tells th e story of ghetto bridges and railroad tracks, but turn s them into an object praised for it s aesthetic satisfaction , even pleasure. In his book on the Holocaust Museum, its first director, Jeshajahu Weinberg, was eager to describe it as a "living museum." 20 What keeps a museum tha t offers object s of death alive ? While th e U.S . Holocaust Memoria l Museum wa s opened t o exhibi t a n alread y established an d growin g collection o f images and objects relating to the Holocaust, the Jewish Museum in Berlin has not been conceived of as a Holocaust museu m a t all . It was planned as an "Extensio n to th e Berlin Museum," and to house Berlin' s small collection o f Jewish artifacts. Initially, a t least , th e Berli n Museum's theater collectio n shoul d be added there as well. Daniel Libeskind' s design of 1989 coincided wit h a new period in Germa n history: th e fall of the Berlin Wall and the move for German reunification. Libeskind created the building in the shape of a broken Star of David that extends the older, classical structure of the Berlin Museum. It came to signify German Jewish history and Berlin history after th e Holocaust. Like Freed's building, Libeskind's museum's desig n was guided by a list of victims' names. Freed etched them in glass o n the walls o f his corridors , Libeskin d used them a s a builder's alphabet. While Freed tried to reimagine elements o f concentration cam p architecture, Libeskind' s structur e lived by abstraction. He described it thus : [T]he first aspect is the invisible and irrationally connected star which shines with absent light of individual address. The second one is the cut of Act Two of [Arnold Schonberg's opera] Moses and Aaron, which has to do with the nonmusical fulfilmen t o f the word . The thir d aspect is that o f the deporte d or missing Berliners, and the fourth aspect is Walter Benjamin's urban apocalypse along the On e Way Street... . Out of the terminus of history, which is nothing other than the Holocaust with its concentrated space of annihilation and complete burn-out o f meaningful redevelopmen t o f the city , an d o f humanity—out o f this even t which shatters this place comes that which cannot really be given by architecture. The past fatality o f the Germa n Jewish cultural relation in Berlin is enacted now in the realm of the Invisible. (It is this remoteness which I have tried to bring to consciousness.) 21 Libeskind's building— a building which relate s t o the invisible , whic h "enacts " the impossibilit y o f architecture rathe r tha n architectur e itself—ha s becom e a landmark nevertheless . Lik e Freed , Libeskin d received multiple award s for hi s museum, an d it has indeed become a tourist site even before its completion. Tour guides lead visitors through the empty building. The official opening of the museum has now been delayed until 2001, an d no concrete plans for the exhibitions have been finalized yet. Thus, i t i s Libeskind's building which ha s realized precisely what the Architectural Record's reviewer had imagined: it is a museum that could
21 In Plain Sight
exist without any exhibitions. Planned to house a collection that should give evidence of the Jewish life in Berlin, it has, perhaps unavoidably, turned into the only Holocaust museum in Germany. One may suspect that it is not only the "cathartic effect" o f its dramatic performance that pleases the museum's many visitors. This i s no t a building for the blind . Lik e Freed's structure, althoug h mor e by symbolic abstraction tha n by visual citations, it can offer aestheti c pleasure. It is difficult t o separate Freed's building from th e plans of the exhibitio n designers who use the building's features and the objects displayed to forge a bond between the visitor an d the victim. 22 Libeskind's deconstructionist building , on the other hand, offers a challenge for exhibitors. In Libeskind's writings, it is interesting to note how the notion of the void and the invisible shifts from the impossibility o f the depictio n o f the Holocaus t t o th e invisibilit y o f a higher power in which fait h ma y rest: "[It is a] conception, rather , which reintegrate s Jewish/ Berlin histor y throug h th e unhealabl e woun d o f faith, which , i n th e word s of Thomas Aquinas, is the 'substanc e of things hoped for; proo f o f things invisible"' (87). Lessing's imagination that tries to complete the sculpture's narrative is here replaced by the unhealable wound of faith and the paradoxical projection of hope. If Libeskind's museum is able to turn recent history into a work of art, has art become just that, an "unhealable wound of faith"? The Greek term for wound is, of course, trauma. Libeskind's architecture seems to be inherently informed by psychoanalytic theory—the trauma not only of the Holocaust, but of architecture itself: "It's not a collage or a collision or a dialectic simply, but a new type of organization which really is organized around a center which is not, the void, around what i s no t visible . An d wha t i s no t visibl e i s th e collectio n o f thi s Jewis h Museum, whic h i s reducibl e t o archiva l an d archeologica l materia l sinc e it s physicality has disappeared" (87).
V. The Origi n o f the Wor k of Art Human being s give testimony. Testimonie s ar e also given by objects. I n Freed's Holocaust museum , hundred s o f photographs of th e prewa r Lithuania n shtet l Ejszyszki nea r Vilnius an d its inhabitants , place d in a tower-like structure, ar e made to tel l the stor y of a destroyed community. Anothe r room offer s no t photographs, but objects , hundred s of shoes of the victim s o f the Majdane k concentration camp near Lublin, Poland. Metonymically, they give evidence for people about whom little more is known today. Miles Lerman, national campaign chairman for the museum, recalled the transfer of artifacts from Poland in one of his fund-raising letters, and the momen t when he was asked to pose for a photograph with a child's shoe: I was asked to pose for a photograph with one of these items—a child's shoe. Let me tell you, when this little shoe was handed to me, I froze.
22
Liliane Weissberg Bear in mind that I am a former partisan. I was hardened i n battle and I deal with this Holocaust story almost on a daily basis. But when I held in my hand that shoe—the shoe of a little girl who could have been my own granddaughter—it just devastate d me.23
An object lik e a shoe should ai d identification an d bridge time. Bu t Lerman did not spea k abou t an y shoe , but th e sho e o f a child whos e innocence wa s made palpable by the object . Innocence and victimhood cam e within one' s grasp. The museum wanted to repeat this experience, even if the objects exhibited were beyond the visitor's reach. In the museum's exhibition , however, this child's shoe is not singled out. It i s the mer e number o f shoes, a fraction o f the survivin g pairs found i n a concentration camp , tha t give s evidence of the enormit y o f the crime . These were shoes sorte d ou t b y prisoners onc e thei r owner s ha d bee n selecte d fo r th e ga s chambers, but the y were not used again: sandals, walking shoes, children' s slippers. In the photograph publishe d i n Weinberg and Elieli's publication, th e shoe s are depicte d as a se a of leather an d canvas , discolore d by tim e int o a uniform gray.24 The museum installation itsel f does not show an endless horizontal cover; instead, the shoes are piled high in an otherwise empty room. In 1936, Martin Heidegger, a German philosopher who was an early member of the Nationa l Socialis t Party , published an essay on the origi n of the wor k of art. In this essay, Heidegger distinguished among a (natural) thing (Ding], a useful artifac t (Zeug), an d a work of art (Kunstwerk). T o elucidate the specia l qualities of a work of art, Heidegger chose a painting by Vincent van Gogh, depicting a pair of shoes (indeed, van Gogh painted several such paintings between 188 6 and 1888).25 Heidegger was not concerne d with va n Gogh' s technique o f painting or impressionist style . Instead, he reflecte d o n the specia l properties of the shoe s depicted. For him, the y were useful object s that told of the soil they had touched and the feet the y had protected. The shoe s provided him in turn with a speculation abou t their probable owner and the owner' s occupatio n (a peasant woman). Heidegger turned these observations into an almost lyrical narrative that referre d to what could be seen and to what could only be imagined: [A]s long as we only imagine a pair of shoes in general, o r simply look at th e empty, unuse d shoes as they merely stand there in the picture, we shall never discover what the equipmenta l being of equipment in truth is. In van Gogh's painting we cannot eve n tell where these shoes stand. There is nothing sur rounding this pair of peasant shoes in or to which they might belong, onl y an undefined space . There are not even clods from the soil of the field or the path through it sticking to them, which might at least hint at their employment. A pair o f peasant shoes and nothing more. And yet . From th e dar k opening of the worn insides of the shoe s the toilsom e trea d of th e worke r stands forth. In the stiffl y soli d heaviness of the shoe s there is the accumulate d tenacit y o f her slo w trudg e throug h th e far-spreadin g an d
23 In Plain Sight
ever-uniform furrow s o f the field, swept by a raw wind. On the leather there lies the dampness and saturation of the soil . Under the soles there slides the loneliness of the field-path as the evening declines. In the shoes there vibrates the silent call of the earth, its quiet gift of ripening corn and its enigmatic selfrefusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety about the certainty of bread, the worldless joy of having once more withstood want, the tremblin g before th e adven t of birth and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. This equipment belongs to the earth and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-in-itself.26 "What happens here? What is at work in the work?" Heidegger finally asked, and gave the answer himself: "[v]an Gogh's painting is the disclosure of what the equipment, the pair of peasant's shoes, is in truth" (664). The truth evoked by the painting not onl y concerned th e essenc e of shoes, bu t als o a truth about their bearer; they stood for her hardships as well. For ar t criti c Meye r Schapiro , thes e remark s ar e highl y speculative , "grounded rather in [Heidegger's] own social outlook with its heavy pathos of the primordial and earthy" (138) , and he rather assigned the shoe s to the painter van Gogh himself. What truth could the painting show, he seemed to ask, if the individual bearer is wrongly identified? Fo r Schapiro, van Gogh's shoes are studies in physiognomy, the y replace a face's portrait. Thus, the y stan d les s fo r a gendered "class o f persons" (peasan t women) than for an individual.27 The picture in question offer s a character study an d autobiographica l tale o f sorts: the shoe s tel l of the painter's wanderings from th e Netherlands t o Belgium, to preach to a group of miners . The shoe s i n th e Holocaus t museu m spea k les s abou t th e suffering s of their bearers, than of their lives cut short by suffering and death. The story of why they were purchased or received and worn is rivaled by that of their forced removal and of their owners' disappearance. They become useless objects; and their owners' real sufferings tak e place after the y were left behind. Faded to a uniform color that masks their individual shapes, they are unable to tell any stories of their bearers. If Schapiro described the shoe s as a form o f portrait painting, these faces los t their features , the y becom e unrecognizable . They turne d int o a still life . Onc e worn by living human beings, these shoes are now evidence of their death , and of the anonymity of their owners, the anonymity they found in death. Homogenized as one group, these shoe s speak as a mass and exemplify mass murder. Individuality has turned into this faceless mass. The pile of shoes revises van Gogh' s paintin g a s an installatio n tha t resemble s conceptua l art . Here, too, may rest th e trut h o f its objects , o f the materia l residue that i s "equipment" an d has reache d th e limit s o f this definition . Thus, th e displa y o f objects result s i n another story of the origin of art. The installation o f a mountain of shoes translates into the experienc e of the vastness of a crime; it is a peculiar form of the sublime .
24
Liliane Weissberg
VI. Still Lives In the winte r o f 1993, th e Magnu m photographer Eric h Hartmann returne d t o Germany t o tak e pictures o f concentration camp s tha t wer e later gathere d in a volume entitled In the Camps, Hartmann had left Germany with his family in the summe r of 1938 for America, and his journey back was emotionally charged. The tim e chosen— a couple of years before the fiftiet h anniversar y o f Germany's surrender an d the en d of World War II—as well a s the seaso n seeme d carefully chosen: The weathe r was fitting—nearl y alway s overcast and wet; ofte n ther e was snow on the ground and sometimes heavy fog in the air. The days were short and most of the time it was half dark even at noon. In the great stillness I heard little except the barking of dogs, the crunch of my shoes on the ground, sometimes the throb of my pulse. Even when my wife was along it was a voyage of silence; words are of no avail there. Visitors, if any, were few—it was the season of holidays and school vacations.28 While concentratio n camp s may not b e proper destinations fo r holidays or school vacations, they seem to have a seasonal attraction here. Not only silence is in demand (the silence of strangers, or of one's own wife), but als o the absenc e of any visual distraction that other living beings offer. Hartmann's pictures show barracks, rooms , railroa d tracks, barbe d wire—some of it alread y replaced by a maintenance cre w that preserves these sites. The photographs are taken in black and white, and a cold light and melancholic air pervade them. Architectural structures an d signs appear as geometrical shapes . The property of the victim s i s featured a s well . On e pictur e o f Auschwitz offer s a pile o f suitcases, place d in a showcase. It is reflected through th e camer a lens, take n through the glass of the showcase, and the image reflects the backlit windows of the room. The suitcases, like gravestones, bear the names of their owners, their birthdays, their places of origin,- the date s of death are absent. Another picture show s an already familiar sight. In another glass case that reflects those backlit windows, Hartmann reproduces another of Auschwitz's current exhibits: a pile of shoes. Like many others in this book, this photograph is printed in a black frame tha t resemble s a death notice. The text that accompanies th e picture could have been taken fro m a history book: A top-secre t documen t of Februar y 6 , 1843 , fro m th e Reic h Ministry of Economics liste d amon g almos t three million kilogram s of clothing fro m Auschwitz an d Majdane k 31,00 0 men's, 11,00 0 women's, an d 22,00 0 chil dren's shoes to be redistributed to "ethnic Germans." (28) Visible here are obviously not onl y the remain s of the victims' possessions , bu t also a residue o f another kind : shoes tha t faile d t o reach their ne w owners. Th e photograph documents a war effort tha t was stopped, quite literally, in its tracks.
25
In Plain Sight
While Hartmann emphasize s th e mas s of shoes, one shoe stands out in the window light's reflection. The reflectio n o f the showcas e produce s th e simulacru m o f a doubl e exposure,- the pictur e is a document o f imprisonment tha t hint s toward a world outside. Bu t Hartmann render s an image that has already become a marker for the sufferin g o f the camp' s inhabitants. Th e museum' s shoes were a "gift" fro m the Majdane k camp ; thes e ar e photographed i n Auschwitz . Bot h th e museu m installation and photograph remind th e viewer tha t image s ca n easily tur n into repeatable motives; th e pile of shoes is similar a s well to the image s of countless bones, corpses, and victims' objects discovered shortly after th e liberatio n o f the camps, and published by the international press. 29 There is a certain similarity betwee n Hartmann's black-and-whit e photographs and those by Ira Nowinski, fo r example, published in Sybil Milton's book, In Fitting Memory, i n 1991. 30 Nowinski's photographs, which documented memorial sights , communicat e a melancholy mood , wor k with obliqu e lighting, an d search for new and unconventional vantag e points. "Hi s documentar y style discloses the unexpected and the haunting natura l beauty that exist s eve n at site s of humanity' s evil" (271) , Milton wrote . For her, these were images that "enabl e the reade r to access the visua l heritage of the Holocaust " (271) . But what woul d the "visua l heritage" o f the Holocaust be? Certainly, this "heritage" di d not onl y pertain t o the concentratio n cam p sites, bu t t o a vocabulary of images tha t ha s become a common language (see the citations in Freed's museum architecture). In Nowinski's photograph s as well, n o human being s were visible,- th e landscape s were transformed into stil l lifes . Tree s appeare d as weeping willows; i n Hartmann's photographs , they ar e bare of leaves. In the wor k of both photographers, objects take on the fee l o f ruins, an d the differenc e betwee n nature and machine is blurred. Bush and shoe and wire become monuments o f sorts. The perspectival geometry has a modernist feel, but the decaying structures and the wintery gloom conform to the Romantic tradition of infinite spaces and nature's grandeur, as well as its preference for ruins. These are images of mourning. The camera completes, paradoxically, the work of a technology that had death as its primary imperative, turning human beings into objects in the first place. These are not images of trauma, but o f belatedness.
VII. Holocaus t Aesthetic s Quite obviously , Adorno's call for the en d of poetry was never heeded, not eve n by himself. Even after Worl d War II and afte r th e Holocaust , ar t an d poetry seem to be alive and well. Moreover, we have come to witness an extraordinary amount of poetr y an d ar t create d about Auschwit z an d th e Holocaust . Auschwit z ha s been a preoccupation for many visual artists, jus t as there has been the repeated
26 Liliane Weissberg
challenge to translate these recent historical events into a visual display for museums an d exhibitions. The deman d to articulate the limit s o f representation has not resulted in the end of artistic productivity. It has resulted in its own language of mourning, absence, and trauma. In the mid-twentieth century, the sculpture of Laocoo n was replaced with a pile of shoes: and these shoe s ar e no longer th e sign of unique individuality, but object s of technological reproducibility. They are historical evidenc e and art a t once. Like the Laocoon, they tell a narrative, too, but pain can only be shown obliquely. The Holocaust aesthetics no longer centers on the scream, but on its absence. In its introduction o f silence, th e void, breaks, and afterimages, this aesthetics ha s foun d it s allie s i n psychoanalytic theory and its conceptio n of the unconscious, an d poststructuralist philosophy . I t has als o produced criteria of judgment: Holocaust memorials and museum buildings, as well as individual artworks, selecte d throug h competition s whos e judge s as k not onl y for historica l message o r educational impact, but als o for "good" art . "[B]eautifu l thing s give rise to the notion of distribution, t o a lifesaving reciprocity, to fairness not just in th e sens e of loveliness of aspect but i n the sens e of 'a symmetry of everyone's relation to one another/" wrote Scarry. Can beauty exist when the relationships are broken, and no lifesaving reciprocity exists? Do we as artists or audience carry any ethical responsibility if we derive pleasure from "unfairness"? These questions will remain, even as the new academic interest i n beauty continues . NOTES
1. Craig Lambert, "The Stirring of Sleeping Beauty," Harvard Magazine (SeptemberOctober 1999) : 46. 2. Elaine Scarry, On Beauty (Princeton: Princeton University Press , 1999) , 3. 3. Alexander Nehamas, "An Essay on Beauty and Judgment," The Threepenny Review 80 (Winter 2000), 4. 4. Theodor W. Adorno, "Cultura l Criticism and Society/' tr. Samue l and Shierry Weber, Prisms (Cambridge , Mass.: MIT Press, 1981) , 34. 5. Adorno, "Commitment," Notes t o Literature 2, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, tr . Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Ne w York: Columbia University Press, 1991) , 88, 87.
6.
Dan
Diner(ed.)
Verlag, 1988). 7. Adorno, cited in Ernestine Schlant, Ti e Language of Silence: West German Literature and th e Holocaust (New York: Routledge, 1999) , 9. 8. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, ed. Gretel Adorno and Rolf Tiedemann; ed. and tr. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press , 1997) . Adorno's Asthetische Theorie was published posthumously i n 1970 . 9. Hans Adler, "Aisthesis , steinerne s Her z und geschmeidig e Sinne: Zur Bedeutun g de r Asthetik-Diskussion i n der zweiten Halfte des 18. Jahrhunderts," in Derganze Mensch: Anthropologie und Literatur im 18, Jahrhundert, ed. Hans-Jiirgen Schings (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1994), 96-111. 10. Karl Aschenbrenne r an d Willia m B . Holther, "Introduction, " i n Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten's Reflections on Poetry/Meditations philosophicae de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus, tr. an d ed. Karl Aschenbrenner and William B . Holther (Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1954) , 4.
27 In Plain Sight
11. For a discussion of Baumgarten's Aesthetica, see Hans Rudol f Sehweizer , Asthetik als Philosophie der sinnlichen Erkenntnis (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1973). 12. "Asthetik/' i n Philosophisches Worterbuch I , ed . Georg Klaus and Manfre d Buhr , 8t h ed. (Leipzig: VEB Bibliographisehes Institut, 1971) , 119 . 13. Jean Paul Richter, Vorschule der Asthetik (1804) , cited in Joachim Richter, "Asthetik, " in Histoiisches Worterbuch de r Philosophie I, ed. Joachim Ritter (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971) , 556. Translation mine. 14. Johann Joachim Winckelmann, Reflection o n the Imitation of Greek Works in Painting and Sculpture, tr . Elfried e Heyer and Roger C. Norton (L a Salle, 111.: Open Court, 1987). 15. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Lacoon, tr. Edward Allen McCormic k (Indianapolis : BobbsMerrill, 1962) , 19-20. 16. Simon Richter , Laocoon's Body an d th e Aesthetics o f Pain: Winckelmann, Lessing, Herder, Moritz, Goethe (Detroit : Wayne State University Press , 1992) . 17. James Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials an d Meaning (New Haven: Yale University Press , 1993) . 18. Herbert Muschamp, " Shaping a Monument to Memory," New York Times (April 11,1993), sec. 2 ; 1,32; here 1. 19. "U.S. Holocaust Museu m Challenge s Litera l Architectural Interpretation s o f History," "Design News," Architectural Record (May 1993): 27. Freed is a member of the architectural firm Pe i Cobb Freed. 20. Jeshajahu Weinberg and Rina Elieli, The Holocaust Museum i n Washington (Ne w York: Rizzoli, 1995) , 17. 21. Daniel Libeskind, Countersign (Ne w York: Rizzoli, 1992) , 86-87. 22. For a more extensive discussion , se e Liliane Weissberg, "Memory Confined," documents 4-5 (1994) : 81-98; reprinted in Cultural Memory an d the Construction o f Identity, ed . Dan BenAmos and Liliane Weissberg (Detroit: Wayne State University Press , 1999) , 45-76. 23. Miles Lerman, undated letter mailed t o potential donors , spring 1993 . 24. Weinberg and Elieli, 14. 25. See Meyer Schapiro, "The Stil l Life as a Personal Object—A Note on Heidegger and van Gogh (1968)," in Theory and Philosophy o f Art: Style, Artist, and Society: Selected Papers (New York: George Braziller, 1994), 136. 26. Marti n Heidegger , "Origin s o f the Wor k of Art" [De r Ursprung de s Kunstwerks] , tr . Albert Hofstadter, in Philosophies of Art an d Beauty: Selected Readings in Aesthetics from Plato to Heidegger, ed. Alber t Hofstadte r an d Richar d Kuhn s (Ne w York: Random House/Moder n Library, 1964) , 662-3. 27. Compare t o Schapiro , "Furthe r Note s on Heidegger an d van Gog h (1994), " in Theory and Philosophy o f Art, 150 . 28. Erich Hartmann, "Afterword," In the Camps (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 99. 29. See Barbie Zelizer, Remembering t o Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera's Eye (Chicago : University o f Chicago Press, 1998) . 30. Sybi l Milton, I n Fitting Memory: Th e Art an d Politics of Holocaust Memorials, photo graphs by Ira Nowinski (Detroit: Wayne State University Press , 1991).
Andreas Huyssen
Of Mice and Mimesis : Reading Spiegelman with Adorno I resist becoming th e Elie Wiesel o f th e comic book.
—Art Spiegelman
Since the 1980s , the question no longer is whether to represent the Holocaust in literature, film, an d the visual art s but how t o do so. The conviction about th e essential unrepresentabilit y o f the Holocaust , typicall y grounde d i n Adorno' s famous an d ofte n misunderstoo d statemen t about th e barbaris m of poetry afte r Auschwitz, has lost much o f its persuasivenes s fo r later generation s wh o onl y know of the Holocaust through representations: photos and films, documentaries, testimonies, historiography , and fiction . Give n th e flood of Holocaust representations in all manner of media today, it would be sheer voluntarism to stick with Adorno's notion o f a ban on images which translate s a theological concept into a ver y specific kind o f modernist aesthetic . It seem s muc h mor e promising t o approach th e issu e o f Holocaust representation s throug h anothe r concep t tha t holds a key place in Adorno's thought, that of mimesis. In his recentl y publishe d book , In th e Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals Between Apocalypse an d Enlightenment,1 Anson Rabinbach has persuasively shown how Adorno's understanding of Nazi anti-Semitism is energized by his theory of mimesis.2 More important, however, he has linked Adorno's discussion o f the rol e o f mimesis i n anti-Semitis m t o Horkheime r an d Adorno's historical and philosophical reflections on mimesis a s part of the evolution of signifying systems , a s the y ar e elaborate d i n th e firs t chapte r o f the Dialectic of Enlightenment,3 Here Horkheimer and Adorno discussed mimesis in its true and repressed forms , it s rol e i n th e proces s o f civilization an d it s paradoxica l relationship to the Bilderverbot, the prohibition of graven images.4 At the same time, the concep t of mimesis i n Adorno (and I take it tha t Adorn o rather than Horkheimer is the driving force in articulating this concept in the coauthored work) was not easil y defined, a s several recent studie s hav e shown. 5 It actually functione d more like a palimpsest tha t partakes in at least five different ye t overlapping discursive registers in the text: first, in relation to the critique of the commodity form , Copyright © 2001 by Andreas Huyssen. Thi s essay has als o appeared in New German Critique, Winter 2001.
29
Of Mice an d Mimesi s
its power s o f reification an d deception , a thoroughly negativ e for m o f mimesi s (Mimesis ans Verhdrtete); second, in relation to the anthropological grounding of human natur e which , a s Adorno insists in Minima Moralia, wa s "indissolubl y linked t o imitation";6 third, in a biological somatic sens e geared toward surviva l as Adorno had encountered it in Roger Caillois's work, some of which he reviewed
for the Zeitschrift fur Sozialfoschung;7 fourth, in the Freudian sense of identifi-
cation an d projection indebted t o Totem an d Taboo-, an d lastly , i n a n aestheti c sense and with strong resonances of Benjamin's language theory, in relation to the role of word and image i n the evolution of signifying systems . It is precisely this multivalence o f mimesis, I would argue, that make s the concep t productive for contemporary debates about memory , trauma, and representation i n th e publi c realm. Thus it is more than merely a paradox that mimesis serve d Adorno to read Nazi anti-Semitism, whereas it serves me to understand the ethics and aesthetics of approaching Holocaust memor y in our time . In this essay, then , I focus o n one specific aspect o f memory discourse , namely, the vexing issue of (in Timothy Garton Ash's succinct words) if, how, and when t o represent historica l trauma. 8 My example for the representatio n o f historical traum a i s the Holocaust , a topic o n which, a s already indicated, Adorno had provocative things to say, although he never said quite enough. But I do think that the issues raise d in this essay pertain a s much t o other instances of historical trauma and their representation. Whether we think of the desaparecidos in Argentina, Guatemala , or Chile, th e stole n generatio n in Australia, or the postapartheid debates in South Africa, in all of these cases issues of how to document, how to represent, and how to view and listen to testimony about a traumatic past have powerfully emerged in the public domain. I hope to show that a reading through mimesis o f one specific Holocaust image-text may allow us to go beyond arguments focusing primarily on the rather confining issue of how to represent the Holocaust "properly " or how to avoid aestheticizing it . M y argument i s based on the readin g of a work, Art Spiegelman' s
Maus,9 which has shocked many precisely because it seems to violate the Bilderverbot in the most egregious ways, but which has also been celebrated, at least by some, a s one o f the mos t challengin g in a n ever widening body of recent works concerned with the Holocaust and its remembrance. But more is at stake her e than just the readin g of one work throug h th e conceptual screen of another. A discussion o f Art Spiegelman' s Maus i n terms of the mimetic dimensio n may move us beyond a stalemate in debates about Holocaust representations, a stalemate which, ironically, rests on presuppositions tha t were first and powerfully articulated by Adorno himself in a different contex t and at a different time . Reading Maus through the conceptua l scree n of mimesis permits u s t o read Adorno against on e of the mos t lingerin g effect s o f his wor k on contemporary culture, the thesis about the culture industry and its irredeemable link with deception , manipulation , domination , an d the destructio n o f subjectivity. While this kind of uncompromising critique of consumerist culture, linked
30 Andreas Huyssen
as it is to a certain now historical type o f modernist aestheti c practice, resonates strongly with a whole set of situationist and poststructuralist position s developed in Franc e in th e 1960 s (Bardies, Debord, Baudrillard, Lyotard, Tel Quel), it ha s generally been on the wane in contemporary aesthetic practices. For obvious reasons, however, it has proven to have much staying power in one particular area: that o f Holocaust representation s where Adorno's statements about poetry afte r Auschwitz (ofte n misquoted , unanalyze d an d rippe d out o f their historica l con text)10 have become a standard reference point and have fed into the recent revival of notions of an aesthetic sublime and its dogmatic antirepresentational stance.11 This is where the issue of public memory emerges. Politically, almost everybody seems to agree, the genocide of the Jews is to be remembered (with allegedly salutory effect s o n present and future) b y as large a public as possible, but mas s cultural representations ar e not considere d proper or correct. The paradigmatic case exemplifying this broad, though now perhaps fraying, consensus is the debate over Spielberg's Schindler's List and Lanzmann's Shoah. Spielberg's film, playing to mass audiences, fails to remember properly because it represents, thu s foster ing forgetting: Hollywood as fictiona l substitut e for "real history. " Lanzmann's refusal t o represent, o n the othe r hand, is said to embody memory in the proper way precisely because it avoids the delusions of a presence of that which is to be remembered. Lanzmann's film is praised as something like a heroic effort i n th e Kulturkampf against the memory industry, and its refusal to re-present, its adherence t o Bilderverbot, become s the groun d for its authenticity. 12 Aesthetically speaking, thes e opposin g validations o f Spielberg versus Lanzmann still rest o n the unquestione d modernis t dichotom y tha t pit s Hollywoo d an d mass cultur e against forms of high art.13 Looking at Spiegelman's Mam throug h the various discursive screens of mimesis ma y allow us to approach Holocaust memory and its representations toda y in a way different fro m this earlier dominant paradigm.
Narrative Strategies Mam undercuts this dichotomy in the first rather obvious sense that Spiegelman draws on the comic as a mass cultural genre, but transform s it in a narrative saturated with modernist techniques of self-reflexivity, self-irony , ruptures in narrative time, and highly complex image sequencing and montaging. As comic, Maus resonates less with Disney than with a whole tradition of popular animal fables , from Aeso p to LaFontain e to eve n Kafka . A t the sam e time, i t evolve d from a n American comic book countertradition born in the 1960 s that includes such works as Krazy Cat, Fritz the Cat, and others. Yet, Maus remains different from the older tradition o f the enlightenin g anima l fable . I f the anima l fabl e (Georg e Orwell's Animal Farm a s a twentieth-century fictiona l example) had enlightenment a s its purpose through either satire or moral instruction, Maus remain s thoroughly
31 Of Mice an d Mimesis
ambiguous, if not opaque , to the possible succes s of such enlightenment. Rather than providing us with an enlightened moral or with a happy reconciliation between high an d low, human an d animal, traum a an d memory, the aestheti c an d emotional effect of Maus remains jarring throughout. This irritating effect on the reader results fro m a variety of pictorial and verbal strategies that hav e their common vanishing point i n mimesis, in both its insidious an d salutory aspects which, as Adorno would have it, can never be entirely separated from eac h other. Let me turn now to the dimension s of mimesis in this image-text. As is well-known, Maus as narrative is based on interviews Art Spiegelman conducted with his father, Vladek, an Auschwitz survivor, in the 1970s. Spiegelman taped these interviews in Rego Park, Queens, in the house in which he grew up, and during a summer vacation in the Catskills. These interviews trace the story of Spiegelman's parents' life in Poland from 193 3 to 1944, but th e telling of this traumatic past, as retold in the comic, is interrupted time and again by banal everyday events in the Ne w York present. This crosscutting o f past and present, by which the fram e keep s intruding into th e narrative , allows Spiegelman, as it were , t o have it both ways: for Vladek, it seem s to establish a safe distanc e betwee n th e two temporal levels,- actually the tale of his past is visually framed by Spiegelman as if it were a movie projected by Vladek himself. As Vladek begins to tell his story, pedalling on his exercycle, he says proudly: "People always told me I looked just like Rudolp h Valentino" (1:13) . Behin d him i n th e fram e i s a larg e poster of Rudolph Valentino's 192 1 film The Sheik with th e main actor as mouse holding a swooning mouse lad y in his arms, and the whole exercycl e mechanism look s remotely like a movie projector wit h th e spinnin g wheel resembling a film reel and Vladek as narrator beginning to project his story. This crosscutting of past and present points in a variety of ways to how this past holds the present captive independently of whether this knottin g of past into present is being talked about or repressed. Thus one page earlier, Art, who is sitting in the background and has just asked Vladek to tell him th e story of his life in Poland before and during the war, is darkly framed withi n th e fram e b y the arm s and the exercycle' s handlebar in the foreground. Vladek's arms, head, and shirt with rolled-up sleeves are all striped, and the Auschwitz number tattoed into his left ar m hovers ominously just above Art's head in th e fram e (1:12) . Both the narrato r (Art Spiegelman) and the reader see Vladek's everyday behavior permeated by his past experiences of persecution during the Nazi period. This firs t narrativ e framing i s also itself spli t i n two . In addition to th e narrative fram e th e interview s provide , another leve l o f narrative tim e show s the author Art Spiegelman, or rather the Kunstftgur Artie, during his work on the book from 197 8 to 1991 , years during which Vladek Spiegelman died and the first part of Maus became a great success, all of which is in turn incorporated into th e narrative of the secon d volume. The complexit y of the narratio n is not jus t an aesthetic device employed for its own sake. It rather results from the desire of members of the second generation to learn about their parents' past of which they
32
Andreas Huyssen
are always, willingly or not, already a part: it i s a project o f mimetically approxi mating historical an d personal trauma in which th e various temporal levels are knotted together in a way that refuse s t o allow talk about the past to pass away, as discusse d i n th e Germa n Historikerstreit o f the mid-1980s. 14 The survivors ' son's life stand s in a mimetic affinit y to his parents' traum a long before he ever embarks on his interviews with his father.15 Therefore, this mimetic relationshi p cannot be thought of simply as a rational and fully articulated working through.16 There are dimensions to mimesis tha t lie outside linguistic communicatio n and that are locked in silences, repressions, gestures, and habits—all produced by a past that weighs all the more heavily as it is not (yet ) articulated. Mimesis in its physiological, somatic dimension is Angleichung, a becoming or making similar, a movement toward , never a reaching o f a goal. It i s not identity , no r ca n it b e reduced to compassion or empathy. It rather requires us to think o f identity and nonidentity togethe r as nonidentical similitud e an d in unresolvable tension wit h each other. Maus perform s precisel y such a mimetic approximation. Spiegelman' s initial impetus for conducting these interviews with his father came out of a traumatic experience: the suicid e of his mothe r Anja i n 1968 , an event Spiegelman made into a four-page image-text originally published in 1973 in an obscure underground comic under the title "Prisoner of the Hell Planet." It is only in the latter half o f the firs t par t of Maus tha t Artie suddenly and unexpectedly comes across a copy of this earlier, now almos t forgotten attemp t t o put par t of his ow n life's story into the comics. Maus the n reproduces the "Prisone r of the Hell Planet" i n toto (1:100-103). These four pages, all framed in black like an obituary in German newspapers, intrud e violentl y int o th e mous e narrative , breaking the fram e i n three significant ways. First, in this earlier work, the figures of Vladek and Artie mourning th e deat h o f Anja ar e drawn as humans, a fact tha t goe s surprisingly unremarked by the mice Artie and Vladek as they are looking at these pages in the narrative of the later work. The identity of the nonidentical seems to be taken for granted in this porousness between human and animal realms. Second, the comic "Prisoner o n the Hell Planet" opens with a family photo that show s 10-year-ol d Art in 195 8 with his mother on summer vacation in the Catskills. 17 It is the first of thre e famil y photo s montage d into th e comic , al l o f which functio n not t o document, but to stress the unassimilability of traumatic memory.18 Third, "Pris oner" articulates a n extreme moment o f unadulterated despair that disrupt s the "normal" frame o f the interviewin g process, the questionin g and answering, the bickering and fighting betwee n fathe r an d son. These page s give testimony t o the emotiona l breakdown of both father an d son at Anja's burial: in Art's case, it is overlaid by a kind of survivor guilt of the second degree, once removed from th e original traum a hi s parent s experienced. The memorie s o f Auschwitz no t onl y claim Anja ; the y also envelop the so n born years after th e war. Thus Ar t draws himself throughou t this episode in striped Auschwitz prisoner garb, which gives a surreal quality to these starkly executed, woodcut-like, grotesque images.
33
Of Mice and Mime
In thi s momen t o f secondary Holocaust traum a Spiegelma n performs a kind of spatial mimesis of death in the sens e of Roger Caillois's work of the 1930s , which Adorno read and commented on critically in his correspondence with Benjamin.19 Spiegelman performs a compulsive imaginary mimesis o f Auschwitz as space of imprisonment and murder, a mimesis, however, in which the victim, th e mother, becomes perpetrator while th e real perpetrators have vanished. Thus at the en d o f this ra w an d paralyzin g passage, Art, incarcerate d behind imaginary bars, reproaches his mother for having committed the perfect crime: "You put me here... shorted all my circuits . .. cut my nerve endings . .. and crossed my wires! . . . //You MURDERE D me , Mommy , and you lef t m e her e t o tak e th e rap!!! " (1:103). The drawing s are expressionist, th e tex t crud e though in a certain sens e "authentic," but it is easy to see that Spiegelman's comic would have turned into disaster had he chosen th e imag e and language mode of "Prisoner" fo r the late r work. It could only have turned into psycho-comikitsch. Spiegelman di d need a different, mor e estrangin g mode of narrative an d figurative representation in order to overcome the paralyzing effects o f a mimesis of memory-terror. He needed a pictorial strategy that would maintain the tensio n between th e overwhelmin g realit y o f the remembere d events an d the tenuous , always elusive status of memory itself. As an insert in Maus, however, these pages function as a reminder about the representational difficulties o f telling a Holocaust or post-Holocaust story in the for m o f a comic. But they also powerfully support Spiegelman's strategy to use animal imagery in the later, longer work. The choice of medium, the animal comic, is thus self-consciously enacted and justified in the narrative itself. Drawing the stor y of his parents and the Holocaust as an anima l comic is the Odyssean cunning that allows Spiegelman to escape from th e terror of memory—even "postmemory" in Marianne Hirsch's terms—while mimeticall y reenacting it.20
Image Strategies But the question lingers. What do we make of the linguistic and pictorial punning of Maus, Mauschwitz, and the Catskills in relation to mimesis? Th e decision to tell the stor y of Germans an d Jew s a s a story o f cats an d mice a s predators and prey shoul d no t b e misrea d a s a naturalization o f history, a s som e hav e done . Spiegelman is not the Goldhagen of the comic book. After all, the comic does not pretend t o b e history . Mor e seriou s migh t b e anothe r objection : Spiegelman's image strategies problematically reproduce the Naz i image of the Je w as vermin, as rodent, a s mouse. Bu t i s i t simpl y a mimicry o f racist imagery ? An d eve n if mimicry, does mimicry o f racism invariabl y imply its reproduction , or can such mimicry itsel f ope n u p a gap, a differenc e tha t depend s o n wh o perform s th e miming an d how? Mimesis , afte r all , i s based on similitude as making simila r
34
Andreas Huysse n
(Angleichung in Adorno's terminology), the production of "the same but not quite," as Homi Bhabha describes it in another context. 21 And Angleichung implies difference. Thu s Spiegelma n himself draws the reader's attention t o his consciou s mimetic adoption of this imagery. The very top of Maus I's copyright page features a Hitler quote: "The Jews are undoubtedly a race, but they are not human." And Maus II, right after the copyright page, begins with a motto taken from a Pomeranian newspaper article from the mid-1930s: "Mickey Mouse is the most miserable ideal ever revealed. . .. Healthy emotions tell every independent young man and every honorable youth that th e dirty and filth-covered vermin, the greatest bacteria carrier in the animal kingdom, cannot be the ideal type of animal.... Away with Jewish brutalization o f the people ! Down with Mickey Mouse! Wear the Swastika Cross!" Maus thu s gives copyright where it is due: Adolf Hitler and the Nazis. But that may still not be enough as an answer to the objection. More crucial is the way in which the mimesis of anti-Semitic imagery is handled. Here it would be enough to compare Spiegelman's work with the 194 0 Nazi propaganda movie The Eternal Jew, which portrayed the Jewish world conspiracy as the invasive migration of plague-carrying herds of rodents who destroy everything in their path. Suc h a comparison makes it clea r how Spiegelman' s mimetic adoptio n of Nazi imagery actuall y succeed s i n reversin g its implication s whil e simultane ously keeping us aware of the humiliation an d degradation of that imagery's original intention. Instead of the literal representation of destructive vermin, we see persecuted little animals drawn with a human body and wearing human clothes, with a highly abstracted, nonexpressive mouse physiognomy. "Maus" here means vulnerability, unalloyed suffering, victimization . As in th e cas e of the "Prisone r of th e Hel l Planet," here, too, an earlier more naturalistic version of the mouse drawings shows how far Spiegelman has come in his attempt t o transform the anti-Semitic stereotype for his purpose s by eliminating an y all-too-naturalisti c elements from his drawings. Defenders of Maus have often justified the use of animal imagery as a necessary distancing device, a kind of Brechtian estrangement effect. Spiegelman's own justification is more complex: First of all, I've never been through anything like that—knock on whatever is around to knock on—and it would be a counterfeit t o try to pretend that the drawings are representations of something that's actually happening. I don't know exactly what a German looked like who was in a specific small town doing a specific thing. My notions are born of a few scores of photographs and a couple of movies. I'm bound to do something inauthentic. Also, I'm afrai d that if I did it with people, it would be very corny. It would come out as some kind of odd plea for sympathy or 'Remember the Six Million/ and that wasn't my point exactly, either. To use these ciphers, the cats and mice, is actually a way to allow you past the cipher at the people who are experiencing it. So it's really a much more direct way of dealing with the material. 22
35
Of Mice and Mimesi s
It is, in m y terms, an estrangement effect i n th e servic e of mimetic approxima tion, and thus rather un-Brechtian, for at least in his theoretical reflections, Brecht would not allow for any mimetic impulse i n reception. Spiegelman accepts that the pas t i s visuall y no t accessibl e throug h realisti c representation : whateve r strategy he might choose, it is bound to be "inauthentic." He also is aware of his generational positionin g a s someon e wh o mainl y know s o f this pas t throug h media representations. Documentary authenticity o f representation can therefore not be his goal, but authentication throug h the interviews with his father is. The use of mice and cats is thus not simply an avant-gardist distancing device in order to give the reader a fresh, critical , perhaps even "transgressive" view of the Holocaust intended to attack the various pieties and official memorializations that have covered it discursively . Of course , Spiegelman is aware of the dangers of using Holocaust memory as screen memory for various political purposes in the present. His narrative and pictorial strateg y is precisely devise d to avoid that danger . It is actually a strategy of another kind of mimetic approximation: getting past the cipher to th e people and their experience. But before getting past the cipher, Spiegelman has to put himself into that very system of ciphering: as Artie in the comic , he himself becomes mouse , imitate s th e physiognomi c reduction o f his parent s by racis t stereotype, the post-Auschwitz Jew still as mouse, even though now in the country of the dogs (America) rather than the cats. Paradoxically, we have here a mimetic approximation o f the pas t that respect s the Bilderverbot not despit e but rathe r because of its use of animal imagery, which tellingly avoids the representation of the human face. Bilderverbot and mimesis are no longer irreconcilable opposites, but ente r into a complex relationship i n which th e imag e is precisely not mere mirroring, ideologica l duplication , o r partisa n reproduction, 23 bu t wher e i t approaches writing. This Adornean notion of image becoming script was first elaborated by Miriam Hansen an d Gertrud Koch in their attempt s t o make Adorno pertinent fo r film theory. 24 But it work s for Spiegelman's Maus a s well. As it s image track indeed becomes script, Maus acknowledge s the inescapable inauthenticity o f Holocaust representations in th e "realistic " mode, but achieve s a new and unique form of authentication effec t o n the reader precisely by way of its complex layering of historical facts, their oral retelling, and their transformation into image-text. Indeed, it is as animal comic that Maus, to quote a typically Adornean turn of phrase from the first chapter of Dialectic of Enlightenment, "preserves the legitimacy of the image . .. in the faithful pursui t of its prohibition."25 If this seems too strong a claim, conside r the notio n o f image-becomingscript in Maus from another angle. Again, Spiegelman himself is a good witness for wha t is at stake: I didn't want people to get too interested in the drawings. I wanted them to be there, but the story operates somewhere else. It operates somewhere between the words and the idea that's in the pictures and in the movement between the pictures, which is the essence of what happens in a comic. So by not focusin g
36 Andreas Huyssen
you too hard on these people you're forced back into your role as reader rather than looker.26
And in a radio interview o f 1992, he put i t eve n more succinctly b y saying tha t Maus i s "a comic book driven by the word." 27 I cannot hope to give a full sense of how the linguistic dimensio n of Maus drives the image sequences. A few comments will have to suffice. Centra l here is the rendering of Vladek's language taken from the taped interviews. The estranging visualization o f the animal comic is counterpointed by documentary accuracy in the use of Vladek's language. The gestus of Vladek's speech, not easily forgotten by any reader with an open ear, is shaped by cadences, syntax, and intonations o f his East European background. His Englis h is suffuse d b y the structure s o f Yiddish. Residues of a lost world are inscribed into the language of the survivor-immigrant . It is this literally—rather than poetically or mystically—broken speech that carries the burden of authenticating that which is being remembered o r narrated. On the other hand , Vladek himself i s aware of the problemati c natur e of any Holocaus t remembrance, eve n in language , when h e says : "It's n o more to speak " (11:113) . Spiegelman's comple x arrangemen t o f tempora l level s find s it s paralle l i n a n equally complex differentiatio n o f linguistic registers . Thus th e insid e narratio n about the years in Poland as told by Vladek are rendered in fluent English. A natural language gestus is required here because at the time Vladek would have spoken his national language , Polish. I t is logical that Vladek' s broken speech onl y appears on the level of the frame story, the narrative time of the present. Past and present, clearl y distinguishe d b y the languag e track , ar e thus nevertheles s suf fused i n th e presen t i n Vladek' s broken English , whic h provide s the linguisti c marker of the insuperabl e distance tha t stil l separates Artie from Vladek' s experiences and from hi s memories. Artie , afte r all , always speaks fluent Englis h as his native language. If Spiegelman's project is mimetic approximatio n not o f the event s themselves, bu t o f the memorie s o f his parents , an d thu s a construction o f his ow n "postmemory,"28 then this mimesis is one that must remain fractured, frustrated , inhibited, incomplete . Th e pain of past traum a i s repeated through narration i n the present and attaches itsel f t o the listener, t o Artie as listener insid e th e tex t as well as to the reade r who approaches the content s o f Vladek's autobiographic tale through its effects on Artie. Artie as a Kunstfiguz—the sam e but not quite th e same as the author Art Spiegelman—thus becomes the medium in the text through which w e ourselve s becom e witnesses o f his father' s autobiographi c narration . While this narration, gently and sometimes no t so gently extracted from th e survivor, aims at a kind of working through in language, it is a mimetic process that will never reach an end or come to completion, eve n if and when Vladek's tal e catches u p to the postwar period. And then there is always that other most painful obstacle to a full mimeti c knowledge of the past. For the process of an Angleichung ans Vergangene, an assim-
37 Of Mice and Mimesis
ilation to the past, is not only interrupted by the inevitable intrusion of everyday events during the time of the interviews; another even more significant gap opens up in the sense that only Vladek's memories are accessible to Artie. The memories of Artie' s mother , whos e suicid e triggere d Art Spiegelman' s projec t i n th e firs t place, remain inaccessible not onl y because of her death, but becaus e Vladek, in a fit o f despair after her death, destroyed her diaries in which she had laid down her own memorie s o f the year s in Polan d and in Auschwitz . An d just as Artie had accused his mother for murdering him, h e now accuses his fathe r fo r destroying the diaries: "Go d DAMN you! You . . you murderer!" (1:159). Anja's silence thus is total. If it was Anja's suicide that generated Art Spiegelman's desire to gain selfunderstanding through mimetic approximation of his parents' story and of survivor guilt, then the discovery that the diaries have been burned points to the ultimat e elusiveness of the whole enterprise. Artie's frustration about the destruction of the diarie s only makes explicit tha t ultimate , unbridgeabl e gap between Artie' s cognitive desires and the memories of his parents. Indeed, it marks the limits of mimetic approximation, but it marks them in a pragmatic way, without resorting to new definitions of the sublime as the unpresentable within representation.
Bildcrverbot and Mimeti c Approximation All of Spiegelman's strategie s o f narration thu s maintain th e insuperable tensio n within mimeti c approximatio n between closeness and distance, affinity an d difference. Angleichung is not identification or simple compassion. Artie's listenin g to his father's story makes him understand how Vladek's whole habitus has been shaped by Auschwitz and the struggle for survival, while Vladek himself, caught in traumatic reenactments, may remain oblivious to that fact. Rather than assuming continuity, Vladek' s storytelling seems to assume a safe and neutralizing distance between the event s of the past and his New York present. But his concrete behavior constantly prove s the opposite. Artie, on the other hand, is always conscious o f the fact that the borders between past and present are fluid, not only in his observation of his father, but i n his self-observation as well. Mimetic approximation a s a self-conscious project thus always couples closenes s an d distance , similitude an d difference . This dimension becomes most obvious in those passages in Maus II where Spiegelman draw s himself drawin g Maus (11:4Iff.) . Th e yea r is 1987 ; Vladek has been dead for five years; Art works on Maus II from the tapes which now have become archive; and Maus I has become a great commercial success . Thi s chapter, entitle d "Auschwit z (Tim e Flies)," demonstrate s ho w beyond the multipl y fractured layerin g of language and narrative time, the very pictoriality of the animal comic i s significantly disrupte d as well. We see Art in profile, sitting at hi s drawing table, but now drawn as a human figure wearing a mouse mask. It is as if
38 Andreas Huyssen
the imag e track coul d no longe r sustai n itself , a s if it collapse d under it s ow n weight. Artie's mimicry reveals itself to be a sham. The mask reveals the limits of his project. The ruse does not work any longer. The task of representing tim e in Auschwitz itself, just begun in the preceding chapter, has reached a crisis point. This crisi s i n th e creativ e process is tellingly connecte d with th e commercial success of Maus I; the Holocaust as part of the culture industry. Crisis of representation and crisis of success throw the author into a depressive melancholy state, i n which h e resists th e marketin g of his work (translations, film version, TV) throug h a fi t o f total regression . H e avoid s th e annoyin g question s o f th e media sharks (questions such as: What is the message of your book? Why should younger Germans today feel guilty? How would you dra w the Israelis ? 11:42) by literally shrinkin g in hi s chai r from fram e t o fram e unti l w e see a small chil d screaming: "I w a n t . . . I want.. . my Mommy!" (11:42). The pressures of historical memory are only intensified by Holocaust marketing, to the point where the artist refuses an y further communication . Th e culture industry's obsession with the Holocaust almos t succeed s in shutting down Spiegelman's quest. The desire for a regression to childhood, as represented in this sequence, however, is not only an attempt to cope with the consequences of commercial success and to avoid the media. This moment o f extreme crisis, a s close as any in the work to traumatic silence and refusal t o speak, also anticipates the very ending of Maus II. On the very last page of Maus II , as Vladek's story has caught up with his postwar reunificatio n with Anja , ironicall y describe d by Vladek in Hollywood terms as a happy ending and visually rendered as the iris-like fade-out a t the end
of silent films,29 Artie is again put in the position of a child. In a case of mistaken
identity resultin g from a merging of past and present in his father's mind, Vladek addresses Artie as Richieu, Artie's own older brother who did not survive the war, whose only remaining photo had always stared at him reproachfull y during his childhood fro m the parents' bedroom wall, and to whom Maus II is dedicated. As Vladek asks Artie to turn off his tape recorder and turns over in his bed to go to sleep, he says to Artie: "I'm tired from talking, Richieu, and it's enough stories for now" (11:136) . This misrecognition of Artie as Richieu is highly ambiguous: it i s as if the dead child had come alive again, but simultaneousl y th e traumatic past proves its deadly grip over the present one last time. For these are the last words a dying Vladek addresses to Artie. This last fram e o f the comi c is followed onl y by an image of a gravestone with Vladek's and Anja's names and dates inscribed and, at the very bottom of the page and below the gravestone, by the signature "art spiegelman 1978-1991," year s that mark the long trajectory of Spiegelman's project of approaching an experience that ultimately remains beyond reach. Much more could be said about Spiegelman' s mimetic memor y project, but I hope to have made the case that the Adornean category of mimesis helps us read Holocaust remembranc e in a way that brackets the debate about the proper or correct Holocaust representation and shifts the criteria of judgment. If mimetic
39
Of Mice an d Mimesi s
approximation, drawing on a variety of knowledges (historical, autobiographic, testimonial, literary , museal) , were to emerge as a key concern, the n on e could look at other Holocaust representations through this prism rather than trying to construct a Holocaust cano n based on narrow aesthetic categorie s that pi t th e unrepresentable agains t aestheticization , modernis m against mas s culture , o r memory against forgetting. This field of discussion might be more productive than the ritualistic incantations o f Adorno regarding the cultur e industr y o r the barbarity of poetry after Auschwitz . As a work by a member of the "second generation," Mam may indeed mark a shift in the ways in which the Holocaust and its remembranc e are now represented. It is part of a body of newer, "secondary" attempts to commemorate the Holocaust that simultaneously incorporate the critique of representation and stay clear of official Holocaus t memory and its rituals. I have tried to show how Spiegelman confronts the inauthenticity of representation withi n a mass cultural genre while tellin g a n autobiographi c stor y and achievin g a powerful effec t of authentication. Like many other creators of works of film, sculpture, monuments, literature, theater, even architecture, Spiegelman rejects any metalanguage of symbolization and meaning, whether it be the officia l languag e of Holocaust memorials o r the discours e tha t insist s o n thinkin g abou t Auschwit z a s the telo s of modernity. The approach to Holocaust history is sought in an intensely personal , experiential dimension that finds expression in a variety of media and genres. Prerequisite for any mimetic approximation (of the artist/reader/viewer) is the liberation from the rituals of mourning and of guilt. Thus it is not s o much the threat of forgettin g a s th e surfei t o f memory 30 tha t i s th e proble m addressed by suc h newer work. How to get past the official memorial culture? How to avoid the trappings of the cultur e industr y whil e operating within it? How to represent tha t which one knows only through representations an d from an ever-growing historical distance? All of this requires new narrative and figurative strategies including irony, shock, black humor, eve n cynicism, muc h o f which i s present in Spiegelman' s work and constitutive o f what I have called mimetic approximation. Bilderverbot is simply no longer an issue since it has itself become part of official strategie s of symbolic memorializing. This very fact may mark the historical distanc e between Adorno, whose "after Auschwitz" chronotope with its insistence on the prohibition of images and th e barbaris m of culture has a definite apocalypti c ring to it, and younger postmodernist writers and artists to whom the prohibition of images must appea r like Holocaust theology . But if, on the othe r hand, Adorno's notion of mimesis can help us understand suc h newer artistic practices and their effect s in a broader frame, the n there may be reason to suspect that Adorno's rigorously modernist reflection itself blocke d out representational possibilities inheren t i n that mimetic dimension. In its hybrid folding of a complex and multilayered narration into th e mas s cultural genre , Spiegelman's image-text makes a good case
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Andreas Huyssen
against a dogmatic privileging of modernist techniques of estrangement and negation, for it demonstrates how estrangement and affective mimesi s ar e not mutu ally exclusive, but can actually reinforce each other. Finally, ther e i s a weaker , les s apocalypti c readin g o f Adorno's "afte r Auschwitz" statements. Such a reading would emphasize Adorno's historical critique o f that attemp t t o resurrec t Germa n cultur e afte r th e catastrophe , tha t attempt to find redemption and consolation through classical cultural traditions— Lessing's Nathan, dei Weise as proof of German "tolerance" o f the Jews, Goethe's Iphigenie as proof of German classical humanism, German poetry, music, and so
forth: "healing through quotation"—as Klaus Scherpe has called it.31 The spirit of such a critique of an official Germa n post-Auschwitz culture is one that Adorno shares with the newer generation of artists in many countries today, all of whom try t o work against the contemporar y versions o f an officia l Holocaus t culture , the dimension s o f which Adorn o could no t hav e imagined during his lifetime . There is another sentence, less frequently quoted, but perhaps more pertinent today than th e famou s statement "t o writ e poetry afte r Auschwit z is barbaric." This sentence continue s t o haunt al l contemporary attempt s t o write the Holocaust : "Even the most extreme consciousness o f doom threatens to degenerate into idle chatter."32 Only works that avoid that danger will stand. But the strategies of how to avoid such degeneration into idle chatter in artistic representations cannot be written in stone . NOTES
1. Anson Rabinbach, In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals between Apocalypse an d Enlightenment (Berkeley : University o f California Press, 1997). 2. Central her e i s the chapte r entitle d "Element s o f Antisemitism" in Horkheime r and Adorno's classic work, Dialectic of Enlightenment, originall y published i n 1947 , English trans lation by John Gumming (New York: Continuum, 1982) . 3. As is to be expected, the discussion o f signification, hieroglyphs, language, and image is pre-Saussurean, presemiotic i n the strict sense. It remains indebted to Benjamin on the one hand, and through Benjami n als o to a nineteenth-century traditio n o f German language philosophy. But it is precisely th e non-Saussurean nature of this thought that allows the notion o f mimesis to emerge in powerful ways. 4. See Gertrud Koch , "Mimesis und Bilderverbo t i n Adorno' s Asthetik, " in Koch , Die Einstellung ist di e Einstellung (Frankfurt a m Main: Suhrkamp, 1992). 5. See Josef Friichtl, Mimesis: Konstellation eines Zentmlbegriffs be i Adorno (Wurzburg: Konighausen & Neumann, 1986) ; Karla L. Schultz, Mimesis on the Move: Theodor W , Adorno's Concept o f Imitation (Bern : Peter Lang, 1990); Gunter Gebaue r and Christoph Wulf, Mimesis; Kultur, Kunst, Gesellschaft (Reinbek : Rowohlt, 1992) , esp. 374-422; Martin Jay, "Mimesis an d Mimetology: Adorno and Lacoue-Labarthe," in Jay, Cultural Semantics (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1998) , 120-37. 6. Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from a Damaged Life, tr . E. F. N. Jephcott (London : Verso, 1974), 154. 7. Theodo r W . Adorno, Revie w o f Roge r Caillois, L a Monte religieuse, Zeitschrift fu r Sozialforschung 7 (1938): 410-11. See also Adorno's letter to Benjamin o f September 22, 1937 , and Benjamin's response i n his letter of October 2 , 1937, i n Theodor W . Adorno—Walter Benjamin; Briefwechsel 1928-1940, ed. Henri Lonit z (Frankfurt a m Main: Suhrkamp 1994) , 276 78, 286.
41 Of Mice and Mimesis
8. The literature o n representing th e Holocaus t i s by now legion. One of the riches t an d still influential collections of essays is Saul Friedlander, ed., Probing the Limits o f Representation: Nazism and the "Final Solution" (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992). Most recently, Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press , 1998). 9. Art Spiegelman , Maus I : A Survivor's Tale. My Father Bleeds History (New York: Pantheon, 1986) and Maus II: A Survivor's Tale and Here My Troubles Began (New York: Pantheon, 1991). Page references will be given in the text . The following publications wer e extremely helpfu l i n preparing this essay. I acknowledge them summaril y since my concern is a theoretical propositio n rather than a new and differen tiated reading of the tex t pe r se . Joseph Witek, Comic Books as History (Jackso n and London 1989); Andrea Liss, "Trespassing Through Shadows: History, Mourning, and Photography in Rep resentations o f Holocaust Memory," Framework 4:1 (1991): 29-41; Marianne Hirsch, "Family Pictures: Maus, Mourning, an d Post-Memory," Discourse 15:2 (Winter 1992-93): 3-29 ; Mile s Orvell, "Writin g Posthistorically: Krazy Kat, Maus, and the Contemporar y Fiction Cartoon, " American Literary History 4:1 (Spring 1992): 110-28; Rick ladonisi, "Bleeding History and Owning His [Father's] Story: Maus an d Collaborative Autobiography," CEA Critic: An Official Journal o f th e College English Association 57: 1 (Fall 1994) : 41-55; Michael Rothberg , "'W e Were Talking Jewish': Art Spiegelman's Maus as 'Holocaust' Production," Contemporary Literature 35:4 (Winte r 1994): 661-87; Edward A. Shannon, "'It' s No More to Speak' : Genre, the Insuffi ciency of Language, and th e Improbabilit y of Definition in Ar t Spiegelman' s Maus," Th e MidAtlantic Almanac 4 (1995): 4-17; Alison Landsberg, "Toward a Radical Politics of Empathy," New German Critique 7 1 (Spring-Summer 1997) : 63-86 . An d mos t recentl y Dominic k LaCapra, '"Twas Night before Christmas: Art Spiegelman's Maus," i n LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998); James Young, "The Holocaust as Vicarious Past: Art Spiegelman's Maus and the Afterimages of History," Critical Inquiry 24:3 (Spring 1998): 666-99. 10. For a discussion o f the wors t offenders se e Michael Rothberg, "After Adorno : Culture in the Wake of Catastrophe," Ne w German Critique 72 (Fall 1997): 45-82. 11. Th e parado x is tha t whe n Adorn o accused poetry after Auschwit z o f barbarism, h e deeply suspected the apologetic temptation o f a poetic and aesthetic tradition, wherea s much of the recen t poststructuralist discours e of the sublim e i n relation t o Holocaust representations does exactly wha t Adorno feared: it pulls the genocide into the realm of epistemology and aesthetics, instrumentalizin g i t fo r a late modernist aesthetic o f nonrepresentability. A very good documentation an d discussion o f notions o f the sublim e ca n be found i n Christin e Pries , ed. , Das Erhabene: Zwischen Grenzerfahrung un d Grofienwahn (Weinheim : VCH Acta Humaniora, 1989). 12. Paradigrnatically in Shoshana Felman's much discussed essay "The Return of the Voice: Claude Lanzmann's Shoah," i n Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York: Routledge, 1992), 204-83. For a convincing critique of Felman's work see Dominick LaCapra , Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994) as well as LaCapra, History and Memory after Auschwitz (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998). The latter volum e als o contain s a well-documented essa y o n Spiegelman's Maus that includes a critical discussion of much of the literature on this work. 13. This argumen t ha s bee n mad e ver y forcefull y an d persuasivel y i n Miria m Hansen , "Schindler's List Is Not Shoah: The Second Commandment, Popular Modernism, and Public Memory," Critical Inquiry 22 (Winter 1996): 292-312, also in this volume. For the earlier debate on the TV series Holocaust, a similar argument can be found in Andreas Huyssen, "Th e Politic s of Identification: Holocaust and West German Drama," in After th e Great Divide: Modernism, Mass Culture, Postmodernism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 94-114. 14. These were central topoi in the German debate about Holocaust memory. See the special issue on the Historikerstreit, New German Critique 44 (Spring-Summer 1988) as well as Charles S. Maier, The Unmasterable Past: History, Holocaust, and German National Identity (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press , 1988) . 15. Cf. the two-pag e prologue initiating volume I, dated Rego Park, N.Y. ca. 1958 when Art is only ten years old, or the photo of his dead brother Richieu that overshadowed his childhood ,
42 Andreas Huyssen but is later used at the beginning o f volume II to dedicate this part of the work to Richieu and to Nadja, Art Spiegelman's daughter . 16. The category of working through has been most thoroughl y explored for this context by Dominick LaCapra , Representing the Holocaust: History, Theory, Trauma (Ithaca : Cornell University Press , 1994) . LaCapra bases his approach on Freud, and he acknowledges that ther e cannot b e a rigorous and strict separation betwee n actin g out and working through for trauma victims. While I feel certain affinities to LaCapra's general approach, I prefer not to engage the psychoanalytic vocabulary . While th e psychoanalyti c approac h is certainl y pertinen t t o th e analysis of survivor trauma, it does have serious limitations whe n it comes to artistic representations o f the Holocaust an d their effec t o n public memory. The notion of "mimetic approximation" which I try to develop through my reading of Maus tries to account fo r that difference. 17. Significantly, the prologue to volume I that shows Artie roller-skating and hurting himself i s also dated 1958, and when just a few pages and many years later Artie asks his father t o tell his life's story, he is looking at a picture of his mother, and he says: "I want to hear it. Start with Mom" (1:12) . 18. With thi s insight an d s o much more , m y readin g o f Maus i s indebte d t o Mariann e Hirsch's incisive essa y "Family Pictures : Maus, Mourning, and Post-Memory," Discourse 15:2 (Winter 1992-93): 3-29. Reprinte d in Hirsch, Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997). Cf. also M. Hirsch, "Projected Memory: Holocaust Photographs in Personal and Public Fantasy," in Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe, and Leo Spitzer, eds., Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present (Hanover and London: University Press of New England, 1999), 3-23 . 19. See note 6. 20. Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997) . 21. See Homi K. Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," in Bhabha, The Location of Culture (New York and London: Routledge, 1994), 86. 22. Interview conducte d by Gary Groth, "Ar t Spiegelma n and Frangoise Mouly," in Gary Groth and Robert Fiore, eds., The New Comics (New York: A Berkley Book, 1988) , 190-91. 23. These ar e the terms Adorno uses in the first chapter of the Dialectic of Enlightenment where the y discus s th e irremediabl e splittin g of linguistic sign and image. Horkheime r an d Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 17-18 . 24. Miriam Hansen, "Mas s Cultur e a s Hieroglyphic Writing : Adorno, Derrida, Kracauer," New German Critique 56 (Spring-Summer 1992): 43-75. Gertrud Koch, "Mimesi s un d Bilder verbot in Adorno's Asthetik," in Koch, Die Einstellung ist die Einstellung (Frankfurt a m Main: Suhrkamp, 1992), 16-29. 25. Horkheimer an d Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 24. In German: "Gerettet wird das Recht des Bildes in der treuen Durchfuhrung seines Verbots." Theodor W. Adorno, Gesammelte Schriften 3 (Frankfurt a m Main: Suhrkamp, 1983), 40. 26. Quoted in Joshua Brown's review of Maus I in Oral History Review 1 6 (1988): 103-4. 27. " A Conversation wit h Art Spiegelman . With John Hockenberry," Talk of the Nation , National Publi c Radio, February 20, 1992. 28. Marianne Hirsch, Family Frames. 29. An observation I owe to Gertrud Koch. 30. The ter m is Charles S . Maier's. See his essa y " A Surfeit of Memory? Reflections o n History, Melancholy , an d Denial," History and Memory 5 (1992): 136-51. 31. Klaus R. Scherpe, ed., In Deutschland unterwegs 1945-48 (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1982) . 32. Theodor Adorno, Prisms, 34.
Art
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Ernst van Alp hen
Deadly Historians: Boltanski's Intervention in Holocaust Historiography My work is not about xxxxxxx it is after xxxxxxx1
Despite man y disagreements , th e debat e abou t Holocaus t representation s ha s been strikingl y unanimou s o n one point: th e presumptio n tha t Holocaus t sur vivors an d ne w generation s afte r th e Holocaus t hav e a specia l responsibilit y toward its historical events. This presumption is not surprising, for the Holocaust has disrupted every conventional notion o f history. While its factua l event s are over and belong to the past, the experience of partaking in historical events continues. In that many survivors are still inside the event, its history is in both the past and the present. Thus, the cultural responsibility that befalls all those living now is to establish contact with the "past" part of the present survivors, to integrate them and their past within our present. But wha t does this cultura l responsibility toward the historica l events mean? For most critics and Holocaust scholars, it implies that bare realism must be the most effective an d proper mode for representing the Holocaust in art or literature. The genres then most appropriate to depict the Holocaust are realistic and offer histor y i n it s mos t direct , tangibl e form—testimonies , autobiographica l accounts of the Holocaust , documentaries. This preference i s based not o n aesthetic but on moral grounds, for these modes of representation are thought to best serve our moral responsibility toward this gruesome past, because they stay closest to its factual events. When I use expressions like the "pressur e on " o r "moral imperative" of Holocaust studies, I am not overstating the case. 2 Indeed, Terrence Des Pres has formulated prescription s for "respectable" Holocaus t studie s i n all seriousness . Appropriating the voice of God in his use of the "genre " o f the Commandments , he dictates:
Reprinted from Caught By History: Holocaust Effects i n Contemporary Art, Literature, and Theory, b y Ernst van Alphen, with permission o f the publishers , Stanfor d University Press. Copyright © 1997 by the Boar d of Trustees of the Lelan d Stanford Junior University.
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1. Th e Holocaust shall be represented, in its totality, as a unique event, as a special case and kingdom of its own , above or below or apart from history . 2. Representation s of the Holocaus t shal l be as accurate and faithful a s possible to th e fact s an d conditions o f the event , without chang e or manipulation for any reason—artistic reasons included. 3. Th e Holocaus t shal l be approached as a solemn or even sacred event, with a seriousness admittin g no response that might obscure its enormity or dishonour its dead. (1988,217) Setting aside the question of the Holocaust as "sacred" event, in this essay I explore what is implied in a "faithfulness to the facts and conditions of the event " and how it relates to artistic representation. I dwell on the notion of commanded accuracy and the conceptions of history and representation to which it leads. The pressure exercised by and on Holocaust studie s is derived from no t only a moral imperative, but als o from a particular conception o f art that seem s to impose itself on the face of the Holocaust. This conception of art and literature turns authors an d artists into historians, who are expected to model themselves in the image of the archivist or the historian, in the image of professionals whose task i s to inventory the facts an d reconstruct the m i n a correct place and order. Whatever the differences between the historian's options in representational modes, they share an orientation by which the y pursue making past events objectivel y present. The pressure I have in mind specifies the availabl e modes of representation even further. The pursuit o f the barest representation o f factual events gives preference t o th e archivist' s practice over that o f the historian , wh o transform s the fact s an d events int o a n historical narrative . This preference ma y be unexpected for students of literature, because realism as a literary mode of representation has always used narrative plot as its most elementary an d seductive device. Aristotle already pointed out that in order to be successful th e mimetic impuls e must focus on action, making narrative plot the inevitable result. But when considering what makes the historical mode so urgent, we reach the inevitable conclusio n tha t eve n history writing is not sufficient fo r this purpose. Many historians today , influenced if not determined by neopositivist thinking, approach even the most elementary narrative plot with suspicion. They have a point, i n that narrative plots are always simplifications when compared to the complexity o f historical reality . And the coherence an d unity of traditional plot s produce meaning effects tha t may not have been present in the past. One aspect of the traditional, realist plot, for instance, i s its closure: everything comes to an end, an end that somehow satisfies. And more often tha n not, that end is good. If th e shapin g of facts into a narrative, however truthful, is unable t o do justice to the facts , the n the only mode of representation that might d o so, however poorly, is the archiva l mode : the collecting , ordering, and labeling o f facts, items, pieces of evidence, testimonies. Th e rigorous endorsement of that conclu-
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sion is what made Claude Lanzmann's film Shoah such a compelling work. Convinced of the inheren t untruthfulness an d the negativ e effect s o f any realist narrative accoun t o f th e Holocaust , h e mad e a fil m i n whic h h e presente d th e testimonies of survivors. He did not create a fictional account in the realist mode; but h e collected the memories of those who had been the victims of that past. By making Shoah he did not represent or tell the Holocaust; he piesented the storie s of survivor s on e afte r anothe r (themselve s representations, of course). Shoah is, however, no t a documentary i n th e traditiona l sense . I n fact, Lanzman n insists that his film is not a documentary but a performance. He asks survivors to go with him, back to the places where they lived the events of the Holocaust. Hirsch and Spitzer formulate his filmic practice adequately: "Like an analyst, he brings each of the m t o the poin t o f re-experiencing their mos t profoun d encounte r wit h th e Nazi death machinery" (1994, 16) . But from tha t moment, Lanzman n becomes a real archivist: he collects the traces that the Holocaust had left in the form of reexperienced memories o f the survivors. 3 Lanzmann's refusal t o adopt the narrating function himself is the logical consequence of a more general suspicion toward realist narrative plots that underlies the critica l debate about Holocaust ar t an d literature. S o it cam e a s no surprise when Lanzmann criticized Stephen Spielberg for his account of the Holocaus t in his film Schindler's List. Spielberg does not present traces of the Holocaust; he represents the Holocaust in the traditional realist mode. This results in a coherent narrative account with a redemptive closure. Relying on all the realis t conventions, he creates the illusion o f providing a transparent entrance to the historical events. Lanzmann criticizes Spielberg, for instance, because the film's closure suggests that th e Holocaust ha s been meaningful: it has led to the birth of the Stat e of Israel. According to Lanzmann, the film's closure, set in color while the rest of the fil m i s black an d white, look s like a reconciliation with th e Holocaust . To avoid this image of reconciliation, Lanzmann ended his documentary Shoah with footage o f a moving train i n orde r to signif y hi s convictio n tha t th e Holocaus t never ends. Redemption is impossible. Although Lanzman n betrays his rigorous refusal o f the narratin g subject with thi s symboli c ending, it i s nonetheless pos sible to claim that he has modeled himself on the image of the archivist. Spielberg, on the contrary , identifies himself a s the storyteller . He is the narrativizin g historian who uses all the devices of fictional realism to tell a rounded narrative.4
Boltanski the Archivist In the face of the aforementioned pressure to represent the Holocaust in the mode of the historian o r the archivist, i t is remarkable that the French artist Christia n Boltanski has chosen t o consistently presen t hi s work as that o f an archivist. A t first sigh t he gives the impressio n of being a docile artist, giving in to the mora l
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Figurel. Christian Boltanski, Chases High School , 1988. Detail. Black-and-white photographs, photomechanical prints, metal lamps. Installation. Approximately 120 x60 x23 cm.
imperative o f the ongoin g discussions abou t Holocaust representations . I n fact , some of his work s are explicitly entitle d Inventories o r Archives. And although Boltanski did not approac h the subject of the Holocaust head-on until 1988 with his installations Chases High School (1988), Reserves: The Purim Holiday (1989), and Canada (1988), one can argue—an d I do so later—that his earlie r works and those after 1988-89 deal with aspects of the Holocaust, albeit in a noniconic, nonhistorical mode . The question tha t arises , then , is : What does this engagement with the favorite modes of the Holocaust historia n mean as an artistic practice? The first two installations jus t mentioned evoke the Holocaust mor e or less directl y b y using images o f specifically Jewish children. Fo r Chases High School (figur e 1 ) Boltanski used a photograph of the graduatin g class of a private Jewish high schoo l tha t h e found i n a book on Jews of Vienna. The installatio n consisted o f eighteen blurr y black-and-white close-ups of each o f the students . Boltanski rephotographe d th e student s individually , enlargin g thei r face s unti l they lost their individual features. As an effect their eyes became transformed into
49 Deadly Historians
empty black sockets whil e thei r smilin g mouth s turne d into grimace s of death. The photographs, presented in tin frames perched on top of a double stack of rusty biscuit tins , were overlighted by extendable desk lamps. In their aggressive overexposing of the images, these lamps evoked those which are used in interrogation rooms. Instead o f being illuminating they ar e blinding, obscurin g the enlarge d faces even further. The exhibitio n catalogue , publishe d by th e Kunstverei n in Diisseldorf , reproduced the origina l photograph, t o which Boltansk i gave the followin g caption: "All w e know abou t the m is that they wer e students at the Chase s Hig h School in Vienna in 1931." This caption stresses th e fact tha t the remaining picture no longer has correspondence with a present reality. The faces of the childre n as we see them i n the photograph have disappeared. This disappearance is acted out in enlarged close-ups. What we see there is no longer the realistic illusion of the presence of a living subjectivity, as the standard views on photography and the portrait would have it, but empty , blinded faces. And the blinding of a face is a figurative way of objectifying o r even killing somebody. It is more than likely that most or even all of the represented Jewish students did not surviv e the Holocaust. Chases High School and also Reserves: The Purim Holiday (figur e 2) are in that sense explicit and direct references t o the Holocaust. Thanks to this quality of referring to a factual reality, Boltanski the artis t qualifies himself as an historian. He has traced some victims of the Holocaust and now shows them t o us. This aspect of his work is based on the sam e historical , archival principle as , for instance, Lanzmann' s Shoah. Yet, the Holocaust is evoked not only by means of reference to its victims, but als o by means o f the connotativ e effect s o f the photographi c signifiers. Th e enlarged images that transfor m the face s int o skeletal vestiges remind us of the photographs that were published after the Second World War had come to an end and which showed emaciated survivors of the Holocaust. This effect complicate s Boltanski's position as a loyal practitioner of traditional Holocaust studies. Once this complication is foregrounded, on e notices still another aspect of these works which evokes the Holocaust in a nonreferential way. Both installations can be seen as archives. They bring together images of Jewish victims of the Holocaust, reminding us of the lists of people who died in the camps. Seen in this light, the number of pictures evokes the incomprehensible number s who died in the concentration camps. But the object of this representation is the archive as institution, no t the "archived" subjects. It is important to realize that the last two ways in which Boltanski evokes the Holocaust ar e not based on reference. He produces what I would like to call a Holocaust-effect, by reenacting principles that are defining aspects of the Holocaust: a radical emptying out o f subjectivity as a road leading to th e wholesal e destruction o f a people—genocide. The reenactmen t o f these tw o principle s an d the Holocaust-effect they produce is, however, not at all specific for the works that address the Holocaust head-on. In the same way that Boltanski produces Holocaust-
50 Ernst van Alphen
Figure 2. Christian Eoltanski, Reserves: The Purim Holiday, 1994. Moving photographs, fluorescent lamps, nails, fan. Installation dimensions variable.
effects i n most of his other works that do not deal with the Holocaust in a direct, referential way , this effect defines not only his work but also the engagement wit h the debate on modes of representation that thi s art embodies. I do not wan t t o imply tha t an y systematic emptyin g ou t o f subjectivity by means of photographic enlargement or use of the archival mode automatically gives rise to a Holocaust-effect. I t is Boltanski's oriented use of these devices and modes tha t bring s i t about , reenactin g a principle that literall y o r figuratively defines Nazis m i n on e of its aspects, according to th e rhetorica l mode of synecdoche. One aspect, whic h woul d in itself no t necessaril y lea d to the sam e overarching destruction, here, according to synecdochic logic, represents the whole of these practices, includin g thei r consequences. It is the conjunctio n of this use of reenactment (concerning th e practices of the perpetrators) with the overwhelm ing awareness of total loss it evokes (concerning the victims of Nazism) that I call a "Holocaust-effect. " The tw o elements o f Boltanski's work s that creat e this Holocaust-effec t are his consistent us e of photographic portraits and the archival mode. But what
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is it that makes these two elements s o effective? Wha t have portraits and archives in common that enable s Boltanski to use their principles in such a way that they both creat e Holocaust-effects? I first dwell o n the portrait , it s generi c premises and Boltanski' s appropriation s of the genr e for his ow n ends . That discussio n enables m e t o relat e Boltanski's use o f portraiture to th e archiva l mode as th e emblem or extreme mode of bare realism.
The Absence of Portraiture's Presence The pictoria l genr e of the portrait , whethe r painterl y or photographic, doubl y cherishes th e cornerston e o f bourgeois Western culture . Th e uniquenes s o f th e individual and his or her accomplishments ar e central in that culture. And in the portrait, originalit y appears twice. The portrai t is highly esteeme d as a genre because, according to the standard view, in a successful portrait the viewer is not only confronted with the "original," "unique" subjectivity of the portrayer, but also that of the portrayed. Linda Nochlin has expressed this abundance of originality tersely: in the portrait we watch "the meeting of two subjectivities" (1974 , 29). Such a characterizatio n o f th e genr e immediatel y foreground s thos e aspects of the portrait that heavily depend on specific notions of the human subject an d th e practic e o f representation. A s for the represente d object , thi s view implies tha t subjectivity can be equated with notion s lik e the "self, " "personal ity," or "individuality." Somebody's subjectivity is then defined and delimited i n its uniqueness an d originality, rather tha n i n its socia l connections, - i t i s someone's interior essence or presence, rather than a moment o f short duratio n in a differential process. Somebody's continuity or discontinuity with others is denied in order to present the subject as personality. One may ask if this view does justice even to the traditional portrait. As fo r the representatio n itself, th e notio n w e ge t fro m th e representa tional characteristics of the portrait is equally specific. It implies that the portrait refers t o a human being which is (was) present outside the portrait. A recent book on portraiture makes this notion o f the portrait explici t o n its first page: "Fundamental to portraits as a distinct genre in the vast repertoire of artistic representation is the necessity of expressing this intended relationship betwee n the portrait image and the human original." 5 The artisti c portrai t differs , however , fro m th e photographi c portrait a s used in legal and medical institutions, b y doing slightly more than jus t referrin g to somebody. It is more than documentation. 6 The portraye r proves her o r his originality and artistic power by consolidating the self of the portrayed. Although the portrait refers t o an original self alread y present, this sel f need s its portrayal in orde r to increase its ow n being. The portrayer has enriche d the interiorit y of the portrayed's self b y bestowing exterior form t o it. For without oute r for m th e
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uniqueness of the subject's essence could be doubted. The artistic portrayer proves her or his own uniqueness b y providing this proof. By consolidating the self , portraiture gives authority not only to the portrayed self , bu t als o to th e mimeti c conceptio n o f artistic representatio n which enables that increas e of authority. Since no pictorial genre depends as much o n mimetic referentialit y as the traditional portrait, it becomes the emblem o f that conception. The German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer is a clear spokesman for this exemplary status of the portrait. The portrai t is onl y an intensifie d for m o f the genera l nature of a picture. Every picture is an increase of being and is essentially determined as representation, a s coming-to-presentation. In the specia l case of the portrai t this representation acquires a personal significance, i n that here an individual is presented in a representative way. For this means that the ma n represented represents himself in his portrait and is represented by his portrait. The portrait is not only a picture and certainly not only a copy, it belongs to the present or to the present memory of the man represented. This is its real nature. To this extent the portrai t i s a special cas e of the genera l ontological value assigned to the picture as such. What comes into being in it is not already contained in what his acquaintances see in the sitter.7 In the portrait, Gadamer claims, an individual is not represented as idealized, nor in an incidental moment , but in "the essential quality of his true appearance." This description of the portrait as exemplum of the (artistic) picture shows the contradictory nature of mimetic representation. I t shows how the traditiona l notion of the portrait depends on the rhetorical strategy of mimesis, a strategy of rnake-believe.8 Let us rea d Gadamer' s argument in mor e detail. In the portrait , more than in any other kind of picture, a n "increase of being" comes about. This increase of being turns out to be the essential quality of the true appearance of the sitter. The portrait refer s t o this sitter who exists outsid e th e work. Since th e sitter exist s outside the work, we may also assume that her or his essence exist s outside the work.9 This implies that the portrait brings with it two referents. The first is the portrayed as body, profile, material form. The second is the essential quality of the sitter, his or her unique authenticity. 10 Within the traditiona l notion o f the portrait, it is almost a truism to say that the strength of a portrait is judged in relation to this essential quality, not jus t in relation t o the look s or appearance of a person. This explains, for instance, the possibilit y o f negative judgments on photographic portraits . Although a camera capture s the materia l realit y o f a person automatically and maximally, the photographer has as many problems in capturing a sitter's "essence" a s a painter does. Camera-work is not the traditional portrayer's ideal but its failure, because the essential quality of the sitter can only be caught by the artist, not by the camera. But in Gadamer's text we do not read about an essential qualit y that has been captured. The essential quality of the sitter is the increase of being, produced
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by the portrayer in the portrait. "Wha t comes into being in it is not already contained in what his acquaintances see in the sitter. " Th e portrayer makes visible the inner essence of the sitter an d this visualizing act is creative and productive. It is more than a passive rendering or capturing of what was already there, althoug h interior and hence invisible. Th e portrayer gives this interiority a n outer form so that we viewers can see it. This outer form is then the signifie r of the signified , of the sitter's inne r essence . What to do with the surplu s of the increas e of being? Gadamer makes u s believe that wha t come s into being in the portrait i s the same as the referent or origin of the painting. Semiotically speaking, he presumes a unity between signifier and signified, between increase in being and the essential quality of the sitter . By presuming that unity he denies that the increase of being is a surplus. By doing that Gadamer exemplifies the semiotic economy of mimetic representation . This economy involves a straightforward relationship between signifier and signified. This identity between signifier and signified is not inevitable. Andrew Benjamin historicizes th e kind of semiotic conceptio n that als o underlies Gadamer's view in the following terms: The signifier ca n be viewed as representing the signified . Their unity is then the sign. The possibility of unity is based on the assumed essential homogeneity of the signified. The sign in its unity must represent the singularity of the signified. I t i s thu s tha t authenticit y is interpolate d int o th e relationship between the elements of the sign. Even though the signifier and the signifie d can never be the same, there is, none the less, a boundary which transgressed would render the relationship unauthentic. (62) Most surprisingl y in this argument, Benjami n attributes authenticit y neithe r t o the signifier nor to the signified, but to the special relationship between the two. In the cas e of the portrait, this semioti c econom y implies that th e qualifications "authenticity," "uniqueness," or "originality" d o not belong to the portrayed subject, portrait, or portrayer but to the mode of representation that makes us believe that signifie r an d signified form a unity. I n connection with th e issu e o f authority, this entail s a socially embedded conception: the bourgeoi s self depend s on a specific mode of representation for its authenticity . The link between a mimetic rhetori c and the production of authority can be illustrated with the exampl e of Rembrandt. We think w e know the fac e of the self-portraitist Rembrandt, even though other painters have presented a face of Rembrandt quite different fro m his self-portrait, just because we adopt the mimeti c way of reading when we look at Rembrandt self-portraits. 11 Perhap s Lievens's or Flinck's Rembrandts are closer t o what th e artis t "really " looked like, bu t ho w can we mistrust suc h a great artist to tell us the truth about himself? My earlier remark that th e portrait embodies a dual project a t this point becomes cleare r yet more specific: it give s authority t o the portraye d subject as well as to mimetic representation . Th e illusion of the presence and authenticit y
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Figure 3 . Christian Boltanski, Th e 6 2 members of the Micke y Mouse Clu b i n 1955, 1972 . Detail. Sixty-two black-andwhite photographs in tin frames with glass. Each photo 30.5 x 22.5 cm . Collectio n Ydessa Hendele s Ar t Foundation , Toronto . (Picture show s onl y on e photograph , o f sixty-two.)
of the portrayed subject presupposes, however, belief in the unit y of signifier an d signified. As soon as this unity is challenged, the homogeneity an d authenticit y of the portraye d subject fall apart. This is exactly what we see happen in Boltanski's works with portraits. He challenges th e unit y between th e photographic signifier and its signifie d mercilessly. He does so by focusing on the ide a of reference, th e presume d fundamental premise of the genr e of the portrai t as well as the mediu m of photography. In his works, referentiality has become an object of intense scrutiny. Boltanski is very outspoken i n hi s desir e to "captur e reality" , an d man y o f his work s consist of rephotographed "found" snapshots . Th e "capturin g o f reality" happens twice i n these works, not only by using found, captured images, but also by photographing them, which doubles the gesture of capturing. He incorporates thes e photographs in large r installations. I n his Th e 62 members o f th e Mickey Mouse Club i n 1955 (1972), fo r instance , h e present s rephotographed pictures of children which he had collected when he was 11 years old (figure 3). The original photos were pictured in the children's magazine Mickey Mouse Club. The children had sent in pictures that best represented them. We see
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them smiling, well-groomed, or with their favorite toy or animal. Seventeen years after h e had collected th e pictures, watching them, Boltansk i is confronted with the incapacity of these images to refer: "Today they must all be about my age, but I can't learn what has become of them. Th e pictur e that remain s of them does not correspon d any more with reality, an d all these children' s face s hav e disappeared."12 These portraits d o not signif y "presence, " but exactl y th e opposite : absence. If there were "interiority" or "essence" i n a portrait, as traditional beliefs on portraiture would have it, these photographs should still enable Boltanski to get in touc h with the represente d children . But they d o not. The y onl y evok e absence. In some of his later works he intensifies thi s effect b y enlarging the photos so much that most details disappear. The eyes, noses, and mouths become dark holes, th e face s whit e sheets . Th e Holocaust-effec t thes e blowup s produc e i s inescapable. They remin d us o f pictures of survivors of the Holocaus t just afte r they were released. In these work s the Holocaus t i s not referre d t o by choosing images of Jewish children, as Boltanski did for his Chases High School and Reserves: The Purim Holiday. It is not evoke d by means o f reference. It is produced as an effect. The importance and possibilities of dealing with the Holocaust in a nonreferential o r historical wa y is provocatively addressed by Boltanski in his work The Dead Swiss (1990 ) (figur e 4) . For this work he cu t ou t illustrate d obituarie s from a Swiss newspaper. The photographs of the recently decease d were usually snapshots o r studio portrait s taken i n orde r to commemorat e event s suc h a s a wedding or a graduation. Just as in his other works in which he used photographs, Boltanski reshot the already grainy images, enlarging them slightly over life-size. The nea r life-siz e portraits , a s well a s his decisio n t o present portrait s of Swiss instead of Jews, were intended to evoke normality. These portraits did not refer to humans wh o were victimized i n an unimaginable way, nor did they refer t o th e absoluteness or overwhelming power of death. Boltanski said the following about this work : "Before, I did pieces with dea d Jews but 'dead ' an d 'Jew ' go too well together. There is nothing mor e normal tha n the Swiss . There is no reason for them t o die , s o they are more terrifying in a way. They ar e us."13 Boltanski has done everything to make identification and correspondence possible between the living spectators an d the image s o f dead Swiss represented. Th e image s ar e life size and they connote life instead of death. Nevertheless, two features of this work make the Holocaust-effec t unavoidable . Again, the shee r number of similar portraits evoke s th e dehumanizatio n o f the Holocaust . Whil e the portrai t as genre evokes the idea of individual identity, the number of portraits transforms the evoked idea of individuality into anonymity. It is precisely this transformation that happens while watching the work. Therefore, the work can be seen as a reenactment of one of the principle s that defin e the Holocaust : the transformatio n of subjects into objects. Seeing the first image, one is still able to activate the traditional beliefs in
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Figure 4 . Christian Boltanski, 17 4 Dead Swiss , 1990 . Installation view, Marian Goodman
Gallery, New York. Black and white photographs, metal lamps.
the capacitie s of portraiture. One is in touch then with th e presence of a unique individual being. Seeing more of them, all similar o r ultimately al l the same , one realizes tha t th e opposit e effec t ha s take n over . The samenes s o f all the face s i s enforced b y the fac t tha t th e photographs have been enlarged: individual feature s disappear in that process. One is confronted with the absence of the presence of unique human beings. One sees a collection of exchangeable objects. Precisely this transformation in one's experience as a spectator reenacts the Holocaust. This reenactment is an effect, no t a representation; it does something instead of showing it. The produce d Holocaust-effect undercut s tw o element s o f the portrait' s standard view . B y representing thes e peopl e a s (almost ) dead , Boltansk i fore grounds the idea that the photographs have no referent. And by representing these human beings in the "Naz i mode, " tha t is , without an y individual features, h e undermines th e idea of the "presence" in the individual portrait. All the portraits are exchangeable, in that the portrayed have become anonymous. They all evoke absence, absence of a referent outside the image, as well as absence of "presence " in the image.
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Figure 5. Christian Boltanski, Monuments, 1986. Seventeen color photographs, tin frames, five lights with wires. 130 x 60 cm.
About his Monuments (1986) (figure 5), for which he used a photograph of himself an d of seventeen classmates, Boltanski says the following : Of all these children, among whom I found myself, on e of whom was probably th e gir l I loved, I don't remembe r an y o f their names , I don't remembe r anything more than th e face s o n the photograph. It could be said that the y disappeared from my memory, that this period of time was dead. Because now these children must be adults, about whom I know nothing. This is why I felt
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the need to pay homage t o these "dead/' who in this image, all look more or less the same, like cadavers.14
The photographs do not help bring back the memories of his classmates. He calls his classmates "cadavers, " because their portraits are dead. The portraits are dead because they do not provide presence or reference. He only remembers that which the picture offers in its plain materiality as a signifier: faces. He.clearly denies any "increase o f being." The dead portraits are in tension with another important elemen t o f Boltanski's installations. These ar e often frame d a s monuments, memorials, altars , or shrines (Monuments [1985], Monument [1986], Monuments: The Children of Dijon [1986], Monument (Odessa) [1991], The Dead Swiss [1991]). The portraits are in many cases lit by naked bulbs, as if to represent candles and emphasize th e work's status as memorial or shrine. The framings make explicit the intention of the installation. Thes e works want to remember, to memorize or to keep in touch with the subjects portrayed. The photographs, however, are in conflict with this stated intention, unable to make the portrayed subject present. They evoke absence. That is why the memorials are not so much memorials of a dead person, or, already less ambitiously, o f a past phase of somebody's life, but o f a dead pictorial genre. The portrait is memorized in its failure to fulfill it s traditional promises. Boltanski has also made works with photographs that make a slightly dif ferent point about the genre of the portrait; as a consequence, the Holocaust-effec t is evoked on the basis of a different mechanism there. For the works The Archives: Detective (1987 ) and Reserve: Detective II I (1987 ) (figure 6) he used images fro m the Frenc h tabloid Detective. Thi s journal reproduces photographs of murderers and their victims. In the first-mentioned work he used the images rephotographed and enlarged; for the second he used the newspaper images themselves. H e taped the clipping s onto the fron t o f cardboard cartons on which a random date from 1972 was also written. The cartons were stacked on crudely constructed wooden shelves. It was intimated tha t th e cartons containe d document s concernin g th e individuals whose images were taped to the outside. But since one was not supposed to open the cartons, it was impossible to relate the documents to the images. And as is often th e case in Boltanski's work, this work is not a "real" archive , bu t onl y has an archival effect . I n reality th e boxes contained onl y unrelated newspaper stories. Bu t let us take its effec t seri ously. The separation of image and text, then, makes it impossible to distinguish the murderers from th e murdered. We only sec smiling individuals. It is not possible to recognize criminal personalities in the portraits. Another part of the same installation foregrounde d the failed effor t t o distinguish the criminal personality from it s victims even more explicitly. The installation no t onl y consisted of four wooden shelves with the cardboard boxes, but also of twelve framed collages of the photographs with clamp-on lamps. These lamps created the connotation of interrogation an d scrutiny, the portraits being interrogated as if they had to reveal
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Figure 6 . Christian Boltamki, Reserve : Detectiv e III , 1987. Wooden shelves with cardboard boxes, photographs, stories, and twelve black lamps.
their truth. But again this is without success. We do not see the difference between murderer and murdered, rendering this too a disturbing statement abou t portraiture as well as about photography, with neither genre nor medium abl e to provide the presence of someone's subjectivity. Genre and medium have turned the subjects into objects, an d the only things we see are faces. A similar effec t i s reached in works for which Boltansk i used snapshot s from Germa n family photo albums that he found at a flea market. Gumpert says the following about these family albums: Like the snapshots of the Family D., these albums documented the lives of ordinary people during extraordinary times. Among the ritualized shots of birthdays and anniversaries were uniformed Nazi soldiers—smiling and holding babies, happy, it seems, to have a respite from thei r duties. (1994, 143) Boltanski used the photographs in his work Conversation Piece (1991} but also for his book Sans-Souci (1991) (figure 7). This book showed snapshots of several Nazi families, wh o probably did not kno w eac h other . A s in "real " photo albums , a sheet o f cobweb paper was inserted between th e pages.
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Figure 7. Christian Boltanski, page from Sans-Souci, 1991. Frankfurt am Main and Cologne: Portikus and Walther Konig, 1991. 16 pp., black and white illustrations, two thousand copies.
The intriguing an d disturbing effec t o f Sans-Souci was caused by the fac t that traditional meaning s o f the family photo alburn overruled the subjectivitie s supposed to be represented in th e snapshots . Th e Nazi soldier s in these photographs do not show any signs or symptoms of the ideology and destruction of which they partake . W e only se e affectionat e friends, lovers , husbands , an d fathers . Gumpert reads the impossibility o f recognizing the Nazi character or subjectivity in these pieces as Boltanski's disinterest in ascribing blame to the Nazis. He is presumed to "underscore the potential evil that resides in us all" (1994, 143). Boltanski's works, then, make a general claim about humankind . Gumpert's reading seems implausible t o me because it neglects the mode of this artistic practice itself. She ignores the fact that these works all consist of photographic portraits. I n fact , sh e quote s a remark o f Boltanski tha t allegedl y illustrates his intentions behind works like Conversation Piece and Sans-Souci. In 1987 , when the tria l of the infamous Nazi war criminal Klau s Barbie in Lyons was recorded in the media , Boltanski said the following : "Barbie has the fac e of a Nobel Peace Prize winner. I t would be easier if a terrible person had a terrible face."15
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With this remark, however, Boltanski is not making a claim about potential evi l whic h hide s i n u s all . O n the contrary , h e label s on e specifi c person , namely, Klaus Barbie, as a terrible person. His remark broaches the problem that this terribl e subjectivit y canno t b e recognize d whe n w e se e this perso n a s an image in newspapers or on television, or even when we see him i n person. In the process of representing th e terribl e subject Barbie as an image, he is transformed into something else and he loses his terribleness . In an interview wit h Delphin e Renard , Boltanski explain s thi s transfor mation of a subjectivity whe n a person i s being portrayed photographically : "I n most o f my photographic pieces I have manipulated th e qualit y o f evidence tha t people assign to photography, in order to subvert it, or to show that photography lies—that what it conveys is not reality but a set of cultural codes." 16 In the case of th e wor k Sans-Souci, it i s very clear which se t o f cultural codes blocks access to the Nazis as subjects—the family albu m as a traditional mediu m bound up in a fixed set of meanings. This implies that the snapshots that fill family albums do the opposit e of capturing and representing th e reality of a family.17 In Boltanski's own words: "I had become aware that in photography, and particularly in amateur photography, the photographer no longer attempts to capture reality: he attempts to reproduce a pre-existing and culturally impose d image."18 The photographic portrait fails to fulfill it s promises now in another way. As I recalled before, according to traditional views, the photographic portrait captures the reality and truth of somebody's subjectivity; it makes the portrayed subject present . Mos t o f Boltanski' s photographi c work s confron t thei r viewers , however, with absence instead of presence, with object s instead of subjects, with cadavers instead of living human beings. But the photographic pieces with images of murderers or Nazi soldiers do not confront us with absence but rather with lies . With these works Boltanski does not make the point that Nazi soldiers were also loving husbands or fathers, bu t tha t we are not abl e to capture the realit y of the Nazi subject by means of the photographic medium. We end up with lies. By showing that photography is a medium of lies, Boltanski creates another Holocaust-effect. This time he does not reenact the absolute dehumanization of Nazism, bu t anothe r aspec t of Nazism whic h i s als o an intrinsi c featur e o f th e Holocaust. Boltansk i confronts the viewers of his works with a mechanism tha t is consistently producing decei t and lies. He stimulates viewers t o activate a set of cultural codes (e.g., the famil y album) that projects false meanings, lies, o n th e portrayed subjects. By adopting these cultura l codes, it is as if we, as viewers, are placed in the shoe s of the Naz i soldiers who believed that they were decent citizens by doing what the y were doing. Boltanski's use of portraits repeatedly produces the same disturbing effect . They do not evok e the illusio n o f the presence of a human being in all her or his individuality, but only the idea of plain absence or the projection of lies. He deconstructs the photographic portrait in its promise of providing an exact, faithful correspondence with a historical o r living reality. One is confronted wit h th e spli t
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between signifier and signified or the disappearance of the signified. Provocatively and consistently Boltanski's works fail to provide living realities which correspond with the represented persons.
Leftovers o f Reality The tw o mode s o f representation tha t produce Holocaust-effect s in Boltanski' s work are photographic portraiture and the archive. As argued earlier, both modes of representin g reality ca n b e see n a s emblem s o f bare realism, th e representa tional effec t s o much favore d b y Holocaust commentary . The photographic portrait and the archive seem to share an ability to represent (historical) reality in an apparently objective way. We can almost spea k of a presentation instead o f a representation o f reality. In both cases there seems to be a minimum o f intrusion o r "presentness" of the subjec t or medium of representation in the product of representation. Anothe r commo n aspec t tha t link s thes e tw o mode s in Boltanski' s practice i s th e foregrounding , an d the n questioning , o f th e individual : mos t archival installations consis t of the belongings of one individual. I now want to explore Boltanski's use of the archive in order to see possible consequences o f the archiva l mode for our understanding of the Holocaus t itself . In only one series o f his work s is the Holocaus t directl y evoked by means of reference to it. In 1988 he made some installations to which he gave the title Canada. This title refers t o the euphemistic nam e the Nazis gave to the warehouses that stored all the personal belongings of those who were killed in the gas chambers or interned in the labo r camps. "Canada" here stands for the countr y of excess and exuberance to which one wants to emigrate, because it can offer a living to everybody. In the works with the titl e Canada (figur e 8) Boltanski showed piles of secondhand garments. For the first version of this installation, a t the Ydessa Hendels Art Foundation in Toronto, he used six thousand garments. The brightly colored clothes were hung by nails on all four walls. Every inch of the room was covered by them. This installation not only brought to mind the warehouses in the concentration camps, but by the sheer number of garments it also evoked the incredible number o f people who died in the camps and whose possessions were stored in "Canada." Like Chases High School and Monument: Th e Purim Holiday, Canada evokes the Holocaust referentially. This time it is not the used "material"—photographs that show European Jewish children before the war, hence, targets of the Holocaust—which denot e th e Holocaust , but th e titl e of the work . These garments, probabl y obtained from th e Salvatio n Army in Toronto, represen t a specific historical space: the warehouses in Auschwitz, because the title denominates the installation a s such. But Boltanski's other works based on the same archival, inventory principle do not refer t o the Holocaust by denominating a specific ele -
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Figure 8 . Christian Boltanski, Canada , 1988 , Secondhand clothing. Installation view, Ydessa Hendeles Art Foundation, Toronto.
ment of it. Still, they have "Holocaust-effects" as well, effect s simila r to his photographic portraiture pieces that d o not use images of Jewish people. In 197 3 and 1974 Boltanski made several installations, genetically called Inventories, which consisted of the belongings of an arbitrarily selected person. In his Inventory o f objects that belonged to a woman o f Ne w York (figur e 9) , fo r instance, shown in the Sonnabend Gallery in New York (1973) , he presented furniture of a woman who had just died. These belonging s had the functio n of witnessing th e existenc e o f the woman who had died. Semiotically speaking , thes e Inventories are fundamentally different fro m th e installations with photographs . While the photographs refer iconically, o r fail to do so, the inventories refe r indexically. The pieces of furniture represent the woman, not by means of similarity or likeness, but b y contiguity. The woman and her belongings have been adjacent . These belongings pretend to be and thus represen t the ide a of having been contiguous to the woman, because later Boltanski admitted that he had "cheated" the audience b y exhibiting furnitur e tha t h e ha d borrowed from persona l acquaintances. Thi s cheating onl y enhance s th e semioti c statu s o f his work. The sign , according to Umberto Eco's definition, is "everything which can be used in order to lie" (1976,10). The installations ar e not "real" indexes but "look like" them; just like fake signatures they are icons parading as indexes.
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Figure 9. Christian Boltamki, Inventory o f objects that belonged to a woman o f New York, 1973. Installation view, Centre National d'Art Contemporain, Paris.
The point here, however, is the shift fro m ico n to index.19 The differenc e between the iconical an d the indexical works is a matter of pretension. The photographic portraits claim , by convention, to refer to somebody and to make tha t person present. They fail, as I have argued, in both respects. The indexical works, however, do not clai m presence: the y show somebody's belongings, not th e person herself or himself. And, strangely enough, they seem to be successful a s references to the person to whom the objects belonged. At first sight, it is rather unexpected tha t Boltanski's installations , based on the archiva l mode, are slightly close r to fulfilling th e standar d claims of portraiture than his pieces with photographic portraits. This success is due to the fact that on e o f the traditiona l component s o f the portrai t ha s bee n exchange d for another semioti c principle . Likeness , similarity ha s gone and contiguity i s proposed as the new mode of portraiture. When we stay with the standard definition of th e portrai t (se e Brilliant) Boltanski's indexica l work s fit much bette r i n th e genre of the portrait than his photographic portraits. Although referentialit y i s mor e successfull y pursue d i n th e indexica l installations, th e proble m of presence in these works is again foregrounded as a failure. I n Th e Clothes of Francois C (1972 ) (figur e 10) , we se e black-and-white, tin-framed photograph s of children's clothing . The photograph s of these clothe s immediately raise the question o f the identity and the whereabouts of their owners. This leads again to the Holocaust-effect. The clothes connote the warehouses in the deat h and concentration camps , where all the belongings of the inmate s were sorted (thu s depriving them of individual ownership) and stored for futur e
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Figure 10 . Christian Boltanski, Th e Clothe s o f Frangoi s C , 1972 . Black-and-white photographs, ti n frames, glass. Each photograph 22.5 x 30.5 cm . Muse e d'art Contemporain, Nimes , on loan fro m th e Fonds Musee d'Art Moderne de la Ville de Paris, 1989 .
use by the Germans. After the war, some of these storages were found, and became symbols, indexical traces , of the millions wh o were put to death in the camps. In other indexical "portraits " th e Holocaust-effect i s pursued even more directly. Part of the installatio n Storage Area of the Children's Museum [ 1989) (figure 11) , for instance, consisted of racks with clothing. The piles of clothes stored on the shelves referred t o the incomprehensible numbers who died in the concentration camps. But in contrast with the series of works entitled Canada, these works do not refe r to the Holocaust; they have a Holocaust-effect becaus e they reenact a principle that defines the Holocaust as the deprivation of individuality applie d in the most extreme and radical way. Deprived of their individuality, the victims of the Holocaust were treated impersonally as specimens of a race that first had to be collected and inventoried before they could be used (in the labor camps) or destroyed (in th e ga s chambers). The Nazi s no t onl y inventorie d th e possession s o f their victims, but th e same principles were in fact applie d to the victims themselves . The notion s o f usability an d uselessness ar e of crucial importance for an understanding of how Boltanski's archival works produce Holocaust-effects. Th e "inventories" or selections, performed when on e entered th e camp s but whic h returned almost daily in the labor camps, were based on the distinction between usable and unusable. The mechanisms of the Holocaust were such that ultimatel y everybody had to end up in the category "useless. " It i s exactly thi s idea o f uselessness tha t overwhelm s Boltansk i when, like man y othe r artist s i n th e 1960 s an d th e 1970s , he becam e interested i n
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Figure 11 . Christian Boltanski, Storag e Are a o f th e Children' s Museum , 1989 . Children's clothing, metal shelves, lamps. Installation view, "Histoires de musees," Musee d'Art Moderne de la Ville de Paris.
anthropological museums. The Musee de 1'Homme in Paris made the following impression o n him : It was . .. the age of technological discoveries, of the Musee de 1'Homme and of beauty, no longer just African art , but a n entire series of everyday objects: eskimo fishhooks , arrow s fro m th e Amazo n Indian s . . . Th e Muse e d e 1'Homme was of tremendous importance to me, - it was there that I saw large metal and glass vitrines in which were placed small, fragile, an d insignificant objects. A yellowed photograph showing a "savage" handling his little objects was ofte n place d in th e corne r of the vitrine . Eac h vitrine presented a lost world: the savag e in th e photograp h was most likel y dead ; the object s ha d become useless—anyway there's no one left who knows how to use them. The Musee de 1'Homme seemed like a big morgue to me.20 While Boltanski expected to find "beauty" in the museum, an expectation inspire d by the kin d o f eye Cubist artists had for the object s of African cultures, h e found
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Figure 12 . Christian Boltanski, Referenc e Vitrines, 1969-70. Various objects i n wooden vitrine with Plexiglas. 120 x 70 x 15 cm.
instead los t world s in the vitrines . Th e inventories revea l the sam e meaning t o him as do photographic portraits. He sees absence instead of presence. The anthropological museum di d not become a fine arts museum; i t was transformed into a morgue of useless objects . In the earl y 1970 s Boltanski made two series of works in which h e made use of the museological vitrine (Attempt to Reconstruct Objects that Belonged to Christian Boltanski between 1948 and 1954, Reference Vitrines [figur e 12]) . On e series of works, generically entitled Reference Vitrines (1970-73), consisted of museum-type vitrine s i n which Boltansk i displayed a sampling o f the wor k h e had mad e since 1969 . He showed smal l pile s o f the dir t balls, self-mad e knives , traps, carve d sugar cubes, page s fro m hi s books , and part s o f his mail-art . Each item in the vitrines had a label that usually listed the title and the date of the work. With this series o f works Boltanski turned himsel f int o the archivis t o f his ow n work. In his similar series Attempt to Reconstruct he was the archivist of his childhood.21 However, these "reconstructions " fai l utterly a s reconstructions, unabl e to reconstruct eithe r hi s childhoo d o r his artisti c career . Instead we see useles s objects. The frame o f the museologica l vitrin e o r the archaeologica l museum, i n short, th e archiva l mode of representation, withdraw s object s fro m th e context s in whic h the y wer e originally present . I n the vitrine , museum , o r archive the y become subjecte d to principles tha t no t onl y defin e th e object s a s useless, bu t
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which were defining for the Holocaust practice. Through his archival work as well as in his photographic work, then, Boltanski, rather than "obeying" the historian' s prescriptions, challenges and subverts them.
Boltanski as Historian In his Reflections o f Nazism, historian Saul Friedlander suggests that systematic historical research, which uncovers the facts in their most precise and meticulous interconnection, provide s little understanding of the Holocaust; it rather protects us from the past and keeps it at a distance. He holds the language of the historian responsible for that effect. The distance is caused by the reading attitude the reader is encouraged to adopt by the historian's language. The attitude of the expert, in charge of checking the accurac y of the fact s and the connection s betwee n them , protects the reader: That neutralizes the whol e discussion and suddenly places each one of us, before we have had time to take hold of ourselves, in a situation not unrelated to the detached position of an administrator of extermination. Interest is fixed on an administrative process, an activity of building and transportation, words used for record keeping. And that's all. (91) But Friedlander' s words suggest tha t th e historian' s detache d position involve s more tha n a neutralization o f the discussio n o n th e Holocaust . Paradoxically , Friedlander suggests that the historian could be said to reenact the Holocaust precisely b y his o r her detache d position a s an administrator o f extermination. So , whereas the historian provide s only little understanding of the Holocaust, what he provides his reader s is a Holocaust performance. This can be quite uncann y when th e historia n i s no t self-reflexiv e an d i s unawar e o f th e effect s o f hi s practice. Friedlander, however, is self-reflexive. Bu t he indicates tha t for the histo rian there is no way out: "The historian canno t work in any other way, and historical studies have to be pursued along the accepted lines. Th e events described are what is unusual, no t th e historian's work. We have reached the limits of our means of expression. Others we do not possess " (92) . Boltanski the artist present s himsel f no t a s a "believing," bu t a s a self reflexive historian lik e Friedlander. 22 He adopts and explores the archival mode s of the historian as if he wanted to follow the rules formulated by many Holocaust commentators. He consistently use s modes of representation tha t are supposed to be most promising in providing a truthful, objective account of past realities. From this perspective th e photographic portraits, vitrines , reconstitutions , and inventories all belong to the same historical paradigm . They are all extreme examples of non-narrative genres that stand for bare realism, embodying the promise of the
69 Deadly Historians
presence of the past. Yet this promise is never fulfilled. No r is, by implication, the historian's. Boltanski foreground s the Janus's head of historical realism. He shows us, again and again, the presenc e of absence. His acts of reconstruction an d making present hi t u s with th e awarenes s that wha t i s being reconstructed is lost. But Boltanski does more than inflict a general idea of death, loss, and absence. He specifies th e mode s o f production semioticall y a s well as historically. Foregroundin g the principles of the archival mode, he foregrounds the Holocaust, its presentness in its pastness, in the sam e act. The way he does this ca n be summarized by the epigraph with whic h I began this analysis: "M y work is not abou t xxxxxxx it is after xxxxxxx." In this sentence the word "Holocaust" i s not mentioned. Twice we see an unreadable mark, the resul t o f Boltanski's "corrections " i n th e tex t o f an interview. His copy in which he made the corrections was published in the catalogue in this form. It is quite plausible, however , that the crossed-out word was "Holocaust." Boltanski has sai d in severa l interviews tha t h e consider s hi s wor k as post-Holocaust work, a formulation which indicates that for him th e Holocaust is a fundamental break in history. If we assume that the unreadable word is "Holocaust," he seems to suggest tha t th e Holocaust itsel f i s unreadable or incomprehensible. That is exactly why his work is not "about " th e Holocaust. For making work "about" the Holocaust would be a hopeless project. It is hopeless because of the impossibility o f having a detached position fro m it which would enable one to write "about" it. Although one cannot make work about the Holocaust, on e ca n focu s o n th e fundamenta l changes in ou r perceptio n o f lif e after the Holocaust. Boltanski favors an indexical approach to the Holocaust over an iconic, realistic one. Thus, it was more effective to represent a dead woman by the belongings sh e left behind than by a photographic portrait o f her. The break caused by the Holocaust consist s for Boltanski a loss o f hope or Utopia: For a long time humanity was in a childhood-like state believing that things would get better and better, that ma n woul d become more and more wise. What is terrible is that afte r th e Holocaust we can see that it wa s not true. And now with the en d of Communism, which is something very sad, we no longer hav e a goo d Utopi a an y more . Communism was th e las t Christia n Utopia, Holocaust was the worst thing that could happen. In the 19th century it was possible to believe in a moral Utopia and a scientific Utopia. Today we have lost everything.23 It is remarkable that Boltanski mentions the nineteenth century as the century of Utopias. This is an important historiographic statement, albei t unelaborated. For, as Hayden White has argued, the nineteenth centur y mark s the professionalization an d disciplinization o f historical thinking . In order to transform itself into a
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modern scientific discipline it had to disengage itself fro m politica l and ideological thinking. "History" had to repress Utopian thinking if it wished to claim th e authority of a discipline. It is only then that historical modes of representation are defined by distinguishing them from fiction and imagination. Historical thinking is de-rhetoricized, an effort tha t was a "rhetorical move in its own right, the kind of rhetorical move that Paolo Valesio calls the rhetoric of anti-rhetoric."24 The disciplinization o f history led to an image of history as something that can be ordered, understood, explained . Politica l an d Utopian thinkin g t o whic h history was subordinated until then had presented history a s a spectacle of confusion, uncertainty, and moral anarchy.25 Prior to the nineteenth century, history possessed all kinds of sublime, unrepresentable qualities. I t had been conceived "as a spectacle of crimes, superstitions , errors , duplicities, an d terrorisms" tha t justified visionary and Utopian recommendations for a politics that would anchor social processes on a new, rational ground. It is this spectacle of the historical sublime tha t i s suppressed when history i s domesticated as an understandable and explainable domain, a respected object of a disciplinary field of study. When we take this history of the fiel d o f history and its mode s of representation into consideration, it seem s as if Boltanski suggests that the disciplinization o f history, an d the los s of Utopian thinking that goes with it , defin e th e Holocaust in a crucial way. Again and again, he makes use of the archiva l mode of representation as a way of evoking the Naz i mode of making history and practicing genocide. His works, then, evoke the Holocaust by being "about" the disciplinization of history. But another danger lurks here. This conclusion might seem paradoxical if his distanc e from th e disciplinizatio n o f history entaile d a nostalgia for the state of history that preceded it. For, as Hay den White already remarked, fascist ideologie s are those seen as a return of Utopian thinkin g afte r th e disciplinization o f history: "it i s possible that fascist politic s is in part the price paid for th e ver y domestication o f historical consciousness tha t i s supposed to stand against it " (1987 , 75) . The nostalgi c desir e for sublimity serve s there as a legitimization of the projec t for the future . This opens the possibility that Boltanski's work, in its critique of historical modes of representation and of the domestication of the past, is unconsciously drawn into the Nazi project that he assumes to have laid bare. I do not think that this is so, but the reason why he does not fall into that trap needs spelling out. It cannot be denied that Boltanski is turning the past, the past of the Holocaust that is, into something that can evoke the sublime. By means of his failing domestication of the past, he presents the opposite of a well-ordered and understood image of history. He presents history as sublime, as something that recedes into absence when we try to capture it. Importantly, this resublimation of the past is not performed, as in the case of Nazism, as a way of legitimizing th e Utopia n thinking of fascism. For Boltanski, the Holocaust means the end of any Utopia: "Holocaust wa s the worst thing that could happen. In the 19t h century it was possible to believe in a moral Utopia and
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a scientific Utopia . Today we have lost everything . . . . We have no mor e hope " (1994,43). Boltanski defines not only the past but also the future in terms of a sublime chaos tha t canno t b e ordered. It is here, in thi s differen t conceptio n o f the future (instea d of the past) , that hi s critiqu e o f Nazism come s t o a closure. Th e only space which is left fo r him, then, is the present . NOTES 1. Georgia Marsh, "Christian, Carrion, Clown an d Jew: Christian Boltansk i interviewe d by Georgia Marsh, revised by Christian Boltanski," in Reconstitution (London: Whitechapel Art Gallery, 1990) , 10. 2. An exception to this general tendency is Sidra Dekoven Ezrahi's valuable book By Words Alone: The Holocaust in Literature. Without any moral pressure she discusses all kinds of Holocaust literature : literatur e tha t keep s clos e t o th e documentar y a s well a s literature tha t ha s mythical proportions. She sees what sh e calls the "surviva l novel" a s "the firs t breac h in th e tyranny o f fac t ove r imagination, employin g memory, fantasy , an d metapho r as a manne r of escape from an d denial of reality within th e private soul of the victim" (14) . For her, Holocaust literature is not submitte d exclusively t o the function o f providing historical knowledge. 3. Lanzmann's refusal of the fictiona l mod e of realism in favor of the archiva l mode of collecting memories should not be understood as an effort t o reach more "objective" knowledge of the Holocaust . A s Bartov (Murder i n ou r Midst: Th e Holocaust, Industrial Killing, and Representation) an d Hirsch an d Spitzer ("Gendere d Translations: Claud e Lanzmann' s Shoah" ) have pointed out, Lanzmann's choice of witnesses for his documentary has been highly selective. Th e constructedness o f his documentar y manifest s itself especiall y i n hi s choic e o f whom he ha s asked to testify and whom not. 4. When we compare these filmmakers with "real" historians, Lanzmann has the positio n of thos e historian s wh o hav e criticized Simo n Scham a (Spielberg ) fo r adopting the narrativis t mode too liberally and eagerly in his Death Certainties. 5. Richard Brilliant, Portraiture, 7. 6. For the use of the photographic portrait in medical and legal institutions, see Tagg (The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photography an d Histories) and Sekula ("The Body and th e Archive"). Sekula argues that the photographic portrait extends and degrades a traditional func tion o f artistic portraiture , that is , providing the ceremonia l presentation o f the bourgeois self. "Photography came to establish an d delimit th e terrain of the other, to define both the generalized look—the typology—and the contingent instance o f deviance and social pathology " (345) . 7. Gadamer Truth an d Method, 131 . 8. See Kendall L. Walton, Mimesis a s Make-Believe. 9. Brillian t see s th e portrai t a s a transcenden t entity : "Portrait s concentrat e memor y images into a single, transcendent entity,- they consolidate many possible, eve n legitimate, representations int o one, a constant imag e that capture s the consistency o f the person, portrayed over time but in one time, the present, and potentially, forever" ("Portraits: A Recurrent Genre in World Art," 13) . I contend that hi s transcenden t entity , the resul t o f the concentratio n of several images into one , is based on the sam e representational logi c as Gadamer's "increas e of being." 10. See Andrew Benjamin, "Betraying Faces: Lucian Freud's Self-Portraits," in his Art, Mimesis, and the Avant-Garde (London, 1991) . Benjamin discusses th e semantic economy of mimetic representation fro m a philosophical perspective . I follow here the main points of his argument. 11. This example is mentioned b y Svetlana Alpers in Rembrandt's Enterprise: Th e Studio and th e Market. For a study of Rembrandt's self-portraits, see H. Perry Chapman, Rembrandt's Self-Portraits. A semiotic perspective on his self-portraits, related to psychoanalysis, i s proposed by Bal in Reading "Rembrandt." 12. Boltanski, in Monumente, eine fast zufallige Ausstellung vo n Denkmdler in de r zeitgenossischen Kunst (Dusseldorf: Stadtische Kunsthalle, 1973) ; quoted in Lynn Gumpert, Christian Boltanski.
72 Ernst van Alphen 13. Georgia Marsh, "The White and th e Black, " 36 ; quoted i n Lyn n Gumpert , Christian Boltanski, 128. 14. Interview with Christian Boltanski by Demosthenes Davvetas, New Art (October 1986): 20; quoted in Lynn Gumpert, Christian Boltanski. 15. Boltanski quoted in Rene van Praag, "Century '87, een expositie van 'ideetjes'." Het Vrije Volk 2 8 (August 1987) . 16. Delphine Renard, "Interview with Christian Boltanski," 1984; quoted in Lynn Gumpert, Christian Boltanski, 176. 17. See Marianne Hirsch's analysis of the family portrait, "Masking the Subject : Practicing Theory." Sh e uses Lacania n concepts for that whic h Boltansk i calls a "cultural se t o f codes." The subjectivities of portrayed persons in family portraits are "masked" because "existing in the familial, th e subjec t is subjected to the familial gaze and constructed through a series of familial looks" (114) . 18. Delphine Renard, "Interview with Christian Boltanski"; quoted in Lynn Gumpert, Christian Boltanski, 177. 19. For a seminal discussio n o f the importan t role of the inde x in contemporar y art, se e Krauss, "Notes o n the Index: Part 1" and "Notes on the Index: Part I." 20. Delphine Renard, "Entretien avec Christian Boltanski/' in Boltanski, Musee National d'Art Moderne , 71. Englis h translation by Cynthia Campoy, quoted by Gumpert, Christian Boltanski, 32. 21. In his site-specifi c work in Berlin, Missing House (1990), Boltanski has turned himself into the archivis t of a vacant lot in a former Jewish neighborhood. The Missing House consists of nam e plates attache d to th e fir e wall s of houses adjacen t t o th e empt y lot created by th e destruction o f a house in th e Secon d World War. The plates included the names , dates of residence, and professions of the las t inhabitants o f the missin g house. For an excellent reading of this site-specific work, see Czaplicka, "History, Aesthetics, and Contemporary Commemorative Practice in Berlin." 22. Karen Holtzman points in her article "The Presence of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art" at the danger that artists may become guilty of using techniques analogous to those of the Nazis. This i s indee d a serious danger but Boltansk i has no t falle n int o this tra p because he explores the archival mode of the (Nazi ) historian in such a self-reflexive an d critical way. 23. Steinar Gjessing, "Christian Boltanski—An interview/' 42-43. 24. White, "The Politics of Historical Interpretation," in The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), 158-82 . Valesio, Novantiqua: Rhetorics as a Contemporary Theory. 25. White, "The Politic s o f Historical Interpretation, " 72 . REFERENCES Alpers, Svetlana. 1988 . Rembrandt's Enterprise: The Studio and Market. Chicago: Universit y of Chicag o Press . Bal, Mieke. 1991. Reading "Rembrandt": Beyond th e Word-Image Opposition. Ne w York: Cambridge Universit y Press . Bartov, Omer . 1996 . Murder in ou r Midst: Th e Holocaust, Industrial Killing, an d Representation. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Benjamin, Andrew . 1991 . Art, Mimesis an d th e Avant-Garde. Londo n an d Ne w York: Routledge. Boltanski, Christian . 1997 . "Mommen t a une personne inconnu: Six questions a' Chris tian Boltanski." In And Actuel Skira Annuel (Geneva, 1975) , 145-48. English transla tion of part of this text in: Lynn Gumpert, Christian Boltanski (1994), 171-72. . 1987. Classe Terminale du Lycee Chases, 1931: Castelgasse-Vienne (exhibition catalogue). Diisseldorf : Kunstverein fu r die Rheinlande und Westfalen . Brilliant, Richard. 1990 . "Portraits : A Recurrent Genr e i n World Art/' In Jean M. Borgatti and Richard Briljant, (eds.), Likeness an d Beyond: Portraits from Africa an d the World, 11-27. New York: The Center fo r African Art.
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. 1991. Portraiture. London: Reaktion Books/Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard Universit y Press. Chapman, H. Perry. 1990. Rembrandt's Self-Portraits. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Czaplicka, John. 1995. "History, Aesthetics, and Contemporary Commemorative Practice in Berlin." Ne w German Critique (Sprin g 1995): 155-87. Des Pres, Terrence. 1988 . "Holocaust Laughter. " In Berel Lang (ed.), Writing and the Holocaust, 216-33. New Yor k and London: Holmes & . Meier. Eco, Umberto. 1976 . A Theory of Semiotics. Bloomington : Indiana University Press . Ezrahi, Sidra DeKoven. 1980. By Words Alone: Th e Holocaust in Literature. Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press. . 1996. "Representing Auschwitz. " History and Memory 7 , no. 2, 121-54. Friedlander, Saul. (1982) 1993. Reflections o f Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch e) Death. Translated from the French by Thomas Weyr. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. (1960) 1975. Truth and Method. Ne w York: Continuum . Gjessing, Steiner. 1993. "Christian Boltanski—An interview, November 1993." Treskel/ Threshold 11 (January 1994): 41-50. Gumpert, Lynn. 1994. Christian Boltanski. Paris : Flammarion . Hirsch, Marianne. 1994 . "Maskin g th e Subject : Practicing Theory." In Mieke Bal and Inge E. Boer (eds.), The Point of Theory: Practicing Cultural Analysis, 109-24. Amsterdam: Amsterdam Universit y Press . Hirsch, Marianne , an d Le o Spitzer. 1994 . "Gendere d Translations : Claud e Lanzmann' s Shoah." In Miriam Cooke and Angela Wollacott (eds.), Gendering War Talk, 4-19. Princeton: Princeton Universit y Press . Holtzman, Karen . 1994. "The Presenc e of the Holocaus t i n Contemporar y Art." In Burnt Whole: Contemporary Artists Reflect o n th e Holocaust, 22-26 . Washington , D.C. : Washington Project for the Arts . Krauss, Rosalind. 1985. "Notes o n the Index: Part 1" and "Notes o n the Index: Part 2." In The Originality of the Avant-Garde and Other Modernist Myths, 196-209 and 210-20. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Marsh, Georgia. 1989. "The Whit e and the Black." Parkett 22, 36-40. Nochlin, Linda . 1974. "Some Women Realists." Arts Magazine, May, 29-32. Renard, Delphine . 1984 . "Intervie w wit h Christia n Boltanski. " I n Boltanski (exhibitio n catalogue). Paris: Musee National d'Art Moderne, Centre Georges Pompidou. Sekula, Alan. 1989. "The Body and the Archive." In Richard Bolton (ed.), The Contest of Meaning: Critical Histories of Photography, 343-88. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Tagg, John. 1988. Th e Burden o f Representation: Essays on Photography and Histories. Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press . Valesio, Paolo . 1980 . Novantiqua: Rhetorics a s a Contemporary Theory. Bloomington : Indiana University Press . Walton, Kendall L. 1993. Mimesis a s Make-Believe. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Universit y Press. White, Hayden . 1987 . The Content o f th e Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation. Baltimor e and London: Johns Hopkins University Press .
Lisa Saltzman
Lost in Translation: Clement Greenberg, Anselm Kiefer , and th e Subjec t of History Modernist paintin g an d its histor y ar e deeply marked by the wor k of Clement Greenberg. Whether through adherence or resistance to his aesthetic vision, generations o f American artists, critics, and art historians hav e contended wit h th e presence and legac y of Greenberg's prodigious body of critical writings. A s th e preeminent proponen t of formalist criticism and painterly abstraction in postwar America, Greenberg crafted and championed an aesthetic paradigm founded upon the inviolable principles of purity, autonomy, and self-reflexivity. Articulated and refined over a period of more than fifty years, Greenberg's aesthetic paradigm was as strict a s it was simple. Namely , it was the tas k of painting to emphasize th e opacity of its medium, surrender to the flatnes s o f the picture plane, and destroy realistic pictorial space . In short, Greenber g believed the essential task of painting to b e th e exploratio n o f painting a t it s essence . Concomitantly, Greenberg believed the essential task of criticism to be the reception and recognition of such aesthetic enterprises . Much as my words thus far might sugges t yet anothe r essay devoted to revisiting, i f not revising, Greenberg's critical contribution to the history of modernist painting , establishing , i f only t o critique , tha t legacy , I should assur e th e reader that it will be quite the contrary. That is, even as I construct an account of Greenberg's critical contribution s an d predilections, i t is my intention t o turn, or return, t o another aspect of his activity in the domain of culture, namely, Greenberg's work in the field of translation. It ha s no t gon e unacknowledge d tha t Greenber g began his caree r a s a translator. We know from bot h Greenberg' s own writings and those of his com mentators, critics , an d biographers that upo n graduating from college , he wen t back to his parents' home in Brooklyn and spent two years studying German, Italian, French, and Latin. We know further that although during the 1930s and 1940s, he would devote time t o his father's business, wor k in various capacities for the federal government, an d begin his career as a critic for Partisan Review, periods of unemployment would twice push Greenberg into work as a translator.l But if it is repeated in the scholarship on Greenberg that his two substantial works of Copyright © 2001 by Lisa Saltzrnan.
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translation, both don e in 193 6 for Knight Publications, included a report by th e World Committee for the Victims of German Fascism, entitled The Brown Network: The Activities of the Nazis in Foreign Countries, and a biography of the artist Goya , neither translate d text i s treated in an y detail , a s interesting a s an analysis o f either migh t prov e for understanding Greenberg' s late r position a s a critic. Nor, for that matter, is much attention given to his work in the 1940s translating Kafk a for Schocken Books. Much as I briefly raised, if only to foreclose, the question of the legacy of Greenberg's critical writings, it is not, in the end, to these acts of translation that I intend to turn, although his translation of the World Committee report and his work with Kafka's texts are certainly of parenthetical interest. Rather , it is to a later act of translation that I turn, on e that was undertaken i n 1955 , when Greenberg was well established as a leading modernist critic and editor at Commentary magazine.2 In March 1955, Greenberg translated and published a piece of poetry. That poem was Paul Celan's lyrica l evocation of the Naz i death camps, "Todesfuge" ("Death Fugue"—Greenberg's translation—or, more commonly, "Fugue of Death"). Appearing only several years after the first American translation of The Diary of Anne Frank (Doubleday, 1952) and in the same year that its stage production brought intense public attention to the diary and the historical traum a t o which i t bore witness, Greenberg's translation was part of the first wave, if belated, of the American cultural encounter with the Holocaust. 3 One might sa y that Celan' s poem began as a translation, onl y the first in its linguistic path from conceptio n t o publication. First and foremost, it might be said that for Celan, the poem was a means of translating into language, into poetic form, the reported horrors of the death camps, transforming trauma into lyric, history into poetics, atrocity into aesthetics. Dated 1945, Celan's "Death Fugue" was written perhaps as early as the autumn of 1944,4 in German, which was, quite literally, Celan's mother tongue, if not the native tongue, of his childhood in polyglot Bukovina. Notably, Celan's "Deat h Fugue" first appeared not in its original German but as a translation—"Tangoul Mortii" ("Tango of Death")—published in Romanian for a Bucharest journal in 1947. Celan's poem did not appear in its original German, in an Austrian publication, until the following year, and it was not published in Germany until 1952. It was from this doubly belated German appearance of the poem that Greenberg produced his translation i n March 1955. 5 Greenberg's translatio n appeare d in Commentary a s follows: Black milk of the daw n we drink it evenings we drink it noon and morning we drink it nights we drink and drink we dig a grave in the wind you won't lie cramped there A man lives in the house who plays with the snakes who writes who writes at dusk to Germany your golden hair Margarete he writes it and comes out of the house and the stars twinkle he whistles his hounds out
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Lisa Saltzman he whistles fort h his Jews has a grave dug in the ground he orders us strike up now for the dance Black milk o f the daw n we drink you nights we drink you morning and noon we drink you evenings we drink and drink A man lives in the house who plays with the snakes who writes who writes at dusk to Germany your golden hair Margarete your ashen hair Sulamith we dig a grave in the wind you won't li e cramped there He cries dig deeper in the ground you ones you others sing and play he reaches for the iron in his belt he swings it his eyes are blue dig your spades deeper you ones you others keep playing for the dance Black milk o f the daw n we drink you nights we drink you noon and morning we drink you evening s we drink and drink a man lives in the house your golden hair Margarete your ashen hair Sulamith h e plays with the snakes He cries play death sweeter death is a master from German y he cries fiddle lower then you'll raise in the air as smoke then you'll have a grave in the clouds you won't li e cramped there Black milk of the daw n we drink you nights we drink you noon death is a master fro m German y we drink you evenings an d mornings we drink and drink death is a master from German y his eye is blue he strikes you with leaden balls his aim is true a man lives in the house your golden hair Margarete he sicks his hounds on us he gives us the gif t o f a grave in the air he plays with the snakes death is a master from German y your golden hair Margarete your ashen hair Sulamith 6 If subsequent translations, the most recent of which is John Felstiner's,7 will correct some of the infelicitie s o f Greenberg's 195 5 effort, i t is less the precision or artfulness o f his translatio n tha n th e ver y fac t o f its existenc e tha t I want t o pursue. By 1955 , Greenber g ha d alread y writte n som e o f his mos t importan t pieces of modernist art criticism, among them "Avant-Garde and Kitsch" (1939), "Towards a Newer Laocoon " (1940) , "The Crisi s of the Easel Picture" (1948), "O n the Role of Nature in Modernist Painting" (1949), and "Abstract and Representa tional" (1954). Taken together, cumulatively, the essay s progressively and eve r more rigorously banis h the presence o f any content from painting beyond painting's
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own self-reflexive exploratio n o f its possibilities an d limits. As Greenberg wrote in "Abstract and Representational": That the Divine Comedy has an allegorical and analogical meaning as well as a literal one does not make it necessarily a more effective wor k of literature than the Iliad, in which we fail to discuss more than a literal meaning. Similarly, the explicit comment on a historical event offered by Picasso's Guernica does no t mak e it necessaril y a better work than a n utterly 'non-objective ' painting by Mondrian that says nothing explicitly about anything.8 If literar y theorist s and historians migh t conten d wit h Greenberg' s assessment s of Dante and Homer, his words make clear his aversion to what might be termed modernist histor y painting , as is emblematized fo r Greenberg i n Picasso' s 193 7 elegy to the suffering of the Spanish victims of fascism, Guernica. More than Greenberg's own criticism, it is the words of Greenberg's most ardent and articulate disciple, Michael Fried , that brin g the rigor s of the formalis t paradigm into sharpe r focus. Fried writes: Criticism concerned with aspects of the situation in which it was made other than it s forma l contex t ca n ad d significantl y t o ou r understandin g of th e artist's achievement . But , criticis m o f thi s kin d ha s show n itsel f largel y unable to make convincing discriminations of value among the works of a particular artist, and in this century it often happens that those paintings that are most full o f explicit human content can be faulted o n formal grounds — Picasso's Guernica is perhaps the most conspicuous example—in comparison with others virtually devoid of such content.9 With even greater force, and brevity, Fried sums up the formalist paradigm as follows: "It is one of the prime , i f tacit, convictions o f modernist painting— a conviction mature d out of painful experience, individual and collective—that only an art o f constant forma l self-criticism ca n bear or embody or communicate mor e than trivia l meaning." 10 That moder n art might recapitulat e the grand traditio n of history painting, tha t modern painting might be the site for historical subjects , that Picasso' s Guernica might indee d be an important paintin g precisel y fo r the horrors of the political situatio n i t sought to represent, was a possibility denied to it by the rigors and refusals of the modernist paradigm . Recent critic s and art historians motivated, if not at times frustrated, b y the limits and lacunae of Greenberg's modernist paradigm , have labored to discover and define a Greenberg who wavered from it s logic . A generation o f Marxist ar t historians sough t and found, if not a Marxist Greenberg or a Trotskyite Greenberg , at leas t a Greenberg, a n early Greenberg , wh o di d not utterl y foreclos e histor y from hi s critical vision, as much a s the painting he came to champion may have insistently done so.11 Other art historians have pursued the issue of identity, seekin g to uncover the subjectivit y o f the presumptive universa l Kantia n spectator, thei r ques t particularized i n the issue of Greenberg's "Jewishness."12 It is the case that by 1955,
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Greenberg had written what Sidney Tillim would term a number of pieces of "Jewish interest/'13 addressing in relation to literature issues that he would withhold from his critical contemplatio n o f art. Despite his reticence about and resistance to subject matter , to content, to the subject , i n art, it is interesting to note that Greenberg began 1955 with the publication of his "Autobiographical Statement." And in April 1955, just one month after the publication of his translation of Celan's poem , Greenberg published on e of his most self-revelator y pieces, "Th e Jewishness of Franz Kafka: Som e Sources of His Particular Vision." 14 As Marxism ha s waned and identity politics have risen within art historical scholarship, th e particular intersection o f history and Jewishness, as it migh t be sai d t o converg e in th e momen t o f Greenberg's translatio n o f Paul Celan' s poetic evocation of the deat h camps, has not bee n explored. I should note that I am interested in this critical moment not only for the publication of Celan's poem, although it i s the poem and its translation that I will discuss . I am interested in this moment more generally because it marks a turning point in the history of modernist painting . Looking back to the future from the mid-1950s, it is certainly the case that abstract painting continued t o flourish for at least a decade, whether in the continued practic e o f abstract expressionist s o r i n th e ensuin g work o f color-fiel d painters and minimalists. Nevertheless , it is also the case that by the mid-1950s, the presumptively unified and purified painterly field of pictorial modernism was shattered, literally and figuratively, not only by the tragedy of Pollock's premature death, but b y the adven t of Pop, augured in the mid-1950 s assemblages of Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns. That is, history, subject matter, content, began to intrude, if only as fragments, upon the previously pristine surfaces of Greenberg's cherished modernist painting. 15 That Greenber g translated Celan's "Deat h Fugue " for an American audience does not mean that in 1955 he broke with his prior critical criteria and advocated tha t paintin g abando n the projec t o f abstraction. Nor doe s it mea n tha t Greenberg advocate d that paintin g pursue th e subjec t matte r o f Celan's poem, reductively, the Holocaust, German and Jewish identity, and the death camps. If anything, his continued critical preoccupation with preserving the purity of abstraction suggests tha t paintin g continue d t o function for Greenberg as an aestheti c haven, what might even be termed an aesthetic Utopia, where painting would be free o f the politica l an d aesthetic contaminatio n h e ascribed to th e ar t o f totalitarian regimes. His translation suggests that despite the presumptive importance that he ascribed to Celan's poem and to its subject for an American audience, he persisted, some might say stubbornly, in his conviction that painting was not the site for historical subjects. In other words, his translation suggests that despite his apparent belief that poetry (as evidenced in his own act of selection and translation) could indee d be a site for historical subjects , a site where history, o r historica l experience, might be translated into poetic form, for Greenberg, modernist painting was to remain steadfastly apart from world historical events .
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Of course , I am no t suggestin g that Greenberg believed history, particularly the histor y of the Holocaust , could be "translated" int o poetry, made full y immanent, known, in poetic form. We do not know his critical response to Celan's work, eve n if his ac t o f translation suggest s his interes t an d support . Althoug h Greenberg did write on other German-language authors (among them Kafk a an d Brecht), he di d not publis h an y critical writings on Celan. But, as I have already said, h e di d choose t o translat e an d publish Celan' s poem. An d in s o doing, h e revealed a certain conviction, abou t Celan, about poetry, about "Death Fugue/' and about translation. To th e latter , I will ad d the following . Throug h hi s ac t o f translation , Greenberg suggested, if not enacted, a belief in the power of language and the possibility o f understanding. H e displayed, as perhaps many a writer o f his da y still would, a conviction i n th e semanti c transparenc y of words, a transparency that would allow even the words of Celan's poem to be transposed not only into another language, but int o another culture , another time , another place . His translation enacted an d literalized th e ver y concept o f translation, namely , tha t whic h i s carried from one place to another, transported across borders at once temporal and geographic.16 That is, it could be said that th e Greenberg who had once labored in the Appraiser's Division o f the Customs Service in the Port of New York transported and imported for an American audience a work that is considered perhaps the most importan t postwar poetic evocation o f the Holocaust . For som e critics , amon g the m Walte r Benjamin , th e ac t o f translatio n involves a certain empowermen t o f language, albei t necessaril y belated. 17 For others, amon g them Jacques Derrida, the act of translation reveal s quite the contrary. For even if translatable, a text remains always, at th e sam e time, untranslatable, and in that inevitable impossibility of translation, reveals the very incommensurability, the very inadequacy, the very foreignness, the very condition of language itself. 18 In the belatedness o f Celan's poem, its distanc e from th e experience it seeks to represent, and in the further belatedness of its publications and translations, w e ge t a sense o f what Benjami n woul d cal l th e "afterlife " o f th e translation,19 its necessary distance from, despite its close connection to, the original. But even more, in the belatedness of Celan's poem, whether in its "original" or translated form, we get a sense of the gap it can never close, the distance it can never recover, the experience it can never fully represen t a s much a s it strives t o provide access and bear witness. An d that belatedness, that temporal , even conceptual distance, is only made all the more acute when we contemplate it s subject, th e Holocaust , the traum a o f Auschwitz, the historica l even t whic h ma y be said to deny, if not entirel y defy , representation. 20 Celan's poeti c oeuvre seemed to embody and articulate i n its language a deep awareness of the limitation s (and yet necessity) of language and representation. A s Theodo r Adorn o write s o f Celan' s work , "Celan' s poem s articulat e unspeakable horror by being silent."21 Against Celan, if not Adorno, Greenberg's act o f translation seeme d to grant t o his ow n words, if not t o Celan's , a certain
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Benjaminian powe r and "afterlife/ ' a voice to counterman d the silence . Celan' s poem, introduced to an American reading public in 1955 by Greenberg and immediately followed in Commentary by a piece of expository prose about Celan and his wartime experiences , was framed a s able to express, represent, put int o lan guage, something o f the historical trauma i t took as its subject. More simply, on the pages of Commentary magazine in 1955, poetry was allowed to portray what was forbidden, i n Greenberg's formalist paradigm, to painting. What, then, would Greenberg have made of a series of paintings, execute d in th e early 1980s, that might be said to so challenge his critical convictions ? Moreover, what woul d Greenber g hav e mad e o f a serie s o f paintings tha t i n som e way s repeated his act of initial translation, introducing, translating, Celan's "Todesfuge" once again for an American audience? The painter is the postwar Germa n artis t Anselm Kiefer, known for his aesthetic explorations of German national identity. The particular paintings i n question bea r the names, an d the titles , Margarethe and Sulamith (figures 1 and 2). As their title s an d basic iconography suggest, th e paintings take as their source, if not their subject, the figures of German and Jewish womanhood who structure an d haunt Celan's poem. They might well be considered a painterly translation , transcription , transposition, transformation , transcen dence, i f not transgression , o f Celan's poem. And, as such, the y introduc e ye t another belated translation, albeit this time into the realm of visual culture, of Celan's "Todesfuge." And with that, they (re)introduce the historical trauma of the Holocaus t t o an American audience, thi s tim e throug h the foru m o f a midcareer retrospective tha t travele d to Chicago, Philadelphia, Ne w York , and Los Angeles in the late 1980s . Were Kiefer's paintings to be viewed strictly through the lens of Greenberg's criticism, they would be considered an outrage, departing wildly from th e tenet s and strictures of his formalist paradigm. For as much as their treatment of surface may be indebted t o earlie r moments i n a history o f modernism, whether t o th e painting of Pollock or to the collage of Picasso, their composition insistently challenges, if not simpl y ignores , the essentia l purity , autonomy, an d self-reflexivit y demanded by Greenberg of the modernist pictur e plane. Word and image compete on the densel y layere d canvases. Surface s are at once obdurate an d illusionistic, materials a t once literal an d insistently referential. If figuration itself is put int o a certain visual and thematic tension, i f not suspension, i n many of Kiefer's majo r paintings, ther e i s n o doub t tha t subjec t matte r intrude s heavil y upo n thei r surfaces. Whether drawing, in this case, upon Celan's leitmotif, or elsewhere, for example, upon Wagnerian libretti or kabbalistic tales, Kiefer's work resolutely, if not at times repetitively, put s forth subject matter . And yet, the questio n migh t b e asked, What is the "subject " o f Kiefer's painting, o f these Kiefe r paintings? If we focus our attention o n the mor e conventionally "representational" o f the pair, Sulamith, we might well ask just what might
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Figure 1 , Anselm Kie/er, Margarethe, 1981. Oil and straw on canvas; 280 x 380 cm . Courtesy Anselm Kiefer an d Maria n Goodman Gallery, New York.
be the subject of this architecturally exactin g rendering. Many critics have likened Kiefer's monumentalized representation and revision of Wilhelm Kreis's Memorial to German Soldiers to a crematorium, it s darkened brick interior and recessiona l movement to a row of painterly flames (some would say suggestive of a menorah), a presumptive evocation through transformation of the Nazi apparatus of destruction. Once an architectural space commemorative of German war heroism, th e extinguished latera l lantern s an d the inscriptio n o f a name, Sulamith, allow th e space to become a different kin d of memorial space. It would seem that muc h of the transformatio n of the spac e rests on th e power of the name, a biblical name, a Jewish name, a name that is born in the "Song of Songs" and comes to rest in the "Fugue of Death." With the conferral of a name, Sulamith, and with the evocation of both the Hebrew Bible and Celan's poem, it is presumed that the darkene d chamber is transformed, transfigured, translated , into a site of Jewish memory, a Holocaust memorial in painterly form . And yet, I ask again, What does it represent? What is its subject ? O n th e surface (an d ultimately, o r literally, tha t i s all that w e have when w e look a t a painting), it is the representation of the interior of a piece of Nazi architecture. So
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Figure 2. Anselm Kiefer, Sulamith , 1983 . Oil, acrylic, emulsion, shellac, and straw on canvas, with woodcut; 290 x 370 cm. Courtes y Anselm Kiefer an d Maria n Goodman Gallery, New York.
we might sa y that there is a certain historical referent, a certain historical specificity t o the painting. Lik e many of Kiefer's paintings tha t precede d it an d some that will follow, it takes us into the history of the Third Reich by way of its most concrete aesthetic trace, architecture, eve n if that architectur e is mediated, and at times also singularly preserved by the form of the photograph. Given the frequency wit h which Kiefe r made use of Nazi architecture in his wor k in th e 1970 s and 1980s , it i s not th e architectura l edifice, a s visually arresting as that form may be, that marks this work as a memorial to, or as a representation of, the Holocaust. It is, as I have already said, the inscription of a name upon that form. It is the inscription of the name Sulamith, th e dark-haired woman of th e Son g of Songs, who i s reincarnated, if only as an image of Jewish death, i n Celan's haunting poem. She, in name alone, becomes a figure, a cipher for Kiefer and his asymptotic imaging of the Holocaust . Ironically, but perhaps significantly, Celan's poetic image—your ashen hair Sulamith—turns, when translated into painterly form, not into an image, but into a word, a word alone, Sulamith. 22 Inscribed in a small, constraine d han d in th e uppermost left corner of the painting, the white letters occupy the most marginal and unobtrusive position within th e otherwise massive painting. Where Celan's poem evokes, through its use of the first-person pronoun "we" and an insistent pres-
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ent tense , the fragil e an d futile activities of human life, o f Jewish life, lived, if only to be extinguished, i n a place of death, Kiefer's painting shows us only stasis, th e concrete, hulkin g form o f an architectura l monument t o death . Kiefer take s us into, force s u s into , give n hi s insisten t us e o f perspectival visua l cues , a concretized spac e of Nazism, o f the past , of history, onl y t o withhol d fro m u s it s presumptive subject , Sulamith an d the Jewish victims o f Nazism. We might say that absent, lost, is Celan's grounding figure of Jewish womanhood, of Jewish victimhood. We might say that Kiefer takes us into the very site of history, the concrete trace and vestige of the Nazi regime (here architecture but elsewhere, landscape, the forest), only to withhold from us the human subject, the victims of that very regime. We then might ask whether that withholding of the subject, o f the subjec t of history, registers as a failing o f the painting , a failing i n Kiefer's act , or acts, of translation, transformation , and interpretation. 23 For if in Kiefer's translation o f poetry into painting, history into aesthetic form, the image is missing, i f we see , no t a figurativ e representatio n o f Sulamith an d he r ashe n hair, but the inscription of her name alone, does this mean that she, and with her, history, i s missing a s well, tha t al l are, indeed, lost, irrevocably , in translation? What are we to do with the seemingly absent subject of Kiefer's painting, the subject at once named and negated in the aching void that is the architectural mausoleum, that is, in the end, the crypt ? Might Kiefer's painting function as a two-dimensional analogue to the contemporaneous "countermonuments " posite d by James Young, commemorativ e structures in 1980s Germany that eschew figuration and are characterized more by absence then presence?24 For these are structures—sculptures and installations— that mark and configure absence, gesturing, in their refusa l t o figure, both to the enormity of the historica l loss and the impossibilit y o f ever finding forms appro priate to its representation. Migh t Kiefer's painting echo , if only mutely and statically, the staging and aesthetic ethics of Claude Lanzmann's Shoah! For Kiefer's painting, like Lanzmann's film, takes us to a historical site of Nazism, but refuse s to represent the historical human subject . The absent subject of the German monuments of the 1980 s may be closer in gesture to Kiefer's painting. And certainly, they share a nationality. In the case of Lanzmann , although he refuse s th e us e o f either archival footage o r historica l re-creation, choosing instea d to narrate the film from th e present, the historica l subject returns through interviews, on site and off, with survivors and former perpetrators.25 As such, Lanzmann' s film fills the void in ways that neithe r Young' s "countermonuments" no r Kiefer' s empt y edifices ca n do . For narrative completion, fo r human presence , bot h Young' s monuments an d Kiefer' s painting s ar e reliant on the presence, and with that, on the knowledge, of the spectator. 26 I could continue t o explore the relative merits and weaknesses o f Kiefer's aesthetic endeavor. But rather than so doing, I should admit that, thus far, I have withheld on e crucial detail in my description o f Kiefer's painting. That is, even as the paintin g establishes a n illusionistic recessio n int o th e depth s of Kreis's
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architectural form and stops at a small row of flames, the painting also establishes a countering force. Namely, the movement toward the murky vanishing point of the empty chamber is destabilized, blocked, by the intense materiality of the surface of the painting, particularly the upper register, which is embedded, encrusted, covered, with ashen residue. That is, just as the spectatorial eye recedes into the depths of the chamber, it is pulled back to the texture of the surface. If that surface matter may be linked back to the recessional depths of the painting, that is, if it may be read as the very ash produced by the represented fire, it may also be linked, quit e powerfully, to Celan's poem. For it is with the application of ash to th e surfac e o f the canva s that Kiefe r gestures , most literally , t o Celan's poem, Kiefer's material gesture, his metonymic gesture, his iconographic gesture, concretizing Celan's words—your ashen hair, Sulamith... you'll rise then as smoke to the sky . Made present a s absence, embodied in the very metaphori c construction employed by Celan, Sulamith occupies Kiefer' s cavernous chamber, if onl y as ashen trace . The ash that recur s in Celan's poetic oeuvre becomes—is translated into—an ashen residue that covers the surfac e of this and many a subsequent Kiefer painting. And yet, what is ash? As Derrida writes, as he writes on Celan: "There is ash, perhaps, but a n ash is not. This remainder seems to remain of what was, and was presently,- it seems to nourish itself or quench its thirst at the spring of being-present, but it emerges from being , it uses up in advance the being from which i t seems to draw." 27 Ash (elsewhere translated as cinder) is absence made present, the trace, the remain without a remainder. I t draws its ver y being, as absence, fro m destruction . I t is that which is not. It is, were Derrida to write, when he writes on Celan, of "Todesfuge," which, sadly , he doe s not, Sulamit h an d the absenc e of Sulamith, he r biblical creation and her historical destruction, as one. Ash becomes, on Derrida's account, an all-consuming specter. In Kiefer's work, Sulamith, as ashen hair, as ashen trace, as a specter haunting not jus t representation, but, in this instance , the pictorial field, gives wa y to Lilith , th e ghostl y demoness , th e biblica l specter , wh o wil l come to displace Sulamith in Kiefer's subsequent ashen canvases that take as their source, not Celan, but kabbalistic literature . But i f Sulamit h materialize s mor e full y i n Kiefer' s subsequen t Lilith pictures, wher e as h an d inscriptio n ar e joine d by tresse s o f dark hair, here , i n Sulamith, her presence is marked, identified, with the inscription of the name. It is the name that gives the ash its absent presence. It is the name that marks the painting as a transformed spac e of commemoration, of Jewish memory. As Derrida goes on to write, in a passage that might be seen at moments as an uncanny description of the very picture in question , The loss cannot be worse than when it extends to the death of the name, to the extinctio n of the prope r name which a date, bereaved commemoration, remains. It crosses that boundary where mourning itself is denied us, the interiorization of the other in memory (Erinnerung), the preserving of the other in a sepulcher or epitaph. For in securin g a sepulcher, the dat e would stil l
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make room for mourning, for what one calls its work . Whereas Celan also names the incinerated beyond of the date, words lost without sepulcher, "wie unbestattete Worte." But once dead, and without sepulcher, these words of mourning which are themselves incinerated may yet return. They come back then as phantoms.28 In Kiefer's Sulamith, the name, translate d fro m th e biblical t o the poetic t o the painterly domain, becomes an epitaph, the painting a sepulcher, but neithe r epitaph nor sepulcher is fixed in time by a date. Nazi Germany, the postwar present, the future as architectural ruin , th e painting hovers in an atemporal netherworl d that is neither fully past nor fully present, much like Sulamith, dispersed as ashen residue. Unmoored, and, as such, unmourned, Sulamith , th e absen t Jewish subject o f Kiefer's dark an d funerea l painting , haunt s th e scen e o f representation . Kiefer's architectural rendering, his painterly crypt, his visual sepulcher, becomes a space for preserving, if only as ashen trace, as that which is never fully there, as that which is never fully visualized, that which cannot, or will not, be mourned.29 It becomes what Derrida, or, more typically, psychoanalyst s woul d refer to as the space of repression, of internalization, but her e externalized, displaced, into th e form of a painting.30 It becomes the space where the absent Jewish subject, the Holocaust, i s gestured toward but neve r full y represented , and in turn , neve r full y mourned. The painting as sepulcher functions, then , a s a space not o f mourning and memorialization, but of melancholia and forgetting, where the remains of history give way to ashen remainder . If I might return, as a gesture toward a conclusion, not just to Kiefer, but t o Greenberg the criti c and the matter of his act of translation, I would offer th e followin g thought. I f history an d its subject s remain lost , los t i n translation , los t i n th e matter of language and painting, lost in representation, perhap s Kiefer's painting upholds Greenberg's aesthetic ethics far more closely than I initially allowed. For Kiefer doe s resist conventiona l forms o f figuration, withholding th e huma n figure, the subject, even as he gives us its staging grounds, the scene, if not the seen, of representation. He refuses t o translate Celan's poetry into painting, even as he takes "Death Fugue " as his subject. He avoids representation even as he is trapped in its prison house. An d it is thus that in figuring the very impossibility o f figuration, in translating the very impossibility o f translation, i n representing the very impossibility o f representation, Kiefer's Sulamith refuse s th e historica l subject, turning content int o pure abstraction, even as the image remains grounded in the contested field of painterly practice. NOTES
1. See, for example, Greenberg's "Autobiographical Statement" (1955) in Clement Greenberg: The Collected Essays an d Criticism, vol. 3: Affirmations an d Refusals: 1950-56, ed. John
86 Lisa Saltzman O'Brian (Chicago and London: University o f Chicago Press, 1993), 194-96. See also, to name but two possible sources, Susan Noyes Platt, "Clement Greenber g in the 1930s : A New Perspective on His Criticism," Ait Criticism 5 (1989): 47-64 and Bradford Collins, "L e pessimism politique et 'la haine de soi juive': Les origines de 1'esthetique purite de Greenberg/' Les Cahiers du Musee National d'Art Moderne 45-46 (1993): 61-84. 2. It is also of parenthetical interest that Greenberg had begun at Commentary in 1944, when Commentary was still known as the Contemporary Jewish Record, as published by the American Jewish Committee . 3. For the most recent, if polemical and cynical, discussion of the American reception of the The Diary of Anne Frank, with particular attention given to the stage play, see Peter Novick, The Holocaust in American Life (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1999) . 4. John Felstiner make s this claim for the earlier dat e of the poem in his Paul Celan: Poet, Survivor, Jew (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1995), 27-28. 5. In the explanator y tex t tha t follow s Greenberg' s translation , i t i s noted tha t "Deat h Fugue" is taken from the "lone book of poems Mr. Celan has published so far, Poppies an d Memory (Mohn un d Gedachtnis), which was brought out in 1952 by the Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt in Stuttgart." Commentary (Marc h 1955): 243. The editors are mistaken. It is the case that a prior collection, Dei Sand aus den Urnen (Vienna: A. Sexl, 1948) , had already been published, but i n Austria, not in Germany. It is also the case that Greenberg's was not necessarily th e first Englishlanguage translatio n a s in that sam e spring , a British versio n appeared , translate d b y Michael Bullock, Jewish Quarterly 2, no. 4 (Spring 1955): 6. 6. Paul Celan, "Death Fugue," tr. Clement Greenberg, Commentary (March 1955): 242-43. 7. Felstiner, 31-32. 8. O'Brian, "Abstrac t and Representational" (1954) , Clement Greenberg, 187 . 9. Michael Fried, Three American Painters: Kenneth Noland, Jules Olitski, Frank Stella (Cambridge, Mass.: Fogg Museum of Art, 1965) , 5. 10. Ibid., 25. 11. See, for example, the essays anthologized in Pollock and After: Th e Critical Debate, ed. Francis Frascina (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), particularly thos e of T. J. Clark and Thoma s Crow. 12. In addition to the essay s already cited by Collins an d Noyes Platt, see as well Thierry de Duve, Clement Greenberg between th e Lines (Paris : Dis Voir , 1996) , 39-46; Louis Kaplan, "Refraining th e Self-Criticism : Clemen t Greenberg' s 'Modernis t Painting ' i n Ligh t o f Jewish Identity," i n Jewish Identity i n Modern Art History, ed. Catherine M . Soussloff (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1999) , 180-99; and Sidney Tillim, "Criticism an d Culture, o r Greenberg's Doubt," Art in America 75 (May 1987): 122-28. 13. Tillim concentrate s on six pieces from the 1940 s but one might look as well to his work on Kafka and Jewishness tha t appeared in 1955, the same year as his translation o f Celan's poem. 14. O'Brian, Clement Greenberg, vol. 3, 194-96 and 202-09. A significantly revised editio n of the Kafk a essay appears as "Kafka's Jewishness," in an anthology Greenberg edited of his ow n work, Art an d Culture: Critical Essays (Boston : Beacon Press, 1961) , 266-73 . I n it, Greenberg writes, "Bu t might no t al l art, 'prosaic' as well as 'poetic/ begin to appear falsifying t o the Jew who looked closely enough ? And when did a Jew ever come to terms with art without falsifyin g himself somehow? Does not art always make one forget what is literally happening to oneself as a certain person in a certain world? And might not th e investigation of what is literally happening to oneself remain the most human, therefore, the most serious and the most amusing, of all possible activities ? Kafka' s Jewis h self asks this question, an d in asking it, tests the limits of art" (273) . 15. Although Pollock' s fata l ca r crash would not occu r until 1956 , his painting, an d wit h that, the triumph of abstract expressionism and high modernism, had already succumbed to his heavy drinking and depression. As early as 1952, Greenberg was reported to have said that Pollock had "lost his stuff." Rosalin d Krauss cites th e comment, i n her The Optical Unconscious (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993) , 251, 322. Her source for the comment is the biography by Steven Naifeh and Gregory White Smith, Jackson Pollock: An American Saga (New York: Clarkson Potter, 1989) , 698, 731, 895. 16. For my understanding of the practice and theory of translation, I am indebted to several sources, among them Andrew Benjamin, Translation and the Nature of Philosophy: A New The-
87 Lost i n Translation ory of Words (London and New York: Routledge, 1989); Walter Benjamin, "The Task of the Translator/' in Illuminations, tr. Harry Zorn (New York: Schocken Books/ 1969), 69-82; J. Hillis Miller, "Borde r Crossings, Translating Theory: Ruth," in Th e Translatability o f Cultures: Figurations of the Space Between, ed. Sanford Budick and Wolfgang Iser (Stanford, Stanford Universit y Press, 1996) , 207-23; and Azade Seyhan, "Visual Citations : Walte r Benjamin's Dialectic of Text and Image," in Languages of Visuality: Crossing between Science, Art, Politics, and Literature, ed. Beate Allert (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1996) , 229-41. 17. Walter Benjamin, "Th e Tas k of the Translator," 69-82. 18. See Andrew Benjamin, Translation, 9-38, 150-80 , which deals, in large measure, wit h Jacques Derrida's Ulysse Gramophone (Paris: Galilee, 1987). See as well Jacques Derrida, "Shibboleth for Paul Celan" (1986), in Word Traces: Readings of Paul Celan, ed. Aris Fioretos (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Universit y Press , 1994) , 3-72 . 19. Walter Benjamin, "Th e Tas k of the Translator, " 71. 20. In his essay "Symptoms o f Discursivity: Experience , Memory, and Trauma," in Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present, ed. Mieke Bal, Jonathan Crewe, and Leo Spitzer (Dartmouth and London: University Press of New England, 1999), 24-38, Ernst van Alphen makes th e more radical claim that there are those things (namely, traumatic experiences) that simply cannot be symbolized, for which there is no language, and as such, they are not "experienced. " Against such work, although never explicitly invoking the wor k of van Alphen, would be the contem poraneous work of Dominick LaCapra , who in his "Trauma , Absence , Loss," Critical Inquiry 25 (Summer 1999) : 696-727, seeks to differentiate betwee n absence and loss, and with that, structural and historical trauma, precisely to prevent what he terms the "quasi-transcendental , endless grieving," th e "indiscriminat e generalization, " through which historica l trauma loses it s specificity and , on his account, the distinctio n amon g victims, perpetrators, and bystanders is effaced. 21. Theodor Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, tr . C . Lehnhardt (London and Boston: Routledge &. Kegan Paul, 1984) , 444. 22. There do (or did) exist other versions of Sulamith in Kiefer's private collection in which the female figure is given form. Mark Rosenthal reproduces one such version as small black-andwhite marginal illustration in his catalogue Anselm Kiefer (Chicago and Philadelphia: Art Institute of Chicago and Philadelphia Museu m o f Art, 1987) , 88. That same picture, accompanie d by two others, appears in an issue of Kunstforum International 8 7 (January-February 1987): 185, entitled "Das Brennende Bild: Eine Kunstgeschichte des Feuers in der neueren Zeit." Each painting is inscribed with the title "Dein aschenes Haar Sulamith/' in the scrawling script, as opposed to the constraine d print, mor e typical of Kiefer's inscriptions. Tw o depict a nude woman, with a massive head of black hair, seated before an d dwarfin g a cityscape of densely skyscrapers. The third, echoing Margarethe, depicts a thick tress of darkened hair fixed abov e a steeply pitched landscape. 23. Elsewhere, I have suggested that Kiefer' s refusa l t o figure the (Jewish ) subjec t may be contextualized within a certain ethics of representation, beginning with the biblical prohibition on figuration and continuing, although not ending, with Adorno's (later qualified) aesthetic prohibition o n poetry afte r Auschwitz . Se e my "'Thou shal t not mak e graven images': Adorno , Kiefer, and the Ethics of Representation," in Anselm Kiefer an d Art after Auschwitz (New York and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) , 17-47 . 24. Jarnes Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993) . 25. See Miriam Bratu Hansen, "Schindler's List Is Not Shoah: The Second Commandment, Popular Modernism, and Public Memory," Critical Inquiry 2 2 (Winter 1996) : 292-312, also in this volume. 26. For a discussion o f the critica l and contemplativ e role of the spectato r in viewing and learning fro m Holocaus t monuments i n Berlin , see John Czaplicka , "History, Aesthetic s an d Contemporary Commemorative Practic e in Berlin," New German Critique 65 (Spring-Summer 1995): 155-87. 27. Derrida, "Shibboleth fo r Paul Celan," Word Traces, 47. In his subsequent work, Cinders, tr. Ned Lukacher (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1987) , 39, Derrida write s the following: " If a place is itself surrounded by fire (falls finally to ash, into a cinder tomb), it no longer is. Cinder remains, cinder there is, which we can translate: the cinde r is not, is not
88 Lisa Saltzman what is. It remains from wha t is not, in order to recall the delicate, charred bottom of itself only non-being or non-presence. Being without presenc e has not bee n and will no longer be there where there is cinder and where this other memory would speak. There, where cinder means the difference betwee n wha t remains and what is, will she ever reach it, there?" 28. Derrida, "Shibbolet h for Paul Celan," 57. 29. In my chapter "Our Fathers, Ourselves: Icarus, Kiefer, an d the Burden s of History," i n Anselm Kiefer an d Ar t after Auschwitz, 48-74 , I have made a related argumen t i n regar d to Kiefer's self-representations, what might be termed his symbolic self-portraits, as seen in his To the Unknown Painter series. There I am concerned primarily with an act of mourning for the Jewish other that gets displaced onto the self , a displacement tha t results, fo r the postwar German subject , in the assumptio n o f a deeply melancholic subjec t position o f victim. 30. See Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, "A Poetics of Psychoanalysis: The Los t Object— Me/" Substance 43 (1984): 3-18 .
Television and Video
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Jeffrey Shandler
The Man in the Glass Box: Watching the Eichmann Trial on American Television In the years since the watershed miniseries Holocaust: The Story of the Family Weiss wa s firs t broadcas t in 1978 , th e Naz i persecution of European Jewry ha s appeared hundreds of times on American television. The subject of numerous dramas and documentaries/ the Holocaust i s also frequently invoked in news reports, in public affair s programming , and even in the occasiona l situatio n comedy and advertisement. The small screen now plays a central role in maintaining the powerful relationshi p tha t million s of Americans hav e with the Holocaust, enablin g them t o feel tha t the y understand this forbiddin g event , remote from thei r own experience, an d that it informs their moral consciousness. 1 While the miniseries is the most prominent single event in the annals of American Holocaus t television , broadcast s tha t dealt with wha t became know n as the Holocaust were aired beginning in the late 1940s. And there is a major landmark i n this chronology o f programs that predate s the miniserie s b y seventee n years: telecasts of and about the war crimes trial of Adolf Eichmann in 1961 . This marked the first time that the Holocaust receive d prominent, extende d televisio n coverage in the form of news reports, public affairs programs, documentaries, and dramas aired over a period of months. The Eichmann case also provided the firs t opportunity for television t o deal with th e Holocaust in the contex t o f reporting a major news story. Indeed, many Americans may have first heard the word "Holocaust" used to describe this chapter of history during telecasts of the trial. 2 In th e histor y o f Holocaust memor y cultur e th e Eichman n tria l is , of course, widely recognized as a threshold event. It was the first major public effor t to conceptualize the Holocaust as a discrete chapter of history, distinguished fro m larger narratives of World War II or the Third Reich, and defined as a phenomenon centered around Nazi efforts to exterminate Jews. Telecasts of the Eichmann trial, seen by millions o f people in dozens of countries, ar e also noteworthy a s a landmark in the annals of television broadcasting, for they mark the first international telecasts o f the proceeding s of a major trial . In addition, the Eichmann case provided the occasion for what is, perhaps, From While America Watches: Televising the Holocaust by Jeffrey Shandler . Copyright © 1999 by Jeffrey Shandler . Used by permission o f Oxford University Press , Inc.
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the firs t extended public contention over the significanc e of the Holocaust. The Israeli government conceived the trial as an occasion for presenting the Holocaust as a distinctly Jewish phenomenon an d as a public event that would validate the new state's political agenda. However, American conceptualizations of the Eich mann case usually approached the Holocaust as a morally charged, paradigmatic event with universal significance. Watching the trial on television played a strategic, although largely unacknowledged, role in this contention. I n the United States, where the Eichmann trial had its largest television audience, the medium not only informed viewers but also shaped public discussion of what it meant to be a "witness" to this historic event.
Debating the Eichmann Case Among the mos t sought-afte r Nazi war criminals i n th e year s following World War II was Adolf Otto Eichmann. This former SS officer had been the highest ranking figure in the Naz i hierarchy specificall y charged with facilitatin g the extermination o f European Jewry. As soon as the Israeli government announced in May 1960 that , afte r year s o f searchin g fo r him , the y ha d capture d Eichman n an d planned to put him on trial, the case became the subject of multiple controversies. Among the issues debated—the legality of Eichmann's abduction from Argentina, where he had been hiding; th e legitimacy o f trying him in a new nation, by laws enacted ex post facto, before a Jewish court—was the question of the planned war crimes trial as a performance. To some extent, this issue is always at least implicit in public trials, and it is often seen as problematic. As Robert Hariman notes, the perception of a trial as a "performance of the laws" in the "national theater" creates a dilemma: "the more a trial appears to be a scene or product of ... rhetori cal artistry, the less legitimate it appears.... It seems that good law and powerful rhetoric d o not mix." 3 Yet both supporters and detractors of the Eichman n tria l invoked the notion of the trial as performance when discussing its legitimacy and effectiveness. Some of the Eichman n trial's critics warned of an event whose performative nature would preclude its claim to serving justice. Thus, one American newspaper expected the trial to be "a new wailing wall—a show and spectacle carefully stage-managed to wring the maximum sympathy out of a dramatic exposure of Nazi genocide." 4 Israel i prime minister Davi d Ben-Gurion responded to suc h charges by validating, rather than denying, the notion of the Eichmann trial as a performance, arguin g that the proceedings would effectively an d appropriately fulfill a larger agenda: "We want to establish before the . . . world how million s of people, because they happened to be Jews,... were murdered by the Nazis.... [The world] should know that anti-Semitism is dangerous and... should be ashamed of it." Ben-Gurion also hoped that the trial would help "ferret out other Nazis" and
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that it would educate "the generation of Israelis who have grown up since the holocaust." Indeed, he claimed not to care what verdict was delivered against Eichmann: "Only th e fact tha t he will be judged in a Jewish state is important."5 Chief prosecuto r Gideon Hausner was also sensitive t o the trial's performative aspects. Rather than present his case primarily through documentary evidence, as was done in the Nuremberg war crimes trials, Hausner wished to ''reach the heart s of men" by presenting " a living record" of the Holocaust . I n selecting which of many possible witnesses woul d testify at the trial, Hausner sought effec tive performers and made dramaturgical choice s as to how particular individuals might present simila r evidence . For example, h e chose to have a plumber testif y "in his own simple words" about Nazi persecutions in Bialystok, instead of a wellknown writer who had been a leader of the underground. 6
Televising the Eichmann Trial The specia l concer n fo r th e Eichman n trial' s effectivenes s a s a performanc e extended to preparation s for its worldwid e audience . The Israel i governmen t planned the trial with a large press presence, including television, in mind. Thei r decision to televise the courtroo m proceedings, an unprecedented move, proved controversial. When Eichmann's defense counsel argued against allowing cameras in the courtroom, th e prosecution made its case by citing precedents tha t championed publicity a s a guarantor of a fair trial. 7 Israeli judges who ruled in favor of the prosecution cite d British law on the subject of witnesses an d publicity: "Wher e there is no publicity ther e is no justice. It keeps the judg e himself, while trying , under trial. The security of securities is publicity."8 Beit Ha'arn, a new public hall in western Jerusalem, where the tria l was conducted, was extensively remodeled to accommodate the event . Renovations included providing hundreds of journalists with workspace and telecommunica tions services. O f the 75 6 seats in the spectators ' sectio n o f the auditorium , 47 4 were reserved for members of the press (whereas, initially, onl y about twenty were set aside for the public). The Israeli government provide d reporters with transis tor radios that received ongoin g translation of the trial, which was officially con ducted in Hebrew, into English, German, and French. In addition, journalists were able to watch th e tria l proceedings live on closed-circuit television i n th e press room.9 Israel itself had no broadcast television a t the time ; Israelis followed th e trial by listening t o the radio and reading newspapers.10 The arrangements to televise the trial specifically targeted foreign audiences; in Hausner's words , this was done "so that th e whole world could watch."11 Rather than allo w eac h commer cial network and national television syste m to set up its own cameras in the courthouse, the Israeli government decided to engage a single broadcaster to create an
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Figure 1. The courtroom set up in Jerusalem's Beit Ha 'am/or the war crimes trial of Adolf Eichmann, 1961. Television cameras were located behind windows on the left- and right-hand sides of th e stage. Israel Government Press Office, courtes y of U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum Photo Archives.
official video record of the trial. The contract was made with Capital Cities Broadcasting Corporation, then a relatively small, independent compan y based in New York. Capita l Cities set up four camera s in Beit Ha'am, which were concealed in
booths located to the left and right of the stage on which the tribunal sat.12 Capital
Cities agree d to provide trial footag e t o all interested broadcasters and newsree l producers and to turn over any profits from th e fees it charged to charity. Recording the proceedings involved a crew of two dozen men, supervised by Capital Cities's Leo Hurwitz. Under his direction, the filming of the Eichmann trial evolved its own aesthetic criteria. "Yo u can't simply follow a witness al l the time he speaks, and then put th e camer a on Eichmann when his name is mentioned," Hurwit z explaine d i n a n interview . "Yo u hav e t o hav e a sens e o f th e event."13 Thus, the choices made by Hurwitz's team—camera angles, composition and length of shots, camera-to-camera editing—became a fixed part of the trial's official visua l record.
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However, most o f this footage wa s never aired. During the trial , broadcasters presented no more than one hour of trial footage daily; most offere d muc h less. Eac h day, sixt y minute s o f footage wa s preselecte d by Capita l Citie s producers in Jerusalem before being duplicated and flown t o broadcasters around the world. I n th e Unite d States , th e footag e wa s usually aire d one da y after i t wa s recorded. Television coverag e of the Eichmann trial thus represents a transitional stage in international telecommunications. While this "next-day" presentation of trial footag e was an advance over newsreels, which too k several days to process and distribute, thi s achievement woul d soon be eclipsed by simultaneous globa l broadcasting via satellite.14 New York Times medi a critic Jac k Gould noted tha t televisio n coverage of the Eichmann trial promised to be "the most sustained and extensive attention that TV ever has accorded a single news story, partly because what will be one of history's most celebrated trials wil l be the first to be televised o n home screen s around the world." 15 According to Milton Fruchtman, executive producer of Capital Cities, footage of the trial was used by thirty-eight countries, and an estimated "80 per cent o f the world' s viewers [saw] shots of the trial." 16 American broadcasters offered mor e extensive television coverag e of the Eichmann trial than did those from an y other nation. All three national commercial networks featured report s on the cas e in their nightly prime-time news programs over the course of the proceedings, and all three presented a variety of special programs dealing with th e tria l near the tim e o f its openin g and closing. Of the three networks, ABC offered th e most extensive regular coverage. The network broadcast weekly, one-hour summaries nationally and also presented nightly, half-hour highlight s o f the previou s day' s proceeding s o n it s flagshi p station , WABC-TV in Ne w Yor k City. The ful l hou r of daily videotapes was also aired in New York on independent station WNTA (Channel 13), which advertised the most complete coverage of the Eichman n trial.17 Special programs aired during the week that the trial began included public affairs programs focusing on the case itself as well as documentary and dramatic programs offering background on Nazism and the Holocaust. 18 At the same time, the parameter s of television coverag e of the Eichman n cas e were articulated by what wa s not broadcast . Comedians Marty Allen and Steve Rossi, scheduled t o appear that week on The Ed Sullivan Show, reported that "there's nothing you can . . . do with the Eichmann thing that is really funny." While regularly drawing on current events in their routines, they explained that "th e crime s charged to Eichmann def y humor." 19 Although at first telecasts of the trial were treated as newsworthy in themselves, there was relatively little discussion o f this unprecedented mediation of a major court case in the American press, in contrast with its extensive coverage of the proceedings themselves. Just before the first day of the Eichmann trial, Gould noted in the Ne w York Times tha t a number of television program s made comparisons between the upcoming Jerusalem trial and the war crimes trials held in
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Nuremberg durin g th e immediat e postwa r years , whic h "pointe d u p a little noticed fact tha t could have a bearing on the future awarenes s of Nazi bestiality. In the fifteen years separating the Nuremberg and Jerusalem trials the medium of television was introduced." Gould is one of the few observers to mention television's role in shapin g either th e presentatio n of the tria l t o Americans or their response to the case . Yet in this review he comments directl y on the medium' s impact only once, noting as problematic the presence of commercials in an ABC broadcast, which "opene d with a n appropriately somber and serious summatio n of the meanin g of the tria l and then switched t o a frothy an d gay plug for a consumer product; the juxtaposition was jarring."20 Television was , o f course, no t th e onl y sourc e that American s had for learning about the Eichman n case; the range of American news media treated it as an important story. Nonetheless, television coverage offered a n unrivaled combination of the other media's attributes. Compare d to newsreels and popular magazine features, television offere d American s report s that wer e more immediate , presenting courtroo m footag e a s quickl y a s on e da y after i t ha d take n place . Although newspaper and radio coverage was often jus t as prompt, television als o offered the trial as spectacle, fostering a sense of "live" contact between event and audience. Th e medium' s intimat e scal e an d domesti c viewin g contex t gav e viewers an unparalleled sens e of proximity to the proceedings. Moreover, televisio n could present segments of trial footage that , whil e selectively edited, still ran much longer than the film clips usually shown in theatrical newsreels. Fo r those watchin g th e tria l coverage in New York, th e dail y reports appeared in installments tha t paralleled the progress of the case. Together these elements fostere d what Goul d described as "a very real sense of presence at the courtroom drama in Jerusalem."21 Similar sentiments wer e expressed elsewhere, such as in an editorial in the newsletter of the American Jewish Congress: "Thanks to th e ingenuit y o f modern communications—particularl y th e urgen t intimacy of television—the distance between us and the Beit Ha'am in Jerusalem is almost non-existent ; we, too, ar e present in th e courtroom . We listen t o th e recitals of the prosecution. We hear the testimon y o f the witnesses. W e see Adolf Eichmann."22 Although these telecasts do not meet all of Daniel Dayan and Elihu Katz's criteria fo r what the y defin e a s "medi a events"—fo r example , the y were no t broadcast live—the televised coverage of the trial might still be considered a forerunner o f these "hig h holidays o f mass communication. " Lik e the mor e recen t media events that Daya n and Katz analyze (such as the Apollo 11 moon landing in 1969, or Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977), the Eichmann trial broadcasts demonstrate the role that television can play in creating galvanizing viewing experiences that hel p for m politica l constituencie s an d shap e civi l religion . Accordin g t o Dayan and Katz, such broadcasts "integrate societie s in a collective heartbeat and evoke a renewal of loyalty to the societ y and its legitimat e authority." 23 At th e same time, the televising of the Eichmann trial in America makes for a valuable
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case study in the limits of media events as socially galvanizing phenomena, especially during the early years of television broadcasting .
Verdict for Tomorrow Although the y constitute a watershed, the telecast s o f the Eichman n trial wer e also responsiv e t o sixtee n year s of previous presentations o f the Holocaus t i n American film , radio , and television. Beginnin g with som e of the firs t o f these— the newsreel s screene d i n movi e theater s i n th e sprin g o f 1945, which showe d footage of liberated Nazi concentration camps—Americans were presented with the notion (on e that is still very much in effec t t o this day) that vicariously witnessing the Holocaust through the media is a morally transformative experience. This notion figures strategically i n televising th e Eichman n trial , where the morall y charged act of witnessing is repeatedly linked to a validation of the authority of mass communications media . This is exemplified by Verdict for Tomorrow, a half-hour documentary o n the trial produced by Capital Cities afte r th e conclusio n o f the proceedings. Th e documentary was aired on American television durin g the fal l of 1961, while th e Israeli tribunal was preparing its verdict. Verdict fo r Tomorrow opens with newsreel footage fro m th e 1930 s showin g Nazis drivin g through th e street s o f a German city and putting up boycott sign s on Jewish shops. The sound track plays a vintage radio broadcast by Lowell Thomas, a renowned newscaster for CBS during the 1930s , reporting the news of anti-Semitic violence in Germany. Next, Thomas (who in 196 1 was a major stockholder of Capital Cities) appears on the screen and addresses the camera: I wonder if you recal l that news broadcast of mine of November 10 , 1938 . It was the clima x of the openin g chapter of one of the mos t shocking news sto ries of our time, of all time—the infamous Kristallnacht, or "Crystal Night," when Nazi mobs smashed the windows of Jewish shops, plundered synagogues, and beat up Jews in Germany and Austria. This was the beginning—the ending involved the murde r of six million Jews as part o f Nazi Germany's Final Solution to the Jewish problem.24
As Thomas continue s his narration of the Nazis' effort s t o exterminate th e Jews of Europe , more vintage images appear on the screen : footage o f German officer s directing civilians ont o cattle car s is followed by films recorded in liberated concentration camps , including shots of an empty stretcher bein g pushed into a crematorium oven , o f the charre d remains o f a corps e insid e a n oven , an d o f a n emaciated corpse lying on the ground. "The last chapters of this unforgettable nightmare are now being written— written b y newsmen crowde d into Jerusalem's Bei t Ha'am," Lowell continues, as
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images of the trial fill the screen, beginning with a long shot of the courtroom interior as seen fro m th e spectators' gallery. Eichmann is shown in the defendant's dock, enclosed wit h bulletproof glass; on the soun d track a male translator asks in English how the defendant pleads, and he responds in German. A female voice translates Eichmann' s repl y into English : "I n th e spiri t o f the indictment , no t guilty." As Eichmann continues t o respond to each of the counts against him with identical answers , the program's title and opening credits appear on the screen. This prologue to Verdict for Tomorrow offers, i n effect , a capsule version of wha t wa s the n coalescin g a s th e Holocaust' s maste r narrative . Here , radio , newsreel, and television report s not onl y serve as the instrument s o f narration; they also embody the creative force behind the narrative's conception. Newsmen are described as forging the last chapters of this epoch, just as journalists—including Thomas himself—authored its opening chapters. Indeed, Thomas first describes this narrative in journalistic terms, as "one of the most shocking news stories of our time." Early in the documentary's ensuing overview of the Eichmann trial, Thomas addresses the significance of witnessing the proceedings and links it to the role of television: "I t was of paramount importance . . . that the whole world see, hear, and understand the causes [of Nazism] and the consequences—the price that must be paid should this ever be allowed to happen again. This job could only be done by a world mass communications medium. " A s the screen fills with shots of the television control room in the courthouse, Thomas continues: "Throug h the eyes of the televisio n camer a and by means of videotape, the whol e world had a front row seat in the Beit Ha'am." Like the firs t newsreel s that presented images of liberated Nazi concentration camps , Verdict fo r Tomorrow articulates it s moral agenda by contrastin g virtuous witnessing wit h culpabl e witnessing. I n the newsreels, American mili tary personnel appeare d appropriately moved by the ordea l of confronting Nazi atrocities; Germa n civilians, force d to visit the camps by the Allies, were shown trying guiltily to avoid looking at them. Verdict for Tomorrow similarly juxtaposes survivors who testif y fo r the prosecution agains t Eichmann, the sol e defendant . As prosecution witnesse s describ e th e Nazis ' gruesom e acts o f sadism, torture , and murder, the camera cuts awa y to show Eichmann listening impassively , his mouth occasionally twisted to one side in a smirking tic . These reaction shots sho w a dispassionate Eichmann amid some of th e most well-known moments o f the trial , including author Yekhiel Dinur collapsing after his agitated and rambling effort to testify about his experiences at Auschwitz. As another witness describe s her surviva l of a mass execution, th e imag e cuts to Eichmann, listening, an d then returns to the witness. The editing of this sequence not only contrasts her emotional testimon y with Eichmann's detached appearance; it also intimates that she is testifying against the defendant as though he were the man who had actually shot at her, thereby realizing in televisual terms
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Hausner's agenda of presenting Eichmann as "the central pillar of the whole wicked system."25 Thomas conclude s Verdict fo r Tomorrow by championin g television' s contribution of creating an international audience for the trial and facilitating the transformation o f each viewe r int o a morally charge d witness: "Wha t i s trul y important is t h a t . .. by means of the television camera and videotape, this trial has been seen by thinking men throughout th e world. . . . We trust it has caused you to stop and think, to render your own final verdict—a personal resolve ... that this shall never be allowed to happen again. "
Watching Eichmann Even before Americans saw the first televised images of the Eichmann trial, broadcasters encouraged them t o conceptualize watchin g the proceedings as a morally charged act. Whereas viewing concentration camp footage in newsreels was rooted in wartime propaganda, watching the Eichmann trial was tied to an agenda both more universalized an d more individuated. In the mainstream America n media, witnessing the courtroom proceedings was linked not so much to the Nazi era as it was to general concerns about human psycholog y and morality.26 Watching the trial on television shifted the center of attention away from the events of the Holocaust and onto the presence of the man accused of their realization. This is borne out in the extensive discourse surrounding the trial and can even be seen in promotions for its presentation on television. For example, a fullpage advertisement, run b y WABC-TV in New Yor k City's daily newspapers on April 12, 1961 (the date of the first telecast o f the trial) , exhorted viewers to tun e in to "watch the judgment of Eichmann by sitting in judgment of ourselves."27 By focusing attention o n the presence of the trial's sole defendant, this act of witnessing emerged as a psychologized and self-reflexive act . This approach exemplifies what Michel Foucault describes as the "psychiatrization of crime" in the modern age, which requires not only that a criminal be proved the agen t of a transgression, but tha t a psychologically convincing motiv e for th e crime be established i n order to mete out justice. Indeed, Foucault argues, the issu e o f establishing th e criminal' s psychological motiv e a s part of the tria l process has become so important in modern criminology that it is now "more real . . . than the crime itself." 28 Like others attending the trial, journalists were preoccupied with watching Eichmann. Before his first public appearance in court, the lack of any vintage film footage and a dearth of photographs of the defendan t (whic h was said to have made his capture that much more challenging) intensified the public anticipatio n of laying eyes on him. The ac t of seeing Eichmann proved so central that looking,
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watching, and witnessing figured as running motif s in the trial's press coverage. Print journalist s offere d reader s extensively detailed descriptions o f Eichmann's physical presence and demeanor. For example, Lawrence Fellows wrote in the Ne w York Times at the trial's opening: Lean and partly bald, Eichrnann was well groomed and poised throughout the first day's sessions. He had a fresh haircut and wore a dark gray suit that had been finished for him onl y yesterday. It was set off by a starched white shirt and black-and-white tie. There were only the smallest indications that he was at all restive. He frequently tightened his lips and wet them from time to time. He swallowed often and rubbed his right thumb against his left forefinger. 29 Such reports as this evince a fixation on the ordinarines s o f Eichmann's appearance (which extended close-ups on television only magnified), in stark contrast to the enormity o f the crimes for which he was on trial. These accounts sought in Eichmann's appearance some revelation regarding the Nazi character, the human condition i n general, or the nature of evil as a metaphysical force. In their quest for insight into Eichmann—and all that he had come to embody—through their attentio n t o his body, observers scrutinized hi s presence fo r revealing minutiae , hi s behavio r fo r involuntary betrayal s o f inner monstrosity. Thus, Eli e Wiesel wrote in the Jewish Daily Forward: "A man wh o is a murderer six million time s ove r can't be perceived as normal people are. He must have a different appearance : he must display some sort of nervousness,... hatred . . . , [or] madness tha t woul d mark hi m a s different fro m othe r huma n beings."30 Although (or perhaps because) his physical presence was so undemonstrative, Eichman n inspire d a range of symbolic associations , especiall y fo r Jewish observers. Leyb Rakhman, also writing for the Forward, offere d a vision o f Eichmann a s metonymizing generations of anti-Semites: "Torquemada and Chmielnicki, Haman and Hitler, their shadows filled Eichmann's glass cell."31 And, in an effort t o demonstrate how the Eichmann trial had become a "Kafka nightmare," New York Times editor C. L. Sulzburger described the defendan t as being "himself mor e 'Jewish looking/ accordin g t o conventiona l definitions , tha n th e tw o sunburned Israeli guards who sit with him inside a bullet-proof, glass courtroom cage."32 Accounts of Eichmann's appearance tended to include a description of the glass-enclosed defendant' s dock as an extensio n o f his presence. 33 According to one source, a number of American observers likened the doc k "to th e glass cage used in televised quiz shows." 34 The association wit h television , especiall y by Americans, is telling. Correspondents who attended the trial in person sometime s watched the proceedings on closed-circuit televisio n themselves , an d they were doubtless aware that many of their readers were seeing Eichmann on television a t home. Thus, print journalists' detaile d descriptions of his appearance and demeanor resonated with readers' own experiences o f watching Eichmann closely.
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Figure 2, Adol f Eichmann in the glass-enclosed defendant's dock, surrounded by Israeli guards. Israel Government Pres s Office , courtes y of U.S. Holocaust Memoria l Museum Photo Archives.
This attentio n t o Eichmann's presence was extended to include several incidents during the trial that centered on watching Eichmann watch somethin g (notably, concentration cam p footage) or someone in the courtroom (for instance, a "duel of glares" between Eichmann and psychologist Gustave Mark Gilbert). Although thes e report s o n Eichman n a s bot h a n insensitiv e watche r an d a n impenetrable objec t of watching do not mention th e televising o f the trial, they illuminate th e problemati c nature o f the Eichman n trial as a television event . Telecasting th e proceedings was vaunted as facilitating for millions th e edifyin g and morall y transformativ e ac t o f witnessing. However, th e auster e imag e of Eichmann on television onl y compounded the inscrutable presence described by journalists wh o watched him i n court . Rathe r than makin g him mor e immi nent—and, therefore, ostensibly more comprehensible—television only emphasized Eichmann's enigmatic ordinariness . This frustrating spectacle was compounded by the audi o component of the telecasts . Those attendin g the tria l i n perso n wer e abl e t o hea r Eichman n speak when he testified (albeit via a microphone), but America n television audi ences heard relatively little of Eichmann's voice, listening instead to most of his testimony in translation. During these sequences, viewers watched Eichmann sit— perhaps listening, perhap s merely waiting—while an interpreter delivere d translations of his testimony. The spectacle of Eichmann thus clashed with his displaced
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audio presence—a voice other than his own (often female), speaking in a language that he did not know , and doing so when he himself was not talking. The audio component of Eichmann's televisual presence, in effect , furthe r refracte d his enigmatic visual image. It disrupted the broadcasts' purported immediacy by undoing the synchronized picture and sound that is fundamental to television's simulatio n of a continuous present . This was further compounded by the trial's complex multilingual dynamic. As engineered for American television, th e soun d track made the Englis h translation th e dominan t language , so that the tria l became, in effect , a n event tha t took place in English. Yet while th e subtletie s o f the trial' s multilingual forma t might wel l have been lost o n the majorit y o f American television viewers , th e audio presence of Hebrew, German, Yiddish, and other languages was accessible , even when they could only be heard under the English translation. Thus, the cogent viewer of the tria l could discern the significanc e of each of these languages, irrespective of what was being said in them, but rather as part of what literary schola r
Benjamin Harshav calls the "semiotics of Jewish communication."35 In this sym-
bolic performance of language, Hebrew, as the language of Zionism, was valorized, while German , a s the languag e of Nazism, wa s demonized , and Yiddish, as th e language of diaspora, was marginalized. Complementing th e frustrating , enigmati c presenc e o f th e trial' s on e defendant wa s th e displace d presence of the implici t plaintiffs—the million s of Jewish victims o f Nazi persecution who m Hausne r claime d t o represent i n hi s opening address. They were invoked repeatedly throughout th e proceedings—as an abstract number ("the six million"), a s communities, o r as individuals, both named and anonymous. Their lives and deaths were represented by statistics, documents, oral testimonies, and film footage. Yet, in contrast to Eichmann's corporeal, if inscrutable, presence at the trial, "the six million" remained elusive. "Who were they?" Martha Gelhorn wondered, in her trial reportage; "their names, light as leaves, float through the days of testimony."36 Consequently, the Eichmann trial often proved disappointing as dramatic spectacle. Indeed , dissatisfaction with watching th e tria l increase d when, afte r weeks o f testimony b y prosecutio n witnesses , Eichman n too k th e stand . Th e American press reported that Israeli spectators apparentl y found Eichmann's testimony "extremely boring, " at times falling asleep in the gallery or leaving well before the court had adjourned for the day. 37 American television audiences may have also found watchin g the tria l les s tha n compelling , especiall y when compared to th e medium' s othe r offerings. 38 Courtroo m dram a series suc h a s Perry Mason or The Defenders typically offered tightly constructed episodes with cohesive an d suspensefu l narratives , a s wel l a s readil y recognizabl e villains an d heroes who were the agents of a moral problem that was resolved by the episode' s end. Compared to the attenuated, enigmati c portrai t o f Eichmann that emerge d over the course of the trial, Engineer of Death: The Eichmann Story, a docudrama broadcast o n Armstrong Circle Theater shortl y afte r Eichmann' s captur e and
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reaired as his tria l commenced, presented a succinct, compellin g portrai t o f its subject a s a histrionic sadis t an d reenacted an incident fro m hi s youth that wa s the purported origin of Eichmann's anti-Semitism. And thanks to the liberatin g possibilities of science fiction, an episode of Rod Serling's Twilight Zone televised in th e fal l o f 196 1 provided American audiences with a supernatural drama of bringing a Nazi war criminal to justice in a manner that was doubtless much more emotionally satisfying than the Eichmann trial. In this broadcast, entitled Death's Head Revisited, viewers could enjoy the spectacle of concentration camp inmates rising from th e dead to put their demonstrably villainous , Eichmann-like persecutor o n trial and expeditiously sentenc e hi m t o become the victi m o f his ow n tortures.39 In contrast , th e telecast s o f the Eichman n trial ma y wel l hav e seemed slow, diffuse , an d extensiv e beyon d the medium' s limits . The y were , indeed , unlike anythin g else American television had ever offered. The trial' s televised presentation was both exotic and universal, bot h news and history, bot h special and routine. The conten t o f the tria l itsel f veered from th e histrionic s o f Jewish "folk opera," as one journalist described the prosecution's case , to the deadlines s of what another dubbed Nazi "bureaueratese." 40 The great majority of the plain tiffs were invisible, and their absence became only that much more palpable with every effor t t o invoke their presence. The trial' s arc h villain, accuse d of unfathomable atrocities , appeare d to b e unexceptional, undemonstrative, and boring. His antispectacular presence matched the trial's visuall y austere setting—a converted assembly hall that was neither playhouse nor courthouse. The trial's mos t eye-catching element was the glass box in which the defendant sat throughou t the proceedings . This glas s box—with its contradictor y promises t o display and to protect—came to epitomize the enigmas of the trial. 41 The fact tha t Eichmann was successfully prosecuted and eventually executed (o n May 31, 1962 ) did not mitigat e th e widesprea d sense of the tria l a s a problematic performance . Man y considere d his convictio n ineffectual , anticli mactic, or a confirmation of the inability o f justice to make amends for the enormity of these crimes. The problematic issue of the trial as a performance figured prominently i n retrospective analyse s of the Eichmann case. Among American Jewish intellectuals, muc h o f the discussio n centere d o n Hannah Arendt' s controversial analysis, which was issued i n book form in 196 3 as Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. 42 Arendt critiques the effectiveness of the trial as an act of justice in part by faulting its performative elements. Early in the book, she makes derisive references to Ben-Gurion as "the invisible stage manager of th e proceedings " and t o Hausner' s "lov e o f showmanship," a s well as to th e judges' reluctant presence, "facing the audience as from th e stage in a play"; ultimately she proclaims th e failure of what she terms "the pla y aspect of the trial." (Her on e referenc e to th e proceedings ' presentatio n o n televisio n i s a passin g expression of contempt for the commercials: "the American program is constantly interrupted—business as usual—by real-estate advertising.")43
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Although Arendt and the controvers y ove r her work dominated th e discussion o f the Eichman n trial i n th e mid-1960s , othe r intellectuals als o offere d Americans reflections on the trial' s significance. Some of them deal t mor e centrally wit h th e performativ e nature o f the tria l an d did so with greate r nuance. Susan Sontag , for example, conceptualize s the Eichman n trial as a work of performance art that epitomizes the place of tragedy in the modern age. She sees the role in which Eichmann was cast as crucial to the problematic nature of the proceedings: "Eichmann . .. stood trial in a double role: as both the particular and the generic; both the man, laden with hideous specific guilt, and the cipher, standing for the whole history of anti-Semitism." Sontag also argues that the trial's format thwarted its agenda as a cathartic performance of memory: "The trial is a dramatic form which imparts to events a certain provisional neutrality; the outcome remains to be decided; the very word 'defendant' implies that a defense is possible. In this sense, though Eichmann, as everyone expected, was condemned to death, the form of th e tria l favored Eichmann. Perhaps this is why many feel, i n retrospect, that the trial was a frustrating experience , an anticlimax."44
The Eichmann Trial as Holocaust Memory Culture While the Eichmann case is widely cited as a threshold event in American awareness o f the Holocaust , th e tria l itself—despit e Sontag' s suggestio n tha t i t b e regarded as a "work of art"—failed t o emerge as a fixtur e o f American Holocaust memory. Televising the tria l figured strategically i n this landmark of American Holocaust consciousness , ye t this landmark presentation an d how it was understood also indicate the limits of that consciousness, and of media literacy in general, at the time . Impact studies undertaken during the trial tabulated which medi a infor mants used to follow the proceedings. According to The Apathetic Majority, a survey publishe d b y th e America n Jewis h Committe e i n 1962 , 6 8 percent o f th e informants, al l residents of the Sa n Francisco Bay area, said that television news reports were one of their sources of information on the Eichmann trial, and 25 percent cited television special s as a source (versus 78 percent for newspapers, 65 percent fo r radi o news reports , 4 1 percen t fo r conversation , an d 3 6 percen t fo r magazines). However, this and othe r studie s offere d n o discussio n o f the effec t that televising th e proceedings might hav e had on responses t o the case . If anything, Th e Apathetic Majority questione d the value of the trial' s televisio n coverage, concludin g tha t "wha t mos t distinguishe s the knowledgeabl e from th e unknowledgeable" with regard to the Eichmann case "is the tendency of the former to rely on the written word, rather than the broadcast media, as a source of information."45 Yet in her study of Holocaust literature, Sidra Ezrahi argues that telecasts
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of th e Eichman n trial helped galvanize American writers by "forcin g it s entr y into the homes of all Americans who committed th e minima l ac t of turning on their televisio n sets," In their literar y responses t o the Holocaust—which were, in Ezrahi's words, "catalyzed " by the trial—America n writers such as Arthur A. Cohen, Irvin g Feldman, Arthur Miller , Sylvi a Plath, Charle s Reznikoff , Norm a Rosen, and Isaac Rosenberg focused not s o much o n the historica l event s of the Nazi er a but o n the paradigmatic—the "psychologica l possibilities" an d "mora l options which prevailed in those times and which could be repeated under similar circumstances." 46 Even so, the Eichmann trial seems to have had less of a lasting impact in America than did other contemporary phenomena, suc h as the feature fil m Judgment a t Nuremberg o r the English-languag e translation o f Elie Wiesel's Night, which bot h appeare d i n 1961 . Mor e recent presentation s o f the Holocaus t o n American television hav e also proved to be more enduring. Israeli television no w annually broadcasts excerpts o f Eichmann tria l footage on Yom ha-Sho'ah, but i n the United States this material has appeared only in the occasional documentary on Eichmann. 47 And, while American Jews generally acknowledge Israel as having a special relationshi p wit h th e Holocaust , they experienc e thi s connectio n more regularly and powerfully throug h local Yom ha-Sho'ah commemorations or Holocaust tourism in Israel than through any institutionalized recollectio n of the Eichmann trial. 48 The failure of the Eichmann case to become a lasting fixture of American Holocaust remembrance might be attributed, in part, to the nature of trials as social rituals. Political scientist s Lance Bennett an d Martha Feldma n write that , for trials to "make sense to untrained participants, there must be some implicit frame work of social judgment that people bring into the courtroom from everyday life." To that end, criminal trials in Western democracies are organized around the quotidian activit y of storytelling, s o that th e participants in the moder n courtroom can "engage some parallel form of social judgment that anchors legal questions in everyday understandings."49 In the cas e of the Eichman n trial, a number of factors complicated , perhaps even confounded, the function of storytelling i n the proceedings. The Israeli government's ambitious , multivalen t agend a for th e tria l presente d on e se t of challenges,- the multiple audience s that the trial sought to address were another. The repeated identification of the Holocaust as an atrocity unrivaled in scope and beyond description als o implicitly challenge d th e effectivenes s of storytelling a s a means of bringing about justice. Indeed, Dinur's incoherent testimon y and collapse on the witness stan d (one of the most ofte n show n excerpts from th e tria l footage) offers viewers the spectacle of the inability to offer narrative. Arendt wrote that thi s incident "t o be sure, was an exception, bu t i f it was an exception tha t proved the rule of normality, it did not prove the rule of simplicity or of ability to tell a story."50 Disparities between the particularist agenda of the Israeli government in
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conducting the Eichmann trial and the universalist approac h of American television coverag e of the even t further complicat e th e trial's effectiveness bot h as an adjudicating narrativ e an d a s a landmark o f memory. The America n televisio n broadcasters' approach may have been a bid to attract a largely non-Jewish audience t o watc h th e proceedings—i n other words , t o scrip t a role tha t America n spectators might play in this public performance. This universalizing of the Eichmann case may have also been responsive to a more general reluctance o f American Jew s during the earl y postwar years to present themselve s o r their fello w Jews as forthrightly exceptional i n this public arena. In addition, America n television' s presentatio n o f the tria l a s a morally transformative event reflects the industry's larger concern, during the early 1960s, with rehabilitatin g it s tarnished reputation by asserting its role as a moral voice for th e natio n (thi s in the wak e of scandals surrounding rigged quiz shows and corrupt FC C officials durin g the lat e 1950s) . Thus, America n television furthe r complicated the trial' s already ambitiou s symbolic agenda . Indeed, rathe r tha n enhancing the potential fo r the Eichman n trial t o become a fixture o f American Holocaust remembrance, television coverag e may have contributed to its problematic status a s a cultural landmark . These broadcast s have als o failed t o becom e a fixture o f the histor y of American television. Majo r chronicle s o f the medium do not mentio n th e Eichmann tria l coverage. 51 Yet in 196 1 the decision t o televise the proceedings was considered both pathbreaking and controversial. While some hailed the broadcasts as a worthy and forward-moving effort, other s expressed concer n that th e very presence of cameras in the courtroom would violate the trial's integrity and dignity. For these critics, the cultural force of television was inherently incompatible with courtroom trials as a social ritual. I n part as a concession t o these concerns, th e Israeli government limited th e number of cameras in the courthous e an d thei r presence, while no secret, was concealed from view . In fact, Capita l Cities' Milton Fruchtman prided himself on the fact tha t no one in Beit Ha'am was able to detect where the cameras had been placed.52 Aside from th e issue of courtroom decorum, this evinces a general innocence, among the press as well as the Israeli government, about the impact of the cultural forc e of television o n the tria l as a public event. Reporters covering th e Eichmann case usually characterized the decision to broadcast the proceedings on international television as an act that, in effect, simply enlarged the gallery of Beit Ha'am t o include million s o f viewers from aroun d the world. They reported the televising of the Eichmann trial, like the concomitant coverage of early American and Soviet space missions, a s a pioneering achievement o f the broadcasting industry and a measure of general technological advancement . By contrast, journalists presented Israel's lack of television at the time as primitive. This is illustrated by the following oft-reported anecdote about Israelis watching the trial on closed circuit televisio n i n Jerusalem's Ratisbonne Hall (th e one place where members of the Israeli public could see Eichmann on television):
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As it happen s each morning, th e pictur e fluttered into focus wit h the bailif f peering from th e courtroom toward the judges' chambers to wait for the three men to emerge in their solemn, black robes. When the judges came into sight the bailiff spu n around to call the spectators in court to order. "Beit Hamishpat!" he barked (the words mean "court" in Hebrew). Without stopping to think that they were more than a block away from the courtroom, the attorneys [who were watching the trial] in Ratisbonne Hall jumped respectfully t o their feet.53 But wherea s thes e Israelis , watchin g liv e televisio n fo r the firs t time , naively faile d to distinguish the virtual fro m th e actual (muc h like the first audiences o f silent fil m a t th e tur n o f the century, who jumpe d fro m thei r seat s t o avoid being hit by the image of a locomotive headin g toward them), many Americans were still naive in thei r acceptanc e of television coverag e of the tria l a s a simulation o f the actual experience of sitting in Beit Ha'am. Not only did the tria l footage offe r viewer s images, such a s close-ups of Eichmann's face or hands, tha t were unavailable to courtroom spectators; the trial's presentation on television had transformed this "actuality" through the process of selecting and editing excerpts of th e footage , reengineerin g its multilingua l soun d track, and recontextualizin g it through reporters' commentary and supplementary coverage. The domestic setting of television watchin g promoted a distinctively intimat e relationship betwee n viewers and the proceedings. Thus, in her 1969 novel, Touching Evil, Norma Rosen described the dail y ritual o f watching th e telecast s a s transforming viewers int o "an experimental, silen t film reacting to a film on TV."54 Moreover, knowin g that a vast public was able to watc h th e Eichman n trial shaped the prosecution's presentatio n o f its case, striving to make it an emotionally engaging performance for millions as opposed to a legally persuasive argument befor e th e adjudicatin g tribunal. Televisio n als o affected , i f obliquely, th e way that American journalists and others discusse d the trial, directin g the focu s away fro m th e historica l event s o f th e Holocaus t an d ont o bot h Eichmann' s physical presence and the issue of the proceedings as a problematic performance. Indeed, the defendant's antispectacular appearance, made widely available on television, ma y have made Arendt's notion o f explaining th e cas e as a lesson i n th e "banality o f evil" seem a particularly apt way of understanding the tria l and th e historical events that it recounted. As the first major televised presentation o f actual courtroom proceedings , the Eichmann trial anticipated by three decades the advent of Court TV, the American cabl e channel devote d to televising curren t trials . Discussions o f the effec tiveness and legitimacy of Court TV (especially in the wake of its presentation of the O. J. Simpson trial) have retraced key issues debated in 1961 , such as whether the presence o f cameras in the courtroo m compromise s it s dignit y or otherwis e adversely affects th e proceedings. Yet the recent discourse on televising trials also demonstrates a more sophisticated leve l of media literacy, as commentators consider the comple x implications o f what one critic has dubbed the "cinem a verit e of due process." 55
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The lack of consciousness o f television's impact on the Eichmann trial as a public event—understandable, perhaps, in light of the novelty of the enterprise— may have limited the extent to which American viewer s embrace d it as a galvanizing medi a even t i n 196 1 or, subsequently, as a fixture of public memory . Yet thanks i n considerable measur e to television, th e Eichmann trial aroused extensive American interest in the Holocaust an d inspired a range of works of Holocaust remembrance, includin g prose fiction , drama , and film. At the tim e of the Eich mann trial , the issue of presenting th e Holocaust on American televisio n barely arose as a subject of discussion—and would not do so until late in the next decade, with the premiere of the Holocaust miniseries. These two watershed events provide a telling measure o f the dynamic s o f American Holocaus t remembranc e an d of the changing role that television has played in shaping public memory. Whereas the impac t o f television o n Holocaust remembranc e ha s been largely ignored in the cas e o f the Eichmann trial , it was the focus of attention following the broadcast of the miniseries . Much o f this discussion centered o n whether a mediu m as widely popula r as television was , by its very nature, a n appropriate foru m for addressing a subject as vast and disturbing as the Holocaust . NOTES
1. On the strategi c role of television in American Holocaust remembrance, see Shandler, While America Watches: Televising th e Holocaust (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), Introduction; fo r a discussion o f American Holocaust televisio n prio r to 1961, see chaps 1-3 . 2. The word "Holocaust" wa s used during the proceedings to translate th e Hebrew term sho'ah. This can be heard in prosecutor Gideon Hausner's summation, for example, in the documentary Verdict for Tomorrow (National Jewish Archive of Broadcasting of the Jewish Museum, New York [hereafter, NJAB] : item no. T382). 3. Robert Hariman, ed., Popular Trials: Rhetoric, Mass Media, and the Law (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1990) , 21, 3. 4. The Tulsa Tribune, April 1961, as cited in George Salomon, "The Eichmann Trial: America's Response," in American Jewish Year Book 1962 (New York: American Jewish Committee/ Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1962), 88. 5. "Th e Eichman n Case as Seen by Ben-Gurion," New York Times, December 18 , 1960 , sec. 6, 7, 62, passim, 6. Gideon Hausner, Justice in Jerusalem (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 4, 291, 296. 7. See "Court Approve s Filming of Trial," New York Times, March 11, 1961 , 4; Hausner, Justice in Jerusalem, 307. 8. A s cited i n Horac e Sutton , "Eichman n Goe s o n Trial: Th e Charge d Air, " Saturday Review 44, no. 1 4 (April 8, 1961) , 49. 9. Lawrence Fellows, "Eichmann Goes to Trial," New York Times, April 9,1961, sec. 4, 5; Samuel Caplan, "At the Eichmann Trial: Six Million Prosecutors," Congress Bi-Weekly 28 , no. 9 (May 1 , 1961): 5. 10. Lawrence Fellows, "TV Makes Its Israeli Debut with a Tragedy," New York Times, July 2, 1961, sec. 2, 9. 11. Hausner, Justice in Jerusalem, 307. 12. "Eichmann Goes to Trial," New York Times, April 9, 1961, sec. 4, 5. 13. Fellows, "TV Makes Its Israeli Debut with a Tragedy," sec. 2, 9. Fellows notes that th e knowledge of the live, albeit unseen, audience in Ratisbonne Hall helped the television crew to remain "alert i n its work." 14. Telstar I inaugurated satellite relays of television programs in July 1962, followed shortly
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The Man i n the Glass Bo x thereafter by the enactment o f the Communications Satellit e Act. COMSAT (the Communications Satellite Corporation ) was established i n 1962 . The Earl y Bird (Intelsat I) , which enable d synchronous transmission, wa s the first commercial communications satellite ; it was launched in 1965 . 15. Jack Gould , "TV : The Eichman n Trial," New York Times, April 10 , 1961, 55 . Majo r congressional investigation s ha d bee n televise d durin g th e 1950s , notabl y th e Senat e Crim e Committee hearings , conducted by Estes Kefauver i n 1951 , and the Army-McCarth y hearing s in 1954 . In addition American television ha d previously offered regiona l telecasts of local trials, despite a 195 2 ruling b y the America n Ba r Association agains t th e broadcastin g o f court proceedings. According to Paul Thaler, Th e Watchful Eye: American Justice in the Age of the Television Trial (Westport , Conn.: Praeger , 1994) , televisio n camera s wer e briefl y allowe d int o Oklahoma court s in 1953, an d the first live television broadcast of a trial in America was a murder case in Texas, broadcast by KWTX-TV in Waco, beginning on December 6, 1955 (25-26). 16. "Newsfront: Th e Eichman n Trial," Television Age 9, no. 1 (August 7, 1961): 27. 17. "Eichmann Trial: Daily Videotapes, WNTA-TV" [advertisement], New York Times, April 12, 1961, 53. 18. See, e.g., "TV Guide Close-up: Eichmann Trial," TV Guide 9, no. 1 4 (April 8-14, 1961) , A8. 19. Bert Burns, "Eichmann Case Stymies Comics," New York World-Telegram an d Sun, April 13, 1961,32. 20. Jack Gould, "TV: The Eichmann Trial," 55. 21. Jack Gould, "TV: Live Court Drama," New York Times, April 13 , 1961, 71. 22. "Timely Topics: Reliving the Past," Congress Bi-Weekly 28 , no. 9 (May 1, 1961): 3. 23. Daniel Day an an d Elihu Katz , Media Events: The Live Broadcasting of History (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995) , 9. 24. This and all other citations fro m Verdict fo r Tomorrow were transcribed from a copy of the broadcast in the NJAB ; see note 2, above. 25. Hausner, Justice in Jerusalem, 300. 26. Historian Stuar t Svonki n note s tha t th e America n Jewish Committee an d the Jewish Anti-Defamation Leagu e embarked on a media campaign , i n print an d o n radio, to promote a distinctive readin g of the trial , whic h emphasize d tha t ther e was no doubt tha t Jew s were th e chief victims of the Nazis' systematic campaign of extermination ("Th e Return to Parochialism : American Jewish Communal Life in the 1960s," conference paper presented at the Second Annual Scholars Conference o n American Jewis h History [June 12-14, 1996], 8). See also Svonkin, Jews Against Prejudice: American Jews and the Intergroup Relations Movement from World War to Cold Wa r (New York: Columbia Universit y Press, 1997) . 27. "Th e Judgmen t of Eichmann: WABC-TV" [advertisement], New York Times, April 12, 1961, 82. For other newspapers carrying the same advertisement, se e New York World-Telegram and Sun, April 12, 1961, 51; New York Herald Tribune, April 12, 1961, 29; New York Post, April 12, 1961 , 90 . 28. Michel Foucault, "The Dangerous Individual," in Michel Foucault, Politics, Philosophy, Culture: Interviews an d Other Writings, 1977-1984, ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman (New York and London: Routledge, 1988) , 126-27 , 127-28 . The essa y firs t appeare d as "About th e Concep t of the Dangerou s Individual in 19t h Century Lega l Psychiatry," International Journal o f Law and Psychiatry 1 , no. 1 (1978): 1-18 . 29. Lawrence Fellows, "Eichmann i s Neat in New Gra y Suit," Ne w York Times, April 12, 1961, 16 . 30. Elieze r Veyzel [Elie Wiesel], "De r ershte r tog " (Th e firs t day) , Jewish Daily Forward, April 12 , 1961, 1 . My translation fro m th e Yiddish. 31. Leyb Rakhman, "Zitsndi k in gerikht baym Aykhman-protses" (Sitting in judgment at the Eichman n trial), Jewish Daily Forward, Apri l 14, 1961, 2. My translation fro m th e Yiddish. 32. C. L. Sulzburger, "Foreign Affairs: Kafka Nightmare Come to Court," New York Times, August 2,1961, 28. According to the New York Times, the men selected to guard Eichmann were all non-European Jews who had not suffere d unde r th e Nazi s an d presumably would not tak e revenge against th e defendant (Lawrence Fellows, "Eichman n i s Neat in New Gray Suit," Ne w York Times, April 12 , 1961, 16). 33. Special legal provisions were made to allow Eichmann t o remain i n the glass-enclose d
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Jeffrey Shandler defendant's dock when he was called as a witness. See, e.g., "Heavy Security Protects Nazi From Himself an d From Others," New York Times, April 11, 1961 , 14 ; Homer Bigart, "Eichmann t o Stay in Glass Cag e If He Testifies at Israeli Trial," New York Times, June 5, 1961, 5. 34. Sutton, "Eichman n Goe s on Trial," 49. 35. Benjamin Harshav, The Meaning of Yiddish (Berkeley : University o f California Press, 1990), 3. 36. Martha Gelhorn, "Eichmann and the Private Conscience," Atlantic Monthly 29, no. 2 (February 1962): 53. 37. See "Eichmann Paint s a Robot Portrait/' New York Times, June 26, 1961, 8. 38. One possible indicatio n of the declining interest in watching th e Eichmann tria l is the suspension o f daily reports showing footag e o f the proceeding s b y WNTA New Yor k (Channel 13) in mid-May. 39. Engineer of Death (NJAB: item no. T383) was originally telecast on CBS on October 12, 1960 and was rebroadcast on April 12, 1961; Death's Head Revisited (NJAB: item no. T380) was originally aire d on CBS on November 10 , 1961. 40. Homer Bigart, "Servatius Wins Respect in Trial," New York Times, July 3, 1961, 3; Fellows, "T V Makes Its Israeli Debut with a Tragedy," sec. 2, 9. 41. In addition to frequent reference s in the press to Eichmann as the man in the glass box (or booth or cage), the image was selected as the title of Robert Shaw's play, The Man in the Glass Booth (New York: Grove Press, 1968), which is based somewhat on Eichmann's capture and trial. 42. Arendt' s view s wer e firs t publishe d a s a serie s o f article s entitle d "Eichman n i n Jerusalem" in the New Yorker during February and March 1963. An expanded version of these articles was first published in book form a s Eichmann i n Jerusalem: A Report o n the Banality of Evil (New York: Viking, 1963) ; a revised and enlarged paperback edition wa s published th e following year. 43. Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil rev. ed. (New York: Viking Penguin, 1964) , 4-8, passim. 44. Susan Sontag, "Reflections on The Deputy," Against Interpretation an d Other Essays (New York: Delta, 196 6 [1964]), 125 , 127. 45. Charles Y. Clock, Gertrude J. Selznick, and Joe L. Spaeth, The Apathetic Majority: A Study Based on Public Responses to the Eichmann Trial (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 48-50. 46. Sidra DeKoven Ezrahi, By Words Alone: The Holocaust in Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) , 205-6. 47. On telecasts o f Eichmann trial footage in Israel, see Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis an d th e Holocaust, tr. Haim Watzman (New York: Hill and Wang, 1993), 8. Examples of American documentaries tha t present thi s footage include Justice in Jerusalem Revisited: The Eichmann Trial, aired on NBC in 198 6 (NJAB: item no. T408) and The Trial o f Adolf Eichmann, aired on PBS on April 30, 1997. The trial's television coverage was the subject of a retrospective exhibition a t the Jewish Museum in New York in 1986. 48. See, e.g., Jack Kugelmass, "The Rite s of the Tribe: The Meanin g of Poland for American Jewish Tourists," YIVO Annual 21 (1992): 395^53; Oren Baruch Stier, "Lunch at Majdanek: The March of the Livin g as a Contemporary Pilgrimage of Memory," Jewish Folklore and Ethnology Review 14, nos. 1- 2 (1995): 57-66. 49. W. Lance Bennett an d Martha S . Feldman, Reconstructing Reality i n th e Courtroom: Justice an d Judgment i n American Culture (Ne w Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1981), 3, 4. 50. Arendt, Eichmann i n Jerusalem (1964), 224 . This scen e i s prominent i n th e footag e shown annuall y o n Israeli television o n Yom ha-Sho'ah. See Segev, The Seventh Million, 8. 51. See, e.g., Erik Barnouw, Tube of Plenty: The Evolution o f American Television, 2nd rev. ed. (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) ; Christopher H . Sterling and John M. Kittross, Stay Tuned: A Concise History o f American Broadcasting, 2nd ed . (Belmont, Calif. : Wadsworth, 1990) ; Michael Winship, Television (New York: Random House, 1988). 52. "Newsfront: The Eichmann Trial," Television Age, 25. 53. Lawrence Fellows, "Eichmann Goe s to Trial," New York Times, April 9, 1961, sec. 4, 5. 54. Norma Rosen, Touching Evil (New York: Harcourt Brac e and World, 1969). 55. James Wolcott, "Prime-time Justice," The New Yorker 68, no. 41 (November 30,1992): 159.
Geoffrey Hartman
Tele-Suffering an d Testimony in the Dot Com Era Why was the sight To such a tender ball as the eye confined?
—Milton, Samson Agonistes
Television is a mechanism bringing us images from far away while making itself as invisible a s possible. To be effective i t cannot relinquish thi s magical realism . Arguably, TV shares that characteristic with print or other media: to cite a common definition o f imagination, they render what i s absent present. Yet TV's differenc e from a verbal or literary medium i s quite clear . Novels or histories i n book form respect the absence of those absent things more: their distance is factored in, not only by deliberate device s tha t expose a (relatively) invisible author's rhetorica l manipulations but als o by the differenc e betwee n the mental activities of viewing and reading. TV, to generalize, conveys the illusion not of making absent things present but present thing s mor e present (tha n they are or can be). Even when devoted to information rather than fiction, it emits a hyperbolic form o f visuality. Of course , lik e literature , T V ca n becom e self-consciou s and blo w th e cover o f its magi c by showing within it s picture s a camera takin g pictures o r a monitor reflectin g them. But it doe s so, usually, only to increase its authority as an objective mediation, or rather to make us think o f it as a medium rathe r than a mediation. Showin g the camera is showing what you shoot with: it is no longer a concealed or self-concealing instrument . Those oppose d to the modern world's iconomani a can shun th e camera s but would find it futile to smash them. Cameras are not icons but productive of them, and the network by which they send images is redundant rathe r than placebound, so that any damage would be merely symbolic. In fact, although a religious rhetoric denouncing the lust of the eyes is still heard, many faiths have succumbed to the medium and adopted it for profitable evangelical propaganda. I do not want to give the impression tha t TV is purely a mechanism. I t is, indeed, the most powerfu l mean s we presently have for the production of images (if w e conside r the downloadin g of images o n th e Interne t a s simpl y a furthe r Reprinted by permission fro m Raritan: A Quarterly Review, Vol . XIX, No. 3 (Winter 2000). Copyright © 2000 by Raritan.
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extension o f its potency) . Ye t behind th e mechanis m ther e ar e it s director s or agents, removed by the magic—the automatism—of photography. 1 The interaction of TV' s image production and those who coordinat e or manipulate i t i s a lively and self-complicating topic . Not without reaso n has journalism (now dominated by TV's influence on the general public) been called the Fourth Estate. Sociologists and others have begun a full-scale critique o f the managers who set the condition s of reporting and viewing for the medium. They suspect a "structural corruption " which makes it ineffective to try to modify by discursive means (such as this essay) what goes on. There exist , n o doubt, genial filmmakers who attempt t o criticiz e th e image through th e image ; and I will soon describ e the Yal e Video Archive's further attempt t o do just that. But it is hard not to agree with Pierr e Bourdieu that anyone who goes on television will suffer a loss of autonomy, and that th e self analysis occasionall y nurture d b y T V journalists onl y feed s thei r "narcissisti c complaisance."2 Now and then a murderous incident like the 1999 Columbine Schoo l massacre by two Colorad o teenagers incites a flurry o f speculation abou t the influence of the imagery video brings into the home. The television se t or a computer with video games has become, as it were, a new hearth. But is it a controlled, domesticate d fire we have brought into the castl e of our privacy? As parents, my generation tried to limit the viewin g of TV, primarily to prevent neglect o f homework or a sidelining o f intellectual an d socializing influ ences. Increasingly, though, th e problem involves not only the proper allotment of leisure time. What is viewed comes into question, a s does the very modality of watching. For not only are violent films available on a twenty-four-hour basis but newscasting itself , on the sam e continuous basis , brings us daily pictures of violence, suffering, an d destruction. One of the simples t axiom s of psychoanalysis holds tha t hyperarousa l leads to traum a o r inappropriate psychic defenses—i t seems clear enough that, while human responses are not uniform and our psyches are quite resilient, thi s intensification ha s its impact and must be thought about. We live in an artificially enhanced visual culture, but it is premature to claim that we have visual culture. Yet the issue of TV's responsibility fo r social violence is a complicated one. The medium does not present a seamless web of visual images. Its hypnotism i s far fro m unalloyed . Th e mediu m i s mor e talky , i n fact , tha n mos t cinemati c composition: it adds layers of words to juxtaposed visual excerpts. In addition to the words (and snatches of music) that come with the relayed images, we have the anchor-person's o r moderator's commentary. News, talk shows, music montages, and documentaries, therefore , may be the ultimate TV , rather than th e retailin g of Hollywood-type films. Moreover, while films usually hide the fact that they are episodic and present themselves as wholly new and startling (although playing on
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continuities bestowe d by famous actors or character-types), TV not only likes t o serialize programs but allows arbitrary breaks for advertising that disturb our concentration withou t quit e dehypnotizing it. TV offers (als o because of the eas e of surfing) not rea l breaks or reflective pauses but one audiovisual representation after th e other. Its "flow/' i n short, at once isolates certain sequences and distracts us from them. The reality-effect of its imagery, therefore, is heightened and diminished at the same time. This is one reason why it is hard to generalize about the contagiou s effec t o f TV violence: i t all depends o n whether your inner reception is tuned t o what tries to invade you and will not let go, or, alternatively, to the interruptions—visual and verbal—that dissipate it. Yet one clear danger should not be overlooked. Increasingly, as on-the-spot news reporting and other live broadcasts, especially the wilder kind of talk show ("My sister has two lovers"), gain TV share, the reality-effec t o f what is viewed verges on an unreality-effect. The reason may be stated as follows: when reading fiction, or seeing it in cinematic form, we adopt what Coleridge called a "suspension of disbelief." We know those multiple gor y deaths in action movies are faked, an d that a considerable supply of ketchup is used. But what can keep addicted viewers, especially younger ones, from a more fatal "suspension," which consists in looking at everything live as if it were a reality that could be manipulated? The unrealityeffect tha t turn s what we actually se e into electric phantom s is a new and insidious psychic defense. 3 Good fictio n quietl y post s man y signs tha t impl y "N o Way Through t o Action." It constructs reflective detours that convert reading into a many-leveled interpretive act and remind us we are dealing with simulacra. The problem with TV, however, is that, only a click away, and an intimate part of home, it becomes a treacherous servomechanism conspiring with a residual, delusory omnipotence of thoughts. While for most of us TV simply hard-copies the eye, making the "ten der ball" less vulnerable, for some it may produce a mental atmosphere that makes it appear as if the very place we live in also came from that box. Televised reality, Norman Manea has noted, "becomes a self-devouring 'proto-reality' without which the real world is not confirmed and therefore does not exist." The world is then no more and no less incredible than what confronts u s in the news or ever-more horrific movies . It is not that there will be, necessarily, a direct link between violent scene s depicted on TV or film and the brutal acts of teenagers: we surely know how confusing, precarious, and potentially catastrophic the passage from late childhood to maturity is, independent of a supposedly malignant TV effect. Bu t there probably is a derealization o f ordinary life that causes some young people to act out—like a game or drama whose roles they assume—their pain, disillusion, o r mania. Animated gadgets rather than people inhabit a world of that kind, and it is easy to fall
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into the Manichaean mind-frame of "them and us/' or "the good and the bad guys," which our increasingly formulai c and ferocious movies also foster. Youthful idealization o f certain role models often goe s together with a n underestimation or even scapegoating of a despised group. Concerning this derealization, it is astonishing to reflect that only forty years ago one of the mos t significant books about the cinema , Siegfried Kracauer' s Theory of Film, bore the subtitle The Redemption o f Physical Reality, It argued with great cogency that "film renders visible what we did not, or perhaps could not, see before its advent. [Film] effectively assist s us in discovering the material world with it s psychophysical correspondences. We literally redeem this world from its dormant state, its state of virtual non-existence."4 Kracauer dealt with film as the fulfillmen t of th e realisti c effec t o f black-and-white photography. The cinema , h e claimed , was animate d b y " a desir e t o pictur e transien t materia l life , lif e a t it s mos t ephemeral," whether stree t crowds, involuntary gestures , o r "the rippl e o f the leaves stirred by the wind."5 Compared to this view of the medium, what we see in movie houses today should be called photoys. It is a ghosting of reality, not it s redemption. What, for example, is being rendered—made visible—by Th e Matrix! Ther e are, no doubt, some strong "psychophysical" sensations produced by this film's mastery of special effects : th e way , for example, it carrie s the tendenc y of a body-piercing generation t o a n extreme by undermining th e integrit y o f personal flesh. So, in addition t o th e doublin g an d out-of-body experience s intrinsi c to it s storyline , near the beginning o f the film ther e i s a brilliant visual pu n when th e movie' s involuntary her o is "bugged" by a disgustingly alive mechanical insec t inserte d via the navel into his innards. This inverted parturition recalls Nietzsche's insight that all preconceptions arise in the entrails. It is as if we had to return there to see the world without prejudice . Yet ordinary sense-data enter this fil m only in th e for m o f incongruous scenes, a here-and-now that can no longer be securely confined to a single location. As Christian painters ofte n surroun d earthly events with heavenly figures, doubling the locus of the action, so every significant adventure of the hero, however external or apparently objective , has its echo in an invasive internal change dramatized as physical agony or the labo r pains of rebirth. Moreover, a devious topology leads to defamiliarized interiors that remain absurdly familiar. The contraption to which people are strapped before the y undergo their psychophysical journey is a conflated image of a dentist's chair , an electric chair, and how astronauts are buckled up before th e launch . Similarly , although we traverse nondescript and potentially mysterious passageways to get to the Oracle, when we meet her she is in an ordinary kitchen bakin g cookies. And despite the importance to the film of mobile communication, a t a crucial final moment the hero steps into the interior of an old-fashioned phone booth, a retro effect tha t recalls (affection -
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ately enough, but hardly realistic) Superman's transfiguration. In a sense we never get outside—outside the movie studio producing all these effects . What kind of reality, then, are we shown? Interestingly enough, we are not as far from Kracauer' s "redemption " a s might firs t appear . For it i s precisely a redemption of physical reality that is being aimed at—radically, comically, ingeniously, despairingly—by movies like these. The motif of redemption, in fact, governs Matrix's plot: to find "the One" who has the guts to free us from a world of appearances that limit s or controls huma n perceptio n an d presumably keeps us from experiencin g the real real world. Yet in trut h th e movi e offers onl y an engineered reality—a n assemblag e of phantasms , o f illusionistic contraption s tha t see k t o ge t unde r our ski n ye t rarely do so. In fact, in order to remain in the human, it relies on a few sentimental o r fairy-tale episodes , such as a life-giving kiss . When Kracauer, then , write s that th e cinem a i s uniquely equippe d t o "redee m thi s world from it s dorman t state, its stat e of virtual nonexistence," he lays bare the ghostlines s of existence revealed by cinematic photography' s own countergnostic, technological quest romance. I continue to prefer poetry's economy of means, as in these (admittedly imploding) stanzas of Emily Dickinson: I heard, as if I had n o Ear Until a Vital Word Came all the way from Lif e t o me And then I knew I heard. I saw, as if my Eyes were on Another, till a Thing And now I know 'twas Light, because It fitted them, came in. I dwelt, as if Myself wer e out, My Body, but within Until a Might detected me And set my kernel in.6
It ma y have been my ow n reality-hunger, as well a s the dut y of memory, tha t made me take part in a project to film Holocaust survivors. Founded in 1979 by a New Haven grassroots organization, the project was adopted by Yale, which created in 198 1 the earlies t video archive for Holocaust testimonies. Working with the archive I became more aware of the power and the limits of film and video. Our ai m t o record on video the storie s of survivors and other witnesse s proved more complex than we had assumed. The idea was to put people with direct knowledge of those grim events before th e camer a and let the m spea k with th e least possible intervention. A series of authentic autobiographical accounts would
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emerge and contribute to the collective memory of a time passing away together with the eyewitness generation. That would soon be an era available only through history books . The project was instinctively righ t in seeking to extend the oral tradition by means o f video testimony, an d allowin g th e voice s o f witnesses t o be heard directly in an embodied, audiovisual form . But we only gradually understood th e communal implications o f the enterprise and its potential impact on memory and the communicative environment . Let m e illustrat e what w e learne d b y discussin g a number o f practica l issues that arose in taping the survivors. How does a venture like this balance the seductive magic of photo-realism—expressive of the wis h to make the survivor s and their experienc e more evidential—with an anxiety about intrusion an d voyeurism? Should we not hold such an archive to be a sacred deposit and shield it, for a time at least, fro m th e merely curious or prying? We turned to a law school professor wh o wrote an opinion quotin g Justice Brandeis's "sunligh t is the bes t disinfectant." We obtained informed consent fro m eac h person interviewed and made sure they understood that their testimony would be a public act of witness open to all who came to consult it in the university library. Moreover, visitors to the archive were asked to read a statement tha t laid out the reasons for the testimony project. When I look back at the first two years of filming, I realize what may have made the issue of privacy more sensitive. The survivors who came to be interviewed were totally supportive; but others— a few historians and some survivors not yet interviewed—felt uncomfortabl e watching the tapes . What disturbed them was partly the emotional, intimate texture of these oral histories, but chiefly their videovisual aspect. Indeed, amon g the almos t tw o hundred testimonies initiall y recorded , I now see inspired but also , at times, irritatin g camera work. Wishing to projec t the ac t as well as narrative of witness, w e often sough t what one of the project' s founders, adopting a legal term, called "demeanor evidence." The result was excessive camera movement. The supposedly "imperturbable" camer a (Kracauer's word) zoomed in and out, creating Bergmanesque close-ups. Eventually we advised that the camera should give up this expressive potential an d remain fixed, except for enough motion t o satisfy more naturally th e viewer's eye. Another decisio n als o involve d th e visua l sense . Shoul d witnesses b e recorded in a studio or at home? Ou r choice was at first forced o n us rather than thought out, yet proved to be fortunate. There was so little funding that space provided free o n the unoccupie d floor of a building became a makeshift studio an d more feasible than transporting equipment and interviewers from one home to the other. The makeshift studio was sparsely furnished: chairs as necessary, a backdrop curtain, and sometimes a plant. What we sacrificed was the kind of colorful, personal setting we would have found in the survivors ' homes, and which helps when videography has a film in mind; what we gained (this realization came later,
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and we stuck with our ascetic decision) was not only simplicity or starkness but a psychologica l advantage . Th e interviewees , i n a sparse setting , entere d thei r memories with less distraction, or, to put it differently, the y could not divert their attention to this or that familiar object. There were also fewer disruptions—such as a child crying , a dog barking, a telephone ringing—to disconnect the flo w of thought. A further decision was for the camera to focus exclusively on the witness and not show the interviewers. I n retrospect, I think we might have included a t least a n initial verification shot o f the interviewers ; but w e were determined t o keep the survivor at the center, visually as well as verbally. Despite TV's disdain for "talkin g heads, " tha t i s exactly wha t w e aimed for. The survivo r as talking head and embodied voice: a more sophisticated techniqu e woul d merely distrac t viewers. We were not filmmakers, even potentially, but facilitators and preservers of archival documents i n audiovisual form. In short, our technique, o r lack of it, was homeopathic: i t used television to cure television, t o turn the medium agains t itself, limiting eve n while exploiting its visualizing power. I suppose we did sacrifice by this effacement o f the interviewers—hear d and not seen , an d trained t o ask only enoug h questions t o make the witnesses comfortable, to keep them remembering, and sometimes t o clarify a statement— a certain amoun t o f transparency. For interviewers have a special importance i n this kind of oral history. They are positioned quit e differently fro m investigativ e journalists. They do seek to elicit information, often o f historical value. Yet basically their purpose is to release memories of what happened: not yesterday or a short time ago, but a s far back as forty years when the project started in 1979 , and fiftyfive or more by 2000. This act o f recall canno t b e accomplished withou t respectin g the Holocaust's continuing impact on the life of the survivors. Afterthoughts and associations ofte n aris e i n th e ver y momen t o f giving testimony : the pas t canno t b e confined to the past. The best interviews result from a testimonial alliance between interviewer an d interviewee: a trust-relation forms i n which th e searc h for facts does not displac e everything else. Such an alliance, however, is a framing even t that lie s beyond the scop e of the camera . It cannot b e made transparent (i n the sense of visually open) but needs the sort of meditation Dori Laub and others who know the Yale project have given it. When I talk of the project's communal frame , a return of trust, a wounded trust, is involved. The interviewers—indeed, all persons associated with the project—form a provisional community an d become, for the survivor-witness , representative of a potentially larger community, one that does not turn away from but recognizes the historical catastrophe and the personal trauma undergone. Memory, we have learned from Mauric e Halbwachs, and again from Pierr e Nora, always has a milieu. How do you photograph a memory, then, how do you give it
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visibility, when that milieu has been destroyed by Holocaust violence as well as the passage of time? But experiences are often imprinted on the mind, and set off by the very absence of what inhabited the original space. Our foreknowledge of mortality may even enhance what has vanished. The quiescent o r subdued memory-image endows photos with a physical aura. The effect is that of a still life (even when the camera is in motion): a spectral presence emerges, which demands to be integrated, or, as Kracauer might say, "redeemed. " Holocaust videography, of course, to achieve a return of memory through photographed testimonial speech, can place the victims back in what is left of their milieu o f suffering, a s Claude Lanzmann tends to do. It shows, for example, a field or grove of trees, now quite innocent, and which defeats the camera-eye as in Antonioni's Blow Up, Lanzmann even arranges a remarkable mise-en-scene by placing a barber, whose duty in the camps was removing the prisoners' hair, into an ordinary barber shop. However effective thi s device may be, we sense its artifice. It is best to resuscitate memories by simply raising the internal pressure with the assistanc e of maieutic interviewers. Ideally, these interviewers become more than questioners: they comprise a new "affective community" that substitutes, however inadequately, for the original and tragically decimated milieu. But here an unresolved contradiction casts its shadow over the video-testimon y projec t in the dot com era . Can memor y retrieval and its communitarian aspec t withstand th e "imperturbable camera, " its cold, objectifying focus, and now, in addition, the impersonal, market forces of electronic recal l and dissemination? I hav e suggeste d tha t survivo r videograph y counteracts th e gloss y o r ghostly unreality of seemingly realistic yet increasingly surrealistic TV programs. In part this is because the testimonial word s do not fade out, or into a cinematic simulacrum o f the event s being described. Although the testimonie s rang e over time and space, the camera's mobility, as well as its visual field, remains restricted to a person speaking in a particular place, at a particular time. While presenting testimonies i n audiovisual forma t ma y add an expressive dimension, tha t is not an essential feature—sinc e the speaker' s bearing and gestures could also distract from the story being told. What is essential is the mental space such minimal visuality ("I see a voice!") allows. Witnesses can "see" bette r into, or listen more effectively to, themselves; and viewers, similarly, respond to that intimacy . All of our efforts at Yale were directed, then, toward capturing the personal story,- and to maximize the witnesses' autonomy during the taping process, we did not limit the time of the interview or impose any conditions whatsoever. Yet our decision in this regard was based less on sophisticated thinking about TV than on the fact that victims of the Shoah had been brutally deprived of precisely their personal autonomy. The camera, also, because it focused on the face and gestures of the witnesses, was anything but cold: in fact, it "reembodied" those who had been denied their free and human body-image in the camps.
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I am less sure , however, about the succes s we will hav e in tamin g postproduction procedures . As distanc e learnin g become s standard , an d machine readable cataloguing take s over, archives of conscience like ours may not be able to resis t bein g turne d int o gigabyte s of information, electroni c warehouse s of knowledge that marginalize the other values I have mentioned. This greed for more and more information, for positivities, whic h ha s already accumulated an extraordinary and melancholy record on the Holocaust, has not yielded appreciable ethical lessons. The heaping up of factual detail may even be an excuse to evade the issue of what can be learned. It is not enough to say "nothing" can be learned; that no lesson ca n stand up to the enormit y and contrariety of what happened. If only because suc h a position neglect s th e testimonia l ac t as such, an d the gul f tha t appears, in the aftermat h of Auschwitz, betwee n the possibilit y of testimony— which extends to visual and verbal representation generally—and Sarah Koffman's axiom: "Speak one must, without bein g able to."
Having describe d th e communa l fram e o f memory retrieva l an d th e potentia l impact of survivor videography on the medium, I am tempted to make a final and very broad generalization. It shifts the focus from th e survivors to those who look at their testimony , an d ultimately t o the qualit y of our gaze. What others suffer , we behold, Terrence Des Pres once said of the modern condition—with reference, in particular, to the increased technical power of optical transmission. We become, through the media, impotent involuntar y spectators: it was so with the events in Bosnia, and then in Kosovo. It is no longer possible not t o know. But the effect s of this traumatic knowledge, this tele-suffering—Luc Boltanski , a French sociologist, has named it souffrance a distance—are beginning to be felt . One difficul t effec t i s tha t o f secondary traumatization, through a guilt, perhaps shame, which the knowledge of evil, or simply of such suffering, implants. We know more about identification with th e aggresso r than identificatio n with the victim: a bond sometimes grows between persecuted and persecutor, between the kidnapping victim, for instance, and the abductor. The strong effects o f a sympathetic identification with th e victim have drawn less attention. In the humanities, wher e th e subjec t o f trauma is beginning to b e recognized, we stil l spend more energy criticizing psychoanalysis than dealing with what is fruitful i n trauma theory. That w e learn through our own suffering i s a cliche tha t target s abstract or book knowledge: the real issue, however, is whether we can learn from th e suffering o f others withou t overidentifying . To overidentif y wit h th e victi m ma y have consequence s a s grave as t o identif y wit h th e aggressor . Indeed, I suspect there may be some convertibility in the for m o f a movement toward coldness or cruelty when it becomes too hard to take in something which s o intensely want s to be forgotten o r mastered. We fear not jus t the image of suffering itsel f bu t als o
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the sense of powerlessness that accompanies it—the obsessive thoughts and a drift toward desensitization. Without empathy there can be no art, especially no fiction; yet the management of empathy is not easil y taught. The Holocaust testimony project, an active if belated response, relays terrible stories, yet in a bearable way, most of the time. In the telling, the psychologist Judith Herman has remarked, the trauma story becomes a testimony; an d in the hearing of it th e listener, wh o as interviewer enables the telling , i s a partner in an act of remembering forward tha t obliges us to receive rather than repress inhuman events . So the wors t returns to haunt late r generations. But it als o gives them a chance to work it through . That i s still a crude way of putting it, however . We know from Primo Levi's The Drowned and the Saved that the "ocean of pain" for the survivors rose instead of ebbing from year to year, and that the just among them were afflicted wit h a shame that could not be cleansed. In fact, a s these storie s circulate, in the for m o f video-testimonies, an d generally as written memoir s or fictionalized accounts—as they gradually, and not always in a conscious manner, reach the public, we see the beginning of a rather astonishing phenomenon . I call i t memory-envy . A n extreme cas e may be that o f Binjamin Wilkomirski , whose Fragments was hailed as the most authentic depictio n so far of a child survivor of the Holocaust. Yet the chance s ar e that Wilkomirsk i was brought up in Switzerland and never saw the inside of a concentration camp . His identification, nevertheless, with survivor experiences is quite convincing. The author internalizes what he has heard, read, or seen in movies and photos, and it emerges as his own experience. Here the creative and the pathogenic are hard to tell apart. Some deep envy may be at work, particularly in thos e who have no strong memories themselves—"strong" also in the sense that they bestow social recognition. The pressure to own a distinctive identity , howeve r painful, play s into this: better to recover false memories than none, or only weak ones. An equall y interestin g althoug h ver y differen t cas e i s Harol d Pinter' s play, Ashes t o Ashes (1996) . It depicts a woman who is being interrogated by her husband about the sadistic practices of a former lover. Rebecca seems to have tolerated o r been hypnotize d b y them. Perhap s she is still under their spell . Th e Holocaust is neve r mentioned , but her mind , lik e Sylvi a Plath's, live s in its penumbra—in a memory, perhaps a fantasy, dominated by male violence, the loss of babies, an d of the innocenc e the y evoke . Her husband is unable to bring her back; his very questioning becomes another kind of violence. As in the setting for survivor testimony, the stage is bare of props and the only action is a (tormented) interview. It comes as a shock to hear Rebecca repeat, at the end and climax of the play, the word s of a woman who had her baby taken away (I quote verbatim here but leav e out the "Echo " which, i n the play, repeats the last words of each phrase):
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They too k us to the train s They wer e taking the babies away I took m y baby and wrapped it in my shaw l And I made it into a bundle And I held it under my left ar m And I went throug h wit h my baby But the baby cried ou t And the man called m e back And he said what do you have there He stretched ou t his hand fo r the bundl e And I gave him th e bundl e And that's the last time I held the bundl e And we arrived at this place And I met a woman I knew And she said what happene d to your baby Where is your baby And I said what baby I don't hav e a baby I don't know of any baby 7
The words were a shock because they reproduce with sligh t change s and omissions thos e of a survivor in a Yale testimony.81 read them first in a 1998 New Yorker review of Pinter's play after it was staged in America. We glimpse here how diffusion occurs : how Holocaus t memory influences affectively a wider public. For it is improbable that Pinte r could have seen the Yale testimony i n question. It is far more likely tha t he saw those words in a book by Lawrence Langer, who was the first to study the Yale archive in Holocaust Testimonies: The Ruins of Memory. Tha t boo k di d not quot e these particula r words, bu t a later boo k by Langer, Admitting the Holocaust (1995), does—in a chapter, interestingly enough, on Cythnia Ozick's "The Shawl." 9 In Pinter the original memory-milieu of the survivor's words is elided. No one could guess that "Echo" is, in a sense, a real person, namely, Pinter, whose mind has played back, almost verbatim, a description of the traum a of deportation. We pick up clues about the Holocaust context earlier in the play, but this final monologue clinches th e matter. Ye t what i s remarkable is less tha t contex t tha n it s resonance: the Holocaust has invaded Rebecca's (and the dramatist's) consciousness to such an extent that no further historical specificity is needed—indeed, to be more explicit might limit the power and pathos of this short play. We have no technical term , tha t I know of, to describe the playwright' s symbolic method, although Aharon Appelfeld too, in some novels, allows the setting of the actio n t o b e at onc e recognizable and unspecific. (Th e kind of denial depicted in Alber t Camus' s The Plague, whose contex t certainl y include s the wartime persecution o f the Jews in France, is conventionally, though effectively , allegorical.)10 However unique the contextualizing event , Pinter wishes to make the woman' s narrative express a general aspect of the huma n condition . One i s
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left wonderin g how ofte n thi s occurs in literature—how often w e fail to identif y the elided circumstance. Perhaps this is what Aristotle meant when he said that poetry is more philosophical tha n history . I n Greek tragedy, moreover, with it s moments o f highly condensed dialogue, the framing legend is so well known that it does not have to be emphasized. A powerful abstraction, or simplification, takes over. In this sense, and this sense only, the Holocaust is on the way to becoming a legendary event . In Pinter' s cas e we ca n trac e ho w th e historica l referen t almos t elide s itself. The very resonance o f the even t bot h broadens it an d makes it vanish— a pattern similar to waves caused by a pebble thrown into water. Key phrases have migrated from a videotaped testimony t o a scholarly book to a popular play to an influential magazine's review of the play. Ashes to Ashes, however, is an unusually conscious case of memory-envy. Holocaust imager y has been adapted rather tha n appropriated, and Rebecca's passion narrative suggests a sympathetic rathe r than total identification. Her repetition o f the survivor's account is a self-redeeming, if nonconsoling, reenactment . Two concerns remain . A t what poin t doe s diffusio n becom e commodificatio n and banalize, rathe r tha n universalize , a new representational genr e (the videotestimony), o r Holocaust memor y itself ? Wil l everything end up, not eve n i n a scholarly book, or as the climax to an enigmatic and moving play, but a s a series of conventionalized iconi c episodes variously packaged? A further concern , more distinctly ethical, is Pinter's use of this incident. Imagery from the historical Holocaust is made to fuse with a very private and precarious mental condition. Some might characteriz e this as exploitation. Yet it ma y be , as I have suggested, an inevitable an d eve n appropriat e development. For the patho s o f the testimon y moment loses its specific context precisel y because it arouses a widespread anxiety: her e concernin g th e los s o f a chil d an d th e traumati c repressio n o f that memory. What others suffer , w e should suffer . Try to suffer , tha t is. The entir e problematic o f how w e can feel fo r others—and continue t o feel for them—surfaces here. The pressure to respond with empathy (not an unlimited resource) is enormous, an d it produces what has been called compassion fatigue . But it coul d als o incite anger and hate: first, perhaps, turned inward as a form of self-disgust (and leading to depression should we deem ourselves insufficiently responsive), then turne d outward as a sadistic or callous action, and completing in this manner a vicious cycle. This cycle is inevitable if we overidentify, in the very name of morality, with the victims, or do not respect the differenc e betwee n their sufferin g an d our own. As Primo Levi and Charlotte Delbo have observed, even the words that seem to describe that suffering become false tokens when it comes to the Shoah. "Hunger" an d "tomorrow" do not mean in everyday language what they meant in the camps. At this point art discloses its truest reason. Art expands the sympathetic
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imagination while teaching us about the limits of sympathy. Such teaching hopes to brin g the cognitiv e an d the emotiona l int o alignment . Ther e i s no formula , however, fo r aesthetic educatio n o f this kind : it mus t star t earl y an d continu e beyond the university, perhaps for a lifetime. It is rarely prescriptive, and, although it may schematize itself as a set of rules (as a poetics or a hermeneutics), the type of thinking involved seems to import a structural moment of indeterminacy tha t escapes the brain's binary wiring. A sort of unframed perception becomes possible, a suspension o r confusion of personal identity a s at th e en d of Pinter's play, one that touches on what Keats named "negative capability." Because to think sufferin g is different tha n to think abou t suffering, it is not the absenc e of meaning that disturb s Maurice Blanchot, for example, but it s presence: mor e precisely, wha t disturb s hi m is the temptation t o foreclose "th e writing of disaster" by assigning meaning too quickly. "Danger that the disaster take on meaning rather than body." "Watch over absent meaning." "Tr y to think with grief. " Visual literacy i s even furthe r behin d in recognizing this challeng e than literary study. While Kracauer's axiom that the cinema "aims at transform ing the agitated witness into a conscious observer"11 recognizes how important a human resource film can be, it understates the moral problematic: the guilt or shame accompanying sight, and the vicissitudes o f empathy. Today the dominanc e of the video-visual has become a fact of life as clear as other global influences. It has a bearing on both morality and mentality. However difficult it is to disenchant the medium of TV, we must find a way to approach it as more than a source of entertainment o r information. Above all, "useless violence" ( a phrase coined by Primo Levi to describe Nazi brutality), when routinely transmitted by TV in fantasy for m o r real-time reportage, should lead to intens e self-reflection. Th e hyperrealit y of the imag e in contemporar y modes of cultural production not only makes critical thinking more difficult but at once incites and nullifies a healthy illusion: that reality could be an object of desire rather than of an aversion overcome. NOTES 1. Stanley's Cavell's Th e World Viewed: Reflections o n th e Ontology of Film (New York: Viking, 1971 ) discusses i n chapte r 2 the wa y the photographi c medium achieve s its effec t of "presentness" by "automatism" or (seemingly) "removing th e huma n agen t from th e tas k of reproduction." 2. For the issue s raised in this paragraph, see Pierre Bourdieu, Sur la television: suivi d e L'emprise du journalisme (Paris: Raisons d'agir, 1996). Also see "Ces grands patrons qui tiennent les medias," Le Nouvel Observateur no. 1808 , July 1-7, 1999 : 8-18 . 3. The tension that what we know about the world comes primarily from th e mass media, even while we are haunted by the suspicion that all we are given to see is manipulated, has been explored by Niklas Luhman. A striking example of what he calls Manipulations-Verdacht i s the assertion o f Goran Matic, a minister i n Milosevic' s government, who claime d "tha t wha t th e world had assumed were refugees—driven fro m thei r homes by Serbian police and paramilitary units—were in fact 3,000 or so ethnic Albanian 'actors/ paid $5.50 each . .. by the CIA to take part in a NATO 'screenplay.' New Republic, May 31, 1999 : 12.
124 Geoffrey Hartman 4. Siegfried Kracauer , Theory o f Film (New York: Oxford University Press, I960), 300. 5. Kracauer 1960: Ix . 6. Final Harvest: Emily Dickinson's Poems, ed. Thomas H. Johnson (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), 234 (1039 in Johnston's numbering). 7. Harold Pinter, Ashes t o Ashes (London : Faber and Faber, 1996). 8. Bessie K., Holocaust Testimony (HV T 205), Fortunoff Vide o Archive for Holocaust Testimonies, Yal e University. 9. Lawrence Langer, Admitting th e Holocaust: Collected Essays (Ne w York: Oxford University Press, 1995) , 142-43. 10. A related technique, which elides, however, a fictional rather than documentary source, is found in E. L. Doctorow's nove l Ragtime. The novel's hero, Coalhouse Walker Jr., and its basic theme of an irrationally stubbor n pursuit of justice, are based on a famous novella by Heinrich Kleist, Michael Kolhaas. But in Doctorow the historica l sixteenth-century setting of the story is transposed to a new, clearly defined contemporary milieu . 11. Kracauer 1960:58.
Film
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Miriam Bratu Hansen
Schindler's List Is Not Shoah: Second Commandment, Popular Modernism, and Publi c Memory If ther e wer e a Richter scal e t o measur e th e exten t t o whic h commercia l film s cause reverberations in the traditional public sphere, the effec t of Schindler's List might come close to, or at least fall into the general range of D. W. Griffith's racis t blockbuster o f 1915 , Th e Birth o f a Nation. I f w e bracke t obviou s difference s between the films (which are perhaps not quit e as obvious as they may seem), as well as eight decades of media history, the comparison is tempting because a similar seismic intensit y characterize s both Spielberg's ambition an d the film's public reception.1 Each film demonstratively takes on a trauma of collective historica l dimensions,- and each reworks this trauma in the nam e of memory and national identity, inscribed with particular notions of race, sexuality, and family. Each film participates in the contested discourse of fiftieth-year commemorations, markin g the eventual surrender of survivor- (or veteran-) based memory to the vicissitude s of public history. While Birth of a Nation was not the first film to deal with the Civil War and its aftermat h (ther e were in fact dozen s of Civil War films between 1911 and 1915), the film did lay unprecedented claim to the construction of national history and thus demonstrated the stakes of national memory for the history of the present. And while Schindler's List is certainly not the first film to deal with the German Judeocide, Spielberg's story about a Sudeten-German Catholic entrepreneur wh o save d the live s o f 1,10 0 Polish }ew s asserts a similar plac e of centrality in contemporary U.S. culture and politics. On the level of reception, both Birth and Schindler's List provoked responses from far beyond the pale of industrial-commercial culture , getting attention fro m writers, activists, and politicians who usually don't take films seriously,- it thus temporarily linked the respective media publics (emergent in the case of Birth, allinclusive i n the case of Schindler's List] with the publics of traditional politics and critical intellectuals. 2 What is extraordinary about these two films is not just how they managed to catalyze contesting points of view but also how they make visible the contestatio n amon g various and unequal discursiv e arena s in thei r effor t t o lay claim t o wha t an d how a nation remembers—no t a n identical nation , t o be From Critical Inquiry 22, Winter 1996 : 292-312. Reprinte d by permission of the autho r and the University of Chicago Press.
_U8_ Miriam Bratu Hamen
sure, but distinctl y different formation s o f a national public. As is well known, Birth was the first film to be given a screening at the White House (after whic h President Wilson's comment, "It is like writing history in lightning," became part of the legend), but it was also the first film to galvanize intellectual and political opposition in an alliance of Progressive reformers and the newly formed NAACP. As is likewise known , not all intellectuals protested : Birth became the foundin g text fo r an apologetic discourse on "film art " tha t for decades tried to relativize the film's racist infraction. 3 Here, at the latest, my comparison turns into disanalogy. For can we compare the violent and persistent damag e done to African Americans by Birth to the damage done, as some critics claim, by Schindler's List to the victims in whose name it pretends to speak? And can we compare the white and black, liberal and radical engagement for a disenfranchised community t o the contemporary intellectual stance that holds all representations o f the Shoah accountable to the task of a n anamnestic solidarit y with the dead ? To what extent is the disjunctio n of the tw o films a matter of the differen t historie s they engage and to what exten t does it illustrate the profound transformation of public memory in contemporary media culture? What do we make, in each case, of the ambivalen t effect s o f popular success? And how, finally, does popularity as such shape the critical accounts we get of the films ? In the following , I will try t o trace some of the dynamics at work in th e reception o f Schindler's List. I regar d the controversie s over the fil m a s symptomatic of larger issues, in particular the ongoing problematic of Holocaust remembrance an d th e so-calle d Americanization o f the Holocaust , but als o th e mor e general issue of the relationship of intellectuals to mass culture, specifically to th e media publics of cinema and television. I see both these issues encapsulated in the pervasive polarization of critical argument into the opposition of Schindler's List versus Claude Lanzmann's documentary Shoah (1985), as two mutually exclusive paradigms of cinematically representin g or not-representing the Holocaust. This opposition, I will argue, does not yield a productive way of dealing with either the films or the larger issues involved. I distinguish, roughly, among three major strands or levels in the reception of Schindler's List, First, there is the level of official publicity. Under this term I lump together a whole variety of channels and discourses, ranging from Spielberg's self-promotion an d the usua l Hollywood hype (culminating in th e Osca r Award ceremony) to presidential endorsement s a t hom e an d abroad as well a s government bannings of the fil m i n some Near Eastern and Asian countries,- from subsidized and mandatory screenings for high school student s and youth groups to the largely adulatory coverage in the trad e papers, the dail y press, and TV talk shows. The second, though by no means secondary, level of reception is the mercurial factor of popular reception. While this reception is no doubt produced and shaped by official publicity, it cannot be totally reduced to intended response. The
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distinct dynamic s o f popula r receptio n come s t o th e for e i n precisel y thos e moments when an audience diverges or goes away from th e film, when reception takes on a momentum of its own , that is, becomes public in the emphatic sense of the word. 4 This includes moments of failure, such as the much publicized irreverent reaction of black students at Castlemont Hig h in Oakland. 5 It also includes the film' s enormou s succes s i n Germany , which prompte d endless discussions , letters t o th e editor , an d the discover y of local Schindler s everywhere—a development on e canno t bu t vie w wit h amazemen t an d ambivalence. Methodologically, this aspect of reception is the mos t difficul t t o represent, for it eludes both ethnographic audienc e researc h an d textuall y base d construction s o f possibl e spectatorial effects,- yet it requires an approach that is capable of mediating empirical and theoretical levels of argument. The thir d level of reception, on which I will focus here, is the vehemen t rejection of the fil m o n the par t of critical intellectuals. Thi s includes both academics an d journalists , avant-gard e artists an d filmmaker s (amon g others , Ar t Spiegelman and Ken Jacobs in a symposium printed in the Village Voice], but als o a fair number of liberal publicists (fo r example, Frank Rich, Leon Wieseltier, Philip Gourevitch, Ilene Rosenzweig) who voiced their dissent in middle-brow papers such as the New York Times, the New Republic, the New York Review of Books as well as Jewish publications such as Forward, Tikkun, and Commentary. Mos t of these critical comment s positio n themselve s a s minorit y opinio n agains t th e film' s allegedly overwhelming endorsement in the media, if not as martyrs in the "resistance" against popular taste ("ther e is little pleasure in being troubled by what so many have found deeply moving").6 Accordingly, critical dissent is directed as much agains t the large r impact of the film—which Michael Andre Bernstein has dubbed "the Schindler's List effect" 7—as agains t the film itself. This response is no doubt legitimate and, in print a t least, highly persuasive. For all I know, I might well have joined in, that is, had I seen the film in this country rather than in Germany. The kin d of work the fil m di d there, in light of a hopelessly overdetermined and yet rapidly changing "politics of memory," may arguably present a special case. 8 Seeing the film outside the contex t of American publicity, however , mad e m e conside r th e film' s textua l work , i f not indepen dently of its intentions and public effects, ye t still from a slightly displaced location in relation to both Hollywood globality and its intellectual critics. Let me say at the outset that it is not my intention to vindicate Schindler's List as a masterpiece (which would mean reverting to the Birth of a Nation debate). I think there are serious problems with th e film' s conception , an d I could have done withou t much o f the las t third , whe n Oska r Schindle r (Lia m Neeson) , the opportunist , gambler, and philanderer, turns into Schindler, the heroic rescuer. But seen fro m a perspective of displacement, an d considered from a n interstitial spac e between distinct critical discourses and between disjunctive political legacies, the film did seem t o have an important function , not onl y for empirically divers e audiences, but als o fo r thinkin g throug h ke y issue s involve d in th e representatio n o f th e
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Shoah and the problem of "public memory."9 Moreover, in the way the film polarized, or was assumed to have polarized, critical and popular responses, the reception o f Schindler's List threw into relie f a particular pattern in the intellectuals ' reactions to the film: they seemed to rehearse familiar tropes of the old debate on modernism versu s mass culture. Before I elaborate on this pattern, and on what it occludes in the public as well as textual workings of the film, I will first outline the intellectual critiqu e in its key points. The following summary distinguishes, roughly, among arguments pertaining to (a) the culture industry (in Horkheimer and Adorno's sense); (b) the problem of narrative; (c) the question of cinematic subjectivity; and (d) the question o f representation. (a) The first and obvious argumen t i s that Schindler's List is and remains a Hollywood product. As such it is circumscribed by the economi c and ideological tenets o f the cultur e industry , with it s unquestione d an d supreme values of entertainment an d spectacle; its fetishism of style and glamour; its penchant for superlatives and historicist gras p at any and all experience (''the greatest Holocaust film ever made"); and its reifying, leveling , and trivializing effect o n everything it touches. In this argument, Schindler's List is usually aligned with Spielberg's previous mega-spectacles, especially Jurassic Park, an d is accused of having turned the Holocaust into a theme park. Since the business of Hollywood is entertainment, preferably i n th e ke y of sentimental optimism , ther e i s something intrinsicall y and profoundly incommensurable about "re-creating" the traumatic events of the Shoah "for the sak e of an audience's recreation" (Spiegelman). 10 Or, as J. Hoberman puts it so eloquently: "I s it possible to make a feel-good entertainment abou t the ultimate feel-ba d experience of the twentiet h century?" 11 This critique o f Schindler's List link s the fil m t o th e large r problem of the Holocaust' s dubiou s mass-media currency, recalling the ugl y pun o f "Shoahbusiness." The interesting question here is whether Spielberg's film is merely the latest culminatio n o f what Sau l Friedlander discerned, in film s an d novels of the 1970s, as a "new discours e about Nazism o n the righ t as well a s on the left, " a discourse tha t thrive d on the spectacula r fusio n o f kitsch an d death. 12 Or doe s Schindler's List, along with the succes s of the Holocaus t Memoria l Museum in Washington, D.C., mark the emergenc e of yet anothe r new discourse ? If the latte r is the case, this new discourse, whose different dynamic s the film might hel p us understand, wil l hav e t o b e situate d i n relatio n t o othe r struggle s ove r publi c memorializing concernin g mor e specificall y U.S. American traumat a suc h a s slavery, the genocide of Native Americans, an d Vietnam. (b) The second and more local argument made about the film's inadequacy to the topi c it engage s is that i t doe s so in th e for m o f a fictional narrative. One emphasis in this argument is on the choic e of fiction (notwithstanding the film' s pretensions to historical "authenticity" ) ove r nonfiction o r documentary, a form of fil m practice that would have allowed for a different organizatio n of space and temporality, differen t sound/imag e relations, an d therefore differen t possibilitie s
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of approachin g the event s portrayed. Attendant upo n the film' s fictiona l form— with its (nineteenth-century) novelistic and historicist underpinnings—is the claim, supported by the publicity and Spielberg's complicity with it, that Schindler's List does not just represent one story from th e Shoa h but tha t it does so in a representative manner—that it encapsulates the totalit y of the Holocaust experience. 13 If that wer e the case , the film' s focu s o n the heroic exception, th e Gentil e rescue r and the miracle of survival, would indeed distort the proportions and thus end up falsifying th e record. Related to this charge is the condemnatio n of the film' s choic e of a particular type of narrative, specifically, the classical mode that governed Hollywood products until about 1960 and beyond.14 In a technical sense , this term refers to a type o f narrativ e tha t require s thoroug h causa l motivatio n centerin g o n th e actions and goals of individual characters (as opposed to the "anonymous " Jewish masses who were the objec t o f extermination); a type of narrative in which character psychology and relations amon g characters ten d t o b e predicated on masculinist hierarchie s o f gender and sexualit y (i n the cas e of Schindler's List, th e reassertion o f certain "style s o f manhood" an d the sadistic-voyeuristi c fascina tion wit h th e femal e body , i n particula r th e stagin g o f Amon Goeth' s [Ralp h Fiennes] desir e an d hi s violenc e towar d Hele n Hirsch , th e Jewis h housemai d [Embeth Davidtz]); 15 a typ e o f narrative i n whic h th e resolutio n o f larger-order problems tends to hinge upon the formation of a couple or family and on the restoration of familial forms of subjectivity (Schindler as a super father figure who has t o renounce his promiscuity an d return t o marriage in order to accomplish his historic mission, th e rescu e of Jewish families). 16 A fundamental limitation o f classical narrative in relation to history, and to the historical event of the Shoa h in particular, is that i t relies on neoclassicist principles of compositional unity, motivation, linearity, equilibrium, and closure— principles singularl y inadequat e i n th e fac e o f an even t tha t b y it s ver y nature defies ou r narrative urge to make sense of, to impose order on the discontinuit y and otherness of historical experience. Likewise, the deadly teleology of the Shoah represents a temporal trajector y tha t give s the li e to any classical dramaturg y of deadlines, suspense, and rescues in the nick of time, to moments of melodramatic intensity and relief. There are at least three last-minute rescues in Schindler's List, leading up to the compulsory Hollywood happy ending. This radically exacerbate s the genera l proble m o f narrativ e film , whic h Alexande r Klug e ha s succinctl y described as the problem of "how t o get to a happy ending without lying." 17 The rescue of the Schindler Jews is a matter o f luck an d gamble rather than melodramatic coincidence ; an d although the stor y is historically "authentic, " it canno t but remai n a fairy tal e i n th e fac e o f the overwhelmin g facticity of "man-mad e mass death" (Edit h Wyschogrod).18 Critics of the film, notably Claude Lanzmann and Gertrud Koch, have observed that Schindler's List (lik e Agnieszka Holland's 1991 Europa, Europa) mark s a shift i n th e publi c commemoration o f the Shoah : the fil m i s concerned with survival, the surviva l of individuals, rathe r than th e
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fact o f death, the deat h of an entire people or peoples.19 If the possibilit y of passing through Auschwitz is the film's central historical trope, the implications are indeed exorbitant—although not necessarily, in my opinion, that self-evident and unequivocal. Finally, as a classical narrative , Schindler's List inscribes itsel f i n a particular tradition o f "realist" film. This is not just a matter of Spielberg's declared efforts to ensure "authenticity" (by using authentic locations, by following Thomas Keneally's novel, which is based on survivor testimony); nor is it simply a matter of th e us e o f black-and-white fil m stoc k an d the imitatio n of a particular 1940 s style. The film's "reality effect," t o use Roland Barthes's phrase, has as much to do with the way it recycles images and tropes from other Holocaust films, especially European ones; but a s a classical narrative , it doe s so without quotatio n marks, pretending to be telling the story for the first time.20 As Koch argues, there is something authoritarian i n the way Schindler's List subsumes al l these earlie r films, using the m t o asser t it s ow n trut h claim s fo r history ("MMM, " 25-26) . Th e question that poses itself is whether the film's citational practice merely follows the well-worn path of nineteenth-century realis t fiction, or whether it does so in the contex t o f a postmodern aesthetics tha t ha s rehabilitated suc h syncretisti c procedures in th e name of popular resonance and success. Th e more interestin g question, though, may be to what extent this distinction actually matters, or in which ways the event of the Shoah could be said to trouble, if not challenge postmodernist assumptions about representation, temporality, and history. (c) Th e third objection raised against Schindler's List pertains to the way it allocate s subjectivity among its character s and engages the viewer' s subjec tivity in that process. The charge here is that the film narrates the history of 1,100 rescued Jews from th e perspective of the perpetrators, the Germa n Gentile Nazi turned resister and his alter ego, Anion Goeth, the psychotic SS commandant. As Philip Gourevitch asserts, "Schindler's List depicts the Nazis' slaughter of Polish Jewry almost entirely through German eyes." 21 By contrast, the argumen t goes, the Jewish characters are reduced to pasteboard figures, to generic types incapable of eliciting identification and empathy. Or worse, some critics contend, they come to lif e onl y t o embod y anti-Semitic stereotype s (money-grubbin g Jews , Jew-aseternal-victim, th e associatio n o f Jewish women wit h dangerou s sexuality, th e characterization of Itzhak Ster n [Ben Kingsley], Schindler's accountant, a s "kin g of th e Jewis h wimps").22 This argument no t onl y refer s t o th e degre e to whic h characters are fleshed out, individualized by means of casting, acting, cinematography, and narrative action; the argument also pertains to the level of filmic narration or enunciation, th e level at which characters function to mediate the film's sights and sounds, events and meanings to the spectator, as for instance throug h flashbacks, voice-over , or optical point of view. As psychoanalytic film theorists have argued in the 1970 s and early 1980s, it i s on this level that cinemati c subjectivity is formed most effectively because unconsciously.23 If that is so (and let's for th e moment, for the sak e of argument, assume it is) , what does it mea n tha t
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point-of-view shots are clustered not only around Schindler but also around Goeth, making u s participate i n on e of his killin g spree s in shot s showin g th e victi m through the telescope of his gun? Does this mean that, even though he is marked as evi l o n th e leve l o f the diegesi s o r fictional world of the film , th e viewe r i s nonetheless urge d to identify with Goeth's murderous desire on the unconsciou s level of cinematic discourse? (d) Th e fourth , an d most difficult , objectio n t o Schindler's List is that i t violates the taboo on representation (Bilderverbot), tha t it tries to give an "image of the unimaginable." 24 If the criticisms summarized up to this point imply by and large that the film is not "realistic" enough, this critique involves the exact opposite charge, that the film is too "realistic." So, by offering us an "authentic" reconstruction o f events o f the Shoah , the fil m enhance s th e fallac y o f an immediat e and unmediated access to th e pas t (the fallacy o f historical film s fro m Birth of a Nation to JFK)—by posing as the "real thing" the film usurps the place of the actual event. What is worse, it does so with an event that defies depiction, whose horror renders any attempt at direct representation obscene. Spielberg transgresses the boundaries of representability mos t notoriously, critics agree, when he takes the camera across the threshold o f what we, and the women in the film "mistakenly" deporte d to Auschwitz, believe to be a gas chamber. Thus Schindler's List, like the TV miniseries Holocaust, ends up both trivializing and sensationalizing the Shoah. The most radical proponent of this critique, Lanzmann, accuses Schindler's List of not respecting the unique and absolute status of the Holocaust: "unique in the sense that it erects around itself, in a circle of flames, a boundary which cannot be breached because a certain absolute degree of horror is intransmissable: t o pretend it can be done is to make oneself guilty of the most seriou s sort of transgression."25 The counterexample of a film that respects that boundary and succeeds in a n aesthetic figuratio n o f the ver y impossibility o f representation is , for both Lanzmann and other critics of Spielberg, his ow n film Shoah (1985). Lanzmann's film, as has often been pointed out, strictly refuses any direct representation of the past, whether by means of fictional reenactment o r archival footage. Instead, th e film combine s interviews featuring various types of witnesses (survivors , perpetrators, bystanders, historians) to give testimony a t once to the physical, sense defying details of mass extermination and to the "historical crisis of witnessing" presented by the Shoah. 26 This crisis threaten s no t merel y the project o f a retrospective, anamnestic account, but th e very possibility and concept of eyewitnessing and, by extension, th e recordin g capacity of the photographic media. (This is why Lanzman n s o radicall y distrust s Spielberg' s untrouble d accessing—or , a s Lanzmann call s it, "fabrication"—o f a visual archive : "If I had foun d a n actua l film—a secre t film , sinc e tha t was strictly forbidden—mad e by an SS man an d showing how 3000 Jews , men, women, and children, died together, asphyxiate d in a gas chamber of the crematorium 2 in Auschwitz—if I had found that, not only would I not have shown it but I would have destroyed it.")27
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Lanzmann's argument, like the critique of Schindler's List in the name of Shoah, is bound up with a complex philosophical debat e surrounding the Holocaust to which I cannot do justice here. Suffice i t to say that the moral argument about the impossibilit y o f representation—of mimeti c doubling—is linked, via a quasi-theological invocation o f the Secon d Commandment, to th e issu e o f th e singularity o f the Shoah , it s statu s a s a n even t tha t i s totall y an d irrevocably Other, an event that ruptures and is ultimately outside history. What matters in this context is the further linkage, often made concurrently, between the claim to singularity and the typ e of aesthetic practice that alone is thought to be capable of engaging the problematic of representation without disfiguring the memory of the dead. For the breach inflicted by the Shoa h has not only put int o question, irrevocably, the status of culture as an autonomous and superior domain (to invoke an often misquoted statement by Adorno);28 it has also radicalized the case for a type of aestheti c expressio n that is aware of its problemati c status—the nonrepresentational, singular, and hermetic ecriture to be found in works of high modernism. Shoah ha s rightl y bee n praise d for its uniqueness , it s rigorou s and uncompromising invention o f a filmic language capable of rendering "imageless images" of
annihilation (Koch paraphrasing Adorno's Aesthetic Theory}.29 Schindler's List,
by contrast, doe s not see k to negate the representational , iconic power of filmic images, but rather banks on this power. Nor does it develop a unique filmic idiom to captur e th e unprecedente d an d unassimilabl e fac t o f mass extermination ; rather, it relies on familiar tropes and common techniques t o narrate the extraordinary rescue of a group of individuals. The critiqu e of Schindler's List in high-modernist terms, however, especially in Lanzmann' s version, reduces the dialectic s o f the problem of representing the unrepresentable to a binary opposition of showing or not showing—rathe r than casting it, a s one might, a s an issue of competing representations and competing modes of representation. This binary argument also reinscribes, paradoxically, a high-modernist fixation on vision and the visual, whether simply assumed as the epistemologica l master sense or critically negated as illusory and affirma tive. What gets left ou t i s the dimensio n o f the othe r senses and of sensory experience, that is, the aesthetic in the more comprehensive, Greek sense of the word, and its fate in a history of modernity that encompasses both mass production and mass extermination. 30 What gets left ou t i n particular i s the dimensio n o f the acoustic, the rol e of sound in the production of visuality, especially in the technical media where sound has come to compensate for the historical marginalization of th e mor e bodily senses. Yet, if we understand the Shoah' s challenge to repre sentation t o be as much one of affect a s one of epistemology, the specifi c sensory means of engaging this challenge cannot be ignored. The sound track, for example, is neither the seat of a superior truth (as Lanzmann seems to claim for Shoah} nor merely a masked accomplice for the untruth s o f the imag e track (as assumed in summary critiques of the classical Hollywood film), but rathe r the material site of particular and competing aesthetic practices. 31
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It is no coincidence that non e of the critic s of Schindler's List have commented o n the film' s us e o f sound (except for complaints abou t th e sentimenta l and melodramatic music)—no t to mention how few have actually granted th e film a closer look. Although I share some of the reservations paraphrased above, I still would argue that Schindler's List is a more sophisticated, elliptical, an d selfconscious film than its critics acknowledge (and the self-consciousness is not limited to the epilogue in which w e see the actors togethe r with th e survivors the y play file past Schindler's Jerusalem grave). Let me cite a few, brief examples tha t suggest that we might imagin e thi s film differently, examples pertaining t o both the film' s comple x use o f sound and its structurin g o f narration and cinemati c subjectivity. To begin with the latter point, the complaint that the film is narrated from the poin t of view of the perpetrator s ignores the crucia l function o f Itzhak Stern (Ben Kingsley) , the Jewis h accountant, in the enunciativ e structur e of the film. Throughout th e film, Stern is the focus of point-of-view edits and reaction shots , just as he repeatedly motivates camera movements and shot changes. Stern is the only characte r who get s to authoriz e a flashback, in th e sequenc e in which h e responds to Schindler's attemp t t o defen d Goet h ("a wonderful crook" ) by evoking a scene of Goeth's close-rang e shooting o f twenty-five men in a work detail i n retribution for one man's escape; closer framing within the flashback in turn fore grounds, as mute witness, the prisoner to whom Stern attributes the account. The sequence i s remarkabl e als o i n tha t i t contain s th e film' s onl y flashforward, prompted by Schindler's exasperated question, "Wha t do you want me to do about it?" Notwithstandin g Stern' s disavowin g gestur e ("nothing , nothing—it' s jus t talking"), his flashback narration translates into action on Schindler's part, resulting in the requisitioning of the Pearlmans as workers, which is shown proleptically even before Schindler hands Stern his watch to be used as bribe. This moment no t only marks, on the diegeti c level of the film , Schindler' s firs t consciou s engagement in bartering for Jewish lives; it also inscribes the absolute difference in power between Gentiles an d Jews on the level of cinematic discourse, as a disjunction of filmic temporality. Ster n is deprived of his ability, his right to act, that is, to produce a future, but he can narrate the past and pass on testimony, hoping to produce action in the listener/viewer. More often, temporal displacement i s a function of the sound track, in particular a n abundance of sound bridges and other forms of nonmatching (suc h as a character's speec h o r readin g turnin g int o documentary-styl e voice-over) ; and there ar e numerous moments whe n th e forma l disjunctio n o f sound an d image subtends rhetorica l relation s o f irony an d eve n counterpoint . Thi s disjunctiv e style occur s primaril y o n the leve l of diegetic sound , in particular, speech. (The use of nondiegetic music i n Schindler's List is indeed another matter, inasmuc h as it function s more like th e "glue " that traditionall y cover s over any discontinuity an d sutures th e viewe r into th e film.) 32 But the persisten t splittin g o f the image track by means o f displaced diegetic soun d still undercuts th e effec t o f an
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immediate and totalitaria n grasp on reality—such a s that produce d by perfec t sound/image matching in numerous Worl d War II films or, to use a more recent example, Stone's JFK. In the sequenc e tha t initiates the liquidatio n o f the Krako w ghetto (fig ures 1-16), disjunctive sound/image relations combine with camera narration that foregrounds Stern' s point o f view. The sequenc e i s defined b y the duratio n o f an acoustic event, Goeth's speech that begins and ends with the phrase "today is history." The speech starts in the middle of a series of four shots alternating between Schindler and Goeth shaving, which briefly makes it an acoustic flashforward. Only in the fifth shot is the voice grounded in the speaking character, Goeth now dressed in a uniform, addressing his men who stand around him i n a wide circle. In the shots that follow, the speech appears to function as a kind of voice-over, speaking the history of the ghetto's inhabitants and the imminent erasure of this history and its subjects. But the images of the living people we see—a rabbi praying, a family having breakfast, a man an d a woman exchanging loving looks—also resist thi s predication. S o does the voice of the rabbi that competes with Goeth's voice even before we see him pray , and it continues , a s an undertone to Goeth's voice, into the subsequent shot s of ghetto inhabitants (s o that in one shot, in which we hear the subdued synchronic voices of the family at breakfast, there are actually three different layer s of sound); the praying voice fades out just before the last sentenc e of Goeth' s speech . Not coincidentally , al l the Jewis h characters shown in thi s sequence will survive, that is, they will, as individuals, give the lie to Goeth's project. What is more, nested into this sequence is a pronounced point-of-view pattern that centers on Stern and makes him the first to witness the ominous preparations. The ac t of looking is emphasized by a close-up of him puttin g on his glasses and turning to the window, and by the answering extreme high-angle shot that frame s window and curtain from his vantage point. This shot is repeated, after two objective, almost emblematic shots (closel y framed an d violating screen direction) of rows of chairs an d tables being set u p by uniformed arms an d hands, an d the n bookended by a medium shot o f Stern watching and turning away from th e window. The whole sequence is symmetrically closed by reattaching Goeth's voice to his body, thus sealing the fate of the majority of the ghetto population, the people not shown on the image track. To be sure, the film's hierarchy of physicality and masculinity woul d never allow Stern to be seen shaving (as Schindler and Goeth are in the beginning of the sequence). But the structuring of vision on the level of enunciation establishes Stern as a witness for the narration, for the viewer, for posterity. By contrast, moment s of subjectiv e vision ascribe d to Schindler , most notabl y the point-of-vie w shot s that stage his two sightings of the little girl in the red coat, serve quite a different function, stressin g character psychology rather than narrational authority. Stern's role as enunciative witness is particularly interesting in a sequence that does not involve optical point of view—the sequence in which Goeth kills Lisiek (Wojciech Klata), the bo y whom he has made his personal servant (figure s 17-22) . What is
Figure I . Today i s history;
Figure 2. - today will be remembered.
Figure 3. - Years from now the young will ask with wonder about
Figure 4 . -thi s day. Today i s history and you are part of it. Six hundred years ago,
Rabbi's voice praying
Figure 5. -when elsewhere they were put in the blame for the black death, Casimir the Great
Figure 6. -so-called, told the Jews they could come to
Figure 7. -Krakow. They came, they trundled their belongings into the city; they
Mrs. Dresner's voice: a bit les s
Figure 8 . -settled, they took hold, they
Figure 9. -prospered; and business
Figure lOa. -science, education, the arts.
Figure lOh
Figure 11. They came here with
nothing,
Figure 12. -nothing,
Figure 13. -and they flourished.
Figure 14 . -For si x centuries, there has bee n a
Figure 15 . -Jewis h Krakow; think about that. By this evening, those six centuries are a rumor;
Rabbi's voice fades
Figure 16. -they never happened. Today i s history.
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remarkable about this sequence is the oblique, elliptical rendering of the killing: we neither se e Goeth shooting nor do we see the boy being hit; w e only see his body lying in the background as Stern walks across the yard, and it is Stern's movement tha t motivates tha t of the camera. Even Stern's registering of the killing i s rendered only obliquely, stressing th e spli t betwee n seein g and meaning, seein g and feeling characteristic o f the concentratio n cam p universe. Compared to th e systematic way Shoah (in Shoshana Felman's reading) foregrounds th e problematic of witnessing, such moments are perhaps marginal in Schindler's List, but they nonetheless deserve to be discussed in similar terms—as an aesthetic attempt to engage the extreme difficulty (althoug h not absolut e impossibility) of giving sensory expression to an experience that radically defies sense. 33 Important as the close attention t o the film's textual work is, it can only provide a weak answer t o the fundamental objections raised by the film' s intel lectual opponents. Let me repeat that I am not interested in defending Schindler's List o n aestheti c ground s (the aesthetic narrowl y understood as relating to th e institution o f art and its mass-mediated afterlives). No r am I suggesting that th e film's us e o f sound an d its overal l narrational strategie s ar e radical, unique , o r original; on the contrary, most of these textual devices belong to the inventory of classical Hollywood cinema, from th e mid-teens through the 1950s . Seen in light of the history o f that institution up to and including commercia l film production of the present, however, Schindler's List makes use of these devices in a relatively more intelligent , responsible , an d interestin g manne r tha n on e migh t hav e expected, fo r instance, o n th e basi s o f Spielberg's earlie r work . Th e wholesal e attack o n the fil m no t onl y erase s thes e distinctions ; i t als o misses th e film' s diagnostic significance in relation to other discourses, junctures, and disjunctures in contemporary American culture. The point I'm tryin g to mak e is that th e lac k of attention t o th e film' s material an d textual specificit y is itself a symptom o f the impass e produced by the intellectual critique , an impasse that I find epitomized in the binary opposition of Schindler's List and Shoah. (Lanzmann's position in this regard is only the most extrem e version of this opposition: "I n [Spielberg's] film there is no reflec tion, no thought, about what is the Holocaust and no thought abou t what is cinema. Because if he would have thought, he would not have made it—or he would
have made "Shoah."')34 It is one thing to use Shoah for the purpose of spelling out
the philosophical and ethical issues of cinematic representation in relation to the Shoah; it is another to accuse Schindler's List of not being the sam e kind of film. For while Shoah has indeed changed the parameters of Holocaust representation , it is not without problems, aesthetic as well as political, nor is it sacrosanct. More important, the attack on Schindler's List in the name of Shoah reinscribes the debate on filmic representation with the old debate of modernism versus mass culture, an d thus with binary oppositions o f "high" versus "low," "art" versus "kitsch," "esoteric" versus "popular." However, Adorno's insight that, to use Andreas Huyssen's paraphrase, ever since the mid-nineteenth century "modernism
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and mass culture have been engaged in a compulsive pas-de-deux" has become exponentially more pertinent in postmodern media culture.35 "High" an d "low " are inextricably part of the sam e culture, part of the sam e public sphere, part of the ongoing negotiation of how forms of social difference are both represented and produced in late capitalism. This is not to say that Shoah did not have to compete for fundin g in an unequal struggle with commercial cinema ; nor that it did not have to fight for distribution and access. But once the film was released, especially in the United States, it entered the commercial circuit of the art film market and was praised by the same critics and in the same hyperbolic term s that celebrated Schindler's List. Ironically, i t coul d be argued, Schindler's List itsel f participate s in th e modernism/mass culture dichotomy even as it tries to overcome it. Here is where I would like t o inser t th e concep t o f popular modernism (whic h I elaborate in
greater detail elsewhere).36 If we want to grasp the plurality and complexity of
twentieth-century modernity , it i s important t o note the exten t t o which modernism was not just the creation of individual artists and intellectuals or, for that matter, avant-garde coteries, but also, especially during the interwar period, a popular and mass movement. I am thinking in particular of formations usually subsumed unde r labels suc h a s Americanism an d Fordism , but mor e specifically referring to a new culture of leisure, distraction, an d consumption that absorbed a number of artistic innovations into a modern vernacular of its ow n (especially by way of design) and vice versa. It seems to me tha t Spielber g would like t o go back to that moment—that he is trying to make a case for a capitalist aesthetic s and culture which i s at once modernist an d popular, which woul d be capable of reflecting upon the shocks and scars inflicted by modernization on people's lives in a generally accessible, public horizon. The reason I believe that something of that order is at stake has to do with the wa y Schindler's List refers itsel f t o tha t grea t monument o f cinematic modernism, Citizen Kane.37 This argument is primarily based on striking affinities of film style—the self-conscious use of sound, low-key lighting, particular angles and compositions in frame, montage sequences, as well as the comic use of still photography early on in the film. If Spielberg tries to inscribe himself into an American film history pivoting around Citizen Kane, he also tries to revise the message—if one can speak of a message—of Welles's film. Citizen Kane traces the disintegra tion of its protagonist from a young man o f lofty ideals to a monstrous figure of the specular, two-dimensional , an d fragmente d medi a cultur e h e helpe d create . Schindler's List reverses the direction of this development. It presents us with an enigmatic character who starts out in the world of dazzling surfaces and glamour and who i s repeatedly identified with th e aesthetic s o f fashion, advertising , and consumption. (In the scene in which Schindler proposes to Stern what is basically a highly exploitative scheme, Stern asks: "They [the Jewish 'investors'] put up all the money,-1 do all the work. What, if you don't mind my asking, would you do?" And Schindler replies: "I'd make sure it's known the company's in business. I'd see
Figure 17 . -Lisiek : 1 have to report, sir: I've been unable to remove the stains from th e bathtub. Goeth : G o ahead, go on, leave. 1 pardon you.
Figure 18.
Figure 19. -1 pardon you.
Figure 20.
Figure 21.
Figure 22.
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Schindler's List Is Not Shoah
that it had a certain panache. That's what I'm good at. Not the work, not the work: the presentation!") But out of that cypher of a grifter-conman-gambler develops an "authentic" person, an integrated and intelligible character, a morally responsibl e agent. No doubt Spielberg himself has an investment i n this redemptive trajectory; and if, as a number of critics have pointed out, the director strongly identifies with his protagonist, he does so in defens e o f a capitalist culture , o f an aesthetics tha t fuses modernist style , popular storytelling, an d an ethos of individual responsibility. Whether he succeeds in reversing Citizen Kane's pessimistic trajectory , that is, in disentangling Schindler—and the story of the Schindler Jews—from th e reifyin g effects o f mass-mediated , spectacula r consume r culture , i s a n ope n question , depending as much on the film's long-term public effects a s on textual critique. But perhaps this question is beside the point, as is treating the oppositio n of Shoah versu s Schindler's List as if it were a practical alternative, a real option. For whether we like it or not, the predominant vehicles of public memory are the media of technical re/production and mass consumption. This issue is especially exacerbated for the remembrance of the Shoa h in light of the specifi c crisis posed by the Nazis ' destruction o f the ver y basis an d structures o f collective remem bering. (In contrast with most of the "ordinary massacres" committed in the course of th e Germa n genocidal war al l over Europe, the Shoa h did not leav e any communities o f survivors, widows and children, not even burial sites that would have provided a link with a more "organic" traditio n o f oral and collective memory.) 38 In a significant way, even before the passing of the last survivors, the remembranc e of the Shoah, to the extent that it was public and collective, has always been more dependent on mass-mediated forms o f memory—on what Alison Landsberg calls "prosthetic memory." 39 Much has been written abou t the changing fabric of memory in postmodern medi a society , i n particula r th e emergenc e o f new cultura l practice s (new types of exhibits, th e museu m boom ) that allo w the beholders to experience the past—any past, no t necessaril y thei r own—wit h greate r intensity an d sensuou s immediacy (fo r example, a t the U.S. Holocaust Memoria l Museum). 40 We need to understand th e plac e of Schindler's List in the contemporar y cultur e o f memory and memorializing; and the film in turn may help us understand that culture. This might als o shed ligh t o n how the popula r American fascination wit h th e Holo caust ma y functio n a s a "scree n memory " (Deckerinnerung) i n th e Freudia n sense, coverin g u p a traumatic event—anothe r traumatic event—tha t cannot b e approached directly . More than jus t a n ideological displacement (whic h it i s no doubt as well), the fascination with the Holocaust could be read as a kind of screen allegory behind/through which th e natio n i s struggling to find a proper mode of memorializing traumat a closer to home. Th e displaced referents of such memori alizing may extend to events as distant as the genocide of Native Americans or as recent as the Vietnam War. It is no coincidence that African American historian s have begun using concepts developed in the attempt to theorize the Shoah, such as the notion of a "breach" or "rupture," t o talk about the Middle Passage.41
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Likewise, the screen memories of the Holocaust could be read as part of an American discourse on modernity, in which Weimar and Nazi Germany figure as a n allegor y o f a modernit y gon e wrong. 42 Th e continue d currenc y o f thes e mythical topo i in the popular media may indicate a need for Americans to externalize and project modernity's catastrophic features onto another nation's failure and defeat—s o a s to salvag e modernity the America n way. This would give the American public's penchan t fo r allegories o f heroic rescue (elaborate d in cinematic form b y D. W. Griffith) a particular historical an d political twis t in that i t couples the memory/fantas y o f having won the war with th e failur e t o save the Jews. In any case, if Schindler's List functions as a screen memory in this or other ways, th e pasts that it ma y at onc e cover and traverse cannot be reduced to th e singular, just as the Americanization of the Holocaust cannot be explained by fixating exclusivel y o n its ideologica l functions. 43 Tha t th e fil m touche s o n more than one nerve, appeals to more constituencies tha n a narrowly defined identit y politics woul d have it, coul d be dismissed a s an effect o f Hollywood's marketing strategies in th e blockbuste r era. But it coul d also be taken a s a measure of the film's abilit y t o engender a public space, a horizon of at once sensory experience and discursive contestation . No doub t Schindler's List coul d have been a different film , o r many different films, eve n as based on Keneally's novel. And differen t storie s relating to the mos t traumati c an d central even t o f the twentiet h centur y will be and will have to be told, in a variety of media and genres, within an irrevocably multiple and hybrid public sphere. If The Birth of a Nation remains important to American history, it is not only for its racist inscription o f the Civil War and Reconstruction periods; i t i s just as important fo r what i t tell s us abou t 1915 , about th e ne w medium's rol e i n creatin g a nationa l public , abou t th e dynamic s o f cultura l memory and public memorializing i n a volatile immigran t society . Schindler's List comes at a radically different moment—in national and global history, in film history, i n th e histor y o f the publi c sphere . To dismiss th e fil m becaus e of the a priori established unrepresentability of what it purports to represent may be justified o n ethical an d epistemological grounds , but i t mean s missing a chance to understand the significance of the Shoa h in the present, in the ongoing and undecided struggle s over which pas t get s remembere d and how. Unless w e tak e al l aspects—omissions an d distortions , displacement s an d possibilities—of public , mass-mediated memory culture seriously, we will remain caught in the "compulsive pas-de-deux" o f (not just) intellectual history. NOTES
1. The comparison was first suggested, in a somewhat different spirit , by Terrence Rafferty in Th e Ne w Yorker 6 9 (Decembe r 20, 1993) , 132 . Raffert y praise s th e epi c significance and "visionary clarity" of Schindler's List by invoking James Agee's reverie about Birth as "a perfect realization of a collective dream of what the Civil War was like, as veterans might remember it fifty years later, or as children, fifty years later might imagine it." Obviously , such a compari-
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son asks to be turned against itself: see Philip Gourevitch, "A Dissent o n 'Schindler's List/" Commentary 97.2 {February 1994) : 52. For astute readings and suggestions on this essay, I wish to thank Homi Bhabha, Bill Brown, Michael Geyer , Alison Landsberg, and audiences a t the University of Chicago, Harvard University, and the annua l conference of the Society for Cinema Studies, March 1995 . 2. Anothe r exampl e o f such boundary-crossin g publicit y i n th e recen t pas t i s Olive r Stone's JPK (1992) . My use of the term "public," like the distinction among various types of publicness, i s indebted to Oskar Negt and Alexander Kluge , Public Sphere an d Experience {1972), tr. P . Labanyi, J. O. Daniel, an d A. Oksiloff (Minneapolis : University o f Minnesota Press, 1993). 3. See Janet Staiger, "The Birth of a Nation: Reconsidering Its Reception," i n Robert Land, ed., TH E BIRTH O F A NATION: D . W . Griffith, Director {New Brunswick, N.J. : Rutgers University Press, 1994) , 195-213 . For an earlier account, se e Thomas Cripps , Slow Fade t o Black: The Negro in American Film, 1900-1942 {London: Oxford University Press , 1977) , chap. 2. On the film's intervention i n the contemporary political and ideological context , se e Michael Rogin's excellent essay, "'The Sword Became a Flashing Vision': D. W. Griffith's Th e Birth of a Nation," Representations 9 (Winter 1985): 150-95. On the film's devastating and lasting effects on African Americans' cinemati c representatio n an d relation to film practice, se e Manthia Diawara, ed. , Black American Cinema (Ne w York: Routledge, 1993). 4. See Alexander Kluge, "On Film and the Public Sphere," tr. Th. Y. Levin and M. Hansen, New German Critique 24-25 (Fall-Winter 1981-82) : 206-20. 5. Frank Rich, "Journal: 'Schindler's' Dissed," New York Times, February 6, 1994, sec. 4,17; see also "Laughter at Film Brings Spielberg Visit," New York Times, April 13, 1994, Bl 1. 6. Michael Andre Bernstein, "The Schindler's List Effect," American Scholar 63 (Summer 1994): 429-32; p. 429. 7. Ibid. 8. Michael Geyer, "The Politic s o f Memory in Contemporary Germany," in Joan Copjec, ed., Radical Evil (London: Verso, 1996) , 169-200 . See also Michael Geye r and Miriam Hansen , "German-Jewish Memory and National Consciousness, " in Geoffrey Hartman , ed. , Holocaust Remembrance: Th e Shapes o f Memory (Oxford : Blackwell, 1994), 175-90 . 9. See Geoffrey H. Hartman, "Public Memory and Its Discontents," Raritan 13.4 (Spring 1994): 24-40. Hartman defines contemporary "public memory" in contradistinction t o traditiona l "collective memory " (33) . I am usin g th e ter m i n a more genera l and less pessimisti c sens e indebted to Negt and Kluge's theory of the public sphere (see note 2, above). 10. Art Spiegelman , in J. Hoberman et al., "SCHINDLER'S LIST: Myth, Movie, and Memory," Village Voice, March 29,1994, 27; hereafter abbreviated "MMM." See also Sean Mitchell's profile of Spiegelman, "Now, for a Little Hedonism," Los Angeles Times, Calendar section, December 18 , 1994, 7, 97-98; on Schindler's List, p. 98. 11. J. Hoberman, "Spielberg's Oskar, " Village Voice, December 21, 1993, 65. See also Frank Rich, "Extras in the Shadows," New York Times, January 2,1994,4; and Leon Wieseltier, "Close Encounters of the Naz i Kind," New Republic (Januar y 24, 1994) , 42. 12. See Saul Friedlander's introduction to the volume of essays, edited by him, Probing the Limits o f Representation: Nazism an d th e "Final Solution" (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), and Reflections o f Nazism: An Essay on Kitsch and Death (1982), tr. Thomas Weyr (New York: Harper & Row, 1984), 13. 13. See Ora Gelley, "Poin t o f View and the Narrativizatio n of History in Steven Spielberg's Schindler's List," paper delivered at the Society for Cinema Studies annual conference, New York, March 1995. 14. David Bordwell, Janet Staiger, and Kristi n Thompson, Th e Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and Mode o f Production to 1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985) ; David Bordwell, Narration in th e Fiction Film (Madison: University o f Wisconsin Press , 1985), chap. 9. The concep t o f classical cinem a owe s much t o psychoanalytic-semiotic an d feminis t film theory of the 1970s, - see Philip Rosen, ed., Narrative, Apparatus, Ideology (Ne w York: Columbia University Press, 1986) . 15. Ken Jacobs and Gertrud Koch, in "MMM," 27-28 . 16. Bernstein, "The Schindler's List Effect," 430; Geoff Eley and Atina Grossmann, "Wa