Theory Construction in Second Language Acquisition
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Theory Construction in Second Language Acquisition
Language Learning and Language Teaching The LL< monograph series publishes monographs as well as edited volumes on applied and methodological issues in the field of language pedagogy. The focus of the series is on subjects such as classroom discourse and interaction; language diversity in educational settings; bilingual education; language testing and language assessment; teaching methods and teaching performance; learning trajectories in second language acquisition; and written language learning in educational settings.
Series editors Birgit Harley Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, University of Toronto
Jan H. Hulstijn Department of Second Language Acquisition, University of Amsterdam
Volume 8 Theory Construction in Second Language Acquisition by Geoff Jordan
Theory Construction in Second Language Acquisition
Geoff Jordan
John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam/Philadelphia
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The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jordan, Geoff Theory construction in second language acquisition / Geoff Jordan. p. cm. (Language Learning and Language Teaching, issn 1569–9471 ; v. 8) Includes bibliographical references and indexes. 1.Second language acquisition--Philosophy P118.2 J67 2004 418-dc21 isbn 90 272 1705 X (Eur.) / 1 58811 481 3 (US) (Hb; alk. paper) isbn 90 272 1706 8 (Eur.) / 1 58811 482 1 (US) (Pb; alk. paper)
2003070868
© 2004 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa
To Judy
Table of contents
Acknowledgements Abstract The Guidelines (Abridged) Part 1 Some fundamental issues concerning the construction and assessment of theories of SLA Chapter 1 Key terms and current problems in SLA 1.1 SLA Theory: Key terms5 1.1.1 Phenomena5 1.1.2 Language5 1.1.2.1 Chomsky’s Linguistic Competence6 1.1.2.2 Halliday: “Language as social semiotic”6 1.1.2.3 Bachman’s Communicative Language Ability Framework7 1.1.3 Acquisition10 1.1.4 Explanation11 1.2 Problems confronting current theories of SLA12 1.2.1 Proliferation12 1.2.2 Objectives14 1.2.3 The domain of SLA15 1.2.4 Contradictions16 1.3 Conclusion17
xiii xv xvii
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Chapter 2 Research methodology: Rationalism and its critics 2.1 Introduction19 2.2 Rationalists and Empiricists19 2.3 Positivists27 2.4 Popper29 2.5 Problems with the Falsifiability Criterion33 2.6 Kuhn37 2.7 Feyerabend40 2.8 Lakatos41 2.9 Laudan43 2.10 Conclusion46 Chapter 3 Recent relativists 3.1 Introduction51 3.2 The sociology of science51 3.3 Postmodernism54 3.3.1 Derrida57 3.3.2 Foucault61 3.3.3 Conclusion63 3.4 Constructivism64 Chapter 4 In defence of rationalism 4.1 Introduction69 4.2 Against relativism69 4.2.1 There is no one “scientific method”69 4.2.2 Underdetermination71 4.2.3 Kuhn and Feyerabend72 4.2.4 Postmodernists and constructivists77 4.3 The rationalist case81 4.3.1 Critical rationalism82 4.3.2 Observing a real world83 4.3.3 The practice of science84
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Chapter 5 The construction and assessment of theories of SLA 5.1 Science and SLA87 5.2 Phenomena and data90 5.3 Explanation91 5.4 Theory assessment95 5.5 Four views on constructing and assessing theories of SLA97 5.5.1 The relativist approach97 5.5.1.1 Discussion99 5.5.2 Strictly science101 5.5.2.1 Discussion107 5.5.3 Theory types and theory assessment110 5.5.4 General rational requirements for a theory of SLA112 5.6 Guidelines for a critical rationalist approach towards theory construction in SLA114 5.6.1 Preamble114 5.6.2 The guidelines115 5.7 Conclusion118 Part 2 A critical rationalist review of some hypotheses, models and theories of SLA Chapter 6 Chomsky 6.1 Introduction123 6.2 Chomsky’s Generative Grammar123 6.3 Chomsky’s theory of UG: Principles and parameters128 6.4 The Minimalist Program133 6.5 Internalism137 6.6 UG remains the relevant theory138 6.7 Chomsky’s critics139 6.7.1 Jean Piaget140 6.7.2 Geoffrey Sampson141 6.7.3 Elizabeth Bates147 6.8 Conclusion149
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Chapter 7 The role of UG in an explanation of SLA 7.1 Introduction151 7.2 Evaluating UG151 7.3 UG and SLA156 7.4 Discussion158
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Chapter 8 Approaches to SLA that offend the guidelines 167 8.1 Introduction167 8.2 Contrastive analysis168 8.2.1 Discussion170 8.3 The ethnography of communication, and hermeneutic research172 8.3.1 Discussion176 8.4 Krashen’s 5 hypotheses: The Monitor Model178 8.4.1 Discussion180 8.5 Variable competence models183 8.5.1 Tarone183 8.5.2 Ellis184 8.5.3 Discussion184 8.6 The acculturalisation/pidginisation approach188 8.6.1 Discussion190 8.7 Theories of aptitude and motivation191 8.7.1 Aptitude192 8.7.1.1 Discussion193 8.7.2 Motivation and attitude197 8.7.2.1 Discussion200 Chapter 9 Signs of progress 9.1 Introduction203 9.2 Error analysis204 9.2.1 Discussion205 9.3 The morpheme order studies205 9.3.1 Discussion206 9.4 Other early staged development studies207 9.4.1 Discussion207
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9.5 Processing approaches: Introductory remarks209 9.5.1 McLaughlin: Automaticity and restructuring210 9.5.1.1 Discussion211 9.5.2 Schmidt: Noticing213 9.5.2.1 Discussion216 9.5.3 Long’s Interaction Hypothesis219 9.5.3.1 Discussion220 9.5.4 Pienemann’s Processability Theory221 9.5.4.1 Discussion225 9.6 Towell and Hawkins’ Model of SLA227 9.6.1 Discussion232 9.7 The Competition Model235 9.7.1 Discussion239 9.8 Emergentism243 9.8.1 Discussion246 Chapter 10 Explaining SLA 10.1 Introduction251 10.2 The domain of theories of SLA252 10.3 Theories of SLA260 10.4 Conclusion265
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Bibliography
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Name index
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Subject index
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Acknowledgements
First and foremost, thanks to Mike Long for all his encouragement and help. I am also very grateful to Kevin Gregg, Guy Cook and Gerry Sweeney, to my habitual sparring partners Mick Carter, Conny O’Grady, and David Beavers, and to my editors Kees Vaes, Jan Hulstijn, Birgit Harley and Lisl Haldenwang. Thanks to everybody for their good-humour and patience in dealing with the awful vagaries of my writing.
Abstract
Whereas ten years ago most SLA researchers assumed a rationalist, even “scientific”, approach to theory construction, recently, growing numbers in the ranks have adopted relativist positions that strongly criticise the methods and authority of the rationalist/empiricist paradigm. Apart from the fundamental problem of research methodology, other problems make progress in the construction of a theory of SLA difficult: the proliferation of theories, contradictions among theories, and, most important of all, confusion about the domain and objectives of a theory of SLA. This book addresses the problems outlined above by returning to first principles and asking what it is that we can know about the world, whether there is any such thing as reliable knowledge, what is special about scientific methodology, and what the best way of tackling the complex task of explaining SLA might be. While previous surveys of SLA research exist, no previous attempt has been made to examine SLA research in terms of its epistemological underpinnings and its relation to scientific method, or to evaluate different research programmes and putative theories in terms of how they form part of, and contribute towards, a rational explanation of the phenomena of SLA. Having outlined basic terms and the main problems to be dealt with, I give a brief history of scientific method and explain the objections to a rationalist methodology that various relativists have raised. I then attempt to defend rationality against relativists’ attacks and suggest criteria that can guide a rationalist research programme in SLA. The questions of the domain of SLA theories, what counts as an explanation, and different theory types are examined. Having suggested guidelines for a rationalist approach to SLA theory construction, I examine different approaches to SLA in the history of SLA, assessing them in terms of the guidelines. Finally I suggest what the domain of a theory of SLA should be and discuss to what extent theories to date offer a satisfactory explanation of the phenomena within that domain.
Part 1
Some fundamental issues concerning the construction and assessment of theories of SLA
Introduction There is a “Science and Culture War” currently raging in academia, and it has spilled over into the field of Second Language Acquisition (SLA). When TESOL Quarterly devoted a special issue to research methods in SLA in 1990, and when Applied Linguistics followed with a special issue on theory construction in SLA in 1993, almost all of the articles in both journals assumed a rationalist approach to theory construction, based on logical reasoning and empirical research. But subsequently, and increasingly in the past few years, a growing number of researchers in SLA have adopted relativist positions of one sort or another, most frequently following the constructivist position of Lincoln (1990) and Guba (1990), or sometimes appealing directly to the work of such postmodernists as Derrida (1973, 1976) and Foucault (1980). Whatever their inspiration, what unites the rebels is their rejection of the methods, assumptions, and authority of the rationalist/empiricist approach to research and theory construction. Schumann (1983), and Candlin (1983) were early protesters. Widdowson (1992), while certainly not adopting a constructivist view, gave voice to a growing feeling among SLA researchers that a dominant, even bullying, group had somehow hijacked the SLA agenda. Widdowson chided those professing to use a rationalist, deductive research methodology for imposing their methods on others and being insensitive to “the possible validity of home-grown ways of thinking”. Markee (1994) joined the protesters and complained that “nomothetic” science, which “assumes a single, discoverable reality” and focuses on “explanation”, had established a stranglehold on SLA research. Markee suggested that this smothering nomothetic scientific approach should be replaced with “hermeneutic” science, which assumes that “multiple realities exist”, and which focuses on “understanding”.
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The grumbling soon turned to outright revolt. In a special edition of TESOL Quarterly in 1996 devoted to ethnographic, subjective research in SLA, the contributors argued for a position totally opposed to the rationalists, and presented research papers that struck the rationalists they were attacking as being almost incomprehensible. In Applied Linguistics, Block (1996) wrote a critique of the papers by Long, Beretta, Gregg, Crookes, and others which had appeared in a special issue of Applied Linguistics devoted to theory construction in SLA (1993), suggesting that they were guilty of “science envy”, that there was no need to recognise accepted findings, no need for replication studies, and an urgent need for SLA researchers to throw off the oppressively restricting constraints of the “scientific” approach, recommended by Long and others, so as to embrace a more relativist approach. Perhaps the most fully-developed relativist methodology is to be found in Lantolf ’s paper, suitably titled “Letting all the flowers bloom!” which offers “a postmodernist critical analysis of the SLA theory-building literature” as primarily represented in the writings of Beretta, Crookes, Eubank, Gregg, Long and to some extent Schumann. Lantolf argues that theories are metaphors and should be appreciated in more or less the same way as we appreciate pictures in an art gallery. As for scientific method, Lantolf has this to say: The greater the acceptance of and acquiescence to standard scientific language within a discipline, the greater the chances that the productivity of the scientific endeavour will diminish. (Lantolf, 1996a: 756)
Those in the rationalist camp were not slow to respond. Gregg, Long, Jordan and Beretta (1997), in a reply to Block, claimed that Block had demonstrated a striking ignorance of scientific practice, mischaracterised the role of evidence in scientific research, misread Kuhn, misunderstood theory assessment, and offered no support whatsoever for the relativistic SLA research programme he recommended. Long, in a reply to a paper by Firth and Wagner (1997), dismissed the paper as containing little more than strawman arguments, arguments by assertion, rather sweeping claims about the state of the field based on very limited data, and an unfortunate, irrelevant endorsement of Block’s confusions about philosophy of science issues. (Long, 1997a: 322)
Gregg, in his reply to the Lantolf “Letting all the flowers bloom!” (1996a) paper mentioned above, concludes (the conclusion is headed “Get real”) that Lantolf wants to replace scientific research in SLA with “a kaffeklatsch of solipsists who
Some fundamental issues concerning the construction and assessment of theories of SLA
do nothing but chat — or rather discourse — without actually doing anything” (Gregg, 2000: 6). There is obviously a problem here, and it is not, I suggest, simply a question of extremists at either ends of the spectrum screaming at each other in mutually exclusive terms, while the great majority get on with things. There are of course extremists at both ends, but there are also those with more moderate opinions who tend towards one position or another, and yet others who are not very clear about the issues involved. I suggest that the “realist/relativist” dispute is just the latest and most dramatic symptom of a long-standing problem among those in the SLA academic community: there is no consensus on the fundamental issues of what needs to be explained, what counts as an explanation, and what criteria should be used to assess different theories of SLA. To put it another way, there is not just a lot of disagreement among SLA academics, there is also confusion and misunderstanding about the underlying principles on which any research programme rests: how do we best construct a theory, and how do we go about the task of judging among rival theories of the same phenomena? In short, while Gregg and Lantolf may be seen as extremists arguing at opposite poles, the arguments between them raise important epistemological and methodological questions which need to be untangled and clarified. In an attempt to deal with these issues, I propose to go back to first principles and ask what it is that we can know about the world, whether or not there is any such thing as reliable knowledge, what if anything is special about scientific methodology, how researchers go about constructing theories, whether there is any optimum way of approaching the task of theory construction, and what the best way of tackling the complex task of explaining SLA might be. While there have been a number of surveys of SLA theories (Long, 1999, Mitchell and Myles, 1998, Ellis, 1994, Larsen-Freeman and Long, 1991), I am not aware of any large scale attempt to examine SLA research and theories of SLA in terms of its epistemological underpinnings, and to then evaluate different research programmes and putative theories in terms of how they might form part of, and contribute towards, a rational theory of SLA which avoids the excesses of radical relativism and the restrictions of over-demanding “scientific” approaches. That is the aim of this book.
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Chapter 1
Key terms and current problems in SLA
1.1 SLA Theory: Key terms SLA theory attempts to explain the phenomena involved when a person acquires a second language. We observe that people whose native language is X acquire a second language Y: How do they do it? The point of this over-simplified description is to emphasise that any theory is an attempt to explain phenomena, and to highlight three key terms: phenomena, language, and explanation. 1.1.1
Phenomena
The term phenomena refers to things that we isolate, define, and then attempt to explain. Examples of phenomena are volcanoes, tides, genes, hallucinations, warts, steam, the second world war, car rage, the beginning of the universe. We should note immediately that phenomena are not always directly observable: genes and hallucinations are two examples from the foregoing list, the fundamental particles of physics and the force of gravity in Newtonian physics are two more. The distinction between phenomena and empirical data, the latter being by definition observable, is an important one for this book. 1.1.2 Language In SLA the phenomenon which interests us is people being able to speak languages other than their own native language/s. How one describes that phenomenon is crucial to the subsequent investigation. Those taking a Universal Grammar (UG) approach to SLA, for example, say that the phenomenon to be explained is a certain type of knowledge, namely linguistic competence, and their research consequently involves describing this knowledge and explaining how it is acquired. There are others in the field of SLA, however, who wish to take a much broader view of SLA, who wish to investigate “communicative competence”, and language use. As a result, a wider range of phenomena need to be explained
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by appeal to individual differences among learners, social and cultural factors, and so on. Let us look very briefly at three different approaches to language. 1.1.2.1Chomsky’s Linguistic Competence The distinction between performance and competence is most closely associated with Chomsky’s work on the universal features of language that Chomsky claims are shared by all languages. Chomsky argues that we need to distinguish between people’s language performance, what they say at any given moment (which may be influenced and explained by an enormous number of factors), and their competence, what they know about language. Chomsky concentrates exclusively on linguistic competence, which, in Bachman´s model (see below), is just one part of one component. We will examine Chomsky’s arguments, and their relevance to SLA, in some detail later, so suffice it to say for now that Chomsky’s approach to language assumes that language is a restricted psychological phenomenon. Chomsky takes language to be a complex, abstract system of rules, and Chomsky supposes that the job of a theory of language acquisition is to describe that system of knowledge and to explain how it is acquired. The question of language use, of what Chomsky has referred to as “the creative aspect of language… the ability of normal persons to produce speech that is appropriate to situations, though perhaps quite novel, and to understand when others do so” (Chomsky, 1980), lies completely outside the domain of Chomskian linguistics. To Chomsky, this question, and many others included in the Bachman model, are “mysteries” which simply lie beyond the reach of our minds, structured and organised as they are, either absolutely beyond those limits, or at so far a remove from anything we can comprehend with requisite facility that they will never be incorporated within explanatory theories intelligible to humans. (Chomsky, 1980: 136)
The issue of what sort of knowledge and abilities are involved in SLA, and the extent to which they can be adequately described and explained, is one of the most vexed issues in SLA research and theory construction. 1.1.2.2Halliday: “Language as social semiotic” While Chomsky’s UG approach sees language as a purely cognitive phenomenon, Halliday (1973, 1985) proposed a “systemic, functional” view of language which sees it in terms of the social functions it serves. According to Halliday, language is a systematic resource for expressing meaning in context, not the set of all possible grammatical sentences. Consequently, language should be
Key terms and current problems in SLA
analysed in terms of the ways language users go about the task of “the realisation of meaning in context”. As Widdowson says, “the emphasis here is on language not as genetic endowment, but as generic accomplishment” (Widdowson, 1996: 14). Halliday takes a functional, semantic view of language as opposed to the formal, syntactic view of Chomsky and others. He sees the text, rather than the sentence, as the object of language, and he defines its scope by reference to usage rather than grammaticality. As a consequence of his approach, Halliday explains language as developing according to the changing needs of human communities. The two main functions that language performs are what Halliday calls the “ideational function”, which allows people to deal with the external world, and “the interpersonal function”, which allows people to deal with each other. These two functions can be said to underlie all languages, and to afford a way of describing universal features of language in a systematic way which differs radically from Chomsky’s. Halliday makes it clear that language can be seen as both abstract knowledge and as human behaviour. 1.1.2.3Bachman’s Communicative Language Ability Framework Bachman (1990) provides a framework for Communicative Language Ability (CLA) which builds on the work of Hymes (1972), Canale and Swain (1980), and Widdowson (1989). The framework includes three components: – –
–
language competence: “a set of specific knowledge components that are utilised in communication via language” (Bachman, 1990: 66). strategic competence: “the mental capacity for implementing the components of language competence in contextualised communicative language use” (Bachman, 1990: 67). psychophysiological mechanisms: “the neurological and psychological processes involved in the actual execution of language as a physical phenomenon” (Bachman, 1990: 67).
The interaction of these components of CLA with the language use context and the language user’s general knowledge of the world is illustrated in Figure 1. Bachman divides language competence into the components in Figure 2. Bachman insists that the tree diagram is intended as a visual metaphor, not as a theoretical model; it represents the hierarchical relationships among the components at the expense of making them appear as if they are separate and independent of each other. However, in language use these components all interact with each other and with features of the language use situation. (Bachman, 1990: 86)
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KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES Knowledge of the world
LANGUAGE COMPETENCE Knowledge of language
STRATEGIC COMPETENCE
PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS
CONTEXT OF SITUATION
Figure 1.Components of communicative language ability in communicative language use. From Bachman 1990: 41. Language Competence Organizational Competence Grammatical Competence
Textual Competence
Pragmatic Competence Illocutionary Competence
Sociolinguistic Competence
Figure 2.Components of language competence. Adapted from Bachman 1990: 67.
A brief description of the main components of Bachman’s model follows. Language Competence is composed of two components: Organisational Competence, divided into a. Grammatical competence: knowledge of vocabulary, morphology, syntax, and phonology/graphology. b. Textual competence: “includes the knowledge of the conventions for joining utterances together to form a text, which is essentially a unit of language — spoken or written — consisting of two or more utterances or
Key terms and current problems in SLA
sentences that are structured according to rules of cohesion and rhetorical organisation” (Bachman, 1990: 88). Pragmatic competence, which deals with the speaker’s or writer’s ability to achieve his purpose through his utterances. It consists of a. Illocutionary competence: the ability to express and interpret the function performed in saying something. For example, the statement “It’s cold in here” may function as an assertion, a warning, or a request to turn the heater on. The theory of speech acts makes a distinction between an utterance act (just saying something), a propositional act (referring to something), and an illocutionary act. The meaning of an utterance can thus be described in terms of its propositional content and its illocutionary force. b. Sociolinguistic competence: sensitivity to, or control of, the conventions of language use that are determined by the features of the specific language use context; it enables us to perform language functions in ways that are appropriate to that context. Strategic competence consists of three components: a. Assessment component: enables us to identify the information needed for a communicative goal, decide what resources to use, evaluate our interlocutor, and evaluate the outcome. b. Planning component: enables us to marshal the necessary items from language competence. c. Execution component: draws on the relevant psychophysiological mechanisms to implement the plan. Bachman’s objective in identifying the various types of competencies outlined here is to construct adequate tests of L2 learners’ proficiency; his re-organising and re-defining of the terms used previously by Hymes, Canale and Swain, and Widdowson is motivated by a desire to make the terms more testable. Thus, using Bachman’s framework to mark out the domain of a theory of SLA has its problems: measures of performance do not necessarily reflect well-defined competencies. A related issue is the difference between attempts to describe a given type of knowledge, and attempts to explain the process of learning or acquiring that knowledge. Nevertheless, the framework gives some idea of the possible scope of SLA and immediately suggests that very different types of knowledge and abilities are involved. Grammatical competence and sociolinguistic competence are, intentionally no doubt, the furthest apart in Bachman’s diagram, and would seem to need very different types of research, and theory development.
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1.1.3
Acquisition
If breaking down the term “language” into better-defined competencies is an important step towards describing what is acquired in SLA, then similarly, when we ask the question “How is a second language acquired?” we need to take a similarly close look at the process of acquisition. Long gives this description of SLA theory: SLA theory encompasses the simultaneous and sequential acquisition and loss of second, third, fourth, etc. languages and dialects by children and adults learning naturalistically or with the aid of instruction, as individuals or in groups, in second or foreign language settings. (Long, 1993: 225)
While Long’s description helps to give some idea of the breadth of SLA theory, it is useful to break the question of the process of acquisition down, so as to highlight the phenomena that we are interested in. I cite two, by no means definitive, lists. The first, by Towell and Hawkins (1994) identifies five core phenomena for which, they maintain, a theory of SLA must account: 1. Transfer — of grammatical properties from the L1 mental grammar into the mental grammar that learners construct for the L2. 2. Staged Development — L2 learners go through a series of “transitional stages” towards the target language, i.e. from the initial-state grammars that L2 learners construct (often heavily influenced by transfer) they subsequently go through stages of development towards the target language. 3. Systematicity — in the growth of L2 knowledge across learners, i.e. learners from different L1 backgrounds acquiring an L2 under different conditions of exposure — naturalistic versus classroom — often go through the same stages of development. 4. Variability — in learners’ intuitions about, and production of, the L2 at various stages of L2 development. These seem to allow for more than one variant for a given construction where the target language has only one form. 5. Incompleteness — most L2 learners do not achieve native-like competence. This phenomenon is referred to as fossilisation by Selinker (1972) and as incompleteness by Schachter (1990). (Towell and Hawkins, 1994: 15) This list has a definite, explicit agenda, which is to argue for the key role played by Chomsky’s theory of UG. Towell and Hawkins argue that any approach to SLA that lacks “a sophisticated theory of the nature of grammatical structure” (Towell and Hawkins, 1994: 55) will not be able to offer a satisfactory explanation of these five phenomena. These phenomena would certainly not be the
Key terms and current problems in SLA
(only) ones listed by many working in the field today. Behaviourists, for example, would question the assumption of a developing interlanguage, and even within the “linguistic” camp, there are some researchers, as we shall see, who would not agree with the inclusion of Variability in the list. Mitchell and Myles (1998), in their more general survey of SLA, describe the areas of interest in SLA research slightly differently, and identify four: 1. The role of internal mechanisms a. Language-specific: how similar are 1st. and 2nd language acquisition processes? (Is UG available?) b. Cognitive: is SLA similar to learning any other complex skill? 2. The role of the first language: the phenomenon of transfer. 3. The role of psychological variables: how do individual characteristics of the learner affect the learning process? 4. The role of social and environmental factors. (Mitchell and Myles, 1998:40) 1.1.4 Explanation Having introduced the issues of what language might consist of, and the types of phenomena that might interest SLA researchers, we come to the term “explanation”. An explanation is generally taken to be an answer to a “Why” or “How” question about phenomena; it involves causation or a causal mechanism. Why do most L2 learners not achieve native-like competence? How do L2 learners go through stages of development? Explanation is said to be the purpose of a theory, and one of the most important criteria for judging theories is their explanatory power. We will need to examine what is involved in an adequate explanation later, but for the moment we can note that the best theories are the ones that provide the most generally applicable explanations: if we could construct a theory of SLA that explained the way in which anybody, anywhere, at any time learned a second language, and if that theory did not clash with the facts, we would have a very strong theory indeed. It seems, then, that all we have to do is define the phenomena we want to explain, ask relevant questions, and then set about the search for the answers. While this may appear to be a straightforward task, and while it is all too frequent for researchers in this, as in other fields, to complicate the issues unnecessarily, the attempts to explain the phenomena of SLA have so far produced no satisfactory answer, i.e. there is no theory that covers all the phenomena, that fits the facts, and that is accepted by a majority of those working in the field.
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1.2 Problems confronting current theories of SLA 1.2.1 Proliferation In order to construct a theory of SLA that the majority of those working in the field agree on, there needs to be agreement on what phenomena are to be explained and what counts as an explanation. No such agreement exists. There is fundamental disagreement on both of these issues, and, as a consequence, SLA research is conducted under the “umbrella” of a wide range of theories. Long (1993) estimates that “there are between 40 and 60 theories of SLA”, and he goes on to give an outline of the diversity. He notes that the two main forms these theories take are “causal-process” (e.g., Gardner, 1985) and “set-of-laws” (e.g., Spolsky, 1989), and that there are three basic types: nativist, both specific (e.g., White, 1989) and general (e.g., Wolfe-Quintero, 1992), environmentalist (e.g., Schumann, 1986), and interactionist (e.g., Pienemann and Johnston, 1987). Long then indicates the variety of sources of SLA theories, and the wideranging, different domains they cover. SLA theories also differ in source drawing upon work in linguistics (Cook 1988), pidgin & Creole studies (Schumann 1978), sociolinguistics (Tarone 1983), psychology (Clahsen 1987), neurolinguistics (Lamendella 1977), cognitive science (Gasser 1990), social psychology (Giles & Byrne 1982), and combinations thereof (Hatch, Flashner & Hunt 1986). They also differ in scope, or the range of data they attempt to explain. Some address naturalistic acquisition only (Schumann 1978), some instructed only (Ellis 1990), some both (Krashen 1985); some children (Wong-Fillmore 1991), some adults (Bley-Vroman 1989), some a specific cognitive capacity, such as metalinguistic awareness (Bialystok 1991); some a specific psychological process, such as transfer (Eckman 1985), restructuring (McLaughlin 1990), or implicit learning (Hulstijn 1989); some a specific linguistic system, such as phonology (Major 1987) or the lexicon (Hudson 1989), some a specific subsystem, such as word order (Meisel, Clahsen, & Pienemann 1981), speech act behaviour (Wolfson 1988), or interrogative structures (Eckman, Moravcsik, & Wirth 1989). (Long 1993: 226–227)
Beretta (1991) makes a similar point by drawing attention to which theories various prominent researchers in the field have focused on: McLaughlin (1987) evaluated five of them; Larsen-Freeman (1983) 4; LarsenFreeman and Long (1991) 5. Ellis (1986) identified seven key areas of SLA research: the acculturation model (Andersen, 1981, 1983; Schumann, 1978,
Key terms and current problems in SLA
1978b), accommodation theory (Giles & Byrne, 1982), discourse theory (Hatch, 1978), the monitor model (Krashen 1982, 1985), the variable competence model (Ellis, 1984; Tarone 1983), universal grammar hypotheses (Flynn 1984; White 1987), a neurofunctional theory (Lamendella, 1977). (Beretta 1991: 452)
The question is: Is such theory proliferation a problem? Since SLA is such a broad field perhaps we need a proliferation of theories to break down the vast areas. The need for some description of language in terms of forms and functions, syntax and grammar, discourse and pragmatics, etc., is a wide enough area in itself, and scope enough for a tremendous variety of approaches. But in order to explain how someone acquires a second language, we need to investigate even further: questions of cognition, of individual will, and of social influences are all relevant. Surely we cannot expect one theory to explain all this to the satisfaction of all. To the extent that the various theories do not overlap, and that they are complementary not oppositional, there should be no problem. Some, like Ellis (1986), Selinker and Lamendella (1978), Schumann (1983), McLaughlin (1987), take this optimistic view, and indeed Ellis, in a complement to his 1986 list (above), later looked at seven different teaching methods, and then outlined a theory of teaching which, in his view, was “consistent with the theoretical positions and research discussed in previous chapters” (Ellis 1990: 174). Others, however, like Long (1993, 1997a, 1998), Gregg (1993, 1997, 2000), Crookes (1992), and Beretta (1991), are convinced that there is a problem, or rather, various problems. The first problem is that of proliferation itself. To date, there is no complete theory of SLA that a majority of researchers in the field accept, or even any group of theories that between them make up some coherent picture. Widdowson (1992) described the current state of applied linguistics as “a patchwork of insights stitched together”, a description that many researchers think applies equally to the field of SLA today. These researchers argue that while much good work has been done in various areas, little progress has been made towards any unified theory, or any coherent group of theories. At the moment, in their opinion, SLA research draws on many methods from many disciplines, but there are contradictions, overlaps, and incommensurable approaches that make progress towards a unified research programme difficult, to say the least. I reject the demand for any unified research programme, and I will pursue this point later. For now, let us examine the obstacles to progress towards a satisfactory theory of SLA.
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Problematic areas which are assumed to present obstacles to progress towards a theory of SLA can be grouped (perhaps “shoe-horned” is a better word, since the grouping is somewhat forced in an attempt to clarify a complex problem) under four main headings: objectives, domain, contradictions within a limited domain, and research methods. 1.2.2 Objectives What should be the objective of a theory of SLA? Two main questions need attention. First, while most academics would agree that the main objective of a theory of SLA should be to explain the phenomena under investigation, the question remains: What counts as an explanation of SLA? This question, already briefly touched on above, permeates any discussion of theory construction; it involves issues such as research methodology, domain, and what might be appropriate questions for SLA researchers to ask. Some researchers, like Tarone and Ellis, regard their work as essentially descriptive: they observe classroom behaviour, for example, and their objective is to find ways of providing an adequate description of what they observe. This essentially inductive approach to research is shared by many researchers in a wide range of fields; its conservative, methodical, painstaking approach is one of the most pervasive in the history of science. The objectives of a theory are seen, from this view, as discovering (uncovering), describing, making sense of the data. A different perspective, that taken in the field of SLA by researchers such as McLaughlin, Eubank, Skehan, Chaudron, and Gass, is that the objective of any theory is to provide a more general causal explanation of the phenomena. From such a perspective, without a causal explanation there is no theory, just (empirical) data and taxonomies. Second, should an SLA theory aim to inform language teaching practice, or ignore such considerations? Again, the question greatly influences the way researchers approach theory construction. While this book is solely concerned with SLA, which is just one part of the broader field of applied linguistics, van Lier’s comment echoes the concerns of many researchers in SLA: The linguistics in AL has veered off in the direction of theory, …leaving pedagogy to cope with the practical side of things. There has occurred a sort of “double split” — linguistics (and SLA) with theory in one direction, and education with practice in another — and this split needs to be resolved before we can once again speak of a healthy AL. (van Lier, 1994: 30)
Key terms and current problems in SLA
There are those who would argue that no such split exists (pointing to Robinson 2001, for example), and on the other hand, many researchers, particularly those working in a UG framework, argue that they have no necessary obligation to look for pedagogical pay-offs, and that their real purpose is to describe and explain certain phenomena. Long’s position seems the most sensible. Long (1998) recognised the social responsibility researchers have to help improve the efficaciousness of classroom teaching and to forge a more liberal language policy, but at the same time defended the right of scholars to pursue “pure” research, where no practical payoff is foreseen. A related issue is to what extent one adopts a “realist” or an “instrumentalist” view of explanations. 1.2.3 The domain of SLA One of the main arguments among SLA researchers concerns what an SLA theory should or should not consist of, i.e. its domain. The choice of different domains reveals fundamental incompatibility. An example is Gregg’s attack (1990) on variable competence models (Tarone, 1988; Ellis, 1989), which Gregg thinks are totally mistaken because they confuse performance and competence, data and the phenomena to be explained. From Gregg’s UG perspective the domain of Tarone’s and Ellis’ models is irrelevant since performance is the data, and cannot possibly form part of the phenomena which a theory of SLA should explain. Another increasingly important disagreement about domain concerns the role of sociolinguistics. Firth and Wagner (1997) have criticised SLA research for “ignoring social context”, and suggest that SLA research should give up its preoccupation with what goes on in the learner’s mind and pay more attention to social factors. Lurking behind this criticism is the related question of research methodology, as we shall see. In fact, questions of the scope of an SLA theory are probably the most central to the research programme. What is the “L” in SLA? What is the competence that we seek to describe or explain? What is the role of UG? What else, apart from grammatical competence, should be included? What is the end state of SLA? What is the process of SLA? Do we need two theories to deal with the “L” and the “A” of SLA? Should an SLA theory attempt some overall explanation of an agreed list of phenomena like, for example, those already referred to, or should it shun the overall theory in favour of some partial explanation, concentrating on, for example, linguistic competence, or variability, and developing its own separate constructs and hypotheses?
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1.2.4 Contradictions Even within a particular domain, there are contradictory theories. Long gives some examples: – Krashen’s Input Hypothesis (1980) (learners can only acquire new structures that are “one step ahead” of their current stage of development) clashes with Pienemann (1984, 1992), who made essentially the same claim in his Learnability and Teachability Hypotheses, but criticised Krashen on the grounds that the Input Hypothesis was not predictable or testable. – Krashen’s dichotomous model versus several continuum models of interlanguage variation (see Tarone, 1983a, for discussion). – Conflicting views about access to principles of UG in adult SLA (BleyVroman 1989, Schwartz 1990). – Sociolinguistically-based and cognitivist accounts of interlanguage variation (Sato 1984, Tarone 1988, 1989, Crookes 1989, Hulstijn 1989, Selinker and Douglas 1989). – Linguistic and cognitivist explanations for observed developmental sequences (data on Swedish SL negation Hyltenstam 1977, 1982; Jordens 1980, 1982.) (Long 1993: 148)
Beretta (1993) agrees with Long, and argues that while complementary theories (theories operating in different domains and each providing answers to different parts of the SLA puzzle) are no problem (provided the complementarity is theoretically coherent), oppositional theories are a problem, since they offer theoretically incompatible, mutually exclusive explanations of the same facts. Moreover, like Long, Beretta sympathises with the view that different researchers from different traditions find it difficult to communicate with each other or to appreciate the significance of the questions being addressed. On this view, different theories are not just oppositional: they are, in Kuhn’s (1962) sense, incommensurable. The three basic types of theories that Beretta sees as mutually exclusive are those dealing with cognitive, affective, or linguistic factors, respectively. Long and Beretta both believe that multiple theories like these indicate a very serious problem, since the theories are oppositional, and indicate that SLA theory construction is still immature — in what Kuhn (1962) would call a “pre-paradigm stage”. Long suggests that some culling is needed, firstly because we need to make progress so as to solve pressing social problems the appropriacy of different kinds of SL teaching or SL educational programs for learners of different ages and different L1 & L2 proficiencies currently have to be based in large part on SLA theory (Long, 1993: 229),
Key terms and current problems in SLA
and secondly because, following Kuhn (1962), the history of science shows that successful sciences are those which work (for most of the time) under a paradigm, or at least a very small number of dominant theories. As has already been mentioned, even these two points are controversial: many, like Gregg and Eubank, for example, do not agree that researchers have any duty to solve social problems, others, like Schumann and Davies, for example, do not think SLA should attempt to be a successful science, and others, Feyerabend, for example, do not agree with Kuhn’s account of the history of science or with the lesson which he draws from it.
1.3 Conclusion There is little agreement among researchers in SLA about fundamental questions concerning how to construct a theory of SLA. In the rest of this book I will attempt to unravel the various threads running through the disagreements that exist about first principles, and then suggest some ways in which those of us who agree to a minimally rationalist-realist approach can move forward.
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Chapter 2
Research methodology Rationalism and its critics
2.1 Introduction In Chapter 1, I suggested that a major problem facing theory construction in SLA is the disagreement among researchers working in the field about how research should be carried out. In this chapter I tackle the problem of research methodology in some depth. It is important to get the background to the current disputes and confusions clear, and so I begin by sketching the history of the philosophy of science, which includes the contributions of Kuhn and Feyerabend, who have so often been used by relativists to support their approach. Along the way, we must untangle the confusion about empiricist, positivist, and rationalist approaches.
2.2 Rationalists and Empiricists While the English philosopher Francis Bacon is said by many to have been the father of the philosophy of science, I want to take Rene Descartes, his French contemporary, as the starting point for our discussion. The arguments of both these philosophers are relevant, but Descartes’ work makes a more convenient starting place, since it is, in terms of modern western philosophy, the first exposition of the rationalist argument. In Discourse on Method Descartes (1969 [1637]) tells us how he, a hapless soldier, sat in an abandoned baking oven, sheltering from the cold, with a war going on around him, and how he played with a piece of wax. When he examined the wax initially, he detected certain properties of the wax: it had a shape, a colour, and a certain dimension. It had no smell, it made a dull thud when struck against the wall, and it felt cold. As Descartes and the wax warmed up, the wax started to melt in his hands, and everything his senses had told him
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about the wax turned to its opposite. The shape, colour and dimensions changed, it had a pungent odour, it made little sound and it felt hot. How then, asked Descartes, do I know that it is still a piece of wax? He decided to adopt a totally sceptical approach, and to suppose that a demon was at work, doing everything it could to delude him. Perhaps nothing he perceived or imagined was true. Perhaps it wasn’t snowing, perhaps it wasn’t cold, perhaps he wasn’t in a small dark space, perhaps it didn’t stink in there. And perhaps his name wasn’t Rene, perhaps no war was going on, perhaps it wasn’t Thursday. Was there anything that could escape the Demon hypothesis? Was there anything that Descartes could be sure he knew? His famous conclusion was that the demon could not deny that he thought, that he asked the question “What can I know?” Essentially, then, it was his capacity to think, to reason, that was the only reliable source of knowledge, and hence Descartes’ famous “Cogito ergo sum”. I think, therefore I am. From this first principle Descartes built his philosophical system, which was based on the innate ability of the thinking mind to reflect on and understand our world. We are, in Descartes’ opinion, unique in having the ability to reason, and it is this capacity to reason that allows us to understand the world. What is reasoning? Reasoning is the rational pursuit of an argument. It is not quite true to say that Spinoza and Leibniz (see Russell, 1961: 542–576) further developed Descartes’ rationalist approach, because so much separates them from him, but it is true enough that Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz are recognised as “the big three”, and that together they form an important part of the paradigm of the Enlightenment, a crucial plank in the ideological underpinnings of the so-called scientific revolution that took place in the 17th century. Mathematics (brilliant geometry in Descartes’ case) and logic (Spinoza was the most acute), were at the core of the rationalist approach, and the two false gods, maths and logic, were both given a specially privileged status by those seeking reliable knowledge. But equally important to the so-called scientific revolution (we are back at the start of the 17th century) was the empirical method adopted by scientists, a method that was most vigorously championed by Francis Bacon. In his most important work, The Advancement of Learning (Bacon, 1974 [1605]), Bacon attacked the triviality of medieval theologians and philosophers and, in common with Descartes after him, Bacon insisted that the crucial issue was that of reliable knowledge. Bacon criticised medieval philosophers for their preoccupation with petty scholastic squabbles (famously, how many angels could dance on the head of a pin) and blamed their silly thinking on the blind tradition
Research methodology
(established by the Greek philosophers from Socrates onwards) of giving preeminence to logical deduction. This, in Bacon’s opinion, had led to over five hundred years of sterile debate. Bacon proposed that empirical observation and formal experiments should take the place of scholastic conundrums, and become recognised as the real business of science. Bacon’s proposal, revolutionary in its time and profoundly rational in its intention, is obviously at odds with the (historically subsequent) rationalist arguments put forward by Descartes. It amounts to saying that induction, rather than deduction, should be at the heart of scientific method. Bacon recommends a bottom-up approach to theory construction: carefully conducted empirical observations should be the firm base on which a theory is built. Scientists should dispassionately observe, measure, and take note, in such a way that, step by careful step, checking continuously along the way that the measurements are accurate and that no unwarranted assumptions have crept in, they accumulate such an uncontroversial mass of evidence that they cannot fail to draw the right conclusions from it. Thus they finally arrive at a theory whose truth is guaranteed by the careful steps that led to it. In fact, if one actually stuck to such a strictly empirical programme, it would be impossible to arrive at any general theory (there is no logical way to derive generalisations from facts). With equal sureness we can assert that it is impossible to develop a rationalist epistemology from Descartes’ “Cogito ergo sum” (the existence of an external world does not follow). In both cases a sleight of hand was needed. Nevertheless, Bacon’s arguments were extremely influential with scientists, and the general association of empiricism with science became part of the popular explanation for the enormous successes of science. And spectacular advances were being made in science. Russell names the players: four great men — Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, and Newton — are preeminent in the creation of science. (Russell 1961: 512)1
Between them, these four remarkable men finally scotched the idea that the earth was at the centre of the universe, and Newton’s general law of gravitation, published in 1687, gave the first coherent explanation of the observed movements of the planets (see Russell, 1961: 512–525). At the same time, the invention of calculus by Newton and Leibniz laid the foundation for modern mathematics (see Russell 1961: 563–576). The eighteenth century saw the inevitable applications of the new scientific discoveries: an explosion of new and improved tools (telescopes, microscopes, thermometers, barometers, clocks,
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pumps, etc.), and the ability to harness energy, culminated in the industrial revolution (see Asimov, 1975a: 407–440). Scientific developments during the 18th century made it possible for far more general theories to emerge in the following century, including Dalton’s atomic theory of matter, the electromagnetic theories of Faraday and Maxwell, and the law of conservation of energy, developed by James Prescott Joule and others (see Asimov, 1975a: 358–398). And the predictive successes of Newtonian physics went from strength to strength, culminating in the discovery of the planet Neptune by Leverrier in the position he had predicted on the basis of Newton’s laws (see Asimov, 1975a: 381). Biology, geology and medicine also made similarly spectacular progress, starting somewhat later and flourishing particularly in the nineteenth century. Interestingly, in these three areas the Baconian methodology was particularly in evidence: the incredible collections of biological and geological specimens that accrued throughout Western Europe in the nineteenth century, leading to the building of national museums in which to house these collections, are evidence of this basically descriptive, linear, inductive approach to scientific research. Of course, Darwin’s theory of evolution was a huge exception to this tendency. The theory of evolution put forward by Charles Darwin in his On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, (1963 [1849]) (see Asimov 1975b: 134–5) was the most comprehensive of the biological theories, and provided a revolutionary, sweeping explanation which created perhaps even more controversy in its time than the work of Copernicus did in its time.2 We can see, then, that as early as the mid-seventeenth century two important strands of modern research methodology had already emerged. On the one hand, rational thought, with its reliance on deductive logic and mathematics, and on the other hand, empirical investigation, with its assumptions of observation and an inductive method. These two strands can subsequently be seen separately in two very different approaches to research and theory construction, the first based on generating explanations, and very often proceeding deductively, and the second based on descriptive generalisations. But they can also often be seen together, as different methodologies used at different stages of the development of a particular theory. Historically, in the development of scientific theories in the last three hundred years, the tensions between these two strands waxed and waned, yet for much of the time they managed to live quite comfortably together, as they often do today. In many research projects both inductive and deductive processes are involved, and, as I argue throughout this book, there is no need to choose between the two. Nevertheless, the tension
Research methodology
between inductive and deductive approaches, between the more conservative discoverers and the more radical inventors and “big theory” builders, can be seen throughout the development of modern science in general, and in the (much more recent and restricted) development of SLA theory in particular. Larsen-Freeman and Long (1991), for example talk about two research traditions in SLA: “research then theory”, and “theory then research”, and these obviously correspond to the inductive and deductive approaches respectively. It should now be clear that the claim in Chapter 1, that the best theories are those that provide the most generally applicable explanation, needs to be qualified. Much scientific progress has been made without the scientists involved having any pretensions to a generalised theory. Apart from the examples of biology and medicine, many nineteenth century advances in optics were made by scientists using experimental methods that had very little to do with the construction, testing, or comparison of theories. As Hacking says of Brewster, who discovered many new properties of light in the early nineteenth century, “Brewster was not testing or comparing theories at all. He was trying to find out how light behaves” (Hacking 1983: 157). The Baconian tradition, the investigation of the behaviour of matter in novel situations, or “twisting the lion’s tail” as Bacon himself put it, cannot be said to be based on a desire for general explanation, but rather on a desire to “see what happens” with the aim of controlling the physical world, and this remains an important aim of modern science. Nevertheless, the practical applications of particular experimental results depend on the ability to generalise: an engine designed in France could be improved in Germany thanks to the general theory of thermodynamics, Fresnel’s wave theory of light made it possible for those working in the field of optics to go much further than Brewster had managed. The theoretical generalisations of science obviously allow more universal application, and they are what make science so powerful. But it remains the case that it is far too simplistic to see theories as causal explanations. In linguistics, the division between “empiricist” and “rationalist” camps is noteworthy. The empiricists, who held sway, at least in the USA, until the 1950s, and whose most influential member was Bloomfield (see Bloomfield, 1933), saw their job as field work: accompanied by tape recorders and notebooks the researcher recorded thousands of hours of actual speech in a variety of situations and collected samples of written text. The data were then analysed in order to identify the linguistic patterns of a particular speech community. The emphasis was very much on description and classification, and on highlighting the differences between languages. We might call this the botanical
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approach, and its essentially descriptive, static, “naming of parts” methodology depended for its theoretical underpinnings on the “explanation” of how we acquire language provided by the behaviourists. Behaviourism was first developed in the early twentieth century by the American psychologist John B. Watson, who, influenced by the work of Pavlov and Bekhterev on conditioning of animals (see Toates and Slack, 1990: 255–262), attempted to make psychological research “scientific” by using only objective procedures, such as laboratory experiments which were designed to establish statistically significant results. Watson (see Toates and Slack, 1990: 252–253) formulated a stimulus-response theory of psychology according to which all complex forms of behaviour are explained in terms of simple muscular and glandular elements that can be observed and measured. No mental “reasoning”, no speculation about the workings of any “mind”, were allowed. Thousands of researchers adopted this methodology, and from the end of the first world war until the 1950s an enormous amount of research on learning in animals and in humans was conducted under this strict empiricist regime. In 1950 behaviourism could justly claim to have achieved paradigm status, and at that moment B. F. Skinner became its new champion. Skinner’s contribution to behaviourism was to challenge the stimulus-response idea at the heart of Watson’s work and replace it by a type of psychological conditioning known as reinforcement (see Skinner, 1957, and Toates and Slack, 1990: 268–278). Important as this modification was, it is Skinner’s insistence on a strict empiricist epistemology, and his claim that language is learned in just the same way as any other complex skill is learned, by social interaction, that is important to this book. In sharp contrast to the behaviourists and their rejection of “mentalistic” formulations is the rationalist approach to linguistics championed by Chomsky. Chomsky (in 1959 and subsequently, see below), argued that it is the similarities among languages, what they have in common, that is important, not their differences. In order to study these similarities we must allow the existence of unobservable mental structures and propose a theory of the acquisition of a certain type of knowledge. A top-down, rationalist, deductive approach is evident here. This particular conflict was resolved in very dramatic fashion, as we shall see later, but it is important to note three things. First, only very extreme forms of any particular epistemology or research methodology are completely incompatible; the behaviourists’ refusal to entertain any concept of “mind” is a good example, since it represents an extreme form of empiricism. Second,
Research methodology
there are stages in the development of theories, which often start with the accumulation of data and low-level generalisations, and later develop into general causal explanations. Third, there are obvious reasons why theories of different phenomena develop in different ways (a cognitive theory, or a theory of physics is likely to be top-down, a theory of the development of certain social customs is more likely to be bottom-up), but there is nothing necessary or inevitable about such a tendency, and nothing to prevent inductive and deductive processes from working together. In SLA research, psycholinguistics attracts a topdown approach, sociolinguistics encourages a more bottom-up methodology. There is no necessary conflict here; as with most modern research programmes, empirical field work can be combined with theoretical speculation. But I have, of course, jumped the gun. In order to appreciate what influenced Watson and Skinner to take such a radical epistemological position, we must return to our brief history of scientific method. In philosophical circles the rationalist arguments of Descartes et al. came under attack in the second half of the eighteenth century from a new movement in philosophy whose members were mostly drawn from the British Isles, and who were known as the empiricists.3 Three of the most influential empiricists of this period were Locke, Mill, and Hume (see Russell 1961: 577–651). In a much more radical, more epistemologically-formulated, statement of Bacon’s views, the British empiricists argued, in complete opposition to Descartes and the Rationalist school, that everything the mind knows comes through the senses. As Hume put it: “The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions” (Hume, 1988 [1748]: 145). One of the conclusions Hume came to, the one that was so crucially to affect the development of research methodology, was that the elementary principles of scientific method were not justified, since predictions about the unobserved behaviour of objects could never be proved to be true or even probable. Starting from the premise that only “experience” (by which Hume meant that which we perceive through our senses) can help us to judge the truth or falsity of factual sentences, Hume argued that if we want to understand something, we must observe the relevant quantitative, measurable data in a dispassionate way. This is familiar territory — Bacon again, we might say — but the argument continues in a way that has dire consequences for rationalism. If, as Hume insists, knowledge rests entirely on observation, then there is no basis for our belief in natural laws: we believe in laws and regularities but this is only because of repetition, it is not rational. We believe the sun will rise tomorrow because it has repeatedly done so every 24 hours, but it is not rational
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to do so: it is an unwarranted inductive inference. As Hume so brilliantly pointed out, we cannot logically go from the particular to the general: no amount of cumulative instances can justify a generalisation. No matter how many times the sun rises in the East, or thunder follows lightening, or swans appear white, we will never know that the sun rises in the East, or that thunder follows lightning or that all swans are white. This is the famous “logical problem of induction”. Popper distinguishes between the logical problem and the consequent psychological problem: Why, nevertheless, do all reasonable people expect, and believe that instances of which they have no experience will conform to those of which they have experience?” Hume’s answer is: ‘Because of custom or habit’. (Popper, 1972: 4)
More devastating still was Hume’s answer to Descartes’ original question “How can I know whether my perceptions of the world accurately reflect reality?” Hume’s answer was “You can’t.” It is a question of fact whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external objects resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as all questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be, entirely silent. The mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any experience of their connection with objects. The supposition of such a connection is, therefore, without any foundation in reasoning. (Hume, 1988 [1748]: 253)
Thus, said Hume, Descartes was right to doubt his experiences, but, alas, experiences are all we have. Hume regarded this discovery about the limits of inductive reasoning as little more than an interesting puzzle; he never questioned that scientific laws and theories were useful, informative, the most reliable source of knowledge available, even; but he insisted that, to the extent that they told us about unobserved objects, they could not be known to be true on the basis of reason and experience. In contrast to Hume, others who became aware of the problem of induction later chose to pursue the argument, and to develop different varieties of relativism. Taken to its limit, Hume’s argument can easily lead to full-blown scepticism. If induction is in principle illogical, and if we cannot know the world directly, then no knowledge is objective: only historical accident, whim, social conventions, etc., decide what counts as an explanation and which theories gain acceptance.
Research methodology
2.3 Positivists Positivism refers to a particular form of empiricism, and the positivists were always, throughout the long history of the positivist movements, primarily concerned with the issue of reliable knowledge. Positivists were particularly concerned with Hume’s work on the limitations of empirical knowledge, and they saw their job as defending objective knowledge by establishing a reliable epistemological base. In his typically strict and unintentionally amusing style, Russell says: It is therefore important to discover whether there is any answer to Hume within a philosophy that is wholly or mainly empirical. If not, there is no intellectual difference between sanity and insanity. The lunatic who believes that he is a poached egg is to be condemned solely on the grounds that he is in a minority. (Russell, 1961: 698)
The third wave of positivists continued the job of cleaning up science, and argued that true science could only be achieved by: 1. Completely abandoning metaphysical speculation and any form of theology. According to the positivists such speculation only proposed and attempted to solve “pseudo-problems” which lacked any meaning since they were not supported by observable, measurable, experimental data. 2. Concentrating exclusively on the simple ordering of experimental data according to rules. By so doing, science would eventually dominate the world of experience: it was only a matter of time before all the secrets of this world were revealed and became “an open book” to the patient scientist. This implies that scientists should not speak of causes: there is no physical necessity forcing events to happen and all we have in the world are regularities between types of events. Furthermore, the positivists rejected the existence of, and thus any role for, unobservable or theoretical entities. This epistemology makes positivist science the only valid knowledge, to the exclusion of any other type of “understanding”. Apart from establishing a strict demarcation line between positivist science and everything else, the positivists shared the underlying pretension of achieving some kind of global unification of the sciences. Such a programme is obviously tremendously ambitious, and, many would say, equally arrogant. The approach was, to a large extent, a reaction to the Aristotelian approach in the middle ages, and more recently, it was against the idealism of Hegel and Heidegger. It represents, in my humble opinion, the biggest wrong turn philosophy ever took.
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Positivism represents a radical form of the “generalised description” approach to theory construction: it is totally opposed to causal “explanations”, and to most forms of philosophical argument. I choose an almost random anecdote to serve as an example of the positivist attitude. Einstein remarks in his autobiography (1979: 168) that he was very struck by the “dogmatic faith” that Mach had in positivism, and that, in his opinion, the worst thing about Mach’s approach, as a faithful positivist, was the belief that science consisted in the mere ordering of empirical data, and the denial that imagination or creativity had any place. For the positivists, science is a question of discovery, that is, of uncovering information, not of invention. Again, I have jumped the gun. The Vienna circle, which met in Vienna and elsewhere in the mid 1920s, represented the third wave of positivism. Comte is usually taken as the leader of the first wave, and invented the term. Comte argued that each branch of knowledge passes through “three different theoretical states: the theological or fictitious state; the metaphysical or abstract state; and, lastly, the scientific or positive state” (Comte, 1830, cited in Ryan, 1970: 36). At the theological stage, the will of God explains phenomena, at the metaphysical stage phenomena are explained by appealing to abstract philosophical categories, and at the scientific stage, any attempt at absolute explanations of causes is abandoned. Science focuses on how observational phenomena are related, and any generalisations are subjected to empirical verification. Mach, the Austrian philosopher and physicist, headed the second wave, which rooted out the “contradictory” religious elements in Comte’s work, and took advantage of the further progress made in the hard sciences to insist on purging all metaphysics from the scientific method (see Passmore, 1968: 320–321). There is, interestingly, a fifty-year gap between each of these three phases of positivism: like a bad penny, it kept coming back. In the social sciences, biology, psychology and linguistics, it continued to have a powerful influence on research methodology right up until the nineteen sixties. The development of behaviourism was inspired by positivist ideology, by the desire to rid psychology of speculative thought and to put it on a sound “scientific” footing, and the predominant tendency for linguistics at this time to eschew “mentalist” models also has its roots in positivism. The objective of the members of the Vienna Circle was to continue the work of their predecessors by giving empiricism a more rigorous formulation through the use of recent developments in mathematics and logic. The Vienna circle, which comprised Schlick,4 Carnap, Godel, and others, and had Russell, Whitehead and Wittgenstein,5 as interested parties (see Passmore, 1968: 367–368, and
Research methodology
Hacking, 1983: 42–44), developed a programme labelled Logical Positivism, which consisted first of cleaning up language so as to get rid of paradoxes,6 and then limiting science to strictly empirical statements: in the grand tradition of positivism they pledged to get rid of all speculations on “pseudo problems” and concentrate exclusively on empirical data. Ideas were to be seen as “designations”, terms or concepts, that were formulated in words that needed to be carefully defined in order that they be meaningful, rather than meaningless. The logical positivists are particularly well-known for their attempt to answer Hume’s criticism of induction through Probability Theory, which, crudely, proposed that while a finite number of confirming instances of a theory could not prove it, the more numerous the confirming instances, the more probability there was that the theory was true.
2.4 Popper Popper insisted that the Vienna circle had not answered Hume’s criticism and, what was more, probability theory quite simply did not work. There is no logical way of going from the particular to the general, and that is that: however probable a theory might claim to be, it can never be claimed to be true. Popper (1959, 1963, 1972) argued that the root of the problem of induction was the concern with certainty. In Popper’s opinion Descartes’ quest was misguided and had led to three hundred years of skewed debate. Popper claimed that the debate between the rationalists and the empiricists, with the idealists pitching in on either side, had led everybody on a wild goose chase — the elusive wild goose being “Truth”. From an interest in the status of human knowledge, philosophers and philosophers of science had asked which, if any, of our beliefs can be justified. The quest was for certainty, to vanquish doubt, and to impose reason. Popper suggested that rather than look for certainty, we should look for answers to problems, answers that stand up to rational scrutiny and empirical tests. Popper insists that in scientific investigation we start with problems, not with empirical observations, and that we then leap to a solution of the problem we have identified — in any way we like. This second anarchic stage is crucial to an understanding of Popper’s epistemology: when we are at the stage of coming up with explanations, with theories or hypotheses, then, in a very real sense, anything goes. Inspiration can come from lowering yourself into a bath of water, being hit on the head by an apple, or by imbibing narcotics. It is at the
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next stage of the theory-building process that empirical observation comes in, and, according to Popper, its role is not to provide data that confirm the theory, but rather to find data that test it. Empirical observations should be carried out in attempts to falsify the theory: we should search high and low for a non-white swan, for an example of the sun rising in the West, etc. The implication is that, at this crucial stage in theory construction, the theory has to be formulated in such a way as to allow for empirical tests to be carried out: there must be, at least in principle, some empirical observation that could clash with the explanations and predictions that the theory offers. If the theory survives repeated attempts to falsify it, then we can hold on to it tentatively, but we will never know for certain that it is true. The bolder the theory (i.e. the more it exposes itself to testing, the more wide-ranging its consequences, the riskier it is) the better. If the theory does not stand up to the tests, if it is falsified, then we need to re-define the problem, come up with an improved solution, a better theory, and then test it again to see if it stands up to empirical tests more successfully. These successive cycles are an indication of the growth of knowledge. Popper (1974: 105–106) gives the following diagram to explain his view: P1 Æ TT Æ EE Æ P2 P = problem TT = tentative theory EE = Error Elimination (empirical experiments to test the theory) We begin with a problem (P1), which we should articulate as well as possible. We then propose a tentative theory (TT), that tries to explain the problem. We can arrive at this theory in any way we choose, but we must formulate it in such a way that it leaves itself open to empirical tests. The empirical tests and experiments (EE) that we devise for the theory have the aim of trying to falsify it. These experiments usually generate further problems (P2) because they contradict other experimental findings, or they clash with the theory’s predictions, or they cause us to widen our questions. The new problems give rise to a new tentative theory and the need for more empirical testing. Popper thus gives empirical experiments and observation a completely different role: their job now is to test a theory, not to prove it, and since this is a deductive approach it escapes the problem of induction. Popper takes advantage of the asymmetry between verification and falsification: while no number of empirical observations can ever prove a theory is true, just one such
Research methodology
observation can prove that it is false. All you need is to find one black swan and the theory “All swans are white” is disproved. Falsifiability, said Popper, is the hallmark of a scientific theory, and allows us to make a demarcation line between science and non-science: if a theory does not make predictions that can be falsified, it is not scientific. According to such a demarcation, astronomy is scientific and astrology is not, since although there are millions of examples of true predictions made by astrologers, astrologers do not allow that false predictions constitute a challenge to their theory. It is important to note the fundamental differences that exist between Popper’s account of scientific method and that of the empiricists. In particular, Popper argues that good theories, good conjectures, will often be highly improbable in terms of current knowledge; he turns probability theory on its head. Rather than supporting the slow, careful, cautious, step-by-step approach favoured by Bacon and the inductivists, with their assumption that such caution is the best guarantee of arriving at the truth, Popper encourages scientists to make bold counter-intuitive conjectures which have little to do with things that have already been observed. Popper says that the inductive approach leads to theories that are safe (in terms of their fit with present knowledge), but uninformative. Having suggested a solution to the problem of induction, and, in the process, giving us his famous demarcation criterion between science and pseudo-science, Popper went on to apply his idea of falsification to the social sciences, politics, and ethics. In The Open Society and Its Enemies (1980),7 and the much earlier The Poverty of Historicism (1965)8 Popper attacked what he called “holistic thinking”, the grand plans of Marx for example, which claimed to have discovered the truth, and Popper argued that the best way to improve society was through “piecemeal social engineering”, which tackled specific, well-defined, and successive social problems. There are extremely serious shortcomings in Popper’s treatment of politics and the social sciences; claims by his followers that they provide powerful support for a rational, scientific approach to research in the so-called behavioural sciences are, I believe, unjustified. More successful, in my opinion, were Popper’s attempts to apply the asymmetry between verification and falsification to ethics. Popper suggested that in ethics, rather than trying to agree on what is morally right, we should tackle the much easier job of agreeing on what is wrong. While there is an infinite variety of opinions on what is morally right and good, there tends to be a far greater consensus about what is morally wrong and bad: most people would agree that torture, racism, religious intolerance, starvation, and cruelty to animals are wrong, for example.9
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Popper claimed that his research methodology, and the epistemology that informs it, is rationalist because it insists that we arrive at knowledge of the world, and in particular, that we build scientific theories to explain aspects of our world, by using our minds creatively. However, Popper also argues that we need to test these a priori ideas empirically. Hence, the two central premises of Popper’s argument are: – –
Knowledge advances by trying to solve problems in a rational way. The role of empirical data is to test theories.
At this stage I want to make two points relating to the arguments among SLA researchers about methodology, outlined in Chapter 1. First, “Positivism” in general, and as expounded in the writings of the Vienna Circle in particular, is, in my opinion, a good example of philosophers stubbornly marching up a blind alley. It is a fundamentally mistaken project as Popper has, I believe, shown, and as Wittgenstein himself recognised in his later work (see Wittgenstein, 1953). Those critics of mainstream SLA research who label their opponents “positivists”, or who argue against “positivist science”, are either ignorant of the history of positivism or are making a strawman case which no present-day researcher in the field of SLA adopting a rationalist position need defend. Second, empiricism as an epistemological system, if taken to its extreme, leads to radical scepticism and solipsism. The relativist critics of “scientific” SLA research who accuse their opponents of being “empiricists” are mistaking an outmoded and erroneous epistemological argument with an essential tool in a rationalist methodology. It is one thing to argue that there can be no such thing as mental states, and quite another thing to argue that theories need at least some theoretical content and to be tested by appeal to empirical observations. Let it be clear then that: 1. Positivism was not, and is not, a good way to characterise the rational development of research programmes and theories in science or in any other area of academic research. Postmodernists and other relativists who attack rationalists by calling them positivists, or by accusing them of adopting a “positivist” attitude to science, are mistaken. 2. Empiricism as an epistemological argument, if taken to its extreme, leads to radical scepticism. A clear distinction must be made between such an extreme philosophical position, and the insistence that theories must have some empirical content and be open to empirical tests. To return to the main argument, while Popper’s arguments seemed to solve
Research methodology
many of the problems about science and the growth of knowledge referred to above, it was his falsifiability criterion, his solution to Hume’s problem of induction, that unwittingly played a key role in promoting the relativist cause, and, even more strangely, in providing ammunition to those supporting a constructivist approach to SLA research.
2.5 Problems with the Falsifiability Criterion There are several problems with Popper’s falsifiability scheme. First, there is the issue of so-called confirmation of theories by data and experimental results. Popper notwithstanding, most scientists continue to believe that if a theory survives some well-constructed tests in risky circumstances, then it has been at least partially confirmed, and it is therefore more likely to be true. There are also philosophers of science who argue that purely deductive arguments will never provide causal explanations, and that some kind of inductive process is involved. Perhaps the best summary of these arguments is to be found in O’Hear (1989). Popper always refused to countenance either confirmation or probability, and believed that Hume’s answer to the problem of induction was right. While Popper’s critics complained that if we rely solely on deductive logic then we have no reason to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow, Popper replied that of course we can believe it, but we do not know that it is true. As long as we accept that it is a theory, and regard the fact that the sun rose yesterday as evidence that the theory has survived a test, then we are rationally entitled to go on believing the theory. There are, nevertheless, serious problems in insisting on the falsifiability criterion and denying the claims of probability and of supportive evidence in general. First, generalised statements can be proved. We can prove that existential generalisations, like “There are at least five kinds of vitamins”, or “bacteria exist”, are true. Furthermore, scientists do, in practice, rely on probability and they also regard replication studies that give the same results as the original tests as confirming evidence. But this is of little importance compared to the really important issue of what scientists accept as falsification. The second problem, then, is to do with falsification. In order to test a theory it is necessary to give a concrete example of the generalisation the theory makes. O’Hear (1989) gives the example of Newton’s Third Law: for every applied force, there is an equal and opposite reaction. This general statement needs to be applied to a concrete situation.
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if two spring balances are hooked together and pulled, we will be able to predict that the one will register the same force as the other. If the force registered by the second was not equal to the force registered by the first, we would then appear to have a disconfirmation of Newton’s Third Law. The first point to notice is that a general theory needs to be combined with some relevant particular observation statement before any prediction is yielded. Further, the actual effect will also have to be observed and recorded in another observation statement before there is an falsification of the theory. The significance of this role of observation statements in the actual testing and falsifying of a universal theory is that it is always possible to deflect criticism of a theory by questioning the truth of one or other of the observation statements involved in the testing. (O’Hear, 1989: 60–61)
Any big theory is a cluster of hypotheses, observational data, and measurement instruments, and one cannot know, so the argument goes, what accounts for the theory failing any particular test: perhaps it is the observation (which is fallible), perhaps it is the instruments, perhaps it is another part of the theory, perhaps it is the theory itself. Attempts to falsify a theory usually depend on isolating one element of it, assuming that the test is a genuine replication of the original experiment, and assuming that “everything else remains equal”. These objections can be brought together under the general argument that all observation is “theory-laden”, and hence that falsification is as problematic as confirmation. The argument needs to be expanded a little, in order to make the relativists’ point of view clearer. We can consider three related points. First, it is argued that our experience sometimes changes dramatically even though the perceptual stimulus remains the same. From this it follows that such changes are dependent on interpreting the stimulus theoretically. The duckrabbit drawing in Figure 3 is an example.
Figure 3.The duck-rabbit drawing. From Couvalis, 1997: 12.
Research methodology
Most people can easily switch from seeing the duck to the rabbit, that is, they can decide what they want to see. Similarly, the Müller-Lyer illusion in Figure 4 is claimed to show that sometimes the way something looks does not reflect how it really is (the lines are of the same length), and it is argued that the best explanation for this phenomenon is that theories permeate experience.
Figure 4.The Müller-Lyer illusion. From Couvalis, 1997: 12.
Following this argument, Hanson (1958) claimed that Copernicus and Ptolemy had completely different experiences when they watched the sunrise. Because Copernicus believed that the horizon falls, he experienced the horizon falling, while Ptolemy’s experience, because of his beliefs, was of the sun rising. If Hanson is right, then there is no way to test a theory objectively since the observations designed to test it are contaminated by the theory itself. A related issue is the claim that observation is always directed by theory. Popper argued that science should be characterised not as the gathering of random observations, but as the process whereby we look for data that challenge our theories, our expectations: one does not, indeed one cannot, simply observe. This argument has been taken by some (Hanson, 1958, Kuhn, 1962, Feyerabend, 1975) to show that scientists are biased in a way that undermines objectivity; if we only notice things which either fit or conflict with our expectations, then there is always the possibility that we may miss vital evidence. Finally, it is claimed that all statements about what we observe are theoretical. Feyerabend (see below) is well-known for his eloquent writings on the subject. Couvalis neatly summarises the argument. How something looks in experience does not in any way determine the meaning of terms which correctly describe it. If experience does not determine the meaning of the terms which describe what is being experienced, there is no necessary connection between the experience of something and a true description of what is being experienced. Thus, no statement about what we are observing logically follows from how a thing looks in experience. (Couvalis, 1997: 26)
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It seems, then, that in order for us to be able to falsify hypotheses, we need to assume that our senses provide us with objective facts about the world around us. It turns out, however, that human perceptions are permeated by theories, that theories direct our observations in a biased way, telling us which observations are significant, and that all statements about what we observe are theoretical and cannot be derived from our experience. Human observers are subjective, influenced by their cultural and theoretical background, and thus scientific theories are relative to the people who make them, to their theoretical assumptions, and to their cultures. There is another problem with falsification known as “underdetermination”, often referred to as the Duhem Quine thesis. This asserts that any theory can be reconciled with any evidence, or more formally, that since the set of all experimental data is finite, and since any powerful theory contains a potentially infinite number of predictions (Chomsky’s theory of parameter settings describes not only how children acquire a particular language, but how future children might acquire any new language that might emerge), there are indefinitely many mutually contrary theories that can logically entail the evidence. As Quine said: Any finite number of observations can logically support an infinite number of theories. (Quine, 1953: 20)
And even more radically: One may hold onto any theory whatever in the face of any evidence whatever. (Quine, 1953: 27)
While the first of Quine’s two statements quoted here is trivially true, the second is, on the face of it, extraordinary. It depends, of course, on what Quine means by “may”. If Quine is merely asserting that human beings are capable of believing anything, then the statement loses interest, but if he is asserting that it is equally rational to hold on to any theory whatsoever in the face of any evidence whatsoever, then the claim is that deductive reasoning is no better than inductive reasoning. The most convincing argument that Quine gives in support of this assertion is that any theory which seems to be contradicted by a particular empirical finding can be rescued by making adjustments in our auxiliary theories. This is a development of the “theory-ladenness of observation” argument. When a theory fails a test, what fails is the whole theory and all the theoretical assumptions that surround it — which Quine called “a web of belief”. Thus, empirical evidence can only falsify a “block of theory as a whole”,
Research methodology
it can never tell us where precisely the problem lies, and we can always rescue the theory by making suitable adjustments to other assumptions. The third, and perhaps the most commonly, cited argument against falsification is that many of the most powerful theories in the history of science would never have survived infancy if the falsification criterion had been applied. Even the recognised king of quantifiable science, physics, progressed because the pioneers involved chose to ignore damning evidence. Newton’s theory of gravity was falsified by observations of the moon’s orbit, and Newtonian mechanics was falsified by the observed orbit of the planet Mercury. Bohr’s theory of the atom conflicted with observation, as did Maxwell’s kinetic theory of gases and Copernican physics (see Asimov, 1975a). It is argued that Popper’s falsifiability criterion is far too strict, and that, at best, it tries to prescribe how scientists should go about research and theory construction, while failing to take much account of how in fact historically scientists behaved. There is finally, despite all Popper’s claims to have solved the problem of induction, the argument that there is no escape from the problem if one wants to claim that there is progress in science. How do we know that one theory has more verisimilitude, or “truth content”, than another? Theory comparison depends, often crucially, on the degree of corroboration, or on how well each theory has stood up to severe tests, i.e. it depends on induction.
2.6 Kuhn The criticisms outlined above of Popper’s falsification criterion culminated in Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962),10 which has probably done more than any other publication to encourage the relativists’ cause. The essence of Kuhn’s argument is that most scientific activity takes place under the domination of a theory, or a very limited cluster of theories, which define the domain of research in a particular area, the procedures researchers should follow in their experiments, and the criteria by which they test and evaluate the theory. Kuhn labels this dominant theory, and the set of assumptions it generates, a “paradigm”, and he refers to those periods of time where a paradigm dominates as “normal science”. But, Kuhn argues, there are also periods when science enters into a revolutionary period, and there is then a “paradigm shift”. One clear example in the twentieth century is when relativity theory and quantum mechanics replaced Newtonian physics to become the new paradigm. In revolutionary moments the research methodology of scientists is
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very different from that of “normal science”: it is chaotic, contradictory and fragmentary, but on the other hand these are often very exciting times to live in. Sooner or later, however, the new paradigm is established, and scientists go back to their work, which is more mundane perhaps, but usually more productive. Kuhn describes three stages in the development of scientific theories. The first stage is the pre-paradigm stage, when there is no agreement among those working in the field about essential, fundamental issues of theory, and a general avoidance of theory-building in favour of more or less random, uninformed gathering of data, which is carried out without any general agreement about procedures. This stage is unlikely to produce any good results; a great deal of time and energy is spent on arguments about fundamental issues, and most of the data-gathering will fail to solve important problems, or even accumulate new facts. This strikes some as a fairly accurate portrait of the current state of affairs in the SLA community.11 In the second stage, normal science, a majority of those working in a particular field agree that a certain type of theoretical approach, and the assumptions underlying it, should serve as a model for their research. In this period the common assumptions of those involved and agreement about the ways of doing research mean that the work of that scientific community is dominated by a paradigm. Using similar procedures, and leaving the basic assumptions of the paradigm unquestioned, scientists solve more and more problems, factual knowledge expands and becomes better-defined, and technological innovations abound.12 Of course, if we are to accept Kuhn’s arguments, the implication that the normal science period is preferable to the pre-science period is an illusion (see the next chapter, and the following section on Feyerabend). Sooner or later, however, the theoretical framework runs into trouble: predictions are contradicted, problems emerge which cannot be explained, what Kuhn calls “anomalies” emerge, and multiply. As more and more scientists take these failures more and more seriously, that area of science enters into a crisis and subsequently into the third stage of theory development: a scientific revolution. This period ends when the crisis is resolved and a new paradigm emerges to replace the old one. In the United States the shift in the 1950s from the type of linguistics exemplified by Bloomfield and briefly mentioned above, to the Chomskian approach to linguistics that will be discussed below, is one of the most dramatic examples of a paradigm shift in the last sixty years. Not surprisingly, this shift had a great impact on the development of SLA research. Kuhn mixed a historical analysis with an epistemological one, and, while it is part of Kuhn’s argument that the two are mutually dependent, it is important
Research methodology
to be aware of the two strands. Kuhn argued that Popper was prescribing what scientists should do, and ignoring what in fact they actually did. While, said Kuhn, Popper was right to criticise the Vienna circle (right, that is, to say that scientists were not in the business of simply observing things), he was wrong to say that they tried to refute theories. What scientists do, according to Kuhn, depends on the historical moment. In periods of normal science, they work in a more or less inductive way, using empirically-based studies, experiments and tests, looking for confirmation of the dominant theory, seeking to expand its reach, repairing problems that experiments turn up, etc. In revolutionary periods scientists work in confusion, often swayed in their choice between those rival theories fighting for paradigm status by totally irrational considerations, and rarely, if ever, following the methodology proposed by Popper. During a period of scientific revolution there is typically a conservative group who try to stick to the old paradigm, often because, having used it for a long time, they are comfortable with it, and a rebel group, often much younger, whose thinking has not been moulded by the old paradigm. Again, one is strongly reminded of the current dispute going on in SLA research, and it is hardly surprising that the “rebels” see themselves as progressive, or that they should emphasise the political nature of the conflict. But the crucial consideration for Kuhn, and the key argument for the relativist camp in SLA and elsewhere, is that this conflict cannot be rationally resolved: the claim is that the old guard will just die out and fail to attract new adherents. In Kuhn’s opinion, the process by which the new paradigm is established is irrational. Unlike Popper, who sees a cyclical development in the history of science and is convinced that this ensures progress, Kuhn says that the new paradigm is established in a completely open-ended way that has nothing to do with rational choice or with a respect for, or even awareness of, progress. There can be, says Kuhn, in the periods of paradigm shifts, no rational reasons for preferring one theory over another. As Kuhn puts it: “There is no higher standard than the assent of the relevant community” (Kuhn, 1962: 98). Hence, Popper notwithstanding, there is no continuity, and no progress in science. Kuhn’s account of the development of science culminates in his notion of the incommensurability of theories which are formulated under the umbrella of different paradigms. Theories formulated under the new paradigm are so different from the older theories that there is no justification for saying that the new theories follow on from their predecessors. Different paradigms are not, according to Kuhn, commensurate — Newtonian physics is not commensurate with Einstein’s Relativity theory, for example. When Newton and Einstein speak
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of matter, energy, time, etc., they are speaking about different things, and thus there is no rational way of choosing between them. The suggestion is that the researcher’s observations, experiments and tests on so-called empirical data are crucially affected by the theories they believe in, that is, most of the time, by the paradigm theory. Kuhn gives the example of chemists’ acceptance of Dalton’s atomic theory, which at first was in conflict with some experimental results. Not only did they ignore the negative evidence, they reported chemical compositions in different ways (as ratios of integers rather than as decimals) and, in Kuhn’s words “beat nature into line… The data itself had been changed, and the chemists were now working in a different world.” (Kuhn, 1962: 135) It should be emphasised that with Kuhn we enter into a different area of debate about rationality and scientific method. Kuhn wants to shift, if I may use the term, the discussion so as to talk about the history of science, to describe how scientists behave and to assess the rationality of their actions. The claim is thus that if we can show the history of science to be a succession of irrational, socially-determined decisions, we can undermine the rationalist case. This is, in my view, a non sequitur, a false claim, which we will examine when the time comes to defend a rationalist approach. Meanwhile we can note the enormous influence that this approach has had. In a recent search I did on the Internet, using the search engine Google, a search for “Kuhn and paradigm shift” produced links to well over 20,000 sites. Kuhn’s ideas are now discussed in hundreds of MA programmes in applied linguistics, and have been taken by many as damning evidence against “modernist science” in general and claims for a scientific SLA research programme in particular. 2.7 Feyerabend Feyerabend is best known for his provocative statement: All methodologies have their limitations and the only “rule” that survives is “anything goes”. (Feyerabend 1975: 296)
The claims by scientists that they pursue research according to a rationalist methodology where empirical observation and testing play fundamental roles, receive perhaps their most extreme criticism in Feyerabend’s Against Method (1975), in which he argues that a close examination of the history of physics shows that science is not the careful, rational endeavour it is made out to be, but rather, an erratic series of blundering steps involving politics, bribery, lying, cheating, blackmail, and even murder.
Research methodology
Feyerabend argues that there are no rules, such as those proposed by the positivists, or even any more moderate rules, such as “reject theories which are contradicted by generally accepted empirical data”, that can be laid down to guide scientists in their work. Indeed, Feyerabend says, it is both “unrealistic” and “pernicious” to attempt to do so. Feyerabend takes Kuhn’s arguments about the incommensurability of different theories to the limit, and argues that so-called scientific progress is no more than a conversion from one myth to another. Although, says Feyerabend, in Western society science has reached almost idolatry status, scientists have no right to suppose that their research gives rise to knowledge which is in some way superior to others. Feyerabend makes great play of his anarchist beliefs, and insists on locating scientific research in its historical and socio-political context. He urges scientists to throw off methodological constraints, academic ideology, etc., to see science as just one kind of historical knowledge, no better than myths or fairy tales, and to exercise their freedom. While there is no doubt that Feyerabend was a harsh critic of Popper, it is no less true that he often defended a very Popperian approach. One example of this is his challenge to Kuhn’s claim that normal science is necessary for progress, which, as Feyerabend points out, contradicts Kuhn’s general argument that there can be no such thing as progress. Feyerabend argues that to encourage the establishment and perpetuation of a paradigm is not just contradictory but downright authoritarian and reactionary: Kuhn is encouraging conformity, and suggesting that in order to maximise results, scientists should accept assumptions uncritically and bow to the paradigm. Feyerabend suggests instead, in true Popperian style, that all scientists should be encouraged to constantly develop theories which challenge the widely-accepted theory, and that it is wrong to wait for a crisis before developing a new kind of theory under a different paradigm. It is difficult to exaggerate the difference between Feyerabend’s underlying commitment to rationality and the effect that his dadaistic attitude had on his contemporaries and on future developments in the philosophy of science. It is, for me, even more difficult to give any credence to those relativists in the field of SLA research who adopt Feyerabend as their ally.13
2.8 Lakatos Imre Lakatos, who worked with Popper for years, and who became a close friend of Feyerabend’s during the latter’s stay at the LSE in the mid 1960s, tried to rescue
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Popper from his critics. Lakatos accepted that there were many problems with Popper’s Falsifiability criterion, including the already mentioned one that if it is allowed that a theory is refuted by a single instance of empirical data, then no theory would survive. In the history of science all major theories have been refuted time and time again (in the sense that they have contradicted the evidence of the day), especially in their early stages. The extreme version of the falsifiability criterion, where one instance of negative data is enough to refute a theory, has become known as “naive falsifications” and is now generally rejected. In a series of steps (Lakatos and Musgrave 1970, Lakatos, 1978a, 1978b), Lakatos proposed a “theory of research programmes” which tried to “amend the falsificationist definition of science”, and specifically to address the problem of theory choice: given two rival theories, is there any rational way of choosing between them? Lakatos suggested that Popper’s theory should be amended by shifting the problem of appraising theories to the problem of appraising historical series of theories, or rather ‘research programmes’, and by changing the falsificationist rules of theory rejection. (Lakatos, 1978a: 318)
The difference between a theory and a research programme is that a research programme is more extensive: it consists of a hard core theory, a group of auxiliary theories and assumptions, and some agreed procedures or techniques for solving problems. At the heart of Lakatos’ proposal was the idea of two different “heuristics” working inside the same programme: a Negative heuristic which essentially called on researchers not to attack the hard core theory, and a Positive heuristic which encouraged improvements to be made in the auxiliary hypotheses, which Lakatos sometimes referred to as “the refutable protective belt”. Ad hoc hypotheses were not allowed. The research programme thus involved working on “the belt”, and leaving the core assumptions alone: you opt out of the programme if you attack the hard core. Lakatos claimed that this solved the problem of identifying the part of the theory that is responsible for the falsification (since it cannot be in the hard core), and at the same time, allowed for choice among rival theories: bold new hypotheses on the belt can be subjected to tests, and the better theories will be those that survive such tests. The essential criterion for assessing rival programmes is progress: the more progressive programme is better. If the modifications to the auxiliary assumptions result in new predictions, and if the predictions of novel facts are corroborated, then the programme is progressive. On the other hand, a research programme is considered to be degenerating (as opposed to progressing) if those working on it do no more than add untestable ad hoc
Research methodology
auxiliary assumptions in order to save its core, and that these merely account for already known facts. When a stage is reached where one research programme is degenerate, and another is making good progress, then the degenerate programme must be jettisoned. Lakatos’ Research Programme is very Popperian — there is progress through successive refutations of competing theories which gradually make the whole theory, including its hard core, more coherent, more powerful, more open to testing, able to predict more, able to explain more. And Lakatos says that his theory, his methodology of science, itself is testable — by looking at the history of science. There is also a recognition of the social dimension of science (Lakatos is trying to defend the rationality of the history of science, not rationality itself, nor any scientific method per se), and thus Lakatos can justifiably claim to have been a precursor to Kuhn, rather than simply, as he is sometimes described, an apologist for Popper, trying to fix the problems raised by Kuhn and Feyerabend. For all its merits, Lakatos’ research programme does not actually address the issues in a satisfactory way. We are asked to take the hard core on trust, and only to judge the rationality of the research programme in general. Feyerabend (1978) points out that since Lakatos does not actually specify the conditions under which a research programme has been falsified, because he is aware of the need to protect programmes from being prematurely dismissed, a scientist could work on a voodoo research programme full of ad hoc hypotheses, with no novel predictions to its credit, on the grounds that the programme needs time to develop. Furthermore, Lakatos does not provide any details concerning ways to measure degeneracy, or to locate the point at which degeneracy can prove fatal to a research programme. As a result, Lakatos offers no rational way of choosing between two rival theories, except in hindsight.14
2.9 Laudan Laudan (1977, 1990, 1996) accepts that Popper’s falsification criterion cannot be strictly applied, and attempts to improve on the work of Lakatos by suggesting, firstly, that science is to do with problem-solving, and secondly, that it makes progress by evolving research traditions. The main features of research traditions are: 1. Every research tradition has a number of specific theories which exemplify and partially constitute it; some of these theories will be contemporaneous, others will be temporal successors of earlier ones;
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2. Every research tradition exhibits certain metaphysical and methodological commitments which, as an ensemble, individuate the research tradition and distinguish it from others; 3. Each research tradition (unlike a specific theory) goes through a number of different, detailed (and often mutually contradictory) formulations and generally has a long history extending through a significant period of time. (By contrast, theories are frequently short-lived.) (Laudan, 1977: 78–79)
Laudan, like Lakatos, attempts to provide guidelines for researchers, and puts limits on the type of theories that the tradition should contain (its allowed ontology), and on what experimental methods are acceptable. Laudan gives the example of the geological research tradition of “Uniformitarianism”. Geologists in this tradition believed that processes of the Earth were cyclical, alternatively building up and wearing down surface features. On average, the Earth’s geology is said to be uniform over long periods. The ontology of Uniformitarianism is the presently observable causes of geological phenomena (e.g., erosion, weathering, uplift and folding) which give rise to all geological processes, such as mountain building and canyon formation. The methodology is to apply these same causes to past situations in order to explain the Earth as it is today, and to explain traces left from past geological eras — fossils, strata, and so on. The methodology was summed up in the motto “the present holds the key to the past”. Researchers working inside this tradition have a framework, but this is to help their theories develop and evolve by the modification of component theories which provide answers to the questions posed by the tradition. The research tradition, like Lakatos’ research programme, is offered as an answer to the problems outlined above about what counts as counter-evidence, but more central is Laudan’s suggestion that the overriding criterion for how rival research traditions can be assessed is their ability to solve problems. This allows Laudan to go beyond Kuhn’s and Lakatos’ stark choice between either accepting or rejecting a theory and to offer a spectrum of possible responses: The logic of acceptance and rejection is simply too restrictive to represent this (historical) range of cognitive attitudes… My view is that this continuum of attitudes between acceptance and rejection can be seen to be functions of the relative problem-solving progress (and rate of progress) of our theories. (Laudan, 1981: 150)
Laudan is obviously continuing the attempts to rescue science from the attacks of relativists like Kuhn, Feyerabend and others, by arguing that the choice among rival theories is rational — in Laudan’s case it is rational to choose the group of theories that most effectively solve the problems they address, and to
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work inside the research tradition which accepts that cluster of theories. But how do we know which theory has the greatest problem-solving adequacy? The overall problem-solving effectiveness of a theory is determined by assessing the number and importance of empirical problems which the theory solved and deducting therefrom the number and importance of the anomalies and conceptual problems which the theory generates. (Laudan, 1977: 68)
In a later work, Laudan (1996) develops his “problem-solving” approach and offers a taxonomy. He suggests, first, that we separate empirical from conceptual problems, and that as far as empirical problems are concerned, we distinguish between “potential problems, solved problems and anomalous problems.” ‘Potential problems’ constitute what we take to be the case about the world, but for which there is as yet no explanation. ‘Solved problems’ are that class of putatively germane claims about the world which have been solved by some viable theory or another. ‘Anomalous problems’ are actual problems which rival theories solve but which are not solved by the theory in question. (Laudan, 1996: 79)
As far as conceptual problems are concerned, Laudan says that such problems arise for a theory, T, 1. when T is internally inconsistent or the theoretical mechanisms it postulates are ambiguous; 2. when T makes assumptions about the world that run counter to other theories…; 3. when T violates principles of the research tradition of which it is part; 4. when T fails to utilise concepts from other, more general theories to which it should be logically subordinate. (Laudan, 1996: 79)
Laudan claims that this “taxonomy” helps in the relative assessment of rival theories, while remaining faithful to the view that many different theories in a given domain might well have different things to offer the research effort. Instead of making “progress parasitic upon rationality”, Laudan argues that it is rational to choose the most progressive research tradition, where “most progressive” means the maximum problem-solving effectiveness. There is no presumption of cumulativity in Laudan’s account: while more problems are being solved more rapidly in the present research tradition than its predecessors, some problems may become “unsolved” by the current tradition. The essential difference between Laudan and Kuhn is that “problem-solving” in Laudan’s sense is taken to be the measure of both progress and rationality,
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while, unlike Lakatos, Laudan dispenses with the criteria of empirical content and the cumulative growth of theories, and downplays the importance of generating novel predictions and avoiding ad hocness. The problem, of course, is how we assess the problem-solving effectiveness of rival research traditions. In the end, we will be forced to compare different theories, and then how does one count the number of empirical problems solved by a theory? For example, is the “problem of the planets” to be counted as one problem or nine? In principle the number of problems could be infinite. And how are we to assign different weightings to theories? Laudan’s inability to suggest how we might go about enumerating the seven types of problems in his taxonomy that are dealt with by any given research tradition (itself not a clearlydefined term), or how these problems might then be weighted, seems a fatal weakness in his account.
2.10 Conclusion This chapter has attempted to lay the foundations for a discussion of theory construction in SLA by looking at the development of theories of modern science and their philosophical underpinnings. We have seen that one of the key factors in this development is the tension between two different approaches to theory construction; what can be referred to as the inductive, “research-thentheory” methodology first championed by Bacon, and the deductive “theorythen-testing” approach more typical of Descartes and the seventeenth century rationalist movement. The inductive method gives prime importance to careful unbiased observation, the separation of “facts” from “value judgements”, the reliance on observable, quantifiable information. This leads to the slow, gradual but cumulative discovery (uncovering) of new facts about our world which in turn allows us to generalise about it. The deductive method stresses that understanding our world comes through theories which are the product of the workings of the human mind on the data that is presented to it. According to this view, theories are bold conjectures, often leap into the unknown, and the role of observation is to serve as confirmation of or counter-evidence against the theory. The deductive, rationalist approach favoured causal explanations — answers to questions about why and how things happen — while the inductive approach gave rise to more descriptive explanations — answers to questions about what and when. And, again, very broadly, while theories of the physical sciences tended towards the deductive approach, theories of the biological
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sciences had a tendency to be more descriptive. This is not, as we saw, entirely accidental: much of the work in the biological sciences was to do with the classification of species, and much of the work of the physical sciences was to do with grand organising principles, like gravitation. Nor, of course can this dichotomy, and the division of sciences and theories into two camps, be seen in any way as an accurate historical account: it simply serves to highlight the differences between theories, and, I hope, will be of use in our forthcoming discussion of theories of SLA, since the tension between “research then theory” and “theory then testing” approaches continues to this day. As was noted, in the history of science, the tension between inductive and deductive methodology did not cause any serious problems. Indeed, even in physics, Bacon’s methodology was widely believed by scientists themselves to very accurately describe how they worked, and to mark them out from others. Empirical observation and experimentation was seen to be at the very heart of the scientific method. It was partly new developments in science, mathematics, and logic that renewed interest among philosophers of science and members of the scientific community in the so-called problem of induction. Hume’s claim that we cannot logically go from the particular to the general, and that therefore no general theory can be rationally held to be true, began to be taken far more seriously than Hume himself took it. The Logical Positivists, as we saw, attempted to rescue empiricism from Humean scepticism, and to put modern mathematics, logic and science onto a firm footing. Far from succeeding, they failed miserably, and it is important to be clear that their programme was both arrogant and misguided: most philosophers and scientists would agree today that while empirical observation is a necessary part of scientific method, empiricism as a philosophical tradition is dead. Popper, in his attempts to confront the shortcomings of the Logical Positivists, offered a solution to the problem of induction through his arguments concerning the asymmetry between proof and falsification: we cannot prove a theory is true, but we can demonstrate that it is false. Thus the deductive method is the true method of science, and the role of observation and experimentation is to test our hypotheses. Crucial here are Popper’s two claims that 1. theories are conjectures: provisional tentative answers to problems we have posed ourselves 2. the role of observation is to look for evidence that challenges our theory.
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Finally we saw that a number of objections were made to Popper’s “falsifiability” model. Some of these objections were to do with the consistency of the argument, some to do with the strictness of the criterion, and some to do with the social behaviour of scientists. The most influential critic was, without doubt, Kuhn, whose arguments concentrated on the way that scientific research is actually conducted. Attempts to answer these objections, notably by Lakatos and Laudan, were not entirely successful. For the moment we have come to the end of this short account of the development of the philosophy of science, and we must now turn to the even more radical attacks that have been made against the so-called scientific method since 1970.
Notes 1.Russell’s account of the history of western philosophy is as idiosyncratic and unreliable as was the man himself. His accounts of those I refer to are, however, in my opinion anyway, succinct and fair. 2.By the beginning of the 20th century, however, the fact, but not the mechanism, of evolution was generally accepted, with disagreement centring on the genetic processes through which it occurs. 3.Popper calls empiricism the “Common Sense” or “Bucket View” of knowledge, and while in fact there is very little common sense involved, in the usual sense of the expression, the bucket metaphor seems entirely apt. Knowledge is collected, sorted, stored, and can be measured in buckets! 4.Schlick was shot dead by one of his doctoral students, a lesson to all academics who deal too harshly with dissenting voices! 5.In his autobiography Russell describes his first encounter with Wittgenstein. The young man paced up and down Russell’s sitting room talking at a furious pace with enormous energy and conviction. Russell remarks, dead pan as usual, “I hardly understood a word he said, but I was convinced he was a genius.” 6.Russell’s visiting card is a famous example: he dropped a card through various houses in Bloomsbury. The card had, instead of the usual name and address on one side, a two-sided message: on one side “The statement on the other side of this card is false”, on the other side “The statement on the other side of this card is true”. This is Russell’s variation of the original problematic statement “This statement is false.” 7.I was at a lecture given by Popper in 1966 when, in reply to a question from a student about why he had so badly misquoted Hegel in this book, Popper described the book as “my contribution to the war effort”, without any hint of irony. It is a most unscholarly work; Popper confessed to never having read Hegel, and his treatment of Marx borders on the
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ridiculous. Its aim was clearly to defend capitalism and “western democracy” against attacks from communism or the left, rather than bettering our understanding of Plato, Hegel, or Marx. It was for many years (and perhaps it still is) required reading for all social science students at the LSE and at thousands of other universities around the world with a similar interest in defending capitalism. 8.Almost as unscholarly as The Open Society and its Enemies, this book is often cited as one of the finest examples of a strawman argument in so-called academic writing. 9.In this field, see W. W. Bartley’s Retreat to commitment (1982) which developed the theory of Comprehensibly Critical Rationalism based on Popper’s ideas, and became part of Popperian cannon. Bartley’s later extension of this work is commented on later in this book. 10.Although Kuhn’s famous book was published in 1962, the sparks really began to fly in 1965, when Kuhn and Popper came face-to-face in a conference in London at Bedford College. I was lucky enough to be there, and remember Kuhn’s lecture as one of the most electric events I have ever witnessed. The LSE team — Popper, Lakatos, Watkins, Gellner, Musgrave, Bartley — sat in the front row and behaved like football supporters watching their side fouled time after time. At one point Lakatos leapt to his feet and yelled “I shall refute you in my next lecture!” 11.Long (1993), among others, thinks that research and theory construction in SLA is in this first stage. 12.This would seem to be the state of affairs that Long (1993, 1997) among others, is aiming for in SLA research, and why Long calls for some culling of SLA theories. It would also seem to describe quite well the research programme inspired by Chomsky in UG-based linguistics. 13.Feyerabend was enormously charismatic and persuasive. As Newton-Smith (1981: 68) says “No more lively or entertaining critique of the scientific method has been provided than that offered by Feyerabend in his Against Method which may well have been called Against Received Opinion.” I was at LSE when Feyerabend gave a series of lectures ostensibly for “freshers” — first year undergraduates like myself — as an introduction to scientific method. People travelled from far and wide to attend these lectures and there were often scuffles to get into the Old Theatre, which was packed an hour before the lectures were scheduled to begin. Feyerabend began his first lecture by using the enormously long blackboard in the Old Theatre to wonderful theatrical effect. He took a piece of chalk and starting at the left-hand side of the blackboard, dragged the chalk along the blackboard making a line. (He had quite a bad limp which made it even more dramatic.) When he got half way across, he stopped and lifted the chalk. Half a centimetre later, he continued the line until he got to the end of the blackboard. Then he strode back to the tiny gap in the line, thumped it and bellowed “THAT is Popper’s contribution to the philosophy of science!” He was equally enthralling when he sat in LSE’s Three Tuns Bar, good-naturedly and passionately arguing about science and politics with anyone who could get a seat at the crowded table. 14.Another problem with Lakatos is that he saw science as physics, and little else. (Feyerabend was quite similar in this respect.) He simply assumed that physics was the model of rational thought and that everything else was inferior, but he never bothered to demonstrate this.
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Chapter 3
Recent relativists
3.1 Introduction However strongly Kuhn, and even Feyerabend, argued against the more traditional epistemological assumptions underlying theory construction in science, there is a strong sense in which they were somehow “within the fold”. As Feyerabend made clear in the Introduction to the 1978 edition of Against Method (and as I have pointed out elsewhere — see Gregg et al., 1997), he was in many ways playing the devil’s advocate; he expected, and hoped, that his friend Lakatos would win the debate, he recognised that scientific research in the last four hundred years had earned a special place in the history of intellectual endeavour, and he never ceased to insist on the need for rigour and clarity in research. Likewise Kuhn, both in his lectures and in his later publications (Kuhn, 1977) expressed his horror at suggestions that he had given any encouragement to those who adopted any radical form of relativism. It is when we come to the proponents of the “Strong Programme” in the sociology of science, and later to those involved in the Postmodernist and Constructivist movements, that we see an unbridgeable gap opening up, and communication breaking down.
3.2 The sociology of science The attempts of Popper’s followers to rescue scientific research from the relativists seemed, ironically, only to have strengthened their case. Despite the attempts of Lakatos, Laudan and others, it was beginning to look as if Feyerabend was right: there is no scientific method, science is a social institution, and thus scientific change is to be explained not in terms of a rationalist, progressive movement, but by the influences of pressure groups, spin doctors, propaganda, the state of the economy, pure chance, personal weakness, and so on.
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In the 1970s many working in the area of the sociology of science, perhaps emboldened by the apparent inability of the rationalists to justify their view of scientific progress, and undoubtedly taking inspiration from the “Strong Programme” developed by Barnes (1974) and Bloor (1976), changed their aim from the established one of analysing the social context in which scientists work to the far more radical, indeed audacious, one of explaining the content of scientific theories themselves. While Merton (1973) had launched the sociology of science as a scientific discipline in the 1930s, attempting to explain the interactions among scientists in communities, Barnes and Bloor, in their separate publications, argued that all systems of belief are equivalent, and “knowledge is whatever men take to be knowledge” (Bloor, 1976).1 Bloor distinguishes between knowledge and belief by reserving the word “knowledge” for “what is collectively endorsed, leaving the individual and idiosyncratic to count as mere belief” (Bloor, 1976: 2–3). Thus, the content of scientific theories is socially determined, and there is no place whatsoever for the philosophy of science and all the epistemological problems that go with it. Since science is a social construction, it is the business of sociology to explain the social, political and ethical factors that determine why different theories are accepted or rejected. The initial development of quantum mechanics is often given as an example of a “socially-determined belief”. Forman (1971, cited in Riggs, 1992) suggested that quantum mechanics can best be understood as the result of the social conditions in post-World War I Germany, which led German public opinion to an anti-intellectual, anti-science stance. Since the principle of causality was an architypical example of the pre-war, now unacceptable, attitudes of scientists (indeed causality was understood by pre-war scientists, and by most today, to be at the very heart of explanation), quantum mechanics, which does not require all physical events to be caused, was adopted as the favoured theory. Thus, according to Forman, one theory superseded another not because it offered a more complete, more powerful, explanation of the phenomena under consideration, but because it suited social conditions. Gross and Levitt (1998) give a more concrete example of the Strong Programme’s sociological approach in action. Sociologist Ferguson explains the paradigm shift in physics which followed Einstein’s publication of his work on relativity as follows: The inner collapse of the bourgeois ego signalled an end to the fixity and systematic structure of the bourgeois cosmos. One privileged point of observation was replaced by a complex interaction of viewpoints.
Recent relativists
The new relativistic viewpoint was not itself a product of scientific “advances”, but was part, rather, of a general cultural and social transformation which expressed itself in a variety of modern movements. It was no longer conceivable that nature could be reconstructed as a logical whole. The incompleteness, indeterminacy, and arbitrariness of the subject now reappeared in the natural world. Nature, that is, like personal existence, makes itself known only in fragmented images. (Ferguson 1990, cited in Gross and Levitt, 1998: 46)
Here, Ferguson, in all apparent seriousness, suggests that Einstein’s relativity theory is to be understood not in terms of the development of a progressively more powerful theory of physics which offers an improved explanation of the phenomena in question, but rather in terms of the evolution of “bourgeois consciousness”. Latour, who with co-author Woolgar, wrote the influential Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific Facts in 1979, carried on the new approach to the sociology of science. Latour, having spent two years working with laboratory scientists at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies, described how the scientists at the Institute went about their work. What the scientists were actually doing, according to Latour, who “saw through” the surface explanations that the scientists themselves offered, could best be seen as the collective construction of facts and theories, according to conventions agreed among themselves. Latour thus unmasked what the deluded members of the Institute, and by extension, scientists everywhere and throughout history, mistakenly understood to be disinterested attempts to explain phenomena by appealing to observations of regularities in a real external world, and revealed theories to be no more than invented myths. Latour went on to argue (Latour, 1985, 1988) that scientists use language to construct a particular kind of discourse which is then, in a typically self-fulfilling way, interpreted as scientific: the use of particular kinds of concepts which are taken as uncontroversial by the scientific community, the use of references, quotations and footnotes, the structuring of scientific articles, all play their part in legitimising the output of scientists and disguising their totally subjective nature. While Latour claimed to be adopting the point of view of a social anthropologist, his argument — that it is by analysing the way scientists use language that we can discover the real “significance” of the “text” — strongly resembles the approach taken by Derrida and other postmodernists, discussed below. Derrida and others take a more overtly philosophical line, and argue for a radical form of relativist epistemology, but they inherit from Latour the view that scientists are engaged in nothing more than the creation of a certain type of specialised myth through the construction of a specialised form of discourse or text.
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These new sociologists were quick to point out that their own work was included in this general characterisation and thus capable of being explained in terms of its own causal social conditions. Having made this forlorn gesture at covering their own backs, the sociologists could argue that any attempt to make a demarcation line between science and non-science, or to claim some special intellectual authority for science, was doomed: everything is relative. The relevance of this programme to those researchers in SLA who challenge the “orthodox” methodology, and who want to give more importance to sociological matters, should be obvious. Science is seen as the arrogant bogeyman, the methodology it recommends takes us away from a proper “understanding” and “appreciation” of ourselves and traps us inside an arid alienated framework. If, as the advocates of the Strong Programme recommend, one does away with objectivity, and if one accepts that a “rational judgement” is an oxymoron, then one is left to get on with the only real job remaining: that of describing social events and uncovering what lies behind the texts which social interaction produces.
3.3 Postmodernism Postmodernism began to make itself felt in the late 1970s, and it has since come to play an increasingly important part in discussions about scientific method and how research should best be done. Both postmodernists and constructivists are playing their part in discussions among those involved in SLA research, as was mentioned in Chapter 1, and it is now time to examine their ideas more closely. With the best will in the world it is difficult to give a fair account of postmodernism and constructivism, since what exactly the terms mean is highly debated, even among the postmodernists and constructivists themselves. The term “post-modern” means “after modernity”, which in turn refers to the “modern project” that began in the 17th Century and is often referred to as The Enlightenment. At the heart of the Enlightenment project was a new paradigm, namely rationalism. Rationality took over from religion as the preferred way of understanding ourselves and the world around us. Modern science claimed to be based on reason, and the spectacular results of the socalled scientific method — the industrial revolution, the harnessing of energy, modern medicine, etc. — were taken as evidence of the tremendous efficacy and power of the rationalist approach. The idea of progress was also central to the rationalist paradigm: the history of science was seen as the story of a
Recent relativists
progressive movement towards better and more complete explanations of ourselves and the world we lived in. In the 1950s, as we saw, the relativists’ argument — that ‘reality’ has no meaning apart from what is believed to be real — began to exert its influence in the new social science departments of western European and American universities. The basic argument was that if you believe something, then it is “real”, and thus scientific knowledge is not powerful because it is true; it is true because it is powerful. The question should not be “What is true?”, but rather “How did this version of what is believed to be true come to dominate in these particular social and historical circumstances?” Truth and knowledge are culturally specific. If we accept this argument, then we have come to the end of the modern project, and we are in a “post-modern” world. As Lois Shawver, the influential postmodernist figure, puts it, “Postmodernism begins with a loss of faith in the dreams of modernism.” She continues: In place of the lost dream of modernism, postmodernism gives us a new vocabulary, a new language game, for helping us notice dimensions of experience that were obscured by the modernist vision. It’s a dynamic language game, with meanings evolving and changing. And when you are within this language people may well say things that you will want to challenge. Being post-modern is not endorsing a dogma. It is just a new language game, but it is a powerful language game that calls attention to dimensions of our reality that were obscured in our forgetting, our denial, such as the political dynamics behind publications which then become recognised as truth. It doesn’t say that specific dynamics are always there. It simply calls attention to the dynamics modernism tried to minimise and overlook. Once we’re looking in this direction, we can discuss and ponder what various people see. (Shawver, 1996: 372)
Of course, this loss of faith in the modernist project did not begin in the 1970s. Many would go back at least as far as Nietszche, who, with his famous statement “God is dead”, urged his contemporaries to scorn Christianity and its “slave morality”. With his insistence on individual will and heroism, his loathing of the democratic ideals of the French revolution, and his rejection of both the rationalists and the empiricists (he vilified both Spinoza and Mill, among many others, — see Russell 1961: 728–739), Nietszche seems to have served as an inspiration for many who were disenchanted with the “lost dream” of modernism. And Shawver’s reference to “a new language game”2 must certainly hark back, wittingly or not, to the work of Wittgenstein. While Wittgenstein’s
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Tractatus, originally published in English in 1922, was much admired by Russell in particular, and by the Vienna school in general (see Pears, 1971:11–21), since it was an attempt to define the logical limits of language, Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations (1953) represented a dramatic change in his thinking, a change which many postmodernists see as giving credence and support to their own rejection of “modernist” thinking and their adoption of the “game” metaphor. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein argued that just as the world is composed of complex facts that can be analysed into simple facts, so language is composed of complex propositions that can be reduced to simple propositions. Wittgenstein suggested that elementary propositions picture atomic facts, and that only propositions that picture facts are meaningful. Thus metaphysics and ethics are meaningless. In the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein abandoned any attempt to accurately and uniquely associate words with their meanings and suggested instead that we should look at linguistic usage, and try to discover the functions that linguistic expressions served. Not all propositions “picture” facts; some are used to ridicule, others to apologise, others to question, and so on. According to this view, language use can be seen as a language game, with different types of groups playing different language games. Scientists, concerned with observable data and causal explanations, are playing a different language game to theologians concerned with describing sin. And, of course, whether or not a proposition is meaningful depends on its context, that is, meaning depends on the rules of the game of which that proposition is a part (see Passmore, 1968: 343–466). Wittgenstein battled with very complex problems of logic and semantics; the summary above is hugely simplistic. It seems to me that Wittgenstein’s later work is a comment on the sterility of the logical positivists’ programme, but in any case, if my summary is of any use at all, it is to indicate one of the important sources of the now very popular idea of language games. To return to the postmodernists, Ashley (1997) explains them this way: Modern, overloaded individuals, desperately trying to maintain rootedness and integrity…ultimately are pushed to the point where there is little reason not to believe that all value-orientations are equally well-founded. Therefore, increasingly, choice becomes meaningless. According to Baudrillard (1994: 38–9), we must now come to terms with the second revolution, “that of the Twentieth Century, of postmodernity, which is the immense process of the destruction of meaning equal to the earlier destruction of appearances. Whoever lives by meaning dies by meaning.” (Ashley 1997: 2)
Recent relativists
Post-modernism, then, entails the belief that the modern project has failed, and that we should reject, among other things, its methodology. It is an extremely eclectic movement, originating in aesthetics, and as already noted, there is an enormous variety of opinions within the camp. For some (Derrida, 1981, Culler, 1982, Rosenau, 1992) postmodernism is already upon us, for others (Shawver, 1997, Brinner, 1999) it is a way of thinking that is so new that it will take at least two more generations to take hold. There is often the suggestion that, since postmodernism is attempting such a radical rejection of “modernism”, it is not surprising that so many people find it difficult to make sense of the writings of its main protagonists. They are, it is claimed, still trying to work out their terms, still sorting out their new language, still basically talking to each other — which makes it rather hard for the profane! In any case, some key ideas which postmodernist theories include are: – – –
the decline of any absolute truths — the deliberate creation of relativity the lack of purpose and direction in historical change the fragmentation and division of all academic subjects into a variety of perspectives — with no ‘answers’, no agreement, no paradigm. (see Appignanesi and Garratt, 1995: 13–67)
According to Rosenau, postmodernists have been divided into two camps, Sceptics and Affirmatives. Sceptical Postmodernists are extremely critical of the modern subject. They consider the subject to be a “linguistic convention” (Rosenau, 1992: 43). They think that “modernists” use time to measure and control people, and they reject “Theory”, adopting Rosenau’s position that Theory conceals, distorts, and obfuscates, it is alienated, disparated, dissonant, it means to exclude, order, and control rival powers. (Rosenau, 1992: 81)
While Affirmative Postmodernists also reject Theory by denying claims of truth, they think that Theory needs not to be abolished but rather transformed. Affirmative Postmodernists are somewhat less extreme and rigid than the Sceptics, and are associated with movements organised around peace, the environment, and feminism. 3.3.1 Derrida Let us now examine two of the leading figures of postmodernism, starting with Derrida. The concern with the interpretation of texts is central to postmodernists, and the key idea of “deconstructing” texts is a term that is most closely associated with Derrida.
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Deconstruction emphasises negative critical capacity. Deconstruction involves demystifying a text to reveal internal arbitrary hierarchies and presuppositions. By examining the margins of a text, the effort of deconstruction examines what it represses, what it does not say, and its incongruities. It does not solely unmask error, but redefines the text by undoing and reversing polar opposites. Deconstruction does not resolve inconsistencies, but rather exposes hierarchies involved for the distillation of information. (Rosenau, 1992: 134)
Derrida’s famous saying “There is nothing beyond the text.” (sometimes translated as “There is nothing outside the text.”) has become an icon of postmodernism, and his theory of “deconstruction” is at the heart of postmodernist thought. According to Stanford University’s Presidential Lectures web page (http://prelectur.stanford.edu/lecturers/derrida/), Derrida’s work has been the subject of more than four hundred books and five hundred dissertations. In the 1960s Derrida published a series of articles in Tel Quel, a French magazine dedicated to left-wing avant-garde theory, where other important figures in the post-modernist and constructivist movement, such as Foucault, Baudrillard, Lyotard, and Kristeva were also featured. Since then he has published books and articles which cover literary criticism, psychology and philosophy, he has made many appearances at US, Australian and British universities, and the legions of his followers continue to grow. Deconstruction is, typically, very difficult to define. My own understanding of the term is that it is a method of enquiry, and more specifically, a set of methods for analysing texts. The aim is to undermine “logocentrism”, by which is meant the concern with truth, rationality, logic and “the word”, the hallmarks of the Western philosophical tradition. I should say immediately that Derrida specifically denies that deconstruction can be reduced to a method, but nevertheless, that is what it seems to be to me. One of Derrida’s most faithful and influential followers, Jonathan Culler, says this: To deconstruct a discourse is to show how it undermines the philosophy it asserts, or the hierarchical oppositions on which it relies, by identifying in the text the rhetorical operations on which it relies, by identifying in the text the rhetorical operations that produce the supposed ground of argument, the key concept or premise. (Culler, 1982: 86)
The most important strategy for deconstructing a text is to identify binary hierarchical “oppositions” like speech/writing, male/female, truth/fiction, signified/signifier, reality/appearance. In such binary oppositions, Derrida claims, the first or left-hand term is given a superior status over the right-hand term, which is regarded by the logocentric as a negation of the first. Derrida
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suggests that we reverse the hierarchy — so that speech becomes a form of writing, understanding a form of misunderstanding, appearance a form of reality, etc. Derrida is well known for his assertion that writing is prior to speech, that speech is really a form of writing. Derrida argues that writing has been “repressed”, and he suggests that the “privileging” of oral speech at the expense of writing is the “fundamental operation” of logocentricism. It is the job of the post-modernist to reveal such operations. A second strategy is to uncover those key words, motifs and characters in a text that reveal its hidden agenda. Certain key words can be seen as belonging to oppositions (referred to above) that are essential to the text, but they can also be used by the alert postmodernist to subvert the text. Derrida gives the example of Rousseau’s use of the word “supplement”. In different texts Rousseau uses the word with reference to writing, and with reference to sex: writing, Rousseau says, is a supplement to speech, and masturbation is a supplement to sex. Derrida concludes “within the chain of supplements it was difficult to separate writing from onanism” (Derrida 1976: 165). If the central arguments in a text can be identified by “oppositions” and key words, then it is by scrutinising the rest of the text, looking at marginal features, paying attention to such things as the kind of metaphors used, that one finds important clues as to what is important. These strategies, combined with a general questioning of any items that are claimed to be original, natural, or self-evident, and a general eye for the “instabilities” within a text, allow the perceptive postmodernist reader to rip away the veils that hide the real meaning of texts, which is, if I understand the argument correctly, that they have no meaning other than that which is attributed to them by those that engage them. Deconstructing texts consists of re-interpreting them, so as to move beyond the restrictions of a logocentric view. There is very often a “savant” quality to Derrida’s writing, as there is in that of many postmodernists: they give the impression of having dealt a definitive blow to ignorance and finally seen the light. They are full of insights; they can turn their hands to literary and art criticism, sociology, psychology, philosophy, science, and, whatever the field, by adopting a radically critical approach so as to discover the variable wonders of complex ontology which lie outside the confines of the blinkers of rationality, they see through, behind, and beyond the limitations of the mainstream Western intellectual tradition. Derrida’s declared objective is to undermine the Western concept of rationality and all the presuppositions that underlie our ideas of science, common sense, reality, etc. This is obviously a very politically-influenced
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objective, and in general the postmodernists are clearly associated with leftwing politics, although, of course, they would claim to have gone beyond such a clearly logocentric polarity as left and right. While Derrida began as a literary critic, he is now equally, if not more, influential as a philosopher and his ideas have since been adopted by the new relativists in many academic departments, including those of the philosophy of science, sociology, anthropology, and of course, some branches of linguistics. Another way to see Derrida is as a successor to the structuralists. It was, after all, Levi-Strauss (1978) who saw the basic structures of myth as binary oppositions, pairs of ideas that gave each other value, like male/female, culture/ nature, universal/specific, mind/body, and that were, by definition, always separate. Derrida suggested that structuralism had stopped too soon, and that we had to take the extra step of destroying these binary oppositions whose function is to lock us inside the confines of a particular myth — rationality being the dominant Public Enemy Number One. Thus we must look for these binary pairs of oppositions and then look for examples where the division between them breaks down. In a broader context, structuralism sees all philosophical systems in terms of the features they share, and in terms of the historical circumstances that produced them. Structuralism also identifies a central element in different philosophical systems: from the early Christian era until the eighteenth century God was at the centre, the Enlightenment replaced God with rational thought, and in the 1960s, rationality was, so the argument runs, replaced by irrationality or desire. In 1976 Derrida published Structure, Sign, and Play and deconstructed the idea of a centre: there is no centre, no God, no rationality, no desire, there is only the text. Derrida thinks that scientific texts should be treated like any others, and that it is important to reject the special privileged status of scientific discourse. Not surprisingly, then, he also thinks that literary scholars trained in deconstruction are capable of a more profound understanding of scientific texts than scientists themselves, an understanding that uncovers the “real” meaning and the unconscious intentions of the writers. At the same time, Derrida, like many postmodernists, claims to be quite familiar with science, and is not averse to using some of its findings to support his own point of view. For example, Derrida is one of many postmodernists who claim that Godel’s proof supports their claims that “language is indeterminate”. Gross and Levitt give another example of Derrida’s pronouncements on scientific matters: The Einsteinian constant is not a constant, not a center. It is the very concept of variability — it is, finally, the concept of the game. In other words, it is not
Recent relativists
the concept of some thing — of a center from which an observer could master the field — but the very concept of the game. (Derrida, 1981, cited in Gross and Levitt, 1998: 79)
Gross and Levitt comment: The “Einsteinian constant” is, of course c, the speed of light in vacuo, roughly 300 million meters per second. Physicists, we can say with confidence, are not likely to be impressed by such verbiage, and are hardly apt to revise their thinking about the constancy of c. (Gross and Levitt, 1998: 79)
3.3.2 Foucault Let us now move on to Foucault, another key figure in the postmodernist movement, often credited with having invented the term. Although, in keeping with the postmodern tradition, Foucault denied that he was a structuralist, he shared many of the structuralist concerns. A typical example of this structuralist approach is seen in this statement: The analysis of statements is a historical analysis, but one that avoids all interpretations: it does not question things said as to what they are hiding, what they were “really” saying in spite of themselves, the unspoken element they contain, … but, on the contrary, it questions them as to the mode of existence, what it means for them to have appeared when and where they did — they and no others. (Foucault, 1980: 109)
This is in many ways the exact antithesis of Derrida: Foucault saw himself as an archaeologist and often criticised those who claimed to be re-interpreting texts. While sharing much of Derrida’s epistemological relativism, Foucault is, in my opinion, an altogether more approachable and interesting thinker. Foucault attacked the idea of subjectivity, and preferred to regard the basic ideas that people normally take to be permanent truths about human nature and society as changing myths influenced by social factors in the course of history. According to Foucault we understand society and ourselves by investigating the rules governing the construction of these myths, and the way claims about the truth and falsity of myths, their status, change. Foucault suggests that we should investigate how people’s everyday practices enable them to define themselves and to systematise knowledge; how they use concepts of nature, human agency or God to explain things. What is so characteristic of this approach is that the various types of explanations are never judged in terms of their correspondence to the facts; they are simply different ways of talking about the world that have
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their own advantages and disadvantages. Foucault rejected any talk of human nature, he even rejected cultural anthropology since, in his opinion, this was just another product of Western Being, as reconstituted around 1789. For Foucault, the revolution that took place in France in 1789 is a crucial turning point in our history because it introduced the political mentality of totalization that led to a new conceptualisation of science and the emergence of a new historical mode of Being. This idea of Being owes much to the work of Heidegger. Heidegger’s philosophy of “phenomenological existentialism” attempted to describe (not explain) the structure of human consciousness, which, Heidegger argued, only comes into existence as experience is generated. Heidegger claimed that modern man’s experience is “totally” bound up with technology: the “technologization” of man’s experience, including his experience of himself and other people, is total. Technology is a “total” world for modern man because he has turned his back on God, and without any recognition of, or dependence on, God, there is nothing outside technology. Foucault argued that in the era of the French revolution, Western man’s world became transformed, so that man became the object of scientific study and technological manipulation, in turn treating himself and others as objects. Foucault is particularly well known for his investigation of patterns of power within a society and the ways in which power relates to the self. Foucault argues that Western society has developed a new kind of power which he calls bio-power (Foucault, 1980), that is, a new system of control that traditional concepts of authority are unable to understand and criticise. Foucault sees his task as uncovering the real nature of these power relationships, avoiding all the trappings, and indeed the traps, of modern science, its labels, and its methods. Thus, Foucault’s critique is at base political and his agenda is also political. Any attempt to bring down the modern project must reject its paradigm, including its de-humanising scientific paradigm based on rationalism. Once again we see the familiar argument that theories of physics, society and the individual are no more than historically-determined myths, and, once again, we see the attempt to avoid the discredited language and ideology of modernism, and to forge new constructs and approaches. Perhaps Pennycook is the most striking example of the influence of Foucault in applied linguistics. Pennycook takes a very socio-political view of developments in his field, which extends to his view of research and theorybuilding in SLA. In one article (1989) Pennycook examines Krashen’s theories (see below) and argues that while the Natural Approach is a reaction to structuralism, it nevertheless reflects the “positivist”, “scientific” underpinnings which
Recent relativists
language teachers should challenge. According to Pennycook, although Krashen’s and Terrell’s method initially helped liberate teachers from the old methods and encouraged them to share authority with their students, it now represents the status quo, it legitimises the power and authority of an elite, and should consequently be submitted to critical analysis so that its biases are revealed. In a reply to a comment on his article (1991) Pennycook says that his attempt to “deconstruct the applied linguistics canon” has a number of aims. Having listed three of these aims, Pennycook continues: Fourth, I want to ask with respect to applied linguistics a question similar to Foucault’s (1980) “What types of knowledge do you want to disqualify in the very instant of your demand ‘Is it science?’ (p. 85); finally, and following from this last question, I want to explore the possibilities of Foucault’s phrase “the insurrection of subjugated knowledges” (p. 81) and thus to look not only at the construction of applied linguistics as a scientific discourse but also at what knowledges have been left out, submerged, and what, therefore, a new, broader, and more open applied linguistics might look like. (Pennycook, 1991: 749–750)
It is interesting that Pennycook uses the word “positivist” to typify a “scientific” approach. I have already explained why I think that this is a gross misrepresentation of a scientific approach, but nevertheless, it is clear that, like Markee (1994), Lantolf (1996a), Block (1996) and others in the field, Pennycook wants to challenge what he sees as a restrictive paradigm and to encourage a wider, more pluralistic approach. My point in mentioning Pennycook is to illustrate the influence of Foucault, but I nevertheless endorse Pennycook’s concerns, which properly separate political issues from methodological ones. I completely agree with Pennycook that it behoves us all to challenge orthodoxy and to broaden our particular field of enquiry. The important proviso being, of course, to establish ground rules for how, once an area of investigation has been defined, that investigation is carried out and evaluated. 3.3.3 Conclusion Returning to the main narrative (!) a few more short quotations from or about some of the leading figures of the postmodernist movement might do more than further exposition to help convey their particular point of view. Postmodern would be that which in the modern invokes the unpresentable in presentation itself, that which refuses the consolation of correct forms, refuses the consensus of taste permitting a common experience of nostalgia for the
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impossible, and inquires into new presentations — not to take pleasure in them, but to better produce the feeling that there is something unpresentable. (Lyotard, 1984: 76) Everything has already happened… nothing new can occur. There is no real world. (Baudrillard, cited in Rosenau, 1992: 64) Derrida tries to problematize the grounds of reason, truth, and knowledge… he questions the highest point by demanding reasoning for reasoning itself. (Norris 1990: 199) Foucault’s study of power and its shifting patterns is a fundamental concept of postmodernism. Foucault is considered a post-modern theorist because his work upsets the conventional understanding of history as a chronology of inevitable facts and replaces it with underlayers of suppressed and unconscious knowledge in and throughout history. These underlayers are the codes and assumptions of order, the structures of exclusion that legitimate the epistemes, by which societies achieve identities. (Appignanesi, 1995: 45) Post-modern methodology is post-positivist or anti-positivist. As substitutes for the scientific method the affirmatives look to feelings and personal experience… the sceptical post modernists look for substitutes for method because they argue we can never really know anything. (Rosenau 1992: 117) Postmodern interpretation is introspective and anti-objectivist which is a form of individualized understanding. It is more a vision than data observation. (Rosenau 1992: 119) There is no final meaning for any particular sign, no notion of unitary sense of text, no interpretation can be regarded as superior to any other. (Latour 1988: 182)
3.4 Constructivism Constructivism can claim a long and prestigious heritage: Dewey, Piaget, Bruner, and, perhaps most importantly today, Vygotsky, are all taken to endorse the constructivist cause. While the influence of postmodernism and constructivism on the field of applied linguistics in general and SLA research in particular are hard to separate, one can easily appreciate how much more strongly the latter impinges on theories of learning. Constructivist learning is based on students’ active participation in problem-solving and critical thinking regarding a learning activity which they find relevant and engaging. They are “constructing”
Recent relativists
their own knowledge by testing ideas and approaches based on their prior knowledge and experience, applying these to a new situation, and integrating the new knowledge gained with pre-existing intellectual constructs. (Brinner, 1999: 1)
There is nothing particularly worrying about that, one might well think, and indeed I would not challenge the considerable contribution that such a humanistic, liberal, approach to education has made in the past. It is when we come to the epistemological underpinnings of modern constructivist thinkers that we are back in radically relativist territory. Again, it is difficult to generalise, but the modern constructivists, or at least, some of them, adopt a rather more traditional style of academic writing and seem to be more interested in talking to those who take a realist view of things than some of the postmodernists. Once again, there is an enormous range of views about what constructivism is, and what the implications of a constructivist approach are, among the constructivists themselves. One thing constructivists seem to have in common is their total opposition to the idea of objective truth. Denzin and Lincoln (1998) explain. Constructivists are deeply committed to the view that what we take to be objective knowledge and truth is the result of perspective. Knowledge and truth are created, not discovered by mind. They emphasise the pluralistic and plastic character of reality — pluralistic in the sense that reality is expressible in a variety of symbol and language systems; plastic in the sense that reality is stretched and shaped to fit purposeful acts of intentional human agents. They endorse the view that “contrary to common sense, there is no unique “real world” that pre-exists and is independent of human mental activity and human symbolic language” (Bruner, 1986). In place of a realist view of theories and knowledge, constructivists emphasise the instrumental and practical function of theory construction and knowing. (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998: 7)
Lincoln and Guba (1985) have proposed a “Constructivist paradigm” as a replacement for what they label the “conventional, scientific, or positivist paradigm of enquiry”. Their constructivist philosophy is idealist (they assume that “what is real is a construction in the minds of individuals”), pluralist and relativist: There are multiple, often conflicting, constructions and all (at least potentially) are meaningful. The question of which or whether constructions are true is sociohistorically relative. (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 85)
Lincoln and Guba assume that the observer cannot (should not) be neatly disentangled from the observed in the activity of inquiring into constructions.
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Constructions in turn are resident in the minds of individuals: They do not exist outside of the persons who created and hold them; they are not part of some “objective” world that exists apart from their constructors. (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 143)
Thus constructivism is based on the principle of interaction. The results of an enquiry are always shaped by the interaction of inquirer and inquired into which renders the distinction between ontology and epistemology obsolete: what can be known and the individual who comes to know it are fused into a coherent whole. (Guba: 1990: 19)
Brinner (1999) develops her idea of constructivism from an educational perspective. She says that constructivists reject the realist view of epistemology because it sees knowledge as a passive reflection of the external, objective reality and implies a process of “instruction”: the subject receives information from the environment, it is “instructed”. She continues: The naive view is that our senses work like a camera that just projects an image of how the world “really” is onto our brain, and use that image as a kind of map, an encoding in a slightly different format of the objective structure “out there”. Such a view runs quickly into a host of conceptual problems, mainly because it ignores the infinite complexity of the world. Moreover, detailed observation reveals that in all practical cases, cognition does not work like that. It rather turns out that the subject is actively generating plenty of potential models, and that the role of the outside world is merely limited to reinforcing some of these models while eliminating others (selection). Since Constructivism rejects any direct verification of knowledge by comparing the constructed model with the outside world, its most important issue is how the subject can choose between different constructions to select the “right one”. Without such a selection criterion, Constructivism would lapse into absolute relativism: the assumption that any model is as adequate as any other. The two most often used criteria are coherence, agreement between the different cognitive patterns within an individual’s brain, and consensus, agreement between the different cognitive patterns of different individuals. The latter position leads to “social Constructivism”, which sees knowledge solely as the product of social processes of communication and negotiation (the “social construction of reality”). We reject these positions as unduly restrictive, and take a much more pragmatic stance, where we note that the adequacy of knowledge depends on many different criteria, none of which has an absolute priority over the others. People can very well use incoherent models, over which there is no agreement with others, but which still are valuable for adaptation to a complex world.
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These criteria will include at least subjective coherence, intersubjective consensus, and (indirect) comparison with the “objective” environment. (Brinner 1999: 2)
At least here, Brinner acknowledges that the central issue raised by such a relativist methodology is how one chooses between rival constructions. Her answer, unfortunately, does not take things very far, although by saying that she does not accept the position of social constructivism she indicates the breadth of views within the camp. Lincoln has this to say: Although all constructions must be considered meaningful, some are rightly labelled “malconstruction” because they are incomplete, simplistic, uninformed, internally inconsistent, or derived by an inadequate methodology. The judgement of whether a given construction is malformed can only be made with reference to the paradigm out of which the construction operates; in other words, criteria or standards are framework-specific, so, for instance, a religious construction can only be judged adequate or inadequate utilizing the particular theological paradigm from which it is derived. (Lincoln, 1990: 144)
There is in constructivism, as in postmodernism, an obvious attempt to throw off the paradigmatic blinkers of modernist rationality, in order to grasp a more complex, subjective reality. Perhaps it has led to new insights into human imagination, perhaps poetry or novels or works of art have been created under its influence, almost certainly constructivists feel they know something that those adhering to a rationalist epistemology do not. Nevertheless, I confess that I can find nothing in constructivist writings to persuade me that it is a fruitful attitude to adopt as far as constructing a theory of SLA is concerned; the constructivists’ attempts at developing a coherent epistemology strike me as hopelessly muddled. I turn now to a discussion of relativist arguments in general, which will include the arguments of the post-modernists and constructivists in particular.
Notes 1.It should be noted that Barnes and Bloor were not joint authors until later (Barnes and Bloor, 1982), and that there were considerable differences between their separate accounts of the strong programme in the sociology of knowledge. 2.References to “games” in general appear all too frequently in postmodernist texts these days — in the field of SLA see Block 1996, and van Lier 1994, for examples.
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Chapter 4
In defence of rationalism
4.1 Introduction Chapter 2 began with a brief description of the problem of induction, which neither empiricists nor positivists successfully overcame, and which Popper then claimed to have solved with his notion of falsification. Chapter 2 went on to explain the serious doubts that were raised about this putative solution, and that attempts to reply to these doubts were not entirely successful. In Chapter 3, the arguments of more recent relativists were examined. I will now deal more completely with the relativist arguments, and defend the rationalist position.
4.2 Against relativism I define relativism as the view that there is no objective reality; that the way we perceive the world depends on who and what we are, and where and when we live. More particularly, the relativist position that I want to disagree with claims that there is no rational standard of judgement that can be used to decide between opposing theories. 4.2.1 There is no one “scientific method” While the objections outlined in Chapter 2 to what Lakatos (1978a) called “naive falsification” are quite insurmountable, I suggest, nevertheless, that the problems of induction, and those encountered by a strict application of Popper’s falsification criterion, do not add up to any real case for abandoning a rational programme in research. Sokal and Bricmont’s approach to these problems seems apposite: We stress the methodological continuity between scientific knowledge and everyday knowledge. This is, in our view, the proper way to respond to various sceptical challenges and to dispel the confusion generated by radical interpretations of
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correct philosophical ideas such as the underdetermination of theories by data. (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998: 55)
To the extent that Popper, or anyone else in the philosophy of science, attempts to answer Hume’s radical scepticism, and to prescribe “the” scientific method, they are probably doomed to failure. But this does not warrant going to the other extreme. I suggest that the arguments of Kuhn, Feyerabend and others can be regarded as either valid critiques of attempts to formalise the scientific method, or as reformulations of Humean radical scepticism, and that neither provides any real justification for abandoning a rationalist approach. First, then, we should resist attempts to formalise the scientific method. Reality cannot be fully apprehended, empirical data are often very hard to interpret, any individual instance of falsification can be challenged, thousands of such instances are in fact ignored, there is no algorithm for hypothesis testing, and there is no hard and fast demarcation line between science and non-science. We must, I suggest, reject the positivist programme completely, and abandon their, and other, attempts to build a monolithic united science that boasts a single foolproof method which guarantees truth. What the work of Kuhn, Feyerabend, Quine, Koestler and others has done is to emphasise the disunity and diversity of science; they have quite rightly pointed out that science is conducted by people who can be, and indeed have been, prejudiced, corrupt, misguided, dishonest, ambitious, etc., that science takes place in history and within a community, that the development of a theory is neither steady nor linear, and so on. But none of this has any necessary implications for the truth or worth of scientific theories. Feyerabend was against the pretensions and institutionalised idolisation of science, and as an anarchist he loathed those smug scientists who simply assumed the superiority of their methods and achievements, but he was not against science. Second, we must accept that there is no philosophical refutation of radical scepticism since we cannot know the external world directly. But very little follows from this. Both Kuhn and Feyerabend make the mistake of confusing a critique of attempts to formalise the scientific method with an adoption of Humean radical scepticism, and in so doing they throw the baby out with the bath water. Of course all methodologies have their limitations, but this does not justify the conclusion that anything goes. There is no way we can refute radical scepticism, no way we can prove that the world exists to those who choose to adopt systematic scepticism or solipsism, but this is not to say that there is anything to recommend adopting such a view. As Popper stressed, the irrefutability of an idea is a weakness not a strength: just because we cannot falsify an
In defence of rationalism
idea is no reason at all to believe that it is true. Having made these two general points, I will now review a few of the problems related to a rationalist approach discussed above. 4.2.2 Underdetermination Laudan distinguishes two generic types of underdetermination. The first he calls “Humean underdetermination”, which amounts to the claim that (because of the universal character of theories) for any finite body of evidence there are indefinitely many mutually contradictory theories, each of which logically entails that evidence. (Laudan 1996)
The second type of underdetermination is Quine’s version, discussed briefly above, which claims that “one may hold onto any theory whatever in the face of any evidence whatever.” As Laudan points out, the Humean version is an “extraordinarily weak” thesis, and one that says very little to challenge a rational approach. While it may be the case that infinitely many theories could be reconcilable with any body of evidence, it is not the case that all actual, existing theories are; in fact, there is often not more than one theory in a certain field that is compatible with the data. As for Quine’s version, this rests on the Duhem-Quine thesis described above, which claims that any particular instance of data seemingly falsifying a theory is only a challenge to “a web of beliefs”. It challenges one undetermined part of a block of theories, one component of a complex system of multiple theories, assumptions about instrumentation, etc. Consequently, by making suitable adjustments to our assumptions, the recalcitrant evidence can be reconciled with the theory. This is, of course, true in a trivial sense: by removing any part or parts of a theory that clash with the evidence, and/or by adding an ad hoc hypothesis or two, the theory can be saved. But it is precisely by evaluating what is lost by such a rescue operation, in terms of the theory’s explanatory power and its evidential support, that we are able to make rational choices between rival theories. In short, underdetermination, while appearing to be a serious problem for rationalists, turns out to be of little practical importance. Perhaps its main value is in pointing out that deductive arguments are, if not as problematic as inductive ones, at least not free from problems, and thus Popper’s proposals require substantial modification. But there is, I suggest, no good argument here
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to support a relativist case: these considerations are important for understanding the limits of our knowledge, and it is quite right that Popper’s “naive falsificationist” position should have come under such heavy fire. Not even Popper would say that any instance of falsification must necessarily bring down a theory, there are, pace Popper, obvious inductionist elements in any prediction and any causal explanation, and there will never be empirical proof of any general statement. All of which is a long way from supposing that, whatever the facts, all theories are equally valid. The same arguments apply to the related problem of never knowing which part of a theory is responsible for failure to satisfy a particular test. While at first glance this seems an extremely serious problem, in fact, the effort to isolate different parts of a complex theory is an important part of scientists’ work, almost a criterion for scientific status. Scientists are well aware of the complexity of theories and the need to look at all the various elements that might explain why any particular experiment contradicts a theory. (Couvalis, 1997: 145–190) Indeed, this is an area where scientists are particularly careful, and in most cases experimental design allows scientists to be quite clear about what is being tested. The academic journals of all fields testify to the importance scientists, including social scientists, give to this problem; it is a top priority. 4.2.3 Kuhn and Feyerabend As we saw earlier, Kuhn and Feyerabend, wittingly or not, provided relativists with what many consider to be very heavy ammunition. The following discussion is intended to dispel the doubts raised at the beginning of Chapter 3. One of the most frequent criticisms of Kuhn is that he confuses the history and sociology of science with the philosophy of science. Chalmers (1978, 1990), for example, correctly states that when Kuhn points out that a successful change in a paradigm occurred by accident, for irrational reasons, he has not proved that science itself is irrational. Suppose that Theory X was originally adopted for faulty reasons, but is today empirically established beyond reasonable doubt, and is generally accepted as being the best explanation of certain phenomena currently available. Theory X is accepted because scientists have subjected it to rigorous tests that allow them to accept it, for the time being at least, regardless of mistakes made in the early stages of its development. Similarly, however altered the mental states of the scientists who first challenged the theory that the earth was at the centre of the universe might have been, and whatever (greed, ambition, a search for truth, …) inspired the theory that the earth moves round
In defence of rationalism
the sun at a certain rate, and that as a result, the sun will rise in the East approximately every 24 hours, it remains a well-established hypothesis that we can reasonable ascertain and use today. Which is not to say that it will be regarded as true in 100 years time. Kuhn deliberately intertwined his historical and philosophical arguments, and this is because he, like Lakatos, believed that the history of science has important implications for a discussion about how scientific research should proceed. But let us for the moment restrict the discussion to questions related to theory construction today. Central to Kuhn’s argument about paradigm shifts (Kuhn, 1962, 1977) is that paradigms crucially affect perception, and thus different paradigms cannot be easily rationally compared by participants (see Chapter 2.6 above). This view of perception is profoundly relativistic, and while Kuhn always refused to accept the conclusion his argument so obviously implies (see particularly Kuhn, 1977: 23–45), many in the relativist camp (see, for example Lincoln and Guba, 1985, and Block, 1996) have since been quick to embrace it. Basically, the argument is that by adopting a paradigm, those who work within it perceive the world in such a way that what they notice (what they deem important or trivial), the way they classify the things they notice, and the sense they make of their experiences, are all crucially affected. Under this “umbrella” are the problems outlined above in Chapter 3.4 about our perceptions, the incommensurability of theories, and the theory-laden nature of observation statements. So, let us deal with these problems. Kuhn is quite right to say that those working in science focus on only a narrow range of features of the world that they observe, and that this is influenced by the paradigm under which their work takes place, but there is nothing irrational about this. Whereas the relativists take Kuhn’s argument as evidence of some inherent irrational bias which necessarily robs the scientist’s work of objectivity, in fact it is perfectly proper for scientists to concentrate on those perceptually salient features of the observable world which allow them to solve the problems they have posed themselves. This is precisely the picture of science that Popper paints: it rejects the Baconian view, it challenges the first principles of the empiricists in general and of Locke, Hume and the Positivists in particular, and insists that we cannot help but be extremely selective in our observations. As for the wider claim that the paradigm is so all-pervading in the mind of the scientist who works under it that he is incapable of perceiving the salient features of things which are independent of that paradigm, this does not stand up to examination. However much our perceptions are influenced by adopting
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any particular point of view, what we could notice, what could be perceptually salient does not change — unless we adopt a totally solipsistic approach. We can learn to notice things that we were not previously focusing on, and the existence of such anomalies as the Müller-Lyer illusion, where we can find it very difficult to change our perception once we have seen one “view”, does not alter the fact that in ordinary cases we can learn how to re-group objects and see similarities between them which we did not notice before. There are limits to perceptual manipulation: in the rabbit/duck picture reproduced on p. 34, we cannot get it to look like the Empire State building or a waterfall. Our experience is sometimes untrustworthy, because of bad conditions, or because we are looking at two-dimensional representations, but this does not warrant the conclusion that it is so theory-laden as to be subjective: our beliefs do not determine the way things look. As Fodor (1983) has pointed out, whether we believe that the two lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion are equal or unequal when we observe the diagram, they continue to look unequal, and thus our beliefs do not cause them to look unequal. Perhaps here we should pause very quickly to chase the problems of perception to their epistemological roots. Since we are forced to give some explanation of perception, we may adopt the view that our perceptions “represent” an external world that we never directly “know”. This leads to the possibility of scepticism, Humean or other, since we can argue that nobody has ever seen anything other than mental representations. For example, I have never seen the desk I am working at, and thus the desk, and everything else “in the world”, is mental. From here it is but one small step to the inevitable solipsistic dead end: it gets us precisely nowhere. To avoid such a dead end we must accept that we have perceptual knowledge of an external world; that when I look at the desk in front of me there is a causal process taking place between that desk and my mental representations of it. Assuming that we accept that there is an external world out there to explain, the business of science is solving problems, and solving problems does not involve just looking at the world. It involves focusing our attention on something, making conjectures about some problem we have posed ourselves, and then looking for evidence which supports or challenges those conjectures. Kuhn does not offer any conclusive arguments (and nor, I suggest, does anybody else) to support the case that the crucial step of examining the world around us for evidence which tells us something about our theory is so affected by our preconceptions as to make an objective appraisal of empirical data impossible. Kuhn’s arguments about incommensurability are similarly exaggerated.
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Even if, in exceptional cases, changes in paradigms are due to non-empirical factors, this does not justify the argument that the new paradigm, once accepted, conditions our perception of the world to such an extent that only our subsequent experience can be used to test it. As Maudlin (1996) points out, if Aristotle were presented with moon rock today, he would conclude that the moon was not made of “aether”, and that its natural movement is not fundamentally different from that of terrestrial material. The sense in which one’s paradigm may influence one’s experience of the world cannot be so strong as to guarantee that one’s experience will always accord with one’s theories, else the need to revise theories would never arise. (Maudlin 1996: 442)
There is also the “self-refutation” objection to Kuhn’s, Feyerabend’s, and other relativists’ versions of the history of science, and the claimed incommensurability of theories. Historians employ methods of research not very different to those used in science: studying documents, drawing inferences from the data, etc. If we cannot trust the arguments used in physics to arrive at reliable conclusions, why should we trust them in history? When Kuhn (1965: 67) describes the differences between Aristotelian and Galilean accounts of the pendulum, for example, he is doing precisely what his thesis claims cannot be done. But of course the two descriptions of the same phenomenon can be compared, and there are good reasons, as opposed to irrationally motivated ones, for preferring the Galilean one. As for Feyerabend, his arguments, like those of Kuhn and Lakatos, intertwine historical and philosophical issues. Feyerabend’s treatment of the history of physics suggests that it is far removed from the patient, rational process we were taught at school, and resembles more a process of religious conversion. I have already suggested that this says nothing about the objectivity of scientists’ findings, nor about the rationality or otherwise of accepting modern theories of physics. Feyerabend’s other main point concerns the incommensurability of two theories, and I have already pointed out that this argument refutes itself. It is worth repeating this point because one version or another of incommensurability is at the heart of many relativists’ arguments. Feyerabend suggests that the Ptolemaic and Copernican theories describe different worlds and thus cannot be objectively compared. For example, Ptolomaists refer to planets as features of crystalline spheres whereas Copernicans refer to them as earthlike objects in the sky. Feyerabend argues that the two world pictures that emerge from these two theories refer to different items (in the same domain) and the adoption of
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one picture or the other by this or that group is therefore necessarily irrational, since there can be no way of objectively comparing the two. But to show that there are two different incommensurable world pictures which refer to items in different worlds, Feyerabend must use our present concepts and fundamental assumptions to do so, which, according to him, will be so completely different as to make the comparison impossible. In other words, Feyerabend contradicts himself and fails to show that changes in theories are so radical that competing theories cannot be assessed by a common standard. I suggest that when answering the cases made by Kuhn and Feyerabend, and also to some extent, the cases made by those in the field of the sociology of knowledge, we need to be quite clear about what it is that we want to defend. It is surely the rationality of scientific investigation that needs defending, by which I mean that we need to characterise it and recommend it as a methodology to be used in theory construction. I think both Lakatos and Laudan make the mistake of equating a defence of rationality with a defence of the history of science, which hands the sociologists of knowledge victory on a plate. Whatever motives scientists had for doing what they did, and taking the decisions they did, they gave us theories, and this is the basis of objective knowledge, what Popper (1972) refers to as “World Three”: We may distinguish the following three worlds or universes: first the world of physical objects or of physical states; secondly the world of states of consciousness, or of mental states, or perhaps of behavioural dispositions to act; and thirdly, the world of objective contents of thought, especially of scientific and poetic thoughts and of works of art. (Popper, 1972: 106)
Popper develops this idea: In our attempts to solve problems we may invent new theories. These theories, again, are produced by us; they are the product of our critical and creative thinking, in which we are greatly helped by other existing third-world theories. Yet the moment we have produced these theories, they create new, unintended and unexpected problems, autonomous problems, problems to be discovered. This explains why the third world which, in its origin, is our product, is autonomous in what may be called its ontological status. It explains why we can act upon it, and add to it or help its growth, even though there is no man who can master even a small corner of this world. (Popper, 1972: 161)
The key questions are surely: ‘How can we improve on current theories?’, and ‘How can we (better) explain the phenomena we are interested in?’ It is, I imagine, uncontroversial to suggest that looking at past attempts to explain the
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problems we are currently concerned with is one valuable method of assessing our current theories about them, but there is no need to be bound by the historical beliefs of past scientists. In other words, it is not necessary for a good account of rationality to fit the history of science. 4.2.4 Postmodernists and constructivists What is to be made of the postmodernists and constructivists? To the extent that, like Feyerabend, they are making a political point, one may sympathise. In many ways the modern project has indeed failed. There is a great deal of injustice in the world, and there are good grounds for thinking that a ruling minority who benefit from the way economic activity is organised are responsible for manipulating information in general, and research programmes in particular, in extremely sophisticated ways, so as to bolster and increase their power and control. To the extent that postmodernists and constructivists feel that science and its discourse are riddled with a repressive ideology, and to the extent that they feel it necessary to develop their own language and discourse to combat that ideology, they are making a political statement, as they are when they say that “Theory conceals, distorts, and obfuscates, it is alienated, disparated, dissonant, it means to exclude, order, and control rival powers” (Culler, 1982: 67). They have every right to express such views, and it is surely a good idea to encourage people to scrutinise texts, to try to uncover their “hidden agendas”. Likewise the constructivist educational programme can be welcomed as an attempt to follow the tradition of humanistic liberal education. Where the postmodernists are mistaken is in their assumption that their political analysis has necessary implications for the veracity or otherwise of any particular theory. And where they seem to fail miserably is in the alternative they offer to a rationalist research programme. When one adopts a radical version of post-modernism, when one looks at the world from Derrida’s perspective, what are the results for theory construction? What are the results of all this analysis? No causal explanations, or theories, are allowed, it seems. All attempts to explain, refute, establish, confirm, etc., must be deconstructed and exposed as the logocentric-serving myths that they are; the task is to undermine, and overcome not just science but language and common sense. To what end? Culler, a committed postmodernist, claims that The effect of deconstructive analyses, as numerous readers can attest, is one of knowledge and feelings of mastery. (Culler, 1992, cited in Searle 1993: 179)
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Searle comments: The trouble with this claim is that it requires us to have some way of distinguishing genuine knowledge from its counterfeits, and justified feelings of mastery from mere enthusiasms generated by a lot of pretentious verbosity. (Searle, 1993: 179)
In short, if I may play the game for a moment, constructivism does not seem very constructive. The constructivists obviously have a point when they say (not that they said it first) that science is a social construct. Science is certainly a social institution, and, as has already been indicated, scientists’ goals, their criteria, their decisions and achievements are historically and socially influenced. And all the terms that scientists use, like “test”, “hypothesis”, “findings”, etc., are invented and given meaning through social interaction. Of course. But, and here is the crux, this does not make the results of social interaction (in this case, a scientific theory) an arbitrary consequence of it. Popper, in reply to criticisms of his naïve falsification position, defends the idea of objective knowledge by arguing that it is precisely through the process of mutual criticism incorporated into the institution of science that the individual short-comings of its members are largely cancelled out. As Bunge (1996) points out “The only genuine social constructions are the exceedingly uncommon scientific forgeries committed by a team.” (Bunge, 1996: 104). Bunge gives the example of the Piltdown man that was “discovered” by two pranksters in 1912, authenticated by many experts, and unmasked as a fake in 1950. According to the existence criterion of constructivism-relativism we should admit that the Piltdown man did exist — at least between 1912 and 1950–just because the scientific community believed in it. (Bunge, 1996: 105)
And here, perhaps, is the heart of the confusion for all those who take a radically relativist position, whether they be proponents of the Strong Programme in the sociology of knowledge, social constructivists, or postmodernists: the deliberate confusion of two separate issues: claims about the existence or non-existence of particular things, facts and events, and claims about how one arrives at beliefs and opinions. Whether or not the Piltdown man is a million years old is a question of fact. What the scientific community thought about the skull it examined in 1912 is also a question of fact. When we ask what led that community to believe in the hoax, we are looking for an explanation of a social phenomenon, and that is a separate issue. Just because for forty years the Piltdown
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man was supposed to be a million years old does not make him so, however interesting the fact that so many people believed it might be. As Paul Boghossian points out, the class of things that can be labelled social constructions is enormous: nation states, the dollar, university education and the BBC are random examples. Anything that could not have existed without societies actually defines the class, and likewise, anything that actually does or did exist independently of societies cannot be a social construction, dinosaurs, giraffes and proteins are examples. “How could they have been socially constructed, if they existed before societies did?” (Boghossian, 2001: 7) Yet it is precisely this obvious distinction that is ignored in many of the constructivist texts, which claim that our beliefs are all we have, and that there is nothing “out there” that exists independently of them. Latour and Woolgar’s study (1979) referred to above is a good example. While it might very well be the case that we believe that dinosaurs existed, and that DNA exists today, because the scientists tell us so, it remains, for those of us who want to take a realist, rationalist view of the world at least, an independent question of fact as to whether or not such things exist, i.e. whether or not our beliefs are true or false. When one examines the constructivist methodology as outlined above, there are many suggestions that seem perfectly acceptable. When Lincoln and Guba say “There are multiple, often conflicting, constructions and all (at least potentially) are meaningful. The question of which or whether constructions are true is sociohistorically relative.” (Lincoln and Guba, 1985: 85), this is a perfectly acceptable comment, as far as it goes. If Lincoln and Guba argue that the observer cannot be neatly disentangled from the observed in the activity of inquiry, then again the point can be well taken. But when they insist that constructions are exclusively in the minds of individuals, that “they do not exist outside of the persons who created and hold them; they are not part of some “objective” world that exists apart from their constructors”, and that “what can be known and the individual who comes to know it are fused into a coherent whole”, then they have disappeared into a Humpty Dumpty world where anything can mean whatever anybody wants it to mean. It is when constructivists and postmodernists insist on a radically relativist epistemology, when they rule out the possibility of data collection, of empirical tests, of any rational criterion for judging between rival explanations that I believe those of us interested in doing research and building theories should part company with them. Solipsism and science, like solipsism and anything else of course, do not go well together. If postmodernists reject any understanding of time because “the modern understanding of time controls and measures
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individuals”, if they argue that no theory is more correct than any other, if they believe that “everything has already happened”, that “there is no real world”, that “we can never really know anything” (see Section 3.3.3 above), then I think they should continue their “game”, as they call it, in their own way, and let those of us who prefer to work with more rationalist assumptions get on with scientific research. There is also the question of what seems to me to be a deliberate attempt by some postmodernists to make their arguments obscure and difficult to follow. There is, I suggest, a lot of similarity here with the publications of the Vienna Circle: most people thought it was extremely difficult to understand the writings of the Vienna Circle, and this finds an echo today in the difficulty many experience when confronting the texts of those who adopt a postmodernist approach. Those without a sound mathematical training (and indeed, many with such a training, too) who have attempted to read any of the Vienna Circle’s work are usually struck by the enormous difficulty of following the arguments. Russell and Whitehead claimed that there were fewer than ten people in the world capable of understanding Principia Matematica, Carnap is almost as taxing, and those unfortunate students of Wittgenstein who are unwise enough to try and articulate the master’s thoughts end up talking as enigmatically as the man himself.4 The question is, are the texts difficult because of the nature of the subject, or because the language is deliberately obscure and more complicated than necessary? Sokal and Bricmont, whose book attempts, in their words, to “unmask” the postmodernist writings of Lacan, Irigaray and others, suggest some criteria for distinguishing between these two types of difficulty. The crucial criterion is this one: When the difficulty is genuine, it is usually possible to explain in simple terms, at some rudimentary level, what phenomena the theory is examining, what are its main results and what are the strongest arguments in its favour. By contrast, some obscure discourses give the impression that the reader is being asked to make a qualitative jump, or to undergo an experience similar to a revelation, in order to understand them. Again, one cannot help being reminded of the emperor’s new clothes. (Sokal and Bricmont, 1998: 177)
Godel’s theorem is, I am told, an enormously elegant argument, but the original is far too technical, too difficult, for me to follow. Thanks, however, to Nagel and Newman’s extraordinarily clear account of the theorem in their short, lucid book (1959), I can appreciate the argument, and its importance. Thus, Godel’s
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Proof is genuinely difficult, and Nagel and Newman have managed to help a wider audience appreciate the main arguments. On the other hand, the writings of Derrida, Lyotard, and other postmodernists, are extremely difficult to read, and attempts to make them more accessible have largely failed. There are, of course, a plethora of introductory texts, but these are usually disowned, in true postmodernist style, by the original authors. Perhaps the authors feel that to be understood is to betray the cause. There is also the more mundane matter of wanting to sound profound. Either way, my feeling is that many postmodernist texts are difficult because the writer deliberately makes them obscure and because, as Sokal and Bricmont (1998: 177) put it, “the reader is asked to make a qualitative jump” — leaving reason behind. I would stress the broadness of the rationalist definition of research and theory construction; the relativists often seem unaware of what science, and rational enquiry in general, involves. It seems necessary to point out that science is not the same as positivism, or empiricism, it does not exclude certain types of relativism, it does not prescribe any fixed methodology.
4.3 The rationalist case In the development of Western philosophy, rationalism and empiricism were seen as mutually exclusive. Rationalism was based on the assertion that knowledge of the world is gained by the working of the intellect, reasoning from assumptions to conclusions, with various rules of logic and language to guide the process. Empiricism, on the other hand, was based on the assertion that knowledge of the world is derived from observing actual events in the real world: everything the mind knows comes through the senses. The rationalist case I wish to defend is that knowledge of the world is gained in all sorts of ways, but that the most reliable knowledge comes from engaging in research which leads to the development of theories, i.e. attempts to explain phenomena. These theories are developed with various rules of logic and language to guide the process and are scrutinised so as to discover flaws in terminology or reasoning, and to build the clearest, simplest version of the theory. Such theories should then lay themselves open to empirical tests: there must be the possibility of observing events in the world that contradict them.
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4.3.1 Critical rationalism What of rationality itself? Bartley, (1982, 1987) tackles the problem of infinite regress: whatever justification I give for my belief will depend on an appeal to an authority which will then in turn need justifying. Bartley points out that this implies that there can be no justification for a belief in rationality. The grounding of a belief in a reason R1, demands justification of R1, and each new R1 has to be similarly justified. Bartley argues, in a way very reminiscent of Popper’s answer to the problem of induction, that we must forget about justification and ground our beliefs in the attitude of criticism. We locate rationality in criticism. A rationalist is, for us, one who holds all his positions — including standards, goals, decisions, criteria, authorities, and especially his own fundamental framework or way of life, open to criticism. He withholds nothing from examination and review. (Bartley, 1982: 128)
This more viable version of Popper’s critical rationalism Bartley calls “pancritical rationalism.” It suggests that the goal of rationalism is to root out intellectual error, and it asserts that a theory is held rationally if it contains no built-in devices for avoiding or deflecting critical arguments, empirical or otherwise, that its holder tries as hard as possible to expose himself or herself to criticism, and that these two conditions are themselves subject to the same principle. In answer to the objection that pancritical rationalism itself is not open to criticism, and that therefore it does not solve the problem of infinite regress, Bartley insists that pancritical rationalism is, more than anything, an attitude; as Redman (1993: 55) puts it: for Bartley “the demarcation criterion is not criticisability but vulnerability to criticism.” This is, in my opinion, an acceptable account of rationality, and one which Popper himself would accept as a generalisation of his philosophy. It is a fairly long way from “naive falsification”, and indeed, as Bartley accepts, embraces a certain relativistic element. In order to criticise a position, other positions have to be accepted for the moment — but this does not put them beyond criticism. Pancritical rationalism is hence compatible with one kind of relativism. The survival of a position is relative to its success in weathering serious criticism. A position that survives at one time may be refuted later. This kind of relativism is harmless. It is an example of the way that learning proceeds by trial and error — by guessing and trying to criticise guesses: the making and destroying of theories is part of the evolutionary process. (Bartley, 1982: 160)
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4.3.2 Observing a real world As for observation, in order to understand our experiences I assume that there is an external world that corresponds to the images of it provided by our senses. Of course, it does not correspond exactly to our perceptions of it, of course our perceptions and images of the world change, and are influenced by a great many factors, both individual and social. The question is simply to what extent we can trust the data we derive from our senses, and I suggest that the answer is: to the extent that we take a practical, objective approach to them, establishing criteria for measuring and comparing them as carefully and systematically as possible. We should appreciate the difference between data and phenomena (see below), appreciate that conceptual considerations (the theoretical consistency, coherence, simplicity, and clarity of theories) are as important as empirical problems, and appreciate, above all, that the rationality of any theory must be analysed on a case-by-case basis. Scientists articulate problems, make observations, perform experiments, propose hypotheses, build theories and test them, all the while communicating their results to colleagues. The content of the messages that accumulate and that are available in the public domain (rather than the personal knowledge of individual scientists, their memories and thoughts), are what we can call scientific knowledge. Popper (1972) refers to it as “World 3”, and distinguishes it from subjective knowledge by saying that it is “knowledge without a knowing subject”. The objectivity of scientific knowledge stems from its being a social construct, not owing its origin to any particular individual but created communally. Einstein’s relativity theory established him as a great scientist, but the final product, the established theory and the body of evidence it has accumulated, belong to humanity. At this point I must return briefly to the issues raised by Lakatos and Laudan. In an attempt to answer problems posed by Kuhn and others about the rationality of choosing between rival theories, Lakatos and Laudan suggest that scientists should be seen as part of a “research programme”, or a “research tradition” respectively. In Lakatos’ case the negative heuristic protects the hard core, and programmes, rather than theories, are assessed in terms of the ability of the programme to come up with changes to the protective belt that produce novel predictions, rather than ad hoc bolt-ons that do no more than desperately try to protect the hard core. In Laudan’s case, a research tradition comprises a number of theories, and they can be collectively assessed in terms of how many problems they deal with. We have already seen that both are attempts to answer
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Kuhn and to insist that most of the data of the history of science can be explained rationally; scientists mostly made rational decisions about which Theories to believe in. Given the historical data, such an attempt is bound to fail, but it is not necessary to defend the actions and decisions of past scientists in order to defend rationalism, in the sense I am recommending using the word here. Nor is it necessary to consciously identify oneself with a particular programme or tradition. I can see no good reasons for suggesting that those who are working in any academic field, and who are faced with the choice between two opposing theories, should adopt either of the strategies recommended by Lakatos or Laudan. The only real controversy is between rationalists and radical relativists, and once this epistemological issue is resolved we would, I suggest, be well advised to keep the history and sociology of science, and the so-called sociology of knowledge, out of discussions about theory construction and assessment. 4.3.3 The practice of science To return to the general argument, Ziman (1978) argues that what distinguishes scientific knowledge from other intellectual artefacts of human society is, firstly, that its contents are what he calls “consensible”, by which he means that each message should not be so obscure that the recipient is unable either to give it full assent or offer well-founded objections. Secondly, the goal of science is to achieve the maximum degree of “consensuality” — the general body of scientific knowledge should consist of facts and principles that are firmly established and accepted by a majority of the scientific community. There is of course an element of circularity here: scientists decide what counts as scientific knowledge and scientific knowledge is what scientists decide it is. While consensibility is a necessary condition for scientific communication, only a small proportion of the whole body of science is undeniably consensual at a given moment, and it is questionable if this second goal can be defended. Ziman (1978) suggests that “fully consensible communication” requires an unambiguous language, mathematics being the ideal form. So use of natural languages needs to be carefully controlled, which, Ziman points out, often leads scientific discourse to lack any literary merit, the authors being primarily interested in maximising the transmission of unambiguous information. Scientists are, of course, very keen to persuade their colleagues, and the community must always be on guard against rhetoric or sloppy reasoning. Illdefined terms, ambiguities, unwarranted conclusions, must be uncovered by
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the community as they strive for the clearest, simplest expression of the theory. The exchange of these logically consistent messages should refer to recognisable and reproducible events within the experience of individual scientists. Scientific knowledge is gained primarily through observation, and the crucial principle here is that all observers are equivalent: anyone observing the event would agree on the report one person made of it. This fundamental principle of objective knowledge needs a lot of interpretation and qualification, but the criterion that all human beings are interchangeable as observers remains one of the most important pillars of science. Which is why experiments are such an important tool for scientists. Experiments are observations carried out under controlled, reproducible conditions, and one of their chief functions is to allow others to carry out similar experiments in different places at different times. Consensuality implies co-operation and interaction among scientists. Mistakes and misunderstandings are cleared up, and promising hypotheses are tested through replication studies and theoretical criticism. The coherent and consistent set of beliefs generated by all this activity is the paradigm, the generally-accepted theory in any given field which allows scientists to pursue their work in a systematic way. Of course, the paradigm is not necessarily close to any absolute truth; paradigms often contain fallacies and need unexpected discoveries or massive falsification of predictions to dislodge them. A basic characteristic of science is the way its theories are scrutinised. We have already seen that the “naïve falsification” view — scientists accepting that any test of the predictions of a hypothesis that contradicts it is a demonstration that the hypothesis is false — needs some modification. Testing hypotheses is not a mechanical process whose outcome can be determined by simple logic. There are always questions about the reliability of the data, and of how the data should be interpreted, and in the end it is the expert judgement of the community that must decide if there is a good enough fit between the theory and the data. And different standards will be applied to different kinds of theories at different moments in their development. At the beginning of the development of a new theory, when there is little common ground, and where there are few accepted findings, a relatively unsubstantiated theory might be encouraged, despite flimsy empirical support or rigorous conceptualisation, for example, because it is seen as a useful guide to future research. Sometimes, scientists may even choose to work with two contradictory models of the same system. Ziman (1978: 67) points out that in the theory of atomic nuclei, in the 1950s there were two theories: the “liquid drop model”, and the “shell model” which contradicted each other in terms of the behaviour of protons and neutrons. Both models
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earned Nobel prizes for their authors, and both are now part of a more complex but unified theory which deals with all the phenomena involved. It was therefore a wise decision for scientists working in this area in the 1950s to look for evidence that showed how the two theories could be reconciled, rather than assume that one of the two must be false. In short, although Popper’s demarcation line between science and nonscience cannot be made as clearly as he suggested, what distinguishes science from other types of enquiry is that its theories are couched in such a way that they make powerful predictions which are open to falsification through empirical observations and experiments. The more a theory lays itself open to these tests, the better it is. Thus, deductive reasoning and empirical tests are the two main ways in which theories are scrutinised.
Chapter 5
The construction and assessment of theories of SLA
5.1 Science and SLA Can the description of scientists at work given in the previous chapter be applied to researchers working in the field of SLA? Can researchers in SLA construct a scientific theory? Many natural scientists, Popper, Lakatos and Feyerabend among them, deny scientific status to the areas involved in SLA research (psychology, cognitive psychology, sociology, anthropology, social psychology, linguistics, applied linguistics), and there are also numerous academics working in the field of SLA who think that the so-called scientific method is inappropriate for their work. As far as those in the field of SLA are concerned, there are those who embrace a relativist view (the post-modernists, constructivists, etc., who have been examined earlier), and then there are those who believe that there is a fundamental difference between the natural sciences and areas of enquiry dealing with human beings. There are obviously some important differences between a physicist working in a laboratory, devising experiments on innate matter under carefully controlled conditions, and a researcher working in SLA who has people as the subject matter. First, there is the problem of categorical imprecision. While nature can be put into relatively well-defined categories to which deductive arguments can be applied with reasonable certainty, it is much more difficult to categorise people. What is a French speaker? What is fluency? What is a dialect? What are learner strategies? In the study of SLA, if there are elements which are not well-defined, stable, meaningful elements in the conceptual framework, then formal logical implications cannot be applied to them. Ziman paints this gloomy picture: Unfortunately human behaviour is always so complex and varied that we can seldom make a sharply confirmable (or disconfirmable) prediction from the model. At best, the chain of inference can only be tested statistically; the model produces no more than “tendencies” in particular directions… More harshly
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it might be said that the behavioural sciences are cluttered with innumerable half-articulated speculative models that have never been subject to critical validation. Standards of theory construction and confirmation have seldom been sufficiently high to distinguish clearly between what is well established, what is essentially conjectural, and what has been thoroughly disconfirmed. …Such a situation is, of course, deplorable; but it reflects the enormous difficulties of defining consensible observations and discovering consensual theories to explain them. (Ziman 1978: 171)
Ziman might be understood as simply saying that as a matter of fact the behavioural sciences have a bad record, not that there is any necessary reason why the domain of their research makes scientific research and theory construction impossible. But perhaps necessary ethical restraints on doing experiments on human beings, plus the serious problems involved in observing human behaviour due to the fact that humans respond to being observed in complex and unpredictable ways, make a scientific approach impossible. Surely the whole point of science is that it deals with a world that has nothing to do with human beings — it attempts to explain things that would be true even if human beings never existed, and it relies on the fact that the natural world is impartial to human beings’ beliefs. As O’Hear puts it: A scientific theory will characteristically attempt to explain some natural phenomena by producing some general formula or theory covering all the phenomena of that particular type. From this general formula, it will be possible to predict how future phenomena in the class in question will turn out. Whether they do or not will depend on nature rather than on men, and any scientist can observe whether or not they do, regardless of his other beliefs. (O’Hear, 1989: 7)
In any investigation of human beings, as much as researchers might try to set up experiments in carefully controlled and standardised situations, how can we know the effect that extraneous factors, such as the way the experiment was set up, the subjects chosen, the instructions given, had on the participants’ behaviour? How do we deal with experimenter variables? Can the problems of the self-consciousness of the subjects and the bias of the observer be overcome? Winch (1970) argues that human actions are meaningful and that meaning is not a category open to causal analysis. Thus, human and social behaviour should be seen as rule-following behaviour, not as causally regular behaviour. Social science is distinguished from natural science by the unique property of its subject matter — it entertains beliefs about its own behaviour. The sociologist’s or anthropologist’s beliefs about the persons who make up the society under
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investigation have to take account of the beliefs of those persons about the very same facts. When we look at politics, we use political criteria, when we examine religion, we use religious criteria — we are nearly participants in the events. Related to both the conceptual and observational problems of the social and behavioural sciences in general, and of SLA in particular, is the problem of what is observable. If science is supposed to explain the facts, if the empirical method involves limiting enquiries to questions about objects and properties which can be perceived by the senses, then how can we expect SLA research, which deals, among other things with cognitive processes, emotional states, and social pressures, to conform to the scientific framework sketched above? Arguments like these are used to suggest that investigation of SLA should be excluded from the scientific club, as if, in some way, it did not live up to the standards of science. But there are, of course, a lot of academics in the field of SLA who have no wish to join the club. They argue that the insistence on being “scientific” robs the study of SLA of its interest. If science insists on reducing the complexities of human communication to mechanisms, and if it insists on a certain type of causal explanation, then we are better off without it. To some extent, doubts about, and objections to, the applicability of a scientific approach to SLA stem from a misunderstanding about what science is. I have already dealt with this issue at some length, with the aim of showing that there is no one scientific method, and that the claims for science, in terms of its ability to establish the truth, to give causal explanations, or even to accurately describe the world around us are extremely limited. If science is defined as the study of natural phenomena then obviously SLA is not part of science, and neither for that matter is mathematics. If those engaged in research in the areas of sociology, economics, anthropology and psychology, for example, wish to call themselves scientists in order to emphasise the rigorous nature of their work and to distinguish it from the work of astrologers, for example, then I see no reason to object, but there remain fundamental differences between the hard sciences and the social sciences. My intention, in any case, is not to argue that SLA research should or should not be scientific, but rather that it should be rational, in the sense just outlined, and that its explanations should be open to empirical tests. Science is in many ways the best example of rationality at work, and can, I suggest, be characterised by its insistence on the twin criteria of rational argument and empirical testing. I distance myself from those who claim that there is no such thing as objective knowledge, and also from those who claim that any legitimate explanation of SLA must conform to a narrowly-defined scientific framework. The aim is to dispel misunderstandings
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about what explanations and theories involve, and to provide minimal criteria for assessing our current theories.
5.2 Phenomena and data One central problem mentioned in the last section is the problem of what is observable. The problem is not confined to the natural sciences; it concerns any and all rational investigation. In order to deal with the problem of observability, a clear distinction should be made between phenomena and data. Theories attempt to explain phenomena, and observational data are used to support and test those theories. This distinction, argued for succinctly by Bogen and Woodward (1988), helps repair the damage done by positivists, for whom “cognitive psychology” would be an oxymoron. Phenomena are detected through the use of data, but in most cases are not observable in any interesting sense of that term. Examples of data include bubble chamber photographs, patterns of discharge in electronic particle detectors, and records of reaction times and error rates in various psychological experiments. Examples of phenomena, for which the above data might provide evidence, include weak neutral currents, the decay of the proton, and chunking and recency effects in human memory. (Bogen and Woodward, 1988: 306)
Bogen and Woodward give the example of research into the frontal lobes by neurophysiologists. Two researchers, Millner and Teuber, compared the performance of patients with frontal lobe damage due to surgery or gunshot wounds with normal controls on a number of tests. The tests involved sorting cards, visual searches, and orientation tasks. The data consisted of drawings made by surgeons and X-ray photographs of the skull, together with the test scores. Millner interpreted her data as indicating that damage to the frontal lobes impairs a subject’s ability to give up unsuccessful problem-solving strategies and devise new ones. Teuber thought his data indicated an impairment of a certain kind of co-ordination between motor and sensory functions. If Millner was right, behavioural preservation was the phenomenon her data indicated. If Teuber was right, the phenomenon indicated was a kind of dysfunction of sensory processing. (Bogen and Woodward, 1988: 316)
The important difference between data and phenomena is that instances of phenomena can occur in a wide variety of situations, since they are the result of
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the interaction of some manageably small number of causal factors, instances of which can also be found in a wide variety of situations. By contrast, many different sorts of causal factors play a part in the production of data, and their characteristics depend on the peculiarities of the experimental design, or datagathering procedures, employed. Data are idiosyncratic to particular experimental contexts, and typically cannot occur outside those contexts, whereas phenomena have stable, repeatable characteristics which will be detectable by means of different procedures, which may yield quite different kinds of data. … The psychological functions which Millner and Teuber ascribed to the frontal lobes ought to be exhibited in a wide variety of everyday behaviour. But the data (drawings, photographs and test scores) which they appealed to as evidence were idiosyncratic. (Bogen and Woodward, 1988: 317)
Bogen and Woodward go on to argue, as I have attempted to do above, that empirical observation is needed to test hypotheses, not to be collected for its own sake: we do not go around the world impassively, objectively observing things. Our observation is theory-laden, and both the natural world and human experience are so complex that mere data can never describe or explain them. The claim by positivists and some empiricists that we have no good reason to believe in the existence of entities which we cannot perceive is both overly optimistic about what our sense organs and instruments can tell us about the world, and overly pessimistic about our resources for establishing the existence of phenomena. Bogen and Woodward conclude their paper: In order to understand what science can achieve, it is necessary to reverse the traditional empiricist placement of trust and doubt. Our stance is to be modest and conservative in our estimation of what our senses and instruments can register, and to put more trust in the abilities of scientists to detect phenomena from the relatively little our senses and instruments do provide. (Bogen and Woodward, 1988: 352)
5.3 Explanation The previous section only partly deals with the fact that in all kinds of investigation, including that of SLA, there are appeals to things that cannot be observed in order to explain things that we can and do observe. To repeat: unobserved things include actual entities, like Neptune (which was claimed to exist — in order to explain the movements of Uranus — before it was eventually observed),
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electrons (which have never been observed, but can be, in principle), and forces, such as gravity. In all these examples, the claim of the theories involved is the same: some of the things we observe are manifestations of unobservable entities or forces. Theories attempt to explain the causes of things that often cannot be observed. The evidence for our theory is indirect, we argue that some of the things that we can observe are manifestations of, or effects of, the phenomena under study. If there are rival theories of a phenomenon, (and if more than one gets through the conceptual and empirical tests we subject it to — see below), then we tend to favour the theory that gives a better explanation of the phenomenon, by which is meant a more complete entailment of the statement of the problem. This is popularly known as the “inference to the best explanation”, the inference being that explanatory power is taken to be a reason for belief. We cannot, of course, in strictly logical terms, allow this inference: the phenomena, if not observable, are only inferred in virtue of the explanation they are part of. Yet it seems extremely unlikely that a particular theoretical account can actually fit the facts so well by pure coincidence. The logical positivists would say that we have gone beyond permissible operations, but, as Popper says Realists not only assume that there is a real world but also that this world is by and large more similar to the way modern theories describe it than to the way superseded theories describe it. On this basis, we can argue that it would be a highly improbable coincidence if a theory like Einstein’s could correctly predict very precise measurements not predicted by its predecessors unless there is “some truth” in it. (Popper 1974: 7)
Hacking makes a similar point: it would be an absolute miracle if for example the photo-electric effect went on working while there were no photons. The explanation of the persistence of this phenomenon — the one by which television information is converted from pictures into electrical impulses to be turned into electromagnetic waves in turn picked up by the home receiver — is that photons do exist. (Hacking, 1983: 54)
It is also worth reminding ourselves that many postulated entities for which there was initially no observable proof have since been observed: Neptune, microbes, genes, molecules among them. What then is a good explanation? What is it we are looking for when we ask for an explanation of some particular event that we find puzzling? The deductive view of explanation is that we look for information which, when appropriately put together, yields us an argument to the effect that the event in question
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was what we should rationally expect. For example, I go to get my motorcycle from the car park and find that it has a buckled front wheel. How did it happen I wonder? My friend tells me he borrowed my bike and hit a curb at speed. Well, that explains it! The event C (buckled wheel) was preceded by event A (my friend borrowed my bike) and event B (he hit a curb at speed).1 This explanation rests in turn on a causal law that hard objects will damage softer ones on impact (the explanans). A fully spelled out explanation takes the form of adducing a general law or laws, or generalisation, some set of initial conditions, and deducing from these the statement describing the event to be explained (the explanandum). Another feature of a deductive explanation is that it should show why something else did not happen — why the event in question had to happen. Deductive argument is so strong because if we can cite a valid generalisation of the form “All As are Bs” we rule out the chance of finding a singular statement of the form “This is A but not B.” The basic point of a deductive argument is that we cannot both accept the premises and deny the conclusion. Such a clean and tidy type of explanation is not always available, however; often, pace Popper, we have no general laws, we make unwarranted inferences, we use inductive arguments, we ignore cases of Bs that are not quite As, and so on. Nevertheless, the deductive schema serves as an ideal model, and has its practical uses. Let us take another tack: How is an explanation arrived at? The first step in constructing a satisfactory explanation is often to propose a low level theory: generalisations of what is immediately observable, such as that gases expand when heated, that glass is brittle, or as when Molière’s character ascribes the fact that opium puts people to sleep to its possession of “a dormative power”. Such generalisations do not get us much closer to an understanding of the cause of the expansion of gas, the brittleness of glass, or the sleepiness induced by opium: they do not tell us why they happen. But at least these low-level generalisations can succeed in eliminating other alternatives under review. If we explain the broken window by adducing the fact that glass is brittle, we rule out the alternative explanation that the projectile possessed immense, non-obvious force. A little further along in the development of an explanation, we might be able to make some more general statement about the relation between two observable events. Let us take the example of Boyle’s law. Boyle showed that reducing the volume of gas to one half doubled its pressure, in other words the pressure of a gas is inversely proportional to the volume (Asimov, 1975a). This is an example of an empirical law. The law generalises about a kind of event, not
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about a particular experiment with a particular cylinder using a particular gas, and is applicable to different events — other types of gases and/or cylinders. But it still does not tell us why an increase in pressure is linked with a decrease in volume. For this we need a theory of gases. Before we come to the theory, we should note that Boyle did not simply happen upon a J tube with some mercury in it, and observe that the pocket of air trapped in the closed end on the short side of the J shrank as he poured in more mercury. Boyle started with a problem — the density of air — and his experiment was designed to refute the accepted theory that the atmosphere was evenly dense all the way up. Continuing with the explanation of gases (Asimov, 1975a), the kinetic theory of gases answers the question of why the pressure of a gas is inversely proportional to the volume. The kinetic theory invokes the atomic nature of gas, and sees it as being composed of a large number of molecules which, because they are moving, sometimes collide with each other and the walls of the cylinder. Newtonian mechanics described the motion of these molecules and made it possible, in principle at least, to calculate the pressure on the walls of the cylinder by determining how many molecules are colliding with the walls at each instant, and the strength of each collision. With this picture in mind it is not surprising that when the cylinder’s surface area is reduced, the pressure rises, since there are more collisions. The same theory explains why gases expand when heated. The kinetic theory of gases says that gases are made up of molecules in constant motion and that heat causes more and more violent motion of the particles that compose the gas. This more general theory has wider application, it answers more questions (changes in pressure and expansions in volume have common underlying causes) and gives us a more complete picture. We should note two things. First, Boyle’s law was “the first step in the long series of discoveries about matter that eventually led to the atomic theory” (Asimov, 1975a: 170). A well-defined but unexplained empirical relationship is established between two phenomena, and this not only challenges the current paradigm but plays an important part in the development of a powerful new theory. Second, what has been improved is the causal narrative, not the deductive rigour. In some treatments of theory construction, distinctions are made between four different stages of development: description, prediction, determining causes, and explaining phenomena. In the case of Boyle’s law and the kinetic theory of gases, such a development might be argued to have taken place, but, Boyle’s law hardly serves as a good example of the first stage. To take another example, once it has been observed that watching violence on television and
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aggressive behaviour are systematically related to one another, it becomes possible to make predictions. We then try to determine the causes of this relation that we can now predict. And finally we need to explain the events described: even if we establish that watching violence on television causes aggressive behaviour, we have not yet explained why it does: we need a theory.2 While this might be an appealing account, it does not really do justice to the complexity of the matter: all these four “steps” are very tightly intertwined, particularly determining causes of events and explaining them, and often one or more step is left out.
5.4 Theory assessment By what criteria do we judge theories that offer different explanations of the same phenomena? What makes one theory “better” than a rival? First, like any text, a theory needs to be coherent and cohesive, and expressed in the clearest possible terms. It should also be consistent — there should be no internal contradictions. Theories can be compared by these initial criteria which may help to expose fatal weaknesses or simply invite a better formulation. In the discussions among philosophers of science about the natural sciences, these considerations are almost taken for granted: the big questions concern empirical adequacy, predictive ability, and so on. But I think Laudan is quite right to emphasise the importance of these “conceptual problems” although I disagree with his treatment of them. Of the four types of conceptual problem Laudan lists in his taxonomy (see above), the first — internal inconsistency or ambiguous theoretical mechanisms — is surely the most important. The second type of problem — assumptions made that run counter to other theories, prevailing metaphysical assumptions, widely accepted epistemology and methodology — seems to me to be relevant only to radical forms of relativism, which, according to my arguments in this book, means they should actually be excluded from serious consideration. There are no conceptual problems involved in assuming things that run counter to other theories, as long as the widely accepted epistemology and methodology is rationalist in the sense I have already defined it. Laudan’s third category is reserved for conceptual problems that cause the theory in question to violate the “research tradition” of which it is a part. I have already said that I think this is an ill-defined technical term, and that anyway I can see no use for it. There is no need to pledge allegiance to any group, or to
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belong to any tradition, apart from the rationalist one, which has nothing to say about such “conceptual problems.” Once again, I suggest that Laudan’s attempt to champion the rationalist cause is misguided; we do not have to regard clashes of theories as evidence of irrationality or to suppose that this is a problem that can only be solved by inventing a research tradition. Laudan’s final type of conceptual problem occurs when a theory fails to utilise concepts from more general theories to which it should be logically subordinate. Unfortunately Laudan does not expand on this, and it seems to me that this type of problem either belongs properly to the first category, or is no problem at all. If the argument is that a theory “should” be subordinate because of some obligation to the research tradition it is supposed to belong to, then I would say that if the theory has the impudence to challenge its presumed superiors, well good luck to it. Despite my objections to important aspects of Laudan’s theory of scientific progress, I think Laudan is right to emphasise the importance of conceptual problems when assessing a theory. In the field of SLA, there is a great deal of muddled thinking, there are poorly-argued assertions, and badly-defined terms. Consequently, discussions among researchers and academics in SLA often deal with just these issues. Similarly, research methodology is less of a problem in the natural sciences than it is in SLA, partly because in the former experiments are often easier to control, variables are easier to operationalise, etc., and partly because the latter is so relatively young. Whatever the reasons, it is certainly the case that when judging theories of SLA, we should favour those that are most rigorously formulated. Once a theory passes the test, more or less strictly set and marked, of coherence, cohesiveness, consistency, and clarity, we may pass on to questions of falsifiability and empirical adequacy. I should insist yet again that we are dealing with common sense notions of evaluation; the tests are never absolute. Crucially, theories should lay themselves open to empirical testing: there must be a way that a theory can in principle be challenged by empirical observations, and ad hoc hypotheses that attempt to rescue a theory from “unwanted” findings are to be frowned on. The more a theory lays itself open to tests, the more risky it is, the stronger it is. Risky theories tend to be the ones that make the most daring and surprising predictions, which is perhaps the most valued criterion of them all, and they are often also the ones that solve persistent problems in their domain. Generally speaking the wider the scope of a theory, the better it is, although often in practice many broad theories have little empirical content. There are often “depth versus breadth” issues, and yet again,
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how these two factors are weighted will depend on other factors in the particular situation where the theory finds itself. Simplicity, often referred to as Occam’s Razor, is another criterion for judging rival theories: ceteris paribus, the one with the simplest formula, and the fewest number of basic types of entity postulated, is to be preferred for reasons of economy. There are no golden rules for theory assessment, no hard and fast rules even, except the obvious requirement that a theory has empirical content. How long should we defend a theory with bad test results — when do we say it has been falsified? To what extent do we ignore anomalies? When should we agree that a theory which is vague and confused is nevertheless a plausible candidate for development? Such issues must be decided on a case-by-case basis, and publicly debated among those working in the field.
5.5 Four views on constructing and assessing theories of SLA Before giving my own guidelines for a “critical rationalist” approach to SLA, I will briefly examine four different views of theory construction and assessment in SLA: the views of the relativists, Gregg, Long, and McLaughlin. 5.5.1 The relativist approach Those in the SLA academic community, already mentioned in Chapter 1, who adopt a relativist, postmodernist position, deny the idea of any objective reality external to the observer, and claim that there are a multiplicity of realities, all of which are social constructs. The adoption of the view that the construction of reality is a social process means, as we have seen, that there can be no one “best” theory of anything: there are simply different ways of looking at, seeing, and talking about things, each with its own perspective, each with its own set of explicit or implicit rules which members of the social group construct for themselves. Thus science, for example, is just one specific type of social construction, a particular kind of language game which has no more claim to objective truth than any other. In SLA research, those who take this view see the need to fight what they see as the outdated and suffocating “positivist” paradigm which currently dominates the field, and to replace it with their own methodology. Let us look at a few short examples of this point of view.
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Schumann (1983) suggests that SLA research should be viewed as both art and science. As an example of the artistic perspective Schumann suggests viewing the opposing accounts of Krashen and McLaughlin of conscious and unconscious learning as two different paintings of the language learning experience — as reality symbolised in two different ways… Viewers can choose between the two on an aesthetic basis, favouring the painting which they find to be phenomenologically true to their experience. (Schumann, 1983: 74)
Lantolf (1996a) suggests that scientific theories are metaphors, that the acceptance of “standard scientific language” within a discipline “diminishes the productivity of the scientific endeavour” and that “to keep a field fresh and vibrant, one must create new metaphors” (Lantolf, 1996a: 756). Firth and Wagner (1997) argue that SLA research should be “reconceptualised” so as to “enlarge the ontological and empirical parameters of the field”. They continue: We claim that methodologies, theories and foci within SLA reflect an imbalance between cognitive and mentalistic orientations, and social and contextual orientations to language, the former orientation being unquestionably in the ascendancy. (Firth and Wagner, 1997: 143)
At the end of their paper they say: although SLA has the potential to make significant contributions to a wide range of research issues, that potential is not being realised while the field in general perpetuates the theoretical imbalances and skewed perspectives on discourse and communication. (Firth and Wagner, 1997: 285)
Block (1996) argues that the field of SLA is under the sway of a ruling ideology, and in the course of a plea for a wider view of SLA research, Block challenges some central assumptions held by what he sees as the ruling clique. The assumptions that Block objects to include that there is any such thing as “normal science”, that a multiplicity of theories is problematic, that replication studies are helpful, and that there is an “ample body” of “accepted findings” within SLA research. Finally Block argues that one problem for the SLA community, which stems from its being under the sway of such misleading assumptions, is that those who attempt to challenge them do not get a fair opportunity to voice and promote their alternative views. Markee (1994) notes that: “a few writers have valiantly attempted to stem the nomothetic tide”, but that “these have been voices crying in the applied
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linguistic wilderness” (Markee, 1994:91). The “hermeneutic scientific tradition” that Markee would like to see given at least equal footing with its nomothetic big brother replaces explanation with understanding, replaces “objective, valuefree language” with “the ordinary language of social actors and their lay explanations of everyday experience” (Markee, 1994: 92), and replaces a mathematical statistical explanation of a phenomenon with an explanation “that is constructed in terms of lay participants’ real-time understanding of the phenomenon” (Markee, 1994: 93). 5.5.1.1Discussion While I have already explained my objections to the relativists’ epistemological claims, and argued the case for critical rationalism, I would like here to separate two different issues which I think have been wrongly bundled together by the relativists. The two issues I refer to can be summed up in these questions: 1. What phenomena need explaining and what range of opinions should be expressed in the SLA research community? 2. How should we explain the phenomena of SLA? When Firth and Wagner (1997) argue for “a reconceptualization of SLA research that would enlarge the ontological and empirical parameters of the field”, they would seem to be making a plea for more attention to be paid to sociolinguistics and discourse analysis, and for SLA research to be liberated from the domination of “Chomskian thinking.” But there is another argument in the Firth and Wagner paper, namely that those working in psycholinguistics are dominated by the views of a small group of researchers who insist that SLA research be carried out according to “established” and “normal” scientific standards. Firth and Wagner argue that there is something deeply wrong with such a position, and they go on to suggest that SLA research should throw off the assumptions of scientific enquiry and adopt a relativist epistemology which holds that there is not one reality, that all science is political, that all statements are theory-laden, that theories are a kind of storytelling, and so on. Here the two separate issues mentioned above have become tangled up. As Long puts it Firth and Wagner attempt to bolster their “social context” case by an unfortunate appeal to epistemological relativism thereby conflating what are two separate issues. (Long, 1999: 3)
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Block (1996) makes exactly the same mistake as Firth and Wagner. Block claims that those who attempt to challenge the ruling clique in SLA do not get a fair opportunity to voice and promote their alternative views, and at the same time he claims that the field of SLA is dominated by a certain methodological orthodoxy which should be replaced by a more relativistic alternative. Again, we must separate the issues. To argue for a shift in focus for SLA research, i.e. for a more multi-theoretical, multi-methodological approach, where research is done from a sociocultural perspective, where a more context-sensitive approach is adopted, where concepts such as “non-native speaker”, “learner”, and “interlanguage” are reexamined with increased “emic” (i.e. participant-relevant) sensitivity, is one thing. To argue that there is no rational way to decide that Theory X is better than Theory Y is another, separate thing. The first issue is a political question about priorities in the distribution of limited research resources, the second issue is about the fundamental questions of what we can know, and of how we should do research. The relativists have every right to argue for more resources to be devoted to their kind of research, and to argue the merits of their kind of approach to theory construction and assessment. But they should clearly separate what are, I repeat, two different issues. If it is in fact the case that those professing to use a rationalist, deductive research methodology are imposing their methods on others, and are insensitive to the value of “home-grown ways of thinking”, then I would be the first to urge them to stop such an imposition, and to listen to different points of view. What I would not ask them to do is stop criticising, or to abandon their methodology. The important issue concerns explanation. While I hold a rationalist, realist position, the relativists claim that such views are obsolete and blinkering. This is an epistemological issue. As an example we can take the suggestion that scientific theories are metaphors, that the acceptance of “standard scientific language” within a discipline “diminishes the productivity of the scientific endeavour” and that “to keep a field fresh and vibrant, one must create new metaphors.” Nobody, I suppose, would question that terms like “input” “processing” and “output” are metaphors, and it is certainly worth reminding oneself that they are metaphors. But, from my side of the fence, scientific theories are not just metaphors, they are attempted explanations of events that take place in a real world and they are open to empirical tests which support or falsify them and thus make it possible for us to choose rationally between them. To the extent that researchers need to be flexible, to be imaginative, to open
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up to unlikely possibilities, to brainstorm, to “fly kites”, etc., I would completely endorse Schumann’s suggestion that SLA research should be viewed as both art and science. I have no objection to looking at Krashen’s and McLaughlin’s theories as “paintings”, as reality symbolised in two different ways, but sooner or later, I suggest, we will need to scrutinise Krashen’s and McLaughlin’s accounts in order to check their validity, and to subject them to empirical tests. On the basis of such scrutiny, by uncovering ill-defined terms, contradictions, etc., and by seeing how they stand up to empirical tests, we will be able to evaluate the two accounts and make some tentative choice between them. First, they cannot both be correct: McLaughlin suggests that conscious learning affects language production, while Krashen denies this. Second, they suggest different ways of continuing the search for answers to the question of interlanguage development, and different pedagogical applications, and researchers have to have some reasons to choose between them. Krashen’s account is seriously flawed since, first, its terms are almost circular, and second, there is very little empirical content in it These, to the rationalist, are extremely serious defects. Schumann suggests that: “Neither position is correct; they are simply alternative representations of reality” (Schumann, 1983: 75). It may well turn out that neither position is correct, and they are certainly alternative representations of reality; but if the implication is that there is no way, other than an appeal to our own subjective aesthetic sense, to decide between them, then here lies the fundamental disagreement between rationalists and extreme relativists. 5.5.2 Strictly science Gregg’s discussion (1993, 1996a, 2001) of the issues of theory construction and assessment represents a particularly radical version of a scientific, linguistic approach to explanation encouraged by Chomsky. By insisting on this approach to SLA theory, and concluding that there is absolutely no theory of SLA that satisfies his criteria, I think Gregg misappropriates Chomsky’s L1 agenda and sets inappropriate standards for those involved in SLA research. A close examination of the three papers cited above reveals that Gregg has nothing very useful to say about explanation, and that while his argument in the 1996a and 2001 papers that “the heart of a comprehensive L2 acquisition theory is a theory that deals with the logical and developmental problems of L2 acquisition” (Gregg, 1996a:74) is persuasive, it actually amounts to very little. Gregg gives the impression of demanding the impossible, but his arguments do not in fact hold a broader, less demanding, but still rationalist SLA research programme to ransom.
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Gregg (1993) takes the acquisition of L2 competence, in the Chomskian sense of the term, to be the domain of a theory of SLA. To explain SLA in this limited sense, Gregg says two different types of theory are required: a transition theory and a property theory. (The terms were coined by Cummins (1983).) A transition theory asks questions of the form: Why does system S change states from S-1 to S-2? Why does water expand when it freezes? A property theory, on the other hand, does not deal with causes and effects, it deals with the question “What is it for system S to have property P?” One way of constructing a property theory is to carry out a functional analysis — an analysis of S is constructed that explains S’s possession of P by an appeal to the properties of S’s components and their mode of organisation. Flow charts or exploded views of complex machinery are examples. Gregg argues that theories of generative grammar can be seen as property theories: complex grammatical knowledge is broken down into the interaction of less complex, “ultimately mindless”, principles and rules. Meanwhile, to explain the acquisition of the knowledge thus described, we need a transition theory. Thus, the two questions to be answered by a theory of SLA are: 1. How is L2 knowledge instantiated in the mind/brain? 2. How does L2 knowledge come to be acquired? Gregg goes on to discuss explanation in more detail. He begins by describing Hempel’s model of explanation, called deductive-nomological (D-N), where an explanation is seen as a deductive argument where the explanandum is a true statement that is entailed by the conjunction of a covering law and a specific condition. An example from SLA is All learners of L follow an acquisition order of X before Y Fred is a learner of L Fred acquired X before Y. Gregg lists several problems with the D-N model. First, it only explains individual events, not regularities. Second there are phenomena that are neither logically necessary, nor likely, and yet are explicable. Third, as applied to SLA, the model requires laws and we do not have any, or if we do, they are to be found in the property theory. Fourth, when the covering law is bi-conditional (if p then q and if q then p), we can, to use Gregg’s example, explain a storm by appealing to the barometer. And finally, the stringency of the D-N model only applies to truly universal covering laws; it makes no reference to individuals, and it is, therefore, as Gregg puts it “irrelevant to SLA theory.”
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Gregg goes on to say that what is lacking in a D-N explanation is the idea of causality. When we look for causes we need to go beyond what is observed and look for hidden causes which lead us to more successful theories. Gregg cites the arguments of Bogen and Woodward (which I have dealt with above in Chapter 5), in support of the argument that theories are explanations of phenomena, and that data are evidence for the phenomena; the phenomena are the subject of the explanation. So theories try to explain phenomena; we infer phenomena from data and we infer an explanation from the phenomena. Gregg tells us that this kind of explanation is known as “inference to the best explanation”: we posit an explanans which, if it existed, would allow us to deduce the explanandum. If there were another planet beyond Uranus, its gravitational force would cause the orbit of Uranus to be such and such; Uranus’s orbit is in fact such and such; therefore there is another planet. Gregg accepts that logically, this is a fallacy — it affirms the consequent — but he says “it works surprisingly well”, or at least sometimes. It worked for Uranus when they found Jupiter, but it did not work for Mercury. Clearly, it is not enough to posit a given unobserved cause just because it explains the phenomena. Gregg’s next point is that the range of candidate causal explanations needs to be limited as much as possible. One way to do this is to focus on what counts as the ‘best’ explanation. Gregg cites Lipton (1991), who makes the distinction between the most warranted explanation (the ‘likeliest’), and the one which is most explanatory (the “loveliest”). For example Molière’s explanation of why opium makes you sleepy (it’s dormative virtue), or the explanation that L2 learners do not reach native proficiency because of fossilisation, are likely, but they do not get us very close to the causes. A conspiracy theory, on the other hand, is lovely, according to Gregg, because it can account for widely disparate phenomena. Gregg concludes that we must choose between two different standards; local plausibility or general understanding, and that, luckily for us, the world is so structured that the lovelier the explanation the more likely it is to be the correct explanation. Gregg gives some examples. Flynn’s explanation (1987) of the differences in elicited imitation scores between Japanese-speaking and Spanish-speaking non native-speakers of English is an example of a lovely explanation in SLA. It connects her explanation to a rich, well-developed linguistic theory and thus relates her explanandum phenomena to a wider set of phenomena and hence offers greater opportunity for enlightenment On the other hand, Ellis’s and Tarone’s Variable Competence model “shuns loveliness with all its might”. By clinging to the data and avoiding SLA phenomena the
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Variable Competence model wilfully shuts out the possibility of using variation as a means of explaining L2 competence. As for the so-called functional or discourse theories of SLA, Gregg opines that they have yet to approach the question of loveliness in the first place, and, for Gregg, it is not self-evident that functionalist “explanations” are explanations at all, let alone lovely ones. Gregg admits that loveliness, however, is not enough; relevant evidence is also necessary. To determine whether given evidence is relevant we need to further narrow the range of possible explanations, and Gregg suggests that a good way of doing this to look at contrastive versus non-contrastive explanations. It is sometimes possible to explain the contrast without being able to explain the fact itself. In SLA we can often propose contrastive explanations which, while not necessarily incorrect, are to a greater or lesser extent, incomplete. Acculturation theory accounts for proficiency contrasts by putative acculturation contrasts; Krashen does the same by appealing to affective differences. These are contrastive differences, and the explanations, while likely, are not lovely. UG-related SLA theory has the advantage of having a detailed property theory to latch on to. Thus enabled, the researcher can ask ‘Why is population A better with ECP violation than population B?’, a lovely question, rather than questions like ‘Why is population A better than population B?’ Gregg finishes his paper by noting that in so far as UG is a set of constraints on possible grammars, UG has a causal relation to acquisition (at least L1 acquisition) but it is not the whole story. What is also necessary is a transition theory that connects UG with some sort of acquisition mechanism, such as a parser or some sort of bootstrapping procedure that acts on the input in such a way as to lead to the formation of a grammar. In his 1996 article, Gregg again insists that a theory of SLA is a theory of linguistic competence, and explores the nature of L2 competence. To explain L2 competence, Gregg argues that we need a property theory to explain the “logical problem” of SLA, which is, similarly to the logical problem of L1 acquisition, that L2 learners achieve a competence which goes well beyond the input they receive. There are two varieties of property theories: modular (UG) and nonmodular. Gregg deals with two nonmodular approaches to L2 competence: O’Grady’s language acquisition theory (1987, 1996), and connectionism (see Gasser, 1990 and Chapter 7). Gregg says that there is little evidence yet to support either view. We are left with theories of UG. Gregg uses a theological analogy to describe different UG approaches to L2. UG “deists” say that UG is essential for L1 development but has no role in L2 development, just as God created the
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universe, set things going, and then retired. “Theists”, on the other hand, say that UG is immanent in language use and L1 acquisition, so also participates in L2 acquisition, just as some argue in theology that God is everywhere. (Nonmodular approaches can be seen as forms of atheism.) Whether one adopts a deist or theist approach, the domain of the theory is limited: it says nothing about foreign accent, L1-related errors, or indeed anything outside the confines of the “core grammar” dealt with by UG. This narrowing of the theoretical domain is, says Gregg, “a result devoutly to be wished” — those advocating a “communicative competence” approach, like the morpheme-acquisition researchers, have, according to Gregg, found themselves in difficult situations for lack of a theoretical foundation for interpreting empirical data. Gregg gives some examples of the difference between deism and theism. The principle of Subjacency is irrelevant to languages without wh-movement, and so the question arises: will the principle of Subjacency constrain the learner of an L2 with wh-movement whose L1 does not have wh-movement? Theists say yes, deists say no. Similarly, with binary parameters (pro-drop, or agreement), if L1 and L2 have different settings, the theist will expect the parameter to be “reset” for the L2, while the deist will not. Turning to the transition theory component, Gregg cites Atkinson (1982) who lays down conditions for a theory of L1 acquisition: a sequence of theories T1, T2, … Tn, each accounting for the data in a given domain D for different times t1, … tn, (a property theory) plus a mechanism M for getting from Ti to Ti+1 (a transition theory). Gregg examines SLA theories in terms of 3 criteria Atkinson gives for any theory to meet: 1. Ti must be constructed within the framework of a particular general theory. This is the Theoretical Framework Criterion. 2. The sequence T1, T2, … Tn must be explicable: we must be able to explain why X occurs before Y and not vice versa in a developmental sequence. This is the Sequence Criterion. 3. There must be a detailed specification of the acquisition mechanism, M. This is the Mechanism Criterion. The Theoretical Framework Criterion implies that any theory that does not