Transcending Self-Interest: Psychological Explorations of the Quiet Ego

Transcending Self-Interest PSYCHOLOGICAL EXPLORATIONS OF THE QUIET EGO

Edited by

Heidi A.Wayment Jack J. Bauer

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': DECADE o/SEHAVIOR Q

AMERICAN

PSYCHOLOGICAL WASHINGTON,

ASSOCIATION

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Quiet Ego Conference (1st : 2005 : Northern Arizona University) Transcending self-interest : psychological explorations of the quiet ego / edited by Heidi A. Wayment and Jack J. Bauer. p. cm. - (Decade of behavior) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-1-4338-0340-6 ISBN- I0: 1-4338-0340-2 1. Egoism-Congresses. 2. Self-interest-Congresses. 3. Self-Congresses. 1. Wayment, Heidi A. II. Bauer, Jack J. III. Title. BJ1474.Q44 2005 155.2'5-dc22 2007039932

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A CIP record is available from the British Library.

Printed in the United States ofAmerica First Edition

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In memory of my father and baby twin sister

-Heidi A. Wayment To my wife and children

-Jack J. Bauer

Contents

Contributors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xv

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xvn

Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xix

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

Foreword .

Heidi A. Wayment and Jack J. Bauer 1.

The Psychology of the Quiet Ego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Jack J. Bauer and Heidi A. Wayment Part I . Putting the Ego I nto Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

The Lure of the Noisy Ego: Narcissism as a Social Trap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . W. Keith Campbell and Laura E. Buffardi

23

2.

3.

A Terror Management Perspective on the Quiet Ego and the Loud Ego: Implications of Ego Volume Control for Personal and Social Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

Spee Kosloff, Mark J. Landau, Daniel Sullivan, and Jeff Greenberg 4.

5.

In Search of the Optimal Ego: When Self-Enhancement Bias Helps and Hurts Adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Virginia S. Y. Kwan, Lu Lu Kuang, and Belinda X. Zhao

43

Taming the Wild Ego: The Challenge of Humility . . . . . . .

53

Julie Juola Exline 6.

From Egosystem to Ecosystem: Implications for Relationships, Learning, and Well-Being . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

Jennifer Crocker Part II . The I mportance of Awareness in Quieting the Ego. . . . .

73

Beyond Me: Mindful Responses to Social Threat . . . . . . . .

75

7.

Kirk Warren Brown, Richard M. Ryan, J. David Creswell, and Christopher P. Niemiec 8.

9.

Individual Differences in Quiet Ego Functioning: Authenticity, Mindfulness, and Secure Self-Esteem . . . . . . Michael H. Kernis and Whitney L. Heppner Self-Compassion: Moving Beyond the Pitfalls of a Separate Self-Concept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Kristin D. Neff xi

85

95

xii

CONTENTS

10.

The Role of Awareness and Autonomy in Quieting the Ego: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Christopher P. Niemiec, Richard M. Ryan, and

107

Kirk Warren Brown 11. Motivation, Threshold for Threat, and Quieting the Ego . . . . ... . . . ... . ... . . ... . ..... . . ... . . .... . ..

117

Holley S. Hodgins Part III. The I mportance of Others in Quieting the Ego . ... .. .

12.

Hierarchy Among Selves: An Implication for Relations With Persons Versus Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

125

127

Lowell Gaertner, Constantine Sedikides, Michelle Luke, and Jonathan Iuzzini 13.

Allo-Inclusive Identity: Incorporating the Social and Natural Worlds Into One's Sense of Self . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13 7

Mark R. Leary, Jessica M. Tipsord, and Eleanor B. Tate 14. Perspectives on the Self in the East and the West: Searching for the Quiet Ego . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

149

Derrick Wirtz and Chi-yue Chiu 15. The Collective and Compassionate Consequences of Downward Social Comparisons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

159

Heidi A. Wayment and Erin M. O'Mara 16.

Collective Angst: How Threats to the Future Vitality of the Ingroup Shape Intergroup Emotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

171

Michael J. A. Wohl and Nyla R. Branscombe 17.

Beyond the Individualistic Self: A Framework for Prosocial Motives and Judgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

183

M. Audrey Korsgaard and Bruce M. Meglino Part IV. Developmental Perspectives on Quieting the Ego. . . . .

18.

How the Ego Quiets as It Grows: Ego Development, Growth Stories, and Eudaimonic Personality Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

197

199

Jack J. Bauer 19.

Homonegativity and the Lesbian Self: Portraits of the Ego as Either Transcender or Occluder of Negative Social Stereotypes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

211

Ed de St. Aubin and Kim Skerven 20.

Self-Development Through Selflessness: The Paradoxical Process of Growing Wiser . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Monika Ardelt

221

CONTENTS

21.

xiii

Generativity, the Redemptive Self, and the Problem of a Noisy Ego in American Life . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dan P. McAdams

235

Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

243

Subject Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

253

About the Editors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

263

Contributors

Monika Ardelt, PhD, University of Florida, Gainesville Jack J. Bauer, PhD, University of Dayton, Dayton, OR Nyla R. Branscombe, PhD, University of Kansas, Lawrence Kirk Warren Brown, PhD, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond Laura E. Buffardi, MS, University of Georgia, Athens W. Keith Campbell, PhD, University of Georgia, Athens Chi-yue Chiu, PhD, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign J. David Creswell, PhD, University of California, Los Angeles Jennifer Crocker, PhD, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor Ed de St. Aubin, PhD, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI Julie Juola Exline, PhD, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OR Lowell Gaertner, PhD, University of Tennessee, Knoxville Jeff Greenberg, PhD, University of Arizona, Tucson W hitney L. Heppner, MS, University of Georgia, Athens Holley S. Hodgins, PhD, Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, NY Jonathan I uzzini, PhD, Robart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY Michael H. Kernis, PhD, University of Georgia, Athens M. Audrey Korsgaard, PhD, University of South Carolina, Columbia Spee Kosloff, MA, University of Arizona, Tucson Lu Lu Kuang, MA, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Virginia S. Y. Kwan, PhD, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ Mark J. Landau, PhD, University of Kansas, Lawrence Mark R. Leary, PhD, Duke University, Durham, NC Michelle Luke, PhD, University of Southampton, Southampton, England Dan P. McAdams, PhD, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL Bruce M. Meglino, PhD, University of South Carolina, Columbia Kristin D. Neff, PhD, The University of Texas at Austin Christopher P. Niemiec, MA, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY Erin M. O'Mara, MA, University of Tennessee, Knoxville Richard M. Ryan, PhD, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY Constantine Sedikides, PhD, University of Southampton, Southampton,

England Kim Skerven, PhD, Alverno College, Milwaukee, WI Daniel Sullivan, University of Arizona, Tucson Eleanor B. Tate, MA, Duke University, Durham, NC Jessica M. Tipsord, MA, University of Oregon, Eugene Heidi A. Wayment, PhD, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff Derrick Wirtz, PhD, Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff Michael J. A. Wohl, PhD, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada Belinda X. Zhao, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ

xv

Foreword

In early 1988, the American Psychological Association (APA) Science Directorate began its sponsorship of what would become an exceptionally suc­ cessful activity in support of psychological science-the APA Scientific Confer­ ences program. This program has showcased some of the most important topics in psychological science and has provided a forum for collaboration among many leading figures in the field. The program has inspired a series of books that have presented cutting­ edge work in all areas of psychology. At the turn of the millennium, the series was renamed the Decade of Behavior Series to help advance the goals of this important initiative. The Decade of Behavior is a major interdisciplinary campaign designed to promote the contributions of the behavioral and social sciences to our most important societal challenges in the decade leading up to 2010. Although a key goal has been to inform the public about these scientific contributions, other activities have been designed to encourage and further collaboration among scientists. Hence, the series that was the "APA Science Series" has continued as the "Decade of Behavior Series." This represents one element in APA's efforts to promote the Decade of Behavior initiative as one of its endorsing organizations. For additional information about the Decade of Behavior, please visit http://www.decadeofbehavior.org. Over the course of the past years, the Science Conference and Decade of Behavior Series has allowed psychological scientists to share and explore cutting-edge findings in psychology. The APA Science Directorate looks forward to continuing this successful program and to sponsoring other conferences and books in the years ahead. This series has been so successful that we have cho­ sen to extend it to include books that, although they do not arise from confer­ ences, report with the same high quality of scholarship on the latest research. We are pleased that this important contribution to the literature was sup­ ported in part by the Decade of Behavior program. Congratulations to the edi­ tors and contributors of this volume on their sterling effort. Steven J. Breckler, PhD

Virginia E. Holt

Executive Director for Science

Assistant Executive Director for Science

xvii

Preface

The past several decades in America have been characterized by a nearly fanatic preoccupation with "me" and "mine." Western psychology has also been influenced by this cultural obsession, which has resulted in a relatively one­ sided representation of human cognition, affect, and behavior as primarily motivated and enhanced by self-interest. In this volume, we have assembled a group of contributors whose work focuses on understanding and documenting what it means to transcend individualistic aspects of the self (e.g., excessive self-interest, ego defenses). Consequently, this volume recognizes that people are connected to something larger than the self, explores how they transcend self-interest and an individualized sense of self, and addresses the benefits and drawbacks they may encounter as a result. Although ideas related to the notion that people can transcend the immediacy of their self-interests is not new, the appearance of these ideas in contemporary psychology has waxed and waned. Furthermore, the public face of Western psychology has helped to perpetuate the idea that the self is of utmost importance. The elevation of self-enhancement goals (of individuals and collectives) over self-transcendent goals is at the heart of many current social, political, and economic woes. Thus, the objective for the creation of this volume was to bring more attention to the empirical study of transcending egoism. Our belief is that this volume captures the wide variety of research that describes the multifaceted nature of self-interest and the benefits of the awareness of self-interested concerns as well as the social, developmental, cognitive, and clinical variables that aid our understanding of the nature and benefits of regulating and managing these tendencies for the greater good of self and others. We hope the chapters begin to capture what is clearly a renewed interest in the scientific investigation of a wide variety of psychological constructs related to keeping the ego in check. The impetus for this volume was a 2005 conference entitled "The Quiet Ego: Implications of a Less Defensive Orientation Toward the Self and Oth­ ers"; therefore, we would both like to thank all of the conference attendees for their enthusiasm, the support and collaborative spirits of the authors who have contributed to this volume, and our "Quiet Ego" team of students who helped organize the conference: Jenna Hamilton, Lindsay Richerson, Desiree Sharpe, Jen Shott, and Stephanie Wells. We extend special thanks to Holley S. Hodgins and Jennifer Crocker for their early support of the conference; their enthusi­ asm was key in making it a reality. In addition, we are especially grateful to the American Psychological Association (APA) Science Directorate for its generous support of the stand-alone conference and to Northern Arizona University for providing us with significant funding to get it off the ground. Numerous people at Northern Arizona University arranged financial or other forms of support: Kathy Cruz-Uribe, Susanna Maxwell, Ramona Mellott, Rob Till, Linda Shad­ iow, Gypsy Denzine, Janina Burton, Peter Schwepker, Astrid Sheil, and gradu­ ate students in Heidi's 2005 and 2006 social psychology seminars. We are very

xix

xx

PREFACE

appreciative of the support oftheAPA Books Department, particularly Lansing Hays, Maureen Adams, Genevieve Gill, and Devon Bourexis, and the help of anonymous reviewers. We also thank all the people in our lives who have been influential to us in our pursuit of these ideas, who have taught us more than we could ever hope to return, and who are an inspiration. I (Wayment) would like to thank my husband, Craig Steele, for his keen insights, sense of humor, and unwavering support. I also thank my children, Hannah and Dean; my stepsons, Benjamin and Quinton; my sister, Aleta; my brother, Mark; my mother and stepfather, Gertrud and Willi Menges; and my father-in-law, Stanley Steele, for their unique ability to live in the moment. I (Bauer) wish to express loving gratitude to my wife, Tricia, for her per­ petual support, ideas, and patience over the course of organizing the confer­ ence and the book. I also thank my children, Jackson and Grace, for their love, patience, and self-transcendent inspiration. Finally, I extend deep thanks to my parents, Carolyn and John Bauer, and my uncle, Bud Kramer, for their support, guidance, and conversations on precisely the topics of this book since before I can remember. Finally, we both consider ourselves fortunate to have had the opportunity to work together on this project and to have had such wonderful mentors, including Shelley Taylor, Roxane Silver, and Margaret Kemeny (Wayment) and Dan McAdams, George Bonanno, and Jim Youniss (Bauer). We hope that researchers, practitioners, and graduate students enjoy the work represented in each chapter. Taken together, these chapters represent a great deal of em­ pirical research and offer insight into the importance of transcending egoistic self-interest, methods for studying these processes, and the implications of doing so.

Transcending Self-Interest

Introduction Heidi A. Wayment and Jack J. Bauer Thousands of psychological studies have identified egotism as an important influence on human behavior. This volume seeks to address the question, What can research psychologists gain, both in explaining human behavior and in advancing psychological science, by examining the perspective that our thoughts, feelings, and actions are also influenced by a need to transcend egotism? The chapters in this volume, which represent current research from a variety of disciplines within the field of psychology, including clinical, devel­ opmental, industrial/organizational, personality, and social psychology, ad­ dress this question. These chapters not only reflect a variety of methods and research orientations but also represent many established and new theoreti­ cal perspectives and constructs that are crucial in understanding the impor­ tance of transcending egotism.

Overview of Parts

Our challenge was to organize the chapters in a way that captured some of the main themes that arise when considering a quiet ego. For example, to un­ derstand the concept of a quiet ego, we need to first consider the "noisy" ego and its advantages and disadvantages. Thus, Part I of this volume is entitled "Putting the Ego Into Perspective." The chapters in Part II, "The Importance of Awareness in Quieting the Ego," highlight some of the intrapsychic mecha­ nisms that can explain or describe how individuals are able to quiet their otherwise-egoistic tendencies. Parts III and IV include chapters that help us ultimately understand how the quiet ego emerges from our social and developmental contexts. Over the course of the past few years, we have seen that there is a tendency to jux­ tapose the concepts of egotism and self-interest with being other-focused and considering others' needs. One of the important assumptions that cuts across all of the chapters is that a quieted ego does not imply a negation of self in favor of the care and concern for others (see also chap. 1) . However, we did want to address the ability of our social and human connections to motivate and inform a quieted ego. Accordingly, Part III of the volume is entitled "The Importance of Others in Quieting the Ego." Finally, the chapters in Part IV,

3

4

WAYMENT AND BAUER

"Developmental Perspectives on Quieting the Ego," address important ques­ tions about developmental influences on the creation and maintenance of both noisy and quiet egos. Next, we briefly describe the chapters in this vol­ ume part by part as well as how they fit into two primary perspectives on the nature of ego quieting. To facilitate a common thread among the chapters, we asked authors to respond to two of the following three questions: 1 . How d o you conceptualize and measure aspects o f the quiet ego? 2. What does your work say about the importance and benefits of a quiet ego? 3. What about the importance and benefits of a not-so-quiet ego? In the end, we believe we have a collection of chapters that provides the reader with a rich overview of the current interest among research psycholo­ gists about the quieted ego, many well-articulated avenues for future re­ search, and a blueprint for incorporating the ideas of a less defended self into the mainstream of psychological inquiry and application.

Overview of Chapters

This volume begins with our (Bauer & Wayment, chap. 1) overview of the

quiet ego, its historical and theoretical underpinnings, and a consideration of why this term may serve as a useful concept to consider a variety of psy­ chological processes today. Beginning with chapter 2, Part I contains five chapters that highlight some of the advantages and disadvantages of exces­ sive self-focus and self-interest as related to psychological well-being and adjustment. W. Keith Campbell and Laura E. Buffardi explain in chapter 2 the allure of the noisy ego and, more specifically, how narcissism affords short-term benefits but long-term costs. Spee Kosloff, Mark J. Landau, Daniel Sullivan, and Jeff Greenberg detail in chapter 3 how the ideas of quiet and noisy egos fit within the context of terror management theory and argue that an authentic existence involves oscillating between both as appropriate; they also suggest factors that may help achieve that balance. In chapter 4, Vir­ ginia S. Y. Kwan, Lu Lu Kuang, and Belinda X. Zhao explain and deconstruct the concept and measurement of self-enhancement, outlining ways in which moderation and situational discretion in the use of self-enhancement are key to understanding adjustment. The last two chapters in Part I not only ex­ pand on the benefits and drawbacks of egotism but also go a step further and propose psychological constructs that may lead to a quieter ego. In chapter 5, Julie Juola Exline contrasts what she calls the "wild" (noisy) ego with the "humble" (quiet) ego and describes the difficulties and challenges in studying humility as a potentially important factor in a quiet ego. In chapter 6, Jenni­ fer Crocker closes Part I with her argument that there is a dual motivational system that encompasses not only the motivation behind noisy ego behaviors (i.e., egosystem goals) but also the motivation behind supportive and compas-

INTRODUCTION

5

sionate behaviors (i.e ., ecosystem goals). All the chapters in Part I describe both the noisy and the quiet egos, their unique and important contributions to behavior, and the importance of balance for optimal human functioning. Part II contains five chapters that focus on the intrapsychic skills and abilities to reduce egoistic motivation and behaviors, most notably the abil­ ity to be an impartial observer of the self, as one integrates awareness with a secure sense of self and purpose. Part II leads off with chapter 7, by Kirk Warren Brown, Richard M. Ryan, J . David Creswell, and Christopher P. Niemiec, who pursue the premise that identification with the self can lead to its overprotection and that mindfulness, or the ability to be a witness to the self and all of its processes, is a step to reducing defensiveness. Michael H . Kernis and Whitney L . Heppner argue i n chapter 8 that individuals with a "strong sense of self' are more likely to reflect quiet-ego tendencies, and they explain the authentic self in the context of mindfulness and self-esteem. In chapter 9, Kristin D. Neff describes the concept of self-compassion, or feel­ ings of care and nonjudgmental understanding of the self, and how it stands in contrast to self-esteem or our cultural valuation of the separate self. Next, Christopher P. Niemiec, Richard M . Ryan, and Kirk Warren Brown show in chapter 10 how the autonomous self-regulation of self-determination theory facilitates intra- and interpersonal harmony, whereas introjecting but not integrating others' values into one's self-identity makes for a noisier ego. Fi­ nally, in chapter 11, Holley S . Hodgins describes in more detail how the self­ determination theory construct of autonomy provides a motivational basis for understanding people's ability to take in information in a less biased and defensive way. Part III contains six chapters that are devoted to the role that others may play in quieting the ego, from the extent to which others are incorporated into the self-concept, to the identification with individuals and groups, to the ex­ plicit considerations of others . The first three chapters are primarily focused on the extent to which others are included in the self-concept . In chapter 12, Lowell Gaertner, Constantine Sedikides, Michelle Luke, and Jonathan Iuzz­ ini explore the motivational hierarchy of the individualistic, relational, and collective selves and which of these might be most conducive in quieting the ego. Next, in chapter 13, Mark R. Leary, Jessica M. Tipsord, and Eleanor B. Tate consider the impact of incorporating the larger social and physical world into the self-concept and describe a new construct they call "allo-inclusive identity" and its benefits . In chapter 14, Derrick Wirtz and Chi-yue Chiu review theoretical conceptualizations of the self from Western and Eastern traditions to explore how incorporating others into the self-concept, as well as negative emotions, can lead to a more subdued ego. The next two chapters focus on possible implications of identifying with others on the ego and focus to some extent on the negative emotions such identification can produce. Heidi A. Wayment and Erin M. O'Mara argue in chapter 15 that although the literature on downward social comparisons has found that comparing oneself with less fortunate others is self-enhancing, the processes of feeling similar to those others may open the door for collective and compassionate outcomes that can help quiet the ego. In chapter 16, Michael J. A. Wohl and

6

WAYMENT AND BAUER

Nyla R. Branscombe focus on the dilemma for individuals whose collective identifications are threatened and suggest ways to reduce the threat to the collective ego. Finally, M. Audrey Korsgaard and Bruce M. Meglino, drawing primarily from the literature in industrial/organizational psychology, describe in chapter 17 the motive of other-interest that is gaining favor in explaining work-related behaviors and examine the motives and underlying judgment processes associated with self- and other-interest. Part IV contains four chapters that emphasize the role of personality development in quieting the ego. In particular, these chapters focus on the narrative construction of self-identity, where the individual's subjective inter­ pretations of self and others are compared with broader measures of psycho­ social development (thereby merging qualitative and quantitative data). In chapter 18, Jack J. Bauer presents the case that the ego quiets as it grows, portraying the developmentally quieter ego as one that interprets the self and others in increasingly more integrative terms, in addition to more emotion­ based forms of growth. Ed de St.Aubin and Kim Skerven outline in chapter 19 how, among self-identified lesbians, a narrative self-identity that transcends instead of internalizes the social stigmas toward sexual orientation facilitates psychosocial maturity, well-being, and a range of ego-quieting characteris­ tics. In chapter 20, Monika Ardelt gives a developmental account of wisdom wherein movement toward higher levels of wisdom and self-actualization cor­ respond to increasing degrees of selflessness-all illustrated with narratives of people who scored high on her quantitative measure of wisdom. In chapter 21, Dan P. McAdams paints a rich portrait of how an American prototype of life stories-the "redemptive self'-features the hardships and benefits of quiet­ ing the ego over the life course. Here the individual (especially in midlife) harnesses a range of quiet-ego qualities in constructing a life story that trans­

forms difficulties into opportunities for generativity.

1

The Psychology of the Quiet Ego Jack J. Bauer and Heidi A. Wayment Egotism is in. For the past few decades, it has been okay to "look out for Number 1," with the assumption that "Number 1" refers to an individualistic notion of the person-and then mostly in the immediate moment, without re­ gard for the individual's own long-term interests. Advertising and marketing campaigns feed our cultural obsession with egoistic pursuits, and political and economic forces help make many self-indulgent behaviors and expectations a perceived necessity. The burgeoning business of self-help books in pop psychol­ ogy has contributed to the cultural endorsement of excessive self-interest, sell­ ing advice on how to be, or to get, anything one wants. What is wrong with that? To start, excessive self-interest is not entirely in the interest of the self: As the chapters in this book demonstrate, the prob­ lems of egotism include not only social disharmony but also diminished per­ sonal well-being, health, productivity, and self-esteem. Public messages from academic psychology and the social sciences have taken fierce stands against unchecked egotism (e.g., Lasch, 1979/1991; Twenge, 2006), have surveyed the conflicts in American life between self-interest and collective concern (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, SwidIer, & Tipton, 1985; Putnam, 2000), and have pointed down paths of lessened ego investment (e.g., Leary, 2004; Schwartz, 2005). In addition, the academic and popular interest in positive psychology dem­ onstrates a widespread concern for the problems of egotism and the ways of transcending it. Finally, the self-help industry is not entirely about selfish gain: Books on the humanistic, prosocial forms of personal growth have always made bestseller lists and are still on the rise in that respect (Korda, 2001). Thus, it is no cultural coincidence that psychological research has recently emerged to examine the transcendence of self-interest. We use the terms the quiet ego and quieting the ego to connote the individual who routinely transcends egotism as well as the need to turn down a few notches the booming volume of egotism, on both individual and cultural levels . The blossoming of research on transcending self-interest has grown in scattered patches across the vast field of psychology. With this book we hope to provide a unifying source and framework for understanding and advancing this research. In this chapter, we introduce this research as a new area of scien­ tific inquiry, provide a framework for understanding the empirical research on the quiet ego, sketch psychology's historical interests in quieting the ego, and finally, point to current research and future directions that we find especially

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exciting. By way of preview, researchers tend to take one of two approaches to conceptualizing the quiet ego: (a) as a balance between the interests of the self and others or (b) as the development of self-awareness, interdependent iden­ tity, and compassionate experience. The Quiet Ego as a Topic of Empirical Inquiry

This chapter and book are an attempt to give a name to the theoretically dispa­ rate research programs that aim toward understanding how people transcend egotism. Rooted in the earliest underpinnings of psychology and philosophy, academic interest in quieting the ego is not new. Most recently, the positive psychology movement has cleared a path for empirical research on quieting the ego. Many of positive psychology's interests deal with quieting the ego, notably forgiveness, gratitude, mutual love, courage, responsibility, altruism, and tolerance (e.g., Snyder & Lopez, 2001).As we discuss later in this chapter, the range of topics dealing with quieting the ego is vast. However, underlying all this research is a central focus on how the individual interprets the self and others-in particular, how the individual might arrive at a less defensive, more integrative stance toward the self and others. In our struggle to find a unifying language for this area of research, we sought a term that conveyed the concerns of scientific psychology as well as the culture at large. To us, the term quiet ego conveys the notion that the core problems of egotism deal with the individual's screaming for attention to the self. Far from meaning a "squashed" or "lost" ego, we see in the quiet ego a self-identity that is not excessively self-focused but also not excessively other-focused-an identity that incorporates others without losing the self. In addition, the phrase quieting the ego conveys the sense of process we were seeking. Meanings of Ego and

Quiet Ego

In thinking about the contents of this book on quiet-ego topics, we learned that there were several interpretations of what a quiet ego might be. Some inter­ preted a quiet ego as a fragile, squashed, or unwillingly silenced ego. Others thought of the "strong, quiet type"-a person who has a self-confidence born of self-understanding and feels no need to talk in depth about things. This lat­ ter interpretation is a little closer to the meaning of quiet ego in this volume, although the physical strength and loquaciousness of the individual are not of particular concern. To us, the relatively quieter ego listens to others as part of a psychosocial harmony, whereas the noisier ego tunes others out as one would tune out back­ ground noise. The quieter ego is attuned to internal rhythms of people's (in­ cluding the self's) psychological dynamics, whereas the noisier ego is attuned more to the clamoring boom of people's external appearances. The quieter ego, compared with the noisier ego, has more balance and integration of the self and others in one's concept of the self, a balanced recognition of one's strengths and weaknesses that paves the way for personal growth, and a greater compassion for the self and others. The quieter ego is less under the spell or the "curse"

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9

of the self's (Leary, 2004) responsibilities and social images. The quieter ego realizes that the self is ultimately a construction or story that not only creates a sense of unity and purpose in life (McAdams, 1985) but also casts illusions, some constructive and some destructive. The noisier ego spends much of its energy identifying and defending the construction of self as if it were not a construction, and then asserting itself into the world. However, quiet is not cat­ egorically beneficial; there are risks and benefits associated with both quieter and noisier egos. Many of the chapters in this volume describe these trade-offs in great detaiL Turning to a more technical definition, research on quieting the ego has roots in a range of theoretical and methodological approaches, which in turn are rooted in varying definitions of ego. These definitions can be grouped into five (nonexhaustive) sets: Ego = the self, notably affective evaluations o f the self, such as self­ esteem, self-confidence, self-worth, and self-image (as connoted by a strong, wounded, boosted, or deflated ego). 2 . Ego = the self, notably i n relation to others, a s in identifying with oth­ ers, bonding with others, and identities that include versus exclude others. 3. Ego = that which constructs, organizes, or evaluates the concept of self; that which is aware of or witnesses experience; James's (1890/1950) "I" (in contrast to "Me"); consciousness itself; one's frame of reference, or, in psychoanalytic theory, the "synthetic function." 4. Ego = the arbiter, defender, or transformer of internal impulses (e.g., of biology and society in psychoanalytic theory). 5. Ego = an ego that too readily capitulates to the id, resulting in self­ seeking motivation, egotism, and conceit (as connoted by a big ego). 1.

Of these five approaches to the definition of ego, researchers in scientific psychology tend to adopt one of the first three. Definitions 1 and 2 equate the ego with the self. Here, the characterization of ego typically emphasizes an af­ fective dimension (as with self-esteem and Definition 1) and/or a psychosocial dimension (as with relational self-concepts and Definition 2). Whereas Defini­ tions 1 and 2 are more common and straightforward, Definition 3 distinguishes the ego from the self and perhaps requires more explanation. Definition 3 views the self as a construction of the ego. Here, the ego is viewed more as a verb (i.e., a process) than a noun (i.e., a product). The ego (Le., James's "I") is that which interprets objects and "brands" (James, 1890/1950) them as part of the self (Le., the "Me") or not. These perceived objects of identification are what constitute one's concept of self. Research Approaches to Ego Volume: Quiet Enough or Ever Quieter?

Research on the quiet ego that adopts the first three approaches to the defini­ tion of ego (i.e., Definitions 1-3) involves a primary focus on the individual's interpretations of self and others.However, in line with the varying approaches

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to defining the ego, researchers differ in the degree to which they characterize ego-quieting as a good thing. These differences can be described in terms of a primary emphasis on either balance or growth.

Balance: Seeking a Quiet-Enough Ego Research that adopts either of the first two definitions of ego tends to view some ego-quieting as desirable but too much ego-quieting as undesirable . From this perspective, if an ego gets extremely quiet, it can lose its identity or be squashed. Thus, the notion of balance is key in this research (and is seen mostly in theoretical perspectives and operational definitions). Two kinds of balance emerge . First, in line with Definition 1, is a positive-negative balance in one's self-evaluations . This research tends to show that one problem with a noisy ego is a relative inability to perceive and think about the negative qualities in one's life, particularly in U.S. culture (see chap. 14, this volume). Of course, too much thinking about those negatives (i.e., too much ego-quieting) results in a squashed ego, and research points to an optimal balance of positive and negative self-evaluation (Bauer & Bonanno, 2001). Second, in line with Definition 2, is a self-other balance in one's psychosocial concerns. Too much concern for the self leans toward egotism and narcissism (see chap. 2, this vol­ ume), but too much concern for others leans toward unmitigated communion, a condition in which one's own ego or identity is lost (Helgeson & Fritz, 1999). These two forms of quiet-ego balance are in practice related, if only because the tendency to focus on the self to the exclusion of others typically involves an unrelenting push to view the self as positive . In the balance approach to a quieter ego, optimal human functioning involves an ego that is quiet enough to hear others and to balance one's concerns with those of the self (the chapters in Parts I and III of this volume tend to take this approach).

Growth: Seeking an Ever-Quieter Ego Research that adopts Definition 3 tends to view ego-quieting as desirable, period. From this perspective, an ego can get quieter and quieter without be­ coming lost or squashed. This approach generally contends that "the ego quiets as it grows" (see chap. 18, this volume). The ego's frame of reference for view­ ing the self widens in psychosocial space, such that the view of self is not lost but instead becomes increasingly more integrative. From the balance/quiet­ enough perspective, a growing ego tends to connote a big or inflated ego. From the growth perspective, a growing ego becomes increasingly aware of the self (cognitively), less defensive (emotionally), increasingly interdependent in its construal of self and others (cognitively), and increasingly more compassionate toward others and the self (emotionally).! As the ego grows, the self neither lAbalance between the self and others is implicit here (note that the first two qualities of a growing ego just listed are agentic concerns, whereas the next two are communal concerns). In fact, balance itself is part of what grows (i.e., self and others become increasingly more optimally balanced) as part of the developing, quieting ego.

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11

takes up all of one's psychosocial space nor gets entirely crowded out by con­ sidering others. Instead, the ego 's very interpretations of self are progressively transformed in a sequence that proceeds roughly from selfish (preconventional) to group focused (conventional) to interdependent (postconventional). The in­ terdependent self2 is not a lost self; in contrast, it is stronger, more resilient, and more self-assured than ever. In the growth approach to a quieter ego, opti­ mal human functioning involves an ego that becomes ever quieter as it gradu­ ally identifies with an increasingly wider and deeper psychosocial world (the chapters in Parts II and N of this volume tend to take this approach).

A Shared Resonance The balance and growth approaches are not entirely at odds; in fact, we per­ ceive more similarities than differences at a broader level . To start, the two views share a common interest in transcending egotism . Although the two groups advocate turning ego volume down either just enough or all the way, these images have more to do with definitions of ego and ego volume than with the resulting qualities of a quieter ego. Both groups present empirical research to support the psychosocial benefits of nondefensive awareness, in­ terdependence, complexity of perspective taking, and compassion toward self and others. In the end, both approaches can well incorporate both balance and growth, even if the empirical measures or theoretical orientations at hand are primarily rooted in one approach or the other.

Position on Self-Interest Egoistic self-interest seems not only to bring some short-term gain but also to cause long-term pain, for others as well as for the self (see chaps. 2-4, this volume). In addition, self-interest itself is an essential component of psy­ chological health and social interaction (a personal sense of competence and self-understanding are critical to most widely accepted models of psychosocial development, e .g., Erikson, 1950; for a discussion of the problems of unmiti­ gated communion, see Helgeson & Fritz, 1999). The balance approach calls for a balance of interests in the self and others. Similarly, the growth approach calls for an ego that transforms self-interest from being individualistic to in­ creasingly interdependent. The problem with excessive self-interest is a matter of either self-other imbalance or lack of psychosocial growth. Having distinguished these approaches to the study of quieting the ego, we now turn to the qualities of a quieter ego itself that are common to both camps. 2Here the term interdependence has a different meaning than in research on individualism versus collectivism (in which collectivist interdependence can also function as unmitigated communion; see chap. 14, this volume). In the present context, interdependence refers to a level of maturity at which one understands both one's psychosocial independence (something that itself takes some maturity) and one's inextricable connectedness with others and culture. This kind of interdepen­ dence generally does not develop before young adulthood, if at all (Labouvie-Vief, 2006; Loevinger, 1976).

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Prototypical Qualities of a Quieter Ego

It is probably impossible to map out the entire field of quiet-ego research. In attempting to generate a list of quiet-ego phenomena, we stopped at approxi­ mately 100 topics. Just about any topic in psychology can have some relation to the problems or transcendence of egotism . This book showcases a range of the research that has examined quiet-ego topics; however, it only begins to scratch the surface . For example, in addition to the specific areas addressed by the chapters in this book, there are potential physiological, neurological, immunological, and biological influences related to ego defenses; specific self­ related emotions, such as depression and anxiety; and ego-quieting behaviors. Some (and only some) important quiet-ego topics not showcased in this volume include emotional intelligence (e.g., Salovey & Grewal, 2005), gratitude (e.g., Emmons & McCullough, 2004), forgiveness (e.g., Rye, 2005), outgroup toler­ ance (e.g., Brewer & Pierce, 2005), consumerism (Kasser & Kanner, 2004), community service (Metz & Youniss, 2005), the psychobiological limitations to a quiet ego (e.g., Kemeny, 2003), and the psychobiological benefits of medita­ tion (e.g., Davidson et aI., 2003). Despite the vast range of quiet-ego topics, we posit four prototypical quali­ ties of a quieter ego: (a) detached awareness, (b) interdependence, (c) compas­ sion, and (d) growth. Our aim in positing these four qualities is not to stake a claim of truth about the quieter ego but instead to stimulate an empirically informed dialogue about the basic components of the quieter ego. First, detached awareness deals with a nondefensive sort of attention: mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003; Langer, 1989), that is, being aware of the positives and negatives of a situation or of the self or others and being focused on the present (or even the past or the future, as appropriate to the situation).

Here detached awareness refers to a subjective interpretation of the present situation in which that interpretation is not predicated on how that situation makes one feel about oneself; that is, the person's awareness is detached from egoistic appraisals of the situation (as we discuss in the next paragraph, de­ tached does not refer to a lack of interpersonal communion). Detached aware­ ness depends on a certain degree of openness and willingness to accept what one might discover about the self or others (among other things), but neither of those two alone guarantees detached awareness. Among its many benefits is that detached awareness allows for a less defensive interpretation of the self and others in the present moment . Second, interdependence deals with a largely conceptual interpretation of the individual's mutual relations with others (from dyads to groups and be­ yond), that is, a balanced or developmentally more integrated interpretation of the self and others. Central to interdependence is the capacity to understand other people's perspectives in a way that allows one to identify with those other people . This interdependence is not mere conformity or agreeableness; it in­ volves the ability to see past differences to more underlying, unifying aspects of other individuals' humanity. This interdependence, as well as compassion, may seem to be at odds with detached awareness. However, detached awareness is precisely what facilitates those two, especially in times of conflict . For instance,

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE QUIET EGO

13

when intimate partners are in an argument, the capacity to mentally detach from one's own views, ideals, and expectations is precisely what clears a path toward understanding the perspectives of both self and other (Gottman, Coan, Carrere, & Swanson, 1998). Third, compassion deals with a largely emotional stance toward the self and/or others that involves acceptance, empathy, and a desire to foster the well-being of the person or group. We view interdependence and compassion as closely related because they are the relatively more conceptual and more emotional facets of psychosocial identification. Either one can trigger the other. For example, the conceptual understanding of one's interdependence with others may lead to compassion, and one's feelings of compassion may lead to a conceptual interpretation or insight that the self and others are interdependent. Fourth, growth deals with a humanistic or prosocial kind of development over time, where one either is concerned with or actually establishes height­ ened levels of quiet-ego qualities, such as awareness, interdependence, and compassion. Even the mere subjective concern for growth can quiet the ego. Like nondefensive awareness, growth-oriented thinking clears a space for un­ derstanding multiple perspectives. Part of the problem of egoistic self-interest is a limited scope of time by which one interprets the situation; egotism chan­ nels the mind toward the immediate moment (see chap. 2). In contrast, a concern for growth forces the individual to question the long-term effects of current actions. Furthermore, growth interpretations view the present situa­ tion (notably, conflicts) as part of an ongoing process instead of as a permanent end (which, if one is under threat, can be easily exacerbated into a threat to one's self and existence; see chap. 3). These four qualities of a quiet ego are closely related, and yet each has been studied relatively independently. Each one can be viewed as a state, a trait, a skill to cultivate intentionally, and a trigger for the emergence of the others. Furthermore, these four quiet-ego qualities, either individually or collectively, can be found at the root of most quiet-ego characteristics . For example, gratitude involves an awareness of one's lack of provision and some sense of interdependence . Humility involves self-awareness tempered by self­ compassion. Wisdom has been defined as any one of the four or as a combina­ tion of any of the four. Finally, a quieter ego is not defined by behavior, any more than the ego (or the selD itself is a behavior. The relative quietness or noisiness of the ego is a matter of how the individual interprets the self and others-with detached awareness in a balanced, integrated, compassionate, or growth-oriented manner.

Psychology's History of Concern With Quieting the Ego

Interest in quieting the ego has an enduring, distinguished history in psychol­ ogy. Indeed, it may well be historically one of the field's central theoretical concerns, although an actual body of research on these concerns has emerged only recently. In the historical sketch that follows, we highlight some of the key

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elements of ego-quieting that are found in research today but that were empha­ sized by the great figures and movements in psychology's history. Perhaps the most famous use of the term ego is the Latin translation of Freud's das Ich. Here, the ego, among other things, is trapped between the selfish (i.e., other-less) desires of the id and the equally strong desires of the superego. Freud's intrapsychological model of the ego resonated with a theme long found throughout the arts and humanities-that the individual is torn between the pull of biology and society, or between agency and communion (Bakan, 1966). To resolve these conflicts in the immediate moment, the ego uses a range of defenses, the more immature of which cause problems not only for others but also, eventually, for the self. Freud proposed a path to help resolve inner conflict that deals with a central element of quiet-ego research today: awareness of one's ego defenses. Jung ( 1951/1978) elaborated on this process, identifying layers of unconscious ego defenses that are encountered and defused along the path of individuation. Psychoanalytic theories eventu­ ally came to emphasize the social nature of the individual (e.g., Erikson, 1950; Horney, 195011991; Sullivan, 195311992), advocating another key element of quiet-ego studies, namely, balance of self and others in one's sense of self. Although the strictly psychoanalytic views of ego and self are largely different than those of contemporary research on ego-quieting, the basic ideas of aware­ ness and balance as necessary for healthy functioning took hold in the field. To awareness and balance the humanistic psychologists (e.g ., Maslow, 1968; Rogers, 1961) added at least two key ingredients of a quiet ego: (a) growth and (b) compassion. Regarding growth, the humanistic movement shifted the emphasis of therapy away from unearthing egotism to transcending it . In other words, personally working on the kinds of things that foster growth-such as openness, humility, self-awareness, acceptance of self and others, genuineness,

and self-improvement-would pave a more promising path toward optimal hu­ man functioning than would regurgitating one's troubles. William James ( 1890/1950, 1902/1990) stands out among many great fig­ ures in psychology's history for having paved a path toward empirical research on quieting the ego. His famous chapters on the stream of consciousness and the self, as well as his Varieties ofReligious Experience ( 1902/1990), all suggest the immense pull toward egotism, the difficulties of transcending it yet the hu­ man need to transcend it, and some paths toward that aim. James's division of the self into the I and the Me-plus his descriptions of the "empirical" self 's constituents, self-esteem, and other processes of self-identity-have all shaped current research on the self and on quieting the ego in particular. His exami­ nation of mystical states of consciousness, in which workaday perceptions of the self are expanded to the point of perceived unity with all people and the universe, pointed to the role of an expanded self-identity in quieting the ego. In a philosophical sense, James's plea for psychology to adopt a position of radical empiricism, in which anything perceived could be studied scientifically, opened researchers' minds to the possibility of empirically studying the effects of the ego, even if doing so would be difficult (on this point, we see how far psychology has come in merely 100 years) . From his philosophical approach to scientific psychology to the actual phenomena he considered, James made clear that quieting the ego should be of central concern to the field of psychology.

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15

Two closely related fields-personality psychology and social psychol­ ogy-are each influenced by James's (1890/1950) portrayal of the self and are at the heart of much contemporary, empirical research on quieting the ego. Both fields have historically framed the self in terms of others (Allport, 1937; Erikson, 1950; Mead, 1934/1967). Social psychologists have found creative, shocking, and often humorous ways of demonstrating just how selfish people are. Experiments in social psychology over the past 70 years have shown that given the slightest incentive or threat individuals are quick to exhibit blind obedience, ruthless conformity, fierce ingroup dedication and outgroup exclu­ sion and discrimination, self-protection, self-serving biases, blaming of others, and to otherwise place other people at a disadvantage (e.g., Milgram, 1953; Sherif, 1958) . However, these types of findings were not counterbalanced with research on the ways in which people could reduce their excessive self-interest. Current research in social psychology is increasingly showing how people do just that (some excellent examples of which appear in this book). The field of personality psychology approaches the quiet ego as a property of the individual person rather than the situation. Adler (1927/1998) argued that the self is a fiction that people create. Kelly's (1955) theory of personal constructs advanced that idea, emphasizing the constructed and malleable nature of the self. In these constructivist approaches, the relatively quieter ego is more aware of the fact that the self is a set of constructs; the noisier ego is less aware of this fact, and this diminished awareness limits the capacity to grasp others' points of view (e.g., Loevinger, 1976). In his dynamic study of the whole person, Murray (1938) outlined, among other things, a set of needs that function and compete to varying degrees within the individual, many of which can, on balance or in combination, form relatively noisier and quieter egos (e.g., needs for dominance, aggression, exhibition, affiliation, and understanding). Erikson's (1950) psychosocial theory of personality development demonstrated how the ego develops in proportion to its capacity to identify with an increas­ ingly broader spectrum of people and psychosocial concerns. Murray's and Erikson's work helped pave the way for narrative research (e.g., McAdams, 1985), in which the subjective interpretations of self and other-which are at the heart of the ego's quietness or noisiness-can be studied empirically. Another important tradition in personality psychology, especially in the past 25 years, is the study of broad personality traits. Allport (1937) identified a vast array of traits that helped later researchers to distill the famous Big Five traits, one of which,Openness to Experience, is central to quieting the ego (as seen in numerous chapters in this book) . Developmental psychology has also contributed a great deal of theory and research on quieting the ego. In most theories of cognitive and social-cognitive development, development is defined loosely as an increasing capacity to dif­ ferentiate and integrate conceptual perspectives (e.g., see Piaget, 1970). This increasing integration of perspectives involves a corresponding, normative de­ cline in egocentrism throughout childhood and adolescence (and may continue in adulthood; Labouvie-Vief, 2006). Vygotsky (19 78) argued that nothing facili­ tates this kind of development like interactions with other people and actively incorporating their views into one's own, which are key elements of a quieter ego as presented in this book. Many of the famous theories of psychosocial

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personality development chart precisely these capacities as they progress over time (e.g., Erikson, 1950; Kohlberg, 1969; Loevinger, 1976). Finally, underlying all this work (notably, Piaget, 1970) is the breadth and depth of human develop­ ment outlined by James Mark Baldwin, who charted human development as an increasing ability to integrate, among other things, perspectives on the self and others (Broughton, 1981).

The Future of Quiet-Ego Studies

In the past, empirical investigations in psychology have emphasized the variet­ ies of human egotism, whereas most research on quieting the ego takes a more constructive approach, emphasizing the varied paths toward transcending egotism. The frontiers of studying the quiet ego scientifically seem to point down at least a few paths. One involves adopting new perspectives on previously existing concepts and theories in psychology. Examples from this book include the study of narcissism as a social trap (chap. 2), the trade-offs of noisy and quiet egos in terror management theory (chap. 3), the undesirable effects of self-enhancement bias (chap. 4), mindfulness in the processes of self-identity versus mindlessness (chap. 7; see also Langer, 1989), whether identifying with persons or groups better facilitates a quieter ego (chap. 12), the different paths toward a quiet ego in the individualist West and collectivist East (chap.14), the viewing of downward social comparison as a vehicle for compassion instead of merely self-aggrandizement (chap. 15; see also Wayment, 2004), the question­ able assumptions of rationality and self-interest in the organizational sciences (chap. 1 7), and wisdom defined in terms of increasing capacities for meaning

making and selflessness (chap. 20). Another path involves the explicit identification of previously existing research as "quiet-ego" topics. For example, research on self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 2000) often focuses on transcending selfish impulses by appealing to a more autonomous orientation toward self and others-where autonomous means not simply "independent" but instead the consideration of the authenticity or intrinsic humanity of both the self and others in everyday life (see chaps. 8, 10, and 11, this volume).This research involves a part of posi­ tive psychology that deals specifically with quieting the ego. Yet another path to the future of quiet-ego studies involves the creation of new phenomena for empirical study. Examples in this book include egosystem versus ecosystem goals (chap. 6), humility (chap. 5), self-compassion (chap . 9), allo-inclusive identity (chap. 13), collective angst (chap. 16), growth stories and growth goals (chap. 18), transcending versus occluding undesirable stereotypes (chap. 19), and the redemptive self (chap. 2 1). In other words, a great deal of research currently going on in psychology is already dealing with quiet-ego issues. One of the aims of this book is to make this fact known to the field. Looking to the horizon of human potential, one likely source of ideas is humanistic psychology. We tend to view humanistic psychology as focused on some of humanity's deepest and greatest potentials, many of which are just beyond reach of empirical study, but others of which

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17

may well be ready for prime time in research.3 Theorists in and around hu­ manistic psychology, and transpersonal psychology in particular, have been mapping the more subtle qualities and farther reaches of human growth and ego-quieting (Walsh & Vaughan, 1993). For example, Wilber (2000), along with his proponents and opponents, are generating exciting models of the individu­ al's transformation of consciousness. Much of this work extends scientifically established theory and can be (and to some degree has been) translated into new, empirically measurable constructs. Another area of promise is cross-cultural studies. Some studies have shown that quiet-ego characteristics function similarly across cultures (e.g., intrinsically motivated goals; Sheldon et aI., 2004), whereas other studies sug­ gest that different cultures take different paths to a quiet ego (see chap. 14, this volume). If one looks to the earliest philosophical traditions in the East and West, one sees that cultural concerns for quieting the ego seem to have a universal appeal. Research in this area can help clarify the properties of the quiet ego while also helping to refine current concepts of cultural differences such as individualism and collectivism. Similarly, we have discovered that Buddhist philosophy and practices are common among many of the researchers interested in this topic . This is not to say that Buddhism is by any means the only path to a quieter ego, but we were pleasantly surprised by how many conversations at the Quiet Ego Conference (see Preface, this volume) involved explicit references to Buddhist notions of compassion, mindfulness, and meditation. Thus it seems that religious ideas­ notably the more transcendent, less ethnocentric ones-will be likely sources for future research on quieting the ego, which is, after all, a central concern of re­ ligions. Buddhism, as a psychologically minded system of thought, has already been such a source (e.g., see discussions of mindfulness-Brown & Ryan, 2003; emotions that help vs. hinder well-being-Ekman, Davidson, Ricard, & Wal­ lace, 2005; and self-compassion-Neff, 2003). Christianity has already played a considerable role (see, e.g ., discussions of gratitude-Emmons & McCullough, 2004; humility-Exline & Geyer, 2004; and forgiveness-Rye, 2005) . In the end, we think that research on quieting the ego will continue to spread through the application of rigorous, empirical methods to models of transcending egotism that at one time seemed to be the exclusive domain of the humanities. We believe that the field of psychology is well poised to help society better understand the costs of excessive self-interest and the benefits of transcending it. This book happens to showcase empirical, psychological research on quiet­ ing the ego. However, human interest in quieting the ego is much broader, ex­ tending past the sciences and humanities to the arts, politics, business, media, education, religion, and beyond. People interested in quieting the ego from across these areas are contributing in their own ways toward a collective un­ derstanding of the problems and transcendence of egotism. We hope this book serves as a first step toward a more unified effort on behalf of psychology to lay an empirical foundation for society's understanding of these issues. 3This is not to suggest that no empirical research goes on within humanistic psychology, only that humanistic psychology's existence outside the mainstream of research in fields such as personality, social, and developmental psychology is well known and unfortunately ignored or disparaged.

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References Adler, A. ( 1998). Understanding human nature. Center City, MN: Hazelden. (Original work pub­ lished 1927) Allport, G. w. ( 1937). Personality: A psychological interpretation. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Bakan, D. ( 1966). The duality ofhuman existence: Isolation and communion in Western man. Bos­ ton: Beacon Press. Bauer, J. J., & Bonanno, G. A. (2001). Doing and being well (for the most part): Adaptive patterns of narrative self-evaluation during bereavement. Journal of Personality, 69 , 451-482. Bellah, R. N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W. M., Swidler, A., & Tipton, S. M. ( 1985). Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. New York: Perennial. Brewer, M. B., & Pierce, K. P. (2005). Social identity complexity and outgroup tolerance. Personal­ ity and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 428-437. Broughton, J. M. ( 1981). The genetic psychology of James Mark Baldwin. American Psychologist, 36, 396-407. Brown, K. w., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role in psychological well-being. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 84, 822-848. Davidson, R. J., Kabat-Zinn, J., Schumacher, J., Rosenbranz, M., Muller, D., Santorelli, S. F. , et al. (2003). Alterations in brain and immune function produced by mindfulness meditation. Psychosomatic Medicine, 65, 564--5 70. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227-268. Ekman, P., Davidson, R. J., Ricard, M., & Wallace, B. A. (2005). Buddhist and psychological per­ spectives on emotions and well-being. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 59-63. Emmons, R. A., & McCullough, M. E. (2004). The psychology ofgratitude. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Erikson, E. H. ( 1950). Childhood and society. New York: Norton. Exline, J. J., & Geyer, A. L. (2004). Perceptions of humility: A preliminary study. Selfand Identity, 3, 95-114. Gottman, J. M., Coan, J., Carrere, S., & Swanson, C. ( 1998). Predicting marital happiness and stability from newlywed interactions. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 60, 5-22. Helgeson, V. S., & Fritz, H. L. (1999). Unmitigated agency and unmitigated communion: Distinc­ tions from agency and communion. Journal ofResearch in Personality, 33, 131-158. Horney, K. ( 1991). Neurosis and human growth: The struggle toward self-realization. New York: Norton. (Original work published 1950) James, W. ( 1950). Principles ofpsychology. New York: Dover. (Original work published 1890) James, W. (1990). Varieties of religious experience. New York: Vintage-Library of America. (Origi­ nal work published 1902) Jung, C. G. ( 1978). Aion: Researches into the phenomenology of the self (R. F. C. Hull, Trans.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (Original work published 1951) Kasser, T., & Kanner, A. D. (2004). Psychology and consumer culture: The struggle for a good life in a materialistic world. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Kelly, G. A. ( 1955). A theory of personality: The psychology of personal constructs. New York: Norton. Kemeny, M. E. (2003). The psychobiology of stress. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 12, 124--1 29. Kohlberg, L. ( 1969). State and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. In D. A. Goslin (Ed.), Handbook ofsocialization theory and research (pp. 347-480). Skokie, IL: Rand McNally. Korda, M. (2001). Making the list: A cultural history of the American bestseller, 1900-1999. New York: Barnes & Noble. Labouvie-Vief, G. (2006). Emerging structures of adult thought. In J. J. Arnett & J. L. Tanner (Eds.), Emerging adults in America: Coming of age in the 21st century (pp. 59-84). Washing­ ton, DC: American Psychological Association.

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Langer, E. J. ( 1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Lasch, C. (1991). Culture of narcissism: American life in an age of diminishing expectations. New York: Norton. (Original work published 1979) Leary, M. R (2004). The curse ofthe self: Self-awareness, egotism, and the quality of life. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Loevinger, J. (1976). Ego development. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Maslow, A. H. ( 1968). Toward a psychology of being. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold. McAdams, D. P. (1985). Power, intimacy, and the life story: Personological inquiries into identity. New York: Guilford Press. Mead, G. H. (1967). Mind, self, and society from the standpoint of a social behaviorist. Chicago: University of Chicago. (Original work published 1934) Metz, E. C., & Youniss, J. (2005). Longitudinal gains in civic development through school-based required service. Political Psychology, 26, 413-437. Milgram, S. ( 1953). Behavioral study of obedience. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67, 37 1-378. Murray, H. A. ( 1938). Explorations in personality. New York: Oxford University Press. Neff, K. D. (2003). Self-compassion: An alternative conceptualization of a healthy attitude toward oneself. Selfand Identity, 2, 85-10 l . Piaget, J . ( 1970). Piaget's theory. In P. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael's manual of child psychology (pp. 703-732). New York: Wiley. Putnam, R D. (2000). Bowling alone: The collapse and revival ofAmerican community. New York: Simon & Schuster. Rogers, C. R ( 1961). On becoming a person. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Rye, M. S. (2005). The religious path toward forgiveness. Mental Health, Religion, & Culture, 8, 205-2 15. Salovey, P., & Grewal, D. (2005). The science of emotional intelligence. Current Directions in Psy­ chological Science, 14, 281-285. Schwartz, B. (2005). The paradox ofchoice: Why more is less. New York: Harper Perennial. Sheldon, K. M., Elliot, A. J., Ryan, R M., Chirkov, v., Kim, Y.-H., Wu, C., et al. (2004). Self­ concordance and subjective well-being in four cultures. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 35, 209-223. Sherif, M. ( 1958). Superordinate goals in the reduction of intergroup conflict. American Journal of Sociology, 63, 349-356. Snyder, C. R, & Lopez, S. J. (2001). Handbook of positive psychology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Sullivan, H. S. ( 1992). The interpersonal theory ofpsychiatry. New York: Norton. (Original work published 1953) Twenge, J. M. (2006). Generation me: Why today's young Americans are more confident, assertive, entitled-and more miserable than ever before. New York: Free Press. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychological processes. Cam­ bridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Walsh, R., & Vaughan, F. ( 1993). Paths beyond ego: The transpersonal vision. New York: TarcherlPutnam. Wayment, H. A. (2004). It could have been me: Vicarious victims and disaster-focused distress. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 5 15-528. Wilber, K. (2000). Integral psychology. Boston: Shambhala.

2 The Lure of the Noisy Ego: Narcissism as a Social Trap W.

Keith Campbell and Laura E. Buffardi

For at least 2,500 years, a clear and compelling case has been made for the ben­ efits to both self and society of quieting the ego. From the historical Buddha's sermon at the Deer Park and the Katha Upanishad to the Book of Ecclesiastes, individuals can find convincing support for a quiet approach to life . Neverthe­ less, egotism has continued to rise in our society, even reaching new heights in the past several decades (e.g., see Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, & Bush­ man, in press; see also Foster, Campbell, & Twenge, 2003; Twenge & Campbell, 2001). In this chapter, we address two questions: (a) Why do the demands of egotism-the "noisy ego," so to speak-continue to be heard? and (b) What does the study of egotism's costs teach about the benefits of quieting the ego? Our focus is on the individual-difference variable of narcissism. We use narcissism as a window for observing egotism or self-enhancement in ac­ tion. To briefly presage our argument, we posit that narcissism is a trade-off between several benefits to the individual and several costs to the individual and to society. It is important to note that this type of trade-off is remarkably seductive and self-sustaining. Narcissism's benefits for the self often occur in the short term and are emotional and affective in nature . In contrast, the costs typically appear in the longer run and are experienced by both the narcissistic individual and others. Because of this pattern of benefits and costs, we argue that narcissism operates like a social trap. Before making our argument in detail, we define narcissism and describe a systemic model that can be used to represent it.

Narcissism: The Noisy Ego in Action

What makes the noisy ego demand attention? In the case of narcissism, we can identify both the structure of the ego and its function, where structure refers to both the self-concept and personality and function refers to self-regulation strategies. In regard to structure, narcissism is primarily associated with posi­ tive and inflated self-views and relatively little interest in warm or intimate relationships with others (Paulhus, 2001). Narcissistic individuals' self-views are positive in domains connected with agency, such as dominance, status, intelligence, and physical attractiveness (Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004; Gabriel,

23

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Critelli, & Ee, 1994). There is also evidence that these views are inflated inso­ much as narcissism positively predicts self-perceived intelligence and attrac­ tiveness but not objectively assessed intelligence and attractiveness (Gabriel et aI., 1994). In addition, narcissistic individuals see themselves as special and unique (Emmons, 1984) and entitled to special treatment (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004) . In contrast, they do not report the same level of self-enhancement on communal traits, such as warmth and agreeable­ ness (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002). Indeed, narcissism negatively predicts self-reported agreeableness (Bradlee & Emmons, 1992) and even Intimacy and Affiliation as measured with the Thematic Apperception Test (Carroll, 1987). In regard to function, people with narcissistic personalities must self­ regulate to maintain their inflated self-views on agentic domains; that is, they engage in a range of behaviors that ensure they continue to feel positively about themselves. These self-regulation efforts are shaped by narcissistic individuals' relative lack of interest in communal relationships. This lack of concern for others allows for a greater degree of interpersonal exploitation and manipulation in the service of self-regulation . Narcissistic self-regulation is pervasive across all facets of life . It can be seen in private fantasies of power and fame (Raskin & Novacek, 1991), spontaneous monologues that tend to be about the self (Raskin & Shaw, 1988), interpersonal conversations that turn into opportunities to self-promote (Vangelisti, Knapp, & Daly, 1990), attention seeking and showing off (Buss & Chiodo, 1991), materialism (Vohs & Camp­ bell, 2006), game playing in relationships (Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002), and other social domains. In short, when there is an opportunity to look and feel good, narcissists are likely to jump at it (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). These clear efforts at self-regulation have led researchers to model narcis­ sism as a self-reinforcing system. Such models typically involve the current self-concept (Le., a positive view of the self), a social action that further en­ hances a positive view of the self (e.g., winning a public competition, a display of grandiosity), and some affective or esteem-laden consequence of this process . One of the earliest social-personality models was Raskin, Novacek, and Ho­ gan's (1991) model of narcissistic self-esteem management, which focused on narcissistic individuals' displays of grandiosity in the interest of maintaining and bolstering self-esteem. Campbell's (1999) self-orientation model focused directly on romantic relationships, demonstrating that people with narcissistic tendencies seek out partners who are high in status and admire them as part of an effort to increase the narcissistic person's own social status and self-esteem . Morf and Rhodewalt (2001) presented a dynamic self-regulatory processing model that provided a more complete account of narcissistic self-enhancement that included affect regulation. Baumeister and Vohs (2001) focused directly on the affective qualities of narcissistic self-regulation by proposing what is es­ sentially an addiction model of narcissism; that is, the narcissistic individual receives a "rush" when self-enhancement is experienced, which reinforces the desire to experience self-enhancement. It is important to note that this model also contains the habituation component common to all addictions: The situations that provide the rush to narcissistic individuals initially will not be potent enough to provide the same rush after repeated exposure . In their

THE LURE OF THE NOISY EGO

25

work on self-conscious emotions, Tracy and Robins (2004) linked narcissism more specifically to the emotion of pride . More recently, Campbell, Brunell, and Finkel (2006) proposed an agency model of narcissism that represented an effort to incorporate the previous systemic models of narcissism while adding the basic emphasis on the agentic concerns that narcissistic individuals exhibit (e .g., Paulhus, 2001) . This model used the term narcissistic esteem as a label to describe the affective rush, pride, and dominance-tinted self-esteem associated with narcissistic self-enhancement . Although our focus is primarily on the noisy ego, it also is important that we briefly address the relationship between narcissism and the quiet ego; in other words, how are we conceptualizing a quiet ego? The simple answer to this is that low levels of narcissism are indicative of a quiet ego. There is a hidden complexity in this answer, however, because one can conceptualize low narcissism in at least two ways. First, low narcissism might be thought of as psychological dependence and weakness. Second, it might be thought of as a robust self-system but one lacking in grandiosity, self-centeredness, and a need to constantly maintain and defend status and esteem. We endorse a concep­ tualization of the quiet ego that is aligned with the second conceptualization; in other words, quieting the ego is not about weakness or passivity but about approaching life without grandiosity and puffery and with an interest in con­ necting with others and the world.

The Nature of Social Traps

Imagine that you want to catch a lobster. The standard way to do this is to place a special type of cage, which offers easy entry and a difficult exit, at the bottom of the sea . Inside the cage you would put something that a lobster would find tasty, such as the head of a cod. The trap works because the lobster, drawn by the easily obtainable tasty fish head, enters the cage . He enjoys his stay for awhile, eating the fish head in the comfort of the cage. The downside, of course, comes later, when he tries to escape, cannot, and is hauled into a boat . The two basic mechanisms of a trap such as a lobster cage are (a) the lure of an immediate benefit to the self and (b) the longer term costs to the self that are ignored initially. There are some classic variations on this trap as well . For example, imagine that a psychologist is substituted for the lobster and the tasty fish head is replaced by equally tasty donuts. The psychologist might be lured to the donut by the rush of sugary goodness. Although there is no physical cage, the psychologist might sneak back, so to speak, the next day, for another donut . Day after day this happens, and as the psychologist grows more de­ pressed by his increased girth and failing health, the donut runs become more frequent, and he graduates to oversized bear claws, because more pastry is needed to provide the same fleeting rush of positive affect and joy. Eventually, the psychologist develops diabetes and is hospitalized. In a sense, he has been trapped by his own craving for sugar and carbohydrates. Another classic example of a trap involves a group or society instead of an individual. Imagine the lobster fisher rather than the lobster. The fisher gets his or her reward from hauling in the lobster: The more lobsters, the bigger the

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reward. At the same time, there are 100 other lobster fishers facing the same "more lobsters equal more reward" equation. As long as the entire fleet of fish­ ers can restrain from overharvesting, everyone can be moderately successful. What often happens, however, is that a significant number of fishers go for the bigger catch. Like the lobster in the trap with the tasty fish head, this strategy works well in the short term. In the longer term, however, the whole fleet suf­ fers as the fishery is depleted and eventually destroyed . In his seminal review on social traps, Platt (1973) described three forms of traps (along with several others) . The first two examples are variants of in­ dividual traps, or self-traps. More specifically, the first represents a time-delay trap, in which the individual selects a short-term benefit and then suffers a longer term cost. Often, this entails a clear problem with delay of gratification (e.g., "I will buy this car now instead of waiting until I actually make enough money to safely afford it") . The second represents a sliding-reinforcer trap, in which the benefit of a particular course of action decreases slowly as the costs increase. Often, this entails a form of habituation (e.g., "I do not get the same mellow feeling from the same amount of alcohol, so I gradually increase my intake from a single tequila sunrise to several shots of mescal [tequila]"). The third example is an individual goods and collective bads trap. The "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) fits this mold. In this type of trap, a behavior that leads to an individual good also leads to a collective bad. Because the individual is a member of the collective, of course, the bad might befall him or her to some extent as well. Social traps often exist when individual actions that benefit the self in the short term lead to negative consequences to the self and to the collective. The negative consequences typically occur in the longer term, although the time frame that constitutes the longer term varies dramatically. The time interval from initial use of methamphetamine to serious negative consequences can be relatively short; in contrast, the depletion of the fish in the Grand Banks went on for hundreds of years and many generations before cod fishing was banned.

When the Noisy Ego Chases the Lure: Narcissism as a Social Trap

Overview The function of a trap is relatively clear when the reward is as simple and bio­ logically straightforward as a chocolate cookie or cocaine. What we argue is a little-but not much-more complex. In short, we argue that the experience of egotism and its concomitants (e.g., status, esteem, pride) can act in a similar way. Thus narcissism, as an individual-difference variable that operates as part of an ego-enhancing and -sustaining system, should make the individual susceptible to certain social traps. Consider the following example. Hal, a narcissistic person, leases a new Mercedes. This has a small immediate cost (i.e ., the lease payment), but this cost is easily outweighed in the short run by the self-enhancing benefits of the

THE LURE OF THE NOISY EGO

27

car. Hal gets a rush of narcissistic pride every time he throws his Mercedes keychain on the counter at a bar or the gym, catches his reflection in the rear­ view mirror, or walks to get his car in a lot full of the Hyundais and Fords that, according to Hal, "only losers drive." For Hal, driving the Mercedes has other benefits as well. He manages to catch the attention of an attractive, albeit somewhat shallow woman, who seems to admire him greatly. This pumps up his ego further, and the added confidence enables him to be more successful at his sales job. Hal buys an expensive wardrobe and a bigger Mercedes. He mar­ ries his attractive girlfriend and joins an elite country club . At this point in his journey, Hal is like the lobster happily munching away at the fish head without knowing he is trapped. His narcissism is working like a charm. Unfortunately, the trap starts to close at this point . He begins to neglect his wife in favor of a young colleague at his office, whom he convinces that his marriage is on the outs because of his wife's self-absorption. His wife, sensing the neglect, compensates by buying lots and lots of expensive shoes and having the house remodeled. Stuck with the high credit card bills, Hal starts to cut a few corners at work . He exploits his clients and colleagues and hopes that his charm will keep him out of trouble . His stress starts to show in his short temper and increased interest in drinking mojitos at lunch. He puts on weight from the alcohol, and his girlfriend starts to avoid him. One day, after having too much to drink, he yells at her, and she retaliates by telling his wife (and the other employees at the office) about the affair. In short order, Hal loses his wife in an expensive divorce and is asked to leave his job. This example has characteristics of each of the traps described earlier. There is a time-delay trap (e.g., leasing an ego-enhancing car with the cost of poor long-term financial stability), a sliding-reinforcer trap (e.g., no longer be­ ing satisfied with his attractive wife and finding a girlfriend on the side), and an individual goods and collective bads trap (e.g., Hal's cutting corners with his clients harms the entire firm) . Although this example is somewhat fanciful, and we acknowledge that other personal qualities of Hal's and situational forces beyond his control surely contributed to his downfall, we can search the research literature on narcissism to see whether support for its trap-like nature exists. If narcissism operates like a trap, we should find three things: (a) the benefits of narcissism to the self are largely immediate, (b) the costs of narcissism to the self are typi­ cally experienced in the long term, and (c) the outcome of narcissism for others is generally negative . In simple terms, the existence of (a) and (b) suggests a time-delay or sliding-reinforcer trap, and (a) and (c) suggest an individual goods and collective bads trap.

Some Benefits to the Self There is a compelling case to make for the psychological benefits of narcissism. First, narcissism feels good in the short term (Rose, 2002; Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004) . It is linked to greater positive affect and less anxiety and depression. It is also linked to pride (Tracy & Robins, 2004), self-esteem (Brown & Zeigler-Hill, 2004), and inflated views of one's academic

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and intellectual abilities (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004; Gabriel et aI., 1994; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, & Lysy, 2004). There is also a proposed (al­ though at this stage only anecdotal) rush associated with narcissistic individu­ als' experience of self-enhancement (Baumeister & Vohs , 2001). Narcissism also provides many tangible benefits to the individual . People with narcissistic tendencies are better performers in public competitive tasks (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002) and resilient in the face of the negative feedback they receive (Campbell, Reeder, Sedikides, & Elliot , 2000). They also are able to extract resources more rapidly from the commons in a classic commons­ dilemma task (Campbell, Bush, Brunell , & Shelton, 2006). Finally, narcissism predicts a wide range of advantages in the initiation of interpersonal relationships . In certain contexts, when compared with non­ narcissistic individuals, narcissistic individuals find it is easier to be liked as friends or acquaintances (Oltmanns, Friedman, Fiedler, & Turkheimer, 2004; Paulhus, 1998), dating partners (Foster, Shrira , & Campbell, 2003), potential leaders of a group (Brunell, Gentry, Campbell, & Kuhnert , 2006), and even as celebrities on reality television shows (Young & Pinsky, 2006).

Some Costs to the Self Narcissism also has its costs. The confidence and inflated self-views that make narcissistic individuals feel good and perform well in public also , for example , lead to decreased academic performance over time (Robins & Beer, 200 1), diminished performance on multiple laboratory-based betting tasks (Camp­ bell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004; Lakey, Goodie, & Campbell, 2006), and even pathological gambling (Lakey et aI., 2006). Narcissistic individuals also tend to underperform when performance is not public and there is no opportunity for glory (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). The self-promoting, exciting personality and charm that lead narcissistic individuals to be so successful at initiating relationships are not enough to sustain relationships (which usually demand a level of concern or caring for the other). Thus, over time, people with narcissis­ tic tendencies become less liked (Paulhus, 1998), and their romantic relation­ ships are more likely to fall apart (Foster, Shrira , & Campbell, 2003). Their violence is even likely to land them in jail (Bushman & Baumeister, 2002). On a similar note, although narcissistic individuals excel at becoming leaders, there is no evidence that they are more effective leaders (Brunell et aI . , 2006); neither is there evidence that they excel at maintaining celebrity status (Young & Pinsky, 2006). An additional cost of narcissism is a hypothesized addiction to the rush of self-enhancement (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001).

Consequences for Others The costs of narcissism for others and for society have garnered some empiri­ cal verification. Coworkers of narcissistic individuals , for example, receive an undeservedly small portion of any group success and an overly large portion of the blame for failure (Campbell et aI., 2000). Narcissistic individuals' self­ enhancing attributional style is often linked with anger and aggression to-

THE LURE OF THE NOISY EGO

29

ward anyone who criticizes them (Bushman & Baumeister, 2002; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1996). Indeed, this aggression can even extend to persons associated with the criticizer (Gaertner & Iuzzini, 2005). Other threats, such as social rejection and autonomy restriction, also lead to violence on the part of people with narcissistic tendencies (Bushman, Bonacci, Van Dijk, & Baumeister, 2003; Twenge & Campbell, 2003) . Narcissistic individuals' ability to rapidly extract resources also has significant consequences for the common good, nota­ bly, rapid destruction (Campbell, Bush, et aI., 2006). Finally, there is a range of negative consequences reported by people who enter relationships with narcissistic individuals . These consequences can range from mild annoyance with the narcissistic person to deeply troubled romantic relationships filled with infidelity, game playing, manipulation, and control (Campbell, Brunell, & Finkel, 2006) . In organizational settings, there is evidence that narcissistic individuals are more likely to be corrupt leaders (Blickle, Schlegel, Fassbender, & Klein, 2006) .

Summary Consistent with the metaphor of a trap, the benefits of narcissism to the self are plentiful, affective-emotional, and generally immediate . The costs of nar­ cissism are generally apparent in the longer term, not affective-emotional, and borne by others or society. This is consistent with narcissism as a social trap.

Conclusions: What Are the Benefits of a Quiet Ego?

In this chapter, we have answered the question of why the demands of ego­ tism-the noisy ego, so to speak-continue to be heard. The answer, at least as it applies to narcissism, is that the benefits of a noisy ego are immediate and affective and the costs occur in the longer term and are often paid by others. Thus, egotism shares similar patterns of reinforcement with chocolate and nicotine (i.e., good and rush-producing in the short term, bad in the long term) and driving sport-utility vehicles (i.e., good for the individual, bad for the com­ mons) . A quieter ego, in comparison, has all the initial attraction of tofu and a Toyota Prius . Who wouldn't rather be driving down the highway, cigar clamped firmly in one's jaw, behind the wheel of a "competition yellow" Hummer? Lost in the siren call of the noisy ego, however, are the fainter and per­ haps more durable benefits of the quiet ego. Many of these p ayoffs are the flip side of the costs of narcissism. For the self, the quiet ego brings accurate self­ perception, less irrational risk taking, and a willingness to take responsibility for mistakes and correct them . Although this might not feel as good in the short run, in the long run this approach leads to higher levels of functioning. The quiet ego has some very significant interpersonal benefits as well, including more stable and resilient interpersonal relationships. Finally, the quiet ego is clearly a boon for others. A quiet ego means less aggression, less manipulation, less dishonesty and infidelity, less resource destruction, and less destructive competitiveness. Beyond simply avoiding the traps of narcissism, quieting the

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ego has three other potential benefits. First, quieting the ego might be a diffi­ cult task in the short run-one that demands both self-control and compassion. In the longer run, however, it is easier to operate one's life from the perspec­ tive of a quiet ego. Chasing attention, fame, and status takes a tremendous amount of resources, and it is a pursuit that never ends. Second, the noisy ego demands cognitive attention . An individual might be enraptured by him- or herself, but this self-absorption prevents that person from seeing others as more than actors in the individual's play. In contrast, the quiet ego might allow for a more direct experience of the world. Recent research on wisdom in older age, for example, has found that self-transcendence is negatively related to narcissism (Levenson, 2006) . Third, at a societal level, quiet egos can exist as equals; in contrast, noisy egos perform best in the company of weaker others . In Prisoner's Dilemma (Axelrod, 1980) terminology, a community of quiet egos can more easily make the cooperative rather than the defect choice (e.g., compete) . In contrast, the noisy ego will do better when making the defect choice within a community of submissive individuals. To some extent both approaches benefit the individuals who use them, but the former seems to us more human. References Axelrod, R. (1980). Effective choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24, 3-25. Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2001). Narcissism as addiction to esteem. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 206-2 10. Blickle, G., Schlegel, A, Fassbender, P., & Klein, U. (2006). Some personality correlates of business white-collar crime. Applied Psychology, 55, 220-233. Bradlee, P. M., & Emmons, R. A ( 1992). Locating narcissism within the interpersonal circumplex and the five-factor model. Personality and Individual Differences, 13, 82 1-830. Brown, R. P. , & Zeigler-Hill, V. (2004). Narcissism and the non-equivalence of self-esteem mea­ sures: A matter of dominance? Journal of Research in Personality, 38, 585-592. Brunell, A B . , Gentry, w., Campbell, W. K., & Kuhnert, K. (2006, January). Narcissism and emer­ gent leadership. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Palm Springs, CA Bushman, B. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2002). Does self-love or self-hate lead to violence? Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 543-545. Bushman, B. J., Bonacci, A M., Van Dijk, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2003). Narcissism, sexual refusal, and aggression: Testing a narcissistic reactance model of sexual coercion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 1027-1040. Buss, D. M., & Chiodo, L. M. ( 1991). Narcissistic acts in everyday life. Journal ofPersonality, 59, 179-215. Campbell, W. K. ( 1999). Narcissism and romantic attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1254-1270. Campbell, W. K., Bonacci, A M., Shelton, J., Exline, J. J., & Bushman, B. J. (2004). Psychological entitlement: Interpersonal consequences and validation of a new self-report measure. Journal ofPersonality Assessment, 83, 29-45. Campbell, W. K., Brunell, A. B., & Finkel, E. J. (2006). Narcissism, interpersonal self regulation, and romantic relationships: An agency model approach. In E. J. Finkel & K. D. Vohs (Eds.), Self and relationships: Connecting intrapersonal and interpersonal processes (pp. 57-83). New York: Guilford Press. Campbell, W. K., Bush, C. P., Brunell, A. B., & Shelton, J. (2006). Understanding the social costs of narcissism: The case of tragedy of the commons. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1358-1368.

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Campbell, W. K , Foster, C. A . , & Finkel, E . J . (2002). Does self-love lead t o love for others? A story of narcissistic game playing. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 83, 340-354. Campbell, W. K, Goodie, A. S., & Foster, J. D. (2004). Narcissism, confidence, and risk attitude. Journal ofBehavioral Decision Making, 1 7, 297-311. Campbell, W. K , Reeder, G. D., Sedikides, C., & Elliot, A. J. (2000). Narcissism and comparative self-enhancement strategies. Journal of Research in Personality, 34, 329-347. Campbell, W. K, Rudich, E. A., & Sedikides, C. (2002). Narcissism, self-esteem, and the positiv­ ity of self-views: Two portraits of self-love. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 358-368. Carroll, L. (1987). A study of narcissism, affiliation, intimacy, and power motives among students in business administration. Psychological Reports, 61, 355-358. Emmons, R. A. ( 1984). Factor analysis and construct validity ofthe Narcissistic Personality Inven­ tory. Journal ofPersonality Assessment, 48, 291-300. Foster, J. D., Campbell, W. K, & Twenge, J. M. (2003). Individual differences in narcissism: In­ flated self-views across the lifespan and around the world. Journal ofResearch in Personality, 37, 469-486. Foster, J. D., Shrira, I., & Campbell, W. K (2003, June). The trajectory of relationships involving narcissists and non-narcissists. Poster presented at the annual meeting of the American Psy­ chological Society, Atlanta, GA. Gabriel, M. T., Critelli, J. w., & Ee, J. S. (1994). Narcissistic illusions in self-evaluations of intel­ ligence and attractiveness. Journal of Personality, 62, 143-155. Gaertner, L., & Iuzzini, J. (2005). Rejection and entitativity: A synergistic model of mass violence. In K D. Williams, J. P. Forgas, & W. von Hippel (Eds.), The social outcast: Ostracism, social exclusion, rejection, and bullying (pp. 107-108). New York: Psychology Press. Hardin, G. (1968, December 13). The tragedy of the commons. Science, 162, 1243-1248. Lakey, C. E . , Goodie, A. S., & Campbell, W. K (2006, November). The roles of individual differ· ences and basic judgment and decision-making in gambling pathology. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, Houston, TX. Levenson, M. R. (2006, November). Self-transcendence and optimal functioning. Paper presented at the Optimal Functioning conference, Athens, GA. Morf, C. C . , & Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Unraveling the paradoxes of narcissism: A dynamic self­ regulatory processing model. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 177-196. Oltmanns, T. F., Friedman, J. N., Fiedler, E. R., & Turkheimer, E. (2004). Perceptions of people with personality disorders based on thin slices of behavior. Journal ofResearch in Personality, 38, 216-229. Paulhus, D. L. (1998). Interpersonal and intrapsychic adaptiveness of trait self-enhancement: A mixed blessing? Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 74, 1197-1208. Paulhus, D. L. (2001). Normal narcissism: Two minimalist views. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 228-230. Paulhus, D. L., Harms, P. D., Bruce, M. N., & Lysy, D. C. (2004). The over-claiming technique: Measuring self-enhancement independent of ability. Journal of Personality and Social Psy­ chology, 84, 890-904. Platt, J. (1973). Social traps. American Psychologist, 28, 641-651. Raskin, R. N., & Novacek, J. (1991). Narcissism and the use of fantasy. Journal of Clinical Psy­ chology, 47, 490-499. Raskin, R. N., Novacek, J., & Hogan, R. (1991). Narcissistic self-esteem management. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 911-918. Raskin, R. N., & Shaw, R. (1988). Narcissism and the use of personal pronouns. Journal of Person­ ality, 56, 393-404. Rhodewalt, F. , & Morf, C. C. (1996). On self-aggrandizement and anger: A temporal analysis of narcissism and affective reactions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 672-685. Robins, R. w., & Beer, J. S. (2001). Positive illusions about the self: Short-term benefits and long­ term costs. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 80, 340-352. Rose, P. (2002). The happy and unhappy faces of narcissism. Personality and Individual Differ­ ences, 33, 379-392.

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Sedikides, C., Rudich, E. A., Gregg, A. P., Kumashiro, M., & Rusbult, C. E. (2004). Are normal narcissists psychologically healthy? Self-esteem matters. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 400-416. Tracy, J. L., & Robins, R. W. (2004). Putting the self into self-conscious emotions: A theoretical model. Psychological Inquiry, 15, 103-125. Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K (2001). Age and birth cohort differences in self-esteem: A cross­ temporal meta-analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 5, 321-344. Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2003). "Isn't it fun to get the respect that we're going to deserve?" Narcissism, social rejection, and aggression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 261-272. Twenge, J. M., Konrath, S., Foster, J. D., Campbell, W. K, & Bushman, B. J. (in press). Egos inflating over time: A cross-temporal meta-analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Journal of Personality. Vangelisti, A. , Knapp, M. L., & Daly, J. A. ( 1990). Conversational narcissism. Communication Monographs, 57, 251-274. Vohs, K D., & Campbell, W. K (2006). [Narcissism and materialisml. Unpublished raw data, Uni­ versity of British Columbia, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. Wallace, H. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2002). The performance of narcissists rises and falls with perceived opportunity for glory. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 82, 819-834. Young, S. M., & Pinsky, D. (2006). Narcissism and celebrity. Journal of Research in Personality, 40, 463-471.

3 A Terror Management Perspective on the Quiet Ego and the Loud Ego: Implications of Ego Volume Control for Personal and Social Well-Being Spee Kosloff, Mark J. Landau, Daniel Sullivan, and Jeff Greenberg In this chapter, we examine the metaphors of quiet ego and loud ego from the perspective of terror management theory (TMT; see Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). TMT offers an empirically substantiated framework for understanding the psychological functions of these ego orientations and their potential to manifest in ways that promote or undermine personal growth and social harmony. We begin by considering what the ego is and what it means for an ego to be quiet or loud. Then we present a TMT analysis of the quiet ego and loud ego and the research supporting it. We conclude by considering the implications of TMT and research for understanding how to best promote ways of flexibly adjusting the ego's "volume" in the interest of reaping the growth and prosocial benefits of quietness and loudness.

The Quiet Ego and the Loud Ego: Neither on Its Own Is Sufficient for Personal and Social Well-Being

'I\vo important functions of the ego-the mind's central decision-making ap­ paratus-are (a) to mediate between the interests of the individual and the interests of others (Becker, 1973; Freud, 1957) and (b) to strike a balance be­ tween assimilating experiences into familiar knowledge structures and forging novel conceptions of the world (Piaget, 1955). Regarding these functions, we can conceptualize a spectrum: At one end is the loud ego, which orients the in­ dividual toward seeking personal benefit, asserting his or her uniqueness and value, and sharing that value or imposing it on others; at the other end is the quiet ego, which orients the individual toward transcending personal concerns to integrate social knowledge and experience with existing self-structures. As discussed in chapter 1, a number of perspectives have been proffered as to where the optimal level of human functioning lies along this spectrum, and although each is unique, most equate the ideal personality with a quiet temper-

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ing of egoism and self-aggrandizement in favor of interrelatedness, tolerance, and openness to experience (reviewed in Coan, 1977) . Consistent with these views is evidence that a characteristically loud preoccupation with sustaining a high level of self-regard can have negative personal and social consequences . For example, a heightened motivation to assert and gain validation for one's claim to a self-defining identity can interfere with personal improvement by blocking openness to others' perspectives and preventing acknowledgment of one's personal shortcomings (Wicklund & Steins, 1996). Furthermore, indi­ viduals with high but unstable self-esteem are particularly derogatory and aggressive toward others who criticize them (see chap. 8, this volume). Although this research highlights some downsides to ego loudness, the truth regarding optimal selfhood may not be so unidimensional. First, the effects of aggressive self-promotion and the uncompromising expression of a unique vision are not necessarily problematic . In almost every reach of cultural life-politics, sports, art, science-a readiness to pursue and preserve personal significance and potency often aids the creative and enthusiastic realization of both one's own goals and those of society. A loud ego can ensure that one's authentic gifts are used to the benefit of everyone . Indeed, in a comparative study of several creative individuals who helped shape the modern era-rang­ ing from artists, such as Picasso; and thinkers, such as Einstein; to activists, such as Gandhi-Gardner (1993) found each creator to be characterized by strong egoism and a propensity to alienate others . These figures demonstrate that, although a loud ego orientation has the potential to yield a rigid and static mentality characterized by narcissistic self-interest, loudness may also provoke powerful embracing of possibilities and a socially beneficial will to in­ novate and lead (see chap. 2, this volume). Second, the quiet ego may not be unequivocally beneficial. The loss of in­ dividual identity has been shown to have startlingly negative consequences. Milgram's (1974) obedience studies demonstrated the extent of the inhumanity of which people are capable when, at the command of an authority figure, they turn down the inner protests of their conscience. Research also shows that cer­ tain social contexts that diminish self-awareness render the individual more likely to become sadistically authoritative or, conversely, sheepishly submis­ sive (e .g., Haney & Zimbardo, 1998). Arthur Koestler (19 78) recognized the real world significance of these findings: "Throughout human history, the ravages caused by excesses of individual self-assertion are quantitatively negligible compared to the numbers slain ad majorem gloriam out of a self-transcending devotion to a flag, a leader, a religious faith" (p. 78) . The quiet ego was much in evidence during the My Lai massacre, when men who, under normal circum­ stances, conceived of themselves as moral individuals silenced inner qualms about slaughtering civilians in the interest of their company or the ideal of a U . S.victory. Indeed, we have learned from tragedies such as Jonestown, Waco, Heaven's Gate, and 9/11 that the urge toward immersive self-transcendence can result in the most extreme expression of the quiet ego-turning down the volume completely through self-termination. Both the quiet and the loud ego orientations can manifest in personally and socially maladaptive forms . The loud ego can be defensively rigid in assert-

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ing the superior validity of certain limited conceptions of the world and defend­ ing an inflated sense of personal value; conversely, the quiet ego can permit the mindless adoption and defense of group norms and beliefs, resulting in a muted expression of personal potential . These considerations lead us to believe that individuals (and, ultimately, society at large) may be best served by sustain­ ing a flexible, situationally appropriate balance between the two orientations: Tum down the ego volume when it means expanding the self to incorporate new experiences, celebrating others, and acknowledging personal limitations in a reasoned and constructive manner, but turn up the volume when it means offering personal gifts, advocating creative solutions, and rallying against malevolent voices. To better understand how the individual might attain an optimal balance between the self-assertive loud ego and the self-transcendent quiet ego, we believe it is important to consider the psychological functions served by both of these orientations.

The Interplay of Quiet Egos and Loud Egos: The Contributions of Otto Rank

Otto Rank (194111958) proposed that the ego arbitrates primarily between desires for individual value and connectedness to others and that these desires stem from a central motivational source that lies at the heart of the human ex­ istential condition. The core problem, he wrote, is that we are at least implicitly aware of the fact that death is always potentially imminent and an inevitable termination of our selves. Rank proposed that because consciously ruminating on this existential reality could trigger severe anxiety, we are motivated to re­ press death concerns by perceiving ourselves as playing valuable and enduring roles in a meaningful cultural drama. Rank's (194111958) pertinent insight was that the underlying motivation to deny the reality of death lies at the root of the complementary impulses of the ego to assert its unique value and to immerse itself in the security of a greater whole that transcends the self . These ideas were further explored by Rank's intellectual disciple, Ernest Becker (1973), who argued that individuals respond to the fact of death with a craving to be remembered for one 's unique­ ness, a desire to know that one's life has counted for something special in the staggering cavalcade of all human lives. Faced with the devastating possibil­ ity of obliteration, the ego must be capable of orienting the individual toward demonstrating unique self-worth, to stand out from the masses. If the ego fails in this capacity for loudness, then the person faces the risk of losing all that is unique in the self, of being swallowed up by the crowd and by history and reduced to one among billions of merely mortal creatures destined to die and be forgotten. Yet by the same token, people also deny death by transcending the self-merging with some larger and more enduring whole . Many people are profoundly comforted by the belief that their lives are ensconced in an all­ encompassing scheme (e.g., God's plan or the progression of history) and unfold according to its logic and ultimate purpose. Others derive a symbolic sense of

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immortality through their identification with enduring social groups, leaders, or ideologies (e.g., a nation, a sports team) that have the potential to exist in perpetuity. This line of defense against death concerns requires the ego to quiet its individual strivings to profit from the psychological protection afforded by complete immersion in the collective entity or worshipped other. When the individual copes with death through self-transcendence, opportunities to em­ brace freedom or individuate oneself in a way that forces separation from the larger whole can be psychologically threatening . Rank ( 194111958) clarified that people rarely adopt one or the other ego orientation in coping with death concerns; instead, these tendencies usually operate in tandem, because in most cases efforts to secure self-worth function simultaneously to bolster the perceived meaning and significance of the cul­ tural systems on which one's self-esteem is based. However, there may be cases in which these tendencies conflict . In their ambitions to improve themselves, boast of their accomplishments, and get ahead, people may symbolically stand apart from a meaningful cultural order. We can imagine, for example, a scien­ tist (e .g., Galileo) on the verge of a breakthrough discovery, or a young Chinese woman from a strongly collectivist background considering severing familial and traditional ties to pursue a lucrative career in the American business realm. Both of these individuals stand to distinguish themselves with a special achievement that affirms their creativity and competence, yet if they were to do so, they would undermine their own faith and participation in the symbolic structures (paradigms, values, traditions) that give life meaning . Attaining a balance between the quiet ego and the loud ego-alternately stressing either orientation in the service of optimal functioning-is rendered difficult by the fact that, in some situations, emphasizing one of those ego orientations may undermine the death-denying bases of meaning and value provided by the

other.

Evidence That the Quiet Ego and the Loud Ego Serve a Terror Management Function

TMT (Greenberg et aI., 1997) is a social psychological theory that builds on Rank's ( 194 111958) and Becker's ( 19 73) analyses of the motivational underpin­ nings of human behavior. The theory posits that the uniquely human aware­ ness of death engenders a potential for terror that people manage through a dual-component anxiety buffer consisting of two things : (a) a cultural world­ view-a humanly constructed set of beliefs about the nature of reality that imbues the world with meaning and offers the promise of protection and some form of immortality to those who fulfill prescriptions for valued conduct and (b) self-esteem-the belief that one is fulfilling the individually internalized standards of value, norms, and social roles derived from the culture. By main­ taining faith in the cultural worldview and perceiving oneself to be a valuable participant therein, people symbolically qualify for death transcendence and hence can maintain psychological equanimity despite their foreknowledge of mortality. Symbolic immortality can be obtained by perceiving oneself as part

A TERROR MANAGEMENT PERSPECTIVE

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of a culture that endures beyond one's lifetime or by creating enduring testa­ ments to one's existence (e .g. , great works of art or science) . Literal immortality is procured by means of the various afterlives promised by almost all organized religions. Insofar as belief in a cultural worldview and having self-esteem function to provide protection against death concerns, then reminders of death (mortality salience, or MS) should intensify reliance on and defense of these psychologi­ cal structures. This broad hypothesis is supported by a large array of studies demonstrating the influence of MS (operationalized, e .g ., as open-ended ques­ tions about death or subliminal death primes) on a wide range of cognitive and behavioral efforts to bolster important sources of meaning and personal value (for reviews, see Greenberg, Solomon, & Arndt, 2007; Greenberg et al., 1997). Many of these studies have demonstrated that affectations associated with the loud ego-asserting personal worth and imposing one's cultural beliefs and identity-are exacerbated by MS. MS boosts efforts to live up to individual standards of value in a diverse array of behavioral domains, including risky driving behavior, fitness intentions, and displays of physical strength (Green­ berg et al., 2007). Research also shows that MS motivates disidentification from one's ingroup when affiliation with that group is thought to have negative implications for self-esteem. Furthermore, MS increased physical aggression (assessed by the amount of painfully spicy hot sauce administered to a fellow participant) toward those who attacked participants' political orientation . Research also shows that MS sometimes increases quiet ego tendencies. For example, one study (Pyszczynski et al ., 1996) found that participants inter­ viewed in front of a funeral home exaggerated the degree to which others agree with their opinions, suggesting that subtle intimations of mortality decreased willingness to deviate too far from internalized conventional beliefs. MS also increases identification with valued groups, including one's university, nation­ ality, political party, and sports team, and it leads people to donate more money to charities that benefit one's ingroup (Greenberg et al., 2007). MS similarly engender s inflated regard for a wide range of people, concepts, and objects that represent the broader culture to which one subscribes, and it increases adherence to cultural norms (Greenberg et al ., 1997, 2007). This work helps demonstrate the role of immersion in self-transcending collectives in providing symbolic immortality. In addition to identifying with and defending a meaningful group, the quiet ego can orient the individual toward transferring power to and invest­ ing faith in an exalted other, such as a lover, mentor, or political figure. From a TMT perspective, these figures command affection and devotion in part be­ cause they promise the individual validation of the self 's significance through unconditional affection, or a significant role in a grand cultural vision that transcends death. Supporting this analysis, Mikulincer, Florian, and Hirsch­ berger (2003) showed that MS increases investment in romantic relationships. In the political realm, Landau et al. (2004) found that reminders of death and the 9/11 terrorist attacks increased support for President George W. Bush, a political leader who portray s himself as spearheading a divinely sponsored crusade intended to triumph over evil .

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When Terror Management Needs Undermine the Benefits of the Quiet Ego and the Loud Ego: Implications for Personal Growth

By coupling Rank's (194111958) analysis with TMT research, we can gain a deeper understanding of why, in some situations, the quiet ego and the loud ego might conflict with each other. Rank's analysis suggests that individuals manage existential fears by maintaining an optimal balance between assert­ ing individuality and immersing the self in the security of the crowd. Indeed, Simon et aI . (1997) found that MS increased efforts to maintain such a balance. Specifically, they told some participants they were very similar to their peers and told other participants they were very different from their peers. Mter MS, participants who had been given feedback that they were conformists reported opinions very different from the average person, whereas participants who were told they were deviants reported opinions very similar to the average person. A further implication of this analysis is that, in their reluctance to chal­ lenge protective meaning, people can muffle the beneficial expressions of their loud egos. For example, creative activity distinguishes the individual but can also thereby threaten social connections that provide protection from mortality concerns. In support of this idea, MS led participants who had displayed their creativity to experience increased guilt and make increased efforts to re-imbed themselves in a sense of collective validation through enhanced social projec­ tion (Greenberg et aI., 2007). In a related line of research, Landau, Greenberg, and Sullivan (2006) examined how people respond to mortality primes when personal accom­ plishments threaten to diminish the exalted status of others who provide symbolic protection. Consistent with prior research, MS increased efforts to self-enhance in important domains, but this effect was eliminated and even reversed when self-enhancement meant surpassing a valued political leader or the participant's parents. Another study assessed the possibility that con­ flicting loud and quiet ego defenses contribute to the tendency for people to underperform when confronted with negative cultural stereotypes (i.e ., stereo­ type threat). MS was predicted to strengthen identification with one's group even if it meant squelching efforts to excel . Accordingly, mortality-primed women who were stereotyped to fare poorly on an academic test underper­ formed even when the task was quite easy. These results suggest that people are often reluctant to loudly self-enhance or distinguish themselves with ex­ cellence because doing so can cleave them from important sources of terror-as­ suaging meaning. TMT research shows that quiet and loud ego orientations allay death concerns and that adopting either orientation can threaten to undermine the psychological protection afforded by the other. Although more research is needed, the findings so far indicate that people sometimes reduce this conflict by squelching their loud egos, even if it means taking a negative attitude to­ ward their own creativity and competence.

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Toward an Optimal Balance: Managing Terror While Benefiting From Both Ego Orientations

Given the potential for conflict between the quiet and loud egos, reaping the benefits of both orientations while assuaging death-related concerns seems quite challenging. Achieving such a balance may require a psychological con­ text of flexibility, in which the individual expansively shares his or her talents yet also processes input from others in an open-minded and accommodating manner. TMT research points to aspects of the individual , situation, and cul­ ture that may facilitate the emergence of such flexibility.

Dispositional Factors in Ego Flexibility Existing research suggests that having a reliable basis of psychological secu­ rity reduces defensive manifestations of the loud ego. For instance, individu­ als with high self-esteem do not respond to MS with strengthened assertion of their cultural beliefs' superiority, whereas people with low self-esteem do (Harmon-Jones et aI., 199 7). Moreover, Taubman Ben-Ari, Florian, and Mi­ kulincer (1999) observed that , although MS increased risky driving behavior (both in self-reports and on a driving simulator) among participants who valued their driving ability as a source of self-esteem, a boost to self-esteem eliminated this MS-induced need to demonstrate personal value. Secure attachment style has been associated with similar attenuations of defense. For example, MS increased the severity of punishment for a moral transgressor among insecurely attached individuals but not among securely attached individuals (Mikulincer et aI., 2003) . Furthermore , securely attached individuals were found to be more creative after MS than insecurely attached individuals (Greenberg et aI . , 2007). Research also supports the idea that dispositional features moderate the quiet ego's potential for uncritical adherence to ingrained brands of thinking. For instance , among individuals high in personal need for structure, MS in­ creased preference for conventional structure over novel stimuli (Greenberg et aI . , 2007), yet individuals low in personal need for structure did not respond to MS with these structuring tendencies, suggesting that simplicity and famil­ iarity may be less central to their protective worldview. In sum, individuals equipped with psychological defenses that permit a secure and flexible ego ori­ entation are less likely to manage mortality concerns through rigidly defensive expressions of the loud ego and quiet ego.

Situational Factors in Ego Flexibility Impending information about one's success in acquiring meaning and value may aid or hinder flexibility at either volume of the ego. Harmon-Jones et aI. (1997) observed that receiving a self-esteem boost reduced MS-induced worldview defense . However, research also suggests that the nature of social

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validation individuals receive may temper the extent of defensiveness they exhibit. For instance, Schimel, Arndt, Pyszczynski, and Greenberg (2001) found that receiving positive feedback for one's achievements did not alleviate participants' tendency to defensively distance themselves from a negatively portrayed other, whereas receiving positive feedback for intrinsic aspects of the self (Le., "who one is") did alleviate this and other defensive responses, such as downward social comparison and conformity. This suggests that positive inter­ personal feedback may maximize the benefits of the quiet ego and the loud ego when the feedback is a response to intrinsic self-characteristics, as opposed to contingent self-features rooted primarily in external efforts to garner others' approval . A situationally heightened sense of social connection may also decrease the negative outcomes associated with rigid ego orientations.Arndt , Routledge, Greenberg, and Sheldon (2005) showed that by first informing participants that they are quite similar to others, creative action after MS could transpire without generating guilt and that, when primed with tasks that enhanced at­ tention to others, participants under MS actually increased reports of optimal psychological functioning (see Greenberg et aI., 2007). Such findings support the notion that situations conducive to fulfilling needs in personally significant yet socially embedded ways can help individuals constructively mitigate con­ cerns with mortality.

Cultural Factors Although certain kinds of worldviews may predispose individuals to respond to MS with rigidity and conventionality, others may inspire increased openness to alternative ways of thinking and expressing. For example, whereas people with an authoritarian worldview responded to MS with intense derogation of dissimilar others, those with a politically liberal worldview (which strongly emphasizes tolerance) responded with more liking for dissimilar others (see Greenberg et aI., 1997). These findings illustrate how positive and negative potentials of the loud ego and the quiet ego arise in different individuals' en­ culturated views of reality. Whereas people rigorously committed to convention and authority may seek protection from existential fears in aversive social action, adhering to tolerance-based cultural conceptions may foster assertions expressing the righteousness of accepting different others . Different religious worldviews prescribe different norms of ritual and pro­ priety, which in turn may require more or less defensive forms of adherence. In line with this, Jonas and Fischer (2006) found that individuals high in intrin­ sic religiosity (i.e., those who have truly integrated spirituality into the self), when reminded of their religiosity, did not demonstrate worldview defense or elevated death thought accessibility after MS. In contrast, individuals high in extrinsic religiosity (i.e . , those who use religion merely to fit in) reaped no such benefit from being reminded of their religiosity.

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Summary and Conclusion

The theory and research we have examined in this chapter suggest that the human experience is a challenging balance between dual motivations to assert the self and its strengths, on the one hand, and to sustain mutually beneficial social bonds, on the other hand. The notion of transcending the self to attain a harmonious relation with one's surrounding social and natural environment is indeed an alluring ideal captured in many prominent and thoughtful views of human nature (e.g ., see Coan, 197 7; chap. 13, this volume), yet such a goal is not without its trade-offs. We believe that for individuals to fully actualize their potential they must address their needs not only to merge with others but also to emerge with the force of an active, creative agent in the world . The ideas of Rank (194111958), Becker (1973), and TMT converge to sug­ gest that human defensive needs are multifaceted and cannot be satisfied by an ego gauged to "mute" the self entirely, or to simply "shout" aggressively at the world . Although we could thus say that one optimal mode of selfhood would be to maintain a constant moderate volume, such an approach may preclude the important benefits of both the quiet and loud ego orientations for the indi­ vidual and humanity at large . It seems, instead, that a readiness for productive oscillation between self-assertion and self-transcendence is essential if one is to avoid a static, inauthentic existence . In the words of Richard Coan (1977), "a flexibility that permits sequential expression of contrasting modes-and under some conditions, an integrative merging of them-is more consistent with our basic nature and permits something closer to a full realization of our develop­ mental potentials" (p. 293). We have reviewed research specifying a handful of resources that may con­ tribute to such flexibility, including intrinsic self-esteem, secure attachment style, low need for structure, high valuing or salience of tolerance-each of which helps mitigate maladaptive quiet and loud ego responses to reminders of mortality. Several of the chapters in this volume also describe such resources. However, what we really do not know yet is whether such terror management resources can lead people to be appropriately quiet or loud as the situation requires . For example, if a person bearing some of these qualities was on a decision-making team, and was particularly knowledgeable regarding an is­ sue, would she or he be particularly likely to pipe up and offer insights? If this same person was less knowledgeable than other team members, would he or she be particularly quiet and open to the insights of those others? To assess such ideas, paradigms must be developed in which individuals are placed in two situations: (a) one in which being quiet is most beneficial and (b) one in which being loud is most beneficial . Although MS should lead people who are prone to a rigidly quiet ego to be quiet in both situations and those prone to a rigidly loud ego to be loud in both situations, people with intrinsi­ cally based self-worth or a low need for structure may instead react to MS with flexible adjustments of ego volume attuned to the situation at hand. Future research along these lines may help us more fully and directly assess what situational and dispositional factors facilitate assuagement of death concerns

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while nurturing the ego's positive potentials for dynamic expression and social conscience . References Arndt, J., Routledge, C., Greenberg, J., & Sheldon, K. M. (2005). Illuminating the dark side of creative expression: Assimilation needs and the consequences of creative action following mortality salience. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31 , 1327-1339. Becker, E. (1973). The denial ofdeath. New York: Free Press. Coan, R. W. (1977). Hero, artist, sage, or saint? A survey of views on what is variously called mental health, normality, maturity, selfactualization, and human fulfillment. New York: Columbia University Press. Freud, S. (1957). The ego and the id. London: Hogarth Press. Gardner, H. ( 1993). Creating minds. New York: Basic Books. Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Arndt, J. (2007). A basic but uniquely human motivation: Terror management. In J. Y. Shah & W. L. Gardner (Eds.), Handbook of motivation science (pp. 114134). New York: Guilford Press. Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. ( 1997). Terror management theory of self-esteem and social behavior: Empirical assessments and conceptual refinements. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 29, pp. 61-139). New York: Academic Press. Haney, C., & Zimbardo, P. G. (1998). The past and future ofD.S. prison policy: Twenty-five years after the Stanford Prison Experiment. American Psychologist, 53, 709-727. Harmon-Jones, E., Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & McGregor, H. (1997). Terror management theory and self-esteem: Evidence that increased self-esteem reduces mor­ tality salience effects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 24-36. Jonas, E., & Fischer, P. (2006). Terror management and religion-Do religious beliefs prevent worldview defense following mortality salience? Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 91, 553-567. Koestler, A. ( 1978). Janus: A summing up. New York: Vintage Books. Landau, M. J., Greenberg, J., & Sullivan, D. (2006). When selfesteem and meaning collide. Un­ published manuscript. Landau, M. J., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., et al. (2004). Deliver us from evil: The effects of mortality salience and reminders of 9/11 on support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1136-1150. Mikulincer, M., Florian, v., & Hirschberger, G. (2003). The existential function of close relation­ ships: Introducing death into the science of love. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, 20-40. Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York: Harper & Row. Piaget, J. ( 1955). The child's construction of reality. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Pyszczynski, T., Wicklund, R. A., Floresky, S., Gauch, G., Koch, S., Solomon, S., & Greenberg, J. (1996). Whistling in the dark: Exaggerated estimates of social consensus in response to inci­ dental reminders of mortality. Psychological Science, 7, 332-336. Rank, O. ( 1958). Beyond psychology. New York: Dover Books. (Original work published 1941) Schimel, J., Arndt, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Greenberg, J. (2001). Being accepted for who we are: Evidence that social validation of the intrinsic self reduces general defensiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 35-52. Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Arndt, J., Pyszczynski, T., Clement, R., & Solomon, S. ( 1997). Perceived consensus, uniqueness, and terror management: Compensatory responses to threats to inclu­ sion and distinctiveness following mortality salience. Personality and Social Psychology Bul­ letin, 23, 1055-1065. Taubman Ben-Ari, 0., Florian, v., & Mikulincer, M. ( 1999). The impact of mortality salience on reckless driving-A test ofterror management mechanisms. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 76, 35-45. Wicklund, R. A., & Steins, G. ( 1996). Person perception under pressure: When motivation brings about egocentrism. In P. M. Gollwitzer & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), The psychology of action: Linking cognition to behavior (pp. 511-528). New York: Guilford Press.

4 In Search of the Optimal Ego: When Self-Enhancement Bias Helps and Hurts Adjustment Virginia S. Y. Kwan, Lu Lu Kuang, and Belinda X. Zhao Readers familiar with Greek mythology will remember Narcissus as an egotis­ tical man who scorned the love of a nymph named Echo and so was cursed by the gods to fall in love with his own reflection in a pond . Enthralled by his own beauty, he refused to leave his image even to eat or sleep, and he slowly wasted away. Some say that was the end to it, whereas others say that he turned into the narcissus flower. Either way, his vanity became his curse, leading to his tragic ending. Many similar cautionary tales of the ancient Greeks, who were strong proponents of accurate self-perception and humility, demonstrate clearly their hearty disapproval of narcissism . Even centuries later, modern psychology looks on it unfavorably enough to deem it a disorder.According to the Diagnos­ tic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed.; American Psychiatric Association, 1994), individuals with narcissistic personality disorder exhibit a grandiose sense of self-importance and an unreasonable sense of entitlement. These individuals are interpersonally exploitative and have deficits in empa­ thy and a need for excessive admiration (see also chap. 2, this volume). Not many people actually qualify as having a narcissistic personality dis­ order, although overly positive self-evaluations (Le., self-enhancement bias) are pervasive in today's U.S.society (Taylor & Brown, 1988).In the 1970s, nick­ named the "Me Decade," people began to turn toward concentrating on their own desires and pleasures. The self began to gain popularity quickly then, and snowballed into the egocentric culture of today. With the recent trend of elevated self-esteem and bigger egos, psycholo­ gists have begun to explore the nuances and ramifications of self-enhancement bias, leading to a debate that has spanned 3 decades and continues today. Is self-enhancement good or bad? As it turns out, the answer here, as in any com­ plex situation, is "It depends ." Some studies have found that self-enhancement is beneficial to adjustment, whereas other studies have found that selfThe authors gratefully acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation Research grant BCS-0541896 for the preparation of this work.

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enhancement is detrimental to adjustment. The time has come to take a more balanced look at both the benefits and the costs of self-enhancement bias and to weigh them against each other in different situations . There may be a time and place for self-enhancement. Not all ego-enhancing strategies are purely self-serving, and in some situations a strong sense of self may be beneficial to others as well. Nevertheless, the key to optimal adjustment may require the ability to recognize when the situation calls for self-enhancement and when it is best to quiet the ego. We begin our discussion with a brief review of the debate over the value of self-enhancement bias. We then review a componential approach to self­ enhancement and discuss the factors that influence the link between self­ enhancement bias and adjustment .

The Debate: Self-Enhancement Bias and Adjustment

A basic assumption about mental health is that psychological adjustment requires the ability to accurately discern reality. This assumption dates back to our forefathers of Western civilization, the ancient Greeks, and can be best summed up by the Socratic admonition to "Know thyself." In contrast to this long-standing view that self-insight is necessary to function effectively, Tay­ lor and Brown (1988) argued that overly positive, self-enhancing illusions about the self are the hallmark of mental health . This new perspective drew considerable attention and has led to a protracted debate between those who believe that psychologically healthy individuals perceive themselves accu­ rately and those who believe that it is more adaptive to have positive illusions. Subsequent research has yielded divergent results, and it is unclear whether self-enhancement has a positive (e.g., Bonanno, Field, Kovacevic, & Kaltman, 2002; Sedikides, Rudich, Gregg, Kumashiro, & Rusbult, 2004; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003), negative (e.g., Block & Colvin, 1994; Col­ vin, Block, & Funder, 1995; Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993), or mixed (e.g., Paulhus, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001) impact on mental health . The pattern of findings in the literature suggests that whether self­ enhancement bias is good or bad for adjustment depends in part on which aspect of adjustment was examined (Paulhus, 1998; Robins & Beer, 2001). Two aspects of adjustment, namely, intrapsychic adjustment (i.e., feeling good about the self) and social adjustment (i.e., forming and maintaining harmoni­ ous relationships with others), have received the most empirical attention on their relation with self-enhancement . Previous findings have shown that self-enhancement bias is good for intrapsychic adjustment, but a review of the methods calls this conclusion into question . Almost all measures of intra ­ psychic adjustment used in the research on self-enhancement have been self­ reports (e.g., self-esteem, life satisfaction), which are of doubtful import here. Individuals who self-enhance are likely to do so in most aspects of their life, in­ cluding their self-view, leading them to positively distort their self-evaluations. Therefore, self -report measures that contain a self-evaluation component may well be positively biased and of questionable validity (Colvin et aI., 1995; Shedler et aI., 1993).

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The findings linking self-enhancement bias to social adjustment, however, have shown less consensus . Some studies suggest that self-enhancement bias promotes social adjustment. In their review, Taylor and Brown (1988) inte­ grated research showing the positive value of self-enhancement bias in pro­ moting mental health and social adjustment . Self-enhancers are seen by their peers as likable and good at maintaining close relationships (e.g., Felson, 1981; Taylor et aI., 2003). Other studies, however, h ave shown that self-enhancement bias is a risk factor for interpersonal conflict (Atwater & Yammarino, 1997). Self­ enhancement bias can generate a vicious cycle of rigid and constant posi­ tive self-regard that continually and cumulatively alienates friends (Colvin et aI., 1995; Paulhus, 1998).Also, people who are close to individuals who self­ enhance describe such people as defensive and as having difficulties in forming close interpersonal relationships (Kwan, John, Robins, & Kuang, 2007; Norem, 2002). Individuals who self-enhance are seen negatively by their peers in study groups (Paulhus, 1998) and are regarded by their close friends as less honest (Bonanno, Rennicke, & Dekel, 2005). These divergent findings about the value of self-enhancement add to the debate regarding whether self-enhancement bias is adaptive or maladaptive . In an attempt to settle this debate, Kwan, John, Kenny, Bond, and Robins (2004) proposed that the issue has gone unresolved because researchers h ave used two rather different conceptions of self-enhancement that have not been properly distinguished. One conception originated from Festinger's (1954) so­ cial comparison theory and compares the perceived self with perceived others; thus, individuals who self-enhance are those who perceive themselves more positively than they perceive others . The other conception originated from Allport's (1937) notion of self insight and compares self-perception with percep­ tion by others; thus, individuals who self-enhance perceive themselves more positively than they are perceived by others. Both of these conceptions compare self-perception with important criteria (i.e., perceptions of others and perceptions by others), but each conception is incomplete without the other. According to the social comparison conception, individuals may be labeled as self-enhancers for two different reasons : (a) because they have an overly positive self-perception or (b) because they are actually better than others. Likewise, according to the self-insight conception, individuals may be labeled as self-enhancers for two different reasons: (a) be­ cause they have an overly positive self-perception or (b) because they generally see people (including themselves) very positively. Thus, the social comparison conception confounds self-enhancement with the person's actual standing . The self-insight conception confounds self-enhancement with how the person generally perceives others. The two previous conceptions of self-enhancement are different from each other, and each confounds self-enhancement bias with an irrelevant component. Also, these confounds are not inconsequential . The relation between self-enhancement and adjustment varies depending on the way in which self-enhancement is conceptualized and measured (Kwan et aI., 2004, 2007). To address the problem of confounds in the conceptualization of self­ enhancement, Kwan et al . (2004) proposed a componential approach to self-

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enhancement. By extending the social relations model (SRM; Kenny, 1994) to self-enhancement, Kwan et al.'s componential approach identified three com­ ponents in self-perception. Conceptually, these components are (a) the socially desirable merit of the individual (i.e., the target effect in SRM terms), (b) the general tendency to perceive others in a benevolent manner (i.e., the perceiver effect in SRM terms), and (c) the self-perception bias (i.e., the relationship­ with-the-self effect in SRM terms). Thus, these three components are referred to, respectively, as merit, benevolence, and self-perception bias (i.e., target ef­ fect, perceiver effect, and relationship-with-the-self effect). Given that there are multiple components of self-perception, the compo­ nential approach to self-enhancement bias hints that the question of whether self-perception bias is good or bad for adjustment may be too simple. This suggests that if we are to understand how self-enhancement bias relates to adjustment, then other components in self-perception (i.e., both merit and be­ nevolence) must also be included in the research design to gain a better picture of its subtleties. In terms of simple effects, the componential approach to self-enhancement and previous findings suggest three predictions. First, liking should be re­ lated positively to merit. People who have more desirable characteristics, such as skills or talents, are better liked by others. Second, liking should also be related positively to benevolence. People who like others elicit reciprocity. People who see others in a positive light and like them are in turn liked. Third, liking should be related negatively to self-enhancement bias. People who self­ enhance behave in self-centered ways that make them less likable. Results, however, may be more complicated than previously thought be­ cause the three components may interact . The link between social adjustment and self-enhancement bias may depend in part on merit: People may dislike only individuals who self-enhance but who do not command socially desir­ able qualities (i.e., those who have low merit). This is a compensatory model in which socially desirable qualities of the individual can compensate for the social costs of self-enhancement bias. This moderator account thus suggests that some individuals who self-enhance, such as highly skilled and talented people, may still be well liked because they have high merit.A focused program of research is now needed to examine these kinds of interaction effects and to delineate their generality. The componential approach predicts that, among individuals who self-enhance, those with low merit should be the worst off in terms of being liked and included, because they are lacking this compensatory effect. On a similar note, the link between socia l adjustment and self­ enhancement bias may depend in part on benevolence: People may dislike only individuals who feel superior and see others negatively (i.e., with low be­ nevolence).A general positivity may offset the social costs of self-enhancement bias. People may still like individuals who brag about themselves but also hold high regard for others. What is important in understanding the value of self-enhancement bias is pinpointing the degree to which an individual who self-enhances has each of these desirable qualities and their configuration. There may be different

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profiles among individuals who self-enhance : For example, some have more socially desirable qualities, such as benevolence or merit, than others . Having other socially desirable qualities may compensate for the negative costs of self­ enhancement bias. Recently, Kwan and Kuang (2007) illustrated exactly this, explaining why self-enhancement bias sometimes appears to be good for social adjustment and other times appears to be bad for social adjustment. Their findings demon­ strated that whether self-enhancement bias is good or bad for social inclusion depends on whether the individual possesses other socially desirable qualities. P ossessing self-enhancement alone was detrimental for social adjustment; people generally disliked individuals who self-enhanced . However, possessing other socially desirable qualities, such as merit and benevolence, can compen­ sate for the negative cost of self-enhancement . Also, the lack of socially desir­ able qualities made the people who self-enhanced especially disliked. These findings suggest that self-enhancement is harmful when the individual does not have positive qualities. Just as other qualities can affect whether individuals who self-enhance are welcomed, so can the situation. An adaptive individual is one who uses the required skills in the right situation . Different circumstances require the individual to use different skills and demonstrate different abilities to achieve different goals. Having a balanced ego requires the ability to use self­ enhancement only in advantageous situations. Self-enhancement bias may be beneficial in situations in which characteristics of individuals who self­ enhance match the demand of the situation. It is important to take an integra­ tive approach to examine how different configurations of qualities possessed by individuals who self-enhance and situation-to-situation variability affect adjustment . Previous studies have often examined self-enhancement bias in context­ free situations . For example, people have been asked to compare their self­ ratings with normative criteria without specifying the context (i.e., asking participants to compare themselves with "a hypothetical generalized other" or "most other people"; e .g ., Alicke, 1985; Brown, 1986; Buunk & Van Yperen, 1991; Svenson, 1981; Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). A more ecologically relevant approach is to take into account the nature of the situations in which individu­ als who self-enhance are being evaluated. A recent study alluded to self-enhancement bias being good for adjust­ ment in some instances but not others. For example, individuals who self­ enhance and who survived the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center showed more resilience than individuals who did not self-enhance (Bonanno et al., 2005). The positively skewed expectations of individuals who self-en­ hance and their beliefs in their coping may be beneficial when they are facing extreme adversity. Biased expectations and beliefs in the health domain (e.g., Taylor et al., 1992) might prove more beneficial than biased self-perceptions in personality and achievement domains . However, even as they are more mentally resilient, people who self-enhance are rated by their friends as less well adjusted s ocially, showing that the interpersonal costs are still heavy (Bonanno et al., 2005).

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Recent ly, Kwan and Kuang (200 7) examined the value of s e lf­ enhancement bias in three common situations: (a) getting along interper­ sonally, (b) working collaboratively toward a shared goal, and (c) striving together against another force for the purpose of attaining a reward. Each of these situations portrays different situational features or demands. The value of a self-enhancement bias depends on the coordination of self-enhancement with the demands of the situation. Self-enhancement is beneficial in competitive situations, such as when teams are competing for a single title or award, or when people are work­ ing together as a team against an outside force . In a competitive situation, individuals who self-enhance are actually preferred . A grandiose sense of self­ importance may impress others, signaling to rivals a keen sense of confidence and fueling everyone's competitive urge . However, findings show that indi­ viduals who self-enhance do poorly and are disliked more in noncompetitive interpersonal situations that are not related to work, in which empathy and co­ operation are prized . The self-centered nature of individuals who self-enhance makes it difficult for them to get along with people in everyday interpersonal interactions, because their self-centeredness alienates others and results in in­ teractions that are awkward and uncomfortable. The excessive self-promotions of individuals who self-enhance, especially if their claims of superiority are not backed by skills, creates negative impressions (Paulhus, 1998) . The value of self-enhancement in situations such as working collab­ oratively with others toward a shared goal falls in between that for com­ petitive situations and that for interpersonal situations . On the one hand, self-enhancement qualities such as egocentricity and grandiosity convey that one has the confidence to get things done . On the other hand, these same quali­ ties hamper smooth interactions with others and make individuals who self­

enhance less likable . Therefore, the association between self-enhancement and social inclusion in collaborative situations reflects a combined pattern of both the positive correlates and the negative correlates .

Conclusions

Is it better to have a noisy ego or a quiet ego? The answer is still "It depends ." Such a question tries to simplify self-enhancement to a coin toss of being ei­ ther good or bad, but as a part of human nature, in which almost nothing is simple, self-enhancement is governed by complexities and variables as tangled as human society itself. Thus, the better question that we have discussed is "What makes for an optimal and balanced ego?" How and where does self­ enhancement fit into social adjustment? We believe an optimal ego involves balancing self-enhancement and other qualities that influence its adjustment value, as well as coordinating self-enhancement with the context to meet the demands of the situation . Other qualities of the individual and the nature of the situation have been shown to have an effect, either beneficial or deleteri­ ous, on the adjustment of an individual who self-enhances. Future research needs to take into account a model of self-enhancement

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bias that is illustrative of its dual nature. Self-enhancement bias can be an as­ set in competitive situations, but it is detrimental in interpersonal situations, engendering social costs. People may turn a blind eye to self-centeredness in competitive situations, which serve as a perfect breeding ground for individu­ als who self-enhance.A better understanding of the effects of self-enhancement in work-related situations has important implications for personnel selection. In the workplace, it is a common view that leadership calls for an individual to dominate, be assertive, take charge, and have confidence (Frank, 1993; Lord, DeVader, & Alliger, 1986). These qualities appear to be in line with the char­ acteristics of an individual who self-enhances. Thus, organizations can benefit by placing people who self-enhance in positions that require competitiveness and self-importance and avoid putting them in positions that require people management skills. Self-enhancement can be beneficial at the opportune moment. As we have shown, self-enhancement in a competitive work environment garners the approval of others, because it projects confidence and productivity. This is the case, however, provided that there are other socially desirable qualities within the individual. With no other skills or abilities, an individual who self­ enhances is simply a narcissistic person. However, self-enhancing in social and interpersonal situations tends to do an individual more harm than good, giving others the impression of less emotional connection and likability, especially as time passes. Constantly self­ enhancing in social situations may cause one to lose friends. Thus, the key to an optimal ego appears to be to be able to wield the power of self-enhancement at the right place and time. Self-enhancement is not good or bad on its own, but for maximal benefits and minimal costs, it should be a tool in a person's repertoire that is used only under certain circumstances, not a defining feature of that person's personality. Someone who never self-enhances, however, may not gain the career success that he or she hopes to achieve, whereas someone who self-enhances indiscrim­ inately with the necessary skills may be successful in his or her competitive career but at the heavy cost of alienating friends and losing meaningful rela­ tionships. Even at work, one must have good relationships with other people to be successful. Someone who is disliked by both superiors and coworkers is not likely to rise very far in the ranks, but neither is someone who does not have the self-confidence to make others believe he or she has the requisite ability. Moderation and situational discretion are key. As U.S. society becomes more and more individualistic, narcissism is ris­ ing as well (Lasch, 1978; Twenge, 2006). In a culture in which we are all striv­ ing for our own goals and status symbols, we are losing sight of relationships with others.Yet we are not simply individuals; we are parts of families, teams, organizations, companies, friendships, and cultures. Our relationships define us just as much as our personalities and abilities do . Perhaps it is time that we attempt to concentrate less on promoting the self and more on balancing the self with our external environment.A noisy ego may be good under some situ­ ations, but self-enhancing in the long run is as adaptive as Narcissus staring at his reflection all day.

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References Alicke, M. D. ( 1985). Global self-evaluation as determined by the desirability and controllability of trait adjectives. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 49, 1621-1630. Allport, G. W. (1937). Personality: A psychological interpretation. New York: Holt. American Psychiatric Association. (1994). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders (4th ed.). Washington, DC: Author. Atwater, L. E., & Yammarino, F. J. (1997). Self-other rating agreement: A review and model. In G. R Ferris & K. M. Rowland (Eds.), Research in personnel and human resources management (Vol. 15, pp. 121-174). Greenwich, CT: JAl Press. Block, J., & Colvin, C. R (1994). Positive illusions and well-being revisited: Separating fiction from fact. Psychological Bulletin, 11 6, 28. Bonanno, G. A , Field, N. P. , Kovacevic, A , & Kaltman, S. (2002). Self-enhancement as a buffer against extreme adversity: Civil war in Bosnia and traumatic loss in the United States. Per­ sonality and Social Personality Bulletin, 28, 184-196. Bonanno, G. A., Rennicke, C., & Dekel, S. (2005). Self-enhancement among high-exposure survi­ vors of the September 11th terrorist attack: Resilience or social maladjustment? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 984-998. Brown, J. D. (1986). Evaluations of self and others: Self-enhancement biases in social judgments. Social Cognition, 4, 353-376. Buunk, B. P. , & Van Yperen, N. W. (1991). Referential comparisons, relational comparisons, and exchange orientation: Their relation to marital satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17, 709-7 11. Colvin, C . R, Block, J., & Funder, D. C . (1995). Overly positive self-evaluations and personality: Negative implications for mental health. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, 1152-1162. Felson, R. B. (1981). Ambiguity and bias in the self-concept. Social Psychology Quarterly, 44, 64-69. Festinger, L. (1954). Motivation leading to social behavior. In M. R Jones (Ed.), Nebraska Sympo­ sium on Motivation (Vol. 2, pp. 191-218). Lincoln: University of Nebraska. Frank, M. S. (1993). The essence of leadership. Public Personnel Management, 22, 381-389. Kenny, D. A (1994). Interpersonal perception: A social relations analysis. New York: Guilford Press. Kwan, V. S. Y., John, O. P. , Kenny, D. A., Bond, M. H., & Robins, R. W. (2004). Reconceptualizing individual differences in self-enhancement bias: An interpersonal approach. Psychological Review, 111, 94-110. Kwan, V. S. Y., John, O. P., Robins, R w. , & Kuang, L. L. (2007). Conceptualizing and assessing self-enhancement bias: A componential approach. Manuscript submitted for publication. Kwan, V. S. Y., & Kuang, L. L. (2007). When does self-enhancement affect social adjustment? Manu­ script submitted for publication. Lasch, C. (1978). The culture of narcissism: American life in an age of diminishing expectations. New York: Norton. Lord, R. G., DeVader, C. L., & Alliger, G. M. (1986). A meta-analysis ofthe relation between person­ ality traits and leadership perceptions: An application of validity generalization procedures. Journal ofApplied Psychology, 71 , 402-410. Norem, J. K. (2002). Defensive self-deception and social adaptation among optimists. Journal of Research in Personality, 36, 549-555. Paulhus, D. L. (1998). Interpersonal and intrapsychic adaptiveness of trait self-enhancement: A mixed blessing? Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 74 , 1197-1208. Robins, R w., & Beer, J. S. (200 1). Positive illusion about the self: Short-term benefits and long­ term costs. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 80, 340-352. Sedikides, C., Rudich, E. A., Gregg, A. P., Kumashiro, M., & Rusbult, C . E. (2004). Are normal narcissists psychologically healthy? Self-esteem matters. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 400-416. Shedler, J., Mayman, M., & Manis, M. (1993). The illusion of mental health. American Psycholo­ gist, 48, 1117-1131.

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Svenson, O. (1981). Are w e all less risky and more skillful than our fellow drivers? Acta Psycho­ logica, 47, 143-148. Taylor, S. E., & Brown, J. D. (1988). Positive illusions and well-being: A social psychological per­ spective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210. Taylor, S. E., & Gollwitzer, P. M. (1995). Effects of mindset on positive illusions. Journal ofPerson­ ality and Social Psychology, 69, 213-226. Taylor, S. E., Kemeny, M. E., Aspinwall, L. G., Schneider, S. G., Rodriguez, R, & Herbert, M. (1992). Optimism, coping, psychological distress, and high-risk sexual behavior among men at risk for acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 460-473. Taylor, S. E., Lerner, J. S., Sherman, D. K, Sage, R M., & McDowell, N. K (2003). Portrait of a self­ enhancer: Well adjusted and well liked or maladjusted and friendless? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 165-176. Twenge, J. M. (2006). Generation me: Why today's young are more confident, assertive, entitled­ and more miserable than ever before. New York: Free Press.

5 Taming the Wild Ego: The Challenge of Humility Julie Juola Exline In this chapter, I introduce the metaphor of a wild ego. There are several ways the term wild could be used, three of which are relevant here. First, a creature that is wild is one that roams free, with no limits, nothing to fence it in. Sec­ ond, wildness could imply a lack of constancy-a tendency toward instability or rapid fluctuation, of being tough to pin down. Third and finally, being wild could imply being untamed and disconnected from others, having a maverick quality in which autonomy and individuality are prized above all else. In this chapter, I begin by outlining ways each of these three facets of wild­ ness (or, as other authors in this volume describe, "noisiness") might be helpful in understanding problems with the ego. Next, I shift the focus to description of a humble or quiet ego, which I contrast with the wild ego. I conclude the chap­ ter by exploring some challenges that can arise if one tries to tame or humble the ego. Please note that, in keeping with the focus of this volume, the word ego is used here to refer to a broad sense of self, one that encompasses a wide range of self-oriented perceptions and motivations.

The Wild Ego: A Quick Look at Benefits and Costs

Before addressing the dangers of a wild ego, it seems important to consider some of its potential benefits. A wild ego could be framed as a positive, ex­ pansive self-view, one associated with positive emotion and confidence. Such qualities should energize people to pursue goals, as has been shown in research on stable self-esteem (Kernis, 2005). The flexibility of a wild ego could be a strength, especially if contrasted with a rigid self-view that admits no discrep­ ant feedback.A sense of self-respect should also promote assertiveness, reduc­ ing the odds that a person will be exploited by others. It is clear, then, that a positive self-view can bring its share of benefits. But how much is too much? As discussed in chapter 2 (this volume), an inflated sense of self can get people into trouble, as evidenced in many stud­ ies in the field of psychology. An exaggerated, cocky sense of confidence can lead people to set goals that are too high (Campbell, Goodie, & Foster, 2004), particularly if there is an opportunity to show off and gain the admiration of others (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). An overconfident person may expect to

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reach lofty goals with minimal effort, and failure can be particularly deflating when expectations have been set so high. (For a creative look at these prob­ lems as they apply to the post-Baby Boomer "Generation Me," see Twenge, 2006.) In more general terms, positive emotions foster expansive attitudes in which people tend to take on new projects and activities (Fredrickson, 2001). Excessive optimism about what one can achieve could easily cause a person to become overextended, as readily seen in the case of mania . Thus, even if posi­ tive emotions and confidence facilitate the pursuit of goals, people are likely to benefit by having some awareness of their limitations. What about the second quality of a wild ego, the tendency toward rapid and frequent fluctuation? Within the past decade, a growing literature has demonstrated costs associated with unstable self-esteem. For example, a re­ cent review by Kernis (2005) suggested that unstable self-esteem is positively associated with hostility, defensiveness, reactivity, and problems with the regulation of emotions (see also chap. 8, this volume). As Crocker and Wolfe (2001) showed, many people see their sense of personal worth or value as being contingent on some external factor, such as performance, appearance, or social approval. When one's sense of self-worth is at stake, the prospect of failure is likely to be terrifying, creating tremendous performance pressure on the do­ mains in question. Broadly speaking, moods and energies can fluctuate wildly when people focus excessively on the self (Leary, 2004) or on the pursuit of self­ esteem (Crocker & Park, 2004). Also as discussed in chapter 2, some of the most glaring costs of a wild ego center on its social features: disconnection, competitive strivings, and distanc­ ing from others. To use an image from the animal kingdom, one might picture monkeys that are preoccupied with their respective places in the dominance hierarchy. Seeing resources as limited, they view others as rivals and behave

accordingly. What happens when humans perceive their worlds in terms of a social hierarchy, focusing on how their own status, power, and privileges stack up against those of others? Seeing oneself as the low person on the social totem pole would obviously be an unpleasant prospect. However, there can also be costs to seeing oneself as a winner.Being the target of envy can cause empathic distress, relationship strain, and fears of retaliation or rejection (Exline & Lo­ bel, 1999). Of course, people who are oriented toward dominance will actively pursue superior status, craving the power, respect, and success that they associate with it. This is the stance of a narcissistic individual, and it tends to foster interpersonal strife. Individuals who feel superior to others often feel entitled to special privileges, making them prone to exploit others by taking more than their rightful share (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). A narcissistic, inflated sense of entitlement also makes people more likely to blame others (McCullough, Emmons, Kilpatrick, & Mooney, 2003), hold grudges (Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004), and seek vengeance (Brown, 2004; Twenge & Campbell, 2003). In relationships, narcis­ sistic individuals tend to seek out people who will admire them and make them look good (Campbell, 1999), and they then show low commitment to these part­ ners (Campbell & Foster, 2002).As a result, partners of narcissistic individuals

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often end up feeling used and unsatisfied. Their initial positive impressions of the narcissistic person usually diminish over time. All of these factors can make it difficult for narcissistic individuals to maintain satisfying intimate relationships (see chap. 2, this volume). In seeking a prototype of the wild ego, one might envision a person with a narcissistic, grandiose sense of self-but one characterized by a certain fra­ gility (Kernis, 2005; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Zeigler-Hill, 2006). The term threatened egotism (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996) is a useful label for this stance. In threatened egotism, one can see all three aspects of wildness: (a) arrogance, (b) a desire to dominate others, and (c) an underlying fragility. For the threatened egotist, one of the major bases of self-worth would be a need for superiority and dominance-inherently unstable qualities that also represent disconnection from others. Because of this shaky foundation, the threatened egotist would not have a firm conviction of personal worth, instead harboring an enduring-but hidden-fear of being exposed as worthless . The only way for this person to maintain a sense of value and security would be to cling desperately to a sense of the self as superior. The social world would become a hostile place in which one's own interests must be guarded with vigilance. This person's ego would be like a balloon inflated beyond the point of stability, ready to burst at the slightest provocation. In keeping with this view, the threatened­ egotism pattern has been identified as a major source of violent behaviors, ranging from domestic violence to genocide (Baumeister et aL, 1996).

Humility and the Quiet Ego

Given the costs of a wild ego, one might wonder about alternatives: What would a quiet ego be like? One aspect of a quiet ego may be a sense of humility, a concept that has begun to receive theoretical and empirical attention over the past decade. The term humility is often misunderstood. For example , Tangney (2000, 2002) has described how people often confuse humility with humilia­ tion or low self-esteem. A recent study of college students revealed, somewhat surprisingly, that they held quite positive views of humility, often associating it with modesty about achievements or abilities (Exline & Geyer, 2004). Yet even though the students tended to see humility as a strength, they saw it as a qual­ ity that was more suitable for certain types of people (e.g ., religious seekers, subordinates) than for others (e.g., leaders, entertainers). In two recent overviews, Tangney (2000, 2002) identified several key fea­ tures of humility: an accurate sense of one's abilities; the ability to acknowl­ edge mistakes, imperfections, gaps in knowledge, and limitations; openness to new ideas, contradictory information, and advice; keeping one's abilities and accomplishments in perspective; low self-focus or an ability to "forget" the self; and an appreciation of the value of all things. In another recent conceptual article (Exline, Campbell, et aL, 2004), my colleagues and I offered a tentative definition of humility as a nondefensive willingness to see the self accurately, including both strengths and limitations. Both of these views of humility seem closely related to the concept of a quiet ego as used in this volume. Thus, al-

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though fine-grained distinctions could be made among the concepts, the terms

humility, humble ego, and quiet ego are used interchangeably in the para­ graphs that follow. The core qualities of a humble, quiet ego contrast directly with those of a wild ego. First, a quiet ego is one that is not inflated-at least, not deliber­ ately. Because humans are notoriously imperfect gauges of reality, it may be unreasonable to insist on a completely accurate self-view to describe a person as humble.However, a humble person should be able to tolerate an honest look at the self, reflecting on both strengths and limitations in an evenhanded way. It is important to note that a humble self-view need not be negative or self­ deprecating, and it does not require a sense of inferiority to others. A humble person might see the self as a relatively small part in a larger scheme of things, perhaps in comparison to God or to the universe. When seen from such a broad perspective, however, one would appear to be about the same size as all other humans. Second, a secure, stable basis of self-worth should provide the foundation for a quiet ego.A secure attachment style should be a major asset, particularly if it is rooted in a sense of being unconditionally loved-perhaps by a parent, a relationship partner, or God.Beliefs about the inherent value and dignity of life might provide another type of solid foundation. Regardless of the exact source, people may need a secure sense of personal worth before they can tolerate an honest assessment of their strengths and weaknesses . If people lack such a foundation, feedback about limitations could prompt defensive reactions. It could also prompt depressive responses or self-loathing, particularly among people who already have negative self-views. Third, relative to the wild ego, a quiet ego should involve a greater sense of connection with others. Granted, some humble people might live a hermit's

lifestyle, but for those trying to function in the social world, it seems likely that seeing oneself as similar to others-and connected to them in meaningful ways-should help to quiet the ego. Seeing oneself as serving a valuable role within a larger system should work against competitive strivings and preoc­ cupation with one's place in a status hierarchy. The group with which one feels connected could range from a small unit (e.g., one's family) to one that is much more inclusive (e.g., humanity, living things, the universe) . In terms of promot­ ing dispositional humility, one might speculate that a broad, perhaps universal sense of connection would be more effective than a more limited set of bonds with family or close friends. This possibility awaits empirical testing.

The Humble, Quiet Ego: An Undervalued Psychological Stock?

Now that many costs of the wild ego have been documented in the psychology literature, it seems timely to consider possible benefits of a humble, quiet ego. What hypotheses could be offered at this point? One hypothesis is that humility should facilitate good social relationships . Because they are not seeking social dominance, humble people should be willing to learn from others (Tangney, 2000, 2002) and to give credit where it is due. To the extent that it helps people

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to transcend self-interest, humility should also pave the way for virtues such as forgiveness, repentance, and compassionate love. Because they do not fear being seen as vulnerable or inferior, humble people should be willing to serve others and to receive from others. A quiet ego might also restrain people from adopting judgmental attitudes, because those who are humble should not need to derogate others to feel better about themselves. In more individual terms, humility should help people to set realistic goals. By protecting people from excessive ego involvement in their goals, a humble outlook should reduce the amount of energy that people need to spend on self­ enhancement and mood regulation, leaving more energy for other pursuits. Humility should also free people to admit that they need help, thus opening the door to accepting resources from others that can save time and energy. A quiet ego should also facilitate an attitude of self-compassion (Neff, 2003) after people make errors. When considering the potential benefits of humility, the fable of the tor­ toise and the hare may be helpful to consider. In this tale, a naturally speedy but cocky hare wastes time during a race, eventually losing to his opponent-a steady and persistent tortoise. One might envision humility as the tortoise in this race, with narcissism symbolized by the hare. Humility is an unassuming quality, one that may not impress people much in terms of first impressions. On the surface, the narcissistic individual may seem much more able and im­ pressive. In the long run, however, the personal and social benefits of humility should pay off. Time-and empirical testing-will tell. Despite its potential benefits, humility seems to be an undervalued stock in modern Western culture, which has been obsessed with the promotion of self-esteem (Twenge, 2006) . There seems to be a delicate balance to strike when considering the self-esteem movement.Although the dangers of egotism are clear, self-esteem could be adaptive to the extent that it represents a sense of personal worth, motivation, and confidence. When seen through this lens, healthy self-esteem seems compatible with a quiet ego. Perhaps high self­ esteem poses problems only when it runs wild, knowing no sense of personal limitation or accountability-only unlimited opportunity, entitlement, and competitive success.

Humility as the "Master Virtue"? Probably Not . . .

At this point, it seems important to clarify that I am not proposing humility as the ultimate virtue, one that can stand alone. It would seem ironic to make such a bold claim about such an unpretentious virtue. Granted, humility might provide a good foundation for virtuous action. It could be seen as a protective coating or cushion, a shock absorber that protects the ego from bumps. Or it might be like a screen, one that sifts out damaging aspects of corrective feed­ back while admitting useful parts. Humility appears to be a protective and temperate quality, one that moderates goal pursuit and saves emotional en­ ergy. When considered alone, humility does not seem to be an energizing force; it is a stabilizing, protective one.

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One implication of seeing humility as protective is that a humble person could also be a passive one. Of course, a humble outlook in no way rules out the presence of achievement strivings, but if a humble person is to be active in goal pursuit, then there needs to be some infusion of motivation and energy into the system. Competitive success or dominance would probably not be the goals of choice, but other motivators might include a desire to learn, creative strivings, or a desire to serve others or God. If a person's humility stems from a deep sense of connection with others, this sense of interdependence should encourage prosocial pursuits.Yet because prosocial motives are not a required element of the definition of humility (Ex­ line, Campbell, et aI., 2004), it remains possible that a humble person might pursue goals that are nonsocial or even antisocial. For example, if energized primarily by a personal desire for cleanliness, a humble person could spend many days ridding the house of dust bunnies and never get around to helping others. Worse, a government-sponsored engineer might humbly and dutifully help his country to design weapons of mass destruction. If humility is to be a prosocial quality, then prosocial motivators are needed.

Why Are There So Little Data on Humility? Measurement Snags and Preliminary Findings

Some readers may wonder why I am emphasizing conceptual work and test­ able hypotheses instead of providing an in-depth review of research on humil­ ity. The reason is that, to date, little empirical work has focused directly on the humility construct. The first step is to develop several reliable and valid measures of humility, and humility is not an easy concept to measure (see Ex­

line, Campbell, et aI., 2004, for a discussion). For example, do people who are humble realize that they are humble? If they do, would they rate themselves as humble on a self-report questionnaire? Is humility unidimensional or mul­ tidimensional? Despite these difficult issues, advances are being made on the measurement front. Rowatt and colleagues (Powers, Nam, Rowatt, & Hill, 2007; Rowatt et aI., 2006) have developed a measure of humility based on the Implicit Association Test (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and have used semantic-differential methods to assess humility.Another research team has been developing a multidimensional self-report measure (Bollinger, Kopp, Hill, & Williams, 2006; Kopp, Hill, Bollinger, & Williams, 2006). Furthermore, some larger inventories of personality and character strengths also include subscales relevant to humility (e.g., Costa & McCrae, 1992; Lee & Ashton, 2004; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Although there is little published research on humility, the data that do ex­ ist seem to fit with the notion of humility as a character strength.For example, humility has been linked with altruistically motivated helping (Rowatt et aI., 2007) and good school performance (Rowatt et aI., 2006). Humility is negatively linked with narcissism (Bollinger et aI., 2006; Rowatt et aI., 2006) and positively linked with forgiveness (Powers et aI., 2007; Rowatt et aI., 2006) and qualities such as gratitude, spirituality, and agreeableness (Rowatt et aI., 2006).

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Challenges in the Study of Humility: A Quick Sketch of Our Journey

At this point in the chapter, I shift gears. In this last section, I provide a brief, first-person account of some challenges that my colleagues and I have encoun­ tered in our study of humility. Our attempts to understand humility can best be described as a rocky road-and, aptly enough, a humbling one. My interest in humility-related themes began in the early 1990s. As a graduate student at Stony Brook University, I was introduced to social com­ parison research by my advisor, Marci Lobel . While acquainting myself with the social comparison literature, I became troubled by the themes of competi­ tiveness and self-enhancement that seemed to prevail : Was everyone so preoc­ cupied with being superior to others? Partly in response to my question, Marci and I began a series of projects on the social dangers of outperforming others (e .g ., see Exline & Lobel, 1999 ; chap. 15, this volume). I was introduced to the concept of humility during my postdoctoral work with Roy Baumeister and Dianne Tice at Case Western Reserve University. Roy had secured a grant from the John Templeton Foundation to study links among egotism, humility, and forgiveness. We could see from existing research that egotism often led to aggression and self-defeating actions, and the rem­ edy seemed obvious to us at the time : We reasoned that if we could encourage people to focus on their limitations, then they would start to act in constructive, prosocial ways . In our first study, we asked undergraduates to describe a time when they had felt humble . We predicted that writing this "humble essay" (compared with a "proud essay" or no essay) would make people more forgiving toward a player who had betrayed them in the Prisoner's Dilemma game (Axelrod, 1980). The findings were mixed (Exline & Zell, 2007): Although some students who wrote humble essays became more cooperative, they were those who recalled pleas­ ant experiences, such as gazing at stars. Many people associated humility with shameful experiences, with a classic example being a student who recalled getting drunk and throwing up on a friend . Shame, in turn, tended to foster aggression . In another set of forgiveness studies (see Exline & Zell 2007, for an over­ ' view), we asked people to recall offenses of their own that were similar to those that had been committed against them. We reasoned that focusing on one's own offenses would facilitate humility and empathy, both of which should encour­ age forgiveness. Our hypotheses were largely supported for men, but not for women. Among women, thinking about one's own misdeeds seemed to create negative emotions and defensive social comparisons instead of empathy. My research team encountered similar problems in studies of acts of kind­ ness (Exline & Fisher, 2005). As part of a project funded by the Institute for Research on Unlimited Love, we began to test a conduit model of love: If people recall or experience acts of kindness that others have done for them, will they be inspired to pass on kindness to others? Once again, the results were mixed. In general, having people recall times when they received kindness did moti­ vate them to be generous, but memories of receiving kindness often prompted

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feelings of weakness, guilt, or obligation . These negative emotions in turn made people less likely to show kindness to others. These studies have taught my colleagues and me that facing people with their limitations does not necessarily make them more kind, empathic, or for­ giving. In hindsight, these findings make sense : Mter all, the use of ego threat is a standard social psychological technique used to elicit aggressive and self­ destructive behavior. We were essentially threatening people's egos in these studies, but we were expecting them to reflect on the feedback and respond as humble people would. In retrospect, this was too much to expect. As suggested in research on self-affirmation (e .g., Steele, 1999) and attach­ ment (e.g., Cassidy & Shaver, 1999), it may be vital to help people feel secure before giving them humbling feedback . One promising strategy from clinical lore is the sandwich technique. The premise is that when confronting someone, it can be effective to sandwich critical input between several pieces of positive input. The positive input may help to reduce defensive reactions. (The same procedure also goes by the whimsical name of the "kiss, kick, kiss" strategy.)

Conclusion and Future Directions

As suggested by trends within psychology and the broader culture, this seems like a good time to invest energy in the study of the quiet ego. Although stud­ ies have revealed many benefits of self-esteem, the dangers of the wild ego are also becoming apparent. As I have described in this chapter, a humble or quiet ego would enable people to consider their strengths and limitations in an evenhanded, nondefensive way. There is good reason to propose that a humble stance could yield both personal and social benefits, especially over the long term. However, more empirical work is needed before firm conclusions can be made about the costs and benefits of a quiet ego.

References Axelrod, R. ( 1980). Effective choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 24, 3-25. Baumeister, R. F., Smart, L., & Boden, J. M. ( 1996). Relation ofthreatened egotism to violence and aggression: The dark side of high self-esteem. Psychological Review, 103, 5-33. Bollinger, R. A, Kopp, K J., Hill, P. C., & Williams, J. (2006, August). The validation of a mea­ surement of dispositional humility. Poster presented at the 114th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, LA Brown, R. P. (2004). Vengeance is mine: Narcissism, vengeance, and the tendency to forgive. Jour­ nal ofResearch in Personality, 38 , 576-584. Campbell, W. K ( 1999). Narcissism and romantic attraction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 1254-1270. Campbell, W. K, Bonacci, A. M., Shelton, J., Exline, J. J., & Bushman, B. J. (2004). Psychological entitlement: Interpersonal consequences and validation of a new self-report measure. Journal ofPersonality Assessment, 83 , 29-45. Campbell, W. K , & Foster, C. A (2002). Narcissism and commitment in romantic relationships: An investment model analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 484-495. Campbell, W. K , Goodie, A S., & Foster, J. D. (2004). Narcissism, confidence, and risk attitude. Journal ofBehavioral Decision Making, 17, 297-3 11.

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Cassidy, J . , & Shaver, P. R . (Eds.). (1999). Handbook of attachment. New York: Guilford Press. Costa, P. T., Jr. , & McCrae, R. R. (1992). Revised NEG Personality Inventory (NEG-PI-R) profes­ sional manual. Odessa, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources. Crocker, J., & Park, L. E. (2004). The costly pursuit of self-esteem. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 392-414. Crocker, J., & Wolfe, C. T. (2001). Contingencies of self-worth. Psychological Review, 108, 593-623. Exline, J. J., Baumeister, R. F., Bushman, B. J., Campbell, W. K, & Finkel, E. J. (2004). Too proud to let go: Narcissistic entitlement as a barrier to forgiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 894-912. Exline, J. J., Campbell, W. K , Baumeister, R. F. , Joiner, T., Krueger, J. 1., & Kachorek, L. V. (2004). Humility and modesty. In C . Peterson & M. Seligman (Eds.), Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification (pp. 461-475). New York: Oxford University Press. Exline, J. J., & Fisher, M. L. (2005, January). Sentimental journeys and balanced accounts: Emotion, social exchange, and decisions to "pass on" acts of kindness. Poster presented at the sixth annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, New Orleans, LA. Exline, J. J., & Geyer, A L. (2004). Perceptions of humility: A preliminary study. Self and Iden­ tity, 3, 95-114. Exline, J. J., & Lobel, M. (1999). The perils of outperformance: Sensitivity about being the target of a threatening upward comparison. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 307-337. Exline, J. J., & Zell, A. L. (2007). Does a humble attitude promote forgiveness? Challenges, ca­ veats, and the role of gender. In W. Malcolm, N. De Courville, & K Belicki (Eds.), Women's reflections on the complexities offorgiveness (pp. 235-251). New York: Routledge. Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The role of positive emotions in positive psychology: The broaden-and­ build theory of positive emotions. American Psychologist, 56, 2 18-226. Greenwald, A G., McGhee, D. E., & Schwartz, J. L. K (1998). Measuring individual differences in implicit cognition: The Implicit Association Test. Journal of Personality and Social Psy­ chology, 74, 1464-1480. Kernis, M. H. (2005). Measuring self-esteem in context: The importance of stability of self-esteem in psychological functioning. Journal of Personality, 73, 1-37. Kopp, K J., Hill, P. C., Bollinger, R. A , & Williams, J. (2006, August). A humble undertaking: Research on the measurement of humility. Poster presented at the 114th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, New Orleans, LA. Leary, M. R. (2004). The curse of the self: Self-awareness, egotism, and the quality of human life. New York: Oxford University Press. Lee, K, & Ashton, M. C. (2004). Psychometric properties of the HEXACO Personality Inventory. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 39, 329-358. McCullough, M. E., Emmons, R. A, Kilpatrick, S. D., & Mooney, C. N. (2003). Narcissists as "victims": The role of narcissism in the perception of transgressions. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 885-893. Morf, C. C., & Rhodewalt, F. (2001). Unraveling the paradoxes of narcissism: A dynamic self­ regulatory processing model. Psychological Inquiry, 12, 177-196. Neff, K D. (2003). The development and validation of a scale to measure self-compassion. Self and Identity, 2, 223-250. Peterson, C., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2004). Character strengths and virtues. New York: Oxford University Press. Powers, C., Nam, R. K, Rowatt, W. C., & Hill, P. C. (2007). Associations between humility, spiri­ tual transcendence, and forgiveness. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion, 18, 74-94. Rowatt, W. C., McCullough, G., Johnson, M., LaBouff, J., Mohiuddin, A, & Tsang, J.-A (2007). Dispositional humility and prosocial motivations for helping. Manuscript submitted for publication. Rowatt, W. C., Powers, C., Targhetta, V. , Comer, J., Kennedy, S., & LaBouff, J. (2006). Develop­ ment and initial validation of an implicit measure of humility relative to arrogance. Journal of Positive Psychology, 1, 198-2 11. Steele, C. M. (1999). The psychology of self-affirmation. New York: Psychology Press.

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Tangney, J. P. (2000). Humility: Theoretical perspectives, empirical findings and directions for future research. Journal ofSocial and Clinical Psychology, 19, 70-82. Tangney, J. P. (2002). Humility. In C. R. Snyder & S. J. Lopez (Eds.), Handbook ofpositive psychol· ogy (pp. 411-419). Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Twenge, J. M. (2006). Generation me: Why today's young Americans are more confident, assertive, entitled-and more miserable than ever before. New York: Free Press. Twenge, J. M., & Campbell, W. K. (2003). "Isn't it fun to get the respect that we're going to deserve?" Narcissism, social rejection, and aggression. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29 , 261-272. Wallace, H. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2002). The performance of narcissists rises and falls with perceived opportunity for glory. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 82, 819-834. Zeigler-Hill, V. (2006). Discrepancies between implicit and explicit self-esteem: Implications for narcissism and self-esteem instability. Journal ofPersonality, 74, 119-143.

6 From Egosystem to Ecosystem: Implications for Relationships, Learning, and Well-Being Jennifer Crocker Egosystem motivation-the desire to construct, maintain, protect, and enhance positive images of the self-underlies a great deal of human behavior (Crocker, Nuer, Olivier, & Cohen, 2006). In this chapter, I propose that egosystem goals are motivating but costly for learning and growth, relationships, and well­ being. I propose an alternative: ecosystem motivation, in which others' needs have priority, in a non-zero-sum framework. This framework ironically sug­ gests that when people give priority to supporting and having compassion for others, they are more likely to satisfy their own fundamental needs and experi­ ence increased well-being.

Egosystem and Ecosystem Motivation

People want to see themselves in a positive light, and they want others to agree with their rosy self-views. Over the past 3 decades, social psychological

research has documented widespread self-enhancing biases in judgments of the self, defensive responses to self-threats, and self-serving attributions for success and failure (see chap. 4). This research suggests that people have ego­ system goals: They desire to construct, maintain, and defend positive images of themselves and to see themselves as worthy and valuable. This research portrays people as concerned with others only insofar as others satisfy desires of the self, bestowing worth and value on the self through their evaluation, ac­ ceptance, rejection, reflection on, or comparison with the self.

The research reported in this chapter was supported by National Institute of Mental Health grant ROI MH58869. I am grateful to Noah Nuer, Marc-Andre Olivier, and Sam Cohen, my friends and collaborators at Learning as Leadership, Inc. The idea of egosystem and ecosystem motivational frameworks is theirs; my role has been to translate it into psychology. I also am grateful to Paul Denning, without whose tireless efforts the data for the Goals and Adjustment to College Study would not have been collected; to the graduate students and postdoctoral fellows in my laboratory; and to Rebecca Caulfield, Timothy Cavnar, Andrew Crocker, and Sarah Franz for their assistance with data collection and entry.

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Yet people sometimes genuinely care about and prioritize the well-being of others; they are compassionate, generous, and supportive of others, with­ out concern for what this means for their self-image (Batson, 1998; Brown & Brown, 2006; see also chap. 15, this volume) . Drawing on the biological notion of an ecosystem, my colleagues and I (Crocker, Nuer, et aI., 2006) defined eco­ system motivation as a "motivational framework for the self in which people see themselves as part of a larger whole, a system of individuals whose actions have consequences for others, with repercussions for the entire system" (p. 48) . In this framework , the well-being of the self and others is not a zero-sum propo­ sition. Consequently, in ecosystem motivation people are willing to prioritize the well-being of others, not out of virtue or self-sacrifice but instead because ultimately it is the best way-and perhaps the only sustainable way-to en­ sure that their own and others' fundamental needs (as opposed to their egosys­ tem wants) are met . Ecosystem goals are not limited to specific activities, such as community service, volunteer work, or philanthropy; any of these activities could be moti­ vated by either egosystem or ecosystem goals . Similarly, ecosystem goals are not limited to specific relationships, such as people with whom one has a com­ munal relationship; in any interaction with another person, one can try to get others to acknowledge desirable aspects of the self, or one can have the inten­ tion to be supportive, compassionate, and do no harm . Although people may differ in their chronic tendencies to be motivated by egosystem or ecosystem goals, social life requires both motivational systems and the capacity to switch flexibly between them . Just as brilliant plumage can signal to females that a male bird would be a good mate , and fur standing on end can make a wolf appear larger and more intimidating , construction of de­ sired images can help people gain resources and fend off threats . For example, a reputation for loyalty may foster inclusion in groups that control resources, whereas a reputation for ruthlessness may prevent attempts at cheating by others. Threats to desired images can have serious social and financial conse­ quences. Consequently, egosystem goals that are focused on attending to how one appears to others as well as to the self may be essential to human social life (Schlenker, 2003) . However, giving support to others, behaving authentically, and disclosing one's fears and weaknesses build closeness and trust in relation­ ships (Murray, 2005) . Responsiveness to others' needs strengthens social bonds (Reis, Clark , & Holmes, 2004) and increases the likelihood that one will receive support from others . Therefore, ecosystem goals focused on supporting others in a non-zero-sum framework may also be essential to human social life .

Costs and Benefits of Egosystem and Ecosystem Goals

Although egosystem and ecosystem goals both contribute to human social life, they have quite different psychological and social consequences. When people have egosystem goals, they are highly motivated and energized; and they ob­ tain social and material resources for the self; but they may unintentionally undermine their learning, relationships, and well-being . When people have ecosystem goals that prioritize the needs or well-being of something larger

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than themselves, or of other people, they may forgo or give away social or ma­ terial resources but paradoxically enhance their learning, relationships, and well-being .

Motivation Egosystem goals are highly motivating . People want to experience the boosts to self-esteem and the emotional high of success, praise, acknowledgment, recognition, admiration, and feelings of superiority, and they want to avoid the loss of self-esteem and intensely negative emotions that can accompany criticism, failure, rejection, feelings of inadequacy or inferiority, and contempt (Crocker & Park, 2004). When the ego quiets, therefore, people may become unmotivated or unenthusiastic, lacking in passion. However, ecosystem goals may also be a source of motivation and enthusiasm, albeit without the intense self-relevant emotions of pride and shame that accompany success and failure at egosystem goals (Crocker, Nuer, et aI., 2006). Egosystem goals may lead to obsessive passion, and ecosystem goals may lead to harmonious passion (Valle­ rand et aI., 2003) .

Learning and Growth When performance goes smoothly, learning is compatible with egosystem motivation; by learning and growing, people can demonstrate ever-greater competence, enhancing their self-image. When people encounter difficulty or setbacks, however, egosystem motivation is incompatible with learning; mis­ takes, criticisms, setbacks, and failures become self-threats to be defended against, instead of learning opportunities (Crocker & Park, 2004; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Goldenberg, 2003). For example, under self-esteem threat, peo­ ple reject or dismiss negative feedback (Baumeister, 1998), derogate the source of negative feedback (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1982), or search for explanations that diminish their own responsibility (Greenberg & Pyszczyn­ ski, 1985). Each of these responses decreases the likelihood that people will identify and understand their own contribution to the problem and therefore undermines learning (Niiya & Crocker, 2006) . Learning is also compatible with ecosystem goals; when the well-being of other people or something larger than the self is at stake, people may care deeply about improving their own abilities so they can better contribute or support others. Furthermore, because they are not focused on self-image, eco­ system goals may foster learning and growth better than egosystem goals at precisely those moments when learning is most difficult and important: when things are not going well, or when one is on the receiving end of criticism, rejec­ tion, or failure.

Relationships In egosystem motivation, relationships become subtly, or blatantly, antagonis­ tic. For example, in achievement domains one person's success diminishes oth-

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ers' accomplishments. In social relationships, the goal of winning over another person focuses the self on gratifying one's own desires, perhaps at the expense of others. Furthermore, in the egosystem framework, others become judges or evaluators of the self, creating tension in relationships; consequently, egosys­ tern goals should foster feelings of competition and conflict, undermine close­ ness, and increase feelings of loneliness. In contrast, in ecosystem motivation, people do not view relationships as being zero sum in nature; ecosystem goals support both the self and others. Consequently, ecosystem goals build social bonds and create collaborative, supportive relationships.

Well-Being Egosystem goals may undermine well-being because they foster feelings of loneliness and, over time, diminish the social support people receive from oth­ ers. Ecosystem goals, however, should enhance well-being, because they foster feelings of closeness and build social support . Social support has benefits for both physical and psychological health (Cohen & Syme, 1985; Pierce, Sarason, & Sarason, 1996; Sarason, Sara son, & Gurung, 199 7; Uchino, 2004; Uchino, Cacioppo, & Kiecolt-Glaser, 1996). Furthermore, the perception that others are available and supportive is more strongly related to health and well-being than is objective social support received from others (Cohen & Syme, 1985). If egosystem goals undermine social support, and ecosystem goals increase it, then these goals should also have consequences for psychological well-being and depression.

The Goals and Adjustment to College Study

At the start of their freshman year of college, 199 students were paid to par­ ticipate in a study of goals and adjustment to college CCanevello & Crocker, 2007; Crocker & Canevello, 2007; Crocker, Niiya, & Luhtanen, 2007). Students gave their informed consent, completed a series of pretest questionnaires, and received instructions for completing the remainder of the study. Participants accessed a Web-based survey once each week for 10 weeks in the fall semester and completed a questionnaire about their goals in the past week, their psycho­ logical well-being, their academic outcomes, and their relationships. Finally, they completed a posttest survey. Participants were paid for taking part in the study, and they could earn a bonus for completing all 12 surveys; consequently, of 199 students in the study, 194 completed all 12 surveys.1 Each week, students rated their egosystem and ecosystem goals over the past week in two domains (academics and friendships). Examples of egosys­ tern items included "avoid showing your weaknesses," "avoid being wrong," "avoid being criticized by others," "get others to recognize or acknowledge your intelligence," "convince others that you are right," and "do things you know you can succeed at." Examples of ecosystem items included "have compassion IMore detail on the methods and procedures of the study are available from the author.

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for others' mistakes and weaknesses," "be supportive of others," "avoid being selfish or self-centered," and "avoid doing anything that would be harmful to others."

Goals and Outcomes The study design provided multiple opportunities to examine the correlates and consequences of egosystem and ecosystem goals. Hierarchical linear mod­ eling analyses were used to examine short-term within-person associations be­ tween weekly goals and weekly outcomes; weekly egosystem goals and weekly ecosystem goals were entered simultaneously as within-person predictors of weekly outcomes. These analyses revealed whether changes in participants' goals led to changes in their outcomes, regardless of their average levels of the goals and outcomes. Regression analyses were used to examine individual differences in chronic egosystem and chronic ecosystem goals; each outcome (averaged across the 10 weeks) was regressed onto average egosystem and av­ erage ecosystem goals scores across the 10 weekly reports, gender, and social desirability. Relatively long-term changes in outcomes were investigated in regression analyses that predicted posttest outcomes from chronic egosystem and ecosystem goals , controlling for pretest levels of the outcome, gender, and social desirability. RELATIONSHIPS. Ecosystem goals foster feelings of closeness and social support, whereas egosystem goals foster feelings of loneliness and decreased social support. Several findings from the Goals and Adjustment to College Study support this conclusion. Each week , participants rated their relation­ ship closeness and feelings of loneliness; on weeks when their egosystem goals were relatively high (compared with their own baseline), participants reported feeling more loneliness. On weeks when their ecosystem goals were relatively high (again, compared with their own baselines), participants reported feel­ ing more closeness. Furthermore, participants with high average egosystem goals tended to be high in loneliness over the 10 weekly reports, especially if they were also low in ecosystem goals. Participants with high ecosystem goals, however, tended to feel closer to others across the 10 weekly reports, especially if they were low in egosystem goals. A third set of analyses examined changes in perceived social support from the pretest at the beginning of the semester to the posttest at the end of the semester. Students with high average levels of ecosystem goals during the 10 weekly reports showed increases in social sup­ port from friends, but only if they were also low in egosystem goals. Additional items included in the weekly survey enriched our understand­ ing of why egosystem and ecosystem goals have these effects. Ecosystem goals were strongly associated with believing that it is important that people look out for each other, whereas egosystem goals were strongly associated with be­ lieving that people should look out for themselves, even at the expense of oth­ ers, and with more frequent interpersonal conflicts. These associations were consistently observed both for individual differences in chronic goals and for changes in goals from week to week .

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Both between- and within-person analyses indicated that egosystem goals were associated with increased loneliness and conflict and a zero-sum perspec­ tive on relationships, whereas ecosystem goals were associated with increased relationship closeness and a non-zero-sum perspective on relationships. Analyses of change over time suggested that ecosystem goals increased social support, but only for people who were also low in egosystem goals. LEARNING. Ecosystem goals fostered an orientation toward learning and growth. Each week, participants completed measures of learning orientations, including a measure of growth goals, interest in their courses, whether they had asked questions in class, and self-regulation (e.g., completing assignments on schedule, staying focused on important goals, not procrastinating). On weeks when their ecosystem goals were high (relative to their own baselines), participants were higher in growth goals, had more interest in their courses, asked more questions in class, and improved their self-regulation compared with weeks when they were low in ecosystem goals. Furthermore, partici­ pants who averaged high in ecosystem goals across the 10 weekly reports also reported more growth goals and more interest in the ir courses, asked more questions in their classes, and reported better self-regulation. Egosystem goals were unrelated to any of the learning orientation measures in these analyses. Egosystem and ecosystem goals also predicted changes in students' achievement goals over the semester. Students completed three measures of learning goals and three measures of performance goals at pretest and post­ test.Average egosystem goals across the 10 weekly reports predicted increases over the semester in the goal to avoid failure (performance avoidance goals), the goal to outperform others (performance approach goals), and the goal to demonstrate one's intelligence (ability-validation goals). Average egosystem goals also predicted decreases over the semester in the desire to learn from failure . Average ecosystem goals predicted increases in the goal to acquire knowledge and in the goal to learn from failure over the semester. Both between- and within-person analyses of learning-oriented outcomes, and analyses of changes in achievement goals across the first semester of col­ lege, indicated that ecosystem goals were associated with increased learning orientations . Unexpectedly, egosystem goals were not related to any of the weekly measures of learning orientations. Egosystem goals did, however, pre­ dict increases in performance-focused achievement goals over the first semes­ ter of college .

W ELL-BEING. Egosystem goals undermine well-being, whereas ecosystem goals improve well-being. Each week, participants reported on their feelings of vitality, engagement in the present moment, self-esteem, anxiety, and stress; these measures were combined into a composite well-being measure. Well­ being was higher on weeks when participants were high, relative to their own baselines, in ecosystem goals. Within-person changes in well-being were not associated with changes in egosystem goals, except for one of the well-being indicators-being engaged in the present moment . Furthermore, the more ecosystem goals participants had on average across the 10 weekly reports, the

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higher their well-being; the more egosystem goals they had, the lower their average well-being. Students also completed measures of anxiety, depression, and stress at pretest and posttest.Egosystem and ecosystem goals did not predict changes in stress across the semester, but they did predict changes in anxiety and depres­ sion. Students with higher average egosystem goals became more depressed and more anxious over the first semester of college, whereas students with higher average ecosystem goals became less depressed and anxious over the first semester. Within- and between-person analyses, and analyses of changes over time, all indicate that egosystem goals undermined psychological well-being, whereas ecosystem goals improved psychological well-being .

Mechanisms Egosystem motivation might affect well-being through a variety of routes, and at different levels of analysis . Egosystem goals may use the fight-or­ flight physiological system, which evolved to mobilize resources in response to threats to survival, whereas ecosystem goals may use the physiological sys­ tems for attachment, which promote caregiving and the protection of others, especially offspring . In a physiological sense, egosystem motivation activates the fight-or-flight response, raising cortisol levels (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004) and undermining immune system responses (Dickerson, Kemeny, Aziz, Kim, & Fahey, 2004). Ecosystem motivation is hypothesized to activate endocrine sys­ tems that support caregiving, which is called the species-preservation system (Henry & Wang, 1998) or the tend-and-befriend system (Taylor et aI., 2000). The attachment hormones oxytocin, progesterone, and perhaps vasopressin are implicated in the tend-and-befriend system (Henry & Wang, 1998; Taylor et aI., 2000). In humans, nasal inhalation of oxytocin increases trust (Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005) and down-regulates cortisol during marital conflict (Ditzen, Bodenmann, Ehlert, & Heinrichs, 2006). Thus, ego­ system and ecosystem goals may affect learning, relationships, and well-being through their physiological connections to the neuroendocrine systems associ­ ated with the fight-or-flight and tend-and-befriend responses to stress. In a psychological sense, the more people attempt to construct desired self­ images, the more their attention will be focused on how others see them, lead­ ing to high public self-consciousness and social anxiety (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). Egosystem motivation might be associated with decreased intrinsic motivation or increased extrinsic motivation, which are negatively related to well-being (Deci & Ryan, 2000; see also chap . 10, this volume). Egosystem mo­ tivation might be linked to greater self-judgment and self-criticism, as people continually evaluate whether their behavior is consistent with the self-images they wish to construct, or to external contingencies of self-worth . Because one cannot completely control how others see the self, people with egosystem moti­ vation may feel they are at the mercy of other people. Several psychological mechanisms could also account for the effects of ecosystem motivation on learning, relationships, and well-being . When people

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are driven by ecosystem motivation, they may be higher in self-compassion and less critical of their own mistakes and weaknesses, seeing them as part of the human experience (Neff, 2003; see also chap. 3, this volume). Ecosystem motivation may be associated with the sense that one can be the source of need satisfaction for oneself and others. Ecosystem motivation may create a non-zero-sum, less competitive view of others, fostering feelings of closeness and building social support. Ecosystem goals may give people a reason to learn even when learning is difficult or ego threatening; what better reason to learn than because it will help one support the people and things about which one cares?

Caveats and Conclusions

The results of the Goals and Adjustment to College Study suggest that ego­ system goals have considerable costs to relationships and well-being, and al­ though they can foster growth they do so less effectively than ecosystem goals. Ecosystem goals are associated with increased learning, increased relationship closeness and decreased loneliness, and increased well-being. The fact that these effects were replicated in between-person analyses of chronic goals and outcomes over a semester, analyses of changes from the beginning to the end of the semester, and in within-person analyses of relation­ ships between weekly goals and weekly outcomes is important for several rea­ sons. First, the between-person effects indicate that people differ reliably and consistently in how much they have egosystem and ecosystem goals, and those individual differences are related to individual differences in learning, rela­ tionships, and well-being. Second, the fact that these effects were consistently observed in within-person analyses means that these goals can change from week to week, and when they do, outcomes also change. This suggests that people might be able to increase their growth goals, relationship closeness, and well-being, and decrease loneliness, by increasing their ecosystem goals. Third, the within-person analyses examined effects of variations around individuals' own averages on these measures, regardless of whether they were chronically high or low in egosystem or ecosystem goals. Thus, unlike the between-person effects, the within-person effects cannot be due to unmeasured individual dif­ ferences that affect both goals and outcomes. Interventions that helped people explore the costs and benefits of their egosystem goals and helped them clarify, if they chose to, ecosystem goals, could have salubrious effects on relationships, learning, and well-being. People sometimes erroneously assume that egosystem goals are bad and that ecosystem goals are good. Both egosystem and ecosystem motivation, and the ability to switch flexibly between them, are important to human social life . Both have important benefits and important costs. My research emphasizes the costs of the egosystem and the benefits of the ecosystem because in modern, individualistic societies they are underappreciated. It is neither possible nor desirable to rid oneself entirely of egosystem goals. Problems develop when people overemphasize egosystem goals, or rigidly adhere to them even when the results are counterproductive. Instead, it is helpful to be aware of the qual-

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ity of one's goals and their likely consequences and to choose to operate out of one motivational framework or the other at each moment. When egosystem goals contribute to one's survival or well·being, giving them up is reckless. However, when the only thing at stake is one's ego, then ecosystem goals may be more constructive . The benefits of ecosystem goals are not a result of being a "good person," or even aspiring to make the world a better place or to make a difference for other people some day in the future . Practicing ecosystem goals, using them as a compass to guide behavior during the routine and mundane activities of one's daily life, improves relationships, learning, and ultimately creates sustainable well-being for oneself and others.

References Batson, C. D. (1998). Altruism and prosocial behavior. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lin­ dzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol . 2, pp. 282-3 16). New York: McGraw-Hill. Baumeister, R. F. (1998). The self. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 680-740) . New York: McGraw-Hill. Brown, S. L., & Brown, R. M. (2006). Selective investment theory: Recasting the functional signifi­ cance of close relationships. Psychological Inquiry, 1 7, 1-29. Canevello, A., & Crocker, J. (2007). What predicts entity and incremental theories ofrelationships?

Intrapersonal and interpersonal consequences of the goal to support others. Manuscript sub­ mitted for publication. Cohen, S., & Syrne, S. L. ( 1985). Social support and health. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Crocker, J., & Canevello, A. (2007). Creating and undermining social support in communal relation­ ships: The role ofcompassionate and self-image goals. Manuscript submitted for publication. Crocker, J., Niiya, Y., & Luhtanen, R. K. (2007). Ecosystem goals and learning orientations. Manu­ script submitted for publication. Crocker, J., Nuer, N., Olivier, M.-A., & Cohen, S. (2006). Egosystem and ecosystem: Two motiva­

tional orientations for the self. Unpublished manuscript. Crocker, J., & Park, L. E. (2004). The costly pursuit of self-esteem. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 392-414. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227-268. Dickerson, S. S., & Kemeny, M. E. (2004). Acute stressors and cortisol responses: A theoretical integration and synthesis of laboratory research. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 355-39l. Dickerson, S. S., Kemeny, M. E., Aziz, N., Kim, K. H . , & Fahey, J. L. (2004). Immunological effects of induced shame and guilt. Psychosomatic Medicine, 66, 124-13l. Ditzen, B., Bodenmann, J. G., Ehlert, u., & Heinrichs, M. (2006, June). The effects ofsocial support and oxytocin on psychological and physiological stress responses during marital conflict. Paper presented at the International Congress of Neuroendocrinology. Retrieved November 13, 2007, from http://www.upmc.comINRirdonlyres/848E97 40-E2C8-4E4 7 -90AC- ID2AA5FB9A1C/0/ Ditzen.pdf Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. ( 1985). Compensatory self-inflation: A response to the threat to self-regard of public failure. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 49, 273-280. Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. ( 1982). The self-serving attributional bias: Beyond self-presentation. Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology, 18, 56-67. Henry, J. P. , & Wang, S. ( 1998). Effects of early stress on adult affiliative behavior. Psychoneuro­ endocrinology, 23, 863-875. Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, u., & Fehr, E. (2005, June 2). Oxytocin increases trust in humans. Nature, 435, 673-676. Murray, S. L. (2005). Regulating the risks of closeness: A relationship-specific sense offelt security. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 14, 74-78.

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Neff, K. D. (2003). Self-compassion: An alternative conceptualization of a healthy attitude toward oneself. Selfand Identity, 2, 85-1Ol. Niiya, Y., & Crocker, J. (2006). Acquiring knowledge and learning from failure: Theory, measure­ ment, and validation. Unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor. Pierce, G. R, Sarason, B. R, & Sarason, I. G. ( 1996). Handbook of social support and the family. New York: Plenum Press. Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Goldenberg, J. (2003). Freedom versus fear: On the defense, growth, and expansion of the self. In M. R Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook ofself and identity (pp. 3 14-343). New York: Guilford Press. Reis, H. T., Clark, M. S., & Holmes, J. G. (2004). Perceived partner responsiveness as an organizing construct in the study of intimacy and closeness. In D. Mashek & A P. Aron (Eds.), Handbook of closeness and intimacy (pp. 367-389). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Sarason, B. R, Sarason, I. G., & Gurung, R A R. (1997). Close personal relationships and health outcomes: A key to the role of social support. In S. Duck (Ed.), Handbook of personal relation­ ships (2nd ed., pp. 547-573). New York: Wiley. Schlenker, B. R (2003). Self-presentation. In M. R Leary & J. P. Tangney (Eds.), Handbook of self and identity (pp. 492-518). New York: Guilford Press. Schlenker, B. R, & Leary, M. R (1982). Social anxiety and self-presentation: A conceptualization and model. Psychological Bulletin, 92, 641-669. Taylor, S. E . , Klein, L. C . , Lewis, B. P. , Gruenewald, T. L., Gurung, R A R, & Updegraff, J. A (2000). Biobehavioral responses to stress in females: Tend-and-befriend, not fight-or-flight. Psychological Review, 197, 411-429. Uchino, B. N. (2004). Social support and physical health: Understanding the health consequences of our relationships. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Uchino, B. N., Cacioppo, J. T., & Kiecoit-Glaser, J. K. ( 1996). The relationship between social support and physiological processes: A review with emphasis on underlying mechanisms and implications for health. Psychological Bulletin, 119, 488-53 l . Vallerand, R J . , Blanchard, C., Mageau, G. A , Koestner, R , Ratelle, C . , Leonard, M., e t al. (2003). Les passions de l'Ame: On obsessive and harmonious passion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 756-767.

7 Beyond Me: Mindful Responses to Social Threat Kirk Warren Brown, Richard M. Ryan, J. David Creswell, and Christopher P. Niemiec For millennia, philosophers and spiritual leaders have pointed out that at­ tempts to secure our "selves," even at the expense of others, are a primary source-if not the source-of personal distress and interpersonal strife (Wal­ dron, 2003) . Many traditional moral and religious cultures have focused on modifying the expression of behavior to ameliorate the excesses of self­ centeredness, egotism, and other problematic products of self-identification (Leary, 2004; Waldron, 2003), but there has also been long-standing interest, especially among Asian and several Western contemplative and scholarly tra­ ditions, in "taking a look inside" to closely examine the properties and opera­ tion of the self and to investigate qualities of consciousness that can facilitate more adaptive ways of being with oneself and others. In this chapter, we consider theory and findings from our program of research on mindfulness that begin to integrate these traditions with contem­ porary research psychology. Mindfulness is an exemplar of the experiential mode of conscious processing and concerns a receptive state of mind wherein attention, informed by a sensitive awareness of what is occurring in the pres­ ent, simply observes what is taking place; this is in contrast to the conceptu­ ally driven mode of processing, in which occurrences are habitually filtered through cognitive appraisals, evaluations, memories, beliefs, and other forms of cognitive manipulation (see Brown & Cordon, in press, and Brown, Ryan, & Creswell, 2007, for reviews). We discuss how mindfulness can facilitate per­ sonal and relational well-being through an easing of self-identification, or ego quieting. Our domain of interest is one in which such identification is known to be easily aroused, and the consequences of which are legion-when the self is under threat by others.

The Mental Construction of Me

Study of the self has been of key interest to psychologists, psychiatrists, philosophers, sociologists, and, more recently, neuroscientists, and this wideWe thank Jeff Green for helpful suggestions on an earlier version of this chapter.

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spread interest reflects the centrality of the self to human experience. Two views of self predominate today, namely, (a) what McAdams ( 1990) described as the "1" self, which has been studied within organismic theories (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1991), and (b) the "Me" self, which has been central to social construc­ tionist views of self. Of particular interest to the present discussion is the Me self, which is derived from the Mead-Cooley tradition (Ryan, 1993) and con­ cerns the creation of personal identity. This Me self involves an identification with particular attributes, roles, group memberships, and belief systems that effectively narrow down competing possibilities for thought and action that are both derived from and consistent with the social inputs and appraisals to which one has been exposed over time (e.g., Gilbert, 2005). This personal identity is a mental model, formed from ongoing life experiences and cogni­ tive elaborations on those experiences and inseparable from the larger social and cultural contexts in which it is formed and continually operates, even in individualistic societies (e.g., Waldron, 2003). Together, these characteristics highlight a view of identity as dynamic, constructed, contingent, and, perhaps most important, an emergent property of the mind and brain, not an entity in its own right. The existence of personal identifications and internalized constructions contributes to the lay view of self; specifically, people generally regard them­ selves as substantial-distinct from other selves and objects ; as individual­ unique and indivisible ; and as essential-relatively constant or the same over time (Metzinger, 2003). Perhaps most critical for the present analysis is that humans treat their mental self-representations as if they were real. This has two important implications for social interactions. The first implication is that, in real or imagined interactions, self-related thoughts and feelings are engaged and then feed back to influence the way individuals behave. In this way, social exchanges can be viewed as interactions between the self-representations of those individuals, in which each person's perceptions, reactions, and responses to the other are filtered through and mediated by his or her internalized views of self and other (Leary, 2002). A second implication of the reified self for social interactions is that when it is threatened, people respond in defensive ways. Most immediately, defensive response to social threat is manifest as a mental, emotional, and/or behavioral reaction to events and experiences on the basis of how they affect, or could affect, the identity. This reflects one form of primary appraisal : Events and experiences are judged as bad, good, or neu­ tral in reference to Me. When perceived as bad, such events or experiences are treated as threatening or harmful, something with which one then has to cope in some way. However, judgment of the opposite kind is also problematic; even when judged as good for Me, those events or experiences will inevitably end, something that can again be regarded as threatening or harmful when personal identity is projected into the future . These self-relevant and inevi­ tably biased judgments can negatively influence psychological well-being, the quality of social relationships, and ways one negotiates the social world. More problematic still, this evaluative reactivity to events and experiences may oc­ cur nonconsciously because, over time, our reactions can become habitual and automated (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999). Thus, quality of experience may be

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compromised without notice and without apparent (i.e., a consciously known) cause. Because personal identity is a central preoccupation for the individual (e.g ., see chap. 12, this volume; Gaertner & Sedikides, 2005), and because events and experiences regularly impinge on it that require maintenance and protection, a final consequence of self-identification is that a great deal of life energy may be spent in the service of Me, with a variety of associated costs (e.g., see chap. 6, this volume; Crocker & Park, 2004; Ryan, 1993). Finally, when so deeply invested in it-when one presumes that one is this Me-the individual may have little access to other aspects of the self that reflect more authentic functioning (e.g., unbiased processing of self-relevant information; Kernis & Goldman, 2006; see also chap. 8, this volume).

Mindful Attention as Antidote to Self·Identification

If investment in identity, or the Me self, is problematic, then how can the indi­ vidual have a more adaptive relationship to one's self? From one perspective, the proposition appears quixotic, given the deeply entrenched, pervasively influential nature of identity. Yet theorists informed by both Buddhist and organismic psychologies (e.g., Leary, 2004; Ryan, 1993) argue that a primary way that identity is fueled is by a lack of awareness of our thought patterns, emotional reactions, desires, and behavioral tendencies. This view suggests that if one could get a clear, moment-to-moment look at one's ways of thinking, feeling, and acting, then the automatic flow of self-representations could be interrupted, their constructed nature seen more clearly, and responses could be made with more choice instead of in reaction to identity-based productions (Rabinowitz, 2006). This view argues for the value of an observant stance on our experience-a self-as-knower, not as an agent of reflexive cognition, in which attention simply informs thought about the self, as in "self-awareness" (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972), but instead as an inner witness, in which the contents of consciousness-including self-relevant thoughts, images, and iden­ tities-and one's overt behavior are on display. One conceptualization of this basic witnessing capacity is mindfulness, in which internal and external events and occurrences are simply seen as phenomena "rather than as the objects of a conceptually constructed world" (Olendzki, 2005, p. 253). Bringing such open, receptive attention to bear on ex­ perience may permit a clearer recognition that self-representations are simply mental concepts; that is, in observing that thoughts come and go; memories arise and replace each other; desires emerge, develop, change, and vanish, and so on, the identity may become less substantial and engrossing, allowing for disidentification with it-that is, when the functioning of the Me can be observed, then one is clearly not that Me. Theorists argue that because mind­ fulness permits an immediacy of contact with events as they occur, without the overlay of discriminative, categorical, and habitual thought, consciousness takes on a clarity and freshness that reduce reactivity and permit more ob­ jectively informed responses, unbiased by self-centered biases and prejudices (e.g., Nyanaponika Thera, 1973).

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Mindfulness and Social Threat

As an open or receptive attention, mindfulness may facilitate exposure, or nondefensive processing of threatening experience (e.g., Baer, 2003), leading to desensitization and a reduction in emotional reactivity; a greater tolerance of unpleasant states; and, consequently, more adaptive responding in social and other situations in which self-representations are under threat. Thus, more mindful individuals should show lower levels of anger, anxiety, and other emotional responses in social threat situations that represent a disengagement from the "urgencies of risk assessment" (Allen & Knight, 2005, p. 250) and should manifest cognitive and behavioral responses that reflect greater toler­ ance, less judgment (including censorship, condemnation, and exclusion), and, more generally, less concern for the status of personal identity in social threat contexts . In the remainder of this chapter, we present preliminary evidence that mindfulness supports nondefensive processing in three social contexts in which identity is commonly threatened: (a) romantic relationship conflict, (b) social exclusion by members of an ingroup, and (c) worldview rejection by an outgroup member.

Romantic Relationship Conflict A primary basis for identity is a presumed dichotomy between self and not-self that, at the interpersonal level, is reflected in images of self, other, and the re­ lationship, developed from learning experiences and memories of how one was viewed and treated by the other, how one adjusted behavior to maximize re­ ward and minimize punishment, and so on (Rabinowitz, 2006). These mental representations of self and other can color the perception and interpretation of past events and present interactions (Leary, 2002), perhaps most strongly when images of the self and "my" relationship are threatened by conflict . In such circumstances, self-protective strategies, including avoidance, with­ drawal, or aggression, may be invoked to minimize personal hurt, threats to self-esteem, and loss of power (Epstein & Baucom, 2003). When the identity is engaged in this way, direct, unmediated contact with the other is inhibited . Romantic relationships are a primary arena in which the engagement of images of self and other can have detrimental effects. The investment of self in the partner and the relationship, coupled with an attachment to seeing the re­ lationship unfold in particular ways, represents psychological tinder for couple conflict. However, mindfulness may have value in couple conflict situations through processes that reflect an abeyance of the ego. For example, the recep­ tive attentiveness that defines mindfulness may promote a greater ability or willingness to take interest in a partner's thoughts, emotions, and welfare and thereby to be less invested in one's own reactions. Boorstein ( 1996) argued that mindfulness promotes an ability to witness thoughts and emotions so as not to react impulsively and destructively to them . Through a willingness to contact experience directly rather than defend against it, mindfulness may promote attunement, connection, and closeness in relationships (e.g., Welwood, 1996). Barnes, Brown, Krusemark, Campbell, and Rogge (2007) conducted two studies to examine the role of mindfulness in romantic relationship function-

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ing, with a particular interest in examining how this quality of consciousness affects responses to relationship stress. In the initial, 10-week longitudinal study with dating college students, the authors found that dispositional mindfulness, assessed with the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown & Ryan, 2003), was associated with greater capacities to respond con­ structively to relationship stress. For example, Barnes et al. (2007) found, af­ ter controlling for gender, length of relationship, and time spent together each month, that higher mindfulness was related to greater accommodation (Rus­ bult, Verette, Whitney, Slovik, & Lipkus, 1991)-a self-reported willingness to inhibit tendencies to act destructively, and instead to respond constructively, when the romantic partner had acted in a way that was potentially destruc­ tive to the relationship. In the second study, Barnes et al. (2007) tested whether mindfulness would predict more adaptive cognitive, affective, and behavioral responses in the heat of a relationship conflict. Using a conflict discussion paradigm, they asked steadily dating heterosexual partners to engage in a discussion of the most conflictual issues currently challenging the relationship. The au­ thors found that for both members of the couple, dispositional MAAS scores predicted lower emotional stress reactions-hostility and anxiety-to the conflict, and these effects were explained by lower hostility and anxiety, re­ spectively, measured on entry into the discussion. These results showed that instead of simply buffering the effects of emotional reactions during conflict, mindfulness helped inoculate individuals against the arising of those reac­ tions. The capacity of mindfulness to inhibit reactivity to conflict was also evident in the cognitive judgments that each partner made; those higher in trait mindfulness showed a more positive (or less negative) pre-post conflict change in their perception of the partner and the relationship. The study also supported the importance of a mindful state in challenging exchanges, in that state, or current mindfulness was related to several indicators of better com­ munication quality, as assessed by objective raters. Both of Barnes et al.'s (2007) studies lend support to the notion that mindfulness can enhance healthy romantic relationship functioning (cf. Car­ son, Carson, Gil, & Baucom, 2004) and suggest that one way it may do so is by facilitating a greater willingness to be present to a partner when chal­ lenged in ways that could provoke identity defense. There is some indication that this other-centeredness may extend beyond the romantic context and be reflected in a more general compassionate concern for others. For ex­ ample, Shapiro, Schwartz, and Bonner ( 1998) found that, relative to control participants, medical students who received practical training in mindful­ ness showed increases in empathy over time, despite the fact that postint­ ervention assessments were collected in a high-stress period, during final examinations.

Social Exclusion Another interpersonal situation that presents significant identity challenges is social exclusion. As social creatures, humans have an inherent need to belong (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1991) and are highly motivated to avoid social demotions

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and exclusions (e.g., Allen & Knight, 2005; Leary, 2004). The perception that one has been rejected, even by strangers, can quickly provoke psychological dis­ tress (e.g., Leary, 2004). Identity, as already noted, is strongly influenced by the opinions and reactions of others, and negative evaluative reactions to rejection occur because the individual's sense of self-worth is invested in, or contingent on, validation by others. However, with the capacity to recognize the identity as a construction, events such as rejection that impinge on it may be less likely to be destabilizing because a deeper sense of self is operational that is grounded in awareness (Ryan & Brown, 2003). Creswell, Eisenberger, and Lieberman (2008) tested aspects of this argu­ ment, specifically by examining the proposition that with consciousness more firmly rooted in mindful attention, individuals are less likely to experience distress when excluded by members of a group. In line with our proposition that mindfulness promotes more open, nondefensive processing of challeng­ ing events, Creswell et al. also examined whether the more mindful person's greater equanimity in the face of exclusion was due to reduced reactivity to this form of social threat, measured by functional magnetic resonance imaging of neural regions known to be implicated in the experience of social pain and distress. College students in Creswell et al.'s (2008) study engaged in a ball-tossing video game (i.e., Cyberball), ostensibly with two other student participants sit­ uated in nearby functional magnetic resonance imaging scanners. In fact, each participant was interacting with a computer. In the first block of trials, the participant was included in the ball-tossing game by what he or she thought were the other players; then, in a second block of trials, the participant was excluded from the ball tossing. The results showed that mindfulness, assessed with the MAAS upon entry into the study, predicted lower self-reported social distress after the exclusion experience. Mindfulness also predicted reduced activation of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) during the exclusion task relative to the inclusion task; the dACC is a neural region associated with reports of physical and social pain (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003). Analyses also showed that the reduced dACe activation partially mediated, or helped to explain the relation between, mindfulness and lower social distress. These findings provide initial evidence for an association between mindful­ ness and reduced reactivity to social exclusion distress, and suggest that this association may be explained, in part, through reduced reactivity of the dACC during social exclusion. The picture painted by Creswell et al.'s (2008) study is consistent with Barnes et al.'s (2007) examination of romantic couple conflict described earlier, in that it suggests that mindfulness predicts a more subdued response to social threat-in this case, apparent rejection by peers-and that this attenuated response is due, in part, to reduced evaluative reactivity to that threat (see also Creswell, Way, Eisenberger, & Lieberman, 2007). Furthermore, Creswell et al.'s (2008) the study findings appear to support the conceptualization of mindfulness as a receptive, experiential mode of stimulus processing, in con­ trast to an analytic mode, wherein events and experiences are processed in an abstracted, ruminative fashion (Teasdale, 1999).

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Worlduiew Defense The social embeddedness ofthe individual i s reflected not only i n intimate rela­ tionships and peer groups but also in broader social or cultural groups defined by their shared worldviews. These worldviews, reflecting values, ideals, or beliefs about the world and the place of the individual or group in it, provide a sense of shared meaning and order that acts to affirm personal and group iden­ tity (e.g. , see chap. 3, this volume; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2004). Tajfel (1981) defined social identity or group identity as "that part of the indi­ vidual's self-concept which derives from his [or her] knowledge of membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (p. 255). Paralleling romantic relationship con­ flict, investment in a relational identity-in this case, an ingroup identity-can lead to conflict and antagonism when that identity ("us" and "ours") is threat­ ened by an outgroup or something representative thereof ("them" and "theirs"). As contemporary world events and the historical record suggest, people will often act as strongly to ward off threats to their social identities as they do to defend their own persons against attack. As discussed in chapter 3 of this volume, terror management theory (TMT; Solomon et aI., 2004) argues that a key trigger for social identity defense is the threat of death. According to TMT, the knowledge of one's inevitable demise creates an omnipresent potential for anxiety that is managed by affirming or defending cultural worldviews. A common way in which this is manifest is by upholding ingroup worldviews and by derogating outgroup members whose views are counter to those of the ingroup. In so doing, people are enabled to view themselves as valuable members of a permanent reality. Such action af­ firms the features of the ontological self-in this case, the social self-noted earlier in this chapter, namely, substantiality, independence, and essentialism. From a scientific perspective on the self, however, such affirmation attempts to "turn reality on its head" (Waldron, 2003, p. 147). If, as we have argued, more mindful people are less invested in identity, will they show less world view defense, particularly when, as TMT argues, their sense of self is threatened by a confrontation with their own mortality? In a series of four studies, Niemiec, Brown, and Ryan (2006) addressed this ques­ tion by first assessing mindfulness among American citizens and then asking them to write either about their death (mortality salience condition) or about TV watching (control condition). Mter a brief delay, they then read a pro-U.S. essay and an anti-U.S. essay purportedly written by two different foreigners. The outcome in these studies was a series of evaluations of the essay authors and their opinions. Across several independent samples, the findings showed that participants with lower MAAS mindfulness scores in the mortality sa­ lience condition evidenced worldview defense, as reflected in stronger deroga­ tion of the anti-U.S. (outgroup) essay author and higher favoritism toward the pro-U.S. (ingroup) essay author. In contrast, the ratings of participants higher in mindfulness showed no worldview defense. In an effort to explain these findings, Niemiec et aI. found that more mindful individuals, when confront­ ing their death, spent more time writing about it and used more death-related

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words to describe it, suggesting a greater openness to processing this threaten­ ing potentiality. In turn, analyses showed that this more receptive processing of mortality helped to explain the association between mindfulness and lack of worldview defense.

Conclusions and Further Considerations In this chapter, we have highlighted findings from several studies showing that mindfulness facilitates a capacity to respond less defensively to social threat, manifest in reduced emotional reactivity to interpersonal conflict and peer rejection and a lack of worldview defense in the face of social identity threat. These findings are consistent with the thesis that mindfulness helps to reduce identity investment, or to quiet the ego. The research in this area is still nascent, and more work is needed to examine more thoroughly the relation of mindfulness to identity and its functioning. However, the preliminary findings suggest that mindfulness tempers a primary set of symptoms of identity invest­ ment, namely, defensive response. What are the adaptive implications of mindful responses to social threat? One could argue that in hostile and other dangerous situations, a defensive state of mind, instead of a receptive one, is highly adaptive because it offers protection to the physical organism (Allen & Knight, 2005). It may appear that mindfulness, with its emphasis on receptivity to even threatening events and experience, has adaptive costs. Although this remains an open empirical question, Buddhist scholars and, more recently, clinical psychologists using mindfulness-based therapies (e.g., Hayes, 2002), argue that mindfulness does not eliminate identity but instead contextualizes it, so that its functions can be channeled more flexibly, constructively, and with more choice toward, for exam­ ple, an engagement of reflectively considered values, goals, and activities that support personal and social well-being. This involves a fundamental change in the place of identity in consciousness and in day-to-day life, because it entails a shift in the locus of personal subjectivity from conceptual representations of the self and others to awareness itself (e.g. , Deikman, 1996). Research on the implications of such a shift, although still in its infancy, is promising. Given the harm that identity investment is known to cause in interpersonal and social affairs, such research may offer valuable contributions to enhancing the qual­ ity of people's social lives.

References Allen, N. B., & Knight, W. (2005). Mindfulness, compassion for self, and compassion for others. In P. Gilbert (Ed.), Compassion (pp. 239-262). New York: Routledge. Baer, R. A. (2003). Mindfulness training as a clinical intervention: A conceptual and empirical review. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10, 125-143. Bargh, J. A., & Chartrand, T. L. ( 1999). The unbearable automaticity of being. American Psycholo­ gist, 54, 462-479.

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Barnes, S., Brown, K w., Krusemark, E., Campbell, W. K, & Rogge, R. D. (2007). The role of mind­ fulness in romantic relationship satisfaction and responses to relationship stress. Journal of Marital and Family Therapy, 33, 482-500. Boorstein, S. ( 1996). Transpersonal psychotherapy. Albany: State University of New York Press. Brown, K W., & Cordon, S. (in press). Le sentiment de l'existence: The phenomenological nature and emotional correlates of mindfulness. In F. Didonna (Ed.), Clinical handbook of mindful­ ness. New York: Springer Publishing Company. Brown, K w. , & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role in psychological well-being. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 822-848. Brown, K w., Ryan, R. M., & Creswell, J. D. (2007). Mindfulness: Theoretical foundations and evidence for its salutary effects. Psychological Inquiry, 18, 2 11-237. Carson, J. w., Carson, K M., Gil, K M., & Baucom, D. H. (2004). Mindfulness-based relationship enhancement. Behavior Therapy, 35, 471-494. Creswell, J. D., Eisenberger, N. I., & Lieberman, M. D. (2008). Neurobehavioral correlates ofmind· fulness during social exclusion. Manuscript in preparation. Creswell, J. D., Way, B. M., Eisenberger, N. I., & Lieberman, M. D. (2007). Neural correlates of mindfulness during affect labeling. Psychosomatic Medicine, 69, 560-565. Crocker, J., & Park, L. E. (2004). The costly pursuit of self-esteem. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 392-414. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. ( 1991). A motivational approach to self: Integration in personality. In R. Dienstbier (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 38, pp. 237-288). Lincoln: Univer­ sity of Nebraska Press. Deikman, A. J. (1996). "I" awareness. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 3, 350-356. Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. A. ( 1972). A theory of objective self consciousness. New York: Academic Press. Eisenberger, N. I., Lieberman, M. D., & Williams, K. D. (2003, October 10). Does rejection hurt? An fMRI study of social exclusion. Science, 302, 290-292. Epstein, N. B., & Baucom, D. H. (2003). Couple therapy. In R. L. Leahy (Ed.), Roadblocks in cogni· tive-behavioral therapy (pp. 217-235). New York: Guilford Press. Gaertner, L., & Sedikides, C. (2005). A hierarchy within: On the motivational and emotional pri­ macy of the individual self. In M. D. Alicke, D. A. Dunning, & J. I. Krueger (Eds.), The self in social judgment (pp. 2 13-239). New York: Psychology Press. Gilbert, P. (2005). Compassion and cruelty. In P. Gilbert (Ed.), Compassion (pp. 9-74). New York: Routledge. Hayes, S. C. (2002). Buddhism and acceptance and commitment therapy. Cognitive and Behavioral Practice, 9, 58-66. Kernis, M. H., & Goldman, B. M. (2006). A multicomponent conceptualization of authenticity: Theory and research. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 38, pp. 283-357). New York: Academic Press. Leary, M. R. (2002). When selves collide: The nature of the self and the dynamics of interper­ sonal relationships. In A. Tesser, D. A. Stapel, & J. V. Wood (Eds.), Self and motivation: Emerging psychological perspectives (pp. 119-145). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Leary, M. R. (2004). The curse of the self New York: Oxford University Press. McAdams, D. P. (1990). The person. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Niemiec, C. P., Brown, K. w., & Ryan, R. M. (2006). Being present when facing death: The role of mindfulness in terror management. Manuscript submitted for publication. Nyanaponika Thera. ( 1973). The heart ofBuddhist meditation. New York: Weiser Books. Olendzki, A. (2005). The roots of mindfulness. In C. K. Germer, R. D. Siegel, & P. R. Fulton (Eds.), Mindfulness and psychotherapy (pp. 241-261). New York: Guilford Press. Rabinowitz, J. (2006). Cultivating presence. Unpublished manuscript, Jewish Family Services, Richmond, VA. Rusbult, C. E., Verette, J., Whitney, G. A., Slovik, L. F., & Lipkus, I. ( 1991). Accommodation pro­ cesses in close relationships. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 60, 53-78. =

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Ryan, R. M. ( 1993). Agency and organization: Intrinsic motivation, autonomy and the self in psychological development. In J. Jacobs (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Vol. 40, pp. 1-56). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Ryan, R. M., & Brown, K. W. (2003). Why we don't need self-esteem: On fundamental needs, con­ tingent love, and mindfulness. Psychological Inquiry, 14, 71-76. Shapiro, S. L., Schwartz, G. E., & Bonner, G. (1998). Effects of mindfulness-based stress reduction on medical and premedical students. Journal of Behavioral Medicine, 21, 58 1-599. Solomon, S . , Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2004). The cultural animal: Twenty years of terror management theory and research. In J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, & T. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Hand­ book of experimental existential psychology (pp. 13-34). New York: Guilford Press. Tajfel, H. (1981). Humans and social categories. London: Cambridge University Press. Teasdale, J. D. (1999). Emotional processing, three modes of mind and the prevention of relapse in depression. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 37, 53-77. Waldron, W. S. (2003). Common ground, common cause: Buddhism and science on the afflictions of identity. In B. A. Wallace (Ed.), Buddhism and science (pp. 145-19 1). New York: Columbia University Press. Welwood, J. (1996). Love and awakening. New York: HarperColiins.

8 Individual Differences in Quiet Ego Functioning: Authenticity, Mindfulness, and Secure Self-Esteem Michael H. Kernis and Whitney L. Heppner As stated in previous chapters, a noisy ego is a defensive, self-aggrandizing ego. People with noisy egos often have as their prime directive the protection and enhancement of a fragile sense of self and its worth. They tend to be overly aggressive and defensive, and they abhor anything that suggests they are less than perfect. In contrast, individuals with quiet egos do not gear their efforts toward constantly defending or bolstering their sense of worth. Instead, they take their sense of worth to be a given, neither needing to be constantly earned nor capable of being easily taken away. They are accepting of their weaknesses, and it takes a great deal for them to feel threatened. We believe that people with a quiet ego possess a "strong sense of self" (Kernis, Paradise, Whitaker, Wheatman, & Goldman, 2000, p. 1297), that is, stable and secure feelings of self-worth (i.e., secure high self-esteem), clear and confidently held self-knowledge, and self-regulatory styles that reflect agency and self-determination. Recent research and theory (Goldman, 2004; Kernis & Goldman, 2006) indicate that authentic functioning, defined as the unimpeded operation of one's true self in one's daily enterprise (Goldman & Kernis, 2002; Kernis, 2003), is integrally tied to a strong sense of self. We believe that an­ other aspect ofheaIthy functioning inherent in a strong sense of selfis mindful­ ness, the capacity to be fully present and aware in the present moment (Brown & Ryan, 2003; see also chap. 7, this volume). In this chapter, we focus on the roles that authentic functioning, mindful­ ness, and secure high self-esteem play in the operation of a quiet ego. We begin by presenting a muIticomponent conceptualization of individual differences in authentic functioning. Next, we present research findings that associate authentic functioning with mindfulness and report the results of two studies indicating that authentic functioning and/or mindfulness relate to relatively low aggressiveness. After this, we report research findings that link daily felt authenticity with daily high self-esteem, and we end the chapter with a discus­ sion of research that demonstrates that high authenticity relates to secure high self-esteem and that both predict relatively low levels of verbal defensiveness. Preparation of this chapter was facilitated by National Science Foundation grant BCS-0451029.

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Authenticity We conceptualize authenticity as "the unimpeded operation of one's core or true self in one's daily enterprise" (Goldman & Kernis, 2002, p. 18; Kernis, 2003). Kernis and Goldman (2005, 2006; Goldman & Kernis, 2002) suggested that au­ thenticity comprises four distinct but interrelated components: (a) awareness, (b) unbiased processing, (c) behavior, and (d) relational orientation. Awareness refers to being aware of one's feelings, motives and desires, strengths and weaknesses, and self-relevant cognitions. It also involves being motivated to learn about oneself, to be aware of inherent dualities in one's personality as­ pects, and to have trust in one's self-knowledge. Unbiased processing involves being objective when processing information related to one's positive and negative attributes and qualities. Stated differently, it involves not denying, minimizing, exaggerating, or ignoring positive or negative self-evaluative information, regardless of whether the information is externally provided or internally generated. Behavior refers to acting in accord with one's values, preferences, and needs as opposed to acting merely to please others or to attain rewards or avoid punishments. In addition, behavioral authenticity involves the free and natural expression of one's feelings, motives, and inclinations, and sensitivity to the fit between one's self and dictates of the environment. Rela­ tional orientation involves valuing and engaging in openness and truthfulness in one's close relationships. In other words, it involves being genuine and not fake in one's close relationships and allowing close others to see the real you, both good and bad. Goldman and Kernis (2004) developed the 45-item Authenticity Inventory (Version 3 [AI-3]) to assess these four components of authentic functioning. Internal reliabilities and test-retest correlations are adequate. Moreover,

correlation and confirmatory factor analyses support the view that these com­ ponents of authentic functioning are interrelated yet distinct and that these interrelationships are best explained by a broad latent construct of authen­ tic functioning (a single second-order authenticity factor model, as reported by Kernis & Goldman, 2006, along with the scale itselD. Goldman (2004) examined the relation between authentic functioning and various aspects of adjustment and well-being. Table 8. 1 displays the correlations between total authenticity and some of the measures he examined (also reported in Kernis & Goldman, 2006). As can be seen in the table, authenticity relates positively to life satisfaction, positive affect, self-actualization, vitality, self-concept clarity, mindfulness, and adaptive coping strategies.

Authenticity, Mindfulness, and Aggressive Behavior As noted earlier, recent theory and research link authenticity to the construct of mindfulness. Mindfulness is defined as moment-to-moment awareness (Kabat-Zinn, 1990) or as enhanced awareness and attention to the present moment (Brown & Ryan, 2003). Highly mindful people are highly aware not only of environmental stimuli, as has often been emphasized (e.g. , Langer, 1989), but also of internal stimuli and aspects of self-knowledge. In addition,

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Table 8.1.

87

Correlations Between Authenticity and Various Aspects of Psychological

Functioning Psychological functioning Subjective well-being Life satisfaction Positive affect Negative affect Self-actualization Vitality Self-concept clarity Self-concept differentiation Mindfulness Active coping Planning

Authenticity

.32** . 40 ** -.24* .61** .23* .68 ** -.32** . 49 ** .48** .31**

Note. From Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 38, Figures 3, 4, and 5), edited by M. P. Zanna, 2006, San Diego, CA: Elsevier. Copyright 2006 by Elsevier. Adapted with permission. *p < .05. **p < .01.

mindful people experience their present moments in an open and relatively nondefensive manner (Hodgins & Knee, 2002; see also chap. 11, this volume). These considerations suggest that the more mindful people are, the higher they should score on the AI-3, in particular on the Awareness and Unbiased Processing subcomponents. Indeed, recent research (Lakey, Kernis, Heppner, & Lance, in press) revealed that dispositional mindfulness, as measured with the Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale (Brown & Ryan, 2003), positively correlates with the Awareness (r = .40, p < .01) and Unbiased Processing (r = .53, p < .01) subscales of the AI-3, as well as with the total AI-3 (r = .55, p < .01). Furthermore, like authenticity, dispositional mindfulness is linked to a number of positive psychological outcomes, including lower neuroticism, de­ pression, anxiety, and unpleasant affect, and to higher self-esteem, vitality, and self-determination (Brown & Ryan, 2003, Study 1 ). In addition, state mindful­ ness relates to higher state autonomy and pleasant affect and to lower state unpleasant affect (Brown & Ryan, 2003, Study 4). Anger and aggressive behavior often reflect an attempt to restore one's damaged feelings of self-worth after threat (Feshbach, 1970). Kernis, Granneman, and Barclay ( 1989) found that whereas individuals with fragile high self-esteem reported especially high tendencies to experience anger and hostility, individuals with stable high self-esteem reported especially low ten­ dencies. These considerations suggest that one quality associated with a quiet ego is a relatively low tendency to respond to an insult or rejection with aggres­ sion. If this is true, then the greater an individual's dispositional authenticity or mindfulness, the lower should be his or her dispositional tendency toward aggressiveness. Recent research in our laboratory involving undergraduate students as participants confirmed this proposition (Heppner et aI., in press, Study 1). Specifically, negative correlations emerged between the AI-3 and

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a measure of hostile attributional bias (the Hostile Attribution Bias Scale; Lakey, Kernis, Heppner, & Davis, 2005; r = -.23, p < .01), and the Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992; r = -.24, p < .01). Likewise, scores on the Mindful Attention and Awareness Scale were inversely related to scores on the Hostile Attribution Bias Scale (r = -. 17, p < .05) and Aggression Questionnaire (r = -.34, p < .01). It is important to note that mindfulness can be conceptualized not only as an individual difference construct but also as a state of being that can be cultivated and enhanced. This raises the possibility that mindfulness training or inductions can be used to enhance quiet ego functioning. Heppner et al. (in press, Study 2) examined the effectiveness of a temporary mindfulness induc­ tion for reducing aggressive behavior after social rejection. They randomly assigned undergraduate students to one of three conditions. Participants in the acceptance condition were informed that fellow participants wanted to work with them, so that they would be a part of a group in the upcoming computer-based task. Participants in the rejection condition were informed that fellow participants did not want to work with them, so that they would be the "individual" on the next task. Participants in the mindfulness-rejection condition received the same feedback as did individuals in the rejection condi­ tion; however, immediately prior to receiving the feedback, they participated in a mindfulness induction task. Specifically, they participated in a scripted "raisin eating" task adapted from Kabat-Zinn's (e.g. , see Kabat-Zinn, 1990) mindfulness-based stress reduction program. In this exercise, participants initially examine a raisin carefully, noticing its shape, texture, and color; then, participants slowly and thoroughly chew, taste, and swallow the raisin. In this way, the task brings about a state of heightened attention and awareness to an ordinarily mundane activity (eating) that often is done with little attention or

awareness. Experimenters guided participants through the exercise once and then left to allow participants to practice on their own for 5 minutes. All participants then "competed" in a computer-based reaction time task that has been used extensively in previous aggression research (e.g., Bush­ man, 1 995 ; Bushman & B aumeister, 1 998; Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, & Stucke, 2001). Participants selected the duration and intensity of noise (i.e., aggression) that they would deliver to their opponents should they win a particular reaction time trial. A one-way analysis of variance revealed a sig­ nificant overall difference among the three conditions, F(2, 54) = 4.47, p < .02. Planned comparisons showed significant mean differences in aggression levels between the acceptance (M = -0.623) and rejection (M = 0. 725) conditions (p < .01). Aggression in the mindfulness condition (M = -0. 173) was lower than in the rejection condition (p < .055) and not significantly different from that in the acceptance condition (p > .33). These findings indicate that a temporary induction of mindfulness was sufficient to produce lower levels of aggression in the face of a potent social rejection. The ability of heightened mindfulness to reduce situational aggression, combined with the inverse relations between dispositional mindfulness (and authenticity) and aggressiveness, supports our contention that mindfulness and authenticity are important aspects of a quiet ego.

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Authenticity, Mindfulness, and Self-Esteem As discussed earlier, we believe that another important component of quiet ego functioning is possessing positive feelings of self-worth that are relatively stable and secure. In this section, we describe findings linking daily felt au­ thenticity to greater daily well-being, specifically, higher daily self-esteem and pleasant affect and lower daily unpleasant affect (Heppner et al. , 2007). One hundred eighteen participants completed daily measures of authen­ ticity, autonomy, competence, relatedness, self-esteem, positive affect, and negative affect once a day for 2 weeks. Heppner et al. (2007) used multilevel random coefficient modeling instead of ordinary least squares regression methods because of the former's advantage in producing parameter estimates (Nezlek, 2001, 2005). Daily felt authenticity related positively to same-day reports of self­ esteem (B = 0.38, p < .001) and positive affect (B = 0.43, p < .001), and related inversely to same-day reports of negative affect (B = -0.43, p < .001). Research from a self-determination theory (Deci & Ryan, 1995, 2000) perspective has previously shown the importance of the purported psychological needs of autonomy, competence, and relatedness for daily well-being (Reis, Sheldon, Gable, Roscoe, & Ryan, 2000). It is important to note that this study revealed that daily felt authenticity predicted all three markers of daily well-being independently of the posited psychological needs of self-determination theory; that is, when we entered all four daily predictor variables (autonomy, compe­ tence, relatedness, and authenticity) into the model, authenticity maintained a significant relationship with all three markers of daily well-being. These results offer support for our contention that authenticity is an important marker of quiet ego functioning, in this case, positive feelings of self-worth. Although Heppner et al.'s (2007) findings reveal that daily felt authen­ ticity relates to higher daily self-esteem, the relation between authenticity and self-esteem is complex, because high self-esteem has multiple forms, some more closely related to psychological health and well-being than oth­ ers (Kernis, 2003). These forms fall broadly within two categories: (a) secure high self-esteem and (b) fragile high self-esteem. People with secure high self-esteem feel worthwhile and valuable, they like and are satisfied with themselves, and they accept their weaknesses. Secure high self-esteem is well anchored; it does not require continual validation or promotion, and it relates strongly to a variety of adjustment and well-being indices. In contrast, fragile high self-esteem is vulnerable to challenge, it requires continual vali­ dation, and it relates relatively weakly to adjustment and well-being. People with fragile high self-esteem reject personal weaknesses and are prone to engage in excessive self-protection and self-promotion (see also chap. 6, this volume). Existing theory and literature provide several ways to distinguish be­ tween secure and fragile forms of high self-esteem. Each of these forms has been discussed extensively elsewhere, along with supporting evidence (Ker­ nis, 2003; Kernis, Lakey, & Heppner, in press; Kernis & Paradise, 2002), so we discuss them only briefly here. Unstable (fragile) self-esteem reflects

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substantial short-term fluctuations in contextually based, immediate feelings of self-worth, whereas stable (secure) self-esteem reflects minimal short­ term fluctuations. Contingent (fragile) self-esteem is dependent on achiev­ ing specific outcomes, meeting expectations, matching standards, and so on, whereas true (secure) self-esteem arises naturally from satisfaction of basic psychological needs and is not in need of continual validation. A match be­ tween an individual's implicit (nonconscious) and explicit (conscious) positive feelings of self-worth reflects secure high self-esteem. In contrast, a mismatch between an individual's implicit (nonconscious) and explicit (conscious) feel­ ings of self-worth (i.e., when one is negative) reflects fragile high self-esteem. Optimal self-esteem, which reflects the sum of secure self-esteem markers, arises naturally from the following: (a) successfully dealing with life chal­ lenges; (b) the operation of one's core, true, authentic self as a source of input to behavioral choices; and (c) relationships in which one is valued for whom one is, and not for what one achieves (Kernis, 2003). We believe that authenticity (and possibly mindfulness) shares a recipro­ cal relationship with each aspect of secure high self-esteem; that is, authentic­ ity may provide both the foundation for achieving secure high self-esteem and the processes through which secure high self-esteem relates to psychological and interpersonal adjustment (Kernis & Goldman, 2005). To date, we have obtained data linking dispositional authenticity and mindfulness to several aspects of secure high self-esteem. Specifically, we have found that higher dispositional authenticity and mindfulness relate to higher self-esteem levels, more stable self-esteem, and less contingent self-esteem (e.g. , Heppner et al., in press). An important agenda for future research will be to further examine the interplay of self-esteem, authenticity, and mindfulness.

Authenticity, Self-Esteem, and Verbal Defensiveness Emotions, thoughts, behaviors, or information that are discrepant with one's consciously held self-image can be especially threatening to an ego that is not secure, producing decreases in self-esteem and/or increases in negative affect. People may use a wide range of defense mechanisms in an attempt to fend off these threats. For example, when people perceive a self-esteem threat, they may deal with surfacing unpleasant affect by attempting to prevent the threat from entering consciousness (awareness) or by controlling the specific content of the thoughts or feelings that enter consciousness (distortion; Feldman Bar­ rett, Cleveland, Conner, & Williams, 2000). We believe that people high in dispositional authenticity are motivated to understand themselves, to experi­ ence affect as it is felt, and not to distort evaluative self-relevant information. Likewise, people with secure high self-esteem are comfortable with negative self-relevant information and have the strength and personal resources to acknowledge information that is potentially threatening without being overly defensive (Kernis, 2003). Feldman Barrett, Williams, and Fong (2002) recently reported a struc­ tured interview technique and sophisticated coding scheme for eliciting threatening experiences and defensive processing, called the Defensive Verbal

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Behavior Assessment (DVBA). Specifically, individuals engage in a 40- to 60minute stressful interview about their experiences. Respondents first answer 5 nonstressful items to acclimate them to the interview context. They then respond to 15 mild to moderately stressful items (e.g., "Tell me about a time when you felt that your parents were really disappointed in you"; "Tell me about a time when you've broken the rules"; "Tell me about a time when you have done something unethical on an assignment"). The interview concludes with 5 items designed to gradually restore a nonthreatened self-view. These audiotaped interviews are then rated by highly trained coders who incorporate two aspects of defensiveness into their ratings: (a) awareness and (b) distortion. Awareness is defined as the conscious understanding and ac­ ceptance of one's cognitions, emotions, and behaviors in the face of threat. Dis­ tortion is defined as the reinterpretation of events through rationalization or justification to fit one's preexisting self-concept (Feldman Barrett et aI., 2002). As such, individuals' responses may be nondefensive (high awareness and low distortion), mildly defensive (moderate awareness with mild distortion), moderately defensive (limited awareness and moderate distortion), or highly defensive (little or no awareness and high distortion). Lakey, Kernis, Heppner, and Lance (in press) predicted that, overall, greater authenticity would relate to lower defensiveness on the DVBA. More­ over, they hypothesized that higher AI-3 Awareness and Unbiased Processing subscale scores would relate to lower defensiveness because these subscales deal specifically with the extent to which people are aware of, and feel comfort­ able experiencing, unpleasant self-relevant thought and affect. However, they did not anticipate significant relations between relational orientation and ver­ bal defensiveness, because the interview setting did not include close others. To test these hypotheses, Lakey et ai. (in press) had 101 male and female undergraduates participate in individual DVBA interviews with one of three trained interviewers that later were coded according to the criteria described in detail in Feldman Barrett et ai. (2000). Interrater reliability was excellent, exceeding .80. Total authenticity correlated inversely with defensiveness (r = -.25, p < .02). In addition, awareness correlated inversely with defensiveness, (r = -.21, p < .04), as did behavior (r = -.28, p < .01) and unbiased processing, although the latter was only marginally correlated (r = . 19, p < .062). Finally, relational authenticity did not correlate significantly with defensiveness (r = -. 10). In addition to providing important support for the construct validity of the AI-3, these data lend credence to the notion that authentic functioning re­ flects a quiet ego that does not need to be tenaciously defended. Other data collected from these same individuals (Kernis et aI., in press) indicated that individuals with secure high self-esteem exhibited considerably less verbal defensiveness than did individuals with fragile high self-esteem. This was true regardless of the marker of self-esteem fragility or security. Spe­ cifically, among individuals with high self-esteem, the more their self-esteem was stable, not contingent, and concordant with high implicit self-esteem, the less they were verbally defensive. In fact, verbal defensiveness was lowest among individuals with secure high self-esteem and was considerably higher among individuals whose high self-esteem was unstable, contingent, or incon­ gruent with low implicit self-esteem. Among individuals with low self-esteem,

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their standings on the fragility markers had considerably less impact on their degree of verbal defensiveness. Regardless of their standing on the fragility markers, individuals with low self-esteem exhibited degrees of verbal defen­ siveness that were very similar to individuals with fragile high self-esteem. Taken together, the findings from Lakey et al.'s (in press) and Kernis et al.'s (in press) studies indicate that the more authentic one is, and the more secure one's high self-esteem, the greater one's awareness and acceptance of one's thoughts, feelings, and actions in the face of threat, and the lower one's tendencies to rationalize and justify threatening events. Such understanding and acceptance of one's frailties without distortion and justification are impor­ tant makers of a quiet ego.

Summary In this chapter, we have conceptualized the operation of a quiet ego in terms of a strong sense of self. Consistent with this framework, we presented find­ ings that link the constructs of authenticity, mindfulness, and secure forms of high self-esteem to quiet ego functioning; specifically, the higher individuals' authenticity, mindfulness, and/or secure self-esteem, the lower was their an­ ger, aggressive behavior, and verbal defensiveness. These findings illustrate the usefulness of an individual-difference approach to understanding quiet ego functioning. The promise of such an approach will be realized when we fully understand the interplay among these constructs and their implications for other sequelae of a quiet ego.

References Brown, K. w., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role in psychological well-being. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 84, 822-848. Bushman, B. J. (1995). Moderating role of trait aggressiveness in the effects of violent media on aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 950-960. Bushman, B. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Threatened egotism, narcissism, self-esteem, and direct and displaced aggression: Does self-love or self-hate lead to violence? Journal ofPerson­ ality and Social Psychology, 75, 2 19-229. Buss, A. H., & Perry, M. ( 1992). The Aggression Questionnaire. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 63, 452--459. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. ( 1995). Human autonomy: The basis for true self-esteem. In M. H. Kernis (Ed.), Efficacy, agency and self-esteem (pp. 3 1--49). New York: Plenum Press. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227-268. Feldman Barrett, L., Cleveland, J., Conner, T., & Williams, N. L. (2000). Manual for the Defensive Verbal Ratings Scale Mrsion 3.0). Unpublished manuscript. Feldman Barrett, L., Williams, N. L., & Fong, G. T. (2002). Defensive Verbal Behavior Assessment. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 776-788. Feshbach, S. ( 1970). Aggression. In P. H. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael's manual ofchild psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 159-259). New York: Wiley. Goldman, B. M. (2004). The interrelated roles of dispositional authenticity, self-processes, and global role-functioning in affecting psychological adjustment. Unpublished doctoral disserta­ tion, University of Georgia, Athens.

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Goldman, B. M., & Kernis, M. H. (2002). The role of authenticity in healthy psychological nmc­ tioning and subjective well-being. Annals of the American Psychotherapy Association, 5(6), 18-20. Goldman, B. M., & Kernis, M. H. (2004). [The development of the Authenticity Inventory, V.3l. Unpublished raw data. Heppner, W. L., Kernis, M. H., Lakey, C. E., Davis, P. J., Cascio, E., Goldman, B. M., & Campbell, W. K (in press). Heightened mindfulness as a means ofreducing aggression: Dispositional and situational evidence. Aggressive Behavior. Heppner, W. L., Kernis, M. H., Nezlek, J. B., Foster, J. D., Lakey, C. E., & Goldman, B. M. (2007). Daily self-esteem and well-being: Predictions from authenticity, autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Manuscript in preparation. Hodgins, H. S., & Knee, C. R. (2002). The integrating self and conscious experience. In E. L. Deci & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), Handbook of self-determination research (pp. 87-100). Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Kabat·Zinn, J. ( 1990). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind to face stress, pain, and illness. New York: Dell Publishing. Kernis, M. H. (2003). Toward a conceptualization of optimal self-esteem. Psychological Inquiry, 14, 1-26. Kernis, M. H., & Goldman, B. M. (2005). Authenticity: A multicomponent perspective. In A. Tesser, J. Wood, & D. Stapel (Eds.), On building, defending, and regulating the self: A psychological perspective (pp. 31-52). New York: Psychology Press. Kernis, M. H., & Goldman, B. M. (2006). A multicomponent conceptualization of authenticity: Theory and research. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 38, pp. 283-357). San Diego, CA: Elsevier. Kernis, M. K, Granneman, B. D., & Barclay, L. C. (1989). Stability and level of self-esteem as predictors of anger arousal and hostility. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 1013-1022. Kernis, M. H., Lakey, C. E., & Heppner, W. L. (in press). Secure versus fragile high self-esteem as a predictor of verbal defensiveness: Converging findings across three different markers. Journal ofPersonality. Kernis, M. H., & Paradise, A. W. (2002). Distinguishing between secure and fragile fOTIns of high self-esteem. In E. L. Deci & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), Handbook of selfdetermination research (pp. 339-360). Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Kernis, M. H., Paradise, A. w., Whitaker, D. J., Wheatman, S. R., & Goldman, B. M. (2000). Mas­ ter of one's psychological domain? Not likely if one's self·esteem is unstable. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1297-1305. Lakey, C. E., Kernis, M. H., Heppner, W. L., & Davis, P. J. (2005). [Development of the Hostile At­ tribution Bias Scalel. Unpublished raw data, University of Georgia. Lakey, C . E., Kernis, M. H., Heppner, W. L., & Lance, C. E . (in press). Individual differences in authenticity and mindfulness as predictors of verbal defensiveness. Journal of Research in Personality. Langer, E . J. (1989). Mindfulness. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. Nezlek, J. B. (2001 ). Multilevel random coefficient analyses of event- and interval-contingent data in social and personality psychology research. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 77 1-785. Nezlek, J. B. (2005). Distinguishing affective and non-affective reactions to daily events. Journal ofPersonality, 73, 1-30. Reis, H. T., Sheldon, K M., Gable, S. L., Roscoe, J., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). Daily well-being: The role of autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 419-435. Twenge, J. M., Baumeister, R. F., Tice, D. M., & Stucke, T. S. (2001). If you can't join them, beat them: Effects of social exclusion on aggressive behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 81, 1058-1069. Zanna, M. P. (Ed.). (2006). Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 38). San Diego, CA: Elsevier.

9 Self- Compassion: Moving Beyond the Pitfalls of a Separate Self- Concept Kristin D. Neff The theory and research presented in this volume emphasize the ways an ego­ focused stance may lead to problems in personal and interpersonal functioning, suggesting that quieting the ego may enhance well-being. What does it mean, however, to quiet the ego? Does this refer to a type of self-abnegation in which the self's needs are ignored, suppressed, or subordinated to those of others? Quite the opposite. In this chapter, I provide an overview of theory and re­ search on a form of self-to-self relating known as self-compassion, in which ego­ istic self-focus is minimized at the same time that great care and concern are felt toward the self. To understand what is meant by the term self-compassion, it is useful to consider what it means to feel compassion more generally. When one experiences compassion, one notices and is moved by the suffering of oth­ ers, so that the desire to alleviate their suffering arises. Compassion for the failings and misdeeds of others is also met with understanding instead of harsh condemnation that simplistically reifies people as bad, so that unskilled actions and behaviors are seen in the context of shared human fallibility. Self­ compassion involves taking a similar stance toward one's own suffering, so that one is kind and understanding toward oneself when failure, inadequacy, or mis­ fortune is experienced. Self-compassionate individuals recognize that pain and imperfection are an inevitable part of the human experience, something that we all go through instead of an isolated occurrence that happens to "me" alone. Having compassion for oneself also involves taking a balanced perspective on negative self-relevant emotions, so that personal pain is neither suppressed and denied nor exaggerated and dramatized. Most people say they are less nurturing toward and more harsh with themselves than they are with other people (Neff, 2003a). Self-compassionate individuals, however, say they are equally kind to themselves and others. Self-compassion can be thought of as a type of openheartedness in which the boundaries between self and other are softened-all human beings are worthy of compassion, the self included. In this way, self-compassion represents a quiet ego, because one's experience is not strongly filtered through the lens of a sepa­ rate self. Before I review the research on self-compassion, I think it is useful to consider the more well-known construct of self-esteem, which is a noisy instead of quiet approach that often enshrines the ego in neon lights screaming "Me, me, me!"

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Self-Esteem Many psychologists assume that psychological well-being stems from hav­ ing a strong sense of self with a clearly defined identity (e.g., Erikson, 1968; Mahler, 1967). To the extent that the self is seen as a separate individual who is completely independent and wholly responsible for personal thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, it becomes imperative that the self be evaluated positively in order to feel acceptable. It is not surprising, then, that the con­ struct of self-esteem is often considered the ultimate marker of psychological well-being. Self-esteem refers to how much one likes or values the self and is based on congruence with personal standards or on comparisons with others (Coopersmith, 1967; Harter, 1999). In American culture, at least, having high self-esteem means standing out in a crowd-being special and above average (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). The psychological benefits of high self-esteem have been touted in both academia and the popular press (McKay & Fanning, 1987; Rosenberg, 1979), leading many schools to adopt large-scale programs to enhance students' self-esteem. Psychologists are in­ creasingly criticizing the emphasis placed on separation and individuation as indicators of mental health, however, given the potentially self-centered and egocentric nature of this stance (e.g., Cushman, 1990). Similarly, the pre­ sumed benefits of raising self-esteem as a means of enhancing well-being are now being questioned (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; Crocker & Park, 2004). First, it is difficult to raise self-esteem, because people often cling to their self-image (even when negative) as a means of maintaining a continuous and unambiguous sense of self (Swann, 1996). Moreover, attempts to raise self­ esteem-which sometimes involves giving indiscriminate praise or encourag­ ing positive self-affirmations (Hewitt, 1998)-can ignore or obscure patterns of behavior that need to be changed because they are unproductive, unhealthy, or harmful. The pursuit of high self-esteem may also cause problems in and of it­ self. The attempt to maintain self-esteem has been associated with narcissism and feelings of superiority (see chap. 2, this volume), inflated and unrealistic self-views (see chap. 4, this volume), prejudice (Aberson, Healy, & Romero, 2000), and bullying behavior (Salmivalli, Kaukiainen, Kaistaniemi, & Lager­ spetz, 1999). To the extent that the self is evaluated in distinction to others, others may be derogated in order to feel better about the self. Crocker and Park (2004) argued that the pursuit of sEM-esteem is typically focused on state self-esteem instead of trait self-esteem (see also chap. 6, this volume). Trait self-esteem represents a global, overall evaluation of self-worth that lasts over time, whereas state self-esteem refers to how good one feels about oneself at a particular moment in time. Individuals often try to experi­ ence positive affect by boosting their state self-esteem above trait levels and to avoid negative affect by not allowing their state self-esteem to fall below trait levels. A person with high self-esteem ironically is in a vulnerable position, because even slight failure (e.g. , an "N' student who receives a B) can feel like a self-esteem blow, whereas the excitement of a self-esteem boost may require near-perfection (e.g . , an A student needs to receive an A+ to feel anything spe­ cial). Because it is not always possible to meet personal goals and expectations,

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even people with high trait self-esteem may have state self-esteem that fluctu­ ates a great deal (see chap. 8, this volume). Unstable state self-esteem often occurs when perceived self-worth is highly contingent on success in particular domains (Crocker & Wolfe, 2001)-getting that desired job, grade, date, com­ petition trophy, and so on. The more one's self-worth is invested in doing well in a particular domain (e.g. , sports or academics), the greater the boost to state self-esteem when success is experienced, but the greater the drop in state self­ esteem when failure occurs. People with unstable, contingent high self-esteem often feel shame when they do not meet their desired self-validation goals and may express anger toward others in an attempt to externalize blame (Kernis, 2005). They may also react with aggression toward people who threaten the ego (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996).

Self-Compassion Because of the problems associated with the pursuit of self-esteem, many psychologists have proposed alternative conceptualizations of healthy self­ attitudes, such as self-respect (Seligman, 1995), self-efficacy (Bandura, 1990), or true self-esteem (Deci & Ryan, 1995). One self-attitude construct that has received increasing attention lately is self-compassion (Gilbert & Irons, 2005; Leary, Tate, Adams, Allen, & Hancock, 2007; Neff, 2003a, 2003b). Drawing on writings of various Buddhist scholars (e.g. , Brach, 2003; Goldstein & Kornfield, 1987; Salzberg, 1997), I (Neff, 2003b) have defined self-compassion as being composed of three main components: (a) self-kindness, (b) common humanity, and (c) mindfulness.

Self-Kindness Self-compassion entails being warm and understanding toward oneself when encountering suffering, inadequacy, or failure, instead of ignoring one's pain or flagellating oneself with self-criticism. Self-compassionate people recognize that being imperfect, failing, and experiencing life difficulties are inevitable, so they tend to be gentle with themselves when confronted with painful experi­ ences instead of getting angry when life falls short of set ideals. People can­ not always be, or get exactly, what they want. When this reality is denied or fought against, then suffering increases in the form of stress, frustration, and self-criticism. When this reality is accepted with sympathy and kindness, then greater emotional equanimity is experienced.

Common Humanity Frustration at not having things exactly as one wants is often accompanied by an irrational but pervasive sense of isolation-as if "I" were the only person suffering or making mistakes. When one's experiences are interpreted from the perspective of a separate self, there is little room left for thinking about or remembering the similar experiences of others. All humans suffer, however.

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The very definition of being human means that one is mortal, vulnerable, and imperfect. Therefore, self-compassion involves recognizing that suffering and personal failure are part of the shared human experience (see chaps. 13 and 15, this volume).

Mindfulness Self-compassion also requires taking a balanced approach to one's negative emotions so that feelings are neither suppressed nor exaggerated. This equili­ brated stance stems from the process of relating personal experiences to those of others who are also suffering, thus putting one's own situation into a larger perspective (see chap. 15, this volume). It also stems from the willingness to observe negative thoughts and emotions with openness and clarity, so that they are held in mindful awareness (Bishop et aI. , 2004). Mindfulness is a nonjudg­ mental, receptive mind state in which individuals observe their thoughts and feelings as they are, without trying to suppress or deny them (see chap. 7, this volume). One cannot ignore one's pain and feel compassion for it at the same time. Conversely, mindfulness requires that one not be overly identified with mental or emotional phenomena, so that one is caught up and swept away by one's aversive reaction (Bishop et aI., 2004). This latter type of response involves narrowly focusing and ruminating on one's negative emotions (Nolen­ Hoeksema, 1991), often with an exaggerated emphasis on implications for self-worth. The mental space provided by taking a more impersonal approach to one's negative self-relevant emotions, therefore, allows for greater emotional well-being (Baer, 2003; Shapiro, Carlson, Astin, & Freedman, 2006). The idea behind self-compassion is that, paradoxically, healthy and con­ structive self-attitudes stem in part from de-emphasizing the separate self instead of from building up and solidifying one's unique identity. By recogniz­ ing that personal thoughts, feelings, and actions are affected by factors not typically included in one's self-concept, such as parenting history, culture, and genetic and environmental conditions, as well as the behavior and expectations of others, one gains appreciation for what Thich Nhat Hanh ( 1987) called in­ terbeing. Hanh argued that by recognizing the intricate web of reciprocal cause and effect in which we are all imbedded, we are able to be less judgmental about personal failings. If individuals had full control over their behavior, it is unlikely that many would consciously decide to have anger issues, addiction issues, debilitating social anxiety, eating disorders, and so on. Many aspects of ourselves and the circumstances of our lives are not of our conscious choosing but instead stem from innumerable factors (genetic and/or environmental) over which we have little control. By recognizing our essential interdependence, therefore, failings and life difficulties do not have to be taken so personally. In­ stead, problems can be approached with a compassionate, accepting mind-set that maximizes the emotional equanimity needed to recognize and act on pos­ sible ways to improve the situation (or at least our response to it). In contrast, the belief in a separate self that is distinct from others means that the self's successes and failures tend to be taken highly personally (at least when the blame for failure cannot be easily shunted oft) and tends to engender a competi-

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tive mind-set in which the self's worth is judged and evaluated in comparison to others. This false sense of separation may lead to high self-esteem when the self succeeds, but when the self fails it can also lead to harsh self-judgment, perceived isolation, and difficulty facing painful truths about oneself with clar­ ity and balance. Because self-compassion treats the painful experiences of all humans (the self included) with compassion and understanding, it helps to maintain a balanced integration between concerns with self and others-a state that researchers are increasingly recognizing as essential to optimal psychologi­ cal functioning (Deci & Ryan, 2000). This balance does not stem from pitting concerns with oneself against concerns with others and finding some sort of compromising halfway point. Instead, it recognizes that all individuals should be treated with kindness and caring and that a compassionate attitude toward oneself is needed to avoid falsely separating oneself from the rest of humanity. In this way, self-compassion is quite distinct from self-pity (Goldstein & Kornfield, 1987). When individuals feel self-pity, they tend to become im­ mersed in their own problems and forget that others have similar problems. They ignore their interconnections with others and feel that they are the only ones in the world who are suffering. Self-pity emphasizes egocentric feelings of separation from others and overdramatizes the extent of personal suffering. Self-compassion, however, allows one to see the related experiences of self and other without this type of distortion or disconnection. Self-compassion is also distinct from complacency or self-indulgence. Individuals are sometimes reluc­ tant to be self-compassionate out of fear of letting themselves get away with anything (Neff, 2003b). Although focusing exclusively on pleasure for oneself might lead to self-indulgence, compassion involves desiring health and well­ being for the self rather than pleasure per se (Brach, 2003). In many instances, giving the self pleasure may harm well-being (e.g., taking drugs, overeating), whereas promoting one's health often involves a certain amount of displeasure (e.g., exercising, dieting). People may also resort to harsh self-criticism as a means of shaming oneself into action when confronting personal weaknesses. However, this approach often backfires if weaknesses remain unacknowledged in an unconscious attempt to avoid self-censure (Homey, 1950). In contrast, the care intrinsic to compassion provides a powerful motivating force for growth and change while also providing the safety needed to see the self clearly with­ out fear of self-condemnation.

Empirical Data Research has helped establish the beneficial nature of self-compassion. So far, most of the research on self-compassion has been conducted using the Self­ Compassion Scale (Neff, 2003a), which measures the degree to which indi­ viduals display self-kindness versus self-judgment, common humanity versus isolation, and mindfulness versus overidentification. Research indicates that self-compassionate individuals experience greater psychological health and resilience than those who lack self-compassion. For example, self-compassion

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is positively associated with life satisfaction, emotional intelligence, and so­ cial connectedness and negatively associated with self-criticism, depression, anxiety, rumination, thought suppression, and perfectionism (Neff, 2003a; Neff, Kirkpatrick, & Rude, 2007). A study designed to explore the link among self-compassion, positive psychological functioning, and the Big Five person­ ality traits (Neff, Rude, & Kirkpatrick, 2007) found that self-compassion was associated with greater reflective and affective wisdom, curiosity and explora­ tion, happiness, optimism, and positive affect. It was also linked to increased personal initiative, which involves trying to grow and change to lead a more productive and fulfilling life (Robitschek, 1998). This is important, because it supports the proposition that self-compassion leads to self-growth instead of self-indulgence. In terms of personality traits, self-compassion was signifi­ cantly associated with Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Neuroticism (negatively), although self-compassion still predicted unique vari­ ance in positive functioning after controlling for personality. My colleagues and I (Neff, Hsieh, & Dejitthirat, 2005) examined the link between self-compassion and motivation among college students to deter­ mine whether self-compassion might be adaptive in academic contexts. Self­ compassion was positively associated with mastery goals, which include the joy of learning for its own sake, and negatively associated with performance goals, which involve defending or enhancing one's sense of self-worth through academic performances. These findings were replicated with students who had recently failed a midterm examination and indicated that self-compassionate students exhibited more adaptive ways of coping with failure. Self-compassion may also play a role in the success of mindfulness-based clinical interventions, which are becoming increasingly widespread (Baer, 2003). For instance, a recent study by Shapiro, Astin, Bishop, and Cordova (2005) found that participation in a Mindfulness-Based Stress Reduction significantly increased participants' self-compassion levels and that self­ compassion mediated reductions in stress associated with the program.

Self-Compassion Versus Self-Esteem Self-compassion confers many of the same benefits as self-esteem in that it provides positive self-affect and a strong sense of self-acceptance. However, these feelings are not based on evaluating the separate self or on comparing personal performances with those of others. Instead, they stem from recog­ nizing the shared nature of the human condition, so that the self can be seen clearly and extended kindness without the need to feel superior to others. Gilbert and Irons (2005) suggested that self-compassion enhances well-being because it helps people feel a greater sense of interpersonal connection. Using social mentality theory, which draws on principles of evolutionary biology, neu­ robiology, and attachment theory, Gilbert ( 1989) proposed that self-compassion deactivates the threat system (which is associated with feelings of insecurity, defensiveness, and the limbic system) and activates the self-soothing system (which is associated with feelings of secure attachment, safeness, and the oxy­ tocin-opiate system). Thus, giving compassion to the self can be seen as a way

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to prime one's own attachment security. The theory argues that self-esteem, in contrast, is an evaluation of superiority-inferiority that helps to establish so­ cial rank stability and is related to alerting, energizing impulses and dopamine activation (Gilbert & Irons, 2005). Self-esteem, therefore, by its very nature tends to position the self in opposition to others. Research supports the proposition that self-compassion is a useful alterna­ tive to the construct of self-esteem. Self-compassion and self-esteem overlap to some degree, because both represent a positive emotional stance toward the self, and the Self-Compassion Scale tends to be moderately correlated with various self-esteem measures (Neff, 2003a). The two constructs differ in im­ portant ways, however. Whereas self-compassion is based on feelings of care and nonjudgmental understanding that connects the self to others, self-esteem is based on positive self-evaluations that tend to separate the self from oth­ ers. Also, self-compassion is relevant and available precisely when self-esteem tends to falter-when one fails or feels inadequate. Thus, self-compassion appears to provide emotional resilience over and above that attributable to self-esteem. For example, when controlling for self-esteem, I found that self­ compassion was still a robust (negative) predictor of depression and anxiety (Neff, 2003a). Another study involved a mock interview task that involved answering that dreaded but inevitable interview question, "Please describe your greatest weakness" (Neff, Kirkpatrick, & Rude, 2007). My colleagues and I found that self-compassion was associated with reduced anxiety after the task but that self-esteem did not provide such a buffer. Moreover, self­ compassionate individuals tended to use fewer first-person singular pronouns, such as I, when writing about their weaknesses, while using a greater number of first-person plural pronouns, such as we, and making more social references to friends, family, communication, and other humans. Self-esteem did not show this same pattern of association with language use. These results suggest that self-compassion involves a more connected and less separate view of the self when one is considering personal failings. Moreover, recent research suggests that self-compassion is more predic­ tive of healthy self-related functioning than is self-esteem (Neff & Vonk, 2006). A survey conducted with a large Web-based community sample in Denmark included measures of self-compassion and global self-esteem as well as a num­ ber of self-related processes known to be maladaptive: self-esteem instability and contingency, social comparison (i.e., the tendency to evaluate self-worth in comparison to others), narcissism, reactive anger, public self-consciousness, and self-rumination (i.e., the tendency to become self-absorbed and fixated on disliked aspects of oneselD. The study also examined need for closure, a type of rigid closed-mindedness (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) often driven by the need to maintain a sense of self-worth. Regression analyses indicated that, after ac­ counting for variance in outcomes attributable to self-esteem, self-compassion predicted significant additional variance (in the negative direction) for self­ esteem instability, self-esteem contingency, social comparison, reactive anger, public self-consciousness, and self-rumination. Moreover, in almost every case, self-compassion was a much stronger negative predictor of these outcomes than was self-esteem. The one exception was narcissism, which showed a quite different pattern. Self-esteem had a substantial positive association with nar-

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cissism, but self-compassion predicted no additional variance in narcissism after being added to the regression model. These results suggest that self­ compassion provides greater protection from dysfunctional self-to-self relating than self-esteem and that self-esteem has a narcissistic aspect not shared by self-compassion.

Culture and Self-Compassion Given Markus and Kitayama's ( 1991) well-known theory proposing that Asians have an interdependent sense of self and Westerners have an independent sense of self, an interesting question concerns whether self-compassion levels differ between the East and West (see also chap. 14, this volume). Although one might expect that Asians would have higher levels of self-compassion given their more interdependent sense of self, self-construal theory is actually used to argue that Asians are more self-critical than Westerners because they are more invested in conforming the self's behavior to the requirements of social relationships (Heine et aI., 1999; Kitayama, Markus, Matsumoto, & Norasak­ kunkit, 1997). These seemingly contradictory expectations highlight the mul­ tifaceted meaning of interdependence in self-construal theory and therefore the difficulties of understanding how self-construals relate to self-compassion. To the extent that an interdependent self-construal taps into feelings of human interconnectedness, it should promote feelings of self-compassion, but to the extent that it reflects concerns with social conformity and harsh self-regulatory tactics to keep oneself in line (a notion quite distinct from Hanh's, 1987, con­ ception of interbeing), it might hinder self-compassion. Similar issues exist with regard to independent self-construals. On the one hand, independence

may involve care and concern for the self, increasing self-compassion. On the other hand, independence may connote feelings of separation or isolation, thus undermining self-compassion. To explore these issues, my colleagues and I (Neff, Pisitsungkagarn, & Hsieh, in press) examined self-compassion, self­ construal, and psychological well-being in Thailand, Taiwan, and the United States. Because Thailand is strongly influenced by Buddhism, and the value of compassion is emphasized in parenting practices and everyday interactions, we expected the highest levels of self-compassion to be found in Thailand. In contrast, Taiwan is more influenced by Confucianism and tends to emphasize shame as a parenting practice and means of social control, so we expected self­ compassion to be the lowest in Taiwan. We thought Americans would fall in between these two poles given the mixed messages of American culture with regard to self-compassion (e.g. , a strong emphasis on positive self-affect but also an isolating, competitive ethos). As we had expected, self-compassion levels were highest in Thailand and lowest in Taiwan, with the United States falling in between (all cultures differed significantly from one another; Neff, Pisitsungkagarn, & Hsieh, in press). These cross-cultural differences remained even when controlling for self-construal, suggesting that self-construal differences did not explain variations in self-compassion. (Taiwan and Thailand had almost identical levels of interdependent self-construal, even though they had very differ-

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ent levels of self-compassion.) Moreover, there were cultural differences in the link between self-compassion and self-construal. Interdependence was linked to self-compassion in Thailand only, with independence being linked to self-compassion in Taiwan and the United States. The results suggest that the meanings of independence and interdependence may vary across cultures. Interdependence involves being deeply embedded in a particular social system. If that system promotes the value of self-compassion, as it does in Thailand, then being more interdependent within that system seems to promote self-compassion and decrease self.judgment. If the culture does not actively promote self-compassion, however, which appears to be the case in the United States and Taiwan, then being independent of the prevailing cultural ethos may facilitate the type of self-understanding and self-care required to be compassionate toward oneself. In all three cultures, however, greater self­ compassion significantly predicted less depression and greater life satisfaction, suggesting that there may be universal benefits to self-compassion despite cultural differences in its prevalence.

Future Research Directions

A great deal of research is now under way to develop a better understanding of self-compassion in relation to psychological functioning as well as its clinical relevance. For instance, researchers in our laboratory are now examining the role of self-compassion in the well-being of adolescents and developing a school­ based intervention to try to engender greater self-compassion among high school students. My colleagues and I have also developed a self-compassion exercise that can be used not only for research designs that experimentally ma­ nipulate self-compassion levels but also as a tool for increasing self-compassion in everyday life. Gilbert and Irons (2005) developed a therapeutic approach to treating habitually self-critical individuals called compassionate mind training that specifically targets self-compassion. The approach helps clients develop the ability to self-soothe, reassure, and feel warmth for personal difficulties and imperfections. Although research on the effectiveness of the approach is still in its early stages, initial results suggest that compassionate mind train­ ing significantly reduces self-hatred and associated feelings of anxiety and depression and may have a life-changing impact for individuals who practice being more self-compassionate (Gilbert & Proctor, 2006). Research on self-compassion strongly suggests that one can experience positive emotions toward the self by quieting the ego, by emphasizing con­ nections with others instead of by feeling special, unique, and above aver­ age (see chap. 15, this volume). If this is the case, then psychologists may need to consider how to de-emphasize instead of promote a separate identity and self-concept to encourage the development of healthy self-attitudes (see chap. 18, this volume). One promising avenue for developing a quiet but self-compassionate ego is through mindfulness meditation techniques that emphasize remaining connected to one's present moment experience in an open and accepting way, without getting lost in the storyline of me, myself, and mine (Baer, 2003; Shapiro et al., 2006; see also chap. 7, this volume). Such

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techniques have been shown to change the physical structure of the brain, including greatly enhanced brain activation in the left prefrontal cortex, a re­ gion associated with joy, happiness, and optimism (Lutz, Greischar, Rawlings, Ricard, & Davidson, 2004).

References Aberson, C. L., Healy, M., & Romero, V. (2000). Ingroup bias and self-esteem: A meta-analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 4, 157-173. Baer, R A. (2003). Mindfulness training as a clinical intervention: A conceptual and empirical review. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 10, 125-143. Bandura, A. (1990). Reflections on nonability determinants of competence. In R J. Sternberg & J. Kolligian Jr. (Eds.), Competence considered (pp. 316-352). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Baumeister, R F., Campbell, J. D., Krueger, J. I., & Vohs, K. D. (2003). Does high self-esteem cause better performance, interpersonal success, happiness, or healthier lifestyles? Psychological Science in the Public Interest, 4, 1--44. Baumeister, R F. , Smart, L., & Boden, J. M. ( 1996). Relation of threatened egotism to violence and aggression: The dark side of high self-esteem. Psychological Review, 103, 5-33. Bishop, S. R, Lau, M., Shapiro, S., Carlson, L., Anderson, N. D., Carmody, J., et al. (2004). Mind­ fulness: A proposed operational definition. Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice, 11, 191-206. Brach, T. (2003). Radical acceptance: Embracing your life with the heart of a Buddha. New York: Bantam Books. Coopersmith, S. (1967). The antecedents of self-esteem. San Francisco: Freeman. Crocker, J., & Park, L. E. (2004). The costly pursuit of self-esteem. Psychological Bulletin, 130, 392--414. Crocker, J . , & Wolfe, C. T. (200 1). Contingencies of self-worth. Psychological Review, lOB, 593-623. Cushman, P. (1990). Why the self is empty: Toward a historically situated psychology. American Psychologist, 45, 599-611. Deci, E . L., & Ryan, R M. ( 1995). Human autonomy: The basis for true self-esteem. In M. H. Kernis (Ed.), Efficacy, agency, and self-esteem (pp. 3 1--49). New York: Plenum Press. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R M. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227-268. Erikson, E. H. ( 1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York: Norton. Gilbert, P. ( 1989). Human nature and suffering. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Gilbert, P. , & Irons, C. (2005). Therapies for shame and self-attacking, using cognitive, behav­ ioural, emotional imagery and compassionate mind training. In P. Gilbert (Ed.), Compassion: Conceptualisations, research and use in psychotherapy (pp. 263-325). London: Routledge. Gilbert, P., & Proctor, S. (2006). Compassionate mind training for people with high shame and self-criticism: Overview and pilot study of a group therapy approach. Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, 13, 353-379. Goldstein, J., & Kornfield, J. (1987). Seeking the heart of wisdom: The path of insight meditation. Boston: Shambhala. Hanh, T. N. ( 1987). Interbeing: Fourteen guidelines for engaged Buddhism. Berkeley, CA: Parallax Press. Harter, S. (1999). The construction of the self' A developmental perspective. New York: Guilford Press. Heine, S. J., Lehman, D. R, Markus, H. R, & Kitayama, S. ( 1999). Is there a universal need for positive self-regard? Psychological Review, 106, 766-795. Hewitt, J. P. ( 1998). The myth ofself-esteem: Finding happiness and solving problems in America. New York: St. Martin's Press. Horney, K. (1950). Neurosis and human growth: The struggle toward self-realization. New York: Norton.

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Kernis, M. H. (2005). Measuring self-esteem in context: The importance of stability of self-esteem in psychological functioning. Journal of Personality, 73, 1-37. Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R, Matsumoto, H., & Norasakkunkit, V. (1997). Individual and collective processes in the construction of the self: Self-enhancement in the United States and self-criti­ cism in Japan. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 72, 1245-1267. Leary, M. R, Tate, E. B., Adams, C. E . , Allen,A B., & Hancock, J. (2007). Self-compassion and reac­ tions to unpleasant self-relevant events: The implications oftreating oneselfkindly. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 887-904. Lutz, A , Greischar, L. L., Rawlings, N. B., Ricard, M., & Davidson, R J. (2004). Long-term medita­ tors self-induce high-amplitude gamma synchrony during mental practice. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 101, 16369-16373. Mahler, M. S. (1967). On human symbiosis and the vicissitudes of individuation. Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association, 15, 740-763. Markus, H. R, & Kitayama, S. ( 1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224-253. McKay, M., & Fanning, P. ( 1987). Self-esteem. Oakland, CA: New Harbinger. Neff, K D. (2003a). The development and validation of a scale to measure self-compassion. Self and Identity, 2, 223-250. Neff, K D. (2003b). Self-compassion: An alternative conceptualization of a healthy attitude toward oneself. Self and Identity, 2, 85-102. Neff, K D., Hsieh, Y., & Dejitthirat, K (2005). Self-compassion, achievement goals, and coping with academic failure. Self and Identity, 4, 263-287. Neff, K D., Kirkpatrick, K, & Rude, S. S. (2007). Self-compassion and its link to adaptive psycho­ logical functioning. Journal ofResearch in Personality, 41, 139-154. Neff, K D., Pisitsungkagarn, K, & Hsieh, Y. (in press). Self-compassion and self-construal in the United States, Thailand, and Taiwan. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. Neff, K D., Rude, S. S., & Kirkpatrick, K (2007). An examination of self-compassion in relation to positive psychological functioning and personality traits. Journal of Research in Personality, 41, 908-916. Neff, K D., & Vonk, R (2006). Self-compassion: A healthier alternative to high self-esteem. Paper presented at the 36th annual meeting ofthe Jean Piaget Society, Baltimore. Nolen-Hoeksema, S. ( 1991). Responses to depression and their effects on the duration of depressive episodes. Journal ofAbnormal Psychology, 100, 569-582. Robitschek, C. (1998). Personal growth initiative: The construct and its measure. Measurement and Evaluation in Counseling and Development, 30, 183-198. Rosenberg, M. (1979). Conceiving the self. New York: Basic Books. Salmivalli, C., Kaukiainen, A., Kaistaniemi, L., & Lagerspetz, K M. J. (1999). Self-evaluated self­ esteem, peer-evaluated self-esteem, and defensive egotism as predictors of adolescents' partici­ pation in bullying situations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1268-1278. Salzberg, S. (1997). Lovingkindness: The revolutionary art ofhappiness. Boston: Shambala. Seligman, M. E. P. (1995). The optimistic child. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Shapiro, S. L., Astin, J. A , Bishop, S. R, & Cordova, M. (2005). Mindfulness-based stress reduction for health care professionals: Results from a randomized trial. International Journal of Stress Management, 12, 164-176. Shapiro, S. L., Carlson, L. E., Astin, J. A, & Freedman, B. (2006). Mechanisms of mindfulness. Journal ofClinical Psychology, 62, 373-386. Swann, W. B. (1996). Self-traps: The elusive quest for higher self-esteem. New York: Freeman. Webster, D. M., & Kruglanski, A W. ( 1994). Individual differences in need for cognitive closure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 1049-1062.

10 The Role of Awareness and Autonomy in Quieting the Ego: A Self-Determination Theory Perspective Christopher P. Niemiec, Richard M. Ryan, and Kirk Warren Brown The ego has maintained a prominent status among psychological constructs since its initial popularization more than a century ago. A recent PsycINFO (http://www.apa.org/psycinfo) search, which returned 5,655 results to the key word ego, attests to the importance of the construct within myriad areas of study among theoretical and empirical psychologists. Furthermore, lay con­ ceptualizations and uses of the ego are manifold, which underscores the strong influence of the ego on the current landscape of Western thought. It is interest­ ing that most of these lay uses are pejorative (e.g., egotist, egocentric). Among contemporary theories within psychology, however, the meanings and functional implications of the ego are divergent. Like the lay public's vary­ ing use of the term, many technical uses of the term ego focus on problematic personality styles or motivational states-being egotistical, ego involved, or having an inflated ego (Leary, 2004). However, some theorists (e.g. , Freud, 1923/1960; Loevinger, 1976) posit that the ego is anything but problematic, that instead it is the basis of assimilation, growth, and harmony within the psyche. As an organ of awareness and integration, this use of the ego is de­ fined essentially as the synthetic process of the mind (e.g., see McAdams, 1990) that plays an important and constructive role in adaptation and conflict resolution. In this chapter we examine, using self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 1985, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000), the relation of the ego to several types of motivated behavior that vary in the degree to which they are initiated with the experience of choice and volition. In brief, SDT suggests that autonomous self­ regulation involves the reflective endorsement of behaviors and their integra­ tion with important needs and values, which we propose is associated with the quieting of the ego. In contrast, introjected behavioral regulation involves the initiation and maintenance of behaviors through internally controlling motiva­ tional states, such as ego-involvement and self-esteem concerns. Moreover, in­ trojection is characterized by a lack of integrative awareness, which precludes

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the ability to synthesize these behaviors with preexisting psychic material and therefore stalls the process of quieting the ego. As such, from the perspective of SDT, the regulation of a behavior through introjection is closely associated with a "noisy" ego: Both involve restricted awareness, the administration of control­ ling contingencies, and defensive responding when threatened. Considerable empirical evidence from SDT suggests that introjected behavioral regulation has deleterious consequences for both psychological health and motivation, whereas autonomous self-regulation is conducive to well-being, higher qual­ ity interpersonal relationships, and motivated behavior. In the paragraphs that follow, we briefly review relevant theory and research and then proceed to discuss how reflective awareness (Ryan, 2005), and specifically mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003; see also chap. 7, this volume), underpin autonomous self-regulation and the integrative functions of the psyche that are associated with inner harmony and the capacity to quiet the ego.

Self-Determination Theory

SDT is an approach to self-regulation and personality development that rests on an organismic-dialectic metatheory in which humans are viewed as vulner­ able to control and passivity as well as capable of choice, growth, and authen­ ticity. SDT proposes that biological, developmental, and social factors have both proximal and distal influences on the development of autonomy-the ex­ perience of reflective self-endorsement of activity that occurs at both the inner and outer boundaries-that in turn affects behavioral regulation, personality integration, and life-span development. Thus, the primary focus of investiga­ tion within SDT has centered on motivation, which is bifurcated into two types (viz. , intrinsic and extrinsic) that have divergent consequences for healthy development and well-being (see Deci & Ryan, 2000, for a review). Motivation was classically formulated as a unitary concept that varied in amount instead of type (e.g., Hull, 1943). It became apparent, however, that motivation was a more dynamic concept than drive-based energy used to develop new associative bonds and that such a definition could not account for nonderivative (e.g. , exploratory) behaviors. Deci ( 1975) used the concept of intrinsic motivation to account for behaviors that are performed in the absence of contingent rewards or punishments and thus are perceived as vo­ litional. Intrinsic motivation refers to the natural tendency to seek out novel and challenging situations, to expand cognitive and behavioral capacities, and to explore the inner and outer environment. Moreover, the maintenance and enhancement of intrinsic motivation rely on satisfaction of the psychological needs for autonomy and competence (Deci & Ryan, 1985). Within SDT, intrin­ sic motivation is considered to be an evolved, inner resource that supports the development of new skills and competencies, as well as a source of fun and vitality (Ryan, Kuhl, & Deci, 1997). Young children typically have ample opportunity to engage in intrinsi­ cally motivated activities (e.g., play). As people grow older and venture into the broader social milieu, however, they more often spend their time fulfilling social duties and obligations. This type of motivation, in which the behavior

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is performed to obtain outcomes that are separable from the activities them­ selves, is termed extrinsic motivation. It is important to note that although these behaviors are not spontaneously initiated, extrinsic motivation can vary in the degree to which the behavior is enacted volitionally (Ryan & Connell, 1989). Organismic-integration theory, a subtheory within SDT, proposes that ex­ trinsic motivation exists along a continuum of relative autonomy and suggests that, through the process of internalization, extrinsically motivated behaviors can be regulated more or less volitionally. The least autonomous form ofbehav­ ioral regulation, termed external regulation, refers to behavior that is enacted to obtain rewards or to avoid punishments and is experienced as relatively controlled because the impetus for action exists outside the person. An example of external regulation is a student who studies to obtain parental rewards or to avoid punishments. Once internalized, behavioral regulation occurs through introjection, in which behavior is enacted to garner pride and esteem or to avoid guilt and shame and, like external regulation, is experienced as relatively con­ trolled because, even though the origin of the behavior is inside the person, it is external to the self. An example of introjection is a student who is driven to study to avoid feelings of guilt or to feel pride and ego inflation associated with success and high performance. As internalization proceeds toward greater autonomy, self-regulation oc­ curs through identification, in which the value of the behavior is understood, is considered to be important for the individual, and is experienced as relatively autonomous because it is self-endorsed and volitionally enacted. An example of identification is a student who studies because he considers it worthwhile to do so. The process of internalization is completed when behavior is regulated through integration, in which the identified regulation is brought into coher­ ence and harmony with other identifications and aspects of the self and thus is experienced as relatively autonomous. An example of integration is a student who studies because she defines herself as someone who considers learning to be important and who has aligned this value with other personally endorsed values.

A Deeper Examination of Introjection

SDT proposes that humans have an inherent tendency toward psychological synthesis through the internalization of social regulations and values and their integration with preexisting self-structures to form a coherent and uni­ fied sense of self. Moreover, environmental supports (e.g. , parents, teachers) for the satisfaction of the psychological needs for autonomy, competence, and relatedness facilitate fuller internalization (viz. , identification and integration) and higher well-being in a variety of domains and across the life span (see Deci & Ryan, 2000, for a review); that is, people are more likely to identify with the value of an external regulation and to make it their own when they experience provision for the satisfaction of their psychological needs, and such satisfaction contributes to psychological health (cf. Niemiec, Lynch, et aI. , 2006) across cul­ tures, contexts, and age groups (see Deci & Ryan, 2000, for a review).

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Nonetheless, some of the most common forms of behavioral regulation are anything but harmonious, especially those that are described within SDT as introjected. Introjection involves the adoption of external regulations and val­ ues without really assimilating them. In a developmental sense, introjection typically results when socializers prompt behavior using contingent approval, essentially communicating to the socialized person, "I will love you only if you do as I say." This is experienced phenomenologically as having the satisfaction of the needs for relatedness and autonomy pitted against each other, which results in the experiences of internal compulsion, a lack of choice, and shame and guilt after failure (Assor, Roth, & Deci, 2004). Thus, introjection is likely to manifest among people who were exposed to a socialization strategy in which they were forced to decide between satisfaction of one psychological need at the expense of another, and this controlling practice is then applied to one's self. Therefore, through introjection, the person controls the self through the ad­ ministration of contingent consequences in the forms of pride and self-esteem after adherence or success and guilt and shame after lapses or failure. Such controlled behavioral regulation has been found to be associated with a variety of negative consequences for motivation and well-being, including increased tension, anxiety, vulnerability, and depression (see Deci & Ryan, 2000, for a review). The experience of introjection is quite prevalent in contemporary society. Indeed, Deci and Ryan ( 1985) suggested that the process of organismic inte­ gration typically gets stalled at the level of introjection, which results in the development of various psychological conflicts and psychopathologies. Introjec­ tion is most commonly manifest in daily life as ego involvement and public self­ consciousness. Ego involvement refers to an internally controlled motivational state in which success or failure at a task is considered to be an indicator of self­

worth (Nicholls, 1984; Ryan, 1982). Ryan (1982) manipulated ego involvement by telling experimental participants that their performance on an intrinsically motivated task was a reflection of their creative intelligence and found that participants who were ego involved demonstrated less intrinsic motivation for the target activity. Public self-consciousness reflects people's tendency to be aware of themselves as objects of others' observation. Plant and Ryan ( 1985) found that dispositional and experimentally induced public self-consciousness had similarly deleterious effects on intrinsic motivation. These results con­ verge to suggest that, although introjection-manifest as ego involvement and public self-consciousness-can involve a high level of behavioral responding (Ryan, Koestner, & Deci, 1991), it undermines intrinsic motivation because of the accompanying feelings of internal pressure and negative affect. Another common manifestation of introjection is contingent self-esteem (Deci & Ryan, 1995; see also chap. 6, this volume). Ryan and Brown (2003) suggested that the pursuit of self-esteem-characterized by a preoccupation with the enhancement of one's self-worth through the attainment of external indicators (e.g. , accomplishment, appearance, status)-is derived from experi­ ences with relational others (e.g., parents, teachers) who use contingent regard as a socializing technique. People who experience a high level of contingent self-esteem are theorized to have introjected the contingencies that their so­ cializing agents displayed to them, and essentially push around different parts

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of their psyche through the administration of contingent rewards (i. e., pride) and punishments (Le., guilt and shame). Kernis and Paradise (2003) reported that contingent self-esteem is associated with a stronger anger response after an ego threat. Thus, when one's self-worth is considered to be dependent on external outcomes, indicating that behavior is regulated through introjection, then the pursuit of self-esteem is a costly endeavor (see chap. 8, this volume). Finally, introjection is manifest in the seeking of self-esteem through the establishment and pursuit of particular life goals, or aspirations. Kasser and Ryan (1996) proposed that people's long-term aspirations are likely to fall into two general categories and found that the aspirations for money, fame, and an appealing image loaded onto one factor that they labeled extrinsic aspirations, whereas personal growth, interpersonal relationships, community contribu­ tion, and physical health loaded onto a second factor, labeled intrinsic aspira­ tions. This factor structure appears to be common across cultures (e.g. , Grouzet et aI. , 2005). Kasser and Ryan found that the strength of people's intrinsic (relative to extrinsic) aspirations was positively associated with psychological health, and these findings have been replicated among a number of diverse cul­ tural groups and across the life span (e.g., Ryan et al., 1999). Moreover, Bauer, McAdams, and Sakaeda (2005) found that people who emphasized intrinsic memories in their narrative autobiographical accounts tended to experience greater eudaimonic well-being. Recently, Niemiec, Ryan, and Deci (2006) found that, although intrinsic aspirations facilitated psychological health, the attain­ ment of extrinsic aspirations made no contribution to well-being and actually heightened experiences of ill-being. Although introjection and the pursuit of extrinsic aspirations are theoretically distinguishable (Deci & Ryan, 2000), we consider the two concepts to be conceptually similar because they both involve attempts to bolster self-esteem through the attainment of external indicators of worth and involve pressured, internal control.

Introjection and the Ego

According to SDT, introjection represents a controlled form of behavioral regulation that is based largely on motives intended to protect the ego through the maintenance or enhancement of self-esteem (Ryan & Brown, 2003). In­ trojection differs from more autonomous forms of self-regulation because the latter are experienced as less pressured and conflictual and are associated with a perceived sense of self-endorsement and volition. When behavior is regulated through introjection, the ego can be characterized as noisy because it uses various defensive strategies to restrict awareness of those parts of experience that are forbidden or negatively regarded by the social world. The noisy ego uses controlling contingencies to maintain its harsh rule, such as the administration of contingent, self-conscious affect (e.g. , shame, pride). Because introjection necessarily thwarts the satisfaction of autonomy, there is often an accompanying experience of coercive pressure and internal conflict. Indeed, success and failure at introjected standards have direct implications for self-esteem and the ego. When introjected standards (e.g., "I should be an A student") are met, this success yields an inflation of the ego and contingent

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self-esteem. In contrast, when such standards are not met, the person is left to feel less worthy. Accordingly, introjection is associated with negative conse­ quences for motivation, physical health, and psychological well-being (e.g., see Ryan, Deci, Grolnick, & La Guardia, 2006, for a review).

The Role of Awareness in Quieting the Ego

Because of the many problems associated with a noisy ego, it is important to consider ways to quiet the ego and thus to facilitate the process of internaliza­ tion toward greater autonomy and self-congruent behavioral enactment. Deci and Ryan ( 1980, 1985) have suggested that awareness is necessary for the amelioration of introjection and for the development of flexible structures that facilitate unified, integrated functioning. Moreover, Hodgins and Knee (2002) suggested that the willingness to perceive reality with open, receptive aware­ ness is associated with autonomy and reduced defensiveness when faced with threat, both of which are hallmarks of the quiet ego. Recently, Brown and Ryan (2003, 2004, 2006) began a program of research centered on the motivational, affective, and behavioral correlates and con­ sequences of mindfulness-a receptive state of present-centered awareness. Mindfulness is inherently a state of consciousness into and out of which people move, but there is evidence that reliable interindividual differences exist in the propensity to abide in mindful states over time. Several lines of evidence suggest that mindfulness is an important inner resource that facilitates less egoistic, more autonomous forms of self-regulation. Brown and Ryan (2003) found, using both concurrent and prospective study designs, that dispositional mindfulness was positively associated with more autonomous self-regulation. Furthermore, Levesque and Brown (in press) found that dispositional mindfulness predicted higher day-to-day auton­ omous self-regulation and even modulated an implicit, nonconscious tendency to regulate behavior in a more egoistic way. Moreover, the benefits of mindful­ ness do not appear to be limited to those embodying the disposition. Brown and Ryan (2003) showed, using within-person diary data, that when in more mind­ ful states, people were more likely to regulate their behavior autonomously. In addition, experimental evidence (Brown & Ryan, 2006) indicated that the induction of state mindfulness led to higher intrinsic motivation-interest and enjoyment-for a reading task and, subsequently, to better recall of the text material. Finally, Brown and Kasser (2005) found that more mindful people were more likely to endorse the importance of intrinsic (relative to extrinsic) aspirations. These results suggest that mindfulness fosters a motivational ori­ entation marked by self-endorsed, noncontingent behavior and goal pursuits that reflect less egoistic functioning. Thus far, we have characterized the noisy ego as being preoccupied with, and oriented toward, self-esteem enhancement through the use of various defensive motivational strategies that collectively fall under the rubric of in­ trojection. Because the noisy ego is maintained contingently, it often needs to be defended when contingencies of self-worth are not obtained. Perhaps the greatest threat to the ego is its annihilation. Indeed, research in terror man-

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agement theory (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997) has demonstrated repeatedly that confrontation with personal mortality breeds responses that are focused on defensive self-esteem enhancement, for example, ingroup favor­ itism and outgroup derogation. If, however, as we suggest, awareness-and, more specifically, mindfulness-facilitates the quieting of the ego, then it is possible that mindfulness may reduce the defensive responding engendered by a noisy ego that is typically observed in response to mortality salience. Recently, we (Niemiec, Brown, & Ryan, 2006) investigated the role of mindfulness in the processes involved in terror management. Participants were instructed to write about either their own death or an innocuous topic (i.e., watching television). After this, all participants were asked to read two essays purportedly written by foreigners, one who supported participants' cul­ tural worldview by expressing pro-U.S. sentiments, and the other who opposed it, with the latter being an ego threat. Because people desire to feel like a valu­ able member of a meaningful existence when under existential threat (Green­ berg et aI., 1997), they often respond defensively to reminders of their death by expressing favoritism toward an outgroup (foreign) author who upholds the ingroup worldview and by derogating an author who opposes it. In a series of studies, we found that more mindful people in a mortality salience condi­ tion showed less defensive responding by reporting less ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. This effect was explained, in part, by more mindful people's calm emotional reaction to mortality salience, greater willingness to process the death experience for a longer amount of time, and less suppression of death-related thoughts. From the perspective of SDT, we propose that the defensive responses to mortality salience documented by research from terror management theory rely on the experience of having a noisy ego. Our results suggest that mindfulness, which encourages more receptive, less egoistic re­ sponding, helps discourage defensive responding when faced with existential threat.

Conclusion: Awareness, Autonomy, and the Quiet Ego

Using SDT, we have proposed that autonomous self-regulation has consider­ able value and yields a variety of salutary outcomes that are associated with the quieting of the ego. With relative freedom from the loud cries of egoistic de­ mands, SDT proposes that autonomous self-regulation is more clearly guided by the core synthetic processes of the self that orient the organism toward greater internal psychic coherence, congruence with the social world, and satisfaction of the basic psychological needs. Thus, within SDT we interpret the quiet ego as being the basis of behavioral regulation that is truly self­ determined, which facilitates the organismic tendencies toward growth and intra- and interpersonal harmony. A considerable body of research indicates that autonomous self-regulation can be facilitated by appropriate social supports. In this chapter, we have shown that this motivational style can also be fostered by mindfulness, which represents an inner support for autonomous self-regulation that may oper­ ate synergistically with supportive social contexts to foster healthy forms of

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motivation (Brown & Ryan, 2004). However, the capacity for mindfulness may be particularly important in social environments that encourage ego involve­ ment instead of autonomous self-regulation. Such environments arguably are common in contemporary society, and the cultivation of mindfulness may help foster a way of being that would otherwise prove difficult. Indeed, the benefits to such an endeavor are manifold; without the defense, judgment, or esteem that make a noisy ego so problematic (Deci & Ryan, 1995), the individual whose functioning is self-congruent and has cultivated a quiet ego will be better able to pursue ends that truly satisfy.

References Assor, A , Roth, G., & Deci, E. L. (2004). The emotional costs of parents' conditional regard: A self­ determination theory analysis. Journal ofPersonality, 72, 47-88. Bauer, J. J., McAdams, D. P., & Sakaeda, A R. (2005). Interpreting the good life: Growth memo­ ries in the lives of mature, happy people. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 203-2 17. Brown, K. w., & Kasser, T. (2005). Are psychological and ecological well-being compatible? The role of values, mindfulness, and lifestyle. Social Indicators Research, 74, 349-368. Brown, K. w., & Ryan, R. M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role in psychological well-being. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 84, 822-848. Brown, K. w., & Ryan, R. M. (2004). Fostering healthy self-regulation from within and without: A self-determination theory perspective. In P. A Linley & S. Joseph (Eds.), Positive psychology in practice (pp. 105-124). New York: Wiley. Brown, K. w., & Ryan, R. M. (2006). Induced mindfulness as a predictor ofpositive motivational, emotional, and task performance outcomes. Unpublished manuscript, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY. Deci, E. L. ( 1975). Intrinsic motivation. New York: Plenum Press. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1980). Self-determination theory: When mind mediates behavior. Jour­ nal ofMind and Behavior, 1 , 33-43. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1985). Intrinsic motivation and self-determination in human behavior. New York: Plenum Press. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. ( 1995). Human autonomy: The basis for true self-esteem. In M. Kernis (Ed.), Efficacy, agency, and self-esteem (pp. 3 1-49). New York: Plenum Press. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227-268. Freud, S. ( 1960). The ego and the id. New York: Norton. (Original work published 1923) Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. (1997). Terror management theory of self-esteem and social behavior: Empirical assessments and conceptual refinements. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 29, pp. 61-139). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Grouzet, F. M. E., Kasser, T., Ahuvia, A, Dols, J. M. F., Kim, Y.-H., Lau, S., et al. (2005). The structure of goal contents across 15 cultures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 800-816. Hodgins, H. S., & Knee, C. R. (2002). The integrating self and conscious experience. In E. L. Deci & R. M. Ryan (Eds.), Handbook of self-determination research (pp. 87-100). Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Hull, C. L. ( 1 943). Principles of behavior: An introduction to behavior theory. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts. Kasser, T., & Ryan, R. M. (1996). Further examining the American dream: Differential correlates of intrinsic and extrinsic goals. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 280-287. Kernis, M. H., & Paradise, A W. (2003). Unstable self-esteem, contingent self-esteem, and no anger. Unpublished manuscript, University of Georgia, Athens.

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Leary, M. R. (2004). The curse of the self Self-awareness, egotism, and the quality of human life. New York: Oxford University Press. Levesque, C., & Brown, K W. (in press). Mindfulness as a moderator of the effect of implicit moti­ vational self-concept on day-to-day behavioral motivation. Motivation and Emotion. Loevinger, J. (1976). Ego development. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. McAdams, D. P. ( 1990). The person: An introduction to personality psychology. San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Nicholls, J. G. ( 1 984). Achievement motivation: Conceptions of ability, subjective experience, task choice, and performance. Psychological Review, 91, 328-346. Niemiec, C. P., Brown, K w., & Ryan, R. M. (2006). Being present when facing death: The role of mindfulness in terror management. Manuscript submitted for publication. Niemiec, C. P., Lynch, M. F. , Vansteenkiste, M., Bernstein, J., Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2006). The antecedents and consequences of autonomous self-regulation for college: A self-determination theory perspective on socialization. Journal ofAdolescence, 29, 761-775. Niemiec, C. P., Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2006). The path taken: Consequences of attaining intrin­ sic and extrinsic aspirations in post-college life. Manuscript submitted for publication. Plant, R. w., & Ryan, R. M. ( 1985). Intrinsic motivation and the effects of self-consciousness, self­ awareness, and ego-involvement: An investigation of internally controlling styles. Journal of Personality, 53, 435-449. Ryan, R. M. (1982). Control and information in the intrapersonal sphere: An extension of cognitive evaluation theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 43, 450-461 . Ryan, R . M. (2005). The developmental line of autonomy i n the etiology, dynamics, and treatment of borderline personality disorders. Development and Psychopathology, 1 7, 987-1006. Ryan, R. M., & Brown, K W. (2003). Why we don't need self-esteem: On fundamental needs, con­ tingent love, and mindfulness. Psychological Inquiry, 14, 71-76. Ryan, R. M., Chirkov, v: I., Little, T. D., Sheldon, K. M., Timoshina, E., & Deci, E. L. (1999). The American dream in Russia: Extrinsic aspirations and well-being in two cultures. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1509-1524. Ryan, R. M., & Connell, J. P. ( 1989). Perceived locus of causality and internalization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 57, 749-76 1 . Ryan, R . M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation o fintrinsic motiva­ tion, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55, 68-78. Ryan, R. M., Deci, E. L., Grolnick, W. S., & La Guardia, J. G. (2006). The significance of autonomy and autonomy support in psychological development and psychopathology. In D. Cicchetti & D. J. Cohen (Eds.), Developmental psychopathology (pp. 795-849). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Ryan, R. M., Koestner, R., & Deci, E. L. (1991). Ego-involved persistence: When free-choice behav­ ior is not intrinsically motivated. Motivation and Emotion, 15, 185-205. Ryan, R. M., Kuhl, J., & Deci, E. L. (1997). Nature and autonomy: Organizational view of social and neurobiological aspects of self-regulation in behavior and development. Development and Psychopathology, 9, 701-728.

11 Motivation, Threshold for Threat, and Quieting the Ego Holley S. Hodgins Social psychology is full of behavioral descriptions of bias, distortion, and self­ protection, including self-serving assessments (Epley & Dunning, 2000), ego­ centric estimates of one's own noticeability (Le. , the "spotlight effect"; Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000), egocentric judgments of social categories (Dunning, Perie, & Story, 1991), and much more (see chap. 1, this volume) . Indeed, some research describes the tendency to distort as so pervasive that it might seem normative. In recent years, however, other research has documented the costs of egoistic behavior and the benefits of less narcissistic functioning. For ex­ ample, self-enhancement is associated with positive initial impressions that deteriorate over time (Paulhus, 1998), and the short-term benefits of positive illusions are accompanied by long-term costs (Robins & Beer, 2001). Consistent with the cost of egoistic behavior, I view the ego as primarily disruptive of effective functioning and performance. Under egoistic function­ ing, an individual's foremost priorities are self-enhancement to expand the so­ lidity, importance, and position of the self while simultaneously self-protecting against threat. Egoistic functioning therefore requires that we distort our experience: We must defend against and not take in new information that is potentially threatening, even when that new information would be useful in choosing the optimal behavioral response. Similarly, we must overemphasize information that will enhance and extend the self. Through its selective use of data, ego-directed functioning ultimately should undermine performance. However, even more immediately, in the short term, egoistic defensiveness causes individuals to suffer a pattern of perceived threat, arousal, and defen­ sive effort to control information in order to reduce perceived threat. Hence, quieter egos improve life quality, even in the short run. I should note that the term egoistic defensiveness actually is redundant, because all defensiveness arises from the ego; that is, we experience defensive reactions and thoughts only to the extent that we are invested in an ego­ involved opinion that requires protection and bolstering. Of course, I use a conceptualization of ego that is more similar to the Buddhist concept, which sees the ego as an unhelpful and delusional construction, than to the Freudian concept, which views ego strength as necessary for even minimal functioning in society.

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Motivation and Threshold for Defensiveness

In this chapter, I suggest that defensiveness is a key symptom of egoistic functioning and that defensiveness is reduced, and the ego quieted, under an autonomous motivation orientation, as conceptualized by self-determination theory (SDT; Deci & Ryan, 2000; Ryan & Deci, 2000; see also chaps. 7 and 10, this volume). SDT discusses three motivation orientations: (a) autonomy, (b) control, and (c) impersonal. Autonomy motivation refers to the tendency to initiate behavior on the basis of choices that are consistent with one's feel­ ings, values, and intrinsic psychological needs; it is accompanied by a sense of endorsement of own behavior. In contrast, control motivation refers to the tendency to organize behavior on the basis of external contingencies and internally controlling imperatives, such as shoulds and oughts and is charac­ terized by a sense of coercion and pressure. Finally, SDT defines impersonal motivation as the tendency to experience behavior as disorganized and to experience little sense of competence or intentionality in behavior, thoughts, and feelings; impersonal motivation, therefore, is associated with a lack of motivation. Hodgins and Knee (2002) proposed that motivation orientations are sys­ tematically related to levels of defensiveness; they suggested that motivation orientation at any given moment is an important predictor of how we ap­ proach experience in that moment. Specifically, they proposed that autonomy motivation allows us to approach ongoing experience for what it is and to be more likely to see what actually is occurring. This experiential openness, or nondefensiveness, is apparent both in intrapersonal domains-for example, in a readiness to experience one's own thoughts and emotions-and in interper­ sonal situations, including all types of social interactions. Moreover, experiential openness includes both nondefensiveness toward information that is seemingly threatening and, conversely, a lack of grasping onto information that appears affirming. It is as though autonomy motivation makes us less likely to pass experiences through a filter or to impose agendas from preconceived, ego-related notions onto ongoing events. Hodgins and Knee (2002) postulated that experiential openness is possible under autonomy mo­ tivation because, consistent with an SDT view, autonomy is associated with integrated self-structures and with genuine self-esteem that is based on being, instead of doing (Deci & Ryan, 1995; Ryan, 1995). Thus, to the extent that we function from autonomous motivation and from integrated, secure self-aspects, we have less to fear, less to defend, and less to lose when encountering new experiences and information. Hodgins, Liebeskind, and Schwartz ( 1996) conceptualized the lower de­ fensiveness that is associated with autonomy motivation as reflecting a higher threshold for threat, so that to the extent we are functioning autonomously in a given moment, we are less easily threatened. They also postulated that the higher threshold for threat is associated with a more open and less egocentric interpersonal stance toward others, so that we are more able to de-center when we are autonomously motivated. Their interpretation was consistent with em­ pirical data showing that individual differences in autonomy predict lower de­ fensiveness in social predicaments that require apology (Hodgins, Liebeskind,

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& Schwartz, 1996), lower defense in self-reports of naturally occurring inter­ actions over a 10- to 14-day period (Hodgins, Koestner, & Duncan, 1996), less use of self-serving biases (Knee & Zuckerman, 1996), and less use of defensive coping strategies (Knee & Zuckerman, 1998). Regarding control motivation, Hodgins and Knee (2002) suggested that to the extent that we are control oriented at a given time, we are likely to approach ongoing events conditionally, for their relevance to ego. A condi­ tional approach to experience includes defensive self-protection in the face of perceived potential threat and emphatic grasping and augmenting of experi­ ences that contain perceived self-affirmation. Control motivation requires a conditional approach to experience because, consistent with an SDT view, the "noisy" ego of control motivation is accompanied by self-esteem that is contin­ gent on affirmation and by ego-involved self-structures (Deci & Ryan, 1995; Ryan, 1995). Thus, when we are highly control motivated, we behave as if from a low threshold for threat and an egocentric interpersonal stance. Finally, impersonal motivation should be associated with the greatest ex­ periential defensiveness of all, because impersonal functioning involves a lack of self-esteem, either genuine or contingent, and a lack of clear self-structures, either integrated or egoistic (Hodgins & Knee, 2002). To the extent that we are oriented toward impersonal motivation, we should show the greatest defense, even though the defenses are unlikely to be effective, leaving us immersed in intense negative affect and with an inability to act.

Recent Experimental Support

When Hodgins and Knee (2002) proposed the model of motivation and experi­ ential openness, the supporting data were based on individual-difference mea­ sures of motivation orientation. However, the tendency to be autonomously, control, or impersonally oriented also is influenced by situational factors; hence experimental tests of the link between motivation and defense are possible. In my laboratory, my colleagues and I have been priming motivation orientations to examine the effect of motivation orientations on defensiveness, self-esteem, and self-structures. Priming serves as an analogue of a real life situation; the dimension that is primed can be thought of as a temporary situational context. Just as situational contexts can influence momentary motivation orientation, so too can priming influence motivation orientations, at least briefly. Motiva­ tion priming has the advantage, of course, that it is randomly assigned and can test causal relations among variables. Thus, we can examine whether autonomy motivation leads to lower defensiveness, higher self-esteem, and more integrated self-structures. Some of our priming studies have examined all three orientations; more recently, we have focused on autonomy and control motivation, which are of more interest because they both involve effective func­ tioning, whereas impersonal motivation does not. Hodgins, Brown, and Carver (2007) tested the prediction that motivation orientations influence implicit self-esteem in two studies, using a reaction time measure of self-esteem that is based on subliminal stimuli. The results showed that control priming decreased implicit self-esteem relative to au-

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tonomy priming, and the same trend approached significance for defensiveness of self-esteem (i.e., the discrepancy between implicit and explicit self-esteem). The pattern suggests that when we are exposed to very subtle situational cues of control motivation, our automatic self-associations are measurably less positive. The findings provide evidence for an explanatory mechanism under­ lying the relation between motivation and defensiveness: Autonomy increases automatic self-esteem, which lowers the threshold for experiencing threat. Conversely, feeling control motivated, even momentarily, makes automatic self-associations more negative, which might explain why control motivation leads to defensiveness: When we do not feel good about ourselves, we feel com­ pelled to self-protect. In a test of self-structures, the other mechanism postulated to underlie openness or defense, I (Hodgins, 2006) examined the effect of primed motiva­ tion orientations on self-integration. The tasks included a Stroop test (Study 1) and a card sort (Study 2), both of which used evaluative adjective descriptors, so the tasks specifically measured the self-integration of positive and negative self-aspects. The results showed that autonomy orientation led to the highest self-integration, control orientation led to a moderate level of self-integration, and impersonal orientation led to the lowest level of self-integration. Consis­ tent with predictions, simply being exposed to cues of nonautonomous motiva­ tion undermined the degree of integration we experience among our positive and negative self-aspects, at least momentarily. In addition to the self-integration measure, Study 2 (Hodgins, 2006) also included a mood report with scales measuring positive and negative affect and tendency to fake positive and negative affect. The results showed that primed control, and especially impersonal motivation orientation, led to a pattern of overreporting positive and underreporting negative mood. It suggests that

when our nonautonomous motivation orientations are activated, we act with emotional defense in which we pretend to ourselves (or to the experimenter) that we feel better than we actually do. Beyond the mechanisms just discussed, several studies have directly tested outcomes related to experiential openness versus defense. In their first study to examine clinging to affirming information, Hodgins et al. (2006) timed participants as they read false success and failure feedback. Although the suc­ cess and failure feedback were of equal lengths, control-primed participants spent more time reading success than failure feedback, whereas the prefer­ ence for positive feedback was reduced in neutral-primed participants and was least pronounced among participants who were autonomy primed. Relative to neutral and autonomy cues, then, subtle cues of control motivation cause individuals to overattend to flattering feedback and underemphasize negative feedback. The pattern almost suggests magical thinking, as if paying attention to some events and ignoring other events would change reality. In contrast, primed autonomy motivation orientation led to evenhanded attention to both positive and negative feedback. The reverse of clinging to positive events is defending against threatening ones; several studies support the notion that motivation orientation influences defensiveness. For example, Hodgins, Yacko, and Gottlieb (in press) showed that autonomy-primed participants were the least defensive, control-primed

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participants were in the middle, and impersonally primed participants were the most defensive, in their self-reported desire to escape their current experi­ ence (Study 1), in use of the self-serving bias (Study 2), and in the tendency to make excuses (i.e., self-handicap) for athletic performance (Study 3). In addition to defensiveness, in Study 3 Hodgins, Yacko, and Gottlieb (in press) tested whether autonomy motivation would enhance performance. The rationale for this prediction was that information that is defended against cannot be used. If defended-against information is useful but unavailable, then performance should be impaired. Study 3 participants were collegiate rowers who, after being primed for motivation orientation and given a chance to self-handicap for their upcoming performance, estimated their rowing time and then actually rowed. As predicted, primed motivation influenced estimated and actual rowing times, with autonomy-primed rowers perform­ ing best, control-primed rowers in the middle, and impersonally primed row­ ers performing worst of alL Although primed motivation influenced rowing, there was no evidence that defensiveness (i.e., self-handicapping) mediated the effect of motivation on rowing performance. A similar pattern of motiva­ tion, defense, and performance was shown in Study 2 (Hodgins, 2006), in which game-performance measures were administered after self-integration and defensiveness measures. Again, although motivation influenced perfor­ mance as predicted, there was no evidence for the mediation of performance by self-integration or defensiveness. Hence, two studies contain evidence that motivation orientation influences both defensiveness and performance, but the precise relation of those variables remains for future tests to determine (see Hodgins, 2006, for a discussion).

Reflections and Ponderings

The studies I have discussed in this chapter suggest that when nonautono­ mously motivated self-aspects are made salient by unobtrusive environmental cues, we begin to make more negative automatic self-associations; compart­ mentalize positive and negative self-aspects so that we are less integrated, at least momentarily; pretend better moods than we feel; pay more attention to positive feedback than to negative feedback, as if to augment the positive and diminish the negative; defend against potential threats; and perform worse on objective performance measures. Taken together, the results show that very subtle environmental cues can activate momentary motivation orientations and their accompanying self-structures and self-esteem. Activated motivation orientations lead, at least temporarily, to the adop­ tion of particular stances toward reality, and those stances direct subsequent cognition and behavior. In the case of activated autonomy, our integrated self­ aspects and secure self-esteem become salient; we adopt an open stance toward others and behave as though we have a relatively high threshold for threat that requires less distortion, self-protection, and self-enhancement. I am not sug­ gesting that autonomy eliminates the ego but instead that it partially quiets it. Consistent with a quieter (but not totally quiet) ego, Hodgins and Liebeskind (2003) showed that highly autonomous individuals were less defensive in

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responding to mild or moderate reproaches for wrongdoing, but under severe reproach, they were just as defensive as highly control-oriented individuals. If control orientation is activated, our nonintegrated, egoistic self-aspects and contingent self-regard become salient, and we act as though we have a low threshold for threat. Consequently, every event is evaluated for its relevance to ego; ego threats are avoided, and ego affirmation is grasped for its seeming proof of worth. In our enthusiasm for self-protection when control oriented, we behave from a more egocentric stance toward others and consider their welfare less than our own (Hodgins & Liebeskind, 2003; Hodgins, Liebeskind, & Schwartz, 1996). It is important to note that when motivation is manipulated, it is possible to say that motivation orientation causes changes in self-esteem, self-integra­ tion, and defensiveness. The empirical evidence that motivation orientation causes experiential openness or defense does not preclude causality in the re­ verse direction, however; that is, it is possible (or probable) that becoming more open to experiencing the current moment also can shift motivation orientation toward autonomy. Hence, practices that increase awareness and attention to the current moment, such as meditation, could well have the effect of shifting motivation orientation toward greater autonomy. Likewise, experiences that numb and decrease current moment awareness might lead to a greater sense of the pressure and coercion that define control motivation. There is a clear connection between what I refer to as experiential openness or nondefensiveness, and mindfulness, long discussed by Buddhists (for a re­ cent example, see Chodron, 2005) and explored empirically by Brown and Ryan (2003) and others. The two conceptions are compatible; experiential openness as I have discussed it refers to a willingness or ability to experience what occurs in the current moment, whereas mindfulness refers to the receptive attention

to and awareness of internal and external stimuli in the present (see chap. 7, this volume). My perspective clearly contains the assumption that nondefensiveness is optimal, but I do not suggest that it is easy. On the contrary, being open to ongoing events as they are includes experiencing the whole range of vulner­ ability-related thoughts and emotions. Being willing to experience events is the only way to integrate them, of course, so that over time our threshold for threat will increase. However, endorsing the idea of becoming integrated does not make the process itself easy. Nonetheless, nondefensiveness has a kind of snowball effect: The less defensive we are, the more we can integrate our experiences, and the higher our threshold for threat becomes. Likewise, the more self-protective we are, the more defensive we grow, which ironically robs us of the opportunity to integrate experiences and establish more genuine and secure self-worth.

Conclusion

The relevance of my work to quieting the ego is this: The environmental cues to autonomy that are present in autonomy-supportive environments help inter­ rupt the cycle of egoistic defense and conduce toward quieting the ego. To the

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extent that our egos subside, we can be more present for our lives, with less distortion of what occurs. In contrast, environmental cues to control motiva­ tion make our egos noisy, and noisy egos feed the vicious cycle of reality distor­ tion. When we avoid and distort events, we further preclude the integration of experiences that we encounter moment to moment. In the long run, then, the processes that accompany control motivation conduce toward further compart­ mentalization and fragmentation. Although most of us are not often subject to laboratory priming, situations in our everyday lives-including deadlines, evaluations, surveillance, and, perhaps especially salient, internal contingencies-continually function as real life cues to control motivation. These naturally occurring primes are likely to move us toward more negative automatic self-associations and lower self­ integration, and toward defending against some experiences while clinging to others. Fortunately, to the extent that we create our lives to include autonomy­ supportive contexts (e.g., spending time with autonomy-valuing others), the situational cues to which we are exposed will support genuine self-esteem and the kind of experiential openness that promotes further self-integration.

References Brown, K. w., & Ryan, R M. (2003). The benefits of being present: Mindfulness and its role in psychological well-being. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 84, 822-848. Chodron, P. (2005). No time to lose: A timely guide to the way of the bodhisattva. Boston: Shambhala. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R M. ( 1995). Human autonomy: The basis for true self-esteem. In M. H. Kernis (Ed.), Efficacy, agency, and self-esteem (pp. 3 1-49). New York: Plenum Press. Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R M. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11, 227-268. Dunning, D., Perie, M., & Story, A. L. ( 1991). Self-serving prototypes of social categories. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 61, 957-968. Epley, N., & Dunning, D. (2000). Feeling "holier than thou": Are self-serving assessments pro­ duced by errors in self- or social prediction? Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 79, 861-875. Gilovich, T., Medvec, v., & Savitsky, K (2000). The spotlight effect in social judgment: An egocen­ tric bias in estimates of the salience of one's own actions and appearance. Journal ofPersonal­ ity and Social Psychology, 78, 211-222. Hodgins, H. S. (2006). Autonomy and self integration. Manuscript submitted for publication. Hodgins, H. S., Brown, A. B., & Carver, B. (2007). Autonomy and control motivation and self­ esteem. Self and Identity, 6, 189-208. Hodgins, H. S., & Knee, C. R (2002). The integrating self and conscious experience. In E. L. Deci & R M. Ryan (Eds.), Handbook of selfdetermination research (pp. 87-100). Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. Hodgins, H. S., Koestner, R, & Duncan, N. ( 1996). On the compatibility of autonomy and related­ ness. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22, 227-237. Hodgins, H. S., & Liebeskind, E. (2003). Apology versus defense: Antecedents and consequences. Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology, 39, 297-3 16. Hodgins, H. S., Liebeskind, E., & Schwartz, W. (1996). Getting out ofhot water: Facework in social predicaments. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 71, 300-3 14. Hodgins, H. S., Shiffman, S., Adair, K, Gordon, R , Wozniak, K, & Saavedra, Y. (2006, January). Clinging to positive feedback as a function of autonomy and control motivation. Poster pre-

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sented at the seventh annual meeting of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Palm Springs, CA. Hodgins, H. S., Yacko, H., & Gottlieb, E. (in press). Autonomy and nondefensiveness. Motivation

and Emotion. Knee, C. R., & Zuckerman, M. ( 1996). Causality orientations and the disappearance of the self-serving bias. Journal of Research in Personality, 30, 76-87. Knee, C. R., & Zuckerman, M. (1998). A nondefensive personality: Autonomy and control as mod­ erators of defensive coping and self-handicapping. Journal of Research in Personality, 32, 115-130. Paulhus, D. L. ( 1998). Interpersonal and intrapsychic adaptiveness of trait self-enhancement: A mixed blessing? Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 74, 1197-1208. Robins, R. w., & Beer, J. S. (2001). Positive illusions about the self: Short-term benefits and long­ term costs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 80, 340-352. Ryan, R. M. ( 1995). Psychological needs and the facilitation of integrative processes. Journal of

Personality, 63, 397-427. Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2000). Self-determination theory and the facilitation of intrinsic motiva­ tion, social development, and well-being. American Psychologist, 55, 68-78.

12 Hierarchy Among Selves: An Implication for Relations With Persons Versus Groups Lowell Gaertner, Constantine Sedikides, Michelle Luke, and Jonathan Iuzzini In this chapter, we discuss motivational-primacy research as a framework for contemplating when egoism can be transcended. Our research examines which of three fundamental forms of self-definition-the individual self (i.e., self as a unique and independent social agent), the relational self (i.e., self as an in­ terconnected partner in an interpersonal relationship), and the collective self (i.e., self as an undifferentiated and interchangeable member of a group)-is experientially more essential; psychologically the home base; or, alternatively, motivationally primary. Stated metaphorically, we ask which self smiles brighter when enhanced and screams louder when threatened. As we discuss in this chapter, data from several studies evidence a motivational hierarchy with the individual self elevated above the other two selves, and the relational self elevated above the collective self. In the context of that hierarchy, a quieter ego can be conceptualized as a self-system in which the motivational striving of the individual self is de­ emphasized and brought into balance with the strivings of the other selves. A quieter or transcended ego, for example, could appear as a lessened concern for protecting and enhancing the individuated person and a heightened concern for protecting and enhancing others through their inclusion in the relational or collective self. Central to this chapter is the implication from the hierarchy that such transcendence is more likely when social relations involve another person, who is internalized through the relational self, than when relations involve a group, which is internalized through the collective self. We begin the chapter with a review of the primacy research to justify and frame the person­ group implication and proceed with exploring the implication in the context of three diverse bodies of research.

A Hierarchy Within

Initial research compared the motivational primacy of the individual versus the collective self, with the assumption that the primary self would react more

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fervently when threatened or enhanced (L. Gaertner, Sedikides, & Graetz, 1999). L. Gaertner et al. ( 1999) manipulated threat of the individual or col­ lective self and enacted particular care to control the relative salience of each self to avoid the possibility that primacy is simply a function of contextual salience. Across experiments, they (a) assessed multiple reactions to threat (e.g. , anger, mood state, strategic self-perceptions, derogation of the threat), (b) controlled various confounding variables (e.g. , domain of threat, relative importance of the threat domain, delay between the onset of threat and assess­ ment of reaction), (c) targeted a variety of ingroups serving as a collective self (e.g. , ascribed groups, achieved groups, novel groups), and (d) invoked mul­ tiple methods for varying the selves' salience (e.g. , simultaneously activated both selves, maximized the salience of one self and minimized the salience of the other, premeasured idiographic identification with the targeted ingroup). Providing initial evidence for the motivational primacy of the individual self, participants reacted more strongly to a threat to their individual self than their collective self. L. Gaertner, Sedikides, Vevea, and Iuzzini (2002) then replicated and extended the finding of individual-self primacy while addressing the possibil­ ity that L. Gaertner et al.'s ( 1999) initial evidence was unique to the specific threats, measures, and groups used. They searched the empirical literature and conducted a random-effects meta-analysis that assessed the relative reac­ tion of the individual versus collective self to threat and enhancement. The ex­ isting experiments used various threats or enhancements, measured an array of reactions, and targeted a variety of ingroups representing the collective self. They addressed the possibility that primacy varies with the contextual salience of a self by coding two variables: (a) whether the targeted ingroup was a novel group formed in the laboratory or a preexisting group (e.g., sorority, university affiliation, political party) and (b) strength of ingroup identification (i.e., the ex­ tent to which members identified with the group). Neither variable moderated the results. The data evidenced individual-self primacy: Participants reacted more fervently to both threat and enhancement of their individual than collec­ tive self. The self-concept is characterized by a motivational hierarchy along which the individual self has a privileged position.

Wherein Lies the Relational Self!

Absent from past research was the relational self. There are reasons to argue, however, that the relational self, forged from close interpersonal bonds, has an elevated status along the motivational hierarchy (Tice & Baumeister, 200 1). The dyad, for example, which enables internal fertilization and provides the bond that promotes infant survival (Bowlby, 1969), is phylogenetically the most ancient repeated social configuration (Caporael, 1997). Indeed, given the widespread detriments to mental and physical health that people experience when deprived of stable relationships, the need to belong (i.e., the desire "to form and maintain strong, stable, interpersonal relationships"; Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 497) is considered a fundamental human motive. We recently completed three experiments comparing the relative motiva­ tional positioning of the individual, relational, and collective selves (L. Gaert-

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ner, Sedikides, Luke, & Iuzzini, 2007). We used different approaches to assess motivational primacy across studies. In Experiment 1, we examined reaction to threat, as earlier research had. In Experiment 2 , we examined relative valuing of each self. In Experiment 3, we examined proactive capacity to af­ fect a desired future in terms of the extent to which the selves differentially contribute to future goals (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). Likewise, we used different techniques for controlling the salience of the selves across studies. In Experiments 1 and 2, we made the selves simultaneously salient, whereas in Experiment 3 we differentially primed each self. Participants in Experiment 1 read definitions of each self, recorded the most important trait they possessed that completely defined them in regard to each self (i.e., three different traits), and completed an imagination task for each self (L. Gaertner et aI. , 2007). Participants imagined awaking after having had a given self's most important trait surgically removed and then rated their reaction to the loss in terms of the extent to which they would be negatively impacted, remain the same person, experience a meaningless life, and experience a negative mood. All four measures evidenced an equally strong reaction to loss of the trait associated with the individual self and the relational self. Three measures evidenced stronger reaction to the imagined loss of the trait for either the individual self (impact, same person, and mood) or the re­ lational self (impact, meaningless life, and mood) than for the collective self. Furthermore, in no instance did loss of the collective-self trait elicit a stronger response. The results, which suggested that the elevated motivational status of the individual and relational selves is not unique or limited to young adults, were consistent across a broad age range ( 17-57 years). Participants in Experiment 2 read definitions of each self and completed three forced comparisons in which they distributed a fixed sum of money among the selves to indicate their relative value (L. Gaertner et aI., 2007). Participants indicated how much they would (a) spend improving each self, (b) price the worth of each self, and (c) anticipate receiving in a sale of each self. Participants more strongly valued the individual self and the relational self over the collective self on all three measures, more strongly valued the indi­ vidual self than the relational self on the sale measure, and equally valued the individual self and relational self on the spending and pricing measures. Participants in Experiment 3 wrote a narrative describing themselves in terms of the individual, relational, or collective self; listed 12 goals they had for their future; and, in a counterbalanced order, rated the importance of each goal and indicated the self to which each goal corresponded (L. Gaertner et aI., 2007). Participants attributed more goals to the individual self (Le., 56% of all goals) than to the relational self or the collective self, with women attributing more goals to the relational self (i.e., 25%) than to the collective self (i.e., 19%) and men attributing an equal number of goals to those selves (i.e., 22%). We subsequently examined whether the goal that received the highest importance rating for one self was more important than the most important goal of the other selves. Participants rated their most important individual-self goal as more important than their most important relational-self goal, which in turn they rated as more important than their most important collective-self goal. These patterns persisted regardless of whether participants initially described themselves in terms of their individual self, relational self, or collective self.

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Despite their different measures and methods for examining motivational primacy, the three experiments evidenced remarkably similar findings (L. Gaertner et at , 2007). These findings replicated previous research in that they illustrated the elevated motivational status of the individual self over the col­ lective self. The findings also established the elevated status of the relational self over the collective self. Comparisons ofthe individual and relational selves, however, were mixed. Most measures evidenced an equivalent status of the latter selves, but when differences emerged they favored the individual self. The weight of the current empirical evidence tentatively points to the elevated status of the individual self over the relational self. Without empirical dispute, however, is the elevated motivational status of both the individual and rela­ tional selves over the collective self.

An Implication for a Quieter Ego

If ego is equated with the motivational striving of the individual self, then the motivational hierarchy, particularly the elevated status of the relational self over the collective self, offers an implication for the possibility of a quieter ego. The hierarchy implies that transcendence of egoism varies with whether social relations involve persons or groups. When the motivational strivings of the three selves are noncorrespondent, the elevated status of the relational self will better challenge or assuage the motivational striving of the individual self than will the lower status collective self. Put otherwise, the motivational striving of the individual self will be less influential when relating with a person, who is internalized in the self system through the relational self, than when relating with a group, which is internalized through the collective self. To be clear, the implication is not necessarily an absolute silencing of the individual self. The implication is a relative silencing such that the individual self will be quieter when relations involve another person than a group.

Glimpsing a Quieter Ego With Persons Than With Groups

The social science literature provides glimpses of the possibility for a quieter ego in relations with persons than with groups. The glimpses, some of which are more fleeting than others, are provided by three diverse areas of research: (a) number of others in a social dilemma, (b) helping persons versus groups, and (c) the self-serving bias.

Number of Others in a Social Dilemma Social dilemmas involve situations of moderately noncorrespondent outcomes for self and other such that, if all participants maximize immediate self­ interest (e.g. , listen but not donate to public radio), they collectively fare worse than if they maximize joint welfare (e.g., donate to public radio). Research has revealed an interesting tendency for people to behave more competitively (Le.,

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less prosocially) as the number of others in the dilemma increases (particularly in public-goods dilemmas), and a variety of explanations have been offered (Brewer & Kramer, 1 986). The implication from our motivational-primacy framework provides another explanation for the number-Dr-others effect. What appears to be an effect of the number of others might be an effect of the nature of the others. If an increasing number of others promotes a psycho­ logical shift in the representation of the others from distinct persons to a group (S. L. Gaertner, Mann, Murrell, & Dovidio, 1989), then, perhaps in an effort to simplify or reduce social information, any counter to individual-self interest provided by the relational self (through an interpersonal self-other connec­ tion) would diminish with the ensuing activation of the less potent collective self (through a group-based self-other connection). Consequently, if numbers could be held constant and people interacted with a single individual or a single group, then behavior would be more cooperative when interacting with the in­ dividual than with the group. Partial support for such a possibility is provided by the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect, which involves greater competition between interacting groups than between interacting individuals (Wildschut, Pinter, Vevea, Insko, & Schopler, 2003). The only complication is that discontinuity research involves, for our purpose, a confounding of op­ ponent (group vs. person) and actor (group vs. person). A direct test of the person-group implication requires a comparison of competition rates when a person interacts with a person versus with a group (for another approximation, see Wit & Kerr, 2002, Experiment 2).

Helping Persons Versus Groups Research indicates a stronger tendency to aid identified victims than noniden­ tified victims (Small & Lowenstein, 2003). Consistent with the implication of a quieter ego when connecting with persons than with groups, this identified­ victim effect is stronger when the victim is a person than when the victim comprises a group. Research by Kogut and Ritov (2005) illustrates the point. Participants in the unidentified condition learned of a sick 2-year-old or a group of eight sick 2-year-olds in need of expensive treatment for a deadly ill­ ness. Participants in the identified condition also viewed a photo of the patient or a group photo of the eight patients. In two such experiments, identification increased the money that participants were willing to contribute when the vic­ tim was a single person but had no effect when the victim comprised a group. A field study replicated this effect: Participants donated more money to the identified person than to the group. Furthermore, the implication of an ego that is quieter in relations with persons than with groups is consistent with two competing pathways for en­ hanced helping through identification. As anticipated by the negative-state relief model (Cialdini et aI., 1987), which suggests that helping is used egoisti­ cally to reduce personal distress, participants reported greater distress with an identified person than with a group (Kogut & Ritov, 2005). Of course, the subsequent behavior of helping is ostensibly egoistic in the service of negative­ state relief. However, the antecedent generation of a greater negative state

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by the suffering of an identified person than of a group is consistent with the quieter ego implication. Indeed, the pattern of distress tracks the finding that threat (represented in this instance by the victim's suffering) elicits a stronger response when directed to the relational self than to the collective self. The distress ratings are open to another interpretation through the em­ pathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 1991), which suggests that helping is al­ truistically motivated by concern for the identified victim. The ratings do not distinguish between personal distress and feeling distress for the victim, the latter of which correlate more strongly with the empathic antecedent of altru­ istic action (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997). As with personal distress, expe­ riencing stronger distress for the identified person than for the group certainly follows the quieter ego implication (see chap. 15, this volume).

Self-Serving Bias Reflecting the influence of the individual self, people engaged in tasks routinely seize credit for success and deny or displace blame for failure (Campbell & Sedikides, 1999). Consistent with the implication of a quieter ego with social connections to a person, the self-serving bias on dyadic tasks is tempered by relationship closeness. Dyad members were less apt to seize egoistically credit for success and deny blame when their partner was a friend instead of a stranger, and such an effect was replicated when closeness was manipulated among strangers ( Sedikides, Campbell, Reeder, & Elliot, 1998, 2002). On group tasks, however, the self-serving bias is particularly pronounced (Miller & Schlenker, 1985)-even on athletic teams, for which the self-group connection is conceivably strong (Mullen & Riordan, 1988). As an apparent exception to the quieter ego implication, Schlenker and Miller ( 1977) reported reduced self­ serving bias among members of high-cohesion groups than among members of low-cohesion groups. Two aspects of the research, however, bring into question whether the collective or relational self tempered the bias. Self-other attribu­ tions for responsibility involved ratings of individual group members instead of ratings of the group as a whole, which likely invoked the relational self instead of the collective self. Self-serving attributions are more robust when ratings focus on group-level performance (Mullen & Riordan, 1988). Also, cohesion was manipulated through interpersonal similarity, which plausibly enhanced self-other connection at the interpersonal instead of the group level. Accord­ ingly, Schlenker and Miller suggested that cohesion exerted its effect through "interpersonal bonds . . . that mitigate against taking higher personal credit for success and low blame for failure" (p. 1039). In any event, whether a reduced self-serving bias in a group task occurs through an interpersonal versus a group connection is awaiting controlled testing. As with the number of others in social dilemmas, however, our quieter ego implication offers a ready explanation for why the self-serving bias grows stronger with increasing group size (Mullen & Riordan, 1988). With increasing size, perhaps the self-other connection shifts from an interpersonal to group bond (Prentice, Miller, & Lightdale, 1994).

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Are There Benefits of a Quieter Ego?

Although the research we have discussed did not address directly the benefits of a quieter ego, an obvious speculation is that de-emphasizing the individual self in favor of the relational or collective self has the potential to promote so­ cial harmony. Indeed, as we suggested in the preceding section, the heightened emphasis of the relational self versus the collective self promoted a tendency to cooperate with and help other persons more so than other groups and reduced the tendency to seize credit for joint success and deny blame for joint failure on interpersonal more so than intragroup tasks. However, lurking behind the speculative benefit of quieting the motivational strivings of the individual self is a not-so-obvious potential danger. Imagine a total silencing of the individual self in favor of absolute collective-self striving. In such a state, persons would function in devotion to their group. Life within the group would be cooperative and harmonious; conflict over interests would be nonexistent (see chap. 3). However, what would life be like at the intersection of groups? With each member engaged in the betterment of the group, chaos and conflict between groups would perpetuate (see chap. 16). Of course, such conflict can readily oc­ cur with the strong strivings of the individual self. The motivational presence of the individual self, however, likely serves as an important check against collective action. Weighing in with "What about me?" drives people to speak up, protest, and sway others from the collective motion. A complete silencing of the individual self is ostensibly socially destructive, and the pursuit of such silencing potentially underestimates the individual-self's role in maintaining social harmony. Perhaps optimal benefits for self and others ensue with a balance among the motivational striving of each self. The ability to self-define at the level of the individual, relationship, and group is unlikely a product of happen­ stance and instead an evolutionary consequence of the concurrent necessity for well-being and survival that is engendered by acting uniquely, connecting and uniting interpersonally, and existing in a broader collective (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997, 2000; Sedikides, Skowronski, & Dunbar, 2006). The unmiti­ gated striving of any form of selfis likely detrimental, as would be the complete silencing of any self. The ideal psychological state to attend and promote the welfare of the individual, his or her interpersonal relations, and groups is likely achieved with equilibrium among the motivational strivings of the selves (see chap. 6, this volume). An important area for future research is to develop an understanding of the dynamic interplay among the selves and the psychologi­ cal processes that bring balance among selves.

Conclusion

On the basis of a motivational hierarchy among the three fundamental forms of self, we drew an implication for a quieter ego: Transcending the motivated strivings of the individual self occurs more readily for connections with persons than with groups. A foray into three relatively diverse areas of research sug-

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gested that the implication is certainly plausible. We offered the speculative warning, however, that a complete silencing of the individual self is not a pro­ ductive means to a gentler world. Instead, a better solution might be obtained through a motivational balance among selves.

References Batson, C. D. ( 1991). The altruism question: Toward a social psychological answer. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Batson, C. D . , Early, S., & Salvarani, G. ( 1997). Perspective taking: Imagining how another feels versus imagining how you would feel. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23, 75 1-758. Baumeister, R. F., & Leary, M. R. (1995). The need to belong: Desire for interpersonal attachments as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 117, 497-529. Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and loss: Vol. 1. Attachment. New York: Basic Books. Brewer, M. B., & Kramer, R. M. ( 1986). Choice behavior in social dilemmas: Effects of social identity, group size, and decision framing. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 50, 543-549. Campbell, W. K., & Sedikides, C. ( 1999). Self-threat magnifies the self-serving bias: A meta­ analytic integration. Review ofGeneral Psychology, 3, 23-43. Caporael, L. ( 1997). The evolution of truly social cognition: The core configurations model. Person­ ality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 276-298. Cialdini, R. B., Schaller, M., Houlihan, D . , Arps, K., Fultz, J., & Beaman, A. L. (1987). Empathy­ based helping: Is it selflessly or selfishly motivated? Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychol­ ogy, 52, 749-758. Gaertner, L., Sedikides, C., & Graetz, K. (1999). In search of self-definition: Motivational primacy of the individual self, motivational primacy of the collective self, or contextual primacy? Jour­ nal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 76, 5-18. Gaertner, L., Sedikides, C., Luke, M., & Iuzzini, J. (2007). Motivational primacy in self-definition: Wherein lies the relational self? Unpublished manuscript, University of Tennessee. Gaertner, L., Sedikides, C., Vevea, J. L., & Iuzzini, J. (2002). The "I," the "we," and the "when": A meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 574-591. Gaertner, S. L., Mann, J. A., Murrell, A. J., & Dovidio, J. F. ( 1989). Reduction of intergroup bias: The benefits of recategorization. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 57, 239-249. Gollwitzer, P. M., & Moskowitz, G. B. ( 1996). Goal effects on action and cognition. In E. T. Higgins & W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (pp. 361-399). New York: Guilford Press. Kogut, T. , & Ritov, I. (2005). The "identified victim" effect: An identified group, or just a single individual? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18, 157-167. Miller, R. S., & Schlenker, B. R. ( 1985). Egotism in group members: Public and private attributions of responsibility for group performance. Social Psychology Quarterly, 48, 85-89. Mullen, B., & Riordan, C. A. (1988). Self-serving attributions for performance in naturalistic set­ tings: A meta-analytic review. Journal ofApplied Social Psychology, 18, 3-22. Prentice, D. A., Miller, D. T., & Lightdale, J. R. ( 1994). Asymmetries in attachments to groups and to their members: Distinguishing between common-identity and common-bond groups. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 484-493. Schlenker, B. R., & Miller, R. S. (1977). Group cohesiveness as a determinant of egocentric percep­ tions in cooperative groups. Human Relations, 30, 1039-1055. Sedikides, C., Campbell, W. K., Reeder, G. D., & Elliot, A. J. ( 1998). The self-serving bias in rela­ tional context. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 378-386. Sedikides, C., Campbell, W. K., Reeder, G. D., & Elliot, A. J. (2002). The self in relationships: Whether, how, and when close others put the self "in its place." In W. Stroebe & M. Hewstone (Eds.), European review of social psychology (Vol. 12, pp. 237-265). Oxford, England: Wiley.

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Sedikides, C., & Skowronski, J. J. (1997). The symbolic self in evolutionary context. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 80-102. Sedikides, C., & Skowronski, J. J. (2000). On the evolutionary functions of the symbolic self: The emergence of self-evaluation motives. In A. Tesser, R. B. Felson, & J. M. Suls (Eds.), Psycho­ logical perspectives on self and identity (pp. 91-117). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Sedikides, C., Skowronski, J. J., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2006). When and why did the human self evolve? In M. Schaller, J. A. Simpson, & D. T. Kenrick (Eds.), Evolution and social psychology: Frontiers in social psychology (pp. 55-80). New York: Psychology Press. Small, D. A., & Lowenstein, G. (2003). Helping a victim or helping the victim: Altruism and identifi­ ability. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 26, 5-16. Tice, D. M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2001). The primacy of the interpersonal self. In C. Sedikides & M. B. Brewer (Eds.), Individual self, relational self, and collective self (pp. 7 1-88). Philadel­ phia: Psychology Press. Wildschut, T., Pinter, B., Vevea, J. L., Insko, C. A., & Schopler, J. (2003). Beyond the group mind: A quantitative review of the interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 698-722. Wit, A. P. , & Kerr, N. L. (2002). "Me versus just us versus us all": Categorization and cooperation in nested social dilemmas. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 83, 616-637.

13 Allo-Inclusive Identity: Incorporating the Social and Natural Worlds Into One's Sense of Self Mark R. Leary, Jessica M. Tipsord, and Eleanor B. Tate A great deal of research has supported James's ( 1890) observation that the content of people's identities can be meaningfully partitioned into various "con­ stituents." Although researchers have sliced the self-concept pie in different ways, a consensus is emerging that people's self-construals can be classified into three primary sets, reflecting individual, relational, and collective aspects of identity (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Cheek, 1989; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; see also chap. 12, this volume). Individual (or personal) identity is composed of physical and psychological characteristics that distinguish the individual from others in his or her social context, specifically, traits that may be described without reference to the person's social relationships. Relational (or social) identity involves aspects of the self-concept that define the person with refer­ ence to his or her roles and relationships, particularly those that are based on bonds of attachment (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; see also chap. 12, this volume). Finally, collective identity is based on one's inclusion and membership in social groups, including large collectives based on race, ethnicity, nationality, and re­ ligion, as well as smaller groups, such as clubs, work groups, teams, and other organizations (see chap. 14, this volume). However, philosophical and scientific discussions suggest the presence of a fourth category of self-construal that has received little attention from re­ searchers. In addition to defining themselves in terms oftheir unique traits, so­ cial relationships, and group memberships, some people's self-concepts include broader categories of people, animals, and inanimate objects. For example, a person's identity might include the idea that he or she is a member of the hu­ man species; involve his or her kinship with other animals; or incorporate the belief that he or she can be identified as a part of the universe, God, or some other transcendent quality. We call this aspect of identity that goes beyond one's individual, relational, and collective identities alla-inclusive identity (alla = other). Earlier in this program of research, we referred to this construct as the transindividual identity, but we have since realized that its central feature is the inclusion of other entities in one's self-concept instead of merely an iden-

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tity that extends beyond the individual him- or herself (in fact, relational and collective identities may be viewed as transindividual). Early discussions of allo-inclusive identity can be traced to ancient philosophical and spiritual traditions, such as Taoism, Vedanta, Buddhism, Hinduism, and many indigenous religions. These belief systems share the as­ sumption that each person, animal, and feature of nature is part of a larger whole (e.g., Tao, God, Brahma, Great Spirit) and thus is inherently defined by his or her relationship to everything and everyone else. Thus, practitioners of these spiritual practices are urged to cultivate their awareness of the allo­ inclusive aspects of their identities. The existence of allo-inclusive identity has also been suggested by psychol­ ogy writers. James ( 1902/1985) suggested that one consequence of mystical re­ ligious experiences is the lingering sense that one is connected to a dimension of existence that is deeper than the visible, sensory world, leading the person to define him- or herself in terms of relationships to entities outside him- or herself. Similarly, Maslow ( 1971) described transcendence in a manner that has an allo-inclusive quality, suggesting that transcendence involves "behav­ ing and relating as ends rather than as means to oneself, to significant others, to human beings in general, to other species, to nature, and to the cosmos" (p. 279). In addition, he identified three characteristics of transcendence that seem to reflect an allo-inclusive perspective: (a) harmony with nature, (b) mys­ tical experience, and (c) cosmic consciousness (i.e., a state in which a person experiences a feeling of unity with the cosmos and integration of all things with oneself; see also Bucke, 1923). Along the same lines, Csikszentmihalyi ( 1993) described transcendent people (in our view, those with an allo-inclusive identity) as balancing their pursuit of personal interests with a concern for connectedness to others and the world. Such people integrate nonpersonal goals, such as the welfare of the global community, with personal ones and attend to each with equal energy. More recently, Pittinsky (2005) described allophilia, an interpersonal orienta­ tion that involves acceptance of and liking for all other people and groups, which may be a socioemotional consequence of feeling highly identified with other people and the natural world. The only research that has focused explicitly on the degree to which people's self-concepts include elements beyond their individual, relational, and collective identities comes from work on the metapersonal self. DeCicco and Stroink (2000) developed the 10-item Metapersonal Self Scale, which includes items 1 such as "I feel a sense of kinship with all living things" and "I believe that no matter where I am or what I am doing, I am never separate from others." Endorsement of a metapersonal self is distinct from independent and interdependent self-construals ( Singelis, 1994) and correlated with the tendency to experience positive emotions. It is not surprising that people who scored high on the Metapersonal Self Scale scored lower in racism and placed 1From Third model of self-construal: The metapersonal self [paper presented at the 108th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC], by T. DeCicco and M. Stroink, August 2000. Copyright 2000 by Teresa DeCicco and Mirella Stroink. Reprinted with permission.

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a greater value on benevolence, universalism, and spirituality than those who scored low (see also Stroink, DeCicco, & Mehta, 2005). Although conceptually related, the Metapersonal Self Scale does not pre­ cisely measure allo-inclusive identity as we define it. Although some items on the scale assess the sense of connection to people and things that lies at the heart of an allo-inclusive identity (e.g., "I see myself extended into everything else"), other items assess spiritual sensibility (e.g., "My sense of inner peace is one of the most important things to me") and the belief that existence is mean­ ingful (e.g., "My personal existence is very purposeful and meaningful").

The Allo-Inclusive Identity Scale

Although previous references to concepts related to aUo-inclusive identity can be found in discussions of spirituality, mysticism, and humanistic psychology, at its heart alIo-inclusive identity is merely an extension of the widely accepted notion that people incorporate people and things outside themselves into their sense of who they are (Aron, Aron, & Smollen, 1992; Brewer & Gardner, 1996; James, 1890; Wright, Aron, & Tropp, 2002) and need not be associated with particular spiritual philosophies. Just as people may identify themselves with reference to their personal traits, other people, and the groups to which they belong, they may also incorporate broader categories of people and nature into their sense of self. We developed a measure of allo-inclusive identity by adapting the Inclu­ sion of Others in the Self (lOS) Scale designed by Aron et al. ( 1992). The lOS Scale presents Venn diagrams of seven pairs of circles that range from two nonoverlapping circles to circles that are virtually congruent. In the original version of the lOS Scale, respondents selected the pair of circles that best rep­ resented their sense of interconnectedness with another specific person. In our modification ofthis approach, we asked respondents to indicate which diagram best expressed their relationship with each of 16 stimulus entities described in Exhibit 13.1. Although this approach asks about perceived "connection" or "relatedness" instead of identity per se, research has shown that people's responses to the lOS Scale reflect the degree to which they include others in their identities. When people incorporate others into their sense of self, their cognitive representations of themselves and the others literally overlap, lead­ ing people to conflate judgments of themselves and the people and groups with which they perceive they are highly connected (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Aron & Fraley, 1999; Smith & Henry, 1996; Tropp & Wright, 200 1). We initially selected the stimuli for the Allo-inclusive Identity (AI) Scale to reflect four categories: (a) people with whom the person has a relationship (e.g., a friend, a family member); (b) people with whom the person has no rela­ tionship (e.g. , a homeless person, a stranger); (c) animals (e.g. , an eagle, a dog); and (d) inanimate features of nature (e.g., the moon, a tree). However, factor analyses showed that the items repeatedly loaded on only two factors reflecting people versus the nonhuman natural world. Thus, in addition to the total AI score, we use two 8-item subscales, which we call AI-People and AI-Natural World. The Allo-inclusive Identity Scale is presented in Exhibit 13.1.

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140

Exhibit 13.1.

The Allo-Inclusive Identity Scale

Instructions: Below are seven diagrams that express varying degrees of relatedness or connection with some other person or thing. For each of the people or things listed below, indicate which diagram best expresses your relationship with that person or thing. For example, Diagram 1 indicates no relationship or connectedness, Diagram 4 indicates a moderate degree of connectedness, and Diagram 7 indicates complete connectedness.

88 ffi ffi 1

3

2

5

e

6

7

The connection between you and the person with whom you feel closest. The connection between you and your best friend of your own sex. The connection between you and a wild animal (such as a squirrel, deer, or wolf). The connection between you and the average American. The connection between you and the moon. The connection between you and a homeless person on the street. The connection between you and your best friend of the other sex. The connection between you and a dog. The connection between you and a tree. The connection between you and a stranger on a bus. The connection between you and all living creatures. The connection between you and your family. The connection between you and the Earth. The connection between you and an eagle soaring in the sky. The connection between you and the universe. The connection between you and a person of another race.

The total AI score and both AI subscales have acceptable reliability (Cron­ bach's ex > .75), and the two subscales correlate with each other in the vicinity of .35 across samples. Neither the subscales nor the total score appear to be contaminated by social desirability biases, because no significant correlations were obtained between the AI Scale and the Balanced Inventory of Socially Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991). As one would expect, scores on the total AI Scale, as well as on both sub­ scales, correlated with the Metapersonal Self Scale (DeCicco & Stroink, 2000), but the correlations were small enough to suggest that they do not measure precisely the same construct (AI-Total, r .37; AI-People, r .26; AI-Natural =

=

ALLO-INCLUSlVE IDENTITY

141

World, r = .35). Furthermore, after factor analyzing the Metapersonal Self Scale, the AI Scale correlated most strongly with the factor of the Metapersonal Self Scale that assesses one's perceived connection to all things (r .39) and less strongly with factors that involve spiritual interests (r = .20) and one's sense of having a meaningful existence (r = .20). =

Personality, Emotions, and the Self

There is a growing consensus that the empirical description of any character­ istic must include reference to its relationship to five fundamental personality traits (i.e., the Big Five): Extraversion, Neuroticism, Agreeableness, Consci­ entiousness, and Openness to Experience (McCrae & John, 1992). As shown in Table 13. 1, the total AI score correlated only with Conscientiousness (r -. 17), but we have no ready explanation for why people who score high on allo­ inclusive identity tend to be less conscientious than those who are low in AI. In addition, the AI-People subscale correlated with higher Extraversion and Agreeableness and with lower Neuroticism, and a stepwise regression

=

Table 13.1.

Personality, Emotion, and Self-Related Measures Allo-Inclusive Identity (AI) Scale

Measure

Total AI score

Big Five personality traitsa Extraversion Neuroticism Agreeableness Conscientiousness Openness to Experience Emotional dispositionsb Depression Worry Anger-proneness Life satisfaction Self-related measuresC Self-esteem Narcissism Self-compassion Private self-consciousness Public self-consciousness Entitlement Prosocial interpersonal orientationsd Kindness Forgiveness Compassion an 114. bn 148. en 147. dn ***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05. =

=

=

=

148.

AI-People

AI-Natural World

.11 -.05 .11 -.17* .04

.29*** -.16* .20** -.15 .10

.08 -.03 -.13 -.05

-.08 .07 -.04 .21**

-.2 1 * * -.03 -.04 .26**

.07 . 12 -.04 .08

. 18* .08 .21* .20** .03 -.01

.24* .13 .28** .05 .03 -.01

.07 .01 .08

.36** . 16*

.36** . 16*

.14

.21**

-.11

.24** -.03 .07 . 15* .00 -.03

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LEARY, TIPSORD, AND TATE

analysis revealed that all three personality traits predicted unique variance in the AI-People scores. We are inclined to suggest that including other people in one's sense of identity fosters a more sociable and extraverted orientation, leads one to interact with others in a more cooperative and agreeable manner, and helps to stabilize one's emotional reactions (thereby lowering neuroti­ cism), but of course these correlational data do not allow definitive conclusions regarding possible causal connections between AI-People and these funda­ mental features of personality. None of the Big Five traits correlated with the AI-Natural World subscale. Proponents of an allo-inclusive perspective have suggested that see­ ing one's connections to the larger world should be associated with a lower tendency to experience negative emotions (Maslow, 1971). Along these lines, DeCicco and Stroink (2000) found that scores on the Metapersonal Self Scale correlated negatively with anxiety. In our data, the AI-People subscale cor­ related negatively with the tendency to experience depression, but none of the AI scales correlated with the tendency to worry or to become angry (see Table 13. 1). In addition, AI-Total and AI-People correlated with overall life satisfac­ tion (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). As seen in Table 13.1, both the AI-Total and AI-People scores correlated with trait self-esteem (Rosenberg, 1965), which may reflect the fact that the perception that one is connected with other people promotes self-esteem (Leary & Baumeister, 2000). AI Scale scores were also associated with self compassion, the tendency to treat oneself with caring and kindness in the face of failure, rejection, loss, and other negative events (Leary, Tate, Adams, Allen, & Hancock, 2007; Neff, 2003). A central component of self-compassion involves the perception that one's problems and shortcomings are part of the common human experience (Neff, 2003), something that is likely to be associated with the degree to which people incorporate others into their identities. Put differ­ ently, a person who feels disconnected from other people would find it difficult to sustain the sense of common humanity that is central to self-compassion (see chap. 9, this volume). AI-Total and AI-Natural World al so correlated with private self­ consciousness, but not with public self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). When private self-consciousness is broken down into two compo­ nents-internal state awareness and self-reflectiveness (Anderson, Bohon, & Berrigan, 1996)-only internal state awareness was associated with scores on the AI-Natural World subscale. Internal state awareness involves an open, nonjudgmental attentiveness to one's inner states and experiences, an orien­ tation somewhat akin to mindfulness (see chap. 7, this volume). In contrast, self-reflectiveness involves a "negative and oppressive style of private self­ consciousness" (Anderson et aI. , 1996, p. 150) that involves excessive rumina­ tion and self-preoccupation. Apparently, people who identify more strongly with the natural world tend to be more attentive to their inner states but are no more or less likely to ruminate about themselves than people who score low on the AI-Natural World subscale. Perhaps high internal state awareness is associated with greater sensitivity to one's feelings of connection, appreciation, and awe with respect to animals and nature.

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We had assumed that people who construed themselves as related to the social and natural worlds would score lower in narcissism as well as have a lower sense of being entitled to special treatment but, contrary to expectations, allo-inclusive identity was not related to either narcissism (Emmons, 1987) or entitlement (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). How­ ever, consistent with the idea that having an extended view of oneself should be associated with a more altruistic and caring approach toward other people (Bucke, 1923; Maslow, 1971), high AI was associated with greater self-reported kindness, forgiveness, and compassion (see Table 13. 1), suggesting that a central feature of allo-inclusive identity is lower egocentrism and a prosocial orientation toward other people (see chap. 15, this volume).

Values

The degree to which people include the social and natural worlds in their identities should be related to what they value in life, in particular, endorse­ ment of values that benefit others and the world at large. To examine the relationship between allo-inclusive identity and values, we administered the Pairwise Comparison Value Survey (Oishi, Schimmack, Diener, & Suh, 1 998), a measure of 10 fundamental values: (a) power, (b) achievement, (c) hedonism, (d) stimulation, (e) self-direction, (D social/ecological concern (sometimes called universalism), (g) social relationships (sometimes called benevolence), (h) tradition, (i) duty, and (j) security. The Pairwise Comparison Value Survey asks respondents to compare each of the 10 values with each of the other 9 values and to rate which they value more. As shown in Table 13.2, total scores on the AI Scale correlated sig­ nificantly with 4 of the 10 values. First, AI-Total correlated positively with the value that participants placed on social relationships (which includes valuing helpfulness, honesty, loyalty, and responsibility) and on social/eco­ logical concern (e.g., protecting the environment, valuing a world of beauty, social justice, unity with nature). The separate effects for the AI-People and AI-Natural World subscales supported the discriminant validity of the subscales in that the value placed on social relationships correlated only with the AI-People subscale, and the value placed on social/ecological con­ cern correlated only with the AI-Natural World subscale (see also Mayer & Frantz, 2004). Allo-inclusive identity correlated negatively with the value that respon­ dents placed on power, a relationship that was observed for the AI-People subscale but not for the AI-Natural World subscale. People who incorporate others into their identity presumably interact with them in an egalitarian and less status-driven manner. All three AI Scale scores were negatively related to the degree to which participants valued security (e.g., national security, social order, family security, cleanliness). This effect may reflect the fact that people who feel more connected to others and the environment feel less threatened by other people and the natural world and thus are less concerned with safety and security.

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Table 13.2.

Values and Spirituality Allo-Inclusive Identity (AI) Scale

Measure

AI-Total

AI-People

AI-Natural World

. 18** .28*** .07 -.20**

.29*** .07 .13 - .24***

.01 .38*** -.01 -.09

Values (PCVS) Social relationships SociaVecological concern Duty Power Self-direction Tradition

.08 .08

Achievement

.08 . 19*

.05 -.05

-.09 -.05

-.12

-.03

Hedonism

-.01

-.06

Stimulation

-.04

-.10 -.23***

.04 -.22**

.23** .23** . 18* . 19* .26**

.22** .22** .03 . 12

Security Spiritual experience

-.28***

Spirituality and religion (DSES) Spirituality (DSES) Religion (DSES) Frequency of prayer Allo-inclusive identity vis-a.-vis God

.27** .27** .13 . 19* .17*

.02

Note. PCVS '" Pairwise Comparison Value Survey; DSES '" Daily Spiritual Experience Scale. ***p < .001.

**p < .01.

*p < .05.

Spiritual and Religious Orientation

Most religious and spiritual traditions emphasize one's connections with other people and, as noted, many traditions also stress that each individual exists as part of some larger essential entity that renders everything inherently related. Thus, we expected to find that people with a stronger allo-inclusive identity would be more inclined toward spirituality, although not necessarily toward organized religion. The Daily Spiritual Experience Scale (DSES; Underwood & Teresi, 2002) assesses the frequency with which people have ordinary spiritual experi­ ences, involving, for example, feeling God's presence, a sense of inner peace, or divine guidance. As seen in the lower portion of Table 13.2, scores on the DSES correlated with AI-Total, AI-People, and AI-Natural World. However, inspection of the item content of the DSES reveals a decidedly theistic, if not Judeo-Christian slant to many of the items, rendering them questionable as an index of general spiritual experience. Thus, we split the items into two sets: (a) those that explicitly refer to having an experience with God (e.g. , "I feel God's presence," "I ask God for help in the midst of daily activities") and (b) those that refer to spiritual experiences but do not mention God (e.g. , "I am spiritually touched by the beauty of creation," "I find comfort in my religion or spirituality"). As can be seen in Table 13.2, the sum of the spirituality items

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145

correlated with AI-Total, AI-People, and AI-Natural World, but the sum of the items that refer to experiences with God correlated only with AI-People. When we asked participants to indicate the connection "between you and God" using the seven Venn diagrams from the lOS Scale, ratings of closeness to God correlated with AI-Total and with AI-People, but not with AI-Natural World. Furthermore, AI-Total and AI-People weakly predicted the frequency with which people prayed. Thus, incorporating people into one's identity is associ­ ated with theistic, religious behavior (and with relating to God more or less as a person), whereas feeling connected to the natural world is associated more with spiritual experiences that do not necessarily involve a divine being.

Conclusion

Throughout history, many philosophical, religious, and cultural traditions have promoted the notion that people are inherently connected with other hu­ man beings and the natural world and that recognizing one's connection to all things is associated with a variety of beneficial outcomes. In fact, some tradi­ tions maintain that construing oneself in relation to the rest of existence is a central characteristic of an adjusted, moral, and fully functioning individual, and some even identify it as a feature of self-realization or enlightenment (Leary, 2004). Although our research can in no way address these weighty issues, our preliminary findings suggest that people who feel a greater sense of personal connection with other people and the natural world are less egocentric, more concerned about others, more oriented toward social relationships and eco­ logical issues, less interested in social power, and more inclined toward certain kinds of spiritual experiences. The data also suggest that people high in an allo-inclusive identity may fare better emotionally, in terms oflower depression and higher life satisfaction, although these effects may involve only individu­ als' perceived connections with other people. Whether scores on the AI-Natural World subscale predict features of well-being other than those measured here remains to be seen. Although the data clearly show that an allo-inclusive identity is associ­ ated with a stronger orientation toward other people and the natural world, evidence regarding the relationship between AI and egoism is less direct. On the one hand, we assume that people who are more oriented toward others-in terms of being more agreeable, kind, compassionate, forgiving, and ecologically minded, for example-are inherently less self-centered. On the other hand, contrary to our expectations, AI was not inversely related to constructs that ex­ plicitly involve egoism and self-centeredness, such as narcissism, entitlement, public self-consciousness, and the value that people place on self-direction and hedonism. Although we are reasonably confident that people who have stron­ ger alIo-inclusive identities also have quieter egos than those who are less allo­ inclusive, additional research is needed to explore which self-relevant motives, perspectives, and beliefs are and are not related to having an alIo-inclusive identity.

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We encourage researchers, in further studying allo-inclusive identity, not only to use the version of the AI Scale described in this chapter but also to modify the items to suit their own research interests. We view the scale not so much as a concretized instrument but rather regard the inclusion-of-others-in­ the-self approach on which it is based (Aron et at , 1992) as a versatile means of assessing the degree to which people incorporate aspects of the social and natural worlds into their identities.

References Anderson, E. M., Bohon, L. M., & Berrigan, L. P. ( 1996). Factor structure of the Private Self­ Consciousness Scale. Journal of Personality Assessment, 66, 144-152. Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollen, D. (1992). Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale and the structure of interpersonal closeness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 596--6 1 2. Aron, A., Aron, E. N., Tudor, M., & Nelson, G. (1991). Close relationships as including others in the self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 241-253. Aron, A., & Fraley, B. (1999). Relationship closeness as including others in the self: Cognitive un­ derpinnings and measures. Social Cognition, 1 7, 140-160. Brewer, M. B., & Gardner, W. (1996). Who is this "we"? Levels of collective identity and self repre­ sentations. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 71, 83-93. Bucke, R ( 192 3). Cosmic consciousness. New York: Dutton.

Campbell, W. K., Bonacci, A. M., Shelton, J., Exline, J. J., & Bushman, B. J. (2004). Psychological entitlement: Interpersonal consequences and validation of a new self-report measure. Journal

ofPersonality Assessment, 83, 29-45. Cheek, J. M. (1989). Identity orientations and self-interpretation. In D. M. Buss & N. Cantor (Eds.), Personality psychology: Recent trends and emerging directions (pp. 275-285). New York: Springer-Verlag. Csikszentmihalyi, M. ( 1993). The evolving self New York: HarperColiins. DeCicco, T. L., & Stroink, M. (2000, August). Third model of self-construal: The metapersonal self Paper presented at the lO8th Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, Washington, DC. Diener, E., Emmons, R A., Larsen, R J., & Griffin, S. (1985). The Satisfaction With Life Scale.

Journal ofPersonality Assessment, 49, 71-75. Emmons, R A. (1987). Narcissism: Theory and measurement. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 11-17. Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., & Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: Assess­ ment and theory. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 43, 522-527. James, W. (1890). The principles ofpsychology. New York: Holt. James, W. (1985). The varieties ofreligious experience. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. (Original work published 1902) Leary, M. R (2004). The curse of the self: Self-awareness, egotism, and the quality of human life. New York: Oxford University Press. Leary, M. R, & Baumeister, R F. (2000). The nature and function of self-esteem: Sociometer theory. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 32, pp. 1-62). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Leary, M. R, Tate, E. B . , Adams, C. E . , Allen, A. B., & Hancock, J. (2007). Self-compassion and reac­ tions to unpleasant self-relevant events: The implications oftreating oneself kindly. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92, 887-904. Maslow, A. H. ( 1971). The farther reaches of human nature. New York: Viking Press. Mayer, F. S., & Frantz, C. M. (2004). The Connectedness to Nature Scale: A measure of individuals' feeling in community with nature. Journal ofEnvironmental Psychology, 24, 503-515. McCrae, R R , & John, o. P. (1992). An introduction to the five-factor model and its applications.

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Neff, K. (2003). The development and validation of a scale to measure self-compassion. Self and

Identity, 2, 223-250. Oishi, S., Schimmack, U., Diener, E., & Sub, E. M. ( 1998). The measurement of values and indi­ vidualism--collectivism. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 24, 1177-1189. Paulhus, D . L. ( 1991). Measurement and control of response bias. In J. R Robinson, R Shaver, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), Measures ofpersonality and social psychological attitudes (pp. 1579). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Pittinsky, T. L. (2005). Allophilia and intergroup leadership. In N. Huber & M. Walker (Eds.),

Building leadership bridges: Emergent models ofglobal leadership (pp. 34--49 ). College Park, MD: International Leadership Association. Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Sedikides, C., & Brewer, M. B. (Eds.). (2001). Individual self, relational self, collective self Phila­ delphia: Psychology Press. Singelis, T. M. ( 1994). The measurement of independent and interdependent self-construals. Per­

sonality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 20, 580-591. Smith, E . R , & Henry, S. (1996). An in-group becomes part o f the self: Response time evidence.

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14 Perspectives on the Self in the East and the West: Searching for the Quiet Ego Derrick Wirtz and Chi-yue Chiu The picture of the ego-or self-that has historically emerged from American social psychology is that of an organization of knowledge that controls and assimilates new information in ways that reinforce (instead of disrupt) the existing cognitive framework. Greenwald ( 1980) referred to this highly self­ reinforcing system as the totalitarian ego, likening the mechanisms and biases of the self to a controlling political state. Whereas the totalitarian state might exercise control of the media, regulate political life, and rely on propaganda, the self's efforts at information control manifest in a variety of cognitive biases. Egocentrism, the illusion of control, the self-serving bias, the confirmation bias, and constructive memory processes all operate to glorify the self and either reinforce preexisting beliefs or disguise the fact that one's beliefs have changed to maintain a perception of consistency. In this chapter, we compare this tra­ ditional formulation of the self with recent perspectives from cultural psychol­ ogy, which suggest that the view of the self that is prevalent in much American social psychology is but one possible self. Specifically, we review research sug­ gesting that the self's autocracy in Eastern (vs. Western) culture is more re­ strained or subdued: It is more inclusive of others in the self-concept and more inclusive of a wider variety of experiences in forming everyday judgments and evaluations. In doing this, we consider whether the self that is typical among individuals who share an Eastern cultural heritage represents a quiet-or, in contrast to Greenwald's totalitarian characterization, more subdued-ego.1 lIn using the terms noisy and quiet it is not our intention to evaluate differing perspectives on the self with the goal of suggesting that one perspective is superior; any evaluative connotation of these terms is unintended. We do, however, wish to draw attention to the growing consensus that the notion of ego that has dominated American social psychology through much of its history is but one conceptualization of the self. To the extent that this self has traditionally been described as egocentric in its construal of everyday events, totalitarian in its processing of new information, and thus somewhat noisy, the Eastern self may in contrast be less so. Moreover, because of the markedly different physical and social environments in the East and the West, most cross-cultural studies (including the ones reviewed in this chapter) have compared individuals from Western cultures with individuals from East Asian cultures. Such comparisons should be interpreted as differences in central tendencies (e.g., mean-level differences). Furthermore, it is important to recognize that the presence of differences in central tendencies between two groups does not entail

149

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Theoretical Conceptualizations of the Western Self and the Eastern Self

Sampson ( 1977) discussed selfcontained individualism as an American ideal in which the self is viewed as distinct and separate from others: "The self­ contained person is one who does not require or desire others for his or her completion in life . . . . Self-containment is the extreme of independence: need­ ing or wanting no one" (p. 770). Similarly, the concept of vertical individual­ ism-a cultural orientation that focuses on personal competitiveness, status, and distinction from others-has also been used to describe American society (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998). The "noisy," totalitarian ego is frequently observed in American society and is evident in many social psychological research find­ ings, perhaps because it emerges from this cultural emphasis on individualism in which the self is a contained unit separate from others. Furthermore, be­ cause cognitive biases motivated by the American cultural ideal work against the elaboration of negative experiences that are relevant to the self, the ego may thus be characterized as having a ready social-cognitive defense against threats. For example, unrealistic optimism affords a self-deceptive view of the self as being invincible, and the self-serving attribution bias externalizes and hence discounts negative experiences so that they do not form part of the phenomenological self. Accordingly, psychological well-being is constructed rather exclusively on the basis of one's own experiences, and in particular on the basis of one's own positive experiences. The selective revision of personal history formed one of the pillars of Greenwald's ( 1980) analogy of the self as a totalitarian system, and the assertion that psychological well-being is based on the positive experiences of the self has implications that we discuss later in this chapter.2 When conceptions of the self are examined cross-culturally, however, alternative models for the ego become apparent. The individualist cultural orientation typified by the United States contrasts with a more collectivist cul­ tural orientation dominant in East Asia (e.g., China, Japan, Korea). Whereas individualism implies a view of the self as separate from others, collectivism implies a view of the self as interconnected with others (Markus & Kitayama, 199 1; Triandis, 1989). In this interdependent model of the self, the distinction between self and other is less sharply defined; priority is placed on collective goals over individual goals; and a well-adjusted, mature individual is one who

an absence of variability within either group (Chiu & Hong, 2006). Thus, in this chapter, when differences are described as between "Westerners" and "Easterners" collectively, such terms refer to average members (statistically speaking) of the groups examined (e.g., an average Westerner or an average Easterner). 2The notion of the self as separate from others may constitute an American ideal and may serve as one possible source of many social psychological research findings, but it is not intended to imply perfect homogeneity in conceptions of the self within the United States. As a mean-level charac­ teristic, independent self-construal is thought to be, on average, more prevalent among Western cultures than among Eastern cultures, but within-culture variability also exists. Thus, not every American has a noisy, totalitarian ego, although it is likely that most Americans are aware of the cultural ideals of individualism and often feel pressured to conform to this ideal (Chiu & Hong, 2006).

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is skilled at maintaining harmonious social relationships and aspires to fulfill social roles and obligations (see chap. 12, this volume). In contrast with the noisy, totalitarian self, the Eastern view of the self as interdependent can be construed as representing a quieter ego that is more seasoned and inclusive. It includes others in its self-definition, and the self is humbled by taking into account others' perspectives on the self. Furthermore, although a greater degree of other-focused thinking may represent one major facet of the Eastern self, we propose that it also encompasses a wider synthesis of experience; specifically, whereas the biases of the totalitarian ego distance the self from others and from negative experiences, from this alternative per­ spective both positive and negative experiences are included in the phenom­ enological self and used to construct the psychological well-being of the self.3

Consequences of Divergent Selves in the West and the East: Empirical Evidence

Cross-cultural research has demonstrated that the nature of the self influences varied aspects of cognition, emotion, and motivation (Markus & Kitayama, 199 1). In this section, we briefly review research that supports two main conclusions: (a) The Eastern (vs. Western) self is more inclusive of negative experiences in the phenomenological self and in constructing psychological well-being, and (b) it is more inclusive of others in self-definition and in con­ structing psychological well-being.

Inclusion of Negative Experiences in the Phenomenological Self The Eastern and Western selves differ in the degree to which negative experi­ ences and information are acknowledged and elaborated. First, in research that has examined open-ended descriptions of the self, Japanese were balanced in their self-descriptions, including both favorable and critical appraisals (Ross, Heine, Wilson, & Sugimori, 2005), suggesting that the East Asian self is more tolerant of negative self-relevant information. Second, although both Easterners and Westerners are motivated to feel good about the self, the Eastern and Western conceptions of how to feel good about the self differ (Heine, 2003). In the West, individuals feel good about themselves when they can filter out negative experiences from their phenome­ nology. In the East, individuals feel good about themselves when they can iden3That is not to suggest that the Eastern self does not present its own pattern of self-reinforc­ ing tendencies and cognitive biases. Some researchers have contended, for example, that self­ enhancement is culturally universal, taking an individual form in the West and a collective form in the East (Brown & Kobayashi, 2003; Sedikides, Gaertner, & Toguchi, 2003). In addition, both cultural models emphasize agency; that is, in both Eastern and Western cultures the attainment of valued goals is important for psychological well-being, but the appropriate goals to pursue, as well as where those goals originate, differ. In the West, the pursuit of individual goals is normative, and agency itself is seen as originating within the individual. In the East, the appropriate goals to pursue are collective in nature, and agency is seen as originating in the collective rather than the individual (Hernandez & Iyengar, 2001; Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1999).

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tify and improve on their shortcomings. Thus, whereas North Americans have been found to demonstrate compensatory self-enhancement, in which short­ comings in one domain are offset by emphasizing competence in a different domain, Japanese fail to show a similar pattern; instead, feedback regarding one's failures is particularly meaningful to Japanese, because improvement on one's failures or shortcomings receives emphasis (Heine, Kitayama, & Lehman, 200 1). For example, when North Americans failed on an academic task, they persisted on subsequent, related tasks less than when their efforts were met with success (Heine, Kitayama, Lehman, et aI., 2001). Among Japanese, the reverse pattern emerged, with greater persistence on tasks on which one has performed poorly instead of well (see also Oishi & Diener, 2003). Furthermore, Canadian participants provided with feedback that they had performed worse on various tasks than their classmates tended to resist accepting such infor­ mation. Japanese participants, however, were reluctant to accept feedback that suggested they had performed better than their peers (Heine, Takata, & Lehman, 2000). Self-criticism implies an emphasis on one's negative attributes or shortcomings, and self-improvement highlights efforts to rectify those short­ comings. Thus, the Eastern ego may be described as more inclusive of negative experiences in the phenomenological self.

Inclusion of Negative Experiences in the Construction of Psychological Well-Being The inclusiveness or tolerance of the negative in the Eastern self becomes further apparent in research that has examined the role of recalled positive and negative affective experiences in judgments related to the individual's construction of psychological well-being. Across several studies involving judg­ ments about the quality of a vacation, a friendship, and life overall, European Americans and Asian Americans differed in the degree to which negative affect was weighted in forming such evaluative judgments (Wirtz, Chiu, Diener, & Oishi, 2007). In one study, participants' affect was measured before, during ("on-line"), and after a spring break vacation (Wirtz et aI., 2007). Although no differences emerged in the actual, on-line experience of positive and negative emotions be­ tween Asian Americans and European Americans while on the trip, significant differences appeared when participants were asked to recall their experience after the vacation. When asked to recall the intensity of their positive emotions during the trip, European Americans were biased in favor of remembering the vacation as more intensely positive than their on-line reports suggested was truly the case. Asian Americans instead exhibited a bias such that they recalled the vacation as more intensely negative than their on-line reports corroborated. In a sense, the European Americans remembered feeling better than they actually did, whereas Asian Americans remembered feeling worse than they actually did. After the spring break vacation ended, participants were asked to rate the degree to which they would like to take a similar vacation in the future (Wirtz et aI., 2007). Participants' responses to this question were then predicted from

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their on-line reports and recalled positive and negative affect. European Amer­ icans appeared to ignore or discount their recalled negative affect when rating their desire to embark on a similar vacation; their recalled positive affect was the only significant predictor of the rating they provided. Asian Americans' rat­ ings, in contrast, were predicted about equally well by their recall of positive affect and negative affect (although when regression was used to estimate the relative contribution of both valences simultaneously, the absence of negative affect was a better predictor than the presence of positive affect). In other words, Asian Americans viewed a good, repeatable vacation as one with a lot of positive affect and not much negative affect. Comparable findings were obtained when Asian Americans and European Americans were asked, in a second study (Wirtz et aL, 2007), to evaluate their satisfaction with a personal friendship. Overall, the recall of positive affect (but not negative affect) in a friendship-related event was significantly related to European Americans' overall satisfaction with the friendship, such that a greater intensity of recalled positive feelings was related to greater friend­ ship satisfaction. It is interesting that, even when recalling friendship-related events that were predominantly negative, the presence of positive affect in the episode positively influenced European Americans' overall satisfaction with the friendship. In other words, the presence of some positive feelings in an otherwise-negative event appeared to increase European Americans' satisfac­ tion with the friendship. Among Asian Americans, the intensity of recalled negative affect (but not positive affect) was significantly related to overall friendship satisfaction, such that the more intensely negative participants recalled feeling, the less satis­ fied they were with the friendship overall (Wirtz et aL, 2007). This pattern held even when the event being recalled was overall positive in nature; that is, the presence of negative feelings in an otherwise-positive event lowered Asian Americans' friendship satisfaction. Taken as a whole, these findings can be construed as suggesting that European Americans' friendship satisfaction increased as a result of their focus on the good parts of a bad event, whereas Asian Americans' friendship satisfaction decreased as a result of their focus on the bad parts of a good event.

Inclusion of Others in Self-Definition In addition to representing an ego inclusive of negative experience, we argue that the Eastern self is more inclusive of other people as well. Cohen and Gunz (2002) hypothesized that if the Eastern self is characterized by interdepen­ dence, with others being included in one's own self-definition, then this per­ spective on the self should produce cross-cultural differences in self-referential memory; specifically, Eastern individuals might be expected to more commonly store memories of the self from a third-person perspective compared with Western individuals. Indeed, the authors reported results confirming that for experiences in which one is the center of attention (i.e., situations in which an­ other person is present and whose attention is focused on oneselD, memories of those experiences were more often described in the third-person point of view

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among Asian Canadians than European C anadians. Similarly, research on the representation of personal versus collective traits in long-term memory sug­ gests that whereas Westerners typically are quicker to recognize context-free self-relevant words, Easterners are quicker to identify words representing the self in a social context (Wagar & Cohen, 2003). Emotional perception was affected as well, with European Canadians more likely to show egocentric projection of their own emotions onto others and Asian Canadians more likely to demonstrate relational projection, in which another person is perceived as experiencing emotions complementary to one's own (Cohen & Gunz, 2002). These findings for both memory represen­ tations and emotional perception are consistent in providing evidence for a different phenomenology of the self-one that features others as a part of the self-among individuals sharing an Eastern versus Western cultural heritage; that is, whereas Westerners tend to exclude others (even significant others) in the definition of the self, Easterners' self-definition is considerably more inclusive.

Inclusion of Others in Constructing Psychological Well-Being Just as we previously presented evidence demonstrating that negative expe­ riences play a greater role in the psychological well-being of the Eastern ego versus Western ego, here we present evidence that there is a greater role for other people in constructing psychological well-being among Easterners than among Westerners. Specifically, we consider cross-cultural data on emotional representations and the degree to which positive and negative experiences at­ tributable to the self (vs. others) factor into one's own sense of psychological

well-being. Kitayama, Markus, and Kurokawa (2000) distinguished between inter­ personally engaged emotions (e.g., respect) and interpersonally disengaged emotions (e.g., pride). It is interesting that the frequency with which Japa­ nese experienced interpersonally engaged positive emotions correlated more strongly with their experience of general positive emotions (e.g. , elation) than did the frequency with which they experienced interpersonally disengaged pos­ itive emotions. This finding suggests that, for Japanese, feeling respected may be a greater source of positive affect than a sense of pride. The opposite pattern was apparent for European Americans, with interpersonally disengaged emo­ tions more closely related to feelings of general positive affect. For European Americans, feeling proud may be a greater source of positive affect than feeling respected. This overall pattern of results suggests that engagement with others is a major factor in the affective experience of Japanese and is consistent with the self-construal of the self as interdependent with others. Research that has examined the effects of one's own (vs. others') posi­ tive and negative experiences on well-being presents further evidence for the inclusiveness of the Eastern self. In a 3-week study of everyday experiences, European Americans tended to identify the self as the causal agent in more everyday positive events than negative events, and they rated the self as the cause of positive events to a greater degree than did Japanese (Wirtz et aI.,

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2007). The Japanese participants showed the opposite trend, attributing nega­ tive events to the self more than positive events. These patterns of attribution were further linked to changes in life satis­ faction during the course of the study (Wirtz et aI., 2007). Controlling for initial life satisfaction, European Americans' life satisfaction at the end of the 3 weeks was predicted by the degree to which they had experienced positive events attributable to themselves. In other words, causing good things to happen (or believing themselves to be the cause of good things) made European Americans more satisfied with their lives as a whole. Among Japanese, a different pat­ tern appeared: Changes in life satisfaction were best predicted by the degree to which they experienced negative events attributable to others instead of themselves; that is, when other people brought about negative events (or were believed to bring about negative events), Japanese participants became less satisfied with their own lives over time. Negative events were simply unrelated to life satisfaction for the European Americans, whereas positive events were unrelated to life satisfaction for the Japanese.

Benefits and Costs of a Quieter Ego

Both the Western (independent, totalitarian, noisy) and the Eastern (interde­ pendent, subdued, quiet) models of the self we have discussed in this chapter have their psychological benefits and liabilities. For example, unrealistic op­ timism and self-enhancement have been linked to psychological and physical well-being and freedom from psychopathology (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor, Lerner, Sherman, Sage, & McDowell, 2003; see also chap. 4, this volume). Yet individuals living in Western cultures may at the same time experience more intense ego threat and feel greater pressure to engage in ego defense when ob­ jective experiences are incongruent with their inflated positive view of the self. In response to ego threat, for example, individuals with high self-esteem may make suboptimal choices (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1993). A greater resistance to ego threat may thus represent one benefit of the Eastern (subdued) ego. Consistent with the proposal that Westerners react more extremely than Easterners to self-threatening information, Brockner and Chen ( 1996) demonstrated that U.S. participants with high self-esteem enhanced an ingroup and disparaged an outgroup more than did Chinese par­ ticipants in response to negative individual feedback. This tendency appeared to be explained by self-construal: Individuals in each culture who scored high on a measure of independent self-construal tended to respond similarly, com­ pared with those who scored low on the measure. In addition to being less vulnerable to defensive responses to ego threat, Easterners tend to exhibit less self-deceptive enhancement, a type of socially desirable responding in which an individual perceives him- or herself in overly positive terms, than do Westerners (Lalwani, Shavitt, & Johnson, 2006). Self­ deceptive enhancement may in turn lead to maladaptive behaviors, particu­ larly in response to ego threat, because it represents a genuine belief that one's traits or abilities are superior to others, without regard to the objective status of one's actual traits or abilities. Furthermore, the noisy, totalitarian ego has

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no mechanisms to correct for the biases induced by self-deceptive enhance­ ment. In a quieter, more seasoned ego, the self could be humbled by others' perspectives on the self, providing a corrective mechanism-an "outside-in" perspective (Cohen & Gunz, 2002)-for the biases inherent in self-deceptive enhancement. However, the Eastern, subdued ego risks being overpowered by others and hence losing its autonomy. In European American families, parents commonly praise a child after the child has displayed self-initiated desirable behaviors. In contrast, praise after self-initiated positive behavior is much less frequent in Chinese immigrant families in the United States. Often, Chinese American children are instead praised for following parental expectations. Sometimes, in Chinese immigrant families, the parents first communicate their expecta­ tion to the child and then use praise as a means to elicit the desirable behavior (Wang, Wiley, & Chiu, in press). In short, to most European Americans, prais­ ing children's desirable behaviors to foster their autonomy and self-competence is a common practice. In contrast, in many Chinese immigrant families, praise is a means of fostering adherence of parental expectations. It is not surprising that, as shown in one study (Kim, Chiu, Kwak, Cho, & Au, 2006), European Americans tend to develop an autonomous self-view; they perceive themselves positively both from their own perspective and from their parents' perspective. In contrast, Asians tend to view their parents as discipli­ narians who set and enforce standards that have not yet been achieved. As a consequence, they tend to develop a contingent self-view; they have many more negative self-perceptions when they view themselves from the perspective of their parents than from their own perspectives. In another experiment (Kim et aI., 2006), Asian and European Americans looked at two faces displaying a neutral emotion. Half of the participants described an occasion on which they themselves had displayed the emotions (the self-priming condition), whereas the remaining ones described an occasion on which their parents had displayed the emotions (the parent priming condition). Next, all participants evaluated themselves using some personal adj ectives. In the self-priming condition, Asian Americans and European Americans evaluated themselves equally posi­ tively; in the parent priming condition, Asian Americans evaluated themselves more negatively than did European Americans (Kim et al. , 2006). In summary, in Asian contexts, taking an outside-in perspective can humble the self. How­ ever, with this practice the self may also risk losing its perceived independence to the overpowering authority of others' expectations.

Conclusion

The view of the self traditionally emerging from American social psychology, as composed of a variety of self-serving cognitive biases, is but one conceptualiza­ tion of the ego. Cross-cultural research in psychology has revealed an alterna­ tive to this Western model of the self that is rooted in East Asian cultures. Compared with its Western counterpart, the Eastern self is more inclusive of other people and of negative information and experience, which manifests in cross-cultural differences in the individual's self-definition and construction of

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well-being. To the extent that the Western self has been described as a meta­ phorically totalitarian or autocratic system, the Eastern self represents, by comparison, a more restrained or quiet ego. Both Western and Eastern selves likely entail distinct benefits (and li­ abilities) to the individual. Defensive responses to ego threat and a propensity for self-deceptive enhancement, for example, are drawbacks of the Western self and are less pervasive in the East. Conversely, the autonomy ofthe Eastern self may be overwhelmed by the expectations of others, an outcome that is unlikely in the West. Emphasizing inclusiveness-of others in the self-concept and of a broader array of affective experience-would offer one approach to counter­ ing some of the costs of (or "quieting") the Western ego. Redirecting attention from social conformance to collective agency-that is, people acting in concert to shape their future through interpersonal sensitivity, pooled understandings, and group aspirations-would give a voice to the quiet Eastern ego (Bandura, 2000).

References Bandura, A. (2000). Exercise of human agency through collective efficacy. Current Directions in

Psychological Science, 9, 75-78. Baumeister, R. F., Heatherton, T. F., & Tice, D. M. (1993). When ego threats lead to self-regulation failure: Negative consequences of high self-esteem. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychol­

ogy, 64, 141-156. Brockner, J., & Chen, Y. (1996). The moderating roles of self-esteem and self-construal in reaction to a threat to the self: Evidence from the People's Republic of China and the United States.

Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 71, 603-615. Brown, J. D., & Kobayashi, C. (2003). Self-enhancement in Japan and America. Asian Journal of Social Psychology, 5, 145-168. Chiu, C.-y', & Hong, Y.-Y. (2006). Social psychology of culture. New York: Psychology Press. Cohen, D., & Gunz, A. (2002). As seen by the other . . . : Perspectives on the self in the memories and emotional perceptions of Easterners and Westerners. Psychological Science, 13, 55-59. Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. Ameri­ can Psychologist, 35, 603-618. Heine, S. J. (2003). An exploration of cultural variation in self-enhancing and self-improving mo­ tivations. In V. Murphy-Berman & J. J. Berman (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on Motiuation (Vol. 49, pp. 102-128). Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. Heine, S. J., Kitayama, S., & Lehman, D. R. (2001). Cultural differences in self-evaluation: Japa­ nese readily accept negative self-relevant information. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 32, 434--44 3. Heine, S. J., Kitayama, S., Lehman, D. R. , Takata, T., Ide, E., Leung, C., & Matsumoto, H. (2001). Divergent consequences of success and failure in Japan and North America: An investigation of self-improving motivations and malleable selves. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychol­

ogy, 81, 599-615. Heine, S. J., Takata, T. , & Lehman, D. R. (2000). Beyond self-presentation: Evidence for self­ criticism among Japanese. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26, 71-78. Hernandez, M., & Iyengar, S. S. (2001). What drives whom? A cultural perspective on human agency. Social Cognition, 19, 269-294. Kim, Y.-H., Chiu, C.-Y. , Kwak, N. S., Cho, S., & Au, E. (2006). I am a good person, euen though

my parents do not think that way: The moderation effect of consistency motiuation on self­ enhancement. Unpublished manuscript. Kitayama, S., Markus, H. R., & Kurokawa, M. (2000). Culture, emotion, and well-being: Good feel­ ings in Japan and the United States. Cognition & Emotion, 14, 93-124.

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Lalwani, A K., Shavitt, S., & Johnson, T. (2006). What is the relation between cultural orienta­ tion and socially desirable responding? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90,

165-178. Markus, H. R., & Kitayama, S. (1991). Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224-253. Menon, T., Morris, M. w., Chiu, C . -Y. , & Hong, Y.-Y. (1999). Culture and the construal of agency: Attribution to individual versus group dispositions. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychol­

ogy, 76, 701-717. Oishi, S., & Diener, E. (2003). Culture and well-being: The cycle of action, evaluation and decision.

Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 939-949.

Ross, M., Heine, S. J., Wilson, A E., & Sugimori, S. (2005). Cross-cultural discrepancies in self­ appraisals. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31, 1175-1188. Sampson, E. E. (1977). Psychology and the American ideal. Journal of Personality and Social

Psychology, 35, 767-782. Sedikides, C . , Gaertner, L., & Toguchi, Y. (2003). Pancultural self-enhancement. Journal ofPerson­

ality and Social Psychology, 84, 60-79. Taylor, S. E . , & Brown, J. D. ( 1988). Illusion and well-being: A social psychological perspective on mental health. Psychological Bulletin, 103, 193-210. Taylor, S. E . , Lerner, J. S . , Sherman, D. K., Sage, R. M., & McDowell, N. K. (2003). Are self­ enhancing cognitions associated with healthy or unhealthy biological profiles? Journal of

Personality and Social Psychology, 85, 605-615. Triandis, H. C . (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. Psychological

Review, 96, 506-520. Triandis, H. C . , & Gelfand, M. J. (1998). Converging measurement of horizontal and vertical indi­ vidualism and collectivism. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 74, 118-128. Wagar, B. M., & Cohen, D. (2003). Culture, memory, and the self: An analysis of the personal and collective self in long-term memory. Journal ofExperimental Social Psychology, 39, 468-475. Wang, Y., Wiley, A, & Chiu, C.-Y. (in press). Independence-supportive praise versus interdepen­ dence-promoting praise. International Journal ofBehavioral Development. Wirtz, D., Chiu, C.-Y. , Diener, E., & Oishi, S. (2007). What constitutes a good life? Cultural differ­ ences in the role ofpositive and negative affect in subjective well-being. Manuscript submitted for publication.

15 The Collective and Compassionate Consequences of Downward Social Comparisons Heidi A. Wayment and Erin M. O'Mara

Compassion is the keen awareness of the interdependence of all things. -Thomas Merton

In line with the theme of this book, in this chapter we argue that the ability to quiet egoistic tendencies is related to the extent to which one can identify with others, especially less fortunate others. Identifying with others requires a shift away from self-preoccupation, and such a shift is at the heart of what is called compassion (Cassell, 2002). Compassion has been defined in many ways, from an emotion evoked by the suffering of others to a state of mind in which one senses the true condition of others. One of the key reasons why compassion and one's ability to identify with others are so inextricably linked is because such identification, especially with people who are suffering or less fortunate than oneself, makes one very aware of one's own fragility, vulnerability, and mortality. As Schopenhauer ( 1969) described, compassion brings with it the recognition that any perceived distinction between oneself and others is only a "fleeting, deceptive phenomenon" (p. 372). Social psychologists have long been interested in the concept of perceived similarity to others. It has figured prominently in the study of many social psychological phenomena, including attraction, friendship formation, person perception, and social comparison processes. The goal of this chapter is to ex­ amine how downward social comparison information, and identification with that information, may play a role in people's ability to connect with the feel­ ings of others and quiet their own otherwise egoistic or defensive reactions. We argue that when it comes to considering people's reactions to less fortunate others, the bulk of the literature on reactions to downward social comparison information has been primarily focused on ego-protective outcomes (i.e., self­ enhancement and self-protection), whereas the potential for such information to stimulate more collective and compassionate reactions has been largely overlooked.

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Egoistic Reactions to Downward Social Comparison Information

The social psychological literature describes two basic reactions to downward social comparison information: (a) contrast effects and (b) assimilation effects (Mussweiler, 2003). Both of these reactions are egoistic in nature. Contrast effects are characterized by heightened self-esteem or well-being after expo­ sure to information about a less fortunate other (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Hakmiller, 1966; Wills, 198 1 ; Wood, 1989), whereas assimilation effects are characterized by reductions in self-esteem or well-being that are associated with perceptions of increased vulnerability to a similar, negative outcome (Buunk, Taylor, Collins, VanYperen, & Dakof, 1990) and, often, self-protective behaviors (Lockwood, 2002). In this chapter, we do not wish to diminish the importance of ego-protective reactions in response to downward social com­ parison information. Ego-protective reactions to less fortunate others, such as self-enhancement, may be critical to sustaining one's motivation or sense of efficacy. Similarly, feeling threatened may allow an individual to take effec­ tive precautions against potential setbacks. Instead, we hold the philosophical position that optimal human functioning relies on the ability to adapt flexibly to different situations, and part of this flexibility may involve high ego involve­ ment (i.e., a "noisy" ego), whereas at other times optimal functioning requires low ego involvement (i.e., a quiet ego).

Collective Reactions to Downward Social Comparison Information

A closer review of the social psychology literature reveals that exposure to a less fortunate other has also been shown to make one's social identity and af­ filiative needs salient (Helgeson & Taylor, 1993; Ybema & Buunk, 1995). When perceived similarity with less fortunate others leads to increases in perceived vulnerability, individuals often report increases in interpersonal affection (Mikulincer, Florian, & Hirschberger, 2003) and a greater affinity toward one's ingroup (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Simon, 1994). Although the need for affiliation after threat may be self-serving (i.e., reduce personal anxiety; Schachter, 1959), forging a connection to other human beings is believed to be a most basic, powerful, and adaptive human motive (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), and seeking out such connections to others may have multiple positive effects. In fact, Helgeson and Mickelson ( 1995) found that, after experiencing or imag­ ining a negative event, participants reported that the goal of having a common bond was a more important evaluative motive than either self-enhancement or self-improvement. In their naturalistic study of social comparisons, Locke and Nekich (2000) found that whereas most social comparisons were focused on dis­ similarities leading to boosts to the self (e.g. , contrast effects), a large number were also focused on seeking a common bond, which generated feelings of con­ nectedness with close others. Empathy is often experimentally manipulated by increasing the degree of similarity between a perceiver and target (Batson et aL, 1995; Westmaas & Silver, 2006), thereby blurring self-other distinctions

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(Mussweiler, 2001; Stapel & Koomen, 2000) and reducing the psychological distance between a perceiver and target.

Testing an Integrative Model of Downward Social Comparison Processes

In this chapter, we present results from several studies. The theoretical ba­ sis for these studies was developed by Wayment (2004a), who proposed an integrative model of reactions to downward social comparison information; specifically, this model proposes that perceived similarity to a downward social comparison target would lead to self-enhancing and self-protective outcomes as well as collective and compassionate ones (see Figure 15. 1). Self-enhancing outcomes are defined as increases in well-being and self-esteem as typically as­ sessed in social comparison studies, and self-protective outcomes are defined as related to increases in perceived vulnerability and accompanying assimilation reactions described earlier in this chapter. A collective outcome is defined as one in which a person feels a common bond with the group, and compassionate responses involve thoughts and feelings arising out of connecting to and feel­ ing concern for others, such as sympathy, empathy, and the desire to help. The model posited the following: 1.

Perceived similarity t o a less fortunate other was hypothesized to be directly associated with greater well-being (i.e., a self-enhancing re­ sponse or contrast effect).

Assimilation Perceived

Well-Being

Vulnerability

Perceived Similarity to Less Fortunate Other

Self-protective and

..................................?�!!.:���.
Collective and CompaSSionate Outcomes

Common Bond

+

CompaSSionate Responses

Integrative model of downward social comparison processes. Pathways above the dashed line represent self-protective and self-enhancing reactions to down­ ward social comparison information and those below the dashed line represent collec­ tive and compassionate reactions. Figure 15.1.

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2.

3. 4.

Perceived similarity was hypothesized to be associated with increased personal vulnerability (i.e., a self-protective response) and with feeling a common bond (i.e., a collective response). Increases in personal vulnerability were expected to be associated with decrements in well-being (i.e. , an assimilation effect). Increases in common bond were expected to be associated with com­ passionate responses.

We had no expectation about the relationship between perceived vulnerability and common bond. On the one hand, one might expect that individuals who feel vulnerable might feel closer to their ingroup (i.e., the threat-affiliation response). On the other hand, those who feel a strong bond with others may feel less personally threatened, or those who feel threatened may be too pre­ occupied to see their connection with others. Thus, no prediction was made regarding these. Feeling a common bond was hypothesized to be associated with greater well-being. How personal vulnerability would be related to compassionate outcomes was less clear cut. Although personal vulnerability, characterized as self-focus and worry, could be associated with fewer compas­ sionate responses, it is equally plausible that some individuals would cope with personal vulnerability by shifting their attention away from the self and toward others, leading to a positive association between personal vulnerability and compassionate outcomes.

Examinations of the Integrative Model Wayment (2004a) first tested the hypothesized model in a sample of data collected after the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Wayment, 2004a). Two latent out­ comes variables were created: (a) well-being (i.e . , self-esteem, well-being, and depression [reversedD and (b) compassionate outcomes (i.e., sympathy, empathy, and a desire to help). As expected, perceived similarity to the at­ tack victims was associated with well-being (i.e., a self-enhancing reaction) and with both increased personal vulnerability (i.e., a self-protective reac­ tion) to experiencing a similar outcome and feeling a common bond with all Americans (i.e . , a collective effect). Perceived vulnerability was associated with reductions in self-esteem (i.e., an assimilation effect), and feeling a common bond was associated with compassionate outcomes. The results from this study were largely in line with expectations and demonstrated that per­ ceived similarity to less fortunate others was associated with self-enhancing, self-protective, collective, and compassionate outcomes. However, the unique nature of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the threat of future attacks, and the perception that all Americans were under attack are likely to have inflated the observed effects and relationships. Thus, subsequent laboratory studies were conducted with more traditional (and mundane) examples of downward social comparison information. The goal of the three laboratory studies (see Wayment, 2004a, 2006) that have been completed to date was to examine the model relationships and to examine whether specific individual-difference variables moderated the strength of these relationships.

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The Impact of Trait Self-Construal In the first laboratory study (O'Mara, 2005) that used a method from Lockwood (2002), 1st-year undergraduate students read a narrative, ostensibly written by a college student, that explained in some detail why he or she was having difficulties in adjusting to college or getting a job after college. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two experimental groups: (a) a feared-self condition and (b) a control condition. Participants in the feared-self condition (Markus & Nurius, 1986) were asked to describe how a similar situation could befall them. Students who successfully created a feared self reported greater similarity to the target, greater personal vulnerability, and a greater sense of a common bond after reading the student's story than did participants in the control condition. These results confirmed the expectation that high identifi­ cation with a downward social comparison target is related to both personal vulnerability and feeling a common bond, but perhaps even more important, it highlights that people need time and an occasion to forge a sense of similarity with a less fortunate other. The results from the 9/11 study (Wayment, 2004a) seemed to clearly indi­ cate that the nature of the 9/11 attacks made people's collective self-identities salient, and so it was hypothesized that the salience of collective self-identity would make collective and compassionate reactions to less fortunate others more likely (see chap. 12, this volume, for a discussion of self-construals). Thus, O'Mara (2005) examined whether trait differences in self-construal (i.e., vertical individualism vs. horizontal collectivism, the most extreme forms of these two traits) would affect the hypothesized model relationships. Among participants in the feared-self condition, vertical individualism and horizontal collectivism were not correlated (-.09), suggesting that they are relatively or­ thogonal constructs and may coexist within the same person and be activated at different times or in different circumstances (Brewer, 1996). Participants with higher scores in vertical individualism felt more similar to the target and reported greater personal vulnerability and lower well-being and reported fewer compassionate reactions, and participants higher in horizontal collectiv­ ism reported more of a common bond, greater well-being, and more compas­ sionate reactions. The results from this study suggest that when one can forge a connection with a less fortunate other, then an increased sense of similarity, personal vulnerability, and sense of connection may result. Furthermore, self­ construal appeared to moderate these effects: Participants with a greater col­ lective self-construal were more likely to report collective and compassionate outcomes, whereas those with a more individualistic self-construal seemed to feel more personally vulnerable and reacted with lower well-being and less compassionate reactions.

The Impact of Self-Compassion and Wisdom The goal of the second laboratory study (Wayment, 2006) was to explore whether two individual-difference variables, self-compassion and wisdom, would lead to outcomes similar to those found for collective self-construal.

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Wayment (2006) reasoned that individuals who reported higher levels of wis­ dom (see chap. 20, this volume) and self-compassion (see chap. 9, this volume) would be more able to respond to information about a less fortunate other with more collective and compassionate reactions; that is, would individuals higher in wisdom or higher in self-compassion report higher well-being, feeling a common bond and more compassionate reactions after reading about a less fortunate other? Also, would individuals higher in wisdom or self-compassion react less defensively and report lower personal vulnerability? The predic­ tions among this sample (n = 58) were largely supported. Wisdom and self­ compassion were moderately correlated (r = .50, p < .0001), and median splits were performed on both variables. The results for both variables were similar: Mter reading about a struggling college student, participants who were higher in wisdom or self-compassion reported lower levels of personal vulnerability, greater levels of feeling a common bond, and higher levels of college adjust­ ment than participants who were lower in wisdom or self-compassion. There were no main effect differences for wisdom or self-compassion on the variable of perceived similarity or the willingness to help. In addition, the pattern of correlations for the model variables was similar to those reported in Wayment (2004a): Perceived similarity was related to both perceived vulnerability and feeling a common bond. Perceived vulnerability was related to reductions in college adjustment, whereas feeling a common bond was related to more compassionate behaviors (e.g. , a willingness to help) and greater college adjustment.

The Impact of Autonomy In a third laboratory study, Wayment (2006) explored the effect of autonomy and control motivation on the relationships among the model variables. Hodgins and Knee (2002) proposed that the ability to experience ongoing events without defensiveness is, in part, a function of the autonomy, control, and impersonal motivation orientations as described by self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Hodgins effectively argues in chapter 11 of this volume that autonomy allows individuals to approach ongoing experience in a more open and less defensive way. When individuals act on the basis of au­ tonomous motives, they are less likely to defend or distort unwanted informa­ tion or cling to self-enhancing information. In contrast, control motivation is characterized by self-protection in response to perceived threat. In this study (n 6 1), college participants were randomly assigned to one of three conditions in which either autonomous motivation, control motivation, or no motivation was primed (Bargh, Chaiken, Raymond, & Hymes, 1996). Next, participants read about a downward social comparison target and, to increase perceptions of similarity and vulnerability, were all given time to describe how a similar situ­ ation could happen to them (i.e., the feared-self condition). Next, participants rated perceptions of similarity, vulnerability, sense of common bond, college adjustment, and empathy toward the target. The predictions were straightfor­ ward. We expected that individuals acting from a sense of control motivation would be more threatened and more likely to act in a defensive way than those =

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motivated by autonomy concerns. Individuals whose sense of autonomy was primed reported greater college adjustment, whereas those who were primed with a control motivation reported greater similarity to the target and greater perceived vulnerability. These results suggest that the priming manipulation was successful. Wayment (2006) next looked at the patterns of correlations among the model variables in all three conditions. In the no-motivation condition, per­ ceived similarity was strongly related to feeling personally vulnerable and, in tum, feeling personally vulnerable was associated with lower college ad­ justment (Le., an assimilation effect). Perceived similarity was marginally positively associated with feeling a common bond with other college students (Le., a collective response). In turn, feeling a common bond with other college students was associated with both greater empathy and college adjustment. As in the 9/11 study (Study 1; Wayment 2004a)-but not Study 2 (O'Mara, 2005)-participants who reported feeling greater personal vulnerability also reported more empathy. Thus, overall, support for the integrative model was found in the group that was not primed with a motivation and was similar to findings in Study 1 (Wayment, 2004a), Study 2 (O'Mara, 2005), and Study 3 (Wayment, 2006) and two previous laboratory studies. The patterns of correlations in the groups primed with autonomy mo­ tivation and with control motivation showed some interesting differences that provided general support for the predictions. In the group primed with autonomy motivation, the relationship between perceived similarity and feeling a common bond was significantly more positive than in either the no­ motivation or control-motivation conditions, and feeling a common bond was strongly related to reporting lower perceived vulnerability. Although the re­ lationship between perceived similarity and personal vulnerability was posi­ tive, it was not nearly as high as it was in the other two conditions. Taken together, these results support the idea that, for autonomously motivated individuals, perceived similarity was more strongly related to collective out­ comes instead of self-protective outcomes when those individuals were react­ ing to a less fortunate other. The pattern of correlations among participants primed with a control motivation was largely similar to that found in the participants primed with no motivation or with autonomy motivation, with two important differences, namely, that perceived similarity and personal vulnerability were strongly and negatively related to empathy. The results from this study offer tentative support that autonomy motivation may allow one to react less defensively to a less fortunate other by reducing the sense of personal vulnerability, whereas a control orientation may lead to a more defensive reaction by increasing one's sense of self-protection and reducing empathy.

Concluding Remarks

Hundreds of studies illustrate the types of ego-protecting motives served by downward social comparison information, such as self-enhancement (Wills, 1981; see also chap. 4, this volume), self-improvement (Taylor & Lobel, 1990),

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and self-protection (Lockwood, 2002; Markman & McMullen, 2003). The re­ sults from the studies we have described in this chapter suggest that collec­ tive and compassionate reactions ought also be considered as consequences of comparing oneself with, and identifying with, a downward social comparison target. Furthermore, although acknowledgment of one's similarity to a less fortunate other may feel distressing or awaken a sense of personal vulner­ ability, there may be a silver lining-a sense of connection to others, increased compassion, and thus the quieting of the ego. For downward social comparison information to have any kind of impact (i.e. , positive or negative), an individual has to notice less fortunate others and forge a sense of similarity to those individuals. It may be that individuals with different goal orientations or motivations (see chaps. 6 and 13) or those with greater self-awareness (see Part II) may be more likely to see a connec­ tion between themselves and less fortunate others precisely because they are personally motivated to quiet the ego. In the studies we have discussed in this chapter, participants either had (Wayment, 2004a) or were given the opportunity and asked to forge a sense of similarity to a less fortunate other (O'Mara, 2005; Wayment, 2006). In contrast, questionnaire studies assessing the relative frequency with which people report using downward social comparison information have found that downward social comparison information is reported as the least used form of self-evaluative information (Wayment, 1992; Wayment & Taylor, 1995; Wheeler & Miyake, 1992). Given the likelihood that identifying with a less fortunate other may lead to distressing thoughts and emotions, this avoidance of downward social comparison information for some individuals is perhaps understandable. However, there are times when downward social comparison information

is unavoidable and contemplating downward social comparison information may be a pathway to transcending self-interest and a quieter ego. Misfortune, whether it is among friends, family, or presented by the media in great detail (Wayment, 2004b), may strike close to home. Examples of people who are suf­ fering and less fortunate are always nearby. When one contemplates how one is similar to people who are suffering, one blurs the distinctions between self and others and begins to see the interdependence among all things, and one is closer to becoming a compassionate human being. If one is young, one might realize that one will grow old. If one is healthy, one may also be aware that one could become sick. If one has enough money and material goods, one can remember when one had less or imagine that it is possible to have less in the future. Acknowledgment and awareness of one's human vulnerability are, in a sense, dealing with loss-the loss of one's illusion of invulnerability. As with other losses, this experience has the potential to transform a person, help one make meaning of one's life, and lead one to acts of kindness and generosity (Harvey, 200 1). We should also note that there are negative consequences of identifying with less fortunate others and, for some individuals, in some situations, there could be debilitating consequences. One particularly tragic example is that of Army Specialist Alyssa Peterson, a young woman from Flagstaff, Arizona, and a graduate of Northern Arizona University with a degree in psychology. From

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all accounts, Ms. Peterson was an intelligent, gifted, and compassionate person with a skill for language and an interest in serving her country. After graduat­ ing from college, Ms. Peterson joined the Army, learned Arabic, and was sent to Iraq-a bit earlier than scheduled, because she volunteered to take the place of someone who did not want to go. Because of her language skills, she was able to communicate with the Iraqis, something that brought her pleasure. Just after her arrival in Iraq, Ms. Peterson was assigned to the prison in Tal-Mar, in northwestern Iraq. According to news reports, Ms. Peterson objected to the interrogation techniques used on the prisoners and refused to participate after only 2 nights of working in the unit known as the "cage." Days later, she was officially reprimanded by the Army for "identifying too closely" with the Iraqi detainees and showing them empathy. In the specific situation she was in, Ms. Peterson's ability to identify with the Iraqis, which likely was heightened be­ cause of her ability to speak their language, was not valued by her supervisors and left her highly distressed. She told her fellow soldiers that she was unable to separate being an interrogator from who she was as a person. Although there may have been other possible reasons for her suicide, Ms. Peterson's empathic and compassionate stance is believed to be a possible reason for her suicide, 25 days after her arrival in Iraq (Hendricks, 2007). Ms. Peterson's experience not only is tragic but also underscores how the pain of identifying with others may indeed be great, and it may help explain why a quieted ego may not necessar­ ily be associated with Western conceptualizations of happiness (see chap. 18, this volume). Over the past few decades, the focus of downward social comparison re­ search has been on the effects of such information on egoistic goals such as self­ enhancement and self-protection. We suggest that this focus may lead people to overlook some of the important consequences of identifying with less fortunate others. Identifying with others can remind one of one's humanity and awaken within one a capacity for compassion and, in so doing, quiet one's ego.

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16 Collective Angst: How Threats to the Future Vitality of the Ingroup Shape Intergroup Emotion Michael J. A. Wahl and Nyla

R.

Branscombe

When people perceive a threat to the self, they have a tendency to respond with negative emotions. Which specific negative emotion will predominate depends on the nature of the threat and how it is interpreted. Feelings of angst will emerge when a person experiences an intense concern that something nega­ tive will befall the self in the future (Barlow, 1988). According to social iden­ tity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), people can define themselves at either the personal level or the social identity level. When an important social identity is salient, the individual comes to think, feel, and act on the basis of his or her membership in that social group-to the extent that he or she has internalized that group membership as an aspect of the self. In line with social identity theory, we argue in this chapter that angst can be experienced not only at the level of the personal self but also as a result of perceived threats to a group to which one belongs. We focus on people's emotional responses when they perceive threats to the future of their ingroup; that is, when people respond to threat with collective angst. Although the study of emotion has traditionally been examined at the level of the personal self, group researchers have begun to illustrate how some important emotions are dependent on a different aspect of the self being sa­ lient: the social self (Smith, 1993; Wohl, Branscombe, & Klar, 2006). Whereas other chapters in this volume examine the self at the level of personal identity and explore means of transcending egoistic responses to threat, we explore the social self and the emotional response of collective angst as a response to threat experienced at the group level. We begin by considering the antecedent conditions that elicit collective angst; specifically, we examine the impact of threats to group distinctiveness in the present, as well as reminders of ingroup victimization in the past, for the experience of collective angst. We then turn to the potential social consequences that can stem from the experience of collec­ tive angst. We argue that reminders of historical victimization initiate ingroup defensive responses that result in group-level egoistic tendencies. Attention This research was supported by a grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (410-2005-1140) to Michael J. A. Wohl.

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is then directed toward possible means of quieting these group-level egoistic tendencies, in particular, mechanisms that may reduce collective angst. We provide empirical evidence that illustrates the impact offeeling collective angst on group members' desire to protect ingroup interests and how shifts in level of categorization can facilitate prosocial intergroup relations.

Individual and Collective Angst

Feelings of fear and worry are unpleasant. We consider angst to be in this general family of emotion, which is characterized by feelings of apprehension in situations that are perceived to be threatening (R. F. Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996). Most theorists agree that anxiety can be distinguished from fear, which is characterized by an immediate surge in arousal and an activation of the fight-or-flight response when confronted with a threatening situation (Gray, 1982). Anxiety, in contrast, is typically less intense and stems from a sense of uncertainty, concern for what might happen in the future, and lack of predictability. The uncertainty that results in anxiety is future oriented in that it is attuned to prospective threats, dangers, or other possible negative events (Barlow, 1991). Such anxiety is often nonspecific in terms of when, what, and how a terrible thing might befall the self, coupled with certainty that it will happen eventually. This form of anxiety is often termed angst, whereby the individual exhibits self-focused worry concerning perceived possible threat­ related outcomes (see Barlow, 1988; Rank, 1909/1914; Sartre, 1956). To experience collective angst, group members must appraise a situation as potentially harmful to the future of the ingroup (Le., the perception that the threat, if realized, will undermine the vitality of the ingroup). Because of the future orientation of collective angst, the threat, if realized, may be quite removed from the group member's current lived experience. For example, the Quebecois may feel collective angst about the future of the French Canadian culture because of the pervasive influence of English Canadian and American culture. Indeed, the Quebecois are keenly aware of the decline in the use of French among francophones (A. Baumeister, 2003) and the rise of "mixed" marriages (O'Donnell, 2001). Should group members extrapolate this situa­ tion over subsequent generations, French Canadian culture might easily be perceived as likely to be compromised in the future (see Bourhis, 1994, and Thomson, 1995, for discussions of ethnolinguistic vitality and the future of French Canadian culture). The ultimately feared outcome, in which one's cul­ tural identity is seen as likely to be lost, might not reach a critical threshold for generations. Nonetheless, because the group is an extension of the self, when group members feel the future vitality of their group is in danger, collective angst will be experienced. The consequences of collective angst among some French Canadians was elucidated in the early part of 2007, when the small town of Herouxville in the Canadian province of Quebec adopted a declaration of "norms" designed to force immigrants to conform to French Canadian values and traditions ("Her­ ouxville wants," 2007). The declaration forbids people from wearing ceremonial religious daggers (e.g. , kirpans worn by some Sikhs) and wearing coverings

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over the face (e.g. , hijabs worn by some Muslims). It is interesting that, at present, the population of Herouxville is exclusively French Canadian (The Canadian Islamic Congress, 2007). For this reason, the community cannot be seen as experiencing an immediate threat to their cultural identity. Nonethe­ less, a perceived threat to the future vitality of the values and traditions of the community could well be experienced, even though immediacy is lacking. It is not surprising that threat to the ingroup's identity is a central ex­ planatory concept in theories addressing intergroup attitudes and behavior (see Brewer, 1999; Stephan & Stephan, 2000; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Threat is important because it can have a tremendous impact on the ingroup's social identity-its goals, values, status, and its very existence. As such, when threat­ ened, group members tend to engage in behaviors in defense of the ingroup. Within the context of the present volume, such defensive responses can be conceptualized as resulting from a "noisy" collective ego. We argue that collec­ tive angst is an emotional reaction to perceived realistic or symbolic future­ oriented threats to the group as a whole. Indeed, Stephan and Stephan ( 1996) offered the threat of group extinction as an extreme instance of realistic threat (e.g., through warfare, genocide). Similarly, symbolic threats can challenge a group's value structure and worldview. As Allport ( 1954) noted, "In a deep sense, we are the values that we hold" (p. 74). When the values of the ingroup are perceived as potentially slipping away, it is likely that collective angst will be experienced.

Empirical Evidence of Collective-Angst Antecedents

We consider the available empirical studies that illustrate the psychological factors that are necessary for evoking collective angst. We argue that the ex­ perience of collective angst rests on two antecedent conditions: the presence of a threat to distinctiveness and reminders of how the ingroup was victimized in the past. When people are confronted with such distinctiveness threats and their group's historical victimization is salient, collective angst is most likely to be experienced.

Identity Distinctiveness and Collective Angst Threats that elicit collective angst often stem from various forms of social change involving demographic, organizational, ideological, and environmental shifts that can dramatically alter the social environment (Breakwell, 1986). Examples of these stressors include economic instability and poverty (e.g., globalization, inflation), rapid political change and instability (e.g. , oppression, exclusion), and a variety of social changes that fall under the broad umbrella of modernization (e.g., urbanization, secularism, consumerism; Ashmore, Jussim, Wilder, & Heppen, 200 1). These threats may take a material (i.e., economic and political) or symbolic (i.e. , modern ideals displacing traditional values) form. For example, immigrant parents may experience concern that the traditional values of their group will fade or disappear in subsequent generations as a

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result of pressures (and possibly threats) from the resident culture. In essence, the collective ego becomes active in defense of perceived blurring or elimination of the lines that differentiate what is "us" from what is "them." According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), group mem­ bers are motivated to differentiate the ingroup from other salient groups to achieve a positive social identity. This becomes increasingly difficult, and particularity threatening, when the demarcations between the ingroup and various outgroups are blurred. Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje ( 1999) described this as a threat to group distinctiveness. In situations in which intergroup distinctiveness is reduced-and ingroup identity thereby threatened-people use strategies of differentiation to regain distinctiveness (Jetten, Spears, & Postmes, 2004). We argue that distinctiveness threats need not be limited to those occurring to the group in the present; instead, group members may project a perceived threat into the future. For example, Jewish parents may not be concerned with the vitality of their community at present, but they may be concerned that their children will not follow the group's tradi­ tions when they are older and thus weaken the group as a whole in the future. Although distinctiveness may not currently be a concern, the parents may still worry about how distinct from non-Jews their children and their children's children will be eventually. Wohl, Bookalam, and Branscombe (2006) tested the idea that distinctive­ ness threat can elicit feelings of collective angst and hypothesized that threats to the future distinctiveness of the ingroup would elicit more collective angst than other types of threat to a positive social identity. In this research, Carle­ ton University students who lived in on-campus housing and who highly iden­ tified with the house (i.e., residence hall) in which they resided were presented with a news release that ostensibly had been issued by the university's Board

of Governors. Participants were told that the Board of Governors had dis­ cussed potential changes to the residences on campus. In the distinctiveness­ threat condition, participants were told that there was a desire on the part of the board to eliminate the unique cultures that have developed in each house (e.g. , Dundas House, Storemont House) and replace it with a residencewide identity and that, as a consequence, the current distinct residence system would be replaced with one large housing unit called Carleton University Housing. Participants in this condition were also told that all house-specific murals (it is an honored tradition for each house, at the end of the year, to paint a mural in the tunnels connecting the various buildings on campus) would be removed, as would all house-specific memorabilia. In contrast, in the identity-threat condition, participants were told that the Board of Governors was not happy with the behaviors in campus housing-that it was believed there was currently a culture of hooliganism. Reports were cited detailing the lower than average grade point average of students living on campus and indicating that this lack of "smarts" might be contributing to the delinquency. In this case, the future of the group was not at stake, but the value of the group was questioned (Wohl, Bookalam, & Branscombe, 2006). In the no-threat, control condition, participants were simply told of upcom­ ing events that would take place in campus housing. After the experimental manipulation, participants completed a scale assessing collective angst. Will-

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ingness to undertake collective action also was assessed. Participants were told that the president of the student union was looking for volunteers to help in a rally for various residence houses. Participants were asked if they would like to participate in such a rally, with those who voiced a desire to help with the protest providing their name and contact information (Wohl, Bookalam, & Branscombe, 2006). The results showed that threat to group distinctiveness (i.e., distinctiveness­ threat condition) elicited greater collective angst (M 4.22, SD = 0 83) than either the threat to identity value (i.e., identity-threat condition; M 3.53, SD 0.80) or the control condition (M = 2.86, SD 0.55, ps < 05; Wohl, Booka­ lam, & Branscombe, 2006). Furthermore, the distinctiveness threat prompted students to want to take part in a rally for the residence houses more than the identity-threat condition or no threat at all. The students reliably differed across conditions in the assistance given to the student-union-run protest campaign, X2(2, N 49) 12.92, p .002. Whereas 18.4% of students in the distinctiveness-threat condition offered to assist the student union, only 6 . 1% offered their assistance in the identity-threat condition, and no one in the no­ threat condition offered their assistance. Thus, threat to group distinctiveness plays an important role in eliciting collective angst, and willingness to engage in collective action can stem from feelings of collective angst. =

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Historical Victimization and Collective Angst Wrongs committed against members of one's group in the past can evoke emotional responses that are as intense as those for harm committed more recently (Branscombe, Doosje, & McGarty, 2002). In fact, personally experienc­ ing the harm done is not necessary for emotion to occur; psychological effects among group members not directly affected are similar to those observed among individuals who experienced the harm directly (Wayment, 2004). In­ deed, children of Holocaust survivors exhibit increased vulnerability to post­ traumatic stress disorder, including its neurochemical correlates (Yehuda et aI., 2000), with such stress responses lasting beyond two generations (Klein­ Parker, 1988). We argue that the effects of historical victimization may not only influence perceptions of the present but also create a biased perception of the future. When historical victimization is salient, group members may become vigilant for cues or stimuli in the present that are consistent with the social context that facilitated the earlier victimization. As Kelman ( 1992) stated, "A people that, within its recent memory, has come close to annihilation finds it easy to imagine that it may again be subject to a similar threat" (p. 34). In other words, the saliency of past victimization is likely to result in increased sensitiv­ ity to the possibility of future victimization. Wohl, McVicar, and Branscombe (2006, Study 1) documented the effects of historical threat on collective angst in a survey of Jewish people (N 99). They first asked participants to write a short paragraph about the impact the Holocaust has had on the Jewish community. As a measure of collective angst, participants then indicated the likelihood that an event similar to the Holocaust would happen once again (e.g. , "I am worried about the future vi=

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tality of the Jewish people," "I am distressed by the possible disappearance of Judaism") and responded to items that assessed ingroup-protective strategies (e.g. , "I want to send my children to Jewish private school," "I am an active member of the Jewish community"). The authors hypothesized that the extent to which a group perceives that a Holocaust-like event may once again occur at some unforeseen time in the future would lead Jewish people to take action to protect the group. Moreover, they argued that collective angst would medi­ ate this relationship. As predicted, perceived likelihood that a Holocaust-like event could occur once again significantly predicted feelings of collective angst, � 0.22, t(98) 2.23, p .02, and desire to engage in strategies to protect the ingroup, � 0.22, t(98) 2.22, p .03. When Jewish people felt that an event similar to the Holocaust would happen in the future, they felt intense concern for the future vitality of the ingroup and were motivated to protect the group from this expected negative future event. Wohl, McVicar, and Branscombe (2006) then assessed the potential me­ diating influence of collective angst on protective behaviors using Baron and Kenny's ( 1986) test for mediation. They regressed ingroup-protective responses onto both perceived vulnerability to a Holocaust-like event and collective angst. The coefficient associated with collective angst was significant, � 0.34, t(98) 3.61, p < .00 1; however, the coefficient associated with vulnerability to a Holocaust-like event was no longer significant, � 0.14, t(99) 1 .48, p . . . . . . . . . . 14. Thus, perceived likelihood of future victimization propels group members to act in ways that protect their group's interests-to the extent that they feel collective angst. To test the effect of historical victimization on collective angst and ingroup­ protective behavior, Wohl, McVicar, and Branscombe (2006, Study 2) ma­ nipulated historical victimization salience among Jewish people; specifically, Jewish Canadians (N 42) either were asked to write about the impact the Ho­ locaust has had on the Jewish community or were given no such writing task. Participants then completed the same measures as those in Study 1 (collec­ tive angst and ingroup-protective behavior). As expected, Jewish participants experienced more collective angst when reminded of the ingroup's historical victimization (M 3.36, SD 0.58) than when no such reminder was given (M 2.82, SD 0.59), F( l, 40) 8.88, p .005. Likewise, participants expressed a greater desire to engage in ingroup-protective behavior in the historical­ victimization condition (M 3.60, SD 0.57) than in the no-reminder condi­ tion (M = 3. 13, SD 0.69), F( l, 40) 5.95, p .02. Using Baron and Kenny's ( 1986) procedure for testing mediation, the authors again found that collective angst mediated the effect of the historical-victimization reminder on ingroup­ protective behavior. When ingroup-protective behavior was regressed onto both the historical-victimization reminder variable and collective angst simultane­ ously, the coefficient associated with collective angst remained significant, � = 0.42, t(40) 2.76, p = .009, whereas the Holocaust reminder manipulation was no longer significant, � = 0. 18, t(40) = 1.21, p = .24. Thus, reminders of one's group's past victimization can heighten anxiety about the future of the group and lead to ingroup protection (see also Kel­ man, 1992). Indeed, reminders of past victimization may strengthen ingroup resolve to do what it takes to secure the group's future. A potential negative =

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consequence of historical-victimization reminders, however, is that by elicit­ ing collective angst the stage may be set for bias in the processing of current information. To test this idea, we (Wohl & Branscombe, in press) first either reminded Jewish people of the Holocaust or did not give them such a reminder. We then assessed responsibility for the current Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Jews who had been reminded of their past victimization were less likely to accept responsibility for the current conflict than were those who had not re­ ceived such a reminder. Furthermore, in the reminder condition, the actions of the Israeli government were legitimized by attributing the current conflict to acts of terrorism committed by Palestinians. Thus, appraisals of the current social context are likely to be biased-greater attribution of sinister intentions behind a new outgroup's actions-when the ingroup's own historical victimiza­ tion is salient. We next turn to the conditions that can reduce collective angst and thereby quiet the collective ego.

Strategies for Reducing Collective Angst

Collective angst can be characterized as a distressing intergroup emotion, given that perceived uncertainty regarding the future of the ingroup is experi­ enced as threat. In an attempt to cope with feelings of collective angst, group members may engage in ingroup-protective behaviors, including engaging in ingroup-specific activities, conscious attempts to pass along the traditions and values of the group to subsequent generations, and donating money to causes that serve the ingroup's interests. Through active engagement in such behaviors, group members may perceive themselves as helping to secure the future of the group. Given that lack of perceived control is a crucial antecedent of anxiety (Barlow, 1988), attempts to regain control should reduce collective angst and thus ease the concerns of the collective ego. Indeed, group members may proactively try to lessen the experienced angst by promoting attachment to the ingroup's goals, values, and traditions. In this way, group members exert some control over the future by protecting and enhancing the group's present. We argue, as others have (e.g. , Rodin, 1986), that perceptions of control are essential for feelings of security as well as health and well-being. If control is achieved (or simply perceived), then egoistic balance can be gained, and the door may be open for more positive intergroup relations. Keeping group-level egoistic tendencies at bay is not, however, an easy task. The mere presence of another group with different values and traditions can pose a significant threat to the ingroup's worldview (Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000). Contact with other groups may stimulate ingroup members to glorify the group by vanquishing outgroups that are perceived to pose a threat to the future vitality of the ingroup. However, intergroup conflict is not the only means of protecting the future of the group-indeed, the vitality of the ingroup can be also maintained by promoting ingroup goals, values, and traditions to subsequent generations in a prosocial manner. Investing time and money in the community can heighten ingroup attachment (i.e., involvement in group traditions) without the negative consequences that result from ingroup glo­ rification (see Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). Should such investment in the

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ingroup occur, the vitality of the group may be enhanced and collective angst may be reduced. Another possible means of reducing collective angst may involve shifting self-categorization from the social identity level to a more inclusive group. According to selfcategorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Weth­ erell, 1987), at increasing levels of category abstraction some intergroup emo­ tions that would be felt at lower levels of categorization may be less likely to be experienced. In a series of studies, we (Wohl & Branscombe, 2005) assessed the impact of shifting levels of self-categorization from the social level to the human level for expectations that contemporary Germans should feel collective guilt about the harm done to the ingroup (i.e., Jews) by Nazi Germany; specifi­ cally, Jewish respondents were asked to think about their history of victimiza­ tion by Germans (i.e., the Holocaust) or those same atrocities framed more inclusively as actions that humans have committed against other humans. We hypothesized, and found, that shifting the level of categorization to greater in­ clusion reduced the amount of guilt assigned to Germans. We suggest that the same increasing inclusiveness process may lower vigilance for threat, which is at the heart of collective angst. Taken together, this evidence suggests that collective angst may be allevi­ ated by recategorizing the ingroup as part of a more inclusive superordinate group. In doing so, the collective ego may be quieted when all people are in­ cluded as a common unit. It may be, however, that group members-especially those who are strongly identified with their social group-will be relatively unwilling to self-categorize at more inclusive levels (which might be seen as including the threatening outgroup); that is, the collective ego may rebuff attempts at altering its frame of reference. Indeed, highly identified group members may perceive such inclusion as a threat to ingroup distinctiveness (see Jetten et aI., 2004). Consequently, to re-establish positive and distinc­ tive group identities, members of such groups could react negatively to each other (Deschamps & Brown, 1983). For example, Hornsey and Hogg (2000) found that, within a university context, there was increased threat when common university membership was emphasized between humanities stu­ dents and math and science students than when conditions emphasized their separate group identities. To counteract this potential spur to collective ego defensiveness, it may be necessary to maintain the group's social identity, while facilitating a common superordinate identity (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Hewstone, 1996). Therefore, recategorization should be most effective at quieting the collective ego when it takes the form of a dual identity in which superordinate and subgroup identities are both salient. In effect, recategoriza­ tion under these conditions will allow people to maintain their separate group identities while accepting a new group identity that is more inclusive. This group-within-a-group frame may be particularly effective because it permits the benefits of a common ingroup identity to operate without arousing coun­ tervailing motivations to achieve positive subgroup distinctiveness. Moreover, this type of recategorization may be particularly effective when people identify strongly with their original groups. Within the context of the Palestinian­ Israeli conflict, for example, collective angst may be reduced to the extent that group identities are maintained while promoting a common Semitic or Middle

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Eastern ancestry. Doing so may not only improve intergroup relations but also contribute to social adjustment, psychological adaptation, and overall well­ being (see LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993)-in sum, lead to a quiet collective ego.

Conclusion

We began this chapter by arguing that appraising a situation as potentially harmful for the ingroup's future-either because of reminders of past in­ group victimization or because of contemporary threat to ingroup distinctive­ ness-can elicit feelings of collective angst. The research we and our colleagues have conducted thus far illustrates how perceived threat to the ingroup, both historical and contemporary, can affect subsequent generations and how a perceived lack of interest in preserving the traditions and culture of the in­ group (i.e., because of younger group members' attempts to assimilate) affects ingroup-protective actions, with collective angst as the emotional mediator. For example, we showed that feeling collective angst predicts the desire to transfer ingroup traditions and values to subsequent generations among Jewish Cana­ dians. We suggest that such protective actions may lessen collective angst by allowing for the maintenance of ingroup distinctiveness. Categorizing in more inclusive terms-at the human level, for exam­ ple-may also lessen collective angst by lowering the perceived threat of an outgroup. Superordinate categorization, however, may be difficult to induce among highly identified group members because such a blurring of category distinctions may threaten group distinctiveness. A more promising way to reduce collective angst may be to promote a dual identity whereby group mem­ bers can maintain their ingroup identities while accepting a new, inclusive group identity. As Allport ( 1954) discussed, simply bringing people together without regard for group differences may not be effective in reducing inter­ group tensions (i.e., group-relevant egoistic tendencies). By creating subgroups within a team, so to speak, individuals can simultaneously perceive themselves as sharing a group membership with former outgroup members on a more in­ clusive level and maintain their membership in their original ingroup on a less inclusive level (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Doing so may reduce collective angst and thereby promote more positive intergroup relations.

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17 Beyond the Individualistic Self: A Framework for Prosocial Motives and Judgments M. Audrey Korsgaard and Bruce M. Meglino The existence of other-interest as motive distinct from self-interest has long been debated in psychology (Cropanzano, Stein, & Goldman, 2007). Although many scholars acknowledge that social motives, such as the need for belong­ ingness (Brewer, 2004) and empathy (Batson et aI., 1991), are distinct from self-interest, others have also questioned whether the observed effects of such variables might not be simply explained by self-interest (e.g., Maner et aI., 2002). In our view, these criticisms fail to consider the potential differences in judgment processes associated with self- versus other-oriented motivation, leading to post hoc explanations that assume that all such activities are based on rational self-interest. In this chapter, we advance a theory that examines both the motives and the underlying judgment processes associated with self­ and other-interest. This debate has particular resonance in the organizational sciences, be­ cause most theories in this field assume that persons will use some form of rationality or utility maximization in the pursuit of their self-interest goals (Mellers, Schwartz, & Cooke, 1998). The approach we take challenges the as­ sumptions of uniform rationality and universal self-interest; specifically, build­ ing on the theory of other orientation (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2004, 2006), we present a new framework of prosocial motives and judgments that delineates modes of behavior based on the configuration of self- versus other-interest and the extent to which the behavior reflects a rational or heuristic process. Because both self-interest and rational judgment are pervasive assumptions in theories of attitudes and behavior in the organizational sciences, this theory has important implications for research on a broad range of phenomena. In this chapter, we first examine the origin and nature of other orientation, addressing why other orientation reflects both a distinct motive and judgment process. Second, we more closely examine the distinction between self- and other-motives and rational versus heuristic processes. Finally, we discuss the broader implications of other orientation.

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Origins and Nature of Other Orientation

We define other orientation as the dispositional tendency to be concerned with and helpful to other persons. In addition, our view of other orientation is that it encompasses both a motivational orientation-other-interest-and an underlying judgment process: a tendency to rely on heuristic processing. To understand the nature of other orientation as reflecting a distinct motive and process, we turn to evolutionary perspectives on altruism and cooperative behavior (Brewer, 2004; Simon, 1990). These perspectives postulate that the tendency to be prosocial has evolved in humans because there is a biological advantage to being open to social influence. Brewer (2004) used the analogy of the characteristic of being ominivorous, which would be difficult to sustain in a species if every individual had to learn what to eat through trial and error. Members of the species that rely on vicarious learning are more likely to thrive and have a higher survival rate. Because vicarious learning requires an open­ ness to social influence, the reliance on such information, as opposed to one's own judgments, is adaptive. In the case of more complex social systems characteristic of humans, the need to rely on social information arguably carries even greater adaptive ad­ vantage. Citing the limitations associated with bounded rationality, Simon ( 1990) argued that individuals who are open to social influence acquire more information more rapidly than those who process information in a rational manner. Because rationality involves evaluating the anticipated consequences of one's actions, screening social information in a rational manner creates an information bottleneck. People who are more open therefore adapt to social systems faster and, because the group serves as a buffer between the organ­ ism and the environment (Brewer, 2004), those individuals are more apt to

survive. It is important to note that the mode of processing information described earlier is not rational in the strict sense. Openness to social influence involves adopting and acting on cues about modes of behavior, such as rules, norms, and standards, in lieu of assessing courses of actions on the basis of anticipated consequences (e.g., omnivores' trial-and-error testing of food sources). We refer to this mode as heuristic judgment; it involves the application of simple rules to choices and actions. Rules are derived from social cues about modes of behavior (e.g. , norms, mores, standards). Choices and actions are based on the appro­ priateness of the act (i.e., the correspondence of the act to the norm). Heuristic judgment stands in contrast to rational judgment, which involves making choices on the basis of evaluation of anticipated consequences. Brewer (2004) referred to this characteristic as sociality and maintained that it encompasses a strong interest in others as well as a willingness to con­ form to norms. Thus, the tendency toward normative reasoning is inextricably tied to other-interest. Specifically, Brewer argued that an individual's willing­ ness to accept and act on social cues is motivated by the fundamental human drive of belongingness. She reasoned that, because of the adaptive advantage of social susceptibility, this motivation has evolved as a general human charac­ teristic. An important implication of this view is that social contextual factors can stimulate other-interest and in turn lead to a tendency to conform to norms and cooperate with the group.

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Whereas Brewer's (2004) work helps clarify why the general characteristic of other orientation evolved in humans, Simon ( 1990) sought to explain the variability in other orientation within humans. He argued that an individual's openness to social influence, which he termed docility, reinforces other-interest by leading to the acquisition of other-oriented values; that is, social informa­ tion promulgated throughout a group or society includes cues about norms that promote the welfare of the collective. Because abiding by these principles is not always in the interest of the individual, persons who tend to process informa­ tion rationally are likely to resist such social influence, whereas those who rely more on heuristic reasoning are more apt to accept and internalize prosocial norms. Thus, individual differences in other orientation is a by-product of a more fundamental tendency to be open to social influence (i.e., to engage in heuristic processing). Simon's ( 1990) arguments suggest that individual differences in other orientation should therefore be manifested in a pattern of socialized values and traits that reflect a concern for others. Consistent with this assertion, a substantial amount of research addressing the prosocial personality indicates the existence of a broad category of prosocial disposition (e.g., Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 2005). This category of individual differences includes trait-based empathy; social interest; and prosocial values, such as those evaluated by the Concern for Others subscale of the Comparative Emphasis Scale (Ravlin & Meglino, 1987). Research suggests that not only do these individual differences cluster together but also that they are differentiated from measures of self­ orientation, such as self-enhancement (Korsgaard, Meglino, & Lester, 1996). Furthermore, contextual factors that stimulate a focus on or concern for others should also induce other orientation. One such factor is the perception of common group membership, which leads to prosocial and cooperative behavior (Penner et aI., 2005). One explanation for this effect is that group membership results in a degree of depersonalization, wherein the self becomes subsumed within the collective (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). An­ other contextual influence is perspective taking, which is also associated with prosocial behavior. There is some debate as to whether the effect of perspective taking is explained by empathic concern (i.e., concern for others) or shared identity, but either way this factor leads to prosocial behavior independent of the effect of hedonic factors such as guilt, distress, or vicarious joy (Batson et aI., 1991; Maner et aI., 2002). Finally, priming individuals on moral or prosocial concepts appears to induce other interest as well (Smeester, Warlop, & Van Avermaet, 2002).

A Framework of Prosocial Motives and Judgments As noted in the preceding section, research on both trait and state versions of other orientation has focused on the motive of other-interest, with little at­ tention directed at the potential differences in underlying processes between self- and other-motivated behavior. Viewed through the lens of evolutionary theories of prosocial behavior, other orientation should encompass not only other-interest but also a greater reliance on a heuristic judgment process that is quite distinct from rationality. To understand more fully the implications

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of other orientation as encompassing both a distinct motive and judgment process, we next examine more closely what it means to be motivated by self- versus other-interest and how rational judgment differs from heuristic judgment.

Self- and Other-Interest Consistent with previous work (Cropanzano et aI. , 2007), we define self­ interest as intentions or behaviors wherein the ultimate goal is to benefit the self. In contrast, we define other-interest as intentions or behaviors that are directed at the goal of benefiting others. Self- and other-concerns are thought to reflect distinct motivational systems (e.g., Brewer, 2004; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Furthermore, the relative strength of self- and other-interest is likely to vary as a function of distinct individual differences and contextual factors. As noted earlier, individual differences, such as prosocial values, and contextual factors, such as those that induce group identity and empathic concern, are associated with other-interest. Individual differences in self-interest, such as pro-self orientation (Van Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), as well as contextual fac­ tors, such the salience of money (Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006), are associated with self-interest. Although self- and other-interests are distinct, they are not fully indepen­ dent of one another (De Dreu & Nauta, 2007) and in some circumstances are in direct conflict. Brewer (2004) described these motivations as in competition and viewed the individual as seeking to balance these two sets of interests. The task of the quiet ego is, to some extent, to achieve this balance and, in cases of high conflict, to de-emphasize (transcend) self-interest. In the case of other orientation, this balancing act is achieved by engaging in a judgment process that allows individuals to suspend self-concerns.

Rationality and Heuristic Processing Drawing on research on judgment and social information processing, we distin­ guish between two main modes of reasoning, rational and heuristic (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Stanovich & West, 2002). Rationality is defined as thinking and acting in a manner that is expected to lead to an optimal or maximum result for a person on the basis of a consideration of the person's values and risk preferences (Stanovich & West, 2002). Rational judgment involves choosing the most attractive course of action on the basis of the expectation that the act is associated with certain outcomes, weighted by the value or attractiveness of each outcome to the individual. A distinguishing feature of rational judgment, then, is consequentialist thinking (Bastardi & Shafir, 2000); that is, rational judgment involves choosing an act on the basis of a consideration of the value of anticipated consequences of the action. Heuristic judgment involves the application of existing knowledge struc­ tures (e.g., rules, standards, scripts) as a means of determining choices and be­ havior (Stanovich & West, 2002). Heuristics simplify the judgment process by indicating what choice or behavior is appropriate. As such, it requires consid-

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erably less effort and conscious control than does rational judgment (De Neys, 2006). Moreover, this mode of reasoning is nonconsequentialist in that it does not require the systematic evaluation of anticipated consequences (Baron, 1994). In short, choices made under the heuristic model of reasoning can occur without consideration of personal preferences or the personal consequences of the act. It is important to note that heuristic reasoning, although not rational ac­ cording the aforementioned definition, is not necessarily inferior to rational judgment. Heuristics are "fast and frugal" (Snook, Taylor, & Bennell, 2004), thus enabling individuals to solve problems rapidly and with a minimum of effort. Also, if the heuristic is ecologically rational (i.e., the heuristic matches the structure of the environment), it is likely to result in high-quality decisions (Snook et aI. , 2004). Moreover, some scholars (Bazerman, Loewenstein, & Moore, 2002) have argued that in the case of conflicts of self- and other-interest, attempts to solve the problem through rational means may result in less favor­ able results for the collective. Rational and heuristic judgment are considered distinct but related processes. To the extent that individuals lack motivation or are otherwise in­ hibited from engaging in rational processing, they are apt to rely on heuristic reasoning. For example, research has shown that motivational issues, such as goals and accountability, and ability issues, such as training and cognitive load, affect the extent to which individuals rely more or less on rational judgment (e.g. , Ferreira, Garcia-Marques, Sherman, & Sherman, 2006). A critical premise in our framework is that rational judgment and self­ interest are positively related. Self-interest may stimulate rational judgment: Research indicates that to the extent to which personal stakes are high, in­ dividuals tend to apply more effort and rigor to their decisions (McAllister, Mitchell, & Beach, 1979). Moreover, mode of reasoning may affect levels of self-interest. For example, Irwin and Baron (2001) conducted a series of experi­ ments wherein participants were presented with product choices that varied in quality, price, and prosocial implications (i.e. , the environmental impact of the product). When choices were presented in a holistic mode (i.e., willingness to purchase), participants' prosocial values strongly predicted their choices; however, when participants were required to use a more rational approach of estimating the value they would place on purchasing environmentally friendly products, their choices tended to place less weight on the prosocial values and more weight on self-interests (i.e., price and quality). These findings suggest that the rational process of evaluating the attractiveness of anticipated out­ comes heightened the salience of self-interest.

Four Modes of Behavior The joint consideration of the two motives of self- and other-interest yields a 2 x 2 matrix, shown in Figure 17.1, that depicts four modes of behavior. Given the aforementioned dependence between rationality and self-interest, we posit that, in cells involving low levels of self-interest, individuals will rely more on heuristic processing and less on rational processing. Thus, each cell in this

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Other-Interest Low

High

Low

Self­ Interest

High

Figure 17.1.

A framework of motives and judgment processes.

matrix reflects a unique combination of motivational emphasis and judgment process. By simultaneously considering variation in both motives and their as­ sociated judgment process, our model suggests new and various ways of consid­ ering alternatives to egoism. For illustrative purposes, we present categorical differences in modes of behavior, but in reality these modes are likely to differ in degree; that is, the motives and judgment processes underlying these modes are continua; individuals may be more or less self-interested, more or less other-interested, and rely more or less on heuristic or rational judgment. The upper left cell of Figure 17. 1, labeled Mindlessness, is a category that includes individuals who are low in both self- and other-interest. Given the lack of self-interest, this mode of behavior is posited to involve heuristic processing. Included in this category are scripted behaviors that are activated automati­ cally through priming or chronic accessibility (e.g. , habits). This sort of behav­ ior has been documented extensively in research on automaticity (Bargh & Chartrand, 1999) and mindlessness (Langer, 1989). The lower left cell of the figure, which depicts a category wherein indi­ viduals are high in self-interest and low in other-interest, is labeled Rational Self-Interest and represents egoism in its most rigorous form (i.e. , the "noisy" ego). Individuals in this category pursue only self-serving goals in a manner that maximizes expected personal outcomes. This type of reasoning underlies classical economics and value-expectancy models of attitudes and motivation (e.g. , Ajzen, 200 1).

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The lower right cell of the figure depicts a category in which persons pur­ sue both self- and other-oriented goals and is labeled Collective Rationality. Because this cell involves a high level of self-interest, we posit that individuals engage in rational judgment. In this case, individuals are motivated to serve their own interests as well the interests of others and to formulate intentions in a rational manner; that is, they consider the self- and other-outcomes and try to jointly maximize these outcomes. The joint pursuit of self- and other­ goals tends to co-occur with rational judgment for two reasons. First, as noted earlier, rational processing is likely to make self-interests salient. Individuals in pursuit of others' interests who use a rational model are likely to develop a heightened awareness of their own interest and of the trade-offs between their personal concerns and the concerns of others. Second, individuals are unlikely to be successful at joint maximization without using a high degree of cogni­ tive effort. This contingency was illustrated in a study by De Dreu, Beersma, Stroebe, and Euwema (2006, Experiment 5). The authors varied two factors: (a) cooperative or competitive orientation (i.e., self- and other-oriented goals vs. self-oriented goals) and (b) participants' accountability for their judgment pro­ cesses (which should promote greater cognitive effort). When held accountable, cooperative participants showed less contentious behavior and achieved higher joint outcomes than did competitive participants. However, cooperative par­ ticipants were no less contentious and no more successful at arriving at a joint solution than were competitive participants if they were not held accountable. That is, unless they were held accountable for their judgments, participants who were instructed to pursue both self- and other-oriented goals behaved as though they were pursuing only self-oriented goals. As De Dreu et aL's (2006) findings suggest, when interests conflict, collec­ tive rationality is a difficult state to sustain. This suggests that the relative noisiness of the ego, along with the limited cognitive capabilities of humans, poses a potential threat to addressing social problems. One solution to this problem is to apply rules of conduct that do not require consideration of self concerns. This is the nature of behavior in the category depicted in the upper right cell of Figure 17. 1 . This cell, which we label Other Orientation, represents individuals who are high in other-interest but low in self-interest. We expect individuals in this category to engage in heuristic processing. In these circum­ stances, individuals are focused on benefiting others and apply principles or norms of behavior to meet these goals, which obviates the need to consider personal consequences. This cell is distinguished from the Collective Rational­ ity cell in that it does not involve the explicit consideration of self-interests. However, the "other" may involve an entity (e.g. , a dyad or group) within which the self is subsumed. Our conceptualization of other orientation implies that there is interde­ pendence between other orientation and heuristic judgment. This dynamic should be manifest in the relationship between prosocial values and greater reliance on heuristic judgment as opposed to rational judgment. Preliminary evidence of this link was obtained by Korsgaard et al. ( 1996), who presented participants with a series of choices varying in probability and attractiveness, the two elements used in rationally assessing anticipated consequences. Using the Concern for Others subscale of the Comparative Emphasis Scale (Ravlin &

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Meglino, 1987) to measure other-oriented values, they found that the choices made by persons higher in concern for others were less affected by both prob­ ability and attractiveness, thus indicating a low degree of rational deliberation. Research on protected values also supports this contention (Baron & Spranca, 1997) indicating the individuals are less likely to consider consequences (a hallmark of rational judgment mode) in making choices involving closely held moral values.

Implications for Prosocial Behavior The framework we have just described provides a basis for understanding pro­ social behavior that incorporates distinctions in both motives and judgment process. Our focus is mainly on delineating other orientation from other modes of behavior as reflected in the joint influence of other-interest and heuristic judgment. This arguably is a relatively extreme mode of quieting the ego, because it involves a degree of selflessness or depersonalization. In contrast, collective rationality involves a relatively lesser degree of quieting the ego, wherein both self- and other-interests are pursued in a more rational manner. The distinction between these two modes of behavior and their contrast to ra­ tionally self-interested behavior warrant further consideration. Other orientation, collective rationality, and rational self-interest are dif­ ferentiated by the relative strength of other-interest. However, it is important to note that self-interest and other-interest are not distinguished by the act itself but by the motive underlying the act. Behavior that benefits others may be motivated solely by a concern for others, by joint concern, or by a desire to advance one's own interests (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). In other words, each of these modes of behavior may result in an act that could be deemed prosocial. The extent to which others will benefit from the actions of an individual who is motivated by rational self-interest or by collective rationality will depend in part on the degree and nature of interdependence between the outcomes for the actor and others. When outcomes are complementary, others will benefit, even when the actor gives no thought to the consequences of his or her actions for others (i.e., rational self-interest). To the extent that the consequences for the actor and others conflict, rational self-interest is likely to produce less prosocial behavior than either collective rationality or other orientation. The nature of conflicting outcomes can vary in terms of whether an integrative solution (i.e., joint optimization) is possible. The differences between prosocial behavior mo­ tivated by collective rationality and by other orientation are likely to be most evident when joint optimization of outcomes is not possible, as in a zero-sum game. Even when joint optimization is possible, collective rationality may pro­ duce actions that are less prosocial than those motivated by other orientation. This may occur because, in attempt to address conflicts of interest rationally, individuals are subject to self-serving biases. In one study, for example, par­ ticipants were assigned the perspective of the plaintiff or defendant in a legal dispute over a traffic collision (Bazerman et aI. , 2002). When asked to predict the amount a judge would award the plaintiff, participants' estimates strongly

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favored their own role. Similarly, van Dijk and De Cremer (2006) demonstrated that individuals are likely to take more than a proportionate share of a pooled resource when they were assigned the role of leader than if they were assigned the role of team member. Although this effect was stronger for participants with a pro-self predisposition, the self-serving effect of leadership role was sig­ nificant even for participants predisposed to jointly maximize self- and other­ outcomes (i.e., those who are collectively rational). In contrast, because judgments underlying other-oriented behavior do not involve a systematic evaluation of consequences, such behavior is not subject to egocentric evaluations of deservingness. Of course, reliance on norms can result in judgment biases that may lead to unintended effects. Depending on the nature of the problem and the operant value or norms, individuals may make choices that are not consonant with their goals, even when those goals are prosocial (Baron, 1994). Thus, to fully understand the distinction between prosocial behavior motivated by other orientation and these other modes, these processes should be examined in light of the configuration of outcomes and norms. The preceding framework provides insight into how different motive and judgment processes may lead to prosocial behavior. Given that these motives and processes are so fundamental, the implications of differentiating other orientation from collective rationality and rational self-interest extend beyond prosocial behavior. In the section that follows, we turn to a close examination of other orientation and its broader implications for behavior and attitudes.

A Broader Role of Other Orientation Given that social norms represent a form of heuristic, the behavior of persons in an other-oriented mode should be particularly sensitive to norms. Lester, Meglino, and Korsgaard (2006) provided for this principle in a study of the im­ pact of the norm of reciprocity and the value of concern for others on volunteer behavior. In this study, the norm of reciprocity was manipulated by providing participants with gifts that were attributable either to the experimenter or to an unrelated third party. Participants were then asked to volunteer to help the experimenter with another study. The findings showed that the reciprocity manipulation had a stronger impact on volunteering among persons higher in other orientation. Research investigating the role of group identity and group norms on behavior also supports this contention (Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999); specifically, norms regarding recycling predicted intentions only for individuals who were highly identified with the group. A trade-off between rational and normative influences exists in models of the attitude-behavior link. Popular theories linking attitudes to behavior posit an expectancy-valence mechanism (i.e., rational self-interest) underlying the link between attitudes and behavior (Ajzen, 2001). These theories also allow for the independent influence of norms on intentions and behavior, but in many studies the impact of norm beyond attitudes has been weak or nonexistent (Sheeran, Norman, & Orbell, 1999). Our approach suggests that the relative impact of attitudes and norms should depend on other orientation. Similarly,

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using a priming manipulation of collective versus individual self-concept, Ibarra and Trafimow (1998) examined the extent to which attitudes or norms predicted health-related behavior. They found that, for participants with a collective-self prime, norms accounted for more variance in intentions than did attitudes, whereas the opposite pattern was obtained for participants with an individual-self prime. Research further suggests that the impact of attitudes on behavior is weaker for persons high in other orientation. For example, Korsgaard, Meg­ lino, Thomas, and Au (2001) investigated in a scenario study the relationship between job satisfaction and reactions to a violation of expectations. For par­ ticipants higher in other orientation, as measured by the value of concern for others, intentions to remain were unrelated to job satisfaction. The intentions of individuals lower in other orientation more closely corresponded to their attitudes, with dissatisfied participants having higher intentions to leave. A similar pattern has been observed in the relationship between job satisfaction and organizational citizenship behavior (OCB; i.e. , unrewarded discretion­ ary behaviors that promote the functioning of an organization). As with other attitude-behavior relationships, the relationship between job satisfaction and OCB is believed to be grounded in a rational self-interested process. The results of a field study of administrative employees (Lester, Meglino, & Kors­ gaard, 2002) indicated a weaker relationship between employee satisfaction and supervisory ratings of OCB among employees higher in other orientation, as measured by work values. The link between other orientation and sensitivity to norms has also been demonstrated in the impact of incentives on work motivation. A classic debate exists in the organizational sciences between predictions of expectancy theory, which is based on a rational self-interested process, and those of equity theory, which is based on the influence of norms of exchange (Adams, 1963). In expec­ tancy theory, higher compensation should signal a higher probability of future positive outcomes, motivating an increase in the quantity of an employee's output. In contrast, equity theory predicts that overpayment signals a viola­ tion of norms of fair exchange, motivating employees to restore balance in the exchange by decreasing the quantity of their output and increasing its quality. Our framework suggests that both theories are valid but depend on other ori­ entation. In support of this view, Vecchio ( 1981) found that participants high in other orientation (as measured by trait empathy) conformed to equity norms by decreasing the quantity of their output and increasing its quality. Participants low in other orientation responded to overpayment by increasing the quantity of their output, which is consistent with expectancy theory. Further evidence of the other-interest/heuristic reasoning link can be inferred from research on attitude formation. Traditional models of job atti­ tudes are based on a rational self-interested process of combining beliefs and valences. The theory of other orientation indicates that a person's beliefs that his or her job contains attractive job attributes will have a weaker relation­ ship to job satisfaction among persons who are higher in other orientation. Support for this prediction was obtained in a series of studies that examined the association between perceptions of enriched job attributes and job satisfac­ tion (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2007). These studies showed that the presence of

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enriched attributes had a significantly weaker impact on the job satisfaction of persons higher in other-oriented values. The research we have just described illustrates how other orientation in­ fluences attitudes and behavior when there is a trade-off between self-interest and normative pressures. Noteworthy about much of these findings is that the consequences of this mechanism extend to behavior and attitudes that have lit­ tle to do with prosocial action, such as work productivity and intention to quit one's job. Research across a broad range of theories and methods suggests that, for certain individuals, and under certain circumstances, behavior is governed by a strong concern for others coupled with a tendency to be more sensitive to social norms and less prone to engage in rational calculations.

Conclusion

Our aim in this chapter was to stimulate thinking and research on alternatives to universal egoism. To this end, we developed a framework that highlights the significance of distinct motives and judgment processes in understanding prosocial behavior. This framework suggests different degrees and forms of quieting the ego. We consider motive and judgment process as separate and interrelated mechanisms. The thrust of this analysis is our conceptualization of other orientation as the product of other-interest and heuristic judgment. We examined how this conceptualization informs not only on prosocial behavior but also its implications for theories and frameworks that assume rational self­ interest. As such, we believe that understanding the nature of other orientation has broad implications beyond helping.

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18 How the Ego Quiets as It Grows: Ego Development, Growth Stories, and Eudaimonic Personality Development Jack J. Bauer No one is born with a quiet ego. The ego starts off "noisy," egocentric, and clamoring for selfish needs in the immediate moment. Eventually, however, the ego matures, and one learns to transcend self-interest-to think from oth­ ers' points of view; to relate present actions to future outcomes; and to identify with people and experiences in an increasingly broader, deeper manner. In this chapter, I first attempt to demonstrate that levels of ego volume are in many ways differences in not only kind but also levels in a developmental trajectory, from noisier to progressively quieter. From the standpoint of psychosocial de­ velopment, and Loevinger's ( 1976) model of ego development (ED) in particular, many qualities of the noisy ego are hallmarks of relative immaturity, whereas many qualities of the quieter ego characterize psychosocial maturity. I then showcase research on how growth-oriented narratives shape the self-identity of a developmentally quieter ego. Finally, I expand on the notion of a develop­ mentally quieter ego: I propose that a developmentally quieter ego involves a balance of social-cognitive qualities of a quiet ego (which follow developmental stages) and social-emotional qualities (which do not), in addition to other kinds of balance, in constructing a self-identity. This balance constitutes a particu­ larly eudaimonic form of personality development. In this chapter, I take the perspective that an ego's quietness or noisiness is not a matter of how much self-esteem or self-confidence one has. Here, ego volume involves the degrees of breadth and depth by which one interprets the self and the psychosocial world. 1 As such, a louder ego interprets the self in more individualistic, immediate, concrete, and external terms-as with an ego shouting for attention to the point that it cannot hear the voices of others or of one's own internal dynamics. A quieter ego interprets the self in more interdependent, long-term, abstract, and internal terms. In this scenario, the ego never loses its self-identity as it becomes increasingly quieter; instead, the IHere the ego is viewed as that which interprets and identifies with objects (which may be people, events, abilities, beliefs, etc.). These perceived objects of identification are what constitute one's concept of self. This is consonant with William James's (189011950) "1,» which appropriates objects to the "Me." These objects, and thus the self, may be interpreted relatively more simply or com­ plexly, narrowly or broadly, externally or internally, excludingly or includingly, and so on.

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ego becomes even stronger, more resilient, and more assured in its roles (as in Erikson, 1968).

Ego Development as a Process of Ego Quieting

Not only are people not born with quiet egos, but also, by most developmental accounts, people are born without any ego at all. The ego is commonly viewed as coemerging with the concept of the self gradually over the first 18 months or so of life (e.g., Loevinger, 1976). When the ego does emerge, it is noisy, literally incapable of taking others' perspectives. However, jump ahead in age a couple years: Four-year-olds are still notably egocentric in the sense that they have marked limitations in taking others' perspectives (Piaget, 1970), yet they are significantly more capable than 3-year-olds in thinking from others' points of view (Prencipe & Zelazo, 2005). The ego, although still noisy, is at least a bit quieter than it was on its emergence-more aware of self and others, more ca­ pable of thinking how present actions have implications for the future. Now jump ahead to later childhood and adolescence, for which Damon and Hart's ( 1988) developmental model of self-understanding provides an apt overview for studying a gradual quieting of the ego in youth. In later child­ hood, children identify with particular peer groups and not with others. The psychosocial self is constructed largely as a product of evaluative comparisons of the selfto others. Early in adolescence, the person identifies more with those particular, evaluative comparisons that he or she thinks other people (notably peers) find valuable. By later adolescence, on average, the person has begun to internalize those values into a more or less systematic set of beliefs. During this time, the ego becomes preoccupied less with appearances and more with psychosocial dynamics. More than that, however, the subjective ego gains in the ability to organize a self more complexly-to bring an increasingly greater range of psychosocial perspectives to bear on thoughts of self and others. Of course, adolescents are notoriously egocentric, but they are less egocentric than they once were and are more egocentric than they are likely to become (Westenberg & Gjerde, 1999).

Loevinger 's Ego Development as Ego Quieting Loevinger's ( 1976) theory of ED provides a stage model of this kind of develop­ ment that extends from infancy through adulthood. Although in this chapter I address several models of psychosocial maturity, ED theory is widely acknowl­ edged as one of the most comprehensive and empirically studied theories of personality development (Westenberg & Block, 1993). Thus, it is difficult to state simply what is developing in ED. For the present purposes, however, what develops in ED is the increasing capacity to think about the self and oth­ ers from more differentiated and more integrated perspectives. In Loevinger's theory, the ego is best thought of as a frame of reference or a lens for interpret­ ing and understanding the psychosocial world. ED is concerned not as much with what one thinks about as with how one organizes experience. ED involves

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several dimensions that characterize a quieting ego, notably, the increasing capacities to think from others' perspectives and to integrate them with one's own; make meaning of one's inner experience; reason morally in terms of rights, principles, and contexts; control impulses and defenses; relate to others with mutuality and a sense of interdependence; respect the autonomy of both the self and others; address conflict directly instead of defensively (or instead of with immature defenses); identify with increasingly broader social groups (e.g., from one's ingroup to humanity), and value psychological growth. There are, in essence, eight stages beyond the pre-egoic stages of infancy (see Figure 18. 1). The personality characteristics of each level of ED function as individual sets of routinely expressed traits, yet they are arranged in a progressive hierarchy of increasing complexity and psychosocial depth. For example, at the selfprotective level the individual has little capacity to under­ stand others' points of view, views others as either for or against him- or herself in a dog-eat-dog world, and is preoccupied with getting what he or she wants

Characteristics

Ego level (approx.

f%)

o

5r I mpulsive

Q;

'iii '0

«

Impulse control

Interpersonal mode

Psychosocial concerns

Impulsive

Egocentric, dependent

Bodily feelings

1)

------

Z Self-protective «

Opportunistic

Manipulative, wary

''Trouble,'' control

Respect for rules

Cooperative, loyal

Appearances, behavior

Exceptions allowable

Helpful , self-aware

1 0)

Conformist

(-10) Self-aware (-40) Conscientious

Self-evaluated

(-30)

standards, self-critical

Individualistic

Tolerant

I ntense, responsible

Autonomous

5r «

Q;

�

Motives, traits, achievements

Mutual

(-10) o

Feelings, problems, adjustment

Individuality, development, roles

Coping with conflict

I nterdependent

2)

Self-fulfillment, psychological causation

-------

I ntegrated

a «

1)

Reconciling inner

Cherishing of

conflicts

individuality

Identity

Figure 18.1. Levels of Loevinger's ego development. Approximate frequency percent­ ages are representative of several sources (Cook-Greuter, 2000; Cramer, 1999; Manners,

Durkin, & Nesdale, 2004; McCrae & Costa, 1980; Truluck & Courtenay, 2002; Westen­ berg & Gjerde, 1999). From Ego Development (pp. 24-25), by J. Loevinger, 1976, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Copyright 1976 by Jane Loevinger. Adapted with permission.

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JACK J. BAUER

and not getting caught. In contrast, the conformist level involves a respect for others and group loyalty. However, the conformist mind-set also guides the individual to identify predominantly with the ingroup, to accept the values of those in authority of that group, to aggrandize its values, and to look down on those who do not fit that mold. Although a conformist ego can have quiet moments (e.g., when interacting with members of the ingroup), the routine mode of functioning is to exclude much of the social world, pass judgments on the basis of appearances, and define the self largely in terms of appearances and group affiliation. These are, generally speaking, characteristics of a noisy ego (although not as noisy as at the self-protective level). More quiet than that conformist is the conscientious mind-set, which keeps open the possibility that one's personal views might not be the best ones and strives toward under­ standing the underlying motives of the ways things appear and actively seeks alternative perspectives. Still, even at this stage, the ego has much quieting to do: The person still exhibits intolerance for conformity (indicating remnants of conformist-level thinking) and has an exaggerated sense of control over his or her own destiny as well as over the destiny of others (Loevinger, 1976). Quieter still is the autonomous level, at which the person interprets the self and others more in terms of growth processes than at previous levels and more as an interdependently developing dynamic. The person routinely seeks to understand the mutual dynamics of broad principles, personal characteristics, and contextual idiosyncrasies. The person is cognizant of apparent behaviors and their motivations and the myriad and largely unconscious developmental forces from which those motivations and behaviors emerge in the present situ­ ation as well as generally. Yet even here the ego makes its noise: For example, the person's emphasis on growth is so valued and identified with that the per­ ceived lack of it-in the self, in relationships, with society-can yield anxiety and interpersonal discord. Thus, as the ego develops, it interprets the self and others differently and in a manner representing a progressively quieter ego. The developmentally immature ego is noisier; it is full of itself (read: full of its selD. It is more prone toward valuing the self's autonomy over the autonomy of others. As the ego ma­ tures and becomes quieter, it becomes more likely to seek a balance or mutual dynamic between the self and others. In addition, the developmentally noisier ego is more preoccupied with and evaluates the self and others on the basis of mere appearances and group affiliation. In contrast, the developmentally qui­ eter ego focuses more on and evaluates the self and others on the basis of the subtler qualities of human experience, such as people's motivations, intentions, and subjective interpretations of those appearances. However, as long as the ego identifies with people and experiences, the ego has room for quieting, or to use Buddhist terminology, as long as one forms attachments to the self, there will be suffering.

Empirical Evidence of Ego Development as Ego Quieting This conceptual description of ED has found considerable validation and ex­ tension in research. Higher levels on measures of ED (as assessed with the

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Sentence Completion Test; Hy & Loevinger, 1996) are known to correlate empirically with a range of personality measures that suggest a quieter ego. Among the Big Five personality traits, Openness to Experience stands out as a quiet-ego candidate, given its tendency to value universalism, to seek alterna­ tive perspectives, and its relative lack of need to preserve current conditions and viewpoints (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002). Openness to Experi­ ence is a quality of several quiet-ego constructs, such as perspective taking, mindfulness (see chap. 7, this volume), self-compassion (see chap. 9, this vol­ ume), compassion (see chap. 15, this volume), autonomy (see chaps. 10 and 11, this volume), authenticity (see chap. 8, this volume), and humility (see chap. 5, this volume). Another Big Five trait, Agreeableness, might also fit the quiet-ego mold with its concern for helping others, but a significant portion ofAgreeable­ ness also involves conformity, compliance, and lack of self-direction (Roccas et aI., 2002). As it turns out, only Openness to Experience exhibits a consistently significant correlation with ED (Bauer & McAdams, 2004b; Bauer, McAdams, & Sakaeda, 2005b; Einstein & Lanning, 1998; McCrae & Costa, 1980; Morros, Pushkar, & Reis, 1998). Higher levels of ED also correlate with a range of prosocial (i.e., less self­ ish) abilities and concerns. Adults with high levels of ED have been found to have high levels of responsibility, tolerance, and psychological-mindedness (Helson & Roberts, 1994), as well as ego resilience and interpersonal integrity (Westenberg & Block, 1993). Adults (especially in midlife) with high levels of ED, as well as other markers of psychosocial maturity, tend to have greater concerns for generativity, or caring for the development of future generations and society (de St. Aubin, McAdams, & Kim, 2004). With its emphasis on cognitive complexity, ED also has strong ties to intelligence, yet intelligence probably has little to do with many qualities of quieting the ego, beyond the lowest levels of ED. A review of research on ED and intelligence suggested that the two are consistently independent compared with various personality measures (Cohn & Westenberg, 2004). Whereas intel­ ligence generally deals with complexity of thinking in general, ED deals with complexity of psychosocial thinking specifically. It is psychosocial thinking, not thinking in general, that seems more crucial to quieting the ego. ED is widely known as a form of psychosocial maturity. Helson and Rob­ erts ( 1994) found some especially relevant longitudinal patterns for women from ages 21 to 43 in the Mills College Study. The authors found not only that higher ED levels correlated with higher levels of tolerance (as noted earlier) but also that participants who were at what the authors labeled the Conscien­ tious and Individuated levels at age 43 showed increased levels of tolerance for the beliefs and values of others from ages 2 1 to 43, whereas participants who were at the Self-Aware level showed marginal decreases in tolerance over that period. Social responsibility followed a largely similar pattern. Thus, the de­ velopmental quieting of the ego (i.e., the transcendence of self-interest) seems to coincide with longitudinal increases in tolerance and responsibility. It is interesting that participants who were at the Conscientious and Individuated levels also showed an increase in achievement through independence from ages 21 to 43, whereas those who were at the Self-Aware level did not. This last find­ ing supports the idea put forth in the present volume that a developmentally

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quieted ego is not a squashed ego-indeed, ego·quieting serves both the self and others simultaneously. John, Pals, and Westenberg ( 1998) found ties between ED levels and three personality prototypes: (a) conflicted, (b) traditional, and (c) individuated. The conflicted type was characterized as hostile, defensive, and noncommittal; the traditional type was characterized as adopting and fulfilling conventional social roles and norms; and the individuated type was characterized as open minded, introspective, and sensitive to interdependence. These types mapped onto lower (Impulsive and Self·Protective), middle (especially Conformist and Self·Aware), and higher (Individuated, Autonomous, Integrated) levels, re­ spectively. Thus, the conflicted type seems to represent a relatively noisy ego, whereas the individuated type seems to represent a relatively quieted ego, with the traditional type falling somewhere in between. Similarly, Cramer ( 1999) found that higher levels of ED corresponded to the use of three ego defenses-denial, projection, and identification-in a young adult sample. Cramer explained that denial develops earliest, domi­ nating in the preschool years but declining in use in the grade school years as other, more effective defenses emerge. Projection (attributing undesirable self-attributes to others) emerges in early childhood and remains throughout adolescence at least. Identification (identifying with values of self and others) emerges roughly in late adolescence, as the individual becomes capable of creating a psychosocial identity. Whereas all three defenses represent ways that the ego makes sense of situations in relation to the self, only the first two, denial and projection, are typical of what is commonly meant by defensive. Identification is a more mature defense (Vaillant, 1977), is not part of what is commonly meant by defensive, and is the quietest of these ego defenses. Cra­ mer found that participants at lower ED levels (Impulsive and Self-Protective) were more likely to use the relatively immature defenses of denial and projec­ tion. Participants at the Conscientious level or higher were more likely to use identification. In other words, participants with a developmentally quieter ego were less defensive. People at higher levels of ED seem to have many qualities ofa developmen­ tally quieter ego, such as Openness to Experience, tolerance for others' values and beliefs, psychological awareness, ego resilience, psychosocial integrity, purpose in life, personal growth, autonomy, and lower levels of defensiveness. Furthermore, longitudinal research suggests that these quiet·ego characteris· tics tend to develop together.

A Fuller Portrait of the Developmentally Quieter Ego

The presentation so far of a developmentally quieter ego has focused on one of two broad facets of personality development-that of social-cognitive develop­ ment (see Bauer & McAdams, 2004a). However, the developmental quieting of the ego also involves a social-emotional facet that, unlike the social-cognitive facet, does not seem to emerge in sequential stages of capacities for organiz­ ing one's experience. In this section, I compare these two facets or paths of development, show how they operate in the development of narrative self-

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identity, and integrate the two facets under the label of eudaimonic personality

development.

Two Paths of the Developmentally Quieter Ego Contrary to common sense (Flanagan, 1991), ED and other measures of mean­ ing making are generally not related to measures of well-being (e.g., Bauer & McAdams, 2004b; Bauer et aI., 2005b; Helson & Roberts, 1994; Helson & Wink, 1992; King & Raspin, 2004; King, Scollon, Ramsey, & Williams, 2000; Westen­ berg & Block, 1993). In other words, people with a developmentally quieter ego (as presented earlier) are about as likely to be happy as to be unhappy. Fur­ thermore, it seems that personality qualities in general tend to map onto either ED (and other maturity-related phenomena) or well-being, but not both. For example, the trait of Openness to Experience typically correlates with ED but not with well-being, whereas Neuroticism and Extraversion typically correlate with well-being but not with ED (Bauer et aI., 2005b). Thus, I argue that the development of personality, and self-identity in particular, follows two broad paths that have some overlap but are readily distinguishable (Bauer & McAd­ ams, 2004a, 2004b; Bauer et aI., 2005b). One path is relatively more social­ cognitive and leads toward psychosocial maturity, that is, how complexly or integratively one thinks about the self and others. The other path is relatively more social-emotional and leads toward well-being and psychological health: how good one feels about the self in a world of others as well as how deeply one experiences (not how complexly one thinks about) relatedness. Similarly, I suggest that the quieting ego has its relatively social-cognitive and relatively social-emotional facets. The first facet can be thought of as the path ofthe head, whereas the second might be more the path of the heart. However, should not a quieter ego be a happier ego? The research points to a divided answer, suggesting that the developmentally quieter ego as presented earlier does not capture the entire scope of ego-quieting. For ex­ ample, quieting the ego involves an acceptance of self, flaws and all (as with self-compassion; see chap. 9, this volume), as well as a sense of interpersonal security (Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005), both of which are an essential part of well-being (Ryff & Keyes , 1995). Indeed, many of the chapters in this book discuss direct correlations between ego-quieting phe­ nomena and well-being, including the allo-inclusive identity (see chap. 13, this volume), ecosystem goals (see chap. 6, this volume), self-compassion (see chap. 9, this volume), stereotype transcendence (see chap. 19, this volume), self-determination (see chap. 10, this volume), authenticity (see chap. 8, this volume), and perceived similarity to less fortunate others (see chap. 15, this volume). These quiet-ego phenomena and others, such as gratitude (Emmons & McCullough, 2004) and forgiveness (which has correlated with Neuroticism and Extraversion but not with Openness to Experience; Brose, Rye, Lutz­ Zois, & Ross, 2005), tend to be operationally defined in terms of affect-laden phenomena such as positive self-regard and positive relations with others.2 21 find it interesting that many, if not most, quiet-ego characteristics are the kinds of phenomena that researchers have not been able to plot along developmental levels. Research has not shown

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However, in cases in which ego-quieting phenomena are defined more strictly in terms of complexity of perspective taking and psychosocial reasoning, a qui­ eted ego is likely not to correlate with well-being.

Growth Narratives and the Two Facets of the Quieting Ego The division of quiet-ego qualities into two facets is readily seen in recent research on narrative identity and life stories. Life stories reveal narrative patterns of self-interpretation that reflect how quieter and noisier egos in­ terpret psychosocial experience and construct a self-identity (see McAdams, in press). One such pattern is an orientation toward growth. Such personal narratives have been called growth narratives or growth stories-personal nar­ ratives that emphasize progressive development (Bauer, McAdams, & Pals, in press). Growth stories are not just about any kind of progress; they deal with psychosocial growth.3 Maslow ( 1968) claimed that people interpret life events in terms of either growth or safety. A safety orientation involves a preoccupa­ tion with protection, conservation, security, and defending-characteristics of a developmentally noisier ego. A growth orientation involves a preoccupation with developing, learning, exploring, and deepening-characteristics of a de­ velopmentally quieter ego. Growth narratives correlate with a host of quiet-ego characteristics, providing a window into how people with these characteristics interpret and create meaning in their lives-that is, a sense of identity-nota­ bly along social-cognitive and social-emotional dimensions. Growth stories that express quiet-ego phenomena tend to correspond to ED or to well-being, but not both. People with higher levels of ED and psycho­ social maturity tend to construct narratives that emphasize the elaboration and accommodation of meaningful life events (King & Noelle, 2005; King et aI., 2000; King & Smith, 2004); causal connections between life events and one's broader concept of self (Pals, 2006a); psychosocial meaning making, especially in stories of conflict (McLean, 2005; McLean & Thorne, 2003); memories about psychosocial exploration and learning important lessons in life (Bauer & Mc­ Adams, 2004b; Bauer et aI., 2005b; Pals, 2006b; Thorne, McLean, & Lawrence, 2004); and life goals aimed toward exploration and learning (Bauer & McAd­ ams, 2004a). Also, older adults are more likely than younger adults to tell life stories that emphasize psychosocial meanings instead of merely life facts, good times, or social status (Bauer et aI., 2005b; Pasupathi, 2001; Pasupathi, Alder­ man, & Shaw, 2007), suggesting that egos quiet (at least in a social-cognitive sense) with age. progressive levels by which people (especially not adults) acquire quiet-ego phenomena such as forgiveness, gratitude, humility, intimacy, empathy, altruism, helping, and bonding with others. The degree of complexity by which people think about these phenomena is another matter and has received far less empirical attention (although see Labouvie-Vief, 2006). 3Many people wish to develop abilities and resources to increase their power over others, exclude others, and gain status. This is characteristic of neither a quieter ego nor growth stories as I have defined them. I find it compelling that research has generally not examined this extrinsically mo­ tivated (Deci & Ryan, 2000) kind of growth in personal narratives. Research has instead focused on the kinds of growth that promote psychosocial maturity and self-understanding.

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Other kinds of growth stories, those with more social-emotional bases, correspond to well-being but not to ED. These tend to emphasize various quiet-ego phenomena: avoiding counterfactual thinking in difficult times eKing & Raspin, 2004; King et aI., 2000); major life decisions motivated more by deep desires than by defensiveness (Bauer, McAdams, & Sakaeda, 2005a); and memories and goals that are intrinsically motivated, that is, focused on the importance of meaningful relationships and doing meaningful work instead of status seeking, appearances, material gain, and gaining others' ap­ proval (Bauer & McAdams, 2004a, 2004b; Bauer et aI., 2005b; Kasser & Ryan, 1993). These intrinsic memories and goals were also more likely to be found in the narratives and other goal measures of older adults than in those of younger adults (see Bauer & McAdams, 2004a; Sheldon & Kasser, 2001), sug­ gesting that egos seem to quiet with age in the more social-emotional sense as well. On the basis of these studies it is perhaps easier to see how the quieter ego has two, relatively distinct processes of interpreting psychosocial life, one focused on seeking and integrating new perspectives on the self and others and the other focused on deepening the meaningfulness of and compassion in relationships and activities.

Eudaimonic Personality Development Some personality characteristics and growth stories contain a combination of social-cognitive and social-emotional qualities. Many quiet-ego characteristics such as generativity-that is, concern for future generations, which has been found to correlate with both ED and well-being-seem to fall in this category (McAdams, Ruetzel, & Foley, 1986). In the present volume, the transcendence of sexual orientation stereotypes in personal narratives have been shown to correlate with both ED and well-being (see chap. 19, this volume). Narratives expressing self-transformation in difficult times were also found to correlate

with both ED and well-being (Pals, 2006b). In a recent longitudinal study, a col­ league and I found that narratives that expressed self-transcendence-a kind of growth story conveying an explicit sense of unity with humanity-predicted both ED and well-being 3 years later (Bauer & McAdams, 2007). Many other quiet-ego phenomena seem to combine social-cognitive and social-emotional qualities, such as compassion, self-compassion (see chap. 9, this volume), mind­ fulness (see chap. 7, this volume), authenticity (see chap. 8, this volume), self­ determination (see chap. 10, this volume), autonomy motivation (see chap. 11, this volume), wisdom (see chap. 20, this volume), and ecosystem goals (see chap. 6, this volume). Whether they would actually correlate with both ED and well-being is a matter of how those phenomena were operationally defined. The combination of ED and well-being has been called the good life (King et aI., 2000) as well as eudaimonic well-being or eudaimonic personality devel­ opment (Bauer et aI., 2005b), in a tradition dating at least to Aristotle's (trans. 1925) notion of eudaimonia. People who have cultivated eudaimonic personal­ ity development interpret their sense of identity and happiness as grounded not only in satisfaction or pleasure but also in long-term psychosocial growth,

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concerns for social responsibility and virtue, and the pleasure of bonds with other people and humanity. Such people seem to have struck a balance with the social-cognitive and social-emotional facets of a quieter ego. The notion of balance is seen throughout the present volume as a quality of the quieter ego, notably in a balance of agency and communion in one's interpretations of psychosocial life (e.g. , see chaps. 2, 3, 5, 6, 12, 15, and 16, this volume) and a balance of positive and negative self-appraisals (e.g. , see chaps. 4 and 14, this volume). To the balancing of agency and communion and positivity and negativity I would add the balancing of more cognitive and more emotional interpretations of self and others. In fact, the combination of social-cognitive, social-emotional, agentic, and communal forms of growth in narratives of life transition was an especially strong predictor of both ED and well-being, more so than individual forms of growth themselves. People with such narratives also conveyed a range of quiet-ego characteristics, such as high levels of grati­ tude, generativity, humility, and compassion (Bauer & McAdams, 2004b). Perhaps most impressive is the fact that people who have cultivated a bal­ ance in these three domains-that is, people who characterize optimal forms of personality development and the good life as defined by the field of psycho1ogy-have in common the transcendence of self-interest and characteristics of a quieter ego. In other words, the quieter ego seems to represent a human ideal from the standpoint of psychology. Furthermore, these quiet-ego qualities have long been hallmarks of a life well lived for religious and philosophical systems around the world (Haidt, 2006). Indeed the eudaimonic, well-balanced, devel­ opmentally quieter ego may represent a pancultural ideal for living life.

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Morros, M., Pushkar, D., & Reis, M. ( 1998). A study of current, former, and new elderly volunteers: A comparison of developmental and trait models of personality. Journal ofAdult Development, 5, 2 19-230. Pals, J. L. (2006a). Constructing the "springboard effect": Causal connections, self-making, and growth within the life story. In D. P. McAdams, R. Josselson, & A. Leiblich (Eds.), Identity and story: Creating self in narrative (pp. 175-200). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Pals, J. L. (2006b). Narrative identity processing of difficult life experiences: Pathways of person­ ality development and positive self-transformation in adulthood. Journal of Personality, 74 , 1079-1109. Pasupathi, M. (2001). The social construction of the personal past and its implications for adult development. Psychological Bulletin, 127, 651-672. Pasupathi, M., Alderman, K., & Shaw, D. (2007). Talking the talk: Collaborative remembering and self-perceived expertise. Discourse Processes, 43, 55-77. Piaget, J. (1970). Piaget's theory. In P. Mussen (Ed.), Carmichael's manual of child psychology (pp. 703-732). New York: Wiley. Prencipe, A., & Zelazo, P. D. (2005). Development of affective decision making for self and other. Psychological Science, 16, 501-505. Roccas, S., Sagiv, L., Schwartz, S. H., & Knafo, A. (2002). The Big Five personality factors and personal values. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28, 789-80l. Ryff, C . D . , & Keyes, C . L. M. ( 1995). The structure of psychological well-being revisited. Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 69, 7 19-727. Sheldon, K. M., & Kasser, T. (2001). Getting older, getting better? Personal strivings and psychoso­ cial maturity across the life-span. Developmental Psychology, 34, 491-50l. Thorne, A., McLean, K. C., & Lawrence, A. M. (2004). When remembering is not enough: Reflecting on self-defining memories in late adolescence. Journal of Personality, 72, 5 13-542. Truluck, J. E., & Courtenay, B. C. (2002). Ego development and the influence of gender, age, and educational levels among older adults. Educational Gerontology, 28, 325-336. Vaillant, G. E. ( 1977). Adaptation to life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Westenberg, P. M., & Block, J. ( 1993). Ego development and individual differences in personality. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65, 792-800. Westenberg, P. M., & Gjerde, P. F. (1999). Ego development during the transition from adoles­ cence to young adulthood: A 9-year longitudinal study. Journal ofResearch in Personality, 33, 233-252.

19 Homonegativity and the Lesbian Self: Portraits of the Ego as Either Transcender or Occluder of Negative Social Stereotypes Ed de St. Aubin and Kim Skerven One way that the ego might be considered "noisy" is if it has negative elements clanging around within it that stifle one's psychosocial health, productivity, and maturity. In this chapter, some negative elements of the noisy ego are conceptualized to stem from social stigmas and stereotypes that partly shape one's understanding of self. We are interested in the self-society link in terms of how the individual ego processes social stigmas within its mix of ingredients and how this influences ego functioning. Focusing on lesbians, we examine the extent to which society's homonegativity becomes internalized at the indi­ vidual level of ego functioning. We chose to focus on lesbians, in part, because this population is ideal for highlighting the complex connection between self and society. Because lesbians are stigmatized in our heterosexist society, they may be faced with potentially stifling stereotypes. The ego must negotiate the manner in which social stigmas are processed and possibly incorporated into one's self-image. For our sample of self-identified lesbians, we posit that a quiet ego is relatively free of the raucous negative stereotypes. The quiet lesbian ego does not deny or avoid the stigma being hurled at it; instead, it has processed and moved past such negativity. These women can be considered ego transcenders, because their egos operate above or beyond societal homonegativity. The noisy lesbian ego, however, is rife with such negative facets. Societal homonegativity has been internalized into discordant components of the ego that darken one's image of self. We refer to these women as occluders because the ego has ab­ sorbed the negative lesbian stereotypes, becoming blocked from moving toward psychosocial health. In this chapter, we empirically examine these postulates. First, we test whether ego transcenders (i.e., lesbians who scored low on a measure of inter­ nalized homonegativity) are indeed relatively more healthy (as measured by four indexes of quality oflife), productive (as measured by two measures of gen­ erativity), and mature (in terms of ego developmental level) than ego occluders (i.e., lesbians who scored high on internalized homonegativity). We also exam-

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ine the relation between internalized homonegativity and locus of control-the extent to which one believes that experiences and performance are determined by the self, powerful others, or chance. Finally, we address the manner in which transcenders (who have quiet egos) and occluders (who have noisy egos) differ in terms of identity as manifested in self-defining autobiographical life stories. Evidence from these five areas of investigation provide sketches that coalesce into portraits of ego transcenders and ego occluders. First, however, we need to explicate our understanding of the ego and briefly review research relevant to internalized homonegativity.

The Ego

We conceptualize the ego as a collection of processes, primarily those concerned with regulation (of affect, self-presentation, and competing desires), synthesis (of experiences), and interpretation (of self, others, and institutions; see chaps. 1, 18, and 21, this volume). We think about the ego more in terms of what it does than what it is, and our perspective is influenced by the interrelated intel­ lectual traditions of W. James, Erikson, and Loevinger. W. James ( 1890, 1892) presented a model that distinguishes the "I" from the "Me." He equated the ego with the I component of the self-the subjective thinker, the ongoing processor of experiences. The Me is the product of the selfing endeavor-the object that is known, the set of images that one has of one's self. In our scheme, we attempt to understand the manner in which the processing ego (i.e., I) of lesbians is in­ fluenced by social stigma and how this may affect ego functions, including the construction of an identity (i.e., Me). Erikson wrote of ego an d i dentity as s e parate yet interrelated facets of personality. In his life cycle model of human development, he (Erikson, 1950) tracked the movement ofthe ego through eight phases. Here is Erikson's ( 1950) description of the ego: Between the id and the superego, then, the ego dwells. Consistently balanc­ ing and warding off extreme ways of the other two, the ego keeps tuned to the reality of the day, testing perceptions, selecting memories, governing action, and otherwise integrating the individual's capacities of orienting and planning. (p. 193)

Erikson began this description rooted in Freudian dynamics, but by the end of this quote he has credited the ego with several attributes. For Erikson, the ego is the central organizing agent; again, it is about processing. Ego develop­ ment occurs as a result of both evolving cognitive-emotional capacities of the individual and emergent social expectations. Let us use midlife (the age of our sample) ego development as an exam­ ple. Erikson ( 1959) suggested that the ego of the midlife adult is striving for generativity (Stage 7 in his 8-stage theory of ego development), a mode that positively affects younger and future generations. An adult of this age has the cognitive-emotional ability to care for wide groups of others. Furthermore, there is a social press felt regarding expectations to engage in activities such

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as mentoring, creating, or passing on traditions. We believe that ego occluders, midlife lesbians with high internalized homonegativity, will be less generative than lesbians who are not dominated by these negative lesbian stereotypes. The internalization of social stigma is associated with stifled ego development and less generative modes. Finally, Loevinger's model of ego development complements Erikson's ( 1950) psychosocial theory, because she charted the trajectory of the ego as an increasingly more sophisticated and accurate frame of reference (see Hy & Loevinger, 1996). For Loevinger ( 1976), the ego is "the striving to master, to integrate, to make sense of experience" (p. 5). As we mentioned earlier in this chapter, the ego is a collection of processes. Loevinger ( 1987) described a series of ego stages, each of which is characterized by a unique constellation of impulse control, interpersonal mode, and conscious preoccupations. Higher stages are marked by the acceptance of paradox, an understanding of human interdependency, and a striving for self-fulfillment over achievement (Hy & Loevinger, 1996). Within this framework, we contend that the more evolved ego is likely to be a quiet ego, free of the noisy and smothering effects of internal­ ized homonegativity. We have briefly highlighted the historical roots of our conceptualization of the ego. Although further discussion is well beyond the scope of this chapter, there are plenty of contemporary research programs that are congruent with our view of the ego, addressing topics such as Loevinger's ( 1987) ego stages (Bauer & McAdams, 2004; King & Noelle, 2005), ego defense mechanisms (Cramer, 2006), Erikson's ( 1950) stages (de St. Aubin, McAdams, & Kim, 2004; Georgios & Bosma, 2005; J. James & Zarrett, 2005), and affect regulation (Tamir, 2005). Given that we view the ego as a collection of regulatory, synthe­ sizing, and interpretive processes, we believe that many methods can be used to assess the dynamics of the ego.

Internalized Homonegativity

One set of ego dynamics that must be navigated by people who belong to sexual minority groups are those involving the processing (the Jamesian "J") of rel­ evant social stigmas, because these influence the construction of a personal identity (the Me). The concept of the looking-glass self (Cooley, 1902) applies to all individuals in that identity is, in part, based on beliefs about others' per­ ceptions and judgments of who one is. For members of sexual minority groups, much of the "others' perceptions and judgments" in this formula is defined by prevailing societal heterosexism (Skerven & de St. Aubin, 2006). Homonega­ tivity is an irrational hatred, disapproval, or fear of homosexual people and their culture. Internalization refers to consciously or unconsciously adopting the beliefs, values, and attitudes of others. Thus, internalized homonegativity is the extent to which a lesbian or gay man adopts these negative perspectives into views of one's self. Empirical studies have demonstrated many negative correlates of inter­ nalized homonegativity, including shame (Allen & Oleson, 1999), depression and anxiety (Igartua, Gill, & Montoro, 2003), substance abuse (Amadio &

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Chung, 2004), demoralization (Herek, Cogan, Gillis, & Glunt, 1997), and lower perceived social support (McGregor et aI. , 200 1). We used the Lesbian Internal­ ized Homophobia (LIH) Scale (Szymanski & Chung, 2001, 2003; Szymanski, Chung, & Balsam, 2001 ) to assess internalized homonegativity in our sample (Skerven & de St. Aubin, 2006). Missing from this research literature is a larger edifice of theory that elu­ cidates the complex self-society link. We believe that the ego lies at the crux of this link. Building theory concerning ego processes will help us to see the connection between internalized homonegativity and related concepts, such as stereotype threat, the felt risk of being viewed through the lens of a negative stereotype (Steele, 1997). Our attempt to begin that theory construction begins here, as we examine internalized homonegativity in a sample of lesbians as it relates to other ego functions and psychosocial quality of life. Along with the measures we describe later, we administered the LIH to a sample of 225 self-identified lesbians in the greater metropolitan area of a moderately large midwestern city (for details, see Skerven & de St. Aubin, 2006).

The Psychosocial Health of Transcenders and Occluders

We start with the fundamental question of whether the quiet lesbian ego is associated with psychosocial health. Instead of examining mental illness or pathology as indexes of maladjustment, we draw from the spirit of positive psy­ chology and focus on wellness. Along with the LIH, all participants completed four measures of psychosocial health: the Psychological Well-Being Scale (Ryff, 1989), the Social Well-Being Scale (Keyes, 1998), the Overall Happiness Mea­ sure (de St. Aubin & McAdams, 1995), and the Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985). There is a relatively strong and consistent relation between internalized homonegativity and psychosocial well-being (see Table 19.1). The t values re­ ported in the far right-hand column of Table 19. 1 are based on a median split. Occluders are participants who scored above the median on the LIH; tran­ scenders scored below the median. There is solid evidence that the quiet ego of the transcenders, an ego with less internalized homonegativity, is associated with psychosocial health. These women, compared with the occluders, are more likely to report happiness and satisfaction with their lives, to find vital social coherence and integration, and to believe that one is creating a meaningful life.

The Generativity of Transcenders and Occluders

As noted earlier, the hallmark of the healthy midlife ego for Erikson ( 1950) can be seen in generativity. Much of the current scholarship on generativity stems from the seven-faceted model proposed by McAdams and de St. Aubin ( 1992, 1998; see also de St. Aubin et aI., 2004) and the quantification methods stem­ ming from it. Two scales that target different components of the model were used in our study: the Loyola Generativity Scale (which measures generative

HOMONEGATMTY AND THE LESBIAN SELF

Table 19.1.

215

Relations Among Internalized Homonegativity and Well-Being,

Generativity, Ego Maturity, and Locus of Control Mean for high- Mean for lowLIH group LIH group Correlation (occluders) (transcenders) with LIH

Measure Well-being Personal well-being

-.40**

Group differences

t

df

83.99 60.51

89.63 68.05

4.27*** 219

24.12

26.53

5.75*** 219

Satisfaction with life

-.50** -.32**

Overall happiness

-.26**

7.17

7.67

2.70*** 217 2.30** 215

-.37** -. 15*

37.88 29.49

43.72 32.63

4.96*** 2 1 9 2.04* 2 19

4.86

5.34

2.74**

83

.31**

34.83 20.03

35.70 14.69

0.69 -3.45**

81 77

.23*

17.21

13.67

-2.32*

81

Social well-being

Generativity Generative concern Generative action Ego maturity Ego development Locus of control Internality Powerful others Chance

-.35*** -.19

Note. LIH Lesbian Internalized Homophobia Scale. *p � .05. **p � .01. ***p � .001. =

concern) and the Generativity Behavioral Checklist (which measures gen­ erative action). Reviews of generativity scholarship can be found in McAdams (200 1) and de St. Aubin et al. (2004). Included in his list of possible causes of stagnation (thwarted generativ­ ity), Erikson ( 1959) discussed "faulty identifications with parents" and a lack of a "belief in the species" (p. 103). Most lesbians have heterosexual parents, so total identification is not possible and, in fact, not ideal. Erikson ( 1950) also discussed the importance of role repudiation, that is, selective negation of cer­ tain aspects of adult role models. It may be that the women we describe as tran­ scenders have been able to process the identification disconnect surrounding sexuality within a balance of other positive parental identifications. Occluders, plagued by a negative selfing process, may be unable to move beyond this dis­ connect. Likewise, the occluders may struggle with this "belief in the species" that Erikson ( 1959) and others (Van De Water & McAdams, 1989) posed as central to generativity. Faith in the worthwhileness of the human enterprise would be difficult to maintain for a person whose salient ego elements capture the self-condemning and heterosexist views of society. As can be seen in Table 19.1, ego transcenders did score significantly higher than occluders on these two indexes of generativity, particularly on the Loyola Generativity Scale. Although the particular causal links are not clear, lesbians who were low in internalized homonegativity seemed better able to successfully negotiate the generative path of adulthood. It appears that lesbi-

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ans high in internalized homonegativtity, those with noisy egos, were not as successful in meeting this psychosocial hallmark of adult productivity.

The Ego Maturity of Transcenders and Occluders

Loevinger developed the Washington University Sentence Completion Test for Ego Development to classify individuals into a maturity stage (Hy & Loevinger, 1996). This semiprojective technique, based on completion of sentence stems, was included in Phase 2 of our project, in which we administered additional measures to 86 of the original (Phase 1 ) participants. For these women, the average ego development score was 5.4, with a range of 4 to 7 and a standard deviation of 0. 73. Table 19. 1 reveals that our predictions here were supported: There is a significant negative relation between internalized homonegativity and ego development. Furthermore, the 41 women we classified as transcend­ ers scored significantly higher on ego development than did the 42 occluders (3 protocols were not used because of missing data). All but 5 women scored within either Stage 4, 5, or 6, so it makes sense to explore the distinctions among these stages as we discern what separates a quiet ego from a noisy one in terms of ego maturity. Level 4 is the conformist stage. The frame of reference is a conventional one in which rules and the authorities that impose them are viewed as accept­ able without question. Major strivings are toward loyalty and social approval. In the selfaware stage (Level 5), the image of "what I am" is untied from "what I ought to be." There is a focus on the inner life of individuals; interpersonal modes are understood in terms of feelings as well as the actions that dominated Level 4 perspectives. Finally, the defining features of Level 6 (the conscientious stage) are self-evaluated standards. The adult is now postconventional in that judgments regarding right and wrong, good and bad, and so on, originate from internal standards, not social mores. Participants who were classified as ego occluders were, on average, between the conformist and self-aware levels of ego development. The transcenders were more firmly rooted in the self-aware level, with some heading toward the conscientious stage.

The Locus of Control of Transcenders and Occluders

The concept of internalized homonegativity seems closely aligned to locus of control. Building on Rotter ( 1966), Levinson ( 1981) wrote of the extent to which one believes that life experiences and outcomes are determined by internality (i.e., one's own agency), powerful others, or chance. His measure, which we used in Phase 2 of our study, includes subscales for each of these three con­ structs. We hypothesized that ego occluders would score higher on the power­ ful-others dimension, whereas transcenders would score higher on internality. Lesbians who are strongly influenced by the negative stereotypes held by others ( occIuders) are more likely to operate under the assumption that others exert control over their life experiences. Conversely, lesbians who assume that

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they determine their own courses (internality) are likely to have ego dynamics that operate free from social stigma (transcenders). Here, our predictions were not completely supported (see Table 19.1). We were correct in our thoughts regarding the relation between internalized ho­ monegativity and the powerful-others dimension of locus of control. However, there was no significant relation for the internality (self-agency) dimension. It is interesting that the construct of chance-the belief that random forces de­ termine one's experiences-was associated with internalized homonegativity such that ego occluders scored significantly higher than ego transcenders. One possible explanation for this is that occluders tend to possess a lower sense of self-agency; in turn, lower levels of self-agency may lead these women to feel affected by an oppressive environment, thus increasing their vulnerability to feeling that chance factors are more influential than internality.

The Identity of Transcenders and Occluders

Recall that W. James ( 1890, 1892) wrote about one function of the I (ego) be­ ing the construction of a me (identity). We follow McAdams (2006a, 2006b; see also chap. 21, this volume) and other narrative psychologists in looking to self­ defining life stories as a window into the adult identity. For example, Lori, a 32-year-oldl participant in our study, scored second highest of all 225 women on the LIH measure, marking her as an ego occluder. When asked to write a story about a turning point in her life, Lori wrote the following: My turning point was when I stopped people from saying just anything to me . . . . You can only feel like a punch in the face when someone tells you your [sic] no kind of mother, you're a pervert, or you need to do this or that. . . . Which pissed me off to the point where I cursed out everyone, be­ cause I was tired of my feelings being hurt, so I made that final stand and gained my respect as a person. It may say it taught me to be a better person inside, and out. To be not only even smarter, but also yet the more wiser; and to speak up so I may be heard.

Given the same prompt, 43-year-old Sandi, an ego transcender who scored extremely low on the LIH scale, responded with the following: This is one specific to the ending of a 13-year relationship, one which I had considered a lifetime commitment . . . . When it ended, I was in shock, despair, everything seemed to slip away [and] I just wanted to go . . . as far away as I could from everything that was "our" life [and] start over. After about a year of being a recluse . . . I started to go out, meet people, I found that I could be myself without her. . . . Some friends told me that I looked so happy, I thought I had been before, but I knew that I was in a "new place," I have felt more resolved to improve each day, make better of my relationships 1 Names

and identifying information of study participants have been altered for anonymity.

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[and] cherish each day as I now understand how easily it can all slip away if you do not pay attention.

Note that there are some similarities in the stories. Both end with a de­ cidedly positive remark-about becoming wiser (her words) for Lori and being more enlightened for Sandi. There are differences as well, however. Lori's tone is bitter, and the content of her story speaks to how the antipathy of others has harmed her. Sandi's story is more reflective, centering on complex internal states such as security, despair, escapism, and resolve. Her ego is quiet in that it operates without the clanging distraction of negative social stereotypes and the resulting self-loathing that characterizes ego occluders. We have started to examine the life stories of all of our participants and to focus on the differences between those written by transcenders and occlud­ ers. Although this work is still in the preliminary stages, we are beginning to discern demarcations. Occluders seem more likely to write stories that pit self against other (individuals or generalized groups). The transcenders tend not to do this, writing stories characterized by an awareness of coping and defense mechanisms and what we refer to as experiential digestion (i.e., an author's tendency to connect the episode to a change in perspective or behavior). Often, the episode is understood as transformative, changing the author in an endur­ ing way. Our goal is to systematically content-analyze the self-stories for ad­ ditional themes. At this nascent stage of that work, we consider our ideas about these differences as speculative.

Discussion

One frustrating aspect of our work has been the inability oflanguage to capture the complexity of ego functioning as it applies to our sample of lesbians. There is a disappointing reification that occurs when one begins to place labels on such amorphous phenomena, and this is exacerbated as we move to the level of numbers. Referring to a woman as an "occluder," or to one's ego maturity as a "5" feels a bit absurd, and definitely disrespectfuL At the same time, we move forward, fully aware of the limitations of our approach. Lesbians who tend to internalize heterosexist stereotypes differ from those who do not. The psychological portrait we are beginning to paint of the occluder, one with a noisy ego, depicts a lesbian who is relatively low in psy­ chosocial health, generativity, and ego maturity. She is also relatively high in the belief that powerful others and chance determine her experiences and out­ comes. Finally, she is likely to have constructed an identity life story defined by dark tones, antagonistic tensions between self and other, and a rather concrete understanding of the human experience. This is a very different portrait than the one emerging for ego transcenders. These lesbians tend to be low in the belief that others and chance control one's destiny. They relate self-defining narratives that incorporate an awareness of multifarious internal states, and a self-context dialectic plot that depicts experiences as advancing self develop­ ment. Their experience of self development is based around processes consis-

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tent with a quiet ego, including psychosocial health, generativity, and higher levels of ego maturity. The research reported here is based on our study of self-identified lesbians. Although there are several good reasons to examine lesbians, our approach is based on the logic that this group represents an intensified microcosm by which to understand the self-society connection. We examine lesbians to bet­ ter understand the universal dynamics of ego-that which lies at the intersec­ tion of self and society. The noisy ego, in this view, contains a cacophony of negative images and sentiments drawn from one's perception of how others view them. Such self-damaging dynamics occur in lesbians (occluders), and in any person for whom the perception of how others view them paralyzes their self-enlightenment. For example, to what extent does an Asian American man incorporate negative social stereotypes of his sex and ethnicity into his im­ age of self? And how might that process be related to psychosocial health and adult maturity? The quiet ego, however, is relatively unencumbered by an individual's perception of how others view him or her. Our lesbian transcend­ ers are an amazingly resistant group. Even within this heterosexist society, the transcenders thrive, enjoying psychosocial health and adult maturity. The quiet ego, in our view, is one that muffles the swarming social stigmas and gets on with the business of living a healthy life.

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Journal ofResearch in Personality, 23, 435-449.

20 Self-Development Through Selflessness: The Paradoxical Process of Growing Wiser Monika Ardelt

o Divine Master, grant that I may not so much seek to be consoled

As to console; To be understood, as to understand; To be loved, as to love. For it is in giving that we receive, It is in pardoning that we are pardoned, And it is in dying that we are born to eternal life. -The Peace Prayer of St. Francis, by an anonymous Norman, c. 1915

If wisdom is defined as a combination of cognitive (an understanding of life and the desire to know the truth), reflective (the ability and willingness to look at phenomena and events from different perspectives), and affective (sympathetic and compassionate love for others) personality qualities (Ar­ delt, 1997, 2003, 2004; Clayton & Birren, 1980; Manheimer, 1992), then truly wise people, such as Jesus Christ or the Buddha, can also be described as the most psychologically developed persons. They are mature; psychologically healthy; autonomous; fully liberated from all outside and inside forces; and are, therefore, the masters of their own fate (Ardelt, 2000; Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, 1990; Kekes, 1983 ; Levenson & Crumpler, 1996; Pascual-Leone, 1990). Because people who grow in wisdom gradually come to accept reality as it is (and not as they would like it to be), including the negative side of their personalities, they are able to learn from their experiences, which allows them to overcome their negative tendencies and to gain inner peace through the de­ velopment of equanimity (Hart, 1987). Hence, they tend to be less affected by external events and internal drives than other people, which results in greater autonomy and control (Ardelt, 2005; Kekes, 1983; Levenson & Crumpler, 1996; Pascual-Leone, 1990). Yet wise individuals are also selfless; that is, they have transcended the egotistical self and feel more part of the ocean instead of an The research was supported by a Brookdale National Fellowship and a grant from National Insti­ tutes of HealthlNational Institute on Aging (R03 AG 14855-01).

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individual wave (Carmody & Carmody, 1994; Levenson, Aldwin, & Cupertino, 2001; Takahashi, 2000). How can we explain the paradox that the highest level of self-development requires a quieting of the ego and the transcendence of the self? Quests for self-realization, self-actualization, maturity, and autonomy, and even the quest for wisdom might initially be motivated by a desire for a stron­ ger self, yet it is precisely through the process of self-development and self­ knowledge that people start to realize the illusory nature of the phenomenal self. The self is not a substance, an unchangeable essence, or an "individual," but a construct (Metzinger, 2003) that is created through social interaction (Cooley, 1922; Mead & Morris, 1934). According to the liberative model ofadult development (Levenson et aI., 2001 ; Levenson & Crumpler, 1996), the self may be thought of as a construct of attachments and aversions, which need to be transcended. Self-transcendence can be achieved through nonattachment, patience, and in particular self-observation and self-knowledge. A person in search of wisdom will eventually come to the realization that what is conven­ tionally called the "self," the "I," or the "ego" is an illusion that enables one to construct a stable image of oneself (Carmody & Carmody, 1994; Levitt, 1999; Takahashi, 2000). It is the attachment to the self that creates the ego. Through the practice of self-examination, self-reflection, and mindfulness (Baer, Smith, & Allen, 2004; Brown & Ryan, 2003) the ego grows quiet, which allows a glimpse into reality beyond the self and consequently results in greater wisdom (Levenson et aI., 2001). It should be noted that wise people's selflessness is not equivalent to low self-esteem or low self-confidence (Helson & Srivastava, 2002). Maslow ( 1970) even maintained that "the best way to transcend the ego is via having a strong identity" (p. 200). A dialectical relationship exists between selflessness and self-knowledge insofar that only individuals who know who they are can over­ come their self-centeredness (Levenson & Crumpler, 1996; Levitt, 1999). To illustrate the process of self-development through a quieting of the ego, semistructured interviews with three older adults who scored relatively high on the Cognitive Wisdom Dimension, the Reflective Wisdom Dimension, and especially the Affective Wisdom Dimension of the Three-Dimensional Wisdom Scale (3D-WS; Ardelt, 2003) were analyzed in depth. Respondents were asked about their current religion and spirituality, how their religion and spirituality had changed over the years, and how they coped with crises and obstacles in life. The 3D-WS conceptualizes and operationalizes wisdom as a combination of cognitive, reflective, and affective personality characteristics (Ardelt, 2003), based on Clayton and Birren's ( 1980) pioneering wisdom research . The Cogni­ tive Wisdom Dimension is defined as comprising the search for a deeper truth (Osbeck & Robinson, 2005), which necessitates a comprehension of the signifi­ cance and deeper meaning of phenomena and events, particularly with regard to intrapersonal and interpersonal matters (Ardelt, 2000; Blanchard-Fields & Norris, 1995; Chandler & Holliday, 1990; Kekes, 1983; Sternberg, 1990). It is measured by the respondent's capability and desire to understand a situation or phenomenon thoroughly, knowledge of the positive and negative aspects of human nature, acknowledgment of ambiguity and uncertainty, and ability to

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make important decisions despite life's unpredictability and uncertainties. The Reflective Wisdom Dimension represents mindful reflection; self-examination; self-awareness; and self-insight, which is a prerequisite for a deeper and unbi­ ased view of life. It is assessed by the respondent's capability and willingness to look at phenomena and events from multiple perspectives and an absence of subjectivity and projections. A transcendence of subjectivity and projections is normally accompanied by a decrease in self-centeredness and a quieting of the ego, which makes possible a more thorough and deeper understanding of human nature and reality (Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, 1990; Kekes, 1995; Levitt, 1999; Taranto, 1989). A quieting of the ego and a better understanding of the complexities of human nature, in turn, tend to increase general senti­ ments of goodwill and sympathetic and compassionate love for others, which describe the Affective Wisdom dimension (Achenbaum & Orwoll, 1991; Clayton & Birren, 1980; Csikszentmihalyi & Rathunde, 1990; Holliday & Chandler, 1986; Levitt, 1999; Pascual-Leone, 1990). Although the quieting of the ego is achieved primarily through the Reflective Wisdom Dimension and is likely to result in an increase in the Cognitive Wisdom Dimension, it is assumed that one of the major characteristics of a quiet ego is a feeling of sympathetic and compassionate love for others. This characteristic is assessed by the Affective Dimension of the 3D-WS, which measures the presence of positive, caring, and nurturant emotions and behavior and the absence of indifferent or negative emotions and behavior toward others.

Method

In this section, I describe how respondents for a larger quantitative study on Personality and Aging Well were initially recruited, how the three dimen­ sions of Wisdom were measured, how the three respondents with a relatively quiet ego were chosen from the larger pool of study participants, and how the semistructured qualitative interviews with them were analyzed. I also exam­ ine how the demographic characteristics and religiosity of the three selected respondents are related to the three dimensions of Wisdom in the larger initial sample.

Procedure Between December 1997 and June 1998, 180 older adults between age 52 and 87 (M 7 1 years, SD 8.04) were recruited from 18 civic, community, or church groups in north central Florida to take part in a survey titled Personality and Aging Well, the primary purpose of which was the development and assess­ ment of the 3D-WS (Ardelt, 2003). ApprOximately 10 months later, 123 of the respondents participated in a follow-up survey. Between September 2000 and February 2001, 16 of those respondents were selected for a qualitative inter­ view study called Aging and Dying Well on the basis of their gender, race, and socioeconomic status. Ten of the 16 participants were women, 10 were White, 6 were African American, 8 had a high socioeconomic status, 15 belonged to a =

=

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Christian denomination, and 1 participant was not affiliated with any religion. The respondents' ages ranged between 65 and 87 years (M = 75 years, SD = 7.47). In semistructured in-depth interviews, which lasted between 40 and 120 minutes (M 72.5 minutes, SD 23.09), participants were asked about their religion and spirituality, attitudes about death and dying, and recent positive and negative events in their life. All interviews were audiotaped and transcribed verbatim. =

=

WISDOM MEASURE. The Cognitive Wisdom dimension of the 3D-WS (Ardelt, 2003) is the average of 14 items, all of which measure the absence of this char­ acteristic, such as "Ignorance is bliss" and "People are either good or bad." The Reflective Wisdom dimension is the average of 12 items that assess either the respondent's ability and willingness to look at phenomena and events from dif­ ferent perspectives, such as "I always try to look at all sides of a problem" and "When I'm upset at someone, I usually try to 'put myself in his or her shoes' for awhile," or the absence of self-examination, self-awareness, and self-insight and the presence of subjectivity and projections, represented by items such as "Things often go wrong for me by no fault of my own" and "When I look back on what's happened to me, I can't help feeling resentful." The Affective Wis­ dom dimension is the average of 13 items that measure positive, caring, and nurturant emotions and behavior toward others, such as "Sometimes I feel a real compassion for everyone" and "If I see people in need, I try to help them one way or another," or indifferent or negative emotions and behavior toward others, such as "I am annoyed by unhappy people who just feel sorry for them­ selves" and "It's not really my problem if others are in trouble and need help." All items were assessed on one of two scales that ranged from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree) and from 1 (definitely true ofmyself> to 5 (not true of my­ self>. The scores of items that measure the absence ofthe Cognitive, Reflective, and Affective Wisdom characteristics were first reversed before the average of the items was computed. The reliability coefficient Cronbach's alpha for the Cognitive Dimension, Reflective Dimension, and Affective Wisdom Dimension were .78, .75, and .74, respectively, in the 1997-1998 survey and .85, .71, and .72, respectively, in the 10-month follow-up survey. The three wisdom dimen­ sions were significantly and moderately correlated, ranging from .30 to .50 in the 1997-1998 survey and from .33 to .48 in the 10-month follow-up survey. The lowest correlation was between the Cognitive Wisdom Dimension and the Affective Wisdom Dimension. A detailed account of the development and em­ pirical assessment of the 3D-WS can be found elsewhere (Ardelt, 2003), yet I should mention that the reliability and construct, content, predictive, discrimi­ nant, and convergent validity of the 3D-WS were satisfactory. SELECTION AND DESCRIPTION OF CASES. Participants in the qualitative inter­ view study who received a score of 4 or higher on the Affective Wisdom Dimen­ sion of the 3D-WS (Ardelt, 2003) in both surveys and a score of 4 or higher on at least one of the other wisdom dimensions were considered exemplars of a quiet ego and therefore were selected for an in-depth analysis of their interviews. Only 3 of the 16 cases met this criterion. One of the 3 respondents scored consistently above 4 on all three dimensions of wisdom in both surveys. A

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second respondent received a score of 4 or higher on all three wisdom dimen­ sions in the first survey and on the Reflective Wisdom Dimension and Affective Wisdom Dimension in the follow-up survey_ A third respondent scored above 4 only on the Affective Wisdom Dimension in the first survey but had scores of above 4 on the Cognitive Wisdom Dimension and Affective Wisdom Dimen­ sion in the follow-up survey. All 3 respondents were highly religious Mrican Americans with a graduate degree, and 2 of the 3 were men. Indeed, in the 1997-1998 survey, years of schooling was positively correlated with the Cogni­ tive Wisdom Dimension (r = .42, p < .001), Reflective Wisdom Dimension (r = . 16, p = .038), and Affective Wisdom Dimension (r = . 16, p = .037), and there was a slight trend for Mrican Americans to have higher average scores on the Affective Wisdom Dimension (M = 3.71) than Whites (M = 3.56), t(175) = 1.80, p = .074. However, women (M = 3.65) tended to score significantly higher than men (M = 3.48) on the Affective Wisdom Dimension at the trend level, t(176) = -1.96, p = .052, whereas men (M 3.63) tended to score significantly higher than women (M = 3.37) on the Cognitive Wisdom dimension, t(176) = 2.76, p = .006. Similarly, religiosity, which was assessed in the follow-up survey by Allport and Ross's ( 1967) Intrinsic and Extrinsic Religious Orientation Scales, does not appear to be a prerequisite for wisdom, although all 3 of the selected respondents had relatively high scores on intrinsic religiosity. Yet an intrinsic religious orientation, which indicates a strong commitment to God and a reli­ gious life, was positively related only to the Affective Wisdom Dimension (r = .26, p = .004). It was unrelated to the Reflective Wisdom Dimension (r = .08, p = .366) and negatively related to the Cognitive Wisdom dimension (r = -.23, p = .0 12). Hence, wisdom, assessed as the average of the 3 dimensions, was not significantly related to an intrinsic religious orientation (r = .02, p = .862). By contrast, an extrinsic religious orientation that characterizes people who use their religion for extrinsic ends, such as companionship, respectability, and relief in times of sorrow, was negatively correlated with the Cognitive Wisdom Dimension (r = -.35, p < .001), Reflective Wisdom Dimension (r = -.33, p < .001), and Affective Wisdom Dimension (r = -. 17, p .065) and wisdom as a combina­ tion of the three dimensions (r = -.36, p < .001). The three individuals who were selected for the analysis of their quieter egos were Earl, a single 7 1-year-old retired schoolteacher and school ad­ ministrator; James, a married 77-year-old retired school administrator with four children; and Fay, a married 69-year-old retired schoolteacher without any children. To protect the respondents' identities, all of these names are pseudonyms. =

=

Analysis The three qualitative interviews were analyzed in depth, using the method of analytic induction (Katz, 2001). The analysis of the first person (Earl) served to construct a preliminary theory of characteristics of elders with relatively quiet egos. The analyses of the other two persons helped to refine, expand, and modify the theory so that all three fit the theoretical framework. Although respondents were not asked directly about their quiet egos, because this was

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not the purpose of the original qualitative interview study, the analyses made clear that the three elders described the same pathways to a quieter ego and similar expressions of selflessness.

Attainment and Expressions of a Quieter Ego

The in-depth analyses of the qualitative interviews revealed that the three el­ ders who scored relatively high on the three dimensions of the 3D-WS (Ardelt, 2003), particularly the Affective Wisdom dimension, attained a quieter ego through spiritual growth, listening to one's inner voice, and the development of humility. They expressed their quieter egos through a commitment to serve, a commitment to give, and ethical conduct.

Pathways to a Quieter Ego The analyses of the qualitative interviews showed that the spirituality of the three elders grew deeper over the years, which enabled them to listen to their inner voice and to follow "God's" will. This process resulted in a decrease in self­ centeredness and the development of humility and a quieter ego. SPIRITUAL GROWTH. All three respondents reported that their religious and spiritual beliefs had grown stronger over the years. Earl said, I've gotten stronger [spiritually]. I've gotten more involved . . . . You learn, just like a baby when you're walking. When you're just coming aboard, you've got to learn. As you're learning, your faith is becoming stronger. Then you become more personal with God, okay?

James explained how his religious spirituality had developed over the years: It was a matter of progressive growth. When you first convert you're young, just like you're young in chronological age, and you have to grow in strength and faith. Along the way there are certain things that happen in your life, that if you associate with God in your Christian life, it will make you stron­ ger in the faith. You just become stronger and stronger. Some people say, "The weaker the physical, the stronger the spiritual." So you get stronger as you go along. . . . When you're young in life you're a radical. You've got your physical strength, and you depend on that a lot. As you grow older, a heart attack, arthritis, a wreck or something brings you closer to the spiritual. So as the physical gets weaker, the spiritual gets stronger until, I guess, when you're about my age, you're right there.

The loss of physical strength and the loss of overconfidence that are often pre­ dominant in youth might paradoxically facilitate the development of an inner spiritual strength that depends not on physical prowess or feelings of superior­ ity but on the confidence that one is a part of something larger than the self.

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Fay recounted how her faith in God had changed over the years. When she was young, she liked to party and to have a good time, she said; however, her divorce at age 32 turned her from a party girl into a devout Christian: I was young and full of life and energy, and my energies were always on the dance floor or parties or whatever. I was having a good time. I thought that that was the good time. I had my cigarettes and my beer or whatever, a cocktail, as they call it. If things happened I'd say "Oh Lord, why did this have to happen to me? Oh Lord, take that and don't let it happen to me." Now I understand. Things happen to everybody. And some things are sup­ posed to happen to you, because if you don't have anything happen, you don't need to pray. You don't know what to pray for. You don't have to pray. So we need to know how to pray. And when God gets ready for you to stop all that foolishness, He'll stop it. So yes, I've learned, and I've learned how to pray. I dropped all that, and He delivered me from all that.

Fay learned from experience that "life is not a rose garden" and that nobody is spared from suffering in this world, which is also the First Noble Truth that the Buddha taught CNanamoli, 2001). She credited her suffering for her spiritual awakening. After her divorce, however, she first felt that God had abandoned her. Her spiritual growth was the result of a difficult spiritual struggle that confronted her with her own self-centeredness and eventually led her to dedi­ cate her life to God. Fay stated that her faith "grows stronger in grace as I grow in age." She worked on becoming more loving and forgiving and on overcoming her nega­ tive emotions and feelings, such as anger and resentment. By first realizing and accepting her own faults, she was able to be more tolerant toward the faults of others, which paradoxically made it easier to overcome her negative tendencies: I'm sure you've heard the statement "I'll forgive it, but I won't forget it." I want to be able to forgive you, and I want to be able to forget it too. Maybe I don't forget it, but I don't want it to be a point of anger. I'll say "Oh, that's all right, you taught me a lesson." . . . I've forgiven you, and I have no malice about what you did to me. That's growing in grace. And I still love you, be­ cause I asked God to forgive me, because I'm not perfect. Let grace abound. He gives me grace, so I have to do the same for you.

Fay claimed that her love for others derived from her devotion to God. Because she had experienced God's forgiveness in her own life, she felt she was able to

forgive others who might have wronged her. Yet her new life was not restricted

to prayerful seriousness, devoid of all kinds of fun. On the contrary, Fay ex­ plained that her life was more satisfying now than when she was still a party girl. She said, "At one time, I didn't think you could have a good time being a Christian. . . . [But now] I have fun. I have a whole lot of fun. It's good clean fun. It's just so different. I just wish everybody could do it." WORLDLY AUTONOMY THROUGH INNER-CENTERED GUIDANCE. By dedicating their lives to God, the three elders appeared to have exchanged self-centered

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autonomy with inner-centered guidance. By feeling that they received guid­ ance from a higher power, they had greater freedom to act in socially indepen­ dent ways based on principles of ethics and morality. Listening to the ocean made them less dependent on the other waves around them (Levenson et aI., 200 1). James remarked, I feel that religion and your belief in God controls and guides every possible activity of your life, dealing with people, dealing with employment, deal­ ing with honesty and all of that. You become dedicated and something just guides you into the realm of the Lord God. You don't have to stop to think about it-well, I'm a Christian, am I going to do this in a Christian way or am I going to deal with this in a Christian-like manner. Being a Christian automatically guides you, and I feel that's forever with you once you get into that realm.

Similarly, Fay followed the maxim "Not my will, but thine, be done" (Luke 22:42). She said, "I do love the Lord, and I want to do as He would have me to do. I know that His will must be done. If He wills for me to do something, I'll do it." Trusting in God took the form of listening to one's inner voice to do the right thing. Earl said that by doing that he felt that God protected him from harm: "It's like the Holy Spirit guides me. I can sense when there's danger. I can sense really when . . . if I go someplace or something isn't quite right . . . you get a warning, and you move away from that." DEVELOPMENT OF HUMILITY . The three elders were able to learn from their own experiences, yet this resulted not in pride, arrogance, and a feeling of su­ periority but in the development of humility. Earl, Fay, and James learned to accept the fact that life consists of unpredictability and uncertainty and that dedicating one's life to God or a higher power allows for an underlying sense of security in a world that is inherently fragile and uncertain. For example, Earl said, "[I pray to God to] give me the strength and assurance that I need . . . . Hey, we are here by the grace of God." Humility is also necessary to realize that unanswered prayers can be a blessing in disguise. As James explained, Prayer is powerful and sometimes prayer unanswered is God's best gift to you . . . . Sometimes we pray for things we want and God answers with what you need. And then when you tum around and look after it, you say, well, that is better this way.

James realized that humans are too limited in nature to comprehend the con­ sequences of their prayers. By believing that God always has his best interest in mind, James felt he was able to wait patiently and humbly for God to give him what he needed and not necessarily what he wanted. A self-centered person typically cannot comprehend that an unanswered prayer or an unfulfilled wish can be a blessing in disguise, because a strong focus on the self with its desires and aversions makes the fulfillment of one's wishes of utmost importance. Only someone who has experienced the truth of "I know that I don't know" can accept the fact that wishes and desires might be

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shortsighted and even detrimental to one's own and others' well-being_ People who have reduced their self-centeredness (i.e., quieted their egos) are more likely to accept what has been given to them and might even realize that some­ times an unanswered prayer "is God's best gift." For individuals with quiet egos, the purpose of prayer is foremost not about requests but about praising God and giving thanks (Merton, 1972; Steindl-Rast, 1984). James said, "To me prayer is a way of praising God for being a good God and honoring Him as God and thanking Him." Similarly, Fay stated, "I thank God for life, health, and strength and for the ability to do things. He gives me strength and understanding. I thank Him for that. I thank God for everything." Hence, the development of humility inevitably led to gratitude, because the elders realized that all the positive things in their life were not necessarily deserved. As Earl remarked, Some of the things I get from God . . . I don't even want and I don't even earn them. We've got to pray and thank Him for them. Whatever I need, I get just about everything I need and more than I need. Hey, my cup runneth over around here.

People who dedicate their lives to God or a higher power and develop humility in the process may be able to control ego-centered emotions and im­ pulses, such as anger, rage, jealousy, envy, and greed, by focusing on the larger picture and on the more important things in life instead of on life's little an­ noyances (Teresa of Avila, 2000). Those individuals give their problems over to a higher power and allow themselves to be filled with positive emotions, such as love, joy, and patience, that are the result of a decreased self-centeredness and a quieting ofthe ego, which Earl described as "the fruits of the Holy Spirit." Fay told the interviewer that prayer for her is a "communication with God" that can lift her spirits, and James summed up his life by stating "I've had a happy life."

Expressions of a Quieter Ego Spiritual growth, inner-centered guidance, and the development of humility resulted in a quieter ego, which Earl, Fay, and James expressed through a com­ mitment to serve, a commitment to give, and ethical conduct in their lives. COMMITMENT TO SERVE. All three respondents were very involved and served in official positions in their respective churches. James was a president and deacon in his Baptist church and the treasurer for the Gideons, "Christian men who put the Bibles, the word of God, in as many places as possible." Earl was a deacon and the treasurer in his Baptist church and the president of the church choir. Fay was a missionary in her Methodist church, which entailed "going to visit the sick and doing [things] for people that need it, whatever we can do to help people, that's the first part of our mission. Also, to try to bring others to the Lord." LOVE THY NEIGHBOR: COMMITMENT TO GIVE. The three elders' involvement in

their church was manifested by their commitment to give. Earl stated,

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You've got to give God some of your time. You've got to become a tither once you become of age. You make your contribution to your church, make your contribution to society, and whatever you do, do those things, and if you want to do something else on the side, you do that, but make sure you make your contributions in those areas.

A commitment to give was not limited to monetary giving; it also extended to helping community members who were in trouble. However, this help was given not out of a feeling of superiority but with compassion, sympathy, and the encouragement to do better in the future. James remarked, You get that reputation [as an upright person] in the community, and you get a lot of calls, and you can help a lot of people, but who you help, you don't go out calling names and that kind of thing. That's between you and your God and that person. You might tell him, "Listen, Brother or Sister, this is just between you and me what happened. You want to straighten up." By that way, you call the people's conscience, and it can make a difference in their life. Water dropping on a rock will knock a hole in it, you see, so you keep tapping on it. You don't break it all at once.

James emphasized that he would not reprimand or publicly blame others for their failings. Instead, with sympathetic and compassionate love, he appealed to their inner goodness (conscience). By not giving up on others and continually reminding them of their inner goodness, he tried to help others to overcome their problems. People who have committed their lives to God or a higher power and have quieted their egos in the process are practicing the commandment to "Love thy neighbor" in a very real sense (Ardelt & Koenig, 2007). They strive to love and give to all people depending on need instead of on the personal characteristics of the receiver. Fay explained, Love is for everybody, because God is love, and so we ought to love one an­ other. If we show love to each other, then in that way they'll see the light in us . . . . God is love, and you don't hold anything in your pocket. You can't do that and be a Christian. No. We look beyond that, because God looks beyond our faults and finds our needs. So He gives us grace, you know. We have to love everybody.

Fay knew that loving everybody was not always easy, especially if people be­ haved in negative ways. However, even though it was sometimes difficult to realize, Fay felt that the commandment to "Love thy neighbor" should not ex­ clude anyone. She admitted, "It's hard to be patient. And it's hard to love some people too. It's hard, but you have to love them anyway." ETHICAL CONDUCT. The three elders believed that ethical conduct was most important for a meaningful life. Earl said, When you live and do the things, which you're supposed to be doing, as is prescribed already by God, this is life. This is living. When you're out there

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sinning, it's not really life. What you're doing is committing suicide. You're killing yourself. You're dead, spiritually dead.

For Fay, the meaning of life consisted of being a good role model, sharing what had been given by God and loving others. She explained, I want to be a light so that [others] can see that the light shines in me and they may want to do the same thing. Because sometimes all people need to do is see what you are doing, and then they can better understand what it's all about.

For James, ethical conduct was important not only for this life but also for the hereafter: I don't think you can earn your way into Heaven. That comes as a result of how you treat your neighbor, your faith, and your strength in God. Man looks at the outer thing. God looks at the heart, and when your heart is right and you love God, that afterlife will be a place of peace and happiness and the result from this world.

James believed that it was most important to love God and others and to have a pure heart. He felt that living a God-centered rather than a self-centered life was less about outward behavior than about inner beliefs and the motivations behind the behavior.

Conclusion

Levenson et al. (2001) suggested the following six practices for the cultivation of selflessness: (a) practicing generosity to achieve detachment from material possessions, (b) practicing patience as an antidote to anger and hostility, (c) self-discipline, (d) meditation, (e) commitment, and CD the avoidance or trans­ formation of negative personality tendencies. The three case studies in this chapter can be considered exemplars of those prescriptions. Earl, Fay, and James practiced generosity through their commitment to serve and to give, de­ veloped patience through the development of humility, learned self-discipline through spiritual growth and inner-centered guidance, engaged in sincere and personal prayer, and dedicated their lives to God, and in the process they transformed self-centered emotions and impulses into positive emotions, such as love and joy. The analyses showed that through mindful reflection, self­ examination, and a willingness to learn from experiences self-development ultimately leads to a quieting of the ego and to self-transcendence manifested in a concern for the well-being of all and an altruistic, all-encompassing love (Achenbaum & Orwoll, 1991; Helson & Srivastava, 2002; Levenson & Crum­ pler, 1996; Levitt, 1999; Maslow, 1970; Takahashi, 2000). Hence, the thoughts, feelings, and behavior of people who have quieted and transcended their egos are directed toward the benefit of all beings rather than only themselves and their loved ones (Levenson et aI., 2001).

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Mead, G. H., & Morris, C. W. ( 1934). Mind, self, and society: From the standpoint ofa social behav­

iorist. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Merton, T. ( 1972). New seeds of contemplation. New York: New Directions. Metzinger, T. (2003). Being no one: The self-model theory of subjectivity. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Nanamoli, B. (2001). The life of the Buddha: According to the Pali Canon. Seattle, WA: BPS Pari­ yatti Editions. Osbeck, L. M., & Robinson, D. N. (2005). Philosophical theories of wisdom. In R. J. Sternberg & J. Jordan (Eds.), A handbook of wisdom: Psychological perspectives (pp. 6 1-83). New York: Cambridge University Press. Pascual-Leone, J. (1990). An essay on wisdom: Thward organismic processes that make it possible. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Wisdom: Its nature, origins, nnd development (pp. 244-278). Cam­ bridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Steindl-Rast, D. (1984). Grntefulness, the heart ofprayer: An appronch to life in fullness. New York: Paulist Press. Sternberg, R. J. ( 1990). Wisdom and its relations to intelligence and creativity. In R. J. Sternberg (Ed.), Wisdom: Its nature, origins, and development (pp. 142-159). Cambridge, England: Cam­ bridge University Press. Takahashi, M. (2000). Toward a culturally inclusive understanding of wisdom: Historical roots in the East and West. International Journal ofAging and Human Development, 51 , 217-230. Taranto, M. A. (1989). Facets of wisdom: A theoretical synthesis. International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 29, 1-21. Teresa of Avila. (2000). The way of perfection (H. L. Carrigan, Jr., Ed.). Orleans, MA: Paraclete Press.

21 Generativity, the Redemptive Self, and the Problem of a Noisy Ego in American Life Dan P. McAdams The concept of the quiet ego captures many positive trends in psychological research and theorizing today. In calling for a less defensive and self-serving view of human life, the authors in this volume examine the power of compas­ sion and wisdom; the importance of cooperation and prosocial human behavior; the dangers of narcissism; and the limits of such well-worn individualistic conceptions in psychology as self-esteem, self-control, and self-enhancement (see Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 2003; de Waal, 1996; Emmons & McCullough, 2004; Leary, 2004). As a personality psychologist and life-course researcher, I view the quiet ego from the standpoint of individual differences and human development. Human beings differ substantially from each other on how much they behave in accord with egoistic impulses on the one hand or tendencies toward empathy, sympathy, cooperation, and agreeableness on the other hand (Graziano & Eisenberg, 1997). Put most simply, some egos are quieter than others (see chap. 8, this volume). Furthermore, with respect to certain critical developmental challenges in the human life course, people often manage to channel their most self-serving inclinations into life projects that aim at a greater good, even if their efforts in this regard sometimes seem more "noisy" than quiet. The best psychological example I can think of whereby people act to serve both egoistic and other-oriented motives at the same time is generativity, a prime developmental challenge of the midlife years.

Generativity and Adult Development

Erik Erikson (1963) defined generativity as an adult's concern for and com­ mitment to promoting the well-being of future generations (see also chap. 19, this volume). Through parenting, teaching, mentoring, leadership, and a wide range of activities and life pursuits, men and women in their 30s, 40s, 50s, and beyond care for and advance the interests of young people as they aim to leave

The preparation of this chapter was supported by a grant from the Foley Family Foundation to establish the Foley Center for the Study of Lives at Northwestern University_

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a positive legacy of the self for future generations (see de St. Aubin, McAdams, & Kim, 2004; Kotre, 1984; McAdams, 200 1 ; McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998; Snarey, 1993). In Erikson's famous eight-stage model of human development, generativity versus stagnation represents the seventh and by far the longest stage-the prime years of adulthood wherein, according to the ideal scenario, mature adults establish themselves as stakeholders in society and work hard to fulfill a wide range of adult roles as breadwinners, caregivers, and citizens. The well-being of future generations and the effectiveness of societal institu­ tions depend on the generative efforts of adults. Generativity, therefore, aims at the broader social good. At the same time, generativity is good for the gen­ erative adult as well. Erikson argued that generativity is a mark of maturity and successful adaptation in the middle adult years and that highly generative adults should be happier and healthier than those midlife adults who are un­ able, for whatever reason, to meet this developmental demand. Empirical research on individual differences in generativity has shown Erikson ( 1963) to be right. Using the Loyola Generativity Scale (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1992) and other self-report, Q sort, attitudinal, and behavioral indexes of generativity, researchers have shown that generativity tends to in­ crease with age through middle adulthood (Keyes & Ryff, 1998; McAdams, de St. Aubin, & Logan, 1993) and that midlife adults who tend to score high on these measures also show superior levels of subjective well-being and mental health and enjoy broader networks of social support and friendship, compared with midlife adults who score lower in generativity (see de St. Aubin et al., 2004, and McAdams, 2001 , for reviews). A growing body of research, further­ more, attests to the familial and societal benefits of generativity. In the realm of parenting, high levels of generativity are associated with authoritative (warm and disciplined) parenting styles, strong psychological investments in chil­ dren's education, passing on wisdom to children, and successfully nurturing prosocial tendencies in children and adolescents (e.g., Peterson, 2006; Peter­ son, Smirles, & Wentworth, 1997; Pratt, Danso, Arnold, Norris, & Filyer, 2001). Highly generative adults engage in greater levels of caregiving in their families and communities (Peterson, 2002; Rossi, 200 1). They engage in more volunteer work, give more time and money to charitable organizations, and participate at higher levels in religious and civic organizations, compared with adults low in generativity (Dillon & Wink, 2004; Hart, McAdams, Hirsch, & Bauer, 2001 ; Rossi, 2001). Adults high i n generativity are more politically involved and more likely to vote in local and national elections, compared with their less genera­ tive counterparts (Cole & Stewart, 1996; Hart et al. , 200 1). In that generativity concerns itself with caring for the next generation, the concept is aligned with the quiet ego's efforts to transcend the self and focus attention on the well-being of other people (see chap. 9, this volume). In­ deed, Erikson (1963) designated care to be the central virtue that is cultivated in midlife generativity, and research shows clearly that highly generative adults tend to be providers of care on many different levels, from one-on-one caregiving to providing support for institutions whose mission is to care for others (Rossi, 200 1). The opposites of generativity are stagnation and self­ preoccupation, Erikson asserted. Adults who feel stuck in life, whether because of psychological problems or societal and economic constraints, may focus so

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much attention on their own problems that they are severely compromised in the realm of caring for the next generation. In Erikson's developmental view, furthermore, successful generativity awaits the resolution of earlier psychoso­ cial stages wherein the individual consolidates identity (Stage 5 in Erikson's scheme) and commits the self to long-term intimate relationships (Stage 6). For Erikson, then, the developmental ascendance of generativity's quiet ego requires the individual's prior consolidation of a clear and well-defined sense of the adult self (see also Vaillant & Milofsky, 1980; Westermeyer, 2004; for a related developmental conception, see also chap. 18, this volume). It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that the generative adult's ef­ forts to care for others entail the surrender, loss, or transcendence of the self. In generativity, the self expands to encompass others. Erikson ( 1963) empha­ sized that whereas generativity is about caring for the next generation, it is also about generating offspring, products, and outcomes that, in some literal or symbolic sense, are extensions of the self. Among other things, generativity is a psychosocial effort to extend the self beyond one's own lifetime, to attain a kind of symbolic immortality through one's children, grandchildren, reputation, achievements, and legacy (Kotre, 1984; McAdams, 1985). Research suggests that highly generative adults express strong needs for both communion (car­ ing for others) and agency (extending and expanding the self; McAdams, 1985; McAdams, Ruetzel, & Foley, 1986; Peterson & Stewart, 1993). Generativity may fuse both other-oriented and self-serving motivations. In looking for examples of the nobler sentiments of human nature, psy­ chologists sometimes consult religious texts. For generativity, there may be no more seminal text, in both name and content, than the book of Genesis. In the creation stories known for centuries to Jews, Christians, and Muslims, God cre­ ates the heavens and the earth and then sets about the business of generating people. The human beings God creates have a special status in God's plan. Hu­ man beings are exalted above all the other beasts of the field and the seas be­ cause they are created in God's own image. Psychologically speaking, this is no selfless act of altruism! Instead, God generates a powerful extension of the self, a legacy. God's children are, well, His. Like the highly generative adult, God cares for His children in the book of Genesis, and He struggles to grant them some degree of autonomy. Their eventual disobedience, therefore, symbolizes what may be the primal problem in generativity for all adults in all societies for all time-the ultimate inability to control completely the offspring, prod­ ucts, and legacies that one has generated and for which one has cared. If God's children were no different from the fishes and serpents, if He had not created them in His own image, as an extension of the self, then their transgressions would be of little concern. Generative adults do not lose too much sleep when they learn that somebody else's kids have betrayed their respective parents, but when the transgressor is your own kid, the fruit of your own generative efforts, it all matters much, much more-so much more as to be described as original sin in the book of Genesis. "Sharper than a serpent's tooth is to have a thankless child," cried King Lear. Generativity, then, is about the self as much as it is about the generated other. If this were not so, then the Old Testament God would have turned the other way when Eve bit into the apple, and Lear would have never descended into madness.

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Like the prime generator in the book of Genesis, highly generative adults can make a lot of noise in their efforts to care for the most cherished extensions of the self. In generativity, the ego may not always speak in a quiet voice. Even the most well-meaning endeavors in generativity may reveal their self-serving roots, and, of course, many very bad things may be justified in the name of gen­ erativity, as people often invest in their own children, their own society, their own people, to the direct and ultimate detriment of other children, other societ­ ies, and other peoples (Kotre, 1984). Nonetheless, generativity often motivates and justifies some of the most sincerely caring and life-affirming human proj­ ects to be seen on the planet (Erikson, 1969). To use a contemporary American cliche, generativity is often about our best efforts, both grand and mundane, to "make the world a better place."

How Generative Adults (in America) Narrate Their Lives: The Redemptive Self

Generativity is hard work. Whether it involves raising children, teaching Sunday school, mentoring students, working on a political campaign, agitat­ ing for social justice, healing the sick, feeding the poor, leading a nation, or saving enough money to put your children through college, generativity may bring as many headaches and heartaches as it does fulfillments in life. Genera­ tive adults sometimes find support for their work in family, good friendships, churches, and other social institutions that aim to help those who help others. However, this may not be enough. As Erikson ( 1963) suggested, generative adults need to have the kinds of identities that are designed to support and sustain generativity itself, especially when the generative going gets tough and one runs up against the forces of stagnation and self-preoccupation. Among other things, an identity designed to support generativity is a way of talk­ ing about the self that makes a generative life make sense. In his book Acts of Compassion: Caring for Others and Helping Ourselves, Wuthnow ( 1991) wrote, "The possibility of compassion depends as much on having an appro­ priate discourse to interpret it as it does on having a free afternoon to do it." "To ask whether compassion is possible," Wuthnow added, is to "ask about the language in which its very conceivability depends" (p. 45). Wuthnow could just as well have been discussing generativity, which itself often involves compas­ sion for others. Generative adults need good stories-good narrative identities (Singer, 2004)-within which their generativity can be conceived, articulated, sustained, promoted, and strengthened. Both qualitative and quantitative studies have shown that the life stories told by highly generative American adults tend to take the form of what I (Mc­ Adams, 2006) called the redemptive self (Colby & Damon, 1992; Mansfield & McAdams, 1996; McAdams & Bowman, 2001; McAdams, Diamond, de St. Au­ bin, & Mansfield, 1997; McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001). American men and women who score high on objective indexes of generativity are significantly more likely than adults who score lower to reconstruct their autobiographical past and imagine their future in redemptive terms. Stripped to its psychological core, redemption means the deliverance from suffering to

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an enhanced status or state. More than their less generative peers, highly generative American adults tend to tell life stories that feature the redemptive themes of atonement (the move from sin to salvation), upward social mobility (rags to riches), enlightenment (ignorance to knowledge), liberation (slavery to freedom), recovery (illness or addiction to health), and development (immatu­ rity to maturity). These kinds of narrative identities feature the self's struggle to overcome adversity and to transform negative emotional, material, and physical circumstances into positive outcomes. The redemptive self is a common script in American society for living a gen­ erative life at midlife. Its central theme is redemption, but the story showcases other related themes as well. Significantly more often than their less genera­ tive counterparts, highly generative American adults at midlife tend to tell life stories in which the protagonist (a) enjoys a special advantage or blessing early on in life, (b) witnesses as a child the suffering or oppression of others, (c) estab­ lishes a clear and compelling personal ideology by late adolescence, (d) encoun­ ters negative events that are often transformed into positive outcomes (Le., redemption), (e) struggles with competing desires for power (i.e., agency) and love (Le., communion), and (f) expects to leave a positive legacy of growth for the future (McAdams, 2006; McAdams et aI., 1997). In essence, the redemptive self is a story about a gifted protagonist who, equipped with moral conviction, journeys forth into a dangerous and unredeemed world, overcoming obstacles along the way, struggling to reconcile competing desires for power and love and aiming to make a positive difference for the future. In the broad cultural terms that resonate deeply with American history and heritage, the protagonist of the redemptive self has been "chosen" (by God, luck, or good genes) to live out his or her manifest destiny so that he or she can redeem suffering and make the world a better place. From Puritan conversion stories to Benjamin Franklin to The Oprah Winfrey Show, American culture provides a wealth of narrative models for the redemptive self. Research suggests it is the most generative adults in American society who manage to understand and narrate their own lives in ways that most closely resemble this classic American form (McAdams, 2006). The redemptive self is a good narrative identity to construct if one chooses to live a generative life in America today. This is the kind of story that can support generativity through thick and thin. The protagonist is singled out for positive distinction early in life. At the same time, the protagonist is sensitized early on to the suffering and oppression of other people. The story says "1 was blessed, but others suffer" and "I am lucky, but others are not." The contrast sets up a moral challenge in the story. Because 1 am blessed and the world is dangerous, I am called to make a positive difference in the world. My personal destiny is to give back to society for the blessing I have received. This kind of story reinforces the generative adult's resolve. It also suggests that no matter how bad things get, positive outcomes will eventually follow. The adult who constructs his or her own life as a narrative of redemption may be better posi­ tioned, psychologically speaking, to make the kinds of long-term investments in the future that generativity requires because his or her story says that sacrifices in the short term will lead to good things down the road. In redemp­ tive narratives, pain gives way to pleasure, rags become riches, the enslaved become free, and the sick and addicted typically embark on the long process

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of recovery. If an adult sees life as conforming to a redemptive narrative, then the challenges of generativity may seem rather less daunting than they might otherwise seem, and generativity itself may seem to be the natural thing to do. It is as though one's story has specially prepared one to take on this important task in midlife, as if one were always meant to be a generative adult. Generativity is a human universal. In all societies, adults must take on the responsibilities of raising children and working for the well-being of future generations. However, societies differ substantially in the roles, expectations, and resources they offer the generative adult (McAdams, 2001). Generativity is always difficult, but it is difficult in different ways across different cultures. Accordingly, different societies may privilege different stories for how gen­ erative adults should live their lives. In American society, the redemptive self captures some of the most cherished, and contested, themes regarding what it means to live a good and generative life. The story affirms gratitude, sacrifice, nurturance, care, and other important features that quiet the self-serving ego. However, it affirms them with respect to a universal developmental concept­ generativity-and a culturally grounded story-the redemptive self-that can still sometimes seem a little noisy. Although generativity is centrally about the self-sacrifices involved in caring for the next generation, it is also about expanding and extending the self. The redemptive self is an especially Ameri­ can form of narrative identity well designed to support a generative life. The protagonist in this story empathizes deeply with the pain and suffering of oth­ ers. The protagonist works hard to make the world a better place for future generations. However, this same protagonist feels chosen to live out a personal destiny that distinguishes him or her from others. The redemptive self is a heroic story about the self's overcoming adversity and transforming suffering into both personal enhancement and the benefit of others. Within the dramatic frame this story sets up, generativity helps to quiet the ego and transform the hero's quest into words and deeds that aim to benefit others for generations to come.

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Rossi, A. (Ed.). (2001). Caring and doing for others: Social responsibility in the domains offamily, work, and community. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Singer, J. A. (2004). Narrative identity and meaning making across the adult lifespan: An introduc­ tion. Journal of Personality, 72, 437-459. Snarey, J. (1993). How fathers care for the next generation: A four-decade study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Vaillant, G. E . , & Milofsky, E. ( 1980). Natural history of male psychological health IX: Em­ pirical evidence for Erikson's model of the life cycle. American Journal of Psychiatry, 137, 1348-1359. Westermeyer, J. F. (2004). Predictors and characteristics of Erikson's life cycle model among men: A 32-year longitudinal study. International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 58, 29-48. Wuthnow, R. (1991). Acts of compassion: Caring for others and helping ourselves. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Author Index Numbers in italics refer to listings in the references.

Aberson, C. L., 96, 104 Achenbaum, A. w., 223, 231, 232 Adair, K, 123 Adams, C. E., 97, 105, 142, 146 Adams, J. S., 192, 193 Adler, A., 15, 18 Meriat, D. R., 181

Bargh, J. A. , 76, 82, 164, 167, 188, 193 Barlow, D. R., 171, 172, 177, 1 79 Barnes, S., 78, 79, 83 Baron, J., 187, 190, 191, 193, 194 Baron, R M., 176, 180 Bastardi, A., 186, 193 Batson, C. D., 64, 71, 132, 134, 160, 167, 183,

Ajzen, I., 188, 191, 193 Ahuvia, A., 114 Aldeguer, C. M. R, 167

185, 193 Batson, J. G., 167, 193 Baucom, D. R., 78, 79, 83

Alderman, K , 206, 210 Aldwin, C. M., 222, 232

Bauer, J. J., 10, 18, 111, 114, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 208, 213, 219, 236, 241 Baumeister, A., 172

Alicke, M. D., 47, 50 Allen, A. B., 97, 105, 142, 146 Allen, D. J., 213, 219 Allen, K B., 222, 232 Allen, N. B., 78, 80, 82, 82 Alliger, G. M., 49, 50 Allport, G. w., 15, 18, 45, 50, 173, 179, 1 79, 225, 232 Amadio, D. M., 213, 219 American Psychiatric Association, 43, 50 Anderson, E. M., 142, 146 Anderson, N. D., 1 04 Antoni, M. R., 220 Ardelt, M., 221, 222, 223, 224, 226, 230, 232 Aristotle, 207, 208 Arndt, J., 37, 40, 42 Arnold, M. L., 236, 241 Aron, A., 139, 146, 146, 147 Aron, E. N., 139, 146 Ashmore, R D., 173, 1 79 Ashton, M. C., 58, 61 Aspinwall, G., 51 Assor, A., 110, 114 Astin, J. A., 98, 100, 105 Atwater, L. E., 45, 50 Au, E., 156, 157 Au, K, 192, 194 Axelrod, R, 30, 30, 59, 60

Baumeister, R F., 24, 28, 29, 30, 32, 53, 54, 55, 60, 61 , 65, 71, 88, 92, 93, 96, 97, 104, 128, 134, 135, 142, 146, 155, 157, 160, 167, 172, 180, 235, 240 Bazerman, M. R., 187, 190, 193 Beach, 1. R, 187, 194 Becker, E., 33, 35, 36, 41, 42 Beer, J. S., 28, 31, 44, 50, 117, 124 Beersma, B., 189, 194 Bellah, R N., 7, 18 Bennell, C., 195 Bernstein, J., 115 Berrigan, L. P. , 142, 146 Bierer, L. M., 181 Birren, J. E., 22 1 , 222, 223, 232 Bishop, S. R, 98, 100, 104, 105 Blanchard, C., 72 Blanchard-Fields, F., 222, 232 Blickle, G., 29, 30 Block, J., 44, 50, 200, 203, 205, 210 Boden, J. M., 55, 60, 97, 104, 172, 180 Bodenmann, J. G., 69, 71 Bohlinger, R A., 58, 60 Bohon, L. M., 142, 146 Bollinger, R A., 61 Bonacci, A. M., 24, 29, 30, 54, 60, 143, 146

Aziz, N., 69, 71

Bonanno, G. A., 10, 18, 44, 45, 50 Bond, M. R., 45, 50

Bae� R. A., 78, 82, 98, 100, 103, 104, 222, 232

Bonner, G., 79, 84 Bookalam, D., 174, 175, 181

Bakan, D., 14, 18 Balsam, K F., 214, 220 Bandura, A., 97, 104, 157, 157 Barclay, L. C., 87, 93

Boorstein, S., 78, 83 Bosma, R., 213, 219 Bourhis, R Y., 172, 180 Bowlby, J., 128, 134

243

244

AUTHOR INDEX

Bowman, Po Jo, 238, 241 Brach, To, 97, 99, 104 Bradlee, Po Mo, 24, 30 Branscombe, No R, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 180, 181 Breakwell, Go Mo, 173, 180 Breslau, I., 181 Brewer, Mo Bo, 12, 18, 131, 134, 137, 139, 146, 147, 163, 167, 173, 180, 183, 184, 185, 186, 193 Brockner, Jo, 155, 157 Brose, 1. A , 205, 208 Broughton, Jo M o , 16 Brown, A Bo , 119, 123 Brown, Jo Do, 43, 44, 45, 47, 50, 51, 155, 157, 158 Brown, K Wo , 12, 17, 75, 78, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 92, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 114, 115, 122, 123, 222, 232 Brown, R , 178, 180 Brown, Ro B., 194 Brown, R M o , 64, 71 Brown, Ro Po , 23, 27, 30, 54, 60 Brown, So Lo, 64, 71 Bruce, Mo No, 28, 31 Brummett, B. Ho, 167 Brunell, A Bo, 25, 28, 29, 30 Bucke, R, 138, 143, 146 Bush, Co Po , 28, 30 Bushman, Bo Jo, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 32, 54, 60, 61, 88, 92, 143, 146 Buss, A Ho, 88, 92, 142, 146 Buss, Do Mo, 24, 30 Buunk, Bo P, 47, 50, 160, 167, 1 69 Cacioppo, Jo To, 66, 72 Campbell, Jo Do, 96, 104, 235, 240 Campbell, W K, 23, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 53, 54, 55, 58, 60, 61 , 78, 83, 93, 132, 134, 143, 146 Canevello, A, 66, 71 Caporael, Lo, 128, 134 Carlson, Lo E o , 98, 104, 105 Carmody, Do Lo, 222, 232 Carmody, Jo, 104 Carmody, Jo To, 222, 232 Carrere, So, 13, 18 Carroll, Lo, 24, 31 Carson, Jo W, 79, 83 Carson, K Mo, 79, 83 Carver, Bo, 119, 123, 220 Cascio, E., 93 Cassell, Eo Jo, 159, 167 Cassidy, Jo, 61 Chaiken, So, 164, 167, 186, 193 Chandler, Mo Jo, 222, 223, 232 Chartrand, To Lo, 76, 82, 188, 193

Cheek, Jo Mo, 137, 146 Chen, Y., 155, 157 Chiodo, Lo Mo, 24, 30 Chirkov, v., 19 Chiu, Co-Yo , 152, 156, 157, 158 Cho, So, 156, 157 Chodron, Po , 122, 123 Chung, Y. Bo, 214, 219, 220 Cialdini, R B., 131, 194 Clark, Mo So, 64, 72 Clayton, V. Po, 221, 222, 223, 232 Clement, R, 42 Cleveland, Jo, 90, 92 Coan, Jo, 13, 18 Coan, R W, 34, 41, 42 Cogan, Jo Co, 214, 219 Cohen, Do, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158 Cohen, Fo , 42 Cohen, So, 63, 66, 71 Cohn, Lo Do, 203, 208 Colby, A, 238, 240 Cole, E. R, 236, 240 Coleman, H. Lo K, 179, 180 Collins, R Lo, 160, 167 Colvin, Co R, 44, 45, 50 Comer, Jo, 61 Connell, Jo Po, 109, 115 Conner, To, 90, 92 Cook-Greuter, So R, 208 Cooke, Ao Do Jo, 183, 194 Cooley, Co Ho, 213, 219, 222, 232 Coopersmith, So, 96, 104 Cordon, So, 83 Cordova, M o , 100, 105 Costa, Po To, Jro, 58, 61, 203, 209 Courtney, Bo Co, 210 Cramer, P , 204, 208, 213, 219 Creswell, Jo Do, 75, 80, 83 Critelli, Jo W , 24, 31 Crocker, Jo, 54, 61 , 63, 64, 65, 66, 71, 72, 83, 77, 96, 97, 104 Cropanzano, Ro, 183, 186, 194 Crumpler, Co A, 221, 23 1 , 232 Csikszentmihalyi, Mo, 138, 146, 221, 223, 232 Cupertino, A Po , 222, 232 Cushman, P., 96, 104 Dakof, Go Ao, 160, 167 Daly, Jo A, 24, 32 Damon, W , 200, 209, 238, 240 Danso, Ho Ao , 236, 241 Davidson, Ro Jo, 12, 17, 18, 104, 105 Davis, P Jo, 88, 93 De Cremer, Do, 191, 195 De Dreu, Co K W, 186, 189, 194 De Neys, W, 187, 194

AUTHOR INDEX

de St. Aubin, E., 203, 209, 213, 214, 215, 219, 220, 236, 238, 240, 241 de Waal, F. , 235, 240 Deci, E. L., 16, 18, 69, 71, 76, 79, 83, 89, 92, 97, 99, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 114, 114, 115, 118, 119, 123, 124, 164, 168, 209 DeCicco, T. L., 138, 139, 140, 141, 146, 147 Deikman, A. J., 82, 83 Dejitthirat, K , 100, 105 Dekel, S., 45, 50 Deschamps, J. C., 178, 180 DeVader, C. L., 49, 50 Diamond, A., 238, 241 Diaz-Loving, R., 177, 181 Dickerson, S. S., 69, 71 Diener, E., 142, 143, 146, 147, 152, 158, 214, 219 Dillon, M., 236, 240 Ditzen, B., 69, 71 Dolan, S., 181 Dols, J. M. F., 114 Doosje, B., 174, 175, 180 Dovidio, J. F. , 131, 134, 178, 1 79, 180, 185, 194 Dunbar, R. I. M., 133, 135 Duncan, N., 119, 123 Dunning, D., 117, 123 Duran, A., 177, 181 Durkin, K, 209 Duval, S., 77, 83 Early, S., 132, 134 Ee, J. S., 24, 31 Ehlert, U., 69, 71 Einstein, D., 203, 209 Eisenberg, N., 235, 241 Eisenberger, N. I., 80, 83 Ekman, P., 17, 18 Ellemers, N., 174, 180 Elliot, A. J., 19, 28, 31, 132, 134 Emmons, A., 12, 17, 18 Emmons, R. A. , 18, 24, 30, 31, 54, 61 , 142, 143, 146, 205, 209, 214, 219, 235, 240 Epley, N., 117, 123 Epstein, N. B . , 78, 83 Erikson, E. H., 11, 14, 15, 16, 96, 104, 200, 208, 212, 213, 214, 215, 219, 235, 236, 237, 238, 241 Euwema, M. C., 189, 194 Exline, J. J., 17, 18, 24, 30, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60 , 61, 143, 146 Fahey, J. L., 69, 71 Fanning, P., 96, 105 Fassbender, P., 29, 30 Fehr, E., 69, 71 Feldman Barrett, L., 90, 91, 92 Felston, R. B., 50

245

Fenigstein, A., 142, 146 Ferreira, M. B., 187, 194 Feshbach, S., 87, 92 Festinger, L., 45, 50 Fiedler, E. R., 28, 31 Field, N. P. , 44 Filyer, R., 236, 241 Finkel, E. J., 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 54, 61 Fischbacher, U., 69, 71 Fischer, P., 40, 42 Fisher, M. L., 59, 61 Flanagan, 0., 205, 209 Floresky, S., 42 Florian, V., 37, 39, 42, 160, 168 Foley, J. M., 207, 209, 237, 241 Fong, G. T., 90, 92 Foster, C. A., 24, 31, 54, 60 Foster, J. D., 23, 28, 31, 32, 53, 60, 93 Fraley, B., 139, 146 Frank, M. S., 49, 50 Frantz, C. M., 143, 146 Fredrickson, B. L., 54, 61 Freedman, B., 98, 105 Freud, S., 33, 42, 107, 114 Friedman, J. N., 28, 31 Fritz, H. L., 10, 11, 18 Funder, D. C., 44, 50 Gable, S. L., 89, 93 Gabriel, M. T., 23, 24, 28, 31 Gaertner, L., 29, 31, 77, 83, 128, 129, 130, 158 Gaertner, S. L., 131, 134, 178, 179, 180 Garcia-Marques, L., 187, 194 Gardner, H., 34, 42 Gardner, W. , 137, 139, 146 Gauch, G., 42 Gelfand, M. J., 150, 158 Gentry, w., 28, 30 Georgios, v., 213, 219 Gerrard, M., 160 Gerton, J., 179, 180 Geyer, A. L., 17, 18, 55, 61 Gibbons, F. X., 160, 167 Gil, K M., 79, 83 Gilbert, P., 76, 83, 97, 100, 101, 103, 104 Gill, K, 213, 219 Gillath, 0., 205, 209 Gillis, J. R., 214, 219 Gilovich, T., 117, 123 Gjerde, P. F. , 210 Glunt, E. K, 214, 219 Goldenberg, J., 65, 72 Goldman, B. M., 77, 83, 85, 86, 90, 92, 93 Goldman, B., 183, 194 Goldstein, J., 97, 99, 104 Gollwitzer, P. M., 47, 51, 129, 134 Goode, M., 186

246

AUTHOR INDEX

Goodie, A S . , 28, 31, 53, 60 Gordon, R. , 123 Gottlieb, E., 120, 121, 124 Gottman, J. M., 13, 18 Graetz, K., 128 Granneman, B. D., 87, 93 Gray, J. A, 172, 180 Graziano, W. G., 235, 241 Greenberg, J., 33, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 65, 71, 72, 81, 84, 113, 114, 160, 168 Greenwald, A G., 58, 61, 149, 150, 157 Gregg, A P. , 27, 32, 44, 50 Greischar, L. L., 104, 105 Grewal, D., 12, 19 Griffin, S., 142, , 146, 214, 219 Grolnick, W. S., 112, 115 Grouzet, F. M. E., 111, 114 Gruenewald, T. L., 72 Gunz, A , 153, 154, 156, 157 Gurung, R. A. R., 66, 72 Haidt, J., 208, 209 Hakmiller, K. L., 160, 1 68 Hancock, J., 97, 105, 142, 146 Haney, C., 34, 42 Hanh, T. N., 98, 102, 104 Hardin, G., 26, 31 Harmon-Jones, E., 39, 42 Harms, P. D., 28, 31 Harrell, K. L., 193 Hart, D., 200, 209 Hart, H. M., 236, 241 Hart, w., 232 Harter, S., 96, 104 Harvey, J. H., 166, 1 68 Hayes, S. C., 82, 83 Healy, M., 96, 104 Heatherton, T. F. ,155, 157 Heine, S . J., 96, 102, 104, 151, 152, 157, 158 Heinrichs, M., 69, 71 Helgeson, V. S., 10, 11, 18, 160, 168 Helson, R., 203, 205, 209, 222, 231, 232 Hendricks, L., 167, 168 Henry, J. P., 69, 71 Henry, S., 139, 147 Heppen, J., 173, 1 79 Heppner, W. L., 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93 Herbert, M., 51 Herek, G. M., 214, 219 Hernandez, M., 157 Hewitt, J. P., 96, 104 Hewstone, M., 178, 180 Hill, P. C., 58, 60, 61 Hirsch, B. J., 236, 241 Hirschberger, G., 37, 42, 160, 168 Hodgins, H. S., 87, 93, 112, 114, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 164, 168

Hogan, R., 24, 31 Hogg, M. A. , 178, 180, 181 , 185, 191, 195 Holliday, S., 222, 223, 232 Holmes, J. G., 64, 72 Horney, K., 14, 18, 99, 104 Hong, Y.-Y. , 157, 158 Homsey, M. J., 178, 180 Hsieh, Y., 100, 102, 105 Hull, C. L., 108, 114 Hy, L. X., 203, 209, 213, 216, 219 Hymes, C., 164, 167 Ibarra, 0., 192, 194 Ide, E., 157 Igartua, K. J., 213, 219 Insko, C . A , 131, 135 Irons, C., 97, 100, 101, 103, 104 Ironson, G., 220 Irwin, J. R. , 187, 194 Iuzzini, J., 29, 31, 121, 128, 134 Iyengar, S. S., 157 James, J., 213, 220 James, VV., 9, 14, 15, 18, 137, 138, 139, 146, 209, 212, 217, 220 Jetten, J., 174, 178, 180 John, O. P., 45, 50, 141, 146, 204, 209 Johnson, M., 61 Johnson, T., 155, 158 Joiner, T., 61 Jonas, E., 40, 42 Jung, C. G., 14, 18 Jussim, L., 173, 1 79 Kabat-Zinn, J., 18, 86, 88, 93 Kaistaniemi, L., 96, 105 Kachorek, L. v., 61 Kaltman, S., 44 Kanner, A. D., 12, 18 Kasser, T., 12, 18, 111, 112, 114, 207, 209, 210 Katz, J., 225, 232 Kaukianen, A, 96, 105 Kekes, J., 221, 222, 223, 232 Kelly, G. A, 15, 1 8 Kelman, H. C., 175, 176, 180 Kemeny, M. E., 12, 18, 51, 69, 71 Kennedy, S., 61 Kenny, D. A, 45, 46, 50, 176, 180 Kemis, M. H., 53, 54, 55, 61, 77, 83, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 97, 105, 111, 114 Kerr, N. L., 131, 135 Keyes, C. L. M., 205, 210, 214, 220, 236, 241 Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K., 66, 72 Kilpatrick, S. D., 54, 61 Kim, K. H., 69, 71 , 156 Kim, T.-C., 203, 209, 213, 219, 236, 240 Kim, Y.-H., 19, 114, 157

AUTHOR INDEX

E}ng, L. A., 205, 206, 207, 209, 213, 220 E}rkpatrick, K , 100, 101, 105 E}tayama, S., 96, 102, 104, 105, 150, 151, 152, 154, 157, 158 Klar, Y., 171, 177, 180, 181 Klein, L. C . , 72 Klein, U., 29, 30 Klein-Parker, F., 175, 180 Knafo, A., 203, 210 Knapp, M. L., 24, 32 Knee, C. R., 87, 93, 112, 114, 118, 119, 123, 124, 164, 168 Knight, w., 78, 80, 82 Kobayashi, C., 157 Koch, S., 42 Koenig, C. S., 230, 232 Koestler, A., 34, 42 Koestner, R., 72, 110, 115, 119, 123 Kogut, T. , 131, 134 Kohlberg, L., 16, 18 Konrath, S., 23, 32 Koomen, W., 161, 1 68 Kopp, K J. , 58, 60, 61 Korda, M., 7, 18 Kornfield, J., 97, 99, 104 Korsgaard, M. A., 183, 185, 189, 191, 192, 194 Kosfield, M., 69, 71 Kotre, J., 236, 237, 241 Kovacevic, A., 44 Kramer, R. M., 131, 134 Krueger, J. 1., 61, 96, 104, 235, 240 Kruglanski, A. w., 101, 105 Krusemark, E., 78, 83 Kuang, L. L., 45, 47, 48, 50 Kuhl, J., 108, 115 Kuhlman, D. M., 186, 195 Kuhnert, K, 28, 30 Kumashiro, M., 27, 32, 44, 50 Kurokawa, M., 154, 157 Kwak, N. S., 156, 167 Kwan, V. S. Y. , 45, 46, 47, 48, 60 La Guardia, J. G., 112, 115 LaBouff, J., 61 Labouvie-Vief, G., 15, 18, 209 LaFromboise, T., 179, 180 Lagerspetz, K M. J., 96, 105 Lake� C . E., 28, 31, 87, 88, 89, 91, 92, 93 Lalwani, A. K, 155, 158 Lance, C. E., 87, 91, 93 Landau, M. J., 37, 38, 42 Lange� E. J., 12, 16, 19, 86, 93, 188, 194 Lanning, K, 203, 209 Larsen, R. J., 142, 146, 214, 219 Lasch, C., 7, 19, 49, 50 Lau, M., 104 Lau, S., 114

247

Lawrence, A. M., 210 Leary, M. R., 7, 18, 54, 61, 69, 72, 75, 76, 78, 80, 83, 97, 105, 107, 115, 128, 134, 142, 145, 146, 160, 1 67, 235, 241 Lee, K , 58, 61 Lehman, D. R., 96, 104, 152, 157 Leonard, M., 72 Lerner, J. S., 44, 51, 155, 158 Lester, S. w., 185, 192, 194 Leung, C., 157 Levenson, M. R., 30, 31, 221, 222, 228, 231, 232 Levesque, C., 112, 115 Levinson, H., 216, 220 Levitt, H. M., 222, 223, 231, 232 Lewis, B. P., 72 Lewis, M., 238, 241 Lieberman, M. D., 80, 83 Liebeskind, E., 118, 121, 122, 123 Lightdale, J. R., 132, 134 Lipkus, I., 79, 83 Liviatan, 1., 177, 180 Lobel, M., 54, 59, 61, 165, 168 Locke, K D., 160, 168 Lockwood, P., 160, 163, 166, 168 Loevinger, J., 15, 16, 19, 107, 115, 199, 200, 202, 203, 209, 212, 216, 219, 220 Loewenstein, G., 135, 187 Logan, R. L. , 236, 241 Lopez, S. J., 8, 19 Lord, R. G., 49, 50 Lowenstein, G., 131, 193 Luce, C. L., 194 Luhtanen, R. K, 66, 71 Luke, M., 129, 134 Lutz, A., 104, 1 05 Lutz-Zois, C., 205, 208 Lynch, M. F., 109, 115 Lysy, D. C . , 28, 31 Madsen, R., 7, 18 Mageau, G. A., 72 Mahler, M. S., 96, 105 Maner, J. K, 183, 185, 194 Manheimer, R. J., 221, 232 Manis, M., 44, 50 Mann, J. A., 131, 134 Manners, J., 209 Mansfield, E. D., 238, 241 Markman, K D., 166, 168 Markus, H. R., 96, 102, 104, 105 150, 151, 154, 157, 158, 163, 168 Maslow, A. H., 14, 19, 138, 142, 143, 146, 206, 209, 222, 231, 232 Matsumoto, H., 102, 105, 157 Mayer, F. S., 143, 146 Mayman, M., 44, 50

248

AUTHOR INDEX

McAdams, D. P., 15, 19, 76, 83, 107, 111, 114, 115, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 208, 209, 213, 214, 215, 217, 219, 220, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 240, 241 McAllister, D. w., 187, 194 McCrae, R R , 58, 61, 141, 146, 203, 209 McCullough, G., 61 McCullough, M. E., 12, 17, 18, 54, 61, 205, 209, 235, 240 McDowell, N. K, 44, 51, 155, 158 McGarty, C . , 175, 180 McGhee, D. E ., 58, 61 McGregor, B . A., 214 McGregor, H., 42 McKay, M., 96, 1 05 McLean, K C . , 206, 209, 210 McMullen, M. N., 166, 168 McVicar, D. N. , 175, 176, 181 Mead, G. H., 15, 19, 233 Mead, N. L., 186 Medvec, v., 117, 123 Meglino, B. M., 183, 185, 190, 191, 192, 194 Mehta, S., 139, 147 Mellers, B. A., 183, 194 Menon, T., 158 Merton, T., 229, 233 Metz, E. C . , 12, 19 Metzinger, T., 76, 83, 222, 233 Mickelson, K D . , 160, 1 68 Mikulincer, M., 37, 39, 42, 160, 168, 205, 209 Milgram, S., 15, 19, 42, 34 Miller, D. T., 132, 134 Miller, R S., 132, 134 Milofsky, E., 237, 242 Mitchell, T. R , 187, 194 Miyake, K, 166, 168 Mohiuddin, A., 61 Montoro, R, 213, 219 Mooney, C. N., 54, 61 Moore, D . A. , 187, 193 Morf, C. C . , 24, 29, 31, 55, 61 Morris, C. w., 233 Morris, M. w., 158 Morros, M., 203, 210 Moskowitz, G. B., 129, 134 Mullen, B., 132, 134 Muller, D., 18 Murray, H. A., 15, 19 Murray, S. L., 64, 71 Murrell, A. J., 131, 134 Mussweiler, T., 160, 161, 168 Nam, R K, 58, 61

Nanamoli, B., 227, 233 Nauta, A., 186, 194 Neff, K. D., 17, 19, 58, 61 , 70, 72, 95, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 1 05, 142, 147

Nekich, J. C . , 160, 1 68 Nelson, G., 139, 146 Nesdale, A. , 209 Neuberg, S. L., 194 Nezlek, J. B., 93 Nicholls, J. G., 110, 115 Niemiec, C . P., 8 1 , 83, 109, 111, 113, 115 Niiya, Y , 65, 66, 71, 72 Nitzberg, R A., 205, 209 Noelle, S. S., 206, 209, 213, 220 Nolen-Hoeksema, S., 98, 105 Norasakkunit, v., 102, 105 Norem, J. K, 50 Norman, P. , 191, 195 Norris, J. E., 236, 241 Norris, L., 222, 232 Novacek, J., 24, 31 Nuer, N., 63, 64, 65, 71 Nurius, P., 163, 168 Nyanaponika Thera, 77, 83 Oakes, P. J., 1 78, 181, 185, 195 O'Donnell, P. E., 172, 180 Oishi, S. , 143, 147, 152, 158 Olendzki, A., 77, 83 Oleson, T. , 213, 219 Olivier, M.-A., 63, 71 Oltmanns, T. F., 28, 31 O'Mara, E. R, 163, 165, 168 Orbell, S., 191, 195 Orwoll, L., 223, 231, 232 Osbeck, L. M., 222, 233 Pals, J. L., 204, 206, 208, 210 Paradise, A. w. , 85, 89, 111 Park, L. E., 54, 61, 65, 71, 77, 83, 96, 104 Pascual-Leone, J., 221, 223, 233 Pasupathi, M.,206, 210 Patten, A., 238, 241 Paulhus, D. L., 23, 25, 28, 31, 44, 45, 48, 50, 117, 123, 140, 147 Peekna, H. M., 193 Penne� L. A., 185, 194 Perie, M., 117 , 123 Perry, M. 88, 92 Peterson, B. E., 236, 237, 241 Peterson, C . , 58, 61 Piaget, J. , 15, 16, 19, 33, 42, 200, 210 Pierce, G. R., 66, 72 Pierce, K. P. , 12, 1 8 Piliavin, J . A., 185, 194 Pinsky, D., 28, 32 Pinter, B., 131, 135 Pisitsungkagam, K., 102, 105 Pittinsky, T. L., 138, 147 Plant, R. w., 110, 115 Platt, J., 26, 3 1

AUTHOR INDEX

Postmes, T., 174, 180 Powers, C., 58, 61 Pratt, M. w., 236, 241 Prencipe, A., 200, 210 Prentice, D. A., 132, 134 Proctor, S., 103, 104 Pruitt, D. G., 186, 190, 194 Pushkar, D., 203, 210 Putnam, R D., 7, 19 Pyszczynski, T., 33, 37, 42, 65, 71, 72, 81, 84, 113, 114, 160, 168 Rabinowitz, J., 77, 78, 83 Ramsey, C., 205, 209 Rank, 0., 35, 36, 38, 41, 42, 172, 180 Raskin, R N., 24, 31 Raspin, C., 205, 207, 209 Ratelle, C . , 72 Rathunde, K , 22 1, 223, 232 Ravlin, E. C., 185, 189, 194 Rawlings, N. B., 104, 105 Raymond, P. , 164, 167 Reeder, G. D., 28, 31, 132, 134 Reicher, S. D., 178, 181, 185, 195 Reis, H. T., 64, 72, 89, 93 Reis, M., 203, 210 Rennicke, C., 45, 50 Reynolds, J., 238, 241 Rhodewalt, F., 24, 29, 31, 55, 61 Ricard, M., 17, 18, 104, 105 Riordan, C. A., 132, 134 Ritov, 1., 131, 134 Roberts, B. w., 203, 205, 209 Robins, R w., 25, 27, 28, 31, 32, 44, 45, 50, 117, 124 Robinson, D. N., 222, 233 Robitschek, C., 100, 105 Roccas, S., 177, 180, 203, 210 Rodin, J., 177, 180 Rodriguez, R, 51 Rogers, C. R., 14, 19 Rogge, R. D., 78, 83 Romero, v., 96, 104 Roscoe, J., 89, 93 Rose, P. , 27, 31 Rosenberg, M. 96, 105, 142, 147 Rosenbranz, M., 18 Ross, J. M. , 225, 232 Ross, M., 151, 158 Ross, S. R, 205, 208 Rossi, A., 236, 242 Roth, G., 110, 114 Rotter, J. B., 216, 220 Routledge, C . , 40, 42 Rowatt, W. C., 58, 61 Rubin, J. Z., 186, 190, 194 Rude, S. S., 100, 101, 105

249

Rudich, E. A., 24, 27, 31, 32, 44, 50 Ruetzel, K., 207, 209, 237, 241 Rusbult, C. E., 27, 32, 44, 50, 79, 83 Ryan, R M., 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 69, 71, 75, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 89, 92, 93, 97, 99, 104, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 114, 115, 118, 119, 122, 123, 124, 164, 168, 207, 209, 222, 232 Rye, M. S., 12, 17, 19, 205, 208 Ryff, C. D., 210, 214, 220, 236, 241 Saavedra, Y. , 123 Sagarin, B. J., 194 Sage, R M., 44, 51 , 155, 158 Sagiv, L., 203, 210 Sakaeda, A. R., 111, 114, 203, 207, 208 Salmivalli, C . , 96, 105 Salovey, P., 12, 19 Salvarani, G., 132, 134 Salzberg, S., 97, 105 Sampson, E. E., 150, 158 Santorelli, S. F., 18 Sarason, B. R , 66, 72 Sarason, I. G., 66, 72 Sartre, J. P. , 172, 180 Savitsky, K, 117, 123 Schacter, S., 160, 168 Scheier, M. F., 142, 146 Schimel, J., 40, 42 Schimmack, U., 143, 147 Schlegel, A., 29, 30 Schlenker, B. R , 64, 69, 72, 132, 134 Schmeidler, J., 181 Schneider, S. G., 51 Schopenhauer, A., 159, 168 Schopler, J., 131, 135 Schumacher, J., 18 Schwartz, A., 183, 194 Schwartz, B., 7, 19 Schwartz, G. E., 79, 84 Schwartz, J. L. K, 58, 61 Schwartz, S. H., 203, 210 Schwartz, w., 118, 119, 122, 123 Scollon, C. K, 205, 209 Sedikides, C., 24, 27, 28, 31, 32 44, 50, 77, 83, 128, 129, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 147, 158 Seligman, M. E. P. , 58, 61, 97, 105 Shafir, E., 186, 193 Shapiro, S. L., 79, 84, 98, 100, 103, 104, 105 Shaver, P. R , 61 , 205, 209 Shavitt, S., 155, 158 Shaw, D., 206, 210 Shaw, L. L., 167 Shaw, R, 24, 31 Shedler, J., 44, 50 Sheeran, P. , 191, 195 Sheldon, K M., 17, 19, 40, 42, 89, 93, 207, 210

250

AUTHOR INDEX

Shelton, J., 24, 28, 30, 54, 60, 143, 146 Sherif, M., 15, 1 9 Sherman, D. K , 51 , 155, 158 Sherman, J. w., 187, 194 Sherman, S. J., 187, 194 Shiffman, S., 123 Shira, I . , 28, 31 Silver, R. C., 160, 168 Simon, H. A., 184, 185, 195 Simon, L., 38, 42, 160, 1 68 Singelis, T. M., 138, 147 Singer, J. A., 238, 242 Skerven, K , 213, 214, 220 Skowronski, J. J., 133, 135 Slingsby, J. K , 193 Slovik, L. F., 79, 83 Small, D. A. , 131, 135 Smart, L., 55, 60, 97, 104, 172, 180 Smeester, D., 185, 195 Smirles, K A.,236, 241 Smith, E. R., 139, 147, 171, 181 Smith, G. T. , 222, 232 Smith, N. G., 206, 209 Smollen, D., 139, 146 Snarey, J., 236, 242 Snook, B., 187, 195 Snyder, C. R., 8, 19 Solomon, S., 33, 37, 42, 65, 71, 81, 84, 113, 114, 160, 168 Spears, R., 174, 180 Spranca, M., 190, 193 Srivastava, S., 222, 231, 232 Stanovich, K E., 186, 195 Stapel, D. A., 161, 168 Steele, C. M., 61, 214, 220 Stein, J., 183, 194 Steindl-Rast, D . , 229, 233 Steins, G., 34, 42 Stephan, C . w., 173, 181 Stephan, W. G., 173, 177, 181 Sternberg, R. J., 222, 233 Stewart, A. J., 236, 237, 240, 241 Story, A. L., 117, 123 Stroebe, K, 189, 194 Stroink, M., 138, 139, 140, 141, 146, 147 Stucke, T. S., 88, 93 Sugimori, S., 151, 158 Suh, E. M., 143, 147 Sullivan, D., 18, 38, 42 Sullivan, H. S., 19 Sullivan, W. M . , 7 Svenson, 0., 47, 51 Swann, W. B., 96, 105 Swanson, C . , 13, 18 Swidler, A., 7, 1 8 Syme, S. L., 6 6 , 71 Szymanski, D. M., 214, 220

Tajfel, H., 81, 84, 171, 173, 174, 181 Takahashi, M., 222, 231, 233 Takata, T., 152, 157 Tamir, M., 220 Tangney, J. P., 55, 56, 62 Taranto, M. A., 223, 233 Targhetta, v. , 61 Tate, E. B., 97, 105, 142, 146 Taubman Ben-Ari, 0., 39, 42 Taylor, S. E., 43, 44, 45, 47, 51 , 69, 72, 155, 158, 160, 165, 166, 167, 168 Taylor, P. J., 195 Teasdale, J. D., 80, 84 Teresa of Avila, 229, 233 Teresi, J. A., 144, 147 Terry, D. J., 191, 195 Thomas, D., 192, 194 Thomson, A., 172, 181 Thorne, A., 206, 209, 210 Tice, D. M., 88, 93, 128, 135, 155, 157 Tipton, S. M., 7, 18 Todd, R. M., 167, 193 Toguchi, Y., 158 Tracy, J. L., 25, 27, 32 Trafimow, D., 192, 194 Triandis, H. C . , 150, 158 Trope, Y. , 186, 193 Tropp, L. R., 139, 147 Truluck, J. E., 210 Tsang, J.-A., 61 Tudor, M., 139, 146 Turkheimer, E . , 28, 31 Turne� J. C . , 171, 173, 174, 178, 181 , 185, 195 Twenge, J. M., 7, 19, 23, 29, 3 1 , 32, 49, 51 , 54, 57, 62, 88, 93 Uchino, B. N., 66, 72 Underwood, L. G., 144, 147 Updegraff, J. A., 72 Vaillant, G. E., 204, 210, 237, 242 Vallerand, R. J., 65, 72 Van Avermaet, E., 185, 195 Van De Water, D., 215, 220 van Dijk, E . , 191, 195 Van Dijk, M., 29, 30 Van Lange, P. A. M . , 186, 195 Van Yperen, N. w., 47, 50 Vangelisti, A., 24, 32 Vansteenkiste, M., 115 VanYperen, N. V., 160, 167 Vaughn, F., 17, 19 Vecchio, R. P., 192, 195 Verette, J., 79, 83 Vevea, J. L., 128, 131, 134, 135 Vohs, K D., 24, 28, 30, 32, 96, 104, 186, 195, 235, 240

AUTHOR INDEX

Vonk, R, 101, 105 Vygotsky, 1. S., 15, 19 Wagar, B. M., 154, 158 Waldron, W. S. , 76, 81, 84 Wallace, B. A , 17, 18 Wallace, H. M., 24, 28, 32, 53, 62 Walsh, R , 17, 19 Wang, S., 69, 71 Wang, Y. , 156, 158 Warlop, L., 185, 195 Way, B. M., 80 Wayment, H. A, 16, 19, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 175, 181 Webster, D. M., 101, 105 Weis, S., 220 Welwood, J., 78, 84 Wentworth, P. A., 236, 241 West, R, 186, 195 Westenberg, P. M., 200, 203, 204, 205, 208, 210 Westermeyer, J. F., 237, 242 Westmaas, J. L., 160, 168 Wetherell, M. S., 178, 181, 185, 195 Wheatman, S. R, 85 Wheeler, L., 166, 168 Whitaker, D. J., 85 White, K. M., 191, 195 Whitney, G. A, 79, 83 Wicklund, R A, 34, 42, 77, 83 Wilber, K., 17, 19 Wilder, D., 173, 1 79 Wildschut, T., 131, 135 Wiley, A, 156, 158

251

Williams, J., 58, 60, 61 Williams, K. D., 80, 83 Williams, N. L., 90, 92 Williams, T., 205, 209 Wills, T. A, 160, 165, 169 Wilson, A E., 151, 158 Wink, P., 205, 209, 236, 240 Wirtz, D., 152, 153, 154, 155, 158 Wit, A. P., 131, 135 Wohl, M. J. A , 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 181 Wolfe, C. T., 54, 61, 97, 104 Wood, J. v., 160, 169 Wozniak, K., 123 Wright, S. C . , 139, 147 Wu, C.,19 Wuthnow, R, 238, 242 Yacko, H., 120, 121, 124 Yammarino, F. J., 45, 50 Ybema, J. F., 160, 169 Yehuda, R, 175, 181 Young, S. M., 28, 32 Youniss, J., 12, 18 Yount, S. E., 220 Zak, P. J., 69, 71 Zarrett, N., 213, 220 Zeigler-Hill, V., 23, 27, 30, 55, 62 Zelazo, P. D., 200, 210 Zell, A L., 59, 61 Zimbardo, P. G., 34, 42 Zuckerman, M., 119, 124

Subject Index

Adaptation ego function in, 107 function of other orientation, 184 Adjustment accuracy of perceptions for mental health, 44 balance between noisy and ego orientations, 44 egosystem and ecosystem goals and, 66-70 intrapsychic vs. social, 44-45 self-enhancement bias and, 43-48 Affective functioning allo-inclusive identity and, 142 in concepts of ego, 9 cross-cultural comparison of processing negative experiences, 152-153 interpersonally (dis)engaged emotions, 154 mindfulness and social threat response, 78 motivational orientation and, 120 social-emotional development, 205-206 wisdom in, 224 Aggressive behavior authenticity and, 87-88 mortality salience response, 37 narcissism and, 28-29 noisy ego response to criticism, 34 response to threat to self-worth, 87 Agreeableness, as quiet ego characteristic, 203 Allo-inclusive identity, 5, 16 assessment, 138-141 benefits, 145 conceptual evolution, 137-138 definition, 137 egoism and, 145 emotional functioning and, 142 narcissism and, 143 personality traits and, 141-142 personal values and, 143 religious and spiritual orientation and, 144-145 research opportunities, 146 self-consciousness and, 142 social orientation, 143, 145 Allo-Inclusive Identity Scale, 139-141 Allophilia, 138 Altruism, in empathy-altruism hypothesis, 132

American culture generativity in, 240 individualist orientation, 150 Angst collective vs. individual, 172-173 definition, 172 See also Collective angst Anterior cingulate cortex, 80 Anxiety, fear vs., 172 Aspirations, self-determination theory, 111 Assessment allo-inclusive identity, 138-141 authenticity, 86 ego maturity, 216 generativity attitudes, 2 14-215 humility, 58 mindfulness, 87 wisdom, 222-225 Attachment security ego flexibility and, 41 loud ego and, 39 for quiet ego, 56 self-compassion and, 100-101 Attentional processes detached awareness, 12 See also Mindfulness Attractiveness, self-perception in narcissism, 24 Attribution style, cultural differences, 154-155 Authentic self, 5 aggressive behavior, 87-88 assessment, 86 behavioral component, 86 component model, 86 defensiveness against self-esteem threat, 90-92 definition, 86 mindfulness and, 86-87 quiet ego and, 85, 88 relational component, 86 self-awareness, 86 stable self-esteem in, 89-90 unbiased processing in, 86 Autonomy, 5, 16, 89 cultural differences, 156 environmental cues in ego quieting, 122-123 self-determination theory, 108, 118

253

254

SUBJECT INDEX

self-integration and, 120 in self-regulation, 108, 112, 113 through inner-centered guidance, 227-228 Autonomy motivation defensiveness and, 120-122 defensiveness orientation, 118-119 downward social comparison and, 164-165 performance enhancement and, 121 self-esteem and, 119-120 Awareness in authenticity, 86 ego function in, 107 in quieting of ego, 112-113 Balance classic psychoanalytic conceptualization of ego, 14 in concept of quiet ego, 10 ego flexibility, 39-40, 41 ego orientation for optimal adjustment, 44 ego orientation in coping with death concerns, 36, 38, 39-42 egosystem-ecosystem motivation trade-offs, 64-65 eudaimonic personality development, 207-208 psychosocial growth and, 11 quiet ego characteristics, 8 self-enhancement, 48 in self-evaluation, 10 self-interest, 11 self-other concerns, 10 situationally appropriate, between quiet and loud ego, 34-35, 4 1 Baumeister, R . , 59 Benevolence, 46, 47 Big Five model of personality, 15 allo-inclusive identity and, 141-142 quiet ego and, 202-203 Buddhism, 17, 23 concept of ego, 117 Children cultural differences in parenting, 156 ego development, 200-203 Christianity, 17 Collaboration, self-enhancement bias effects, 48 Collective angst, 16 antecedent conditions, 173, 179 future orientation of, 172 historical victimization and, 175-177 individual angst and, 172-173 social identity theory, 171 strategies for reducing, 177-179 threat to identity distinctiveness and, 173-175

Collective identification, 6 Collective rationality, 189, 190-191 Collective self definition, 127, 137 in motivational hierarchy, 127-130 Collectivist orientation, individualism vs., 16, 150-151 Common good balanced ego orientation, 10 benefits of humility, 56-57 benefits of quiet ego, 8, 30 compassion orientation, 13 narcissism and, 28-29 negative aspects of egoistic self-interest, 11, 34-35 personal gain and common loss, 25, 26 positive aspects of noisy ego orientation, 34 social psychology research, 15 Compassion definition, 159 downward social comparison and, 16, 159 as quiet-ego prototypical quality, 12, 13 self-compassion and, 98-99 Compassionate mind training, 103 Competition humility and, 58 individualism and, 150 self-enhancement bias effects, 48, 49 Confidence, wild ego and, 53-54 Conformity, 202, 216 Construction of self historical evolution of psychology research, 15 Me self concept, 76 noisy ego characteristics, 9 quiet ego characteristics, 9 Contingent self-esteem, 110-111 ego orientation, 111-112 Control, locus of among ego transcenders and ego occluders, 216-217 social stigmatization and, 211-2 12 Control motivation, 118, 119 defensiveness and, 120-121, 122 downward social comparison and, 164-165 environmental cues in ego quieting, 123 self-esteem and, 119-120 self-integration and, 120 strategies for reducing collective angst, 177 Cortisol, 69 Creativity, mortality salience effects, 38 Criticism, aggressive response of loud ego, 34 Culture ego orientation in coping with death concerns and, 36 future of quiet-ego studies, 17 generativity and, 240

SUBJECT INDEX

individualist vs. collectivist, 16, 150-151 mortality salience effects, 40 narcissistic trends, 43, 49 perceptions of egotism, 7 self-compassion and, 102-103 terror management theory, 36-37 threat response, 155 worldview defense, 81-82 See also Eastern concept of self Daily Spiritual Experience Scale, 144 Death ego orientation in coping with concerns about, 35-36 mindfulness processing of concept of, 81-82, 113 terror management theory, 36-37, 112-113 Defenses and defensiveness autonomy motivation orientation and, 118-119, 121-122 control motivation orientation and, 119, 122 cultural differences, 155 ego development and, 204 egoistic functioning, 117, 118 impersonal motivation orientation and, 119, 122 in individualist cultures, 150 motivational orientations, 118, 119-122 self-esteem threat, 90-92 social threat, 76-77 worldview defense, 81--82 Denial, ego development and, 204 Depersonalization, 185 Detached awareness qualities of, 12 as quiet-ego prototypical quality, 12 See also Mindfulness Development, 6 ego maturity, 216 generativity and, 235-238 historical evolution of ego concepts, 15-16 as integration of perspectives, 15 introjected behavioral regulation, 110 liberative model, 222 life cycle model, 212 motivation, 108-109 quiet ego and, 4, 199 self-determination theory, 108-109 See also Growth model of ego quieting Docility, 185 Downward social comparison autonomy and, 164-- 165 collective reactions to, 160-161 compassion and, 16, 159 egoistic reactions to, 160 integrative model of processes, 161-167 potential negative effects, 166-167

255

self-compassion and, 163-164 social construal and, 163 wisdom and, 163-164 Eastern concept of self advantages, 155-156 attribution style, 154-- 1 55 costs, 156, 157 defining characteristics, 149, 151, 156-157 inclusion of negative experiences, 151-153 inclusion of others in self-definition and well-being, 153-155 quiet ego and, 149 Ecclesiastes, 23 Ecosystem goals, 5, 16 college adjustment and, 66-70 conceptualization, 64 egosystem motivation and, 63, 64 function, 64 learning and, 65, 68 motivation, 65, 69-70 neurophysiology, 69 psychological significance, 70-71 scope, 64 social relationships and, 66, 67-68 trade-offs, 64--65 well-being and, 66, 68-69 Ego in arbitrating self-other concerns, 35 classic psychoanalytic conceptualization, 14 concept of self and, 9 coping with idea of death, 35-36 definitions, 9, 117 functions, 33, 107 historical evolution of psychological construct, 15-16, 107, 149 individual development, 199, 200, 213. See also Growth model of ego quieting in integration of social knowledge, 33 introjection and, 111-112 Me self, 76, 212 in narcissism, 23-25 process model, 212 self-determination theory, 107 Ego development, 199, 2 12-213 ego transcenders and occluders and, 215-2 16 eudaimonic personality development and, 207-208 happiness and, 205-206 as process of ego quieting, 200-204 Ego involvement, 110 Egoism allo-inclusive identity and, 145 defensive functioning, 117, 118 reactions to downward social comparison, 160

256

SUBJECT INDEX

Ego occluders, 211-2 12 ego maturity, 216 generativity, 2 14-216 locus of control, 216-217 psychosocial health, 214 self-defining life stories, 217-218 Egosystem goals, 5, 16 college adjustment and, 66-70 costs, 63 ecosystem motivation and, 63, 64 function, 64 learning and, 65, 68 motivation, 63, 65, 69 neurophysiology, 69 psychological significance, 70-71 social relationships and, 65-66, 67-68 trade-offs, 64-65 well-being and, 66, 68-69 Egotism attractions of, 29 negative aspects, 7 self-other concerns in, 10 sociocultural trends, 23 sociocultural values, 7 temporal orientation, 13 wild ego as threatened egotism, 55 See also Noisy ego Ego transcenders, 211-212 ego maturity, 216 generativity, 214-216 locus of control, 216-217 psychosocial health, 2 14 social stigma and stereotype effects, 219 Empathy forgiveness studies, 59 reactions to downward social comparison information, 160-161 Empathy-altruism hypothesis, 132 Endocrine system, 69 Equity theory, 192 Eudaimonic personality development, 207-208 Evolutionary theory other orientation and, 184 species preservation theory, 69 Expectancy theory, 192 Extrinsic aspirations, 111 Extrinsic motivation, 108-109 Family functioning, benefits of generativity, 236 Fear, anxiety and, 172 Feedback effects cross-cultural comparison of processing negative information, 152 humility response, 60 motivational orientation and, 120 sandwich technique, 60

self-esteem threat response, 65 social relationships, 40 Fight-or-flight response, 69 Forgiveness, 59 Freud, S., 14 Generativity, 207, 212-213 adult development and, 235-238 among ego occluders, 215 among ego transcenders, 215-216 assessment, 2 14-215 associated behaviors, 236 benefits, 236 causes of stagnation, 215 definition and characteristics, 235-236 ego orientation in, 235, 236, 237, 238 individual differences, 236 life stories for, 238-239 redemptive self and, 238-240 religious conceptualization, 237 sociocultural context, 240 stagnation vs., 236-237 Goal setting, humility and, 57 Gratitude, 13 Group identity collective angst and, 171 depersonalization and, 185 ego development, 200, 202 historical victimization and, 175-177 other orientation and, 185 perceived group membership, 185 social identity theory, 171, 174 superordinate group, 178 suppression of self-enhancement for, 38 terror management theory, 37 threat to identity distinctiveness, 173-175 worldview defense, 81-82 Growth as quiet-ego prototypical quality, 13 Growth model of ego quieting, 10-11, 12, 13, 16 conceptual basis, 199, 200-202, 213 empirical evidence, 202-204 eudaimonic personality development, 207-208 in humanistic psychology, 14 self-interpretation in, 199-200 social-emotional development and, 204-207 well-being and, 205 Growth stories, 206-207 Habituation traps, 25, 26 Heuristic judgment, 184, 186-187 in self- and other-interest four mode model, 187-188, 189 Humanistic psychology conceptualization of quiet ego, 14

SUBJECT INDEX

future of quiet-ego studies, 16-- 1 7 Humility, 13, 16 accuracy of self-perception for, 56 achievement and, 58 assessment, 58 benefit s, 56--5 7 conceptualizations of, 55-56 development of, 228-229 goal setting and, 57 prosocial motivation and, 58 protective qualities of, 57-58 quiet ego and, 4, 55-56 research base, 58, 59-60 Id, 14 Impersonal motivation defensiveness and, 118, 119, 120-121 definition, 118 downward social comparison and, 164-165 self-integration and, 120 Implicit Association Text, 58 Inclusion of Others in the Self Scale, 139 Individual differences in ego orientation, 235 in generativity, 236 in other orientation, 185 in quiet ego, 85-92 Individualism American culture, 150 collectivist orientation vs., 16, 150-151 self-contained, 150 tragedy of the commons and, 25, 26 vertical, 150 Individual self definition, 127, 137 in motivational hierarchy, 127-130 potential negative effects, 133 quiet ego and, 133 Industrial/organizational psychology, 6 Information processing egoistic functioning, 117 inclusion of negative experiences, 15 1-153 motivation orientation and, 118, 120-121 openness to social influence, adaptive advantage of, 184 unbiased, in authenticity, 86 Intelligence ego development theory, 203 self-perception in narcissism, 24 Interbeing, 98 Interdependence collectivist orientation, 150-151 as quiet-ego prototypical quality, 12-13 self-compassion and, 98-99, 102-103 self-construal theory, 102 Intrinsic aspirations, 111, 112 Intrinsic motivation, 108, 112

Introjected behavioral regulation development of, 110 ego function, 111-112 ego orientation, 108 manifestations, 110-111 mindfulness for amelioration of, 112 negative effects, 110, 112 self-determination theory, 107-108, 109 James, w. , 14-15, 138 Kindness, 59-60 self-kindness, 97 Leadership, narcissism and, 28 Learning development of humility and, 228 ecosystem motivation and, 65, 68 egosystem motivation and, 65, 68 vicarious, 184 Lesbians ego maturity, 216 generativity attitudes, 213, 2 14-2 16 internalized homonegativity, 2 13-214, 2 18-2 19 locus of control, 2 16-217 narrative self-identity, 6 psychosocial health, ego orientation and, 214 self-defining life stories, 217-218 social stigma effects on ego functioning, 211-212 Liberative model of development, 222 Lobel, M., 59 Maslow, A. H., 138 Memory, cultural differences in, 152-154 Merit, 46, 47 Me self, 76, 212 Mindfulness, 5 adaptive function, 82 aggression and, 87-88 assessment, 87 authenticity and, 87 definition and characteristics, 75, 77, 85, 86--8 7, 112 interruption of self-representations, 77 neurobiology, 103-104 openness to experience and, 122 in process of self-identity, 16 quiet ego and, 82, 85, 88, 112 self-compassion and, 98, 100 shift in self-identity in, 82 social context, 113-114 social threat and, 78-82 terror management theory, 81, 112-113 well-being and, 75

257

258

SUBJECT INDEX

Mindlessness, 188 Mortality salience, 37-40, 4 1-42, 81-82, 112-113 Motivation, 4-5 coping with idea of death, 35-36 defensiveness orientations, 118, 119-121 ecosystem, 64, 65, 69-70 ego involvement and, 110 egosystem, 63, 65, 69 environmental influences on motivation orientation, 121-123 extrinsic, 108-109 hierarchy. See Motivational hierarchy individual development, 108-109 intrinsic, 108 mindfulness and, 112 in other orientation, 184, 186 priming, 119 prosocial, humility and, 58 prosocial behavior, 190-191 self- and other-interest four mode model, 187-190 self-compassion and, 100 self-determination theory, 108, 118 terror management theory, 36 See also Autonomy motivation; Control motivation; Impersonal motivation Motivational hierarchy contextual salience, 128 empathy-altruism hypothesis, 132 future orientation, 129 identified-victim effect, 131 negative-state relief, 1 3 1-132 quieter ego and, 130, 133-134 relative positioning of selves, 128-130 relative valuing of selves, 129 self-serving bias and, 132 social dilemma conditions and, 130-131 structure, 127 threat response, 127-128, 129 Mystical states of consciousness, 14, 138 Narcissism, 4, 16 allo-inclusive identity and, 143 benefits of, 27-28 clinical conceptualization, 43 cost-benefit trade-off in, 23 costs for others in, 28-29 costs to self of, 28 ego structure and function in, 23-25 interpersonal relationships and, 54--55 mythological origins, 43 quiet ego and, 25 self-regulation in, 24 as self-reinforcing system, 24 as social trap, 23, 25-29

Narrative construction of self-identity, 6 among ego occluders and ego transcenders, 2 17-218 ego development, 199, 206-207 ego quieting and, 206 for generativity, 238-239 historical evolution of psychology research, 15 Negative-state relief, 131 Neurobiology egosystem and ecosystem motivation, 69 mindfulness meditation effects, 103-104 Noisy ego, 4--5 balanced self-evaluation and, 10 coping with death concerns, 35-36 definition and characteristics, 8, 33-34, 85 individual development, 199 introjected behavioral regulation and, 108, 111-112 mortality salience response, 37 motivation orientation and, 123 negative effects, 34 orientation, 33 positive aspects, 34 psychological security and, 39 self-interpretation and, 199-200 situationally appropriate balance with quiet ego, 34-35, 41 social stigma and stereotypes as source of, 211, 219 terror management theory, 37 Western culture and, 150 See also Egotism Occluders, ego. See Ego occluders Openness to experience, 15 mindfulness and, 122 motivational orientation, 118, 120, 122 noisy ego orientation, 33-34 as quiet ego characteristic, 202-203 vulnerability in, 122 Openness to social influence, 184-- 185 Organismic-integration theory, 109 introjection in, 110 Organismic psychology, 76, 77 self-determination theory and, 108 Organizational citizenship behavior, 192 Organizational psychology, 183 equity theory, 192 expectancy theory, 192 implications of other orientation, 191-193 Other-interest, 6 adaptive function, 184 definition, 186 normative reasoning and, 184, 191-192 openness to social influence, 184-- 185

SUBJECT INDEX

in other orientation, 184, 185-186 psychology concepts, 183 self- and other-interest four mode model, 187-190 Other orientation collective rationality, 189, 190-191 contextual determinants, 185 definition and characteristics, 184 heuristic judgment in, 186-187 implications for organizational functioning, 191-193 individual differences, 185 normative reasoning and, 191-192 other-interest in, 184, 185-186 perceived group membership and, 185 perspective taking and, 185 rational judgment and, 186 self- and other-interest four mode model, 189-190 Oxytocin, 69 Personality psychology, 6 historical evolution of ego research, 15 Perspective taking, 185 ego development, 200-201 Peterson, AJyssa, 166-167 Positive psychology, 7, 8 Pride, 154 Prisoner's Dilemma, 30, 59 Progesterone, 69 Psychoanalytic theory and practice ego conceptualization, 14 Purpose in life motivation to self-transcendence, 35-36 quiet ego characteristics, 9 terror management theory, 36 Quiet ego authentic functioning in, 85, 88 benefits, 29-30, 133, 155, 235 Big Five personality traits and, 202-203 collective ego, 177-179 concept of balance in, 10 definition and meanings, 7, 8-9, 85 developmental context, 4, 6, 199 Eastern concept of self and, 149, 155-156 environmental cues to autonomy and, 122-123 eudaimonic personality and, 207-208 expressions of, 229-231 future of psychology research, 16-17 generativity and, 238 growth model, 10-11 historical evolution of psychology concerns, 13-16 humility and, 55-56, 228-229

259

individual differences, 85-92 inner-centered guidance, 227-228 mindfulness and, 82, 85, 88, 112 mortality salience response, 37 motivational hierarchy and, 130, 133-134 narcissism and, 25 negative effects of immersive selftranscendence , 34, 35, 133 orientation, 33 pathways to, 226-229, 231 personality development and, 6 prototypical qualities, 12-13 psychological significance, 12 research approaches, 9-10 role of awareness in, 112-113 self-determination theory, 107, 108, 118 self-interpretation and, 199-200 situationally appropriate balance with loud ego, 34-35, 4 1 social connectedness beliefs, 56 social context, 3-4, 5-6 spirituality and, 226-227 strength of self-sense in, 85 vs, wild ego, 56 well-being and, 205-206, 214 wisdom and, 223 See also Growth model of ego quieting Rank, 0" 35-36 Rationality heuristic judgment and, 186-187 in other-interest, 184 Redemptive self, 6, 16, 238-240 Relational orientation in authenticity, 86 Relational prOjection, 154 Relational self definition, 127, 137 in motivational hierarchy, 128-130 quieter ego and, 130 Religion and spirituality allo-inclusive identity and, 144-145 autonomy through inner-centered guidance, 227-228 development of humility, 228-229 expressions of quieter ego, 229-231 generativity and, 237 mediation of mortality salience effects, 40 pathways to quieter ego, 226-229 quiet ego and, 226-227 Repression of death concerns, 35-36 Romantic relationships conflict in, mindfulness and, 78-79 narcissism and, 24 Secure attachment, 39 ego flexibility and, 41

260

SUBJECT INDEX

for quiet ego, 56 Secure self-esteem, 89-90 Self belief in purposeful life, 35-36 concept of ego and, 9, 222 defensive response to social threat, 76-77 existential motivation to demonstrate unique self-worth, 35 liberative model of development, 222 Me self, 76 motivational hierarchy, 127-134 reality of mental self-representations, 76 wisdom and, 222 See also Eastern concept of self Self-awareness, 216 Self-categorization theory, 178 Self-compassion, 5, 16 attachment security and, 100-101 compassion for others and, 98-99 components, 97 culture and, 102-103 definition and characteristics, 95, 97 downward social comparison and, 163-164 future research directions, 103-104 mindfulness and, 98, 100 motivation and, 100 recognition of common humanity in, 97-98 self-esteem vs., 100-102 self-kindness in, 97 well-being linkage, 99-100 Self-concept internalized homonegativity, 213-214 intrapsychic adjustment, 44 social relations and, 5-6 Self-construal theory, 102, 137, 155 downward social comparison and, 163 Self-determination theory, 5, 16 conceptual basis, 108-109 ego orientation in, 107-108 motivational orientations, 118 quieting of ego and, 113, 118 Self-enhancement, 4, 16 adjustment effects, 43-48 competition and, 48, 49 componential model, 45-46 cross-cultural comparison, 152 egoistic functioning, 117 egosystem motivation, 63 interpersonal conflict risk and, 45 mortality salience effects, 38 positive implementation, 49 research needs, 48-49 self-deceptive, 155-156 situational factors, 47-48, 49 social comparison theory, 45 Self-esteem, 5 allo-inclusive identity and, 142

authenticity and, 89 benefits for self, 96 contingent, 110-111 definition and characteristics, 96 ego flexibility and, 41 instability, 34, 54 introjected behavioral regulation and, 111 mortality salience response, 39-40 motivation orientation and, 119-120, 122 in narcissism, 24--2 5 negative effects of attempting to increase, 96-97 perceived vulnerability and, 162 quiet ego compatibility, 5 7 reactions t o downward social comparison information, 160 security, 89-90, 96--9 7 self-compassion vs., 100-102 terror management theory, 36 threat response, 65 verbal defensiveness against threat to, 90-92 Self-evaluation balance in, 10 narcissistic, 23-24 Self-help movements, 7 Self-identity among ego occluders and ego transcenders, 217-218 growth-oriented narrative, 199 historical evolution of psychology conceptualizations, 14 mindfulness in, 16, 82 narrative construction, 6 noisy ego, 34 self-determination theory, 109 social exclusion and, 79-80 threat to identity distinctiveness, 173-175 well-being and, 96 Self-insight, 45 other-interest vs., 186 Self-interest balance in, 11 other-interest concepts in psychology, 183 psychology research trends, 7-8 psychosocial growth and, 11 rational judgment and, 187 self- and other-interest four mode model, 187-190 Self-interpretation detached awareness and, 12 ego volume and, 199-200 historical evolution of ego concepts, 15 interdependence concepts in, 12 Selflessness practices for cultivation of, 231 self-knowledge and, 222

SUBJECT INDEX

wisdom and, 6, 16, 221-222 Self-observation, 5 Self-pity, 99 Self-regulation autonomous, 108, 113 mindfulness and, 112 in narcissism, 24 self-determination theory, 107-108, 109, 113 See also Introjected behavioral regulation Self-structures, motivational orientation and, 120 Shame, 59 internalized homonegativity, 213-214 Sliding-reinforcer traps, 26, 27 Social adjustment, 44-45 Social comparison, 16 mortality salience effects, 40 self-enhancement theory, 45 Sociality, 184 Social mentality theory, 100 Social psychology historical evolution of ego research, 15 Social relationships aggression response to social rejection, 88 allo-inclusive identity orientation, 143, 145 authenticity in, 86 balanced self-other concerns, 10 benefits of narcissism, 28 benefits of quiet ego, 29, 30 concept of ego, 9 costs of narcissism, 28-29 cultural differences in self-referential memory, 153-154 defensive response to social threat, 76-77 developmental models, 15-16 ecosystem goals and, 66, 67-68 ecosystem motivation, 64 ego development, 200-202 egosystem goals and, 67-68 egosystem motivation and, 65-66 growth model of ego quieting, 10-11 homonegativity, 213 humility and, 56-57 identifying with others, 159 inclusion of others in self-definition, cultural differences in, 153-154 interdependence as quiet-ego quality, 12-13 interindividual-intergroup discontinuity effect, 131 interpersonal feedback effects, 40 narcissism as social trap, 23, 25-29 narcissism effects, 54-55 negative effects of immersive selftranscendence, 34, 35 noisy ego characteristics, 8 numbers-of-others effect, 130-131 openness to social influence, 184-185

261

quiet ego and, 3-4, 5-6 , 8, 56, 133 reality of mental self-representations and, 76 response to persons vs. groups, 131-132 romantic relationships, 24, 78-79 romantic relationships and narcissism, 24 self-enhancement bias and, 45, 46, 47 self-perception in narcissism, 24 self-serving bias and, 132 social exclusion, 79-80 terror management theory, 37 See also Downward social comparison; Other-interest Social relations theory, 46 Species-preservation motivation, 69 Stereotypes, as source of negative elements of noisy ego, 211, 219 Stigmatization effects on ego functioning, 211 internalized homonegativity, 213-214 lesbian identity and, 212 narrative self-identity and, 6 occlusion of, 211 resistance to negative effects of, 219 as source of negative elements of noisy ego, 211, 219 transcending, 211 Superego, 14 Temporal orientation benefits of humility, 57 for collective angst, 172 egotism, 13 generativity, 207 growth model of quiet ego, 13 motivational hierarchy, 129 Tend-and-befriend response, 69 Terror management theory, 4, 16 balanced ego orientation in, 38 conceptual basis, 36-37 ego orientation and, 37-42 group identification motivation, 37 mindfulness and, 81, 112-113 purpose, 33 research needs, 41-42 Threat-affiliation response, 162 Threat response collective angst, 172-173 contingent self-esteem effects, 111 cultural differences, 155 defensive information processing in egoism, 117, 155 defensiveness against self-esteem threat, 90-92 egosystem motivation, 65, 69 feelings of angst, 171 historical victimization and, 175-177

262

SUBJECT INDEX

identity distinctiveness threat, 173-175 mindfulness and social threat, 78-82 motivational hierarchy of self, 127-128 motivational orientation and, 118-119, 120, 122 narcissistic individuals, 28-29 processing concept of death, 35-37, 8 1-82, 112-113 self-relevant evaluation, 76-77 social psychology research, 15 wild ego as threatened egotism, 55 worldview defense, 8 1-82 Three-Dimensional Wisdom Scale, 222 Time-delay traps, 26, 27 'Iblerance, 40, 41 Totalitarian ego, 149, 150, 155-156 Tragedy of the commons, 25, 26 Transindividual identity, 137-138 Transpersonal psychology, 17

Upanishads, 23 Vasopressin, 69 Western culture. See Eastern concept of self Wild ego, 4 benefits, 53 definition and characteristics, 53 instability, 54 negative aspects, 53-54 quiet ego vs., 56 as threatened egotism, 55 Wisdom, 13 assessment, 222-225 definition, 221 downward social comparison and, 163-164 meaning making and, 16 psychological health and, 221 quiet ego and, 223 selfle ssness and, 6, 16, 221-222

About the Editors

Heidi A. Wayment, PhD, is professor of psychology at Northern Arizona

University in Flagstaff, where she conducts research on psychosocial reactions to personal and collective loss as well as predictors and consequences of com­ passionate reactions. Dr. Wayment serves on the editorial boards of Compass: Journal in Social Psychology, the Journal of Personal and Social Relation­ ships, and Coping With L08s and Trauma. Before completing her graduate studies and postdoctoral work at the University of California, Los Angeles, Dr. Wayment earned small college All-American honors in volleyball and bas­ ketball and had a long career in basketball, playing with top European teams, with both U.S. and German national teams, and in the first professional league in the United States. She now enjoys living in the beautiful region of northern Arizona with her husband and children and finding time to cook, quilt, and relax with friends. Jack J. Bauer, PhD, is assistant professor of psychology at the University of

Dayton in Dayton, Ohio. Dr. Bauer conducts research on narrative self-iden­ tity and personal growth. His studies of growth goals and growth stories in relation to happiness and meaning making have been supported by The Foley Center for the Study of Lives at Northwestern University as well as by Positive Psychology grants from the Templeton Foundation. He serves on the edito­ rial board of the Journal of Research in Personality. He previously taught at Northern Arizona University and was a visiting professor at Washington Col­ lege. Before entering the field of psychology, he was the editor of a newspaper in northern Michigan and worked in public relations and strategic planning in Chicago and Cleveland. He lives with his wife and two young children in Ohio, where they enjoy amusement parks, putt-putt, swimming, baseball, planets, and princesses.

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