CURRENT EVENTS • ASIA
relations. His newest work solidifies that position by offering the most comprehensive account available of Tibet’s resistance during the buildup to the Beijing Olympics—an uprising that challenged
SMITH
“Warren W. Smith Jr. has emerged as the preeminent writer on Tibetan history and Sino-Tibetan
China’s claim that it has a legitimate right to colonize and suppress the Tibetan people. Smith relates Beijing’s paranoid reaction to the uprising in fascinating detail. Anyone who is interested in the Tibetan issue or the nature of modern Chinese nationalism must read Tibet’s Last Stand?, a seminal and mesmerizing book.”
—Mikel Dunham, author of Buddha’s Warriors
analysis of the causes of the uprising is surpassed only by his detailed examination of the conand the collapse of the Dalai Lama’s negotiation attempts with Beijing. It is a must read for those concerned about the fate of Tibet. The book takes on special significance in the wake of the similar conflict in Xinjiang in 2009, providing useful insight into the future of China’s colonial empire.” —Jamyang Norbu, author of The Mandala of Sherlock Holmes This deeply knowledgeable book offers the first sustained analysis of the 2008 uprising in Tibet, which revealed much about Tibetan nationalism and even more about Chinese nationalism. Retracing the complex history between China and Tibet, noted expert Warren Smith describes the uprising itself and explores its broader significance for Chinese-Tibetan relations. He sharply critiques China’s use of heavy-handed propaganda to recast the uprising and obscure its origins and significance. The book convincingly shows that far from becoming more lenient in response to Tibetan discontent, China has determined to eradicate Tibetan opposition internally and coerce the international community to conform to China’s version of Tibetan history and reality.
TIBET’S LAST STAND?
sequences of that eruption: the resurgence of Tibetan nationalism, the brutal Chinese crackdown,
THE TIBETAN UPRISING OF 2008 AND CHINA’S RESPONSE
“A lucid, comprehensive, and insightful account of the 2008 uprising in Tibet. Smith’s impressive
WARREN W. SMITH JR. is a researcher and writer with the Tibetan Service of Radio Free Asia.
TibetsLastStand?LITHO.indd 1
ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD
For orders and information please contact the publisher ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 90000 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200 9 780742 566859 Lanham, Maryland 20706 1-800-462-6420 Cover image © Patrick Lin/AFP/Getty Images www.rowmanlittlefield.com
TIBET’S LAST STAND?
THE TIBETAN UPRISING OF 2008 AND CHINA’S RESPONSE
WARREN W. SMITH JR.
10/2/09 5:38:43 PM
TIBET’S LAST STAND?
TIBET’S LAST STAND? The Tibetan Uprising of 2008 and China’s Response
Warren W. Smith Jr.
ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC. Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK
Published by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706 http://www.rowmanlittlefield.com Estover Road, Plymouth PL6 7PY, United Kingdom Copyright © 2010 by Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. All photos are from 50th Anniversary of Tibet Democratic Reforms Exhibition Online, except photos 12 (by anonymous photographer) and 15 (Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy). All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the publisher, except by a reviewer who may quote passages in a review. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Smith, Warren W. Tibet’s last stand : the Tibetan uprising of 2008 and China’s response / Warren W. Smith, Jr. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-7425-6685-9 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-7425-6687-3 (electronic) 1. Tibet (China)—Politics and government—1951- 2. Tibet (China)—History— Autonomy and independence movements. 3. Demonstrations—China—Tibet. 4. Political persecution—China—Tibet. 5. Propaganda, Chinese. 6. Tibet (China) —Relations—China. 7. China—Relations—China—Tibet. 8. Nationalism—China— Tibet. 9. Nationalism—China. 10. China—Foreign public opinion. I. Title. DS786.S657 2010 951.06—dc22 2009029975
⬁ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992. Printed in the United States of America
Contents
List of Abbreviations
vii
Introduction 1 2
3
4
1
Chronology of Revolt China’s Response: Repression Repression in Eastern Tibet Patriotic Education Patriotic Education outside the TAR An Atmosphere of Fear and Oppression China’s Response: Propaganda Blaming the “Dalai Clique” “Hostile Western Forces” Testimony of Tibetans Traditional Themes of Chinese Propaganda Propaganda Aimed at Tibetans White Paper on Tibet Tibet and the Olympics China’s Response to International Criticism Olympic Torch Relay China Responds to Pressure for Talks Sichuan Earthquake Dialogue and Olympics
—v—
11 41 55 61 67 70 79 80 90 95 102 114 128 139 140 152 166 185 190
vi
5
Contents
One State, Two Nations “Eighth Round” of Dialogue “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People” Dharamsala “Special Meeting” of Tibetan Exiles “Serf Emancipation Day” Tibetan Nationalism Chinese Nationalism China’s New Diplomatic Offensive
209 211 218 228 234 250 259 267
Selected Bibliography
289
Index
291
About the Author
299
Abbreviations
CCP CCTV CPPCC ICT KMT MWA NPC OSC PAP PEC PCTAR PLA PRC PSB REAL RFA SFT TAR TAP TCHRD TGIE TPUM TWA TYC VOA
Chinese Communist Party Chinese Central Television Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference International Campaign for Tibet Kuomintang Middle Way Approach National People’s Congress Open Source Center People’s Armed Police Patriotic Education Campaign Preparatory Committee Tibet Autonomous Region People’s Liberation Army People’s Republic of China Public Security Bureau Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law Radio Free Asia Students for a Free Tibet Tibet Autonomous Region Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy Tibetan Government in Exile Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement Tibetan Women’s Association Tibetan Youth Congress Voice of America — vii —
Map of sites of Tibetan demonstrations during March and April 2008.
Introduction
T
1876 BATTLE OF THE LITTLE BIGHORN is popularly known to Americans as Custer’s Last Stand. George Armstrong Custer was the commander of the U.S. Army’s Seventh Cavalry, which was pursuing Sioux and Cheyenne Indians who had fled into Montana from reservations in South Dakota. These Great Plains Indians, led by Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, had seen the U.S. government’s promises of territorial autonomy, “as long as the grass grows and the streams flow,” in the Black Hills of South Dakota violated within three years after gold was discovered there. Custer underestimated the number of Indians when he attacked, leading to his “Last Stand.” The Battle of the Little Bighorn was not only Custer’s Last Stand but also that of the last of the free Indians, who gained a gratifying victory but knew that it meant their end. Although there is an interesting analogy between the history of the American conquest of the Native Americans and that of China over Tibet, it should not be taken too far. This is in fact a favorite analogy of the Chinese and their apologists because it implies inevitability, a natural replacement of a primitive culture by one more advanced, and a precedent implicating China’s American critics in the same crime of which China is accused. China’s ultimate defense for its claim to Tibet is similar to Americans’ manifest destiny argument in regard to the American continent and its natives. As Chairman Mao said openly to Tibetans in the early 1950s, Tibet should fulfill China’s need for natural resources while China would fulfill Tibet’s need for people. Much like Americans’ attitudes toward the unexplored west in the nineteenth century, many Chinese tended to regard Tibet not as a nation or a people but as an essentially empty territory open for settlement and exploitation. HE
—1—
2
Introduction
The difference between these two conquests is that Tibet had a high and ancient civilization with a written language and extensive literature, a unique religious culture, a functioning government administering a defined territory, and a Tibetan consciousness as a distinct nation. Tibet had all the characteristics of a national entity, and was therefore entitled according to international law to the right of national self-determination. The Native Americans in contrast had no common spoken language, no written language, and no state structure. Another difference is that Americans did little to disguise the nature of their conquest of the continent, whereas China pretends that Tibet has always been part of China and that China has liberated the Tibetans. Perhaps this is the only way in which human civilization has advanced in the interim. Now, conquerors at least feel the need to disguise and justify their conquests. The demonstrations and riots in Tibet in March 2008 were the largest anti-Chinese protests there since March 1989, when martial law was imposed for a year, or perhaps even since the 1959 revolt. The magnitude and spread of the protests to all parts of the Tibetan Plateau, including many areas outside the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), fully justify their characterization as a Tibetan national uprising. China’s response to this rejection of its rule was a typical combination of repression and propaganda. The Chinese government’s response and that of the Chinese people to what they regarded as an attempt to spoil the Beijing Olympics and to damage China’s reputation revealed much about the nature of modern Chinese nationalism. On 10 March 2008 some five hundred monks of Drepung monastery, located a few miles northwest of Lhasa on the edge of the Lhasa valley, attempted to march into the center of the city. They were stopped within a few miles of their monastery by Chinese security police. Some of the monks were reportedly arrested and beaten. The rest were then confined to their monastery, which was surrounded by police. Meanwhile, a smaller number of monks from another of Lhasa’s large monasteries, Sera, about three miles from the center of the city on the northern edge of the Lhasa valley, were arrested near the Jokhang, the central temple of Lhasa, for carrying the banned Tibetan flag.1 The next day an estimated six hundred monks from Sera were prevented from marching on Lhasa to demand the release of their fellows arrested the day before. Again, some of the monks were reportedly beaten and arrested and the monastery was subsequently surrounded by police. The monks of the last of the three great monasteries near Lhasa, Ganden, some twenty miles to the east, were prevented from demonstrating the next day by security forces that had surrounded that monastery as well. Nuns from Chutsang nunnery in Lhasa were also stopped from demonstrating. The monks were deprived of
Introduction
3
food and water and those arrested were reportedly mistreated, which became a source of more discontent. Rumors spread that some monks had been killed by security personnel or secretly executed. Two Drepung monks attempted suicide on Wednesday. The occasion for these protests was the forty-ninth anniversary of the 10 March 1959 Tibetan revolt against Chinese rule that led to the flight of the Dalai Lama into exile in India. The purpose of the protests was revealed by their symbols and slogans, which included the Tibetan national flag and demands for freedom and independence. Given that the last monk who carried a Tibetan flag in a demonstration, in 1988, was shot through the head, the courage of these monks was astounding. Additional sources of discontent were the marginalization of Tibetans and their culture in a new flood of Chinese to Tibet since the opening of the railroad in mid-2006, new restrictions on religion and patriotic education campaigns in monasteries, and frustration at the lack of progress in the Dalai Lama’s attempt to engage the Chinese in a dialogue about Tibetan autonomy. On Friday some two hundred monks of an important monastery in the old Tibetan section of the city, Ramoche, attempted to demonstrate and were again reportedly beaten, setting off a large-scale riot by thousands of Tibetans that lasted for several hours. Security personnel quickly abandoned the scene. Tibetans took advantage of this rare opportunity to ransack and burn more than twelve hundred Chinese shops, offices, and residences in the area and overturn and set fire to eighty-four vehicles. During the riots, 325 people, mostly Han Chinese, were injured and 22, mostly Han shopkeepers, were killed. Total damage was estimated at 280 million Yuan (40 million U.S. dollars).2 Some time later that day Chinese security personnel, both the paramilitary People’s Armed Police and disguised units of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), were given the order to use lethal force and did so, killing an estimated fifty to one hundred Tibetans and injuring many others.3 Many of the injured were reportedly afraid to seek medical care out of fear of arrest and others were refused care by Chinese medical staff. Also on 14 March, in eastern Tibet, in what is now a part of Gansu Province, a demonstration by four hundred monks of Labrang Tashikyil monastery was repressed with force by security police, leading to a protest the next day by five to ten thousand local Tibetans, who again burned the shops of local Han and Hui (Chinese Muslims) in the town adjacent to the monastery. Several Tibetans were reportedly killed by Chinese security forces rushed to the area. In Beijing, where Tibetan and Chinese officials were gathered for the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress, the Tibetan chairman of the TAR government, Jampa Phuntsok, made a statement to the foreign press
4
Introduction
claiming that security personnel in Lhasa had exercised remarkable restraint and had not used lethal force. He also said that the PLA was not involved.4 His claim may have reflected the instructions that he and Chinese officials had issued upon leaving Lhasa, or the reluctance of those remaining there to tell him what had actually happened. Nevertheless, his version of reality was subsequently strictly adhered to by the Chinese government, which has yet to admit any deaths of Tibetans at the hands of the security police. Significantly, only Zhang Qingli, the Han Chinese chairman of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Tibet, returned to Lhasa to handle the situation, while Tibetan officials remained in Beijing. Further demonstrations and riots by Tibetans, and repression by Chinese security forces resulting in more deaths, occurred in many other places within the TAR and in eastern Tibet in the following days. Usually these took the form of marches by monks, whose beatings and arrests were then protested by more monks and laypeople, leading to more beatings, shootings, and arrests and the surrounding of monasteries by security forces. Eventually, more than 90 places in Tibet, many in eastern Tibetan areas outside the TAR, erupted in protests that collectively had the character of a Tibetan uprising. As the flags and slogans suggest, the uprising was against what Tibetans perceive as the fundamental illegitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet. World leaders called on the Chinese authorities to exercise restraint and to talk to the Dalai Lama. China responded with a flood of propaganda denouncing the Dalai Lama and blaming him for having instigated the riots. China’s evidence for this was some protests against the Beijing Olympics in India and other countries. One such event, a quixotic “March on Tibet,” organized by Tibetans in India, had been given the rather provocative name, “Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement,” and was therefore cited by the Chinese as irrefutable evidence of the “Dalai clique’s” involvement. In fact, the name was chosen to commemorate what Tibetans refer to as the 1959 Uprising, although some of the organizers admitted that they also hoped for some response within Tibet. The Dalai Lama himself and his government were uninvolved in promoting any protests in Tibet or anywhere else. In fact, the Dalai Lama was so upset at the deviation from his policy of nonviolence and dialogue that he threatened to resign from his position as head of the Tibetan government in exile. As some Tibetans said, had the Dalai Lama really instigated the protests in Tibet, they would have been even larger. Tibetans in exile undoubtedly intended to exploit China’s hosting of the 2008 Summer Olympics to publicize their cause. Those within Tibet no doubt also had that in mind. Tibetans and their supporters were subsequently very successful in turning the Olympic Torch relay that Beijing had promoted as a “Journey of Harmony” into a propaganda disaster for China. The torch
Introduction
5
relay was disrupted in London and Paris and had to be restricted in San Francisco, Islamabad, New Delhi, and Jakarta. Attempts by the Chinese embassy and student organizations in Australia to “let China’s voice be heard” at the Canberra relay led to conflicts with Tibet supporters and the perception that China thought it could silence differing opinions anywhere in the world by means of Chinese numbers and their unified opinions. Chinese worldwide reacted with outrage at what they considered an attempt by Tibetan separatists to defame China and spoil the Beijing Olympics. Comments by many Chinese revealed that they were not aware of any reason why Tibetans should question or oppose Chinese rule. Having been taught that China had liberated Tibetans from their own feudal misrule, they imagined that Tibetans were ungrateful or had forgotten this fact and that Western supporters of Tibet were ignorant of this history. Most Chinese also seemed to believe their government’s propaganda that Tibetans actually ruled their own autonomous region, and even that they, as minority nationalities, received preferences such as exemption from the one child policy and preferred admission to educational opportunities. They tended to accept as fact that Tibetans were now vastly better off than they had been under the feudal rule of the Dalai Lama and that this was all due to the generosity of the Chinese government and people. They had been taught that the Dalai Lama had betrayed his motherland in 1959, that he had done nothing but make trouble for China ever since, and that his only goal was the restoration of his feudal rule. Even overseas Chinese, who had access to other sources of information than their own government’s propaganda, tended to accept this version of Tibetan reality. According to China, Tibet was “peacefully liberated” in 1950 and the 1959 Tibetan revolt was an attempt by the feudal serf-owners, led by the Dalai Lama, to perpetuate their oppression and exploitation of the Tibetan “serfs and slaves” who longed for their ultimate liberation by the CCP. The Chinese Communists denied that there was any issue of Tibet’s political status or the legitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet because Tibet had “always” been a part of China. There was no national issue of Tibet versus China, only a class issue of Tibetan serfs versus their own exploitative upper class. Chinese rule was further justified by the characterization of old Tibet before liberation as a dark, barbaric, cruel, feudal Hell on Earth, suitably exaggerated by Chinese propaganda, from which Tibetans were grateful to have been liberated by the CCP. China’s class-based justification for its rule over Tibet is familiar to every imperialist who has argued that foreign rule is preferable to the misrule of the natives. Nevertheless, it has fooled many who have argued on this basis in favor of the legitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet. Chinese typically cite the funds that their government has devoted to the preservation of monasteries
6
Introduction
and cultural relics in Tibet, apparently without knowing about the government-sponsored looting of the vast wealth of Tibet’s monasteries during Democratic Reforms of the 1959–1962 period and the destruction of every monastery save a dozen during the Cultural Revolution that began in 1966. They speak of how Tibet and Tibetans have benefited from China’s official largess and economic development, without mentioning the exploitation of Tibet’s forest and mineral wealth or the fact that economic development in Tibet has mostly benefited Chinese, who have moved there in large numbers, thus contributing to Tibetan discontent. Most Chinese are unaware that hundreds of thousands of Tibetans were killed in the revolt, or died in prisons or labor camps or due to the famine caused by the 1959–1962 Great Leap Forward. The claim of the Tibetan government in exile that 1.2 million Tibetans were killed in the course of the imposition of Chinese rule over Tibet is refuted and ridiculed by Chinese officials by citing statistics that there were only 1 million Tibetans in “Tibet” at the time. However, what the Chinese refer to as “Tibet” is only what they designated as the TAR. There were more Tibetans in other areas outside the TAR than within, the total Tibetan population in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) at that time being 2.8 million. Tibetan claims of numbers of deaths may be exaggerated, but most independent estimates agree that some hundreds of thousands died. Similarly, Chinese citizens and many foreign commentators tend to accept statistics that show that Tibetans are still 92 percent of the population of the TAR,5 despite all evidence to the contrary. China’s reaction to the recent Tibetan protests has been to deny any Chinese government responsibility for Tibetan discontent. The response has taken on a nationalistic defensiveness that has revealed much about the nature of the modern Chinese state. Chinese officials and media have challenged all critics of China’s actions in Tibet with the “irrefutable facts” as known to the Chinese. These facts are so contrary to what is known by Tibetans and knowledgeable foreigners as to preclude any mutual understanding or dialogue. Chinese officials and citizens have aggressively attacked all critics and even other Chinese who have expressed any sympathy for Tibetans or suggested that China should dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Chinese Internet opinions have tended toward favoring more severe repression of Tibetans for their disloyalty. China has appeared more like a nineteenth-century state desperately trying to hold on to its empire than the modern twenty-first-century state image it had hoped to promote at the Olympics. Chinese government propaganda now labels the Tibetan protests and riots the “3.14 incident” and emphasizes the death of innocent Chinese at the hands of Tibetan rioters. Chinese media ignore the peaceful protests of the preceding days as well as the widespread protests in other parts of Tibet in the follow-
Introduction
7
ing days. China denies any forcible repression of Tibetan demonstrations or rioters resulting in the deaths of any Tibetans. By confining its account to one day of the protests when Tibetans turned violent and killed several Chinese, the Chinese government intentionally inflamed Chinese animosity against Tibetans and fueled their anger against what they regard as distorted Western media coverage. China’s total unwillingness to admit any legitimate reasons for Tibetan discontent and its self-righteous indignation at what it considers its critics’ willful distortion of the reality of Tibet have led it to blame the usual scapegoats, not only the Dalai clique but also “hostile Western forces.” In an attempt to label Tibetans as terrorists, China has charged that the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC), which it accused of advocating violence and of having been a primary instigator of the riots, is a terrorist organization.6 China’s angry intransigence in regard to the Tibetan challenge has exposed many of the elements of the Chinese sense of aggrieved nationalism. The CCP has maintained itself in power partly by constantly reminding the Chinese people of the “hundred years of humiliation” suffered by China at the hands of Western powers before liberation. Because of this interpretation of history the Chinese people tend to regard any foreign criticism as an attempt to prevent China from resuming its rightful role as a major power in the world. China therefore dismisses virtually every foreign criticism, not only about Tibet but on any subject, as “groundless,” as an “interference in China’s internal affairs,” and as having the potential to “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” China so fears that any remnant of Tibetan culture or national identity might spark a revival of Tibetan nationalism and separatism that it has had to abrogate all its promises of autonomy in favor of the traditional Chinese assimilationist solution to frontier problems. The international response to the events in Tibet was almost exclusively confined to platitudes from world leaders suggesting that China should exercise restraint and Chinese leaders should talk to the Dalai Lama. China maintains that it will talk to the Dalai Lama under certain conditions. However, these conditions would require him to abandon all his “splittist activities,” by which is meant all his international activities, even the existence of his government-in-exile, thus achieving China’s purpose without making any concessions in regard to Tibetan autonomy. Even after the “3.14 incident” China repeated its willingness to talk with the Dalai Lama, with the added condition that he should stop trying to sabotage the Beijing Olympics. China’s adroit move to offer to talk with the Dalai Lama’s representatives was transparently a tactic to defuse international criticism before the Olympics. Despite the obvious motive behind China’s offer to hold talks, it was interpreted by some, particularly those governments that had called on China to talk with the Dalai Lama, as a Chinese concession to international pressure.
8
Introduction
Tibetans’ rejection of the legitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet, which the Tibetan uprising of 2008 reiterated, has revived the issue of Tibetan self-determination. Many Tibetans no longer believe in the possibility of real autonomy under China or that China will allow any remnant of Tibet culture to survive. China has apparently decided that Tibetan national identity cannot be allowed to survive because it poses a threat to China’s territorial integrity. Given that autonomy is infeasible, Tibetans ask why not demand independence, or at least self-determination, which may also be infeasible but not any more so than autonomy. Only time will tell if the Tibetan Uprising of 2008 was Tibet’s Last Stand. Certainly the severity of the current campaign of repression in Tibet indicates that China intends it to be so. The utter lack of any Chinese sympathy for Tibetans or recognition of Chinese responsibility for Tibetan discontent leads to the conclusion that China will pursue its current policy of repression combined with colonization as its “final solution” to the Tibet problem. Despite a certain Tibetan sense of euphoria that their struggle for survival has briefly caught the attention of the world, China’s repressive methods may achieve a more lasting effect. Thousands of Tibetans have been detained and hundreds formally charged with crimes in Lhasa and eastern Tibet. Many if not most of those detained will have suffered beatings at the hands of angry Chinese security personnel. Those who were beaten and released are the fortunate ones, although their record of protest will follow them. Those arrested will suffer far worse fates, for if past Chinese practice against Tibetans is any guide they will be tortured to confess their crimes and reveal names of others involved. Those involved in “beating, smashing, looting and burning” will receive long prison sentences from which many will emerge, if they emerge at all, as broken remnants of their former selves. All Tibetans, even loyal Tibetan cadres, will be subjected to ever more intense “patriotic education” and pressure to publicly denounce the Dalai Lama. Monks in particular will be coerced to denounce their spiritual leader and pledge loyalty to China and the CCP. In contrast to past revolts, even escape has not been possible, due to the almost total lock-down of Tibet by Chinese security forces. Chinese security and military forces in Tibet have been increased on a more permanent basis to prevent any further uprisings. Chinese policy in Tibet combines disincentives for opposition as well as almost irresistible incentives for cooperation. The Tibetan economy is almost entirely supported by state subsidies, as are many Tibetans. Almost all employment in Tibet is tied to the state and thus dependent upon cooperation with the government. Many Tibetan cadres are able to retire at an early age on generous retirement benefits, thus ensuring their loyalty to the state. Many Tibetans,
Introduction
9
especially former serfs, owe their careers to government support and are often resistant to any change that would alter their status or privileges. China has responded to the challenge of the Tibetan uprising with a new diplomatic offensive aimed at coercing foreign critics to change their very perception of the Tibet issue. China thinks that it won the propaganda battle over Tibet after the March uprising. It avoided any Olympic boycotts by its pretense of willingness to talk with the Dalai Lama. It believes that it held a successful Olympics that marked China’s emergence on the world stage as a rising power. Once the Olympics were over, China scornfully rejected any dialogue with the Dalai Lama and began a campaign to coerce foreign countries to no longer allow his visits or official meetings with him. China believes that it now has the political and economic power to resolve the Tibet issue by coercing international conformity to its position. Many countries may be vulnerable to such coercion. The result of the Tibetan uprising of 2008 has thus been that China has become more intractable on the issue than ever before. Rather than being conciliatory, given the undeniable evidence of Tibetan discontent, China has denied the validity of any such discontent. China has now resolved to eradicate all opposition within Tibet by means of repressive force and to eliminate international criticism by means of coercive diplomacy. The uprising demonstrated Tibetan rejection of Chinese rule and the desire to retain their own culture. While this demonstration of Tibetan resolve received much sympathy from the world, it received almost none from the Chinese government or people. Rather than resolve the issue by allowing some real autonomy or even by dialogue with the Dalai Lama, China seems more determined than ever to eradicate all Tibetan autonomy and to finally resolve the issue by means of colonization and assimilation, its traditional solution to frontier ethnic problems. The threat to the survival of Tibetan culture and its national identity is thus greater than ever before. International supporters of Tibet will have to redirect their efforts from the futile effort to put international pressure on China to dialogue to the attempt to prevent their governments’ giving in to Chinese coercive pressure to deny official meetings with the Dalai Lama. Tibetans may have to redirect their efforts from the campaign for Tibetan independence or even autonomy to the preservation of Tibetan national identity. China is engaged in a massive propaganda campaign to rewrite Tibetan history. Tibetan “scholars” are employed for the purpose of denying their own national identity. Only Tibetans in exile have the freedom to write the truth of Tibet’s history and thus preserve Tibetan national identity. So long as Tibetan national identity survives, so does the Tibetan right to national self-determination.
10
Introduction
Notes 1. “Complete One-Week Update on Tibetan Protests,” 18 March 2008, Dharamsala, Central Tibetan Administration, www.tibet.net/en/flash/2008/0308/18A0308.html. 2. “More Than 300 Innocent People Injured in Lhasa Riot, Damage up to 200 million Yuan,” Beijing, Xinhua, 19 March 2008; “Magnitude of Riot Losses Much Larger,” Beijing, China Daily, 10 April 2008. 3. “China Rolls Out Tanks to Suppress Tibetan Protests,” 8 April 2008, Dharamsala, Central Tibetan Administration, www.tibet.net/en/flash/2008/0308/14D0308.html. 4. “Police Exercised ‘Great Restraint’ in Quelling Riots,” Beijing, China Daily, 18 March 2008. 5. “Facts and Figures: Tibet’s Population,” Beijing, Xinhua, 11 April 2008. 6. “TYC a Terrorist Organization More Catastrophic Than bin Laden,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao, 10 April 2008.
1 Chronology of Revolt
Tibet is a place inseparable from the great motherland. Here, there are continuously rolling high mountains, raging rivers and more so, and there are hardworking people of various nationalities whose hearts are oriented towards the party and the motherland.1
Z
HANG QINGLI, THE CCP SECRETARY in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR),
made the above remarks in an interview with Chinese Central Television (CCTV) at the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC) in Beijing a few days before they were published in Lhasa by Tibet Daily on 11 March. 10 March
On Monday, 10 March, some three hundred to five hundred monks of Drepung monastery (Ch. Zhaibang), located a few miles northwest of Lhasa on the edge of the Lhasa valley, attempted to march into the center of the city. They reportedly intended to present a petition demanding the release of five monks arrested the previous October for celebrating the award to the Dalai Lama in Washington, D.C., of the Congressional Gold Medal. They were stopped within a few miles of their monastery by security police. As many as fifty monks, thought to be the ringleaders, were arrested. The rest of the Drepung monks then staged a sit-down strike where they were that lasted for the rest of the day.2 The security forces eventually persuaded the monks to return to Drepung but then surrounded the monastery, cut off food and water, and did not allow the monks to leave or outsiders to enter. — 11 —
12
Chapter 1
Meanwhile, fourteen monks from another of Lhasa’s large monasteries, Sera (Ch. Sela), about three miles from the center of the city on the northern edge of the Lhasa valley, staged a demonstration in front of the Jokhang (Ch. Dazhao), the central temple of Lhasa. They were all visiting monks from the Golok region of Amdo (Golok Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture [TAP], Qinghai) and the Kanze area of Kham (Kanze TAP, Sichuan) who were studying at Sera. The monks were joined by two laypeople from Kham. They carried the banned Tibetan flag and shouted slogans for Tibetan independence. They were immediately surrounded by undercover and uniformed Public Security Bureau (PSB) police, severely beaten, and arrested. The area was then flooded with security police and shops were ordered closed. The nature of these monks’ activities and the severe punishment they anticipated perhaps indicates why this protest, in contrast to that of the Drepung monks, involved only a few monks. They were later charged with the crime of “gathering to create a disturbance by shouting reactionary slogans” and “premeditatedly carrying homemade reactionary flags.”3 There were also reports of demonstrations by monks and laypeople at two sites in Amdo, in eastern Tibet outside the TAR, in Tsolho (Ch. Hainan) Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, Qinghai Province, south of Lake Kokonor. They were reported to have shouted “Long live the Dalai Lama,” and “The Dalai Lama should return to Tibet.” At Jyekundo in Qinghai police raided houses in the middle of the night and confiscated hundreds of banned portraits of the Dalai Lama. The next day, independence manifestos appeared on walls in the town. In Labrang Tashikyil (Ch. Labuleng), the largest monastery in Gansu (Kanlho TAP), police removed wall posters calling for Tibetan independence. Also in Kanze, police removed independence posters. In Lhasa, police raided the homes of former political prisoners looking for incriminating evidence such as computers, cell phones, and CDs of the U.S. Congressional Gold Medal ceremony. 11 March The next day an estimated six hundred monks from Sera were prevented from marching on Lhasa to demand the release of their fellows arrested the day before. As many as two thousand People’s Armed Police (PAP) used tear gas, but the monks succeeded in holding a sit-down in the street near Sera. The monastery was subsequently surrounded by police. 12 March The monks of the last of the three great monasteries near Lhasa, Ganden, some 20 miles to the east, were prevented from demonstrating by security
Chronology of Revolt
13
forces that had surrounded that monastery as well. Nuns from Chutsang (Ch. Qusang) nunnery in Lhasa also undertook a demonstration to commemorate the anniversary of 12 March 1959 when the women of Lhasa demonstrated against the Chinese presence in Tibet. They were prevented from reaching the Jokhang. Two Drepung monks, originally from Ngaba Kirti monastery of Ngaba TAP, Sichuan, reportedly cut their wrists in a suicide attempt. They refused to be taken to a hospital. Sera monks began a hunger strike. The tactic of surrounding monasteries, both to prevent further protests and to facilitate a later investigation, was to become a factor in later events. The monks were deprived of food and water and those arrested were reportedly mistreated, which became a source of more discontent. Also, most security personnel were already occupied with these duties when a much larger protest broke out on Friday, 14 March. 14 March On Friday around noon, monks of the second most important temple in the old Tibetan section of the city, Ramoche (Ch. Xiaozhao), overturned a police car outside the monastery and then went back inside. This was reportedly preceded by some monks having complained about the police presence outside the monastery and being roughed up by the police in response. Around 1:00 pm there was a scuffle at the entrance to the monastery between monks and police summoned to the area after the first incident. Bystanders went to the aid of the monks, and the situation evolved into a large-scale riot by hundreds of Tibetans who live in the area.4 Other reports said that Tibetans were angered at the presence of undercover police in the crowd. Security personnel, who seem to have been overwhelmed by the Tibetan reaction, quickly abandoned the scene. Tibetans took advantage of this rare opportunity to ransack and burn as many as twelve hundred Chinese shops, offices, and residences in the area and to overturn and set fire to eighty-four vehicles. Three hundred twenty-five people, mostly Han Chinese, were injured and twenty-two, mostly Han shopkeepers, were killed. Total damage was estimated at 280 million Yuan (40 million U.S. dollars).5 Some time later that day Chinese security personnel, both the paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP) and disguised units of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), were given the order to use lethal force and did so, killing an estimated fifty to one hundred Tibetans and injuring many others. A report by an expert on Chinese military affairs claimed that some of the military vehicles visible in Chinese TV footage of the riots were issued only to a few rapid response units of the PLA. The TV footage showed that the PLA red star symbols on each vehicle were covered up.6 Many of the injured were reportedly
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afraid to seek medical care out of fear of arrest and others were refused care by Chinese medical staff. Tibetans later reported that the bodies of those Tibetans killed on 14 March were collected by the security forces and taken to a crematorium at Toelung Dechen, just to the west of Lhasa city. One source reported that eighty-three bodies had been cremated. In eastern Tibet, in what is now a part of Gansu Province, four hundred monks of Labrang Tashikyil monastery demonstrated with many, mostly printed, Tibetan flags and shouted for Tibetan independence, “Long Live the Dalai Lama,” and “Restore Religious Freedom.” They were dispersed by force by security police. Monks of Dreru Wangten monastery in Nagchu, within the TAR north of Lhasa, demonstrated, and their monastery was surrounded by security police. 15 March Lhasa was in a military lockdown, with Tibetans fearful to go out onto the streets. Some hundreds of Tibetans had already been arrested and a deadline of 17 March was given for all those involved in the incident of “beating, smashing, looting and burning” to surrender, with promises of leniency for those who did so and repressive measures for those who did not. Chinese security forces were arresting many Tibetans in house searches. Many of those arrested were beaten in front of their families. Several small protests were reported from areas near Lhasa. A large protest of several thousand Tibetans took place in Phenpo, just north of Lhasa. Labrang Tashikyil was the scene of a demonstration of several thousand monks and laypeople, who burned the shops of local Han and Hui (Chinese Muslims) in the town (Ch. Xiahe) adjacent to the monastery. Several Tibetans were reportedly killed by Chinese security forces rushed to the area. Several other protests were reported from Tibetan areas of Gansu, Qinghai, and Sichuan. Official Chinese reports of damage in Labrang and five other Tibetan towns in Gansu included an amazing 4,279 shops and houses and 1,500 other public facilities destroyed and an estimated 230 million Yuan (33 million U.S. dollars) in damage.7 16 March In Lhasa forty arrested Tibetans were paraded through the streets in two military vehicles. Their hands were tied behind their backs and their heads bowed by two Chinese police standing behind each of them. Protests were reported from several areas in central Tibet, including at the Panchen Lama’s Tashilhunpo in Shigatse. In the Ngaba (Ch. Aba) area of Sichuan, monks of
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the large Lhamo Kirti monastery demonstrated with Tibetan flags, shouting slogans for independence, freedom, and the return of the Dalai Lama. Monks were joined by laypeople and together they burned twenty-four shops and eighty-one vehicles. Damage was estimated as equivalent to the county’s total revenues for the past ten years.8 Local Tibetans claimed that as many as eighteen Tibetans were killed by Chinese security forces in Ngaba, and they sent photos of the dead bodies to the international press to prove it.9 China dismissed this evidence as inconclusive. More protests occurred in several Tibetan areas of Qinghai and Gansu. Several were peaceful, but some resulted in the burning of Chinese shops and vehicles. 17 March Demonstrations and protests took place in at least fifteen places, mostly in Amdo (Qinghai and Gansu). Many of the protests were characterized by the display of Tibetan flags, the shouting of independence slogans, and the lowering of Chinese flags from public buildings and raising the Tibetan flag. 18 March Arrests of Tibetans were still taking place in Lhasa, with police checking the IDs of all Tibetans on the streets and raiding homes looking for those without Lhasa residency permits or those who took part in the demonstrations and riots. Beatings were a regular aspect of the searches and arrests. There were reports of marches and protests in numerous places, mostly in Tibetan areas outside the TAR. The largest was in Kanze, Kham, where thousands of Tibetans marched and were fired on from surrounding rooftops by PAP, with several Tibetans being killed. 19 March The large monasteries of the Lhasa area, Drepung, Sera, and Ganden, were still surrounded by security forces, with no one allowed in or out and water and food supplies cut off. The Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy (TCHRD) in Dharamsala reported that sixty-five Tibetans had been killed. More than one thousand Tibetans had been arrested in Lhasa. Lhasa TV broadcast the Public Security Bureau’s first, second, and third Most Wanted lists, with the photos of twenty Tibetans taken by security cameras. Three Tibetans committed suicide by jumping off a building rather than submitting to arrest. Those arrested were routinely beaten with iron bars by PAP. The streets of Lhasa were almost empty of Tibetans. Some Chinese on
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the streets were said to have expressed their approval of Tibetans being beaten and arrested. Reports from Qinghai said that almost all Tibetan towns were surrounded by Chinese security forces. Protests still took place in several places. 20 March Protests were held in several places in Amdo. Chinese authorities in Gansu issued an ultimatum for Tibetans involved in the criminal acts of burning Chinese shops and government buildings to surrender by 25 March. As usual, promises were made of lenient treatment for those who turned themselves in voluntarily and harsh treatment for those who did not. At the same time, security forces were making many arrests during night raids on residences. Thousands of Chinese troops were reportedly in the area. CCTV broadcast a special feature titled “A Record of the Violent Incident Involving Beating, Smashing and Looting in Lhasa.” This propaganda was broadcast repeatedly and was described by Tibetans as intentionally meant to and as having the effect of increasing Chinese animosity toward Tibetans. Orders of Arrest were also broadcast for Tibetans identified for having participated in the crimes of beating, smashing, looting, and burning. 21 March Government organizations, enterprises, institutions, and various neighborhood committees held meetings to study the speeches of Chinese leaders and Tibetan officials. During the meetings all Tibetan cadres, staff, and residents were required to “expose, repudiate and denounce the evil doings of the Dalai clique and firmly struggle against the separatists.” All were required to declare where they stood and to therefore pass the political test. Tibetan officials of various levels of government organizations, United Front figures, and religious leaders of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) gave speeches and appeared on TV to denounce the Dalai Lama. Even students of primary and middle schools were required to condemn the Dalai Lama. The PSB’s Most Wanted list was updated to twenty-nine Tibetans. In Golok TAP, Qinghai, Tibetans protested by pulling down a Chinese flag from a local government office and replacing it with a Tibetan flag. Chinese security forces sent to respond were blocked by 350 horsemen. Lamas of the local monastery intervened to secure a temporary peace, but police later arrested some one hundred Tibetans for taking part in the protest. Tibetans fled to the surrounding mountains and were surrounded by a force of eight
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hundred Chinese PAP. Most of the Tibetans later surrendered. In another incident Chinese PAP fired on protesting Tibetans, killing at least one. 22–25 March Protests continued in several areas of Amdo, despite the presence of large numbers of Chinese security personnel. Arrests also continued and prisons in or near Lhasa were so full that those arrested had to be transported to other areas. The attitude of Chinese security personnel toward Tibetans was aggressive and Tibetans were beaten at the slightest provocation or without provocation. Authorities in Gansu admitted that the protests had affected 105 government organizations, 27 towns, 22 villages, and 113 work units in Machu (Ch. Maqu), Sangchu (Ch. Xiahe), Chone (Ch. Zhuoni), and Tso (Ch. Hezhou). Tibetans of Holka township, Tsigorthang county, Tsolho TAP in Qinghai, peacefully demonstrated without incident on 25 March. However, PAP were rushed to the area and in the following early morning homes of suspected leaders were raided. Several Tibetans were arrested, and notices were issued giving a deadline of three days for leaders of the “illegal demonstration” to voluntarily surrender or face severe punishment. There was a large protest by monks, nuns, and laypeople in Drango, Kanze TAP, reportedly involving several hundred people, who shouted “Long Live the Dalai Lama,” and “Tibet Belongs to Tibetans.” The armed police opened fire, killing two and injuring ten. China’s explanation for this event was: “When many armed police were on duty they were violently attacked by some lawless people. One armed policeman died and many others were injured. The lawless people killed an armed police with sharp knives and stones. At that time, the armed police were forced to fire into the air to warn these lawless people and disperse them.” TCHRD published an estimate of seventy-nine Tibetans killed by Chinese security forces. It challenged the claim that any Tibetans had “voluntarily surrendered,” saying that “surrender is a willingness on the part of a person who surrenders under normal circumstances and not under duress [of] threats by the authority in power by inducing in the minds of people that if they do not surrender they would suffer far more serious repercussions.” It expressed the fear that those detained under whatever circumstances would be subjected to coercion and torture to reveal information about others. It also reported that Lhasa and other sites of protest had been overwhelmed by the presence of large Chinese police and security forces. Lhasa TV broadcast the Public Security Bureau’s sixth, seventh, and eighth Most Wanted lists, adding the photos of four (all women), seven (one monk and six women), and eight Tibetans, respectively, for a total so far of 53.
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26–28 March Security forces arrested many of the monks and nuns involved in the Drango protest. Authorities reportedly seized the corpses of the two Tibetans killed and burned them by the local river, further angering the monks, who were prevented from performing death rituals. Local authorities organized a township meeting at which Tibetans were ordered to denounce and criticize the Dalai Lama and “separatist forces.” An elderly woman refused and instead called for the return of the Dalai Lama. She was beaten by the township Party Secretary, presumably a Tibetan, but she shouted that she would never denounce the Dalai Lama even if she were killed. Her son rushed to defend her and beat the Party Secretary, who along with the woman was hospitalized while the son absconded. In Lhasa the first group of foreign journalists allowed into Tibet arrived on a controlled group visit. Tibetans reported that military forces and checkpoints were removed from the streets in order to create for the reporters the appearance of a “man-made harmonious society.” However, this appearance was dispelled the next day when thirty young monks of the Jokhang broke into a meeting between the journalists and temple authorities to shout out that what they were being told were all lies, that the Dalai Lama had nothing to do with the protests, that Tibetans had no freedom, that they had been confined to the Jokhang since the fourteenth, and that the Tibetans supposedly freely worshiping at the temple were Tibetan cadres who had been ordered to appear as ordinary worshipers. Similarly, when the journalist group went to Sera the monks were told to create an appearance of religious freedom by holding a ceremony usually attended by seven hundred monks. However, the monks boycotted the ceremony, at which there were only about ten monks. Sera remained surrounded by security forces, as did Drepung and Ganden, with food, water, and communications cut off. Many monks were said to be missing, presumably having been arrested. Similar circumstances seemed to prevail at virtually every monastery in Tibet where protests had occurred. Ngaba Lhamo Kirti monastery, the site of protests and deaths on 16 March, was raided by security forces that searched for incriminating materials such as Dalai Lama photos, Tibetan flags, and weapons. About one hundred monks were taken away to the local detention center. Later reports said that the raid continued the next day and that security personnel searched for monks with cell phones, cameras, and computers who might have communicated with the outside world. Monks were reportedly intimidated and forced to pose with Tibetan flags or weapons in order to implicate them. Police were also said to have stolen valuable items from monks’ rooms. Ancient weapons traditionally kept at monasteries or weapons given to the monastery by those who had renounced hunting were confiscated and displayed as evidence of criminal acts
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by the monks. A total of 572 monks were said to have been detained. Thirty Tibetans, including some monks, were paraded through the area in a truck to intimidate others. Security forces raided at least four other monasteries in the area and detained many monks. Twenty-three Tibetans were reported to have been killed on 16 March. TCHRD later published photos of the Dalai Lama images damaged or destroyed by the security forces. On 27 March a thirty-two-year-old monk, Lobsang Jinpa, of Ngaba Lhamo Kirti monastery, committed suicide. In a suicide note he said that the Chinese government had made false accusations against the monks of Lhamo Kirti monastery for leaking state secrets to the outside world (photos of dead bodies of those killed), but that he alone was responsible for that, for keeping the dead bodies from the police and for leading the protests. He ended by saying that he could not live under Chinese oppression for another minute. Another monk, Legchok, seventy-five years old, who had been severely beaten by Chinese police a few days earlier, committed suicide on 30 March. He had told his disciples that he could not bear the oppression anymore. The Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE) estimated that 140 Tibetans had been killed altogether and released the names of 40. Bodies were being cremated by the Chinese to remove evidence of Tibetan deaths. Military units (PLA) were reportedly removed from Lhasa, but PAP and PSB forces remained. 29–30 March Beijing-based diplomats from fifteen countries arrived in Lhasa for a oneday visit. The diplomats visited the Jokhang but were unable to meet with the monks who had interrupted the previous journalists’ tour, supposedly because the monks’ study could not be disturbed. Demonstrations erupted near the Jokhang later that day, presumably by Tibetans who hoped to show the diplomats’ group that the situation had not returned to normal as the Chinese claimed, but the group had already left. Han Chinese shopkeepers were said to have prepared to defend their shops with iron bars while concealed police rushed out of hiding to confront the demonstrators. Retired Tibetan officials had been told to visit the Potala, Jokhang, and other monasteries and to perform other religious activities such as circumambulation that were normally prohibited for them in order to create an appearance of normalcy and religious freedom. Patriotic education was reported to have been intensified in monasteries in all parts of Tibet. There were reports from several places that monks who refused to participate in patriotic education or who refused to denounce the Dalai Lama were beaten and arrested. A Tibetan in Lhasa who failed to stop his motorbike at a checkpoint was shot and killed.
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1–3 April CCTV repeatedly broadcast a speech by a Public Security Bureau spokesperson claiming that weapons confiscated from monasteries proved that the “3.14 Incident of Beating, Smashing, Looting and Burning” was part of the “Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement” organized by the Dalai clique. It also broadcast the documentaries “Past Events of Tibet: Recalling History of Tibetan Serfs Full of Blood and Tears,” “Guns Held by Some Monasteries,” “Two British Invasions of Tibet,” “The Dalai Lama’s Proposal of ‘Great Tibet’ Is Disguised Independence,” “Has the Dalai Lama Really Given Up Independence?,” “The Inside Story of How the Dalai Lama Masterminded the ‘Uprising,’” and “Police Capture Key Members of the March 14 Incident.” Most Wanted lists of those implicated in the protests by surveillance cameras were also repeatedly broadcast. So far seventy-four Tibetans had appeared on such lists. Zhang Qingli gave a speech in which he said that the punishment of separatists should be conducted according to the principles of “quick approval, quick arrest, quick trial, quick execution” (kuai pi, kuai zhua, kuai shen, kuai sha). Hong Kong–based Phoenix TV broadcast a State Council Information Office briefing on the March 16 Incident of “Beating, Smashing, Looting and Burning” in Ngaba County of Ngaba Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture in Sichuan Province. Xiao Youcai, deputy head of the Tibetan and Qiang Autonomous Prefecture, acknowledged that “policemen on duty used weapons in accordance with law,” but denied that armed police killed Tibetans when they fired at them. He said that “at present we have not found anybody injured or killed,” and all the injured people had already “fled.” At the same time, he claimed that photos of Tibetans killed were probably forged. In Kanze TAP the Tongkor monastery was searched on 3 April by Chinese police and patriotic education work teams. Cell phones were confiscated and photos of the Dalai Lama thrown to the ground. Monks were ordered to curse the Dalai Lama but they refused, after which some were arrested. Police ordered monks to stomp on photos of the Dalai Lama and when they refused they were beaten and arrested. That evening monks staged a protest demanding that those arrested be released. Local people joined the protest and shouted slogans such as “Long Live the Dalai Lama,” “Let the Dalai Lama return home,” and “We want freedom.” A thousand PAP suppressed the protest, killing eight Tibetans and injuring many. TGIE published a list of the eight Tibetans killed. Updated lists added the names of several others killed. Cultural relics of the monastery, which was famous for the antiquity and value of its artifacts, were also deliberately damaged or stolen. Locals were threatened by officials that if they disclosed anything about the incident to the outside world they would be punished for violating the law. Officials warned
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that if those who fled to the mountains did not surrender the local monastery and people would be held responsible. Some who had been shot were in critical condition but feared to go to local medical facilities. The Deputy Party Secretary of the Lhasa Municipal Committee told media that over a thousand people had been arrested or surrendered themselves to the authorities in connection with the riots. He said trials would be held before 1 May. The PSB of the TAR sent a text message to Lhasa cell phone owners saying that the masses were welcome to provide clues leading to the capture of suspects on the Most Wanted list for involvement in the March 14 incident. As soon as the information was verified, the informer would be awarded 20,000 Yuan, and the identity of the informer would be kept secret. In addition, 5,000 Yuan would be awarded for other information, 20,000 Yuan for information about anyone sending messages to India or the outside world, and 100,000 Yuan for information about the ring leaders of the 3.14 Incident. The twelfth and thirteenth Most Wanted lists were broadcast, adding five (including four females) and five Tibetans, for a total of seventy-nine. 5–8 April Security police shut down a religious ceremony at Tawu monastery, Kanze TAP, Sichuan, leading to a protest march by a thousand monks and laypeople, who shouted, “Long Live the Dalai Lama” and “Free Tibet.” PAP fired on the marchers and ten Tibetans were shot, five being seriously injured. TCHRD said that 2,300 Tibetans had been arrested in all parts of Tibet. The fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth Most Wanted lists were broadcast on Lhasa TV, adding five, four, and five people, mostly monks, respectively. Some of the photos appear to have been taken by cell phones at the 14 March Ramoche incident. Ninety-nine Tibetans had so far appeared on the lists. Seventy monks of Ramoche temple were arrested in a midnight raid by PSB and PAP. One Ramoche monk was reported to have committed suicide. Other monasteries in Lhasa, including Drepung, Sera, and Ganden were still closed off by security personnel. 9 April The second group of foreign journalists to visit Tibetan areas went to Labrang Tashikyil, where, as at the Jokhang in Lhasa, their visit was interrupted by twenty to forty monks who appeared carrying a large Tibetan flag and appealed to the journalists to tell the truth about what was happening there. They said that many monks were in custody and that there were undercover agents everywhere monitoring their activities. They demanded that the Dalai Lama should be allowed to return to Tibet.
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In Lhasa, Jampa Phuntsok said that the thirty monks who interrupted the meeting with foreign journalists would not be prosecuted. He said that they would not be punished for expressing their opinions because China was a country ruled by law. He explained that the foreign diplomats who visited the Jokhang a few days later could not meet with the monks because it was too early in the morning and the monks refused to come out of their rooms despite being called several times. He also said that 953 Tibetans had been detained due to their involvement in the riots and that 328 had been released. Of those detained 362 had voluntarily surrendered. The PSB was looking for another 403 people. Of the 99 so far on the Most Wanted list, 13 had been captured and nine had voluntarily surrendered. The eighteenth Most Wanted list added six Tibetans for a total of 105. All government organizations and enterprises and all schools in Lhasa and other areas were being required to condemn the “3.14 Incident” and to criticize the “Dalai separatist clique.” Tibetan cadres were required to deeply expose the evil deeds of the Dalai clique and to write articles criticizing the Dalai Lama. 10 April Lhasa TV broadcast the nineteenth Most Wanted list, adding six people for a total of 111. The Lhasa railway station was being used as a temporary prison for those detained, and some Tibetans had reportedly already been sent by train to more permanent prisons. The monks who interrupted the journalists’ tour at Labrang were reportedly arrested. One of the monks earlier arrested was released in an “unstable mental condition,” with bruises all over his body, having apparently been tortured in custody. Other monasteries in the Tibetan areas of Gansu were also raided by security forces and some monks were arrested. Chinese police were looking for weapons in the monasteries to be used as evidence of the “terrorist” activities of the Tibetans. In Ngaba local authorities were putting Tibetans in front of cameras and making them say that they opposed the Dalai clique and did not want the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet, that they loved the Communist Party and would completely obey the Party and were grateful for the graciousness of the Party. They were threatened that if they refused to be filmed saying these things they would be arrested. 11–13 April Drepung, Sera, and Ganden, as well as the Jokhang and Ramoche, had been surrounded by security police for as long as one month. Lhasa TV broadcast the twentieth and twenty-first Most Wanted lists, with the photos of 32 Tibet-
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ans, bringing the total to 143. Clashes between Chinese and Tibetan students occurred at Lhasa Middle School. There was said to be much hostility between Chinese and Tibetans of Lhasa. In one incident an argument over the price of vegetables in the market, where Chinese were charging Tibetans more than Chinese, led to the arrest of five Tibetans. A large number of military trucks entered Drepung monastery after monks refused to attend patriotic education sessions. An unknown number of monks were taken away in the trucks. More than three thousand Tibetans had reportedly been arrested in Lhasa, some who were apprehended while shopping on the street. Eight hundred were still detained at Lhasa railway station. Many had been beaten (presumably as part of the interrogation process). Some had been released while others were sent to more permanent detention facilities. The twenty-second Most Wanted list was broadcast, with the photos of eleven Tibetans, mostly monks. Religious leaders and other Tibetan officials of Kanze TAP were gathered and required to sign statements denouncing the Dalai Lama. Kanze Party officials announced that all monasteries would be subjected to renewed Patriotic Education and anti–Dalai clique campaigns. 14 April Lhasa TV reported that a “working team to publicize laws and regulations” had been established at Drepung monastery, in order to “strengthen the effort to publicize and educate people about laws and regulations and to restore the normal Buddhist activities.” The work team was said to have “gained understanding and support of the monks and lay Buddhist followers.” Lhasa PSB repeated its 20,000 Yuan reward for information leading to the arrest of several Tibetans, mostly monks, implicated in the “3.14 Incident,” which would seem to imply that many of those involved had still managed to avoid capture. All monasteries were to be required to fly the Chinese flag and all monks would be obliged to acknowledge that the 3.14 Incident was masterminded by the Dalai clique and to declare that they were determined to “criticize the Dalai Lama’s separatist clique.” Officials in Gonjo, Kanze TAP, Sichuan, announced that they had arrested nine monks from Thongsha monastery in Gonjo in relation to a bombing incident in Chamdo. The nine monks were said to have confessed to the crime. Security police raided Labrang Tashikyil monastery and searched the living quarters of all monks. They beat monks who resisted, tore up photos of the Dalai Lama, and destroyed other property. The security forces were accused of looting cultural relics from the monastery. Two hundred monks were arrested, some of whom were released the next day. Those monks considered to be the ringleaders of the protests were beaten so severely that they required
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hospitalization. Three thousand Tibetans in the area had reportedly been detained. Many had been released after paying fines of from two thousand to tens of thousands of Yuan. Nyantho monastery in Ngolha Township, Machu County, Qinghai (Amdo), was also raided. Police confiscated Dalai Lama photos and DVDs and arrested 150 monks. 16 April Lhasa PSB issued the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth Most Wanted lists, each with the photos of four Tibetans, bringing the total to 169 on the list. Security police were searching Tibetan homes for photos of the Dalai Lama or other implicating evidence. Tibetans were forced to burn or otherwise destroy any such photos discovered and were sometimes arrested. Informants were encouraged to tell the police which Tibetans were religious and therefore might have such photos. Meetings to force Tibetans to criticize the evil deeds of the Dalai clique were still going on. Everyone, including schoolchildren, was required to make speeches or write articles condemning the Dalai Lama. A well-known Tibetan female singer, who worked for Qinghai TV, was detained by the PSB for unknown reasons. Several other Tibetan artists who had worked on the preservation of Tibetan art and literature were detained in Qinghai. In Ngaba, authorities closed the school affiliated with Lhamo Kirti monastery because many of its students had participated in protest activities. Seventy-three Tibetans who had been arrested, among them nineteen monks, were paraded through the streets to intimidate others. Three hundred monks of the Chone region of Kanlho TAP, Gansu, were said to have been arrested. Local prisons were so full that some of those arrested had to be transferred to the neighboring Ninxia Hui Autonomous Region. Some thirty-two monks of Ratoe monastery, Chushul County, Lhasa Municipality, were detained in connection to a protest they had held on 14 March. The 14 March protest had included monks and laypeople, who shouted slogans for Tibetan freedom and independence. The protest was defused by security forces without incident or any arrests. The monks later refused to participate in the Patriotic Education Campaign. On 16 April the monastery was surrounded by large numbers of Chinese security personnel at 4:00 am and the monastery was searched for cell phones and Dalai Lama photos, which were confiscated. The thirty-two arrested monks were reportedly severely beaten at the local prison. 17 April In Rebgong (Ch. Tongren) County in Tsolho (Ch. Huangnan) TAP, Qinghai Province, monks from a local monastery protested the arrest of their
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fellows for a demonstration on 16 March. These monks were also arrested, resulting in a larger demonstration of monks and laypeople. Many Tibetans were beaten by security police and as many as two hundred were arrested. Rongwu monastery was later raided by police, and photos of the Dalai Lama and other articles were confiscated or destroyed. In Lhasa, officials announced that they had detained 953 suspects who were suspected of being involved in beating, smashing, looting, and burning activities, among whom 362 suspects had voluntarily surrendered themselves. Three hundred twenty-eight were already released and 403 had been formally arrested. Ninety-three people on the wanted lists were still at large. 18 April All the monasteries of Lhasa were still surrounded by security personnel. Twenty-three Tibetans, all monks, were removed from the wanted lists, presumably because they had been detained. Woeser interviewed a Tibetan who had arrived from Tibet at the Beijing train station. He said he had witnessed several Tibetans being shot by Chinese security police on 14 March. Their bodies had been quickly thrown in trucks and taken away. 20 April Lhasa PSB announced that 365 people suspected of being involved in the “14 March Incident of Beating, Smashing, Looting and Burning” had voluntarily surrendered themselves. One hundred and seventy suspects against whom the authorities had evidence proving their involvement were on the most wanted lists, among whom eighty-two had been captured and eleven had voluntarily surrendered themselves. Woeser reported that forty trucks had gone to Sera monastery in Lhasa and had taken away over four hundred monks. Most of the monks of Ganden monastery were also arrested. She said that Chinese and Tibetan leftists and former Red Guards were reviving the language of the Cultural Revolution and demanding the creation of militias among the people to expose counterrevolutionaries. Chinese entertainment establishments in Lhasa, including restaurants, dance halls, and prostitution shops were open, while Tibetan establishments remained closed. Chinese lawyers who had expressed their willingness to provide legal assistance to Tibetans were privately warned by officials not to get involved. 21 April Woeser reported that Tibet Daily had declared the beginning of a new Patriotic Education Campaign with the theme of “Opposing Separatism,
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Safeguarding Stability and Promoting Development.” Dorje Tsedrub, the deputy party secretary of the Lhasa Municipal Party Committee and mayor of Lhasa, said that the performance in the campaign would be used as an important standard to assess the achievements of party members and cadres. TCHRD reported that the campaign was aimed at monasteries, cadres and government employees, security forces, educational institutions, and the common people. The campaign was scheduled to last for two months. It said that the campaign aimed to educate the masses about opposing splittism, protecting stability, and backing development, by holding meetings, inviting experts to give speeches, teaching and discussing the contents of the Patriotic Education Campaign, holding denunciation sessions of the Dalai Lama and screening propaganda shows, and teaching Chinese laws and regulations. The renewal and intensification of Patriotic Education apparently applied to all areas of Tibet, both within and outside the TAR. In her blog, Woeser wrote: “We can say that nobody can escape the campaign. Judging from this, it seems that every township, every county and every prefecture will carry out the political campaign of the same scale, and this will be another ‘Cultural Revolution’ sweeping across the Tibetan areas and touching on the soul of Tibetans.” All monasteries were required to fly the Chinese flag and in many places monks were required to take an oath of loyalty to China and to have their photos taken doing so. Many Tibetans, especially monks, were resisting Patriotic Education by refusing to attend. They particularly refused to denounce the Dalai Lama. Monks were sometimes asked to sign a blank paper, but they refused to do so because they believed the officials would later add a denunciation of the Dalai Lama. Many monks and nuns who refused to cooperate with Patriotic Education were arrested. Monks and nuns from the area of Medro Gongkar just east of Lhasa held a protest against Patriotic Education, including shouting slogans such as “Long Live the Dalai Lama,” and “Free Tibet.” Several dozen people were arrested and a thirty-one-yearold nun hanged herself. TCHRD said that the campaign focused on communist ideology and the theme that Tibet has benefited from CCP rule. Old Tibetan society was denigrated by showing films from the 1950s. Monks were educated to be patriotic toward China, to oppose splittists, and to help maintain social stability and religious order. Work teams were sent to monasteries to conduct Patriotic Education. Zhang Qingli ordered harsh punishments for local officials found lacking in their commitment to Beijing’s official line. Tibet Daily quoted Zhang as recommending that the campaign should focus on negative portrayals of Tibet before 1950 and vilification of the Dalai Lama for inciting the 3.14 Incident and attempting to sabotage the Olympics.
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22 April Woeser reported that the public security organs in Kham and Amdo were recruiting Tibetan “people’s policemen.” Since the primary qualification was translation ability, the purpose of these policemen was apparently to be to facilitate investigations of Tibetans’ complicity in demonstrations and their loyalties. When the Olympic torch reached Lhasa on 20 June the Chinese planned to hold a rally in Potala Square to “Safeguard the Torch and Love One’s Country.” Tibetans were to be under some sort of curfew, although officials denied this, and Tibetans without residence permits for Lhasa would have to leave and Tibetans from other areas could not travel to Lhasa at that time. Lhasa officials and organizations were conducting investigations of the residency status of all Tibetans. Tibetans from areas outside Lhasa who were temporary workers in Lhasa were being fired and required to leave the city. Tibet Daily denounced the Dalai Lama as “the ringleader who damages the fundamental interests of the Tibetan people, the cause of misfortune for Tibetan people, the disaster for people in China, and the chief boss of the separatist political clique that schemes for ‘Tibet Independence.’” Woeser also reported the arrest of many monks after raids at several monasteries, mostly in eastern Tibet, and the flight of monks from another monastery, Lhamo Kirti in Ngaba, to the mountains. A blind monk of Lhamo Kirti monastery committed suicide, saying, “We do not need to mention that you with eyes can not stand such kind of life. Even I, a blind person, can not endure it.”
23 April Chinese troops (presumably PAP) were still encamped around Lhasa in the courtyards of various work units and at the Lhasa stadium. Further information was revealed about the arrests of monks of Drepung on 10 April and those of Sera on 16 April. PSB police were gathered in each instance and told they had a “special assignment.” Cell phones were confiscated so that no information would leak out. They waited until after midnight to take action. They arrested most of the monks of Drepung and Sera, leaving only the aged and those known to be politically reliable. Many Tibetan cadres were said to be resentful of the ethnic nature of the repression and the blaming of the protests on the Dalai Lama. Many thought Zhang Qingli was responsible because of his harsh policies. Even loyal Tibetan cadres felt fearful because of the Chinese distrust of all Tibetans and they were questioning the supposedly multinational nature of the PRC.
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24 April Tibet Daily continued to publish a series of editorials exposing and criticizing the reactionary nature of the “Dalai Separatist Clique.” Woeser wrote that the wording and style of these editorials was “Cultural Revolution–type clichés.” Tibet Daily even published an article by a Han Chinese who “neither believes in Buddhism nor understands Buddhism” but who criticized the Dalai Lama for failure to abide by his religious discipline (by espousing nonviolence while instigating violence). China’s patriotic education strategy was to first concentrate on Tibetan party members, who were subjected to strict political education. These cadres were then to pursue the campaign further in monasteries, schools, work units, and community associations. They were to use such tools as Patriotic Education Campaign written booklets, photo exhibitions and movies, public discussions that included compulsory denunciations of the Dalai Lama, and written expressions of loyalty to the CCP and rejection of the Dalai Lama. The best of the written and filmed denunciations of the Dalai Lama were then propagated by other media including newspapers, radio, and TV. In Lhasa the authorities continued to check the identity and registration of all Tibetans. Organizations and work units in Lhasa warned all Tibetans to avoid spreading rumors. They should particularly not divulge any information about arrests to the outside world. Anyone found spreading rumors or sending messages to the outside world would be severely punished. There was still no information about the fate of the arrested monks of the monasteries and nunneries of Lhasa. Lhasa’s prisons were reported to be filled to overflowing, and temporary detention facilities were being used. In the Kanlho TAP of Gansu there were reported to be ten thousand PAP, approximately equal to the number of Tibetans. 26 April Xinhua announced that China had agreed to hold talks with representatives of the Dalai Lama. Meetings were held in Lhasa of all party members to brief them on the struggle against separatism (and presumably to reassure them that the offer of talks did not represent a change in China’s policy toward the Dalai Lama). Chinese media continued to attack the Dalai Lama. Woeser wrote that some Chinese thought the talks were a tactic to get Tibetans to stop disrupting the Olympic torch relay. If Tibetans continued to do so then China would blame the Dalai Lama for insincerity. Her personal opinion was that the Chinese intention in offering talks was to stop the threats from some Western leaders to boycott the Olympics opening ceremonies. She wrote: “The announcement about the talk is a trick played by the Chinese govern-
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ment to cheat the world! It does not have any sincerity! If China is sincere it should open Tibet to all the journalists of the world and allow human rights organizations and the UN to go to Tibet to investigate the situation.” Woeser wrote that most Tibetans (presumably those in Beijing) did not have any hope for the talks. They held that China was putting on a show for the sake of ensuring that the Olympics would not be disrupted. From Lhasa it was reported that Tibetans could not take their dead to the sky burial site without the bodies being checked by police at checkpoints to see if they had died from gunshot wounds (so that police could investigate the family and the person’s friends and accomplices). Some Tibetan PSB had been purged for revealing secrets to other Tibetans. An “on the spot” investigation by a team from Sohu.com produced a video of interviews in Lhasa with six or seven people, all but one of whom were Han Chinese. Some of the Chinese said that their parents had worked in Tibet, that they were the second generation who had dedicated themselves to Tibet, that 80 percent of Tibetans were friendly to them and would not go against China but rather would stand together with the Chinese people. One said that Tibet was not just for Tibetans but rather that Tibet belonged to all the nationalities of China. 29 April Lhasa displayed a patriotic air, with Chinese flags flying from the top of the Potala and on almost every building and house in the city. Chinese media reported that Sera monastery had reopened and that “the believers are devotedly worshipping in various shrines.” However, according to Lhasa people, the so-called “believers” were Tibetan cadres told by the authorities to pretend to be believers. Tenzing Namgyal, the secretary of the Party Committee of TAR Committee of Nationality and Religious Affairs, said that Buddhist activities at Sera and the life and practice of over five hundred monks had been restored to normal. However, Lhasa Tibetans doubted that there were five hundred monks at Sera at the time. They said that there were at least one thousand monks at Sera before the riots, many of whom were visiting monks from Kham and Amdo. Drepung, Ganden, and Jokhang were still closed, and there was no communication with the monks of those monasteries. Thirty Tibetans were formally sentenced to prison terms ranging from three years to life for their involvement in the Lhasa riots. Three were sentenced to life imprisonment, seven received fifteen- to twenty-year sentences, and the rest were sentenced to terms of three to fourteen years. Six were monks, one of whom was sentenced to life imprisonment for leading ten people, including five other monks, in destroying local government offices, burning shops, and attacking policemen in a town outside Lhasa. Two of the monks were
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sentenced to twenty years and three for fifteen years. The monk sentenced to life was Pasang, from Dingkha monastery in Toelung Dechen County, west of Lhasa, who, on 17 March, along with twelve monks, went to the local market and raised slogans for Tibetan independence. They took out goods from Chinese shops and burned them in the street. They were arrested and severely beaten by PAP. This incident was three days after the Lhasa riot. The fact that these monks were sentenced first may be because they were caught in the act, while those involved in Lhasa had still not been apprehended or fully investigated. A Tibetan lawyer who was allowed to visit his client said that he observed ten of the prisoners, all of whom had been so severely tortured that they were being treated by medical personnel (presumably to prepare them for the public sentencing). Those attending the sentencing were carefully selected and screened by the authorities and did not include the relatives of those being sentenced. Some of the prisoners had to be held up by the police as they entered the courtroom. One of the Tibetans appeared to have a broken leg and had to be seated on a chair because he could not stand. New York–based Human Rights Watch (HRW) said that the trials were not “open and public,” as claimed by the Chinese government. Only the sentencing was in “open court session” and that for propaganda purposes, while the actual trials had been conducted covertly on undisclosed dates. HRW also disputed the Chinese claim that the defendants were represented by lawyers of their own choice. All the lawyers who had publicly offered to defend Tibetan protesters were forced to withdraw their assistance after judicial authorities in Beijing threatened to discipline them and suspend their professional licenses. The authorities claimed that the Tibetan protesters were not ordinary cases but sensitive cases. The government made it clear it would not respect their right to choose their own counsel.10 This contrasted with the attempt of Chinese authorities to characterize the Tibetans’ crimes as ordinary civil offenses connected to the incident of “beating, smashing, looting and burning,” rather than as acts of expression of political dissidence. Woeser cited an analysis by a Tibetan who said that not only did the Chinese government have its reasons for its repressive policies in Tibet but so did those who had benefited from the struggle against separatists. This group of former Tibetan serfs now elevated to high positions owed their positions to a hard-line policy in Tibet and were the recipients of political and material benefits because of their status. They had “managed Tibet for many years and Tibet is the treasure site for their official careers and material interests. If the Dalai Lama were to return they would be the ones to suffer the most. A great number of Chinese and Tibetan officials made a living by opposing separatism, were promoted because of opposing separatism, and have become rich as
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a result of opposing separatism.” This interest group was always opposed to any dialogue with the Dalai Lama or any real Tibetan autonomy. Many of the security personnel in Lhasa had changed into civilian clothes and were disguised as tourists or workers. They could be identified by their communication devices. The streets of Lhasa were full of undercover agents and spies. Among the Tibetans who went on circumambulation every day were to be found undercover agents and informants and retired Tibetan cadres from the PSB and other offices who would never ordinarily go on circumambulation. 1 May A Tibetan PSB official in Golok TAP, Qinghai, was shot to death. Official media said that he was killed by a Tibetan he was trying to arrest for having burned a Chinese flag. Chinese authorities honored him as a hero but local Tibetans say that he had shot the monk accused of burning the flag and then was killed by Tibetans in response. In Chusul, near Lhasa, nineteen nuns of Shutse nunnery were arrested. For the 1 May celebration Chinese security personnel were putting on a show of “serving the people,” by providing medical care, haircuts, bicycle repair, and so forth, to citizens on the street. All of the ordinary citizens being so served were Tibetans ordered by neighborhood committees to appear on the streets for that purpose. The streets were sealed off to other Tibetans not selected to participate. This was intended as a show of stability and harmony and was enthusiastically reported by the Lhasa media. 2 May Woeser reported that the Chinese government’s claim that the thirty Tibetans sentenced so far had been represented by lawyers was not true. Also, they had all been tortured but had been told to say they had not with the threat of harsher punishment. Almost all Tibetans detained had been beaten and tortured, even those who were quickly released. Some had been beaten and tortured so severely that they had to be hospitalized, or they were disabled, mentally deranged, or died. Tibetan opinion in regard to the forthcoming meeting between Chinese officials and representatives of the Dalai Lama was that this was nothing but a public relations exercise by China intended to assuage foreign criticism and ensure the success of the Beijing Olympics. China had already proclaimed to the world that the Dalai Lama was the instigator of the disturbances in Tibet and that Chinese policy was blameless; therefore, there was nothing to talk about.
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3 May The two special envoys of the Dalai Lama traveled to Shenzhen via Hong Kong, to hold talks with the Chinese. The official Chinese media did not report this news. Instead, Woeser wrote that the Chinese media were still using Cultural Revolution–type language to demonize the Dalai Lama. She cited an article in Tibet Daily with the title “The Dalai Clique Sabotages the Normal Order of Tibetan Buddhism.” This article, by a Tibetan who worked for the United Front, claimed that the Dalai Lama violated the teachings of Buddha Sakyamuni. In Lhasa the authorities were busily creating the appearance of harmony. Many security personnel were now in civilian clothes. Tibetan cadres and those employed in work units were ordered or given incentives to ostentatiously circumambulate or make offerings at temples and shrines. In preparation for the arrival of more foreign journalists work units were organizing Tibetans to hold demonstrations for some trivial nonpolitical purpose in order to give the impression of freedom of speech and assembly. All offices and work units were holding sessions on Patriotic Education. All present had to write articles to expose and criticize the “Dalai Separatist Clique.” They had to publicly read these speeches, naming the Dalai Lama as the culprit but had to refer to him as “Dalai” rather than Dalai Lama. Those who were reluctant to do so were criticized, much like the thamzing (Struggle) sessions of the 1960s. Some of those arrested without any reason in the days after the 14 March riots, on the streets or in house searches, were released. Most had been tortured in order to extract information and had been deprived of food and water. In Derge, Kanze TAP, Sichuan, monks of one monastery were told by a work team to sign a document, “Expose and Criticize the Dalai Separatist Clique,” and to give two photos each to paste to it. Many refused to do so. In another part of Kham (Dzachukha) houses were searched, and police destroyed images of the Dalai Lama. A Tibetan woman hanged herself and an old monk became mentally deranged. When local officials held a ceremony to raise the Chinese flag, none of the Tibetans attended. Some were arrested afterward. A high Lama of Seshul monastery in Dzachukha objected to the Patriotic Education Campaign, saying, It is totally without any basis to claim that this incident was masterminded by the Dalai Lama. The cause is that a great number of Han immigrants moved to Tibet to plunder the land resources, and to rob the locals of their rights to receive education and to work. There is no Tibetan who does not want to believe in the Dalai Lama. The Chinese government should hold talks with the Dalai Lama as soon as possible.
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He was then arrested. In Amdo, Rebgong, Tsolho TAP, three monks were tried in secret and sentenced to two to three years. In Kanze TAP six nuns and one layperson were tried in secret and sentenced to various terms. 4 May The one-day talk between the Dalai Lama’s special envoys and two officials of the United Front Work Department ended without any agreement. Woeser commented that for many Tibetans this was the expected but sad result. Tibetans in exile were thought to have had some hope for the talks but those in China did not believe that China had any sincerity. They thought that the talk was just a show that would be beneficial only to the Chinese. The CCP could rest assured about the Olympics and the heads of Western countries could attend the opening ceremonies. They thought that Tibetans’ sacrifices had been wasted, but that the CCP could not be sure that there would not be more incidents in Tibet. An exhibition titled “Tibet’s Past and Present” opened in Beijing at the Nationality Palace Museum. It was sponsored by the United Front Work Department, the State Council Information Office, the State Commission for Nationality Affairs and the TAR. The exhibition attempted to demonize old Tibet with themes such as “Tibetan History and the Feudal Serfdom System.” Some Chinese wrote in the visitors’ book comments such as “Down with Tibet independence,” and “Safeguard Unity.” Pointing at such instruments of punishment as wooden cangue as well as human skin in the showcases, an old woman said to her grandson, “Dalai did all these.” One official said, “How many benefits we have given to them, and they still revolt. Why?” The “Chinese Panchen Lama” and his parents were reported to have visited the exhibition. In Beijing, the mistrust of Tibetans was high and neighborhood committees were checking houses to discover any Tibetans in Beijing without resident permits. Officials were very afraid of protests by Tibetans or Uighurs during the Olympics. In Lhasa the Ramoche temple reopened to the “public,” many of whom were said to be spies, informants, or undercover security police. Some of the Ramoche monks previously arrested had been released but some were still detained and would reportedly be charged with crimes. Some other Tibetans in the Lhasa area were released but all had to pay 3,000 Yuan fines. One was released in such bad condition that he soon died. Twenty monks from Ganden monastery had been transferred to Lhasa Prison. The various work units of the Lhasa area were ordered to make “voluntary” donations to those, mostly Han Chinese, who suffered from the “beating, smashing, looting and burning” of 14 March.
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On 7 May an estimated five thousand Chinese security personnel surrounded Labrang Tashikyil monastery in Gansu and carried out a raid on the monastery and monks’ quarters. About 140 monks were taken away for questioning, most of whom were released in the following days. Two monks who most prominently spoke out during the media tour of Labrang on 7 April had disappeared and authorities denied any knowledge of their existence. 9 May Woeser reported that Chinese and Tibetan academics had been dispatched to various universities in Xian to provide students with the official version of Tibetan history. The program of education on Tibetan history was planned to extend to universities nationwide. Some Tibetans arrested in the Amdo area had been released but only after paying fines as high as 10,000 Yuan. The singer Dolma Kyi was still detained because her family could not afford to pay the demanded fine. This situation could lead to her formal arrest and sentencing since Chinese law required the police to issue an arrest warrant after a person had been detained for thirty-seven days. Until that time the police could release a person without charge upon the payment of specified fines that were actually bribes. Dolma Kyi’s offense was said to be that she sang songs praising the Dalai Lama and hoping for his return and allowed others to also do so at her song and dance hall. A singer detained along with Dolma Kyi had sung a song with the lyrics: “The sun and the moon are not here, and our hope is gone. Is this the karma of Tibetans?” The sun and the moon refer to the Dalai and Panchen Lamas. Woeser reported that a patriotic education work team sent to Polha monastery in Sangchu (Xiahe) County in Kanlho TAP of Gansu had demanded that the monks worship Shugden, the protective spirit whose worship had been discouraged by the Dalai Lama. The monks reportedly refused to do so. Work teams at all monasteries were requiring the flying of the Chinese national flag. There were several instances of monks being arrested for refusal to fly the Chinese flag, for putting up the Tibetan flag, or for refusing to denounce the Dalai Lama. Protests continued at several places, including the hanging of banners and shouting of Tibetan independence slogans. Several demonstrations by monks and nuns took place in Kanze TAP; several monks and nuns were beaten, and fifty-five nuns were arrested. A nun arrested during the protests in Ngaba on 16 March was released from detention but died shortly after due to injuries from severe torture. One Tibetan of Kham who was accused of participation in the riot in Lhasa on 14 March was killed in Chamdo when he resisted arrest. A well-known monk author of Machu County, Kanlho TAP, founder of a private school and editor of a Tibetan language periodical, was
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arrested for writing articles inciting Tibetans to participate in demonstrations and for sending information about the demonstrations out of China. On 18 May, security forces in Kanze arrested the reincarnate lama of Kanze monastery in connection with the refusal of the monks of his monastery and nuns of associated nunneries to participate in the Patriotic Education Campaign. His arrest provoked a demonstration by monks, nuns, and laypeople in Kanze, who shouted slogans for Tibetan independence. They were beaten by police and some were arrested. In a particularly Tibetan style of retaliation against Tibetan collaborators, the lamas of Tawu monasteries declared that the families of two Tibetan cadres would henceforth be denied all religious ceremonies, including prayers at their funerals. Sixteen monks of two monasteries in Markham, Chamdo Prefecture, TAR, were arrested for refusing Patriotic Education. One reason for many protests by monks and nuns in all parts of Tibet was that they were not to be allowed to remain at their monasteries and nunneries if they refused Patriotic Education and refused to denounce the Dalai Lama. In Lhasa, the Jokhang temple, closed since 10 March, was reopened on 16 May. Sera and Ramoche were also open, but Drepung and Ganden remained closed. Tibetans from outside Lhasa were being denied entry to the city, and Tibetans arriving on the railway were closely checked at the Lhasa railway station. There were no restrictions on Han Chinese arrivals. Lhasa television broadcast increased rewards for the most wanted Tibetans accused of involvement in the “3.14 Incident.” The reward for information about the first person on the list was 50,000 Yuan and for six others was 20,000 Yuan. All activities of domestic and foreign NGOs working in Tibet were put on hold. Some foreign NGOs were accused by Chinese media of supporting revolution against China in Tibet. On 19 May, twelve monks of Shelkar Choedhe monastery of Tingri County, Shigatse Prefecture, TAR, were arrested in a nighttime raid by security personnel after the monks and their lama had refused Patriotic Education. Numerous small-scale protests by nuns in the Kanze area continued throughout the month of May, culminating in the large-scale demonstration of nuns of Samtenling nunnery on 8 June after one of their number had been severely beaten during a solo protest during which she called for freedom in Tibet and the return of the Dalai Lama. By early June, protests in most areas of Tibet, except Kanze, had decreased in size and frequency but some protests still occurred, usually by monks and nuns against Patriotic Education. Tension remained high in all parts of Tibet, due to the high level of Chinese security forces and the continuing efforts of officials, both Chinese and Tibetan, to investigate the loyalties of all Tibetans and their support or participation in the protests. In Lhasa, tensions were
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higher still due to the upcoming Olympic Torch relay. The actual date remained secret until only a few days before the actual event on 21 June. Besides the taking of the torch to the top of Everest in early May, the torch relay in Tibet had been shortened from three days to a few hours on one day. On 21 June the Olympic torch was taken through Lhasa under highly controlled conditions. The atmosphere was tense, as police were everywhere and most Tibetans were barred from the ceremonies. Only Han Chinese residents of Lhasa and a few of the most trusted Tibetans were allowed to witness the torch relay. Also present were Tibetan schoolchildren and song and dance groups who were required to perform for the occasion. Only a few foreign journalists were present, and their reporting was highly restricted. No incidents marred the event, but the event itself was characteristic of the repressive atmosphere of Lhasa. The few foreign journalists allowed to cover the torch relay in Lhasa reported that they were very restricted in their movements and in what they could see and report. They were taken on tours of the Potala and Sera monastery but were not allowed to visit the Jokhang. At Sera they were allowed to speak only to the head of the Democratic Management Committee. They noticed the absence of the usual numbers of monks. The journalists were kept busy with organized visits and were not allowed to go out on their own. Chinese officials claimed that Lhasa was too dangerous for them to go about alone. They noticed the absence of any Tibetans at the ceremony and even on the back streets of Lhasa during the ceremony. They found out that most Tibetans and all monks and nuns had been told to stay in their residences during the torch ceremony. The journalists were allowed to witness only the end of the torch relay at the square in front of the Potala. They reported that the square was surrounded by police and no uninvited people were allowed to enter. They themselves were confined to a small area and not allowed to talk to anyone. The foreign journalists could not help but notice that, with the exception of the Tibetan schoolchildren and singers and dancers, most of those at the ceremony were not Tibetans but Han Chinese. Thus, with the exception of a few trusted Tibetans and some whose presence was required at the ceremony, the event was not a Tibetan celebration of the Olympic torch but a Chinese celebration of Chinese control over Tibet. This was emphasized by Zhang Qingli, who was quoted as saying In order to bring more glory to the Olympic spirit, we should firmly smash the plots to ruin the Beijing Olympic Games by the Dalai clique and hostile foreign forces inside and outside of the nation. We will certainly be able to totally smash the splittist schemes of the Dalai Lama clique. Tibet’s sky will never change and the red flag with five stars will forever flutter high above it.11
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Three days after the Olympic torch ceremony in Lhasa, the TAR was reopened to foreign tourists and foreign journalists, with some restrictions. Journalists were to be required to request permission to go to Tibet and they would presumably be assigned to government handlers. The decision to reopen Tibet to tourists and journalists was said to be because Tibet was now stable and safe for foreigners. No doubt it was the lack of any disturbances during the torch relay that convinced Chinese leaders that Tibet was now safe. An International Campaign for Tibet report in July documented 159 separate incidents of protest since 10 March. A large number of incidents, 117 out of the 159, had been in Tibetan areas outside the TAR, particularly in the Labrang area of Gansu and the Kanze and Ngaba areas of Sichuan. While the majority of protests had been peaceful, at least fourteen had involved violence, usually only against property. Eleven incidents had involved violence by Chinese security forces against Tibetans. Many of the protests in late March, April, and May were due to monks’ resistance to the Patriotic Education Campaign, particularly its requirement that they verbally or in writing denounce the Dalai Lama. Monks and nuns also resisted security forces’ raids on monasteries and nunneries in search of independence materials, including photographs of the Dalai Lama. During these searches, which usually took place without notice and often in the middle of the night, security forces were accused of mistreating monks and nuns and of destroying and stealing religious artifacts. Some protests took place when monasteries raised the Tibetan flag or refused to fly the Chinese flag.12 In March 2009 Human Rights Watch issued a report that quoted a Chinese source saying that there had been 150 instances of protests.13 The significance of the Tibetan uprising will be examined in the following chapters, but something may be said here about the territorial extent of Tibetan protests. The original protest was mostly confined to Lhasa and the TAR. However, a large-scale protest occurred in Labrang Tashikyil almost simultaneous with the 14 March outbreak of violence in Lhasa. Labrang is on the edge of the traditional border between China and Tibet, a border defined mostly by altitude and ecology and economy, but also by history. This border was maintained during the Tibetan Empire and Tang Dynasty era by the establishment of Tibetan outposts intended to define and protect Tibet’s frontier with China. Tibetans from central and western Tibet were sent to permanently populate those outposts. They were told not to return without orders, or kha ma lok in Tibetan, by which the peoples of the Tibetan frontier with China were thereafter known. This strategy is similar to the traditional Chinese frontier policy of establishing military-agricultural colonies to expand and protect their border, a policy applied in Xinjiang during the CCP era with the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps.
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After 14 March most of the protests were in eastern Tibet in areas near the traditional frontier with China, in Tibetan areas of Gansu and northern Qinghai, and in Sichuan. If one looks at a map of the places where protests occurred, the sites appear to define the traditional Sino-Tibetan frontier. These are the areas where Tibetans are most in contact with Chinese and where they should presumably be the most assimilated. Chinese policies in many of these areas have also, at least until recently, been more tolerant of Tibetan culture. The predominance of protests in eastern Tibet undoubtedly reveals something about the Tibetan nationalist nature of the uprising. It was not only those supposedly more nationalistic and less assimilated Tibetans of Lhasa and the TAR who expressed their rejection of the conditions of Chinese rule over Tibet, but it was equally or even more so the supposedly more assimilated Tibetans closest to the traditional Tibetan frontier with China who retained and expressed Tibetan nationalist sentiments.
Notes Sources for this chronology, unless otherwise indicated, are “Woeser: Tibet Update,” www.chinadigitaltimes.net; the website of the Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy, www.tchrd.org; and the official website of the Central Tibetan Administration, Dharamsala, www.tibet.net. 1. “Zhang Qingli Makes Guest Appearance on CCTV to Talk Freely about Tibet Developments and Transformations,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 11 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080322530003. 2. Robert Barnett, “Thunder from Tibet,”New York Review of Books, 29 May 2008. 3. Robert Barnett, “Thunder from Tibet.” 4. Woeser, “The Fear in Lhasa as Felt in Beijing,” High Peaks Pure Earth, 4 July 2008, www.highpeakspureearth.com; Ah Shen, “Lhasa Witness: March 2008,” High Peaks Pure Earth, 4 April 2008, www.highpeakspureearth.com. 5. “More Than 300 Innocent People Injured in Lhasa Riot, Damage up to 200 million Yuan,” Beijing, Xinhua, 19 March 2008; “Magnitude of Riot Losses Much Larger,” Beijing, China Daily, 10 April 2008. 6. “Elite PLA Army Units Enter Lhasa,” Kanwa Defense Review, 19 March 2008. 7. “More Than 2200 People Who Took Part in Burning Incidents Surrendered in Gansu,” Beijing, Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service in Chinese, 9 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080409074008. 8. “Sichuan Officials Brief Press on Management of Unrest in Aba Prefecture,” Beijing, Zhongguo Wang in Chinese, 3 April 2008, in OSC CCP20080404584003. 9. “Fresh Pictures of Tibetan Protesters’ Dead Bodies and Crackdown by the Chinese Security Forces,” Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy, 17 March
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2008, www.tchrd.org/press/2008/pr20080317c.html; “Photographic Evidence of the Bloody Crackdown on Peacefully Protesting Tibetans at Ngaba County, Sichuan Province, on 16 March 2008,” TCHRD, 18 March 2008, www.tchrd.org/press/2008/ pr20080318c.html. 10. “China: Tibetan Protesters Denied Fair Trial,” Human Rights Watch Press, 29 April 2008,
[email protected]. 11. Buckley, Chris, “China Condemns Dalai Lama on Torch Relay,” Reuters, 21 June 2008. 12. Tibet at a Turning Point: The Spring Uprising and China’s New Crackdown (Washington DC: International Campaign for Tibet, 6 August 2008), 19. 13. “China: Hundreds of Tibetan Detainees and Prisoners Unaccounted For,” New York, Human Rights Watch, 9 March 2009, quoting Xinhua, 2 April 2008.
2 China’s Response: Repression
C
HINA’S FIRST RESPONSE
to the unrest in Tibet was, as usual, repression. This response began with police and paramilitary suppression of the riots of 14 March, the subsequent house searches to round up suspects and rid Lhasa of Tibetans from other parts of Tibet without Lhasa residence permits, and interrogation and torture of those arrested in detention centers and prisons. Lhasa’s major monasteries were also subjected to lock-downs, interrogation of monks, and subsequent arrests of any who had participated in demonstrations and riots. Monks from eastern Tibet were sent back to their home provinces and usually detained until after the Olympics. Lhasa was flooded with People’s Armed Police (PAP) who inspected, searched, and intimidated Tibetans and beat and arrested any who dared resist. China’s usual remedy for Tibetans’ ideological deviation, “Patriotic Education,” was also employed to repress their thoughts of separatism and to further ferret out dissidents. The result was an atmosphere of fear and animosity, along with enforced conformity to China’s ideological campaigns against separatism and the Dalai Lama. Some demonstrations may have been anticipated on 10 March, given the circumstances of the Olympics and the Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement (TPUM) in India. However, there had been no demonstrations in Lhasa or any other parts of Tibet on 10 March in recent years, no doubt due to the level of repressive force available to the authorities. The demonstration of the Drepung monks seems to have been handled with some care, the monks simply being prevented from entering Lhasa. Some fifty of the Drepung monks were reportedly arrested and the monastery was surrounded by security — 41 —
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police to prevent any further instances, but the authorities avoided any open clashes with the monks. The demonstration by the Sera monks in front of the Jokhang was much smaller but more serious in that it involved the display of the Tibetan flag. It was met with more brutality on the part of the security police, who publicly beat up the monks before tossing them into trucks and taking them off to a detention center, where they were reportedly beaten even more severely. Teargas was used on a much larger group of Sera monks the next day, and Sera was subsequently surrounded, as was Ganden. By surrounding the three great Lhasa monasteries the authorities may have thought they had prevented any further demonstrations, assuming that they only had to worry about monks. However, the monks of Ramoche broke out into the street on 14 March in a scuffle with police. Why the subsequent rampage was allowed to continue without a response from the security forces remains something of a mystery. The deployment of so many security forces at the three big Lhasa monasteries is perhaps a partial explanation. The lack of an immediate response to the rioting has led to speculation that the Lhasa authorities allowed the rioters to do their damage in order to justify the subsequent campaign of repression. Leading to this speculation is the fact that video recording and even CCTV filming of the rioting was conspicuous and was employed repeatedly in Chinese propaganda thereafter. A more likely explanation may lie in the absence from Lhasa of almost all CCP officials, who were at the National People’s Congress (NPC) meeting in Beijing. Assuming that they left instructions that force was not to be used without their permission, then it is plausible that the delay was due to the time needed to secure that permission. It is even possible that they were in the NPC meeting and no one dared to interrupt them. In that case they would not have decided to use force until that evening. It is also possible that the remaining low-level officials in Lhasa were hesitant to admit that they had let the situation get out of control and therefore delayed informing the officials in Beijing of how bad the situation had actually become. Lhasa authorities may have wanted to remove all foreign tourists from the streets before they began using force on the Tibetan rioters. Whatever the explanation, the delay allowed the riot to assume such proportions as to cause great damage and loss of life in Lhasa and to turn the event into an international incident. Other reports from Tibetans who were at the scene indicate that there was no delay in the response of the security forces at all. The only place where there were no police was in the center of the Tibetan area of Lhasa around the Barkor. It was apparently the magnitude of the riot that kept the security forces out of the center. One Tibetan described the riot as an explosion of pent-up Tibetan resentment, set off by the conflict between the police and the
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Ramoche monks and the actions of bystanders who went to the monks’ aid. One Tibetan who later escaped to Nepal said that about one hundred armed police responded to the initial disturbance at Ramoche and that they fired on the crowd, hitting some monks. As the riot grew, the police disappeared from the area. The police withdrawal from the center of the Tibetan area of the city allowed the riot to proceed, but security forces on the periphery fired on demonstrators and killed several, whose bodies were seen being carried through the Barkor. As this source reportedly said, “There was not a single policeman in the Tibetan quarter, but the avenues separating it from the Chinese city were full of troops armed to the teeth.” According to this account, an estimated one hundred Tibetans were killed on 14 March by security forces, beginning on the edges of the Tibetan area and moving toward the center. Some wounded Tibetans were refused treatment at Chinese hospitals. Some bodies of Tibetans who were killed were taken by the security forces and Tibetans had to pay 3,000 Yuan to get them back. By 15 March, the security forces had regained control over the Tibetan section of the city and many Tibetans were being arrested. The source reported seeing Tibetans being forced to kneel in rows in the street and being beaten bloody by the police. Gunfire was heard for several days from nearby Tibetan parts of the city and several more Tibetans were killed, their bodies taken away in trucks by the security forces. The source characterized the bystanders who went to the aid of the Ramoche monks as “Khampas,” and the majority of the participants in the subsequent riot as “youngsters from the countryside.”1 Woeser wrote about hearing that one strange characteristic of the beginning of the riot was the sound of many people whistling in the way that nomads do when herding yaks. She said that this was evidence that it was rural Tibetans in Lhasa who were a main component of the rioters because city Tibetans didn’t know how to whistle like this. Another Tibetan source also reports seeing Tibetans shot on 14 March. He said that security forces were firing indiscriminately at Tibetans in all parts of the city, some of whom were going to pick up their children at a school. The security forces were trying to retain the bodies of any Tibetans killed so that no one could take pictures and send them outside Tibet. Tibetans who had taken the bodies of their relatives to their homes were visited by the security police, who confiscated the bodies. Hospitals refused to release the bodies of Tibetans who had been killed without papers from the police, the hospital, and a lawyer. Since this was impossible in the days immediately after 14 March, Tibetans were unable to recover the bodies of their relatives until several days later. On 14, 15, and 16 March security police came to Tibetan houses in the middle of the night to search for pictures of the Dalai Lama and for any
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Tibetans without residency permits. Tibetans found without Lhasa residency permits were taken away. The police had pictures of people who had taken part in the riots that they compared with the faces of Tibetans as they searched. Most Tibetans were unable to leave their houses for three days. Those who ventured out were accosted by police and often beaten. Chinese were at the same time allowed free passage. After three days Tibetans who worked at official jobs were told to return to work but others were not allowed to go out. On the day after the riot, 15 March, the TAR Superior People’s Court of the TAR People’s Procuratorate published a notice offering reduced penalties for those rioters who turned themselves in to the authorities and incentives for those who informed on others: Public Security Bureau, Notice #1, March 15, 2008. Since March 10, 2008, a very small minority of monks and nuns in the Lhasa region have been stirring up trouble and doing their utmost to create social chaos. This is part of a carefully planned political plot by the Dalai clique to split off Tibet from the motherland, disrupt the peace, harmony and normal lives of the various nationalities of Tibet. Particularly on March 14, some lawbreakers in Lhasa beat people, vandalized, stole, burned and murdered in an organized and premeditated manner. They burned a school, hospital, kindergarten, a market and residential housing. They violently forced their way into Party and government offices, enterprises, smashed cars, stole property, killed innocent people, and mobbed and beat up law enforcement officers. This behavior violates the “Criminal Law of the PRC” and constitutes criminal behavior. People who have encouraged, organized, planned or participated in these acts of Lhasa, beat people, vandalized, stole, burned and murdered should immediately stop their criminal activities. They should turn themselves in. The broad masses are encouraged to make reports exposing criminal elements. Therefore notice is given of the following: Whosoever, before midnight on March 17 turns themselves in to a public security or court organ, can according to law, receive a lighter punishment or reduced penalty. People who turn themselves in and at the same time earn the merit of turning in other criminal elements, can according to law, be exempted from punishment. Criminal elements who do not surrender before the time limit will be dealt with harshly according to law. Whosoever covers up for or conceals a criminal element, once discovered will receive a strict punishment according to law. Citizens who actively expose the crimes of criminal elements will be protected and given awards and rewards.2
Another Tibetan eyewitness reported that Lhasa had been calm before 10 March, with little indication that demonstrations might occur. There had been increased inspections of Tibetans arriving by road from Nepal, as if the authorities thought that Tibetans from India and Nepal might try to enter Tibet in order to incite and organize demonstrations. He said that the
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Drepung monks who demonstrated on 10 March were shouting slogans for freedom of religion and against the migration of Han Chinese to Tibet. This source said that when the rioting started on 14 March the Public Security police, many of whom are Tibetans, were reluctant to confront the rioters, who also avoided the police. People’s Armed Police began to appear after 2:00 pm, and then large numbers of them in military vehicles began to arrive from the west. By 3:00 pm these police were shooting Tibetan bystanders and stopping anyone taking photos with cameras or cell phones. This source speculated that the riot spread as far as it did because the police were afraid to take repressive measures while Western tourists were watching. At the same time, Tibetans were being shot in areas where there were no tourists. After dark, when the tourists were in their hotels, the sounds of gunfire increased. This source said that by 17 March Chinese state television repeatedly showed scenes of Tibetans burning shops and beating up Han Chinese. He said that some of the Chinese beaten up were innocent but others were undercover police who were well known to the Tibetans. He said that the media coverage was meant to incite anger against Tibetans and some of it was misleading. Tibetans did not steal from the shops they burned, he said; instead, they took the contents of the stores into the streets and burned them. The one or two schools that were burned caught fire from adjacent buildings. He questioned the footage of the person shown brandishing a non-Tibetan machete-type sword. The person did not look Tibetan and his appearance with the sword was inconsistent with the actions of the rioters. This “Tibetan” was airbrushed out of later versions of this photo. Tibetans who were interviewed on TV denouncing the rioters were misinterpreted in the translation from Tibetan to Chinese. House searches and arrests of Tibetans continued. For the first three days house searches had been done by uniformed police. Later they were done by plainclothes police. Those arrested usually suffered beatings. Others were beaten and tortured so severely in detention centers that they emerged seriously injured and sometimes died days later. Rewards of 2,000 Yuan were offered for information leading to the arrest of rioters. The Public Security Bureau of Lhasa sent a message to all cell phone subscribers offering a reward of 20,000 Yuan for information leading to the arrest of anyone on the “Most Wanted” list. Photos of the Most Wanted were broadcast every day on TV with brief suspensions when foreign journalists were being given guided tours. On 27 March, when a group of foreign journalists was visiting, Tibetans were paid 200 Yuan to appear in the Potala Square looking normal and going about activities such as saying their ritual prayers.3 A Tibetan whose account was received by the International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) said that he was arrested during a house search on 18 March by
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armed soldiers who broke down the door of his house, ransacked it and beat members of his family. He was taken to a detention center where he was put in a cell with several other Tibetans. They were given one steamed bun per day and no water. They had no blankets or mattresses and had to lie on the cold floor. Many of the Tibetans in the detention center had broken limbs or gunshot wounds but were not provided with any medical attention. Others had broken ribs, swollen faces, and teeth punched out. Monks had been especially severely beaten and they seemed to be regarded with particular hatred by the Chinese. After several days the interrogations and tortures began, conducted by both Chinese and Tibetan guards. This Tibetan lamented the effect of Chinese repression on the Tibetan population: I’m worried about the small Tibetan population. Many people are dying today or being crippled with broken arms and legs, and that’s very bad. And people are in prison, like me, and I think about the people in prison all the time. I think about the terrible state they are in. Young people, 16 or 17 years old, crying all the time; it makes me really sad. I saw people with broken limbs and people who’d been shot; seeing their pale faces is very, very sad.
Some Tibetans from Amdo without Lhasa resident permits were taken by train to Qinghai. In one such case some three hundred were seen at the Sining railway station. All appeared injured and some were still being beaten. Some eight hundred Tibetans were reportedly seen at the railway station in Lhasa before being sent to Qinghai. Many had been beaten severely and were deprived of food. Tibetans from Kham arrested in Lhasa were sent back to their homes by road. One monk was beaten every day while detained in Lhasa. He was taken to Mianyang Prison in Sichuan and was released due to fear that he might die. He could hardly walk and had trouble breathing. The source said that there were many Tibetans from Lhasa in the same prison.4 A month after the riot, Lhasa was still under what was essentially an undeclared martial law. In the Tibetan part of the city armed troops were a conspicuous presence. This was in addition to the usual heavy presence of Public Security Police, undercover police, and spies and informants. In the Barkor area there were armed troops on every street and in every alley. All Tibetans had to show their identification at checkpoints, while Chinese could pass freely. Only Tibetans with residence papers were allowed to enter Tibetan areas near the Barkor. Others were not allowed to do the circumambulation around the Barkor. The area in front of the Jokhang, usually crowded with Tibetans, was empty. Every courtyard and empty space or building in the Tibetan area was filled with additional military personnel. Tibetans on the street avoided talking to each other because any gathering would arouse the attention of the police. Many Tibetans stayed in their homes out of fear of
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being arrested if they went out. Since the security forces took away all the dead bodies of Tibetans killed, nobody really knew how many had been killed. Others had been arrested without notice so nobody knew of they were alive or not; all they knew was that they had disappeared. When foreign journalists were in Lhasa at the end of March the military disappeared from the streets. Many previously uniformed military police changed into civilian clothes or the uniforms of traffic police or gatekeepers. Others were hiding in buildings where the foreigners could not see them. Tibetans were allowed to go anywhere during those days. When the journalists walked around, officials in traditional Tibetan clothes followed them and made themselves available to answer their questions. They also took pictures of anyone else who talked to the journalists and tried to prevent others from doing so. The pilgrims the journalists saw inside the Jokhang were all elderly officials who were usually not allowed to engage in any religious activities but on this day were required to pretend to be worshipers at the Jokhang. Other officials were told to go to the Jokhang or Potala areas with their families in traditional dress so that it would appear that there was a lot of freedom in Lhasa. After the journalists left, the military reappeared immediately, and the Jokhang monks who had appealed to the journalists were rumored to have been arrested. Between 17 and 20 April most of the three hundred monks of Sera were reportedly taken away in trucks in the middle of the night. This Tibetan did not know what had happened at Drepung and Ganden but heard that they had also been taken away. All Tibetans from other parts of Tibet had to return to their homes. If they were discovered during house searches they were forcibly sent back. There were still many Tibetans in detention centers and prisons. They often did not get sufficient food, water, or blankets. They generally were beaten badly; the guards focused on the kidneys and liver regions of the body so that Tibetans would suffer internal injuries and slowly die. This was known from those who had been released. There was no way to help those in prison. In schools and offices Tibetans were required to write about the 14 March incident and blame it on the Dalai Lama, but they could only say “Dalai.” They had to rewrite their stories several times until they got it right.5 On 20 June another twelve Tibetans received sentences, in addition to the thirty sentenced on 29 April. They were convicted of arson, robbery, “the crime of gathering to assault state organs,” and other crimes. Another 116 people were in custody waiting for trial.6 Many of the monks who had disappeared from the monasteries of the Lhasa area were reportedly being held in a military detention center at Golmud in Qinghai. The monks were from Amdo and Kham, or Qinghai and Sichuan provinces, and had been studying at the great monasteries of Lhasa. Radio Free Asia reported that of the 675 monks
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held at Golmud, 405 were from Drepung, 205 from Sera, 8 from Ganden, and the remaining 57 from smaller monasteries in the Lhasa area. The Drepung monks had been rounded up on 10 April and those from Sera on 14 April. They had reportedly been sent by train from Lhasa on 25 April. Many of those from Amdo had been transferred to their home areas and detained at detention centers in those areas. They were reportedly escorted from Golmud by officials of the Qinghai United Front Work Department and the Religious Affairs Bureau. Monks from Kham were still being held in Golmud at the end of August. All of the monks were reported to have suffered harsh treatment, including beatings, while at the detention centers.7 In July the London Sunday Times reported from Hong Kong about information obtained from internal CCP documents that revealed that China was planning a campaign of harsh political repression in Tibet after the August Olympics despite a public show of moderation to win over world opinion before the Olympics. This information had appeared in the April and May editions of Xizang Tongxun (Tibet Communications), a classified publication restricted to party officials, which had been obtained by the Sunday Times in Hong Kong. Zhang Qingli had reportedly said in Lhasa that Chinese authorities there faced a “tide of encirclement” and that the violence in March had damaged social stability. He warned that final victory over separatism was far off. Zhang’s policy to counter Tibetan separatism included a “Mao-era” system of “democratic management committees” in monasteries and “neighborhood committees” in civilian society combined with intensive security enforced by large numbers of security personnel and military forces. The Sunday Times commented that the documents revealed that China’s response to unrest in Tibet was a “classic Marxist-Leninist propaganda and re-education campaign backed up by armed force.” Zhang was quoted from the documents saying: “Propaganda and education are our party’s greatest advantages. These are the most useful weapons with which to defend ourselves against the Dalai Lama group. So let the propaganda department work more actively to expose its plots.” The article quoted the head of the Propaganda Department in Tibet, Lie Que, from Tibet Daily on 2 June saying, “We must clean out the monasteries and strengthen the administrative committees. After that we will absolutely control them.”8 In mid-July the TAR Discipline Inspection Commission and Department of Supervision promulgated “Regulations for Disciplinary Sanction against Communist Party Members and Public Functionaries of the State Who Send Their Children to Overseas Schools Operated by the Dalai Clique.” The regulations were said to be intended to counter the scheme plotted by the Dalai clique to lure young people to go to its schools in India with offers of scholarships and free room and board:
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Communist party members and public functionaries of the state may not send their children to attend schools operated by the Dalai clique (or to its lamaseries to study scriptures). This is a serious political disciplinary rule. Those communist party members and public functionaries of the state who send their children to attend schools operated by the Dalai clique shall be subjected to the party’s and the government’s disciplinary sanction. All those communist party members and public functionaries of the state who send their children to attend schools operated by the Dalai clique after the Regulations have been promulgated will be dismissed from the party or from their public offices; and those who have sent their children to attend schools operated by the Dalai clique before the Regulations have been promulgated and their children have already returned home shall take the initiative to explain their cases to the organizations.
Those whose children had received “reactionary education” in India or who had “taken part in secessionist and sabotage activities” must be examined by CCP organizations. Those whose children were attending schools operated by the Dalai clique should bring them home within two months. Those who did not report their children in such schools or who did not return them would be dismissed from the party and removed from their public offices. The discipline inspection commission urged all supervisory bodies to tighten the supervision and inspection of the way “party members, public functionaries of the state and retired party members and cadres observe the Regulations, and seriously investigate and punish those who have violated the Regulations.”9 In Nyingtri (Ch. Nyingchi) in Kongpo, in the TAR east of Lhasa, officials sent out work groups to guide stability maintenance work. They reinforced security patrols and conducted 3,568 security checks on people from outside the prefecture. They had set up checkpoints on highways and checked on more than 60,000 vehicles. They had stepped up border control (with India) and stopped the channels through which Tibet independence elements might sneak into and out of the country. They dispatched work groups to monasteries to conduct legal propaganda and education. Party organizations and cadres had formed self-defense mass organizations and had organized and guided patriotic personages from religious groups to hold denouncement meetings and discussion meetings to criticize the Dalai clique and “let the masses see more clearly the reactionary nature of the Dalai clique and the evil intention of hostile forces to westernize and disintegrate the motherland.” The cadres had used discussion meetings to compare life in Old Tibet with life in the New Tibet, and had thereby foiled the plot of the Dalai clique to instigate ethnic conflicts. The prefecture had held a total of 939 discussion meetings and denouncement meetings. One result of the antisecession campaign in Nyingtri was that monks had become more patriotic. They had held flag-raising
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ceremonies in monasteries and had realized that only by upholding the leadership of the CPC can they fully enjoy freedom of religious belief.10 Tibetan nomads in Nangchen, Jyekundo (Ch. Yushu) TAP in Qinghai were reportedly arrested for refusing Chinese attempts to use the traditional horse festival of the nomads to show support for the Beijing Olympics. The nomads had been told they must attend the festival and wear their traditional fur-lined chubas of the type they had ceased wearing after the Dalai Lama had asked that Tibetans stop the slaughter of threatened species of animals. Any family that failed to produce at least one member at the festival would be fined 1,000 Yuan. Chinese officials organized a rehearsal day for the performing artists, but the nomads’ songs were in appreciation of the Dalai Lama and complaining about repression after the March uprising. The Chinese ordered the Tibetans to compose new songs, but the nomads refused and left the festival site altogether, leaving only the tents set up by the officials. There were also reports from Rutok in the far western Ngari area of the TAR and Kanze in Sichuan of “fake films” being made by the Chinese showing Chinese security personnel resisting peacefully and nonviolently against Tibetan monks who were actually soldiers dressed in monks’ robes.11 In October, Wang Bingyi, standing committee member of the autonomous region’s CPC committee, secretary of the autonomous region’s Political and Legal Affairs Committee, and secretary of the Integrated Stability Management Committee, chaired a “Region-Wide Social Stability Management Meeting,” in which he set seven requirements for stability management. These were a “harsh crackdown” on separatism; conflict mediation and investigations work; “safe county, city or district” and “safe temples” work; shifting population services and management work; publicity and education work about the legal system; grassroots foundation work; and accountability and social stability management.12 On 4 November the vice chairman of the TAR government, Pema Tsewang (Ch. Baema Cewang), in response to a question for a visiting member of the Australian House of Representatives, said that so far 55 Tibetans had been sentenced for their involvement in the March riot. He said that 1,317 people had been detained and 1,115 subsequently released. Those not released had stood trial, he said, without explaining the discrepancy between the 55 sentences handed down and the difference (202) between those detained and those released. All of those sentenced so far had been convicted of arson, robbery, disrupting public order, and attacking government offices, among other crimes. None had yet been sentenced for the more serious crimes of the acts that had resulted in the deaths of the “18 innocent civilians and one police officer,” and the injuries to “382 civilians and 241 police officers.”13 Australian journalists accompanying the government official published a collection
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of nineteen photos of PSB and PAP patrolling the streets and posted on the rooftops of buildings around the Jokhang. All of the security personnel were armed.14 On a visit to Japan the Dalai Lama said that Chinese repression in Tibet was equivalent to a “death sentence” for Tibetan culture. Speaking on 2 November while his representatives were in Beijing talking to Chinese officials, he told reporters, Tibetans are being handed down a death sentence. This ancient nation, with an ancient cultural heritage is dying. Today, the situation is almost like a military occupation in the entire Tibetan area. It is like we’re under martial law. Fear, terror and lots of political education are causing a lot of grievance.15
At a press conference on 23 December, Xin Yuanming, deputy director of Lhasa City Public Security Bureau, said that after the incident of beating, smashing, looting, and burning on 14 March, “a number of people with ulterior motives, engineered and encouraged by the Dalai Separatist Clique, have intentionally created rumors and incited national sentiments to endanger the security of the state and nation.” To deal with this situation, the PSB had established a “leading group for special action,” to crack down on rumor mongering and rumor spreading. The PSB had selected 108 people’s policemen and organized them into 14 work teams to start a special action to crack down on rumor mongering and rumor spreading. They had “cracked 48 cases of creating and spreading rumors and captured 59 suspects.” According to Xin, rumor mongering and rumor spreading had “seriously affected the image of the party and the government and seriously damaged the people’s sense of security.” The fifty-nine suspects were accused of “illegal downloading and spreading of reactionary information and songs.” They had “illegally downloaded reactionary songs from the Internet and sold them to people in the city in the form of CDs, MP3, and MP4, and other electronic products to make excessive profit and to interfere and undermine the stable political situation in Lhasa City.”16 The “reactionary songs” in question were any that referred to the Dalai Lama or his family or that spoke of Tibetan independence or even a separate Tibetan identity. Woeser wrote that such songs were often recorded by Chinese Muslim (Hui) traders in the Lhasa markets and sold to Tibetans. It was unclear whether the traders or those who bought the songs were the ones arrested. Woeser said that such songs usually came to the attention of the authorities long after they had been heard and seen by many Tibetans and had thus already become popular. The reason for this was that the lyrics were often subtle references to the banned subjects; Tibetans, even cadres, were slow to report the matter to Chinese officials. Woeser said that it was
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no mystery why such songs were popular, given the usual fare of songs such as “Liberated Serfs Sing” and “Bitterness Has Turned to Sweetness after the Communist Party Came.”17 In mid-January China Daily announced new rules for “migrants” in Lhasa. Anyone who stayed for more than thirty days in Lhasa would be required to apply for a temporary residence permit under a new regulation approved by the local people’s congress. People with temporary residence permits would be able to benefit from the same education, employment, and family planning services as permanent residents.18 Although this regulation might appear to be aimed at Han Chinese migrants to Lhasa, and it might in the sense that they would be likely to easily obtain such permits, it was probably aimed at Tibetans from areas outside the TAR and even from areas inside the TAR. Some of the leaders of and many of the participants in the riot of 14 March had been Tibetans from outside Lhasa. Many of the monks, especially those Sera monks who demonstrated in front of the Jokhang on 10 March, were from eastern Tibetan areas outside the TAR. Many of those who joined the rioting were reportedly youths from outside Lhasa. Even before this new regulation the Lhasa authorities had been checking resident permits of Tibetans in order to keep Tibetans from other areas from staying in Lhasa. No doubt the new regulation was in preparation for the anniversary of the riot in March 2009. Lhasa Public Security Bureau began a “Strike Hard” campaign in Lhasa on 18 January, deploying 600 officers and 160 vehicles and launching raids on 7 housing blocks, 2,922 rented houses, 14 guest houses and hotels, 18 bars, and 3 Internet cafes. Within three days they rounded up 5,766 suspects and questioned them.19 The primary purpose of this campaign, as was evident from the type of residences raided, was to find Tibetans in Lhasa without resident permits and to remove them. A secondary purpose was to find any Tibetans not yet discovered who had participated in the March riot or who were guilty of any other offenses under Chinese law. On 11 February Xinhua announced that seventy-six Tibetans had been sentenced so far for involvement in the 14 March riot. At a press conference in Lhasa making this announcement, one of the monks who had disrupted a tour of foreign journalists at the Jokhang at the end of March 2008 recanted his claim that one hundred Tibetans had been killed, saying that he was misled by others. He said that he was neither taken into custody nor punished and that his life and religious study had been normal.20 Chinese media claimed that the trials and sentences of those involved in the 14 March riot in Lhasa had been “strictly in line with Chinese law.” All defendants had defense lawyers and all proceedings had been conducted in Tibetan. The defense lawyers’ opinions were fully respected and their recommendations for lenient sentences were often adopted by the court. Those who
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had voluntarily surrendered, usually after learning the truth about the 14 March incident, obtained lenient sentences. Defense lawyers said that none of the defendants had been tortured or forced to make a confession, and food at the detention center was good. The accused received justice and leniency because “China is a country ruled by the law.”21 On 18 February Xinhua reported that the Tibetan Buddhist Association had unanimously voted to revise its constitution, calling on monks and nuns to “safeguard social stability, abide by the law and not to participate in separatist activities.” They were urged to “see clearly that the 14th Dalai Lama is the ringleader of the separatist political association which seeks ‘Tibet independence,’ a loyal tool of anti-China Western forces, the very root that causes social unrest in Tibet and the biggest obstacle for Tibetan Buddhism to build up its order.” About 260 lamas, monks, and nuns attended the congress at the Jokhang in Lhasa. Later, thirty-six monks and nuns and ten monasteries, including Tashilhunpo in Shigatse, were awarded the title of “patriotic and law-abiding.” The monasteries awarded this title were apparently those that did not participate in any demonstrations in March: “The monks and nuns and monasteries have safeguarded the unity of the country and contributed to the promotion of social stability over the past years, especially during the March 14 riot in 2008 in Lhasa.”22 At the end of February, Radio Free Asia received a message from a Tibetan in Lhasa who described the conditions there before the beginning of Losar: “All Tibetans are now under a very close watch. You can see heavily armed Chinese soldiers stationed on all the roof tops of Barkhor areas and there are street patrols round the clock. Even breathing is difficult for Tibetans now.” Another Tibetan reported that the New Year was so quiet in Lhasa that the only sound was the fireworks set off by security personnel. Lhasa had been cleansed of any undesirable people beforehand and thousands of Tibetan pilgrims and monks had been detained at a center in the eastern suburbs. Others had been sent back to the places they had come from. All Tibetans in the Lhasa administration were told that they had to celebrate Losar, set off fireworks, and change their door hangings and prayer flags. Officials also went door to door telling all Tibetans they must do the same. There were more security personnel in the Barkor area than Tibetans and the atmosphere was “very tense and intimidating.” The only fireworks were those set off by the security personnel and most Tibetans did not renew their door hangings and prayer flags.23 In early March, South China Morning Post reported that Drepung and Sera were surrounded by police, and security was being tightened a week before the 10 March anniversary. Squads of paramilitary police in bulletproof vests, carrying shields, weapons, and tear gas launchers lined the road to Sera.
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Monks of the two monasteries were cut off from telecommunications services. A Sera monk said that communications had been cut off since April, when police confiscated all mobile phones. A Drepung monk said that his monastery had only five hundred monks, whereas before last March there were two thousand. Many had been sent back to their home areas in Sichuan and Qinghai.24 On 9 March 2009 Xinhua reported that more than 2,300 officials had been sent to Tibet’s (TAR) 505 monasteries “to promote the legal awareness of monks and nuns and dissuade them from being duped by separatist forces.” The article said that an investigation at Drepung had found that most of those monks who participated in the riots were visiting monks from other monasteries. Seven hundred monks from other monasteries were sent back to their home provinces, leaving only six hundred registered monks at Drepung. Another five hundred visiting monks had been removed from Sera. The thirteen Sera monks who had “shouted anti-government slogans” in front of the Jokhang on 10 March 2008 were from Qinghai and Gansu, the article said.25 In Beijing for the annual NPC meeting, Jampa Phuntsok, chairman of the TAR government, said that only 76 of the 953 people detained for their involvement in the Lhasa riot had received prison sentences and the rest had been released. Most of those jailed were found guilty of theft, robbery, arson, disrupting public services, or attacking government agencies. Only a few were convicted of endangering national security. “Everything was conducted strictly according to the law. Every verdict was based on clear and strong evidence,” he said. He also said that there were not enough armed police in Tibet. The regional government had applied to the central government for the deployment of more police.26 Since all Tibetan areas both within the TAR and without were then reportedly flooded with PAP in anticipation of trouble around the 10 March period, presumably this request was an attempt to put a Tibetan face on the presence of Chinese security forces in Tibetan areas. The first death sentences for Tibetans involved in rioting were handed down in early April 2009. Two Tibetans were sentenced to death, two to death with a two-year reprieve, and one to life imprisonment for starting fatal fires. The sentences involved three separate arson cases in which seven people died. Two of the cases were from Lhasa on 14 March, while one was from Dechen township near Lhasa on 15 March. Another arson case in which five people were killed was still under trial. A spokesperson for the Lhasa People’s Court said that judges had followed the criminal policy of “tempering justice with mercy” and “exercising strict and cautious control over the use of death penalty.” The two defendants given death penalties had “committed extremely serious crimes and have to be executed to assuage the people’s anger.” The spokesperson said that defendants had been given open trials; they were
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provided with Tibetan interpreters and “their lawyers fully voiced their defenses. The litigious rights of the defendants were fully safeguarded and their customs and dignity were respected.”27 The two death sentences announced for three arson instances involving seven deaths, plus another trial still in progress for an unknown number of defendants involving five deaths, might indicate that the total number of death sentences in Lhasa would be smaller than expected.
Repression in Eastern Tibet The demonstrations in eastern Tibet outside the TAR met with the same sort of repressive response as did those in Lhasa and other parts of the TAR. In addition, large numbers of PAP and PLA forces were moved into eastern Tibet, more so than in the TAR, where large numbers were already available. As in the TAR, the protests in eastern Tibet were led by monks. The Chinese response included isolating monasteries with security forces, raiding the monasteries in search of incriminating information and in order to arrest those monks who participated in the protests, and Patriotic Education to lead the remaining monks on to the “correct” path of loyalty to the Chinese state and the CCP. The searches of monasteries by security personnel were often accompanied by beatings of monks, random destruction and desecration of images of the Dalai Lama, and petty theft of valuables such as money and religious objects. The attitude and actions of many of the security forces revealed that they harbored a personal animosity toward Tibetans, and especially monks, for disloyalty to the Chinese nation. In Labrang, armed police raided the monastery the night of 14 March, searching every monk’s cell for incriminating evidence such as photos of the Dalai Lama and smashing altars and abusing monks. They also confiscated computers and cell phones. Monks accused the police of stealing money, thangkas, and antique statues. A much larger contingent of PAP arrived from Lanzhou that evening or the next day. The PAP also responded to several other sites in Tibetan areas of Gansu where protests had occurred. On 20 March a public notice was issued warning those who had protested, or criminals as the notice called them, to surrender by 25 March, promising the usual policy of leniency for those who gave themselves up and harsh treatment for those who did not or for those who sheltered them. The notice mentioned protests in Sangchu (Labrang, Ch. Xiahe), Luchu (Ch. Luqu), Machu (Ch. Maqu), Chone (Ch. Zhouni), Tewo (Ch. Diebu), and Hezhou city.28 An account of a Labrang monk, who was arrested on 22 March, reveals much about the atmosphere of repression there. The monk was arrested in
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the local market on suspicion of participation in the demonstrations and riots on 14 and 15 March. At the headquarters of the PAP he was threatened by an armed policeman with summary execution if he made a move. This, the monk said, was the case of, a powerful nationality harassing and oppressing a small nationality, a big nation making weapons to kill a small nationality. The way they oppress and murder Tibetans, and can utter such words while aiming guns, stunned me. By telling us that Tibetans could be killed and our dead bodies dumped in the trash and that nobody would know—we are not even treated like dogs and pigs.
He was questioned about whether the Dalai Lama instigated him to carry out looting, burning, and destruction and whether he was loyal to the Dalai Lama. He replied that the Dalai Lama was “like my life, heart and soul.” He rejected the accusation that the Dalai Lama had instigated anything in Labrang. After a few days at the detention center he was taken to a prison in Linxia along with several other monks. In prison he was beaten by Chinese guards and called an animal because he could not understand their commands in Chinese: There is no differentiation on the basis of one’s actions or age. For instance, monks as young as fourteen and fifteen and as old as sixty and seventy years old were arrested. No difference is made whether they are involved in protests or not. We had no clothes on our backs or shoes on our feet. Two monks would be tied together and put in the vehicle to be driven away. They are thrown in the vehicle like you would throw logs of wood. Even if some of them had their heads injured, and for some, their hands broken, they were all taken to the prison. Relatives or friends were not allowed to bring food, clothing or beddings. We had to huddle together to bear the cold. The reason why we were so severely beaten is solely because we are Tibetans. For that we feel extremely sad.
During interrogation at the prison he was accused of having contacts outside China with the Dalai Lama, Samdhong Rinpoche, and Arjia Rinpoche, the former abbot of Labrang who fled to the United States in 1998. He was accused of having other contacts with Tibetan scholars and teachers inside China and of having been “involved in activities and having led organizations.” He was also accused of having printed the Tibetan flags that were displayed during the protests. He was hung from the ceiling by his hands and told to confess his crimes. He was beaten on his face, chest, and back “with the full force of their fists.” When he lost consciousness he was taken to a hospital and when he regained consciousness he was taken back to prison and the beating and interrogations resumed. He again lost consciousness and was again taken to the hospital, where he did not regain consciousness for six days.
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In the end, after a month, when he was on the verge of dying, he was handed over to his family. When he was released, his captors told the provincial authorities that he had not been tortured. The same was said to his family and he was required sign a document saying that he had not been tortured. He had to stay twenty days in a hospital to recover, and his family spent 20,000 Yuan for his treatment. When the monk finally returned to Labrang he was told that 180 monks had been arrested. All had been beaten and tortured. When the police searched the monastery they stole statues, money, and monks’ personal belongings. He said that the real looters were the Chinese police. The Chinese were accusing the Tibetans of doing things such as rioting and looting but they were torturing and killing Tibetans. Some Tibetans had fled to the mountains out of fear. He cast doubt on China’s ostensible goal of a harmonious society when the monks’ spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, was the subject of such vilification. The monks who spoke out during a visit by foreign journalists were later tortured with electric batons. Some had become mentally unstable as a result. He and the other monks were required to study the Chinese Constitution and to write confessions. They were allowed no communication devices and could only listen to or watch Chinese media. This monk was told not to contact any outside media, but he did, being interviewed by Voice of America. He went into hiding shortly thereafter, but returned to his monastery and was arrested and taken away by seventy armed police on 4 November.29 Other monasteries in eastern Tibet were similarly searched by security forces during this time period. Ngaba Kirti monastery was raided on 28 and 29 March and other branches of the same monastery in the area on the following days; Tongkor monastery in Kanze on 3 April; Nyantho monastery in Ngolha Township, Machu County, Qinghai (Amdo), on 14 April; Rongwu monastery in Rebgong (Ch. Tongren) County in Tsolho (Ch. Huangnan) Prefecture, Qinghai Province, on 17 April. Other monasteries were raided if their monks had participated in demonstrations or they had resisted Patriotic Education. Theft of valuables seems to have been a common occurrence at most of the monasteries raided by Chinese security personnel. At Tsandrok monastery in Gansu, thangkas and other religious objects, antique porcelain bowls, and jewelry were stolen on 18 April. The most sacred and valuable statue in the monastery, of the protective deity, which the monastery was built to house in 1819, was also stolen. As TibetInfoNet wrote, “As it is customary in Tibet for families to give their most precious and valuable goods to a monk within the family, and virtually every family has at least one relative who is a monk, the valuables will either have been given to the monk as offerings or simply placed in his custody, since monasteries are considered to be safe places.” The theft was not
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confined to monasteries. In Machu a nomad reported that armed police and soldiers searched homes while making family members line up outside. They not only seized pictures of the Dalai Lama, they also took away family jewelry made of gold, turquoise, and coral, as well as other valuable possessions such as old religious statues and money. Many nomads also had their motorbikes confiscated and had to pay high fines (1,500 Yuan) to get them back. Tibetans who were arrested often had to pay fines to get released, varying from 5,000 to 20,000 Yuan without regard to guilt or innocence.30 The theft of valuables from monasteries is reminiscent of the much larger state-sponsored theft of Tibetan wealth in the form of religious articles during democratic reforms beginning in 1959.31 In Ngaba, local Chinese and Tibetan officials held a press conference for the Chinese and foreign press in which they insisted that the searches of Kirti and other monasteries had conclusively established the link between the protests there and those in Lhasa and the Dalai Lama’s instigation behind them all. The officials said that “some lawless elements, instigated by some lawless monks” had engaged in “violent beating, smashing, looting and burning crimes.” They had brandished “Snow Mountain and Lion flags” and Dalai portraits and had shouted secessionist slogans. They had burned twenty-four shops, two police stations, and eighty-one police and civilian vehicles, and had injured many innocent people and more than two hundred government workers and policemen on duty. On 28 March the public security authorities had seized from Kirti monastery a large quantity of weapons and ammunition, including 16 small-caliber rifles, 14 other forearms, 498 rounds of ammunition, 4 kilograms of dynamite, 33 controlled knives, and thousands of articles advocating “Tibet independence.” They also seized “short message transmitters” and CDs with pornographic pictures. The tactics of these “lawless elements” were said to be virtually identical with those in Lhasa on 14 March. They had gone about their sabotage activities while shouting secessionist political slogans. Lawless monks acted as ringleaders and even took a direct part in the beating, smashing, looting, and burning, just like in Lhasa. This coincidence supposedly showed that the incident in Ngaba was part of the violent sabotage activities plotted by the Dalai clique. The purpose of the Dalai clique’s instigation and organization, and the participation of the misinformed masses in those activities under the clique’s coercion, was to create bloodshed. But its scheme did not materialize because of the maximum restraint the public security police and armed police demonstrated in handling the incidents lawfully. Local people were said to have been shocked by the seizure of guns and ammunition and secessionist literature. The officials claimed that the unrest was handled by local security forces without resort to security or military forces from outside the area and
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that nobody had been killed. They also said that many monks had voluntarily surrendered after being exposed to education about the incident.32 The sixteen small-caliber rifles and fourteen other firearms (probably pistols) hardly prove that the monks of Ngaba Kirti were planning an armed insurrection. The lack of any evidence except a coincidence of methods and slogans hardly proves instigation by the Dalai Lama. Tibetan monasteries, especially in nomadic areas where there are many hunters, are the typical repository for weapons of hunters who have renounced their sins and wish the monasteries to both be witness to their renunciation and to retain their weapons so that they might not sin again. The same was true of the weapons that the Chinese authorities confiscated from other monasteries. Some “illegal knives” confiscated were no doubt the traditional long knives carried by almost all Khampas until the Chinese era. An account of a monk from Rongwu monastery in Rebkong (Ch. Tongwu) County, Tsolho (Ch. Huangnan) TAP, Qinghai, characterizes the atmosphere in many areas of eastern Tibet: Like all the Tibetan-inhabited regions, Chinese army trucks with machine guns are everywhere in Rebkong, checking every move by the monks in the monastery and surrounding areas. The monks are no longer allowed to go around in groups of more than two and they have to attend patriotic education classes every day or they are threatened with imprisonment. All the monks are not allowed to travel out of their county if they don’t have a permit from the local authorities and no train tickets from Siling [Sining] to Lhasa are sold to monks. Likewise, the villagers are also not allowed to go to villages other than their own out of fear that they would hatch a plot against the Chinese. . . . There were strong suggestions from lay Tibetans that they should wage a war against the Chinese in the aftermath of the uprising because they simply couldn’t bear seeing the beatings and arrests of their monks and lamas. They knew they wouldn’t win the war but they simply wanted to die rather than letting the Chinese kill their monks and lamas.33
In Kanze, officials issued an Order from the People’s Government of Ganzi TAP entitled “Measures for dealing strictly with rebellious monasteries and individual monks and nuns.” The document began: “In order to defend social stability, socialist law and the basic interests of the people, the measures listed below have been resolutely drafted for dealing clearly with participants in illegal activities aimed at inciting the division of nationalities, such as shouting reactionary slogans, distributing reactionary writings, flying and popularizing the ‘snow lion flag’ and holding illegal demonstrations.” The measures were divided into two sections, one “dealing strictly with monk and nun troublemakers,” and one “dealing strictly with troublemaking monasteries.” Monks who had committed minor offenses but had admitted their mistakes and shown a good attitude would be kept within the monastery and
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made to strictly follow Patriotic Education. Those whose offenses were greater but who were ready to admit them would be subjected to Patriotic Education and made to write a statement of guilt. Those guilty of serious offenses who showed a stubborn attitude would be stripped of their rights as religious practitioners, expelled from their monasteries, and held in custody doing Patriotic Education. Those involved in “instigating splittism and disturbances, hatching conspiracies, forming organizations and taking a leading role” would be strictly punished according to law, expelled from their monasteries and the monkhood and not allowed to reenter the monkhood or any monastery. If any monastery took them they would be held responsible. Monasteries with 10 to 30 percent of their monks or nuns participating in disturbances would be “sealed off, searched, suspect persons detained according to law and any banned items they have hidden shall be confiscated. All religious activities will be suspended, inmates will be prohibited from leaving the premises, and they will be cleaned up and rectified in the proper manner.” Any monastery whose management committee monks or lamas participated in disturbances would be “rectified in a timely manner and in cases where an overt incident has occurred, or where there are no suitable personnel available, the local government will depute officials to assume control of management.” During the period of rectification of a monastery, any monks or nuns who do not assist the work of the rectification committee, who “do not agree to be registered and photographed, or who refuse to correct themselves despite repeated reeducation,” would be expelled from the monastery, be sent back to their native places, and their residential cells demolished. Monks and nuns “returning to the monastery who cannot give a clear reason for having gone outside, who cannot make a clear stand with respect to the unification of the Motherland and rejection of the separation of nationalities will be expelled, and their cells demolished.” The limit on the number of monks or nuns allowed to join a monastery would be reduced in accordance with the number who participated in the disturbances. Any monks and nuns who continued to “profess splittism, who covertly assist or participate in disturbances, or refuse to comply with reeducation” would be expelled. Monasteries whose monks and nuns again made trouble would be “investigated, and in due course, according to law, they will be removed from the list of registered religious institutions and closed down.” Monastery officials who did not take a clear stand, or failed to investigate monks and nuns involved in disturbances would be “subjected to careful scrutiny of their mistakes while undergoing criticism and re-education.” Taking a clear stance would mean taking an examination before the monastic community and making a written guarantee that would be “shown repeatedly in newspapers and on television.” Monastery officials who “send secret re-
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ports or collude with foreign separatists, assist in disturbances, tolerate them, or incite others will be severely punished by law.” They would not be allowed to participate in religious activities, and “in the case of Tulkus, they will be stripped of the right to hold the incarnation lineage.”34 In December Radio Free Asia reported that officials were handing down sentences for Tibetans arrested earlier in the year in Sichuan. Several Tibetans, mostly monks, were sentenced in Kanze to terms typically of three years for participation in the 18 March protest in Kanze. More than two hundred Tibetans had been detained in Kanze and about 70 percent had been sentenced. All were said to have been beaten and tortured while in detention.35 Anonymous foreigners attempting to enter Tibetan areas of Sichuan in October reported that all foreigners were banned from Kanze and Ngaba TAPs but that it was possible to reach Kanze. Police and military forces, PSB, PAP, and PLA, were conspicuous and there were many checkpoints. Many long military convoys were seen on the roads. Troops were seen on roads and at bridges in bunkers, heavily armed and in riot gear with shields and metal batons. Local Tibetans seemed to have freedom of movement, but monks and nuns did not. All bridges were fortified with bunkers and PLA and it seemed the military was prepared for attacks by Tibetan “separatists.”
Patriotic Education The Patriotic Education Campaign (PEC) was instituted in the PRC after 1989 to instill Chinese nationalism into Chinese students and people. It was remarkably successful. The Western-inspired democracy movement of 1989 was essentially forgotten by a new generation of Chinese students, who became virulent nationalists and supporters of the CCP. They also acquired anti-Western attitudes because a primary theme of the campaign was to blame the foreign imperialists for all of China’s ills going back to the Opium War of 1840. This new Chinese nationalism was based on a victim mentality that blamed all China’s problems on outsiders. One of the most obvious manifestations of this new nationalism was the response of Chinese citizens at home and abroad to the unrest in Tibet and especially to the humiliation of the anti-China protests during the international Olympic torch relay. In Tibet, the PEC was intended to inculcate patriotism to China and eliminate separatism and loyalty to the Dalai Lama. In contrast to its success among the Chinese people, patriotic education in Tibet was far less successful. In fact, one of the reasons Tibetans most often stated for the discontent that led to demonstrations in March was the oppressiveness of Patriotic Education, especially in monasteries. Monks, and Tibetans in general, were particularly
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resistant to and offended by the requirement to reject and denounce the Dalai Lama. One characteristic of the PEC typical of Chinese communist ideology was the belief that ideological unity and conformity could be achieved with coercive indoctrination. Whether or not Chinese and Tibetans would actually come to believe the tenets of Patriotic Education, they could at least be coerced to conform outwardly to the required ideology and behavior. Among many Chinese there seemed to be a belief that Tibetans, especially monks influenced by the Dalai clique, simply did not know the “truth” about Tibet. The PEC began in earnest in Tibet in 1996, when China intensified its anti– Dalai Lama propaganda campaign after the controversy over the Panchen Lama’s reincarnation. The PEC was initiated in monasteries and nunneries because they were identified as the centers of Tibetan nationalism and separatism. PEC work teams were sent to monasteries, usually for three-month periods, where they forced monks to study four pamphlets during compulsory study sessions. The first pamphlet was on the history of Tibet, how Tibet had “always” been a part of China, how China had administered Tibet, how the concept of “Tibetan independence” was an invention of foreign imperialists, and how Tibetans welcomed their liberation from those same imperialists by the CCP. The second pamphlet was about the Dalai Lama’s splittist activities, the feudal nature of old Tibet, the inevitability of Tibet’s union with China, and the necessity of preserving that union so that Tibet might prosper. The third pamphlet was about the Chinese legal system and how it applied to religious institutions. The fourth pamphlet was about the CCP’s policy on religion, the fundamental premise of which was that religion had to adapt to socialist society and not the other way around. Religious believers had to obey the law, support stability, and oppose separatism. Hostile foreign forces, meaning the Dalai Lama, were not allowed to have any influence over religion in Tibet, particularly over the choice of reincarnated lamas. After having completed their study of the four indoctrination books, Tibetan monks and nuns were tested on their contents. Only by passing the test were they allowed to remain in the monasteries and nunneries. Whether or not a monk or nun was allowed to stay in their monasteries also depended on their age (over age 18), the limit on the number of monks and nuns set by the Chinese government, the political reliability of themselves and their family, and the availability of a teacher or supervisor. The teacher or supervisor of each monk was also responsible for the monk or nun being patriotic and devoted to religion. The first question monks and nuns had to answer was about the reasons for the Patriotic Education Campaign. The required answer was that the campaign was necessary for the unification of the motherland, political stability, solidarity between nationalities, and the struggle against separatists. The next
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question was about the character of the Dalai Lama, the answer to which effectively required monks and nuns to denounce him. Tibetans were required to repeat the characterization of the Dalai Lama as “the head of the splittist clique that is plotting the independence of Tibet, a faithful tool of international powers that oppose China, the main source of social unrest in Tibet and the biggest obstacle to the establishment of a normal order in Tibetan Buddhism.” Another question was about China’s policy toward the Dalai Lama. The correct answer was that the Dalai Lama could return to China if he would acknowledge that Tibet is an inalienable part of China, give up the idea of Tibetan independence, and abandon all his splittist activities. Monks and nuns were then asked about what separatist activities the Dalai Lama had been engaged in. The correct answer was that he instigated the revolt in 1959, set up a government in exile, sought Western support to promote the idea of Tibetan independence, and attempted to infiltrate his ideas and his agents into Tibet in order to promote splittism. A further question was about the nature of the struggle with the Dalai Lama. The correct answer was that it was not an issue of religion or autonomy but only about the unity of the motherland. It was a class struggle between classes in Tibetan society, not a national struggle between Tibetans and Chinese. The PEC campaign was said to have won understanding from and support of lamas and laymen alike. Many monks and nuns were said to have lacked knowledge about the reality and history of Tibet. But now they had realized that the Dalai Lama was not their spokesman or their religious leader but the head of the clique that sought to split China and hinder the normal functioning of Tibetan Buddhism. The administration of monasteries was said to have been improved by the establishment of democratic management committees. Discipline of monks and nuns had improved. Construction of new monasteries without permission and recognition of tulkus without approval had been stopped. All of these rules and regulations were said to be for the benefit of monks and nuns so that they could abide by the laws and so that they could use the law in order to protect their personal and religious rights. The Patriotic Education Campaign continued off and on in Tibet, not only in monasteries but among the general population as well, from the mid-1990s to the present. There was a significant revival of the campaign in 2005. According to a TCHRD report in April 2005, officials from the Lhasa Religious Bureau began a three-month-long Patriotic Education Campaign in Sera monastery, near Lhasa, and presumably in other monasteries as well. The monks were issued six different pamphlets to study and four education sessions per week were conducted. The pamphlets were titled “Handbook on Crushing the Separatists,” “Handbook of Contemporary Policies,” “Handbook
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of Policies on Religion,” “Handbook on Law,” “Handbook on Ethics for the Masses,” and “Handbook of History of Tibet.” The monks were subjected to random questions regarding the texts and an examination was conducted at the end of the campaign in July 2005 to test their knowledge regarding the handbooks and their allegiance to the state. TCHRD said that it had documented expulsions of 11,383 clergy between January 1996 and August 2004 under the Patriotic Education Campaign.36 Patriotic Education was considered the solution to the problem of Tibetan monks’ lack of loyalty and it was quickly resorted to after the March uprising. A renewed campaign was announced for the TAR and Tibetan areas in other provinces in early April to last for a period of two months. The campaign was intended to cover almost all sections of society, “beginning primarily with the monastic institutions, party cadres, security forces and government employees, farmers and private entrepreneurs, educational institutions and common people.” The message of the campaign was to “vehemently oppose the Dalai clique” and to “expose the true nature of the Dalai clique and the March 14 riot.” TCHRD, quoting Tibet Daily of 3 April, said that the Chinese authorities had ordered more stringent ideological education and intensified propaganda in Tibet to build up antiseparatist sentiments. Zhang Qingli warned all cadres to adhere to the party line: “We absolutely will not condone violations of political and organizational discipline and will definitely find those responsible and mete out harsh punishment.” He told cadres to focus on negative portrayals of old Tibet and exposure of the Dalai Lama’s secret campaign to split Tibet from China and sabotage the Olympics.37 In Lhasa a Patriotic Education Campaign was undertaken among students and teachers to instill a clear understanding of the 14 March incident and of the reactionary essence of the Dalai clique. They were to learn to “follow the CPC, oppose separatism, safeguard the motherland’s unification, strengthen ethnic unity, and cherish the happy life they have.” The campaign organized students to watch documentaries on the 14 March incident in Lhasa and “visit exhibitions of historical photos showing contrast between new and old Tibet.” The intensive education in patriotism campaign created a patriotism education network of families, schools, and communities. This involved letters from schools to parents, open houses for parents, and conversations with parents when they visited the school. Schools had speech contests in patriotism with the themes of ”Speaking under the National Flag” and “The Motherland in My Heart.” Schools had “patriotism oath-taking activities.” They had activities to learn to sing the national anthem and draw the national flag. Students were subjected to intensive education in patriotism to promote understanding of China’s national conditions, Tibet’s history, and their own family history. All senior students in Lhasa City participated in activities to
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write their family history, and students talked about their family history in class. Schools organized students to visit “patriotism education bases,” such as Shol Village at the Potala, the Tibet Museum, and the Lhasa Cemetery of Revolutionary Martyrs. Students were instructed in the historical facts that “education in old Tibet was solely for the nobles.” Schools organized extensive propaganda activities with the theme of “Welcoming the Olympics, Stressing Civility, and Fostering New Ethics.” “Comrades from politics and law departments” gave lectures to students on the Constitution, the “Law on Penalties for Offenses against Public Order,” and the Criminal Law. Students visited some of those who were injured on 14 March and those who sustained damage to their property. Students of Chinese-language and Tibetan-language classes launched activities to promote friendship between each other.38 Nagchu Prefecture (Ch. Naqu) in the TAR, north of Lhasa, carried out numerous activities to promote socialism with Chinese characteristics. Officials organized talks to discuss the improvements in the lives of the masses since liberation by the Communist Party. Retired cadres told of their lives before liberation in order to show younger generations the differences between life in old Tibet and new Tibet. Lectures and discussions were held to promote education on the struggle against separatism, the legal system, and patriotism. Nagchu area officials combined “socialism with Chinese characteristics” education with the “Oppose Separatism, Preserve Stability, Promote Development” campaign. Farmers and herdsmen were organized into groups to view special education and patriotic films. Through these activities, the Tibetans of Nagchu had come to understand that “unity and stability bring prosperity while separatism and turmoil bring disaster.”39 Tsetang County (Ch. Nedong) of Lhoka Prefecture (Ch. Shannan) had organized a work team to go into Ganden Chukorling monastery (Ch. Gandan Quguoling) to carry out a patriotic education campaign “in order to safeguard the social stability of Nedong, eliminate hidden danger of instability, and actively create a harmonious, stable, and safe environment for development.” Monks were treated to a lecture entitled “Earnestly implementing the party’s religious policy and striving to make a success of religious undertaking under the new situation.” The work team profoundly expounded on the party’s religious policy, and explained some key points of autonomous regional leaders’ relevant speeches and the knowledge of the relevant laws and regulations. Through a comparison of the new with the old, the instructors made the monks understand the enormous development and changes of Tibet since the peaceful liberation and made clear to them that only adhering to the leadership of the CPC could people of all ethnic groups in Tibet lead a happy life. The monks resolved to “resolutely support the leadership of the CPC, maintain the national unity, and oppose separatism.”40
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On 11 September, Ragdi (Ch. Raidi), vice chairman of the 10th NPC Standing Committee, visited the Legal System Propaganda and Education Work Group stationed in Drepung monastery. Ragdi declared that the religious life of the monastery had returned to normal after having been “turned into some separatist clowns’ dens and bases for launching frenzied attack on the party, the government, and the people, thereby depriving patriotic, law-abiding monks and nuns of the place to practice Buddhism and carry out normal religious activity.” This situation had “caused tremendous indignation and regret among people because monasteries and monks ceased to perform their normal functions.” After the 14 March incident the TAR authorities had dispatched work groups to various monasteries to “carry out legal system propaganda and education” in order to restore order in the monasteries. With regard to monks who were not aware of the truth and were forced to take sides, the work group “conducted patient and detailed ideological work to help the monks change their thinking and understand the situation better.” The Drepung work group had adopted the “old Tibet spirit,” and had won over the monks, thereby “dealing a heavy blow at the separatists’ arrogance; and making important contributions to safeguarding the unification of the motherland and unity of nationalities.”41 Chamdo Prefecture (Ch. Qamdo) had intensified Patriotic Education in the temples and monasteries and launched activities to establish harmonious temples and monasteries. The result was that the patriotic enthusiasm of the monks and nuns in Chamdo’s temples and monasteries had reached even greater heights. The temples and monasteries had raised the national flag on their own initiative, and “allowed the national flag to fly high in the hearts of the vast masses of monks and nuns, thereby expressing unity with the party and deep feelings that flow in the same direction as socialism.” The local patriotic education work groups had adopted methods such as entering into the monks’ dormitories, and “befriending and holding heart-to-heart talks with the monks and nuns, in order to establish good relations based on mutual trust with the monks and nuns, comprehensively understand the basic situation in the temples and monasteries, understand the ideological trends among the monks and nuns, disseminate and explain laws and regulations, and raise the ideological and political awareness of the monks and nuns.” The work groups had, “by methods such as explaining Tibet’s history and comparing present Tibetan society with the past, thoroughly revealed the evil path of the Dalai faction.” They had also visited villages and nomads and had “conducted open-hearted face-to-face talks, disseminated the law and regulations, and disseminated the party’s policy of benevolence to the people and freedom of religious belief.” The masses had “expressed their firm support of the party’s leadership and their close adherence to the party’s policy of benev-
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olence to the people, making the people prosperous, and diligently developing production; and used real actions to repay the loving kindness of the party and the government.” The monks and nuns had written articles about what they had learned, and condemned the criminal behavior of the Dalai Lama. The movement to bring the national flag into the temples and monasteries was gradually spreading to all of the temples. Temples and monasteries, one after another, had held ceremonies to raise the national flag.42
Patriotic Education outside the TAR The Patriotic Education Campaign in Tibetan areas outside the TAR had, like the campaign within the TAR, been pursued off and on since the mid-1990s, with perhaps less intensity in these areas because they were thought to be less nationalistic. This attitude had dramatically changed in 2007, however, after the incident at the horse festival in Lithang. At that festival, held at the beginning of August, a Tibetan nomad, Rungye Adak, had jumped on the festival stage and called for the return of the Dalai Lama. He and several of his friends and relatives were arrested and charged with subversion against the Chinese state. The area was soon flooded with thousands of security police, local Tibetan officials were replaced with Chinese, and Tibetans were subjected to new Patriotic Education Campaigns. Reportedly, what precipitated these events was a campaign in the monasteries of Lithang to get monks to say that they did not want the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet. The nomadic areas of Kham and Amdo had been the center of previous “separatist activities,” in 2006, when they had participated with great enthusiasm in the fur-burning campaign after the Dalai Lama had called on Tibetans to protect endangered species of animals. In response to the Lithang incident, the authorities of the Kanze TAP instituted a renewed Patriotic Education Campaign characterized by virulent denunciations of the Dalai Lama. The Dalai Lama and his supporters were accused of having actually planned and manipulated the incident at Lithang. There were reports that Tibetan officials were forced to denounce the Dalai Lama and their denunciations were videotaped for Chinese propaganda purposes. The Patriotic Education Campaign in Kham included the usual propaganda about patriotism to China and rejection of Tibetan separatism, but it also involved the expulsion of young monks from monasteries and the confiscation of all weapons. Khampas were coerced to say that they do not want the Dalai Lama to return. The local officials may have hoped to use these forced statements to argue against foreign governments’ attempts to convince the Chinese government to talk to the Dalai Lama and allow him to return.
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An article in the Kanze Daily claimed that the Patriotic Education Campaign was very successful. The local officials congratulated themselves for their organization of the campaign in a manner typical of Chinese politics in which officials promote themselves and their organizational activities as if the organization itself is equivalent to actual results. The officials of the prefectural party committee claimed that they “applied just the right amount of forcefulness, tackled the real issues, and adopted just the right measures.” They claimed that the achievements of the patriotic education campaign were plentiful. After this campaign, Tibetans were said to have a “clearer understanding of the Dalai clique’s plots to divide the motherland over nationality and religion, of its political reactionary nature, of its religious dishonesty, and of the duplicity of its methods.” They were said to “better understand the superiority of the socialist system and the historical fact that only socialism under the leadership of the CPC can save China and develop China.” They had strengthened their resolve to wage a “firm struggle with the separatist activities of the Dalai clique until the final victory.”43 A January 2008 article in the Kanze newspaper reiterated the theme that all was well in Kham, that separatists were being suppressed, and that Tibetans were cooperating with authorities to inform on anyone with such sentiments. The PEC had made full use of all media, including TV, Internet, print media, wall boards, and propaganda banners. They had used “propaganda and cultural service kits” to do shows in villages, schools, and monasteries. They had also held mass rallies in villages and monasteries on the theme of “witnessing the changes by recalling the past in the light of the present; following the party single-mindedly.” This had supposedly “enabled the masses and the Sangha [monks and nuns] in the rural and pastoral areas to have a deeper appreciation of the earthshaking changes that have happened to Garze County since its liberation, the warm care from the party and the government, and the immediate relevance of the Patriotic Education Campaign.” In the course of the campaign, “over 100 slogan banners were posted around the county, 1,356 copies of wall charts and propaganda material in both Tibetan and Chinese languages distributed, and 120 feature stories produced.” Kanze County, with its forty-two monasteries, was said to have a special political status due to its “complex political background.” It was therefore in the “forefront of the combat against separatism and infiltration.” The county sent work groups to all monasteries in the county. They “collected a host of information” and “got to know what was on the minds of the monks and nuns.” All the registered monks and nuns of the county’s forty-two monasteries had signed a pledge that they would “firmly safeguard nationality solidarity and the unity of the motherland.” The article said that local officials had become closer to the people by visiting them in their homes and opening up more offices, with the implication that this was helpful for the local people.44
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The Kanze newspaper’s article described the PEC as undertaken for the benefit of Tibetans and as having actually benefited them in a variety of ways, to which they themselves testified. It did not admit to any negative or repressive effects on the Tibetans of Kanze. However, despite the authorities’ claims for the success of their campaign and the loyalty and satisfaction it had achieved among the Tibetan population, the Kanze area was one of the centers of the uprising only two months later. In Kanze and in other parts of Kham as well as in Lhasa and the TAR, the Patriotic Education Campaign was one of the most often cited reasons for discontent. The most offensive aspect of the campaign was the requirement to denounce the Dalai Lama. Despite the actual lack of success of Patriotic Education in Kanze and other parts of eastern Tibet, and much evidence that it was in fact the source of Tibetan discontent, the PEC was intensified in all areas shortly after the uprising. In Qinghai, a Tibetan official said that the purpose of the post-uprising PEC was “to educate, rehabilitate and salvage as many as possible of the majority of Buddhist monks who have been politically deceived by the Dalai clique’s separatist plots on the one hand, and to separate and punish rigorously the few diehard supporters of the Dalai Lama.” The official, Pema (Ch. Bai Ma), chairman of the Qinghai provincial committee of the CPPCC, said, in an interview with the South China Morning Post, “This is a fight against the Dalai Lama by winning the hearts and minds of the people in Tibetanpopulated areas.” Local Communist Party officials at the prefecture and county levels would help Buddhist monks “realize their mistakes and figure out how to rectify them.” Pema said the unrest had exposed serious problems in the management of monasteries: “We have begun pilot projects to research new ways of controlling monasteries and treating them like other social organizations.” Pema also commented, “It is regrettable that authorities in Lhasa failed to take firm action to control the situation during the first few hours of the March 14 riots.” He said that the scale of the riots in Lhasa had surprised the authorities: “They had controlled the protesting monks in the major monasteries in Lhasa since March 10, but they were unprepared for the massive street protests which escalated into violence within a few hours. They did not have enough police or effective means to confront rioters. They had guns, but they could not open fire without permission from above.” He admitted, apart from blaming the Dalai Lama, that the government’s ineffective education was also to blame for the unrest. “It is true that the Dalai clique has never stopped their separatist attempts. They began inciting protests in the region by telephone and other communications last year, especially among the younger generation of monks,” he said. He claimed that the young monks knew little about Tibet’s history, especially, “the dark days under the rule of the Dalai Lama before 1959. Our education system has done rather poorly in
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conveying historical and traditional knowledge to the younger generation, and we have come across similar difficulties in educating young monks.” And, he said, particularly in regard to the major monasteries of Lhasa, that the heavy-handed and arbitrary tactics of the government only created more animosity.45 In May, in the Ngaba TAP of Sichuan, the chairman of the provincial party committee told Tibetans to “develop the patriotic tradition, treasure the excellent situation, become patriotic clergy and law-abiding citizens, and jointly safeguard the excellent situation of political stability, economic development, unity among nationalities, and social harmony.” He said that Tibetans should “make a clean break with the Dalai clique politically and take a clear-cut stand in resolutely struggling against all speeches and acts of splitting the motherland and undermining unity among nationalities. History has shown that all Tibetan-inhabited areas in China, including those in our province, can enjoy today’s prosperity and development and have a brighter future only in the motherland as a big family.” China was a country under the socialist rule of law, he said, and all citizens obey the constitution and the laws: “For many years, the party and the government have consistently and firmly implemented the policy on freedom of religious belief; the believers’ freedom of religious belief has been truly guaranteed, normal religious activities have been protected by the law, and the religious circles’ legal rights and interests have been effectively safeguarded.” Therefore, he said, Tibetan Buddhists should become patriotic clergy as well as law-abiding citizens and should “take practical actions to safeguard our province’s overall interests of political stability, economic development, unity among nationalities, and social harmony.” They should “treasure the excellent situation of stability and unity while jointly safeguarding stability, accelerating development, and promoting social harmony.” The local Tibetan Buddhists said that they would “uphold the position of loving the country and the church and become qualified patriotic religious figures, that they will join the local clergy and believers in making concerted efforts to maintain stability, oppose separatism, prevent sabotage, promote development, and build a harmonious society, and that they will hold blessings for the successful holding of the Beijing Olympic Games.”46
An Atmosphere of Fear and Oppression In contrast to the tremendous amount of propaganda denying any responsibility for the unrest in March and blaming it all on the “Dalai Clique,” China revealed nothing about the repressive measures it instituted in Tibet after the
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uprising. Some understanding of the measures taken could be gleaned from propaganda articles. China publicized the riot in Lhasa with video footage of the rampage, but only in order to illustrate the barbarity of the Tibetan rioters, to elicit sympathy for the innocent Chinese shopkeepers, and to arouse Chinese nationalism against Tibetans. All information about the subsequent demonstrations in eastern Tibet and Chinese repressive measures came from Tibetans, mostly through cell phone contacts. Even the images of demonstrations in other parts of Tibet and pictures of those Tibetans killed by the security forces came from cell phones. Much of this information came through direct calls to or from Radio Free Asia and Voice of America Tibetan Services. Some came indirectly from India, mostly from monks at the Tibetan monasteries in India who had been contacted by their brethren in Tibet. However, these contacts were soon cut off by the authorities, especially after the pictures of Tibetans shot dead in Ngaba reached the outside world. Cell phone transmissions were blocked, and cell phones and all other communication devices such as computers were confiscated from Tibetans. Chinese security personnel who raided monasteries were particularly looking for any such communication devices; one of the questions asked was whether any monks had made any contacts with anyone in the outside world. Information from Tibet subsequently almost completely dried up because of these measures but also because of the fear of being found out for having contacted anyone outside Tibet. Tibetans tended to assume that any and all transmissions, whether by phone or computer, were being monitored. There is therefore a relative lack of information about the details of China’s repressive measures, particularly the fate of many monks and laypeople who were detained and never formally arrested or sentenced. However, something of the atmosphere of oppression can be known from the information received and from what the Chinese have said in their propaganda. One obvious aspect of the post-uprising atmosphere in Lhasa was animosity between Chinese and Tibetans. There was a time many years ago when many Han Chinese in Tibet had a fear of Tibetans, mostly due to their own mythology about Tibetans’ barbaric nature. But after the riot it was Tibetans who were afraid of the Chinese. Tibetans were stopped at the numerous roadblocks and checkpoints and could be beaten and/or dragged off to detention for the slightest infraction or surly attitude or for no reason at all. Chinese and even some Tibetan police seemed to be looking for an excuse to beat or detain Tibetans. Tibetans were subjected to constant searches of their person and their homes, usually in the middle of the night, and could be detained for any reason or for no reason except suspicion. The security personnel were looking not only for any who had participated in the riot but for any who knew who
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did so. Chinese investigation techniques required as many Tibetans as possible to be rounded up in order to elicit information about those responsible. They therefore detained a large number of Tibetans on suspicion alone to obtain information by means of coercion and torture. Tibetans were detained to obtain information about their friends or relatives or in order to coerce their relatives to provide information. Given the coercive pressures, there were inevitably false denunciations of others in order to escape the interrogation or simply to settle scores with enemies. Almost all Tibetans who were detained reported that they were severely beaten while in detention to obtain the information the officials wanted. Information was also gathered through the usual sources of spies and informants and scrutiny of all Tibetans through neighborhood committees and work units. Anyone could be an informant, even one’s own children, since schoolchildren were pressured to inform on the attitudes of their parents. Tibetans report the presence in Tibetan parts of Lhasa of numerous spies and undercover agents, whose identity was usually well known to locals. After the riot there was also the intimidating presence of armed PAP patrols and armed observers on rooftops. Video surveillance was also pervasive. Compulsory meetings in work units and neighborhood committees were intended to ascertain the attitudes of Tibetans and to obtain information. This was much like the atmosphere during Democratic Reforms after the 1959 revolt, when the Chinese needed to identify all actual and potential opponents. The requirement to write essays in schools, monasteries, and work units in support of the government and blaming the Dalai Lama was another method reminiscent of Democratic Reforms. Tibetans could not find refuge even in ethnic solidarity, since many Tibetans had been co-opted by the Chinese regime. There were the “liberated serfs,” many of whom were now high officials whose fate was entirely tied to and dependent on the CCP. They had prospered due to their loyalty to the system and had the most to lose should the system collapse or be altered in some way such as by a return of the Dalai Lama. There were many Tibetans in the security forces, primarily the PSB, whose job it was to supervise other Tibetans and provide information to Chinese officials. Some Tibetans in the PSB reportedly objected to the torture of those in detention and were dismissed as a result. Many more Tibetans were dependent on the government, including all officials, teachers, and most workers in the state-owned economy. Many former officials were provided generous retirement benefits in order to ensure their loyalty. So generous were these benefits that officials could retire at an early age. All of these Tibetans could be coerced to provide information or at least to conform by the threat of loss of employment or pensions. Even before
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the March events it was well known that some of the worst prison guards and some of the most repressive officials were Tibetans. The atmosphere of fear and oppression gave ample opportunity for petty vendettas, since anyone could be arrested on information provided by a rival or enemy. The animosity between Chinese and Tibetans also provided opportunity and motive for thefts of personal items and artifacts from monasteries and homes, reminiscent of the state-sponsored theft of Tibetan wealth during Democratic Reforms. Many Chinese PAP and PLA troops had animosity toward Tibetans, particularly monks whom they considered traitors, which they used as justification for mistreatment and abuse. Some PAP and PLA officers even seemed to consider their deployment in Tibet as an opportunity to practice on a non-Chinese minority the tactics and techniques they might use on a foreign enemy. Han Chinese animosity against Tibetans was particularly evident in the reports of beatings. Tibetans were severely beaten when being detained and in detention. Security personnel often took the opportunity to beat Tibetans, especially monks and nuns, with violence intended to inflict permanent damage to skulls, bones, or internal organs. In detention it appears that almost all Tibetans were beaten, often severely and sometimes fatally. Several Tibetans were released from prisons or detention centers in such condition that they soon died, a common tactic of officials who did not want to be responsible for prisoners dying in their custody. Many Tibetans reported that they were tortured in detention in ways intended to cause internal injuries, often lifethreatening. The Chinese and some Tibetans who inflicted such torture seemed to want to eliminate their opponents in this way and to send a message to all others that this would be their fate. The repressive nature of the Patriotic Education Campaign was obvious from all the Chinese propaganda articles about it. Tibetans were told what they must think lest they fall afoul of the Chinese “legal” system. Implied in the Chinese system of indoctrination was the understanding that repressive force would be applied to ensure compliance. There was also the presumption that if real ideological belief was not possible, then at least outward conformity was a necessity. However, there was also an almost naive sense of Chinese wonderment at why Tibetans continued to be dissatisfied and why they continually rose up in protest. One of the themes of Chinese propaganda aimed at Tibetans was about how they had benefited from Chinese largess since their “peaceful liberation” in 1950 and release from feudal serfdom in 1959. The Chinese reaction to Tibetan protests in March revealed that most Chinese thought that Tibetans had not only benefited from Chinese assistance but that they had also been the beneficiaries of certain preferences in
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state policy. Since the Chinese had been taught and thoroughly believed, both intellectually and psychologically, that Tibet had “always” been part of China, they could not understand why Tibetans still had separatist sentiments. Thus “education” in the “correct” view of history was considered the solution. From the Chinese point of view, Tibetans had full freedom of expression and cultural rights, such as freedom of religion, so long as they were patriotic and had the correct attitudes toward political issues. Only those with incorrect attitudes were repressed; therefore, from the Chinese point of view there was some mystification about why the Tibetans did not simply adopt the correct attitude. Many Chinese seemed to think that Tibetans were simply ignorant about the “truth” of Tibet’s history and political status. From the Tibetan point of view, however, they had no freedom of speech on political issues and their rights to freedom of assembly were also curtailed. Cultural autonomy was restricted because the Chinese tended to regard any and all aspects of Tibetan culture and cultural activities as separatist. There was an almost palpable atmosphere of fear obvious from Chinese propaganda articles that were meant to convey the opposite impression. Since monks and nuns had been the leaders of the protests in all parts of Tibet, and because they were thought to be influenced by the Dalai Lama’s propaganda from exile, the authorities still imagined they could transform the monks’ and nuns’ loyalty from the Dalai Lama to loyalty to China and the CCP. However, the belief of officials, both Chinese and Tibetans, that Tibetans’ opinions could be altered by “patriotic education” was based on the theory that they were deceived by the Dalai Lama’s “lies” and could be convinced once they were exposed to the “truth” of the CCP’s version of Tibetan history. Once the Dalai Lama was exposed as a “splittist,” they thought, Tibetans would abandon him because they would be shocked to know that he really wanted Tibetan independence. Many Chinese seemed to think that the monks and many other Tibetans were just misinformed about the Dalai Lama’s real intentions. Thus, their resort to ever more “Patriotic Education” as the solution to the problem of the lack of Tibetan loyalty to the party and state. The best illustration of the dichotomy between the Chinese and the Tibetan conception of the issue of Tibet was seen in their different attitude toward Patriotic Education. For the Chinese, and even for some Tibetan officials, patriotic education was the natural solution to the problem, and more and larger doses of it were always prescribed. For Tibetans, Patriotic Education was part of the problem, or at least it exacerbated the problem of the lack of any Tibetan autonomy of any form, political or cultural, individual or collective. Tibetans were told that they had religious freedom, but they had to abandon their loyalty to the head of their religion because he was a “splittist.” Tibetans’ sentiments were constantly violated by the incessant Chinese denunciations
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of the Dalai Lama and by the requirement that they must denounce him. Patriotic Education was a violation of Tibetans’ personal autonomy in that neither their persons nor their thoughts were free from Chinese control and indoctrination. And just as was done during “Democratic Reforms,” the Patriotic Education Campaign with its meetings, its indoctrination, its requirements for expressions of loyalty and denunciations of others was intended to identify and repress Tibetans opposed to or resistant to Chinese control. Like the Democratic Reform campaign, the PEC allowed no refuge and no escape. It aroused memories of earlier repressive campaigns in those old enough to remember and it reminded all Tibetans that not only did they have no political freedom but even their thoughts were subject to Chinese control.
Notes 1. Ursula Dauthier, “Several Hundred Died,” Paris, NouvelObs.com in French, 23 July 2008, in OSC EUP20080724029004. 2. “Public Security Bureau, Notice #1,” China Tibet News Network, 15 March 2008, www.chinatibetnews.com/GB/channel2/22/200803/15/78729.html. 3. Ah Shen, “Lhasa Witness: March 2008,” High Peaks Pure Earth, 4 April 2008, www.highpeakspureearth.com. 4. “Climate of Fear as Olympic Torch Arrives in Lhasa,” International Campaign for Tibet, 20 June 2008, www.savetibet.org/media-center/ict-news-reports. 5. Ah Shen, “Lhasa Witness,” High Peaks Pure Earth, 27 April 2008, www.high peakspureearth.com. 6. “Tibet Court Hands Down Punishment to 12 People Involved in Lhasa Riot,” Beijing, Xinhua, 20 June 2008. 7. “Tibetan Monks Still Held in Qinghai,” Washington, Radio Free Asia, 29 August 2008, www.rfa.org/english/news/monks-08282008164711.html. 8. Michael Sheridan, “Olympic Crackdown: China’s Secret Plot to Tame Tibet,” Hong Kong, London Sunday Times, 13 July 2008. 9. “Tibet Regional Discipline Inspection Commission and Department of Supervision Promulgate Regulations for Disciplinary Sanction against Communist Party Members and Public Functionaries of the State Who Send Their Children to Overseas Schools Operated by the Dalai Clique,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 15 July, in OSC CPP20080716066003. 10. “Nyingchi Prefecture in Tibet Thoroughly Carries Out the Work of Maintaining Social Stability,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao Online in Chinese, 2 July 2008, in OSC CPP20080831480002. 11. “Four Tibetans Arrested for Protesting against Summer Festival to Greet Olympics,” Dharamsala, Tibetan Solidarity Committee, 31 July 2008, www.stoptibetcrisis.net. 12. “Region-Wide Social Stability Management Meeting Convened in Bomi,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao Online in Chinese, 20 October 2008, in OSC CPP20081118480003.
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13. “Sentences for 55 People Handed Down So Far over Lhasa Violence,” Beijing, Xinhua, 4 November 2008. 14. “Photos Show Armed PSB, PAP Patrolling Lhasa, Tibet in November 2008,” The Australian, 7 November 2008. 15. “Dalai Lama Says Chinese Rule Handing Down ‘Death Sentence’ to Tibetans,” Hong Kong, AFP, 2 November 2008. 16. “Lhasa City Public Security Bureau Announces Latest Progress in Cracking Down on Rumor Mongering and Rumor Spreading,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao Online in Chinese, 25 December 2008, in OSC CPP20081226073001. 17. Woeser, “What Kind of Songs Are Reactionary Songs?” High Peaks Pure Earth, 30 January 2009, www.highpeakspureearth.com. 18. “Across China: Tibet,” Beijing, China Daily, 15 January 2009. 19. “China Rounds Up 5766 Tibetans in Lhasa under ‘Strike Hard’ Campaign,” Dharamsala, Phayul, 24 January 2009, www.phayul.com/news/article. aspx?id=23671&t=1. 20. “76 People Convicted over Lhasa Violence,” Beijing, Xinhua, 11 February 2009. 21. “Trials and Sentences of Suspects of ‘14 March’ Riot in Lhasa Strictly in Line with Chinese Law,” Beijing, Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service, 19 February 2009. 22. “Revised Tibetan Buddhists Constitution Says No to Separatism,” Beijing, Xinhua, 18 February 2009. 23. “ICT Report,” Washington, International Campaign for Tibet, 27 February 2009. 24. “Police Tighten Control of Lhasa Monasteries before Anniversary,” Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 5 March 2009. 25. “Focus on Tibet,” Lhasa, Xinhua, 9 March 2009. 26. “Only 8 Percent of Lhasa Rioters Sent to Jail,” Beijing, China Daily, 7 March 2009. 27. “Chinese Court Sentences Two to Death for Starting Fatal Fires in Lhasa Riot,” Beijing, Xinhua, 8 April 2009. 28. “Fresh Ultimatum Issued in Gansu for Tibetans to Surrender,” TCHRD, 21 March 2008, www.tchrd.org/press/2008/pr20080321.html. 29. “A Voice from Tibet: VOA Tibetan Service Exclusive Video Interview,” in Tibetan (Translation by VOA), 3 September 2008, in High Peaks Pure Earth, 3 September 2008, www.highpeakspureearth.com. 30. TibetInfoNet Update, 30 June 2008,
[email protected]. 31. See Warren W. Smith Jr., China’s Tibet? Autonomy or Assimilation (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 112. 32. “State Council Information Office Hosts News Briefing on 3 April to Brief Press on Situation in Aba Tibetan-Qiang Autonomous Prefecture,” Beijing, Zhongguo Wang in Chinese, 3 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080404584003. 33. “Account of a Monk from Rebkong,” in Tibet at a Turning Point (Washington, DC: International Campaign for Tibet, 2008), 36. 34. “New Kardze Measures,” in Tibet at a Turning Point (Washington, DC: International Campaign for Tibet, 2008), 141.
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35. “Chinese Court Jails More Tibetans,” Radio Free Asia, 22 December 2008, www .rfa.org/english/news/tibet/jail-12222008165412.html. 36. “China Recommences Patriotic Education Campaign in Tibet’s Monastic Institutions,” Dharamsala, TCHRD, 13 October 2005, www.tchrd.org/press/2005/ nb20051013.html. 37. “China Launches Renewed Patriotic Education Campaign across All Sections in Tibet,” Dharamsala, TCHRD, 24 April 2008, www.tchrd.org/press/2008/pr20080424. html. 38. “Lhasa’s Education System Makes Constant Efforts to Deepen Education in Patriotism,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao Online in Chinese, 17 July 2008, in OSC CPP20080718066001. 39. “Tibet TV Coverage of Unrest,” Lhasa XZTV-2 in Chinese, 14 August 2008, in OSC CPP20080814584002. 40. “Nedong County Thoroughly Carries Out Patriotic Education Campaign in Monastery,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao Online in Chinese, 2 July 2008, in OSC CPP20080831480001. 41. “Raidi, Accompanied by Zhang Yijiong and Luosang Jiangcun, Visits the Legal System Propaganda and Education Work Group Stationed in the Drepung Monastery,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao Online in Chinese, 12 September 2008, in OSC CPP20080921480002. 42. “Report on the Intensification of Patriotic Education in the Temples and Monasteries of Qamdo,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao Online in Chinese, 19 September 2008, in OSC CPP20080921480001. 43. “Many Achievements of Patriotic Education Campaign in Seda,” Kanding, Ganze Ribao in Chinese, 18 December 2007, in OSC CPP20080111584003. 44. “Flag Flies over Garze—Review of Patriotism Education Campaign in Garze County,” Kanding, Ganzi Ribao in Chinese, 4 January 2008, in OSC CPP20080201584002. 45. Shi Jiangtao, “Qinghai Party Official Reveals Drive to Re-educate or Punish Monks,” Xining, South China Morning Post, 26 April 2008. 46. “Become Patriotic Clergy and Law-Abiding Citizens,” Chengdu, Sichuan Ribao Online in Chinese, 8 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080508050001.
3 China’s Response: Propaganda
C
HINA’S SECONDARY REACTION
to the uprising in Tibet was a propaganda campaign intended to deny any responsibility for Tibetan discontent and to place all blame on the “Dalai clique” and “hostile Western forces.” The aim of the Dalai Lama was said to be Tibetan independence, the restoration of his rule, and the reimposition of the feudal serf system. The aim of the so-called hostile Western forces, primary among which was the United States, was to denigrate, divide, and weaken China. Chinese officials claimed to have evidence to prove that the Dalai Lama and his clique had planned, instigated, and coordinated all the protests in March. Most of this evidence consisted of the coincidence of the uprising in Tibet with the Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement (TPUM) in India and the Dalai Lama’s statements that the Beijing Olympics offered an opportunity for Tibet to publicize its case. Further “proof” of Western countries’ collusion in this conspiracy was cited, particularly their support for Tibetan activist organizations. Ultimately, Chinese propaganda reverted to the traditional themes and justifications for Chinese rule over Tibet, primary among which was Tibet’s inability to govern itself as demonstrated by its “savage, cruel and barbaric feudal serf system.” Chinese propaganda also maintained that there was no political issue of Tibet, or no question about Tibet’s political status or the legitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet, because Tibet had “always been a part of China.” Much of Chinese propaganda focused on the evils of old Tibet, suitably magnified to suit China’s purpose. In contrast, China’s “peaceful liberation” of Tibet, its “emancipation of the serfs” by means of “democratic reforms” of Tibetan society, and its selfless economic assistance to Tibet were — 79 —
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glorified. An associated theme was that the Dalai Lama’s Middle Path policy of “genuine autonomy” and a “Greater TAR” was intended to revoke China’s “improvements” to Tibet’s social and political systems, to deny China’s sovereignty over Tibet, and to ultimately achieve Tibetan independence.
Blaming the “Dalai Clique” A few days before the outbreak of protests in Lhasa, Tibet CCP and government leaders were in Beijing for the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress (NPC). The Hong Kong South China Morning Post quoted deputy secretary of the Tibet CCP, Legchok (Ch. Legqog), as saying that authorities in Tibet would take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that there were no disturbances during the Olympics in August. Legchok said the authorities would “bring those with an ulterior motive under control” during the Olympics: “Those who can be educated will be educated. Those who need to be brought under control will be brought under control.” He also attacked the Dalai Lama with accusations of seeking to sabotage the event: “But even for a grand gathering like this, he is trying to sabotage and threatening to cause trouble. How can this not be called being engaged in splittism?”1 Although the article also quoted a PAP official in Lhasa saying that the security forces there were prepared for any disturbances, particularly during Olympics-related events there like the torch relay to Everest and through Lhasa, the assumption of Chinese and Tibetan officials seems to have been that the most likely time for any such disturbances would be during the Olympics and the most likely place would be Beijing. Beijing was already reportedly on high alert for protest activities by Tibetans or Uighurs during the NPC meeting or planned for the Olympics. People of these ethnic groups in Beijing were being regarded suspiciously even before the protests within Tibet. Besides expressing the capability and willingness of security forces within Tibet to quell any demonstrations, Tibetan cadres Jampa Phuntsok and Legchok, in a typical example of overconfidence created by a belief in their own propaganda, predicted that there would be no disturbances in Tibet because of “unprecedented coherence” among the Tibetan people. Legchok said that this was because they now enjoyed democracy through the regional autonomy system: “The regional People’s Congress has provided a platform for Tibetan people’s political participation, where their representatives discuss regional affairs, make regional laws, supervise the government, elect local government and legislature heads, and approve appointments of local officials.”2 Ragdi, one of the CCP’s most loyal “liberated serfs,” now a vice chairman of the
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NPC, added his opinion that Tibet was in the best period of development and stability in its history.3 In response to a question at a press briefing about the Dalai Lama’s claim that China had destroyed Tibetan culture, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said that he hoped that the Dalai Lama could face up to history and reality, and take concrete actions to do something good for the people of Tibet: The Dalai group has always claimed that the Tibetan culture, religion, and environment have been destroyed. There is something destroyed in Tibet, but it is not the Tibetan religion or culture. Rather, it is the dark serfdom system that has been completely destroyed and will never be restored again.
The Foreign Ministry spokesman claimed that Tibet enjoyed “economic development, social stability, national unity, and religious harmony,” which were “facts obvious to all.” He warned that “attempts to continuously distort the facts, even link the Tibet issue with the Beijing Olympics, and politicize the Beijing Olympics are not only unwise but also will not succeed.”4 Even before the events of 14 March, China claimed that the demonstrations on 10 and 11 March were part of a “political plot that was meticulously schemed by the Dalai clique, aiming to split Tibet from China and to undermine the peaceful, harmonious, and normal life of the Tibet people.” The Chinese Foreign Ministry went on to say that “Lhasa’s situation is stable after mediations by the local government and the temples’ democratic administrative committees.” The Foreign Ministry spokesman repeated the stock phrase about the reality, from the Chinese point of view, of Tibet and the irreversibility of the changes made there: Tibet carried out democratic reform 49 years ago and millions of serfs stood up and were liberated. Over the past 49 years, Tibet has witnessed earth-shaking changes. Safeguarding national reunification and unity as well as social harmony is the common aspiration of the Tibet people of various nationalities. The Dalai clique’s scheme is doomed to failure. No force can obstruct Tibet’s development and progress.5
By 17 March, Chinese government–controlled news outlets were claiming that the 14 March incident in Lhasa of “beating, smashing, looting and burning,” was an “organized, premeditated and elaborately planned atrocity of the Dalai clique.” This atrocity had elicited “strong indignation and stern condemnation of the people of various ethnic groups in Tibet and the people of various ethnic groups have resolutely opposed the criminal acts of the Dalai clique in undermining the motherland’s unification and social stability.” The article quoted “people of various ethnic groups” who had witnessed the atrocity saying that Buddhism advocated kindheartedness and that the rioters were
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not true believers in Buddhism. As evidence of the Dalai Lama’s instigation, the Chinese media cited an interview by British TV in January in which the Dalai Lama had said that during the Olympics he would “support the Tibetan people in making peace protests in China against Beijing’s rule.” His call for peaceful protests could not cover up the resulting acts of violence and destruction: “As a matter of fact, riots broke out in Lhasa on many occasions in the past years and they were all instigated by the Dalai clique and plotted by rebel elements sent to Tibet by the clique.”6 In a long editorial on the same day, Xizang Ribao (Tibet Daily) reiterated that the “beating, smashing, looting and burning” had been “meticulously planned and incited by the Dalai clique.” Despite the magnitude of the riots on 14 and 15 March, these were said to have been carried out by a “small number of monks” and “a very small number of lawless elements” whose “ambition is evil and their crimes tower to heaven.” Their atrocities were characterized as a “concentrated reflection of the long-term sharp struggle between us and the Dalai clique,” and a “life-and-death struggle between the enemy and ourselves.” The editorial said that there was “sufficient evidence to show that this incident was organized, premeditated, and carefully plotted by the Dalai clique,” whose evil ambition was to “sabotage our political situation of stability and unity.” Tibetans were instructed that they must understand the “difficulty, complexity, and long-term nature of this struggle” and truly bring their thinking into line with the instructions of the central authorities in regard to the antiseparatist struggle, which was defined as a “people’s war to oppose separatism and preserve stability.”7 China’s propaganda mouthpiece, Xinhua, claimed that the Dalai Lama was lying when he said he was not behind the violence in Tibet and, furthermore, when he threatened to resign as head of the TGIE if Tibetans continued on the path of violence: Repeated inconsistencies between what Dalai says and what he does ended up leaving all in disbelief. Dalai claimed “non-violence,” but furtively stoked bloodshed in Lhasa, he claimed “culture genocide” in the face of a thriving Tibet with a well-protected culture, and he even claimed to “serve” the Tibetan people whom his clique have chosen to victimize. When a fox tries to play angel, its tail will eventually stick out. Hard evidence, mounted by the Chinese government, tells that the Dalai clique was the hand behind the bloody Lhasa riot.
Some of this “hard evidence” was the coincidence of the riots in Lhasa with the march on Tibet from India, the claim that Tibetans had sacks of stones and flammable liquids ready for the riot on 14 March, and allegations that some were paid to participate according to how much destruction they caused. There was also the unsubstantiated allegation that “the Dalai clique
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maintained real-time contacts, sources say, through varied channels with the rioters in Lhasa, and dictated instructions to his hard core devotees and synchronized their moves.” Despite the Dalai Lama’s “senseless” call for investigations into “his own drama,” China magnanimously declared that it remained open to dialogue with him.8 The Tibet Party Secretary, Zhang Qingli, back in Lhasa on 17 March, congratulated the security forces that had put down the rioters and castigated the Dalai Lama as the “scum of the nation.” Zhang encouraged the security personnel to serve the party and the people, listen to the command of the party, and continue fighting heroically and carrying forward the “old Tibet spirit.” The “old Tibet spirit” is often invoked by Chinese and Tibetan cadres to refer to the period of the 1950s, before Tibetan resistance had coalesced, when CCP cadres regarded themselves as the liberators of the Tibetans and thought that Tibetans shared that feeling. After inspecting the results of the riots, Zhang made the argument, “with a heavy heart and great indignation,” that the destruction was proof both that the Dalai Lama was not really an adherent of nonviolence and that he was the instigator of the violence in Lhasa: This is ironclad evidence that the Dalai clique has incited the unlawful elements to carry out beating, smashing, looting, and burning. These rioters’ savage violent acts of killing people and their beating, smashing, looting, and burning activities have fully proven that the Dalai is not a non-violence and peace advocate as he has advertised himself but is a scum of the nation wearing a kasaya [Buddhist robe] who is plotting to achieve “independence for Tibet.9
On 18 March, in an interview with the foreign press covering the NPC meeting in Beijing, Jampa Phuntsok (Ch. Qiangba Puncog), chairman of the TAR government, denied that security forces in Lhasa had used deadly force in putting down the riot on the fourteenth or that troops of the PLA had been involved. He was quoted as saying that Chinese security forces “did not carry or use any lethal weapons or fire any gunshots throughout the entire process.” He also accused overseas media of sympathizing with the Dalai Lama and distorting key facts of the unrest.10 Further articles in the Chinese press reiterated that China had “sufficient evidence” to prove that the destructive activities of the rioters were “carefully plotted and directed by the Dalai clique outside China in an organized and premeditated way.” Their “sinister ambition” was to “separate Tibet from the great family of the motherland.” “The Dalai clique’s activities in Tibet have proven and will continue to prove that Dalai is the overall chief of the separatist political clique plotting Tibet independence, a loyal tool of international anti-China forces, the chief cause of creating social turmoil in Tibet, and the
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biggest obstacle blocking the establishment of normal order in Buddhism in Tibet.”11 Chinese propaganda soon took on a typical self-defensiveness, particularly as expressed by Chinese and Tibetan officials who had to defend not only their administration but also their failure to anticipate or prevent the violent manifestations of Tibetan discontent. The very fact of such discontent was denied by ascribing the violence to a “tiny minority” who were instigated by outside agents in the absence of any real reasons for discontent within Tibet. The officials castigated foreign reporting of the events for concentrating on government repression of the rioters instead of the evil motives of the rioters themselves. They denied that there had been any deaths except at the hands of the rioters, emphasized the suffering of the innocent victims, and wondered why the foreign media did not share their outrage at the crimes of the rioters. In an address to the Tibet Regional CCP Standing Committee meeting on 19 March, Zhang Qingli said that the situation had been put under control, social order had stabilized, and the life of the majority of people in the city had returned to normal. The people had “actively taken the initiative to expose hostile elements and help the public security departments in waging resolute struggle against a very small number of hostile elements, leaving them no place to hide, and turning them into rats running across the street with everyone shouting for beating them; a dragnet of dealing blows at the enemy and protecting the people has formed in Tibet.” Zhang emphasized that the struggle against separatism would be difficult, complex, and long-term. He listed several specific measures that would be taken in this struggle, including education in patriotism in monasteries and temples; strengthening the role of people’s control committees, grassroots party organizations, and patriotic individuals; education on the “three cannot do without” principle (minorities cannot do without the Han, the Han cannot do without the minorities, and the minorities cannot do without each other); and vigilance against people provoking trouble between ethnic groups. The party cadres should also “get a handle on correct public opinion guidance, ensure that people inside and outside China and the masses of all ethnic groups in Tibet understand the true facts, and fully expose the ugly features of the Dalai clique to the full light of day.”12 Given that the Dalai Lama and the “Dalai clique” had been blamed for instigating the disturbances, to the exclusion of any other factors such as any legitimate Tibetan grievances about the conditions of Chinese rule over Tibet, the traditional themes of China’s anti–Dalai Lama propaganda were soon being emphasized. A Xinhua article warned against attempts by the Dalai Lama to project an image as a victim in an effort to win sympathy, pity, and support. Among his typical tricks was the spreading of rumors that the
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Chinese government was guilty of trying to exterminate Tibetan culture. This lie of the Dalai Lama had blinded some people who did not know the truth and had provided ammunition for hostile Western forces seeking to demonize China. However, Xinhua claimed, China had spared no effort to support Tibet’s economic and social development. China has poured a vast amount of human, financial, and material resources into protecting, saving, and promoting the fine traditions and ethnic characteristics of Tibetan culture through legal, economic, administrative, and other means. The freedom of the Tibetan masses to inherit and develop their traditional ethnic culture and to believe in their religion is guaranteed under the law. In 1959, Tibet practiced democratic reform and abolished the feudal serf system, resulting in the liberation of a million serfs and slaves, bringing an end to the history of Tibetan culture being monopolized by a few upper-class feudal monks and aristocrats, and turning Tibetan culture into a common cultural legacy for all the people of Tibet to inherit and develop.
The article went on to extol China’s efforts to protect the Tibetan language, to protect cultural relics like the Potala, “even during the Cultural Revolution” (when only the Potala and some dozen other monasteries and temples survived), and to repair and protect other cultural relics. Tibetan religious and cultural traditions were similarly preserved and protected, and the government had fostered modern Tibetan academic studies. However, without regard to these facts the Dalai clique continued to claim that China had destroyed Tibetan culture: Despite the government’s strict protection of Tibetan culture and the tremendous development and progress in this respect, the Dalai clique, which is the chief representative of the feudal serf system, is still wantonly concocting the “theory of Tibetan cultural genocide.” This cannot but make people wonder whether it is unwilling to see the extermination of Tibet’s feudal serf system, which was even darker than the Dark Ages in Europe. Perhaps the Dalai clique really wants the Tibetan people to keep intact the lifestyle and cultural values under that dark system as well as the power of a handful of aristocrats, upperclass monks, and serf owners to rule over Tibetan culture. To restore its dark rule under the old system, the Dalai clique has not hesitated to take chances by choosing the doomed path of “Tibet independence,” which goes against history and the popular will.13
China also continued to bolster its “evidence” that the Dalai clique had instigated the demonstrations and riots. The most fundamental basis for this conclusion seemed to be that this must be the case because there were no legitimate reasons for Tibetan discontent. This led to some curious exercises
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in circular reasoning: “There is conclusive evidence to prove that this violent incident of beating, smashing, looting, and burning was deliberately created by the ‘Tibetan independence’ separatist forces at home and outside China. It was carefully engineered and incited by the Dalai clique in an organized and premeditated way.” That this must be so was substantiated with no other evidence other than that it must be so because the Dalai Lama’s intention to stir up trouble before the Olympics, to “sabotage China’s socio-political situation of stability and solidarity,” and to “separate Tibet from our motherland” was well known: “This violent incident of beating, smashing, looting, and burning fully demonstrates that the ‘non-violence’ and ‘peaceful dialogue’ that the Dalai clique kept flaunting was a pack of lies through and through and ‘not seeking independence’ and ‘caring about the Tibetan people’ that they kept gassing about was every inch a deceit.” Therefore, since “hypocrisy cannot conceal facts,” the “incident of beating, smashing, looting, and burning carefully engineered by the Dalai clique has fully exposed its true face of obstinately seeking ‘Tibetan independence.’”14 A Renmin Ribao article, “A True Account of the Beating, Smashing, Looting, and Burning Masterminded by the Dalai Clique in Lhasa,” provided no more evidence of the Dalai Lama’s actual instigation or even support for the riots. Instead, it attempted to establish guilt by association due to the coincidence of the date when the protests started, 10 March, and the Dalai Lama’s treason on that date in 1959, when he rebelled against the motherland and fled abroad, from where he has plotted Tibetan independence ever since. The article focused on the actions of the “bad elements, lawless elements and thugs,” who had “shouted reactionary slogans” and attacked police, whose response was characterized by remarkable restraint. The Dalai Lama had become increasingly frustrated because his “reactionary position” on genuine autonomy and a Greater TAR had met with no success, it being nothing more than a scheme for him to seize power on the plateau and then achieve his dream to separate Tibet from the motherland. He had therefore “shifted the focus of his sabotage from outside Tibet to within Tibet,” in order to achieve his goal of “operating inside, exaggerating outside, exerting pressure both inside and outside,” and “openly supporting the violent activities of some radical ‘Tibet independence’ organizations, instead of quietly encouraging them as he did in the past.” One of the ways he had done this was through religion, by “training and planting agents in the monasteries inside Tibet as the breakthrough for his separatist activities and sabotage.” He had enticed some monks to India, where he had trained them, and sent them back into Tibet for sabotage and anti-Chinese resistance activities. The plan of the Dalai clique to stage protests against the Beijing Olympics
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internationally was considered irrefutable evidence that the same forces had instigated violence within Tibet for the same purpose.15 This line of evidence was furthered by another of China’s media mouthpieces, Ta Kung Pao in Hong Kong, whose theme was that “Tibetan Independence” forces were attempting to undermine the Olympics. This article identified the Tibetan Youth Congress as the organization of the Dalai clique whose position was most clearly in favor of independence and whose activities could most easily be linked to the events within Tibet, particularly their sponsorship of the march to Tibet from India. This connection had proven that the nonviolence advocated by the Dalai Lama was “nothing more than a pretext to win fame by cheating the world.” The violence in Lhasa had exposed the separatist nature of the Dalai clique and the “hypocrisy and deceptive nature of the ‘peace’ and ‘nonviolence’ they advocate.” Anyone who “respects the facts and holds justice” could see the ulterior motives of the Dalai clique: “The recent violent crime orchestrated by the Dalai clique has endangered national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, harmed the safety of the people’s lives and property, and violated the UN Charter and the norms of international practice.”16 By the end of March, China claimed to have uncovered hard evidence that the “Dalai clique” had “plotted and incited” the violence in Lhasa. In a “signed article” by “Yedor,” it was claimed that an “unnamed suspect” in custody in Lhasa had confessed that he had acted in collaboration with the Tibetan government in exile to instigate an uprising in Tibet. He claimed that the “security department” of the “Tibetan government in exile” had asked him to hand around leaflets promoting the “Tibetan people’s uprising movement.” Therefore, it was “untrue for the Dalai clique to claim that the riot was a spontaneous peaceful protest which the Dalai Lama has had nothing to do with.” The suspect was said to have further claimed that the “beating, smashing, looting and burning were by no means peaceful demonstrations, and the deeds were inhuman. If they wanted to follow the non-violence ‘middle way’ such violence should have never happened.” Yedor went on to say that on the same day that violent mobs attacked innocent civilians in Lhasa, the Dalai Lama held a meeting in Dharamsala on how to enlarge the “achievements.” The meeting reportedly decided to mobilize all monasteries in Tibet to launch continuous protests. Samdhong Rinpoche was supposed to have said at the meeting that they should seize the chance offered by the Olympics to make breakthroughs in the Tibet cause and to pave the way for the Dalai Lama to return, to achieve a higher degree of autonomy in a Greater Tibet, and to abolish the CCP’s control over Buddhist reincarnations. The exile ministry of finance was supposed to support this “decisive
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battle against the Chinese government.” In fact, the meeting to which Yedor referred was an attempt by the Dharamsala government to exercise some control over the organizations that had started the “Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement” (TPUM) by bringing them under what was called a Solidarity Committee. This was actually a step taken to prevent any deviation from the Dalai Lama’s policies of nonviolence and dialogue. The Yedor article went on to single out the Tibetan Youth Congress as the organization “under the Dalai clique” that was the primary instigator of violence and promoter of Tibetan independence. They were said to openly preach violence, to have purchased weapons, and to have sent guerrillas to infiltrate Tibet in order to start armed struggles. Other organizations of the Dalai clique were said to have told their members in India and Nepal to contact people in Tibet and incite them “in the name of the Dalai Lama” to hold demonstrations in other parts of Tibet after the violence in Lhasa on 14 March. Yedor correctly identified the five groups that had organized the Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement in India. They were the TYC, the Tibetan Women’s Association (TWA), Students for a Free Tibet (SFT), the National Democratic Party of Tibet, and the Gu-Chu-Sum Movement of Tibet, an organization of former prisoners. However, he misidentified them as all being “under the Tibetan government in exile.” Yedor also accurately claimed that one of the movement’s aims was to promote demonstrations within Tibet. The Yedor article took the first step in linking these “Dalai clique” organizations to support from “anti-China hostile Western forces.” The Gu-Chu-Sum and TWA were accused of having received grants from the U.S. government–funded National Endowment for Democracy.17 A more detailed Chinese-language version of the same “Yedor” article attempted to demonstrate close links between the Dalai Lama and his exile government and these “Dalai clique” organizations by claiming that some of these organizations, like the TYC and TWA, were set up by the exile government under the guise of nongovernmental organizations. As evidence it cited the fact that many of the founders or former officials of the TYC had become members of the exile government, including the Dalai Lama’s personal secretary, Tenzin Geyche, his current Kalon Tripa, Samdhong Rinpoche, and his special envoy, Lodi Gyari. Half the current staff of the TGIE were formerly members of TYC, and all of the Kalon Tripas had been members of the TYC. The current president of the TYC had made militant statements and his organization had trained members in the use of explosives. Another clique organization, SFT, had conducted eight “Tibet Liberation Action Camps” and had trained 450 activists. These were the camps that had trained Western students and exile Tibetans to scale buildings, bridges, and other structures to hang banners and Tibetan flags. The Yedor article also attempted to construe the
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Dalai Lama’s threat to resign as head of the TGIE if violence continued within Tibet as equivalent to an admission that he had been behind the violence.18 People’s Daily castigated the Dalai Lama for claiming that he was willing to participate in building a harmonious society in China while at the same time instigating violence in Tibet: “The Dalai clique plotted and incited the March 14 Lhasa riots, in which they resorted to violence to disrupt the peaceful life of Tibetans, and brought terror and scourge to the innocent people, thus seriously infringing upon the ‘freedom’ and ‘rule of law,’ and fundamentally undermining social harmony in Tibet.” The Dalai clique had been instigating violent incidents in Tibet for the past half-century. Violence could not give rise to harmony; the failure of their deeds to match their words could not but lead to doubts about the sincerity of the Dalai clique. Peace and development were the desires of the people of the world and a situation of harmonious relationships among people of various nationalities was the norm since Tibet’s peaceful liberation; therefore, violence was unacceptable both within Tibet and in the world. Violence was also contrary to Buddhist principles. If the Dalai clique really wanted to support the construction of a harmonious society within Tibet, it should stop plotting and instigating violent actions. The Chinese argument was that violence could not lead to harmony, despite their claim that the Communist victory in China’s civil war had done so, and that all Tibetan attempts to resist Chinese rule by means of violence, or even, it was implied, by accusing China of abusing Tibetans’ human rights, were inconsistent with the Dalai Lama’s own goals and principles. Thus, for the sake of the harmony established and maintained by force by China in Tibet, the Dalai Lama should not upset that harmony with his demands for Tibetans’ human rights or any semblance of self-determination: Violence cannot give rise to harmony, and still less win public will. When peace and development have been turned into the tide of the contemporary world, violent actions to the detriment of peace have become the common foe of all people in the world yearning for peace. Under the pretexts of the “human rights” issue, or a religious issue, or whatever issues, with whatever purposes, violence can only mean moving against the current of the times and is therefore unacceptable. . . . The vain attempt of the Dalai clique to seek “Tibetan independence” with the use of violence has not only harmed the quintessence of Buddhism with “mercy at heart” but also runs counter to the Buddhist core foundation of “not hurting all living beings,” let alone carry forward and develop the Buddhist culture to seek harmony.19
A synopsis of Tibet TV’s coverage of the uprising from March to July published by the U.S. government’s Open Source Center (OSC) found that the extensive coverage had focused on condemnation of the Dalai Lama for
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orchestrating the riots and made no mention of any possible role that popular resentment against government officials or policies played in causing the riots. The news programs also highlighted speeches and activities of Tibet Party Secretary Zhang Qingli, economic progress in the TAR under the CCP, and the Patriotic Education Campaign. Condemnation of the “Dalai clique” was the dominant theme of newscasts, with reports of officials, religious figures, and ordinary people blaming the Dalai Lama for orchestrating the riots ahead of the Olympics to create trouble for China. Newscasts in March showed footage of the riots and damage done by rioters, as well as footage of Tibetans turning themselves in to the police and saying that they had been coerced into joining the riots. By April, Tibet TV began to highlight Patriotic Education campaigns, showing Tibetan Buddhist monks and religious leaders supporting the government and condemning the riots and the Dalai Lama. In addition, reports highlighted economic progress in Tibet and government efforts to restore social and economic order, including a series of reports on rebuilding Lhasa following the riots. The newscasts included several interviews with average Tibetans, often shown speaking Tibetan with Chinese subtitles, praising the CPC and the government for Tibet’s economic development. Several reports also said that the government had handled the riots according to law. A program in May featured a ceremony for the publication of a book linking the Dalai Lama with the March unrest, titled Monstrous Crimes of the Dalai Clique—A Record of the Truth of Lhasa 3.14 Incident. The majority of reports aired in May, June, and July were officials’ comments emphasizing the importance of stability, national unity, economic development, and CCP rule in Tibet. Only minimal coverage was given to talks between China and the Dalai Lama’s representatives in May. There was no coverage observed on the second round of talks in July.20
“Hostile Western Forces” Zhang Qingli and other officials engaged in propaganda within Tibet meant to encourage Han and Tibetan cadres, whose confidence may have been shaken by the recent display of Tibetans’ lack of loyalty to their administration. Zhang maintained that the social situation had taken a turn for the better after putting down the “14 March serious violent and criminal incident of beating, smashing, looting and burning.” He said that the 3.14 Incident had shown that the struggle against the Dalai clique had entered a new, acute and complex period: “After finally stripping itself of its mask of ‘peace’ and ‘nonviolence,’ the Dalai clique had a fierce trial of strength with us face to face and became the biggest obstacle and most realistic threat to Tibet’s development
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and stability.” In response, the Party and government had implemented the central authorities’ instructions, adopted measures to seek unity of thinking, increased media guidance, and taken the initiative in conducting propaganda. Now, the situation was heading for stability, thanks to the support of the broad masses of various nationalities: “So long as the people of all ethnic groups in Tibet follow the party and unite as one, we can certainly deflate the arrogance of the Dalai clique; then, Tibet will certainly be able to usher in an ever brighter future along the path of development with both Chinese and Tibetan characteristics.” However, Zhang warned, the situation was still very grim. “We must profoundly understand that this incident was another secessionist activity plotted and prepared elaborately by the Dalai clique for a long time and that its basic aim was to seek ‘Tibet independence’ by splitting the motherland; we must profoundly understand that international hostile forces have not in the least changed their political attempt to Westernize or divide our country and that their ultimate objective is to subvert socialist China.” Both history and reality showed that the struggle against the Dalai clique’s infiltrating, secessionist, and subversive activities would be protracted, complicated, and intense. Zhang said that it was necessary to carry out educational activities among party members and cadres at all levels, who would then be responsible for “collective education in all government organizations, schools, enterprises, urban communities, and other units.” This education should focus on the “three inseparables” (the Han are inseparable from Tibetans, etc.), and the theme that unity and stability mean happiness while separatism and turmoil mean disaster.21 Hong Kong’s PRC-owned Ta Kung Pao informed its Chinese readers that the events in Tibet were a contemporary version of the Eight Powers foreign invasion of China during the Boxer Rebellion of the late nineteenth century. The West was blamed for supporting Tibetan independence in order to counter the rise of China. Tibetan independence activities were equated with terrorism. Hostile Western forces were cultivating radical Tibetans who openly agitated for independence so that China could be coerced to negotiate with the more moderate Tibetans represented by the Dalai Lama. China could thus be forced to accept “covert independence” under the guise of the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way. Many Western commentators had been following this propaganda line, saying that China must understand that the Dalai Lama’s moderate line was the only choice for China. The author of the Ta Kung Pao article said that he had visited Tibetan areas of Sichuan, where most of the monasteries listened to foreign radio broadcasts; thus, it was not surprising that they had received orders to stage a great uprising. Further evidence of European and American involvement
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in the recent unrest in Tibet was provided by the high-profile receptions (in 2007) of the Dalai Lama in Germany, the United States, and Canada, “which clearly declared the West’s intention to increase pressure on China over the Tibet issue.” The visit of the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, to Dharamsala shortly after 3.14 showed that she had obviously known everything (about the plans for an uprising) in advance. The pressure from several countries on China to dialogue with the Dalai Lama was also intended to force China to make concessions to him. All this was planned well in advance and was meant to take advantage of the Beijing Olympics. This Western pressure would continue long after the Olympics because the Western countries had decided to use the Tibet issue as a long-term strategy to contain China. Of the three independence issues: Tibet, Taiwan, and Xinjiang, Tibet had been chosen because Xinjiang involved Islamic radicalism and Taiwan could lead to a war. The Tibet strategy of the Western countries, the author claimed, was intended to keep the “East wind from prevailing over the West wind.” Because of its own decline, the West did not dare to confront China openly; thus, it had to resort to base and petty tricks like supporting Tibetan independence in the hope of defaming China and slowing down its rise. Actually, this was but a “desperate struggle prior to the West’s decline; in fact, it is an indication of a base, tragic, ridiculous, and sympathetic show of weakness.” The Western strategy had not fooled the Chinese people; instead, it had “fully exposed the West’s prejudice and hypocrisy and once again inspired the patriotic feelings of the Chinese nation, especially Chinese living overseas.” The role of the Chinese people in resisting the West’s attempt to use Tibet to denigrate China had educated the people throughout the country and prevented the government’s making concessions to save the Olympics. “Building a harmonious society does not include being harmonious with the enemy.”22 Another Ta Kung Pao article identified the United States as the leader of all those “hostile Western countries” using the Tibet issue to denigrate and oppose China. The article said that the connection between the October 2007 honors to the Dalai Lama in Washington and the March 2008 “violent crimes masterminded by the Dalai clique” were “worthy of thorough analysis and investigation in order to ensure that the international community will have a correct understanding of the facts.” The background for understanding these events was China’s recent rise in status and influence, thanks to the superiority of the socialist system and correct leadership of the CCP, the “world’s biggest and most successful political party.” When China was attracting the attention of the world in October 2007 with its NPC meeting, the United States tried to “challenge the 17th Party Congress and divert global attention” by honoring the Dalai Lama:
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China has clearly told the world that the Dalai Lama is a Tibetan scum who dons the religious cloak and attempts to seek “Tibet independence” and split the nation. The Dalai Lama has never stopped splitting the motherland during the decades since fleeing the country after his unsuccessful armed revolt. The US government and congress supported the Dalai Lama in intervening in China’s domestic affairs. How can such blatant acts not arouse great indignation? Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, as a deputy to the 17th Party Congress, angrily refuted the United States for its big blunder of holding the candle to the devil. How much longer can the Dalai Lama, whose political future is nearing its end, continue to struggle and limp along as a tool of anti-China forces?
Again, in March 2008, during the NPC’s “two sessions,” during which China “calmly replaced senior government leaders, in contrast to the chaos of the American presidential campaign happening at the same time,” the United States again interfered in China’s internal affairs by supporting the riots in Lhasa: On 14 March, two days before the present session of the NPC victoriously came to a close, an incident of violent crimes of beating, smashing, looting and arson broke out in Lhasa. As disclosed by the Ministry of Public Security, two months before the United States heaped favors on the Dalai Lama, that is, in May 2007 [when the Congressional Gold Medal was announced], the Dalai clique held the Fifth International Conference of Tibet Support Groups in Brussels, Belgium, which adopted plans such as boycotting the Olympic Games and proceeding to Lhasa to stage demonstrations and parades. The United States could not have been ignorant about the opening of this conference and the adoption of these plans. It not only knew about them but showed its support by treating the Dalai Lama generously. US support fed the arrogance of the Dalai clique in masterminding the riots.23
Xinhua took the “blame the foreign imperialists” theme to its ultimate source, the British. Two articles reiterated the theme of Chinese propaganda that “Tibetan independence” was an invention of the British imperialists, absent which the idea would never have even arisen among any Tibetans: “The issue of ‘Tibet independence’ is fundamentally a product of the history of imperialist invasions of China.” Being unable to establish Tibet as its actual colony, the British cultivated anti-Chinese sentiment within Tibet in order to keep Tibet under British influence. Thus, Tibetan anti-Chinese nationalism was born without any other cause. As Xinhua opined, “These were the most commonly used despicable means by imperialists at the time. History is a mirror of reality. Anyone’s attempt to agitate for ‘Tibetan independence,’ like the serious crimes of aggression against Tibet committed by imperialist powers in the past, is doomed to failure.”24
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In keeping with the strategy of blaming outside forces for the uprising in Tibet, and characterizing Tibetan resistance as terrorism, China’s People’s Daily denounced the Tibetan Youth Congress as “a terrorist organization more catastrophic than bin Laden’s.” The TYC was said to be part of the Tibetan government in exile and the “core of power of the Dalai clique.” The TYC openly advocated independence and violence and was thus the same sort of organization as al Qaida. After the failure of their plans for an uprising in Tibet the TYC had declared its intention to infiltrate its members into Tibet for the purpose of guerrilla warfare: “A TYC ringleader even claimed that they are ready to sacrifice another 100 Tibetans for their complete victory. This has once again laid bare the ugly feature of this group of terrorists.”25 China responded to the criticism of Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, who had called on China to resolve the Tibet issue, by asking what was the “Tibet issue” she wanted China to resolve? People’s Daily indignantly defied her to defend the Dalai Lama against his own human rights abuses from exile and when he was in Tibet. It asked how the Chinese government, or any government, should respond to such violent crimes as the beating, smashing, looting, and burning of the Lhasa incident and how it could be criticized for restoring order, protecting the lives and property of citizens, and punishing those responsible. Ms. Pelosi was also reminded that the Dalai Lama was formerly the head of the system of feudal serfdom in Tibet that was “much darker and more sinister and vicious than the days under the ‘integration of the state and religion’ in the Middle Age Europe.” Tibetans had been relieved of the human rights abuses of this system only after the “peaceful liberation” of Tibet. “With such a historical background and present reality, how are the Dalai clique, the chieftains of serfdom in old Tibet, qualified to talk excessively and glibly about the ‘human rights’ issue of Tibet?” People’s Daily correctly pointed out that the Tibet issue was not about religion. It defended China’s religious policy and said that the freedom of religion was obvious to anyone who had seen Tibetans worshiping at the many temples and monasteries. Similarly, it was not an ethnic issue, since China had poured vast sums into Tibet to help the Tibetan people and to preserve their culture. In fact, said People’s Daily, it was crystal clear what the real issue of Tibet was. The Dalai Lama’s Middle Way policy of autonomy and human rights could not disguise its real strategy of seeking Tibetan independence: In the final analysis, the “Tibet issue” is not at all a “human rights issue,” a religious issue, or an ethnical issue, but an issue concerning China’s state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and an issue of core interests for the Chinese nation. Not a single nation on earth can tolerate to see its sovereignty sustain losses or sit idle to see its territory being seceded. On this issue, the Chinese government has made it very clear that the unity of the Chinese nation is the
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supreme, overriding principle, and there is no room whatsoever for any bargain on the issue of sovereignty. So any scheme to encroach upon China’s sovereignty and meddle in China’s internal affairs on the Tibet issue is only futile under whatever banner is hoisted.26
Testimony of Tibetans A fundamental theme of Chinese propaganda about Tibet, before and after March 2008, was that the vast majority of Tibetans were better off than ever before and were immensely loyal to the Party and the Chinese state as a result. Any discontent was by definition confined to a tiny minority, despite the recent evidence to the contrary, who themselves had no legitimate reasons for discontent except as instigated by the Dalai Lama. The testimony of loyal Tibetan cadres and ordinary Tibetans was publicized to make that case. There was no more loyal Tibetan cadre, or none so essential to the legitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet, than Ngawang Jigme Ngapo, who had headed the delegation that had signed the 17-Point Agreement in 1951. Ngapo, now over ninety years of age, condemned the rioters, although in a somewhat less than enthusiastic style. Ngapo’s statement reiterated most of the themes of China’s justification for its control of Tibet, especially those he could testify to from his long personal experience. He concurred that the “violent criminal incident,” of “smashing, looting and burning,” was “obviously organized, planned meticulously and in advance, and directed by the domestic and foreign apparatus of the Dalai Lama clique.” He said that the Dalai Lama clique sought to take advantage of China’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics as “an opportunity to make trouble, and build up momentum internationally, so as to achieve the goal of splitting Tibet from the motherland.” Ngapo repeated the staple Chinese argument that no country in the world had ever recognized Tibetan independence and that Tibet had always been effectively under Chinese control. After the peaceful liberation of Tibet, in which he had played a significant role, some people had continued to disregard the will of the people and had not ceased attempting to split Tibet from the motherland. But their rebellion not only failed but hastened the arrival of democratic reform, by means of which the Tibetans were finally liberated and became the masters of their own territory. The failure of the rebels had proven that pursuing Tibetan independence was contrary to the will of the people. Ngapo said that as a witness to almost a hundred years of change in Tibet he could testify that “the Tibetan people can only be masters of their territory by following the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics under the leadership
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of the Communist Party of China. Only within the larger family of the People’s Republic of China can Tibetan society progress and develop.”27 Legchok, deputy secretary of the TAR Party Committee and chairman of the TAR People’s Congress Standing Committee, agreed, saying that the disturbances in Lhasa were instigated by the Dalai clique and had caused the state and the people enormous losses in lives and properties: “The perpetrators’ outrages, their inhumane behaviors and their shocking atrocities make people boil with anger,” he said. Legchok further said that facts had fully proven that it was an “organized, well-planned and premeditated incident of violence that the Dalai clique meticulously orchestrated.” He was “furious,” he said, about the Dalai clique’s attempt to “secede the motherland, and also about the small number of lawless elements’ insane beating, smashing, looting and burning atrocities.” He said that he had been born in old Tibet and grew up in new Tibet so he knew the great progress that Tibet had made under the leadership of the CCP. However, The hostile forces of the West and the Dalai secessionist clique don’t want to see the good life the Tibetan people can enjoy today. Whenever Tibet has had a new development, they will do everything they can to vilify it with rumors; and whenever Tibet has made some progress, they will do everything they can to intensify their sabotage. . . . Their fundamental purpose is to overturn the CPC leadership in Tibet, subvert the socialist system, negate the autonomous system in minority regions, reinstate Dalai’s rule in Tibet, and undermine the stability in China’s other minority regions and divide socialist China. These bloody facts should warn us once again that the antagonistic forces in various parts of the world have not in the least changed their political schemes to Westernize and divide China, that the Dalai secessionist clique has not in the least weakened its infiltrative and subversive activities against China, and that the secessionist and sabotage activities at home and abroad have not stopped even for one moment.28
Another loyalist Tibetan cadre, Lhakpa Phuntsok (Ch. Lhaba Puncog), director of the Chinese Tibetan Affairs Research Center in Beijing, a center of China’s strategy to use academic Tibetology for propaganda purposes, also weighed in with similar, if not identical, arguments. He opined that “viewing either from the incident itself or from a wider scope of the relevant aspects, the violent incident in Lhasa was premeditated and organized. Facts have one more time suggested that this was a violent act meticulously schemed by the Dalai clique through internal and external collaboration.” He said that he was “very astonished” and “very indignant” at the incident, since it had appeared without cause during an “excellent situation” in Tibet. Tibet had recently experienced its best period of economic and social development due to the policies of the central government intended to support Tibet. The opening of the
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Qinghai-Tibet railway had “strengthened the connections between Tibet and the hinterland, stimulated Tibet’s tourism, and made the world understand Tibet’s culture better,” he said. Lhakpa Phuntsok maintained that the timing of the incident was evidence of its outside instigation. The Dalai clique had been organizing events to commemorate the 1959 uprising every year in order to “cause trouble to the motherland.” The 1959 revolt happened, he said, because “the masses demanded a democratic reform, but the regime of the old Tibetan government-religion integration system wanted to maintain the feudal serfdom of government-religion integration. They wanted to keep the system unchanged forever, so they launched an armed rebellion.” He said that the March 2008 incident was not a peaceful demonstration, nor a religious or an ethnic issue, nor even a criminal incident, but rather a political incident instigated by foreign hostile forces. He condemned those monks who had violated their vows of nonviolence and he claimed that their participation in the recent incident was more evidence of the Dalai Lama’s instigation because he had been using religion to “conduct infiltration” and create an “underground organization,” in order to “make the monks stand in the forefront of splitting the motherland.” Lhakpa Phuntsok said that the Dalai Lama had spent decades trying to internationalize the Tibet issue and gain international support. The latest incident was an attempt to “disrupt Tibet’s excellent situation and mar China’s international image. They are trying to make the whole world condemn China and undermine the Beijing Olympics.” But, he said, they would not succeed, “no matter how they conduct their activities, no matter how overseas and domestic Tibet independence forces collaborate, they will never be able to change the history and fact that Tibet is a part of China.” The Dalai Lama’s proposals for dialogue were based on a “greater Tibet region” and “high degree of autonomy,” but these were really about a “semi-independent greater Tibet region to seek independence on this basis.” The Dalai Lama’s proposal to hold discussion for this purpose of “shaking China’s basic political system” was “very ridiculous,” he said.29 Compliant religious leaders were called forth to add their voices to those who condemned the rioters and supported the government. Monks were condemned for their participation in the riot of 14 March and the “reactionary” demonstrations on the preceding days. Buddhist precepts were cited to show that they had violated their vows: “They are not monks who devote themselves to the study of Buddhism and to universal salvation but are outand-out secessionists, a lawless gang that violates the law and commits crimes, a small mob that harms other people’s lives and property.” Monks were accused of having participated in the “counterrevolutionary armed rebellion” of 1959 that was “staged by the Dalai Lama.” They had also been involved in
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the late 1980s, “when the Dalai clique incited and plotted the Lhasa riots.” In the “violent criminal incident of beating, smashing, looting and arson” on 14 March 2008, “a handful of monks in red robes carefully fostered by the Dalai clique fanatically charged to the forefront . . . and took the lead in causing trouble in their attempt to claim credit from their ‘Buddha.’” They were “the first to hoist the banner of secession, beat up officers on duty, set things on fire, and kill people. These so-called Buddhist disciples simply are not real Buddhist disciples but are loyal running-dogs of the Dalai clique and secessionists hiding in monasteries.”30 Tibetan experts of the China Tibetology Research Center condemned the Dalai Lama for his continual pursuit of Tibetan independence despite his professed acceptance of Tibetan autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. The experts said that the Dalai Lama’s “true colors” were exposed by his “old tricks, which included “sending ‘Tibet independence’ key elements to sneak across the boundary to carry out sabotage activities,” and “constantly instigating and hatching separatist activities inside and outside the boundary.” The Dalai Lama was accused of saying, when he went into exile in 1959, that Tibet had been an independent country, of establishing a “government in exile,” organizing the “rebellious armed forces” in Mustang, and spreading “rumors and slanders to sow dissension among various ethnic groups” such as that the Chinese government was restricting religious rights and cultural autonomy and had exploited Tibetan resources. Since the 1980s he had stepped up his Tibetan independence activities and in 1987 he had said that Tibet was an independent country, which led to riots within Tibet. In 1991 he had said that Tibet was an occupied country. Tenzin, a research fellow of the China Tibetology Research Center, was quoted as saying that the Dalai clique and separatist forces had never abandoned their position on Tibetan independence or stopped their hostile activities against China’s Tibet Autonomous Region. He condemned the Dalai Lama’s proposals for a “Greater Tibet Area” and a “High Degree of Autonomy” as “Pronouns of Separation and Independence.” The greater Tibetan area was said to have “no basis in history,” while the purpose of the higher degree of autonomy was to “abolish the leadership of the CCP, the socialist system and the system of regional autonomy,” to change the existing political structure in Tibet and establish an independent government with the Dalai Lama as its head. Because China’s domestic and international situation had improved, the Dalai Lama had gradually given up openly advocating for Tibetan independence and had adopted his “Middle Way” of not seeking independence but still demanding a Greater Tibetan Area and a higher degree of autonomy. This was intended to create the false impression that he had given up Tibetan independence; however, “various kinds of facts” had proven that his stance on independence was
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unchanged, including the violent activities conducted by Tibet independence elements in March in Lhasa. The Middle Way was but a “new trick of the Dalai clique to seek opportunities for conducting subversive and sabotaging activities.” In exile the Dalai Lama had annually conducted 10 March ceremonies to celebrate Tibetan independence at which the Tibetan “national flag” was raised and the Tibetan “national anthem” was sung. In his speeches at these 10 March ceremonies the Dalai Lama had from 1960 to 1967 called for Tibetan independence; from 1984 to 1989 he avoided directly using the word “independence” in favor of independence in disguise via the Middle Way; in 1990, because of his euphoria over the fall of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, he again called for Tibetan independence; from 1994 to 2007 he again played down Tibetan independence in favor of his Middle Way. Tenzin said that the Dalai Lama’s shifting position proved that he was not sincere about abandoning independence: “When the Dalai clique thinks the international situation is to its advantage, it will play up the tune for independence, but when it thinks the international situation is to its disadvantage, it again will play down the tune and ask for contacts and talks.” Since the Dalai Lama began to betray the motherland he had never changed his stand on plotting for Tibetan independence and separating the motherland. Recently, “seeing that it is impossible to realize separatism,” the Dalai Lama had dropped his mask of peace and nonviolence and shifted his sabotaging activities inside Tibet, changed from secretly instigating violence through organizations like the Tibetan Youth Congress to openly supporting them in order to achieve the goal of “conducting activities inside the boundary, playing them up outside the boundary and exerting both internal and external pressure.” However, the “ridiculous dream” of Tibetan independence would be shattered and the Tibetan people would enjoy a more beautiful future.31 Another China Tibetology Research Center expert focused on the duplicity of the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way proposals. He said that an analysis of the Middle Way revealed that its purpose was the same as Tibetan independence—to separate Tibet from China. This was revealed in five ways. First, the Dalai Lama’s refusal to admit that Tibet was always a part of China. Second, his insistence that the PLA should be withdrawn from Tibet, the status of Tibet should be finally determined by some international arbitrator, and Tibet should become a “Zone of Peace” or a buffer state. Third, his insistence that Tibet should have diplomatic relations with foreign countries. Fourth, his insistence that Tibetans should have “genuine autonomy” in a “Greater Tibetan Area.” And fifth, his insistence that non-Tibetan people should all have to leave this new Tibetan Autonomous Region. All of these conditions, he said, revealed that the Middle Way was really a subterfuge for the ultimate goal of Tibetan independence.
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The first of these conditions, that Tibet had been an independent country before 1950, called into question the legitimacy of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, accused China of imperialist aggression against Tibet, and opened the possibility that Tibet, as a once-separate country, might again seek independence under the principle of national self-determination. Some of the other conditions, such as that the PLA would not be stationed in Tibet and Tibet should have international relations with other countries, would limit Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and open the door to independence. Other conditions, such as that non-Tibetans should leave Tibet and Tibet should be governed by the Dalai Lama under a system different from that of the rest of China, would pave the way for Tibet’s ultimate independence. The idea that the status of Tibet might be determined by some international arbitrator would transform the Tibet issue from an internal affair of China into an international issue. All of the Dalai Lama’s proposals revealed his real strategy, which was “to return to the inside of the boundary through talks because the Dalai clique has achieved nothing in its independence activities abroad in the several decades and, therefore, it is necessary to return to Tibet so as to give command to the independence activities more directly and to obtain better results; in the second step, to seize political power through ‘real autonomy’; and in the third step, to finally realize ‘Tibet independence’ by means of a referendum.” The Dalai Lama’s “not seeking Tibet independence” but only seeking “real autonomy” strategy was merely a slogan to influence the international community to exert pressure on China. In the meantime the Dalai clique had continued to engage in separatist activities abroad. These separatist activities included the maintenance of a Tibetan government in exile under a constitution with the Dalai Lama as head of state and with various ministries, and the singing of the Tibetan “national anthem” and raising the “national flag,” both of which were an undisguised declaration of Tibetan independence. None of the functions of this government in exile or the expressions of Tibetan independence had ceased since the Dalai Lama declared his Middle Way policy.32 More arguments, of people of “various nationalities” in Tibet, whose “strong indignation” had supposedly been aroused by the 14 March incident, were elicited to refute the Dalai Lama’s assumption that he was qualified to speak for the Tibetan people. Their unanimous opinion was that Dalai, “as the chief representative of the three major estate holders in old Tibet, is hostile to the socialist system under which the people act as the master of the country, so that he cannot represent the people in Tibet today.” The people in Tibet who were fully enjoying the progress of the times and the achievements in social development would never allow any forces to hinder the historical wheel of Tibet’s harmonious development. Tibetan deputies to the National People’s Congress maintained that they were more qualified to speak for
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Tibet because they were “democratically elected by the people of various nationalities in Tibet.” The people of Tibet were said to “have fully exercised the right to be the master of the country according to state law and also enjoyed ever increasing sufficient legal guarantees in the aspects of equally taking part in the management of state affairs and independently managing the affairs of their localities and Tibetan nationality.” Dorje Tseten (Ch. Duoji Cizhu), mayor of Lhasa, said that the violent incident in Lhasa organized and plotted by the Dalai clique had sabotaged Tibet’s economic development and the interests of the people. He denied that the Dalai Lama was the spokesperson for the Tibetan nationality; instead, he had “plotted Tibetan independence and acted as a comic tool for the anti-China forces on the international arena. He spread rumors in Tibet and stood in the way of Tibet’s normal social order.” Dorje Tseten said that the Dalai Lama had intentionally sabotaged the harmonious and prosperous situation that existed in Tibet, especially after the opening of the railway. “The Dalai clique organized and plotted the incident of violence, sabotaged Tibet’s economic development and the gratifying situation in which the people’s livelihood keeps on improving, brought about great sabotage to the broad masses of the people in Tibet, and greatly sabotaged the interests of the people in Tibet.”33 Another Tibetologist, Pasang Wangdu (Ch. Basang Wangdui) was elicited to denounce the Dalai Lama and accuse him of bringing misfortune to the Tibetan people. He began by citing the fact “known to all,” stipulated in the Chinese Constitution, that all China’s nationalities were equal. The incident of violent crimes of beating, smashing, looting, and burning of 14 March had caused physical harm to innocent people; therefore, “facts have proved that the Dalai clique is bringing misfortune to the Tibetan people.” He said that he had seen with his own eyes and was filled with deep gratitude for the earth-shaking changes that had taken place in Tibet under the leadership of the CCP. Tibet had rejected the feudal serf system characterized by “poverty, backwardness, self-enclosure, and stagnancy” and had achieved a “civilized, open, and modern people’s democratic society that pursues constant development and progress.” From their own personal experiences the Tibetan people had come to realize that it was “the highest blessing to live happily in the big family of the motherland that consists of 56 nationalities.” Pasang Wangdu said that the Dalai Lama had betrayed his motherland and his people, forgotten his ancestral traditions, and engaged in political separatist activities under the guise of religion. He had fabricated the lie that Tibet was once independent. He had said that he had given up independence but “regretfully, what he has said is totally inconsistent to what he has done.” The 14 March Incident was an activity “planned, premeditated, and organized by the Dalai clique that aimed at separating the country and bringing misfortune
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to the people, and has once again laid bare the hypocritical nature of ‘peace’ and ‘non-violence’ advocated by Dalai.” Posing as the spokesman of the Tibetan people and as a defender of human rights, the Dalai Lama had no scruples about his own record of brutal violations during his own rule of Tibet and had fabricated lies that China had violated human rights in Tibet. Pasang Wangdu concluded that he believed that “once they learn about Tibet’s history and gain a clear view of the actual state of affairs, people around the world who uphold justice and have a sense of righteousness will be able to see clearly: Who is bringing misfortune to the Tibetan people?”34
Traditional Themes of Chinese Propaganda In order to deny any legitimacy to “Tibet independence,” an essential part of China’s propaganda is that Tibet has “always” been a part of China and that, therefore, there is no issue of the political status of Tibet. Without saying that Tibet actually was a part of China during the Tang Dynasty–Tibetan Empire period of the seventh to ninth centuries, a Xinhua “Backgrounder on the Historical Facts of Tibet” claimed that the “Tibetans and Hans had through the marriage of their royal families and various meetings, formed close economic and cultural relations laying the groundwork for the ultimate foundation of a unified nation.” Ever since Tibet officially became a part of China during the Yuan Dynasty of the thirteenth century various Chinese dynasties exercised administrative control over Tibet but because they pursued an ethnic policy “marked with ethnic discrimination and oppression,” they could not solve the “issue of ethnic equality and that of enabling the local people to become masters of their own affairs.” Only the founding of the PRC “ended the dark history of the semi-colonial, semi-feudal China, realized unification of the country, unity of ethnic groups and people’s democracy, and brought hope to the Tibetan people that they could control their own destiny in the large family of the motherland.”35 A subsidiary theme to the historical argument that Tibet has “always” been part of China is that, in the absence of any historical basis or legitimacy of Tibetan sovereignty, self-determination or separatism, to campaign for such is to harm the long-established ethnic unity and harmony between Han Chinese and Tibetans. As an article in the Tibet CCP mouthpiece, Tibet Daily, put it: Tibet is a member of the motherland’s big family; the Tibetan people of all nationalities are blood brothers who have always lived in harmony alongside China’s big family of 56 ethnic groups and have maintained ethnic unity and made positive contributions toward the unification of the country. But the unscrupulous Dalai clique is ignoring our national interest as its people attempt to
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destroy our ethnic unity by committing the violent crimes of beating, smashing, looting, and arson in Lhasa in their futile attempt to separate Tibet from the motherland. Their intent is vicious and their crimes monstrous.
Since it was an “undisputed fact” that “Tibet has been a part of China’s sacred territory since ancient times,” then the Dalai clique’s “criminal act of working toward Tibetan independence,” and fomenting of ethnic separatism and divisions between nationalities was a racist crime equivalent to the slavery of the blacks in the United States or the Nazi Holocaust against the Jews. The Dalai clique had “degenerated into criminals to be condemned forever and are the scum of the nation spurned by all the people of the world.” The basis of this theme is that almost all countries of the world, China included, are multiethnic; therefore, ethnic harmony is a universal goal and ethnic discrimination or separatism an evil: Decades of words and deeds have proven that the Dalai Lama is a political exile bent on engaging in international activities to split the motherland and destroy ethnic unity. His “Tibetan independence” theory fully exposes the hideous features of one who incites ethnic contradictions and exposes his crime of splitting the motherland. . . . The Dalai Lama’s evil deed of splitting the motherland aims to ruin the political situation of stability and unity, ruin the good life of the people of all nationalities in Tibet, and ruin the national relation of peaceful coexistence. Unity and stability is a blessing; division and chaos is disaster. Protecting the motherland’s integrity, ethnic unity, and social harmony is the common wish of the people of all nationalities in Tibet. No reactionary force can stop Tibet’s development and progress. . . . So long as we hoist the great banner of ethnic unity and sing the songs of love for the party, love for the motherland, and love for socialism, the Dalai Lama’s crimes and vicious plots will only be his last mad leap before he walks toward destruction.36
Tibet Daily weighed in with an essay on how the Dalai Lama had never given up his goal of independence. The “3.14 Incident” was further evidence that, despite the Dalai Lama’s “Middle Path” policy, his real intentions to achieve Tibetan independence and restore his own feudal rule had never changed. The Dalai Lama’s attempts, while he was in Tibet and from exile, to prevent the socialist development of the Tibetan people were condemned as “debts owed in blood that the Dalai clique will never be able to repay.” He was personally condemned as the “chief culprit who has trampled on Tibet’s human rights and freedom and obstructed Tibet’s development and progress.” The Dalai Lama, however, having no shame, had never had the courage to talk about the legacy of his cruel feudal rule in Tibet and instead had posed as the representative of Tibetan freedom and human rights in order to hoodwink the international community.
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Tibet Daily accused the Dalai Lama of having attempted to use the liberalization period of the 1980s to restore feudalism. The Dalai clique supposedly took advantage of the “reform and opening up” policies to infiltrate Tibet and to restore “vestiges of the feudal serfdom.” This had hampered the dissemination of science and technology and obstructed the development of the productive forces. At the end of this period the Dalai clique had perpetrated an “astounding riot in Lhasa with beating, smashing, looting and burning.” The central government’s post-1989 correct policies had resulted in rapid and sustained growth in Tibet and Tibet entered the “best period of development and stability in history.” However, the Dalai clique was “unwilling to see Tibet’s development, harmony, and stability and the Tibetan people’s happy lives. So they organized, premeditated, meticulously masterminded, and instigated the incident of beating, smashing, looting, and burning in Lhasa on 14 March.”37 The theme that the Dalai Lama wanted to restore feudalism was continued by Chinese and Tibetan experts of the Tibetan Affairs Research Center. In response to a foreign reporter’s question on the fundamental cause of the violence in Lhasa, Lhakpa Phuntsok said that the “fundamental purpose of the Dalai clique in instigating the 14 March incident in Lhasa was to restore the feudal serfdom of government-religion integration.” He said that the Dalai Lama had gone into exile in 1959 after opposing the reform of the Tibetan social system, that he had instigated troubles on the anniversary of the 1959 uprising every year, and that his reasons for doing so again this year were because “the Dalai clique was not happy with the abolition of the feudal serfdom of government-religion integration, was not happy with millions of serfs becoming masters of their own affairs, and was not happy with Tibet being freed from backwardness.” The Tibetologists said that the Dalai Lama’s strategy was to “use a religious cloak to hoodwink and instigate the monks to engage in separatist activities,” and that some monks had indeed participated in the demonstrations. However, most monks remained patriotic and had expressed opposition to the violence. It was necessary to conduct education on the legal system among the monks so that religion would develop within the framework of state law. Education on patriotism had begun in monasteries in 1996, they said, with the purpose of strengthening the monks’ awareness about the motherland and about law. They claimed that such education was very successful, because it was not “government-guided political education or ideological education” but included study contents spontaneously organized by the monks themselves.38 An angry anti–Dalai Lama diatribe in Tibet Daily predicted the failure of the Dalai Lama’s secessionism because “Tibet’s history and reality repeat-
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edly prove that secession is unpopular and sabotage is doomed.” The article reminded Tibetans of Tibet’s inability to govern itself, as had been demonstrated by its history of feudal serfdom “more reactionary, ruthless, barbaric and backward than the Middle Ages in Europe.” The abolition of feudal serfdom was “an inevitable requirement for the development of the Tibetan society. This was also the ardent hope of the Tibetan people.” The Dalai Lama had not given up his plot to split the motherland and he never gave up his “wishful thinking to restore his feudal prerogatives in Tibet,” as evidenced by the “towering crimes perpetrated by the Dalai clique.” The article said that in the 1980s the Chinese government let the Dalai Lama’s representatives visit Tibet but one of them “delivered a speech that befogged the minds of the people at the entrance of the Jokhang monastery as soon as he stepped down from his car. He also organized an illegal gathering at Ganden monastery and openly agitated for ‘Tibet independence.’” (This refers to the incident in Lhasa in 1982 when delegation members were mobbed by sobbing Tibetans beseeching them to tell the Dalai Lama of their sufferings under Chinese rule.) Since then the Dalai clique had been attempting to internationalize the Tibet issue and was advocating nonviolence in a bid to win the support of international public opinion. However, it had never stopped inciting trouble and resorting to violence as a means to exert pressure on China. The “3.14 incident of serious violent crimes of beating, smashing, looting and arson deliberately perpetrated by secessionist forces for ‘Tibet independence’ and carefully plotted and instigated by the Dalai clique in a organized and premeditated manner” had shown that the Dalai Lama’s nonviolence and peaceful dialogue policies were a “pack of lies” and a “downright deception.”39 Another indignant Tibet Daily article said that the Dalai Lama’s history, including his instigation of the 3.14 incident, made him “unqualified to talk about human rights at all.” Eighteen innocent people were brutally killed, 382 were injured, 120 houses and 908 shops were burned, 7 schools and 5 hospitals were smashed. These acts, attributed to the Dalai Lama, showed who it was who trampled on the human rights of the various ethnic groups in Tibet. The Dalai clique’s claims that this was all for “freedom” and “human rights” were hypocritical lies. “All of the inhuman atrocities of the rioters made people boil with anger, and these were the so-called human rights of the Dalai clique!” If the Dalai clique’s plot should succeed, it would bring a disaster of human rights to the Tibetan people. However, the wheel of history will not go backward for a handful of people with ulterior motives. The Dalai clique, therefore, slyly but awkwardly uses “peace,” “freedom,” and “human rights” as placards to deceive the world. What they do not know is that more and more people have
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become aware of their reactionary nature in politics, hypocrisy in religion, and deceitful means. When the Dalai clique once again organized and instigated their followers to use their knives and clubs to harm the kind and innocent residents of Lhasa, and insisted on calling their knives and clubs “human rights” and “freedom” this time, righteous people around the world have seen clearly their sinister intention and ugly features. How can the Dalai clique, red-handed with people’s blood, be qualified to talk about human rights?40
A Renmin Ribao article pursued the connection between Tibetan separatism, feudalism, and the denial of Tibetans’ human rights. The essence of this argument, the most popular argument about Tibet for many Chinese and some foreign leftists, is that Tibetans had no human rights under the old feudal system; they achieved human rights only after liberation by China; therefore, human rights for Tibetans are possible only under Chinese rule and impossible under Tibetan separatist rule. This theme, the “bottom line” justification for Chinese rule over Tibet, became more prevalent in Chinese propaganda as time passed after the March incident. After the standard recitation of the evils of the feudal serf system, including several methods of torture more familiar to China than Tibet, the article concluded, “Therefore, from a historical point of view, there is a tradition of disregard for human rights and deprivation of Tibetans’ human rights within the Dalai clique.” Human rights for Tibetans were only achieved after liberation by China and the CCP: After the peaceful liberation of Tibet, especially through the democratic reform of Tibet, the Tibetan people overthrew the brutal serf system and abolished the legal code and various unwritten laws of the former Tibetan local government that had deprived people of their human rights, and massive numbers of serfs freed themselves and became their own masters, enjoying all the rights possessed by citizens of the People’s Republic of China, with their human rights fully guaranteed.41
A follow-up Renmin Ribao article made an even more simple analogy: all of the Dalai Lama’s rebellious activities illustrated his violence and denial of human rights to the Tibetan people. Every time that Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule had degenerated into violence, it was the Dalai Lama’s fault and it showed the duplicity of his nonviolence policy and his disregard for human rights. “Even under the banner of ‘non-violence’ and even under the guise of ‘pacifist,’ violence is violence. The truth cannot be hidden and lies cannot become truth. Justice is in the hearts of people.”42 The simple lesson was that rebellion against the Chinese government was illegitimate, no matter under what principle, even that of self-determination, it was undertaken. Another Renmin Ribao article returned to the theme that the Dalai Lama’s declaration of his acceptance of Tibetan autonomy could not conceal his real
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goal of independence. As evidence, the article cited the fact that lawless elements within Tibet had chanted the slogan of Tibet independence and they had brandished the “snow mountain lion flag” that symbolized Tibetan independence. If the Dalai Lama did not seek independence, the article asked, then why had he created a government in exile, which had adopted a constitution with the aim of Tibetan independence and which rather than fading away after the Dalai Lama had supposedly given up independence had grown ever larger? Tibetan independence activities in exile were all under the control of this still-existing government in exile. If the Dalai Lama had no intention to split Tibet, then why did this government in exile still sing the Tibetan “national anthem” and raise the “national flag” on major occasions, all of which advocated Tibetan independence? And why did the Dalai Lama continue to refer to Tibet as a state with the same status as the Chinese state? Why did the Dalai Lama and the ministers of this exile government continue to make the “outrageous statement” that Tibet was independent before 1950? Despite the Dalai Lama’s game of words about his Middle Way and nonviolence policies, and despite his assurances to world leaders that he was not seeking separation from China, his goal had always been to achieve “Tibet independence.” No matter how he had adjusted this game of words according to circumstances, whether it was “high degree of autonomy” or “Middle Way,” all the terms he had employed were aimed at serving the ultimate purpose of separating Tibet from China. The Dalai Lama’s own statements and actions had shown that he had never abandoned the separatist stand or stopped his separatist activities. His statements about “true autonomy” instead of independence were no more than slogans aimed to deceive the international community and Tibetans within Tibet in order to put pressure on the Chinese government. However, “What is false will be proved false; and no matter how beautifully packaged its words are and no matter what crafty means it will employ, nothing can conceal its separatist essence of ‘Tibet independence.’”43 Another article refuted the Dalai Lama’s contention that his Middle Way proposals were in accordance with China’s Constitution. The Dalai Lama had claimed that Tibet was independent before 1950, which was a “conspiracy to falsify and blur the ownership of Tibet.” The Dalai Lama had also claimed that Tibet was a country under colonial occupation. In the Dalai Lama’s view, the issue of Tibet was not China’s internal affair but rather was one of Chinese colonialism in Tibet, which meant that Tibet could claim the right to national self-determination under international law. The Dalai Lama’s proposal for a democratic political system in Tibet would negate the existing socialist system. The proposal for a Greater TAR would imply that only Tibetans could live in this area and that China could not station the PLA there, all obvious
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violations of China’s Constitution and its sovereignty. Thus, although the central government had exercised utmost patience while pursuing dialogue with the Dalai Lama, it was the Dalai Lama himself who had undermined the basis for talks with his unacceptable policies and proposals. If the Dalai Lama were sincere about talks he should stop instigating and orchestrating violence, stop trying to sabotage the Beijing Olympics, and stop trying to split Tibet from China.44 Another theme of Chinese propaganda, primarily aimed at the Chinese people, was to blame the violence in Tibet on Tibetan Buddhist monks. Monks were an easy target since they had indeed led many of the demonstrations and in some cases had resorted to violence, a violation of their Buddhist principles. An article in Sichuan Ribao attempted to turn the Chinese people against the monks of Ngaba Kirti monastery, who had led one of the largest protests in eastern Tibet. The title of the article was “The Facts of the Incident of Assault, Vandalism, Looting and Arson Committed by Some of the Monks at the Kirti Monastery in Aba County.” The title betrays the theme, which was that there was an atmosphere of “propitious harmony and tranquility” before the monks, without any reason, began their rampage: Particularly shocking to the world’s people is that the chief perpetrators of this incident of violent crimes were actually a number of monks who violated the doctrines of Buddhism. They led the attack on police lines; they led the attack on party and government offices; they led the acts of assault, vandalism, looting and arson, trampling on the country’s laws and regulations, abandoning Buddhist doctrines; the violent conduct of a number of monks in the Kirti Monastery makes one bristle with anger.
The article assumed that the fact that monks led the protests in Lhasa as well as in Ngaba and other places proved they were in collusion with and were orchestrated by the “Dalai clique.” The Kirti monks were described as charging out of their monastery and assaulting innocent police who were doing their normal duties; they chanted reactionary slogans for Tibetan independence, distributed reactionary leaflets, hurled stones at policemen, and “madly carried out assault, vandalism, looting and arson.” They also carried the “snow mountain and lions flag” and pictures of the Dalai Lama. The police on duty were said to have acted with restraint, even when they were backed into an alley and several were injured. The police were described as “warriors” while the monks were “thugs.” Soon the protest spread to the town, shops and government offices were burned, and “the whole county town was enveloped in terror.” The protests were soon joined by townspeople and monks and nuns from other monasteries and spread to nearby towns.
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Several Han Chinese were quoted tearfully reporting the destruction of their shops. The violence by monks was reported to have provoked extreme anger from “people of all walks of life including monks and the Tibetan masses,” despite the fact that many lay Tibetans had joined in the violence. The “extremely small but organized number of people” were denounced by several who said they never imagined that monks would resort to violence. Raids on monasteries turned up weapons and reactionary propaganda materials, which were said to prove that the monks had planned the protest long in advance. Several local Tibetans were quoted denouncing the violence of the monks, calling for their severe punishment and professing loyalty to the party and government forever. By making absolutely no mention of any legitimate reason for Tibetan discontent, blaming all the violence on monks, and praising the restraint of the police while denying their acts of repression, the article aroused Chinese anger against the ungrateful Tibetans in general and the parasite unpatriotic monks in particular.45 Chinese propaganda extended to the visual level with the opening of an exhibition in Beijing at the Cultural Palace of Nationalities. The exhibition, “Tibet: Past and Present,” was billed as a chance to “get close to the real Tibet.” The exhibition was composed of some 160 artifacts and more than 400 historical photographs and graphics and its political intentions were explicit: Precious cultural relics, detailed historical documents, and concrete figures, as well as other exhibits collectively portray a history of Tibet with its ups and downs and tortuous development. They present the long history of inseparable links between Tibet and its motherland, cautioning people that the dark, barbarian feudal serfdom was not something in the distant past and reminding them to doubly cherish ethnic unity and firmly safeguard the motherland’s unification. Shocking pictures and photos of cruel flogging, enslavement, and torture bring people back to a barbaric world. They make people aware of the backward state and darkness of the old Tibet and realize that the feudal serfdom that integrated the church and the state and lasted for several hundred years in Tibet runs counter to the world’s progressive trend today and that the system, once reinstated, would throw Tibet back to the secluded state of poverty, backwardness, and atrophy and push the Tibetan people back to suffering and enslavement.
The exhibition was said to enable visitors to see the development and progress in Tibet under the leadership of the CCP and how “democratic transformation, regional autonomy and reform and opening up” had eliminated Tibet’s seclusion and social stagnation and enabled it to move toward a modern society. There were exhibits that testified to the “flesh-and-blood ties between Tibet and its motherland.” These were intended to demonstrate that Tibet had been an inalienable part of China since ancient times and that the Tibetan ethnic group was an important member in the big family of the Chinese
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nation: “Marching from darkness to light, from backwardness to progressiveness, from poverty to prosperity, from autocracy to democracy, and from seclusion to opening—this is Tibet, past and present.”46 Chinese propaganda about Tibet after the uprising gradually and naturally evolved toward fundamental themes such as the historical (Tibet has always been part of China) and class (feudal Tibet was a Hell on Earth) issues. The historical issue was essential in order to eliminate the possibility of Tibetans ever demanding the right to national self-determination in international law. Chinese “experts” attacked the two main historical studies by Tibetan or foreign scholars on that subject, A Political History of Tibet by Shakabpa and A Brief History of Tibet by the former British representative in Lhasa, Hugh Richardson (Li Jisheng in the Chinese rendering). Both were denounced as having been written specifically to produce evidence for “Tibet independence,” and for having “resorted to taking history out of context, distorting historical facts, and playing tricks” in order to “come up with all sorts of independence fallacies in order to lend support to the separatist conspiracy.” The flaws in their historical analysis were summarized: First, they distinguished Tibet’s ethnic group, language, and culture from Chinese culture, especially the culture of the Han nationality, which is the main nationality in China, even portraying them as opposed to each other. Second, they seized upon the relationship between Tibet and successive central governments and tried to make an issue of it, fabricating a history of Tibet as an independent country with a long unbroken lineage. Third, they sought to blur the line between nationality and country and equated the Zang [Tibetan] nationality with the Tibetan nation in an attempt to distort Chinese history and the history of inter-nationality relations from the perspective of parochial ultra-nationalism.
The fundamental premise of the Chinese argument was that nationality was not necessarily equivalent to country; that national identity did not necessarily demand a separate country or lead to the right to national self-determination; that this idea was a manifestation of “parochial ultra-nationalism,” while the more natural situation was that most states, like China, were multinational. The flaw in this argument was that China, with 92 percent of the population being Han Chinese, is one of the most unitary nationality states in the world and that other multinational states (such as the United States) had been formed by voluntary unification of nationalities. The Chinese argument goes on to deny that Tibet is any less a part of China because its relations were with non-Chinese conquest dynasties of China (Yuan and Qing) and not Han Chinese dynasties (Ming and the Chinese Republic). Instead, the nonHan ethnicity of the Yuan (Mongol) and Qing (Manchu) dynasties was said to testify to the historical multinational character of the Chinese state. The
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Chinese scholars’ theory of Chinese multinational state formation is based on the premise that state and nation are not equivalent, that the Chinese nation was not the same as the Chinese multinational state even in ancient times, and even dynasties that were exclusively Han were also multinational if only because they claimed an illusory dominance over surrounding states.47 Zhang Yun, of the China Tibet Studies Center, weighed with China’s most fundamental argument in regard to Tibet, that the Dalai Lama was in no position to demand human rights for Tibetans because he had been the head of the feudal serf system under which Tibetans had no human rights and from which they had been liberated by the CCP. Tibet had lagged in social development, and therefore in the concept of human rights, Zhang argued, due to isolation but primarily due to the backwardness of Tibet’s feudal social system, its theocratic political system, and the otherworldly nature of the Buddhist religion. The Buddhist religion “emphasizes the next life but downplays this life” and it removed the most talented people from social production. The theocratic system “stifled freedom of person and freedom of spirit and trampled upon humanity. It resembled an iron curtain that snuffed out the hope for local Tibetan development and the people’s dream of pursuing human rights.” The feudal lords were said to have been the only Tibetans who enjoyed any human rights. Zhang’s conclusion was that “old Tibet was a heaven for serf-owners but hell on earth for the serfs.” And he maintained that the “Dalai clique in exile overseas continues to represent the human rights and interests of the highlevel serf-owners.” The “Dalai clique” was accused of continuing a theocratic dictatorship in exile. The former serf-owners were said to continue to exercise power in the Tibetan government in exile and ordinary Tibetans to “continue to live in a state of enslavement.” Furthermore, the Dalai Lama had not been content to prevent the progress and development and human rights of Tibetans in exile but he had done so for those in Tibet as well with his constant disruptions of social stability there.48 The Party attempted to bolster the ideological conformity of its own members by a theoretical article in Xueshi Shibao, the ideological organ of the CCP Party School, about the nature of the Tibet issue. The 3.14 Incident had been a reminder that this would be a long struggle to safeguard the unity of the motherland and oppose nationality division. It was “not an ethnic or a religious issue,” but it “has a close relationship to the ethnic and the religious issue.” The Dalai Lama always “flaunted an ethnic banner and a religious banner,” but this was but a deception. The ethnic and the religious issue would continue to exist “in the initial stage of socialism, in the border areas inhabited by national minorities,” but ultimately the Party’s policy on nationality equality and unity and the policy on religious freedom would resolve all nationality issues.
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The Dalai Lama’s attempt to be the spokesman for the Tibetan nationality and to use ethnicity and religion to create divisions between nationalities would fail because of the ultimate certainty of the Party’s ideology on the nationality issue. The issue of Tibet was thus a separatist issue, an attempt by the Dalai Lama to re-create his feudal domain in Tibet, and he used religion and nationality to do so, but the issue was not an ethnic or a religious issue because the Party had resolved that issue by means of Marxist ideology and policy. The CCP should take more effective measures to “enhance legal education and patriotic education for monks in the temples, especially young monks.” The Party should help the monks, to understand that Tibet has been an inseparable part of China’s territory since ancient times, and make them gradually understand that the separatist activity of the Dalai clique not only goes against the law of historical development, but also violates the fundamental interests of the vast majority of the Tibetan people, so it is doomed to failure, and that only by taking the road commensurate with socialist society can one have a bright future. Under the caring leadership of the party Central Committee, with the assistance of the people throughout the country, the people of all ethnic groups in Tibet will more closely unite. No force can obstruct Tibet’s social development and progress.49
Lhasa’s China Tibet News, an Internet news site jointly sponsored by Tibet Daily, the daily newspaper of the Tibet Autonomous Region CPC Committee, and People’s Daily, the newspaper of the CPC Central Committee, intensified the criticism of the Dalai Lama by accusing him of violating his vows of abstinence, betraying his ancestors, bringing disaster to Tibet, and bringing chaos to religion. The article, without citing any evidence, claimed that the Dalai Lama “cannot persist in abstinence and, furthermore, has violated abstinence again and again.” He had betrayed his ancestors by advocating Tibetan independence when Tibet had been “an inseparable part of China since ancient times.” He had brought disaster to Tibet by defaming China in the international community; he had claimed that China had killed 1.2 million Tibetans and was guilty of cultural genocide. In fact “Tibet’s economy has developed, the society is stable, ethnic groups are united, religion is harmonious, and the broad masses of the people enjoy their lives and jobs. These facts have been witnessed by all.” Worst of all, the Dalai Lama had defended the feudal serf system, which, “as was known to all,” was more extremely corrupt and backward than that during the Middle Ages in Europe. The Dalai Lama said that he hoped to realize democracy and freedom within the Tibetan traditional system that integrates politics and religion: “This statement has allowed people to better see the true
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objective behind his repeated ‘lies’ and ‘blandishments’—restoring the hellish feudalist serf society.”50 Xinhua quoted the Dalai Lama saying, in 1956, “The Communist Party of China represents the interests of all ethnic groups in China. It has resolutely implemented the policy of freedom of religious belief since its birth.” Two telegrams from the Dalai Lama to Mao Zedong, in 1956 and 1957, praised the efforts of the CCP to protect religious freedom in Tibet. In April 1957, after his return from India, he wrote, “Through participating in the Buddhist meeting in India we have not only strengthened the friendly relations between China and India, but also made the world see that the policy of freedom of religious belief has been and is being implemented thoroughly in China.” From the Dalai Lama’s own statements, Xinhua claimed, “it is reasonable to conclude that China has maintained religious freedom in Tibet after the region’s peaceful liberation.” However, “In 1959 the Dalai Lama and the reactionary clique of the upper strata of Tibet instigated an armed rebellion in Tibet and went into exile abroad. They have since continuously claimed that ‘Tibet is lacking in the freedom of religious belief.’” Nevertheless, Xinhua said: “We can deduce from the contradiction of Dalai’s own words that the essence of the Tibet issue is fundamentally not a religious one. Religious freedom is only an excuse employed by the Dalai clique to split China.”51 Despite Xinhua’s claims, what the Dalai Lama said about religious freedom in 1956 and 1957 applied only to central Tibet, where “democratic reforms” had not yet been instituted and it certainly did not apply to any part of Tibet after 1959. Quishi, the official theoretical journal of the CCP Central Committee, made the usual Chinese argument that if the world knew what old Tibet was like under the Dalai Lama’s rule they could not possibly believe his pretensions to be a defender of human rights: “Before the Democratic Reform in 1959, old Tibet was under a long-term governance of the serf-owner class headed by the Dalai Lama and in a state of extreme darkness and backwardness in both its social and political systems and social and economic development, going against the trends of progress and advancement of modern human civilization.” Facts have adequately proven that the social and political system of old Tibet is an autarchy system which stifles the democratic rights of the masses and is the evil source of the people’s miserable lives in old Tibet. Old Tibet’s social and political system was against humanity. Serfdom featuring a combination of politics and religion gave rise to many evils which went against the laws of human subsistence and erased humanity. Facts have adequately proved that old Tibet’s social and political system was an evil system which stifles people’s right to subsistence and is a reactionary force that impedes human progress.
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Under the banner of protecting Tibetan culture, the Dalai clique had deprived the Tibetan people of their right to development. They had never done anything for the benefit of the Tibetan people and were only interested in the restoration of their own status and privileges. They had falsely accused China of trying to eliminate Tibetan culture. They had accused China of exploiting Tibet when in fact China had devoted huge financial resources to Tibet: Under the mask of defending the rights of the Tibetans, the Dalai Clique has attempted to split Tibet from China. Over a long period the Dalai Clique wrested the facts and fabricated many lies that “the Hans persecute the Tibetans,” such as “the Hans have massacred 1.2 million Tibetans” and “owing to Han immigration, the Tibetans have become a minority in Tibet.” Pretending to be “the representative of the interests of the Tibetan people,” the Clique has long engaged in political activities to split the country. By either plotting and instigating violence or successively putting forward the “great Tibetan region,” “high-degree of autonomy,” and “the middle course,” the Dalai has one real objective to seek “independence of Tibet,” to achieve separatist activities and go back to the old days when the old Tibet was built with the blood and tears of the serfs. Facts have shown that the nature of the Dalai Lama to protect the rights of Tibetan people is to defend his own interests, which betrays the interests of the Tibetan people and the Chinese nation as a whole. Today when modern civilization is highly developed, any plot which attempts to reduce Tibet to the dark ages of serfdom is doomed to fail and no fine dream which attempts to split Tibet from the big family of the motherland will succeed.52
Propaganda Aimed at Tibetans Beginning in April, Lhasa’s Tibet Daily published three series of commentaries, in Chinese and Tibetan, aimed at Chinese in Tibet and Tibetans, about the reactionary nature of the Dalai separatist clique. The purpose of this series was to “thoroughly expose and criticize the evil deeds of the Dalai separatist clique in instigating and masterminding the ‘3.14’ incident of serious crimes of beating, smashing, looting and burning,” and to expose the “shameless lies, reactionary nature and towering crimes of the Dalai separatist clique to broad daylight.” The first part of the first series cited evidence that the “3.14 incident of serious crimes of beating, smashing, looting and burning,” along with violent assaults by Tibetan independence elements against Chinese embassies and consulates abroad and their attempts to obstruct the Olympic torch relay, proved that they were all instigated by the Dalai separatist clique. “They also exposed the reactionary nature of the Dalai separatist clique in attempting to split the motherland and exposed the Dalai Lama as the chieftain of the separatist political clique plotting for ‘Tibet independence.’” The Dalai clique
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adjusted its strategy when it lost international support for its violent activities; then, it adopted the “middle way” and “non-violence principle” to disguise its continuing goal of independence. By claiming that it was no longer seeking independence and was only asking for a high degree of autonomy, the Dalai clique tried to use dialogue to achieve autonomy in order to reach independence step by step: No matter how the Dalai Lama changed his tactics and played tricks, he has never given up on sabotage activities aimed at splitting the motherland and has always been obstructing the unification of the motherland and the development of Tibet. Hard facts have proven once again that all the separatist and sabotage activities were organized and masterminded by the Dalai Lama from behind the scenes. The whole world knows that the Dalai Lama has always been the chieftain of the separatist political clique plotting for “Tibet independence.” This has never changed.
The Dalai Lama was denounced for having organized the violence within Tibet in an attempt to hijack the Beijing Olympics: “As proven by facts, this incident of violence was carefully masterminded and instigated by the Dalai clique in an organized and premeditated manner. The Dalai clique was the direct organizer, plotter and commander of the ‘Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement.’” The Dalai Lama’s “shameless and deliberate lies,” for example, that the Tibetans who rioted were “expressing Tibetan people’s aspirations by peaceful means when they had reached the end of their forbearance,” could not hide the “true intention and reactionary nature of the Dalai Lama in splitting the motherland and seeking ‘Tibet independence.’ . . . Countless facts have proved that the Dalai Lama is the culprit who is hurting the most vital interests of the Tibetan people, the scum of the Tibetan people, a disaster for the people of the whole country, and the chieftain of the separatist political clique plotting for ‘Tibet independence.’”53 The second part of the first Tibet Daily series denounced the Dalai Lama as a “faithful tool of international anti-China forces.” Tibet Daily asked, “Why do a small number of Western important political figures and media have an intense interest in the Tibet issue, which is an internal affair of China, and why have they not even hesitated to hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and undermine the diplomatic relations between their countries and China?” The answer was that this had nothing to do with any actual sympathy for Tibetans but was an attempt to oppose China because China’s rise was a threat to those countries’ hegemony: “This year, the international anti-China forces finally made use of the so-called ‘Tibet issue’ and the Beijing Olympic Games to launch an attack against China. The Dalai clique and the so-called ‘Tibet issue’ are a piece of chessman of the international anti-China forces for ‘containing’ China.”
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The Tibet Daily commentary accused Western countries of having continued to cultivate the Dalai Lama after the failure of their scheme of the 1980s to “disintegrate China,” “Westernize China,” and “promote peaceful evolution in China.” They awarded him the Nobel Peace Prize and, the “US Congress staged a farce of presenting a ‘gold medal’ to the Dalai Lama.” The Western countries, even though they were Christian and therefore must regard the Dalai Lama as a pagan, were willing to use him in their goal of opposing China. The Dalai Lama would in fact have no means of financial support except that he received subsidies from the CIA and several other U.S. government organizations. The Dalai Lama repaid his masters by selling out his national sovereignty and betraying national interests by accusing China of human rights violations in Tibet: All the shameless lies dished out by the Dalai Lama were either personally created by the international anti-China forces or done according to their suggestion. In the middle of the last century, under the manipulation of the United States, the United Nations spread slanders that the Chinese government infringed upon “the basic human rights and freedom” of the Tibetan people and deprived the Tibetan people’s “national self-determination right.” Now, “human rights” and “freedom” have become a “flag” of the Dalai clique for resurrecting the feudalistic serfdom. Even the non-existing “Tibet issue” is a “legacy” inherited by the Dalai Lama from Western colonialists. . . . The farce staged by the international anti-China forces about the “Tibet issue” is gradually coming to an end as the motherland has become more prosperous and stronger. Even though he is serving as a political tool of the international anti-China forces with all his heart, the Dalai Lama cannot avoid the destiny of being abandoned by his masters. When the time comes, you will know that all your clever calculations and intrigues have resulted only in your doom.54
The third part of the Tibet Daily series denounced the Dalai Lama as the root cause of social disturbances in Tibet. The primary evidence was the fact that “The Dalai clique plotted and organized the 14 March Lhasa incident all by itself, which was shocking, horrible, and inhuman to people and raised their hackles.” Social and economic development in Tibet was impossible without stability: “Unity is happiness, and division and disturbance are misfortune.” However, “the Dalai betrayed and fled the motherland fifty years ago and does not want to see development or the happiness of the people. Instead, he has created various incidents and disturbances in an attempt to undermine Tibet’s political situation of unity and stability and has seriously harmed the fundamental interests of the Tibetan people.” Besides “betraying his motherland,” the Dalai Lama was accused of the usual litany of crimes in exile, including setting up separatist organizations,
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which had “disrupted the unification of the motherland,” including a broadcasting station in the 1970s (presumably, All India Radio Tibetan Program), “through which they have created and spread many rumors, engaged in political demagogy and separatist instigation, incited ethnic contradictions, undermined ethnic unity, spread views on ‘Tibet independence,’ and instigated secessionist incidents.” He was accused of having used the opportunity offered by China in the early 1980s to send delegations to visit Tibet in order to instigate Tibetan independence. “Immediately after the ‘visiting group’ led by Zhandong Danzeng Langjie [Tenzin Namgyal Tethong] got off their cars, they went to the Jokhang Monastery to make a seducing speech and organized an illegal meeting at the Ganden Monastery at which he openly instigated ‘Tibet independence.’” The “Dalai clique” was also accused of plotting and instigating the disturbances of 1987 and 1989 in Lhasa. In addition, in 2008, “the Dalai clique brazenly created the ‘14 March’ violent incident in Lhasa shocking the world.” The Dalai Lama was accused of having been behind every disturbance in Tibet over the past fifty years. He had never done anything to improve the people’s living standards; instead, “Dalai has fabricated lies and agitated for ethnic hatred in an attempt to carry out his political plot of ‘Tibet independence’; he has tried by hook or by crook to create disturbances in Tibet with which to obstruct its economic development and social progress, so that he would be able to separate Tibet from the motherland and to restore his past rule.” This is what Dalai has done! So Dalai is the root cause of social disturbance in Tibet. . . . Facts speak louder than words, and a sense of justice is common to all people. As for what Dalai has done, the Tibetan people keep an account book in their minds—Without the Communist Party there would be no new Tibet, and only in the big family of the motherland is Tibet able to enjoy happiness today and will it be able to have an ever happier tomorrow. Whoever goes against the wishes of the people, undermines the unification of the motherland, and disrupts harmony and stability in Tibet sets himself against the people. By creating disturbances in Tibet, Dalai certainly will lift a rock only to drop it on his own feet, be cast aside by the people, and end in thorough defeat.55
In the fourth and final part of the first Tibet Daily commentary, the Dalai Lama was accused of being the biggest obstacle hindering the establishment of a normal order in Tibetan Buddhism. It began by pointing out that the “3.14 incident of violent crimes of beating, smashing, looting and burning” was led by a “handful of law-breaking monks and nuns.” However, the majority of religious believers had come to realize the following facts: The Dalai Lama, due to his reactionary nature as someone who attempts to overthrow the leadership of the CPC in Tibet, subvert the socialist system, negate the
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system of regional national autonomy, restore the barbaric and ruthless system of feudal serfdom, thereby undermining the stability of other border ethnic areas and split socialist countries, has for many years been using Tibetan Buddhism as his political tool to engage in all kinds of political activities aimed at splitting the motherland under the signboard of the “religious leader” of Tibetan Buddhism. He has done many things that seriously violated the doctrines and precepts of Tibetan Buddhism and wantonly disrupted the normal order of Tibetan Buddhism. Forgetting his own ancestral traditions, he has perpetrated many evil deeds that wandered from the right path. Facts have proven once again that the Dalai Lama is the biggest obstacle hindering the establishment of normal order in Tibetan Buddhism.
The Tibet Daily lectured the Dalai Lama on the true precepts of Buddhism and accused him of violating all of them in his pursuit of independence in the name of religion. The Dalai Lama’s lectures on religion, some of which were broadcast into Tibet, “were mingled with numerous remarks advocating ‘Tibetan independence’ and secession.” His sermons and speeches were smuggled into Tibet: “Many of these included political lies denigrating the government and demagogic remarks instigating separatist activities.” Normal religious activities were therefore affected. Some temples became bases of the Dalai clique and took orders from them to create disturbances: They wantonly engaged in political activities aimed at splitting the country and paid no attention to religious practice. They were lax in precepts and disorderly in management. There were no rules or procedures to follow in the recruitment of new monks. Unlawful and foul behaviors were common. Monks did not behave as monks and temples were not run as temples. The riots and serious incidents of violent crimes instigated and masterminded by the Dalai clique over the years brought serious and disastrous consequences to Tibetan Buddhism and did harm to many monks and nuns who were ignorant of the truth. Some eminent monks and religious dignitaries in Tibetan Buddhist circles were deeply worried and found this distressing and resentful.
The Dalai Lama was further accused of “interfering” in the system of reincarnation, which was rightly a prerogative of the Chinese government, by naming his own choices: Many historical archives of the local government of Tibet as well as the central government contained detailed records saying that the selection and confirmation of the reincarnated soul boy must be approved by the central government. Even the 14th Dalai Lama himself was enthroned with the approval of the central government. This embodies the central government’s sovereignty over Tibet and is an important historical convention in Tibetan Buddhism.
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The Dalai Lama “ignored religious rituals and historical convention out of his political plot to split the motherland and pursue ‘Tibet independence’” in selecting his own reincarnation of the Panchen Lama. “This was not only an attempt to negate the authority of the central government but was a betrayal of the traditions of Tibetan Buddhism.” The article even denied the Dalai Lama the right to decide on his own reincarnation, which would be chosen by the “traditional practice.” From the actions of the Dalai Lama and his reactionary clique, we cannot see any traits of a merciful heart to be of help to all and a humble wish to save all living beings. To the contrary, out of his political need to realize his conspiracy for “Tibet independence,” he openly trampled upon religious rituals and historical conventions in an attempt to lead Tibetan Buddhism astray. In so doing, he seriously ruined the reputation of Tibetan Buddhism and disrupted the normal order of Tibetan Buddhism. . . . Facts have proven that using religion as a political tool to harm the interests of the people, undermine ethnic solidarity and split the motherland is a dead alley that leads to nowhere. The Dalai Lama’s attempt to peddle his political ware and evil plots for restoring feudal serfdom and splitting the motherland will end in complete failure.56
In July, Tibet Daily published another series of commentaries on the reactionary nature of the Dalai Lama as seen in his “two-faced tactics.” Foremost among these tactics was his profession of nonviolence as a principle while using violence in his attempt to achieve Tibetan independence: In his reactionary career of many years seeking to divide the motherland and bring disaster upon Tibet, the Dalai has customarily employed the tactics of resorting to “nonviolence” when violence fails to work and reverting to violence when “nonviolence” fails to work. Nevertheless, countless facts have long proved that, whether the Dalai resorts to “nonviolent” or violent means, his criminal acts of dividing socialist China, refuting the ethnic regional autonomy system, and undermining Tibet’s development and stability are bound to fail. The myriad tricks of “nonviolence” or violence will only do more to expose his reactionary nature that brings disaster upon the country and the people and goes against the tide of history.
The Dalai Lama was described as posing as a Buddhist in religious garb and carrying out separatist and disruptive activities under the pretext of religious doctrine. In his speeches and sermons the Dalai Lama talked about altruism, harmony, and not taking life. However, “under the guise of these fine words, he has wantonly deceived the religious masses, worked constantly to provoke religious sentiment and sow discord, and gone all out to create various disturbances.” The proof of this was his instigation of monks in Lhasa to take part
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in the violent 3.14 incident. These monks had “extended their bloody talons and fangs, acting like wolves in human skin” and attacked innocent people, without sparing even women and children.” The Dalai Lama had instigated similar violence in eastern Tibet and, “far from showing even a smidgen of remorse,” had described these incidents as spontaneous and a result of Tibetan resentment at Chinese treatment. His justification was denounced as “an open instigation and encouragement of evil acts of terrorism and violence.” In this way the Dalai Lama had “seriously trampled upon the religious doctrine of Tibetan Buddhism and seriously discredited the fine tradition of Tibetan Buddhism.” In his international travels the Dalai Lama played the role of peace and human rights advocate and he talked about his concern for all the people of the world. However, he only pretends to care; in fact, “he does not think of the people’s well-being but only ‘cares’ about how to condemn the people in the world to eternal damnation by doing everything in his power to make them serve him in his efforts to divide the motherland and undermine Tibet’s development and stability.” The Dalai Lama spreads lies and rumors about China, such as that Tibetans live in fear, China has destroyed Tibetan culture, or China killed 1.2 million Tibetans. “He has been running around on his sinister errands, constantly clamoring for ‘sanctions,’ ‘interference,’ ‘investigations,’ and ‘concern,’ thereby completely showing his dark mentality of wishing for the world to be plunged into great chaos and for China to turn into hell on earth.” The Tibet Daily article then went through a list of the Dalai Lama’s “long history and tradition” of seeking Tibetan independence through violence. In old Tibet he had shown a “ghastly interest in collecting human bones and skin, the mere mention of which gave ordinary people the creeps.” He had associated with an Austrian Nazi (Heinrich Harrer) in Lhasa during the Second World War. The Tibetan rebels in 1959 were guilty of all sorts of atrocities, for which the Dalai Lama was also responsible. He plotted the Lhasa riots of 1987 and 1989, which threatened the Tibetan people’s lives and property. “The violence, bloodbath, and terror of the ‘3.14’ incident were particularly shocking to the world.”57 The second in the series of Tibet Daily articles on the Dalai Lama’s “doublefaced tactics,” was titled “The Lie of ‘Supporting the Olympic Games’ Can Hardly Cover Up the Fact of Undermining the Games.” The Dalai Lama was said to say one thing and do another; for instance, he preached “peace,” “nonviolence,” and “dialogue,” but these fine words were just intended to “cover up the violence that he orchestrated not too long ago.” He had said that he supported the Beijing Olympics, but the secessionists of the Dalai clique had harassed the Olympic torch relay and the Dalai Lama had not condemned them for it. In fact, the article said, the Dalai Lama and his clique regarded
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the Olympics as an opportunity to “internationalize the activities of dividing the motherland.” He had made it his practice to associate the “Tibet issue” with the Olympic Games. He urged his supporters to demonstrate during the Olympics for Tibetan independence. The world had bestowed upon China the sacred responsibility to host the Olympics, but the Dalai Lama had created interferences and sabotaging activities: “The tactics which the Dalai clique employs in its attempts to politicize the Beijing Olympic Games, associate the games with the ‘Tibet issue’ and broaden the international influence of secessionist activities is despicable and doomed to failure.”58 The theme of the third part of the second Tibet Daily series was that the Dalai Lama’s claim that he was just a Buddhist monk could not cover up his role as a politician. On his international travels the Dalai Lama often made statements such as, “As a Buddhist monk who abides by monastic disciplines, I can assure you that my wishes are genuine and my motive is sincere.” But, “A lie is a lie. No matter how he tries to cover up his intentions, what he has done has long exposed his features of a politico who puts on a robe and engages in political maneuvers.” The Dalai Lama had violated one of the most important of the Buddhist precepts, the article said, that of killing, due to his instigation of the “serious criminal act of beating, smashing, looting and burning in Lhasa on 14 March.” He was further accused of involvement in several political assassinations of people who disagreed with him. He was accused of lying by having said that Tibet had been an independent country and that it was now an occupied country. He had shown a lack of Buddhist compassion by saying that the Tibet issue was somehow more important than the Sichuan earthquake. From what the 14th Dalai has said and done in betraying his motherland for nearly 50 years, it is easy to see his ugly countenance of being a politico. . . . For a long time the 14th Buddhist monk has not been a Buddhist monk who “follows Buddhist disciplines” but an out-and-out reactionary politico who engages in maneuvers of dividing the motherland and seeking “Tibet independence.”
Why does the Dalai Lama, who only wants Tibetan independence and himself as ruler of Tibet, pretend to be just a Buddhist monk? The answer, Tibet Daily said, is that he needs to use Buddhism in order to reestablish the feudal serf system; he needs to pretend to be just a simple Buddhist monk in order to get foreign support; and he needs to be a Buddhist monk in order to create Tibetan separatism based on religion: The 14th Dalai is an exceedingly avaricious, angry and unrepentant person who, for his selfish interests, has betrayed the interests of the country and the nation,
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hence all the evil things he has done. The roots of all the evils can be traced from his obsession of restating the “theocratic” system that has long been swept to the garbage heap of history. We suggest Dalai to seek some advice of his Western masters whether they want to return to the time when the Christian church could dominate their societies before the Renaissance; and why did they reject the “theocratic” system that sounds as good as a paradise in Dalai’s mind. “Theocracy,” which goes nowhere in Europe, also will not be able to find any foothold in China. The reactionary scheme of Dalai the politico will never succeed.59
The fourth article in the Tibet Daily series on observing the Dalai Lama’s reactionary nature from his double-dealing tactics was titled: “Scurrying Visits Can Hardly Cover Up True Feature of Tail-Wagging Supplicating Lackey of the West.” The Dalai Lama was accused of intensifying his international activities after the 3.14 incident. His purpose was to “hoist the banner of religion and human rights, advocate ‘Tibet Independence’ and persuade and deceive the international community into pressuring China on the ‘Tibet issue.’ However in today’s highly informatized [sic] world, faced with the iron-clad historical facts and current realities, the Dalai’s customary tactics can hardly cover up the true feature of a tail-wagging supplicating lackey of the West.” Nevertheless, the Dalai Lama did not receive as much support as before. This was due to changing attitudes about Tibet: “First, the pursuit of ‘Tibet Independence’ no longer gains widespread support; second, Tibet is no longer referred to as ‘illegally occupied by China’; third, there is doubt about whether Tibet was that good 50 years ago; fourth, the Dalai is no longer perfect.” The Dalai Lama’s lower-level reception in some European countries, it was implied, was due to China’s forceful protests at the high-level reception he received in Germany and other countries in the summer of 2007. The Dalai Lama had therefore tried to disguise his goal of independence by talking about the preservation of Tibetan civilization and his “zone of peace” idea, which would be attractive to a foreign audience, but “insightful people” knew that this was nothing but another manifestation of Tibetan independence. In Britain he had said that Britain and Tibet had longstanding friendly relations, a statement that had filled the “insightful people of the Chinese Nation,” who had once resisted British imperialism, with “grief, indignation, insult and injustice.” The Dalai Lama had also said that the Tawang region of Tibet was part of India, which “perfectly illustrated his reactionary nature of selling out the motherland’s territory for personal motive and his true feature of a tail-wagging supplicating lackey of the West.” The Chinese people have long seen though his nature of forgetting his origins and splitting the motherland, and the Western world is also gradually coming to
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see his endless lies and true feature of a tail-wagging supplicating lackey. Over the years the Dalai clique has done all it could to internationalize the “Tibet issue”; however, the effect of winning the support of the so-called international community is still very limited, at least not a single country has recognized the so-called Tibet Independence. History has long proven that the “international card” cannot save the “dream of Tibet independence!” No matter how he changes its cloak, the road to “Tibet Independence” was never feasible in the past, is not feasible now, and will never be feasible in the future.60
The fifth article in this Tibet Daily series asked, with an incredulous tone, why the Dalai Lama rejected all the evidence of development and prosperity in Tibet: There is only one explanation for his attitude, that is, the extreme hatred from the bottom of his heart toward the socialist system, under which the Tibetan people are the masters; and this attitude is dictated by his reactionary nature as the representative of feudal society of selfdom. The so-called “religions and cultural autonomy” he has promoted is merely a fig leaf to cover his attempt to split the motherland and restore the feudal selfdom of combining politics with religion in Tibet.
If the Dalai Lama would only open his eyes he would see that Tibet has “fully exercised the autonomy of self-government and development of regional cultural undertakings.” It had protected ethnic culture and the freedoms of the Tibetan people in inheriting and developing traditional ethnic culture and religious belief. The Tibetan language had also been preserved and protected. Media in the Tibetan language were flourishing. Tibetan culture in the form of literature, songs, and dances had been collected and preserved. Even cultural relics were said to have been protected. The TAR had laws and statutes on protecting cultural relics and more than 300 million Yuan had been spent on restoring 1,400 temples and monasteries. The CCP also had a policy on freedom of religious belief: All kinds of religious activity proceed normally; the masses of religious followers’ needs are satisfied to the fullest extent; and the Tibetan people fully enjoy the freedom of religion. Countless facts have proven that under the leadership of the CPC and in the big family of the motherland, outstanding traditional Tibetan culture has been inherited and development on a large scale never seen before; and that the Tibetan people have enjoyed indisputable freedom of religion. Dalai’s so-called “religious and cultural autonomy” is nothing but a pretense of his vain attempt to split the motherland and take personal control and government of Tibet’s religion and culture. How can he impose his petty selfish interest on other people? His wishful thinking will never be realized.61
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In mid-August, Lhasa’s Tibet Daily published a third series of articles in Chinese and Tibetan. The theme of the series was that unity and stability represent happiness while separation and disturbance lead to disaster. The first article began by extolling the CCP for its wise and correct policies that had led to remarkable development and prosperity in Tibet. However, “When the people lead a happy life, it’s a hard time for the reactionary elements. Under the instigation and support of hostile forces of the West, the Dalai clique, which has never intended to see that the people lead a happy life, has continuously changed its tricks in an attempt to thwart the development and progress in Tibet.” The Dalai Lama had instigated the revolt in 1959, the disturbances in 1987 and 1989, and the “serious criminal incident of beating, smashing, looting, and arson” of March 2008. These instances of interference and sabotage had caused damage to Tibetans but they had also enabled them to understand the Dalai’s reactionary nature “and the truth that unity and stability represent happiness and separation and disturbance lead to disaster.” In order to cherish their present happy life it was necessary for Tibetans to take a clear-cut stand against separatism and create a peaceful and harmonious social environment. “The facts, past and present, suggest that our struggle against the Dalai clique and the hostile forces of the West is not an ethnic issue, religious issue, or a human rights issue. It is a major political struggle between separatism and anti-separatism.” Tibetans should adhere to the Party’s policies for Tibet, for it was only because of those policies that Tibet enjoyed its current prosperity: “In order to promote stability, it is necessary to hold high the banner of safeguarding social stability, socialist legality, and the fundamental interests of the people. In order to promote stability, it is necessary to strengthen national solidarity.”62 The second article in this series sought to prove that not only such economic activities as tourism were harmed by the 3.14 Incident, but the economy of farmers and herdsmen was adversely impacted as well: “Facts have adequately proven that only in a greater environment of unity and stability can the production of agriculture and animal husbandry maintain good development, and peasants and herdsmen can obtain advantages and material benefits.” Tibetan agriculture and animal husbandry was said to have been improved dramatically with the Party’s assistance since the “peaceful liberation.” Many of these improvements came about through “inland technicians and local people working together.” The stability of agricultural and pastoral areas was the foundation of their development, so that they could “settle down” and “get cash income.” “The development course of Tibet after the peaceful liberation tells us that all the turmoil and sabotage created by the Dalai Clique harm the fundamental interests of peasants and herdsmen in the end.” The Dalai Lama was said to have
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never mended a single canal or built an inch of road for the Tibetan people: “The only thing he did was disrupt and sabotage our progress in becoming rich and heading toward a well-off life, splitting our motherland, creating turmoil, harming our fundamental interests, and sabotaging the happy lives created for us by the party.” The Tibetan farmers and herdsmen would not be deluded by the Dalai Lama’s lies, Tibet Daily said, and they would understand that the turmoil caused by his sabotage was against their fundamental interest.63 The third part of the third Tibet Daily series focused on the theme that stability was a necessity for development and prosperity of the Tibetan people: “Unity and stability command popular support of people of all nationalities in the Tibet Autonomous Region and this represents the well-being of the masses, while on the other hand, secession and disturbances can bring only economic stagnation and enormous worries for the masses.” Secession and disturbance were a “calamity,” the article said, while unity and stability “equate to fortune” and “represent the fundamental interests of 2.8 million people of all nationalities in the TAR.” The economic losses from the 3.14 incident were some 250 million Yuan. The industry most impacted was tourism.64 Part four of this series reiterated the wisdom of the CCP’s policy of reform and opening up, which was naturally accompanied by social transformation: Advancing from darkness to light, from backwardness to progress, from poverty to prosperity, from autocracy to democracy, and from self-enclosure to openness, today’s Tibet has plunged itself into the mighty torrent of reform and opening up of the entire country . . . . Without stability, there could hardly be development; and without development, stability would also be unlikely. Only through development are we able to solve all the problems in Tibet, and only under a stable environment are we able to deepen reform, expand the scope of opening up, and gain a development by leap and bound in Tibet.65
Part five of the series focused on national unity as a prerequisite for development and happiness: “With the country’s integrity, national unity, and social stability, the people will live a happy life and the economy will develop; when the country splits, the nation is in discord, and society is in turmoil, the people will suffer and the economy will remain stagnant.” The antirebellion theme was bolstered with evidence that Tibet had always developed the most rapidly when there was “unity and stability,” and had suffered when there were disruptions organized by the Dalai clique. The 1959 revolt, organized under the leadership of the Dalai Lama, had caused economic disruptions that were only alleviated with the implementation of democratic reforms and regional autonomy, which “helped emancipate the productive forces and
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bring about fast economic development.” This economic development was again sabotaged by the Dalai Lama in 1969 when he organized the Nyemo revolt. He did it again in 1987 and 1989 when “the Dalai clique incited several incidents to disrupt and undermine Tibet’s economic buildup.” For the next eighteen years Tibet experienced its best period of economic development, only to be sabotaged again in March 2008.66 The sixth and final part of the third Tibet Daily series reiterated the theme that Tibet had always prospered under the correct policies of the CCP and it had only suffered due to the Dalai Lama’s sabotage. This line of reasoning included the extraordinary claim that the Nyemo revolt of 1969 “destroyed the economic and social situation which was improving,” not from the chaos of the Cultural Revolution but from the leftover effects of the feudal system. According to this Chinese theory nothing was ever the fault of the CCP’s policies, not the largest man-made famine in human history during the Great Leap Forward, not the economic breakdown during the Cultural Revolution, and not the disaster of communization. Instead, everything had been fine in Tibet under the Party’s leadership, even during the Cultural Revolution, except when it was sabotaged by the Dalai Lama from his exile in India, including his latest attempt in March: Ironclad evidence has repeatedly shown that the disturbances have merely brought pain and calamity to the people of Tibet, and this has confirmed the truth that unity and stability mean fortune while secession and disturbance equate to calamity. Only by cherishing the great situation of stability and unity which has not come easily, clearly recognizing the reactionary nature of the Dalai clique, combating secession with a clear-cut stand, and firmly seizing development, can we ensure good and rapid economic and social development in our region.67
The Tibet Daily series of articles was an attempt to blame all economic disruptions in Tibet on the absent Dalai Lama and to deny any responsibility for the CCP’s actual policies. In addition, it was meant to warn Tibetans that their economic situation would suffer if they supported the Dalai Lama’s separatist campaigns. Implied was the message that they would also suffer politically if they failed to support the CCP’s policies of national unity and ethnic harmony and if they failed to denounce the Dalai Lama personally. The fundamental message of the series of articles was that Tibetan stability was necessary for the prosperity of China and for the Chinese in Tibet. Tibetans should therefore abandon any agitation or any hope for changes in Chinese policies in Tibet, especially those advocated by the Dalai Lama, for the sake of their own political and economic benefit.
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In mid-August, Tibet Daily claimed that the Dalai Lama was no longer popular among Tibetans. The contention that the Dalai Lama was no longer popular, despite the overwhelming contrary evidence demonstrated by Tibetans in March, was presented as the results of a survey through secret questionnaires at several Tibetan educational institutions. The survey was conducted by the “research group on the topic of moral education and political ideology education at schools in Tibet,” at six universities and colleges, and three hundred elementary and middle schools in five prefectures and cities, including Lhasa, Tsetang (Ch. Shannan), Nyingtri (Ch. Linzhi), Shigatse (Ch. Rikaze), and Chamdo (Ch. Qamdo). The results of the survey were said to have “fully reflected the hearts and minds of people of all ethnic groups in Tibet and exposed the true color of the Dalai clique.” To “dispel misgivings among interviewees and enhance the verity and validity” of the survey, the questionnaire was done “in a secret manner to allow the interviewees to fully express their opinions.” There were forty questions on the questionnaire, covering issues such as the “understanding of and the attitude toward the motherland, the understanding of and the attitude toward nationalities, the understanding of and the attitude toward religions, the understanding of and the attitude toward culture, and the understanding of and the attitude toward the Dalai clique.” When answering the question about their attitude toward the Dalai clique, more than 90 percent of students and teachers “steadfastly opposed separatism” and said that the Dalai Lama was a separatist. The results of the survey were said to show that teachers and students in Tibet “command strong mainstream political ideology.” The masses of the teachers and students are steadfast in their political stance of the “Four Fundamental Principles” of Marxism; they support the party leadership and unswervingly implement the party line and guiding policies; they have clear understanding about the reactionary nature of the Dalai clique’s futile intent to split the motherland and about the nature of the 14 March incident in Lhasa; they are well aware of the historical fact that Tibet has been an inseparable part of China since ancient times; they think that protection and development of the Tibetan culture has been unprecedented, that the party policy on freedom of religions and beliefs has been fully guaranteed, and that regional autonomous system by nationalities is the fundamental support system for development and stability in Tibet.68
This survey was conducted between 10 June and 4 July 2008, at the same time and at the same institutions where Patriotic Education was being carried out, perhaps by the same personnel. Despite the “secret” nature of the survey, few Tibetans could have had any confidence that their opinions would not be revealed to the cadres conducting Patriotic Education. Having just been
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subjected to a campaign to teach them the “correct” answers to questions essentially the same as those asked on the survey, Tibetans knew what answers were expected and they knew the consequences for giving the wrong answers. Perhaps what is most surprising is that almost 10 percent still dared to give the wrong answer about the Dalai Lama. Although aimed at Tibetans, the survey was apparently intended to reinforce to Tibetans what they should believe and what they were required to express at least outwardly, but it may also reflect the attempt by Chinese and Tibetan cadres to convince themselves that they, not the Dalai Lama, had the loyalty of Tibetans.
White Paper on Tibet In September, the Information Office of China’s State Council published its seventh White Paper on Tibet, titled “Protection and Development of Tibetan Culture.” Its three sections were on the Tibetan language; Tibet’s cultural heritage, religious beliefs, and “native customs”; and the development of modern science, education, and media. The purpose of the White Paper was said to be to refute the Dalai Lama’s claim that China was guilty of cultural genocide in Tibet. A secondary theme was to expose the Dalai Lama’s demand for cultural autonomy as really meant to achieve independence. The publication of a new White Paper at this time was apparently meant to build on the international goodwill China believed it had gained due to its successful conduct of the Olympics. It was thought that this would create a more receptive international audience for China’s version of the reality of Tibet. The White Paper was also evidence that China had no intention of altering its policy in Tibet or of talking with the Dalai Lama about those policies. The primary theme of the new White Paper was that Tibetan culture had not in any way suffered under Chinese rule but had been successfully “inherited, protected and promoted.” The Chinese government had devoted a large amount of manpower, materials, and funds to the protection and promotion of Tibet’s traditional culture while at the same time vigorously developing modern science, education, and culture. The Chinese government had attached great importance to the protection and development of Tibetan culture over the past half-century and especially since the adoption of reform and opening up policies in 1978. The White Paper was intended “to give the international community a better understanding of the reality of the protection and development of Tibetan culture, citing facts to expose the lie about the ‘cultural genocide’ in Tibet fabricated by the 14th Dalai Lama and his cohorts, exposing the deceptive nature of the ‘cultural autonomy of Tibet’ they clamor for, and to further the protection and development of Tibetan culture.”
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The Dalai Lama’s accusation of cultural genocide in Tibet as well as his demand for cultural autonomy were said to be part of his attempt to gain independence under his own rule and to restore the former feudal system. The Dalai Lama and his supporters were condemned for wanting to keep Tibet in a premodern stage without any of the benefits of modern technology or development. The Dalai Lama and his supporters were hypocritical, the White Paper said, because they enjoyed all the benefits of modern culture, but they still wanted to deny such benefits to Tibetans. The White Paper also defended the interaction and fusion of Tibetan culture with Han Chinese culture as natural and inevitable. Tibetan culture was said to have developed under unique natural conditions as a distinct culture but also “by means of interaction and fusion with other cultures, especially that of the Han people.” Tibet had long been a society “languishing under a system of feudal serfdom under theocratic rule, a society which was even darker than the European society of the Middle Ages.” Before 1959 the 14th Dalai Lama, as a leader of Tibetan Buddhism and also head of the “Tibetan local government,” monopolized both political and religious power. The serfs and slaves, making up over 95 percent of the total population in old Tibet, suffered destitution, cruel oppression, and exploitation, and possessed no means of production or personal freedom, not to mention access to culture and education. The long centuries of theocratic rule and feudal serfdom suffocated the vitality of Tibetan society and led to the decline of Tibetan culture. The founding of the PRC was said to have “brought hope to the protection and development of Tibetan culture.” After the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the Central People’s Government “helped Tibet protect and recover its traditional culture, and develop its modern cultural, educational and health sectors, opening up a completely new chapter for the development of Tibetan culture.” The Democratic Reform in 1959 abolished theocratic feudal serfdom and ended the monopoly of the nobility and senior monks over culture and education: “The broad masses of serfs and slaves were politically, economically and mentally emancipated, and became the real masters in protecting, developing and enjoying Tibetan culture. The reform made Tibetan culture a people’s culture, and inaugurated a promising future for its development.” The Tibetan language, “a member of the Han-Tibetan language family” (not the Sino-Tibetan language family), was said to hold “a special position among the diverse languages and cultures of the Chinese nation.” The Chinese government had “attached great importance to guaranteeing the Tibetan people’s right to learn and use the Tibetan language, both spoken and written, and has made huge efforts in promoting the learning, use and development of it, registering major progress.” The learning and use of the spoken and
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written Tibetan languages were guaranteed by law. The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China and the Law on Ethnic Regional Autonomy both prescribe that all ethnic minorities have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages. In old Tibet only the nobility learned the proper language: “After the peaceful liberation of Tibet, the Central People’s Government paid great attention to the learning and popularization of Tibetan, and made clear requirements for people who were to go to Tibet on learning, using and spreading Tibetan.” After the Tibet Autonomous Region was set up in 1965, “it was stipulated that schools of all kinds and at all levels must lay stress on the learning and use of Tibetan and strengthen work on the teaching of Tibetan. A bilingual teaching system was adopted in an all-round way in the educational sector of Tibet, with priority given to teaching in Tibetan.” Media and publications in Tibetan were well developed. “The application of computer technology and wide use of the Internet have provided a new platform for the learning, use and development of the Tibetan language.” The second section was on the “Inheritance, Protection and Promotion of the Tibetan Cultural Heritage.” Tibet’s cultural heritage is an important part of China’s cultural heritage: “The Central People’s Government sets great store by the protection and development of traditional Tibetan culture, devoting a great amount of human, financial and material resources through legal, economic and administrative means to ensure the inheritance, promotion and development of the fine traditional culture of Tibet on the basis of effective protection.” Since the Democratic Reform in 1959, “the Central People’s Government has attached great importance to the protection of cultural relics in Tibet.” Since the 1980s, the state had allocated a huge amount of funds to repair key cultural relic sites in Tibet. The Central People’s Government invested more than 300 million Yuan to help Tibet renovate and open to the public over 1,400 monasteries. From 1989 to 1994 the Central People’s Government allocated 55 million Yuan and a great amount of gold, silver, and other precious materials for the renovation of the Potala Palace. In 2001, a special fund of 330 million Yuan was apportioned to repair the Potala Palace, the Norbulingka, and the Sakya Monastery. During 2006–2010, the central government would allocate 570 million Yuan for the repair and protection of twenty-two key cultural relic sites in Tibet. “Such a colossal investment and large-scale renovation were unprecedented in China’s history of cultural relic protection.” The third section was about how religious beliefs and “native customs” have been respected. The White Paper says that the Chinese government “has set great store by respecting the freedom of religious beliefs and customs of
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the various ethnic groups living in Tibet.” It then condemned the Tibetan politico-religious system as a theocracy, “like that in the Middle Ages of Europe.” The upper class dominated the politics, economy, and culture of Tibet, and controlled the practice of Tibetan Buddhism. This was not religious freedom at all: “Under the system of theocracy and religious autocracy, the ordinary people had no freedom of religious belief at all.” Such freedom was gained only after the Democratic Reform, which “toppled the decadent and outdated theocracy and the religious regime controlled by the Dalai Lama and other living Buddhas, and separated religion from politics. The monasteries were put under democratic management, thus providing an institutional guarantee for the freedom of religious belief.” The Chinese state had “placed Tibetan Buddhism under effective protection as part of traditional Tibetan culture.” The state had made great endeavors to preserve monasteries, cultural relics, and sites of historical significance in order to “satisfy the needs of religious believers.” Since the 1980s, more than 700 million Yuan and a large quantity of gold and silver had been appropriated for repairing a large number of religious sites. “The murals, sculptures, statues, thangkas, sutras, ritual implements, and Buddhist shrines have been well repaired and protected.” The government had appropriated more than 40 million Yuan for the collation and woodblock printing of the Tibetan Buddhist canon, Tengyur and Kangyur. “Normal religious activities and beliefs” were protected by law. The Buddhist system of reincarnation was respected by the state and forty “living Buddhas” had been approved “in line with religious rituals and historical practice.” Since the 1980s, more than forty religious festivals had been resumed. “Many believers have sutra rooms or shrines in their homes, and they often circumambulate monasteries and sacred places, go on pilgrimages, or invite monks or nuns to conduct Buddhist services.” Tibetan customs and lifestyle had been respected and protected. “Since Tibet’s peaceful liberation, the Chinese government has respected and protected the customs and lifestyle of the Tibetan and other ethnic groups in the Tibet Autonomous Region, including respect for and guarantee of their freedom to conduct religious and folk activities.” “Since its peaceful liberation in 1951, along with the drive for modernization, in Tibet not only the fine traditional Tibetan culture has been inherited, protected and promoted, but modern scientific, educational, journalistic and cultural undertakings have also been developing in an all-round way.” A “historical leap” had been achieved in education. In old Tibet, access to education was restricted to members of the aristocracy. Now, all Tibetans had access to schools, including schools in the interior. “An unprecedented advance had been made in academic research.” There were more than fifty Tibetology
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research institutions in the country, including the China Tibetology Research Center, with nearly three thousand experts and scholars. Chinese Tibetology “enjoys high reputation among the Tibetology circles throughout the world.” The press and publishing industry in Tibet was flourishing, as was the radio, film, and TV industry. In conclusion, the White Paper maintained that its “facts” proved that there has been no “cultural genocide” in Tibet at all: “On the contrary, the traditional culture of Tibet has been appropriately inherited, effectively protected and vigorously promoted, while modern Tibetan culture, oriented toward modernization, the future and the rest of the world, has opened up to the outside world and achieved rapid and all-round development propelled by Tibet’s economic and social development.” The “14th Dalai Lama and his clique” had spread the rumor about the “cultural genocide” in Tibet to the world “in defiance of objective facts.” It is known to all that the 14th Dalai Lama and his clique are the chief representatives of the backward feudal serfdom system and culture of theocratic rule and religious despotism that used to prevail in Tibet, as well as the vested-interest monopolists of the political, economic and cultural resources of old Tibet. . . . Facts prove that the 14th Dalai Lama and his clique are the representative and guardian of the backward culture of old Tibet, and that China’s Central People’s Government and the local people’s government of the Tibet Autonomous Region are the ones that truly protect and develop Tibetan culture. The 14th Dalai Lama and his clique fled abroad nearly half a century ago, and have never made any efforts for or contributions to the protection and development of Tibetan culture. However, they absurdly claim themselves to be “protectors of Tibetan culture.” They have clamored about the “cultural genocide” in Tibet for the sole reason that their cultural despotism and cultural system along with their cultural privileges and vested interests have been irretrievably destroyed due to the irresistible development of Tibetan culture. The 14th Dalai Lama and his clique’s clamor for “cultural autonomy of Tibet” is essentially a political conspiracy to restore theocratic rule over the culture of Tibet and other Tibetan-inhabited regions, and thus realize the “independence of Greater Tibet.” Such a scheme of historical retrogression is bound to fail.
The White Paper concluded: It is an overwhelming historical trend for the times to move forward, society to progress and culture to develop. . . . People who conform to the mighty trend of modernization will prosper, while those who do not will perish. . . . The 14th Dalai Lama and his clique and the anti-China forces in the West conspire to force the Tibetan ethnic group and its culture to stagnate and remain in a state similar to the Middle Ages, in effect to become living fossils, while they themselves enjoy the fruits of modern civilization and culture. Such an attempt must
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have ulterior motives. The people of Tibet and other ethnic groups in China will absolutely not fall for such a scheme.69
The White Paper’s emphasis on its protection of Tibetan culture after 1978 is revealing, since China has good reason to not want its record on protection of Tibetan culture before that time to be too closely examined. China’s claim that the Dalai Lama and his supporters want to keep Tibet in an undeveloped state is an attempt to equate Chinese culture with modernity and to obscure the issue of Tibet’s right to develop independently of Chinese control. By claiming that Chinese culture is the same as modern culture, the Chinese can argue that Tibetan resistance to Chinese culture is the same as resistance to modernity. In this way the Chinese pretend that there is no controversy over the nature of China’s “socialist” culture or China’s right to impose its culture on Tibet. However, the White Paper does not address the issue of Tibetans’ right to develop their own culture as they themselves decide. China’s new White Paper on Tibet, like all those in the past, thus fails to address the real issue of Tibet or to justify any of China’s policies in Tibet. The problem for China in justifying its policies in Tibet is that it is unable to justify the fundamental right of China to control Tibet and to decide how Tibet and its culture should develop.
Notes 1. Kristine Kwok, “Tibet Leaders Vow to Do All to Keep Region under Control for Games,” Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 8 March 2008. 2. “Instigation of Tibetan Independence Doomed to Fail,” Beijing, Xinhua, 8 March 2008. 3. “Tibet Crushes a Series of Conspiracies by Dalai Clique,” Beijing, Xinhua, 8 March 2008. 4. “Foreign Ministry Spokesman: We Hope the Dalai Lama Can Face Up to History and the Reality,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 11 March 2008, in OSC, CPP20080311074006. 5. “Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Answers a Reporter’s Question on a Recent Incident in Lhasa Where a Small Number of Monks Stirred Up Troubles,” Beijing, Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service in Chinese, 13 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080313163002. 6. “Elaborately Planned Atrocity,” Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po in Chinese, 17 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080317710003. 7. “Resolutely Hit Back in Tit for Tat Fashion to Ensure Social Stability in the Tibet Autonomous Region,” Lhasa, Zhongguo Xizang Xinwin Wang in Chinese, 17 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080317530002. 8. “Epicenter of Lies,” Beijing, Xinhua, 18 March 2008.
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9. “Zhang Qingli Stressed Fear No Fatigue, Fight Successively, and Restore the Normal Work and Life Order of the Masses of All Nationalities as Soon as Possible,” Lhasa, Zhongguo Xinwen Wang in Chinese, 17 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080317530003. 10. “Lethal Weapons Not Used in Tibetan Unrest,” Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 18 March 2008. 11. “Sinister Ambition Is All Too Clear,” Lhasa, Zhongguo Xizang Xinwen Wang in Chinese, 18 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080318584014. 12. “Regional CPC Committee Convenes Standing Committee Meeting to Look into and Arrange the Work of Preserving Stability,” Lhasa, Zhongguo Xizang Xinwen Wang in Chinese, 20 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080320530002. 13. “The Dalai Clique’s Claim of ‘Tibetan Cultural Genocide’ Is a Pack of Lies,” Beijing, Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service in Chinese, 19 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080319364001. 14. “Uphold Rule of Law, Protect the People, Safeguard Stability,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 22 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080321074009. 15. “Evil under the Sun: A True Account of the Beating, Smashing, Looting, and Burning Masterminded by the Dalai Clique in Lhasa,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao (Overseas Edition, Internet Version) in Chinese, 18 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080318710003. 16. “The Dalai Clique’s Plot Is Doomed to Bankruptcy,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao (Internet Version) in Chinese, 20 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080320710002. 17. “Dalai Clique’s Masterminding of Lhasa Violence Exposed,” Beijing, Xinhua in English, 30 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080330968057. 18. “Dalai Clique Is Mastermind and Instigator of Incident of Violence of Beating, Smashing, Looting and Burning in Lhasa,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 30 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080330005002. 19. “Only by Halting Violence Can There Be Harmony,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao, 8 May 2008. 20. “Tibet TV’s Coverage of Lhasa Riots Focused on Condemnation of Dalai Lama,” OSC Report, 19 August 2008, FEA20080819755036. 21. “Strive for the Victory of the Anti-Secessionist Struggle and Usher in a Happy Future for Tibet,” Lhasa, Zhongguo Xizang Xinwen Wang in Chinese, 3 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080403584006. 22. “The Eight-Power Allied Forces Are behind Tibet Independence,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao (Internet Version) in Chinese, 9 April 2008, in OSC, CPP20080409710011. 23. “Riots in Tibet Connected with the United States,” Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao (Internet Version) in Chinese, 9 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080409710010. 24. “Looking at the Roots of ‘Tibet Independence’ from Britain’s Two Invasions of Tibet in History,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 6 April 2008, in OSC, CPP20080406005001; “British Invasions Probed as Root Cause of Tibetan Separatism,” Beijing, Xinhua in English, 8 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080406968064. 25. “TYC, a Terrorist Organization More Catastrophic Than Bin Laden’s,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao, 10 April 2008. 26. “What Issue Is ‘Tibet Issue’”? Beijing, Renmin Ribao in English, 16 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080417701001.
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27. “Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme Meets Xinhua Reporter, Makes Statement on Seriously Violent Criminal Incident of Smashing, Looting, and Burning in Lhasa,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 23 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080323338004. 28. “What the Dalai Secessionist Clique Does Is Tantamount to Lifting a Rock Only to Drop It onto Its Own Feet,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 27 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080327338008. 29. “Fresh Negative Material That Helps Clearly See the Dalai Clique in Their True Colors,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 24 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080324163005. 30. “Expose the Real Features of Lawless Monks Who Violate the Precepts and Betray Their Heritage,” Lhasa, Zhongguo Xizang Xinwen Wang in Chinese, 25 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080326530005. 31. “Lay Bare True Colors of ‘Tibet Independence,’” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 25 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080325063011. 32. “Real Intention of ‘Middle Way’ of Dalai Clique Is to Realize ‘Tibet Independence,’” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 28 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080328716003. 33. “Dalai Clique’s Essence in Splitting the Motherland Remains Unchanged,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 30 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080330063008. 34. “Who on Earth Is Bringing Misfortune to the Tibetan People?” Beijing, Guangming Ribao (Internet Version) in Chinese, 3 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080403710011. 35. “Historical Facts of Tibet,” Beijing, Xinhua, 25 March 2008. 36. “Dalai Stand Condemned through the Ages for Destroying Ethnic Unity,” Lhasa, Zhongguo Xizang Xinwen Wang in Chinese, 26 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080326530004. 37. “Another Crime of the Dalai Clique,” Lhasa, Zhongguo Xizang Xinwen Wang in Chinese, 28 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080328071001. 38. “Tibetan Affairs Experts Comment and Analyze the Violent Incident in Lhasa at a News Conference for Chinese and Foreign Reporters,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 26 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080326074011. 39. “He Who Is Unjust Is Doomed to Destruction,” Lhasa, Zhongguo Xizang Xinwen Wang in Chinese, 27 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080327530007. 40. “Dalai Clique Not Qualified to Talk about Human Rights at All,” Lhasa, Zhongguo Xizang Xinwen Wang in Chinese, 29 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080331530022. 41. “Seeking Secession under the Pretext of ‘Freedom’ and ‘Human Rights’— Commenting on the 14 March Violent Incident of Beating, Smashing, Robbing, and Burning in Lhasa, Orchestrated by the Dalai Clique,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao (Internet Version) in Chinese, 29 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080329722008. 42. “‘Peaceful Aspirations’ Expressed through Violence?” Beijing, Renmin Ribao (Internet Version) in Chinese, 30 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080331710001. 43. “‘Game of Words’ Cannot Conceal the Essence of ‘Tibet Independence,’” Beijing, Renmin Ribao (Internet Version) in Chinese, 1 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080401710005.
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44. “So Where Does the ‘Middle Path’ Go?” Beijing, China Daily (Internet Version), 2 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080402968012. 45. “Lies Cannot Conceal Evil Nature,” Chengdu, Sichuan Ribao (Internet Version) in Chinese, 10 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080410072013. 46. “Tibet: Past and Present—A Grand Theme Exhibition,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 30 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080430364003. 47. “Tibet Experts Refute Fallacies Fabricated by the Dalai Clique and Foreign Anti-China Forces about Jurisdiction over Tibet,” Beijing, Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service in Chinese, 22 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080422354002. 48. “The Dalai Clique and So-Called ‘Tibet Human Rights,’” Beijing, Renmin Ribao (Overseas Edition) (Internet Version) in Chinese, 1 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080501710004. 49. “Thoughts Lhasa 14 March Incident Leave with Us,” Beijing, Xuexi Shibao in Chinese, 14 April 2008, in OSC, CPP20080502622001. 50. “Lies and Blandishments to Blindfold People’s Eyes,” Lhasa, Zhongguo Xizang Xinwen Wang in Chinese, 31 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080331530021. 51. “Two Telegraphs Sent by the 14th Dalai Lama to Chinese Leader Mao Zedong in 1956 and 1957 Defied Proclamations That Tibet Is Lacking in Freedom of Religious Belief,” Beijing, Xinhua, 8 June 2008. 52. “Looking at the Dream of Dalai Clique Today from the History of Old Tibet,” Beijing, Quishi Online in Chinese, 1 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080501710003. 53. “The Dalai Lama—Chieftain of the Separatist Clique Plotting for ‘Tibet Independence’—First Installment of a Series of Commentaries Exposing the Reactionary Nature of the Dalai Separatist Clique,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 22 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080507050002. 54. “Faithful Tool of International Anti-China Forces,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 23 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080507050003. 55. “Dalai: The Root Cause of Social Disturbance in Tibet,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 24 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080507050004. 56. “The Dalai Lama: The Biggest Obstacle Hindering the Establishment of Normal Order in Tibetan Buddhism,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 25 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080507050005. 57. “Lies of ‘Nonviolence’ Can Hardly Hide the Truth of Violent Incidents—First in a Series of Commentaries on the Reactionary Nature of the Dalai as Seen in His Two-Faced Tactics,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 30 June 2008, in OSC CPP20080819480003. 58. “The Lie of ‘Supporting the Olympic Games’ Can Hardly Cover Up the Fact of Undermining the Games,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 5 July 2008, in OSC CPP20080819480004. 59. “The Title, ‘Buddhist Monk,’ Can Hardly Cover His True Feature of a Politico,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 7 July 2008, in OSC CPP20080819480005. 60. “Scurrying Visits Can Hardly Cover Up True Feature of Tail-Wagging Supplicating Lackey of the West,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 11 July 2008, in OSC CPP20080819480002.
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61. “Religious and Cultural Autonomy’ Can Hardly Cover the Essence to Split the Motherland,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 16 July 2008, in OSC CPP20080717066001. 62. “Unity and Stability Represent Happiness and Separation and Disturbance Lead to Disaster,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao Online in Chinese, 14 August 2008, in OSC CPP20080815480001. 63. “Turmoil Harms the Fundamental Interests of Peasants and Herdsmen,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 7 August 2008, in OSC CPP20080818480004. 64. “A Good Development Environment Is the Fundamental Guarantee for the Masses to Receive Tangible Benefits,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 8 August 2008, in OSC CPP20080818480005. 65. “Reform and Development Call for Stable Social Environment,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 10 August 2008, in OSC CPP20080818480007. 66. “Without Stability, There Can Be No Good and Fast Economic Development,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 11 August 2008, in OSC CPP20080818480006. 67. “Development Is Impossible without a Stable and United Social Environment,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 13 August 2008, in OSC CPP20080818480003. 68. “Dalai’s Futile Attempt to Split the Motherland Is Unpopular; Survey Fully Reflects Hearts and Minds of All Ethnic Groups in Tibet and Exposes the Dalai Clique’s True Colors,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao in Chinese, 15 August 2008, in OSC CPP20080818480001. 69. “The Information Office of China’s State Council on Thursday Issued a White Paper Titled ‘Protection and Development of Tibetan Culture,’” Beijing, Xinhua, 25 September 2008.
4 Tibet and the Olympics
T
MARCH 2008 UPRISING IN TIBET was an international event, arousing interest in the Tibet issue, sympathy for the Tibetans who demonstrated, opposition to the repression by Chinese security forces, and condemnation of the associated violence on both sides. China denied that its security forces had resorted to violence in repressing the demonstrations and rejected much of the international media coverage as biased. The international response to the events in Tibet evolved into calls for a boycott of the Olympic Games, or at least the opening ceremonies by international leaders, and pressure on China to dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Popular international support for Tibet was expressed in demonstrations against the Olympic Torch relay that China had unwisely expanded into a worldwide propaganda event that included taking the torch to the summit of Everest and parading it through Lhasa. The threat to the Beijing Olympics was alarming to the CCP, which had elevated the event into a defining moment for modern China and a legitimating event for the CCP itself. The Olympics were intended to demonstrate that China was modern and prosperous under the rule of the CCP, whose political ideology and style of rule should therefore be seen as legitimate despite its undemocratic and authoritarian characteristics. Even a proposed boycott of the opening ceremonies by world leaders was a threat since the CCP had invited an unprecedented number of world leaders to the Olympics and had construed their attendance as signifying international acknowledgment of the CCP’s accomplishments and legitimacy. Their attendance became even more important to the CCP after the events in Tibet. HE
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Protests against the torch relay were also an intolerable embarrassment to the Party and the Chinese people, who reacted as if China’s honor had been questioned and its right to hold the Olympics challenged. Since the Chinese people tended to believe their government’s propaganda that the protests in Tibet were instigated from outside and that there were no reasons for Tibetan discontent, they interpreted the protests against the torch relay as aimed at denigrating China rather than supporting Tibetans’ rights. Since most Chinese believed that Tibetans had benefited from Chinese rule, they assumed that international interest in Tibet and support for Tibetans was misinformed at best or aimed against China at worst. This of course played into the Chinese sense of past victimization at the hands of these same countries who now claimed such interest in the welfare of Tibetans.
China’s Response to International Criticism Only days after the riots of 14 March, Xinhua denounced the Dalai Lama for using the Beijing Olympics to drum up publicity for Tibetan independence. The tone of this article and others was one of righteous indignation that the Dalai Lama would use his evil separatist ambitions to besmirch the Olympics, which represented the hopes of the world for harmony between peoples. While the people of all nationalities in China were enthusiastically preparing for the Olympics, which would allow them to use their own multinational solidarity to enhance cooperation with the peoples of all nations and promote a harmonious world with peace and prosperity, the “Dalai Clique” saw an opportunity to internationalize their Tibetan independence activities. The Dalai clique intended to turn the Olympics into “an arena on which they can stage large-scale propaganda and publicity campaigns and intensive demagoguery for the purpose of splitting the country.” The usual Chinese reminder of the fact that no country in the world had recognized Tibetan independence was extended into a false assertion that it was “common knowledge that none of the countries in the world thinks Tibet has grounds for independence.” China was faced not only with the protests in Tibet, which had spread to all parts of ethnic Tibet and showed no sign of lessening despite large repressive forces rushed there, but also with international protests that threatened to disrupt the torch relay and perhaps even the Olympics. China railed against any attempt to politicize the Olympics, the hosting of which was a “sacred right granted by the people of the world.” China denounced the ploys that the Dalai clique was using to politicize the Olympics and to “link the Tibet issue with the Beijing Olympics, thereby to boost the international influence of their separatist activities.”
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China dismissed the Dalai Lama’s public statements that he was in favor of China holding the Olympics, choosing instead to focus on his words that the Olympics would provide an opportunity for the world to engage China on different issues and that Tibetans should therefore hold demonstrations during the Olympics. China also cited the activities of the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) and other organizations of the Dalai clique and their plan to march to Tibet from India. The TYC in particular was accused of favoring Tibetan independence and the use of terrorist tactics. The name chosen for the march from India to Tibet, the Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement (TPUM), was cited by China as evidence of an intention to foment violence inside Tibet. These “facts” were used to substantiate China’s contention that the Dalai Lama was behind the disruptions in Tibet: The Dalai clique organized, premeditated, and carefully engineered and instigated the incident of beating, smashing, looting, and burning by a tiny minority of people in Lhasa on 14 March. Once again, they offered sacrifice to their consistent, maleficent act of splitting the country and machinating “Tibetan independence” with the raging flames ablaze on the state property and the property of the masses and with the blood of innocent people. . . . All people with goodness of heart in the world who uphold fairness and justice are aware that the Dalai clique’s acts of splitting the country have not stopped even for a moment. The lies they tell, such as “nonviolence,” “a high degree of autonomy,” and “supporting the Beijing Olympics,” cannot conceal the essence of their attempt to “split the country” and “seek Tibetan independence.”1
Xinhua opined that China was being unfairly criticized for what was actually a “humane way of checking violence and terror” in Tibet. China had “quieted down the riot in Lhasa with just limited tear gas and warning gun shots.” Nevertheless, there was an international uproar of condemnation and calls for restraint. Why, Xinhua asked, was China put under such pressure when it did what any other country would do to bring back order on a piece of its own land? The reason was because it was China, which the West was used to criticizing, and it was Tibet, the reality of which the world was intentionally ignorant: Some people, organizations and countries seem to be conditioned to opposing anything that China does in Tibet, either because of their ignorance of the whole story about the roof of the world or a habitual cold-war mentality to contain China. So they jumped out, calling for boycotts and condemnations against the Chinese government, which took legitimate actions to safeguard the security of its people, but turning a blind eye to those rioters, arsonists and killers.
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Xinhua complained that the West had for many years promoted a stereotype of big China bullying little Tibet. The Dalai Lama had exploited and encouraged this misconception in order to expand the living space for his secessionist campaign. However, “The card players must alert themselves to a dangerous prospect.” Their appeasement had groomed a group of Tibetan radicals who were poised to become a terrorist force that would be a problem for those countries that had supported them: If the international community does not contain the radicals, they will sooner or later evolve into a more dangerous force, posing security threats to the region and further afield. As long as the international community acknowledges Tibet is part of China, as all countries that have diplomatic relations with China actually do, the Tibet issue will remain a card, and only a card but nothing else, in the hands of certain Western politicians or pressure groups. They should also be aware that China, a nation with an inherent determination to safeguard territorial integrity, will never brook any separatist activities. It’s time to end the card games.2
Xinhua may have been correct that many westerners labored under misconceptions about Tibet. One of the most common misconceptions was that Tibet was a simple issue that could be resolved through dialogue. This idea had undoubtedly been promoted by the Dalai Lama’s Middle Path policy, which called for dialogue to resolve the issue within China’s Constitution. This misconception was most often expressed as an appeal from a foreign leader to his Chinese counterpart to talk to the Dalai Lama, as if the Tibet issue were a simple misunderstanding that could be resolved if the parties could be brought together and convinced to abandon their mutual animosities. For example, in 1998, U.S. president Clinton encouraged Chinese president Jiang Zemin to talk to the Dalai Lama, saying that he would find the Dalai Lama a likable fellow with whom he could dialogue. International leaders’ ignorance of the historical and political complexity of the Tibet issue surfaced again when leaders were asked to respond to the events in Tibet. UK prime minister Gordon Brown found himself in a difficult position when, after being told by China’s president Hu Jintao that he was willing to meet with the Dalai Lama, imagined this a breakthrough. This news was conveyed by the international press as if it really represented a new Chinese offer on Tibet, despite a denial by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Hu’s remarks to Brown represented any change in Chinese policy toward the Dalai Lama. Brown was unaware that Hu’s offer to talk was nothing more than the usual Chinese position, expressed to Brown as a perfunctory restatement of a policy that China had held for almost thirty years. Brown, imagining that Hu’s offer indicated some Chinese flexibility on Tibet, announced
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that he would meet with the Dalai Lama on an upcoming visit to Great Britain, perhaps expecting to play a role as mediator, or at least not expecting that his meeting with the Dalai Lama would be intolerable to the Chinese, which of course it was. China misinterpreted the conversation between Brown and Hu in its own, more intentional way. Chinese media reported Brown to have said, in response to Hu’s informing him about the truth of the recent “serious violent criminal incident” and the Chinese government’s “principled position” on the issue, that the British side also “opposes violent criminal activities.” There was no mention of Brown’s intention to meet the Dalai Lama, only that Brown would attend the Olympics. Thus the impression was given to the Chinese people that Britain supported the Chinese government fully and condemned the violence by Tibetans, while in reality Brown had advised the Chinese government to refrain from violence.3 China responded to international calls for dialogue with the Dalai Lama by reiterating its willingness to dialogue at any time if the Dalai Lama would just give up independence and stop his separatist activities. His instigation of the riots in Tibet was cited as evidence that he had not satisfied China’s conditions and that therefore it was he, not China, who was unwilling to dialogue. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Qin Gang, called on the Dalai Lama to “genuinely abandon his proposition of so-called ‘Tibetan independence’ and bring all activities of splitting the motherland to a complete halt.” He said that recent events in Tibet had shown that the Dalai Lama was not sincere about dialogue: “We hope that Dalai would come to his senses once and for all, thereby to create conditions for dialogue.” The “serious incident of criminal violence that happened in Lhasa recently, involving beating, smashing, looting, and burning, once again fully exposed the separatist nature of the Dalai clique.” Qin said that China hoped that the international community would recognize the “separatist essence of Dalai” and stop supporting him. Qin characterized international support for the Dalai Lama as aimed at opposing China: “Some people in the international arena do not wish to see China developing and they attempt to create obstruction.” He said that some media coverage of Tibet was “seriously inconsistent with the facts” and he called on the international media to “respect objective facts with a responsible attitude and provide objective and fair coverage according to the code of conduct of the journalism profession.” “Facts allow no distortion and defy cover-up. . . . We believe that as investigation progresses, relevant evidence will continue to come out into the open.”4 A Xinhua article complained about biased international media coverage. It questioned why China was being pressured about Tibet and wondered how anyone could sympathize with the “ransacking mobs” in Lhasa who engaged
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in “violent manslaughter, arson and sabotage of public facilities.” The article assumed it was because they “really know too little about China and China’s Tibet,” and all they did know came from the “so-called Tibetan government in exile and other anti-China cliques.” The Dalai Lama had won some sympathy from “the naive and from those who hate to see even the slightest signs of development in Tibet.” Such people hoped to isolate Tibet from the rest of the world by opposing development there and, when this failed, by claiming cultural genocide. Their purpose was to keep Tibet as a “stereotyped cultural specimen” for their own enjoyment. These were the people who had opposed the railway to Tibet. However, Xinhua asked, “Would anyone of them readily choose to live in the old Tibet themselves, working under the whips of serf owners, and trekking for weeks just to get to Lhasa?”5 Ragdi (Ch. Raidi), one of Tibet’s “liberated serf” officials, expounded on the theme that it was the very success of CCP policies in Tibet, rather than their failure, that had led to the riots. He said that the “atrocities and crimes” perpetrated by the Dalai clique in Lhasa “make people boil with anger.” “We must use facts to fully expose the truths behind the beating, smashing, robbing, and burning perpetrated by the extremely small number of lawless elements, and expose the Dalai clique’s scheme of seceding Tibet from the motherland and undermining the Beijing Olympic Games,” he said. He had seen that some politicians and media in the West had advised the Chinese government to exercise restraint, not use violence to suppress peaceful demonstrations, and respect human rights. These “irresponsible comments” ignored the facts, confounded black and white and showed the ulterior motives of those making such suggestions. “This is preposterous! This is infuriating!” Because of the Central Government’s correct leadership and the energetic support from people across the country, the past 20 years have been the best years for Tibet’s development and stability. . . . Tibet today is a place marked by logical administration, harmonious people, booming businesses, economic growth, social progress, stability, national solidarity, strong border defense, and people living in peace and working in contentment. . . . The Dalai clique, however, considers it a thorn in the flesh. It does not want to see that the emancipated Tibetan people are now the masters of their own house. It does not want to see that the Tibetan people are now able to live in happiness under the CPC leadership. They have racked their brains to harass and undermine Tibet’s development and stability. They have never stopped making troubles! Thus, we had anticipated that the beating, smashing, robbing and burning incidents like those in Lhasa would take place sooner or later.
Ragdi repeated the contention that the Tibet issue had nothing to do with nationality or autonomy or human rights or religious freedom. It was only about splitting the motherland, he said. “It is a major struggle waged
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between us and the Dalai clique over national unity and secession. On this issue concerning major issues of principle, there is no leeway whatsoever for compromise.”6 The widespread demonstrations against China at its embassies and consulates were also attributed to the machinations of the Dalai clique and Tibetan independence elements. The Chinese ambassador to the United States, Zhou Wenzhong, speaking to a Chinese audience in Washington, said that the attempt by Tibetan independence elements to split the motherland and undermine the Beijing Olympics exposed the true aim of the Dalai clique in pursuing Tibetan independence. Zhou thanked the vast numbers of Chinese in the United States for supporting the government’s handling of the Tibet incident according to law and for condemning the Tibetan independence elements and the Dalai clique’s separatist attempt.7 This was one of the first indications of how the CCP would exploit the virulent nationalism of overseas Chinese. China responded to widespread calls for dialogue by claiming that it was always willing but the Dalai Lama had consistently sabotaged any such dialogue by his persistent pursuit of Tibetan independence. The Dalai Lama’s recent urging of the international community to pressure China to dialogue “so as to resolve the Tibet issue by nonviolence means” was but a trick by the Dalai Lama, whose real purpose was independence: “This ‘trump weapon’ under hypocritical disguise meticulously designed by the Dalai clique is deceiving some good and honest people who do not know the truth and is also making a fool of some Western ‘human rights activists.’ The Dalai clique has attempted to put the Chinese Government under the international pressure of being ‘not willing to hold dialogue and talks with the Dalai Lama.’” In fact, Xinhua said, the door to talks was always open so long as the Dalai Lama abandoned independence, stopped all secessionist activities, and recognized that Tibet was part of China and the PRC was the sole legitimate government of China. These conditions were “perfectly in keeping with historical facts and the political mainstream of the contemporary world. As we all know, no country in the world thinks there are grounds for Tibet to be independent; nor has the government of any country recognized the ‘government in exile’ of the Dalai clique.” “In the mirror that reflects the truth,” Xinhua said, the illusory image of nonviolence and nonindependence dressed up by the Dalai Lama actually reflected his lack of sincerity for dialogue. The actions of the Dalai clique over the past showed that it had never abandoned independence nor stopped its secessionist activities. The violent riots in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet were the latest example revealing the true separatist colors of the Dalai clique. The Chinese Central Government, in contrast, had always sincerely hoped to resolve the Tibet issue through dialogue and talks and was always making
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constructive efforts to this end. When the Dalai led the rebellion in 1959 and fled into exile, Mao Zedong expressed his “sincerity and good intention” by inviting him to return. However, he chose to continue his rebellious and secessionist activities from exile. At the end of 1978 Deng Xiaoping stated clearly his willingness to hold dialogue; however, “the Dalai clique showed no sincerity at all, but played tricks, beat about the bush, constantly set barriers to dialogue, and stuck to the baseline of separating the country and plotting for ‘Tibet independence.’” The Dalai clique had never recognized that Tibet was a part of China in history, but claimed that it was a country invaded and occupied by China. They had never recognized the existing system in Tibet but instead intended to set up a new one. They insisted on establishing a “Greater Tibet” with an area nearly one quarter that of the PRC, which never existed in history, and demanded that the PLA and all Han people should move out of this area. They also proposed a “one country, two systems” type plan for resolving the Tibet issue, even though there was no “resumption of Chinese sovereignty” over Tibet (requiring the integration of different political systems), unlike Hong Kong and Macau, since Tibet had always been a part of China. This demand, along with that for a “high degree of autonomy” and a “greater Tibetan area” were actually independence in disguise. The Dalai Lama’s proposals were tricks to achieve the real goal of independence; therefore, he had no sincerity for dialogue at all. While the Dalai clique was engaged in these tricks, Tibet was making tremendous achievements in economic and social development; the Tibetan people had become masters of the country and fully enjoyed democratic rights and economic, social, and cultural rights. The Tibetan culture had been greatly protected. However, the Dalai clique, because of its scheme for Tibetan independence, had been unwilling to admit these facts.8 China’s campaign to alter the international interpretation of the Tibetan events and to contribute to the Chinese people’s sense of biased treatment by the outside world included a forum of Chinese journalists and “journalistic scholars,” at which the hypocrisy of the Western press about Tibet was denounced. They cited the Western media’s bias and “distorted reporting” about the Lhasa riots. They said that some Western media had “violated the basic journalist principle of truth, objectiveness and fairness, and made untruthful and biased reports through spreading rumors, quoting out of context or fabricating stories.” This was now such an article of faith among the Chinese people and a primary propaganda position of the state media that it was not considered necessary to cite any evidence. Instead, “the participating journalists and journalistic scholars expressed their anger, denounced the Western media’s behavior, and analyzed the hypocrisy of the Western journalistic outlook.” They opined that “facts cannot be distorted and the truth
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cannot be buried” and said that the Western media had only hurt their own reputation and credibility. The Western media’s “untruthful reports” were said not to be accidental; rather, they were “inspired by the Western media’s deep-rooted bias against China.” The Chinese journalists and scholars advised the Western media to adhere to the principles of truth, objectiveness, and fairness. They were advised to abandon their anti-China prejudices and report truthfully about Tibet. Some Western media had not only deliberately distorted the facts but had also made up false stories. By thus “turning a blind eye to the real facts,” they had “hurt the professional reputation of the journalists of the whole world.”9 The tone of this article was consistent with that of much of Chinese opinion about Tibet in that the truth of the Chinese point of view was unquestioned. There was no admission of any possibility of inaccuracy in the Chinese version of Tibetan history or of the hypocrisy of the Chinese government propagandists’ accusing the independent Western press of lack of objectivity. China reacted strongly to the visit of Speaker of U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, to Dharamsala only days after the riots. Pelosi had been on a previously scheduled visit to India and the stop in Dharamsala had also been preplanned, but the visit appeared to the Chinese to be part of an anti-Chinese conspiracy. Hong Kong Ta Kung Pao, which often seemed to be used to put forth the hardest line, said that Pelosi’s visit was a part of the Western “hostile forces” plot to disrupt China’s stability and unity and to contain China’s rise to world power status. The article complained that some Western countries had shared the Dalai clique’s hope to sabotage the Beijing Olympics and to cast shame on China. It was only for that reason that they failed to support China in its legitimate repression of the criminal acts of the Tibetan rioters and instead criticized China for its supposed violations of human rights in doing so: According to the international convention, as countries having diplomatic relations with China, Britain and the United States should logically have supported China’s action of safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Dalai is the representative for the Tibetan serf system characterized by government-religion integration. He is a political refugee who has long engaged in the activities of splitting the motherland and disrupting national unity. Meeting with the Dalai means encouraging and supporting his attempt to split the motherland. This is an act of perfidy and is therefore held in contempt by the majority of the people in the world who support China’s territorial integrity and love peace.10
China served notice in a Xinhua article that it would not let the threat of an Olympic boycott force it to compromise with the “Dalai clique.” Written
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in a defiant tone, the article declared that it would not submit to the demands of the “lobbyists and activists who serve anti-China plots.” In a statement that presaged the popular Chinese support for the government and the government’s exacerbation and exploitation of that support, China declared the Tibet issue one on which it would never compromise: Closely tied to China’s national interests in territorial integrity, the Tibet issue is one where the government will never compromise, even if those boycotters see the Olympics as a historical chance to pressure the country. The noisy boycotts will become weightless compared with Chinese people’s mounting support, which can be seen in online forums and blogs, to the government’s actions in restoring stability in Lhasa and other ethnic Tibetan areas. Behind their support is the inherent determination of the nation to safeguard sovereignty.
China also cited the “will of the international community,” which was against any politicization or disruption of the Olympics. It condemned those organizations and individuals who thought that their own will should take precedence over the “Olympic Charter, which outlaws political acts and religious or racial propaganda.” The Games were in danger of becoming a political hostage when international politicians conditioned their presence in Beijing over dialogue between China and the Dalai Lama. However, they made a “romantic mistake, neglecting the unchanged Chinese stance on its dialogue with the Dalai Lama.” They had also ignored the fact that many countries had voiced their support for China and many international leaders had reiterated that they would attend the Games: “They should be aware that neither pressure nor boycotts will force the Chinese government to compromise with secessionists. On the contrary, their appeasement of separatist activities would only encourage the Dalai Lama and his supporters to drift further away from the negotiations table and resort to more violence and terror.”11 In a Xinhua article titled “Stop the Irresponsible Clamor!” China continued to pose as the defender of the “Olympic Spirit.” The article complained about European threats to boycott the opening ceremonies if China did not reduce its repression in Tibet and dialogue with the Dalai Lama. As the article said, when the Chinese people and those of the world were looking forward to celebrating the Olympics, the president of the European Parliament, HansGert Pottering, “made some extremely irresponsible public remarks centering on the violent incidents of beating, smashing, looting, and burning that happened in Lhasa and other places.” Pottering had said, “If the violence in Tibet continues, European countries should not rule out threatening China with a boycott of the Olympic Games.” Xinhua condemned this as “an absurd remark that stood facts on their head.”
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As everyone knows, the Lhasa incident was separatist violence elaborately engineered and deliberately stirred up by the Dalai clique and the beating, smashing, looting, and burning by an extremely small number of people seriously harmed human rights and jeopardized public security and social order. This is an undisputable fact obvious to all the local populace and foreign tourists. On the other hand, the Chinese Government’s restoration of normal order to Lhasa and other places by taking action in accordance with the law precisely was a necessary, legitimate measure that has the understanding and support of more than one hundred countries in the world.
Xinhua opined that the president of the European Parliament should know about the system of legal justice and the right of modern civilized countries to stop violent crimes, protect the citizens’ safety, and restore social order: As president of the European Parliament, Pottering ought to know democracy. The Olympic Movement is the movement with the widest participation of the populace worldwide while the granting of the Olympic sponsorship to Beijing was the result of the International Olympic Committee’s democratic decision making and a reflection of the democratic will of the majority of countries in the world. To threaten to “boycott the Olympic Games” actually is to boycott the International Olympic Committee’s democratic decision making, thereby putting oneself on the opposite side of the big international family.
Pottering was also accused of going against the international popular will because of the dubious claim that the award of the Olympics to China represented the popular will of the countries of the world. His statement was characterized as reflecting the political prejudice of “certain people” in the West. Furthermore, such irresponsible statements were unpopular in the international community and had “badly hurt the feelings of the 1.3 billion Chinese people, and have put him on the opposite side of a quarter of the world’s population. No reasonable people would do that.” He was accused of cherishing cold war thinking and taking a distorted view out of hostility to China. Such people “shut their eyes to China’s stability, development, and prosperity and invariably find fault with, smear, and accuse it; this only shows their conceitedness and ignorance.” However, no matter how they clamor, the Chinese people would not waver in their determination to make a good job of sponsoring the Beijing Olympic Games: “Nothing will come out of the clamor of an extremely small number of people!”12 An article in Ta Kung Pao accused Western countries of attempting to exploit the Tibet issue not out of any real sympathy for or interest in Tibet but in order to divide and weaken China: Since the beginning of reform and opening up, China’s economy has developed rapidly and comprehensive national power has been strengthened. China’s
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international prestige has been rising and the role played by China in international affairs has become greater. All those have expedited the crumble of old international order and intensified the tendency of multi-polarization. The situation has affected the vested interests and benefits of some countries and made them unhappy. In particular, after China put forward the call of peaceful rise, those countries that attempt to continue their leading position in the world and set rules and order to gain benefits feel greatly nervous and uneasy. They do not want to see an ideologically totally different big country to rise in the East, do not want to have any challenge to their leading position in the world, and do not want to see the slightest loss of their vested interests and benefits. Therefore, they always want to place obstacles and create troubles. Based on their own wishful thinking, they hope that China will split and become smaller.
The article warned the leaders of those unnamed countries that their support for the Dalai clique was a naked intervention in China’s internal affairs. They were accused of having “instigated the Dalai clique to follow the evil road of splitting the motherland and egged the Dalai clique on to be enemies of the whole China.” They were warned that if they had been unable to split Tibet from China during the first half of the twentieth century when China was weak, they would be unable to do so now when China was strong and prosperous. Their actual goal was to denigrate China and hamper its inevitable rise to great power status.13 The Dalai Lama’s professed support for the Beijing Olympics was refuted by Renmin Ribao, using as evidence his instigation of the “3/14 Incident” as well as the incident on 30 March of a Tibet supporter’s disruption of the lighting of the Olympic Torch in Greece. The Dalai Lama’s and other Tibetans’ call for using the Olympics to publicize Tibet’s cause was blamed for inciting Tibetans to violence within Tibet and for Tibet supporters’ attempts to disrupt the “sacred Olympic torch.” The Dalai Lama was accused of using his nonviolence policy as a cover for his crimes of violence within Tibet. He was condemned for trying to hold the Beijing Olympics for ransom in order to force concessions from China and thereby further his goal of Tibetan independence. The tone of this and other articles was one of righteous indignation and an attempt to arouse such feelings among the Chinese people, but it also revealed a real fear that China’s celebration of its own glory, and that of the CCP, at the Olympics was in jeopardy. Chinese propaganda attempted to associate the Beijing Olympics and China’s hosting of the Games with the loftiest aspirations of mankind and to ostracize any criticism as contrary to the “harmonious society and harmonious world” that China claimed to be creating: The Olympic Games carries man’s common hopes and dreams and is where worldwide sincere yearnings for peace and progress are placed. It is a result of
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civilization that is shared by various countries, various faiths, people of different colors, and various races and a humanistic treasure jointly owned by them. Any individuals or cliques that take advantage of the Olympic Games to build momentum for a separation and seek to politicize the Olympic Games are bound to meet with universal condemnation, and failure inevitably will be the ending waiting for them.14
The U.S. Government’s Open Source Center (OSC) did an analysis of posts on Chinese blogs that revealed some frightening Chinese opinions about the need to suppress the Tibetans and almost no sympathy for their reasons for demonstrations and protests. The analysis was for the period between 10 March and the beginning of April, before international protests against the Olympic Torch relay aroused similar emotions among Chinese worldwide. Comments by Chinese Internet netizens about Tibet included statements such as “Kill all those who oppose the great China!” “Don’t be soft, kill!” “Resolute suppression!” “Never tolerate separatism!” and “No mercy!” One post said, “For the greater good, either give in or just kill Dalai Lama.” Only one anonymous poster, who identified himself/herself as Tibetan, asked for tolerance, saying Tibetan people were also victims of the riot and asked other posters not to say things like “kill, kill, kill.” On Sohu.com the overwhelming majority of the comments represented the same call for resolute suppression. Some accused Tibetans of lack of gratitude and called Tibetan monks “parasites.” Some asked that the Dalai Lama be “brought to justice.” One post said “Love China, hit reactionary organizations hard, protect 2008 Olympic Game.” Another suggested that the “Tibetan independent movement” be defined as a terrorist organization and be shut down. This was echoed by many others. Of 1,823 posts on Sina.com, all called for suppression of the Tibetan separatists. Many urged the classification of the Dalai clique as a terrorist group. Some cited the U.S. response after 9/11 as an example of how China should respond to the Lhasa riots. U.S. and other international support for the independence of Kosovo was cited as a bad example. Some posters suggested that China’s development had brought fear to the West, whose primary goal in recent years had been to divide and weaken China. One poster suggested taking it easy (on Tibetans) now, and then after the Olympics, to “settle accounts.”15 The Wall Street Journal reported that several foreign journalists stationed in China had been subjected to a campaign of harassment for alleged bias in their coverage of unrest in Tibet. The intimidation included hundreds of calls and text messages to the cell phones of journalists, particularly some of those who took part in a Chinese government–organized visit to Lhasa at the end of March. Complaints centered on the journalists’ reporting about the reasons for Tibetan discontent and on Chinese repression of Tibetans after the revolt,
Map of PLA invasion routes in 1950 in the “Peaceful Liberation of Tibet.”
Tibetan soldiers at Chamdo surrendering to the PLA, “after learning of the PLA’s lenient policies toward rebels.” 20 October 1950.
British “secret agent” Robert Ford captured at Chamdo during the invasion of Tibet, October 1950. Ford was subjected to three years of thought reform for “entering China illegally.”
Clay figures of the Tibetan delegation signing the Seventeen-Point Agreement in 1951.
Tibetan monks surrendering weapons after the 1959 revolt. This was a staged photo taken months after the revolt to demonstrate participation by monks.
Meeting of Preparatory Committee of TAR, July 1959, at which the decision was made to implement Democratic Reform.
Mural of Tibetans celebrating Democratic Reform in 1959 by burning “land indenture contracts, usury bills and serf ownership documents.”
Tibetans burning land deeds during 1959 Democratic Reform.
“Former serfs from all over Tibet join the campaign to vent grievances and search out the root of their sufferings.”
“Rioters burn the national flag.” The “Tibetan” armed with a long knife in upper right of this photo was removed when he was exposed as a Chinese policeman.
Images of Lhasa riot that China claims were distorted by Western media. Upper photo was cropped by some Western media to exclude Tibetans throwing stones. Lower photo thought to be a Tibetan being arrested was actually a Han citizen being rescued by police. On lower right he displays his broken tooth.
Photo of Lhasa riot substantiates Tibetan claim that they burned Chinese goods but did not loot. (Anonymous photographer)
Poster of Olympic Torch Relay in Tibet. Left: Relay in Lhasa. Center: Torch on Mt. Everest. Right: Zhang Qingli (left) and Jampa Phuntsok with Olympic torches.
Disabled torch bearer Jin Jing protects the “Sacred Olympic Torch” from Tibetan protester in Paris.
Image of Dalai Lama at Kirti Monastery defaced by Chinese security police. (Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy)
Tibetan delegates to the TAR People’s Congress vote unanimously to celebrate Serf Emancipation Day. January 2009.
Tibetans hear testimonies by former serfs at ceremony of Serf Emancipation Day, 28 March 2009.
Tibetan dancers perform at celebration in Beijing of first Serf Emancipation Day.
Tibetan dancers perform at celebration in Beijing of first Serf Emancipation Day.
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instead of focusing exclusively on the Chinese government’s contention that the protests were foreign-inspired and the sufferings of innocent Chinese shopkeepers at the hands of Tibetan rioters. The cell phone numbers of the journalists were published on a website and were not removed by government censors. The Wall Street Journal opined that Chinese anger reflected deepseated resentment among many Chinese, fostered by decades of government propaganda, at perceived interference in China’s internal affairs by foreign governments and groups.16 AFP reported that more than a million people had signed a website petition to criticize Western media bias in covering the Tibetan unrest. The petition repeated Chinese government statements referring to the “violent crimes of beating, smashing, looting and burning” in Lhasa. Western media organizations such as BBC and CNN were criticized for untrue and distorted reporting on Tibet.17 Many Chinese pointed to the bias of Western reporting as revealed in some photos of the riots published in the Western press. One was of Tibetans demonstrating in Kathmandu being manhandled by Nepalese police, mistakenly labeled as Chinese police mistreating Tibetans in Lhasa. Another was of Chinese military vehicles in Lhasa being pelted with stones by Tibetans, the Tibetan stone-throwers being cut out in some publications. These two examples were considered by many Chinese as irrefutable proof of Western bias if not outright deception. However, in the first instance, there was much confusion about the location of demonstrations during the week of 10–14 March because they took place in India, Nepal, and Tibet. In the second instance, the Tibetans throwing stones were to the far right in the photo while the Chinese vehicles were to the far left with a large space in between, just the sort of space routinely cropped by newspapers short of space.
Olympic Torch Relay As the Olympic Torch began its worldwide “journey of harmony,” Chinese media began a long-planned campaign to use the Olympics for the further glory of China and the CCP while at the same time warning against any attempt by Tibetan separatists or their supporters to “politicize” the Games. As the “sacred Olympic flame” was carried from Greece to Beijing, from whence the international relay would begin, China Daily reiterated that the Chinese passion for the Olympics was because “the ideals and values of the Olympic Games are very much akin to ours. . . . Peace, respect and friendship are what the Olympic flame represents, tenets that are at the heart of Chinese civilization.” It warned against any attempts to protest against the torch as a “blasphemy against the Olympic spirit.” And it said that more and more people
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would see through the hypocrisy of those who sought to hijack the Beijing Games, and they would “appreciate the Chinese sincerity about harmony.”18 Chinese nationalists, already upset about the protests in Tibet, were given more reasons to be angry when the Olympic Torch reached major Western cities. The torch was met by protesters in London on 6 April, Paris on 7 April, and San Francisco on 8 April. The torch relay in London was met by thousands of pro-Tibet demonstrators who forced the relay to be rerouted despite a large police presence. The torch was also accompanied by a dozen or more Chinese runners of a special “Sacred Flame Protection Unit” who were at first claimed to be volunteer students but were later revealed to be members of the People’s Armed Police who had trained for months for the role. They were observed to roughly handle any who approached the torch, including local police, and appeared to assume that they were in charge. Chinese officials accompanying them were said to operate on the same assumption. The behavior of the Chinese torch protectors led the British Olympic chairman to characterize them as “thugs.” Later it was revealed that the Chinese torch protectors did not respond to local police because they spoke little or no English or any other foreign language. They wore earpieces from which they received their orders from Chinese officials. Eventually, their presence was limited in San Francisco and banned in countries like India and Australia. The torch was disrupted several times in Paris. In one instance a protester attempted to grab the torch from a Chinese woman athlete in a wheelchair, providing much ammunition for the Chinese propagandists. By the time the torch reached San Francisco, the home of a large Tibetan community and many American sympathizers, the local organizers were so concerned that they surreptitiously ran the relay on an unannounced street. San Francisco was also the first site where the torch was met by a large number of locally recruited Chinese counterdemonstrators, a tactic that was to dominate the event in subsequent cities. Disruptions of what the Chinese media labeled a “journey of harmony” for the “sacred torch” aroused the Chinese people at home and abroad to new heights of furious indignation. This led to large rallies of patriotic Chinese to “protect the torch” in Australia and South Korea, and bruised feelings of Australians and South Koreans, who felt intimidated by the Chinese in their own countries. However, many Chinese nationalists felt that they had won in this confrontation with anti-China demonstrators. A French publication, Paris Intelligence, reported on an emergency meeting of the CCP politburo in which the chief of Chinese security services, Zhou Yongkang, and Propaganda Department director, Li Changchun, prevailed in a debate over what policy to adopt in regard to the Tibet issue and its impact on the Beijing Olympics. They declared it possible for China to regain the initiative on the Tibet issue and to burnish China’s image in world opinion,
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on the condition that all China’s propaganda and political networks were activated. Their opinion had prevailed over that of Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and others who advocated some sort of compromise with the Dalai Lama, at least to the extent of meeting with his representatives. The essence of the plan was to concentrate on the line that the Dalai Lama had orchestrated the Lhasa riots. Propaganda organs were instructed to claim that some of the more radical elements of the “Dalai clique” were planning suicide attacks and therefore should be labeled terrorists. Chinese embassies abroad were asked to activate associations of Chinese students to stage demonstrations in support of the Olympic torch and to “release an avalanche of patriotic slogans on blogs and Internet sites.” Embassy officials in charge of keeping an eye on students were tasked with organizing demonstrations in league with “Bureau 610,” whose job it was to spy on the Falun Gong and separatist groups. Intelligence agents at the Chinese embassy in London had also reportedly collaborated with Chinese triads (mafia-like criminal gangs), in particular the Shui Fong and the Big Circle gangs, to disrupt the operations of dissidents and Tibetan refugees in the UK.19 Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post reported that Beijing had ordered state-run media to go all out in a national campaign, referred to as “our unprecedented ferocious media war against the biased Western press,” to counter bad publicity associated with the Olympic torch relay. The Central Publicity Department, formerly the Propaganda Department, had told all media to stick to the official line in order to make China’s case to the world and also to the Chinese themselves. By the time of the demonstrations in London, all media had apparently received instructions to go all out to counter Western coverage. State media thereafter lashed out at saboteurs of the flame in Paris, airing footage of attacks on the torch-bearers, especially the Chinese woman in the wheelchair, and on the Chinese escorts.20 China’s official reaction, in Renmin Ribao, to the demonstrations against the torch relay was to maintain that this “farce” could not “obstruct the splendor of the sacred flame.” It said that the Olympic torch was being relayed through the five continents “with the blessings of the whole world. . . . As the ultimate symbol of the spirit of the Olympics, the sacred Olympic flame embodies the shared dreams of humanity.” However, the torch had been hindered by an “extremely small number of ‘Tibet independence’ elements” who had attempted to disrupt the torch relay: The many episodes of the “Tibet independence” elements’ farce once again provided footnotes to their talk of “hijacking” the Olympics, and exposed before the people of the world their treacherous act aimed at separatism. In recent days, the firm interdiction of governments of the countries along the sacred flame’s route and the strong condemnation by the broad populace also once again warned the
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“Tibet independence” elements: The attempt to exploit the “opportunity of the 2008 Olympics” to force the Chinese government to solve the so-called “Tibet question,” and the attempt to hijack the Olympics onto the “Tibet independence” bandwagon and break up the Olympic torch relay are not only extremely stupid but will also accomplish the exact opposite.
Renmin Ribao opined that this “heinous act can only heighten everyone’s anger toward the ‘Tibet independence’ elements and arouse the intense patriotism of the people of China and overseas Chinese and their determination to defend the territorial integrity of China.” It quoted Chinese Internet opinion that the Tibet independence elements had taken a stand against the peace-loving people of the world and that their deeds would be condemned by the people of the world. The “sacred Olympic flame” was a “symbol of human values; . . . it broadcasts human civilization and spreads universal values.” People of the world were said to regard the torch relay as a sacred ceremony and they therefore thought “any act that interferes with or damages the sacred Olympic torch is not only blasphemous to the Olympic spirit but is also a provocation to human civilization.” Renmin Ribao opined that as the torch illuminated the bright future of humanity, the Dalai clique’s attempt to disrupt it also exposed its reactionary attempt to smear China and the values that the Olympic torch represents.21 China focused its resentment about the treatment of the “sacred torch” on France, where the disruptions had been the greatest and the attempt to snatch the torch from a disabled Chinese female athlete offered the greatest opportunities for propaganda. French President Nicolas Sarkozy had threatened to boycott the Olympic opening ceremony if China did not improve its treatment of Tibet and talk with the Dalai Lama. Chinese netizens threatened to boycott a French supermarket chain’s stores in China because of a rumor that the company had financially supported the Dalai Lama. The Chinese government threatened France indirectly by warning that France should listen to the voices of the Chinese people. This was a not so subtle tactic similar to the often repeated warning to all critics of China to avoid “hurting the feelings of the Chinese people.” A Xinhua article urged the French side to “consider and reflect upon opinions and sentiments expressed by some Chinese people on the internet,” noting that there “must be reasons for them.” As a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said, “Some Chinese people have expressed their opinions and feelings recently. All these are by no means accidental, and the French side needs to ponder and reflect upon them.” The spokesperson also said, “The Chinese cannot accept France promising to value China-France ties on one hand, while witnessing occurrence of things ‘incomprehensible and unacceptable’ for Chinese people.” She said that she hoped that the French side “will
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give audience to the Chinese people and take an objective, impartial stance on the recent issues,” and “we hope various circles in France could cherish the friendly ties with their real actions, and create favorable conditions and make positive efforts and contributions for the further development of the ties.”22 Another scapegoat was the speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, who had dared to visit Dharamsala shortly after the uprising. China Daily said that Pelosi was previously little known in China, but “Her hysterical performance on the China-bashing bandwagon has made her a household name here.” Pelosi might be surprised by the reaction of Chinese people: “It might be particularly confusing for Westerners who claim and perhaps even believe they are pursuing a just cause in harassing the Olympic torch relay and siding with the violent mobsters in some of China’s Tibetan-inhabited areas.” Instead of dividing the Chinese people from their government, “the series of events following the riot in Lhasa have rallied the multi-ethnic Chinese, at home and abroad, more tightly together. More important, the unprecedented solidarity has demonstrated universal spontaneity.” The West, as well as the Dalai Lama, should not have tied politics to the Olympics: “In doing that, they have not only blasphemed the noble Olympic ideal, which aspires for peace and harmony, but at the same time offended the broad Chinese public, who have been doing whatever they could in the innocent hope to present the world an enjoyable Olympic Games.”23 A Xinhua article thanked those people in all countries who had welcomed and supported the Olympic torch, while condemning the “extremely small number of radicals for their harassment and sabotage.” A Beijing Olympic Organizational Committee official stressed the fact that despite the “Tibet independence” elements’ harassment of the torch relay, “people who love the Olympic spirit have condemned the conduct of challenging rule of law, trampling upon human rights, and obstructing peace and progress.” Most people of the countries where the torch relay was held had welcomed and celebrated it: However, while people of all countries were jubilantly greeting the Olympic torch, we also saw an extremely small number of “Tibet independence” elements who harassed and undermined the relay. In total disregard of the purpose of the Olympic Games, the local laws and the safety of the torch bearers, these elements repeatedly obstructed the normal process of the relay and stormed the relay team members. Some elements even attempted to seize the torch from the torch bearers and extinguish the flame. Jin Jing is a handicapped girl. . . . During the Paris relay, she was the third-leg torch bearer. But this torch bearer who was confined to a wheelchair became the “Tibet independence” elements’ target of attack. . . . The use of force to treat this totally unarmed handicapped girl showed that those “Tibet independence” elements demonstrated no humanitarian spirit at all. . . .
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We saw that some people, while shouting “democracy, freedom, human rights and rule of law,” brutally violated the torch bearers’ right to relay the torch. In one voice overseas Chinese people condemned such acts.
The official claimed that the “extremely small number of ‘Tibet independence’ elements’ despicable acts of harassing and sabotaging the torch relay were a blasphemy against the Olympic spirit.” The Dalai Lama had said that he supported the Beijing Olympics, but the actions of his supporters during the torch relay showed the opposite. The official said that the torch relay was the “most important ceremonial rite” held before the opening of the Olympics and that the relay of the torch on its “harmonious journey” had important significance for fostering the Olympic spirit around the world and promoting friendship among people of all countries of the world. The implication was that not only was “Tibet independence” contrary to the “tide of history” but that its proponents were condemned by all peace-loving people of the world.24 Beijing Zhongguo Wang, an official PRC portal site, published an article on Chinese overseas students’ rallies in support of their government and against the Tibetan protesters. The article included photos of rallies in several cities of Chinese students holding flags and signs with slogans such as “Stop Violence,” “Say No to Riots,” “Stop False Reporting,” Stop Misleading News,” “False Reporting Hurts Chinese,” “No Politics with Olympics,” “Chinese and Tibetans Are Brothers,” and “I Love Tibet.” The slogans showed that the Chinese students naively believed their own government’s version of the truth about Tibet. They were supremely confident that they knew the absolute truth about Tibet and they angrily denounced any who dared to question it. The article engaged in the same sense of righteous indignation and it glorified the young Chinese nationalists for rejecting and defying the Western interpretation of events in Tibet. It congratulated those Chinese who had created websites to expose the Western media’s distortions, including a YouTube video, “Tibet was, is and will always be part of China,” which consisted of little more than a young Chinese in Canada angrily repeating the theme of the title. The article mentioned that these websites had received millions of visits by Chinese and even claimed that Western websites had deleted the real numbers of visits and had censored comments in order to downplay their significance. Despite the evidence of Chinese government manipulation of these nationalistic sentiments, and the obvious question of exclusive reliance on government propaganda for information, the article claimed that this populist reaction was evidence of genuine Chinese democracy that was being downplayed by Western media because of their disbelief that any such democracy was possible in China.
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The article quoted Chinese students in the West who said that Westerners were ignorant because they refused to believe the Chinese version of the truth about Tibet, instead preferring to believe that the Chinese were brainwashed by their own government. Many Chinese were particularly offended that people in the West would not give China credit for how far it had developed away from its Communist past and toward the same traditions that were valued in the West. They protested that people in the West forgot that China liberated Tibet from the serf system, that Tibet was never independent in the past, and that China had devoted billions of Yuan to “boosting Tibet’s economic and religious development all through the years.” CNN was criticized for a commentator, Jack Cafferty, who had described the Chinese leaders as “goons and thugs” for their repression of Tibetans. CNN was also accused of having deliberately distorted the news about Tibet. These distortions had provoked Chinese anger and destroyed the credibility of Western media in the eyes of the Chinese people: “If you surf any Chinese internet forum, you will find indignant Chinese protesting against Western media and the distortion of facts by Western politicians.”25 People’s Daily asked those who sympathized with the Tibetan separatists whether they realized that they thus opposed the aspirations of the Chinese people to make friendship with the rest of the world through the Olympics and that they supported the medieval Tibet of integration of “narrow-minded nationalism with the extremism of religion.” It wondered if they realized that they were “hurting the dignity and feelings of 1.3 billion Chinese and resisting the Olympic spirit of peace, merging, unity and friendship recognized unanimously by more than 6 billion people on earth.” In contrast to those promoting violence in Tibet, “Any people with an intuitive [sic] and a sense of love are convinced that the 1.3 billion Chinese are smiling to the world, which is also smiling back to China.” It asked if those in Western countries that had themselves been freed from the feudal integration of state and religion really wanted Tibet to return to such a condition: The Dalai clique turns a blind eye to the modernization process in Tibet in a vain attempt to restore serfdom and even smeared the construction of the gigantic Qinghai-Tibet railway. Moreover, the Dalai clique viciously slanders the selfless aid of other ethnic groups to Tibet and tried to drive a wedge between Tibetans and people of other ethnicities in China. . . . How can the abyss of serfdom repeat itself and the dark rule from the integration of the state and region be allowed to recur again?26
Meanwhile, the Tibetan official of the United Front Work Department, Sitar, who had been involved in all of the recent dialogues, said that the Dalai Lama was destroying the basis for dialogue by stirring up violence in Tibet
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and encouraging the disruption of the Beijing Olympics. Sitar said that the door to dialogue with the Dalai Lama was still open but that he should stop all secessionist activities in order to create a basic environment for dialogue. He said that the Dalai clique’s role in instigating violence in Tibet and in organizing disruptions of the torch relay in Paris and London had greatly hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and damaged the basic conditions and atmosphere for dialogue. The government of the PRC had always shown the utmost sincerity and patience in keeping contact with the Dalai Lama, he said, citing the six meetings with the Dalai Lama’s personal representatives since 2002. These representatives had been escorted to various areas in China to better understand economic development and the implementation of regional autonomy of ethnic groups. Since 1979 the Dalai Lama had sent more than twenty delegations, which included many of the Dalai Lama’s close relatives, and they had discussions with relevant departments on issues with which they were concerned: “The root cause for no progress after so many contacts is that the Dalai Lama is not sincere: he has proven this by not giving up the ‘Tibet independence’ stand.”27 China Daily published an article by a member of the China Society for Human Rights Studies, who said that he was having second thoughts about the wisdom of having talks with the Dalai Lama. This article reflected the Chinese contention that the Dalai Lama did not represent the Tibetan people. The author said that he was no expert on Tibet but felt that dialogue must be more constructive than antagonistic. However, recent events had made him question whether the Dalai Lama was qualified for such a dialogue. To have a dialogue, the Dalai Lama should have enough political capital among his own supporters in order to enforce any agreement. The Dalai Lama claimed to be an advocate of nonviolence, but his followers had resorted to violence in Lhasa. He claimed that he is not a separatist and he wants Tibet to remain within China, but his followers abroad mounted demonstrations where they shouted “Free Tibet,” even though “Tibet was freed from the cruelest rule in human history 50 years ago.” The Dalai Lama claims he has the best wishes for the Beijing Olympics, but his supporters in Western countries tried to hijack the Olympic torch and spoil the first Olympic Games to be hosted by China. The author said that he would very much like to believe that the Dalai Lama had nothing to do with all those ugly acts against China, and that he has no hostility toward the Han people. But his followers seemed to not listen to him. “Assuming he has been as honest as his words, the fact is his words failed to make any impact on them.” He appeared to have no control over those who followed and supported him. “If he is so powerless then what authority does he have to request a dialogue with the Chinese central government? If in fact he does have some authority over his followers then he is complicit in the ugly
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acts that violate his own principles. Then he would be a liar and not qualified as an honest broker in a dialogue.” The Dalai Lama was once a “Chinese leader and he was supposed to represent the people’s interest. Yet he did not seem to treasure this honor and power, and left the country without saying good-bye.” With his departure, he lost the trust of the Chinese people: For nearly 50 years the Dalai Lama has stayed abroad, without doing anything constructive for his native land. But his shadow loomed over almost every bloody and violent act against law and order in Tibet. If he was really behind those violent acts, the monk would be a criminal, who has no status to request for a dialogue with the government. If he was clean, then his incapacity again deprives him of the qualification for a political dialogue. . . . A request to have a dialogue with such a person is a joke. No responsible government can take it seriously.28
A Canadian journalist, Doug Saunders, writing for the London Globe and Mail, described the bizarre situation in which he found himself after Xinhua misquoted him in regard to a secret Western plan to sabotage the Beijing Olympics. Xinhua had reported that “according to a news report by Canadian journalist Doug Saunders,” these attacks on China were orchestrated in a Washington-Berlin conspiracy that began when the German state-run Friedrich Naumann Foundation organized a conference in Brussels, attended by the U.S. State Department, where the whole anti-China plot was launched. This meeting, Saunders had supposedly written, was where the Lhasa riots were planned by a government-backed band of Tibetan activists. The meeting in question was actually a meeting of Tibet support groups in Europe that was attended by TGIE representatives. Chinese propaganda had long used this meeting as evidence that the “Dalai clique” was implicated in the planning for the demonstrations in Tibet. Saunders received phone calls and messages from hundreds of Chinese, both official and public, thanking him for exposing the truth about the secret plan supported by Western countries to ruin the Beijing Olympics. In his Globe and Mail article Saunders said that what he had written had little to do with what the Chinese media had interpreted him as saying. The Brussels conference in question, which was a regular event for Tibet-rights groups, was not attended by the State Department or any government, and it was not organized by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, which in turn is not owned or controlled by the German government. And the torch-relay protests that arose from that conference, whatever you may feel about them, have no relationship to the riots and uprisings inside Tibet. It tells you something about the current dangerous state of events that millions of people inside China are willing to believe that there is a vast Western plot against them, and to congratu-
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late me for “proving” this. But it tells you even more that hundreds of thousands of people living outside China are apparently willing to believe the same thing, despite having full access to free media—in fact, the social-networking sites of Web 2.0 have created a worldwide explosion of ethnic-Chinese nationalism.29
The absolute certainty of most Chinese that the truth was on their side was illustrated by a suggestion that Chinese citizens should sue the Western media in international courts for their distortions of the truth about Tibet. The suggestion, by Zhu Zhengfu, “noted international law expert, member of the National Committee of the CPPCC and vice president of the Guangdong Provincial Lawyers Association,” appeared in Guangzhou Nanfang Dushi Bao, affiliated with Nanfang Ribao, the daily newspaper of the Guangdong Provincial CCP Committee. He said that Chinese citizens who were maliciously maligned could “take up the legal weapon and file lawsuits against Dalai and the Western media that made untrue reportage and demand apologies and damages from them.” The basis of his argument was that the riots caused actual damage to some Chinese, those in Lhasa, and the slanders by the Western media damaged the reputation to Chinese individuals or organizations, who could sue the Dalai Lama or media organizations to gain restitution: The rumor-mongering and slandering statements made, whether by Dalai or by the Western media, in disregard of the truth of the matter caused injury to the reputation of the enterprises and parties concerned. For instance, the proprietors of the enterprises, the victims, or the victims’ families have the right to file lawsuits against Dalai, who falsely accused the stores burnt as places of prostitution, and CNN, which made untrue reportage, and demand apologies and damages from them. . . . The reputation and feelings of our enterprises and citizens were hurt. Although we can conduct propaganda and make clarifications with our voice, it is still inadequate. We must make Dalai and the Western media that made untrue reportage pay a price legally and financially.
Zhu, the international law expert, said that justice might be obtained in some Western courts because the legal system was to some extent separate from the political system. The suggestion by this seemingly sincere scholar betrays absolutely no doubt about the justice of China’s case, even though his and almost all Chinese people’s source of information about Tibet was their own government, whose media and legal systems, unlike those of the West, were in no way separate from the government.30 Another Guangzhou commentator suggested that the very fact that the West was threatened by China’s rise meant that China was already winning the ideological competition. China’s economic model was now more successful than that of the West. The only way in which the Western countries could deal with the economic and political threat of China was to try to denigrate
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China. Thus they had dreamed up the Lhasa riots and the demonstrations against the Olympic torch. This Chinese thinker also cited the meeting of Tibetan activists in Europe as the genesis of the anti-China action plan. The salient point of this analysis was the confident assumption that Western criticism of China had nothing to do with Tibet but was actually only due to a Western fear of China’s rise: Western media are using the Tibet issue as a pretext to set off a tidal wave of boycotting the Beijing Olympic Games and demonizing China and some of the overwhelming reports of all descriptions are those built on lies, prejudices, humiliation, or even hysteria and not well-meaning criticisms based on facts. . . . The West’s attempt to take advantage of the assaults on the sacred-flame relay to humiliate China is nothing but the behavioral expression of the “Chinese threat” argument that has in recent years grown in intensity and it stinks of racism. . . . Revealing reports from the West show that Germany’s Friedrich Naumann Foundation, some organizations in the United States, and the Dalai clique jointly drew up the “action plan” of exploiting the Tibet issue to set off an anti-China wave and provided help in the form of money, organization, and propaganda. From the initial fabrication of the Lhasa incident to the assaults on the sacred-flame relays in the UK and France, all were directed by some political organizations in the West, performed by “Tibetan independence” elements, and chorused by commercial media, while the Western common people were widely misled.31
A commentary in Hong Kong’s PRC-owned Wen Wei Po pursued the theme that the Lhasa riots had been orchestrated by outside forces, based on the universal Chinese assumption that there were no inherent reasons for Tibetans’ discontent, and the Olympic torch relay had been disrupted by the same forces all because of these anti-China forces’ fear of China’s rise. China’s rise had aroused their extreme uneasiness and fear because the influence of a strong China on international affairs was a threat to their hegemonic interests. The riots in Lhasa were distorted by the Western media, and the “thugs” who engaged in “beating, smashing, looting and burning” were portrayed as peaceful human rights demonstrators. These intentional distortions by the Western media resulted in a worldwide anti-China wave, like “one dog barking at a shadow and a hundred curs following suit.” The international perception of the recent Tibetan events was thus, like all criticisms of China and the CCP, denounced as “without foundation,” and China was once again an innocent victim of an international anti-China conspiracy. As evidence of this conspiracy the commentator cited the threats of some foreign heads of state to boycott the opening ceremony of the Olympics if China did not dialogue with the Dalai Lama. Rather than ask why there was so much international sympathy for Tibet, the question was instead con-
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strued as why anti-China forces had such deep hatred for the Beijing Olympics. The answer, of course, was their fear of China’s rise. This fear was not only because of China’s size and its competitive potential but also because the political system of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was supposed to have failed by now and been replaced by a system based on Western values and China should then have become their dependent country. Instead, China was taking its own road and that road was becoming wider; thus, the fear, dissatisfaction and hatred of the anti-China forces were unstoppable and their obstruction and disruption of the Beijing Olympics had become an “uncontrollable recklessness.”32 On 9 April the U.S. Congress passed a resolution calling on China to end its crackdown in Tibet and for China to enter into a “results-based” dialogue with the Dalai Lama. The resolution was introduced by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, and others, including the nine members who accompanied Pelosi on her visit to the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala in March. The resolution passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 413 to 1. Members from both parties spoke on the House floor in support of the resolution. The members opposed the ongoing repression against the Tibetan people, refuted the accusations from Beijing that the Dalai Lama instigated the violence, and called for independent investigations into these allegations and the actions of the Chinese authorities. They commented that China’s brutality violated its commitments as host of the Olympics and called on the Chinese government to enter into a dialogue with the Dalai Lama on the future of Tibet. This expression of support for Tibet by the U.S. Congress was condemned as an “act of perversity” by the Chinese press. Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao took the opportunity to condemn the history of U.S. interference in China’s Tibet and specifically to denounce the current expression of support as “unpopular” internationally, especially among developing countries, and even among “justice-holding public opinion” in Western countries. The U.S. congressional resolution, or the “Tibet-Related Anti-Chinese Bill,” “wantonly distorts Tibet’s history and reality, groundlessly criticizes China for lawfully handling the serious violent criminal incident in Lhasa on 14 March, and rudely interferes in China’s internal affairs.” It was denounced as “purely an act of perversity” and “a serious case of undermining China-US relations.” The anti-China forces in the United States were advised to stop supporting “Tibetan separatism under the cloak of religion,” because to do so was “an immoral act against international law and an act of perversity.”33 Some Chinese commentators promoted the idea that it was not China that had been embarrassed by the protests against the torch relay but instead the Western countries where those protests had taken place. Those countries,
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which “claim to be democratic, free and open,” still had citizens “living in the black hole of rudeness, selfishness and full of prejudices.” Their “vicious actions to attack the sacred flame of the Beijing Olympics are a big embarrassment to Western cultural values. It is these people, rather than China, who have lost credit and made fools of themselves.” The sacred flame of the Beijing Olympics, which carries the Chinese people’s magnificent vision of the world and their friendly cordiality toward peoples in all countries, is so auspicious, so bright and so beautiful that it had originally been expected to be reciprocally greeted, respected and received courteously. It was unexpected, however, that Tibet independence elements would ever be able to barge about blaspheming the sacred flame wantonly. . . . It is unimaginable that the sacred flame should have ever been attacked. . . . What happens to the Western world today? How could they ever treat the sacred flame and China in that way?
The article questioned why the “sacred flame” was treated so unfairly and unjustly in Western societies that advocate equality and justice. Why had the Western media, which flaunts objectiveness and truthfulness in its news coverage, not defended the sacred flame but had instead said that the protests had been an embarrassment to China? How could a Western society that advertised its civilization, rule of law, and loving hearts allow an attack on a disabled athlete? Where were the rule of law and efficiency of public security when some lawless troublemakers could so easily break guard lines set by authorities? The commentator went on to complain that the Chinese government and people had made every effort to “adapt themselves to international practice,” and had “humbly and reasonably” asked only for the privilege of hosting the Olympics, but some people in the West had still mercilessly attacked any such goodwill gestures from China. “Their ignorance, prejudices and hostility toward socialist China have come near to the point of insanity.” They refused to accept a “peacefully developing and rising China.” In response to this non-acceptance by the Western world of China’s innocent efforts to host the Olympics, the furious indignation expressed by many Chinese people and by their government was entirely appropriate.34 The article admitted no validity to any criticism of China about Tibet, because China had been exemplary in its treatment of Tibet; therefore, the protests had to reflect irrational anti-China prejudices. The lack of acknowledgment of the legitimacy of any Tibetan discontent and the total lack of any sympathy for any Tibetan sufferings under Chinese rule reached a new low in an editorial in English in People’s Daily that heaped scorn upon the “grief” expressed by the Dalai Lama in his attempt to get sympathy. The Dalai Lama was accused of pretending to be grief-stricken about
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China’s supposed repression in Tibet in order to get support in the West. Based just on their words, the article said, the Dalai clique would be judged to be the most pitiful and innocent people in the world, but were they not guilty of instigating the violence in Tibet and attempting to separate China and to sabotage the Beijing Olympics? If the Dalai clique did not plot the riots in Lhasa then why did those Tibetans who had surrendered themselves confess that they had been incited by the Dalai clique? If they did not really seek “Tibet independence” then why did they maintain a “government in exile?” If they sincerely supported the Olympics, as the Dalai Lama said, then why did they disrupt the Olympic torch relay? By playing the “grief” card the Dalai clique was trying to stir up antagonism between the ethnic groups in China and achieve their separatist goal. Western politicians and media were complicit in this act and ignored the crimes of the Dalai clique and their separatist schemes: “On the contrary, they prettify their activities as for ‘seeking the human rights and resisting to oppression,’ so as to enhance their image as the ‘weak’ and ‘victimized.’” The article advised the Dalai Lama to give up his activities to separate the motherland by playing the grief card. “Only in this way, can you get the people’s most rudimentary respect instead of being spurned and forsaken by history.”35 Another People’s Daily article attempted to solve the mystery of why the “demonization” of China had staged a comeback. The premise of the analysis was that in the absence of any real fault on China’s part the criticism must necessarily reflect Western bias, ignorance, and fear of China’s rise: The reason the “demonization of China” still has a market is that the outlook of some Westerners regarding China remains unchanged. Despite tremendous changes that have taken place since the nation launched its reform and opening up three decades ago, the cognition of these Westerners on China and knowledge about the nation is outdated. Many of them do not know much about China, still less about the nation’s peaceful rise. When Westerners are facing the displacement of industrial enterprises overseas, outsourcing their work opportunities and seeing “China-made” products pile up in shops or stores in their countries and tourists from China walk in groups along streets of Paris, London and New York, they would instinctively envy, fear and even hate this big nation that has been developing without being based on the Western mode.
Such a “complex mentality” was due to a sense of superiority rooted in the value concepts of Westerners, who were unable to accept that a system not based on their Western model could be successful. Such biased people were easily confused with false associations between issues such as Darfur or Tibet and the Beijing Olympics. In order to change the Westerners’ faulty opinions about China it was necessary for China to adhere to its policy of peaceful
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development and to clarify issues with ironclad facts. “Westerners should adjust their mentality with respect to China’s development. . . . the West should cater to China’s development, gradually get used to discussing problems on an equal footing with the country, draw on the essence of China’s development and, on this basis, restructure the cognition of the West about China.”36 This analysis betrayed the assumption that Western concern about Tibet was false, since there were no real problems or issues there, and indeed that any and all criticisms of China were similarly unfounded. Instead, there must be some ignorance or bias on the part of the West to explain the mystery of Western criticism of innocent and friendly China.
China Responds to Pressure for Talks Despite its denial of any reason to talk to the Dalai Lama about Tibet, on 25 April China announced that it would again entertain the “personal envoys” of the Dalai Lama in response to the “repeated requests” of the Dalai side. Given its position, the reason China made this “concession” was undoubtedly due to international threats to boycott the Olympic opening ceremonies if China did not talk to the Dalai Lama or at least pretend to do so. There was also the fear that China’s celebration of its own glory and that of the CCP might be tarnished by protests or attempts to disrupt the Olympics. China’s Foreign Ministry reiterated that the policy toward the Dalai Lama had been consistent and that “the door of dialogue has remained open.” It only hoped that “through contact and consultation, the Dalai side will take credible moves to stop activities aimed at splitting China, stop plotting and inciting violence and stop disrupting and sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games so as to create conditions for talks.”37 The announcement was immediately greeted with positive responses by the governments of the United States, the EU, France, Germany, Japan, and Singapore, to mention only the responses cited by Xinhua. Many international leaders took the opportunity to congratulate the Chinese government for its willingness to dialogue and themselves for having convinced the Chinese to do so. Their self-congratulatory sentiments may have been due to an unfounded belief that China would actually dialogue in response to international pressure. Those leaders who had threatened to boycott the Olympic opening ceremonies were relieved that China’s response allowed them to withdraw their threats. China thus significantly defused the international criticism about Tibet simply by adhering to its own policy of ostensible openness to talks at any time.
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In contrast to the usual alacrity to which Dharamsala had responded to all previous Chinese invitations for talks, and also in contrast to the uncritical enthusiasm with which international leaders greeted the invitation, this time the Tibetan side demurred somewhat. The Tibetan response may have represented a realization that the Chinese invitation was intended only to defuse international criticism and prevent any disruptions to the Olympics. The Tibetan exiled prime minister, Samdhong Rinpoche, responded to the Chinese invitation by rejecting any actual dialogue until the repression within Tibet and the vilification of the Dalai Lama ended. He left open the possibility that “informal meetings” could take place in the meantime: We feel it will require normalcy in the situation in the Tibetan areas for the formal resumption of the talks and we are committed to take all steps, including informal meetings, to continue in bringing about this. It is our position that for any meeting to be productive it is important for the Chinese leadership to understand the reality and acknowledge the positive role of His Holiness the Dalai Lama rather than indulging in vilification campaign that is even contained in the same Xinhua report [offering talks].38
China did not take any steps to reduce its propaganda campaign against the Dalai Lama in order to create a “conducive atmosphere” for talks. Only three days after the offer of talks, Xinhua published an article accusing the Dalai Lama of continuing his efforts to win Western sympathy for his anti-China separatist activities. Xinhua cited the fact that the Dalai Lama had embarked on another international tour, which to the Chinese mind meant that he did not intend to satisfy the Chinese condition that he stop all his separatist activities: “Despite his claim that his itinerary had nothing to do with ‘political activities,’ each time Dalai’s tours have coincided precisely with some antiChina clamors, prompting people to doubt his claim. This coincidence in fact indicates some hidden mutual needs between the Dalai clique and some Western forces.” Xinhua said that the Dalai Lama was trying to link the Tibet issue and the Olympics and was trying to put pressure on China by internationalizing the Tibet issue. This, Xinhua said, “only reveals Dalai clique’s ulterior motive of achieving its separatist scheme by using the influence of some foreign forces.” The Xinhua article then went through the usual litany of the Dalai Lama’s attempts to use foreign influence to achieve his goal of separating Tibet from China: “After five decades of life in exile, the Dalai clique has learned how to cater to the West by flaunting human rights, peace, environment protection and culture, among others. But they never say a single word about the inhuman serfdom in Tibet under their rule, nor the atrocities committed by the
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Tibet Youth Congress.” The article reiterated the Chinese claim that the Dalai Lama had not satisfied the condition that he give up his separatism and stop trying to sabotage the Olympics: “The fact that the Dalai clique has kept its ‘government in exile’ and Tibetan separatists disrupted the Olympic torch relay only shows the Dalai clique’s claims about not seeking Tibet independence and supporting the Beijing Olympics are nothing but pure lies.” The characterization of the existence of the TGIE as one of the separatist activities of which the Dalai Lama was accused reinforced the perception that this, along with all of his international travels and meetings, was what he must abandon before China would talk to him, even if only about his personal status. The article ended by quoting Hu Jintao to the effect that the Tibet issue was an internal affair of China and “the conflict with the Dalai clique is not an ethnic problem, not a religious problem, nor a human rights problem. It is a problem either to safeguard national unification or to split the motherland.” What this Chinese position meant was that the Tibet issue was not about the denial of human rights to Tibetans, but that it was an attempt by anti-China forces, employing the Tibetans as their surrogates, to split China, to denigrate China, and to circumscribe China’s rise to its rightful position in the world. This Xinhua article, coming between the Chinese offer of talks and the actual meeting, stated China’s usual uncompromising position that the Dalai Lama must give up everything and that China would give up nothing.39 Beijing Review, China’s primary English-language political magazine, published a series of articles on Tibet that appeared on 17 April, shortly before the Chinese offer of talks. Although written before the CCP decided to talk with the Dalai Lama’s envoys, the magazine made clear to its foreign readers China’s intransigence in regard to the Dalai Lama and thus the unlikely prospect that China would negotiate with him. The lead article was titled “Exposing Dalai Lama as a Dishonest Person.” It said that the Dalai Lama was dishonest in saying that he had no intention to split China or to cause a rift between the Han and Tibetan peoples. His dishonesty was proven by the riots in Lhasa, in which Tibetans attacked Hans, and which had been instigated by the Dalai Lama. Other lies intended to cause ethnic friction were that the Han were attempting to assimilate Tibetans or that they were colonizing Tibet and that they were monopolizing economic progress in Tibet. The Dalai Lama had said that a “deep distrust” exists between Tibetans and Chinese due to Chinese repression of Tibetans. Why, the Beijing Review article asked, has the Dalai Lama stirred up conflict between the Han and Tibetan people? The Chinese government had poured a huge amount of funds and manpower into Tibet for the development of Tibet and benefit of Tibetans:
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The development of Tibet relies on the support of people from all ethnic groups, including the Han. The Tibetan people today live in a big family united by friendship and harmony. Many Tibetans say they are enjoying the best times in the history of the development of Tibet. Such a harmonious, happy and serene situation in Tibet is what the Dalai Lama clique has long been worried about, because it means it will lose the opportunity to achieve “Tibet independence” and lose public support of their secessionist activities. It is not difficult to understand why the Dalai Lama wants to exploit the recent violence and create ethnic conflict.40
Another of the Beijing Review articles, supposedly by a Tibetan, “Gelek,” was on the theme that Tibet was prosperous under the PRC’s system of regional autonomy, while what Tibetans feared most was the return of the pre-1959 feudal serfdom and “Tibet independence” forces’ terrorist activities. In contrast to the Dalai Lama’s claim that Tibetans were living in a “state of constant fear,” Gelek said that Tibet had made remarkable progress in political, economic, and cultural fields since the Democratic Reform of 1959, and especially after the reform and opening up after 1979. Tibetans were masters of their own destiny and enjoyed equal political status with all China’s other ethnic groups. China enjoyed political and social stability, ethnic unity, a booming economy, and a rising international status. It was just daydreaming for the Dalai Lama and his followers to think that China might collapse and Tibet achieve its independence. In fact, what Tibetans feared most was the sabotage activities of the secessionists. Gelek said, “The 4 million Tibetan population should decide the future and destiny of the Tibetan ethnic group.” This is in contrast to the usual Chinese position that all the Chinese people, not just Tibetans, should decide Tibet’s future. However, he said that Tibetans had already made their decision by choosing the road toward a modern socialist society.41 Another of the Beijing Review articles, by Han and Tibetan scholars of the China Tibetology Research Center, claimed that the Lhasa riots were not evidence of an ethnic conflict because Tibetans were also targeted. Despite all the evidence that the Tibetan rioters had indeed targeted Han and Hui, and Chinese media having emphasized that fact in order to arouse Chinese nationalism, this position was necessary because of China’s need to maintain that the riots had no legitimate cause within Tibet but instead were entirely instigated from outside. According to one Han scholar, “The riot in Tibet is not only targeted at Han people or other minority ethnic groups in Tibet, but also at local Tibetans. So the riot is not ethnic feud between the Han and Tibetan peoples.” A Tibetan scholar opined that the several ethnic groups in Tibet and surrounding areas had lived together for a long time and their social and economic lives were complementary. All of this was evidence that
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the “violent crimes” were “an organized and plotted event.” A Han scholar suggested that some Tibetans, particularly monks, were ignorant of the truth and thus should be provided with more education.42 Far from meeting any of the Tibetan conditions for talks, China set its own conditions. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said on 29 April: “We hope the Dalai will treasure the opportunity of consultation, stop his violent and criminal activities with concrete actions, stop his activities to interrupt and sabotage the Beijing Olympic Games, and stop his activities to split the motherland so as to create conditions for the next consultation.” China’s willingness to hold talks, despite its accusation that the Dalai Lama had instigated violence in Tibet, was said to show “the Central Government’s consistent policy and broadmindedness toward the Dalai.” The Foreign Ministry was anxious to deny that it had responded to any foreign pressure to have another meeting with the Dalai Lama’s representatives: Tibet affairs are purely China’s internal affairs. Contacts and consultations between the Central Government and the Dalai are utterly China’s internal affairs. On the issues of safeguarding national sovereignty and territorial integrity, the Chinese Government and people have never succumbed to any foreign pressures.43
A Hong Kong PRC-owned newspaper, Zhongguo Tongxun She, reiterated China’s consistent policy on its willingness to dialogue, despite the Dalai’s past treason and present splittism, by giving a history of the past dialogue and explaining China’s principled stand. The article was addressed to the question, “Why should the central government talk to the Dalai Lama?” It mentioned, without explanation, that this was the first time that an official announcement was released prior to talks. The actual reason was presumably that China’s audience was in fact the foreign leaders who had pressured it to dialogue and China wanted it known that it was open to talks even if the Tibetan side wasn’t. The article gave an overview of the history of Sino-Tibetan dialogue and emphasized that China’s position had always been consistent. The Dalai Lama could return if he would give up all his separatist activities. The obstacles to contact and consultations lay with the Dalai. If he were really sincere he should show his sincerity by actions, which now included that he should stop instigating violence within Tibet and stop trying to sabotage the Olympics. Since China’s policy had been consistent and China had always been open to dialogue it was not surprising that it had extended the recent invitation: “It is thus clear that the decision to have a relevant department of the central government get ready to contact and hold consultation with the Dalai side is an extension of the CPC’s consistent policy toward the Dalai and not accidental or unexpected.” This was perhaps a defense against Chinese popular opinion
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that opposed any talks with the Dalai Lama and accused the government of yielding to foreign pressure to do so. For the CCP the overriding issue was to avoid any disruption to a successful Olympics. China’s policy of consistent openness to dialogue was said to be for the well-being of the Tibetan people. The Dalai Lama’s separatist activities were the main threat to Tibet’s stability and prosperity. Continuing in its defensive tone the article asked, “What will the central government talk about with the Dalai side?” Persons who have followed the contact between the central government and the Dalai side for a long period revealed that between 1979 and today, the issues discussed in-depth by the relevant department of the central government with more than 20 groups of representatives and observation delegations sent by the Dalai Lama were about the Dalai Lama’s future; about the central government’s hope that he would abandon the illusion of Tibetan independence, end his exile, return to the motherland, and do something beneficial to the Tibetan people for the rest of his life.
Deng Xiaoping was said to have set out the conditions for dialogue to Gyalo Thondup in 1979: Tibet is part of China. Their [the exiles] return can only be discussed as an internal issue; it cannot be taken as a dialogue between states, and this is a fundamental issue. To the central government, the Dalai does not represent the Tibetan people; the status of Tibet has long been determined by history, chosen by the Tibetan people, and recognized by the international community. There is no need to discuss the status and future of Tibet with Dalai.
This version of Deng’s statement about the dialogue not being “between states” seems to be what Tibetans have since interpreted as meaning that anything but independence could be discussed. The rest of the statement, however, says that nothing about Tibet would be discussed with the Dalai Lama. The announcement that the “relevant central government department” was ready to have “contact and consultation with the Dalai side” meant that they would meet with the Dalai’s private representative and the consultations would be about the Dalai Lama meeting China’s three conditions for the “next round of consultations, namely the Dalai side should stop its activities to split the motherland with concrete action, stop plotting and instigating violent activities, and stop its activities to disrupt and sabotage the Beijing Olympics.” The Chinese article predicted that the outcome of the upcoming talks would be like those in the past because the Dalai Lama typically asked for talks when he thought the situation was unfavorable for him but even while talking he would continue his separatist activities at home and abroad.44
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The most strident rejection of any real dialogue with the Dalai Lama appeared in Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao, which quoted an “authoritative source” who dismissed as “talking nonsense” the Dalai Lama’s description of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue as “negotiations.” “Negotiation” was merely a term the Dalai Lama used to raise his own status as the representative of the Tibetan people, while the central government had never recognized him to be the representative of the Tibetan people: “The stance of the central government has been consistent. We say that having ‘dialogues’ and ‘contacts and discussions’ with the Dalai’s circle is to explore the way out for the Dalai and the people around him.” Seeing China’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics as the last opportunity for “Tibet independence,” the Dalai Lama had orchestrated a series of separatist activities and tried to elicit Western support to put pressure on China. However, China was familiar with the West’s strategy of using nationality issues to promote secession in other countries, such as Kosovo, and it was aware of the strategy the West would pursue in its attempt to separate Tibet from China: First, the West will try to arouse national conflicts through any means. . . . The West will try every possible means to stir up trouble and capitalize on the Tibet issue to split China. Second, whenever a relevant country needs to maintain social order, the West repeatedly accuses it of using violent suppression and calls for negotiations and reconciliation, just like in the case of China, it started demanding negotiation between the central government and the Dalai. Third, if negotiations are recognized, the West will then appear as a mediator, asking the central government to approve the “Greater Tibet region with a high degree of autonomy” and claiming that “only by allowing all Tibetans to jointly form an administrative region and practice a high degree of autonomy can China enjoy stability.” Fourth, after realizing the goal of the “Greater Tibet region with a high degree of autonomy,” the West will, on this basis, plot “national self-determination” and “national referendum” to achieve the separatist goal.45
For China, “genuine” autonomy in Tibet was nothing but a first step toward independence and the Tibet issue was simply a Western attempt to weaken and divide China. Chinese propagandists took pains to explain to a Chinese audience that the offer of talks did not mean that China had been coerced by foreign pressure. China had no intention to concede anything. In fact, the talks were presented as an opportunity for the Dalai Lama to realize the failure of his separatism and to stop all the activities of Tibetans and their foreign supporters that had embarrassed China, such as demonstrations during the torch relay. China’s aggressive policy toward foreign criticism continued by denouncing and threatening all those countries that had been the scene of anti-China demonstrations, or whose leaders had expressed any sympathy for the Dalai Lama, had honored him in any way, or had threatened to
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boycott the Olympic opening ceremonies. France was singled out for the most criticism because the demonstrations against the torch had been the most disruptive there, because the Dalai Lama had visited Paris shortly thereafter and been awarded with an honorary citizenship, and because French president Sarkozy had threatened to boycott the Olympic opening ceremonies. The “nasty behavior” of France had “stoked the anger of the Chinese people and overseas Chinese,” “damaged relations between China and France,” and “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” Neither the Chinese government nor its people could be silent on this: “If the Chinese government, Chinese people, and overseas Chinese do not speak up, do not cry out, and do nothing in the face of international anti-China, Chinese-hating insults and provocations, they will not be able to face up to the world or stand among the peoples of the world, not to mention rising up as a big nation or revival of the nation.” The struggle was not just against “Tibet independence,” but was a struggle to defend China’s national dignity. France should not follow the “disastrous path” of Germany, whose economic and political relations with China had been harmed by Chancellor Merkel’s meeting with the Dalai Lama in 2007: At that time, the French side was able to clinch these huge [business] orders successfully because Germany’s female Chancellor met with Dalai, which resulted in a deterioration of Chinese-German relations. Therefore Beijing did France a special favor. . . . If anyone damages this type of relation, or if anyone attempts to follow in the footsteps of Germany’s female Chancellor, then Sino-French economic and trade relations will definitely be affected. Germany has paid a price for this, and the German business world and public have criticized their female Chancellor severely, scathingly denouncing her for greatly damaging German interests for wanting “to be in the limelight.” Would France dare to follow the disastrous path of Germany?46
On 2 May the Dalai Lama’s private office in Dharamsala announced that Tibetan envoys would arrive in China the next day for “informal talks” with Chinese officials. By characterizing the talks as “informal,” Dharamsala was able to maintain the condition set forth by Samdhong Rinpoche that the Tibetan side would not have anything more than “informal meetings” until China normalized the situation within Tibet and ceased its anti–Dalai Lama propaganda campaign. The Tibetan announcement said that the envoys would “take up the urgent issue of the current crisis in the Tibetan areas,” and they would “convey His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s deep concerns about the Chinese authorities’ handling of the situation.” The envoys would also “raise the issue of moving forward on the process for a mutually satisfactory solution to the Tibetan issue.”47 In its haste to validate its own Middle Way policy of dialogue by agreeing to a meeting without its conditions being met,
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Dharamsala lost any leverage it had to achieve those conditions and allowed Beijing to escape international pressure for an Olympic boycott. Hong Kong’s PRC-owned Ta Kung Pao opined that the question of whether or not there would be any result of the meeting depended on the Dalai Lama’s actions, meaning that the only issue of Tibet was the Dalai Lama’s separatist activities abroad and his instigation of violence within Tibet. It said that the Dalai Lama claimed that he did not seek Tibetan independence, did not instigate the recent violence in Tibet, and that he supported the Beijing Olympics. These claims had fooled some “Western personalities,” but the 1.3 billion Chinese people would rather observe whether his words and his actions coincided, “which is the Oriental wisdom as well as scientific spirit and rational attitude.” The article claimed that the Dalai clique was the “source of chaos” in Tibet, because if they did not stir up the incident of beating, smashing, and looting then there would have been no reason for it in a Tibet “which practiced the system of regional autonomy of minority nationalities over the years, had enjoyed social stability, growing economy, and harmonious coexistence between the Tibetan and Han nationalities, which could have been maintained for a long time to come.”48 Eventually the “informal meeting” in Shenzhen between the Tibetan envoys and two officials of the United Front department ended in one day rather than the three that some Dharamsala officials had predicted. The only notable result was that a more formal meeting was scheduled for sometime before the Olympics, which would be, according to Dharamsala’s reckoning, the seventh round of dialogue, the present contact not meriting any number. Upon his return to India, Lodi Gyari gave a press conference in which he said he had rejected the accusation that the Dalai Lama had in any way instigated the violence in Tibet. Instead, he said, there were ample reasons for Tibetan discontent due to the erroneous policies of officials in Tibet: “The recent crisis in Tibet is a clear symptom of deeply felt grievances and resentment of the Tibetans with these policies. The task at hand is to address the legitimate concerns of the Tibetan people in a realistic and constructive way.” He had stressed the importance of ending the repression in Tibet, to release prisoners, to provide medical treatment and to allow access by the international press. He had also called for the end of the Patriotic Education Campaign, which was deeply resented by the people. He denied that the Dalai Lama had tried to sabotage the Olympics. And he welcomed a statement by Hu Jintao made shortly after the meeting (in Japan) that China was serious about the dialogue.49 As a condition for further talks, Beijing demanded that the Dalai Lama adhere to what it called “Three Stops.” These were that that the Dalai Lama should stop his promotion of Tibetan independence; stop his fomenting of violence in Tibet, and stop trying to sabotage the Beijing Olympics. China also
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adhered to its usual tactic of describing the Dalai Lama’s envoys as private, by which it means that they represented him personally and that all there was to talk about was his personal future. Despite the absence of any positive results, Dharamsala cited the Chinese promise of further talks as an encouraging sign when in fact there was little about which to be encouraged. Xinhua’s official commentary on the meeting blamed the failure of the dialogue exclusively on the Dalai Lama: The contact has once again demonstrated that the central government’s policy toward the Dalai Lama has been consistent, clear, and that the door to dialogue is open. Despite the fact that the Dalai side has done a lot of things that should not have been done, the central government still patiently urges them to take into consideration the overall situation, match words with actions, and return to the correct path. . . . Despite the seriously violent criminal incident that occurred recently in Lhasa, despite the serious sabotage of the torch relay for the Beijing Olympic Games that is hailed by all the Chinese people including Tibetan compatriots, the responsible persons of the central government’s relevant department still carried out contacts with the private representatives of the Dalai Lama following the repeated requests by the Dalai Lama side. Facts have fully demonstrated that the central government has shown extreme tolerance, sincerity, and patience toward the Dalai Lama. We hope the Dalai side will take into consideration the national interests and the interests of the Chinese nation, conform to the will of all the Chinese people including those of the people of various nationalities in Tibet, go with the tide of historical development, genuinely stop the activities to split the motherland with actual actions, cease planning and instigating violent activities, as well as stop the activities to sabotage the Beijing Olympic Games, and create favorable conditions for the next stage of contact and negotiations.50
Subsequent Chinese propaganda revealed no flexibility on the Tibet issue. Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao defined the issue of Tibet as exclusively about the Dalai Lama: “In fact, the Dalai Lama issue is an issue about him coming back to the country. One basic fact is that the Dalai Lama himself left Tibet to go overseas.” “Since ancient times, the Chinese people have been magnanimous, with a broad-minded and open attitude.” The central government had therefore never closed the door to contact or negotiation. In initiating the dialogue in 1979, Deng Xiaoping had said: “The fundamental question is that Tibet is a part of China. Right or wrong, it is necessary to use this as the yardstick for judgment.” Since then there had been twenty or more contacts and delegations, none of which had made any headway, the fundamental reason being the Dalai Lama’s lack of sincerity. This was demonstrated by his demands for “high-level autonomy” and a “Greater Tibetan Region,” both of which were contrary to China’s constitution and were only intended to promote “Tibet independence.”51
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The Chinese government–controlled media continued their attack on the “biased” Western media in a way that revealed that the CCP was treating the Tibet issue as part of a propaganda war with the outside world. Ta Kung Pao implied that Chinese popular and governmental resistance to Western criticism about Tibet had forced foreign leaders and media to back down. Despite the extreme enormity of its “soft power,” the Western media has committed a fatal error in its execution and handling of the “3.14” Lhasa violent incident, and that is, its massive fabrication of reportage. The rational online opinions of PRC citizens and overseas Chinese and their rational patriotic sentiment have forced the Western media, as it demonizes China, into a situation where it can no longer overlook the basic facts. . . . The rumor mongering bids of the Western media have provoked retaliation from patriotic compatriots both inside the country and abroad. Domestic and overseas patriotic compatriots have strongly retaliated against the false allegations of several Western media, braving all odds to publicize the truth behind the “3.14” violent incidents and the Tibet issue through their own initiatives.
The Western media were accused of having gone to great lengths in “distorting the facts, blurring the line between right and wrong and swapping black with white through fabrication methods like editing and montage, attributing wrong labels and stealthily substituting one thing for another and it has even dragged the Beijing Olympics into the picture, calling for a boycott of the Games.” Chinese “patriotic compatriots” had countered this by swamping the websites of Western media organizations with so many complaints that some of their websites were closed down. Offending organizations like German TV, which mistakenly labeled a photo of Tibetans being beaten by police in Kathmandu as having taken place in Lhasa, and CNN, which cropped a photo in a manner that appeared to many Chinese as intended to deny the presence of Tibetan stone-throwers, were forced to admit that their reports were “factually inaccurate.” This was taken to mean that they admitted their reportage was biased and intentionally false. Other media organizations “have hurriedly penned articles to gloss over their errors.” Western media hegemony was said to have experienced its greatest defeat in history through its “fabricated publicity on the 3.14 violent incidents in Lhasa.” The “stupid mistake” of the Western media was said to be in “covering up the intention of the Dalai clique in splitting the motherland.” The reaction of Chinese citizens was said to have been an expression of “rational anger” in the face of “incredible untruthful reports about the Lhasa incidents.” The popular Chinese reaction, combined with the Chinese government’s disclosure of the truth through video footage of rioters beating, smashing, looting, and burning, defeated the attempt of the pro-Tibet independence forces to
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link their issue to the Beijing Olympics and to put pressure on China. China’s peaceful use of its own “soft power,” based on a philosophy of a harmonious and multipolar world, had defeated the Western attempt to use its soft power in a hostile and coercive manner for the purpose of maintaining its own hegemony.52 China’s People’s Daily, the official outlet for an English-speaking audience, attempted to solve the “mystery” of why the West was criticizing China for its Tibet policies. The answer was that Western public opinion did not understand China’s multiethnic history: China is a multi-ethnic nation, and the “Chinese” are in essence made up of all of the ethnic groups inhabited in the domain of China. The various ethnic groups have all along been influencing each other in politics, economy, culture and many other fields. The Han ethnic group, for example, is a product of mixing different cultures of other ethnic groups, and with impressive markings of influence left by combining different ethnic cultures. The Han people originated from Central Plains, namely an area comprising the middle and lower reaches of the Huanghe River, and were addressed as Han in the Han Dynasty. In its development, the Han people assimilated with other ethnic groups and turned out to be the Han today. Those who have little knowledge of the ethnic structure of the “Chinese” will have no access to the true essence of “Tibet Issue,” and thus they will cut the tie between Han and Tibetans, and will be probably taken in by some people or groups with ulterior motives like the Dalai clique.
The fundamental premise of this argument is that Tibetans have always been “Chinese” and that they will be assimilated into Chinese culture, which is the same as Han culture. The assumption of eventual Tibetan assimilation is a fundamental contradiction to the letter of the PRC’s nationality policy, but is compatible with the underlying goals of that policy. People’s Daily went on to remind the West that the reason the Olympics were so important to the Chinese people was that they had been denied that privilege and honor until now due to imperialist interference during the “hundred years of humiliation.” The West should therefore understand China’s patriotism in regard to the Olympics and it should not attempt to denigrate China by linking the Tibet issue with the Olympics and thus remind the Chinese people of similar tactics used by the West to humiliate China in the past.53 CCP media glorified the patriotic spirit of Chinese youth who had risen to China’s (and the Party’s) defense in regard to Tibet and the torch relay. Chinese youth were congratulated for their patriotic spirit. Despite doubts about this generation, they had proven themselves in defense of the “sacred” Olympic torch: “When the Olympic torch that has carried the dreams of all Chinese for over 100 years came under the barbaric attacks of anti-China forces such as the ‘Tibet independence’ elements in London and Paris, the people of the
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world became witness to the strength of China’s youth.” Overseas Chinese youth had “spontaneously” organized themselves to “support the motherland and protect the Olympic torch.” On the Internet they had “used facts and evidences to refute and expose the lies of some Western media, forming a tidal wave of voices for justice.” Their response to the insults to China and the torch were described as “patriotic and passionate but without loss of reason.” This could be summed up in four characters, li xing ai guo, “rational patriotism.”54 China’s self-righteousness in regard to foreign criticism about Tibet was illustrated by an article in Xuexi Shibao (Study Times), the official journal of the CCP Central Committee Party School. The article professed to understand that some anti-China forces would support the separatist activities of the Dalai clique, but expressed surprise at “the hideousness of the behavior of some Western media and politicians.” Some Western media “shamelessly misrepresented the facts and deliberately fabricated false reports,” a “female politician called Nancy Pelosi not only uttered totally unreasonable remarks but even openly underpinned the evil-doing terrorist force that committed the crimes of beating, smashing, looting, and burning,” and “some people in the US Congress and in the European parliaments behaved recklessly, hypocritically, and perversely by confounding right and wrong and concocting anti-China motions.” These media and politicians had “made fools of themselves and disgraced themselves in front of the Chinese people.” These anti-China Western forces might have been trying to divide the Chinese people from their government, but the result was just the opposite. On the issue of opposing Tibet independence and secession the Chinese government and people held identical positions: “The Chinese Government just completely represents the will of the Chinese people. Therefore, no Western forces will succeed in any of their sinister activities to split Tibet from China.” The Dalai clique was advised to stop trying to curry favor with the West and to collude with them in their sinister attempt to split Tibet from China and instead stop doing harm to China and to Tibet. In contrast to the Chinese spirit of upholding the Olympic ideals of world civilization and harmony, some anti-China Western and Tibet activists had acted contrary to these same ideals: “Events in the last month and more have shown that although China is still far less developed and powerful than the Western countries, it is precisely China, which is less developed and powerful, that has spared no effort in defending the noble spirit of the civilization of mankind, while some forces in the developed and powerful Western countries have just stood side by side with the clique that has endangered freedom and human rights in an extremely immoral and barbarous way in Lhasa, London, Paris, and other places.”55
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While dismissing the legitimacy of any Tibetan discontent or any Western sincerity in criticisms of China about Tibet, the Chinese political system was limited in its ability to respond to what it regarded as an ideological war against China’s political system. China could counter much of the official pressure from Western governments with threats of economic or political pressure that China now possessed, but it had no way to counter the opinionmaking role of Western cultural figures and organizations, many of which were particularly critical of China about Tibet. An attempt to address this lack of Chinese ability to counter criticism on this level was made in the Internet version of Nanfang Ribao, the daily newspaper of the Guangdong Provincial CCP. Several analysts recognized that China had no internationally known cultural figures or organizations to counter the criticisms from such figures and organizations in Western society. However, they were unable to admit that it was the CCP’s monopoly on all media, organizations, and influence that prevented the emergence of any such persons or institutions. The suggestion that China should cultivate cultural figures with international influence illustrated the inability of Chinese society to do so on its own because of the conditions imposed by its political system. The analysts expressed the bewilderment of many Chinese at being unfairly and unjustly criticized about Tibet just when China was about to host the Olympics, an event that many Chinese interpreted as a “symbol of China’s ascendance to a new level in the international arena and a sign that China has won new recognition among the nations of the world.” Unexpectedly, as the Olympics drew near, the disturbances in Lhasa had launched an unprecedented anti-China wave in the world. Those countries with which China thought it had cultivated the best relations (like France) were surprisingly the ones that were the most critical. The only way to explain this was to conclude that China had been “unjustly treated and insulted, and obviously right and wrong have been reversed.” The reason that some countries had such irrational hostility toward China must be due to their fear of China’s rise: “A communist country with such a huge economic scale and a very different system of values has risen in a way that is completely unfamiliar to the West—this reality has deeply worried Western countries.” The analysts also suggested that China was losing the information war with the West because of the Chinese habit of trying to conceal rather than reveal information. Assuming that Western media reports on the unrest in Tibet were part of their governments’ information warfare against China, they recommended that Chinese media should respond with more information in order to compete in what they characterized as an international “information society.” This remarkable analysis was based on the assumption that the truth about Tibet and the recent events there lay on China’s side while the Western
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media were engaged in disinformation. It also ignored the fact that Chinese state-controlled media had propagated a huge amount of information about Tibet, which presumably had failed to alter Western perceptions only due to a persistent anti-China bias promoted by Western media. However, the rise of popular Chinese nationalism in response to the Tibet events and the torch relay was one reason for optimism: We can see that in the process of the relay of the Olympic torch, the key for China to gradually reverse the unfavorable situation has been mobilizing the masses. Without the power of the vast numbers of Chinese people living abroad, the problems facing the Chinese Government could have been much more serious. Now, even Western media are surprised by the power spontaneously arising from among Chinese people living abroad during the process of the relay of the torch. More surprising has been that in the process of the relay of the Olympic torch, Chinese people living abroad have gathered under one slogan, demonstrating their power.
This demonstration of the power of the Chinese people at home and abroad had unified them with the Party and had strengthened the government’s response to the Tibet events: “Indeed, the recent blatant and unreasonable ‘antiChina chorus’ staged in the West has objectively added to China’s nationalist emotions, increased the cohesive power of the Chinese people, and formed a situation of uniting together to resist the West.” In this case the government need not fear the expression of the unsupervised emotions of the Chinese people because they were entirely in accord with the policy of the government.56 A remarkable characteristic of this analysis, as well as the reaction of ordinary Chinese worldwide, was an absolute confidence and even self-righteousness that they were in possession of the “truth” about Tibet despite the fact that their information was derived entirely from the government-controlled media that they knew not to trust on any other issue. Chinese intransigence, vindictiveness, and self-righteousness were most prominently displayed in the reaction of Chinese citizens on the Internet and by overseas Chinese both on the Internet and in anti-Tibetan, pro-Chinese rallies at Olympic torch relay sites. This had both been encouraged by and had encouraged the CCP, which allowed anti-Tibetan posts on its otherwise highly censored Internet. An article in Ta Kung Pao maintained that antiChina provocations had actually strengthened Chinese patriotism and support for the Party and government. Western media’s distorted coverage of the Lhasa incident, as well as the provocations associated with the torch relay, had led to mass indignation among the Chinese people and aroused the righteous anger and patriotic zeal of Chinese around the world. The Chinese people “have never identified so highly with the motherland and have never had such
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strong patriotism” as they did today. Western media were thus unintentionally “helping to promote or bring about a strong China.” What was most encouraging from this Chinese nationalistic point of view was the role played by overseas Chinese. They had “played a crucial role in explaining the viewpoints as well as presenting the facts and truths in China.” They had thus “played a role that those in China could not in terms of external propaganda work.” They had also “played a role in localization efforts which cannot be matched by the ‘Tibet independence’ elements,” meaning that they had outnumbered the pro-Tibetan demonstrators in places such as Australia and South Korea: The strength displayed by all Chinese around the world and the impact that they have exhibited have made the motherland even more confident about the future. Chinese people have become increasingly more aware that the strength of China is a great event in contemporary world history, and its significance and impact will be more important than the rise of any other world power in the past. Its impact on the changes to the world pattern, influence on world affairs and the development of world history is a fact that still cannot be calculated at the moment. While it cannot be said that the rise of China will determine the future of the world, it is not excessive to say that a strong China will impart its own important influence on the development of world history.
This display of Chinese strength and unity had made the West even more uncomfortable about the rise of China. The anti-China forces in the West had made the Chinese people ever more vigilant about the obstructions that some in the West would try to use to prevent China’s rise. In this struggle with the West “ideological and cultural clashes are inevitable,” while “the likelihood of localized and medium-scale armed conflicts also cannot be ruled out.”57 Another article suggested that the issue of Western criticism about Tibet and the threat that some leaders might boycott the Olympics had already been significantly defused by China’s “gesture of willingness in settling the issue through dialogue.” The latest dialogue had supposedly been characterized by unprecedented “openness and transparency” just because, unlike the previous rounds, it had been announced in advance by Xinhua. The fact that communications have been resumed with Dalai’s envoys serves to show, to say the least, the Chinese Government’s willingness to settle the Tibet issue through dialogue. This explains why the move has been generally received with positive response by countries like Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and the United States, including those that used to make irresponsible criticisms against the Olympic Games. As a result, the tense situation since March, which is marked by protests and confrontations staged against the Beijing Olympic
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Games by the foreign media and NGOs because of the Tibet issue, has been considerably relaxed.
This style of “openness, transparency, and dialogue” was suggested as “the code of conduct China should abide by in the course of its rise.” This was the best way for removing the obstacles that were sure to be placed in the way of a country such as China with a political system different from those of the West that had nevertheless produced unprecedented prosperity and unity.58 In regard to Tibet, of course, the appearance of “openness, transparency and dialogue” was little more than an illusion created by Chinese propaganda, since the talks at that time and subsequently revealed absolutely no willingness to dialogue with the Dalai Lama about Tibet. Popular Chinese incomprehension about the fundamentals of the Tibet issue was illustrated by a conversation between several Chinese scholars and journalists about how China should dialogue with the West and how it should address the public relations crisis following the Tibet incident. Their comments revealed an absolute ignorance of any political issue about the legitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet, based on a total acceptance of the claim that Tibet had “always” been a part of China. The scholars all had access to international media and understood that the “propagandistic way” of Chinese media “will never be able to defeat free communication. . . . Administrative propaganda tools can hardly become credible media.” Nevertheless, they assumed that the style of the Chinese media was the only problem, given that the truth in regard to Tibet was on China’s side. This truth was essentially that relations between Han and Tibetans were good, even “the best among relations between ethnic Han people and people of other ethnic groups.” As one scholar said, We are amply confident that our previous achievements—the fruitful results accumulated by revolutionaries of the older generations in Tibet over the past several decades—are still there. Tibet has always been part of China. Tibet autonomy became a reality under the leadership of Mao Zedong and the CPC. The situation where “the million of serfs sing praise to their status of having stood up” is still there. The vast majority of ethnic Tibetan people are grateful to the CPC and the Liberation Army. Most of the people in various circles do not want to “separate” Tibet from the country and become “independent.” Some people do; but these people are actually people who have been influenced by the indoctrination of Tibet independence forces abroad. Many ethnic Tibetans still hang Chairman Mao’s portrait in their homes today.
These Chinese scholars acknowledged the existence of a Tibetan independence issue but they assumed it had no internal causes. This was especially so because the Chinese government had, since the reform and opening up,
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“increased its support for Tibet and given the region even more preferential treatments.” These supports had “completely ensured Tibet’s social stability and development.” There was considerable confusion about the role of Buddhist monks. They were thought to have been the leaders of the protests because they were like students in their cohesion and ability to organize. The monks represented “the clash between the enclosed theocratic society and open secular society” that had arisen because of the development of a market economy in Tibet. The Chinese scholars recognized that there were some tensions and resentments on the part of Tibetans due to the entry of many Han and Hui into Tibet and their predominance in the economy. However, as one said, Tibetan people in agricultural and pastoral areas are very simple people. They have profound love for the ruling party. Because of Mao Zedong’s democratic reform, they have stood up and have a higher social status. I don’t believe that the Tibetan people in agricultural and pastoral areas have any deep hatred toward the CPC.
The scholars and experts warned that the Olympic torch represented a gesture that the Chinese government was making to demonstrate China’s intention to assimilate to the world community and it symbolized the ideals that the Chinese nation wanted to achieve; therefore, “when you think that you can humiliate the Chinese government by protesting the torch relay, the Chinese people would think you are humiliating them and the Chinese nation as a whole.” The Olympic Games “indicate our willingness to converge with the world’s mainstream culture; and when you want to humiliate our government and people, you have aroused the Chinese people’s grievance and bad historical memories.”59 These Chinese scholars could not acknowledge that their government had anything to hide in Tibet or had deceived the Chinese public. They assumed the opposite: that it was the world that was deceived about Tibet for some reasons they found hard to comprehend. While the Dalai Lama’s representatives were meeting with Chinese officials, a prominent policy journal published by the Guangzhou CCP Committee declared that China had already prevailed in the propaganda competition about Tibet and had defused any threat of an Olympic boycott. It began by declaring that the “Tibet independence” movement was “a product of the CIA,” which had been involved in all instances of Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule including those most recently: “Its fingerprints could be found in the disturbances in Tibet in 1987. Online materials indicate that the ties between the CIA and Tibet independence elements have again strengthened since September 2001.” Since Tibetan independence was a creation of foreign antiChina forces and had no support even among Tibetans within China, China
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should make no concessions because of the recent protests in Tibet or because of Western appeals that China dialogue with the Dalai Lama: “If we submit and make concessions just because a handful of Tibet independence elements engage in a little rioting and international anti-China forces take advantage of the situation to make trouble out of nothing, wouldn’t we be encouraging Xinjiang independence and Taiwan independence?” The Beijing Olympics were a target of anti-China forces because of “the Chinese people’s eager desire to make the Beijing Olympic Games a success and show off China’s new look of peaceful development to the whole world.” However, China should not give in because “right is on our side.” First of all, the broad masses of people and overseas Chinese are on the government’s side, especially after they have witnessed the Tibet independence elements beating, smashing, looting, and burning and the Western media deliberately distorting the facts in their reports, insisting that Tibet is entitled to independence, and depicting China as the violent oppressor. Driven by a bitter hatred of the enemy, the Chinese people have spontaneously posted the truth online for the whole world to know and waged a heated and continuous debate in cyberspace with those who support Tibet independence, which is unprecedented. Some people have suggested that the string of anti-Olympic incidents in the world in recent times has whipped up a new wave of nationalism among Chinese worldwide. Both in London and Paris, the sea of Chinese flags easily drowned the handful of Tibet independence flags. In San Francisco, the Chinese spontaneously organized over ten thousand people to line the street to protect the Olympic torch. With such powerful public support behind it, the Chinese government is in an invincible position both at home and abroad.
The article opined that China had handled the Tibetan issue well and time was on its side. The riots were repressed with appropriate force. Some Western media purposely distorted their reporting but “they were soon met with a spirited counterattack by private Chinese citizens as well as official news releases. There was a steady increase in the amount of evidence and facts available online that was favorable to the Chinese side.” More and more Westerners thus came to understand the historical fact that Tibet is part of China. The Olympic Games belong to the whole world and the success of the Games is the shared responsibility of the whole world. If the international community allowed the Olympics to be disrupted by a “handful of extremists” then China should not be held accountable. It was foreign governments, not China, that were responsible for the disruptions to the Olympic torch relay. While it could not be said that China had won the international media war to date, “it has at a minimum held its own.” If China maintained the international order and was open and aboveboard and acted in accordance with the
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law, “we will automatically seize the moral high ground and regain our voice on the issues concerned and win over world opinion.” On that basis, China can even engage the Dalai Lama, who espouses peace and has said he is not seeking independence, and demand that he practices what he preaches and joins China in denouncing the minority of violent Tibet independence elements and appealing to them to renounce violence and give up their quest for independence. In so doing, we will turn the tables on the Dalai and put him completely on the defensive. If he refuses, he would show the whole world that he has been talking out of both sides of his mouth. If he agrees, then the handful of violent Tibet independence elements would become outcasts. Further, if the Tibet independence elements accept the joint appeal, thus turning hostility into friendship, everybody would be happy. On the other hand, if they defy the Dalai, it would be the Living Buddha’s own political and religious position that would come under challenge. In that situation, the Tibet independence elements would make themselves the target and the Dalai must work hard to secure his negotiating credentials. In any of these scenarios, China would be in an invincible position. If the non-issue is resolved, China would be able to concentrate its energies on being a good host in August. Some people have suggested that China should continue to press ahead with various reforms, review its nationalities and religious policies, and correct its mistakes. These are pedantic ideas that will not solve the problems at hand in a hurry. Nevertheless, they are clichés that are always right. Trotting them out will help improve China’s image somewhat.60
Sichuan Earthquake On 12 May a 7.9 magnitude earthquake hit Sichuan Province, with an epicenter northwest of Chengdu and an area of influence that included some Tibetan areas in Ngaba TAP. Ultimately, the death toll reached some 70,000, with another 18,000 missing. Some 375,000 people were injured, 5 million left homeless, and another 1.5 million displaced. Many of the dead were schoolchildren who were trapped inside poorly constructed schools. Chinese rescue units of the PLA rushed to the scene, as did Chinese leaders such as Wen Jiabao, who was filmed directing rescue efforts and expressing his sorrow for the victims. The Chinese government publicized its rescue and assistance efforts and reduced controls on domestic and foreign media coverage of the earthquake. Media controls were reimposed when coverage focused on the official corruption that had led to shoddy school construction. A primary theme of official Chinese media coverage was the rapid response of the government to the crisis and the humanitarianism displayed by the Party and its officials as well as the media freedoms allowed. China and its government thus gained
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much international sympathy that diverted attention and concern from the Tibet issue. The earthquake, along with China’s recent talks with the Dalai Lama’s envoys and promises to do so again before the Olympics, helped China to escape international pressure about Tibet and threats of an Olympic boycott. Within hours after the earthquake, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao rushed to the scene and was soon seen on Chinese TV directing the rescue efforts and referring to himself as “Grandpa Wen.” The Communist Party realized that the earthquake presented it with a public relations opportunity that could end China’s international isolation over Tibet. The government publicized its response as showing its care and concern for the people. The relaxation on media controls was interpreted by some in the West as an encouraging policy change that showed a new openness by the government. However, the media freedoms allowed in Sichuan were part of an overall propaganda campaign and they contrasted with the simultaneous media blackout in Tibet. Nevertheless, despite these contradictions and the obvious effort by the Chinese government to elicit sympathy, it achieved considerable success in making the world forget about the simultaneous repression in Tibet. Xinhua exulted in this shift in world opinion about China and the Beijing Olympics, only a few weeks after “China was fiercely attacked by those who didn’t have the slightest idea of the truth of the secessionist riot in Tibet.” Over more than thirty years of reform and opening up, China had been “reaching out to the world through consistent and extensive engagement, with an expectation that its political system, its way of development and its people should be gradually known, understood and acknowledged.” However, the Western media reporting on the Tibet riots had “made the average Chinese wonder how the Western world can be so opinionated that riots, arson and murder could be interpreted as the government’s ‘crackdown’ on a ‘peaceful protest’ by Tibetan monks.” The Western media’s “biased and hurtful reports” and “the Western world’s indifference toward China’s indignant defense” had made the Chinese people wonder if there was any chance for understanding between China and the West But, only two months later, “the Western stance toward China shifted in the face of another disaster, the Sichuan earthquake. . . . To the surprise of many Chinese, the Western media this time reported the Chinese government’s rapid response and efficient disaster relief efforts with unprecedented acknowledgement and even admiration.” World leaders expressed their grief over the loss of life in China and “their admiration for the Chinese people and the government.” In the aftermath of the earthquake the world had a better appreciation for the character of the Chinese people and their “respect for human life, bravery, selflessness and perseverance in the face of difficul-
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ties.” The Chinese people had gained the sympathy of the world and “both the West and China learned to appreciate and admire each other.” After the earthquake, both East and West could better appreciate the slogan of the Beijing Olympics: “One World, One Dream.”61 The Tibetan Government in Exile also expressed sympathy for the earthquake victims and asked Tibetans and their supporters to halt demonstrations against China, at least until the end of May, in an expression of solidarity. Tibetan monasteries, some in the earthquake area, held prayer ceremonies for those who had died. Some monasteries, like Kirti in the Ngaba TAP, did so even though they were still surrounded by Chinese security forces. In London, in response to a journalist’s question about whether he would attend the Olympics if invited, the Dalai Lama said that there was no such invitation but that if the situation within Tibet improved and there were indications that China was willing to negotiate for real autonomy then he was ready to go to the Olympics if China invited him. This hypothetical response to a hypothetical question was then misinterpreted by the international press as another indication that China was willing to talk with the Dalai Lama and might demonstrate its new policy of compromise and openness by inviting the Dalai Lama to Beijing. There was absolutely no basis for such speculation but it provided further excuses for international leaders to claim that their pressure had produced a more conciliatory attitude from China such that they could drop their threats to boycott the Olympic opening ceremonies. Also in London, the Dalai Lama somewhat contradicted his optimism about future talks with China by reporting that he had been informed of a plan by China to move as many as a million Chinese settlers into Tibet after the Olympics. He said that this information came from a “military source” in Tibet and from Tibetans who reported that settlement areas were already being marked out and prepared. He remarked that with this scale of Chinese colonization, in which “Tibet becomes a truly Han Chinese land and Tibetans become an insignificant minority,” then “the very basis of the idea of autonomy becomes meaningless.” He said that young Tibetans were willing to follow his advice only while he was alive, after which they would “take appropriate action.”62 A tentatively scheduled “seventh round” of talks (the Tibetan side having given no number to the May “informal” meeting) for 11 June was postponed by China ostensibly because of the ongoing earthquake relief efforts.63 However, unless the two officials who normally met with the Tibetan envoys were urgently needed to dig through the rubble in Sichuan there was no logical reason to postpone the meeting. Perhaps the Chinese wanted to milk more sympathy from the earthquake first or, more likely, they wanted only one meeting before the Olympics and preferred to have it closer to August to
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avoid pressure for another meeting. Meanwhile, in India, a Chinese visiting official, Mao Siwei, gave a press interview in which he succinctly summarized some of China’s primary arguments about Tibet. In response to a question about why China doubted the sincerity of the Dalai Lama he said: One of the main reasons is that the Dalai Lama refuses to recognize Tibet has been part of China for several hundred years. . . . This is the key question. If you don’t recognize Tibet was part of China before 1951, then the logical consequence would be like this: the action of the People’s Liberation Amy in 1951 was an illegal aggression; Tibet now is an “occupied country”; the Dalai Lama has been forced to agree that Tibet can be within China; and, finally, Tibetans have the definite right to declare Tibet independence when the opportunity comes in the future. However, if you recognize that Tibet was part of China, then whatever happens in Tibet is the internal affair of China, and Tibet independence cannot be the solution. Actually, some important Tibetans in exile openly said their strategy was that the “genuine autonomy” would be the first step and independence would follow some time later.
In response to a question about why China did not accept the “Greater Tibet” proposal, the Chinese official called attention to a map of Tibet in the headquarters of the TGIE in Dharamsala, which he assumed was the Tibetan conception of a Greater TAR. On this map an area greater than the TAR and TAPs was shown, with large areas of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu, and even Xinjiang being claimed.64 The map to which he referred is in fact one sponsored by the TGIE that shows as part of Tibet all of the territory conquered by Tibet during the empire period of the seventh to ninth centuries. This is not the same as what Dharamsala would presumably claim as the boundaries of a Greater TAR, that territory being logically confined to the TAR and the Chinese-designated TAPs of Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan. Subsequent Chinese propaganda did not fail to point out the contradiction between Western criticism of China about the supposed human rights issues in Tibet while at the same time professing sympathy for China because of the earthquake. Britain was criticized for allowing the Dalai Lama to make a presentation before the House of Commons about the “so-called China’s human rights issue,” at the same time that the Chinese government and people of all ethnicities across China were plunging themselves into the earthquake relief work and making every possible effort to save lives: This move has not only hurt the feelings of the 1.3 billion people in the country but poses a bitter sarcasm about some Western forces on the so-called “human rights issue.” . . . Since a devastating quake jolted Wenchuan county in southwestern Sichuan province on May 12, the Chinese government and people nationwide have moved or touched the entire world deeply with the great spirit
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of “taking the people first” they displayed during the quake rescue and relief. Most of the overseas quake-related media reportages and appraisals have something in common, and that is the confirmation of the loving care the Chinese government and people have demonstrated for lives. Some people turn a blind eye to this reality and still do not forget slamming China under the signboard of “human rights.” For a long period of time, they have confused the Tibet question and the so-called “human rights” issue, and they thought they could gesticulate profusely from the height of morality by doing so.
The article in People’s Daily opined that it was “extremely sarcastic” for the British members of Parliament, who often pass themselves off as “defenders of human rights,” to ask the Dalai Lama to speak on “China’s human rights” when it was “known to all” that he was the former head of the feudal serf system under which Tibetans had no human rights at all, while the current situation of human rights in Tibet was the best it had ever been. Those foreigners who wanted to know the human rights situation in China had only to visit the quake relief areas to hear the genuine voices of ordinary Chinese, who were the only people entitled to speak on China’s human rights. Only the performance of these Chinese acting with the support of their government could be said to be the true record of China’s human rights.65 China Daily reiterated the theme that the “swiftness and efficiency the Chinese government had displayed in its response to the earthquake had “amazed the world” and had “suddenly struck dumb” those who had previously pointed fingers at China on issues like human rights.66 A journal affiliated with the Youth League of the CCP Central Committee, while extolling the rescue efforts of a parachute regiment of the PLA in some Tibetan areas affected by the earthquake, did not hesitate to arouse Chinese animosity against Tibetans by claiming that some “Tibet independence elements” had harassed them by stealing their equipment and even firing shots. The PLA troops were in the Ngaba area that was the scene of many demonstrations in March and April and where Tibetans claimed that Chinese military had fired on them, killing several. The Youth League article, in Chinese, was meant to not only contrast the evidence of China’s exemplary human rights practices, as demonstrated by the rescue effort, with the Tibetan rioters’ violations of the human rights of innocent Chinese in Lhasa, but to further inflame the animosity of Chinese against Tibetans by claiming that they were hindering the rescue efforts.67 Meanwhile, the TGIE, perpetually hopeful that China would really negotiate, sought to dispel China’s “misconceptions” about the Dalai Lama’s positions. The government in exile reportedly sent a document stating that the Dalai Lama supported the Olympics, did not seek independence, and followed the principle of nonviolence, meaning that he had not instigated the March
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violence in Tibet. The document, issued after a prayer ceremony in Dharamsala for the earthquake victims, was seen as an attempt to dispel Beijing’s suspicions ahead of the next round of talks. The document was a compilation of past statements by the Dalai Lama about his support for the Beijing Olympics, his desire for autonomy under the framework of the PRC, and his opposition to violence. In regard to his and Tibetans’ support for the Olympics, the Dalai Lama was quoted: “It will be futile and not helpful to anyone if we do something that will create hatred in the minds of the Chinese people.”68 This lofty sentiment was not reciprocated in any way by Chinese propaganda, which had done everything possible to arouse Chinese chauvinism and nationalism against Tibetans. China in fact accused the Dalai Lama of failure to adhere to its “Three Stops” policy by claiming that he was still trying to promote violence in Tibet. A Tibetan official, Pema Tinley, a vice chairman of the TAR, predicted that Tibetan separatists might try to upset the arrival of the Olympic torch in Lhasa. The prediction of possible disturbances was said to be based on certain statements of the Dalai Lama in which he said that some Tibetans might protest the torch ceremony in Lhasa. The Dalai Lama had expressed regret that even he was unable to convince all Tibetans to refrain from such protests. However, for the Chinese, the Dalai Lama’s benign statement was equivalent to a threat. Since the Chinese had accused the Dalai Lama of instigating all such disturbances in Tibet, they considered his statement a threat to do so during the Olympic torch ceremonies in Lhasa. However, all the Dalai Lama said was that having the torch ceremony in Lhasa was an insult to Tibetans given the recent events there and that China should cancel the ceremony there in order to avoid any such Tibetan protests. Pema Tinley’s statement allowed the Chinese to continue to deny media access to Tibet, to accuse the Dalai Lama of failing to adhere to China’s conditions for dialogue, and to invoke anger from the Chinese people against Tibetans who would protest against the Beijing Olympics and the “sacred” Olympic flame. The prediction of further violence also allowed China to justify continued repressive measures against Tibetan independence elements: “Just as China is busy fighting the earthquake and providing disaster relief, the ‘Tibetan independence’ forces continue to deliberately create new disturbance in Lhasa, which undoubtedly repulses people with goodness of heart around the world.”69
Dialogue and Olympics On 21 June the Olympic torch was paraded through Lhasa, a planned threeday celebration being confined to one day. The city was under tight security
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with hundreds of police and paramilitary troops lining the streets. Tibetans said that only Chinese and trusted Tibetan cadres were allowed along the route from Norbulingka to the Potala, while most Tibetans were prevented from approaching the route by street blockades. Shops were closed and Tibetans were reportedly told to stay in their homes. Groups of schoolchildren, Chinese and Tibetans, lined the route, waving Chinese and Olympic flags and shouting slogans such as “Go China.” Fences were erected along the route to prevent any untoward incidents such as had marred the torch relay in several foreign countries. Some foreign reporters were present but they were kept in a controlled group, allowed to observe only the beginning and end of the procession and not allowed to talk with Tibetans. Reporters who were promised they would be allowed to go to the Jokhang to check on the welfare of the monks who had spoken out to an earlier press tour on 27 March were not permitted to go there. At the end of the procession the Olympic flame was greeted by a carefully choreographed display of ethnic dancing and flag-waving from schoolchildren and other chosen spectators. Tibet Party Secretary Zhang Qingli gave a speech in which he reportedly said: “Tibet’s sky will never change and the red flag with five stars will forever flutter high above it.” “We will certainly be able to totally smash the splittist schemes of the Dalai Lama clique,” he added. Zhang’s provocative speech elicited a rare rebuke from the Olympic Committee, which criticized him for politicizing the Olympics. China denied this accusation, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson saying “I don’t think their purpose is to politicize the Olympics but rather to create a stable and harmonious environment for the Olympics. So you can’t say relevant remarks by relevant officials reflect a Chinese position of politicizing the Olympics.”70 China was obviously stung by this rebuke, having repeatedly warned foreigners not to politicize the Olympics by criticizing China. On 29 June China announced that it would meet again with the Dalai Lama’s representatives in early July. As usual, China described the talks as coming at the request of the Dalai Lama. Xinhua quoted a government spokesman saying, “Our door is always open for the dialogue with the Dalai Lama. We hope that the Dalai Lama would treasure this opportunity and give positive response to the requirements of the central authorities.” This was obviously a reference to the “Three Stops” that China had demanded as a precondition for talks: that the Dalai Lama should stop instigating violence in Tibet, stop trying to sabotage the Olympics, and stop his separatist activities. The scheduling of the talks was announced during a visit to China of the U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and may have been connected to American pressure as well as China’s hopes to ease international criticism ahead of the Olympic Games. The Chinese decision to hold talks at this time, instead of as
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previously scheduled on 11 June, might also reflect their relief at having taken the Olympic torch through Lhasa without incident. The Tibetan side described the next talks as a continuation, the seventh round, of the formal dialogue. Even before the Dalai Lama’s envoys arrived in China, French president Nicolas Sarkozy said that he might attend the Beijing Olympics if there were progress in talks between China and representatives of the Dalai Lama. He eventually announced that he would attend, even though no progress was made in the actual dialogue. For Sarkozy as for many Western leaders, the process of dialogue was sufficient for them to pretend that progress was being made. A pool conducted among Chinese Internet users showed that 90 percent of Chinese did not want Sarkozy to attend the Olympics in any case.71 China also warned Sarkozy not to meet with the Dalai Lama, who was scheduled to visit France during the Olympics. Although many other world leaders had met with the Dalai Lama, China seemed to have chosen France for particular pressure on the issue because France had tried to establish a special relationship with China, which to the Chinese meant adherence to all their policies, and perhaps because France had wavered in its response to the Olympic torch incident in Paris by sending apologies. China now accused Sarkozy of interference in its internal affairs if he went through with his plan to meet with the Dalai Lama. On the day that the Tibetan envoys did arrive in China, 1 July, Beijing Jiefangjun Bao, the online English-language newspaper of the Central Military Commission of the PLA, published a selection of Chinese Internet opinions, one of which, by Yi Gu, titled “What to Talk about with Dalai Lama?” reflected the results of Chinese propaganda on the Chinese people: It seems a new round of talks between the Beijing central government and the Dalai Lama will start soon. Then, what are the topics on the table? Is it the current situation of Tibet, position of Tibet, future of Tibet, or the destiny of the Tibetan people, of course NOT. The reason is simple. Dalai is a Buddhist lama, his past political status was based on the system of theocracy. The system, in which a society is ruled by a priest or monk who represents a god, has been abolished in Tibet long before. So if one is going to discuss with a monk the position and future of Tibet, and destiny of Tibetan people, doesn’t that give an impression that China will allow theocracy to resume in Tibet? Tibet is an autonomous region of China, and representing it is the government of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. The 14th Dalai Lama has set up an “exile regime” in Dharamsala, India, and he claims to be the leader of the exile regime. The fact is that not a single state in the world today admits the legitimacy of Dalai Lama’s exile government in Dharamsala. If the central government is going to discuss the position, future of Tibet, and destiny of Tibetan people, doesn’t that give an impression that Dharamsala exile regime is legitimate? Tibet
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has achieved a lot in the past 50-odd years, but Tibet’s success and progress has nothing to do with the Dalai Lama. He by no means can represent Tibet or the Tibetan people now. So, China’s central government is not going to discuss with Dalai Lama the current situation of Tibet, position of Tibet, future of Tibet, or the destiny of the Tibetan people, but only the future and destiny of Dalai Lama himself.72
The “seventh round” of the Sino-Tibetan dialogue lasted only two days, in Beijing, on the first two days of July, including a tour of the Olympic facilities and talks with Chinese Tibetologists. The Tibetan envoys adhered to their usual practice of not releasing the results of their meeting until they had returned to India and reported to the Dalai Lama. However, Xinhua released its version of the meeting, in Chinese and English, on the day after the meeting concluded. Again, the Tibetans were described as “private representatives” of the Dalai Lama. The Chinese description of the event left no room for any interpretation except that there had been no real dialogue, the Tibetans having been put off with promises only that the dialogue might continue sometime later in the year, after the Olympics, if the Dalai Lama displayed some “positive behavior.” In particular, he was required to “openly and explicitly promise and prove it in his actions not to support activities to disturb the upcoming Beijing Olympic Games, not to support plots to fan violent criminal activities, not to support and concretely curb the violent terrorist activities of the ‘Tibetan Youth Congress’ and not to support any argument and activity to seek ‘Tibet independence’ and split the region from the country.” The former “Three Stops” conditions thus became “Four No Supports,” with the addition of the condition that he should not support the activities of the TYC. The Chinese central government’s policy toward the Dalai Lama was said to be “consistent and explicit” and the “door for dialogue is always open.” In Tibet “the adherence to the CPC leadership, the socialist system and the regional autonomy of ethnic minorities will not be altered.” The central government would “apply its policies in Tibet, support the region’s economic and social development and work to improve living standards of people in Tibet as it did before.” The “strong cohesiveness and profound love among its people” shown during the earthquake relief work had served as a “vivid illustration of China’s protection of human rights.” The earthquake relief had also demonstrated China’s policy of “timely and unimpeded information disclosure” and the government’s philosophy of “centering on the people and governing for the people” had highlighted the superiority of the socialist system.73 Thus, the Chinese declared that they would never alter any of their policies in regard to Tibet and they would talk to the Dalai Lama about his personal situation only if he adhered to all of China’s conditions in advance. These conditions would require him to discontinue all his international activities
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and those of his supporters and dissolve all his organizations, particularly the Tibetan government in exile. China did not respond to any of the Tibetans’ conditions, such as that the repression within Tibet should stop, the patriotic education campaign should be discontinued, and China should stop its vilification of the Dalai Lama. Instead, China accused the Dalai Lama of having failed to meet its conditions by his continued support for organizations such as the Youth Congress, which was specifically charged with embarrassing China by holding demonstrations at Chinese diplomatic posts, particularly in Nepal. The outcome of the latest round of dialogue appeared to confirm the opinion of those who said that China had held it only because of international pressure to do so and because of the hope that it might eliminate the last vestiges of the threats of Olympic boycotts. In this China appeared to be successful, since the combination of its ostensible willingness to “dialogue” about Tibet and international sympathy for China due to the Sichuan earthquake had defused almost all such threats. On 5 July, Lodi Gyari issued a press release in Dharamsala in which he admitted no progress in the latest dialogue: We had hoped that the Chinese leadership would reciprocate our efforts by taking tangible steps during this round. On the contrary, due to their excessive concern about legitimacy, the Chinese side even failed to agree to our proposal of issuing a joint statement with the aim of committing both parties to the dialogue process. While the Chinese side finally seems to have realized that their allegations against His Holiness for instigating the recent events in Tibet and in sabotaging the Olympics Games have become untenable, they are now urging His Holiness not to support violence, terrorism, and sabotaging the Olympics. . . . While the Tibetan Youth Congress does not support the Middle Way Approach of His Holiness the Dalai Lama and stands for independence of Tibet, we categorically rejected the Chinese attempt to label it as a violent and terrorist organization. His Holiness has repeatedly and clearly stated publicly he is not seeking separation and independence of Tibet. Throughout our talks we have reiterated to our counterparts that the issue at hand is the welfare of the Tibetan people and is not about the personal status and affairs of His Holiness the Dalai Lama or that of the Tibetans in exile. In the course of our discussions we were compelled to candidly convey to our counterparts that in the absence of serious and sincere commitment on their part the continuation of the present dialogue process would serve no purpose. The Chinese side expressed the view that the dialogue process has been productive and that we need to keep in mind that a half-a-century-old issue of great complexity cannot be resolved in a matter of years. Guided by the Tibetan leadership’s policy of engagement, we agreed with our counterparts to have the next round of discussions in October and discussed some points that could serve as the basis of the agenda.74
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In a press release, the Kashag and the Tibetan Parliament in Dharamsala “appealed to the Tibetan people to remain steadfast in the Middle Way Approach and to enhance the strength of non-violence and collective merits in their resolve to continue the struggle of the Tibetan people without showing any signs of laxity and faint-heartedness.”75 In a formal statement the Kashag said: Unfortunately, the seventh round of talks—as we have suspected from the very beginning—did not at all go in accordance with our hopes and expectations. Moreover, the Chinese government has indulged in a selfish act of spewing onesided propaganda on Tibet. Greatly disturbed by these negative developments, we are doubtful, more than ever before, whether the leaders of the People’s Republic of China have the determination and sincerity to work towards achieving reconciliation on the issue of Tibet.
The Kashag reiterated the demand that China should stop all “acts of repressing, beating, torturing, arresting and incarcerating Tibetan people for peacefully expressing their views,” stop the Patriotic Education Campaign in monasteries and its excessive interference in religious affairs, and stop all its activities—carried out in the name of progress and development—that harmed the land and environment of Tibet, including excessive exploitation of natural resources, changing forcibly the traditional lifestyles of Tibetan peasants and nomads, and the policy of flooding Tibet with nonTibetan immigrants. The Kashag mentioned one positive development of the latest dialogue, an agreement that in the next round the subject of discussion would be on how the provisions of the National Regional Autonomy system (now, Regional Ethnic Autonomy in the Chinese translation) as enshrined in the constitution of the PRC were being implemented in Tibet.76 On the same day as the Kashag statement, 6 July, Xinhua published an interview with a “responsible person” of the United Front Work Department that elicited some of the subtleties of the Chinese point of view. This person said that it was “time for the Dalai Lama to respond with sincerity and prove it by deeds after the Chinese central government had communicated goodwill to him during the meeting with his private representatives.” Du Qinglin of the United Front had told the Tibetans that the Dalai Lama should “openly and explicitly promise and prove it in his actions not to support activities to disturb the upcoming Beijing Olympic Games, not to support plots to fan violent criminal activities, not to support and concretely curb the violent terrorist activities of the ‘Tibetan Youth Congress’ and not to support any argument and activity to seek ‘Tibet independence’ and split the region from the country.”
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The “four not-to-supports” were said to be “detailed measures of the three stops” that were “more practical and more convenient for the Dalai Lama to follow.” This was said to represent a “message of goodwill that we would like to send to the Dalai side, in order to ensure positive results for the contacts between the two sides.” However, “If the Dalai Lama fails to meet such simple and rational requirements, it will be impossible to have necessary atmosphere and condition for next round of contact.” The “responsible person” stressed that the “door for dialogue was always open . . . as long as the Dalai Lama suits his actions with his words and truly practices the four ‘not-to-supports,’” but the contacts and dialogues were about “Dalai Lama’s personal future, not so-called ‘China-Tibet negotiation’ or ‘dialogue between Han and Tibetan people.’” He said that he would like to put special emphasis on this fact: We do not recognize the so-called “Tibetan Government in Exile,” there is no country in this world that recognizes the “Tibetan Government in Exile,” and the central government will by no means hold any discussion with such an illegal organization. I would also like to stress that having gone through the democratic reform and upon the establishment of the autonomous region, the broad numbers of the liberated serfs in Tibet have already become the masters of themselves, and Tibet has already embarked on the road of socialism; and only the central people’s government and the people’s government of the Tibet Autonomous Region are the representatives of the Tibetan people, and no one else has the right to represent the Tibetan people.77
On 5 July, only two days after the end of the latest dialogue, Beijing Guangming Ribao Online, which OSC describes as the “website of the party’s primary daily newspaper for intellectuals and professionals,” published in Chinese an analysis of the latest round of dialogue by Yiduo, or Yedor. Yedor emphasized the shift of requirement of the Chinese side from “three stops” to “four not supports,” in particular the requirement “not to support and concretely curb the violent terrorist activities of the ‘Tibetan Youth Congress.’” The TYC was said to have been one of the “plotters and executors responsible for the 14 March serious violent criminal incident of beating, smashing, looting, and arson and for the later serious criminal incidents that occurred in Tibetan areas.” Yedor complained that even after the Chinese government put forward the “three stops” condition in May, the TYC still “took its own course and further intensified its separatist and sabotage activities under the banner of being loyal to the Dalai Lama.” It had organized a “Tibet independence torch” to compete with the Olympic torch and had brazenly called on citizens and governments to boycott the Olympics and help Tibet gain its lost independence. It had organized more than sixteen hundred people in Nepal
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to demonstrate in front of the Chinese embassy. These demonstrators had “charged against the Nepalese police line several times, posing a serious threat to the safety of our embassy personnel in Nepal.” Some had even attempted to seize weapons from the police. “If the violent terrorist trend of such an organization were allowed to continue, it would not only constitute a threat to the overall situation in combating terrorism in China and the world but also cause a great embarrassment for the Dalai Lama who always considers himself an advocate of peace and nonviolence.” The Dalai Lama had said that he did not approve of the extremist activities of the TYC but he had not condemned their activities: We have noticed that Dalai has expressed his support for the Beijing Olympic Games on one hand but turned a blind eye to disturbing the Beijing Olympics by some people on the other. He has claimed to oppose violent terrorist activities on one hand but has not condemned the “Tibetan Youth Congress’” undisguised violent terrorist activities at all on the other. On one hand, he has said that he does not approve of the extremist activities carried out by the “Tibetan Youth Congress” and other organizations, but on the other hand, he has argued that its statements and actions have nothing to do with him. On one hand, he has professed to abandon “Tibet independence,” but on the other hand, he has whitewashed various kinds of “disguised independence.” Such an attitude actually represents his connivance at and support of the anti-Olympic, violent, terrorist, and separatist activities. The central government and people across the country have seen all these very clearly and cannot tolerate them. If the Dalai Lama really wants to make progress in the contacts and talks, he must win the trust of the central government and the people across the country with actual deeds.
Yedor said that the “Four Not Supports” were not a change from the “Three Stops” but rather an “epitomization” of them. “This has made it more convenient for the Dalai Lama to accept such requirements openly. If he should not accept such simple, logical requirements and act according to them, would there be any sincerity of contacts and talks to speak of?” The difference in the two requirements was thus revealed to be that the Dalai Lama was required not only to not engage in any “separatist activities” himself but he should not allow any of his supporters to do any such things either. The Dalai Lama could thus be accused of having violated China’s conditions if any of his supporters did anything that displeased China. Rather than being “more convenient” for the Dalai Lama than the “Four Stops,” the “Four Not Supports” were an increased requirement on the Dalai Lama to prevent any of what China regarded as separatist activities by any of his supporters. Yedor said that the Dalai Lama’s representatives had informal discussions with experts of Tibetology institutions, which were intended to “enable them
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to understand the situation in the country and in the Tibetan areas more objectively and in a more all-round way so that they would have a more profound understanding of the central government’s policies. All this could not but move the Dalai Lama’s private representatives to some extent.” In a review of the central government’s contacts with the Dalai Lama, Yedor gave yet another translation of what Deng Xiaoping had told Gyalo Thondup in 1979: “While meeting with Gyalo Thondup, the Dalai Lama’s second elder brother, in 1979, Deng Xiaoping said: ‘The fundamental question is whether Tibet is part of China. Whether one is right or wrong is to be judged according to this standard.’” The Chinese Central Government had always been firm on principle: The Dalai Lama and his “Tibet government in exile” cannot represent the Tibetan people, and the central government cannot possibly discuss with them on Tibet’s political standing and social system, issues which have been solved long before. Second, the central government always leaves adequate leeway for the Dalai Lama and gives him a way out. Though various complicated situations have arisen from the troubles made by the “Tibet independence” forces in the past many years, the central government has always maintained contact with the Dalai Lama. From 1979 to now, arrangements have been made for more than 20 groups of the Dalai Lama’s representatives and relatives to revisit the country. . . . All this has been aimed to enable the Dalai Lama to really understand the situation, to be close to the requirements of the central government and the provisions of the Constitution, and to make a correct choice. At the recent meeting, Du Qinlin had specially emphasized that “in Tibet, we will never waver in upholding the leadership of the CPC, the socialist system, and the system of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities.” The central government has reiterated these remarks many times, and the Dalai Lama side should think deeply in this regard and respond to the central government’s requirements with positive actions.78
Even though the most recent dialogue had failed to produce any results, it was sufficient excuse for most Western leaders to announce that they would attend the Olympics opening ceremonies. Most also ceased their criticisms of China about Tibet. China was invited as an observer to the G-8 economic summit held in Japan the first week of July and escaped any mention of the Tibet issue. The Tibet issue was reportedly shelved based on the judgment that “effective dialogue” between the Chinese authorities and representatives Dalai Lama, demanded by the United States and other countries, had been held.79 The European Parliament did pass a resolution, on 10 July, in which it welcomed the resumption of contacts between the representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese authorities and called for an intensification of those contacts. However, it “deplored the fact that participants in the protest
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in Lhasa are still being traced, detained and arbitrarily arrested,” and called upon China to “halt its patriotic education campaign.” The president of the European Parliament, Hans-Gert Pottering, announced that he would not be attending the Games in Beijing due to the lack of progress in talks about Tibet.80 Beijing interpreted the failure of Olympic boycott threats as due to the international community having recognized that the Olympics should not be politicized. Chinese propaganda also implied that the world had realized that it had been wrong to criticize China about Tibet when China had actually been blameless. Xinhua quoted French apologies that the disruptions of the torch relay in Paris did “not represent France or the French people.” Xinhua said that China was a “hospitable and friendly nation” and the Olympics were to be a “gathering of all the peace-loving people around the world” that would “propagate valuable virtues such as peace, friendship and cooperation.” To politicize such a grand and happy ceremony would only “hurt the feelings of all the peace-lovers, including the Chinese people, and tarnish the spirit of the Olympics.”81 Nevertheless, China abandoned its earlier optimistic slogans about the Olympics, such as the “Harmonious Olympics” and the “Best Olympics in History,” in favor of “Hold a Safe and Sound Olympics.” Beijing now merely hoped for an Olympics not marred by demonstrations or other embarrassing disruptions. Security became the primary focus of Chinese officials, who tightened up on visa and security regulations and backtracked on their promises to allow full media freedom. When the Olympics began, on 8 August, Tibetans and their supporters worldwide demonstrated at Chinese embassies. This would later be cited by the Chinese as evidence that the Dalai Lama did in fact try to sabotage the Olympics and that he had not adhered to their requirement that he not do so. The Games went off with only a few protests by foreign Students for a Free Tibet activists who managed to climb light poles near the Olympic facilities and unfurl banners. Otherwise the Olympic events were marked by tight security that prevented any incidents but that also characterized the Beijing Games. The atmosphere of international harmony that had indeed marked previous Olympics and that China had declared the theme of these Games was replaced by security, sterility, and the absence of spontaneity. An international media survey revealed that the media covered the Olympics as a sporting event and as a spectacle without reference to any political issues except the emergence of China as a world power: The brilliantly conceived and staged opening ceremony attracted “gee-whiz” coverage by newspapers around the world. . . . The press ignored the attending heads of state and even in most instances the parade of athletes, and focused on the new Chinese superpower. Coverage of the earthquake earlier in the summer
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had won China needed global sympathy. The choreography of lights, music and actors at the opening of the 2008 Games won China global admiration.82
China’s and the International Olympic Committee’s promises that the Olympics would lead China to more openness and better human rights conditions were forgotten. China reneged on its promise to allow complete media freedom; sensitive websites remained blocked and foreign journalists were hindered by restrictions on using the local color segments in their broadcasts that were characteristic of previous Olympics. Few journalists were able to travel in China and none were allowed to go to Tibet. A small park far from the Olympic site was set aside for permitted protesters but was empty because all permits had been denied. The magnificence of the opening ceremony generally silenced all criticism of the Chinese Olympic hosts, at least temporarily. But the militaristic choreography of the ceremony characterized the humorless, contrived, and controlled nature of the Beijing Olympics and of China itself. Later it was revealed that the training and practice required of the participants in the ceremony was little less than abusive. There were some negative incidents, such as the revelation that a procession of ostensibly ethnic minority children were all Han Chinese. In Tibet, monasteries were surrounded by police to prevent any incidents. Uighurs and Tibetans living in Beijing had found themselves under scrutiny before the Olympics and others of those nationalities were not allowed to go to Beijing during the Olympics. If they somehow managed to get there they found that hotels had been instructed to deny them rooms. Beijing had been cleansed of any sights that might harm China’s image, including thousands of undesirable people like beggars and homeless workers. Despite these restrictions the Chinese were satisfied with the success of their Games and foreigners were generally relieved that the air pollution, although bad, was not as poisonous as anticipated. None of the international leaders who attended the Olympics was reported to have raised any human rights or Tibet issues with Chinese leaders. In France the Dalai Lama visited for eleven days but did not meet with Sarkozy, who was given an excuse when the Dalai Lama declared that the time was not convenient for an official meeting. Sarkozy said that the meeting was merely postponed and that he would meet with the Dalai Lama on another scheduled visit before the end of the year. The Dalai Lama met with Sarkozy’s wife, Carla Bruni, who attended an inauguration of a Buddhist temple in southern France with him. When the Olympics came to a close, the CCP no doubt uttered a collective sigh of relief that there had been no disruptions or incidents. The few negative incidents that did occur were ignored by most Chinese, who reveled in a “successful” or even the “best ever” Olympics. The Beijing Olympics were for the Chinese more about China, and the CCP, than about international athletics.
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For the Chinese it was all about national dignity and prestige; for the CCP, it was all about legitimacy. Few other countries could have been so desperate to host the Olympics and to have considered it so significant in terms of international legitimacy. The fact that China had not previously hosted an Olympics was considered a part of the history of Western disrespect and humiliation of China. When China was denied the 2000 Olympics it was considered another grave insult to the Chinese nation. And when China was awarded the 2008 Olympics it was regarded as an international acknowledgment of China’s rise to an important world status and a chance for China to prove its worthiness and for the CCP to demonstrate its legitimacy. Since the Chinese people and their government had construed the significance of the Olympics as all about China, they reacted to criticism of the CCP’s handling of the Olympics and associated issues in a xenophobic and nationalistic manner. The international protests against the Olympic torch relay were regarded as not at all about Tibet but about the usual Western attempt to denigrate and humiliate China. Most Chinese found it hard to believe that Westerners were really so interested in and concerned about Tibet, and in any case they thought they were misinformed or were using the Tibet issue just as an excuse to attack China. Since China’s policies in Tibet were regarded as faultless then this must be the case. The nationalistic reaction of Chinese people, particularly those residing abroad, to what they regarded as an intolerable and unjust criticism of China in regard to Tibet, was considered an appropriate reaction to unjust criticism. The Chinese sense of righteous indignation was seemingly validated when this display of Chinese pride and resistance to national humiliation seemed to have been successful in lessening Western protests about Tibet. However, people of other countries were stunned to see that Chinese students did not hesitate to intimidate citizens of the countries in which they were guests for daring to protest about Tibet. International sympathy for China because of the Sichuan earthquake, along with an illusion that China’s professed willingness to dialogue about Tibet was sincere, was responsible for China escaping further criticism about Tibet and for the end of Olympic boycott threats. Nevertheless, Chinese nationalists were undoubtedly given the impression that their display of nationalistic fervor and defensiveness had “won” the debate about Tibet. This sense of victory in regard to the Tibet issue was consistent with a Chinese belief, furthered by Party propaganda, that the Tibet issue was nothing but an ideological tactic employed by “Western anti-China forces” to weaken and divide China, without any basis in legitimate concern about Tibet or knowledge of the facts of Tibet. Having conducted a successful Olympics which an unprecedented number of world leaders had been coerced to attend was considered an international acknowledgment of China’s increased status in the world and even
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an admission that criticisms of China about Tibet were unfounded. Both the Party and Chinese nationalists celebrated the success of the Beijing Olympics as an international acknowledgment of China’s rise to its rightful place in the world but also as a victory in the ideological battle about Tibet. At the very least China had shown its power to intimidate into silence those who might criticize it in regard to Tibet. This sense of the power to enforce conformity in regard to Tibet on all those who wished to have good relations with China was much on display after the Olympics. Hong Kong’s Ta Kung Pao declared a “New Geopolitical Situation after Post-Beijing Olympic Games.” A new international situation is being born. . . . In the wake of the Beijing Olympic Games, China’s power and prestige are on the rise, which will certainly deepen the misgivings of the United States and Europe and prompt them to join forces to contain China. . . . In China, the geopolitical significance of the Beijing Olympic Games cannot be underestimated. The games may well turn out to be the marker of China’s rise in history. . . . What the Beijing Olympic Games have shown is that a rising China will change the world. . . . The Beijing Olympic Games were preceded by a fierce trial of strength between China and the West. Since the beginning of the year, the West has been engaging in political blackmail and used the Olympic Games to put pressure on China on a string of issues, from human rights and democracy to “Tibetan independence” and religion. The West helped bring about the 14 March riots in Tibet and attempts to boycott the Olympic Games and disrupt the Olympic torch relay. What the West did not expect was that its actions aroused the righteous anger of Chinese people at home and abroad, who launched an epical and unprecedented counterattack and initiated a new form of people’s warfare, namely, Internet people’s warfare. This blunted the West’s arrogance and prompted France, which currently holds the rotating presidency of the European Union, to send a special envoy to China as peacemaker.83
In March 2009, the International Olympic Committee banned any future international torch relays. Organizing countries would be allowed to conduct Olympic torch relays only within their own countries. The disastrous Chinese torch relay thus entered history as only one of two international relays ever held. The other, the 1936 relay from Greece to Germany, was performed by the German Nazi Party for propaganda purposes much like those of the CCP. The 1936 Nazi Olympics were intended to glorify the Nazi regime much as the 2008 Beijing Olympics were intended to glorify the CCP. They shared a propagandistic character intended to impress the world with the legitimacy and permanence of the Nazi Party and the CCP, respectively.
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Notes 1. “How Can the Dalai Clique Use Olympics to Drum Up Publicity for ‘Tibet Independence,’” Beijing, Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service in Chinese, 18 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080318063010. 2. “Commentary: The Logic of Card Games,” Beijing, Xinhua, 17 March 2008. 3. “BBC Monitoring: Chinese Media Misrepresent Gordon Brown on Tibet,” Caversham, BBC Monitoring, 19 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080319950001. 4. “Foreign Ministry Spokesman Urges Dalai to Create Conditions for Dialogue,” Beijing, Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service in Chinese, 20 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080320138001. 5. “Pricking the Bubble of ‘Terrorizing Tibet,’” Beijing, Xinhua, 20 March 2008. 6. “Ragdi: Tibet Will Not Permit Its Development and Stability to Be Undermined,” Beijing, Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service in Chinese, 19 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080319136003. 7. “Zhou Wenzhong Says Overseas ‘Tibet Independence’ Elements’ Attacks at Chinese Embassies and Consulates Abroad in Collaboration with Each Other Have Brought to Light the Dalai’s True Features,” Beijing, Zhongguo Xinwen She in Chinese, 23 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080323072003. 8. “Central Government Always Opens Wide Door to Dialogue; Dalai Clique Consistently Lacks Sincerity for Talks,” Beijing, Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service in Chinese, 21 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080321354004. 9. “Journalists and Scholars: Western Media Unmasked Hypocrisy of Their Journalists’ Outlook with Distorted Reports on Lhasa Incident,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 28 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080328364001. 10. “Western Countries Cherish Ulterior Motives on the Tibet Incident,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao in Chinese, 25 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080325710010. 11. “Olympic Boycott Will Never Force China to Compromise with Dalai Clique,” Beijing, Xinhua, 29 March 2008. 12. “Stop Irresponsible Clamor!” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 29 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080330045001. 13. “The Dalai Clique Has Become a Chess Piece in the Game to Oppose China,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao in Chinese, 29 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080329722002. 14. “Olympic Spirit Allows of No Tarnishing,” Renmin Ribao in Chinese, 31 March 2008, in OSC CPP20080331710003. 15. “China—OSC Summary in Chinese 01 Apr 08–03 Apr 08,” OSC CPP20080403437001. 16. “Chinese Harass Western Journalists on Tibet,” Beijing, Wall Street Journal, 5 April 2008. 17. “China Promotes Website Attacking Western Media,” Beijing, AFP, 5 April 2008. 18. “Journey of Harmony,” China Daily, 1 April 2008. 19. “Beijing: Agencies Prepare to Strike Back,” Paris, Intelligence Online, 10 April 2008, in OSC EUP20080410177003.
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20. “Censor Loosens Media Strings in Publicity War,” Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 9 April 2008. 21. “Farce Cannot Obstruct Splendor of Sacred Flame,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao in Chinese, 9 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080409710001. 22. “China Urges France to Reflect upon Chinese Public’s Opinions and Sentiments,” Beijing, Xinhua, 15 April 2008. 23. “China-Bashing Backfires,” Beijing, China Daily, 15 April 2008. 24. “Beijing Olympic Organizational Committee Official Issues Statement to Thank People of All Countries for Welcoming and Supporting Olympic Torch; and to Condemn an Extremely Small Number of Radicals for Their Harassment and Sabotage,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 10 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080410074006. 25. “China Resolved Despite Attacks,” Beijing, Zhongguo Wang, 15 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080416701003. 26. “Think Thrice when the Dust Is Settled,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao, 15 April 2008. 27. “Dalai Destroying Base for Dialogue,” Beijing, Xinhua, 9 April 2008. 28. “On Second Thoughts, Talks Not a Good Idea,” Beijing, China Daily, 17 April 2008. 29. Doug Saunders, “Beijing Has Become the Guardian of the Chinese Brand,” London, Globe and Mail, 19 April 2008. 30. “Draw on Legal Weapon to Make Foreign Media Apologize,” Guangzhou, Nanfang Dushi Bao in Chinese, 18 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080419066006. 31. “China Needs to Handle Western Challenges with Greater Reason,” Guangzhou, Shiji Jingji Bao in Chinese, 18 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080419066010. 32. “Where Does the Reason for Frantically Disrupting the Beijing Olympics Come From?” Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po, 11 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080411710012. 33. “US Support for the Dalai Is an Act of Perversity,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao in Chinese, 20 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080421710008. 34. “Striking Powerful Counterblows against Provocations,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao, 25 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080425715019. 35. “In Retrospection of the Dalai Clique’s ‘Grief Cards,’” Beijing, Renmin Ribao, 24 April 2008. 36. “Why Has ‘Demonization of China’ Staged a Comeback?” Beijing, Renmin Ribao, 25 April 2008. 37. “China’s Decision to Meet Dalai’s Representative Receives Positive Responses,” Beijing, Xinhua, 25 April 2008. 38. “Press Statement by Kalon Tripa on Xinhua Report of China’s Wishing to Meet with His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Envoys,” Dharamsala, Central Tibetan Administration, 25 April 2008, www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=31&articletype=press. 39. “To Play the Victim Offers No Help for Tibet-Independence Daydream,” Beijing, Xinhua, 28 April 2008. 40. “Exposing Dalai Lama as a Dishonest Person,” Beijing, Beijing Review, 17 April–23 April 2008. 41. “Tibet Benefiting from Regional Autonomy,” Beijing, Beijing Review, 17 April–23 April 2008.
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42. “Lhasa Riot Is Not Ethnic Feud,” Beijing, Beijing Review, 17 April–23 April 2008. 43. “Chinese Foreign Ministry Says: We Hope the Dalai Will Treasure the Opportunity of Consultation, and Stop His Separatist and Sabotage Activities,” Beijing, Xinhua Asia-Pacific Service in Chinese, 29 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080429173005. 44. “A Relevant Central Government Department Is Ready to Make Contact and Hold Consultation with the Dalai Side,” Hong Kong, Zhongguo Tongxun She in Chinese, 27 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080427338003. 45. “Beijing Is Not in ‘Negotiation’ with Dalai,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao in Chinese, 23 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080423710004. 46. “The West Will Pay a Price for Boycotting the Beijing Olympic Games,” Hong Kong, Wen Wei Po in Chinese, 25 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080425710010. 47. “His Holiness the Dalai Lama’s Envoys to Leave for China,” Dharamsala, Central Tibetan Administration, 2 May 2008, www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=35&a rticletype=press. 48. “Whether There Will Be Results from the Dialogue Depends on Dalai’s Action,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao in Chinese, 5 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080505710011. 49. “Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Kasur Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari,” Dharamsala, Central Tibetan Administration, 8 May 2008, www.tibet. net/en/prelease/2008/080508.html. 50. “The Dalai Lama Should Go with Historical Tide,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 4 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080505706001. 51. “The Door Has Been Open All Along, and the Dalai Lama Should Be Sincere,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao in Chinese, 3 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080503718003. 52. “Western ‘Soft Power’ Thwarted,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao in Chinese, 7 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080407710016. 53. “The West Needs to Make Up the Missed Lessons of Chinese History and Culture,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao, 4 May 2008. 54. “The Most Beautiful Legacy—Interpreting the Patriotic Spirit of ‘post80s’ Youth,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 3 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080503136010. 55. “Evaluating the Current Anti-China Clamor,” Beijing, Party School of the Central Committee in Chinese, 25 April 2008, in OSC CPP20080429615002. 56. “How a Rising China Should Conduct Dialogue with the West—Strategic Reflections Triggered by the Disruptions to the Relay of the Olympic Torch,” Guangzhou, Nanfang Zhoumo in Chinese, 1 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080504004008. 57. “Anti-China Provocations Help Make China Stronger,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao in Chinese, 2 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080502710003. 58. “Openness, Transparency, and Dialogue: The Code of Conduct China Should Abide By in the Course of Its Rise,” Guangzhou, Nanfang Zhoumo in Chinese, 8 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080511004006. 59. “How Should a Rising China Conduct Dialogue with the West—How to Address the Public Relations Crisis following the Tibet Incident?” Guangzhou, Nanfang Zhoumo in Chinese, 1 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080511004004. 60. “China Should Host Olympic Games Calmly,” Guangzhou, Nanfeng Chuang Online in Chinese, 1 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080511004005.
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61. “Through Trauma, West and China Find Much in Common,” Beijing, Xinhua, 25 May 2008. 62. Julian Borger, “Tibet Could Be Swamped by Chinese Settlement after Olympics, says Dalai Lama,” London, The Guardian, 24 May 2008. 63. “A Seventh Round of Long-Running Talks between China and Tibet Scheduled for June 11 Has Been Postponed as Beijing Focuses on Earthquake Relief Efforts, an Aide to the Dalai Lama Said Wednesday,” Hong Kong, AFP, 4 June 2008. 64. “China Envoy Mao Siwei in India Writes: ‘Five Questions on the Tibetan Issue,’” Chennai, The Hindu, 4 June 2008. 65. “Tendentious Loss of Sight for ‘Human Rights Defenders,’” Beijing, Renmin Ribao, 4 June 2008. 66. “Serving People Core of Human Rights Practice,” Beijing, China Daily, 5 June 2008. 67. “Paratroops Encounter ‘Enemy Situations’ in Disaster Relief,” Beijing, Qingnian Cankao in Chinese, 30 May 2008, in OSC CPP20080603442001. 68. Josephine Ma, “Dalai Lama Document Aims to Ease Beijing Fears,” Hong Kong, South China Morning Post, 6 June 2008. 69. “Baima Chilin’s ‘Divulging the Secret’ Serves to Kill Two Birds with One Stone,” Hong Kong, Zhongguo Tongxun She in Chinese, 8 June 2008, in OSC CPP20080608338005. 70. “PRC Foreign Ministry Spokesman Denies China Politicizing Olympics after IOC Rebuke,” Hong Kong, AFP, 26 June 2008. 71. “Poll Shows Chinese Netizens Oppose Sarkozy’s Olympics Attendance,” Hong Kong, AFP, 2 July 2008. 72. “Choice for Dalai Lama,” Beijing, Jiefangjun Bao, 2 July 2008, in OSC CPP20080702702012. 73. “Chinese Central Government Officials Meet with Dalai Lama’s Private Representatives,” Beijing, Xinhua, 3 July 2008. 74. “Statement by Special Envoy of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, Kasur Lodi Gyaltsen Gyari,” Dharamsala, Central Tibetan Administration, 5 July 2008, www.tibet. net/en/index.php?id=58&articletype=press. 75. “Tibetans Stand Committed to Middle-Way Approach: Kashag,” Dharamsala, Central Tibetan Administration, 6 July 2008, in OSC CPP20080707584004. 76. “The Statement of the Kashag on the Occasion of the 73rd Birthday Celebration of His Holiness the Dalai Lama,” Dharamsala, Central Tibetan Administration, 6 July 2008, www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=59&articletype=press. 77. “Chinese Official Urges Dalai Lama to Respond with Sincerity after Recent Contact,” Beijing, Xinhua, 6 July 2008; “The Responsible Person of the Central United Front Work Department Answers Xinhua Reporter’s Questions on the Recent Contact with Dalai Lama’s Personal Representatives,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 6 July 2008, in OSC CPP20080707716001. 78. “Viewing the Central Government’s Policy toward the Dalai Lama from ‘Four Not-Supports,’” Beijing, Guangming Ribao Online in Chinese, 5 July 2008, in OSC CPP20080705708002.
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79. “Tokyo Summit: Criticism of China Disappears, Wavering Ideology, Tibet Issue Shelved,” Tokyo, Sankei Shimbun in Japanese, 10 July 2008, in OSC JPP20080710026006. 80. “European Parliament Resolution on China and Tibet—Pottering Not Attending Opening Ceremony,” 11 July 2008, International Campaign for Tibet, savetibet. org/news/newsitem.php?id=1335. 81. “World Will Not Allow Olympics to Be Politicized,” Beijing, Xinhua, 14 July 2008. 82. “Global Media Coverage of Olympics Avoids Politics,” Newswise, College Park, University of Maryland International Center for Media and the Public Agenda, 17 September 2008. 83. “New Geopolitical Situation after Beijing Olympic Games,” Hong Kong, Ta Kung Pao Online in Chinese, 31 August 2008, in OSC CPP20080901718001.
5 One State, Two Nations
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TIBET is that there are two distinct nations, Tibet and China, within one political entity. China can claim that Tibet has “always been a part of China,” but it cannot deny that Tibetans have a distinct national and cultural identity. The Chinese Communists underestimated the strength of Tibetan national identity and they overestimated the assimilative power of Chinese culture and the efficacy of Marxist-Leninist nationalities theory and policy to facilitate that assimilation. The policy that the CCP adopted in Tibet was the precursor to what, when applied to Hong Kong and offered to Taiwan, was known as “One Country, Two Systems.” Despite this precedent, the CCP denied that Tibet was deserving of a similar status, because Tibet had already “returned to the Motherland.” The fact that Tibet had once been offered a similar status, in the 1951 Seventeen-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, in order to secure its “return to the Motherland,” but no longer deserved that status once its return had been secured, reveals the temporary tactical nature of the CCP’s idea of autonomy. The Chinese Communists have been repeatedly surprised that the Tibetan political issue survives despite all the coercive means applied to eliminate Tibetan national identity. Because Tibetan national identity has proven more pervasive than anticipated, the Chinese have never been able to allow even the limited and temporary autonomy that they promised. China cannot allow any real autonomy because of the fear that any degree of autonomy would perpetuate Tibetan national identity and thus the separatist issue. China therefore thinks that it has no choice but to pursue a thoroughly assimilationist policy with no allowance for autonomy. The Chinese have been uncompromising HE FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL ISSUE OF
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in their refusal to discuss any political issues in regard to Tibet, while at the same time always expressing their willingness to dialogue. However, the most recent dialogue, from 2002, revealed that China’s strategy is one of “prolonging” or “time wasting” until the Dalai Lama passes and the issue, they think, will be finally resolved.1 Nothing better illustrates China’s position on Tibet, and on dialogue, and little is so misunderstood, than the formulaic statement often repeated by Chinese spokespersons that Tibet is not an issue of human rights, religion, or ethnicity, but a fundamental issue about Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity about which it cannot compromise. The Dalai Lama and his international supporters continue to urge Chinese leaders to negotiate about Tibetan autonomy. They imagine, given that the Dalai Lama has given up independence and accepted Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, that the nature of autonomy is then the issue. And, because the Chinese Constitution and the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law already promise most of the autonomous rights that the Dalai Lama demands, there presumably should be no barriers to dialogue about the nature of Tibetan autonomy. However, the Chinese position is that the Dalai Lama has not really given up independence; therefore, the issue of Tibet is still about China’s sovereignty. China maintains that what the Dalai Lama really wants is the independence of Tibet and what his foreign supporters, or “hostile Western forces,” really want is to denigrate, weaken, and divide China. The Dalai Lama and his supporters may think that the Tibet issue is about human rights, religion, and ethnicity, or the nature of Tibetan autonomy, but the Chinese know that the Tibet issue has always been and always will be about Tibetan independence. This is undoubtedly what Deng Xiaoping meant when in 1979 he said to the Dalai Lama’s brother, Gyalo Thondup, that “anything but independence can be discussed.” What he meant, or at least what later Chinese dialogue strategy implies he meant, is that nothing about the political issue of Tibet could be discussed, that issue being based on Tibet’s claim to independence before 1951. The Chinese will not talk with the Dalai Lama about “genuine autonomy,” since the Dalai Lama’s demand is based on Tibet’s former separate political status and would invalidate all China’s “successful” policies in regard to regional autonomy. They will not talk about a “Greater Tibetan Autonomous Region,” even though all such areas are already designated with Tibetan autonomous status, because a reunified Tibet even with an autonomous status within the PRC would undo China’s successful political divisions of Tibet, and would provide the territory and the political status within which Tibetan separatism could flourish.
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They will not talk about Tibetan autonomy at all because, despite foreign advice that autonomy is in China’s best interest, the Chinese know that it isn’t because autonomy would perpetuate the separatist issue. Despite advice that the Dalai Lama is the solution to the Tibet issue, not the problem, the Chinese know that he is the problem, because he is the symbol of Tibetan national identity. They know that his time on this earth, like any other mortal, is limited. The Chinese know that they have the solution to the Tibet issue, if they admit that there is any such issue, and that solution is not autonomy. The Chinese solution to the Tibet issue is the traditional solution to frontier issues practiced by China for thousands of years and available to modern China as well. That solution is inherent in the vast numbers of Chinese relative to the tiny number of Tibetans. The territory of the Tibetan Plateau is very important to China, but the cultural survival of the tiny number of Tibetans is not very important at all.
“Eighth Round” of Dialogue At the end of October 2008 the Dalai Lama’s representatives were again invited to Beijing for what the Tibetan side numbered as the “eighth round” in the most recent series of dialogues. On 30 October Huanqiu Shibao (Global Times), a newspaper sponsored by Renmin Ribao, announced that the Chinese Central Authorities had arranged for “personal delegates of the Dalai Lama” to come to China for contacts. The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson, Jiang Yu, urged the Dalai Lama “to do something good for the Tibetan people in his remaining years” and to fulfill his pledges to Beijing made in talks in July.2 Prior to the meeting, Xinhua denounced the Dalai Lama for remarks that “confound black and white and disregard facts.” The remarks in question were made by the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, when he said that he was losing faith in the dialogue process. While on a visit to Japan he said that Chinese repression in Tibet was the equivalent of a death sentence for Tibetan culture. Xinhua said that “the self-proclaimed spiritual leader, who betrayed his home country and fled Tibet in 1959, made a cliché-ridden statement when he said the current situation in Tibet is ‘very sad.’” Despite his having never made any efforts for or contributions to the protection and development of Tibetan culture “the Dalai Lama absurdly claims himself as the protector of Tibetan culture.” Xinhua said that the Dalai Lama made accusations about a “death sentence” for Tibetan culture only to further his separatist ambitions. Xinhua continued that the “four not to supports” policy (not to support violence in Tibet, sabotage the Olympics, separatist activities, or terrorist
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activities of the Tibetan Youth Congress) explicated by the central government in July was “concrete, simple, reasonable and explicit, which would have facilitated the contacts and negotiations to generate effective results if the Dalai Lama side had seriously carried out the promises.” The Dalai Lama’s expression of disappointment in the dialogue was only meant to gain public attention and sympathy and it revealed his reluctance to give up Tibetan independence: “Recognizing the irreversible situation, the Dalai Lama should stop repeating the mistakes and discard his fantasies. He should live up to his words in a bid to create a favorable condition for the contacts and negotiations between the central government and his private representatives.”3 Upon the Tibetan delegation’s return to India, Lodi Gyari made a statement to the press in which he said that the delegation had been in China from 30 October to 5 November. They had met in Beijing with Du Qinglin, vice chairman of the CPPCC and minister of the Central Committee United Front Work Department, and Zhu Weiqun, executive deputy director, and Sithar, deputy director, both of the Central United Front Work Department. An official from the TAR, executive vice chairman Pema Trinley (Ch. Baima Chilin, Pelma Trilek) was also present. They had a briefing by experts at the China Tibetology Research Center on the Chinese Constitution and the “Law on Regional National Autonomy” (which the CCP now translates as Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, or REAL). The delegation had also visited the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. They had presented to the Chinese officials the memorandum on Tibetan autonomy that the Chinese officials had requested at the meeting in July. Gyari declined to make any more statements until the special meeting of the Tibetan exiles to be held in Dharamsala at the end of November.4 In contrast to the Tibetan side’s reticence in divulging details of the latest round of talks, the Chinese uncharacteristically publicized the event. The three negotiators on the Chinese side, Zhu Weiqun, Sithar, and Pema Trinley, held a press conference on 10 November to which the Chinese and foreign press were invited. Zhu Weiqun began by saying that they had met with the Dalai Lama’s “private representatives” for the ninth time in the series of contacts and talks since 2002. This was the first time that the Chinese side had given the talks a number, unlike the Tibetans, who had numbered the “rounds of dialogue” since the beginning in order to give them some substance. However, the Chinese numbering differed from the Tibetan, the Chinese apparently counting the “informal meeting” in May that the Tibetan side had not. Thus for the Chinese this was the ninth “contact or talk” while for the Tibetans it was the “eighth round of dialogue.” Zhu said that the talks had been for one day, while five days had been taken up with briefings on the regional autonomy system and the visit to the Ningxia Hui Autonomous
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Region. This schedule reveals that there was much less time for “dialogue” than for the usual attempts to lecture the Tibetans about the successful and permanent nature of “regional ethnic autonomy.” Zhu said that the two sides’ views had differed greatly but “the atmosphere was generally frank and sincere.” The Tibetans had been told that “nobody is permitted to create national secession and undermine national unity under the ‘genuine autonomy’ banner,” and “‘Tibet independence,’ ‘semi-independence’ and ‘independence in disguise’ were all impermissible.” The Dalai Lama should “thoroughly reexamine and completely correct his political proposition and behavior and match his words with deeds. Only by so doing will there be the conditions for improving his relations with the Central Government.” Zhu said that the Tibetan side had not met the Central Government’s “four not-support” requirement. They had not stopped their boycott and sabotage of the Beijing Olympic Games; they had continued to attack the Central Government and supported the Tibetan Youth Congress; and they had continued to promote internationalization of the Tibet issue. Zhu said that the main purpose of Lodi Gyari’s visit was to present to the Central Government the “Memorandum of the Tibetan People for Genuine Autonomy.” In response to the memorandum’s “absurd claim” that “the Tibetan government in exile represents the interests of the vast majority of Tibetan people,” he said that it was the Central Government and the People’s Government of the Tibetan Autonomous Region that represented the people of all ethnic groups in Tibet. The “so-called ‘Tibetan government in exile’ is the product of the small number of secessionists who fled abroad after the defeat of their armed rebellion in 1959, it has engaged in secessionist and sabotage activities for decades, its existence is illegal, and it has not had the recognition of even one country in the world.” The Central Government had accepted the Tibetans “only as the Dalai Lama’s private representatives.” The only issue discussed was “the Dalai Lama’s need to completely renounce his secessionist proposition and activities, his plea for the understanding of the Central Government and the people of the country, and his future and the future of some of those by his side. We simply would not discuss with them about any so-called ‘Tibet issue.’” They had listened to the Tibetan representatives’ explanations only in order to examine “whether or not the Dalai Lama had renounced his secessionist proposition and wanted to come back to the Central Government.” Although the Tibetan memorandum on autonomy deliberately used a lot of ambiguous language, it was clear from it that the Dalai Lama had not renounced his secessionist stand: “The provisions in the ‘Memoranda’ concerning ‘genuine autonomy’ are provisions that attempt to pit the Central Government’s centralized leadership against regional ethnic autonomy; attempt to reject, restrict and
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weaken the Central Government’s authority; reject the supreme legislative authority of the National People’s Congress; and even attempt to let you people of the secessionist clique revise the Constitution so that you actually can have the rights of an independent country.” Even though the memorandum borrowed phrases from the PRC Constitution and Law on Regional Ethnic Autonomy to “wrap and decorate itself,” its name and substance were the same old stuff, such as a “Greater Tibetan Region” that would have a “high degree of autonomy.” This, Zhu said, is “what we call semi-independence or independence in disguise or Tibet independence in essence.” Tibetan autonomous political divisions had been established according to the Constitution “on the basis of respecting historical facts and considering all political, economic and the real conditions comprehensively. The so-called ‘Greater Tibetan Region’ never existed in history, nor does it have any real foundation and basis.” China’s law on regional ethnic autonomy specified that autonomous regions or districts could not be altered except by the Central Government or “autonomous bodies of autonomous ethnic regions.” Since the Dalai Lama’s representatives were not these bodies, they had no authority. As Zhu said, “In other words, you don’t even have any lawful identity. To put it politely, it is improper for you to put forth such an issue; and to put it in a straightforward way, you are not even qualified to put forth this issue.” Zhu said that before the latest meeting he had gone over the records of all such meetings since the early 1980s. From the beginning, Chinese officials had told the Tibet representatives (one of whom was Lodi Gyari): China will not permit Tibet to be turned into a country, nor a region enjoying any so-called “high degree of autonomy.” Creating what you call a Greater Tibetan Autonomous Region simply is unrealistic and absolutely impossible. Now, after more than 20 years, you still want to talk to the central authorities on this issue, albeit in a roundabout way. This specifically shows that you don’t even have the minimum sincerity. Now the contacts and talks have made no progress, and you should bear all the responsibilities. . . . The Central Government will always open their door for the Dalai Lama to reassume the patriotic stand. The door will remain open in the future. However, it has never opened—and will never open—the door for “Tibet independence,” “semi-independence,” or “independence in disguise.”
In response to questions, Zhu explained what the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way policy meant: First, he refuses to acknowledge that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times. The Dalai Lama has repeatedly stated that Tibet was a fully independent country until 1949 when the Chinese People’s Liberation Army entered Tibet,
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and that Tibet is still an independent country that is illegally occupied. Anyone who has a little common knowledge of history knows that Tibet has always been a part of the Chinese territory since ancient times and, beginning from the Yuan Dynasty, China’s central governments have been exercising indisputable and effective administrative jurisdiction over Tibet. The sovereignty issue is the fundamental issue. The Dalai Lama’s refusal to acknowledge that China has sovereignty over Tibet is in fact an attempt to find a legal basis for his attempt to promote “Tibet independence,” “semi-independence,” or “independence in disguise.”
Second, the Dalai Lama wanted to create a “Greater Tibetan Region,” which would cover one-fourth of the territory of the PRC. This demand “harbors an evil intent,” since he wants an autonomous region with only Tibetans: “If Chinese people of all ethnic groups all demand to set up their individual autonomous regions, people who know a little about China’s situation and history will know that there will be total chaos in the country.” Third, he wants to “negate and overturn Tibet’s current social and political systems in the name of demanding a high degree of autonomy.” The socialist system and regional ethnic autonomy would be overturned and replaced by “a theocratic, feudalistic serf system.” Fourth, the PLA would have to be withdrawn, which would negate China’s sovereignty. Fifth, he wants to remove all non-Tibetans, which would be the same as ethnic cleansing. Once he had achieved these conditions the Dalai Lama would have the territory and the conditions in order to pursue Tibetan independence. Zhu said, “Why should the Chinese people accept the ‘middle way,’ which obviously wants to divide our country and our nation?” When asked whether Deng Xiaoping had really said that anything but independence could be discussed with the Dalai Lama, Zhu said: This is also the question that Mr. Gyari Lodi asked me. Comrade Deng Xiaoping didn’t say such a thing. The statement that Gyari fabricated has greatly twisted Comrade Deng Xiaoping’s statement on the issue. What Deng Xiaoping did say was: “The key issue is whether or not Tibet is a part of China; and whether you talk to us from the position that Tibet is a so-called independent country or from the position that it is part of China.”
Zhu emphasized another statement of Deng Xiaoping about Tibet made to former U.S. president Jimmy Carter in 1987 when he said that China would no longer judge its policy based on the number of Han Chinese there, meaning that there would no longer be any attempt to limit that number out of respect for Tibetan autonomy. As Zhu paraphrased Deng’s words, “Tibet is a big place with a small population. The construction projects, which ethnic Han people and people of other ethnic groups there help build in Tibet, are
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good for Tibet. We must consider problems from the angle of helping Tibet develop as quickly as possible and helping the people there become affluent as quickly as possible.” Zhu denied that there was any tension in Tibet, saying that if there was, it was the “nervousness of the bad people who took part in the ‘beatings, smashing, lootings and burnings’ and their behind-the-scenes instigators.” The vast majority of Tibetans were against secession. The main forces that put down the riot were Tibetan cadres, military police, and people. Zhu said that the Dalai Lama should adhere to China’s conditions rather than continue to propose his “genuine autonomy” and “greater autonomous region,” and “independence in disguise,” “then, we may continue to have contacts and talks with him on his personal future.” In response to a question to Sithar about whether the Dalai Lama had adhered to China’s “not to support” conditions, he said the Dalai Lama side had “organized more than 16,000 people to harass and create disturbances in front of more than 40 Chinese embassies and consulates in foreign countries.” They had “hired foreigners to carry out a string of harassments and troublemaking activities in areas adjacent to the Olympic Games venue and in Tiananmen Square. These activities showed that they did not stop their sabotage of the Olympic Games as they had promised.” The Dalai Lama had also “never acknowledged the fact that Tibet has been an inalienable part of Chinese territory since ancient times. We have had contacts with Dalai’s private representatives nine times since 2002, and they indicated every time that they would not accept the fact that Tibet has been part of Chinese territory since ancient times.” In response to a question about whether Tibetans might become more radical after the death of the current Dalai Lama, Zhu responded that he hoped the Dalai Lama would “amend his way, accept the Central Government’s demand and, before he dies, do something useful to the country and the people so as not to leave behind a bad reputation in history. Since, historically, the titles of all the Dalai Lamas must be approved by the Central Government, if the Dalai Lama continues to refuse to listen to advice and continues to do what he has been doing, then not only will he leave behind a bad reputation in our history, but also will dishonor the title that we respect.” He said that there was a threat implied in such predictions, “in case there are people who intend to use violence and terrorism against us, you should know the results of each of the fights that we had with them in the past. . . . We fought before, didn’t we? If certain people still want to use violence and terrorism, not only that they will never succeed, but that they will be condemned and will perish even faster politically.”
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Zhu said that the results of the last meeting should not be interpreted to mean that the talks were deadlocked. China’s policy was that the door to contacts and talks was always wide open: “Despite the serious situation caused by the beating, smashing, looting and burning incidents that the Dalai clique orchestrated in Lhasa on 14 March, and despite the Dalai clique’s activities of harassing and sabotaging the Olympic Games, we didn’t stop the contacts and talks.” Despite the lack of success in the last talks, the Tibetan side should be encouraged that this time they were met by a higher level official than before, Du Qinglin, a department head and a “state-class leading cadre.” Lodi Gyari had also been allowed to present “the thing that they held dear—the ‘Memorandum’—to the central authorities. . . . Thus, we need not be so pessimistic over the prospects of future talks.”5 Immediately after this unprecedented news conference, China continued its public relations offensive by sending Zhu to Europe and Sithar to the United States and Canada to explain China’s position on Tibet and the results of the latest dialogue. In Washington, in a news conference open only to invited guests, Sithar suggested that the international community should hear the voices of the Tibetans in China, who were against Tibetan independence in any form, against splitting the motherland, and against the retrogression of Tibet in history. He said that the Memorandum on Autonomy presented by the Dalai Lama was ostensibly aimed at autonomy but in essence at independence. It was contradictory to the Chinese Constitution and its presentation had caused the dialogue to end without achieving anything. China still remained willing to discuss with the Dalai Lama the issue of his personal future. He had given a true account of the Tibet issue to U.S. Congressional and government officials, he said, and had warned them that any external pressure on China about Tibet would only undermine relations between China and the Dalai Lama and would not help the settlement of the Tibet issue.6 Even after scornfully rejecting the Tibetan memorandum and the very idea of dialogue about autonomy, Chinese policy was to continue its pretense of willingness to dialogue at any time. Chinese officials may have realized that they had overreacted, since they were soon complaining that the Tibetan representatives had not even requested another meeting. In an event in Washington in March, Lodi Gyari said that he had indeed not requested another meeting due to China’s total rejection of all Tibetan proposals. A delegation of Tibetan National People’s Congress members and the Chinese foreign minister, both while on visits to Washington, blamed the failure of dialogue on the Dalai Lama’s unreasonable proposals. These Chinese officials complained that the Dalai Lama’s Middle Path policy would set up an independent kingdom on 25 percent of China’s territory, his demand that Tibet should control
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immigration to that territory would amount to “ethnic cleansing,” and the demand that the PLA should withdraw from Tibetan territory would deny Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. Lodi Gyari denied these accusations as an attempt to blame the failure of dialogue on the Dalai Lama when in reality it was China that refused to dialogue. He said that Chinese policy was to pretend a willingness to dialogue in order to defuse foreign criticism while refusing to dialogue in reality.7
“Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People” During the “seventh round” of talks in Beijing on 1 and 2 July 2008, the Chinese side invited the Tibetan representatives to submit a document explaining what they meant by “genuine autonomy.” According to the Tibetan version of events, Du Qinglin “explicitly invited” suggestions from the Dalai Lama in regard to the “stability and development of Tibet.” Zhu Weiqun said that he would “like to hear our views on the degree or form of autonomy we are seeking as well as on all aspects of regional autonomy within the scope of the Constitution of the PRC.” Accordingly, the Tibetans had presented the “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People” at the meeting on 4 and 5 November and had “extensive discussions” with the Chinese officials. However, the Chinese side later issued statements about the talks and particularly about the content of the memorandum that “distort the position and proposal we have outlined in our paper.” Therefore, on 16 November, Dharamsala released the memorandum along with the above account. The Memorandum began by describing the purpose of the Middle Way Approach (MWA) as “to secure genuine autonomy for the Tibetan people within the scope of the Constitution of the PRC.” We remain firmly committed not to seek separation or independence. We are seeking a solution to the Tibetan problem through genuine autonomy, which is compatible with the principles on autonomy in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. . . . On this basis, His Holiness the Dalai Lama is confident that the basic needs of the Tibetan nationality can be met through genuine autonomy within the PRC. The PRC is a multi-national state, and as in many other parts of the world, it seeks to resolve the nationality question through autonomy and the self-government of the minority nationalities. The Constitution of the PRC contains fundamental principles on autonomy and self-government whose objectives are compatible with the needs and aspirations of the Tibetans. Regional national autonomy [Dharamsala had not noticed, or pretended not to notice, that the Chinese had now in every case substituted “ethnic” for “national”] is aimed at opposing both the oppression and the separation of nation-
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alities by rejecting both Han Chauvinism and local nationalism. It is intended to ensure the protection of the culture and the identity of minority nationalities by empowering them to become masters of their own affairs.
The memorandum proposed to use the “significant discretionary powers” given to state organs and within the constitutional provisions on autonomy “to facilitate genuine autonomy for Tibetans in ways that would respond to the uniqueness of the Tibetan situation.” In a sentence to which the Chinese would later object, the Tibetans proposed that “legislation relevant to autonomy may consequently need to be reviewed or amended to respond to the specific characteristics and needs of the Tibetan nationality.” The Tibetans suggested that “given good will on both sides,” all problems could be resolved “within the constitutional principles on autonomy,” thus achieving “national unity and stability and harmonious relations between the Tibetan and other nationalities.” A section titled “Respect for the Integrity of the Tibetan Nationality” argued that “Tibetans belong to one minority nationality regardless of the current administrative divisions.” Also, “The integrity of the Tibetan nationality must be respected.” This, they said, was also “the spirit, the intent and the principle underlying the constitutional concept of national regional autonomy as well as the principle of equality of nationalities.” Without using the words “Greater Tibetan Autonomous Region,” the memorandum argued for that concept: There is no dispute about the fact that Tibetans share the same language, culture, spiritual tradition, core values and customs, that they belong to the same ethnic group and that they have a strong sense of common identity. Tibetans share a common history and despite periods of political or administrative divisions, Tibetans continuously remained united by their religion, culture, education, language, way of life and by their unique high plateau environment. The Tibetan nationality lives in one contiguous area on the Tibetan plateau, which they have inhabited for millennia and to which they are therefore indigenous. For purposes of the constitutional principles of national regional autonomy, Tibetans in the PRC in fact live as a single nationality all over the Tibetan plateau.
In the next section, titled “Tibetan Aspirations,” the Tibetans argued for cultural autonomy based on Tibet’s “rich and distinct history, culture and spiritual tradition all of which form valuable parts of the heritage of humanity.” They said that Tibetans could benefit from China’s economic and scientific development, as “a part of the multi-national state of the PRC,” but they wanted to ensure that “this happens without the people losing their Tibetan identity, culture and core values and without putting the distinct and fragile environment of the Tibetan plateau, to which Tibetans are indigenous, at
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risk.” They maintained that the uniqueness of the Tibetan situation had consistently been recognized within the PRC “and has been reflected in the terms of the ‘17 Point Agreement’ and in statements and policies of successive leaders of the PRC since then.” It should therefore “remain the basis for defining the scope and structure of the specific autonomy to be exercised by the Tibetan nationality within the PRC.” The Chinese Constitution, they said, “reflects a fundamental principle of flexibility to accommodate special situations, including the special characteristics and needs of minority nationalities.” The Dalai Lama’s commitment to seek a solution for the Tibetan people within the PRC was “clear and unambiguous.” His position was in “full compliance and agreement with paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s statement in which he emphasized that except for independence all other issues could be resolved through dialogue.” The Dalai Lama was committed “to fully respect the territorial integrity of the PRC,” but he expected “the Central Government to recognize and fully respect the integrity of the Tibetan nationality and its right to exercise genuine autonomy within the PRC.” For Tibetans to advance as a distinct nationality within the PRC, they need to continue to progress and develop economically, socially and politically in ways that correspond to the development of the PRC and the world as a whole while respecting and nurturing the Tibetan characteristics of such development. For this to happen, it is imperative that the right of Tibetans to govern themselves be recognized and implemented throughout the region where they live in compact communities in the PRC, in accordance with the Tibetan nationality’s own needs, priorities and characteristics. The Tibetan people’s culture and identity can only be preserved and promoted by the Tibetans themselves and not by any others. Therefore, Tibetans should be capable of self-help, self-development and self-government, and an optimal balance needs to be found between this and the necessary and welcome guidance and assistance for Tibet from the Central Government and other provinces and regions of the PRC.
The Tibetan memorandum specified the “Basic Needs of Tibetans” in regard to “subject matters of self-government.” In regard to language, “the most important attribute of the Tibetan people’s identity,” it demanded respect for Article 4 of the PRC Constitution, which guaranteed “the freedom of all nationalities to use and develop their own spoken and written languages.” In order for Tibetans to preserve their own language, “Tibetan must be respected as the main spoken and written language. Similarly, the principal language of the Tibetan autonomous areas needs to be Tibetan.” The Tibetan language should also be the principal medium of education. In regard to culture, assuming, perhaps naively, that “the concept of national regional autonomy is primarily for the purpose of preservation of the culture of minority nationali-
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ties,” the memorandum said that the “distinct Tibetan cultural heritage needs protection through appropriate constitutional provisions.” In regard to religion: “Religion is fundamental to Tibetans and Buddhism is closely linked to their identity. . . . It is impossible for Tibetans to imagine personal or community freedom without the freedom of belief, conscience and religion.” The Tibetans demanded only the right to freedom of religious belief guaranteed in the Chinese Constitution. This freedom should cover “the right of monasteries to be organized and run according to Buddhist monastic tradition, to engage in teachings and studies, and to enroll any number of monks and nuns or age group in accordance with these rules.” The state “should not interfere in religious practices and traditions, such as the relationship between a teacher and his disciple, management of monastic institutions, and the recognition of reincarnations.” Similarly, the right of the organs of self-government of national autonomous areas to “independently administer educational affairs in their own areas” should be respected. Tibetans “should be given the right over the environment and allow them to follow their traditional conservation practices.” In regard to the utilization of natural resources the memorandum demanded more than the “limited role for the organs of self-government of the autonomous areas” as specified in China’s laws of nationality autonomy: The principles of autonomy enunciated in the Constitution cannot, in our view, truly lead to Tibetans becoming masters of their own destiny if they are not sufficiently involved in decision-making on utilization of natural resources such as mineral resources, waters, forests, mountains, grasslands, etc. The ownership of land is the foundation on which the development of natural resources, taxes and revenues of an economy are based. Therefore, it is essential that only the nationality of the autonomous region shall have the legal authority to transfer or lease land, except land owned by the state. In the same manner, the autonomous region must have the independent authority to formulate and implement developmental plans concurrent to the state plans.
In regard to economic development and trade, the autonomous region of Tibet should have the right to conduct border trade and trade with foreign countries: “The recognition of these principles is important to the Tibetan nationality given the region’s proximity to foreign countries with which the people have cultural, religious, ethnic and economic affinities.” In regard to public security, “it is important that the majority of security personnel consist of members of the local nationality who understand and respect local customs and traditions.” On population migration, the memorandum again repeats the questionable proposition that the “fundamental objective of national regional autonomy and self-government is the preservation of the identity,
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culture, language and so forth of the minority nationality and to ensure that it is the master of its own affairs.” Therefore, “When applied to a particular territory in which the minority nationality lives in a concentrated community or communities, the very principle and purpose of national regional autonomy is disregarded if large scale migration and settlement of the majority Han nationality and other nationalities is encouraged and allowed.” In an analysis that perhaps reveals the real purpose of nationality autonomy in the PRC the memorandum said: Major demographic changes that result from such migration will have the effect of assimilating rather than integrating the Tibetan nationality into the Han nationality and gradually extinguishing the distinct culture and identity of the Tibetan nationality. Also, the influx of large numbers of Han and other nationalities into Tibetan areas will fundamentally change the conditions necessary for the exercise of regional autonomy since the constitutional criteria for the exercise of autonomy, namely that the minority nationality “live in compact communities” in a particular territory is changed and undermined by the population movements and transfers. If such migrations and settlements continue uncontrolled, Tibetans will no longer live in a compact community or communities and will consequently no longer be entitled, under the Constitution, to national regional autonomy. This would effectively violate the very principles of the Constitution in its approach to the nationalities issue.
The memorandum suggested that it “would be vital that the autonomous organs of self-government have the authority to regulate the residence, settlement and employment or economic activities of persons who wish to move to Tibetan areas from other parts of the PRC in order to ensure respect for and the realization of the objectives of the principle of autonomy.” It was not their intention to expel non-Tibetans who had permanently settled in Tibet; their only concern was the “induced massive movement of primarily Han but also some other nationalities into many areas of Tibet, upsetting existing communities, marginalizing the Tibetan population there and threatening the fragile natural environment.” The last item demanded the same rights to conduct cultural, educational, and religious exchanges with other countries that were already provided for in Chinese autonomy law. The next section of the memorandum returns to the argument for a single administration for the Tibetan nationality in the PRC: In order for the Tibetan nationality to develop and flourish with its distinct identity, culture and spiritual tradition through the exercise of self-government on the above mentioned basic Tibetan needs, the entire community, comprising all the areas currently designated by the PRC as Tibetan autonomous areas, should be under one single administrative entity. The current administrative
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divisions, by which Tibetan communities are ruled and administered under different provinces and regions of the PRC, foments fragmentation, promotes unequal development, and weakens the ability of the Tibetan nationality to protect and promote its common cultural, spiritual, and ethnic identity. Rather than respecting the integrity of the nationality, this policy promotes its fragmentation and disregards the spirit of autonomy.
The demand for a single Tibetan autonomous region was consistent with the PRC’s laws on regional autonomy that stated that “regional autonomy is practiced in areas where people of minority nationalities live in concentrated communities.” The Tibetan nationality within the PRC could only exercise its right to govern itself and administer its internal affairs “through an organ of self-government that has jurisdiction over the Tibetan nationality as a whole.” The boundaries of the Tibetan Autonomous Region would have to be modified accordingly, as was recognized as a possibility by the Law on Regional National Autonomy. In regard to the nature and structure of autonomy, “the exercise of genuine autonomy would include the right of Tibetans to create their own regional government and government institutions and processes that are best suited to their needs and characteristics.” A crucial element of genuine autonomy would be that laws in regard to autonomy could not be unilaterally abrogated or changed: “This means that neither the Central Government nor the autonomous region’s government should be able, without the consent of the other, to change the basic features of the autonomy.” China’s laws might have to be modified to secure this: “Although the needs of the Tibetans are broadly consistent with the principles on autonomy contained in the Constitution, as we have shown, their realization is impeded because of the existence of a number of problems, which makes the implementation of those principles today difficult or ineffective.” There would have to be more “clear divisions of powers and responsibilities between the Central Government and the government of the autonomous region. Currently there is no such clarity and the scope of legislative powers of autonomous regions is both uncertain and severely restricted.” The last section of the Tibetan memorandum was titled “The Way Forward.” It reiterated that the intention was to explore how the needs of the Tibetan nationality could be met within the framework of the PRC: “As His Holiness the Dalai Lama stated on a number of occasions, we have no hidden agenda. We have no intention at all of using any agreement on genuine autonomy as stepping stone for separation from the PRC.” Once an agreement was reached between the Chinese Government and the Tibetan Government in Exile, the exile government would be dissolved. The Dalai Lama would not accept any political office in Tibet. “His Holiness the Dalai Lama, nevertheless,
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plans to use all his personal influence to ensure such an agreement would have the legitimacy necessary to obtain the support of the Tibetan people.” The Tibetans suggested that the next step would be to start discussions on the points raised in their memorandum.8 The Tibetan memorandum assumes that the Chinese were sincere in their interest in what the Dalai Lama meant by “genuine autonomy” and were prepared to dialogue on that basis. The Tibetans were perhaps naive about their assumption that China’s nationality laws were meant to preserve nationality cultures and identities rather than assimilate them. They proposed several changes to Chinese laws needed to achieve their aims. However, these changes were later cited by the Chinese as unacceptable. The Tibetans also made considerable attempts to put their position within the framework of Chinese laws and politics and even to repeat slogans such as “unity of nationalities,” “stability and development,” “multinational state,” “Tibetan nationality” and “local nationalism.” Had the PRC really been willing to dialogue about Tibetan autonomy, it would have been a significant departure from previous Chinese policy, which had always insisted that there was nothing to discuss with the Dalai Lama about Tibetan autonomy and that there was no possibility of dialogue with him about Tibet. There is therefore some mystery why the Chinese invited the Tibetan proposal in July only to reject it with such contempt in November. Lodi Gyari insisted that the Chinese officials did indeed invite such a proposal in formal, lengthy discussions in July. The Tibetan side was not just grasping at an informal inquiry about what they meant by genuine autonomy, he said. In his opinion, the dichotomy between the Chinese positions of July and November reflected the factional politics in regard to Tibet within the CCP.9 There is some evidence of such a factional split, such as the rumor that Wen Jiabao preferred a softer approach in March than the one actually taken. However, Wen’s position was presumably predicated on whatever would avoid a Western boycott of the Olympics, which seemed a real possibility at the time. In addition, his position may have been only to appear conciliatory, which was eventually part of the strategy actually adopted. According to Lodi Gyari’s factional theory of Chinese politics, the hard-liners opposed and eventually rejected any discussion about Tibetan autonomy as a violation of China’s position that it would not negotiate about Tibet with the Dalai Lama or the illegal Tibetan exile government. Another interpretation would be that the Chinese in July were willing to appear conciliatory about dialogue in order to ensure a successful Olympics in August. Once the threat of a boycott or disruption had passed, they had no more reason to be conciliatory. The Tibetan position on autonomy as explicated in the memorandum is indeed consistent, with a few exceptions, with China’s Constitution and laws
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on nationality, or “ethnic,” autonomy. Where the Tibetan proposal differs is in the demand that the autonomous regional authorities might actually have some decision-making authority not subject to veto from Beijing and the suggestion that some laws might have to be changed to achieve that purpose. In particular, they demanded some control over natural resources and migration policy as well as the important cultural issues of language and religion. Their proposal for a unified autonomous region may have been consistent with the “spirit” of the PRC’s requirements for the constitution of autonomous areas but not the actual practice. Their proposal would require the alteration of provincial boundaries and would undo China’s successful political divisions of Tibet accomplished over several dynasties. Ultimately the greatest obstacle to the Tibetans’ seemingly reasonable proposals was the assumption that the purpose of the PRC’s National Regional Autonomy law was to “ensure the protection of the culture and the identity of minority nationalities by empowering them to become masters of their own affairs.” If the assumption of China’s nationality policies and the purpose of its laws on autonomy were actually assimilation rather than the stated purpose of preservation of nationality cultures and identities, then the Tibetan proposals, though seemingly reasonable, were irrelevant. China responded to the publication of the Memorandum by Dharamsala with a “signed article” by “Yiduo,” or “Yedor,” a pseudonym of a probably nonexistent Tibetan at the China Tibetology Research Center, which was often used to express official Chinese policy on Tibet in an ostensibly Tibetan voice. Yedor said that his own reading of the memorandum found many contradictions with China’s Constitution. It would deny China’s regional autonomy system for ethnic minorities in that it would give Tibetans the right to create their own regional government. The “local matters” under the jurisdiction of that government would include everything but foreign affairs and defense. Tibet would have a system much like the “One Country, Two Systems” formula in Hong Kong but with even more autonomous rights. This was contradictory to the unitary nature of the Chinese nation and to Article 3 of the Constitution, which says, “The division of functions and powers between the central and local State organs is guided by the principle of giving full scope to the initiative and enthusiasm of the local authorities under the unified leadership of the central authorities.” Furthermore, Article 15 on Regional Ethnic Autonomy says, “The people’s governments of all national autonomous areas shall be administrative organs of the State under the unified leadership of the State Council and shall be subordinate to it.” Autonomous region governments were under the authority of the central government and there was no system of sharing power between them.
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Yedor then went through the history of the regional autonomy system, which he said is “cordially supported by people of all ethnic groups.” In Tibet, since the founding of the TAR in 1965, “people of different ethnic groups have actively participated in the management of the national and regional affairs, by fully practicing their autonomous rights endowed by the Constitution and law.” The regional autonomy system for ethnic minorities was the “basic policy for the country on ethnic issues, and it is a fundamental political system for the country.” Tibet does not have the problem of “restoring the sovereignty and practicing a different social system,” and thus it cannot adopt the model of “One Country, Two Systems.” By proposing the so-called Genuine Autonomy in the name of the Chinese Constitution, the Dalai Lama in fact “attempted to deny China’s regional autonomy system for ethnic minorities and the unified leadership of the central authorities, and set up another system according to their political design.” The memorandum demanded a political power in Tibet equivalent to a state level, which was obviously incompatible with the Chinese Constitution. The memorandum’s proposal for a “Greater Tibet” was without any historic, realistic, or legal basis. The Dalai Lama’s real purpose was to create Tibetan independence in this “greater Tibetan area.” His proposal to control migration of other ethnic groups to Tibet was contradictory to the right of peoples in a sovereign nation to choose where to live. There was no migration of Han people to Tibet as the Dalai Lama claimed. Tibet needed the help of people of other nationalities and would be harmed by the sort of ethnic isolation proposed by the Dalai Lama. Even the exclusive use of the Tibetan language would not help Tibetans, who needed to know Chinese for economic and other reasons. The Dalai Lama’s proposals in regard to religion denied the state the right to control the public and state interests in regard to religion according to law: “Religion not only is ideology, but also involves social activities and institutions. It definitely involves public and state interests.” Despite clear laws and regulations, the Dalai Lama insists that religion should be supreme: “This is not surprising because before his exile, the Dalai Lama was in fact the chief of the feudal slavery system by which the old theocratic Tibet was governed. . . . So it is not surprising that he still dreams of restoring such a ‘wonderful system.’” Lastly, the memorandum completely ignored the fact that Tibet has always been part of China: “The memorandum has said nothing about the ownership of the sovereignty of Tibet and completely ignored the fact that Tibet has been part of China since ancient times. Tibet has always been an inalienable part of Chinese territory.” The PRC Constitution says that all the regional autonomous areas are inalienable parts of the PRC. But the Dalai Lama claimed that Tibet was an independent country before 1950 and that it is now an
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occupied nation under colonial rule. If Tibet were independent before 1950 and is now a colony “it would enjoy sovereignty of its own and the right to gain independence in the future, according to international law. This would in fact deny China’s sovereignty over Tibet and violate the principle set by the Constitution and law on regional autonomy of ethnic minorities that the autonomous areas are inalienable.” By his refusal to give up the claim that Tibet was once independent, the Dalai Lama was revealing his intention to claim Tibetan independence in the future. Furthermore, the Dalai Lama and his “government in exile” did not represent the Tibetan people as they claimed: Tibet was peacefully liberated in 1951 and with the democratic reform in 1959, the feudal serfdom under theocracy was overturned and the people’s democratic government was established and more than 1 million serfs were emancipated. In 1965, the regional autonomy system for ethnic minorities was exercised, and people of various ethnic groups became the masters of their own affairs. Therefore, it is the central government and the Tibet Autonomous Regional People’s Government, elected by the People’s Congress of the Tibet Autonomous Region, that can represent the Tibetan people. The so-called “Tibet government-inexile” was created by the upper class of the serf owners who launched a failed armed rebellion in 1959, and then fled China. It is totally illegal and has been recognized by no country in the world.
The Dalai Lama’s characterization of his contacts and talks with the central government as a “Sino-Tibetan dialogue” was an attempt to confuse the nature of the talks and mislead the public. The purpose of the Memorandum on Autonomy was to “set up a ‘half independent’ or ‘covertly independent’ political entity controlled by the Dalai clique on soil that occupies one quarter of the Chinese territory, and when conditions are ripe, they will seek to realize ‘total Tibet independence.’” As early as the 1980s when delegations of exiled Tibetans visited China, they were told that neither “‘Tibet as a country’ nor ‘high degree of autonomy’ would be tolerated, and that the ‘Greater Tibetaninhabited Area’ was absolutely out of the question.” Nearly thirty years had passed and the Dalai Lama side was still talking about these issues: “They never truly relinquish their stance on splitting the homeland, which is the fundamental reason why their contacts and talks with the central government have never made substantial progress for so many years.” The only purpose of talks was what Zhu Weiqun said at his press conference: We only accept Mr. Lodi Gyari and his party talking with us as the private representatives of the Dalai Lama, and the topics can only be the Dalai Lama completely giving up separatist propositions and activities and his seeking forgiveness from the central government and all Chinese people for his own
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future. We will never discuss with them anything like the “Tibet issue.” To help the Dalai Lama better understand the central government’s attitude and realize his own mistakes, we will listen to their explanations, and the objective is still to check if he has given up his separatism and is trying to get close to the central government.10
Dharamsala “Special Meeting” of Tibetan Exiles On 14 November the Dalai Lama sent a message to “Tibetans in and outside Tibet,” calling for a special meeting in Dharamsala to discuss options given the failure of the latest dialogue. He said the “Special Meeting is being convened with the express purpose of providing a forum to understand the real opinions and views of the Tibetan people through free and frank discussions. It must be clear to all that this special meeting does not have any agenda for reaching a particular predetermined outcome.” Citing the democratic system established in exile, he said that the Tibetan people themselves had to take responsibility for the situation in Tibet. The reason for setting up a democratic system was not that he was “reluctant or wanted to shirk my responsibility,” but was “based entirely on the need to secure a solid and sustainable future system of governance for Tibet.” He continued, It is extremely important that we take stock of history and our past experience, as well as learn from the present world situation in order to keep up our struggle. . . . Since coming into exile, we have exercised the essential functions of a democratic system by inviting our people to express their opinions about important political decisions on the future of Tibet. The current, mutually beneficial Middle Way Approach was formulated in the early 1970s as a result of much deliberation and discussion with leaders who represented the Tibetan people. . . . After the break in contacts with the PRC in 1993, we conducted an opinion poll of the Tibetans in exile and collected suggestions from Tibet wherever possible on the proposed referendum, by which the Tibetan people were to determine the future course of our freedom struggle to their full satisfaction. Based on the outcome of this poll and suggestions from Tibet, our parliament in exile passed a resolution empowering me to continue to use my discretion on the matter without seeking recourse to a referendum. Therefore, until now we have followed the Middle Way Approach and eight rounds of talks have taken place since contact with the PRC was restored in 2002. Despite this approach receiving widespread appreciation from the international community, as well as the support of many Chinese intellectuals, there have been no positive signs or changes in Tibet.
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Given the failure of the latest series of dialogues, from 2002 to 2008, he was, in accordance with clause 59 of the Charter for Tibetans in exile, requesting the elected exile leaders to convene a special meeting: It is my hope that participants will be able to gather the opinions of their respective communities and be able to present them on this occasion. Taking into account the inspiring courage being shown by people all over Tibet this year, the current world situation, and the present intransigent stance of the government of the PRC, all the participants, as Tibetan citizens should discuss in a spirit of equality, cooperation and collective responsibility the best possible future course of action to advance the Tibetan cause. This meeting should take place in an atmosphere of openness, putting aside partisan debate. Rather, it should focus on the aspirations and views of the Tibetan people.11
Although the Dalai Lama called for the convening of a special meeting to discuss future policy, it was not entirely his own initiative. There was considerable pressure from critics of the Middle Way policy to alter it, abandon it, or at least discontinue the fruitless dialogues with the Chinese. The Dalai Lama’s official announcement of the meeting was made on 14 November, but the meeting was already scheduled for 17 November, and there was much discussion in the Tibetan community about it. The Chinese were aware of the meeting during the last dialogue at the beginning of November and there was much speculation about how their uncompromising position and the unprecedented press conference had been intended to influence the Tibetan meeting or had been influenced by it. A group of former exile ministers had called their own meeting in Dharamsala to criticize the Middle Way and the leadership of Samdhong Rinpoche, if not the Dalai Lama himself. This meeting, which took place from 21 to 24 September, criticized the Middle Way policy for serving China’s purposes in deflecting global criticism, and for also being convenient for Western governments to support with no political costs to themselves, while producing no improvement in the situation in Tibet. The Dharamsala “Special Meeting,” took place from 17 to 22 November and was attended by more than five hundred Tibetan exiles. Most of the attendees were current and former TGIE officials and representatives of various exile organizations, settlements, schools, and monasteries. The meeting was opened by the Kalon Tripa, Samdhong Rinpoche, with a speech in which he said that the discussion should be free and open and that even present Government in Exile officials should express their own opinions rather than those of the exile government. He said that the opinions of Tibetans inside Tibet would also be taken into account and, in that context, the Speaker of the Tibetan Parliament in exile revealed the results of a clandestine survey
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taken within Tibet. According to this survey, the methodology of which was not specified, 17,000 Tibetans had been asked their opinions. Over 8,000 said they would follow the Dalai Lama’s policy; another 2,000 said they supported the Middle Way; and a surprising 5,000 said that the Middle Way should be abandoned in favor of a policy for independence. Writing from Beijing, the Tibetan blogger Woeser said that many Tibetans supported the Dalai Lama’s policy but some favored independence: There is also a more intense point of view which holds that in the beginning His Holiness followed the path of Rangzen [independence] but later gradually changed, especially after Deng Xiaoping promised, “Except for independence, everything can be discussed.” What he sought then was a high degree of autonomy within the framework of China’s constitution. However, after almost 30 years, there has been no progress at all. Therefore, at this juncture of history, the right course is to turn back to the path of Rangzen. Although the world’s support is still necessary, the important thing is for Tibetans themselves to shoulder this duty. Any people that has sought independence has had to pay for it with blood and lives. Though we don’t want to shed our blood, it can’t be helped, there’s no way around it; and so Tibetans both inside and out must join together and be prepared to sacrifice for this goal.12
After the opening statements and the revelation of the results of the survey inside Tibet, the meeting broke up into fifteen groups for discussions for the next three and a half days. They gathered together again on the last day to adopt final resolutions. The official TGIE report on the meeting said that the resolutions reconfirmed the Dalai Lama as the spiritual and temporal leader of Tibet, which was meant to refute Chinese claims that the Dalai Lama could not legitimately represent the Tibetan people. They reiterated their support for the Dalai Lama’s leadership and asked him to “continue to shoulder the responsibility of the spiritual and temporal leadership of the Tibetan struggle at this crucial period by not stating even a word of semi-retirement and retirement.” They urged the Chinese government to “immediately stop the baseless and unimaginable accusations against His Holiness the Dalai Lama,” which had “contributed to ethnic tension between Tibetans and Chinese thus damaging the long-term interests of unity and co-operation amongst the nationalities.” They resolved to continue to follow the Dalai Lama’s leadership and follow his Middle Way policy. However, “looking at the Chinese Government’s behavior in the past, views to stop sending envoys and to pursue complete independence or self-determination if no result comes out in the near future were also strongly expressed.” In addition, whatever policy was pursued, the “Middle Way Approach, independence or self-determination . . . we shall not deviate from the path of non-violence to achieve our aims.”
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The meeting further resolved that the blame for the failure of dialogue was due to the intransigence of the Chinese government. The cause for the recent demonstrations in Tibet was “the outburst of long pent-up dissatisfaction and suffering of Tibetans.” The reasons for this outburst are due to harsh and severe policies adopted towards Tibet and Tibetans for all these years since China s occupation of Tibet. The reasons for the continuing Tibetan protests stem from the systematic plundering of Tibet’s natural resources, the annihilation of Tibetan tradition and custom, specifically forcing Tibetans in the so-called patriotic education, a campaign which forces Tibetans to vilify His Holiness. The Tibetan protests continue because of the policy of large-scale population transfer of Chinese into Tibet, which further undermines the already-worsened state of Tibetan religion and culture and causes the destruction of Tibet’s ecology. The protests also took place because of violations of all fundamental human rights.
The resolutions denied that the Dalai Lama had instigated the disturbances in Tibet and said that the demonstrations and protests were due to the “repressive policies adopted by PRC towards Tibet and Tibetans since its occupation. Therefore, the PRC government should accept responsibilities for their mistakes.” They opposed Chinese Government interference in religious affairs in Tibet and the Patriotic Education Campaign in monasteries.13 Although the results of the meeting were later characterized by TGIE spokespersons and much of the international press as confirming Tibetan support for the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way policy, the actual results were an expression of support for the Dalai Lama himself. As was the case with the survey taken within Tibet, Tibetans were much more supportive of the Dalai Lama’s leadership than his actual policy. Many more expressed support for the Dalai Lama than for the Middle Way and a very large number rejected the Middle Way altogether in favor of independence. The opinions expressed at the meeting in Dharamsala were very similar to those from inside Tibet. Presumably, many if not most of those who favored independence would still support the leadership of the Dalai Lama. Independent views of the meeting differed somewhat from those of the TGIE. These views emphasized that, although the meeting did not favor abandoning the Middle Way, almost all thought it had failed. They were more emphatic that the dialogue should cease unless the Chinese changed their position than was obvious from the TGIE account. No doubt this reflected the fact that the TGIE could hardly turn down any Chinese offer of another meeting, for reasons of its own need to validate the Middle Way policy as well as foreign pressure to dialogue. For many of Tibet’s official foreign supporters, the dialogue itself, even without any results, was seen as better than nothing
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and as evidence of the results of their pressure on China. Even though the meeting did not resolve the problem of the lack of success of the Middle Way strategy by adopting an alternative, many thought it a sign of progress just that those alternatives were openly discussed. Previously, many supporters of the Middle Way had castigated opponents to it with the accusation that they were disloyal to the Dalai Lama. At this meeting for the first time the proponents of independence and self-determination at least received a hearing. Not all the participants, however, thought the meeting was such an open exercise of Tibetan democracy in exile. Some thought the meeting was set up to support the Middle Way and to prevent any real discussion of alternatives. The Tibetan writer Jamyang Norbu provided the best analysis of the meeting from the point of view of a Middle Way critic and Rangzen proponent. He quotes Samdhong Rinpoche as saying before the meeting: “We are committed to our Middle Way Approach and we will continue our efforts for a genuine autonomy within China’s framework, and that will not change.” The composition of the meeting was another problem. Most of the participants were “former and serving Tibetan government officials, former members of Parliament, settlement officers, leaders of the narrow regional-based political organizations and subsidized pressure groups masquerading as political organizations.” The TYC, the largest Tibetan exile organization, and one committed to Tibetan independence, was only allotted two seats. Other organizations in favor of independence such as the Students for a Free Tibet were not even invited to attend. Although the meeting was supposed to include as many as fifty “intellectuals, scholars and experts,” none were actually personally invited and those who did attend had to pay their own expenses. When the meeting broke up into smaller groups, Norbu and several others found that their groups were dominated by Middle Way supporters. Current or retired TGIE officials took up most of the first day with opening statements in support of the Middle Way. On the second day, leaders of settlements in India insisted on the reading of the resolutions adopted by their members in support of the Middle Way, all of which had been the results of meetings in the settlements long before China’s recent rejection of dialogue. Norbu wrote that it would be easy enough to get an almost unanimous expression of support for the Dalai Lama in any Tibetan settlement, but that the way in which the resolutions had been formulated and presented made it appear like an orchestrated effort to create an appearance of enthusiastic endorsement of the Middle Way and an impression that most Tibetans did not want any discussion about alternatives. The Tibetan settlements in India and Nepal had been subjected to education on the Middle Way organized by the TGIE and conducted by the “Tibetan People’s Movement for Middle Way.” Some of the arguments for
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the Middle Way were actually warnings about the negative consequences of alternatives. The primary argument was that Tibetan religion, culture, and identity were in danger of being lost because of the rapidity of the Chinese population transfer into Tibet. Therefore, there was not enough time to pursue independence. The only chance was to accept “meaningful autonomy” under China. This argument was based on the supposed assurance that Deng Xiaoping had given to Gyalo Thondup in 1979 that “anything but independence can be discussed.” Middle Way proponents adhered to this statement as an article of faith despite the fact that China had never been willing to talk about “anything but independence” and had actually refused to talk about anything at all, and that Chinese officials had recently denied that Deng had said any such thing. Another of what Norbu calls “scare tactics” used by Middle Way proponents was that international support would be lost if it were abandoned. However, he pointed out that international support was for dialogue rather than for the specifics of the Middle Way policy. Some Western leaders, including the former U.S. president George Bush and Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State under the Obama administration, have construed the Tibet issue as being exclusively about religious freedom. Another scare tactic was the argument that India would deport Tibetans back to Tibet if they demanded independence. Ultimately, the most effective argument in favor of the Middle Way was that it was the Dalai Lama’s policy and to oppose it was equivalent to disloyalty to him. The proponents of Rangzen were thus characterized as disloyal to the Dalai Lama. There was also the accusation that organizations such as the TYC and those who had protested against the Olympic torch relay were responsible for the failure of dialogue because they had angered the Chinese. This is the same argument that has been used by some Tibetans and many others internationally and has been exploited by China to its advantage. As Norbu wrote: This was the big scare tactic. That if we caused the Dalai Lama any more distress he was going to step down from power and give up his leadership role—in effect abandon us all. The only way to prevent this terrible calamity was to demonstrate absolute and uncritical loyalty to him, and assure him that we absolutely supported all his policies, including the Middle Way. This was emotional, even spiritual, blackmail, no doubt, but it was effective.
The difference between the Middle Way supporters and those who favored other alternatives was, according to Norbu, that the former based their whole belief system on unquestioning faith in the Dalai Lama while the latter were more independent thinkers. He wrote that at the final meeting, “the inclusion of the proceedings and resolutions of the earlier public meetings at Tibetan
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settlements into the records of the Special Meeting largely overwhelmed whatever discussions had taken place at the committee meetings.” There was little mention of alternative policy ideas and strategies and the impression was created of “near unanimous support for the Middle Way Policy and of unquestioning acceptance of anything the Dalai Lama had decided.” Samdhong Rinpoche declared that over 90 percent of Tibetans supported the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way Approach. Norbu concluded by saying that the Dalai Lama should have known, even if he really wanted an open discussion of alternative ideas, that Tibetan officials with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo would manipulate the meeting in order to give the Dalai Lama the impression of unanimous support. This may be evident in the hope expressed in the official resolutions of the meeting that the Dalai Lama would not say “even a word of semi-retirement and retirement.” Norbu wonders if the Dalai Lama wasn’t aware that “most of the people who attended the meeting were those who invariably echoed his own thoughts and feelings and would never dare contradict him under any circumstance.”14 Although the Dharamsala meeting was undoubtedly a refreshing and legitimate expression of Tibetan democracy in exile, it reflected the difficulty in actually achieving any real democracy given the peculiar role of the Dalai Lama in the Tibetan political system. The Dalai Lama himself eventually contributed to the distortion of the results of the special meeting by saying, in his annual 10 March statement, that “the outcome of the process was that a majority of Tibetans strongly supported a continuation of the Middle Way policy.” Therefore, he said, “we are now pursuing this policy with greater confidence and will continue our efforts toward achieving a meaningful national regional autonomy for all Tibetans.”15
“Serf Emancipation Day” In the middle of January 2009 Chinese propaganda organs began promoting the idea of a celebration of the liberation of the Tibetan serfs fifty years ago. The plan was said to have originated among Tibetan “legislators,” or members of the People’s Congress of the TAR. The purpose was supposedly to help the people, both Han and Tibetan, to remember history. Although many old people could remember the horrors of the former serf system, the young had no such experience and needed to be reminded. The date finally chosen by the Tibetan People’s Congress, 28 March, was the day in 1959 that the Tibetan Government was dissolved by decree from the State Council. A Tibetan official, Legchok (Ch. Legqog), a former serf himself, said that the celebration, to be an annual event, would “strengthen Tibetans’ patriotism and expose the
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Dalai clique.” “Tibet has since embarked on a glorious path from darkness to light, from backwardness to progress, from poverty to prosperity, from dictatorship to democracy and from isolation to openness,” he added.16 The real reason for the celebration was no doubt to counteract Tibetans’ traditional commemoration of the10 March 1959 uprising and any publicity about the anniversary of the uprising of 2008. Lhakpa Phuntsok (Ch. Lhagpa Phuntshogs, Lhaba Puncog), director-general of the China Tibetology Research Center in Beijing, said that 28 March would be an annual festival for “millions of former Tibetan serfs and their offspring to celebrate their emancipation from the hell of cruel oppression, but for the former oppressors who are still dreaming of returning to the past, the day is marked for their paradise lost.” Although all Tibetans were liberated in 1951, the feudal serf system under which the serfs were oppressed remained according to the terms of the 17-Point Agreement. Many of the serfs and some of the upper class wanted to reform the serf system, but, “in a hope to maintain their paradise, the reactionary part of the upper class on March 10, 1959 launched an armed rebellion, backed by international anti-China and anti-communism forces.” The subsequent Democratic Reform was “the people’s revolutionary movement, in which the Party led the one million Tibetan serfs to topple the dark rule of the serf owner class,” said Lhakpa Phuntsok. The “rebellious forces in exile” had never given up their attempt to restore their paradise lost, “so they mark March 10 as a day for their so-called uprising,” and on that day the Dalai Lama makes an announcement “to curse the democratic reform, tell lies to the international community and sabotage the prosperity, stability, peace, and unity in Tibet.” But, he said, “the masses of emancipated serfs and their offspring living in Tibet are clear who are the guard for the Tibetan people’s fundamental interests and who are the saboteurs of their happy life.”17 People’s Daily opined that 28 March 1959 “mattered a great deal to Tibet as serfs celebrated Tibetan emancipation.” The democratic reforms begun that day “overthrew the feudal serf system and freed millions of serfs and slaves. From then on, they took their destiny in their own hands and became the masters of the country.” The celebration every year of a Serf Emancipation Day would “help Tibetans remember the historic event of democratic reform in the region and also reveal the truth of ‘Tibet issue’ from another angle.” This “angle” was the revelation that Tibet’s feudal serf system was “crueler than that of Western Europe in the Middle Ages,” and the “root cause of poverty and backwardness and the obstacle for making civilized progress in Tibet.” This, according to the Chinese, was the real issue of Tibet: On March 28, 1959, the Central Government announced the dismissal of the original local government of Tibet and led the Tibetan people in quelling the
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rebellion, implemented the democratic reform, overthrew the feudal serfdom under theocracy and abolished all savage punishments. From darkness to brightness, from poverty to wealth, from dictatorship to democracy, from seclusion to opening up, the democratic reform has fundamentally changed the lives of millions of serfs in Tibet, a turning point in Tibetan history. . . . It was the dividing line between savagery and civilization, backwardness and progress.18
Former serfs danced traditional dances and heartily applauded the legislature’s decision, Xinhua said. The annual celebration was “in line with the common aspiration of the Tibetans,” according to the former serfs, nearly all of whom were “starved, tortured, traded and lived in constant fear of death before that landmark day in 1959.” Xinhua even equated the emancipation of the Tibetan serfs to the emancipation of the American slaves. Some people in the world are yet to find out how much the emancipation of Tibetan serfs resembles that of American slaves. Like the two sides of one coin, both events represented human rights improvement and social progress, and both lifted multitudes out of their plight. But one big difference between the two is that slave owners are extinct in the United States, but advocates of Tibet’s serfdom are not. The 14th Dalai Lama and his “government-in-exile” still cling to the medieval social system and advocate its comeback. . . . His preaching for a return to the “good old Tibet” is similar to calling for a restoration of slavery in the United States and to undo the civil rights development achieved over the years.19
Other commentaries hailed the liberation of the Tibetan serfs as “a milestone in the world history of human rights.” The event was put into the context of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which says, “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.” By recalling the past and comparing it with the present one could see “a sharp contrast between the evil history of old Tibet when the human rights were trampled on and today when everyone is entitled to equal rights.” Article 4 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates that “no one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.” Article 5 says that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” The violations of those rights under the laws of old Tibet were compared with the laws of the present under which Tibetans had freedom and human rights: In the long course of the historical development of mankind, half a century is only a short period of time but it has formed a glorious page in the history of the progress of human rights of the Tibetan people. The great liberation of more than one million serfs in Tibet 50 years ago is not only a great pioneering un-
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dertaking in the history of human rights in China but also an important chapter with milestone significance in the world history of human rights.20
As part of the propaganda offensive, a documentary film was released, titled, Tibet of China: Past and Present. “Featuring a large amount of precious historical audio and visual files,” the documentary “tells of a languishing Tibet society under a system of feudal serfdom before the democratic reform in 1959 and the changes of people’s life ever since.” The film was to be shown across the country.21 There were also museum exhibits in Lhasa and other sites in Tibet, as well as in Beijing and even international travel exhibits that sought to display the horrors of the feudal serf system and to prove that Tibet had always been part of China. In Beijing there was an exhibition on Tibet in 2008 that continued through the Olympics. This exhibition, or parts of it, were taken on an international tour, although in Washington it was open only by invitation. In 2009 a new exhibition opened in Beijing titled the 50th Anniversary of Democratic Reforms in Tibet. The exhibition was promoted as an “objective and factual exhibition, featuring strong contrasts, [that] vividly demonstrates the darkness and backwardness of old Tibet and the development and progress of new Tibet in a touching and tremendously convincing display.” The exhibition was said to allow people to “feel the liberation of the Tibetan Plateau.” The democratic reform was said to have “abolished the decayed and dark feudal serfdom, setting one million serfs and slaves free.” Serfs became entitled to human rights such as personal freedom and, “Tibet began a glorious process from darkness to light, from backwardness to progress, from poverty to richness, from autocracy to democracy, and from being closed to opening-up. Prior to this, the Tibetan Plateau did not have happy songs, laughter or yearning for bright future.” Through the exhibition Tibet’s future could also be envisioned: A beautiful tomorrow with economic development, the unity of ethnicities, a safe border defense and a harmonious society with people living and working in peace and contentment in Tibet are all displayed before the audience’s eyes. The 50th Anniversary of Democratic Reforms in Tibet Exhibition is a condensed version of Tibet’s history. New and old Tibet are displayed as two extremes. Facing the indubitable facts, we believe everyone will reach a clear and definite conclusion: the old Tibet was barbarous, underdeveloped and dark, while the new Tibet is civilized, progressive and bright.22
Such propaganda about the evils of old Tibet has always been a prominent part of the Chinese argument on Tibet. Some of the most notorious examples of Chinese propaganda are the famous film Serf, and the museum exhibit in
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Lhasa, The Wrath of the Serfs. The Serf film, produced by a PLA film company in the 1960s, paints a dark picture of suffering serfs before liberation by the PLA, whom they supposedly called the “Army of Bodhisattvas.” It was shown all over China and had a significant influence on Chinese audiences in the formation of their opinions about Tibet and the Chinese role there. It was in many cases the only source for many Chinese in forming their impressions about Tibet. The Wrath of the Serfs museum exhibit was created in Lhasa in the early 1970s by Chinese art students. It contained a series of 106 lifelike clay sculptures of serfs in all of their sufferings. The exhibit lasted only until the reform period began in 1979, but during the 1970s it was required viewing for all Tibetan schoolchildren. There were smaller museums in other places, particularly in the former dungeon of the Potala, the old Lhasa jail, and at several former manor houses in rural areas. All had examples of torture implements used on the serfs and photos of serfs and beggars in poor condition. Another propaganda tactic was the public recitations of former serfs of their sufferings. Some former serfs, their stories suitably elaborated, became semiprofessional performers who were taken around to almost all Tibetan villages and towns.23 The popularity of the evils of the serf system theme for the Chinese is explained by the fact that it obscures the political issue of the legitimacy of Chinese rule over Tibet. China claims that there is no such political issue, Tibet having “always” been a part of China. The popularity of the serf issue for the Chinese is also because it is one of the fundamental tenets of Communist liberation ideology. Marx held that economic conditions determined political consciousness, or, in other words, that class issues were predominant over national issues and proletarian internationalism would prevail over nationalism. This ideology was extremely efficacious for communist tyrants like Stalin, who used it to justify Soviet dominance over non-Russian nationalities in the Soviet Union. The most convenient aspect of this ideology is that it justifies the elimination of the upper class of the target society, the most nationalist class, under its class ideology. In the PRC the class theory of nationalism was taken to the point that a slogan attributed to Mao, “the national issue is in essence a class issue,” characterized the most leftist periods and the periods when assimilation of nationalities was most openly pursued. According to this ideology, the interests of the working class of any nationality should reside with the multinational proletariat rather than with its own exploitative upper class. In Tibet, the serfs should identify with their liberators, the Chinese workers represented by the CCP, rather than with their own aristocracy, feudal government, or religious establishment. The Chinese Communists imagined that this would really hap-
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pen, that the Tibetan serfs would support the CCP in overthrowing their own ruling class. Some former serfs who were elevated to ceremonial positions did so. However, the failure of the “Tibetan masses” to support the Chinese was obscured with propaganda that they actually did. Thus, in regard to the suppression of the revolt and institution of “Democratic Reforms,” Chinese propaganda claims that this was all done by the Tibetans themselves who had “stood on their own feet” and achieved “self-rule.” Where the Chinese Communists miscalculated was in underestimating the strength and persistence of Tibetan culture and national identity. The communist ideology told them that nationalism was a phenomenon of a former period of history that would be superseded by the advent of Socialism. They believed that their nationalities policies, perfected by Lenin and Stalin, would defuse nationalities’ resistance until they could be seduced with the attractions of Chinese and socialist culture. And they had a typically Chinese chauvinistic opinion of Tibetan culture, which they regarded as essentially no culture at all. They therefore had no understanding why Tibetans would want to retain or preserve their “barbaric” culture and they could imagine no reason for the persistence of Tibetan national identity or nationalism except as manipulated by foreign influences. In order to justify the ideology that foreign rule is preferable to self-rule by its own upper class, the Tibetan “feudal serf system” was portrayed in the worst light. Thus, Chinese propaganda resorts to the most negative depictions of the “Hell on Earth” that they claim was old Tibet before “liberation” by the Chinese. Chinese propaganda depicts the sufferings of the “serfs and slaves” as unrestricted by any rules or traditions and unrestrained by any religious morality or human compassion. Certainly, Chinese depictions do not accord with an image of Tibet consistent with the ideals of Buddhism or with the accounts of Tibetans or those travelers who reached Tibet before 1950. Tibet was the subject of much fascination on the part of many foreigners. Several foreigners undertook heroic and lifelong attempts to visit Tibet and those who were successful usually wrote accounts of their travels. In none of these is Tibet pictured as the “Hell on Earth” of Chinese propaganda. The Italian scholar and Buddhist Giuseppi Tucci traveled thousands of miles, mostly on foot, across Tibet during eight visits between 1927 and 1948. During this period almost no Chinese traveled so extensively in Tibet. Tucci was the founder of Tibetan academic studies and is uniquely qualified to comment on what Tibet was like before the Chinese invasion. He wrote: On a likely estimate, 30 percent of the landed property belonged to the state, 40 percent to the monasteries, and the rest to the nobility. Usually, the relation between the landlord and his dependants was fairly humane. Caste did not exist in Tibet, and in religion all found that equality which poverty or social customs
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denied them. Monastery life was open to all, and even if the love of all living creatures and the spirit of sacrifice for the suffering, inculcated by Buddhism, remained generally theoretical, a fundamental humanity governed social relations throughout the country.24
Chinese depictions of the events of March 1959 are similarly distorted for propaganda purposes. Contrary to China’s claims, the Tibetan revolt was not a “revolt of serf owners,” who were against reforms. In Central Tibet the reform program had been postponed by Mao in 1957; therefore, the serfowners had no reason to revolt at that particular time. The Tibetan serfs were not demanding “Democratic Reforms” nor did they rise up in revolt against the feudal serf system. Tibetans of all classes were in open revolt at that time, but against China, the revolt having begun in 1956 in eastern Tibetan areas outside the future TAR due to the imposition of Democratic Reforms, which for most Tibetans were their first experience of actual Chinese control over their lives. The revolt spread to Central Tibet in late 1958 and early 1959 and culminated in an open rejection of Chinese rule by the citizens of Lhasa beginning on 10 March. On 17 March the Dalai Lama secretly escaped. At the border with India he repudiated the 17-Point Agreement and on 31 March he entered India. Fighting in Lhasa continued until 23 March, during which many Tibetans were killed and after which many were arrested and many escaped or tried to escape to India. Resistance continued outside Lhasa for several months. In the chaotic situation at that time it is unlikely that any of the so-called Tibetan serfs even knew they had been “emancipated.” “Democratic Reforms” were begun only in July; therefore, the serfs’ “Emancipation Day” should logically be celebrated then rather than on 28 March were it not for China’s propaganda needs. Democratic Reforms were also not what the Chinese claimed. The main principles of democratic reforms were redistribution of wealth and class divisions leading to class struggle. Redistribution of wealth involved the division of feudal estates with the serfs acquiring title to the land. Class divisions and class struggle were intended to liberate the serfs’ mentality from the class oppression of the feudal system. However, the lands the serfs acquired were soon confiscated again during “socialist transformation,” or collectivization. Class divisions and class struggle were employed to identify and repress all opponents to Chinese control. Tibetans were forced to endure intensive investigative processes to ascertain their loyalties and opinions and they had to denounce other as exploiters, which allowed the Chinese to turn Tibetans against each other and to identify those willing to cooperate and those less than willing. It was this repressive aspect that was revealed by the CCP’s char-
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acterization of Democratic Reforms as part of the repression of the revolt and of Tibetan resistance. An aspect of the redistribution of wealth during Democratic Reforms was that all property now theoretically belonged to “the people.” Tibetans were told that “the people” were Han and Tibetan without distinction. Thus Tibetans had to support the Han in Tibet. Tibetans also had to support the people in other provinces who were suffering from famine due to the Great Leap Forward of 1959–1961. Grain was exported from Tibet although thousands of Tibetans also died of starvation at this time, as was described by the Panchen Lama in 1962 in his petition to the Chinese leaders.25 One of the most culturally destructive effects of Democratic Reforms was also the result of the “redistribution of wealth” principle. In the three years of Democratic Reforms almost all temples and monasteries were closed. Some were closed due to their participation in or support of the revolt. Many monks and nuns fled to India, further depopulating the monasteries. Virtually all of the remaining monks were forced to secularize under the “freedom of religion” aspect of Democratic Reforms, meaning that monks and nuns whom the Chinese claimed had been forced into a religious life now had the freedom to leave. As monasteries were depopulated and closed, they were systematically looted by Chinese state agencies. The most valuable artifacts were identified by art experts and metallurgists in advance. Then, the relics of each monastery were removed and trucked to China. The most valuable articles were taken first and then all articles of metal were taken to China where they were melted down. Many of the most precious and valuable Tibetan artworks in sculptures and paintings disappeared, only some of which ultimately reappeared on the international art market. All of this was justified according to the principle of redistribution of wealth to all of the people. The wealth of Tibet belonged not just to the Tibetan people, for whom it was the expression of their national culture, but to all the Chinese people. The Chinese Communist Party claimed that it represented all the people; therefore, it felt justified in confiscating the wealth of Tibet for its own purposes. Under the rubric of Democratic Reforms, Tibet’s national wealth was looted for the benefit of the Chinese state and Tibet’s culture was irreparably damaged. The magnitude of this disaster for Tibetan culture was increased because of the fact that almost all Tibetan artistic and cultural expression was devoted to Buddhist art, and Tibetan cultural wealth and wisdom was devoted to Buddhist scholasticism, all of which was destroyed. Far from being a liberation of the Tibetan serfs, Democratic Reforms were the means by which the Chinese enforced their control over Tibet, identified and repressed their opponents, and significantly destroyed the symbols of Tibetan culture and national identity. By the beginning of the Cultural
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Revolution in 1966 almost all Tibetan monasteries except for some dozen of the most famous were looted of their precious contents. During the Cultural Revolution almost all temples and monasteries were physically destroyed, often by Tibetan Red Guards and villagers encouraged and coerced to do so by Chinese officials and advisers. Tibetan culture came under tremendous destructive and assimilative pressures in many other ways during the campaign against the “four olds” (old society, culture, tradition, and habits), all of which were epitomized by traditional Tibetan society. Tibetan autonomy, theoretically established by the creation of the TAR in 1965, was anathema to many Chinese cadres, who thought Tibetan culture backward and its eradication progressive. Autonomy, in any case a temporary status until assimilation could be achieved, was to be skipped over, just as the bourgeois-democratic period in the Marxist progression of history was to be skipped over in order to enter the socialist society in one “Great Leap.” China’s declaration and celebration of a “Serf Emancipation Day” is, like many aspects of Chinese policy in Tibet, intended for propaganda purposes, both to “educate” Tibetans and to propagandize to the outside world. The class theme of China’s justifications for its rule over Tibet has become the most fundamental of its arguments, especially when challenged by Tibetans or the outside world, and the best argument to obscure the political issue. It is this issue of the justification for Chinese rule over a non-Chinese people, or China’s denial of Tibet’s right to national self-determination, that the Chinese employ the class argument to obscure. If Tibet before “liberation” can be depicted as an orgy of suffering, then perhaps Chinese rule can be justified. However, in order to achieve this, the evils of old Tibet have to be exaggerated to the point of absurdity. No society could have been as awful as Tibet is portrayed by the Chinese. And no one but the Chinese, few if any of whom had any knowledge of Tibet before 1950, describes it in this way. Modern Tibetans admit the inequalities of the political and social system, but none but the former serfs cultivated by the Chinese describe it like the Chinese do. The Chinese motive in denigrating Tibetan society in such awful terms is obviously to justify the “liberation” of Tibet and the denial of Tibet’s right to national self-determination. In early March China’s State Council Information Office published an official White Paper, “Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet.” The three sections of the White Paper were on old Tibet and its feudal serf system, the Democratic Reforms that ended the serf system, and the tremendous changes that had taken place in Tibet since then. The first sentence established the foundation of the Chinese argument that there was no political issue of Tibet: “Tibet has been an inseparable part of China since ancient times.” The 1951 Seventeen-Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet “enabled
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Tibet to repel the imperialist forces and realize peaceful liberation.” The 17-Point Agreement had acknowledged the necessity of reforming the social system, which the local government should carry out voluntarily. In consideration of the special circumstances of Tibet, the Central People’s Government “adopted a circumspect attitude toward the reform.” With “great patience, tolerance and sincerity,” it made efforts to persuade and waited for the local upper ruling strata of Tibet to carry out reform voluntarily. However, “instigated and supported by imperialist forces, some people in the upper ruling strata, despite the ever-growing demand of the people for democratic reform, were totally opposed to reform and proclaimed their determination never to carry it out.” According to the White Paper the Tibetan ruling class abandoned the 17-Point Agreement and, in an attempt to perpetuate feudal serfdom under theocracy, “brazenly staged an all-out armed rebellion on March 10, 1959.” The Central People’s Government and the Tibetan people took decisive measures to quell the rebellion in order to “safeguard the unity of the nation and the basic interests of the Tibetan people.” Democratic Reforms were carried out to “overthrow Tibet’s feudal serfdom system under theocracy and liberate about one million serfs and slaves, ushering in a new era with the people becoming their own masters.” Democratic Reform was the most significant social reform in Tibet’s history and “an epoch-making event in Tibet’s history of social development and the progress of its human rights, as well as a significant advance in the history of human civilization and the world’s human rights development.” These events were to be celebrated: The year 2009 marks the 50th anniversary of the democratic reform in Tibet. It is conducive to telling the right from wrong in history and helps the world better understand a real Tibet in progress for us to review the overwhelming democratic reform and the profound historical changes that have taken place in Tibet over the past 50 years, to shed light on the laws governing the social development of Tibet, and expose through facts the various lies and rumors spread by the 14th Dalai Lama and his hard-core supporters over the so-called “Tibet issue,” as well as the true colors of the 14th Dalai Lama himself.
Old Tibet was described as “a society of feudal serfdom under theocracy, a society characterized by a combination of political and religious powers, and ruthless political oppression and economic exploitation of serfs and slaves by the serf-owner class.” The Tibetan people were “living in dire misery and suffering from the harshness of life, and their society had sunk into a grave state of poverty, backwardness, isolation and decline, verging on total collapse.” Some facts detrimental to China’s argument were also unintentionally revealed. One such was the statistic that there were 2,676 monasteries in what
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is now the TAR, which was intended to illustrate the dominance of religion in Tibet. More Tibetans lived outside the TAR than inside and there were at least an equal number of temples and monasteries outside the TAR. Given that only a dozen or so remained in all of traditional Tibet after Democratic Reforms and the Cultural Revolution, this statistic reveals the enormously destructive effects of those campaigns on Tibetan culture and national identity. The serf system was criticized for not allowing serfs to leave the lands and manors of their lords, which is exactly the situation that existed under the CCP’s commune system. Traditional Tibetan law was criticized for its division of people into “three classes and nine ranks, enshrining inequality between the different ranks in law,” which is exactly what the class divisions of Democratic Reforms did as well. The White Paper says that there were “penitentiaries or private jails in monasteries and aristocrats’ residences, where instruments of torture were kept and clandestine tribunals held to punish serfs and slaves.” Compare this to the prison and “reform through labor” system established after 1959 and the hundreds of thousands of Tibetans who suffered and died in them. Tibetan serfs were said to have suffered heavy taxes, labor requirements, and rents for land and livestock, all of which are actually contractual relationships that reveal a degree of independence of the so-called “serfs and slaves.” “Ruthless oppression and exploitation under the feudal serfdom of theocracy” was said to have stifled the vitality of Tibetan society and reduced Tibet to a state of chronic stagnation for centuries. The same could be said for at least the first thirty years of Chinese control over Tibet. The Democratic Reform campaign was said to have been an “inevitable requirement for social progress,” and “the only solution for social development in Tibet.” It also “reflected the yearning of the overwhelming majority of the Tibetan people.” The White Paper says that reforms were postponed in Tibet (or that part of Tibet that was to become the TAR), which is supposed to exemplify the government’s patience, but, nevertheless, the upper strata revolted against reforms. After the revolt, “the Central People’s Government immediately dissolved the Kasha regime and its armed forces, courts and prisons, which had oppressed the Tibetan people for hundreds of years. At the same time, it repealed the old Tibetan Code and barbarous punishments.” This was followed by the Democratic Reforms, by means of which “the one million serfs and slaves in Tibet were emancipated. They became the masters of their country [meaning China], as well as Tibet.” Their lives and personal freedom were then supposedly protected by the Chinese Constitution and law, unless they, of course, had participated in or supported the revolt in any way, or they were of the upper classes or their agents, or they revealed anti-Chinese opinions during the traumatic thamzing struggle sessions of Democratic Reforms.
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After land reform “the laboring Tibetan people who had been enslaved generation after generation stood on their own land, celebrating all night. They cried, ‘The sun of the Dalai Lama shone on the nobility, while the sun of Chairman Mao is shining on our poor people. Now the Dalai Lama’s sun is set, and our sun is rising.’” The unprecedented enthusiasm for production and life after the serfs and slaves became masters of the land supposedly increased the grain output the next year to unprecedented levels. In fact, grain production figures were falsified by Chinese cadres in Tibet as in all of China during the hysteria of the Great Leap Forward, and thousands of Tibetans and millions of Chinese starved to death. During Democratic Reforms, Tibetans’ freedom of religious belief was protected as were “patriotic and law-abiding monasteries. . . . Historical monasteries and cultural relics were all protected.” Apparently only a dozen or so monasteries were “historical” or “patriotic and law-abiding,” and only their cultural relics were saved, while all the rest were destroyed and their relics confiscated by the state. Democratic Reform “enabled the true features of religion to emerge, effectively safeguarded the Tibetan people’s freedom of religious belief, and laid a foundation for the introduction of the political system of people’s democracy in Tibet.” The third section of the White Paper is devoted to all the economic and social developments in Tibet since Democratic Reforms. Tibetans supposedly enjoy extensive autonomous rights. China has poured huge financial resources into Tibet for economic development. Health care has improved and the Tibetan population has rapidly increased for this reason and also because the number of monks and nuns has been drastically reduced. Vast sums have been devoted to cultural preservation and promotion. The freedom of religious belief and “normal religious activities” of the Tibetan people are protected. The conclusion of the White Paper was that Tibet “has experienced a process from darkness to brightness, from poverty to prosperity, from autocratic rule to democracy, and from self-seclusion to opening up.” Tibet is now “in its best period of historical development with rapid economic and social progress, cultural prosperity, improved living conditions, national unity, good government and harmonious people.” According to the White Paper, history has convincingly proved that the Democratic Reforms that ended feudal serfdom and emancipated one million serfs and slaves “is of great significance not only in the history of China’s human rights development, but also in the world’s anti-slavery history. This is a great page in the progress of human civilization that will shine throughout the ages.” History has also supposedly proven that the Dalai Lama and his political clique are the representatives of feudal serfdom and are therefore in fundamental conflict with the interests of the Tibetan laboring people. There are “irreconcilable and profound contradictions between them and the need
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for social progress in Tibet as well as the rules for the development of human society.” The Dalai clique will always be against democratic reforms and will never cease their separatist activities and their sabotage of development in Tibet. The White Paper declares that the difference with the Dalai Lama is not about autonomy, it is a “struggle between progress and retrogression, and between unity and separation.” History has proved that “abolition of serfdom, the liberation of serfs and slaves, and keeping national unity safe against separation are a progressive and just cause for the protection of human rights and maintenance of national sovereignty” equivalent to the abolishment of slavery and the preservation of the union of the American states during the Civil War: When the Dalai clique staged the large-scale armed rebellion to retain the theocratic feudal serfdom and to split the country, the Chinese government took actions to quell the rebellion for the sake of defending national unity and emancipating the serfs and slaves of Tibet. The historical significance of this righteous action is entirely comparable to the emancipation of the slaves in the American civil war. Yet the anti-China forces in the West simply ignore the historical facts and confuse right and wrong by exalting the 14th Dalai Lama as a “guardian of human rights,” “peace envoy,” and “spiritual leader,” and accusing the Chinese government that abolished feudal serfdom and emancipated the serfs and slaves of “trespassing on human rights.” This is totally absurd, and provokes deep thought. . . . The armed rebellion staged by the Dalai clique to split the country in 1959 was supported and instigated by imperialist forces. Ever since the Dalai clique went into exile, Western anti-China forces have never ceased their instigation and training of the Dalai clique to support their split and sabotage activities. It is thus clear that the so-called “Tibet issue” is by no means an ethnic, religious and human rights issue; rather, it is the Western anti-China forces’ attempt to restrain, split, and demonize China.
The White Paper declared that there was no way to restore the old feudal order and no prospect for the success of any separatist attempt. Social progress was the will of the people that no one could resist: “The will of the people of all ethnic groups in China, including the Tibetans, shall never be shaken from safeguarding national unity and sovereignty, from following the socialist road with Chinese characteristics under the leadership of the Communist Party of China, from holding on to the system of regional autonomy, from promoting the realization of modernization in Tibet, and from building a new, united and democratic Tibet with a prosperous, civilized and harmonious society.” The Dalai Lama would not succeed in his attempt to achieve Tibetan independence, or semi-independence or covert independence under the guise of a “high degree of autonomy.”
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The Dalai clique would not be able to “turn back the wheel of history and to restore the rule of feudal serfdom, the Tibetan people and people of other ethnic groups who personally experienced the misery under the serfdom system and the happy life in Tibet today will never allow it.” The only way out for the 14th Dalai Lama was to give up advocating “Tibet independence,” to admit that Tibet is an inalienable part of Chinese territory, to disband the so-called Tibetan government-in-exile and stop all his activities aimed at splitting the country. “The 14th Dalai Lama must thoroughly reflect upon and correct his political position and behavior. The central government has opened and will always keep its door open for the 14th Dalai Lama to return to a patriotic stand.”26 As is usual with Chinese propaganda on Tibet, the White Paper on Democratic Reform revealed more and raised more questions than intended. Extravagant claims about the emancipation of the serfs and the fifty years of prosperity that Tibetans have supposedly been enjoying ever since inevitably raise questions about contradictions in the Chinese narrative about Tibet’s recent history. First, there is the transparent attempt to transform the political issue of Tibet into an exclusively social or class issue of the “liberation” of the “serfs and slaves.” Then there is the disparity between the Chinese version of the Tibetan revolt and its aftermath and the Tibetan version. The Chinese White Paper ignores the Tibetan deaths during the revolt, the exile of thousands, and the imprisonment and deaths of thousands more. The personal freedom supposedly experienced by the majority of Tibetans cannot be reconciled with the accounts of Chinese control over all aspects of their lives. Tibetans having become “masters of their own fate” cannot be reconciled with China having become the master of them and their country. China’s supposed protection of religious freedom and cultural relics cannot withstand evidence that almost all monasteries were looted and destroyed. China’s ostensibly selfless economic development in Tibet is contradicted by the fact of massive exploitation of Tibet’s natural resources and the ongoing colonization under the guise of economic development. China’s claim that its reforms and investments in Tibet have facilitated an increase in the Tibetan population cannot answer the Tibetan claim that hundreds of thousands have died due to repression of Tibetan resistance to Chinese rule. None of China’s justifications for its rule over Tibet can answer the question of why China does not allow Tibetan self-determination. The White Paper is written with the tone of wounded pride that is typical of China’s victimization mentality promoted by the CCP. The Chinese cannot understand why they are criticized about Tibet when the emancipation of the serfs is equivalent to the freeing of the slaves during the American Civil War. Given China’s faultless, even selfless and exemplary behavior in Tibet,
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Western criticism of China in regard to some nonexistent “Tibet issue” can have no other logical cause than the Western countries’ wish to keep China from achieving its rightful role as a world power. All the evidence from official as well as popular Chinese sources indicates that most Chinese actually believe this narrative. Not only do they believe it but they insist that the rest of the world must believe it as well. To persist in doing otherwise would be an intolerable insult to Chinese pride, or would “hurt the feelings of the Chinese people.” The tone of the White Paper and much of recent Chinese propaganda reveals a confidence that China now has sufficient economic and political power to coerce international conformity to its position on Tibet. China perhaps expects that it will not be too many years before it will have representatives of Western countries at its annual celebrations of “Serf Emancipation Day.” On 11 March the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution calling on China to end its repression in Tibet and to dialogue with the Dalai Lama to find a lasting solution to the Tibet issue. China responded with a scathing Xinhua article that said the resolution “disregards Tibet’s history and reality, embellishes feudal serfdom which integrates politics and religion in old Tibet, sings the praises of the Dalai Lama who engaged in splitting the motherland for a long time, and levels unjustified charges at China’s ethnic and religious policies.” This was “calling black white,” Xinhua said, and “harbors ulterior motives.” The article went on to elaborate about the comparison between China’s liberation of the Tibetan serfs and America’s emancipation of slaves: “The history of the abolition of serfdom in Tibet’s democratic reform was an important milestone in human rights progress in the world just as the abolition of slavery in the United States.” The Tibetan rebellion of 1959 was compared with the southern states’ secession in 1861. Just as the United States had preserved the union and abolished slavery China put down the rebellion of the serf-owners and freed the serfs. Xinhua wondered why the members of Congress who voted for the anti-China resolution did not see this comparison: The handful of congressmen who initiated this bill prided themselves for “speaking out from a sense of justice” for human rights as the “moral authority.” However, what they initiated was a bill that negates human rights progress. If these congressmen really want to “speak out from a sense of justice” for human rights in Tibet, they should see the striking similarities between Tibet under the rule of serf owners headed by the Dalai Lama 50 years ago and the southern states before the abolition of slavery. Both places divided people into grades and made it clear that men were not born equal. Like the slaves in the cotton fields of the south, serfs in old Tibet had no personal freedom and would lose their right to live any time as a result of private torture. . . . If there is any difference
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at all, it is that Tibetan serfs faced a more miserable plight and fate than did the American slaves.
The Ku Klux Klan, organized by the former slave owners in the Southern states after the Civil War, was equated with the Tibetan Government in Exile, organized by the Dalai Lama and former serf owners in an attempt to restore the feudal serf system. However, just as the efforts of the Ku Klux Klan to suppress the rights of the former slaves were rejected by most Americans, so should the conspiracies of the Dalai clique be rejected by Tibetans and by Americans as well. Rather than criticize China, the United States should unite with China to resolve the current financial crisis. In a veiled threat that there would be repercussions if the United States did not do so, the article said, “In making irresponsible remarks on China’s internal affairs and provoking contradictions and disputes at this moment in time, these US congressmen not only violated the basic norms of international relations but acted contrary to the United States’ own interests. The congressmen concerned should respect facts, give up their prejudice, show their sense of moral and sense of responsibility as politicians, and refrain from doing anything to harm SinoUS relations.”27 The celebration of Serf Emancipation Day on 28 March 2009 was preceded by numerous propaganda articles, mostly testimonies of former serfs about how their lives had improved, and articles by Chinese and Tibetans about the evils of the serf system from which Tibetans had been liberated. The actual celebration in Lhasa was almost anticlimactic. It consisted mostly of speeches by officials and more testimonies of liberated serfs. Some ten thousand people were said to have attended the rally in Potala Square, waving national flags with flowers in their hands to welcome the day. Zhang Qingli once again repeated the CCP line on the Tibet issue: Completely abolishing the feudal serf system and emancipating one million serfs in Tibet was the broadest and deepest social transformation in the history of Tibet, pioneered new ways for Tibet’s development and prosperity, and drew a dividing line between barbarianism and civilization, between darkness and brightness, and between backwardness and progress on the roof of the world. This immortal monument will always stand on the snow-covered plateau and be kept in the hearts of the people of all nationalities in Tibet. Our struggle against the Dalai clique is not an issue related to ethnics, religions, and human rights but it is a struggle for national sovereignty and territorial integrity. . . . Tibet belongs to the big family of the Chinese nation, as well as the people of all nationalities in Tibet and that by no means does Tibet belong to the tiny number of splittist elements or the anti-China forces in the international community. All attempts to push “Tibet independence” and to split socialist China will be doomed to failure. The skies in Tibet are always blue and
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the five-star red flag will always fly in the skies of Tibet. This great true principle is that without the CPC, there would be no new China and new Tibet. Only by upholding the leadership of the CPC, the socialist system, and the system of regional ethnic autonomy will Tibet have prosperity and progress and have a more brilliant future.28
Tibetan Nationalism Tibetan national identity is very distinct, based on ethnicity, language, religion, culture, territory, cultural ecology adapted to territory, and a history of direct political administration of Central Tibet and indirect administration of all Tibetan cultural territory. Tibetan national identity so closely corresponds to the Tibetan Plateau that one might say that Tibet is a nation defined by altitude.29 Tibet had mutually advantageous relationships with pre-twentieth-century Chinese regimes, primarily with conquest dynasties. Its relations with the Mongol Yuan Dynasty (1270–1368) avoided a Mongol conquest of Tibet and promoted Tibetan Buddhism. Buddhism was also promoted by the Manchu Qing (1642–1911), while Tibetans had only to tolerate the abuses of a few Ambans, the Manchu representatives in Lhasa. A Tibetan nationalist consciousness was stimulated by the British invasion of 1904, the Chinese invasion of eastern Tibet in response, and then by British support for Tibetan autonomy. Britain recognized China’s suzerainty over Tibet, not sovereignty, but China never gave up its claim to full sovereignty over Tibet. The Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1950 was the first time that China had ever tried to substantiate its claim to sovereignty over Tibet by actual administration, and the first time that most Tibetans had ever experienced actual Chinese control. Tibetan resistance arose in areas outside what was to become the Tibetan Autonomous Region in 1956 upon the introduction of “Democratic Reforms.” The 1959 Lhasa revolt grew out of the eastern Tibetan revolt because refugees and resistance fighters moved from the east to Central Tibet. However, in the Chinese mind the reason for the revolt was Mao’s 1957 promise, as a part of his “Hundred Flowers” policy, to delay reforms in the TAR. Some Chinese cadres were removed, reforms were not implemented, and this, in the opinion of many Chinese, allowed Tibetan resistance to arise. The demonstrations and riots in Lhasa from 1987 to 1989 were, like the 1959 revolt, credited by many Chinese to an excessively liberal and tolerant policy toward Tibetan culture, religion, and autonomy. The liberalization policy introduced by Deng Xiaoping after 1979 dissolved the communes and allowed for some minimal Tibetan autonomy. Tibetan religion, culture, and nationalism rapidly revived, much to the surprise of the Chinese, who thought Tibetans were fully reconciled to Chinese rule. The protests of 1987
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to 1989 were due to the resentments of the past and the continuing reality of Chinese control over Tibet. A specific reason for Tibetan discontent was the policy of sending more Chinese to Tibet, under the justification that they were needed for economic development, after promising a permanent reduction in order to allow for Tibetan autonomy. Many Chinese saw the respect for Tibet’s “special characteristics,” the justification for Tibetan autonomy, as a mistake that resulted in the revival of Tibetan separatism. Since then, China has greatly restricted almost all aspects of Tibetan autonomy, especially any with nationalist implications. Since almost all aspects of Tibetan religion and culture do have nationalist implications, the Chinese have had to restrict almost all Tibetan autonomy. After 1989, Chinese policy in Tibet was one of restriction of autonomy, repression of all separatist sentiments, economic development to buy the loyalty of some Tibetans, and colonization as the ultimate solution to the Tibetan problem. China has consistently refused to dialogue with the Dalai Lama about autonomy, instead insisting on confining all discussions with him to his personal fate. The reasons for the protests of 2008 were, like those of the past, founded in Tibetan resentment at the reality and the conditions of Chinese rule. Specific reasons included the increased flood of Chinese to Lhasa and other Tibetan areas, especially after the opening of the railroad in the summer of 2006. Other irritants were the continuing and increasing denunciations of the Dalai Lama and regulations meant to control the choice of Buddhist reincarnations. Tibetans were frustrated by China’s duplicitous expressions of willingness to dialogue with the Dalai Lama, meant only to satisfy foreign criticism, while being totally uncompromising about actual policy in Tibet. As in the 1950s, the uprising in Lhasa was preceded by protests in eastern Tibet and renewed repressive measures there, including an increase in the numbers of security personnel and the revival and intensification of “Patriotic Education.” There was also a large-scale program in the grassland areas of eastern Tibet to remove the nomads from pasture lands and settle them in newly constructed towns. This program had huge implications for Tibetan culture and national identity due to the significance of the nomadic lifestyle in Tibetan culture and economy. Some of the nomadic youth uprooted from their livelihood were undoubtedly among those who rioted in Lhasa. A letter sent to the International Campaign for Tibet from an anonymous Tibetan at the end of March 2008 expressed more specific reasons for Tibetan discontent. The writer listed five primary reasons for the protests: Han immigration to Tibet, lack of religious freedom, dilution of Tibetan culture and identity, provocative propaganda in the media, and unrestricted exploitation of the natural resources of Tibet. The writer said that seventy percent of the businesses in Lhasa were owned by Han Chinese. There was no real autonomy.
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Tibetan officials were afraid that if they promoted autonomy they would be labeled as having separatist sentiments. The railroad had brought so many new settlers to Lhasa that the prices of everything had gone up. The benefits of tourism went mainly to Han Chinese because Han tourists preferred Han guides. The majority of hotels, restaurants, shops, tourist vehicles, and travel agencies were owned by Han Chinese. Levels of unemployment among Tibetans were very high due to the increase in Han Chinese immigration. Despite Beijing’s claims that there was religious freedom in Tibet, the writer continued, what actually existed was little more than a facade to fool tourists. Students, government employees, and CCP members were forbidden to visit monasteries or attend religious ceremonies or festivals. All materials such as pictures, books, and recordings related to the Dalai Lama were forbidden. This was enforced by random inspections and searches of houses and stores. Monks were forced to write denunciations of the Dalai Lama and attend classes in Patriotic Education. The number of monks was tightly controlled. All high lamas had to be approved by a government committee in Beijing. The Chinese Government even installed its own Panchen Lama, in whom Tibetans had no faith. When the Chinese Panchen Lama visited Lhasa, each family had to send one member to the welcoming ceremony or else pay a fine. Monks were discriminated against and any religious activity taking place without government approval was handled exceedingly harshly. For instance, in 2007, two statues of Guru Rinpoche, one at Samye and another at Mt. Kailas, were destroyed because they were built without permission. Those who constructed them were punished. Due to policies encouraging and supporting immigration to Tibet, Tibetans had become a minority in their own land. Most of the subjects in schools were taught in Chinese only. Tibetan language was taught only up to middle school. It was not even possible to post a letter with an address in Tibetan. Young people and office workers were encouraged to use Chinese language instead of Tibetan, so the younger generation was starting to lose their own language and culture. Even if one wished to study Tibetan language and culture there were virtually no resources available to do so. Anyone who started a Tibetan language center or school came under official suspicion and surveillance. Such schools were frequently shut down, ostensibly due to their association with foreign sponsors. According to the law of the PRC, all minorities are entitled to preserve their own language and culture. But, in Tibet, any effort at doing this resulted in suspicion and repression from the government. The Tibetan writer complained that official Chinese media made “childish” and false accusations against the Dalai Lama. They tried to claim that he was responsible for a situation that had been entirely created by the government. The only reason there was any semblance of stability in Tibet was that the
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Dalai Lama had appealed to Tibetans to remain calm and not commit any violence. If the Dalai Lama had really instigated the riot it would have been much worse. Chinese media sought to fool their own people, but the world was not fooled because they had other sources of information. Tibet had become a proving ground for Chinese officials looking for further promotions. Those who pursued harsh policies in Tibet were often promoted to higher positions, the best example being Hu Jintao. The Chinese government promoted itself as the saviors of the poor Tibetan serfs, condemning the old Tibetan society. If this were true the people would of course be loyal to the government. The fact that Tibetans were unhappy enough to rise up and riot should be a clear indication about how they truly feel about the policies imposed on the Tibetan people. With increasing demands for energy, Tibet’s resources were being exploited without proper rules and regulations. The Tibetan nomads and farmers whose lands were destroyed received virtually no compensation. Deforestation was taking place on a massive scale in Kongpo area, where it contributed to downstream flooding in the Brahmaputra River. Ironically, this area was designated a nature reserve even while huge swaths of forest were being cut down. Local culture, faith, and lifestyle were not considered by the government when approving mining projects. In Chamdo, huge copper mines had dislocated nomads from their lands with no compensation. Over 100,000 nomads were being forced to give up their traditional way of life and move into rows of housing built for them. The Chinese said they were protecting the sources of the “Three Rivers,” but this was untrue. Nomads had been using this land for centuries in a sustainable manner.30 The specific reasons for the uprising of 2008 included these cited by an anonymous Tibetan and many others, all ultimately having their sources in the fact and the conditions of Chinese rule over Tibet. In Lhasa the primary grievance seems to have been the recent influx of Chinese due to the railroad. The increasing numbers of Chinese everywhere in Tibet was probably the overriding consideration for many Tibetans. The marches and riots were expressions of Tibetan grievances against Chinese control over their lives and their country. The Tibetan flag was prominently displayed in many of the protests, especially those in eastern Tibet. Some of these were printed, especially those used in Labrang, but others were hand-made. Many protests included the hauling down of Chinese flags wherever they were found and the flying of the Tibetan flag instead. The symbolism of this is indisputable, and the bravery of those who displayed flags incredible considering the known penalty. The reasons for the uprising were not just specific issues that might be resolved with a change in policy but nationalistic reasons related to what Tibetans perceived as the injustice of Chinese rule over Tibet.
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In the aftermath of the riot in Lhasa, the protests spread to eastern Tibetan areas outside the TAR and lasted far longer there, into April, May, and even June. The marches and protests in eastern Tibet began in sympathy with what had happened in Lhasa and then continued as demands for the release of Tibetans arrested in marches and demonstrations in each of the eastern Tibetan sites. In its report on the uprising, “Tibet at a Turning Point,” the International Campaign for Tibet detailed 159 protests, 42 of which were in the TAR and 117 in other provinces. Twenty-five known protests were in Gansu, 32 in Qinghai, and 60 in Sichuan. Many of these were described as “multiple instances” and it was admitted that there were probably many more unknown instances.31 Only one-fourth of the protests were within the TAR; three-quarters were outside the TAR. The overall effect on Tibetans was one of a renewed national consciousness in all of the areas of Tibetan inhabitation. A map of the protest areas defines the frontiers of Tibetan territory as they existed at the height of the Tibetan Empire period when Tibetan political control extended over the entire plateau. Tibetans immediately experienced severe Chinese repression, but the experience of Tibetan solidarity was real and could not be eradicated. Tibetan accounts, as related by Woeser and others, confirm that Tibetans experienced a heightened sense of national identity. The sense of elation while waving or even just seeing the Tibetan flag displayed and the Dalai Lama’s name openly shouted must have contributed to a short-lived feeling of national strength. Even the subsequent repression no doubt had a unifying effect on Tibetans, despite the efforts to make them inform on and denounce each other and the collaborationist acts and speeches of Tibetan cadres and officials. Some Tibetan officials were said to have had some sympathy for those who were arrested and tortured. Their sense of Tibetan identity had to have been increased by the knowledge that most Chinese did not trust them no matter how loud or subservient their declarations of loyalty. There was a similar effect on Tibetans in exile due to their sympathy for those within Tibet. No doubt many Tibetans had a renewed sense of the importance of the preservation of their language, culture, and national identity. The aftermath of the uprising was a sense of elation among Tibetans that they could stand up to the Chinese and declare their opposition to Chinese rule, even if only briefly. Tibetans also experienced intense repression and pressure to forget any sense they might have gained of Tibetan solidarity and their ability to resist the power of the Chinese state. Those most resistant were, as in previous Tibetan uprisings, identified by their opposition and then subjected to arrest, torture, and imprisonment. All Tibetans undoubtedly experienced a sense of intimidation due to the presence of large numbers of security forces and their
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searches of Tibetans’ houses and persons. Most monasteries were semipermanently surrounded by security forces. There were intense pressures as well as incentives to inform on others and interrogations of those arrested for the same purpose. All of these measures had and were intended to have divisive effects on Tibetan resistance and solidarity, but they may have had a unifying effect as well. The price for any resistance became apparent to all, as did the rewards for cooperation. As was the case after the uprising of 1959, Tibetans were coerced to display their support for the government at rallies and “spontaneous” demonstrations, particularly in Lhasa for the arrival of the Olympic torch. This undoubtedly aroused the resentments of many Tibetans. Despite propaganda to the contrary, relations between Han Chinese and Tibetans reached a new low, but this may have had a positive effect on many Tibetans’ sense of solidarity. The Patriotic Education Campaign in monasteries and in society in general may have had the opposite effect than that intended, particularly due to the propaganda against the Dalai Lama, which, indeed, was one reason many cited for their protests in the first place. Some other Chinese measures taken after the uprising may have a significant effect on Tibetan national identity and cultural consciousness. Monks from outside the TAR studying at the three great Lhasa monasteries were identified as the leaders of the protests and riot and were removed. The Lhasa monasteries traditionally trained monks from all over the plateau and from Buddhist areas beyond, thus making Lhasa the center of the Tibetan Buddhist world and giving the monasteries a role in the political administration of all Tibetan areas. Even though the former Tibetan government did not directly administer all Tibetans of the plateau, the cultural and political role of the great monasteries contributed to Tibetan cultural and national identity. If monks from all over the plateau are no longer allowed to go to Lhasa for their religious training and if pilgrims and others from all over the plateau are no longer allowed to go to Lhasa or to stay there, this will reduce Lhasa’s role as the center of Tibetan culture and will have a divisive effect on Tibetan national identity. Since the authorities identified the three great monasteries of Lhasa as the source of their problem, they were also reportedly planning to reduce their role and influence. The TAR began constructing a Tibetan Buddhist Academy, in Nyetang, Chushul (Ch. Quxu) County, near Lhasa, in October 2008. The purpose of the academy was said to be “to train patriotic and devotional religious personnel who are widely recognized both in their religious accomplishments and moral character.” In addition to religious subjects, students would also be taught other disciplines “such as politics and sociology.”32 According to information received from anonymous sources by Radio Free
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Asia, the plan was to move all of the troublemaking younger monks from the three great Lhasa monasteries and the Jokhang to the new academy and to turn the Lhasa monasteries into museums and tourist centers, much like the Potala. Only elderly monks and some custodians would be left in Lhasa’s great monasteries to act as caretakers and museum guides. The monks sent to the new site would be under increased control and farther away from Lhasa and thus less able to make trouble. This was in addition to no longer allowing any monks from Kham and Amdo to remain in monasteries anywhere within the TAR. China’s resettlement of Tibetan farmers and nomads was another important source of Tibetan resentment. Many of those who rioted in Lhasa seem to have been unemployed farmers and nomads. The resettlement of nomads also had the potential to have a significantly negative impact on Tibetan culture and national identity. Nomadism has been an important component of Tibetan cultural identity since ancient times. The mobility provided by nomadic tribes when they allied with the more agricultural areas of Central Tibet during the rise of the Tibetan Empire facilitated the expansion of that empire to the edges of the plateau. Tibetan nomadism existed in a harmonious relationship with the environment for thousands of years until the Chinese conquest of Tibet. In the early 1950s the Chinese started draining the high altitude marshes of the upper Yellow and Yangtze River watersheds. Later, the Chinese “experts” caused overgrazing by demanding increased meat production from the nomads. Then they tried fencing each nomad family, which of course caused overgrazing inside each fenced area because nomads could not move to follow the growth of the grass at different elevations according to season. This is the area that the Chinese refer to as “China’s water source” and from where they now say the Tibetan nomads have to be removed because they have caused its ecological deterioration. Within the TAR, 312,000 farmers and herders from 57,800 families were moved in 2008 “from shanty homes into new solid brick houses under a government-subsidized housing project.” Nomads were to be removed from grasslands so that they could recover and farmers were to be paid to plant trees and shrubs on their former farmlands. The project in the TAR began in 2006 and was aimed at providing new housing for 220,000 families, 80 percent of the total in the TAR by 2010. To date, 860,000 farmers and herders from 170,000 families had moved into the new houses. The resettlement project was said to have been launched to improve living conditions, to provide “public services,” and “for the sake of ecological conservation in nature reserves and for the health of the farmers and herders.”33 In Gansu, 73,700 nomadic Tibetans were scheduled to be moved from the pastures into new houses. This was out of a total Tibetan population in Gansu of 480,000, not
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all of whom were nomads. Here, as in other areas of the plateau, 80 percent of nomads were to be resettled.34 In Sichuan, 470,000 nomads out of a total of 533,000 were to be resettled.35 Yushu and Golok TAPs of Qinghai Province, where the headwaters of the Yellow and Yangtze were located, were the focus of the plan to preserve these areas as water sources. The area of the headwaters was to be turned into a “noman’s land.” In 2003 the government resettled 28,000 people and in 2004 announced that another 43,600 would be resettled. The new houses into which the dispossessed nomads were moved were constructed of brick and concrete. Some of the new “socialist villages” had the appearance of low-income housing projects in other countries that inevitably become slums. The row houses were devoid of any ethnic style or charm and appear to have been placed without any regard to the local environment. The resettlement was said to be “voluntary” and nomads were to be compensated for their unemployment for a few years. However, in the current political atmosphere in Tibet any opposition to government plans was often interpreted as “harming national unity” or even “separatist.” China’s projects are described as “scientific” and all opposition as “backward” and “unscientific.” The endemic corruption of Chinese officialdom would undoubtedly have an effect upon how much compensation Tibetans actually received. Some of the unemployed nomads were said to have been employed on road-building projects.36 Whatever China’s justifications for this massive social engineering project, its effect was to almost eradicate one of the most important components of Tibetan culture. Nomadism is almost synonymous with Tibetan culture; the Chinese authorities set about to eliminate it with the arrogance and cultural chauvinism typical of Chinese rule over Tibet. Chinese culture has traditionally associated civilization with agriculture and barbarism with nomadism and has proposed to resettle the Tibetan nomads consistent with the attitude that this would “improve their lives” simply because they would then be settled and thus civilized or at least exposed to civilizing influences. As Human Rights Watch wrote, “Similar resettlement projects carried out in the 1990s in Inner Mongolia and Xinjiang have more often than not resulted in considerable impoverishment, and China’s attempts to refashion cultural identity, most notably in Xinjiang, have ultimately been attempts to defuse ethno-nationalism.”37 The unemployed nomads were supposed to enter the modern economy, but without any skills. These unemployed Tibetan youths provided some of the manpower for the uprising of 2008 and undoubtedly would again for any similar future events. Given the overwhelming presence of security forces in all areas in March 2009, Tibetans had little opportunity for any further demonstrations or protests, including during the 10 March fiftieth anniversary of the 1959
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uprising or the one year anniversary of the March 2008 uprising. However, they did manage to stage a boycott of the traditional New Year (Losar) celebrations in February. This seems to have been as threatening to the Chinese as an active demonstration or riot because it refuted the contention of Chinese propaganda that Tibetans were happy and their lives completely normal. The campaign to commemorate those who died the previous year rather than celebrate Losar began among exile Tibetans and was taken up by those in Tibet. This outside instigation was another reason for the Chinese to try to counteract the Losar boycott. Chinese and Tibetan officials organized many Losar activities and used the usual coercive tactics to make sure that Tibetans attended. They even distributed funds so that Tibetans could celebrate and, in some areas, firecrackers that Tibetans were supposed to use, even those this was a Chinese rather than Tibetan New Year tradition. Despite the coercion of officials, many Tibetans did not celebrate Losar in the usual manner. Losar celebrations were generally confined to religious rituals for those who were killed by Chinese security forces the past year. In the Kanze area, none of the usual festivals such as dances, incense burning rituals, horse races, or raising prayer flags on mountains were observed by the local Tibetans. Tibetan officials were made to organize song and dance performances, but few if any Tibetans attended. Instead of taking the usual weeklong holiday, many Tibetans continued to work at their normal jobs.38 The Tibetan refusal to celebrate Losar was embarrassing for Chinese and Tibetan officials, who constantly maintained that Tibetans were happy under their leadership and that the only discontents were those few who were influenced by outside forces like the Dalai clique. The uprising of 2008 undoubtedly raised Tibetan nationalistic consciousness and many Tibetans’ determination to preserve their own culture, language, and religion. It also, unfortunately, brought down on them tremendous Chinese repression and associated culturally destructive policies. It also, of course, aroused Chinese nationalism and popular Chinese intolerance of Tibetan separatism. Most Chinese imagined that Tibetans had been liberated by China and had greater privileges than most Chinese, so they had little sympathy for their discontent. The Chinese government similarly had less tolerance for any aspects of Tibetan autonomy because all were considered the breeding grounds for Tibetan nationalism and separatism. The Chinese government was unmoved to negotiate about autonomy with the Dalai Lama or to alter its policy on autonomy within Tibet. If anything, the Chinese government was likely to have been confirmed in its belief that any autonomy at all simply fostered Tibetan separatism and, therefore, even less autonomy than before should be allowed.
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Tibetans in exile also experienced a renewed sense of commitment to their cause. However, the failure of the Middle Way strategy was a source of discouragement and division. Even though the Chinese had rejected any dialogue on Tibetan autonomy, Dharamsala had failed to come up with a new strategy. The Special Meeting in November reconfirmed Tibetan resolve to follow the leadership of the Dalai Lama, which was to be expected given his role in Tibetan society. But the interpretation by the Dalai Lama and his administration that the result of the meeting was an expression of commitment to the Middle Way was somewhat tenuous. In fact, the lack of success of the Middle Way strategy was a major source of Tibetan discouragement and division. Not only had China rejected dialogue, but it had demonstrated that it would not be moved by foreign pressure. Nevertheless, Tibetan strategy remained to lobby for foreign pressure on China to convince it to dialogue. There was therefore a sense of futility among Tibetans, who knew that the Middle Way strategy was unlikely to achieve any success, but also that the Tibetan exile administration was incapable of altering its policy as long as the Dalai Lama still favored it. While the Middle Way policy was a failure in regard to China, it was still successful among foreign governments sympathetic to the Tibetan cause. They were comfortable with a policy of dialogue, which they could easily recommend, even if without result; but, there was little more they could do. The Middle Way policy remained an outstanding success with other countries, if not with China. Those who argued against the Middle Way policy were warned that to abandon it, in favor of independence or self-determination, would result in the loss of foreign governments’ support. Tibetans were thus stuck with a policy that had no effect on resolving their issue but that was too popular with foreign supporters to change.
Chinese Nationalism The Chinese Communist Party came to power not because of its Marxist ideology but because of its nationalist stance against the Japanese invasion of China and against the Kuomintang (KMT) for its failure to resist the Japanese. Mao’s attempts to reconstruct China by means of Marxist ideology resulted in catastrophe during the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution. Mao’s successors reverted to capitalism and nationalism as the basis of the CCP’s legitimacy. However, the demise of Communist ideology and the reforms of the 1980s led to Western liberal and democratic ideas that the CCP had to crush in 1989 in order to preserve its authoritarian rule. Since then, nationalism has played an even greater role in the legitimating ideology of the CCP.
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The CCP attempted to restore political stability by repressing all dissent and by fostering patriotism, which was equated with loyalty to the CCP. Political indoctrination of the younger generation was thought to be an urgent need and was pursued by means of “Patriotic Education.” One theme of the subsequent Patriotic Education Campaign was China’s humiliation at the hands of foreign imperialists during the “Hundred Years of National Humiliation,” between the Opium War of 1842 and the creation of the PRC in 1949. A related theme was the responsibility of “Western hostile forces” and their “peaceful evolution” strategy (meaning a natural evolution away from authoritarianism toward democracy) for the Tiananmen democracy movement of 1989. The Patriotic Education Campaign, primarily aimed at students, was carried out throughout the country and essentially replaced indoctrination in Communist ideology. Patriotic Education emphasized China’s “unique national conditions” of a still backward economy and uneducated people, which made China not ready for Western-style democracy. The continuation of one-party rule was thus justified. China’s liberation from imperialism and all its advances were credited to the indispensable CCP. Only socialism and the CCP could save China. China’s still undeveloped economy and the pursuit of capitalist rather than communist economic development were explained by the theory that China was still in the primary stage of socialism. Patriotic Education also sought to justify the CCP’s rule on the basis of Chinese tradition and culture. In contrast to Mao’s attempt to eradicate traditional culture and philosophy, the CCP now sought to justify itself on that basis rather than on Communist ideology and even revived the Confucianism that Mao had denounced. One aspect of this was the adoption of the slogans of a “harmonious society” and a “harmonious world” derived from Confucianism. The Chinese tradition of social harmony was contrasted to the decadent societies of the West. The Confucian values of social and cultural conformity and obedience to authority were used to encourage Chinese loyalty to the CCP. The Patriotic Education Campaign was surprisingly successful in turning the sentiments of the Chinese people, especially the youth, away from an idealization of Western democracy to a defense of China and the CCP against criticisms from Western democratic countries. Many Chinese believed the argument of the CCP that too-rapid democratization would cause the disintegration of the country, as had happened with the Soviet Union. They tended to share the resentment, exacerbated by the CCP, that China had been prevented from achieving its rightful place in the world because of foreign imperialist exploitation. Many Chinese accepted the CCP’s claim that stability was necessary for economic development and that only it could provide such stability. Political reforms and such goals as democracy and human rights
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would have to wait. The subsequent rapid economic development confirmed the opinion that Confucian authoritarianism was necessary for economic prosperity. The return of Hong Kong to China in 1997 was exploited to arouse positive Chinese patriotism. The Chinese embassy bombing in Belgrade in 1999 and the EP-3 incident in 2001 were used to arouse the negative sort against the United States. Western criticisms of China were characterized as based not on any real Chinese faults but on a desire to keep China down and prevent it from rising to its rightful role as an important world power. Western criticisms of China about its human rights practices were rejected as an attempt to “Westernize” China. China’s failed bid to host the 2000 Olympics was interpreted as an anti-China plot. The Chinese government mounted such an intensive propaganda campaign to get the 2000 Olympics that the Chinese people were shocked that China lost out to Australia in the last round of voting. The unexpected result was blamed on the opposition of the United States and foreign human rights groups. China determined to bid for the 2008 Games and to not be denied and humiliated again by a rejection of its right to host the Olympics. China’s failure to be awarded the 2000 Olympics, even after a major government-sponsored campaign, and its sense that China had once again been humiliated, helps explain the extraordinary significance that was attached to the award of the 2008 Games. China interpreted the 2008 Olympics as signifying China’s emergence onto the world stage, at last, as a prominent world power accepted as such by all the world’s countries. The CCP regarded its hosting of the Games as a validation of its rule within China and an international acceptance of its legitimacy. The Chinese government devoted a huge amount of resources to mounting a successful and impressive Olympics and promoted the event to the Chinese people as having tremendous significance for China’s world reputation. An unprecedented number of world leaders were invited to the opening ceremonies so that they might witness China’s glory. China’s emphasis on its own glory as reflected in the Olympics far surpassed its emphasis on the Games themselves. The Chinese people were therefore unprepared for another humiliation at this moment of China’s glory. Most Chinese believed there was no reason for Tibetan discontent, so they readily believed the explanation of their government that the disturbances were instigated from outside. They had been exposed to many of the same denigrations of the Dalai Lama as Tibetans had, so they quickly accepted that the “Dalai Clique” had instigated the uprising. They were told that the security forces had exercised remarkable restraint, no shots were fired anywhere, and no Tibetans were injured. Therefore, they wondered why there was so much international sympathy for the Tibetans who had rioted and none for
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the innocent Chinese shopkeepers who were killed. They interpreted innocent mistakes in Western media about the events in Tibet as intentional anti-China bias. They were unaware of any repression of Tibetans by their government, so they interpreted international condemnation of China’s repression of Tibetans as an anti-China conspiracy. They thought their country was once again being humiliated by critics who did not know the truth of the situation. Their government propaganda confirmed them in all these opinions, and its censorship prevented them from knowing anything different. Overseas Chinese were a different and more disturbing story. They had access to the media of the countries where they resided, but they preferred to believe their country innocent of any fault in regard to Tibet. They allowed themselves to be organized by their foreign embassies into counterdemonstrations at the Olympic torch relays, which impressed other countries only with the arrogance, virulence, and intolerance of Chinese nationalism. No doubt there was a psychological component to this Chinese defensiveness. They preferred to think of themselves and their country as the liberators of Tibetans rather than their repressors and exploiters. Many if not most overseas Chinese were thus immune to any explanation for the events in Tibet contrary to their own government’s explanation. And their success in numerically overpowering anti-Chinese demonstrations in several countries gave them a sense that they had defended China’s dignity and even that they had won the war of perceptions about what had happened in Tibet. Their self-congratulatory attitude and that of their government at having won what they regarded as essentially a propaganda battle gave them the sense of their own power and increased their nationalist fervor. The Chinese government was significantly responsible for these opinions and it exploited the popular nationalist reaction for its own benefit. Chinese media repeatedly broadcast footage of the riots in Lhasa, giving the Chinese people the impression of barbaric and violent Tibetans attacking innocent Chinese. Nothing was said about any reasons for Tibetan discontent, about other demonstrations, many of them nonviolent, in other parts of Tibet, or about the repression that followed and caused many Tibetan deaths. The emphasis of Chinese media on the violence and irrationality of the riot and its virulent propaganda against the Dalai Lama could only inflame Chinese animosity toward Tibetans and their outside supporters. Given what they knew, many Chinese thought their government’s response to the riots in Lhasa was too lenient. In Labrang, a Chinese man was quoted: Most of us think that the policy toward Tibetans has been too soft. They get all kinds of special preferences, but they’re just not as hard-working, and they drink too much. And then after we help them so much, they riot against us. So most of us think the policy toward Tibetans should be stricter.39
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Much of China’s nationalistic anger was spread on the Internet, both within China and overseas. This was an unprecedented expression of popular Chinese opinion, but it was also manipulated and exploited by the government to support its own position. What the overseas Chinese expressed was what they thought was a misunderstanding of their country, seemingly based on a willful ignorance of their history and, often, anti-China motives. A popular Internet posting expressed the common grievances of the Chinese: When we were the Sick Man of Asia, we were called The Yellow Peril. When we are billed to be the next Superpower, we are called The Threat. When we closed our doors, you smuggled drugs to open markets. When we embrace Free Trade, you blame us for taking away your jobs. When we were falling apart, you marched in your troops and wanted your fair share. When we tried to put the broken pieces back together again, Free Tibet you screamed, It [the Liberation of Tibet] was an Invasion! When we tried Communism, you hated us for being Communist. When we embrace Capitalism, you hate us for being Capitalist. When we have a billion people, you said we were destroying the planet. When we tried limiting our numbers, you said we abused human rights. When we were poor, you thought we were dogs. When we loan you cash, you blame us for your national debts. When we build our industries, you call us Polluters. When we sell you goods, you blame us for global warming. When we buy oil, you call it exploitation and genocide. When you go to war for oil, you call it liberation. When we were lost in chaos and rampage, you demanded rule of law. When we uphold law and order against violence, you call it violating human rights. When we were silent, you said you wanted us to have free speech. When we are silent no more, you say we are brainwashed and xenophobic. Why do you hate us so much, we asked. No, you answered, we don’t hate you. We don’t hate you either, But, do you understand us? Of course we do, you said, We have AFP, CNN and BBC. What do you really want from us? Think hard first, then answer . . . Because you only get so many chances. Enough is Enough, Enough Hypocrisy for This One World. We want One World, One Dream, and Peace on Earth. This Big Blue Earth is Big Enough for all of Us.
This expression of Chinese complaints about how they and their country were misunderstood has some reasonable points. However, it presents China
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as faultless and accepts no responsibility for any of the reasons for which it is criticized. It ends with the complaint that the West does not understand China because of the bias of the Western media, as was evident, at least to most Chinese, in Western coverage of the events in Tibet. Chinese media bias and outright fabrication was not similarly obvious, however, even though all Chinese knew that their media was not to be trusted. The appeal to the West to accept that China just wants to be loved and accepted by the world, as its hosting of the Olympics and the “One World, One Dream” slogan demonstrated, betrayed an ignorance of how China is regarded in the world. Even though most Chinese may know that their system of government is illegitimate and unjust, they do not want outsiders to criticize them on that basis. In regard to Tibet, however, it is not just that they do not want to be criticized on a very sensitive issue with colonialist implications, but that they are so defensive that they are willing to suspend the usual disbelief in their government’s propaganda and to accept that their country has been faultless in its policy in Tibet. Not only is China regarded as faultless, but it is actually deserving of praise for all that has been done to elevate the Tibetans to some semblance of civilization. In this narrative, Tibetans are regarded as primitives gratefully accepting the gift of civilization from their liberators. When some Tibetans reveal a lack of gratitude, it upsets this Chinese narrative and poses an existential threat to the Chinese people’s conception of themselves. Thus the Chinese reaction to criticism about Tibet from Tibetans or foreigners is one of indignant outrage at this perversion of what every Chinese has been taught to believe about China’s role in Tibet. The Chinese narrative about how much China has helped the poor oppressed Tibetans is meant to deny that Tibetans have the ability to help themselves. Tibetans are portrayed as primitive natives who cannot rule themselves without intolerable exploitation and therefore have to be ruled by their more advanced Chinese brothers. The Chinese attitude in regard to Tibet and Tibetans is so typically colonialist as to be obvious to anyone, except to the Chinese themselves, who perhaps are so defensive because they are also aware of their vulnerability on this charge. The outrage and injustice of Tibet is not the willful ignorance of the “truth” of Tibet by the outside world but the willful ignorance of the Chinese people. The Chinese certainty that they know the reality and the truth about Tibet is contradicted by the nature of their own political system, in which the government tells the people what they are to believe and gives them great incentives to conform along with ominous disincentives for dissent. Many Chinese may know Tibetans who have told them that they are eternally grateful for China’s liberation from the barbarism of old Tibet where Tibetans exploited each other, but they do not acknowledge the Chinese political system’s penalties for any contrary opinions. Even Chinese who have worked in Tibet are
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unaware of Tibetans’ real feelings because no Tibetan is so foolish to tell any Chinese what he really believes. Both the Chinese government and many Chinese people claim that foreigners do not know the reality of Tibet because they have never been there. But even Chinese who have been there for many years are more willfully ignorant of the reality of Tibet than the most superficially aware foreigner. Any foreigner who has been to Tibet is immediately aware of the fundamental injustice of Chinese rule over Tibetans. Anyone who delves deeper into the history of Chinese rule over Tibet discovers how China’s claim to Tibet has resulted in the tragedy of oppression of Tibetan resistance, destruction of Tibetan culture, and denial of Tibetans’ right to rule themselves. The Chinese denial of the reality of Tibet reveals much about the nature of Chinese culture, China’s political system, and its nationalism fostered and exploited by that system. Chinese culture is traditionally assimilative and therefore considers the assimilation of Tibet natural and inevitable as well as progressive and beneficial to Tibetans. The current Chinese political system, with its control of all information, is able to perpetrate to the Chinese people the myth of their benevolent assistance to the formerly benighted Tibetans. Chinese nationalism reflects the conformity of traditional Chinese culture as well as the animosity and defensiveness inculcated by the narrative about China’s humiliation by foreigners. Many Chinese react to any criticism as more evidence of this attempt by foreigners to humiliate and denigrate China. Since Tiananmen, many Chinese have been convinced by “patriotic education” that all criticisms of China are unfounded and have ulterior motives. Given this defensiveness, there is no dialogue about almost any issue, much less so sensitive an issue as Tibet. China’s memory of the “hundred years of national humiliation” is a fundamental component of its modern nationalism. The emphasis on this memory has political as well as psychological reasons. The political reason is due to the CCP’s exploitation of this issue to arouse Chinese nationalism and support for itself in the absence of any remaining belief in Communist ideology. The psychological reason has to do with the nature of China’s conception of itself. Imagining itself the Central Kingdom (not Middle Kingdom, which implies comparable kingdoms elsewhere) and the epitome of world civilization, China was shocked at the superiority of Western countries, at least in the technological sense, it encountered in the nineteenth century. Western countries’ ability to dominate China was a major shock to China’s image of itself as superior in all ways. Even though China was not actually colonized, it has a greater victim mentality than some countries that were colonized because of China’s exaggerated image of itself. India, which was colonized for far more than the hundred years about which China complains, has no similar modern
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sense of victimization. China’s victimization mentality is a raw wound to the Chinese solely because of their opinion that they were unfairly deprived of their rightful place in the world. China blames foreign imperialism for keeping it from maintaining its position as the epitome of world culture. China blames foreign interference and exploitation for keeping China from developing economically and technologically. However, it was not the West that left China vulnerable to Western technological superiority. And it was not the West that kept China from developing. It was Chinese culture and its political system that kept it stagnant and made it vulnerable to foreign imperialism. China’s exploitation by foreign countries has become an excuse for its failure to live up to its image of itself. It is much easier to blame outsiders for everything rather than taking any responsibility for China’s own failures. It is more convenient for the CCP to ascribe foreign criticism about Tibet to “anti-China” motives rather than taking any responsibility for the failure of its own ambitions and policies there. Most Chinese are much more likely to ascribe foreign criticism about Tibet to foreigners’ anti-China sentiments than to any fault of China. Their absolute certainty that they know the truth about Tibet, while non-Chinese do not, is due more to their traditional sense of cultural superiority than to any actual knowledge. Their outrage at being criticized and humiliated in regard to Tibet is due to that sense of superiority being challenged, as in the past, by those same foreign countries. And, ultimately, the Chinese and the CCP are super-sensitive to the accusation that they are colonialists in Tibet. It is in order to invalidate this charge that China must deny that Tibet was ever independent; it must rewrite Tibetan history to eliminate the separate Tibetan national identity on which a claim for national self-determination might be based. The popular and official Chinese response to the Tibetan uprising of 2008 revealed the ominous nature of modern Chinese nationalism. The Chinese people and their government are proud of their culture, but at the same time insecure about their own history, about why Chinese culture and political system kept the country from developing, about the nature of the current political system, and about why China is so criticized in the world. This cultural arrogance and superiority, combined with insecurity and a sense of inferiority based on China’s treatment in the past, leads to an extreme sensitivity about China’s reputation and an intolerance of most foreign criticism. Any evidence of what is seen as condescension toward or unjust criticism of China evokes the memory in the Chinese of their victimization by foreigners. Their reaction is typically angry and defensive to an astonishing degree. Chinese nationalism is also, of course, like any nationalism, defensive simply for reasons of group identity and solidarity.
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The reaction of overseas Chinese to what they regarded as insults to their pride and China’s reputation during the Olympic torch relay was an ominous and frightening display of the irrationality, intolerance, and threat of Chinese nationalism when it is aroused. The sort of aggrieved nationalistic defensiveness that was on display in the popular Chinese reaction to criticism about Tibet reveals much about China itself. The overseas Chinese did not regard the issue as being about Tibet at all. All they could see was an intentional insult to China, based on nothing but an anti-China bias, which evoked a finely cultivated sensitivity about their country’s victimization in the past. It was ominous to see how intolerant of contrary opinions, how arrogant even in its ignorance and how threatening and frightening in its aggressiveness Chinese nationalism could be. This display of mindless Chinese nationalism, while claiming the utmost rationality, was a frightening prospect not only for those who hope that China might someday treat Tibetans a bit better, but for any who hope that China might play a nonconfrontational, cooperative role in the world.
China’s New Diplomatic Offensive The CCP apparently convinced itself that its citizens’ counterdemonstrations at the Olympic torch relays in several countries impressed the world with the righteousness of China’s position on the Tibet issue. China defused the threats of several world leaders to boycott the Olympic opening ceremonies by pretending to dialogue with the Dalai Lama’s representatives. And it gained international sympathy after the Sichuan earthquake, which it exploited to the maximum extent. China believes that its successful Olympics marked its emergence onto the world stage as a new economic and political power. Its post-Olympics attitude quickly changed to one of scornful rejection of dialogue with the Dalai Lama. China seems to be determined to never again be embarrassed by the Tibet issue. China now feels that it is in a position to coerce conformity from other countries to China’s position on Tibet. China’s current policy on Tibet, as invariably expressed by its officials and spokespersons, is that Tibet is not an issue of “human rights, ethnicity or religion,” but rather a fundamental issue of China’s sovereignty over Tibet. What this means is that China does not believe that the Dalai Lama has really given up independence. The Dalai Lama’s Middle Way policy, by accepting Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, assumes that other issues of Tibetan autonomy, like human rights, ethnicity, and religion, can then be discussed. However, the Chinese maintain that the Dalai Lama really wants independence or “semiindependence” or “independence in disguise.” His proposal for “genuine
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autonomy” and a “greater Tibetan autonomous region” are the means by which he would deny Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and eventually seek Tibetan independence under the principle of national self-determination. China says that Tibetans already have autonomy based on their ethnicity and they have human rights and freedom of religion; therefore, these are not subjects for discussion. These issues have already been resolved by Tibet’s “liberation” and “democratic reforms.” What the Dalai Lama really wants is the restoration of the feudal serf system and his own rule. China’s policy reveals that it does not want any real autonomy in Tibet, under the Dalai Lama or not. China does not want to allow the survival of Tibetan culture and national identity, on which Tibetan separatism is based. China’s experience has been that whenever it has allowed even minimal autonomy it has led to a revival of Tibetan separatism. China believes that its retrenchment policy in 1957 led to the 1959 revolt and its liberalization during the 1980s led to the riots of 1987–1989. In contrast to foreign critics who wonder why China does not realize that autonomy is in China’s best interest, China knows that autonomy is not in its best interest. China is lectured by its critics that only autonomy can create real stability in Tibet, but China knows that autonomy only creates instability and therefore cannot be allowed. Chinese leaders know that they cannot allow the existence of a separate national entity within China’s national territory. The solution to the Tibet issue from the Chinese point of view is not autonomy but economic development, colonization, and assimilation. China clearly imagines that it won the propaganda battle about Tibet that began in March and it has since begun an unprecedented diplomatic offensive. This offensive is based on the belief that Western countries do not really care about Tibet and are only exploiting a nonexistent issue in order to denigrate China and prevent its rise to its rightful status as a great world power. China believes that Western countries will not jeopardize their diplomatic and economic relations with China for the sake of Tibet. Tibet has always been an issue of extreme sensitivity for China, perhaps even more sensitive than Taiwan because it involves the question of Chinese rule over a non-Chinese people. In the past, China has often imagined that the Tibet issue was resolved and has reacted with surprise when Tibetans reveal that they are still not reconciled to Chinese rule and that they still revere the Dalai Lama. They were surprised again in 2008. The difference this time is that China feels it has the economic and political clout to mount an offensive of its own sufficient to coerce international acceptance of its position on Tibet. China has always reacted strongly to the Dalai Lama’s international travels and world leaders’ meetings with him. However, it has typically confined its reaction to angry statements about “hurting the feelings of the Chinese people,” but has not allowed any such incidents to damage its relations with other
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countries. This situation began to change in 2007 when several important countries’ leaders, including those of Austria, Germany, Australia, Canada, and the United States met with him officially for the first time. In the United States he was awarded the Congressional Gold Medal and in Canada he was made an honorary citizen. China singled out Germany, whose chancellor, Angela Merkel, was the first leader of an important country to meet officially with him, for economic pressure and demanded that Germany apologize in order to restore good relations. Germany had to send several delegations to China before China was mollified. France was the next subject of China’s ire after French president Sarkozy threatened to boycott the Olympic opening and Paris was the site of one of the worst protests against the Olympic torch. Sarkozy declined to meet with the Dalai Lama in August when the Dalai Lama was in France, but he promised to do so in December at a meeting of Nobel Prize winners in Poland. Sarkozy perhaps thought a meeting in another country on the sidelines of a meeting with a different purpose might not be too offensive to the Chinese. However, China reacted in an unprecedented manner, canceling an already scheduled and important economic summit with European leaders. China’s cancellation of the European meeting may in the future be seen to have been the first move in its new offensive on Tibet. Before Sarkozy met with the Dalai Lama, China published a flurry of explanations for its “principled stand” on its “core interests” in regard to Tibet. The tone of these preliminary articles was the expectation that China’s cancellation of the economic summit meeting and other threats would coerce Sarkozy to cancel his scheduled meeting with the Dalai Lama. China’s position was that it was Sarkozy, not China, who was being unreasonable and it was he who had sabotaged the economic summit meeting: To safeguard China-France and China-EU relations, the Chinese side has repeatedly and patiently stated that it hoped the French side would appropriately handle Tibet-related issues to prevent obstructing the China-EU leaders’ meeting. But the French side has stubbornly held to a wrong stand and created obstacles to the leaders’ meeting. . . . For this reason, the Chinese side had to make the necessary response and announce the decision to postpone the meeting. The Chinese government and people are always reasonable and can take the overall situation into account. But on issues of major principle involving the country’s core interests, there can be no double standards. We resolutely oppose the Dalai’s activities to split China and also resolutely oppose any foreign governments and leaders’ contacts with the Dalai in any form. As China’s comprehensive strategic partner, France should play a role in its relations with China. Clear-sighted people will understand that the responsibility for the emergence of the current situation does not lie with the Chinese side.40
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Once Sarkozy went ahead with the meeting, China threatened that relations with France would be damaged as a result. Xinhua said that Sarkozy had ignored China’s “repeated and patient work and solemn representations on many occasions” and had “obstinately” met with the Dalai Lama. This was “extremely unwise and has seriously hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and impaired China-France relations.”41 Renmin Ribao opined: Political figures like Sarkozy in the West will never understand the sensitivity of the Tibet issue, nor can they understand why China opposes any forms of separatist activities by the Dalai Lama in any countries. China also opposes any foreign leader’s contact with the ousted Tibetan spiritual leader. Regardless of Beijing’s strong protest, Sarkozy stubbornly carried out the meeting, in a move that was thought to be provocative and dangerous. He must pay for it.42
China rejected French explanations that the meeting was not intended to harm relations with China and said that the responsibility to repair relations lay entirely with France. In response to a question, the Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson said: “The French leader’s insistence on meeting with the Dalai constitutes interference in China’s internal affairs and has hurt China’s core interests. France should fully recognize the gravity of the current problems, face China’s concerns squarely, and take effective measures to create conditions for the healthy and stable development of its relations with China.”43 A Chinese expert on European affairs opined that, in the future, “the issue of Tibet in Sino-European relations may become as important as that of Taiwan in Sino-US relations.” He also thought that Sarkozy was “not fully aware of China’s core interests, and it is very likely that he underestimated China’s reaction.” He recommended that France could restore relations only by apologizing, as Germany had done when its chancellor had offended China by meeting with the Dalai Lama.44 Another expert said that Tibet was being used as a bargaining chip to play against China: The Tibet issue is an issue of sovereignty and territorial integrity for China and bears on the country’s core interests. Since Ma Ying-jeou took office in Taiwan in May, relations across the Taiwan Straits have improved. The Taiwan question has been marginalized and is no longer an effective tool for Western countries to contain China. In this context, they have resorted to the Tibet issue, and meeting the Dalai Lama is the most direct way of using the Tibet issue to hedge against China. France is not alone. German leader Angela Merkel also met with the Dalai Lama before.45
At the end of March 2009, Chinese spokespersons were still demanding that France must make some “substantial concession” to repair relations.46 China’s president, Hu Jintao, finally met with French president Sarkozy in
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early April at the G-20 Economic Summit in London after France issued a joint communiqué with China clarifying the French position on Tibet. France satisfied the Chinese by declaring (according to the English translation published in Xinhua): France fully recognizes the importance and sensitivity of the Tibet issue and reaffirms its adherence to the one-China policy and the position that Tibet is an integral part of the Chinese territory, in accordance with the decision made by General Charles de Gaulle, which has not changed and will remain unchanged. Based on this spirit and the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, France refuses to support any form of “Tibet independence.”47
No doubt it was Xinhua that added the quotes around the words “Tibet independence.” In this version, France declared Tibet an “integral” part of China, whereas later Xinhua versions for its domestic readers translated this as “inalienable” and “inseparable.”48 The Chinese Foreign Minister said that “France has made a solemn commitment that France will uphold One-China policy and Tibet is an inalienable part of China. France refuses to support Tibet independence at any point.” In response to a question about what France meant by saying it would not support “any form” of Tibetan independence, whether this meant that French officials would not meet with the Dalai Lama, the Foreign Minister replied: China has a clear and consistent position on Tibetan issues. We oppose Dalai Lama’s separatist activities outside China by any pretext, any form, and we oppose any officials of foreign government meeting with Dalai Lama and we firmly oppose any country interfering in China’s internal affairs by using Dalai issue. China and France have released a joint communiqué and France has made solemn commitment in this communiqué; the description and content of their commitment is clear. We hope France can abide by principles and spirit of this communiqué and work together with China to maintain healthy development of China-France relations.49
While stopping short of confirming that China expected that French officials would no longer meet with the Dalai Lama for the sake of good relations with China, there was at least an implication that this was the Chinese expectation. Sarkozy denied that there was any private understanding that he would not meet with the Dalai Lama in the future.50 However, only time would tell if Sarkozy would again dare to jeopardize relations with China by meeting with the Dalai Lama. France and all other European countries had learned that the price for meeting with the Dalai Lama would be months of damaged relations with China, including economic sanctions, that would be repaired only by apologies for having “hurt China’s feelings.”
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China was satisfied that it had forced France to back down and essentially apologize for having unilaterally damaged relations with China. At the G-20 Summit, Hu Jintao met with French president Sarkozy and said that he appreciated France’s move to repair relations. Hu also met with U.S. president Obama and managed to secure a statement (according to Xinhua) that “Tibet is a part of China and the United States will not support Tibetan independence.”51 A commentary in China Daily said that it hoped that France and other countries would really respect China’s sensitivities in regard to Tibet: Many in this country were outraged by the farce surrounding the Dalai Lama. To most people here, the globe-trotting monk is not the respectable religious figure he is in Western eyes. Instead of seeking peace, he incites hatred among our people, and between the people and the government. That is why the Chinese insist that any endorsement of the Dalai Lama threatens our fundamental national interest. The French reiterated its commitment to “one China,” saying Tibet is an inalienable part of it. This is China’s diplomatic bottom line. But there’s a lot more that needs clarifying. The French say they are “fully aware of” the weight of the Tibet issue on Chinese minds. We hope they really are. The two parties pledged to enhance their all-round strategic partnership. We appreciate the shared willingness displayed here. Yet it is not merely a matter of rhetoric. As the past rapport between the two countries demonstrates, both countries have to be sensitive to each other’s concerns.52
The comment about the Dalai Lama “inciting hatred” among the Chinese people is the usual Chinese denunciation of any Tibetan resistance to Chinese control over Tibet or any criticism of Chinese policies there for “harming national unity” or “harming the relations between nationalities.” Another China Daily article said that the global financial crisis was a vital factor behind Sarkozy’s pledge not to support “Tibet independence.” China’s cancellation of the economic summit in November after Sarkozy met with the Dalai Lama had “cost the Europeans up to 10 billion Euros because Premier Wen Jiabao had planned to lead a 150-strong delegation to buy goods from Europe.” Since then, “the Sarkozy administration has enhanced its understanding of the Chinese government and its core interests.” The previous difference between the two sides was that “while the Tibet affair is seen by China as a sovereignty issue, it is addressed by France as a human rights and religious matter.” But now, France had come to understand that it is a core interest for China, involving territorial sovereignty, which made it “indisputable for China as a sovereign state.” This concession on the part of France had “marked the failure of Sarkozy’s use of the Tibet card,” which he had hoped to use as leverage against China for economic gains.53 China used the “Sarkozy affair” to lay down a new “red line” in behavior that European countries must not cross. All countries were put on notice
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that the Tibet issue was one of China’s “core interests.” It, like Taiwan, was an issue of sovereignty about which China would not compromise. Taiwan not currently being a subject of contention, China was willing to make Tibet a more prominent issue than ever before in its foreign relations. Tibetans and their Western supporters may have thought that the 2008 uprising put them on the offensive. But China’s belief that it won the subsequent propaganda battle and that its successful Olympics marked its emergence onto the world stage as a new economic and political power convinced the Chinese leaders that they could take a more aggressive position on Tibet. China now seems to be intent on demanding that other countries adhere to its position on Tibet at the risk of damaging their good relations with China. Renmin Ribao said as much: “If one truly desires to have friendly relations with China, then one must clearly acknowledge that Tibet is an inseparable part of China, and fundamentally revise one’s mistaken knowledge about Tibet.” China thus insists that not only must other countries and people not criticize it about Tibet but they must actually revise their thinking about the issue. This is very typical of the Chinese political and cultural mentality. It reflects an ideology of mind control or thought control that is a characteristic of Chinese political history and a specialty of Communist doctrine. China demands that Western countries should stop their campaign to damage China’s reputation in regard to Tibet: Tibet is an inseparable part of China. This is an indisputable historical fact and the collective understanding of all the sons and daughters of China, including the Tibetan compatriots. But certain people in the West can never bring themselves to accept this basic fact. . . . With China’s status rising on the world stage and contacts deepening with the rest of the world, Western ideas about Tibet are also changing. . . . As lies supporting Tibet separatism become less influential, China’s standpoint has gained extensive understanding and backing. . . . In recent years, more and more foreigners have come to China and visited the sacred Tibetan plateau. They have beheld the joyous and peaceful life of the Tibetan people, as well as the booming economy there. This has helped them form a deeper understanding of the Chinese government’s position.
China’s recent propaganda indicates that it will require conformity to China’s view on Tibet as a price for good relations and it will use its political and economic power to enforce this demand. The Renmin Ribao article revealed China’s strategy to coerce conformity in regard to Tibet: The facts show that the only way to make a correct choice that accords with the current of the times is to thoroughly revise mistaken knowledge about Tibet. In the end, revising mistaken knowledge regarding Tibet means a renewed knowledge of China’s questions, and of the question of how to deal with a China that
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is currently undergoing a great renaissance. Therefore, it is a question that is related to world peace and world development. China’s relations with the world have already undergone historic changes. Today, China’s development cannot be separated from the world, and the countries of the world must deepen their contacts and cooperation with China. It is impossible for any Western country not to have contacts with China. As there is a need for common development, mutual understanding must be deepened, and old, wrong viewpoints must be revised. Without a correct understanding of the Tibet question, without firmly establishing the viewpoint that Tibet is an inseparable part of China, it is impossible to advance cooperation with China in a sincere manner.54
China now feels that it is in a position to demand international conformity to its version of the reality of Tibet, much like the ideological conformity the CCP demands of all Chinese and like China’s coercion of almost all countries in the world to adhere to its “One China” policy in regard to Taiwan. China interprets the “One China” policy to also apply to Tibet and demands statements of recognition that Tibet is an inseparable part of China as the price for good relations. China was successful in its campaign to coerce conformity to its “One China” policy, often from countries for which this policy had little or no meaning. Now, it clearly imagines that this is also the solution to the Tibet issue, an issue the existence of which it denies except as invented and exploited by “hostile Western forces.” China believes that its international critics have no real interest in Tibet and will abandon the issue if the alternative is bad relations with China. One can expect a new round of statements coerced by China from every country in the world that they recognize Chinese sovereignty over Tibet and reject Tibetan separatism. China will also try to prevent visits or high-level official meetings with the Dalai Lama. A China Daily article called on China to develop its own diplomatic doctrine. The “China Doctrine” would make clear to the world that China claims the right to have its own say in the international community. The world should be made clear on what are China’s core interests and bottom lines. The article said that the world did not yet understand that Tibet was one of China’s core interests. It quoted Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s statement that China would make it a core interest that other countries not interfere in China’s internal affairs by entertaining the Dalai Lama. Yang urged the international community “to not allow the Dalai Lama to visit their countries” and “to not allow him to use their territories to separate Tibet from China.” Refusing visitations by the Dalai Lama should become one of the “basic norms of international relations” of any country cultivating ties with China, Yang said. Clearly, China Daily said, the foreign minister was “erecting a post” to delineate its bottom line on Tibet, part of its diplomatic doctrine.55
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Another article in the Chinese press was titled, “Westerners Must Change Their Erroneous Cognition of Tibet!” The error of Westerners’ cognition of Tibet was that they thought of Tibet and China as two countries, rather than as two ethnic groups of one country, and they thought the Tibet issue a convenient card to play for containing the rise of China. The Western perception of Tibet arose from their own countries’ colonialist history in Tibet, from the time when the British Empire regarded Tibet as a potential colony. The erroneous Western cognition of Tibet may have been impossible to eradicate in the past, “but at present, this may not necessarily be impossible.” The difference was that in the past “contacts between China and the West were few. It was not necessary for Westerners to understand China and Tibet, and China did not have sufficient strength to urge Westerners to change their views.” Now, however, the West needed to understand the Tibet issue because, “With increasing exchanges between the two sides and with the continuous development of China, the historical biases and ignorance shown by the West on the ‘Tibet issue’ have become the ‘fuse’ that constantly touches off conflicts. Therefore, in the past year or two, the contention between China and the West on issues involving Tibet has become fiercer and fiercer.” Because the Tibet issue had become more prominent, more Westerners had come “to understand the seriousness of the issue and, at the same time, to begin to doubt their cognition of Tibet.” Many Chinese and Western scholars had begun to “proceed from history, culture, religion, philosophy” to understand the root cause of the erroneous cognition of Westerners: Gaining a fresh understanding of the so-called “Tibet issue,” fundamentally changing the historical cognition of Tibet, and establishing in the depth of one’s heart that Tibet is an inalienable party of China’s territory have already become an issue that any Western country wishing to have normal exchanges with China must resolve, and have become a compulsory course and basic course for Westerners who want to understand China. Whether or not there is a clear understanding of this issue and whether or not this course is properly studied will have a direct bearing on whether or not relations with China can be properly handled.56
A further article warned that Chinese public opinion would henceforth play a greater role in the international perception of the Tibet issue. Western politicians had long used “so-called public opinion” to exert pressure on China. Now, however, with the increase in the number of Chinese Internet users, “the political game played by these ill-conceived politicians could no longer continue.” China had surpassed the United States to become the country with the largest number of Internet users: “Via the Internet, an increasing
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number of Chinese people have expressed disappointment toward the West and shown their disgust for the support afforded to the Dalai Lama’s separatist activities.” China had developed “a 300 million-strong army of netizens,” who had changed China’s political landscape: Thus, any talks about the Tibet issue should take their opinions into full consideration. It is expected that any Western succor for the Dalai Lama will not only encounter opposition from the Chinese government, but will also run into resistance from the country’s public opinion. Western strategists should acknowledge China’s peaceful rise as a world power as irresistible and adapt to this geopolitical trend. Any attempt to block China’s peaceful development by playing the Tibet card is a miscalculation.57
China also planned to use its overseas “people power” in the campaign to isolate the Dalai Lama, as was evident in a news item from New Zealand, which said that some twenty-eight organizations of Chinese living in New Zealand had banded together to form a “United Chinese Association of New Zealand” to lobby against a scheduled visit by the Dalai Lama in December 2009.58 The plan to use overseas Chinese in this way was obviously because of their success in countering the Olympic torch protests. Overseas Chinese in many countries would undoubtedly organize in order to lobby on the Tibet issue, encouraged and facilitated by Chinese embassies. The strategy of using the democratic process in Western countries had previously been the key to overseas Tibetans’ success; now, China planned to use the same strategy. This could be a significant factor in countries where there are large Chinese communities, including the United States, Canada, Britain, Australia, and others. China’s Tibet propaganda offensive continued with a North American tour by four Tibetan “living Buddhas” all of whom were National People’s Congress delegates. They held invitation-only press conferences in Washington and New York and met with any government officials willing to receive them. The head of the delegation was quoted as saying that a U.S. Congressional resolution had “hurt the feelings of the Tibetan people.” The resolution, passed on 11 March 2009, had called on China to end the repression of the Tibetan people.59 This delegation was quickly followed by another of Chinese “experts” on Tibet. The sending of endless delegations to other countries to explain China’s policy on Tibet, begun with the visits of the officials in charge of dialogue with the Dalai Lama’s representatives after the last round of dialogue in November, was clearly to be a part of the new diplomatic offensive. China’s new diplomatic/propaganda offensive included plans to launch its own international TV news channel to challenge CNN, BBC, al Jazeera, and other international broadcasters. The Chinese government was reported to
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have set aside more than US$6 billion to launch the TV station, to nearly double the number of Xinhua’s foreign bureaus, and to upgrade People’s Daily. The plan was intended to improve China’s image in the world, which was said to be incommensurate with its new status, and to counter the monopoly of information provided by Western news sources. Chinese commentators admitted that China’s current media was too “unbalanced” and was considered propaganda, but the new international media would be more “objective.” The TV news outlet would be based somewhere outside China, and private investors would be sought. However, a statement by the CCP’s top ideology official, Li Changchun, indicated that Party control of the news was still the goal: “We must enhance our consciousness of politics . . . firmly establishing the Marxist view of journalism, constantly improving our capacity to correctly guide public opinion,” he said.60 China’s new media offensive was based on the idea that there was an opportunity for China to increase its “soft power” because of the decline of the Western economic model and the ascendance of the “China model.” One scholar said that the success of the China model had “saved the world socialist movement.” Another thought the China model would be more appealing to other countries because of its “wholesome sense of peace and harmony.”61 China would have another advantage in that its international media would have an unlimited government budget while Western media were all suffering financial difficulties. China also attempted to project its soft power by promoting its ancient, if not modern, cultural heritage. Since 2004 it had opened 238 “Confucius Institutes” in 69 countries.62 The Chinese cultural centers were most popular for their Chinese language classes. However, as was the case with Chinese media, its cultural institutes were agents of the government and were intended to promote the CCP’s ideologies. China’s disadvantage was that all its media were seen as being governmentcontrolled; therefore, as propaganda mouthpieces. Suggestions to remedy this problem by having “autonomous” organizations or persons provide media content were contradicted by the CCP’s intolerance of any autonomous voices of any kind. Chinese commentators also noted the lack of any Chinese with an international cultural personality comparable to the Dalai Lama. The reason for China’s lack of any independent cultural personalities also lay with its political system. One Chinese media expert cited the Dalai Lama’s use of “universal values,” such as human rights, democracy, and freedom to promote his cause. China’s response should be to “use specific examples to explain the situation in Tibet.” What this meant was that China should counteract the argument about the fundamental injustice of Chinese policies in Tibet with “specific examples” of the horrors of Tibet’s feudal past and the Dalai Lama’s role as the number one serf-owner.63
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China’s new diplomatic offensive on Tibet might have some success, given China’s increased economic power and its coercive style in international relations. Or, Chinese leaders may have overestimated their persuasive power, as they are wont to do. One predictable result of China’s elevating the Tibet issue to new prominence will be that the issue will indeed be the subject of more international attention. If China insists that Tibet is more important than anyone knew, then it will become a more important factor in international relations. China will try to impress other countries that Tibet is a “core issue” about which China is willing to demand conformity from other countries, who will then realize that the Tibet issue is indeed more significant than they imagined. Tibetans and their supporters have long thought that their issue should receive more international attention. Now, China’s diplomatic offensive about Tibet may arouse that level of attention. China’s policy on Tibet, its intransigence about dialogue or allowing any autonomy, and its willingness to elevate the issue to the highest level in its international relations, all reveal its extreme sensitivity about Tibet. China undoubtedly underestimated the ease with which it would be able to annex Tibet, incorporate it politically, and assimilate it culturally. Much of this has to do with China’s underestimation of what Tibet was, how distinct it was from China in culture and in national identity. Given that most Chinese had no conception of Tibetan culture, and they imagined that Tibet was already a part of China, they were easily convinced that Tibetan resistance was due to foreign imperialism rather than flaws in their government’s policies or Tibetans’ natural resistance to foreign rule. China’s misconceptions and miscalculations about Tibet have led to its current sensitivity. The CCP defined itself by its anticolonialist ideology and history, yet it is accused of colonialism in Tibet. The Chinese people have been told how much they have helped the poor helpless Tibetans; nevertheless, they are accused of oppressing them. Perhaps the greatest source of China’s sensitivity about Tibet is due to its own victim mentality promoted by endless propaganda about China’s humiliation at the hands of foreign imperialists. China’s sense of cultural superiority and arrogant but still insecure nationalism has left it with no ability to admit its own faults and, therefore, no ability to correct them. In regard to Tibet, China’s sense of cultural superiority was so immense that it had no comprehension of why Tibetans would resist the “gift” of Chinese and socialist culture. This attitude is evident from the past when conquered frontier tribes would be “allowed” to accept Chinese culture after a suitable period of political assimilation. Tibet was slated to receive this same “award” once political integration was achieved. Promises of cultural autonomy were nothing more than facilitators of the ultimate goal. Autonomy in Marxist-Leninist and CCP ideology was never considered to be
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a permanent condition; it was always considered a temporary expedient until assimilation could be achieved. In the early 1950s Mao openly proposed a mutually advantageous “bargain” to delegations of Tibetans, including the Dalai Lama and Panchen Lama. Because Tibet had too much space without enough people, while China had too little space and too many people, a mutually beneficial exchange could be made. Mao proposed that it would be mutually advantageous for Tibet to provide China with its territory and natural resources while China would give Tibet its people. Tibet needed the Chinese people to help it develop, while China needed Tibet’s natural resources so that both China and Tibet could develop. Mao openly offered this “bargain” to Tibetan delegations in the 1950s without any apparent comprehension of why Tibetans would consider it disadvantageous to them. China has always been much more concerned with Tibetan territory than with the Tibetan people. China is far less concerned with the happiness of the Tibetans, who are only one-half of one percent of the population, than with Chinese control over the Tibetan Plateau, which is one-fourth of the territory of the PRC. Little has changed in China’s Tibet policy since Mao’s time. The fundamental issue was created by China’s overambitious attempt to annex Tibet. China found itself in the position of every colonialist country that imagined it would be greeted as a liberator but found itself regarded as a conqueror. China has reverted to the defensiveness typical of colonialists. China’s failed policies in Tibet have created ever more reasons for denial of any fault. China has to portray old Tibet as unimaginably evil in order to justify China’s own arrogant ambitions. China has to portray its repression of Tibetan nationalist resistance, its elimination of the traditional Tibetan government and exile of Tibet’s leader, and its exile, murder, and imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of Tibetans as an “emancipation of the serfs” that Tibetans will now be forced to celebrate. Having denied Tibet its right to national self-determination, China cannot allow any autonomy in Tibet out of fear that the self-determination issue might again arise. The official and popular Chinese conception of the reality of the Tibet issue is now so sensitive and so defensive that absolutely no admission of fault and no compromise are possible. The Chinese conception of Tibet and that of Tibetans is so contrary as to seem to be about different realities. Despite the Dalai Lama’s perpetual hopefulness that the Chinese people, if not their government, are becoming more sympathetic to Tibet, the reality of an almost total lack of Chinese sympathy for Tibetans was revealed by their reaction to the events of March 2008 and the international protests against the Olympic torch relay. Even were the Chinese government able to see the injustice of its role and its policies in Tibet, which is unlikely, it is unable to alter any of
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its policies out of fear of losing Tibet. Having denied any validity or value to Tibetan culture, China now has to crush that culture in order to protect its faulty assumptions and to preserve its conquest. The CCP considers its achievement of China’s perpetual ambition to impose its sovereignty over Tibet as one of its greatest victories. It is not about to jeopardize that victory by limiting Chinese sovereignty in any way or even by admitting any questions about how that sovereignty was achieved or has been maintained. Having claimed that Tibet has “always” been a part of China, China has to eliminate the evidence that Tibet was ever independent or has any right to independence based on a separate national identity. China has to rewrite the history of Tibet to make it a part of China and it has to eliminate Tibetan national identity so that Tibet might never be able to claim the right to national self-determination. In order to eliminate any history of Tibetan independence, Chinese propagandists have recently claimed that Tibet was part of China even before being officially incorporated during the Yuan Dynasty. Tibet Daily claimed that what was meant by Tibet having been apart of China “since ancient times” did not mean “since the Yuan Dynasty,” rather it meant “since there were human activities.” Tibet has been part of the history of China, its borders, and its ethnic groups, and it has never been a part of the history of any foreign country. Like Han and other ethnicities, Tibet ethnicity is also a creator of Chinese history. . . . By the time the Tibetan ethnic group was formed, close ties between its ancestors and those of the Han had already existed in all aspects such as nationality, blood, and culture.64
This is an attempt to rewrite Tibetan history to eliminate any evidence of Tibet ever having been separate from China. Even China’s own claim that Tibet became a part of China during the Yuan Dynasty is not enough to eliminate all evidence of Tibet ever having been independent of China. If Tibet were ever independent in the past, then it might be independent again. If Tibet ever had an independent national identity, then Tibetans might claim the right to national self-determination. Similarly, in order to justify China’s “liberation” of Tibet in 1950–1951, the history of Tibet before that liberation has to be rewritten to make Tibet unworthy of independence. Old Tibet has to be denigrated to such an extent that Tibetans’ right to rule themselves is invalidated. This need to rewrite the history of Tibet to justify China’s right to rule over Tibet has compounded Tibet’s tragedy. Tibet must not only suffer the loss of its independence and the denial of its right to self-determination but it must suffer the loss of its history as well. China has to eradicate Tibet’s history as a national entity separate from China in order to eradicate Tibet itself. China has to alter Tibet’s history to the extent that China’s elimination of
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the Tibetan nation is seen as justified. In order to deny Tibetan independence, China has to eradicate any evidence that Tibetans have any right or even any need for independence or even an independent national identity. The essence of the Chinese demand that the outside world change its perception of the Tibet issue is the contention that Tibet is a territory, not a colony, of China. China wishes the world to see Tibet as China sees it, as a virtually unpopulated territory into which Chinese culture has naturally expanded, much like the Americans expanded to fill the continent and displaced the natives in the process. This might be considered tragic by some but no more so than the displacement of the Native Americans and many other examples. China may even claim to have treated the Tibetans better than the Americans did the Native Americans. China does not want the Tibet issue to be seen as a case of Chinese colonialism against a formerly separate nation or country. This is how many Tibetans and their supporters see the issue, as a case like that of overseas European colonialism, in which colonies are exploited for awhile but then regain their independence. China’s colonialism is of the “continental” type, which is more often successful in absorbing formerly independent territories and peoples than overseas colonialism. A colonizing power can more easily annex an adjacent territory than one territorially separated. China’s plan for Tibet is not just colonial exploitation, but permanent political annexation, administrative incorporation, and cultural and national assimilation. Marxism provided China with a “civilizing mission” ideology by redefining imperialism as the “liberation of the Tibetan serfs and slaves.” China’s need to justify its imperialism magnifies the tragedy of Tibet. Under Chinese rule Tibetans cannot even have any pride in their own history. In order to justify Chinese rule over Tibet, Tibetans have to be portrayed as so barbaric that they can be ruled only by other, more enlightened people. This is the typical sort of justification for colonialism, but even colonialism did not usually need to completely eradicate the history of the independent existence of those being colonized. In order to totally eradicate any possibility of Tibet’s future separate existence, China has to eradicate any evidence of its separate existence in the past. This is China’s goal. However, it is a goal that can be opposed. Tibetans may never be able to recover their independence, but they do not also have to lose their national history. China has now mounted an international campaign to eradicate Tibet’s existence even in history. However, this is one battle in which Tibetans can prevail. Tibetans do not have to accept China’s history of their country. Tibetans can exercise the right to write their own history and therefore preserve their national identity at least to this extent. China’s current diplomatic and propaganda campaign about Tibet reflects the need to eradicate Tibet’s independent existence and its right to an
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independent existence even in history. China’s new offensive on Tibet is born out of a sense of confidence in China and the CCP’s power and coercive ability, but also out of China’s incredible sensitivity and defensiveness about Tibet. International criticism of China about Tibet has not moved the Chinese to reconsider their role in Tibet or any of their policies there, but rather to increase the intensity of their diplomatic and propaganda offensive intended to eradicate the issue rather than resolve it. China has said clearly and bluntly that it will not dialogue with the Dalai Lama about Tibetan autonomy. China has resisted the offensive mounted by Tibetans and their supporters to convince it to dialogue with the Dalai Lama and has countered with its own offensive. Supporters of Tibet will have to go on the defensive to oppose China’s coercive strategy. Tibet’s supporters, including those in the United States, will have to contemplate a shift in their own strategy from the futile attempt to put pressure on China to dialogue to a defense against China’s new diplomatic offensive. China will try to coerce any and every country to deny the Dalai Lama’s visits or meetings with their leaders. China will go to unprecedented lengths to coerce all countries to adhere to its policy on Tibet. Tibetans will have to hold the line of their previous successes in having high-level meetings between the Dalai Lama and the leaders of important countries. The futile campaign to put international pressure on China to dialogue will no doubt continue, if only because Dharamsala sees no alternative to this strategy. But the best counterstrategy to China’s offensive is still the principle of self-determination. China can always counter arguments about autonomy by its claim that Tibetans already have autonomy. China has no fear of this argument. The only argument the Chinese really fear is about Tibetan self-determination. China’s current campaign to eradicate Tibetan history and national identity is so that Tibetans can never claim the right to self-determination. So fearful is China of the principle of self-determination that it has eradicated the term “national” in English translations of its policies, such as by substituting “regional ethnic autonomy” for the previous “national regional autonomy.” This is because international law supports the self-determination of nations but not of ethnic groups. (It may also be significant that “regional” now precedes “ethnic,” thus emphasizing the territorial rather than ethnic or national basis for autonomy.) Tibetans and their supporters should therefore cite this principle at every opportunity, but not in the way that Dharamsala has construed it, as essentially the same as the Middle Way policy. Self-determination does not mean a one-time choice for autonomy. Self-determination is a permanent right of any nation to choose its political status for itself at any time. The Chinese are quite clear on this definition of self-determination and this is why they consider it the most fundamental threat to Chinese rule over Tibet.
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Only time will tell if the uprising of 2008 was “Tibet’s Last Stand,” but China’s response reveals that it intends that it should be. The level of repression that China has applied within Tibet is clearly intended to crush all dissent while making no concessions to Tibetans’ sentiments. China has defined its problem in Tibet in terms of ideology rather than policy. China’s policy cannot and will not be changed; therefore, it is the ideology of its critics that must change. Within Tibet, China has applied its usual solution of more “patriotic education” and pressure for Tibetans to conform to China’s ideological demands. China also regards its international problem in regard to Tibet as primarily an ideological issue and has responded with an increased intensity of propaganda. China thinks its international critics do not really know the “truth” about Tibet and that their thinking can be reformed with more “objective” information. It thinks it can deal with international governmental criticism about Tibet with an intensified diplomatic and economic offensive. The premise of this offensive is that Western countries mistakenly think that Tibet is a human rights issue about which they can legitimately criticize China. This is based on the Dalai Lama’s Middle Way policy of acceptance of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, therefore theoretically making Tibet an issue of human rights for Tibetans within the PRC. However, China maintains that the Tibet issue is not about human rights, the Dalai Lama having not really given up independence. For China the Tibet issue is about China’s sovereignty over Tibet, which no country of the world challenges. Therefore, no country can legitimately challenge China about this “core issue” of its sovereignty. A recent article in Asia Times, by a Fudan University professor, Jian Junbo, suggests that China’s critics would have more success with less confrontational methods that allow China to “save face.” Citing the 10 March 2009 European Parliament resolution calling on the Chinese government to resume dialogue with the Dalai Lama about genuine autonomy for Tibet, the professor asked why the EU parliament would endorse such a resolution when it was sure to be rejected by China, “especially in the current economic climate, when the EU wants to build closer relations with China.” The EU’s mistake was to think that Tibet was a human rights issue, when for China it was an issue of sovereignty: “China views the Tibet issue in terms of sovereignty, so will never allow it to be internationalized. For China, ‘a sovereignty issue is not open to negotiation,’ as late paramount leader Deng Xiaoping once said.” The result of this confrontation over Tibet would be to “undermine the base of good bilateral relations.” A solution was suggested by the professor: A good way to ease tensions would be to set the Tibet issue aside from bilateral relations between China and the EU and its member states. To allow these strategic partnerships to be hijacked by the Tibet issue shows a lack of political
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wisdom and would jeopardize bilateral cooperation in such important areas as economy, technology and global affairs. It is unlikely the EU will change its strategy of value expansion, but this could take the form of more useful and reasonable approaches, such as informal talks. China will never accept formal dialogue with the EU and its members over the Tibet issue. . . . In short, the EU may need to find a more constructive approach toward the Tibet issue. The EU ought to respect Chinese sovereignty and stop trying to intervene in Tibet’s affairs through a unilateralist approach. Although China will reject formal talks with the EU on Tibet, it is likely to listen to its suggestions if the EU and its members can deal with the issue from a friendly and constructive approach that would not be considered as intervention in domestic affairs. Chinese people always hope their friends can save their “face.” A constructive rather than an unilateralist approach to deal with the Tibet issue and even other bilateral quarrels between these two powers is a better option for the European Union and its member countries, by doing this the EU could enhance its strategic partnership with China, a rising power in the world.65
This seems a perfectly reasonable suggestion, one very convenient for China and compatible with its policy on other issues about which China is typically criticized. China managed by means of intransigence and bullying to convince its international critics on human rights issues, including Tibet, to transfer their criticisms from international organizations like the United Nations to bilateral dialogues, which successfully submerged the issue without any positive result whatsoever. Most countries have simply given up trying to dialogue with China about human rights. China managed to transform the UN Commission on Human Rights, in which it was criticized by other countries and NGOs, into a Human Rights Council, which it packed with its authoritarian friends, and avoided any criticism altogether. The implication that China might be more conciliatory about Tibet if the dialogue became similarly private and nonconfrontational is not borne out by the results of the human rights dialogue. The professor’s suggestion is consistent with the PRC’s belief that all issues can be resolved by means of political coercion and ideological thought reform. China’s ideological coercion is the most ominous aspect of its diplomatic and propaganda offensive about Tibet and the one that Tibetans and their supporters can and should most resist. China would resolve the issue of Tibet by coercing all critics to repeat its own propaganda on the subject, which some have always been willing to do for the sake of economic benefits or due to ideological sympathy. Any question about human rights or selfdetermination issues in regard to Tibet would then be ideologically resolved in China’s favor. The history of Tibet would be China’s version of Tibetan history. The reality of Tibet would be whatever China says it is. This is the danger of China’s becoming a “stakeholder” in the world system only on its
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own terms. China, or at least China under the rule of the CCP, intends to transform the international law and diplomacy of the world to suit its own needs. The world that the PRC hopes to see would be one of a “harmonious society” within China imposed by means of one-party, nondemocratic, authoritarian rule, and a “harmonious world” internationally, in which harmony means no criticism of or opposition to China for its domestic or international policies. Neither Tibetans nor the world could prevent China from forcibly imposing its sovereignty over Tibet. Neither Tibetans nor the world may ever be able to make China give up its colonialist enterprise in Tibet or even alter its policies there for the sake of a semblance of Tibetan freedom or autonomy. But Tibetans and the world can prevent China’s rewriting of the history of Tibet in order to justify its crime of depriving Tibet of the right to national self-determination. Tibetans and the world may have to accept that China has conquered Tibet and will never voluntarily give it up. However, they do not have to accept China’s version of Tibet’s history before or after 1950. Tibetans do not have to accept that they are Chinese or that Tibet has “always” been a part of China. Tibetans do not have to accept that their history as an independent country never happened or that Tibetan society was a feudal “Hell on Earth.” Tibetans may have lost their rightful independence and they may be forever deprived of their right to national self-determination, but they retain the right to write their own history. Even China is unable to deny Tibetans that right. China may be able to coerce Tibetan “former serf” officials and “Tibetologists” to mouth Chinese propaganda, but it cannot force those in exile to do the same. The history of Tibet, and therefore Tibetan national identity, will not die as long as there are Tibetans in exile, and their friends, who are able to write the true history of Tibet.
Notes 1. Jamyang Norbu, “Middle Way Metamorphosis,” Shadow Tibet, 13 November 2008, www.jamyangnorbu.com/blog/2008/11/13/middle-way-metamorphosis/. 2. “Central Authorities Arrange Personal Delegate of the Dalai Lama to Come to China for Contact,” Beijing, Huanqiu Ribao in Chinese, 30 October 2008, in OSC CPP20081030361003. 3. “Dalai Lama’s Remarks Add to His Mistakes,” Beijing, Xinhua, 4 November 2008. 4. “Statement of Special Envoy Kasur Lodi Gyari, Head of the Tibetan Delegation, Following the 8th Round of Discussions with Representatives of the Chinese Leadership,” Dharamsala, Phayul, 6 November 2008, www.phayul.com/news/article. aspx?id=23162&t=1.
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5. “Transcript of PRC State Council Information Office 10 November News Briefing on Contacts and Talks with the Dalai Lama’s Private Representatives,” Beijing, State Council Information Office in Chinese, 10 November 2008, in OSC CPP20081110046001. OSC’s translation, “regional national autonomy,” has been replaced with the PRC’s preferred translation, “regional ethnic autonomy.” 6. “Foreign Pressure on Tibet Opposed,” Beijing, China Daily, 11 December 2008. 7. Lodi Gyari, talk at Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, 25 March 2009. 8. “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,” Dharamsala, Central Tibetan Administration, 16 November 2008, www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id =78&articletype=press&rmenuid=morepress. 9. Lodi Gyari, personal interview, Washington, DC, 7 January 2009. 10. “Signed Article by Yiduo: On the ‘Memorandum’ of the Dalai Clique,” Beijing, Xinhua, 21 November 2008. 11. “Special Message of His Holiness the Dalai Lama for Tibetans in and outside Tibet,” Dharamsala, Central Tibetan Administration, 14 November 2008, www.tibet. net/en/index.php?id=585&articletype=flash. 12. “A Way Forward: Perspectives from Inside Tibet,” International Campaign for Tibet, 17 November 2008, www.savetibet.org. 13. “Recommendations of the First Special General Meeting Convened under Article 59 of the Charter,” Dharamsala, Central Tibetan Administration, 22 November 2008, www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=595&articletype=flash. 14. Jamyang Norbu, “A Not So Special Meeting,” Shadow Tibet, 4 February 2009, www.jamyangnorbu.com/blog/2009/02/04/a-not-so-special-meeting/. 15. “March 10 Statement of HH the Dalai Lama,” Dharamsala, The Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 9 March 2009, dalailama.com/news.350.htm. 16. “Tibet Top Legislator Backs Establishment of “Serfs Emancipation Day,” Beijing, Xinhua, 15 January 2009. 17. “Serfs’ Emancipation Topples Dark Rule in Tibet,” Beijing, Xinhua, 21 January 2009. 18. “March 28, A Turning Point for Tibet,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao, 20 January 2009. 19. “A Day to Remember, for Tibetans and All,” Beijing, Xinhua, 19 January 2009. 20. “Xinhua Commentary Hails the Great Liberation of Millions of Tibetan Serfs, the Milestone in the World History of Human Rights,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 19 January 2009, in OSC CPP20090119005014. 21. “Documentary on Tibet Premieres,” Beijing, Xinhua, 15 February 2009. 22. “Immeasurable Contrast Seen between Past and Present Tibet,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao, 25 February 2009. 23. See Warren W. Smith Jr., China’s Tibet? Autonomy or Assimilation (Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 96, 133. 24. Giuseppi Tucci, Tibet: Land of Snows, J. E. Stapleton Driver, trans. (London: Paul Elek, 1973), 57.
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25. Panchen Lama, A Poisoned Arrow: The Secret Report of the 10th Panchen Lama (London: Tibet Information Network, 1997). 26. “Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet,” Beijing, Xinhua, 2 March 2009. 27. “Resolution on Tibet’ That Calls White Black,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 12 March 2009, in OSC CPP20090312354002. 28. “Zhang Qingli: Brilliant Five-Star Red Flag Will Always Fly in Skies of Tibet,” Beijing, Xinhua Wang in Chinese, 28 March 2009, in OSC CPP20090329066002. 29. See Warren W. Smith Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), xix. 30. “Letter from Tibet,” Washington, International Campaign for Tibet, 25 March 2008, www.savetibet.org/media-center/ict-news-reports/letter-tibet. 31. Tibet at a Turning Point: The Spring Uprising and China’s New Crackdown (Washington DC: International Campaign for Tibet, 6 August 2008), 19. 32. “Tibet Builds First Buddhism Academy,” Beijing, Xinhua, 18 October 2008. 33. “300,000 More Tibetan Farmers, Herders Move into New Houses,” Beijing, Xinhua, 26 December 2008. 34. “Nomadic Tibetans in NW China’s Gansu to Settle into Permanent Homes,” Beijing, Xinhua, 15 August 2008. 35. “470,000 Tibetan Herds People in SW China’s Sichuan to Move into Brick Houses,” Beijing, Xinhua, 11 October 2008. 36. “Farmers, Herders in Tibet Benefit from Road Building Projects,” Beijing, Xinhua, 30 January 2009. 37. “No One Has the Liberty to Refuse,” New York, Human Rights Watch, June 2007. 38. “Tibetans Protest in Kardze during the Tibetan New Year,” Dharamsala, Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy, 7 March 2009, www.tchrd.org/ press/2009/pr20090307a.html. 39. Nicholas Kristof, “Fed Up with Peace,” Xiahe, China, New York Times, 18 May 2008. 40. “He Who Created the Trouble Should Resolve It,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao Online, 29 November 2008, in OSC CPP20081129708003. 41. “Unwise Move That Impairs China-France Relations,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 6 December 2008, in OSC CPP20081206066002. 42. “Sarkozy-Dalai Lama Meeting Undermines Political Credibility,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao, 8 December 2008. 43. “Transcript of Regular News Conference by PRC Foreign Ministry,” Beijing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 11 December 2008, in OSC CPP20081211364001. 44. “Sarkozy May Have Underestimated China’s Reaction,” Guangzhou, Nanfang Zhoumo Online in Chinese, 18 December 2008, in OSC CPP20081219705006. 45. “Is Meeting the Dalai Lama a Bargaining Chip?” Beijing, Beijing Review, 5 December 2009. 46. “Next Month Hu Jintao to Meet with British, US, Russian Leaders but Not Sarkozy,” Hong Kong, Zhongguo Tongxun She in Chinese, 24 March 2009, in OSC CPP20090324163005.
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47. “Press Communiqué between China and France,” Beijing, Xinhua, 1 April 2009. 48. “Full Text of China-France Press Communiqué,” Beijing, Xinhua Domestic Service in Chinese, 1 April 2009, in OSC CPP20090401004005. 49. “MOFA Weekly Briefing,” Beijing, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2 April 2009. 50. “France’s Sarkozy Denies Deal to Restore China Ties,” London, AFP, 2 April 2009. 51. “Mutual Respect, Consideration of Core Interests Key to Sino-U.S Ties: Chinese President,” Beijing, Xinhua, 1 April 2009. 52. “Commentary: Sino-French Relations,” Beijing, China Daily Online, 2 April 2009. 53. “Crisis Sheds Light on Cooperation,” Beijing, China Daily Online, 3 April 2009. 54. “Mistaken Knowledge about Tibet Runs Contrary to Development, Progress,” Beijing, Renmin Ribao in Chinese, 2 March 2009, in OSC CPP20090302710005. 55. “The Time Has Come for Country to Set Its Own Rules in Diplomacy,” Beijing, China Daily, 12 March 2009. 56. “Westerners Must Change Their Erroneous Cognition of Tibet!” Beijing, Renmin Wang in Chinese, 13 March 2009, in OSC CPP20090313710001. 57. “Misrepresenting Tibet a Disingenuous Strategy,” Beijing, China Daily Online, 17 March 2009, in OSC CPP20090317968014. 58. “Chinese Seek to Ban Dalai Lama from NZ,” New Zealand Herald, 2 April 2009. 59. “Govt. Invites Foreign Journalists to Visit Tibet,” Beijing, China Daily, 19 March 2009. 60. Peter Ford, “Beijing Launches a ‘Chinese CNN’ to Burnish Image Abroad,” Beijing, Christian Science Monitor, 5 February 2009. 61. Willy Lam, “Chinese State Media Goes Global,” Hong Kong, Asia Times, 29 January 2009. 62. “China’s Revival of Confucianism Sparks Enthusiasm and Wariness,” Singapore, Straits Times, 5 August 2008. 63. “How Can China Sound Forceful and Lofty When It Speaks,” Beijing, Huanqui Shibao in Chinese, 16 January 2009, in OSC CPP20090203671003. 64. “Tibet Has Been Part of China since Ancient Times,” Lhasa, Xizang Ribao Online in Chinese, 17 December 2008, in OSC CPP20081218066001. 65. Jian Junbo, “Sino-EU Ties Hijacked by Tibet Issue,” Shanghai, Asia Times, 27 March 2009, www.atimes.com/atimes/China/KC27Ad01.html.
Selected Bibliography
A Great Mountain Burned by Fire: China’s Crackdown in Tibet. Washington, DC: International Campaign for Tibet, March 2009. Arjia Rinpoche. Surviving the Dragon: Autobiography of Arjia Rinpoche. Unpublished manuscript. Brady, Anne Marie. Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. Connor, Walker. The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984. Dalai Lama. My Land and My People. New York: Potala Press, 1983. ———. The Collected Statements, Interviews and Articles of His Holiness the Dalai Lama. Dharamsala: Information Office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1986. Gries, Peter Hays. China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004. Gyatso, Palden. The Autobiography of a Tibetan Monk. New York: Grove Press, 1997. He Qinglian. The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China. New York: Human Rights in China, 2008. Hollander, Paul. Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba, 1928–1978. New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1983. ———. From the Gulag to the Killing Fields: Personal Accounts of Political Violence and Repression in Communist States. Wilmington: Intercollegiate Studies Institute Books, 2006. International Commission of Jurists. The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law. Geneva: ICJ, 1959. ———. Tibet and the Chinese People’s Republic: A Report to the International Commission of Jurists by Its Legal Inquiry Committee on Tibet. Geneva: ICJ, 1960. ———. Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law. Geneva: ICJ, 1997. — 289 —
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Jampa: The Story of Racism in Tibet. Washington, DC: International Campaign for Tibet, 2001. Kapstein, Matthew T. The Tibetans. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006. Khetsun, Tubten. Memories of Life in Lhasa under Chinese Rule. New York: Columbia University Press, 2008. Mao Tse-tung. “On the Policies of Our Work in Tibet,” Selected Works, vol 5. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977. Mining Tibet: Mineral Exploration in Tibetan Areas of the PRC. London: Tibet Information Network, 2002. Moseley, George. The Party and the National Question in China. Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966. No One Has the Liberty to Refuse: Tibetan Herders Forcibly Relocated in Gansu, Qinghai, Sichuan, and the Tibet Autonomous Region. New York: Human Rights Watch, June 2007. Norbu, Dawa. Red Star over Tibet. New York: Envoy Press, 1987. ———. Tibet: The Road Ahead. London: Rider, 1998. ———. China’s Tibet Policy. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001. Norbu, Jamyang. Shadow Tibet: Selected Writings 1989 to 2004. New York: High Asia Press, 2004. Panchen Lama. A Poisoned Arrow: The Secret Report of the 10th Panchen Lama. London: Tibet Information Network, 1997. Schell, Orville. “China: Humiliation and the Olympics.” New York Review of Books, 14 August 2008. Smith, Warren W., Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and SinoTibetan Relations. Boulder: Westview Press, 1996. ———. China’s Tibet? Autonomy or Assimilation. Boulder: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008. Stalin, Joseph. Marxism and the National-Colonial Question. Moscow: Proletarian Publishers, 1975. Strong, Anna Louise. When Serfs Stood Up in Tibet. Beijing: New World Press, 1960. Tibet at a Turning Point: The Spring Uprising and China’s New Crackdown. Washington, DC: International Campaign for Tibet, 6 August 2008. Tibet under Chinese Communist Rule: A Compilation of Refugee Statements: 1958–1975. Dharamsala: Information and Publicity office of His Holiness the Dalai Lama, 1976. Tracking the Steel Dragon: How China’s Economic Policies and the Railway Are Transforming Tibet. Washington, DC: International Campaign for Tibet, 2008. Tucci, Giuseppi. Tibet: Land of Snows. London: Paul Elek, 1973. Wang Jiawei and Nyima Gyaincain. The Historical Status of China’s Tibet. Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2000. Zhao, Suisheng. A Nation-State by Construction: Dynamics of Modern Chinese Nationalism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004.
Index
All India Radio, 117 al Qaida, 94 Ambans, 250 Amdo, 12, 15, 16, 17, 24, 27, 29, 33, 34, 46, 47, 48, 57, 67, 256 Arjia Rinpoche, 56 assimilation, 9, 168, 177, 209, 224, 225, 238, 242, 265, 268, 278, 279, 281 Australia, 5, 153, 181, 261, 269, 276 Australian House of Representatives, 50 Austria, 269 Barkhor, 42, 46, 53 Beijing, 2, 29, 30, 33, 42, 51, 54, 80, 82, 96, 218, 225, 237 Belgium, 93 Belgrade, 261 Berlin, 160 bin Laden, 94 Black Hills, 1 Brahmaputra River, 253 Britain, 122, 147, 162, 181, 188, 276 the British, 93, 143, 250, 275 British Parliament, 189 Brown, Gordon, 142, 143 Bruni, Carla, 200
Brussels, 93, 160 Buddhism, 28, 29, 32, 53, 63, 66, 70, 81, 82, 84, 87, 89, 97, 98, 108, 111, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 129, 131, 183, 192, 221, 239, 241, 250, 251, 252 Bush, George, 233 Cafferty, Jack, 158 Canada, 92, 160, 217, 269, 276 Canberra, 5 Carter, Jimmy, 215 Central Committee Party School, 178 Central Publicity Department, 154 Central Tibetan Administration, 38. See also Tibetan government in exile Chairman Mao, 1, 245. See also Mao Zedong Chamdo, 23, 34, 35, 66, 127, 253 Chengdu, 185 Cheyenne Indians, 1 China Society for Human Rights Studies, 159 China Tibet Studies Center, 111 China Tibetology Research Center, 98, 99, 132, 169, 212, 225, 235
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292
Index
Chinese Communist Party, 4, 5, 7, 22, 28, 33, 37, 42, 48, 50, 55, 65, 68, 72, 74, 80, 83, 84, 90, 91, 92, 96, 98, 101, 106, 111, 112, 113, 117, 123, 124, 125, 126, 139, 144, 145, 150, 162, 166, 170, 171, 176, 177, 179, 180, 182, 183, 189, 193, 198, 200, 201, 202, 209, 224, 238, 239, 240, 244, 246, 247, 249, 250, 252, 259, 260, 261, 265, 266, 267, 277, 278, 280, 282, 284 Chinese Constitution, 57, 101, 107, 108, 130, 142, 175, 198, 210, 212, 214, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 230, 244 Chinese Foreign Ministry, 81, 142, 143, 155, 166, 170, 191, 211, 217, 270, 271 Chinese government, 118, 119, 143, 145, 148, 152, 155, 159, 164, 166, 172, 178, 186, 189, 193, 197, 213, 216, 230, 231, 261, 279 Chinese nationalism, 2, 6, 153, 157, 161, 169, 178, 180, 181, 184, 190, 201, 202, 259–67, 278 Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 16, 161, 212 Chinese Republic, 110 Chinese Tibetan Affairs Research Center, 96, 104 Chone, 17, 24, 55 Chushul, 24, 31, 255 Chutsang nunnery, 2, 13 CIA, 116, 183 Clinton, Bill, 142 Clinton, Hillary, 233 Cold War, 141, 149 colonization, 9, 168, 187, 195, 221, 222, 226, 231, 233, 247, 251, 252, 268, 278, 281 Cultural Palace of Nationalities, 109 communization, 126, 240, 244, 250 Confucianism, 260, 261 Confucius Institutes, 277 Congressional Gold Medal, 11, 12, 93, 116, 269
Crazy Horse, 1 cultural genocide, 112, 114, 120, 128, 129, 132, 144 Cultural Palace of Nationalities, 109. See also Nationalities Palace Museum Cultural Revolution, 6, 25, 26, 28, 32, 85, 126, 241–42, 244, 259 Custer, George Armstrong, 1 Custer’s Last Stand, 1 Dalai Clique, 4, 7, 16, 20, 22, 23, 24, 27, 28, 32, 36, 44, 49, 51, 58, 64, 66, 68, 70, 79, 81–85, 87–96, 100–106, 108, 111–14, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 123–27, 132, 140, 141, 144, 145, 146, 147, 154, 155, 158, 159, 160, 162, 165, 167, 168, 169, 174, 176, 177, 178, 191, 217, 227, 235, 245, 246, 247, 249, 258, 261 Darfur, 165 Dechen, 54 Democratic Management Committee, 36, 48, 63, 81, 131 Democratic Reforms, 6, 58, 72, 73, 75, 79, 85, 95, 106, 109, 113, 125, 129, 130, 131, 169, 183, 196, 227, 235, 236, 237, 239–47, 250, 268 Deng Xiaoping, 146, 171, 175, 198, 210, 215, 220, 230, 233, 250, 283 Derge, 32 Dharamsala, 15, 38, 87, 88, 92, 147, 156, 163, 166, 173, 174, 175, 188, 190, 192, 194, 195, 211, 212, 218, 225, 228, 229, 231, 234, 259, 282 dialogue, 86, 88, 90, 92, 97, 120, 139, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 166–85, 186, 187, 190–202, 210, 211–18, 224, 227, 229, 231, 232, 233, 248, 251, 259, 265, 267, 276, 278, 282, 283, 284 Dingkha monastery, 30 Dolma Kyi, 34 Dorje Shugden, 34 Dorje Tsedrub, 26 Dorje Tseten, 101
Index
Drango, 17, 18 Drepung monastery, 2, 11, 12, 13, 15, 18, 21, 22, 23, 27, 29, 35, 41, 45, 47, 48, 53, 54, 66, 256 Dreru Wangten monastery, 14 Du Qinglin, 195, 198, 212, 217, 218 Dzachukha, 32 economic development, 6 Europe, 162, 202, 217, 269, 270, 271, 272, 281 European Parliament, 148, 149, 178, 198, 199, 283 European Union, 166, 202, 283, 284 Everest, 36, 80, 139 Falun Gong, 154 feudalism, 5, 102, 104, 106, 243 feudal serf system, 5, 72, 79, 81, 85, 94, 101, 105, 106, 109, 111, 112, 113, 116, 118, 119, 121, 123, 126, 129, 132, 147, 158, 167, 169, 189, 215, 226, 235, 236, 239, 240, 242, 243, 244, 245, 248, 249, 268, 277 Fiftieth Anniversary of Democratic Reforms in Tibet Exhibition, 237 Four Fundamental Principles, 127 Four Olds, 242 France, 155–56, 162, 166, 173, 179, 181, 192, 199, 200, 202, 269, 270, 271, 272 Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 160, 162 Ganden Chukorling monastery, 65 Ganden monastery, 2, 12, 15, 18, 21, 22, 25, 29, 33, 35, 42, 47, 48, 105, 117, 256 Gansu, 3, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 22, 24, 28, 34, 37, 38, 55, 57, 188, 254, 256 Gelek, 169 Germany, 92, 122, 160, 162, 166, 173, 176, 181, 202, 269, 270 Golmud, 47, 48 Golok TAP, 12, 16, 31, 257 Gonjo, 23
293
Greater TAR, 86, 87, 97, 98, 99, 107, 114, 132, 146, 172, 175, 188, 210, 214, 215, 216, 219, 222–23, 225, 226, 227, 268 Great Leap Forward, 6, 126, 241, 245, 259 Greece, 150, 152, 202 Guangdong, 161, 179 Guangzhou, 161, 183 Gu-Chu-Sum Movement, 88 Guru Rinpoche, 252 Gyalo Thondup, 171, 198, 210, 233 Gyari, Lodi, 88, 174, 194, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 224, 227 “harmonious society”/ “harmonious world,” 150, 246, 260, 285 Harrer, Heinrich, 120 Holka, 17 Hong Kong, 32, 48, 87, 146, 162, 163, 170, 172, 174, 175, 202, 209, 225, 261 Huanghe River, 177 Hui, 3, 14, 51, 183 Hu Jintao, 142, 143, 168, 174, 253, 270, 272 human rights, 89, 94, 102, 103, 105, 106, 111, 113, 116, 120, 144, 145, 147, 156, 162, 165, 167, 168, 188, 189, 193, 200, 202, 210, 231, 236, 237, 243, 245, 246, 248, 249, 260, 261, 267, 268, 272, 277, 283, 284 Human Rights Watch, 30, 37, 257 Hundred Flowers, 250 “hundred years of humiliation,” 177, 260, 265, 266, 278 imperialism, 62, 93, 100, 122, 243, 260, 266, 278, 281 India, 3, 44, 48, 49, 71, 79, 87, 88, 113, 122, 126, 147, 152, 153, 188, 192, 193, 212, 232, 233, 240, 241, 265 Inner Mongolia, 257 International Campaign for Tibet, 37, 45, 251, 254 International Olympic Committee, 149, 191, 200, 202
294
Index
Internet, 130, 154, 155, 158, 178, 179, 180, 184, 192, 202, 263, 275 Islamabad, 5 Jakarta, 5 Jampa Phuntsok, 3, 22, 54, 80, 83 Jamyang Norbu, 232–34 Japan, 51, 166, 174, 181, 198, 211 Jian Junbo, 283 Jiang Yu, 211 Jiang Zemin, 142 Jin Jing, 156 Jokhang, 12, 13, 18, 19, 21, 22, 29, 35, 36, 42, 46, 47, 52, 53, 54, 105, 117, 191, 256 Jyekundo, 12, 50 Kailas, 252 Kalon Tripa, 88 Kangyur, 131 Kanlho TAP, 12, 24, 28, 34 Kanze, 12, 15, 35, 37, 50, 59, 61, 68, 69, 258 Kanze monastery, 35 Kanze TAP, 12, 17, 20, 21, 23, 32, 33, 34, 57, 67 Kashag, 195, 244 Kathmandu, 152, 176 Kham, 12, 15, 27, 29, 32, 34, 46, 47, 48, 67, 68, 256 Khampa, 43, 59 Kongpo, 49, 253 Kosovo, 151, 172 Ku Klux Klan, 249 Kuomintang, 259 labor camps, 6 Labrang Tashikyil monastery, 3, 12, 14, 21, 22, 23, 34, 37, 55, 56, 57, 253, 262 Legchok, 80, 96, 234 Lenin, 239 Lhakpa Phuntsok, 96, 97, 104, 235 Lhasa People’s Court, 54 Lhoka, 65 Li Changchun, 153, 277
Linxia, 56 Lithang, 67 Little Bighorn, 1 Lobsang Jinpa, 19 London, 5, 153, 154, 159, 160, 165, 177, 178, 184, 187, 271 Losar, 53, 258 Luchu, 55 Macau, 146 Machu, 17, 24, 34, 55, 57, 58 manifest destiny, 1 Ma Ying-jeou, 270 Mao Siwei, 188 Mao Zedong, 48, 113, 146, 182, 183, 238, 240, 259, 260, 279 Markham, 35 martial law, 2 Marxism, 127, 209, 238, 242, 259, 277, 278, 281 Medro Gongkar, 26 Memorandum on Tibetan Autonomy, 212, 213, 217, 218–28 Merkel, Angela, 173, 269, 270 Mianyang Prison, 46 Middle Way Approach, 80, 87, 91, 94, 98, 99, 100, 103, 107, 114, 115, 142, 173, 194, 195, 214, 215, 217, 218, 228–34, 259, 267, 282, 283 Ming Dynasty, 110 minority nationalities, 5 Montana, 1 Mustang, 98 Nagchu, 14, 65 Nangchen, 50 National Democratic Party of Tibet, 88 National Endowment for Democracy, 88 Nationalities Palace Museum, 33. See also Cultural Palace of Nationalities National People’s Congress, 3, 11, 42, 66, 80, 81, 92, 93, 100, 214, 217, 276 National Regional Autonomy, 80, 96, 98, 109, 118, 125, 177, 195, 219, 221,
Index
222, 225, 234, 282. See also Regional Ethnic Autonomy national self-determination, 1, 2, 9, 100, 116, 172, 242, 266, 268, 279, 280, 285. See also self-determination Native Americans, 1, 2, 281 natural resources, 1 Nazis, 120, 202 neighborhood committees, 48 Nepal, 43, 44, 88, 152, 194, 196, 197, 232 New Delhi, 5 New York, 165, 276 New Zealand, 276 Ngaba Lhamo Kirti monastery, 13, 15, 18, 19, 24, 27, 57, 58, 59, 108, 187 Ngaba TAP, 13, 14, 15, 20, 22, 24, 34, 37, 58, 61, 70, 71, 108, 185, 187, 189 Ngapo, Ngawang Jigme, 95 Ngari, 50 Ngolha, 24, 57 Ninxia Hui Autonomous Region, 24, 212 Nobel Peace Prize, 116, 269 nomads, 251, 253, 256, 257 nonviolence, 4, 86, 87, 88, 99, 102, 105, 106, 107, 115, 119, 120, 141, 145, 150, 159, 189, 195, 230, 253 Norbulinka, 130, 191 Nyantho monastery, 24, 57 Nyemo revolt, 126 Nyetang, 255 Nyingtri, 49, 127 Obama, Barack, 233, 272 “old Tibet spirit,” 66, 83 Olympic boycott, 139, 148, 149, 162, 166, 173, 174, 176, 186, 187, 194, 196, 199, 201, 202, 224, 269 Olympics, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 26, 28, 29, 31, 33, 36, 41, 48, 50, 64, 65, 70, 79, 80, 81, 82, 86, 87, 90, 92, 93, 95, 97, 108, 115, 120, 121, 128, 139–66, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 174, 177, 178, 179, 181, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189,
295
190–202, 213, 216, 217, 224, 237, 261, 264, 267, 273 Olympic torch, 4, 27, 28, 36, 37, 80, 114, 120, 139, 140, 150, 151, 152–66, 168, 172, 175, 177, 178, 180, 183, 184, 190, 191, 192, 196, 199, 201, 202, 233, 255, 262, 267, 269, 276, 279 One Country, Two Systems, 146, 209, 225, 226 Open Source Center, 89, 151, 196 Opium War, 61, 260 Panchen Lama, 14, 33, 34, 62, 119, 241, 252, 279 Paris, 5, 153, 154, 156, 159, 165, 173, 177, 178, 184, 192, 199, 269 Pasang Wangdu, 101, 102 Patriotic Education Campaign, 3, 8, 19, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 32, 34, 35, 37, 41, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61–70, 72, 74, 75, 84, 90, 104, 127, 174, 194, 195, 199, 231, 251, 252, 255, 260, 265, 283 “peaceful rise,” 150, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 173, 179, 202, 209, 268, 276 Pelosi, Nancy, 92, 94, 147, 156, 163, 178 Pema, 69 Pema Tinley, 190, 212 Pema Tsewang, 50 People’s Armed Police, 3, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 21, 27, 28, 30, 41, 45, 51, 54, 55, 61, 72, 73, 80, 153 People’s Liberation Army, 3, 4, 13, 19, 55, 61, 73, 83, 99, 100, 107, 146, 185, 188, 189, 192, 214, 215, 218, 238 People’s Republic of China, 6, 44, 61, 96, 102, 106, 130, 145, 146, 159, 162, 177, 182, 190, 195, 215, 218, 220, 222, 223, 226, 228, 229, 231, 238, 260, 283, 284, 285 Phenpo, 14 Poland, 269 Polha monastery, 34 Potala, 19, 27, 29, 36, 65, 85, 130, 191, 238, 249, 256 Pottering, Hans Gert, 148, 149, 199
296
Index
prisons, 6, 244 Propaganda Department, 48 Public Security Bureau, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 44, 45, 46, 51, 52, 61, 72, 93 Qin Gang, 143 Qing Dynasty, 110, 250 Qinghai, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 24, 31, 38, 46, 47, 48, 50, 54, 57, 59, 69, 97, 188, 254, 257 Radio Free Asia, 47, 53, 61, 71, 255–56 Ragdi, 66, 80, 144 railroad, 3, 97, 144, 158, 251, 252, 253 Ramoche monastery, 3, 13, 21, 22, 33, 35, 42, 43 Ratoe monastery, 24 Rebgong, 24, 33, 57, 59 Red Guards, 242 referendum, 100, 172, 228 Regional Ethnic Autonomy, 119, 130, 159, 169, 174, 193, 195, 198, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 218, 221, 223, 225, 226, 227, 246, 250, 282. See also National Regional Autonomy Rice, Condoleezza, 191 Richardson, Hugh, 110 Rongwu monastery, 25, 57, 59 Rungye Adak, 67 Rutok, 50 Sakya monastery, 130 Samdhong Rinpoche, 56, 87, 88, 167, 173, 229, 232, 234 Samtenling nunnery, 35 Samye, 252 San Francisco, 5, 153, 184 Sangchu, 17, 34, 55 Sarkozy, Nicholas, 155, 173, 192, 200, 269–72 Saunders, Doug, 160 self-determination, 8, 89, 102, 106, 107, 110, 230, 232, 247, 259, 279,
282, 284. See also national selfdetermination Sera monastery, 2, 12, 13, 15, 18, 21, 22, 25, 27, 29, 35, 36, 42, 47, 48, 53, 54, 63, 256 “Serf” (film), 238 Serf Emancipation Day, 234–42, 248, 249 serf liberation, 85 Seshul monastery, 32 Seventeen-Point Agreement, 95, 209, 220, 235, 240, 242, 243 Seventh Cavalry, U.S. Army, 1 Shakabpa, 110 Shelkar Choedhe monastery, 35 Shenzhen, 32, 174 Shigatse, 14, 35, 53, 127 Shol, 65 Shutse nunnery, 31 Sichuan, 12, 13, 14, 20, 21, 23, 32, 37, 38, 46, 47, 50, 54, 61, 70, 91, 185–90, 254, 257 Sichuan earthquake, 121, 185–90, 193, 201, 267 Sioux Indians, 1 Singapore, 166 Sining, 46 Sitar, 158, 159, 212, 216, 217 Sitting Bull, 1 slavery, 103, 236, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249 South Dakota, 1 South Korea, 153, 181 Soviet Union, 99, 238, 260 “special characteristics,” 251 Stalin, 238, 239 State Commission for Nationality Affairs, 33 State Council Information Office, 20, 33, 128, 242 Students for a Free Tibet, 88, 199, 232 suzerainty, 250 Taiwan, 184, 209, 270, 273, 274 Tang Dynasty, 37, 102 TAR People’s Procuratorate, 44
Index
TAR Superior People’s Court, 44 Tashilhunpo, 14, 53 Tawang, 122 Tawu monastery, 21, 35 Tengyur, 131 Tenzin, 98, 99 Tenzin Geyche, 88 Tenzin Namgyal, 29 Tethong, Tenzin Namgyal, 117 Tewo, 55 thamzing, 32, 244 Thongsha monastery, 23 Tiananmen, 216, 260, 265 Tibet: autonomy, 3, 7, 8, 9, 30, 74, 75, 80, 87, 94, 97, 100, 106, 107, 115, 123, 128, 129, 132, 141, 144, 146, 172, 175, 182, 187, 188, 190, 209–17, 218–28, 242, 245, 246, 250, 251, 252, 258, 267, 268, 278, 279, 282, 285; civilization, 2; culture, 2, 7, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 146, 209, 211, 219–22, 224, 239, 241, 244, 245, 250, 251, 252, 255–58, 265, 268, 278, 280, 282; deaths, 6, 7, 13, 29, 247; education, 252; flag, 2, 3, 4, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 21, 42, 56, 58, 59, 99, 100, 107, 108, 253, 254; government, 2, 255; independence, 12, 14, 15, 24, 27, 34, 35, 49, 51, 53, 58, 62, 63, 74, 79, 80, 83, 85, 86, 87, 89, 91–95, 97–103, 105, 107, 108, 110, 112, 114, 115, 117–23, 128, 140, 141, 143, 145, 146, 150, 151, 154, 155, 156, 157, 159, 162, 164, 165, 168, 169, 171–78, 181–85, 188, 189, 190, 193–98, 202, 210–18, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231, 233, 246, 247, 249, 267, 268, 271, 272, 280, 281; language, 2, 123, 128, 129, 130, 219, 220, 222, 225, 226, 250, 252, 258; literature, 2; nation, 1, 2, 110; national identity, 2, 7, 9, 51, 144, 209, 211, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 233, 239, 241, 244, 250, 251, 254, 255, 256, 266, 268, 278, 280, 281, 282, 285; nationalism,
297
62, 93, 158, 239, 250–59, 279; national uprising, 2, 4, 254; peaceful liberation, 5, 72, 79, 89, 94, 95, 106, 124, 129, 130, 131, 227, 242, 243, 268; people, 1; population, 6, 247; religion, 2, 123, 128, 130, 131, 144, 158, 221, 225, 226, 245, 250, 251, 255, 258, 267, 268; revolt (1959), 2, 3, 4, 6, 86, 97, 104, 113, 120, 124, 125, 146, 213, 227, 235, 240, 243, 246, 247, 250, 255, 258, 268; separatism, 5, 7, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67, 70, 84, 86, 87, 98, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 110, 112, 114, 115, 118, 119, 121, 126, 127, 140, 142, 143, 145, 146, 148, 154, 158, 159, 163, 165, 167, 172, 174, 182, 194, 197, 209, 210, 211, 218, 246, 251, 252, 258, 268, 270, 271, 273; splittism, 60, 74, 80, 93, 141, 143, 147, 175, 176, 195, 246, 247, 248, 249; territory, 1, 2, 211, 217, 218, 250, 279, 281, 282 Tibetan Buddhist Academy, 255 Tibetan Buddhist Association, 53 Tibetan Center for Human Rights and Democracy, 15, 17, 19, 21, 26, 38, 63, 64 Tibetan Empire, 37, 102, 188, 254, 256 Tibetan government, 234, 279 Tibetan government in exile, 4, 6, 7, 19, 20, 82, 87, 88, 89, 107, 111, 144, 145, 160, 165, 168, 187, 188, 189, 192, 194, 196, 198, 213, 223, 224, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231, 232, 236, 247, 249, 259 Tibetan People’s Uprising Movement, 4, 20, 41, 79, 87, 88, 115, 141 Tibetan Plateau, 2, 219, 237, 250, 255, 279 Tibetan Women’s Association, 88 Tibetan Youth Congress, 7, 87, 88, 94, 99, 141, 168, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 212, 213, 232, 233 Tibet Autonomous Region, 2, 3, 4, 6, 11, 21, 26, 29, 35, 37, 38, 49, 50, 52, 54,
298
Index
55, 64, 66, 69, 83, 90, 96, 98, 99, 112, 123, 125, 130, 131, 132, 188, 192, 196, 212, 213, 221, 223, 226, 227, 234, 240, 242, 244, 250, 254, 255, 256 Tibet Museum, 65 Tibetology, 96, 101, 104, 131, 132, 193, 197, 285 Tibet Support Groups, 93 Tingri, 35 Toelung Dechen, 14, 30 Tongkor monastery, 20, 57 Tsandrok monastery, 57 Tsetang, 65, 127 Tsigorthang, 17 Tso, 17 Tsolho TAP, 12, 17, 24, 33, 57, 59 Tucci, Giuseppi, 239–40 tulkus, 61, 63, 131, 221, 251 Uighurs, 33, 80, 200 United Front, 16, 32, 33 United Front Work Department, 158, 174, 195, 212 United Nations, 28, 87, 116, 284; Commission on Human Rights, 284; Human Rights Council, 284 United States, 92, 93, 110, 145, 147, 151, 162, 166, 181, 198, 202, 217, 236, 246, 248, 249, 261, 269, 270, 272, 275, 276, 282; Congress, 116, 163, 178, 217, 249, 276; House of Representatives, 92, 94, 147, 156, 163, 248; State Department, 160 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 236
Voice of America, 57, 71 Wang Bingyi, 50 Washington, D.C., 11, 92, 145, 160, 217, 237, 276 Wen Jiabao, 154, 185, 186, 224, 272 White Paper, 128–33, 242–48 Woeser, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 38, 43, 51, 229, 254 Wrath of the Serfs Exhibition, 238 Xiahe, 14, 34 Xian, 34 Xiao Youcai, 20 Xin Yuanming, 51 Xinjiang, 37, 92, 184, 188, 257 Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, 37 Yang Jiechi, 93, 274 Yangtze River, 256, 257 Yedor, 87, 88, 196, 197, 198, 225–28 Yellow River, 256, 257 Yi Gu, 192 Yuan Dynasty, 102, 110, 215, 250, 280 Yunnan, 188 Yushu TAP, 257 Zhang Qingli, 4, 11, 20, 26, 27, 36, 48, 64, 83, 84, 90, 191, 249 Zhang Yun, 111 Zhou Wenzhong, 145 Zhou Yongkang, 153 Zhu Weiqun, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 227 Zhu Zhengfu, 161
About the Author
Warren W. Smith Jr. has more than twenty-five years’ experience in Tibetan studies. From 1970 to 1981 he was a resident of Nepal. In 1982 he was one of the first Westerners allowed in Tibet. In 1994 he received a Ph.D. in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, with a dissertation on Tibetan nationalism. He is the coauthor, with Manabajra Bajracharya, of Mythological History of Nepal Valley from Svayambliu Parana (1977) and the author of Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations (1996), China’s Tibet? Autonomy or Assimilation (2008), and numerous articles on Tibetan politics. Since 1997 he has been a researcher and writer with the Tibetan Service of Radio Free Asia, where he has written hundreds of programs on all aspects of Tibetan history and politics, Sino-Tibetan relations, Chinese politics, and Sino-U.S. relations.
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