Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade

V I C T O R Y I N T H E EAST A military history of the First

JOHN

FRANCE

University College,

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C A M B R I D G E UNIVERSITY

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Crusade

Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge C B 2 I R P 4 0 West 20th Street, New York, N Y I O O I 1-4211, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia © Cambridge University Press 1994 First published 1994. Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge A catalogue recordfor this book is available from the British Library of Congress cataloguing in publication

Library

data

France, John. Victory in the East: a military history of the First Crusade/John France, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0 5 2 ] 41969 7

i . Crusades - First, 1096-1099. 2. Military art and science - History - Medieval, 5 0 0 - 1 5 0 0 . 3. Military history, Medieval. I . Title. D161.2.F73 1994 94o.i'8-dc20 ISBNO

93-28329 C I P

521 41969

CE

7 hardback

n8

VICTORY

IN THE

EAST

participate i n the siege o f Nicaea and A n n a tells us quite plainly t h a t this was because he d i d n o t trust the crusaders and, indeed, she shows t h a t he later deceived them i n the 'drama o f betrayal' by which Nicaea s u r r e n d e r e d . I f Alexius really had promised to go, all the sources w o u l d have said so - i t was n o t the k i n d of statement that could be kept secret. T h e Gesta's statement should be read i n the context o f its presentation o f the betrayal at Philomelium - i t is a deliberate exaggeration o f Alexius's promise to give m i l i t a r y aid to the crusaders. There were good reasons w h y Alexius could not j o i n the western a r m y for, as he said to R a y m o n d o f Toulouse, he had many enemies o n many frontiers. W h a t he d i d not say was t h a t Jerusalem was strategically irrelevant to the empire and that any emperor w h o went off o n such irrelevancy w o u l d be endangering his throne. O f course this does not mean that Alexius could not decide to j o i n them at some future date when conditions m i g h t be very favourable, merely t h a t he had no intention of b i n d i n g himself to such a dangerous course o f action, and d i d not. F r o m the emperor's p o i n t o f view the treaty w i t h the leaders was very satisfactory. T h e leaders were his vassals. H e recognised that this was a fragile b o n d , hence his insistence on some renewing their oaths at Pelekan u m after the siege o f Nicaea and on m a k i n g a wide range o f senior crusaders take the oath. I n this capacity they were sworn to r e t u r n to h i m a l l former i m p e r i a l territories. There must have been some geographical l i m i t a t i o n o n this, for, i f one goes back far enough i n time, all o f the M i d d l e East had been ruled from Constantinople. I n September 1098, R a y m o n d of Toulouse seized A l b a r a and installed a L a t i n bishop there. Since at this time he was the c h a m p i o n of imperial rights, and was resisting Bohemond's seizure o f A n t i o c h , he w o u l d h a r d l y have offended his ally Alexius b y holding the city himself a n d a p p o i n t i n g an alien bishop. Furthermore, C o u n t R a y m o n d was later to h o l d Laodicea of the emperor (sec fig. 4 ) . A n t i o c h a n d its immediate area probably formed the b o u n d a r y of the o l d i m p e r i a l poscssions which were to be restored. O f course, the Greeks were very sceptical of the ability of the westerners to conquer any o f this, as A n n a indicates, b u t should they succeed Alexius was i n a position to profit w i t h a m i n i m u m commitment o f his o w n . 113

1 1 4

1 1 5

1 1 6

1 , 3

Alexiad, p p .

336-7.

m

R A , p. 4 1 .

R A , p. 9 1 - 2 . On Laodicea see David, Robert Curlhosc, pp. 1 , 6

230-44.

Tatikios's instructions were to take over any cities which the crusaders conquered ' i f indeed God granted them that favour': Alexiad, p. 3 4 1 .

Fig. 4

Syria and the First Crusade

120

VICTORY

From the point o f view o f the crusaders they had obeyed Urban's directive a n d profited f r o m the addition o f imperial forces w h i c h would be substantial a t Nicaea, rather less thereafter. I n the longer r u n the Byzantines w o u l d take over cities a n d fortresses w h i c h i t would be unwise to leave unguarded i n their rear, b u t which were irrelevant t o the achievement of Jerusalem. I n a d d i t i o n , they were promised naval a i d a n d supplies a n d a clear passage for any reinforcements t h a t m i g h t come after them. I t is very probable t h a t they were also able to l a y plans for the war i n Asia M i n o r , for A n n a says that Alexius advised them about the tactics of the Turks and he must surely have explained something o f the political situation i n the M i d d l e East for he certainly suggested how they could exploit this b y negotiating w i t h the E g y p t i a n s . Adhcrnar was i l l at Thessalonica at the t i m e that most o f the arrangements were made and we k n o w n o t h i n g o f his dealings w i t h the i m p e r i a l authorities. However, he was later at pains to establish close relations w i t h Simeon, the Patriarch o f Jerusalem, w i t h w h o m he wrote two letters to the west, and after the fall of A n t i o c h J o h n the O x i t e , its O r t h o dox P a t r i a r c h , was r e s t o r e d . This suggests that after the i n i t i a l difficulties, good relations prevailed. 117

118

I n a d d i t i o n , the negotiations at Constantinople produced a special relationship between Alexius a n d R a y m o n d o f Toulouse. Quite h o w this was achieved is not clear; they had begun on very bad terms indeed, according to the L a t i n sources, as w e have n o t e d , w i t h R a y m o n d refusing any oath of homage. However, by the t i m e the army was setting off to Nicaea R a y m o n d was at Alexius's c o u r t , hence his late arrival a t N i c a e a . A n n a never mentions the early hostility; i n her story a l l is sweetness and light from the first, and she suggests t h a t i t was m u t u a l mistrust of Bohcmond w h i c h brought the two men t o g e t h e r . However, this may well reflect later events hindsight is highly developed i n the Alexiad. Later, R a y m o n d w o u l d appear as b y far the wealthiest of the crusaders and w h e n the a r m y was frustrated at A n t i o c h b y the quarrels o f the princes the suggestion was made that those who favoured the imperial p a r t y , amongst w h o m R a y m o n d was the most prominent, were i n Byzantine p a y , but this m a y merely have been camp rumour. R a y m o n d appears as 119

121

Preparations and prelude

I N T H E EAST

far wealthier t h a n any of the other leaders - i n the spring o f 1098 he took over the Mahomeries tower at A n t i o c h when his followers were m u r m u r i n g about his meanness, paid Tancred to man the fort b y the S t Paul Gate and produced money to compensate knights for loss of horses. I n early iogg he offered huge sums to the other leaders to enter his service. A f t e r the crusade was over Raymond w o u l d hold Laodicea for Alexius a n d act w i t h h i m i n dealing w i t h the crusade o f 1 1 0 1 . There is no clear evidence, but i t is possible t h a t Alexius gave R a y m o n d o f St Gilles significant military subsidies. W h a t is certain is that under the pressure o f events at Antioch i n the summer o f 1098 R a y m o n d became a close ally of the emperor. Between the conversations at Constantinople and this time there is little direct evidence o f his attitudes, though A l b e r t of A i x says he received r i c h presents f r o m the e m p e r o r . 121

122

123

T h e arrangements at Constantinople laid the basis for cooperation between B y z a n t i u m and the crusading army. M i l i t a r i l y the crusaders were strengthened by the deal w i t h Alexius. But one matter never seems to have been discussed at Constantinople leadership of the crusade i n the absence o f the emperor. The princes had made their arrangements w i t h Alexius as individuals. None of them had overlords w i t h any real power and even men of the second rank were used t o a h i g h degree of independence. T h e device o f a council o f leaders seems to have emerged quite naturally i n this situation and A d h 6 m a r w o u l d seem to have been its mentor a n d political guide - as a priest w o u l d later s a y . B u t this was a dangerous omission for a m i l i t a r y expedition, and one for w h i c h they w o u l d later pay dearly. However, after the arrangements made at Constantinople the leaders could t u r n their attention to the clash of arms which was n o w i m m i n e n t . 124

120

1 , 5

1 , 8

Sec below p p . 165, 166. Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe,

pp. 141-3, 146-9; on the restoration o f j o h n the Oxite, see

AA, 4 3 3 . 1 1 9

Alexiad, p. 3 3 0 ; A A , 314.

1 2 0

Alexiad, pp. 3 2 9 - 3 1 .

"> R A , pp. 6 2 - 3 , 9 4 , 100. Alexiad, p. 353; J . L . Cate, 'The Crusade of 1101', in Setton, Crusades, 1. 354. "23 France, 'Tatikios', 143-5; > 3'4R A , p. 7 3 . 1 2 2

A A

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Size of the crusader army CHAPTER

5

The size of the crusader army

After the conclusion o f the agreements between Alexius and the leaders, the crusader forces gathered i n Asia M i n o r . Godfrey's army had crossed i n Lent of 1097 and doubtless they were joined by other contingents such as that o f Robert o f Flanders. Bohcmond's force crossed under the command o f Tancred i n late A p r i l though he stayed w i t h the emperor, w h i l e the army led by Godfrey, Robert of Flanders and Tancred, i n c l u d i n g the 'feeble debris' o f the 'People's Crusade', marched along the G u l f o f Nicomedia to that city via Runnel to begin their approach to Nicaea. T h e Anonymous says that they were too numerous to take the road used by the 'People's Crusade' and opened u p their o w n route direct to Nicaea using 300 men to clear and mark the way. This probably means that the old Roman road from Nicomedia to Nicaea was badly overgrown and had to be cleared for the army. This road crosses the Naldokan Daglari, mountains w h i c h rise to over 1,400 metres, and the crusaders marked i t w i t h crosses for those who w o u l d follow them (see figs. 2 a n d 5). They arrived at Nicaea on 6 M a y 1097 and even at this early stage food was short and the army was relieved when Bohcmond arrived w i t h supplies. T h e count of Toulouse had also stayed behind, according to A n n a Comnena establishing very cordial relations w i t h Alexius, and d i d not arrive before Nicaea until 14 M a y , while the north French under Robert o f N o r m a n d y and Stephen o f Blois only arrived at Constantinople on that day and did not reach Nicaea until 3 J u n e . The crusader force was augmented by a Byzantine contingent o f some 2,000 under Tatikios, to which was later added a smaller force under the command o f Boutoumites with boats to cover the Ascanian Lake w h i c h lay along the city's western perimeter.. Both these men were trusted confidants of 1

1

AA, 3 1 1 - 1 2 , 314; GF, p, 13-14.

122

Fig. 5

The Siege of Nicaea and the Turkish attack of 16 May 1

097

Size of the crusader army

124

VICTORY IN THE

Alexius and had considerable experience i n dealing w i t h westerners. Alexius himself settled at Pelekanum (on the n o r t h coast o f the G u l f of Izmit, opposite Civitos) and from there m a n i p u l a t e d the activities of his commanders. I t was only slowly t h a t the full strength o f the western army gathered and i t seems likely t h a t i t d i d n o t r e a c h maximum until after the siege o f Nicaea, for at t h a t t i m e A l e x i u s (at Pelekanum) was at pains to demand the oath be taken by those w h o had not done so, which suggests the late a r r i v a l o f some c o n tingents. But as more than one crusader source produces a figure for the strength of the army at this time, when they were a b o u t to m a r c h into enemy territory, it is an appropriate j u n c t u r e t o consider the matter of numbers. I t is often said that medieval people were not good a t numbers. I t was an essentially local world in which large gatherings w e r e uncommon and therefore impressed themselves u n d u l y u p o n t h e imaginations of participants. Literacy was relatively rare a n d n u m eracy even rarer. But the fact is that most people i n most eras are pretty bad at estimating large numbers of people. I recall o n e large demonstration in which I participated i n H y d e P a r k i n the s u m m e r of 1982 for which the organisers claimed an attendance o f 300,000 and the police suggested 60,000 - a discrepancy o f positively m e d i eval proportions. Of course politics has something to d o w i t h such estimates; the police, as the guardians of law and o r d e r , t r y to p l a y down such events while the organisers have the opposite t e n d e n c y . Just such political considerations entered i n t o the crusade's o w n estimates. Simeon, Patriarch of Jerusalem a n d A d h e m a r w r o t e t o the west asking for reinforcements and stating: ' W e have 100,000 mounted knights and armoured men, b u t w h a t o f it? W e are few i n comparison with the pagans, b u t verily G o d is fighting i n o u r 2

3

4

* AUxiad,pp.^336 7; Boutoumitcs had much naval experience but he was also a diplomat w h o dea t wHh Hugh orVermandois. Tatikios was an experienced soldier who had commanded S l T T ? L , ' ' ° 9 ° - The two had campaigned together i n Dn ift! c « " «™™£« Byzantins de I'AUxial (Louvain, , 8 o ) , pp. 8 , 5, 8 . On the reasons for Alexius not joining the crusadere, see below VP- ' 5 ° /• Mixiad, p. 340. r

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behalf. The rhetoric warns us t h a t t h o u g h this m a y be a serious estimate, the w r i t e r must have been anxious not to p i t c h the figure too high or too low lest he discourage people f r o m c o m i n g , hence also the stress o n the magnitude o f t h e task. W e m u s t recognise t h a t large numbers i n r o u n d figures need t o be treated w i t h c a u t i o n , b u t that smaller figures may be q u i t e accurate i f there is reason t o believe that the source is i n any w a y a u t h o r i t a t i v e . F u r t h e r m o r e , the leadership must have felt the need to k n o w w h a t troops were a t t h e i r disposal and this must have become v e r y acute i n the later stages o f the crusade when numbers seem to h a v e been h e a v i l y reduced b y the attrition o f battle, starvation a n d illness. T h e Papal L e g a t e Daimbcrt w h o arrived i n the East a t the v e r y e n d o f the crusade wrote to the West announcing its success a n d stated that a n a r m y 300,000 strong at Nicaea had been r e d u c e d to 20,000 b y the b a t t l e o f Ascalon on 12 August 1099. W c need n o t accept these n u m b e r s , o r even the p r o p o r t i o n o f losses i m p l i e d , o n l y t h a t the crusaders t h e m selves recognised t h a t they had suffered t e r r i b l e a t t r i t i o n . Since nobody actually tried to conduct a c o u n t o f p a r t i c i p a n t s we c a n o n l y hope to arrive at a general estimate, b u t a v i e w o f n u m b e r s is v i t a l i f we are to understand w h y the crusade was successful. However, before numbers can be c a l c u l a t e d w c need some definition. T h e contemporary chroniclers refer to the leaders, w h o m they often call 'Princes', knights, foot a n d t h e poor. S e t t i n g aside the Princes and lords of high rank o f w h o m w e often h a v e some i n d i vidual knowledge, men like A n s c l m o f R i b e m o n t , t w o o f whose letters to the West have survived, or R a y m o n d P i l c t w h o p l a y e d a notable semi-independent role, i t is i m p o r t a n t to realise t h a t knights, foot and poor are not w a t e r t i g h t categories. K n i g h t s were social superiors w e l l equipped for w a r - yet o n the r o a d across the Anti-Taurus m a n y abandoned t h a t e q u i p m e n t a n d m a n y m o r e lost horses i n the course o f the campaign. R a y m o n d o f A g u i l e r s d i s t i n guishes between knights and milites plebei, p o o r k n i g h t s w h o seem only to have been mounted at times w h e n horses w e r e p l e n t i f u l . Such poor knights must have slipped easily i n t o the great mass o f the army - b u t who were they? T h e t e r m ' p o o r ' is a d i f f i c u l t one. Contemporary sources were clearly a w a r e o f a r m e d m e n o t h e r t h a n knights - the letter o f Simeon a n d A d h e m a r to the W e s t w r i t t e n i n 5

6

7

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too small for m n t were in battle formation, i t would extend two, three, or more t.mes beyond the field of vision'. Such common sense is rare i n any age!

6

7

Hagcnmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, Hagcnmeyer, Kreuzzugsbricfe, GF, p. 27; RA, p. 106.

p. 142, Krcy, The First pp. 168, 172.

Crusade,

p. 13a.

126

VICTORY

IN THE

Size of the crusader army

EAST

October speaks o f mounted knights and armoured men who were presumably the professional retinues o f the lords and the greater knights. As horses became scarcer knights reinforced this group which became a very i m p o r t a n t element of the crusader a r m y by the end o f the siege of A n t i o c h . B u t i n addition to this group there were the servants, who must have formed the largest single group i n the army. M a n y of these w o u l d have had a military function - to look after horses and arms as well as to perform menial tasks. Horses need a great deal of looking after a n d for this purpose alone knights must have taken large numbers o f followers. I n the West we have noted that a whole infrastructure was needed to support the warhorses of the upper classes, b u t h u m b l e r r i d i n g and draught animals also needed m u c h care. Every k n i g h t must have started w i t h at least three animals: a warhorse, a palfrey and a pack-horse. T h e mercenaries w h i c h W i l l i a m Rufus and H e n r y I arranged to employ from R o b e r t o f Flanders were each to be provided w i t h three warhorses, b u t I a m assuming t h a t this represents the equipment of a really professional soldier. M a n y of the knights would have had as many warhorses plus numbers o f palfreys and pack animals and undoubtedly the richer knights and great nobles had many m o r e . Thus, i n association w i t h the knights alone a m i n i m u m o f 20,000 horses w o u l d have begun the journey, and i n addition there were pack and draught animals i n c l u d i n g oxen for the carts. T h e servants needed i n order to look after these 20,000 alone would have constituted a substantial army. I n the following of important men, servants and retainers o f all kinds must have been numerous; almost any knight w o u l d have had at least one. I f those w i t h a quasim i l i t a r y function could a r m themselves they could be pressed into service easily, but o n the other hand i f his master died a m a n o f this type could easily find himself i n the wider mass of general domestic servants and non-combatants. For the army attracted large numbers of poor pilgrims, some i n f i r m , w i t h women and children. This last group o f genuine non-combatants must have dwindled q u i c k l y under the impact o f deprivation and disease, for they must have 8

9

8

9

See above, p. 125, n. 5. On the treaty see above pp. 116-18; M . Bennett, 'La règle du Temple as a military manual, or how to deliver a cavalry charge', in C. Harper-Bill, C. J. Holdworth and J . Nelson, eds., Studies in Medieval History presented to R, Allen-Brown,

p. 7 says that the Rule of the

Temple limited each knight to one or two warhorses, one riding animal and one packhorse with a squire for each warhorse. This reflects the military conditions of the later twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

127

been the poorest a n d therefore most vulnerable to disease. By 1099, however, anyone fit enough to bear arms, except for clergy, was probably i n the infantry. T h e y were disciplined and trained b y sheer force of circumstance. M a n y of them were dismounted knights who m i g h t f r o m time to time find horses. Thus an army w i t h a huge civilian t a i l became progressively smaller and more militarised as time w e n t on, under the pressure o f enemy attack. Fulcher o f Chartres' statement that the army gathered at Nicaea was 600,000 strong i n c l u d i n g 100,000 'protected by mail hauberks' is clearly sheer fantasy, as is Ekkehard's figure of 300,000. A l b e r t o f Aix says the a r m y was 300,000 strong at Nicaea (manuscript variants say 600,000) w i t h w o m e n and children i n addition, and he also indicates t h a t the T u r k s believed t h a t 400,000 were attacking Nicaea. A n n a Comnena says that Godfrey's army alone numbered 10,000 cavalry and 70,000 infantry, w h i c h is surely as wild as the statement b y A l b e r t that Godfrey led 60,000 knights to the rescue o f Bohemond at the battle of D o r y l a c u m . O n the other hand, Albert reports Godfrey attacking the enemy leader w i t h fifty sodalibus during this battle a n d adds t h a t the enemy suffered losses of 3,000, a surprisingly modest figure i n the light of the implied size o f the Turkish a r m y - w h i c h Anselm of R i b c m o n t placed at 260,000 and Tudebode at 360,000.' Indeed, when i t comes to specific battles the total numbers suggested by the sources reduce dramatically. O n 31 December 1097 fc> under Bohemond and Robert of Flanders sent out to forage r a n into the army o f Damascus attempting to relieve A n t i o c h . A l b e r t o f A i x says that the westerners had 15,000 foot and 2,000 knights and the Anonymous gives an overall figure o f 20,000 - t h o u g h R a y m o n d of Aguilers suggests that there were only 400 Frankish knights present. There is a much greater consensus on the second battle fought against the relieving force of R i d w a n o f Aleppo o n g February 1098. O n this occasion the approach of an enemy a r m y came at a moment when suffering i n the bitter winter was at its h e i g h t a n d losses i n horses had been heavy. The council of leaders decided to send all their knights under the command o f Bohemond to ambush the enemy at a n a r r o w passage between the 10

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12

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11

1 2

FC, p. 8 1 ; Ekkehard, p. a i ; Alexiad,

p. 318; A A , 3 2 9 - 3 0 , 365.

A A , 330, 33i;Hagenmeycr, Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 145; Peter Tudebode, Historia de Hierosolymitano Itinere, ed. J . H . H i l l and L . L . H i l l (Philadelphia, 1974) [hereafter cited as Tudebode], P- 36. A A , 3 7 3 - 5 ; GF, p. 30; R A , pp. 53.

128

Size of the crusader army

VICTORY I N T H E EAST

river Orontes and the lake of Antioch, leaving the foot t o defend the camp. Albert says that only 700 could find horses and this figure is confirmed by Raymond of Aguilers and b y Stephen o f Blois i n his second letter to his wife A d e l a . O f course this is a measure of horses rather than men as we have already noted. T h e figure 700 occurs again for Albert says that when the crusaders were p r e p a r i n g for the betrayal o f Antioch at a time when Kerbogah's relief a r m y was approaching, they pretended to repeat the tactics of the Lake b a t t l e and allowed the garrison to see 700 cavalry m a r c h away — suggesting that even then this was the size of the cavalry c o m p o n e n t . I n t h e later stages of the crusade Albert's estimates o f the total size o f t h e army grow much more modest. I n February iogg Godfrey d e Bouillon and Robert of Flanders were forced b y p u b l i c o p i n i o n t o leave Antioch with an army 20,000 strong w h i c h when j o i n e d to t h a t of Raymond of Toulouse, Robert of N o r m a n d y and T a n c r e d a t 'Akkar made a total of 50,000, of which only 20,000 were fit to fight. The total figure had risen at Jerusalem to 60,000 ' i n c l u d i n g b o t h sexes', which I take to mean including non-combatants. B y the e n d of the siege the Christians could muster only 20,000 fighting m e n against the Egyptians at Ascalon on 6 August i o g g . These figures suggest that i n the later stages o f the crusade there was a core fighting force of 20,000 men which could be augmented i n emergency by a number of less well-armed people d r a w n f r o m amongst the poor. There is nothing impossible about these figures i n t h e m selves, but the suggestion that i n the army at Ascalon Godfrey alone could lead 2,000 cavalry (and 3,000 foot) does not sit w e l l w i t h t h e attrition of horses which we have observed, a n d generally 50,000 seems a lot after three years of fighting and marching. I n m a n y w a y s the evidence of Raymond of Aguilers is far more impressive. 13

14

15

Raymond of Aguilers says that at the start o f the siege of A n t i o c h the army had 100,000 armed men {armatorum), a figure w h i c h reappears i n the two letters sent by Simeon Patriarch of Jerusalem t o the west, although in the second, that of January iog8, i t is specifically stated that this figure includes losses so far i n c u r r e d . As b o t h these letters were inspired by Adhcmar, and R a y m o n d was i n h i s mouvance, we can assume that this was some sort o f quasi-official estimate of numbers at the start of the crusade. As such i t is l i k e l y t o 16

» AA, 4 0 0 - 1 ; R A , pp. 380; Hagenmeyer, Kreuxugsbriefe, AA, 4 5 4 , 4 6 1 , 4 6 3 , 4 9 6 . 1 5

'

6

RA, p. 48; Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbrieje,

p.

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i * AA, 400-.. '

be a n overestimate, and we must note that i t does not include non-combatants. B u t i t is for the later stages o f the crusade t h a t R a y m o n d o f Aguilers furnishes us w i t h very consistent a n d conv i n c i n g indications o f numbers. Historians have noted some of his figures but have not noticed h o w full a picture he offers o f the manpower situation o f the crusade i n the period after the fall o f Antioch. 17

As we have noted, after the capture of Antioch the a r m y fell to quarrelling over its fate and the advance to Jerusalem was stalled i n N o r t h Syria for over 5 months ( J u l y iog8-January 1099). By time R a y m o n d o f Aguilers was a chaplain to the count of Toulouse and thus close t o an i m p o r t a n t leader. A t Rugia on 4 J a n u a r y iogg, R a y m o n d o f Toulouse offered money to the other leaders, and w e k n o w that amongst t h e m was T a n c r e d who accepted i t : 'on the agreement t h a t he w o u l d be i n his service until they gained J e r u salem'. W e can assume t h a t similar terms were offered to the other leaders. Such a deal w o u l d have restored m o m e n t u m and had the effect of m a k i n g Count R a y m o n d leader. The offer made was as follows: 10,000 solidi t o Godfrey de Bouillon and R o b e r t o f N o r mandy; 6,000 t o Robert o f Flanders; 5,000 to T a n c r e d . This must reflect the strength o f the forces disposed o f by each leader at t h a t time, and as the q u a l i t y a n d constitution of the foot element was uncertain p r o b a b l y reflects their strength i n knights. N o w T a n c r e d accepted a n d followed Count R a y m o n d w i t h forty knights and a number of foot-soldiers. O n this basis we can guess t h a t R o b e r t o f Flanders h a d fifty knights, w h i l e R o b e r t Curthosc and Godfrey each had 100. I n a d d i t i o n , R a y m o n d says that money was given to other leaders p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y [prout). T h i s presumably refers to secondary figures whose stature has been discussed above, b u t we know n o details of t h e offers made to them. T h e sources give the impression t h a t R a y m o n d o f Toulouse had b y far the biggest of the armies, and a t this very j u n c t u r e , as the a r m y was contemplating the march south, R a y m o n d tells us that t h e count had 300 knights i n his a r m y . W h e n he was j o i n e d , therefore, b y Tancred a n d Robert o f N o r m a n d y R a y m o n d o f Toulouse h a d only some 450-500 knights, allowing for a n y independents w h o may have j o i n e d h i m , while 150-200 r e m a i n e d i n the service o f Godfrey and the count o f t r u s

18

19

2 0

"

4

and see above p. 125, n. . 5

i2g

1 8

Riley-Smith, Idea of Crusading, p . 63 and Runciman 1. 363, for example, both quote Raymond o f Aguilers' figure for the army at Jerusalem. R A , pp. 100, 112. R A , p. 102. RA, p. 102. , a

2 0

13»

VICTORY

IN THE

Size of the crusader army

EAST

Flanders at A n t i o c h a n d its environs, together w i t h those i n any independent groups w h o refused the offer. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers makes clear that a l l this must be read i n the context o f a shortage of men. A t M a ' a r r a where they were starving some Provencals deserted, despairing of proceeding ' w i t h o u t the help of the Frankish people', a n d when the count decided to conduct a razzia to revictual his army they complained that he could not do that and hold Ma'arra w i t h a mere 300 knights. Furthermore, the count was so anxious about the manpower situation that when he marched south he made the bishop o f Albara leave only a tiny garrison o f seven knights a n d t h i r t y foot to hold the c i t y . T h e razzia improved the food situation and at Horns a friendly reception f r o m its ruler enabled the pilgrims to b u y precious horses, increasing their cavalry strength to about 1,000. When an attack on Jabala was proposed Tancred opposed i t , p o i n t i n g to the weakness of an a r m y w h i c h had started w i t h 100,000 knights and 200,000 foot and now had barely 1,000 o f the one and 5,000 of the o t h e r . This shortage o f manpower must explain the many doubts and hesitations of the leaders i n the summer o f 1098 and their desperate hope for reinforcements expressed i n their letter to U r b a n I I of 11 September i o g 8 . 21

22

2 3

The count of Toulouse must have had the question o f numbers very m u c h i n his m i n d when, after a prosperous march w i t h m u c h good foraging and looting, he halted the army before 'Akkar w h i c h was conveniently close to the coast where sea power facilitated communications w i t h the other forces i n and around A n t i o c h . Godfrey a n d Robert o f Flanders eventually left A n t i o c h and besieged Jabala, then came to the aid o f Count R a y m o n d w h e n he announced that an enemy army was i n the field. This proved to be a chimera a n d the j o i n i n g of the two forces was marred by b i t t e r divisions over whether to continue the siege of 'Akkar w h i c h was eventually abandoned i n early M a y 1099. Raymond gives no figures for the combined force at this stage. I n his account of the discussions at R a m l a w h e n a suggestion was made that the army should attack Egypt, those who were against i t pointed to the weakness of an a r m y which had barely 1,500 knights and few foot-soldiers. H e gives a n estimate o f their strength on the eve of their assault on Jerusalem o n 13/14 J u l y 1099. There were, he says, 1,200-1,300 mounted m e n 24

2

* RA p ' i 3 6 P

,

a

' '° ' 5

^

P

4

' '° '

"

H a g c n m e

>'

e r

' "uzzugsbrieft, K

p. 165.

and 12,000 foot, w i t h i n a d d i t i o n the disabled and the poor: the reduction i n the number o f knights f r o m 1,500 probably reflects the deaths of horses and m e n d u r i n g the siege. These figures are broadly i n line w i t h those we have already noted: a force of around a thousand knights a n d 5,000 or more infantry under Count Raymond was j o i n e d at 'Akkar by one o f 200 knights and, we may guess, roughly 4,000—5,000 infantry. These would have been augmented by stragglers, and by men f r o m the English and Genoese fleets. I n August the crusaders marched out of Jerusalem against an Egyptian relief force gathering at Ascalon and destroyed i t i n battle on the twelfth o f that m o n t h . O n the eve of the battle Raymond estimates the crusader army at 1,200 knights and 9,000 foot. These figures suggest t h a t the capture of Jerusalem had cost the army almost a quarter of its fighting strength. I t may seem odd that the complement o f knights recorded is not much smaller, but fluctuations i n their n u m b e r were related to supply of horses and while they must have suffered losses, the garrison's horses were captured d u r i n g the sack. These figures have the ring o f truth, as many commentators have remarked, b u t what is impressive is the consistency w i t h w h i c h we can trace numbers i n Raymond's account since the time of the fall of M a ' a r r a and the Rugia meeting. I n January 1099 a force o f some 14,000 fighting men, including at the most 1,500 mounted troops, was available to march to Jerusalem. This allows for losses due to sickness and disease, the fighting around 'Akkar and, i n a d d i t i o n , some coming and going of which we hear no trace. These figures relate to numbers o f fighting men - there is simply no way of estimating the non-combatants. By the time Ascalon been fought this number had dwindled to not many more t h a n 10,000, o f w h o m something like 3,000 stayed at Jerusalem. 25

26

27

T h e figure seems strikingly small only because we have become hypnotised by the huge numbers mentioned i n other sources, but i t should not surprise us. T h e a r m y must have suffered appalling losses since i t set out. As we have noted, even before i t left Europe pilgrims were dying. Nicaea was a major siege w i t h intense and large-scale 2 5

2 6

RA, pp. 134, 14a, tells us that the English burned their worn-out boats as the army left 'Akkar, while six Genoese ships put into Jaffa during the siege of Jerusalem only to be trapped by the Egyptian fleet, whereupon, on 19 June, they were burned and the sailors joined the siege. RA, p. 156. AA, 477. 2 7

132

VICTORY

IN THE

Size of the crusader army

EAST

military activity w h i c h must have been costly. D u r i n g the siege the Chris dans fought off an enemy relief army and then engaged the Turks o f Asia M i n o r i n a major battle at Dorylacum. T h e siege of Antioch lasted for nine months and d u r i n g i t the a r m y fought off three major relief expeditions, while we hear of numerous minor clashes w h i c h we can be sure represent only a fraction of the totality. There followed the savage second siege of A n t i o c h , the attack on Ma'arra and the fighting a r o u n d 'Akkar. This attrition of battle must have been costly i n lives, b u t there was also starvation, disease and accident. T h e a r m y had barely started the siege o f Nicaea when i t was asking for food, while A l b e r t records the deaths of 500 poor due to thirst only a few days after Dorylaeum when even the falcons and hunting-dogs of the rich were d y i n g . By December 1097 the a r m y at A n t i o c h was starving, a state w h i c h must have been semi-permanent d u r i n g the w i n t e r w h i c h f o l l o w e d . T h e count o f Toulouse was desperately i l l d u r i n g the crossing of Asia M i n o r , d u r i n g much o f the siege and even at the m o m e n t o f the great battle w i t h Kerbogah i n w h i c h he was unable to participate. Baldwin o f Boulogne's English wife died at Marasch and a knight o f the house of Boulogne, Adelrard o f Guizan, i n mid-October 1097. Godfrey dc B o u i l l o n was mauled by a bear while h u n t i n g and suffered a long illness. M a t t h e w of Edcssa actually says that during the siege of A n t i o c h the Franks lost one i n seven o f their men to plague. But i n a d d i t i o n to these obvious attritions o f strength there were other factors at w o r k to reduce the size o f the a r m y by January 1099. I n the a u t u m n o f 1098 B a l d w i n had begun operations i n conjunction w i t h native Armenians, i n the area o f their settlement east of Antioch, c a p t u r i n g many places i n c l u d i n g Tell-Bashir and Ravendan. I n early February Thoros, prince o f Edessa, asked for his support and B a l d w i n gathered 500 mounted troops, only to be repulsed by a T u r k i s h attack. Eventually he got t h r o u g h to Edessa w i t h 200 sociis and b y M a r c h he had overthrown Thoros and was i n complete control o f the c i t y . I t is, o f course, difficult to be certain how many o f Baldwin's troops were native Armenians - a group w i t h a strong m i l i t a r y tradition - and how many Frankish. M a t t h e w o f Edessa says that he had 100 w i t h h i m at Tell-Bashir and took only sixty to Edessa. Fulcher says that he h a d only eighty knights w i t h h i m w h e n 28

29

30

32

33

3 4

35

36

37

38

3 5

3 5

3 6

GF, pp.

14, o ; A A , 3 3 9 - 4 0 ; R A , p. 5 0 . 3

»

RA, pp. 46, 62, 79; A A , 358.

3 1

AA, 351-5.

FC, p. 90; Matthew, 35. FC, pp. 129-30, 137. RA, pp. 46 -8. Hagcnmcycr, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 145, 151. Runciman 1. 338 gives Bohemond's army a strength of 500 knights when it left Italy, on the basis of unverified evidence, but Ycwdale, Bohemond, p. 37, found the same figure in Lupus Protospatarius. The 10, 0 0 0 knights plus many foot mentioned by Albert in Bohemond's army at Constantinople is clearly a nonsense: A A , 312. However, the general impression is that Bohemond had a small and well-disciplined army and a figure approaching 500 plus servants would not seem unreasonable. By the time he reached Antioch that would have been reduced substantially, and some may have left him in order to go to Jerusalem, as did 3 3

the author o f the Gesla 3 7

Matthew of Edessa, Chronicle, R H C arm. i (Hereafter cited as Matthew), 33.

33

he went to Edessa. Possession o f Edessa was militarily extremely useful to the crusade, b u t i t had to be garrisoned, as had its dependencies, and Frankish troops used for this purpose could not go on to Jerusalem. W h e n B a l d w i n wanted to complete his pilgrimage at Christmas 1099 he took only a small force and joined Bohcmond and D a i m b e r t o f Pisa's bigger force i n marching to Jerusalem, b u t when his b r o t h e r died on 18 J u l y 1100 he could afford what Fulcher describes as 'a little a r m y ' of 200 knights and 700 foot, w i t h o u t stripping Edessa. A t the start of the siege of Antioch Raymond of Aguilers remarks on the number o f cities and forts held by the crusaders w h i c h had to be garrisoned, w i t h the result that many knights were leaving the a r m y . Anselm o f Ribcmont, writing i n November 1097, said that the army held 200 fortresses and cities, while Stephen o f Blois, w r i t i n g late i n the first siege of Antioch gave a figure of 165. Some o f these must surely have been garrisoned by Tatikios's troops on behalf o f Alexius, but even so the Franks seem to have been left w i t h m a n y on their hands and would not have been w i l l i n g to abandon a l l . Moreover, there was the question of Antioch and its area w h i c h b y the w i n t e r of 1098 was firmly i n the hands of B o h e m o n d . T h e quarrels between the leaders i n the summer and a u t u m n o f 1098 and the creation o f a Frankish dominion i n N o r t h Syria created a fluid and confusing situation and considerable opportunities for wealth. T h e leaders took many of the poor into their service. W e have noted that R a y m o n d of Toulouse stripped Albara o f its garrison so that only seven knights and thirty foot were left to h o l d i t , b u t this very r a p i d l y grew to sixty knights and seventy foot, presumably f r o m stay-behinds. A l b e r t says that immediately after the crusade Godfrey had a force of 3,000 troops i n Jerusalem, which fell to 200 knights a n d 1,000 foot by the following s p r i n g . I t

31

8 8

l

3 8

GF, pp.

3 4

Francorum.

72-3.

R A , p. 105; AA, 507, 517; on conditions in the early kingdom sec J. Pravvcr, T h e Settlement o f the Latins in Jerusalem', Speculum, 27 (1952), 4 9 ' - 5 ! Riley-Smith, 'The settlement ofLatin Palestine', 721 - 3 6 ; Murray, 'The origins of the Frankish nobility o f the

134

VICTORY

Size of the crusader army

I N T H E EAST

is unlikely t h a t Edessa c o u l d have been held b y many fewer, though its total forces included good quality native troops a n d w e can assume t h a t A n t i o c h r e q u i r e d something like the same numbers to h o l d i t . Q u i t e possibly a l o t o f these men subsequently made their w a y to Jerusalem and t h e n returned to the west - accounting for the disparity between the figures w h i c h Albert gives for 1099 and 1100. W e can reasonably assume t h a t some 300-500 knights and a commensurate n u m b e r of foot, say about 3,000-5,000, were tied u p i n the nascent principalities o f N o r t h Syria and places like A l b a r a , M a r a c l e a a n d Tortosa, b u t this may be an underestimate. T h e a r m y also suffered f r o m desertion. Early i n 1098 Louis, archdeacon o f T o u l , left t h e siege of A n t i o c h for a safer place forty-eight kilometres away, though perhaps he returned. I n the second siege o f A n t i o c h desertions grew numerous - W i l l i a m o f G r a n d m e s n i l , Bohemond's brother-in-law, fled w i t h a g r o u p o f N o r t h F r e n c h , while most notorious of all was the flight o f Stephen o f Blois w h o was i l l just before the betrayal of A n t i o c h and seems to have believed that the a r r i v a l o f Kerbogah had doomed the a r m y . After the capture o f the c i t y the leaders sent H u g h o f Vermandois t o Alexius to see i f he w o u l d take control o f the city; an ambush en route killed his companion, B a l d w i n of Hainault, and H u g h never r e t u r n e d . A l l these m e n w o u l d have had escorts and companions a n d their d e p a r t u r e was, therefore, a considerable blow to the a r m y . T o counter this a t t r i t i o n the crusaders d i d receive some reinforcements. Fleets p u t i n t o P o r t St Symeon, notably the English w h o took w i t h t h e m B r u n o , a citizen o f Lucca. He returned to his city i n t h e summer o f 1098, b u t the stream of western ships a r r i v i n g i n N o r t h Syria b r o u g h t others, like t h e 1,500 Germans from Ratisbon w h o came to A n t i o c h i n the summer of 1098 and died of the p l a g u e . B u t i t is u n l i k e l y t h a t such reinforcements were i n any way commensurate w i t h the losses the crusader army suffered, for we hear too l i t t l e o f them. 39

40

I t is h a r d l y surprising that the army which captured Jerusalem should have been so small; i t was o f much the same order as t h a t w i t h w h i c h W i l l i a m conquered England i n 1066 and Guiscard attacked B y z a n t i u m i n 1081. Clearly i t had started out very m u c h kingdom of Jerusalem', 2 8 1 - 3 0 0 , and 'The army or Godfrey de Bouillon 1 0 9 6 - 9 9 ,

larger: we have Daimbert's figures suggesting losses of 93.4 per cent w h i c h means t h a t only one i n fourteen o f those who gathered at N i c a e a i n J u n e 1097 assembled for departure i n September 1099. O f course, we must remember that many stayed, either permanently o r for more or less short periods, i n Syria, but that is still a quite staggering loss. Losses i n pre-industrial armies could be appalling. I n t h e Seven Years W a r (1756-63) 135,000 of the 185,000 recruited f o r the R o y a l N a v y died o f disease. I t has been calculated t h a t 70 per cent o f the class of twenty-year-olds called to the colours i n France i n 1812 became casualties. Amongst such losses battle casualties were not the greatest single element. Napoleon's huge invasion a r m y o f 1812 lost 30 per cent o f its effectives to desertion a n d sickness before i t fought its first battle at Smolensk o n 17 A u g u s t 1812. O f a total force o f 611,000 which crossed the Russian frontier at various times after 24 June 1812, only 107,000 returned; o f the rest 400,000 were casualties and 100,000 prisoners but o n l y 74,000 died i n open b a t t l e . I t needs to be stressed that most o f these losses were n o t the result o f the legendary Russian winter. I n the C r i m e a n W a r 4,285 British soldiers died i n battle or of wounds, w h i l e 16,422 died o f disease. T h e U n i o n army i n the A m e r i c a n C i v i l W a r lost 96,000 i n battle to 183,287 to disease. Even i n t h e First W o r l d W a r the ratio o f battle to non-battle casualties was 1:1.3. As Daimbert's letter shows, contemporaries believed t h a t the crusade's losses h a d been huge, and our knowledge o f the general conditions o f war, and the specific hardships o f their theatre o f battle, tends to confirm this. Is i t possible to estimate t h e number i n the a r m y at the start o f the campaign when they prepared to leave Nicaea? 41

42

43

44

45

R a y m o n d of Aguilers suggests that 60,000 died in Asia M i n o r i n the destruction o f the People's Crusade, b u t he was not well informed about this event and refers to i t only i n a context o f attacking t h e emperor Alexius w h o m he blamed for its f a i l u r e . This is a p o l i t i c a l figure i f ever there was one. Albert tells us that 46

4 1

4 2

4 3

4 4

328-9, 3 9

Sec above p . 125, n . 6. J. Kecgan and R. Holmes, Soldiers:

a History of Men in Battle (London, 1985), p. 144.

J. Houdaille, 'Le problème des pertes de guerre', Revue d'Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine, 17 ( 1 9 7 0 ) . 423¬ G. F . Rothenberg, The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon (Indiana, 1978), pp. 5 4 - 5 , 2 5 1 ; G. Lefcbvre, Napoleon from

Ycwdale, Bohemond, p. 6 8 ; A A , 3 7 5 , 4 3 4 - 5 ; GF, pp. 6 , 63-5, 72. Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, p p . 1 6 5 - 7 ; AA, 446.

Tilsit

to Waterloo, 1807-1815,

London, 1 9 6 9 ) , pp. 3 1 1 , 3 1 7 .

5

4 0

135

4 5

Keegan, Soldiers,

pp. 143-4.

4

8

R A , p. 44.

t r . J . E. Anderson (Paris, 1936,

136

VICTORY

137

Size of the crusader army

I N T H E EAST

3,000 foot and 200 knights were lost i n the German raid on Nicaea, and that the army, w h i c h was shortly afterwards destroyed b y the Turks, numbered 25,000 foot and 500 knights. H e states specifically that the non-combatants were left behind i n the camp. So the final strength of the People's Crusade was 28,000 foot and 700 knights plus non-combatants; o f these, 3,000, including a disproportionate number o f knights, survived to j o i n the m a i n a r m y . These figures do not sound unreasonable for this People's Crusade was obviously a large-scale a n d striking affair. I t is impossible to suggest how m a n y there were i n contingents w h i c h never got to the east or to estimate Peter the H e r m i t ' s losses i n the Balkans, but i f we assume Albert's figures are somewhat optimistic and should be read to include non-combatants, we can estimate the People's Crusade at somewhat above 20,000. I t is much m o r e difficult to suggest an overall figure for the m a i n armies. W e have noted that a figure o f 100,000 may w e l l have represented some k i n d of official guess. The largest ever crusading army was probably t h a t o f Frederick Barbarossa which set o u t from Ratisbon i n M a y 1189 a n d is. generally reckoned to have been 100,000 strong including perhaps 20,000 mounted troops. T h e r e fore the figure of 100,000 is n o t impossible. I t should be n o t e d , however, that Barbarossa h a d immense authority and went to considerable lengths to prepare his w a y diplomatically a n d t o organise his army. Even so w h e n he died i t fell apart. The business o f holding together a n d above a l l feeding a host of 100,000 w o u l d have been enormously difficult and indeed until the era of modern i n d u s trialisation, such considerations continued to be a major brake o n the size o f armies. D u r i n g the period 1700-1763 only some t w o million men served i n the armies o f France, the greatest European power o f the day, and there were never more than 200,000 i n its forces at any one time. Napoleon's army i n Russia i n 1812 collapsed through indiscipline, largely brought about b y a scorched e a r t h policy w h i c h deprived it o f f o o d . There are some indications o f j u s t such problems on the march across Asia M i n o r . A day or two after leaving Nicaea the army d i v i d e d into two w i t h Bohemond, R o b e r t o f N o r m a n d y , Stephen of Blois and Tancred i n the vanguard and the 47

48

49

larger part of the army following o n . Fulcher confesses he d i d n o t understand w h y this was a n d R a y m o n d o f Aguilers blames t h e rashness of Bohemond, b u t A l b e r t says clearly that i t was the need for f o r a g i n g w h i c h enforced this division. O n 1 J u l y 1097 t h e v a n g u a r d was ambushed by the Turks of Anatolia near Dorylaeum, and after their v i c t o r y the crusader leaders resolved to keep t h e a r m y together, b u t not long after, A l b e r t says, they again had t o divide for foraging purposes and this time Tancred and B a l d w i n formed a smaller v a n g u a r d . Even so the army was i n for a fairly g r i m passage through A n a t o l i a . After Dorylaeum, the army experienced the heat o f the A n a t o l i a n plateau where i n J u l y a d a i l y m a x i m u m o f 28° centigrade and a m i n i m u m o f 15 centigrade can be expected. A l b e r t reports t h a t i n this arid zone 'water was i n shorter supply than usual' and 500 died. So terrible were the sufferings t h a t w o m e n abandoned newly-born babies and when water was reached some died f r o m excessive d r i n k i n g . The Anonymous and Fulcher both confirm these problems though w i t h o u t mentioning n u m b e r s . However, i t is difficult to get any sense of the scale of the army's loss beyond the general feeling that i t was very large. W h a t the evidence does p e r m i t , however, is a sense of very deep suffering. 5 0

51

0

52

T h e road across the Taurus Mountains was so steep that knights and others threw away their equipment rather than carry i t . A t Caeserea-in-Cappadocia i n September mean temperatures o f 12-15 centigrade can be expected. By Christmas, as we have noted, food was short b u t the siege of A n t i o c h began w i t h plentiful food supplies i n a pleasant climate. However, the weather gradually became more severe. T h e temperatures and precipitation during the siege o f A n t i o c h were as follows: 0

Temp (°C) Rain (mm)

Oct. 20 109

Nov. Dec. Jan. Feb. Mar. April May June 15 11 9 10 12 16 20 25 96.5 168 259 178 127 78.7 53.3 356

L i t t l e wonder that Stephen o f Blois commented on the excessive cold and immoderate rain so like winter i n his homeland which was so hard o n the poor. H e had been led to expect heat i n an exotic c l i m e . B y Christmas, as w e have noted, food was short and the 53

« 4 8

4 9

AA, 284-7.

E . N.Johnson, 'The Crusades orFrederick Barbarossa and Henry V I ' , in Setton, Crusades, 2. 8 7 - 1 2 2 ; Runciman 3. 11; Barbarossa's army took three days to pass a single point; Nesbitt,'Rate or march', 178-9. Houdaille 'Le problème des pertes', 5 4 ; Rothenbcrg, Art of Warfare, pp. 316 -17.

M

5 1

M

A A , 3 2 8 - 9 ; R A , p. 4 5 ; GF, p . 18; F C , p. 8 5 ; Hagenmcyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, A A , 332-3, 340-1. A A , 3 3 9 - 4 0 ; GF, p. 2 3 ; FC, pp. 8 7 - 8 .

5

3

Hagenmcyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe,

p. 145. p. 150.

i 8

VICTORY

3

Size of the crusader army

I N T H E EAST

military expedition o f Bohemond and R o b e r t of Flanders, although it fought off a relief force, was unable to improve the situation, and starvation led t o a wave o f desertions w h i c h A d h e m a r tried to counter w i t h a period of religious celebration intended to improve m o r a l e . F o r the m a i n army at A n t i o c h this was a bitter winter and to find food they were obliged to f o r m into groups o f 200-300 because o f m a r a u d i n g T u r k s . So frequent were their attacks, however, t h a t the knights were reluctant to protect such groups until the c o u n t of Toulouse offered t o replace horses lost i n such s k i r m i s h i n g . O n the other h a n d , the crusaders d i d receive supplies from A r m e n i a n princes and the monks o f the Black M o u n t a i n and later f r o m B a l d w i n o f Edessa a n d ships w h i c h p u t into St Symeon P o r t . F u r t h e r , although the crusaders had decided at the very start of their siege t h a t they w o u l d invest A n t i o c h closely, the fact that they h a d acquired so many cities a n d fortresses, such as the base established b y R a y m o n d o f Toulouse at R u g i a even before they got to A n t i o c h , meant t h a t the a r m y had bases for foraging and supply. Godfrey and R o b e r t o f Flanders seem to have got help f r o m B a l d w i n at Edessa and t o have had forts on the roads leading there. Tancred later had l a n d near ' I m m and H a r e m and Bohemond gained C i l i c i a . I n d e e d , i n the summer o f 1098, after the defeat o f Kerbogah, the A n o n y m o u s reports that a l l the princes retired t o their o w n lands. R a l p h o f Gaen alleges t h a t R o b e r t o f N o r m a n d y , w h o m R a y m o n d o f Aguilers notes as absent f r o m Antioch b y Christmas 1097, spent most of his time at Laodicea a n d had to be dragged back in the final crisis o f the siege. T h e visionary, Peter Bartholemew, seems to have spent most o f the w i n t e r o f 1098 t r a v e l l i n g about looking for food. H e saw his first vision at A n t i o c h in J a n u a r y 1098, and his second while foraging near R u g i a on 10 February, while a t h i r d occurred at St Symeon p o r t a n d a fourth at M a m i s t r a f r o m whence he was seeking to sail to Cyprus w i t h his lord. R a l p h of Caen gives us a d i a t r i b e o n the sufferings o f the army d u r i n g the w i n t e r . I n the spring o f 1098 as conditions i m p r o v e d the crusader leaders made i t a p r i o r i t y to blockade the Bridge Gate from w h i c h the Turks 34

55

56

57

58

5 9

pp. 2 7 , 3 3 - 4 ; RA, pp. 5 3 - 4 . M A A , 375; RA, p . 55. A A , 2 0 3 - 4 ; Matthew, p. 33; on fleets see below, pp. 2 0 9 . R C , 6 4 9 - 5 0 . 1 have followed Riley-Smith, Idea of Crusading, p. 75 in identifying these areas. GF, pp. 26, 72; R C , 649; R A , p. 50; on Robert's relations with Laodicea see David, Robert Curthose, p p . 2 3 0 4 4 and below pp. 215.

were sallying forth and i n t e r r u p t i n g their communications w i t h St Symeon w h i c h was the handiest port for contact w i t h Byzantine Cyprus. So i m p o r t a n t was i t t h a t they were prepared to defeat heavy enemy resistance a n d later t o invest i n a b i g garrison for the new s t r o n g - p o i n t . Thereafter, w e hear less o f starvation until the second siege o f A n t i o c h , w h e n the crusaders found themselves trapped i n a city w h i c h they had besieged for nine months and then sacked. A l l o u r sources are agreed o n the horrors of starvation which n o w overcame the army; A l b e r t , who stresses that the leaders tried to get food i n t o the city before Kerbogah arrived, tells us about the a w f u l camel meat for w h i c h Godfrey had to pay so m u c h . These a p p a l l i n g conditions were repeated d u r i n g and after the siege of M a ' a r r a w h e n the a r m y was desperate for food and there were accusations o f c a n n i b a l i s m . Thereafter, shortages of food seem to have occurred only m o m e n t a r i l y d u r i n g the siege o f Jerusalem where thirst was the major p r o b l e m for they were attacking the city i n J u n e and J u l y w h e n the average m i n i m u m temperature is 17 centigrade and the average m a x i m u m 29 centigrade. I n general we can probably assume t h a t disease became more of a problem in the heat of Syria and Palestine. Overall the record is one of suffering and m u c h death. I n a letter w r i t t e n early i n the siege of Antioch, p r o b a b l y at the end of N o v e m b e r 1097, Anselm of Ribemont asked those at home to p r a y f o r his dead companions and gave a list o f t h i r t e e n , seven of w h o m h a d died i n battle and six through illness. W e can assume that this was a list of those w h o m he knew and would be likely to be k n o w n t o the recipients o f his letter; of course, these are men of some substance, knights and i n one case an abbot. Given that this list comes at a t i m e before the worst horrors of the siege of A n t i o c h , at a time w h e n A n s e l m says that food was plentiful, we can see t h a t losses were m o u n t i n g very steeply indeed. Overall, there seems t o have been no sudden holocaust, simply a steady attrition d u e to disease and hardship w h i c h increased at moments of crisis A l b e r t ' s 500 d y i n g at once f r o m thirst appears to be exceptional. But to this a t t r i t i o n must be added t h a t o f fighting and here again the evidence is very l i m i t e d . 60

61

62

0

0

63

64

T h e sources are very coy about crusader losses i n battle. A letter of

GF,

R A , pp. 6 8 - 7 2 ; R C , 6 5 0 - 1 .

139

6 0

0 1

6 2

6 4

GF, pp. 3 9 - 4 2 ; R A , pp. 59- 6 2 ; A A , 383- 6.

R A , p. 5 9 ; GF, pp. 6 2 - 3 ; A A , 4 0 7 , 4 1 2 . GF, p. 8 0 ; RA, pp. 1 0 0 - 1 ; R C , 675; A A , 4 5 0 . Hagcnmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe,

p . 145.

6 3

GF, p. 89; R A , pp. 139-40.

140

VICTORY

IN THE

Size of the crusader army

EAST

the leaders to t h e West refers to 10,000 being lost i n the fighting around N i c a e a ; this is a nice r o u n d n u m b e r b u t it suggests heavy losses. T h e A n o n y m o u s says t h a t d u r i n g the fighting around this city ' m a n y o f o u r men suffered m a r t y r d o m ' , though i t must be admitted t h a t h e rarely mentions numbers anyway. A l b e r t of Aix says t h a t a t D o r y l a e u m the v a n g u a r d suffered 4,000 casualties, i n c l u d i n g some knights, and he records the massacre o f 300 of Bohemond's m e n outside T a r s u s . T h e r e was, however, one occasion w h e n n u m e r o u s sources took notice o f crusader losses - i n the fighting o n the St Symeon road w h i c h followed the decision to build the M a h o m m e r i e s T o w e r and so prevent enemy sallies f r o m the Bridge G a t e . A b o u t 4 M a r c h 1098 a n English fleet put i n to St Symeon a n d t h e crusader leaders decided to use the material and reinforcements to fortify a small h i l l w i t h a mosque w h i c h stood outside t h e B r i d g e Gate f r o m w h i c h the garrison had hitherto been able t o i n t e r r u p t their communications w i t h the sea. O n 6 March Bohemond a n d R a y m o n d returned to A n t i o c h w i t h a great convoy bearing the e q u i p m e n t , food a n d reinforcements b r o u g h t by the fleet. T h e y w e r e ambushed and their forces scattered. However, the crusaders r a l l i e d and drove the Turks back into the city w i t h heavy losses. T h i s was a comparatively small engagement, n o t on the scale o f D o r y l a e u m or the t w o battles against the relief forces from Damascus a n d A l e p p o , b u t i t was fought o u t i n the presence o f the whole a r m y . F o r this reason i t stood o u t i n the minds of those who witnessed i t a n d they gave figures. A l b e r t says that 500 Christians died, w i t h m a n y wounded and taken prisoner i n the initial ambush, but gives n o figures for Christian losses i n the subsequent fighting. R a y m o n d o f A g u i l e r s suggests losses o f 300 Christians i n the initial battle, b u t gives no further figures except for enemy losses o f 1,500. The A n o n y m o u s reports crusader losses o f 1,000 and enemy losses of 1,500 a n d he is followed b y m a n y others like Tudebode. I n his second l e t t e r w r i t t e n i n J u l y 1098, A n s c l m of Ribemont says the army lost 1,000 and the enemy 1,400, w h i l e Stephen ofBlois suggests 500 foot a n d t w o horsemen on the C h r i s t i a n side and 1,230 o f the 65

66

67

68

6 5

m

6 7

Hagenmeycr, Kreuzzugsbritfe, p. 154. GF, p. 17. GF gives the numbers on the foraging expedition as 20,000 knights and foot. In February 1098 he says that there were barely 1,000 horses in good condition, reports the death of 1,000 Christians and 1,500 of the enemy in the battle on the St Symeon road and says that the Egyptian army at Ascalon numbered 200,000: pp. 34, 4 0 - 1 , 96. I t is unfortunate that so many medieval writers who used the Gesla copied this reticence. AA, 329-30, 3 4 6 - 7 .

6 8

GF, pp.

3 9 - 4 2 ; R A , pp.

59-62.

141

enemy. I n the letter of the people o f Lucca 2,055 Christian losses are reported and only 800 e n e m y . This was a sharply fought battle but on a l i m i t e d scale; crusader losses, however, seem to have been well over 500 i n all, and perhaps very much higher. This was partly because there were a lot of foot-soldiers i n the convoy which was overrun, while the knights could flee to fight again. But there was much fighting of j u s t this k i n d around A n t i o c h w i t h small forces, 200-300 w i t h mounted escorts setting out to forage; Albert describes one w h i c h got into trouble and had to be rescued. Raymond of Aguilers, as we have noted, tells us that these expeditions were so costly i n horses t h a t at one stage knights refused to go. Albert and Tudebode describe siege activity w h i c h must have been costly in manpower. From time to time there was larger-scale action such as that o n 29 December 1097 w h e n the Turks killed twenty knights and thirty foot and captured the standard o f Adhemar of Le Puy. When we add to this heavy a t t r i t i o n the major battles and the savage and continuous combat w h i c h characterised the second siege of A n t i o c h (for none of w h i c h , unfortunately, are figures given) the impression grows o f very heavy crusader losses. I n the end we can only get an impression of battle losses for the evidence is not satisfactory. Taken together w i t h our knowledge of numbers at the end o f the crusade w h i c h is reasonably certain, we can a t least make an educated guess at the size o f the army w h i c h left Nicaea. 69

70

I n September 1099 when D a i m b e r t o f Pisa, Raymond count of Toulouse, Robert o f N o r m a n d y and Robert of Flanders wrote to the West anouncing the crusader victory they stated that the army at Ascalon was 20,000 strong. I f this figure was based on the numbers arriving at Laodicea for transport home i t may have represented a pardonable exaggeration. T h e force which came up from Jerusalem under R a y m o n d a n d the two Roberts, including non-combatants, was o f the order o f 10,000. M a n y o f the 4,000-5,000 troops, here estimated as being i n N o r t h Syria, w o u l d also have made for the city and the o p p o r t u n i t y to go h o m e . A m i l l i n g mass o f 12,000 or more arriving and going off at various times w o u l d have been difficult to count. I n addition, 3,000 remained at Jerusalem and probably something of that order at Edessa and A n t i o c h . A round figure of the order o f 20,000 survivors seems likely o f w h o m fewer than 2,000 71

6 9

AA, 3 8 3 , 386; RA, p. 5 9 ; GF, pp. 4 0 - 4 1 ; Tudebode, pp. 5 4 - 5 ; Hagenmeycr, Kreuzzugsbrie/e, pp.

10

151, 158, 166.

AA, 3 6 7 - 8 ; Tudebode, p. 57; R A , p. 5 1 .

7 1

See above pp. 133-4.

142

VICTORY

IN THE

EAST

would have been knights. I n the light of all they had gone through and all the attritions they had faced an overall loss rate of 3:1 would appear reasonable. T h a t w o u l d have fallen rather more heavily on the followers than on the knights and lords; they might have been more at risk i n battle but battle losses were only a fraction o f total losses and their superior w e a l t h must have meant they were less exposed, though never i m m u n e , to m a l n u t r i t i o n and its attendant risks. So a likely figure for the army at its greatest w o u l d be around the 50,000-60,000 mark i n c l u d i n g non-combatants. Losses at Nicaea p r o b a b l y were quite heavy for, as we shall see, they attacked the city vigorously, so there were probably about 50,000 i n the army as they left Nicaca, o f w h i c h 7,000 were knights or lords. T h e y and an unknown number of trained soldiers formed the core o f an army which could call u p as m a n y as i t could arm i n an emergency. I n time, the proportion w h i c h fought must have been very high, for the old, the sick, the children and the weak must have died like flies, the need for men was acute and there must have been plenty o f captured weapons available. I t has already been noted that the main force of the People's Crusade was o f the order o f 20,000, o f w h o m about 3,000 survived to march on, so a total of 70,000-80,000 reached Asia M i n o r at one time or another. Thousands more must have d i e d on the road to Constantinople, or turned back before they got there and yet others may never have left. By any standards i t was a very large force indeed w h i c h left Nicaea i n late June iog7; its m a i n enemies were those of every army, starvation, malnutrition, disease b u t they were familiar ghosts which haunted medieval men. T h e y are com­ mented on i n our sources when they strike the important, or reached unusual heights, b u t the daily attrition was so much to be expected, so commonplace, t h a t i t has left little record. However i t was the best ally of the T u r k s .

CHAPTER

6

The first enemy: the Turks of Asia

Minor

O n 6 M a y 1097 elements o f the crusader a r m y appeared before the city o f Nicaea held b y K i l i j I Arslan, the Seljuk Sultan of Rhüm {1092-1107). T h e city lies i n a fertile basin bounded to the west by the Ascanian Lake ( i z n i k G ö l ü ) . F r o m the south gate (Yenişehir Gate) the land rises sharply into the 800-metre-high Avdan Daglari. From the n o r t h gate ( I s t a n b u l Gate) the rise into the much higher Naldökan range w h i c h the crusaders had crossed is much gentler and only becomes appreciable after three kilometres. T o the east (Lefke Gate), a w i d e and gently sloping valley rises to a watershed then slopes m i l d l y d o w n to the valley o f the Sangarius (Sakarya Nehri) and the m i l i t a r y roads to A n k a r a and the A n a t o l i a n plateau (see fig. 5). R a y m o n d o f Aguilers and A l b e r t o f A i x were much impressed b y Nicaea's fortifications w h i c h the leaders examined carefully. Fulcher remarked on the determination and cruelty of its garrison. I t s fortifications were R o m a n , d a t i n g from the fourth century, b u t they had been modified and kept i n repair under the Byzantine empire. A great w a l l , pierced at the points o f the compass by four m a i n gates, surrounded the city. I t was probably about ten metres h i g h and studded w i t h 114 round or square towers rising to seventeen metres, and its circuit measured 4,970 metres. There was a double d i t c h around the outside. These fortifications were made the more formidable because the garrison needed to defend only half their c i r c u i t . F r o m the n o r t h to south gates the western wall of the city followed the Ascanian Lake whose huge size, forty kilometres long, made i t impossible to blockade unless the attacker had boats. I t is very i m p o r t a n t to recognise that u n t i l the crusaders brought up 1

2

1

2

RA, pp. 4 2 - 3 ; AA, 314; FC, pp. 8 1 - 2 . A. M . Scheider and W . Karnapp, Die Stadtmauer von Iznik-Mcea (Berlin, 1938); S, Eyicc, Iznik-Mcaea: the History and the Monuments (Istanbul, 1991). Stephen of Blois was exaggera­ ting when he said that the city had 300 towers; Hagenmeycr, Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 149.

HS

144

VICTORY

IN THE

First enemy

EAST

boats they faced an enemy who had only to defend h a l f the circuit, and this is the key to understanding the course of m i l i t a r y events at Nicaea. Amongst the crusader contingents arriving for the siege was, as we have n o t i c e d , a force o f Byzantine troops under the command of Tatikios. T h e y were later reinforced b y more soldiers and some small boats under Boutoumitcs who blockaded the Ascanian lake on the western perimeter o f the city. This was a comparatively small force for Alexius to send i n support of what he regarded as his men, almost his hirelings. This is especially true because, as A n n a Comnena says, he had twice before attacked the city w h i c h seems to have fallen i n t o Turkish hands i n 1078, i n 1081 and 1086. Here was an ancient c i t y whose loss to the empire was deeply felt. T h e Seljuks were c o n v e r t i n g it from an outpost into a real capital, thus threatening to stabilise their regime, yet the emperor w o u l d hazard only a small force, and, above all, would not come himself. A n n a stresses that her father was anxious to regain Nicaea, b u t offers only the feeblest o f excuses for his refusal to j o i n the siege - t h a t he feared the enormous numbers of the Franks. Anna's insistence on the bad faith and untrustworthiness o f all Latins is intimately connected w i t h her case t h a t they had broken their oath to Alexius i n the matter o f A n t i o c h and owes much to hindsight. I t is, i n fact, a revelation o f the extent to which much modern w r i t i n g about the crusades has been f r o m a pro-Byzantine standpoint that her statement has passed unchallenged. Alexius had reasons to distrust Latins - the expedit i o n o f Guiscard is clear evidence - but he distrusted almost everybody else as well and he had actively sought them as mercenaries. 3

4

5

6

7

A t present the north gale is 250 metres from the lake, but the extensive marshes at this point arc very much closer and point to the advance of the shoreline since the eleventh century. The same phenomenom is remarked by the south gate which at present is 350 metres from the shore, but there modern filling has taken place on a large scale. The re-entrant or the wails on this south-west corner of the city is probably to be explained by the shoreline and marsh in ancient times. The three landward gates of the city and almost all the enceinte still surround the small town oflznik, although the walls are ruinous in places by the lake, where the Watergate has long perished. There is an outer wall which terminates north and south on the shore, protecting the littoral of the city, but this is a late construction and its crudity is particularly evident at the gates in comparison with the fine work of the inner Roman gates. I t is a construction of the thirteenth century.

3

4

Alexiad,

5

Alexiad,

5

7

pp. 3 3 5 - 6 , 130, 206; on the last occasion Alexius's commander was Tatikios. p. 3 3 0 - 1 .

France, 'Anna Comnena', 22-3. See in particular Runciman's declaration of faith, 1. 171: 'he [Alexius] believed that the welfare of Christendom depended on the welfare of the historic Christian Empire. His belief was correct.'

H5

His caution on this occasion probably owed m u c h to his attitude to the Seljuks of R h i i m a n d the curious process by which they conquered Anatolia. T h e Turks are p a r t o f a vast family of steppe peoples who include the Mongols. T h e y first appear i n western history i n the guise of the H u n s and later as the Hungarians o f the middle Danube. T h e Patzinacks and Uzes, w h o were such a scourge of the Byzantine Balkans, are also o f the same people. I t is, however, w i t h the people of Turkestan - t h e n o m a d i c tribes occupying a vast area from the Black Sea to C e n t r a l A s i a - t h a t we are concerned, and i n particular w i t h the Oghuz w h o pressed on the frontiers o f Islamicised Asia and Persia. Amongst t h e m a pre-eminent family were the descendants o f the legendary Seljuk. T h e expansion o f Islam into Transoxania brought these T u r k s i n t o i n t i m a t e conflict w i t h Islam along the frontiers where ghazis, I s l a m i c volunteers, and nomads waged war. B u t the Shamanist T u r k s began to be converted i n large numbers to I s l a m , and i n t h e t e n t h century we see the creation of Turkish Islamic powers l i k e the Karakhanids o f Bukhara and the Ghaznavids who ruled o n the borders o f I n d i a . Thus the border between I s l a m and the T u r k s became porous to Islamicised Turks, some o f w h o m were already established i n the Islamic heartlands by a different process. T h e A r a b s who destroyed the R o m a n and Persian empires i n the seventh century were a w a r r i o r aristocracy r u l i n g over diverse peoples a n d sheer m i l i t a r y need forced them to incorporate those peoples i n t o t h e i r a r m i e s . This diversification facilitated the recruitment o f peoples w i t h special skills - the Daylamis of the Caspian area p r o v i d e d good infantry u n t i l the crusader period. K u r d s provided l i g h t c a v a l r y and infantry. For a long time K h o r a sanian horse archers a n d cavalrymen were i m p o r t a n t but they tended to be replaced b y T u r k s . A t the same time, rulers favoured such processes w h i c h lessened their dependence on the tribal elements to w h i c h they owed their p o w e r . " T h e destruction of the U m a i y a d Caliphate of Damascus i n 750 and the rise of the Abbasids 8

9

10

C. Cahen, Pte-Olloman

8

9

1 0

Turkey (London, 1968) pp.

19-20.

C. Cahen, 'The Turkish invasion: the Selchukids', in Setton, Crusades 1. 139-40. B. I^wis, The Arabs in history

(London, 1958), pp.

49-63.

" C. E. Bosworth, 'Recruitment, muster and review in medieval Islamic armies', in V . J. Parry and M . E. Y a p p , cds.,

War,

Technology and Society in the Middle Mast (London, 1975),

p. 60; J. D . Latham and W . F. Paterson, Saracen Archery (London, 1970), p. xxiii; this cycle of rulers throwing oiT tribal dependence is a major theme of Ibn-Khaldfin, especially pp. 123 263.

146

VICTORY IN THE

First enemy

EAST

of Bagdad marked a political transformation which favoured I r a n i a n groups, especially a military élite associated w i t h Khorasan, and Mesopotamian groups at the expense o f Arabs. ' T h e Caliphate developed a complex military organisation and placed more and more emphasis on mamlûk troops, slave-soldiers who were often recruited from the Iranian and the Eurasian steppe. U n d e r the Caliph A l Mu'tasim (892-902) Turkish troops became well established i n the Islamic armies and he created the great palace complex of Samarra near Bagdad to house these élite forces. By the eleventh century Turks were a powerful element i n almost all Islamic forces, even as far afield as Egypt, and at this very time political developments o n the frontier made them more important. I n 1025 a group of Oghuz, having been settled i n Khorasan, rebelled and were ejected by the Ghaznavids, but they were followed by another i n 1035, pre-eminent amongst whom were T u g h r i l a n d Chagri w h o b y 1040 dominated all of Khorasan including M c r v and Nishapur and drove out the Ghaznavids. While Chagri consolidated their position in the east T u g h r i l turned west. H e and his people had i m b i b e d a fierce Islamic orthodoxy and the domination o f the C a l i p h a t Baghdad by Shi'ite Buwaihids and others was a scandal upon w h i c h he capitalised. His entry into Baghdad i n 1055 peaceful one facilitated by contacts with Turkish elements around the C a l i p h , and though he had to fight later, by 1059 T u g h r i l was master o f the Caliphate and enjoyed the title of S h a h . I n the process of constructing his power i n the heart o f Islam T u g h r i l and his successor, A l p Arslan, were happy to adopt the composite armies o f their predecessors i n which the tribal element of the Turks was only a p a r t , though Turkish enlistment as slave-soldiers, mamluks, continued to be important. This was a vital element i n the stabilisation o f t h e i r dynasty and as a corollary they encouraged the nomadic T u r k s to attack the Fatimids of Palestine and the Byzantine frontier. P a t r o n age of such a holy war would give the Shah prestige and allow the tribes to plunder, while providing a reservoir for recruitment. T h e 2

13

w

a

s

a

14

scale o f their success was remarkable. I n 1057 they sacked Melitene ( m o d e r n M a l a t y a ) , i n 1059 Sebasteia (modern Sivas) and i n 1064 A n i a n d by the late 1060s they were v i r t u a l l y raiding at w i l l i n eastern Asia M i n o r , even devastating the land behind the advance o f i m p e r i a l armies u n d e r Romanus I V Diogenes (1067-71) when he campaigned against t h e m i n 1069. Such success o w e d something to their tactics. T r a d i t i o n a l l y steppe people r i d e l i g h t ponies, perhaps ten to twelve hands on average, and depend o n strings o f t h e m to provide speed and endurance i n battle. W e h a v e very l i t t l e i n f o r m a t i o n about T u r k i s h horses, though i n contrast to the M o n g o l armies we do not hear o f large strings of spare horses. W h e n A l p A r s l a n fought at M a n z i k e r t i n 1071 he took w i t h h i m 15,000 p i c k e d cavalry, and the fact that all had a spare horse is remarked u p o n b y the sources suggesting that i t was unusual and a mark o f their élite s t a t u s . I n fact, for nomads the difficulties i m p l i c i t i n the raising o f heavier breeds w i t h the need for stallfeeding, stud farms a n d the isolation of dams were overwhelming. Their special forte was m o u n t e d archery and they provided extraordinary fire-power a n d accuracy combined w i t h speed of manoeuvre. A n i n t h - c e n t u r y A r a b w r i t e r remarked o f the Turkish troops t h e n b e c o m i n g c o m m o n : ' T h e T u r k can shoot at beasts, birds, hoops, m e n , s i t t i n g q u a r r y , dummies and birds on the w i n g , and do so at f u l l gallop t o fore o r to rear, to left or to right, upwards or downwards, loosing ten arrows before the K h a r i j i t e [ A r a b tribesman hostile t o the Abassids] can nock o n e . 15

16

17

18

This c o m b i n a t i o n o f speed of manoeuvre w i t h the range o f the bow was e x t r e m e l y d i f f i c u l t to combat. T h e y used the composite bow wood w i t h h o r n w h i c h reacts to compression bound on the belly side, and s i n e w o n the back to increase elasticity. Thus, despite its shortness, the nomad's b o w h a d great strength and considerable range. A l b e r t o f A i x salts his chronicle w i t h poetic clichés; his Franks seize h e l m s a n d a r m o u r as they fly to battle, but the T u r k s seize bows, o f t e n described as b e i n g o f h o r n and sinew. Such v i v i d word 1 5

¡3 n A ' "V U. Ayalon

7 P Slates', in Setton, Crusades i , 8 i - 2 . Preliminary remarks on thc Mamluk military institution in Islam', in V . G. h C

C a l i

h a t c i n

Parry and M . E. Yapp, eds.,

pp. 5 . - 4 , Bosworth

t h c

A

r

a

b

'

8

War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London, , 9 7 5 ) ,

Recruitment, muster and

review', pp. 6 2 - 3 ; O. S. A.

Ismail,

Mu^asum and thc Turks', Bulletin of the School of African and Oriental Studies, 2 9 ( , 6 6 ) , 9

1 7 1 4

Cahen, 'The Turkish invasion', 143-6.

147

1 8

S. V r y o n i s , The Decline

of Medieval

Hellenism

in Asia Minor

(London, 1971), p p . 8 7 , 9 4 - 5 .

C. C a h c n , 'Les changements techniques militaires dans le Proche Orient médiéval et leur importance historique', in V . G. Parry and M . E. Yapp, eds., War, Technology and Society in 1ht Middle East (London, 1975), 115 comments on the need for research on Turkish horses. Lindner, 'Nomadism, horses and Huns', 3-19; Bundari, Dawolal al-Saljuq (Cairo, 1900), p. 37 - I owe this reference to Professor A . K . S. Lambton. A matter which Davies stresses. See above p. 73. a! J a h i z quoted in L a t h a m and Paterson, Saracen Archery, p. xxiii,

148

VICTORY

First enemy

I N T H E EAST

pictures convey sharply the difference i n style o f w a r f a r e . I n a famous passage after his account o f the battle o f Dorylaeum, the Anonymous praises the skill of the Turks as soldiers, b u t A l b e r t gives a very m u c h more specific example o f their archery. D u r i n g the pursuit after D o r y l a e u m , he says, the enemy remained dangerous and often t u r n e d at bay. Gerard of Quiersy, spotting a T u r k o n the brow o f a h i l l , d r e w his shield across h i m and attacked w i t h his lance; his intended v i c t i m , however, fired an arrow w h i c h w e n t through the shield and struck h i m between the liver and lungs, and while he lay d y i n g the T u r k made off w i t h his horse. As the Franks forced the crossing o f the I r o n Bridge he again mentions T u r k i s h arrows piercing a h a u b e r k . I f we think o f a T u r k i s h horseman d r a w i n g a b o w w i t h a p u l l o f between twenty-seven and thirty-six kilograms, he m i g h t have an effective range of well over sixty metres so the Anonymous's comment o n their 'astonishing range' makes sense. Consider the effect o f many such individuals firing together and i t is possible to understand the frequency w i t h w h i c h the western accounts mention the sleets o f arrows w h i c h the Turks produced i n battle. Fulcher speaks o f the clouds o f arrows which overcame t h e army at D o r y l a e u m , and A l b e r t describes hails of arrows as t h e Turks fought back i n the pursuit after the battle and w h i c h destroyed Swein o f Sweden's reinforcements and Renaud o f T o u l ' s force i n the final battle at A n t i o c h . Such language is too f r e q u e n t to be mere extravagance, as are references to the fast horses o f t h e Turks. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers describes their hit-and-run tactics i n which speed was essential t o avoid crusader retribution. R a l p h shows them manoeuvring outside 'Artâh to lure Franks i n t o ambush, while according to Albert warriors o n speedy m o u n t s opposed the crossing o f the fords near the I r o n Bridge a n d l a t e r lured Roger of Barneville to his d e a t h . I t is possible that they h a d developed light tubular crossbows, throwing darts to augment t h e i r firepower. I t was by t h r o w i n g a hail of arrows that the T u r k s demoralised their enemies, isolated and broke u p their f o r m a t i o n s 19

20

21

22

23

1 9

2 0

2 1

2 2

2 3

A A , 344, 359, 369, 4 0 0 . I _

before charging i n for the k i l l at close quarters w i t h sword and spear. T h i s was how they h a d destroyed the forces of the People's Crusade. Once at close quarters their p r i m a r y weapon was the sword, a t this time a straight edged weapon rather narrower and more sharply pointed than the Frankish weapon, b u t otherwise little different. I t is difficult to comment on the armour of the nomads. As early as 1037/8, Bayhaqi says that w h e n T u g h r i l Bey entered Nishapur his 3,000 cavalry were mostly armoured. M u c h o f our evidence about the Seljuks comes f r o m Byzantine sources o f the twelfth century w h i c h show mail shirts a n d poncho-like garments o f mail. By this time Greek influence u p o n their protective equipment and style o f war was becoming very s t r o n g . However, there is ample evidence for the use o f armour, scale, chain-mail a n d lamellar armour t h r o u g h o u t the M i d d l e East. Strips or scales fastened to cloth or leather seem to have been outmoded i n the West, b u t such lighter equipment would have suited the warfare of the area very well and so have remained i n use. T h e r e is no reason to t h i n k that the nomads of Asia M i n o r were i g n o r a n t of armour. R a l p h o f Caen gives a very v i v i d description of the fighting at D o r y l a e u m a n d tells us that i n the press o f battle the T u r k s 'trusted i n their numbers, we i n our armour' w h i c h implies that they d i d not have armour. However, he docs not explicitly say that they had none and i t w o u l d be very surprising i f they were prepared to close w i t h the Franks w i t h no protection at all. I n m u c h o f the M i d d l e East a r m o u r was w o r n under the cover of other materials, most often i n the f o r m of a Hazagand, a leather j e r k i n w i t h m a i l or lamellar w i t h i n a n d there were variations on this like the l a t e r western brigandine. Felt o r fur caps were often w o r n by T u r k s a t this t i m e . W e can t h i n k , therefore, o f the T u r k i s h horsemen wearing rather l i g h t e r armour t h a n the western knights, and, above all, c a r r y i n g a m u c h smaller and lighter shield. However, their skilful horsemanship a n d tactics were n o t i n themselves a sufficient advantage to account for the victories o f the Turks i n Asia M i n o r - they owed far more to Byzantine weakness. 24

25

2 6

27

2 4

A A , 3 3 2 . 362: La Chanson d'Anlioche,

ed. S. Duparc-Quioc, 2 vols. (Paris, 1 9 7 7 - 8 ) , 2,

1606, 8979 mentions Gerard at Nicaea and later at the battle against Kcrbogah. Latham and Paterson, Saracen Archery, pp. xxv, 30; A A , 334, 377, 424; FC, p. 8 5 .

3 5

i 6

RA, pp. 5 0 - 1 ; R C , pp. 6 3 9 - 4 1 ; A A , 362, 408; sec below pp. 192-3, 206, 2 7 1 - 2 .

Latham and Paterson, Saracen Archery, pp. xxiv-xxxi; C. Cahen, ' U n traité d ' a r m u r e r i e compose pour Saladin', Bulletin

d'Etudes

Orientales de l'Institut

Français de Damas,

12

(1947/48). i 3 ~ 3 d 'Les changements techniques militaires' pp. 116-17, points to the development or this light crossbow which threw large numbers ordarts, hence its n i c k n a m e 'hailstone', which is described in some detail by Latham and Paterson, pp. 1 4 5 - 5 1 . 2

a n

149

There are some fine eleventh-century examples in the armoury of the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul. D . Nicolle, 'Early medieval Islamic arms and armour', Gladius, special volume (1976), 53. Nicolle, 'Early medieval Islamic arms', 26, 5 3 - 8 2 ; M . V . Gorelik, 'Oriental armour of the Near and Middle East from the eight to the fifteenth centuries as shown in works of art', in R. Eigood, ed. Islamic Arms and Armour (London, 1979), pp. 3 0 - 6 3 ; R C , 6 2 1 .

2 7

O n the destruction of the People's Crusade see above p. 9 3 - 5 ; W . E. Kacgi, 'The contribution of archery to the Turkish conquest of Anatolia', Speculum, 39 (1964), 9 6 - 1 0 8 rather exaggerates the influence of archery. After all, many Turks fought for the Byzantines w i t h the same tactics.

150

VICTORY

First enemy

I N T H E EAST

The death of Basil I I (976-1025) saw the Byzantine empire i n a position of strength, extending from Mesopotamia to B u l g a r i a . B u t Basil's success, a n d the manner i n w h i c h i t was achieved, left considerable problems for the Byzantine state. H e significantly changed Byzantine m i l i t a r y organisation. I n the seventh century t h e Byzantine a r m y h a d been reorganised w i t h the division of t h e empire into Themes, each o f which was defended b y its o w n military-force locally recruited, housed and financed. W h e n a n imperial expedition was mounted, the army o f the themata c o m b i n e d w i t h the central a r m y based at Constantinople, the tagmata, a t selected aplikta, camps on the military highways such as that a t D o r y l a e u m w h i c h was the gateway to the A n a t o l i a n p l a t e a u . However, the settlements of peasant soldiers, w h i c h were the basis o f this army, were being absorbed into the estates o f the aristocracy o f Asia M i n o r w h o thus were able to control the armies of the Themes. I n 987 a group o f these families revolted against Basil and were o n l y defeated i n 989 w i t h the aid o f a corps of 6,000 Russians, the basis o f the later V a r a n g i a n guard. F r o m this time onwards Basil f o u n d i t prudent to rely more a n d more on mercenaries for the regular a r m y w h i c h was the basis o f his successful expansion o f the empire in t h e Balkans. T h e increasing wealth o f the empire, evidenced b y t h e growth o f cities, facilitated the replacement o f territorial forces b y mercenaries. As a result, the old armies of the Themes were somewhat neglected, except o n exposed frontiers where they continued t o serve a useful purpose. A t the same time, he revived old legislation t o prevent the great families o f Asia M i n o r from absorbing peasant holdings into their estates i n order to protect the tax base w h i c h w a s even more necessary t o pay his professional armies. O n the basis o f his victory o f 989, Basil established a harsh government w h i c h dominated the great noble houses and at the same time demanded a 28

29

30

The general explanation or Byzantine decline here relies on: M . Angold, The

Byzantine

Empire ¡025-1204, a Political History (London, 1984), pp. 1-113 and Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 70-142. See also Charanis, in Setton, Crusades 1. 177-219; Jenkins, Byzantine Empire; Ostrogorsky, Byzantine Slate, pp. 2 8 0 - 3 1 5 . On the Byzantine army see J . D . Howard-Johnstone, Studies in the Organisation of the Byzantine Army in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries, unpublished D.Phil, thesis, University o f

Oxford, 1971; H . A h r w e i k r , 'L'organisation des campagnes militaires a Byzance', in V . J . Parry and M . E. Yapp, eds., War, Technology and Society in the Middle East (London, 1 9 7 5 ) , pp. 8 g - g 6 is particularly useful on its subject. See also Ostrogorsky, Byzantine Slate, pp. 87-go; on Dorylaeum which had baths for 1,000 troops sec Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 3 1 - 2 . Angold, Byzantine Empire, pp. 6 3 - 5 ; C. Mango, Byzantium (London, i g 8 8 ) , p. 5 7 .

crushing t a x a t i o n to support a professional army a n d a policy o f expansion. T h e strains t h a t this imposed o n the empire meant t h a t when Basil died there was b o u n d to be change, and this was complicated by the lack o f a clear line of succession on the death o f his b r o t h e r Constantine V I I I (1025-8) whose daughters' marriages determined the succession for the next twenty years without ever p r o d u c i n g heirs to p r o l o n g the Macedonian house. This failure inevitably produced uncertainty a n d promoted the emergence o f aristocratic factions w h o competed for power; there were t h i r t y rebellions i n the period 1 0 2 8 - 5 7 , t h a t of Tornikios i n 1047-8 w h i c h was only defeated b y stripping the frontiers o f troops. C o m p e t i t i o n for power amongst aristocratic houses was a feature of Byzantine history, and this period produced able, as well as feeble, emperors, b u t this came at a time when the empire had severe problems. T h e rise o f a mercenary army imposed massive financial burdens a n d i t is h a r d l y surprising that, w i t h the less expansionist stance after 1025, efforts were made t o cut back on m i l i t a r y expenditure. Constantine I X Monomachus dismantled the army o f the theme o f I b e r i a . T h e policy was logical for the local army d u p l i c a t e d the mercenary one, but, to its great discontent, this area n o w h a d t o pay taxes and i t was exposed t o hostile attack. I n the East, t h e T u r k s began to press o n the frontier, while i n the Balkans t h e Patzinacks were a potential menace and in I t a l y the Normans became a major force i n the 1040s. Thus, economy i n m i l i t a r y matters came at a time o f increasing external threat. Moreover, i n the east, there were a number o f populations whose religious affiliations made t h e m suspect to the Byzantine authorities (most n o t a b l y the Jacobite Syrians and the Armenians), and the efforts o f Constantine X Doukas (1059-67) to settle problems w i t h these churches, intended to strengthen the frontiers, simply aroused hatred. T h u s , every effort o f the i m p e r i a l government worsened the security situation i n t h e eastern provinces and, by the 1060s, the Turks were r a i d i n g deep i n t o Asia M i n o r w i t h I c o n i u m and Chonae falling v i c t i m towards the end o f the decade. Even more importantly, the v a c u u m of power at the centre continued to be filled only i n t e r m i t t e n t l y a n d the autocracy was the subject of bitter factional conflict w h i c h prevented consistent policies f r o m emerging. T h e factional struggle allowed other forces to emerge w i t h i n the state the c h u r c h especially under the Patriarch Michael Keroularios (1043-58) became a major factor i n the state and not a mere a r m o f s u c n

a

s

152

VICTORY IN THE

the autocracy, while the mob o f Constantinople had also to be considered. T h i s was the background to the reign of Romanus I V Diogenes (1067-71). W h e n Constantine Doukas died he had invested imperial power in his wife E u d o c i a , to exercise on behalf of his young sons, but there was widely felt t o be a need for a strong ruler and as a result, she married Romanus I V Diogenes, a successful soldier who had defeated the Patzinacks i n t h e Balkans. He consolidated his power and produced two sons, b u t i n e v i t a b l y this aroused the hostility of the Doukas. R o m a n u s was determined to end the T u r k i s h attacks on the eastern p r o v i n c e s , but there was considerable uncertainty about how best t o do this. A considerable body of thought suggested that he should make the border provinces, w i t h their disloyal populations, a desert and crush the Turks i n central Asia Minor. He preferred t o t r y and oust the Turks by a strategy o f large-scale expeditions to the eastern frontier which would p u t pressure upon the S u l t a n A l p Arslan. But the Turks were steppe horsemen to w h o m the A n a t o l i a n plateau presented a congenial and familiar habitat across w h i c h they could move quickly and they melted before the l u m b e r i n g Byzantine army, returning to isolate the fortresses once they had gone. I n 1068 Romanus attacked Aleppo, and the c a m p a i g n of 1069 was directed against the upper Euphrates although t h e rebellion of the N o r m a n mercenary Crispin was a considerable diversion. These expensive forays produced no results and i t is l i k e l y that the emperor's enemies, led by the Caesar John Doukas w e r e becoming a threat. I n 1071, Romanus led a huge Byzantine a r m y with the intention o f bringing the Sultan A l p Arslan, w h o was preparing for an attack on F a t i m i d Egypt, to battle: R o m a n u s needed a victory. T h e army was overwhelmingly mercenary w i t h contingents of Greeks, Russians, Khazars, Alans, Georgians, Armenians, Turks and Franks; i t was the Germans, amongst these latter, who attacked the emperor at Cryapege when he tried to c u r b their excesses. Some of the units were very good but there was enormous variation in quality and they were not used to working together. As they moved eastwards there was friction with the A r m e n i a n s . I t was a huge army, though the 300,000 suggested by some A r a b sources is a gross exaggeration: i t was probably of the order of 40,000-60,000. Alp Arslan was surprised by their coming 31

3 1

First enemy

EAST

W. C. Brice, 'The Turkish colonisation of Anatolia', Bulletin of John Ryland's Library, 38 ('955). >8-44-

!53

he had negotiated a truce w i t h Romanus i n the previous year, b u t the Byzantines saw continued T u r k i s h raiding, over w h i c h the Sultan had n o control, as a breach. M a n z i k e r t (east of m o d e r n Erzerum (see fig. 3 ) ) , a fortress recently captured by the Turks, was quickly recaptured, b u t a large section o f the imperial army was dispatched to take C h l i a t . W h e n A l p Arslan arrived, the N o r m a n mercenary leader, Roussel of Bailleul, a n d Tarchaniotcs who commanded many o f the T u r k s , simply fled. I n the crisis of the battle Andronicus Doukas seems deliberately to have betrayed Romanus who was captured i n the ensuing r o u t . M a n z i k e r t was not quite the overwhelming victory that has been supposed, for m u c h o f the a r m y was never engaged and many units escaped i n t a c t , but the emperor's guard was slaughtered. A l p Arslan concluded a very merciful treaty w i t h Romanus, for he was preoccupied elsewhere a n d had no wish to see a major T u r k i s h power i n A n a t o l i a . I t was the Byzantine reaction which turned the situation into a disaster. Romanus's enemies, led by Michael V I I Doukas (1071-8), denounced the treaty and blinded Romanus. T h e Byzantine state now dissolved i n a series o f civil wars, i n which the numerous contenders were all prepared to call i n the Turks. This was why the cities o f Asia M i n o r w h i c h could have resisted a nomadic people w i t h no experience of siege warfare d i d not do so. Instead, the keys o f their gates were handed over to the Turks by the contending magnates. I n the chaos, the N o r m a n mercenary leader Roussel o f Bailleul attempted to create a new state i n Asia M i n o r and his success brought 3,000 Franks into his following. I n an effort to divide his enemies he championed the imperial pretensions o f j o h n Doukas. H e was only defeated i n B i t h y n i a when the imperial authorities brought in the T u r k i s h E m i r , A r t u k , whose activities so far to the west are a revelation of Byzantine weakness. Even then, he escaped and i n the end was betrayed to Alexius Comnenus. I n Cappadocia and 32

33

34

3 Î

O n Manzikert see C. Cahcn, 'La campagne de Mantzikert d'après les sources musulmanes', Byzanlion, 9 (1934.), 6 1 3 - 4 2 , and for corrections based on the Greek sources Vryonis, Hellenism,

pp. 9 6 - 1 0 3 ; A .

Friendly,

The

Dreadful

Day.

The

battle of Mantzikert,

(London, 1981), pp. 163-52; J . C. Cheynet, 'Mantzikert. U n désastre militaire?',

1071

Byzan-

tion, 5 0 ( 1 9 8 0 ) 4 1 0 - 3 8 . î 3

3 4

Cheynet, 'Mantzikert', p. 431 suggests losses o f five to ten per cent in total much less than those of Alexius Comnenus's, reputedly 5,000 at Dyrrachium ten years later, on which see above pp. 7 5 - 6 . J. Schtumberger, 'Deux chefs normands des armées byzantines au X I siècle: ceaux de Hervé et de Raoul deBailleul', Revue Historique, 16 (1881), 289-303; L . Brchier, 'Les aventures d'un chef normand en Orient au X I siècle', Reme des Cours et Conferences, 20 (1911 —ra), 9 9 - 1 1 2 ; see also Marquis de la Force, 'Les conseillers latins d'Alexis Comnène', Byzanlion, î ' ( ' 9 3 6 ) , 153-65-

154

VICTORY

First enemy

I N T H E EAST

C i l i c i a , independent A r m e n i a n princes were happy to see the back o f B y z a n t i n e rule a n d to take over the cities of the area. Amongst t h e m was a former Guropalate and Domestic of Romanus I V who h a d f o u g h t w i t h h i m a t M a n z i k e r t , Philaretus Brachamius, w h o refused to recognise M i c h a e l V I I and created a principality based o n M a r a s c h , A h l i s t h a and Melitenc (see figs. 2 and 4 ) . I n 1074 h e defeated Isaac Comnenus, duke o f A n t i o c h , and by 1078 he h a d acquired t h i s m a j o r city. Niccphorous Botaneiates, who rebelled against M i c h a e l i n 1078, was a former comrade i n arms of Philaretus a n d recognised his independent p r i n c i p a l i t y to w h i c h he added Edessa i n 1083-4. W h e n Sulayman, leader o f the A n a t o l i a n T u r k s , was peacefully a d m i t t e d to A n t i o c h i n 1085, ^ * impossible t h a t local f a c t i o n a l i s m w i t h i n the city was encouraged to this end b y A l e x i u s I Comnenus - i n order to get r i d o f an adherent o f t h e o v e r t h r o w n Botaneiates. W h e n Nicephorous Botaneiates began his r e b e l l i o n i n 1077 he was able to gather very few troops b u t the g o v e r n m e n t , beset by the rebellion of Nicephorous Bryennius i n the west w h i c h allowed the Patzinacks i n once again, called u p o n S u l a y m a n , leader o f the Anatolian Turks. H e changed sides, however, a n d Botaneiates used his forces to hold d o w n many of the cities o f western Asia M i n o r , including Nicaca w h i c h appears t o have f a l l e n into T u r k i s h hands at this time. M u c h of the army w h i c h Botaneiates used against Bryennius i n the west under Alexius C o m nenus was T u r k i s h , and i t was turned against Botaneiates w h o m Alexius succeeded i n 1081, only to face the rebellion o f his b r o t h e r i n - l a w , Melissenus, w h o turned over more o f the cities of western A n a t o l i a t o Sulayman. There can be no doubt that for the Byzantine magnates and generals, c i v i l war i n their o w n interests was far m o r e i m p o r t a n t than defence of Anatolia. I t seems almost as i f these great nobles were quite happy to loan a vast and rich province to b a r b a rians for w h o m they had the greatest disdain and w h o m they never seem to have regarded as rivals, like the Arabs against w h o m N i c e p h o r o u s Phocas (963-9) and J o h n Tzimiskes (969-76) h a d waged a holy w a r . I t was the Emperor, Alexius Comnenus sn

o

t

35

(1081-95), w h o finally b r o u g h t to an end the chaos i n the Byzantine state and established himself as the head o f a group of aristocratic families w h o d o m i n a t e d the machinery o f state. H e was not a great soldier: he w o u l d suffer heavy defeats, such as that at Dyrrachium, a n d w i n f e w real victories. H e was as prepared as any of his rivals to m a k e arrangements w i t h the T u r k s . H e was, i n the end, a skilful a n d cautious p o l i t i c i a n anxious t o nurse his deeply wounded empire. T h e spirit o f the crusade was deeply alien to this cautious politician. H e 'came t o power as the head o f a powerful aristocratic network', so i t is h a r d l y surprising t h a t h e offered n o revival of that spirit o f h o l y war w h i c h a century before had enabled the warrior emperors, Nicephorous Phocas a n d J o h n Tzimiskes, to drive the Byzantine frontier deep i n t o S y r i a . B u t the Comneni and the families allied to h i m were a l l f r o m Asia M i n o r w h i c h they regarded as the heartland o f the e m p i r e , hence t h e importance w h i c h he attached to regaining i t , and hence the appeal o f 1095. 37

A n n a C o m n e n a clearly understood the importance her father attached t o Asia M i n o r . She portrays h i m as a Byzantine hero, but his relations w i t h the T u r k s were complex. There was never any question o f h o l y war, o n either side. I t was d u r i n g his reign that Byzantine sources began t o refer to Sulayman o f the Seljuk house a n d leader o f the T u r k s o f A n a t o l i a as Shah - a title not conferred by either the S u l t a n or t h e C a l i p h at B a g d a d . Sulayman was killed i n 1085, a n d i t was n o t u n t i l his son K i l i j Arslan escaped from the Sultan's custody i n 1092 t h a t the Sultanate of R h u m , as i t came to be called, c o u l d rise again. T h e T u r k s remained a largely nomadic people a n d t h e i r d o m i n i o n consisted of garrisons i n the cities and control o f the key routes. K i l i j Arslan held the important cities o f Nicaea a n d I c o n i u m , b u t o n the Aegean coast were emirs like Chaka at S m y r n a , a n d Tangripermes a t Ephesus, who were at best his allies and at w o r s t his rivals. Cyzicus, o n the Propontis, was held b y another e m i r , as were some of the ports along the Black Sea coast. A t 38

3 7

3 6

3 5

O n Philaretus see J. Laurent, 'Byzance et Antioche sous le curopalate Philarète', Revue des Etudes

Arméniennes,

9 ( 1 9 2 9 ) , 6 1 - 7 2 ; T . S. R. Boasc, The Cilician

Kingdom

of

Armenia

Sulayman was acting for the emperor in his capture of Antioch. 3 6

Cahen, Turkey,

p. 7 6 ; Ostrogorsky, Byzantine Stale, p. 257.

A . R. Gadolin, 'Alexius I Comnenus and the Venetian trade privileges. A new interpretation', Byzantion, 5 0 (1980), 4 3 9 - 4 6 , suggests that the great trading concessions, extended to the Venetians in the Golden Bull of 1082, were intended as much to stimulate the damaged Byzantine economy as to persuade them to give support against the Normans; M . Angold, 'The Byzantine State on the eve or the Battle of Manzikert', in A. Brycr and M . Ursinus, eds., Manzikert

(Edinburgh and London, 1978), pp. 3 - 4 ; Skoulatos, Anna Comnena, p p . 2 6 3 - 5 ; Cahcn, Turkey, p p . 76-7; Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 109-10. E. Sivan, L'Islam et la Croisade; Idéologie et Propagande dans les Réactions Musulmanes aux Croisades (Paris, 1968), p . 19 suggests t h a t

155

3 8

lo Lepanlo:

the Byzantine

World and the Turks,

1071-1571,

Byzantinischc

Forschungen 16 (Amsterdam, 1991)1 33¬ Sivan, LTslam et la Croisade, p. 19 stresses the lack or any spirit at jihad amongst the Seljuk leaders. I n taking over A n t i o c h , Sulayman was at pains to safeguard the Christian population; Cahen, Turkey, p. 7 5 .

156

VICTORY

First enemy

I N T H E EAST

Erzerum the Saltukid Turks had established a d o m i n i o n as h a d the Menguchckids at Erzinjan . Further south, the Danishmends had carved out a great principality based on Sivas, Kayseri and A n k a r a . Then there were lesser powers like Baldaji o r Hasan, w h o r u l e d a n enclave including much Armenian territory i n C a p p a d o c i a . Underlining the precarious nature o f these conquests were t h e independent Armenian princes i n the Taurus range, p r o m i n e n t amongst whom were Gonstantine son o f R o u p e n , Pazouni a n d Oschin, Gabriel a former associate o f Philaretus w h o held M e l i t e n e and Thoros of Edcssa. T h e T u r k i s h powers enjoyed a v e r y uncertain relationship with the centre o f power at Baghdad where Malik Shah (1072-92) ruled. When Sulayman h a d threatened t o become a power i n Syria after his conquest of A n t i o c h , he was defeated and killed by the Sultan's brother T u t u s h i n 1085 a n d Antioch was absorbed into the lands o f the Sultan M a l i k Shah. Faced w i t h this complex situation, Alexius proceeded carefully. H e sent forces against Nicaea i n 1081 but the attack o f Guiscard i n the west forced withdrawal, and he was unable to take real advantage o f the weakness of the Sultanate o f R h u m o n Sulayman's d e a t h because of threats in the Balkans from the Patzinacks a n d others. I n 1086 Malik Shah had been prepared to consider an alliance against the Turks of Asia Minor, which would have cleared the western p a r t of the peninsula, and at the time o f his death, was n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h Alexius for an imperial marriage w h i c h m i g h t have opened t h e w a y for an alliance against R h u m . I n the rivalries of the rulers o f A s i a Minor and the tensions between them and the Sultan at B a g h d a d Alexius could see opportunity which was, i f a n y t h i n g , increased b y the deaths of Malik Shah in 1092 and his brother T u t u s h i n 1095, leaving Syria divided between the latter's bickering sons, D u q a q o f Damascus and Ridwan of Aleppo. I t was presumably i n a n e f f o r t to exploit this complex situation that Alexius had asked U r b a n I I f o r aid. He was presented w i t h an independent force, t h e crusade, which, despite his best efforts, was not entirely w i t h i n his c o n t r o l . His refusal to j o i n the army as i t marched against Nicaea, a n d indeed his whole policy towards the Franks, has t o be seen i n t h e 39

40

41

42

3 9

4 0

157

light of this situation. T o back the Franks so unequivocally as to j o i n them i n person w o u l d make relations w i t h R h u m difficult, should they fail. A n d failure m i g h t trigger internal unrest. Better b y far t o leave them to fight, so t h a t , i f they failed, other means could be pursued and his relations w i t h K i l i j A r s l a n could remain. Alexius had not attacked Nicaea i n person before - he had used his generals and now he continued this policy. Alexius w o u l d support the Franks as long as they succeeded. W i t h this equivocal ally a comfortable distance behind them, the crusader a r m y prepared for battle against the first o f its enemies - the Seljuk Sultanate of R h u m and its principal city of Nicaea. I t is very difficult t o estimate the m i l i t a r y capacity of the Sultanate o f R h u m i n this p e r i o d . T h e T u r k s had never been numerous Cahen suggests that o n l y about 20,000-30,000 warriors entered the Caliphate at the time o f its conquest. As steppe people like the Huns, Avars and Magyars before them, they relied on mobility a n d a training i n horsemanship f r o m b i r t h . I t has been suggested o f earlier nomad peoples w h o entered Europe that to maintain t h e i r speed of assault each r i d e r needed a string o f t e n horses. Therefore, nomad forces needed huge open ranges t o graze their ponies. T h e Hungarian plain, where the Huns, Avars a n d Magyars settled, could only support 150,000 horses, a n a r m y o f 15,000 m e n . W e simply do not know i f the T u r k s used such vast strings o f spare horses but is likely that they d i d n o t . M u c h o f the once rich agriculture o f Asia M i n o r had been destroyed b y the T u r k i s h invasions, b u t there was still a large native p o p u l a t i o n w i t h settled cultivation, while a lot of the land was w i l d a n d mountainous. I t certainly could n o t support horses o n a n y t h i n g like the scale o f the Syrian and Mesopotamian plains where later the Mongols h a d difficulty i n m a i n t a i n ing their huge horse t r a i n s . I t is only possible to guess, but i t seems unlikely that K i l i j A r s l a n could find as m a n y as 10,000 Turks, even with the allies he b r o u g h t t o the field o f Dorylaeum. I t was not the vast numbers o f the T u r k s that made them dangerous, b u t t h e i r sheer courage, ruthlessness and d a r i n g tactics w h i c h the crusaders themselves recognised. A t the siege o f Nicaea, Fulcher testifies t o their savagery w h i l e the Anonymous author of the Gesta is lavish i n 43

44

45

Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 114-16; Cahen, Turkey, pp. 7 6 - 8 2 . Matthew, 30-33; Michael the Syrian, Chroniquc de Michel le Syrien, Patriarch Jacobite

d'Anlioche

t-gg cd. and tr, J . B. Chabot, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1963, reprint o f 1 8 9 9 - 1 9 1 0 e d i t i o n ) [hereafter cited as Michael], vol. 3. 179; see below pp. 168-9, 3 0 4 - 7 . " > » % . PP- 77-8o. « Cahen, 'The Turkish invasion', 161-3. C a h e n

T

4 3

4 4

4 5

Cahen, 'The Turkish invasion', 157. Lindner, 'Nomadism, Horses and Huns', 8, 15. A. V . S. Lambton, Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia (London, 1988), pp. 2 1 - 4 and

especially 2 1 , n. 60.

I rj6

VICTORY

First enemy

I N T H E EAST

Erzerum the Saltukid Turks had established a d o m i n i o n as had the Menguchekids at Erzinjan . Further south, the Danishmends h a d carved out a great principality based o n Sivas, Kayseri a n d A n k a r a . Then there were lesser powers like Baldaji o r Hasan, w h o ruled a n enclave including much A r m e n i a n territory i n C a p p a d o c i a . Underlining the precarious nature o f these conquests were t h e independent Armenian princes i n the Taurus range, p r o m i n e n t amongst whom were Constantine son of Roupen, Pazouni a n d Oschin, Gabriel a former associate o f Philaretus who h e l d M e l i t e n e and Thoros of Edessa. T h e T u r k i s h powers enjoyed a v e r y uncertain relationship w i t h the centre o f power at Baghdad w h e r e Malik Shah (1072-92) ruled. W h e n Sulayman had threatened t o become a power i n Syria after his conquest o f A n t i o c h , he w a s defeated and killed by the Sultan's brother T u t u s h i n 1085 a n d Antioch was absorbed into the lands of the Sultan M a l i k S h a h . Faced with this complex situation, Alexius proceeded carefully. H e sent forces against Nicaea i n 1081 but the attack o f Guiscard i n t h e west forced withdrawal, and he was unable to take real advantage o f the weakness of the Sultanate o f R h i i m on Sulayman's d e a t h because of threats in the Balkans from the Patzinacks a n d others. I n 1086 Malik Shah had been prepared to consider an alliance against the Turks of Asia M i n o r , which w o u l d have cleared the western p a r t of the peninsula, and at the time o f his death, was n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h Alexius for an imperial marriage w h i c h might have opened the w a y for an alliance against R h i i m . I n the rivalries o f the rulers o f A s i a Minor and the tensions between them and the Sultan at B a g h d a d Alexius could see opportunity which was, i f anything, increased b y the deaths of Malik Shah i n 1092 and his brother T u t u s h i n 1 0 9 5 , leaving Syria divided between the latter's bickering sons, D u q a q o f Damascus and Ridwan of A l e p p o . I t was presumably i n a n e f f o r t to exploit this complex situation that Alexius had asked U r b a n I I f o r aid. He was presented w i t h an independent force, t h e c r u s a d e , which, despite his best efforts, was not entirely w i t h i n his c o n t r o l . His refusal to join the army as i t marched against N i c a e a , a n d indeed his whole policy towards the Franks, has to be seen i n t h e 39

40

41

42

3 9

4 0

157

light o f this situation. T o back the Franks so unequivocally as to j o i n them in person w o u l d make relations w i t h R h i i m difficult, should they fail. A n d failure m i g h t trigger internal unrest. Better by far to leave them to fight, so t h a t , i f they failed, other means could be pursued a n d his relations w i t h K i l i j A r s l a n could remain. Alexius had n o t attacked Nicaea i n person before - he had used his generals and now he continued this policy. Alexius w o u l d support the Franks as long as they succeeded. W i t h this equivocal ally a comfortable distance behind them, the crusader a r m y prepared for battle against the first o f its enemies - the Seljuk Sultanate of R h i i m and its principal city of Nicaea. I t is very difficult t o estimate the m i l i t a r y capacity of the Sultanate o f R h i i m i n this p e r i o d . T h e T u r k s h a d never been numerous Cahen suggests t h a t o n l y about 20,000-30,000 warriors entered the Caliphate at the time of its conquest. A s steppe people like t h e Huns, Avars and Magyars before them, they relied on mobility a n d a training i n horsemanship f r o m b i r t h . I t has been suggested o f earlier nomad peoples w h o entered Europe that to m a i n t a i n their speed of assault each r i d e r needed a string o f t e n horses. Therefore, nomad forces needed huge open ranges t o graze their ponies. T h e Hungarian plain, where the H u n s , Avars a n d Magyars settled, could only support 150,000 horses, a n a r m y o f 15,000 m e n . W e simply do n o t know i f the T u r k s used such vast strings o f spare horses but is likely that they d i d n o t . M u c h o f the once rich agriculture o f Asia M i n o r had been destroyed b y the T u r k i s h invasions, b u t there was still a large native p o p u l a t i o n w i t h settled cultivation, while a lot o f the land was w i l d a n d mountainous. I t certainly could n o t support horses o n a n y t h i n g like the scale o f the Syrian and Mesopotamian plains where later the Mongols h a d difficulty i n m a i n t a i n ing their huge horse t r a i n s . I t is only possible to guess, but i t seems unlikely that K i l i j A r s l a n c o u l d find as m a n y as 10,000 Turks, even with the allies he b r o u g h t t o the field o f Dorylaeum. I t was not the vast numbers o f the T u r k s that made them dangerous, but their sheer courage, ruthlessness and d a r i n g tactics w h i c h the crusaders themselves recognised. A t the siege o f Nicaea, Fulcher testifies t o their savagery while t h e Anonymous author of the Gesta is lavish i n 43

44

4 5

Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 114-16; Cahen, Turkey, pp. 76 8 s . Matthew, 30-33; Michael the Syrian, Chnnique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarch jacobite

d'Anlioche

1166 99 ed. and tr. J . B. Chabot, 4 vols. (Brussels, 1963, reprint of 1 8 9 9 - 1 9 1 0 e d i t i o n ) [hereafter cited as Michael], vol. 3. 179; see below pp. 168-9, 3 ° 4 - 7 " Cahen, Turkey, pp. 77-80. « Cahen, 'The Turkish invasion', 161-3.

4 3

4 4

4 5

Cahen, 'The Turkish invasion', 157. Lindner, 'Nomadism, Horses and Huns', 8, 15. A. V . S. Lambton, Continuity and Change in Medieval Persia

especially 2 1 , n. 60.

(London, 1988), pp. 2 1 - 4 and

158

VICTORY

First enemy

I N T H E EAST

his praise of their valour . T h e i r battle tactics are very well attested as we have noted - their reliance on m o b i l i t y , seeking to s u r r o u n d their enemies and bombard t h e m w i t h arrows, t o d r a w t h e m i n t o ambush by feigned retreat, breaking u p t h e i r cohesion before v e n t uring to take them on at close range. A passage f r o m Nicephorous Bryennius describing what he believed happened at M a n z i k e r t nicely illustrates Turkish methods: 46

Taranges divided the Turkish army into many groups and devised ambushes and traps and ordered his men to surround the Byzantines and to discharge a rain of arrows against them from all sides. The Byzantines, seeing their horses struck by arrows, were forced to pursue the Turks. T h e y followed the Turks who pretended to flee. But they suffered heavily when they fell into ambushes and traps. The emperor, having resolved to accept a general engagement, slowly advanced hoping to find an army of T u r k s , attack it and decide the battle, but the Turks scattered. But wheeling, w i t h great strength and shouting, they attacked the Byzantines and routed t h e i r right wing. Immediately the rear guard withdrew. The Turks encircled the emperor and shot from all directions. They prevented the left wing f r o m coming to the rescue for they got i n its rear and forced i t to flee. T h e emperor, completely deserted and cut off from aid, drew his sword against the enemy and killed many and compelled them to flee. But encircled b y the mass of the enemy, he was struck i n the hand and recognised a n d surrounded on all sides. His horse was hit by an arrow, slipped and fell, a n d threw down his rider. And in this manner the Byzantine emperor was made prisoner. 47

This is a description that the crusaders w o u l d soon come t o r e c o g nise. The Anonymous describes their surprise a n d dismay as t h e Turks, making an enormous and frightening noise, s u r r o u n d e d t h e army of Bohemond and poured arrows into i t . R a y m o n d o f A g u i l e r s commented of a later conflict: 'The T u r k s have this c u s t o m i n fighting, even though they are few i n number, they always s t r i v e t o encircle their enemy.' Albert o f A i x emphasises, i n a n a t t a c k a t Nicaea, that 10,000 mounted bowmen appeared a n d t h a t j u s t s u c h men surrounded and broke into Bohcmond's camp at D o r y l a e u m . Turks formed an important element i n a l l the armies w h i c h t h e crusaders faced, and indeed i n the Byzantine army, b u t i n A n a t o l i a the crusaders were confronted by forces w h i c h were e n t i r e l y 4 8

4 8

Turkish, and they showed themselves keenly aware of the difference between them a n d other armies. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers speaks o f Turks and Arabs, and A l b e r t refers t o T u r k s and Saracens, present in the army of D u q a q o f Damascus, b u t b o t h writers speak only o f Turks i n Asia M i n o r . T h e composite armies o f the Sultan and his emirs were quite different f r o m the forces o f the Anatolian Turks who were the crusaders first enemy. I n Anatolia, the T u r k s remained largely nomadic and their Seljuk Sultanate had not y e t developed, as far as we can tell f r o m inadequate sources, the kind o f central administration w h i c h could control a composite a r m y . This was t h e w i l d frontier o f Islam a n d w h a t confronted the c r u saders was a brave, dangerous b u t not very numerous enemy. However, there must have been some diversity i n the Turkish army, for Nicaea was strongly garrisoned and resisted bitterly. I t is unlikely that these were simple mounted nomads - presumably some more specialised forces h a d been recruited t o defend this i m p o r t a n t but exposed city, w h i c h the Byzantines h a d attacked more t h a n once. I n this connection i t is perhaps i m p o r t a n t that Nicaea was the only city o f Asia M i n o r to hold out. I c o n i u m was not defended; at Hereclea the T u r k s tried to ambush the crusaders as they approached, then fled. Defence of the cities of Asia M i n o r was n o easy matter for the T u r k s because these were still populated b y Christians: the T u r k s h a d n o t captured them, they had been admitted, as garrisons, by feuding Byzantine lords or after a l o n g period of isolation before a T u r k i s h d o m i n i o n outside their w a l l s . The countryside was i n the hands of the nomads b u t the cities were different. As soon as the crusaders began to w i n victories, the peoples of the cities along their route began to eject their Turkish garrisons. The Anonymous says t h a t after his defeat at Dorylaeum K i l i j Arslan had to pretend to have been victorious i n order to gain admission. The attitude of the native p o p u l a t i o n was to have an important influence on the crusade, as we shall see. I t was certainly to have a great influence o n the siege o f Nicaea for, at the very moment t h a t the a r m y attacked i t , K i l i j Arslan was preoccupied w i t h far-off Melitene. 4 9

50

51

52

53

I n late October 1096 K i l i j Arslan had totally destroyed the armies of the People's Crusade. Leaving his f a m i l y at Nicaea he set out t o

FC, pp. 82 83; GF, p. 21,

« Nicephorous Bryennius Commentarii, ed. A . Meineke (Bonn, . 8 3 6 ) , pp. 4 1 - 2 cited a n d t r . Kaegi, Archery p. 106. «

159

GF, p. 19; R A , p. 52 Krey, First Crusade, p. 135; A A , 3 2 0 , 3 2 8 - 3 : .

4 9

GF, p. 30; R A , p. 52; A A , 3 7 5 .

5 1

GF, p p . 2 3 - 4 .

M

5 0

O n which see below pp. 200- 6.

Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 1 1 2 - 1 3 ; Cahcn Turkey, pp. 7 6 - 7 , 8 3 - 4 .

5 3

GF, p. 2 2 .

i6o

VICTORY

IN THE

First enemy

EAST

intervene i n Melitene. This city was a vital communications centre o n the roads f r o m A n a t o l i a to Mesopotamia and I r a n . I t was held by Gabriel, a former officer of Philaretus, who claimed the Byzantine title o f Curopalate yet nominally held i t o f the C a l i p h . I t was i m p o r t a n t for K i l i j Arslan that Melitene should not be i n the power of the Sultan. I n 1097 the divisions o f Syria and the rivalries w i t h Baghdad, where the Seljuk Sultan Berkyaruk (1094-1105) was preoccupied w i t h events in the East, offered a splendid o p p o r t u n i t y to intervene, b u t he almost immediately found himself i n competition w i t h the Danishmends who also wished to control Melitene. Conflict was avoided for the moment because news reached the Sultan of the new threat to Nicaea, and he hastened westwards. I t was perhaps easier for these nomads to move quickly than a conventional a r m y , b u t this j o u r n e y of not much less than 1,000 kilometres must have been very t i r i n g . The crusaders reached Nicaea on 6 M a y 1097 b u t w i t h only a part of their army. Bohemond a n d the Normans took u p a position along the north wall of the c i t y , w i t h Robert o f Flanders and Godfrey to the east. T h e south gate was left open for R a y m o n d of Toulouse, whose delay at Constantinople we have noted: the N o r t h French had not yet arrived at Constantinople. T h e piecemeal nature o f the siege underlines the lack o f u n i t y i n the crusader force; i t was a huge host made u p of a n u m b e r o f major armies grouped around important leaders, but there was n o overall command. I n fact, they approached Nicaea from the n o r t h and simply fanned out in order of arrival, probably a r r a n g i n g details by consultations amongst the princes. K i l i j Arslan arrived i n the general area of his capital shortly before 16 M a y when his attack precipitated a major battle. 54

We have two versions of the nature o f this attack. A c c o r d i n g to R a y m o n d o f Aguilers i t was two-pronged: one force fell u p o n the Germans o n the east side of the city, while the other attempted to enter the c i t y through the vacant south gate, w i t h the i n t e n t i o n o f sallying out against Godfrey while he was distracted. A c c o r d i n g t o this version, the Provencals happened to come before the south gate and were p i t c h i n g camp when the enemy arrived; they fought o f f the southern attack, thereby enabling the Germans to fight off the o t h e r force. This account gives the South French a beau role indeed, a n d one wonders just how Raymond could have known of the i n t e n t i o n s Matthew, 28; Cahcn, Turkey, pp. 81-2; Michael 3. 179.

of the enemy. T h e Anonymous makes little o f the affair, saying t h a t Count R a y m o n d fought off a n i n i t i a l attack w h i c h was renewed b u t defeated 'by o u r m e n ' . A l b e r t says that, alerted b y the capture of a n enemy messenger t r y i n g to reach the garrison, the leaders asked Count R a y m o n d t o hasten his march, but agrees w i t h Raymond o f Aguilers t h a t the Provencals were attacked j u s t as they were m a k i n g camp. H e says t h a t 10,000 enemy archers fell upon the southerners and that the Germans, supported by the Normans o f Bohemond, then attacked the enemy w h o were p u t to flight. This version is much the more convincing. T h e enemy attack clearly came from the south; the A n o n y m o u s explicitly states that the enemy came d o w n from the hills, a n d A l b e r t confirms t h i s . F r o m this location the Turks w o u l d have had a magnificent view o f Nicaea and the basin which surrounds i t and so could not have missed the slow progress o f the Provençal forces r o u n d the city to the south gate. Clearly the Turks chose to attack w h e n they were most vulnerable, as they prepared their c a m p after the forced march to the city. K i l i j Arslan hoped to brush t h e m aside, and at the least reinforce Nicaea, at the most inflict a discouraging defeat o n the westerners (see fig. 5). T h e attempt failed because the Provencals p u t u p a stiff resistance (and to R a y m o n d o f Aguilers they must have seemed to have been at the very centre o f the affair), d r a w i n g the Turks into a close quarter battle and so g i v i n g time for Godfrey's attack from the east on K i l i j Arslan's r i g h t flank. T h e sheer numbers of the crusader army were decisive i n the n a r r o w area between the wooded hills and the city wall because the T u r k s had l i t t l e room for manoeuvre. The A n o n y mous, who gives the impression of a skirmish, was probably w i t h the Normans to t h e n o r t h o f the city. A l b e r t makes i t clear that i t was a savage and close-fought battle w i t h heavy losses on both sides. There was no overall c o m m a n d on the crusader side but, nonetheless, w e can see generalship of a very h i g h order at work. T h e count o f Toulouse h e l d his troops together at a difficult moment as they were making camp, w h i l e Godfrey seems to have rallied his forces to their relief quickly. These are not small achievements, especially when 55

56

R A , p. 4.3; GF, p p . 1 4 - 1 5 ; A A , 3 2 0 - 1 . I t must be admitted, however, that some aspects o f Albert's account o f the early siege are confused. A long list of those present, 315, includes Robert of N o r m a n d y who, however, is not amongst the leaders who urged Raymond o f Toulouse to h u r r y , 3 1 9 , yet is recorded as taking part in the battle, 320. I n fact he did not arrive until 3 June. I would guess that Albert was trying to reconcile confused and contradictory information from his sources. * GF, p. 15; A A , 3 2 0 .

i s

VICTORY

IN THE

163

First enemy

EAST

one considers the looseness of command and the uneven q u a l i t y o f the western forces. For many this must have been the first experience of battle, and for others their first o f a n y t h i n g on a large scale. I t was essentially the mass of the crusader a r m y operating i n a confined space which frustrated Turkish tactics and drove off K i l i j A r s l a n , but in the circumstances, the cohesion o f what must have been pretty green troops i n the i n d i v i d u a l armies w i t h i n the host was remarkable. Anna Gomnena is quite r i g h t to speak o f the Franks winning a 'glorious v i c t o r y ' . Afterwards, the crusaders stuck the heads of the enemy dead on lances, and sent others to Alexius as tokens of victory. They were n o w free to besiege the city as K i l i j Arslan fell back to rally more troops.

Because so many l a t i n sources based themselves on Raymond a n d the Anonymous they tend to add little. Baudry of D o l gives a few names of participants a n d stresses losses i n the army. The Historia Belli Sacri says, after the story o f the Provençal tower, that all the leaders made machines and R o b e r t the M o n k mentions the b u i l d i n g of wooden towers. Fulcher of Chartres gives a generally vague account b u t includes a list o f the many siege machines used. T h e reasons for this b r e v i t y are clear; R a y m o n d highlights the doings o f his Count, while the Anonymous's master Bohemond does not seem to have had a lot to do. B u t there are hints o f a much more intensive siege and the account o f A l b e r t o f A i x makes i t clear that the Franks went to great lengths to assault Nicaea w i t h elaborate machinery.

Most of the accounts we have o f the siege o f Nicaea are quite brief. The Anonymous says that when the crusaders first arrived, a n d even before the coming of the Provencals, they b u i l t siege m a c h i n e r y including towers and undermined the w a l l , b u t this was i n t e r r u p t e d by the Turkish attack. After the defeat o f K i l i j Arslan he tells us t h a t the count of Toulouse and Adhemar o f L e Puy set troops protected by crossbowmen and archers to undermine a tower, w h i c h d u l y fell, but so late i n the evening that the enemy were able to refortify the gap. Thereafter, i t was the boats sent by the emperor to blockade the Ascanian lake at the west end of the city w h i c h forced a surrender. Raymond of Aguilers mentions fruitless efforts to storm the walls and the building of unspecified machines. H e reports the same story of the undermining of a tower b y the Provencals w h i c h came to nothing and stresses the importance of the boats w h i c h b r o u g h t the siege to an end. This is very much the story told by A n n a C o m n e n a who says that the Count of Toulouse b u i l t a wooden tower o n whose upper stories men engaged the enemy, while others below u n d e r mined what she calls the Gonatas tower, b u t i n her account this simply has no outcome. She praises her father for p r o v i d i n g the Franks with designs for machines and the boats on the lake, a d d i n g much detail on the negotiations for the surrender o f the c i t y .

Albert does not m e n t i o n the early assaults on the city before K i l i j Arslan's attack and his d a t i n g is obscure. H e says that i t was o n l y after seven weeks of siege t h a t the leaders set i n train the construction of catapults and assault equipment. T h e p r i m a r y element i n the assaults seems to have been the penthouse, a wooden structure w i t h an armoured sloping r o o f w i t h i n w h i c h attackers could undermine the wall i n relative safety. A l b e r t mentions an assault i n w h i c h Baldwin C a l d e r i n and B a l d w i n o f Ghent were killed, and another i n which the count o f Forez a n d a k n i g h t called G u y died. Then, o n a day d u r i n g w h i c h the walls were under attack by crusader machines, t w o men i n the force of Godfrey, H e n r y o f Esch a n d Count H e r m a n , b u i l t a penthouse w h i c h they called 'the F o x ' , which was b r o u g h t up against the w a l l w i t h enormous labour, b u t i t collapsed k i l l i n g all twenty knights w i t h i n i t , though not the originators of the project w h o refrained f r o m trusting their lives to t h e device. Such machinery required careful design and construction skills which were evidently rare, as we have noted from Ordericus's story about R o b e r t o f Bellême. T h e next major assault w h i c h Albert mentions was launched by the count o f Toulouse whose forces, covered b y the fire o f mangonels, crossed the ditch protected

57

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byzantines', Byzantion, 7 (1932) 2 6 5 - 8 6 ; the crusaders claimed it was used against them at Jerusalem! see below p. 350. BD, 27-9; HBS, 181 ; Robert the Monk, Mslaria Iherosolimilam, R H C Oc. 3. (hereafter cited as R M ) , 756; FG, p. 8 2 . Rogers, Siege Warfare, studied this and other sieges and has helped to clarify my thinking considerably, Rogers prefers 'armoured roof to my term 'penthouse'. Murray, ' A r m y of Godfrey dc Bouillon', says that Henry was related to Godfrey de Bouillon (his brother Godfrey was also on the crusade) and came of a family which held the castle of Esch-sur-Sûre in the Ardennes; A A , 3 2 1 - 2 ; sec above p. 105.

164

VICTORY

IN THE

First enemy

EAST

by a testudo, the same w o r d as used b y R a y m o n d o f Aguilers, a n d assaulted a tower. However, the enemy b u i l t a w a l l o f stone w i t h i n the tower, frustrating the attack w h i c h had t o be broken off. A l b e r t goes on to tell how boats were brought up t o blockade the Ascanian lake and says that Raymond then renewed the attack. This time the Turks burned the equipment w h i c h brought the wooden penthouse and other instruments forward, and then r e p a i r e d the wall w h i c h had been breached during the night. W h e n the attack was resumed the next day only a single N o r m a n knight could be found to press i t ; he was killed and his body dragged up the walls b y the defenders a n d left hanging there. This account broadly corroborates t h a t o f Raymond of Aguilers and makes i t clear that R a y m o n d ' s testudo was a penthouse. A l l these assaults were causing heavy losses w h i c h worried the leaders, especially as the catapults were having no effect on the walls. Then a Lombard engineer offered to b u i l d a machine i f the leaders would finance h i m ; they agreed to p a y h i m fifteen pounds in the money of Chartres (where i n the twelfth century t h i r t y w o u l d buy a fine house) from their common f u n d . T h i s first mention o f t h e common fund points to the development o f r u d i m e n t a r y o r g a n i sation to sustain the siege. I n fact, a properly b u i l t penthouse w a s constructed and pushed across the ditch up t o the w a l l which was undermined and propped w i t h wood. These props were fired a n d i n the middle of the night the upper part o f the t o w e r fell. T h i s frightened Kilij Arslan's wife who attempted to flee across the lake but was captured, while the garrison o f Nicaea decided to surrender. * Albert's account of the siege fills out considerably the r a t h e r schematic view given by the other sources, t h o u g h i t is c h r o n o logically confused and i t is likely that he was a t t e m p t i n g to conflate the stones of several individuals. W h a t i t does not make clear is t h e importance of the boats provided by Alexius, w h i c h is very evident i n the other schematic accounts. This new attack f r o m the lake, c o m i n g short y after the arrival of the N o r t h French o n 14 J u n e , effectively doubled the length of the walls w h i c h needed t o be defended as w e l l as completely isolating the garrison, and was p r o b a b l y the decisive factor m precipitating their surrender on 19 J u n e after a n o t h e r Frankish assault, under cover of which the Byzantines i m p l e m e n t e d the sccrctly-agrecd surrender arrangements 62

63

T h e army had a considerable knowledge of siegecraft and we can discount Anna's view t h a t Alexius invented machines f o r t h e m . They prosecuted the siege vigorously and suffered heavy casualties which worried the leaders; o f the thirteen dead named by A n s e l m o f Ribemont, two died i n battle and three of disease during the siege o f Nicaea. Albert's m e n t i o n o f a common fund indicates that, a l t h o u g h the armies i n the host were grouped r o u n d several leaders, the need to cooperate was f o r c i n g o r g a n i s a t i o n . T h e army must have relied on the Byzantines for supplies - wood, clamps, nails etc. a n d certainly i t was Alexius w h o provided the boats which closed the Ascanian l a k e . T h e m a j o r problem o f a besieging army, especially one this size, was food, a n d b o t h A l b e r t and Fulcher stress t h a t Alexius sent this i n good quantities, although the Anonymous remarks t h a t some of the poor died of s t a r v a t i o n . By and large the alliance had worked w e l l i n a m i l i t a r y sense. T h e surrender o f the city came as a surprise to the crusaders w h o must have sensed the intrigue f r o m w h i c h they were excluded, b u t the emperor seems to have been reasonably generous i n distributing the spoils o f war to the westerners. Stephen of Blois tells us that Alexius sent food for the poor d u r i n g the siege a n d agrees w i t h Anselm o f Ribemont and the Anonymous that he was subsequently very generous to the knights and princes. O n l y R a y m o n d o f Aguilers complains about this a n d his general attitude is deeply hostile to Alexius. T h e freeing o f the T u r k i s h garrison, however, deeply disturbed the Anonymous w h o feared they w o u l d later attack the F r a n k s . T h e military value o f the Byzantine alliance h a d been clearly demonstrated, a n d they prepared t o march i n t o A n a t o l i a w i t h an i m p e r i a l contingent commanded by the T u r k T a t i k i o s . 66

67

68

69

However, this was n o t t h e only m i l i t a r y assistance w h i c h they received. A n n a reports t h a t Alexius warned them of Turkish tactics, but he seems to have p r o v i d e d them w i t h other information a n d ideas. D u r i n g the siege Alexius had observed events from nearby Pelckanum and after t h e f a l l o f the city he met most o f the leaders, presumably to discuss strategy. I t may well be that this followed u p earlier discussions, o f w h i c h we hear nothing. According to t h e 70

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p. 145. p. 336; GF, p. 16; R A , p. 4 4 ; FC, p. 82.

FC, p . 82; A A , 320; GF, p. 17. RA, p. 44; F C , p. 8 3 ; Hagenmcyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, Alexiad, p. 3 3 6 .

pp. 140, 144-5; GF, p. 17-18.

i66

VICTORY

First enemy

IN THE EAST

Historia Belli Sacri he suggested that they s e n d a n embassy t o E g y p t seeking the friendship of the ' E m i r o f B a b y l o n ' . I t was as a c o n sequence of this that an Egyptian embassy came t o the siege o f Antioch, happily at the very moment w h e n they inflicted a heavy defeat upon the Turks at the Lake Battle i n early February 1 0 9 8 . The encouraging noises made b y these envoys probably exercised a considerable influence over the leaders i n t h e summer and a u t u m n of 1098. I t was a skillful piece o f d i p l o m a c y , reflecting Alexius's intimate knowledge of the politics of the M i d d l e East. T h e decay o f the Abassid Caliphate i n the later n i n t h c e n t u r y and the ensuing disorders enabled the dissident Shi'ites to establish a Caliphate o f their own i n Tunisia i n 909, and from t h e r e they grasped Cairo i n 969 where they set up the Fatimid C a l i p h a t e . T h e Fatimids sought to expand their control over Syria, b u t t h e restoration o f Abassid power under the implacably Sunnite Seljuks after 1055 threatened these new conquests. I n 1060 serious i n t e r n a l conflict broke o u t i n Egypt amongst the diverse elements o f t h e army w h i c h , o n t h e pattern of the other Islamic powers, was a composite o f peoples, i n this case Berbers, Sudanese, Africans and T u r k s . By 1077 a n A r m e nian general, Badr al-Jamali, was able to restore order b u t r e v o l t and Seljuk intervention meant that E g y p t i a n power i n Syria a n d Palestine was confined to the cities o f the coast, and b y 1079 M a l i k Shah's brother Tutush held Damascus a n d was overlord o f J e r u salem, held of h i m by Artuk. T h e f r a g m e n t a t i o n o f the Seljuk Sultanate after the death of M a l i k Shah i n 1095, offered the E g y p t ians an opportunity to recover their lost d o m i n i o n i n Syria a n d Palestine (seefig.3 ) . ^ Badr al-Jamali's son a l - A f d a l saw the crusade as offering golden opportunities. T h e p r o l i f e r a t i o n o f tribes a n d powers i n the Middle East meant that t h e precise nature o f t h e crusaders' interests were not perceived b y t h e Islamic powers - t h e y were simply another factor i n a complex g a m e , to be used, a l l i e d with as self-interest dictated. Alexius shared t h i s mentality, a n d t h e crusader leaders were eager to capitalise. I n their discussions with Alexius at Pelekanum and before, t h e 71

princes must have discussed the coming journey. Stephen o f Blois d i d not j o i n the other leaders at Pelekanum b u t he must have k n o w n o f their discussions a n d i n a letter to his wife written from Nicaea he refers to A n t i o c h as their next target. T h e crusaders must have been aware from p i l g r i m days o f the importance o f this city w h i c h lay firmly across the r o a d to Jerusalem. B u t they d i d not i n t e n d to conquer all the cities between Nicaea and Jerusalem, and Stephen's letter holds out the possibility t h a t A n t i o c h might not resist. T h i s surely reflects knowledge o f the situation i n Syria. T h e death o f M a l i k Shah i n 1092 precipitated a bitter succession conflict between his brother T u t u s h , w h o h e l d Syria, and his son Bcrkyaruk. W h e n T u t u s h was killed i n 1095 Syria was divided between his sons, R i d w a n of Aleppo a n d D u q a q o f Damascus. M a l i k Shah's governor o f A n t i o c h , Yaghisiyan, was able to achieve much independence (sec fig. 3 ) . For Alexius the reconquest o f A n t i o c h was an a l l u r i n g possibility. Sulayman o f Nicaea had attempted t o seize the lands o f Philaretus i n 1086 and h a d died at the hands o f M a l i k Shah for his pains. T h e old duchy o f A n t i o c h stood between Anatolia a n d Syria a n d w i t h i n striking distance of the great route centre at Melitene. I t offered considerable opportunities to any power of Asia M i n o r . T o the crusaders i t was i m p o r t a n t t o have i t i n friendly hands as they entered Syria and Palestine, the real object of their quest. Between t h e Byzantines and the crusaders there was a considerable c o m m u n i t y o f interest. 73

But the crusaders appear to have been aware of other factors i n t h e p o l i t i c a l situation o f the lands they were entering. I n the T a u r u s area there were a n u m b e r o f independent Armenian princes amongst w h o m T h o r o s of Edcssa was very important. Oschin, w h o c l a i m e d to be descended f r o m the Arsacids, held the castle o f L a m p r o n a n d was l o y a l to Alexius w h o m he served as governor. H e seized part o f A d a n a as the crusaders approached. * Constantinc, son o f Roupen, claimed to be a descendant o f the old A r m e n i a n r u l i n g family o f the Bagratids and held the fortress o f Partzapert n e a r Sis. T a t o u l was at Marasch, K o g h V a s i l at Raban and G a b r i e l a t M e l i t e n e . These princelings throve i n the complex politics of the area, p l a y i n g off the T u r k i s h emirs of neighbouring cities. I t is clear t h a t t h e crusader leaders h a d heard about them, for M a t t h e w o f 7

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VICTORY

First enemy

I N T H E EAST

Edcssa says that they wrote letters to Thoros and to C o n s t a n t i n e son of Roupen. I t is probable that such matters were discussed w i t h Alexius who perhaps suggested a course of action to t a k e advantage of the situation. The Armenians h a d a t r a d i t i o n o f hostility t o Byzantium, as we have noted. Constantine, son of R o u p e n , was particularly hostile but on the other h a n d Oschin w a s f r i e n d l y . Furthermore, both Gabriel o f Melitene a n d T h o r o s o f Edessa claimed to be imperial officials - Curopalatoi; the latter, w e are t o l d , was 'expecting to hand i t [Edessa] over t o the e m p e r o r ' . I t is possible that the Armenians themselves made c o n t a c t w i t h t h e Franks but were this the case Alexius w o u l d surely h a v e w a n t e d t o control subsequent events. When Tancred entered C i l i c i a a n d appeared before Tarsus in late September 1097 he was met b y a n Armenian, who was already known to h i m and had r e s i d e d w i t h him, who offered to attempt to negotiate the surrender o f the c i t y . A t Nicaea Baldwin of Boulogne, Godfrey de B o u i l l o n ' s younger brother, had made the acquaintance o f Bagrat, b r o t h e r o f K o g h Vasil of Raban. Baldwin also entered Cilicia, but o n B a g r a t ' s u r g i n g left for Ravcndan and the great adventure which e v e n t u a l l y m a d e him lord of Edessa. The hope of support from such eastern C h r i s ­ tians was probably fed by the uprisings i n the cities o f A n a t o l i a after the crusader victory at Dorylaeum, and i t seems likely t h a t i t h a d a profound effect on crusader policy. W h a t we have to see a t this stage is that the crusaders probably knew a great deal about t h e lands i n t o which they were venturing. Norman and Frankish mercenaries h a d long served i n the Byzantine armies. Roussel of B a i l l e u l , C r i s p i n and, before them, Hcrvey had held land i n the A r m e n i a n t h e m e . William of Apulia wrote his Gesta Roberti Wiscardi as t h e crusaders left for the East and could give a good account o f t h e b a t t l e o f Manzikert, presumably from Norman veterans o f the B y z a n t i n e service. So Alexius had no monopoly of information, b u t f o r the moment he and the Frankish leaders enjoyed a c o m m u n i t y o f interest but i t was not one to which he was w i l l i n g to c o n t r i b u t e more than a few troops under Tatikios, charged w i t h g u i d i n g the 76

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crusaders a n d t a k i n g over any cities they m i g h t capture. Anna's caveat, ' i f indeed G o d g r a n t e d them that favour', probably reflected Alexius's t h i n k i n g . H e w o u l d take w h a t profit he could without heavy c o m m i t m e n t , f o r there was m u c h danger ahead for the expedition. T h e y were not v e n t u r i n g i n t o the unknown, merely into a dangerous h i n t e r l a n d that h a d been T u r k i s h now for a generation. T h e crusader leaders acted quickly. Nicaea fell on 19 June. O n 26 J u n e t h e first contingents left Nicaea, amongst them the Normans of South I t a l y . V a r i o u s groups left subsequently, the last being the Provencals o n 28 J u n e and t h e a r m y gathered at a place where there was a bridge, w h i c h A n n a Comnena identifies as Lefke, about twenty-five kilometres east o f Nicaea. A number of crusaders had stayed b e h i n d a t Nicaea a n d took service w i t h the emperor, while A n s c l m of R i b e m o n t was sent to the imperial court by the leaders i n order t o settle outstanding business. T h e y had already decided to go to A n t i o c h , so necessarily they had to direct their path towards the o l d Byzantine fortress a t D o r y l a e u m (Eskişehir) w h i c h was the gateway to the A n a t o l i a n plateau. T h e sources are quite clear that i n the t w o days o f m a r c h after the concentration of the army they broke i n t o t w o groups, a v a n g u a r d and a m a i n force. Raymond o f A g u i l e r s says t h a t this happened after one day's march, which suggests that the Provencals h a d left Nicaea a day later than the first contingents. W e k n o w h o w they divided; the vanguard was led by B o h e m o n d , T a n c r e d , R o b e r t o f N o r m a n d y and Stephen of Blois, p r o b a b l y fewer t h a n 20,000 i n a l l . T h e second, larger force, com­ prising the rest o f the a r m y was under R o b e r t of Flanders, Hugh of V e r m a n d o i s , Godfrey de B o u i l l o n and R a y m o n d o f Toulouse, rather more t h a n 30,000 s t r o n g . I t is more difficult to suggest why this h a p p e n e d . Fulcher, w h o was i n the vanguard, simply confesses that h e does n o t know; the A n o n y m o u s says there was confusion i n the d a r k as the a r m y left its place of concentration, while Raymond of A g u i l e r s says that i t was the fault o f Bohemond and his com­ panions w h o rushed on rashly {temeré). A l b e r t of A i x says that i t was the r e s u l t of a deliberate decision o f the princes who after two days o f m a r c h i n g t h e a r m y together, n o w felt the need to divide i t for f o r a g i n g . R a l p h o f Caen tells us that some thought the division deliberate, a n d specifically denies this, w h i c h suggests that even 80

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Kreuzzugsbrteje,

VICTORY

IN THE

after the crusade the matter was still being debated. I t is likely t h a t sheer size and the lack of any overall commander were the real reasons. The army of Frederick Barbarossa on the T h i r d Crusade was 100,000 strong and seems to have taken three days to pass any single point. The sources for the battle o f Dorylaeum make clear that most of the casualties were suffered b y stragglers between the two forces, which would suggest that the host became strung out simply as a result of the natural frictions of the m a r c h . The disagreements and uncertainty o f the three eyewitnesses - R a y m o n d with the main force, Fulcher and the Anonymous w i t h the v a n guard, support this view. I t also reflects the incoherence o f the crusade's command arrangements. I t is w o r t h remembering t h a t the baggage train of Peter the Hermit's m u c h smaller force straggled a mile along the road and that the crusader army at its m a x i m u m strength was well over twice that size. B u t perhaps the leaders conferred at some point and gave their blessing to a division already becoming apparent. A t the time o f the battle R a y m o n d of Aguilers says quite clearly that the two parts of the a r m y were two miles a p a r t - over five kilometres. 8 2

83

The crusaders had now begun a march w h i c h w o u l d result i n what is conventionally called the battle o f Dorylaeum, for A n n a Comnena says that i t took place when K i l i j A r s l a n ambushed Bohcmond and the vanguard 'on the p l a i n of D o r y l a e u m ' . I n a letter of the leaders to the West on 11 September 1098, they referred to the battle at 'Dorotilla' which sounds very like the same place. One manuscript of the chronicle of R a y m o n d o f Aguilers refers to the battle ' i n campo florido'. Albert says t h a t the battle took place 'in vallcm Degorganhi', now called the Orellis, b u t later has Bohemond's messenger to the other leaders say that the enemy attacked down the Orellis into the Degorganhi: neither of these place names can be identified and Albert docs later use the name Orellis to m e a n somewhere quite different. However, there are grave difficulties 84

FC p. 8 ; C f . t 8 ; R A , p . 45; AA, 328-9; RC, 6 2 0 - 1 ; on losses amongst the stragglers sec below p. 181, n. 104; Ncsbitt, 'Rate or march', 178-80. RA, p 45; he later, p. 49, tells us that St Symeon Port was ten miles from Antioch - i t is actually twenty-seven kilometres. •* Bibliothèque Nationale , , A , in which Raymond's account is conflated with that o f hulcher, alsomrepresents a conflation of traditions ofhis own work. The life of A d h é m a r i n C P riAnkimh f W ^ r f ? T m0l Uttm separately as Osta Adhemari RHC C « ' battle as taking place ' i n ' , f ° " V « l on Raymond's, but I think it was w r i t t e n close to the t.me w.th other recollections added, and the story that the battle was fought ' i n 8 2

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1

about the idea t h a t the battle was fought at or near Dorylaeum. T h e Anonymous says that the a r m y marched one day from Nicaea a n d encamped for two days b y a bridge w h i l e a l l the contingents gathered, then marched f o r two days u n t i l the battle on the t h i r d day. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers says that on the t h i r d day after the concentration o f the a r m y they met the enemy. Anselm says t h a t after a two day m a r c h they encountered the enemy on the m o r n i n g of the t h i r d day w h i c h was 'kal. I u l i i ' , i J u l y ; Fulcher confirms the date and confirms that the battle began i n the m o r n i n g . Thus the crusade began to leave Nicaea on 26 June and concentrated at a river crossing, f r o m w h i c h i t departed on 29 June. I t then marched for t w o days and fought the enemy i n the m o r n i n g o f 1 J u l y . W h e n we examine the distances and the likely rates of march of the crusader army i t is evident t h a t they could not have reached the close v i c i n i t y of D o r y l a e u m i n this time. A n n a Comnena says t h a t the a r m y concentrated at the bridge o f Lefkc, which probably means the bridge over the Goksu, a western t r i b u t a r y of the Sakarya N e h r i . Nicaea to Lefke on the R o m a n road is twenty-five kilometres, and D o r y l a e u m another n i n e t y kilometres. I f , as has been suggested, the a r m y marched south to the Goksu and crossed i t i n the vicinity o f Yenighehir (a distance of t h i r t y kilometres) they still had to cover roughly the same distance to D o r y l a e u m . A study of the rates o f march of the i n d i v i d u a l armies across Europe to Constantinople suggests that, i n the most favourable circumstances, the forces o f Godfrey and Peter the H e r m i t never d i d more than twenty-nine kilometres per day. T h e a r m y w h i c h left Nicaea was much larger and lacked a clear overall c o m m a n d and is likely to have progressed m u c h more slowly. Barbarossa's a r m y probably managed about twenty-nine kilometres per day i n E u r o p e . Even at these rates the army w o u l d have been about t h i r t y kilometres short of Dorylaeum after two days o f m a r c h i n g , b u t they were probably moving m u c h more slowly for they were i n the presence o f the enemy and encumbered w i t h a heavy baggage-train. W e can reasonably accurately date the departure o f the a r m y f r o m Dorylaeum and its arrival at A n t i o c h as being 4 J u l y t o 20 October. I n 105 days of m a r c h i n g 85

86

3

7 "" ' K ^7^"T" T ' °T h

171

First enemy

EAST

5

m

c c r t a i n l

b a s

W

5

h

3

i

c

5

h

i s

k

n

o

w

r e f c r s

n

to

8 5

8 6

a flowered field' may be one of them. I t is unfortunate that the editors of Raymond o f Aguilers in RHC Oc. 3. 240 capitalised the name without making clear its derivation. T h e latest edition by H i l l and H i l l , p. 4 5 n. 4 gives only a cryptic note; A A , 329-30. GF, p. 18; R A , p. 4 5 ; Hagenmcyer, Krcuzzugsbricfi, p. 161. Ncsbitt,'Rate of march', pp. 173~4i i 7 " ° f i

8

172

VICTORY

IN THE

(with fifteen days of rest) they travelled 1180 kilometres, an average of thirteen kilometres per day which the Chronologie o f Hagenmeyer suggests varied between eight and eighteen kilometres. There is no point i n seeking comparison w i t h events after A n t i o c h w h e n the army was much smaller. Furthermore, the crusaders knew the enemy were about and this would have restricted their speed, even i f the vanguard did push on somewhat. A l l this suggests that the b a t t l e could not have taken place more than forty kilometres, or j u s t conceivably fifty kilometres, south o f Lefke or the Göksu crossing. Hagenmeyer recognised the problem and suggested Bozüyük j u s t over fifty kilometres south of Lefke and about the same f r o m Yenişhehir. This is probably as far as the army could conceivably have reached and i t certainly could be regarded as being i n the valley of Dorylaeum, as suggested by the letter o f the leaders. Runciman points out that a Byzantine road runs further n o r t h through Söğüt and enters the plain ten kilometres short o f D o r y ­ laeum, where he thinks the battle took place. However, as R u n c i ­ man admits, although this road does cross rivers, the countryside was very steep indeed and this probably rules out any o f these crossings. But more simply, this was most certainly further t h a n the army could have reached. W h a t is clear is that the battle t o o k place i n a wide valley, for Albert says that Bohemond's force was well to the right of the main force as well as ahead o f i t . M o r e o v e r , there was a river, for Albert mentions streams and R a l p h o f C a e n , whose description is detailed, says that i t was fought after a r i v e r crossing. William of Tyre follows Albert for the most part b u t w i t h some variations. He says that the army followed a river i n the v a l l e y otGorgoni, and that the main force was to the r i g h t o f Bohemond's, reversing Albert's statement. Albert's account o f a battle f o u g h t where two valleys join, taken together w i t h Raymond's m e n t i o n o f the 'flowered field' and the general description of the battle, suggests that it was fought i n open land on the road towards D o r y l a e u m , a n d the comments of Albert and Ralph indicate not far from a r i v e r crossing or crossings, although these played no role i n the m a j o r action. I n fact to understand the battle we need to understand f u l l y the circumstances i n which the army found itself, the country a n d its road system. 87

88

m "

a g c n m c

3

y

c r

oftnc baulc

' ^»nologu ^

^

169, p. 85; Runciman 1. 186, n. 1 P

' ***

R u n c i m a n

>

l 8 6

First enemy

EAST

> »• ' »»« « ingenious reconstruction

173

After the capture o f Nicaea i t is clear f r o m Stephen's letter that the leaders had decided to m a r c h to A n t i o c h , and evidently they had decided not to take the coastal route. They also rejected the ' P i l g r i m R o a d ' due east f r o m Nicaea v i a Iuliopolis (near the modern village of Çayirbano) a n d A n c y r a (Ankara) down through the heart of Asia M i n o r and across the C i l i c i a n Gates to Tarsus. Instead they decided to m o u n t the A n a t o l i a n plateau towards the Byzantine m i l i t a r y station at D o r y l a e u m (modern Eskişehir) which, at 800 metres commands the obvious point o f entry to the plateau via a broad valley the sides o f w h i c h rise to 1,200 metres and beyond (see fig. 2). Because A n n a C o m n e n a mentions the bridge at Lefke i t has been assumed t h a t the host marched east f r o m Nicaea up the gently sloping p l a i n , over the watershed and into the valley o f the Sakarya and then u p that of its southern t r i b u t a r y , the K a r a Su, to its upper reaches j u s t n o r t h of B o z ü y ü k , where the land opens out into the wide valley w h i c h leads to D o r y l a e u m . B u t i t is difficult to believe that the a r m y w o u l d have taken this route, for the valley of the K a r a Su, even i n its lower reaches, is very steep and difficult and at Bilecik enters a spectacular gorge before n a r r o w i n g even further into a g r i m steep defile w h i c h w o u l d have formed a perfect ambush site. T h e Byzantine road f o r k e d at Bilecik p r o v i d i n g a road via modern Söğüt to D o r y l a e u m , b u t this road too is dangerously scenic and offers no open sites u n t i l i t is very close to Dorylaeum. I t is far more likely that the crusaders marched south f r o m Nicaea. The first stage of this j o u r n e y over the A v d a n D a g i , whose peaks rise to 835 metres w o u l d have been quite difficult b u t thereafter they could cross the Göksu in t h e v i c i n i t y o f m o d e r n Yenişehchir. F r o m there a R o m a n road crossed the A h l D a g , w h i c h rise to 1000 metres and emerged into the b r o a d valley above Bozüyük, roughly where the modern E90 road f r o m Bursa meets route 650 f r o m Bilecik, just south of the n a r r o w gorges o f the K a r a Su and some three to five kilometres n o r t h of Bozüyük. W h i l e b y no means easy this route is no longer and offered a m u c h m o r e open approach to the high plateau. I t is very likely t h a t i t was at this j u n c t i o n of roads i n the plain that the 89

90

8 9

5 0

On

which see

D . French, Roman Roads and Milestones

of Asia Minor:

Fasc. i. The

Pilgrims'

Road, British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara Monograph No. 3, British Archaeological Reports, International Scries 105 (Oxford, 1981). 1 would like to thank Dr David French, Director of the British Institute or Archaeology at Ankara, who told me or the existence of this road. He is currently writing an article on the routes of the crusades and very generously explained his ideas to me.

VICTORY

»74

IN THE

battle o f D o r y l a e u m took place (see figs. 2 and 6). A l b e r t clearly indicates that the site was where two valleys meet, and the open ground here is about the right distance from the crossing o f the Göksu. Moreover, the Anonymous says that when the crusader force came i t formed up to the right of Bohemond's trapped vanguard - it was, therefore, from the right that the attack came. This is also the force of Albert's insistence on telling us that the vanguard moved to the right o f the main force and W i l l i a m o f Tyre's careful correction that they were to the left, which fits w i t h the Anonymous's account. Both are explaining the subsequent alignment o f the b a t t l e . This w o u l d f i t w i t h the suggestion made here that the crusaders approached along the gentle valley from the west a n d were ambushed by the Turkish army l y i n g i n the southern valley to their right. T h e logic of the battle is clear. K i l i j Arslan and his T u r k s were r e t u r n i n g to the fray. This time he had concluded an alliance w i t h the Danishmend E m i r and together they were ready to attack the Franks. T h e y chose to do so on the approaches to the h i g h plateau and at a p o i n t of m a x i m u m advantage where they could l a y an ambush and destroy an isolated part of the crusader force before its m a i n weight could be brought to bear. I t was the strategy o f the Nicaea attack, b u t this time i n less confined ground where T u r k i s h speed of manoeuvre could be maximised. The Turkish a r m y was probably much smaller than the total force of the crusaders a n d so had to avoid direct conflict w i t h the main force and defeat their enemy i n detail. Fulcher's 360,000, though supported by the A n o n y mous, is sheer fantasy. I n the accounts of the Crusade o f 1101 we hear o f the 700 knights in the rearguard of the main L o m b a r d a r m y being savaged b y 500 Turks, while the army w h i c h destroyed the Bavarian and A q u i t a i n i a n army was only 4,000 i n a l l . The T u r k i s h force was entirely mounted and was probably r o u g h l y equal to the knights i n the whole crusader host. Therefore, a b a t t l e of movement i n v o l v i n g the cavalry element w o u l d nullify the huge 91

92

9 3

numeric advantage o f the western forces and, i n the attack on the crusader vanguard, K i l i j Arslan w o u l d actually outnumber the western knights. I f the Franks had marched up the gorge of the K a r a Su they w o u l d surely have attacked them there, just as they w o u l d later destroy the Byzantine a r m y at M y r i o k e p h a l o n i n 1176. O n the evening of 30 June Fulcher and R a l p h of Caen both say that the v a n g u a r d saw T u r k i s h forces, substantiating intelligence which had already suggested that they were i n the vicinity; this last comment suggests that Tatikios was w i t h the vanguard, although no chronicler mentions h i m . Clearly at least, the vanguard, more t h a n five kilometres ahead o f the m a i n force, were aware of the enemy presence. A l b e r t of A i x places the battle i n the evening - starting as the army camped at the n i n t h hour, late afternoon. However, Albert here seems to be t r y i n g to make sense o f his sources, hence perhaps his error on w h i c h side o f the valley the vanguard was following, for his suggestion of an evening battle is connected w i t h the act o f m a k i n g camp. B u t the Anonymous says that the battle raged from the t h i r d to n i n t h hour, and Fulcher suggests that the vanguard was o n its o w n f r o m the first to sixth hour (6~7am-noon). As these writers were actually w i t h the front force they should be preferred, p a r t i c u l a r l y as R a l p h of Caen confirms their story t h a t contact was made w i t h the enemy on the evening before the battle and that the m a r c h was resumed the next morning when the crusaders were forced to p i t c h camp when i t became apparent t h a t a large enemy a r m y was present. I t was probably making sense o f this sequence of events w h i c h confused A l b e r t whose account, however, contains m u c h valuable i n f o r m a t i o n . Fulcher's account is peculiarly vivid for he was i n the camp where: 'We were all indeed huddled together like sheep i n a fold, t r e m b l i n g and frightened, surrounded on a l l sides by enemies so that we could not turn i n any direction', w h i l e the Anonymous was w i t h the knights o f the v a n guard who were outside the camp f r o m w h i c h the women brought w a t e r . R a l p h says t h a t after an anxious n i g h t the army moved o n and forced the passage of a river after w h i c h the appearance o f the enemy compelled t h e m to p i t c h their camp; Fulcher says they camped by a marsh w h i c h gave t h e m some protection from the enemy and t h a t later the enemy broke across the marsh. His account 94

95

96

97

9 1

9 2

W T , 129; GF, p. 20. Ibn al-Qalanisi, Damascus

Chronicle of the Crusades, extracts ed. and tr. H . A . R. G i b b

in o "ft E « ™ ^ C W ; i i of Ihe Crusades], pp. 4 1 - 2 . I'C, p. 84; OF, p. 2 0 ; AA, 565; Ekkehard, p. 3 1 ; These forces may have been detached elements o f a much larger allied force formed by Ridwan of Aleppo, the Danishmend Malik Ghaz, and Karajan ofHarran. The foil size of their army which finally defeated the franks, whose army probably started 50,000 strong, at Mersivan is unknown b u t the l o n g harassment wh.ch preceded the final attack suggests that it was even smaller than the 1

9 3

h e r e a r i c r c i t c d a s 0

l

175

First enemy

EAST

Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 123-5; on numbers see above pp. 157-8. 95 F C . p p . 8 3 - 4 ; RC, 6 2 1 . M GF, p. 2 . ; FC, p. 8 6 . ' FC, p. 85; GF, p. 19. m

9

176

VICTORY

Battle of Dorylaeum: Phase 1

IN THE

First enemy

EAST

177

4 To the Gorge of the Kara Su

Marsh

r

r

^.4

m

Bohemond's line of march

Main Crusader army, 5km behind on the road from Nlcaea

l i

1.1

A

Drumlins

L. Turks Crusaders

To modern BoztlyOk (4 km) To Dorylaeum. now Esklsehlr (45

3 km)

Fig. 6a Bohemond is 5 km ahead of the main army in company with R o b e r t o f Normandy and the Counts of Blois and Flanders together with the Byzantines; having descended from Nicaea to the northwest they enter the main valley l e a d i n g to Dorylaeum and sec the Turks. Bohemond orders his foot to make camp q u i c k l y and throws forward his cavalry to protect them.

F i g . 6b The Franco-Norman cavalry is driven back on the camp, rallied by its leaders, and forms the outer shell of resistance in a 'wearing-out fight'. The crusader army is surrounded, though partially protected by a marsh (location conjectural). T h e y cling on, relying on their compact mass hoping for help from the main force.

First enemy

Sakoirfhl I f , ™y "s * 10 break off their attack and turn to meet the new threat to their left. The new arrivals form up to the R I G H T of Bohemond's beleaguered force e

P r o v e n f a l s

o f

t h e

m

a

i

n

a

a r r i v e

f o r c i

t h c

T

u

r

k

179

Fig. 6d T h e Count of Toulouse enters the main valley through the Drumlins which mark its western shoulder, and his attack on their rear and left forces the Turks to flee leaving victory to the Crusaders.

i8o

VICTORY

IN THE

181

First enemy

EAST

of murderous fighting i n the camp is supported by Albert, who says that R o b e r t o f Paris died there t r y i n g to help the rank a n d file and adds the picturesque detail that young women tried to make themselves look beautiful so that they w o u l d be spared the sword. R a l p h of Caen shows the knights depressed by their i n a b i l i t y to save the others. Crusader sources therefore suggest two distinct actions w i t h i n the battle. Fulcher speaks of the leaders fighting w h i l e those like h i m i n the camp desperately resisted. Albert says t h a t at the sight of the enemy Bohemond and the knights rode forward b u t were unable t o prevent the Turks getting into the camp. R a l p h tells us that w h e n the camp was pitched the knights attacked t h e enemy, but were driven back i n disorder and saved only by R o b e r t of N o r m a n d y w h o rallied them w i t h scornful words - subsequently they were involved i n heavy fighting i n w h i c h Tancred's brother W i l l i a m was killed. T h e Anonymous says that when the enemy were sighted Bohemond ordered the foot to pitch camp and the knights to attack the enemy, and then makes i t clear that the cavalry were driven back on the camp, for he says that i n the subsequent fighting the w o m e n brought water to them. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers suggests that the camp was sacked by the enemy. R a l p h says t h a t thereafter the knights fought hard, commanded separately by Bohemond a n d R o b e r t of N o r m a n d y , and appears to show these men imposing solid discipline upon their followers. T h e Anonymous tells us t h a t f r o m the first the vanguard was surrounded - 'we are encircled' he has Bohemond say - yet Fulcher speaks o f a marsh on one side o f the camp protecting them and the subsequent development o f the battle was to the vanguard's right. This can be explained b y reference to the lie o f the land. T h e convergence of the t w o valleys forms a natural basin against the northern r i m o f w h i c h Bohemond was pinned b y the Turkish main force, but smaller troops o f the enemy probably menaced from the surrounding hills, for the A n o n y m o u s mentions the enemy presence there.

resistance o f the crusader footmen. A b o u t noon, after five to six hours o f this bitter fighting, the knights o f the m a i n force came u p t o relieve their comrades. T h e Anonymous describes the formation o f a battle line, b u t this is the tidiness of hindsight (see fig. 6 c ) . T h e m a i n force was probably w e l l out of sight of the battle i n the western valley and, although messages seem to have been sent back early, i t was n o t until about noon that they appeared. This is not surprising, for the m a i n army's knights had to prepare themselves for battle and then t o ride five kilometres along a road w h i c h was probably choked w i t h transport a n d stragglers. I t is unlikely t h a t they had much t i m e to f o r m into line. Far to the r i g h t , the bishop of Le Puy seems to have charged behind a small h i l l and come upon the enemy now t u r n i n g to face the new threat on their left, f r o m the rear. A t the convergence o f the two valleys there are a number o f glacial drumlins and one of these was probably the h i l l to w h i c h reference is m a d e . T h e r e is no reason to believe that this was planned; rather a pell-mell battle developed i n w h i c h skirmishes such as that i n w h i c h Godfrey w i t h 50 sodales attacked w h a t they believed to be K i l i j Arslan and his household o n a l o w h i l l were the r u l e . A r u n n i n g fight ensued i n w h i c h the enemy often turned to fight causing casualties like Gerard o f Quiersy. T h e enemy's camp was sacked a n d the nomads were pursued along the road so that, for two or three days after, the a r m y passed enemy soldiers and horses fallen by the wayside. Casualties appear to have been heavy although how far we c a n regard Albert's 4,000 Christians and 3,000 Turks as precise figures is a different matter. T h e y do, however, sound small enough to be credible a n d large enough to suggest heavy fighting. Large numbers of the main force, the foot, the non-combatants generally and presumably some knights, were never engaged at all. I t is interesting t h a t Fulcher says that most o f the casualties were those caught straggling between the t w o crusader armies, a comment substantiated b y R a y m o n d o f A g u i l e r s .

T h r o u g h o u t the morning there was heavy and unpleasant fighting at close quarters. T h e western knights seem to have been pinned against the southern side of their camp holding off the T u r k s who, however, were able to penetrate from other sides despite the difficulties presented b y a marsh on one side and the considerable

D o r y l a e u m was a nasty experience for the crusaders. They were not caught totally by surprise i n t h a t they knew the enemy were near, b u t it is odd that the leaders i n the vanguard d i d not warn the m a i n force b e h i n d them. Presumably, they simply took i t for granted that t h e enemy was around b u t could not guess that his main force

98

99

9 0

9 9

FC, pp. 8 5 - 6 ; AA, 3 2 9 - 3 0 ; RC, 6 2 2 - 3 . FC, p. 86; A A , 3 2 9 - 3 0 ; RG, 622-23; RA, p. 45.

1 0 0

101

1 0 2

103

104

"» 1 0 4

GF, p. 20.

1 0 1

GF, p. 19.

>

A A , 3 3 0 , 323; FC, p. 86; R A , p. 45-

m

AA, 331.

1 0 3

R A , p. 46; A A , 3 3 1 .

182

VICTORY

IN THE

First enemy

EAST

was so close. I t is unlikely that K i l i j Arslan was ignorant o f the whereabouts of the crusader main force. H e attempted to destroy their smaller element i n favourable circumstances, counting on numeric superiority to bring victory i n a mobile battle over the knights i n the vanguard. The crusaders were alert and their foot prepared to pitch camp while an element of the knights confronted the enemy and were put to flight, falling back on the camp where their solid formation, and the fact that the site was confined by the edge of the plain and a marsh, enabled them to resist the Turks. T h e Turks were drawn into close quarter fighting b o t h against the knights and in amongst the tents and baggage. 'The enemy were helped by numbers', says Ralph, referring to the knights, 'we b y our armour', which suggests that the knights adopted a solid f o r m a t i o n and refused to be broken up by the enemy's attacks w i t h arrows a n d missiles. The stall-fed horses of the western knights m a y have been larger than the ponies of the Turks, and this weight advantage m a y have helped to solidify their resistance but, i n general i t was o f no more use to them than i t had been to the Byzantines. The western knights i n the vanguard must have been quite helpless and the progress of the Turks i n the camp would have destroyed their entire position, but relief came. Both sides seem to have been surprised by the enemy. The crusaders were appalled by the enemy tactics w h i c h struck the Anonymous as menacing and daring a n d Fulcher as totally new: 'to all of us such warfare was u n k n o w n ' . He was also struck by the fact that the enemy were entirely mounted: ' A l l w e r e mounted. On the other hand we had both footmen and b o w m e n . ' Albert of A i x remarks time after time i n his account o n T u r k i s h use of the bow which clearly struck the crusaders as n o v e l . B u t the leaders had been warned by Alexius and Frankish contact w i t h the east, and even those i n the vanguard managed to keep c o n t r o l o f their forces - though luck played its part i n this. Furthermore, t h e y seem to have made sure that all were alert, for although the t i m i n g of the attack was a surprise, as probably was its direction, w h e n i t came, camp of a sort was made quickly. F r o m the viewpoint o f t h e crusaders, what is striking is that the battle evolved a n d was n e v e r directed. Although only a fraction of the crusader army was engaged, their advantage i n numbers had much to d o w i t h t h e i r victory - just as i t had at Nicaea. For K i l i j Arslan seems to h a v e 105

r e p e a t e d the error made a t Nicaea; he counted on the enemy p a n i c k i n g under a surprise attack. W h e n they resisted he was drawn i n t o a b l o o d y close-quarter b a t t l e i n w h i c h the crusader footsoldicrs i n t h e camp made stiff resistance, p a r t l y because o f their very n u m b e r s . As at Nicaea the appearance of a relief force, i n this case one p a r t o f w h i c h under A d h e m a r came f r o m an unexpected directi o n , d r o v e his m e n f r o m the field. T h a t this was a pell-mell affair w i t h n o evidence o f overall c o m m a n d (which led to the division i n the crusader ranks i n the first place) should n o t be allowed to detract f r o m t h e q u a l i t y o f the crusader l e a d e r s h i p . The army was alert a n d w h e n the surprise attack came managed to establish a camp w h i c h subsequently formed a fortress. R o b e r t of Normandy rallied k n i g h t s alarmed by t h e novel methods o f the enemy and subs e q u e n t l y he and B o h c m o n d imposed a discipline upon them. The e n e m y broke i n t o the c a m p a n d d i d m u c h destruction, but the foot e v i d e n t l y fought h a r d , otherwise the camp which anchored the c a v a l r y i n t h e i r struggle w o u l d have been swept away. A l l of this suggests a formidable coherence i n the crusader army and a cons i d e r a b l e w i l l to fight. I t must be remembered that the terror which they i n s p i r e d had served t h e Turks well i n their fights w i t h the B y z a n t i n e s and others w h o f o u n d their missile tactics difficult to c o u n t e r . A b o v e a l l , the sense of isolation created by encirclement p a n i c k e d large forces t i m e after time. A t Dorylaeum some of the k n i g h t s d i d panic — those u n d e r Bohcmond - but they were rallied b y R o b e r t o f N o r m a n d y . O n c e discipline and solidity of formation was reimposed, p a r t l y because they simply couldn't do anything else p i n n e d against their o w n tents, the knights found that they could resist — t h o u g h fairly passively. I t was a lesson Nicephorous Botaneiates had learned as a general under Constantino I X during a r e t r e a t i n the presence o f the Patzinacks: 106

[Botaneiates] ordered his men not to spread out as the rest of the men were seen to be doing and not to turn their backs to the enemy making themselves into a target for Pecheneg arrows. . . . The Pechenegs on seeing a small group which advanced i n formation and i n battle order, made a violent sortie against them. . . . retired when they saw i t was impossible to disperse the Byzantines. . . . They were unable to engage the Byzantines in hand-tohand combat for having made a trial of close fighting, they had many times lost a great number of m e n . 107

1 0 6

GF, i g , 2 i ; F C , p . 85; A A , 328 9.

1 0 7

A A , 3 3 0 implies that Godfrey was i n command of the main force but this reflects his general prejudice in favour o f his hero. A t t a l i a t e s quoted by Kacgi, 'Archery' p. 103.

VICTORY

IN THE

First enemy

EAST

I n any case, there was a l i m i t to the losses the Turks were prepared to take. T h e loss of Nicaea was a blow to the Seljuk K i l i j A r s l a n for like his father he aspired to be something more than a r u l e r of nomads - hence the acquisition of Nicaea as a capital a n d the effort to seize A n t i o c h under Sulayman. B u t he was a lord of nomads and for them murderous casualties were simply not w o r t h w h i l e before an enemy w h o could be evaded and whose departure w o u l d a l l o w them to r e t u r n t o their pasture-lands. I f Albert's figure of 3,000 is i n any way to be believed they had suffered badly enough for t h e i r leader's ambitions. O n l y once again would they stand and fight - at Heraclea where an ambush was attempted and failed but i t seems to have been so feeble that most of the sources do not mention i t . B u t i f the Turks were n o w i n no position to check the crusaders, they d i d not know t h a t and Fulcher says that from this time the army proceeded very carefully, while Albert says they resolved not to break up a g a i n . T h e Turks of Anatolia had been defeated, i n so far as that means a n y t h i n g when speaking of a nomadic people who h a d clearly not been driven out of Asia M i n o r . T h e i r r u l i n g house had suffered a severe b l o w . T h e y had lost a capital which gave t h e m prestige, access a n d control over the emirates of western Asia M i n o r who were n o w at the mercy of the Byzantines. I t opened the w a y , as we shall see, for a Byzantine reconquest i n western Asia M i n o r . I t was a stunning t r i u m p h for the crusaders for hitherto the o n w a r d m a r c h of the T u r k s had been unstoppable, as they themselves recognised for, as the Anonymous says, 'the T u r k s . . . thought that they w o u l d strike terror i n t o the Franks, as they had done the Arabs and Saracens, Armenians, Syrians and Greeks by the menace o f their a r r o w s ' . I n p a r t they had been defeated by luck. K i l i j Arslan had mistaken the People's Crusade for the totality o f the western effort a n d h a d to return f r o m Melitcne when they besieged Nicaea. His attack o n the Provencals at Nicaea was mistimed, as was that against the v a n guard near Bozüyük. But the victors made their o w n luck. I t was their solid resistance that K i l i j Arslan underestimated, hence their victory a n d his defeat. This rested on their manner of w a r i n the west, which called for disciplined close-quarter fighting i n w h i c h h e a v i l y armoured men played a key role. Ultimately, however, they differed from earlier enemies of the Turks by their motivation, their religious 1 0 8

109

1 1 0

fanaticism w h i c h underpinned their fighting style. I n the crisis of the battle at D o r y l a e u m t h a t zeal showed i n their password, 'Stand fast altogether, trusting i n Christ and i n the victory o f the H o l y Cross. Today, please G o d , y o u w i l l all gain m u c h b o o t y ' . A n d so o f course they d i d , and their spoils were m u c h more than merely t h e pickings of the nomad camp. For the defeat at Dorylaeum seems t o have sparked off revolts i n some o f the cities along the crusader line of m a r c h . T h e Anonymous says that as the Sultan fled he had t o trick his way i n t o the cities w h i c h his forces then looted. By contrast, the C h r i s t i a n a r m y was welcomed i n the vicinity o f I c o n i u m and this reception w o u l d become even w a r m e r i n the Armenian lands to the east. These were t r u l y the fruits of v i c t o r y , for as a later eastern source commented, ' T h e land was shaken before t h e m . ' 111

1 1 2

D o r y l a e u m was a great R o m a n way-station and the key to the route system o f the A n a t o l i a n p l a t e a u . F r o m there they had a choice o f routes t o A n t i o c h (see fig. 2). F r o m Dorylaeum ran the great m i l i t a r y road t h r o u g h A n c y r a to Sebasteia and the far frontiers, towards Lake V a n a n d the Caucasus. A t Ancyra the traveller could t u r n south to the 'Pilgrims' Road' to Tyana, the Cilician Gates a n d o n to A n t i o c h . This road forked east f o r Caeserea-in-Cappadocia, whence i t led d o w n to Comana, Germanicea Caeserea (Marasch) and thence to Antioch. I t was along this r o a d n e t w o r k that the Byzantine emperors had gathered the forces o f the provinces o n their way to the frontiers. They could have taken this route, w h i c h they w o u l d have known from earlier p i l g r i mage, direct f r o m Nicaea; that they d i d not reflects serious political considerations. T h e Byzantines were, above all, interested i n the south a n d west o f A n a t o l i a , and i t can h a r d l y be a coincidence t h a t the r o u t e chosen facilitated the campaign b y Alexius and his generals w h i c h w o u l d carry them to P h i l o m e l i u m b y June of 1 0 9 8 . However, there was a choice o f routes south from Dorylaeum: the quickest lay v i a Pessinus (near modern Ballihisar), Archelais (modern Aksaray), T y a n a (Kemerhisar, south-west of modern Nigde) a n d the C i l i c i a n Gates, b u t this w o u l d have taken the a r m y across the a r i d heart o f A n a t o l i a w i t h all the problems of watering 113

114

111 113 108

GF, p. 23; for the rest it is authors who follow him who mention it: Tudebode, p . 30: HBS, 184; R M , 767. FC, p, 87; A A , 333. "o y

m

G

F

p

2 ]

3

GF, pp. 19-20. GF, pp. 2 3 - 4 ; Tritton, 'Anonymous Syriac Chronicler', p. 70. W . M . Ramsay, The Historical Geography of Asia Minor, Royal Geographical Society Supplementary Papers, 4 (London, 1890), pp. 212-13; K . Belke el al., eds., Tabula 1 1 2

Imperii 114

Byzantini,

5 vols. (Vienna, 1 9 7 7 - 8 4 ) , 4. 94.

O n Alexius's campaign of 1098 see below pp. 2 9 9 - 3 0 2 .

VICTORY

IN THE

and the extremes o f temperatures w h i c h we have noted. I t was possible to fork south and east at Pessinus and descend v i a Philomel i u m (modern Akşehir) towards I c o n i u m (modern K o n y a ) , or south and west via A m o r i u m to the v i c i n i t y o f modern Afyon. Another road r a n due south via Nacolia (modern Seyitgazi) to j o i n the route to I c o n i u m just n o r t h of Afyon, while further west was another route via Cotiaeum (Kiitahaya) to A f y o n . T h e sources are very vague about this early part of the journey: they all wrote long afterwards when the memory of hard marching had been eclipsed b y much later doses of the same thing, and many more spectacular events. There is, however, some indication that they took the r o u t e via Nacolia. A l b e r t of A i x says that on the fourth day o f t h e i r march, having suffered terrible thirst, they rested i n the Malabranias valley, w h i c h cannot be certainly identified, where many died o f d r i n k i n g too m u c h . Nacolia (Seyitgazi), on the river Seydi, is e i g h t y kilo­ metres f r o m the battlefield of Dorylaeum, very roughly four days march, and could thus be Malabranias - though there c o u l d be no certainty. This tale of hardship and suffering is confirmed by Fulcher and the Anonymous who was very worried by the heavy loss of horses. Here i n high summer w i t h temperatures a r o u n d the 3 0 centigrade mark, the crusaders were crossing the A n a t o l i a n plateau; this is not flat land, but highly scenic, scarred by deep scarps a n d dry valleys, and almost waterless. I t is a majestic, rather frightening landscape, and a harsh environment for a large force to traverse. A l b e r t tells us that the army divided after a while, w i t h Godfrey's brother, B a l d w i n , and Bohemond's nephew, Tancred, setting o f f on a different route from the main army. Baldwin took a d i f f i c u l t road into the valley o f the Orellis, while Tancred went to P h i l o m e l i u m and thence to I c o n i u m and Heraclea (modern Ereğli), and the m a i n 1 1 5

116

0

Ramsay, Historical Geography, pp. 1 9 9 - 3 2 1 . For an outline of the ancient and R o m a n roads or the area sec W. M . Caldcr and G. E. Bean, A Classical Map of Asia Minor (London, 1959) and the useful map with Gazeteer in Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 14-15 and the comments PP' 3 0 - 3 ; D. French, ' A study orRoman roads in Anatolia', Anatotian Studies, 2 4 ( 1 9 7 4 ) , 143-9, 'Roman road system in Asia Minor', Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Well 2. 7. 2 ( 1 9 8 0 ) , 6 9 8 - 7 2 9 ; Roman Roads and Milslones

of Asia Minor,

Fase. 1: An Interim

Collection

of

Milestones, Pis. 1-2, British Institute or Archaeology at Ankara, Monograph British Archaeological Reports International Scries 392 (i) and (ii) (Oxford, 1 9 8 8 ) , p. 540 9 >

and

map,

The Pilgrims'

Road, especially p. 130 and

map;

Belke, Tabula

Imperii

Byzantini,

2. 3 2 .

"

6

v°' i ' , ' P the valley or Malabranias is that of the Porsuk near K ü t a h y a (ancient Cotiaeum) which is about four days march south of Eskişehir (Dory­ laeum) for this, I am fairly certain, is the route they took. P

S r

G F

p -

a 3 ,

1 1

i s

o s s i b l e

187

First enemy

EAST

army proceeded to Antioch-in-Pisidia (Antiochetta, now modern Yalvaç) which lies to the south o f the Sultan Daglari. A t this p o i n t , however, Albert's account is at its worst. Antiochetta is described as being next to Heraclea, w h i c h is listed o n Tancred's journey as coming before I c o n i u m . Moreover, there is no further mention o f the journey o f the m a i n a r m y u n t i l i t reaches Marasch, presumably because Albert's informants were w i t h B a l d w i n on his diversions t o Cilicia and Edessa. Fulcher confirms that the army went to A n t i o ­ chetta, but offers no i n f o r m a t i o n on the route t a k e n . I n fact the army could have taken any o f the routes f r o m Dorylaeum. However, no source describes anything remotely resembling the crossing of the Sultan Daglari m o u n t a i n range w h i c h rises suddenly and sharply out o f the steppe to over 2,600 metres; the accounts of suffering reflect the passage across the d r y steppe, not that over a formidable mountain b a r r i e r . Therefore, the likelihood is that they took a western route, p r o b a b l y v i a Nacolia approaching A n t i o c h - i n Pisidia roughly v i a the m o d e r n Afyon and passing to the south of the Sultan D a g l a r i v i a their western foothills, w h i c h are relatively gentle (sec fig. 2). T a n c r e d and B a l d w i n probably left the main army i n the vicinity of Afyon a n d pushed along the more direct route to I c o n i u m north o f the S u l t a n Daglari v i a P h i l o m e l i u m , presumably w a t c h i n g for enemy attack; perhaps one took the road via the ancient H a d r i a nopolis (south-east of Akşehir) and the other that through Laodicea (modern village o f H a l i c i , east of Akşehir). 117

The really interesting question is w h y the army went to A n t i o c h in-Pisidia at a l l , for the road f r o m D o r y l a e u m via Polybotus (modern Bolvadin) and P h i l o m e l i u m (modern Akşehir) to I c o n i u m is shorter (by at least three days march) a n d more direct. A l b e r t attributes the s p l i t t i n g o f the a r m y to the needs for supply. H e and Fulcher stress t h a t Pisidia was a fertile and pleasant land, where the army enjoyed a b r i e f rest and Godfrey was i n j u r e d by a bear while out h u n t i n g . A f t e r his account o f the hardships and want on the d r y steppe the Anonymous mentions a 'fertile country, full o f good and delicious things to eat' w h i c h may well be P i s i d i a . Indeed, Pisidia is a f e r t i l e r o l l i n g country, a great contrast w i t h the steppe to the north o f the S u l t a n D a g l a r i , and this must have been a real consider­ ation i n p l a n n i n g the route of the army. A t the same time, the Anonymous indicates t h a t the populations of the cities of Asia M i n o r 118

t h a t

»' AA, 3 4 1 - 2 ; FG,

pp.

8 7 - 8 ; GF,

p. 2 3 .

"«

FC,

p. 87; A A ,

341-2.

ı88

rose against the Turks and that, f o r the Byzantines, A n t i o c h , the chief city of Pisidia, was a desirable prize. T h e foraging needs o f the army, together w i t h the cooperation w i t h B y z a n t i u m , probably combined to draw the army along this route. Hagenmeyer suggests that they left Antioch about 5 August, a r r i v i n g at I c o n i u m o n 15 August, a rate of march o f about twelve to t h i r t e e n kilometres per day through this relatively flat country, though the last f o r t y kilo­ metres into Iconium pass through harsh a n d waterless hills. Tancred and Baldwin seem to have rejoined the m a i n a r m y at Iconium which the Turks made no effort to defend, a l t h o u g h its Byzantine defences were probably still intact. T h e local p o p u l a t i o n welcomed the crusader army and advised them t o carry m u c h water because the land to the east was d r y . T h e road to Heraclea passes over a featureless plain, probably then something of a salt desert, b u t now brought back to life by irrigation. W e do n o t k n o w w h i c h o f three possible routes they took f r o m I c o n i u m to Heraclea, w h i c h vary in distance between 140 and 170 kilometres for the only clue is that they spent two days resting at a river after t w o days m a r c h eastwards. This must refer to the Carasamba w h i c h , however, cuts all the routes, but there is no reason to believe t h a t they d i d n o t take the shortest r o u t e . A t Heraclea the T u r k i s h garrison attempted to 119

"

9

First enemy

VICTORY I N T H E EAST

Even i f they took the longest route, however, and allowing for delay as they heard of the enemy forces, Hagenmeycr's chronology of this part of the journey is surely wrong. He suggests that after a two day march they arrived at the Carasamba on the 20 August where they rested for two days, then arrived at Heraclea about 10 September. This means a march of between 140 and 170 kilometres over a period of twenty-one days. A daily march rate or seven or eight kilometres per day over these flat lands seems unduly slow. By contrast, Hagenmeyer suggests that the army IeR Heraclea about 14 September and reached Caeserea-in-Cappadocia (modern Kayseri) on 27 September, a daily rate or seventeen kilometres up into the mountains. We can never be precisely certain o f any dates other than 4 July for the departure from the field orDoylacum and 2 0 October for the arrival at the Iron Bridge outside Antioch. I would suggest, however, that they must surely have reached Heraclea by the end or August but that we must allow for a slower rate or march in the mountains. All such dates must be approximate but I suggest: (C) = Hagenmeycr's dates Heraclea 31 August. (10 Sept) Heraclea -Caeserca: 240 km 4-21 September, eighteen days march at 13/14 km per day (14-27 September, 14 days march at 17 km per day) Cacscrea-Comana: 86 km 24-30 September, seven days march at 12 km per day (end Scptcmber-3 October, four days march at 21 k m per day)

a m b u s h them b u t their scouts had warned them and the enemy were b r u s h e d aside easily and the city c a p t u r e d . T h e army rested there f o r four days. T h e y n o w faced a very i m p o r t a n t choice o f route, for east o f Heraclea lay the T a u r u s mountains, i n a great arc from south-west to north-east, d i v i d i n g A n a t o l i a from Syria. They could e i t h e r j o u r n e y south-east o n the ' P i l g r i m R o a d ' via the Cilician G a t e s , Tarsus, A d a n a a n d Alexandretta (iskenderun) to Antioch w h i c h was the more direct route, or they could take the road to Gacserca-in-Cappadocia (Kayseri) across the Taurus and down via G o x o n (Göksün) and M a r a s c h (Kahramanmaraş). The difference b e t w e e n these t w o routes was considerable: Heraclea to Antioch via t h e C i l i c i a n Gates is a j o u r n e y o f some 350 kilometres, b u t via Gaeserea over 630 kilometres. I t was extraordinary that they chose t h e latter route for the m a i n army, while dispatching Tancred and B a l d w i n i n t o Cilicia. W h y was this strange choice made? 120

I t needs to be stressed h o w difficult travelling overland was i n t h i s p e r i o d . A l t h o u g h the r o a d system o f Asia M i n o r was basically t h a t o f the Romans, i t is u n l i k e l y that the roads were i n good c o n d i t i o n after t h i r t y years o f p o l i t i c a l chaos and then Turkish domination. T h o u g h sometimes the j o u r n e y was relatively easy t h e r e were other occasions, as i n the pass south o f Göksün, when e v e r y step was a calvary. F o r most o f the time i t must have been s i m p l y very unpleasant a n d dangerous, even w i t h o u t considering t h e possibility o f enemy attack. T h e death o f horses and pack a n i m a l s must have been a p p a l l i n g a n d m i l i t a r i l y disastrous; just a f t e r D o r y l a e u m , we hear o f knights mounted o n oxen, their horses 1 2 1

C o m a n a - G ö k s u n : 55 k m 1 - 4 October, four days march at 12/13 km per day ( 4 - 6 October, three days march at 17 k m per day) G ö k s u n - M a r a s c h : 80 k m 7 - 1 4 October, eight days march at 10 k m per day ( 8 - 1 3 October, six days march at 13 k m per day) M a r a s c h - I r a n Bridge: 150 km 1 5 - 3 0 October, six days march at 25 k m per day ( 1 4 - 2 0 October, seven days march at 2 0 + km per day) T h i s d a t i n g tries to take account of geographical differences. I t is acknowledged that distances and dates can only be approximate. *™ CF, p. 23. French, 'Roman road system', 7 1 3 , points to the lack o f evidence about maintenance in the Byzantine period. l a l

First enemy

V I C T O R Y I N T H E EAST

having perished on the dry s t e p p e . O n l y the strongest o f motives could have led the army to march northwards to Caeserea, deliberately ignoring a much shorter route. Historians have been strangely slow to grasp the scale and importance o f the diversion v i a Caeserea. I t has been suggested that the narrowness o f the famous Cilician G a t e - only twenty-five metres at one point, and the hostile climate of Cilicia explain the decision. However, although the road to Caeserea is less abrupt than that over the Cilician Gates, the long sustained climb (Caeserea is at 1,254 metres) would have been sapping, while the road down to Marasch offers going every bit as difficult and narrow as either the Cilician Gates or the Belen pass from Cilicia to Antioch over the Ammanus Mountains, often called the 'Syrian Gates'. Further the road rises to a m a x i m u m o f over 1,700 metres, while the Cilician Gates never rise above 1,000 metres, T h e real military risk of the direct route was that the garrison of A n t i o c h might challenge their crossing o f the Belen Pass b u t from their perspective at Heraclea there were unknown risks o f a similar k i n d facing them i n the mountains. Moreover, the season was quite advanced and, while the army was n o w hardened, the loss of animals must have slowed i t down. This opened the risk o f being caught b y the snows which can come as early as October i n the high passes, for the road to which they were committed rises to 1,700 metres. 122

I t is likely that what we see is the development o f an A r m e n i a n strategy which had been discussed w i t h Alexius, either at Constantinople or at Pelekanum after the fall o f N i c a e a . As the Crusade advanced many of the cities i n their path ejected their l u r k i s h garrison and welcomed the crusaders. I n addition, they had contact w i t h Armenians as we have noted and, at I c o n i u m , Christians gave them intelligence about local conditions. The Christian population o f Asia M i n o r had suffered badly at the hands o f the nomadic Turks, whose violent and arbitrary dominion was resented. Raymond of Agmlcrs knew that A n t i o c h had only fallen to the 1 urks some fourteen years before, and he catalogues the sufferings of 123

1 2 2

n

intcrcs s w .

125

1 2 6

T h e l o n g u p h i l l march took the army past the area o f m o d e r n Nigde over a series of dramatic scarps into wide upland plains, often watered b y great lakes. Towards Caeserea they captured a strong place w h i c h was given to Simeon, a local m a n whose presence i n the a r m y points to forethought. Beyond Caeserea, which they reached about 21 and left about 24 September, they travelled t h r o u g h steep and b r o k e n country for some eighty-six kilometres to a city w h i c h had h e l d o u t f o r three weeks against Turkish siege; there Peter d'Aups, a westerner i n the service of Alexius, was given control (see fig. 2 a n d 4 ) . T h i s place has been identified as 'Plastencia', on t h e a u t h o r i t y o f B a u l d r y o f D o l , and recent research identifies the Greek place o f t h a t name w i t h Elbistan, a city w e l l off the crusaders' p a t h to the east o n the road to Melitene. T h e likelihood is that this was Comana where the a r m y seems t o have arrived about 30 September. T h e a r m y left Bohemond to pursue the besiegers of C o m a n a and w e n t o n t o Coxon (Góksun) o n 4 October, which t h e local Christians p r o m p t l y surrendered to them. There a false r u m o u r t h a t 127

' » R A , p. 64. Vryonis, Hellenism, pp. 194-223; Alexiad, pp. 3 4 9 - 5 0 . 126 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 150; Cahen, Turkey, pp. 7 8 - 8 0 . 1

the Gesta,

S ^ W H ^ ^ T K s thTr™fh r * o u t c s ^ ^

124

2

5

'27 Hagenmeyer, Chronologie, 188, pp. 9 7 - 8 suggested Comana but the most recent edition ot

FC, p. 8 8 .

K

its Christian p e o p l e . W h e n the Emperor Alexius retreated f r o m Philomelium, about 20 June 1098, most o f the local p o p u l a t i o n chose t o leave w i t h h i m rather than again face their T u r k i s h mast e r s . I n a passage w h i c h has received surprisingly little a t t e n t i o n , Stephen o f Blois says that i n Cappadocia the army directed its march against a powerful local emir, Hasan, who is probably more correctly called Baldajii. H i s brother, Abu'l-Qasim, had r u l e d a t Nicaca after the death o f Sulayman, whose son K i l i j Arslan was h e l d captive b y M a l i k Shah (1086-92). Hasan himself briefly held power at N i c a c a after his brother, b u t K i l i j Arslan escaped from prison o n the death o f M a l i k Shah i n 1092 and resumed power at N i c a e a . The crusaders, therefore, were prepared to confront real opposition i n p u r s u i t o f w h a t we may call their A r m e n i a n strategy, a n d they drove i n t o his lands as they advanced towards Caeserea and t h e n turned south to A n t i o c h .

^

' h

^ .'

h C

^ a

r

^ m

y

t 0

vnt T

Z °'u ™

6

P S

G

?

P

"

' ° d C

' k

"

1 0 r

h e r e

e

^ a

c

h

^ ' 9 4 ° ) PP. 2 0 - , o was much struck Caeserca-in-Cappadocia and thought 9

i s t h a t

d i f r e r C m

a

t

t h i s

r C a S O n S

s t a

'

S

f a V

c B

"

y

z a n t i

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t

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s C 0 U r S e

0

f

a c d 0 n

-

p. 2 5 follows B D , 3 9 ; for Elbistan see Belke, Tabula

lmpem Byzanhm,

a.

1 0 0 - 1 0 D r David French thinks that 'Plastencia' may be somebody's recollection of, quite literally, "a pleasant place' whose name he had forgotten, transformed by Bauldry into a proper name. The case for Comana is that there was certainly a city there on the route and i t is difficult to see where else could be intended. For the probable line of the road to Comana sec French, Roman Roads and Milestones of Asia Minor,

map.

Fasc. 2. Pt. 2, p. 550 and

ig

VICTORY

2

IN THE

the enemy were deserting A n t i o c h led R a y m o n d of Toulouse to send a force of 500 knights, under Peter o f Castillon, to seize the city; at a settlement of heretic Christians near to A n t i o c h they were informed that the rumour was false whereupon some o f them under the command of Peter de Roaix, went o n to establish a Provençal base in the valley of Ruj, parallel to the Orontes valley on the eastern side of that river. Rugia was about seven kilometres f r o m Rusa t o the south of A n t i o c h . The main a r m y followed along down the bitter and painful pass near what is n o w called the Püren Geçidi, which rises to i ,630 metres, the downward slope o f w h i c h is a penance even in modern transport. The Anonymous records t h a t horses and animals died i n falls and knights sold off their arms at any price rather than carry them across this 'damnable m o u n t a i n ' . 128

A t Marasch the Turkish garrison had fled and the army was welcomed by its Armenian ruler, T a t o u l , who, as a supporter of Alexius, continued to hold the p l a c e . The army had now emerged from the mountain passes and stood at the head o f a great flat valley, the Amouk, which stretches d o w n to A n t i o c h and the coast beyond, between the Ammanus range to the west and the K a r t a l D a g l a r i range to the east on the edge of Syria. The success o f their A r m e n i a n strategy had delivered the mountain cities over to them, and now the army was able to set out on the last leg o f the j o u r n e y d o w n the Amouk. But before they set out, local inhabitants told the leaders that 'Artâh, which the crusader sources call Artasia, w o u l d welcome them but had a strong Turkish garrison. T h e leaders sent R o b e r t of Flanders ahead with 1,000 knights, on whose arrival the A r m e n i a n population butchered the Turkish garrison and opened the gates. Ralph of Caen suggests that Baldwin and Tancred commanded this expedition and never mentions Robert, b u t his account confirms that of Albert i n its main outlines. Once the Franks were installed they were besieged by a force which Albert numbers at 20,000. T h e y provided a lesson in tactics for the crusaders. A small n u m b e r o f lightly armed Turkish horsemen trailed their coats outside the walls and when a lot of Franks, foot and horse, rushed out they fled 129

lffl

OF, pp. 25-7; R. Dussaud, Topographie Historique de la Syrie Antique et Médiévale (Paris, <9?7J. PP- 103-7^dcnhfies this arca, and points out that as the Antiochenes held the I r o n 1 « ? ^ • [°T> ° PP- ) H must have been to the T£ M V * ?' u : "' S was relatively close to A l b a r a (

n V

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drawing their enemies i n t o a n ambush w h i c h cut them off f r o m t h e city. Robert o f Flanders rescued them b y a charge from the city, b u t Christian losses i n men a n d horses were heavy. R a l p h o f Caen also tells us that m a n y Franks were l u r e d o u t o f the city and suffered heavy losses i n close-quarter combat w i t h the Turks. T h e survivors retreated i n t o the city where the depleted garrison now had to face a close siege. T h e siege was lifted w i t h the a r r i v a l o f 1,500 reinforcements and the city was g i v e n a Frankish garrison, w h i c h R a l p h says was i n the c o n t r o l o f B a l d w i n . T h e b i t t e r fight underlines the importance o f ' A r t a h t o the crusaders and the fact that i t later changed hands, for i t was c a p t u r e d b y K e r b o g a h , strengthens t h e point. F r o m this i t w o u l d appear that the main army h a d marched d o w n the A m o u k u n t i l i t was j u s t n o r t h o f the great lake t o the north of A n t i o c h . There t h e road forked; t o the west i t passed the Belen Pass a n d arrived before the Bridge Gate o n the west side o f A n t i o c h . T h e eastern f o r k l e d the a r m y to ' A r t a h , w h i c h R a l p h o f Caen w o u l d later describe as the 'shield o f A n t i o c h ' . I t stood close t o the modern R e y h a n l i across the road to ' A z i z , and just n o r t h o f its j u n c t i o n w i t h the A n t i o c h - A l c p p o road t o the cast of the I r o n Bridge, w h i c h controlled the crossing o f the Orontes to the north o f A n t i o c h . T h e capture o f ' A r t a h helped t o secure the eastern approaches t o A n t i o c h as a p r e l u d e to a siege, thus isolating the c i t y f r o m its obvious source o f support. T h e A r m e n i a n strategy provided a friendly h i n t e r l a n d and a springboard for this isolation of A n t i o c h , w h i c h was increased by the expedition o f T a n c r e d and Baldwin t o Cilicia. A l b e r t emphasises t h a t all this was done w i t h the agreement a n d consent o f the leaders o f the army and this must include the Byzantine representative, T a t i k i o s , whose m a n took over C o m a n a a n d , presumably, at least some o f the other cities. This was m u c h more than mere i n d i v i d u a l o p p o r t u n i s m , the reason usually given f o r the expedition to Cilicia. 1 3 0

1 3 1

Tancred a n d B a l d w i n o f Boulogne's expedition to Cilicia is very w e l l known a n d has generally been treated as a private enterprise affair (sec fig. 2 ) . T h e sources are often n o t very informative o n h o w i t came about. R a y m o n d o f Aguilcrs never discusses this event, perhaps because the Provencals were n o t involved; Fulcher was 1 3 2

t h a t

1 3 0

i a

, l d C n t i f i e d

I M

K .this h acquisition L T V • ol secT below p. 224. ' AA, 136-7; Boase, Armenia, p. 4.

t W s

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193

First enemy

EAST

c c r t a i n

»y

c o r r e c l

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t h e

importance

M

AA, 358-61; RC, 6 3 9 - 4 j . . 7'2This is the clear implication of R u n c i m a n i . 197.Mayer, The Crusades, p. 4 8 remarks:'The two o r them were almost certainly seeking their o w n personal gain', while Riley-Smith, Idea ojCrusading, p. 5 8 , speaks o f the two men breaking away from the main force. 1 3 1

R

C

194

VICTORY IN THE

First enemy

EAST

much more concerned about the expedition to Edessa, i n w h i c h he participated, and says that B a l d w i n took his o w n men into Gilicia, while the Anonymous, as so often, simply reports the events w i t h o u t explanation. Ralph of Caen, who likes to present Tancred as an emerging leader, tells us that T a n c r e d chose to undertake this expedition. Albert of A i x reports t h a t , p r o b a b l y i n the region of Afyon, Tancred and Baldwin were sent along the n o r t h e r n road to Iconium, but that Tancred was ahead after Hcraclea and went down to the coast through Cilicia, leaving B a l d w i n who got somewhat lost following b e h i n d , This presents events i n a different light and it should be noted that each o f these y o u n g m e n seems to have had substantial forces at his disposal. W h e n they came to blows at Mamistra Tancred attacked w i t h 500 m e n b u t was defeated b y the larger force of Baldwin. Earlier, at Tarsus, Tancred had been reinforced by 300 men from Bohcmond, and i n the quarrel over this city both young men claimed that they were acting in the name of their superiors, Bohcmond or Godfrey, i n passages w h i c h smack of the 'my big brother is bigger than yours' s y n d r o m e . T h e impression is of an expedition i n which the ardour and greed of two young men got out of hand. I t is interesting t h a t friendly locals once more appear i n a notable role, Tancred had w i t h h i m an A r m e n i a n w h o m he had known earlier and i t was perhaps this influence, and their fear of Bohemond, that led the Armenian p o p u l a t i o n of Tarsus to prefer his r u l e - though they eventually submitted to B a l d w i n . A t A d a n a Tancred found a city already half-liberated b y the local A r m e n i a n prince Oschin and partly occupied by a B u r g u n d i a n , Welf; given Oschin's good relations with Alexius i t w o u l d seem likely that W e l f was another westerner i n imperial s e r v i c e . A t the end o f the Cilician adventure Baldwin was persuaded by Bagrat, an A r m e n i a n whom he had got to know at Nicaea and w h o was the l o r d of Ravendan, to strike cast into the A r m e n i a n territories towards Edessa to Tell-Bashir, but we know f r o m F u l c h e r that he first returned to the main a r m y . Baldwin then became embroiled in the complex politics of the Armenian princes and i n F e b r u a r y of 133

134

135

1 3 6

137

138

1098 received a request f r o m Thoros, the A r m e n i a n ruler of Edessa, to go to t h a t c i t y which after m a n y adventures he reached on 20 February. B y 8 M a r c h 1098 B a l d w i n h a d i n t r i g u e d w i t h d i s affected citizens to overthrow Thoros and was i n effective control o f the c i t y . L o c a l Christians, as we have already noted, delivered over many key cities as far south as R u j to the Franks and this is corroborated b y the Damascus Chronicle w h i c h specifically mentions the fighting a t ' A r t â h . I t was no wonder t h a t Anselm of R i b e m o n t would boast i n a letter to the west that the a r m y held 200 forts a n d cities, while Stephen p u t the figure at 1 6 0 . This should be seen as the fruits o f a deliberate policy o f w h i c h the C i l i c i a n expedition was a part. At Heraclea, or shortly thereafter, the princes must have decided to implement t h e i r A r m e n i a n strategy w h i c h probably aimed t o reproduce t h e p r i n c i p a l i t y w h i c h Philarctus had ruled i n the years before 1085, elements o f w h i c h (such as Edessa) remained independent and i n some sense attached to the empire. Gabriel o f M c l i t e n e seems to have held aloof f r o m the crusade. T h e idea of creating such a liberated zone was p r o b a b l y developed i n discussions w i t h Alexius - Tatikios was his man on t h e crusade and he seems to have aided and abetted the process - b u t i t was made possible by the success a t Dorylaeum a n d the reaction o f the native p o p u l a t i o n to i t . A f t e r Heraclea the leaders decided to capitalise on their success a n d launched the m a i n army i n t o a long diversion over very d i f f i c u l t territory, d r i v i n g back the forces o f Hasan. I n t o the more sheltered area o f Cilicia a small force led b y T a n c r e d and B a l d w i n was dispatched. I t was a risk, b u t one w h i c h succeeded handsomely. T h e establishment o f a great bastion o f Byzantine power o n the S y r i a n border was welcome to b o t h Alexius and the crusader leaders. I t would enable the Byzantines to conquer southern Asia M i n o r . F o r the crusaders liberation o f the persecuted Christians of the east was one of the objectives of their j o u r n e y . F u r t h e r m o r e , such a Byzantine bulwark w o u l d provide a secure base for the real objective o f t h e i r 139

1 4 0

141

142

1 3 3

133 FC,

p. 89; CF,

pp.

s-; 4

5

p. 629.

RC,

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,

™ AA, 349-50, 347, 343-5.

AA 342; E. A. Hanawall, 'Norman views of eastern Christendom: from the First Crusade 0 the Pnnc,pal,ty of Antioch', in V. Goss and C. C. Bornstcin, The Meeting of Two Christians"' 157

RC, 634; AA, 345.

PP- 5 ' . a

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stresses Tancred's pragmatic attitude p

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to

Worlds

195

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Eastern 1 4 1

FC,

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9 0 - 1 ; AA,

352-3; on

Edessa see

M . Amouroux-Mourad, Le Comté

d'Edesse

1098-1150 (Paris, 1988) Chap. 1, 'Fondation et Evolution du comté d'Edesse 1 0 9 8 - 1 1 5 0 ' , pp. 5 7 - 9 1 ; J . Laurent, 'Des Grecs aux croisés; é t u d e sur l'histoire d'Edesse 1071- 9 8 ' , Byiantion, 1 ( 1 9 2 4 ) , 347~449- T r i t t o n , 'Anonymous Syriac Chronicle', p. 70, says t h a t Baldwin was sent by Godfrey who had been asked for help by Thoros. Matthew, 37; Fulcher alone of the contemporary sources tries to pretend that Baldwin was not a party to the plot, pp. 9 1 - 2 , and W T , 158-9 follows him; A A , 3 5 4 - 5 . Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, pp. 4 2 - 3 .

1 4 2

Sec above p. 133 n, 3 5 .

VICTORY IN THE

EAST

endeavour-Jerusalem. We have to remember that they had come lor Jerusalem, for Palestine, not A n t i o c h or some N o r t h Syrian domination. I t is a point which the mass o f the army would make forcibly to its leaders i n the later months o f 1098.»« As things turned out this p l a n was never properly realised. Its central assumption was a common interest between the Byzantine empire and the crusaders' the stress o f events undermined this. Even so, despite a heavy price in garrison troops detached from their force the conquests paid off handsomely for the First Crusade. Food, useful intelligence and supphes reached the crusade from the Armenians whose merchants frequently visited the city and Armenians helped i n the r o u t i n g of 1 urkish forces and the slaying o f Y a g h i s i y a n . T h e possession of so many bases i n the general area of A n t i o c h , the old dominion of Philaretus, gave the crusade a much needed platform for their assault o n Antioch. Baldwin's possession o f Edessa enabled h i m to send aid and supplies to the army at A n t i o c h . I t was also a powerful distraction for local Islamic leaders. I n M a y 8 this factor caused Kerbogah to divert his huge relief army for a three-week siege, which was fatal for his chances of success against A n t i o c h . »* M i l i t a r i l y the policy was a striking success and the choice made on the road from I 0 9

P

J ! £ 5°

annl ^ tCOmCt S < ™ though i t must have appeared. I t enabled the crusaders to confront their second enemy, the Turks of Syria, w i t h a considerable territorial base and much assistance w h i c h was extremely valuable. C

See above, pp. i - a and below, pp. 3 1 0 - n . Matthew, 3 3 : ^ , 3 3 , 3 7 , , 48. Sec below, pp. 3 6 1 - 2 . 5

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C H A P T E R

7

The second enemy: the siege of Antioch

A t A n t i o c h the army o f the First Crusade had arrived i n the Fractured borderlands of I s l a m - an area o f acute political fragmenta t i o n where small political units proliferated. I t is tempting to consider the victory a n inevitable t r i u m p h of the unified and zealous crusaders over a disunited and poorly prepared Islam. I t is true t h a t some of the Islamic powers took little notice of the crusade and continued w i t h their internecine conflicts. T o later generations of M u s l i m writers, raised on the spirit o f H o l y War, this was shameful, but at the time i t was to be expected because of political circumstances. However, too m u c h scorn should not be poured on the Islamic powers o f N o r t h Syria. The major cities of the area were a f i r m u n d e r p i n n i n g for its defence; the siege of Antioch w o u l d last nine months. Three major battles w o u l d be fought i n efforts to lift the crusader siege and there were innumerable minor ones. For the crusaders i t was a terrible struggle, a m i l i t a r y epic indeed, the success of w h i c h was a more than adequate demonstration that their j o u r n e y was the w o r k of G o d . Political fragmentation i n this area was real, b u t even so m i l i t a r y resistance was considerable (sec fig. 3). 1

2

N o r t h Syria lay far f r o m Constantinople and i t was not u n t i l the crusade was approaching A n t i o c h that its ruler, Yaghisiyan, began to realise that his position was at stake. H e has been appointed by M a l i k Shah to rule A n t i o c h and a substantial part of the former lands o f Philaretus i n 1086-7 i n what amounted to a check to the Shah's brother, T u t u s h , w h o held Damascus and Jerusalem. W i t h

1

2

'Thus the princelings of Syria, when the crusaders arrived, had for making war only the handful of slaves which the revenues from their meager provinces enabled them to buy.': Cahen, 'The Turkish invasion', 165. On this theme of God's delivery o f the army see especially Blake, 'The formation o f the Crusade Idea', 1 1 - 3 1 , and the further discussion in Riley-Smith, Idea of Crusading, pp.

91-119.

197

VICTORY

IN THE

the death of Tutush i n the war for the Sultanate against his nephew Berkyaruk (1094-1105), in 1095 his sons became rivals for power; R i d w a n at Aleppo, where Tutush's v i z i r I b n - B a d i held m u c h power but was soon replaced by Janah-al-Dawlah, and D u q a q at Damascus, where the emir Sawitakin was at first influential. R i d w a n of Aleppo (1095-1113) and D u q a q o f Damascus (1095-1104) met in the battle o f Qinnisrin on 22 M a r c h 1097 when v i c t o r y for the former brought his restless governor o f A n t i o c h to heel, but Ridwan's restless atabeg Janah-ad-Daulah was able to h o l d Horns against h i m . I n this context R i d w a n made an alliance o f convenience w i t h F a t i m i d Egypt which initiated his pro-Shi'ite policies. This process o f fragmentation was greatly facilitated because Berkyaruk was deeply preoccupied w i t h events i n the east, and he relied on Kerbogah, atabeg of Mosul to watch events i n the west. I t was the preoccupation of the Seljuk Sultan, and his failure to dominate Syria, that gave free rein to the divisions w h i c h were endemic there. Kurds, Turks, Circassians, Arabs, Bedouin, all were very different peoples who were i n no sense united by I s l a m , and they ruled over or alongside Armenian and Syrian Christians who were very numerous. A n d the land itself, w i t h stretches o f desert between fertile zones around major cities, favoured these divisions. The Great Seljuks had never succeeded i n attaching A n a t o l i a to their d o m i n i o n despite the relative weakness of its d i v i d e d T u r k i s h clans, b u t they had imposed a precarious stability i n Syria u n t i l the death of Tutush. T h e position of R i d w a n o f Aleppo, a Sunnite i n a zone w i t h a large Shi'ite population who negotiated w i t h the Fatimids against his brother Duqaq and later allied w i t h the Assassins, is indicative o f the political complexities of the area. A t the t i m e o f the arrival o f the crusaders, he and Yaghisiyan were i n alliance w i t h bokman o f Diyar-Bakr, who, w i t h his brother I l - G h a z i (the A r t u kids, the sons of A r t u k who died i n 1091) also, ruled Jerusalem as vassals of Duqaq of Damascus, against A b o u ' n N e d j i m o f Horns. Yaghisiyan p r o m p t l y returned to Antioch, alienating b o t h his allies, and set about expelling many Christians from A n t i o c h and prepar4

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EAST

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i n g its defence. T h e O r t h o d o x Patriarch o f the city was imprisoned, though not all his flock were d r i v e n o u t . He was too weak on his own to take action against the approaching Franks and soon found i t prudent to send one son, Shams-ad-Daulah, to appeal for help to D u q a q and another, M u h a m m e d , to the Turks of A n a t o l i a and to Kerbogah o f Mosul. I t is interesting to note that at the time the crusaders were aware o f this, for i n a letter w r i t t e n j u s t after Easter 1098 Stephen o f Blois comments on Shams-ad-Daulah's diplomatic efforts. This was a fairly comprehensive diplomatic effort, for the other powers o f Syria were not much interested. Shams-ad-Daulah w o u l d abandon Damascus for R i d w a n only when D u q a q had been defeated by the crusaders i n December 1097, b u t he seems to have ignored the other powers of the area. T h e B a n u - M u n q i d h of Shaizar were a n A r a b dynasty w i t h no affection for Turks a n d no leaning towards J i h a d . T h e founder o f their greatness, A b u el-Hasan 'AH ben M u n q i d h , claimed that he persuaded rather t h a n coerced the Byzantine population o f Shaizar into accepting his r u l e , even 'perm i t t i n g their pigs to graze w i t h m y flocks.' The Banu-'Ammar ruled an independent p r i n c i p a l i t y based on T r i p o l i w h i c h was Shi'ite. D u q a q ruled at Damascus w i t h the support o f his great minister, T u g h t i g i n , while J a n a h ad-Daulah, atabeg o f Horns, was no friend o f his former master R i d w a n and much concerned to pursue his vendetta w i t h Y o u s u f ben-Abiks, lord of M a r b i j . I n the n o r t h , Balduk o f Samosata was deeply concerned w i t h B a l d w i n and his encroachments i n Edessa. U n d o u b t e d l y , i n the n o r m a l course o f events a d o m i n a n t force w o u l d have emerged i n the area, b u t at the very moment when the crusade appeared there was nobody, and the result was a critical delay w h i c h allowed the crusaders to establish their siege at A n t i o c h and to strengthen their hold on the surroundi n g countryside, w h i c h rebelled against Yaghisiyan's tyranny as soon as the Franks a p p e a r e d . I t was, however, only a delay, for relief was attempted and for the moment A n t i o c h was strongly defended b y its geographic situation and its formidable walls. A l t h o u g h most m o d e r n writers stress that the crusade was unexpec6

7

8

9

10

" SalTd-Din,

Chronicle of Aleppo,

H a g c n m c y e r , Kreuzzugsbriefc,

KHC

Or. 3. [ h e r a f t e r cited as Aleppo Chronicle],

S i v a n , L'lslam et la Croisade, p . 18. 9 C a h e n , S e t t o n , Crusades, p p . . 6 5 , 322; Aleppo

8

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577.

577-8;

p p . 150-2. Chromcle,

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of the

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200

VICTORY IN THE

ted and that its nature was misunderstood, the nearby Islamic powers d i d mobilise substantial forces and showed considerable determination t o resist this new enemy. A t the start o f his account o f the siege o f A n t i o c h R a y m o n d of Aguilers tells us about the garrison o f the city, 'There were, furthermore, m the city two thousand o f the best knights, a n d four or five thousand c o m m o n knights and ten thousand and more f o o t m e n ' . There is no need to suppose that these figures are accurate but, though his terminology is vague, R a y m o n d here confirms w h a t we' have already noted, that the crusaders understood the composite nature o f the forces they were now facing. T h e model o f state organisation i n the Islamic w o r l d was the Caliphate, although the Caliphs themselves since the n i n t h century had been excluded f r o m effective power at Baghdad by the rise of major groups and factions at the court, of w h i c h the Seljuks, after 1055, were only the latest. T h e Islamic w o r l d was literate and sophisticated, and the régimes at Baghdad under the Abbassids controlled a number o f specialist offices w h i c h amounted to ministries, Diwans, whose efforts were controlled and co-ordinated by a V i z i r . U n d e r the Seljuks the V i z i r N i z a m - a l - M u l k (died 1092) and his family, who were o f I r a n i a n origin, dominated the machinery of government. B u t the v i t a l importance of the army meant that the office of the army, the D i w a n al-Jaysh headed by the A r i d al-Jaysh, was a central force w h i c h spawned subordinate offices such as those w h i c h looked after mercenaries and mâmluks. The connection between war and finance was patent and m u c h commented u p o n . T h e importance o f this office was enhanced b y its control of the ' I q t a . These were o r i g i n a l l y quite small grants of the right to gather state incomes w i t h modest tax-exemptions, made for the maintenance o f soldiers a n d used for ttu', , s associated w i t h the holders o f p o w e r at Baghdad. However, the need to maintain groups of T u r k i s h soldiers and the tendency of all régimes, culminating i n that of the Seljuks, to unity m i l i t a r y and civil authority, meant that governorships o f important provinces and cities, like Antioch, were held as ' I q t a , the holder m rus t u r n letting out I q t a to the troops of his c o m m a n d , w h o thus became tied to h i m . I n the more fluid society o f the N e a r East, w i t h a flourishing money economy, the ' I q t a never became terri¬ 11

12

1 3

t n b a l

»

fbn K h a l d u ^ T ;

e l e m e n t

W

° " * ' 5" '

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LOT, j u i a l d u n , pp. 198-201 expounds upon this.

C

a

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e

n

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T

h

e

201

Second enemy

EAST

T u * ' * «vasion', 153-4.

torial, as d i d the fief or honour i n Europe, and political i n s t a b i l i t y and changes of régime tended to prevent ' I q t a becoming hereditary Cash payment to professional troops continued to be a n i m p o r tant element i n their pay, and the complex diversity o f the machinery controlled b y the V i z i r s under the power of the Shah administered a relatively complex army. N i z a m a l - M u l k (c. 1018-92) had been i n the administration of the Ghaznavids before he served A l p Arslan and M a l i k Shah, u n t i l his assassination in i o g 2 . I n his Book of government he demanded that the wise k i n g should pay careful attention to the regular payment of proper wages to soldiers, and he relates an occasion when a ruler needed to conciliate t h e local p o p u l a t i o n a n d executed a soldier for p i l l a g i n g , justifying the act by reference to his regular pay, bistganV T h e Seljuk Sultans were as anxious as any o f their predecessors to reduce their dependence upon their t r i b a l supporters, the T u r k s whose courage and skill had raised t h e m up, a general point noted b y I b n K h a l d û n . T h e machinery w h i c h they found i n Baghdad f r o m 1055 enabled t h e m to do this, and N i z a m a l - M u l k emphasises the need for a composite army selected f r o m appropriate races i n the t r a d i t i o n o f the C a l i p h a t e , though i t is interesting that he appears to a c k n o w l edge the supremacy o f cavalry. T h e heart of the m i l i t a r y system were slave-soldiers who were often Turks, the màmluks, who formed the g u a r d o f the Sultan (and indeed o f the C a l i p h ) . Since the n i n t h century these T u r k i s h troops had been replacing Iranians as the élite force a n d many o f their commanders had come to hold i m p o r tant offices o f state. T h e Seljuks preferred to recruit from t h e i r o w n people i n t o such formations, w h i c h were far more disciplined a n d loyal u n d e r the eye of the ruler, and i t was clearly politic to give large numbers o f them honorific and highly visible positions a t court, such as the 1,000 o f their sons enrolled as pages. T h e y received careful m i l i t a r y a n d other t r a i n i n g , intended to inculcate l o y a l t y a n d a spirit of service. T h e Seljuk Sultans brought l e a d i n g families f r o m the T u r k i s h tribes i n t o their service; we have noted the example of A r t u k who was employed b y M a l i k Shah i n Bahrain a n d 1 4

5

1 6

17

14 o n the iqta' sec C. Cahen, 'Contribution à l'histoire de l'iqtâ', Annales: économies, sociétés, civilisations, 8 ( 1953), 2 5 - 5 2 and 'The Turkish invasion', . 5 3 - 6 0 ; Bosworth, Recruitment, muster and review', pp. 5 9 - 7 7 ; C Small, Crusading Warfare (rogr-m) (Cambridge, 15 N f e a m ^ M u l k , ' Traité de gouvernement composé pour le Sultan Malik Shah,cà.

C. Scheler, 2 vols

(Paris, ] 8 Q 2 - ! i ) [hereafter cited as a l - M u l k ] , vol. 1. 99> " 3 ~ ' 4 . •« i b n - K h a l d u n , pp. . 4 6 - 7 . » a l - M u l k , 1. 1 0 0 - 1 ; On the Turks see above pp. 145, ' 4 9 -

202

VICTORY

IN THE

Mesopotamia and, finally, by T u t u s h i n Jerusalem. Such notables could play a major role as special troops i n Islamic armies. By such methods, the T u r k i s h tribes were either domesticated or encouraged to move o u t of the settled heart of Islam - especially to the Byzantine frontier where they could expend their warlike energies and form a reservoir o f m i l i t a r y talent. However, substantial T u r k i s h tribal forces were maintained by the Caliphs and by their quasi-feudal governors like Yaghisiyan on ' I q t a and represented the elite element i n their forces. I t was these mamluks who formed the core o f the personal followings, the 'Askars, o f the princelings and emirs of Syria. Overall, the military potential of the Sultan, ruling over all of Syria, Mesopotamia, Iran and the eastern realms and able to call on allies elsewhere, was enormous when the Seljuks were at their greatest. T h i s was made possible by the administration i n Baghdad and there is some evidence of a systematic infrastructure. Local government was required to keep stocks of fodder, as N i z a m a l - M u l k indicates, and i t is probable that under M a l i k Shah central government tried to retain parcels of land i n the provinces for its provision. Huge numbers o f troops are sometimes mentioned - 46,000, even 70,000 horsemen alone, though N i z a m a l - M u l k suggests smaller numbers between , o o o and 25,ooo. I n 1086 A n n a Comnena says that Bursuk advanced into Asia M i n o r on the orders of M a l i k Shah w i t h 50,000 men, which must surely be an exaggeration. I n 1071, Romanus I V ' s army at Manzikert was numbered at 300,000 by the Moslem sources which show that he reduced his effectives by dispersing effort and engaged in battle w i t h only 100,000, but even this figure is excessive, while the mere 14,000 attributed to A l p ArsJan seems rather s m a l l . A t the time of the First Crusade a m a x i m u m all-out effort by the Fatimid Caliphate could raise only an a r m y of 15,000, and that seems to have been the case for some t i m e . I t is almost certain that the Seljuks under M a l i k Shah were m u c h stronger t h a n their Egyptian enemies, but the princelings o f Syria were i n d i v i d u a l l y weaker. However, K e m a l ad-Din, although he gives a figure of 320,000 for the whole crusader army and implies 18

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that their force o f 30,000 was defeated by an inferior number o f the a r m y o f Damascus on 30 December 1097 (the Foraging Battle), tells us t h a t the a r m y o f R i d w a n o f Aleppo defeated i n February at the Lake Battle was larger t h a n the crusader force. His emphasis on d i v i s i o n i n the a r m y o f K e r b o g a h as a cause for its defeat implies its n u m e r i c a l superiority over the Franks as does I b n al-Qalanisi's r e m a r k that, at the time o f Kerbogah's relief force, the armies of I s l a m 'were at the height of their strength a n d numbers'. We need n o t t h i n k of the powers of Syria as being helpless before the crusaders. The 'Askar o f Yaghisiyan, R i d w a n or D u q a q might be l i m i t e d , but i n the face o f a perceived threat i t could be augmented b y r e c r u i t i n g a composite force and m a k i n g allies. This process i n v o l v e d a p o l i c y of conciliation and co-operation which would n a t u r a l l y be complex and, above all, slow. N o effort was made to strike a t the Franks as they approached A n t i o c h , although Kemal e d - D i n says t h a t 'Artâh sought reinforcements, presumably from A l e p p o . O f all the local powers Sokman o f the Artukids had by far the most consistent record, for he fought w i t h R i d w a n and Kerbog a h , b u t his family's h o l d on Jerusalem was directly threatened by their c o m i n g . F o r other rulers, the Franks were just a novel force, l i k e t h e great Byzantine expeditions o f earlier days, w h i c h would pass away, a n d for now simply had to be endured. Hence Balduk's alliance w i t h B a l d w i n and the indifference of the rulers o f T r i p o l i w h o actually allowed the Franks to b u y food and supplies i n their c i t y . T h e divisions i n Syria certainly played into the hands of the crusaders, a n d the divorce f r o m the centre o f Scljuk power i n B a g h d a d was p r o b a b l y even more serious. I n that sense, divisions w i t h i n Islam of course cleared the way for the crusade's victory, b u t this i n itself w i l l n o t do as an explanation. For the powers of Syria, t h o u g h divided and slow to act, were not febrile and could field considerable forces from secure bases against an army whose s t r e n g t h was sapped b y the long and bitter siege o f Antioch. There was n o t h i n g inevitable about the Christian victory and they could easily have been overwhelmed b y the local Syrian powers whose e q u i p m e n t a n d fighting methods proved formidable.

> " invasion', i 8 . ™ ™ Ravandi, Rabat al-sudur wa ayatalsurur,

1 9 8

203

Second enemy

EAST

° " ' . P- ' 6 8 , 'La campagne

669. .

25 The Provençal priest Ebrard was at T r i p o l i seeking food just before the capture ol Antioch. R A , p.

117.

204

VICTORY

205

Second enemy

I N T H E EAST

I n the armies which the crusaders n o w faced the speed, m o b i l i t y and fire-power of the élite T u r k i s h cavalry remained an i m p o r t a n t element. Such tactics were not usually i n themselves enough to w i n against determined enemies; for that, battle at close quarters was essential. The Turks were fully prepared t o fight at close quarters, and indeed i t was precipitate haste to d o so w h i c h caused t h e i r defeats at Nicaea and Dorylaeum. As we have noted they p r o b a b l y wore rather lighter armour than the Franks but at D o r y l a e u m were fully prepared to fight at close q u a r t e r s . As the crusaders m o v e d into the more settled lands of Islam they understood that the armies facing them were rather different, as has been noted already. I n f a n try was clearly a feature o f these armies, i n contrast to the e n t i r e l y mounted nomads. They were bowmen o r spearmen, and i n general were not armoured. The western chroniclers do not often describe their enemies b u t the Anonymous reports that i n the a r m y o f Kerbogah there was a heavily armoured element, even more c o m prehensively protected than the crusaders because their horses wore a special kind of armour: T h e A g u l a n i numbered three thousand; they fear neither spears nor arrows nor a n y other weapon for t h e y and their horses are covered all over w i t h plates o f i r o n . ' 26

27

The description inevitably reminds one o f the heavily a r m o u r e d Persian cavalryman so feared by the late R o m a n a r m y , the ' c a t a p h ract' or i n colloquial Latin clibanarius, 'boiler boy'. There was a marked tradition of heavy cavalry i n Persia w h i c h may w e l l b e where these people originated, although i t should be noted t h a t rather similar troops appear i n Egyptian armies. Cahen thinks i t is possible to see a general development i n Islamic armies towards a heavier type of horseman. This probably arose from settlement, f o r the skills o f the Nomad, particular for his k i n d o f fighting, vanish with the open ranges which dictate his way o f life, hence t h e emphasis i n Islamic thinking on recruiting Turks directly f r o m the steppe. Almost certainly any such tendency to heavier horses was accelerated by the experience o f the crusades. Certainly f r o m 28

29

a b o u t the time the a r m y approached A n t i o c h references grow t o w e l l - a r m o u r e d T u r k s w i t h hauberks. A l b e r t mentions them at the crossing of the I r o n Bridge a n d comments o n them again i n the b a t t l e o n the St Symeon road i n M a r c h 1098, while i t is difficult t o see how the desperate closequarter fighting w i t h i n Antioch d u r i n g t h e second siege could have been possible i f the Moslems lacked a r m o u r . I n the battle against Kerbogah Engelrand o f St Pol was c l a d , according t o the Chanson d'Antioche, i n a splendid eastern ' h a u b e r c jaseran'. R a y m o n d o f Aguilcrs was presumably registering t h e differences between well-equipped and less well-equipped Turks w h e n he spoke o f the garrison of A n t i o c h having 'two thousand o f t h e best knights, and four or five thousand common knights'. T h e g a r r i s o n must have had o r d i n a r y infantrymen who also formed a n element i n the relief forces, and specialist troops equipped w i t h siege m a c h i n e r y . A l b e r t mentions a mangonel used against the crusaders i n the early fighting near t o the D o g Gate, while Fulcher records petrariae and fundibula. I t was, A l b e r t tells us, w i t h such a machine t h a t the garrison o f A n t i o c h tossed the heads o f two o f their more n o t a b l e victims, A d l a b e r o o f M c t z and his lady back to the c r u saders. T h e sources also speak o f A r m e n i a n archers fighting i n the g a r r i s o n at A n t i o c h . I n the fighting o n the St Symeon road the A n o n y m o u s says that the Armenians a n d Syrians, under the c o m m a n d o f the T u r k s , were made to fire arrows at the crusaders h e had earlier commented t h a t the Turks held their wives and made t h e m spy on the army. Armenians had a h i g h reputation as archers, b o t h o n foot a n d o n horseback; A l b e r t says that Baldwin attacked K e r b o g a h ' s a r m y as i t approached Edessa ' w i t h the bows of the A r m e n i a n s a n d the lances o f the Franks'. There were Armenian archers i n the service of all the Islamic armies at this time. I n Egypt t h e r u l i n g V i z i r s , Badr al-Jamali (1074-94) and his son al-Afdal Shahanshah (1094-1121), were A r m e n i a n Moslems and so numero u s was the A r m e n i a n c o m m u n i t y at Cairo, w h i c h provided nearly h a l f the regular a r m y stationed i n the capital, that they had their o w n church a n d P a t r i a r c h . T h e Islamic armies i n no way lagged b e h i n d the crusaders i n the range o f m i l i t a r y skills and capacities. 30

31

32

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(London , P Brown, The World of Late armicsíe M o w p ^ J ^ ^ ' ' > 34i ° " Egyptian 'Djaysh', Encyclopaedia of Islam 2 iofi- ihn U K - M pursuing a general idea that ZÚr ' ". PP- 95, 109, 114., 228 b u t he is S general e a that pnm.uvc men decay from the luxury of civilisation. !

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18-23.

2

o6

VICTORY

IN THE

EAST

Their military technology was clearly the equal o f t h a t o f t h e i r new enemies and their officers enjoyed a t r a d i t i o n o f t r a i n i n g a n d w r i t i n g about the theory and practice of w a r u n e q u a l l e d i n the West. I f Ibn-Khaldun is accurate Moslems h a d l o n g recognised the need for fighting i n close formation, though he acknowledges the speciality o f the Franks in this art. The novelty o f T u r k i s h m o u n t e d b o w m e n i n Latin sources should not disguise f r o m us the fact t h a t I s l a m i c armies understood the need for all arms and formations to w o r k together i n disciplined formation. 33

The Armenian strategy followed b y the crusader a r m y since i t left Heraclca created a large friendly area to the n o r t h a n d west of Antioch, acting as a shield for their siege. T h e m a r c h d o w n the Amouk and the capture of ' A r t a h p r o v i d e d a s t r o n g grasp over a rich agricultural area. The road n o w b r o u g h t t h e m to the T r o n Bridge' which the Antiochenes held i n force. This was a fortified bridge across the Orontes w i t h a t o w e r at cither end, probably built shortly after the t i m e o f J u s t i n i a n (527-65) (sec fig. 7 ) . The Anonymous mentions t h e fight a t the Iron Bridge briefly and Raymond o f Aguilers n o t a t a l l , b u t A l b e r t provides a vivid description. T h e a r m y had c o n c e n t r a t e d at the approaches to the bridge and received a sermon f r o m A d h c m a r alerting them to the dangers which they faced, so o n t h e m o r n i n g o f 20 October they approached the I r o n Bridge i n b a t t l e o r d e r Robert of Normandy and his knights going ahead as a v a n g u a r d , supported by a corps of foot-soldiers 2,000 strong. T h e g a r r i s o n o f the bridge, a hundred strong, offered fierce resistance. T h e n a n o t h e r 700 Turks from Antioch (the figure is p r o b a b l y exaggerated) arrived at the river bank to prevent the a r m y using t h e fords across the river. They were well equipped w i t h m a i l shirts, a n d a d u e l o f archery ensued in which the Turks had the upper h a n d . I n t h e end Adhemar exhorted the soldiers and they formed a t o r t o i s e (testudo), a wall of interlocked shields held over their heads a g a i n s t the enemy missiles, and by this means seized the bridge. O n c e this h a d 34

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208

VICTORY

happened, others charged across the river by the fords and drove the enemy back i n a n engagement i n w h i c h Guy, the French king's Dapifer, distinguished himself. B u t the enemy were n o t pursued for the army was determined to approach Antioch carefully and it rested o n the battlefield. I t m i g h t almost seem perverse for the crusaders to have taken this route obliging them to challenge a well-defended crossing, but its seizure meant that they commanded the r o a d from Aleppo and the extensive agricultural resources o f the Orontes valley. I t was not that the bridge was all that formidable an obstacle - Kerbogah would seize i t i n June 1098 although i t was defended. Probably the fords close by, w h i c h Albert mentions as a feature o f the battle, made i t v u l n e r a b l e . Rather, possession o f this crossing made i t impossible for any large enemy force to surprise the crusaders encamped around A n t i o c h and i t provided a bridgehead for raids out into Syria. Possession o f the valley of R u j h e l d b y the Provencals also facilitated such raids. T h e other major fortress commanding the approaches to the I r o n Bridge, H a r e m , was not attacked and was causing the crusaders grave difficulties b y November 1098. H a r e m stands on the northern spur o f the Jebel Talat, which forms the east bank of the Orontes w i t h superb views o f the I r o n Bridge and the Antioch-Aleppo r o a d . Its garrison was well placed t o harass the Franks around A n t i o c h and make communications w i t h R u j difficult (seefig.4 ) . I t fell to the Armenians only after the defeat of Ridwan's relief army i n February 1098, i m p r o v i n g control over the approaches to the I r o n Bridge; later Kerbogah captured i t . B u t the crusader army had p u t A n t i o c h i n a vice; the only possible approach for a relief army lay along the A l e p p o road across the I r o n Bridge which was thus an outwork of defence for the besiegers. O f course small parties could always attack, a n d as wc shall see they d i d . But Antioch had been largely c u t o f f b y the A r m e n i a n strategy of the crusader army and i t was further isolated by sea-power w h i c h made a vital contribution to the success o f the biTst Crusade. 35

36

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P- "7»; G . Lestrange, Palestine

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"We hear a good deal about naval activity i n support o f the crusade. Ships f r o m Genoa, Pisa, Venice, Greece and England arc all mentioned as being active d u r i n g the crusade. O f their value to the crusaders there can be no d o u b t at a l l . B y Christmas 1097 the army h a d eaten u p everything i n the immediate vicinity of Antioch a n d , despite its ability t o d r a w u p o n a friendly hinterland across w h i c h m u c h o f the army had dispersed, was forced to mount major m i l i t a r y expeditions to fend off starvation. I n these circumstances food b r o u g h t i n b y sea was probably a v i t a l element i n sustaining the army. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers speaks o f western ships plying to Cyprus and p r o t e c t i n g Greek shipping engaged i n the same task and the visionary Peter Bartholemew sought food i n Cyprus, while Bauldry mentions the sailors and merchants l i v i n g b y the coast who were killed d u r i n g t h e second siege o f A n t i o c h . R a l p h of Caen says that goods were i m p o r t e d i n t o Laodicea f r o m Cyprus and sent on to A n t i o c h . I n d e e d , Cyprus seems to have played a key role as a source o f food a n d supply for the army; w h e n the leaders discussed their strategy w i t h Alexius at Constantinople and Pclckanum, Cyprus must have been seen as a very i m p o r t a n t supply base. The crusaders a r r i v e d a t A n t i o c h about 20 October 1097; b y the end of the m o n t h A d h e m a r , the Papal Legate, was sending a letter back to the W e s t i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h Symeon, Patriarch of Jerusalem, who is k n o w n to have been a refugee i n Cyprus at this time, during which he sent lavish presents t o the crusaders at A n t i o c h . When Alexius p r o m i s e d to send supplies t o the crusaders he was presumably t h i n k i n g of C y p r u s , the convenience of w h i c h , for the projected siege o f A n t i o c h , w o u l d have been k n o w n not only to the emperor but to a l l concerned. M o s t trading ships m a k i n g for the Levant would have used C y p r u s as a p o r t of call and i t was certainly known to pilgrims. O r d e r i c u s tells us t h a t A b b o t T h i e r r y of St E v r o u l (1050-7) rested at St Symeon, t h e p o r t of A n t i o c h , before taking ship for Cyprus where he d i e d . R a l p h o f Caen says that d u r i n g the siege of Antioch, R o b e r t o f N o r m a n d y resided at Laodicea b u t sent food, brought f r o m C y p r u s , to the m a i n camp at A n t i o c h . As the army o f R a y m o n d o f Toulouse, R o b e r t of N o r m a n d y and Tancred marched south, i t was the prospect of contact w i t h Cyprus which was one ot 40

41

4 2

43

4 4

under the Moslems

dominated by the huge citadel from which > y°" ™dcrn

d e r n J i s r

209

Second enemy

I N T H E EAST

d

« 4 1

4

2

4

4

BD, 18; O V , 5. 31 (using BD), 2 7 1 ; R A , p. 134-5¬ R A , p p . 134-5 and see above p. 138; BD, 6 5 . RG, 6 4 9 . OV, 3. 68-75.

4

3

Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe,

pp. 1 4 ' - » ;

A

A

> 4 9H

VICTORY

210

IN THE

the factors which decided them to t u r n towards the coast instead o f inland along the Damascus r o a d . I t is remarkable that chroniclers, as hostile to the Byzantines as R a l p h o f Caen a n d R a y m o n d of Aguilers, mention Cyprus as a source o f food for the a r m y . T h i s underlines the importance of the Byzantine alliance, a n d i t was probably the Cyprus connection that made the other leaders reluctant to support Bohemond's b i d for A n t i o c h at the conference o f November 1098. The food and supplies they h a d received made i t difficult to argue that Alexius h a d never supported t h e m , a n d there was the prospect of more yet t o come. This logistical a n d naval support was essential for the crusaders - i t is h a r d l y possible to believe that without such Byzantine help they c o u l d have survived the siege of A n t i o c h . 45

46

Sea power was important to the crusaders' c o m m u n i c a t i o n s . According to a manuscript of B a u l d r y o f D o l , a Greek l i v i n g on the coast near to Antioch was able to take ship for C o n s t a n t i n o p l e three days after the victory over Kerbogah on 28 J u n e 1098 a n d b r i n g news of it to Alexius i n eleven days. A t almost exactly the same t i m e Hugh of Vermandois was sent to Constantinople o v e r l a n d , b u t d i d not arrive until 25 J u l y . The relative speed o f sea travel explains why the crusaders could write letters home. T h e risks o f t h e slow overland journey to Constantinople were revealed w h e n H u g h o f Vermandois and Baldwin o f H a i n a u l t were ambushed o n t h e i r diplomatic mission to Constantinople and the l a t t e r k i l l e d , a n d b y Albert's story of the Danish reinforcements who were k i l l e d near Philomelium during the siege of A n t i o c h . A d h e m a r o f Le Jruy was in contact with Symeon Patriarch of Jerusalem i n exile o n C y p r u s within a fortnight of the arrival o f the a r m y before A n t i o c h . H e was probably i n Cyprus again early i n 1098; for he almost c e r t a i n l y inspired Symeon's letter to the West o f late J a n u a r y 1098 a n d i t is likely that he was not present for the Lake Battle o n 9 F e b r u a r y . W e are told that arrangements for the battle were finalised ' i n t h e house of the bishop' which implies his absence. T h e bishops o f O r a n g e a n d 47

4 8

Grenoble were b r o u g h t to the East on a Genoese fleet. A c c o r d i n g to R a l p h o f Caen, w h e n the crusaders at 'Akkar thought an enemy was threatening, they dispatched A r n u l f of Choques to A n t i o c h on a little boat w h i c h travelled v i a the ports o f Maraclea, V a l a n i a , Jabala and Laodicea to A n t i o c h , while Stephen of Blois fled by sea, probably to A t t a l i a , before s t r i k i n g i n l a n d to meet Alexius at Philomelium. One manuscript o f the w o r k o f Bauldry o f D o l reports t h a t two clientes o f B o h e m o n d , w h o were present at Philomelium were determined t o give their l o r d a Christian b u r i a l and so went to St Symeon b y ship f r o m C y p r u s and there found 500 reinforcements newly a r r i v e d , presumably b y boat. Reinforcements were brought by sea - A l b e r t o f A i x mentions 1,500 a r r i v i n g at St Symeon i n August 1098 f r o m Ratisbon, o n l y to die of plague. Bruno of Lucca boarded an E n g l i s h ship i n late 1097 and was at Antioch by early M a r c h 1098. Sea travel i n w i n t e r was very hazardous and this j o u r n e y demonstrates t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the sailors. H e returned by the a u t u m n o f 1098 w h e n his p r o u d fellow-citizens wrote to i n f o r m the w o r l d o f all t h a t h a d happened. His journey shows j u s t how far the crusaders could r e m a i n i n touch w i t h the distant West. T h e i r envoys to the E g y p t i a n Caliphate were told to go b y sea and the E g y p t i a n envoys, w h o came to A n t i o c h i n February 1098, certainly also travelled by boat. After the defeat of Kerbogah's army, Bohemond sent the defeated prince's tent to Bari as a trophy of v i c t o r y . T h e naval power o f the Greeks and the West w h i c h was concentrated i n the L e v a n t was absolutely essential to the success o f the crusade, for a l t h o u g h the reinforcements they brought were probably few their skills were o f very great importance to the l a n d army. 49

50

51

52

On 15 J u l y 1097 a Genoese fleet of thirteen ships, twelve galleys and one h y b r i d oared ship, a sandanum, filled w i t h armed men and equipment left for the East. I t p u t into St Symeon, the port o f A n t i o c h , o n 17 N o v e m b e r 1097. A few days later, on 23 November, 4 9

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RC, 649; RA, p. t o . 5

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1 4 1 - 2 , 146-9; R A , p. 56; Carfare-49.

RC, 6 8 1 ; A A , 417; Hagcnmeyer, Chronologic, 3 8 7 , p. 237; BD, 73, n. 17; such large figures need to be treated w i t h caution for ships were quite small carrying of the order o f eighty passengers, fifteen crew and forty horses in the twelfth century. Later vessels could carry up to 1,000: S. M . Foster, Some Aspects of Maritime

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Activity and the Use of Sea-power in

Relation to the Crusading States, D . Phil, thesis, University of Oxford, 1978, pp. 109-20; A A , 446.

G

Hagcnmcycr, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 165 -7. ^ HBS, 1 8 1 , 2 0 6 ; A A , 3 8 3 ; GF, pp. 3 7 - 8 , 42 speaks of the Egyptian envoys being at

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PP- t8o, 304, 305.

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coast.

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212

VICTORY

the leaders resolved to b u i l d a fortress o n the m o u n t a i n called M a l r e g a r d . O n 4 M a r c h 1098 an English fleet p u t i n t o St Symeon, bearing B r u n o o f Lucca, and the very next day the leaders decided to build the fort outside the Bridge Gate w h i c h w o u l d be k n o w n as the Mahommeries Tower. * O n 17 J u n e 1099, as the crusaders were besieging Jerusalem, a fleet of six ships p u t into Jaffa, amongst them two Genoese vessels. Immediately the leaders dispatched a strong armed escort to b r i n g the supplies to Jerusalem, a n d w h e n an Egyptian fleet threatened, the sailors b u r n e d their boats and went to Jerusalem where W i l l i a m Ricau served as the engineer w h o b u i l t the siege tower and other machines o f the count of T o u l o u s e . O n this last occasion our sources stress the shortage of wood i n the area. A n early assault o n the city had failed because only a single assault ladder could be built. I t would seem that the fabric o f the dismantled ships, the lumber they were carrying and above all the skills of the sailors must have been absolutely vital for the b u i l d i n g of machines. A l b e r t also reports that, because there was a lack of wood d u r i n g the siege of Antioch an effort was made to b u i l d a fort b y the St George Gate w i t h stone and e a r t h . This remarkable sequence demonstrates the close connection between supplies c o m i n g by sea and siege activity. Sailors were used to spars, masts, lashings and all the^ paraphernalia which was needed to b u i l d siege equipment their coming meant not just raw material b u t m u c h needed skills. I t is w o r t h remarking that at Nicaea H e n r y o f Esch h a d b u i l t a machine w h i c h h a d collapsed i n use, probably because o f his lack of k n o w - h o w . Fleets, therefore, provided a vital element o f support for the crusader a r m y and i t is difficult to see how they could have succeeded w i t h o u t such naval support. T h e connection w i t h Cyprus was probably essential during the long siege of A n t i o c h , and this was kept open b y a continuous Greek and western naval presence. T h e y were fortunate that the Turks had no fleet, though corsairs and the like could easily have cut their communications w i t h Cyprus i f there had been n o naval forces to protect them. Once they attacked the F a d m i d lands the Egyptian fleet made itself felt, w h i c h underlines 53

5

55

56

57

5 3

the importance o f the crusader negotiations i n neutralising i t . Sea power was a v i t a l element i n the success of the crusade, b u t u n f o r t u nately i t is very p o o r l y chronicled and the particulars o f its exercise are h i d d e n f r o m us. W e know t h a t a Genoese fleet of t h i r t e e n ships came i n t o L e v a n t i n e waters i n November 1097, b u t we d o not k n o w h o w l o n g i t stayed or whether the two ships w h i c h appeared at Jaffa d u r i n g the siege o f Jerusalem were part of i t or had come later. Pisan a n d V e n e t i a n ships are mentioned only i n passing and w e are given some h i g h l y confusing i n f o r m a t i o n about the E n g l i s h . W e are very p o o r l y informed o n the question o f ports. 5 8

59

D u r i n g the siege o f A n t i o c h three major channels o f supply are m e n t i o n e d : the ports o f C i l i c i a , M a m i s t r a (Misis), A l c x a n d r e t t a (iskenderun) a n d Tarsus, Laodicea (Latakia) o n the Syrian coast, a n d S t Symeon w h i c h was the p o r t o f A n t i o c h some twenty-seven kilometres away a t the m o u t h o f the Orontes (see figs 2, 4 and 7). St S y m e o n port was b y far the most convenient o f these, for i t was very close t o A n t i o c h , b u t the road passed i n front of the Bridge Gate and so the T u r k s c o u l d easily attack people travelling d o w n to the sea. CafTaro of Genoa has a v i v i d description of the fighting o n the road t o A n t i o c h i n N o v e m b e r 1097, w h e n a Genoese fleet of thirteen ships p u t i n t o St S y m e o n . A l c x a n d r e t t a was more than sixty kilometres a w a y , a n d to reach i t involved a m a r c h over the A m m a n u s range v i a a r o a d w h i c h R a l p h o f Caen described as very difficult; i t also lead f r o m t h e Bridge Gate so the early stages o f any j o u r n e y w o u l d be d i f f i c u l t . Laodicea was over eighty kilometres distant, a n d was n o t m a t e r i a l l y nearer t o Cyprus t h a n St Symeon. W e k n o w t h a t the cities o f Cilicia were captured by the forces of Baldwin a n d Tancred, b u t the question o f h o w and w h e n St Symeon and Laodicea fell t o t h e crusaders is m u c h more difficult. There is no m e n t i o n o f t h e m b e i n g c a p t u r e d b y any element o f the army. Raymond of Aguilers 60

61

5

8

5

9

6

0

CafTaro, 4 9 - 5 0 ; RA, 49; GF, p. 30.

"* Hagcnrncyer, Krmzzugshmfe, pp. , 6 5 - 7 ; RA, p. 59; GF, pp. 39-40 mentions the decision but not the fleet; A A , 383 refers to ships without specifically mentioning any new arrival. CafTaro, 56-7; RA, pp. 141, ,47; GF, p. 88. 5 5

«

213

Second enemy

I N T H E EAST

467, 377; RC, 6 8 8 - 9 ; R A , p. , 3 9 ; GF, p. 88.

Rogers, Stege War/art, p. 6 , suggests that the coming of the ships transformed the crusaders engineering capacity; see above p. 163. I 2

6 1

O n C y p r u s sec P. Edbury, The Kingdom

of Cyprus and the Crusades 1191-1374

(Cambridge,

t g g i ) , p p . 1-5. O n the strength of Egyptian naval power on the Palestinian littoral see below p . 327, n . 7. Sec above p. 9 8 and below p. 336; Foster, Maritime activity, p. 56, points o u t that the only firm figures we have o f Western naval strength are thirteen Genoese ships which put into St Symeon i n October 1097, the thirty English ships mentioned by R A and six ships which entered Jaffa o f which two were Genoese: see above p. 98, below pp. 214, 336. CafTaro, 50; this reads very like other descriptions o f the fighting on 6 March 1098, b u t only Bohemond is mentioned as escorting the sailors. CafTaro mentions some of the Genoese knights as fighting on horseback, which could mean that they had transported horses from the west - but not necessarily.

RC.639-

2i4

VICTORY

Second enemy

I N T H E EAST

tells us that when the army left ' A k k a r i n M a y 1099 they were joined by a number of English sailors who burned their nine or ten vessels, all that remained of the thirty w i t h w h i c h they had come originally. According to Raymond they had responded to the appeal for the crusade a n d 'captured' the ports of Laodicea and St Symeon even before the crusader army arrived at A n t i o c h . His w o r d obtinuerunt has recently been translated simply as 'arrived at', for w h i c h there is w a r r a n t t h o u g h the sense of acquisition w o u l d be more frequent and more n a t u r a l . However, we can be quite sure that Laodicea was captured b y the time that the crusaders arrived at A n t i o c h because K e m a l a d - D i n tell us that twenty-two ships came from Cyprus on 19 August 1097 and seized i t , though he does not say t o w h o m these ships belonged. I n a letter w r i t t e n early i n the siege, A n s e l m of R i b e m o n t says i t was captured at the same time as Tarsus, which tends to confirm Kemal ad-Din and R a y m o n d o f Aguilers t h a t i t had fallen before the army arrived at A n t i o c h . The Florinensis Brevis Narratio Belli Sacri suggests that Laodicea fell after N i c a e a . T h e sources are less precise on St Symeon, but they all seem to assume that i t was i n crusader hands from the moment o f their a r r i v a l at A n t i o c h w i t h o u t ever mentioning its capture. Moreover, w i t h i n a fortnight o f the start of the siege on 20 October 1097 A d h e m a r was i n Cyprus w i t h Patriarch Symeon of Jerusalem, and w i t h i n a m o n t h a Genoese fleet could put into this h a r b o u r . There seems, therefore, good reason to believe that both St Symeon and Laodicea were captured f r o m the sea before the crusaders reached A n t i o c h , a n d every reason to accept Raymond of Aguilers's statement t h a t this was the w o r k o f an English fleet originally some t h i r t y ships strong. This was clearly quite different from the English fleet w h i c h b r o u g h t Bruno of Lucca to the East seven months later i n M a r c h 1 0 9 8 . T h e existence, therefore, of an English fleet which arrived i n t h e east before the crusade and continued through to the b i t t e r e n d is established, though how i t related to the English who brought B r u n o of Lucca is unknown - and what d i d they do i n the meantime? Some 62

63

64

65

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light is cast o n this matter b y R a l p h o f Caen who says that d u r i n g the siege of A n t i o c h Laodicea was held by the English who were sent b y the E m p e r o r Alexius. After the N o r m a n Conquest o f England many Anglo-Saxons took service w i t h Alexius, perhaps w i t h t h e consent o f W i l l i a m , and formed a permanent element i n the Byzantine forces. A m o n g s t them was a fleet w h i c h probably helped to save Constantinople i n 1091 under Sigurd or Siward Barn. I t is entirely possible that i t was just such a force w h i c h took Laodicea. F i n d i n g themselves threatened f r o m l a n d w a r d attack, these English appealed to Robert o f N o r m a n d y as i n some senses their natural l o r d and h e came t o the c i t y where he found life so easy that i t was only m u c h later, a n d after three appeals for help, that he was persuaded t o abandon i t , for i t was w e l l supplied f r o m Cyprus. However, he d i d send generous supplies t o A n t i o c h . R a l p h gives no dates, b u t h i s suggestion t h a t R o b e r t was absent from the siege is supported by the fact t h a t the sources do not often mention any activity of his d u r i n g much o f the siege, and R a y m o n d o f Aguilers says that by December iog7 R o b e r t was absent. T h e i m p l i c a t i o n o f Ralph's statement is that the capture o f Laodicea, and perhaps St Symeon also, was t h e result o f co-operation from the emperor, presumably based on Cyprus. I t does not precisely contradict Raymond's statement that the English had come f r o m t h e i r o w n lands for we know o f another English fleet which came i n M a r c h 1098 and R a y m o n d may have muddled the two. I t w o u l d be remarkable i f the departure of an English fleet t o the East had n o t attracted some attention f r o m native chroniclers, and O r d e r i c u s V i t a l i s records t h a t d u r i n g the second siege o f A n t i o c h (June 1098) Edgar Aetheling led a fleet with 20,000 m e n from E n g l a n d a n d the other islands and seized Laodicea, which h e afterwards gave to R o b e r t Curthose who left a garrison there d u r i n g his m a r c h to Jerusalem. However, the Greek protospatharius Ravendinos drove o u t the F r a n k s . N o w much o f this story was clearly confused. L a o d i c e a was conquered long before the second siege o f A n t i o c h . I n late 1097 Edgar the Aetheling was engaged i n imposing his nephew o n the Scottish throne so i t is unlikely that he joined the crusade. M o r e o v e r his actual pilgrimage t o Jerusalem is very 66

67

t0

3

O n Laodicea seeDavid, Robert Curthose, pp. 2 3 0 - 4 4 ; Aleppo Brevis Narratio Belli Sacri, RHC Oc. 5. 371.

See above pp. 9 8 - 9 .

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Florinensis 6 1

R C , 6 4 g ; R A , p . 50; A A , 3 8 0 - 2 lists him as being at the Lake Battle in February 1098, but Albert's lists ofnames are often erratic. Tudcbodc, p. 4 3 , says he was told to defend the camp; Shepherd, ' T h e English in Byzantium', 5 2 - 9 3 . O V , 5. 2 7 1 .

2l6

VICTORY

IN THE

precisely dated to 1102 by W i l l i a m o f M a l m e s b u r y . I n a n y case, it is hard to believe that i f Edgar had come t o t h e East the fact w o u l d have escaped the attention of crusading c h r o n i c l e r s , s i m p l y because he was of royal blood. Ordericus's evidence strengthens t h e suggestion that Robert of Normandy held L a o d i c e a a t some t i m e , as does Guibert's remark that the citizens o f L a o d i c e a r e v o l t e d against Robert and abjured the use of the money o f R o u e n . B u t Ordericus does add something more - that after R o b e r t L a o d i c e a passed to the Greeks. Ordericus's story was told i n order t o e x p l a i n Bohemond's siege of the port which was definitely held b y t h e Greeks i n September 1099 at the time when the m a i n a r m y was r e t u r n i n g f r o m Jerusalem. Caffaro of Genoa, who had b e e n i n S y r i a e a r l y i n the twelfth century, records that at the time o f the f i n a l c a p t u r e o f Antioch the city was held by Eumathios Philokales, duke o f Cyprus. As Robert Curthose quite d e f i n i t e l y f o u g h t against K e r bogah in June 1098 this suggests that he r e l i n q u i s h e d the c i t y to the Greeks - who, after all, are portrayed as the masters o f the E n g l i s h either because of revolt in the city or because o f repeated calls f r o m the other leaders, as reported by R a l p h o f C a e n , to come to A n t i o c h or indeed possibly because o f both factors. I t is v e r y l i k e l y t h a t the Greeks were in control of Laodicea by the a u t u m n o f 1098 at the latest, because Raymond o f Aguilers reports t h a t at the e n d o f the siege of'Akkar after a vision, Raymond of T o u l o u s e sent A d h e m a r ' s brother to recover the dead bishop's cross a n d m a n t l e w h i c h h a d been left at Laodicea. Raymond would s u r e l y o n l y have left such valuable things at Laodicea i n the care of f r i e n d s - a n d after the f a l l of Antioch he was in close alliance w i t h the B y z a n t i n e s . H o w e v e r , the story of Laodicea and the English fleet is i m m e n s e l y c o m p l i c a t e d by the very different stories told b y Albert o f A i x . 6 8

6 9

70

71

72

According to Albert, when Baldwin was a t Tarsus d u r i n g t h e Cihcian expedition he suddenly saw a fleet ' w h o s e masts o f w o n M

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drous height were covered i n the purest gold and shimmered i n the rays o f the sun'. T h e sailors were commanded by Guinemer of Boulogne, t h e i r caput et magister who had been a man de domo comitis Emtachii a close associate, therefore, o f the house o f Boulogne. They explained t h a t they were m e n of Flanders, A n t w e r p and Frisia who had been l i v i n g for eight years as pirates and had landed i n order to divide their loot, and they asked B a l d w i n and his friends what they were doing. O n hearing of the crusade they agreed to j o i n i t . Three hundred o f t h e m j o i n e d w i t h two hundred of Baldwin's men to garrison Tarsus, while the rest reappear i n the suite of Tancred as he seized fortresses i n Cilicia a n d the p o r t o f Alcxandretta. Subsequently, j u s t as he is about to tell us o f the Lake Battle i n February 1098 A l b e r t says that Guinemer, after he had left Baldwin and T a n c r e d at M a m i s t r a , took once more to the sea and captured Laodicea, b u t got no support because he contributed nothing to the army. His g u a r d was lax and the Greeks managed to take the citadel o f Laodicea and threw h i m into prison, f r o m whence he was later liberated after the victory at A n t i o c h at the special request of Godfrey of B o u i l l o n . This is all very odd and is further complicated b y a q u i t e separate story w h i c h A l b e r t tells later. A t the end of the crusade the r e t u r n i n g armies found Bohemond and Daimbert of Pisa besieging Laodicea, w h i c h , A l b e r t says, had been captured from the Saracens b y Guinemer w i t h a fleet manned by the same people as before, b u t this t i m e i n c l u d i n g Danes, and allied w i t h the men of the lands o f R a y m o n d of Toulouse. After the fall of Antioch, Guinemer handed the city over to R a y m o n d o f Toulouse; after this he was captured a n d imprisoned by the Greeks and freed at the request of Godfrey. W h e n Count R a y m o n d marched south, faithful to his oath t o Alexius, he turned the c i t y over to the Greeks. The contradictions i n these stories are evident. I n one story Guinemer seems to have been t h r o w n into gaol d u r i n g the siege of Antioch, while in the o t h e r he appears as h o l d i n g the city u n t i l the summer of 1098 when h e turned i t over to R a y m o n d , and was then put i n gaol. I n the earlier story he is clearly stated to have been freed at the request of Godfrey shortly after the v i c t o r y over Kerbogah when Yaghisiyan's w i f e was b e i n g ransomed - b u t this date was not possible in the later story. I n the second story the Danes are added to the list of people i n t h e fleet and the Provencals suddenly appear as allies, apparently as 73

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A A , 380, 4 4 7 .

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AA, 500-1.

2l8

VICTORY

IN THE

Second enemy

EAST

a result o f early contact w i t h them. Furthermore, the passage about the masts o f the fleet has a very poetic r i n g and A l b e r t is k n o w n to have used poetic source m a t e r i a l i n c l u d i n g that w h i c h underlay the Chanson d'Antiock. H o w e v e r , we need not dismiss Guinemer altogether, for such wanderers were not so very unlikely. Robert the Frisian, a younger son, was given money and a fully equipped boat by his father, B a l d w i n V o f Flanders, i n order to make his fortune and, although the stories which accrued later about h i m were fantastical, the simple core of the story indicates h o w adventurous people c o u l d travel a f a r . I t seems likely that some of the AngloSaxons w h o fled E n g l a n d after the conquest were accommodated in the distant Crimea and there was p r o b a b l y an i m p o r t a n t English presence at C o n s t a n t i n o p l e . W h e n we consider the range of western mercenaries s e r v i n g the Byzantine emperor and the Zirids o f N o r t h A f r i c a at this t i m e , we ought perhaps to see Guinemer as a real person, and i t should be noted that his story does not appear to derive f r o m the Chanson d'Antioch and that A l b e r t does break into lyrical passages f r o m t i m e t o time, as i n his description of Godfrey's army rushing to the relief o f Bohemond at D o r y l a e u m . A l b e r t was not generally interested i n fleets at all - his sources were apparently men o f the army, generally incurious about maritime matters. I t is remarkable that, although he gives us a very detailed account of the capture of Jerusalem, he never mentions the arrival o f ships i n Jaffa whose importance we h a v e noted; i t was the Provencals w h o provided their escort from the coast and the men o f Godfrey were not i n v o l v e d . T h e great exception to his disinterest, and p r o b a b l y that of his informants, was G u i n e m e r and the reason for that is obvious he was a close connection of the house o f Boulogne. Guinemer probably d i d help in C i l i c i a as indicated, b u t A l b e r t attributes the capture o f Laodicea, b y a northern fleet, to h i m . A l b e r t was then faced w i t h different accounts of his activities, probably given to h i m 76

77

78

79

80

7 6

David, Robert Curlhose, pp. 2 3 7 - 8 handles Albert's account very roughly and makes some of" these points. if7 . ° PP. 121-5 is the chief source for the stories which are analysed by U Vcrl.nden, 'Le chroniqueur Lambert de Hersfeld et les voyages de Robert le Frison, b e

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a t different times, w h i c h he could not reconcile. T h e essential difference between the t w o stories as they concern Laodicea is the i n f l u e n c e o f the count of Toulouse i n the later version and the d i f f e r e n t d a t i n g w h i c h , b y i m p l i c a t i o n , this imposed. Guinemer, a f t e r h e l p i n g i n Cilicia, was captured by the Greeks, perhaps held at L a o d i c e a , a n d released at the request of Godfrey. Laodicea was c a p t u r e d o n 19 August 1097 by an English fleet either acting on A l c x i u s ' s orders or i n conjunction w i t h Byzantine forces i n Cyprus, w h i c h then based itself i n the city to w h i c h i t i n v i t e d R o b e r t o f N o r m a n d y . His departure, almost certainly at the t i m e o f K e r b o gah's m a r c h to A n t i o c h , saw the city fall to the p o w e r of the By2;antine Governor o f Cyprus, who may well have co-operated w i t h R a y m o n d of Toulouse before the latter's departure south. After t h e siege o f 'Akkär the English sailors abandoned t h e i r n o w useless ships and j o i n e d R a y m o n d w h o , after the crusade, took possession o f t h e citadel o f Laodicea w i t h 500 men i n the name of the e m p e r o r . A t some t i m e after the m a i n a r m y had gone home, Alexius ordered R a y m o n d t o h a n d over Laodicea to Andronicus T z i n t z i l o u k e s . T h e m a t t e r o f Laodicea is i m p o r t a n t , for i t shows us the degree o f c o - o p e r a t i o n between B y z a n t i u m and the crusaders. T h e early a r r i v a l o f t h e English fleet i n Byzantine service i n August 1097 p r e p a r e d the way for the crusader army, for w h o m its activities p r o t e c t i n g t h e route to Cyprus were very i m p o r t a n t . O f the other E n g l i s h fleet w h i c h arrived i n M a r c h 1098 we hear n o more, b u t i t is possible t h a t elements of i t j o i n e d the English already i n the East a n d based at Laodicea. T h e Genoese fleet which a r r i v e d i n N o v e m b e r 1097 also seems to have left ships behind, or perhaps was f o l l o w e d b y others, and they too plied to the islands as w e k n o w f r o m R a y m o n d o f Aguilers. B a u l d r y o f D o l mentions V e n e t i a n ships, as does R a y m o n d o f Aguilers, and also Pisans - which p r o b a b l y refers to D a i m b e r t ' s fleet. O f the Venetians' activities we k n o w n o t h i n g , b u t t h e n there seems to have been quite a settlement o f sailors and 81

82

83

« 82

1

Comte de Flandres', Annates de la SocUli d'Emulation

'

8

7 9

3

War, Technology and Society in the Middle

dAnlmhe 8 0

de Bruges 76 ( 1 0 3 s ) , 8 3 - 0 4 .

See above p. 101. M . Brett, 'The military interest o f the battle ofHaydaran', in V . J . Parry and M . E. Yapp, cds.

East

(London, 1975), pp. 6 0 - 7 7 ; Chanson

1. 143-70 and see also S. Duparc-Qtiioc's ' L a composition de la Chanson

d Antioche', Romania, 83 ( 1 9 6 2 ) , 11-12; AA, 331. RA, pp. 1 4 0 - 2 .

219

8 3

A A , 5 0 3 -4. Attxiad, pp. 3 5 3 - 4 ; David, Robert Curlhose, p. 238 rightly criticises P. Riant, 'Invcntaire c r i t i q u e des lettrcs historiques des croisades', Archives de I'Orient Latin, 1 (Paris, 1881), 1B9 -91 and Chalandon, Alexis I Comninc, pp. 212 -17 for assigning this letter to the first half o f 1099. I n fact Anna's account of the later stages of the First Crusade is a mess - she confuses their victory at Ascalon on 12 August 1099 with the near disaster of Baldwin I at second Ramla on 17 May 1102; the letter makes much more sense i f read as part o f the Provencal-Greek alliance as i t developed after the crusade. B D , 18; RA, pp. 134-35- Ordericus's references to fleets arc based on those o f Bauldry 5. 3 1 - B D , 18, 5 . 9 9 - B D , 6 5 , 5 . 161 - BD, 9 8 , except for the story ofEdgar Aethcling p. 2 7 1 .

Second enemy 220

VICTORY I N T H E EAST

Turkish attacks from Harem

traders at port St Symeon, a n d small contingents like that of Guincmer must have arrived from time to time to play a r o l e . This great maritime endeavour, led and supported by the Byzantines, was one o f the key factors which enabled the crusader army to survive the bitter nine-month siege o f A n t i o c h and to t r i u m p h over their enemies. 84

The arrival of the army before A n t i o c h o n 21 October triggered a debate o n strategy. T h e suggestion was made i n the council of leaders o n 21 October that the army should mount a distant blockade of A n t i o c h . Those who favoured the idea pointed o u t that the army was tired - they had after all been marching for some four months - and much o f i t was dispersed amongst captured strongpoints. Better to sit out the winter i n comfort, they urged, and wait for the a r r i v a l of reinforcements from the emperor and the West. I t was an intelligent idea and evidently was supported, and perhaps even conceived of, by Tatikios who may well have k n o w n that this was the method b y which the Byzantines had recaptured A n t i o c h in 969 when Baghras was an important base (see fig. 7 ) . Tatikios revived t h e idea when the army was starving i n J a n u a r y and February 1098. T h e count o f Toulouse, however, urged his comrades to trust in God and pressed successfully for a n immediate and close siege, and this was the course o f action t a k e n . T h e great virtue of the close siege was that i t kept the army together under the control o f its leaders; a distant blockade could have h a d a very adverse effect on the sense of purpose o f the Christian army. However, many crusaders were on garrison duties away from Antioch and Raymond of Aguilers says that knights were a l l too eager for such w o r k . These captured fortresses and cities were the fruits o f the Armenian strategy which the crusaders h a d followed, and despite Raymond's fulminations i t now served them w e l l . As already noted, the Armenian population sent aid and t h e i r merchants sold food, albeit at a high price, but the availability o f these lands as a source o f food was very valuable. T h e presence o f many knights i n fortresses facilitated this and reduced the food p r o b l e m to 8 5

86

87

Fig. 8 9 4

8 5

8 6

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A A , 414; BD, 8 0 . As Rogers, Siege Warfare, p. 83 points out; on the siege o f 969 see Bouchier, Antioch, pp. a i 6 - i g . RA, pp. 4 6 - 7 , 54; the matter is discussed by France, 'The departure of Tatikios from the Crusader army', 138. RA, p. 4 8 .

Siege of Antioch, October 1097 - February 1098

221

222

VICTORY IN THE

Second enemy

EAST

a degree. I n effect, the crusaders imposed a close siege u p o n A n t i o c h and enjoyed some of the benefits o f a distant blockade a n d their situation was later improved when B a l d w i n o f Boulogne took over Edessa. The reason for this debate was quite simply the scale o f the problem which they now faced. A n t i o c h was no longer the magni­ ficent city of late Roman times, when its p o p u l a t i o n h a d reached 300,000 and i t rejoiced i n its position as capital of the East. Its prosperity was ruined by a series o f disasters - the fire o f 525, the earthquakes of 526, 528 and 588, the Persian sack o f 540, the plague of 542 and the Arab capture of 638. However, t h o u g h the i n h a b i t e d city was much reduced, i t still sheltered w i t h i n the walls o f Justi­ nian's rebuilding completed by 560 a n d as modified by earthquake, war and the ravages of t i m e . The crusaders were m u c h struck by the splendour and strength of the place, as was I b n B u t l a n i n 1051 when he described its walls as having 360 towers: archaeological investigation has found evidence of over sixty (we are not sure o f the original total). Antioch was b u i l t o n the eastern b a n k o f the Orontes river, though its walls touched the stream o n l y at the Bridge Gate (see figs. 7 and 8). The fortified area was about three k i l o ­ metres long and two kilometres deep extending u p the eastern w a l l of the Orontes valley formed by the n o r t h e r n extension o f the J c b e l al-Ansariye. The mass of M o u n t Silpius included i n the enceinte rises to a height of 512 metres and about 700 metres n o r t h o f its highest point stood the citadel, rebuilt after the Byzantine reconquest of 969 and dominating the whole enclosure. T h e w a l l then dropped into the deep gully o f the Parmenian torrent w h e r e the Iron Gate restrained this dangerous stream before c l i m b i n g o n t o the southern flank of Mount Staurin and then descending sharply t o the plain by the Orontes at the northern edge of the c i t y . T h e c r u 88

89

223

saders approached the c i t y f r o m the n o r t h , and here i n the valley b o t t o m the wall was pierced b y three gates which the crusaders c a l l e d the St Paul Gate at the very foot o f the mountain, the Dog G a t e further along and then the Gate o f the Duke nearer the river. T h i s n o r t h e r n w a l l of the c i t y was a double wall, for Albert of A i x m e n t i o n s a n outer w a l l i n connection w i t h operations outside thc D o g G a t e and tells us t h a t T a n c r e d lurked i n the space between the m a i n w a l l and the b a r b i c a n before launching a surprise attack on t h e besiegers d u r i n g the second siege. Beyond the Dog Gate the w a l l angled towards the r i v e r bank, though i t is not clear that the o u t e r w a l l continued at this point, w h i c h i t met at the Bridge Gate g i v i n g access to the p l a i n o n the west bank of the Orontes and the roads t o St Symeon Port, A l e x a n d r c t t a and Marasch. After that the w a l l followed the river fairly closely then turned away from i t to the St George Gate, f r o m w h i c h a road ran to the ancient suburb of D a p h n e a n d beyond d o w n to Laodicea and inland to Syria via the J i s r ash-Shogur. T h e w a l l t h e n followed the line of a gorge, the Wadi Z o i b a , rising up onto M o u n t Silpius. T h e inhabited part of the city nestled d o w n on thc lower slopes of Mounts Staurin and Silpius and the n a r r o w strip o f p l a i n b y the Orontes. I n ancient times thc city's d o m i n a t i n g feature h a d been thc great colonnaded Street of Herod a n d T i b e r i a s , r u n n i n g f r o m n o r t h to south. I t must have existed in some f o r m i n crusader times, for its line has now survived i n the m o d e r n Kurtuluş Caddessi. B u t there was a huge and barely i n h a b i t e d area w i t h i n the c i r c u i t of some twelve kilometres, amply s t u d d e d w i t h towers. I n Byzantine times the city was held by a g a r r i s o n o f 4,000, such was the passive strength o f the defences and t h e i r inaccessibility. Yaghisiyan seems to have had forces of about t h e same size. R a y m o n d o f Aguilcrs, as we have noted, suggests a 91

9 0

substantial remains, most notably o f thc citadel, as modified by the crusaders. On the southern side these extend down into thc edge of thc town by thc Hastahanc, the city hospital, where the remains of thc aqueduct remain a notable feature. The west bank of thc Orontes forms the new city and here all evidence of thc past has been buried under a carpet ofconcretc flats and shops. Thc various water courses have all been culverted and therefore we are reliant on the observations of thc pre-war and earlier scholars, though the Parmenian torrent remains evident above the city. I n 1972 the ancient bridge over the Orontes was demolished and replaced. A t present thc citadel and the walls high on Mount Silpius are approached by what I have called the 'back road' which goes via Altınözü to the Syrian plain through the mountains. I t may give readers some sense of the scale of the ancient enceinte to know that from thc Bridge Gate to thc wall above the city on this road is a d r i v e of fourteen kilometres.

G. Downey, A History of Antioch in Syria (Princeton, 1961) pp. 5 2 8 - 9 , 5 4 5 - 5 5 2 . 8

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garrison of 2,000 first-rate knights,4,000-5,000 o t h e r mounted men and more than 10,000 foot. Stephen o f Blois gives a total n u m b e r of 5,000 enemy troops i n the city w h i c h was p r o b a b l y m u c h nearer the mark for the evidence o f events suggests that the garrison was no more than adequate for its task. A t the end o f December 1097 crusaders sent a major foraging expedition out i n t o Syria at a time when Duqaq of Damascus was approaching w i t h a relief a r m y ; on 9 February 1098 the crusaders fought against another relief force under Ridwan of Aleppo. O n both occasions Yaghisiyan's garrison mounted major sorties i n support of the expected relief b u t a l t h o u g h these punished the crusaders they were n o t strong enough to inflict a major defeat upon them nor to b u r n the Bridge o f Boats w h i c h enabled the crusaders to cross the Orontes and t h r e a t e n the Bridge Gate or travel to St Symeon. W h e n the crusaders threatened to build a counterfort outside the Bridge Gate, Y a g h i s i y a n made a desperate effort to prevent i t by ambushing the supply c o l u m n coming up from the coast, but despite i n i t i a l success he was unable to prevent the construction.

m o d e r n A l t i n o z i i i n t o the upper Orontes valley near the Roman bridges at Jisr ash-Shugur w h i c h give access to the Syrian plain. T h e r e was certainly at least a p a t h here, for its use was vital i n the final crusader assault o n the city and i t probably led to the Roman road f r o m A n t i o c h v i a D e l p h i to the Jisr ash-Shugur (see figs. 4 and 7) . I t was p r e s u m a b l y used by b o t h sides for raiding. But the d o m i n a t i n g factor w h i c h shaped the actions o f the army, once they h a d decided o n a close siege, was the need to avoid dispersal of effort. This explains the v e r y slow and very systematic extension of the siege, so t h a t as late as M a r c h 1098 Bruno of Lucca could tell his fellow citizens that the a r m y 'had surrounded the city i n siege, t h o u g h not very w e l l ' . T h e crusader army had approached from the n o r t h and i t was f r o m here that they systematically extended their grasp over A n t i o c h . I t was not perhaps the ideal position but they were well placed t o fend off enemy attack coming down the Orontes valley onto t h e i r rear and to have attempted to establish major forces o n the west b a n k o f the Orontes opposite the Bridge Gate immediately w o u l d have strained the army's resources (see fig.

Once they had resolved upon a close siege the crusader leaders were forced into a cautious strategy. Because A n t i o c h was so large the risk to the attacker was dispersal o f his strength. T h e r e c o u l d be no question of surrounding this huge area; the crusader a r m y was not big enough and any effort to invest a considerable section or sections would open the way for the enemy to sally o u t a n d defeat the crusaders i n detail. N o r was there much chance o f a sudden assault being successful. I n the flatter areas the defences were formidable and the enemy could move their forces a b o u t q u i c k l y . I n the mountains i t would be very difficult to move large bodies o f troops across the jumble of rocks, ravines and harsh slopes a n d to sustain them while they tackled the walls w h i c h rise to twelve metres and are sited to take advantage o f the very rough t e r r a i n . O f course this cut both ways - the enemy could not seriously assault t h e m f r o m this direction, but with their knowledge o f the pathways o f the area the l u r k s could and did mount raids w h i c h sapped crusader strength. There is a back road to the h i g h eastern defences o f t h e city; today i t leaves the Aleppo road some two kilometres n o r t h o f what was the St Paul Gate and winds around the c i t y passing v i a t h e

8) . T h e sheer size o f A n t i o c h enjoined upon the crusaders a cautious strategy of b u i l d i n g u p the blockade; Kerbogah's failure to appreciate this problem was l a t e r a major factor i n his defeat. I n the first phase o f the siege, w h i c h w o u l d last u n t i l Christmas 1097, the crusader a r m y steadily extended its g r i p on the city, though at a great cost in lives. A l b e r t of A i x ' s a c c o u n t of the order of battle of the besieging army is l a r g e l y supported b y t h a t o f R a l p h o f Caen. Neither the Anonymous n o r R a y m o n d o f Aguilers gives an order of siege such as that w h i c h they p r o v i d e for N i c a e a . A l b e r t says that Adhcmar of Le P u y c o m m a n d e d the a r m y for the approach to Antioch but does not make clear t h a t B o h e m o n d h a d already gone before and arrived at A n t i o c h on 20 O c t o b e r . H e gives a poetic description of the army i n a l l its glory a n d n u m b e r s - 300,000 - as i t took lunch on 21 O c t o b e r 1097 close t o the c i t y at a place called Altaian. He then records its deployment f o r the siege (see fig. 8 ) . Albert seems to have been g i v e n an order o f siege related to the point at which the army came u p to the c i t y o n its n o r t h w a l l by the St Paul Gate. He says t h a t a group o f lesser figures, Tancred together with Roger of

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226

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Barneville and A d a m F i t z M i c h a e l established themselves close to 'Altalori and kept the Turks blockaded there w h i c h suggests t h a t this group was close to Bohcmond who took 'the gate towards Persia, at the point where the mountain meets the p l a i n ' - a good description of the location of the St Paul Gate, the natural p o i n t of entry for any force coming down the valley o f the Orontes. R a l p h confirms that Tancred was close to Bohemond b u t suggests that he was encamped with the next contingent along, the N o r t h French. A l b e r t says that Tatikios, whom Ralph never mentions, took u p station somewhat back from the city wall, b u t f o r w a r d o f h i m were B a l d w i n of Hainault, Robert o f N o r m a n d y a n d R o b e r t o f Flanders. Beyond these were the forces of Stephen of Blois and H u g h o f Vermandois. This is confirmed by Ralph, w i t h the exception o f the names o f lesser leaders. Somewhat later, after a b r i e f description o f the c i t y , A l b e r t makes i t clear that Adhcmar a n d R a y m o n d o f Toulouse were attacking the Dog Gate, a n d that beyond t h e m was the gate besieged by Godfrey opposite w h i c h a pontoon bridge was later constructed across the Orontes. Ralph's more schematic d e s c r i p t i o n also appears to confirm this. This left the army w i t h major problems which are rather well summarised b y R a l p h o f C a e n . S t S y m c o n was their obvious port o f supply, b u t v i a the Bridge Gate the garrison was i n a position to cut the r o a d and to raise havoc w i t h small groups or individuals foraging i n the plain t o the west a n d south of the city. They could also attack traffic going to L a o d i c e a and, to a lesser extent, Cilicia. T h e i r access made i t d i f f i c u l t to establish a force along the southern part o f the w a l l ; south o f the Bridge Gate the western wall was so close to the river t h a t a n attacking force could have done nothing, while the southern w a l l was built on a deep gully, the W a d i Zoiba, w h i c h made i t a l m o s t unapproachable. O n this side the St George Gate, giving access o n t o the road to Laodicea, was the only point o n the southern c i r c u i t worth attacking but as long as the enemy had free access o v e r t h e Bridge Gate this was hazardous. I n a d d i t i o n , the garrison c o u l d sally iorth from the western side o f the river and fire o n the F r a n k i s h 97

i r ^ - ? i o ' > R ^ m o n d o f Aguilers r e p o r t s , they d i d . " Control of the bridge over the Orontes i n f r o n t o f t h e Bridge Gate was therefore the vital point i n the attack o n the c i t y . A s long as that gate was open the garrison could take the i n i t i a t i v e a n d C

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c o u l d easily bring i n supplies v i a the u n g u a r d e d St George Gate w h i c h i t covered. There was, however, a l i m i t o n w h a t a garrison o f n o t m o r e than 5,000 could achieve. Yaghisiyan could only harass t h e crusaders i n the hope t h a t they w o u l d t i r e o f the siege o r that t h e y w o u l d be defeated b y the allies he was actively seeking. For the crusaders, i t was vital that they close the Bridge Gate because o f the d a m a g e the garrison could inflict u p o n t h e m . T h i s was not achieved u n t i l M a r c h o f 1098, by w h i c h time the siege was six months o l d . I n t h a t p e r i o d there were other priorities pressing u p o n the crusader army. T h e crusaders seem to have recognised t h a t there was l i t t l e chance o f t a k i n g Antioch b y assault, a n d n o t h i n g o f the sort seems ever to h a v e been suggested. Stephen o f Blois, w h o w o u l d later be chosen to c o m m a n d the crusade, remarked to his wife t h a t A n t i o c h was 'a city g r e a t beyond belief, very strong and unassailable' and this opinion was supported by R a y m o n d o f Aguilers w h i l e Fulcher suggests that t h e leaders adopted a Micawberish policy of s t i c k i n g out a siege and seeing i f something w o u l d t u r n u p . A l l these are w r i t i n g w i t h h i n d s i g h t but Fulcher was p r o b a b l y r i g h t i n a sense. A l l they could d o was to conserve their o w n forces and squeeze A n t i o c h , d i s r u p t i n g t h e n o r m a l life of the city i n the hope t h a t something w o u l d give. T h e y w e r e probably aware that the Greeks h a d seized i t i n 969 after a blockade, b y corrupting one o f the commanders, and that t r e a c h e r y had opened its gates to S u l a y m a n i n 1 0 8 6 . T h i s strategy o f b l o c k a d i n g Antioch meant t h a t there were very few siege o p e r a t i o n s such as those we have noted a t N i c a c a . E a r l y i n the siege A d h c m a r and Raymond were faced b y constant sallies f r o m the D o g G a t e . Outside i t , just below the confluence o f the Parmenian torrent a n d the stream from St Peter's f o u n t a i n , was a marshy area w i t h a s m a l l bridge (see fig. 8). T h e Provencals first t r i e d to demolish the b r i d g e w i t h hammers and other tools b u t i t was too strong. T h e n t h e y b u i l t a wooden penthouse covered w i t h osier w h i c h they p u s h e d onto the bridge; this w o u l d n o t o n l y have prevented sallies b u t w o u l d have also acted as a base for operations against the gate. T h e enemy showered the machine w i t h arrows - p r o b a b l y the real reason t h e bridge could n o t be demolished - a n d the Christians r e p l i e d w i t h bows and crossbows, b u t the defenders sallied f o r t h and 9 9

100

9

9 7

AA, 3 6 6 ^ , 6 4 , - 2 , 6 4 3 .

9

8

RA, pp. 4 8 - 9 .

227

Second enemy

EAST

9

1 0 0

Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugjbriefe,

pp. 149 5 2 K r c y , First

p. 93¬ Bouchier, Antioch, p. 318; Cahcn, Turkey,

pp. 7 6 7.

Crusade,

p. 155; R A , pp. 4 8 g; FC,

228

VICTORY

I N THE

drove off the attackers and set the penthouse on fire. T h e n three mangonels were built i n the hope of destroying the outer w a l l which defended the city at this point, but they failed. I n the end the Provencals organised masses of men (Albert says 1,000) to block the bridge w i t h huge stones and tree-trunks. A l b e r t never dates this fight but i t seems to have occurred early on, before the Bridge of Boats, which was certainly i n place by December 1098, was built. Another machine was used i n late M a r c h or A p r i l iog8. After the b u i l d i n g of a fort outside the Bridge Gate, the leaders decided to built another penthouse, a talpa w h i c h they pushed onto the bridge w i t h a view to breaking i t down, thereby preventing any further enemy sallies. Although i t got onto the bridge and began its work, the enemy caught its crew asleep and burned i t , m u c h to the i r r i t a t i o n o f the army as a w h o l e . I n neither case was the machinery used in an all-out assault - merely as a means o f tightening the screw on Antioch. 101

102

103

T h e very early part of the siege was remembered by the chroniclers as a happy time when food was plentiful and the enemy quiescent; w i t h the resources o f the Orontes valley and the Amouk at their disposal, and fairly free access out into the Syrian plain foraging was easy. But this did not last for long as enemy forces from A n t i o c h and Harem began to harass the army. T h e m a i n effort of the garrison seems to have been devoted to attacking along the west bank o f the Orontes from both the Bridge Gate and the St George Gate, near which there was a ford, c u t t i n g communications with St Symeon (see fig. 8). Their activities figure large i n the accounts of Raymond o f Aguilers and Albert, for the forces about w h i c h they are best informed were close to this area. T h e Anonymous does not mention this fighting - he was preoccupied w i t h enemy raiding down the valley of the Orontes and the mountains above Bohemond's c a m p . The crusaders identified H a r e m as the m a i n base of these raiders and sent Bohemond and Robert of Flanders to attack it (see fig. 4). Their scouts found it but were driven back to where Bohemond's main force lay i n ambush. I n the subsequent fighting, Alberadus o f Cagnano was killed and H e r m a n o f Cannae lost a horse, b u t the enemy suffered numerous casualties. H a r e m was not taken and remained such a grave threat that when materials and 104

Z" »

" ' r ' P- 5 ' • Tudebodc, pp. pp. 4 9 - 5 , ; AA, 367-73, 4 , 9 ; OF, pp. 3 9 - 3 0 .

367

pi'

RA,

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1 0 3

skilled men arrived w i t h the Genoese fleet on 17 November the leaders resolved to b u i l d a fort, w h i c h later rejoiced i n the name Udregard, on the h i l l above the camp of B o h e m o n d . I t was w e l l placed to check enemy raids coming d o w n the Orontes valley or around the back o f the city's defences. Much greater pressure was exerted u p o n the garrison of A n t i o c h by the construction of the Bridge of Boats (see fig. 8 ) . Albert of A i x is very clear about its purpose - to check enemy raids and open the road to St Symeon, and he is quite clear that i t was situated near to the Duke's Gate w h i c h the Germans besieged. I t enjoyed a limited protection because attackers had to cross the W a d i al Quivaisiya w h i c h flowed into the west side o f the Orontes a l i t t l e way to the south. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , nobody says when i t was built, b u t it was certainly i n place by the t i m e o f the foraging expedition o f December 1 0 9 7 . R a l p h mentions the new bridge but his account of the siege is schematic and the author o f the Gesta Francorum never mentions i t . Albert's d a t i n g at this point is very poor and he is ignorant of the expedition to H a r e m , the b u i l d i n g of Bohemond's tower and the a r r i v a l o f the Genoese fleet, b u t the context o f his account suggests t h a t the Bridge o f Boats was built i n November 1097. Christmas can certainly be taken as the absolute outside date for the b u i l d i n g o f this bridge and the p r o b a b i l i t y is that i t was b u i l t much earlier, d r a w i n g on the materials and expertise brought b y the Genoese. T h e pace of siege warfare was, b y modern standards, intolerably slow b u t we can see j u s t how active and organised the crusaders must have been. I t was no small achievement to construct Malregard and the Bridge o f Boats, w h i c h must have been fortified to withstand enemy attack, i n a period o f less than six weeks, at a time when the a r m y was depleted b y knights w h o were keen to serve outlying forts and when there was a good deal of continued smallscale f i g h t i n g . T h i s is a t r i b u t e to the smooth functioning of the collective leadership w h i c h was probably w e l l suited to the conduct of a siege w i t h its deliberate pace. T h e crusaders must have been painfully aware o f how open A n t i o c h was on its southern flank, a n d Albert says they awarded T a n c r e d forty silver marks per m o n t h a n d 105

106

107

108

105

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50-,.

229

Second enemy

EAST

m

GF, pp, 2 9 - 3 0 ; RA, p. 49 tells us that Robert o f Flanders went on this expedition; Tudebodc, p. 36; HBS, 187. AA, 368, 366. See above p. 2 2 4 . RA, p. 48 comments on this, though i t should be noted that A A , 366 says that some had returned to Godfrey's army from Mamistra. 1 0 7

230

VICTORY

IN THE

Second enemy

EAST

sent h i m into the mountains to establish a camp to blockade two gates on that side of the city and observe enemy movements. I t is not clear which two gates are intended b u t one is described as being in the mountains and the other near the Orontes, w h i c h suggests that Tancred was between the St George Gate and the posterns above it. Raymond o f Aguilers and the Anonymous b o t h say that Tancred was paid to establish a fortress outside the St George Gate i n A p r i l 1098. I t is possible that A l b e r t has misdated the event but he appears to be telling us about some earlier i n i t i a t i v e so perhaps the episodes of gallantry and success related by R a l p h o f Caen occurred at this time. Moreover, i n the N e w Year of 1098 the Anonymous describes this area as 'Tancred's m o u n t a i n ' and A l b e r t says specifically that Tancred abandoned this position at the end o f 1097. Indeed, the emphasis i n Albert's account o f Tancred's doings is on surveillance and fighting i n the mountains, rather t h a n the counterfort at the St George Gate of w h i c h we hear l a t e r . I f T a n c r e d did establish himself here for a time i t must have been a b l o w to the city. Their garrison was aggressive i n its efforts to attack the crusaders and they enjoyed the great advantage o f height, for f r o m M t Silpius they could observe the whole crusader a r m y a n d its movements. This was the other side of the coin. T h e crusaders h a d begun a war of attrition - Yaghisiyan tried the same thing. By the Gate o f the Duke there were woods where some o f the Franks relaxed. O n one occasion a noble archdeacon o f M e t z was p l a y i n g dice w i t h a lady when they were ambushed and on another A r n u l f o f T i r s was killed going to the rescue of some people w h o had been ambushed. After this, Godfrey ordered the clearing o f the w o o d s . A l b e r t lamented he sufferings of the army: ' M o r n i n g , noon a n d n i g h t every day there were these sudden attacks, sallies, scenes o f carnage and endlessly you could hear i n the Christian camp always n e w l a m e n tations over further losses'. 1 0 9

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strain o f the s i e g e . O n another occasion the Turks were shooting across the river at the Christians; they hoped to inflict losses and to draw any force sent against t h e m i n t o an ambush. Engelrand of St Pol led a force across the Bridge o f Boats and killed a Turkish horseman, b u t he h a d to be careful not to pursue the Turks into their ambush. T h e strategy to w h i c h the crusaders were committed meant a long d r a w n - o u t war a r o u n d A n t i o c h i n w h i c h encounters such as this, and the business o f b l o c k i n g roads, r a i d i n g and bearing enemy raids, w o u l d be the day-to-day experience o f the army. Sometimes there were greater deeds. T h e Anonymous records the attack on Harem. A l b e r t tells us t h a t after the b u i l d i n g o f the Bridge of Boats, which was about a k i l o m e t r e upstream o f the Bridge Gate, there was a major fracas. A group o f 300 knights and foot crossed the bridge to forage w h e n the enemy sallied forth, causing heavy casualties and driving the survivors back t o the new bridge. The leaders then launched 5,000 m o u n t e d m e n (the figure is surely a gross exaggeration), mostly i n m a i l shirts, against the enemy, H e n r y o f Esch swam across, t h o u g h fully a r m o u r e d , rather t h a n endure the delay to get on the bridge. T h e T u r k s retreated, then called u p reinforcements who pushed the Franks back to their bridge causing heavy losses, especially amongst the foot-soldiers. This k i n d o f warfare must have been nerve-wracking a n d exhausting to both sides. However, the effect u p o n the crusaders must have been brutal for they were out i n the open w h i l e the T u r k s at least had a secure base. 113

114

Against this b a c k g r o u n d , the advance of the siege by the building o f M a l r c g a r d a n d the Bridge o f Boats indicates a pattern of considerable effort a n d organisation i n the period up to Christmas 1097. As we have already noted, there was a common fund and presumably i t was from this t h a t T a n c r e d was paid. T h e committee of leaders seems to have h a d real a u t h o r i t y . I t was their collective decision, as we have seen, to impose a close siege on A n t i o c h , to attack Harem, to build M a l r c g a r d and to l a u n c h the expedition which resulted i n the foraging b a t t l e o f 30 December 1097. I n the absence of Adhemar and perhaps R o b e r t o f N o r m a n d y , the leaders met to decide on dispositions for the Lake Battle on the night o f 8 February 1098 and decided on the b u i l d i n g o f the Mahommeries tower i n M a r c h and

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374J RC, 6 4 - 4 5 ; RA, p. 63; GF, pp.

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AA W H u g h and Engelrand figure in the Chanson d'Antiochc, 11. 1354, 1377. ^So, 2638, 2673, 2729, 2 8 9 0 , 3 6 5 1 , 4704, 4 7 * 4 . 6 r 5 which develops the theme of the rivalry between the father and son enormously. AA, 3 6 8 - 7 0 . 3

232

VICTORY

IN THE

Tancred's fort outside the St George Gate i n early A p r i l . The matter of how to deal w i t h the proposed betrayal of the city was debated by them, probably i n two meetings at the end o f M a y or early June 1098. I t is no wonder that, speaking o f the decision to l a u n c h the foraging expedition of late December 1097, A l b e r t speaks h i g h l y of the authority of the Council: 'For i t h a d been decided from the first that no person, great or small had the r i g h t to oppose that w h i c h was ordered i n the name of the whole a r m y . ' T h i s committee was probably rather wider than the i m p o r t a n t princes and i t is possible that yet wider assemblies were held for special purposes on occasion. At the start o f the siege, all the leaders swore a n oath to see the matter through and there was a similar oath taken i n the emergency of the second siege of Antioch. T h e Anonymous's account o f the decision to build the Mahommeries T o w e r can be read as h a v i n g been taken in a wider assembly i n w h i c h all applauded the proposal of the leaders. They certainly seem to have r u n the siege competently. The construction of counterforts like M a l r e g a r d a n d T a n cred's more temporary structure b y the St George Gate was a familiar part of the repertoire o f war as we have seen, but considerable authority, organisation and, above all, h a r m o n y w o u l d have been needed to achieve i t i n the difficult circumstances at A n t i och. 115

1 1 6

117

118

I n a general sense they were very experienced i n this w a r o f attrition which they were now embarked upon, for i t resembled the campaigns so many of them had waged or p a r t i c i p a t e d i n throughout the west; raiding, destroying, foraging, small-scale conflict, this was what they were used to. B u t the h i t - a n d - r u n methods of the Turks, evolved out of the circumstances o f steppe w a r f a r e , were peculiarly well suited to the circumstances o f the siege o f Antioch where small-scale skirmishes were the n o r m , as w e have observed and rapid fire very effective. These tactics h a d been grafted onto Moslem armies g e n e r a l l y . Albert describes the sallies which killed Adalbero of Metz and A r n u l f o f T i r s , b u t stresses t h a t the Turks were always pouncing on pilgrims i n the p l a i n , opposite the city, going to St Symeon or looking for food. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers, speaking of the fighting outside the city w h e n the T u r k s 119

h a d heard o f the absence o f m u c h of the army on the foraging e x p e d i t i o n at the end of December 1097, makes i t clear that this kind o f t h i n g had become a w a y o f life: ' T h e y repeated their customary assaults. T h e Count, moreover, w a s compelled to attack t h e m i n his usual m a n n e r ' . T h e use o f language i n this passage is a revelation of military reality. B u t the crusaders d i d learn f r o m the march across Asia M i n o r a n d the dangerous small-scale fighting outside Antioch. A l b e r t reports how H u g h of St-Pol was moved by the losses of the foragers and mounted a revenge attack w i t h his son Engelrand and t h e i r f o l l o w i n g . T h e garrison then sent out twenty mounted men w h o t u r n e d i n their saddles a n d fired arrows backwards across the river i n t o the camp, h o p i n g t o provoke the Franks into a pursuit w h i c h c o u l d then be ambushed f r o m inside the Bridge G a t e . This w a s certainly what happened, according to Raymond of Aguilers, d u r i n g the absence of the foraging p a r t y i n December 1097, T u r k s sallied out f r o m A n t i o c h and drew the Provencals up to the B r i d g e Gate where reserves fell upon them. Although i t was recogn i s e d t h a t t h e T u r k s were t r y i n g to provoke the crusaders on this o c c a s i o n , Engelrand of St Pol was again sent out to prevent them f r o m b e i n g seen t o have gained a victory of sorts by enjoying i m m u n i t y , b u t he took care n o t to pursue the enemy too far, and a g e n e r a l and h i g h l y confused melee then developed on the plain b e f o r e the c i t y , w i t h knights a n d Turks criss-crossing like Spitfires a n d Mcsscrschmits i n a dogfight, and indeed the comparison is apt f o r i n b o t h cases there was a huge audience watching their champ i o n s . A l b e r t records evident d e l i g h t and applause when Engelrand u n s e a t e d and killed a T u r k w i t h his lance, b u t stresses that he was v e r y careful n o t to get t r a p p e d . T h e crusader instinct, indeed the o n l y sensible tactic i n view o f T u r k i s h fire-power, was to close with t h e i r enemies. W h e n attacked b y the army o f Damascus during the f o r a g i n g battle of December 1097, R a y m o n d of Aguilers says that R o b e r t o f Flanders charged at them, forcing them to retreat. The d a n g e r s o f this instinct were a l l too obvious - they led to heavy losses 120

1 2 1

122

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9 - 3 ° ' 35- 39, 43-46; RA, pp. 4 6 - 7 , 4 9 , 6 , 5 8 , 50, 6 4 .

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134.

Sec above pp. 147-8; Latham and Paterson, discuss this technique of firing backwards^ Saracen Archery, p. 74 and illustrate i t i n their 'Archery in the lands of Eastern Islam , in K RA,p.

51; AA,

Arms and Armour (London, 1974), 8 2 - 4 .

371-3.

234

VICTORY I N THE

at 'Artâh and to the loss of Roger o f Barneville at the start of the second siege of Antioch as small crusader forces were d r a w n into ambushes. T o prevent charging too far, there needed t o be clear command i n any particular action - supplied by H u g h o f St-Pol in Albert's story, but this was a very difficult p r o b l e m on a l a r g e r scale in an army run by a committee. A n o t h e r n a t u r a l response o f the crusaders was to close ranks for m u t u a l p r o t e c t i o n , a tactic w e have described used by the Byzantines a n d the crusaders themselves at Dorylacum. During the fighting o n the p l a i n outside A n t i o c h , at the time of the foraging battle, R a y m o n d of Toulouse organised his footmen into close order and i t was w i t h a tortoise o f interlocking shields that the Iron Gate was carried. I n the spring o f 1098, when the Mahommcries Tower had been b u i l t , some Provençal knights were ambushed nearby; they formed a circle a b u t t i n g a n o l d house and so prevented the enemy from o u t f l a n k i n g them. A manageable solidity was organised i n the cavalry i n the L a k e Battle b y d i v i d i n g them into squadrons. There is every sign t h a t the mass close-order charge of knights with lances couched was b e i n g used increasingly. I n the disastrous charge at 'Artâh, R a l p h says that after i n i t i a l disorder the Franks organised themselves and charged. ' A t t h e first shock the lance goes forward, pierces and throws [ t h e enemy] down.' Describing the relieving charge led b y the c o u n t o f Flanders in the same fight Albert says that the Franks 'attacked the enemy with their lances held before them'. W e have noted that E n g e l r a n d of St Pol unhorsed his victim w i t h his lance before k i l l i n g h i m , the classic pattern of knightly encounter a n d i n his skirmish t h e T u r k s are described as fighting w i t h bows, the crusaders w i t h lances. Baldwin of Edessafcll upon the advance guard o f K e r b o g a h ' s attack on his city 'with the lance of the Franks a n d the b o w o f the Armenians'. The examples of H u g h o f St Pol i n the p l a i n outside the Bridge Gate and Bohemond d u r i n g the attack on H a r e m show the Franks learning to set ambushes themselves. I t was a d i f f i c u l t business, but the disciplines o f w a r were forcing the F r a n k s into methods of countering Turkish tactics, and above a l l the f i r e - p o w e r upon which they were based. 124

125

126

We tend to make a sharp distinction between a siege a n d field warfare, but i n reality this is false. A siege was a k i n d o f b a t t l e '** RA, pp. 51-2; « m

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i n v o l v i n g most o f the general techniques of w a r i n addition to some specialised ones. I n the case o f A n t i o c h the nature of the crusader strategy - a close blockade w i t h o u t assault - makes the point very clearly. T h e opening phase o f the conflict h a d seen the crusaders g r a d u a l l y t i g h t e n i n g their g r i p on the city, though at a terrible price. I n the next phase they were to be seized by a crisis of supply. O n e v i t a l aspect o f all w a r - and we have noted Vegetius on the p o i n t - was to deny the enemy food. For the crusaders this was easier said t h a n done, for A n t i o c h appears to have been well-stocked. Had i t n o t been, t h e n the siege simply could not have endured. But also food c o u l d find its w a y i n t o the city through the St George Gate and the I r o n Gate, even perhaps the Bridge Gate, and, i n addition, all the posterns along the mountains. I n the end such supply was not satisfactory f o r a major city, especially one w i t h large disaffected elements - S y r i a n and A r m e n i a n Christians o f which the crusaders were w e l l aware. T h e A n o n y m o u s claims that many of them were forced t o fight for the T u r k s because their womenfolk were host a g e s . B u t i t must be repeated that a t t r i t i o n cuts both ways. I n any siege the attackers are at least as likely to starve as the defenders - and b y Christmas 1097 this situation was h u r t i n g the army badly. 127

'«

GF, pp. ag, 4 1 .

237

The siege: crisis and delivery

Iron Bridge, so that the Anonymous confesses: 'No-one d a r e d to go into the land o f the Saracens except w i t h a strong force.' A strong force l e d b y Bohemond and Robert o f Flanders was accordingly assembled and sent off to ravage for food towards the lands of A l e p p o o n l y to encounter a powerful enemy a r m y led b y Duqaq of Damascus. T h e Anonymous says that Bohemond v o l u n teered, b u t b o t h R a y m o n d of Aguilers and A l b e r t report t h a t he and Robert of Flanders were sent b y the leaders, Raymond n o t i n g that Godfrey was i l l a n d R o b e r t of N o r m a n d y absent. I t is not clear w h o was i n c o m m a n d , and p r o b a b l y neither leader was. I t was a substantial force b u t surely not as large as the Anonymous's 20,000 infantry and k n i g h t s nor Albert's reported 2000 knights a n d 15,000 foot; R a y m o n d o f Aguilers says there were 400 knights, w h i c h sounds reasonable i n view of w h a t we know of loss of horses, and mentions the i n f a n t r y , whose numbers we cannot estimate, only i n passing when h e says that Bohemond was alerted to the presence o f the enemy by some of his peasants. His figure o f 60,000 for the enemy must be regarded as a gross exaggeration. T h e expedition entered the valley o f t h e Orontes, for according to the A r a b sources i t met the army o f Damascus near A l b a r a and later fell back o n R u j , the base which R a y m o n d of Toulouse had captured on the eve o f the siege of A n t i o c h . T h i s suggests that they aimed to ravage the rich area of the J e b e l Barisha where they w o u l d later establish a strong lodgment. I t is l i k e l y that the expedition reached R u j by t a k i n g the road via D a p h n e to the Orontes crossing at the Jisir ash-Shogur, for Bohemond c a m e back over 'Tancred's m o u n t a i n ' , w h i c h is crossed by the A n t i o c h - D a p h n e r o a d and so-called because T a n c r e d later blockaded the S t George Gate there. T h i s route must have been the normal line o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n w i t h R u j a n d explains h o w they managed to keep such an exposed area i n their control t h r o u g h the bitter winter o f 1097. H a r e m effectively cut them off from the p l a i n of North Syria (see fig. 4 ) . T h e force w h i c h they encountered was that o f D u q a q w h o h a d left Damascus about the middle o f the month and was accompanied b y his great atabeg, T u g h t i g i n , and Janah-ad-Daulah o f Horns. H e was responding to the supplications 3

CHAPTER

8

The siege of Antioch; crisis and delivery

T h e siege was significantly tighter by December 1097 b u t b y that time operations were r u n n i n g into a new phase for the sources are unanimous - food was desperately short. This crisis of supply saw the crusade come desperately close t o failure. A l b e r t of A i x says they had simply eaten up the resources o f the countryside a n d the surrounding cities round about. R a l p h o f Caen speaks o f shortage, stressing how food had to come from afar: Syria, C i l i c i a , Rhodes, Cyprus, Chios, Samos, Crete and M y t i l e n e . I t was a b i t t e r winter, quite unexpectedly like home as Stephen o f Blois w o u l d remark, and R a l p h speaks of its harshness r o t t i n g the weapons o f the army, Even Stephen of Blois, who was a n incorrigible optimist, speaks of the suffering and starvation amongst the N o r t h French f r o m which many were rescued only through God's aid and the w e a l t h o f the leaders. Anselm recalled that bitter winter: ' W h y recount the trials of many kinds,which,even i f passed over i n silence, are sufficiently evident i n themselves - hunger, intemperate weather and the desertion o f faint-hearted soldiers." Such hardship must h a v e had a devastating effect on the army encamped i n t h e p l a i n outside A n t i o c h and exposed to the worst o f the weather. I n December 1099 B a l d w i n of Edessa and Bohcmond met at Baniyas south o f Laodicea and marched south to Jerusalem where they arrived i n f u l f i l m e n t of their crusading vows on 21 December. D u r i n g this m a r c h o f only some three weeks i n winter weather Fulchcr records deaths due to exposure. T h e attrition i n the crusader camp must have been appalling. The nature of casualties has already been discussed b u t it is w o r t h remembering that i n the American Civil W a r 200,000 men died i n battle, and twice that number from disease. M o r e o v e r , the enemy were pressing hard, especially f r o m their bases b e y o n d the

4

5

6

2

1

Hagcnmeycr, Krcuwgsbriefe,

, o , ,57-60. 5

236

2 FC, p. , 3 , ; Terraine, White Heat, p. .7.

3 AA, 374; R A , p . 5 0 ; GF, p. 3 0 ; FC, p. 94; Hagenmcyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe,

RC, 647.' • GF, p. 30; RA, p. 5 1 ; A A , 373; on horses sec below pp. 2 8 1 - 2 . Sec below pp. 3 0 9 - 1 0 .

!

5

j

* GF, p. 32.

pp. 1 4 9 - 5 2 ;

The siege: crisis and delivery 2

g8

VICTORY

IN THE

EAST

of Shams-ad-Daulah who, as we have noted, h a d been sent b y his father to seek aid for A n t i o c h . The Franks were completely unaware of the presence o f an enemy force i n the vicinity of Albara; according to R a y m o n d o f A g u i l e r s the crusaders were attacking a village when some o f their f o o t m e n cried out that the enemy was at h a n d and Robert o f Flanders a n d a small group which included some Provencals rode o u t to chase t h e m ofT. They were successful, then suddenly saw the enemy m a i n force, notably many foot, on a nearby h i l l . A l b e r t says they awoke one morning to find the enemy all about them. T h e Damascus a r m y was making its way north and had reached Shaizar w h e n news c a m e o f the Frankish incursion and i t moved to the a t t a c k . T h e A r a b accounts tell us little else about the battle. A m o n g s t the W e s t e r n sources Ralph of Caen makes no mention o f i t at a l l , perhaps because Tancred was not present, and neither does t h e second l e t t e r of Stephen of Blois, written i n A p r i l 1098. A n s e l m o f R i b e m o n t , writing i n July 1098, gives i t only a brief mention. T h e A n o n y m o u s was not present and was obviously reporting second h a n d . H e does not mention surprise and simply says that as the enemy a p p r o a c h e d they divided into two forces w i t h the intention o f s u r r o u n d i n g the Franks, but that Robert of Flanders and B o h e m o n d c h a r g e d shouldcr-to-shouldcr i n a single line into the enemy w h o t o o k to flight, and so 'we came back i n great t r i u m p h ' a n d ' o u r m e n t o o k their horses and other plunder'. I t all sounds very s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d a brief hard fight and to the victor the spoils. B u t i t is precisely o n this point that equivocation sets i n , for having t o l d us t h a t they w e r e victorious and seized spoil, the Anonymous goes o n to say t h a t w h e n they returned to Antioch very few o f Bohemond's m e n h a d a n y plunder. Raymond of Aguilers was not an eyewitness either a n d presumably got his information from the Provencals w h o a c c o m panied Robert of Flanders. H e says that enemy scouts c a u g h t Bohemond unawares when he was plundering; they w e r e d r i v e n o f f by Robert of Flanders who then confronted the enemy m a i n force. Robert was reinforced and sent against the enemy as a v a n g u a r d while Bohemond trailed behind to prevent the enemy s u r r o u n d i n g them: 'For the Turks have this custom i n fighting: even t h o u g h t h e y 7

8

9

' Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, p. 43; Aleppo Chronicle, p. 579; on the c a p t u r e o f R u g i a Or, p. 26. » RA, pp. 51

5 2

; AA, 373; Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, p. 43.

Gb, pp. o 3; Hagenmcyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, 3

pp. 150, 158.

sec

239

a r e few i n number, they always strive to encircle their enemy. T h i s t h e y attempted to do i n this battle also, b u t by the foresight o f B o h e m o n d the wiles of the enemy were prevented'. A c c o r d i n g to h i m when the enemy saw that the Franks were determined to close t h e y fled and were pursued for 3.2 k m , w h i l e Bohemond j o i n e d i n the execution. However, this account suffers f r o m the same strange inconsistency as that of the Anonymous - the admission t h a t there was no plunder, and Raymond's explanation strains c r e d u l i t y - i t was he said: 'A strange result of this a c h i e v e m e n t . . . after the enemy h a d been put to flight the courage of our men decreased, so that they d i d not dare to pursue those w h o m they saw headlong i n f l i g h t ' . S u r e l y i f there had been any pursuit at a l l the enemy camp w o u l d h a v e been looted? These two accounts arc fairly compatible i f we take the Anonymous's reference to Bohemond a n d R o b e r t r i d i n g to b a t t l e sidc-by-side figuratively rather t h a n l i t e r a l l y , b u t i t is a strange battle i n w h i c h the v i c t o r gains no spoils. T h i s can be explained i n p a r t ; the crusaders had fought a h a r d battle and avoided encirclement but, unable to destroy the enemy, they feared to press and fell back on R u j . T h i s theory o f a d r a w n battle is perfectly plausible a n d the Moslem sources w h i c h simply say that the Franks fell back to R u j and D u q a q to Horns can be read as substantiating i t . I n this view the A n o n y m o u s and R a y m o n d were c l a i m i n g victory when the reality was rather different for almost any v i c t o r y would have yielded the p l u n d e r o f the enemy c a m p . " T h e r e is another weakness i n these t w o accounts; they b o t h report a b a t t l e o f knights - whatever happened to all the i n f a n t r y w h o m R a y m o n d mentions and the Anonymous says were present i n large numbers? Albert of A i x tells us about them. H e was dependent u p o n L o r r a i n c r knights for i n f o r m a t i o n a n d as far as we know none were present, but the Lorraincrs were later to enjoy close relations w i t h the Flemings, so we cannot just dismiss his account. A c c o r d i n g to A l b e r t , on the m o r n i n g of 31 December the crusaders found themselves surrounded. Bohemond called the knights together and formed them i n t o a phalanx, 'a tightly-packed front, a tortoise o f shields', and broke out of the enemy encirclemen t a b a n d o n i n g their b o o t y and leaving the foot to be massacred - presumably the heavy 10

" R u n c i n i a n , i . 221 offers this explanation; Small, Crusading Warfare,?. 171 ofTers no general comment, simply observing that, on the basis o f these two sources, the crusaders had learned not to allow themselves to be surrounded.

2^0

VICTORY

IN THE

The siege: crisis and delivery

EAST

casualties mentioned i n the A r a b sources. T h e f o l l o w i n g d a y R o b e r t of Flanders, who had become separated f r o m B o h e m o n d , gathered 200 knights and attacked the enemy who were b y n o w t h o r o u g h l y dispersed, and recovered some o f the p l u n d e r b u t was f o r c e d to abandon it. The main difficulty o f the account is Bohemond's role he is said to have returned to A n t i o c h crestfallen a n d w h a t little glory there was thereby went to Robert of Flanders, b u t R a y m o n d of Aguilers, otherwise no friend of Bohemond, says t h a t he g a i n e d a great reputation at this time. However, A l b e r t generally minimises Bohemond's deeds, perhaps consciously i n o r d e r t o exalt G o d f r e y this shows most clearly i n the battle against K e r b o g a h . I f w e a l l o w for this bias Albert's account explains the salient facts r a t h e r better than any other, especially the lack of p l u n d e r a n d the fate o f the infantry. Moreover, his explanation o f the fate o f the i n f a n t r y receives a kind of endorsement f r o m R a y m o n d of A g u i l e r s w h o says that when six weeks later the leaders were p l a n n i n g the L a k e B a t t l e , they decided not to send infantry o u t against R i d w a n ' s a p p r o a c h i n g army for fear that some i n their ranks w o u l d p a n i c . T h i s is r a t h e r puzzling, because by this time a large n u m b e r of horseless k n i g h t s could have provided high-quality infantry b u t i t becomes m u c h more understandable i f there were clear experience t h a t i n f a n t r y could not stand i n the open, and anyway t h e y were l i k e l y to remember, by recent example, that knights c o u l d a b a n d o n t h e m all too easily. Moreover, i n a more general way the accounts o f this conflict arc sketchy, which suggests that i t was s o m e t h i n g less t h a n a glorious victory. Since we do not even know w h e r e the b a t t l e took place and are faced w i t h contradictory a n d vague a c c o u n t s , i t cannot be reconstructed w i t h any c e r t a i n t y . T h e f o r a g i n g b a t t l e was a drawn battle; the crusaders were surprised b u t t h e i r c a v a l r y broke out of an enemy trap and fought well, i n close o r d e r a n d perhaps with a rearguard. They even returned t o t h e f r a y a g a i n the next day, but they were unable to gather food a n d t h e i r v i c t o r y was gained at the expense of a massacre of infantry. T h e enemy, f o r t h e i r part, were either unable or unwilling to follow u p t h e i r a d v a n t a g e 1 2

1 3

14

341

a n d contented themselves w i t h having repulsed an attack. From the crusader v i e w p o i n t the result o f the battle was i n a sense victory, for s u r v i v a l was v i c t o r y and i t m a y well have been from this perspective t h a t a rather inglorious episode was later written up by those chroniclers w h o mentioned i t , albeit w i t h inconsistencies. I t was i g n o r e d by others or dismissed briefly. A l b e r t was not personally i n v o l v e d and s i m p l y recorded what he had learned, w i t h all its l i m i t a t i o n s a n d confusions, some years later. But the episode shows t h a t the crusaders were l e a r n i n g to deal w i t h Turkish attacks. They k n e w the need for close order at Dorylaeum. T h e use of a rearguard was i n a sense developed d u r i n g the attack on H a r e m in November 1097 when knights attacking the castle fell back upon Bohemond's m a i n force w h i c h then crushed the enemy. T h a t such a sensible a d a p t a t i o n to t h e needs o f war against the Turks could be employed i n a n a r m y taken b y surprise points to a high degree of discipline and o r d e r at least amongst the knights. A factor i n instilling this was u n d o u b t e d l y t h e sense t h a t they had to w i n together or die separa t e l y , a n d this was p r o b a b l y an even more powerful incentive on the n e x t occasion w h e n they met an enemy army, at the Lake Battle some six weeks later. T h e Foraging Battle was a near-disaster for the crusader army, perhaps because o f the lack o f a single command. T h e y suffered heavy losses and returned victore et vacuo, victorious but e m p t y - h a n d e d , as R a y m o n d o f Aguilers puts i t , w i t h little food for the a r m y . 15

1 6

T h e check administered to the army deepened the crisis. Starv a t i o n c o n t i n u e d w i t h a p p a l l i n g losses, we have already observed. T h e r e was unrest a n d the crusader leaders established judges to i m p o s e order a n d peace. Associated w i t h this were the ecclesiastical celebrations i n e a r l y J a n u a r y 1098, called for by Adhemar, whose m o s t notorious measure was the expulsion of women. This was a desperate effort to revive morale w h i c h had plummeted in the wake o f t h e failure o f the foraging expedition. T o reassure their followers the princes promised to sec out the siege. Even so there were deserters, m o s t n o t a b l y W i l l i a m the Carpenter, L o r d of M e l u n and Peter the

"

AA, 373-4, 425; RA, p. 53.

is RA, p. 56.

* The tendency of later writers to present tidy and logical accounts o f battles w h i c h are essentially chaotic af!airs is thoroughly criticised by J . Keegan, The Face of Battle ( L o n d o n , 1976). I t is worth noting that in 'Operation Battleaxe' in the Western desert i n 1941 t w e n t y tanks of Seventh Armoured Brigade, one fifth of their strength, simply went missing and were not accounted for until two years later, and even that story was unconfirmed: B . P i l l , fhe Crucible of War; Western Desert

m

,

(London, 1980) pp.

300-1.

H e r m i t w h o fled 'because o f this great wretchedness and misery'. B o h e m o n d caught b o t h o f t h e m b u t W i l l i a m later sloped off any¬ '* GF, 1 6

pp.

29-30.

GF, p . 3 3 ; R A , p. 5 3 ; A A , 375; o n the battle see below pp. 246-52.

242

VICTORY

IN THE

The siege: crisis and delivery

EAST

way. Others secretly considered leaving and even Bohemond wavered, a n n o u n c i n g that he could not bear to watch his men and horses d y i n g o f starvation. Louis, archdeacon of T o u l fled w i t h 300 followers to a place about 4.8 k m f r o m A n t i o c h w h i c h was wellsupplied, only to be slaughtered b y the T u r k s . T h e fact that food was to be f o u n d reminds us that this was the period of the wanderings o f Peter Bartholemew i n search o f f o o d . Food was available - the Anonymous says that after the failure o f the foraging expedition Syrian a n d A r m e n i a n merchants bought u p supplies and sold t h e m at h i g h prices. T h e p r o b l e m was not just lack o f food, although that was to a degree inevitable i n winter, b u t getting it to the camp. For i n the winter sea travel was difficult a n d the Turks were stepping up their attacks on the crusader army. A l b e r t says that i t was at this t i m e of great misery that the crusaders got into the h a b i t o f foraging i n well-protected groups o f 200-300, b u t even so there was terrible carnage. T h e Provençal knights refused to cover such foraging expeditions in J a n u a r y 1098 because o f the loss of horses, and C o u n t Raymond was obliged to offer t h e m compensation. T h e m i l i t a r y significance o f this event has escaped notice somewhat. I t was a profoundly ominous sign for the crusader a r m y that knights were fearful of escorting foraging expeditions. I n the war o f a t t r i t i o n this was a clear sign that the strain was telling, the balance t i l t i n g away from the crusader army i n favour o f the enemy. I f this continued then the army w o u l d starve to death. I t was not something confined to the Provençal army - all the leaders were obliged to offer compensation for lost horses i n the same w a y as the C o u n t . I t cannot be too heavily emphasised that the first object of war is to get food a n d to deny i t to your enemy; i f the crusaders were becoming u n w i l l i n g to fight for i t they faced starvation a n d collapse. This is a tribute to the skill of the Turks i n A n t i o c h and t h e i r allies in H a r e m and along the Aleppo road. T h e absence o f R o b e r t of 17

18

1 9

20

21

22

1 7

GF, pp.

3 3 - 4 ; A A , 378 -9 FC, p. 95; Gesta Francorum Iherusalem expugnantium, RHC

Oc. 3.499;

RA, pp. 5 4 - 5 ; on the attempted disciplinary action see J . A. Brundage, 'Prostitution, miscegenation and sexual purity in the First Crusade', in P. Edbury, ed., Crusade and Settlement in the Latin

1 9

2 8

East,

(Cardiff, 1985), pp.

58-9.

FC, p. 94; RA, pp. 5 3 - 4 , who suggests that Bohemond was even then trying to gain Antioch; A A , 3 7 5 . Sec above pp. 2 0 9 - 1 0 . GF, p. 33. 21 A A , 375. RA, pp. 54-5; on this see France, 'Departure of Tatikios', 145; J. Richard, ' L a confrérie de la première croisade; à propos d'un épisode de la première croisade', in B. Jeannau, éd.,

243

Normandy, w h o remained at Laodicea, and the illness of Godfrey and Raymond o f Toulouse could not have helped matters while the departure o f Tatikios, the i m p e r i a l representative, i n early February 1098 must have depressed morale even f u r t h e r . The Anonymous says Tatikios departed promising to fetch supplies and reinforcements and, according to Raymond o f Aguilers, to bring imperial a i d . T h e i r comments are, however, deeply informed by hindsight; the general tenor o f their remarks is a charge o f cowardice but i t appears t h a t Tatikios left before news of the approach of a major enemy relief force reached the army. A l b e r t lists Tatikios amongst those present at the start of the siege, remarks that he took up a position behind the others because he was 'ever ready for flight', and draws attention to his presence later at Philomelium as one who had deserted the army; however he gives no account of his actual departure, a subject o n which R a l p h of Caen is also silent. The letters o f Stephen o f Blois and Anselm o f Ribemont, which are contemporary documents, do not mention his departure at a l l . Perhaps, i n the circumstances, i t seemed quite a good idea for h i m to seek i m p e r i a l a i d and this story was accepted at the time. I n retrospect the event assumed a quite different importance and indeed i t was to have disastrous implications for the Byzantine alliance. I t is likely that Tatikios had resurrected his idea o f a distant blockade o f A n t i o c h , precipitating a quarrel w i t h the count of Toulouse w h o was obliged to develop a scheme whereby he compensated knights w h o lost horses on foraging expeditions, thus depriving Tatikios's policy o f its chief rationale. Tatikios thus found himself isolated, suspicious o f Bohemond and at odds w i t h the count ofToulouse, and so he decided to leave the army to seek help. I n the circumstances o f isolation and starvation i n which the army found itself this must have appeared pretty reasonable at the t i m e . A l b e r t of Aix mentions further efforts to mount foraging expeditions b y Godfrey de B o u i l l o n and R a y m o n d o f Toulouse, both of w h i c h failed. So severe was the crisis o f morale that i n the face of disorders in the army severe measures had to be taken to enforce discipline and morality; one o f the victims was an adulterous couple who were whipped and paraded naked r o u n d the army as per the arrange23

24

25

2 0

Etudes de civilisation médiévale: mélanges offerts à E. Ji, Labande, (Poitiers, 1974), pp.

617-22.

!3

IS

RA, 50, 5 5 - 6 ; 6 2 , GF, pp. 3 4 - 5 . GF, pp. 34 5; RA, pp. 5 4 - 5 ; A A , 366, 417. RA, p. 55; France, 'Depature of Tatikios', 144-6; see also Richard, 'La confrcrie de la premiere croisade', 6 1 7 - 2 2 . . 2 4

244

VICTORY

IN THE

The siege: crisis and delivery

EAST

merits made i n the New Y e a r . This a p p a l l i n g w i n t e r o f 1098 w i t h its severe losses was a terrible test o f the w i l l o f the crusader a r m y and in these dark hours efforts to t i g h t e n the siege a l l b u t came t o a halt. Albert of A i x records what may have been one effort to close a major gate of the city early i n 1098. H e is v i v i d i n his descriptions of the savagery of the enemy raids coming out of A n t i o c h . H e believed that the main source for these raids was i n the m o u n t a i n s a n d far away from the St Paul Gate w h i c h was besieged b y B o h e m o n d , this suggests the St George Gate, b u t his topography is always weak a n d it is possible that the Bridge Gate was intended. H e r e , he tells us, Count Raymond made an effort to establish a r e d o u b t and one day ambushed an enemy attack, c a p t u r i n g a young m a n o f noble f a m i l y . The princes tried to use h i m to get his family to b e t r a y the c i t y b u t Yaghisiyan heard of the matter and stopped negotiations. T h e unfortunate young man, accused by native Christians o f h a v i n g persecuted them, was tortured and decapitated. T h i s m a y be the same person whom the Historia Belli Sacri describes as a n E m i r w h o had put to death twelve pilgrims by t h r o w i n g t h e m o f f the city w a l l ; he was captured by Peter R a y m o n d o f H a u t p o u l a n d a n effort was made to use him to gain a lodgment i n the city. W h e n this f a i l e d he was k i l l e d . Albert's dating is very confused and i t is possible t h a t the story relates to Raymond o f Toulouse's tower, t h e M a h o m m e r ies, built in March 1098 outside the Bridge G a t e , especially as Raymond of Aguilers says that u n t i l this tower was b u i l t the C o u n t had done little due to illness and was accused o f laziness. I t is probable, however, that this was an earlier effort to t i g h t e n the siege for Albert later refers to the construction of the M a h o m m e r i e s i n t h e clearest terms. However, there can be no d o u b t t h a t the s t a r v i n g army was quite clearly on the defensive i n J a n u a r y a n d F e b r u a r y 1098 and indeed perilously close to defeat. T h e A n o n y m o u s ' s comment on the situation of the army at this time is eloquent a n d apposite: 28

29

We were thus left in the direst need, for the Turks were harrying us on every side, so that none of our men dared to go outside the encampment. The Turks were menacing us on the one hand, and hunger tormented us on the other, and there was no-one to help us or bring us aid. The rank and file, with those who were very poor, fled to Cyprus or R u m or into the

30

I t was at this p o i n t t h a t the crusaders heard of the approach of a strong enemy relief a r m y under R i d w a n of Aleppo. Yaghisiyan had sent his son Shams-ad-Daulah to seek assistance and after Duqaq's failure to relieve the c i t y i n December 1097 he proceeded to Alepp o . The increased enemy pressure w h i c h the Franks seem to have been feeling b y the end of J a n u a r y , was probably the result of this diplomacy for f r o m H a r e m R i d w a n was i n a good position to mount attacks on the crusaders. M a t t h e w o f Edessa suggests that the crusader leaders tried t o counter Antiochcne diplomacy by telling D u q a q after the foraging battle that they had no designs outside the old Byzantine lands. The Historia Belli Sacri suggests that the battle took place because a converted T u r k , who had taken the Christian name H i l a r y , defected and t o l d the Aleppans of the plight of the crusader a r m y t h o u g h this seems u n l i k e l y . The besiegers were now, as the A n o n y m o u s makes clear, i n some sense besieged. I n early F e b r u a r y R i d w a n ' s a r m y was approaching and on 8 February the leaders h e l d a meeting to discuss what to do about the approaching enemy a r m y w h i c h was b y now very close. Aleppo is only one hundred kilometres f r o m A n t i o c h - R a y m o n d of Aguilers says a mere t w o days j o u r n e y a n d he is supported by I b n Butlan, who says it was a 'day a n d a night's m a r c h ' . R i d w a n achieved a high degree of surprise f o r the leaders met i n the house of the bishop (who presumably was absent) on 8 February, by which time they knew the enemy were encamped at H a r e m only thirty-five kilometres away (see fig. 4 ) . T h e c e n t r a l fact about this battle on the crusader side was t h a t they had v e r y few mounted knights at their disposal only 700 i n a l l a n d m a n y o f them mounted on pack animals and even o x e n . T h e leaders t h e n took a highly significant step: for the first time they a p p o i n t e d a single commander for the whole force. They chose B o h e m o n d . Even before the crusade he had enjoyed a great m i l i t a r y r e p u t a t i o n , as A l b e r t tells us, and Raymond of Aguilers testifies to the g l o r y he had w o n fighting against Harem 31

32

3 3

3 4

3 0

3 3

M

'. 378-9.

"

AA, 378-9; JMS,

p

.

,80,

»RA,

p. 62.

2 9

AA, 386.

^

mountains. We dared not go down to the sea for fear of those brutes of Turks, and there was no road open to us anywhere.

26

27

2

GF, p. 3 5 .

3 1

Aleppo Chronicle, p. 579.

s

* Matthew, 33; HBS,

190.

RA, p . 4 g ; I b n Butlan, tr, and cited in Lcstrange, Palestine under the Moslems, p. 370. On the shortage o f horses see below pp. 2 8 1 - 2 ; there is virtual unanimity on the figure of 700; R A , p. 5 6 , A A , 3 8 0 , Stephen o f Blois and Anselm in Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 1 5 1 , 157. T h e only dissenter is R C , 647 who gives a figure of 200.

246

VICTORY

The siege: crisis and delivery

I N T H E EAST

and on the foraging expedition. T h e dangers o f the s i t u a t i o n had forced the leaders to accept one commander against a l l their instincts for independence. I t was almost certainly B o h e m o n d ' s plan which they now followed; i t was agreed to d i v i d e the a r m y t a k i n g almost all the knights available (700) o u t b y n i g h t u n d e r the command of Bohemond so as to avoid w a r n i n g the garrison, l e a v i n g the foot to defend the c a m p . Even the Islamic sources agree w i t h the western accounts that their a r m y was very small as c o m p a r e d to that of Ridwan. Kemal a d - D i n reports that the A l c p p a n a r m y was defeated by a smaller Frankish force. W e d o n o t k n o w h o w l o n g i t took Ridwan to raise his force nor are there any indications o f its size from the Islamic sources. Albert o f A i x suggests 30,000 b u t m o r e impressive is the testimony o f t w o near-contemporary crusader letters, those of Stephen of Blois and Anselm o f R i b e m o n t , w h i c h suggest that i t numbered i 2 , o o o . T h a t m i g h t appear q u i t e modest, and indeed the only major allies supporting h i m w e r e S o k m a n the Artukid emir of Amida and the emir o f H a m a h , b u t i t m u s t be judged i n relation to the military strength o f the crusader a r m y which had dwindled markedly. 35

36

37

38

According to the Anonymous the engagement took place 'between the river and the lake' and R a y m o n d o f A g u i l e r s agrees, adding that the army used these obstacles on its flanks to p r e v e n t the enemy encircling them. They formed, he says, i n t o six s q u a d r o n s each in a little valley. Raymond's account o f the fighting is v e r y schematic - at first the crusaders pushed f o r w a r d against a n e n e m y firing arrows and i t was pretty h a r d going w i t h h e a v y losses, b u t then the enemy front line became entangled w i t h the m a i n f o r c e and the enemy fled to Harem, which was p r o m p t l y b u r n e d . T h e A n o n y mous corroborates this account w i t h rather m o r e d e t a i l . A c c o r d i n g to him, Bohemond was placed i n command b y the c o u n c i l o f leaders and at dawn sent forward a reconnaissance force w h i c h r e p o r t e d the enemy marching with two squadrons t h r o w n f o r w a r d o f a m a i n force. Bohemond then organised his army i n t o five s q u a d r o n s thrown ahead with his own held i n reserve. T h e d e s c r i p t i o n o f the fighting is very vivid - the Anonymous was evidently there a n d gives dramatic detail from which i t w o u l d appear t h a t t h e c r u s a d e r s charged and hand-to-hand fighting ensued. T h e enemy m a i n f o r c e

39

4 0

41

42

»

R A , p p . 5 6 8; CF, pp. 3 5 - 8 .

*°

Anonymi

Gesta Francorum,

cd. H . Hagcnmeycr

*• R A , p p . 4 9 , 5 2 ; Smail, Crusading se A A , 380; Hagcnmeycr, Kreuzzugsbriefe,

149-5«, , 5 7 - 6 0 .

^

t h e n came u p a n d at the c l i m a x o f the battle, at the very moment w h e n the crusader line seemed about to break, Bohemond committed the reserve and the enemy fled, setting fire to Harem i n their precipitate retreat. T h i s v i r t u a l u n a n i m i t y is impressive b u t R a y m o n d d i d employ the Gesia Francorum as a source, particularly f o r t h e period F e b r u a r y - M a r c h 1098 using no fewer than three passages concerned w i t h t h e Lake Battle itself, and others with events i n this period, w h i c h seems to indicate that Raymond was r e l y i n g on i t . Moreover, neither o f these accounts makes the l o c a t i o n of the battle clear, w h i l e Raymond's remark that the army chose t o rest its flanks o n the river and the lake appears to be an e l a b o r a t i o n based on the Anonymous's statement that the battle was f o u g h t between the lake and the river and should be seen in the light o f R a y m o n d ' s earlier comments about the enemy technique o f s u r r o u n d i n g . Furthermore, his notion o f a defensive battle w i t h the crusaders f o r m i n g a l i n e backed by a reserve is not quite what a p p e a r s in the Gesta Francorum and is rather vitiated by his statement t h a t t h e distance between the river and the lake a t this point was a m i l e , for he also tells us that St Symeon was ten miles from Antioch ( a c t u a l l y twenty-six kilometres) which appears to mean that a small f o r c e o f 700 i n six squadrons, of w h i c h one was held i n reserve, was s t r u n g out across two and a h a l f kilometres as a blocking force. M o r e o v e r , i f the leaders h a d wished to fight a purely defensive b a t t l e , why d i d they n o t take their i n f a n t r y and hold the Iron B r i d g e ? R a y m o n d and the Anonymous give no real idea of the site, a l t h o u g h the latter refers to the enemy coming towards the army f r o m the river. Stephen of Blois w h o was present says that i t was f o u g h t i n a little p l a i n near the I r o n Bridge b u t does not say which s i d e o f i t . R a l p h o f Caen was w r i t i n g rather later at Antioch and says t h a t the crusaders crossed the I r o n Bridge i n t o a little plain where a s m a l l h i l l concealed t h e m . F u r t h e r , he tells us that Conan o f Britt a n y d i e d in the battle a n d reports that he had seen his grave on the site i n q u e s t i o n . This is convincing evidence of the location and R a l p h ' s account o f the b a t t l e is interesting. According to h i m the c r u s a d e r s deployed, h i d d e n f r o m the enemy by a small h i l l , and

(Heidelberg, 1890), pp. 5 0 - 8 passages

n u m b e r 7 and 8 ( 2 ) , and sec also 6, 9, 10, M y own work confirms this dependence. Aleppo Chronicle, p. 579.

2

4

2

H a g c n m e y c r , Kreuziugsbriefe,

Warfare,

p. 171 follows this interpretation.

p p . 1 4 9 - 5 2 ; R C , 647- 8 .

248

VICTORY

IN THE

The siege: crisis and delivery

EAST

charged at them; this disconcerted the enemy w h o feared t h a t more were concealed behind the h i l l . T h e suggestion is that i t was an ambush which succeeded because the a t t a c k w i t h lances f o r w a r d (erectis haslis) was fully co-ordinated a n d the enemy were apprehensive that the little h i l l m i g h t conceal more troops. A l b e r t ' s account is suspect because he tells us t h a t A d h e m a r , w h o p r o b a b l y was away, played a major role, t h a t R a y m o n d o f Toulouse, w h o m no other account mentions, was present, a n d t h a t R o b e r t o f N o r mandy, who was probably away at Laodicea, fought. H o w e v e r , we have no very definite evidence of where they a l l were and R a y m o n d does not mention the count o f Toulouse i n his account o f the infantry fighting back at Antioch. M o r e o v e r , T u d e b o d e says that Adhemar, Eustace o f Boulogne and R o b e r t o f N o r m a n d y w e r e left behind to defend the c a m p . A l b e r t agrees w i t h the A n o n y m o u s that the 700 knights set out by n i g h t . T h i s is a n i m p o r t a n t p o i n t for any force crossing the I r o n Bridge i n d a y l i g h t w o u l d have been observed either by scouts or from H a r e m . A t day-break, A l b e r t says, they sent forward scouts led by W a l t e r o f St-Valeri-sur-Somme and Bohemond the T u r k on the basis o f whose i n f o r m a t i o n A d h e m a r and the other leaders led a charge i n t o the massed ranks o f the enemy who fled. Albert's account tends to exalt the role o f G o d f r e y and ignore Bohemond, but he does add the i n t e r e s t i n g d e t a i l t h a t the enemy's resistance was somewhat lessened because heavy r a i n had made their bows useless.

249

Antioch Lake (Amikgölu) ^_

Night ot 8 February, Bohemond deploys his force behind IheTaylnat Hill.

Phase 1 :

In six squadrons they ambush the forward squadrons of Ridwan's army which fall back on the main force as II tries to deploy, causing disorder.

Phase 2 :

The mass of Ridwan's main force resists the disorder then Is put to flight by the charge of Bohemond's reserve.

1 0 ,

»

Spot height

43

44

We have, therefore, two views of the battle - t h a t o f R a y m o n d o f Aguilers who portrays i t as a defensive struggle i n w h i c h the c r u saders stood between the river and the lake, a n d t h a t o f A l b e r t a n d Ralph who portray i t as an ambush. T h e account o f the A n o n y m o u s is very much that of one caught u p i n the event a n d , w h i l e undoubtedly true as far as i t goes, lacks context a n d c o u l d be r e a d as corroborating either view. I n fact, the c r u c i a l factor is l o c a t i o n . What is certain from the information o f R a l p h is t h a t the b a t t l e w a s fought beyond the I r o n Bridge and t h a t a h i l l featured i n i t . T o this wc can add that the army was between the r i v e r a n d t h e l a k e , 1 3

RA, pp. 56, says that the leaders met on 8 February: ' i n the house o f the bishop' w h i c h wrongly suggests that he was away, and later tells us that Count Raymond had been i l l for " „

0

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f

'

h

(

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T 'rll ttT

6 3 !

R

0

b

c

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™ Present, and to this list common sense w o u l d a S^nhl t 8 " ofVermandois who seem to have spent much l i m e w i t h Stephen, but this list is a guess; FT o u AA, 380- 2. ' H u

4 4

n

° a nd Boh<:m a Credand J J

T

F

4

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To Antioch

N Phase 2 Talnal Hoyilgp

Bohemond

•10V

Fig. 9

The Lake Baltic: 9 February 1098

according to the Anonymous and others. T h e l a n d beyond the Orontcs is a r o l l i n g plain w i t h elevations between 86 metres and 90 metres crossed west-east b y the A n t i o c h - A l e p p o road w h i c h climbs very gently away f r o m the I r o n Bridge. T o the n o r t h and below the 8r metres contour line was the great A n t i o c h Lake (Amikgolu) whose southern shore was then quite close to the road, probably on the 86

250

VICTORY

The siege: crisis and delivery

I N THE EAST

metres contour line. A little over two k i l o m e t r e s east o f the I r o n Bridge, and on the north side o f the road i s a h i l l , the T a i n a t H ö y ü ğ ü (Arabic, Tell Tayinat), rising to 101 metres, a n d 622 metres long and 503 metres wide. I t was surely here t h a t the battle took place, for this site agrees perfectly w i t h w h a t R a l p h a n d the other sources tell us - a small hill between the river a n d the lake (see fig. 9 ) . By taking up this position just north o f the r o a d B o h e m o n d was p l a c i n g the enemy towards the river, as the A n o n y m o u s suggests. I t was a terrible risk, for behind and to his left l a y a marsh, a n d t h e only retreat back to the I r o n Bridge w o u l d b e c u t i f the enemy broke through along the road. But i f the crusaders h a d w a n t e d t o block Ridwan's path and fight a g r i n d i n g b a t t l e they w o u l d surely have chosen to do so at the I r o n Bridge w h e r e geography gave t h e m advantages and where their infantry w o u l d have been v e r y useful. I t is evident that the crusaders, and specifically B o h e m o n d , decided to attack Ridwan before he was prepared, h e n c e the secret d e p a r t u r e by night and the decision to take only c a v a l r y whose m o b i l i t y w o u l d enable them to prepare an ambush. I n a n y case t h e b a t t l e was extremely well conceived. The crusaders c o u l d n o t afford t o stand on the defensive and they outmanoeuvred R i d w a n b y m a r c h i n g by night and ambushing him. T h e i r troops w e r e marshalled i n squad­ rons which made control easier. T h e y o b v i o u s l y kept together and because of surprise and the wet weather w h i c h i n h i b i t e d the use o f bows, they were able to close w i t h the e n e m y i n w h a t seems t o have been a tight compact formation. Ridwan's m a i n force was preceded by two squadrons, according to the A n o n y m o u s , and i t w o u l d have been these that the initial charge o f Bohemond's five f o r w a r d units took i n the flank. These two squadrons fell back a n d b e c a m e enmeshed with the main body. A t this p o i n t the sheer mass o f the enemy army threatened to break t h r o u g h the crusader a r m y , b u t Bohemond recognised the crisis o f the b a t t l e a n d unleashed his reserve whose charge finally crushed the d i s o r d e r e d enemy. T h i s 4 5

4 5

The Lake of Antioch has now all but vanished due to drainage schemes. P r e - w a r maps snow it to have been three to four kilometres north o f the Aleppo road, b u t , b y then, drainage efforts had made an impact on its size. M o r e o v e r , Raymond o f A g u i l e r ' s Ün uT u .° « »t>ove the r i v e r refers to mid-winter w h e n i t would have been at as greatest. There are other mounds along this road (indeed, the f S " ! . ) ™ Tayinat is the o n l y one which can be described as Or, l 7 ? P P ° " » d i ' is aligned N E t o SW. U

d 0 U c t

W a S

W H

h

n l y

l h e m

C

dmZZi

t

b

n d

W

0 k i l o m e t r

u

t

tt

h

h

351

was generalship o f a v e r y h i g h order and shows the crusaders maxi­ mising their resources and learning from the enemy. The use of a reserve q u i t e clearly h e l d back to engage the enemy m a i n force once committed is the salient feature o f Bohemond's dispositions. T h e Anonymous a n d A l b e r t speak o f a sharp charge i n squadrons, and R a l p h of Caen adds t h a t this occurred, erectis hastis-the suggestion is of a classic charge o f knights w i t h couched spears falling upon an exposed enemy. T h e coherence and discipline of the crusader army enabled i t t o destroy a much larger force which may well have expected t h e m t o fight defensively o n the I r o n Bridge. I t was the aggressive tactics of Bohemond w h i c h w o n the battle. But there was here a f u r t h e r p o i n t o f some importance for the future. This was the first time the crusaders had fought a major engagement under single command: a t D o r y l a e u m nobody was i n command, while there was a similar p r o b l e m i n December 1097. This raised the question of an overall leader. I t was perhaps no coincidence that shortly after this Stephen of Blois seems t o have been chosen as overall commander. T h e success a t the L a k e Battle ushered i n the t h i r d and decisive phase o f the siege, d u r i n g w h i c h the crusaders were able to tighten the screw o n A n t i o c h (sec fig. 10). I t must have been a great relief that H a r e m , c o m m a n d i n g the approaches to the I r o n Bridge now passed to the A r m e n i a n s . T h e defeat of R i d w a n happened at a happy m o m e n t , for i n the crusader camp were envoys from Egypt who h a d come i n response to the embassy they had sent by sea earlier. T h i s delegation was given the heads o f slain enemies as tokens o f v i c t o r y . T h e y seem to have stayed for some time according to the A n o n y m o u s w h o mentions their presence i n the camp on 9 F e b r u a r y a n d at St Symcon i n the wake o f the victory over the garrison o n t h e St Symeon road on 6 M a r c h . Stephen o f Blois a c t u a l l y says t h a t some k i n d o f understanding was reached with them: ' t h e E m p e r o r o f B a b y l o n . . . established peace and concord w i t h us', w h i l e A l b e r t o f A i x describes this as a friendly meeting and i n the context of the siege of Jerusalem accuses the Fatimids of having b r o k e n the agreement then made. Islamic t r a d i t i o n strongly asserts that a t this t i m e the E g y p t i a n V i z i r , al-Afdal, pursued a policy o f friendship towards the Franks and that indeed he later regretted t h i s . F r o m the F a t i m i d p o i n t o f view the westerners could offer 46

47

48

c

e l a k c

S

c

t n o r l h

o

f t

h

e A l e

t " " " l ' î ™ ^ ' ° ' disfigured by an abandoned factory of 1950s vintage. h

e r

a d

İ s

a

M

o

s

l

e

m

c

e

m

e

t

r

v

.

but the top o f the h i l l is

** Sec below p. 2 5 6 .

«

4 7

Aleppo Chronicle, p . 579.

O n the sending o f the embassy sec above p. 2 1 1 ; GF, pp. 3 7 , 43; R A , p. 58; AA, 379, 383, 463,

4

n

4 5 ; Hagcnmeycr, Kreutzugsbriefe,

pp. 6 4 5 .

pp. 149-52;

Köhler, Allianzen

und Verträge,

252

VICTORY IN THE

The siege: crisis and delivery

EAST

1

km

2

^

i m p o r t a n t aid against the T u r k s and indeed i n July 1098 i n the wake of Kerbogah's defeat they were able to seize Jerusalem. The question o f Jerusalem was o f course an important stumbling block for only t w e n t y years before i t h a d been i n Egyptian hands. Raymond of Aguilers, w h o gives the o n l y clear account of the terms of discussion, reports t h a t the a r m y was w i l l i n g to agree to ally w i t h al-Afdal and restore to h i m all t h a t he h a d lost to the Turks, provided that he w o u l d give them Jerusalem and the lands around it. However i f a l - A f d a l saw the crusade as p r i m a r i l y a Byzantine expedition i t was possible to see this demand for an arrangement there i n the light of the p a s t Byzantine protectorate over the c i t y . I t is clear that some k i n d o f modus uiuendi was reached w i t h the Egyptians which perhaps a n t i c i p a t e d , r a t h e r t h a n agreed, the formation of a protectorate over J e r u s a l e m o n earlier Byzantine models. A crusader delegation r e t u r n e d to Cairo w i t h the E g y p t i a n emissaries and was to spend a year t h e r e . T h i s may well have contributed to the inactivity of the leaders i n the summer and a u t u m n o f 1098 and increased their r e l u c t a n c e to attack the F a t i m i d sphere o f influence, something w h i c h was undertaken o n l y reluctantly. 49

50

I t was the a r r i v a l o f an English fleet at St Symeon on 4 March 1098 w h i c h enabled the crusaders to take the next step i n tightening the siege. T h e f o l l o w i n g day a meeting of the leaders resolved to b u i l d a counterfort outside the Bridge Gate, and Bohemond and R a y m o n d o f St Gillcs were dispatched to escort the sailors and reinforcements b r i n g i n g up material from the coast. I t is hardly s u r p r i s i n g that this evoked a very sharp response from the garrison w h o a m b u s h e d the convoy a n d dispersed i t , only to be defeated *

3 0

Fig. 10

Siege of Antioch, M a r c h - M a y 1098

9

R A , p p . 109 10; K ö h l e r , Allianzen und Verträge, p. 6 4 . Köhler pp. 56-69, thinks that the Kgyptians saw the crusade as a Byzantine force but their ambassadors were at Antioch for a m o n t h and had the chance to examine the crusader legates who returned with them for a year; even i f there were also Byzantine emissaries there, they could hardly have failed to understand the differences. However, this does not alter the possibility that they were prepared to consider making arrangements reflecting earlier Byzantine dealings with the new force. K ö h l e r , Allianzen und Vertragen, p. 6 0 , suggests that they were accompanied by a Greek embassy, but there is no evidence for this. Indeed, given that Tatikios had left the crusader camp b y the time of their arrival, it is difficult to think who would have had the authority to create a Byzantine delegation. Lilie, Byzanz, pp. 51-2, thinks it is unlikely that the Byzantines would have wished to see contact between their allies and Egypt and is sceptical o f R a y m o n d ofAguilers' report of the contacts between Egypt and the crusade, which he sees i n the light o f this writer's known hostility to Byzantium. Köhler, Allianzen und Verträgen, pp. 6 6 8 argues strongly that Raymond was reliable in this context. Essentially, i l seems unlikely that Raymond would have invented such controversial material.

The siege: crisis and delivery 2^4

VICTORY

IN THE

when reinforcements were called up. T h i s a c t i o n received considerable and detailed attention, as we have n o t e d , because i t t o o k place close to the crusader camp. A l b e r t o f A i x says t h a t i t was G o d f r e y , acting on the orders of Adhémar, who organised the c o u n t e r - a t t a c k . He sent out ten knights to reconnoitre, a n d these were challenged b y twenty Turks. When thirty knights were sent t h e enemy responded with sixty and, as a result, a general mêlée developed a n d t h e garrison was drawn into a sharp battle i n f r o n t o f t h e B r i d g e G a t e and driven back onto i t . Godfrey c o m m a n d e d this a n d d i s t i n g u i s h e d himself by hacking a Turkish k n i g h t i n h a l f despite his h a u b e r k , Raymond of Aguilers says that Godfrey played a v e r y n o t a b l e p a r t cutting the enemy i n two and adds t h a t early i n the a c t i o n a Provençal knight, Ysoard of Ganges, led a n i n f a n t r y c h a r g e against the enemy with distinction. Ambushes o f this k i n d were t h e staple of Turkish warfare and in particular o f the w a r o f a t t r i t i o n . T h i s kind of action continued even after the establishment o f the M a h o m mcries Tower which was confided to the care o f C o u n t R a y m o n d . So important was the Bridge Gate that the T u r k s attacked t h e n e w fort savagely, forcing an action i n w h i c h the c o u n t d i s t i n g u i s h e d himself. I t was presumably i n an effort to p r e v e n t this k i n d o f t h i n g that the leaders attempted to destroy the b r i d g e w i t h a p e n t h o u s e and all but succeeded. The Mahommeries T o w e r , as the crusaders called i t , was built on a hill, the site of a M o s l e m cemetery, close to the Bridge Gate. The entire west side o f the O r o n t e s is n o w a built-up area with considerable alterations t o its t o p o g r a p h y . However, about fifty metres beyond a n d to the r i g h t o f t h e b r i d g e the land slopes quite sharply northwards: by contrast, there is o n l y a gendc rise to the left. I t is likely that the t o w e r was erected i n this area where, in the nineteenth century, there was still a M o s l e m cemetery. W i t h the Bridge Gate blocked, t h e crusaders w e r e t h e n able to complete the siege by establishing T a n c r e d at a m o n a s t e r y outside the St George Gate on 5 A p r i l 1098 where s h o r t l y b e f o r e a 51

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crusader r a i d had c a p t u r e d a r i c h booty of horses (see fig. i ) . He would soon capture a r i c h caravan attempting to enter the city. Because he was a secondary leader T a n c r e d had to be subsidised to the tune o f 400 silver marks, o f w h i c h 100 were provided by Raymond o f Toulouse. * 0

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The active role o f R a y m o n d o f Toulouse at this time is very notable. R a y m o n d of Aguilers says t h a t he had been i l l earlier i n the siege and was seeking to re-establish his reputation, and there may be truth i n this. However, he h a d led a foraging expedition, albeit abortive, i n t o Syria, p l a y e d a m a j o r role i n the fighting on the St Symeon r o a d and taken responsibility for the Mahommeries tower which was b o u n d to b e a flashpoint, as w e l l as subsidising Tancred. He seems to have been wealthier t h a n the other leaders and to have had the largest army, for T u d e b o d e remarks that he was given the new counterfort 'because he had m o r e knights i n his household and also more to g i v e ' . B o h c m o n d also had a formidable reputation at this time; he had l e d the expedition against Harem, accepted custody of M a l r c g a r d , led the foraging expedition, commanded the army w h i c h defeated R i d w a n of A l e p p o a n d played a major part i n the fighting on the St Symeon r o a d . By any standard these were the two leading princes i n the a r m y , so i t is very odd that in his second l e t t e r to his wife Stephen o f Blois announced that he had been made b y the other princes ' l o r d and director and governor of all their acts up to the present t i m e ' and this is supported by other sources. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , we do n o t k n o w when this election was held, though the natural sense of the passage i n Raymond of Aguilers suggests f a i r l y shortly before the capture o f the city i n June 1098. Certainly Stephen d i d n o t c o m m a n d any major military action o f which wc k n o w . T h e suggestion t h a t he was a k i n d of quartermaster isscductivc, b u t h a r d l y i n accord w i t h the terms used by the sources, the Anonymous's ductor and R a y m o n d ' s dictator.™ I t can only be a guess b u t perhaps he was chosen to chair the meetings of the leaders, possibly at Easter 1098. H e seems to have been i l l shortly after that and so never exercised a n y real a u t h o r i t y . Certainly such an appointment w o u l d have been logical by the spring of 1098, for the blockade o f the city was n o w very t i g h t and needed a high degree o f co-ordination for its maintenance. T h e council of leaders was prob¬ 55

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p. 149; GF, p. 6 3 ; R A , p. 77.

The siege: crisis and delivery 2 5

6

VICTORY

IN THE

ably the only way i n which final a u t h o r i t y c o u l d be exercised, b u t the near-disaster of the foraging battle a n d the success i n the L a k e Battle exposed its limitations. T h e a r m y needed a single c o m m a n der, even though such a dominance was a l i e n to the leaders, and t h i s was' a step towards giving i t one. T h e y agreed o n S t e p h e n of B l o i s who never seems to have been a masterful personality. The blockade was not, o f course, perfect. I t c o u l d n o t be because access to the city via the mountains was always possible. H o w e v e r , the key importance of the steps w h i c h they h a d t a k e n , a n d e s p e c i a l l y of the blocking of the Bridge Gate, was clearly recognised. A l b e r t has a long imaginary passage i n w h i c h S u l a y m a n advises Y a g h i s i y a n to seek aid from Kerbogah, and messengers are sent a l l o v e r t h e Moslem world to such exotic places as S a m a r k a n d a n d K h o r a s a n . I t is a piece o f high drama, signally poetic a n d i n t e r e s t i n g because i t refers to many real people, amongst t h e m B a l d u k o f S a m o s a t a . T h e drama of the piece underlines the p o i n t m a d e at t h e s t a r t - t h e building of the new counterforts meant t h a t the fate o f A n t i o c h n o w lay i n the hands of its allies. Even so, there was still m u c h h a r d fighting for the crusaders. Albert describes t h e sufferings o f t h e a r m y and i n particular the dearth o f horses. B a l d w i n sent h e l p f r o m Edessa, including horses and arms. I t was at this t i m e t h a t N i c h o s s u s of Tcll-Bashir sent a tent to Godfrey, b u t this was seized b y h i s r i v a l Bagrat of Cyrrhus who diverted i t t o B o h e m o n d . T h i s c a u s e d dissension i n the crusader camp as Godfrey and his a l l y R o b e r t o f Flanders confronted the N o r m a n ; probably the story reflects F r a n kish involvement i n the rivalries of the A r m e n i a n p r i n c e s . The supply situation must have been considerably eased b y t h e e s t a b lishment of outposts around A n t i o c h b y some o f t h e l e a d e r s : Raymond o f Toulouse continued to h o l d R u j i n S y r i a , w h i l e Godfrey and Robert o f Flanders d o m i n a t e d the ' A f r i n v a l l e y , a n d Tancred may have been charged w i t h H a r e m a n d p e r h a p s ' I m m (both o f which he held i n the summer o f 1098) on the A l e p p o r o a d . But there was also much fighting. After the a t t e m p t to d e s t r o y t h e bridge with a penthouse, Peter T u d e b o d e tells us t h a t R a y n a l d Porchet, a knight who had been captured, was led o n t o t h e w a l l o f the city and, i n the sight of the Christian a r m y r e q u i r e d t o r e n o u n c e his religion. When he refused he was beheaded at t h e o r d e r o f Yaghisiyan who also burned to death other prisoners h e l d i n t h e 59

6 0

61

62

63

64

65

The i d e n t i t y o f F i r u z a n d his reasons for betrayal are naturally interesting. T h e A n o n y m o u s tells us n o t h i n g about h i m except his « «

RC, pp. 6 3 9 - 4 0 ; PT, pp. 51 2. Hagcnmcycr, Krcutzugsbriefc, Bouchicr, Antioch, pp. 2 1 7 1 9 , 9 4 6 - 7 ; Cahcn, Turkey, p. 77. 8 5

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A A , 395-6 and sec above p.

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157-60.

AA, 400, says that Bohemond had made contact with Firuz seven months before; Alcxiad, p. 344; Aleppo Chronicle,

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city. O f course such savagery served a political purpose - to make it difficult for any o f the garrison to betray the city by exacerbating hostility a n d , i n this case, p l a y i n g on religious hatred. A little later, Ansclm tells us that some o f the enemy pretended to be w i l l i n g to surrender the city, t h e n t r a p p e d and killed the crusaders, including Guy the Constable, w h o tried to receive their surrender. The story of the c a p t u r e of A n t i o c h is a familiar and dramatic tale of betrayal. Perhaps the crusaders knew t h a t A n t i o c h had fallen to a similar act o f treachery i n 969 a n d that the Turkish capture of 1086 also owed m u c h to t r e a c h e r y . T h e story as told by the Anonymous has been generally accepted by historians. He reports that one Pirus (translated as F i r u z ) , the commander of three towers, 'struck up a great friendship w i t h B o h e m o n d ' w h o approached the other leaders and suggested that a single commander should be appointed who should be given control o f the city. A n n a Comnena says that Bohemond, confident i n his arrangements w i t h Firuz, proposed a competitive siege w i t h the w i n n e r being given the city, and Kemal ad-Din says much the s a m e . T h i s idea was rejected on the grounds [hat all h a d shared i n the l a b o u r and all should share i n the rewards. Shortly after news came o f an enemy relief army, i n fact that of Kerbogah A t a b e g of M o s u l , and an assembly o f the leaders agreed that i f Bohemond c o u l d seize the city he should have i t , providing that the emperor did n o t come t o their a i d . Bohemond then got in touch w i t h Firuz who sent h i m his son as a hostage, and suggested that on the next day the a r m y should pretend to prepare to go out into the Saracen lands. T h e n , i n council w i t h Godfrey, Robert of Flanders, R a y m o n d o f Toulouse and the Legate, i t was arranged lhat the forces o f knights a n d foot i n this expedition should separately approach Firuz's towers, the former b y the plain, the latter by the mountains. There followed a n exciting episode, i n which the Anonymous clearly p a r t i c i p a t e d , as the crusaders got into the city. I n all this the only date mentioned is the fall o f the city on the night of 2-3 June 1 0 9 8 .

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2 8

VICTORY

5

IN THE

name. Raymond of Aguilers says that he was an unnamed T u r k , on w h i c h point Fulcher agrees but tells a fanciful story of h i m being commanded to betray the city i n a vision. A l b e r t tells us n o t h i n g about the betrayer but says that a converted T u r k called Bohernond was active in the negotiations, and he appears to be repeating camp gossip when he says that i t was believed that Bohernond had captured the betrayer's son i n a skirmish. BarHebraeus says that a Persian betrayed the c i t y . R a l p h of Caen gives no name but says that the betrayer was a r i c h A r m e n i a n whose wealth had been confiscated by Yaghisiyan, and t h a t he sent w o r d to Bohernond because of his high reputation, although the towers held by himself and his family were some distance away. A n n a Comnena agrees that the traitor was an A r m e n i a n renegade and this is supported by Michael the Syrian who simply says that Armenians betrayed the city. This identification receives support o f a k i n d from Matthew of Edessa w h o describes the t r a i t o r as one o f the chief men of the city b u t gives no n a t i o n a l i t y . T h e Damascus Chronicle describes the betrayer as an armourer i n the service o f Yaghisiyan called Firuz, information also adduced by I b n a l - A t h i r . K e m a l a d - D i n names the armourer as Z a r r a d and says t h a t he was punished by Yaghisiyan for h o a r d i n g . I n a city w i t h a polyglot population such confusion is not unnatural and i t is t e m p t i n g to see a t t r i t i o n working upon a man of uncertain loyalty, perhaps A r m e nian, straining his relations w i t h his master - hoarding is a classic crime o f shortage. However, we cannot be certain of the t r u t h o f such a n elegant and symmetrical explanation, although we can be reasonably sure that Ralph's remark that Bohernond h a d promised h i m great wealth and honour is a better explanation for his behaviour than are the friendship proposed by the A n o n y m o u s and the miracle reported by Fulcher. 66

67

68

69

But the question of the dating o f events is rather difficult and a matter of some importance. The date o f the fall o f A n t i o c h o n the This Turk Bohernond was presumably identical with Bohernond the converted T u r k , whom Raymond of Aguilers mentions in connection with the negotiations at Ascalon as having been the godchild ofthe Bohernond himself: RA, p. , ; RA, p. 6 4 ; FC, pp. 9 8 - ^ ; . 3 9 9 - 4 0 0 ; Bar-Hcbraeus, p. 334. ^ RC, 65 i-a; Anna's dating at this point is very erratic, for she evidently confuses the relief expeduions of Ridwan and Kerbogah, on which see France, 'Departure o f Tatikios", 138-9, Altnad, p. 342; Michael, p. 184; Matthew, 39.

n i g h t of 2-3 J u n e 1098 is n o t i n d o u b t . W h a t the chronology o f t h e Anonymous w o u l d suggest is that Bohernond opened the question o f A n t i o c h at a n unspecified date before its f a l l , then reopened the question w h e n news had come o f t h e approach o f Kerbogah's a r m y . A t this c o u n c i l he was promised the city. A few days of exchanges ensued, t h e n F i r u z suggested that 'on the m o r r o w ' , i.e. 2 J u n e , the a r m y set off o n its feigned march. As i t happens, the date o f this council o f leaders can be fixed, because A l b e r t o f A i x says t h a t rumours o f t h e approach o f Kerbogah's army h a d caused the leaders to send o u t reconnaissance forces i n all directions. These reported the presence o f t h e enemy to an assembly o f leaders w h i c h met and promised B o h e r n o n d the city, seven days before Kerbogah's a r r i v a l 29 M a y 1 0 9 8 . A c c o r d i n g to Fulcher of Chartres, Kerbogah's army besieged Edessa for three weeks before m o v i n g o n to A n t i o c h where we know its first elements arrived the day after the crusader capture o f t h e city o n 4 J u n e . M a t t h e w of Edessa confirms t h a t there was such a siege b u t gives no dates other than to say t h a t the siege lasted u n t i l the harvest t i m e . A l b e r t says that the attack o n Edessa lasted a mere three days, b u t Fulcher was most certainly present at Edessa at this t i m e . I f we a l l o w a week for the army to reach A n t i o c h f r o m Edessa, this suggests t h a t the siege lasted f r o m 4-25 M a y 1098. The p r o b l e m is t h a t as we have noted, the crusaders were i n close touch w i t h Edessa a n d its o u t l y i n g fortresses were o n l y a day or two's m a r c h away, y e t they appear to have been e n t i r e l y ignorant o f the enemy attack u n t i l late M a y ; i f we allow four days for the reconnaissance force to g o out and r e t u r n , then their ignorance still lasted u n t i l 21 M a y , b y w h i c h time, A l b e r t says, rumours were causing constern a t i o n i n the crusader camp. T h e approach to Edessa of such a huge a r m y as t h a t c r e d i t e d to Kerbogah could h a r d l y have been a secret affair, and i n d e e d A l b e r t says that B a l d w i n k n e w enough o f i t to arrange to a t t a c k its advance guard ' w i t h the bows o f t h e Armenians a n d the lances o f t h e Franks' very successfully. I t is quite cxtra70

71

72

73

70 As Hagcnmeyer, Chronologic no. 265, comments, citing GF, p. 4 8 (and many derivatives); R A , p. 66; letters o f Anselm of Ribemont, People o f Lucca, and Princes to Urban I I , Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbricfc,

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The siege: crisis and delivery

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F C p 101; i t must be said that the major Arab chronicles, o f Aleppo and Damascus and I b n al-Athir, do n o t mention the siege of Edessa, though the Aleppo Chronicle, 5 8 0 , says t h a t they attacked Tell-Mannas which was restored to D u q a q who took tribute and hostages. A A , 397.

260

VICTORY

ordinary that the crusaders should have been u n a w a r e o f t h e presence of an enormous and hostile army only a few days m a r c h a w a y . I t is true that they seem to have bumped i n t o the r e l i e f force o f Duqaq in December 1097 but that was c o m i n g u p f r o m deep i n hostile Syria. They certainly had to p l a n hastily for the a p p r o a c h o f Ridwan in February 1098 b u t Aleppo was fairly close — R a y m o n d o f Aguilers says only a two day march away - and t h e y d i d n o t c o n t r o l the approaches along the r o a d . Baldwin o f Edessa was a w a r e o f Kerbogah's approach - he was clearly not taken b y surprise. Perhaps the inaction was due to a mistaken a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e purpose of the attack. Kerbogah has been m u c h b l a m e d f o r spending time attacking Edessa, g i v i n g the crusaders the o p p o r t u n i t y t o seize Antioch. I t is worth n o t i n g , however, t h a t he d i d n o t k n o w Antioch was going to fall and that his arguments w i t h Y a g h i s i y a n ' s son over terms seem to have gone o n very late i n the d a y . M o r e importantly, we need to recognise that the army w h i c h he raised was an alliance and that this had implications. K e r b o g a h was a c t i n g o n the authority of Bagdad but he had to deal w i t h i n d e p e n d e n t r u l e r s and at some stage he had to gather his army. I t is possible t h a t h e chose to bring much of i t together at Edessa where an a t t a c k m i g h t bring results and would in any case please the l o c a l M o s l e m r u l e r s . His attack there was perhaps not at first perceived as a t h r e a t to t h e main crusader army at Antioch, especially as h i s force m a y h a v e been gathering strength. Kerbogah could not take the s h o r t r o u t e from Mosul to Antioch via Sindjar and A l e p p o because o f t h e hostility of Ridwan. Instead he must have travelled v i a N u s a y b i n (ancient Nisbis) to Edessa. A l b e r t says that K e r b o g a h c o n c e n t r a t e d his forces at Sooch, perhaps Tell ach-Chaikh near M a r d i n , before 7 4

T T °V? ' g together a v e r y large n u m b e r oi allies; rulcher lists twenty-eight of w h o m seven a r e also m e n tioned by Albert. O f the twenty-eight no fewer t h a n fourteen c a n b e identified including five o f those i n common w i t h A l b e r t w h o , however adds another three, Pulagit, Amasa of N i z a n d A m a s a o f U i z n who arc unknown, plus R i d w a n who definitely never j o i n e d he army. O f those identified five are confirmed b y K e m a l a d - D i n g

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261

The siege: crisis and delivery

I N T H E EAST

the allies o f K e r b o g a h : D u q a q o f Damascus, Arslan-Tasch o f Sindjar, Q a r a d j a of H a r r a n , Balduk o f Samosata, Janah-ad-Daulah of Horns, T u g h t i g i n a t a b e g of Damascus, Sokman of M a r d i n whose A r t u k i d c l a n also h e l d Jerusalem, the A r a b commander Wassab i b n - M a h m u d to w h o m c a n be added the sons of Yaghisiyan, Shamsad-Daulah and M u h a m m e d . Fulcher's Emir Bajac may well be Albert's Balas o f A m a c h a a n d Sororgia, for this town was involved in the politics o f Edessa and w o u l d have been known to both of t h e m . Overall, i t was a huge a r m y ; M a t t h e w o f Edessa suggests incredible figures o f 800,000 c a v a l r y and 300,000 foot attacking a Frankish force of 15,000 knights a n d 50,000 foot, while Bar-Hebraeus and Michael the Syrian settle f o r 100,000 mounted men. Such figures are probably fantasy, b u t the Damascus Chronicle says that they were an 'uncountable f o r c e ' . I t was certainly a very large army indeed and its c o n c e n t r a t i o n must h a v e taken time both for military and diplomatic reasons. F u r t h e r , the concentration at Edessa could only have been p a r t i a l - t h e chroniclers are surely listing the army as it was at its greatest a n d we have already noted the comment of Kemal ad-Din t h a t en r o u t e D u q a q subjugated Tell-Mannas, a city to the east of M a ' a r r a ( M a ' a r r a t , an-Nu'man) w h i c h had asked for Frankish a i d . T h i s a n d simple geography suggest that the Damascene force came up t o meet K e r b o g a h at A n t i o c h . K e m a l ad-Din also reports the presence i n the M o s l e m army o f nomads, probably from Asia M i n o r , w h o feared R i d w a n , and Bar-Hebraeus reports that Kerbogah's a r m y , perhaps m e a n i n g elements o f it, encamped at Baghras w h i c h is a t the foot o f the Belen pass (see figs. 4 and 7 ) . I n his account o f the reconnaissance forces sent out by the crusader leaders, A l b e r t stresses t h a t they reported to the leaders that the enemy were coming f r o m a l l d i r e c t i o n s . This suggests an army gathering strength as i t w e n t a l o n g , a process requiring careful military and d i p l o m a t i c p r e p a r a t i o n w h i c h may well explain both the delay at Edessa a n d the f a i l u r e of t h e Franks to recognise its size and ultimate purpose. 7 7

78

79

8 0

81

82

"

Gahen, L a Syne du JVW, p . 215. 35 identifies the Boldagis of Fulchcr and Buldagiso of A A with Bouldadji ofDjahan, b u t A A 390, 392, 409 makes it clear that he was the son ol Yaghisiyan.

w M a t U K W . ^ g , 42; Bar-Hebraeus, p . 235; Michael, p. 184; Damascus Chronicle ojlk

Crusades,

p . 45' >» Sec above p . 2 6 0 . Aleppo Chronicle, 583; Bar-Hebraeus, p. 235. « A A , 398; the leaders, says Albert, tried to keep the news secret for fear of demoralising the army. 8 1

262

VICTORY

IN THE

Once the nature and scale o f the threat w h i c h K e r b o g a h posed was known to the crusader leaders they acted very q u i c k l y . Bohemond had demanded a price for entry into the city a n d s o m e t h i n g like i t was quickly conceded. A l b e r t simply says t h a t all p r o m i s e d the city to Bohemond, b u t the Anonymous makes the p r o m i s e conditional and makes the leaders say that 'we w i l l thereafter give i t to h i m gladly, on condition that i f the emperor come t o o u r a i d a n d fulfil all his obligations which he promised a n d v o w e d , w e w i l l return the city to him as it is right to d o . ' E v e n this is p r o b a b l y a n overstatement. As we have noted the A n o n y m o u s tends to exaggerate the obligations of Alexius to the army, a n d i f there h a d e v e r been any question of the emperor coming i n person, as this passage suggests, then there would have been n o grounds for a n a r g u m e n t i n November 1098. Rather, even under the extreme pressure o f this desperate situation, the leaders were m i n d f u l o f the oaths t h e y h a d sworn and o f all the benefits that they had received i n the p a s t a n d might receive in the future, and promised o n l y t h a t B o h e m o n d could have the city i f the emperor d i d not make a r r a n g e m e n t s t o take and protect i t . This promise appears to have been m a d e b y a very small coterie of leaders. A l b e r t says that all met to discuss t h e report of the coming of the enemy a r m y a n d a debate t o o k p l a c e with Godfrey, Robert of Flanders and R a y m o n d of T o u l o u s e u r g i n g that the army as a whole march out to attack K e r b o g a h , w h i l e others urged that the camp should be manned and the a r m y d i v i d e d as before. I t was then that Bohemond took aside Godfrey, R o b e r t o f r landers and Raymond of Toulouse to a secret place a n d t o l d t h e m 01 the plot with Firuz and his demand to be r u l e r o f the c i t y , t o which they then agreed. 8 3

Ralph of Caen tells us later that Tancred was kept i n i g n o r a n c e o f the plot to seize the city and the arrangements for i t . T h e A n o n y mous says that it was Firuz's idea to pretend t h a t a section o f t h e JET ° P y order to l u l l t h e 8 4

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h e l d by F i r u z . T h e A n o n y m o u s simply says that by night knights r e t u r n e d b y the p l a i n a n d the footsoldiers by the mountain to the a p p o i n t e d s p o t . O n 2 J u n e this expedition set out and under cover of n i g h t t u r n e d back a n d r e t u r n e d to what the Anonymous has Firuz call 'the western m o u n t a i n ' , the southern side of the defences, for i t is clear t h a t F i r u z ' s tower was on that side of the c i t y . The Anonym o u s has F i r u z suggest this feint so that the army 'should pretend to go o u t a n d p l u n d e r the l a n d o f the Saracens', which is rather an odd statement, for a t this c r i t i c a l j u n c t u r e nobody would have been t h i n k i n g o f such a t h i n g . H o w e v e r , i t is probably expressed this way because t h e d i r e c t i o n o f their m a r c h reminded the Anonymous of the e x p e d i t i o n w h i c h led to the Foraging Battle, for i t was surely in t h a t d i r e c t i o n t h a t they set out. Once into the mountains by Daphne the a r m y p r o b a b l y rested, t h e n the infantry took the paths into the m o u n t a i n s towards the back road and Firuz's tower, while the c a v a l r y r o d e back u p towards the St George Gate then climbed on foot to t h e a p p o i n t e d spot (see fig. 11). Once they had gathered u n d e r cover o f n i g h t t h e y prepared to m o u n t a two-pronged attack. A l b e r t ' s i n f o r m a n t s were w i t h Godfrey, while the Anonymous was w i t h B o h e m o n d ' s force, a n d this conditions their accounts. 85

86

T h e A n o n y m o u s p a r t i c i p a t e d i n the secret entry into the city and describes i t as a c o m m a n d o r a i d by an elite group. A party of knights a p p r o a c h e d the w a l l w i t h a ladder just before dawn and sixty of t h e m m o u n t e d i n t o t h e t o w e r o f Firuz, w h o became worried by the absence o f B o h e m o n d a n d the small numbers. Bohemond and his f o l l o w e r s , i n c l u d i n g the A n o n y m o u s , then came to the foot of the l a d d e r a n d showed themselves, calling up. A large number of them ascended w h e n suddenly t h e ladder broke, but those inside opened a s m a l l p o s t e r n gate a n d as m o r e and more crusaders poured i n cries of h o r r o r arose i n t h e c i t y a n d the m a i n army began its assault and a g r e a t s l a u g h t e r . I t is v e r y m u c h the story of a participant, vivid and clear b u t l a c k i n g i n context w h i c h is to some extent provided by A l b e r t . A c c o r d i n g to h i m a L o m b a r d interpreter from Bohemond's h o u s e h o l d a p p r o a c h e d the tower and spoke i n Greek (mentioned by the A n o n y m o u s as t h e language used between the traitor and the F r a n k s ) t o its occupants w h o urged the Franks to come up and get e s t a b l i s h e d before t h e c o m i n g of the watchmen who toured the 87

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264

defences every night - a detail mentioned b y R a y m o n d o f A g u i l c r s who, however, says the Franks waited u n t i l they h a d passed. There was much hesitation amongst the attackers, a c c o r d i n g to Albert, and this may have been because o f the earlier experience when Guy the Constable was killed. H o w e v e r , Godfrey e x h o r t e d those who were hesitating, a rope was l o w e r e d , a l e a t h e r ladder hauled up and sixty men entered u n t i l the w e i g h t of people dragged down the portion of the w a l l to which t h e l a d d e r was a t t a c h e d causing losses; this is rather different to the A n o n y m o u s ' s s t a t e m e n t that the ladder broke. Raymond of Aguilers adds t h a t F u l c h e r o f Chartres was first up and Ralph gives the name as G o u e l . T h e w a t c h then arrived and was killed and as the fighting spread m o s t o f the 700 knights were admitted through a postern gate a n d h a r d fighting ensued. The two accounts and that o f R a l p h a r e g e n e r a l l y c o m patible, but Albert gives a very prominent role i n t h e c o m m a n d o party to Godfrey and Robert of Flanders. B o h e m o n d , R a y m o n d o f Toulouse and Tancred then, he says, r a l l i e d the m a i n a r m y w h i c h was totally surprised to find Christian forces i n A n t i o c h - a d e t a i l supported by Raymond of Aguilers. 80

89

90

However, Albert does add some interesting i n f o r m a t i o n w h i c h provides us with a strong clue as to the location o f F i r u z ' s t o w e r . H e says that as the assault force got into the city i t sounded t r u m p e t s as a signal to Godfrey and Robert of Flanders w h o attacked a g a t e near the citadel; the purpose was surely to seize the c i t a d e l - i n w h i c h they failed. The next day Bohemond w o u l d make a d e t e r m i n e d b u t fruitless attempt to seize the citadel i n the course o f w h i c h he w o u l d be wounded by an arrow i n the leg."" So the n i g h t a t t a c k w a s two-pronged. Almost certainly Bohemond l e d t h e effort t o e n t e r Hruz s tower which i t appears was quite close t o the c i t a d e l f o r Godfrey and Robert of Flanders, who led the attack o n i t , w e r e i n he same general area. The contemporary sources a r e v e r y v a g u e o n he location of Firuz's towers. The Anonymous says c a v a l r y r e a c h e d Irl rP " ^ mountain. A l b e r t confirms t h a t a Rnh Y S over s m a l l p a t h s b y l™7cÍT !, A s c r i b e s * as a l o n g w a y h e T l íu h r f ^ ° y ™ ™ ^ f i c he tells us that Firuz held a tower called the T w o Sister, i n the sou t h l a i

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w a l l of A n t i o c h , close t o the St George Gate, and this has been presumed to reflect t r a d i t i o n s c u r r e n t i n the Principality of Antioch i n the t w e l f t h c e n t u r y . H o w e v e r , i t is evident from Albert's description t h a t the p o i n t of e n t r y must have been much closer to the citadel. T h e i m p l i c a t i o n o f the Anonymous's account is that Firuz's three towers were i n a lonely place. R a y m o n d of Aguilers speaks of t h e m b e i n g ' o n the h i l l o f the c i t y ' and R a l p h says that i t was at a p o i n t too w i l d f o r horses t o venture; this argues against the vicinity o f the St George Gate w h i c h h a d been invested by Tancred and w o u l d h a v e been w e l l m a n n e d . Furthermore, the Wadi Zoiba is a f o r m i d a b l e b a r r i e r a l o n g these southern defences. I n addition, the A n o n y m o u s reports t h a t as d a y broke and the Franks became established i n t h e c i t y B o h e m o n d set up his banner where all could see i t on ' a h i l l opposite t h e citadel'. I t has been suggested that this m u s t refer t o t h e h i g h p o i n t to t h e south o f the citadel where there is a tower s t i l l visible across the w h o l e of Antioch, however this is not precisely opposite the citadel. T h e r e is another tower further along w h i c h is a t the t o p of the south side of the gully facing the citadel and t h o u g h t h i s c o u l d n o t be seen across the whole city, i t could be seen p l a i n l y b y t h e m a i n crusader a r m y m a i n l y concentrated outside the n o r t h e r n defences (see fig. 13). W i l l i a m o f Tyre says that by this t i m e the F r a n k s had captured t e n towers, and by counting we can a r r i v e at F i r u z ' s towers, r o u g h l y at the p o i n t where the defences turn west to f o r m t h e south w a l l o f the city, descending M o u n t Silpius. M o r e o v e r , the accounts agree t h a t near Firuz's tower was a postern a n d there is one i n this area. T h e r e can be no certainty, but i t is very l i k e l y t h a t these towers a t the south-east corner of the defences were those b e t r a y e d b y F i r u z (see fig. 11). 92

93

T h e f a i l u r e t o seize t h e citadel was to have considerable consequences f o r t h e crusader a r m y . B u t what followed the break-in to the c i t y w a s a t e r r i b l e massacre i n w h i c h many Christians, as well as M o s l e m s , d i e d - h o w c o u l d i t be otherwise, as Albert says, when m u c h o f t h e fighting was i n t h e shades o f night; 10,000, he says,

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The siege: crisis and delivery

VICTORY I N T H E EAST

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266 VICTORY

I N T H E EAST

The siege: crisis and delivery

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^ u n s h e d , a n d the Franks were assisted by a n uprising o f the native C h r i s t i a n s . ' ' O n e of the casualties was Yaghisiyan himself who fled |h£ c i t y a n d was killed by local Christians. K e m a l a d - D i n says t h a t hi p a n i c k e d , t h i n k i n g that the citadel had also fallen, rode off w i t h jjj e s c o r t a n d later fell off his horse and was killed by A r m e n i a n s , a story c o n f i r m e d b y Bar-Hebraeus and I b n a l - A t h i r , w h o adds t h a t [je w a s d e c a p i t a t e d by an A r m e n i a n butcher. T h e Damascus Chronicle j j j j i p l y s a y s t h a t he died a t Armanaz near M a ' a r r a t M a s r i n on the ^ l e p p o r o a d n o r t h o f I d l e b , through constantly f a l l i n g o f f his j^rse. 9

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T h e c a p t u r e o f A n t i o c h is a great story i n the best B u l l d o g p r u m m o n d t r a d i t i o n . Such incidents have so often formed k e y j r i o m c n t s o f films about the Second W o r l d W a r that one can almost ee t h e p a r t i c i p a n t s i n k h a k i bearing sten-guns, rather t h a n e n c u m bered w i t h swords, shields and armour. A n d i t is a cliff-hanger i n n o t h c r sense - f o r advancing towards the c i t y was the huge a r m y o f j C c r b o g a h . T h e p l o t t o get i n t o A n t i o c h was a last ditch effort by the c r u s a d e r a r m y . H a d i t failed, then disaster would surely have f o l l o w e d , b u t t h a t , o f course, is i n the best t r a d i t i o n o f all great stories. N a t u r a l l y this is t o look at events i n our i d i o m . F o r t h e c r u s a d e r s , w h a t happened was nothing less than a miraculous d e l i v e r y b y the h a n d o f G o d . R a y m o n d o f Aguilers rejoiced i n t h e s l a u g h t e r o f the enemy - 'the L o r d had confounded t h e m ! ' a n d b e w a i l e d n o t the massacre o f people b u t the loss o f horses w h e n some T u r k i s h r i d e r s were d r i v e n o f f a cliff: ' O u r j o y over the fallen enemy was g r e a t , b u t w e grieved over the more t h a n t h i r t y horses who h a d their n e c k s b r o k e n t h e r e ' . Reports o f the spoils after the v i c t o r y arc c o n t r a d i c t o r y . R a y m o n d o f Aguilers describes a vast booty, b u t A l b e r t s a y s there was n o t m u c h . Above all there was n o t m u c h f o o d - h a r d l y s u r p r i s i n g , f o r A n t i o c h had been invested for nine months and i t s s t o r e s w e r e b a d l y r u n d o w n . I n any case, there was l i t t l e time f o r p l u n d e r i n g , although R a y m o n d o f Aguilers accuses t h e army o f d a l l y i n g over pagan dancing women and so f a i l i n g to take s

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" R A , p . 6 5 , t r . K r c y , pp. 1 5 4 - 5 ; A A , 4 0 5 - 6 , tells a rather similar tale o f numbers o f the e n e m y f a l l i n g to their death after taking a wrong route in an effort to reach the citadel b u t he s u g g e s t s there were 1 ,ooo of them. The road up to the citadel from Antioch proper is so steep a n d dangerous that i t is easy to envisage such an event. * RA,

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68

VICTORY IN THE

EAST

the citadel, because on the day after its fall t h e v a n g u a r d o f K c r b o gah's army arrived at A n t i o c h . " The siege of Antioch had lasted for over e i g h t m o n t h s a n d d u r i n g it the crusader army suffered appalling p r i v a t i o n s a n d t e r r i b l e casualties. I t was a close blockade rather t h a n a set-piece siege i n t h e usual sense of the word. The central p r o b l e m w h i c h the a r m y faced was simply staying alive in the face o f enemy efforts to d e n y t h e m iood. By early February r o 8 the army was i n a desperate s i t u a t i o n and i t was saved by the brilliant victory over R i d w a n ' s a r m y . B u t the crusader leaders showed themselves well a b l e to organise t h e i r huge force and avoided overstretching it. L e a d e r s a n d led l e a r n e d a lot about their enemies i n the course of the siege d u r i n g w h i c h a l l t h e techniques of contemporary war were tested. R a i d i n g , w a s t i n g , small-scale combat by horsemen and i n f a n t r y w e r e t h e d a y - t o - d a y experience of an army which was becoming m o r e cohesive a n d m o r e experienced. I n the long agony o f the siege t h e m o r a l e o f t h e a r m y

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The second siege o f A n t i o c h was to be a desperate affair. From the outset i t was clear t h a t i t w o u l d be very different from the first siege, for both sides m u s t h a v e recognised that i t would be fairly short. The crusaders h a d b r o k e n i n t o a city w i t h food supplies depleted after a nine-month siege. Some effort was made to purchase food at St Symcon, b u t the speed o f Kerbogah's arrival meant that there was simply n o t i m e . S i t t i n g o u t the siege was, therefore, not an option for the crusaders. I n a n y case their military situation was quite different from t h a t o f the earlier defenders for the enemy controlled the citadel w h i c h was c o m m a n d e d by Kerbogah's man Ahmad ibnM a r w a n a n d , a n d f a r o u t n u m b e r e d the crusaders even i f seven to one is an e x a g g e r a t i o n . I t is unfortunate that there are no good estimates o f the size o f Kerbogah's army b u t i t was very large. The crusader a r m y m u s t h a v e been very reduced and even before the fall of A n t i o c h there were f u r t h e r desertions when news came of the approach o f K e r b o g a h ' s a r m y , although they were i n part compensated for b y troops c o m i n g i n f r o m o u t l y i n g places. Their numbers cannot h a v e been as h i g h as 30,000, i n c l u d i n g non-combatants, and were p r o b a b l y m u c h l o w e r so Kerbogah's army could quite credibly have been t w i c e o r three times the size. 1

2

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I n these circumstances i t is little wonder that the early reactions of the crusader a r m y were dominated by fear. Fulcher says that Stephen o f Blois left the siege o n the day before Kerbogah's arrival but gives n o clear reason. R a y m o n d of Aguilers says frankly that Stephen w a s f r i g h t e n e d b y r u m o u r o f the coming of Kerbogah and AA 4 0 7 - 4 0 8 . * Runciman, I . 3 1 9 ; Cahen, Syrie du Word, p.217; GF, p.50, has a vignette ofShams-adDaulah reluctantly conceding the citadel to Kerbogah: on the size ofKcrbogah's army see above p . 2 0 3 : M a t t h e w , p p . 3 9 , 4 ) . R A , p. 6 4 . 1

1

269

271

The victory 2

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VICTORY

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EAST

the Anonymous implies as much by saying t h a t he p r e t e n d e d to be ill. Albert on the other hand actually says that he was i l l a n d went to rest i n Alexandretta where he remained i n a state o f i n d e c i s i o n u n t i l other deserters joined h i m about 11 J u n e ; their reports i m p e l l e d h i m to flee with 4,000 in his train. Fulcher seems t o have b e e n closely connected with Stephen, whose career he followed w i t h interest, so his guardedly neutral tone suggests the w o r s t . Stephen was a major leader, elected, as wc have seen, to lead the a r m y d u r i n g t h e siege of Antioch. His departure had a considerable effect o n t h e m o r a l e o f the army. He was not alone, for after i n i t i a l f i g h t i n g i n the c i t y Bohcmond's brother-in-law W i l l i a m o f G r a n d m e s n i l , his b r o t h e r Aubre, Guy Trousseau L o r d of M o n t l h e r y , L a m b e r t t h e P o o r count of Clermont and W i l l i a m the Carpenter j o i n e d the r a n k s of the 'rope-danglers', so named from the method of their escape d o w n the walls of Antioch. So general was the terror i n t h e C h r i s t i a n a r m y that the Anonymous says that Bohemond fired p a r t o f t h e city to drive out deserters. Such desertions weakened the a r m y a n d sapped its morale. Rumours were rife; A l b e r t says m a n y believed t h a t the princes would desert, perhaps the foundation of M a t t h e w o f Edessa's reports that the leaders of the army h a d decided to s u r r e n d e r o n terms when a vision revealing the H o l y Lance changed t h e i r m i n d s . I t was against this background that w h e n the priest S t e p h e n had a vision promising divine aid, A d h e m a r took the o p p o r t u n i t y o f making all the leaders swear publicly n o t to a b a n d o n t h e siege. 4

5

6

7

The vanguard of Kerbogah's army a r r i v e d before A n t i o c h on 4 June and sent thirty men ahead to t r a i l their coats. S u c h T u r k i s h tactics had not lost effectiveness through r e p e t i t i o n for t h e y were obligingly attacked by Roger of Barneville w i t h fifteen k n i g h t s w h o were i n turn ambushed by a hidden force some 300 s t r o n g and Roger was killed i n sight of the city walls; a lance was s t u c k i n his back and he was decapitated. According to a v a r i a n t s t o r y h i s horse stuck i n a bog and, after defending himself w e l l o n f o o t , h e was 4

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After t h e i r experiences d u r i n g the siege the crusaders were determined to h o l d sally-points p r o t e c t i n g two o f the gates of the city O n * and 6 Tune the T u r k s attacked the Mahommcnes Tower and there was savage fighting as R o b e r t o f Flanders held i t for the Christian army O n 8 J u n e , however, i t was abandoned as untenable.' A t a date u n k n o w n , but p r e s u m a b l y about the same time, a similar 3

J.A. Brundagc, 'An errant crusader: Stephen ofBlois', Tradilio, 16 ( i 9 6 0 ) , 3 8 8 , suggests that the last part of Stephen's letter to Adcla written in late M a r c h 1 0 9 8 ; Hagenmcycr, KTtunugibriefe, p. 15s, in which he says that he will see her soon, means that he had already resolved to leave the crusade, perhaps delaying until Antioch was in Christian hands. Even if the passage could be interpreted in this way it would have been e x t r a o r d i n a r y for him to l

struck i n t h e head b y an A r a b w i t h a long lance and killed. He was North F r e n c h , b u t evidently w e l l k n o w n i n the army for his death was widely noted. A l b e r t reports the j u b i l a t i o n of the enemy and the shame o f t h e Christians for no-one had dared to go out to his assistance, a circumstance w h i c h A l b e r t attributes to the shortage of horses. A large element o f Kerbogah's force encamped near the I r o n Bridge on 5 June; the crusaders had apparently attempted to defend i t because its garrison was destroyed and its commander was found i n chains after the great battle. O n 6 June Kerbogah's main army approached A n t i o c h , apparently around the northern side of the A n t i o c h Lake for they encamped, according to the Anonymous, 'between t h e t w o r i v e r s ' . T h i s could mean by the W a d i al Quivaisiya w h i c h entered the Orontes on the west bank just south of the Bridge o f Boats. M u c h more likely, however, is at or near the junction o f the Orontes a n d the K a r a Su w h i c h drains from the Lake above the c i t y and meets the Orontes about five kilometres above Antioch (see fig. 1 2 ) . T h i s is an odd position from which to conduct a siege, but i t is confirmed by Raymond of Aguilcrs who says that K c r b o g a h c a m p e d some two miles (five kilometres i n his usage) f r o m A n t i o c h because h e believed that the crusaders would fight outside the city - this must be hindsight. Albert says that Kcrbogah m a d e camp ' i n the p l a i n ' and that subsequently he and a section o f h i s a r m y c l i m b e d i n t o the mountains near to the citadel while another part o f his force established itself outside the St Paul Gate this implies t h a t t h e o r i g i n a l camp was to the north of the citv " Since encampments are mentioned later much closer to the city wc can perhaps assume t h a t K c r b o g a h established his mam base at the confluence of t h e t w o rivers, probably to prevent a sally from the three n o r t h e r n gates o f the c i t y against his forces, and that other encampments were set u p according to need.

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new city. By June itwas p a b ly ?

272

VICTORY

IN THE

EAST

The victory

273

redoubt outside the St Paul G a t e was held b y Godfrey whose troops were d r i v e n back i n t o the c i t y after heavy fighting w i t h 200 casualties. B u t m u c h o f the fiercest fighting i n the early part of the siege took place close to the citadel o n the eastern w a l l o f the city at the top of M t S i l p i u s . I t is i m p o r t a n t t o recollect t h a t the city of A n t i o c h covered only a small p a r t o f the area enclosed b y the walls o n the lower slopes of the mountain a n d o n the flat area b y the Orontes. T h e walled circuit protected access t o this b u t f o r the most p a r t the land w i t h i n was as wild and p r e c i p i t o u s as i t was outside. W h e n the city fell i n 969 the attacking f o r c e was isolated for three days o n the lonely part of the wall where t h e y h a d entered t h r o u g h b r i b e r y . Both Kemal ad-Din and I b n a l - A t h i r i m p l i c i t l y b l a m e Yaghisiyan for panicking instead of holding t h e citadel as his son d i d a n d w i t h reason, for the citadel, t h o u g h n o t a p a r t i c u l a r l y powerful fortification, was very difficult to a p p r o a c h . A t the t i m e o f the city's fall Bohemond had placed his b a n n e r on a tower w h i c h stood on the high ground overlooking t h e citadel some 300-400 metres to the north. Between this tower a n d the citadel was a steep g u l l y accommodating an ancient c i s t e r n , across the m o u t h o f w h i c h r a n the only access road to the c i t a d e l o n a piece o f flat land less t h a n t h i r t y metres wide along the e d g e o f a precipitous d r o p (see fig. 13). Thus the crusaders controlled t h e o n l y r o a d b y w h i c h the garrison could get into Antioch, f o r t h e l a n d to the west and n o r t h is simply almost impossible to c r o s s . I m m e d i a t e l y after the fall o f the city Bohemond seems to h a v e advanced along the w a l l to the last tower on the opposite side o f the g u l l y below the citadel, b u t was ejected from i t by the T u r k s a n d w o u n d e d b y a T u r k i s h a r r o w i n the process. I n the fighting here this t o w e r seems to have been one o f the key points i n 14

15

1 6

17

" A A , 4 0 9 10 is the o n l y source for this event, which he appears to place early in the siege. 1 5

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5 - 7 June: Kerbogah's a r

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Aleppo Chronicle, 5 8 1 ; Ibn al-Athir, p. 193.

" RA, p. 6 7 K r c y , First Crusade, p. 169, has an extremely accurate, almost photograhic description o f this battlefield: 'The Turks who had entered the fortress wanted to go down into the city. F o r the valley between our mountain and their fortress was not large, and in the middle o f i t was a certain cistern and a little level place. Nor did the enemy have a path down into the c i t y except through our mountain; wherefore they strove with every intent and all their m i g h t to drive us out and remove us from their path.' The roughness o f the land and the steepness of the gulley must be emphasised. I t is possible to p i c k one's way d o w n from the citadel and then up the mountainside to the crusader positions, b u t it is a slow and difficult business for the walls of the gulley are sown with rocky projections often waist-high, w i t h loose shale below, the whole masked by a covering o f l o w scrub. Effectively an attack against or from the citadel can only proceed cither along the line o f the w a l l or on the access road - two very narrow fronts.

The victory

2

^

n o - m a n ' s - l a n d . T h e T u r k s o f the citadel could either advance along the l i n e o f the w a l l , f r o m w h i c h the land drops sharply y to the cistern, towards Bohemond's tower, assisted by forces on the outside, o r attack along the r o a d : two very narrow fronts. This set the scene for the savage f i g h t i n g w h i c h erupted with the arrival of K e r b o g a h ' s a r m y on 6 J u n e w h i c h the Anonymous emphasises so v i v i d l y . H e fails to m e n t i o n attacks on other areas which suggests that he w a s i n v o l v e d i n this p a r t of the city. 18

a w a

A c c o r d i n g t o the A n o n y m o u s on the t h i r d day after his arrival, by w h i c h is m e a n t 8 June, K e r b o g a h led a major force up the mountain towards t h e citadel. T h i s began a serious assault, for the Turks established a camp o n the m o u n t a i n outside. Their purpose was obvious: t o reinforce the citadel whose forces could then drive down i n t o the c i t y w h i l e further assaults o n the outside of the wall held by B o h e m o n d distracted the defenders. The crusaders sallied out of the c i t y by a p o s t e r n gate to attack t h e m . Raymond of Aguilers says that after i n i t i a l success the crusaders were driven back into the city with terrible losses; the visionary Peter Bartholemew was badly crushed i n the s c r u m t o get t h r o u g h the gate. The failure of this pre-emptive strike b y t h e crusaders is confirmed by Ansclm of Ribemont. The enemy w a s n o w i n a position t o take the fight to the crusaders and the A n o n y m o u s describes ferocious fighting over the next two days, b o t h o u t s i d e a n d inside the walls, which ended only with the e x h a u s t i o n o f the combatants, and this is confirmed by Raymond of A g u i l e r s , b y A n s e l m and b y the letter sent to the pope by the Princes i n S e p t e m b e r 1098 w h i c h says t h a t the enemy were driven back into the c i t a d e l . T h e demoralising effect of all this was making itself felt o n the a r m y for on the n i g h t o f 10 June many deserted the city and fled to S t S y m e o n - amongst t h e m W i l l i a m of Grandmesnil. On 11 J u n e f i g h t i n g was renewed and Peter Tudebode's brother Arved was k i l l e d . P e r h a p s i t was d u r i n g this stage o f the fighting that Bohem o n d w a s n e a r l y killed and rescued only by the combined efforts of R o b e r t o f Flanders, Godfrey and Robert of Normandy who now reappears a t A n t i o c h . T h e Anonymous reports that the enemy got i n t o a t o w e r t r a p p i n g three knights, including Hugh the Beserk who fought b r a v e l y after the others fled wounded. This is not unlike a n o t h e r episode i n w h i c h A l b e r t reports that the enemy got into a 19

20

21

1 8

M

2 1

R M , 806 -7. GF p. 5 6 I A A , 4 1 1 . GF p. 56) R A , p p . 6 6 - 8 ; Hagcnmeycr, Kreuzzugsbriefe, 1

9

GF p p . 5 6 - 7; R A . p p . 6 6 - 8 ; Hagcnmeycr Kreuzzugsbriefe,

pp. 157-60. pp. 157~ 5' 6

276

VICTORY IN THE

tower left unguarded by laxity, and were d r i v e n o u t b y H e n r y o f Esch, a relative of Godfrey. I t may w e l l be that this is the tower o n the slope below the citadel i n no-man's-land w h i c h B o h e m o n d h a d already tried to seize. Pressure f r o m the citadel was so severe t h a t the crusaders built a wall to counter attacks. A l b e r t mentions i t , as docs Ralph of Caen, b u t R a y m o n d o f Aguilers i m p l i e s t h a t i t was built just before the great battle on 28 J u n e . T h e A n o n y m o u s twice refers to the building of this w a l l ; on the first occasion after he tells us how the deserters fled to St Symeon, w h i c h w o u l d i m p l y a date about 11-12 June 1098; the second was the day o n w h i c h a meteor fell into the enemy camp, the night o f 13-14 J u n e . I t seems l i k e l y , however, that the wall could be b u i l t because K e r b o g a h changed the emphasis of his attack. 22

2 3

Anselm of Ribemont says 'But they moved t h e i r c a m p a n d set siege to all the gates of the city', while the letter sent b y the Princes in September 1098 states: when they saw that they could do no harm on that side [by the citadel], they surrounded us all about, so that none of our men could go out or come to us. As a result of this we were all so destitute and afflicted that many o f our men, dying of starvation and many other wants, killed and ate our famished horses and asses. The Anonymous says that after a meteor fell i n the e n e m y c a m p o n the night of 13-14 June 1098 the enemy fled d o w n to the p l a i n ' t o my lord Bohemond's gate [the St Paul Gate besieged b y Bohemond]' which precisely dates the change o f a t t a c k . I t m u s t surely be the case that the wall against the citadel was b u i l t d u r i n g the l u l l as the enemy changed the emphasis o f the attack f r o m assault through the citadel to investment and blockade, almost c e r t a i n l y o n and just after 14 June. I t was probably little m o r e t h a n a b a r r i c a d e across the access road to the citadel and along the crest o f the g u l l y up to the wall, (see fig. 13) This does not mean t h a t fighting stopped in the city altogether for even at the last, as t h e a r m y p r e p a r e d for the great battle, they left a considerable force u n d e r C o u n t 24

7

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p

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R A

6

8

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« ' 1 ' : " ' > PP- 7~ ; A A . 4 ' o - u , 4 ' 3 - O n the tower, see above, p. 266; the suggestion is that ofRey, Monuments, pp. 2 0 1 - 2 . AA,4 ;RC,659-6o;RA,p.7 .

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277

The victory

EAST

Crusade,

R a y m o n d o f Toulouse to blockade the c i t a d e l . Kerbogah probably w i t h d r e w because this line o f attack was proving unprofitable. T h e crusader defence was s t u b b o r n and able to take advantage o f the passive strength o f A n t i o c h ' s defences and the extremely confined space outside the citadel w h i c h made i t difficult for the Turks to b r i n g t h e i r superiority i n numbers to bear. The large Turkish force outside p r o v i d e d reinforcements for the citadel and attacked the w a l l b u t i t m u s t have been difficult to maintain a protracted effort i n this w i l d and waterless t e r r a i n : Albert of A i x says that the c a m p i n the mountains was abandoned because the enemy found i t d i f f i c u l t to supply i t w i t h food and fodder. Water must have been even m o r e d i f f i c u l t to c a r r y u p the m o u n t a i n side. Perhaps also i t was expensive i n m a n p o w e r a n d Kerbogah was beginning to u n d e r s t a n d how desperate was the situation of the crusader army. H e was also discovering the problems posed to an attacker by the sheer size o f A n t i o c h w h i c h threatened to disperse even his strong a r m y . K e r b o g a h ' s decision to s w i t c h the emphasis of his attack was a great r e l i e f to the crusaders o n w h o m the fighting in the city had imposed great strains. O n the n i g h t o f 11 June the priest Stephen h a d his v i s i o n i n the c h u r c h o f St M a r y where he had retired i n terror a t the news t h a t the enemy m i g h t get down into the city. The r e d u c t i o n i n this pressure was undoubtedly a grave mistake. 25

C o n d i t i o n s i n the c i t y , however, d i d not improve, for starvation n o w set i n . T h e sources arc eloquent, particularly the Anonymous w i t h his account o f poor food a n d h i g h prices: 2 6

many o f us died of hunger, for a small loaf cost a bezant, and I cannot tell you the price of wine . . . men boiled and ate the leaves of figs, vines, thistles and all kinds of tree. Others stewed the dried skins of horses, camels,oxen or buffaloes. 27

R a y m o n d o f Aguilers tells m u c h the same tale but he says that the r i c h c o u l d afford the h i g h prices; even so the knights found things d i f f i c u l t a n d some were reduced to bleeding their horses for nourishm e n t . A l b e r t of A i x has m u c h the same story of awful things which 2 8

» 2 6

«

p. 190, 193; CF,

c i t

y had " m a i n i d ° P « « « n d this St Symeon noted above, p . a n , and below 2 8

GF p . 68; R A , p. 79; A A , 4 2 2 . On the i m p a c t o f starvation o n numbers see above, pp. 132, 133. The story o f the visions of Stephen o f Valence and Peter Bartholomew is given in the GF, pp. 5 7 - 6 0 . The b u i l d i n g o f t h e wall against the citadel, and the initial comments on starvation, occur on p. 57 and arc repeated, the latter in vasdy expanded form, p. 62. The sense is o f a w o r k which has been quite violently chopped around, GF, p. 62-3. RA, pp. 7 6 - 7 may have based his account here on GF.

2 8

VICTORY IN THE

7

h a d to be eaten, but adds the curious detail that they were made palatable by the addition of cumin, pepper and other spices; these were normally luxury goods, b u t presumably had been captured in A n t i o c h . He says that many o f the poorer people died and t h a t some were i n the habit of sneaking off to St Symeon to buy food u n t i l the enemy ambushed a group, burned the port and then drove a w a y the ships. Later he reports that d u r i n g the famine even substantial men were reduced to poverty. The noble H e r m a n went to war on a n ass a n d he and Henry of Esch were reduced to beggary and rescued by Godfrey. 29

T h i s was the state of the army i n A n t i o c h w i t h i n less t h a n two weeks o f siege - starvation, bitter fighting, panic, desertion, even, according to Raymond o f Aguilers, treachery when some crusaders went over to the enemy. I t was against this background t h a t there occurred a remarkable series o f visions. O n the morning o f 11 J u n e a priest, Stephen of Valence, revealed that Christ had appeared to h i m and promised divine aid to the crusaders i n a vision w h i c h he was commanded to reveal to the Legate Adhérnar who accepted the tale and took the opportunity to make the crusader leaders swear not to abandon the a r m y . A n d well he might, for this visionary was highly respectful of church order and i n his account invoked the structure of the divine economy i n his icon-like portrayal o f the V i r g i n interceding for her people. Far different was the other revelation by a poor Provençal, Peter Bartholomew, who inveighed against Adhérnar for not preaching to the people and promised not merely divine aid i n return for penance, but a material token of God's favour to His chosen people, the H o l y Lance w h i c h was discovered in the church o f St Peter on 14 J u n e . I t is undoubtedly true that these two visions, and others such as that o f St Ambrose reported by Albert, expressed the deepest beliefs o f the crusaders that God was on their side, a combatant i n the great struggle w h o w o u l d give them aid according to their desserts. N o r is there m u c h d o u b t of the impact upon the army as a whole. R a y m o n d of A g u i l e r s speaks of j o y and exultation i n the city when the Lance was discovered. He was a great partisan of the Lance i n its later troubles, but the Anonymous was not and yet he is even clearer: ' t h r o u g h o u t the c i t y there was boundless rejoicing'. I n a letter w r i t t e n v e r y 30

31

32

33

34

4 I a

4

« R ^ A , pp.; t6 '8 -' AA, .i7.

3 0

3 2

3 3

4

7 5 ;

R

A

p

7 7

GF, pp. 59-60.' - ' 34 R A , p . 7 5 ; C / ? , p . 6 . 5

3

'

R A

279

The victory

EAST

> PP- 7»-+; GF, pp. ' 57-0. F

P

shortly after the siege was over Anselm of Ribernont says o f the Lance 'So w h e n this precious gem was found, all our spirits were revived' a n d t h e crusading princes i n their letter o f September 1098 to U r b a n I I were absolutely explicit: ' W e were so comforted and strengthened b y finding i t , and b y m a n y other divine revelations that we, w h o before had been afflicted and t i m i d , were then most boldly a n d eagerly u r g i n g one another to b a t t l e ' . T h e visions are a deeply i n t e r e s t i n g topic i n themselves, b u t what matters here is their military effect; they profoundly i m p r o v e d the depressed morale o f the crusader a r m y . However, the impression given by the Anonymous t h a t spirits revived and the a r m y was ready to proceed to battle once i t had received the Lance is a mistaken product o f the fractured n a t u r e o f his narrative at this p o i n t . The Lance was discovered o n 14 J u n e , b u t i t was not u n t i l 28 June that the army ventured o u t t o battle, and R a y m o n d of Aguilers makes i t clear that there were a n o t h e r two visions and m u c h suffering before the army was ready t o m a r c h o u t . One of the most i m p o r t a n t events o f this period was t h e selection o f Bohemond to command the army on 20 June. R a y m o n d says he was chosen because Count Raymond and Bishop A d h e m a r were b o t h i l l , b u t he had already admitted his high military r e p u t a t i o n . Previously, he and Adhemar had abruptly closed the gates of the city to prevent the army melting away from desertion. The a p p o i n t m e n t of a single commander showed that the leaders were now a c t i n g to prepare the a r m y for the inevitable, an attempt to break o u t o f the city and destroy Kerbogah's force. I t was a dangerous g a m b l e , though n o t w i t h o u t precedent, for we have noted t h a t w h e n he was cornered b y his father at Gerberoi Robert Curthose s u d d e n l y sallied forth, knocked his father from his horse and scattered t h e besiegers. T h e practical alternative for both Curthose and the crusaders was slow destruction and dissolution. I n the end, as A l b e r t says, they had little choice: ' A l l , great and small, declared t h a t they could no longer endure such suffering, and when they were asked said i t w o u l d be better to die fighting than to 35

3 6

37

38

39

Hagcnmeycr, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 157-65; Krcy, First Crusade, pp, 190, 193. « On the visions see Morris, 'Policy and Visions', pp. 33 -45 and J. France, 'Prophet, Priest and Chronicler o n the First Crusade', (forthcoming). " The words o f the finder o f the Lance, GF, p. 6 5 , clerly refer to the vision as reported on p. 6b, This account has been changed a good deal. » RA, pp. 7 5 - 8 . R A , pp. 5 3 - 4 , 74. 1 5

3 9

280

VICTORY

IN THE

succumb to the cruel famine and watch the miserable Christian people perish day by d a y ' . W h a t distinguished the crusader situation and made i t especially perilous was that because the citadel o f Antioch was in enemy hands, its garrison could see all preparations to sally out; on 28 June A l b e r t reports that they duly raised a black flag as a sign of the coming break-out. But before then the leaders sent an embassy to Kerbogah. I n the version of the Anonymous this is made to appear p u r e l y as a morale-raising episode i n which the ambassadors, Peter the H e r m i t and his translator H e r l u i n , defied Kerbogah. R a y m o n d of Aguilers gives much the same impression, and adds that at the time w h e n the army sallied out Kerbogah announced that he was ready to take up their suggestion of five or ten from each side fighting a k i n d o f trial b y battle - b u t i t was then too late. A l b e r t presents the m a t t e r rather differently. According to h i m the leaders were still very uncertain because of the weakness of the army, and i n particular the loss o f horses; Peter first offered the city to Kerbogah i f he w o u l d become a Christian. When this was refused he suggested a trial by b a t t l e with twenty on each side. When this was refused he left and reported back, being told by Godfrey not to talk about what he had seen in the enemy camp lest i t demoralise the a r m y . I t is very h a r d t o take this embassy as seriously as A l b e r t suggests; perhaps his attitude reflects distrust of the princes amongst o r d i n a r y crusaders w h o were his informants. The embassy o f Peter the H e r m i t was p r o b a b l y also the root of the story i n M a t t h e w o f Edessa that the leaders were prepared to surrender on terms u n t i l the Lance was revealed. N o w , strengthened by fasting and the rites and ceremonial o f the church, almost certainly decreed by Adhemar, the army p r e p a r e d to attack Kerbogah in a desperate sally. 40

41

42

43

This battle was profoundly affected by one simple fact - the army h a d lost almost all its horses. Speaking o f the skirmishing a r o u n d Antioch, Raymond of Aguilers remarks: ' A n d so i t came about through assaults o f this k i n d that they lost a l l their horses, because the Turks, not prepared to fight w i t h lances or swords, but w i t h arrows at a distance,were to be feared while they fled, as w e l l as w h e n they pursued.'

A A, 421 and see above, p, 44.

The description is v i v i d l y endorsed b y R a l p h of Caen a n d r e m i n d s one of the careful instructions i n Islamic manuals on h o w t o fire t o the r e a r . Q u i t e apart f r o m its effect o n foraging, loss o f horses w a s disastrous for the crusader army. T h e scale o f the loss has n o t u s u a l l y been appreciated by h i s t o r i a n s . O v e r a l l the chronicles give us more specific i n f o r m a t i o n about numbers o f horses t h a n they d o about numbers o f people; even a l l o w i n g for the fact t h a t n u m b e r s were m u c h smaller, this shows an interesting perception of p r i o r i t i e s . But i t was a correct one, for w i t h o u t m o b i l i t y the a r m y w o u l d b e gravely weakened. Anselm o f R i b e m o n t says t h a t by l a t e N o v e m b e r 1097 after t h e construction o f M a l r e g a r d t h e a r m y c o u l d m u s t e r only some 700 horses. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers, whose c o m m e n t t h a t the enemy k i l l e d m a n y horses has been noted, remarks t h a t for t h e expedition against H a r e m shortly before this B o h e m o n d a n d R o b e r t of Flanders c o u l d raise only 150 knights a n d that f o r the m a j o r foraging expedition of late December 1097 the a r m y raised o n l y 4.00. During the f a m i n e o f early 1098 R a y m o n d reports t h a t horses w e r e dying a n d t h a t the Provencals were reduced to 100 horses w h e n their count i n v e n t e d the compensation scheme for losses. W h i l e Bohemond a n d Robert o f Flanders were foraging there was f i g h t i n g around the c i t y , i n the midst o f w h i c h the cavalry b r o k e o f f t h e battle to pursue a riderless horse - an event w h i c h caused p a n i c a n d heavy losses a n d indicates the value o f a horse b y t h i s t i m e . T h e Anonymous states t h a t b y late J a n u a r y o r early F e b r u a r y 1098 there were o n l y a b o u t 1,000 horses i n the a r m y and this figure is s u p p o r t e d by Albert of A i x . However, wc have already noted t h a t for t h e L a k e Battle, for w h i c h the knights as a whole were m o b i l i s e d , the sources agree t h a t o n l y 700 could be found - the o n l y dissenter f r o m t h i s figure is R a l p h of Caen who speaks o f only 200, b u t h e was s u r e l y exaggerating and w e can suppose that some mounts w e r e left i n t h e camp, so between 700 and 1000 were available a t this t i m e . However, A l b e r t says this figure i n c l u d e d m a n y on mules, asses a n d pack horses. A l b e r t mentions horses d y i n g i n M a y 1098, a n d explains t h a t n o b o d y w e n t to rescue R o g e r o f B a r n c v i l l e because there were few horses; o n l y 150 were left i n t h e army a t the t i m e o f the fall o f A n t i o c h w h e n a further 400 were f o u n d i n the c i t y . M a n y of these must have died d u r i n g the second siege because the A n o n y 44

45

*' A A , 423

CP, pp. 65-7; RA, pp. 79, 8 1 ; A A , 4 1 9 - 2 1 .

See above, p. 271, n. 7.

281

The victory

EAST

*• RA, p. 5 0 ; RC, p . 715; see above, p. 147. Though useful comments are made by Riley-Smith, Idea of Crusading, 4 5

p. 65.

282

VICTORY IN THE

The victory

EAST

mous speaks of horse-flesh and hides being eaten d u r i n g the famine, while Raymond of Aguilers stresses that many knights, expecting battle, lived on the blood o f their horses but w o u l d not slaughter them. Albert records a sally against the Turks outside the city which broke down because of the exhausted state of the crusaders' horses. By the time the army was ready to face Kerbogah he says t h a t they had lost all the horses they had brought from France and that there were only 200 horses fit for war left i n the army. A t this time the German Count Hermann was reduced to r i d i n g an ass so small his feet dragged, and even Godfrey de B o u i l l o n and Robert o f Flanders had to beg horses from the Count o f Toulouse. As usual with medieval numbers there is some doubt; could i t be that the chroniclers were exaggerating weakness to maximise the sense o f achievement? I n this case the general impression o f the sources a l l points in much the same direction - a dramatic reduction i n numbers. I t is hardly surprising. The crusade had endured a bitter j o u r n e y across the arid Anatolian plateau i n the summer o f 1097 d u r i n g w h i c h , the Anonymous says: 46

we lost most of our horses, so that m a n y o f our knights h a d to go as foot-soldiers, and for lack of horses we had to use oxen as mounts, and our great need compelled us to use goats, sheep and dogs as beasts o f burden.

A little later the passage of the Taurus range took its toll o f m e n and beasts, according to the same a u t h o r . M a n y horses were lost, according to Raymond of Aguilers, i n the fighting around A n t i o c h and disease and starvation must have accounted for most. I n sum, i t would appear that by the time the army reached A n t i o c h i t had little more than a 1,000 horses and their numbers had d w i n d l e d to 700, including beasts of burden, by February 1098 and to 200 or so by the time they fought Kerbogah on 28 June 1098. 47

The decision to break out o f the city on the m o r n i n g o f 28 June 1098 was undoubtedly taken by all the leaders b u t we c a n safely attribute credit for the dispositions o f the a r m y to Bohemond. The subsequent battle resulted i n a remarkable crusader v i c t o r y ; to those who were eyewitnesses and others who later described i t , i t was no

less t h a n a miraculous d e l i v e r y , the very climax of the crusade. So i m p o r t a n t was i t t h a t ' T h e sources give more exact detail concerning this battle t h a n o f any o t h e r fought i n L a t i n Syria d u r i n g the twelfth c e n t u r y ' . As a result scholars have felt able to reconstruct the battle i n some d e t a i l . I t is the account given b y Raymond of Aguilers, supplemented b y t h a t o f the Anonymous, which has been most credited by historians, p a r t l y because he is known to have been present as standard-bearer i n the a r m y o f Adhémar o f Le Puy, partly because i t is a v e r y clear description and partly because i t reports a p a r t i c u l a r t a c t i c a l f o r m a t i o n i n w h i c h foot-soldiers were thrown f o r w a r d to p r o t e c t the cavalry w h i c h was later much used i n the crusading k i n g d o m . 48

4 9

R a y m o n d o f Aguilers tells us that the Provençal army formed up inside the Bridge Gate u n d e r the command o f Adhémar. Raymond o f Toulouse their n a t u r a l commander, was i l l and therefore stayed behind to protect the c i t y against the garrison of the citadel. Accordi n g to R a y m o n d o f Aguilers this a r m y divided into two squadrons each o f t w o lines w i t h t h e foot t h r o w n forward o f the cavalry and this f o r m a t i o n was replicated i n the other divisions o f the army each of w h i c h comprised b r o a d l y n a t i o n a l groups organized around the great leaders. T h e r e w e r e four o f these w h e n they marched out, the first led b y H u g h o f V c r m a n d o i s , R o b e r t o f Flanders and Robert o f N o r m a n d y , the second b y Godfrey, the t h i r d by Adhémar and the fourth b y B o h e m o n d . As they emerged K e r b o g a h was playing chess w i t h one o f his followers, M i r d a l i n , and their dialogue suggests that he was frightened b y t h e Franks, b u t nonetheless formed his army although he a l l o w e d t h e Franks to exit f r o m A n t i o c h unopposed. R a y m o n d says t h a t i n o r d e r to evade encirclement (a theme we have noted i n R a y m o n d before) A d h é m a r ' s force marched towards the mountains some t w o miles (five kilometres) away, disregarding Kerbogah's offer to undergo a t r i a l by battle as Peter the Hermit had suggested. Some o f the T u r k s d i d move to the left of the crusader line to take t h e m i n the rear a n d a crusader infantry detachment fought

4 8

4 3

« Hagenmcycr Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. r ; RA, p p . 5 7

4 9 l

5

, , 53,

5 5 )

77; GF, pp. 34, 6 2 ; PT, p. 44;

KC, 0 4 0 - ; AA, 381, 395, 408, 418-19, 4 2 6 - 8 ; on the figure of 700 in February 1098, sec 7

above, p. 281. "

f > P P ' 3 > 7 ; i 1984 the author T i m Severin, CraWcr (London, 1986), followed the path or the first crusade on horseback and had the greatest difficulty looking after his horses, even with modern aids and the support of motorised transport.

C

2

2

n

283

Smail, Crusading

Warfare,

p. 173,

Smail, Crusading

Warfare,

pp. 1 73 -4, based his reconstruction upon that of O. Heerman, Die

Gefechtsführung

n. 5.

abendländischer Heere

im Orient in der Epoche des ersten Kreuzzugs

(Marburg,

1888), p. 4 1 , though he had reservations about his methods notably expressed p. 171, n. 8. Hccrman depended heavily upon Raymond of Aguilers. I n its main lines, this reconstruction has been followed b y modern scholars, notably C. Morris in his computer program published by the H I D E S Project of Southampton University, 'The battle at Antioch', which provides a sequential representation of the battle.

284

VICTORY

The victory

I N T H E EAST

them off well until the enemy set fire t o the grass and drove them back. Adhemar's force, though encircled, fought its w a y towards the mountain, then the army i n eight divisions (augmented b y five more, by a miracle and their horses w o n d e r f u l l y refreshed b y light rain) charged the enemy who fled. T h e Anonymous makes i t clear that Bohemond's force was i n reserve and t h a t the N o r t h F r e n c h led by Godfrey, Robert of Flanders a n d H u g h were on t h e Christian right by the river and they engaged the m a i n enemy f o r c e . T h e general outline o f the plan and its outcome has been summarised neatly thus: 50

The Franks were marshalled in four divisions, each of two squadrons, in which were both horse and foot-soldiers. The infantry were arrayed in front of the knights... Bohemond was again commander... he led the fourth and last division which was to be in reserve . . . As soon as the first division had passed through the gate and crossed the Orontes bridge, i t was to turn into line, and to march upstream with its right flank on the bank of the river. The second division marched across the rear of its predecessor and turned to face the enemy in line when it was in a position to advance in line w i t h and on the left of the first division. The third did likewise and came into line on the left of the second. The plan ensured that each division as i t left the city changed its formation from column into line at the earliest possible moment, so that it faced the enemy ready to attack, and covered the deployment o f the succeeding column. .. The flanks were covered b y natural obstacles . . . Some two miles ahead of the Franks as they left the city was high ground. The head of the third division was ordered to reach this before i t turned into line; after it had done so the left flank of the Franks was protected just as its right was covered by the river . . . The battle developed almost i n accordance with Bohemond's plan. The Turks resisted the attempts of the third division... and were able to send a detachment across the head of the Latin column . . . a body of crusaders was detailed to meet its attack and i n the resulting encounter the pedites showed they were well able to defend themselves... the three leading divisions . . . were able to attack i n echelon. The T u r k s . . . fled with little resistance to the Latin charge. 51

Now something like this must have happened, b u t the neatness of the event as described must, o n a priori grounds, raise some suspicions. Deployment from column i n t o line is a notoriously c o m p l i cated manoeuvre and undertaken after crossing the rear o f a force under attack, i n the close presence o f the enemy, is a m i l i t a r y nightmare. Raymond asks us to believe that the crusader force was seeking to block the plain as i t executed a right t u r n , yet the p l a i n i n RA, pp. 79-83; G/-; . 70. P

Smail, Crusading

Warfare,

pp. 173-4.

g^

question is four t o five kilometres wide as he says. Moreover, his account suffers f r o m some i n t e r n a l contradictions. He tells us that the a r m y was d i v i d e d i n t o four divisions b u t does not explain whence came the i n f a n t r y u n i t w h i c h dealt w i t h the enemy to the rear. A d h e m a r ' s d i v i s i o n was opposed and encircled yet no arrows were shot against i t a n d n o b o d y killed - b u t Raymond himself tells us that h e replaced H e r a c l i u s o f Polignac who was wounded in the face b y a n a r r o w as t h e standard-bearer o f the bishop. Finally he refers t o a t o t a l v i c t o r y a n d p u r s u i t to the setting o f the sun, b u t remarks t h a t few o f the enemy's m o u n t e d men were killed, though many foot. W h e n we l o o k a t other accounts we can see some i n d i c a t i o n o f the difficulties simply f r o m the variant numbers o f divisions i n the crusader a r m y w h i c h they record. The Anonymous, w h o w a s c e r t a i n l y present, gives six a n d R a l p h agrees on the n u m b e r a n d t h e m a k e - u p b u t suggests a different order. Ansclm, w h o was a p a r t i c i p a n t a n d w r o t e his second letter very shortly after the b a t t l e , mentions o n l y five divisions and omits the name o f G o d f r e y d c B o u i l l o n w h o was most certainly present and i n charge o f a m a j o r d i v i s i o n . A l b e r t o f A i x says there were no fewer than twelve d i v i s i o n s w h i c h h e carefully enumerates specifying who the leaders w e r e . Anselm's slip o f memory should remind us that this was a n e x c i t i n g a n d e m o t i o n a l occasion. T h e importing o f camp gossip b y R a y m o n d a n d his concern w i t h enemy encirclement point t o his efforts t o e x p l a i n events postfacto. T h e Anonymous docs much the same — h e refers to K e r b o g a h a t the start of the battle ordering t h a t grass-firing be used t o signal retreat and records its use against t h e crusader i n f a n t r y d e p l o y e d against the enemy i n the rear as s i g n a l l i n g t h e end o f t h e battle - b u t nobody else does this. Pres u m a b l y h e connected t h e appearance o f a grass-fire with the enemy flight, t h o u g h there is clear reason t o believe that i t signified nothing o f the s o r t . T h e r e is always a tendency to tidy up a battle i n retrospect, t o give i t a shape w h i c h w i l l inevitably reflect the deductions a n d p r e d i l e c t i o n s o f the w r i t e r as much as events, and that is w h a t w e a r e d e a l i n g w i t h here i n w h a t was a remarkable event and a 5 2

5 3

» s s

GF, p . 6 8 ; R C , 6 6 6 ; Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzusbriefe,

pp. 157-60; A, 422; FC, pp. 105-6 is

entirely dependent on R A for his account of the battle. Using smoke to confuse and choke the enemy was a well-known device of Islamic armies, employed, for example, at H a t t i n ; I b n al-Athir, 6 8 4 . More exotic and even poisonous substances were also sometimes used: A . L . S. Muhammad Lutful-Huq, A critical edition of the Mhayal

5 1

2

al-Sul

( 1 9 5 5 ) . P- « 5 '

of Muhammad

b. Isn b. Isma'il

Al-Hanafi,

Ph.D thesis, University of London

286

VICTORY

IN THE

deeply felt experience for all who lived t h r o u g h it. I f we bear a l l this i n m i n d i t seems to me that the crusaders had a much simpler battle p l a n t h a n has been suggested and that the reasons for their victory are fairly clear. The most remarkable t h i n g about the battle against Kerbogah was that it was a victory of a largely i n f a n t r y army over a much larger force w i t h infantry and cavalry. For the crusaders must have been overwhelmingly dismounted. A l b e r t of A i x says that there were o n l y 150-200 horses i n the army fit for battle. This w o u l d suggest t h a t there were barely more t h a n t h i r t y knights on average in each i f there were six crusader divisions. I t is possible t h a t the Provençal force was stronger i n horses t h a n others, for Godfrey and R o b e r t of Flanders had begged horses from Count R a y m o n d , but i f t h a t was the case then other divisions w o u l d have been weaker i n mounted m e n . A l b e r t makes his comments about the shortage o f horses in the context of explaining that its consequence was that there was l i t t l e pursuit o f the enemy after the battle. The other sources seem to p o i n t i n the same direction. Raymond o f Aguilers, who does not comment directly at this point on the number o f horses, says t h a t few of the enemy's horsemen were killed, but many o f their footmen, R a l p h o f Caen says exactly the same t h i n g - only Tancred a n d his small force really pursued the enemy beyond his camp as f a r as 'Artâh. This is confirmed by K e m a l a d - D i n who says that there was no pursuit and no prominent men were lost although many v o l u n teers became casualties. M a t t h e w o f Edessa stresses that i t was the Islamic i n f a n t r y which bore the weight o f the crusader a t t a c k . We need not suppose that Albert was exactly right, and he does qualify his number by saying that the 200 were those fit for battle. However Fulcher, w i t h o u t giving figures, says much the same t h i n g : ' T h e y [the enemy] knew that our knights had been reduced to weak and helpless f o o t m e n ' . The crusader army was overwhelmingly an a r m y on foot and the few horsemen i n its divisions must have been precious nuclei round which the others could rally. We can assume that i n this desperate situation every fit m a n was pressed i n t o service, for after the capture o f the city they w o u l d have had ample supplies of arms for even the poorest. Amongst these were the Tqfurs, a hard-core o f poor men organised under their o w n leaders, whose 5 4

55

56

name m a y be derived f r o m the big l i g h t wooden shield w h i c h m a n y o f them carried, the talevart or talevas. T h e i r ferocity a n d i n p a r t i c u l a r their cannibalism w o u l d later repel friend a n d foe alike, a l t h o u g h their supposed ' k i n g ' may well have been a later i n v e n t i o n grafted o n like the n o b i l i t y of R o b i n H o o d . These desperados seem to have been pre-eminently N o r t h French and Fleming i n o r i g i n and t o have represented a quasi-autonomous force w i t h i n the a r m y . Such troops as these w o u l d have been well-stiffened b y large numbers o f dismounted knights, so t h a t a formidable i n f a n t r y existed, and w o u l d continue to exist f o r the rest o f the crusade. T h e use o f i n f a n t r y thrown f o r w a r d o f the knights was n o t so m u c h a skilful t a c t i c a l invention - rather a necessity, for the shortage o f horsemen m e a n t that the foot w o u l d have to carry the battle to the enemy. I n the event the battle proved t h e i r value i n spectacular fashion. 5 7

Here we come t o the whole p o i n t o f the crusader deployment. They needed t o get to close quarters w i t h the e n e m y as q u i c k l y as possible a n d i n the most favourable circumstances. T h e y c o u l d n o t afford t o fight at a distance for that w o u l d be to the enemy's advantage. T h i s was w h y they chose to break o u t o f the Bridge G a t e . The m a i n enemy camp was situated u p the v a l l e y o f the O r o n t e s some five kilometres above A n t i o c h , as we have n o t e d (see fig. 12). I t seems to have remained there for all the sources i n d i c a t e t h a t after the battle the enemy were pursued u p the v a l l e y a n d their c a m p sacked. T o have attacked through the three n o r t h - f a c i n g gates would h a v e sent the army i n t o the n a r r o w f u n n e l o f the O r o n t e s valley, close to where the enemy m a i n force l u r k e d i n its camp at t h e confluence o f the Orontes and the K a r a Su. I t is clear t h a t his m a i n force was there, for the crusader sources speak o f K e r b o g a h b e i n g i n the camp at the t i m e of their sally and being separated f r o m the main focus of the fighting. T o have attacked south t h r o u g h the St George G a t e w o u l d have been folly, for the enemy w o u l d have been massed b e h i n d a n a r m y w h i c h w o u l d i n e v i t a b l y have fled to the sea. Rather, a key factor i n the defeat of Kerbogah was the decision o f the 58

59

" The origin o f the name is suggested by L . A . M . Sumbcrg, 'The

5 5

5 6

See above, pp. 2 8 1 - 2 . A A , 427; RA, p. 8 3 ; RC, 6 6 9 - 7 0 ; Aleppo Chronicle, 583; Matthew, 43. FC, p. 103. A

Tqfurs

and the First

Crusade', Medieval Studies, 21 ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 2 2 7 - 8 ; on the Tafurs see IM Chanson d'Antioche, n. 2987,404a, 4 0 4 9 , 4 0 6 6 , 4 0 8 7 , 4 1 0 0 , 4 1 0 6 , 4115, 4118, 4299, 4 3 1 8 , 6 3 9 5 , 6 3 9 8 , 6 4 1 7 , 8 2 5 1 , M

5 4

287

The victory

EAST

i s

8921; G N , 242 says their lord was a Norman knight who had lost his horse. Sec above p . a86; on pursuit up the valley sec A A , 426; R A , p. 8 3 ; R C , 6 7 0 ; GF, p. 7 0 . Other Turkish camps were made at various times; for example, that on M o u n t Silpius which was soon abandoned, and then down in the plain to the north o f the Bridge Gate. GF, pp. 6 8 - 9 ; R A , p. 80; RC, 6 6 7 ; A A , 4 2 6 .

288

VICTORY

IN THE

289

The victory

EAST

crusaders to attack against the force i n the p l a i n above the Bridge Gate and the speed w i t h w h i c h this was achieved. I t is easy to forget the sheer size o f A n t i o c h . This had troubled the crusaders w h o for six months could o n l y sustain outposts on the west bank. Kerbogah made the fatal mistake o f dispersing his forces, something the crusaders had been at pains to avoid d u r i n g their siege. H e held much of his army to the n o r t h b u t this separated h i m from the force by the Bridge Gate, m u c h o f w h i c h was m a i n l y on foot to judge by comments i n the sources t h a t the i n f a n t r y suffered the b u l k of the losses. I f all the gates of the city were invested as the crusader sources say we can envisage m u c h of his huge a r m y rallying to the battle w h i c h developed to the n o r t h o f the B r i d g e Gate and being committed to action piecemeal (see fig. 14). Presumably some of those who attacked the crusaders i n the rear came f r o m the force outside the St George Gate. As the crusaders marched o u t , a l l these groups w o u l d have had to concentrate and either a w a i t the coming of their commander or rush into a develo p i n g battle w i t h o u t any d i r e c t i o n . T h e formation adopted by the crusaders was designed to strike at the enemy i n the plain and to seize t h e m i n close combat; this was the j o b of the first divisions to emerge. T h e l o n g m a r c h of the Provencals across the p l a i n was to protect their o w n flanks a n d this was especially useful as Kerbogah and his main force approached, while the reserve under Bohemond was there to give support as needed. Bohemond probably counted on the distance between K e r b o g a h and the forces i n the p l a i n to aid his plan; Kerbogah was sufTering f r o m dispersal of his forces, w h i c h the crusader leaders had been at such pains to avoid. I n the event, the crusaders were able to achieve success because of hesitations i n the enemy camp and the speed o f their own action. 60

W h e n the garrison of the citadel flew the black flag t o warn K e r b o g a h that a break-out was i m m i n e n t the news seems to have triggered not action but a debate i n the enemy camp. Some crusader sources report a dialogue between M i r d a l i n and his commander w h i c h shows K e r b o g a h as fearful. This follows the poetic tradition of i m a g i n a r y exchanges amongst the enemy, i n this case designed to e x p l a i n an e x t r a o r d i n a r y fact, the slowness of the enemy army to react to the a t t a c k . According to K e m a l a d - D i n , the Arab leader 61

6 0

6 1

See below, p. 293. RC, p. 667 repeats exactly the same story, telling it, however, as a rumour. It was probably current in the crusader camp to explain events, and i t is worth noting that Mirdalin passed into the corpus o f crusader legend: Cahen, Syne du Nord, p. 215, n.35.

Fig. 14 The defeat of Kerbogah £ Turkish bowmen routed by Hugh of Vermandios , and * • Godfrey and the North French attack the Turks by the Bridge Gate : f o u t h French under Adhemar, attempting to outflank the enemy, are 3

:Z ^ t ^ ? f « - n «

- W ^ « wavers . , 5 : Rcnaud of Toul's force holds off the enemy m the rear fi • T h e Count of Toulouse continues to blockade the Citadel S : KerbSgah Jib1 his main force advances from the base camp, then turns ' back as he sees the rest of his army breaking up i n defeat

k

W

h

e

n

2go

VICTORY

IN THE

EAST

Wassab i b n - M a h m u d and some emirs urged K e r b o g a h to fall on the ders wanted to let the enemy out to attack t h e m i n the p l a i n . I b n al-Athir says there was i n any case considerable friction between many of the emirs and Kerbogah, and that some favoured an muncdiate attack but Kerbogah favoured letting the enemy o u t " " Kerbogah s view seems to have prevailed, b u t that is n o t to say that no effort was made to attack the Franks as they left the Bridge Gate

UPT t K 1 i

r ° ° ° > ° ° — rocJe u p to the Bridge Gate as i t opened. However, the crusaders had 0

b

f

a

f

r C e

f

2

0 0

m

U

n

t

c

d

b

"T? I , ° ° ^ Vcrmandois at the la!,! £ f i e l d s h e l d up against the enemy arrows and drove back the enemy u n t i l they e

W

f

b

m

W

n

a

m

n

C

n

d

W

k

h

t h G y

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wen b r r r r ' v ° ^ k ^ well be the Turkomen to w h o m K e m a l a d - D i n reffrs as causing disorder in the ranks of Kerbogah's army. Anselm of R i b c m o n t t h e f led his forces into the retreating enemy, followed b y H u g h o f Vcrmandois and the whole group o f the N o r t h French as they toned right across the Bridge Gate - Robert of Flanders, R o b e r t o f Normandy, Baldwin o f Hainault and Eustace of Boulogne.* I t was here on the Christian right b y the Orontes t h a f the engag ^ ^ a

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groups, as they crossed the Bridge, turned right and attacked the enemy to t h e left of its predecessor, fanning out like the fingers o f a hand. I t is u n l i k e l y that there was a deployment i n t o t i d y formations in line a n d far more likely that each charged i n c o l u m n p e l l - m e l l against t h e enemy. B u t the general battle plan was followed. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers describes how the a r m y o f the bishop struck across the p l a i n , surrounded by the enemy w h o swarmed about i t like flies, b u t never came to close quarters. I t is quite likely t h a t enemy c a v a l r y forces, coming up piecemeal f r o m their siege deployments, were attracted into attacking Adhemar's force, leaving t h e i r i n f a n t r y isolated. A n i m p o r t a n t action was caused b y a large g r o u p of the enemy led, so A l b e r t says, by Soliman and Rossilion, w h o moved to the left o f the bishop's force w i t h the obvious i n t e n t i o n of t a k i n g the Christians i n the rear. T h e A n o n y mous says t h a t t o counter this the leaders improvised a force f r o m the armies o f Godfrey and R o b e r t of N o r m a n d y under C o u n t Renaud o f T o u l . A l b e r t says that this enemy force o f 15,000 fell b y chance i n t o conflict w i t h the corps led by R e n a u d I I I o f T o u l and others w h o are all associated w i t h Godfrey. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers remarks t h a t a group of the enemy moved to their rear a n d were attacked b y crusader infantry who fought w e l l , and R a l p h o f Caen says t h a t a n enemy force of 100,000 passed across the Frankish column t o take them i n the rear p r e c i p i t a t i n g a two-faced battle. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers simply records that this i n f a n t r y force fought well, b u t t h e Anonymous says that i t had heavy casualties. A l b e r t says t h a t i t was wiped out, save for the knights a n d , like the A n o n y m o u s , says that the enemy set fire i n order to the grass to defeat t h e m . R a l p h never mentions R e n a u d a n d his m e n , b u t says that B o h e m o n d fought the two-faced b a t t l e . I t is at least possible that after t h e infantry was w i p e d out Bohcmond's force lent support. The i m p r o v i s a t i o n o f such a force i n an emergency suggests that the 65

foot

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.

The following are the other groups mentioned by Albert: 6 5

a Peter ofAstcnois* and his brother Renaud I I I ofToul*, Warner count orGrez*, Henry o i Esch-sur Sûre*, all kinsmen of Godfrey, Renaud ofHamersbach and Walter o f Domedart. b R a i m b a u d d'Orange, Louis count of Mousson*, Lambert son ofCono of Montaigu*. c H u g h or St Pol and his son Engelrand, Thomas de Fe, Baldwin o f Bourcq*, Robert F i t z G e r a l d , Raymond Pelcth, Galon of Calmon, Everard o r Puiset, Drcux of Nesle, Rodolfus son of Godfrey, and Conan and another Rodolfus, both Bretons. Albert says they formed two divisions. Robert FitzGcrard is surely the standard-bearer of Bohemond who fought w i t h such distinction at the Lake Battle: GF, p. 3 7 - 8 . d Gaston o f B e a m , Gerard of Roussillon, William of Montpcllicr, On those marked * sec Murray, 'The army of Godfrey de Bouillon'. A A , 4 2 4 ; GF, p. 6 9 ; RA, p. 8 1 ; R C , 667.

292

VICTORY

IN THE

leaders had established very tight control over their forces which had become disciplined and trained through h a r d and long contact w i t h the enemy. This was a g r i m and costly engagement fought out i n the rear of the main crusader force, but their sacrifice bought time for the main army. T h e only w r i t e r to give any detail about the fighting near the Bridge Gate is Albert o f A i x whose account is confusing and, i n at least one minor respect, demonstrably erroneous. His account tends to exalt the role o f Godfrey a n d very much to play down that of Bohemond who he never suggests to have been i n command. According to Albert, while the fight i n the rear was going on, Bohemond was attacked by a force led b y Oaradja of H a r r a n , Duqaq of Damascus and R i d w a n o f Aleppo. I t is quite definitely known that R i d w a n was not present. Godfrey was, at this time, engaged in attacking a force led by, amongst others, Balduk of Samosata and, as he defeated them, received a call for help from Bohemond. Godfrey rallied to Bohemond's aid w i t h H u g h o f Vermandois, and i t is interesting that they changed position slowly so that horse and foot could stay together. T h e enemy then fled, crossing a stream which flowed into the Orontes, probably the W a d i al Quivaisiya, which must mean that they fled north, and dismounted o n a hilltop to resist, b u t were driven off. This could well represent confused memories of what the Anonymous records i n tidier form; he says that at the moment that the Saracens to the rear were setting fire to the grass around the beleaguered force l e d by Renaud of Toul, Godfrey and the N o r t h French began to press forwards on the right b y the river, Bohemond committed his o w n force to the charge and the enemy fell into disorder a n d r e t r e a t . A l b e r t is reporting recollections o f confused close-quarter fighting w h i c h was witnessed from a distance b y the Anonymous w h o was caught u p i n it just at the moment that the enemy broke. B u t such fighting was confined to this part o f the battlefield and t o the gallant stand o f Renaud o f Toul's men. Raymond reports being attacked w i t h arrows but:'the enemy turned i n flight w i t h o u t g i v i n g us a chance to engage i n battle', b y which he probably means they never got to close quarters." I n the meantime i t w o u l d appear that Kerbogah s main body had reached the battlefield on the Christian left where, Albert says, i t stood still unable to come to the aid o f the retreating Turks by the river. This was not divine i n t e r v e n t i o n as 66

«

A A , 2 - 6 ; GF, p. o. +

5

7

*

R , p. 83; Krey, First Crusade, p. , 8 9 , A

293

The victory

EAST

Albert suggests, b u t because o f the presence of Adhemar s force i n the valley w h i c h w o u l d threaten his r i g h t w i n g should he undertake such a d i f f i c u l t manoeuvre as to gallop to the rescue o f an already broken force. A l b e r t says t h a t at this p o i n t Kerbogah was informed that the crusaders were i n the camp, w h i c h presumably means the camp i n t h e p l a i n immediately above the Bridge Gate, and he retreated, b a r e l y pursued because of the lack of horses. This general picture o f r e a l l y h a r d fighting i n only a l i m i t e d area of the battlefield is c o n f i r m e d b y I b n a l - A t h i r w h o says t h a t only one division of the Islamic a r m y stood, fought and was w i p e d o u t . T h e I s l a m i c sources tend to a t t r i b u t e the defeat of this great army to divisions i n its o w n ranks. A c c o r d i n g to I b n a l - A t h i r there h a d been a l o t o f f r i c t i o n w h i c h came to a head i n the debate over whether t o attack the crusader a r m y as i t emerged f r o m Antioch and as a result most o f the a r m y took flight o u t o f sheer irritation w i t h K e r b o g a h . K e m a l a d - D i n is rather more specific. According to h i m , K c r b o g a h opened negotiations w i t h R i d w a n of Aleppo d u r i n g the siege, a n n o y i n g D u q a q while J a n a h ad-Daulah o f Horns feared vengeance f o r his p a r t i n the murder o f a r i v a l , Youssef ben Abiks, and t h e n o m a d T u r k s disliked R i d w a n . There is a sense i n which this is m a k i n g excuses. A f t e r all, i f the fortune of battle had gone the other w a y doubtless the nascent disputes between Raymond ol Toulouse a n d B o h e m o n d w o u l d have been blamed for the defeat. This is n o t t o say t h a t f r i c t i o n w i t h i n Kerbogah's coalition was not a factor, b u t i t was o n l y a factor. Kerbogah's army was very large, as even t h e I s l a m i c sources a d m i t , b u t the dispersal of its forces and its commander's hesitations meant t h a t its power was never brought to bear. I t is possible t h a t he had always intended to allow the Franks to exit f r o m A n t i o c h , c o u n t i n g o n his 2,000 archers to exact a heavy toll o f t h e i r numbers, and so was surprised b y the speed w i t h which this force w a s brushed aside. But he also seems to have hesitated over plans a n d this was f a t a l . B y contrast the Franks knew what they w a n t e d , t o engage the enemy r a p i d l y and i n this they succeeded by a w e l l - p l a n n e d a n d swift exit. Battle was therefore joined on the river bank b e t w e e n o n l y a p a r t o f Kerbogah's army and a very large p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e Franks, and despite the initiative of a Turkish force w h i c h t r i e d to attack from the rear, there seems to have been a piecemeal c o m m i t m e n t o f the Islamic a r m y which became dis6 8

6 9

ss A A , 4 2 6 ; I b n a l - A t h i r , . 9 6 .

6

9

l b al-Athir, 194-6; Aleppo Chronicle, 5 8 2 - 3 .

294

VICTORY

IN THE

ordered under Frankish pressure. As Kerbogah's m a i n force appeared on the right, his allies' forces on the left by the r i v e r were breaking u p while Adhemar's sizable force was uncommitted. This was the situation i n w h i c h a l l the distrusts a n d frictions i n the Moslem army came into play and sauve qui pent became the rule. T h e Frankish battle plan, w h i c h was surely Bohemond's, was to engage a proportion of Kerbogah's army closely, w h i l e , as far as possible, taking precautions against being surrounded a n d overwhelmed. I t worked because of the dispersal o f Kerbogah's army, his hesitations and the distrust which this unleashed, and also because o f another factor. The Franks were desperate for battle by 28 June. I t is certain that their spirits had been revived by the finding o f the H o l y Lance and other divine messages, and the leaders m a y have noted w i t h interest Kerbogah's failure to press home his attacks from the citadel i n favour of simple attrition. But the army was faced w i t h starvation - they had to fight and w i n i f they were to survive and A l b e r t says that they expressed this view to the leaders. O f course, such an experience could have broken them, b u t sustained by f a i t h and determination, by that driving religious enthusiasm which was the motor of the crusade, they fought for the chance to live. I t was a gambler's throw of all or nothing w h i c h their enemies did n o t fully understand. Some of the Moslems d i d - the volunteers seem t o have fought to the death as the chronicles of Aleppo and Damascus point o u t . But for most of the emirs o f Kerbogah's a r m y this was a w a r for this or that advantage - that was the t r a d i t i o n i n this fractured borderland of Islam. W h e n things went badly distrust flourished, and this vile plant was fed all the more b y the m i l i t a r y incompetence of Kerbogah. So a combination of factors destroyed this great army, as i t has destroyed so many others w h i c h were never, as a whole, brought to battle. T h e great, the rich and the lucky saved themselves - the foot, the women and children and other camp followers were destroyed. Fulcher, speaking of the fate of women i n the enemy camp, expresses the true savagery of the crusader spirit: ' I n regard to the women found i n the tents o f the foe the Franks did t h e m no evil b u t drove lances into their bellies'. 70

71

72

I n this great victory we can see the i m p r o v i n g m i l i t a r y technique of the crusader army. There was no single tactical or technical 7 0

7

'

7 2

The victory

EAST

See above, p. 279,

295

advance. I t s leaders were now very experienced soldiers, a n d B o h c mond was a n exceptional commander. B y the end o f t h e siege o f Antioch the a r m y was cohesive and disciplined. T h i s was t h e r e s u l t of working together i n shared hardship. T h e leaders k n e w t h a t solidity i n formation was i m p o r t a n t before they left t h e west, a n d any doubts they may have h a d w o u l d have been d i s p e l l e d b y t h e advice o f Alexius a n d the experience a t D o r y l a e u m w h e r e i t is evident they knew w h a t was i m p o r t a n t b u t were h a n d l i n g a m u c h less skilled and practised army. I t took time for this k i n d o f lesson t o percolate t h r o u g h the a r m y as i t welded itself i n t o a n effective Bghting u n i t . For knowing w h a t is needed a n d b r i n g i n g troops t o t h e point where they can achieve i t are t w o different things. L u c k w a s a major factor i n their early battles i n Asia M i n o r . I t c o n t i n u e d t o be important, b u t the army was becoming more cohesive a n d the L a k e Battle and the fight against K e r b o g a h demonstrated this. T h e r e arc some indications, especially at the Lake B a t t l e , t h a t the a r m y w a s using the mass charge w i t h couched lances w h i c h is so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of warfare later i n the twelfth century, b u t o f w h i c h t h e r e is l i t t l e evidence before the crusade. T h e crusaders enjoyed no t e c h n i c a l advantage over amongst their enemies t h o u g h w e d o n o t hear o f lamellar a n d scale armour amongst the Franks a n d i t is possible t h a t chain-mail was more widespread amongst t h e m t h a n t h e i r enemies and this w o u l d reflect their predilection f o r close-quarter c o m b a t . Even the large kite-shaped shield, w h i c h is clearly a n a d a p t a t i o n t o this style o f war, was k n o w n i n the East, t h o u g h smaller r o u n d ones were perhaps commoner. T h e westerners were a d a p t a b l e , w i t h t h e knights, t h e key element i n the a r m y , q u i t e capable o f fighting o n foot. T h e real i n n o v a t i o n was i n c o m m a n d . T h e near disaster o f t h e Foraging Battle forced them i n t o a p p o i n t i n g a single c o m m a n d e r and, i n t h e person o f B o h c m o n d , they found a n able general. T h e enemy was particularly adept a t a v o i d i n g close q u a r t e r fighting until their opponents were suitably weakened, a n d used e n c i r c l e ment and ambush to that end. B o h c m o n d t u r n e d t h e tables o n t h e enemy by ambushing them at the Lake Battle, h o l d i n g his o w n force as a reserve to reinforce weak points. A t A n t i o c h he a g a i n s o u g h t to bring the enemy to battle at close quarters b y a s u d d e n sally against a part o f his army, a n d devised a f o r m a t i o n w h i c h offered some protection from encirclement t o the F r a n k i s h force m o s t closely 73

Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, p . 46; Aleppo Chronicle, 5 8 3 . FC, p . 106. "

See above, p p . 71-a, 74.

20,6

VICTORY

IN THE

EAST

engaged. The hallmark of his dispositions w a s aggression - h e never stood on the defensive and never allowed the e n e m y to settle his formation. The crusader army was by t h i s time a seasoned and disciplined force fired by religious fervour a n d the desperate need to win food. The lessons of war were g r a d u a l l y l e a r n e d , t h o u g h at enormous cost in lives. The deadly effectiveness o f a m b u s h , w h i c h might trap a handful o f men, or o v e r w h e l m a whole a r m y as at the Foraging Battle, was only slowly brought h o m e to the Franks. T h i s continued to be a weakness, as i t was of all a r m i e s , i n p a r t because o f poor communications and i n part because o f weak discipline. Also i t is a simple and unavoidable fact that a r m i e s , like a l l organisations, fall into routine or are obliged to do p r e d i c t a b l e things. A t t h e L a k e Battle they ambushed R i d w a n ; less t h a n a m o n t h l a t e r B o h c m o n d , who had commanded them and devised the stratagem, was h i m s e l f ambushed on the St Symeon road b u t t h e n i t was t h e o n l y road down to the sea and i t seems to have been a w e l l - l a i d a m b u s h . B u t two clear-cut victories, i n February and J u n e 1098, achieved over larger forces i n very adverse circumstances, s h o w e d a n a r m y whose cohesiveness was growing and whose c o m m a n d e r s w e r e a d a p t i n g to new conditions. Franks and Turks were u s e d to different styles o f war, and the Franks worked h a r d to b r i n g t h e i r e n e m y to b a t t l e at close quarters. Theirs were victories of m i l i t a r y a b i l i t y , b u t also o f militant temperament. Their enemies d i d n o t , i n the m a i n , share that willingness to conquer or die - the v e r y essence o f crusading. For the most part they fought for more l i m i t e d ends w i t h o u t p r o p erly understanding the nature of their new a d v e r s a r y . H a v i n g said this, we need to recognise that the savagery d u r i n g the siege o f Antioch and the fate o f the volunteers o u t s i d e i n the final b a t t l e show that a quite different spirit could b e engendered i n their enemies. I t is a fine irony that this supreme t r i u m p h o f t h e c r u s a d i n g spirit m the battle over Kerbogah opened t h e w a y t o a m a r k e d change i n the way the army conducted itself.

CHAPTER

10

Divisions

I m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r t h e flight o f Kerbogah's army the citadel of A n t i o c h s u r r e n d e r e d . A c c o r d i n g to the Anonymous its commander offered s u b m i s s i o n t o R a y m o n d of Toulouse, but some South Italians suggested t h a t he accept the banner of Bohemond instead, and so t h e c i t a d e l w e n t t o the S o u t h I t a l i a n leader. I t was a sour note of d i v i s i o n a f t e r t h e g r e a t t r i u m p h , and i t set the tone for a prolonged p e r i o d o f c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the crusader army. For Bohemond's a m b i t i o n t o c o n t r o l A n t i o c h triggered a crisis which was exacerbated b y o t h e r factors a n d w h i c h had a severe impact upon p r a c t i c a l m i l i t a r y necessity. Bohemond had made contact with F i r u z , t h e b e t r a y e r o f A n t i o c h , and i n the end the other leaders made h i m a c o n d i t i o n a l promise of the city: 'on condition that i f the e m p e r o r c o m e t o o u r a i d a n d fulfil all his obligations which he p r o m i s e d , w e w i l l r e t u r n t h e city to h i m as i t is right to do'. 1

2

I m m e d i a t e l y after the defeat of Kerbogah the princes met and sent H u g h o f V e r m a n d o i s to Constantinople, presumably to explain the s i t u a t i o n t o A l e x i u s a n d ask for his help. I t is interesting that even i n t h e e m e r g e n c y , as Kerbogah's force approached, the majority o f the l e a d e r s o f the crusade stood by their oath to Alexius, but c o n d i t i o n s n o w conspired to undermine that fidelity. Bohemond never r e g a r d e d A n t i o c h as a n y t h i n g other than his personal possession. R a y m o n d o f A g u i l e r s , w h o says nothing of Bohemond's role in the b e t r a y a l o f t h e c i t y , reports that he seized the citadel, confirming the s t o r y o f t h e q u a r r e l t o l d by the Anonymous, and persuaded all the leaders e x c e p t R a y m o n d of Toulouse to surrender to him the gates a n d t o w e r s t h e y h e l d along the city wall, with resultant i n t e r n a l s t r i f e . O n 14 J u l y 1098 Bohemond made an agreement w i t h t h e G e n o e s e a n d granted a charter conceding extraterntonal 3

1

GF, p. 71.

2

GF, pp. 44-5 and

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> PP-

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29°

VICTORY

IN THE

EAST

engaged. T h e hallmark of his dispositions was aggression - he never stood on the defensive and never allowed the enemy to settle his formation. T h e crusader army was by this time a seasoned and disciplined force fired by religious fervour and the desperate need to w i n food. T h e lessons of war were gradually learned, though at enormous cost i n lives. T h e deadly effectiveness of ambush, which might trap a handful of men, or overwhelm a whole army as at the Foraging Battle, was only slowly brought home to the Franks. This continued to be a weakness, as i t was o f all armies, i n part because o f poor communications and i n part because of weak discipline. Also i t is a simple a n d unavoidable fact that armies, like all organisations, fall into r o u t i n e or are obliged to do predictable things. A t the Lake Battle they ambushed R i d w a n ; less t h a n a m o n t h later Bohemond, who had commanded them and devised the stratagem, was himself ambushed o n the St Symeon road b u t then i t was the o n l y road d o w n to the sea and i t seems to have been a well-laid ambush. But two clear-cut victories, i n February and June 1098, achieved over larger forces i n very adverse circumstances, showed a n army whose cohesivencss was growing and whose commanders were adapting to new conditions. Franks and Turks were used to different styles o f war, and the Franks worked hard to b r i n g their enemy to battle at close quarters. Theirs were victories o f m i l i t a r y ability, b u t also o f m i l i t a n t temperament. T h e i r enemies d i d not, i n the m a i n , share that willingness to conquer or die - the very essence of crusading. For the most part they fought for more limited ends w i t h o u t properly understanding the nature o f their new adversary. H a v i n g said this, we need to recognise that the savagery d u r i n g the siege o f A n t i o c h a n d the fate o f the volunteers outside i n the final battle show that a quite different spirit could be engendered i n their enemies. I t is a fine irony that this supreme t r i u m p h o f the crusading spirit i n the battle over Kerbogah opened the way to a marked change in the way the army conducted itself.

CHAPTER

10

Divisions

I m m e d i a t e l y after the flight o f Kerbogah's army the citadel of A n t i o c h s u r r e n d e r e d . A c c o r d i n g to the Anonymous its commander offered submission to R a y m o n d o f Toulouse, b u t some South I t a lians suggested t h a t he accept the banner o f Bohemond instead, and so the c i t a d e l w e n t to the South I t a l i a n leader. I t was a sour note o f division after t h e great t r i u m p h , and i t set the tone for a prolonged period o f c o n f l i c t w i t h i n the crusader army. For Bohemond's a m b i t i o n t o c o n t r o l A n t i o c h triggered a crisis which was exacerbated b y o t h e r factors and w h i c h had a severe impact upon practical m i l i t a r y necessity. Bohemond had made contact w i t h F i r u z , the b e t r a y e r o f A n t i o c h , and i n the end the other leaders made h i m a c o n d i t i o n a l promise o f the city: 'on condition that i f the emperor c o m e t o o u r aid and fulfil all his obligations which he promised, w e w i l l r e t u r n the city to h i m as i t is r i g h t to d o ' . 1

2

I m m e d i a t e l y after the defeat o f K e r b o g a h the princes met and sent H u g h o f V e r m a n d o i s to Constantinople, presumably to explain the s i t u a t i o n to A l e x i u s and ask for his help. I t is interesting that even i n the emergency, as Kerbogah's force approached, the majority o f the leaders o f the crusade stood by their oath to Alexius, but conditions n o w conspired to undermine that fidelity. Bohemond never r e g a r d e d A n t i o c h as a n y t h i n g other than his personal possession. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers, who says n o t h i n g of Bohemond's role i n the b e t r a y a l o f t h e city, reports t h a t he seized the citadel, confirming the story o f the q u a r r e l told by the Anonymous, and persuaded all the leaders e x c e p t R a y m o n d o f Toulouse to surrender to h i m the gates a n d towers they held along the city wall, with resultant i n t e r n a l s t r i f e . O n 14 J u l y 1098 Bohemond made an agreement w i t h the Genoese a n d granted a charter conceding extraterr'>nal 3

1 GF, p . 71.

2

GF, pp. 44-5 and see above, pp. 2 6 0 - 2 .

3

F A , pp. 83-4^

2 8

VICTORY

9

privileges i n return for promises of support. There was no mention of the rights o f the emperor i n these documents. I n the pact the Genoese promised m i l i t a r y support against any w h o attacked the city: 'But they w i l l not fight against the count o f St Gilles; i f he wishes to w i t h d r a w we w i l l give h i m council, i f not we w i l l remain neutral'. 4

I t is evident t h a t Bohemond a n d the count o f Toulouse had become rivals i n the matter of A n t i o c h even before the final echoes of the great victory had died away and i t was probably p a r t l y because of t h that on 3 J u l y the leaders decided to delay their journey. As the Anonymous says, i t was sensible to delay for the army was tired and the summer was n o t a good season t o continue, though R a y m o n d o f Aguilers believed that the enemy, terrified by the defeat o f Kerbogah, w o u l d have offered little resistance. He was probably appalled b y the extraordinary decision to p u t off the j o u r n e y u n t i l 1 November 1098, a delay o f four months. Presumably this was to allow plenty o f time for an imperial a r m y to arrive - i t had, after all, taken the crusaders themselves nearly four months to march to A n t i o c h f r o m Nicaea. For most o f the princes a solution to the quarrel was the p r i o r i t y and the coming o f the emperor, or at least substantial i m p e r i a l forces, w o u l d provide that. Its failure to materialise swayed t h e m somewhat to Bohemond's view, however, and this may well have been hastened b y matters of personality! R a y m o n d of Toulouse, for reasons at w h i c h we can only guess, was evidently not popular as a m a n . H e had suffered various illnesses d u r i n g the long siege of A n t i o c h , yet had shouldered a considerable burden. H e never seems to have been a distinguished soldier but was certainly reasonably competent. Yet he was later accused o f being i n the pay o f the emperor a n d this is perhaps the key to understanding his position. A t a time w h e n i t was bound to be unpopular he espoused the i m p e r i a l cause and this isolated a man w h o was already somewhat isolated i n the ranks o f the leaders b y his origins and by his age. 1 S

I f the princes were anxious t o appear t o be fair t o the emperor, there were plenty o f others i n the army who must have regarded this delay as a disaster. For the poor, and even many o f the knights, a halt i n w h a t had become friendly territory which they could not ravage was a disaster. For the moment many o f the leaders used the 4

Hagcnmeycr, Kreuzzugsbriefe,

pp. 1 5 5 - 6 .

299

Divisions

I N T H E EAST

vast p l u n d e r of A n t i o c h to take men i n t o t h e i r service, b u t the d e l a y must have caused tension, n o t least because i t seemed to be c o n t r a r y to the spirit of their whole u n d e r t a k i n g the u l t i m a t e object o i w h i c h was the l i b e r a t i o n of Jerusalem. W i t h Provencals and S " ^ ^ ^ " Normans h o l d i n g strongholds i n the c i t y - C o u n t R a y m o n d held the Governor's Palace and the Bridge Gate - there was a real possibility of violence. T h e question o f w h o held A n t i o c h was c l e a r l y tied to the wider question o f the Byzantine alliance, hence the mission o f Hugh of Vermandois i n early J u l y 1098. B u t soon after h e left the crusaders must have heard of Alexius's encounter w i t h Stephen o f Blois on o r about 20 June 1098. Stephen had fled f r o m the siege o f A n t i o c h w h e n K e r b o g a h approached, b u t he encountered Alexius a t P h i l o m e l i u m . A n n a Comnena w o u l d have us believe that the emperor was there, 'ready to march to the a i d o f the Kelts i n t h e A n t i o c h r e g i o n ' . T h i s , however, must be read i n the context o f A n n a ' s w o r k where her account o f the crusade and relations w i t h the Franks is d o m i n a t e d by the question o f A n t i o c h . She constantly accuses the Franks o f being oath-breakers, because of Bohemond's seizure o f the city. H e r view is t h a t Alexius kept his w o r d t o the Franks, w h i l e they b r o k e theirs to h i m and this is the central thesis o f the Alexiad as far as the crusade is concerned. Anna's version o f Alexius's purposes needs to be seen i n that l i g h t , and i t should be remembered that the crusader army h a d taken w e l l over two months to m a r c h f r o m A n t i o c h - i n Pisida, w h i c h is just west o f P h i l o m e l i u m , to A n t i o c h . O f course, Alexius h a d a smaller a r m y and need not have taken the l o n g d e t o u r of the m a i n crusader a r m y up t o Kayscri, b u t even so w h e n he m e t Stephen o f Blois on o r about 20 June 1098 he was at least three to four weeks m a r c h f r o m A n t i o c h (see fig. 2 ) . Alexius's movements at this time need to be seen i n the light o f his general position. According to his daughter, Alexius was a t first restrained f r o m rushing to the a i d of the Franks at A n t i o c h b y the need to defend his western provinces against local emirs, and so sent out a m i l i t a r y a n d naval e x p e d i t i o n led b y his brother-in-law J o h n Doukas to south¬ 0

1

1

5

6

7

« AA, 4 1 7 - 1 9 , says that the crusaders found out about the matter during Kerbogah's siege, but Hagcnmeycr, Chronalogie no. 2 8 7 , thinks that it took Stephen eleven days by land and sea to reach Philomelium on or about 2 0 June, which makes i t unlikely that news o f the matter c o u l d have got back to Antioch by 28 June. > Altxiad, p . 3 4 8 ; France, 'Anna Comnena', 22-5; Hagcnmeycr, Chronologic Nos. 175, 17b.

300

VICTORY IN THE

western Asia M i n o r . Doukas persuaded many enemy outposts to surrender b y displaying Tzachas's daughter, who had been captured at Nicaea, negotiated the surrender of Smyrna and defeated the T u r k s at Ephesus. H e appears to have left his fleet to clear islands l i k e Chios a n d Rhodes. Doukas pursued the retreating Turks up the Maeandros valley, seizing Sardes, Philadelphia, Laodicea, Lampe a n d reached Polybotus (modern Bolvadin) near Philomel i u m on the great r o a d across Asia M i n o r . Alexius took the field and marched d o w n the R o y a l R o a d , perhaps via Dorylaeum to Philom c l i u m where he a r r i v e d i n mid-June o f 1098, This j u n c t i o n of Byzantine forces c o u l d h a r d l y have been accidental. A glance at the map a n d the roads shows this to be a sensible p l a n to profit from the crusade. I t was almost certainly w i t h such propects in m i n d that Alexius a n d the western princes had made their decisions on the route o f the crusade. T h e loss of Nicaea and the defeat of K i l i j Arslan did n o t destroy Seljuk power i n Asia M i n o r but rolled i t back from the western end of the sub-continent. T h e emirs of western cities like Ephesus a n d Smyrna were virtually cut off from the support of the Seljuk Sultan, w i t h w h o m their relations had always been difficult, and Alexius's campaign i n the spring of 1098 w i t h its two axes of advance was intended to follow up this success. The Byzantine empire h a d certainly profited from the victories o f the crusader army, just as i t had p r o f i t e d f r o m Byzantine support. The question w h i c h arises is d i d Alexius intend to march to their aid as Anna suggests a n d the crusader chroniclers assumed? 8

9

A n n a stresses that her father was anxious to provide a i d to the Franks i n person w h e n at P h i l o m c l i u m he encountered W i l l i a m of Grandmesnil, Stephen of Blois and Peter o f Aups, whose presence astonished h i m . T h e y informed h i m o f the desperate situation in A n t i o c h a n d this increased his anxiety to proceed despite opposition from his o w n entourage. However, news came of an impending attack by I s m a i l , b r o t h e r o f M a l i k Shah. Alexius was also informed, although A n n a does n o t say by w h o m , that the Franks were plann i n g t o surrender. T h i s story is found also i n Matthew o f Edessa which perhaps reflects a later distortion o f the embassy of Peter the H e r m i t to K e r b o g a h o n 27 June. Alexius was persuaded to abandon his intentions and to retreat, taking w i t h h i m large sections of the

8

9

Alexiad, pp. 3 4 5 - 8 ; Vryonis, Hellenism,

Vryonis, Hellenism,

pp. 116-17.

pp. 115-19 sets this in context.

301

Divisions

EAST

local p o p u l a t i o n w h o w o u l d otherwise be exposed to the vengeance of the T u r k s . I n the midst of this A n n a gives a long diatribe about the impulsiveness a n d untrustworthiness o f the Franks and the account ends w i t h a note that Ismail eventually attacked Paipert i n north-eastern A n a t o l i a w h i c h was held b y Theodore Gabras of T r e b i z o n d . Amongst the L a t i n writers t w o make no mention of the episode a t P h i l o m e l i u m : Fulcher, perhaps because of his earlier c o n n e c t i o n w i t h Stephen, and R a y m o n d o f Aguilers perhaps out of regard f o r the susceptibilities o f his master the count of Toulouse. R a y m o n d , however, does mention the desertion of Stephen and later at ' A k k a r comments on the emperor's untrustworthiness and earlier desertion o f the army. The A n o n y m o u s says t h a t Stephen and his followers fled and met the emperor at P h i l o m e l i u m , but the centrepiece o f his account is a speech b y Guy, Bohemond's halfbrother w h o was i n imperial service, w h i c h is scornful o f Alexius (and so c o u l d never have been given) a n d tends to justify ignoring the rights of the emperor: ' i f the w o r d w h i c h we have heard from these scoundrels [Stephen and friends] is true, we and^ the other Christians w i l l forsake thee and remember thee no more'. He adds that m a n y o f the pilgrims w i t h Alexius died i n the subsequent r e t r e a t . R a l p h of Caen confirms the presence o f Guy and adds that Alexius h a d a n a r m y o f 100,000 together w i t h 10,000 Frankish reinforcements b u t his account is b r i e f a n d includes n o t h i n g of the great speech b y G u y . Both R a l p h and the Anonymous had evidently heard some reliable information a b o u t Philomelium for they c o n f i r m A n n a ' s statement that Alexius devastated the land and evacuated the local population. I t is possible t h a t Bauldry's story of some F r a n k s l e a v i n g Philomelium for A n t i o c h has some t r u t h i n i t and t h a t they were the source for this i n f o r m a t i o n . A l b e r t of A i x says t h a t the deserters were Stephen of Blois, W i l l i a m the Carpenter and a n o t h e r W i l l i a m , who must have been W i l l i a m of Grandmesnil, and t h a t they fled b y sea and met Alexius at P h i l o m c l i u m where he had 4 0 , 0 0 0 troops and 40,000 new p i l g r i m s a n d was accompanied by T a t i k i o s . T h e emphasis o f his account, however, is on the 1 0

11

12

'» Alexiad,

p p . 3 4 8 - 9 ; Matthew, 4'- On Theodore Gabras and

V r y o n i s , Hellenism,

his later martyrdom see

pp. 3 6 0 - 1 .

GF, pp. 6 3 - 5 . , '* GF, p. 6 5 ; R C , 6 5 8 - 9 ; for Bauldry's story see above, p . 2 1 1 ; the other copyists ol the Anonymous, PT, pp. 7 4 - 6 ; HBS, 2 0 3 - 4 ; R M , 815, add nothing although G N , 200, has a short d i a t r i b e about deserters and mentions Hugh o r Vermandois. I t should be noted that at first the siege o f Antioch was incomplete: see above, p. 270. 1 1

302

VICTORY

treachery of Stephen and the deserters w h o insisted t h a t there was no point in Alexius pressing o n . The L a t i n sources show n o i n s i g h t into Alexius's intentions and we are left o n l y w i t h A n n a ' s observations, written long afterwards and u n m i s t a k a b l y self-exculpatory i n content. Is i t likely that Alexius, who h a d refused t o j o i n t h e crusaders at Nicaea, would now have been p r e p a r e d t o j o i n t h e m i n adversity at distant A n t i o c h , especially as i t i s quite clear t h a t there was no formal obligation u p o n h i m to go? H a d he a c t u a l l y p r o m i s e d at any stage to come i n person, or had i t b e e n a c o n d i t i o n o f the offer made in the embassy o f H u g h o f V e r m a n d o i s to C o n s t a n t i n o p l e as the Anonymous suggests, i t w o u l d have b e e n m e n t i o n e d a n d been conclusive i n the arguments at the crusader conference o f i N o v e m ber 1098. I t is far more likely that Alexius w a s p r e p a r e d to assist t h e crusaders i f conditions were right - i f they w e r e a l r e a d y successful. The march o f the imperial forces to P h i l o m e l i u m makes sense i n terms of liberating western Anatolia. P h i l o m e l i u m was a l o n g w a y from Antioch and the likelihood is that A l e x i u s was p r e p a r e d t o proceed eastwards only i n the most f a v o u r a b l e circumstances a n d when these were not forthcoming he t u r n e d back. I t must be said that he had assisted the crusaders e n o r m o u s l y d u r i n g t h e i r siege o f Antioch with naval aid and supplies. H e w a s p r e p a r e d to h e l p b u t not to take serious risks. F r o m his point o f v i e w this was sensible for as Anna says, i f he ventured to their aid, ' H e m i g h t lose C o n s t a n t i n ople as well as Antioch'. I t was sensible, b u t i n its i m p a c t u p o n the alliance with the crusader army, disastrous. I t is u n l i k e l y t h a t Alexius's decision to retreat o n or about 20 J u n e c o u l d have become known to the crusaders i n A n t i o c h , b u t n e w s o f i t seems t o h a v e emerged in the summer and caused a violent r e a c t i o n , as witness t h e letter of the Princes to the west dated 11 S e p t e m b e r 1098 w i t h i t s vitriolic attacks on the Greeks and the e m p e r o r . 1 3

1 4

News of events at Philomelium c o m p l i c a t e d a n a l r e a d y d i f f i c u l t situation for the crusader army. T h e leaders m u s t h a v e recognised that the Byzantine alliance was now i n d o u b t . T h e y h a d some hope of an arrangement with the Egyptians, as we h a v e n o t e d . T h e y m u s t have been deeply worried about containing t h e q u a r r e l between Bohcmond and Raymond of Toulouse. T h e r e was a n e v i d e n t shortage of manpower which could only be worsened by the a t t r a c t i o n s o f 1 3

AA, 414-15.

203

Divisions

INTHE EAST

Ed ess a a n d t h e need to garrison A n t i o c h . But there is an additional factor w h i c h resentment against the Byzantine alliance must have let loose. W e t e n d t o see the crusade as a movement with a single s t a n d p o i n t , as a n ideological movement. This is partly the consequence o f c r u s a d e r h i s t o r i o g r a p h y w h i c h , at least since the work of E r d m a n n , has focusscd o n a n exploration of the origins of the c r u s a d i n g m o v e m e n t , o f the crusading idea. That there was such an i d e o l o g i c a l u n i t y is u n d o u b t e d , b u t i t is only one side of the story, for i d e o l o g y c o - e x i s t e d w i t h m a n y other and individual standpoints. T h i s w a s t h e i m p o r t a n c e o f the death of Adhemar on i August iog8. He w a s t h e o n l y c h u r c h m a n w i t h the authority, personality and s t a n d i n g t o insist o n U r b a n ' s intentions being carried out, the only one o f t h e leaders to personify the ideological goal of the expedition - t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f Jerusalem. W i t h o u t h i m there was no clear l e a d e r s h i p f o r t h e i r u l t i m a t e intention and purpose - no-one of rank w h o s t o o d f o r t h e p u r e a n d unallayed spirit of the crusade. O n his d e a t h b e d h e is said t o have commended the care of the army to A r n u l f w h o , a l o n g w i t h Stephen o f Blois's chaplain Alexander, had also b e e n g i v e n legatine powers b y U r b a n I I . Raymond of Aguilers later says t h a t t h e Bishop o f Orange took up his mantle but died at M a ' a r r a . T h e fact was t h a t none o f these men had both the status and p e r s o n a l q u a l i t i e s o f A d h e m a r , hence the moral vacuum left by his d e a t h . I n t o i t stepped the visionary Peter Bartholemew who tried to i n f l u e n c e t h e c o n d u c t o f events through the prestige which he had achieved as t h e discoverer o f the H o l y Lance. However, his main i n f l u e n c e l a y w i t h t h e Provencals and, from another point of view, he c o u l d b e seen as a c t i n g i n the interests of the count of Toulouse. 1 5

16

1 7

18

1 5

O n the E g y p t i a n embassy and the question of numbers see above, pp. 128-42, 253-4 and

below, p p . 3 2 5 - 7 „ is A d h c m a r ' s r e p u t a t i o n has been attacked by J . H . and L . L . H i l l , 'Contemporary accounts a n d the l a t e r r e p u t a t i o n of Adhemar, bishop ofLe Puy', Mtdiemlia el Humantsttca, 9 (1955). •0-8 a n d defended b y J . A. Brundagc, 'Adhemar o f Puy, the bishop and his critics, Sbeeulum, 3 4 (1959), 2 0 1 - 1 2 . I t is evident to the present writer that Adhemar was the fulcrum a r o u n d w h i c h all the forces unleashed during the crusade turned and that he was a figure o f the highest importance. » R G p 6 7 3 - J R i c h a r d , 'Quelqucs textes sur les premiers temps de 1 eglise latine de Jerusalem', Recueil

des Travaux

Offerls

a M.Clovis

Brunei, 2 vols. (Paris, 1955), 2. 420-30

d r e w a t t e n t i o n to the legatine commission of Arnulf and Alexander mentioned by Clanus p

P

T8+-7; see also B . H a m i l t o n , The Latin

Church in Ihe Crusader Slates. The Secular Church.

« i , ^ ^ « ^ rf£ crisis which amicted the crusade * * * * * * * ° [ K c r b w a h see France, ' T h e crisis o f the First Crusade, 276-308 and on the role of Peter and S t a r i c s M o r r i s , 'Policy and Visions', and France, 'Prophet, Priest and Chronicler . P

VICTORY

Divisions

I N T H E EAST

There c a n be no doubt that a desire t o liberate Jerusalem was common to all who went on the crusade: this was sharpened amongst the poor and the lesser knights for w h o m delay was a n economic disaster b u t their anxiety was influential precisely because it was shared b y all. However, as we have already remarked, unalloyed idealism is rare and the tendency o f h u m a n kind t o identify indiv i d u a l interest w i t h the greater good a commonplace. Moreover, the erosion o f the Byzantine alliance was b o t h a practical check to the crusade - perhaps further imperial help w o u l d not be forthcoming, and an ideological blow, for i t was a keystone of Urban's intentions, as w e have noted. I n such a situation many o f the leaders and their more i m p o r t a n t followers may well have felt justified i n exploiting present benefits - the lands they already held around Antioch which we have noted - while awaiting developments. Bohemond's seizure of A n t i o c h and Baldwin's capture o f Edessa set precedents for personal gain and represented only particularly successful efforts amongst a group of leaders all of w h o m could enjoy similar, i f smaller holdings. T h e temptations of N o r t h Syria were all the greater when we consider the weakness of the army and the prospect of challenging the power of Egypt, whose rulers were i n any case seriously considering some k i n d of agreement. N o w the pressure was off the crusaders could look about them, and they found that they were i n a particular political culture - a culture of fragmentation and division, which was p a r t i c u l a r l y congenial to feudal princes w h o had lived all their lives i n not dissimilar political circumstances. 19

W e t h i n k of Baldwin as coming to the aid o f the Armenians of Edessa against their enemies - this is h o w the matter is presented by b o t h Fulchcr and Albert o f Aix. However, as Albert's account makes very clear, the reality was that B a l d w i n was called i n by one faction of Edessans i n order to use h i m against Thoros their r u l e r . This is not to say t h a t Baldwin's force was m i l i t a r i l y insignificant i n the local context - Fulcher says he took eighty knights, w i t h h i m , Matthew refers to sixty and Albert to 200. Indeed, ultimately his acceptability was determined by his m i l i t a r y prowess for Edessa was beset with enemies. Albert tells us t h a t after considerable dispute with 20

21

1 9

2 0

5 1

J . A . Forse, 'The Armenians and the First Crusade', Journal of Medieval History, 17 (1991), 13-22, emphasises the cultural affinity between Franks and Armenians. 'He [Thoros] was much afraid for many of the townsmen [of Edessa] hated him': 'Anonymous Syriac Chronicle', p. 70. F C , p. 90: Matthew, 36; A A , 3 5 2 , on whom see A. A . Beaumont, 'Albert o f Aachen and the county of Edessa', in L . J . Paetow, cd., The Crusades and Other Historical Essays presented to D. C. Munro (New York, 1928), pp. 101-38; Amouroux-Mourad, Comti d'Edesse, p. 59.

n

n

r

Thoros, i n w h i c h B a l d w i n demanded recognition as heir to the city and refused to accept merely a position i n his service, he took 200 of his o w n forces, w h i c h presumably means Franks, and all the mounted men and foot he could find i n the town on an expedition against B a l d u k o f Samosata. They were attacked by Balduk and there were heavy losses amongst the Armenians, though only six westerners were killed. B a l d w i n then established a garrison in the nearby village o f St J o h n i n order to harass Samosata. Undoubtedly the m i l i t a r y skill o f the Franks h a d impressed the citizens and Baldwin's continued bravery, best shown i n his bold attack on Kerbogah's forces, was a v i t a l factor i n maintaining his régime as was his c o n c i l i a t o r y rule and marriage to an Armenian princess. But i f we t h i n k o f Armenians simply as a group distinct from Syrians or Turks we have a mistaken perspective. T h e Armenians were divided i n t o shifting factions focussed around various princes Gabriel o f M e l i t e n e was a former lieutenant of Philaretus and claimed t o be a Byzantine official, though he was a vassal of Malik Shah. T h i s was an area where fragmentation was a norm and had been for m o r e t h a n a century. T h e decline of Abassid power and the expansion o f B y z a n t i u m i n the late tenth century had moved the Christian/Islamic b o u n d a r y eastwards, but Antioch was a border outpost after its recapture i n 969 and on both sides of the religious divide p o l i t i c a l structures were fissured. T h e coming of the Turks did not r a d i c a l l y change this situation, for the nomads of Asia Minor did not b u i l d a state b u t were able t o defy the Seljuk Sultans. Even Malik Shah at the height of his power was obliged to create a network o f competing emirs through whose divisions he could rule. The collapse o f the Seljuk domination freed all the pardcularist forces of the region, and i t was into this maelstrom of competing and often t i n y entities t h a t the crusaders plunged. Baldwin had confirmed his r e p u t a t i o n by the attack on Samosata, but when he gained Edessa its emir, Balduk, handed over the citadel of Samosata and became his condomesticus et fatniliaris, appealing to him for aid in subduing the rebellious city of Sororghia. T h e terrorised inhabitants turned to B a l d u k for protection b u t B a l d w i n prepared for a full scale siege, w i t h engines and mangonels and this forced them to surrender, abandoning Balduk w h o hastened to make his peace. Subsequently Balduk j o i n e d Kerbogah's army b u t after its defeat is 22

23

n

5 3

AA, 3 5 2 - 4 , 397; Matthew, cxiii, where his first wife is named as Arda. Cahcn, Turkey, pp. 8 1 - 2 .

Divisions found once more i n association w i t h B a l d w i n . I t is h a r d l y strange that B a l d w i n should have adapted so q u i c k l y to this culture o f fragmentation, for i t was very like the feudal w o r l d o f the p r i n c i p a l i ties of France. T h e precedents set b y B o h e m o n d and Baldwin, a n d the proposed treaty w i t h the Fatimids p r o d u c e d a change i n m o o d amongst the crusaders w h i c h was intensified b y the failure o f the summer rest t o heal the divisions o f the a r m y . Godfrey held T e l l Bashir, R a v c n d a n and a d o m i n i o n i n the ' A f r i n valley o f B a l d w i n after he fled the plague i n A n t i o c h and was closely associated w i t h Robert o f Flanders (see fig. 4). H e began to expand this and intervened i n the affairs o f the Armenians, s u p p o r t i n g some monks against B a g r a t of Cyrrhus and avenging an earlier insult w h e n this A r m e n i a n prince h a d diverted gifts and n o t a b l y a tent to Bohemond which h a d been intended for h i m . A fort was seized a n d twenty o f its defenders were blinded and shortly afterwards another strong place of K o g h V a s i l o f Kesoun fell. W h e n R i d w a n o f Aleppo besieged his troublesome vassal the emir o f A z a z , a c i t y on the road to Edcssa, its emir appealed to Godfrey who w i t h the h e l p o f his b r o t h e r B a l d w i n , R a y m o n d o f Toulouse and Bohemond raised the siege a n d established c o r d i a l relations w i t h this new a l l y t h o u g h o n l y after R i d w a n had i n f l i c t e d losses on their stragglers. T a n c r e d seems to have continued to h o l d H a r e m and ' I m m on the A l e p p o r o a d . W h e n , i n J a n u a r y o f 1099, the crusader army began its m a r c h south treaties and arrangements w i t h Moslem rulers became common. T h e rulers of Shaizar a n d Horns were more than anxious to a l l o w the crusaders supplies, even to purchase badly needed horses, and free passage. The r u l e r o f T r i p o l i ' s similar offers were rebuffed as the a r m y attacked his city o f ' A k k a r , b u t u l t i m a t e l y he came to terms, as d i d Jabala, A c r e and other places (sec figs. 4 a n d 1 6 ) . T h e pervasive influence o f the culture of fragmentation affected the crusaders i n that summer and a u t u m n o f 1098, a d d i n g t o the delay and u l t i mately significantly modifying their methods. 2 4

2 5

26

I t is v e r y difficult to understand the a t t i t u d e of the Islamic w o r l d to its invaders i n the years of the crusade. T h e a t t i t u d e o f the nomads o f Asia M i n o r is impenetrable, b u t we o u g h t to k n o w more t h a n we do o f those i n the civilised heartlands w h i c h the a r m y had now reached. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , although our sources are often based on

5 5

2 6

A A , 4 4 1 , 4 3 6 - 4 0 ; R A , pp. 8 8 - 9 ; Chronicle of Aleppo, 5 8 6 ; R C , RA, p p . 103, 107, m - 1 2 , 125, 135-36; GF pp. 8 i , 8 3 - 6 .

649-50.

3

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IN THE

EAST

309

Divisions

contemporary material they are overlaid by l a t e r a t t i t u d e s a n d knowledge. The Islamic powers may have seen t h e c o m i n g of the army i n terms o f the great expeditions w h i c h the B y z a n t i n e emperors had once been wont to send to the east, b u t i t is d i f f i c u l t to believe that this idea persisted beyond their a r r i v a l . T h e spirit o f jihad was not entirely dead for there were 'volunteers' i n t h e I s l a m i c armies, certainly i n that o f Kerbogah a n d later i n the E g y p t i a n army which fought at A s c a l o n , But for the most p a r t the a u t h o r i ties i n the cities were untouched by any such s p i r i t . F o r t h e m t h e newcomers were another force i n the complex m i d d l e - e a s t p o l i t i c a l game and one which was not so different i n its n a t u r e f r o m others. I n this area there were ancient centres of settlement — A n t i o c h , A l e p p o , Damascus, Shaizar and the rest w h i c h create a n a p p e a r a n c e o f stability. But sweeping around them were m u c h m o r e restless forces - the Bedouin, the A r a b tribes, invaders f r o m the steppe, o f w h o m the most recent were the Turks, i n the past B y z a n t i n e a r m i e s . T h e y might be unwelcome, but the risks o f c o n f r o n t a t i o n w e r e h i g h better to pay them off and see w h a t the f u t u r e has t o b r i n g . These cities had a long tradition o f neutrality ( perhaps o p p o r t u n i s m p u t s i t better) i n the Seljuk-Fatimid conflict and saw n o reason t o abandon t h i s . As to the crusade's u l t i m a t e objectives, these m u s t have seemed opaque to the Islamic powers. T h e i r a t t i t u d e is best exemplified by the K e m a l ad-Din's b r i e f dismissal o f t h e fall o f Jerusalem, a mere one-line notice of an event w h i c h t o o k p l a c e i n a far-away land, not worth, perhaps, the bones of a n A l e p p a n soldier. Once the major powers o f Syria had failed i n t h e i r p o l i c y o f c o n frontation w i t h the Franks before A n t i o c h , a c c o m m o d a t i o n , a l b e i t grudging, became the r u l e . 2 7

28

29

30

Military activity i n that summer and a u t u m n o f 1098 w a s m u c h

m o r e p u r p o s e f u l t h a n has usually been recognised. Godfrey and R o b e r t o f F l a n d e r s were strengthening their hold on an area which t h e y h a d l o n g d o m i n a t e d . Bohemond left to strengthen his hold on G i l i c i a , a v i t a l buttress o f the emerging Principality of Antioch, t h o u g h w e k n o w n o t h i n g of his activities. The problems for a m e d i e v a l a r m y o f resting i n friendly territory were clearly illustrated b y A l b e r t w h o reports t h a t after the 'Azâz campaign knights and n o b l e s i n g r o u p s o f fifty or a hundred, including quite notable p e o p l e l i k e D r o g o o f Nesle, Gaston o f Beam, Renaud of Toul and F u l c h e r o f C h a r t r e s t r a i l e d along to Edessa driven by want. I t may h a v e b e e n B a l d w i n ' s generosity to them which provoked an Armen i a n p l o t a g a i n s t h i m . C e r t a i n l y Balak of Sororghia was concerned b y t h e r i s i n g p o w e r o f B a l d w i n and tried unsuccessfully to trap him b y o f f e r i n g to surrender Amasya. Fulcher of Chartres was given c o m m a n d o f S o r o r g h i a i n order to harass Amasya. Albert's picture o f k n i g h t s i n w a n t , t r e k k i n g out to offer their services in Edessa, s u p p o r t s R a y m o n d of Aguilers' general picture of a disgruntled and r a t h e r d i s p e r s e d a r m y a n d forms the background to the discontent w h i c h w o u l d w e l l u p i n the winter. 31

I n J u l y 1098 the Provençal k n i g h t Raymond Pilet, lord of Alais i n t h e L i m o u s i n , l e d a r a i d w h i c h captured Tell Mannas, the Christian p o p u l a t i o n o f w h i c h surrendered to h i m and became his allies. His f o r c e w a s l a t e r b a d l y m a u l e d by the garrison of Ma'arra (sec fig. 4). S u c h expeditions b y lesser figures may have been much more c o m m o n t h a n w e suppose, for they answered the imperative to feed a n d s u p p o r t i d l e troops. As the army lingered i n the summer of 1098 s u c h m e n m u s t have f o u n d many opportunities opening up for them. R a y m o n d P i l e t was p r o b a b l y back i n the service of Raymond of T o u l o u s e w h e n he c a p t u r e d Tortosa i n mid-February 1099 and he p l a y e d a n o t a b l e role i n the siege of Jerusalem. I t was because of t h e p o o r t h a t R a y m o n d o f Toulouse joined i n the expedition against ' A z â z i n m i d - S e p t e m b e r . But Count Raymond probably had other m o t i v e s f o r h i s attack on A l b a r a , not far from his base at Ruj later i n t h e m o n t h . R u j formed a n i m p o r t a n t base for thc Provencals and_ i t w a s s u r e l y f r o m there t h a t R a y m o n d Pilet was operating when he seized T e l l M a n n a s to the east o f Ma'arra. Albara and the n e n 3 2

33

A. Maalouf, The Crusades through Arab Eyes (London, 1984), relies heavily on t h i s idea, b u t his work is to crusader historiography as D. Brown, Bury my Heart at Wounded Knee ( L o n d o n , 1971J, |s to that of the western expansion of the United States, chiefly concerned w i t h a l t e r n a t i v e viewpoint; Sivan, L'Islam el la Croisade, p p . 9 5 - 6 , points t o evidence that, in Syria, the crusaders were at first seen as instruments o f the B v ^ n l i n c s . •ten, Z T T, ' > P- 9 ' qwte clear that they were allies o f Alexius w h o y r

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bouring Roman cities ofSirjyla, D e i r Sambil a n d B a ' o u d a dominate the Jebcl Barisha massif and they are so close to one a n o t h e r that t h e fate of one must have been the fate o f all. T h e bishop o f A l b a r a once held a great dominion i n this area, i n c l u d i n g t h e i m p o r t a n t city o f Kafartab, and i t was probably for this reason t h a t R a y m o n d o f Toulouse installed Peter o f Narbonne as bishop there. Later, even when he was very short o f troops, R a y m o n d w o u l d p e r m i t a s m a l l force to be left to garrison Albara. Most c o m m e n t a r y o n Peter's appointment concerns the fact that he was the first l a t i n bishop i n the east, which suggests that the C o u n t saw this c i t y as b e i n g outside the terms of the agreements w i t h Alexius. H o w e v e r , e q u a l l y intcrcsting,especially i n the light o f the later expedition to M a ' a r r a , is t h e fact that the count of Toulouse was b u i l d i n g u p a p o w e r f u l bastion i n Syria about 100 kilometres south-east of A n t i o c h , w h o s e eventual conquest of Ma'arra w o u l d threaten the roads b e t w e e n A l e p p o a n d the southern cities of H a m a h , Homs a n d D a m a s c u s . T h u s a w h o l e group of nascent Frankish dominions was e m e r g i n g — Edcssa, Antioch, the 'Afrin valley, R u j and the Jebcl B a r i s h a . W i t h h i n d sight we know those w h i c h w o u l d endure, but a t the t i m e this w a s not so evident and the rise o f these dominions m u s t h a v e been d e e p l y worrying to many crusaders. 34

I t is against this background that the visions o f P e t e r B a r t h o lomew, acting as spokesman for the rank-and-file a n d d e m a n d i n g that the crusade press on to Jerusalem, must be s e e n . T h i s is t h e context of the conference on i November 1098 w h i c h the leaders had arranged for the resumption of the m a r c h to J e r u s a l e m . T h e conference revealed an a r m y bitterly divided. R a y m o n d o f T o u louse would not accept Bohemond's seizure o f A n t i o c h . R a y m o n d o f Aguilers says that the other leaders sympathised w i t h B o h c m o n d b u t were afraid to say so lest they be charged w i t h o a t h - b r e a k i n g . Perhaps they were also mindful o f the aid w h i c h t h e y h a d received and might hope to go on receiving f r o m Cyprus. I n a n y case, t h e 35

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; P P - 9 ' - ' 4 - 5 ; Dussaud, Topographic, pp. 187-8, who tends to sec their conquest as part ol a plan r advance against Hama; for the capture o f Ma'arra sec below, pp. v 1 - j . The deserted cues' of the Jebcl Barisha are almost intact Roman cities i n g r a d u a l d e c a y .

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s t u b b o r n s t a n c e o f C o u n t R a y m o n d was now a barrier to the o b v i o u s s o l u t i o n o f g i v i n g B o h e m o n d the city, because R a y m o n d h e l d t h e P a l a c e a n d t h e Bridge Gate. Judgment between the two r i s k e d o p e n offence t o the Byzantines and alienating the loser - i t seemed t h a t t h e y w e r e t r a p p e d i n the situation. I n military terms the f a i l u r e o f a w h o l e c o n t i n g e n t to j o i n the march must have seemed to presage disaster. I n t h e end i t was popular pressure which forced the leaders t o w h a t R a y m o n d o f Aguilers, i n a striking phrase, calls a " d i s c o r d a n t p e a c e ' (discordem pacem). T h e Anonymous does not use the p h r a s e b u t describes the r e a l i t y - Bohemond and Raymond were t o p r o m i s e t o press o n to Jerusalem, b u t each was free to fortify his p o s i t i o n i n A n t i o c h . T h e demoralisation o f the rank and file of the c r u s a d e r a r m y w h o h a d been left t o their own devices through a b i t t e r s u m m e r comes o u t i n t h e i r cynical view o f the parties to the q u a r r e l i n w h i c h each side is merely o u t for gain; Count Raymond i n t h e p a y o f A l e x i u s , B o h e m o n d seeking his own benefit: 'Let them w h o w i s h t o h a v e the emperor's gold have i t , and those who wish to h a v e the r e v e n u e s o f A n t i o c h likewise. L e t us, however, take up our m a r c h w i t h C h r i s t as leader, for w h o m we have come'. This revival o f t h e s p i r i t o f t h e People's Crusade was generated by the strains of t h e l o n g s u m m e r i n A n t i o c h . A l b e r t gives no account of the conference as s u c h , b u t he tells us t h a t after the count o f Toulouse had gone s o u t h , t h e forces o f B o h e m o n d , R o b e r t o f Flanders and Godfrey lost m e n w h o w e r e anxious to press o n , and that this eventually forced these leaders, w i t h the exception o f Bohemond, to resume the march. F o r t i f i e d b y t h e ' d i s c o r d a n t peace' the crusader a r m y prepared for its m a r c h s o u t h w a r d s and the Provencals and the Flemings arrived b e f o r e M a ' a r r a o n 27 N o v e m b e r 1099 (see fig. 4)- I citizens were d e f i a n t , f o r t h e y h a d defeated R a y m o n d Pilet's force d u r i n g the s u m m e r a n d t h e c i t y was prepared for a siege w h i c h the crusader forces s y s t e m a t i c a l l y a p p l i e d . I t was neither a large nor an important p l a c e a n d i t s defences were not strong. T h e c i t y w a l l enclosed only s o m e five s q u a r e kilometres and there may have been a citadel. As i t is s i t u a t e d i n a flat p l a i n M a ' a r r a enjoyed few natural advantages. O n l y a l o n g t h e south side was there a ditch and since his army is r e p o r t e d as t r y i n g to fill i t i n R a y m o n d o f Toulouse evidently 3 7

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312

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attacked from this direction, and the other forces from the north. " I t seems odd that a city o f such little importance should have been assaulted. M u c h more i m p o r t a n t places w o u l d later be bypassed sometimes after the conclusion of an agreement affording f é passage, but sometimes, as i n the case of Sidon, w i t h o u t . Perhaps the leaders felt that for reasons of prestige they needed to destroy a city which had defied them once. Perhaps also i t suited them to delay for the peace w i t h i n the a r m y was fragile a n d M a ' a r r a was chosen because i t was on the very edge o f the Provençal dominion - Albara is only some ten kilometres away. Such a siege would satisfy the opposition w i t h i n the army and b r i n g them into contact w i t h enemy lands which could be ravaged. This impression is reinforced by the clear evidence that at least one major prince and probably two were not at Ma'arra. Raymond o f Aguilers who was present throughout the siege says that R a y m o n d o f Toulouse and R o b e r t of Flanders opened the attack w i t h an assault on 28 November, which failed because they had only two ladders and needed four more. The next day Bohemond arrived and another assault was made without success. He mentions no other princes and adds that Godfrey was not at the siege. The Anonymous mentions only Raymond of Toulouse and Bohemond, and as he clearly describes the assault which took place when Bohemond was present i t seems likely he was i n his army. Robert of N o r m a n d y is never mentioned i n his account of the siege, but he later states that Robert j o i n e d Count Raymond i n January 1099 at Kafartab after the meeting at R u j . A l b e r t of Aix says that Count Raymond was supported by R o b e r t (but does not tell us which Robert), Tancred and Eustace; his account of events is fairly schematic but i t is evident that Godfrey was not present. Ralph of Caen does not mention Bohemond's p a r t i c i p a t i o n but says the city was captured by R a y m o n d and Robert o f N o r m a n d y who is not mentioned by anybody else; perhaps this is a confusion with Robert of Flanders. Fulcher says that Bohemond and Raymond 4

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41

The location of Ihccty, its topography and the events ofthe siege have been closely studied by Rogers, Laltn Suge Warfare, pp. , o 6 - , who speaks ofthe ditch on the southern wall. But Ma arm is now a sizeable place and has long outgrown its medieval walls. In its north-west corner there » a citadel with a ditch on its southern side, but i t is not clear whether this was the site ofthe city in the eleventh century. The Iranian traveller Na r-c Khosraw, The Book of Travels, tr. W . M . Thackston (New York, . 0 8 6 ) , p. u , visited Ma arra in ,047 and described it as a walled and prosoperous place with its own cultural I 7

SC

*' RA, pp. 94-5, 99.

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attacked M a ' a r r a while the other princes stayed a r o u n d A n t i o c h . ince it is v e r y clear that Godfrey was not at M a a r r a ! t is h a r d t o the conclusion that the siege was a stop-gap a c t i v i t y w h i c h the a r m y occupied b u t d i d n o t represent a serious b e g i n n i n g to he campaign for Jerusalem. I t s p r o x i m i t y to C o u n t R a y m o n d s dominions p r o b a b l y explains m u c h o f t h e suspicion w h i c h e m e r g e d after its capture. , However, the siege was conducted v e r y v i g o r o u s l y . R a y m o n d of lers says that after a r r i v i n g o n 27 N o v e m b e r t h e forces o f C o u n t Raymond a n d Robert of Flanders l a u n c h e d an assault the f o l l o w i n g day and t h a t i t failed due to lack o f scaling l a d d e r s . B o h e m o n d s force then a r r i v e d and a new assault was l a u n c h e d o n 29 N o v e m b e r involving, o n the count's sector, an effort to fill i n a d i t c h before the wall and this too failed. T h e A n o n y m o u s e v i d e n t l y a r r i v e d w i t h Bohemond's force for he begins by describing this assault w h i c h clearly again depended on v i g o u r a n d was u n s u p p o r t e d b y machinery: i t was a matter of scaling ladders a n d r a w c o u r a g e . Thereafter C o u n t R a y m o n d began m o r e systematic p r e p a r a t i o n s for an assault o n the south w a l l i n c l u d i n g the b u i l d i n g o f a siege t o w e r , but while the Anonymous goes i m m e d i a t e l y i n t o his a c c o u n t o f t h e final attack, Raymond o f Aguilers makes i t clear t h a t some t i m e supervened before this was launched o n 11 D e c e m b e r 1099. A c c o r d ing to h i m Peter Bartholemcw h a d yet another v i s i o n - m u c h mocked by Bohemond's men. T h e r e was great h u n g e r i n t h e a r m y , a point supported by R a l p h of Caen a n d b y A l b e r t o f A i x w h o says that during the great siege of A n t i o c h this area h a d b e e n s c o u r e d o f food causing many of its people to flee. T h e r e c e r t a i n l y m a y be t r u t h in this last point, but i t should be remembered t h a t e x a c t l y one y e a r before the a r m y outside A n t i o c h h a d begun t o suffer b a d l y f r o m famine. Obviously seasonal factors were at w o r k a n d the a r m y needed to extend its foraging r a n g e . B o t h accounts m a k e i t clear that Bohemond and the count o f Toulouse a t t a c k e d t h e c i t y f r o m opposite sides and that i t was C o u n t R a y m o n d w h o b u i l t a n d employed a siege-tower, using, according to A l b e r t , w o o d f o u n d i n the mountains near Talaria w h i c h he seized i n a r a i d . T h i s w o o d e n tower was simply pushed up against one of t h e t o w e r s o f M a ' a r r a once the d i t c h had been filled i n . I t h a d no b r i d g e ; those i n i t s t o p v o i d

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p. 3 8 .

314

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3 5

Divisions

EAST

storey, including Evrard the H u n t s m a n a n d W i l l i a m o f M o n t p e l l i e r , cast heavy stones down u p o n the w a l l , a n d so covered u n d e r m i n i n g operations which were conducted a t its base. I n the final assault o n 11 December the men of Bohemond w h o used o n l y l a d d e r s made no progress on their sector. O n the Provencal side t h e siege tower attracted fire from enemy catapults - t h e crusaders seem to have built none of these. T h e defenders also t r i e d unsuccessfully to set fire to i t , while Raymond adds t h a t they cast l i m e a n d beehives at the crusader force. However, while the e n e m y defence was p r e o c c u p i e d by the tower, ladders protected w i t h mantlets were b r o u g h t f o r w a r d and Geoffrey of Lastours was the first to get o n t o the w a l l . A l t h o u g h he and his party were cut off when the l a d d e r b r o k e the enemy were disheartened by progress made on u n d e r m i n i n g t h e w a l l and fell back into the town. T h e Anonymous says t h a t t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h came as evening fell, and R a y m o n d adds a curious sequel - that the poor i n the Provençal a r m y broke i n a n d c a r r i e d o n the f i g h t i n g b y night, so winning much plunder i n a ferocious massacre. B o h e m o n d , he says, got a lot of booty thereby a r o u s i n g j e a l o u s y , and the Anonymous says that this was by n e g o t i a t i n g a s u r r e n d e r i n his sector of the siege. The Chronicle of Aleppo confirms t h a t t h e Franks used a tower and broke t h r o u g h by n i g h t w h e n a massacre followed with a very systematic search for loot. H o w e v e r , t h e Damascus Chronicle says that the crusaders had several times o f f e r e d the c i t y surrender on terms, about w h i c h the citizens h a d been d i v i d e d , a n d that when the city fell there was a t e r r i b l e sack d u r i n g w h i c h the crusaders broke promises of c o n d i t i o n a l surrender. R a l p h of C a e n says that the crusaders debated the q u e s t i o n o f t e r m s , b u t those i n favour of a massacre w o n . This seems t o reflect t h e confusion o n the fall of the city, w i t h Bohemond offering terms at t h e s a m e t i m e as the Provençal poor broke i n and carried o u t a massacre. 46

1

T h i s was n o t t o t h e l i k i n g o f B o h e m o n d , w h o tried to use his possession o f p a r t o f the c i t y as a b a r g a i n i n g counter to o b t a i n R a y m o n d ' s s t r o n g - p o i n t s i n A n t i o c h w h e n the latter wanted to give M a ' a r r a t o P e t e r , b i s h o p o f nearby A l b a r a . T h i s broke d o w n the ' d i s c o r d a n t p e a c e ' w h i c h h a d made the attack o n M a arra possible a n d r e o p e n e d t h e g r e a t q u a r r e l between Bohemond and C o u n t R a y m o n d . A c c o r d i n g t o R a y m o n d of Aguilers, the bishop of A l b a r a a n d thc r a n k - a n d - f i l e p e t i t i o n e d C o u n t R a y m o n d t o lead t h e m to J e r u s a l e m , w h i l e B o h e m o n d t r i e d first to delay the j o u r n e y , and t h e n to b r i n g i t f o r w a r d . T h e A n o n y m o u s does not m e n t i o n these q u a r r e l s , b u t tells us t h a t t h e a r m y stayed a m o n t h a n d four days at M a ' a r r a a l t h o u g h f o o d was so short t h a t desperate ^ m c n t s a m o n g s t t h e p o o r , t h e Tafurs, resorted to cannibalism. Ralph* C a e n a n d A l b e r t s u p p o r t R a y m o n d of Aguüers s account o f s v a t i o n a n d d e s p a i r i n the a r m y after the fall o f M a arra, b u t his is m u c h t h c m o s t d e t a i l e d . H e says t h a t Bohemond left the a r m y and r e t u r n e d t o A n t i o c h w h e r e u p o n C o u n t R a y m o n d tried toassume t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e crusade b y calling a meeting at R u g í a and o f f e r i n g m o n e y - f i e f s to t h e other leaders. This further delay- pro v o k e d t h e p o o ; t o a t t e m p t to demolish the ^ f ^ o i U ^ a n d i n t h e e n d C o u n t R a y m o n d was forced to a g r e t o eavMor J e r u s a l e m o n 13 J a n u a r y 1099, t a k i n g m his ^ a m o b ^ o i N O T m a n d y a n d T a n c r e d w h o h a d evidently accepted h e - o n e ^ A s we h a v e n o t e d d u r i n g this t i m e the Provencals felt they h a d been F r L k . and complained that R

dS^TS'lS a

r

^

^

4 7

I n a military sense the chief interest o f the siege o f M a ' a r r a was the construction of the siege tower. I t s f u n c t i o n was t o d o m i n a t e t h e city wall and so to cover m i n i n g operations a n d t h e p l a c i n g o f ladders. The assault was not delivered b y troops m o u n t i n g t h e tower and passing over a drawbridge o n t o the w a l l s . T h e fact t h a t Raymond of Toulouse b u i l t i t and t h a t his force p l a y e d t h e l e a d i n g role points to his clear emergence as the l e a d i n g figure i n t h e a r m y . 48

b e e n c l e a r t h a t C o u n t R a y m o n d intended t > ^ J f e n a b l e d B o h e m o n d to use force i n A n t i o c h w i t h little budon.

« H' P - ? ^ ' G

"

p

8

8 0

i s

m

u

c

h

t h c

c l e a r c r

o f

t h e

t

w

0

accounts but i t is supported b y R A , pp. o? 8.

Aleppo Chromclt, 587; Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, p. 47; R C ,

Rogers, Siege warfare, p. 110 thinks there was no drawbridge.

679.

R A , p p . Q f r - t o o ; GF, p . 8o; on the Tafurs!^ee above Plisme s a c r e chez les croiscs populares , Y . M . H.ia.re

f

r e t r i

.

,=,. M . Rouche, 'CannibaJ J >

n

p

o

p

M

n

( P a r i s >

.981), PP- 5 6 - 6 9 . . terms of the money-fief and .t> R A p p . 99/-102; o n the size o f the crusaoer an. y importance see above, p . 129-30. Provencals when he heard that Count a

5 0

o

5 1

„0, «

*

n

d

t h c

316

VICTORY IN THE

The subsequent course o f events suggests that the count never intended to march to Jerusalem w i t h his relatively small force. He left Ma'arra on 13 J a n u a r y barefoot as a p i l g r i m , b u t i n reality the campaign which followed was never intended as anything more than an extended raid whose continuation was provisional on better conditions, and one which might be made to serve self-interest if all else f a i l e d . Raymond o f Aguilers indicates the small size of the army which travelled w i t h the count. H e was accompanied only by Tancred whose force was small, and Robert of N o r m a n d y ; Robert of Flanders and Godfrey stayed behind at A n t i o c h w i t h Bohemond, T h e y set off i n l a n d , marching south v i a Kafartab to Shaizar, Rapi hania and Horns, the rulers of which were more than ready to grant them free passage and the right to b u y goods, even including vital horses which they were able to obtain i n large n u m b e r s . The will¬ ingness to come to terms w i t h Islamic rulers denotes a conjunction of zeal for Jerusalem and a new pragmatic approach to getting there. For those who were eager to reach the H o l y C i t y nowhere else much mattered, while the count must have been anxious to avoid taking on any serious major military commitment. These arrangements greatly facilitated the march, although enemy forces d i d attack the army's stragglers forcing R a y m o n d of Toulouse to m o u n t a strong rearguard. I n late January, as the army turned westwards north of Horns towards the coast, their foragers were attacked by enemy forces based on the Hisn al-Akrad, the later Crac des Chevaliers, The count of Toulouse attacked t h e m forcing them to abandon their flocks and take refuge inside the fortress. M a n y o f his m e n drove off the animals and the enemy were emboldened by this. Raymond was 52

53

during the stay at Ma'arra or shortly thereafter, while A A , 448, reports a violent expulsion, but his dating is uncertain. RC, 6 7 5 says that Tancred quarrelled w i t h Count Raymond earlier, during the siege of Ma'arra and, returning to Antioch, tricked the Provencal garrisons into surrender; he then explains why the Normans and the South French were enemies and gives a very hostile view of the Lance before returning to the fall orMa'arra. It is not impossible that RA, who remarks on the afTair only in passing, is imprecise on the date. I he greatest objection to Ralph's story is that it was only shortly after the siege of M a arra that Tancred took Count Raymond's pay and swore to serve him even to Jerusalem. However, even Bohemond was called to Rugia, so evidently considerable efforts at reconciliation were made. It is not at all impossible that Bohemond seized Antioch lale in the siege o f M a arra; he would have seen that the temper or the army prevented Count Raymond from returning to Antioch. Though H i l l and H i l l , Raymond IV, pp. I I - , suggest that Raymond and the North rrench agreed to march by different routes and rendez-vous at 'Akkar. I n view of the sequence of events this seems unlikely. On numbers see above, pp. 129-30; RA, pp. 102-3; GF, p p . 8 1 - 2 . 3

I

3 7

Divisions

EAST

1

now dangerously exposed, b u t he feigned an attack and then w i t h drew before the t w o groups o f the enemy, one i n the castle, the other on the m o u n t a i n , c o u l d j o i n to attack h i m . Even so he escaped only narrowly a n d vented his rage on his knights. I t was a nice example o f (he problems of c o n t r o l l i n g a medieval army. By the next day the enemy h a d fled a n d Crac was t a k e n . However, there are strong hints o f u n c e r t a i n t y about where they were going. Shortly after the departure f r o m M a ' a r r a i t was suggested that the army should t u r n towards the coast to attack Jabala. T h i s was probably made as the army a p p r o a c h e d H a m a h (ancient Epiphanea) f r o m where a road leads across the J e b e l Ansariye range to Jabala (see fig. 4 ) . W e are not t o l d w h o m a d e this suggestion, b u t i t was attacked by T a n c r e d who spoke i n f a v o u r of m a r c h i n g o n to Jerusalem. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers clearly sympathised w i t h this viewpoint and his failure to indicate t h e proposer suggests the count o f Toulouse. Indeed this would m a k e sense, for i t is probable t h a t he controlled Laodicea and the a c q u i s i t i o n o f a neighbouring p o r t w o u l d have strengthened his emerging S y r i a n d o m i n i o n . T h e idea was rejected b u t this same lack of purpose was soon evident again. T o the south o f the mountains the a r m y debated whether to take the i n l a n d route to Damascus, or to t u r n t o w a r d s the coast, eventually taking the latter and m u c h less dangerous alternative w h i c h had the benefit o f giving access to s h i p p i n g . E v e n t h e n , doubts and hesitations were at w o r k , for a t first t h e c o u n t o f Toulouse seems to have been o f a m i n d to come t o an agreement w i t h T r i p o l i , and was only persuaded to attack his city o f ' A k k a r (Caeserea L i b a n i ) by his envoys i n the hope o f extorting yet m o r e wealth f r o m h i m . Such a policy must have seemed m i l i t a r i l y wise for his army numbered only some 6,000¬ 7,000 i n c l u d i n g n o t more than 1,000 mounted men, h a r d l y a force with w h i c h to challenge the m i g h t o f the F a t i m i d Caliphate, w h i c h in any case m i g h t yet offer terms. F o r the moment the prosperity o f the m a r c h f r o m M a ' a r r a seems to have quelled agitation i n the army. A siege o f "Akkar m i g h t prove highly profitable; i t w o u l d p u t pressure o n the dissenting leaders, Godfrey de Bouillon and R o b e r t of Flanders whose forces remained aloof at Antioch, w h i l e keeping the Provencals reasonably close to friendly Laodicea only about 100 kilometres to the n o r t h . Moreover, from the p o i n t o f view o f the 54

55

5 6

5

« RA, p. 104-6. 5 6

R A , pp.

103-7.

5 5

O n the importance o f which see above, p. 209- 20.

3

i 8

VICTORY

IN THE

Divisions

EAST

count of Toulouse, the acquisition o f ' A k k a r w o u l d strengthen his Syrian redoubt. The capture o f the port o f Tortosa b y Raymond Pilet and the surrender o f Maraclea on terms must have encouraged the crusader army and helped their communications w i t h the north. 57

The attitude o f Godfrey de B o u i l l o n and R o b e r t o f Flanders, whose forces remained w i t h Bohemond at A n t i o c h , is very difficult to understand. They had clearly rejected the leadership o f the count of Toulouse and preferred to w a i t o n events. A l b e r t o f A i x , who is usually at pains to present Godfrey as a Christian hero, casts no light on their reasons, but admits that popular pressure b u i l t u p within their armies i n favour of completing the j o u r n e y to Jerusalem. Their forces and those of Bohemond were eroded b y troops leaving them for Count Raymond, and i n an assembly o n 2 February the two leaders announced their intention of gathering their forces at Laodicea which they reached at the end o f February; there Bohemond left them. O n 1 M a r c h they besieged Jabala - but still held off j o i n i n g the Provencals. I t was only when news came f r o m 'Akkar of the approach o f an enemy army threatening the Provencals that Godfrey and Robert took a tribute from Jabala and rallied t o their aid o n 14 M a r c h 1099. T h e spirit o f u n i t y was strong enough to prevent them standing b y while Count Raymond's force was attacked by the enemy, but i t extended little further for they were greatly annoyed to discover that the r u m o u r was false. A l b e r t of Aix's story that Count Raymond was bribed by the people o f Jabala to draw Godfrey and Robert south probably reflects t h e bitterness felt amongst the rank and file w h i c h enabled Tancred to p l a n t this story. There was great tension between the t w o contingents: Raymond o f Aguilers says that Tancred stirred u p discontent, anxious to leave the service o f Count R a y m o n d for t h a t o f Godfrey and Albert adds that Tancred had quarrelled w i t h R a y m o n d over money. However, Count Raymond was able to reconcile Godfrey by diplomacy and the gift o f a horse and so a l l pursued t h e siege, although Tancred remained hostile. I n fact we later f i n d that Tancred seems to have become the vassal o f Godfrey 'whose knight he was' by the time of the capture of Jerusalem, and this statement of Albert s seems to confirm Raymond of Aguilers' assertion t h a t the young Norman had abandoned R a y m o n d for G o d f r e y . A t last a

substantial p r o p o r t i o n of the crusaders had been b r o u g h t together i n a single a r m y , b u t they were far f r o m u n i t e d , a n d the difficulties o f the siege created problems. T h e j u n c t i o n o f the Provencals a n d the North French was fortuitous a n d the crusader host r e m a i n e d fissured. I t was lucky for t h e m t h a t they were operating i n a m i l i t a r y vacuum. Even so the sapping effect o f these quarrels made itself felt in the siege o f "Akkar. The actual siege attracted very little a t t e n t i o n i n the chronicles. Raymond o f Aguilers says that there were m a n y deaths i n c l u d i n g that o f his co-author Pontius of Baladun k i l l e d b y a stone f r o m a n enemy catapult, w h i l e Anselm o f R i b e m o n t was killed i n the same way while repelling an enemy sally. T h e A n o n y m o u s mentions the deaths o f Anselm, W i l l i a m the Picard ' a n d m a n y others' b u t says nothing o f the circumstances. H e reports the raids c o n d u c t e d b y the crusaders w h i c h gave t h e m possession o f T o r t o s a a n d c o n t r o l o f Maraclea, then p r o v i d e d booty f r o m el-Bukeia a n d terrorised Tripoli itself. A l b e r t o f A i x describes ' A k k a r as a strong place against w h i c h the crusaders constructed catapults, t o w h i c h the enemy replied i n k i n d , and there is similar i n f o r m a t i o n i n R a l p h o f Caen I t was i n a duel between these machines t h a t A n s e l m o f Ribemont was k i l l e d . A l b e r t a n d G u i b e r t o f Nogent say t h a t the leaders tried t o sap the walls o f the c i t y , b u t were foiled b y enemy counter-mines. T h e impression we have is o f an attack w h i c h a t first was sharp, causing heavy casualties, b u t then tapered off. Indeed, i t has been suggested that after t h e a r r i v a l o f G o d f r e y a n d Robert o f Flanders no serious attack was launched o n the c i t y , b u t this seems to be a result o f the way F u l c h e r , w h o was n o t present, reports the siege. I n fact too little a t t e n t i o n has been p a i d t o the situation o f ' A k k a r w h i c h was formidable (sec fig. 15). I t stands o n a spur on the lower slopes o f M o u n t L e b a n o n , projecting d u e west a t a height o f 147 metres above sea-level. T h e m o d e r n r o a d across the plain at its foot f r o m Horns to T r i p o l i runs a t 90 metres. T h e t o p o f the spur is a small p l a i n some 600 metres l o n g and 250 metres w i d e from w h i c h stone columns a n d masonry project at intervals a n d around w h i c h the remains o f walls can clearly be discerned. T h e sloping flanks o f the spur have probably been artificially sharpened, strengthening w h a t is i n a n y case a f o r m i d a b l e p o s i t i o n . T h e 59

60

61

58

5 7

5 8

GF, pp. 83-4; H i l l and H i l l , Raymond IV, p. 121 R A , pp. 1 1 0 - n ; GF, p. 84; AA, 4 5 4 - 5 , . 4

7

9

319

» RA, pp. 107-9; < PP-85-6" Hagenmeyer, Chronologic, No. 355. GF

6

0

A A , 451-2; R C 6 8 0 , 682; G N , 2 1 8 - 1 9 .

320

VICTORY

I NTHE

Bohemond leaves the Crusade 1 March 1099

- Laodlceff

Siege by Godfrey and Robert of Flanders 2-11 March 1099

—

<

Captured by Provencals 17 February At the end of the siege the Crusaders consider, but reject the Inland route by Damascus. Leave on 13 May Emir of Tripoli makes terms They leave 16 May - at Batrun on 17 May

Divisions

EAST

lala Jabala

1

Maraclea Tortosa

Horns

19/20 May 20/22 May Resistance 23/24 May

24/25 May They again consider and reject an Inland route

Sea of Galilee

2S/29 May

80 km

• Caesereai

Mid August attacked by Raymond - no result"

Arsufi

lablus

- Source of timber

17 June Genoese Fleet arrives — j f f , a

Slezed 3 June.Battle near 18 June12 August victory over Egypt but city does not surrender because of quarrels ol Raymond and Godfrey

a

/Rämla

Ascalon,

Jerusalem -

- Siege 7 June-15 July

Bethlehem-

. Slezed by Tancred June /July 1099

Gaza „ Hebron

Dead Sea

Crusader March , Other roads Highland

Egypt

Very Highland

Fig. 16

southern flank o f the c i t y is very steep, forming the wall o f the gorge of the river ' A k k a r ; i n spring this w o u l d have been i n spate, m a k i n g an impassable b a r r i e r . T o the n o r t h the slope is less steep, t h o u g h still very sharp, a n d a n attacker can m o u n t the slope to get access t o the neck o f the spur. I t is this feature which truly makes ' A k k a r impregnable. T h e neck of the spur has been cut into by the river a n d perhaps b y h u m a n action as w e l l , so that the eastern approach is almost as h i g h a n d certainly as steep as any other, and very n a r r o w indeed, A l t h o u g h t h e neighbouring mountain spurs are a c t u a l l y higher t h a n 'Akkâr, they are so far away as to be of no value t o a n attacker. T h e n a t u r a l strength o f its position made i t difficult t o approach a n d this p r o b a b l y ruled o u t the use o f a siege-tower. Ralph of Caen says t h a t the army was divided b y the river w h i c h was crossed by a n ancient stone bridge; probably the Provencals attacked f r o m the n o r t h while R o b e r t of N o r m a n d y a n d T a n c r e d (and perhaps later Godfrey and R o b e r t o f Flanders) attempted t o assault f r o m the east. T h a t m i n i n g formed part o f the assault is evident because A l b e r t says that the army became exhausted b y i t but we do n o t k n o w a n y t h i n g o f the direction o f this attack t h o u g h common sense w o u l d suggest t h a t i t was concentrated o n the n o r t h and east o f the city. T h e steep slopes w o u l d have made m i n i n g difficult f r o m a n y d i r e c t i o n . B u t the failure before "Akkâr was, above all, a failure o f w i l l resulting f r o m divisions w i t h i n the c r u sader army. The a r m y was never defeated - a fact w h i c h the e m i r o f Tripoli recognised w h e n he payed t h e m generously to pass on t h e i r way south. The siege simply languished while internecine p o l i t i c s were dominant. 62

T h e Anonymous a n d the works w h i c h derive from his, and also that of Fulcher o f Chartres, provide a very bland account of events but Albert o f A i x and R a y m o n d o f Aguilcrs, from their very d i f f e r ent viewpoints give a different picture. A l b e r t says that a f t e r Raymond had m o l l i f i e d Godfrey the leaders faced p o p u l a r pressure resisted b y R a y m o n d of Toulouse, t o abandon the siege o f ' A k k â r and to move on to Jerusalem. R a y m o n d of Aguilcrs says that the siege

T h e m a r c h south S!

RG, 68o, 6 8 a ; Rogers, Siege War/are, pp. 1 1 8 - 1 9 describes the city. Kor Dijcbcl ' A k k a r , ils general location and history see Dussaud, Topographie, p. 88, and Tor more detail, 'Voyages en Syrie, O c t - N o v 1896', Revue archéologique, (1897) ( 1 ) , 305- 8; M . van Berchcm, 'Notes sur les Croisades', Journal

Asiatique,

1 ( 1 9 0 a ) , 4 2 1 , 4 4 8 ; lxstrangc, Palestine under the

Moslems, pp. 80, 390. The present writer was able to visit 'Akkar in the spring of 1992 and personal observation is the basis of this description.

322

VICTORY

IN THE

was never popular and describes repeated quarrels amongst the leaders after Godfrey came, fanned by Tancred who wished to leave Count Raymond's service; A l b e r t says that he and R a y m o n d had quarrelled over money. I n a d d i t i o n , the question of t h e Holy Lance was raised; R a y m o n d of Aguilers reports a vision o f Peter Bartholemew which blatantly supported the case o f the count of Toulouse for continuing the siege o f A k k a r and accused the leaders and members o f other armies o f offending against God i n their faint-heartedness. The visionary had prospered by representing the views of ordinary crusaders, b u t now his support for Count Raymond was at odds w i t h the popular desire to get to Jerusalem, and this enabled his enemies to attack h i m and to force a t r i a l by fire. This is widely reported i n the sources and though R a y m o n d of Aguilers defends Peter Bartholemew its result was at best inconclusive and must have harmed the prestige of the count o f Toulouse. The ruler of T r i p o l i had attempted to buy off the crusaders b u t the resistance o f 'Akkar encouraged h i m to resist, so i n m i d - A p r i l a strong raid was mounted o n T r i p o l i w i t h heavy fighting a l o n g the line of the aqueduct into the city, resulting i n a major crusader success. The more generous terms now forthcoming seem t o have further sapped the army's resolution, and R a y m o n d o f Aguilers suggests that the visions of Stephen of Valence and Peter Desiderius encouraged the people to demand a resumption o f the m a r c h , According to Albert o f A i x , Godfrey set himself at the head o f the popular clamour to press on to Jerusalem, and when Count Raymond resisted he, Robert of Flanders and Tancred b u r n e d their camp and marched to T r i p o l i , and desertion f r o m w i t h i n his own army forced Raymond to follow. R a y m o n d o f Aguilers presents a strikingly similar picture, but he sets the debate i n a different context. According to h i m i t was the arrival o f an embassy f r o m the Emperor Alexius i n early A p r i l o f 1099, asking the a r m y t o delay until he arrived i n June, which triggered off the debate. T h e count 63

64

65

66

6 3

RA, pp. 108, 111—12, 124; A A , 4 5 4 - 6 .

<* RA, pp. U 2 - 2 4 ; RC, 682; A A , 452; GN, 217-18. « RA, p. 124, 128-g, 131-4; GF, pp. 8 5 - 6 . 6 6

L i H e

B j , z a n z

su

C!

; ' PP- * » - 3 . gg "s t h a t . t h e wake or the dispute over Antioch, Alexius was simply trymg at all costs to prevent the formation of Prankish lordships, hence, also, his letter to A -Afdal revealing crusader weakness (RA, p. „ „ ) . However, it seems to the present writer that Alexius s attitudes were somewhat more ambivalent especially in view ag ins* i o h 'd * °f Toulouse, and that his essential purpose was t o enlist aid C C

W

3 3

Divisions

EAST

2

wanted to stay a n d i n the meantime press the siege of A k k â r whose abandonment, he p o i n t e d out, w o u l d be a great blow to t h e i r prestige, a n d he expressed great concern t h a t the army o n its o w n would not be strong enough or well enough supplied to take J e r u salem. O t h e r princes poured scorn on Alexius' offer w h i c h they suspected was i n t e n d e d to e m b r o i l t h e m i n his dispute w i t h Bohcmond, and urged the a r m y on, b u t the count's influence was strong enough to p r e v a i l for a while. U l t i m a t e l y , Godfrey put himself at the head of the discontent and, on 13 M a y , marched to T r i p o l i ; he was followed b y m a n y i n the Provençal army w h o burned their tents, forcing C o u n t R a y m o n d to follow along to T r i p o l i where he unsuccessfully pressed for a siege. T h e leaders t h e n concluded a favourable treaty w i t h T r i p o l i a n d the whole a r m y marched south o n 16 May 1099. I n fact the i m p e r i a l embassy arrived at 'Akkâr i n early April, before Easter as R a y m o n d says, so this points to a l o n g running debate i n the army f r o m t h a t time onward. T h e fact was that in m i l i t a r y terms there was little point i n the siege of A k k a r for it had no special m i l i t a r y value a n d once Godfrey and R o b e r t of Flanders h a d j o i n e d , the a r m y had reached its m a x i m u m strength. A number o f factors, i n c l u d i n g the weakness o f his army, led the count to attack ' A k k â r i n the first place. Once battle was j o i n e d , however, and even w h e n Godfrey and R o b e r t o f Flanders had come, considerations of 'face' a n d prestige, and perhaps a n o t unreasonable caution about a t t a c k i n g the F a t i m i d Caliphate w i t h what remained q u i t e a small a r m y , m o v e d the Provençal leader. A n d then there was self-interest - his Syrian bastion. W e need not see this as t o t a l l y opposed t o his desire to go on to Jerusalem, b u t i t was c e r t a i n l y a factor i n his s t u b b o r n resistance to popular agitation. B u t the whole r a t i o n a l e o f the siege o f ' A k k â r collapsed as anxiety w i t h i n the ranks to press o n to Jerusalem arose. 6

The d e p a r t u r e f r o m 'Akkâr marked the end of an era for the First Crusade. T h e y had set o u t under the rule o f a committee o f leaders, pre-eminent amongst w h o m was the Papal Legate, Adhémar o f Le Puy. F r o m early 1098 their affairs were increasingly d o m i n a t e d by Bohemond. H i s desire to hold A n t i o c h precipitated a crisis i n their affairs a n d led to a bitter conflict w i t h the count of Toulouse w h o stood for the rights o f the Emperor Alexius and responded to « Hill and H i l l , Raymond IV, p. 124, think that the siege of'Akkâr helped Count Raymond to establish a claim to T r i p o l i for the future.

VICTORY

I N T H E EAST

agitation i n the army to continue on to Jerusalem. I n the vacuum o f authority after the death o f A d h e m a r on i A u g u s t 1098 he associated himself uneasily w i t h the visionary Peter B a r t h o l o m e w and his clerical associates. I n the end this forced h i m to a b a n d o n his position i n Antioch and to make a b i d for leadership o f the crusade. However, he was never able to convince a l l the o t h e r leaders t h a t they should accept h i m , perhaps because he was a n abrasive a n d domineering personality and w i t h o u t t h e m he lacked the m i l i t a r y strength to satisfy the popular enthusiasm for t h e j o u r n e y to J e r u salem. Both Bohemond and R a y m o n d o f Toulouse, for a l l t h e i r abilities and resources, succeeded only i n establishing a transient pre-eminence. Bohemond had great m i l i t a r y a b i l i t y , b u t he settled at Antioch. Raymond commanded the largest a r m y i n the crusader force but his dominance was u n d e r m i n e d b y events a t 'Akkar. H e insisted too stubbornly on persisting w i t h a n u n p o p u l a r siege on t h e success of which he felt his prestige depended a n d h e was damaged by the death of Peter Bartholomew. Above a l l , he h a d long occupied a paradoxical situation: he was apparently the leader w h o wanted t o press on to Jerusalem, yet he seems to have had considerable doubts about the wisdom o f attacking i t w i t h t h e l i m i t e d resources t h e crusaders controlled: this was p a r t o f his reason f o r awaiting t h e emperor and i t was probably f r o m h i m t h a t d o u b t s appeared a t R a m l a . This enabled Godfrey to undermine his p o s i t i o n w i t h o u t i n any way attacking h i m . B u t R a y m o n d o f Toulouse h a d served t h e crusade well. A t a crucial time when t h e a r m y was b e c o m i n g infected by the political culture o f N o r t h Syria h e was responsive t o the basic driving force o f the crusade a n d , however r e l u c t a n t l y a t times, he helped to keep the whole enterprise together. H e r e m a i n e d important, but he was a n isolated figure, a n d increasingly t h e crusade reverted to what i t had been before, a n alliance led b y a committee. The long and painful course o f events f r o m the defeat o f Kerbogah showed that there could be n o single c o m m a n d o f t h e army - i t had been a crisis of authority and i t was o n e w h i c h w o u l d infect crusader armies i n the centuries to come. B u t the a r m y n o w had to confront a third enemy, the F a t i m i d C a l i p h a t e o f E g y p t (sec % • 3)68

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triumphant ending

J u s t as t h e crusade was about the leave 'Akkar i n considerable d i s a r r a y o n 13 M a y 1099, there occurred an event of great i m p o r t a n c e for t h e c o m i n g c a m p a i g n . T h e i r ambassadors to Cairo finally r e t u r n e d w i t h proposals f r o m the F a t i m i d Caliphate. The leaders h a d first d i s p a t c h e d envoys to t h e Egyptians from Nicaea i n late J u n e 1097 a t t h e suggestion of Alexius and we have seen t h a t some k i n d o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g was reached, or a t least anticipated, after discussions b e t w e e n t h e leaders a n d a F a t i m i d embassy i n F e b r u a r y M a r c h 1098 w h i c h r e t u r n e d home w i t h a crusader delegation. A c c o r d i n g t o E k k e h a r d these Franks were i n al-Afdal's camp before J e r u s a l e m d u r i n g his siege o f the city w h e n he threatened its defenders w i t h h i s F r a n k i s h allies; the Historic. Belli Sacri simply says that t h e y spent Easter i o g g i n the H o l y Sepulchre obviously on friendly t e r m s w i t h t h e i r hosts. T h i s strongly reinforces the idea t h a t the E g y p t i a n s w e r e n e g o t i a t i n g seriously. R a y m o n d of Aguilers makes it c l e a r that a p a r t i t i o n o f l a n d c a p t u r e d f r o m the Seljuks was the basis o f discussion, w i t h J e r u s a l e m b e i n g allocated to the Franks, and the Historia Belli Sacri suggests the same k i n d o f arrangement. I t is d i f f i c u l t t o k n o w h o w serious the crusaders were i n pursuing these n e g o t i a t i o n s b y this t i m e . T h i n g s h a d changed since the ambassad o r s had b e e n sent i n M a r c h 1098. T h e Byzantine alliance was no l o n g e r o p e r a t i v e a n d the crusade h a d become m u c h more focussed o n J e r u s a l e m as its sole objective. A t the same time, the success i n N o r t h S y r i a h a d m a d e t h e princes m u c h more hopeful o f tangible g a i n . I n these circumstances a n arrangement w i t h the Egyptians w o u l d h a v e seemed less t h a n attractive to all elements i n the army. F o r his p a r t , a l - A f d a l was securely i n possession of Jerusalem and w a s p u r s u i n g discussions w i t h the T u r k s o f Syria, as R a y m o n d of 1

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Ekkehard, p p . 171-2; HBS, pp. 2 1 4 - 1 5 .

325

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to return to Antioch. Raymond o f Toulouse took possession of t h , atadel of Byzantine Laodieea and the rest o f the arm^SLI foÎ the west on Greek and other ships.^ I t was on this sour note o W o n amburon and internecine quarrels w h i c h had dogged he cru ad

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T h e r e can be n o d o u b t that b u r n i n g religious conviction underlay the success o f the First Crusade. Time and again when all seemed lost, a t A n t i o c h and at Jerusalem particularly, the army rallied to G o d ' s cause. T h e deep conviction that they were the servants o f G o d u n d e r l a y the boldness w i t h w h i c h they tackled and surprised such f o r m i d a b l e enemies as the Egyptians, when all rational calculation w o u l d have advised against i t . Indeed, not the least o f the factors w h i c h made for their success was the i n a b i l i t y o f the M i d d l e Eastern p o w e r s t o comprehend this all or nothing mentality. But b u r n i n g zeal has t o be controlled, disciplined and sustained. Ecclesiastical p o w e r alone was not enough, a n d as i n Western society generally so o n t h e crusade, power was exercised by an alliance of church, i n the p e r s o n o f A d h e m a r , and state i n the persons of the princes. W h e n the a m b i t i o n s , hesitations and doubts of the lay leaders disrupted the crusade a n d ecclesiastical authority collapsed with the death o f A d h e m a r , the a r m y was plunged into crisis from w h i c h i t was rescued o n l y b y a zealot m i n o r i t y represented b y Peter Bartholemew i n a l l i a n c e w i t h the count of Toulouse. T h e y owed their power to a r t i c u l a t i n g the feelings of the overwhelming mass of the crusaders o f a l l ranks, a n d w h e n Peter was discredited Godfrey was able to harness this r a w power. T h a t religious zeal h a d a very narrow a n d m a t e r i a l focus - to liberate Jerusalem. L a t e r crusades w o u l d never suffer f r o m such tunnel vision, b u t this enormously concentrated the efforts o f the a r m y i n contrast t o their successors i n 1 1 o i a n d n 47. 1

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T h e Crusade of 1101 is the subject of a Swansea Ph.D thesis by Alec Mulinder, which, when complete, should provide valuable insight into the failure of this crusade. The Crusade of 1 1 0 1 lacked coherence. Its various elements never gathered together and perished separately, largely because they had no clear objective such as the First Crusade found in Jerusalem. They were fighting an enemy, the Turks of Asia Minor, who had learned the lessons o f the earlier campaign and refused to be drawn into battle.

37 6

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For ideological cohesion was a rare phenomenon i n the eleventh century, as Gregory V I I had discovered, and i t is h a r d to see how any wider objective could have carried the concentrated appeal of Jerusalem. B u t their spirit and organisation could never have succeeded without help. Byzantine aid was of enormous assistance. A t the siege of Nicaca i t was very much i n evidence, but thereafter i t appeared to dwindle. This was a false perspective, for Alexius's real service to the crusaders was to support them from Cyprus w h i c h formed an offshore base for the siege o f Antioch and operations i n N o r t h Syria (see fig. 3). I n addition, Alexius seems to have committed a sizable fleet to their assistance - far more important than Tatikios's small contingent. W i t h o u t Byzantine help i t is difficult to see how the western fleets could have operated so successfully. T h e reason for this enormous Byzantine investment was that this was a j o i n t enterprise. The whole Armenian strategy promised the restoration of Byzantine power i n the old dominion of Philarctus and the collapse of the Seljuk dominion i n western Asia M i n o r opened the way for the reconqucst of the southern part o f the sub-continent. So when i t came to a dispute Alexius could rightly say that he had played his part but i n the end the greatest prize eluded h i m , for the decision to turn back at Philomelium gave Bohemond his o p p o r t u n i t y a n d a moral justification for the dislike of the Greeks w h i c h was never far below the surface amongst the Westerners. A n d Byzantine help had its influence i n another way. T h e crusade was enormously assisted by the divisions of Islam. H a d the Seljuk dominion of less than ten years before still existed i t is impossible to sec how they could have succeeded. Alexius almost certainly explained the problems of the Turks and the divisions of Islam to his allies, for we know i t was his idea to send an embassy to P took their cue skillfully and played the Egyptians well, and applied the idea to other Islamic powers. They were more pragmatic than the stereotype o f the crusader i n absolute and bitter opposition to a l l that is Islamic would sugggest. T h e fanaticism which drove on the great expedition was an underlying force of enormous power but its influence upon events was continual rather than continuous. N o r should we forget that although the Islamic powers were d i v i d e d they were each i n d i v i d u a l l y very strong and that i n every major battle the crusaders fought against odds. No matter how enthusiastic J t

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t h e y w e r e , nor h o w well supported, v i c t o r y i n the clash of arms was n e v e r i n e v i t a b l e a n d to understand t h a t we must turn to more n a r r o w l y m i l i t a r y factors. T h e i n d i v i d u a l leaders exerted great control over their o w n armies. R o b e r t of N o r m a n d y is one o f the failures of history and this casts a shadow over h i m , b u t at D o r y l a e u m he rallied the troops at a c r u c i a l m o m e n t , a n d at Ascalon he was at the heart of a charge w h i c h swept a l l before i t . This was m i l i t a r y ability of a high order. R o b e r t o f Flanders was a brave soldier w h o organised the foraging a n d g a t h e r i n g o f materials at Jerusalem. Godfrey was in the thick of t h e fighting at the siege o f Jerusalem a n d this was important i n an age w h e n leading b y example m a t t e r e d . Bohemond was an able g e n e r a l whose aggressive tactics created t h e victories over R i d w a n a n d K e r b o g a h . H e made the crusaders use rear-guards - this was by n o means an i n n o v a t i o n i n western w a r b u t i t was a development w h i c h needed discipline and c o n t r o l , a n d such qualities became m o r e e v i d e n t i n the crusader army as t i m e went on. Bohemond's genius l a y i n his aggressiveness - his d e t e r m i n a t i o n to unsettle the e n e m y a n d take t h e m unawares, a n d this characterises his victories o v e r R i d w a n a n d Kerbogah. He was n o t a tactical innovator - the r e a l i n n o v a t i o n was the use o f infantry, a n d that arose from circumstance as they became better armed a n d more experienced. The b a t t l e against K e r b o g a h was a n i n f a n t r y b a t t l e perforce - i t was only a t A s c a l o n t h a t the lessons of careful c o - o r d i n a t i o n were applied. But B o h e m o n d ' s real importance lay i n the fact o f his appointment as sole c o m m a n d e r i n moments of crisis. T h e divisions of the leaders, t h e i r d e t e r m i n a t i o n to head their o w n armies and do j o i n t l y only w h a t w a s agreed j o i n t l y , was the real weakness of this and almost all o t h e r crusades. I t was their good f o r t u n e t h a t when this co-operation w a s at its newest a n d their troops at t h e i r rawest, they confronted the w e a k e s t o f their enemies, the T u r k s o f A s i a M i n o r . The nomads were f e r o c i o u s fighters, b u t they were n o t numerous and K i l y Arslan s t a c t i c s depended too heavily o n the m o r a l effect o f sudden o n s l a u g h t s . H e allowed his men, whose genius lay i n mobile warfare, t o be c a u g h t i n slogging matches where numbers counted; m 1 1 0 1 t h e T u r k s w o u l d learn patience a n d close only w i t h a demoralised e n e m y . I t was luck too that w h e n the leaders were at their most d i v i d e d after the fall o f A n t i o c h , the I s l a m i c w o r l d was demoralised a n d q u i t e unable to exploit their problems, so that despite the f r a g i l i t y o f their co-operation they pressed on to Jerusalem.

370

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T h e leaders were able men w h o managed to w o r k together, though only just. T h e i r real a b i l i t y showed at its best i n sieges. Nicaea, Antioch and Jerusalem were large a n d well-defended cities such as few westerners had seen before, b u t the a r m y set a b o u t t h e i r reduction systematically. Probably the siege o f Nicaea h e l p e d the leaders to settle a raw army, t h o u g h at a terrible price i n lives. F u l l credit has never been given to a leadership w h i c h p e r c e i v e d the problems of the siege of A n t i o c h a n d tackled t h e m w i t h e n o r m o u s persistence and eventual success. T h e experience at A n t i o c h was a n intensification o f what they were used to i n the West - w a r o f position rather than the formal investment experienced a t N i c a e a the strangling of an enemy rather t h a n assault against f o r t i f i c a t i o n s . The siege o f Jerusalem exemplifies the skills o f w h a t w a s n o w a highly experienced and coherent g r o u p i n g o f armies, t h o u g h the passiveness of the defenders c o n t r i b u t e d . I t was not t e c h n o l o g i c a l innovation which made their sieges so successful. A l l the i n s t r u m e n t s they used seem to have been k n o w n t o their enemies. T h e western approach to war which favoured systematic a n d often c l u m s y p r e paration also favoured good performance i n this area. Success was the product of organisation and c o m m a n d above all. 2

T h e Franks enjoyed no technical advantages over t h e i r enemies. Their western horses may have been rather larger t h a n those o f t h e nomad Turks but probably not significantly so, and they soon d i e d anyway. The Turks, an element i n a l l the armies that t h e y faced, had the short bow which dictated their tactics a n d w h i c h t h e F r a n k s found difficult to counter. T h e y m a y even have h a d a f o r m o f quick-firing crossbow u n k n o w n to the West. T h e Franks p r o b a b l y had rather better armour, b u t i n general their weapons w e r e v e r y like those of their enemies. T u t ° ° e k l was the t a c t i c a l skill o f the 1 urkish horsemen firing their arrows from horseback. T h e y w e r e always relatively few and this was critical i n Asia M i n o r . I n t h e Caliphate they were the cutting edge o f armies and s u p p o r t e d b y ru

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a l w a y s desirable i n b o t h cavalry and infantry, but very difficult to a c h i e v e w h e n there was no formal system of training. I n their first b a t t l e t h c F r a n k s f o u n d themselves fighting i n close ground near N i c a e a , w h i c h f r u s t r a t e d T u r k i s h tactics. At Dorylaeum the enemy w a s free to m a n o e u v r e a n d attacked skillfully, cruelly exposing the F r a n k s w h o l a c k e d any overall command. But the chances of topogr a p h y a n d d i r e c t i o n o f attack, and the determination and skill of the l e a d e r s h e l d the armies together. Thereafter the crusader host b e c a m e a m o r e c o h e r e n t group o f units and Bohemond was able to use this experience a n d skill to great advantage at thc Lake Battle. A g a i n s t K e r b o g a h the same cohesiveness was seen amongst thc i n f a n t r y w h o were also refined and trained by the experience of war a n d t h c lessons o f this were applied at Ascalon where a complex m a r c h i n g f o r m a t i o n was adopted, and the classic pattern of infantry p r o t e c t i n g c a v a l r y m a r k e d the final deployment. This was not i n n o v a t i o n as such, for similar formations had been used i n the West b u t h e r e i t was used w i t h great success. 3

I t is this g r o w t h o f t h c coherence and experience of the crusader h o s t as a w h o l e w h i c h was the key to their military success. I n many w a y s t h e i r o v e r a l l organisation and weapons were inferior to those o f t h e i r enemies a n d t h e y were 'away from home' in a strange climate. B u t t h c divisions o f t h e i r enemies meant that their weaknesses were n e v e r exposed f u l l y a n d they were given time i n which they became m o r e a n d m o r e experienced. Crucially the Turks of Asia M i n o r f a i l e d t o stop t h e m . Thereafter what had been a relatively incoh e r e n t host, w i t h i n w h i c h some armies were better ordered than o t h e r s , became m o r e coherent and experienced, and more successful. I n a m i l i t a r y sense the crusade was a success. I t may not have a c h i e v e d a l l t h a t U r b a n wanted i t to achieve in terms of friendship w i t h t h c Eastern E m p i r e . Its success was limited i n that it establ i s h e d b a r e outposts w i t h poor communications w i t h the West and u n c e r t a i n r e l a t i o n s w i t h Eastern Christendom, b u t that is our v i e w p o i n t blessed as we are w i t h hindsight. There was no single w i l l d i r e c t i n g t h e crusade; i t was the product of many wills interacting w i t h circumstances, a n d all that gave it a precarious un.ty was 4

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Jerusalem. To free i t was the task they set themselves a n d t o have achieved that was remarkable. T h e crusade had little immediate i m p a c t on western armies a t this time. The twelfth century w o u l d see the rise o f t w o d i s t i n c t t a c t i c a l developments: the mass charge b y cavalry, using couched l a n c e s for the m a x i m u m shock impact, a n d t h e rise o f h i g h l y effective i n f a n t r y . Discipline and clearly articulated c o m m a n d structures w e r e vital to these developments. L a u n c h i n g a cavalry charge w a s so difficult even for the Templars w i t h their b a c k g r o u n d o f o r d e r a n d discipline that they felt the need to w r i t e i t all d o w n i n d e t a i l . T h e s e developments were only possible because the monarchies o f the W e s t more and more used mercenaries a n d professional commanders w h o were able to impose an appropriate discipline o n the m o r e ' r e g u l a r ' forces w h i c h formed the cores o f t h e i r commands. T h i s , c o m b i n e d w i t h the development of the heavier horses, created t h e classic medieval cavalry charge, and one o f its antidotes — d i s c i p l i n e d infantry, who in any case became m o r e and more necessary as castles grew more complex. T h e conditions o f the crusade r e p l i c a t e d t h e conditions o f common service and experience w h i c h m a d e these armies so efficient. Conditions i n the crusader states c o n t i n u e d to demand constant military activity w h i c h had m u c h the same effect, hence the high prestige of the armies of O u t r e m e r i n the t w e l f t h century. I t is possible that the g l o r y and the prestige of t h e F i r s t Crusade helped to impress upon western commanders the need f o r discipline and coherence i n their armies. I n 1106 R o b e r t C u r t h o s e found himself brought to bay by his brother H e n r y at T i n c h c b r a i , rather as he had been by his father at Gerberoi i n 1079. As t h e n , h e decided to risk battle, on a single coherent charge, b u t he w a s heavily outnumbered. However, H e n r y o f H u n t i n g d o n says t h a t Robert's forces fought well and pressed the enemy h a r d r e l y i n g o n 5

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7

3

On the charge see the literature mentioned above, p. 7 1 , n, 66, 6 7 , a l t h o u g h it must be said that this discussion has fbcussed far too much on the question of the couched lance and insufficiently on the practical problems o f marshalling mounted men - far m o r e important for the rise of shock tactics; on the rise of infantry sec J . Boussard, 'Les m c r c e n a i /f£ , T ^ " S « et les origincs dc l'armce de metier', Bibliolhlgue de a

U

d

C

-

H c

r i

1 1

P , a n t a

c n

I hcoledes Charles 1 0 6 ( 1 9 4 5 - 4 6 ) , 189-324 and Contamine, War in the Middle

Ages, pp.

70-3.

M Bennett, La Regie du Temple as a military manual, pp. 7-20, draws attention to t h e sub-units orten knights under a commander comparable to the conrai discussed by V c r b r u gen, Tactique mihtaire', 161-80. E

' On Gerberoi see above, p.44; H . W . C . Davis, 'The battle o f Tinchebrai', English Historical Review, 2 4 (1909), 72B-32, 25 (1910), 295-6 estimates that Robert had only 6,000 w i t h 7 0 0 cavalry to oppose Henry I's 40,000 including 2,400 cavalry.

373

t h e f a c t t h a t they were ' w e l l trained i n the wars of Jerusalem'. I t w a s i n d e e d a h a r d t r a i n i n g w h i c h produced coherent armies and f e r o c i o u s fighters. I t was this, their belief i n God and themselves, a n d t h e i r able commanders w h i c h gave them the victory i n the East. 8

a H H , p. 235.