Lecture Notes in Computer Science Commenced Publication in 1973 Founding and Former Series Editors: Gerhard Goos, Juris Hartmanis, and Jan van Leeuwen
Editorial Board David Hutchison Lancaster University, UK Takeo Kanade Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA, USA Josef Kittler University of Surrey, Guildford, UK Jon M. Kleinberg Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA Alfred Kobsa University of California, Irvine, CA, USA Friedemann Mattern ETH Zurich, Switzerland John C. Mitchell Stanford University, CA, USA Moni Naor Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel Oscar Nierstrasz University of Bern, Switzerland C. Pandu Rangan Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, India Bernhard Steffen University of Dortmund, Germany Madhu Sudan Massachusetts Institute of Technology, MA, USA Demetri Terzopoulos University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA Doug Tygar University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA Gerhard Weikum Max-Planck Institute of Computer Science, Saarbruecken, Germany
5444
Omer Reingold (Ed.)
Theory of Cryptography 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC 2009 San Francisco, CA, USA, March 15-17, 2009 Proceedings
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Volume Editor Omer Reingold The Weizmann Institute of Science Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science Rehovot 76100, Israel E-mail:
[email protected]
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Preface
TCC 2009, the 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference, was held in San Francisco, CA, USA, March 15–17, 2009. TCC 2009 was sponsored by the International Association for Cryptologic Research (IACR) and was organized in cooperation with the Applied Crypto Group at Stanford University. The General Chair of the conference was Dan Boneh. The conference received 109 submissions, of which the Program Committee selected 33 for presentation at the conference. These proceedings consist of revised versions of those 33 papers. The revisions were not reviewed, and the authors bear full responsibility for the contents of their papers. The conference program also included two invited talks: “The Differential Privacy Frontier,” given by Cynthia Dwork and “Some Recent Progress in Lattice-Based Cryptography,” given by Chris Peikert. I thank the Steering Committee of TCC for entrusting me with the responsibility for the TCC 2009 program. I thank the authors of submitted papers for their contributions. The general impression of the Program Committee is that the submissions were of very high quality, and there were many more papers we wanted to accept than we could. The review process was therefore very rewarding but the selection was very delicate and challenging. I am grateful for the dedication, thoroughness, and expertise of the Program Committee. Observing the way the members of the committee operated makes me as confident as possible of the outcome of our selection process. I also thank the many external reviewers who assisted the Program Committee in its work. I have benefited from the experience and advice of past TCC Chairs, Ran Canetti, Moni Naor, and Salil Vadhan. I am indebted to Shai Halevi, who wrote a wonderful software package to facilitate all aspects of the PC work. Shai made his software available to us and provided rapid technical support. I am very grateful to TCC 2007 General Chair, Dan Boneh, who anticipated my requests before they were made. Thanks to our corporate Sponsors, Voltage Security, Google, Microsoft Research, the D. E. Shaw group, and IBM Research. I appreciate the assistance provided by the Springer LNCS editorial staff, including Ursula Barth, Alfred Hofmann, Anna Kramer, and Nicole Sator, and the assistance provided by IACR Director, Christian Cachin.
December 2008
Omer Reingold
TCC 2009 6th IACR Theory of Cryptography Conference San Francisco, California, USA March 15–17, 2009 Sponsored by The International Association for Cryptologic Research With Financial Support from Voltage Security Google Microsoft Research The D. E. Shaw group IBM Research
General Chair Dan Boneh
Stanford University
Program Chair Omer Reingold
Weizmann Institute
Program Committee Ivan Damg˚ ard Stefan Dziembowski Marc Fischlin Matthew Franklin Jens Groth Thomas Holenstein Nicholas J. Hopper Yuval Ishai Charanjit Jutla Daniele Micciancio Kobbi Nissim Adriana M. Palacio Rafael Pass Manoj M Prabhakaran Yael Tauman Kalai Brent Waters John Watrous
University of Aarhus University of Rome Darmstadt University UC Davis University College London Princeton University University of Minnesota Technion and UC Los Angeles IBM T.J. Watson Research Center UC San Diego Ben-Gurion University Bowdoin Cornell Urbana-Champaign Microsoft Research UT Austin University of Waterloo
VIII
Organization
TCC Steering Committee Mihir Bellare Ivan Damg˚ ard Oded Goldreich (Chair) Shafi Goldwasser Russell Impagliazzo Johan Hastad Ueli Maurer Silvio Micali Moni Naor
UC San Diego University of Aarhus Weizmann Institute MIT and Weizmann Institute UC San Diego and IAS KTH ETH Zurich MIT Weizmann Institute
External Reviewers Ittai Abraham Adi Akavia Joel Alwen Amos Beimel Tor E. Bjorstad Dario Catalano Yan Zong Ding Yevgeniy Dodis Serge Fehr Anna Lisa Ferrara Dario Fiore Matthias Fitzi David Freeman Juan Garay Martin Geisler Craig Gentry Clint Givens Dana Glasner Sharon Goldberg Mark Gondree Dov Gordon Ronen Gradwohl Iftach Haitner Danny Harnik Carmit Hazay Martin Hirt Dennis Hofheinz Russell Impagliazzo Stanislaw Jarecki Ayman Jarrous Bhavana Kanukurthi Jonathan Katz
Aggelos Kiayias Robert K¨ onig Vladimir Kolesnikov Chiu-Yuen Koo Hugo Krawczyk Mikkel Kroigaard Eyal Kushilevitz Anja Lehmann Huija (Rachel) Lin Noam Livne Vadim Lyubashevsky Yury Makarychev Tal Malkin Payman Mohassel Petros Mol Steven Myers Jesper Buus Nielsen Alina Oprea Claudio Orlandi Carles Padro Omkant Pandey Anindya Patthak Chris Peikert Krzysztof Pietrzak Benny Pinkas Bartosz Przydatek Tal Rabin Renato Renner Thomas Ristenpart Alon Rosen Mike Rosulek Guy Rothblum
Amit Sahai Louis Salvail Eric Schost Dominique Schr¨oder Gil Segev Hovav Shacham Abhi Shelat Elaine Shi Michael Steiner Alain Tapp Stefano Tessaro Nikos Triandopoulos Wei-lung (Dustin) Tseng Dominique Unruh Salil Vadhan Vinod Vaikuntanathan Jorge L. Villar Ivan Visconti Hoeteck Wee Stephanie Wehner Enav Weinreb Daniel Wichs Severin Winkler Stefan Wolf J¨ urg Wullschleger Scott Yilek Aaram Yun Rui Zhang Yunlei Zhao Hong-Sheng Zhou Vassilis Zikas
Table of Contents
An Optimally Fair Coin Toss . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tal Moran, Moni Naor, and Gil Segev Complete Fairness in Multi-party Computation without an Honest Majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . S. Dov Gordon and Jonathan Katz
1
19
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority . . . . . . . . . . . . Shien Jin Ong, David C. Parkes, Alon Rosen, and Salil Vadhan
36
Purely Rational Secret Sharing (Extended Abstract) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Silvio Micali and abhi shelat
54
Some Recent Progress in Lattice-Based Cryptography (Invited Talk) . . . Chris Peikert
72
Non-malleable Obfuscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ran Canetti and Mayank Varia
73
Simulation-Based Concurrent Non-malleable Commitments and Decommitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rafail Ostrovsky, Giuseppe Persiano, and Ivan Visconti
91
Proofs of Retrievability via Hardness Amplification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yevgeniy Dodis, Salil Vadhan, and Daniel Wichs
109
Security Amplification for Interactive Cryptographic Primitives . . . . . . . . Yevgeniy Dodis, Russell Impagliazzo, Ragesh Jaiswal, and Valentine Kabanets
128
Composability and On-Line Deniability of Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yevgeniy Dodis, Jonathan Katz, Adam Smith, and Shabsi Walfish
146
Authenticated Adversarial Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yair Amir, Paul Bunn, and Rafail Ostrovsky
163
Adaptive Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Adaptively Secure Oblivious Transfer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yehuda Lindell and Hila Zarosim
183
On the (Im)Possibility of Key Dependent Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Iftach Haitner and Thomas Holenstein
202
On the (Im)Possibility of Arthur-Merlin Witness Hiding Protocols . . . . . Iftach Haitner, Alon Rosen, and Ronen Shaltiel
220
X
Table of Contents
Secure Computability of Functions in the IT Setting with Dishonest Majority and Applications to Long-Term Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Robin K¨ unzler, J¨ orn M¨ uller-Quade, and Dominik Raub
238
Complexity of Multi-party Computation Problems: The Case of 2-Party Symmetric Secure Function Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hemanta K. Maji, Manoj Prabhakaran, and Mike Rosulek
256
Realistic Failures in Secure Multi-party Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Vassilis Zikas, Sarah Hauser, and Ueli Maurer
274
Secure Arithmetic Computation with No Honest Majority . . . . . . . . . . . . . Yuval Ishai, Manoj Prabhakaran, and Amit Sahai
294
Universally Composable Multiparty Computation with Partially Isolated Parties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ivan Damg˚ ard, Jesper Buus Nielsen, and Daniel Wichs
315
Oblivious Transfer from Weak Noisy Channels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . J¨ urg Wullschleger
332
Composing Quantum Protocols in a Classical Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . Serge Fehr and Christian Schaffner
350
LEGO for Two-Party Secure Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jesper Buus Nielsen and Claudio Orlandi
368
Simple, Black-Box Constructions of Adaptively Secure Protocols . . . . . . . Seung Geol Choi, Dana Dachman-Soled, Tal Malkin, and Hoeteck Wee
387
Black-Box Constructions of Two-Party Protocols from One-Way Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rafael Pass and Hoeteck Wee Chosen-Ciphertext Security via Correlated Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alon Rosen and Gil Segev Hierarchical Identity Based Encryption with Polynomially Many Levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Craig Gentry and Shai Halevi Predicate Privacy in Encryption Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Emily Shen, Elaine Shi, and Brent Waters Simultaneous Hardcore Bits and Cryptography against Memory Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Adi Akavia, Shafi Goldwasser, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan
403
419
437
457
474
Table of Contents
XI
The Differential Privacy Frontier (Invited Talk, Extended Abstract) . . . . Cynthia Dwork
496
How Efficient Can Memory Checking Be? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cynthia Dwork, Moni Naor, Guy N. Rothblum, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan
503
Goldreich’s One-Way Function Candidate and Myopic Backtracking Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . James Cook, Omid Etesami, Rachel Miller, and Luca Trevisan
521
Secret Sharing and Non-Shannon Information Inequalities . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amos Beimel and Ilan Orlov
539
Weak Verifiable Random Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Zvika Brakerski, Shafi Goldwasser, Guy N. Rothblum, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan
558
Efficient Oblivious Pseudorandom Function with Applications to Adaptive OT and Secure Computation of Set Intersection . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stanislaw Jarecki and Xiaomin Liu
577
Towards a Theory of Extractable Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ran Canetti and Ronny Ramzi Dakdouk
595
Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
615
An Optimally Fair Coin Toss Tal Moran , Moni Naor, , and Gil Segev Department of Computer Science and Applied Mathematics, Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot 76100, Israel
[email protected], {moni.naor,gil.segev}@weizmann.ac.il
Abstract. We address one of the foundational problems in cryptography: the bias of coin-flipping protocols. Coin-flipping protocols allow mutually distrustful parties to generate a common unbiased random bit, guaranteeing that even if one of the parties is malicious, it cannot significantly bias the output of the honest party. A classical result by Cleve [STOC ’86] showed that for any two-party r-round coin-flipping protocol there exists an efficient adversary that can bias the output of the honest party by Ω(1/r). √ However, the best previously known protocol only guarantees O(1/ r) bias, and the question of whether Cleve’s bound is tight has remained open for more than twenty years. In this paper we establish the optimal trade-off between the round complexity and the bias of two-party coin-flipping protocols. Under standard assumptions (the existence of oblivious transfer), we show that Cleve’s lower bound is tight: we construct an r-round protocol with bias O(1/r).
1
Introduction
A coin-flipping protocol allows mutually distrustful parties to generate a common unbiased random bit. Such a protocol should satisfy two properties. First, when all parties are honest and follow the instructions of the protocol, their common output is a uniformly distributed bit. Second, even if some of the parties collude and deviate from the protocol’s instructions, they should not be able to significantly bias the common output of the honest parties. When a majority of the parties are honest, efficient and completely fair coinflipping protocols are known as a special case of general multiparty computation with an honest majority [1] (assuming a broadcast channel). When an honest majority is not available, and in particular when there are only two parties, the situation is more complex. Blum’s two-party coin-flipping protocol [2] guarantees that the output of the honest party is unbiased only if the malicious party does not abort prematurely (note that the malicious party can decide to abort after learning the result of the coin flip). This satisfies a rather weak notion of fairness in which once the malicious party is labeled as a “cheater” the honest party is allowed to halt without outputting any value. Blum’s protocol can rely on the
Research supported in part by a grant from the Israel Science Foundation. Incumbent of the Judith Kleeman Professorial Chair.
O. Reingold (Ed.): TCC 2009, LNCS 5444, pp. 1–18, 2009. c International Association for Cryptologic Research 2009
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existence of any one-way function [3, 4], and Impagliazzo and Luby [5] showed that one-way functions are in fact essential even for such a seemingly weak notion. While this notion suffices for some applications, in many cases fairness is required to hold even if one of the parties aborts prematurely (consider, for example, an adversary that controls the communication channel and can prevent communication between the parties). In this paper we consider a stronger notion: even when the malicious party is labeled as a cheater, we require that the honest party outputs a bit. Cleve’s impossibility result. The latter notion of fairness turns out to be impossible to achieve in general. Specifically, Cleve [6] showed that for any twoparty r-round coin-flipping protocol there exists an efficient adversary that can bias the output of the honest party by Ω(1/r). Cleve’s lower bound holds even under arbitrary computational assumptions: the adversary only needs to simulate an honest party, and decide whether or not to abort early depending on the output of the simulation. However,√the best previously known protocol (with respect to bias) only guaranteed O(1/ r) bias [7,6], and the question of whether Cleve’s bound was tight has remained open for over twenty years. Fairness in secure computation. The bias of coin-flipping protocols can be viewed as a particular case of the more general framework of fairness in secure computation. Typically, the security of protocols is formalized by comparing their execution in the real model to an execution in an ideal model where a trusted party receives the inputs of the parties, performs the computation on their behalf, and then sends all parties their respective outputs. Executions in the ideal model guarantee complete fairness: either all parties learn the output, or neither party does. Cleve’s result, however, shows that without an honest majority complete fairness is generally impossible to achieve, and therefore the formulation of secure computation (see [8]) weakens the ideal model to one in which fairness is not guaranteed. Informally, a protocol is “secure-with-abort” if its execution in the real model is indistinguishable from an execution in the ideal model allowing the ideal-model adversary to chose whether the honest parties receive their outputs (this is the notion of security satisfied by Blum’s coin-flipping protocol). Recently, Katz [9] suggested an alternate relaxation: keep the ideal model unchanged (i.e., all parties always receive their outputs), but relax the notion of indistinguishability by asking that the real model and ideal model are distinguishable with probability at most 1/p(n) + ν(n), for a polynomial p(n) and a negligible function ν(n) (we refer the reader to Section 2 for a formal definition). Protocols satisfying this requirement are said to be 1/p-secure, and intuitively, such protocols guarantee complete fairness in the real model except with probability 1/p. In the context of coin-flipping protocols, any 1/p-secure protocol has bias at most 1/p. However, the definition of 1/p-security is more general and applies to a larger class of functionalities.
An Optimally Fair Coin Toss
1.1
3
Our Contributions
In this paper we establish the optimal trade-off between the round complexity and the bias of two-party coin-flipping protocols. We prove the following theorem: Theorem 1.1. Assuming the existence of oblivious transfer, for any polynomial r = r(n) there exists an r-round two-party coin-flipping protocol that is 1/(4r−c)secure, for some constant c > 0. We prove the security of our protocol under the simulation-based definition of 1/p-security1, which for coin-flipping protocols implies, in particular, that the bias is at most 1/p. We note that our result not only identifies the optimal trade-off asymptotically, but almost pins down the exact leading constant: Cleve showed that any r-round two-party coin-flipping protocol has bias at least 1/(8r +2), and we manage to achieve bias of at most 1/(4r −c) for some constant c > 0. Our approach holds in fact for a larger class of functionalities. We consider the more general task of sampling from a distribution D = (D1 , D2 ): party P1 receives a sample from D1 and party P2 receives a correlated sample from D2 (in coin-flipping, for example, the joint distribution D produces the values (0, 0) and (1, 1) each with probability 1/2). Before stating our result in this setting we introduce a standard notation: we denote by SD(D, D1 ⊗ D2 ) the statistical distance between the joint distribution D = (D1 , D2 ) and the direct-product of the two marginal distributions D1 and D2 . We prove the following theorem which generalizes Theorem 1.1: Theorem 1.2. Assuming the existence of oblivious transfer, for any efficientlysampleable distribution D = (D1 , D2 ) and polynomial r = r(n) there exists an 1 ⊗D2 ) -secure, for r-round two-party protocol for sampling from D that is SD(D,D 2r−c some constant c > 0. Our approach raises several open questions that are fundamental to the understanding of coin-flipping protocols. These questions include identifying the minimal computational assumptions that are essential for reaching the optimal trade-off (i.e., one-way functions vs. oblivious transfer), extending our approach to the multiparty setting, and constructing a more efficient variant of our protocol that can result in a practical implementation. We elaborate on these questions in Section 5, and hope that our approach and the questions it raises can make progress towards resolving the complexity of coin-flipping protocols. 1.2
Related Work
Coin-flipping protocols. When security with abort is sufficient, simple variations of Blum’s protocol are the most commonly used coin-flipping protocols. 1
In a very preliminary version of this work we proved our results with respect to the definition of bias (see Section 2), and motivated by [10, 9] we switch to the more general framework of 1/p-secure computation.
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√ For example, an r-round protocol with bias O(1/ r) can be constructed by sequentially executing Blum’s protocol O(r) times, and outputting the majority of the intermediate output values [7, 6]. We √ note that in this protocol an adversary can indeed bias the output by Ω(1/ r) by aborting prematurely. One of the most significant results on the bias of coin-flipping protocols gave reason to believe that the √ optimal trade-off between the round complexity and the bias is in fact Θ(1/ r) (as provided by the latter variant of Blum’s protocol): Cleve and Impagliazzo [11] showed that in √ the fail-stop model, any two-party r-round coin-flipping protocol has bias Ω(1/ r). In the fail-stop model adversaries are computationally unbounded, but they must follow the instructions of the protocol except for being allowed to abort prematurely. In this model commitment schemes exist in a trivial fashion2 , and therefore the Cleve–Impagliazzo bound also applies to any protocol whose security relies on commitment schemes in a black-box manner, such as Blum’s protocol and its variants. Coin-flipping protocols were also studied in a variety of other models. Among those are collective coin-flipping in the “perfect information model” in which parties are computationally unbounded and all communication is public [12, 13, 14, 15, 16], and protocols based on physical assumptions, such as quantum computation [17, 18, 19] and tamper-evident seals [20]. Fair computation. Some of the techniques underlying our protocols found their origins in a recent line of research devoted for achieving various forms of fairness in secure computation. The technique of choosing a secret “threshold round”, before which no information is learned, and after which aborting the protocol is essentially useless was suggested by Moran and Naor [20] as part of a coin-flipping protocol based on tamper-evident seals. It was later also used by Katz [9] for partially-fair protocols using a simultaneous broadcast channel, and by Gordon et al. [21] for completely-fair protocols for a restricted (but yet rather surprising) class of functionalities. Various techniques for hiding a meaningful round in game-theoretic settings were suggested by Halpern and Teague [22], Gordon and Katz [23], and Kol and Naor [24]. Katz [9] also introduced the technique of distributing shares to the parties in an initial setup phase (which is only secure-with-abort), and these shares are then exchanged by the parties in each round of the protocol. Subsequent work. Our results were very recently generalized by Gordon and Katz [10] to deal with the more general case of randomized functions, and not only distributions. Gordon and Katz showed that any efficiently-computable randomized function f : X × Y → Z where at X and Y is of polynomial least one of min{|X|,|Y |} -secure. In addition, they size has an r-round protocol that is O r showed that even if both domains are of super-polynomial size but range the |Z| Z is of polynomial size, the f has an r-round protocol that is O √r -secure. Gordon and Katz also showed a specific function f : X × Y → Z where X, Y , 2
The protocol for commitment in the fail-stop model is simply to privately decide on the committed value and send the message “I am committed” to the other party.
An Optimally Fair Coin Toss
5
and Z are of size super-polynomial which cannot be 1/p-securely computed for any p > 2 assuming the existence of exponentially-hard one-way functions. 1.3
Paper Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review several notions and definitions that are used in the paper (most notably, the definition of 1/p-secure computation). In Section 3 we describe a simplified variant of our protocol and prove its security. In Section 4 we sketch a more refined and general variant of our protocol (due to space limitations we refer the reader to the full version for its complete specification and proof of security). Finally, in Section 5 we discuss several open problems.
2
Preliminaries
In this section we review the definitions of coin-flipping protocols, 1/p-secure computation (taken almost verbatim from [10, 9]), security with abort, and onetime message authentication. 2.1
Coin-Flipping Protocols
A two-party coin-flipping protocol is defined via two probabilistic polynomialtime Turing machines (P1 , P2 ), referred to as parties, that receive as input a security parameter 1n . The parties exchange messages in a sequence of rounds, where in every round each party both sends and receives a message (i.e., a round consists of two moves). At the end of the protocol, P1 and P2 produce outputs bits c1 and c2 , respectively. We denote by (c1 |c2 ) ← P1 (1n ), P2 (1n ) the experiment in which P1 and P2 interact (using uniformly chosen random coins), and then P1 outputs c1 and P2 outputs c2 . It is required that for all sufficiently large n, and every possible pair (c1 , c2 ) that may be output by P1 (1n ), P2 (1n ), it holds that c1 = c2 (i.e., P1 and P2 agree on a common value). This requirement can be relaxed by asking that the parties agree on a common value with sufficiently high probability3 . The security requirement of a coin-flipping protocol is that even if one of P1 and P2 is corrupted and arbitrarily deviates from the protocol’s instructions, the bias of the honest party’s output remains bounded. Specifically, we emphasize that a malicious party is allowed to abort prematurely, and in this case it is assumed that the honest party is notified on the early termination of the protocol. In addition, we emphasize that even when the malicious party is labeled as a cheater, the honest party must output a bit. For simplicity, the following definition considers only the case in which P1 is corrupted, and an analogous definition holds for the case that P2 is corrupted: 3
Cleve’s lower bound [6] holds under this relaxation as well. Specifically, if the parties agree on a common value with probability 1/2 + , then Cleve’s proof shows that the protocol has bias at least /(4r + 1).
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Definition 2.1. A coin-flipping protocol (P1 , P2 ) has bias at most (n) if for every probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine P1∗ it holds that Pr [(c1 |c2 ) ← P1∗ (1n ), P2 (1n ) : c2 = 1] − 1 ≤ (n) + ν(n) , 2 for some negligible function ν(n) and for all sufficiently large n. 2.2
1/p-Indistinguishability and 1/p-Secure Computation
1/p-Indistinguishability. A distribution ensemble X = {X(a, n)}a∈Dn,n∈N is an infinite sequence of random variables indexed by a ∈ Dn and n ∈ N, where Dn is a set that may depend on n. For a fixed polynomial p(n), two distribution ensembles X = {X(a, n)}a∈Dn,n∈N and Y = {Y (a, n)}a∈Dn ,n∈N are 1/p
computationally 1/p-indistinguishable, denoted X ≈ Y , if for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D there exists a negligible function ν(n) such that for all sufficiently large n ∈ N and for all a ∈ Dn it holds that |Pr [D(X(a, n)) = 1] − Pr [D(Y (a, n)) = 1]| ≤
1 + ν(n) . p(n)
1/p-Secure computation. A two-party protocol for computing a functionality F = {(f 1 , f 2 )} is a protocol running in polynomial time and satisfying the following functional requirement: if party P1 holds input (1n , x), and party P2 holds input (1n , y), then the joint distribution of the outputs of the parties is statistically close to (f 1 (x, y), f 2 (x, y)). In what follows we define the notion of 1/p-secure computation [10,9]. The definition uses the standard real/ideal paradigm [25,8], except that we consider a completely fair ideal model (as typically considered in the setting of honest majority), and require only 1/p-indistinguishability rather than indistinguishability (we note that, in general, the notions of 1/p-security and security-with-abort are incomparable). We consider active adversaries, who may deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary manner, and static corruptions. Security of protocols (informal). The security of a protocol is analyzed by comparing what an adversary can do in a real protocol execution to what it can do in an ideal scenario that is secure by definition. This is formalized by considering an ideal computation involving an incorruptible trusted party to whom the parties send their inputs. The trusted party computes the functionality on the inputs and returns to each party its respective output. Loosely speaking, a protocol is secure if any adversary interacting in the real protocol (where no trusted party exists) can do no more harm than if it was involved in the abovedescribed ideal computation. Execution in the ideal model. The parties are P1 and P2 , and there is an adversary A who has corrupted one of them. An ideal execution for the computation of F = {fn } proceeds as follows:
An Optimally Fair Coin Toss
7
Inputs: P1 and P2 hold the security parameter 1n and inputs x ∈ Xn and y ∈ Yn , respectively. The adversary A receives an auxiliary input aux. Send inputs to trusted party: The honest party sends its actual input to the trusted party. The corrupted party may send an arbitrary value (chosen by A) to the trusted party. Denote the pair of inputs sent to the trusted party by (x , y ). / Xn the trusted party sets x to some Trusted party sends outputs: If x ∈ / Yn ). Then, the trusted party default element x0 ∈ Xn (and likewise if y ∈ chooses r uniformly at random and sends fn1 (x , y ; r) to P1 and fn2 (x , y ; r) to P2 . Outputs: The honest party outputs whatever it was sent by the trusted party, the corrupted party outputs nothing, and A outputs any arbitrary (probabilistic polynomial-time computable) function of its view. We denote by IDEALF ,A(aux) (x, y, n) the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary and the output of the honest party following an execution in the ideal model as described above. Execution in the real model. We now consider the real model in which a two-party protocol π is executed by P1 and P2 (and there is no trusted party). The protocol execution is divided into rounds; in each round one of the parties sends a message. The honest party computes its messages as specified by π. The messages sent by the corrupted party are chosen by the adversary, A, and can be an arbitrary (polynomial-time) function of the corrupted party’s inputs, random coins, and the messages received from the honest party in previous rounds. If the corrupted party aborts in one of the protocol rounds, the honest party behaves as if it had received a special ⊥ symbol in that round. Let π be a two-party protocol computing the functionality F . Let A be a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time machine with auxiliary input aux. We denote by REALπ,A(aux) (x, y, n) the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary and the output of the honest party, following an execution of π where P1 begins by holding input (1n , x), and P2 begins by holding input (1n , y). Security as emulation of an ideal execution in the real model. Having defined the ideal and real models, we can now define security of a protocol. Loosely speaking, the definition asserts that a secure protocol (in the real model) emulates the ideal model (in which a trusted party exists). This is formulated as follows: Definition 2.2 (1/p-secure computation). Let F and π be as above, and fix a function p = p(n). Protocol π is said to 1/p-securely compute F if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the real model, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model such that 1/p
{IDEALF ,S(aux) (x, y, n)}(x,y)∈X×Y,aux ≈ {REALπ,A(aux) (x, y, n)}(x,y)∈X×Y,aux and the same party is corrupted in both the real and ideal models.
8
T. Moran, M. Naor, and G. Segev
2.3
Security with Abort
In what follows we use the standard notion of computational indistinguishability. That is, two distribution ensembles X = {X(a, n)}a∈Dn,n∈N and Y = c {Y (a, n)}a∈Dn ,n∈N are computationally indistinguishable, denoted X = Y , if for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D there exists a negligible function ν(n) such that for all sufficiently large n ∈ N and for all a ∈ Dn it holds that |Pr [D(X(a, n)) = 1] − Pr [D(Y (a, n)) = 1]| ≤ ν(n) . Security with abort is the standard notion for secure computation where an honest majority is not available. The definition is similar to the definition of 1/p-security presented in Section 2.2, with the following two exceptions: (1) the ideal-model adversary is allowed to choose whether the honest parties receive their outputs (i.e., fairness is not guaranteed), and (2) the ideal model and real model are required to be computationally indistinguishable. Specifically, the execution in the real model is as described in Section 2.2, and the execution in the ideal model is modified as follows: Inputs: P1 and P2 hold the security parameter 1n and inputs x ∈ Xn and y ∈ Yn , respectively. The adversary A receives an auxiliary input aux. Send inputs to trusted party: The honest party sends its actual input to the trusted party. The corrupted party controlled by A may send any value of its choice. Denote the pair of inputs sent to the trusted party by (x , y ). Trusted party sends output to corrupted party: If x ∈ / Xn the trusted party sets x to some default element x0 ∈ Xn (and likewise if y ∈ / Yn ). Then, the trusted party chooses r uniformly at random, computes z1 = fn1 (x , y ; r) and z2 = fn2 (x , y ; r) to P2 , and sends zi to the corrupted party Pi (i.e., to the adversary A). Adversary decides whether to abort: After receiving its output the adversary sends either “abort” of “continue” to the trusted party. In the former case the trusted party sends ⊥ to the honest party Pj , and in the latter case the trusted party sends zj to Pj . Outputs: The honest party outputs whatever it was sent by the trusted party, the corrupted party outputs nothing, and A outputs any arbitrary (probabilistic polynomial-time computable) function of its view. We denote by IDEALabort F ,A(aux) (x, y, n) the random variable consisting of the view of the adversary and the output of the honest party following an execution in the ideal model as described above. Definition 2.3 (security with abort). Let F and π be as above. Protocol π is said to securely compute F with abort if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A in the real model, there exists a non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time adversary S in the ideal model such that c
{IDEALabort F ,S(aux) (x, y, n)}(x,y)∈X×Y,aux = {REALπ,A(aux) (x, y, n)}(x,y)∈X×Y,aux .
An Optimally Fair Coin Toss
2.4
9
One-Time Message Authentication
Message authentication codes provide assurance to the receiver of a message that it was sent by a specified legitimate sender, even in the presence of an active adversary who controls the communication channel. A message authentication code is defined via triplet (Gen, Mac, Vrfy) of probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machines such that: 1. The key generation algorithm Gen receives as input a security parameter 1n , and outputs an authentication key k. 2. The authentication algorithm Mac receives as input an authentication key k and a message m, and outputs a tag t. 3. The verification algorithm Vrfy receives as input an authentication key k, a message m, and a tag t, and outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. The functionality guarantee of a message authentication code is that for any message m it holds that Vrfy(k, m, Mac(k, m)) = 1 with overwhelming probability over the internal coin tosses of Gen, Mac and Vrfy. In this paper we rely on message authentication codes that are one-time secure. That is, an authentication key is used to authenticate a single message. We consider an adversary that queries the authentication algorithm on a single message m of her choice, and then outputs a pair (m , t ). We say that the adversary forges an authentication tag if m = m and Vrfy(k, m , t ) = 1. Message authentication codes that are one-time secure exist in the information-theoretic setting, that is, even an unbounded adversary has only a negligible probability of forging an authentication tag. Constructions of such codes can be based, for example, on pair-wise independent hash functions [26].
3
A Simplified Protocol
In order to demonstrate the main ideas underlying our approach, in this section we present a simplified protocol. The simplification is two-fold: First, we consider the specific coin-flipping functionality (as in Theorem 1.1), and not the more general functionality of sampling from an arbitrary distribution D = (D1 , D2 ) (as in Theorem 1.2). Second, the coin-flipping protocol will only be 1/(2r)-secure and not 1/(4r)-secure. We describe the protocol in a sequence of refinements. We first informally describe the protocol assuming the existence of a trusted third party. The trusted third party acts as a “dealer” in a pre-processing phase, sending each party an input that it uses in the protocol. In the protocol we make no assumptions about the computational power of the parties. We then eliminate the need for the trusted third party by having the parties execute a secure-with-abort protocol that implements its functionality (this can be done in a constant number of rounds). The protocol. The joint input of the parties, P1 and P2 , is the security parameter 1n and a polynomial r = r(n) indicating the number of rounds in the
10
T. Moran, M. Naor, and G. Segev
protocol. In the pre-processing phase the trusted third party chooses uniformly at random a value i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , r}, that corresponds to the round in which the parties learn their outputs. In every round i ∈ {1, . . . , r} each party learns one bit of information: P1 learns a bit ai , and P2 learns a bit bi . In every round i ∈ {1, . . . , i∗ − 1} (these are the “dummy” rounds) the values ai and bi are independently and uniformly chosen. In every round i ∈ {i∗ , . . . , r} the parties learn the same uniformly distributed bit c = ai = bi which is their output in the protocol. If the parties complete all r rounds of the protocol, then P1 and P2 output ar and br , respectively4 . Otherwise, if a party aborts prematurely, the other party outputs the value of the previous round and halts. That is, if P1 aborts in round i ∈ {1, . . . , r} then P2 outputs the value bi−1 and halts. Similarly, if P2 aborts in round i then P1 outputs the value ai−1 and halts. More specifically, in the pre-processing phase the trusted third party chooses i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , r} uniformly at random and defines a1 , . . . , ar and b1 , . . . , br as follows: First, it choose a1 , . . . , ai∗ −1 ∈ {0, 1} and b1 , . . . , bi∗ −1 ∈ {0, 1} independently and uniformly at random. Then, it chooses c ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and lets ai∗ = · · · = ar = bi∗ = · · · = br = c. The trusted third party creates secret shares of the values a1 , . . . , ar and b1 , . . . , br using an informationtheoretically-secure 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme, and these shares are given to the parties. For concreteness, we use the specific secret-sharing scheme that splits a bit x into (x(1) , x(2) ) by choosing x(1) ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and letting x(2) = x ⊕ x(1) . In every round i ∈ {1, . . . , r} the parties exchange their shares for the current round, which enables P1 to reconstruct ai , and P2 to reconstruct bi . Clearly, when both parties are honest, the parties produce the same output bit which is uniformly distributed. Eliminating the trusted third party. We eliminate the need for the trusted third party by relying on a possibly unfair sub-protocol that securely computes with abort the functionality ShareGenr , formally described in Figure 1. Such a protocol with a constant number of rounds can be constructed assuming the existence of oblivious transfer (see, for example, [27]). In addition, our protocol also relies on a one-time message authentication code (Gen, Mac, Vrfy) that is information-theoretically secure. The functionality ShareGenr provides the parties with authentication keys and authentication tags so each party can verify that the shares received from the other party were the ones generated by ShareGenr in the pre-processing phase. A formal description of the protocol is provided in Figure 2. Proof of security. The following theorem states that the protocol is 1/(2r)secure. We then conclude the section by showing the our analysis is in fact tight: 4
An alternative approach that reduces the expected number of rounds from r to r/2+1 is as follows. In round i∗ the parties learn their output c = ai∗ = bi∗ , and in round i∗ + 1 they learn a special value ai∗ +1 = bi∗ +1 = NULL indicating that they should output the value from the previous round and halt. For simplicity (both in the presentation of the protocol and in the proof of security) we chose to present the protocol as always having r rounds, but this is not essential for our results.
An Optimally Fair Coin Toss
11
Functionality ShareGenr Input: Security parameter 1n . Computation: 1. Choose i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , r} uniformly at random. 2. Define values a1 , . . . , ar and b1 , . . . , br as follows: – For 1 ≤ i ≤ i∗ − 1 choose ai , bi ∈ {0, 1} independently and uniformly at random. – Choose c ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random, and for i∗ ≤ i ≤ r let ai = bi = c. (1) (2) (1) (2) 3. For 1 ≤ i ≤ r, choose ai , ai and bi , bi as random secret shares of ai and bi , respectively. (2) 4. Compute k1a , . . . , kra , k1b , . . . , krb ← Gen(1n ). For 1 ≤ i ≤ r, let tai = Mackia i||ai (1) and tbi = Mackb i||bi . i
Output: (1)
(1)
1. Party P1 receives the values a1 , . . . , ar , (k1a , . . . , kra ).
2. Party P2 receives the values
(1) (1) b1 , tb1 , . . . , br , tbr , and ka =
(2) (2) (2) (2) a1 , ta1 , . . . , ar , tar , b1 , . . . , br , and kb =
(k1b , . . . , krb ).
Fig. 1. The ideal functionality ShareGenr there exists an efficient adversary that can bias the output of the honest party by essentially 1/(2r). Theorem 3.1. For any polynomial r = r(n), if protocol π securely computes ShareGenr with abort, then protocol CoinFlipr is 1/(2r)-secure. Proof. We prove the (1/2r)-security of protocol CoinFlipr in a hybrid model where a trusted party for computing the ShareGenr functionality with abort is available. Using standard techniques (see [25]), it then follows that when replacing the trusted party computing ShareGenr with a sub-protocol that security computes ShareGenr with abort, the resulting protocol is 1/(2r)-secure. Specifically, for every polynomial-time hybrid-model adversary A corrupting P1 and running CoinFlipr in the hybrid model, we show that there exists a polynomial-time ideal-model adversary S corrupting P1 in the ideal model with access to a trusted party computing the coin-flipping functionality such that the statistical distance between these two executions is at most 1/(2r) + ν(n), for some negligible function ν(n). For simplicity, in the remainder of the proof we ignore the aspect of message authentication in the protocol, and assume that the only malicious behavior of the adversary A is early abort. This does not result in any loss of generality, since there is only a negligible probably of forging an authentication tag.
12
T. Moran, M. Naor, and G. Segev Protocol CoinFlipr
Joint input: Security parameter 1n . Preliminary phase: 1. Parties P1 and P2 run protocol π for computing ShareGenr (1n ) (see Figure 1). 2. If P1 receives ⊥ from the above computation, it outputs a uniformly chosen bit and halts. Likewise, if P2 receives ⊥ it outputs a uniformly chosen bit and halts. Otherwise, the parties proceed. (1) (1) (1) (1) 3. Denote the output of P1 from π by a1 , . . . , ar , b1 , tb1 , . . . , br , tbr , and ka = (k1a , . . . , kra ).
4. Denote the output of P2 from π by
(2) (2) (2) (2) a1 , ta1 , . . . , ar , tar , b1 , . . . , br , and
kb = (k1b , . . . , krb ). In each round i = 1, . . . , r do: share 1. P2 sends the next to P1 : (2) (a) P2 sends ai , tai to P1 . (2) (2) ai , tˆai = 0 (or if P1 received an (b) P1 receives a ˆi , tˆai from P2 . If Vrfyka i||ˆ i invalid message or no message), then P1 outputs ai−1 and halts (if i = 1 it outputs a uniformly chosen bit). (2) (1) ai , tˆai = 1 then P1 reconstructs ai using the shares ai and (c) If Vrfyka i||ˆ (2)
i
a ˆi . share 2. P1 sends the next to P2 : (1) (a) P1 sends bi , tbi to P2 . (1) (1) (b) P2 receives ˆbi , tˆbi from P1 . If Vrfy kb i||ˆbi , tˆbi = 0 (or if P2 received an i
invalid message or no message), then P2 outputs bi−1 and halts (if i = 1 it outputs a uniformly chosen bit). (1) (1) (2) (c) If Vrfykb i||ˆbi , tˆbi = 1 then P2 reconstructs bi using the shares bi and bi i
Output: P1 and P2 output ar and br , respectively.
Fig. 2. The coin-flipping protocol CoinFlipr On input (1n , aux) the ideal-model adversary S invokes the hybrid-model adversary A on (1n , aux) and queries the trusted party computing the coin-flipping functionality to obtain a bit c. The ideal-model adversary S proceeds as follows: 1. S simulates the trusted party computing the ShareGenr functionality by (1) (1) (1) (1) sending A shares a1 , . . . , ar , b1 , . . . , br that are chosen independently and uniformly at random. If A aborts (i.e., if A sends abort to the simulated ShareGenr after receiving the shares), then S outputs A’s output and halts. 2. S chooses i∗ ∈ {1, . . . , r} uniformly at random.
An Optimally Fair Coin Toss
13
3. In every round i ∈ {1, . . . , i∗ − 1}, S chooses a random bit ai , and sends A (2) (1) the share ai = ai ⊕ ai . If A aborts then S outputs A’s output and halts. (2) (1) 4. In every round i ∈ {i∗ , . . . , r}, S sends A the share ai∗ +1 = ai∗ +1 ⊕ c (recall that c is the value received from the trusted party computing the coin-flipping functionality). If A aborts then S outputs A’s output and halts. 5. At the end of the protocol S outputs A’s output and halts. We now consider the joint distribution of A’s view and the output of the honest party P2 in the ideal model and in the hybrid model. There are three cases to consider: 1. A aborts before round i∗ . In this case the distributions are identical: in both models the view of the adversary is the sequence of shares, and the sequence of messages up to the round in which A aborted, and the output of P2 is a uniformly distributed bit which is independent of A’s view. 2. A aborts in round i∗ . In this case A’s view is identical in both models, but the distributions of P2 ’s output given A’s view are not identical. In the ideal model, P2 outputs the random bit c that was revealed to A by S in round i∗ (recall that c is the bit received from the trusted party computing the coin-flipping functionality). In the hybrid model, however, the output of P2 is the value bi∗ −1 which is a random bit that is independent of A’s view. Thus, in this case the statistical distance between the two distributions is 1/2. However, this case occurs with probability at most 1/r since in both models i∗ is independent of A’s view until this round (that is, the probability that A aborts in round i∗ is at most 1/r). 3. A aborts after round i∗ or does not abort. In this case the distributions are identical: the output of P2 is the same random bit that was revealed to A in round i∗ . Note that A’s view in the hybrid and ideal models is always identically distributed (no matter what strategy A uses to decide when to abort). The only difference is in the joint distribution of A’s view and the honest party’s output. Thus, conditioning on the round at which A aborts will have the same effect in the hybrid and ideal models; in particular, conditioned on case 1 or case 3 occurring, the joint distribution of A’s view and the honest party’s output will be identical in both models. We state this explicitly because in similar (yet inherently different) settings, using conditional probabilities in such a way might be problematic (see, for example, [28], Sect. 2). The above three cases imply that the statistical distance between the two distributions is at most 1/(2r), and this concludes the proof. Claim 3.2. In protocol CoinFlipr there exists an efficient adversarial party P1∗ −r that can bias the output of P2 by 1−2 2r . Proof. Consider the adversarial party P1∗ that completes the pre-processing phase, and then halts in the first round i ∈ {1, . . . , r} for which ai = 0. We denote by Abort the random variable corresponding to the round in which P1∗
14
T. Moran, M. Naor, and G. Segev
aborts, where Abort = ⊥ if P1∗ does not abort. In addition, we denote by c2 the random variable corresponding to the output bit of P2 . Notice that if P1∗ aborts in round j ≤ i∗ then P2 outputs a random bit, and if P1∗ does not abort then P2 always outputs 1. Therefore, for every i ∈ {1, . . . , r} it holds that Pr [c2 = 1 | i∗ = i] =
i
Pr [Abort = j | i∗ = i] Pr [c2 = 1 | Abort = j ∧ i∗ = i]
j=1
+Pr [Abort = ⊥ | i∗ = i] Pr [c2 = 1 | Abort = ⊥ ∧ i∗ = i] =
i
Pr [a1 = · · · = aj−1 = 1, aj = 0] Pr [c2 = 1 | Abort = j ∧ i∗ = i]
j=1
+Pr [a1 = · · · = ai = 1] Pr [c2 = 1 | Abort = ⊥ ∧ i∗ = i] =
i 1 1 1 · + i ·1 j 2 2 2 j=1
=
1 1 + i+1 . 2 2
This implies that Pr [c2 = 1] =
r
Pr [i∗ = i] Pr [c2 = 1 | i∗ = i]
i=1
=
r 1 1 i=1
=
4
r
2
+
1
2i+1
1 1 − 2−r + . 2 2r
The Generalized Protocol
In this section we sketch a more refined and generalized protocol that settles Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 (due to space limitations, we defer the formal description of the protocol and its proof of security to the full version of the paper). The improvements over the protocol presented in Section 3 are as follows: Improved security guarantee: In the simplified protocol party P1 can bias the output of party P2 (by aborting in round i∗ ), but party P2 cannot not bias the output of party P1 . This is due to the fact that party P1 always learns the output before party P2 does. In the generalized protocol the party that learns the output before the other party is chosen uniformly at random (i.e., party P1 learns the output before party P2 with probability 1/2). This is achieved by having the parties exchange a sequence of 2r values (a1 , b1 ), . . . , (a2r , b2r ) (using the same secret-sharing exchange technique as in the simplified protocol) with the following property: for odd values of i,
An Optimally Fair Coin Toss
15
Fig. 3. Overview of the generalized protocol party P1 learns ai before party P2 learns bi , and for even values of i party P2 learns bi before party P1 learns ai . Thus, party P1 can bias the result only when i∗ is odd, and party P2 can bias the result only when i∗ is even. The key point is that the parties can exchange the sequence of 2r shares in only r + 1 rounds by combining some of their messages5. Note that modifying the original protocol by having ShareGen randomly choose which player starts would also halve the bias (since with probability 12 the adversary chooses a player that cannot bias the outcome at all). However, this is vulnerable to a trivial dynamic attack: the adversary decides which party to corrupt after seeing which party was chosen to start. A larger class of functionalities: We consider the more general task of sampling from a distribution D = (D1 , D2 ): party P1 receives a sample from D1 and party P2 receives a correlated sample from D2 (in coin-flipping, for example, the joint distribution D produces the values (0, 0) and (1, 1) each with probability 1/2). Our generalized protocol can handle any polynomiallysampleable distribution D. The basic idea here is ShareGen can be modified to output shares of samples for arbitrary (efficiently sampleable) distributions. 5
Recall that each round consists of two moves: a message from P2 to P1 followed by a message from P1 to P2 .
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T. Moran, M. Naor, and G. Segev
Up to round i∗ the values each party receives are independent samples from the marginal distributions (i.e., P1 receives independent samples from D1 , and P2 from D1 ). From round i∗ , the values are the “real” output from the joint distribution. Figure 3 gives a graphic overview of the protocol (ignoring the authentication tags). As in the simplified protocol, if P2 aborts prematurely, P1 outputs the value ai , where i is the highest index such that ai was successfully reconstructed. If P1 aborts prematurely, P2 outputs the last bi value it successfully reconstructed.
5
Open Problems
Identifying the minimal computational assumptions. Blum’s√coin-flipping protocol, as well as its generalization that guarantees bias of O(1/ r), can rely on the existence of any one-way function. We showed that the optimal tradeoff between the round complexity and the bias can be achieved assuming the existence of oblivious transfer, a complete primitive for secure computation. A challenging problem is to either achieve the optimal bias based on seemingly weaker assumptions (e.g., one-way functions), or to demonstrate that oblivious transfer is in fact essential. Identifying the exact trade-off. The bias of our protocol almost exactly matches Cleve’s lower bound: Cleve showed that any r-round protocol has bias at least 1/(8r + 2), and we manage to achieve bias of at most 1/(4r − c) for some constant c > 0. It will be interesting to eliminate the multiplicative gap of 1/2 by either improving Cleve’s lower bound or by improving our upper bound. We note, however, that this cannot be resolved by improving the security analysis of our protocol since there exists an efficient adversary that can bias our protocol by essentially 1/(4r) (see Section 4), and therefore our analysis is tight. Efficient implementation. Our protocol uses a general secure computation step in the preprocessing phase. Although asymptotically optimal, the techniques used in general secure computation often have a large overhead. Hence, it would be helpful to find an efficient sub-protocol to compute the ShareGenr functionality that can lead to a practical implementation. The multiparty setting. Blum’s coin-flipping protocol can be extended to √ an m-party r-round protocol that has bias O(m/ r). An interesting problem is to identify the optimal trade-off between the number of parties, the round complexity, and the bias. Unfortunately, it seems that several natural variations of our approach fail to extend to the case of more than two parties. Informally, the main reason is that a coalition of malicious parties can guess the threshold round with a pretty good probability by simulating the protocol among themselves for any possible subset.
An Optimally Fair Coin Toss
17
References 1. Ben-Or, M., Goldwasser, S., Wigderson, A.: Completeness theorems for noncryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation. In: Proceedings of the 20th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 1–10 (1988) 2. Blum, M.: Coin flipping by telephone - A protocol for solving impossible problems. In: Proceedings of the 25th IEEE Computer Society International Conference, pp. 133–137 (1982) 3. H˚ astad, J., Impagliazzo, R., Levin, L.A., Luby, M.: A pseudorandom generator from any one-way function. SIAM Journal on Computing 28(4), 1364–1396 (1999) 4. Naor, M.: Bit commitment using pseudorandomness. Journal of Cryptology 4(2), 151–158 (1991) 5. Impagliazzo, R., Luby, M.: One-way functions are essential for complexity based cryptography. In: Proceedings of the 30th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 230–235 (1989) 6. Cleve, R.: Limits on the security of coin flips when half the processors are faulty. In: Proceedings of the 18th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 364–369 (1986) 7. Averbuch, B., Blum, M., Chor, B., Silvio Micali, S.G.: How to implement Bracha’s O(log n) byzantine agreement algorithm (manuscript, 1985) 8. Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography: Basic Applications, vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004) 9. Katz, J.: On achieving the “best of both worlds” in secure multiparty computation. In: Proceedings of the 39th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of computing, pp. 11–20 (2007) 10. Gordon, D., Katz, J.: Partial fairness in secure two-party computation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/206 (2008) 11. Cleve, R., Impagliazzo, R.: Martingales, collective coin flipping and discrete control processes (1993), http://www.cpsc.ucalgary.ca/~ cleve/pubs/martingales.ps 12. Alon, N., Naor, M.: Coin-flipping games immune against linear-sized coalitions. SIAM Journal on Computing 22(2), 403–417 (1993) 13. Ben-Or, M., Linial, N.: Collective coin flipping. Advances in Computing Research: Randomness and Computation 5, 91–115 (1989) 14. Feige, U.: Noncryptographic selection protocols. In: Proceedings of the 40th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, pp. 142–153 (1999) 15. Russell, A., Zuckerman, D.: Perfect information leader election in log ∗ n + O(1) rounds. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 63(4), 612–626 (2001) 16. Saks, M.: A robust noncryptographic protocol for collective coin flipping. SIAM Journal on Discrete Mathematics 2(2), 240–244 (1989) 17. Aharonov, D., Ta-Shma, A., Vazirani, U.V., Yao, A.C.: Quantum bit escrow. In: Proceedings of the 32nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 705–714 (2000) 18. Ambainis, A.: A new protocol and lower bounds for quantum coin flipping. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 68(2), 398–416 (2004) 19. Ambainis, A., Buhrman, H., Dodis, Y., Rohrig, H.: Multiparty quantum coin flipping. In: Proceedings of the 19th Annual IEEE Conference on Computational Complexity, pp. 250–259 (2004) 20. Moran, T., Naor, M.: Basing cryptographic protocols on tamper-evident seals. In: Caires, L., Italiano, G.F., Monteiro, L., Palamidessi, C., Yung, M. (eds.) ICALP 2005. LNCS, vol. 3580, pp. 285–297. Springer, Heidelberg (2005)
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21. Gordon, S.D., Hazay, C., Katz, J., Lindell, Y.: Complete fairness in secure twoparty computation. In: Proceedings of the 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 413–422 (2008) 22. Halpern, J.Y., Teague, V.: Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. In: Proceedings of the 36th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 623–632 (2004) 23. Gordon, S.D., Katz, J.: Rational secret sharing, revisited. In: Proceedings on the 5th International Conference on Security and Cryptographyfor Networks, pp. 229– 241 (2006) 24. Kol, G., Naor, M.: Cryptography and game theory: Designing protocols for exchanging information. In: Proceedings of the 5th Theory of Cryptography Conference, pp. 320–339 (2008) 25. Canetti, R.: Security and composition of multiparty cryptographic protocols. Journal of Cryptology 13(1), 143–202 (2000) 26. Wegman, M.N., Carter, L.: New hash functions and their use in authentication and set equality. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 22(3), 265–279 (1981) 27. Lindell, Y.: Parallel coin-tossing and constant-round secure two-party computation. Journal of Cryptology 16(3), 143–184 (2003) 28. Bellare, M., Rogaway, P.: Code-based game-playing proofs and the security of triple encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2004/331 (2004), http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/331.pdf
Complete Fairness in Multi-party Computation without an Honest Majority S. Dov Gordon and Jonathan Katz Dept. of Computer Science, University of Maryland
Abstract. Gordon et al. recently showed that certain (non-trivial) functions can be computed with complete fairness in the two-party setting. Motivated by their results, we initiate a study of complete fairness in the multi-party case and demonstrate the first completely-fair protocols for non-trivial functions in this setting. We also provide evidence that achieving fairness is “harder” in the multi-party setting, at least with regard to round complexity.
1
Introduction
In the setting of secure computation, a group of parties wish to run a protocol for computing some function of their inputs while preserving, to the extent possible, security properties such as privacy, correctness, input independence and others. These requirements are formalized by comparing a real-world execution of the protocol to an ideal world where there is a trusted entity who performs the computation on behalf of the parties. Informally, a protocol is “secure” if for any real-world adversary A there exists a corresponding ideal-world adversary S (corrupting the same parties as A) such that the result of executing the protocol in the real world with A is computationally indistinguishable from the result of computing the function in the ideal world with S. One desirable property is fairness which, intuitively, means that either everyone receives the output, or else no one does. Unfortunately, it has been shown by Cleve [1] that complete fairness is impossible in general without a majority of honest parties. Until recently, Cleve’s result was interpreted to mean that no non-trivial functions could be computed with complete fairness without an honest majority. A recent result of Gordon et al. [2], however, shows that this folklore is wrong; there exist non-trivial functions than can be computed with complete fairness in the two-party setting. Their work demands that we re-evaluate our current understanding of fairness. Gordon et al. [2] deal exclusively with the case of two-party computation, and leave open the question of fairness in the multi-party setting. Their work does not immediately extend to the case of more than two parties. (See also the discussion in the section that follows.) An additional difficulty that arises in the
This work was supported by NSF CNS-0447075, NSF CCF-0830464, and US-Israel Binational Science Foundation grant #2004240.
O. Reingold (Ed.): TCC 2009, LNCS 5444, pp. 19–35, 2009. c International Association for Cryptologic Research 2009
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multi-party setting is the need to ensure consistency between the outputs of the honest parties, even after a malicious abort. In more detail: in the two-party setting, it suffices for an honest party’s output (following an abort by the other party) to be consistent only with its own local input. But in the multi-party setting, the honest parties’ outputs must each be consistent with all of their inputs. This issue is compounded by the adversary’s ability to adaptively abort the t malicious players in any order and at any time, making fairness in the multi-party setting even harder to achieve. We initiate a study of complete fairness in the multi-party setting. We focus on the case when a private1 broadcast channel (or, equivalently, a PKI) is available to the parties; note that Cleve’s impossibility result applies in this case as well. Although one can meaningfully study fairness in the absence of broadcast, we have chosen to assume broadcast so as to separate the question of fairness from the question of agreement (which has already been well studied in the distributed systems literature). Also, although the question of fairness becomes interesting as soon as an honest majority is not assumed, here we only consider the case of completely-fair protocols tolerating an arbitrary number of corrupted parties. We emphasize that, as in [2], we are interested in obtaining complete fairness rather than some notion of partial fairness. 1.1
Our Results
A natural first question is whether two-party feasibility results [2] can be extended “easily” to the multi-party setting. More formally, say we have a function f : {0, 1} × · · ·× {0, 1} → {0, 1} taking n boolean inputs. (We restrict to boolean inputs/outputs for simplicity only.) For any non-trivial subset I ⊂ [n], define the partition fI of f as the two-input function fI : {0, 1}|I| × {0, 1}n−|I| → {0, 1} given by fI (y, z) = f (x), where x ∈ {0, 1}n is such that xI = y and xI¯ = z. It is not hard to see that if there exists an I for which fI cannot be computed with complete fairness in the two-party setting, then f cannot be computed with complete fairness in the multi-party setting. Similarly, the round complexity for computing f with complete fairness in the multi-party case must be at least the round complexity of fairly computing each fI . What about the converse? We show the following negative result regarding such a “partition-based” approach to the problem: Theorem 1. (Under suitable cryptographic assumptions) there exists a 3-party function f all of whose partitions can be computed with complete fairness in O(1) rounds, but for which any multi-party protocol computing f with complete fairness requires ω(log k) rounds, where k is the security parameter. This indicates that fairness in the multi-party setting is qualitatively harder than fairness in the two-party setting. (A somewhat analogous result in a different context was shown by Chor et al. [3].) 1
We assume private broadcast so as to ensure security against passive eavesdroppers (who do not corrupt any parties).
Complete Fairness in Multi-party Computation without an Honest Majority
21
The function f for which we prove the above theorem is interesting in its own right: it is the 3-party majority function (i.e., voting). Although the ω(log k)round lower bound may seem discouraging, we are able to show a positive result for this function; to the best of our knowledge, this represents the first non-trivial feasibility result for complete fairness in the multi-party setting. Theorem 2. (Under suitable cryptographic assumptions) there exists an ω(log k)-round protocol for securely computing 3-party majority with complete fairness. Our efforts to extend the above result to n-party majority have been unsuccessful. One may therefore wonder whether there exists any (non-trivial) function that can be computed with complete fairness for general n. Indeed, there is: Theorem 3. (Under suitable cryptographic assumptions) for any number of parties n, there exists an Θ(n)-round protocol for securely computing boolean OR with complete fairness. OR is non-trivial in our context: OR is complete for multi-party computation (without fairness) [4], and cannot be computed with information-theoretic privacy even in the two-party setting [5]. Relation to prior work. At a superficial level, the proof of the ω(log k)-round lower bound of Theorem 1 uses an approach similar to that used to prove an analogous lower bound in [2]. We stress, however, that our theorem does not follow as a corollary of that work (indeed, it cannot since each of the partitions of f can be computed with complete fairness in O(1) rounds). We introduce new ideas to prove the result in our setting; in particular, we rely in an essential way on the fact that the output of any two honest parties must agree (whereas this issue does not arise in the two-party setting considered in [2]). Ishai et al. [6] propose a protocol that is resilient to a dishonest majority in a weaker sense than that considered here. Specifically, their protocol achieves the following guarantee (informally): when t < n parties are corrupted then a real execution of the protocol is as secure as an execution in the ideal world with complete fairness where the adversary can query the ideal functionality O(t) times (using different inputs each time). While this definition may guarantee privacy for certain functions (e.g., for the sum function), it does not prevent the malicious parties from biasing the output of the honest parties. We refer the reader to their work for further discussion. 1.2
Outline of the Paper
We include the standard definitions of secure multi-party computation in the full version of this paper [7]. We stress that although the definitions are standard, what is not standard is that we are interested in attaining complete fairness even though we do not have an honest majority.
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We begin with our negative result, showing that any completely-fair protocol for 3-party majority requires ω(log k) rounds. Recall that what is especially interesting about this result is that it demonstrates a gap between the round complexities required for completely-fair computation of a function and its (two-party) partitions. In Section 3, we show an ω(log k)-round protocol for completely-fair computation of 3-party majority. In Section 4 we describe our feasibility result for the case of boolean OR.
2 2.1
A Lower Bound on the Round Complexity of Majority Proof Overview
In this section, we prove Theorem 1 taking as our function f the three-party majority function maj. That is, maj(x1 , x2 , x3 ) = 0 if at least two of the three values {x1 , x2 , x3 } are 0, and is 1 otherwise. Note that any partition of maj is just (isomorphic to) the greater-than-or-equal-to function, where the domain of one input can be viewed as {0, 1, 2} and the domain of the other input can be viewed as {0, 1} (in each case, representing the number of ‘1’ inputs held). Gordon et al. [2] show that, under suitable cryptographic assumptions, the greater-thanor-equal-to function on constant-size domains can be securely computed with complete fairness in O(1) rounds. We prove Theorem 1 by showing that any completely-fair 3-party protocol for maj requires ω(log k) rounds. The basic approach is to argue that if Π is any protocol for securely computing maj, then eliminating the last round of Π results in a protocol Π that still computes maj correctly “with high probability”. Specifically, if the error probability in Π is at most μ (that we will eventually set to some negligible function of k), then the error probability in Π is at most c · μ for some constant c. If the original protocol Π has r = O(log k) rounds, then applying this argument inductively r times gives a protocol that computes maj correctly on all inputs with probability significantly better than guessing without any interaction at all. This gives the desired contradiction. To prove that eliminating the last round of Π cannot affect correctness “too much”, we consider a constraint that holds for the ideal-world evaluation of maj. (Recall, we are working in the ideal world where complete fairness holds.) Consider an adversary who corrupts two parties, and let the input of the honest party P be chosen uniformly at random. The adversary can learn P ’s input by submitting (0, 1) or (1, 0) to the trusted party. The adversary can also try to bias the output of maj to be the opposite of P ’s choice by submitting (0, 0) or (1, 1); this will succeed in biasing the result half the time. But the adversary cannot both learn P ’s input and simultaneously bias the result. (If the adversary submits (0, 1) or (1, 0), the output of maj is always equal to P ’s input; if the adversary submits (0, 0) or (1, 1) the the output of maj reveals nothing about P ’s input.) Concretely, for any ideal-world adversary the sum of the probability that the adversary guesses P ’s input and the probability that the output of maj is not equal to P ’s input is at most 1. In our proof, we show that if correctness
Complete Fairness in Multi-party Computation without an Honest Majority
23
holds with significantly lower probability when the last round of Π is eliminated, then there exists a real-world adversary violating this constraint. 2.2
Proof Details
We number the parties P1 , P2 , P3 , and work modulo 3 in the subscript. The input of Pj is denoted by xj . The following claim formalizes the ideal-world constraint described informally above. Claim 4. For all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and any adversary A corrupting Pj−1 and Pj+1 in an ideal-world computation of maj, we have Pr [A correctly guesses xj ] + Pr [outputj = xj ] ≤ 1, where the probabilities are taken over the random coins of A and random choice of xj ∈ {0, 1}. Proof. Consider an execution in the ideal world, where Pj ’s input xj is chosen uniformly at random. Let equal be the event that A submits two equal inputs (i.e., xj−1 = xj+1 ) to the trusted party. In this case, A learns nothing about Pj ’s input and so can guess xj with probability at most 1/2. It follows that: Pr [A correctly guesses xj ] ≤
1 Pr [equal] + Pr [equal] . 2
Moreover, Pr [outputj = xj ] = 12 Pr [equal] since outputj = xj occurs only if A submits xj−1 = xj+1 = x ¯j to the trusted party. Therefore: Pr [A correctly guesses xj ] + Pr [outputj = xj ] 1 1 ≤ Pr [equal] + Pr [equal] + Pr [equal] 2 2 = Pr [equal] + Pr [equal] = 1, proving the claim. Let Π be a protocol that securely computes maj using r = r(k) rounds. Consider an execution of Π in which all parties run the protocol honestly except for (i) possibly aborting in some round. We denote by bj the value that Pj−1 and Pj+1 both2 output if Pj aborts the protocol after sending its round-i message (and then Pj−1 and Pj+1 honestly run the protocol to completion). Similarly, we (i) (i) denote by bj−1 (resp., bj+1 ) the value output by Pj and Pj+1 (resp., Pj and Pj−1 ) when Pj−1 (resp., Pj+1 ) aborts after sending its round-i message. Note that an (i) adversary who corrupts, e.g., both Pj−1 and Pj+1 can compute bj immediately after receiving the round-i message of Pj . 2
Security of Π implies that the outputs of Pj−1 and Pj+1 in this case must be equal with all but negligible probability. For simplicity we assume this to hold with probability 1 but our proof can be modified easily to remove this assumption.
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S.D. Gordon and J. Katz
Since Π securely computes maj with complete fairness, the ideal-world constraint from the previous claim implies that for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, any inverse polynomial μ(k), and any poly-time adversary A controlling players Pj−1 and Pj+1 , we have: Pr
xj ←{0,1}
[A correctly guesses xj ] +
Pr
xj ←{0,1}
[outputj = xj ] ≤ 1 + μ(k) (1)
for k sufficiently large. Security of Π also guarantees that if the inputs of the honest parties agree, then with all but negligible probability their output must be their common input regardless of when a malicious Pj aborts. That is, for k large enough we have (i) (2) xj+1 = xj−1 ⇒ Pr bj = xj+1 = xj−1 ≥ 1 − μ(k) for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and all i ∈ {0, . . . , r(k)}. The following claim represents the key step in our lower bound. Claim 5. Fix a protocol Π, a function μ, and a value k such that Equations (1) and (2) hold, and let μ = μ(k). Say there exists an i, with 1 ≤ i ≤ r(k), such that for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and all c1 , c2 , c3 ∈ {0, 1} it holds that: (i) (3) Pr bj = maj(c1 , c2 , c3 ) | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (c1 , c2 , c3 ) ≥ 1 − μ. Then for all j ∈ {1, 2, 3} and all c1 , c2 , c3 ∈ {0, 1} it holds that: (i−1) Pr bj = maj(c1 , c2 , c3 ) | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (c1 , c2 , c3 ) ≥ 1 − 5μ.
(4)
Proof. When j = 1 and c2 = c3 , the desired result follows from Equation (2); this is similarly true for j = 2, c1 = c3 as well as j = 3, c1 = c2 . Consider the real-world adversary A that corrupts P1 and P3 and sets x1 = 0 and x3 = 1. Then: – A runs the protocol honestly until it receives the round-i message from P2 . (i) – A then locally computes the value of b2 . (i) • If b2 = 0, then A aborts P1 without sending its round-i message and runs the protocol (honestly) on behalf of P3 until the end. By definition, (i−1) the output of P2 will be b1 . (i) • If b2 = 1, then A aborts P3 without sending its round-i message and runs the protocol (honestly) on behalf of P1 until the end. By definition, (i−1) the output of P2 will be b3 . (i) – After completion of the protocol, A outputs b2 as its guess for the input of P2 . Consider an experiment in which the input x2 of P2 is chosen uniformly at random, and then A runs protocol Π with P2 . Using Equation (3), we have: (i) Pr [A correctly guesses x2 ] = Pr b2 = x2 (i) (5) = Pr b2 = f (0, x2 , 1) ≥ 1 − μ .
Complete Fairness in Multi-party Computation without an Honest Majority
25
We also have: 1 · Pr [output2 = 1 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 0, 1)] (6) 2 1 + · Pr [output2 = 0 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 1, 1)] 2 1 (i−1) (i) Pr b1 = = 1 ∧ b2 = 0 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 0, 1) 2
Pr [output2 = x2 ] =
(i−1)
(i)
+ Pr b3 = 1 ∧ b2 = 1 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 0, 1) (i−1) (i) = 0 ∧ b2 = 1 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 1, 1) + Pr b3 (i−1) (i) = 0 ∧ b2 = 0 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 1, 1) . + Pr b1
From Equation (1), we know that the sum of Equations (5) and (6) is upperbounded by 1 + μ. Looking at the first summand in Equation (6), this implies that (i−1) (i) Pr b1 = 1 ∧ b2 = 0 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 0, 1) ≤ 4μ. (7) Probabilistic manipulation gives (i−1) (i) Pr b1 = 1 ∧ b2 = 0 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 0, 1) (i−1) (i) = 0 ∨ b2 = 1 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 0, 1) = 1 − Pr b1 (i−1) (i) = 0 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 0, 1) − Pr b2 = 1 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 0, 1) ≥ 1 − Pr b1 (i−1) = 0 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 0, 1) − μ , ≥ 1 − Pr b1 where the last inequality is due to the assumption of the claim. Combined with Equation (7), this implies: (i−1) Pr b1 = 0 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 0, 1) ≥ 1 − 5μ. Applying an analogous argument starting with the third summand in Equation (6) gives (i−1) Pr b3 = 1 | (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = (0, 1, 1) ≥ 1 − 5μ. Repeating the entire argument, but modifying the adversary to consider all possible pairs of corrupted parties and all possible settings of their inputs, completes the proof of the claim. Theorem 6. Any protocol Π that securely computes maj with complete fairness (assuming one exists3 at all) requires ω(log k) rounds. 3
In the following section we show that such a protocol does, indeed, exist.
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Proof. Assume there exists a protocol Π that securely computes maj with complete fairness using r = O(log k) rounds. Let μ(k) = 4·51r(k) , and note that μ is noticeable. By the assumed security of Π, the conditions of Claim 5 hold for k large enough; Equation (3), in particular, holds for i = r(k). Fixing this k and applying the claim iteratively r(k) times, we conclude that Pj−1 and Pj+1 can correctly compute the value of the function, on all inputs, with probability at least 3/4 without interacting with Pj at all. This is clearly impossible.
3
Fair Computation of Majority for Three Players
In this section we describe a completely-fair protocol for computing maj for the case of n = 3 parties. The high-level structure of our protocol is as follows: the protocol consists of two phases. In the first phase, the parties run a securewith-abort protocol to generate (authenticated) shares of certain values; in the second phase some of these shares are exchanged, round-by-round, for a total of m iterations. A more detailed description of the protocol follows. In the first phase of the protocol the parties run a protocol π implementing a functionality ShareGen that computes certain values and then distributes authenticated 3-out-of-3 shares of these values to the parties. (See Fig. 1.) Three (i) (i) m (i) m (i) sets of values {b1 }m i=0 , {b2 }i=0 , and {b3 }i=0 are computed; looking ahead, bj denotes the value that parties Pj−1 and Pj+1 are supposed to output in case (i) party Pj aborts after iteration i of the second phase; see below. The values bj are computed probabilistically, in the same manner as in [2]. That is, a round i∗ is first chosen according to a geometric distribution with parameter α = 1/5.4 (We will set m so that i∗ ≤ m with all but negligible probability.) Then, for (i) i < i∗ the value of bj is computed using the true inputs of Pj−1 and Pj+1 but a random input for Pj ; for i ≥ i∗ the value bj is set equal to the correct output (i.e., it is computed using the true inputs of all parties). Note that even an adversary who knows all the parties’ inputs and learns, sequentially, the values (1) (2) (say) b1 , b1 , . . . cannot determine definitively when round i∗ occurs. We choose the protocol π computing ShareGen to be secure-with-designatedabort [8] for P1 . Roughly speaking, this means privacy and correctness are ensured no matter what, and output delivery and (complete) fairness are guaranteed unless P1 is corrupted; a formal definition in given in the full version [7]. The second phase of the protocol proceeds in a sequence of m = ω(log n) iter(i) ations. (See Fig. 2.) In each iteration i, each party Pj broadcasts its share of bj . (We stress that we allow rushing, and do not assume synchronous broadcast.) Observe that, after this is done, parties Pj−1 and Pj+1 jointly have enough in(i) (i) formation to reconstruct bj , but neither party has any information about bj on its own. If all parties behave honestly until the end of the protocol, then in (m) the final iteration all parties reconstruct b1 and output this value. (i)
4
This is the distribution on N = {1, 2, . . .} given by flipping a biased coin (that is heads with probability α) until the first head appears.
Complete Fairness in Multi-party Computation without an Honest Majority
27
ShareGen Inputs: Let the inputs to ShareGen be x1 , x2 , x3 ∈ {0, 1}. (If one of the received inputs is not in the correct domain, then a default value of 1 is used for that player.) The security parameter is k. Computation: (1)
(m)
(1)
(m)
(1)
(m)
1. Define values b1 , . . . , b1 , b2 , . . . , b2 and b3 , . . . , b3 in the following way: – Choose i∗ ≥ 1 according to a geometric distribution with parameter α = 1/5 (see text). – For i = 0 to i∗ − 1 and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} do: • Choose x ˆj ← {0, 1} at random. (i) ˆj , xj+1 ). • Set bj = maj(xj−1 , x (i)
– For i = i∗ to m and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, set bj = maj(x1 , x2 , x3 ).
2. For 0 ≤ i ≤ m and j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, choose (i)
(i)
(i)
(i) bj|1 ,
(i)
(i)
bj|2 and bj|3 as random three(i)
(i)
(i)
(i)
way shares of bj . (E.g., bj|1 and bj|2 are random and bj|3 = bj|1 ⊕bj|2 ⊕bj .) k
3. Let (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 ). For 0 ≤ i ≤ m, and j, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, let Signsk (ijj
(i) bj|j ).
(i) σj|j
=
Output: 1. Send to each Pj the public key pk and the values m (i) (i) (i) (i) (i) (i) . Additionally, for each j ∈ {1, 2, 3} (b1|j , σ1|j ), (b2|j , σ2|j ), (b3|j , σ3|j ) i=0
(0)
parties Pj−1 and Pj+1 receive the value bj|j . Fig. 1. Functionality ShareGen
If a single party Pj aborts in some iteration i, then the remaining players Pj−1 (i−1) and Pj+1 jointly reconstruct the value bj and output this value. (These two parties jointly have enough information to do this.) If two parties abort in some iteration i (whether at the same time, or one after the other) then the remaining party simply outputs its own input. We refer to Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 for the formal specification of the protocol. We now prove that this protocol securely computes maj with complete fairness. Theorem 7. Assume that (Gen, Sign, Vrfy) is a secure signature scheme, that π securely computes ShareGen with designated abort, and that πOR securely computes OR with complete fairness.5 Then the protocol in Figure 2 securely computes maj with complete fairness. Proof. Let Π denote the protocol of Figure 2. Observe that Π yields the correct output with all but negligible probability when all players are honest. This is because, with all but negligible probability, i∗ ≤ m, and then (m) bj = maj(x1 , x2 , x3 ). We thus focus on security of Π. 5
It is shown in [2] that such a protocol exists under standard assumptions.
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Protocol 1 Inputs: Party Pi has input xi ∈ {0, 1}. The security parameter is k. The protocol: 1. Preliminary phase: (a) Parties P1 , P2 and P3 run a protocol π for computing ShareGen. Each player uses their respective inputs, x1 , x2 and x3 , and security parameter k. (b) If P2 and P3 receive ⊥ from this execution, then P2 and P3 run a twoparty protocol πOR to compute the logical-or of their inputs. Otherwise, continue to the next stage. In what follows, parties always verify signatures; invalid signatures are treated as an abort. 2. For i = 1, . . . , m − 1 do: Broadcast shares: (i) (i) (a) Each Pj broadcasts (bj|j , σj|j ). (b) If (only) Pj aborts: (i−1) (i−1) (i−1) (i−1) i. Pj−1 and Pj+1 broadcast (bj|j−1 , σj|j−1 ) and (bj|j+1 , σj|j+1 ), respectively. ii. If one of Pj−1 , Pj+1 aborts in the previous step, the remaining player outputs its own input value. Otherwise, Pj−1 and Pj+1 both (i−1) (i−1) (i−1) (i−1) = bj|1 ⊕ bj|2 ⊕ bj|3 . (Recall that if i = 1, parties output bj (0)
Pj−1 and Pj+1 received bj|j as output from π.) (c) If two parties abort, the remaining player outputs its own input value. 3. In round i = m do: (m) (m) (a) Each Pj broadcasts b1|j , σ1|j .
(m)
(m)
(m)
(m)
= b1|1 ⊕ b1|2 ⊕ b1|3 . (b) If no one aborts, then all players output b1 If (only) Pj aborts, then Pj−1 and Pj+1 proceed as in step 2b. If two players abort, the remaining player outputs its own input as in step 2c. Fig. 2. A protocol for computing majority
When no parties are corrupt, security is straightforward since we assume the existence of a private broadcast channel. We therefore consider separately the cases when a single party is corrupted and when two parties are corrupted. Since the entire protocol is symmetric except for the fact that P1 may choose to abort π, without loss of generality we may analyze the case when the adversary corrupts P1 and the case when the adversary corrupts {P1 , P2 }. In each case, we prove security of Π in a hybrid world where there is an ideal functionality computing ShareGen (with abort) as well as an ideal functionality computing OR (with complete fairness). Applying the composition theorem of [9] then gives the desired result. A proof for the case where only P1 is corrupted turns out to be fairly straightforward, and is given in Appendix A.1. Claim 8. For every non-uniform, poly-time adversary A corrupting P1 and P2 and running Π in a hybrid model with access to ideal functionalities
Complete Fairness in Multi-party Computation without an Honest Majority
29
computing ShareGen (with abort) and OR (with completes fairness), there exists a non-uniform, poly-time adversary S corrupting P1 and P2 and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing maj (with complete fairness), such that
idealmaj,S (x1 , x2 , x3 , k) x ∈{0,1},k∈N i s ShareGen,OR ≡ hybridΠ,A (x1 , x2 , x3 , k)
xi ∈{0,1},k∈N
.
Proof. This case is significantly more complex than the case when only a sin(i) gle party is corrupted, since here A learns b3 in each iteration i of the second phase. As in [2], we must deal with the fact that A might abort exactly in iteration i∗ , after learning the correct output but before P3 has enough information to compute the correct output. We describe a simulator S who corrupts P1 and P2 and runs A as a black-box. For ease of exposition in what follows, we refer to the actions of P1 and P2 when more formally we mean the action of A on behalf of those parties. 1. S invokes A on the inputs x1 and x2 , the auxiliary input z, and the security parameter k. 2. S receives x1 and x2 from P1 and P2 , respectively, as input to ShareGen. If / {0, 1} (resp., x2 ∈ / {0, 1}), then S sets x1 = 1 (resp., x2 = 1). x1 ∈ 3. S computes (sk, pk) ← Gen(1k ), and then generates shares as follows: m (i) (i) (i) (i) (i) (i) (a) Choose b1|1 , b2|1 , b3|1 , b1|2 , b2|2 , b3|2 uniformly at random. i=0
(b) Choose x ˆ3 ← {0, 1} and set b3 = maj(x1 , x2 , x ˆ3 ). Set b3|3 = b3 ⊕ b3|1 ⊕ (0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
(0)
b3|2 . S then hands A the public key pk, the values m (i) (i) (i) (i) (i) (i) b1|1 , b2|1 , b3|1 , b1|2 , b2|2 , b3|2 (along with their appropriate signatures), (0)
i=0
and the value b3|3 as the outputs of P1 and P2 from ShareGen. 4. If P1 aborts execution of ShareGen, then S extracts x2 from P2 as its input to OR. It then sends (1, x2 ) to the trusted party computing maj, outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. 5. Otherwise, if P1 does not abort, then S picks a value i∗ according to a geometric distribution with parameter α = 15 . In what follows, for ease of description, we will use x1 and x2 in place of x1 and x2 , keeping in mind that that A could of course have used substituted inputs. We also ignore the presence of signatures from now on, and leave the following implicit in what follows: (1) S always computes an appropriate signature when sending any value to A; (2) S treats an incorrect signature as an abort; and (3) if S ever receives a valid signature on a previously unsigned message (i.e., a forgery), then S outputs fail and halts. Also, from here on we will say that S sends b to A in round i if S sends (i) (i) (i) (i) (i) a value b3|3 such that b3|3 ⊕ b3|1 ⊕ b3|2 = b3 = b.
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6. For round i = 1, . . . , i∗ − 1, the simulator S computes and then sends b3 as follows: (a) Select x ˆ3 ← {0, 1} at random. (i) ˆ3 ). (b) b3 = maj(x1 , x2 , x ˆ2 = x2 and assigns a value to x ˆ1 7. If P1 aborts in round i < i∗ , then S sets x according to the following rules that depend on the values of (x1 , x2 ) and on (i) the value of b3 : ˆ1 = x1 with probability 38 (and sets x ˆ1 = x ¯1 (a) If x1 = x2 , then S sets x otherwise). (i) ˆ1 = x1 with probability 14 (and (b) If x1 = x2 and b3 = x1 , then S sets x sets x ˆ1 = x ¯1 otherwise). (i) ˆ1 = x1 with probability 12 (and (c) If x1 = x2 and b3 = x2 , then S sets x ¯1 otherwise). sets x ˆ1 = x S then finishes the simulation as follows: (a) If xˆ1 = x ˆ2 , then S submits (ˆ x1 , x ˆ2 ) to the trusted party computing maj. Denote the output it receives from the trusted party by bout . Then S sets (i−1) (i−1) (i−1) (i−1) (i−1) (i−1) b1 = bout , computes b1|3 = b1 ⊕ b1|1 ⊕ b1|2 , sends b1|3 to P2 (on behalf of P3 ), outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. (i−1) (i−1) (i−1) (b) If x ˆ1 = xˆ2 , then S sets b1 = x ˆ1 = xˆ2 , computes b1|3 = b1 ⊕ (i)
(i−1)
(i−1)
(i−1)
b1|1 ⊕ b1|2 , and sends b1|3 to P2 (on behalf of P3 ). (We stress that this is done before sending anything to the trusted party computing maj.) If P2 aborts, then S sends (0, 1) to the trusted party computing ˆ2 ) to the trusted party computing maj. In maj. Otherwise, it sends (ˆ x1 , x both cases it outputs whatever A outputs, and then halts. If P2 aborts in round i < i∗ , then S acts analogously but swapping the roles of P1 and P2 as well as x1 and x2 . If both parties abort in round i < i∗ (at the same time), then S sends (0, 1) to the trusted party computing maj, outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. 8. In round i∗ : (a) If x1 = x2 , then S submits (x1 , x2 ) to the trusted party. Let bout = maj(x1 , x2 , x3 ) denote the output. (b) If x1 = x2 , then S simply sets bout = x1 = x2 without querying the trusted party and continues. (Note that in this case, bout = maj(x1 , x2 , x3 ) even though S did not query the trusted party.) 9. In rounds i∗ , . . . , m − 1, the simulator S sends bout to A. If A aborts P1 and P2 simultaneously, then S submits (1, 0) to the trusted party (if he hasn’t already done so in step 8a), outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. (i−1) (i−1) If A aborts P1 (only), then S sets b1 = bout , computes b1|3 = (i−1)
(i−1)
(i−1)
(i−1)
b1 ⊕ b1|1 ⊕ b1|2 , and sends b1|3 to P2 (on behalf of P3 ). Then: Case 1: x1 = x2 . Here S has already sent (x1 , x2 ) to the trusted party. So S simply outputs whatever A outputs and ends the simulation. Case 2: x1 = x2 . If P2 does not abort, then S sends (x1 , x2 ) to the trusted party. If P2 aborts, then S sends (0, 1) to the trusted party. In both cases S then outputs whatever A outputs and halts.
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If A aborts P2 (only), then S acts as above but swapping the roles of P1 , P2 and x1 , x2 . If A does not abort anyone through round m, then S sends (x1 , x2 ) to the trusted party (if he hasn’t already done so), outputs what A outputs, and halts. The above constitutes the full description of S. Due to space limitations, the analysis of S is given in the full version of this paper [7].
4
Completely-Fair Computation of Boolean OR
The protocol in the previous section enables completely-fair computation of 3party majority; unfortunately, we were not able to extend the approach to the case of n > 3 parties. In this section, we demonstrate feasibility of completelyfair computation of a non-trivial function for an arbitrary number of parties n, any t < n of whom are corrupted. Specifically, we show how to compute boolean OR with complete fairness. The basic idea behind our protocol is to have the parties repeatedly try to compute OR on committed inputs using a protocol that is secure-withdesignated-abort where only the lowest-indexed party can force an abort. (See the full version [7] for further discussion.) The key observation is that in case of an abort, the dishonest players only “learn something” about the inputs of the honest players in case all the malicious parties use input 0. (If any of the malicious players holds input 1, then the output is always 1 regardless of the inputs of the honest parties.) So, if the lowest-indexed party is corrupt and aborts the computation of the committed OR, then the remaining parties simply recompute the committed OR using ‘0’ as the effective input for any parties who have already been eliminated. The parties repeatedly proceed in this fashion, eliminating dishonest parties at each iteration. Eventually, when the lowest-indexed player is honest, the process terminates and all honest players receive (correct) output. The actual protocol follows the above intuition, but is a bit more involved. A formal description of the protocol is given in Fig. 3, and the “committed OR” functionality is defined in Fig. 4. Theorem 9. Assume Com is a computationally-hiding, statistically-binding commitment scheme, and that πP securely computes CommittedORP (with abort). Then the protocol of Fig. 3 computes OR with complete fairness. Proof. Let Π denote the protocol of Fig. 3. For simplicity we assume Com is perfectly binding, though statistical binding suffices. For any non-uniform, polynomial time adversary A in the hybrid world, we demonstrate a non-uniform polynomial-time adversary S corrupting the same parties as A and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing OR (with complete fairness), such that idealOR,S (x1 , . . . , xn , k) x ∈{0,1},k∈N i c CommittedORP ≡ hybridΠ,A (x1 , . . . , xn , k) . xi ∈{0,1},k∈N
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Protocol 2 Inputs: Each party Pi holds input xi ∈ {0, 1}, and the security parameter is k. Computation: 1. Let P = {P1 , . . . , Pn } be the set of all players. 2. Each player Pi chooses random coins ri and broadcasts ci = Com(1k , xi , ri ), where Com denotes a computationally-hiding, statistically-binding commitment scheme. If any party Pi does not broadcast anything (or otherwise broadcasts an invalid value), then all honest players output 1. Otherwise, let c = (c1 , . . . , cn ). 3. All players Pi ∈ P run a protocol πP for computing CommittedORP , with def party Pi using (xi , ri , cP ) as its input where cP = (ci )i:Pi ∈P . 4. If players receive ⊥ from the execution of CommittedORP , they set P = P \ {P ∗ }, where P ∗ ∈ P is the lowest-indexed player in P, and return to Step 3. 5. If players receive a set D ⊂ P from the execution of CommittedORP , they set P = P \ D and return to Step 3. 6. If players receive a binary output from the execution of CommittedORP , they output this value and end the protocol. Fig. 3. A protocol computing OR for n players CommittedORP Inputs: The functionality is run by parties in P. Let the input of player Pi ∈ P be (xi , ri , ci ) where ci = (cij )j:Pj ∈P . The security parameter is k. For each party Pi ∈ P, determine its output as follows: 1. Say Pj disagrees with Pi if either (1) cj = ci or (2) Com(1k , xj , rj ) = cij . (Note that disagreement is not a symmetric relation.) 2. Let Di be the set of parties who disagree with Pi . 3. If there exist any parties
that disagree with each other, return Di as output to Pi . Otherwise, return j:Pj ∈P xj to all parties. Fig. 4. Functionality CommittedORP , parameterized by a set P
Applying the composition theorem of [9] then proves the theorem. When no players are corrupt, security is trivial due to the assumed existence of a private broadcast channel. We now describe the execution of S assuming a set C = ∅ of corrupted parties: 1. Let H = {P1 , . . . Pn } \ C denote the honest players. Initialize I = C. Looking ahead, I denotes the set of corrupted parties who have not yet been eliminated from the protocol. 2. S invokes A on the inputs {xi }i:Pi ∈C , the auxiliary input z, and the security parameter k.
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3. For Pi ∈ H, the simulator S gives to A a commitment ci = Com(1k , xi , ri ) to xi = 0 using randomness ri . S then records the commitment ci that is broadcast by A on behalf of each party Pi ∈ C. If any corrupted player fails to broadcast a value ci , then S submits 1’s to the trusted party on behalf of all corrupted parties, outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. 4. If I = ∅, S submits (on behalf of all the corrupted parties) 0’s to the trusted party computing OR (unless it has already done so). It then outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. If I = ∅, continue to the next step. 5. S sets P = H ∪ I and obtains inputs {(ri , xi , ci )}i:Pi ∈I for the computation of CommittedORP . For each Pi ∈ P, the simulator S computes the list of players Di that disagree with Pi (as in Fig. 4), using as the inputs of the honest parties the commitments defined in Step 3, and assuming that honest parties provide correct decommitments. Observe that if Pi , Pj ∈ H then Di = Dj ⊆ I. Let DH ⊆ I be the set of parties that disagree with the honest parties. Let P ∗ be the lowest-indexed player in P. If no parties disagree with each other, go to Step 6. Otherwise: (a) If P ∗ ∈ I, then A is given {Di }i:Pi ∈I . If P ∗ aborts, then S sets I = I \ {P ∗ } and goes to Step 4. If P ∗ does not abort, then S sets I = I \ DH and goes to Step 4. / I, then A is given {Di }i:Pi ∈I . Then S sets I = I \ DH and goes (b) If P ∗ ∈ to Step 4.
6. S computes the value b = Pi ∈I xi . (a) If b = 0, and S has not yet queried the trusted party computing OR, then S submits 0’s (on behalf of all the corrupted parties) to the trusted party and stores the output of the trusted party as bout . S gives bout to A (either as just received from the trusted party, or as stored in a previous execution of this step). (b) If b = 1, then S gives the value 1 to A without querying the trusted party. S now continues as follows: (a) If P ∗ ∈ I and P ∗ aborts, then S sets I = I \ {P ∗ } and goes to Step 4. / I, or if P ∗ does not abort, then S submits 1’s to the trusted (b) If P ∗ ∈ party if it has not yet submitted 0’s. It outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. We refer the reader to the full version of this paper [7] for an analysis of the above simulation.
References 1. Cleve, R.: Limits on the security of coin flips when half the processors are faulty. In: Proc. 18th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pp. 364–369 (1986) 2. Gordon, D., Hazay, C., Katz, J., Lindell, Y.: Complete fairness in secure two-party computation. In: Proc. 40th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC) (2008)
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3. Chor, B., Ishai, Y.: On privacy and partition arguments. Inf. Comput. 167(1), 2–9 (2001) 4. Kilian, J., Kushilevitz, E., Micali, S., Ostrovsky, R.: Reducibility and completeness in private computations. SIAM J. Computing 29(4), 1189–1208 (2000) 5. Chor, B., Kushilevitz, E.: A zero-one law for boolean privacy. SIAM Journal of Discrete Math 4(1), 36–47 (1991) 6. Ishai, Y., Kushilevitz, E., Lindell, Y., Petrank, E.: On combining privacy with guaranteed output delivery in secure multiparty computation. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 483–500. Springer, Heidelberg (2006) 7. Gordon, S.D., Katz, J.: Complete fairness in multi-party computation without an honest majority. In: 6th Theory of Cryptography Conference, TCC (2009), http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/458 8. Goldreich, O.: Foundations of Cryptography, Basic Applications, vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2004) 9. Canetti, R.: Security and composition of multiparty cryptographic protocols. Journal of Cryptology 13(1), 143–202 (2000)
A A.1
Proofs Proof of Security for Majority with a Single Corrupted Party
Claim 10. For every non-uniform, polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P1 and running Π in a hybrid model with access to ideal functionalities computing ShareGen (with abort) and OR (with complete fairness), there exists a nonuniform, poly-time adversary S corrupting P1 and running in the ideal world with access to an ideal functionality computing maj (with complete fairness), such that idealmaj,S (x1 , x2 , x3 , k) x ∈{0,1},k∈N i s ShareGen,OR ≡ hybridΠ,A (x1 , x2 , x3 , k) . xi ∈{0,1},k∈N
Proof. Fix some polynomial-time adversary A corrupting P1 . We now describe a simulator S that also corrupts P1 and runs A as a black box. 1. S invokes A on the input x1 , the auxiliary input z, and the security parameter k. 2. S receives input x1 ∈ {0, 1} on behalf of P1 as input to ShareGen. k 3. S computes (sk, pk) ← Gen(1 ), and gives to A the public key pk and values (0)
(0)
(i)
(i)
(i)
m
b2|2 , b3|3 , and b1|1 , b2|1 , b3|1 (along with their appropriate signatures) i=0 chosen uniformly at random. 4. If A aborts execution of ShareGen, then S sends 1 to the trusted party computing maj, outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. Otherwise, S picks a value i∗ according to a geometric distribution with parameter α = 15 . For simplicity in what follows, we ignore the presence of signatures and leave the following implicit from now on: (1) S always computes an appropriate signature when sending any value to A; (2) S treats an incorrect signature as an abort; and (3) if S ever receives a valid signature on a previously unsigned message, then S outputs fail and halts.
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5. S now simulates the rounds of the protocol one-by-one: for i = 1 to m − 1, (i) (i) the simulator chooses random b2|2 and b3|3 and sends these to A. During this step, an abort by A (on behalf of P1 ) is treated as follows: (a) If P1 aborts in round i ≤ i∗ , then S chooses a random value x ˆ1 and sends it to the trusted party computing maj. (b) If P1 aborts in round i > i∗ , then S submits x1 to the trusted party computing maj. In either case, S then outputs whatever A outputs and halts. 6. If P1 has not yet aborted, S then simulates the final round of the protocol. S sends x1 to the trusted party, receives bout = maj(x1 , x2 , x3 ), and chooses (m) (m) (m) (m) (m) b1|2 and b1|3 at random subject to b1|2 ⊕ b1|3 ⊕ b1|1 = bout . S then gives these values to A, outputs whatever A outputs, and halts. Due to the security of the underlying signature scheme, the probability that S outputs fail is negligible in k. Note that the view of P1 is otherwise statistically close in both worlds. Indeed, until round m the view of P1 is independent of the inputs of the other parties in both the real and ideal worlds. In round m itself, P1 learns the (correct) output bout in the ideal world and learns this value with all but negligible probability in the real world. We therefore only have to argue that outputs of the two honest parties in the real and ideal worlds are statistically close. Clearly this is true if P1 never aborts. As for the case when P1 aborts at some point during the protocol, we divide our analysis into the following cases: – If P1 aborts the execution of ShareGen in step 4, then S submits ‘1’ on behalf of P1 to the trusted party computing maj. Thus, in the ideal world, the outputs of P2 and P3 will be maj(1, x2 , x3 ). In the real world, if P1 aborts computation of ShareGen, the honest parties output OR(x2 , x3 ). Since maj(1, x2 , x3 ) = OR(x2 , x3 ), their outputs are the same. – If P1 aborts in round i of the protocol (cf. step 5), then in both the real and ideal worlds the following holds: x1 , x2 , x3 ) where x ˆ1 is chosen • If i ≤ i∗ , then P2 and P3 output maj(ˆ uniformly at random. • If i > i∗ , then P2 and P3 output maj(x1 , x2 , x3 ) Since i∗ is identically distributed in both worlds, the outputs of P2 and P3 in this case are identically distributed as well. – If P1 aborts in round m (cf. step 6), then in the ideal world the honest parties will output maj(x1 , x2 , x3 ). In the real world the honest parties output maj(x1 , x2 , x3 ) as long as i∗ ≤ m − 1, which occurs with all but negligible probability. This completes the proof.
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority Shien Jin Ong1, , David C. Parkes2, Alon Rosen3, , and Salil Vadhan4,† 1
2
Goldman, Sachs & Co., New York, NY
[email protected] Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, Cambridge, MA
[email protected] 3 Herzliya Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya, Israel
[email protected] 4 Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences and Center for Research on Computation and Society, Cambridge, MA
[email protected]
Abstract. We provide a simple protocol for secret reconstruction in any threshold secret sharing scheme, and prove that it is fair when executed with many rational parties together with a small minority of honest parties. That is, all parties will learn the secret with high probability when the honest parties follow the protocol and the rational parties act in their own self-interest (as captured by a set-Nash analogue of trembling hand perfect equilibrium). The protocol only requires a standard (synchronous) broadcast channel, tolerates both early stopping and incorrectly computed messages, and only requires 2 rounds of communication. Previous protocols for this problem in the cryptographic or economic models have either required an honest majority, used strong communication channels that enable simultaneous exchange of information, or settled for approximate notions of security/equilibria. They all also required a nonconstant number of rounds of communication. Keywords: game theory, fairness, secret sharing.
1
Introduction
A major concern in the design of distributed protocols is the possibility that parties may deviate from the protocol. Historically, there have been two main paradigms for modeling this possibility. One is the cryptographic paradigm, where some parties are honest, meaning they will always follow the specified
†
Earlier versions of this paper are [34,35]. Work done while author was a graduate student at Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. Part of this work done while the author was a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University’s Center for Research on Computation and Society. Work supported in part by ISF Grant 334/08. Supported by NSF grant CNS-0831289.
O. Reingold (Ed.): TCC 2009, LNCS 5444, pp. 36–53, 2009. c International Association for Cryptologic Research 2009
Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority
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protocol, and others are malicious, meaning they can deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. The other is the economic paradigm, where all parties are considered to be rational, meaning that they will deviate from the protocol if and only if it is in their interest to do so. Recently, some researchers have proposed studying mixtures of these traditional cryptographic and economic models, with various combinations of honest, malicious, and rational participants. One motivation for this that it may allow a more accurate modeling of the diversity of participants in real-life executions of protocols. Along these lines, the papers of Aiyer et al. [2], Lysyanskaya and Triandopoulos [30], and Abraham et al. [1] construct protocols that achieve the best of both worlds. Specifically, they take protocol properties that are known to be achievable in both the cryptographic model (with honest and malicious parties) and the economic model (with only rational parties), and show that protocols with the same properties can still be achieved in a more general model consisting of malicious and rational parties. Our work is of the opposite flavor. We consider properties that are not achievable in either the cryptographic or economic models alone, and show that they can be achieved in a model consisting of both honest and rational parties. Specifically, we consider the task of secret reconstruction in secret sharing, and provide a protocol that is fair, meaning that all parties will receive the output, given many rational participants together with a small minority of honest participants. In standard communication models, fairness is impossible in a purely economic model (with only rational participants) [20,25] or in a purely cryptographic model (with a majority of malicious participants) [10]. Previous works in the individual models achieved fairness by assuming strong communication primitives that allow simultaneous exchange of information [20,19,1,25,28,29,21]1 or settled for approximate notions of security/equilibria [12,7,17,38,25], whereas we only use a standard (i.e. synchronous but not simultaneous) broadcast channel and achieve a standard notion of game-theoretic equilibrium (namely, a trembling hand perfect equilibrium). Thus, our work illustrates the potential power of a small number of honest parties to maintain equilibria in protocols. These parties follow the specified strategy even when it is not in their interest to do so, whether out of altruism or laziness. While we study a very specific problem (secret sharing reconstruction, as opposed to general secure function evaluation), we hope that eventually the understanding developed in this clean setting will be leveraged to handle more complex settings (as has been the case in the past). Below, we review the cryptographic and economic paradigms in more detail. We then introduce the secret-sharing problem we study and survey recent works on this problem in the purely economic model. We then describe our results and compare them to what was achieved before. 1
Actually, the impossibility results of [20,25] also hold in the presence of a simultaneous broadcast channel and thus the works of [20,19,1,25] use additional relaxations, such as allowing the number of rounds and/or the sizes of the shares to be unbounded random variables.
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1.1
S.J. Ong et al.
The Cryptographic Paradigm
In the cryptographic paradigm, we allow for a subset of the parties to deviate from the protocol in an arbitrary, malicious manner (possibly restricted to computationally feasible strategies), and the actions of these parties are viewed as being controlled by a single adversary. Intuitively, this captures worst-case deviations from the protocol, so protocols protecting against such malicious and monolithic adversaries provide a very high level of security. Remarkably, this kind of security can be achieved for essentially every multiparty functionality, as shown by a series of beautiful results from the 1980’s [45,18,8,5,39]. However, considering arbitrary (and coordinated) malicious behavior does have some important limitations. For example, it is necessary to either assume that a majority of the participants are honest (i.e. not controlled by the adversary) or allow for protocols that are unfair (i.e. the adversary can prevent some parties from getting the output). This follows from a classic result of Cleve [10], who first showed that there is no fair 2-party protocol for coin-tossing (even with computational security), and then deduced the general version by viewing a multiparty protocol an interaction between two super-parties, each of which controls half of the original parties. Lepinski et al. [28] bypass this impossibility result by assuming a strong communication primitive (“ideal envelopes”) which allow simultaneous exchange of information, but it remains of interest to find ways of achieving fairness without changing the communication model. 1.2
The Economic Paradigm
In the economic paradigm, parties are modeled as rational agents with individual preferences, and will only deviate from the protocol if this is in their own self interest. This approach has become very popular in the CS literature in recent years, with many beautiful results. There are two aspects of this approach: 1. Design computationally efficient mechanisms (i.e. functionalities that can be implemented by a trusted mediator) that give parties an incentive to be truthful about their private inputs, while optimizing some social choice function, which measures the benefit to society and/or the mechanism designer [32,27,3]. 2. Implement these mechanisms by distributed protocols, with computational efficiency emphasized in distributed algorithmic mechanism design [13,14,15] and extended to also emphasize additional equilibrium considerations in distributed implementation [42,36,37], so that parties are “faithful” and choose to perform message passing and computational tasks in ex post Nash equilibrium. More recent works achieve a strong form of distributed implementation, with provably no additional equilibria [29,21], but require strong communication primitives. Note that distributed algorithmic mechanism design is different in spirit from the traditional problem considered in cryptographic protocols, in that parties have “true” private inputs (whereas in cryptography all inputs are considered
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equally valid) and there is freedom to change how these inputs are mapped to outcomes through choosing appropriate social choice functions to implement (whereas in cryptography, the functionality is pre-specified.) Nevertheless, recent works have explored whether we can use the economic model to obtain ‘better’ solutions to traditionally cryptographic problems, namely to compute some pre-specified functionalities. One potential benefit is that we may be able to incentivize parties to provide their “true” private inputs along the lines of Item 1 above; the papers [31,43] explore for what functionalities and kinds of utility functions this is possible in the presence of game-theoretic agents. A second potential benefit is that rational deviations may be easier to handle than malicious deviations (thus possibly leading to protocols with better properties), while also preferable to assuming a mixture of players at the honest and malicious extremes. This has led to a line of work, started by Halpern and Teague [20] and followed by [19,1,25], studying the problems of secret sharing and multiparty computation in the purely economic model, with all rational participants. One can also require notions of equilibria that are robust against coalitions of rational players [1]. While this approach has proved to be quite fruitful, it too has limitations. Specifically, as pointed out in [19,25], it seems difficult to construct rational protocols that are fair in the standard communication model, because parties may have an incentive to stop participating once they receive their own output. The works [20,19,1,25], as well as [29,21] applied to appropriately designed mediated games, achieve fairness by using strong communication primitives (simultaneous broadcast, “ballot boxes”) that allow simultaneous exchange of information. As mentioned above, we achieve fairness in the standard communication model by considering a mix of many rational participants together with a small minority of honest participants. Note that Cleve’s [10] proof that an honest majority is necessary in the cryptographic setting, by reduction to the two-party case, no longer applies. The reason is that we cannot view a subset of the rational parties as being controlled by a single super-party. Even when considering coalitions, it seems that each individual in that subset would only agree to a coordinated (joint) deviation if it is in its own interest to do so. Our protocol is for the share reconstruction problem in secret sharing, which we now describe in more detail. 1.3
Secret Sharing
In a t-out-of-n secret-sharing scheme [41,6], a dealer takes a secret s and computes n (randomized) shares s1 , . . . , sn of s, which are distributed among n parties. The required properties are that (a) any set of t parties can reconstruct the secret s from their shares, but (b) any set of fewer than t parties has no information about s (i.e. they would have been equally likely to receive the same shares for every possible value of s). Secret sharing is a fundamental building block for cryptographic protocols [18,5,8,39]. Typically, these protocols are structured as follows. First, every party shares its private input among all the parties. Then the computation of the
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functionality is done on shares (to maintain privacy). And at the end, the parties reveal their shares of the output so that everyone can reconstruct it. Our focus is on this final reconstruction step. Typically, it is assumed that there are enough honest parties in the protocol to ensure that the secret can be reconstructed from the revealed shares, even if some parties refuse to reveal their shares or even reveal incorrect values. This turns out to be achievable if and only if more than a 2/3 fraction of the players are honest [9]. (In previous versions of the paper, we restricted attention to fail-stop deviations where a party may stop participating in the protocol early but otherwise follows the prescribed strategy, in which case only an honest majority is needed in the traditional cryptographic model.) 1.4
Rational Secret Sharing
It is natural to ask whether we can bypass this need for an honest majority by considering only rational deviations from the protocol. As noted above, the study of secret sharing with only rational participants was initiated by Halpern and Teague [20], and there have been several subsequent works [19,25,1]. In these works, it is assumed that participants prefer to learn the secret over not learning the secret, and secondarily, prefer that as few other agents as possible learn it. As pointed out in Gordon and Katz [19], any protocol where rational participants reveal their shares sequentially will not yield a Nash equilibrium. This is because it is rational for the t’th player to stop participating, as she can already compute the secret from the shares of the first t − 1 players and her own, and stopping may prevent the first t − 1 players from learning it. One way to get around this difficulty is to assume a simultaneous broadcast channel, where all parties can broadcast values at the same time, without the option of waiting to see what values the other parties are broadcasting. All parties simultaneously revealing their shares is a Nash equilibrium. That is, assuming all of the other parties are simultaneously revealing their shares, no party can increase her utility by aborting (stopping early) instead of revealing. This basic protocol is instructive because it has several deficiences: 1. A simultaneous broadcast channel is a strong (and perhaps unrealistic) communication primitive, particularly in the context of trying to achieve fairness, where the typical difficulties are due to asymmetries in the times that parties get information. For example, fair coin-tossing is trivial with a simultaneous broadcast channel (everyone broadcasts a bit, and the output is the exclusive-or), in contrast to Cleve’s impossibility result for synchronous broadcast channels [10]. 2. Nash Equilibrium in this context is a very weak guarantee. As argued by Halpern and Teague [20], it seems likely that rational parties would actually abort. The reason is that aborting is never worse than revealing, and is sometimes better (if t − 1 other parties reveal, then the tth party will always learn the secret and can prevent the other parties from doing so by aborting.) Halpern and Teague [20] and follow-up works [19,1,25] focus on the second issue. That is, they allow simultaneous broadcast, and explore whether stronger
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solution concepts than plain Nash equilibrium can be achieved. Halpern and Teague [20] propose looking for an equilibrium that survives “iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies.” They prove that no bounded-round protocol can achieve a fair outcome in equilibrium when adopting this solution concept. However, they and subsequent works by Gordon and Katz [19] and Abraham et al. [1] show that fair outcomes are possible even with this equilibrium refinement using a probabilistic protocol whose number of rounds has finite expectation. Moreover, Abraham et al. [1] show how to achieve an equilibrium that is resistant to deviations by coalitions of limited size. Kol and Naor [25] argue that “strict equilibria” is a preferable solution concept to the iterated deletion notion used by Halpern and Teague [20], and show how to achieve it with a protocol where the size of shares dealt is an unbounded random variable with finite expectation. (They also show that a strict equilibrium cannot be achieved if the shares are of bounded size.) In all of the above works, the protocols’ prescribed instructions crucially depend on the utilities of the various players. The works of Lepinski et al. [29] and Izmalkov et al. [21] also can be used to obtain fair protocols for secret sharing by making an even stronger physical assumption than a simultaneous broadcast channel, namely “ballot boxes.” Specifically, they show how to compile any game with a trusted mediator into a fair ballot-box protocol with the same incentive structure. Since the sharereconstruction problem has a simple fair solution with a trusted mediator (the mediator takes all the inputs, and broadcasts the secret iff all players reveal their share), we can apply their compiler to obtain a fair ballot-box protocol. But our interest in this paper is on retaining standard communication models. 1.5
Our Results
In this paper, we address both issues above. Specifically, we assume that there is at least some small number k of honest participants, and along with many rational players. In this setting, we exhibit a simple protocol that only requires a standard communication model, namely synchronous broadcast, and in cases where the total number of players is sufficiently large, achieves fair outcomes with high probability with respect to a strong solution concept, namely (a setNash analogue of) trembling hand perfect equilibrium. We describe both aspects of our result in more detail below. Synchronous Broadcast. With a synchronous (as opposed to simultaneous) broadcast channel, the protocol proceeds in rounds, and only one party can broadcast in each round.2 When all parties are rational, the only previous positive results in this model are in works by Kol and Naor [25,24], who achieve a fair solution with an approximate notion of Nash equilibrium — no party can improve her utility by ε by deviating from the protocol. However, it is unclear whether such ε-Nash 2
For round efficiency, sometimes people use a slightly more general channel where many parties can broadcast in a single round, but deviating parties are can perform ‘rushing’ — wait to see what others have broadcast before broadcasting their own values. We describe how to extend our results to this setting below.
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equilibria are satisfactory solution concepts because they may be unstable. In particular, how can everyone be sure that some parties will not try to improve their utility by ε? Once this possibility is allowed, it may snowball into opportunities for even greater gains by deviation. Indeed, Kol and Naor argue in favor of strict Nash equilibria, where parties will obtain strictly less utility by deviating (and show how to achieve strict equilibria in the presence of a simultaneous broadcast channel). In our work, we achieve an exact notion of equilibrium (i.e. ε = 0). However, we allow a negligible probability that the honest parties will fail to compute the secret correctly, so our notion of “fairness” is also approximate. Nevertheless, we feel that the kind of error we achieve is preferable to ε-Nash. Indeed, the equilibrium concept is supposed to ensure that parties have an incentive to behave in a particular manner; if it is too weak, then parties may ignore it entirely and whatever analysis we do may be rendered irrelevant. On the other hand, if we achieve a sufficiently strong notion of exact equilibrium, then we may be confident that players will behave as predicted, and we are unlikely to see any bad events that are shown to occur with small probability under equilibrium play. Trembling-Hand Equilibrium. In order to establish the equilibrium properties of the protocol, we introduce a framework of “extensive form games with public actions and private outputs,” and use the formalism of incomplete information games to model players’ uncertainties about the inputs (i.e. shares) of other players as well as uncertainty about which players are honest and which are rational. (For simplicity, we assume that each player is honest independently with some probability p, but with small modifications, the result should extend to other distributions on the set of honest players.) The solution concept of Bayesian Nash equilibrium handles the uncertainty that a player has about the shares dealt to other players and requires that beliefs are updated according to Bayes rule “whenever possible,” meaning that this occurs when the observed actions are consistent with the equilibrium. A standard refinement is that of Bayesian subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, which captures the idea that the strategy is rational to follow regardless of the previous history of messages; intuitively, this means that the equilibrium does not rely on irrational empty threats (where a player will punish another player for deviating even at his own expense). In fact, we achieve the additional refinement of trembling hand perfect equilibrium [40], which strengthens this notion by requiring that players update their beliefs in a consistent and meaningful manner even when out-of-equilibrium play occurs. It is one of the strongest solution concepts studied for extensive form games; related notions were advocated in this context by Peter Bro Miltersen (personal communication) and Jonathan Katz [23]. Our Protocol. The protocol that we instruct honest players to follow is simple to describe. The participants take turns broadcasting their shares in sequence. However, if any of the first t−1 parties deviates from the protocol by stopping and refusing to broadcast her share, then the protocol instructs all parties subsequent to the first t − 1 to do the same. The intuition behind this protocol is that if
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there is likely to be at least one honest party after the first t − 1 parties, then each rational party in the first t − 1 parties will also have an incentive to reveal its share because by doing so, the honest party will also reveal her share and enable the rational parties to reconstruct the secret. Then we observe that as long as the set of honest parties is a random subset of k = ω(log n) parties, and assuming that the total number, n, of players is sufficiently large, then there will be an honest party after party t − 1 with all but negligible probability, as long as t ≤ (1 − Ω(1)) · n. Thus, assuming that parties have a nonnegligible preference to learn the secret, we obtain an exact equilibrium in which everyone learns the secret with all but negligible probability. In order to deal with the possibility that some players may try to reveal incorrect shares, we use information-theoretic message authentication codes (MACs) to authenticate the shares, following Kol and Naor [25]. Intuitively, we can tolerate the (negligible) forgery probability of the MACs (without getting an ε-Nash equilibrium) because the first t − 1 players actually achieve strictly higher utility by revealing a valid share than by not doing so. In addition, the incentives in our protocol hold regardless of what information the first t − 1 players have about each others’ actions, and similarly for the last n − t + 1 players. Thus, our protocol can actually be implemented with only 2 rounds of communication (in contrast to all previous protocols, which required a super-constant number of rounds); we discuss how to formalize this below. Modeling Contributions. While the intuition for our protocol is quite natural, modeling it game-theoretically turns out to be quite delicate. As discussed above, we introduce a Bayesian framework for capturing the uncertainty that players have about each others’ secrets and which other players are honest vs. rational. Additional modeling contributions include: Set Nash. We find it useful to avoid specifying the exact actions that rational players should take in situations where the choice is irrelevant to the overall strategic and fairness properties of our protocol. We do this by developing a variant of the notions of Set-Nash [26] and CURB (Closed Under Rational Behavior) Sets [4] for extensive-form games and trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. Roughly speaking, this notion allows us to specify the equilibrium actions only in cases that we care about, and argue that players have no incentive to deviate from the specified actions provided that all other players are playing according to the specified actions (even if they may act arbitrarily when the action is unspecified) and given the existence of a small number of honest players. Since the honest strategy is consistent with the specified equilibrium actions, this solution concept ensures that even repeated rational deviations from the honest strategy (which we envision to be initial “program” distributed to all players) by all but a small number of players will keep everyone consistent with the specified actions. When this occurs as predicted, we show that all honest players will learn the secret with all but negligible probability, and thus fairness is maintained. Modeling Rushing. To save on rounds, the cryptography literature often allows protocols that specify messages for several players at once, but allows the
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possibility that deviating players may wait to see other players’ messages before computing their own (i.e. simultaneity is allowed but not enforced). Modelling such “rushing” game-theoretically was posed as a challenge in the survey talk of Katz [23]. As mentioned above, we argue that our protocol can be collapsed to two rounds of communication. To capture the possibility of rushing gametheoretically, we follow an idea of Kalai [22], and argue that the specified strategy remains an equilibrium for every ordering of players within each round. Thus, players have no incentive to wait for other players’ messages; sending the same message will maximize their utility regardless of what other players send in the same round. 1.6
Future Directions and Independent Work
We view our work as but one more step in the line of work understanding the benefits of bringing together cryptography and algorithmic mechanism design. (See the survey [23].) While our main theorem is admittedly far from achieving an end goal that one would want to implement as is, we hope that our highlevel message (regarding the benefit of a few honest players with many rational players) and our game-theoretic modelling (e.g. the Bayesian framework, the use of set-Nash, and the modelling of rushing) prove useful in subsequent work. Some specific ways in which our results could be improved are: – Handling other distributions on (i.e. beliefs about) the set of honest players. Intuitively, this should be possible by having the dealer randomly permuting the order of the players and including the permutation in the shares (or publishing it). – Achieving solution concepts that are robust even to coalitional deviations from the protocol. In an earlier version of our paper [34], we demonstrated coalition-proofness (against “stable” coalitions) in a model that is even more simplified than the fail-stop one. As we have mentioned, Abraham et al. [1] show how to handle arbitrary, not necessarily stable, collusions of a small number of players with a simultaneous broadcast channel. – Generalizing from secret sharing to secure multiparty computation. Indeed, this is the main application for secret sharing and their reconstruction protocols. – Getting stronger impossibility results for the entirely rational setting (prior impossibility results either require players to learn the secret with probability 1 [25], or suffered other restrictive constraints [35]) or, alternatively, finding a purely rational protocol. O’Neill and Sangwan [33] extend the results from a preliminary version of our paper [35] in several ways, including achieving a strict trembling-hand perfect equilibrium for a restricted deviation model (which is still more general than the fail-stop deviation model we considered in [35]) and handling a small number of malicious players in this model. Fuchsbauer et al. [16] have recently shown how to obtain a computational analogue of trembling-hand ε-equilibrium on a standard communication channel when all players are rational.
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Definitions Games with Public Actions and Private Outputs
To cast protocol executions into a game-theoretic setting, we introduce the notion of extensive games with public actions and private outputs. The basis of this new notion is the more standard definition of extensive form games with perfect information. Extensive form games enable us to model the sequential aspect of protocols, where each player considers his plan of action only following some of the other players’ messages (the “actions” of the game-theoretic model). The perfect information property captures the fact that each player, when making any decision in the public phase of the protocol, is perfectly informed of all the actions by other players that have previously occurred. Thus, extensive form games with perfect information are a good model for communication on a synchronous broadcast channel. We build upon extensive form games with perfect information and augment them with an additional final private stage. This additional stage models the fact that at the end of the game, each player is allowed to take some arbitrary action as a function of the “terminal” history h ∈ Z of messages so far. This action, along with the “non-terminal history” h ∈ H \ Z of public actions that have taken place during the execution of the game (as well as the players’ inputs) has a direct effect on players’ payoffs. Working in the framework of Bayesian games of incomplete information, players i ∈ N are handed private inputs θi (a.k.a. ”types”) that belong to some pre-specified set Θi and specify a distribution μ according to which the inputs are chosen. Players’ inputs can be thought of as the shares for the secret-sharing scheme, and are generated jointly with the secret. The secret is thought of as a “reference” value δ ∈ Δ that is not given to the players at the beginning of the protocol (but may be determined by them through messages exchanged), and is used at the output stage along with private actions to determine player utilities. A game Γ = (N, H, P, A, L, Δ, Θ, μ, u) proceeds as follows: the reference value and the types are selected according to a joint distribution μ. The type θi ∈ Θi is handed to player i ∈ N and the value δ ∈ Δ remains secret and affects the players’ utilities. This is followed by a sequence of actions that are visible by all players. After any history h ∈ H, player i = P (h) whose turn to play is next chooses a public action a ∈ Ai (θi , h). This choice determines the next actions of the players, and so on until a terminal history h ∈ Z is reached. At this point, all players i ∈ N simultaneously pick an action, bi ∈ Li (θi , h), where Li (θi , h) ⊆ Δ. The utility (or payoff) of player i for an execution of the game is then determined to be the value ui (δ, θ, h, b1 , . . . , bn ). 2.2
Set Valued Strategies and Set Nash Equilibrium
The action chosen by a player for every history after which it is her turn to move, is determined by her strategy function. As is required in extensive-form games, the strategy is defined for all histories, even ones that would not be reached if the strategy is followed.
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To enable a simple description of our protocol, and in order to minimize the difference between the description of the behavior of an honest player and that of a rational player, we allow each player to have a strategy that actually maps each information set (i.e. view of the player) into a set of possible actions. More precisely, a set-valued strategy for player i ∈ N is a pair Si = (Mi , Fi ), where: – The public set-valued strategy Mi is a function that takes a pair (θi , h) ∈ Θi × (H \ Z) and defines a set of public messages, Mi (θi , h). – The private set-valued strategy Fi is a function that takes a pair (θi , h) ∈ Θi × Z and defines a set of private outputs Fi (θi , h). We write si = (mi , fi ) ∈ Si to indicate that strategy si is consistent with Si , i.e. with mi (θi , h) ∈ Mi (θi , h) for all (θi , h) ∈ Θi ×(H \Z) and fi (θi , h) ∈ Fi (θi , h) for all (θi , h) ∈ Θi × Z (where these inclusions should hold with probability 1 in case si is a mixed strategy). We will allow the public and private strategy functions to be mixed, where the randomization of the strategy is interpreted to be done independently at each application of the function, if a player has multiple moves in the game. Strategies that consist of deterministic functions are called pure, whereas strategies whose functions have full support on the player’s action set are said to be fully mixed. We achieve fairness (with high probability) in a pure strategy equilibrium but use fully mixed strategies in defining the concept of trembling hand equilibrium. The outcome o of the game Γ under a strategy s ∈ S is the random variable (δ, θ, h, b1 , . . . , bn ), where (δ, θ) ∈ Δ × Θ are sampled according to μ, h ∈ Z is the terminal history that results when each player i ∈ N is given her type θi ∈ Θi , publicly follows the actions chosen by mi , and computes her final private output bi using fi . The value of player i’s utility is totally determined by o. The initial distribution, μ, of the secret and the shares, along with the strategies si = (mi , fi ) induce a distribution on o, and thus on the utilities. Define ui (μ, s) to be the expected value of the utility of player i ∈ N , when the types are selected according to the distribution μ and all players follow strategy s. We assume that rational players seek to maximize expected utility. Definition 2.1 (Set Nash equilibrium). A profile S = (S1 , . . . , Sn ) of setvalued strategies is a (Bayesian) Set Nash equilibrium for a game Γ if for all i ∈ N , every (possibly mixed) s−i ∈ S−i , there exists a strategy si ∈ Si so that for all strategies si , ui (μ, (s−i , si )) ≤ ui (μ, s). Our definition of set-Nash equilibrium is stronger than the set-Nash equilibrium definition introduced by Lavi and Nisan [26], who require only that for every pure s−i ∈ S−i there exists some si ∈ Si for which ui (μ, s) ≥ ui (μ, (s−i , si )) for all possible strategies si . This earlier definition of set-Nash is insufficient to ensure that there is a Nash equilibrium consistent with the set-valued strategy profile S. The problem is that upon restricting the game to S the only Nash equilibrium may be a mixed equilibrium, yet there may be some strategy si outside of Si that is strictly better than all si ∈ Si given that players = i play a mixed strategy consistent with S−i . On the other hand, our definition of setNash is weaker than the CURB (Closed Under Rational Behavior) sets of Basu
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and Weibull [4]; see also a recent discussion in Benisch et al. [11]. A CURB set requires that for every mixed strategy s−i consistent with S−i , all best-responses for player i are consistent with set-valued strategy Si whereas we require only that there is some best-response that is consistent with Si . 2.3
Trembling-Hand Perfect Set Equilibrium
At the heart of a solution concept for extensive-form games with incomplete information is a requirement about the way in which the players update their beliefs about the values of other players’ types. The beliefs are distributions from which players think that the types of other players were drawn. At the beginning of the game, the belief corresponds to the initial distribution μ conditioned on the player’s knowledge of her own type. As the game progresses, players update their beliefs as a function of other players’ actions. A straightforward approach for a player to update her beliefs is to use Bayes rule to condition on her own view of the actions taken in the game. This is the basic approach taken in the game theory literature, and the one pursued in a previous version of this paper [35]. But such an approach suffers from the drawback that updating is not well-defined for views that occur with zero probability, i.e. following out of equilibrium play. A stronger approach, also discussed in the game theory literature, is the one of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium [40]. The idea behind trembling-hand perfect equilibrium is that updating is not problematic if the strategies under consideration are fully mixed (since such strategies would never incur an updating that conditions on a zero probability event). It thus becomes natural to require that the equilibrium strategy is a best response in every subgame to some sequence of fully mixed strategies that converge to equilibrium, and this is indeed the definition of trembling hand equilibria. The trembling-hand solution concept builds on the notion of a subgame Γ (s, h), which is defined in the natural way to be the restriction of an extensive form game with public actions and private outputs Γ , at a history h ∈ H. This definition implicitly captures the way in which players update their beliefs as a result of past players’ actions, assuming previous play according to strategy s. Given a strategy profile s and a strategy si for player i, we denote by ui |h (μ|h , s−i |h , si |h ) the expected value of player i’s utility under strategy vector (s−i |h , si |h ) in the game Γ (s, h). This is interpreted as considering player i’s expected utility when all players except player i follow strategies s−i , and assuming that until the history h has been reached player i has played according to strategy si , and from that point on according to strategy si . We define a set-Nash analogue of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. To the best of our knowledge, such a combination has not been previously considered in the literature. Given a history h ∈ H and a set valued strategy Si , we define Si |h in the natural way (i.e., if Si = (Mi , Fi ) then Si |h = (Mi |h , Fi |h ) where Mi |h (θi , h ) = Mi (θi , (h, h )) and Fi |h (θi , h ) = Fi (θi , (h, h ))).
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Definition 2.2 (Trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium). Let Γ be an extensive form game with public actions and private outputs. A profile of set-valued strategies S = (S1 , . . . , Sn ) is said to be a trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium for Γ if for every s ∈ S1 × · · · × Sn there exists a sequence of fully mixed strategy profiles (sk )∞ k=0 converging to s so that for every history h ∈ H and every i ∈ N , there exists a strategy si ∈ Si |h such that for all strategies si in the game Γ (sk , h) it holds that ui |h (μ|h , sk−i |h , si ) ≥ ui |h (μ|h , sk−i |h , si ) in the game Γ (sk , h) for all k.
3
Secret Sharing
A secret sharing scheme (N, t, Δ, Θ, μ, g) is implemented by letting a trusted dealer jointly pick the secret and shares according to the distribution μ, and then distributing share θi ∈ Θi to player i ∈ N . The reconstruction functions are what enables any set S of at least t players to use their shares (θi )i∈S in order to jointly reconstruct the secret (by using a function gS ∈ g). The scheme should also guarantee secrecy against any subset S of less than t players. To prevent players from revealing shares that are different than the ones they were dealt, we will want to work with a secret sharing scheme that is authenticated. One can use standard “information theoretic” techniques for authenticating shares in any (plain) secret sharing scheme (cf. [44,39,25]). 3.1
Reconstruction Protocols
Once shares are distributed among the players, it is required to specify a protocol according to which the players can jointly reconstruct the secret at a later stage. The reconstruction protocol prescribes a way in which the players compute their “messages”, which are chosen from a given fixed “alphabet,” and are then broadcast to all other players. The protocol also specifies an output function that is used by the players to compute their (private) output. A reconstruction protocol Π = (Σ, H, P, m∗ , f ∗ ) for a given secret sharing scheme is implemented under the assumption that the secret and shares (δ, θ1 , . . . , θn ) are chosen according to the distribution μ. Player i’s type is θi . The protocol is interpreted as follows: player i = P (h) chooses a message m = m∗i (θi , h) ∈ Σ; this choice determines the next player to move, and so on until a terminal history h ∈ Z is reached. At this point all players can determine the value of their private output functions, fi∗ (θi , h). 3.2
Reconstruction Games
A secret sharing protocol induces a reconstruction game in a natural way. Loosely speaking, this is an interpretation of a reconstruction protocol as an extensive form game with public messages and private outputs, in which arbitrary deviations from the protocol’s instructions are allowed. The interpretation of the
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protocol as a game is straightforward: protocol histories correspond to game histories, messages in the protocol correspond to actions, next message functions correspond to strategies, and the outputs correspond to output actions. The reconstruction game allows player i the choice between continuing with the protocol’s prescribed instructions (and in particular choosing an action according to m∗i ), and deviating from Π (by sending some other message from Σ). We require that the utility functions are linear in the sense there are (real) parameters {aij } such that the utility received by player i is equal to the sum of aij over all players j that correctly compute the secret at the end of the protocol. We define the players’ preference for learning the secret to be ρ = mini aii /(− j=i aij ). We require that aii > 0, aij < 0 for i = j, and ρ > 1. These assumptions correspond to the assumptions (also made in previous works) that players prefer to learn the secret over all else, and secondarily prefer that as few other players learn the secret as possible.
4 4.1
Our Protocol Introducing an Honest Minority
Our goal is to show that every authenticated secret-sharing scheme has a reconstruction protocol so that any reconstruction game that corresponds to it has an equilibrium strategy in which all players learn the secret. To do this, we require that a small subset of honest players in the reconstruction game always follows the strategy prescribed by the reconstruction protocol (whether or not this is the best response to other players’ actions). We model this scenario by assuming that the set of honest players is selected according to some distribution that specifies to each player whether she is to act honestly or rationally. The set of actions of an honest player coincides with the strategy prescribed by the reconstruction protocol. The set of actions of a rational player remains unchanged. The private type of player i ∈ N in a reconstruction game with honest players consists of a pair (θi , ωi ) ∈ Θi × Ωi that is drawn along with other player’s types and the reference value δ according to the distribution μ × ζ. The value of ωi ∈ {honest, rational} determines whether player i is bound to follow the honest strategy (as prescribed by Π), or will be allowed to deviate from it. We constraint the set of actions of each player in order to create a situation in which rational players are indeed free to deviate from the public strategy vector m∗ (since they are allowed to choose any action in Σ), whereas the honest players are in fact restricted to the single action prescribed by m∗ . 4.2
Main Result
We show that assuming the existence of a small number of honest players, there is a reconstruction protocol such that every corresponding reconstruction game has an equilibrium such that with high probability all players learn the secret, provided that the set of honest players is uniform among all sets of a sufficiently
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large size and every player has a nonnegligible preference for learning the secret. Specifically, our theorem is the following: Theorem 4.1. Every authenticated secret-sharing scheme (N, t, Δ, Θ, μ, g), with t < |N | = n, has a reconstruction protocol Π such that the following holds. Let Γ = (N, H, P, A, L, Δ, Θ ×Ω, μ×ζm , u) be a reconstruction game that corresponds to Π with honest players and linear utility functions, where ζm is a distribution over tuples (ω1 , . . . , ωn ) ∈ Ω for which ωi = honest with probability m/n independently for all i ∈ N , for some real number m ∈ [0, n]. Suppose further that the players’ preference ρ for learning the secret satisfies: ρ>
1 − 1/|Δ| 1 − 1/|Δ| − p(n, m) − γ
(1)
where p(n, m) = (1 − m/n)n−t+1 ≤ exp(−m · (n − t)/n) and γ is the forgery probability of the authenticated secret-sharing scheme. Then Γ has a profile S = (S1 , . . . , Sn ) of set-valued “rational” strategies such that: 1. The honest strategy profile s∗ = (m∗ , f ∗ ) is consistent with S, 2. S is a trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium in Γ , 3. For every strategy vector s ∈ S, the probability that all honest players compute the secret correctly in Γ is at least 1 − (n − t + 1)γ − p(n, m), when the players’ types are chosen according to μ and they follow strategy vector s. 4. For every Nash equilibrium s ∈ S, the probability that all players compute the secret correctly in Γ is at least 1 − (n − t + 1)γ − p(n, m), when players’ types are chosen according to μ and they follow strategy s. 5. S does not depend on the utility functions u in Γ (provided they satisfy (1)). To interpret this theorem, consider a setting in which we distribute to each player software that is programmed to play the honest strategy, which is in consistent with S by Item 1. Rational players may then decide to deviate from this strategy (i.e. reprogram their software) in order to improve their utility. The fact that S is a trembling-hand perfect set equilibrium (Item 2), however, guarantees that there is no incentive for the rational players to deviate from S, even if this process is iterated. As long as all players remain within S, Items 3 and 4 say that fairness is maintained (with high probability). In case that t ≤ (1−Ω(1))·n, observe that p(n, m) = exp(−Ω(m)) is negligible provided that m = ω(log n), i.e. the expected number of honest players is superlogarithmic. If, in addition, the forgery probability γ is negligible then (1) simply says that a player’s preference for learning the secret should not be negligible. 4.3
The Reconstruction Protocol
The protocol proceeds in two stages, where in the first stage a subset of t − 1 players is instructed to reveal their share to all other parties in some sequence, and in the second stage the remaining n − t + 1 players are instructed to reveal their share in some sequence, provided that none of the t − 1 players in the first
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stage has failed to reveal her share. The individual parties will reveal their share using a synchronous broadcast channel. The stage in which a player is instructed to broadcast is fixed in some arbitrary manner. For concreteness, suppose that at stage 1 of the protocol, it is the turn of players 1, . . . , t − 1 to broadcast, and that at stage 2 it is the turn of players t, . . . , n. The protocol will instruct player i to either reveal her share θi ∈ Θi or not to reveal anything (symbolized by a special action denoted ⊥ ∈ Σ). Specifically, we will require that player i reveals θi unless she is one of the stage 2 players and one of the first t − 1 parties to speak has chosen not to reveal their share. In the latter case player i does not reveal her share either. In addition to revealing her share, player i is required to send along the authentication information that was provided to her by the dealer. In case that either the authentication fails, or that the player has refused to broadcast her message,3 player i will be considered as having failed the authentication and chosen the special ⊥ action. After the two stages are completed, each player locally uses a reconstruction function gS ∈ g in order to try and compute the secret given the shares that have been revealed during the protocol’s execution. By the properties of secret sharing, it follows that a party will be able to compute the secret at the end of the protocol if a set S ⊆ N of at least t − 1 other parties have revealed their shares, and otherwise she has no information about the secret. The protocol requires that the players in each stage reveal their shares in sequential order. However, the order in which the first t − 1 players broadcast has no effect on the strategic properties of the protocol, and similarly for the last n − t + 1 players. Thus, the protocol can effectively be implemented with two rounds of communication (see full version for details). 4.4
Rational Strategies for Corresponding Reconstruction Games
The rational set-valued strategy S instructs both honest and rational players to follow the strategy prescribed by Π, except that it does not specify how rational players should act in cases when the honest strategy may not be in their self interest. Specifically, we allow arbitrary action by a rational player i ≥ t when the first t − 1 players have all revealed valid shares (whereas honest players must reveal in this case). The honest strategy (equivalent to the earlier ‘protocol’) is itself consistent with the rational set-valued strategy profile. In the full version of the paper, we show that S satisfies all the requirements of Theorem 4.1.
Acknowledgements We thank Drew Fudenberg, Jonathan Katz, Silvio Micali, Peter Bro Miltersen, Moni Naor, Adam O’Neill and the anonymous reviewers for helpful discussions and comments. 3
In an implementation, a player that fails to broadcast her value within some predetermined amount of time might be considered to have refused to broadcast.
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References 1. Abraham, I., Dolev, D., Gonen, R., Halpern, J.Y.: Distributed computing meets game theory: robust mechanisms for rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. In: PODC 2006, pp. 53–62 (2006) 2. Aiyer, A.S., Alvisi, L., Clement, A., Dahlin, M., Martin, J.-P., Porth, C.: Bar fault tolerance for cooperative services. In: SOSP, pp. 45–58 (2005) 3. Babaioff, M., Lavi, R., Pavlov, E.: Mechanism design for single-value domains. In: Proc. Nat. Conf. on Artificial Intelligence, AAAI 2005 (2005) 4. Basu, K., Weibull, J.W.: Strategy subsets closed under rational behavior. Economics Letters 36, 141–146 (1991) 5. Ben-Or, M., Goldwasser, S., Wigderson, A.: Completeness theorems for noncryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation (extended abstract). In: STOC 1988, pp. 1–10 (1988) 6. Blakely, G.: Safeguarding cryptographic keys. In: AFIPS, vol. 48, p. 313 (1979) 7. Boneh, D., Naor, M.: Timed commitments. In: Bellare, M. (ed.) CRYPTO 2000. LNCS, vol. 1880, pp. 236–254. Springer, Heidelberg (2000) 8. Chaum, D., Cr´epeau, C., Damg˚ ard, I.: Multiparty unconditionally secure protocols (extended abstract). In: STOC 1988, pp. 11–19 (1988) 9. Chor, B., Goldwasser, S., Micali, S., Awerbuch, B.: Verifiable secret sharing and achieving simultaneity in the presence of faults (extended abstract). In: FOCS, pp. 383–395. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1985) 10. Cleve, R.: Limits on the security of coin flips when half the processors are faulty (extended abstract). In: STOC, pp. 364–369. ACM, New York (1986) 11. Davis, G.B., Sandholm, T.W.: Algorithms for Rationalizability and CURB Sets. In: AAAI 2006 (2006) 12. Even, S., Goldreich, O., Lempel, A.: A randomized protocol for signing contracts. Commun. ACM 28(6), 637–647 (1985) 13. Feigenbaum, J., Papadimitriou, C., Sami, R., Shenker, S.: A BGP-based mechanism for lowest-cost routing. In: PODC, pp. 173–182 (2002) 14. Feigenbaum, J., Papadimitriou, C.H., Shenker, S.: Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions. Journal of Computer and System Sciences 63, 21–41 (2001) 15. Feigenbaum, J., Shenker, S.: Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design: Recent Results and Future Directions. In: Proc. 6th Int’l Workshop on Discrete Algorithms and Methods for Mobile Computing and Communications, pp. 1–13 (2002) 16. Fuchsbauer, G., Katz, J., Levieil, E., Naccache, D.: Efficient rational secret sharing in the standard communication model. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/488 (2008), http://eprint.iacr.org/ 17. Garay, J.A., Jakobsson, M.: Timed release of standard digital signatures. In: Proc. Financial Cryptography 2002, pp. 168–182 (2002) 18. Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to play any mental game or a completeness theorem for protocols with honest majority. In: STOC, pp. 218–229. ACM, New York (1987) 19. Gordon, S.D., Katz, J.: Rational secret sharing, revisited. In: De Prisco, R., Yung, M. (eds.) SCN 2006. LNCS, vol. 4116, pp. 229–241. Springer, Heidelberg (2006) 20. Halpern, J.Y., Teague, V.: Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation: extended abstract. In: Babai, L. (ed.) STOC, pp. 623–632. ACM, New York (2004) 21. Izmalkov, S., Micali, S., Lepinski, M.: Rational secure computation and ideal mechanism design. In: FOCS, pp. 585–595. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2005) 22. Kalai, E.: Large robust games. Econometrica 72(6), 1631–1665 (2004)
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23. Katz, J.: Bridging game theory and cryptography: Recent results and future directions. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 251–272. Springer, Heidelberg (2008) 24. Kol, G., Naor, M.: Cryptography and game theory: Designing protocols for exchanging information. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 320– 339. Springer, Heidelberg (2008) 25. Kol, G., Naor, M.: Games for exchanging information. In: STOC, pp. 423–432. ACM, New York (2008) 26. Lavi, R., Nisan, N.: Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring goods. In: SODA 2005 (2005) 27. Lehmann, D., O’Callaghan, L.I., Shoham, Y.: Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. Journal of the ACM 49(5) 28. Lepinski, M., Micali, S., Peikert, C., Shelat, A.: Completely fair sfe and coalitionsafe cheap talk. In: PODC 2004, pp. 1–10 (2004) 29. Lepinski, M., Micali, S., Shelat, A.: Collusion-free protocols. In: Gabow, H.N., Fagin, R. (eds.) STOC, pp. 543–552. ACM, New York (2005) 30. Lysyanskaya, A., Triandopoulos, N.: Rationality and adversarial behavior in multiparty computation. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 180– 197. Springer, Heidelberg (2006) 31. McGrew, R., Porter, R., Shoham, Y.: Towards a general theory of non-cooperative computation. In: TARK, pp. 59–71 (2003) 32. Nisan, N., Ronen, A.: Algorithmic mechanism design. Games and Economic Behavior 35, 166–196 (2001) 33. O’Neill, A., Sangwan, A.: Honesty, rationality, and malice in secret sharing and MPC: Robust protocols for real-world populations (manuscript, 2008) 34. Ong, S.J., Parkes, D., Rosen, A., Vadhan, S.: Fairness with an honest minority and a rational majority (April 2007), http://eecs.harvard.edu/~ salil/Fairness-abs.html 35. Ong, S.J., Parkes, D., Rosen, A., Vadhan, S.: Fairness with an honest minority and a rational majority. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/097 (March 2008), http://eprint.iacr.org/ 36. Parkes, D.C., Shneidman, J.: Distributed implementations of Vickrey-ClarkeGroves mechanisms. In: Proc. 3rd AAMAS, pp. 261–268 (2004) 37. Petcu, A., Faltings, B., Parkes, D.: M-dpop: Faithful distributed implementation of efficient social choice problems. In: AAMAS 2006, pp. 1397–1404 (May 2006) 38. Pinkas, B.: Fair secure two-party computation. In: Biham, E. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2003. LNCS, vol. 2656, pp. 87–105. Springer, Heidelberg (2003) 39. Rabin, T., Ben-Or, M.: Verifiable secret sharing and multiparty protocols with honest majority (extended abstract). In: STOC, pp. 73–85. ACM, New York (1989) 40. Selten, R.: A reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games. International Journal of Game Theory 4, 25–55 (1975) 41. Shamir, A.: How to share a secret. Commun. ACM 22(11), 612–613 (1979) 42. Shneidman, J., Parkes, D.C.: Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes. In: PODC 2004, St. John’s, Canada (2004) 43. Shoham, Y., Tennenholtz, M.: Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity. Theor. Comput. Sci. 343(1-2), 97–113 (2005) 44. Wegman, M.N., Carter, L.: New hash functions and their use in authentication and set equality. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 22(3), 265–279 (1981) 45. Yao, A.C.-C.: How to generate and exchange secrets (extended abstract). In: FOCS, pp. 162–167. IEEE, Los Alamitos (1986)
Purely Rational Secret Sharing (Extended Abstract) Silvio Micali1 and abhi shelat2 1
MIT CSAIL
[email protected] 2 U. Virginia
[email protected]
Abstract. Rational secret sharing is a problem at the intersection of cryptography and game theory. In essence, a dealer wishes to engineer a communication game that, when rationally played, guarantees that each of the players learns the dealer’s secret. Yet, all solutions proposed so far did not rely solely on the players’ rationality, but also on their beliefs, and were also quite inefficient. After providing a more complete definition of the problem, we exhibit a very efficient and purely rational solution to it with a verifiable trusted channel.
1 Introduction In [LMPS04], Lepinski, Micali, Peikert and shelat put forward the notion and the first implementation of Fair Secure Function Evaluation . This is a communication protocol extending the traditional notion of secure function evaluation [GMW87]. In essence, a Fair SFE is an SFE in which either (1) all players learn the result of evaluating a given function on their secret inputs (but no other information about their inputs) or (2) none of them learns anything. The first outcome is reached when all players want it, and the second one when at least one of the players wants it. The difficulty lies in the fact that such objectives must be reached no matter what the function may be and no matter how many the player are, provided that at least one of the players is honest, that is sticking to his communication instructions in all cases. In [HT04], Halpern and Teague put forward the notion of rational secret sharing (RSS), aiming at distilling separately, and in purely game theoretic terms, the last stage of a Fair SFE (where the players attempt to reconstruct the specified output from their shares of it). We believe this to be a very valuable contribution, but we also believe that the notion of an RSS can be improved. In this extended abstract we shall solely deal with the two-player version of the notion, arguably the best way to highlight the novel and most poignant aspects of the problem.1 1
Our approach easily extends to n players, where the dealer wishes that n out of n of them learn the secret. The k-out-of-n definition of traditional secret sharing is very relevant for robustness, and protects against the potential loss of shares, but is quite distracting and orthogonal to the rationality problem at hand. Indeed, in a “k-out-of-n” rational secret sharing (assuming as usual that the fewer the players knowing the secret, the more value to them), k players will presumably prevent the others from learning their secret. Is this the natural wish of the dealer?
O. Reingold (Ed.): TCC 2009, LNCS 5444, pp. 54–71, 2009. c International Association for Cryptologic Research 2009
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1.1 Rational Secret Sharing as a Special Form of Mechanism Design The Intuitive Notion. At the verge of dyeing, a dealer possessing a secret string S wishes to ensure that two players will later on cooperate so as to both learn S. To this end, he provides each player i with his share of the secret, a string Si . Each share is individually meaningless (i.e., its distribution is independent of S), while together the two shares reveal S. If the players were both honest, the dealer’s goal could be trivially achieved. Unfortunately, honesty is not an available commodity: each player is assumed to be rational (i.e., always trying to maximize his own utility), and the utilities that the players attach to the possible ways of learning S are quite problematic. In particular, each player prefers most to be the only one learning S, prefers less learning S together with the other player, and even less not learning S at all. Accordingly, the dealer wishes to chose the shares such that, for a suitable communication channel, there exists a communication game that, when rationally played, yields the secret to both players. It is thus worth to recall quickly the traditional notions of solving a game. Game Solution Concepts. Given a game G, a solution concept essentially is a way of predicting how G will be played. From the cryptographic perspective of the authors, traditional solution concepts are only partially meaningful, as they are stated from the perspective of individual players, disregarding collusion altogether. Nonetheless their meaningfulness is intact for the problem at hand restricted to just two players. (This is by itself a good reason to focus on the two-player case.) The strongest, traditional solution concept is that of solvability in dominant strategies. Here, each player has a strategy σi that is best of him, no matter what strategies the other players may use. In such a case predicting that each player i will play σi is indeed the strongest form of prediction of play. Note that, in choosing σi , each player i does not need to rely on the rationality on the other players, but just be rational himself! Unfortunately, not all games admit dominant-strategy solutions. The “next best” solution concept is dominant solvability, which now very roughly explain. In a game G, a strategy a for player A is said to weakly dominate another strategy a for A if (1) for all possible strategies b of player B, A’s utility under a is greater than or equal to his utility under a ; and (2) for at least one strategy b of B, A’s utility under a is strictly greater than his utility under a . This being the case, a rational A should remove strategy a and all of his weakly dominated strategies from consideration. And a rational B should do the same on his side. Trusting that B has done so, A should then eliminate from his remaining strategies all those that now become weakly dominated (relative to the strategies left over to B). And so on, until neither player can eliminate any more strategies. At that point, if A is left with a single strategy a and player B with a single strategy b, then G is called dominant solvable, and (a, b) is a very strong prediction for the way in which G will be rationally played. Notice, however, that this second solution concept is weaker than the first one, since each player must rely non only on his rationality, but also on that of his opponent. Again, not all games admit such a strong solution concept.
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The next solution concept we wish to roughly recall is that a Nash equilibrium. This is a pair of strategies (a, b), such that a is the best strategy for A if he believes that B will play b (and symmetrically for B). The good news is that each game admits such equilibria, but the bad news is this is a very distant third among these solution concepts. The meaningfulness of a Nash equilibrium in fact depends not only on the rationality of both players, but also on their beliefs. Typically a game has a plurality of equilibria, often having symmetric payoffs, making it very uncertain to predict which of them will be played. Furthermore, the game may easily not end up in equilibrium at all. If A believes that equilibrium (a, b) will be played, while B believes (a , b ), then the strategy profile ultimately played may be (a, b ) which needs not to be an equilibrium at all! Mechanism Design. Very roughly said the goal of mechanism design is to engineer a game so that, “when rationally played”, a given property P is guaranteed to hold. The quality of such design therefore crucial depends on the solution concept adopted: it is exceptionally meaningful (recall that we are focusing on the two-player case!) when the game has dominant strategy solution, it is very meaningful when the game is “dominant solvable”, and it has only very limited meaningfulness when the game is “Nash solvable.” Such limited meaningfulness persists even if P is guaranteed to hold at each of possible Nash equilibria of the game. In a sense, if the game has k Nash equilibria, then —due mismatched beliefs— it roughly has k 2 (k n if there are n players) possible ways not to end in any equilibrium. Another quality measure in mechanism design is the amount of knowledge about the players (e.g., knowledge about their utilities) required to engineer the game. Indeed, since precise knowledge about the players may not be available or too expensive to gather, the lesser the knowledge required from the designer the better. Rational Secret Sharing and Mechanism Design. We propose to view rational secret sharing as a special mechanism-design problem. That is, one should try to guarantee the property “all players learn the secret” by means of a pure communication game. In essence, the game should be such that (1) all player actions consist of exchanging messages over a special channel, (2) no trusted party is involved, and (3) no exogenous punishments, fines, etc. can be triggered by the final outcome: the players’ utilities must solely depend on who has, or has not, learned the secret. This point of view enables us to extend to RSS the same quality analysis applicable to mechanism design, providing a more meaningful comparison among various RSS protocols. 1.2 Prior Solutions In their quoted paper, Halpern and Teague present a protocol for the 3-out-of-3 case (and then show how to modify it for the m-out-of-n case, where 3 ≤ m < n). Their protocol guarantees that all players learn the secret at a Nash equilibrium whose strategies survive the iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies (IEOWDS for short). Rather than the swap channel of Lepinski, Micali, Peikert, and shelat, they rely on simultaneous-broadcast channels, and prove that no rational secret sharing protocol can be fixed-round with such channels. A main limitation of their protocol is that the trusted dealer continues to be an active participant. (In most settings, such a dealer could directly inform the players of what the secret is.)
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Gordon and Katz [GK06] present a protocol for just two players that dismisses the need for the periodic involvement of the dealer. Their protocol too relies on simultaneousbroadcast channels, and guarantees that all players learn the secret at a Nash equilibrium whose strategies survive IEOWDS. Abraham, Dolev, Gonen, and Halpern [ADGH06] present a similar protocol, but focus on defining (and protecting against) coalitions of rational players. Lysyanskaya and Triandopoulos [LT06], with the same channels and implementation type, consider a model with a mix of rational and malicious players. Kol and Naor [KN08b] present a quite different protocol with simultaneous-broadcast channels, which guarantees that all players learn the secret at a “strict Nash equilibrium”, a locally stronger version of a Nash equilibrium. (In essence, any player deviating from his own equilibrium strategy expects to receive a strictly smaller utility.) A Separate Protocol. We wish to mention an interesting and recent protocol of Ong, Parkes, Rosen, and Vadhan [OPRV08]. Their protocol however works in a quite different model. On one side, it does not require any special channels (that is, it relies on ordinary broadcast channels rather then simultaneous-broadcast ones). On the other, it relies on the honesty of a few players. (As we focus solely on rational players, we shall not include this protocol in any future discussion or comparison.) 1.3 Weaknesses of Prior Solutions Protocol Inefficiency and Excessive Designer Knowledge. The prior protocols share the following logical structure. The players interact in several rounds, using some special channels. The protocol has a special round R, unknown to the players because it is secretly selected by the dealer according to a given distribution. If no player “cheats” then all players learn the secret. A player can successfully cheat only if he correctly guesses R. If a player i erroneously guesses R, then no one learns the secret (which gives i utility ui ). But if i guesses R correctly (and acts appropriately), then he is the only one to learn the secret (which gives him utility Ui ). In essence, therefore, to hope that it is rational to stick to the protocol’s prescribed strategies without cheating, letting p be the probability of successfully guessing R, p needs to be so small that p·ui ≤ (1−p)Ui . This shows two separate weaknesses of these protocols. First, because properly engineering the game implies properly selecting p, the designer needs to know the ui ’s and the Ui ’s quite accurately. (Thus, from a mechanism design perspective, this diminishes the quality of these approaches.) Second, because the expected number of rounds must be greater or equal to p, this implies that all prior protocols run in exponential time. In fact, independent of the distribution according to which R is selected, the expected number of rounds of the prior protocols must be exponential in k, assuming as it is natural that all players utilities are presented in binary, and that their length is k. This inefficiency alone calls for new protocols. Limited Guarantee for the Desired Property. Prior solutions ensure that the property “all players learn the secret” holds at a given Nash equilibrium of the engineered communication game. Again, however, this assurance is far from guaranteeing our property for two separate reasons: equilibrium selection and equilibrium absence. Let us discuss the first reason first. Even if one were certain that the engineered game will end up in an
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equilibrium, he could not be certain of which equilibrium would be actually selected. And since, in the engineered games of the previous works, the “all-know-the-secret” property was guaranteed only at one of the possible Nash equilibria, the equilibrium ultimately selected could very well be one in which not all players learn the dealer’s secret. Let us now discuss the second reason. The meaningfulness of any Nash equilibrium is inextricably linked to the assumption that the players’ beliefs are “consistent”, which of course needs not be the case. Thus, even if all players learned the secret at each Nash equilibrium of the engineered games, there is no guarantee at all that the engineered game ends up in equilibrium. Again: assume that (a, b) and (a , b ) are Nash equilibria, that A believes that B will play b, and that B believes that A will play a . Then, A will rationally (based on her belief!) play strategy a, and B will play b . And since (a, b ) may not be an equilibrium, let alone an outcome in which all players learn the secret. To be sure, the prior protocols were engineered so that all players learned the dealer’s secret not just at a generic Nash equilibrium, but at one whose strategies survived IEOWDS. But as long as multiple Nash survive IEOWDS (which is the case in prior protocols), then equilibrium selection and equilibrium absence will continue to poison the landscape. To be sure too, some of the prior RSS protocols guaranteed that all players learned the secret at an even stronger type of equilibrium, such as the strict Nash of [KN08b]. But these equilibria are in a sense only “locally stronger.” That is, if the players believe that a strict Nash equilibrium (a, b) will be played out, they would have “even less incentives” of deviating from it. But ensuring that A does not deviate from a if she believes that B chooses strategy b is not too meaningful, unless one can also ensure that B actually chooses b. If the game is engineered so that the best we can say about it is that it has a strict Nash equilibrium (at which the desired property holds) alongside with other additional equilibria, then equilibrium selection and equilibrium absence will continue to stand in the way. In sum, all prior RSS protocols did not solely depend on the players’ rationality, but also on their beliefs. Thus they could not guarantee that all players, if rational, learned the secret. 1.4 Our Contributions Our contributions can be summarized as follows. • Modeling. We put forward a more complete modeling of the RSS problem. In particular: we highlight the inputs available to the designer of protocol; provide a more comprehensive set of utilities —including the possibility of learning the wrong secret—; highlight the necessity of modeling RSS as a potentially infinite communication game; provide a very general definition of a communication channel; highlight the necessity of worrying about other channels even in a communication game designed for a specific channel; provide the first rationalization of aborting in a communication game; and bring to the fore the necessity of including bargaining into the definition of RSS.
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• Purely Rational Implementation. Our RSS protocol is an implementation in surviving strategies, as put forward by Chen and Micali [CM08]. In essence, such an implementation is “equilibrium-less.” It guarantees that the desired property holds for any combination of strategies surviving IEOWDS. Implementation in surviving strategies thus implies that the desired property is guaranteed based solely on the rationality of the players, and not on their beliefs. In a sense, as long no player chooses a dumb strategy, the desired property is guaranteed to hold. Actually, our protocol satisfies a stronger notion of implementation: namely, the surviving strategy of each player is essentially unique.2 That is, in our RSS protocol, after iteratively deleting all weakly dominated strategies, essentially a single strategy survives for each player, and playing these two strategies guarantees that both players learn the secret. That is, our RSS protocol essentially is a dominant solvable game. Note that IEOWDS often eliminates very few strategies (a fact that has been used to argue that Nash equilibria that survive IEOWDS is a solution concept not really better than an ordinary Nash). Thus it is even more remarkable that our protocol is such that, for any player, all but one strategy is “rationally credible.” Note too that, in general, which strategy survives depends on the order in which weakly dominated strategies are eliminated. In our case, however, the (essentially) unique surviving strategy of a player is the same irrespective of any possible elimination order. In sum, our solution concept is indeed very strong. • Communication Channel and Security. Our communication channel uses only ordinary envelopes (as a way of temporarily and perfectly hiding a secret value) and the dealer’s public key. The security depends on the ability of envelopes to perfectly hide their content and unforgeable digital signatures. • Operational Efficiency. Ours is the first polynomial-time RSS protocol, fully accounting for all inputs. In fact, each surviving strategy requires a total of 10k envelope operations, 4kL bit operations, plus the time of verifying two signatures relative to k-bit public keys. Here L is an upperbound to the length of the binary representation (of the absolute value) of any of the players’ utilities, and k is a security parameter. The security parameter k controls the probability that something goes wrong. (The probability of something going wrong is guaranteed to be exponentially small in k.) The dealer is required to perform a total of 4kL bit operations, to generating matching public and secret keys of a digital signature with security parameter k, and to produce two signatures relative to the selected public key. 2
The reason that we do not say unique is that, as we shall argue, a pure communication game G should be modeled as a possibly infinite sequence of the same sub-game g. Thus, a strategy of any player in G actually consists of a sequence of strategies, σ1 , σ2 , . . ., where σj is the player’s intended strategy for jth copy of g, if reached. By saying that each player has an essentially unique surviving strategy in G we mean that any of his surviving strategies is of the form s, σ2 , . . ., where s is fixed; that is first sub-strategy is the same for any surviving strategy of the player. And when all players play their first such strategies, G terminates.
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• Round Efficiency. A play of our surviving strategies involves only 6 rounds (1 for the players, and 5 for the channel).
2 Selected Modeling Issues Dealer Secret, Player Outputs, Player Utilities, and Designer Knowledge. For concreteness, we model the secret as a uniformly selected string of n bits. (Our protocol of course works for all kinds of other distributions as well.) We assume that, upon termination, each player outputs either an n-bit string (interpretable as the player’s guess for the dealer’s secret) or the special symbol “?” (interpretable as the player’s having no information about the secret). The protocol terminates when a prespecified stage is publicly reached, or when either one of the players aborts, that is stops communicating and for ever takes no further action —after setting his own output.3 We define an outcome of an RSS protocol to consist of three possible outputs for each player: (1) the correct secret the dealer, (2) the symbol “?”, and (3) an incorrect string. We assume that each player prefers his outputs in this order, and prefers the inverse order for the outputs of the other player. That is, for each player i, denoting by Ki (for “i knows the secret”) his first output, by Wi (for “i wrongly learns the secret) his third output, and by ui his utility function, we assume that the utilities of the first player over the possible 9 outcomes are as follows: u1 (K1 , W2 ) ≥ u1 (K1 , ?) ≥ u1 (K1 , K2 ) ≥ u1 (?, W2 ), ≥ u1 (?, ?) = 0 ≥ u1 (?, K2 ) ≥ u1 (W1 , W2 ), ≥ u1 (W1 , ?) ≥ u1 (W1 , K2 ). Player 2’s utilities are symmetrically defined. (Setting the players’ utilities to 0 when both of them have no information about the secret is somewhat arbitrary, but concretely useful to fix our thoughts.) All of the above inequalities can be strict. But for our analysis it suffices that u1 (K1 , ?) > u1 (K1 , K2 ) > u1 (?, ?) > u1 (W1 , W2 ), and symmetrically for player 2. That is, each player prefers learning the secret alone to learning together with the other player, prefers the latter outcome to not learning the secret, and prefers the latter outcome to learning the wrong secret.4 It is also useful to assume that a player’s expected utility when randomly guessing the secret is negative. (Alternatively, we must ensure that the utility of random guessing the dealer’s secret is less than that of learning the secret together with the other player. Else, a player would not have any incentive to participate in an RSS protocol.) 3
4
That is, we explicitly assume that one players’ aborting is detectable by the other player. (After all, stopping all communications should be “eventually detectable” in practical settings, and immediately detectable in synchronous ones.) Alternatively, each player may keep track of his current output at all times (rather than producing his output at termination). This way if a player aborts without the “courtesy” of informing the other player, the latter’ output is properly set. Indeed, if the secret were the combination of a safe with money and a bomb inside, and the safe exploded when the wrong combination were entered, learning the wrong secret could have truly negative utility for a player!
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This structure of the utility is assumed to be known to the designer. And so is an upperbound to the number of bits necessary to write down the largest of the 16 possibilities of the players. (In other words, it suffices for the designer to know the players’ utilities within an exponential accuracy, rather than the linear accuracy of the prior works.) Ensuring the Rationality of Abort. Our protocol, if a special point in which a player i has not yet learned the secret is reached, calls for him to abort. By so doing, of course, the player looses any hope of learning the secret. Thus, in order to guarantee that the suggested strategy survives IEOWDS, we need to ensure that, at that point of our protocol, the player no longer has any rational hope of learning the secret (whether alone or together with the other player). What should this mean? In particular, of course, it should mean that i’s expected utility when continuing the current execution of the protocol is worse than that of aborting outputting “?”. But it should not mean just that. The dealer who has provided the players with their shares is now dead, and can no longer control what the players do from his grave. RSS is a pure communication game, the players have all the information they need to continue any given execution of our protocol (if they so want) and no authority is there to stop them from (or fine them for) doing so. In addition, the players also have the ability of starting another execution from scratch. (For instance, they may use their same shares, but different coin tosses for their strategies, if probabilistic. Alternatively, if reusing the old shares is not “rationally advisable,” they may first resort to a secure function evaluation to “compute new, equivalent and, independently selected shares from their old ones, and then execute our protocol again. The possible alternatives abound.) Better yet, perhaps, they also have the ability to start a totally different RSS protocol using the same communication channel. More generally yet (unless one were ready to make the outlandish assumption that no other channel exists), they have the ability to execute a totally different RSS protocol with a totally different channel! In sum, To rationalize player i’s aborting in an RSS protocol, we should prove that any chance of i’s learning the secret has vanished. Realizing, formalizing, and delivering this property is a main contribution of our work. Modeling Special Channels. All RSS protocols with rational players must use some special communication channel, such as a swap channel or a simultaneous-broadcast channel. Since we have just argued that a proper analysis of RSS should include the possibility of running a different protocol over a different channel, it becomes imperative to model any possible special channel of communication. We do so by letting special channels consist of “mildly trusted parties in abundant supply.” Let us explain. If some party T could be totally and universally trusted, then many problems (including rational secret sharing) would be trivialized. For instance, the dealer might as well confide his secret to T and ask him to reveal it when all the designated players show up together. Thus “mild trust” became imperative. As for abundant supply we mean that there is not a unique mildly trusted party in the world. (If this were the case, one might ask T to interact only once with a given group of players for a given task, and simplify a lot of things too.) By contrast, to model the fact that a special communication channel (if it exists at all) is indeed a commodity purchasable at any store, we envisage that
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there is a plurality of mildly trusted parties, not aware of —or not in contact with— each other. Accordingly, following [ILM08], we model a mildly trusted party in abundant supply as a verifiable trusted party (VTP for short) with no memory. By verifiable we mean that every one can see the actions a VTP takes and verify that they are the prescribed ones. That is, a VTP is not trusted to keep, nor to correctly make any secret actions. A VTP knows nothing and acts publicly, so that he is trusted only to the extent that he will indeed publicly perform his prescribed public actions. For example, a VTP can trivially implement a swap channel between two parties as follows. First each of A and B seals his message for the other into an opaque envelope and publicly gives it to the VTP. Then the VTP publicly hands A’s envelope to B and B’s envelope to A. As for another example, a VTP can implement a simultaneous-broadcast channel as follows. First, A and B seal their respective messages for the other in two envelopes and publicly hand them to T , then T publicly opens both of them. In sum, VTPs can be viewed as a formalization of a legal system. One may not want to trust his secrets to —say— a judge, but should at least trust a judge to carry out under public scrutiny a specified sequence of totally public actions. Since typically there are multiple judges to choose from, the analogy with the legal system makes it clear that the players can always walk to an new judge to execute their protocol one more time. The analogy also makes it clear that if one type of channel is available, then indeed other types are likely to be available too. Whether or not, as functions, the “swap channel” is reducible to the “simultaneous-broadcast-channel” (or viceversa), from the VTP perspective, both exist. (Indeed any judge can, with envelopes, implement both channels and a host of similar ones.) This highlights the point that when a player is asked to abort, then it really must be the case that no hope to resurrect the secret exists for him, no matter what other protocol and channel might be considered. Adding Costs to the Model. Consider a cryptographic rational secret sharing protocol in which the dealer also announces an encryption E of the secret S. Then, a player, in addition to any other strategy, also has available a computational-attack one: namely, abort and try to decrypt E. A computational-attack strategy is also possible in our protocol, but in a more complex way. Indeed, successfully forging a given value enables a player to learn the secret alone, and force the other to learn a false secret. Thus we too need to argue that computational-attack strategies are not rational. One way to do so is to define a computationally bounded version of rational secret sharing. A preferable way is to attach cost to computation so as make it preferable for a player to play honestly our protocol rather than try to attack the signature scheme and then, if the attack is successful, getting an advantage in the protocol. Details will be provided in the final version. (In any case, as argued by Halpern and Pass [HP08] considering computational costs may be meaningful even for more traditional —i.e., non-cryptographic— game theoretic settings.) We also associate a small additive cost of γ to each use of the channel. (E.g., every one has the right to access the legal system, but incurs a fixed cost in doing so.
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We note that additive (or multiplicative) discounts of the players final utilities are quite standard in game theoretical models in which the players could go on interacting (possible even for ever), typically by executing a given sub-game.5 The Issue of Bargaining. Finally, let us bring to the reader attention a point totally neglected so far. Traditionally, to guarantee the dealer’s wish that all players learn the secret (at least when everyone behaves rationally), the only restrictions envisaged for the utilities are local to each player (e.g., each player must prefer reconstructing the secret alone to reconstructing it together with the other player, etc.). That is, the utilities of an individual player must be “compatible with each other,” but not with those of other players. We wish to point out, however, that it is necessary to consider inter-player restrictions on the players’ utilities, or be ready live with the consequences relative to the dealer’s wishes. Let us explain. A dealer providing players with shares of his secret S automatically enables them to bargain. In a bargaining situation, one player may get a better deal than others without any failure of rationality. For instance, in an RSS context, Player 1 may simply insist that unless everyone plays a protocol in which he learns the secret alone 99 times out of 100, he is not going to cooperate. (In a sense, if to Bill Gates learning the secret together with you and me is worth $1K, but learning it alone is worth $1B, then he would be wasting time and opportunity costs in participating with you and me in a “fair” reconstruction of the secret. Therefore, he may successfully bargain for a higher probability of learning the secret.) Now, if the dealer indeed has come up with shares and channels enabling the players to rationally reconstruct the secret together using a given special communication channel, then we should also expect that —whether with the same or with a different channel— the players can use their same shares to skew the payoffs so as to suit their bargaining needs. Truly unbelievable assumptions must be made to prevent the shares to be used in this alternative manner (especially in light of the result of [ILM08], that essentially enables the players to do rationally almost anything, although not too conveniently). Thus, either one must make the additional assumption that the players utilities are such that their bargaining game has a unique solution (e.g., some form of symmetry), or the dealer must be ready to die in peace with the comfort that either all players (if rational) will learn the secret, or that he has put all of them on a technically equal bargaining position. The reader is free to pick the assumption he prefers. But always guaranteeing that all players together learn the secret may not be possible. For the rest of this extended abstract let us assume that the utilities are such that there is a unique bargaining solution.
3 Our Enriched Solution It is simpler to explain our protocol assuming first that also special, dealer-sealed, envelopes are available: anyone can verify that such an envelope has been sealed by the dealer, and thus that its content is what the dealer wanted it to be, because any attempt to break the dealer’s seal is guaranteed to be detectable by anyone. 5
For instance, if a given contract is executed after i days of negotiation it is worth less to the players than executing the same contract as i − 1 days of negotiation.
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Notice that, if such special envelopes were available, then a trivial solution to the RSS problem exists. In essence, letting s be the secret, the Dealer creates two random strings sA , sB such that s = sA ⊕ sB , and then provides player A (respectively B) with infinitely many pink (respectively, blue) dealer-sealed envelopes, each containing sA (respectively sB ). Players A and B then interact as follows. First, each player, simultaneously with the other, gives the VTP one of his dealer-sealed envelopes. Then, if the VTP receives both a pink and a blue dealer-sealed envelope, he publicly opens both of them. Else (e.g., one of the envelopes is ordinary, or has a broken seal), he destroys all envelopes received. In either case, the players incur a positive cost for this interaction. The above indeed is an RSS protocol working in dominant-strategies. The fact that s becomes public is not a problem: the dealer could just give both players the same string r and choose sA and sB such that their bit-by-bit exclusive-or is s ⊕ r. The problem is that we see no way of keeping its analysis by simulating its dealer-sealed envelopes with ordinary ones and digital signatures. We thus now describe a more complex protocol for which we can “simulate” dealer-sealed envelops as follows. Rather than handing to a player infinitely many dealer-sealed envelopes with content c, the dealer gives him a single digital signature of c, which then the player can —copy and— put into an ordinary envelope and give to the VTP as many times as necessary. (In the final version we shall prove that this simulation keeps our analysis essentially intact.) In order to guarantee implementation in surviving strategies, our protocol critically introduces an asymmetry in the way the players are treated. 3.1 Dealer’s Instructions On input an -bit secret s and a security parameter k , do: 1. Choose a random string σ ∈ {0, 1} and compute s ← s ⊕ σ. 2. Choose a value k such thatfor all i (a) ui (K1 , K2 ) > 2−k/2 ui (K1 , ?) + 1 − 2−k/2 ui (?, ?) 3. For i = 1, 2, . . . , k, repeat the following (a) Randomly select a four-tuple (a0 , a1 , b0 , b1 ) such that a0 , b0 are a random ⊕-sharing of the secret s and a1 , b1 are random and independent values of the same length as s. (b) Pick two random bits e1 , e2 ← {0, 1}. (c) Player 1’s share is (ae1 , a1−e1 ) and Player 2’s share is (be2 , b1−e2 ). (d) Player 1’s check value is C1,i = (e2 , b1 ) and player 2’s check value is C2,i = (e1 , a1 ). (e) Place value aj into envelope E1,i,j and place value bj into envelope E2,i,j for j ∈ {0, 1}. 4. Let C be the k( + 1)-bit number corresponding to the check values C2,1 , . . . , C2,k . Choose random values α, β ∈ Zk and compute the message authentication code γ = α · C + β. 5. Place into an envelope E1,0 the values (C1,1 , . . . , C1,k , α, β) and into an envelope E2,0 the values (C2,1 , . . . , C2,k , γ). Seal the envelope E1,0 . 6. Place into an envelope Ep,σ the value σ for p ∈ {0, 1}. 7. Send the player 1 the envelopes E1,0 , E1,σ and E1,i,j for i ∈ [1, k] and j ∈ {0, 1}. Send to player 2 the envelopes E1,0 , E1,σ and E1,i,j for i ∈ [1, k] and j ∈ {0, 1}.
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3.2 Reconstruction Instructions Recall that a player’s strategy consists of a Turing machine that on input a history h outputs either a special symbol ⊥ to indicate abort, an output string s, or a sequence of 2k + 1 strings to place into envelopes that are submitted to the VTP. We use the symbol ε to denote the initial history consisting of only the envelopes received from the dealer. Player p instructions T (h) : 1. If h = ε, then submit envelopes Ep,0 and Ep,i,j for i ∈ [1, k] to the VTP. If the VTP destroy the envelopes, output ⊥ and stop. Else, after the VTP completes all of its steps, reconstruct n candidates of s by xor’ing the non-check values that have been opened. Let s be the majority candidate. If no majority exists, then output ⊥. Otherwise, privately open envelope Eσ and output s ⊕ σ. 2. For all other histories, output ⊥ (i.e. do not invoke the VTP). VTP Instructions : 1. Publicly verify envelope E1,0 . If the envelope’s seal does not verify, then destroy all envelopes. Otherwise, publicly open the envelope to reveal the values (C1,1 , . . . , C1,k ) and α, β. 2. Publicly open envelope E2,0 to reveal values C = (C2,1 , . . . , C2,k ) and γ. If γ = α · C + β, then destroy all envelopes. 3. Open the check envelopes (left or right) of player two indicated by C1,i , . . . , C1,k . If there exists an opened envelope E2,i,j that does not match its stated value in C1,i , the check fails: destroy all envelopes. 4. Open the check envelopes (left or right) of player one indicated by C2,i , . . . , C2,k . If there exists an opened envelope E1,i,j that does not match its stated value in C2,i , the check fails: destroy all envelopes. 5. If all k checks succeed, open the remaining 2k envelopes (corresponding to shares of the secret s ). 3.3 Analysis Theorem 1. The strategy profile (T, T ) for players 1 and 2 constitute a profile that uniquely survives the iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies in the given VTP model. The main idea of the proof. Unless the first envelope submitted by the first player is sealed correctly, the VTP destroys envelopes. Once the one-and-only sealed envelope E1,0 is opened, the second player knows which of her share values are check values, and which are values that are used in the sharing of s . If the VTP succeeds in the same use that E1,0 is opened, then both players learn the secret. If it does not, then some check envelope has failed and therefore no share value has yet been opened. In subsequent uses of the VTP, the second player can then modify all of her share values by XORing a random string r to them. This action is undetectable by the first player. Moreover, this action is the weakly dominant response for player 2 since player 2 prefers to learn the secret alone. Therefore, the first player has no hope to recover the secret (since any future opened share values will be independent of the real secret s . Thus, the first player will abort in every subsequent use of the VTP. As a result, it is best for the second
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player to submit the envelopes received from the dealer on the first use (since either her envelopes are never opened, or they are opened in the first and only rational opportunity there will be to recover the secret). In this case, the first player should follow T since each use of the VTP incurs a small cost. Then finally, the second player should also play T . Definition 1. A revealing history h is a history in which the envelope E1,0 has been opened and verified in some use of the VTP, but in every use of the VTP, all envelopes have been destroyed. Let X1 be the set of all player-one strategies, and X2 be the set of all player-two strategies. Notice that for all σ ∈ X1 , u2 (σ, T ) ≥ u2 (?, ?) and for all τ ∈ X2 , u1 (T, τ ) ≥ u1 (?, ?). Therefore in the first step of removal, all guessing strategies that have expected utility less than ui (?, ?) can be removed. For any player-two strategy τ , define Γ (τ ) as the following strategy: 1. For the first use of the VTP, follow τ (ε). If the first use of the VTP results in all envelopes being opened, output the same as strategy τ . 2. If the first use of the VTP does not result in all envelopes being opened, for the subsequent uses of the VTP, follow strategy τ with the following exception: for any revealing history h, compute which of player 2’s envelopes are non-check envelopes, choose a random value r and XOR r to each of these non-check values. Use these new non-check envelope values in place of the original non-check values received from the dealer to compute τ (h) for all subsequent histories h. If in this use or any subsequent use of the VTP, all envelopes are opened, compute the output O as per τ using the original non-check envelope values. Claim. The player-two strategy Γ (τ ) weakly dominates τ whenever τ = Γ (τ ). For any player-one strategy σ, the player-two strategies τ and Γ (τ ) are the same for the first use of the VTP, and thus result in similar utilities in any execution that succeeds. For any revealing history, Γ (τ ) never does worse than τ since Γ (τ ) is both perfectly indistinguishable from τ to player one, and the share values produced by Γ (τ ) do not have any information about the secret s . Since Γ (τ ) = τ , then there is some σ and some execution for which Γ (τ ) will be strictly better than τ . Set X21 = {Γ (τ )}τ ∈X2 . For any player-one strategy σ, let Π(σ) be the strategy that does the following: If the input history h is not revealing, then follow σ(h). If input history h is revealing, then (a) never use the VTP in any subsequent round and (b) if σ(h) outputs a string s, then output s and otherwise output ⊥. Claim. The player-one strategy Π(σ) weakly dominates σ whenever (1) σ(ε) submits the sealed envelope E1,0 , and (2) there exists τ ∈ X21 such that (σ, τ ) produces a revealing history h with positive probability and σ(h) does not instruct to abort. Consider any profile (σ, τ ) were τ ∈ X21 . The strategies σ and Π(σ) are equivalent on the first use of the VTP and therefore result in the same history h. If h is successful, then both σ and Π(σ) result in reconstructing the secret. Similarly, if h is not successful and also not revealing, then the two strategies are equivalent. If h is revealing, but σ(h)
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produces an output, then both are equivalent. Finally, if h is a revealing history and σ(h) uses the VTP again, then Π(σ) is strictly better. This follows because τ survives the first step of removal, and therefore τ produces envelopes for the second (and future) uses of the VTP that are independent of the secret s . This upper-bounds player 1’s utility u1 (σ, τ ) by − + u1 (?, ·). However, u1 (Π(σ), τ ) = u1 (?, ·) which is strictly greater. (Similar analysis for the case when σ outputs s instead of ⊥.) The second condition of the claim ensures this situation occurs for some τ , and therefore therefore Π(σ) weakly dominates σ. Set X11 to be the set of player-one stratgies in which after the sealed envelope is submitted, the VTP is never used again. Let Θi (τ ) be the player-two strategy that plays T (ε) in the first i uses of the VTP, and follows τ for all subsequent uses. Claim. If τ = Θ1 (τ ), then Θ1 (τ ) weakly dominates τ . Consider any player-one strategy σ ∈ X11 . For those executions of σ in which player 1 submits an unsealed envelope in the first use of the VTP, all envelopes are immediately destroyed and therefore it holds that u2 (σ, Θ(τ )) = u2 (σ, τ ) since both strategies are equivalent for all second and subsequent uses of the VTP. We now consider those executions of σ in which the sealed E1,0 is submitted. (This can only happen once.) Let pσ,τ be the probability that under profile (σ, τ ), the first use of the VTP results in destroyed envelopes. Observe that pσ,τ ≥ pσ,Θ(τ ) for all σ. Since σ ∈ X11 , the VTP is never used again by σ, and therefore u2 (σ, τ ) = pσ,τ u2 (·, K2 ) which is less than or equal to pσ,Θ(τ ) u2 (·, K2 ) = u2 (σ, Θ(τ )). The condition that Θ(τ ) = τ implies that the inequality is strict for some player one strategy σ which establishes the claim. Induction can be used to show that the claim holds for all i. Set X22 = {Θ(τ )}τ ∈X11 . Claim. The player-one strategy T weakly dominates every surviving strategy σ. Observe that u1 (T, τ ) = u1 (K1 , K2 ) for any τ ∈ X22 . Any other player one strategy has a positive probability of causing the VTP to destroy all envelopes, and therefore incurring a cost of −. A similar argument with Π can be applied to every player-two strategy. Thus, in any use of the VTP that reveals the dealer-received envelope E2 , the player-two strategy no longer uses the VTP. This implies that the player-two strategy T weakly dominates every surviving strategy.
Acknowledgements Many thanks to Sergei Izmalkov for his characteristically generous and insightful help.
References [ADGH06]
Abraham, I., Dolev, D., Gonen, R., Halpern, J.: Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory: Robust Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing and Multiparty Computation. In: PODC 2006 (2006)
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[BP98] [CM08] [GK06] [GMW87] [HT04] [HP08] [IML05] [ILM08] [KN08a]
[KN08b] [LMPS04] [LT06]
[OPRV08] [OR]
Ben-Porath, E.: Correlation without mediation: Expanding the set of equilibria outcomes by “cheap” pre-play procedures. J. of Economic Theory 80, 108–122 (1998) Chen, J., Micali, S.: Resilient Mechanisms For Truly Combinatorial Auctions. MIT-CSAIL-TR-2008-067 (November 2008) Gordon, S.D., Katz, J.: Rational Secret Sharing, Revisited. In: De Prisco, R., Yung, M. (eds.) SCN 2006. LNCS, vol. 4116, pp. 229–241. Springer, Heidelberg (2006) Goldreich, O., Micali, S., Wigderson, A.: How to play any mental game. In: STOC 1987 (1987) Halpern, J., Teague, V.: Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation. In: STOC 2004 (2004) Halpern, J., Pass, R.: Game Theory with Costly Computation (manuscript, 2008) Izmalkov, S., Micali, S., Lepinski, M.: Rational Secure Computation and Ideal Mechanism Design. In: FOCS 2005 (2005) Izmalkov, S., Lepinski, M., Micali, S.: Verifiably secure devices. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 273–301. Springer, Heidelberg (2008) Kol, G., Naor, M.: Cryptography and Game Theory: Designing Protocols for Exchanging Information. In: Canetti, R. (ed.) TCC 2008. LNCS, vol. 4948, pp. 320– 339. Springer, Heidelberg (2008) Kol, G., Naor, M.: Games for Exchanging Information. In: STOC 2008 (2008) Lepinski, M., Micali, S., Peikert, C., Shelat, A.: Completely Fair SFE and Coalition-Safe Cheap Talk. In: PODC 2004 (2004) Lysyanskaya, A., Triandopoulos, N.: Rationality and adversarial behavior in multiparty computation. In: Dwork, C. (ed.) CRYPTO 2006. LNCS, vol. 4117, pp. 180– 197. Springer, Heidelberg (2006) Ong, S.J., Parkes, D., Rosen, A., Vadhan, S.: Fairness with an Honest Minority and a Rational Majority. On Eprint, 2008/097 (2008) Osborne, M.J., Rubinstein, A.: A Course in Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge (1994)
A The Ballot-Box Model Ballot-box mechanisms are extensive-form, imperfect-information mechanisms with Nature. Accordingly, to specify them we must specify who acts when, the actions and the information available to the players, when the play terminates, and how the outcome is determined upon termination. A ballot-box mechanism ultimately is a mathematical abstraction, but possesses a quite natural physical interpretation. The physical setting is that of a group of players, seated around a table, acting on a set of ballots. Within this physical setting, one has considerable latitude in choosing reasonable actions available to the players. In this paper, we make a specific choice, sufficient for our present goals. A.1 Intuition Ballots. Externally, all ballots of the same kind are identical. (Unlike [ILM08], we do not need super-envelopes here.) An envelope may contain a symbol from a finite alphabet. An envelope perfectly hides and guarantees the integrity of the symbol it contains until it is opened. Initially, all ballots are empty and in sufficient supply. Ballot-Box Operations. We only need 3 classes of ballot-box operations. Each operation except for the first type is referred to as a public action, because it is performed
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in plain view, so that all players know exactly which action has been performed. These classes are: (1) writing a symbol on a piece of paper and sealing it into a new, empty envelope; (2) publicly opening an envelope to reveal its content to all players; (3) publicly destroying a ballot; and (4) do nothing. Public Information. Conceptually, the players observe which actions have been performed on which ballots. Formally, (1) we associate to each ballot a unique identifier, a positive integer that is common information to all players (these identifiers correspond to the order in which the ballots are placed on the table for the first time or returned to the table —e.g., after being ballot-boxed); and (2) we have each action generate, when executed, a public string of the form “A, j, k, l, ...”; where A is a string identifying the action and j, k, l, ... are the identifiers of the ballots involved. The public record is the concatenation of the public strings generated by all actions executed thus far. A.2 Formalization Basic Notation. We denote by Σ the alphabet consisting of English letters, arabic numerals, and punctuation marks; by Σ ∗ the set of all finite strings over Σ; by Sk the group of permutations of k elements; by x := y the operation that assigns value y to variable x; by p := rand(Sk ) the operation that assigns to variable p a randomly selected permutation in Sk ; and by ∅ the empty set. If S is a set, by S 0 we denote the empty set, and by S k the Cartesian product of S with itself k times. If x is a sequence, by either xi or xi we denote x’s ith element,6 and by {x} the set {z : xi = z for some i}. If x and y are sequences, respectively of length j and k, by x ◦ y we denote their concatenation (i.e., the sequence of j + k elements whose ith element is xi if i ≤ j, and y i−j otherwise). If x and y are strings (i.e., sequences with elements in Σ), we denote their concatenation by xy. If A is a probabilistic algorithm, the distribution over A’s outputs on input x is denoted by A(x). A probabilistic function f : X → Y is finite if X and Y are both finite sets and, for every x ∈ X and y ∈ Y , the probability that f (x) = y has a finite binary representation. Ballots and Actions. An envelope is a triple (j, c, 0), where j is a positive integer, and c a symbol of Σ. A ballot is an envelope. If (j, c, L) is a ballot, we refer to j as its identifier, to c as its content, and to L as its level. A set of ballots B is well-defined if distinct ballots have distinct identifiers. If B is a well-defined set of ballots, then IB denotes the set of identifiers of B’s ballots. For j ∈ IB , Bj (or the expression ballot j) denotes the unique ballot of B whose identifier is j. For J ⊂ IB , BJ denotes the set of ballots of B whose identifiers belong to J. Relative to a well-defined set of ballots B: if j is an envelope in B, then contB (j) denotes the content of j; if x = j 1 , . . . , j k is a sequence of envelope identifiers in IB , then contB (x) denotes the concatenation of the contents of these envelopes, that is, the string contB (j 1 ) · · · contB (j k ). 6
For any given sequence, we shall solely use superscripts, or solely subscripts, to denote all of its elements.
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A global memory consists of a pair (B, R), where • B is a well defined set of ballots; and • R is a sequence of strings in Σ ∗ , R = R1 , R2 , . . .. We refer to B as the ballot set; to R as the public record; and to each element of R as a record. The empty global memory is the global memory for which the ballot set and the public record are empty. We denote the set of all possible global memories by GM . Ballot-box actions are functions from GM to GM . The subset of ballot-box actions available at a given global memory gm is denoted by Agm . The actions in Agm are described below, grouped in 8 classes. For each a ∈ Agm we provide a formal identifier; an informal reference (to facilitate the high-level description of our constructions); and a functional specification. If gm = (B, R), we actually specify a(gm) as a program acting on variables B and R. For convenience, we include in R the auxiliary variable ub, the identifier upper-bound: a value equal to 0 for an empty global memory, and always greater than or equal to any identifier in IB . 1. (N EW E N, c) —where c ∈ Σ. “Make a new envelope with content c.” ub := ub + 1; B := B ∪ {(ub, c, 0)}; and R := R ◦ (N EW E N, c, ub). —where j is an envelope identifier in IB . 2. (O PEN E N, j) “Publicly open envelope j to reveal content contB (j).” B := B \ {Bj } and R := R ◦ (O PEN E N, j, contB (j), ub). —where j is a ballot identifier in IB . 3. (D ESTROY, j) “Destroy ballot j” B := B \ {Bj } and R := R ◦ (D ESTROY , j, ub). 4. (D O N OTHING ). “Do nothing” B := B and R := R ◦ (D O N OTHING , ub). Remarks • All ballot-box actions are deterministic functions. • The variable ub never decreases and coincides with the maximum of all identifiers “ever in existence.” Notice that we never re-use the identifier of a ballot that has left, temporarily or for ever, the table. This ensures that different ballots get different identifiers. Definition 2. A global memory gm is feasible if there exists a sequence of global memories gm0 , gm1 , . . . , gmk , such that gm0 is the empty global memory; gmk = gm; and, for all i ∈ [1, k], gmi = ai (gmi−1 ) for some ai ∈ Agmi−1 . If (B, R) is a feasible memory, we refer to R as a feasible public record. Notice that if gm = (B, R) is feasible, then Agm is easily computable from R alone. Indeed, what ballots are in play, which ballots are envelopes and which are superenvelopes, et cetera, are all deducible from R. Therefore, different feasible global memories that have the same public record also have the same set of available actions. This motivates the following definition.
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Definition 3. If R is a feasible public record, by AR we denote the set of available actions for any feasible global memory with public record R.
B The Notion of a Public Ballot-Box Mediator (VTP in Our Language) Definition 4. Let P be a sequence of K functions. We say that P is a public ballot-box mediator (of length K) if, for all k ∈ [1, K] and public records R, P k (R) is a public ballot-box action in AR . An execution of P on an initial feasible global memory (B 0 , R0 ) is a sequence of global memories (B 0 , R0 ), . . . , (B K , RK ) such that (B k , Rk ) = ak (B k−1 , Rk−1 ) for all k ∈ [1, K], where ak = P k (Rk−1 ).7 If e is an execution of P, by B k (e) and Rk (e) we denote, respectively, the ballot set, k (e) we denote the public record, and the private history profile of e at round k. By RP k 0 the last k records of R (e) (i.e., “the records appended to R by executing P”). Remarks • Note that the above definition captures our intuitive desideratum that no special trust is bestowed on a public mediator. Because he performs a sequence of public ballot-box actions, any one can verify that (i) he performs the right sequence of actions; (ii) he does not choose these actions; and (iii) he does not learn any information that is not publicly available. • Note too that if P = P 1 , . . . , P K and Q = Q1 , . . . , QL are public mediators, then their concatenation, that is, P 1 , . . . , P K , Q1 , . . . , QL is a public mediator too.
7
Note that the executions of P are, in general, random since P k (R) may return an action of Nature.
Some Recent Progress in Lattice-Based Cryptography Chris Peikert SRI International
Abstract. The past decade in computer science has witnessed tremendous progress in the understanding of lattices, which are a rich source of seemingly hard computational problems. One of their most promising applications is to the design of cryptographic schemes that enjoy exceptionally strong security guarantees and other desirable properties. Most notably, these schemes can be proved secure assuming only the worst-case hardness of well-studied lattice problems. Additionally, and in contrast with number-theoretic problems typically used in cryptography, the underlying problems have so far resisted attacks by subexponentialtime and quantum algorithms. Yet even with these security advantages, lattice-based schemes also tend to be remarkably simple, asymptotically efficient, and embarrassingly parallelizable. This tutorial will survey the foundational results of the area, as well as some more recent developments. Our particular focus will be on the core hard cryptographic (average-case) problems, some recurring techniques and abstractions, and a few notable applications.
O. Reingold (Ed.): TCC 2009, LNCS 5444, p. 72, 2009. c International Association for Cryptologic Research 2009
Non-malleable Obfuscation Ran Canetti1, and Mayank Varia2, 1
School of Computer Science, Tel Aviv University
[email protected] 2 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
[email protected]
Abstract. Existing definitions of program obfuscation do not rule out malleability attacks, where an adversary that sees an obfuscated program is able to generate another (potentially obfuscated) program that is related to the original one in some way. We formulate two natural flavors of non-malleability requirements for program obfuscation, and show that they are incomparable in general. We also construct non-malleable obfuscators of both flavors for some program families of interest. Some of our constructions are in the Random Oracle model, whereas another one is in the common reference string model. We also define the notion of verifiable obfuscation which is of independent interest.
1
Introduction
The problem of program obfuscation has recently received a lot of attention in cryptography. Informally, the goal of obfuscation is to transform a program in such a way that its code becomes unintelligible while its functionality remains the same. This intuitive idea was formalized in [1] using a simulation-based definition. In [1] it is shown that there do not exist generic algorithms that obfuscate any program family. These results are extended in [2,3]. However, positive results have been shown for some program families of interest, such as the family of “point circuits,” which accept a single input string (that is explicitly given in the circuit description) and reject all other inputs [4,5,6,7]. These constructions can be generalized to form obfuscators for two more families: “multi-point circuits,” which accept a constant number of input strings, and “point circuits with multibit output,” which store a hidden string that is revealed only for a single input value [8]. Finally, a different definition of obfuscation has been formulated [9,10] in which it is possible to obfuscate the family of re-encryption programs [10].
Supported by NSF grant 0635297, US-Israel Binational Science Foundation grant 20006317, a European Union Marie Curie grant, and the Check Point Institute for Information Security. Supported by the Department of Defense through the NDSEG Program and by NSF grant 0635297.
O. Reingold (Ed.): TCC 2009, LNCS 5444, pp. 73–90, 2009. c International Association for Cryptologic Research 2009
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However, the question of malleability attacks on obfuscated programs has not been addressed. In fact, many of the above constructions are malleable. We provide an overview of the definition of obfuscation and then describe its malleability concerns. Virtual black-box obfuscation. At a high level, the concept of “obfuscating” a program is to produce a new program with the same functionality but with “garbled” code. Of course, it is impossible for the garbled code to hide all useful information, because at the very least one can run the program and observe its input-output behavior. In this way, the code of a program must be at least as useful as access to an oracle for the program. At a high level, obfuscation ensures the converse: that access to the code of an obfuscated program is no more useful than access to the oracle. The formalization of this idea provided by [1], called the virtual black-box property, considers two different worlds. In the real world, an efficient adversary has access to the code of an obfuscated program, and attempts to learn a singlebit predicate about the underlying program. Now consider an imaginary world in which the code of an obfuscated program is not provided, but rather only oracle access to the program is provided. Obfuscation ensures that there exists an efficient algorithm known as a simulator that can learn the same predicate in the imaginary world that the adversary learns in the real world. Malleability concerns. If an adversary has access to obfuscated code, the virtual black-box property guarantees that she cannot “understand” the underlying program. However, suppose the adversary instead uses the obfuscated code to create a new program in such a way that she controls the relationship between the input-output functionality of the two programs. Intuitively, one might expect that virtual black-box obfuscation already prevents malleability attacks. The simulator only has oracle access to the obfuscated code, so any program that it makes can only depend on the input-output functionality of the obfuscated code at a polynomial number of locations. Therefore, obfuscation should guarantee that the adversary is also restricted to these trivial malleability attacks. However, the virtual black-box definition in [1] does not carry this guarantee. Upon close inspection, the problem is that the virtual black-box definition only considers adversaries and simulators that output a single bit, not adversaries and simulators that output programs. A naïve solution to this problem is to extend the virtual black-box definition to hold even when the adversary and simulator output long strings. However, in this case obfuscation becomes unrealizable for any family of interest. Consider the adversary that outputs its input. Then, a corresponding simulator has oracle access to a program and needs to write the code for this program, which is usually impossible. In this paper, we demonstrate two different methods to incorporate nonmalleability guarantees into obfuscation. Both non-malleability definitions extend the virtual black-box definition by allowing the adversary and simulator to produce multiple bit strings, but only in a restricted manner. There are
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many subtleties involved in constructing a proper definition, such as deciding the appropriate restrictions to impose on the adversary and simulator, and creating relations to test the similarities between the adversary’s input and output programs. We defer treatment of these important details to Section 3. Here, we motivate and describe the two definitions at a high level. Functional non-malleability. Imagine that Alice, Bob, and Charles are three graduate students in an office that receives a new computer. The department’s network administrator wishes to configure the computer to allow the grad students root access to the computer. The administrator receives the students’ desired passwords, and she needs to write a login program that accepts these three passwords and rejects all other inputs. The administrator knows that she has to be careful in designing the login program because the students will be able to read the program’s code. As a result, she forms the login program using an obfuscator for the family of three-point circuits, which ensures that a dictionary attack is the best that the graduate students can do to learn their officemates’ passwords. However, obfuscation does not alleviate all of the administrator’s fears, because the students will have root access to the computer so they can alter the login program as well. The administrator would like to prevent tampering of the login program, but the virtual black-box definition does not provide this guarantee. For instance, suppose Alice wants to remove Bob’s access to the computer. There exist obfuscators of the three-point circuit such that Alice can succeed in this attack with noticeable probability [8]. Intuitively, the goal of obfuscation is to turn a program into a “black box,” so the only predicates that Alice can learn from the program are those she could learn from a black box. We extend this intuition to cover modifications as well. We say that an obfuscator is functionally non-malleable if the only programs that Alice can create given obfuscated code are the programs she could create given black-box access to the obfuscated code. This definition provides a guarantee on the possible attacks Alice can apply. For instance, if Alice only has black-box access to the login program, then she can only remove Bob’s access to the computer with negligible probability. In this sense, functional non-malleability provides stronger security for Bob because it protects all aspects of his access to the computer, whereas the virtual black-box property only protects his password. We wish to define functional non-malleability using a simulation-based definition: for every adversary that receives obfuscated code and uses it to create a new program, there exists a simulator that only has oracle access to the obfuscated code and produces a program that is functionally equivalent to the adversary’s program. However, this definition is too strong: given the trivial adversary that outputs its input, the simulator gets oracle access to a program and needs to output the code of this program, which is usually impossible. But it is unfair to demand that the simulator do this much work. After all, the adversary’s input is a program but the simulator’s input is just an oracle. At the very least, the adversary can output a program that uses its input program in a black-box
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manner, and the simulator should have the same ability. Therefore, we allow the program that the simulator outputs to have oracle access to the obfuscated code. Verifiable non-malleability. Functional non-malleability is a nice property for obfuscators, but there are some scenarios where even this does not suffice. For example, suppose that Alice wishes to play an April fools’ prank on her officemates by altering the login program to accept their old passwords appended to the string “Alice is great.” Alice only knows her own password, so she cannot run the obfuscator to produce this modified program. Nevertheless, she can write the following program: “on input a string s, check that s begins with ‘Alice is great,’ and if so, remove it from s and send the rest of the string to the administrator’s login program.” Functional non-malleability does not prevent this prank. In fact, it is impossible to prevent this prank because Alice only uses the obfuscated login program in a black-box manner. Still, this attack is not “perfect”: after Alice performs this attack, the new login program “looks” very different from a program that the network administrator would create. As a result, we may not be able to prevent Alice from performing her prank, but we may be able to detect Alice’s modification afterward and restore the original program. Alice’s job is now harder, since she has to modify obfuscated code in such a way that the change is undetectable. We say that an obfuscator is verifiably non-malleable if the only programs Alice can create that pass a verification procedure are the programs she could create given black-box access to the obfuscated code. This approach gives us hope to detect attacks that we cannot prevent, although it requires a stronger model in which a verification procedure routinely audits the program. In the setting of our example, one simple way to achieve non-malleability is for the network administrator to digitally sign every program she makes, and for the verification procedure to check the validity of the signature attached to an obfuscated program before running it. By the existential unforgeability of the signature scheme, Alice cannot make any modifications, so the non-malleability goal is achieved. However, this solution requires that the verification procedure can find and store the network administrator’s verification key, which may not be practical. We want the non-malleability guarantee to be an intrinsic property of the obfuscation, without relying on an external public key infrastructure. As a result, in this paper we consider “public” verifiers that depend only on the obfuscation algorithm, and not on the party performing the obfuscation. Informally, a verifier algorithm V accepts programs if and only if they could have been produced by running the obfuscation algorithm. We stress that V does not receive any party-specific information (such as public keys), so it does not depend on the person that runs the obfuscator. Verifiability has interesting applications in and of itself, as we describe in the Discussion section below, but in this paper we only use it to create a simulationbased definition of verifiable non-malleability. The definition guarantees that an adversary cannot maul obfuscated code into a new program that passes the verification test unless there exists a simulator that can perform the same attack
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given only oracle access to the obfuscated code. (Note that the adversary must create a new program and not simply output the obfuscated code it receives.) Because we hope to detect attacks that operate in a black-box manner (which we could not hope to prevent in the functional setting), we no longer give the simulator the extra help that we gave it in the definition of functional nonmalleability. Instead, the simulator must output a fully-functional program that does not have an oracle. Comparison. We show that both forms of non-malleability imply the virtual black-box property. Intuitively, this relationship holds because an adversary that outputs programs should easily be able to encode a single bit of information in the output. As a result, all known impossibility results regarding the virtual black-box property continue to hold for both types of non-malleability [1,2]. Additionally, we compare the two flavors of non-malleability. The goal of functional non-malleability is to prevent as many malleability attacks as possible, whereas the goal of verifiable non-malleability is to detect as many attacks as possible. Intuitively, these goals are incomparable: the verifiable definition is stronger because we can detect more attacks than we can prevent, but on the other hand it is weaker because the model requires its participants to understand and apply the verification algorithm. We justify this intuition by showing that in the random oracle model, the two definitions of non-malleability are indeed incomparable. Constructions. In the random oracle model, we show that the obfuscator for point circuits in [6] satisfies both functional and verifiable non-malleability. Next, we study the family of multi-point circuits, which accept a constant number of inputs. One idea to obfuscate the program that accepts values x1 , . . . , xm is as follows: 1. Use several instantiations of a single-point circuit obfuscator in order to create obfuscated programs P1 , P2 , . . . , Pm , where each Pi accepts only the value xi 2. Create the program P that contains P1 through Pm as subroutines, and on input x, iteratively feeds x into the Pi and accepts if any one of these programs accept. This methodology is known as concatenation, and it is shown in [8] that concatenation preserves obfuscation. That is, given any obfuscator for the family of single-point circuits, concatenation produces an obfuscator for the family of multi-point circuits. However, concatenation does not preserve non-malleability. The program P stores the subroutines P1 through Pm in a readily identifiable way, so an adversary can modify one accepted point by changing one of the subroutines. This is true even if the obfuscator for the family of single-point circuits is non-malleable. In the verifiable setting, we resolve the problem with concatenation by using a self-signing technique to ensure that the subroutines are not modified. The verification algorithm associated with this construction runs the verification algorithm for the signature scheme. This approach does not suffice in the
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functional setting, where the self-signing technique is useless because there is no guarantee that anybody checks the signature. Instead, we “glue” the accepted points together in such a way that any attempt to change the obfuscated code destroys information on all of the points simultaneously. We also give a construction that does not use random oracles. Instead, it uses the common reference string (CRS) model, in which a sequence of bits is chosen uniformly at random and published in a public location that all participants can access. (Note that this is different from a public key infrastructure because the CRS is not tied to the specific identity of the party performing the obfuscation.) We construct a verifiably non-malleable obfuscation for the family of point circuits by providing any (potentially malleable) obfuscation along with a non-malleable NIZK proof of knowledge [11,12] that the obfuscator knows the point that is accepted. Informally, a non-malleable NIZK proof of knowledge considers an adversary that can request multiple proofs for statements of its choice and then produces a new proof. The non-malleability guarantee requires that the adversary knows a witness to its constructed proof, so it cannot simply modify the old proofs to prove a new statement. Intuitively, our construction is verifiably non-malleable because an adversary can only make a program that passes the verification test if she knows its functionality, so she cannot produce a program that is related to a given obfuscated point circuit or else she would learn information about the obfuscated circuit, which is impossible by the virtual black-box property. However, the actual proof turns out to be delicate. Using proof techniques from [4], we achieve a somewhat weaker variant of verifiable non-malleability. Specifically, we show that for a large class of relations, no adversary can perform a modification that satisfies the relation with noticeable probability. Discussion on verifiable obfuscation. The concept of verifiable obfuscation is useful even in situations where malleability is not a concern. For example, suppose you create a new computer program that solves an important problem. You wish to profit from your research by selling this program to others, but you also want to protect the algorithm that you discovered. Therefore, you sell an obfuscated version of the program to your customers. This protects your intellectual property, but another problem has presented itself. Your customers do not wish to install the obfuscated program on their computers because they no longer have any guarantees about what this program does. For all they know, the program could contain a virus, and because the program is obfuscated there is no hope for a virus checker to detect the presence of a virus. Hence, you need a verification algorithm that proves to your customers that you are selling them a program from the proper family. Future work. First, the constructions in this paper use the random oracle model or common reference string model. It remains an open question to construct a non-malleable obfuscator (of either flavor) without trusted setup. Second, we provide a verifiably non-malleable obfuscation of single-point circuits in the CRS model for a large class of relations. Unfortunately, extending
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this construction to the multi-point setting is insufficient, as it only succeeds for a small class of relations. It remains open to find a better construction in the multi-point setting. Organization. In Section 2, we provide an overview of virtual black-box obfuscation [1,2]. In Section 3, we provide rigorous definitions of the two notions of non-malleability. In Sections 4 and 5, we present non-malleable obfuscators of both flavors for the family of multi-point circuits.
2
Obfuscation
In [1], [2], and other works, an obfuscator is defined as a compiler that takes a circuit as input and returns another circuit. The output circuit should be equivalent in functionality to the input circuit, but the output circuit should be unintelligible in the sense that any information that can be obtained from the output circuit can also be obtained with oracle access to the circuit. In this paper we will be interested in obfuscation with dependent auxiliary information, as defined in [2]. Throughout this work, the adversaries and simulators are assumed to be nonuniform. Definition 1 (Obfuscation). Let C = {Cn }n∈IN be a family of polynomial-size circuits, where Cn denotes all circuits of input length n. A probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm O is an obfuscator for the family C operating over randomness R = {Rn } if the following three conditions are met. – Approximate functionality: There exists a negligible function ε such that for every n, every circuit C ∈ Cn , and for all x ∈ {0, 1}n, Pr[r ← Rn , C ← O(C, r) : C(x) = C (x)] > 1 − ε(n) . If this probability is always 1, then we say that O has exact functionality. – Polynomial slowdown: There exists a polynomial p such that for every n, circuit C ∈ Cn , and r ∈ Rn , the description length |O(C, r)| ≤ p(|C|). – Virtual black-box: For every polynomial ρ and every PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT simulator S such that for all sufficiently large n, for all C ∈ Cn , and for all auxiliary information z ∈ {0, 1}∗ , Pr[A(O(C), z) = 1] − Pr[S C (1n , z) = 1] <
1 , ρ(n)
where the first probability is taken over the coin tosses of A and O, and the second probability is taken over the coin tosses of S. Furthermore, we require that A and S operate in time polynomial in the length of their first input. We define obfuscation without auxiliary information in the same manner, except that the auxiliary information is removed from the virtual black-box definition. Unless otherwise specified, in this paper we assume that obfuscations are secure with respect to dependent auxiliary information.
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Defining Non-malleable Obfuscation
In this section, we rigorously define the two variants of non-malleable obfuscation. 3.1
Functionally Non-malleable Obfuscation
We obtain functionally non-malleable obfuscation by generalizing the virtual black-box definition to allow the adversary and simulator to output programs instead of bits. Intuitively, a functionally non-malleable obfuscation has the property that an adversary, given the obfuscated code to a program, can only make a related program if it could have already done so given only black-box access to the program. This is problematic in general, because the simulator cannot emulate all programs that the adversary can produce [1,7]. For example, consider the adversary that outputs its input. Then, the simulator has oracle access to a circuit and has to produce a program that is functionally equivalent to its oracle. This is impossible unless the circuit is learnable with oracle queries, in which case the entire concept of obfuscation is uninteresting. To make the definition meaningful, we allow the program that the simulator produces to make oracle queries to the original circuit as well. To capture the effectiveness of an adversary’s modification, we introduce a polynomial-time computable relation E that receives the adversary’s input program and output program. The adversary succeeds in the modification if E accepts it. The definition of non-malleability ensures that for every relation E, the simulator can perform a successful modification with the approximately the same probability as the adversary. One technical concern about the relation E is the manner in which it receives the adversary’s input and output programs. The goal of functional nonmalleability is to compare the functionality of these programs, and not their underlying code, so E should operate in the same manner when given functionally equivalent inputs. Our definition resolves this issue by giving the relation a “canonical” member of the family that is equivalent to the adversary’s output program. (See the Discussion section below for more detail on this issue.) Additionally, in many situations, the adversary knows some a-priori useful information on the obfuscated program, so we allow dependent auxiliary information in the definition of non-malleability. For instance, in the motivating example from the Introduction in which Alice wishes to modify a login program, she possesses the knowledge of her own password. Definition 2 (Functional equivalence). We say that two circuits C1 and C2 are functionally equivalent, and write C1 ≡ C2 , if for all inputs x it holds that C1 (x) = C2 (x). Definition 3 (Functionally non-malleable obfuscation). Let C and D be families of circuits, and let O be a PPT algorithm. We say that O is an obfuscator for C that is functionally non-malleable over D if the following three conditions hold:
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– Almost exact functionality: There exists a negligible function ε such that for every n and every circuit C ∈ Cn , Pr[r ← Rn : O(C, r) ≡ C] > 1 − ε(n). – Polynomial slowdown: There exists a polynomial p such that for every n, circuit C ∈ Cn , and r ∈ Rn , the description length |O(C, r)| ≤ p(|C|). – Functional non-malleability: for every polynomial ρ and PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT simulator S such that for all sufficiently large n, for all circuits C ∈ Cn , for all auxiliary information z ∈ {0, 1}∗, and for all polynomial time computable relations E : Cn ×Dn → {0, 1} (that may depend on the circuit C), | Pr[P ← A(O(C), z) : ∃D ∈ Dn s.t. D ≡ P and E(C, D) = 1] −Pr[Q ← S C (1n , z) : ∃D ∈ Dn s.t. D ≡ QC and E(C, D) = 1]| <
1 , ρ(n)
where the probabilities are over the coin tosses of A, O, and S. We require that A and S run in time polynomial in the length of their first inputs. If D = C, we say that O is a functionally non-malleable obfuscator for C. Discussion. We make several remarks about this definition. Almost exact functionality. The functionality requirement here is stronger than the one used in Definition 1 above. Approximate functionality only guarantees that an obfuscated program O(C, r) is “close” in functionality to C. However, O(C, r) might never have the same functionality as C does (for any choice of r). By contrast, almost exact functionality requires that the two circuits have identical functionality for most choices of r. We note that most of the constructions in this paper satisfy exact functionality. Bivariate relation. In this definition, the bivariate relation E is allowed to depend on the choice of circuit C ∈ Cn . Thus, restricting attention to univariate relations E(D) results in an equivalent definition. We use a bivariate relation only to emphasize the fact that E depends on both C and D. Possible definitions for E. As mentioned above, an important feature of the definition is that E only depends on the functionality of the adversary’s output P and simulator’s output QC , and not on the code of these circuits. We found three possible ways to enforce this condition on E. First, we can constrain E to receive only oracle access to the program P or QC . As a result, it follows immediately that E only depends on the functionality of these programs, and not on their underlying code. Unfortunately, this definition is too weak, because there are many natural predicates that cannot be tested by relations of this type. For instance, consider the family of point circuits, where Iw is the circuit that accepts only the string w. Suppose the adversary is given an obfuscation of the point circuit Ix and wishes to create a new point circuit Iy such that the first
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bit of x and y are equal. No polynomial-time relation E (even ones that know x, since E can depend on x) can test the adversary’s probability of success given only oracle access to Iy . We believe that relations of this type are meaningful, and therefore we want a definition that can test for them. Second, we can give the relation E full access to the code of P or QC , but restrict our attention to relations that have identical output when given two functionally equivalent programs. Specifically, we only consider relations E such that given any programs C ∈ Cn , D ∈ Dn , and P , P such that D ≡ P ≡ P , it follows that E(C, P ) = E(C, P ). This definition does allow E access to the code of its input programs. The advantage of this definition is that E finally gets access to the code of the programs. The disadvantage is that the condition we impose on relations is very restrictive. As a result, it is still impossible to compute many relations, such as the one described in the previous paragraph. Specifically, the virtual black-box definition guarantees that any relation E(Ix , O(Iy )) cannot compute whether x and y have the same first bit with probability greater than 12 . Thus, the condition that we impose on E is that it has the same probability of success even when it is given Ix and Iy as inputs, in which case E has enough information to perform the computation with probability 1 but must fail half of the time anyway in order to be consistent with the condition. Third, we can allow all polynomial-time relations E, but instead of providing the code of P or QC as input to E, we provide the code of a functionally equivalent member in Dn . This is the option we use in Definition 3 above, because it clearly satisfies the requirement that E only depend on the functionality of the adversary and simulator’s output, and it is a stronger definition that can test for many relations that the previous two definitions cannot. For these reasons, we choose to use relations of this type in the definition of functional non-malleability. One technical point to keep in mind is that the relation E takes the description of circuits in Cn and Dn as input. As a result, this definition is dependent upon the representation of the circuits in these families, and not just the functionality of these circuits. Therefore, we should choose a representation of the circuit families that enables relations to extract important information easily from the description of a circuit. As a result, we define the families of multi-point circuits as follows. Given w1 , w2 , . . . , wm ∈ {0, 1}n, let I{w1 ,...,wm } be the circuit that stores w1 , . . . , wm in some canonical, explicit manner, and on input x returns 1 if and only if x = wi for some i. In particular, relations can extract the strings w1 , . . . , wm from the description of I{w1 ,...,wm } in polynomial time. Note that the wi need not be distinct, so the circuit I{w1 ,...,wm } accepts between 1 and m points. For technical reasons, we may also want to consider the circuit I∅ that immediately rejects all inputs. Let Pnm = {I{w1 ,...,wm } : w1 , . . . , wm ∈ {0, 1}n} ∪ {I∅ } be the set of all m-point circuits on n bits, and let P m = {Pnm }n∈IN be the family of m-point circuits. Also, let P m+ be the subfamily that does not include I∅ .
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Output family D. According to our definition, an adversary succeeds only if it outputs a circuit that is equivalent to a circuit in the family D. The most natural family to choose is D = C, but we allow D to be different from C in order to consider a wider range of adversaries. For instance, perhaps C is the family of point circuits, but we are concerned with adversaries that produce two-point circuits as output as well. The definition of functional non-malleability allows us to form a larger family D to acknowledge this. Of course, there is no reason to stop there: we may also be concerned with an adversary that produces a three-point circuit, or a four-point circuit, or any circuit for that matter. In fact, the presence of the circuit family D in the definition seems restrictive. It would be nice if our definition simultaneously covered all possible outputs of the adversary, and not just those in a specific family. In other words, we would like a functionally non-malleable obfuscator when D is the family of all circuits, but unfortunately this is impossible. Intuitively, the family of all circuits is so big that it allows A to output the obfuscated code that it receives as input, which the simulator cannot do. A formal proof can be found in the full version of this paper [13]. Comparison to virtual black-box obfuscation. Now that we have introduced a new definition of obfuscation, it is natural to compare it to the old one. We show that the functional non-malleability property implies the virtual black-box property (at least for reasonable choices of the circuit family D). This justifies our terminology of using the word “obfuscation” in Definition 3. Theorem 4. Let C and D be circuit families, and let O be an obfuscator for C that is functionally non-malleable over D. Furthermore, suppose that for sufficiently large n, there exist circuits D0 , D1 ∈ Dn such that D0 ≡ D1 . Then, O satisfies the virtual black-box property. As a result, O is an obfuscator for C. This theorem also holds if neither the virtual black-box property nor functional non-malleability allows auxiliary information. Intuitively, this theorem holds because an adversary that outputs programs can use this channel to transmit a single bit of information b by outputting the program Db . See the full version of this paper [13] for a rigorous proof. One consequence of this theorem is that all impossibility results pertaining to the virtual black-box property immediately carry over to the non-malleability setting [1,2]. 3.2
Verifiably Non-malleable Obfuscation
In this section, we develop the notion of verifiable obfuscation and use it to define another definition of non-malleability. Definition 5 (Verifier). Given a pair of PPT algorithms O and V and a circuit family C, we say that V is a verifier for O applied to C if there exists a negligible function ε such that for all n and for all C ∈ Cn , Pr[V (O(C)) = 1] > 1−ε(n), where the probability is taken over the randomness of V and O.
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If O is an obfuscator for the family of circuits C, then we say that the pair (O, V ) constitutes a verifiable obfuscator for C. We do not place any restrictions on V when its input is not the result of the obfuscator applied to a circuit in the family. In particular, given any obfuscator O, the pair (O, 1l) is a verifiable obfuscator, where 1l is the algorithm that accepts all inputs. In many cases, however, we can create much better verification algorithms. For example, the (r, rx ) construction of [4] can simply be verified by checking whether r and rx are elements in the desired group G of prime order, because there is a unique discrete log of rx so the program does implement a point circuit as desired. This results in a perfect verifier that accepts its input program if and only if it has the form of a program produced by the obfuscator. Now we create a definition of non-malleability for verifiable obfuscators. As before, we consider an adversary that takes an obfuscated circuit as input and outputs a program. In this model, the adversary succeeds only if her output program passes the verification test and is related to the input program. Our definition of non-malleability requires that a simulator succeeds with approximately the same probability, so it must also output a program that passes the verification test. In particular, we no longer give an oracle to the program constructed by the simulator. A formal definition follows. Definition 6 (Verifiable non-malleability). Let C and D be a families of circuits such that C ⊆ D, and let O and V be PPT algorithms. We say that (O, V ) is an obfuscator for C that is verifiably non-malleable over D if the following four conditions hold: – Verification: V is a verifier for O applied to C. Additionally, for every n and every circuit P with n bits of input such that V (P ) = 1, there exists D ∈ Dn such that P ≡ D. – Almost exact functionality: There exists a negligible function ε such that for every n and every circuit C ∈ Cn , Pr[r ← Rn : O(C, r) ≡ C] > 1 − ε(n). – Polynomial slowdown: There exists a polynomial p such that for every n, circuit C ∈ Cn , and r ∈ Rn , the description length |O(C, r)| ≤ p(|C|). – Verifiable non-malleability: for every polynomial ρ and PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT simulator S such that for all sufficiently large n, for all circuits C ∈ Cn , for all auxiliary information z ∈ {0, 1}∗, and for all polynomial time computable relations E : Cn × Dn → {0, 1}, | Pr[P ← A(O(C), z) : P = O(C), V (P ) = 1, ∃D ∈ Dn s.t. D ≡ P , E(C, D) = 1] 1 , − Pr[Q ← S C (1n , z) : V (Q) = 1, ∃D ∈ Dn s.t. D ≡ Q, E(C, D) = 1]| < ρ(n)
where A and S run in time polynomial in the length of their first inputs. If D = C, we say that (O, V ) is a verifiably non-malleable obfuscator for C. It is potentially reasonable to relax the definition by not requiring the simulator to pass the verification text. We choose not to do so because the current definition
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puts the adversary and simulator on more equal footing and because all of our constructions satisfy the stronger notion. We also note that the definition requires that V only accept circuits that are equivalent to members of D. The benefit of this restriction is that the adversary can efficiently test whether she outputs a circuit in Dn , which is a requirement for her to succeed under this definition. Additionally, the remarks pertaining to functional non-malleability also apply here: 1. Restricting to univariate relations E(D) results in an equivalent definition. 2. It is usually impossible to achieve verifiable non-malleability if D is the family of all circuits. 3. Verifiable non-malleability also implies the virtual black-box property. Theorem 7. Let C and D be circuit families, and let (O, V ) be an obfuscator for C that is verifiably non-malleable over D. Then, O is an obfuscator for C. This theorem also holds if neither definition allows auxiliary information. 3.3
Comparison
We conclude this section by showing that the two non-malleability definitions are incomparable. Intuitively, functional non-malleability prevents more attacks. This is reflected in the definition by the fact that an adversary attacking functional non-malleability does not have to pass a verification test, so the simulator must emulate more potential attacks. A concrete example of this separation is the obfuscator described in Algorithm 2 below, which does not prevent the attack described in the Introduction in which Alice removes Bob’s password. On the other hand, verifiable non-malleability detects more attacks. This is reflected in the definitions by the fact that the program Q constructed by the simulator is not given oracle access to C in the verifiable definition. A concrete example of this separation is the functionally non-malleable obfuscator for multi-point functions described in the full version of the paper [13], which is vulnerable to a slightly modified form of Alice’s April fools’ prank described in the Introduction.
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Constructions of Functionally Non-malleable Obfuscators
In this section, we present a functionally non-malleable obfuscator for the family of multi-point circuits in the random oracle model. We begin with the single-point case. Algorithm 1 describes an obfuscator OP 1 for the family P 1 [6]. Informally, OP 1 obfuscates the point circuit Iw by recording R(w). This provides an information-theoretic way to hide the point w while still making it easy to check whether the input to the obfuscated program is w. However, the obfuscator should not be deterministic [4], so OP 1 uses some randomness as well.
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Algorithm 1. Obfuscator OP 1 for the family of point circuits P 1
Input: a circuit of the form Iw or I∅ 1: if the input circuit is I∅ then U U 2: choose r ← {0, 1}3|w| and t ← {0, 1}4|w| (that is, uniformly at random) 3: else U 4: extract the point w and choose randomness r ← {0, 1}3|w| 5: set t = R(w ◦ r), where ◦ denotes the string concatenation operation 6: end if 7: output the circuit Φr,t that stores r and t in some clearly identifiable manner, and on input a string x, outputs 1 if R(x ◦ r) = t and 0 otherwise
Theorem 8. In the random oracle model, the algorithm OP 1 is a functionally non-malleable obfuscator for the family of point circuits P 1 . Due to space constraints, rigorous proofs of non-malleability for all of our constructions are deferred to the full version of this paper [13]. Constructing a functionally non-malleable obfuscator for the family of multipoint circuits P m is significantly more difficult. Roughly speaking, the principal issue is that the obfuscated program must “bundle together” the m points in a way that would prevent the adversary from changing any point in the bundle without applying the exact same change to all points in the bundle. For instance, simply concatenating m obfuscations of a single-point circuit (even obfuscations that are individually non-malleable) does not suffice because an adversary will be able to change some of the points at will. Instead, the obfuscated program must be a “house of cards” in the sense that an adversary cannot change the code without destroying information about all of the accepted points simultaneously. Our construction is described in the full version of this paper [13].
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Constructions of Verifiably Non-malleable Obfuscators
In this section, we present verifiably non-malleable obfuscators for the family of multi-point circuits in the random oracle and common reference string models. 5.1
Random Oracle Model
In the single-point case, the obfuscator OP 1 from Algorithm 1 can also be used to create a verifiably non-malleable obfuscation. Let VP 1 be the verification algorithm that accepts if and only if its input is a program of the form Φr,t . It is clear from Algorithm 1 that VP 1 always accepts proper obfuscations of point circuits. Theorem 9. In the random oracle model, (OP 1 , VP 1 ) is a verifiably non-malleable obfuscator for P 1 . In the multi-point setting, we can concatenate m copies of OP 1 and “glue” them together using a self-signing technique in order to construct the obfuscator OP m
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described in Algorithm 2. The associated verification algorithm VP m checks that its input program has the proper structure and validates the signature. The self-signing technique ensures that an adversary will be detected if she tries to re-use any of the OP 1 obfuscations given to her, because she will not be able to forge the required signature. For instance, using the example described in the Introduction, Alice cannot keep the pieces of the obfuscated circuit that accept Charles and herself but remove the part that accepts Bob. However, the scheme does not prevent Alice from implementing this attack, so the scheme is malleable in the functional sense. The one-time signature scheme can be constructed from any one-way function [14] so in particular it can be constructed from the random oracle. Algorithm 2. Obfuscator OP m for the family of m-point circuits Input: a circuit of the form I{w1 ,...,wm } or I∅ 1: let k be the number of distinct accepted points for the input circuit (possibly 0) 2: extract the k distinct points w1 , . . . , wk U 3: choose randomness r1 , . . . , rm ← {0, 1}3mn 4: choose a signature-verification key pair (s, v) for a one-time signature scheme 5: for i = 1 to k do 6: set ti = R(wi ◦ ri ◦ v) 7: end for 8: for i = k + 1 to m do U 9: choose ti ← {0, 1}n+3mn+|v| 10: end for 11: choose a random permutation π on m elements, and permute the ri and ti by π 12: compute the signature σ = signs (t1 , . . . , tm ) 13: output the circuit that stores the ri , ti , v, and σ in a clearly identifiable manner, and on input x does the following: “for i from 1 to m, accept if R(x ◦ ri ◦ v) = ti ”
Theorem 10. In the random oracle model, (OP m , VP m ) is a verifiably nonmalleable obfuscation for P m . However, OP m is malleable in the functional sense. The self-signing technique can also be applied to the functionally non-malleable obfuscator for the family of multi-point circuits described in the full version of the paper [13], producing an obfuscator that simultaneously satisfies both forms of non-malleability. 5.2
Common Reference String Model
In the common reference string (CRS) model, we provide verifiably non-malleable obfuscators for the family P m+ of multi-point circuits that does not include I∅ . This is a slightly different family than we used in the random oracle constructions, because the constructions in this section have the property that it is easy to tell that obfuscated circuits accept at least one input, which was not the case in the random oracle constructions.
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Also, in this section we can only prove a slightly weaker form of verifiable nonmalleability. We first present an obfuscator in the single-point setting, where we believe the weaker non-malleability property is meaningful. Then, we generalize the obfuscator to operate in the multi-point setting, but we also show that the weaker form of non-malleability is insufficient in this setting. Single-point circuits. Our construction uses two building blocks: ˆP 1+ be any obfuscator for P 1+ without auxiliary information, along 1. Let O ˆP 1+ , such as the obfuscator of [4] described with a perfect verifier VˆP 1+ for O in Section 3.2. 2. Let Π be a non-malleable non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof of knowledge system [11,12]. Informally, the proof system Π has the property that given an adversary that sees a proof π and then creates a proof π with π = π, there exists an extractor that extracts the witness to the proof of π . ˜P 1+ (Iw ) that outputs Using these building blocks, we form the obfuscator O ˆ OP 1+ (Iw ) along with a proof that it knows the point w. The verification algo˜P 1+ runs VˆP 1+ and the verification algorithm of the rithm V˜P 1+ associated to O proof system Π to check the validity of the proof. ˆP 1+ as follows: More formally, we define an NP relation ROˆ 1+ based on O P
ROˆ
P 1+
ˆP 1+ (Iw , r) . (P, w) = 1 if and only if ∃r s.t. P = O
That is, the first input to the relation must be a valid output of the obfuscator ˆP 1+ (which can be efficiently verified by VˆP 1+ ), and the second input must be O ˜P 1+ , described the unique point that is accepted by this circuit. The obfuscator O in Algorithm 3, uses the NIZK Π on this NP relation. ˜ P 1+ for the family of point circuits in the CRS model Algorithm 3. Obfuscator O
Input: a circuit of the form Iw and a common reference string Σ ˆP 1+ (Iw ) 1: produce the obfuscated circuit Iˆw = O 2: use Π to prove that the obfuscator knows a witness w to the statement that ROˆ 1+ (Iˆw , w) = 1, and call the resulting proof πw P 3: output the circuit I˜w that is equal to Iˆw except that it also stores πw in some clearly visible way
Intuitively, the non-malleability of the obfuscation follows from the nonmalleability of the NIZK. Unfortunately, the proof turns out to be quite delicate, and we can only prove a weaker version of the verifiable non-malleability property. Definition 11 (Weakly verifiable non-malleability in the CRS model). Let C be a family of circuits and (O, V ) be a pair of algorithms. We say that (O, V ) is weakly verifiably non-malleable for relation E if for every polynomial
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ρ and PPT adversary A, there exists a PPT simulator S such that for all sufficiently large n and for all circuits C ∈ Cn , | Pr[P ← A(O(C), Σ) : P = O(C), V (P, Σ) = 1, ∃D ∈ Cn s.t. D ≡ P , E(C, D) = 1] 1 −Pr[(Q, Σ) ← S C (1n ) : V (Q, Σ) = 1, ∃D ∈ Cn s.t. D ≡ Q, E(C, D) = 1]| < , ρ(n)
where the first probability is taken over the coin tosses of A and O, along with the uniformly random choice of the common reference string Σ, and the second probability is taken over the coin tosses of S. Note that this definition is weaker than the verifiable non-malleability property in Definition 6 in two ways: the simulator S is allowed to depend on the relation E, and there is no auxiliary information in this definition. We can prove that our construction satisfies this weaker variant of non-malleability for many interesting relations E. Definition 12 (Invertible relation). A bivariate relation E is invertible if ¯ such that for every y, E(y) ¯ there exists a polynomial time algorithm E returns a list of all x such that E(x, y) = 1. In particular, because E is a polynomial time algorithm, it can only output a list that is polynomially long in length. Therefore, for every y, there must be only polynomially many x such that E(x, y) = 1. Theorem 13. Let E be an invertible relation. In the common reference string ˜P 1+ , V˜P 1+ ) is a weakly verifiably non-malleable obfuscator for E. model, (O ˜P 1+ can be generalized to the multi-point Multi-point circuits. The obfuscator O ˜ P m+ be the obfuscator that, when given I{w ,...,w } as setting, as follows. Let O 1 m ˆP 1+ (Iw1 ), . . ., input, outputs the concatenation of m single-point obfuscations O ˆP 1+ (Iwm ) followed by a non-malleable NIZK proof of knowledge that it knows O all of the accepted points w1 , . . . , wm . As before, let V˜P m+ be the verification algorithm that checks the structure of the program and the validity of the proof. ˜P m+ is an obfuscator, and we show that this obfuscator It is shown in [8] that O is weakly verifiably non-malleable for invertible relations. Theorem 14. Let E be an invertible relation. In the common reference string ˜P m+ , V˜P m+ ) is a weakly verifiably non-malleable obfuscator for E. model, (O Unfortunately, in the multi-point setting, the set of invertible relations is too } ) that accepts small. For example, the simple relation E(I{w1 ,...,wm } , I{w1 ,...,wm if any of the wi equal any of the wj is not invertible. As a result, Theorem 14 is a promising result but still unsatisfactory. Future research is needed to find an obfuscator that is verifiably non-malleable for a wider class of relations. Acknowledgment. We thank Ronny Dakdouk for his useful comments. In particular, an improvement in Theorem 7 and an error in an earlier proof of Theorem 9 were found by Ronny.
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References 1. Barak, B., Goldreich, O., Impagliazzo, R., Rudich, S., Sahai, A., Vadhan, S., Yang, K.: On the (im)possibility of obfuscating programs. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 1–18. Springer, Heidelberg (2001) 2. Goldwasser, S., Kalai, Y.T.: On the impossibility of obfuscation with auxiliary input. In: FOCS, pp. 553–562. IEEE Computer Society, Los Alamitos (2005) 3. Goldwasser, S., Rothblum, G.N.: On best-possible obfuscation. In: Vadhan, S.P. (ed.) TCC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4392, pp. 194–213. Springer, Heidelberg (2007) 4. Canetti, R.: Towards realizing random oracles: Hash functions that hide all partial information. In: Kaliski Jr., B.S. (ed.) CRYPTO 1997. LNCS, vol. 1294, pp. 455– 469. Springer, Heidelberg (1997) 5. Canetti, R., Micciancio, D., Reingold, O.: Perfectly one-way probabilistic hash functions. In: Proceedings of the 30th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 131–140 (1998) 6. Lynn, B., Prabhakaran, M., Sahai, A.: Positive results and techniques for obfuscation. In: Cachin, C., Camenisch, J.L. (eds.) EUROCRYPT 2004. LNCS, vol. 3027, pp. 20–39. Springer, Heidelberg (2004) 7. Wee, H.: On obfuscating point functions. In: Proceedings of the 37th ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 523–532 (2005) 8. Canetti, R., Dakdouk, R.R.: Obfuscating point functions with multibit output. In: Smart, N.P. (ed.) EUROCRYPT 2008. LNCS, vol. 4965, pp. 489–508. Springer, Heidelberg (2008) 9. Hofheinz, D., Malone-Lee, J., Stam, M.: Obfuscation for cryptographic purposes. In: Vadhan, S.P. (ed.) TCC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4392, pp. 214–232. Springer, Heidelberg (2007) 10. Hohenberger, S., Rothblum, G.N., Shelat, A., Vaikuntanathan, V.: Securely obfuscating re-encryption. In: Vadhan, S.P. (ed.) TCC 2007. LNCS, vol. 4392, pp. 233–252. Springer, Heidelberg (2007) 11. Sahai, A.: Non-malleable non-interactive zero knowledge and adaptive chosenciphertext security. In: FOCS, pp. 543–553 (1999) 12. De Santis, A., Di Crescenzo, G., Ostrovsky, R., Persiano, G., Sahai, A.: Robust noninteractive zero knowledge. In: Kilian, J. (ed.) CRYPTO 2001. LNCS, vol. 2139, pp. 566–598. Springer, Heidelberg (2001) 13. Canetti, R., Varia, M.: Non-mallable obfuscation. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2008/495 (2008), http://eprint.iacr.org/2008/495 14. Lamport, L.: Constructing digital signatures from a one-way function. Technical Report SRI-CSL-98, SRI International Computer Science Laboratory (1979)
Simulation-Based Concurrent Non-malleable Commitments and Decommitments Rafail Ostrovsky1, Giuseppe Persiano2, and Ivan Visconti2 1
2
Department of Computer Science and Department of Mathematics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA
[email protected] Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni, Universit` a di Salerno, 84084 Fisciano (SA), Italy {giuper,visconti}@dia.unisa.it
Abstract. In this paper we consider commitment schemes that are secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle (cMiM) attacks. Under such attacks, two possible notions of security for commitment schemes have been proposed in the literature: concurrent non-malleability with respect to commitment and concurrent non-malleability with respect to decommitment (i.e., opening). After the original notion of non-malleability introduced by [Dolev, Dwork and Naor STOC 91] that is based on the independence of the committed messages, a new and stronger simulation-based notion of nonmalleability has been proposed with respect to openings or with respect to commitment [1,2,3,4] by requiring that for any man-in-the-middle adversary there is a stand-alone adversary that succeeds with the same probability. When commitment schemes are used as sub-protocols (which is often the case) the simulation-based notion is much more powerful and simplifies the task of proving the security of the larger protocols. The main result of this paper is a commitment scheme that is simulationbased concurrent non-malleable with respect to both commitment and decommitment. This property protects against cMiM attacks mounted during both commitments and decommitments which is a crucial security requirement in several applications, as in some digital auctions, in which players have to perform both commitments and decommitments. Our scheme uses a constant number of rounds of interaction in the plain model and is the first scheme that enjoys all these properties under the simulationbased definitions.
1
Introduction
Commitment schemes are fundamental two-party protocols and have been used in the design of more complex cryptographic protocols since the early 80’s (e.g., for coin flipping [5] and for zero-knowledge for NP [6]). The basic setting in which commitment schemes are defined only requires the hiding and binding properties. However several different scenarios need stronger notions of commitment schemes. In some application scenarios, one wants to be able to guarantee that an adversary A, playing as a receiver in an execution in O. Reingold (Ed.): TCC 2009, LNCS 5444, pp. 91–108, 2009. c International Association for Cryptologic Research 2009
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which a honest committer commits to message m, is not able to commit to a related value m ˜ to a honest receiver in another execution in which A plays as a committer. It is easy to observe that the hiding property does not guarantee this extra property. This type of adversary is called a man-in-the-middle adversary (as the adversary plays in between two honest players). Commitment schemes secure with respect to these attacks are called non-malleable commitments. Two notions of non-malleable commitments have been considered in the literature. A commitment scheme that is non-malleable with respect to commitment (in short NMc), first defined by Dolev, Dwork, and Naor [7] guarantees that no polynomial-time man-in-the-middle adversary A can commit to a message m ˜ that is related to the message m committed by the honest committer. Instead, a commitment scheme that is non-malleable with respect to decommitment (also known as non-malleable with respect to opening), (in short NMd), first defined by Di Crescenzo, Ishai and Ostrovsky [1] guarantees that after the commitment phase, no polynomial-time man-in-the-middle adversary A, observing the decommitment to m of the honest committer, obtains an advantage to decommit its commitment to a message m ˜ that is related to m. The need for non-malleable cryptography has been first pointed out in the seminal paper by Dolev, Dwork and Naor [7] who also gave constructions for nonmalleable encryption, non-malleable zero-knowledge proofs and non-malleable commitments. The constructions for non-malleable commitments of [7] required O(log k) rounds, where k is the security parameter. The non-malleability notion of [7] is based on the independence of the committed/decommitted messages played by the man-in-the-middle with respect to the ones played by the sender. The first non-interactive non-malleable commitment scheme (in the common random string model) was shown by Di Crescenzo, Ishai and Ostrovsky [1] (with further efficiency improvement in [2]). They also introduced a new notion of nonmalleability by requiring that for any man-in-the-middle adversary there exists a stand-alone simulator with essentially the same success probability. This new simulation-based notion is stronger than the one of Dolev, Dwork and Naor [7] and is much more useful when a commitment scheme is used as sub-protocol since the security of the larger protocol can be proved more easily by using the simulator associated with the commitment scheme. The first constant-round non-malleable commitment scheme in the plain model (i.e., without setup assumptions such as a common reference string) has been given by Barak [8] under the assumption of the existence of trapdoor permutations and hash functions that are collision resistant against subexponential-time adversaries. Pass and Rosen [3] reduced the assumption to the existence of hash functions that are collision resistant against polynomial-time adversaries using simulation-based definition. Pass and Rosen [3] gave two different simulation-based schemes: one that is NMc and one that is NMd. More recently, Pass and Rosen [4] have considered concurrent man-in-themiddle attacks (cMiM attacks) where the man-in-the-middle can be active in any polynomial number of executions as a receiver and as a committer. A commitment scheme that is secure against cMiM attacks is called concurrent
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non-malleable. As before, we can have two notions of concurrent non-malleable commitment schemes: concurrent NMc and NMd commitment schemes. Pass and Rosen in [4] showed that the NMc scheme of [3] is actually a simulation-based concurrent NMc. This implies that simulation-based security is guaranteed if the commitments are concurrently executed but decommitments are not. Their paper leaves as an open problem the construction of constant-round commitment schemes that are simulation-based concurrent NMd. The scheme of [4] enjoys a weaker notion of non-malleability with respect to decommitment that only focuses on the independence of the opened messages [7]. The security of the scheme of [4] relies on the assumption that commitments and decommitments do not overlap in time. We retain this assumption in our schemes. This assumption is motivated by the fact that several important applications have such a separation (e.g., electronic auctions where first all parties send their hidden bids, and only in a second phase they decommit their bids). Our results. Our main result consists in the construction in the plain model of a constant-round commitment scheme that is simultaneously concurrent NMc and NMd under the simulation-based definition of [3,4]. This implies that security is preserved when polynomially many commitment phases are concurrently executed and when subsequently polynomial many decommitment phases are concurrently executed. This solves a problem left open by the results of [4] and allows one to securely run some commitment-based applications (e.g., digital auctions) by only requiring a constant number of rounds. We follow [4] in that concurrent non-malleability is guaranteed only if commitments and decommitments do not overlap in time (which is the case in several applications). Our scheme builds and extends multiple techniques. In particular, our scheme uses the perfect NMZK argument of knowledge of [3,4,9] but in a critically different manner. Indeed, whereas in [3,4] the perfect NMZK argument of knowledge is simply combined with a (potentially malleable) commitment scheme and a signature scheme, to achieve security in a concurrent setting we also employ a technique by Feige [10] and a more sophisticated rewind technique. Furthermore, the simulator used by [3,4] works in a straight-line fashion including non-blackbox techniques. Our result, instead, combines the straight-line simulation with a new rewinding simulation that still avoids the well known problems of using rewinds in concurrent settings [11]. Our approach also includes and extends some of the techniques developed for building concurrent NMZK in the bare publickey model [12,13]. Finally we stress that in [3] non-malleability with respect to commitment is considered only with respect to statistically binding commitments. Here, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, we show that it is possible to have non-malleable commitments with respect to commitments that are not statistically binding. This is crucially used in our main result since the constant-round NMc and NMd commitment scheme that we show is not statistically binding. We also remark that the recent work of Barak et al. [14] obtains concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge with a poly-logarithmic round complexity, and thus does not seem to help for achieving constant-round simulation-based concurrent non-malleable commitments.
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R. Ostrovsky, G. Persiano, and I. Visconti
Simulation-Based Non-malleable Commitments
Since all our results concern the simulation-based notion of non-malleability, we will concentrate on this notion only. Here we start by considering concurrent non-malleable commitment schemes; that is, commitments schemes that are secure under Concurrent Man-in-the-Middle attacks (cMiM attacks). Informally speaking, a non-malleable commitment scheme guarantees that the value committed to (or the value that is decommitted) by a polynomial-time adversary A is independent of the value simultaneously committed (or the value that is decommitted) to A by a honest committer. We assume that A has full power over the scheduling of the messages in the two sessions (the one in which A is a committer and the one in which A is a receiver). Following [1,2,3,4], we formalize this notion by comparing two executions: the man-in-the-middle execution (the MiM execution) and the simulated execution. We denote the security parameter by k and consider the concurrent case where the adversary A receives and send a polynomial number of commitments. The Dolev-Dwork-Naor notion of non-malleability. Informally speaking, nonmalleability with respect to commitment guarantees that the commitment computed by the MiM adversary corresponds to a message that is independent from the one committed to by the honest committer. In [7], dependency of the values m and m ˜ has been formalized through a poly-time computable relation R for which R(m, m) ˜ = 1. Specifically, Dolev, Dwork and Naor[7] defined non-malleability with respect to commitment by requiring that for any man-in-the-middle adversary A and any polynomial time computable relation R, there exists a poly-time stand-alone adversary S whose success probability in committing to a value m ˜ so that R(m, m) ˜ = 1 is at least as good as A’s success probability. Non-malleability with respect to decommitment [1] instead considers the ability of A to decommit to a value m ˜ that is related to m. Notice that under the definition of [7], if A is no more likely to commit to a related value than S and the commitment is statistically binding, then A is also no more likely to decommit to a related value. This is true regardless of whether A is given the decommitment information or not. So under this definition, any (statistically binding) commitment that is NMc is also NMd. A (stronger) simulation-based notion of non-malleable commitments. In this work we adopt the simulation-based definition [1,2,3,4], which requires that the value m ˜ committed to by S in the stand-alone execution is computationally indistinguishable from the value committed to by A in the man-in-the-middle execution. To have a meaningful definition of non-malleability with respect to decommitment, since A obtains the message m committed by the honest sender before decommitting its commitment, S is assumed to obtain m before decommitting its commitment. It is not clear that with respect to the simulation-based definition, non-malleability with respect to commitment still implies non-malleability with respect to decommitment. The problem here is that (unlike in the [7] definition), one would like the success probability of S
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(i.e., the probability that the stand-alone simulator playing with a honest receiver correctly completes the decommitment phase) to be only negligibly far from A’s success probability. Indeed, in the NMc schemes in the plain model of [3,4], the simulator S generates a bogus commitment that is being fed to A. However, after having committed to some value, S is stuck with the bogus value and it is not clear how to enable S to decommit it to A as m. (In the common reference string (CRS) model, the situation is easier, as CRS could be arranged so that S can use “equivocal” commitments that can be decommitted to any value, while A forced to use statistically-binding on CRS commitment [1,2]. Here,we concentrate on the plain model without the CRS, and hence this approach does not work). From the above discussion we have that the constant-round commitment scheme NMc of [3] that is proved to be NMc, does not seem to be NMd (according to the simulation-based definition of [3]) or, at least, no evidence of this is provided by the proof of [3]. Specifically, the simulator that computes c = SBCom(0k , s) in the commitment phase cannot open c as m since the decommitment phase simply consists in the decommitment phase of SBCom which is statistically binding. Therefore under the simulation-based notion of non-malleability, the proof that NMc is an NMc commitment scheme does not seem to extend to prove that NMc is also NMd. We stress that in [3,4], only the commitment phase is considered for proving NMc, and since the decommitment phase as discussed above is quite problematic, their security proof implicitly requires that the commitment and decommitment phases do not overlap in time. NMc does not necessarily require statistical binding. When statistically binding commitments are considered, the commitment phase encodes the unique message to which the commitment can be later decommitted. Indeed, even in case the adversarial committer is unbounded there is no way for him to violate the binding property. Since NMc considers the message committed in the commitment phase, the statistical binding property guarantees that this non-malleability notion is well defined, and indeed in [3] the authors consider the notion of NMc only for statistically binding commitment schemes. Intuitively, NMc seems far more problematic in case the scheme is not statistically binding (but only computationally binding), since the commitment phase does not uniquely specify the message that is going to be decommitted. Therefore, the meaning of NMc for an unbounded adversarial committer is unclear. We observe though that NMc commitments are meant to be secure against polynomial-time MiM adversaries for which the computational binding property still holds. It is therefore potentially possible to have a commitment scheme that is not statistically binding (i.e., binding does necessarily hold in case the adversarial committer is unbounded) but however still is NMc as at the end of the commitment phase it is always possible to determine the message committed by the polynomial-time MiM and by the honest sender. Indeed, in this paper, we show commitment schemes that are not statistically binding but that are NMc commitment schemes and, at the same time, NMd. To define NMc we will use the concept of “message committed to by an adversary A during the commitment phase.” By this we mean the
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following. We will consider commitment schemes in which, for all adversaries A, and for each possible transcript trans of the interaction between adversary A and a honest receiver R such that R accepts the commitment, there exists (statistically) only one message m that is consistent with trans; that is, for which there exist random coin tosses that give trans. We stress that statistically hiding commitment schemes do not have the above property and thus our definition is not suitable for these commitment schemes. For lack of space, in the full version of this paper [15] we review the two schemes of [3] for non-malleable commitments: NMc that is NMc and NMd that is NMd and we also show a commitment scheme that combines NMc and NMd.
3
Simulation-Based cNM Commitments
Following [3,4], we now formalize the concept of a (simulation-based) concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme by comparing two executions: the concurrent man-in-the-middle execution (the cMiM execution) and the simulated execution. We denote the security parameter by k. The cMiM execution. In the cMiM execution, the cMiM adversary A is simultaneously participating in poly(k) left and poly(k) right interactions. Consider a cMiM execution in which the cMiM adversary A with auxiliary information z interacts in the i-th left interaction with a honest committer running on input a message mi of length poly(k) and in the right interactions with honest receivers. We denote by cmimA Com (M, z), where M = (m1 , . . . , mpoly(k) ), ˜ whose ithe random variable that associates to the cMiM execution a vector M th component m ˜ i is defined as follows. If the commitment phase of the i-th right interaction ends successfully and its transcript is different from the commitment phase of all the left interactions, then m ˜ i is the message that A has committed to in the i-th right interaction. Otherwise, m ˜ i =⊥. ˜ whose i-th component (M, z) the vector M Similarly, we denote by cmimA Dec m ˜ i is the message that A has decommitted in the right interaction. If the i-th right interaction is not successful or its transcript (including commitment and decommitment phase) is identical to the transcript of one of the left interactions then m ˜ i =⊥. The simulated execution. In the simulated execution we have one party S (called the simulator) that interacts with poly(k) honest receivers. S works in two phases: in the commitment phase S receives security parameter 1k and auxiliary information z and interacts with the honest receivers. We denote by csisSCom (1k , z) the ˜ whose i-th component m vector M ˜ i is the value committed to by S if the i-th commitment phase has been successfully completed. Otherwise m ˜ i is set equal to ⊥. Once the commitment phases have been completed, S receives input vector M and interacts with the honest receiver to complete the decommitment phase. ˜ whose i-th component m ˜ i is the value We denote by csisSDec (M, z) the vector M decommitted by S in the i-th decommitment phase if it has been successfully completed. Otherwise m ˜ i is set equal to ⊥.
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We have the following definitions (see also [3,4]). Definition 1. A commitment scheme is simulation-based concurrent nonmalleable with respect to commitment (a concurrent NMc commitment scheme) if, for every probabilistic polynomial-time cMiM adversary A, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S such that following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable: S k {cmimA Com (M, z)}M∈({0,1}poly(k) )poly(k) ,z∈{0,1} and {csisCom (1 , z)}z∈{0,1} .
Definition 2. A commitment scheme is simulation-based concurrent nonmalleable with respect to decommitment (a concurrent NMd commitment scheme) if, for every probabilistic polynomial-time cMiM adversary A, there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator S such that the following ensembles are computationally indistinguishable: {cmimA Dec (M, z)}M∈({0,1}poly(k) )poly(k) ,z∈{0,1} and
3.1
{csisSDec (M, z)}M∈({0,1}poly(k) )poly(k) ,z∈{0,1} . Commitment Scheme cNMcd
In this section we present a constant-round commitment scheme cNMcd that enjoys both simulation-based concurrent NMc and simulation-based concurrent NMd. We will use a constant-round tag-based perfect NMZK argument of knowledge nmZK = {Pt , Vt }t for all NP [3], a constant-round witness indistinguishable (wiP, wiV) proof of knowledge (WIPoK) for all NP [16,17], a non-interactive statistically binding commitment scheme Com and a secure signature scheme SS = (SG, Sig, SVer). The most sophisticated tool that we use is obtained from a sequence of works by Pass and Rosen. Theorem 1 ([3,4,9]). Assume that there exists a family of claw-free permutations. Then for any NP language L there exists a constant-round tag-based oneleft many-right perfect cNMZK arguments of knowledge nmZK = = {Ptag , Vtag }tag for all NP. According to the above definition, this theorem says that for any efficient oneleft many-right concurrent man-in-the-middle adversary A that is restricted to one left session there exists an efficient simulator S that guarantees: 1) the view (including the left proof and all the right proofs) given in output by S is perfectly indistinguishable from the interaction of A with honest prover and honest verifiers; 2) the extraction succeeds for all accepting right proofs in which the one-left many-right concurrent man-in-the-middle adversary has used a tag not appearing in the left proof. See the full version [15] of this paper for details about the other tools. A description of commitment scheme cNMcd is found in Figure 1.
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Security Parameter: 1k . Input to Committer: m ∈ {0, 1}k . Commitment Phase: C → R: pick s ∈ {0, 1}k , set c = Com(m, s) and send c to R. C → R: set (PK, SK) ← SG(1k ) and send PK to R. C ↔ R: C executes the code of PPK on input c to prove knowledge of m, s ∈ {0, 1}k such that c = Com(m, s). R executes the code of VPK on input c. If VPK rejects then R aborts. R → C: pick m0 , s0 , m1 , s1 ∈ {0, 1}k , set c0 = Com(m0 , s0 ), c1 = Com(m1 , s1 ) and send c0 and c1 to C. R ↔ C: R select a random bit b and executes the code of wiP on input ˆ sˆ ∈ {0, 1}k such that c0 = Com(m, ˆ sˆ) or (c0 , c1 ) to prove knowledge of m, ˆ sˆ) using (mb , sb ) as witness. C executes the code of wiV on c1 = Com(m, input (c0 , c1 ). If wiV rejects then C aborts. C → R: let trans0 be the transcript so far with an extra bit 0 at the end. Set σ0 ← Sig(trans0 , SK) and send σ0 to R. R: if SVer(trans0 , σ0 , PK) = 1 abort. Decommitment Phase: C → R: send m. C ↔ R: C executes the code of PPK on input (c, c0 , c1 ) to prove knowledge ˆ sˆ) or c1 = of m, ˆ sˆ ∈ {0, 1}k such that c = Com(m, sˆ) or c0 = Com(m, Com(m, ˆ sˆ), using (m, s) as witness. R executes the code of VPK on input (c, c0 , c1 ). If VPK rejects then R aborts. C → R: let trans1 be the transcript so far with an extra bit 1 at the end. Set σ1 ← Sig(trans1 , SK) and send σ1 to R. R: if SVer(trans1 , σ1 , PK) = 1 abort.
Fig. 1. Our concurrent NMc and concurrent NMd commitment scheme cNMcd
How we achieve concurrent NMd. First of all, we notice that a straight-forward combination of the two commitment schemes of [3] produces a commitment scheme that we call NMcd that achieves non-malleability with respect to both commitment and decommitment, when concurrency is not considered. In proving the NMd property one crucially relies on the existence of a simulator extractor for the NMZK argument nmZK. If one tries to argue that NMcd is a concurrent NMd commitment scheme along the same lines, one would need a simulator that simulates concurrent executions; in other words, one would need a concurrent NMZK argument of knowledge. Unfortunately, the existence of a constant-round concurrent NMZK argument system in the plain model is still an open problem. We use instead a more sophisticated protocol and prove its properties by blending the straight-line simulator of the concurrent NMc commitment scheme of [4] with a sophisticated rewind technique. In using rewinding we have to be careful as the nested sessions can potentially make the running time super
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polynomial1 . Instead, we perform rewinds “in advance,” to extract information from the adversary. The simulator is then able to simulate in a straight-line fashion the decommitment phase by using the information extracted by means of rewinds. Our security proof also employs the two-witness technique by [10] and the well known FLS-technique [18]. In somewhat more details, we extend the commitment phase of the concurrent non-malleable commitment scheme of [4] by requiring that the receiver gives a proof of knowledge of a secret. The decommitment phase consists in sending a message and in proving with a NMZK proof that either the message corresponds to the committed one or the sender knows the secret (this is the FLS-technique [18]). Our simulator will extract the secrets of all receivers in the commitment phase and will use them as fake witnesses in the decommitment phase. Note that one could think that the rewinding technique used by the simulator during the commitment phase could blow up its running time since the adversarial receiver could adaptively play different messages when the transcript changes. Fortunately we adopt a non-dangerous rewind technique that does not harm the running time of the simulator. Indeed, the simulator will first play the commitment phase running the honest sender algorithm. Then it will extract the secrets encoded by the receiver in that specific transcript by running an extractor sequentially for each commitment, one-by-one, starting each time from the same transcript. During this extraction procedure the simulator will not be interested in re-committing again or in simulating concurrent sessions, it will simply play again the honest sender procedure in all sessions with the only exception of the one in which it extracts the secret of the receiver. The extracted secret will only be kept in memory by the simulator and will not be used in the commitment phase. Instead, the decommitment phase will be crucially based on the knowledge of the secrets of the receiver, and will allow the simulator to play in straight-line, opening the committed messages as any messages. We show that an adversary will not be able to use such a secret, since we prove that any successful adversary can be used to break a standard complexitytheoretic assumption by using the two-witness technique of [10] and the nonmalleability of nmZK. In the next section we prove the properties of commitment scheme cNMcd. We will often use the simulation-extractability property of nmZK. Notice that this property is guaranteed only in case the tag used by the adversary is different from the one used by the other parties. Since in our scheme we use as tag the public key of a signature scheme, and since each phase is only correctly completed if there is a signature under that public key of the transcript of the phase, we assume that the simulation-extractability property always holds, since otherwise the security of the signature scheme is broken. We will detail this argument only when we prove the NMc property for the one-left many-right case (see the discussion below the description of Expt2 ), in the other cases the argument is quite similar and is omitted. 1
The study of this problem started with the notion of concurrent zero knowledge [11].
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Binding. In the proof of concurrent NMd we show that any man-in-the-middle adversary that completes the commitment phase, can later open that commitment only in one way. This property is even stronger than binding (since the classical adversary for the binding property can not play as receiver) thus that proof properly contains the proof of the binding property. Hiding. Assume by contradiction that there exists an adversarial receiver A that, after the commitment phase distinguishes a commitment to m0 from a commitment to m1 with non-negligible advantage. We show how to reduce A to an adversary A that breaks the hiding property of Com. Indeed, A on input a challenge com (i.e., a commitment of either m0 or m1 ), plays the honest committer algorithm with the following two exceptions: com is sent in the commitment phase and the simulator for nmZKPK is used instead of the honest prover algorithm. Since the simulation for nmZKPK is perfect, the only chance A has to guess concerns the value of com. Therefore, A by simply giving in output the same bit given in output by A succeeds in guessing with non-negligible advantage the message committed in com. Simulation-Based Concurrent NMc. We start by considering the simpler case in which the adversary A is active in one left commitment and in polynomially many right commitments (a one-left many-right adversary). The one-left many-right case. For every one-left many-right MiM adversary A, we consider simulator S(z) that internally runs A(z) and provides A with a left commitment by executing the code of the honest committer to commit to 0k (k is the security parameter). For the right commitments instead S relays messages