The World Unclaimed: A Challenge To Heidegger's Critique Of Husserl (Series In Continental Thought)

The World Unclaimed A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique ofHusserl

LILIAN ALWEISS

O h i o University Press ATHENS

Series in Continental Thought EDITORIAL

BOARD

Steven Gait Crowell, Chairman, Rice University Elizabeth A. Behnke David Carr, Emory University J o h n J. D r u m m o n d , M o u n t St. Mary's College Lester E m b r e e , Florida Atlantic University B u r t C. Hopkins, Seattle University Jose Huertas-Jourda, Wilfrid Laurier University J o s e p h J. Kockelmans, Pennsylvania State University William R. McKenna, Miami University Algis Mickunas, O h i o University J. N. Mohanty, T e m p l e University T h o m a s N e n o n , University of Memphis T h o m a s M. Seebohm, J o h a n n e s G u t e n b e r g Universitat, Mainz Gail Soffer, New School for Social Research Elizabeth Stroker, Universitat Koln f Richard M. Zaner, Vanderbilt University INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY

BOARD

Suzanne Bachelard, Universite de Paris Rudolf Boehm, Rijksuniversiteit Gent Albert Borgmann, University of Montana A m e d e o Giorgi, Saybrook Institute Richard Grathoff, Universitat Bielefeld Samuel Ijsseling, Husserl-Archief te Leuven Alphonso Lingis, Pennsylvania State University W e r n e r Marx, Albert-Ludwigs Universitat, F r e i b u r g f David Rasmussen, Boston College J o h n Sallis, Pennsylvania State University J o h n Scanlon, D u q u e s n e University H u g h J. Silverman, State University of New York, Stony Brook Carlo Sini, Universita di Milano J a c q u e s Taminiaux, Louvain-la-Neuve D. Lawrence Wieder Dallas Willard, University of Southern California

Ohio University Press, Athens, Ohio 45701 © 2003 by Lilian Alweiss Printed in the United States of America All rights reserved Ohio University Press books are printed on acid-free paper 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03

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Aversion of chapter two was published as "The Enigma of Time" in PhanomenologischeForschungen 4/2 (1999): 159-202 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Alweiss, Lilian, 1966The world unclaimed : a challenge to Heidegger's critique of Husserl / Lilian Alweiss. p. cm. — (Series in Continental Thought; 30) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-8214-1464-X 1. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. 2. Husserl, Edmund, 18591938.1. Title. II. Series. B3279.H49 A644 2002 193-dc21 2002066301

For my parents

"Hiersdn ist herrlich * — Rainer Maria Rilke, Duineser Elegien

CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

XI

LIST OE ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT AND ENDNOTES

xiii

INTRODUCTION

xix

PROLOGUE

1

C H A P T E R O N E . H U S S E R L AND H E I D E G G E R : A REAPPRAISAL OF T H E I R R E L A T I O N S H I P

Introduction Why Husserl Is Not an Internalist §1. Husserl, a Methodological Solipsist? §2. Object and Meaning Do Not Coincide §3. The Structure of Consciousness §4. The Problem of Reference §5. "The Ontological Turn of the Concept of Evidence" Heidegger's Indebtedness to Husserl §6. Intuitions zvithout Concepts Are Blind §7. Categorial Intuition §8. Being Is Not a Predicate The Transcendental Turn §9. The Transcendental Turn §10. Husserl and Hu me §11. The Spectacle of the World §12. Ontology versus Epistemology Conclusion

3 4 5 6 7 8 10 11 12 13 15 16 19 20

C H A P T E R T W O . T O W A R D AN " U N W O R L D L Y " B E G I N N I N G

Introduction Heidegger's Critique §13. HusserVs Cartesianism §14. The Incompleteness of Space §15. The Bracketing of the Unseen §16. An Incompleteness That Is Not Based on Lack §17. The Affirmation of an Enclosed Space Toward an "Unworldly" Existence §18. The 'Annihilation of the World" §19. The Description of Immanent Perception in Ideen I §20. Limitations of I d e e n I

22 23 24 25 26 27 29 30 32

CONTENTS

§84. Phenomenology as a Form of Archaeology §85. To Practice Phenomenology Is to Practice Humility Conclusion

134 136 138

C H A P T E R FIVE. T H E W O R L D RECLAIMED

Introduction The Return to an Embodied Dasein §86. The Need to Return to an Embodied Dasein §87. Heidegger's Reservations §88. "The Body as an Outer Brain of Man " §89. The Prioritization of Theoretical Consciousness The Body Moves before T Can'—The Break with Immanence § 90. The Body as the Hyletic Foundation of Consciousness §91. The Body That Is Felt §92. The Double Apprehension of the Body § 93. The Primacy of the Sensing Body §94. The Reduction of the 7 Can' §95. The Latency of Consciousness §96. The Spatium Sensibile as the Abiding Correlate ofExperien ce §97. Husserl as the True Heir of Kant The Primacy of the World §98. The Absolute Hereness' of My Body §99. The Refutation of Idealism §100. The Objective World §101. But the World Does Not Move Conclusion

141 142 145 147 149 151 152 153 155 155 156 157 158 160 161 162 163 165

A P P E N D I X . T H E W O R L D T H A T SPEAKS

(a) A Linguistic Departure (b) The Symbolic Structure of the World (c) Resisting the Hybrid Called Language' (d) The Return to Dasein (e) The Fear ofFragmentation (f) The Spatial Basis of Language

167 168 171 176 177 178

NOTES

181

WORKS CITED

227

SUBJECT INDEX

237

NAME INDEX

241

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

MY SPECIAL THANKS go to those who have guided me through this work. They are Jay Bernstein, Howard Caygill, Simon Critchley, Klaus Held, William Large, and David Smith. Many eyes and hands were involved to ensure the completion of this work, and I am indebted to them all: Yvonne Alweiss, Charles Barrow, Jeremy Dittmer, Ruth Goodwin, Brian Garvey, Richard Gray, Steven Kupfer, Jean Lechner, Ian Lyne, Alan Montefiore, Paul Naish, Joanna Oyediran, and Nicholas Walker. I am extremely grateful to series editor Steven Crowell for his encouragement and advice, to the two anonymous readers for Ohio University Press for their detailed and constructive comments, and to Sharen Rose and Bevin McLaughlin for their editorial help. Finally, I should like to thank the many friends (too numerous to list) for their advice and encouragement at various stages of writing. It goes without saying that I am to be held responsible for any errors or misjudgments that remain. This book is based on my Ph.D. thesis submitted to the University of Essex and entitled "The Recovery of Time and the Loss of the World." I should like to thank the British Academy for its support at that time.

Abbreviations Used in the Text and Endnotes

Unless it is indicated otherwise, I have a d h e r e d to the most recent translations cited. W h e r e the page n u m b e r of the original text is not provided in the marginalia, I have provided the page n u m b e r of the translated text. Anything in square brackets is my own addition.

A. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR MARTIN HEIDEGGER Note: T h e n u m b e r after the Gesamtausgabe (GA) [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 19-] refers to the individual volume. I have cited the GA only where no other edition is available. When referring to an individual essay, I give two page numbers: the first refers to the page n u m b e r in the original publication; the second, to the page n u m b e r in subsequent editions in which the essay appears. Brief Letter Heidegger wrote to Husserl on 22 October 1927 in Phdnomenologische Psychologie, Hua. IX, 601-2. [Translated by Thomas J. Sheehan: "The Idea of Phenomenology, with a Letter to Edmund Husserl." Listeningl2 (1977): 118-21.] BW David Farrell Krell, ed. Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings. London: Routledge Paul & Kegan, 1993. GA 4 Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Erlduterungen zu Holdertins Dichtung. 1981. GA 15 Curd Ochwadt, ed. Seminare (1951-1973). 1986. GA 20 Petra Jaeger, ed. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs (Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1925). 1988. [Translated by Theodore Kisiel: History of the Concept of Time, Prolegomena. Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.] GA21 Walter Biemel, ed. Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit (Marburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1925/26). 1976. GA 24 Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Die Grundprobleme der Phdnomenologie (Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1927). 1975. GA 26 Klaus Held, ed. Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz. (Marburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1928). 1978. [Translated by Michael Heim: The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.] GA 29/30 Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Die Grundbegriffe der

A B B R E V I A T I O N S

Metaphysik, WeUFndUchkeit-Einsamkdt (Freiburger Vorlesung Wintersemester 1929/30). 1983. [Translated by William McNeill and Nicholas Walker: The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics— World, Finitude, Solitude. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.] Manfred S. Frings, ed. Parmenides (Freiburger Vorlesung WinGA54 tersemester 1942/43). 1982. Claudius Strube, ed. Phdnomenologie der Anschauung und des GA59 Ausdrucks—Theorie der Philosophischen Begriffsbildung (Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1920). 1993. Kate Brocker-Oltmanns, ed. Ontobgie (Hermeneutik der FaktiziGA63 tat) (Friihe Freiburger Vorlesung Sommersemester 1923). 1988. Holzwege Holzwege (1935-1946). Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1950. Or GA 5, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. 1977. Kantbuch Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (1929), 5th extended edition. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991. Or GA 3, 1991. [Translated by Richard Taft: Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.] Kunst und Raum "Die Kunst und der Raum" (1969). In GA 13, Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, ed. Hermann Heidegger, 1983, 203-10. [Translated by Charles H. Seibert: "Art and Space." Man and Worldb (1973): 3-8.] Letter to Richardson. In William J. Richardson, Heidegger through Phenomenology to Thought, viii-xxi. The Hague: Martinus NijhofF, 1963. OWL On the Way to Language. New York: Harper and Row, 1971. SuZ Sein und Zeit (1927), 15th revised and extended edition. Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1979. Or GA 2, FriedrichWilhelm von Herrmann, ed., 1977. [Translated—based on the seventh edition—by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson: Being and Time. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1962.] UzS Unterwegs zur Sprache (1950-59). Pfullingen: Gtinther Neske, 1959. Or GA 12, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., 1985. WdG "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (1929) in Wegmarken, 123-73. [Translated—based on the fourth German edition—by Terrence Malick: The Essence of Reasons. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1969. Wegmarken Wegmarken (1919-1961), 2nd revised edition. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978. Or GA9, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, ed., 1976. [The citations refer to the 1978 edition.] For translations of individual essays, see bibliography. WhD Was heisst Denken? (1951-1952), 4th edition. Tubingen: Max

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Niemeyer Verlag, 1984. Or GA 8. [Translated by Fred D. Wieck a n d j . Glenn Gray: What Is Called Thinking? New York: Harper & Row, 1968.] Zdhringer Seminare Seminare zu Zdhringen. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1973. Or "Seminar in Zahringen 1973" in GA 15,372-400. ZSD Zur Sache des Denkens (1962-1964). Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1969. Or GA 14. [Translated by Joan Stambaugh: On Time and Being. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.]

B. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR EDMUND HUSSERL Note: All references give the page number of the HUSSERLIANA (Hua) (Edmund Husserl: Gesammelte Werke [based on the unpublished work in the Husserl-Archive]. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950-) first. T h e page n u m b e r s in the marginalia of the English translation of H u a X refer to the Hua, whereas the page n u m b e r s in the marginalia of the English translation of Idem / r e f e r to the 1913 (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag) edition. Unless otherwise noted, I have made only the following two amendments to the published translations: 1) I have translated the term Erlebnis as "lived experience" and not as "mental process"; 2) I have translated the term Leib as "lived body" and not as "Body." BrWII HUSSERLIANA-DOKUMENTE Karl Schuhmann in conjunction with E. Schuhmann, ed. Briefwechsel, vol. 2. 1994. BrWIII HUSSERLIANA-DOKUMENTE Karl Schuhmann in conjunction with E. Schuhmann, ed. Briefwechsel, vol. 3, Die Gottinger Schule. 1994. CM S. Strasser, ed. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrdge. 1950. The main text has been edited and individually published by Elisabeth Stroker: Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1987. [Translated by Dorion Cairns: Cartesian Meditations—An Introduction to Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, I960.] EU Ludwig Landgrebe, ed. Erfahrung und Urteil, Untersuchungen zur Genealogie derLogik, 6th revised edition. With an afterword and index by Lothar Eley. Hamburg: Meiner Verlag, 1985. [Translated byJ. S. Churchill and Karl Ameriks: Experience and Judgement—Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1973.] Hua II Walter Biemel, ed. Idee der Phdnomenologie, Fiinf Vorlesungen (1907). 1973. [Translated by William P. Alston and George

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Nakhnikian: The Idea of Phenomenology. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.] Hua VIII Rudolf Boehm, ed. Erste Philosophie (1923-1924). 1959. Hua IX Walter Biemel, ed. Phdnomenologische Psychologie (Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925). 1962. Hua X Rudolf Boehm, ed. Zur Phdnomenologie des Inneren Zeitbeiousstseins (1893-1917). 1966. Originally published as "Vorlesungen zur Phanomenologie des inneren ZeitbewuBtsein" (19051910), Martin Heidegger, ed., in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phdnomenologische Forschung, vol. 9 (1928), 367-498; reprinted in Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1980. The additional texts of the critical edition of Zeitbewufitsein have been individually published and edited by Rudolf Bernet: Texte zur Phdnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917). Hamburg: Felix Mei-ner Verlag, 1985. [Translated by John Barnett Brough: On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917) Collected Works IV. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991; Zeitbewufitsein was first translated by James S. Churchill as The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964.] Hua XI

Margot Fleischer, ed. Analysen zur Passiven Synthesis (Aus Vorlesungs- und Forschungsmanuskripten 1918-1926). 1966. Hua XVI Ulrich Claesges, ed. Ding und Raum (Vorlesungen 1907). 1973. Individual publication and edition of the main text and appendix I by Karl-Heinz Hahnengress and Smail Rapic. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1991. Hua XVII Paul Janssen, ed. Formale und transzendentale Logik— Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft (1929). 1974. First published in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phdnomenologische Forschung, vol. 10, and reprinted in Halle (Saale): Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1929. [Translated by Dorion Cairns: Formal and Transcendental Logic. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.] Ideen I Hua III. Walter Biemel, ed. Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einfuhrung in die reine Phanomenologie (1913), revised and extended edition based on Husserl's handwritten marginalia. 1950. Originally published under the same title in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phdnomenologische Forschung vol. 1, and reprinted by Max Niemeyer, Halle, 1913. [Translated by F. Kersten: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenobgical Philosophy, First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology; Collected Works, vol. II. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982. Ideen I was first translated by W. R. Gibson under the auspices of Hus-

A B B R E V I A T I O N S

Ideen II

Ideen III

Krisis

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serl in 1931 as Ideas— General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology. New York: First Collier Books Edition, 1962.] H u a IV. Marly Biemel, ed. Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: Phdnomenobgische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, ([1912-] 1928). 1952. [Translated by Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy; Second Book: Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989.] Hua V. Marly Biemel, ed. Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phdnomenologischen Philosophie. Drittes Buch, Die Phdnomenologie und die Fundamente der Wissenschaf ten. 1971. [Translated by Ted E. Klein and William E. Pohl: Edmund Husserl Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Sciences; Third Book, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1980.] Hua VI. Walter Biemel, ed. Die Krisis der europdischen Wissenschaften und die transzendentale Phdnomenlogie (1934-1937). 1954. [Translated by David Garr: The Crisis ofEuropean Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1970.] J. N. Findlay, trans. Logical Investigations, vols. I and II. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970. Hua XVIII-XIX/1-2; originally published as Logische Untersuchungen. Tubingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 2nd revised edition. Vol. I: Hua XVIIL Elmar Holenstein, ed. Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (1913). 1975. Vol. I I / l : Hua X I X / 1 . Ursula Panzer, ed. Untersuchungen zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis (1913). 1984. Vol. II/2: Hua XIX/2. Ursula Panzer, ed. "Elemente einer phanomenologischen Aufklarung der Erkenntnis (1921)" in Untersuchungen zur Phdnomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. 1984.

C. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR IMMANUEL KANT KRV

AK

Wilhelm Weischedel, ed. Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781 A version, 1787 B version), in Kant-Werke, vol. 3, part 1 and vol. 4, part 2, special edition. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983. [Translated by Norman Kemp Smith: Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. London: Macmillan Press, 1933.] All references are the standard first- and secondedition pagination. Royal Prussian (later German) Academy of Sciences, ed.

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Kants gesammelte Schriften. Berlin: Georg Reimer, Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1900-.

D. ABBREVIATIONS USED FOR EMMANUEL LEVINAS AQE

DEHH

DL

DQVI EE

Autrement quetre on au-dela de ['essence (Phaenomenologica 54). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. [Translated by Alphonso Lingis: Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.] En decouvrant Vexistence avec Husserl et Heidegger, 2nd revised and extended edition. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1967. Difficile liberte, Essais sur le judaisme, 3rd edition. Paris: Albin Michel, 1976. [Translated by Sean Hand: Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism. London: Athlone Press, 1990.] De Dieu qui vient a Videe, 2nd revised and extended edition. Paris: J. Vrin, 1986. De Vexistence a Vexistant (1940-1945). Paris: J. Vrin, 1990. [Translated by Alfonso Lingis: Existence and Existents. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.]

INTRODUCTION

H o w D O I K N O W that the external world exists? Can it not be that the world is nothing but a figment of my imagination? How can I b e certain that the content of my thought is identical with its referent, namely, an object in the external world? How can I ever know whether you view the world exacdy as I do? Moreover, how can I be sure that you exist a n d are not a m e r e automaton? T h e r e is a strand in contemporary philosophy that believes it has b r o u g h t these questions to a final halt. Instead of direcdy responding to these questions, which have b e e n troubling philosophy ever since Descartes, it has b e g u n to analyze the questioner herself. At issue h e r e is not so m u c h whether it is possible to provide a cogent proof for the existence of things outside us, but what it is that leads philosophers to seek such proof again a n d again. Attention has b e e n diverted from trying to solve the problem to analyzing its source, namely, the motivation that has led philosophy to raise these questions in the first place. It may be fair to say that there is a tendency in contemporary philosophy to problematize the problem. In this m a n n e r , philosophy has b e c o m e self-reflexive. It attempts to u n d e r s t a n d the source of the characteristic anxieties of m o d e r n philosophy—anxieties that center on the relation between m i n d a n d world. Adherents to the analytic tradition have t e n d e d to pathologize philosophical issues. From Wittgenstein we learn that philosophy o u g h t to b e nothing other than a form of therapy. Epistemological skepticism about the existence of the external world is treated as if it were an illness that needs to be cured (cf. Wittgenstein 1958, §255). Continental philosophers, in turn, claim that philosophical issues have b e e n s h a p e d by a tradition. We n e e d to r e a d the history of philosophy, n o t in o r d e r to u n d e r s t a n d the past b e t t e r , b u t to understand our own critical position in the present. We learn that distinctions between m i n d and world, reason and the given, e m e r g e

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within an extended historical process of rational self-examination. Whatever counts as a constraint or limit of thought's self-determination is its very own product. While skeptics would question whether it is possible to match u p o u r ideas with the way things are "in themselves," anti-Cartesians would argue that skeptics fail to reflect on their own standards of evaluation. In the analytic tradition the a r g u m e n t would be that Descartes has distorted the requirements for knowledge. Skepticism is a misg u i d e d philosophical position and reveals nothing about o u r everyday o r scientific knowledge and beliefs. 1 T h e continental tradition, in turn, would argue that the standards of evaluation as to whether things are "thus and so" are historically d e t e r m i n e d or internal to consciousness (cf. Hegel 1977, 53). In other words, those standards are defined in terms of the kinds of reasons we have to r e g a r d t h e m as authoritative. Representatives of both traditions hold that philosophy needs to examine whether these grounds are legitimate. It would thus appear that contemporary philosophy is nothing o t h e r than a clearing u p after the storm. Its primary concern is to disclose the m a n n e r in which Cartesianism, particularly in its m e t h o d and criterion for determining truth, is flawed a n d misguided. We are told that epistemological skepticism arises only when "language goes o n holiday" (Wittgenstein 1958, §38). Epistemology is nothing b u t a history of bad ideas. If this were so, then philosophy should not seek to reveal anything new; rather it should disentangle our philosophical confusions and disclose that which Cartesianism has distorted a n d covered u p , namely, our original familiarity with the world. 2 However, t h e r e is a curious paradox connected with such a corrective or therapeutic stance to philosophy. Not only is it parasitic o n the Cartesian premise it seeks to overcome, but, m o r e important, the anti-Cartesian concerns are not as divorced from the Cartesian enterprise as they may first appear. We should n o t forget that philosophical skepticism about the external world is spurred by the desire to prove its existence. Descartes believed that he was able to prove that it is impossible to d o u b t the existence of the physical world. Yet, that the external world cannot be d o u b t e d can be known only t h r o u g h the m e t h o d of d o u b t itself. In other words: the proof provided by Descartes is that his initial doubts "should be dismissed as laughable." 3 D o u b t refutes skepticism. Hence Descartes, the father of m o d e r n skepticism, appears to be the first to agree with the claim that philos-

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ophy should attempt to disentangle our initial confusions. T h e aim is to overcome skepticism. However, the parallel drawn h e r e is not as straightforward as it might seem. It is true that there are many anti-Cartesians who r e m a i n loyal to the Cartesian project. They believe that Descartes has failed to overcome skepticism and seek to improve his m e t h o d . T h o u g h their work is critical, it remains within the spirit of the Cartesian legacy. We may call such objections internal, insofar as they a d h e r e to the terms that Descartes has set himself. 4 Yet, what is distinctive about the ruling conception of philosophy today is that its anti-Cartesian stance is far bolder. Its objections are external to the Cartesian enterprise. It n o longer seeks to overcome skepticism; rather it seeks to u n d e r m i n e the very project itself. T h e various anti-Cartesian positions could b e presented in the following way. T h e first two refer to internal, a n d the last one refers to external, objections raised against the Cartesian enterprise: 1. T h e r e are those who accept Descartes's project, yet question whether Descartes has not b e e n disingenuous about the limits of possible doubt. They claim that Descartes was p r e m a t u r e in taking the certainty that "I am a thinking thing" as an ultimate premise, and argue that Descartes failed to overcome skepticism about the external world. Such objections are exemplified in Kant's "Refutation of Idealism." According to Kant, if self-knowledge is r e g a r d e d as primary, the existence of things outside us can only be inferred b u t never known. Hence, according to Kant, it is "a scandal to philosophy and to h u m a n reason in general" that there is still n o cogent proof for "the existence of things outside of us." 5 F r o m Kant we learn that we can d o away with skepticism about the external world only if we can prove that knowledge of ourselves presupposes knowledge of things outside us. In this m a n n e r , thinkers like Kant raise objections that are internal to the Cartesian enterprise. T h e aim is to overcome skepticism — a move which, they believe, Descartes has failed to accomplish. 2. T h e r e is another anti-Cartesian strand in philosophy that does n o t seek to correct the Cartesian project but endeavors to p u n c t u r e its pretensions of reason by showing that skepticism is impossible. Such objections are still internal to the Cartesian enterprise insofar as they show that Descartes fails to a d h e r e to the terms that h e has set himself. They question the possibility of universal doubt. H u m e , for example, contends that skeptical d o u b t is possible only if we believe

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we have knowledge of an external world in the first place. 6 Whatever argument is provided, it presupposes a belief in the existence of the external world which can never be undone. 7 Another prime contender for such an anti-skeptical position is Hegel. We learn from Hegel that true skeptics would have to concede that all points of view are relative to o u r own contingent subjective point of view. However, in o r d e r to make such a claim the skeptic must assume a detached universal point of view—one, however, which she cannot justify. T h e pretensions of skepticism are thus r e n d e r e d inefficacious by the impossibility of arriving at an Archimedian point that lies beyond the realm of doubt. 8 Skepticism (Zweifel) is nothing other than a pathway of despair (Verzweiflung). Authoritative skepticism must be skeptical about itself; it must realize that it itself is only an "appearance" (cf. Hegel 1977, 49f). 3. These internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise have b e e n replaced by external objections that define the ruling conception of the philosophical enterprise today. Today many philosophers n o longer seek to overcome or to refute the pretensions of skepticism; instead they question why we should desire to be skeptics in the first place. Contrary to Kant, they claim that the scandal of philosophy is n o t so m u c h that a proof for the existence of things outside us is still outstanding but that philosophy is expecting such proof again a n d again (cf. SuZ, §43a, 205). We are mistaken in seeking an ultimate premise that renders o u r relation to the world intelligible. As Wittgenstein observes: "It is so difficult to find the beginning. Or, better: it is difficult to begin at the beginning. And not to try to go further back" (Wittgenstein 1975, §471). Contemporary philosophy questions whether there is an Archimedian point at all. We are encouraged to accept that a "beginning" could have "no foundation u p o n which something could be built" (ZSD, 34 / 32E). T h e aim, then, is to collapse the traditional project of Cartesian rationalism. Contemporary anti-Cartesianism is anti-foundationalist and thus departs radically from the Cartesian enterprise. The objections it raises are external to the terms that Descartes has set. T h e aim h e r e is n o longer to overcome skepticism and to arrive at certainty. Such an enterprise itself is jeopardized. Inevitably, the question arises whether such a radical a n d external objection to Descartes provides a new dimension to the understanding of our relation to the world, a dimension the Cartesian system cannot acknowledge. T o understand the significance of this

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question it is important first to recall that although Descartes reached the conclusion that his initial doubts were laughable, h e would not claim that his initial doubts were futile. Quite the contrary, Descartes contends that skepticism frees us "from an error that has gripped all of us since our childhood, when we came to believe that there are no bodies a r o u n d us except those capable of being perceived by the senses" (Descartes 1985, 17). In this m a n n e r Descartes wishes to show that physical science is possible once we realize that it should n o t be guided by the senses alone b u t also by the natural light of reason. D o u b t leads to certainty; however, it is a certainty of a world which we would not have were we not skeptics initially. If we follow the anti-Cartesian stance, we cannot accept Descartes's solutions since we n o longer accept his premise. T h a t is to say, if we can n o longer accept the process of d o u b t by means of which the assurance of the external world is achieved, then we have to arrive at a different conception of a world. Indeed, those anti-Cartesians who refuse to endorse the m e t h o d of d o u b t d o not affirm the world of physical science that Descartes had in mind, b u t a world that discloses itself before any d o u b t is possible. T h e world they refer to is the world of the everyday, the world of meaning and belief, or the world of praxis. T h e claim is that this world can be disclosed only outside the Cartesian project a n d thus remains anterior to and radically different from any Cartesian conception of a world. This book sets out to explore whether these external objections to Descartes do, in fact, reveal as fundamentally new a conception of o u r relation to the world as these thinkers would have us believe. We remain skeptical as to whether it is that easy to dispose of the Cartesian problematic; for it would appear that external objections shy away from the p r o b l e m of the external world, rather than proving why we should no longer b e troubled by skepticism. Moreover, we believe that the internal objections raised against Descartes's system allow for a far m o r e truthful depiction of o u r relation to the world than those external objections that refuse to face the p r o b l e m in the first place. This book contends that contemporary philosophy has b e e n prem a t u r e in dismissing skepticism and illustrates this by focusing on the writings of two closely related thinkers who share the same historical descent: E d m u n d Husserl and Martin Heidegger. It is tempting to c o m p a r e these two thinkers, since they were in constant dialogue with

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o n e another, debating whether to adopt an internal or an external critical stance to the Cartesian tradition. T h e philosophical dialogue between them is thus a very useful way of probing the issues that characterize Cartesian and anti-Cartesian responses to skepticism. Edm u n d Husserl sides with those thinkers who seek to rescue Descartes from his own pitfalls; namely, he develops internal objections to Descartes's skepticism and endeavors to replace it with what he calls a "critique of cognition" (Hua II, 29). Heidegger, in contrast, belongs to the contemporary strand of philosophy that is powerfully anti-Cartesian. H e regards Husserl as a representative of the (Cartesian) tradition and in his main work, SuZ, seeks to show why the Cartesian premise is flawed and misguided. In his view the p r o b l e m of the external world arises only if we believe that there is a subject that is distinct from the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. Heidegger contends that this "worldless" subject is a philosophical fiction, as is the p r o b l e m of the external world. T h e main thrust of SuZ is to show why skepticism, a n d with it the central issue that has troubled philosophy ever since Descartes, has become r e d u n d a n t . T h o u g h sympathetic to Heidegger's project, this book questions whether Heidegger manages to reclaim the world which the Cartesian tradition has puportedly overlooked. T h e b o o k sets out to explore what it means to ignore or, indeed, "jump over" the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. It asks what kind of world Heidegger has in m i n d when he articulates this critique. Rather than approaching this question sideways by postulating in advance o u r conception of the world, we will investigate what motivates Heidegger to reconsider the conception of the world and whether he fulfills his promise to salvage the p h e n o m e n o n of the world which h e believes the tradition of philosophy has ignored. T h e book is divided into five chapters: Chapter 1 explores how we are to interpret Heidegger's departure from Husserl. It argues that although Heidegger repeatedly accuses Husserl of exemplifying the tradition of philosophy by returning to a 'worldless subject', we should not understand this accusation as a form of internalism, in the sense made familiar by contemporary analytic philosophy. T h e chapter is divided into three parts. Part 1 will demonstrate that Husserl is not an internalist. LU show that propositional attitudes cannot be assessed without reference to external states of affairs. Part 2 argues that, as long as we depict Husserl as an internalist, we fail to recognize the significant breakthrough of Husserl's

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phenomenology—namely, that it lays out a new form of objectivity and thereby facilitates the question of Being. Part 3 argues that, even after Husserl's so-called transcendental turn, the accusation that Husserl is a methodological solipsist is misplaced. Rather than ignoring the world, the transcendental reduction brings into the foreground the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. Indeed, Heidegger praises Husserl not only for overcoming Cartesian representationalism, but for raising, and even answering, the question of Being. H e n c e , Heidegger's objections to Husserl's work cannot be understood in terms of the recent internalism/externalism debate. What Heidegger objects to is Husserl's transcendental turn. This is not because he believes that it advocates a methodological solipsism, b u t because it is epistemologically motivated. T h e problem, for Heidegger, is that Husserl adheres to the tradition insofar as he raises internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise. H e uses Cartesian d o u b t as a methodological device without, however, taking any of its premises for granted. Husserl is thereby thoroughly anti-Cartesian in his Cartesianism. First, unlike Descartes, Husserl believes that d o u b t leads not to the certainty that "I am a thinking thing," b u t to the realization that we can never think without thinking of something. Essential to cognition is that thought is directed toward something, whether real or imaginary. Husserl calls this directedness intentionality. Second, Husserl believes Descartes was mistaken in equating doubt with a m o m e n t of negation. If we wish to be true skeptics, we need to abstain from making j u d g m e n t s . Husserl calls such a suspension of j u d g m e n t ^TTO^T], or bracketing. Thus Husserl avoids the pitfalls of skepticism as described above: namely, that if d o u b t were a form ofj u d g m e n t , we would conflate o u r own personal point of view with a universal point of view, a move that would p u n c t u r e the pretensions of skepticism. T h e issue for Heidegger is that because Husserl raises internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise, he fails to realize that the world is an existential structure of Dasein which can never be t u r n e d into an 'object' of reflection. This is why Husserl, in the final analysis, forgets the question of Being. Like other adherents to the tradition of philosophy, h e affirms a philosophy of consciousness (Bewufttseinsphilosophie) which ignores the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. Chapter 2 seeks to understand the nature of Husserl's Cartesianism. It explores Husserl's attempt to justify the claim that the stream

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of the appearing world in its suspension, t h o u g h constantiy changing, is fully present in its unity. We will show that Husserl's project is d o o m e d to failure: there is always a trail of life that escapes consciousness which can never be m a d e fully present. Husserl fails to remain faithful to the aim he has set himself, namely, to r e t u r n to an Archim e d i a n beginning that lies beyond the realm of doubt. The enclosed space of consciousness is always already broken. T h e chapter further shows that Husserl adheres to the tradition by prioritizing consciousness over and against the spatiotemporal world. It claims that Husserl's anti-Cartesianism is essentially Kantian in style. Just as Kant argues that the world needs to conform to o u r m o d e of representation, Husserl argues that objects need to conform to the "style" of consciousness. Also like Kant, Husserl realizes that any experience, even i m m a n e n t experience, needs to be accompanied by an experiencing consciousness, which is that of the p u r e Ego in Husserl, and the transcendental unity of apperception in Kant. T h o u g h Husserl's phenomenology imitates a certain form of Kantianism, it exceeds Kant insofar as it manifests that which critical philosophy posits. According to Heidegger, Husserl's anti-Cartesianism has deepe n e d philosophy's subjective turn, since the concern is n o longer "How do I know that the world exists?" b u t "How does the world in its suspension appear to consciousness?" Husserl is concerned neither with the subject n o r with the world, but merely with the directedness of t h o u g h t itself. In this respect Husserl's revised and critical Cartesianism epitomizes m o d e r n philosophy: it makes explicit philosophy's implicit disinterestedness in the existence of the external world. Philosophy is concerned only with the m a n n e r in which we are conscious ofthe world; everything that lies beyond the realm of consciousness is r e n d e r e d futile. This leads Heidegger to claim that Husserl affirms a claustrophobic i m m a n e n c e which excludes the possibility of a m o m e n t of exteriority. Chapter 3 sets out to explore Heidegger's response to the tradition of philosophy. Heidegger seeks to disclose a world that does n o t r e q u i r e validation t h r o u g h doubt. That which determines the meaning a n d n a t u r e of the world is n o longer d o u b t b u t the m a n n e r in which we are b o n d e d to the world. What defines us living h u m a n beings is our c o m p o r t m e n t to the world. Heidegger uses the term Dasein to emphasize o u r openness to the world. Before we think, we find ourselves "over there" (Da) in a world. Dasein is always already "other"

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(transcendent) to consciousness (immanence). Heidegger thereby suggests a "revolution of the place of thinking" (Zdhringer Seminare, 385 / 123) by prioritizing transcendence over immanence. A topology of thinking stands in "lieu" of consciousness. T h e chapter is c o n c e r n e d with the very dis-location, or Ortsverlegung (Zdhringer Seminare, 123 / 385), that the term Dasein suggests. It examines whether SuZ manages to retrieve the world that the tradition of philosophy has purportedly overlooked. Although SuZ suggests a radical break with Husserl, we show that SuZ consistently resists what its critique opens u p , namely, the r e t u r n to the material world and an e m b o d i e d Dasein. In a m a n n e r analogous to Husserl, Heidegger refuses to acknowledge the anterior excess of a life that lies beyond the grasp of Dasein. Rather than returning to things themselves as they show themselves, Heidegger turns away from what shows itself. Thus, Heidegger, like Husserl, discloses a self-enclosed constitutive site a n d fails to a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t this site is always already broken. Chapter 4 argues that SuZ fails to overcome philosophy's subjective turn. Heidegger remains concerned with the question of the "how"— namely, how Dasein comports itself to the world. T h e world is not at issue here; only the m a n n e r in which the world matters to Dasein counts. T h e world is understood purely adverbially. Like Husserl, Heidegger thereby defines the world as a temporal horizon of Dasein. Heidegger departs from Husserl only by calling this horizon finite, in contrast to Husserl's infinite stream of consciousness. In this m a n n e r Heidegger falls prey to the very critique that he himself directs against the tradition. His only concern is Dasein, and everything that exceeds Dasein's understanding is r e n d e r e d otiose. Moreover, by denying the possibility of bracketing the world, SuZ lets the world disappear without acknowledging its loss. Heidegger, even m o r e than Husserl, epitomizes the tradition, insofar as he brings its disinterestedness in the p h e n o m e n o n of the world to completion. Husserl at least lets the world appear in its suspension. T o p u t it another way, Husserl acknowledges the bracketing of the world, while Heidegger wipes out the world without leaving any traces behind, since he denies the possibility of doubting its existence in the first place. This has devastating consequences, for it leads to the denial of any form of exteriority. Dasein's transcendence is even m o r e claustrophobic than Husserl's account of immanence.

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The final chapter explores whether Heidegger's project can be rescued—whether it is possible to pierce the field of immanence and retrieve the world that the tradition has overlooked. We shall claim that such a retrieval is possible if we return to those thinkers who raise internal objections to the Cartesian system, in particular Kant and Husserl. We can reclaim the world that the tradition has ignored only by returning to those thinkers whom Heidegger seeks to overcome.

PROLOGUE

T H E Y ARE T O O C L O S E to separate a n d too far away to see each other. They can neither u n d o their respect for o n e another n o r bear the closeness. It is the father who sees his life continued in the son. T h e son, however, can only accept the heritage by turning against the father. This is how we could describe the relationship between Husserl and Heidegger. Husserl considered Heidegger to b e his heir. Heidegger was the only student who could explore "unknown depths" of Husserl's phenomenological method. 1 With prophetic irony Husserl wrote to Pfander that Heidegger would "not only inherit b u t even surpass." 2 Husserl's hopes a n d expectations were that Heidegger would n o t just continue the phenomenological project but exceed it by allowing for new openings a n d insights Husserl himself could not have envisaged. Inevitably, however, as soon as Heidegger articulated his d e p a r t u r e in SuZ—a text Husserl accepted for publication in his Jahrbuchfur PhanomenologischeForschungwithout even having read the manuscript in detail (cf. Breeur 1994, 3)—an irreconcilable rift emerged. Heidegger would proudly claim that he u n d e r s t o o d the project of p h e n o m e n o l o g y better than its founding father did: "To this day I still consider [SuZ] a m o r e faithful adherence to the principle of phenomenology" (Letter to Richardson, xv). Heidegger believed that he had b o t h inherited and surpassed Husserl's legacy. Husserl, for his part, felt betrayed and a r g u e d that Heidegger's d e p a r t u r e was m a d e possible only by a distortion of his own phenomenological m e t h o d . In a letter to Roman Ing a r d e n Husserl complained: "Heidegger has never u n d e r s t o o d the true m e a n i n g of the m e t h o d of the transcendental reduction." 3 Heidegger, the heir so greatly admired, would soon become the "enemy" (Feind) .4 Accusations of betrayal would replace declarations of admiration. This is the setting in which o u r writing takes place. O u r aim is n o t to reconstruct the awareness and (mis)understanding each thinker had of the other; it is rather to explore SuZ in terms of its adherence to and d e p a r t u r e from Husserl. It will emerge that SuZ's adherence to

2

PROLOGUE

Husserl is far s t r o n g e r than it tries to m a k e us believe. T h e aim is not to vindicate Husserl, nor to blunt Heidegger's philosophical rigor. We a r e only too keenly aware that to philosophize means to do violence and any attempt to do justice, any academic exercise which is engaged merely in trying to minimize differences between thinkers, leads to the greater violence of a philosophical silencing. 5 Rather than r e d u c i n g the differences between the thinkers, the aim is to locate Heidegger's true d e p a r t u r e from Husserl. For SuZ's failure to d e p a r t from Husserl will unwittingly reveal the avenue by which a true departure is possible. SuZ's success thus lies in its failure. By drawing o n its failure we can b o t h exceed Husserl and overcome the limitations of SuZ. We e m b a r k on a curious journey. By taking SuZ's critique of Husserl as our point of d e p a r t u r e , we shall constantly be drawn back to Husserl. SuZ's critique of the tradition of idealism (the t e r m tradition h e r e always includes Husserl, who, according to Heidegger, still exemplifies the tradition) 6 paves the way for the claim that nothing is m o r e u r g e n t today than the task of rethinking our relation to the world in terms of kinaesthesia and embodiment. Yet, as this work will show, it is Husserl a n d n o t Heidegger who will allow us to u n d e r s t a n d our relation to the world in this m a n n e r . SuZ's critique of idealism thus inadvertently p r e p a r e s the g r o u n d for a r e t u r n to Husserl. F r o m the outset our reading is thematically restricted. We read SuZ in terms of its a d h e r e n c e to and d e p a r t u r e from Husserl, and m e a s u r e SuZ's success in relation to SuZ's own proclaimed trajectory. T h e Husserl in question is the Husserl preceding the publication of SuZ. For the aim is to investigate how Husserl unwittingly provides the way for an adequate response to SuZ before SuZ was even written.

CHAPTER ONE

Husserl and Heidegger A Reappraisal of Their Relationship

INTRODUCTION E D M U N D H U S S E R L ' S phenomenological a p p r o a c h is often interp r e t e d as a form of internalism or "methodological solipsism." 1 Husserl, it is claimed, describes o u r propositional attitudes in ways that d o not require the existence of any particular objects or properties in the world. We know the content of our minds. However, we "lack the resources with which to explain how such subjective, intentional experiences can ever make contact with reality, or can ever be related to things which are n o t subjective or intentional in such a way as to constitute objective knowledge of them" (Bell 1990, 148). In view of this, Heidegger's position may appear far m o r e attractive. It advocates an externalist position and shows that experience should b e u n d e r s t o o d n o longer in terms of consciousness but "as the transcendence of the self to things in the world" (Keller 1999, 100) .2 T h e aim of this chapter is to show that such a reading is misleading: although Heidegger accuses Husserl of returning to a philosophy of consciousness {Bexvufitseinsphilosophie), it would be a mistake to interpret that accusation in terms of the internalism/externalism debate. Heidegger does not accuse Husserl of returning to "the Cartesian conception of mind as a kind of inner theater" (Keller 1999, 43); indeed, he praises him for overcoming Cartesian representationalism (cf. GA 20, §6b, a, 78). Husserl, so Heidegger believes, shows that our lived experiences (Erlebnisse) are never of mental contents b u t "simple cognizance of what is found" (GA 20, §5c, a, 51). Nonetheless, H e i d e g g e r admonishes Husserl for his Cartesianism. Husserl still takes the Cartesian project seriously, insofar as h e seeks to secure our knowledge of the external world by puncturing the pretensions of skepticism. For Heidegger the

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H U S S E R L AND H E I D E G G E R

p r o b l e m is not that Husserl can describe only the contents of our mind, b u t that he adheres to the parameters set by the Cartesian enterprise. Thus, when we seek to explain Heidegger's departure from Husserl, we should not draw on the internalism/externalism debate, but should focus on the different ways in which the two thinkers respond to the Cartesian legacy. 3

WHY HUSSERL IS N O T AN INTERNALIST §1. Husserl, a Methodological Solipsist? W h e n we turn to LU, the claim that Husserl promotes an internalist position seems far-fetched. After all, the explicit aim of LU is to salvage logic from psychologism and thereby to affirm the existence of a nonmental reality. In line with his contemporary Gottlob Frege, Husserl argues that we should never conflate concrete (psychical or p h e n o m enological) processes of thinking with p u r e logic, nor temporally individuated acts of thinking with the ideal conditions of cognition. W e r e we to fail to draw such distinctions, we would n o longer b e able to distinguish between "being true" and "being taken as true" (Frege 1966, 30 ff.), and would be paving the way toward skepticism, subjectivism, and relativism (cf. LU I, Prol. §36 ff.). Like Frege, Husserl is thus most anxious to ensure a level of meaning or sense which he regards to be the true object of logical inquiry. Moreover, like Frege, h e believes that logical propositions expressed as a result of logical thinking refer to a sphere of sense which is not contained in the act of thinking. Nothing about the act of counting, for example, belongs to the sense or content of a p u r e number. Rather n u m b e r s , propositions, and logical proofs constitute a closed realm of objects that Husserl calls ideal. Logic refers to p u r e concepts or propositions, just as mathematics speaks about mathematical truths whose m e a n i n g does not d e p e n d on the existence of a spatiotemporal world. Irrespective of whether there is such a world or, indeed, a subject that thinks, logical or mathematical truths such as 2 + 2 = 4 subsist. P u r e truths, according to Husserl, are ideal. They are not conditioned by the factual world. 4 So why is it that Husserl is nonetheless read as an internalist? 5 T h e reason seems to be that Husserl fails to deliver what he promises. Husserl cannot reach a full-blooded objectivity because he argues not

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5

only, in line with Frege, that logical truths are ideal, b u t also, unlike Frege, that it is only possible to overcome logical psychologism if one is also able to show how the truths of logic exhibit a necessary relation to psychological matters of fact (our actual thought processes). 6 It is this latter move that may suggest the view that Husserl is an internalist, for, inevitably, his focus is on the subjective side of experience (Husserl calls it noetic), and he has n o way of showing how it corresponds to an object as it is in itself. Such a reading is, however, misleading. Husserl does not study intentional objects as intrinsic to acts; Husserl in fact seeks to account for an extra-mental reality. Yet, he believes he can d o this only by addressing the p r o b l e m of constitution, namely, by showing how our thought processes relate to an objectivity, the existence of which Husserl takes for granted. 7 T h e question is not "How d o we impose subjective forms onto an objective reality?" or "How d o objects appear within our mind?" b u t "How d o subjective acts instantiate (cf. Smith 1989, 163), or constitute, objective ideal laws of logic or meanings which are true and exist in themselves, i n d e p e n d e n t of o u r thinking about them?" By addressing the p r o b l e m in this m a n n e r Husserl does n o t r e d u c e objectivity to subjective experience; rather, the reverse is true: he describes our relation to objectivity. 8 §2. Object and Meaning Do Not Coincide We can best illustrate what is at issue t h r o u g h reflections on language. According to Husserl, in every objectivating act, meaning is constituted. This meaning is never intrinsic to the act. As Husserl puts it: "Each expression not merely says something, b u t says it ^/something: it not only has a meaning, but refers to certain objects. . . . But the object never coincides with the meaning" (LU I, §12, 52; LI, 287). We need to differentiate between the acts that form words and that confer meanings and the object that is meant. Husserl illustrates this by pointing out (in line with Frege) that two acts of meaning can have the same object but different "contents." 9 We can n a m e the same historical figure when we refer to "the victor at J e n a " a n d "the vanquished at Waterloo." Although the expressed meanings are different, they intend or refer to the same object, namely, Napoleon (cf. LU I, §12, 53; LI, 287). In other words, apart from its meaning, an expression also has the function of "naming" something, the object we are thinking about. The object and the meaning of an expression d o not coincide.

6

H U S S E R L AND H E I D E G G E R

While the act of meaning changes over time —it can be uttered in a n u m b e r of different ways—its object remains identical. To explain this difference Husserl distinguishes between the obj e c t p u r e and simple that is intended and the object as it is intended (cf. LU V, §17, 414; LI, 578). While the object that is intended does n o t change—it possesses an unchanging identity which is "ideal" — the object as it is intended can vary both qualitatively and materially. Not only can it be intended in different apprehensional modes—we can think, fantasize, desire, or perceive one and the same object; b u t the object can also be d e t e r m i n e d in a particular m a n n e r , i.e., we can refer to the knife as such, or the knife as lying o n the table. Husserl thus distinguishes between the objectivity (Gegenstdndlichkeit) to which an act taken fully directs itself (the knife as such) a n d the objects (Gegenstdnde) to which different partial acts direct themselves (cf. LU V, §17, 415; LI, 579). T h e object as such appears as the telos of various intentional processes. It stands to multiple acts of expressing as the species (or essence) "redness" stands to multiple instances of various shades of r e d (cf. LU I, §31,106; LI, 330) .10 In a word, the example of language illustrates that a certain contentspecies is instantiated or constituted in every act. This content is not reducible to individual acts or use. Rather it refers to an ideal unity (cf. LU I, §29) whose identity and objectivity persists over time and space. §3. The Structure of Consciousness Husserl now holds that every conscious act refers to an object; it is intentional. If this is so, then consciousness should not be understood as an inner theater, since it essentially involves reference to an object. Husserl, indeed, warns us not to confuse the term consciousnessvaXh the real being of the empirical ego, i.e., the psychic experiences in the stream of consciousness (cf. LU V, §4, 363; LI, 541), or with an inner awareness of one's psychic perception (cf. LU V, §5). Rather we should understand consciousness in the "pregnant" sense, as intentional experience (Husserl calls it a mental act) which incorporates the distinction between psychic processes (the individual acts) and ideal being (meaning) . Husserl thereby breaks with the tradition, inaugurated by Descartes, that advocates a representational theory of knowledge. 11 H e redefines the way we should understand the term consciousness. As Heidegger observes, "When all epistemological assumptions are set aside, it becomes clear that c o m p o r t m e n t itself—as yet quite apart

Why Husserl Is N o t an Internalist

7

from the question of its correctness or incorrectness—is in its very structure a directing-itself-toward" (GA 20, §5a, 40). §4. The Problem of Reference Consciousness n o t only expresses "a [direct] relation . . . to some 'transcendent' matter" (LU V, appendix to §11 & §20, 437; LI, 595), b u t also directs itself toward something objective. It is important to u n d e r s t a n d what Husserl has in m i n d when he refers to "objectivity" or the "object." Like Frege, Husserl holds that even an expression that has n o actual object, such as a round square, has signification. Unlike a m e r e collection of words that does not form a unified sense (or meaningful whole), 1 2 the expression obeys the syntactic rules for forming complex meanings. While Frege believes that an expression that is correcdy constructed grammatically does not necessarily have a reference, Husserl argues that the fact that an expression has no actual object does not m e a n that it has no reference to an object or that it is non-referential. "To use an expression significantly, and to refer expressively to an object. . . ," Husserl says, "are o n e a n d the same. It makes n o difference whether the object exists or is fictitious or even impossible" (LU I, §15, 59; LI, 293). Distancing himself from Brentano, Husserl claims that the object that is intended is "not therefore part of the descriptive or real make-up (deskriptiven reellen Bestand) of the experience, it is in truth not really i m m a n e n t or m e n t a l But it also does n o t exist extramentally, it does not exist at all" (LU V, §11, 387; LI, 559). Every mental act that confers m e a n i n g necessarily refers to an object that is intended. T o refer to something with an expression is to m e a n (meinen) something, and that which is m e a n t (das Gemeinte) is never identical with the way it is meant. However, to refer to something is not to make the ontological claim that the object that is intended exists. "Object" for Husserl in the first instance means something about which meaningful statements can be m a d e (cf. §5 below). Yet this could suggest that Husserl is an internalist after all. Husserl can understand the notion of reference only as something intrinsicto an expression's meaning (cf. Bell 1990,130). As David Bell states it, "Precisely because 'objectrdirectedness' is an intrinsic property of acts, and one which they can possess without there actually being an object to which they are directed" (Bell 1990, 143), Husserl can have nothing to say about "how such subjective, intentional experiences can ever make contact with reality, or can ever be related to things

8

H U S S E R L AND H E I D E G G E R

which are not subjective or intentional in such a way as to constitute objective knowledge of them" (Bell 1990, 148). 13 §5. "The Ontological Turn of the Concept of Evidence"14 Yet Husserl's position could n o t be m o r e opposed to such a reading. H e does not attempt to elucidate the concept of meaning independently from the concept of truth. To the contrary, Husserl holds that "consciousness was not merely an empty . . . having conscioused [Bezoussthaben], b u t also a process of accomplishing which is . . . goaldirected and directed towards the idea of truth" (Hua IX, 36). 15 Every mental act seeks to bring into coincidence what is i n t e n d e d with actual states of affairs. Husserl calls the experience of such a coincid e n c e meaning-fulfillment, or evidence. 16 Evidence, according to Husserl, is "the experience of the agreement between m e a n i n g and what is itself present, meant, between the actual sense of an assertion and the self-given state of affairs" (LU, Prol. §51, 193-4; LI, 195). W h e n we j u d g e , we make a j u d g m e n t not about the m e a n i n g of an expression but about the state of affairs that is intended (cf. LU I, §34). Full understanding—so Husserl holds —is guaranteed only if we know how to verify a meaning-intention; that is to say, if we know how to recognize its truth value. Husserl illustrates this in the following example: We clarify the concept (5 3 ) 4 by having recourse to the dennatory presentation: Number which arises when one forms the product 5 3 • 5 3 • 5 3 • 5 \ If we wish to clarify this latter concept, we must go back to the sense of 53, i.e., to the formation 5 • 5 • 5. Going back further, we should have to clarify 5 through the dennatory chain 5 - 4 + 1 , 4 - 3 + 1 , 3 = 2 + 1 , 2 = 1 + 1. After each step we should have to make a substitution in the preceding complex expression or thought, and, were this proceeding indefinitely repeatable —it is certainly so in itself, just as it is certainly not so for us—we should at last come to the completely explicated sum of ones of which we should say: "This is the number (5 3 ) 4 'itself'." It is plain that an act of fulfilment not only corresponded to this final result, but to each individual step leading from one expression of this number, to the expression next in order, which clarified it and enriched its content. In this manner each ordinary decimal number points to a possible chain of fulfilments. (LU VI, §18, 601; LI, 723)

Why Husserl Is N o t an Internalist

9

To grasp evidently the equation, it is necessary to u n d e r s t a n d the whole chain of possible fulfillments that confirm it. Full understanding of mathematical expressions requires the ability to show how one arrived at them. T h e state of affairs is not a construction of the mind or an intrinsic property of an act b u t is arrived at t h r o u g h rational clarification. It is the telos of every act. Yet, if Husserl truly believes that we cannot elucidate the concept of meaning apart from the concept of truth, then how are we to make sense of the contention troubling so many readers of Husserl, namely, that it is possible to refer to a theory of intentionality that is based on acts of consciousness that n e e d have n o object at all (cf. Bell 1990, 130 ff.)? Husserl's position here is not as paradoxical as it may at first appear, once we realize that Husserl, like Kant, draws a distinction between thinking and knowing. For Kant an object is an object of knowledge only if it is given to us in a m a n n e r conforming to our form of intuition, namely, time (and space) and the categories of the understanding. This leads Kant to differentiate between objects that can be known and objects that cannot be known or experienced. The former are objects that relate to something given, the latter refer to objects that can only be thought. Likewise for Husserl, it is possible to think of objects, i.e., have meaning-intentions (such as a r o u n d square) that can never find meaning-fulfillment, i.e., become objects of knowledge, since they are never given to us. Every statement has an intended reference, but not all intended references can be fulfilled. This means that the notion of objecthood does not necessarily imply the possibility of experience. Let us look at this in m o r e detail: Husserl says we can recognize an experience as fulfillment only by grasping or understanding the meaningintention in the first place (cf. LU IV, §12). H e n c e , we can think of a " r o u n d square" even though it is never intuitively given, that is, it cannot be known or authenticated in thought. T h e absurdity cannot be detected by looking at the rules of grammar; the expression is not senseless (Unsinn), like a h e a p of words, rather it has a unified sense. Nonetheless, an expression can be absurd (Widersinn) when it, for example, defies "Laws such as that of Contradiction, Double Negation or the Modus Ponens" (LU IV, § 14,343; LI, 523). However, we can recognize it as absurd only if we have u n d e r s t o o d it previously. We recognize that an empty intention remains a presumption if it does not find intuitive confirmation. For example, the expression "round square" cannot be rationally explicated. The two intentions, "circle" and "square,"

10

H U S S E R L AND H E I D E G G E R

contradict each other. The identifying fulfillment (which is the telosof the act) is thus inevitably frustrated. T h e expression bears an expectation of meaning-fulfillment that is a priori impossible. 17 This impossibility does not prove that Husserl seeks to provide a theory of intentionality based on acts of consciousness that need no object at all. T h e contrary is true: it shows that all intentional acts strive for intuitive fulfillment, but that intuitive fulfillment is not always possible. Some objects can only be thought and never be known. T o conclude: Husserl argues that our j u d g i n g is always subject to a kind of assessment as to whether it is correct, namely, true (corresponding to something objective) and successful (corresponding to the intention). Bell's reservations are unfounded: Husserl bites the bullet. H e asks, "Howdo we experience truth?" (cf. LU, prol., §51,193; LI, 194). He attempts precisely to show how subjective, "intentional experience can be related to things which are not subjective in such a way as to constitute objective knowledge." This shows that whatever reservations we may have about Husserl's theory, there is one charge of which Husserl is not guilty: Husserl does not believe that the propositional attitudes can be assessed without reference to states of affairs. In a word, he does not advocate an internalist position. H E I D E G G E R ' S INDEBTEDNESS TO HUSSERL §6. Intuitions without Concepts Are Blind It is time to address the question of how we are m e a n t to u n d e r s t a n d Heidegger's thought in relation to Husserl's. We have seen that the internalist/externalist distinction is irrelevant here. At first sight it would appear that rather than referring to a d e p a r t u r e from Husserl we should speak of an indebtedness to Husserl. O n studying SuZ's references to Husserl we sense that there is a positive engagement between the thinkers. Heidegger professes that he continues to work within the spirit of phenomenology by following the Husserlian maxim "Back to the things themselves" (zuriick zu den Sachen selbst) .18 Heidegger acknowledges, "The following investigation would [not] have b e e n possible if the g r o u n d had not been p r e p a r e d by E d m u n d Husserl, with whose LU phenomenology first emerged" (SuZ, §7, 38). In a footnote he expresses his gratitude to Husserl m o r e explicitiy: "If the following investigation has taken any steps forward in disclosing the 'things themselves', the author must first of all thank E. Husserl"

Heidegger's Indebtedness to Husserl

11

(SuZ, §7, p. 38, fn. 1). What is it, then, about LU that impresses Heidegger so much? I m p o r t a n t to Heidegger is that the LU argues not only that all intentional acts strive for intuitive fulfillment, but also that truth value is d e t e r m i n e d by states of affairs and not by us. Heidegger believes that Husserl thereby "touches or brushes against . . . the question of Being" (Zdhringer Seminare, 111 / 373), since he shows that what is given in experience is far m o r e than sensible data. Let us look at this in detail. T h e phenomenological breakthrough lies in Husserl's claim that it is possible to experience truth. We can experience states of affairs and not just their representations. It is exactiy this insight that leads Husserl to redefine the traditional conception of experience in the Sixth Investigation. O n the one hand, Husserl repeats Kant's insight that intuitions without concepts are blind (cf. KRV, A51 / B75). We cannot make any epistemological claims, i.e., recognize something to b e something, if the intuition has not b e e n subsumed u n d e r a corresponding (categorial, i.e., synthetic) intention. What is merely sensory within experience is insufficient to provide us with an object (Gegenstand) .19 O n the other hand, unlike Kant, Husserl holds that what is given in experience is far m o r e than sensible intuition. Whereas Kant regards intuitions as exclusively distinct from concepts, 20 one representing a m o m e n t of receptivity (intuition) a n d the other a m o m e n t of spontaneity (concepts) ,21 Husserl claims that fulfillment lies in an intuition that is categorial in its form. 22 T h e r e is an analogy here; Husserl says categories can be like intuitions. They can be intuited. § 7. Categorial Intuition Although Husserl argues that categories are given as "an analogue of common sensuous intuition' (LU VI, §44, 670; LI, 784), we should not confuse the term intuition h e r e with "the kind of intuition employed by Bergson" (GA 20, §6, 64). Husserl is not referring to an immediate p u r e seeing but to a cognitive fulfillment that is founded in the material of a perceptual act with which it is b o u n d up. 2 3 It is the disclosure of a state of affairs t h r o u g h the exercise of our understanding. Categorial intuition involves acts of identification and discrimination. It allows us to grasp relations such as "a is 'brighter than' &" or aggregates such as "a+ b+ c±d"24 Husserl says that these relational structures should not be confused with the addition of a series of acts; rather, like meanings, categorial objects are ideal. They are constituted

12

HUSSERL AND H E I D E G G E R

in the categorial act. Take the judgment "Sis P"as an example. According to Husserl, the is is not a copula that connects S and Pin the judgm e n t . Rather, the "is Pn is a nonindependent {unselbststdndiger) but unitary act. The categorial object "5 is P "comes into being when the act ofj u d g m e n t is performed. We do not have simple or first order objects u p o n which we impress a logical form. Rather the form is disclosed in the act. Like Kant, Husserl thus argues that knowledge is j u d g m e n t and j u d g m e n t is a form of synthesis. However, Husserl is unlike Kant in that synthesis is to him not the result of a spontaneous act—it is not the bringing together of various aspects, but it is understood intentionally; it 'gives the object' (cf. GA 20, §6c, 87). Husserl says: "But we d o not enact a m e r e sequence of presentations, but a judgement, a peculiar 'unity of consciousness,' that binds these together. In this binding together the consciousness of the state ofaffairsis constituted: to execute judgement, and to be conscious of a state of affairs, in this synthetic positing ofsomething as referred to something, are one and the same" (LU V, §36, 491; LI, 632). T h o u g h t is a m o d e of disclosure. T h e state of affairs is not assembled but given in a fulfilled intention. "To execute j u d g e m e n t , and to be conscious of a state of affairs, are one and the same." In other words, the synthetic achievement is determined by the object itself. It is not a question of fabricating sense but of "letting the entity be seen in its objectivity" (GA 20, §62, 97). It is through categorial intuition that we grasp that things are thus and so; we recognize something to ^ s o m e t h i n g . §8. Being Is Not a Predicate H e r e Heidegger locates Husserl's significant breakthrough. For "by way of understanding what is present in categorical intuition, we can c o m e to see that the objectivity of an entity is really not exhausted by this narrow definition of reality, that objectivity in its b r o a d sense is m u c h richer than the reality of the thing" (GA 20 §6c, 89). Take the simple expression "the paper is white" as an example. T h e actual word "is" appears in this expression as a sign. However, the "is" to which the meaning intention points is not a real inherent mom e n t given. It does not appear in the same way as sensuous matter does. Husserl says: "I can see colour, but not ^rnig-coloured. I can feel smoothness, but not being-smooth. . . . Being is nothing in the object, no p a r t of it, no m o m e n t tenanting it, no quality or intensity of i t . . . n o constitutive feature of it however conceived. But being is also nothing

T h e Transcendental T u r n

13

attaching to an object: as it is n o real [reales] internal feature, so also it is n o real external feature, and therefore not, in the real sense, a 'feature' at all" (LU VI, §43, 666; LI, 780). "The form-giving flexion Being, whether in its attributive or predicative function, is not fulfilled . . . in any percept. H e r e we are r e m i n d e d of Kant's dictum: Being is no real predicate" (LU VI, §43,665; LI, 780). It cannot be seen or touched. It never appears as such; it is never 'actual'; nonetheless "it" is assumed as given. W h e n we say "The p a p e r is white," we thus n e e d to differentiate between seeing and saying: "I see white paper," says Husserl, "and say 'white p a p e r ' " (LU VI, §40,659; LI, 775). W h e n we see white p a p e r we are referring to purely sensory information. When we say "the paper is white," we are introducing a syntax into what we perceive and recognizing something to be something. 2 5 T h e statement presents not just p a p e r and whiteness but the fact or state of affairs that the paper is white. T h e copula w h e r e provides an objective reference. It does not merely link the two words but presents the paper as "being" white. Heidegger believes that "with those analyses of categorial intuition Husserl has liberated Being from its d e p e n d e n c e u p o n j u d g e m e n t " (Zahringer Seminare, 115 / 377). 'Being-true' is a predicate that does not belong to the j u d g e m e n t a l act but to the state of affairs. T o follow Husserl: "Being is n o t a j u d g e m e n t nor a constituent of a j u d g e m e n t . Being is as little a real consituent of some inner object as it is of some outer object, and so not of a j u d g e m e n t " (LU VI, §44, 668; LI, 782) .26 This insight provides the g r o u n d for Heidegger's own analysis. "As a result of this t h e r e e m e r e d a new orientation of the whole sphere of investigation" (Zahringer Seminare, 115 / 377). "Husserl's achievement consisted precisely in this presentification of Being which is p h e n o m e nally present in the category." T h r o u g h this, achievement, Heidegger continues, "At last I found a ground: 'Being' is no m e r e concept, is n o p u r e abstracation which has e m e r g e d along the path of derivation" (Zahringer Seminare, 116 / 378). We can now understand why Heidegger believes that LU has p r e p a r e d the way for the question of the meaning of Being. It allowed him to assume that Being itself is given.27 THE TRANSCENDENTAL TURN §9. The Transcendental

Turn

While we have shown that we should not understand the relation between Husserl and Heidegger in terms of the internalism/externalism

14

HUSSERL AND H E I D E G G E R

debate, it seems feasible that when turning to Husserl's later work Keller is not mistaken in interpreting their relation in this way. For it is with his transcendental turn that Husserl reduces all p h e n o m e n a to the sense bestowal (Sinngebung) of consciousness. The accusation that Husserl's phenomenological approach affirms nothing other than a "methodological solipsism" thus does not seem unfounded. Indeed, this view appears to reflect Heidegger's reading of Husserl. While the LU touch upon the question of Being, Heidegger believes that with his Cartesian and transcendental turn Husserl betrays the very principle of phenomenology: Even today it is very hard to imagine the scope of the difficulties which stood in the way of asking the question of Being. . . . Husserl himself who came close to the true question of Being in the Logical Investigations—above all in the VI— could not persevere in the philosophical atmosphere of that time. He came under the influence of Natorp and turned to transcendental phenomenology which reached its first culmination in the Ideas. The principle ofphenomenology was thus abandoned. (ZSD, 47; 44E, emphasis added) Yet a closer look at GA 20 suggests that even this reading requires reassessment. Although Heidegger constantly turns against Husserl's transcendental idealism, he never accuses him of r e t u r n i n g to "the Cartesian conception of mind as a kind of inner theatre"; rather he concedes in passing that the aim of the transcendental reduction is "the determination of the very entity" (GA 20, §10b, 136) that has b e e n bracketed. Moreover, he states that "the question of being is thus raised, it is even answered' (GA 20, §12,155). This leads Steven Crowell to observe that, "though difficult to interpret with confidence, this provocative statement suggests that Heidegger has n o quarrel with Husserl's transcendental approach to the question of the being of entities" (Crowell 1997, 32). Indeed, despite the fact that Heidegger tends to object to Husserl's transcendental turn, there is no question that SuZ itself is transcendentally motivated. After all, Heidegger will be c o n c e r n e d with the "conditions for the possibility o f (SuZ, §18,85 & §41,199) all ontical or factual manifestations which h e believes are disclosed when we study the fundamental constitution of the Being of Dasein. Heidegger's approach, like Husserl's, is foundational: "The question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions n o t only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such a type .. . but also for the possibility of those

T h e Transcendental T u r n

15

ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations" (SuZ, §3, 11). In keeping with Crowell, we can thus assume that "transcendental reflection and ontology are not incompatible" (Crowell 1997, 29). If this is the case, we n e e d to ask why Heidegger nonetheless objects to H u s s e r l transcendental turn. §10. Husserl and Hume First let us consider why Husserl could be interpreted as defending an internalist position. It is assumed that Heidegger objects to Husserl's transcendental t u r n because it leads him to bracket the question of existence. After all, Husserl argues that it is necessary to bracket the general thesis of the natural attitude (rather than merely particular acts, as in L U ) . This attitude assumes that a world exists independently of consciousness. T h o u g h it remains unnoticed, this attitude informs o u r everyday life. Whether as scientist or layperson, we all operate with the belief that there is a world within which all experience takes place. H u m e would call this o u r "natural disposition to belief," which we can neither choose n o r u n d o . Since the reduction encourages us d o away with all our presuppositions, it forces us to bracket the belief that such a world and the things in it 'exist'. We are encouraged to look at the structure of appearing without assuming either its existence or nonexistence. It seems that by advocating such a suspension, Husserl is exemplifying the tradition of philosophy as depicted by Heidegger. H e explicitly encourages us to ignore and, indeed, to "jump over" the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. However, such a reading misses the ingenuity of Husserl's position. For Husserl argues not only that we have n o means of affirming, b u t equally that we have n o means of negating, our natural disposition to belief. H e thereby radicalizes a H u m e a n position and shows why scepticism is impossible. 28 H u m e has shown that all arguments in supp o r t of the skeptical position are totally inefficacious, a n d all arguments against it are totally idle. 29 Although a skeptical position may sound convincing, we cannot help believing in the existence of the body, a n d cannot help forming beliefs and expectations in general, in accordance with the basic canons of induction. This leads H u m e to refer to two irreconcilable attitudes: the philosophical attitude (which leads us to be skeptics) and the natural disposition to belief. Husserl, however, contends that this should have led H u m e to realize that both these attitudes are part and parcel of o n e a n d the same attitude, which h e calls the "natural attitude." For Husserl, H u m e has shown that it is

16

H U S S E R L AND H E I D E G G E R

impossible either to affirm or to negate o u r belief in the existence of an external world. We can neither sustain a skeptical position n o r can we justify our natural disposition to belief. If we take H u m e ' s argum e n t seriously, we realize that it should have led him to a position that makes skepticism impossible. Inadvertently, H u m e has shown that we lose the right either to affirm or to negate the existence of the external world. This is why Husserl argues that true skepticism does not d o u b t the world but our capacity to judge whether or not there is a world. It leads to the suspension of j u d g m e n t — t o what Husserl calls the epoche or bracketing or reduction.™ Rather than turning us away from the world a n d describing o u r mental events or "intuitions" (Bell 1990,197), as Bell contends, the reduction leads us to turn o u r attention toward that which has b e e n susp e n d e d , our natural disposition to belief in the existence of the world a n d of entities found within it. As Heidegger observes: "The term 'suspension' is thus always misunderstood when it is thought that in susp e n d i n g the thesis of existence and by doing so, phenomenological reflection simply has nothing m o r e to do with the entity. Quite the contrary: In an extreme and unique way, what really is at issue now is the determination of the being of the very entity" (GA 20, §10, 135). Rather than ignoring it, the reduction brings into the foreground o u r general disposition to belief that there is an external world. It allows us precisely to "look at what we normally look through" (Sbkolowski 2000, 50). T h e transcendental reduction does not lead Husserl to advocate an internalist position. To the contrary, the epoche leads us to look at the world and p h e n o m e n a within it without assuming an innerouter distinction. §11. The Spectacle of the World As in LU, with the introduction of the transcendental reduction the aim is to r e t u r n to a n absolute givenness. 31 New at this stage is that this evidence is n o longer restricted to what can find adequate intuitive fulfillment—it includes objects in the external world, and moreover our general disposition to belief, which can never find adequate fulfillment. 32 In other words, evidence includes objects as they are given in their vagueness. Husserl thereby comes to show that what manifests itself is not only what is fully present but also what is absent. Let us look at this in m o r e detail: T h e world and its objects, looked at from a phenomenological attitude, Husserl calls noemata.

T h e Transcendental T u r n

17

Noematarefer to objects as they are intended, or as looked at precisely as they are intended. Noemata work on two levels: First, the noema refers to individual acts of perception. T h e r e is n o noesiswithout a noema (cf. IdeenI, §93, 232 / 193). According to Husserl, any act of perception strives for fulfillment in the object as it is intended, which, however, can never be t u r n e d into a really inherent c o m p o n e n t of perception. W h e n we perceive an object, for example a die, be it an imagined or a real die, we d o not merely perceive one side of the die that is genuinely given. We cannot see a side of the die without instantaneously intending the unity and identity of the die as such, which is meant or intended, though never genuinely given. This fundamental form of synthesis—identification—is passive. We d o n o t n e e d to walk a r o u n d the die and add u p all its sides in o r d e r to perceive the unity of the die; rather, we perceive the unity as soon as we perceive a particular side of the die. This is not to say that we know what the object looks like from the other side, b u t we can see an object (as three-dimensional) only if we already have some expectations of what the object may look like from the other side. This intending is of a peculiar kind. For we are n o t trying to make present the sides that are absent; rather, the sides that are absent are seen as absent™ We h e r e r e t u r n to the distinction between the object as it is intended and the object that is intended. Perception involves layers of synthesis which are not only actual b u t also potential and thus absent. T h e r e is a multitude of perceptual acts (noeseis), which all strive to (intend) one and the same object as such, which is meant (noema). What is meant is not the essence of the different acts of perceptions but a correlate of all acts of perception. 3 4 T h e noema is the ideal correlate of noesis. It guides and in this way makes possible the manifold of perceptual acts (noeseis). Second, noemata now not only are limited to particular perceptual acts, b u t refer to the absolute interpretative horizon, which is given in its vagueness a n d thus can never find adequate fulfillment. T o follow Husserl: "Any actual experience points beyond itself to possible experiences, which in turn, point to new possible experiences and so ad infinitum. . . . Any hypothetical formulation in practical life or in empirical science relates to this changing but always co-posited horizon whereby the positing of the world receives its essential sense" (Ideen 7, §47,112-13/90). Consciousness is dynamic. Every perceiving not only intends the unity of an individual object as such, b u t co-intends the possibility of

18

H U S S E R L AND H E I D E G G E R

o t h e r objects and, indeed, the unity of the world as such. "For i n d e e d their particularity is particularity within a unitary universe, which, even when we are directed to and grasping the particular, goes on 'appearing' unitarily. . . . This consciousness is awareness of the world-whole in its own peculiar form, that of spatio temporal endlessness" (CM §15, 75). Every object we perceive is situated in one way or another. I never perceive an object, let us say a chair, in isolation. T h o u g h my attention may be o n the chair, Husserl says, I can see the chair only if I also intend the chair as being in a room, and the r o o m , in turn, as being in a house, and the house as being in a city, and so forth. Moreover, all actual a n d possible perceptions a p p e a r within the horizon of one a n d the same world. The world allows for the continuity of experience and the iterative (the "and so forth" or "over and over again") fundamental forms of idealization. Again these intentions are of a peculiar kind. They are implicit, unthematized, or what Husserl calls pre-predicative. Nonetheless they are necessary for any object perception to take place. In a word, all our perceptions are teleologically structured. 3 5 They strive toward the unity of the world. What is evidendy given with every object perception is the implicit awareness of a world-whole in its spatiotemporal endlessness. Phenomenology thereby brings to evidence what H u m e has called our natural disposition to belief that there is an external world. In bracketing the world nothing is lost, and world knowledge is won. Phenomenology describes how all our experiential life —all actual, potential, or habitual posi tings—takes place against a b a c k g r o u n d of indeterminacy (cf Ideen I, §27,58 / 49). This background is the world as such. The reduction draws our attention to exactly that which has b e e n previously ignored—an underlying, implicit world-belief cannot be outstripped. Husserl h e r e operates with a version of ontological difference. T h e horizon of all horizons—the world as such—has a similar function to what Heidegger would call "the worldhood of the world" (SuZ, §14 ff.); it provides the condition for the possibility of any entity to be. It is transcendence p u r e and simple. The reduction brings to light what Heidegger would call the Being of the world, which can never be outstripped.^ 6 It facilitates the determination of the Being of entities. H e n c e , it should n o t surprise us that Heidegger comes to proclaim that the transcendental reduction thus n o t only facilitates, but even answers, the question of the meaning of Being (cf. GA 20 §12, 155).

T h e Transcendental T u r n

19

§12. Ontology versus Epistemology This might suggest a complete overlap between Husserl a n d Heidegger: it was Husserl who raised the question of the meaning of Being in the first place. However, we should remain cautious in o u r assessment. T h e analogies we have drawn above merely make the discrepancies between the thinkers m o r e visible with respect to their approach and m e t h o d . We need to r e m e m b e r that, although Heidegger acknowledges the significance of the transcendental reduction, he nonetheless objects to Husserl's Cartesianism and insists that "the question of being itself is left undiscussedn (GA 20, §12, 157). T h e problem, as seen by Heidegger, is not so m u c h that Husserl fails to raise the question of Being, but that his m e t h o d and analysis remain epistemologically motivated. Rather than sidestepping skepticism, Husserl raises internal objections to the Cartesian enterprise. His aim is still to overcome skepticism in o r d e r to arrive at certainty. In view of this Heidegger believes that "the being of acts is in advance theoretically and dogmatically defined by the sense of being which is taken from the reality of nature" (GA20, §12, 157). Heidegger acknowledges that the significance of Husserl's thinking, with respect to Descartes, is that he does not r e d u c e the notion of person to a "thinking thing." 37 What remains after the reduction is not an T think', b u t thought as an intentional act (cogitatio).38 However, Heidegger believes that Husserl's analysis falls short, since it fails to question the "ontological meaning of 'performance [.]' How is the kind of Being which belongs to a person to b e ascertained ontologically in a positive way?" (SuZ, §10, 48). Husserl's primary question is simply not concerned with the character of the being of consciousness. Rather, he is guided by the following concern: How can consciousness become the possible object of an absolute science? The primary concern which guides him is the idea of an absolute science. This idea, that consciousness is to be the region of an absolute science, is not simply invented; it is the idea which has occupied modern philosophy ever since Descartes. The elaboration of pure consciousness as the thematic field of phenomenology is not derived phenomenologically by going back to the matters themselves but by going back to a traditional idea of philosophy. (GA 20, § l l d , 147)

20

HUSSERL AND H E I D E G G E R

T h e p r o b l e m facing Heidegger is that Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y focuses o n the question of cognition, namely, "how can experience as consciousness give or contact an object?" 39 Husserl thereby affirms a philosophy of consciousness (Beumpseinsphilosophie). Like Descartes, Husserl leaves the question "what is the sum of the cogito?" u n e x p l o r e d and fails to see that the world is an existential structure of Dasein. 40 Heidegger objects to Husserl's Cartesianism. This is not because he believes Husserl's position to be that of an internalist or methodological solipsist, but because he detects a philosophical "natural attitude" in Husserl's prioritization of consciousness a n d theory. 41 In Heidegger's view, Husserl's starting point is unphenomenological because he has failed to free himself from all theoretical presuppositions about the n a t u r e of our relation to the world. Husserl takes it for granted that "man" in the natural attitude "is given as a living being, as a zoological object" (GA 20, §12,155). Yet Heidegger believes that Husserl thereby fails to see that "[m]an's natural manner of experience . . . cannot be called an attitude" (GA 20, §12, 156). Husserl's natural attitude, according to Heidegger, is "totally unnatural. For it includes a welldefined theoretical position in which every entity is taken a priori as a lawfully regulated flow of occurrences in the spatio-temporal exteriority of the world" ( G A 2 0 § 1 2 , 1 5 6 ) . Heidegger thereby raises external objections to the Cartesian enterprise. For Heidegger, phenomenology as transcendental critique is adequate only if it reflects on the being that is able to raise the question of Being, namely, Dasein itself. Once this reflection takes place, we realize that we can never bracket the question of the world's existence, since any bracketing or questioning is possible only if we always already have — and, indeed, live with—an understanding of its existence. As Heidegger provocatively asserts: "The question of whether there is a world at all a n d whether its Being can be proved, makes no sense if it is raised hyDasein as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it?"42 Heidegger not only renders obsolete the problem of the external world, he questions the very possibility of questioning the existence of the world as such. H e questions whether its Being can ever be turned into an object of reflection. CONCLUSION It has become clear that we should not see the relation between Heidegger and Husserl in terms of the internalism/externalism oppo-

Conclusion

21

sition. The problem for Heidegger is not that Husserl returns to "a Cartesian conception of the mind as a kind of inner theater" (Keller 1999, 43), but that his approach remains epistemologically motivated. Husserl's fundamental concern is the question of cognition, namely, "How can experience as consciousness give or contact an object?" 48 Husserl still tries to dissolve Cartesian skepticism in o r d e r to arrive at the assurance that there is an external world. According to Heidegger, Husserl thereby fails to realize that the being that can find such an assurance is a being that always already has a world. While Husserl believes that phenomenology and epistemology go hand in hand, Heidegger argues that ontology precedes epistemology. T o p u t it another way, Husserl's fundamental question will be: "How d o p h e n o m e n a constitute themselves to consciousness?" T h e task is to show how cognitionis possible. Heidegger, in turn, rejects the p r o b l e m of cognition outright. Rather than trying to solve it, he presents traditional philosophy as being "out of tune with that with which [we are] most fundamentally attuned" (Mulhall 1996, 31). T h e problem of cognition is a pseudo-problem which disappears as soon as we realize that Dasein cannot be divorced from the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. Heidegger thereby raises external objections to skepticism. We need to reframe epistemology not by refuting it b u t by questioning its premise. 4 4 It is only by sidestepping epistemological concerns that the question of Being can come into the foreground. 4 5 For it is then that we realize that the Being of the world is an existential structure of Dasein which can never be t u r n e d into an object of reflection. Keller is thus not mistaken when he argues that Heidegger departs from Husserl in understanding experience n o longer in terms of consciousness, but "as the transcendence of the self to things in the world" (Keller 1999,100). However, contrary to Keller's findings, we have seen that we cannot understand this departure in terms of the internalism/ externalism debate.

CHAPTER TWO

Toward an "Unworldly" Beginning

INTRODUCTION T H E P R E V I O U S C H A P T E R has illustrated the proximity of Husserl's and Heidegger's thought. We have shown that Heidegger's d e p a r t u r e from Husserl should not be understood in terms of the internalism/ externalism debate. The aim of the transcendental reduction is not to improve the m e t h o d of analyzing consciousness, it is to bring the phen o m e n o n of the world into the foreground. Heidegger recognizes b o t h the significance of the transcendental reduction and its limitations. "There is n o doubt that Husserl's fundamental position is an advance from neo-Kantianism. For the latter the object is nothing o t h e r than the manifold of sense-data structured by the concepts of the understanding. With Husserl the object regains its p e r m a n e n c e . Husserl rescues the object—but only by integrating it within the immanence of consciousness" (Zahringer Seminare, 382 / 120). Heidegger praises Husserl for having overcome neo-Kantianism by showing that the external world is not a problem that needs to be surmounted. T h e r e is n o need for structuring a meaningless manifold of sense-data, because the world is always already meaningfully structured. In this m a n n e r Husserl departs from the tradition of philosophy. Nonetheless Heidegger criticizes Husserl for his Cartesianism, which in the final analysis leads him to r e t u r n to a worldless subject. T h e problem for Heidegger is that Husserl manages to overcome neo-Kantianism (i.e., "rescue the object") only through the transcendental reduction. This permits Husserl to r e d u c e the external world to the field of immanence. 1 T h e world in question is the world of consciousness. Husserl thus fails to see that the world itself is an existential structure of Dasein and can never be turned into an object of reflec-

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tion. In a curious m a n n e r Husserl thus "rescues" the Being of the world, yet only by "ignoring," that is bracketing, the world. T h e paradox is that Husserl departs from the tradition only insofar as he adheres to it. H e n c e the fundamental p r o b l e m for Heidegger is that Husserl returns to a philosophy of consciousness (Bewufitseinsphibsophie). Husserl, so Heidegger claims, affirms a claustrophobic i m m a n e n c e which excludes the possibility of a m o m e n t of exteriority. Heidegger could n o t emphasize this point m o r e forcefully: "Husserl neither questions n o r pierces the realm of consciousness. . . . Indeed, it cannot be pierced as long as the starting point is the ego cogito. It is fundamental to the ego cogito (as it is for Leibniz's m o n a d ) that it has n o windows t h r o u g h which something could enter or depart. Thus the ego cogito is an enclosed space. T h e idea of being able to 'get out o f this sealed space is self-contradictory. H e n c e the necessity of starting from something other than the ego cogito' (Zahringer Seminare, 383 / 121). As long as philosophy takes consciousness, or the ego cogito, as its starting point, even if "the object is rescued," of necessity a m o m e n t of exteriority is r e n d e r e d impossible. Husserl hereby undermines the significance of his breakthrough. The transcendental reduction permits Husserl to r e d u c e the Being of the world to immanence. H e adheres to the tradition of m o d e r n philosophy by affirming a "worldless Ego" as "the beginning of all beginnings." T h e aim of this chapter is to explore the nature of Husserl's Cartesianism and to analyze the extent to which Husserl's r e t u r n to i m m a n e n c e can be described as a r e t u r n to an absolute and "enclosed" space.

H E I D E G G E R ' S CRITIQUE §13. Husserl's

Cartesianism

Heidegger believes that Husserl epitomizes the tradition of philosophy insofar as he makes philosophy's implicit disinterestedness in the p h e n o m e n o n of the world explicit. By prioritizing consciousness Husserl slights the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the world a n d "abandons the project of phenomenology" (ZSD, 47; 44E). His starting point n o longer differs from an idealist one. 2 Heidegger locates Husserl's "fatal" move in his r e t u r n to Descartes. This finds its fullest expression in §49 of Ideen 7, in which Husserl affirms consciousness as the absolute g r o u n d for

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all appearances. T h e title of §49 alone implies a trajectory opposed to the o n e articulated in SuZ: "Absolute Consciousness as the Residuum After the Annihilation of the World" (Ideen I, §49, 114 / 91). As Heidegger argues, §49 indicates that, for Husserl, "In principle the possibility exists that consciousness itself is 'not affected in its own existence' by an 'annihilation of the world of things' — a consideration which, as is well-known, Descartes h a d already employed" (GA 20, § l l c , 144). While the Heidegger of SuZ maintains that "to Dasein, Being-in-aworld is something that belongs essentially" (SuZ, §4, 13), Husserl returns to a Being that can be defined independently of the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. This is articulated in the following passage of Ideen I: "No real being, no being which is presented and legitimated in consciousness by appearances, is necessary to the being of consciousness itself (in the broadest sense, the stream of lived experiences). Immanental being is therefore indubitably absolute being in the sense that by essential necessity immanental being nulla 're'indiget ad existendum" (Ideen I, §49,115 / 92). Husserl adheres to the Cartesian postulation that we need only thought, and not extension, in order to exist. It is an affirmation of an existence that is not, and could never become, spatial. §14. The Incompleteness of Space Husserl adheres to Descartes, however, only insofar as he departs from him. T h e above citation itself is a partial quotation of Descartes' definition of substance in the Prinapia: "By substancewe can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to d e p e n d on n o other thing for its existence" (Descartes 1985, 210). As Jean-Luc Marion points out, it is important to note that "Husserl, however, modifies Descartes' formula: he omits aliain 'alia re,' and only accepts resin in-verted commas." 3 Husserl makes this modification because he wishes to differentiate consciousness from reality (cf. Ideen I, §42,96 / 77), and therefore has to prevent any association between consciousness and res in terms of realitas} Nonetheless, structurally Husserl adheres to Descartes: not only does Husserl intimate a dualism by defining consciousness (i.e., immanence) as essentially distinct from reality (transcendence), but, like Descartes, he argues that transcendence is characterized by extension. Space is the essence of transcendence 5 and never pertains to i m m a n e n c e , which reminds us of Descartes' definition of extensio as the essence of res corporea, which can never be attributed to res cogitans.

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Indeed, this definition permits Husserl to argue that only the imman e n t field is absolutely given. T h e incompleteness of the transcendent field is d u e to the extended nature of the world. Since the transcend e n t world is spatial, that is, three-dimensional, it is never completely visible at o n e given time. Transcendent objects are given incompletely, for to be absolutely given is to be fully present and completely visible (i.e., clear and distinct). Being spatial and being incomplete are therefore virtually synonymous descriptions of the transcendent world. §15. The Bracketing of the Unseen This leads Husserl to maintain that it is possible to bracket the world, "a consideration which, as is well-known, Descartes had already employed." 6 Because transcendent being, or the world of things, is essentially incomplete and can neverbe exhaustively given to consciousness, it is in principle o p e n to doubt. "The world is dubitable not in the sense that rational motives are present to be taken into consideration over against the tremendous force of harmonious experiences,.. . but dubitability exists in the sense that a becoming doubtful and a becoming null are conceivable; the possibility of non-being, as an essential possibility, is never excluded." 7 We cannot exclude the possibility of d o u b t even if there is no rational motive for it, since o u r expectations might be disappointed and redirected. T h e bracketing of the transcendent world is not the exclusion of objects from the field of the theory of knowledge, b u t it is an exclusion of the unseen. What defines the transcendent world is its indeterminateness in terms of visibility: Of necessity a physical thing can be given only "one-sidedly"; and that signifies, not just incompletely or imperfecdy in some sense or other, but precisely what presentation by adumbrations prescribes. A physical thing is necessarily given in mere "modes of appearance" in which necessarily a core of "what is actually presented"is apprehended as being surrounded by a horizon of "co-givenness, " which is not givenness proper, and of more or less vague indeterminateness. . . . To be in infinitum imperfect in this manner is part of the unanullable essence of the correlation between "physical thing" and perception of a physical thing. (Ideen I, §44, 100 / 80)

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This leads Husserl to his provocative claim that the possibility of the annihilation of the world (Weltvernichtung) can never be excluded. Any perception of a transcendent thing necessitates the co-give nness of empty intentionalities and horizons which are not fully given (i.e., in their totality as being present) and therefore d o n o t provide us with the certainty n e e d e d for an adequate phenomenological starting point. 8 We can now u n d e r s t a n d how Husserl, in a way analogous to Descartes, reaches the conclusion that "in principle the possibility exists that consciousness itself is not affected by the annihilation of the world of things." T h e only area of study that can provide the absolute certainty n e e d e d is p u r e consciousness, and the transcendent world, in whose being d o u b t is conceivable, must be bracketed. Everything that is not actually given in the cogitationes and therefore n o t evidently seen remains only as suspended. §16. An Incompleteness That Is Not Based on Lack T h e transcendent world is essentially distinct from the i m m a n e n t field. Indeed, it is impossible for a transcendent thing ever to turn into an i m m a n e n t being, just as it is impossible for the stream of lived experiences ever to t u r n into a transcendent res. "A lived experience is possible only as a lived experience, a n d not as something spatial. However, the adumbrated is of essential necessity possible only as something spatial (it is spatial precisely in its essence), and not possible as a lived experience" (Ideen I, §41, 95 / 75-76, emphasis a d d e d ) . This definition leads Husserl to give a positive account of incompleteness, in contrast to Descartes. T h e absolute distinction between imman e n c e and transcendence defies a representative account of the world. If the distinction were not absolute, then we would b e led to believe the transcendent domain to be incomplete; it would be an incomplete representation of an ideal world which, in principle, could be given absolutely, i.e., as i m m a n e n t and fully present. If this were the case, t h e n we would u n d e r s t a n d p h e n o m e n a only privatively. "But this view is a countersense. It implies that there is n o essential difference between something transcendent and something immanent, that, in the postulated divine intuition, a spatial physical thing is present as a really i n h e r e n t constituent, that it is therefore itself a lived experience also belonging to the divine stream of consciousness and divine lived experiences generally." 9

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27

Incompleteness, however, does not refer to a m o m e n t of lack. It is not that the transcendent field is an incomplete representation of an ideal, adequately given world. We too easily interpret the unseen as pointing to a mysterious reality from which we are barred. 1 0 T h e world ofrealitasis not an enigma that we, like paleontologists, have to reconstruct. T h e transcendent world can be perceived only incompletely, i.e., aspectivally. For to £e spatial means to be given incompletely. 11 This definition holds even for divine or intellectual intuition: "Not even a Divine physics can make simply intuited determinations out of those categorial determinations of realities which are p r o d u c e d by thinking, any m o r e than a Divine omnipotence can bring it to pass that someone paints elliptic functions or plays them o n the violin" (Ideen I, §52, 129 / 102). We have reached the limits of any form of skepticism. 12 Incompleteness is n o longer measured against a thingin-itself, or an absolute truth that lies beyond the field of p h e n o m e n a ; rather, it describes a m o d e of givenness that is essential to the perception of the transcendent world. T h e diversity between consciousness and reality is so absolute that even an intellectual intuition cannot bridge it. " [A] veritable abyss yawns between consciousness and reality" (Ideen I, § 4 9 , 1 1 7 / 93). This gulf cannot be overcome—a transcend e n t thing can never be t u r n e d into an i m m a n e n t being, since the gulf is founded in the different modes of givenness. §17. The Affirmation of an Enclosed Space Unlike Descartes, Husserl is a thinker of finitude. 13 T h e r e is n o world that lies behind the p h e n o m e n a l world (Hinterwelt). As we have shown, Husserl can sustain this claim only if i m m a n e n c e and transcend e n c e are r e g a r d e d as essentially distinct: "The essentially necessary diversity a m o n g m o d e s of being, the most cardinal of t h e m all, becomes manifest: the diversity between consciousness and reality "u Husserl, therefore, could never allow for a m o m e n t in which b o t h domains b e c o m e united. For Descartes, in contrast, both the substantia cogitans and the substantia corporea, though self-sufficient and distinct, are substances of a second order, after God. This position, as Marion points out, leads to a weaker claim: "For Descartes, every finite substance, thought as well as extension, indicates a radical weakening of God's (usual) support. In this way, the ego has to share its substantiality with extension (first disagreement with Husserl) and has only relative validity (with respect to God) and, thus, is in no way

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absolute (second disagreement with Husserl)" (Marion 1989, 127). Unlike Descartes, Husserl argues that the distinction between imman e n c e and transcendence is absolute and not relative to an absolute a n d ideal being. This leads to Husserl's second modification of Descartes. Not only are there two separate and essentially distinct fields, but Husserl wishes to show that transcendence is dependent on immanence: ''The world of transcendent res' is entirely referred to consciousness and, more particularly, not to some logically conceived consciousness but to actual consciousness" (Idem 7, § 4 9 , 1 1 5 - 1 6 / 92). Only immanence is self-sufficient, while transcendence is by virtue of immanence alone; 15 this is what Husserl calls i m m a n e n t transcendence. T h e r e is only one absolute field and that is the field of immanence; there is n o substance of a higher order. 1 6 Using Descartes' terminology, immanence is a substance of the first a n d transcendence a substance of the second o r d e r . With this claim Husserl avoids the Cartesian subject-object dualism, for everything that is can c o m e into being only through the field of immanence. T h e question "How do we get to know the outside world?" is therefore n o t a p r o b l e m , for the outside is already inscribed by the inside. These modifications allow Husserl to a d h e r e to the Cartesian parameters without affirming a dualism. I m m a n e n c e remains the absolute field that lies beyond the realm of doubt. By turning i m m a n e n c e into a substance of first order, Husserl denies any m o m e n t of exteriority, for everything that is, and could possibly be, is by virtue of consciousness alone. As Heidegger observes: "Consciousness is absolute in the sense that it is the presupposition of being o n the basis of which reality can manifest itself at all" (GA 20, § l l c 144). In this m a n n e r Husserl affirms a m o m e n t of closure. Without the presupposition of an enclosed and stable foundation, nothing can exist, be, or appear. "It is non-sensical to say that there is an object which could n o t principally be an object of consciousness" (Hua XI, §4,19-20). It is only with reference to a stable a n d enclosed terrain that any form of identification, signification, or j u d g m e n t can take place. Thus, in accordance with Heidegger, we can conclude that there is in Husserl a definite r e t u r n to Descartes, a r e t u r n which, however, is "elaborated at a higher level" and with "another philosophical goal": Already here, we can detect a kinship with Descartes. What is here elaborated at a higher level of phenomenological analysis

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29

as pure consciousness is the field which Descartes glimpsed under the heading of res cogitans, the entire field of cogitationes. The transcendent world, whose exemplary index for Husserl as well is to be found in the basic stratum of the material world of things, is what Descartes characterizes as res extensa. This kinship is not merely factual. Husserl himself, at the point where he observes that the reflection has come to a climax refers explicitly to Descartes. He says that what comes to a head is simply what Descartes really sought in the Meditations, to be sure with another method and another philosophical goal. (GA 20, §10, 139) Husserl does not r e t u r n to the ego cogitobut to the structure of thought itself. However, the correlate of thinking and that which is thought— i.e., the entire field of cogitationes—is, in a m a n n e r analogous to Descartes' res cogitans, devoid of space and indeed world. The world Husserl has in m i n d is the world of res extensa. This allows Husserl to perform the transcendental reduction and thus "leap over" (uberspringen) the world. Not only this, b u t Husserl's notion of i m m a n e n t transcendence permits i m m a n e n c e to be an absolute and self-enclosed space, for everything that is and could be is by virtue of i m m a n e n c e alone.

TOWARD AN 'UNWORLDLY' EXISTENCE §18. The "Annihilation of the World" T h e gulf that separates i m m a n e n c e from transcendence permits Husserl to assert the possibility of the annihilation of the world. Transcendence is d e p e n d e n t o n and relative to immanence, while the field of i m m a n e n c e is absolute. Consciousness is thus described as the absolute given, the phenomenological residuum (cf. Ideen 7, §33, 72 / 59). Heidegger's concern is to show that such a self-enclosed realm does not exist, since there is n o being that can exist independently of the world. 17 I n d e e d Heidegger is perplexed about how we can move from a consciousness devoid of the world to the world (cf. GA 20, §10,139). We n e e d to show how Husserl attempts to describe the n a t u r e of consciousness as essentially distinct from the world (cf. GA 20, §1 l c ) . We shall argue that Husserl manages to u p h o l d that distinction by differentiating between temporalization and the spatiotemporal world. Husserl describes consciousness as an event. T h e i m m a n e n t field is nothing static, but is the transcendental stream of consciousness,

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which shows itself in its m o d e of temporalization. T h e transcendental reduction reveals a dimension of being in its temporal upsurge that is distinct from the spatiotemporal world. §19. The Description of Immanent Perception in Ideen I T h e phenomenological reduction does not lead us back to a punctual ego cogito; indeed, it does n o t lead to anything solid whatsoever, but to the transcendental stream of lived experiences {Erlebnisse). It is an experiencing and appearing that is anterior to the act of perception. T h e daring n a t u r e of the claim is that, although the field of imman e n c e is "a perpetual Heraclitean flux" (Hua X, n o . 5 1 , 349), and thus constantly changing, it wfully present in its unity. However, the following statement might lead us to assume the opposite: It is the case also of lived experience that it is never perceived completely, that it cannot be adequately seized upon in its full unity. A lived experience is, with respect to its essence, in flux which we, directing the reflective regard to it, can swim along after it starting from the Now-point, while the stretches already covered are lost to our perception. Only in the form of retention do we have a consciousness of the phase which has just flowed away, or else in the form of a retrospective recollection. And my whole stream of lived experiences is, finally, a unity of lived experiences, which, of essential necessity, cannot be seized upon completely in a perceiving which *'swims along with it." (Ideen I, §44, 103 / 82, emphasis added) T h e phenomenological reduction permits the r e t u r n to what Husserl calls "pure" consciousness (Ideen I, §33, 73 / 59). This "purity" of consciousness should not b e understood in the Kantian way, that is, as free from empiricism (cf. KRV, A50-51 / B74-75). Rather, it is p u r e because it is absolutely free from the incompleteness that defines transcendence; it is free from invisibility. From the beginning, though, it appears that phenomenology is faced with the impossible, for it wishes to present a field that constantly withdraws from any presentation. What is m a d e present through phenomenological reflection inevitably fades away a n d withdraws. It thus seems impossible to seize what p h e n o m e nology seeks to grasp. 18 At first sight it might therefore appear that Husserl's architectonic has lost its foundation, for it seems that it is impossible to seize u p o n lived

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experiences, for they are appearing within a flow a n d therefore by necessity "flowing away" or disappearing. I m m a n e n c e as a self-enclosed space appears thus to be an ideal that is never obtained. Although Husserl admits to this imperfection pertaining to i m m a n e n t perception, he argues that it is distinct from the incompleteness associated with transcendent perception: "But to incompleteness or 'imperfection,' pertaining to the essence of the perception of a lived experience, is radically different from the incompleteness or 'imperfection' pertaining to the essence of the perception of something 'transcendent'" (Ideen I, §44, 103 / 82, emphasis a d d e d ) . Husserl hereby holds o n to the radical distinction between i m m a n e n t and transcendent perception. For while the latter, because of its incompleteness, is not fully given, Husserl wishes to argue that i m m a n e n t perception, in contrast, is absolutely given. T h o u g h incomplete, it will not be incomplete in the sense of being aspectival, in the form of profiles —this incompleteness is peculiar to immanent perception, for it is inevitably accompanied by a sense of completeness. Since immanent being is not spatial, 19 there are n o empty intentions that accompany my perceptions. Rather, 'perceiving and what is perceived form essentially an unmediated unity" {Ideen I, §38, 68, translation slightly altered). H e n c e we are facing the peculiar scenario in which the self-presence of i m m a n e n t being is described as complete in its self-presence, yet simultaneously as an imperfection that should not be confused with the incompleteness of transcendent perception. To clarify this issue, Husserl draws the distinction between the adumbration (Abschattung) and the adumbrated (Abgeschattetes): "The adumbration, t h o u g h called by the same name, of essential necessity is not of the same genus as the o n e to which the a d u m b r a t e d belongs. T h e adumbrating is a lived experience. But a lived experience is possible only as a lived experience, and not as something spatial. However, the a d u m b r a t e d is of essential necessity possible only as something spatial" (Ideen I, §41, 94-95 / 75). Husserl's distinction between two forms of incompleteness is explained in terms of spatiality and temporality. T h e appearing of inner experience is not spatial and thus not aspectival. T h e field of immanence is procedural; it is thus adumbrating and never given as 'adumbration', like the objective transcendent world: 20 "Each actual lived experience . . . is necessarily an e n d u r i n g one; and with this duration it finds its place in an infinite continuum of duration—in a fulfilled continuum. Of necessity it has an all-round, infinitely fulfilled temporal

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horizon. At the same time this says: it belongs to one endless 'stream of lived experiences'" (Ideen I, §81, 198 / 163). T h o u g h incomplete, the stream of lived experiences should not be u n d e r s t o o d in terms of occlusion or obstruction, for occlusion is possible only in a threedimensional world. In i m m a n e n t experience we are faced with an incompleteness that does not occlude the co-appearance of that which appears in its failure to appear, which in t u r n is fully present. In imm a n e n t experience the infinite fulfilled stream of intentions is fully p r e s e n t despite the incompleteness of the a d u m b r a t i n g n a t u r e of lived experiences. §20. Limitations of Ideen I Reading Ideen I in isolation, we fail to u n d e r s t a n d how these claims have c o m e about. How can we simultaneously see incompleteness and completeness? Husserl admits that we can come to u n d e r s t a n d the stream of lived experiences only if we understand it in terms of temporality, which Ideen I leaves uninvestigated. Moreover, as will emerge from investigations to follow later on, time is a name for a completely delimited sphere of problems and one of exceptional difficulty. It will be shown that in order to avoid confusion our previous presentation has remained silent to a certain extent, and must of necessity remain silent about what first of all is alone visible in the phenomenological attitude and which, disregarding the new dimension, makes up a closed domain of investigation. (Ideen I, §81, 197-98 / 162) Husserl h e r e confesses to a certain inertia, as h e refuses to delve d e e p e r into the question of temporality. With a sense of relief h e announces: "Fortunately we can leave out of account the enigma of consciousness of time in o u r preliminary analyses without endangering their rigor." 21 T h e r e is a provisional character to the idea of constitution in Ideen I. In o r d e r not to complicate phenomenological reflection, the reduction has b e e n b r o u g h t to a halt. Ideen I can only naively presuppose the stream of lived experiences, since the Cartesian approach alone fails to show how we could possibly r e t u r n to consciousness in its full temporalization. As Iso Kern righdy observes, Ideen /fails to acknowledge the incompleteness of the Cartesian m e t h o d at this stage. "Is it not t h r o u g h the Cartesian a p p r o a c h of H u a II a n d Ideen I that Husserl after all reaches the

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stream of consciousness in its full temporality? T h e r e is n o d o u b t that Husserl claims that h e has achieved this in those texts. But in critical remarks from the twenties, Husserl explains that in those texts he failed to show how h e arrived at the stream of lived experience, but naively presupposed it" (Kern 1964, 207). Like Descartes, Husserl affirms the quest for certainty, evidence, and the r e t u r n to subjectivity. However, this r e t u r n cannot be Cartesian, 22 for Descartes cannot explain how the phenomenological reduction leads us back to a stream of lived experiences. 2 8 §21. Why Lived Experiences Defy an Atomistic Worldview It is only by returning to Husserl's previous lectures on internal-timeconsciousness, 24 developed between 1905 and 1917, 25 that we can explain how we can simultaneously perceive difference and unity, imperfection and incompleteness, presence and the non-absence of absence. It is in H u a X that Husserl describes the temporalization of time itself. We never intuit momentary instances b u t only their duration. I m m a n e n t objects are called Ablaufsphdnomene26 since they belongto the i m m a n e n t sphere and are thus part of the flow. To emphasize this, H u a X starts off with a critique of Brentano, who, in the spirit of Descartes, is puzzled by the p h e n o m e n a of duration. According to Husserl, for Brentano, time, alteration, and succession are not perceived, b u t are c o m p r e h e n d e d only by means of association and fantasy.27 Although Brentano affirms the consciousness of succession, h e denies that it can be perceived, since we only perceive p u r e nows, for intstance, a single note at one time. 28 Husserl, in contrast, argues that we never intuit a punctual or a hyletic datum; rather, we experience a temporal event prior to any association or fantasy. In the i m m a n e n t sphere we do not perceive static, self-identical now-points b u t the life of the lived experiences (Erlebnisse). T h e emphasis is on the vital, adverbial, and transitory nature of their being, l i v e d experiences are not punctual instants but are given in their m o d e of temporal orientation. Only abstracdy can we isolate a single m o m e n t , for as soon as we experience this m o m e n t , as soon as it exists for us, we already experience it as pointing beyond itself. T h e lived experiences have a certain structure which abstracdy can be divided into three separate components: 'primal impression or sensation', 'primary r e m e m b r a n c e ' , and 'primary expectation'. Primary expectation a n d r e m e m b r a n c e are always already co-intuited with every impression; indeed they make its

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very existence possible. These three components constitute the concrete living present, which forms an original temporal field. 29 T h e actual now which we a p p r e h e n d is always already subject to the "law of modification." 30 It is an appearing which is only because it is temporal. W e should not be led to believe that Husserl is h e r e claiming, purely, that whatever we experience is in time, for it is not that lived experiences are in time but that they exist only as temporal events. Not the p h e n o m e n o n of time is described but the coming into being of lived experiences. T h e emphasis is o n the fact that phenomenological reflection never isolates an atomistic impression; it isolates the temporal form of an impression. 31 Phenomenological reflection cannot go beyond lived experiences, thus the beginning is always one of duration. Even "the point 'now' is also a small field" (Hua X, §16, 40 / 399). T h e now is nothing but an "ideal limit" (ideale Grenze), an abstraction 3 2 that is never experienced as such—for to be means to be temporal. §22. Retention as a Primordial

Intentionality

We d o not synthesize isolated moments; rather, the lived experiences are given in their temporal form. H e r e Husserl is following Kant, insofar as the emphasis is o n the m o m e n t of synthesis. 33 However, unlike Kant, Husserl believes that not all synthesis is active.34 T h e r e is a synthesis "which is not to be thought of as an active and discrete synthesis" (Ideen I, §118, 292 / 246). Synthesis is given. To show how this is possible, Husserl introduces the terms retention and protention, which should not be confused with remembrance and expectation.*5 Any lived experience, even the experience of a p u r e now, exceeds the m o m e n tary, "since it is a relative concept and refers to a ' p a s t / j u s t as 'past' refers to the 'now'" (Hua X, §31, 68 / 423). This pointing beyond itself Husserl calls retention and protention. 3 6 T h e peculiar nature of this pointing is that is has n o object, no contents in the original (i.e., impressional) sense, neither, however, is it imagined. Rather, retention a n d protention allow for the appearing of the now and are "actually existing" (Hua X, §11, 29 / 390). Retention does not belong to the past, and protention to the future, rather b o t h are m o m e n t s of the actual now. 37 Retention bears its object within itself intentionally: The retentional "contents" are not at all contents in the original sense. When a tone dies away, it itself is sensed at first with

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particular fullness (intensity); and then there follows a rapid weakening in intensity. The tone is still there, still sensed, but in mere reverberation. This genuine tone-sensation must be distinguished from the tonal moment in retention. The retentional tone is not a present tone but precisely a tone "primarily remembered" in the now: it is not really on hand in the retentional consciousness. But neither can the tonal m o m e n t that belongs to this consciousness be a different tone that is really on hand; it cannot even be a very weak tone equivalent in quality (such as an echo). A present tone can indeed "remind" one of a past tone, exemplify it; pictorialize it; but that already presupposes another representation of the past. The intuition of the past cannot itself be a pictorialization. It is an original consciousness. . . . The reverberation of a violin tone is precisely a feeble present violin tone and is absolutely different from the retention of the loud tone that has just passed. (Hua X, §12, 3 1 - 3 2 / 3 9 2 - 9 3 ) Retention should not be confused with a m o m e n t of fading, for it is not an original impression; neither is it a replication of a m o m e n t which is n o longer, n o r is it pointing to the loss of the actual present. Unlike r e m e m b r a n c e , retention is not a re-presentation of something that n o longer is: "Retention is not image consciousness; it is something totally different" (Hua X, §13, 34 / 394). Retention differs from the past given in secondary remembering, insofar as r e m e m b r a n c e refers not to the transitory m o m e n t of something slipping away, but to something that has slipped out of sight. Retention is a retaining in its slipping away. It has n o concrete object or content; "the retentional 'contents' are not at all contents in the original sense." It has a "unique Rind of Intentionality" (Hua X, §12, 31 / 392), which can be neither reduced to an impression nor interpreted as an objectification or a re-presentation of an impression; rather, it is presentative. "For only in primary memory d o we see what is past; only in it does the past b e c o m e constituted, and constituted presentatively, not re-presentatively" (Hua X, §17,41 / 401). Retention is given in person without re-presenting anything. It is a presentative co-appearance. O u r immediate experience of an i m m a n e n t object is o u r first a n d most fundamental experience of pastness prior to any sense of loss. It is the slipping away that accompanies the experience of the present, an

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aging that is retained as present. Husserl refers to it in terms of a trail or trace: "This now apprehension is as it were, the head attached to the comet's tail of retentions relating to the earlier now—points of the motion" (Hua X, §11, 30 / 391). The retentional tail is not an additional m o m e n t that has b e e n attached to the present; rather, it is the trace (Hua X, §16, 39 / 398) that constantly accompanies and indeed makes possible any intuition of the now. Any intuition of a now is in this sense prolonged. 3 8 §23. The Identity of the Impression and the Fiction ofAtomistic Psychologism T h r o u g h his notions of retention and protention, Husserl questions an atomistic starting point. 39 It is not that we intuit the now and that intuition is accompanied by empty intentions, b u t that retention and protention are fully present in our intuition of the now. Every actual now is modified and adumbrated: Every actually present now of consciousness, however, is subject to the law of modification. It changes into retention of retention and does so continuously. Accordingly, a fixed continuum of retention arises in such a way that each later point is retention for every earlier point. And each retention is already a continuum. The tone begins and "it" steadily continues. The tone-now changes into a tone-having-been; the impressionalconsciousness, constantly flowing, passes over into ever new retentional consciousness. (Hua X, §11, 29 / 391, emphasis added) Unlike transcendent perception, which is accompanied by empty intentions, the object of immanent perception is fully present in all its "profiles" (cf. H u a X §43,91-92 / 444). In the above quotation Husserl refers to "der T o n setzt an, u n d stetig setzt 'er' sich fort." A direct translation reads: "The sound begins and 'it' steadily continues." T h e inverted commas are crucial, for they signify that no tone actually appears as an isolated moment. No sound-impression, though necessary, ever appears as a punctual impression, since it is only if it is given in its temporalizingyorm, which exceeds the impression. T h e primal impression is always already folded into the adumbrative horizon of retentions a n d protentions, which, in their modification, turn the now into an event. "The object becomes constituted as an object only in the apprehension of time, in the consciousness of time—as an object that endures, that changes or remains unchanged" (Hua X, no. 49, 321). Be

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it the i m m a n e n t perceived, or a particular individual tone, it is never identical with the impression; rather, the very identity of the tone is constituted in the chain of retentions and protentions. "Immanent contents are what they are only as far as, during their 'actual' duration, they point ahead to the future and point back to the past" (Hua X, §40, 84 / 437). T h e punctual now is intuited only as temporally extended: If one speaks of the evident givenness of an immanent content, then of course the evidence cannot signify indubitable certainty respecting the being of the tone at a single point in time; I would consider an evidence so conceived . . . to be fiction. If it belongs to the essence of a content given in perception that it is temporally extended, then the indubitability that pertains to perception can signify nothing other than indubitability with respect to temporally extended being. (Hua X, §41, 84 / 438) What is completely grasped by immanent perception is never a nowpoint. "I would consider an evidence so conceived . . . to be a fiction." It is impossible to grasp completely a momentary point of experience, since it is ready to be perceived only if it is extended. T h e self-identical tone can appear only in inverted commas; t h o u g h it is one a n d the same tone, it is not the impression that appears but only the impression in its modification. §24. The Extension of the Present It should not surprise us that Husserl frequently refers to presence as a temporal extension (das zeitlich Ausgedehnte)40 or as a temporal field (cf. H u a X, §11,32 / 391; no. 15,42). Although these are spatial metaphors, it is important to note that the field of immanence describes lived experiences which are a m o m e n t of life and not of space. The immanent field is prior to and distinct from the transcendent spatiotemporal world: "A lived experience is possible only as a lived experience, and not as something spatial" (Ideen /, §41,95 / 75). Although we can divide the present of an immanent temporal object into impression and the adumbrative chain of retentions and protentions, we can do so only abstractly. For they are one and the same moment. 4 1 It is now that we can understand Husserl's distinction between appearing and appearances, or the adumbrated (Abgeschattetem) and the adumbration (Abschattungen) in Ideen V2 In transcendent perception, things are a p p r e h e n d e d only disjunctively, i.e., we perceive the object either horn the front, the

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side, or the back. In immanent perception, which is not spatial but purely temporal, there are no alternative points of view. "Here there is no actual perspective" (Hua IX, §30, 164). The difference or incompleteness is not disjunctive but assimilative.*3 To follow Sokolowski: "There are n o alternative points of view for an inner temporal object. There is only the present. All looks are available here, and only here. Elapsed looks are assimilated and still at work in the present; there is no other way we can have t h e m . . . . There are boxes inside boxes in temporal constitution, and they melt into one another" (Sokolowski 1974, §62, 163-64). T h e change in a temporal object is therefore presented in its presence. The segment of conscious life involving impression, retention, and protention is a whole and a concretum. It is by virtue of retention and protention that Husserl can describe i m m a n e n t experience, the appearing of appearances, as absolutely given. I m m a n e n t objects are completely given despite the fact that the appearing is not static but a dynamic flow. However, the extent to which i m m a n e n c e is the absolute foundation remains questionable, since it appears that the dynamic structure of i m m a n e n t experience is possible only by virtue of an impression.

THE PROBLEM OF "SENSUOUS HYLE" §25. The Problem of Data-Sensualism We have shown that our original experience is not sense-data, or a punctual now-point, but its temporal form. Phenomenology does not r e t u r n us to a meaningless manifold but synthesis. In this m a n n e r Husserl overcomes the problems of corpuscularism. T h e original and most fundamental experience is not sense-data but the stream of modifications, which is fully present in its unity. T h e problem, however, is that Husserl can reach this observation only by presupposing that there is a punctual now that initiates these modifications. Given this, Husserl still appears to operate with a matter-form dualism. This leads Sokolowski to argue that transcendental subjectivity is p u r e form, which is dependent on a reality that lies outside of its grasp (cf. Sokolowski 1964, 133-41, 210-11). T h e problem becomes visible in §85 of Ideen I, where Husserl distinguishes between two interrelated moments, that of sensuous hyle (impression a n d sensations), which he describes as formless stuffs, and

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intentional morphe, which h e describes as stuffless forms.44 Husserl initially argues that non-intentional sensations cannot be separated from their intentional structure: "This r e m a r k a b l e duality a n d unity of sensuous vXrj a n d intentive fiop(j)fj plays a d o m i n a n t role in the whole phenomenological sphere" (Idem I §85, 208-9 / 172). As in H u a X, Husserl h e r e purely affirms that consciousness should never be confused with an empirical or psychological m o m e n t : "Consciousness is precisely consciousness 'of s o m e t h i n g . . . . Consciousness is not a n a m e for 'psychical complexes/ for 'contents' fused together, for 'bundles' or streams of'sensations' which, without sense in themselves, also cann o t lend any 'sense' to whatever mixture; it is rather through a n d t h r o u g h 'consciousness.' . . . Consciousness is therefore toto coelo different from what sensualism alone will see, from what in fact is irrational stuff without sense—but which is, of course, accessible to rationalization" (Ideen I, §86, 212-13 / 176). Despite these affirmations, Husserl concedes that sensuous hyle&oes constitute an independ e n t field that is o p e n for an i n d e p e n d e n t hyletic phenomenological discipline (cf Ideen I, §86, 215 / 178). For he believes that n o t all experience is intentional, such as " 'sensuous' lived experiences, . . . sensationcontents'such as color-Data, touch-Data a n d tone-Data, and the like, which we shall n o longer confuse with appearing m o m e n t s of physical things—coloredness, roughness, etc.—which 'present themselves' to lived experiences [ertebnismaflig] by means of those 'contents'. Likewise the sensuous pleasure, pain a n d tickle sensations, a n d so forth, and n o d o u b t also sensuous m o m e n t s belonging to the sphere of 'drives'" (Ideen I, §85, 208 / 172). T h e r e is a sensuous sphere, the sphere of pleasure a n d pain, which should never be confused with the intentional experience of touch. Ideen /differentiates between the immediate, pre-objective life of experiences a n d the structuring or objectification of these experiences. Thus, Husserl appears to equate the m o m e n t of objectification a n d representation with intentionality, whereas the pre-objective sphere refers to formless stuff, the "irrational stuff without sense —but which is, of course, accessible to rationalization" (Ideen I, §86, 213 / 176). N o t only does Husserl refer to two separate fields, the sensuous and objective, b u t he points to the possibility of the existence of sensuous m o m e n t s that exceed objectification a n d thus any form or intentional structure: "Whether everywhere a n d necessarily such sensuous lived experiences in the stream of lived experiences bear some

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'animating construing' or other . . . whether, as we also say, they always have intentive functions, is not to be decided h e r e " {Idem I, §85, 208 / 172). In this m a n n e r Husserl advocates a heterological model in which hyle appears as p u r e matter for intentional activity.45 Husserl does not wish to operate with a matter-form dualism, b u t he questions whether all experience is o p e n to objectification. H e n c e the emphasis is n o t o n a data-sensualism b u t o n the possibility of experiencing feelings that are nonobjective. Indeed, the lectures on internal-time-consciousness have shown that all lived experiences, even pre-theoretical ones, are intentional. There are n o non-intentional sensations; data is ready to be perceived only once 'it' obtains a certain form. 46 Even existence that precedes any form of objectification is already intentional. Indeed, intentionality is n o t necessarily a mom e n t of objectification, for what the i m m a n e n t sphere reveals is the primordial n a t u r e of intentionality in its form of retention and p r o tention, which has n o intentional object; it is an intentionality in which an explicitly thematized object is absent. Only abstractly can we differentiate between hyle and morphe, for the hyletic d a t u m as such d o e s n o t exist, having n o being independently of its form. In r e t u r n ing to H u a X, we realize that, even in the i m m a n e n t field, the matterform distinction is an abstraction and a misleading schema to use. As Maurice Merleau-Ponty observes: "Husserl. . . for a long time defined consciousness or the imposition of a significance in terms of the Auffassung-Inhalt framework, and as a beseelende Auffassung. H e takes a decisive step forward in recognizing, from the time of his Lectures on Time, that his operation presupposes a n o t h e r d e e p e r o n e whereby the content is itself m a d e ready for this apprehension." 4 7 T h e r e t u r n to temporality r e n d e r s this dualistic schema r e d u n d a n t . It is, however, not as if Husserl were completely oblivious to these problems; rather, h e wishes to hold o n to "the clearly provisional character of reference to the idea of constitution in the Ideas' (Fink 1966,136). Husserl acknowledges that as long as the question of temporality remains bracketed, 4 8 he has failed to prevent the r e t u r n to a matter-form dualism. 4 9 §26. Inconsistencies in Hua X At first sight, however, the r e t u r n to temporality does not seem to solve the problem. Although H u a X emphasizes that we are never conscious of data, b u t only the form of the appearing, and thus argues

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that even hyle is intentional, H u a X upholds the claim that sense data provide the raw material for intentional formations. Husserl repeatedly emphasizes that t h o u g h atomistic psychologism is a fiction, there is n o consciousness without impression. 5 0 T h e impression is the unmodified source of all being: "The primal impression is something absolutely unmodified, the primal source of all further consciousness and being" (Hua X, §31, 67 / 423). Husserl h e r e appears to refer to a m o m e n t of transcendence within the field of i m m a n e n c e that exceeds the intentional structure of consciousness, but makes consciousness possible. 51 It thus appears that phenomenology is characterized by nothing b u t its failure. Rather than r e t u r n i n g to an absolute foundation, which is fully visible, phenomenology returns to that which fails to show itself—a p u r e 'now' that consciousness fails to grasp. It appears that we have to conclude, with Jacques Derrida, that the 'now' that we perceive is always already other to this p u r e m o m e n t a n d therefore structured by non-presence. According to Derrida, Husserl's account of p u r e presence is always already infected insofar as non-perception, in the form of retention and protention, structures the actual now: As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception and nonperception, in the zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and primordial retention, we admit the other into the self-identity of the Augenblick; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into the blink of the instant There is a duration to the blink, and it closes the eye. This alterity is in fact the condition for presence, presentation, and thus Vorstellung. . . . The fact that nonpresence and otherness are internal to presence strikes at the very root of the argument for the uselessness of signs in the self-relation. 52 Against this view we have already argued that it is not that "nonpresence and non-evidence are admitted into the blink of the instant"; rather, that retentions and protentions are fully present. T h e now is onfy a now if it is experienced
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§27. On the Nature of the Vrimpression—Husserl

and Kant

Husserl's claim that "without impressions there is n o consciousness" is consistent with Kant's doctrine: "Without material nothing whatsoever can be thought" (KRV, A232 / B284). This "stuff or matter should not be confused with Kant's notion of intuition. O n the o n e h a n d , Kant argues that intuition precedes our understanding: "In o r d e r to exhibit the objective reality of the p u r e concept of understanding we must always have an intuition" (KRV, A235 / B288). T h e categories are therefore "merely forms of thought for the making of knowledge from given intuitions" (KRV, B288). O n the other hand, intuitions themselves are p r e c e d e d by a m o m e n t of affectivity. O u r intuition is called "sensible, for the very reason that it is not original, that is, is not such as can itself give us the existence of its object. . . . O u r m o d e of intuition is d e p e n d e n t u p o n the existence of the object, and is therefore possible only if the subject's faculty of representation is affected by that object" (KRV, B72). What characterizes h u m a n intuition is that it is dependent o n the existence of an object that it cannot create itself. H u m a n intuition is an uintuitus derivativus" (KRV, B72). Whatever announces itself should not be confused with the mom e n t of intuition. T h e r e is something that never appears b u t makes intuition possible. Because h u m a n intuition is sensible, we n e e d to believe that there is a cause that initiates these intuitions, and since this 'cause' never appears, it can only be thought, b u t n o t intuited. This merely intelligible cause Kant calls the transcendental object - X: "We may, however, entitle the purely intelligible cause of appearances in general the transcendental object, but merely in o r d e r to have something corresponding to sensibility viewed as a receptivity" (KRV, A494 /B522). From this we can deduce that Kant, like Husserl, gives an account of experience that is nonempirical. 5 6 Though we are affected, everything that we intuit already differs from that which announces itself. T h e transcendental object = X escapes any form of representation. It is "the completely indeterminate thought of something in general" (KRV, A253). However, it should not be confused with the n o u m e n o n . A n o u m e n o n is "even apart from the constitution of o u r sensibility . . . in itself, that is, an object i n d e p e n d e n t of sensibility" (KRV, A252). "This [transcendental object = X] cannot be entitled the noumenon', for I know nothing of what it is in itself, and have n o concept of it save as

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merely the object of a sensible intuition in general, and so as being o n e and the same for all appearances" (KRV, A253). In contrast to the n o u m e n o n , we can think of the transcendental object only t h r o u g h sensible intuition: "This transcendental think object cannot be separated from the sensible data, for nothing is then left t h r o u g h which it might be thought" (KRV, A250-51). It cannot be abstracted from sensible intuition, a n d therefore belongs to the field of appearances, t h o u g h it does n o t appear. T h e r e must be something that announces itself; "otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears" (KRV, BXXVIBXXVII). Thus we can posit it only as the intelligible correlate to sensible intuition. It can be described only in negative terms: it "is transcendental, a n d is therefore necessarily unknown to m e " (KRV, A496 / B524). The transcendental object = X is an essential correlate to receptivity, a correlate that can only be thought, never intuited. Husserl, like Kant, holds on to the necessity a n d primacy of impressions. T h e generative act for consciousness is the impression. T h e r e are retentions and protentions only in relation to a primal impression or sensuous hyle. In addition, appearances are possible a n d there is intuition only if they are p r e c e d e d by a genesis spontanea: "By virtue of the original spontaneity of internal consciousness, each primal m o m e n t is the source-point for a continuity of productions" ( H u a X, appendix VII, 1 1 5 / 468). Since any appearing is possible only as a temporal event, this primal m o m e n t is a source point for both temporality and the appearing. Thus Husserl, like Kant, argues that we need to posit an original source allowing for the appearing of appearances. As in Kant, this genesis spontanea does n o t exist in itself. It is something purely abstract, "which can be nothing by itself ( H u a X, §16, 40 / 400), existing only as a correlate to the stream of consciousness. A primal impression is ready to be perceived only once it obtains a certain form. T h o u g h posited as a creative source, it is something material only from the point of view of an already constituted flow.57 §28. A Kantian Phenomenology T h e r e are, however, important distinctions that need to b e drawn. For Husserl follows Kant only by exceeding his description. We n e e d to r e m e m b e r that the task of the phenomenological reduction is to make manifest that which usually remains hidden. Phenomenology is n o t a r e t u r n to a logical beginning that needs to be thought, b u t a r e t u r n to

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the things themselves as they show themselves. What Kant's critical inquiry posits, in our reading, Husserl's phenomenology manifests. Unlike Kant, Husserl believes that the primal impression is not an intelligible correlate but appears as a correlate. T h e primal impression, like Kant's transcendental object, should never be confused with a n o u m e n o n , a reality to which we have no access. This is not because it is a correlate that needs to be thought, b u t because it is a correlate which appears in its modification. T h e primal impression manifests itself as a correlate to consciousness; it is in the fold of consciousness. Although the primal impression is nothing b u t an 'ideal now, it is not an abstract m o m e n t that can be thought b u t not intuited; it is n o t other to intuition, but actually appears within the tension of retentions a n d protentions. "It remains to be said that even this ideal now is not something toto coelo different from the not-now but is continuously mediated with it."58 What is visible is the mediation of an ideal m o m e n t that exists only in its iteration. It appears in the fold of adumbrative modifications of retentions. T h e comparison with Kant, however, helps us to u n d e r s t a n d how Husserl is able to a r g u e that any m o m e n t is s t r u c t u r e d by its chain of retentions and protentions. Although there is a primacy of the impression, it is retention that constitutes and thus makes possible the experience of a now. "Retention constitutes the living horizon of the now" (Hua X, §18, 43 / 402). Kant helps us to u n d e r s t a n d the correlate between primal impression and consciousness insofar as the primal impression or sensuous hyle exists only in relation to the flow. T h e primal impression is the necessary correlate of consciousness mediating between retention and protention, yet without ever appearing as such. It is neither matter nor form, neither movement nor static; it is the 'in-between' which appears only as mediating.59 T h e primal impression manifests itself in its latency. However, since retentionality itself is present in its slipping away, we are referring not to an absence b u t to a n appearing that lies in the tension of retentions and protentions. We should not interpret the "failure" to appear, as Derrida does, in terms of loss, or in terms of a reality that exceeds the grasp of consciousness. Unlike the transcendental object, the primal impression can b e described positively. T h e primal impression 'is', and comes into being as, a temporal event. Retentions and protentions should not be u n d e r s t o o d as a non-present accompanying the primal impression; rather, the deferral itself is the present, it constitutes the present as

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present. Protention and retention are not m o m e n t s that infect the impression; rather, they t u r n the impression into a temporal event, into a now. As o u r analysis above has shown, protention is in its not-yet; retention a n d protention do n o t re-present a lost m o m e n t , for both are without a. content "in the original sense." 60 In this m a n n e r Husserl n o longer operates with the matter-form dualism. There is n o p u r e now that exists outside the stream of modifications. T h e r e is n o r u p t u r e with the present. Nothing needs to be represented, for nothing has b e e n lost. Husserl does not search for a time foregone. T h e r e is not, as Derrida believes, an infection of a pure present—rather, an enlarging of presence. We are therefore referring to a pointing in which nothing is lost but everything retained. Retention and protention are not a m o m e n t of negation b u t of reiterated modifications ( H u a X , appendix VII, 116 / 469) that are present. §29. The 'Function' of the Primal Impression If the now exists only in its mediation between retention and protention, why cannot we just follow Hegel's account of "sense certainty" in the Phanomenlogie des Geistes?61 Hegel's fundamental claim is that there is n o immediacy, for the 'now' is identical only through mediation: "The 'Now,' a n d pointing o u t the 'Now,' are thus so constituted that neither the one n o r the other is something immediate and simple, but a m o v e m e n t which contains various m o m e n t s " (Hegel 1977, §107). Like Hegel, Husserl argues that the now that we experience is always a now that is folded into the movement (mediated) between retentions and protentions. However, although to be, and thus to appear, means to be temporal and perceived, Husserl, in contrast to Hegel, holds on to the necessity of positing an immediate and simple 'now'. For what needs to be sustained is its ideal function, even if it does not have an existence besides that of being a correlate to consciousness. Husserl, like Kant before him, wishes to uphold a m o m e n t of heteronomy by emphasizing a m o m e n t of givenness. A temporal event is not caused by our will or imagination but by a source that initiates the temporal form of lived experiences. The difference between objective time and i m m a n e n t time lies in their modes of givenness. T h e fluid time of the i m m a n e n t stream is structured a r o u n d the emergence of given now-points, while we are free to recollect objective time. 62 Objective time persists and can be recalled: I can repeatedly r e t u r n to past events a n d b r i n g t h e m to consciousness by way of reproduction. 6 3

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I m m a n e n t , or subjective, time, in contrast, cannot be repeated b u t is given to us in its flow.64 Husserl h e r e is following Heraclitus's postulate "Nothing gone can return": "Nothing can r e t u r n a n d be given in identity a second time" (Hua X, no. 5 1 , 349). Thus, the i m m a n e n t sphere is (pre-) structured by the primal impression, which guarantees a m a n n e r of appearing. O n c e again we can draw parallels to Kant's work. Kant reads the transcendental object = X as subsisting within a dynamic framework, thereby guaranteeing that our knowledge claims are subject to a certain lawfulness, "which prevents o u r modes of knowledge from being h a p h a z a r d or arbitrary, a n d which determines t h e m a priori in some definite fashion' (KRV, A105, emphasis a d d e d ) . Similarly, Husserl argues that the primal impression initiates and guarantees the manner, or form, of appearing: "The form consists in this, that a now becomes constituted by means of an impression and that a trail of retentions and a horizon of protentions are attached to the impression" (Hua X, appendix VI, 114 / 467). T h e ' m o t o r ' of the chains of retentions and protentions is the constant e m e r g e n c e of new 'nowpoints'. New impressions initiate the flow to move, pushing aside each preceding impression and its accompanying retentions and protentions, and thus ensuring an infinite series. T h e now-point, or p r i m a l impression, is, however, nothing but an 'ideal limit' toward which the stream converges. T h e function of the transcendental object in Kant is analogous to that of Husserl's primal impression; while Kant argues that the transcendental object allows for the unity of the manifold (cf. KRV, Al 05), Husserl emphasizes that the primal impression constitutes the unity of the stream, insofar as it is the centrifugal point that structures the manifold of retentions and protentions. In his lectures of 1925 Husserl even refers to it as an Uranstofl,65 an initiating force. §30. The Lawful Nature of the Appearing At first sight the analogies drawn between Kant and Husserl might a p p e a r surprising, for Husserl's account of the primal impression has far stronger empirical overtones than Kant's transcendental object = X. Kant emphasizes that the transcendental object is "throughout all o u r knowledge . . . always one and the same" (KRV, A l 0 9 ) , while Husserl constantiy refers to the emergence of new 'now-points' that continuously modify the previous 'now-points' and indeed push t h e m into the

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background. At the beginning of his lectures Husserl presents us with the following account: If I listen to music I might retain the preceding sounds, however, n o t necessarily the first tone that was played. In the case of the melody, I hear the "nows" that have just elapsed; though they are retained in the present, they are already "older" than the new 'now points'. T h e aging is retained as present as long as I actually continue hearing the melody; that is, as long as my perception is still animatedby the "new" now (cf. H u a X, §8). However, the melody I hear might sink further and further into the past until it fades from consciousness altogether. That is to say, at some stage I will be conscious n o longer of the melody but of something else. At that m o m e n t the melody is n o longer structured or animated by the 'now point'. D e p e n d i n g o n the distance of the primal impression, the individual melody becomes increasingly unclear until it finally disappears completely. 66 H e n c e the extended field of the present, the concrete Prasensfeld, is limited. 67 Phenomenological reflection is supposed to make intentional life available for investigation. "But," Husserl writes in 1909, "all experiences flow away. Consciousness is a perpetual Heraditean flux; what has just b e e n given sinks into the abyss of the phenomenological past and then is gone forever" (Hua X, no. 5 1 , 349). We are h e r e confronted with the same perplexity that initiated o u r investigation in Ideen I. We have shown how i m m a n e n t objects are completely given; however, we have to accept that this completeness is not absolute insofar as it is not permanent. As J o h n Brough observes: "What the flow of time takes away . . . the consciousness of time restores." 68 Indeed, Husserl refers to a Heraditean stream. 69 T h e claim therefore seems to r e p e a t an ancient one, that everything at every time reunites all contraries in itself in the stream of becoming. 70 What remains constant is the pattern of appearing — it has a certain lawfulness. Although Husserl refers to the constant emergence of new 'nowpoints', the emphasis is not on the newness or difference of these 'nowpoints', b u t o n their identical form. As Husserl emphasizes: "And the continuity in which a new now becomes constituted again and again shows us that it is not a question of 'newness' as such b u t of a continuous m o m e n t of individuation in which the temporal position has its origin" (Hua X, §31, 66 / 421). Later he explains what he means by this "individuation": "What 'individual' means h e r e is the original temporal form of sensation, or, as I can also p u t it, the temporal form

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of original sensation" (Hua X, §31, 67 / 423). Thus Husserl's primal impression and Kant's transcendental object have one and the same function, insofar as they animate and structure the appearing. I m m a n e n t objects d o not persist; however, the structure of their appearing does. "What abides, above all, is the formal structure of the flow, the form of the flow. That is to say, the flowing is not only flowing throughout, b u t . . . it is determined t h r o u g h the form of regularity [lawfulness would be a better translation h e r e ] " (Hua X, Beilage VI, 1 1 4 / 467). The primal impression guarantees that the form of appearing is constant. It allows for the constancy of the flow and ensures the lawfulness and unity of the stream. 71 The constant e m e r g e n c e of newnows ensures the continuity of one and the same structure of consciousness. Husserl's account mainly focuses o n the n a t u r e of retention and mentions "protention" only in passing. However, in o r d e r to understand the infinite nature of the stream, we n e e d to u n d e r s t a n d the function of protention. For Husserl's wondrous claim is that not only the past is retained, but also the future. T h e infinite future is retained in a continuum of iterations. §31. The Nature of Protention At first Husserl merely wishes to argue that the p h e n o m e n o n of protention has a structure analogous to that of retention, insofar as it is a pointing towards a future prior to any anticipating or presuming. It is a presentative pointing towards that which is in its not-yet. "What is coming to be perceived in the expectation of the further phases of perception p r o p e r is also posited as now; it exists now and it e n d u r e s a n d fills the same time" (Hua X, appendix X, 123 / 477). However, retention and protention move in opposite directions. 7 2 Retention moves further and further away from the impressional m o m e n t whilst protention converges towards the impression. That is to say, every future impression will come to fulfill the protention. At first sight this might sound impossible. Are we not constantiy disappointed and, indeed, are we not often taken by surprise? If in the i m m a n e n t field everything is completely given, there seems to be n o r o o m for coincidence or disappointment, as all intentions are full. Husserl, however, does not point to a deterministic vision of experience — we should r e m e m b e r that protention is different from expecting or presuming. Like retention, protention is presentative. It does not p o i n t to an object in the future. Protention is not an expectation of a

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particular event, b u t is "primary expectation" insofar as it points to an always already implied future without contents in the original sense — a future that is, in its suspension of any objective event, happening. If we listen to music, for example, we d o not merely h e a r the single tone, or a n u m b e r of individual tones; we hear the whole melody. N o t only are all the past sounds present, but so are the future ones, insofar as they are implied. This is not to say that we expect an object— for example, a particular tone C being followed by a particular tone D —rather, we expect the continuity of the melody. Protention points to a m o m e n t that is structured by a certain type of familiarity. Nothing completely u n e x p e c t e d can happen. T h e next tone might be deficient in that it contradicts our expectations, b u t this contradiction confirms that the tone did not quite fit into our type of expectation, yet is still accommodated within it. T h e "not having expected a particular tone" is not a negative m o m e n t b u t a positive characteristic, for it affirms a vague expectation that is either confirmed or disappointed. Husserl describes this m o m e n t in H u a XI as a "crossing out": it is a "retroactive crossing out of earlier predelineations which are still consciously retained" (Hua XI, §7, 30). We might expect a certain vague continuity of the melody; however, a dissonant tone is perceived that "disrupts" the flow. Although the unexpected tone appears, it appears only in relation to the type of continuity we expected the music would have, i.e., we experience it as not fulfilling our intentions. However — and this is of importance — the previous expectations are retained, for it is only in relation to these expectations that we can come to j u d g e a tone as disappointing or unexpected. We can experience difference only in relation to a certain familiarity, i.e., as the crossing out of that which we expected. 7 3 T h a t which has b e e n crossed out, however, is retained and hence continues to exist. §32. The Prioritization of Protention T h e r e are n o innocent perceptions. Every perception is always already e m b e d d e d in the very pattern of protention a n d retention, which is itself folded together. Husserl now argues that there is a certain prioritization of protention over retention insofar as the movem e n t always points toward the future. Held records that Husserl refers, in his unpublished manuscripts, to curiosity as a primordial drive: "Since . . . all intentional perceptual life is fulfilled in original presentincations, the T instinctively tends towards transforming the

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unknown future into an established familiarity. This curiosity i n h e r e n t in protentionality is a primordial drive of world experiencing life. If this structure of enpresenting turns out to be the primordial way of all life, then it is ^ p r i m o r d i a l drive" (Held 1966, 43). T h e stream of lived experiences is teleological insofar as it always points into the future. It is a pointing toward a future that is in its non-yet and therefore can never end with an impression—for with every impression a n o t h e r pointing is established. 74 T h e stream is therefore infinite and can never come to a standstill; it is an infinite continuity of o n e a n d the same stream. T h e stream has to continue. T h e lawfulness of the stream thus lies in its continuity of form: "But this abiding form s u p p o r t s the consciousness of constant change, which is a primal fact: the consciousness of the change of impression into retention while a fresh impression continuously makes its appearance: or, with respect to the 'what' of the impression, the consciousness of the change of this what as it is modified from being something still intended as 'now' into something that has the character of 'just having b e e n ' " (Hua X, appendix VI, 114 / 467). As Held and Yvonne Picard observe (cf. Held 1966, 44-45), Husserl does n o t prioritize the future over the past a n d present, as Heidegger will do; rather, he prioritizes a future toward which the present tends. 75 Absolute consciousness lives in its longitudinal intentionality insofar as it lives in the unity of the stream. It is nothing but the type or style of appearing that accompanies a n d makes possible all appearances. Everything that appears is always already p a r t of one and the same consciousness—to a p p e a r means to be ready to b e perceived, a n d to be ready to be perceived means to fit into a n d a p p e a r within the structure of consciousness. §33. Limitations of Our Account To conclude, Husserl, similarly to Kant, attributes a structuring function to the primal impression. Whereas phenomenology is c o n c e r n e d with the manifestation of this structuration, Kant refers to that which needs to be thought, yet cannot be manifested. Their accounts reveal significant parallels. If we r e t u r n to the A version of Kant's Transcendental Deduction we can summarize the following steps. Firstiy, all representations have their objects; however, they are only given as appearances: "Appearances are the sole objects which can be given to us immediately" (KRV, A108-9). Secondly, intuitions immediately relate to objects: "That in them which relates immediately to the

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object is called intuition" (KRV, A108-9). Thirdly, that which is intuited immediately is not a thing in itself b u t purely a modification of an object in general which needs to be thought: "But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations, which in t u r n have their object— an object which cannot itself b e intuited by us, a n d which may, therefore, be n a m e d the non-empirical, that is, transcendental object = x" (KRV, A108-9). Fourthly, although this transcendental object = X is no-thing, it still performs a certain function. It functions as a correlate of the manifold of appearances—it opens up, indeed structures, the horizon of the appearing. Indeed, as we will show below, this leads Kant to claim that the transcendental object = X can be thought of only "as a correlate of the unity of apperception" (KRV,A250). As we have shown, Husserl analogously argues that, firstly, we d o not encounter sense data; p h e n o m e n a are given to us. Secondly, we intuit an impression only in its temporal form. Thirdly, whatever we intuit, and hence whatever appears, always exceeds the primal impression, yet the primal impression still appears in its modification. Fourthly, the primal impression is responsible for the m a n n e r in which the stream of consciousness unfolds. For all retentions and protentions converge toward the ideal limit of the primal impression. This fourth step has b e e n merely posited; we have yet to show how the stream as such manifests itself as a correlate of the primal impression. We have a r g u e d for a constancy of the appearing, but have exclusively referred to its formal structure and not to the manifestation of this lawfulness. If we wish not merely to posit a function, b u t to adh e r e to the phenomenological project of revealing that which is absolutely given, we n e e d to show how this m a n n e r or form of appearing manifests itself. We have reached the most difficult and obscure mom e n t of o u r analysis, and we can conclude this section only with HusseiTs voice, pointing to the problems that lie ahead: I do not intend to offer this analysis as a final one; it cannot be our task here to solve the most difficult of all phenomenological problems, the problem of the analysis of time. What matters to me here is only to lift the veil a little from this world of time-consciousness, so rich in mystery, that up until now has been hidden from us. And I want to emphasize particularly the new sense of unity as opposed to multiplicity, with which a number

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of senses of the perception of something immanent, of adequate perception, and even of representation as opposed to the absolute presentation of something itself, are connected. (Hua X, no.39, 276)

T H E ENIGMA OF T H E CONSCIOUSNESS OF TIME §34. The Shuddering Depths of

Intemal-Time-Consciousness

O u r p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l description remains incomplete. We have shown how immanent objects as Ablaufsphdnomene are given completely, b u t we have failed to question how the flow itself is constituted. From 1907 onward, Husserl refines his account a n d questions the nature of the absolute flow.76 For what becomes a p p a r e n t in the analysis is that every temporal object appears within a stream, which in t u r n structures the appearing of temporal events. T h u s the i m m a n e n t sphere has two dimensions: the absolute stream a n d i m m a n e n t temporal objects, which are constituted within that stream. T h e division between immanence and transcendence needs to be refined, for we n e e d to differentiate n o t only between i m m a n e n t and transcendent objects, b u t between i m m a n e n t objects and the absolute stream of consciousness. We n e e d to differentiate a m o n g three levels: " (1) the things of empirical experience in objective time . . . ; (2) . . . the imman e n t unities in pre-empirical time; (3) the absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness" ( H u a X, §34, 73 / 428). T h e r e are two levels of i m m a n e n c e ; o n e is constituted, the other constituting. Just as objective reality is d e p e n d e n t o n and relative to the field of i m m a n e n c e , it now appears that the field of immanence itself is relative to a n d dep e n d e n t on another field that allows for the appearing of i m m a n e n t objects. We need to go beyond describing i m m a n e n t temporal events that are constituted by a stream, and turn to what Heraclitus calls the "ever living fire," a conscious life that allows for the appearing of the stream itself.77 Idem I confesses that it has never succeeded in even getting close to this transcendental, absolute ground: "The transcendentally 'absolute' which we have b r o u g h t about by the reduction is, in truth, n o t what is ultimate; it is something which constitutes itself in a certain p r o f o u n d and completely peculiar sense of its own and which has its primal source in what is ultimately and truly absolute" (Idem I, §81,

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198 / 163). Husserl shies away from this primal source that lies in unknown depths. Held provides us with a telling citation from Husserl's unpublished manuscripts, revealing this anxiety about what phenomenology might reveal: "Do we not shudder at these depths? Who has seriously taken t h e m u p as a systematic theme in past millennia? W h o has risked his life o n the way to the 'Mothers' since the first Augustinian reflections?" 78 Phenomenology intends to make manifest the absolute a n d final g r o u n d of all being—it is guided by this quest for certainty; yet this desire for transparency is accompanied by an even stronger sense of uncertainty a n d even fear of what it might come to reveal. Nonetheless, phenomenology needs to r e t u r n to the things themselves. However unsettling it may be, that which lies covered u p in the depths of all being is not only the final given, b u t a fundamental given that grounds all p h e n o m e n a . Thus Husserl has to appeal to a vigilant subject who has the courage to u n d e r t a k e this daunting task. In the final analysis Husserl cannot compromise and settle for an incomplete p h e n o m e nology. T h e endeavor, t h o u g h provisionally bracketed in Ideen I, should never come to a halt: That which is called "merely subjective" (although already transcendentally subjective) as opposed to the worldly real is constituted yet again, though it is no longer constituted as real (actual). And the constituting in turn is constituted. . . . It is necessary to have the courage to say what one sees and to give it the force of evidence, even if we are "threatened" by regress. The medusa is dangerous only to him who already believes in her and fears her. Riddles may be left over but they are indeed riddles. Riddles without solution are non-sense. 79 T h e fear of infinite regress should not bring the analysis to a halt. We n e e d to have the courage to show what can b e seen, even if this points to an even d e e p e r and unknown riddle. We should not shy away from discovery that the field of i m m a n e n c e is not the final g r o u n d , rather, we should seek to unravel this absolute field that accounts for the appearing of i m m a n e n t objects. T h e transcendental absolute — the riddle beyond riddle—is neither the i m m a n e n t sphere of lived experiences, n o r appears within it; it is the primal source of the stream within which i m m a n e n t objects appear. Husserl is h e r e pointing toward a transcendence within i m m a n e n c e (cf. Ideen I, §57, 138 / 110),

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for i m m a n e n t reflection itself is enveloped within a spontaneous flow of temporality, which is the source and life of any possible reflection. §35. Absolute Consciousness We are here touching o n one of the most ambiguous a n d obscure m o m e n t s of Husserl's phenomenology, a n d that is the sphere of absolute consciousness which Husserl also calls inner or internal consciousness (cf. H u a X, appendix XII, 127 / 481-82). In H u a X, Husserl recognizes that the phenomenological account has c o m e to a halt too early. 80 In appendix XII, he reproaches himself for having r e m a i n e d purely within the inner sphere of Erlebnisse (in LU), a n d thus having failed to ask back into the g r o u n d of the act of reflection. 81 From 1908 onward, Husserl realizes that h e was mistaken to equate the sensing with what is sensed, for there is never a complete congruence between the experiencing self—consciousness — and that which is experienced: "Every experience is 'consciousness,' and consciousness is consciousness of. . . . But every experience is itself experienced [erlebt], a n d to that extent also 'intended' [beivusst]" ( H u a X, no. 41, 291). T h e r e are two forms of consciousness. O n e refers to the conscious act, a consciousness of i m m a n e n t objects. T h e other refers to a consciousness which has to b e written in inverted commas, for it is an accompanying consciousness that exceeds the consciousness of objects and thus does not appear within the i m m a n e n t field. I m m a n e n t objects, though completely given, never coincide with the subject who perceives them. While appearances go into and out of existence, what remains permanent, what endures, is the T that perceives the manifold of appearances. T h e r e is an infinite Heraclitean flux of lived experiences—yet there is an experiencing self or consciousness that accompanies the flux without flowing in it. The self that remains constant can thus not be defined in terms of the flux, for the experiencing self lives prior to the manifestation of immanent objects. In o r d e r to perceive a flow as changing, there must b e an T that remains constant, for difference can be perceived only in relation to unity. 82 Husserl h e r e once again intimates a Kantian move. 83 Kant likewise argues that, for there to be intuitions, there needs to be a subject that can perceive them. This subject cannot be identical with its representations; it is thus a pure apperception, an T think' that accompanies all my representations (cf. KRV, B132). T h e r e is a preceding synthesis that allows for the appearing of diversity. "Now all unifica-

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tion of representations d e m a n d s unity of consciousness in the synthesis of them" (KRV, B137). T h e unity of the horizon is guaranteed by a self that remains constant and precedes the manifold of appearances. Kant thus observes that we n e e d to differentiate between consciousness in time (empirical), and absolute consciousness (transcendental), which is a numerically identical T think'. Any synthesizing presupposes a consciousness of our synthesizing activity, a consciousness that is distinct from my empirical self that changes t h r o u g h time. T h e r e must be an T think' that can accompany all my representations, even the representation of myself. H e n c e that which remains constant is outside space and time, for the 'I think' cannot be an intuition in me. 84 Likewise, Husserl argues that there is a distance between the T that experiences and what is experienced. T h e T that experiences precedes even the subjective time of i m m a n e n t perception. T h e ultimate consciousness is therefore timeless and cannot be an object or representation appearing in time: "Subjective time becomes constituted in the absolute timeless consciousness, which is not an object" (Hua X, appendix VI, 112 / 464). The experiencmg of i m m a n e n t objects exceeds the duration of i m m a n e n t time. It e n d u r e s while my perceptions change. T h e Ego, or p u r e T , does not appear as an object; it is not a representation b u t an activity that allows for presentation. T h e experiencmg-of lived experiences is itself not an inner object b u t manifests the distance between me and my perceptions. Consciousness cannot be defined as something appearing within the sphere of immanence. Husserl, like Kant, concludes that consciousness is "nontemporal; that is to say, nothing in immanent time' (Hua X, no. 50, 334). §36. A Phenomenological "Transcendental Unity of Apperception " T h e analogies drawn so far are not coincidental. From 1907 onward Husserl realizes the significance of Kant's KRV.85 In Ideen I the influence of Kant is most visible: This much is clear from the very beginning: After carrying out this reduction we shall not encounter the pure Ego anywhere in the flux of manifold lived experience which remains as a transcendental residuum —neither as one lived experience among others, nor as strictly a part of a lived experience, arising and then disappearing with the lived experience of which it is a part. The Ego seems to be there continually, indeed, necessarily, and

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this continualness is obviously not that of a stupidly persistent lived experience, a "fixed idea." Instead, the Ego belongs to each coming and going lived experience; its "regard" is directed "through" each actional cogito to the objective something. This ray of regard changes from one cogito to the next, shooting forth anew with each new cogito and vanishing with it. The Ego, however, is something identical. . . . In contradistinction the pure Ego would, however, seem to be something essentially necessary; and, as something absolutely identical throughout every actual or possible change in lived experiences, it cannot in any sense be a really inherent part or moment of the lived experiences themselves. (Idem I, §57, 137-38 / 109) In this passage Husserl emphasizes—as does Kant— that the p u r e Ego is the p e r m a n e n t and self-identical correlate to all experience. T h e p u r e Ego stands apart, indeed never appears within the flux of the manifold of experiences. T h e self is never identical with what is experienced; yet the Ego is p e r m a n e n t and necessarily t h e r e (though anterior) in the experiencing of lived experiences. This Ego is not an empty vessel that exists in itself. It exists only in its synthesizing activity, it "belongs to each coming a n d going lived experience." However, its b e i n g is not reducible to the lived experiences, and hence it is not a "real part or phase of these experiences." It should not surprise us that Husserl concludes this passage by acknowledging the significance of Kant's postulate: "In Kant's words, 'The '7 think" must be capable of accompanying all my presentations'" (IdeenI, §57,138 / 109). T h e acknowledgement, however, remains hesitant. In the edition of the Husserliana the following addition is made: "Whether [this is] also [Kant's] sense I leave undecided." 8 6 Indeed, Husserl's phenomenological app r o a c h is Kantian only insofar as it exceeds Kant. Phenomenology manifests that which critical philosophy posits. Although structurally Husserl's account appears Kantian, phenomenologically it goes beyond K a n t Phenomenology does not search for an intelligible starting point of analysis, but wishes to reveal that which is absolutely given. T o follow Levinas: "Consciousness is a constituting event and not a constituting thought, as in idealism." 87 Husserl believes that he can describe the event oiconsciousness—which is, and already was before, the reflective gaze (cf. Levinas 1973, 30).

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§37. The Riddle Conscious life is not an intelligible correlate but is an event which is a life prior to reflection a n d thought. It is a being prior to being perceived. T h e aim is thus to describe this absolute given, the unity of consciousness, without falling prey to the dangers of what Kant calls the "Paralogism of Reason" (cf. KRV, A341 / B399) — that is, without inferring from the formal conditions of thought that there is a substance of thought, for we are referring only to a constituting event. In o r d e r to avoid an infinite regress, Husserl, like Kant, maintains that consciousness cannot be an intratemporal event, for if it were, then consciousness would appear in time and would be not the absolute ground, but constituted once again. Transcendental consciousness is, however, the absolute final g r o u n d to which phenomenology returns. Hence, consciousness is both outside of time and self-constituting. T h e absolute stream of time-constituting consciousness is "this fundamental form of 'active' [aktuellen] living" (IdeenI, §28, 60 / 51). As a constituting force it allows for the i m m a n e n t sphere to appear, without, however, being an appearance of the stream. Absolute consciousness is pre-phenomenal and pre-immanent. 8 8 Not only this, but since it is the absolute g r o u n d it cannot in turn be constituted. T h e transcendental time-constituting consciousness, if it truly is the beginning of all beginnings, needs to provide for its own g r o u n d of being. Transcendental consciousness is responsible for its own being. H e r e we are reaching one of the most complex and "mysterious" levels of phenomenology, 89 for Husserl needs to account for an absolute time-constituting consciousness that n o t only constitutes, or allows for the appearing of i m m a n e n t objects, but, simultaneously, allows for the manifestation of its own flow. "The self-appearance of the flow does not require a seco n d flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a p h e n o m e n o n in itself (Hua X, §39,83 / 436). T h e flow needs to be aware of its own self; otherwise further levels of investigation would be necessary. Thus, however strange the claim might sound, transcendental consciousness n o t only constitutes i m m a n e n t being but is responsible for its own appearing: "There is one, unique flow of consciousness in which both the unity of the tone in i m m a n e n t time and the unity of the flow of consciousness itself become constituted at once. As shocking (when not initially even absurd ) as it may seem to say that the flow of consciousness constitutes its own unity, it is nonetheless the case that it does"

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( H u a X, §39, 80 / 434). We are referring to a givenness that in turn is the source of its own donation. This account is "shocking (when not initially even absurd)" because this consciousness which lies outside the i m m a n e n t and p h e n o m e n a l field is neither a logical correlate to my appearances, nor is it atemporal. T h e obscure a r g u m e n t Husserl attempts to articulate is that transcendental consciousness is preimmanent, though it still has its own m o d e of appearing. T h e absolute constituting subject is not an empty vessel, nor a logical point of reference, but it appears as a stream in its constituting activity. §38. The "Dogma of the Momentariness of a Whole of Consciousness"90 Husserl's crucial d e p a r t u r e from Kant is his attempt to make manifest transcendental consciousness. For Kant the transcendental unity of apperception is the "highest p o i n t " (hochstePunkt) (KRV, B134) — it is an analytic unity which exists only as a correlate to synthetic unity (cf. KRV, B134). Husserl likewise believes that consciousness exists only as a correlate to experience. However, this consciousness is never a 'point', but discloses itself as this living correlate. T h a t is to say, Husserl believes that phenomenology can disclose this transcendental correlate, for it is in the fold of temporalization. As in his account of i m m a n e n t experience, Husserl argues against an atomistic description of consciousness by breathing life into presence: "The aim is to find life in the present again. "91 T h e p u r e Ego, though pre-immanent a n d pre-temporal, should never be confused with a unitary now-point. It is never a rigid, frozen unity b u t is a living selfpresence which is alert and vigilant in its being. Although Husserl, like Kant, argues that change can be perceived only in relation to unity, from the very beginning of his lectures on internal-time-consciousness, Husserl emphasizes that we are mistaken in believing that change or time can be perceived only in relation to a timeless, non-changing consciousness: It appears to be an evident and quite inescapable assumption of this conception that the intuition of an extent of time occurs in a now, in one time-point. It simply appears as a truism that every consciousness aimed at some whole, at some plurality of distinguishable moments (hence every consciousness of relation and combination), encompasses its object in an indivisible timepoint. Wherever a consciousness is directed towards a whole

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whose parts are successive, there can be an intuitive consciousness of this whole only if the parts, in the form of representants, come together in the unity of the momentary intuition. (Hua X, §7, 20 / 383) Against this common-sense view, Husserl argues that there never is a punctual self-identical now-point. Just as any primal impression only is in relation to its protentions and retentions, so is the experiencing self. As early as 1905 Husserl maintains that it is possible that apprehension "is extended over a stretch of time (the so-called 'presencet i m e ' ) " ( H u a X, §7, 20 / 383). I n d e e d , consciousness of time itself requires time. It has its own form of temporalization: "I see with evidence that that final state is possible only as a final state, that any state or condition that intuits time is possible only as extended, . . . that the consciousness of time itself [requires] time; the consciousness of duration, duration; and the consciousness of succession, succession." 92 Just as the now appears only as extended, so does the experiencing self. Retention and protention are thus not u n i q u e to i m m a n e n t experience, b u t are inherent also in the experiencing of that experience. §39. The Double Nature of Retention T h e peculiarity of transcendental consciousness is that it always is alive; the sense of myself never ceases n o r begins, but accompanies a n d is prior to reflection. This latent anterior existence is, however, experienced as present. It is simultaneously latent and present, for it is retained prior to being perceived. T h e wondrous m o m e n t that Husserl attempts to articulate is the existence of a consciousness that is present, yet anterior, to the p h e n o m e n a l i m m a n e n t field. Transcendental consciousness is m a d e o u t of the same cloth as i m m a n e n t objects, namely retention. In §39 Husserl points to a doubleintentionality of the flow: transverse intentionality (Querintentionalitat) where reflection intuits the temporal event of lived experiences, and longitudinal intentionality (Ldngsintentionalitaf) ,93 which points to the absolute flow itself, "the self-appearance of the flow" (Hua X, §39, 83 / 436). This double intentionality constitutes at once the unity and appearing of the flow and the unity and manifestation of immanent objects. I m m a n e n t objects are structured around the primal impression — their life d e p e n d s on how long they are animated by the primal impression. These temporal objects never appear in isolation, b u t within a chain of preceding temporal objects.

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Not only is the primal impression folded into protention and retention, but every retention in turn is retained again. A tone is given in a n impression (I) and in a retention (R). W h e n a new impression of t h e same tone appears (F), it is accompanied by another retention (R'), and the retention that was originally retained (R) is t u r n e d into a retention of retention (R"). This account can be continued ad infinitum. "Going along the flow or with it, we have a continuous series of retentions pertaining to the beginning point. Beyond that, however, each earlier point of this series is a d u m b r a t e d in its turn as a now in the sense of retention. Thus a continuity of retentional modifications attaches itself to each of these retentions, a n d this continuity itself is again an actually present point that is retentionally a d u m b r a t e d " ( H u a X, §11, 29 / 391). Each retention again merges and implicates o t h e r retentions. This, however, does not lead to an infinite regress, since the infinite horizon of previous modifications is implicated in retention. Retention implicates the "whole heritage" of all the preceding developments and thus intends the flow of consciousness itself. "This does n o t lead to an infinite regress, since each m e m o r y is in itself a continuous modification that carries within itself, so to speak, the heritage of the whole preceding development in the form of a series of adumbrations" (Hua X, no. 50, 327). As Merleau-Ponty observes: "Each m o m e n t of time calls all the others to witness" (MerleauPonty 1962, 69). We therefore have a whole history of series of retentions that are intentionally implicating each other: there is a "continuity of retentions which, however, are not o n an equal footing; they are instead to be related to one another continuously—intentively—a continuous complexity of retentions of retentions" {Ideen I, §81, 199 / 164). Not only d o we perceive the identity of a sound as temporal, b u t we live the identity or unity of the flow, and b o t h forms of intentionality a r e correlates to each other. The sound as a temporal event is folded into the consciousness of the absolute flow of lived experiences, which is also fully present (cf. Ideen I, §§81 - 8 3 ) . Only abstractly can we isolate these intentionalities, for the unity of the tone and the unity of the flow become constituted at once. 94 Although the two intentionalities point in two different directions, it is impossible to separate o n e from the other. Like Kant, Husserl maintains that consciousness exists only as an abiding correlate to experience, that is, the T accompanies my acts of perception. Absolute consciousness appears as this transcendental correlatebetween experiencing and experience. Transcendental

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consciousness is in this fissure — it expresses the synoptic relation between these two dimensions of immanence. 9 5 T h e flow is thus at once conscious of itself as a succession of phases t h r o u g h its longitudinal intentionality. Consciousness is twodimensional: the unity of a temporal object is constituted by an absolute consciousness. "It belongs to the essence of this unity as a temporal unity that it 'becomes constituted in the absolute consciousness. Specifically, with respect to absolute given unities such as the sound-unity we have b e e n discussing, we recognize the marvelous fact that the existence of such a unity is not conceivable without its being a constituted unity of a certain kind; namely, one that points back to a certain uniquely formed and i n t e r c o n n e c t e d ^ ! ^ of consciousness' (Hua X, no. 39, 284). T h e whole of conscious life is unified synthetically t h r o u g h longitudinal intentionality. I m m a n e n t experience is possible only within that unity. We can now finally u n d e r s t a n d the quotation that initiated o u r investigation: "Each actual lived experience . . . is necessarily an enduring one; and with this duration it finds its place in an infinite cont i n u u m of d u r a t i o n —in a. fulfilled c o n t i n u u m . Of necessity it has an all-round, infinitely fulfilled temporal horizon. At the same time this says: it belongs to one endless 'stream of lived experiences'" (Ideen I, §81, 198 / 163). Each lived experience is an e n d u r i n g one and, as such, finds its place in an infinite duration, a. fulfilled continuum. It thus belongs and points to the unity of an infinite o p e n horizon. We can summarize the following steps: firstly, the awareness that consciousness has of itself— of its acts of perceiving, j u d g i n g , or understanding—is different from the awareness that I have of i m m a n e n t experience. Consciousness is an experiencmg that accompanies all my experience. This awareness of my being is neither posited n o r m e a n t and can be described purely as an adverbial non-positing, nonobjectivating awareness of myself as existing. Secondly, this consciousness experiences itself as a unity—it remains constant, in contrast to the manifold of i m m a n e n t experiences that are constandy 'flowing away'. "Every single lived experience, e.g., a lived experience of joy, can begin as well as e n d and hence delimit its duration. But the stream of lived experiences cannot begin and end" (Ideen I, §81, 198 / 163). Thirdly, this self-identical and infinite consciousness is a stream a n d not static. It manifests, however, a movement, a flowing, that is different from the flowing of Ablaufsphanomene, insofar as it precedes and

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makes possible i m m a n e n t experience. T h e main difference between i m m a n e n t experience a n d consciousness lies in the n a t u r e of their givenness: while the former is finite, the stream of consciousness is infinite and absolute. §40. The Sublime Moment of Phenomenology Transcendental consciousness, which accompanies all my (acts of) perception, is latently retained. It is prior to any perception and older than any conscious act. It does not appear in the temporal flow a n d is thus anterior to time and space, yet it has its own form of appearing, and that is in the form of an infinite stream of retentions. It is t h r o u g h the notion of retention that Husserl can show that absolute consciousness is active and changing in its unity. Absolute consciousness is n o 'punctual now' b u t is infinitely extended. Pre-reflexive awareness or self-relation involves a longitudinal intentionality that is characterized by the presentative absence of a content. It is a pre-objective, pretemporal, and non-thetic being that exists in its suspension of being no-thing—for it is purely in its not-yet a n d no-longer. In his u n p u b lished works Husserl describes it as the "'primordial' in which everything which might be called a p h e n o m e n o n in whatever sense is rooted. It is the standing-streaming self-presence, that is to say, that absolute T (!) which is present to itself as streaming in its standingstreaming life."96 Although absolute, the Ego refers to a strange hybrid that exists as a standing-streaming self-presence. But to what kind of flow are we referring? This consciousness that p r e c e d e s all acts of reflection is transitive. Indeed, Husserl constantly refers to the "stream of consciousness." This stream, however, cannot b e u n d e r s t o o d in terms of temporality, for it is pre-temporal, preobjective, and indeed pre-immanent. We are referring to a flow that changes while retaining all its moments. Although the stream flows, a n d thus constantly changes, nothing is lost, for everything is retained in its no-longer. Consciousness is thus both streaming a n d standing. We cannot describe the stream of consciousness in terms of duration, succession of now-points, or temporality: Is it inherently absurd to regard the flow of time as an objective movement? Certainly! On the other hand, memory is surely something that itself has its now, and the same now as a tone, for example. No. There lurks the fundamental mistake. The flow of the

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modes of consciousness is not a process; the consciousness of the now is not itself now. The retention 9 7 that exists 'together' with the consciousness of the now is not 'now', it is not simultaneous with the now, and it would make no sense to say that it is. (Hua X, no. 50, 333, 1908/9) We can describe the stream only negatively: "It is not a process," "It is not itself as now," "It is not a simultaneity of now-points," it is present to itself prior to being perceived as present. We face die absurdity of describing that which cannot be described. While an immanent object has its own velocity—that is to say it can rest or be accelerated—the transcendental stream, although constandy changing, has "the absurd character that it flows precisely as it flows and can flow neither 'faster' nor 'slower'" (Hua X, no. 54,370). Absolute time<:onstituting consciousness is a stream that flows. However, the flow itself is not initiated by an external force, but has its own regularity. In addition to this, Husserl continues: "The change is not a change. And therefore it also makes n o sense to speak of something that endures, and it is nonsensical to want to find something here that remains unchanged for even an instant during the course of a duration" (Hua X, no. 54,370). Even calling the constant retentional iteration of inner time a 'flow' is resorting to an inadequate metaphor, for there is n o time within which it appears. We can describe the stream only as a change that has n o duration, as a flux that, though it flows, cannot be described as passing t h r o u g h time. T h r o u g h the double intentionality of retention the flow appears to itself as a " quasirtemporal a r r a n g e m e n t of the phases of the flow" (Hua X, §39, 83 / 437). T h e flow lies between m o v e m e n t a n d nonm o v e m e n t and is streaming and standing. "We can say nothing other than the following: This flow is something we speak of in conformity with what is constituted, but it is not 'something in objective time.' It is absolute subjectivity a n d has the absolute properties of something to be designated metaphorically as 'flow'; of something that originates in a point of actuality, in a primal source-point, 'the n o w / and so on. In the actuality-experience we have the primal source-point and a continuity of m o m e n t s of reverberation. For all of this, we lack names" (Hua X, §36, 75 / 429). T h e flow is so structured that it manifests itself without, however, appearing within time. Although we refer to an infinite chain of retentions and p r o tendons, we cannot even refer to a duration or simultaneity of different moments, for this would lead us to assume

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that they share o n e and the same time. T h e flow is neither temporal nor static; it is a movement that is reiterated in its unity. T h e r e is n o linearity of internal time. We have reached the m o m e n t at which language defies us in articulating the most fundamental m o m e n t — w h e n unity and diversity, and presence and the non-absence of absence, are simultaneously app r e h e n d e d . Even the "stream" is nothing but a m e t a p h o r , for we are not referring to a movement, nor to a stand-still, b u t to a "thickness" that is "foreign to natural language." 98 This is the most Nietzschean m o m e n t in Husserl's phenomenology. We are pointing to a pre-thetic life that resists any rational account. We are dealing with the simultaneity of difference and non-change—which is n o t o p e n to rational investigation. It is an immediacy that escapes reason, as Nietzsche observes: "Timelessness a n d succession get on well together as soon as the intellect is absent." 99 §41. The "Annihilation of the World" That Does Not Lead to a Loss T h e phenomenological reduction leads us beyond the objective world and the i m m a n e n t field and points to the most subjective experience. It reveals consciousness in its anteriority to perception, as it is implicated in the infinite movement of the stream of retentions and protentions. T h e most fundamental given is not static, but an adverbial transitive life that is p e r m a n e n t in its endless iteration. This movem e n t cannot be described in terms of before a n d after, for everything is retained and implicated in the present. T h e most fundamental given to which phenomenology thus returns is an infinitely e x t e n d e d presence that is pre-temporal and pre-spatial, though allowing for the a p p e a r i n g of i m m a n e n t and transcendent objects. We can now understand m o r e fully the claim, m a d e in chapter one, that the reduction r e t u r n s us to the spectacle of the world (§11) - With the annihilation of the world we have n o t lost the world b u t retained it in its prei m m a n e n t appearing. However, as we have shown, this creates a p r o b l e m in that it leads Husserl to r e t u r n to an idealistic inquiry. T h e n a t u r e of this idealism needs to be explained, for it leads Husserl to r e t u r n to a subjectivity of a peculiar kind. As Husserl argues in CM: Carried out with this systematic concreteness, phenomenology is eo ipso 'transcendental idealism', though in a fundamentally

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and essentially new sense. It is not a psychological idealism, and most certainly not such an idealism as sensualistic psychologism proposes, an idealism that would derive a senseful world from senseless sensuous data. Nor is it a Kantian idealism, which believes it can keep open, at least as a limiting concept, the possibility of a world of things in themselves. On the contrary, we have here a transcendental idealism that is nothing more than a consequentially executed self-explication in the form of a systematic egological science, an explication of my ego as subject of every possible cognition, and indeed with respect to every sense of what exists, wherewith the latter might be able to have a. sense for me, the ego. . . . It is sense-explication achieved by actual work, an explication carried out as regards every type of existent ever conceivable by me, the ego, and specifically as regards the transcendency actually given to me beforehand through experience: Nature, culture, the world as a whole. (CM, §41, 118-19 / 88, emphasis added) What is retained is the type or style of experiencing. Absolute consciousness does not create the objective world of objects; rather, as Sokolowski observes: "It allows t h e m to e m e r g e as real, b u t does not make them" (Sokolowski 1964, 138). It is the source of all life and being. T h e world is retained in its appearing without any appearances or thetic objects. T h e form of the perceiving, not its content, is completely given. J a n Patocka draws o n the vocabulary of SuZ, and describes this event as a projection {Entwurj): "It is a projection of every possible encounter with it. As projection of a possible encounter it, of course, has a relation to beings, which lives in possibilities, and is as the possible; and 'sum' means precisely this" (Patocka 1970, 3 3 1 32). Everything is retained a n d nothing lost. Everything "is nested inside the living present, while it is n o t nested inside anything else. . . . T h e living present is the theater in which the whole spectacle of conscious life is available for phenomenological viewing" (Sokolowski 1974, §61, 159). What is retained is not an objective world b u t the style of the world, the unitary style of appearing that is constant. To follow MerleauPonty: "There is a temporal style of the world, and time remains the same because the past is a former future and a recent present, the present an i m p e n d i n g past and a recent future, the future a present

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a n d even a past to come; because, that is, each dimension of time is treated or aimed at as something other than itself (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 422). T h e world appears in its suspension. T h e 'annihilation of the world' is the contraction of existence into the present—an existence in which n o (thing) has duration b u t everything is. To follow Kern: "The existence of consciousness is n o t destroyed after the annihilation of the world, however its remaining existence has n o duration after the annihilation of the world. In other words, it has n o longer a past and a future b u t fuses together into the present" (Kern 1964, 209). Retentions refer to the form of retaining without an object. T h e infinite flux is nothing but a stream of retentions which sustain an infinitely large presence. T h e annihilation of the transcendent world does not lead to the negation or loss of the world; rather, it shows that reality is retained in subjectivity. As Husserl argues in Ideen I: "Strictly speaking, we have not lost anything b u t rather have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, contains within itself, 'constitutes' within itself, all worldly transcendencies 'as an intentional correlate. . . .'"10° It allows for the leeway (Spielraum) of all appearing. T h e enigma of life lies beyond space a n d time; thus, it can b e solved only after the reduction. As Wittgenstein argues in the Tractatus, "The solution of the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time" (Wittgenstein 1963, 6.4312, 148 / 149).

T H E VIGILANCE OF THE SUBJECT §42. The Seeing of 'Seeing', or I Can 'See' the 'Seeing' Itself Husserl points to a non-thetic consciousness which exists as synthesizing prior to the act of reflection. 101 This passive synthesis,102 as Husserl calls it later, precedes and makes possible the act of understanding. T h e absolute given is not an objective m o m e n t . T h e beginning is thus a life that precedes reflection: "Its beginning is the p u r e —and, so to speak, still d u m b . . . experience" (CM, §16, 77 / 40). This is, however, not the last m o m e n t of phenomenology, for the aim is to reflect u p o n this final g r o u n d so that it becomes visible to phenomenological reflection. This d u m b experience needs to be perceived if it is to serve as a n absolute starting point. This leads Husserl to a radical d e p a r t u r e from Kant. Kant says of the awareness of my self that! am, "this representation is a thought, not an intuition' (KRV, B157). While Kant argues that the unity of appercep-

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tion never appears but can be thought only, phenomenology believes it can be seen. "I surely d o know of the flow of consciousness as flow. I can look at it" (Hua X, no. 54, 378). Husserl believes that "I can 'see' the 'seeing' itself (Hua II, 24 / 31). T h r o u g h a particular p h e n o m e nological reflection, which is n o longer concerned with i m m a n e n t objects, b u t is c o n c e r n e d with the n a t u r e of experiencing as such (reflection o n lived experiences, Erlebnisreflexion), Husserl believes that it is possible to manifest that which precedes any possible perception — even the intuition of o u r own self. In Ideen / H u s s e r l provides us with the following argument: "Each Ego is livingits lived experiences, a n d in the latter a great variety is included really—inherently and intentively. It lives them: that is not to say that it has t h e m and [has] its 'eye o n ' what they include and is seizing u p o n t h e m in the m a n n e r characteristic of an experiencing of something i m m a n e n t or of any other intuiting a n d objectivating of something immanent" (Ideen I, §77, 177-78 / 145, emphasis a d d e d ) . T h e T that experiences lived experiences a n d subsists in these experiences lives this experiencing prior to any reflection. T h a t it is, and persists, ensures that we can b e c o m e conscious of this life t h r o u g h reflection: "Any lived experience which is n o t an object of regard can, with respect to ideal possibility, b e c o m e 'regarded'; a reflection o n the p a r t of the Ego is directed to it, it now becomes an object for the Ego" (Ideen I, §77, 178 / 145). T h e r e is thus an Erlebnisreflexion that is different from the reflection o n the i m m a n e n t object, since it purely makes manifest an awareness that already is. 103 "This occurs in the form of 'reflection', which has the remarkable property that what is seized u p o n perceptually in reflection is characterized fundamentally n o t only as something which exists and e n d u r e s while it is being reg a r d e d perceptually b u t also as something which already existed before this regard was t u r n e d to it. 'All lived experiences are intended to': . . . they are there already as a 'background' when they are not reflected o n and thus of essential necessity are 'ready to be perceived?" (Ideen I, §45,104 / 83-84). Conscious life is latent a n d anterior to any perception, but it is always ready to be perceived. §43. An Unconscious Given Husserl, however, comes to realize that this absolute g r o u n d can never b e completely grasped. "The constituting and the constituted coincide, and yet naturally they cannot coincide in every respect. The

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phases of the flow of consciousness in which phases of the same flow of consciousness become constituted phenomenally cannot be identical with these constituted phases, nor are they" (Hua X, §39,83 / 437). We can grasp parts of the flow, but we can never grasp the unity of the flow as such. 104 T h e fungierende self that precedes any reflective act can never be completely seen. Husserl therefore concedes that it is given only in the sense of a Kantian idea: "In the continuous progression from seizing-upon to seizing-upon, in a certain way, I said, we now seize u p o n the stream of lived experiences as a unity. We d o not seize u p o n it as we d o a single lived experience b u t rather in the m a n n e r of an idea in the Kantian sense" (Ideen I, §83, 202 / 166). While i m m a n e n t objects are absolutely given, the absolute stream is given only in the m a n n e r of a Kantian idea. It is the absolute totality of all experience, which is itself, however, not grasped. T h e true beginning of phenomenology turns out to be an ideal m o m e n t that cannot be seen. T h e annihilation of the world thus leads to a p u r e consciousness in which any reality or realization is disregarded. The living presence that remains is a standing and streaming, a nunc stans and nuncfluens, which, however, is nothing but an ideal (idealiter) infinite continuum. To follow Merleau-Ponty: "Reflection does not itself grasp its full significance unless it refers to the unreflective fund of experience which it presupposes, u p o n which it draws, a n d which constitutes for it a kind of original past, a past which has never b e e n a present" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, 242). The experiencing- that accompanies all my experiences can never be perceived as such. Consciousness thus precedes experience, and is not only anterior to it, b u t remains latent. As Levinas observes: "Consciousness is an ageing and on the search for a time foregone." 105 Consciousness in its temporalization precedes a n d is always already older \hzn experience—our experience is accomp a n i e d by a trail of life that lies beyond our perceptual grasp. T h e d u m b experience can never be fully t u r n e d into speech. It is always anterior to appearances; does not this last consciousness finally lead to an unconscious field that lives without being perceived? But now we ask whether we must not say that there is, in addition, an ultimate consciousness that controls all consciousness in the flow. In that case, the phase of internal consciousness that is actual at any particular moment would be something intended through the ultimate consciousness; and it would be

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this ultimate consciousness that passes over into the reproductive (retentional) modification, which itself would then be something again intended in the ultimate consciousness. This ultimate intentionality can take u p into itself the style of paying attention, and in this way we can become conscious of its content in the manner of the object of attention. We find, moreover, that when we do pay attention to something, something is always already "appearing"—the style of attention always runs through and across an intentionality. But if I direct my regard towards an actual momentary phase of the flow? But we should seriously consider whether we must assume such an ultimate consciousness, which would necessarily be an 'unconscious' consciousness; that is to say, as ultimate intentionality it cannot be an object of attention (if paying attention always presupposes intentionality already given in advance), and therefore it can never become conscious in this particular sense. ( H u a X , no. 54, 382) This is the last entry in H u a X, written between 1909 and 1911. Husserl h e r e raises the most unsettling question for phenomenology: If the ultimate consciousness is unconscious, it could never b e o p e n for phenomenological reflection. Hence, phenomenology faces the strange task of searching for a beginning that always recedes, a n d thus is never present for investigation. T h e beginning of all beginnings is nothing that we can grasp completely. Husserl h e r e , without admitting to it, proves the impossibility of ever grasping this absolute stream of life. Husserl c o n c e d e s , in this last entry in H u a X, that it s h o u l d b e seriously c o n s i d e r e d w h e t h e r o n e must assume such an ultimate consciousness —a consciousness that would be, necessarily, an 'unconscious' consciousness. But Husserl resists this move. T h e final and absolute g r o u n d needs to be present. Husserl refuses to recognize the necessary latency of absolute consciousness: It is just nonsense to talk about an "unconscious" content that would only subsequently become conscious. Consciousness is necessarily consciousness in each of its phases. Just as the retentional phase is conscious of the preceding phase without making it into an object, so too the primal datum is already intended—specifically, in the original form of the 'now' —

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without its being something objective. It is precisely this primal consciousness that passes over into retentional modification— which is then retention of the primal consciousness itself and of the datum originally intended in it, since the two are inseparably united. If the primal consciousness were not on hand, no retention would even be conceivable: retention of an unconscious content is impossible. (Hua X, appendix IX, 119 / 472-73) W h a t comes to light h e r e is the struggle between accepting that there is a n awareness of life that lies beyond our grasp and the refusal to give u p the idea of an absolute beginning. In this struggle Husserl's idea of "philosophy as a rigorous science" surrenders to life.106 This surrender, however, is "played out behind Husserl's back," for it is acknowle d g e d only in the Krisis.m

CONCLUSION In H u a X, Husserl cannot accept that there is an unconscious latency, for whatever is latent is the retention of an originary actual m o m e n t . Longitudinal intentionality is a correlate to a primal impression, for t h e r e are n o retentions without a preceding impression. Husserl is h e r e pointing to an insoluble tension between acknowledging the ideality of the stream and refusing to recognize the impossibility of turning this ideal into a perceived moment. As Rudolf Bernet observes: "Husserl's texts unfold thoroughly within the field of tension which pervades the opposition between the ideal of an absolute, perceptual presence of the flow to itself, and the impossibility, evinced in the phenomenological analysis of the flow, of ever realizing this ideal" (Bernet 1983,110-11). Bernet relates this tension to the fact that Husserl still holds on to a primacy of presence, and therefore is imprisoned in what Derrida calls the metaphysics of presence. Indeed, the p r o b l e m for Heidegger will be exactly this m o m e n t , namely, that Husserl believes that the event of consciousness can be seen. Husserl herewith gives a primacy to intuition and presence, and thus, according to Heidegger, still holds o n to a vulgar notion of time. 108 T h e quest for presence goes h a n d in h a n d with the desire to turn i m m a n e n c e into an absolute, self-enclosed space. To follow Held: "Husserl's aberration away from the primacy of the dimension of appearance can be

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u n d e r s t o o d in terms of a Cartesian ascription of appearance to subjective immanence. T h e aberration can be explained as resulting from the fact that he allowed himself to be misled by 'reflection' which undoubtedly is r e q u i r e d if one is to thematise the appearing of the appearing" (Held 1981, 191). Since phenomenology takes presence as its ideal, it fails to reveal the fundamental disclosure that is always already anterior to presence. This permits Husserl to r e t u r n to subjectivity and to reverse the manifestation of the absolute g r o u n d into the sphere of immanence. Yet inadvertendy, the phenomenological description leads Husserl to disclose a transcendence that not only exceeds i m m a n e n c e b u t lies beyond the grasp of consciousness. Consciousness is thus always already fissured. T h e enclosed space of i m m a n e n c e is broken. Phenomenology as a rigorous science idealizes presence and thus fails to acknowledge that it has s u r r e n d e r e d to a life that lies beyond its grasp, a surrendering that is played out b e h i n d Husserl's back.

CHAPTER THREE

Heidegger's Recovery of the World

INTRODUCTION So FAR W E HAVE focused on Heidegger's critique of Husserl. We have shown that Husserl seeks to r e t u r n to an absolute and, indeed, "worldless" beginning by treating transcendental consciousness as an "ideal, that is, not real being" (GA 20, § l l d , 146). l T h e p r o b l e m for Heidegger is that Husserl thereby ignores the fact that acts of perception essentially belong to a concrete individual h u m a n being that finds itself in a real world. 2 This leads him to complain that Husserl aband o n s the principle of phenomenology. Rather than returning to the things themselves, Husserl returns to a p u r e abstraction a n d r e n d e r s the facticity of o u r existence meaningless. Heidegger's exasperation with Husserl's phenomenological project is well expressed in his bewild e r e d c o m m e n t in the marginalia of Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica article: "Does n o t a world necessarily pertain to the essence of the p u r e ego?"3 Surely the gulf between consciousness and the world cann o t be sustained. T h e question of Being cannot be separated from the question of the world. "Dasein's understanding of Being pertains with equal primordiality both to an understanding of something like a 'world,' and to the understanding of the Being of those entities which b e c o m e accessible within the world" (SuZ, §4, 13). Herewith, Heidegger suggests a radical d e p a r t u r e from Husserl. T h e 'beginning of all beginnings' is not a worldless subject, b u t Dasein as Being-in-the-world. 4 Dasein pierces {durchbricht) the field of consciousness. Contrary to Husserl's p u r e Ego, it is n o t an "enclosed space" b u t is defined in terms of its openness to the world: "The Being in Da-sein must retain its 'exteriority'" (Zahringer Seminare, 121 / 383). T h e problem is n o longer "how to get out of the enclosed space of

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consciousness"; rather, Dasein is always already 'other' to consciousness. It defines the place that makes thinking and acting possible. Heidegger thus suggests a "revolution of the place of thinking" (Zdhringer Seminare, 385 / 123). SuZ's b r e a k t h r o u g h lies in the fact that Dasein replaces an i m m a n e n t transcendence with a m o m e n t of transcendence allowing for immanence. 5 A topology of thinking is going to stand in "lieu" of consciousness. This chapter is concerned with the dis-location, or Ortsverlegung, that the very term Dasein suggests. 6 It explores whether SuZ manages to retrieve the p h e n o m e n o n of the world that the tradition of philosophy has overlooked.

DASEIN'S DISTINCTIVENESS §44. Nihil Sine Esse Ratione SuZ's critique of subjectivity is tied u p with its critique of the search for a singular and absolute foundation of all being. 7 T h e prioritization of subjectivity is problematic insofar as it is r e g a r d e d as a sole source of all being, i.e., as a self-enclosed constitutive site. This function is implicit in the very t e r m subject Subjectum derives from the Greek V7T0KElflEVOV? which literally means to "lie u n d e r " or "lie below" as the "substratum" of all being. This is exemplified in b o t h Husserl's prioritization of i m m a n e n c e and Kant's "I think." T h e role of both— the unity of the stream of consciousness and the transcendental unity of apperception —is a constitutive one, and the world of appearances can be u n d e r s t o o d only by virtue of this ultimate subjectum. T h e subject posits the world. To follow Husserl: "It is exclusively as positingthat I am subject for this world." 9 In this m a n n e r , the world is my representation, 10 a secondary p h e n o m e n o n dependent o n the subject who legitimizes these representations. 1 1 "Nihil sine ratione, "there is nothing without reason — that is to say, without a ground. 1 2 Although Heidegger turns against this prioritization of subjectivity, he does not discard the idea of constitution per se. As he wrote to Husserl in October 1927: "It has to be shown that Dasein's m o d e of Being . . . precisely contains in itself the possibility of transcendental constitution. . . . Therefore the problem of Being is universally related to that which constitutes and to that which is constituted" {Brief, 601-2 / 119-20). SuZ is not simply concerned with the question of existence

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but, like Husserl's work, essentially addresses the question of constitution: "The question about that [ontological] structure [of existence] aims at the analysis (Auseinanderlegung) of what constitutes existence. T h e context (Zusammenhang) of such structures we call 'existentiality.'"13 In the marginalia of his copy of SuZ Heidegger adds: the term constitution indicates that SuZ is "thus, n o philosophy of existence." 14 This emphasis on the question of constitution leads Heidegger to a qualified defence of idealism: "As c o m p a r e d with realism, idealism, n o matter how contrary and untenable it may be in its results, has an advantage point in p r i n c i p l e . . . . If idealism emphasizes that Being and Reality are only 'in the consciousness,' this expresses an understanding of the fact that Being cannot be explained through entities" (SuZ, §43a, 207). Implicitly, Heidegger thereby acknowledges the significance of the gulf that separates immanence from transcendence in Husserl's phenomenology. 1 5 For at least Husserl points to a Being that is radically distinct from the transcendent world. 16 §45. Dasein's Distinctiveness At first sight it appears the term Dasein does not p e r m i t a dis-location of subjectivity. Heidegger merely transfers the subject's constitutive role to Dasein; like the rest of the tradition, he privileges h u m a n Dasein. H e repeats Kant's so-called "Copernican T u r n " by locating the starting "point" of philosophizing in Dasein: "Dasein itself has a special distinctiveness as c o m p a r e d with other entities . . . by the fact that, in its very Being, that Being is an issueior it. . . . Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological" (SuZ, §4, 11-12). What distinguishes Dasein from beings of a character other than its own is that it has an understanding of Being (and in SuZ Being is defined always as t h e Being of beings) which cannot b e divorced from its relation to itself. This understanding is not a matter of theoretical reflection. It is p a r t of Dasein's essential constitution that it comports itself to its Being; this c o m p o r t m e n t itself belongs to the Being of Dasein. T h e comportm e n t to Being is called understanding, which has to be i n t e r p r e t e d existentially, insofar as it characterizes Dasein's way of Being. Dasein has an ontic-ontological priority with r e g a r d to the question of Being. Its priority is 'ontic' insofar as "to be" means that its very Being is an issue for it, even when the question of Being is not raised explicitly. It is 'ontological' insofar as the ontic relation, our pre-understanding of Being, makes the disclosure of Being possible. It is 'ontic-ontological'

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insofar as what is at stake is not only Dasein's Being, b u t the Being of all other beings. What remains relatively undeveloped in SuZ is that Dasein's distinctiveness, i.e., its ontic-ontological priority with respect to the question of Being, is based o n the fact that Dasein can speak: "Dasein has language.. . . Man shows himself as the entity which talks. This does not signify that the possibility of the vocal utterance is peculiar to him, b u t rather that he is the entity which is such as to discover the world and Dasein itself (SuZ, §34, 165). Heidegger thereby appears to be making a classical move, arguing that Dasein is privileged 17 over and against animals and entities insofar as it can use language. 18 (We investigate SuZ's failure to acknowledge fully the significance of language in the appendix, "The World That Speaks.") Only Dasein can speak and understand ?cnd thus can raise the question of the meaning of Being. 19 With this an unquestionable priority is given to Dasein. "But ind e e d something like a priority of Dasein has a n n o u n c e d itself (SuZ, §2, 8). T h e starting point of all philosophizing lies in Dasein's questioning c o m p o r t m e n t to Being: "Fundamental ontology, from which alone all other ontologies can take their rise, must be sought in the existential analytic of Dasein } (SuZ, §4,13). T h e question of Being is nothing but a radicalization of Dasein's tendency toward Being. 20 Thus, by questioning the meaning of Being, Dasein asks about its very self. Dasein is at the center of the investigation. T h e primary question is who we are, "the 'Who' of Dasein" (SuZ, §25, 114 & §54, 267), for ontology is closely entwined with the constitutive structures of Dasein's existence, what Heidegger calls existentiality. 21 At this stage we have difficulties in locating a d e p a r t u r e from Husserl, since for Husserl, too, questioning is the fundamental startingpoint of phenomenology. Although Dasein's questioning is n o t an issue of theoretical reflection or Cartesian doubt, b u t of comportment, structurally Heidegger seems to r e p e a t Husserl's moves: while Husserl's phenomenology finds the principle of all principles in the intentional structure of consciousness, SuZ's starting-point is the existential structure of Dasein's c o m p o r t m e n t to Being. T h e transcendental constitutive site is n o longer the p u r e Ego b u t Dasein. 22 F u r t h e r m o r e , b o t h Husserl and Heidegger work with a dualistic schema. For Husserl, radical doubt reveals the "dualism" between immanence and transcendence, and for Heidegger, Dasein's questioning c o m p o r t m e n t toward Being reveals the "dualism" between Being and

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beings. The distinction between Being and beings is so closely entwined with the dichotomy between Dasein and beings of another character than its own that the whole analysis seems to repeat structurally Husserl' s differentiation between immanence and transcendence. 2 3 Dasein's distinctiveness over and against beings of a character other than its own, which lies in its ontic-ontological priority with r e g a r d to the question of Being, ensures that for Dasein not only its Being, but also the Being of all other beings, is an issue. 24 Dasein opens u p the horizon (cf. SuZ, §5,17) within which beings can appear. N o t only is Dasein at the center of the investigation, but it is by virtue of Dasein that there is Being. 25 These claims remind us of Husserl's definition of consciousness as nulla re indiget ad existendum, which Heidegger so adamantly criticizes. 26 §46. Toward a Constitution without Subjectivity T h e priority and centrality given to Dasein, however, is radically different from that given to subjectivity: "This priority [of Dasein over all o t h e r entities] has obviously nothing to d o with a spurious subjectivizing of the totality of entities" (SuZ, §4,14, translation slightly altered). While for Husserl the priority given to consciousness leads to a radical division between i m m a n e n c e and transcendence, Heidegger emphasizes that the world cannot be bracketed since it is an essential constitu e n t of Dasein: 27 "But to Dasein, Being in a world is something that belongs essentially" (SuZ, §4, 13). Thus, Heidegger repeats Husserl's phenomenological a p p r o a c h only structurally, by prioritizing Dasein. Heidegger concurs with Husserl insofar as he upholds the question of constitution. However, he thereby also departs from Husserl, as the constitutive m o m e n t is no longer sought in an ens creatum. Rather, it is sought in a constitutive transcendental site that is neither subjective nor objective, a n d that is inherent in the t e r m Dasein (beingthere). To put it another way, the aim is to separate the question of constitution from subjectivity and thus from an ultimate and firm foundation. 2 8 Hence, Heidegger both adheres to the principle of phenomenology by addressing the question of constitution and departs from Husserl by ascribing the constitutive m o m e n t to Dasein. Dasein does not purely replace the term subject, b u t "revolutionizes the whole concept of the human-being." 29 The prefix Da-of Dasein does not designate the occurrence of something present but the opening of presence, that is to say, Dasein's openness toward Being, its transcendence.

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Dasein opens u p a constitutive beginning that dis-locates and pierces the unitary source of subjectivity. 30 As Heidegger elucidates in 1946: "That is why the sentence cited from Being and Time (p. 42) is careful to enclose the word 'essence'in quotation marks. This indicates that 'essence' is now being defined f r o m n e i t h e r esse essentiae n o r esse existentiae b u t r a t h e r from the ek-static character of Dasein." 31 Dasein is not a unitary, fundamental, stable beginning b u t is essentially dis-locating. As the lecture "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (which deepens SuZ's analysis of the world) emphasizes, "the essence of Dasein (which then stands 'in the center') is ecstatic or 'excentric.'"*2 T h e priority given to Dasein is, from the outset, a priority that is de-centering. §4 7. Dasein as Being-in-the-World Heidegger not only pierces the field of immanence b u t maintains Dasein's distinctiveness. Dasein is distinct from entities not insofar as there is a gulf that separates Dasein from the world, b u t because Dasein 'is' in-the-world. As an existentiale, 'Being alongside' the world never means anything like the Being-present-at-hand-together of Things that occur. There is no such thing as the 'side-by-side-ness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity called 'world.' Of course when two things are present-at-hand together alongside one another, we are accustomed to express this occasionally by something like 'The table stands "by" ["bei"] the door' or 'The chair "touches" ["beruhrt"] the wall.' Taken strictly, 'touching' is never what we are talking about in such cases, not because accurate re-examination will always eventually establish that there is a space between the chair and the wall, but because in principle the chair can never touch the wall, even if the space between them should be equal to zero. If the chair could touch the wall, this would presuppose that the wall is the sort of thing 'for5 which a chair would be encounterable. (SuZ, §12,55, emphasis added) Dasein's distinctiveness is d u e to the fact that it is {daft es ist) in-theworld. Being-in and Being-alongside the world is an existential characteristic that is unique to Dasein. 33 A table might be found next to a chair but the table has n o sense of beingn&a to the chair; indeed, it has no understanding of Being whatsoever. Dasein alone has an onticontological

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priority with regard to the question of Being. The emphasis in this passage, however, is not on Dasein's understanding of the world, nor on the fact that only Dasein exists and therefore is, but on Dasein's sensibility. Only Dasein can touch and be touched. Objectively speaking, an object might push or "touch" another object; however, "taken stricdy, touching is never what we are talking about," for entities have n o sense or understanding of other beings, n o sense of being nearby or far away. They never encounter anything; they cannot touch and have no sense of being touched. The passage therefore intimates that Heidegger places the distinctiveness of Dasein in sensibility, which needs to be a specifically h u m a n sensibility (should Dasein's distinctiveness be maintained) . M Although this passage suggests that only Dasein has a skin, and is touched by the world, and despite Heidegger's apparent emphasis o n Dasein's e m b o d i m e n t and corporeality, SuZ does not locate Dasein's distinctiveness in its sensibility. To the contrary—SuZ treats touch as a m o m e n t secondary to understanding. The passage cited alludes to §29, in which Heidegger emphasizes that what characterizes Dasein is its facticity and state-of-mind (Befindlichkeit), which has nothing in c o m m o n with a m o m e n t of feeling, vulnerability, sensibility, or touch: "Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by the attunement of a state-of-mind. And only because the 'senses' [die Sinne] belong ontologically to an entity whose kind of Being is Being-in-the-world with a stateof-mind, can they be 'touched' by anything or 'have a sense for' [Sinne habenfur] something in such a way that what t o u c h e s t h e m shows itself in a n affect" (SuZ, §29, 137). T o u c h i n g a n d sensibility are m a d e possible through an a priori understanding of Being-in-the-world. Dasein's openness to the world precedes the m o m e n t of sensibility. I must always already be capable of being touched and affected before touching is possible. Touch is therefore a secondary m o m e n t of Being-in-the-world. A curious constellation has come to light. Although Heidegger maintains that Husserl's transcendental reduction is " u n p h e n o m e n o logical and indeed purportedly phenomenological" (cf. GA 20, §13f., 178) because it turns away from the real world, we now find that Heidegger's affirmation of the world is not derivable from its materiality either. T o u c h and sensibility are possible only by virtue of a Dasein that is Being-in-the-world. In Husserlian terminology, Beingin-the-world is constituting, while touch and sensibility are constituted. Thus, Dasein's dis-location of subjectivity does not lead us back to a m o m e n t of materiality or an e m b o d i e d Dasein. H e r e is a radically

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new definition of the world. Indeed, Heidegger must define the world as "something" that is not some thing or entity in o r d e r to maintain Dasein's distinctive and constitutive role.

THE DISTINCTIVENESS OF T H E WORLD §48. A World without Spectators T h e world that is an existential of Dasein should never be confused with the categorial understanding of the world to which the tradition of philosophy adheres—the world written in inverted commas. 3 5 T h e world is thus never separate from Dasein, is never an 'in itself that needs to be "discovered," but only is in relation to Dasein, in the same manner as Dasein only is as Being-in-the-world. In contrast to Husserl's doctrine of i m m a n e n t transcendence, the dependency between Dasein and its world is not one-sided b u t mutual The hyphens between the words Being-in-the-world are crucial, for they emphasize Dasein's dis-location, that is, this essential interdependency or interrelatedness between Dasein and the world. 36 'Dasein-as-Being-in-the-world' should not be confused with 'immanence-Being-in-transcendence'. For the claim that Dasein always already "finds itself in" a world is still based o n the belief that there is a world that exists i n d e p e n d e n d y of Dasein. This would suggest a dualism between Dasein and the world that Heidegger wishes to avoid.

©

uasein

Fig. 1

Daseln^'oN.

yftffiF1 Fig. 2

Fig. 3

All we would argue is that Dasein occupies a certain place or space (fig. 2) rather than being, like Husserl's p u r e Ego, an outside spectator (fig. 1). It is, however, n o t a matter of placing the p u r e Ego back into the world, for Dasein cannot b e found in anything. Dasein is not in the world in the same m a n n e r "as the water is 'in' the glass, or the garment is 'in' the c u p b o a r d " (SuZ, §12, 54). For Heidegger's is a categorial

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understanding (cf. SuZ, §12, 54) of being-in, referring to the relationship between two entities occupying the same space (fig. 2). 3 7 "Being-in, o n the o t h e r h a n d , is a state of Dasein's Being; it is an existentiale" (SuZ, §12, 54). This existentiale should not b e und e r s t o o d spatially. Drawing on Grimm's etymology of the word in, Heidegger observes: "Nor does the term 'Being-in' m e a n a spatial 'inone-another-ness' of things present-at-hand, any m o r e than the word ' in' primordially signifies a spatial relationship of this kind" (SuZ, §12, 54). 'Being-in' is not "a spatial relationship of this kind," b u t refers to the way Dasein understands itself. Dasein is its world insofar as Dasein is always already in a certain manner in the world. "Dasein is its world existingly" (SuZ, §69c, 364) ,38 T h e world is an existential ontological concept which cannot be described in terms of a what, as an in-itself, b u t only in terms of a how, how it is interlaced with us (fig. 3). We are n o longer referring to two separate entities that need to be linked, b u t to the essential interwovenness between Dasein and its world that cannot be u n d o n e . T h e term Dasein does not "revolutionize the whole concept of the human-being" (cf. GA 26, §9, 167) because the move is from the transcendental world-less spectator (fig. 1) to a spectator in the world (fig. 2), b u t because the spectator to some extent disappears. Dasein cann o t b e differentiated from its world (fig. 3). To follow Fink: "We are never a subject for whom the world as a whole is as 'object' [Gegenstand]. We can by n o means 'set it aside' [beseitigen means both 'set aside' and ' r e m o v e ' ] , cannot set it on one side and us before it as if we were the otherworldly spectators of the world. T h e 'world stage' has n o audience that is distinct from the actors; h e r e everyone participates in the play. . . . Only in the encompassing region of the world d o we encounter objects, d o we stand as subjects over against objects" (Fink 1972,102). T h e world is not a spectacle that takes place in front of us (it is not a Gegenstand, i.e., it does not stand opposed [gegen] to us), b u t the world is in and through our engagement with 'it', a n d Dasein, in turn, is defined t h r o u g h this engagement. Heidegger calls this the facticity that expresses Dasein's dependency and essential interwovenness with the world: "The concept of 'facticity' implies that an entity 'within-the-world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that it can u n d e r s t a n d itself as b o u n d u p in its 'destiny' with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world" (SuZ, §12, 56, emphasis a d d e d ) . Dasein's destiny, as 'Being-in-the-world', is essen-

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tially interwovenvAth the Being of those entities it encounters in its own world. It cannot b e u n d e r s t o o d independently from its world. We now see why Heidegger argues that the 'Being-in' of 'Beingin-the-world' should not be u n d e r s t o o d as a spatial relationship. For Dasein is not an entity that is fully present, and the world is not 'out there', but is defined t h r o u g h Dasein's c o m p o r t m e n t . "If n o Dasein exists, n o world is ' t h e r e ' either" (SuZ, §69c, 365). Thus, Dasein does n o t find itself in a geometrical fixed space in which it moves around, as figure two suggests. 39 N o r is the world a three-dimensional geometrical space or empty void: "A three-dimensional multiplicity of possible positions which get filled u p with Things present-at-hand is never proximally given" (SuZ, §22, 103). Rather, the world is a n d has to be "relative to h u m a n Dasein (WdG, 3 9 / 1 4 1 ; 5 I E ) . Being-in does not emphasize a spatial relationship, but draws o u r attention to the fact that the world is always already familiar to Dasein. The expression 'bin'is, connected with 'bei/ and so 'ich bin' ('I am') means in its turn T reside' or 'dwell alongside' the world, as that which is familiar to me in such and such a way. 'Being' (Sein), as the infinitive of 'ich bin' (that is to say, when it is understood as an existentiale), signifies 'to reside alongside . . . ,' 'to be familiar with . . .' (SuZ, §12, 54, emphasis added) And as Heidegger adds in GA 20: Tn' primarily does not signify anything spatial at all but means primarily beingfamiliar with (GA 20, §19, 213) These passages suggest that there is a familiarity with the world that is essentially pre-spatial and indeed "primarily does not signify anything spatial at all." However, this is not the line of a r g u m e n t that Heidegger pursues. Rather, his aim is to retrieve a spatiality that the tradition of philosophy has ignored. §49. Dasein fs Spatiality Although the primacy of the geometrical description of the world is rejected, SuZ claims: "Then in the end a 'salvaging' of the Cartesian analysis of the 'world' is possible." 40 Descartes is not mistaken in defining the physical world in terms of its extension (res extensa). T h e p r o b l e m is that h e overlooks the existentialontological significance of spatiality. "There is some p h e n o m e n a l justification for regarding

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the extensio as a basic characteristic of the 'world/ even if by recourse to this neither the spatiality of the world n o r that of the entities we e n c o u n t e r in o u r environment (a spatiality which is proximally discove r e d ) nor even that of Dasein itself, can be conceived ontologically" (SuZ, §21,101). What SuZ seeks to rescue from the Cartesian analysis of the world is not the world of nature defined in terms of its extension, but a world a n d spatiality that is specific to Dasein. Hence, when Heidegger emphasizes that Being-in should not be understood as a spatial relationship, not all spatiality is bracketed from Dasein: "By thus delimiting Being-in, we are not denying every kind of 'spatiality' to Dasein" (SuZ, §12,56). T h e r e is a spatiality that is peculiar to Dasein alone: "But its spatiality shows the characters of de-serverance a n d directionality" (SuZ, §23, 105). This spatiality should never be confused with the traditional descriptions of space, for "space is not in the subject" as a form of intuition, nor, as Descartes believes, "is the world in space" (SuZ, §24, 111). This spatiality is neither in, nor external to Dasein. Dasein's spatiality needs to be u n d e r s t o o d adverbially. It is characterized as rapprochement or deseverance (Entfernung): "We use the expression 'deseverance' in a signification which is both active a n d transitive" (SuZ, §23, 105). Entfernung means distancing a n d removing, a n d literally, de-severance (Ent-fernung) means reducing distance. "'De-severing' amounts to making the farness vanish—that is, making the remoteness of something disappear, bringing it close. Dasein is essentially de-severant: it lets any entity be e n c o u n t e r e d close by as the entity which it is" (SuZ, §23, 105). What characterizes Dasein as Being-in-the-world is its tendency to make farness vanish and to b r i n g things closer, "In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness."*1 Geometrico-mathematical models fail to describe this tendency toward closeness, for closeness is not explicable in terms of objective mathematical laws but only in terms of familiarity and of what is environmentally in reach. First and foremost we estimate o u r surroundings in terms of a definite vagueness: "Though these estimates may be imprecise and variable if we try to c o m p u t e them, in the everydayness of Dasein they have their own definiteness which is thoroughly intelligible. We say that to go over yonder is 'a good walk,' 'a stone's throw,' or 'as long as it takes to smoke a pipe'" (SuZ, §23,105). Not only are o u r everyday estimations physically inaccurate and vague, they often even contradict the physical definition of distance and objective measurement. For what is closest to Dasein environ-

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mentally often is, physically speaking, farthest away.42 In terms of physical criteria the glasses I am wearing are closest to me, however, in terms of my environment, the b o o k that I am reading is closer to m e than the glasses. Environmentally speaking, I am m o r e aware of the picture o n the wall than the glasses, although objectively speaking the picture is further away. Spatiality is thus defined in accordance with Dasein's engagement within its environment. §50. Space Is in the World Heidegger thereby intimates a fundamental d e p a r t u r e from Husserl. While Husserl attempts to describe the stream of consciousness as devoid of spatiality, it appears now that the term Dasein "revolutionizes the whole concept of the p u r e Ego." For Dasein's distinctiveness lies in the fact not only that Dasein has a world, but that it is spatial. T h e concept Dasein dislocates subjectivity by allowing spatiality to pierce the enclosed field of immanence. However, Heidegger is not as radical as h e appears. Firstly, Heidegger's emphasis on Dasein's spatiality should not lead us to believe he is arguing that the subject is always embodied. Indeed, Dasein's spatiality is not a result of its bodily nature. As we have shown above, Being-in should not be understood as a spatial relationship. Being-in " . . . in the form of an occurrence . . . does not refer to a corporeal thing called ' h u m a n body' being o n h a n d in a spatial container (room, building) called 'world.' This cannot be the intention from the start, if we keep to what the fundamental character of Dasein itself implies. Dasein is n o t to be taken as an entity with a view to its outward appearance, as it looks to others in o n e or another state. Instead, it is to be taken only in its way to be" (GA 20, §19, 212). We should never confuse Dasein's existential structure of Beingin-the-world with the way in which a body is in space. Similarly, we should never understand Dasein's spatiality in terms of its corporeality or bodily presence, for this would lead us to misinterpret Dasein's existential structure ontically: "Hence Being-in is not to be explained ontologically by some ontical characterization, as if one were to say, for instance, that Being-in in a world is a spiritual property, and that m a n ' s 'spatiality' is a result of his bodily nature (which, at the same time, always gets 'founded' u p o n corporeality)" (SuZ, §12, 56). T h e spatiality of Dasein does not lead us back to Dasein's corporeality but to Dasein' s familiarity with the world, its manner of Being-in-the-world.

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This leads us to the second modification: although Dasein has a spatiality (and thus subjectivity can no longer be defined as devoid of spatial characteristics), Heidegger is careful not to t u r n spatiality into a primordial existential structure of Dasein. Being-in should never be defined in terms of its spatiality; rather, Dasein's spatiality is possible only by virtue of its existential structure of Being-in-the-world. "So if spatiality belongs to it in any way, that is possible only because of this Being-in" (SuZ, § 2 3 , 1 0 4 - 5 , emphasis a d d e d ) . If we recall, Heidegger wishes to break with the tradition in two ways, by arguing that "space is not in the subject, nor is the world in space" (SuZ, §24, 111). T h e world is neither a form of intuition, nor in space; rather, space is 'in the world. §51. Dasein s Directionality Heidegger resorts to the p h e n o m e n o n of directionality—which is the o t h e r definition of Dasein's spatiality 4 3 - to explain why spatiality is a derivative p h e n o m e n o n of the world. Dasein is always already oriented in the world; it has a directionality: "Every bringing-close has already taken in advance a direction towards a region out of which what is desevered brings itself close" (SuZ, §23, 108). By removing distance, Dasein is moving toward a region within which things are b r o u g h t closer. Directionality discloses the primordiality of Being-in-theworld. Heidegger illustrates this by drawing o n Kant's text "Was heiBt: Sich im Denken orientieren." 4 4 Heidegger cites Kant's example of entering a dark b u t familiar r o o m in which everything has b e e n moved around: "Suppose I step into a r o o m which is familiar to m e b u t dark, and which has b e e n r e a r r a n g e d [umgerdumt] during my absence so that everything which used to be at my right is now at my left. If I am to orient myself the ' m e r e feeling of the difference' between my two sides will be of no help at all as long as I fail to appreh e n d some definite object 'whose position,' as Kant remarks casually, T have in mind'" (SuZ, §23, 109). Dasein has a directionality out of which the fixed directions of left a n d right arise. Dasein does not just make farness vanish, b u t deseverance is linked with the m o m e n t of orientation; it is relative to the mann e r in which Dasein orients itself in the world. While Kant explains this directionality and orientation psychologically in terms of r e m e m bering, Heidegger claims that this directionality is g r o u n d e d in Beingin-the-world. Dasein's directionality, its orientation in the world, is not d u e to the fact that Dasein remembershcw the world—or the particular room—was furnished initially, but due to Dasein's a priori under-

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standing of the world. Spatiality is based o n the aroundness (Um-hafte) of Dasein's environment (Um-welt). "One must notice, however, that the directionality which belongs to de-severance is founded u p o n Beingin-the-world" (SuZ, §23, 109). Because Dasein comports itself to the world, it can orient itself within it a n d move toward objects. Being-inthe-world thus makes possible the encounterability of objects and with it the p h e n o m e n o n of spatiality (in the form of deseverance a n d directionality). It is peculiar to see that Heidegger thereby concurs with Husserl. While for Husserl space is possible by virtue of the pure Ego, for Heidegger it is Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world that makes possible the p h e n o m e n o n of spatiality. Although Heidegger breaks with Husserl insofar as he states that there is n o existence indep e n d e n t of the p h e n o m e n o n of the world, this should not lead us to the conclusion that Heidegger returns to the p h e n o m e n o n of spatiality. Thus, despite Heidegger's promise that "in the e n d a 'salvaging' of the Cartesian analysis of the 'world' is possible" (SuZ, §21, 101), Descartes's definition of the world is not "salvaged."45 Spatiality is and remains secondary to Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world. O u r temptation to locate the distinctiveness of Dasein in its spatiality is erroneous, just as touch is never the existential characteristic of Dasein. For in both cases Heidegger ensures that Being-in-the-world maintains its primordial status. Being-in-the-world allows for the encounterability of entities, and thus allows for the m o m e n t of touch, just as it allows for this relational lived and transitive notion of spatiality. §52. The A Priori Perfect We find that SuZ t h r o u g h o u t ensures that Being-in-the-world is anterior to the p h e n o m e n a of both touch a n d spatiality. Indeed, to emphasize this, Heidegger refers to the world as the a priori perfect structure of Dasein. This a priori perfect should not be confused with Dasein's personal past, or the storage of past events; rather, it describes a fundamental dependency that precedes any disclosure of entities within the world and is thus anterior to spatiality and sensibility. As Heidegger notes in the marginalia: 'Anterior' in this ontological sense in Latin means a priori, in Greek npoxepov rfj (frvcrei, Aristot, Physics, A 1 more explicitly rd zi r)v eivai, Metaphysics, E 1025 b 29, 'that which already wasbeing,' 'that which in each case always already was being-before

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(Wesende),' the having-been, the perfect. The Greek verb eivai has no perfect form. This is referred to here by the r]v eivai. Not an ontic past, but an always preceding to which we are directed backby the question about beings as such. Instead of referring to an a priori perfect we could also call it ontological, or transcendental perfect, (cf. Kant's Schematism) 46 T h e a priori perfect is not that which once was present and was p u s h e d into the past; rather, it has been a past to which we are always referred back without it ever being present in front of us. Dasein therefore can only return: the world is "something 'wherein' Dasein as an entity already was, and if in any m a n n e r it explicitly comes away from anything, it can never d o m o r e than come back to the world" (SuZ, §16, 76). This is what the term always already (immer schon) indicates. T h e r e is n o beginning at which Dasein becomes immersed in the world; rather, Dasein is always already interwoven with the world. "Dasein, in so far as it is, has always referred itself already to a 'world' which it encounters, and this dependency belongs essentially to its Being." 47 Dasein is given over to a world; this is a transcendental, ontological, a priori perfect structure of Dasein that cannot be bracketed. In stark contrast to Husserl, Heidegger herewith proposes a worldly model of thought. T o exist and to think is to be-in-the-world. T h e r e is a c o m m i t m e n t that Dasein does n o t make in terms of p r o p o sitions but that Dasein has, insofar as it is, since to be means "to be given over to the world." This a priori perfect refers to what Heidegger calls "state-of-mind" {Befindlichkeit). State-of-mind does not signify that Dasein always already finds (finden) itself within a world, nor does it refer to a psychological state, a m o m e n t of a m e r e feeling, o r what Kant called "I have in mind." Instead, the t e r m Befindlichkeit underlines Dasein's forestructure of understanding, 4 8 insofar as Dasein understands itself t h r o u g h its dependency u p o n the world. "[I] t is itself the existential kind of Being in which Dasein constantly surrenders itself to the world' and lets the 'world' 'matter' to it" (SuZ, §29, 139). T h a t Dasein is, is an a priori perfect Dasein cannot overcome. "This 'that it is' . . . we call it the 'thrownness' of this entity into its ' t h e r e ' " (SuZ, §29, 135). It is an existential of Dasein to be always already thrown into a ' t h e r e ' ; thus it is impossible for Dasein ever to get beh i n d its thrownness. This worldly character of Dasein cannot be annulled, for what makes us h u m a n is our rootedness in the world.

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§53. The World without Dirt We have seen that, although this suggests a fundamental d e p a r t u r e from Husserl insofar as there is n o existence i n d e p e n d e n t of the phen o m e n o n of the world, this constitutive worldly site is not so radically different from Husserl's worldless beginning. For, like Husserl, Heidegger is at pains to stress that e m b o d i m e n t and spatiality are constituted and never constituting. Although Heidegger points out that "It gets the n a m e 'homo' not in consideration of its Being b u t in relation to that of which it consists (humus)" (SuZ, §42, 198), the transcendental constitutive site remains devoid ofmaterialitf9 and indeed devoid of earthiness. It is a world that consists of no soil or dirt. T h e interdependency between Dasein and the world should not be confused with the collapse of the mind-body dualism. Dasein's dislocation of subjectivity is not derivable from its extension, bodily presence, or touch, rather the emphasis t h r o u g h o u t is that Being-in-the-world is anterior to those phenomena. Indeed what is emphazised is the a priori perfect structure of a disembodied Dasein and an immaterial world. T h e world does not touch Dasein, it does not resist or soil Dasein, b u t is interwoven with a being that is neither subject nor body. This weaving structure of Dasein and its world has no texture; the threads never touch b u t are always already entwined before any crossing and touching is possible. T h e real world that Heidegger seeks to retrieve is, like Husserl's p u r e Ego, a site devoid of spatiality and materiality. 50 We are thus faced with the curious paradox that Dasein's interwovenness with the world dis-locates Husserl's 'worldless' subject without r e t u r n i n g to the material world.

THE RELUCTANCE TO T H I N K RESISTANCE §54. Heidegger's Double Refusal O u r analysis points to a double refusal. SuZ refuses to perform the transcendental reduction and additionally refuses to return to a primordial spatiality or sensibility. We are e n c o u r a g e d to think of a radical beginning that should r e t u r n us to Dasein's essential interwovenness with the world. However, the r e t u r n is to a world that has n o opacity, heaviness, or materiality in the same way that Dasein is neutral; it has no flesh and blood—it cannot be wounded—but is always already entwined with this neutral world before any feeling or bodily sensation

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is possible. We therefore find that SuZ 's critique resists that which it seems to be opening u p . T h e r e is a constant tension at work: the m u t u a l dependency between Dasein and its world allows the possibility of attributing a primordial materiality a n d sensibility to Dasein, which, however, are denied. §55. The Ignoring of Sensibility This tension becomes particularly apparent when we t u r n to Heidegger's critique of Descartes, which is an indirect critique of Husserl. 51 Heidegger criticizes Descartes for drawing a distinction between two i n d e p e n d e n t substances—res corporea and res cogitans, "Nature" a n d "spirit" (SuZ, §19, 89)—and for treating the world as something present-at-hand which is o p e n to mathematical analysis. 52 As long as the world is seen as something that is present-at-hand and that remains constant, "remanens capax mutationum" (SuZ, §21, 96), the world is accessible to intuition and thus thought alone. 5 3 This has fatal consequences. T h e division between res cogitans a n d res corporea leads to the adoption of a theoretical attitude toward the world which r e n d e r s sensation as a genuine access to knowing ontologically insignificant: "What is 'proximally' given is this waxen T h i n g which is coloured, flavoured, hard, and cold in definite ways, and which gives off its own special sound when struck. But this is n o t of any importance ontologically, nor, in general, is anything which is given t h r o u g h the senses. . . . These senses d o not enable us to cognize any entity in its Being" (SuZ, §21, 96). Although o u r first encounter with the world might be a sensuous one, it remains insignificant for any ontological claim. Descartes reduces sensuous experience to thought and intuition. 54 T h e substance of res corporea is extension, and properties such as mobility, weight, or resistance are "modes of extensio" (SuZ, §19, 91). Thus, sensation or non-theoretical experience is r e d u c e d to mathematical-physical laws which are disclosed to intuition and thought alone: Hardness gets taken as resistance. . . . For Descartes, resistance amounts to no more than not yielding place — that is, not undergoing any change of location. So if a Thing resists, this means that it stays in a definite location relatively to some other Thing which is changing its location. . . . But when the experience of hardness is Interpreted this way, the kind of Being which belongs to sensory

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perception is obliterated, and so is any possibility that the entities encountered in such perception should be grasped in their Being. Descartes takes the kind of Being which belongs to the perception of something and translates it into the only kind he knows: the perception of something becomes a definite way of Beingpresent-at-hand-side-by-side of two resextensae. . . . Of course no behaviour in which one feels one's way by touch can be 'completed' unless what can thus be felt has 'closeness'of a very special kind. But this does not mean that touching and the hardness which makes itself known in touching consist ontologically in different velocities of two corporeal Things. Hardness and resistance do not show themselves at all unless an entity has the kind of Being which Dasein— or at least something living —possesses. (SuZ, §21, 97, emphasis added) This critique opens u p the possibility of locating the p r o b l e m of Descartes's thinking in his reduction of sensibility, touch, resistance, and hardness to extension a n d hence to intuition a n d thought. Indeed, we might assume that SuZ wishes to safeguard a m o m e n t of resistance and sensibility. Yet it is curious that Heidegger is a d a m a n t and indeed eager in resisting that which his critique has o p e n e d u p . For Heidegger tenaciously claims that resistance and sensibility are derivative phen o m e n a . Indeed, in a way similar to Descartes, SuZ resists thinking resistance. Heidegger intimates a reductive reading by claiming that resistance and sensibility are modi of Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world. §56. The Resistance to Thinking

Resistance

T h e main critique Heidegger launches against Descartes in the passage cited above is that he "obliterates the kind of Being which belongs to sensory perception." Descartes fails to see that touching and hardness, and indeed the p h e n o m e n o n of resistance, exist only in relation to Dasein—or at least something living. Resistance needs to be experiencedby a living being in o r d e r to 'be'. We might assume that Heidegger herewith wishes to point to the primordiality of affectivity, since his claim that Descartes obliterates "the kind of Being which belongs to sensory perception" appears to criticize Descartes's failure to acknowledge that perceptions are embodied. However, the focus of the critique is n o t o n the question of sensibility or Dasein's embodiment; rather, the aim is to show that by bracketing the question "for whom

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t h e r e is resistance," Descartes has b a r r e d a n d covered u p the phen o m e n o n of Being-in-the-world. "But thus the r o a d is completely blocked to seeing the founded character of all sensory and intellective awareness, and to understanding these as possibilities of Being-in-theworld" (SuZ, §21, 98). Heidegger criticizes Descartes's prioritization of 'thought' (Stavoeiv) over sensatio (aiaOrjcng) as the "genuine access to knowing" only because Descartes fails to disclose Dasein's essential c o m p o r t m e n t to the world. And only because the 'senses' [die "Sinne"] belong ontologically to an entity whose kind of Being is Being-in-the-world with a state-of-mind, can they be 'touched' by anything or 'have a sense for' [ "Sinn habenfur"] something in such a way that what touches them shows itself in an affect. Under the strongest pressure and resistance, nothing like an affect would come about, and the resistance itself would remain essentially undiscovered, if Being-inthe-world, with its state-of-mind, had not already submitted itself [sick schon angewiesen] to having entities within-the-world 'matter' to it in a way which its moods have outlined in advance. (SuZ, §29, 137) T h e r e is resistance, touch, or hardness only for a Dasein that always already comports itself to the world. It is the existential structure of Being-in-the-world which makes the encounterability of beings possible. Thus, sensatio, resistance, and thought are g r o u n d e d by Beingin-the-world. T h e r e is n o touch, affectivity, or resistance—indeed there is no bodily sensation— if there is no world. H e n c e , although the text allows for the possibility of a r e t u r n to sensibility and the body, Heidegger does not wish to reverse Descartes's order of prioritization. The p h e n o m e n a of resistance and sensibility are not the primary concern of this critique, for the aim is to r e t u r n to one 'thing' only, and that is Dasein's a priori perfect struct u r e of Being-in-the-world. Thus SuZ not only refuses to perform the transcendental reduction by affirming the essential interwovenness between Dasein and its world, but simultaneously resists what this critique appears to o p e n u p , namely the r e t u r n to an e m b o d i e d Dasein. §57. The Excess of Life A d o u b l e form of resistance is displayed: Heidegger repeatedly invokes a r e t u r n to the p h e n o m e n o n of resistance, yet he resists

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acknowledging its significance. This becomes a p p a r e n t in his critical appraisal of Dilthey. Heidegger praises Dilthey for returning to the p h e n o m e n o n of resistance by showing that "Reality is resistance, or, m o r e exactly, the character of resisting" (SuZ, §43b, 209). But he accuses Dilthey of failing to provide "an ontological Interpretation of the Being of consciousness" (SuZ, §43b, 209). T h e p r o b l e m for Heidegger is that Dilthey has left the nature of the Being that experiences resistance ontologically uninvestigated. Thus, Dilthey, like Descartes, fails to question back into the existential structure of Dasein, for it is only Dasein who can experience resistance. This time, however, Heidegger pushes the critique even further, for not only does the kind of Being that experiences resistance remain ontologically indeterminate, b u t ultimately the p h e n o m e n o n of life remains so too. "That this has not b e e n d o n e , depends ultimately on the fact that Dilthey has left 'life' standing in such a m a n n e r that it is ontologically undifferentiated; and of course 'life' is something which o n e cannot go back ' b e h i n d ' " (SuZ, §43b, 209). T h e Being of consciousness remains ontologically indeterminate because Dilthey has failed to question back into the p h e n o m e n o n of life. SuZ, however, also refuses to r e t u r n to the p h e n o m e n o n of life. SuZ resists what its critique has o p e n e d u p . It states, "Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being; b u t essentially it is accessible only in Dasein" (SuZ, §10, 50). However, life is resisted because it exceeds Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world: "Life is not a m e r e Being-present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein. In turn, Dasein is never to be defined ontologically by regarding it as life (in an ontologically indefinite m a n n e r ) plus something else" (SuZ, §10, 50). Life is neither present-at-hand, nor is it Dasein; it is not a modus of Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world. Rather than acknowledging the significance of this excess which escapes Dasein, 55 the investigation brackets the p h e n o m e n o n of life (cf. Franck 1986, 63). Having criticized Dilthey for leaving ontologically indeterminate the kind of Being that experiences resistance—and thus the p h e n o m e n o n of life —Heidegger himself resists the r e t u r n to the p h e n o m e n o n of life by asserting that the p h e n o m e n o n of resistance does not disclose life, but Dasein as Being-in-the-world: "The experiencing of resistance—that is, the discovery of what is resistant to one's endeavours—is possible ontologically only by reason of the disclosedness of the world' (SuZ, §43b, 210). To c o m e u p against resistance presupposes

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that Dasein has always already disclosed a world wherein resistance can be experienced. Heidegger herewith resists the return to the phenomen o n of life, which goes h a n d in h a n d with the refusal to r e t u r n to the p h e n o m e n o n of resistance. Yet, as we shall show, the peculiarity of the analysis is that SuZ fails to resist the p h e n o m e n o n of resistance, and thus always already avoids its own resistance despite itself. FROM RESISTANCE T O AVOIDANCE §58. The Forestructure of Understanding SuZ resists not only what its critique of the tradition of philosophy makes possible, i.e., the r e t u r n to Dasein's materiality, b u t additionally that which it cannot avoid—which is the materiality of the world. Thus, SuZ can resist only what it has previously avoided. This anterior avoidance is strikingly exemplified in SuZ's analysis of the everyday. T h e everyday discloses a genuine access (Zugangsweise) to knowing which is anterior to both thought and sensation. T h e paradigm of Dasein's everyday is the world of work (Werkwelt). T h e world '"wherein a factical Dasein as such can be said to 'live'" (SuZ, §14, 65) is not the world of puissance or tiredness, as Levinas has pointed out (cf. EE), nor, as Lowith has shown, the world of sleep (cf. Lowith 1969, 43). Rather, it is r e d u c e d to a world that is defined t h r o u g h modals of work. 56 For even the m o m e n t when Dasein does not work is a deficient m o d e of work, such as "leaving u n d o n e , neglecting, renouncing, taking a rest" (SuZ, §12, 57). By means of this practical description of Dasein's everyday, a non-prepositional disclosure of the world, which coincides with the disclosure of Dasein, is revealed. 57 "It is precisely non-theoretical c o m p o r t m e n t which uncovers not only the world b u t also Dasein itself' (GA 20, §21, 227). Dasein's "everyday . . . 'dealings' in the world" (SuZ, §15, 66) exhibit the essential entanglement of Dasein and its world. T h e world is not external to Dasein; it is not an object that needs to be represented. It is Dasein's s u r r o u n d i n g (Umwelt), which is disclosed t h r o u g h Dasein's preoccupation with tools, which are ready-to-hand, immediately is given within a meaningful context. T h e everyday reveals a radically new form of 'knowing' that is based o n Dasein's "pre-predicative 'prepositions' of praxis" (Kisiel 1985, 204), for "the kind of dealing which is closest to us is . . . not a bare perceptual cognition, b u t rather that kind of concern which manipulates things and puts them to use;

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and this has its own kind of 'knowledge'" (SuZ, §15, 67). T h e significance of this knowing is not that it is based on praxis,™ but that it discloses Being-in-the-world, which is anterior to both thought and practice. 59 T h e everyday discloses a genuine access to knowing that is not thought or practice, nor sensation or intuition, b u t the a priori perfect structure of Being-in-the-world. T h e r e is an understanding that is not based on intuition or Aussage, b u t on Dasein's anterior closeness to the world. 60 In contrast to Descartes, Heidegger therefore argues that knowing (Erkennen) does not have "the character of depriving the world of its worldhood in a definite way" (SuZ, §14, 65), but Dasein's knowing a n d 'look' (which Heidegger calls circumspection) are structured by its worldliness. "In dealing with what is environmentally ready-to-hand by interpreting it circumspectively, we 'see' it as a table, a door, a carriage, or a bridge; but what we have thus interpreted n e e d not necessarily be also taken apart by making an assertion which definitely characterizes it. Any m e r e pre-predicative seeing of the ready-to-hand is, in itself, something which already understands and interprets" (SuZ, §32, 149). 'Knowing' is not primordially founded on the m o d e l of perception (Wahrnehmung) —we d o not grasp beings that are posited in front of us, rather, we have an interpretative understanding (auslegendes Verstehen) that precedes intuition and predication. 6 1 "An interpretation is never a presuppositionless a p p r e h e n d i n g of something presented to us" (SuZ, §32, 150), as Husserl contends, for any j u d g m e n t , predication, or assertion maintains itself on the basis of a prior understanding of Being-in-the-world. 62 To emphasize this, Heidegger distinguishes between the 'apophantic as', which is the 'as' of predication (Aussage), a n d the ' h e r m e neutic as', which is based on a "circumspective interpretation" (SuZ, §33, 158). T h e latter is pre-predicative, insofar as it refers to a 'sight' that moves a r o u n d and evades rather than pointing to an object. It describes Dasein's m-explicit awareness of its environment. This ' h e r m e neutic as' both precedes and exceeds any explicit appropriation. It does not refer to a pre-linguistic moment, 6 3 rather, to an inexplicit, yet still interpretative, awareness that accompanies every predication. 6 4 §59. A Circumventive Anteriority of Knowing T h e p r o b l e m with this anterior excess of 'knowing' is that it is a form of circumvention. Something needs to be circumvented (um-gangen) so

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that o u r everyday circumspective (um-sichtigen) dealing (Um-gang) with tools is possible. Yet, it has to precede the m o m e n t of circumvention, for there is nothing to circumvent if the 'hermeneutic as' is always already anterior to that which it is m e a n t to avoid. T h a t is to say, if the 'hermeneutic as' is anterior to any explicit appropriation (i.e., the 'apophantic as'), then it cannot avoidexplicitness, since this is possible only if explicitness precedes the 'hermeneutic as'. Avoidance is possible only on the basis of the assumption that there is something that can be avoided. T o p u t it into Husserlian language: if the ' h e r m e neutic as' is a form of circumvention, then it is not constituting b u t constituted and thus derived. What needs to be questioned is whether these clear distinctions can b e drawn, for from the outset the line of demarcation between the constituting and the constituted appears to be blurred. 6 5 This problem comes to light if we look m o r e closely at the key terms Heidegger employs to describe this 'knowing': Most of t h e m have the prefix Urn, such as Um-gang, Um-welt (environment), Um-zu ( i n o r d e r - t o ) , Um-willen (for-the-sake-of), and um-sichtig. As Magda King observes: "It is n o t by accident that each of these key words begins with Um. . . . It indicates the . . . round-aboutness, nearness, in the sense of immediate surroundings." 6 6 Um additionally can d e n o t e a "vagueness" and "evasiveness." This is particularly visible in the ambiguity of the t e r m Umgang. Umgang means b o t h "dealing" and "handling," but it also means "avoidance," "circumvention," "bypassing," a n d "evasion" (the literal translation of Umgang is "to go a r o u n d " ) . These are the characteristics of pre-predicative 'knowledge' (i.e., its m-explicitness and m-conspiciousness), which is r o o t e d in a kind of oversight of that which is transparent in its familiar m^visibility.67 T h e prefix in- intimates the m o m e n t of avoidance, for it describes the circumvention of the actual visibility of objects. The 'hermeneutic as' thus points to a 'knowing' that inhibits visibility in o r d e r to disclose Beingin-the-world as such. §60. The World of Work as a Form of Circumvention T h e first instance in which this comes to light is the description of Dasein's everyday dealings with tools. These tools are not objects in the traditional sense of the word Gegen-stande; objects that stand o p p o s e d to Dasein which are what Heidegger calls present-at-hand (vor-handeri) .68 Rather, these tools are utensils and e q u i p m e n t that are ready-to-hand (zu-handen). T h e paradigm in SuZ is the h a m m e r . I

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might be using a h a m m e r in-order-to h a m m e r a nail into the wall; however, my attention is not with the h a m m e r , b u t with the picture I wish to hang u p . O u r attention is thus not primordially with the tools b u t with the production of a work. 69 Dasein does not grasp or have any theoretical awareness of the tools. Rather it 'knows' t h e m by no£ primordially dwelling with them. Thus, our circumspective dealing (Umgang) with e q u i p m e n t reveals an understanding that is inexplicit and can be characterized only in terms of its concernful circumvention. 7 0 It belongs to the very nature of a piece of e q u i p m e n t that it points beyond itself to other equipment. Hence, a piece of e q u i p m e n t is never disclosed in isolation.71 It is always already in relation to other equipment; the relation of the i n o r d e r - t o structure is thus one of assignment. 72 The h a m m e r , for example, is not grasped thematically; rather, the m o r e we are engaged in a n d busy with our projects, the less the e q u i p m e n t is "noticed." 73 As Zeug the e q u i p m e n t is n o t theoretically grasped, but is disclosed t h r o u g h its Bewandtnis. Bewandtnis means both "relevance" 74 a n d "letting be" (bewenden lassen).75 T h e m o r e the tools are relevant for our projects, the m o r e we are busy in the world a n d the less we pay explicit attention to the utensils, the m o r e primordially we relate to them, insofar as we "let t h e m be." 76 The relevance (Bewandtnis) of utensils is thus grasped in their inexplicitness and withdrawal, as they point beyond themselves and remain in the background: "The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-toh a n d is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in order to be ready-to-hand quite authentically" (SuZ, §15, 69, emphasis a d d e d ) . What characterizes the ready-to-hand is that it, "as it were, withdrazvs." Rather than dwelling with the tools, Dasein is oriented toward its projects. "That with which o u r everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. O n the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work— that which is to be p r o d u c e d at the time" (SuZ, § 15, 69-70). Knowing is thus based on a form of circumvention, r e n d e r i n g the visibility of objects invisible. 77 §61. A 'Circumvention'Devoid

of Teleology

We might be tempted to equate this kind of knowing with the Aristotelian conception of T£XVT|, which describes a dispositional knowing which that is revealed t h r o u g h work (epyov).78 For Aristotle, this disposition and skill has n o significance independently of work. le^vr) and epyov—which is nothing but eiSog— need to b e thought of

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together. Figal writes that, for Aristotle, "knowing is Teftvrj as knowing the eiSog of a work which is to be p r o d u c e d and thus Aristotle is able to identify T£XVr| with EiSog' (Figal 1988, 80). In contrast to Aristotle, Heidegger posits that "T£XVT| [is] a form of knowing" (ibid.), which has its significance independendy of any zeXoq and thus dSog.79 T h e everyday reveals that Dasein's attention and fundamental orientation is not toward projects, rather, that the world is disclosed as possibility. For even the final project should n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a telos, b u t is itself a form of Zeug that is to say, it is circumvented yet again. While utensils are characterized in terms of their in-order-to structure, the work or p r o d u c t has no finality either, since it is a towards-which (Wozu): "The work to be produced, as the 'towards which 'of such things as the h a m m e r , the plane, and the needle, likewise has the kind of Being that belongs to equipment. The shoe which is to be p r o d u c e d is for wearing (footgear)" (SuZ, §15, 70). Work not only refers to the materials that are used, but it is "also . . . an assignment to the person who is to use it or wear it.80 The work is cut to his figure; he 'is' there along with it as the work emerges" (SuZ, §15, 70-71). As Figal observes, these t h r e e moments, i.e., form, material, and user, "are easily recognised in Aristode's analysis of'causes' (aixia), that is eiSog, vXr], a n d xeXoq (Met.-1013a24ff)" (Figal 1988, 82). T h e work, however, is n o t the telos of the assignment (Verwiesenheit). Rather, the aim is to grasp the assignment as assignment. Figal claims that, while "according to Aristode's conception production has its aim in its actuality, . . . for Heidegger it is a matter of dissolving the actuality of the work back into the equipm e n t a l possibility." 81 E q u i p m e n t should n o t be u n d e r s t o o d in terms of its telos— the knowing that the everyday reveals is not g r o u n d e d in the final work but in the structure of possibility. Thus, the structure of circumvention and assignment should not be u n d e r s t o o d teleologically. That is, the 'knowing' is not focused o n the final work or user; r a t h e r , the significance of the 'knowing' is that it remains circumventive, for any possible telos is circumvented again. 82 Meaning a n d significance are thus not reducible to a telos, n o r to the relation of assertions or predicative judgments, but have their ontological origin in assignments. 83 §62. A Referring without an Indicating T h e peculiarity of the a r g u m e n t is thus that circumventive knowing is m e a n t to precede any form of actuality, be it the explicitness of a tool

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or the final goal. Before a tool is a 'thing,' before it is sensed, intuited, or thematized, it is withdrawing. Whenever we see with this kind of sight, we already do so understandingly and interpretatively. In the mere encountering of something, it is understood in terms of a totality of involvements; and such seeing hides in itself the explicitness of the assignmentrelations (of the 'in-order-to') which belong to that totality. That which is understood gets Articulated when the entity to be understood is brought close interpretatively by taking as our clue the 'something as something'; and this Articulation lies before our making any thematic assertion about it. In such an assertion the 'as' does not turn u p for the first time; it just gets expressed for the first time, and this is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressible. (SuZ, §32, 149) T h e possibility of isolating an object from its environment and identifying it as an object is based on a forestructure of our understanding that allows us to make this as' explicit. Thus, we b e c o m e aware of the particular tool, and its materiality, only after the assignment structure has b e e n disclosed. Indeed, materiality is and can b e only by virtue of this assignment structure. This leads Heidegger to the paradoxical claim that the structure of assignment precedes the m o m e n t of actuality, materiality, and explicitness. This paradox is expressed in the following enigmatic sentences: "Every reference is a relation, b u t not every relation is a reference. Every 'indication' is a reference, but not every referring is an indicating. This implies at the same time that every 'indication' is a relation, b u t not every relation is an indicating" (SuZ, §17, 77). While an assertion explicitly indicates the relation between two moments, in everyday concernful circumspection with tools the relational m o m e n t is inexplicit. For the assignment is based on the inexpressive and inconspicuous nature of equipment. Thus, the assignment is n o t necessarily an indication; i.e., not every indicating is a reference. "This implies at the same time that every 'indication' is a relation, b u t not every relation is an indicating," for the significance of e q u i p m e n t lies in the fact that it does not draw our attention to it. It does not indicate; rather, it, "as it were, withdraws."84 In its withdrawal it refers, however, to the totality of assignments. It does not refer to something new but to something that is constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection: "The context of

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e q u i p m e n t is lit u p , not as something never seen before, b u t as a totality constantly sighted beforehand in circumspection. With this totality, however, the world announces itself (SuZ, §16, 75). T h e whole of the world, the structure of #//possibilities, is anterior to and exceeds any particular e n c o u n t e r of tools. This is what Heidegger calls the "hermeneutical as", which refers to the pre-predicative interpretative understanding of factical Dasein as Being-in-the-world. "Higher than actuality stands possibility' (SuZ, §7, 38). What is anterior to the particularity of an object (the 'apophantic as') is the structure of assignm e n t (the 'hermeneutic as'). We seem to have encountered a fundamental p r o b l e m . It is by virtue of invisibility or withdrawal that the structure of assignment is disclosed. However, the aim is to show that the structure of assignment is p r i o r to the actuality of tools. If this is the case, then n o tools n e e d to withdraw, for the assignment structure is prior to any withdrawal. I n d e e d , it appears that we should not mistakenly construe the circumventive structure of assignment in terms of a temporal o r d e r that posits a tool y b ^ initiating the structure of assignment. That is to say, it is not as if we first encounter a tool which then assigns Dasein to other tools a n d projects. Rather, and this is the peculiarity of the argument, Dasein is always already oriented toward other projects and hence possibilities, before any such encounter is possible. T h e r e is a referring that precedes any indicating (i.e., sign or signals). T h e paradox, however, is that this a priori perfect structure of assignment is disclosed only t h r o u g h a sign, despite itself. §63. The Impossibility of Avoiding the Moment of Avoidance The anterior structure of possibilities is disclosed through the assignm e n t structure of signs. O n the ontological level a sign should not be confused with a Zeug.H5 While tools point to their use-ability, the assignment of signals or signs points to something that is use-able. That is to say, the assignment structure of tools is rooted in the assignment structure of signals. As Heidegger argues in the Prolegomena: "The sign-relation is not, say, the specific reference which constituted the serviceability of a sign; rather, the serviceability is itself determined by the indicating" (GA 20, §23, 283). A sign does not purely refer to other equipment, b u t "establishing a sign can, above all, reveal" (SuZ, §17, 80). A sign allows the in-order-to structure of equipment to appear: "The sign is not only ready-to-hand with other equipment, but in its readiness-to-

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hand the environment becomes in each case explicitiy accessible for circumspection. A sign is something ontically ready-to-hand, which functions both as this definite equipment and as something indicative of [ was. . . anzeigt] the ontological structure of readiness-to-hand, of referential totalities, and ofworldhood' (SuZ, §17, 82). In moving away from the assignment structure of tools to the assignment structure of signs, the worldhood of the world (i.e., the ontological structure of assignments) is disclosed. T h e assignment structure of signs discloses that possibility, or the structure of assignments, "stands higher than actuality." In this m a n n e r , however, Heidegger appears to affirm, after all, that "every relation is an indicating." Although this assignment structure is n o longer r o o t e d in the circumvention of tools, it is still based o n the m o d e l of circumvention. What is circumvented is the materiality of the sign. F u r t h e r m o r e , the significance of the sign is attributable to the p h e n o m e n o n of oversight As with tools, the significance of the sign lies in its invisibility: The sign is not authentically 'grasped' if we just stare at it and identify it as an indicator-Thing which occurs. Even if we turn our glance in the direction which the arrow indicates, and look at something present-at-hand in the region indicated, even then the sign is not authentically encountered. Such a sign addresses itself to the circumspection of our concernful dealings, and it does so in such a way that the circumspection which goes along with it, following where it points, brings into an explicit 'survey' whatever aroundness the environment may have at the time. This circumspective survey does not grasp the ready-to-hand; what it achieves is rather an orientation within our environment. (SuZ, §17, 79) Thus, even on the ontological level we are dealing with the p h e n o m e n o n of circumvention. This time, however, it is not described in terms of the p h e n o m e n o n of Umsicht, b u t of oversight (Ubersicht). Ubersicht means "bringing into view," "survey," "overall view," and literally "oversight." Ontologically, what is overseen is the everyday world of tools, which brings into overall view the ontological structure of Being-in-the-world: "Circumspection . . . is subordinate to the guidance of a m o r e or less explicit survey of the equipmental totality of the c u r r e n t equipment-world and of the public environment which belongs to it. . . . What is essential to it [this survey] is that one should have a primary understanding of the totality of involvements within

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which factical concern always takes its start" (SuZ, §69b, 359). T h e ontic Umsicht is thus p r e c e d e d by and founded u p o n an ontological Ubersicht, which discloses the referential totality of the whole of the world by letting the world of tools be. T h e sign "is not authentically encountered," b u t it brings into an explicit survey (Ubersicht) the 'aroundness' of the environment, which alfowsforDasems factical concern. What Dasein renders invisible this time is not the tool but the materiality of the sign, and with it the ontic world as such. §64. The Return, to Spatiality This presentation is analogous to the description of Dasein's spatiality, which we have described above. 86 We have shown that the r e t u r n to spatiality is resisted by referring to the a priori perfect structure of Being-in-the-world. We now see that this a r g u m e n t is repeated, if we recall that Dasein's spatiality was defined in terms of its de-severance a n d directionality. De-severance is here analogous to the Zeug struct u r e . For the assignment structure of tools reveals that that which is closest to Dasein is, physically speaking, often furthest away. What is closest to us is first and foremost circumvented—indeed, it "as it were withdraws." T h e p h e n o m e n o n of directionality, in turn, is analogous to the assignment structure of signs. For "this circumspective survey [oversight is a better translation in this context] does not grasp the ready-to-hand; what it achieves is rather an orientation within o u r environment." 8 7 T h e ontological significance of assignment (which is nothing but the worldhood of the world) is disclosed t h r o u g h the p h e n o m e n o n of orientation. Just as Dasein's directionality discloses the a priori perfect structure of Being-in-the-world, the assignment structure of signs discloses the worldhood of the world. F u r t h e r m o r e , Heidegger resists the r e t u r n to spatiality. Heidegger admits that "the sign addresses itself to a Being-in-the-world which is specifically 'spatial.'"S8 But by avoiding the materiality of the sign, Heidegger simultaneously resists the r e t u r n to the p h e n o m e n o n of spatiality. This time, however, the disclosure of this a priori perfect structure is based o n the model not of resistance but of avoidance, for it is m a d e possible only by an anterior 'freeing' from spatiality. §65. The Avoidance of Spatiality We h e r e touch u p o n the ontological significance of the t e r m Bewandtnis, for ontologically there is a letting be (bewenden lassen) that allows

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for the use-ability (or its deficient m o d e ) of e q u i p m e n t (to be): "If letting something be involved is u n d e r s t o o d ontologically, what is then pertinent is the freeing of everything ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand, n o matter whether, taken ontically, it is involved thereby, or whether it is rather an entity of precisely such a sort that ontically it is not involved thereby" (SuZ, §18, 85). This "previous freeing' refers to the ontological structure of assignment. 89 O n c e again something needs to be freed. T h e ontological structure of assignment frees us from any particular assertion and assignment structure of tools, a n d from the materiality of the physical world. Bewandtnis turns our attention away from the particular project or a sensible visibility a n d assigns Dasein to the worldhood of the world as such. 90 Dasein 'frees' (freigeben) the 'leeway' (Spielraum; cf. SuZ, §23, 107) and indeed spatiality and region (Gegend) within which beings can appear: Freeing something and letting it be involved, is accomplished by way of referring or assigning oneself circumspectively, and this in turn is based upon one's previously understanding significance. We have now shown that circumspective Being-in-theworld is spatial. And only because Dasein is spatial in the way of de-severance and directionality can what is ready-to-hand withinthe-world be encountered in its spatiality. To free a totality of involvements is, equiprimordially, to let something be involved at a region, and to do so by de-severing and giving directionality; this amounts to freeing the spatial belonging-somewhere of the ready-to-hand. In that significance with which Dasein (as concernful Being-in) is familiar, lies the essential co-disclosedness of space. (SuZ, §24, 110, emphasis added) What is disclosed is a certain leeway that makes possible the encounter of entities within the world. This leeway, however, is grasped only insofar as it is circumvented: "But neither the region previously discove r e d n o r in general the c u r r e n t spatiality is explicitly in view. In itself it is present for circumspection in the inconspicuousness of those ready-to-hand things in which that circumspection is concernfully absorbed" (SuZ, §24, 111). T h e spatiality is overseen.91 "[I]t is not explicitly in view," so that the a priori structure of the world is disclosed, for "spatiality is not discoverable at all except o n the basis of the world" (SuZ, §24, 113). Heidegger wishes to make two moves

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simultaneously. Firstly, his aim is to show, contrary to Descartes, that "space itself cannot be conceived as the kind of Being which belongs to a res extensa (SuZ, §24, 112), for spatiality is transitive and relational to Dasein. Secondly, Heidegger wishes to deny that this leads h i m to subjectivize space. "[N]or does the Being of space have the kind of Being which belongs to Dasein" (SuZ, §24,112), for space can be found not in the subject b u t 'in' the world alone. This account can be sustained, however, only by avoiding the significance of spatiality a n d turning it to a modus of the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. What precedes any disclosure of e q u i p m e n t is the pre-disclosed totality of involvements. However, Dasein first needs to let things be'm order to disclose this ontological structure of assignment. While ontically, Dasein lets tools be—by letting them, as it were, withdraw— ontologically, the assignment structure of signs lets the whole ontic world be —also by letting it, as it were, withdraw. 92 Ontologically, 'letting-be' refers to everything ready-to-hand as ready-to-hand, that is, the ontic world as such. It makes the encounterability of all beings possible. Even on the ontological level, Heidegger fails to avoid the structure of circumvention and, thus, does not seem to succeed in articulating a structure of possibility that is anterior to actuality. For this structure is disclosed by virtue of circumventing the materiality of the sign, which allows for the circumvention of the 'world'. We can thus conclude that, even o n the ontological level, the hierarchical description—"higher than actuality stands possibility" (SuZ, §7, 38)—cannot be upheld, for the invisibility of the actuality of the sign is always already presupposed. §66. A Descriptive Apology O u r analysis so far has shed a peculiar light o n Heidegger's description. We have shown that o n both the ontic and ontological level Heidegger not only resists a r e t u r n to the actual world, but avoids that to which he has always already returned. T h r o u g h a m e t h o d of circumvention and oversight, Heidegger passes over the actual material world. It might be tempting to argue that this structure of circumvention reflects the structure of the book. It is because Dasein is always already fallen that Dasein by definition needs to return. T h e disclosure of the ontological structure is possible only by turning away from (i.e., circumventing) Dasein's fallenness and allowing for the return to Dasein's authentic c o m p o r t m e n t to the world.

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Dasein's everyday is described in terms of its fallenness: Dasein is absorbed (Aufgehen in der Welt),93 fascinated and enthralled {benommeri)94 by the world, or busy in the world. 95 This turning toward and being absorbed by the world is, however, based o n the fact that Dasein has always already t u r n e d axoay from authenticity. This structure of circumvention Heidegger calls fleeing. 96 It is because Dasein is first and foremost fleeing and lost in the everyday that a r e t u r n to authenticity is necessary. O n the descriptive level we can thus u n d e r s t a n d why it appears that it is necessary to first let the world of the everyday withdraw, as it were, so that the structure of assignments can be disclosed. However, even this reading does not help us to overcome the p r o b l e m of avoidance. For this authentic m o m e n t is described only in terms of a not: authentic Dasein is not-yet (c£ SuZ, §48), is the possibility of impossibility,97 is not-at-home, no-thing, and no-where. 98 Authenticity is nothing b u t a modification of inauthenticity. As T u g e n d h a t rightly points out, Heidegger discloses the worldhood of the world only dialectically." Thus we cannot uphold the claim that authenticity or the structure of possibility is anteriorto inauthenticity, for it is only by virtue of being in contradistinction to in-authenticity. T h e p r o b l e m is that this dialectical structure remains unacknowledged. T h e analysis has shown how SuZ falls victim to its facticity. Indeed, in §63 Heidegger concedes that the essential interpretation has b e e n governed by and has received its guidance from an idea of existence that has b e e n presupposed (cf. SuZ, §63, 313). T h e aim is to keep the ontic and ontological, the apophantic as and the hermeneutic as, inauthenticity and authenticity, the present-at-hand and the ready-to-hand separate and distinct. It has emerged, however, that the interpretation needs to keep t h e m in close touch with one another (cf. SuZ, §59,295). T h e r e is n o strict division or gulf that separates different spheres, b u t each m o m e n t implicates the other. Heidegger asserts that he discloses a "genuine access to knowing" without acknowledging that it is p r e c e d e d by a general facticity that it cannot avoid. Heidegger thus fails to acknowledge that which he avoids. This should not surprise us, for what is avoided is a m o m e n t that SuZ always wishes to resist: the r e t u r n to a sensible visibility and materiality. Indeed, it appears that the avoidance of the materiality of the world goes h a n d in h a n d with the resistance to r e t u r n i n g to an embodied Dasein. For the aim is to r e t u r n to one theme only: the ontologicoexistential structure of the world.

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§67. The Refusal to Return to Dasein 's Hands Not only does Dasein as Being-in-the-world "leap over" the phenomen o n of the world, which is characterized in terms of its spatiality, materiality, and sensibility, but it even evades the return to an embodied Dasein itself. As we have shown at the beginning of the chapter, disclosure is possible only because Dasein has an understanding of 'something called' the world. Tools, work, users, and signs are disclosed as assignment and thus have n o telos. There is, however, a finality or destination to the structure of relevance (Bewandtnis) that is Dasein itself. Dasein has no access to the world of utensils unless something like a world has already announced itself. Every significance leads us back to Dasein. The ready-to-handedness of tools, the meaning of signs —all these relationships of 'in-order-to', 'toward-which', and 'for-the-sake-ofwhich' — are b o u n d u p with one another as a primordial meaningful™ totality that signifies Dasein as Being-in-the-world. 101 Disclosure is always already linked to a toward-which: "This primary 'toward-which' is not just another 'toward-this' as something in which an involvement is possible. T h e primary 'toward-which' is a 'for-the-sake-of-which'. But the 'forthe-sake-of' always pertains to the Being of Dasein, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an issue" (SuZ, §18, 84). T h e world is for the sake of Dasein. This world we are referring to is the ontologicoexistential concept of the world, which is not the totality of things. Indeed, it cannot be described in terms of a whatbut only adverbially in terms of a how, or the manner in which Dasein discloses the world. Although Dasein is the final relevance of destination (Bewandtnis), it seems curiously nonmaterial insofar as its essential constitution is concerned. Heidegger contends that the world of tools is ready-toh a n d only if it is in some sense accessible to Dasein. 102 That is to say, Dasein can encounter tools circumspectively only if they are already meaningful to Dasein, i.e., if they are disclose-able in Dasein's world. "In a symptom or a warning-signal, what is coming' 'indicates itself,' but not in the sense of something merely occurring, which comes as an addition to what is already present-at-hand; 'what is coming' is the sort of thing which we are ready for, or which we 'weren't ready for' if we have b e e n attending to something else. . . . Signs always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvem e n t there is with something" (SuZ, § 17, 80). What Heidegger is referring to is a certain preparedness of Dasein. A sign indicates wherein one

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lives and thus points to the referential totality within which things can be. It is only because Dasein is open toward beings that the disclosure of beings is possible. Dasein discloses the possibility and Frei-gabe of the leeway (Spielraum) within which beings can appear. It is tempting to r e a d this preparedness of Dasein as relying on the fact that Dasein has two hands. For it seems that the structure of the ready-to-hand is m a d e possible by a hand that can manipulate the world. And the world is manipulatable, 'to h a n d ' (zurHand; SuZ, §22, 102) only for a Dasein that has hands. Indeed, the world is ready not only to-a-hand, b u t often specifically to two hands, a left and right one. 1 0 3 As Heidegger briefly argues in SuZ: "Thus things which are ready-to-hand and used for the body—like gloves, for example, which are to move with the hands—must be given directionality towards right a n d left" (SuZ, §23, 108). Although other tools d o not n e e d to refer to a specific hand, they still refer to a hand: "A craftsman's tools, however, which are held in the h a n d and are moved with it, do not share the h a n d ' s specifically 'manual' movements. So although hammers are handled just as m u c h with the hand as gloves are, there are n o right- or left-handed h a m m e r s " (SuZ, §23,108). T h e world is relevant (hat Bewandtnis) only for a being that can choose to use and manipulate tools. Thus, without a hand, the world has n o relevance; it is neither ready-to-hand nor present-at-hand, for this very distinction is possible only by virtue of (at least) a hand. Didier Franck suggests this reading by drawing on Heidegger's later text, Was heisst Denken P104 In this text Heidegger posits that only h u m a n Dasein has a world and can speak. H e also claims that h u m a n Dasein is distinct from beings of another character than its own, insofar as it has hands and, thus, has a world that it can form and manipulate.105 "The hand has its own relevance. Normally, the hand is regarded as belonging to our bodily organism. However, the hand's essence can never b e defined or explained as a prehensile bodily organ. For example, the ape has a prehensile organ b u t not a hand. T h e h a n d is infinitely different, that is, separated by an essential abyss, from all prehensile organs: paws, claws, tentacles. Only a being who speaks, i.e., thinks, can have a hand and t h r o u g h manipulation p r o d u c e works by h a n d " (WhD, 5 1 , my translation). Dasein's distinctiveness lies in the fact that it can speak and use its hands. T h e hands, in turn, are distinct from tools in that they are never present-at-hand, n o r ready-to-hand, but they make that very distinction possible.

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However, SuZ refuses to refer the relevance {Bewandtnis) back to Dasein's hands. In a subclause Heidegger briefly admits that he has bracketed Dasein's corporeality: "This 'bodily nature' hides a whole problematic of its own, though we shall not treat it here"W6 As with the phen o m e n o n of touch a n d spatiality, Heidegger contends that the Bewandtnis discloses Dasein's Being-in-the-world as such, which precedes any corporeal presence, even that of a hand. Thus the primordial existential significance of the hand is refused, although it is presupposed.

CONCLUSION SuZ pretends to take Husserl's maxim "Back to the things themselves" seriously. T h e aim is "to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself This is the formal m e a n i n g of that b r a n c h of research which calls itself ' p h e n o m e n o l ogy'. But here we are expressing nothing else than the maxim . . . : 'To the things themselves!"' (SuZ, §7C, 34). T h a t "which shows itself from itself," however, does not lead us back to the material world, n o r an e m b o d i e d Dasein, but, instead, to a world and Dasein which is no^ m g r o n c r e t e ; rather it is the referential totality which makes possible the structure of the assignment of tools. Fundamental ontology should r e t u r n us to the fundamental beginning that is Dasein's existential analytic; a beginning that is not only m o r e radical than b u t anterior to Husserl's 'beginning of all beginnings'. Yet, as we have shown throughout, Heidegger avoids a n d resists revealing the true beginning, which is an unacknowledged materiality and life. That which shows itself from itself is always already a m o m e n t of circumvention and oversight of that which actually shows itself. At both the ontic and the ontological levels, the "'genuine' access of knowing" can be guaranteed only by an oversight of that which always already shows itself.107 Heidegger safeguards Husserl's motto — "Back to the things themselves" — only by circumventing its actual return. Heidegger fails to acknowledge that fundamental ontology falls victim to its facticity.108 Heidegger's work is analogous to Husserl's in that it surrenders to a life that lies beyond Dasein's existential analytic. This s u r r e n d e r i n g is, however, played out behind Heidegger's back.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Final Loss of the World

INTRODUCTION T H E P R E V I O U S C H A P T E R has shown that Heidegger's account of Beingin-the-world entails a constant struggle to resist that which it c a n n o t avoid. We have, however, failed to consider why there is this tension of avoidance-resistance at work in SuZ. Indeed, Dasein's dis-location of subjectivity has remained curiously invisible. Being-in-the-world, like Husserl's p u r e Ego, is a site that is devoid of space and materiality. Although a dislocation does take place, the p h e n o m e n o n of the world is n o t rescued. This chapter explores how Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world dislocates subjectivity a n d why, for SuZ, this dislocation is possible only in preventing a r e t u r n to an embodied Dasein.

FROM 'IMMANENT TRANSCENDENCE' T O 'TRANSCENDENT IMMANENCE' §68. An Ambiguous

Inversion

SuZ appears to reverse Husserl's doctrine of i m m a n e n t transcendence. Husserl's transcendental reduction leads us back to a topology of self-sufficiency (immanence) — a site where the subject is n o longer defined in terms of its " a b a n d o n m e n t to the world [Welthingabe]" or transcendence. 1 SuZ, meanwhile, suggests a topology of dependence (Angetoiesenheit)2 — Dasein as Being-in-the-world. It is important, first of all, to u n d e r s t a n d the s t r u c t u r e of this inversion. After all, o n e of Heidegger's premises is that, like Husserl, he wishes to u p h o l d Dasein's distinctiveness from the world of things (Dingwelt): "We agree that beings in the sense of what you [i.e., Husserl] call 'world' can n o t be explained in their transcendental constitution by a r e t u r n

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to a being of the same m o d e of Being. . . . It has to be shown that Dasein's m o d e of Being is totally different from that of all other beings and that, as the m o d e of Being it is, it precisely contains in itself the possibility of transcendental constitution" {Brief, 601 / 119E). H e r e , Dasein has a transcendental constitutive role which is analogous to that of the p u r e Ego; Dasein discloses a transcendental topology which constitutes the 'world of things'. In this sense, we should argue that the emphasis on Dasein's d e p e n d e n c e o n the world not only reverses Husserl's doctrine, but at the same time radicalizes Husserl's reduction. It shows that his reduction has come to a halt too early and has missed a beginning that is anterior to both what Husserl calls immanence and transcendence. If we restructure the image developed in the previous chapter, we thus appear to end u p with the following construction:

WED Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

H e r e , Dasein's transcendence to the world precedes any form of dualism and, indeed, makes possible the encounter (ability) of beings in the world. Transcendence is prior to, and distinct from, intentionality; it is not a result of intentionality. 3 Thus, Dasein's interlaced structure of Being-in-the-world (fig. 1) is anterior to i m m a n e n c e (fig. 2) and the empirical ontic Dasein that finds itself in the world, be it what Heidegger calls the world of the everyday or Husserl's general thesis of the natural attitude (fig. 3). 4 With this, Heidegger manages to uphold Dasein's constitutive function and dislocates immanence. T h e possibility of performing the reduction has not b e e n annulled. Rather, SuZ discloses that Husserl's bracketing has come to a halt too early. Just as Husserl questions Descartes's starting-point of an ego cogito, Heidegger questions back into the g r o u n d of the p u r e Ego

From 'Immanent Transcendence' to 'Transcendent Immanence' 109

by disclosing that i m m a n e n c e is m a d e possible by Dasein's transcendence. T h e r e is a "primary datum" (SuZ, §12, 53), "a still more primordial p h e n o m e n o n " 5 which is the "unitary p h e n o m e n o n " 6 of Being-inthe-world. At first sight this model of "hierarchization" does not seem quite justified. For Dasein's transcendence is, o n one fundamental level, analogous with Husserl's account of the natural attitude. What characterizes the natural attitude is the subject's "involvement" (Verflechtung), its interlaced structure of being in the world. 7 Indeed, Husserl describes the natural attitude as universal belief (Universalglaube), the m o m e n t when the subject is a b a n d o n e d to the world (Welthingabe) . 8 Literally, Welthingabemeans "given" (geben) "over" (hin) to the world. T h e subject is "donated," "sacrificed," and "offered" (Gabe) to the world. However, whereas the aim for Husserl is to free the subject from this "blind" "surr e n d e r " (Hingabe) and disclose an absolute — that is, self-sufficientfield,9 Heidegger maintains that it is impossible to u n d o this primordial bonding. Bonding is a positive and essential characteristic of Dasein: "This bonding belongs essentially to its Being." 10 In this way, we cannot argue that Heidegger radicalizes the phenomenological reduction, for the fundamental characteristic of the natural attitude, i.e., the belief in the world, can never b e undone. 1 1 T h e world is an existential of Dasein and the possibility of bracketing the world is denied from the outset. §69. The Structure of Reciprocal Dependence These reservations, however, are misplaced. Dasein's d e p e n d e n c e should never be confused with Husserl's notion of Welthingabe, since s u r r e n d e r n o t only describes the natural attitude or Dasein's everyday, b u t is an existential of Dasein—it has an ontological significance. In the everyday, Dasein's s u r r e n d e r to the world comes to light only inauthentically, as Dasein's avoidance of its d e p e n d e n c e . In truth (i.e., [un]concealment), however, Dasein has always already b e e n delive r e d over (ausgeliefert), and cannot be indifferent to its world. That Dasein is given over is expressed in terms of the modes of responsibility and freedom. "As free, Dasein projects itself on the forthe-sake-of-itself, as the whole of the essential possibilities in its capacityto-be . . . only because Dasein as such, as free, applies itself for itself, is Dasein essentially such that in each case it factically stands before the choice of how it should, in a particular case, in the ontic-existentiell sense, apply itself for others and for itself (GA26, §12, 252-53). To be

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m e a n s to be possible. 12 Hence, Dasein is always already responsiblefor its Being. Dasein has to be (hat-zu-sein) ,13 and thus has always m a d e a decision as to how its Being is in each case mine (Jemeinigkeit), i.e., authentically or inauthentically. 14 Dasein, in its c o m p o r t m e n t to Being, has always already s u r r e n d e r e d to, and chosen, how it relates to its Being. As Heidegger notes in the marginalia of his copy of SuZ: To be means "that it has to be; Determination." 1 5 So long as there 'is' Dasein, it has decided its way of Being, for the questionableness of Being is continuously being lived through, regardless of whether we flee from, or face, the question of Being. In the everyday, Dasein's surrender and responsibility come to light only inauthentically. Dasein is disowned 16 (inauthentic) because it has h a n d e d over its primordial responsibility for its world to the 'They'. 17 The everyday thus describes Dasein's recoiltrovci authentic existence. §70. An Authentic

Surrender

Heidegger, like Husserl, believes in the necessity of withdrawing from the everyday world. In Heidegger, this withdrawal is m a d e possible n o t t h r o u g h reflection, as Husserl believes, b u t t h r o u g h a fundamental m o o d , be it anxiety or boredom. 1 8 W h e n Dasein is anxious the world of the everyday slips away; there is n o g r o u n d i n g or hold. Dasein finds itself destitute of everything that was previously meaningful. T h e world is n o longer defined and fixed b u t is disclosed t h r o u g h its no-thingness-as-possibility. T h r o u g h anxiety Dasein is "freed" from the world of things a n d comes to experience the "oppressiveness" of the world qua possibility. " [W] hat oppresses us is not this or that, n o r is it the summation of everything present-at-hand; it is rather the possibility of the ready-to-hand in general, that is to say, it is the world itself."19 The withdrawal from the 'world' should n o t be confused with a r e t u r n to immanence: "Anxiety thus takes away from Dasein the possibility of understanding itself, as it falls, in terms of the 'world' and the way things have been publicly interpreted. Anxiety throws Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about—its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world. Anxiety individualizes Dasein for its ownmost Being-in-the-world, which as something that understands, projects itself essentially upon possibilities. . . . [A]nxiety discloses Dasein as Being-possible." (SuZ, §40, 187-88)

From 'Immanent Transcendence' to 'Transcendent I m m a n e n c e ' 111

In the m o m e n t of anxiety, the world of the everyday ebbs away and what remains in that withdrawal is not a worldless Dasein; rather, anxiety "makes manifest 'how one is.' In anxiety one feels 'uncanny.'"20 What is important here is that Heidegger does not say "/feel uncanny" b u t "one feels uncanny"; the Dasein that feels uncanny is destitute n o t only of the everyday but of its own "dis-owned self." It is n o longer a Dasein d e n n e d in terms of its environment, but is a Dasein that is expressed only as Being-possible. T h e uncanny {unheimlich) describes a m o m e n t when Dasein is n o longer at h o m e (heim) with itself: "Being-in enters into the existential ' m o d e ' of the 'not-at-home. 'Nothing else is m e a n t by o u r talk about 'uncanniness'" (SuZ, §39,189). The authentic m o d e of Being-in discloses that Dasein is primordially no-where, not even at h o m e with itself, and is dis-located of any secure anchorage. This is why the neutral term Dasein has b e e n chosen. It should indicate that Dasein is never some-thing fully present to itself. Dasein's surrender to the world is not expressed in terms of Dasein's embodim e n t but in terms of Being-possible. "This neutrality also indicates that Dasein is neither of the two sexes. But h e r e sexlessness is not the indifference of an empty void, the weak negativity of an indifferent ontic nothing. In its neutrality Dasein is not the indifferent nobody and everybody, but the primordial positivity and potency of the essence"21 Dasein's neutrality is not a privative or negative moment—Dasein is not n o one and everyone — rather, it is the original positivity of being able to choose its Being. Dasein's openness to possibilities precedes the mom e n t of identity, even that of sexual difference. 22 T o emphasize this, in a later essay Heidegger will argue that Dasein is a "lieu-tenant" of this no-thingness. 23 Anxiety brings Dasein face to face with its own nullity, and thus with its ownmost potentiality for Being-in-the-world (cf. SuZ, §50, 251). It confronts Dasein with the uncanniness of the 'there' —i.e., the nothingness of the place —and thus discloses Dasein's ownmost responsibility for Being-in-the-world, a responsibility n o one can take over. T h e fact that Dasein is always already being-possible, and is ahead of itself, toward its ownmost potentiality for Being-in-the-world, shows Dasein's ownmost responsibility. Dasein can flee from this responsibility, b u t it can never u n d o it.24 Thus, Being-in-the world expresses Dasein's dislocation of subjectivity. Before Dasein is a subject (fig. 2), before it has a body and encounters beings in the 'world' (fig. 3), it has s u r r e n d e r e d to the nullity of the world, and thus to Being-possible (fig. 1).

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THE PRIMACY OF T H E WORLD §71. The Indestructible Unity of Being-in4he-World In the first instance it is difficult to understand Dasein's dependence; the world qua possibility cannot precede Dasein, since the world and Dasein exist only by virtue of each other. T h r o u g h o u t SuZ, Heidegger emphasizes that Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world has to be thought of as a whole. The hyphens linking the c o m p o u n d expression are of importance here: "The c o m p o u n d expression 'Being-inthe-world' indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary p h e n o m e n o n . This primary datum must be seen as a whole" (SuZ, §12, 53). Analytically we might isolate the constitutive moments, by analyzing separately Being-in and the world, yet in doing so we should never ignore its necessary indestructible equiprimordial totality. 25 H e r e , Heidegger seems to be oscillating between two claims. O n the o n e hand, he wishes to argue that the world and Dasein are equiprimordial. Any possible dualism is denied by claiming that the world 'is' only by virtue of Dasein, just as Dasein 'is' only by virtue of the world. This is exemplified in the following two statements: "Dasein, then, is n o t Being-in-the-world because and only because it exists factically; o n the contrary, it a m only foas existing, i.e., as Dasein, because its essential constitution lies in Being-in-the-world" (WdG, 139 / 3; 45E). "If n o Dasein exists, no world is ' t h e r e ' either" (SuZ, §69c, 365). O n the o t h e r h a n d , H e i d e g g e r does n o t wish to articulate a dialectical model b u t to affirm the primacy of the world. A dialectical relationship would fail to disclose the superlative structure of Being-inthe-world because it would lead to the collapse of the essential difference between Dasein and its world. The structural interdependency between Dasein and its world cannot be completely mutual if it is to prevent a r e t u r n to subjectivity (immanence). For the primordial difference between Dasein and its world cannot be described in terms of the world's dependency on Dasein—since this would r e p e a t Husserl's description of i m m a n e n t transcendence — but purely in terms of Dasein's s u r r e n d e r to the world. With this a unilateral transcendence a n d d e p e n d e n c e comes to light; we start with Dasein's transcendence toward its world a n d only then r e t u r n from the world to Dasein. Dasein must be orientated toward the world qua possibilities first, before the world's d e p e n d e n c e in turn is possible. If the world were equiprimordially d e p e n d e n t on Dasein, i m m a n e n c e would coincide

T h e Primacy of the World

113

with transcendence, a movement SuZ wishes to disprove. Thus, the structure of b o n d i n g needs to define Dasein before the world's dependency on Dasein comes to light.

1 Dasein

World

§72. The Problem of Space T h o u g h the primacy of the world seems to be emphasized here, it should not b e forgotten that the world is only by virtue of Dasein (cf. SuZ, §69c, 365). T h e world cannot exist outside of, or independently of, Dasein, for this would suggest another form of dualism. To avoid any misunderstanding, Heidegger therefore insists that Dasein's transcendence should n o t be u n d e r s t o o d spatially. As Heidegger elucidates in this 1929 lecture: A preliminary remark on terminology will fix the use of the word "transcendence" and prepare the way for a definition of the phenomenon it signifies. Transcendence means surpassing. What executes the action of surpassing, and remains in the condition of surpassing, is transcendent (transcending). As a happening, surpassing is proper to a being. As a condition, it can be formally construed as a "relationship" that stretches "from" something "to" something. To surpassing, then, belongs that toward which the surpassing occurs, and which is usually but improperly called the "transcendent." And finally, something is always surpassed in surpassing. If we take the above to be the main features of surpassing, it is because we conceive surpassing as a kind of "spatial" happening—which is, after all, what the expression ordinarily means.26 Heidegger fears that this spatial, everyday understanding of transcendence conceals the ontological significance of transcendence because it describes transcendence as a form of surpassing. Indeed, as soon as we wish to visualize transcendence we end u p with the following diagram:

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1 /

Msein

V\ r-

wo ffdofthings v y - - .

. _

_ - -

World

^

This diagram suggests that there is the world of things, and a Dasein which "leaps over" this world. It is exactly such an image that Heidegger wishes to avoid, for it implies that beings in the world make transcendence possible. His aim, conversely, is to show that transcendence is anterior to beings in the world; transcendence should not be understood as a "leap" or "stepping over." We came across the same problem when we described Dasein's dealings in the world. 27 Dasein's circumspection (Umsicht) and dealings (Umgang) presuppose that there is something that has b e e n circumvented (umgangen). Yet, circumvention is m e a n t to make possible and precede that which is circumvented. In the same way, transcendence does not surpass beings. Rather, transcendence is anterior to the possibility of surpassing something, insofar as its surpassing makes possible anything that can 'be' (surpassed). Heidegger therefore insists that we should never understand transcendence literally as a spatial movement of stepping over. Rather it makes possible this spatial and ontic understanding of transcendence: Transcendence can be understood in a second sense, still to be clarified and explained, namely, as signifying what is unique to human Dasein—unique not as one among other possible, and occasionally actualized, types of behavior but as a basic constitutive feature of Dasein that happens prior to all behavior. Of course, since human Dasein exists "spatially," it can, among other things, spatially "surpass" a spatial boundary or gap. Transcendence, however, is the surpassing that makes anything like existence and thereby movement in space possible in the first place. (WdG, 135-36 / 33-34; 35 & 37E) A spatial understanding of transcendence produces a dualism. We would visualize Dasein's transcendence as a "linkage" between two poles—Dasein and the world. However, Dasein does not move to the world; rather Dasein is as being-toward the world. Transcendence characterizes a surpassing that precedes anything that can be surpassed. We can now u n d e r s t a n d why Heidegger constantly refuses and resists the r e t u r n to spatiality, for the aim is to demonstrate the unitary

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115

structure of Being-in-the-world. "We h a d to assure ourselves in the beginning that the structural unity of this p h e n o m e n o n cannot be torn apart" (SuZ, §69, 351). T h e p h e n o m e n o n of space or spatiality threatens this unitary structure, for it suggests a m o m e n t of dispersal. SuZ can thus b e characterized as seeking to prevent the possible dissolution of this fundamental unity. 28 T o protect Dasein from its dispersal, Heidegger needs to show that spatiality is secondary to temporality. § 73. The Return to Temporality Heidegger's d e p a r t u r e from Husserl thereby becomes questionable. As with Husserl, it is the fear of dispersal (which is a m o m e n t of incompleteness for Husserl) that leads Heidegger to affirm a primordial temporality (Zeitlichkeit). Indeed, to avoid the danger of infinite regress, Heidegger, like Husserl, needs to ensure that this temporality is constituting a n d n o t constituted in turn. While Husserl affirms a self temporalizing stream of consciousness that does n o t appear in time, Heidegger claims that Dasein is n o t a thing 'in' time b u t that time temporalizes itself in a n d through Dasein. "Temporality 'is' n o t an entity at all. It is not, b u t it temporalizes itself (SuZ, §65, 328). Dasein is n o t an inter-temporal event b u t 'is' the unfolding of time itself. Furthermore, we find that both Husserl's and Heidegger's descriptions of temporality are haunted by spatial metaphors, yet both deny temporality's spatial basis.29 Whereas Husserl describes an infinite e x t e n d e d living p r e s e n c e , H e i d e g g e r emphasizses Dasein's ek -static temporality, which should not be understood spatially, though the prefix £K signifies "out," "off," "away from the middle," and, indeed, "outside." As does Husserl, Heidegger distinguishes between a vulgar conception of time (Husserl calls it objective time) and Dasein's temporality. A vulgar conception of time is based on an image of the unrolling of an infinite series of now-points, which is analogous to the spatial unfolding of the infinite points of a line. In order to avoid a m o m e n t of dispersal, Dasein's temporality must be protected from such vulgarity; originary temporality must never be interpreted in spatial terms (cf. SuZ, §69, c), 369). Though Heidegger seems to repeat Husserl's presentation structurally, he believes that it is through these essentially non-spatial characteristics of Being-in-the-world that the p h e n o m e n o n world can be salvaged. Originary temporality expresses Dasein's bond with the world, and thus the primacy of the world: "Only through the fact that Being-there is rooted in temporality can we get an insight into the existential possibility of that p h e n o m e n o n which [. . . ] we have designated as its basic state:

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Being-in-the-world" (SuZ, §69,351). We thus encounter the peculiar scenario: that Heidegger can uphold the primacy of the world only by ensuring that the world is devoid of space. 30 Only by returning to a primordial temporality can Heidegger affirm the paradox that the world has primacy, though it 'is' only in relation to Dasein. Originary temporality makes manifest a primordial exteriority that is not extrinsic to Dasein. To understand this argument we need to show how primordial temporality differs from Husserl's account of internal-time-consciousness. §74. The Primacy of the World Devoid of Space In contrast to Husserl's internal-time-consciousness, originary temporality does not arise from intuition, presence, or sensual hyle, b u t from Dasein's understanding and surrender to the world. This explains why touch is secondary to Being-in-the-world. Anterior to intuition, sensation, and presence is an interpretative 'sight' that is always already orientated towards the future (world). Contrary to Husserl's claim, "The 'now' is not p r e g n a n t with the 'not-yet-now', but the Present arises from the future" (SuZ, §81, 427). In this m a n n e r , temporality describes Dasein's transcendence. T h e present (immanence) is secondary to what will be (transcendence). "The primary phenomenon ofprimordial and authentic temporality is thefuture" (SuZ, §65, 329). Temporality permits Heidegger to provide a credible description of Dasein's unilateral movement into the world, for it articulates the manner in which Dasein is "the primordial 'out-side-ofitself in and for itself" (SuZ, §65, 329) without having to s u r r e n d e r to a dualism. The primacy given to the world is demonstrated through the primacy given to the future in Dasein's ecstatic temporality. T h o u g h it has primacy, the future is not extrinsic to Dasein; it is not the unexpected. 3 1 Rather, Dasein 'is' futural insofar it exists finitely. Heidegger calls this finite authentic future Being-toward-death. Death does not refer to Dasein's actual death (for if Dasein were no longer, the existential structure of Being-in-the-world would also perish). Rather, death points to the extreme possibility of the impossibility of existence. It is the ultimate unsurpassable horizon. Being-toward-death brings Dasein face to face with the absolute impossibility of existence, face to face with its own nothingness and thus with the all-embracing potentiality of Being-in-theworld. Being-toward-death is the limit situation which lets beings 'be'. It allows for the encounterability of beings in the world. Being-towarddeath is the foundation of finite existence, the starting-point of all being.

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Unlike in Husserl's work, possibilities are never simply openended, b u t ' a r e ' only in view of an end. Possibilities in a h u m a n sense are constitutively d e t e r m i n e d by finitude. For God there is n o (desirable) possibility that is n o t always already actual, if God wills it. T h e open-endedness of ontic possibilities is thus m a d e d e p e n d e n t o n the radically closed and certain "possibility" of death as the horizon of finite existence. § 75. Death as the Unmasterable Work That Can Never Be Performed That Dasein is futural should not be understood as an anticipation of actuality. T h e future is not a stream of empty intentions (accompanying our perceptions) that anticipate fulfillment; rather, it is a future that can never be actual. This repeats the structure of argumentation we provided in the previous chapter, when we described Dasein's dealings with tools. The significance of the everyday is that it discloses a circumventive form of knowing. Dasein understands tools not as something present-at-hand, b u t in terms of their structure of assignment. Thus, primordial understanding is not based on intuition or sight; rather, understanding is based on a sight that circumvents the material, indeed hyletic, presence of equipment. T h e significance of this circumventive knowing (understanding) is that it, in turn, is not orientated toward any specific xeXog and thus eldog. T h e work (epyov) is not the tehs of the assignment (Verwiesenheit); rather, the aim is to grasp the assignment as assignment, the structure of possibility as such. Similarly, Being-towarddeath, should not be understood as Being-toward-perfection; the future is not a m o m e n t of fulfillment (or completeness) toward which Dasein aspires (as Husserl believes). Dasein does not lack anything for which it seeks fulfillment in the future; death is not the final work. Rather it is the unmasterable 'work' that can neither be performed nor avoided. It grounds the possibility of all Dasein's possible 'works', i.e., ontic actualities. T h e 'end' allows Dasein to grasp the unity (Einheit) of Being-in-the-world. H e r e a clear d e p a r t u r e from Husserl surfaces. For Heidegger shows not only that understanding a n d s u r r e n d e r p r e c e d e imman e n c e (presence) and intuition, b u t also that the future itself is finite.32 This contradicts Husserl's transcendental stream of consciousness that is an infinite, o p e n stream of possibilities. Husserl, in Heidegger's eyes, fails to grasp finitude a n d thus falls prey to an inauthentic (everyday) understanding of possibilities. 33 In the everyday,

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we p u s h the possibility of dying into an infinite future: "it will h a p p e n in the future," "it has nothing to d o with us right now." We find ourselves saying, "on^dies at some time." 34 T h e everyday conceals the certainty of death; or better, in the everyday the 'They' transports this certainty of death into the infinite. "Thus the 'they' covers u p what is peculiar in death's certainty— that it is possible at any moment. Along with the certainty of death goes the indefiniteness of its 'when'" (SuZ, §52, 258). Authentic Dasein cultivates the possibility that death can h a p p e n at any m o m e n t . T h e aim in affirming Dasein's finitude would not b e to hasten our demise, or brood, or sink into a kind of self-pity. Rather, Being-toward-death should be understood as the fore-running a n d anticipation of the ultimate possibility of the impossibility of existence. In fact it makes manifest a m o m e n t of the greatest freedom — the uttermost possibility for beings in the world. Heidegger criticizes Husserl for failing to recognize that it is impossible to perform the transcendental reduction, since the p u r e Ego is always already in the world, and thus takes u p a specific site from which it can "look onto the world." 35 The p r o b l e m is that Husserl fails to recognize Dasein's fundamental responsibility for its Being. H e criticizes Husserl not for failing to grasp that Dasein is primordially spatial, or embodied, or culturally and linguistically defined, b u t for failing to show that the transcendental subject has to be loyal to its ownmost existence: "Resoluteness constitutes the loyalty of existence to its own Self' (SuZ, §75, 391). Rather than seeking r e d e m p t i o n in the infinite, Dasein needs to be loyal to its finitude. The term world thereby gains a peculiar significance; it is neither material, nor external to Dasein, but defines Dasein's finitude and hence Dasein's absolute freedom. §76. An Ambiguous Dis-location of the Unitary Ego Pole In the first instance this emphasis on Dasein's temporality and freed o m suggests a subjectification of the world. Indeed, it intimates a r e t u r n to subjectivity, or what Kant calls "inner sense." 36 Heidegger seems to realize the precariousness of his approach: "If the 'subject' gets conceived ontologically as an existing Dasein whose Being is g r o u n d e d in temporality, then one must say that the world is 'subjective.' But in that case, this 'subjective' world, as o n e that is temporally transcendent, is ' m o r e Objective' than any possible 'Object'" (SuZ, §69c, 366). Being-in-the-world, when u n d e r s t o o d as temporality, does imply subjectivity, b u t it is a subjectivity that exceeds both subjectivity

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and objectivity. It is always already m o r e subjective than any subjectivity and m o r e objective than objectivity, insofar as the 'objective world' manifests itself within Dasein's transcendence. Thus, temporality should never be confused with "conceptions of a 'time' which is 'subjective' or 'Objective,' ' i m m a n e n t ' or 'transcendent'" (SuZ, §65, 326). However, Heidegger implicitly acknowledges that the r e t u r n to temporality inevitably permits a r e t u r n to a subjectivity: "In Kant,. . . while time is indeed 'subjective,' it stands 'beside' the 'I think' and is n o t b o u n d u p with it" (SuZ, §81, 427). T h o u g h Heidegger concedes that h e does r e t u r n to a form of subjectivity, it is a subjectivity that is dis-located from an 'I think'. 37 Temporality defines not the structure of subjectivity, but the condition of the possibility of such a structure. 3 8 Unlike Kant and Husserl, Heidegger posits that Dasein's temporality does not have a unitary starting point (Kant), an Ego-pole, or what Husserl calls the standing-streaming presence, b u t a unity that is n o longer b o u n d u p with presence (a unitary pole). T h e aim is not to find a primal ground, or originary source, but to seek origin in the m o m e n t of diversity: "The p h e n o m e n o n of the equiprimordiality of constitutive items has often been disregarded in ontology, because of a methodologically unrestrained tendency to derive everything and anything from some simple 'primal g r o u n d ' " (SuZ, §28,131). Although Heidegger affirms the unity (Einheit) of temporality, he argues not for a transcendental unum, b u t for a unity that sustains r a t h e r than subsumes the manifold. H e n c e , p r i m o r d i a l temporality c a n n o t be r e d u c e d to a p r i m a l source (i.e., p r e s e n c e ) , b u t is a t e m p o r a l manifold that makes possible the structural unity in the first place. That is to say, the existentials— 'Being-in', 'thrown-projection', 'Being-with-Others', the 'world', the 'call of conscience', and 'Being-toward-death' —all constitute, equiprimordially, Being-in-the-world. This should not be understood dialectically; these moments do not implicate each other, nor d o they presuppose a c o m m o n source, but there is a unity that is coinstantaneous with all these 'moments'. T h e originary unity of temporality is based on an equiprimordial manifold. T h e r e is no subject which unites these moments, n o r is there a primal source (presence) which provides the center for this manifold. Unity is sustained by diversity, of which there is n o center. Heidegger does argue, therefore, with Kant that "time stands besides the 'I think' and is not b o u n d u p with it," for the T think' is just o n e m o d e of this temporality a n d not its primal source. Heidegger

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elucidates this in his Logic lectures: "The T think' is not in time (Kant is completely right about this refusal), but it is time itself. More precisely: it is a m o d e of time, and indeed it is the m o d e of p u r e presentifkation" (GA 2 1 , §36, 405). The T think' is purely a m o d e of temporality: If we take the 'I think' as a mode of pure presentification and presentification as Dasein's mode of Being, as Being-in-theworld, then the Kantian beginning is fundamentally altered. In other words, Cartesianism's dogmatic beginning is avoided from the start. It is not as if first the 'I think' is given as a simple a priori and then time is given which in turn mediates a movement out into the world. Rather the Being of the subject qua Dasein is Being-in-the-world and Dasein's Being-in-the-world is possible only because the fundamental structure of its Being is time itself and, what is more, in this case, is a mode of presentification. (GA 21, §36, 406) Originary temporality prevents a dogmatic Cartesian beginning; the T think' is not an antecedent of temporality allowing the subject to r e a c h out to the world. Rather Dasein is possible only by virtue of the structure of temporality. § 77. The Horizonal Schema O n c e again Heidegger draws o n Kantian terminology to define this structure. Heidegger calls the unity of Dasein's ek-static temporality a horizonal schema. Although Heidegger h e r e alludes to the Kantian concept of schema which h e will develop in the Kantbuch, he departs from Kant on one fundamental level: the schema expresses Dasein's dislocation of subjectivity. For Kant the p e r m a n e n t , self-identical T that accompanies my representation is n o t something in time and thus cannot be represented. It is nothing real a n d can never be perceived. 39 If it could be r e p r e s e n t e d we would fall into an infinite regress, assuming another self that could perceive this self in time. Thus, the T can perceive only what is given in intuition b u t never what is necessary (notwendig) .40 An a priori necessity does n o t appear in space and time, but defines the very subjectivity of the subject, which, however, is only as a correlate of experience (cf. KRV, B277). The permanence of the 'I think' is not a category b u t describes what Kant calls the schema of the category of

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substance. 41 Schemata are "nothing b u t a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules" (KRV, A145 / B184); they make possible appearances in time. This allows Kant to claim —in the first analogy of the transcendental analytic —that all appearances are in time, b u t that time never appears. T i m e is only as a substratum by analogy; it accompanies duration and alteration. T h e substance of appearance (the empirical self) is that which "as the substrate of all change remains ever the same" (KRV, A182 / B225). Its p e r m a n e n c e has as a correlate the p e r m a n e n c e of the T think', which is an abiding correlate not only of alteration but of the p e r m a n e n c e of appearances. T h e schema, for Kant, is a p u r e concept of reason. Heidegger also states that originary temporality should be understood as a horizonal schema. However, this schema is n o t orientated a r o u n d an Ego-pole, an T think' or presence, b u t expresses the equiprimordialstructure of Being-in-the-world, comprising b u t n o t subsuming the three equiprimordial ek-stases of the past (thrownness), present (being-alongside-entities), and the future (projection). Temporality has to be u n d e r s t o o d as a horizonal schema that does n o t describe an Ego-pole, but expresses Dasein's primordial r a p t u r e a n d dis-location of any now-point. "Ecstases are not simply raptures in which o n e gets carried away. Rather, there belongs to each ecstasis a whither' to which one is carried away. This 'whither' of the ecstasis we call the 'horizonal schema'" (SuZ, §69c, 365). In contrast to the Kantian schema, a horizonal schema affirms not the p e r m a n e n c e of an T think', 42 b u t the unity of temporality in its diversity—Dasein's thrown projection, 4 3 which precedes the T think'. W h e r e Kant (and Husserl) goes wrong is in seeking unity in the presence of the Ego-pole. 44 T h e diversity of Dasein's temporal ecstasis discloses the ' t h e r e ' of Dasein and, with it, the horizonal unity of the world: "Having its g r o u n d [grilndend] in the horizonal unity of ecstatical temporality, the world is transcendent" (SuZ, §69c, 366). With this Heidegger determines the transcendental sitethat precedes subjectivity. This site does not have a "primal source," for it 'is' t h r o u g h Dasein's primordial dis-location. However, this primordial diversity or dis-location has its limitations. Diversity can be affirmed only so long as it does n o t threaten Dasein's primordial unity (Einheit). We have shown that, to protect Dasein from the vulgarity of diversity, which would p r o d u c e a dualism, H e i d e g g e r has to insist that this originary unity is devoid of space. 4 5 Diversity is limited to temporal determinations alone. An inevitable

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consequence of this is a r e t u r n to subjectivity, for "time is indeed 'subjective' even if it stands beside the 'I think' and is not b o u n d u p with it." It should not therefore surprise us that Heidegger concedes in 1929—without causing any inconsistency with his argument—that the world is more subjective than objective. "Ultimately the concept of world must b e construed in such a way that the world is indeed subjective b u t for that very reason does not (as would a being) fall within the inn e r sphere of a 'subjective' subject" (WdG, 156 / 54; 89E). It is subjective insofar as it points to an anterior m o m e n t of subjectivity, i.e., to the m a n n e r in which Dasein is its ownmost transcendence. Indeed, since the fundamental aim is to break with i m m a n e n c e and thus to point to an anterior m o m e n t of subjectivity, the place that is disclosed is n o t the world b u t Dasein in its transcendence. Thus, it should not surprise us that Heidegger later refers to the "subjectivity of the subject" 4 6 to describe Dasein's transcendence to the world. Heidegger has n o p r o b l e m calling the world "subjective," so long as this description is not confused with "immanence." This concession is already implicit in SuZ, in which h e acknowledges the r e t u r n to a Kantianism devoid of a transcendental subject. 47 T h e sole aim is to break with the i m m a n e n t starting point. As long as the world is subjective, insofar as it always already precedes and makes possible i m m a n e n c e , the subjectification of the world causes n o further irritation. To break with i m m a n e n c e is m o r e important than to "salvage the world." 48 § 78. The Return to an Originary Spatiality Yet in the first instance Heidegger seems to be aware of the dangers of such an interpretation; h e rejects such a reductionist reading in §70: "The demonstration that this spatiality is existentially possible only t h r o u g h temporality, cannot aim either at deducing space from time or at dissolving it into p u r e time. If Dasein's spatiality is 'embraced' by temporality in the sense of being existentially founded u p o n it, then this connection between them (which is to be clarified in what follows) is also different from the priority of time over space in Kant's sense" (SuZ, §70, 367). H e r e , Heidegger intimates that the affirmation of originary temporality goes hand in hand with a r e t u r n to an originary spatiality. T h o u g h "temporality is already the advance condition of the possibility of Being-the-world in which Being alongside entities withinthe-world is grounded," 4 9 we should not be lead to believe spatiality is secondary to temporality. Indeed, primordially Dasein 'is' 'there' (Da) before it 'is' present to itself ('here'); not only is it temporally ek-static,

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b u t it defines the space, i.e., the 'in-between' (das Zwischeri) within which beings can appear. T h e r e is a spatiality that is antecedent to both immanence (inner sense) and beings in the world (outer sense): "And because Dasein is s p a t i a l . . . in the way we have described, space shows itself as a priori. This term does n o t m e a n anything like previously belonging to a subject which is proximally worldless and which emits a space out of itself. H e r e apriority means the previousness with which space has b e e n encountered (as a region) whenever the ready-to-hand is encountered environmentally" (SuZ, §24, 111). Since any form of dualism is inconceivable from the outset, spatiality cannot be exterior, i.e., 'other' to Dasein, but defines Dasein's structure of comportment. Dasein as Being~in-the-world is spatial and thus always already defines the region (Gegend) in which beings in the world can be: "To encounter the ready-to-hand in its environmental space remains ontically possible only because Dasein itself is 'spatial' with regard to its Being-inthe-world" (SuZ, §22,104), Dasein's spatiality allows for the encounterability of entities in the world. This spatiality is distinct from physical space that can be measured. As we have shown in chapter three, Heidegger defines this spatiality in terms of Dasein's de-severance and distantiality (§49). Dasein has a tendency to bring things closer (cf. SuZ, §22 & §23). 'Nearness' cannot be measured or calculated, b u t is defined in relation to what is environmentally closest to Dasein (i.e., the book on the desk rather than the glasses I am wearing). Equally, e q u i p m e n t is n o t merely present-at-hand, occurring at r a n d o m in some spatial position (cf. SuZ, §22,102), b u t all e q u i p m e n t has its place (Platz) in a specific region (Gegend): "In each case the place is the definite ' t h e r e ' or 'yond e r ' [ Dort'und 'Da'] of an item of e q u i p m e n t which belongs somewhere' (SuZ, §22,102). E q u i p m e n t does not appear at a geometrical point in space but belongs to a region relative to Dasein. T h e significance of the claim is that this region needs to be disclosed in advancefor such a "belonging" to be possible. 50 To be over there, Dasein must have an understanding of being-here, 5 1 an understanding defined in terms of Dasein's c o m p o r t m e n t to the world. Dasein is o p e n to the world insofar as it lets beings be. 52 Negatively this means that Dasein is never present-at-hand in space, not even proximally. Dasein does not fill up a bit of space as a Real Thing or item of equipment would, so that the boundaries dividing it from the surrounding space would themselves just define

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that space spatially. Dasein takes space in; this is to be understood literally. It is by no means just present-at-hand in a bit of space which its body fills up. In existing, it has already made room for its own leeway. It determines its own location in such a manner that it comes back from the space it has made room for to the 'place' which it has reserved. (SuZ, §70, 367-68, emphasis added) Dasein's spatiality should not be confused with Dasein's bodily space. As we have shown in chapter three, SuZ t h r o u g h o u t refuses to r e t u r n to the body, sensibility, or any corporeality and instead emphasizes the a priori perfect structure of Being-in-the-world. H e r e , analogously, Dasein's spatiality does not refer to its physicality, but to a spatiality that makes possible its embodiment. "Dasein does not fill u p a bit of space as a Real Thing or item of e q u i p m e n t would"; indeed, such a "filling" would presuppose that there is a space i n d e p e n d e n t of Dasein. But there is nothing that is exterior to Dasein. Rather, Dasein is always already more exterior than any possible exteriority. In this m a n n e r spatiality exceeds (always already) objective space. "Dasein takes space in; this is to be understood literally"—it defines the region within which beings, and indeed its own bodily presence, are possible. "In existing, it has already made room for its own leeway." Dasein determines its own location in such a m a n n e r that "it comes back from the space it has made room for to the place' which it has reserved. "In exceeding i m m a n e n c e it has always already m a d e r o o m for its own specificity, its own appearance in space. Primordially, Dasein is spatial; it is always already ' t h e r e ' (toward the world) before it is h e r e , an embodied self in space: "Dasein, in accordance with its spatiality, is proximally never h e r e but yonder; from this 'yonder' it comes back to its ' h e r e ' " (SuZ, §23, 107). Before Dasein has any dimensions, before it has a sex or any other specific characteristics, it is neutral in its extension, making possible its ownmost manifestation in both time and space. "In surpassing, Dasein first attains to the being that it is; what it attains to is its 'self" (WdG, 136 / 34; 39E). T h e r e is thus a spatiality that is n o longer defined in accordance with a space-time duality. Dasein's spatiality provides the leeway for both inner and outer sense. § 79. The Struggle between Time and Space In this m a n n e r the structure of presentation appears to mimic that of originary temporality. T h e r e is a spatiality that is anterior to inner and outer sense. Yet to what kind of spatiality are we referring? It should

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not be understood in terms of extension or three-dimensional space, for this would r e t u r n us to an ontic understanding of transcendence as a "passing over" or transition. But if it is not extensive, then what kind of spatiality is h e r e at issue? Heidegger seems to be facing a dilemma in wishing to affirm a spatiality that, from the outset, is devoid of space. Only a nonspatial spatiality resists the "fatal 'linkage of the spirit to a body'" (SuZ, §70,368). This leads Heidegger to the peculiar claim that Dasein is spatial only insofar as it is "spiritual." 53 "Because Dasein is 'spiritual,' and only because of this, it can be spatial in a way which remains essentially impossible for any extended corporeal Thing" (SuZ, §70,368). So, the significance of Dasein's spatiality lies in the fact that it is devoid of space, indeed devoid of matter. Dasein's spatiality does not define outer things in terms of their material extension but purely in terms of their "spiritual extension": Because Dasein as temporality is ecstatico-horizonal in its Being, it can take along with it a space for which it has made room, and it can do so factically and constantly. With regard to that space which it has ecstatically taken in, the 'here' of its current factical situation [Lage bzw. Situation] never signifies a position in space, but signifies rather the leeway of the range of that equipmental totality with which it is most closely concerned—a leeway which has been opened up for it in directionality and de-severance. (SuZ, §70, 369) Heidegger thereby returns to his original claim that transcendence is devoid of space. "Spiritual extension" turns out to be nothing b u t Dasein's temporality. So, in the final analysis, spatiality remains secondary to Dasein's ek-static temporality a n d is not an existential of Dasein. This is confirmed in the following sentence: "Only on the basis of its ecstatico-horizonal temporality is it possiblefor Dasein to break into space" (SuZ, §70, 369). Spatiality can be b r o k e n into only by time a n d c a n n o t exist independently of time. However, t h o u g h Dasein's ecstatic temporality allows it to "break into space," H e i d e g g e r believes he has also p r o v e n that space can be u n d e r s t o o d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of time. "The ecstatical temporality of the spatiality that is characteristic of Dasein, makes it intelligible that space is i n d e p e n d e n t of time; b u t o n the o t h e r hand, this same temporality also makes intelligible Dasein's ' d e p e n d e n c e ' o n space" (SuZ, §70, 369). Yet nowhere in SuZ is this possible i n d e p e n d e n c e of space from time proven. 5 4 I n d e e d section §70 —"The Temporality of the Spatiality that is Characteristic of

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Dasein" (SuZ, §70, 367) —is n o t followed by a section entitled "The Spatiality of Temporality that is Characteristic of Dasein." 55 §80. Dasein Needs No Windows: 'Solus Ipsel Finite temporality breaks with immanence insofar as it discloses a primordial transcendence; however, this thesis does not necessarily imply a r e t u r n to the world. For what is at issue t h r o u g h o u t is that Dasein's d e p e n d e n c e on the world reveals Dasein' s freedom.56 SuZ succeeds in retrieving the world that Husserl has ignored only by reducing it to a modality of temporality, which, in turn, is a modality of Dasein's freedom. 5 7 Everything that could possibly b e exterior to Dasein is reduced to an adverbial function of Dasein's ecstatic temporality. This prevents SuZ from engaging in any form of dualism. T h e world is not subjective, for it merely makes subjectivity possible; n o r is it objective, 'out t h e r e ' , since it is defined in terms of Dasein's transcendence. T h e world has an ambivalent function: it is neither transcendent n o r i m m a n e n t to Dasein. T h e problem, however, is that this ambivalence is n o t evenly weighted, for its existence is accounted for only insofar as it defines Dasein. It thus appears that the world is m o r e subjective than objective, insofar as the aim is to describe Dasein a n d never the world. O u r presentation seems to be reversed; rather than giving primacy to the world, SuZ in the e n d gives primacy to Dasein. T h e significance of the world lies in the fact that it discloses Dasein's nullity, a n d thus, potentiality, for Being-in-the-world. T h e phen o m e n o n of the world is purely a vehicle to describe Dasein's responsibility to be free. As Heidegger states in his 1929 lecture, "Vom Wesen des Grundes," "Surpassing to the world is freedom itself (WdG, 161 / 59; 103E). T h e world is no-thing, but is Dasein's ownmost possibility. What is disclosed is Dasein's primordial transcendence, that is, that Dasein 'is' only for the sake of its world. "World belongs to selfhood; it is essentially related to Dasein" (WdG, 155 / 53; 85E). With this SuZ describes the m a n n e r in which Dasein is in the world, the m a n n e r in which the world is Dasein's world, and the m a n n e r of Dasein's freed o m . T h e world discloses how Dasein is, its transcendence: "World m e a n s a How of the Beingof"being rather than being itself. . . . This primary How in its totality is itself relative to h u m a n Dasein" (WdG, 141 / 39; 5 I E ) . Thus, first and foremost, SuZ is concerned not with the world as such, b u t with Dasein's transcendence, which the world makes possible. T h e world can be u n d e r s t o o d only adverbially:

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"World never 'is'; it 'worlds'" (WdG, 162 / 60; 103E). T h e world never 'is' but becomes possible in and t h r o u g h Dasein's d e p e n d e n c e . In its procedural worldmg, the world describes only Dasein's freedom. T h e gravity and heaviness of the world have thereby b e e n dissolved. All Heidegger is concerned with is Dasein; the significance of the world lies solely in the fact that it describes Dasein's primordial comportment. T h r o u g h this it becomes questionable why it is at all necessary to hold on to the term world, for transcendence is already expressed in the t e r m Dasein (being-there) itself. Indeed, it is tautologous to refer to a transcendent Dasein (cf. WdG, 136; 45E). Dasein is always already there (Da) before it is itself. We can thus revise the image we developed above without omitting any essential characteristics of the world:

Transcendence. Da Being

Sein There Being-in-the-world

T h e ' t h e r e ' of Dasein already describes what the world initially was m e a n t to define —Dasein's dis-location. According to Heidegger, the ' t h e r e ' reveals the world: "In the disclosedness of the ' t h e r e ' the world is disclosed along with it" (SuZ, §69c, 365). T h e world is embedded in the t e r m Dasein itself. It thus seems possible to describe Dasein's transcendence without resorting to the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. For everything is always already m a d e possible, even the world itself, by the fact that Dasein is 'there'. We seem to be returning to a Leibnizian m o n a d without windows, for everything is always already within Dasein's transcendent structure. Dasein as Being-in-the-world defines the horizon wherein beings in the 'world' can be. But such a definition returns to the very criticism launched against Husserl. 5 8 After all, Heidegger criticized Husserl for his "immanentism" and closure: "For Husserl the sphere of consciousness is not at all questioned still less pierced. . . . Indeed it cannot be pierced as long as one's starting-point is the ego cogito. For the fundamental conception of the ego cogito (as also in the case of Leibniz's monads) is such that it has no windows through which anything could enter or depart. Therefore the ego cogitois an enclosed space. T h e idea

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of being able to get out of this sealed space is self-contradictory. Hence, the necessity for a starting-point other than the ego cogito." (Zdhringer Seminare, 383 / 121). Yet in SuZ, Dasein has n o windows either, since everything that is disclosed is within the horizon of Dasein's transcendence. Indeed, Heidegger acknowledges the analogy with Leibniz, b u t only to highlight the discrepancies: Now you see a distinct correspondence between this and Leibniz's monadology, but also that wherein they differ. . . . Leibniz can . . . say, Monads need no windows, because they already have everything in the interior. We would say, conversely, they have no windows, not because they have everything within, but because there is neither inside nor outside . . . insofar as transcendence is already in itself the possible leap over possible beings that can enter into a world. (GA 26, §12, 270-71) Dasein's existential structure of Being-in-the-world is analogous to Leibniz's claim that monads need no windows insofar as there is n o exteriority to Dasein. In contrast to Leibniz, however, Heidegger does not hold that this is because everything is interior to the monad; rather, it is because there is n o outside or inside. Dasein is always already outside before any inside or outside is possible. We are here o n slippery ground, for the distinctions are not as straightforward as Heidegger would have us believe. We concede that Dasein, like Leibnizian monads (and in this respect the Husserlian transcendental stream of consciousness), has n o windows, but that this lack of exteriority is defined in terms of Dasein's dis-location or excentric structure. Moreover, though Dasein is monadic in its structure it should not be defined in terms of immanence, but in terms of transcendence. T h e problem is that, though Dasein pierces the field of immanence, its dis-location defines the "walls" of "region" or "leeway" within which beings can appear. This reading puts us at risk of falling into an ontic understanding of transcendence, since it suggests that Dasein is in a circular monad. However, there are no walls outside of Dasein. Rather, Dasein is always already Being-toward-its-end. Everything that can be and can be known is always already m a d e possible in and through Dasein's forestructure of understanding. Heidegger calls this the hermeneutic circle of understanding. It is a circle that does not engulf Dasein, but describe Dasein in terms of its possibilities: "This circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any r a n d o m kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression

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of the existential fore-structure of Dasein itself. . . . In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing" (SuZ, §32, 153). Whatever can be known is never anything new but always already m a d e possible by Dasein's forestructure of understanding. Although there are n o "walls" in the obvious sense, we cannot avoid the critical conclusion that Dasein engulfs ?M possibilities of appearance and that in this sense everything is "interior" to the m o n a d (Dasein). Although Dasein pierces immanence, the structure of presentation seems to be analogous to Husserl's. Just as, for Husserl, everything that is can be experienced only by the transcendental stream of consciousness, so, for Heidegger, every being can be disclosed only by virtue of Dasein. Thus, as with Leibniz's monadology, SuZ seems to affirm that "monads need n o windows, because they have everything in the interior," even if this interiority describes nothing but Dasein in terms of its possibilities, i.e., its transcendence. Everything that is possible manifests itself xmthin Dasein's transcendence and is thus immanent to its ownmost transcendence. It allows us to focus on Dasein and forget about anything else.

A DEFENSE OF INFINITY §81. The Denial of a Loss In a peculiar m a n n e r Heidegger succeeds in showing why "the external world" is no longer a philosophical problem. Since the world is "constitutive for Dasein," 59 it does not make sense to raise the epistemological question that has occupied m o d e r n philosophy: "How d o we get to know the outside world?" "The question of whether there is a world at all and whether its Being can be proved, makes n o sense if it is raised by Dasein as Being-in-the-world; and who else would raise it?" 60 As we have shown, Heidegger thereby raises external objections to the Cartesian project. Not only does he r e n d e r obsolete the problem of the external world, b u t he questions the very possibility of questioning the existence of the world as such: "To have faith in the Reality of the 'external world,' whether rightly or wrongly; to 'prove'this Reality for it, whether adequately or inadequately; to presuppose it, whether explicitly or not—attempts such as these which have not mastered their own basis with full transparency, presuppose a subject which is proximally worldless or unsure of its world, and which must, at bottom, first assure itself of a world" (SuZ, §43a, 206). T h e need and desire to prove the existence of the world presupposes the ability to see ourselves, in

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principle, as separate from the world. While for thinkers like Kant it is '"a scandal of philosophy and of h u m a n reason in general' that there is still n o cogent proof for the 'Dasein of Things outside of us' which will do away with any scepticism" (SuZ, §43a, 203), the scandal for Heidegger is not that proof of the existence of the external world is still outstanding, b u t that philosophy still seeks such a proof: "The 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are expected and attempted again and again (SuZ, §43a, 205). The expectation, demand, and desire to prove an existence of the external world arises only if philosophy operates with a subject-object dualism and therefore "misses" a m o r e fundamental beginning, which is Being-in-the-world. T h e world is always already an issue forDasein, and it is because this world primordially matters to Dasein that the existence of the world cannot be questioned. S u r r e n d e r to the world thus quenches any desire or need to prove the existence of the world, for Dasein lives the proof insofar as it understands itself t h r o u g h its c o m p o r t m e n t to the world. Heidegger is really arguing that a positive account of finitude should no longer be measured against the infinite. T h e need and desire to prove the existence of an external world arises from the belief that t h e r e is something that transcends our understanding. T h e necessity to prove the external world in this sense is linked to an onto-theological understanding of transcendence. T h o u g h we are finite we wish to obtain a n absolute standpoint that lies beyond finite understanding. Yet the significance of originary temporality is that it is not in contradistinction with eternity, or a God-like world, for the origin of all being lies in the finite structure of Dasein's transcendence. T h e p r o b l e m of the world is a p r o b l e m only as long as we believe in a transcendence that exceeds Dasein's finitude. Husserl adopts the onto-theological conception of transcend e n c e in that his account of temporality maintains the idea of the infinite. Although Husserl does away with a two-world image, he still holds fast to the idea that there is an absolute self-sufficient stream toward which any knowing strives. T h e finitude of our knowledge is understood negatively—in contrast to the infinite. Husserl's onto-theological understanding of transcendence becomes a p p a r e n t if we take a closer look at his account of immanence. I m m a n e n c e is described as the selftemporalizing stream of consciousness. The significance of this stream is that it is an infinitely extended presence. It is an eternal presence in

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which change and non-change coincide. Husserl, in line with the tradition of philosophy, contrasts the absolute present with imperfection or incompleteness (finitude), thereby ensuring the constriction of an onto-theological model. 6 1 Because Dasein's finitude is absolute, there is n o n e e d to search for a beyond, since everything that 'is' is possible t h r o u g h Dasein's b o n d i n g with the world. Dasein is always already there and understands itself t h r o u g h its c o m p o r t m e n t to the world. T h e world is not an enigma, or resistant, b u t is always already grasped in its unity. A positive understanding of finitude thus wipes out once and for all the problem of the world and with it the desire a n d n e e d to search for a transcendence that lies beyond our finitude. In a perverse sense there is n o perfection that lies beyond Dasein's grasp. This leads to dangerous consequences, insofar as Heidegger will come to deny 'reason' in the Kantian sense. 62 At this stage the strengths of Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l ogy, in contrast to SuZ, b e c o m e apparent. §82. The World as a Regulative Idea At first sight it appears that Heidegger's critique is justified, for t h o u g h Husserl's doctrine of i m m a n e n t transcendence affirms that nothing can be outside transcendental subjectivity, Husserl still u p holds a notion of infinity. For Husserl, the possibility of grasping the transcendental stream of consciousness as a whole can be only "in the m a n n e r of an idea in the Kantian sense" (Ideen I, §83, 202 / 166). T h e quest for apodicticity is thus a regulative idea that can never find fulfillment. As we have shown, transcendent perception is incomplete (cf. §15). Yet the a priori incompleteness of object-consciousness is teleologically striving toward completeness. 6 3 T h a t is to say, although the 'thing as such' (Gegenstand selbst)—is never a really i n h e r e n t (reell) c o m p o n e n t of experience, it is nonetheless a teleologically anticipated idea that guides perception. Object perception, though incomplete, strives for a continuous synthesis of appearing—a continuity that is structured by internal-time-consciousness. 64 T o follow Husserl: There are objects —and included here are all transcendent objects, all "'realities" comprised by the name Nature or World—which cannot be given in complete determinedness and, likewise, in complete intuitiveness in a closed consciousness.

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But perfect givenness is nevertheless predesignated as 'Idea " (in the Kantian sense) —as a system which, in its eidetic type, is an absolutely determined system of endless processes of continuous appearings, or as a field of these processes, an a priori determined continuum ofappearances with different, but determined, dimensions, and governed throughout by a fixed set of eidetic laws. (Idem I, §143, 350-51 / 297) Since we have n o actual complete givenness of the object, a principle of reason is invoked to make u p for the deficiency. Reason prescribes the Idea of a completely given object and thereby ensures the progress of knowledge. It ensures that the phenomenologist is able to grasp the visibility of an object m o r e richly and, at the same time, grasp the visibility of the rules that make this infinite progress of knowledge possible. T h e continuum of appearances is guided by the Idea of a completely given world, which, in turn, remains an Idea in the Kantian sense, that is to say, an Idea that can never find fulfillment. 65 Thus, t h o u g h transcendent objects are incomplete, this does not deter Husserl from arguing that it is the idea of completeness which guides o u r perceptions and is anticipated in any appearance. Husserl thereby comes u p against the following paradox: while the goal of knowledge is unattainable, it guides us toward infinite progress (cf. Idem I, §142, 349/296). Implicitly, Husserl draws on the Kantian distinction between 'reason' and 'understanding'. Appearances are always finite (incomplete); b u t perception aspires to the infinite (completeness). This leads Bernet to conclude that there is a third ideological significance, for "[w]hat was true of the perception of a thing also holds for phenomenological science as such. In b o t h cases, the teleological aspiration for absolute cognition of objective being becomes a pursuit of the infinite advancem e n t of the process of cognition" (Bernet 1979, 130). Just as object cognition is orientated toward fulfillment, and the object as constituted within cognition strives for fulfillment t h r o u g h the object X, the phenomenologist reflects this teleological structure insofar as s / h e strives for an apodictic science that never finds fulfillment. T h e ideal of absolute knowledge is accompanied by the awareness of the finit u d e of h u m a n cognition. Heidegger's concern appears proven: Husserl 's thought epitomizes the way in which epistemological concerns a b o u t the external world are essentially onto-theological. "So, inquiry

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into the possible constitution of the transcendent in the epistemological sense is b o u n d u p with inquiry into the possibility of knowing the transcendent object in the theological sense. T h e latter inquiry, in fact, is, in a certain sense, the impulse for the former. Therefore, the p r o b l e m of the existence of the external world a n d whether it can b e known is implicated in the p r o b l e m of the knowledge of God and the possibility of proving God's existence" (GA 26, §11, 207). However, such a reading would lead to a misunderstanding of Husserl's definition of transcendence. Finitude does not lie in contradistinction to an infinite God-like intuition, because the infinite is imm a n e n t to h u m a n knowledge. It is not beyond because it resists the transcendental subject, but because adequate thought exceeds that which can be thought. T h a t which lies beyond our grasp points to an "exteriority" of knowledge, which is itself immanent to thought. It is an infinity i m m a n e n t to the m o n a d . §83. The Fictional Basis of the World Like Heidegger, Husserl believes that the aim should not be to prove the existence of the world. Phenomenology is not concerned with the question of whether the world exists or not, but how the world appears. "We d o not say: things are outside. How can we know them? We d o not say as Kant did in 1772: what is the basis for the relationship of that in us, which we call representation to an object, which is in itself' (Hua XVI, §40,139). While this leads Heidegger to argue that it is impossible to bracket the world, Husserl argues that it is exactly this questioning that justifies the phenomenological reduction, since it shows that the world is nothing 'out there' but 'is' only as constituted. The question about the existence of the external world is thus the wrong starting point, as it takes its existence for granted. "We have n o interest in such putative questions however justified and urgent. They are not only different questions from ours, but as we know questions which are wrongly posed' (Hua XVI §40, 140, emphasis a d d e d ) . Having bracketed the question of whether the world exists or not, we are n o longer concerned with the problem of a world that we suppose exists independently of us. Rather we have t u r n e d our attention to the question of how our belief in the world has become possible in the first place. In a very Nietzschean manner, the transcendental reduction reveals a fundamental finitude: the world is n o longer measured against an ideal world of truth, or intellectual intuition, but is described through the

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m a n n e r in which it is constituted. 66 Thus, phenomenology appears to embrace the Nietzschean question: "Why could the world which is of any concern to us—not be a fiction?" (1990b, 66). O u r belief in the world could in principle be nothing but fiction; i.e., transcendent perception is in principle o p e n to doubt. It is this principle of doubt, however, that allows Husserl to problematize the p h e n o m e n o n of the world again. Husserl does not r e n d e r obsolete the p r o b l e m of the world—he does n o t "wipe out" the question once and for all. Rather, he shows that the problem of the world comes to light only after \he reduction. "Strictly speaking, we have n o t lost anything b u t rather have gained the whole of absolute being which rightly u n d e r s t o o d contains within itself, 'constitutes' within itself, all worldly transcendencies" (Ideen /, §50,119 / 94, emphasis a d d e d ) . We have n o t lost the world b u t gained it, for the reduction makes visible that the transcendent world 'is' only as constituted. While SuZ renders the problem of the external world otiose, and concentrates o n Dasein, Husserl ensures that the problem of the world, and n o t consciousness, remains the fundamental concern of any philosophical investigation. 67 So long as we remain within the natural attitude, we presuppose anonymously the constitution of the world. 68 We n e e d to question back into the g r o u n d of any acquiescing belief in the world by showing how this belief has come about in the first place. Unlike with Nietzsche, it is the fictional basis of the world that leads Husserl to t u r n the "fiction" of the world into an absolute eidetic science. "Thus if o n e is fond of paradoxical phrases, o n e can actually say, a n d say with strict truth, providing o n e understands well this ambiguous sense, that fiction'is the vital element of phenomenology as of all eidetic science. Fiction is the source from which knowledge of 'eternal truths' draws its sustenance." 69 It allows Husserl to move from naturalism to idealism, where certainty can be sought. 70 It is t h r o u g h the reduction alone that we are able to raise the question of how adequate knowledge of the world is possible —it allows us to r e t u r n to a n d strive for a world that lies beyond doubt. The reduction brings us face to face with the p r o b l e m of the world, while Dasein's s u r r e n d e r to the world stifles a n d suffocates the problem of the world. §84. Phenomenology as a Form of Archaeology Husserl does n o t "wipe out" the world, b u t turns the p r o b l e m of the world into an infinite task. With this a peculiar constellation comes to light: Heidegger is not mistaken in criticizing Husserl for his "immanent-

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ism" when he states, "The ego cogito is an enclosed space and the idea of being able to get out of this enclosed space is self-contradictory" (cf. Zdhringer Seminare, 383 / 121). Yet the p a r a d o x is that within this closure Husserl demonstrates a m o m e n t of exteriority, since transcendental subjectivity is an infinite o p e n horizon. T h e infinite is n o t a m o m e n t that is exterior to the m o n a d — t h e r e are n o possible windows that allow us to catch a glimpse of the beyond; the infinite lies within the finite itself. T h e aspiration is never to get beyond consciousness b u t to r e t u r n to the origins of thought itself. T h e original, absolute givenness toward which perception strives is transcendental subjectivity. T h e transcendental stream of consciousness as absolute describes nothing b u t this ideal of all knowledge, and is thus a structure that is defined by reason. 7 1 Husserl refers to it as an originary reason. "Since the rational positing should be a positing originaliter, it must have its rational g r o u n d in the originary givenness in the full sense of what is determined: T h e X is n o t only m e a n t in full determinedness, b u t is given originarily precisely in this determinedness" {Ideen I, §142, 349 / 296). Perception does n o t aspire to an outside world, it does n o t strive toward an idea that is posited outside subjectivity; it intends an originary given that is immanent to transcendental subjectivity. Transcendental consciousness is an "absolute telos" of all knowing. 72 Unlike Kant, Husserl n o t only posits, b u t manifests, the idea of the infinite. O n c e again we can argue that Husserl manifests that which Kant posits. 73 T h e Kantian idea in Husserl's version is n o t posited as an idea b u t is an originary given and can, in principle, be adequately perceived: the object itself is "seized u p o n originarily and therefore in a perfectly adequate way" (Ideen /, §142, 349 / 296). It is given, though it remains as an ideal. It is the infinite process of approximation that "includes in itself a rule for the ideal possibility of its being perfected" (Ideen I, §148, 366 / 311). Although the process of perception is infinite, the rule that governs these perceptions is not: "The idea of an infinity motivated in conformity with its essence is n o t itself an infinity; seeing intellectually that this infinity of necessity cannot b e given does n o t exclude, b u t rather requires, the intellectually seen givenness of the idea of this infinity" (Ideen 7, §143, 351 / 298). T h e infinite process can b e u n d e r s t o o d only by knowing the rule that structures this process. T h e rule itself cannot be infinite since it is structured by the constitutive a priori of internal-time-consciousness. Thinking aspires toward thought itself, and the telos of perception and

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thinking is that which is always already originarily given, the transcendental stream of lived experiences. The ideal of completeness thus does n o t point to a m o m e n t that is exterior to the self, b u t forces us to delve d e e p e r into consciousness. T h e teleological structure of knowing points to absolute immanence. "Philosophy [is] a function of the humanisation of the h u m a n being, in the sense of the humanisation o f ' h u m a n in general,' indeed of humankind." 7 4 What is at work h e r e is a kind of archaeology, r e t u r n i n g to the origins of thought itself, i.e., transcendental consciousness—which, nevertheless, cannot ever be grasped completely. 75 This "return" should not be understood temporally. It is n o t as if we first had the transcendental stream of consciousness and then appearances and acts of perception; rather, the transcendental stream of consciousness 4s' only as a correlate to experience. Thus, although we aspire to r e t u r n to that which makes experience possible, this aspiration expresses itself only in and through experience. For in experience, the transcendental stream of consciousness always already structures our experience. Everything that is possible originates in m e : "All thinking and knowledge about the world . . . derives from my own experience." 7 6 Levinas therefore observes: "Husserl's phenomenology is n o t conc e r n e d with reason: t h e r e is no principle that allows Husserl to liberate himself from and get outside of concrete existence. . . . T h e act of reason' does n o t lead to its 'release' from the origin b u t coincides with it; to reconstruct the world and not to get beyond oneself a n d beh i n d the world is an act that resembles Platonic dying." 77 T h e r e is n o possibility of escaping immanence, and all we can d o is return. However, against Levinas's observation, we have shown that this r e t u r n remains an infinite task. T h e emphasis is thus still o n infinity. T h e inadequacy of thinking within thought remains the central concern. §85. To Practice Phenomenology Is to Practice Humility T h e structure is thus still defined by the desire to reach perfection, to r e a c h beyond imperfection to fulfillment. T o strive for perfection is an ethical responsibility; indeed, it is the ethical teleological motivation b e h i n d Husserl's thought. "For all genuine scientific knowledge is in practice simultaneously normative" (Hua VIII, 201). In this m a n n e r the theoretical project cannot be separated from the practical one. 7 8 It is our absolute responsibility to strive for apodicticity: "For m e philosophy is in accordance with its idea of the universal and in the radical

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sense 'rigorous' science. Thus it is a science g r o u n d e d on an ultimate foundation and as such also a science of ultimate responsibility to ourselves."79 I should not merely passively experience the world, but realize my responsibility by performing the transcendental reduction, since any knowledge originates in ' m e ' , i.e., thought as such. It is my responsibility to delve d e e p e r into 'myself\ This 'myness' does not refer to my particular empirical self b u t the transcendental self, a consciousness that is nothing b u t the representative of possible consciousness: "The individual's responsibility toward himself, who regards himself as a m e m b e r and functionary of the community, also includes the responsibility for this kind of practical life and, accordingly, includes responsibility for the community." 8 0 Bernet is therefore right to conclude that this "(endless) theoretical investigation interests him [Husserl] not only as an attempt to escape death, but because h e believes his activity to be the best and worthiest form of h u m a n life. T h e highest form of h u m a n life is according to Husserl, a search for absolute self-responsibility." 81 T h e ideal is to achieve apodicticity, an ideal that remains, however, as a regulative idea in the Kantian sense insofar as apodicticity is infinitely deferred. T h e significance of Husserl's phenomenological a p p r o a c h , therefore, lies in the fact that he attempts to provide an account of the infinite and to u p h o l d the p r o b l e m of the external world without conflating epistemological concerns with an onto-theological u n d e r standing of transcendence. Husserl thereby shows that so long as the p r o b l e m of the world is maintained, h u m a n knowledge has to acknowledge its inadequacy, for while it strives for perfection it never obtains it. "Thus, omniscience is a goal which is infinitely deferred." 8 2 It is my responsibility to strive for perfection, a responsibility that is always accompanied by risk: "Essentially, areas of leeway always r e m a i n for the unknown, the d a n g e r of e r r o r , sin and so forth. T h e endless progress of knowledge is a progress of reducing limits and dangers b u t it is an endless progress, and danger, sin and so on, r e m a i n to infinity." 83 We strive for perfection, while remaining aware of o u r finitude. We are aware that we can make mistakes —our desire for perfection goes h a n d in h a n d with the recognition that we are n o t perfect, that our life is nothing b u t a constant self-examination. We n e e d to question ourselves constantly and face o u r imperfection. If perfection remains a possibility, so d o imperfection and mistakes. Rather than celebrating o u r finitude, we n e e d to r e m a i n aware that

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the future is n o t something we dispose of, b u t remains an infinite approximation. In contrast to Heidegger, we d o not grasp Being-in-theworld in its entirety {Einheit), for we have always already failed— the telos remains infinitely deferred. T h e r e is a desire for perfection that is n o t based on a m o d e l of lack. For everything is always already within transcendental subjectivity. The origin of t h o u g h t cannot be distinguished from the act of thinking, since whatever we think of is imman e n t to thought. 8 4

CONCLUSION At this stage the advantages of Husserl's phenomenological approach c o m e to light. While Heidegger's critique of Husserl's immanentism is n o t unjustified, Dasein's finitude suggests a far m o r e stifling imman e n c e . T h e world n o longer lies beyond our grasp, for the world is always already "reached." By denying the possibility of bracketing the world, SuZ lets the world disappear without acknowledging the loss. Husserl at least lets the world appear in its suspension. To p u t it otherwise, Husserl acknowledges the bracketing of the world, while Heidegger wipes out the world without leaving any traces behind, for he denies the possibility of the "annihilation of the world" in the first place. In his denial of "the problem of the external world," Heidegger leaves no leeway for the desire for perfection. SuZ thereby affirms what Levinas once called an idealism without reason. 8 5 T h e strength of SuZ lies in the fact that it articulates a transcend e n c e that precedes immanence. In this m a n n e r it points to an originary dis-location that cannot be r e d u c e d to a primal source. SuZ does not seek perfection, certainty, or adequacy—rather, authentic Dasein makes manifest a m o m e n t in which one feels uncanny and is not-ath o m e (i.e., not-certain) .86 Philosophy returns Dasein to its finitude a n d nullity. However, the p r o b l e m is that the concrete ideal of unity is still u p h e l d . Rather than acknowledging our finitude and pointing to an overproduction of sense, Heidegger can affirm finitude only by upholding the absolute claim that it is possible to grasp the possibility of all possibilities. For death is the final perspective that makes life intelligible and possible. Dasein's finitude should not be regarded as a m o m e n t of restriction, weakness, or limitation. T h e r e is no perfection that lies beyond Dasein, there is n o external world to which Dasein should aspire, for

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everything is an adverbial modality of Dasein. With this the p r o b l e m of the external world has b e e n r e n d e r e d otiose. Heidegger is thus able to advocate a nihilistic heroism. Dasein's Eros is orientated toward Dasein's finitude —its ownmost possibilities out of which all life a n d being springs. This leads Heidegger to suggest a "rival metaphysics" by disclosing our creatureliness (Hinfalligkeit) without the infinite instance that gives m e a n i n g to the "ens creatum. "A violent reversal is at play, for the belief is that the nihilistic m o m e n t can be overcome for the sake of a d e e p e r self-possession. Indeed, whereas for Kant and Husserl the tehs is orientated towards the infinite, in SuZ the teleological structure is b o u n d e d and limited. Authentic Dasein can grasp the possibility of all possibilities t h r o u g h its fundamental finitude. H e n c e , although Heidegger undoes the desire for certainty and perfection, Dasein internalizes the teleological model, insofar as authentic Dasein takes over responsibility for its creatureliness. T h e aim is to overcome nihilism within nihilism by positively affirming Dasein's finitude. With this Heidegger affirms an "immanentism" that is far m o r e stifling than Husserl's. T h e primordial projection (the structure of possibilities) is immanent to Dasein, insofar as Dasein is always already coming toward itself—-its ownmost possibility of choosing how it is in the world. This coming toward itself is necessarily accompanied by a m o m e n t of Being-guilty (for first and foremost Dasein is inauthentic). 87 Dasein has to take over its thrownness as it already was, i.e., its primordial not-being-at-home. In this m a n n e r Dasein's primordial ek-static structure leads Dasein back to its past: "The resoluteness in which Dasein comes back to itself, discloses c u r r e n t factical possibilities of authentic existing, and discloses them in terms of the heritage which that resoluteness, as thrown, takes over7' (SuZ, §72, 383). Dasein as being-toward-death grasps the possibility of all possibilities that returns Dasein to what it always already was—thrown into the world. The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly— that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there. The authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been —the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero —is grounded existentially in anticipatory resoluteness; for it is in resoluteness that one first chooses the choice which

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makes one free for the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated. (SuZ, §74, 385) Dasein has to constantly r e t u r n to that which it has always already b e e n , its ownmost possibilities. The return is thus to the fact that Dasein has to be. Dasein in this sense faces the infinite responsibility to r e p e a t its ownmost possibilities and thus to grasp the "the ' m o n u m e n t a l ' possibilities of h u m a n existence"—which define its very existence. 88 Dasein has to choose a hero; the h e r o is not another being (neither transcendent n o r even another Dasein), b u t Dasein's authentic facticalideal. Anticipating my death is not an empty idealhut a concrete ideal that Dasein has to grasp resolutely. 89 To chose a h e r o is to chose one's ownmost self as Being-in-the-world. 90 For Heidegger, as for Husserl, this most individualizing m o m e n t (Dasein as Being-possible) is a mom e n t of utter responsibility. 91 Yet, unlike Husserl, Heidegger believes which Dasein can grasp heroically its thr own-projection—that is, the structure of all possibilities. T h e r e is nothing that lies beyond Dasein. T h e r e is no need for humility, for Dasein is finite in its full positivity, insofar as it itself is the model for perfection. Dasein can choose heroically only ^ a u t h e n t i c self—which is the m o d e l of all being and existence. Husserl's humility is taken over by Dasein's heroism.

C H A P T E R FIVE

The World Reclaimed

INTRODUCTION O U R J O U R N E Y HAS come to an end. In the first instance we believed in SuZ's claim that it "salvages the p h e n o m e n o n of the world that the tradition has ignored." However, we have come to realize that Heidegger n o t only "leaps over" the p h e n o m e n o n of the world, b u t renders it otiose. It is time to explore what we understand by the p h e n o m e n o n of the world. We have shown how SuZ refuses and resists a r e t u r n to an e m b o d i e d Dasein and the material sensuous world, b u t have failed to show why such a r e t u r n is necessary at all. After the T u r n i n g (Kehre), Heidegger admits that it was a mistake to r e d u c e spatiality to a modality of temporality: "The attempt in Being and Time, section 70, to derive h u m a n spatiality from temporality is untenable" (ZSD, 24; 23E). Rather than reducing the world to an adverbial function of Dasein, Heidegger acknowledges that the significance of the world lies in its concealment. T h e r e is a world that is and remains r e t r o c e d e n t to Dasein. "The denial of world about which ' T h e T u r n ' speaks is related to the denial a n d withholding of the present in 'Time a n d Being'" (ZSD, 58; 54E), In Heidegger's later writings Dasein's finitude articulates neither the structure of possibilities, nor the unity of time that can be grasped, b u t a unity that is given only in its withdrawal. Unlike in SuZ, finitude now expresses a limit that is n o longer defined purely temporally b u t also spatially: "Time is four-dimensional; nearness being the first collecting dimension." 1 T h e first dimension expresses a closeness that both gathers the unity of time and ensures that it remains retrocedent. For closeness conceals that which is closest. In this m a n n e r Heidegger acknowledges that the world of SuZ, i.e., the referential totality of signification, is always already in a struggle with the earth which refuses to be disclosed. 2

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T h e problem, however, even in Heidegger's later writings, is that space a n d the body are understood only in terms of appropriation (Ereignis) a n d withdrawal (Entzug). Physis emphasizes not the materiality of the world, but the coming into presence out of withdrawal, i.e., truth (aletheia) (cf. Kunst und Raum, 190-91). F u r t h e r m o r e , t h o u g h space (and, with it, language) will gain increasing significance, Heidegger will n o t r e t u r n to an e m b o d i e d Dasein. Rather the aim is to think of resistance independently of embodiment: "Truth, as unconcealment of Being, is not necessarily d e p e n d e n t on embodiment. Goethe said: 'It is not always necessary that what is true embody itself.'"3 We will therefore n o t be able to retrieve the material world that SuZ has resisted by following Heidegger's turning from philosophy to thinking. 4 Rather, we shall claim that the retrieval can be m a d e possible by ' T u r n i n g ' from Heidegger to Husserl. A reversal of roles is taking place. While SuZ sets itself the task of salvaging the world that Husserl has ignored, now we r e t u r n to Husserl in an attempt to salvage the world SuZ has "leapt over." T h e ' T u r n i n g ' to Husserl is, however, informed by its d e p a r t u r e . In other words, we d o not leave SuZ behind; rather, we seek to overcome SuZ's limitations by r e t u r n i n g to the writings of Husserl. T h e aim remains to affirm the primacy of the world without producing dualisms. N o t only do we believe that it is possible to find the seeds for the retrieval of the p h e n o m e n o n of the world in Husserl's phenomenology, we maintain that they can be traced back to Idem II. It is a text, though published only posthumously, in 1952, with which Heidegger was well acquainted. 5 Husserl shows how it is possible to inherit and exceed his own phenomenological approach. This chapter thus faces the daunting tasks of both dislocating subjectivity and salvaging the sensuous world.

THE RETURN TO AN EMBODIED DASEIN §86. The Need to Return to an Embodied

Dasein

Chapter 4 has shown how SuZ opens u p and prevents a r e t u r n to originary spatiality. However, we have failed to explore Heidegger's reasons for avoiding this unitary spatiality. Surely it cannot be the p r o b l e m of dispersal alone. Dispersal is unique to an everyday ontic understanding of space. T h e p r o b l e m at this stage is not the "vulgarity" of space b u t the fact that a unitary spatiality presupposes an e m b o d i e d Dasein.

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This is well illustrated in Kant's essay of 1768 entitled "Von d e m ersten G r u n d e des Unterschiedes der G e g e n d e n im Raume" (AKII, 375-83). Kant's description of spatiality h e r e bears a strong resemblance to that found in SuZ. In his essay, Kant, like Heidegger, posits a pre-theoretical notion of spatiality. H e distinguishes between spatial "positions" (Lageri) —the relation of things to one another in space — and spatial "directions" (Gegenden) such as nearness, farness, left, and right—which refer to the space outside of the thing. Like Heidegger, Kant gives priority to the latter. T o Heidegger directionality points to the unitary structure of Being-in-the-world, which he conceives temporally, whereas Kant argues that direction "does not consist in the reference of one thing in space to a n o t h e r . . .but in the relation of the system of these positions to the absolute space of the universe" (AKII, 377). Direction discloses that "absolute space, independently of the existence of all matter and as itself the ultimate foundation of the possibility of the compound character of matter, has a reality of its own (AK II, 378). Kant sees directionality as disclosing a unitary spatiality that precedes the world of things and has its own reality. Kant believes h e is able to demonstrate this t h r o u g h his account of incongruent counterparts (inkongruente Gegenstucke), such as a left a n d a right hand. A left a n d a right h a n d are formally identicalwih respect to their internal relations. They can have the same shape, extension, a n d texture. However, there remains an inner difference, which cannot be measured in terms of positions and the relation of their parts to each other. 6 Despite their similarity they cannot b e superimposed o n and m a d e identical to o n e another (i.e., they are not cong r u e n t ) . This leads Kant to argue that we can u n d e r s t a n d their difference only in relation to "absolute and original space" (AK II, 383). "The g r o u n d of the complete determination of a corporeal form does n o t d e p e n d simply o n the relation and position of its parts to each other; it also d e p e n d s on the reference of that physical form to universal absolute space, as it is conceived by geometers" (AKII, 381). Kant arrives at this observation by taking the idea of a solitary h a n d as an example. If we carry out a thought e x p e r i m e n t by imagining a solitary h a n d in the universe, it would still be either a right or left hand. A solitary hand, so Kant claims, is not "completely indeterminate" (cf. AKII, 383). If this thought experiment is correct then Kant has proven that space is not relational; left and right is intelligible at least partly in virtue of its relation to absolute space.

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O n the one hand, Kant thereby seeks to vindicate Newton against Leibniz. Space is not relational; it does not consist of the external relation of parts; it is absolute. O n the other hand, Kant leaves it o p e n as to whether this space, though absolute, has an a u t o n o m o u s reality. 7 Indeed, Kant emphasizes that "the ultimate g r o u n d , o n the basis of which we form o u r concept of directions in space, derives from the relation of these intersecting planes to our bodies" (AK II, 379). Left and right, above and below, n o r t h and south are meaningful only in relation to a body that is divided into left and right counterparts, a n d thus, in relation to my bodily standpoint. This suggests that for us leftness o r Tightness has to be related to o u r bodily standpoint. Nonetheless Kant insists that the essential property of leftness or rightness that pertains to a h a n d is not due to, or relative to, my bodily standpoint. T h a t a h a n d is left does not d e p e n d on how it is related to other material objects, in particular to asymmetrical bodies like o u r h u m a n bodies, but "these differences relate exclusively to absolute and original space" (AK II, 283). It thus seems that what Kant has in mind is n o t necessarily an absolute empty Newtonian space, b u t an absolute space that is defined in accordance with my "bodily figuration" (korperliche Gestalt) (AKII,382). While in this early essay Kant emphasizes that space is n o t an object of outer sensation, b u t "a fundamental concept which first of all makes possible all such outer sensations" (AK II, 383), two years later, in his Inaugural Dissertation (1770), Kant clearly states that space is an intuition and not a c o n c e p t 8 Concepts are general representations that can be divided hierarchically into part-whole relations, containing all things under themselves (e.g., species—genus; animal—cow). Intuitions, such as space and time, in turn, says Kant, refer to singular representations where the p a r t is contained in the whole. "The concept space is a singular representation embracing all things within itself.... For what you speak of as several places are only parts of the same boundless space related to one another by a fixed position" (AK II, 402). Moreover, "the concept of space is . . . a pure intuition, for it is a singular concept, n o t one which has b e e n c o m p o u n d e d from sensations, although it is the fundamental form of all outer sensations" (AKII, 402). This leads Kant to conclude that space has an absolute reality n o t as a selfsubsistent i n d e p e n d e n t object but as a form of sensible intuition. O n c e again it is by virtue of the p h e n o m e n o n of incongruent counterparts that Kant justifies his position: "Which things in a given

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space lie in one direction and which things incline in the opposite direction cannot be described discursively nor r e d u c e d to characteristic marks of the understanding" (AK II, 403). P h e n o m e n a such as a left and right h a n d cannot be explained "conceptually"; their incongruity "can only be a p p r e h e n d e d by a certain p u r e intuition" (AK II, 403). As we have shown above, the ultimate g r o u n d u p o n which we form o u r concept of directions in space derives "from the relation of these intersecting planes to o u r bodies." It could thus be argued that we o u g h t to refer to an embodied intuition of absolute space. 9 Indeed, we shall try to show how absolute and unitary space or spatiality can be affirmed by r e t u r n i n g to an e m b o d i e d Dasein. §87. Heidegger's

Reservations

It is important to note that Heidegger explicitly resists such a return. This emerges in his critique of a later essay by Kant, "Was heiBt: sich im Denken zu orientieren" (1786), which equally claims that I know my way a r o u n d "by the m e r e feeling of a difference between my two sides" (SuZ, §23, 109). H e r e Heidegger could have seized o n the opportunity of r e t u r n i n g to an inner spatiality; yet he immediately criticizes Kant for reducing the p h e n o m e n o n of orientation to a m e r e feeling, and thereby failing to recognize that it is because Dasein is in a world that it can orientate itself.10 Despite this criticism, Heidegger acknowledges the significance of Kant's essay: "Suppose I step into a r o o m which is familiar to m e but dark, and which has b e e n rearr a n g e d [ umgerdumt] during my absence so that everything which used to be at my right is now at my left. If I am to orient myself the ' m e r e feeling of the difference' between my two sides will be of n o help at all as long as I fail to a p p r e h e n d some definite object 'whose position,' as Kant remarks casually, 'I have in m i n d ' " (SuZ, §23, 109). H e r e an ambiguous appraisal emerges. Heidegger criticizes Kant for providing a psychologistic explanation of orientation, yet he praises Kant for intimating the right conclusion: "The psychological Interpretation according to which the T has something 'in the memory' is at bottom a way of alluding to the existentially constitutive state of Being-in-the-world." 11 What Dasein r e m e m b e r s is the whole of the world within which beings are disclosed. T h e p r o b l e m with Kant's presentation is that h e resorts to psychologistic m e t a p h o r s a n d thereby fails to realize that this "memory" and "feeling" refer to Beingin-the-world. This permits Heidegger to argue that transcendental

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imagination (i.e., temporality) is the unknown r o o t of intuition a n d understanding (cf. Kantbuch, §6). In this m a n n e r Heidegger refuses to acknowledge that there might be a primordial spatium sensibile that exceeds inner a n d outer sense. His refusal occurs not only because h e fears a m o m e n t of dispersal, but because a r e t u r n to an embodied Dasein u n d e r m i n e s Dasein's primordial freedom. 1 2 If Dasein were primordially embodied, t h e n it would be first ' h e r e ' (in its thrownness) before it would b e 'over t h e r e ' {Da, in its projection). Dasein would always already be b o n d e d to its body before it was ' t h e r e ' in its possibilities. T h e finitude would n o longer lie in the possibility of the impossibility of existence (death), but in the impossibility of dissolving Dasein's b o n d to its body. It is because SuZ wishes to maintain Dasein's primordial (existential) freedom that it refuses and resists the r e t u r n to an e m b o d i e d Dasein. Friedrich Kaulbach illustrates this dilemma in relation to Kant's theoretical development. In his critical period, Kant replaces the notion of an embodied intuition of spatiality with an intellectualized conception of space. Kaulbach observes that Kant intellectualizes space in o r d e r to guarantee the primacy of the spontaneity of the T think', that is, the freedom and subjectivity which are the central themes of his critical writings. So to u p h o l d the primacy of freedom, Kant needs to minimize the significance of space and show that it is secondary to temporality (inner sense). 13 Kaulbach illustrates this by drawing o n Heidegger's definition of thrown-projection. What characterizes h u m a n intuition is that it is dependent on the existence of an object that it cannot create itself. Intuition expresses the subject's thrownness. Kant now shifts the emphasis from d e p e n d e n c e (intuition) to the spontaneity of the 'I think': "There is a displacement from the standpoint of intuition. Intuition previously dominated thought (in the sense of conceptual t h o u g h t ) . T h e receptive openness to the given which c o r r e s p o n d e d to the attitude of intuition is overtaken by the projection of the rules of understanding" (Kaulbach 1960, 115). It is the schema that has priority as a conceptual rule (begriffliche Regel) over intuition. "In the same b r e a t h that we refer to the thrownness which inheres in sensation we n e e d to refer to something else which is connected with freedom, spontaneity, a predecessor of any possible spatial encounters: Indeed, h e r e Kant refers to projection (Entzuurfi" (Kaulbach 1960, 114). Ac-

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cording to Kaulbach, to ensure self-determination and freedom, the role of intuition, and with it an e m b o d i e d intuition, loses its significance. As soon as we affirm the primacy of the material world, we can n o longer u p h o l d a categorial understanding of freedom. Before I could say "I am" o r "I am possible," I would be b o u n d to a body that has a world. §88. 'The Body as an Outer Brain of Man"14 At first sight, however, Heidegger's p r o b l e m does not seem to be that Dasein's e m b o d i m e n t u n d e r m i n e s its primordial freedom — rather, that it suggests a r e t u r n to subjectivity. T h e fact that I am b o u n d to the body does not dislocate subjectivity, but broadens consciousness. This emerges in Husserl's Ideen II. In a curious m a n n e r Husserl h e r e unknowingly repeats and refines Kant's 1768 text by emphasizing the primacy of an e m b o d i e d intuition. 15 In the first instance Husserl argues that the world of things has primacy over the lived pre-theoretical world. 16 T h i n g s ' are essentially spatial. 17 Be they real things or phantoms, they are given only aspectivally, as "the sensuous schema of the thing [that] undergoes continuous alteration " (Ideen II, §15b, 37) .18 T h e real thing cannot be distinguished from a phantom so long as I perceive it in isolation. We can be assured that it is n o t a p h a n t o m only if it is causally related to other objects. Husserl hereby is following Kant's a r g u m e n t as presented in the second analogy of the KRV. Every event has a cause; that is to say, every event takes place in a temporal o r d e r insofar as alterations are governed by the "law of the connection of cause and effect" (KRV, B232). T h e reality of the thing, its materiality, is guaranteed only as a substratum of its changing qualities in relation to other objects. Husserl therefore concludes that to know a thing is to know how it reacts, for instance to pressure or heat. "[R]eal substance (concretely understood as a thing in a very b r o a d sense), real property, real state (real behavior) and real causality are concepts which belong together essentially" (Ideen II, §31, 126). However, Husserl realizes that this causal relation alone is not sufficient to show how an objective thing is constituted. For an objective 'thing' is perceived only when it is opposed to us. Spatial objects presuppose not only an observer, b u t a subject that possesses a spatial location, i.e., that is embodied. All spatial being necessarily appears in such a way that it appears either nearer or farther, above or below, right or left. This holds

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with regard to all points of the appearing corporeality, which then have their differences in relation to one another as regards this nearness, this above and below, etc., among which there are hereby peculiar qualities of appearance, stratified like dimensions. The lived body then has, for its particular Ego, the unique distinction of bearing in itself the zero point of all these orientations. One of its spatial points, even if not an actually seen one, is always characterized in the mode of the ultimate central here: that is, a here which has no other here outside of itself, in relation to which it would be a "there." (Ideen II, §41b, 158) Objects (Gegenstande) stand over and against my bodily standpoint; they can be only ' t h e r e ' , as opposed to my lived body, which is ' h e r e ' : "I have all things over and against me; they are all ' t h e r e ' -—with the exception of one and only one, namely the lived body, which is always ' h e r e ' " {Ideen II, §41b, 159). Since all experience is orientated a r o u n d my lived body, it is the absolute zero point of all experience. Farness, nearness, left, a n d right make sense only in relation to my lived body. Like Kant, Husserl argues that we have pre-theoretical experience of the world. It is defined in terms of nearness and farness, r a t h e r than objective measurement. Unlike in Heidegger's work, the emphasis is o n Dasein's 'hereness', the very fact that it is (thrown). Furt h e r m o r e , like Kant, Husserl says that I cannot be anywhere else b u t here—\ can never be 'there', for 'thereness' is possible only in relation to my absolute standpoint. My lived body defines the insubstitutable ' h e r e ' ; everything that 'is' or 'can b e ' can be only as opposed to me, i.e., over 'there'. In this m a n n e r Husserl shows that, for object perception, it is not an T think' that accompanies all my representations but an e m b o d i e d psyche (psychophysical unity). T h e manifold of appearances is thus united by the unitary standp o i n t of my body. As Husserl argues in the 1930s: "The entire physical perceptual field as a constituted manifold of things that appear in perspectives is a h a r m o n i o u s unity of perspectivity; one perspectival style governs and continues to govern t h r o u g h o u t the changing perceptual field." 19 1 experience the unity and continuity of the world as orie n t e d a r o u n d my body: "Thus each thing that appears has eo ipso an orienting relation to the lived body, and this refers n o t only to what actually appears b u t to each thing that is supposed to be able to appear. If I a m imagining a centaur I cannot help b u t imagine it as in a certain

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orientation and in a particular relation to my sense organs: it is 'to the right' of me; it is 'approaching' me or 'moving away'; it is 'revolving,' turning toward or away from ' m e ' " {Ideen II, §18a, 56). T h e world is only in relation to my living and moving body. As I move a r o u n d the world all real and possible appearances by necessity accommodate themselves to, and are positioned in relation to, me. Thus, even if I imagine an object, my lived body is presupposed. 2 0 This claim alone, however, is not particularly radical. For we seem to be merely enveloping, indeed broadening, consciousness to the realm of the lived body. T h e body remains the constitutive pole of all experience. Thus, in the same way as the 'I think' accompanies all my experiences, so does my body. Knowing is a function not only of consciousness; there is also a gnosis of the body. Like consciousness it is the centrifugal "point" of possible perceptions. T h e body is the "center of orientation" (Orientierungszentrum) (Ideen II, §41 a, 158). My absolute standpoint ('hereness') discloses that the world is for m e . Once again the "world is my representation." My lived body expresses nothing but an T can'; I a m / r ^ to move my body. T h e body is the only organ that is immediately moveable by my will. Just as the p u r e Ego is the "terminus a quo" (Ideen II, §25, 105), the center pole of all conscious life, the 'I can' is the transcendental unity of all cogitationes: "The structure of the acts which radiate out from the Ego-center, or, the Ego itself, is a form which has an analogon in the centralizing of all sense-phenomena in reference to the lived body" (Ideen II, §25, 105). If the T can' is analogous to the 'Ego pole' then we have not escaped the sphere of immanence. Rather than dislocating subjectivity, the lived body merely emphasizes that everything that 'is' needs to be in relation to an 'I can'. We can thus u n d e r s t a n d why Heidegger refuses and resists the r e t u r n to an e m b o d i e d Dasein. For as soon as we r e t u r n to an embodied Dasein we r e t u r n to the field of immanence. §89. The Prioritization of Theoretical Consciousness So long as the lived body is analogous to the Ego pole, consciousness is merely b r o a d e n e d . Husserl also maintains his position, developed in Ideen I, by giving primacy to theoretical consciousness. I n d e e d , in the first instance it seems impossible to affirm the primacy of the material world via Husserl. For Husserl's entire p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l project r e m a i n s c o n c e r n e d with n o t h i n g b u t the idealization of the world. While the second section of Ideen II, "The Constitution of

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Animal Nature," affirms the necessary r e t u r n to a n e m b o d i e d Dasein, the t h i r d and last section of Ideen / / s e e k s to e n s u r e the r e t u r n to an absolute consciousness that guarantees the constitution of an idealized, objective world. Although Ideen //discloses that an e m b o d i e d Dasein is an essential correlate for the naturalistic attitude (not to b e confused with the "natural" attitude), which is c o n c e r n e d with the reality of material things a n d the reality of mental life, 21 Husserl will u p h o l d the claim, developed in Ideen I, that "this naturalistically c o n s i d e r e d world is of course not the world" {Ideen II, §53, 208). The world, indeed, the only world which concerns the p h e n o m e n o l o gist, will r e m a i n the objective apodictic world that is constituted by an absolute spirit (Geist) or subject. In this m a n n e r Ideen / / r e p e a t s the conclusions drawn in Ideen I. Consciousness can b e t h o u g h t of as i n d e p e n d e n t of the world, while the world, in t u r n , is d e p e n d e n t o n consciousness: "It [the spirit is] absolute, irrelative. T h a t is to say, if we c o u l d eliminate all spirits from the world, t h e n that is the e n d of n a t u r e . But if we eliminate n a t u r e , ' t r u e , ' Objective-intersubjective existence, t h e r e always still remains something: the spirit as individual spirit" (Ideen II, §64, 297). T h e aim r e m a i n s to r e t u r n to an absolute positing consciousness. 2 2 This reflects H e i d e g g e r ' s r e a d i n g of Ideen //. As he claims in the GA 20: "We are r e f e r r e d o n c e again to what is already familiar to us. T h e personalistic attitude a n d experience is characterized as inspectio sui, as an i n n e r inspection of itself as t h e ego of intentionality, that is, the ego taken as subject of cogitationes" (GA20, §13, 169). Yet the paradox is that, in the same breath, Ideen //shows that this Ego cannot be thought of as i n d e p e n d e n t of the world. Contrary to Heidegger, Husserl says that 'to b e ' means n o t to be-in-the-worldbut to have-a~world and to have-a-body: "I am not my lived body, but I have my lived body" (Ideen II, §21, 94). The body and its correlate, the world, are n o t the objective body (Korper) and the world of the natural sciences, b u t a pre-theoretical lived body a n d lived world. Any material object is constituted only as a correlate of a lived body. "It d e p e n d s o n the lived body and on what is proper to the psyche, what it is that, as world, stands over and against the subject." 23 T h o u g h the aim of Ideen / / i s to show how an objective perception of the world, and hence of objects, is possible, Husserl realizes that the possibility of such an investigation presupposes that the world 'is' for a lived body. To grasp the objective

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world, we n e e d to be able to communicate, and the ability to communicate presupposes embodiment. But in principle subjects cannot be blind as regards all the senses and consequently at once blind to space, to motion, to energy. Otherwise there would be no world of things there for them; in any case it would not be the same as ours, precisely the spatial world, the world of n a t u r e . . . . There is always the possibility that new spirits enter into this nexus; but they must do so by means of their lived bodies, which are represented through possible appearances in our consciousness and through corresponding ones in theirs. (Ideenll, §18g, 86) In this m a n n e r Husserl intimates a retrieval of the world that Heidegger has r e n d e r e d otiose. T h e problem, however, is that this retrieval remains inexplicit and, indeed, rudimentary, and Husserl himself will seek to u n d o the possibility of such a retrieval. We do not wish to disclose the tensions within Ideen II;24 rather the aim is to explore how Idem / / c o u l d help us in both dislocating subjectivity and retrieving the world. This can be achieved only by bracketing Husserl's aim to affirm the primacy of theoretical consciousness. It is with the help of Husserl that we wish to reach the limits of transcendental phenomenology itself. THE BODY MOVES BEFORE T CAN' — THE BREAK WITH IMMANENCE §90. The Body as the Hyletic Foundation of

Consciousness

We have posited that the lived body accompanies object-perception, yet we have failed to show how the essential "link" between subjectivity and the body has come about; rather, we have merely claimed that originary spatiality presupposes an e m b o d i e d subject. T h e significance of Husserl's presentation, however, is not that h e shows that subjectivity is essentially e m b o d i e d (as the analysis above m a d e us believe), b u t that an unthematized body-consciousness always already exceeds subjectivity. In this m a n n e r Husserl dislocates subjectivity; the lived body stands apart from and dislocates the T can'. Subjectivity comes about only through a lived body. Husserl shows this by returning to the p h e n o m e n o n of sensual hyle, which we discussed in relation to internal-time-consciousness. 25 We recall Husserl's

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claim that sensual hyle provides the raw material for intentional formations. It is because we are affected, because there is an Uranstofi, that there is the intentional stream of life. This claim is upheld in Ideen II; but this time it refers us back to a lived body. T h e r e t u r n to the lived body is guaranteed by this belief in a necessary originary affectivity. T h e lived body is thus the hyle tic foundation for consciousness (i.e., i m m a n e n c e ) : "Hence, in this way a human being's total consciousness is in a certain sense, by means of its hyletic substrate, bound to the lived body' (Ideen II, §39, 153). Since affectivity is possible only through the body, subjectivity is inextricably linked with the body. With this it appears that the body and subjectivity originate instantaneously out of sensual hyle. T h e center where conscious life receives rays (lived body) a n d emits t h e m (i.e., the noetic side) is identical. This, however, merely repeats the claim that the lived body is analogous to the Ego pole. Yet this cannot be the case, because the lived body is already presupposed. T o be affected there needs to b e a body that is ready to be affected. T h e r e is only a sensuous moment if there is a lived body that can be affected. To put it another way, for there to be affectivity (Empfindung) there needs to b e a sensing body (ein empfindender Leib). This leads to a radical new understanding of sensual hyk, for hyle is possible only if a body is already ' h e r e ' (cf. Franck 1981,43). With this a curious constellation emerges: not only is consciousness embodied, b u t there is a living and sensing body before there is a subject. The lived body is not an extension of subjectivity. It accompanies and stands apart from subjectivity. §91. The Body That Is Felt In o r d e r to avoid any confusion we shall unravel these steps slowly. Husserl distinguishes between two bodies, the objective body that moves a r o u n d in three dimensional space and the body that is sensed. Husserl calls the latter the lived body (Leib) and the former the body (Korper). T h e body now has this double reality of being b o t h experie n c e d as a body in terms of res extensa and as a body that is felt. I can never perceive my own body completely, n o t only because as a transcendent 'thing' it is aspectival, but because my body, as it were, stands in the way. My vision of myself and, indeed, of the environment is always occluded by my body: "The same lived body which serves m e as m e a n s for all my perception obstructs m e in the perception of it itself and is a remarkably imperfectly constituted thing" (Ideen II, §41, 159).

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I can perceive my body only partially. I can see my h a n d or my foot, but not my eyes or my mouth. Additionally, this very same body is also a sensing body that I can never perceive. "A subject whose only sense was the sense of vision could not at all have an appearing lived body" (Ideen II, §37, 150). This lived body is nothing b u t this absolute perspective, the center of orientation which we described above. It can never b e perceived, but is only felt. Even when I look into the m i r r o r I fail to see myself as the one looking—but see myself as being looked at from my perspective. 2 6 As Wittgenstein once said: "But really you d o not sec the eye." 27 It cannot be seen, but, as Kant argued above, it can only be felt. T h e lived body is thus not an object of nature, nor a thing in space, b u t it has space insofar as it feels itself as the center of orientation. This is what we have called an e m b o d i e d intuition. Consciousness and the body are linked to a psychophysical unity which is never an object of nature; 2 8 it cannot be seen, but only felt. We recall that Heidegger criticized Kant for reducing the phen o m e n o n of orientation to a "psychologistic p h e n o m e n o n . " A subject with the "mere feeling" for left and right is a construction that does not get at a being of Dasein. Conversely, Husserl shows that feeling need not necessarily refer to an inadequate concept of Dasein, that of the isolated subject (cf. GA 20, §25, 321), but can disclose a sensing that exceeds the subjective Ego pole. §92. The Double Apprehension

of the Body

In the first instance it seems that sensual hyle brings about the sense of o u r body. We n e e d to be affected in o r d e r to have a lived body. I feel my body when I touch hot water, when it is caressed or pushed. Thus, like consciousness, a lived body 'is' only if it is affected by sensual hyle; there is a hyletic substratum that makes possible b o t h thought and feeling. This suggests that 'the beginning of all beginnings' lies in a mom e n t of passivity a n d affectivity. We thereby encounter a p r o b l e m analogous to the one that we discussed in chapter 2: Husserl still seems to operate with a matter-form dualism. Not only transcendental subjectivity but even embodied subjectivity is p u r e form that is dependent on a reality that lies outside of its grasp. 29 However, the significance of Husserl's account is that he undoes the p r o b l e m of affectivity once and for all by showing that the lived body is characterized in terms of its self-affectation. It is simultaneously constituting and constituted. T h e lived body does not need to

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be affected in o r d e r to c o m e into existence, b u t it exists t h r o u g h its kinaesthesia (bodily movement). H e r e , Husserl distinguishes between two modes of feeling; o n e is active a n d the other passive. Not only d o I experience my body when it is touched, but I also sense my lived b o d y as mowing, touching, walking, a n d acting. T h e peculiarity of the lived body is that it is not only sensed (passive) b u t also sensing (active) .30 Two hands that touch each other illustrate this double sensation: Touching my left hand, I have touch-appearances, that is to say, I do not just sense, but I perceive and have appearances of a soft, smooth hand, with such a form. The indicational sensations of movement and the representational sensations of touch, which are Objectified as features of the thing, 'left hand,' belong in fact to my right hand. But when I touch the left hand I also find in it, too, series of touch sensations, which are 'localized'in it, though these are not constitutive of properties (such as roughness or smoothness of the hand, of this physical thing). (Idem II, §36,144-45) My right h a n d has tactile sensations t h r o u g h which my left h a n d is experienced as a physical thing—i.e., as a res that has a certain extension, shape, and texture. Instantaneously my left hand has certain sensations that are n o t qualities of its body b u t are in principle different from all material determinations of a res. T h e body hereby is a "physicalaesthesiological unity" (Ideen II, §40, 155), a carrier (Trdger) of sense organs and a body of sensations. I feel my h a n d moving a n d feel the o t h e r hand. Merleau-Ponty calls this an "ambiguous m o d e of existence." 31 It is ambiguous since it is completely neither o n e n o r the o t h e r . T h e m o m e n t my h a n d touches another hand, the distinction between touching a n d being touched becomes ambiguous. Not only is the h a n d active (constituting), but, in the very instant that it is touching it is being touched (passive and constituted) and experienced as a bodily thing. 32 T h e touching hand touches and is instantaneously t o u c h e d by the other hand. We can refer only to a double touching. It is impossible to say which hand touches the other. T h e division between constituting and being constituted is blurred. Indeed, I never perceive my own body completely as a thing, n o r completely as a lived body, b u t only in its double and ambiguous reality.

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§93. The Primacy of the Sensing Body Only the body felt is d e p e n d e n t o n being affected. 33 T h e sensing body, in turn, is n o longer d e p e n d e n t o n an Uranstofi. T o exist, it does not need to be affected by a reality that lies beyond its grasp, since it affects itself in a n d t h r o u g h its movements. It is self-constituting t h r o u g h kinaesthesia. So, kinaesthesia makes sensual hyle possible. I can experience my body as touched or felt only if I have kinaesthetic sensations. It is for this reason that feeling can only b e kinaesthetic; sensual hyle — the m o m e n t of affectivity, passivity, and touch—thus presupposes the active sensing and moving body. 34 In other words, kinaesthesia is the necessary correlate of sensuous hyle and affectivity. This leads Husserl to claim that it is possible to bracket the body that is sensed, but n o t the sensing body, for only a sensing lived body is a p p r e h e n d e d fully: The touch-sensings, however, the sensations which, constantly varying, lie on the surface of the touching finger, are, such as they are lying there spread out over the surface, nothing given through adumbration and schematization. . . . The touch-sensing is not a state of the material thing, hand, but is precisely the hand itself which for us is more than a material thing, and the way in which it is mine entails that I, the 'subject of the lived body,' can say that what belongs to the material thing is its, not mine. All sensings pertain to my soul; everything extended to the material thing. (Idem II, §37, 150, emphasis added) T h e touch-sensing is completely given, that is, "not given through adumbration." This touch-sensing is not the material body— it is not the body sensed as having a certain dimension, shape, and texture—but the lived and sensing body that exceeds a material thing insofar as it is mine. "All sensings pertain to my soul." And what pertains to my soul, i.e., the sensing body, cannot be doubted: "If I convince myself that a perceived thing does not exist, that I am subject to an illusion, then, along with the thing, everything extended in its extension is stricken out too. But the sensings do not disappear. Only what is real vanishes from being" (Idem II, §37, 150). What is sensed is open to doubt but not the sensing. 35 §94. The Reduction of the T Can' The body is the turning-point (Umschlagspunkt) where the causal relation between m e and the world is transformed into conditional relations between the external world and my body. 36 My body is both subjective

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and objective. It is "medium ofall perception', it is the organ of perception and is necessarily involved in all perception" (Ideen II, §18, 56) and it is the other organ of my will. This body as the organ of my will is only as a correlate to the lived body: The distinctive feature of the lived body as a field of localization is the presupposition for its further distinctive features setting it off from all material things. In particular, it is the precondition for the fact that it, already taken as lived body (namely, as the thing that has a stratum of localized sensations) is an organ of the xvill, the one and only Object which, for the will of my pure Ego, is moveable immediately and spontaneously. {Ideen II, §38, 151-52) T h e body as the organ of my will is an object of my will. It is the body that can touch and b e touched. It is the body of the 'I can', that is: T can' move my body freely and T can' perceive the world by means of these movements. Yet in o r d e r to have this free access to the body the existence of the lived body is presupposed. "The distinctive feature of the lived body as a field of localization is the precondition for the fact that it can be an organ of the will." We are immediately conscious of o u r kinaesthetic system as a system of making possible (Ermoglichung); o n the other hand the kinaesthetic system is always already ' h e r e ' before I can manipulate it. The double apprehension of the lived body thus reveals that there is a body, analogous to consciousness (it has a n Ego-like — ichlichen—characteristic), that is immediately subordinate to my will, and a lived body that is other to my will, the sensing body. T h e T can' has immediate access only over the body sensed, not over the sensing body. T h e sensing body will be the absolute center of orientation that precedes the 'I can'. We are h e r e not referring merely to an incarnate Ego-pole which accompanies all my representations, but to a sensing body that stands apart from the T can' (Ego). §95. The Latency of

Consciousness

It is striking that we are now repeating an argumentation that we developed in chapter 2. We recall Husserl's belief that it is possible to disclose an absolute consciousness that is the abiding correlate to all experience. It accompanies and always exceeds any perceptual act. 37 Analogously, we can argue that there is an absolute sensing that is always already older than any 'thing' that is sensed; it can never be t u r n e d into an object of perception. Sensing accompanies and exceeds the T can' (the body that is immediately subject to my will). This

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absolute sensing does not appear in time and space b u t is pre-spatial and pre-temporal. As Husserl elucidates in his manuscripts, "My animate organism has extension, etc., b u t n o change and non-change of place in the sense of the way whereby an outer body is presented as in motion receding or approaching, or not in motion as near, far away" (Husserl 1981c, 315; 226E). H e r e is an absolute life that lies outside of space and time. 38 It is a sensing that therefore remains latent. It is always already older than any act. In chapter 2 we showed that Husserl could n o t accept this primordial aging, for if consciousness were latent then it would be necessary to affirm an unconscious consciousness, a claim that Husserl wishes to resist 3 9 Absolute consciousness needs a correlate of a primal impression. T h e claim t h r o u g h o u t was linked with the belief that sensual hyle, or living presence, is the fundamental substratum of experience. This led Heidegger to claim that so long as presence is seen as the principle of all principles, a r e t u r n to immanence is inevitable. Yet in Ideen / / a n inverse reading emerges. Presence and hyle are n o longer the substratum of all experience; rather, they are possible only by virtue of a sensing body. What precedes presence is an absolute immediacy of sensing that exceeds anything that can be sensed (presence). It is a trail of life that remains anterior to objectivity. T h e beginning of all beginnings is not a m o m e n t of passivity, b u t the activity of the living body, which makes the receiving of any given possible. T h e sensing body is not constituted t h r o u g h being affected by an external source (a reality that lies beyond its grasp); rather, it is self-constituting. Sensing is always kinaesthetic; that is to say, it is selfmoving. Before I can say "I am," "I can," or "I am possible," I move. "Originally, the T move,' 'I d o / precedes the T can d o ' " {Ideen II, §60, 261). My lived body is in and t h r o u g h its own movement. If the term affectivity h e r e makes sense we should argue that the 'I move' is the self-affectivity of my body. Thus we can conclude with Landgrebe: "Without impressions there are no time-constituting accomplishments and without kinaesthesia there are no impressions' (Landgrebe 1981b, 59). With this Husserl brings into question the primacy of the presence. What exceeds and is older than any experience and presence is the sensing body. §96. The Spatium Sensibile as the Abiding Correlate of Experience Sensuous hyle is possible only because a sensing body is ready and prep a r e d to b e affected. T h e ^ t o m o m e n t is possible on the basis of the

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prior openness of the lived body to the world. T h e lived body, the absolute center of orientation, thus defines the horizon within which beings can be disclosed. A peculiar analogy to Kant comes to light h e r e , for Kant has also argued for an absolute spatiality that is not d e p e n d e n t o n outer sensation: "Absolute space is n o t an object of outer sensation, it is rather a fundamental concept which first of all makes possible all such outer sensation" (AKII, 383). Husserl now has shown how this sense of space that precedes any material given is possible. F u r t h e r m o r e , h e has shown that t h e r e is a feeling that is n o t r e d u c i b l e to a psychological m o m e n t b u t that is t r a n s c e n d e n tal. T h e r e is an absolute "inner" sense of spatiality that precedes any f o r m of dualism. We have thereby r e t u r n e d to a "transcendental sensualism." 40 Movement is self-affection and sensing. H e r e Husserl describes a primordial spontaneity that precedes any activity or passivity. This spontaneity is not the spontaneity of the T think', n o r of my will, b u t of a moving that is before I can seize or act. Kinaesthesia does n o t express a psychological m o m e n t , nor is it a bodily movement perceived by an immobile subject (the transcendental unity of apperception). Rather, it is the originary mobility and motility of the subject. Movem e n t belongs essentially to subjectivity. Without my lived body—this moving, self-affecting sensing— there is n o world. Before T act' I have always already been, without having ever b e e n present. For presence and, indeed, the self-presence of an T , is possible only in view of a sensing body: "The discovery of 'mineness' precedes the discovery of the 'I.'" 4 1 To translate this observation into Heideggerian language; Dasein's mineness precedes immanence. Dasein is always already o p e n to the world before it is a subject. We are h e r e describing an embodied facticity that is free from any empiricism or idealism. For the lived body is anterior to a p u r e Ego that organizes the world and the empirical self. We have r e t u r n e d to a materialism that exceeds the idealistrealist debate. Sensing is n o t conditioned, but a m o m e n t of absolute spontaneity, a spontaneity that is, however, always already older than any 'I can'. §97. Husserl as the True Heir of Kant In a peculiar m a n n e r we find a similar presentation in Kant's later writings. In the Kritik der Urteilskraft and the Opus Postumum he develops the claim, which h e articulated in 1768, that there is an inner

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sense of spatiality (spatium sensibile) that is n o t d e p e n d e n t on outer sensation. 42 Like Husserl, he argues that t h e r e is an active life principle that precedes the m o m e n t of affectivity. Kant refers to the selfaffection of the Gemut, which needs to be u n d e r s t o o d as "dynamical." 43 It is an "aroused movement." 4 4 Should I be able to represent anything to myself it must occupy my Gemut.Ah Gemut refers to the preparedness and readiness to b e affected. We can find passages in the Opus Postumum in which Kant, like Husserl, argues that this self-affection is m a d e possible t h r o u g h the transcendental deduction of the body. Moving forces of matter cannot be passively received; only a subject that is moving can anticipate counteracting moving forces of matter. It is only because I am moving that I can appear to myself as sensuous and corporeal. 4 6 Indeed, Kant refers to a material force in the subject that discloses this originary spatium sensibile: But space as something capable of being sensed {spatium sensibile), whose manifold content presents itself in the form of coexistence as an object of possible experience {spatium cogitabile), is nonetheless an actual (existing) object of possible perceptions, of those material forces that modify the sense of the subject, itself which affects itself Without the subject's apprehension of the manifold of the phenomena (given to it) no object of empirical representations would ever be given.47 H e r e , the question of space is defined in terms of a sensing. There is the self-affection of the subject that is not reducible to the spontaneity of an T think'. There is an essentially dynamic sensing that is anterior to physical (static) space. Further, an inner extension (self-affection) is the transcendental condition for the possibility of outer experience. This permits us to conclude that Husserl is m o r e truthfully an heir of Kant than Heidegger. W h e n Kant emphasizes the inner sense of spatium sensibile, like Husserl, h e returns not to a psychologism, n o r to an originary temporality (as Heidegger claims), but to an originary movement48 T h e essential correlate between the noesis znd noema and the fundamental g r o u n d of intuition and understanding is not the transcendental unity of apperception, nor an originary temporality, b u t a living and moving body. T h e lived body expresses the in-between {das Zwischen) that is Dasein's s u r r e n d e r to, and b o n d i n g with, the world. I d o not know the world merely t h r o u g h sight and intuition, but every

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seeing is accompanied by kinaesthesia. T h e g r o u n d of intuition and understanding is a radical immediacy of the T move'. 4 9

THE PRIMACY OF THE WORLD §98. The Absolute 'Hereness' of My Body By emphasizing that the subject always has a body, Husserl does not, as we originally believed, merely b r o a d e n consciousness. Rather, there is a sensing that exceeds any conscious act. This sensing is nothing other than what Kant has called the inner sense of absolute, original space (spatium sensibile). We can therefore conclude that though the living body is the center of orientation, it is not analogous to an Ego pole. Rather there is a 'hereness' that exceeds subjectivity. This 'hereness' does not refer to my empirical body that moves, b u t to a sensing that is anterior b o t h to inner sense—i.e., the experience of myself in time —and to outer sense —i.e., the experience of objects that stand over and against ' m e ' . T h e 'hereness' thus refers to a mineness that exceeds any possible location in both space a n d time. It precedes a n d makes possible any particular spatial position in objective space. Whereas Heidegger argues that Dasein is always already "there" (Da), Dasein's e m b o d i m e n t discloses that Dasein is always already "here"; it is the zero-point of orientation that makes any particular "here" or "there" possible. I can never u n d o this 'hereness'; my lived body can never be 'there': "I d o not have the possibility of distancing myself from my lived body, or my lived body from m e " (Ideen II, §41 b, 159). My 'hereness' is the absolute standpoint that cannot be annulled. Consciousness is inextricably b o u n d to a sensing, moving body over which it never has control. It is always already p r e s u p p o s e d as ' h e r e ' before I can move, i.e., before the body is subjected to my will. This is emphasized in the following passage of CM: "I, as the primordial psychophysical Ego, am always p r o m i n e n t in my primordial field of perception, regardless of whether I pay attention to myself a n d t u r n toward myself with some activity or other. In particular, my lived body is always there a n d sensuously prominent; but, in addition to that a n d likewise with primordial originariness, it is e q u i p p e d with the specific sense of an animate organism" (CM, §51,143 / 113). The lived

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body is always ' h e r e ' , whether I draw my attention to it or not. It is, so to speak, differentiated, abgehoben—it stands apart—though it is the abiding correlate to my will. In the same m a n n e r , as Heidegger argues with Kant that "time . . . stands beside the T think' and is not b o u n d u p with it" (SuZ, §81, 427), we can now claim that "the lived body accompanies all my representation; however, it stands apart from the 'I can'." Husserl thereby affirms a primordial transcendence (cf. CM, § 4 8 , 1 3 6 / 1 0 8 ) . §99. The Refutation of Idealism At first sight it appears that, unwittingly, Husserl is following Kant's "Refutation of Idealism": According to Kant, p e r m a n e n c e is a substratum of all change, even the change of myself in time. 50 "This perman e n t cannot, however, be something in me, since it is only t h r o u g h this p e r m a n e n t that my existence in time can itself be determined." 5 1 That is to say, whatever is p e r m a n e n t cannot have originated in me, for it makes me possible. Since time itself (inner sense) has n o manifold, 52 the representation of my self in time is guaranteed only by outer sense, which precedes —and thus does not originate from—inner sense. 53 This leads Kant to conclude he can provide a cogent proof of the existence of things outside of me: "Thus perception of this perman e n t is possible only t h r o u g h a thing outside of m e and not t h r o u g h the m e r e representation of a thing outside m e " (KRV, B275). Before I know that I exist in time, there is a world. Knowledge of the world makes possible the representation of myself in time. Husserl now adheres to and exceeds Kant's position by arguing that, t h o u g h the p e r m a n e n t is outside me, it should never be confused with things outside m e . In KRV we have an experience of objects outside us only t h r o u g h o u r a priori intuition of space. Space is the condition of sensibility for outer experience. It ensures that we can experience objects as opposed—or, indeed, as external —to us. This leads Kant to argue that, since the p e r m a n e n c e of things outside m e makes knowledge of myself in time intelligible, outer sense precedes inner sense. Kant thereby inherits the Cartesian premise that there are two distinct realms —the inner a n d the outer. Indeed, Kant emphasizes that "time cannot be outwardly intuited, any m o r e than space can be intuited as something in us" (KRV, A23 / B38). This is why he can refute Cartesian or problematic idealism only by reversing it,

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namely, by showing that "our inner experience, which for Descartes is indubitable, is possible only on the assumption of outer experience" (KRV, B275). W h e n Husserl argues that the m o d e in which we can experience things as outside us presupposes not only outer sense, b u t a subject that possesses a spatial location, h e questions Kant's dualism. Permanency is guaranteed no longer by objects outside us, b u t by a position that exceeds the distinction between subjective and objective, i n n e r and outer. §100. The Objective World Like Kant, Husserl argues that the sense of myself as moving in space (the body as the 'I can') is made possible because there is an absolute position, in accordance with which I can move. This permanency, however, refers neither to outer sense nor to inner sense. The lived body exceeds knowledge of myself in time and space and knowledge of objects in the world. It is an absolute position that is given before there is an T that can act. Although I can change my position in relation to objects, what remains stable is the unity of my lived body, that is, its absolute position: "But it [the lived body] in its unity does n o t 'move', although every individual organ can be moved" (Husserl 1940, 27). T h e paradox is that the unity of my lived body cannot move. I can move my body in space, b u t this movement is guaranteed only through its stable standpoint. I can never choose to be 'there', for any particular "here" or "there" is intelligible only in relation to an absolute standpoint. This absolute position is the horizon of all horizons—the objective world—within which change and non-change can take place. In the first instance, it appears that the lived body affirms merely my personal center of orientation. Namely, I have n o choice in the matter; / a m always ' h e r e ' . This hereness refers to the fact that n o matter w h e r e I am, I will see the world as orientated a r o u n d my lived body. However, in the same instance, I have a sense that my lived center itself shifts. I am aware that I have changed my position in space. W h e n I move, objects are positioned differently a r o u n d my lived body: some objects might appear closer, others might disappear out of my visual field. However, they will always remain 'other' to me; namely, 'over t h e r e ' as opposed to me, who is always ' h e r e ' . T h o u g h my perspectives change, I am aware that the objects d o not change. As Kant observes in the "Second Analogy," my subjective apprehension of the world is

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necessarily accompanied by an objective apprehension. Namely, I am aware that the world does not exist only in relation to myself, b u t that it has an objective o r d e r . That I have a sense that I am moving, and, indeed, that I can comp a r e my different perspectives, suggests that there is a c o m m o n shared ground, an objective world that makes these different perspectives intelligible. T h e permanency that is thereby affirmed is n o longer my individual position in space, but the horizon of all horizons, within which all beings can be—even my particular bodily position in space. 54 §101. But the World Does Not Move This leads Husserl to the claim that it is the stability of the 'hereness' of the earth that stands apart and makes possible the experience of myself and others. It is "the ark which makes possible in the first place the sense of all motion and all rest as m o d e of motion. But its rest is not a m o d e of motion" (Husserl 1981 c, 324; 230E). Its constancy is not a m o d e of change. Rather, constancy is m o r e constant than change or non-change in the world. T h e absolute ' h e r e ' is a standpoint that precedes any possible standpoint. It is a constancy that is prior to activity a n d passivity, change and rest, myself and the other; it is the absolute 'hereness', the primordial transcendence within which beings can be. This claim seems to contradict our original finding that the moving and, indeed, lived body precedes both intuition and understanding. However, this confusion arises only if we mistake Dasein's spatium sensibilewtfh outer sense. For the crucial claim is that kinaesthetic movem e n t describes an inner movement that is not d e t e r m i n e d in terms of res extensa. "My animate organism has extension, etc., but n o change and non-change of place in the sense of the way whereby an outer body is presented as in motion receding or approaching, or not in motion as near, far away" (Husserl 1981c, 315; 226E). Kinaesthetic movement refers to an inner spontaneity that precedes the distinction between inner and outer, objective space and spatial positions. T h e body is not a thing in space; it has space. It is the immediacy of having the world before we find ourselves as moving bodies in a world. T h e world that we have is constituted t h r o u g h the infinite movement, b u t as inner movement it is at the same time the absolute 'here'. We are referring here to what Husserl has called the "standing-streaming life" in H u a X. 55 Yet, this time, this life is not consciousness, but the living body, that is the

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correlate of the world that is standing-moving. T h e living body is the pre-phenomenal immediacy that precedes and makes possible time and space. It is an anterior, moving, sensuous richness, though it is stable. For this richness is the center of all orientation. This ' h e r e ' is not in space; it is the absolute stability of the world. "But the basis on which my animate organism goes or does not go is also not experienced as a body, as wholly to be moving away or not moving away" (Husserl, 1981c, 315; 226E). It is a sensing of the havingof-the-world-as-stable. T h e world is the immediate sensuous experience. It is not the perspective of the 'I can' but of the sensing body that precedes the 'I can'. With this a curious claim comes about: there is a perspective that is not mine but belongs to the sensing body toward which even this T can' is oriented. As soon as I move my body (Korper) I experience this movement, because it is in contrast to something that remains stable. This 'something' is not a thing—it is not other to me— but a mineness that is other to the T think' a n d T move'. T h e world is experienced as unchanging and stable even t h o u g h I move a r o u n d in the world. It is not that I am in a world b u t that I have a world that is defined in terms of absolute 'hereness'. This 'hereness' c a n n o t be moved, bracketed, or u n d o n e . T h e stable earth is the primary basis of all experience. Both objects in the world a n d my body in space 'are' only in relation to this absolute standpoint. With respect to the earth there is m o v e m e n t in space. According to my immediate experience this earth is immobile; that it nevertheless really moves cannot be phenomenologically shown. Thus the transcendental immediacy of the 'hereness' of the world reverses the "Copernican Turn." T h e ultimate basis, our earth, remains stable. "But if this is the case, n e e d we say with Galileo: pur si muove? And not the contrary: it does not move?" (Husserl, 1981c, 324; 230E). The h u m a n perspective has b e e n diverted to a perspective that is always already other to the T can' a n d T think', but it is mine so far as it is immediately felt—it is a sensing that originates in m e before I am thinking and acting. T h e 'beginning of all beginnings' is a Dasein that has a world before it is a subject. This world, however, is not the world of extension, n o r is it a world that is completely other to us, which we need to reach; it is a world to which we have already surrendered. We have always already reached this world insofar as the sensing of this world precedes my sensed body, my consciousness and any object in the world. We are h e r e affirming n o t a m o m e n t of dualism, but a primordial transcen-

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dence that lies not in Dasein's finite future, but in the immediacy of the 'hereness' of the world that cannot be annulled. With this, Husserl affirms the primacy of what we have called Kant's spatium sensibile. I u n d e r s t a n d myself and the world only in relation to this lived 'hereness', the absolute originary space.

CONCLUSION Husserl has enabled us to see how Dasein's e m b o d i m e n t dislocates subjectivity. Contrary to SuZ, we have shown that Dasein's transcendence articulates not that Dasein is always already "there" (Da), but that Dasein has s u r r e n d e r e d to its 'hereness' before it can move and act. Before Dasein 'is' Being-irc-the-world, it has-a-wor\d. Dasein's primordial transcendence points not to a finite future, but to a past, and, indeed, primordial, aging that cannot be annulled. Being-possible is thus always already p r e c e d e d by Dasein's "rootedness" in the world. Finally, Heidegger's observation (which remained unaccounted for in SuZ) is vindicated: "It gets the n a m e 'homo'not in consideration of its Being but in relation to that of which it consists (humus)" (SuZ, §42, 198). What defines us as human beings is in relation to that of which we consist: our earthiness, flesh, blood, and sensuousness. 56 O u r creatureliness and surrender to the world is understood in terms of a sensing body. T h e r e is a transcendental sensualism that cannot be annulled. The Heidegger of SuZ could not have succeeded in retrieving this sensualism. So long as its fundamental concern is Dasein's freedom a n d bringing into presence the unitary structure of Being-in-the-world, SuZ has to ignore Dasein's e m b o d i m e n t and primordial spatiality. Only by letting loose SuZ's fundamental project— that is, to heroically grasp Being-in-the-world in its entirety—can we salvage the material and sensuous world. For Dasein's e m b o d i m e n t expresses a facticity that always already lies beyond Dasein's grasp. SuZ thus could have succeeded in its critique of Husserl only by questioning its own heroic project of grasping the possibility of all possibilities, which is the impossibility of existence. Husserl has pointed us in the right direction. Rather than proclaiming a rival metaphysics, h e has helped us by showing how we can dislocate i m m a n e n c e and salvage the world without surrendering to a dualism. Husserl thereby has led us to the limits of phenomenology and, indeed, of SuZ itself. We r e t u r n to a facticity and sensuous richness that refutes both idealism a n d realism.

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H e n c e , we have r e a c h e d a curious solution: it is Husseri who unwittingly shows us how to bring SuZ's project to completion. H e finally permits us to salvage the world that SuZ sets out to retrieve. SuZ could have succeeded in its d e p a r t u r e from Husseri only by r e t u r n i n g to Husseri and by acknowledging its indebtedness. In a r a r e m o m e n t of humility, Heidegger admits: "It almost goes without saying that even today I still r e g a r d myself as a learner in relation to Husseri." 57 T h e "son" has to return to the "father/' for the father, Husseri, has unknowingly sown the seeds for his own overthrow.

APPENDIX

The World That Speaks

(a) A Linguistic D e p a r t u r e From an analytic-linguistic (sprachanalytischen) standpoint, the immateriality of the world and Dasein's a priori dis-embodiment d o not pose a problem, for the radicality of Heidegger's thinking can be sustained, insofar as the world is read as another term for language. Thus, Heidegger's departure from Husserl is located in the fact that the constitutive site is n o longer the subjective act of a p u r e Ego, b u t the intersubjective, constitutive structure of language. The symbolic structure of the 'world'—which is nothing b u t a "linguistic a priori" (Apel 1976a, 39 [Sprachapriori]) —discloses the possibility of a new starting point. This is a reading suggested by Karl-Otto Apel, who believes that Heidegger's pre-predicative understanding can be translated into what linguistic theory calls language (Sprache). Unlike Tugendhat, Apel does not wish to interpret SuZ as a speculative book. T u g e n d h a t believes that the pre-predicative disclosure of the world points to a pre-linguistic, and indeed speculative, m o m e n t , for the "derivative m o d e [of disclosure]" is not articulated in assertoric sentences (Tugendhat 1986,166). Rather, it leads "beyond the domain of language/' a n d thus lacks an adequate criterion for truth. 1 "The thesis that asserts such derivativeness is speculative in the sense that one cannot specify which criteria are to be relevant in evaluating its correctness." 2 For T u g e n d h a t it is without d o u b t that Heidegger follows Husserl by arguing for a necessary link between "disclosure" and "truth." H e believes this link to be identical to the link Husserl draws between "assertion" and "truth." However, as Apel shows, Tugendhat thereby misses the radicality of Heidegger's thinking, since the pre-predicative disclosure points to the leeway (Spielraum), which, in turn, allows for the articulation of truth claims, r a t h e r than being

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identical with truth claims themselves. "Heidegger's discovery which significantly deepened or widened the phenomenological problematic of constitution which had b e e n o p e n e d u p by Husserl was not a new concept of truth b u t the exposure of a 'forestructure' of the problematic of t r u t h which is essentially identical with the . . . forestructure of the 'understanding"' (Apel 1976a, 43). Heidegger's discovery is this prepredicative forestructure of understanding, which should n o t b e mistaken for a speculative moment, because "what precedes is not pre-linguistic b u t language itself."3 T h e pre-predicative disclosure points not to a pre-linguistic moment, nor to a new notion of truth, but to a forestructure that allows for the articulation of truth claims. Linguistic theory calls this forestructure "language" (Apel here mainly thinks of the later Wittgenstein). It is identical to what Heidegger calls the "perfect tense a priori which characterizes the kind of Being belonging to Dasein itself" (SuZ, §18, 85). The claim is that what Heidegger calls ontology can be easily replaced with the term onto-semantics (Apel 1976a, 329).

(b) T h e Symbolic S t r u c t u r e of the W o r l d At first sight the GA 20 appears to confirm such a reading: "Since Dasein is moreover essentially d e t e r m i n e d by the fact that it speaks, expresses itself, discourses, and as speaker discloses, discovers, and lets things be seen, it is thereby understandable that there are such things as words which have meanings" (GA 20, §23, 287). What distinguishes Dasein from other beings is that it can speak and thus can disclose. Dasein is disclosing and always already stands in the possibility of truth and untruth, i.e., (un)concealment (fj(d)^rjOeia).4 Indeed, Heidegger emphasizes that disclosure should not be mistaken for a new conception of truth. Disclosure and discourse refer back to the Greek t e r m Xdyoq— translated by Heidegger as "letting things be seen" (Sehenlassen) —which can b e both true and false. "Because the Xoyoq is a letting-somethingbe-seen, it can thereforebe true or false" (SuZ, §7B, 33). It is the possibility of both truth and untruth (d)An6tefa), (un-)forgetting, or (un-) concealment, and thus is not the locus of truth, as T u g e n d h a t maintains. "But because 'truth' has this meaning, and because the Xoyog is a definite m o d e of letting something be seen, the Xojoq is just not the kind of thing that can be considered as the primary i o c u s ' of truth" (SuZ, §7B, 33). H e r e , Apel's critique of T u g e n d h a t seems confirmed;

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there is n o necessary link between disclosure and truth, for discourse as disclosing is the possibility of both truth and u n t r u t h . Additionally, the analogy drawn between language a n d what Heidegger calls "world" seems to be confirmed in the very same passage: "It is not as if there were first verbal sounds which in time were furnished with meanings. O n the contrary, what is primary is being in the world, that is, concerned understanding and being in the context of meanings. Only then d o sounds, pronunciation, and phonetic communication accrue to such meanings from Dasein itself. Sounds d o not acquire meaning; rather, it is the other way around: meanings are expressed in sounds" (GA 20, §23, 287). Like the later Wittgenstein, Heidegger says that meaning precedes predication. It is not as if Dasein creates its own language, but prior to any speech, sounds, signs, or phonetic communication, Dasein has a pre-understanding of a "context of meaning" (Bedeutungsztisammenhang) within which articulation is possible. What precedes any speech and the act of predication or disclosure is the possibility of disclosure, a general meaningfulness within which articulation occurs. Thus, the claim "Sounds d o not acquire meaning; rather, meanings are expressed in sounds" 3 is close to Wittgenstein's assertion: "The meaning of a word is its use in the language." 0 The m e a n i n g of a sound d e p e n d s o n its use in a language in the same way that predication is g r o u n d e d in a pre-predicative structure that makes the m e a n i n g of a particular predication possible. 7 What Heidegger calls pre-predicative understanding is virtually analogous with what Wittgenstein calls language. Returning to the analysis of the previous section, we might be t e m p t e d to argue that, in the same way that tools are meaningful only through their use and non-use within the equipmental totality, the m e a n i n g of a word (sign) is p r e c e d e d by that of a sentence. 8 Just as the significance of tools is m a d e possible by Dasein's primordial disclosure of the world, "To u n d e r s t a n d a sentence means to understand a language" (Wittgenstein 1958, §199). As we have shown above, the assignment of tools refers back to the assignment of signs, and signs, in turn, disclose the w o r l d / l a n g u a g e as such. "Because world is present, that is, because it is disclosed and in some sense e n c o u n t e r e d for the Dasein which is in it, there is in general something like sign-things, they are handy" (GA 20, §23, 5, 285). It is because t h e r e is a w o r l d / language that predication is possible. Heidegger, like Wittgenstein, emphasizes that the question of predication becomes a p r o b l e m only

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when "the world/language goes on holiday." 9 As Heidegger says, objects in the world are seen purely as something present-at-hand when the particularity of the place to which the tools and objects belong is overlooked: "Its place becomes a matter of indifference. This does n o t m e a n that what is present-at-hand loses its 'location' altogether. But its place becomes a spatio-temporal position, a 'world-point,' which is in n o way distinguished from any o t h e r . . . . [T]he releasing from such environmental confinementbelongs to the way one's understanding of Being has b e e n modified." 10 The loss of the significance of the place or environment in which tools and objects are encountered produces what Heidegger calls the philosophical turning (Umschlag); the primordial significance of the world "goes on holiday."11 It is important to note that for Heidegger this 'turning' does not lie in the loss of the practical significance of the tool, but in the loss of the particularity of the place of Being-in-the-world as such. H e r e Heidegger is not concerned with the division between theory and praxis: "In characterizing the change-over from the manipulating and using and so forth which are circumspective in a 'practical' way, to 'theoretical' exploration, it would be easy to suggest that merely looking at entities is something which emerges when concern holds back from any kind of manipulation. What is decisive in the 'emergence' of the theoretical attitude would then lie in the disappearance of praxis." (SuZ, §69b, 357) What is at issue is not that we no longer use tools. For even in the mom e n t of 'nonuse' the significance of the environment can be sustained: "But the discontinuance of a specific manipulation in our concernful dealings does not simply leave the guiding circumspection behind as a remainder. Rather, our concern then diverts itself specifically into a just-looking-around [ein Nur-sich-umsehen]. But this is by no means the way in which the 'theoretical' attitude of science is reached" (SuZ, §69b, 357-58). O u r pre-theoretical attitude is thus not essentially the field of praxis: "On the contrary, the tarrying which is discontinued when one manipulates, can take on the character of a m o r e precise kind of circumspection, such as 'inspecting,' checking u p on what has been attained, or looking over the 'operations' [Betrieb] which are now 'at a standstill.' Holding back from the use of equipment is so far from sheer 'theory' that the kind of circumspection which tarries and 'considers,' remains wholly in the grip of the ready-to-hand equipment with which one is concerned" (SuZ, §69b, 358). T h e pre-theoretical site is overlooked purely "when the world, and not praxis," "goes on holiday." 12

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It is not surprising, therefore, that Apel suggests that the term world can be easily replaced with the term language. For the world is nothing material; rather, it is the symbolic, intersubjective structure that allows for beings in the world. Instead of searching for a material affirmation of the world, we might be tempted to conclude, with Apel, that "the impossibility of transcending the everyday language" 13 —which is nothing but the impossibility of getting beyond the Um-welt—permits Heidegger to depart from Husserl. T h e m o m e n t of constitution is n o longer located in a subject or in a consciousness: "This viewpoint n o longer permits us to explicate the Husserlian problem of transcendental 'constitution' as a problem of subjective 'performance' o n the part of a ' p u r e consciousness/ It is, in fact, a mistake from a transcendental phenomenological viewpoint, to refer to 'constitution' as a subjective act: p h e n o m e n a constitute themselves and have always already constituted themselves for us" (Apel 1976a, 39). It thus appears that Being-in-theworld dislocates Husserl's p u r e Ego, though it does not embrace the material world. SuZ departs from Husserl's work insofar as it locates the constitutive a priori in the intersubjective sphere rather than in a constitutive Ego. 14

(c) Resisting the Hybrid Called ' L a n g u a g e ' The equation between world and language is not as clear-cut as it might appear at first. SuZ itself quite explicitly refuses to draw this analogy. T h r o u g h o u t the text we find the desperate attempt to show that language is not an existential characteristic of Dasein, that it has no ontological significance and thus cannot and, indeed, should never be equated with the notion of the world. 15 This claim might come as a surprise because the analogy Apel draws between onto-/ogy and onto-semanticsis implicit in Heidegger's definition of the term hoyoq. Aoyog means disclosure, letting things be seen as they show themselves, concealed or unconcealed (d)Xr}6£id). However— and this might sound peculiar at first—Heidegger says t h r o u g h o u t that we should never confuse this emphasis o n Xoyoq with a r e t u r n to language. H e justifies this claim by arguing that "The Greeks had no word for 'language'; they understood this p h e n o m e n o n 'in the first instance' as discourse" (SuZ, §34, 165). The aim is not only to "return" to the phen o m e n o n Aoyoq, but to draw a distinction between Xoyoq, which he translates as Rede (discourse), and Sprache (language). 1 6

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In this way Heidegger attempts to resist the r e t u r n to language. This resistance is necessary because Heidegger believes that the affirmation of language could suggest a return to a philosophy of consciousness. As Lafont points out, in SuZ Heidegger's concerns are: first, that the prioritization of language might e m b r a c e a philosophy of consciousness. Meaning would then be founded in the speaking subject, a n d thus r e d u c e d to intentional acts of consciousness. 17 Second, Heidegger is concerned that language could be seen merely as a pragmatic tool, which misses the overarching significance of Being-in-theworld; and finally, that language could be interpreted as a m i r r o r i n g device that represents the world. Thus the world would be nothing but "my representation" again. 18 To ensure a non-subjective starting point, Heidegger believes that he needs to resist the r e t u r n to language. H e n c e , Apel is right to claim that Heidegger's aim is to sustain a nonsubjective, constitutive a priori.™ However, he misses the fact that Heidegger believes h e can uphold this aim only by reducing language to a secondary p h e n o m e n o n . T h e aim is to show that language only is ontically, "an entity within the w o r l d . . . which we may come across as ready-to-hand." 20 It is a tool or medium, something that is ready-to-hand in the world, while discourse should reveal the transcendental, ontological site within which language is possible. As we shall show, this reductive reading of language fails, for once again we find that Heidegger cannot avoid that which h e wishes to resist—this time, the significance of language (Sprache)P Heidegger insists that there is a categorial distinction between language and discourse that is at the same time a hierarchical one: " The existential-ontologicalfoundation of language is discourse or talk" (SuZ, §34, 160). Being an ontic p h e n o m e n o n , language is constituted and never constitutive, while discourse, being ontological, is constituting. T h e significance of discourse lies in the fact that it discloses the prepredicative forestructure of understanding: "Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion" (SuZ, §34, 161). That is to say, "In discourse the intelligibility of Being-in-the-world (an intelligibility which goes with a state-ofm i n d ) is articulated" (SuZ, §34, 162). It is an existential of Dasein insofar as it discloses the Da within which thinking, acting, and indeed languageare possible. "Discourse, as the Articulation of the intelligibility of the 'there,' is a primordial existentiale of disclosedness" (SuZ,

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§34, 161). Dasein is distinguished from other beings in that it can speak. What is important h e r e is not that it can make sounds, but that it discloses, and what it discloses is not language b u t Being-in-theworld as a whole. Discourse thus discloses the constitutive whole of the referential totality that makes possible different languages: "That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the 'fofa/z^K)f-significations.'"22 This constitutive a priori can be maintained, however, only if the manifold of languages and worldviews is seen, in contrast, as a m e d i u m or tool, as an ontic p h e n o m e n o n that is constituted rather than constitutive. T h e p r o b l e m is that, as soon as Heidegger describes the function of discourse, the d e m a r c a t i o n line between discourse and language is blurred. Indeed, it is impossible to maintain that language is purely an inner-worldly ontic p h e n o m e n o n . This emerges in the following passage: For the most part, discourse is expressed by being spoken out, and has always been so expressed; it is language. But in that case understanding and interpretation already lie in what has thus been expressed. In language, as a way things have been expressed or spoken out [Ausgesprochenheit], there is hidden a way in which the understanding of Dasein has been interpreted. This way of interpreting it is no more just present-at-hand than language is; on the contrary, its Being is itself of the character of Dasein. (SuZ, §35, 167, emphasis added) In this passage the distinction between discourse and language, which should reflect the ontic-ontological divide, collapses. As soon as discourse is expressed, it is language. F u r t h e r m o r e , it is always already language. H e r e Heidegger admits that language is not purely presentat-hand but "on the contrary, its Being is itself of the character of Dasein." Yet if discourse is always already language, and language is an existential of Dasein, then the categorial and hierarchical distinction between language and discourse can n o longer be maintained. Indeed, in the following passage the complete collapse of the distinction is suggested: Discourse is the Articulation of intelligibility. Therefore it underlies both interpretation and assertion. That which can be Articulated in interpretation, and thus even more primordially in

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discourse, is what we have called 'meaning'. That which gets articulated as such in discursive Articulation, we call the 'totality-ofsignifications' [Bedeutungsganze].... If discourse, as the Articulation of the intelligibility of the 'there', is a primordial existentiale of disclosedness, and if disclosedness is primarily constituted by Being-in-the-world, then discourse too must have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically ivorldly. . . . The way in which discourse gets expressed is language. Language is a totality of words—a totality in which discourse has a 'worldly' Being of its own; and as an entity within-the-world, this totality thus becomes something which we may come across as ready-to-hand. (SuZ, §34,161) O n the one h a n d Heidegger says that discourse discloses the prepredicative forestructure of understanding. It discloses the totality of significations, the place of the 'there' (Da) of Dasein, which makes thinking and acting possible. O n the other hand, he admits that if discourse is a "primordial existential of disclosedness," then it is itself constituted by Being-in-the-world, which makes possible this disclosing activity. Thus, discourse, although primordial, is itself constituted. N o t only this, but discourse is dependent o n language itself. T h e p r o b lem for Heidegger is that if this 'there' is "constituted in Being-in-theworld," then discourse must be "worldly. " "Discourse too must have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically worldly." However, this worldliness of discourse is made possible by language (which was m e a n t to b e purely an ontic and, indeed, constituted, p h e n o m e n o n ) . For "the way in which discourse gets expressed is language" and "language is a totality of words—a totality in which discourse has a 'worldly' Being of its own." The worldliness of discourse is thus guaranteed by language, or, to p u t it another way, language transgresses the categorial distinction between the ontic a n d ontological. However, if this is the n a t u r e of language then language can be neither purely ontic n o r ontological, b u t hovers between the two. Indeed, it has a hybrid status similar to that of the sign. We recall that the sign can be ready-to-hand a n d at the same time have an ontological significance, insofar as it points to the referential totality of Being-in-the-world. This is Lafont's reading of the passage cited above: [T]he ontological dimension of discourse (the "articulation of intelligibility") is precisely a consequence of the ontic character of language as ready-to-hand (because language just like Dasein

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"does not just occur amongst other entities"). Thus, the "articulation of intelligibility" can "have essentially a kind of Being which is specifically worldly' only in language. In this way, language here acquires the same 'function mediating' between the 'ontic' and 'ontological' (which corresponds to what Heidegger calls "worldly") which the sign already performs in the analysis of the world. (Lafont 1994, 102) Language articulates the 'in-between' (das Zwischeri); it allows for the transgression between the ontic a n d the ontological. Discourse is only by virtue of language, in the same way as it is by virtue of the sign that the referential totality of the world is disclosed. Heidegger seems to acknowledge this hybrid n a t u r e of language in the following question: "In the last resort, philosophical research must resolve to ask what kind of Being goes with language in general. Is it a kind of e q u i p m e n t ready-to-hand within-the-world, or has it Dasein's kind of Being, or is it neither of these T (SuZ, §34,166, emphasis a d d e d ) . Yet rather than advocating the third option, or even attempting to suggest a solution to the question "What is the Being of language?" Heidegger is swift in bracketing the whole issue in o r d e r to r e t u r n to the claim that discourse is "a fundamental kind of Being" (SuZ, §34, 166). T h e aim is thus to r e t u r n to the initial claim that language is constituted: "But in significance itself, with which Dasein is always familiar, there lurks the ontological condition which makes it possible for Dasein, as s o m e t h i n g which u n d e r s t a n d s a n d interp r e t s , to disclose such things as 'significations'; u p o n these, in turn, is founded the Being of words and of language" (SuZ, §18, 87). Yet we know from his marginalia that Heidegger was aware that such a reductive reading of language is unjustifiable. H e adds to the citation above: "False. Language is n o t a compilation, b u t woriginary essence of truth as ' T h e r e \ " 2 3 Once again we can conclude that Heidegger attempts to resist something he cannot avoid. This time a r o u n d it is the phenomen o n of language itself. We have shown that it is impossible for Heidegger to sustain the claim that language is purely an inner-worldly p h e n o m e n o n , yet SuZ refuses to acknowledge its constitutive function, in the same way it avoids the materiality of the sign in the previous section. For the aim is to u p h o l d the initial claim that "Language . . . has its roots in the existential constitution of Dasein's disclosedness" (SuZ, §34, 160). In this m a n n e r SuZ refuses to acknowledge a n d constantly avoids the significance of language.

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(d) T h e R e t u r n to Dasein What are the possible reasons for such a reductive reading? Apart from Heidegger's fears that an emphasis on language could suggest a r e t u r n to a philosophy of consciousness, Lafont shows that Heidegger also fears that a r e t u r n to language could threaten the unitary structure of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. It is striking not only that Heidegger avoids language, because it suggests the r e t u r n to a philosophy of consciousness, but also that he refuses to acknowledge that it was W. von H u m b o l d t who attempted to give a non-instrumental, and thus nonsubjectivized, account of language. O n the one hand, Heidegger praises H u m b o l d t for showing that language is n o longer based on predication. O n the other, he claims that H u m b o l d t "requires beforehand a positive understanding of the basic a priori structure of discourse in general as an existential (SuZ, §34, 165). Although H u m b o l d t points to the pre-predicative nature of language, his account falls short because he fails to realize that discourse is an existential of language, which ensures a nonsubjective starting point. Disregarding the constitutive significance of discourse is a shortcoming only if we acknowledge Heidegger's claim that language is purely a medium, and thus an ontic p h e n o m e n o n . However, once we acknowledge that the radicality of Humboldt's thinking lies in the attempt to account for the phenomen o n of language that is not purely a m e d i u m or tool (which Heidegger refuses to do), the significance of Heidegger's critique n o longer holds. 24 According to Lafont, Heidegger cannot acknowledge the significance of language if h e wishes to ensure the r e t u r n to Dasein: " . . . the way in which Heidegger manages to get r o u n d Humboldt's insistent critique and refusal of every attempt to understand language instrumentally can only be understood by r e m e m b e r i n g Heidegger's r e m a r k which immediately follows [the previous quote] which explicitly appeals to Husserl: 'The doctrine of signification is rooted in the ontology of Dasein'" (SuZ, §34, 166) .25 According to Lafont the problem is that Heidegger wishes to ensure that all p h e n o m e n a remain modi of the unitary existential structure of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. Unlike Humboldt, who opens u p the possibility of a manifold of worldviews, Heidegger wishes to ensure that they are all reducible or are modi of a transcendental ontological a priori structure that allows for the manifold of appearances—indeed, for different languages. T h e third option — to see language neither as something present-at-hand nor as an exis-

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tential of Dasein—would lead to an affirmation of languages that could n o longer be categorized within the ontic-ontological framework. It would affirm a pluralism irreducible to the existential structure of Dasein. It is such a m o m e n t , however, that Heidegger refuses to consider. Indeed, the only time such a m o m e n t is affirmed is in SuZ's description of the everyday, which is immediately seized on in favor of the project of fundamental ontology. 26 Unlike H u m b o l d t , Heidegger wishes to u p h o l d the claim that: "A doctrine of signification will not e m e r g e automatically even if we make a comprehensive comparison of as many languages as possible, and those which are most exotic. T o accept, let us say, the philosophical horizon within which W. von H u m b o l d t m a d e language a problem, would be no less inadequate" (SuZ, §34, 166). T h e aim is to reduce the manifold of worldviews to: "The unity of significance —that is, the ontological constitution of the world" (SuZ, §69c, 365). Heidegger's resistance to a r e t u r n to the p h e n o m e n o n of language is inspired not purely by the fear of a r e t u r n to a philosophy of consciousness, but also by the attempt to ensure the r e t u r n to the unitary structure of Dasein as Being-in-the-world.

(e) T h e Fear of F r a g m e n t a t i o n In a different context Levinas makes a claim similar to Lafont's. Levinas praises Heidegger's account of the everyday because it risks "drowning ontology into existence": "And yet the philosophy of existence is immediately effaced by ontology" in affirming a m o m e n t that remains ambiguous and opaque for Dasein. 27 At the same time, Levinas shows that Heidegger's p r o b l e m is that he is at pains to reduce the whole of humanity to ontology: 28 "In fine, it turns out that the analysis of existence and of what is called its thisness (Da) is nothing b u t the description of the essence of truth, the condition of the very understanding of being" (Levinas 1989, 123). Lafont similarly argues that it is t h r o u g h Heidegger's "disparaging treatment of the 'Public' that he inconsistently avoids this path and decides to follow a n o t h e r path that once m o r e privileges Dasein. A path u p o n which he is d e t e r m i n e d programmatically t h r o u g h the apodictic insistence u p o n the claim that 'the doctrine of signification is rooted in the ontology of Dasein'" ( SuZ, §34, 166) (Lafont 1994, 111). Against the plurality, the oneness of the p h e n o m e n o n of Being-in-the-world should be sustained.

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Heidegger never loses sight of his aim of r e t u r n i n g to the existential structure of Dasein and grasping this structure of Being-in-the-world in its totality. "If, however, the ontological Interpretation is to be a primordial one, this not only demands that in general the hermeneutical Situation shall be one which has b e e n m a d e secure in conformity with the p h e n o m e n a ; it also requires explicit assurance that the whole of the entity which it has taken as its theme has been b r o u g h t into the fore-having" (SuZ, §45, 232). The return to the referential totality, which goes h a n d in h a n d with a r e t u r n to Dasein, needs to be assured. To ensure such a return, SuZ has to remain essentially hierarchical in its structure. We differentiate between Sprache and Rede. Rede is founded in Being-in-the-world, which is well illustrated in the following passage from the GA 20: "Here it is only a matter of seeing the connection between the levels of verbal sound and meaning; meanings are to be u n d e r s t o o d on the basis of meaningfulness, and this in turn means only on the basis of being-in-the-world. . . . In o r d e r to make meaningfulness as such understandable in a provisional way, we must r e t u r n to a more original phenomenon of being-in-the-world" (GA 20, §23, 28, emphasis a d d e d ) . Meaningfulness is p r e c e d e d and m a d e possible by the phen o m e n o n of Being-in-the-world; language has to be a modus of Rede, and Rede in t u r n a modus of Being-in-the-world. 29 With the help of Lafont we have shown that, though SuZ wishes to ensure the r e t u r n to the unitary structure of Dasein as Being-in-theworld, Heidegger fails to accomplish that goal t h r o u g h his distinction between Rede and Sprache, for the hierarchical and clear-cut divide is always already transgressed. What Lafont does not show—what is, however, implicit in her argument—is that the refusal to r e t u r n to language is not based purely on the fear of affirming a multiplicity of worldviews, but is based also on the fear that the unitary structure of Being-in-the-world can be u n d e r m i n e d . Thereby spatiality could gain a significance i n d e p e n d e n t of temporality.

(f) T h e Spatial Basis of Language T h e refusal to attribute a constitutive, existential function to language is also—and m o r e importantly for our investigation—caused by the fact that language is essentially spatial: "The whole stock of significations which belong to language in general . . . [is] d o m i n a t e d t h r o u g h and through by 'spatial representations'" (SuZ, §70, 369). This insight

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is most likely based o n Ernst Cassirer's analysis. Cassirer has shown the p r e d o m i n a n c e of spatial images in linguistic expressions. 30 With the emphasis o n language, then, a significance would be attributed to the p h e n o m e n o n of spatiality, which SuZ refuses to acknowledge. 31 Indeed, it is Dasein's dispersalin the ontic world that is reflected in language: "The p h e n o m e n o n of Dasein's dissemination in space is seen, for example, in the fact that all languages are shaped primarily by spatial meanings" (GA 26, §10, 174). Fundamental ontology wishes, however, to grasp this dispersal as a whole. 32 To follow Franck: "If language is d e t e r m i n e d by its spatial meaning, then the worldliness, as a m o d e of presence, can n o longer ensure the foundation from the m o m e n t that spatiality exceeds temporality" (Franck 1986, 52). W h e n a greater significance is attributed to language, spatiality gains a significance that has to be u n d e r s t o o d i n d e p e n d e n d y of temporality. As we shall show, this is what Heidegger refuses to acknowledge. T h u s it should not surprise us that the next step in SuZ is to understand discourse in terms of temporality. T o avoid any misinterpretation Heidegger will come to rid himself of the distinction between Rede And Spracheby showing that all existentials of Dasein—that is, its thrownness, understanding, and discourse — are derived from the unitary care structure, which has to be u n d e r s t o o d temporally. For it is only temporality that can ensure the unitary character of Being-in-theworld. This is emphasized by Lafont: In view of this fundamental constellation of unavoidable inconsistencies it is no longer surprising that Heidegger's next stage in SuZ is an attempt to prove that all existentials which he has disclosed phenomenologically can be referred back to the care structure of (individual) Dasein. Discourse—which is one of the three equiprimordial existentials of Dasein—'disappears' without further explanation . . . and when finally the context of the analysis of temporality should explicate "those fundamental structures of Dasein which we have hitherto exhibited, these structures are all to be conceived as at bottom 'temporal' and as modes of the temporalizing of temporality" (SuZ, §61, 304). However due to their incompatibility with any of those three "ecstasies of temporality" the insoluble problem is rather pushed aside than investigated. (Lafont 1994, 114-15) T h e significance of discourse virtually disappears in SuZ; indeed, the

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whole analysis is r e d u c e d to Dasein's care-structure, which will indicate the primordial significance of temporality. This becomes apparent in Heidegger's later writings, which can be described as a turning (Kehre) from fundamental ontology to "appropriation" (Ereignis). It is in discarding the existential analytic of Dasein, and turning to the appropriation of the 'there is' (esgibt), that language as the "house of Being" (Haus des Seins) gains significance, a n d with it, the question of spatiality. For after the Kehre the disclosure of the world is possible only by virtue of language: "Only where t h e r e is language there is a world. . . . Language is not a tool over which we have control, rather it is appropriation which has the highest possibility of mankind at its disposal." 33 Being is n o longer u n d e r s t o o d in terms of Dasein's comportment, but it is an event of appropriation, and, "since time as well as Being can only be thought from Appropriation as the gifts of Appropriation, the relation of space to Appropriation must also be considered in an analogous way. . . . T h e attempt in Being and Time, section 70, to derive h u m a n spatiality from temporality is untenable." 3 4 Thus, in attributing a greater significance to language, as Heidegger does after the Kehre, the question of space is automatically reconsidered. 3 5 The Kehre from fundamental ontology to Ereignis is accompanied by a r e t u r n to language and spatiality. SuZ ensures that language remains a secondary and innerworldly p h e n o m e n o n . The Offenbarkeitshorizont is not language, b u t Dasein's existential of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger explicitly follows Husserl when he says that "the doctrine of signification is rooted in the ontology of Dasein. Whether it prospers or decays d e p e n d s o n the fate of this ontology" (SuZ, §34A, 166). For the overarching aim of SuZ is to uphold a constitutive a priorifunction of Dasein. Yet, if we refuse to interpret the worldhood of the world as another term for language— indeed if we return to Dasein's constitutive functions — then have we n o t u n d e r m i n e d all possible departures from Husserl once again? We recall Apel's claim that Heidegger departs from Husserl insofar as the constitutive function is transferred from a transcendental subjective act to the intersubjective, constitutive structure of language. Yet our analysis has shown that even language threatens the project of fundamental ontology.

NOTES

INTRODUCTION 1. Cf.J. L. Austin 1962, 4-5 and M. Williams 1996. 2. Cf. SuZ, §5, 19 or Wittgenstein 1958, §109. 3. Descartes 1986, 89. 4. J o h n Cottingham draws the distinction between internal and external objections to the Cartesian enterprise. Cf. Cottingham 1992, 10. 5. Cf. KRV, Bxl and SuZ, §43a, 203. 6. T h e professed skeptic "must assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, . . . he cannot p r e t e n d by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity" ( H u m e 1978, 187). 7. "Nature has n o t left this to his [the skeptic's] choice, a n d has doubtless e s t e e m ' d it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to o u r uncertain reasonings and speculations" ( H u m e 1978, 187). 8. This objection has already been raised by Mersenne and Arnauld, namely, that reason cannot perform the task of justifying itself (Cartesian circle).

PROLOGUE 1. Letter to Pfander, 1931, B r W I I , 181. Cited by Roland Breeur (1994, 4). % Letter to Pfander, 1931, in BrW II, 181. Cited by B r e e u r (1994, 4). 3. Letter to R o m a n Ingarden, 26 D e c e m b e r 1927, in Husserl 1968, 43 a n d BrW III, 236. 4. Letter to Mahnke, 1933, in BrW III, 505. Cited by Breeur (1994, 5). 5. T o echo Nietzsche: "His m i r r o r i n g soul, for ever polishing itself, n o longer knows how to affirm or how to deny; he does n o t c o m m a n d , neither does h e destroy" (Nietzsche 1990b, §207, 136). 6. As Michael Theunissen notes, although SuZ needs to be r e a d as an explicit dialogue with Husserl, Husserl himself is hardly m e n t i o n e d . This is n o t only because Heidegger did not wish to confront Husserl directiy, b u t also because he r e g a r d e d h i m as a representative of the tradition: "Heidegger deals with Husserl anonymously not only because respect for his teacher forbids any direct attack b u t also because he regards Husserl simply as a representative of the m o d e r n tradition (i.e., post-Cartesian) in general" (Theunissen 1984, 167-68, translation slightly altered). CHAPTER

1

1. David Bell 1990, 133; cf. Keller 1999, 8.

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2. Pierre Keller actually goes further than this by arguing that "it is n o t quite correct to describe his position as externalism. Externalism p r e s u p poses the traditional inner-outer distinction, a n d argues for the d e p e n d e n c e of the i n n e r on the outer, whereas Heidegger thinks that the traditional innero u t e r distinction is based o n a mistaken ontology of h u m a n existence" (Keller 1999,112). 3. It is i m p o r t a n t n o t to confuse the internal a n d external objections that can be raised against the Cartesian enterprise with an internalist or externalist position. 4. "What is t r u e is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is o n e a n d the same, whether m e n o r non-men, angels o r gods a p p r e h e n d a n d j u d g e it" (LU, Prol., §36, 125; LI, 140). 5. David Bell, for e x a m p l e , holds that Husserl can d e s c r i b e only the c o n t e n t s of o u r t h o u g h t s . However, h e is n o t able to show w h e t h e r o u r t h o u g h t s a r e related to any particular objects o r p r o p e r t i e s in the environm e n t (cf. Bell 1990, 148). Husserl can thus u n d e r s t a n d the i n t e n t i o n a l obj e c t only as intrinsic to the act, a n d never, like F r e g e , as a "genuine, fullb l o o d e d , relational r e f e r e n c e " (Bell 1990, 130). A c c o r d i n g to Bell, Husserl is t h e r e f o r e c o m m i t t e d to a "methodological solipsism a c c o r d i n g to which t h e workings of t h e m i n d can b e investigated a n d u n d e r s t o o d in c o m p l e t e isolation from any facts c o n c e r n i n g the n a t u r e , o r even the existence, of n o n - m e n t a l reality" (Bell 1990, 148). 6. While for Frege meanings are meanings of signs, they are intentional correlates o£ acts for Husserl. Indeed, Husserl draws a distinction between signs a n d expression. N o t all signs convey meaning. T h e c o n c e p t of the sign is wider t h a n that of expression, insofar as expressions also signify. However, we should n o t conflate t h e function of m e a n i n g with the function of signifying; the two a r e totally different. Cf. LU I, chapter 1. 7. T o constitute here m e a n s to disclose, to b r i n g forth, to m a k e manifest, o r to reveal — n o t to create or construct. As Robert Sokolowski observes: "To 'constitute' a state of affairs is to exercise o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d to let a thing manifest itself to us" (Sokolowski 2000, 93). 8. As D e r m o t M o r a n notes: "What Husserl wants to e x p l o r e are the a priori, necessary conditions which psychic acts r e q u i r e in o r d e r to achieve grasp of identical meanings necessary for knowledge. This in short, for Husserl, is the p r o b l e m of constitution (Moran 2000b, 47). 9. Husserl m o r e o v e r holds that "two expressions can have the same m e a n i n g b u t a different objective reference" (LU I, §12,53; LI, 287). In o t h e r words, two uses of o n e expression can refer to different objects although the signification of the expression remains the same. Indexical expressions illustrate this claim. Husserl confusingly uses the expression "a h o r s e " as an exa m p l e . In the statements "Bucephalus is a horse" a n d "This old n a g is a horse," the expression "a horse," says Husserl, has the same signification, b u t a differe n t reference. "A horse," however, is not a referring expression. If anything, it refers to the universal 'horseness', or what Husserl calls a "species" or "essence" (cf. Atwell 1977, 92). 10. T h e m e a n i n g of an expression or statement is ideal, n o matter

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whether the expression's object exists or is impossible a n d n o matter what kind of expression is uttered. Husserl believes that every empirical language conforms to an a priori structure: "The foundations of speech a r e n o t only to be found in physiology, psychology and the history of culture, b u t also in the a priori' (LUIV, §14, 346-7; LI, 525). Indeed, n o language, so Husserl claims, is thinkable that is n o t " d e t e r m i n e d by this a priori' (ibid.). 11. Even when we describe perceptual experience, there are n o mental images 'in' the mind. Perceptual experience does not refer to sensations, sensa, or representations, b u t to the object that is intended. "I d o n o t see colour sensations b u t coloured things," says Husserl. "I d o not hear tone-sensations b u t the singer's song etc. etc." (LU V, § l l a , 387; LI, 559). T h e being of what we sense (empfinden) is different from the being that is perceived (wahrgenommen). 12. Husserl refers to a "pile of words" ^(LIJIV, §14; LI, 522). 13. O r at least we would have to concur with Keller that Husserl opts for a theory of intentionality "based o n acts of consciousness that n e e d have n o object at all" (Keller 1999,17). 14. Cf. T u g e n d h a t 1967,105. 15. Husserl 1977, 209E. As Michael D u m m e t t in his critique of Bell rightiy observes, for Husserl sense itself is the r o u t e a n d n o t h i n g b u t the r o u t e to reference. Cf. D u m m e t t 1993, 227. 16. An empty intention finds fulfillment w h e n it intends something that is bodily present. 17. According to Husserl t h e r e are certain meaning-intentions that can a priori never find fulfillment, such as a r o u n d square, a n d others that have n o t yet or, indeed, can never, find fulfillment—as a matter of fact. For example, I can sit in my study and think a b o u t the bridge that I crossed yesterday. T h e bridge is n o t actually given or present; nonetheless, I intend the bridge itself a n d n o t an image of it. At that m o m e n t the intention does n o t yet find fulfillment, since I am in my office a n d n o t on the bridge. W h e n we think of an expression such as "the bald king of France," the meaning-intention can never find fulfillment as a m a t t e r of fact because it remains at present, as Husserl would p u t it, "empty." According to Husserl, o u r acts can be m o r e or less intuitively fulfilled. In LU, for example, Husserl holds that it is impossible to gain a d e q u a t e evidence from the perception of objects in the external world. Since such objects are three-dimensional, they are never adequately given—fully p r e s e n t or visible. They a r e always accompanied by unfulfilled intentions. Further, there are different grades of evidence. Husserl refers to provisional, adequate, a n d final fulfillments. T h e last refers to an ideal of knowledge (cf. LU VI, introduction, 540; LI, 670). 18. In his translation of GA 20, T h e o d o r e Kisiel translates this dictum as: "Back to the matters themselves." 19. Husserl says: "A state of affairs, even o n e concerning what is sensibly perceived, is not, however, an object that could be sensibly perceived" (LU V, §28, 461; LI, 611). States of affairs (Sachverhalte) are never directly perceivable; rather, the identity of a state of affairs d e p e n d s o n a synthetic constitutive consciousness. 20. "These two powers or capacities cannot exchange their functions.

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T h e understanding can intuit nothing, the senses can think nothing" (KRV, A51/B75). 21. "If the receptivity of o u r mind, its power of receiving representations in so far as it is in any wise affected, is to be entitled sensibility, then the m i n d ' s power of p r o d u c i n g representations from itself, the spontaneity of knowledge, should b e called the understanding. O u r n a t u r e is so constituted that o u r intuition can never be o t h e r than sensible; that is, it contains only the m o d e in which we are affected by objects. T h e faculty, o n the o t h e r hand, which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the u n d e r s t a n d i n g " (KRV, A51 / B75). However, at this stage it is i m p o r t a n t to point o u t that Kant is m o r e ambiguous. Heidegger has drawn o u r attention to the fact that in the A version the difference between sensibility and spontaneity is b r i d g e d t h r o u g h the 'gemeinsame WurzeF of the transcendental imagination — it is only in the B version that the function of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g comes to dominate. Cf. H e i d e g g e r 1990, §33. 22. As J. N. Mohanty observes, "In Husserl, the Kantian concept-intuition distinction takes the form of the distinction between meaning-intention a n d meaning-fulfillment" (Mohanty 1982, 110-11). 23. " [ T ] h e o u t c o m e of a categorial act, . . . consists in an objective 'view' (Fassung) of what is primarily intuited, a 'view' that can only be given in such a f o u n d e d act, so that the t h o u g h t of a straightforward p e r c e p t of the f o u n d e d object, or of its presentation t h r o u g h some other straightforward intuition, is a piece of non-sense" (LU VI, §61, 714-15; LI, 820). 24. Categorial objects that Husserl discusses are conjunctions, disjunctions, universals, identity relationships, n u m b e r s , classes, a n d states of affairs. 25. This is why Husserl calls "the whole perceptual assertion an expression of perception" (LU VI, §45, 142; LI, 784). 26. Husserl differentiates between analytic a n d synthetic propositions. Analytic propositions abstract from the question of truths a n d can be formalized. T h a t is to say, all material terms can be reqlaced by an empty formula such as the principle of noncontradiction. "In such proposition what is material is boundlessly variable" (LU VI, §63, 724; LI, 827). 27. However, this r e a d i n g has its limitations. First, the 'Being' that is at issue is never the Being of all Beings that Heidegger envisages. It is limited to object perception. For Husserl the p r o b l e m of Being is in n o way fundamental; 'being' is just o n e of many logical forms that exceed sensible perception. "The 'a' and the 'the,' the 'and' and the 'or,' the 'if a n d the 'then,' the 'all' a n d the ' n o n e , ' the 'something' and the 'nothing,' the forms of quantity a n d the determinations of n u m b e r , etc. —all these are meaningful propositional elements, b u t we should look in vain for their objective correlates . . . in the s p h e r e of real objects, which is in fact n o other than the s p h e r e of objects of possible sense-perception (LU VI, §43, 667; LI, 782). Second, in LU Husserl has n o t succeeded in ridding himself fully of the "ancestral household effects of philosophy" (GA 20, §6, a, 97). Although Husserl argues that "everything categorial ultimately rests u p o n sense intuition" (GA 20, §6, a, 94), the distinction between sensible and categorial intuition in many ways resembles that be-

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tween form a n d matter. Indeed, this leads Husserl to reconsider his position. In the foreword to the second edition of LU (1920), he writes: "After twenty years of further work . . . I d o n o t approve o f . . . the doctrine of categorial representation" (LU VI; LI, 663). Husserl concedes that h e was mistaken to define categorial representation as a form of intuitive representation, i.e., as the categorial synthesis of sensuous content. It should n o t surprise us that Husserl, in his later writings, hardly uses the expression "categorial intuition." It does n o t a p p e a r at all in the Idem Tor in the CM. In EU Husserl again draws o n the t e r m "categorial intuition," which will, however, refer only to the mann e r in which ideal objects (Gegenstdnde) are given (cf. EU, §§57-59). 28. O n the relation between Husserl a n d H u m e , see M o r a n (2000a, 13942) a n d B e r g e r (1939, 342-53). 29. "Thus the skeptic still continues to r e a s o n a n d believe, even t h o u g h h e asserts, that h e c a n n o t defend his reason by reason; a n d by t h e same r u l e h e m u s t assent to the principle c o n c e r n i n g the existence of body, t h o u g h h e c a n n o t p r e t e n d by any a r g u m e n t s of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nat u r e has n o t left this to his choice, a n d has doubtless e s t e e m e d it an affair of too great i m p o r t a n c e to b e trusted to o u r u n c e r t a i n reasonings a n d speculations. We may well ask, W h a t causes i n d u c e us to believe in the existence of body? But it is in vain to ask, W h e t h e r t h e r e b e body o r not? T h a t is a point, which we must take for g r a n t e d in all o u r reasonings" ( H u m e 1978, 187). 30. This leads Klaus Held to c o m p a r e Husserl's e p o c h e with pyrrhonic skepticism. Cf. Held 2000, 43 ff. According to Husserl, had H u m e n o t held on to his sensualism, h e could have b e c o m e the founding father of p h e n o m e n o l ogy. "Had his [Hume's] sensualism not blinded him to the whole sphere of intentionality, of 'consciousness-of,' h a d h e grasped it in an investigation of essence, h e would n o t have b e c o m e the great skeptic, b u t instead the founder of a truly 'positive' theory of reason. All the problems that move him so passionately in the Treatise a n d drive him from confusion to c o n f u s i o n , . . . all these p r o b l e m s belong entirely to the area dominated by phenomenology" ("Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Husserl 1981a, 182). T h e p r o b l e m is that H u m e believes that only sensory information is i m m a n e n t or immediately given. 31. According to Ullrich Melle, Husserl introduces the idea of the phenomenological r e d u c t i o n for the first time explicitly in his lectures of 1906 to 1907. See Ullrich Melle's introduction to E d m u n d Husserl, Einleitung in die Logik und Erkenntnistheorie Vorlesungen 1906/07 (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1984), xxii. 32. LU limited its investigation to the "noetic side" of experience, without, however, investigating the m a n n e r in which the object, as it is intended, constitutes itself. In view of this, in the second edition of LU Husserl argues that it is necessary to differentiate between the real contents of an act And its intentional content (LU 1,411). Husserl later comes to distinguish between the noesis (the real act) a n d the noema (the object that is m e a n t or intended, precisely as it is int e n d e d ) . T h e differentiation between noesisrax\d noemais introduced in Idem L 33. Chapter 2 will explain how such a seeing is possible.

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34. "One must not confuse noema (correlate) and essence" (Hua V, §16, 85). 35. T o follow Husserl, "the series of appearances is r u l e d by a certain teleology" (Hua XVI, §39, 103). 36. This leads Held to describe the world "as this unovertakeable, the world is unsurpassable and in this way it is 'in itself" (Held 1980, 49). Cf. Michael Theunissen 1963, 352-53. 37. "I am, then in the strict sense only a thing that thinks" (Descartes 1986, 27; cf. 86). 38. "Essentially the person exists only in the p e r f o r m a n c e of intentional acts, and is therefore essentially not an object" (SuZ, §10, 48). It is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e that the r e d u c t i o n does not r e t u r n to an individual or personal consciousness, as Keller assumes (Keller 1999, 39). Indeed, Husserl criticizes Descartes for confusing the ego with the animus, which still belongs to n a t u r e , which needs to be bracketed. 39. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Husserl 1981a. 40. "Descartes" Heidegger argues, " . . . is credited with providing the point of d e p a r t u r e for m o d e r n philosophical inquiry by his discovery of the 'cogito sum.' H e investigates the 'cogitare'of the 'ego,' at least within certain limits. O n the other hand, he leaves the 'sum'completely undiscussed, even t h o u g h it is r e g a r d e d as n o less primordial than the cogito" (SuZ, §10, 4 5 - 4 6 ) . 4 1 . Heidegger's recourse to Husserl is thereby similar to Husserl's recourse to Descartes. Husserl uses Cartesian d o u b t "as a methodological device" (IdeenI, §31,64 / 54; translation my own) to facilitate the Cartesian overthrow (Umsturz; cf. CM §3, 48 / 8). Heidegger, meanwhile, uses Husserl's p h e n o m e nology "as a methodological device" that, this time, leads to Husserl's "overthrow." T o follow von H e r r m a n n : "Thus, Heidegger too seeks to achieve a phenomenological seeing that is independent of phenomenological directions" (von H e r r m a n n 1981, 14). Cf. Walter Biemel 1976, 204-5. Heidegger takes Husserl's m e t h o d seriously insofar as his philosophical bracketing includes the bracketing of what he regards to be Husserl's preconceptions. 42. SuZ, §43a, 202. Cf. SuZ, §43, 206. 43. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Husserl 1981a, 172. 44. As Simon Glendinning states it, "A response by refraining does n o t aim to refute skepticism b u t to u n d e r m i n e the whole fabric of thinking which sustains it as a threat" (Glendinning 1998, 23). 45. Although H e i d e g g e r insists that his analysis of the world is "always of s u b o r d i n a t e significance" (Zdhringer Seminare, 1 1 0 / 372), it is without d o u b t that h e can raise the question of Being only if h e succeeds in reframing epistemology. CHAPTER 2 1. This is exemplified in Husserl's claim that "the world of transcendent "res" is entirely referred to consciousness and, m o r e particularly, n o t to some logically conceived consciousness b u t to actual consciousness" (Ideen I, §49, 115-16/92).

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2. "Consciousness in this sense of the absolute m e a n s the priority of subjectivity over every objectivity. . . . This d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d conception of consciousness is likewise the place where idealism a n d idealistic inquiry, m o r e precisely idealism in the form of neo-Kantianism, enter into p h e n o m e n o l o g y " ( G A 2 0 , § l l c , 145). 3. Marion 1989, 127. Rudolf B o e h m m a k e s the same observation a n d notes that, t h o u g h n o Latin edition of Descartes's Principia can b e found in Husserl's library, the relevant passages are u n d e r l i n e d in Husserl's copy of J. H . von K i r c h m a n n ' s translation of Rene Descartes's Phihsophische Werke, Part Three: 'DiePrinzipien derPhilosophie,' Berlin, 1870. Cf. B o e h m 1959, 223 n. 41. 4. As Marion explains Husserl's slight r e p h r a s i n g of Descartes, "Why? Evidendy, because alia (res) would imply that consciousness was first a n d foremost a res. However, Husserl h e r e precisely u n d e r t a k e s to o p p o s e consciousness to realitas. T h u s , in o r d e r to only k e e p the application of substantiality to the ego, Husserl, in defiance of all philological probity, has to modify that which in Descartes's citation implicitly extends the realitas to the res cogitans" (Marion 1989,127). Cf. GA 20, §10,139. 5. " [ T ] h e a d u m b r a t e d is of essential necessity possible only as something spatial (it is spatial precisely in its essence)" (Ideen I, § 4 1 , 9 5 / 7 5 - 7 6 ) . As we shall show later, the a d u m b r a t e d (das Abgeschattete) is the characteristic of t r a n s c e n d e n t p e r c e p t i o n (cf. §§16 & 19 below). 6. GA 20, § l l c , 144. Cf. CM, §8, 60 / 22. 7. Ideen I, §46, 109 / 87, emphasis a d d e d (originally emphasized in the 1913 edition a n d in Kersten's translation, n o t e 232). 8. "According to eidetic law it is the case that physical existence is never required as necessary by the givenness of something physical, but is always in a certain m a n n e r contingent. This means: It can always be that the further course of experience necessitates giving u p what has already b e e n posited with a legitimacy derived from experience. Afterwards one says it was a m e r e illusion, a hallucination, merely a coherent dream, or the like" (Ideen I, §46,108 / 86). 9. Ideen I, §43, 98-99 / 78-79. Indeed, Husserl argues that we should never i n t e r p r e t transcendent perception as a sign or inadequate representation: "The holders of this view are misled by thinking that the transcendence belonging to the spatial physical thing is the transcendence belonging to something depicted or r e p r e s e n t e d by a sign. Frequently the picture-theory is attacked with zeal a n d a sign theory substituted for it. Both theories, however, a r e n o t only incorrect b u t countersensical. T h e spatial physical thing which we see is, with all its transcendence, still something perceived, given 'in p e r s o n ' in the m a n n e r peculiar to consciousness. It is n o t the case that, in its stead, a picture o r a sign is given. A picture-consciousness or a sign-consciousness must n o t b e substituted for perception" (ibid.). 10. "A n o t insignificant influence is exercised in these misinterpretations by the circumstance that o n e misinterprets t h e lack of sensuous intuitability. . . . [T]hat which is n o t intuitable sensuously is u n d e r s t o o d to b e a symbolic representative of something h i d d e n , which could b e c o m e an object of simple sensuous intuition if t h e r e were a better intellectual organization; a n d the m o d e l s a r e u n d e r s t o o d to serve as intuited schematic pictures in place of this

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h i d d e n reality having, accordingly, a function similar to the belonging to the hypothetical drawings of extinct living beings which the paleontologist makes o n t h e basis of m e a g r e Data" (Idem I, §52,129 / 102). 11. "If we are dealing, as h e r e , with the p e r c e p t i o n of a physical thing then it is i n h e r e n t in its essence to be an adumbrative perception; and, correlatively, it is i n h e r e n t in the sense of its intentional object, the physical thing as given in it, to be essentially perceivable only by perceptions of that kind, thus by adumbrative perceptions" (Idem I, §43,100 / 80, emphasis a d d e d ) . 12. Husserl h e r e intimates Nietzsche's observation: "We have abolished the real world: what world is left? the a p p a r e n t world p e r h a p s ? . . . But n o ! with the real world we have also abolished the a p p a r e n t world!" (1990a, 51). B o e h m illustrates this analogy in his excellent article (1962, 171). 13. In LU, we cannot yet find such a strong affirmation of finitude. "What is t r u e is absolutely, intrinsically true: truth is o n e a n d the same, w h e t h e r m e n or non-men, angels or gods a p p r e h e n d and j u d g e it" (LU, Prol., §36,125; LI, 140). However, even in the Ideen I, Husserl's account in this respect remains ambiguous. While in general he stresses the impossibility of an existence that is n o t constituted by consciousness, we can still find phrases like the following: "Obviously there a r e physical things a n d worlds of physical things which d o n o t admit of being definitely demonstrated in any h u m a n experience; b u t that has purely factual g r o u n d s which lie within the factual limits of such exp e r i e n c e " (Ideen I, § 4 8 , 1 1 4 / 9 1 ) . 14. Ideen I, §42,96 / 77. Indeed, the question will be whether H e i d e g g e r imitates this radical distinction with his articulation of the ontic-ontological difference between Dasein a n d entities. 15. "Reality, the reality of the physical thing taken singly a n d the reality of the whole world, lacks self-sufficiency in virtue of its essence (in o u r strict sense of the w o r d ) " (Ideen I §50, 118 / 93-94). 16. "Reality is n o t in itself something absolute which b e c o m e s tied secondarily to something else; rather, in the absolute sense, it is n o t h i n g at all; it has n o 'absolute essence' whatever; it has the essentiality of something which, of necessity, is only intentional, only an object of consciousness, something p r e s e n t e d (Vorstelliges) in the m a n n e r peculiar to consciousness, something a p p a r e n t [as a p p a r e n t ] " (Ideen I, §50, 118 / 94). 17. T h e main criticism of the GA 20 is that Husserl has n o t asked back into the being of intentionality (cf. GA 20, 178) a n d has thus forgotten the question of Being. We have dealt with these issues in chapter 1. H e i d e g g e r ' s critique is curious in view of the fact that before his publication of SuZ, h e hardly refers to Husserl's H u a X. It is, however, in these very lectures that the n a t u r e of intentionality is clarified. Heidegger observes in the preface to Husserl's publication that the significance of these lectures is "the growing, fund a m e n t a l clarification of intentionality" ( H u a X, 367). O n this question see Dahlstrom (1994). 18. As Held puts it: "Intellectual perception of phenomenological reflection thus immediately . . . encounters a m o m e n t of experience which withdraws from the desire to grasp it which must be a p p r e h e n d e d as an 'original fact'" (Held 1 9 6 6 , 2 3 - 2 4 ) .

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19. "A lived experience is n o t a d u m b r a t e d " (Idem I, §42, 97 / 77). 20. Unfortunately, Husserl is n o t consistent h e r e . Frequently h e refers to a d u m b r a t i o n s when describing the n a t u r e of the i m m a n e n t sphere. 2 1 . Ideen /, §81,198 / 163. In H u a XVI Husserl repeats this claim, b u t this time referring to the "dark abysses of time-consciousness" ( H u a XVI, §19,64). 22. As George Heffernan observes, according to Husserl, Descartes's doubt is n o t sufficiently radical even to address the problem of transcendence — namely, how can consciousness qua i m m a n e n c e reach the transcendent world? This question becomes meaningful only with the "discovery" of transcendental subjectivity. Indeed, according to Husserl, Descartes cannot even show how a subjective a n d i m m a n e n t character of consciousness can have objective a n d transcendent meaning. T o p u t it a n o t h e r way, "the h u m a n being existing naturally in the world cannot inquire transcendentally" (Heffernan 1997, 119). Moreover, Descartes falls prey to a circular argument. H e n e e d s to show "how any subjective perception can achieve objective validity' (ibid., 123), a n d this is why h e will resort to the idea of God. Husserl thereby takes Descartes to task, "questioning, n o t only what guarantees that clear a n d distinct perceptions in particular are true, b u t also what assures that evidence a n d truth in general ' c o r r e s p o n d ' ? " (ibid., 130). Descartes cannot answer this question, since h e can legitimate evidence only by validating it in terms of evidence again. 23. T h e question for Descartes is how the continuity of my existence as substance is g u a r a n t e e d t h r o u g h time: "For a life-span can b e divided into countless parts, each completely i n d e p e n d e n t of the others, so that it does n o t follow from the fact that I existed a little while ago that I must exist now, unless t h e r e is some cause which as it were creates m e afresh at this m o m e n t — t h a t is, which preserves m e " (Descartes 1986, 33). 24. T h e s e were published, however, only in 1928, fifteen years after the publication of Ideen I. 25. "The efforts of the a u t h o r concerning this enigma, a n d which were in vain for a long time, were b r o u g h t to a conclusion in 1905 with respect to what is essential; the results were communicated in lectures at the University of G6ttingen" (Ideen I, §81, 198 / 163 n. 1 [n. 26 in trans.]). B o e h m notes that, alt h o u g h Husserl argues in Ideen / t h a t the lectures were b r o u g h t to a conclusion in 1905, " T h e r e is a shift of perspective in Husserl's recollection. . . . In t r u t h ' T h e efforts of the a u t h o r c o n c e r n i n g this enigma, a n d which were in vain for a long time' were ' b r o u g h t to a conclusion' only a r o u n d 1909" ( B o e h m 1962, xxxi). T h e actual Vorlesungen zur Phdnomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, which were collated by Edith Stein a n d formally edited by Martin Heidegger, refer to a large extent to later writings dating u p to 1917. Even the first p a r t of these lectures, d a t e d 1905 —"Die Vorlesungen iiber das i n n e r e Zeitbewusstsein aus d e m J a h r e 1905" (see contents page) —are actually of a later origin. As B o e h m observes: "Only a few sections of the 'First Part' of the 1928 publication date back to 1905. T h e majority date back to the years 1907 to 1911 a n d even to 1917" (Boehm's introduction to H u a X, xxiii). Although H e i d e g g e r is the formal editor of the "Vorlesungen zur P h a n o m e n o l o g i e des i n n e r e n Zeitbewusstseins" ( H u a X) (published in Jahrbuch fur Philosophie und phanomenologische Forschung 9 [1928]: 3 6 7 - 4 9 9 ) , it n e e d s to b e n o t e d that

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H e i d e g g e r did n o t e n c o u r a g e Husserl to publish these lectures (as it is often maintained); rather, Husserl himself asked H e i d e g g e r to edit his lectures after Heidegger told him that he intended to dedicate SuZ to Husserl (cf. B o e h m ' s introduction to H u a X, xxiii-xxiv). F u r t h e r m o r e , to Husserl's dismay, Heidegger merely u n d e r t o o k some stylistic alterations, while the collating a n d editing was p e r f o r m e d by Husserl's assistant, Edith Stein. B o e h m cites a letter from Husserl to R o m a n Ingarden dated 13 July 1928 in which he expresses his disappointment with r e g a r d to H e i d e g g e r ' s effort: "Jahrbuchsb a n d , Volume IX, 500 pages is nearing completion. It contains my Vorlesungen iiber inneres ZeitbewuBtsein von 1905, including appendices u n a l t e r e d , a p a r t from a few stylistic changes i n t r o d u c e d by H e i d e g g e r who edited this volume. I was not even sent the proofs" (cited ibid., xxiv n. 2). 26. J o h n Barnett Brough awkwardly translates Ablaufsphanomene as "runningoff p h e n o m e n a " (Hua X, §10, 27 / 388); "flowing p h e n o m e n a " would be a m o r e suitable translation in this context. 27. "Brentano speaks of a law of original association according to which representations of a m o m e n t a r y memory attach themselves to the p e r c e p tions of the m o m e n t . . . . W h e n Brentano speaks of the acquisition of the future, h e distinguishes between the original intuition of time, which according to h i m is the creation of original association, a n d the e x t e n d e d intuition of time, which also derives from phantasy b u t n o t from original association" ( H u a X , §6, 1 5 - 1 6 / 3 7 9 ) . 28. Brentano, according to Husserl, thus opposes m e m o r y or memorial presentation to perception. It follows that when I hear a melody I actually perceive only a single n o t e at any o n e time. What B r e n t a n o calls m e m o r i a l presentation Husserl will call 'retention' (see below). 29. "Das originare Zeitfeld" (Hua X, §11, 31 / 391). 30. "Every actually present now of consciousness, however, is subject to the law of modification" (Hua X, §11, 29 / 390). 3 1 . "What 'individual' m e a n s h e r e is the original temporal form of sensation, or, as I can also p u t it, the temporal form of original sensation, h e r e of the sensation belonging to the c u r r e n t now-point a n d only to this" ( H u a X, §31,67/423). 32. T h e m o m e n t a r y act "is not the perception of the t e m p o r a l object; o n the contrary it is an abstractum" (Hua X, no. 29, 227). 33. Indeed, as Kern points out: "The most significant of Kant's discoveries according to Husserl was his doctrine of synthesis" (Kern 1964, 247). 34. T h e p r o b l e m for Husserl was that Kant accounted only for an active synthesis: "Husserl always u n d e r s t o o d Kant's 'synthesis' as creative or p r o d u c tive" (Kern 1964, 257). It should therefore not surprise us that Husserl emphasizes the A version of Kant's transcendental deduction. In the Idem I, Husserl pays the following tribute to Kant: "Thus, for example, the transcendental deduction in the first edition of the KRV, was actually operating inside the r e a l m of phenomenology" (Idem I, §62, 148 / 119). T h e A version of the transcendental d e d u c t i o n is also emphasized in his later writings (cf. Krisis, §28, 106). We can assume that Husserl, like Heidegger later, focuses o n the A version of the transcendental deduction because in it the gulf between intui-

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tion and u n d e r s t a n d i n g is r e d u c e d t h r o u g h the function of the transcendental imagination (cf. H e i d e g g e r ' s Kantbuch, especially §31). 35. F r o m 1909 onward Husserl increasingly uses the terms retention and protention rather than primary remembrance a n d primary expectation. H e also employs the t e r m primal impression or primal sensation rather than novyperception. O u r analysis focuses mostly o n these later versions of the text. 36. Although Husserl refers to p r o t e n t i o n frequently in the text, the core analysis centers a r o u n d retention. We shall t u r n specifically to the n a t u r e of p r o t e n t i o n later in the analysis. 37. William J a m e s referred to the extension of the presence long before Husserl: "The practically cognized present is n o knife-edge, b u t a saddle back" (William James, The Principles ofPsychology,\o\. 1 [New York: Dover Publications, 1890], 609, cited by Brough in the introduction to his translation of H u a X [xxviii] a n d by Rudolf Bernet in his introduction to Husserl's Texte zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), ed. Rudolf Bernet [ H a m b u r g : Meiner Verlag, 1985], xxii n. 1). According to Bernet, Husserl r e a d William J a m e s as early as 1891 or 1892, a n d especially in 1894; that is, at the time when h e worked on H u a X. It is therefore most likely that his interpretation of the ' e x t e n d e d ' presence has its source in J a m e s (cf. Bernet, ibid.). Indeed, Husserl himself refers to William James's concept of'fringes' in H u a X (appendix I, 151). 38. Levinas's notion of trace finds its origin in this analysis. T h e fundamental difference is that Husserl argues that retention is possible only if it is p r e c e d e d by an impression, while Levinas believes that the trace is always already in the past a n d has never b e e n present. Both, however, p o i n t to an appearing without a content, an intention without an intentum (cf. the last three essays in D E H H ) . 39. A n d therefore atomistic psychologism. 40. Cf. H u a X, §11, 45 / 405; §19, 32 / 391, n o . 12, 34. O n the n a t u r e of the t e m p o r a l extendedness of experience, see also Miller 1982. 4 1 . "Retentional consciousness really contains consciousness of the past of the tone, primary m e m o r y of the tone, a n d must n o t be divided into sensed tone a n d a p p r e h e n s i o n as m e m o r y " ( H u a X, §12, 32 / 393). 42- "It must be b o r n e clearly in m i n d that the Data of sensation which exercise the function of a d u m b r a t i o n s of color, of smoothness, of shape, etc. (the function of 'presentation') are, of essential necessity, entirely different from color simpliciter, smoothness simpliciter, shape simpliciter, and, in short, from all kinds of m o m e n t s belonging to physical things. T h e a d u m b r a tion, t h o u g h called by the same n a m e , of essential necessity is n o t of the same genus as the o n e to which the a d u m b r a t e d belongs. T h e a d u m b r a t i n g is a lived experience. But a lived experience is possible only as a lived experience, a n d n o t as something spatial. However, the a d u m b r a t e d is of essential necessity possible only as something spatial" (Ideen I, §41, 94-95 / 75). 43. "Both the inner temporal object and the experiencing of an inner t e m p o r a l object are thus assimilative wholes, not disjunctive a n d exclusive as spatial objects are" (Sokolowski 1974, chapter 6, §62,164). Within all Husserl's systematic!ty, a peculiar Nietzschean m o m e n t suddenly seems to erupt.

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44. "Formlose Stoffe u n d stofflose F o r m e n " {Ideen I, §85, 209 / 173). 45. A dualism exists between feeling a n d t h o u g h t that m a p s the distinction between non-intentional a n d intentional lived experiences. Thus, we n e e d to differentiate between hyle, the formless stuff, a n d noesis, the intentional mom e n t , In LU Husserl already refers to t h e m as non-intentional Erlebnisse: "That not all experiences a r e intentional is p r o v e d by sensations a n d sensational complexes. Any piece of a sensed visual field, full as it is of visual contents, is an experience containing many part-contents, which are n e i t h e r r e f e r r e d to, n o r intentionally objective, in the whole" (LU V, §10, 382 / 83; LI, 556).Cf.LUV,§15b. 46. "Primary contents are at all times b e a r e r s of rays of a p p r e h e n s i o n , a n d they d o n o t occur without such rays, however i n d e t e r m i n a t e the latter may b e " ( H u a X, a p p e n d i x III, 105 / 456). 47. Merleau-Ponty 1962,152. Eugen Fink makes an analogous claim: "In truth, however, there is n o dualism of heterological moments in the p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l idea of constitution b u t only relative strata within the unified constitutive disclosure of the world's origin from within the depths of the transcendental subject's life. Both the hyle, which is first exhibited as the act's nonintentional m o m e n t , a n d the totality-form of the act itself a r e constituted within the d e p t h s of the intentional self-constitution of p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l time, a constitution which, however, does n o t p r o c e e d by m e a n s of acts" (Fink 1 9 6 6 , 1 3 6 37). 48. "We already suggested above, w h e n we characterized the stream of lived experiences as a unity of consciousness, that intentionality, disregarding its enigmatic forms a n d levels, is also like a universal m e d i u m which ultimately b e a r s in itself all lived experiences, even those which are n o t themselves characterized as intentive. At the level of consideration to which we a r e confined until further notice, a level which abstains from descending into the obscure d e p t h s of the ultimate consciousness which constitutes all such temporality as belongs to lived experiences, a n d instead takes lived experiences as they offer themselves as unitary t e m p o r a l processes in reflection o n what is i m m a n e n t , we must, however, essentially distinguish two things: 1. all the lived experiences designated in the Logische U n t e r s u c h u n g e n as 'primary contents'; 2. the lived experiences or their m o m e n t s which b e a r in themselves a specific trait of intentionality" {Ideen 7, §85, 207-8 / 171-2, emphasis a d d e d ) . 49. Shortly before 1928 Husserl notes in his "critical r e m a r k s " (Textkritische Anmerkungen) to §88 of Ideen I: "It is n o t until p . 199 [of the English translation] that it is said in passing that 'noesis' signifies the same thing as 'concrete-complete intentive lived experience,' with 'emphasis o n its noetic c o m p o n e n t s . ' T h u s the hyletic m o m e n t s belong to the noesis in so far as they b e a r the functions of intentionality, u n d e r g o sense-bestowal, help constitute a c o n c r e t e noematic sense. But this must be stated earlier with c o r r e s p o n d i n g seriousness. I myself have vacillated before in distinguishing noetic a n d hyletic m o m e n t s " {Ideen /, §88, 218 / 181 n. 2). This passage is cited also by Sokolowski (1964, 180). 50. "Consciousness is n o t h i n g without impression" ( H u a X, a p p e n d i x I, 100/451).

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5 1 . I n d e e d the following passage a d d e d to the 1928 edition appears to confirm o u r suspicions: "'Sensed' would then be the indication of a relational concept that in itself would signify nothing about whether what is sensed is sensual — indeed, about whether it is immanent at all in the sense of what is sensual. In o t h e r words, it would r e m a i n o p e n whether what is sensed is itself already constituted and p e r h a p s entirely different from the sensual. — But this whole distinction is best left aside; not every constitution has the schema: apprehensioncontent-apprehension" ( H u a X, §1, 7, n. 7, emphasis a d d e d ) . 52. D e r r i d a 1973, 65-66. Cf. p p . 8 3 - 8 5 . 53. I a m a d h e r i n g to Marion's critique of Derrida. Marion argues that Derrida's reading of Husserl's p h e n o m e n o l o g y as a "metaphysics of presence" is too narrow. D e r r i d a is c o n c e r n e d only with the Urimpression, which never appears and therefore fails to acknowledge that Husserl enlarges the present: "Paradoxially, Derrida's interpretation is n o t radical e n o u g h (by assuming that the significance lies in the r u p t u r e with the presence a n d thus is outside of metaphysics), since this r e a d i n g relies u p o n a too limited understanding of the presence which lacks the d e p t h of a truly Husserlian donation" (Marion 1989, 56; see especially chapter 1, 11-63). 54. Since we are reading the H u a X in relation to Ideen I, it is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e that Husserl acknowledges the i m p o r t a n c e of Kant to p h e n o m e n o l o g y in Ideen I: "Thus, for example, the transcendental d e d u c t i o n in the first edition of the KRV was actually operating inside the realm of phenomenology" (Ideen I, §62, 148 / 119). Husserl, however, at this stage still reads the deduction in psychologist!c terms, for h e continues: "But Kant misinterpreted that realm as psychological a n d therefore h e himself a b a n d o n e d it" (ibid.). As Kern observes, we have to r e m e m b e r to r e a d Husserl's interpretation "in the context of N a t o r p ' s interpretation of Kant a n d his conception of philosophical psychology" (Kern 1964, 194). Although H u a X needs to be r e a d as a response to Meinong a n d Brentano, we believe that the sections written after 1907 indicate Kantian influences, as the next section o n the n a t u r e of the transcendental consciousness will explain. However, the aim of this analysis is n o t to follow Husserl's reading of Kant—which has b e e n already investigated by Kern (ibid.)—but to clarify Husserl's thought by drawing o n Kant. Kockelmans gives a short overview of the gradual shift in Husserl's thinking from an empiricist conception derived from Brentano to the Kantian conception of the p u r e ego a n d N a t o r p ' s interpretation of Kant (Kockelmans 1977). 55. This is against the observation of A r o n Gurwitsch, who sides with Husserl's critique of Kant. For Gurwitsch, Kant, together with the empiricist tradition in m o d e r n philosophy, confuses sense data or psychic facts {Empfindungen) with sensible qualities in the object as presented (Gurwitsch 1966, 158). According to Kern, Husserl r e a d mainly the first edition of Kant's KRV between 1907 a n d 1909: "Almost t h r o u g h o u t Husserl uses the Kahrbach edition which is based on the A version" (Kern 1964, 30). W h e t h e r this is d u e to the fact that h e had only the first edition at h a n d or whether we n e e d to attribute a greater significance to it, we leave uninvestigated. O u r account of the transcendental object = X is, however, strongly based o n the A version. T h e A version deals with what Allison calls the "'weighty' sense of object"

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(Allison 1983,147), which is c o n c e r n e d with the conditions of representation of a n object, in contrast to the B version, which is c o n c e r n e d with the objective validity of the unity of apperception. W h e n we t u r n to the 'status' of the transcendental subject, below, we shall draw on the B version. 56. T o follow H e n r y Allison's reading of the status of the transcendental object = x: "The transcendental question therefore concerns the consciousness of this necessity, i.e., how its 'sense' arises in consciousness. This immediately shifts the discussion from the empirical-realistic to the transcendentally idealistic standpoint" (Allison 1975, 151). Allison in this text continues to show the extent to which Kant can be r e a d as a phenomenologist. 57. Brough makes a similar point when h e argues: "The now is n o t a thing in any sense. It is r a t h e r a m o d e of appearance" (Brough 1989, 257). 58. H u a X, §16,40 / 400. T h e not-now h e r e refers to the n a t u r e of retention. Husserl continues: "And to this corresponds the continuous transition of p e r c e p t i o n into primary m e m o r y " (ibid.). This passage was composed in 1905, which explains why Husserl still refers to the not-now a n d primary rem e m b r a n c e r a t h e r than retention. Husserl started employing the t e r m retention only from 1909 onward. We are keeping to the later terminology a n d will use the term retention t h r o u g h o u t , since the t e r m not-now still suggests a r u p t u r e with the present. 59. Cf. Levinas's essay, "Intentionalite et Sensation," in D E H H , esp. 155-56. 60. Retention does n o t make present something that is not; neither is it a re-presentation or a signification. As Husserl emphasizes in his lectures o n H u a XI: "It is dangerous to refer to a representing or represented, to an interpretation of sense-data or even o n the basis of such an 'interpretation' to refer to an outward directedness. T o be adumbrated, or manifested as sensory-data is completely different to the interpretation of signs" (Hua XI, § 4 , 1 7 ) . 6 1 . It is Yvonne Picard who reads Husserl's account of time in terms of a Hegelian dialectic (cf. Picard 1946, 99 or 111-12). This extremely sensitive a n d thought-provoking r e a d i n g of Heidegger a n d Husserl o n the question of time was published in 1947, after her death. Picard was engaged in the French resistance m o v e m e n t a n d died d u r i n g deportation. Levinas pays h e r the following tribute: "Cf. o n the whole p r o b l e m of time a n d intentionality—see the detailed study published in Deucalion in 1947. Yvonne Picard's thesis for the Diplome d'etudes superieures must have b e e n written d u r i n g the first years of occupation. This text notably shows the significance of a p p e n d i x V of H u a X. By following the p a t h o p e n e d u p byJean-Wahl it is one of the first attempts that vigorously rethinks Husserl's detailed analysis. Picard thus prefigures the thinking of Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur and Derrida. It compares Husserl a n d H e i d e g g e r , a n d Heidegger does not always have the final word. Yvonne Picard died during d e p o r t a t i o n because of her involvement with the F r e n c h resistance movement; h e r descent cannot be the cause of her m a r t y r d o m . We wish to pay her o u r reverent homage—eternally—by evoking h e r t h o u g h t a n d thus allowing h e r d e a d lips to move" (DEHH, 156). Picard is also paid h o m a g e by H e l d (1966, 45 n. 2). 62. For Husserl, recollection (Erinnerung) is the primordial form of objectification (ursprunglicheForm der Vergegenwdrtigung).

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63. "The time in recollection, of course, is also given as oriented in each moment of the memory; but each point presents an objective time-point that can be identified again and again. . . . I have an original schema: a flow with its content. But I have in addition an original multiplicity of the 'I can': I can shift back to any position in the flow and produce it 'once again'" (Hua X, appendix IV, 108-9 / 460-61). 64. It is not that recollection simply draws on an even more distant past; rather, remembrance has no concrete immediate impression. There is a structural difference, for while retention is constantly modified and turned into a retention of second order, in recollection the whole perception is given. Objective time does not sink back; is not a temporal event but a static object remembered. 65. As Held observes: "Thereby he has dropped the sensuous construction of a pure stream of consciousness which is based on pre-given, quantified hyletic data, but not the idea that the unity that maintains the stream at standstill is something like an 'originary impulse' as a pre-figuration of any determinant content whatsoever. (Husserl himself alludes to Fichte's notion of an 'incomprehensible impulse' in Hua IX, p. 287)"( Held 1981, 199 & n. 25). 66. The 'width' or 'extent' of the temporal field varies depending on the intensity of our reflective regard. Husserl tellingly uses terms such as the aging and fading of a tone and the wakening of the new tone. Factually and psychologically Husserl admits that retentions do not extend very far (cf. Hua X, appendix II, 153). However, Husserl does not exclude the possibility that we could, in principle, have an infinitely large retentive field "and idealiter a consciousness is probably even possible in which everything remains preserved retentionally" (Hua X, §11, 31 / 391 n. 1). Cf. Held 1966, 27, and 1981, 205. 67. "We say of the elapsed extent that it is intended in retentions;... And the situation is the same after the whole duration has elapsed: what lies nearest to the actually present now, depending on its distance from it, perhaps has a little clarity; the whole [then] disappears into obscurity, into an empty retentional consciousness, and finally disappears altogether (if one is permitted to assert that) as soon as retention ceases" (Hua X, §9, 26 / 387). 68. Barnett Brough, introduction to his translation of Hua X, xxiii. 69. "Consciousness is a perpetual Heraclitean flux" (Hua X, No. 51, 349). 70. "In itself every lived experience is a flux of becoming" (Ideen I, §78, 182/149). 71. As Held points out, "the 'now' is a transitional continuum and thus not originally border, but number. This is already how Aristode has defined time" (Held 1981, 200). 72. Husserl points to this reversal of direction in relation to remembrance and expectation: "To that extent, the intuition belonging to expectation is memorial intuition turned upside down, for in memory's case the intentions aimed at the now do not 'precede' the event but follow after it" (Hua X, §26, 5 5 - 5 6 / 4 1 3 ) . 73. A similar argument is developed by Donald Davidson in his 1974 article "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" (Davidson 1984,183-99). 74. It is exactly this claim that "there can be no experience of a first (last)

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t e m p o r a l event" that leads Heidegger to affirm that time is essentially finite. Cf. chapter 4 and Merlan (1947). 75. Yvonne Picard argues that, while Husserl's notion of time a n d therefore future is dialectical in relation to the present, Heidegger prioritizes the future non-dialectically (Picard 1946, 95-124). Cf. chapter 4, §74. 76. Indeed, the most crucial passages to which we refer date from 1911. As B o e h m notes in the critical edition H u a X, this third section of analysis, which is c o n c e r n e d with the question of constitution—the Time-Constituting Flow ( § § 3 5 - 3 9 ) - d a t e s from 1911 or after. "The text of §§ 35-39 from this p o i n t on is based o n the text of a sketch that probably did n o t originate before the e n d of 1911. T h e sketch is completely r e p r o d u c e d in its original form (to the extent that it has b e e n preserved) as No. 54 in the supplementary texts" ( H u a X, §35, 73 n. 4). 77. Fink interprets Heraclitus's Fragment 30 in the following way: "The nvp dei^coov is neither like a process within time, n o r is it comparable with the way in which Kant describes the world matter, namely, as the substrate of an always subsisting time. What Heraclitus h e r e calls 'fire' is n o t in time b u t time as 'letting time b e " ' (Eugen Fink in "Martin H e i d e g g e r — E u g e n Fink: Heraklit" in GA 15, 95 / 97). 78. M S B 1,14, XIII, 27 (1933), cited by H e l d (1966, 87 n. 2). ["Schaudert uns nicht vor diesen Tiefen? Wer hat sie j e ernstlich zum systematischen T h e m a gemacht in d e n J a h r t a u s e n d e n der Vergangenheit, wer h a t an die ersten Reflexionen eines Augustin anknupfend an d e n Weg zu den, M u t t e r n ' sein L e b e n gewagt?"] 79. H u a VIII, a p p e n d i x XXI, 442. ["Das 'gegeniiber' d e m Weltlich-Realen als 'bloB subjektiv' —obschon schon transzendental —subjektiv—zu Bezeichnende ist selbst wieder Konstituiertes, obschon n u n nicht m e h r als real, das Konstituierende seinerseits wieder . . . Man muB d e n Mut h a b e n , selbst wo Regresse ' d r o h e n , ' zu sagen, was m a n sieht, u n d es in seiner Evidenz gelten lassen. Die Medusen sind n u r d e m gefahrlich, d e r an sie im voraus glaubt u n d sie furchtet. Es m o g e n hier zunachst Ratsel iibrig bleiben, aber es sind e b e n Ratsel, unlosbare Ratsel sind Widersinn."] 80. These passages were written in 1910. As the translator B r o u g h notes, "Rudolf Bernet has . . . located the original manuscripts for §§42-45; they b e a r the date: '21.2.1910'" ( H u a X, §42, 88 n. 1). 8 1 . "The entire p h e n o m e n o l o g y I had in view in the Logical Investigations was the p h e n o m e n o l o g y of experience in the sense of data of internal consciousness; a n d this, in any event, is a closed f i e l d . . . . T h u s it is u n d e r s t o o d why I could identify sensing and the content of sensation in the Logical Investigations. If I moved within the boundaries of internal consciousness, t h e n naturally there was n o sensing there b u t only something sensed" ( H u a X, app e n d i x XVII, 127-28 / 482) / 82. "But in every case—and not only in the case of continuous change—the consciousness of otherness, of differentness, presupposes a unity. Something e n d u r i n g must be there in the variation and in the change as well, something that makes u p the identity of that which changes or that which u n d e r g o e s a variation" (Hua X, §41, 87 / 440).

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83. However, we have to r e m e m b e r that H u a X has to be read as a response to Meinong and Brentano, and does not deal with Kant directly. Indeed, Husserl refers to Kant only in a handwritten marginalia (cf. H u a X, No. 35 n. 16). However, the significance of Kant is acknowledged in Idem I (cf. §36 below). 84. "But this p e r m a n e n t cannot be an intuition in m e . For all g r o u n d s of d e t e r m i n a t i o n of my existence which a r e to b e m e t within m e are representations; a n d as representations themselves require a p e r m a n e n t distinct from them, in relation to which their change, a n d so my existence in the time wherein they change, may be d e t e r m i n e d " (KRV, Bxxxix a n d B276). 85. This coincides with the time when h e developed the idea of p h e n o m e nology as a transcendental philosophy. T h e transcendental r e d u c t i o n was first i n t r o d u c e d in 1907 in H u a II. Biemel, however, in his introduction to H u a II (p. viii), notes that the initial idea of the reduction can already be found in the Seefeld papers, dated s u m m e r 1905: "We can already find a first attempt at the idea of the reduction in the so called Seefeld papers of the s u m m e r 1905, (Sign a t u r e : A VII 25)." Kern believes that Kant played a m u c h m o r e significant role after H u a II. "In fact there is a great deal of evidence that after his decisive lectures in the s u m m e r semester of 1907 that Husserl worked intensively o n Kant" (Kern 1964, 2 9 - 3 0 ) . 86. Idem I, §57, 138 / 109 n 7. Cf. Kern 1964, 4 1 . 87. E m m a n u e l Levinas, "Intentionalite et Sensation," in D E H H , 154. 88. "This p r e p h e n o m e n a l , p r e i m m a n e n t temporality becomes constituted intentionally as the form of the time-constituting consciousness and in it itself' ( H u a X, §39, 83 / 436). 89. As Husserl says, "What matters to m e h e r e is only to lift the veil a little from this world of time-consciousness, so rich in mystery, that u p until now has b e e n h i d d e n from us" (Hua X, No. 39, 276). 90. "Dogma von d e r Momentaneitat eines BewuBtseinsganzen" ( H u a X, §7, 20 / 383 ). This is a phrase Husserl adopts from "William Stern: Psychische Prasenzzeit" (psychic presence-time), in Zeitschrifi fir Psychologie und Physiologie der SinnesorganeXIII (1897): 325-49 (ibid., n. 2; n. 3 in the translation). B o e h m provides the full citation: "'Dogma of the momentariness of a whole of consciousness or, in other words, of the necessary isochronism of its m e m b e r s ' is found on p . 330 f. of this article. — Cf. also William Stern: Psychologie der Veranderungsauffassung [Psychology of the a p p r e h e n s i o n of change] (Breslau, 1898)" (ibid., n. 2). 91. E m m a n u e l Levinas, "Rupture de 1'immanence" in DQVT, 1982, 53. 92. H u a X, n o . 20, 192. Brough (1989) emphasizes the same issue. T h e particular passage is cited o n p p . 283-84. 93. Barnett Brough translates Ldngsintentionalitdt as horizontal intentionality. H e r e , however, J a m e s S. Churchill's chosen translation, longitudinal intentionality, seems m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e . Cf. J a m e s S. Churchill's translation of H u a X,107-8. 94. "The unity of a tone-duration, for example, b e c o m e s constituted in the flow, b u t the flow itself becomes constituted in t u r n as the unity of the consciousness of the tone-duration" ( H u a X, §39, 80 / 434). 95. As B r o u g h observes, "There is a kind of fissure between my acts, my

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sensory experiences and the marginal awareness of them that I continually possess. This is the abiding character of the life of consciousness itself over against the implicitly recognized transitory character of any one act of consciousness or state of mind" (Brough 1977, 94). 96. MS C7 II, 12 (1932), cited by Held (1966, 70). ["'Urphanomen,' in dem alles, was sonst Phanomen heiBen mag, in welchem Sinne immer, seine Quelle hat. Es ist die stehende-stromende Selbstgegenwart bzw. das sich selbst stromend gegenwartige absolute Ich in seinem stehend-stromenden Leben."] 97. Boehm (the editor of Hua X) notes that the word retention was added later. 98. MS C21,5 (1931), cited by Sokolowski (1974, §60,158 n. 19). The full citation reads: "All these expressions, which involve the words temporalization [Zeitigung], time, world, and also object, when they are not mundanely used, have a sense that first comes out when the transcendental-reductive method is systematically exercised; and so their sense is completely foreign to the natural language" (ibid.). Cf. Hua X, no. 54, 371. 99. Nietzsche 1978, §1341,476. ["Zeitiosigkeitund Sukzession vertragen sich miteinander, sobald der Intellekt weg ist!"] 100. Idem 7, §50, 119 / 94; the translator Kersten adds this in note 28. 101. What Sartre will come to call the pre-reflexive consciousness. 102. "Perception has its own form of intentionality which has nothing in it of the active attitude of the T or its constitutive activity" (Hua XI, §14, 54). 103. Reflection on lived experiences. 104. Heidegger will show that there is another form of disclosure that neither is based on the perceptual model, nor has its starting point in a punctual now. Being in the world as a whole is disclosed through Stimmungen (cf. chapter 4, §71 &.). 105. "La trace de Vautre" in DEHH, 156. 106. Husserl in this text does not refer to the phenomenon of life as such but to the fact that history is a necessary precondition for radical philosophical reflection. Yet this is founded on the fact that Husserl realizes that it is impossible to return to this absolute beginning. Landgrebe makes a similar observation. However he does not refer to Hua X, but to Husserl's later lectures in Hua VIII (1923-1924). The Krisis is not a break with Husserl's earlier beginnings but is rather the consequence of a program dedicated to an ultimate establishing of philosophical truth upon "absolute experience" (Landgrebe 1981b, 98). 107. Landgrebe uses this expression to describe this unconscious surrender (Landgrebe 1981b, 98). 108. Cf. chapter 4, §74ff. CHAPTER 3 1. From Denise Souche-Dagues, who compiled Husserl's marginalia in his copy of SuZ, we know that Husserl always felt misunderstood when Heidegger referred to a "worldless I": "Every time Husserl read terms such as

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"worldless T " in Heidegger's writings he is correct in believing it refers to himself (he notes objection [Einwand]). But he considers it to be based u p o n a distortion of his thinking, which is the result of a linguistic deviation. This in his eyes is unjustified a n d unjustifiable. In o t h e r words, the deliberate use of a Heideggerian text in any other register than that of transcendental phen o m e n o l o g y is challenged by Husserl, because h e considers the results of the existential analytic to be identical with those of phenomenology, b u t deprived of the rigour which the m e t h o d of constitution ensures" (Souche-Dagues 1993, 125), Cf. Husserl 1994. 2. "It [the reduction] disregards not only reality b u t also any particular individuation of lived experiences. It disregards the fact that the acts are m i n e or those of any other individual h u m a n being and regards t h e m only in their what. It regards the what, the structure of the acts" ( G A 2 0 , §12, 151). 3. "Der Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikel," second version, in H u a IX, 274 n. 1. Cf. Biemel 1977. As Sheehan reports, this critique originated eight years before the publication of SuZ: "In a recently discovered letter of J u n e 20,1919, from o n e H e r r Walter of Freiburg to Professor Pfander, we find that . . . Heidegger was openly criticizing the transcendental ego in Husserl. Walter r e p o r t s that at o n e of the Saturday-morning discussions which Husserl was accustomed to have at his h o m e , the young Doctors Ebbinghaus a n d Heidegger launched a 'campaign against the p u r e e g o ' " (Sheehan 1979, 199). 4. In this m a n n e r , David R. C e r b o n e claims, Heidegger affirms n o t only a h u m a n standpoint, b u t "one might say, a worlded o n e " ( C e r b o n e 1994, 419). 5. H e n r i Birault makes a similar point: "Heidegger . . . replaces an intentional conception of transcendence with a transcendental conception of intentionality" (Birault 1978, 492). Cf. chapter 4, "From ' I m m a n e n t Trans c e n d e n c e ' to ' T r a n s c e n d e n t I m m a n e n c e , ' " §68 ff. 6. Zdhringer Seminare, 123 / 385. A literal translation would be "displacem e n t of location." 7. As we know from his recendy published lectures, Phdnomenologie der Anschauung (1920): "The 'Ego' is a source of p r o b l e m s only for a problematic governed t h r o u g h o u t by the idea of constitution. T h e r e f o r e the starting-point has its sense only in the idea of constitution. T h e 'Ego' as source of problems, as the g r o u n d of all givenness is the 'I think' which must be capable of accompanying all consciousness. In this way, the 'Ego' maintains the quite determinate role it has b e e n assigned, which is decisive a n d original, namely, that of basis for all constitution within consciousness of every manifold" (GA 5 9 , 1 5 b , 131-32). 8. Cf. SuZ, §10, 46. 9. 'Nachwort' in Ideen III, 146 / 556, emphasis a d d e d . 10. Indeed, in 1954 Heidegger believes that S c h o p e n h a u e r ' s famous dict u m epitomizes m o d e r n philosophy: "'The world is my representation.' In this sentence S c h o p e n h a u e r has s u m m e d u p the t h o u g h t of r e c e n t philosophy" (WhD, 15 / 39, translation slightly altered). 11. T h e subject is "£G)OV Xoyov £#ov a n d this is I n t e r p r e t e d to m e a n an animal rationale, something living which has reason" (SuZ, §10, 48).

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12. As Leibniz has already argued: "The fundamental principle of reasoning is that there is nothing without a reason; or, to explain the m a t t e r m o r e distinctly, that t h e r e is n o truth for which a reason does n o t subsist" (Leibniz 1973,172). 13. SuZ, § 4 , 1 2 , emphasis a d d e d . 14. SuZ ( R a n d b e m e r k u n g e n ) , 12d,440. 15. "Implicitly" insofar as Husserl is n o t m e n t i o n e d by n a m e in this section. 16. This citation continues, emphasizing that it is only because of its failu r e to raise the question of Being that "idealism is n o less naive in its m e t h o d t h a n the most grossly militant realism" (SuZ, §43a, 208). Idealism thus has the potential to express an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the differentiation between Being a n d beings by positing that consciousness c a n n o t b e explained t h r o u g h a recourse to reality, a potential which is denied to realism. "If what the t e r m 'idealism' says, a m o u n t s to t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g that Being can never b e explained by entities b u t is already that which is 'transcendental' for every entity, then idealism affords the only correct possibility for a philosophical problematic" (SuZ, §43a, 208, emphasis a d d e d ) . 17. It is in his lecture course, Die Grundbegriffe derMetaphysik (GA 29 / 30), that H e i d e g g e r develops the distinctions between m a n , animals, a n d things. While SuZ brackets the question of animals a n d is interested only in the distinction between Dasein a n d beings of a n o t h e r character than its own (what Husserl calls the world of things [Dingwelt]), in these lectures H e i d e g g e r addresses the status of animals directly a n d distinguishes between t h r e e kinds of beings: 1) h u m a n Dasein, which is world-forming (tueltbildend), 2) animal Dasein, which is ' p o o r in world' (weltarm), a n d 3) things, which are worldless (weltlos). In these sections it is without question that H e i d e g g e r does n o t wish to give way to a biological determinism, n o r to a vague experience of life, b u t wishes to u p h o l d a distinctiveness of human Dasein. T h e significance of this analysis is that t h e difference between poverty a n d wealth is n o t o n e of d e g r e e . H e i d e g g e r argues for a deprivation of world (Entbehrung) that is peculiar to animals a n d n o t to things, a n d that should n o t b e r e a d as a m o m e n t of inferiority. T h e aim is to avoid an a n t h r o p o c e n t r i s m (that is still implicit in SuZ), yet at the same time to maintain a structure of differentiation. This complex s t r u c t u r e of differentiation without hierarchization has b e e n well illustrated by D e r r i d a (1987, chapter 6). Despite this differentiation Michel H a a r believes that Heidegger remains within the humanist tradition, for the aim is n o t to b e c o m e a c r e a t u r e (cf. GA 54, 229, cited by H a a r 1993, 31). O u r analysis h e r e will r e m a i n within the framework of SuZ, a n d thus will bracket the question of the Being of animals. 18. In his later writings H e i d e g g e r addresses the significance of language directly, admitting: "The capacity to speak distinguishes the h u m a n being as a h u m a n being. . . . Man would n o t b e m a n if it were d e n i e d him to speak— ceaselessly, ubiquitously, with respect to all things, in manifold variations, yet for t h e most p a r t tacitly—by way of an 'It is.' I n a s m u c h as language grants this very thing, the essence of m a n consists in language" ("Der Weg zur Sprache," 1959, in UzS, 241; GA 12, 229; BW, 397-98). T h e h i d d e n a g e n d a of SuZ is the

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relation between Being a n d language, which, however, remains in the backg r o u n d . "I only know o n e thing: because reflection o n language, a n d o n Being, has d e t e r m i n e d my path of thinking from early on, therefore their discussion has stayed as far as possible in the background. T h e fundamental flaw of the book Being and Time is p e r h a p s that it ventured forth far too early" ("Aus einem Gesprach von d e r Sprache; Zwischen einem J a p a n e r u n d einem Fragenden," 1953/54, in UzS, 93; GA 12, 88-89; OWL, 7). For m o r e o n language a n d SuZ, please see the appendix. 19. Many of the terms that a r e used to characterize the distinctiveness of Dasein are indeed related to language use: Reference (Verweisung), sign (Zeicheri), significance (Bedeutsamkeit), u n d e r s t a n d i n g (Verstehen), Interpretation (Austegung), discourse (Rede), Language (Sprache), or assertion (Aussage). 20. "If to I n t e r p r e t the m e a n i n g of Being becomes o u r task, Dasein is n o t only the primary entity to be interrogated; it is also that entity which already c o m p o r t s itself, in its Being, towards what we are asking about when we ask this question. But in that case the question of Being is n o t h i n g o t h e r than the radicalization of an essential tendencyof-Being which belongs to Dasein itself — the p r e o n t o l o g i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Being" (SuZ, §4, 14-15). 21. This is well illustrated by Sallis (1986). 22. As H e i d e g g e r writes to Husserl: "It has to b e shown that Dasein's m o d e of Being is totally different from that of all other beings a n d that, as the m o d e of Being it is, it precisely contains in itself the possibility of transcendental constitution" (Brief, 601 / 119E). 23. This leads Cristina Lafont to argue: "With this 'distinctiveness' which guarantees the basis for the equation of the difference between B e i n g / b e i n g s and the dichotomy D a s e i n / a n d beings of a n o t h e r character than Dasein, the subject-object schema is already structurally a d o p t e d " (Lafont 1994, 44). However, the distinctiveness of Dasein lies in its diversity, which cannot b e c o m p a r e d with the unitary starting point of the transcendental subject. Cf. chapter 4, §77ff. Moreover, Heidegger believes that Dasein's distinctiveness exceed the subject-object dualism insofar as the language o f ' e s s e n c e ' or 'substance' does n o t pertain to Dasein. Dasein has to b e described in terms of its 'existential analytic'. I n other words, we should n o t refer to two distinct substances since Dasein's distinctiveness lies in the fact that it is n o t a thing (res) o r substance. 24. "Dasein also possesses—as constitutive for its understanding of existence — a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the Being of all entities of a character o t h e r than its own" (SuZ, §4, 13). 25. "Only as long as Dasein is (that is, only as long as an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of Being is ontically possible), 'is t h e r e ' Being" (SuZ, §43c, 212). This sentence should n o t b e u n d e r s t o o d as a 'subjectification of Being'. Cf. §77ff. 26. Heidegger later realizes that SuZ's starting point remains too m u c h entwined with the tradition (which seeks its starting point in the reflective subject) . Questioning cannot b e the beginning of thinking: "The authentic attitude of thinking is not a putting of questions—rather, it is a listening to the address, the promise of what is to b e p u t in question. But in the history of o u r thinking, asking questions has since the early days been r e g a r d e d as the characteristic

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p r o c e d u r e of thinking, a n d n o t without good cause. Thinking is m o r e thoughtful in p r o p o r t i o n as it takes a m o r e radical stance, as it goes to the radix, t h e r o o t of all that is." ("Das Wesen der Sprache," 1957-58, in UzS, 175; OWL, 71). Questioning itself is the "'piety of thinking"' (ibid., UzS, 175; OWL, 72). For what p r e c e d e s any questioning is that we are "addressed by the voice of Being" ("Nachwort zu: »Was ist Metaphysik?«" 1943, in Wegmarken, 103 / 305; Heidegger 1975b, 261). This thought, although intimated in H e i d e g g e r ' s t r e a t m e n t of the call of conscience, remains relatively undevelo p e d in SuZ. Jean-Luc Marion has convincingly shown how Dasein's existential analytic still intimates a self-constituting ego and thus represents the last heir to the tradition (cf. Marion 1996). 27. However, it is i m p o r t a n t to keep in m i n d that the world Heidegger has in m i n d has n o t h i n g in c o m m o n with Husserl's definition of the transcend e n t world. Indeed, Heidegger will also bracket the transcendent world. H e will write it in quotation marks. As we shall show below a n d in chapter 4, the existential structure of the world should never be confused with the categorial u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the world. It refers neither to the totality of entities which are present-at-hand n o r to the Being of those entities, b e it the world of mathematics or biology. Rather these ontic a n d ontologico categorial definitions of the 'world' 'pass over' the existential u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the world, which refers to the world wherein Dasein lives (the ontic-existentiell structure) a n d the w o r l d h o o d of the world (the ontologico-existential structure). Cf. SuZ, §14, 65. 28. As Heidegger explains in his self-appraisal: "The foundation of fundam e n t a l ontology is n o foundation u p o n which something could b e built, n o fundamentum inconcussum, b u t rather a fundamentum concussum" (ZSD, 34; 32E). This leads H e i d e g g e r to d r o p the term fundamental ontology altogether in his later writings. 29. "The essential structure of Dasein must revolutionize the whole concept of the h u m a n being" (GA 26, §9b, 167). 30. As Heidegger states in 1949: "To characterize with a single t e r m b o t h the involvement of Being in h u m a n n a t u r e and the essential relation of m a n to t h e openness ('there') of Being as such, the n a m e o f ' b e i n g there [Dasein]' was chosen for that sphere of being in which m a n stands as m a n The term 'being t h e r e ' neither takes the place of the t e r m 'consciousness' n o r does the 'object' designated as 'being t h e r e ' take the place of what we think of when we speak of 'consciousness.' 'Being t h e r e ' names that which should first of all be experienced, and subsequently thought of, as a place—namely, the location of the t r u t h of Being" ("Einleitung zu Was ist Metaphysik?" 1949, in Wegmarken, 202 / 368; Heidegger 1975b, 270-71, emphasis a d d e d ) . 31. "Brief iiber d e n Humanismus" 1946, in Wegmarken, 158 / 32; BW, 231. 32. WdG, 58 / 160 n. 59; 99E. 33. As h e emphasizes in his lectures o n Leibniz, an animal "existiert nicht, sondern lebt, ein Stein existiert nicht und lebt nicht, sondern ist vorhanden" (GA 26, §9a, 159). Cf. note 17 of this chapter. 34. Indeed, in GA 29 / 30 Heidegger differentiates between t h r e e essentially different forms of'sensibilities', that is to say, forms of touching: "We can

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say that the stone is exerting a certain pressure u p o n the surface of the earth. It is 'touching' the earth. But what we call 'touching' h e r e is n o t a form of touching at all in the stronger sense of the word. It is n o t at all like that relationship which the lizard has to the stone o n which it lies basking in the sun. A n d the touching implied in b o t h these cases is above all not the same as that touch which we experience when we rest o u r h a n d u p o n the head of a n o t h e r h u m a n being. T h e lying u p o n . . . , the touching involved in our three examples is fundamentally different in each case" (GA 29 / 30, §47, 290, emphasis a d d e d ) . T h e question that needs to be raised, however, is whether this differentiation does n o t n e e d to b e b r o k e n down in turn. For example, we n e e d to differentiate between touching and being t o u c h e d by others and touching ourselves. Cf. chapter 5, esp. §92ff. 35. Heidegger is n o t consistent in his use of quotation marks. Quite often the 'world' refers to the existential u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the world, for example in SuZ, §18, 87. 36. Being-in-the-world is a unitary p h e n o m e n o n which should never be b r o k e n u p into separate parts: "The c o m p o u n d expression 'Being-in-theworld' indicates in the very way we have coined it, that it stands for a unitary p h e n o m e n o n . This primary d a t u m must be seen as a whole" (SuZ, §12, 53). 37. "By this 'in' we m e a n the relationship of Being which two entities ext e n d e d 'in' space have to each o t h e r with r e g a r d to their location in that space" (SuZ, §12, 54). 38. Heidegger thereby does n o t argue that n o spatiality pertains to Beingin; rather, the emphasis is o n the fact that "Being-in is n o t a spatial relationship of this kind" (i.e., a spatiality defined in terms of its extensio). 39. As Heidegger tellingly argues: "As Dasein goes along its ways, it does n o t m e a s u r e off a stretch of space as a corporeal T h i n g which is present-ath a n d ; it does n o t 'devour the kilometres'" (SuZ, §23, 106). 40. SuZ, §21, 101, my translation ["Dann wird am E n d e d o c h eine »Rettung« d e r cartesischen Analyse d e r »Welt« moglich."] 41. SuZ, §23, 105. Indeed, according to Heidegger, in o u r m o d e r n technological age this tendency becomes increasingly visible: "All the ways in which we speed things u p , as we are m o r e or less compelled to d o today, push us o n towards the conquest of remoteness. With the 'radio,' for example, Dasein has so e x p a n d e d a n d destroyed its everyday environment that it has accomplished a de-severance of the 'world' — a de-severance which, in its meaning for Dasein, cannot yet be visualized" (SuZ, §23, 105, translation slightly altered). 42. "That which is presumably 'closest' is by n o means that which is at the smallest distance 'from us.' It lies in that which is desevered to an average extent when we reach for it, grasp it, or look at it.. . . When, for instance, a m a n wears a pair of spectacles which are so close to him distantially that they are 'sitting o n his nose,' they are environmentally m o r e r e m o t e from him than the picture on the opposite wall. Such e q u i p m e n t has so little closeness that often it is proximally quite impossible to find. E q u i p m e n t for seeing—and likewise for hearing, such as the telephone receiver — has what we have designated as the inconspicuousness of the proximally ready-to-hand" (SuZ, §23, 106 / 7).

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43. "But its spatiality shows the characters of de-seruerance a n d directionality" (SuZ, §23, 105). 44. This is a r a t h e r reductive reading of Kant. We shall evaluate Heidegg e r ' s reading of this passage in chapter 5, §87ff. 45. Indeed, H e i d e g g e r will ensure that spatiality will b e t r e a t e d as a phen o m e n o n secondary to temporality (cf. §74, below). 46. SuZ, Marginalia to §85b, 441-42. 47. SuZ, §18, 87, translation slightly altered. 48. This is a t e r m that H.-G. G a d a m e r introduces in o r d e r to explain what H e i d e g g e r calls the circle of understanding. Cf. G a d a m e r 1989, II, l a , 2 6 5 71. 49. As we shall show, it is a world that is n o n m a t e r i a l by definition, insofar as it is defined in t e r m s of its temporality. I n d e e d , it will b e d e m o n s t r a t e d that H e i d e g g e r needs to affirm the primacy of a n o n m a t e r i a l world, so that the inversion of Husserl's doctrine of immanent-transcendence can b e maintained. Cf. chapter 4, "From ' I m m a n e n t T r a n s c e n d e n c e ' to ' T r a n s c e n d e n t Immanence,'"§68ff. 50. Indeed, in his later writings Heidegger a p p e a r s to address this appare n t idealism with the introduction of notions such as the earth (Erde) a n d space-time c o n t i n u u m . T h e s e m o m e n t s of resistance, opacity, a n d withdrawal, however, will b e raised in his writings only following SuZ—in particular, in " U r s p r u n g des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege. Cf. i n t r o d u c t i o n to chapter 5. 5 1 . This is confirmed by a note in the marginalia of Heidegger's own copy of SuZ, which indicates that Heidegger always h a d Husserl in m i n d when h e referred to Descartes or the Cartesian tradition. Heidegger argues: "Descartes has still laid the basis for characterizing ontologically that entity within-theworld u p o n which, in its very Being, every o t h e r entity is founded — material N a t u r e . " H e adds in the marginalia: "[This is] a criticism of Husserl's construction of'ontologies'! [one which] is implicit h e r e in the overall critique of Descartes" (SuZ, §21,98 & marginalia, a, p . 442). Marion also refers to this note in the marginalia: "A note in the marginalia of Heidegger's personal copy of SuZ confirms the p e r m a n e n c e of his j u d g m e n t concerning this 'affinity'" (Marion 1989,129 n. 16). 52. T h e world that is accessible (zugdngig) only t h r o u g h knowing, intellects o r cognition—i.e., t h r o u g h mathematics or physics this kind of "ontology of t h e 'world'"—does n o t seek the " p h e n o m e n o n of the world" (SuZ, §21, 95). 53. "A g e n u i n e grasp of what really is . . . lies in voeiv— ' b e h o l d i n g ' in the widest sense . . . ; Siavoeiv or 'thinking' is just a m o r e fully achieved form of VO£?vand is f o u n d e d u p o n it. Sensatio (aiGOrjoiq), as o p p o s e d to intellect™, still r e m a i n s possible as a way of access to entities by a b e h o l d i n g which is p e r c e p tual in character; b u t Descartes presents his 'critique' of it because h e is orie n t e d ontologically by these principles" (SuZ, §21, 96). 54. "And t h o u g h substance may i n d e e d b e known by some attribute; yet e a c h substance has o n e principal p r o p e r t y which constitutes its n a t u r e a n d essence, a n d to which all its o t h e r properties are referred" (Descartes 1985, 25; a n d SuZ, §19, 90). 55. "But the basic ontological state of'living' is a p r o b l e m in its own right

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a n d can be tackled only reductively and privatively in terms of the ontology of Dasein"(SuZ, §41,194). 56. T h e world of work in m i n d is, however, n o t the world of the industrial worker. H e i d e g g e r is motivated m o r e by an artisanal romanticism referring to n o n - m e c h a n i z e d labor. I n d e e d , it is this emphasis o n t h e world of work which leads us back to Ernst J u n g e r *s heroic descriptions of Der Arbeiter, Herrschaft und Gestalt (cf. J u n g e r 1982). H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t of the everyday is thus limited. It has to be said, however, that SuZ does n o t p r e t e n d to p r e s e n t a c o m p l e t e analysis of all the m o d e s of Being-in a n d Being-with. N o t only is the question of life bracketed, b u t also the b e i n g of artworks a n d the question of n a t u r e , which will b e c o m e increasingly i m p o r t a n t in his later writings. H e i d e g g e r acknowledges in passing that n o t all beings can b e red u c e d to the s t r u c t u r e of Dasein's Bewandtnis: "The N a t u r e which 'stirs a n d strives,' which assails us a n d enthralls us as landscape, r e m a i n s h i d d e n . T h e botanist's plants a r e n o t t h e flowers of t h e h e d g e r o w ; the ' s o u r c e ' which the g e o g r a p h e r establishes for a river is n o t t h e ' s p r i n g h e a d in t h e d a l e ' " (SuZ, §15, 70). Cf. SuZ, §43 a n d Villela-Petit 1992, 126. However, the p r o b l e m is that this bracketing is necessary for SuZ if it wishes to m a i n t a i n the unitary s t r u c t u r e of Being-in-the-world. Cf. a p p e n d i x to c h a p t e r 3, section (e), a n d c h a p t e r 4, §73 ff. 57. However, against this r e a d i n g Heidegger warns us that the t e r m besorgen is chosen n o t to emphasize the practical a n d economic e n g a g e m e n t in the world but to make manifest care as the existential overall structure of Dasein-asBeing-in-the-world: "This term has b e e n chosen n o t because Dasein h a p p e n s to be proximally a n d to a large extent 'practical' and economic, b u t because the Being of Dasein itself is to be m a d e visible as care" (SuZ, §12, 57). 58. J a c q u e s Taminiaux has shown convincingly that SuZ, despite its emphasis o n praxis, sides with Platonism, as its distinction between authenticity a n d inauthenticity expresses a disdain for doxa. In fundamental ontology t h e r e is n o r o o m for doxa (cf. Taminiaux 1991). O n the relation between H e i d e g g e r a n d Aristotle see Kisiel (1993), especially p a r t two, a n d Felix O M u r c h a d h a (1999), chapter two. 59. It refers us back to the care-structure, which is nothing b u t the existential structure of Being-in-the-world: "this p h e n o m e n o n [that is 'care'] by n o m e a n s expresses a priority of the 'practical' attitude over the theoretical. . . . 'Theory' a n d 'practice' are possibilities of Being for an entity whose Being must b e defined as ' c a r e ' " (SuZ, §41,193). T h e aim is therefore to reclaim the unity of theory a n d practice which is g u a r a n t e e d by the care-structure. In the Kantbuch Heidegger warns us n o t to mistake the analysis of the everyday as a form of pragmatism: "The existential analytic of everydayness does n o t want to describe how we use a knife a n d fork. It should show that a n d how all association with beings, even where it appears as if t h e r e were just beings, already presupposes the transcendence of Dasein —namely, Being-in-the-world" {Kantbuch, §43, 235 / 160E. 60. Emil Kettering explores the significance of the t e r m Ndhe in Heidegg e r ' s work (cf. Kettering 1987). In his later writings H e i d e g g e r relates the notion of closeness to withdrawal (Entzug) to stress a positive notion of concealment. Cf. introduction to chapter 5.

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61. "Interpretation is carried out primordially n o t in a theoretical statem e n t " (SuZ, §33, 157). 62. "Assertion is n o t a free-floating kind of behaviour which, in its own right, might b e capable of disclosing entities in general in a primary way: o n t h e contrary it always maintains itself o n the basis of Being-in-the-world" (SuZ, §32, 156). 63. This contradicts the r e a d i n g of Ernst T u g e n d h a t , who interprets the pre-predicative m o m e n t as pointing "beyond the domain of language" (Tug e n d h a t 1986,166, emphasis a d d e d ) . O n T u g e n d h a t ' s critique, see a p p e n d i x to c h a p t e r 3, section (a). 64. "From the fact that words are absent, it may n o t b e c o n c l u d e d that int e r p r e t a t i o n is absent" (SuZ, §33,157). 65. We d o n o t wish to reverse the presentation by arguing that the present-at-hand p r e c e d e s the ready-to-hand; r a t h e r , we wish to question the very dichotomy. For this radical disjunction suggests an avoidance of sensible visibility. However, it is n o t a p p a r e n t to us that seeing a n d sensing, interpretation a n d theory are necessarily radically distinct. 66. King 1964, 95. This is an excellent introductory text to SuZ. It p r o vides a sensitive r e a d i n g at a time when Heidegger was just being i n t r o d u c e d to t h e English-speaking world (J. Macquarrie a n d E. Robinson's translation was first published in 1962). 67. It has n o t "the m o d e s of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, a n d obstinacy" (SuZ, §16, 74); the m o d e s of the world of objects which a r e present-athand. 68. H e r b e r t Dreyfus suggests the translation "occurrentness" for Vorhandenheit: "This t e r m [ Vorhandenheit] is usually translated 'presence-at-hand,' b u t since t h e r e is n o m e n t i o n of presence in the G e r m a n , a n d since Heidegger rarely makes use of the embedded word for hand, I shall use the translation 'occurr e n t n e s s ' " (Dreyfus 1991,40, emphasis a d d e d ) . Dreyfus, however, thereby occludes the significance of the differentiation between Zuhandenheit a n d Vorhandenheit, for it is the 'handiness' of the e q u i p m e n t which is crucial. Vorhandenheit is n o t h i n g b u t a deficient m o d e of this handiness. T o follow H e i d e g g e r : the t e r m Zuhandenheit expresses that entities a r e "zurHand" ("to h a n d " ; SuZ, §22, 102), a n d ^ Vorhandenheit suggests that is it before o u r h a n d s a n d n o t to h a n d (cf. §70 below). 69. "That with which our everyday dealings proximally dwell is not the tools themselves. O n the contrary, that with which we concern ourselves primarily is the work—that which is to be p r o d u c e d at the time" (SuZ, §15, 69-70). 70. " E q u i p m e n t can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own m e a s u r e ( h a m m e r i n g with a h a m m e r , for e x a m p l e ) ; but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipmentstructure known as such even in the using. T h e h a m m e r i n g does n o t simply have knowledge a b o u t the h a m m e r ' s character as e q u i p m e n t , b u t it has a p p r o p r i a t e d this e q u i p m e n t in a way that could not possibly b e m o r e suitable. In dealings such as this, w h e r e something is p u t to use, o u r c o n c e r n subordinates itself to the 'in-order-to' which is constitutive for the e q u i p m e n t we a r e employing at the time" (SuZ, §14, 69, emphasis a d d e d ) .

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71. "Taken strictly, t h e r e 'is' n o such thing as an e q u i p m e n t . T o the Being of any e q u i p m e n t t h e r e always belongs a totality of e q u i p m e n t , in which it can b e this e q u i p m e n t that it is" (SuZ, §15, 68). 72. " E q u i p m e n t is essentially 'something in o r d e r to . . . ' A totality of e q u i p m e n t is constituted by various ways of the 'in-order-to,' such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability. In the 'in-order-to' as a struct u r e t h e r e lies an assignment or reference of something to something (SuZ, §15, 68, emphasis a d d e d ) . 73. "Thematical p e r c e p t i o n of Things is precisely n o t the way e q u i p m e n t ready-to-hand is e n c o u n t e r e d in its ' t r u e ' 'in-itself,' it is e n c o u n t e r e d r a t h e r in the inconspicuousness of what we can c o m e across 'obviously' and 'Objectively'" (SuZ, §69a, 354). 74. Macquarrie a n d Robinson translate Bewandtnis as "involvement." 75. "To say that the Being of the ready-to-hand has the structure of assignm e n t o r reference m e a n s that it has in itself the character of having been assigned or referred. An entity is discovered when it has b e e n assigned o r r e f e r r e d to something, a n d r e f e r r e d as that entity which it is. With any such entity t h e r e is an involvement which it has in something. T h e character of Being which belongs to the ready-to-hand is j u s t such an involvement. If something has an involvement, this implies letting it be involved in something. T h e relationship of the 'with . . . in . , . ' shall b e indicated by the t e r m 'assignment' or 'reference'" (SuZ, §18, 8 3 - 8 4 ) . 76. "The less we j u s t stare at the h a m m e r - T h i n g , a n d the m o r e we seize hold of it a n d use it, the m o r e p r i m o r d i a l does o u r relationship to it b e c o m e , a n d the m o r e unveiledly is it e n c o u n t e r e d as that which it is—as e q u i p m e n t " (SuZ, §15, 69). 77. I n d e e d H e i d e g g e r later acknowledges that t h e r e is a 'thingliness' a b o u t tools which withdraws from Dasein. T h e thing is n o t reducible to the ready-to-hand a n d present-at-hand structure. T h e r e is something obtrusive a b o u t the thing that c a n n o t b e r e d u c e d to use o r utility. "It is m e r e things, excluding even utensils, that c o u n t as things in the p r o p e r sense" ("Der Ursp r u n g des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege, 6; BW, 147-48). Similarly to the p h e n o m e n o n of life, things a r e n e i t h e r m e r e objects n o r tools. While the world of SuZ is described in terms of its structure of assignment a n d thus suggests a subjectincation of the world, in his later writings H e i d e g g e r moves away from the question of use a n d emphasizes m o r e the structure of 'letting b e ' , which is already implicit in SuZ. In " U r s p r u n g des Kunstwerkes" Heidegger, for example, writes against the m o m e n t of aesthetics, which b o t h divorces art from truth a n d turns art into a subjective e x p e r i e n c e (Erlebnis). 78. For example, in medical knowledge Te%VT1 refers to the m a n n e r whereby a goal is achieved. T h e d o c t o r ' s skills a n d 'tools', o r choice of m e t h o d , are assessed in accordance with the aim or deed, i.e., curing those who are ill. 79. Similarly William Blattner observes: "For Aristotelian energeiais complete in an instant; to b e in act is to realize its end. But for H e i d e g g e r quite the opposite seems to b e true: the goal is always 'outstanding'" (Blattner 1992, 126).

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80. "In the work t h e r e is also a reference o r assignment to 'materials': the w o r k is d e p e n d e n t o n leather, thread, needles, a n d the like, Leather, m o r e over is p r o d u c e d from hides. These are taken from animals. . . . " (SuZ, §15, 70-71). 8 1 . Figal 1988, 84. This leads J. M. Bernstein to argue: "The 'as' structure of equipmentality approximates the image of ethical life p r e s u p p o s e d by the logic of the lost sensus communis" (Bernstein 1992, 76). 82. However, H e i d e g g e r adopts the Aristotelian conception of a final e n d (telos) in the form of a ' g o o d life' by rearticulating it in terms of a n e n d (Ende) of Dasein as Being-towards-death. As we shall show, t h e r e is a finality or destin a t i o n (Bewandtnis) to the assignment structure that is Dasein itself (cf. chapter 4, esp. §76 a n d conclusion). 83. "If we are to investigate such p h e n o m e n a as references, signs, or even significations, n o t h i n g is to b e gained by characterizing t h e m as relations. Ind e e d we shall eventually have to show that 'relations' themselves, because of their formally general character, have their ontological source in a reference [assignment]" (SuZ, §17, 77). 84. "The peculiarity of what is proximally ready-to-hand is that, in its readiness-to-hand, it must, as it were, withdraw in o r d e r to b e ready-to-hand authentically" (SuZ, §15, 69). 85. "But h e r e we m u s t notice that this 'referring' as indicating is n o t the ontological structure of the sign as e q u i p m e n t Instead, 'referring' as indicating is g r o u n d e d in the Being-structure of e q u i p m e n t , in serviceability for. . . . " (SuZ, §17, 78). 86. Cf. §52ff., above. 87. SuZ, §17, 79, emphasis added. 88. SuZ, §17, 79, emphasis added. 89. SuZ, §18, 83, emphasis a d d e d . 90. "As the Being of something ready-to-hand, a n involvement is itself discovered only o n the basis of the prior discovery of a totality of involvements" (SuZ, §18, 85). 9 1 . As R o b e r t Bernasconi observes: "The constant necessity to suspend a specific sense of spatiality, suggests that in all of these p h e n o m e n a a certain sense of something like spatiality is still in play" (Bernasconi 1988, 48). 92. This withdrawal is m a d e possible by fundamental m o o d s such as anxiety o r p r o f o u n d b o r e d o m . Cf. chapter 4, §71. 93. Cf. SuZ, §12, 54 a n d SuZ, §13, 61. 94. Cf. SuZ, 76, 113, 176, 271, 344. 95. T h e expressions used for the analysis of the everyday in SuZ illustrate a fundamental dislocation a n d lostness: fallenness (175), curiosity (175), lost (168), not tarrying alongside (Unverweilen) (172), distraction (172), entangled (178), being everywhere and nowhere (173). 96. "Dasein's absorption in the 'they' and its absorption in the 'world' of its concern, make manifest something like afleeingof Dasein in the face of itself— of itself as a n authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self' (SuZ, §40, 184). 97. "We have prescribed in a prohibitive way how it is possible for authentic Being-towards-death not to b e " (SuZ, §53, 260, translation slightly

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c h a n g e d ) . "The m o r e unveiledly this possibility gets u n d e r s t o o d , the m o r e purely does the u n d e r s t a n d i n g p e n e t r a t e into it as the possibility of the impossibility of any existence at aT (ibid. 262). 98. "In anxiety o n e feels 'uncanny.'' H e r e the peculiar indefiniteness of that which Dasein finds itself alongside in anxiety, comes proximally to expression: the 'nothing a n d nowhere.' But h e r e 'uncanniness' also means 'notbeing-at-home'" (SuZ, §40, 188). 99. In SuZ the m o m e n t of negation is used dialectically. In his later writings —from "Was ist Metaphysik," (1929, Wegmarken; BW) onward—the adverb nothing (nichts) is substituted with the n o u n nothingness {das Nichts). Tug e n d h a t maintains that this move—from the adverb to the noun—is nonsensical and unjustifiable, since it leads Heidegger to combine the infinitive of the verb to be (Sein) with the substantive nothingness (das Nichts) rather than referring to being-nothing (dasNichtsein). T o follow T u g e n d h a t : "Having nothing to h o l d o n to is a g e n u i n e experiential possibility whereas to hold o n to nothingness, is not" ( T u g e n d h a t 1992, 59). However, T u g e n d h a t ' s intent to eliminate 'the question about nothingness' (dieFrage nach dem Nichts) is questionable. As J a c o b Taubes observes, we n e e d to contextualize Heidegger's motives. T h e substantive 'nothingness' (das Nichts) needs to be i n t e r p r e t e d in relation to H e i d e g g e r ' s (destructive) r e a d i n g of Parmenides. Parmenides needs to draw o n 'nothingness' in o r d e r to negate the possibility of the existence of nothing: "Heidegger's discursive transition from n o t h i n g to nothingness is a kind of an amnesis of the P a r m e n i d e a n transition from nothingness to nothing" (Taubes 1975, 147). 100. We a d h e r e to Kisiel's translation of Bedeutsamkeit as meaningfulness r a t h e r than significance, which Macquarrie a n d Robinson have chosen. Cf. Kisiel's translation of the GA 20, §23. 101. "These relationships a r e b o u n d u p with o n e a n o t h e r as a primordial totality; they a r e what they a r e as this signifying [Be-deuten] in which Dasein gives itself b e f o r e h a n d its Being-in-the-world as something to be u n d e r s t o o d . T h e relational totality of this signifying we call 'significance' This is what makes u p the structure of the world — the structure of that wherein Dasein as such already is" (SuZ, §18, 87). 102. "This state of Being does n o t arise just because some other entity is present-at-hand outside of Dasein a n d meets u p with it. Such an entity can ' m e e t u p with' Dasein only in so far as it can, of its own accord, show itself within a world' (SuZ, §12, 57). 103. I n d e e d Kant has shown that orientation is possible only by virtue of inc o n g r u o u s counterparts such as a right a n d a left h a n d (cf. chapter 5, §87). 104. Cf. "La main et le m o n d e " in Franck 1986, esp. p. 53, a n d Courtine 1987-88. 105. This reminds us of Aristotle's observation that "The soul, as it were, acts like a h a n d " (Aristotle 1957, 432a, translation slightly altered). 106. SuZ, §23, 108, emphasis a d d e d . 107. H e i d e g g e r later admits in a footnote to his essay "Vom Wesen des Grundes": "If we somehow equate the ontical system of useful things (of tools) with the world and explain Being-in-the-world as traffic with useful things, we

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t h e n a b a n d o n any u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t r a n s c e n d e n c e as Being-in-the-world in t h e sense of a 'basic constitutive feature of Dasein'" (WdG, 51 / 153 n. 55; 81E). 108. Implicitly, the Heidegger of SuZ questions the relationship between philosophy and life. Not only does philosophy arise o u t of o u r concrete existence, but it needs to r e t u r n to life. Heidegger is h e r e similar to Plato, who argues that the philosopher king needs to r e t u r n from the world of Ideas: "Philosophy is universal phenomenological ontology, and takes its d e p a r t u r e from the h e r m e n e u t i c of Dasein, which, as an analytic of existence, has m a d e fast the guiding-line for all philosophical inquiry at the point where it arises and to which it returns" (SuZ, §7, 38 & §83,436). This issue of return or folding back becomes m o r e explicit in GA 26: "But the temporal analysis is at the same time the turning-around [Kehre], where ontology itself expressly r u n s back into the metaphysical ontic in which it implicitly always remains" (GA 26, appendix to §10, 201). An investigation concerning this turning back \lETafioXf[ (Umschlag) Heidegger calls metontology (Metontologie) (cf. GA 26, §10 & appendix, 199). A r e t u r n to the ontic world, however, questions the radical distinction between the ontic and ontological that SuZ suggests. Indeed, Heidegger concedes that t h e r e is a proximity between the ontic and ontological: "Nevertheless, the Interpretation which is m o r e primordial existentially, also discloses possibilities for a m o r e primordial existentiell understanding, as long as our ontological conceptualization does not let itself get cut offfrom our ontical experience" (SuZ, §59, 295, emphasis a d d e d ) . F u r t h e r m o r e , the r e t u r n to ontical experience thereby reveals that a. factical ideal informs the ontological investigation: "Is there not, however, a definite ontical way of taking authentic existence, a factical ideal of Dasein, underlying o u r ontological Interpretation of Dasein's existence? That is so indeed. But not only is this Fact one which must n o t b e denied and which we a r e forced to grant; it must also be conceived in its positive necessity, in terms of t h e object which we have taken as the theme of o u r investigation" (SuZ, §62, 310). A factical ideal guides philosophical investigation, which, however, philosophy needs to unfold: "Philosophy will never seek to deny its 'presuppositions' b u t neither may it simply admit them" (ibid.). A bridge between philosophy and life is affirmed. Hereby the question of authenticity a n d the necessity of 'choosing one's h e r o ' (SuZ, §74, 385) b e c o m e intelligible. Although this ideal needs to r e m a i n an illusion, Heidegger believes that it is necessary to a d h e r e to it if we wish to have an art of existence: "Not only d o we n e e d analyse in general, b u t we must p r o d u c e the illusion, as it were, that the given task at h a n d is the o n e a n d only necessary task. Only the person who understands this art of existing, only the person who, in the course of action, can treat what is in e a c h case seized u p o n as wholly singular, who at the same time nonetheless realizes the finitude of this activity, only such a one understands finite existence a n d can h o p e to accomplish something in it. This art of existing is not the selfreflection that hunts a r o u n d uninvolved, r u m m a g i n g about for motives a n d complexes by which to obtain reassurance a n d a dispensation from action. It is r a t h e r only the clarity of action itself, a hunting for real possibilities" (GA 26, §10, 201, emphasis a d d e d ) . For a discussion of metontology and the possibility of a n ethics, see Bernasconi (1988), Cullen (1991), and H o d g e (1995). Steven

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Gait Crowell (2000) convincingly shows why Heidegger's aim to replace transcendental philosophy (phenomenology) with metontology (metaphysics) remains an illusory idea. For a good overview of Heidegger's use of the term metontology, see McNeill (1993/1994) and Krell (1986), who initiated the discussion.

CHAPTER 4 1. H u a VIII, 45. Lecture, 121. 2. T h e o d o r e Kisiel has shown convincingly that Heidegger adopts the term Hingabe—which he translates as "devotion," "dedication," "submission," and "immersion"—from Emil Lask, who already differentiated between Hingabe and Hinsehen (cf. Kisiel 1993, chapter 1). J o h n Macquarrie and Edward Robinson translate Angewiesenheit as "submission." However, "referential dependency upon," "being ascribed," or "subjected to" is m o r e appropriate here. 3. Cf. SuZ, §69b, 363 n. 1; 498 n. xxiii(E). It is there that Heidegger argues that what Husserl calls "intentionality" is grounded in the ecstatical unity of Dasein. Heidegger explains in his 1929 lecture: "If o n e characterizes every way of behaving toward being as intentional, t h e n intentionality is possible only on the basis of transcendence. It is neither identical with transcendence n o r that which makes transcendence possible" (WdG, 133 / 31 / 29E). This text was originally published in a collection dedicated to Husserl in h o n o r of his seventieth birthday. 4. Although Heidegger refers n o t to the natural attitude, which he calls the world of things, b u t to the everyday, which is Dasein's environment—the world of work— the claim remains identical insofar as Dasein's distinctiveness lies in the fact that it is neither ready-to-hand n o r present-at-hand, b u t defined in terms of its structure of c o m p o r t m e n t . We have neglected Dasein's existential structure of Being-with since it does n o t structurally change the main arg u m e n t . Heidegger wishes to argue that Dasein is n o t only Being-in-the-world b u t equiprimordially Being-with. In the everyday this Being-with is characterized in terms of a lack of 'self. Dasein is n o t free (i.e., responsible), b u t defines itself in terms of the 'They' (be it n o r m s or conventions). Indeed, Heidegger uses the Husserlian terminology of the natural attitude when h e argues that in the everyday Dasein is fascinated by or u n d e r the spell of the world (benommen) (cf. SuZ, §13, 6 1 ; §16, 76; chapter 3, §66), a n d is thus lost in the world. 5. SuZ, §41, 196. "Ein . . . n o c h ursprunglichere [s] P h a n o m e n . " This quotation is taken out of context, for it does n o t refer to Husserl b u t to the primordial structure of care. 6. SuZ, §12, 53. llEinheitliches P h a n o m e n . " 7. Ideen I, §39, 87 / 70. Gibson's translations—"interwovenness," "entwinement," a n d "entanglement" —are m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e here. 8. Cf. H u a VIII, Lecture 45, 121. 9. "The Ego . . . is a b a n d o n e d to what is objective. . . . T o this state of affairs, however, t h e r e belongs apriori the 'possibility' of an alteration in the subject's attitude" (Ideen II, §4, 10-11).

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10. SuZ, §18, 87, emphasis a d d e d . 11. It is in this context that we can u n d e r s t a n d why Levinas criticizes H e i d e g g e r for his paganism (cf. "Heidegger, Gagarine et n o u s " in DL, 3 0 0 301). 12. "In d e t e r m i n i n g itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility, which it is itself a n d which, in its very Being, it somehow u n d e r stands" (SuZ, §9, 43). 13. "The 'essence' of this entity lies in its "to be"' (SuZ, §9, 42, emphasis added). 14. "Dasein always u n d e r s t a n d s itself in terms of its existence—in terms of a possibility of itself: to b e itself or n o t itself (SuZ, §4, 12). T h e aim of SuZ is to make this questionableness of Being visible again, thus to r e t u r n to this possibility ofchoosing a n d sustaining possibility as possibility, 15. SuZ, p . 440, " R a n d b e m e r k u n g e n zu," p . 42b. Although H e i d e g g e r insists that we should n o t u n d e r s t a n d the distinction between authenticity a n d inauthenticity in moralistic terms, this is disingenuous in some sense. For authenticity still constitutes the exemplary possibility for Dasein: to assume its true n a t u r e or Be-stimmung. This is a normative concept; what o n e essentially 'is' o n e should authentically become. 16. This is a translation King (1964) suggests o n p a g e 56. 17. SuZ therefore describes Dasein's everyday in the following m a n n e r : Dasein is floating, dispersed, lost, never dwelling anywhere, not-tarrying alongside of what is closest (i.e., its ownmost possibilities); it is dragging, groundless, unattached, a n d u p r o o t e d . 18. This presentation is n o t quite accurate because o n e of Husserl's p r o b lems is to account for the possibility of an a d e q u a t e philosophical beginning. H e i d e g g e r believes that such a beginning can b e motivated only by a fundam e n t a l m o o d , such as anxiety, which is unmotivated—i.e., t h e r e is n o t h i n g in t h e ontic world in the face of which o n e has anxiety. Husserl, meanwhile, arg u e s that the transcendental r e d u c t i o n also c a n n o t be motivated by the general thesis of the natural attitude: "No o n e can simply tumble into philosophy" ( H u a VIII, Lecture 3 0 , 1 9 ) . "Indeed, h e r e we a r e dealing with a n entirely 'unn a t u r a l ' attitude a n d a n entirely u n n a t u r a l way of viewing ourselves a n d the world" ( H u a VIII, Lecture 45, 121). T h e transcendental r e d u c t i o n is u n m o t i vated. Writing u n d e r the auspices of Husserl, Fink observes: "The u n m o t i vated character of the phenomenological r e d u c t i o n (the absence of any worldly p r o b l e m which could serve as its real motive) expresses the r e d u c tion's unfamiliar n a t u r e in a similar way. Because it is the suspension of the "natural attitude" it c a n n o t appear within this attitude a n d it therefore must b e unfamiliar. T h e r e d u c t i o n becomes knowable in its 'transcendentalmotivat i o n ' only with the transcending of the world" (Fink 1970, 105). I n d e e d Husserl will later relate this transcendental motivation to Plato's a n d Aristode's n o t i o n of Oav^etv (cf. Krisis, 331£). Cf. H e l d 1991, 89, a n d H e l d 1992a, 142. 19. SuZ, §40, 187. I n d e e d , there is a n etymological connection; Angst derives from the Latin angustus, which means "tight" (engin G e r m a n ) .

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20. SuZ, §40, 188, emphasis added: "Macht offenbar, ' s w e i n e m ist\ In der Angst ist einem 'unheimlichY' 21. G A 2 6 , §10,172, emphasis a d d e d . This passage is also cited by Derrida (1983, 70-71). D e r r i d a points o u t that "the Geschlechtslosigkeit would n o t be m o r e negative than aletheia" (ibid., 72). Geschlechtslosigkeit is the original 'potency' of the articulation of truth a n d u n t r u t h . 22. Heidegger repeats this a r g u m e n t in "Vom Wesen des G r u n d e . " "Only because Dasein is defined by selfhood can an I-se If relate 'itself to a Thou-self. Selfhood is the presupposition of the possibility of being an 'I,' which itself is revealed only in the ' T h o u . ' Selfhood is never related to a T h o u ; it is neutral toward 'being an I': and 'being a T h o u , ' a n d even m o r e toward 'sexuality,' since it is what makes t h e m all possible in the first place. All essential propositions of an ontological Analytic of Dasein in m a n treat Dasein in its neutrality" (WdG,54/156;87E). 23. "[A] lieutenant of the nothing" ("Was ist Metaphysik," 1929, in Wegmarken, 15 / 117; BW, 106). O n the question of the differentiation between dasNichts andnichts, see chapter 3, §66, n. 99. 24. T h e fact that Dasein always already is inauthentic (fallenness is an existential of Dasein) means that Dasein has always already avoided its responsibility. H e n c e Being-guilty is a n o t h e r existential of Dasein. 25. "The world as this 'How in its totality' underlies every possible way of segmenting being; segmenting being does n o t destroy the world b u t requires it" (WdG, 140-141 / 38-39; 49E). 26. WdG, 135 / 33; 35E, emphasis a d d e d . 27. Cf. chapter 3, §§62-67. 28. Indeed, the whole structure of the book reflects the fear of affirming a m o m e n t of dispersal r a t h e r than the unitary structure of Being-in-the-world. After the analysis of the everyday we are i n t r o d u c e d to a manifold of structures: "Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting, and for which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is an issue, both in its Being alongside the 'world and in its Being-with Others" (SuZ, §39, 181). Although these m o m e n t s are investigated separately, the aim is to show that Being-in, Being-alongside, a n d Being-ahead-of-itself equiprimordially constitute the structure of Being-inthe-world. They are not separate m o m e n t s that can be glued together but always already implicate each other. Being-in-the-world needs to b e t h o u g h t of in its indestructible totality (Ganzheit), which encapsulates all these structures. This totalizing structure H e i d e g g e r calls care: "Being-in-the-world, in turn, is b o u n d u p ontologically in the structural totality of Dasein's Being, a n d we have characterized care as such a totality" (SuZ, §43b, 209). T h e t e r m totality, however, still implies that t h e r e are diverse structures that form this structural whole. SuZ p r o c e e d s to show that care articulates n o t only Dasein's thrown projection b u t also Dasein's Being-toward-death, the call of conscience and anticipatory resoluteness. This diversified articulation of the structural whole thus persuades us to lose sight of the unitary structure of care. "The totality of the structural whole has become even more richly articulated; and because of this, the existential question of the unity of this totality has become still more urgenf (SuZ, §64,

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317). T h e totalizing structure of care is n o t sufficient. What needs to b e p r o v e n additionally is the unity of care. T h e ontological questioning needs to persist "until we can exhibit a still moreprimordialphenomenon which provides the ontological s u p p o r t for the unity and the totality of the structural manifoldness of care" (SuZ, §41, 196). This unity is g u a r a n t e e d by temporality alone: "The primordial unity of the structure of care lies in temporality" (SuZ, §65, 327). T h e m o v e m e n t is thus from dispersal to totality (Ganzheit), a n d from the totality of care to the unity (Einheit) of temporality. 29. This is well illustrated by Protevi (1994, 117), and Derrida's "Ousia a n d G r a m m a r " (1982). 30. That is, if the primordial unitary structure of Being-in-the-world is to b e maintained. 31. This would suggest a n o t h e r form of dualism, for now there would be something lying beyond the grasp of Dasein. 32. As Sallis observes: "In Being and Time presence means predominantly, t h o u g h n o t exclusively, Vorhandenheit (present-at-hand . . .). This is to be und e r s t o o d in its correlation with p u r e seeing, with voeiv, with intuition (AnschauungY (Sallis 1986a, 142). 33. This is not quite correct, for Heidegger describes the everyday as an infinity without a telos, while for Husserl the infinite is teleologically structured (cf. §83, below). Indeed, it is interesting to note that the original Greek meaning of rsteiogis close to Heidegger's description of Being-toward-death: it signifies "a whole" or "something complete." It really means something "rounded off as a whole." For Aristode and Plato the infinite in the sense of an indefinite and unending multiplicity was precisely axekfiq (i.e., non-bounded and therefore imperfect: it did not have its 'limit' within itself; it was amipov [boundless]). I should like to thank Nicholas Walker, who drew my attention to this analogy. 34. I n d e e d the significance of the 'They' is that it c a n n o t die (cf. SuZ, §81, 424-25). 35. uFreedomfrom any standpoint if the p h r a s e should m e a n anything at all is precisely n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the adoption of a viewpoint This is s o m e t h i n g historical, that is, s o m e t h i n g p e r t a i n i n g to Dasein (and h e n c e a m a t t e r of responsibility—Dasein's m o d e of relating to this viewpoint) — n o t a n extrat e m p o r a l chimerical in itself (GA 63, §17b, 83). 36. Ever since Kant, time a n d temporality have been defined in t e r m s of subjectivity (inner sense). This claim is n o t quite true, for in terms of the history of philosophy the "subjectification of time" was i n t r o d u c e d with Augustine. With this the path was set to characterize the subject in terms of its temporality, which found its full articulation only with Kant. However, we n e e d to note that Heidegger h e r e attempts to retrieve Aristode's claim that "time in a sense belongs to a psyche" when he argues that, when n o Dasein 'is', t h e r e 'is' n o truth or primordial temporality. 37. T h e p r o b l e m with this kind of claim is that in o r d e r to affirm a prim o r d i a l transcendence the 'I think' needs to be presupposed. Dasein's dislocation in this sense presupposes a 'location' from which it can depart. 38. Indeed, in the Kantbuch, Heidegger calls transcendental imagination (which is analogous to Dasein's temporality) "the original g r o u n d for the pos-

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sibility of h u m a n subjectivity" (Kantbuch, §31, 172; 118E). Transcendental imagination as the "sensibility a n d understanding, which p e r h a p s spring forth from a c o m m o n , b u t to us unknown, r o o t (KRV, A15 / B29)" (Kantbuch, §6, 37;24E). 39. A schema should therefore n o t be confused with a pictorial representation (cf. KRV, A140-41 / B179-80). 40. Cf. KRV, A227-28 / B279-81. 4 1 . "The consciousness of myself in the representation T is n o t an intuition, b u t a merely intellectual representation of the spontaneity of a thinking subject. This T has not, therefore, the least predicate of intuition, which, as p e r m a n e n t , might serve as correlate for the determination of time in inner sense" (KRV, B278). 42. I n d e e d the aim is to avoid any form of dualism: "We n e e d to avoid the schema: There are subjects and objects, that is to say, there is consciousness a n d existence [Sein]; existence is the object of knowledge; existence is really the existence of n a t u r e ; consciousness is T think,' h e n c e a self, an Ego-pole, the centre of acts, person" ( G A 6 3 , §17a, 81). 43. T h e whither of the ecstasis expresses the for the sake of which, that Dasein has to be (futural), that in the face of which Dasein is anxious—i.e., its thrownness (past)— a n d that Dasein is as Being along-side entities of the world, making p r e s e n t the world of tools t h r o u g h its projects (gegenwartigen). 44. Cf. Kantbuch, § 2 2 , 1 0 6 - 7 8c §35, 200-201. 45. Cf. a p p e n d i x to chapter 3, section (f). 46. "Transcendence is r a t h e r the p r i m o r d i a l constitution of the subjectivity of a subject. T h e subject transcends q u a subject; it would n o t be a subject if it did n o t transcend" (GA 26, §11, 210-11). It might be a r g u e d that Heidegger h e r e is purely in want of an a d e q u a t e term. Indeed, we d o n o t deny that Heidegger wishes to reconfigure a n d destruct what the tradition aimed at in its talk of 'subjectivity'. However, this is possible only as a qualified defense of idealism: unlike materialism, idealism at least opens u p the question of a constitutive a priori, i.e., a transcendental dimension within which o u r e n c o u n t e r with beings always already transpires. T h a t is why the world is ' m o r e ' subjective t h a n objective (cf. chapter 3, §49ff.). T h e p r o b l e m remains, however, that for H e i d e g g e r this reconfiguration is possible only in r e n d e r i n g the significance of the world meaningless. 47. This is an expression Paul Ricoeur employs to describe Levi-Strauss's structuralist approach. Levi-Strauss 1963, 633. 48. H e r e we a r e alluding to the phrase Heidegger coins in relation to Husserl w h e n he praises Husserl for "rescuing the object." Cf. Zdhringer Seminare, 382 / 120, a n d the introduction to chapter 2 in this volume. 49. SuZ, §69, 351, emphasis added, translation slightly altered. 50. "But in general the 'whither' to which the totality of places for a context of e q u i p m e n t gets allotted, is the underlying condition which makes possible the belonging-somewhere of an equipmental totality as something that can b e placed. This 'whither,' which makes it possible for e q u i p m e n t to belong somewhere, and which we circumspectively keep in view a h e a d of us in o u r concernful dealings, we call the 'region" (SuZ, §22, 103).

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5 1 . T h e significance of Dasein's locality is discussed in c h a p t e r 5, especially u n d e r "The Primacy of the World." 52. "Dasein's openness to the world" (SuZ, §29, 137); "This discovery of regions b e f o r e h a n d is co-determined [mitbestimmt] by the totality of involvem e n t s for which the ready-to-hand, as something e n c o u n t e r e d , is freed" (SuZ, §22,104). 5 3 . It is i m p o r t a n t to n o t e the inverted commas, for the aim is n o t to privilege the 'soul', 'subject', ' m i n d ' , 'ego, or ' p e r s o n ' . 54. It is only once, namely in §24 of SuZ, that H e i d e g g e r comes close to considering the a n t e r i o r structure of space. 55. T o follow Poggeler: "Although Heidegger goes beyond Becker's phenomenological investigation o n geometry by affirming a primordial experienced and 'lived' spatiality, h e still wishes to refer spatiality back to temporality, even though differently from Kant" (Poggeler 1983,179). This leads Edward Casey to claim: "Not only does Dasein not break into space from temporality, b u t the very terms of Heidegger's argument suggest that spatiality is prior to the fallen temporality with which every Dasein is beleaguered" (Casey 1990, 72). 56. We recall: that in the face of which Dasein has anxiety is Being-possible. Cf. §70, above. 57. For H e l d t h e r e is n o question a b o u t it: "Just as in Husserl's objecto r i e n t e d intentional consciousness the will to evidence is operative, so Dasein, in t h e freedom of its existence, gives vent to a militant will which, as its 'for-thesake-of-which,' gives the world in advance as the field of play for this freedom. With this idea H e i d e g g e r forces the sovereignty of the will a n d the m o d e r n voluntaristic world-relation to its e x t r e m e a n d outbids even Husserl's imman e n t a l theory of world constitution. T h e world is now fully integrated u n d e r the sway of the will" (Held 1992b, 313). For H e l d it is only after the iKehre\ w h e n concealment b e c o m e s a constitutive positive a priori of the world, that H e i d e g g e r manages to overcome this subjectivism. For it is t h e n that the world in its constant concealment is n o longer available (verfilgbar) to Dasein. 58. Cf. i n t r o d u c t i o n to chapter 2. 59. SuZ, §11, 52: "Ein Konstitutivum des Daseins." 60. SuZ, §43a, 202. Cf. SuZ, §43, 206. 6 1 . Heidegger thereby does not reject outright theological concerns. Rather, h e believes that the question of the "divine" can 'in principle' b e raised o n the basis of the clarification of issues in fundamental ontology. T h u s , there is a m o r e a p p r o p r i a t e way of grasping 'eternity' from the standp o i n t of the finite. 62. We h e r e a d h e r e to Ernst Cassirer's observations. Reviewing Heidegg e r ' s Kantbuch h e shows that Heidegger constantly brackets the significance of reason in his r e a d i n g of the KRV by r e d u c i n g everything to the unifying function of the transcendental imagination (i.e., temporality). Against this Cassirer argues: "Nowhere does Kant present such a ' m o n i s m ' of the imagination, r a t h e r h e insists o n a deliberate a n d radical dualism, the dualism between the sensible a n d the intelligible world. Kant's p r o b l e m is n o t that of 'Being' a n d ' T i m e ' b u t the p r o b l e m o f ' B e i n g ' a n d ' O u g h t , ' o f ' E x p e r i e n c e ' a n d 'Idea'" (Cassirer 1931, 16).

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63. Cf. H u a XVI, §38, 134. I n d e e d it is an inauthentic (uneigentliche) app e a r a n c e (cf. ibid., §22, 74). 64. Cf. H u a XVI, §19, 26 8c 28-30. 65. Cf. Idem I, §143 and chapter 1, §12ff. 66. Cf. Idem I, §52,129 / 102. 67. "The life which effects world-validity in natural world-life does n o t p e r m i t of being studied from within the attitude of natural world-life" (Krisis, §39, 151;148E). 68. "In the first place transcendental subjectivity is for itself absolutely anonymous' ( H u a VIII, a p p e n d i x XVIII, 417). 69. Idem I, §70,163 / 132, translation slightly altered. This drawn analogy is, however, n o t quite accurate, for Husserl refers to the notion of 'fiction' only when he introduces the eidetic r e d u c t i o n — n o t the transcendental reduction. 70. As Husserl adds in a footnote to the passage above: "A sentence which should be as a quotation perfectly suited to ridiculing eidetic knowledge from a naturalistic perspective" (Ideen I, §70, 163 / 132 n. 1, translation slightly altered) . 71. As Franck observes, Husserl discloses " that reason is an essential a n d universal structure of transcendental subjectivity" (Franck 1981, 56). 72. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 197. 73. Cf. chapter 2, especially §28 a n d "The Enigma of the Consciousness of T i m e " a n d "The Vigilance of the Subject." 74. Krisis, a p p e n d i x X to §21 ff., 429. Cf. B r o e k m a n 1963, 136-87. 75. I n d e e d Fink notes that: "Husserl always d e p l o r e d the fact that the expression 'archaeology' so a p p r o p r i a t e to the essence of philosophy should already have b e e n taken u p by a positive science" (Fink 1966, 246). 76. H u a VIII, a p p e n d i x XVIII, 416. 77. "De la description a l'existence" in D E H H , 97. 78. As D e r r i d a observes: "Theoretical consciousness is nothing other, in itself a n d thoroughly u n d e r s t o o d , than a practical consciousness, the consciousness of an infinite task a n d the site of absolute value for itself a n d for humanity as rational subjectivity. . . . T h e unity of Reason in all its usages would manifest itself fuWy for Husserl in the theoretical project (rather than in the practical function, as would be the case for Kant)" (Derrida 1978,136 n. 162). 79. "Nachwort" in Ideen III, 139 / 550. 80. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 197-98. 81. C f . B e r n e t 1979, 131. 82. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 196. 83. H u a VIII, additional texts, A, 202. 84. I n d e e d it is at this stage that parallels between Husserl a n d structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers c o m e to l i g h t For once we bracket Husserl's ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science, we can r e p h r a s e this by arguing t h e r e is always already an overproduction of m e a n i n g / s e n s e — w h a t Deleuze calls a virtual reality—that can never be m a d e actual (cf. Deleuze 1973, 3 2 5 26 and Levi-Strauss 1950, floating signifiers). 85. Cf. "De la description a l'existence" in D E H H , 96.

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86. As he states in his 1929/30 lectures: "For God does not philosophise, if indeed (as the name already says) philosophy, this love of... as homesickness for . . . , must maintain itself in nothingness, in finitude" (GA 29 / 30, §6, 28). 87. Cf. SuZ, §§59 & 60. 88. SuZ, §76, 396: "'Monumentalen' Moglichkeiten menschlicher Existenz." 89. Cf. SuZ, §62, 310. 90. This is in contrast to Gunther Figal's reading, which argues that the claim that Dasein needs to chose one's hero "is nonetheless not very convincing. The choice of a hero after all betokens the wish to be like an other Dasein and with this one remains caught up in the structure of the 'They'" (Figal 1988, 322). Indeed, Bernasconi (1990) has beautifully illustrated how the call of conscience is linked to Being-towards-death through his reading of Tolstoy's The Death of Ivan Ilyich. Bernasconi convincingly shows that Heidegger cannot avoid existential commitments, though his analysis serves to protect the reduction of the formal existential analysis to the existentiell level. Cf. conclusion to chapter 3, n. 108. 91. Like Husserl, Heidegger emphasizes that this primordial possibility to which Dasein returns is representative of the community as a whole: "Its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny [ Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people" (SuZ, §74, 384). For destiny is to struggle for authenticity; it is a factical ideal that is not only Dasein's ideal but the ideal of the people (Volk). It is the repetition of facing the destiny by which Dasein understands itself as Being-with-others, a return to the fate of resolutely grasping Being-in-the-world as Being-possible. It is a destiny of the people, insofar as the forgetting of Being, and thus the forgetting and fleeing from our ownmost potentiality of Being, is our philosophical heritage. This heritage cannot be undone but only destructed—by undoing the forgetting without 'forgetting' the path that has led to this undoing. It is our fate that we are always already guilty and thus need to 'return' to authenticity, which is nothing other than Dasein's thrown-projection. Cf. SuZ, §58. CHAPTER 5 1. "Einleitung zu Was ist MetaphysikV in Wegmarken, 206 / 377 (in GA 9 only), footnote added to the fifth 1949 edition; Heidegger 1975a. Cf. ZSD, 15-16; 14-15E. 2. Cf. "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes" in Holzwege; BW, 139-212. 3. Kunst und Raum, 210; 8E. In this manner Heidegger fails to realize that the lived body is the common root of thought and intuition. And it is to that analysis that we wish to return through Husserl. The aim is thus to remain at the limits of SuZ, rather than turning to Heidegger's later accounts of the world—to put it another way, we wish to retrieve the world within the phenomenological project. 4. Cf. "Brief iiber den Humanismus," 1946, in Wegmarken; BW, 213-65.

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5. F r o m the GA 20 we know that H e i d e g g e r h a d the m a n u s c r i p t of Ideen his desk in 1925. Cf. GA 20, §13,167. 6. "[NJamely, that the surface which encloses the o n e c a n n o t possibly enclose the o t h e r " (AKII, 384). 7. As Michael F r i e d m a n (1992) observes, "he is n o t endorsing a Newtonian conception of the a u t o n o m o u s reality of 'absolute space.' This is clear from the passage (cf. AKII, 378) where Kant deliberately refrains from endorsing the Newtonian conception—adopted by Euler—of absolute motion' (p. 29). 8. Cf. A K I I , 385-419. 9. S. Glockner has coined this expression leibhaflige Anschauung. Cited by Kaulbach (1960), 134. 10. For Heidegger, Being-in-the-world makes possible the p h e n o m e n o n of orientation. Cf. chapter 3, §51ff., a n d G A 2 0 , §25b, 320-22. 11. SuZ, §23, 109. Cf. GA 20, §25b, 320-23 a n d chapter 3, §51. 12. Cf. a p p e n d i x to chapter 3, §5ff., a n d chapter 4, §70ff. 13. However, Kant's position is n o t as clear-cut as K a u l b a c h m a k e s it a p p e a r . While Kant treats time in the Transcendental Aesthetic as the formal a priori c o n d i t i o n of all a p p e a r a n c e s whatsoever — that is, a p p e a r a n c e s in time a n d space —and space as the a priori c o n d i t i o n only of o u t e r a p p e a r a n c e s (cf. KRV, A34 / B50), this relation is reversed in the Refutation of Idealism, in which he claims that self-knowledge (of my existence in time) presupposes knowledge of the existence of objects outside us (outer sense). Cf. KRV, B275ff. 14. This phrase alludes to Kant, who, according to Merleau-Ponty, calls the h a n d an "outer brain of m a n " (un "cerveau exterieur de rhomme"; MerleauPonty 1962, 316). As we have shown above, the true source of this insight, however, is n o t Kant b u t Aristotle, who says: "The soul, as it were, acts like a h a n d " (Aristotle 1957, 432a, translation slightly altered). Cf. chapter 3, §67 n. 105. 15. Husserl does n o t refer to this text in Ideen II. 16. This is analogous to Kant's presentation in the KRV. Kant distinguishes between the dynamic principles of substance (intensive magnitudes) a n d causality. Cf. 'Axioms of Intuition.' 17. Cf. chapter 2, §14ff. 18. Husserl introduces the t e r m phantom for visual a n d spatial forms in §10 of Ideen II 19. Husserl 1981b, 324; 239E. 20. I move my eye (occulatory kinaesthetic), I position the imagined obj e c t in relation to my reallived body. "In phantasy, I d o look at the centaur; i.e., my eye, freely moved, goes back a n d forth, a c c o m m o d a t i n g itself in this or that way, a n d the visual 'appearances,' the schemata, succeed o n e a n o t h e r in motivated ' a p p r o p r i a t e ' o r d e r , whereby they p r o d u c e the consciousness of an e x p e r i e n c e of an existing centaur-object viewed in various ways" (Ideen II, §18a, 5 6 - 5 7 ) . 21. Cf. Ideen II, §49e, 181-85. 22. "The pure Ego must be able to accompany all my representations" (Ideen II, §26,108). 23. Ideen II, §18c, 75: "Es h a n g t von d e m Leib u n d von d e m Eigenen d e r Psyche ab, was das Subjekt als Welt sich gegeniiber hat." lion

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24. Ludwig L a n d g r e b e has shown that Husserl fails to develop the essential insight he developed in the second section of Ideen / / b e c a u s e h e wishes to u p h o l d the primacy of a theoretical constituting consciousness. Cf. Landg r e b e 1981c. Cf. Claesges (1964), who develops L a n d g r e b e ' s claims. 25. Cf. chapter 2 u n d e r "The Problem of 'Sensuous HyleT 26. "Obviously, it c a n n o t b e said that I see my eye in the m i r r o r , for my eye, that which sees qua seeing, I d o n o t perceive" (Ideen II, §37, 148 n. 1). 27. Wittgenstein 1 9 6 3 , 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 5.633. 28. "But neither lived body nor soul thereby acquire 'nature-properties': in the sense of logico-mathematical n a t u r e " (Ideen II, §32, 132). 29. Cf. chapter 2 u n d e r "The Problem of 'Sensuous Hyle,'" §25ff. 30. W h e n I touch an object, I feel not only the object b u t also the movem e n t of my h a n d touching the object. T h a t is to say I have a kinaesthetic tactile sensation. Cf. Ideen II, §36. 3 1 . Cf. Merleau-Ponty 1962, 93. Merleau-Ponty therefore calls the lived body "a third genus of being" (ibid., 350) a n d argues that "1 know myself only in ambiguity" (ibid., 345). 32. In a beautifully written article on Ideen II, Merleau-Ponty illustrates how this ambiguous m o d e of existence, for example, shaking hands, makes intersubjectivity possible. "My right h a n d was p r e s e n t at the advent of my left h a n d ' s active sense of touch. It is in n o different fashion that the o t h e r ' s body c o m e s to life before m e when I shake a n o t h e r m a n ' s h a n d or when I j u s t look at it" (Merleau-Ponty 1964,168, translation slightly altered). Prior to analogical reasoning, the otherhody arises out of inter-corporeity. T h e copresence of the two hands, which are b o t h felt (sentir) and feeling (sentanf),is e x t e n d e d to the o t h e r person. T h e r e is an aesthesiological c o m m u n i t y which founds intersubjectivity a n d n o t reason, analogy, or indeed communication. 3 3 . T o follow Claesges (1964): "It is only by reflecting u p o n e m b o d i e d consciousness that we realize that hyle as such is possible only as sensation" (p. 134). 34. Cf. H u a XVI, § 4 6 , 1 6 1 . 35. This insight p r e e m p t s the Fifth Meditation in CM, in which Husserl realizes that a second r e d u c t i o n is necessary. It is possible that Ideen II rem a i n e d unpublished because Husserl h a d not yet gained this insight. As Alfred Schiitz notes: "In 1934 Husserl told the p r e s e n t writer (i.e., Schiitz) that he left the second volume of the / ^ ^ u n p u b l i s h e d , because h e h a d n o t at that time f o u n d a satisfactory solution for the p r o b l e m of intersubjectivity which h e believed to have b e e n achieved in the V. Cartesian Meditation" (Schutz 1 9 5 2 / 3 , 395-96). It is necessary to bracket not only the world of things, b u t also the idea that t h e r e is a n intersubjective world, i.e., a world that can b e perceived from a viewpoint that is different from m i n e . For it is only in this mann e r that the question can be raised of how an intersubjective world can c o m e about. T h e question requires that I bracket the animal n a t u r e a n d thus reg a r d spiritual or living beings purely as things, objective bodies (Kbrper) that n o l o n g e r play a constitutive role (cf. Fifth Meditation in CM). T h e Fifth Meditation is often m i s u n d e r s t o o d as introducing the ' o t h e r ' into philosophy. However, the fundamental question is n o t 'how d o we know that o t h e r h u m a n

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beings exist?' n o r the question of empathy or appresentation. Rather the question is "How is an objective world possible?"—i.e., a world that is identical for all of us a n d n o t d e p e n d e n t o n my viewpoint. For if something is inter subjective, it is objective. Cf. Schutz 1975, 51-91 and Fink 1970, 368. 36. Cf. Ideenll, §42c, 161. 37. Cf. chapter 2 u n d e r "The Enigma of the Consciousness of T i m e " a n d "The Vigilance of the Subject." 38. As Aristotle has already shown, what defines life ((pvaiq) is that all things move or change or c o m e a n d go. 39. Cf. §42 a n d §43 above. 40. Claesges has coined the t e r m transzendentaler Sensualismus (Claesges 1964,131). 4 1 . Cited by L a n d g r e b e (1974), 478G; 61E, translation slighdy altered: "Die E n t d e c k u n g des m e i n geht d e r Entdeckung des Ich voran." 42. Cf. §86 above. 43. A K 5 , 269; Kant (1987). 44. Ibid., A116 / B117, o u r translation: "Erregte Bewegung." 45. "[A] 11 representations, whether they have for their objects outer things or not, belong, in themselves, as determinations of the mind, to o u r inn e r state" (KRV A34 / B50). 46. OpusPostumum, AK22, 364. 47. Opus Postumum, AK 22, "Zehntes Convolut," 332. Cited by Kaulbach (1960), 136. 48. Kaulbach pursues this line of t h o u g h t in Kant in the most intriguing m a n n e r . H e shows that Kant ' r e t u r n s ' to the idea of an e m b o d i e d intuition in the Kntik der Urteilskrafi and the Opus Postumum. This leads Kaulbach to the conclusion: "Fruitful t h o u g h Heidegger's insight might have b e e n in g r o u n d i n g transcendental philosophy o n temporality, it was also one-sided: Movement is m o r e originary a n d makes possible b o t h time and space" (Kaulbach 1960, 152). Cf. Aristotle, Physics, Book IV. It is i m p o r t a n t to note that in the KRV Kant refuses to provide a transcendental d e d u c t i o n of movement. T h e r e he states: "Transcendental aesthetic cannot contain m o r e than these two elements, space a n d time. This is evident from the fact that all other concepts belonging to sensibility, even that of motion, in which b o t h elements are united, p r e s u p p o s e something empirical" (KRV, A42 / B58, emphasis a d d e d ) . 49. T o follow Casey, the lived body "is the ' c o m m o n , b u t to us u n k n o w n r o o t ' of all that comes to b e classified in rigidly stratified ways in m o d e r n Weste r n thought" (1993, 50). Ludwig L a n d g r e b e also alludes to this analogy (1954,202-3). 50. Cf. KRV, "First Analogy," A184 / B227. 51. KRV, B275. Cf. B XXXIX. 52. This has b e e n shown well by Kriiger (1950, 884ff.) and Allison (1983, 258-59). It is Vogel who does n o t accept this line of interpretation, arguing that inner sense has its own p u r e manifold (1993, 8 7 8 - 8 1 ) . T h e a r g u m e n t that Vogel provides, however, indicates a conflation of what Kant calls 'inner sense' a n d ' T i m e ' a n d 'subjectivity'. For Vogel it is deeply problematic "to see why the self, unlike outer things, has to be r e p r e s e n t e d (if we can talk that

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way) as a bare substratum rather than a fully-fledged object" (ibid., 881). H e r e Vogel conflates the substratum of the self with the self that can be known in time. We n e e d to distinguish between time that determines my empirical b e i n g {ich bin in der Zeit [I am in time]), and the temporal relation to myself (die Zeit in mir [the time in m e ] ) , which has its own sense of p e r m a n e n c e . T h e latter refers to a p e r m a n e n c e "as substratum (as p e r m a n e n t form of inner intuition) " (KRV, B224). This is well illustrated by Miiller-Lauter (1964, 74-78). 53. We are referring to inner sense in the narrower sense, i.e., to consciousness of ourselves in time. 54. Curiously we are h e r e repeating Kant's second analogy: alterations are governed by the law of the connection of cause and effect. Every event has a cause; that is to say, every event takes place in a temporal order. Every event is m e a s u r e d over against a c o m m o n ground, which is an absolute temporal horizon. As Husserl observes: "The constitution of myself in time and the o t h e r in time is tied u p essentially with the constitution of a world a n d a world time." 55. Chapter 2, §40, and Husserl, MS C7 II, 12 (1932), cited by H e l d (1966,70). 56. We do n o t wish thereby to u n d e r m i n e Dasein's distinctiveness over and against beings of other character than its own. Cf. chapter 3, §45, esp. n. 17. 57. GA 20, §13, 168. Simon Critchley, drawing o n the same citations, observes: "The point at issue h e r e is that Heidegger's critique of the Cartesian Husserl is necessarily based u p o n a partial reading of the Husserlian text a n d p r e m i s e d u p o n an oversimplification of the extremely rich and complex history of subjectivity between Descartes and Husserl" (Critchley 1996, 17).

APPENDIX 1. T u g e n d h a t 1986, 166, emphasis added. 2. T u g e n d h a t 1986, 166, emphasis added. 3. Lafont, 1994, 99. She h e r e refers explicitly to Apel. 4. Indeed, Lafont cites a passage from Heidegger's earlier work in which this link between discourse, disclosure, a n d truth is clearly expressed: "The achievement of discourse is to r e n d e r something accessible, as openly there As such Xoyoq has the privileged potentiality for aXr\6evew... making available, openly t h e r e as unconcealed that which was formerly concealed, covered over" (Lafont 1994, 96; cf. G A 6 3 , 11). 5. This claim is r e p e a t e d in SuZ: "To significations, words accrue. But word-Things d o n o t get supplied with significations" (SuZ, §34, 161). 6. Wittgenstein 1958, §43. Or: "Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? —In use it is alive'' (ibid., §432). 7. Cf. chapter 3, §58 a n d §62. 8. Ibid. 9. "For philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday' (Wittgenstein 1958, §38). 10. SuZ, §69b, 361-62, emphasis added.

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11. Macquarrie a n d Robinson translate it as "change-over." 12- " [ T ] h e p h e n o m e n o n of w o r l d h o o d . . . gets passed over''' (SuZ, §14, 65). 13. Apel 1976a, 39 n. 56. 14. It is doubtful, however, whether this reading helps us to disclose a radical d e p a r t u r e from Husserl. For as we have shown in chapter 1, the transcendental reduction does n o t lead to a 'loss' of the world, n o r is the existence of the world negated; rather, the world remains as an intentional interpretative horizon. After the reduction, the world remains qua cogitatum, which is given p r i o r to a n y j u d g m e n t or positing. This horizon is, however, nothing b u t a horizon of meaning, indeed, Husserl himself refers to it as a "pre-predicative experience of the world" (EU, §9, 37), a general intuition that accompanies any particular constitution of an object. Thus, it appears that the r e t u r n to language is equally implicit in Husserl's texts. 15. This is, however, specific to SuZ. Heidegger will soon consider language and Being as co-original. Cf. Lafont 1994, second part. 16. As Lafont points out, Rede can be c o m p a r e d with Humboldt's concept of process or energeia, or Saussure's parole, whereas Sprache is synonymous with what H u m b o l d t calls system (ergon) and Saussure (langue) (cf Lafont 1994,95). 17. T h e aim is to avoid Burner's (and implicidy Husserl's) view of language. Buhler views language as having merely a representative function (Darstellungsfunktion); Husserl claims that m e a n i n g is intentional. 18. For a summary of these three issues see Lafont (1994, 135). Not only is H e i d e g g e r ' s conception of language still strongly u n d e r the influence of Husserl, but, because of a misreading of H u m b o l d t , H e i d e g g e r believes that language is always r e a d as a m e d i u m and tool. This leads h i m to differentiate between Rede (discourse or address) a n d Sprache (language), a differentiation that Lafont believes to fall short, since in SuZ there is a kind of indecision about the function of language. O n the o n e h a n d , Heidegger argues that Rede is the existential of language: "The existential-ontologicalfoundation of language is discourse or talk " (SuZ, §34,160). Indeed, in GA 20 Heidegger emphasizes that Rede allows for the pre-predicative disclosure of the world. Heidegger illustrates this by employing Husserl's term Apprasentation: "Making manifest t h r o u g h discourse first and foremost has the sense of interpretive appresentation of the environment u n d e r concern; to begin with, it is n o t at all tailored to knowledge, research, theoretical propositions, and propositional context" (GA 20, §28d, 361). ( O n Heidegger's adoption of Husserl's t e r m Apprasentation, see Kisiel 1983, esp. 199-206). O n the other hand, Heidegger gives an ontological interpretation of language. Suddenly it is n o t only an innerworldly p h e n o m e n o n , but: "Our Interpretation of language has b e e n designed merely to point o u t the ontological 'locus' of this p h e n o m e n o n in Dasein's state of Being" (SuZ, §34, 166; cited by Lafont 1994,107). 19. T o avoid any misinterpretations Heidegger later argues: "We speak a n d speak about language. What we speak of, language, is always ahead of us" ("Das Wesen d e r Sprache," 1957-58, in UzS, 179; OWL, 75E). 20. SuZ, §34, 161: "Als innerweldich Seiendes wie ein Z u h a n d e n e s vorfindlich."

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2 1 . This is well illustrated by Lafont, o n whose analysis we shall draw. See especially Lafont 1994, §1.4.3, "Sprache u n d Rede," 94-116. 22. SuZ, § 3 4 , 1 6 1 , emphasis added. Cf. GA 20, §28, 364. 23. SuZ, " R a n d b e m e r k u n g e n , " 442, 87c. 24. Indeed, as Cassirer has shown, H u m b o l d t ' s account of language is essentially Kantian. Language, like the categories of the u n d e r s t a n d i n g in KRV, does n o t represent an outside world. Rather it forms the objective world. N o t only this, but language discloses our original unity with the world (and p e o p l e ) . Language discloses objectivity in its subjective acts. Language is thus n o t the tool of an individual b u t r e t u r n s us to an original unity that has m a d e possible u n d e r s t a n d i n g in the first place: "We must free ourselves completely from the idea that it can be separated from what it designates, as for e x a m p l e t h e n a m e of a m a n from his person, a n d that like a conventional cipher it is a p r o d u c t of reflection a n d a g r e e m e n t o r in any sense the work of m a n . . . n o t to say the work of the individual For striving d e e p within him after that unity a n d totality, m a n seeks to surpass the barriers of his individuality T h e individual, wherever, whenever a n d however h e lives, is a fragment b r o k e n off from his whole race, a n d language demonstrates a n d sustains this eternal b o n d which governs the destinies of the individual a n d the history of the world" (Wilhelm F r e i h e r r von H u m b o l d t , "Uber die Verschiedenheiten des menschlichen Sprachbaues," cited by Cassirer [1953, 156-57]). 25. Lafont (1994), 107. In a footnote H e i d e g g e r refers explicitly to Husserl (ibid.). 26. T h e everyday, which o u r analysis has hardly m e n t i o n e d , is i n d e e d characterized in terms of a breathlessness a n d fluidity, where Dasein is never itself, b u t is always already defined by the 'They' (das Man). T e r m s such as averageness (Durchschnittlichkeit; SuZ, §27, 127), publicness (Offentlichkeit; ibid.), not tarrying along (Unvenveilen; SuZ, §36, 172), distraction (Zerstreuung; ibid.), idle talk (Gerede; SuZ, §35, 167), a n d ambiguity (Zweideutigkeit; SuZ, §37, 173) a r e chosen to describe this m o m e n t of lack of selfhood. O n the notions of 'selfhood' a n d 'authenticity', see chapter 4, §70 a n d §75. 27. Levinas 1989, 123. 28. Levinas praises SuZ for its anti-intellectualistic stance, which comes to light in its account of the everyday, in which H e i d e g g e r argues that o u r responsibility exceeds the r e a l m of intentionality. We c o m m i t ourselves to life a n d this committal easily turns into comedy, a n d this comedy can t u r n easily into tragedy. "The c o m e d y begins with the simplest of o u r movements, carrying with t h e m every inevitable awkwardness. In putting out my h a n d to app r o a c h a chair, I have creased the sleeve of my jacket, I have scratched the floor, I have d r o p p e d ash from my cigarette. In d o i n g that which I wanted to do, I have d o n e so m a n y things that I did not want to d o . T h e act has n o t b e e n p u r e for I have left traces, in wiping o u t these traces, I have left o t h e r s . . . . W h e n the awkwardness of the act turns against the goal p u r s u e d , we a r e at the h e i g h t of tragedy" (Levinas 1989, 122-23). 29. It is curious to see that Apel makes a similar move. H e too wishes to safeguard this constitutive m o m e n t by drawing analogies to what Wittgenstein calls ' d e p t h g r a m m a r ' . Apel advocates a symbolic a priori that could form the

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basis for a regulative principle in the Kantian sense, which makes possible any form of communication: "The factical existing multifarious a n d inconsistent language-games which are 'interwoven' with equally multifarious, inconsistent forms of life c a n n o t be assigned to the criterial context for the following of a rule as postulated by Wittgenstein. It is rather the 'transcendental' language-game which is p r e s u p p o s e d in all of t h e m as the condition of the possibility a n d validity for communication" (Apel 1976b, 162-3). T h e significant m o m e n t for Apel is that Wittgenstein still holds o n to a notion of a depth-grammar, "lTiefengrammatik" (Wittgenstein 1958, §664), which, like Heidegger's notion of the w o r l d h o o d of the world, allows for different language-games, namely, the e n c o u n t e r of beings in the world and i n d e e d differe n t 'worlds'. It is i m p o r t a n t to note that Wittgenstein does n o t purely affirm the multiplicity of language-games b u t searches for what h e calls a primitive form of language-game that could explain m o r e complicated forms. "If we want to study the p r o b l e m s of t r u t h a n d falsehood, of the a g r e e m e n t a n d disagreem e n t of propositions with reality, of the n a t u r e of assertion, assumption, and question, we shall with great advantage look at primitive forms of language in which these forms of thinking appear. . . . We see that we can build u p the complicated forms from the primitive ones by gradually adding new forms" (Wittgenstein 1969,17). Furthermore, Wittgenstein believes that these primitive forms of language are based on certainty: "The primitive form of the languageg a m e is certainty, n o t uncertainty. For uncertainty could never lead to action" (Wittgenstein 1976,404 / 420E). T h a t is to say, "Somewhere I must begin with not-doubting; and that is not, so to speak, hasty b u t excusable: it is p a r t of j u d g i n g " (Wittgenstein 1975, §150). What is of i m p o r t a n c e for Apel is that this d e p t h - g r a m m a r points to a quasi-transcendental apriorim the Kantian sense: "It is noteworthy that we are dealing h e r e with the linguistic analytical, that is the h e r m e n e u t i c transformation of the problematic of Kant's transcendental philosophy." (Apel 1976a, 327). For Apel, H e i d e g g e r a n d Wittgenstein are vehicles for the articulation of a quasi-transcendental regulative principle that allows n o t only for "providing in principle for the possibility of universal c o m m u n i c a t i o n . . . it [i.e., universal communication] first acquires its significance u n d e r the condition that this possibility be progressively realized. This, however, means that [linguistic analysts, hermeneuticists, and interpreters] must be able to p r e s u p p o s e the idea of universal communication as a regulative principle in the Kantian sense" (Apel 1976b, 162). This move appears justified insofar as Heidegger's search for a fundamental ontology leads him to "inquire into the basic forms in which it is possible to articulate anything u n d e r s t a n d a b l e " (SuZ, §34,166). Cf. GA 20, §28. Thus, the w o r l d h o o d of the world could be r e a d as the regulative principle that allows for a n d makes possible, to use the Kantian expression, 'the condition of possibility' of any form of communication. 30. Cf. Cassirer 1953, chapter 3, 149-69. 31. As we shall show later, SuZ's spatiality is a secondary p h e n o m e n o n to its temporality, as the tide of §70 indicates: "The Temporality of the Spatiality T h a t Is Characteristic of Dasein." Cf. chapter 4, §79. 32. In the lectures on Leibniz h e calls this "transcendental dissemination"

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(transzendentale Zerstreuung); it is nothing but Dasein's thrownness (GA 26, §10,173-74). 33. GA 4, "Holderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung," 35; 38. Also cited by Franck (1986, 52), and Lafont (1994, 122f.). 34. "Zeit und Sein" in ZSD, 24; 23E. 35. The essence of language will indeed be a moment of pointing: "What unfolds essentially in language is saying as pointing. Its showing does not culminate in a system of signs. Rather, all signs arise from a showing in whose realm and for whose purposes they can be signs" ("Der Weg zur Sprache," 1959, in UzS, 254; OWL 410).

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SUBJECT INDEX

absolute consciousness, 54-5 affectivity, 42, 89-90, 152, 153,155, 157, 159 animals, 75, 200 n. 17 anxiety, 110-1 'apophantic as', 93, 98, 103 atomism, 33-4, 36-7 authenticity, 103, 110, 139-40

Being versus beings, 75-6, 200 n. 16, 201 n.23 question of, xxv, 14, 15, 19-21, 72, 75-6, 77, 110, 186 n. 44, 188 n . l 7 , 2 0 0 n . l 6 , 201 n.20 Bewandtnis, 100-1, 104-6 body, 83, 87, 90, 111, 124, 142, 144, 146,147-9, 163-5, 220 n.32 lived body [Leib], 148-61, 163, 218 n.3,219n.20, 220nn.28,31,221 n.49 objective body [Korper], 150, 152, 164, 220 n. 35 see also embodiment bracketing, xxv, xxvii, 15, 16, 18, 25-6, 138, 155 Cartesianism, 3-4, 19, 22, 23-4, 32-3, 120 see also Descartes categorial object, 11, 184 n. 24 see also categorial intuition circumspection, 93, 97-8, 99, 101, 114, 170 circumvention, 93-6, 99, 101-2 consciousness, xxvi, xxvii, 3, 6-7, 16-7, 23-4, 27-30, 47-8, 54-5, 56-62, 67-70, 72-3, 134-6, 149, 151-2, 156-7, 160, 163-4

constitution, 5-6, 67-8, 74, 76-7, 94, 107-8,115,153-4,182n.8 corpuscularism, 38 Dasein, xxv, xxvi-xxvii, 14, 20, 22-3, 72-131 passim, 138-40, 141-51 passim, 158, 160, 163-5,169, 171, 172-80 passim, 200-18 passim, 223 n. 18 denned 73-9 Ego (pure T ) , xxvii, 55, 56, 58, 62, 67, 73,75,79,83,85,87,107-9,118, 149,150, 156,167,171,187 n. 4, 199nn.3, 7,202 n.26, 211 n.9, 216n.53, 219n.22 empirical ego, 6 Ego-pole, 118-21, 149, 152, 153, 156, 158, 160, 219 n. 42 embodiment, 78, 87, 89, 111, 124,142, 147, 151, 160, 165 see also body everyday, xxiii, 92-3, 96, 103, 108-10, 117, 177, 205 nn. 56, 59, 208 n . 9 5 , 2 H n . 4 , 213n.28,214 n.33,224nn.26,28 evidence, 8-10, 16, 18, 33, 37, 53, 183 n.17, 189n.22, 216n.57 external ism, xxv, 3 fallenness, 102-3, 208 n.95, 213 n.24 flowing phenomena [Ablaufsphdnomene], 33, 52, 62, 190 n.26 Gemiit, 159 'hermeneutic as', 93-4, 98, 103 idealism, 2, 74, 161-2, 200 n. 16

238

SUBJECT INDEX

immanence, 24-5, 52, 68,123,124,139 and transcendence, 26, 28, 29-32, 36-8, 53-4, 64, 79,108-10, 112, 122,126-7,129, 131, 138,149 see also transcendence intention, 10,11,12,18, 32, 48-9,191 n.38, 195 n. 72 empty intention, 9, 31, 36, 117, 183 n.16 fulfilled intention, 12, 32 meaning-intention, 8-9, 12, 183 n. 17, 184 n. 22 unfulfilled intention, 49,183 n. 17 intentionality, xxv, 9-10, 35, 108 longitudinal [Langsintentionalitdt], 50,59, 61,62, 70,179 n.93 intentional morphe, 38 see also matter versus form intentional object, 5, 40, 182 n.5, 188 n.ll internalism, xxiv-xxv, 3, 5 intuition, 11-2, 16, 5 0 - 1 , 116, 133-4 categorial intuition, 11-2, 184-5 n.27 sensible intuition, 11, 42-3, 144, 184n.21 Kehre (Turning), 141, 180, 210 kinaesthesia, 2, 154-5, 158, 159-60, 163 language [Sprache], xx, 5-6,64,75,142, 167-80,183 n. 10, 200-1 n. 18, 201 n. 19, 206 n.63, 222 n.9, 223 nn.14, 15,17, 18,19,224n.24, 226 n. 35 language-games, 224-5 n.29 leaps or jumps over [uberspnngen], xxiv, 15,29, 114, 141,142 lived experiences [Erlebnisse], 3, 24, 27, 30-5, 37, 39, 40, 50, 53, 55-56, 59-62,67, 68, 189 n. 19, 191 n.42,192 nn.45,48, 49,195 n.70 material, 42, 43, 96, 118, 155 material extension (versus spiritual extension), 125

material nature, 204 n.51 material world, xxvii, 29, 87, 102, 106,141,142,147,149,165,171 materialism, 158, 215 n.46 materiality, 78, 87-8, 92, 97, 99-104, 106,107,142,147,175 matter, 7, 12, 42, 125, 143, 159, 196 n.77 versus form, 38-40, 43, 44, 153, 184-5 n.27 see also sensuous hyle methodological solipsism, xxv, 3, 4-5 natural attitude, 15-6, 20, 108, 150 neo-Kantianism, 22 noema, 16-7 object that is intended and object as it is intended, 6, 7, 17 objectivity, 5-7, 12-3, 118-9, 157, 187 n. 2, 224 n. 24 ontology versus epistemology, 19-20, 21 passive synthesis, 66 passivity, 153, 155, 157 praxis, 92, 93, 170, 205 n.58 protention, 48-50 receptivity, 11,42-3, 184 n. 21 reference, 7-8 retention, 34-6 sensuous hyle, 38-52, 155, 157 see also matter versus form sign, 12, 41, 102,104, 169, 174-5, 187 n.9, 194n.60, 201 n. 19, 208 n.83, 222 n.6, 226n.35 versus equipment, 98-100, 208 n. 85 versus expression, 182 n.6 skepticism, xx-xxiv, xxv, 15-6, 19, 21 space, 6, 9, 24-5, 29, 37, 55, 62, 66, 7985,101,107,113-7,120,121, 123-6, 142,143-5,146,151-3, 157-65 passim, 178-80, 203 n.39, 216 nn.54, 55, 219 nn.7, 13,221 n.48

SUBJECT INDEX

spatiality, 31, 81-7, 100-2, 114,122-6, 141, 142-6, 151, 158, 165, 17880, 203 n.38, 204 nn.43, 45, 208 n.91,216n.55, 225n.31 spontaneity, 11, 43, 146, 158,159, 163, 184n.21,215n.41 state of affairs, 8-9, 12-3, 183-4 n. 19 synthesis, 12, 17, 34, 38, 54-5, 66, 131, 184-5 n. 27, 190 nn. 33, 34 transcendence, 108-10, 113-4, 125, 130 see also immanence transcendental object, 42-4, 46-7, 64 transcendental reduction, xxv, 14-6, 18,22, 23,29, 30,78,87,90,107, 118, 133, 137, 197 n.85, 212 n.l8,217n.69,223n.l4

239

transcendental subject, 118, 122, 133, 192 n.47, 193-4 n.55, 201 n.23 transcendental subjectivity, 38, 131, 135-6,153,189 n.22,217 nn.68, 71 transcendental turn, xxv, 13-5 transverse intentionality [ Quenntentionalitdt], 59 vorhanden [present-at-hand], 45, 104, 105,117,1234 worldless (subject, ego, or beginning), xxiv, 23, 72, 87,188-9, 111, 123, 129 zuhanden [ready-to-hand], 94-5, 98-9, 101,102, 105, 123,174, 207 n. 75