Index
Abstract / concrete distinction ,, 1, 120 - 124 of , 124- 126 consequences -
Dummett's, 126- 127 objectionsto, 6...
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Index
Abstract / concrete distinction ,, 1, 120 - 124 of , 124- 126 consequences -
Dummett's, 126- 127 objectionsto, 6n2, 60- 61, 193- 194(see alsoOntological challengeto realism) Platoon, 124- 126 to, abstract, putative counterexamples 132- 138 to, putative counterexamples , 138- 152(seealsoComposite composite objects) revisionarydefinitionsof, 18, 118, 126- 127 Abstractobjects. Seealso Abstract/ concretedistinction argumentsfor, 4- 6, 29- 32 (seealso ) Indispensabilityarguments characteristics of, 1, 37n5, 77- 79, 120- 124, 124- 127, 129- 132 definedas nonspatiotemporal , 1, 120- 124 revisionarydefinitionsof, 18, 118, 126- 127 as sourcesof normativity, 82, 114- 115, 160 . Seealso Acquaintanceepistemology Empiricism inadequatefor realism, 23-24, 25-26, 36- 39, 58-59 unnecessaryfor realism, 39- 41, 58-59 usedby forms of realism, 14- 18, 23-24 Allaire, Edwin B., 181 Analyticity Carnapon, xx- xxi, 69- 70, 181- 182 Fregeannotion of, xx- xxi, 69, 18n5, 179- 182, 184, 185- 186 -Kantiannotion of, xxin6, 7, Lockean 179- 180, 185- 186
non-Fregeannotion of, 93, 178- 179, 185- 186 Quine on, 70- 71, 72n3, 80, 93, 181- 184 Anselm, 128 Antirealism. SeealsoNominalism; Conceptualism . epistemicchallengeto, 63- 65 semanticchallengeto, 29- 32 Apodicticity, 47- 48 A priori knowledge analyticity in explanationsof, xx- xxi, 69, lSO- l ~l , 198- 199 linguisticismabout, 198- 199 in philosophy, xi- xv, xx, 177- 179, 188- 190, 196-200 rationalistcharacterizationof, 23-24, 36- 41 and revisability, 48-50, 172, 183 synthetic, xx, 177- 179, 186- 188 Aristotle, 204. SeealsoContemporary Aristotelianism ArmstrongD . M., 130n7 , 134, 170, 173
Benacerraf , Paul. Seealso Epistemologicalchallengeto realism; Semanticchallengeto realism, 's Benacerraf indeterminacy on the philosophyof mathematics , xxx, 26-27
andsemantic to antirealism , challenge 29-32 as structuralistabout arithmetic, 85- 86, 105- 112 Berk, Lon, 152n15 , George,202 Berkeley Blanshard , Brand, xii
220
Index
Bloomfield, Leonard as linguistic nominalist, xxiv- xv, 3, SO , 135 , Paul A., 97n6 Boghossian Boolos, George, 139, 152n15 Branch, Glenn, 35n4, 52n15, 128 Brouwer, L. E. J. intuitionism of, 8, 9n4 as mathematicalconceptualist , 8, 9n4,
20, 23-24, 119 , 192 , JohnP., 29-30, 77, 207 Burgess
Caesarproblem, 103- 105, 108 Carnap, Rudolf on analyticity, xx- xxi, 69- 70, 181- 182 criticism of traditional philosophy, 188, 206-209 on intensionalism , 90-91 on internal and externalquestions , 207- 209 Carroll, Lewis, 77 Casti, JohnL., 173n30 Causaltheory of knowledge, 27- 28, 31- 32. SeealsoAcquaintance epistemology Certaintyin the formal sciences antirealistinability to explain, 77, 82- 83 plausibility of, 64- 65 realistexplanationof, 77- 79, 83 subjectiveversusobjective, 63- 64 Chihara, CharlesS., 19, 32, 116 Chisholm, RoderickM., xii, 198 Chomsky , Noam, xxiii- xxv. Seealso Conceptualism criticism of linguistic nominalism, xxiv- xxv, 3, 135, 159n21 as linguistic conceptualist , xxv, 2, 8, 23-24, 35, 135 nativism and rationalism, 23-24, 35 ClassicalPlatonism, 14- 17 Compositeobjects and relativepredication, 150- 152 simple, complex, and compound, 142- 143 theory of, 141- 143, 145- 147 Composition, 121- 122, 141- 145 , 131 Compositionality Compoundcompositeobjects. Seealso Compositeobjects and discoveryversuscreation, 168- 170 linguistic, 166- 167
theory of, 142- 143, 166- 168 , 56-58 Conceivability Conceptualism in linguistics, xxv, 2, 8, 23-24, 35, 135, 163n23 in mathematics , 8, 9n4, 20, 23-24, 109- 11On14 Concreteobjects, 1, 124- 129 Constitution. SeeComposition . SeeAcquaintance Contactepistemology epistemology ContemporaryAristotelianism, 17- 19 Creationversusdiscovery. See Discoveryversuscreation Creativerelations, 141, 152- 154 ( D), 124. SeealsoAbstract/ concrete distinction; Objects , categoriesof ( Dl), ( D2), ( D3), ( 04), and ( D5), 140- 141. SeealsoObjects,categoriesof Danto, Arthur C., xviii , 67 Descartes , Rene on conceivability , 56-58 on skepticismabout logic, 53-55, 58, 203 Discoveryversuscreation, 134- 135, 137, 168- 170 Donnellan, Keith, xxvii, 185 Dummett, Michael, 32, 116, 126- 127, 130- 132, 180, 198 Eliminativism, 79- 81. Seealso Supervenience Empiricism. SeealsoAcquaintance ; Causaltheory of epistemology knowledge and certainty, 65- 67, 68- 69, 71- 72, 74 in epistemicchallengeto realism, 25-26, 27- 28 inadequatefor realism, 23-24, 25-26, 27- 28, 31- 32, 36-39, 58-59 inseparabilityfrom naturalism, xxxi, 32n3, 68- 69n2 Mill ' s, 65- 66, 69, 71, 74 ' Quine s, 65- 67, 68- 69, 71- 74, 182- 183 reasonin, 33- 34, 52, 54, 68- 69 unableto explain knowledgeof necessity , xxxi, 7, 32, 63, 187 usedin forms of realism, 14- 18, 23-24 Epistemicchallengeto antirealism, 63- 65. SeealsoCertainty antirealism's inability to meet, 77, 82- 83
Index conventionalistresponse , 66, 69- 70 Mill ' s response , 65- 66, 69 , 69- 71 noncognitivist response realism's ability to meet, 77- 79, 83 ' , 66- 67, 68- 69, 71- 72 Quine s response ' , 75-77, 77- 78n4 Wittgensteins response to realism Epistemicchallenge dependenceon empiricism, 25-26, 2728 rationalistsolution to, 34- 61 passim , pure, 192- 193 Epistemology Ewing, A. C., xii, 46 Field, Hartry, 31 epistemologicalviews of, 10- 11, 25, 32, 116, 172 as fictionalist nominalist, 11- 12 as mathematicalnominalist, >OOcn9 , 10- 14, 29nl Fodor, JerryA., xxiv, 68 Formalsciences , 2nl , 79 , distinguishedfrom natural sciences 58-59, 111- 173 and Occam's razor, 171, 173 pure and applied, 2, 163- 166 Foundationaldisciplines, 5- 6, 118- 120, 114, 191- 192 of foundationaldisciplines, 118- 120, 191- 193 , 5- 6, 29-31, 77, independenceof science 85- 86n2, 114, 191- 193, 206-207 Frege, Gottlob and analyticity, xx- xxi, 69, 18n5, 179- 182, 184, 185- 186 on the Caesarproblem, 103, 105 contextprinciple of, 130- 131, 180 intensionalismof, xxvi- xxviii, 18n5, 93, 105, 114- 115, 118- 179, 184- 186(seealso Intensionalism ) , criticismof Fregean and linguistic turn, xx- xxi, 177- 178, 179- 180, 181- 182, 184- 186 as mathematicalrealist, xxxiii, 2, 20, 177, 179 as rationalist, 177- 179 on senses , xxvi- xxviii, 18n5, 105, 185- 186
Gemes , Ken, 93 in, 160- 162 , demonstration Geometry , Alexander , 20-21 George Gibson , Roger , 89
221
God and metaphysics , 128, 130- 131, 147- 148 and skepticism, 53, 55, 203, 204n4 GOdel, Kurt epistemologicalviews of, 15- 17, 26, 34, 116 as mathematicalrealist, xxxi, xxxii, 1, 20, 26, 119, 192 Goldfarb, Warren, 152n15 Goldman, Alvin , 27 Goodman, Nelson, 1, 3, 12, 53, 76, 189 Gottlieb, Dale, 25, 32, 116 Gregory, R. L., 149- 150 Grice, H. P., 72n3, 164 Hale, Bob, 49, 126, 132- 133, 137- 138, 175n33 , 198 Halle, Morris, xxvi Hardy, G. H., 134 , Martin, 177 Heidegger Hempel, Carl Gustav, 69, 195 Hilbert, David, xixnS, 119 Hume, David, 7, 69, 179- 180, 181, 189, 204-205 Husserl, Edmund, 17, 179, 186 Indeterminacyarguments. SeeSemantic challengeto realism , 10- 11, 50-51 Indispensabilityarguments . SeealsoSenses Intensionalism Carnapon, 90-91 criticism of Fregean , xxvii- xxviii, 77- 78n4, 78n5, 93, 105, 114- 115, 156, 178, 181- 183, 184, 185- 186 , xxvii- xxviii, 78n5, 93, 105, Fregean 114- 115, 178- 179, 184- 186 non-Fregean , xxvii- xxviii, 78n5, 93, 114- 115, 156- 157, 178- 179, 184- 186 Intuitions of conceivabilityand inconsistency , 56-58 GOOelon, 15- 17, 34 and Kantianintuitions, 44- 45 as sourceof basicknowledge, 43- 46 ' Wittgensteins criticism of, 43- 44 Isaacson , Daniel, 144 , Samuel, 202 Johnson Kant , Immanuel . Seealso Analyticity , Lockean-Kantian notion of on a priori knowledge , 8, 179- 180, 186
222
Index
Kant, Immanuel(cont.) criticism of empiricism, )OOQ , 7, 32 criticism of traditional philosophy, 7- 8 on Hume, 7, 179- 180 as mathematicalconceptualist , 7- 10, 16, 20, 23 transcendentalidealismof, 8- 10, 186-187 verificationismin, ~ 10 Kastin, J., 103nl1 Kaufmann, Walter, 13n6 Kenny, Anthony, 181 Kim, Jaegwon , xxii, 81- 82 Kitcher, Philip, 49, 172 Kivy, Peter, 169n27 Koslow, Arnold, 188nl Knowledge. SeealsoA priori knowledge; Skepticism of apodicticprinciples, 47- 48 basic/ transcendent , 42- 43 formal versusnatural, 58-59, 171- 173 foundational, 192 holistic characterof, 46- 47, 71- 72 Internal/ External, 193- 194 as justified true belief, 34 , 192- 193 metaphysical of necessaryfacts, xxxi, 7, 32, 56-58, 63, 187 observational / theoreticaldistinction in, 42- 43 philosophical, 188-204 , 185. Seealso Kripke, Saul, xxvii, 123n3 Semanticchallengeto realism, ' Kripke s rule- following , D. Terence , 138n9 Langendoen Langford, C. H., xii Latham, Noah, 148n13 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, xxxi, 24, 32, 204 Levinson, Jerrold, 169n27 Lewis, David, 37- 38, 143- 145 Linguistics, xiii- xiv conceptualismin, xxv, 2, 8, 23-24, 35, 135, 163n23 demonstrationin, 162- 163 nominalismin, xxiii- xxv, 3, 12, SO , 135, 159n21 , 163n23 realismin, xxv- xxvi, xxviii, 2- 4, 136- 138, 162- 163 Linguistic turn, xiv- xv, xx- xxi, 177, 184, 209-210
and Frege, xx- xxi, 177- 178, 179- 180, 181- 182, 184- 186 and logical positivism, 177- 178, 179- 181 and Quine and Wittgenstein , 178, 181- 184 Locke, John, 204. SeealsoAnalyticity, Lockean-Kantiannotion of Logicalpositivism. SeealsoAyer; Camap; Schlick on analyticity, xx- xxi, 69- 70, 181- 182 on a priori knowledge, xiii - xiv, xx- xxi, 69- 70, 180- 181 criticism of traditional philosophy, xiii- xiv, xx, 178, 179- 181, 188, 191n2 , 204-205 in first phaseof linguistic turn, 177- 178, 179- 181 , 17- 19 Maddy, Penelope Malament, David B., xxxn9 Marcus, Ruth Barcan , 32 Martin, R. M., 108- 109 Mathematics conceptualismin, 8, 9n4, 20, 23-24, 109- 11On14 nominalismin, 3, 10- 14, 109- 11On14 , 119 realismin, xxviii, xxxi- xxxiii, 1- 4, 5- 6, 20, 26, 77- 79, 109- 11On14 MtGinn, Colin, 21 . SeeComposition Mereology Mill , JohnStuart on certainty, 65- 66, 69, 71 empiricismof, 65- 66, 69, 71, 74 and skepticismabout necessity , 56-57, 65 Moore, G. E., 82n8, 143- 144, 200-202 Mysticism distinguishedfrom mystery, 33, 116 whetherrationalisminvolves, 25, 32- 34, 43, 116 Nagel, Thomas, xii, xiiin2, 189 Nativism, 23-24, 35 Naturalism. SeealsoPhilosophy , naturalistconceptionsof disillusionmentwith, xxiii- xxviii inseparabilityfrom empiricism, xxxi, 32n3, 68- 69n2 ontological, epistemological , and , xii methodological relationto materialism, xiin1, 67
Index Naturalizedrealism, 19- 23 Necessity and certainty, 77- 79 knowledgeof, xxxi, 7, 32, 56-58, 63, 187 skepticismabout, 32, 56-57, 63, 65, 75, 182, 184 sourcesof, 181- 182, 184- 185 Nishiyama, Yuji, 20 Nominalism fictionalist, 11- 14, 29nl ( V, 3, 12, SO , 135, linguistic, xxxiii- )OO 159n21 mathematical , 119 , 3, 10- 14, 109- 11OnI4 Noonan, Harold, 126 Nozick, Robert, xxix, 204n4 Objects, categoriesof, 145 abstract, 1, 120- 124 , 141- 143, 145- 147 composite 1 concrete , , 124- 129 , 121- 122, 140- 141 homogeneous , 141, 145nll heterogeneous Occam's razor, 170- 175 Ontological challengeto realism to involvescounterexamples abstract/ concretedistinction, 117 not usually viewed as challenge , 117 whetherproblemonly for realism, 117- 118 putative counterexamp ~es, abstract, 132- 138 , , composite putative counterexamples 138- 152 Ontology as foundationaldisciplineof foundationaldisciplines, 118- 120, 191- 193 , 5- 6, 192independenceof science 193 pure, 192- 193 (Pl.1), (Pl.2), (Pl .3), and (Pl .4), 142. See alsoCompositeobjects, theory of ' ), (P6), and (P7) , (P2), (P3), (P4), (PS), (PS 145- 147. SeealsoCompositeobjects, theory of Pap, Arthur, xii Parsons , Charles, 44- 45 Passmore , John, 179 Peirce,CharlesSaunders , 37n5, 117, 133, 148 Philosophy
223
a priori knowledgein, xi- xv, xx, 177- 179, 188- 190, 196-200 as conceptualanalysis, xii- xv, 111 dialecticof, xix- xx, 5- 6, 85- 86n2, 118- 120, 173- 174, 193- 194, 211 as distinct from science , 5- 6, 29- 31, 77, 85- 86n2, 174, 191- 193, 206-207 - order, whetherfirst-orderor second xiv- x knowledgein, 188-204 naturalistconceptionsof, xi- xii , - 112, 178- 179, xiv- xvi, 67- 68, 111 184- 185 progressin, xiii , xvi, 188- 189 i science as a posterior , xi- xii , xv, xxi- xxii, 178, 202- 203(seealsoQuine) as therapy, xi, xv, xxii- xxiii, 75, 88, 182 ) (seealsoWittgenstein traditional conceptionof, xi- xiii , xvi- xvii, 178-179, 184- 187, 188- 189 (seealsoRealisticrationalism) uniquely puzzling questionsof, xvii, xxii, xxix Plato, 1, 2, 14- 15, 124- 126, 128, 204. See alsoClassicalPlatonismForms Postal, Paul M., xxiv, 8n3, 135, 138n9 Prichard, H. A., 195- 196, 201 Proofs, 37- 41 , 34, 165 Propositions as Fregeansensesof sentencetypes, 36, 38-39, 165 and necessarilyfalsestatements , 37- 38 as Russellianbearersof truth values, 36, 165 Putnam, Hilary, xxvii, xxx, 116, 153, 185, 198. SeealsoSemanticchallengeto realism, Putnam's Skolemite on indispensabilityarguments , 10- 11, 50-51 on revisabilityof a priori knowledge, 49- 50 Quine, W. V. on analyticity, 70-71, 72n3, SO , 93, 181- 184 and a priori knowledge, xv, 48, 182- 183 and certainty, 66- 67, 68- 69, 71- 72 i conceptionof philosophyasa posterior science , xi- xii, xv, xxi- xxii, 178, 202203 criticism of Camap, xxi, 70- 71, 90, 181- 183, 207, 209
224
Index
Quine, W. V. (cont.) criticism of Fregeanintensionalism , xxviii, 93, 181- 182, 185- 186 criticism of traditional philosophy , xv, 182- 184 and empiricism, 6.5-67, 6S- 69, 71, 74, 182- 183 epistemicholism, 66, 71, 72 inconsistencyof epistemologyof, 71- 74, 191 on indeterminacy(seeSemantic ' challengeto realism, Quines ) indeterminacy and indispensabilityarguments , 10- 11, 50-51 as linguistic nominalist, xxiii- xxv, 3, 12, 80 and naturalism, xi- xii, xv- xvi, xxi- xxii, 59- 60, 66, 68, 111, 178, 184 naturalizedPlatonism, 59- 60 and necessity , 32, 63, 65, 184 on ontological ignorance , 197- 198 on radical translation(seeRadical
translation ) on revisability , 48, 183 andskepticism , xxii, 189,202-204 Radicaltranslation. SeealsoSemantic ' challengeto realism, Quines indeterminacy and bilingual speakers , 89- 90, 92 as excludingintensionalevidence , 89- 92 paradoxicalsymmetryin, 93- 94 sourceof indeterminacyof translation, 8S- 89, 92 Rationalism and apodicticknowledge, 47- 48 and a priori knowledge, 36- 41, 190 basicversustranscendentknowledge in, 41- 47 expansionsof, 187- 188 inseparabilityfrom realism, xvii, xxviii, xxxi- xxxii, 23-24, 26, 68- 69n2, 187 and nativism, 23-24, 35 and revisability, 48-51 and skepticismin general, 51- 55 and skepticismabout knowledgeof necessity , 56-58 Realism , 1, 2 argumentsfor, 4- 6, 29-32 (seealso Indispensability arguments )
and discoveryversuscreation, 134- 135, 137, 168- 170 and empiricism, 14- 18, 23-24 generalversusparticular, 2- 4 inseparabililityfrom rationalism, xvii, xxviii, xxxi- xxxii, 23-24, 68- 69n2, 187 linguistic, xxv- xxvi, xxviii, 2- 4, 136- 138, 162- 163 mathematical , xxviii, xxxi- xxxiii, 1- 4, 5- 6, 20, 26, 77- 79, 109- 11On14 Realisticrationalism, xvii- xxi, xxii- xxiii, xxviii- xxix, xxxii, 210- 211 . SeeEliminativism Reductionism Relativepredication, 150- 152. Seealso Compositeobjects Rollins, C. D., 64 Rule- following. SeeSemanticchallenge to realism, Kripke' s rule-following; , rule- following argument Wittgenstein Russell, Bertrand, xxiii, 67, 114, 178 Sartre, Jean-Paul, xviii Schlick, Moritz, xx- xxi, 178, 179, 184, 191n2 , 210 Seeingas, 156- 160 Semanticchallengeto antirealism, 29- 32 Semanticchallengeto realism basedon paradoxicalsymmetries , 99- 103 generalform of, 99- 100 instability of, 100- 102 , 87- 88, skepticalversusnonskeptical 99- 102 strategyfor resisting , 102- 106, 108 ultimate significanceof, 116 , 86- 87 why flaws in undetected ' s ruleand Wittgenstein following argument, 87- 88 Semanticchallengeto realism, 's Benacerraf indeterminacy , 85 as challengeto generalrealism, 86 claimsnumbersare not objects , 106- 107 claimsnumbersare not sets, 106- 107 compatiblewith unknowablenumbers, 106 and epistemicchallengeto realism, 86 - 112 motivatedby naturalism, 111 paradoxicalsymmetryin, 107, 110 presupposesstructuralismabout arithmetic, 107- 110, 111 , 86- 87 why flaws in undetected
Index 22S Semanticchallengeto realism, Kripke' s rule- following aboutjustificationof projectionto unknown, 94-95, 96, 97 as nonskeptical , 88, 99- 100 paradoxicalsymmetryin, 98-99, 101nl0 sensesin solution of, 95-98, 101nl0 Semanticchallengeto realism, Putnam's Skolemite Benacerrafon, 113- 114 compatiblewith unknowablesets, 113 and conceptionsof understanding , 112- 113 presupposesstructuralismabout set theory, 112- 114 realist responseto, 114- 115 relieson naturalism, 116 ' s rulerelieson Wittgenstein following 114 116 , argument Semanticchallengeto realism, Quine' s indeterminacy as basedon criticism of analyticity, 93 as basedon radical translation, 88- 89, 92 (seealsoRadicaltranslation) , begsquestionagainstintensionalism 89- 92, 93 , compatiblewith unknowablemeanings 88 paradoxicalsymmetryin, 93- 94, 101 as skeptical, 99- 100 . SeealsoIntensionalism Senses and Fregeanpropositions, 36, 38-39, 165 Fregeantheoriesof, xxvi- xxviii, 18n5, 105, 185- 186 , 96-98 graspingof in Kripke' s rule- following semantic , 95-98, 101nl0 challenge non-Fregeantheoriesof, xxvi- xxviii, 18n5, 185- 186 Shapiro, Stewart, l03nll , l00n9 Ship of Theseus Skepticism Cartesian(about the externalworld), 189, 200-202, 203 Cartesian(about logic), 52, 53-55, 58, 193, 203 as challengeto rationalism, 51- 52 as externalchallengeto knowledge, 194- 195, 199-200 Humean, 53-55, 189, 193, 200, 203, 205
in' elevanceto internal knowledge, 54-55, 193- 194, 204-206 Moore on, 200-202 about necessity , 32, 56-57, 63, 75, 182, 184 not necessarilycentralto philosophy, 204 Prichardon, 195- 196 Quine on, xxii, 189, 202- 204 semanticchallengesto realismas exhibiting, 87- 88, 99- 102 Wittgensteinon unintelligibility of, 76- 77, 205-206 Smith, G. E., 38 Soames , Scott, 22 Socrates , 204 , 148n13 Spinoza, Benedict Strawson, P. F., xii, xiiin2, 72n3, 207, 209 Stroud, Barry, xixn4, xxi- xxii, 189, 201- 202 Structuralism about arithmetic, 85- 86, l03nll , 105- 112(seealsoSemanticchallengeto 's realism, Benacerraf ) indeterminacy about set theory, 112- 114(seealso Semanticchallengeto realism, Pumam's Skolemite) Structuralproperties, 107- 110 Studdert-Kennedy , Michael, 159n21 , 81- 82. Seealso Supervenience Eliminativism , 38- 39, 58-59 Supposability Transcendental , 48n12 arguments Transcendental idealism. SeeKant, transcendentalidealism Type/ token distinction. Seealso Compositeobjects and abstract/ concretedistinction, 117- 118, 133- 134 exemplifiedin puzzling figures, 149- 150(seealsoSeeingas) in linguistic antirealism, 3, 12, 118 uncontroversialityof, 133- 134 and universal/ instancedistinction, 154- 155 Verificationism , xiiin3, 9- 10, 99n8, 209n7 Wang, Hao, 15, 17 Warnock, Mary, xiv- xv, xvii
226
Index
Wetzel, Linda, 109, 152n15 , 155n18 White, Alan R., 63- 64 , Ludwig Wittgenstein and a priori knowledge, )()(- xxi, 180- 181, 184 on certainty, 75-77, 77- 78n4 on color incompatibility, 181- 182, 184 conceptionof philosophyas therapeutic, xi, xv, xxii- xxiii, 75, 182 criticismof Fregeanintensionalism , xxvii, 77- 78n4, 114- 115, 156, 181- 182, 184, 185- 186 criticism of intuition, 43- 44 criticism of traditional philosophy, xi, xv, )()(, 75, 182, 184 on meaning , )()(, 77- 78n4, 88, 114- 115, 156, 158n20 , 160 and naturalism, xi, )()(, 68, 75-77, 111, 178, 184 and necessity , 75, 181- 182, 184- 185 rule- following argumentof, 77- 78n4, 87- 88, 114- 116, 156- 157 on seeingas, 156- 160 and skepticismas unintelligible, 76- 77, 205-206 Wollheim , Richard, 154- 155 Wright, Crispin, 99n8 Yablo, Stephen , 56-58 Yourgrau, Palle, 15- 16