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person w h o s e speech is being p a r a p h r a s e d ^ ^ I take a w o m a n seriously, I take seriously w h a t she has said, that is, precisely what she has said and h o w she has said it. I assume that she means w h a t she says, and that she says w h a t she means. A n d I can reply only to w h a t she has actually said, n o t to w h a t I t h i n k she has said. If a w o m a n criticizes the b e h a v i o u r or statement of a n o t h e r w o m a n or even a group of w o m e n w h o identify themselves as feminists, this does n o t m e a n that ' f e m i n ism' has b e e n criticized, and should not b e reformulated as such. If Black w o m e n criticize the fact that m a n y w h i t e feminists prioritize sexism over racism, they do n o t t h e r e b y question feminism or even sexism, b u t the insistence of some w h i t e w o m e n that sexism can be separated f r o m racism and that sexism has to c o m e firstj B u t the point of such reformulations is evidently not to engage w i t h t h e critique or to enter into a dialogic exchange w i t h the critics — to try to understand, to ask for clarification, to contribute to the analysis and to c o n t i n u e to think f u r t h e r . T h e point is to establish discursive p o w e r , to reformulate the p r o b l e m , replacing it by one's o w n definition, and to w i n the audience as allies in this v e n t u r e . This explains w h y critique is rarely q u o t e d verbatim, w h y the critics are n o t given t h e chance to speak for themselves. It is an exercise of p o w e r and c o n t r o l , eliminating 'the o t h e r ' t o g e t h e r w i t h h e r speech and c o n t r o l ling w h a t is heard. In this way, n o t only her critique is suppressed, b u t also the c o m m u n i c a t i v e significance of her critique as a speech act, that is, h e r i n t e n t i o n of speaking with us to reach a c o m m o n understanding. W h a t was an act of social c o m m u n i o n b e c o m e s an act of opposition, t h r o u g h the discursive restructuring of the c o m m u n i c ative parties of M' and ' y o u ' as the oppositional parties of 'us' and 'them'.
f W h i l e discursive strategies, such as paraphrasing the speech of others for an a u d i e n c e of an 'us' w h i c h excludes those speakers, are thus signs that ' w e ' prefer to remain mistresses of the discourse and to converse a m o n g 'ourselves', it yet is n o t the case that 'the others' could simply >") \ stay w h e r e they are. R a t h e r , m a n y w h i t e w o m e n , as w e have seen, are ' o n their way to ' t h e others', seeking an e n c o u n t e r w i t h 'the others'. T h e y m a y n o t wish to let Black w o m e n speak to t h e m a n d to hear w h a t they are saying, b u t they w a n t to e n c o u n t e r , c o u n t e r and c o n f r o n t t h e m . As w e have seen already, this, too, may manifest itself in w h i t e w o m e n ' s speech.
W h e r e Black w o m e n have m a d e a critique of racism and racist behaviour, w h i t e w o m e n feel r e p r o a c h e d w i t h racism. This is not just the w r o n g choice of w o r d . Wdiile a critique — the discussion and analysis of formulations, meanings, interpretations and practice - is a f o r m of social behaviour, the collective self-criticism of a m o v e m e n t referring to c o m m o n principles, standards and political aims, the t e r m 'reproach' shifts the f r a m e of reference to a radically different d o m a i n , namely the arena of personal relationships...^ ( " W h a t is of interest is not w h a t has b e e n said and w h e t h e r it is true but rather w h o has said it and w h a t it means for 'us', its recipients. W h a t is b e i n g heard is less the issue of racism that has b e e n raised - the analysis of reality, here of specific racist practices - than the m e r e fact | that s o m e o n e has spoken and expressed a v i e w p o i n t w h i c h is different f r o m m i n e and w h i c h may c o n c e r n m y o w n b e h a v i o u r . If usually w e focus o n the ' c o n t e n t ' of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , at the expense of the m e a n i n g of c o m m u n i c a t i v e b e h a v i o u r , here w e shift o u r attention f r o m the c o n t e n t of the critique and turn to the fact of critique. Since for the subject, h o w e v e r , a relationship by definition is an opposition b e t w e e n the subject and the other, w h i c h thus excludes the possibility of a j o i n t process of understanding, the subject does not recognize c o m m u n i c a t i o n for its c o m m u n i c a t i v e i n t e n t i o n , the interest in dialogue. R a t h e r , it sees the speech of a n o t h e r as a challenge to a duel of words, w h i c h can b e resolved only t h r o u g h victory and unity, victory of o n e (my) representation over the other, and eventual unification u n d e r o n e p o i n t of view (mine). T h e m e r e speech of a n o t h e r is a threat, critique a sign of dissent and disunity, w h e r e 'I' am not only being ' o p p o s e d ' , b u t 'reproached' f o r w h a t I've said, which I regard as hostile behaviour towards myselfA A u d r e Lorde, for one, has constantly u n d e r l i n e d the significance of critique as a j o i n t c o m m u n i c a t i o n , as for instance in her famous ' A n O p e n Letter to Mary Daly':
. . . I write this letter to you now, hoping to share with you the benefits of my insights as you have shared the benefits of yours with me . . . what I want us to chew upon here is neither easy nor simple. The history of white women who are unable to hear black women's words, or to maintain dialogue with us, is long and discouraging . . . I invite you to a joint clarification of some of the differences which lie between us as a black and a white woman. 3 (my emphases)
As the addressees of this passage (which w e have b e c o m e t o g e t h e r w i t h Mary Daly since its publication), w e may see ourselves addressed in A u d r e Lorde's ' y o u ' — that is, as feminists talking t o g e t h e r — j o i n i n g her in t h i n k i n g a b o u t w h a t she invites us to t h i n k about together: the history of the relationship b e t w e e n w h i t e and Black w o m e n and the differences w h i c h lie b e t w e e n us as Black and as w h i t e w o m e n , and the specific criticisms she makes of Daly's text (and by implication of similar discursive behaviour). O r , as w h i t e w o m e n w e may ignore her c o m m u n i c a t i v e speech act, choosing instead t o identify as w h i t e w o m e n , that is, as m e m b e r s of a racially constituted group, a party w h o s e interests are in conflict w i t h those of Black w o m e n . T h u s w e will see Lorde's text as an attack, and leap to w h i t e w o m e n ' s defence, either by trying to p r o v e the 'attacker' w r o n g (say, arguing that ' n o t all w h i t e w o m e n ' are d o i n g w h a t Lorde here criticizes), or explaining w h e r e w h i t e w o m e n ' s fallibilities c o m e f r o m , in the h o p e of n e g o t i a t ing m e r c y in Black w o m e n ' s j u d g e m e n t of w h i t e w o m e n . Speech — h e r e A u d r e Lorde's 'letter' — t h e n b e c o m e s less a c o m m u n i c a t i o n f r o m a speaker to h e r addressees than a m o v e in an o n g o i n g war b e t w e e n o p p o s i n g parties. This view of critique, w h i c h regards the critical discussion especially of our o w n texts, statements and interpretations, and also our behaviour, o n principle as an attack, is also manifest in the increasing use of the term 'debate', w h i c h indeed designates a contest of opinion, an adversarial battle of arguments. A n d it is reflected in the desire, m u c h vaunted a m o n g G e r m a n feminists, for a 'culture of quarrelling' (Streitkultur) and 'strategies of conflict resolution' a m o n g feminists. T h e choice of terminology is revealing, since it betrays its origins in the domains of personal relationships and military conflict, w h e r e the central activity is indeed quarrel and battle rather than discussion, and where the reason for the quarrel usually recedes behind the fact of the quarrel. Conflicts and quarrels, moreover, are a matter less of the disputed content of the quarrel than of the relationship of the quarrelling parties. W h a t the feminist m o v e m e n t needs is less a culture of quarrelling than, o n the contrary, a recollection of the fact that critique is a m a t t e r of discussion w h i c h requires the separation of arguments f r o m persons, thus allowing us to engage w i t h each other's a r g u m e n t s . w i t h o u t personal conflict. If o n the o n e hand, h o w e v e r , w e refrain f r o m engaging w i t h the arguments of others and o n the other respond to critique as if it were" a personal attack, a collective discussion cannot
take place. Yet w e should ask ourselves what is the point of public feminist discourse if critical discussion of each other's arguments is considered undesirable, if everyone wants to make her statement but is unwilling to refer to anybody else's, let alone have her o w n discussed — because w e think that analysing and responding are forms of personal aggression while listening is a f o r m of submission. If it really is o u r goal that everyone should be able to express her opinion w i t h o u t anyone responding, it is not obvious w h y w e have to express our opinions publicly — unless the issue of course is a p o w e r struggle, a struggle for supremacy on the level of public speech, w h o s e aim can. only be victory, w h e r e victory means speech in front of a silent mass audience. If the issue, h o w e v e r , is feminism or indeed any cause, then the question is the c o m m o n cause rather than w h o represents it or a particular view. A n d w e represent a particular v i e w n o t because it is ours, b u t because, according to our present understanding, it seems to us right. W e w o u l d perhaps all agree w i t h this in theory; o u r practice, h o w e v e r , consumes itself in the opposite. It shows itself, amongst other things, in the choice of expressions such as ' r e p r o a c h ' , ' d e b a t e ' , 'quarrel' and 'conflict'. This shift f r o m the level of political discussion to the level of personal relationships is particularly m a r k e d in the history of w h i t e w o m e n ' s discourse in response to Black w o m e n and w o m e n f r o m the T h i r d W o r l d . W a l k e r alludes to it in her critique of w h i t e w o m e n ' s perception of themselves as victims, their habit of taking recourse to having b e e n damaged by patriarchal oppression - that is, their selfpathologizing. Such alleged damage apparently not only dispenses a woman, f r o m her responsibility in general, b u t specifically f r o m her responsibility for seeing her o w n oppression, in relation to the oppression of other w o m e n . W e k n o w this practice to excess f r o m experience in projects and contexts of the W e s t e r n w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t , w h e r e one's oppression credentials or even one's personal situation — f r o m o v e r w o r k to illness — are ritually offered as a reason for d i m i n ished responsibility, and in particular as a reason w h y one's responsibility should be taken over by the o t h e r w o m e n present. B u t it is manifest also in w h i t e w o m e n ' s theoretical a r g u m e n t a t i o n in relation to Black w o m e n ' s critique of racism. Self-pathologizing and its attendant claim to incapability are thus the last resort of the relatively p o w e r f u l in trying to outbid those w i t h less p o w e r in terms of victim
jj mc jjuimuti yi ycriuiugiiui: status. It is a strategy w h i c h has all the m o r e chance of succeeding w h e r e the w o m e n c o m p e t e d with are in turn struggling for c o m p e t e n c e and capability, and refrain f r o m pathologizing t h e m selves. O n e of the most typical symptoms of this shift f r o m the political to the level of personal relationships is the practice of psychologizing political reality. W h i l e the point of a political critique is to analyse political realities in terms of their p o w e r relations in the interest of changing t h e m , an e v e r - g r o w i n g part of the w o r k of white and W e s t e r n academic feminists is dedicated to explaining political reality, and explaining it in terms of psychology. N o sooner is the extent of m e n ' s sexual violence discussed and d o c u m e n t e d , n o sooner is their c o n s u m p t i o n of p o r n o g r a p h y raised as an issue, n o s o o n e r is the racist violence of whites a topic of public discussion, than theories emerge to explain this b e h a v i o u r , and explain it by pathologizing those w h o engage in it: m e n are said to have a deep-seated fear of w o m e n or female sexuality, ' p e o p l e ' are said to have a d e e p - r o o t e d fear of the 'strange' and the 'different'. T h a t is to say, the active agents themselves are the 'victims', if only of their o w n psychology. T h e r e is n o question w h e t h e r such explanations in fact explain anything, f o r their f u n c t i o n is less to clarify a problematical reality than to exonerate those responsible for it. T h e y b e c o m e all the m o r e popular if the behaviour in question is that of the explainers themselves, here w h e n w h i t e w o m e n and feminists are questioned about our o w n use of p o w e r . H a v i n g explained problematical b e h a v i o u r psychologically, it follows that, if w e l o o k for solutions at all, w e look for psychological solutions — say, w h e r e behaviour is seen as 'motivated by fear, hate or ignorance', suggest replacing it by love and ciesire. A d r i e n n e R i c h ' s article 'Disloyal to Civilization: Feminism, R a c i s m , G y n e p h o b i a ' is a case in point, all the m o r e important as R i c h is o n e of those feminists w h o have taken the critique of racism extremely seriously. T h e article dates f r o m the late 1970s and thus cannot be taken to represent A d r i e n n e R i c h ' s current understanding as a person, while m y critique of course is m a d e w i t h the benefit of hindsight, that is, after years of feminist critique of racism. Yet the article traces a m o v e m e n t of t h o u g h t and feeling w h i c h has characterized that of m a n y w h i t e w o m e n and feminists since, namely responding to the insight into the realities of racism b y explaining o u r response to
the reproach of racism - followed by the desire for a personal relationship w i t h Black w o m e n . In the very course of recognizing w h i t e w o m e n ' s historical and present-day racism in the U n i t e d States, R i c h continually feels o b liged, or feels the need, to find an explanation for this h o r r e n d o u s fact, namely that w h i t e w o m e n w h o suffer so m u c h f r o m sexist oppression nevertheless themselves oppress Black people. W h i t e w o m e n ' s implication in racism, h o w e v e r , appears above all in terms of their relative lack of p o w e r and responsibility, rather than in terms of their relative p o w e r . T h a t is, R i c h highlights w h i t e w o m e n as ' w o m e n ' in relation to ' m e n ' (white m e n ) , w h e r e they appear as victims of sexism, rather than as w h i t e w o p i e n in a comparison of p o w e r in relation to Black w o m e n and m e n . C o n c e r n i n g the role of w h i t e w o m e n in slavery R i c h writes: Women
did not create the p o w e r relationship b e t w e e n master and
slave, n o r t h e m y t h o l o g i e s u s e d t o j u s t i f y t h e d o m i n a t i o n o f m e n o v e r w o m e n . . . b u t in t h e h i s t o r y o f A m e r i c a n s l a v e r y a n d r a c i s m w h i t e w o m e n h a v e b e e n i m p r e s s e d i n t o its s e r v i c e , n o t o n l y as t h e m a r r i a g e p r o p e r t y a n d c r e a t u r e - o b j e c t s o f w h i t e m e n , b u t as t h e i r a c t i v e a n d passive i n s t r u m e n t s . 4
Every f o r m u l a t i o n immediately takes back any responsibility and relative p o w e r that w h i t e w o m e n m i g h t have ('did n o t create', 'have been impressed into its service'), constructing t h e m instead as victims, ' as w h i t e m e n ' s ' p r o p e r t y ' and 'objects'. E v e n in the approximation to their active participation in racist oppression, this participation is rendered n o t as active action b u t as ' b e i n g instrumentalized to b e active': they have been made into active instruments. W h e n the formerly enslaved Frederick Douglass speaks of the 'irresponsible p o w e r ' of his f o r m e r w h i t e mistress, R i c h corrects and improves, writing: She was n o t , I suggest, c o r r u p t e d b y 'irresponsible p o w e r ' in the sense t h a t a m a l e t y r a n t o r p a t r i a r c h a l d e s p o t c o u l d b e so d e s c r i b e d ;
but
r a t h e r , t o r n a n d m a d d e n e d b y false p o w e r a n d false l o y a l t y t o a s y s t e m a g a i n s t w h i c h s h e h a d at first i n s t i n c t i v e l y r e v o l t e d , a n d w h i c h w a s destroying h e r integrity. Powerless in the institution of marriage, the i n s t i t u t i o n o f slavery did g i v e h e r n e a r - a b s o l u t e p o w e r o v e r a n o t h e r h u m a n being, h e r only outlet for rage and frustration b e i n g the control she h a d o v e r t h a t p e r s o n . 5
xi t-ric jjuiu ilui psycrtu logical r Feminists have been fighting against structurally similar arguments m e a n t to exonerate rapists and sexual abusers: that they have less than absolute p o w e r c o m p a r e d to the most p o w e r f u l of the p o w e r f u l w h i t e despots or millionaires, while appealing to the necessity of a safety valve, an 'outlet' f o r rage and frustration. Yet here, in the context of w h i t e w o m e n , they suddenly seem reasonable. T h u s the w h i t e w o m a n is not responsible for herself, she is the victim of a system, 'torn and m a d d e n e d ' . It is n o t she w h o gives u p her original integrity, the system is 'destroying her integrity'. It is n o t she w h o decides irresponsibly to abuse her 'near-absolute p o w e r over a n o t h e r h u m a n being'; the system of slavery gave it to her - f r o m w h i c h w e apparently are to infer that she could n o t b u t exercise it. In o t h e r words, in her legitimate concern w i t h the position of w h i t e w o m e n as oppressed by w h i t e m e n , R i c h foregrounds their oppression at the cost of the oppression of Black people - in this case at the cost of the oppression directly caused by the w h i t e w o m a n herself. O u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of structural, systemic oppression is used to s h o w u n d e r s t a n d i n g for the specific actions of the w h i t e w o m a n at the very p o i n t w h e r e that w o m a n ' s b e h a v i o u r towards her slave, Frederick Douglass, is in question. T o put it bluntly: w h e r e the w o m a n ' s b e h a v i o u r towards others is the issue, w e speak of others' behaviour towards the w o m a n . In the context of the present, that is, the early w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t , R i c h argues:
If a s h a l l o w ' l i f e - s t y l e ' b r a n d o f f e m i n i s m c a n s h r u g o f f t h e issue o f r a c i s m a l t o g e t h e r , it is also t r u e t h a t m o r e ' p o l i t i c a l ' w h i t e f e m i n i s t s still o f t e n feel vulnerable to the charge that ' w h i t e middle-class w o m e n ' o r ' b o u r g e o i s f e m i n i s t s ' are d e s p i c a b l e c r e a t u r e s o f p r i v i l e g e w h o s e
op-
p r e s s i o n is m e a n i n g l e s s b e s i d e t h e o p p r e s s i o n o f b l a c k , T h i r d W o r l d , o r working-class w o m e n
and m e n . T h a t charge, of course,
resolutely
a v o i d s t h e c e n t r a l f a c t o f m a l e g y n e p h o b i a a n d v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t all w o m e n . It also d i v e r t s e n e r g y i n t o t h e l u d i c r o u s a n d f r u i t l e s s g a m e o f ' h i e r a r c h i e s o f o p p r e s s i o n ' . . ,6
A sensitive understanding is here b e i n g e x t e n d e d towards the psychological vulnerability of political w h i t e w o m e n — and the analysis m o v e d to the level of personal relationships, w h e r e critique b e c o m e s a 'charge', and w h i t e w o m e n are b e i n g j u d g e d and sentenced as 'despicable creatures', that is, o n the grounds of their identity (which
they cannot help) as b e i n g white and middle-class. As a result they in turn feel vulnerable and presumably h u r t indeed, all the m o r e so as being seen as despicable means personal rejection. T h e words of the critique are n o t q u o t e d b u t paraphrased by R i c h , and paraphrased f r o m the perspective of w h i t e w o m e n ' s reception, their subjective and e m o t i o n a l response. R i c h ' s c o n c e r n is to show h o w m e n in patriarchy are prepared to use any pressure, manipulation or violence to prevent w o m e n f r o m organizing as w o m e n - historically and in the present operating the 'divide and c o n q u e r ' strategy w h i c h effects deep divisions b e t w e e n w o m e n , of w h i c h racism is o n e of the deepest, and the o n e w h i c h is the t h e m e of her article. Y e t w h a t in the passage above begins as a discussion of the 'issue of racism' turns into a discussion of male abuse of w h i t e w o m e n : 'the charge of "racism" f l u n g at w h i t e w o m e n in the earliest groupings of the i n d e p e n d e n t feminist m o v e m e n t was a charge made in the most obscene bad faith by w h i t e "radical" males (and by some leftist w o m e n ) against the daring leap of self-definition n e e d e d to create an a u t o n o m o u s feminist analysis.' 7 W h i l e such male behaviour, and in particular the cynical abuse of 'reproaches' of racism, classism or anti-Semitism (by anyone), is indeed reprehensible behaviour, it substitutes at this point of the discussion for a discussion of o u r o w n behaviour: that of political white w o m e n (in contrast to the shrugging-off of the issue of racism by 'life-style' feminists). A n y legitimate issue of racism disappears f r o m the discussion while w e are c o n c e r n e d w i t h the cynical charge m a d e in the most obscene faith. W h e t h e r critics o f ' t h e issue of racism' really consider w h i t e w o m e n 'despicable' and regard sexist oppression of white w o m e n as 'meaningless', or w h e t h e r in fact their critique concerns behaviour rather than identity, does not get raised. It is less important than considering white w o m e n ' s feelings. H e n c e w h i t e w o m e n ' s response of feeling ou tbid in their oppression, and of entering into c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h Black w o m e n and m e n , also seems a p r o d u c t of such abusive charges, although w e k n o w it also as an a u t o n o m o u s response by w h i t e feminists to the (legitimate) criticism of racism, in particular as the attempt to prioritize sexism over racism. Y e t b y discussing m e n ' s behaviour of flinging abuse, w o m e n appear indeed in a relation w h e r e they are the victims — as the white slave mistress is a victim in relation to her w h i t e husband. B u t they are victims m o r e crucially of the violence of abusive charging, be
it by m e n or b y a n y o n e , less of their general structural position as (white) w o m e n w h i c h , if it w e r e the issue, w o u l d need to appear in relation to that of Black m e n and w o m e n . T h u s even in the context o f ' r a c i s m ' (as a charge or reproach), w h i t e w o m e n are victims rather than those w i t h p o w e r — although it is w h i t e w o m e n w h o at this very m o m e n t are taking advantage of the p o w e r of discourse, deciding w h a t to f o r e g r o u n d a n d w h a t to exclude. T h e issue of racism thus appears above all as a c o u n t e r in the strained relations b e t w e e n w h i t e w o m e n and m e n o n the left, rather than a political issue w h i c h w h i t e w o m e n m i g h t consider as a question they (also) pose themselves — w h i c h in particular Black people, and especially Black w o m e n , m i g h t have raised apart f r o m w h i t e m e n . A n d it seems that the cynical bad faith of white leftist m e n (and some Black m e n ) and the 'intense negative pressures by the m a l e - d o m i n a t e d Left in the 1960s' 8 are b e i n g used to explain if n o t to excuse white w o m e n ' s 'retreat f r o m a n y t h i n g resembling rhetorical demands that w h i t e w o m e n "deal with o u r racism" as a first priority'. 9 Finally, the a u t h o r herself insists that really this is n o argument at all: But surely such demands have a different meaning and imperative when they come in bad faith from the lips of white — or black — males, whose intention is to discredit feminist politics; and when they are articulated by black feminists, who are showing themselves, over time, unflagging and persistent in their outreach toward white women, while refusing to . deny — or to have denied — an atom of their black reality.10 If Black w o m e n have, over time, unflaggingly and persistently b e e n speaking to w h i t e w o m e n , reaching out to t h e m , w h y n o t discuss w h a t t h e y have b e e n saying? B u t Black w o m e n , it appears, have n o t yet f o r m u l a t e d their critique in a way that w e as w h i t e w o m e n can accept: 1 can easily comprehend that when black women have looked at the present-day feminist movement, particularly as caricatured in the maledominated press (both black and white), and have seen blindness to, and ignorance of, the experience and needs of black women, they have labeled this 'racism', undifferentiated from the racism endemic in patriarchy. But I hope that we can now begin to differentiate and to define further, drawing both on a deeper understanding of black and white women's history, and on an unflinching view of patriarchy itself.11
Black w o m e n ' s critique (if indeed they have any) has n o t apparently b e e n based on their experience, b u t just on their ' l o o k i n g at the feminist m o v e m e n t ' . M o r e o v e r , they have probably b e e n looking less at the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t t h a n at caricatures of it in the male press. T h e i r visual impression that there is racism in the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t is therefore (1) m o r e of an appearance (a male representation) than an experienced reality, and (2) w r o n g l y labelled as racism. Black w o m e n , w e gather, first need to differentiate m o r e carefully b e t w e e n the racism of w h i t e w o m e n and the racism 'in patriarchy', just as R i c h differentiated the 'false p o w e r ' of Douglass's white mistress f r o m real p o w e r (as m e n have it in patriarchy). In other words, if anything is standing b e t w e e n w h i t e w o m e n and Black w o m e n , it is above all w h i t e m e n ' s violence towards white w o m e n , and it is Black w o m e n ' s undifferentiated labelling of w h i t e w o m e n - standing in the way, at least, of w h i t e w o m e n ' s ability to consider the issue of racism. W h i c h suggests that it is Black w o m e n w h o have the p o w e r of n a m i n g and defining, that is, p o w e r over w h i t e w o m e n . If there is any i m p e d i m e n t to a j o i n t w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t o n the side of w h i t e w o m e n at all, it is not anything that w h i t e w o m e n are doing, b u t their psychological vulnerability to the charge of racism, a vulnerability due to their b e i n g oppressed b y m e n . A n d it is t w o f u r t h e r weaknesses and disabilities: 'ignorance' and 'blindness'. All the m o r e reason, it seems, for Black w o m e n to tread carefully w h e n they label — for they have b e c o m e (in this account) the (wrong)doers, w i t h w h i t e w o m e n b e i n g the victims. W h e r e Black w o m e n are exposed to the real violence of racism — by w h i t e m e n and w h i t e w o m e n — w h i t e w o m e n escape to the level of feelings (even if exclusively their o w n ) , w h i c h are ultimately b e y o n d disputation. For w h a t a w o m a n feels cannot be disputed; w h a t she thinks she has heard can b e j u d g e d only by herself. W h a t could o n the other hand very well be discussed is w h a t has in fact b e e n said and w h e t h e r it is true, for it is a reality to w h i c h w e all have equal access. It could also be clarified by analysis h o w appropriate a feeling may be — w h e t h e r it relates to any real action or statement, or in fact to m y subjective impression of w h a t I think has h a p p e n e d or I have heard, or I have heard s o m e w h e r e else. Feelings, h o w e v e r , e n j o y such a privileged status a m o n g W e s t e r n w o m e n that their appropriateness is rarely analysed, let alone questioned.
xj irtc yumiuii psycriutugicair '^Shortly afterwards R i c h explicitly shifts to the level of personal relationships, addressing 'Black woman.' first in a poetic m o n o l o g u e , t h e n in a dialogue: T h e images w e have of each other. H o w black w o m a n and
white
m o v e as m y t h s t h r o u g h e a c h o t h e r ' s fantasies, m y t h s c r e a t e d b y t h e w h i t e m a l e p s y c h e i n c l u d i n g its p e r v e r s e ideas o f b e a u t y . H o w h a v e I h a n d e d m y o w n s e x u a l i t y , m y sense o f m y s e l f as d e v i a n t , o v e r t o b l a c k w o m e n , n o t to speak of m y o w n m a g i c , m y o w n rage? W h a t illusions d o w e h a r b o r still, o f o u r o w n a n d e a c h o t h e r ' s A m a z o n p o w e r o r i n c o m p e t e n c e , glamor or,disability, 'smart-ugliness' or cerebral coolness, h o w d o w e p l a y t h e m o t h e r o r t h e d a u g h t e r , h o w d o w e u s e e a c h o t h e r to k e e p f r o m t o u c h i n g o u r o w n p o w e r ? . . . W h a t caricatures of b l o o d l e s s f r a g i l i t y a n d b r o i l i n g s e n s u a l i t y still i m p r i n t o u r p s y c h e s , a n d w h e r e d i d w e r e c e i v e t h e s e i m p r i n t i n g s ? . . . H o w has t h e w h i t e m a n , h o w has t h e b l a c k m a n , s t o o d t o g a i n f r o m p i t t i n g white bitch against nigger cunt, ' y e l l o w gal' a g a i n s t b l a c k ? 1 2
In the 'personal' relationship o f ' I and y o u ' , o f ' u s ' with 'each other', R i c h and the Black w o m a n have apparently escaped the historical and social p o w e r relationships w h i c h R i c h just b e f o r e had so painfully analysed. T h e y m e e t in a m u t u a l e n c o u n t e r w h e r e each is 'I' and the other her ' y o u ' , w h e r e p o w e r and risk are apparently even in the d e n u d e d opposition of t w o subjects. T h e images each has of the other, the prejudices about the other, the illusions each has about herself and the strength or weakness of the other, are here c o m m o n and evenly distributed — and also linguistically j o i n e d in the c o m m o n subject ' w e ' : 'the images w e have', and ' w h a t illusions d o w e harbor'. Even so, as is usual w i t h the c o n c e p t i o n of personal relationships, the subject's o w n subjectivity occasionally obtrudes and casts the other in the stereotyped role of the object: ' H o w have I h a n d e d my o w n sexuality, m y sense of myself as deviant, over to black w o m e n , not to speak of m y o w n magic, m y o w n rage?' B o t h h o w e v e r are damaged, victims of the same master, the w h i t e m a n and his defining p o w e r — the myths and images 'not created by t h e m ' apparently remaining outside their o w n responsibility even in their o w n imagination and fantasy. T h e c o m m o n a l i t y of their victimization as w o m e n , each being pitted, against the other, lets us forget the asymmetry and hierarchy even in abuse^J It hardly comes as a surprise that this e n c o u n t e r - the speaker's attempt to o v e r c o m e the political p o w e r disequilibrium t h r o u g h a
personalized relationship - eventually turns into an erotic fantasy of love: T a u g h t to d e n y m y longings for a n o t h e r female b o d y , taught that dark s k i n w a s s t i g m a , s h a m e , 1 l o o k at y o u a n d see y o u r flesh is b e a u t i f u l ; different f r o m m y o w n , but t a b o o to m e n o longer. W h e t h e r
we
c h o o s e t o a c t o n this o r n o t ( a n d w h a t e v e r p a i n w e m a y e x p l o r e i n t o u c h i n g o n e a n o t h e r ) if w e b o t h h a v e this k n o w l e d g e , if m y flesh is b e a u t i f u l t o y o u a n d y o u r s t o m e , b e c a u s e it b e l o n g s t o us, in a f f i r m a t i o n o f o u r s i m i l a r a n d d i f f e r e n t p o w e r s , i n a f f i r m a t i o n o f scars, s t r e t c h m a r k s , l i f e - l i n e s , t h e m i n d t h a t b u r n s i n e a c h b o d y , w e lay c l a i m t o ourselves and each other b e y o n d the most e x t r e m e patriarchal taboo. W e take each o t h e r u p in o u r strong arms. W e d o n o t infantilize each o t h e r ; w e r e f u s e t o b e i n f a n t i l i z e d . W e d r i n k at e a c h o t h e r ' s d i f f e r e n c e . W e begin to fuse o u r powers.13
After the m a n n e r of desire, the subject infers f r o m her desire for the other a c o m m o n and mutual desire of b o t h for each other, goes over f r o m 'I' to the j o i n t subject ' w e ' : 'I look at y o u and see y o u r flesh is beautiful . . . t a b o o to m e n o longer . . . W h e t h e r w e choose to act o n this or n o t . . .' O n the basis of a mutuality w h i c h has b e e n linguistically constructed, her ' k n o w l e d g e ' , her o w n reaching out to the other's flesh, is assumed to be the same o n the part of the other, is projected o n to the o t h e r w i t h only a rhetorical proviso o f ' i f ' - in a speech act w h i c h renders the other silent, w h i c h extinguishes the other's will and wish by s u b s u m i n g it u n d e r m y o w n , since, despite the ' i f ' , it is h e n c e f o r t h conceived of and treated only as identical. T h e shared identity of being w o m e n and lovers shall suffice to guarantee equality and mutuality, i n d e e d to extinguish the inequality of a history of racism — desire sufficing to annul the difference b e t w e e n t w o persons in this 'personal relationship' w h e r e w e 'fuse o u r powers'. R i c h here poetically makes explicit w h a t usually remains implicit but generally underlies the practice of psychologizing the political and resolving it t h r o u g h personal relationship, namely that the issue is love and recognition — the other's love and recognition of myself. It is the b o u n t y love yields to the o n e w h o loves, h e n c e she is willing to get it by force. H a v i n g chosen the e n c o u n t e r , h e r o w n love 'lays claim' to the other and her love, regards it as a right. ' F o r you are my rejected part, m y antiself.' 1 4
T o this personal desire, any collective cause is sacrificed time and again - in the present c o n t e x t Black w o m e n ' s c o m m u n i c a t i v e c o n c e r n for a j o i n t understanding of feminism and a j o i n t political struggle against racism. T h r o u g h the reformulation of their critique as a ' r e p r o a c h ' , their analysis as a 'charge', Black w o m e n are discursively coerced i n t o a personal relationship, w i t h their political i n t e n t i o n recast as their o w n desire for relationship. N o matter that Black w o m e n k e e p repeating h o w they cannot respect w h i t e w o m e n w h o c o n t i n u e to b e h a v e like wilful 'children'. B u t respect is n o t the issue, o u r desire is for 'love' and a personal relationship. For a relationship, even a quarrel, even a ' c o n f r o n t a t i o n ' is p r o o f that the other has entered the game, that she is playing a m a t c h w i t h m e — that she has recognized m e , e v e n if only as an o p p o n e n t . It hardly seems to matter that thus not only the c o m m o n cause, b u t also the o t h e r has b e e n sacrificed: that this recasting of politics as relationship constitutes an act of violence against the o t h e r in w h i c h her i n t e n t i o n , her self-expression and her self-determination are annihilated. T h e e n f o r c e d 'togetherness' — togetherness even in quarrel and c o n f r o n t a t i o n — apparently justifies the means. N o r does it seem to matter that in this shift to a 'personal relationship' m y o w n subjectivity r e m a i n s d o m i n a n t , egocentrism replacing w h i t e - w o m e n centrism. R a t h e r , the fact that the question of the other's wish and will does n o t even arise, any m o r e than the question of m y o w n love and r e c o g n i t i o n of the other arises, shows that this so-called personal relationship, this erotic relationship, is the desired private sphere in w h i c h t h e r e is only one" p o i n t of view, m i n e , and only one interest, m y self-interest, and the o t h e r has b e c o m e part of m y self.\
Psychotherapy, or the legitimation irresponsibility
of
T h e fact that the parameters of subjectivity, feelings and opinions have b e c o m e such a solid part of c o m m o n s e n s e 'rationality' is n o t unrelated to the uncritical status w h i c h psychology enjoys a m o n g discourses. W h i l e even o n a theoretical level its status is rarely d e t e r m i n e d in relation to o t h e r disciplines, that is, o t h e r levels of analysis of social ('human') p h e n o m e n a , in practice its ubiquitous relevance seems b e y o n d any d o u b t or question. Psychological truths — say the m u c h quoted adage that 'the strange' and 'the unfamiliar are always threatening' - b e c o m e the axiomatic starting-point of political analyses or philosophical treatises. T h r o u g h the p h e n o m e n a l expansion of psychotherapeutic practice in o u r society, m o r e o v e r , a discourse of popular psychology has b e c o m e so firmly established as to i n f o r m our most c o m m o n s e n s e notions of people in society. In o u r enthusiasm for all things psychological w e tend to forget that the original impetus of psychoanalysis as well as o t h e r kinds of therapy was the investigation of psychic (and social) disorders — leaving aside for the m o m e n t w h a t was considered as such — and that even the study of the psychology of so-called healthy people is based to a large extent on clinical data o f ' p a t h o l o g i e s ' . 1 T h e aim was to study and explore disturbances in people's thinking, feeling and b e h a v i o u r , or crises in their ability to cope w i t h their lives, in order to help t h e m o v e r c o m e them. If F r e u d in the course of developing his science eventually came to the diagnosis that ( W e s t e r n ) adults in general are basically neurotic, this means less that neurosis is the n o r m a l state of the h u m a n psyche than that there is s o m e t h i n g seriously w r o n g w i t h the conditions of life in m o d e r n W e s t e r n society.
Yet in the course of the d e v e l o p m e n t of psychological t h e o r y and above all w i t h the explosion of psychotherapy as a b o o m i n g business, it has b e c o m e a central tenet of E u r o c e n t r i c t h i n k i n g to regard the n e u r o t i c inhabitants of W e s t e r n urban societies n o t only as ' n o r m a l ' , b u t as at the highest stage of d e v e l o p m e n t of h u m a n sensibility. T h a t is to say, the empirical evidence of a high degree of neurosis in our societies has b e c o m e a reason less for trying to heal it than for people to try and 'accept' it and to learn to 'live w i t h it'. A l t h o u g h therapy is b e i n g offered as a universal panacea, it simultaneously teaches us that w e are basically incurable. B u t since it is a scientifically attested incurability w h i c h m o r e o v e r is quite ' n o r m a l ' in the most 'advanced' societies of the w o r l d , it loses the stigma of an incurable disease, b e c o m i n g instead the p r o u d certification of o u r highly strung, highly sophisticated p o s t m o d e r n i s t sensibility. In c o n f i r m i n g o u r suffering and discontent and assisting us in accepting it, if not indeed in taking pride in it, psychotherapy has a key f u n c t i o n in stabilizing and m a i n taining t h e social and political status q u o . H e n c e there is a t e n d e n c y also a m o n g feminist psychotherapists to r e c o m m e n d to w o m e n a cure o n the c o u c h as a progressive step in their struggle to c o m e to terms with patriarchal oppression. T h e political aim of changing social structures and behaviour gives way to the scientific aim of explaining ' w o m e n ' s psychology'. A l t h o u g h w h a t is f o u n d empirically to be the psychology of (many) w o m e n is also u n d e r s t o o d to b e socially d e t e r m i n e d , it is nevertheless scientifically attested as 'the psychology' of w o m e n . H e n c e the client's political aim of changing society correspondingly gives way to the aim of asserting her socially d e t e r m i n e d psychology m o r e effectively. T h a t is to say, w o m e n ' s project of affecting society is replaced by the project scientifically to describe and therapeutically to c e m e n t the w a y society affects w o m e n . Luise E i c h e n b a u m and Susie O r b a c h , w h o explicitly identify t h e m selves as part of the w o m e n ' s liberation m o v e m e n t , describe h o w and w h y ' t h r o u g h the process of trying to change o u r society' 2 they discovered psychoanalysis and other therapeutic m e t h o d s : despite feminism and consciousness-raising they ' c o n t i n u e d to feel unentitled, u n e x p e r i e n c e d , or u n e q u a l . . . This discovery o n a feeling level led us to try to discover the vital connections b e t w e e n the social w o r l d that w o m e n inhabit ahd the inner private w o r l d that governs us in the deepest reaches of o u r personalities.' 3 W h i l e this largely corresponds a
to the aims of feminist consciousness-raising, the crucial difference is that here the non-hierarchical structures of collective self-help are being replaced by a hierarchical and c o m m e r c i a l relationship b e t w e e n therapist and client — that while the ' c o n t e n t ' apparently remains the same, the political ' f o r m ' has b e e n abolished. W e shall see m o r e o v e r that the political aim of changing society also disappears w i t h o u t trace, while the w o m e n u n d e r g o i n g therapy in search of political liberation equally e m e r g e f r o m the therapy 'incurable'. T h e three advantages w h i c h the therapeutic techniques selected by E i c h e n b a u m and O r b a c h in their o w n v i e w have to offer are, first, that they hold 'the possibility that people could get in t o u c h with their feelings m o r e speedily than t h r o u g h psychoanalytic methods'; secondly, that they '[encourage] individuals to act o n their o w n b e h a l f ' , and thirdly, that t h e y '[demystify] the process of psychological change'. 4 That is, the clients, like their therapists b e f o r e t h e m , will discover 'the feeling level', and apparently get there m o r e speedily than t h r o u g h any other m e t h o d s . In particular, they will learn to give up their political aspirations and have the 'courage' instead to act o n their o w n behalf, that is, in their self-interest. A n d if the process of psychological change is thus b e i n g demystified, there is n o m e n t i o n even any longer of any process of political change. T h e psychological change o p e n to the client is the change f r o m a feeling of social discontent and cri tique of political conditions — 'unentitled, u n e x p e r i e n c e d , unequal' — to an acceptance of her feelings as part of her innermost self. For as we shall also see, the client is mistaken if she thinks that her feelings of discontent and displeasure are due to the social and political conditions of her life as a w o m a n in patriarchy, that is, due to real experience of social and political inequality. T h u s this feminist therapy reproduces the very t u r n - a b o u t w h i c h Freudian psychoanalysis p e r f o r m e d at the b e g i n n i n g of the century, w h e n f r o m b e i n g a potential means of recognizing reality it t u r n e d into a scientific t h e o r y in support of the status q u o , scientifically certifying feelings as psychic products and explaining away any causes in social reality. T h e same theory 'demystified' the sexual exploitation of girls by m e n in their family, explaining that the experience of w o m e n and girls is n o t a social and political reality, b u t a p r o d u c t of their imaginations, a wishful fantasy. 5 N u m e r o u s w o m e n objected to this 'discovery' o n the 'feeling level', amongst t h e m Bertha P a p p e n heim and C h a r l o t t e P e r k i n s - G i l m a n , w h o after escaping f r o m their
respective therapies w i t h Breuer, Freud or W e i r Mitchell as well as f r o m their respective families, spent their lives fighting for w o m e n ' s rights and against the sexual and e c o n o m i c exploitation of w o m e n and girls, 6 n o t w i t h o u t incurring f u r t h e r slander, b o t h f r o m the great master F r e u d and f r o m their o w n families. T h u s a descendant of P a p p e n h e i m asked h e r interviewer A n n j a c k o w i t z : ' W h y are y o u interested in P a p p e n h e i m ? She was n o t h i n g b u t a n u t and a lesbian.' 7 Freud, o n the o t h e r h a n d , w r o t e to Marie B o n a p a r t e about P a p p e n h e i m : 'She never married. A n d she has f o u n d great j o y in life. C a n y o u guess h o w ? W h a t she does . . . She is active in societies f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of w h i t e w o m e n . Against prostitution! She speaks out against anything sexual.' 8 T o Freud, speaking out against the sexual exploitation and enslavement of w o m e n and girls is equivalent to speaking o u t 'against anything sexual'. A n d that Bertha P a p p e n h e i m n e v e r married b u t campaigned against w h a t was then called the ' w h i t e slave trade' or ' f o u n d e d the G e r m a n J e w i s h feminist m o v e m e n t u n d e r the n a m e the League of Jewish W o m e n ' 9 proves to the great master that she continues to have a sexual h a n g - u p . H a d she stayed in therapy instead, she w o u l d surely have b e e n cured of it. A b o v e all she w o u l d have refrained f r o m political activity. W h a t was clear to Freud, in other words, also became clear to many w o m e n patients, namely that therapy contributes to the social control of w o m e n . For P a p p e n h e i m , as for so many w o m e n of the first w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t w h o had b e e n therapized, the 'healing'' step consisted in leaving the p o w e r relationship of the therapy, casting off its patriarchal ideology and seeking the causes of her suffering n o l o n g e r in personal 'illness' b u t in political (including familial) social conditions. W h i l e their recovery began precisely w h e n they exc h a n g e d their d e p e n d e n t existence as suffering daughters or wives of the bourgeoisie for an active political life in their o w n right, feminist therapists today advise w o m e n to give up political struggle in favour of starting a career as a patient. T h e therapy's ' c o n t e n t ' m a y have been adjusted 'feministically', yet the ideological foundations of psychological t h e o r y and the political structure of therapy remain unchallenged and u n c h a n g e d . Psychology and therapy today n o t only orient themselves by the highly n e u r o t i c standards of h u m a n sensibility in the m e t r o p o l i t a n societies of the West, but they are also primarily based o n the
development of the psyche at the stage of babyhood. Since Freud — until his radical U - t n r n back to an 'instinctual determinist' as a consequence of his denial of the sexual exploitation of children 1 0 — was convinced that problems in adult life often stemmed from unresolved problems in childhood, childhood increasingly became the focus of analysis. B u t while psychoanalysis originally saw itself as an instrument for resolving these difficulties — raising such childhood experiences into the consciousness of adults to enable t h e m retrospectively to come to terms with t h e m and to recover their ability to cope w i t h their lives — psychological theory increasingly sees early childhood per se as determining the adult's future, that is to say, as the 'cause' of adult mental life." H e n c e it is less the extreme, traumatic experiences of a child (not to m e n t i o n an adult) w h i c h the person at this stage is unable to cope with that are seen to cause disturbances in later life. Increasingly it is the experience of early c h i l d h o o d in general, the conditions of life as a being w h o has not yet m a t u r e d , w h o is n o t yet capable of surviving alone, w h o is d e p e n d e n t o n care and n u r t u r e , w h i c h are declared the paradigmatic determinants of the psychic structure of the adult p e r sonality. Birth, if n o t i n d e e d prenatal experiences in the w o m b , consequently b e c o m e traumas f r o m w h o s e after-effects people may continue to suffer until death - or until their e n c o u n t e r with the relevant psychological theory or therapeutic t r e a t m e n t w h i c h , if it cannot r e m o v e the after-effects, at least can alleviate t h e m . T h u s the m o t h e r ' s breast offered f o r n u r t u r e b u t periodically w i t h drawn — n o t to m e n t i o n the affront of b e i n g b r o u g h t up o n the bottle — b e c o m e the understandable 'cause' of adult m e n ' s p h e n o m e n a l sexual violence against w o m e n , in particular their obsession with stuffing w o m e n ' s m o u t h s literally in sadistic torture and symbolically t h r o u g h political silencing, as a revenge for the fact that the breast was ever w i t h d r a w n . 1 2 In o t h e r words, the m e r e c o n d i t i o n of childh o o d as such, of having had a person, let alone a w o m a n as a m o t h e r , suffices to predict the relative inability of f u t u r e adults to cope w i t h their lives. And indeed 'I refuse to have b e e n b o r n by a w o m a n ' , o n e valiant adult protests against this particular c h i l d h o o d deprivation. 1 3 O n the other hand, progressive medical science and h i g h - t e c h gynaecology prophylactically support this u n d e r s t a n d i n g of h u m a n psychology, r e c o m m e n d i n g birth by Caesarian o p e r a t i o n to grant the child, b u t above all the f u t u r e adult, a gentler entry into the w o r l d than his or her m o t h e r w o u l d provide. 1 4 B u t w h e t h e r by birth or by
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Caesarian operation, to have had a h u m a n b e i n g as a m o t h e r at all, s o m e o n e w i t h personal dimensions, w i t h interests and aspirations of her o w n instead of a c o n t i n u o u s caring and n u r t u r i n g service or a p e r m a n e n t l y available slave, will, as w e shall see, b e c o m e o n e of the chief causes of the problems of adult h u m a n s in m o d e r n W e s t e r n society. 1 5 Far f r o m using such observations about adult mentality to point out the infantilism of g r o w n - u p m e n (and w o m e n ) , thus to enable t h e m by means of therapeutic consciousness-raising belatedly to o v e r c o m e it, psychology o n the contrary makes the infantile needs of babies the standard of the e m o t i o n a l life of adults. W h i l e Freud, for instance, still regarded the need to gaze at genitals as a characteristic of the preoedipal infant, c o n t e m p o r a r y W e s t e r n society is celebrating genital scopophilia as the latest progress of a liberatory adult culture attempting o n the contrary to p r o t e c t children f r o m it, to w h o s e developmental stage in fact it corresponds). Similarly, feminist psychologists and therapists today derive their understanding of the mental life of adult w o m e n f r o m the structure of feelings and needs of post-natal infants, that is to say, f r o m w h a t a psychological t h e o r y imputes to children as their structure of feelings and needs. T h u s the W o m e n ' s T h e r a p y C e n t r e in L o n d o n , for example, explicitly bases its approach o n the object relations school, a loose g r o u p i n g of theories a b o u t infantile d e v e l o p m e n t (Fairbairn, W i n n i c o t t , G u n trip and others), as well as o n the w o r k of Melanie Klein, w h o sees in infantile fantasy the paradigm of the f u t u r e personality structure of the adult, and for w h o m the crucial period of c h i l d h o o d is limited to the first t w o years of life or so. 1 6 W h i l e Klein is an instinctual determinist, object relations t h e o r y emphasizes the infant's social experience, in particular h e r or his relationship to the primary carer, the ' m o t h e r ' . W h a t object relations has in c o m m o n w i t h Melanie Klein, h o w e v e r , is that b o t h consider the first couple of years after birth to be the crucial p e r i o d for the 'construction of personality', that is, the p e r s o n ality of the f u t u r e adult: 'Ego d e v e l o p m e n t begins at birth and in relation to the primary caregiver, the m o t h e r . This early period, w h i c h Fairbairn calls "infantile d e p e n d e n c y " , is the pivotal period in ego d e v e l o p m e n t . ' 1 7 C o n s e q u e n t l y the adult individual b e c o m e s interchangeable w i t h the infant, the infant w i t h the adult individual. T h u s E i c h e n b a u m and O r b a c h explain w h y they have chosen object relations theory:
It posited a materialist view of psychological development on the basis that the individual has a need for relationship and a drive for contact with another human being, and that the first two years of life are the most important time for the development of the inner core of the person, the psyche and the personality together, which Fairbairn and Guntrip mean when they refer to the ego . . . The infant has a primary need for human contact. 18 (my emphases except 'primary') Or: 'Whereas Freud saw libido as primarily seeking satisfaction, Fairbairn believed that the individual has a drive for relationship, a drive for contact with another human being. Thus the infant has a primary need for human contact. 19 (my emphases) So w e are hardly surprised to find that adult sexuality, too, is seen principally as the p r o b l e m of an infant. A c c o r d i n g to J o a n n a R y a n , 'the idea that adult sexual activity can stir u p infantile feelings in adults is basic to any psychoanalytic approach.' 2 0 T h u s E. S. Person argues that 'sexuality expresses m a n y aspects of personality and m o t i v a t i o n , originating in b o t h infantile and later experiences.' 2 1 Generally it is assumed that the adult individual w h o s e infantile personality developed d u r i n g the first t w o years of life continues to yearn for the state of infancy, especially in matters sexual, as R y a n f u r t h e r explains quoting Person: 'because of the real d e p e n d e n c e of a helpless child on a relatively p o w e r f u l adult, "it is unlikely that sexuality will ever be completely free of submission—dominance c o n n o t a t i o n s " . ' For 'sexuality expresses an e n o r m o u s variety of motives, p r e d o m i n a n t l y d e p e n d e n t or hostile, and the force of sexuality exists precisely because sexuality is linked to other motives.' 2 2 N a n c y C h o d o r o w , followed or paralleled by large n u m b e r s of feminist psychologists and psychotherapists, 2 3 again takes it as read that the aim of sexuality is a ' r e t u r n ' to 'oneness' w i t h the imaginary mother. 2 4 It has l o n g b e e n a central cliche in o u r culture that m e n ' s sex, that is, their genitally p e n e t r a t i n g w o m e n , constitutes their attempt to r e t u r n to the w o m b and the state of an e m b r y o - even though, to the best of m y k n o w l e d g e , there exists n o evidence of infants and children manifesting a like desire to return and regress. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , this myth has s/ince b e e n adapted also for the adult w o m a n , w h o in y e a r n i n g for a ' m e r g e r ' w i t h the ' o t h e r ' is said to
express a like desire. O n l y rarely does o n e c o m e across a hint in the expert literature like the f o l l o w i n g by J o a n n a R y a n , namely that 'in adult—adult relationships w e are also trying to be adults.' 2 5 W h i c h is w h y this aspect of adult mental life continues to remain largely unexplored. B u t since it is the 'core of the person' w h i c h allegedly is f o r m e d d u r i n g the first years of life, it is n o t just in sexuality that this infantile personality manifests itself: the infantile personality is the personality of the adult. H e n c e , an adult's v i e w of the w o r l d and attitude to reality equally originate in the p e r c e p t i o n and cognition of a n e w b o r n baby. E i c h e n b a u m and O r b a c h describe this baby stage of h u m a n cognition, w h i c h is characterized b y the fact that it is fantasy: For Klein, the instincts sought objects as their aim, rather than pleasure as Freud posited. The objects - the people - were, however, objects of an internal nature rather than the images of the actual people in the child's life. The internal objects were part of the heritage that an infant brought into the world along with instincts. Where an instinct arose so did an image of an object to satisfy it. Real people were screens upon which the infant could project its internal fantasies. Experience of people in the world confirmed the experience of the child's internal object relations. 26
A l t h o u g h , due to their greater emphasis o n social influences, the biological d e t e r m i n i s m of object relations approaches such as N a n c y C h o d o r o w ' s in The Reproduction of Mothering seems minimized in comparison w i t h the theoreticians of inborn instincts, there still remains the f u n d a m e n t a l structure of childhood experience causing the adult personality structure: ' W o m e n c o m e to m o t h e r because they have b e e n m o t h e r e d by w o m e n . ' 2 7 T h o u g h in this case m e n w o u l d also have to c o m e to m o t h e r , since they too had b e e n m o t h e r e d by w o m e n - unless it is for a different reason that w o m e n c o m e to m o t h e r . It is a corollary of such theories and their c o r r e s p o n d i n g therapies that m o t h e r l y care or ' n u r t u r a n c e ' — an amalgam of w a r m t h and n o u r i s h m e n t — must f o r m a central part of the therapeutic relationship: ' W h a t c o m e s across clearly in G u n t r i p ' s descriptions of his w o r k and clients is the i m p o r t a n c e of n u r t u r a n c e w i t h i n the therapy relationship. T h i s c o n c e p t is a cornerstone of our feminist psychotherapy.' 2 8 This means infantilizing n o t only the client but also the therapist, and
with t h e m the therapy relationship as a w h o l e - since the c o n c e p t i o n of this so-called m o t h e r - i n f a n t relationship is based n o t o n any real relationship b e t w e e n a m o t h e r and her child, b u t on the infant's fantasy of its relationship to its 'internal object' of a ' m o t h e r ' , a fantasy grown out of the insatiability of an infant's needs. This infantile fantasy of a ' m o t h e r - c h i l d ' relationship, h o w e v e r , becomes the m o d e l not only of the therapeutic relationship, but of (adult) relationships in general. T h a t is, it becomes the model for 'love' - emotional needs and fulfilment — in the relationships b e t w e e n adults when w e do not m e a n sex. As Lynne Segal explains in her article called 'Sensual Uncertainty, or W h y the Clitoris is not E n o u g h ' , there are 'all sorts of other emotional needs — to obtain approval and love, express hostility, d e p e n d e n c e and domination, relieve anxiety, and repair deep-lying psychic w o u n d s of rejection, humiliation and despair', with which 'sexual desire is k n o t t e d t h r o u g h ' . 2 9 W i t h o u t distinguishing b e t w e e n t h e o r y and practice or p o i n t i n g to their dialectical interaction, w i t h o u t differentiating b e t w e e n an analysis and an explanation, b e t w e e n a description of symptoms and a diagnosis of their cause, or b e t w e e n a p r o b l e m and w h a t might constitute its possible solution, therapists take the empirical evidence of the average e m o t i o n a l state of their clients — and amateur psychologists that of their friends — and make it the basis of a 'theory' w h i c h clearly reflects the childlike regression effected or f o u n d in the patient. Since this 'little-girl' s y n d r o m e plays a considerable role n o t only in feminist psychotherapy itself b u t in the understanding of relationships in general, it is w o r t h studying its genesis in s o m e w h a t m o r e detail. As Janice R a y m o n d has argued, therapy has b e e n central in the development o f ' t h e r a p i s m ' and the a c c o m p a n y i n g s y n d r o m e o f ' r e l a t i o n i s m ' - making a therapeutic context out of one's relationships 3 0 — w h i c h increasingly also informs o u r politics and o u r c o n c e p t i o n of w h a t would constitute a 'caring way of dealing w i t h each other'. In a series o f ' c a s e studies' in their b o o k , What do Women Want?, the authors Luise E i c h e n b a u m and Susie O r b a c h t e n d themselves to speak in the language of the little girl they postulate as b e i n g h i d d e n in every w o m a n . T h u s they tell us in childlike earnest h o w a 39-year-old educated middle-class w o m a n w i t h a j o b at the B B C — w h i c h she is about to give up to go freelance — is t h r o w n into an existential crisis w h e n her husband of t w o years proposes to go o n a business trip precisely d u r i n g her last w e e k at the B B C : 'Katie felt totally
a b a n d o n e d and w o n d e r e d h o w she was going to make it t h r o u g h an entire w e e k w i t h o u t h i m . . . In fact, she only had o n e free night in the w h o l e w e e k . A n d yet she felt dejected, rejected, vulnerable and scared at the t h o u g h t of b e i n g o n her o w n . ' 3 1 In fact, she survived the difficult w e e k , yet the trauma extends well b e y o n d it: Pete returned from the week wrung out and tired. He behaved in a withdrawn and distant way and it emerged later that he was actually feeling lousy about having left Katie for the week. Shortly after his return he got a cold, then he had an accident playing football . . . Katie looked after him and was a tower of strength. He gradually got better but something significant in their relationship changed from that point on. For the next few years, Katie felt suspicious towards Pete and somewhat disdainful. She felt he couldn't really give to her in the way he had in the past and she wondered whether she was right about what had originally flowed between them. But at the same time as she became somewhat contemptuous of him and even undermined his attempts to reach out to her, she became increasingly dependent on the relationship and felt more insecure than she had for ages. She kept looking to Pete for some sign that he still loved her and wanted her. 32 W h a t seemed a crisis in the relationship in fact turns into a crisis of self: Katie discovered with an unpleasant jolt that she could not rely pn maintaining an independent stance while she was in a close relationship. As soon as she had opened herself up in this relationship all her hidden and forbidden dependency desires came up and overwhelmed her. She was caught out by the intensity of her feelings of abandonment and rage at Pete. And she resented being so affected by these emotions. 33 So m u c h for the description of the case in the paraphrasing words of the therapists. T h e i r analytical explanation follows w i t h hardly a change of style: The unfortunate sequence of events had destabilized Katie. Nerves had been touched and her self-confidence shattered. The explanation for this went back years before Katie was involved with Pete. Fr6m beneath the layers of rationality and life experience, Katie's unconscious asserted itself. With different players and different goals, Katie was reliving with Pete her very earliest childhood steps towards independence. 34
These w e r e , so the therapists tell us, her first steps of 'separationindividuation' out of a total symbiosis with the m o t h e r w h e n she was a toddler. Katie's m o t h e r , it appears, had n o t b e e n able to cope with h e r baby's needs: Katie's needs frightened her, for they reminded her of her own forbidden feelings. Sometimes she was unable to be responsive to Katie, to tune in absolutely to what she wanted and, in giving to her, provide a reassurance that all was well. At other times, Katie's mother ignored her needs, just as she was forced to ignore her own. 35 Because of this inadequacy of the m o t h e r to respond to the needs of her baby, to ' t u n e i n t o ' her neediness at all times and 'absolutely', the three- or f o u r - y e a r - o l d Katie 'came to understand that she shouldn't rely o n her m o t h e r too m u c h ' and should 'hide away her little-girl part': She was a little girl who had inadmissible needs now hidden inside her. She made an unconscious resolution to approach the bigger world without the cumbersome neediness of her first years. She couldn't bear to feel the rejection again . . . she was hoping either to have her needs met elsewhere or escape them altogether . . . Every new situation built her confidence that she could cope, that she could take care of herself, that she didn't really need anyone. But every victory had its reverse psychic effect, for Katie became more and more distant from the little-girl part of her inside who had stopped growing, whose needs had been prematurely nipped in the bud, who still hungered for constant attention. 36
A l t h o u g h she tries to disengage f r o m her little-girl part, the latter in fact remains inside her, u n n o t i c e d and repressed: The little-girl part did not present itself directly . . . But when Katie fell in love with Pete, a part of her psyche unfroze . . . In her closeness with Pete, her earlier feelings of closeness with her mother were reevoked . . . When Pete 'left her' for the week at a point when she was moving out of her secure job at the BBC, she felt as though she was being abandoned to face the world once again on her own. More than that even, she unconsciously felt as though his departure was some kind of punishment for her new work decision. 37
W e m i g h t w o n d e r w h y neither the therapist n o r her client ever raises the question as to the appropriateness of these feelings w i t h respect to the actual events — w h y Katie's childlike representation of the 'events', u n i n f l u e n c e d b y realism or k n o w l e d g e , never b e c o m e s the subject of discussion. For it is here, in her account, that she expresses her t h i n k i n g and understanding — h o w she perceives her problems and h o w she sees or c a n n o t see her options for dealing w i t h t h e m — and to change w h i c h , one presumes, she is seeking help and support. Y e t the therapist simply confirms w h a t her client reports. M o r e o v e r , she derives from, it a theory, or the c o n f i r m a t i o n of a theory, c o n c e r n i n g t h e nature and f u n c t i o n of feelings in 'relationships': the excessive neediness of the adult w o m a n must correspond to a neediness in h e r infancy, a neediness w h i c h m o r e o v e r was never satisfied. T h e therapist's t h e o r y - her generalized account of universalized 'events' ('every m o t h e r ' , ' w h e n w e first c o m e into the w o r l d ' etc.) 3 8 - is absolutely c o n g r u o u s w i t h the individual client's account, the t w o mutually i n f l u e n c i n g and c o n f i r m i n g each other. T h e theory reproduces the client's childlike subjective understanding w i t h o u t ' i f ' or ' b u t ' , and t h e client reproduces a therapizing account of her own c h i l d h o o d . T h e r e p o r t e d c o n t e n t of the o n e as of the o t h e r account remains solid fact: the child suffered f r o m e m o t i o n a l deprivation, f r o m unfulfilled neediness, n o t because such neediness by definition of its postulated u n b o u n d e d n e s s c a n n o t be satisfied, b u t because her m o t h e r was inadequate. W h y the m o t h e r was inadequate is also quickly explained: there is a 'tug of w a r ' , a 'push—pull dynamic' in the mother—daughter relationship. ' M o t h e r s relate to their daughters in this fashion because they w e r e similarly related to by their mothers. Inside each m o t h e r lives a repressed little girl w h o is still yearning for acceptance and love.' 3 9 T h a t is to say, m o t h e r herself is a potential client for therapy, w h o at the time Katie was little must have suffered as the adult patient Katie is suffering today, and must have suffered as m u c h w h e n she was little as did Katie w h e n she was a little girl. H e n c e the t h e o r y comes full circle back to the p r o b l e m : the theory is the same as the p r o b l e m . A n d the therapy in store is also the same, for it does n o t consist, say, of w o r k i n g t h r o u g h the fantastic and unrealistic (alleged) c o n c e p t i o n of feelings and needs of the toddler f r o m the perspective of the realistic and d e v e l o p e d cognition of an adult, it consists in c o n f i r m i n g and affirming these insatiable and p e o p l e - c o n s u m i n g needs. T h e repeated
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m e n t i o n of ' f o r b i d d e n feelings' and 'inadmissible needs' already hints at w h a t direction the therapy will take, besides betraying its o w n childlike c o n c e p t i o n of reality as a fatherly authority w h i c h 'forbids' feelings and needs. W h a t R o b i n N o r w o o d considers to be a central feature of the 'dysfunctional family', n a m e l y 'their inability to discuss root p r o b lems', 4 0 turns out to b e a central feature also of the therapy relationship. W h a t N o r w o o d says about the family can be applied w i t h o u t change to the therapy context: What all unhealthy families [and therapies] have in common is their inability to discuss root problems. There may be other problems that are discussed, often ad nauseam, but these often cover up the underlying secrets that make the family [the therapy] dysfunctional. It is the degree of secrecy - the inability to talk about the problems - rather than their severity, that defines both how dysfunctional a family [a therapy relationship] becomes and how severely its members are damaged. A dysfunctional family [therapy] is one in which members play rigid roles and in which communication is severely restricted to statements that fit these roles.41 In o t h e r w o r d s , this suppression of 'root p r o b l e m s ' serves to keep such 'dysfunctional families' precisely functional, that is to say, ' t o g e t h e r ' , real problems n o t b e i n g allowed to surface so as n o t to threaten the apparent h a r m o n y of family 'togetherness' - say, in the f o r m of an insight that, f o r some m e m b e r s of the family, separating might be appropriate. Just as the 'dysfunctional family', u n d i f f e r e n tiated here in terms of the p o w e r relations amongst its m e m b e r s , 'has' an interest in maintaining its togetherness at the cost of individual m e m b e r s and their personal liberation, so the 'therapy relationship' has an interest in maintaining itself and n o t e n d a n g e r i n g its ' m o t h e r child' h a r m o n y . If the therapist in recognizing and discussing real problems risks her client's b e c o m i n g capable and thus 'liberating' herself, and so stands to lose a paying client, her client, in recognizing and coping w i t h h e r problems, stands to lose her claim to a w a r m and comforting, family-like therapy relationship. H e n c e the therapy i n d e e d consists in ' w o r k s h o p s o n d e p e n d e n c y ' , w h e r e the client ' b e c a m e aware of h o w disappointed and upset she was about the course of events', b e c a m e aware, that is, of m u c h the
same thing she had originally felt, and just as she had originally felt it — unadulterated by any reflection or insight: She realized that she didn't want Pete to do very much at all; she didn't really want to collapse, and felt she could conquer any challenge if she only knew that he was really behind her. Until that fateful week and the ensuing illness she had felt Pete was really there for her, concerned about her. She experienced his week's absence as a withdrawal and a rejection. 42 T h e only additional 'insight' in this report is the theoretical postulate of the therapy, namely that the p r o b l e m lies n o t in the present, b u t in the past: 'It f l u n g her back almost thirty-five years to feelings of utter loneliness and anxiety that she had suppressed. She felt that she had b e e n d r o p p e d , she had b e e n pushed out . . . She was forced to deny her d e p e n d e n c y needs once again. These needs w e r e so f o r b i d d e n . ' 4 3 W h a t the therapy has to offer is e n c o u r a g e m e n t b y all means to 'admit' those ' f o r b i d d e n ' needs, to b e c o m e conscious of t h e m and to 'accept' t h e m . W h e t h e r this will in fact help the client is d o u b t f u l . She m a y indeed k n o w n o w that she has insatiable d e p e n d e n c y needs, unfulfillable claims to u n c o n d i t i o n a l care and support, b u t they are not t h e r e b y any m o r e likely to get satisfied. R a t h e r , the probability increases that she will be t h r o w n into despair n o t only by her husband's leaving her for a w h o l e w e e k , b u t by the slightest sign that once again he is n o t 'really b e h i n d her' — w h e n to be 'really b e h i n d her' means n o t to pursue his o w n j o b , to make the timetable of her career the schedule of his o w n life, and w h e n to be ' c o n c e r n e d about h e r ' means having n o c o n c e r n in the w o r l d b u t her, n o c o n c e r n , that is, b u t to satisfy the equivalent of an infant's expectation of continual ' m o t h e r l y ' care. W h i l e these d e p e n d e n c y needs, accepted or otherwise, may thus never b e satisfied b y Pete, or indeed by any real person, the therapy relationship in t u r n offers a u n i q u e o p p o r t u n i t y for the client to experience that her therapist — for the duration of a session — is 'really b e h i n d her', having n o c o n c e r n b u t her c o n c e r n for her, and to live out this d e p e n d e n c y n e e d for as long as the m o n e y for a c o n t i n u i n g therapy lasts. T h e r e may be problems that are talked about in this therapy
-
perhaps even continually. B u t there is n o p r o b l e m to be solved, since
neither the client n o r her partner does a n y t h i n g that might b e a problem in need of changing. In fact, neither of t h e m does anything at all, for there are n o persons acting in this a c c o u n t , even t h o u g h it is about a relationship. T h e dramatis personae, rather, are Fate on the one hand, and her victim, the client, on the o t h e r — w h a t happens and to w h o m it happens. W h a t Pete may be d o i n g is less an action on his part than a m o v e o n the part of Fate, using a p a w n in h e r attack o n the client: Pete happens to have to go away just w h e n Katie most needs him. T h e n h e falls ill and incurs an injury - a further b l o w of Fate against the client, w h o w o u l d have preferred being l o o k e d after to looking after. T h a t she c a n n o t reproach h i m for this is obvious even to the client; she does n o t reproach h i m f o r it, she reproaches the course of events f o r taking such a turn. T h e therapist too sees the real p r o b l e m in the course of events: 'the u n f o r t u n a t e sequence of events had destabilized Katie.' T h e y have declared war o n her: 'nerves had been t o u c h e d and h e r self-confidence shattered.' So w h a t was this sequence of events, w h a t was their u n f o r t u n a t e course? T h e course of events is, above all, a sequence of different feelings presenting themselves. It is n o t a sequence of real events or actions — of a b a n d o n i n g and b e i n g a b a n d o n e d , of rejecting, of inflicting injuries, or of w i t h h o l d i n g instead of giving: n o o n e abandons Katie, n o o n e rejects her, n o o n e hurts her, n o o n e t h r o w s her d o w n , nor does she perish after a w e e k o n her o w n . She felt totally aband o n e d , rejected, dejected and vulnerable, and she felt that Pete could not really give to h e r as he had given to her in the past. A n d although she survives the w e e k o n her o w n , she w o n d e r s w h e t h e r she was right about w h a t had originally f l o w e d b e t w e e n t h e m - she asks herself but she does n o t ask h i m . She keeps l o o k i n g to Pete f o r some sign that he still loves her and wants her. T h e fact that he lives w i t h her, that he is trying to reach o u t to her (which she undermines) apparently is n o sign f r o m him, is n o t the sign (from Heaven?) she is waiting for. W h a t such a sign w o u l d l o o k like is difficult to say, since his acts of love and concern, his apparently m o d e l b e h a v i o u r , clearly are n o t sign e n o u g h . W h e t h e r she in t u r n makes any signs is n o t the question, for she is not an actor in this drama, she is the patient and recipient of action. H e n c e she does n o t s h o w suspicion towards her partner, she just feels suspicious towards h i m for the next f e w years; she does n o t hold h i m in c o n t e m p t , she just b e c o m e s c o n t e m p t u o u s towards h i m . Far f r o m being actions o n her part and against him, it is, rather, yet a n o t h e r
b l o w of Fate against h e r that she has to feel this way, since she w o u l d prefer to feel happy, k n o w i n g that h e loves her, k n o w i n g that he wants her. W h e t h e r she in turn wants h i m is just as little the question: she does n o t w a n t h i m , she wants him. to w a n t her. It is a battle in w h i c h she is the victim. B u t it is n o t a fight in the relationship, a fight w i t h a partner w h o does n o t love or give her e n o u g h : it is a fight w i t h the relationship. It is towards the relationship that she b e c o m e s suspicious — was it really w h a t she t h o u g h t it was, or had she perhaps b e e n mistaken? ' S o m e t h i n g significant in their relationship changed f r o m that point o n ' , not in her partner's beha-r v i o u r towards her, b u t 'in the relationship'. H e n c e w e should not be surprised that it is n o t Pete she increasingly gets d e p e n d e n t on: 'she b e c a m e increasingly d e p e n d e n t o n the relationship.' T h e relationship, it seems, does n o t consist of the c o n t i n u i n g b e h a v i o u r of the partners in relation to each other; the relationship is the s u m and sequence of Katie's feelings. T h a t these are not reactions in response to h e r partner's actual b e h a v i o u r w e have already seen: it is n o t his departure for o n e w e e k that is the p r o b l e m , b u t his going at a time w h e n she wishes he w o u l d be 'really b e h i n d her', w h e n she 'felt utterly u n s u p p o r t e d ' . 4 4 N o r was his falling ill the actual p r o b l e m , but his d o i n g so at a m o m e n t ' w h e n she was feeling she w o u l d like that bit of reassurance h e r s e l f ' . 4 5 M o s t i m p o r t a n t l y , h o w e v e r , h e r feelings are not her o w n affair for w h i c h she herself m i g h t b e responsible; like the events, they are blows w h i c h Fate deals o u t to her; they appear as Pete's cold appears. H e n c e she feels suspicious towards h i m for the next f e w years, just as he feels ill f o r the next f e w days. Like villains, desires for d e p e n d e n c y 'came u p ' and ' o v e r w h e l m e d ' her; 4 6 and they 'flung' h e r back almost thirtyfive years to feelings of utter loneliness and anxiety. She was 'caught o u t ' by the intensity of her feelings of a b a n d o n m e n t and rage at Pete. And she felt resentful about b e i n g 'so affected' by t h e m . H e r rage, n o n e the less, is directed at Pete — t h o u g h it remains her that is 'affected' by the intensity of this feeling. F r o m b e n e a t h the layers of rationality and life experience, Katie's u n c o n s c i o u s 'asserted itself' — it too, like the feelings and needs, being part of the arsenal in Fate's conspiracy against o u r heroinfe. It obliges Katie o n c e again to relive, ' w i t h different players and different goals', a n o t h e r relationship, the relationship with her m o t h e r nearly thirtyfive years b e f o r e . In this drama too, o u r h e r o i n e is the principal
victim, suffering and e n d u r i n g the machinations of Fate. In this case, the latter's chief agents are an i n c o m p e t e n t m o t h e r as well as a 'little-girl part' of the daughter's that had ceased to g r o w b u t was still h u n g e r i n g for constant attention. T h e little-girl part 'did not present itself directly, indeed, [ Katie] might n e v e r have b e c o m e reacquainted with her if she had f o u n d e n o u g h challenges to negate her existence'. 4 7 But w h e n Katie fell in love w i t h Pete, 'a part of h e r psyche u n f r o z e ' and the little-girl part came back to life again - just as Americans have themselves f r o z e n after death in the h o p e of b e i n g u n f r o z e n back t o life again in a f e w h u n d r e d years. But while the infant h e r o i n e of this relived drama of a c h i l d h o o d relationship - relived by the g r o w n - u p Katie d u r i n g that fateful w e e k — is cast as the passively suffering Victim, it turns out that the real t w o - y e a r - o l d Katie — as presented in the a c c o u n t of her actual childhood — was i n d e e d an active agent in her o w n life: one w h o w a n t e d to understand, and apparently did understand that she should not rely o n her m o t h e r as if the latter w e r e the imaginary m o t h e r object of h e r o w n fantasy, o n e w h o ' m a d e an unconscious resolution to approach the bigger w o r l d w i t h o u t the c u m b e r s o m e neediness of her first years' and w h o 'quashed' this part in her; w h o set about 'to look outside the mother—daughter orbit', h o p i n g to have her needs m e t elsewhere or escape t h e m altogether, w h o 'thrust f o r w a r d , taking up challenges with gusto, p r o v i n g to herself that she could handle different situations'. 4 8 W h i l e this little girl, in o t h e r words, was still acting, taking her life into her o w n hands according t o her best understanding and abilities, it is the 3 9 - y e a r - o l d Katie w h o has b e c o m e exclusively a Victim, passively experiencing and e n d u r i n g n o t only the circumstances of h e r life, b u t equally the foreign bodies inside her e m o t i o n a l household: ancient feelings of yesteryear, a f r o z e n and u n f r e e z i n g 'little-girl part', and a myriad of u n w a n t e d and uncalled for 'feelings' and 'needs' w i t h w h i c h she has n o t h i n g to do except for the fact that they d o to her. This suggests that it is n o t so m u c h the experiences of early childh o o d w h i c h exert their u n c a n n y influence o n the adult, b u t on the contrary, problems of adult life - unrealistic desires and illegitimate claims o n o t h e r people — w h i c h are b e i n g p r o j e c t e d back into b a b y h o o d and c h i l d h o o d . W h i l e toddlers according to their abilities and possibilities actively put u p resistance against experiences of violence, attempting to o v e r c o m e their problems as best they can, adults by
contrast project a chosen 'helplessness' and incapability retrospectively o n to childhood. W h i l e as adults w e discover the pleasure of p o w e r , the desire to control and use o t h e r people in o u r o w n interests, and, in general, motives w h i c h are 'predominantly d e p e n d e n t or hostile', w e project t h e m o n to an alleged experience of such pleasures as infants, the better to excuse and legitimate t h e m . T h u s Lynne Segal exploring her sexual needs as an adult discovers that she does not just w a n t to be loved, b u t equally to 'express hostility, d e p e n d e n c e and d o m i n a t i o n ' . R a t h e r than w o r r y i n g about her violence, her desire for p o w e r over a n o t h e r person and for hostility towards t h e m , she tries to legitimate these by p r o j e c t i n g t h e m o n to babies: 'As babies w e have been the passive and powerless, but also p o w e r f u l l y d e m a n d i n g , recipients of e n o r m o u s parental attention and, hopefully, physical gratification and love.' 4 9 T h e fantasies w h i c h are thus projected o n to babies are the fantasies of adults, their adultocentric p r o j e c t i o n of what 'being a baby' might m e a n . Far f r o m b e i n g the fantasies of the powerless, they are fantasies f r o m the perspective of those having p o w e r , p o w e r for example over babies, and they are fantasies of 'being a baby' w h i c h precisely appear attractive to adults for themselves. In particular, they betray the response of p o w e r f u l adults to the extreme powerlessness of babies, their hostility towards the w e a k and their c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h t h e m in a 'tug of w a r ' b e t w e e n their o w n demands and the baby's demands: their c o n c e p t i o n of the self and the baby based o n opposition and struggle. T h u s the very existence of another w i t h such obvious claims as a baby b e c o m e s a challenge to the self, an i m p e d i m e n t to the subject's exclusive pursuit of its o w n demands. This confirms itself explicitly in feminist theories of object relations w h i c h include the 'mother's' perspective. Yet they n o m o r e attempt to address adults' violence against children than do non-feminist theories. R a t h e r , it becomes apparent that the 'mother—child' relationship is conceived as a fundamental antagonism, an adversarial relationship of two opponen ts engaged in a tug of war b e t w e e n their respective demands, a 'push—pull dynamic' b e t w e e n t w o competing 'little-girl parts'. And since all w o m e n are potential patients, to w h o m therapy extends its total 'understanding', n o one must be f o u n d to be responsible for this war, no one held responsible for any violence they commit. Instead, therapeutic explanation sets in m o t i o n a spiral of infinitely regressing responsibility. For n o sooner d o w e turn to the alleged
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w r o n g d o e r , the m o t h e r w h o caused all the suffering of a patient like Katie, than this w r o n g d o e r equally gains indulgent therapeutic u n d e r standing, b e c o m i n g a patient herself in turn, since she too was the victim of the actions of a n o t h e r and earlier w r o n g d o e r , namely her m o t h e r . A n d so ad infinitum. N o n e of t h e m experienced happiness a n d c o n t e n t m e n t ; they all received insufficient care and attention. A n d as A d r i e n n e R i c h explains the w h i t e w o m a n ' s violence against Black people by p o i n t i n g out that sire too is oppressed by patriarchy 'Powerless in the institution of marriage, the institution of slavery did give her near-absolute p o w e r over a n o t h e r h u m a n being, her only outlet for rage and frustration b e i n g the control she had over that person' — so the violence of 'the m o t h e r ' , her abuse of p o w e r in relation to her children, is 'explained' as the p r o d u c t of a superior p o w e r : powerless in the institution of patriarchal d a u g h t e r h o o d (and marriage), m o t h e r h o o d did give her near-absolute p o w e r over a n o t h e r h u m a n being (her baby), her only outlet for rage and frustration. It is not the m o t h e r deciding to enter an unfair tug of war, a battle with her small daughter, a push—pull dynamic w i t h a baby; it is n o t h e r deciding irresponsibly to abuse her near-absolute p o w e r over a child. T h e system of m o t h e r h o o d gave it to h e r — f r o m w h i c h apparently w e are to infer that she could not but (ab)use it. If the W o m e n ' s T h e r a p y C e n t r e in L o n d o n p u t their emphasis o n m o t h e r s ' incapability to enter into absolute symbiosis w i t h their baby daughters, discharging these in turn dissatisfied o n their path t h r o u g h life (and into m o t h e r h o o d ) , N a n c y C h o d o r o w o n the contrary sees the p r o b l e m precisely in m o t h e r s ' o v e r p o w e r i n g and u n e n d i n g symbiosis w i t h their daughters. 5 0 T h a t is to say, if the issue is to legitimate the wish of adults to d e m a n d and receive absolute care and n u r t u r a n c e f r o m others, this wish is projected o n to the infinitely n e e d y baby w h o was n e v e r sufficiently satisfied (symbiosed) by h e r m o t h e r . If, o n the other hand, the issue is explaining w h y adult w o m e n do n o t take responsibility for themselves, clinging to unrealistic demands and needs, attention shifts to the small child's a t t e m p t to separate and individuate f r o m the m o t h e r , w h o h o w e v e r thwarts this bid f o r i n d e p e n d e n c e t h r o u g h h e r overprotective and s m o t h e r i n g n u r t u r i n g care. In any case, the wish of the child is unfulfilled b u t legitimate, the b e h a v i o u r of the m o t h e r illegitimate, the wish of the n o w adult child still legitimate (because previously unfulfilled), and the behaviour of the erstwhile m o t h e r 'responsible' for it.
In either case it is n o t t h e real b e h a v i o u r of the m o t h e r or the child w h i c h is at issue, b u t t h e need or incapacity of the 'child' and a corresponding inadequate and unsatisfying b e h a v i o u r of the ' m o t h e r ' as constructed f r o m the perspective of the n o w adult 'child', said to be responsible for h e r n e e d and incapacity as an adult. T h e spiral of regressing responsibility has b e e n set in m o t i o n , w h i c h legitimates the needs in question of any c u r r e n t patient of therapy and exonerates h e r f r o m any responsibility for t h e m . For there is n o longer any responsibility in the present; there are only 'causes' in the past. This adultocentric perspective, h o w e v e r , this legitimation of n o n responsibility, is i n h e r e n t in object relations theory and ego-psychology in general, as they all project the problems of adults o n to infants and their ' m o t h e r s ' : adults' f u n d a m e n t a l hostility towards the other, their claims to p o w e r and their pleasure in d o m i n a n c e and control over others. T o represent the factual powerlessness of infants as their apparent ' p o w e r f u l d e m a n d i n g ' is to play sleight-of-hand w i t h the c o n c e p t of p o w e r (and w i t h the p o w e r of representation). T h e ' p o w e r ' of a ' p o w e r f u l l y d e m a n d i n g ' baby is a projection by adults to w h o m the legitimacy of the baby's claim o n their care appears as a restriction u p o n their o w n search f o r satisfaction. N o child demands p o w e r f u l l y , she d e m a n d s out of a position of powerlessness. As E i c h e n b a u m and O r b a c h argue rather casually: 'babies taken into care b u t given n o love and personal attention c a n n o t sustain life — they give up and die.' 5 1 Apart f r o m the fallacious implication that biological m o t h e r equals love and care ( h o w e v e r insufficient), while fostering means n o love and care, w e m a y assume the p o i n t to b e the absence of love and care, n o m a t t e r f r o m w h a t source. In such a case a child may d e m a n d and cry as ' p o w e r f u l l y ' as she wishes, it does n o t help in a situation of utter d e p e n d e n c e o n g r o w n - u p s , w h o alone will decide w h e t h e r they will l o o k after h e r or n o t . If I question this m e c h a n i s m of spiralling m o t h e r - b l a m i n g , I d o not t h e r e b y deny that children do indeed suffer violence at the hands of adults, including m o t h e r s . N o r in addressing the issue of violence against children d o I argue that all m o t h e r s abuse their children. M y point is, rather, that n e i t h e r psychology n o r p s y c h o t h e r a p y in any way seriously address the question of adult p o w e r over children, that o n the contrary, they w a n t to have their cake and eat it — w a n t to claim parental violence o n behalf of the (adult) children clients, yet absolve
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any adult (clients) f r o m responsibility f o r their o w n violence. If every client by definition is a victim of her past, there are no acting persons left in the present. H e n c e therapy is n o t so m u c h taking side w i t h children as taking side w i t h adult children, that is, clients. N e i t h e r can there b e any serious attempt to c o n f r o n t violence if therapy proposes to solve the p r o b l e m o n the patient's part, that is, o n the part of the victim of violence. For the victim-patient is either to 'accept' the consequences of violence suffered in c h i l d h o o d by accepting an insatiable neediness as an adult, or else to '[develop] a narrative of self u n d e r s t o o d as a "biographical a c c o u n t i n g " w i t h w h i c h she or h e feels emotionally comfortable'. 5 2 T h e issue, in o t h e r words, is neither the patient's b e h a v i o u r in the present, n o r her (or his) actual history, the history of any violence experienced and resistance offered to it: the issue is r e w r i t i n g that history, and rewriting it n o t according to any criteria of t r u t h and reality, b u t of w h a t history the patient may feel most comfortable w i t h . N o matter that this precisely does not constitute a w a y of 'cognitively and emotionally' w o r k i n g t h r o u g h and c o m i n g to terms w i t h one's history. N o r does the question arise w h a t 'narrative' or ' a c c o u n t ' it is in the first place w h i c h is either to be 'accepted' or to be rewritten f r o m a m o r e comfortable p o i n t of view — that is, n o r is the narrative account of adult patients (in the present) ever problematized as the construction of a narrative. P o w e r , of course, is the real underlying issue, w h i c h the therapeutic definition of the ' p r o b l e m ' h o w e v e r does everything to disguise. This means in the first instance n o t to identify, let alone analyse, p o w e r relations, reformulating any p o w e r — be it the client's p o w e r in her o w n relationships and her p o w e r as the subject of her account, or the therapist's p o w e r in the therapy relationship — as powerlessness, all the better to legitimate it. A n d w h e r e p o w e r cannot altogether be m a d e invisible, it is naturalized. As patriarchal sociobiology and its amateur camp-followers attempt to naturalize m e n ' s sexual violence t h r o u g h (selective) recourse to an allegedly natural male aggression in the animal w o r l d , thus to e x onerate m e n f r o m any responsibility for their violent b e h a v i o u r , so psychological theories naturalize and legitimate the illegitimate desires of adults — their desire for p o w e r and control over o t h e r people — t h r o u g h recourse to the alleged ' n a t u r e ' of children. Such 'naturalizat i o n ' n o t only serves to legitimate p o w e r , it is itself an exercise of
p o w e r in relation to this so-called nature, h e r e the animal w o r l d and children respectively: control over a discourse about 'others' which these others can neither influence n o r determine. T h e y are the p o w e r less objects of the discourse, defenceless victims of theories and allegations, screens for projections by p o w e r f u l subjects w h o objectify them. W h a t object relations t h e o r y posits as the infant's heritage (innate or otherwise) in reality is the freely chosen m e t h o d of a scientific discourse. T a k e the description of the infantile fantasy process as defined by M e l a n i e Klein and paraphrased by E i c h e n b a u m and O r b a c h above, substitute 'scientists', 'theoreticians', 'psychologists' for the original 'infant', transpose i n t o the present tense - and already y o u have the scientific m e t h o d : 'For Klein, the instincts sought objects as their aim, rather than pleasure as Freud posited.' It appears that science also seeks objects as its aim (even if some posit the pleasure of research). If the pleasure posited by F r e u d is w h a t makes a 'drive' a drive, the drive is necessary to disguise the p o w e r of the subject of the drive. Science m a y n o t b e a drive, b u t like the drive it serves to disguise the p o w e r of the subjects of science, that is, of the scientists and theoreticians, the masters and mistresses of the discourse. A c c o r d i n g to our adaptation of object relations t h e o r y , t h e n , theory and science have objects as their aim, that is to say, the objectification of reality — the reality of people, animals and nature w h o m they make into objects. ' T h e objects - the p e o p l e - [are], h o w e v e r , objects of an internal nature rather than the images of the actual people in the [scientists'] life. T h e internal objects [are] part of the heritage that a [scientist] brings into the w o r l d along w i t h [science]. W h e r e a [science] [arises] so [does] an image of an object to satisfy it.' W h e r e a desire for the p o w e r of t h e o r y arises, an object of theory is sure to arise to satisfy it. Real people [and children, animals and realities] are screens upon which [scientists and theoreticians] [can] project [their] internal fantasies. Experiences of people [and other realities] in the world of [the scientist] [only confirm] the experience of the [scientist's] internal object relations. Klein explained the inner fantasy world [science] in terms of the struggle between the two great instincts: libido . . . and aggression. These two instinctual forccs [meet] in the individual [science] and [form] the battleground on which the [scientific ego, that is, science] develops.
M o r e o v e r , w e w o u l d argue w i t h b o t h object relations theory and with Freud that neither objects only, n o r pleasure alone, b u t objects and pleasure are the aim — that t h e corollary of the object is the pleasure of objectification, and the corollary of pleasure is the p o w e r over the 'objects'. For the object only exists u n d e r the p o w e r of the subject, the pleasure of the subject only in its p o w e r over the object. T h e real aim is the subject's pleasure of p o w e r : its p o w e r as subject over the object. So p o w e r f u l is this m e t h o d , so successful in e m p o w e r i n g the self as subject and opposing the w h o l e w o r l d as object, that almost n o o n e today any l o n g e r seems to take offence at it. W e seem to find it quite normal that n o t only scientists, b u t all of us walk the earth like the Kleinian infant w i t h a screen in f r o n t of o u r eyes, o n to w h i c h w e project o u r o w n fantasies. W e are most likely still to take offence only if it happens to be w e w h o are b e i n g used as a screen, w h e n of course we m e a n to be the projectors. O b j e c t relations t h e o r y is the apex of a d e v e l o p m e n t of psychological t h e o r y w h i c h also in its o t h e r manifestations ceaselessly posits this f u n d a m e n t a l p o w e r relationship — the c o n c e p t i o n of self as subject in relation to an object w o r l d - as 'normal' and ' h u m a n ' , as 'natural' and given and h e n c e unchangeable. O b j e c t relations theory is the apex only in as m u c h as it explicitly names w h a t could n o t be n a m e d m o r e clearly, namely that everybody and e v e r y t h i n g and all may legitimately be m a d e into an object. A n d it is of significance in so far as feminists in particular have b e g u n to select it as their preferred psychological theory. W h e r e o n c e there existed a feminist critique of psychology and a feminist critique of objectification, a critique precisely in terms of p o w e r and p o w e r relations, there n o w exists a 'feminist' legitimation of p o w e r effected t h r o u g h objectification, propagated by psychology. W i t h w o m e n gaining access to positions of p o w e r in patriarchal society, with w o m e n ' s g r o w i n g experience of p o w e r and the pleasure of p o w e r , there apparently is a g r o w i n g interest also in legitimating w o m e n ' s claims to p o w e r and in u n d e r m i n i n g the critique of p o w e r . Apparently w e n o longer have a critique of p o w e r as such, only of the fact that p o w e r used to be the prerogative of m e n . Apparently w e n o longer have a critique of objectification and the c o n c o m i t a n t subjectification, b u t only of the fact that the roles of subject and object used to be distributed according to gender. H e n c e tire t e r m ' e m p o w e r m e n t ' and the project of s e l f - e m p o w e r m e n t increasingly feature in
feminist discourse, replacing the goal of d e c o n s t r u c t i n g the p o w e r structure. 5 3 Equality apparently n o longer holds the promise of an end to oppression, b u t of equal access to the roles of d o m i n a t i o n and oppression. T h u s w e may witness a veritable explosion of 'object worlds', no longer the exclusive prerogative of science (or m e n ) : 'A person lives in a multiple object w o r l d — in the internal, largely unconscious object w o r l d of their psyche w h i c h has laid its f o u n d a t i o n in the past, in c h i l d h o o d , and in the external largely conscious w o r l d of daily life.' 5 4 T h a t g r o w n - u p people v i e w the w o r l d like n e w b o r n infants, ( m i s t a k ing the p r o j e c t i o n of their fantasies for reality, their 'imaging of the w o r l d ' 5 5 for the w o r l d , is n o l o n g e r the p r o b l e m to be analysed: it is the assumption f r o m w h i c h w e start and w i t h w h i c h w e w a n t to stay. N o t only the imagination (or the psyche) produces an 'object w o r l d ' , w i t h the i n h e r e n t p r o b l e m of the subjectivity of the 'arrogant perceiver' 5 6 that created it; the world itself, the consciously experienced w o r l d of daily life, 'is' an object w o r l d . T h u s the real w o r l d has successfully b e e n m a d e to disappear. T h e r e is n o reality any longer to consider, there are only the 'internal' and the 'external' object worlds — internal to m e , and external of me.
Ego-psychology,
or My relationship
and I
This demise of the w o r l d as reality n o t only leaves us w i t h a m u l t i t u d e of personal object worlds; like the big bang, it also sets a myriad n e w 'objects' into the world(s). W h i l e o n the one hand p e o p l e (everyone except for the subject) n o w c o u n t a m o n g the objects, it is also the case that m a n y n o n - h u m a n and inanimate 'objects' assume the role of subject and take action. T h u s w e have seen a veritable cast of actors p o p u l a t i n g Katie's relationship, taking over directing the play: the events, the needs and feelings, old unsatisfied feelings as well as a little-girl part (in the order of their appearance). T h e reality of the present b e c o m e s the stage for a drama f r o m the past. Katie o n the o n e hand is the centre of the stage, the pivot a r o u n d w h i c h the action turns, yet she is not a protagonist, since she is n o t herself a dramatis persona. Like the princess of fairy tales or the h e r o i n e of the bourgeois n o v e l she does n o t participate in the action, b u t is passively enduring, suffering and w a i t i n g — victim a n d object of the actions of the dramatis personae. Y e t she has another role beyond the stage, w h i c h tends to conflate with that of her therapist: they b o t h are in the audience w a t c h i n g the drama, w h i c h in t u r n they describe, narrating its plot. In this f u n c t i o n of re-presenting the alleged drama as narrative lies the e n o r m o u s p o w e r of the subject — creating a reality as the Lord in the b e g i n n i n g created a world, f r o m scratch and according to his wish and will. This act of narration, of objectifying and representing the drama o n stage, also fulfils the famous postulate of the splitting of the ego into subject and object. In order to b e c o m e a subject able to make o t h e r people into objects, so the theory, the self must learn to conceive of itself as a potential ' o b j e c t ' . Since the g r o w i n g infant must learn to
consider the m o t h e r as ' n o t - I ' , as not in fact part of the infant's o w n self, she must learn, not that m o t h e r is m o t h e r and self is 'I', b u t to perceive herself as a separate and c o h e r e n t b o d y entity. 1 According to Lacan this happens d u r i n g the ' m i r r o r stage', w h e n the child, directing her gaze at herself in the m i r r o r , c o m p r e h e n d s herself as an object of sight. T h u s the child simultaneously is the subject of her gazing and c o m p r e h e n d i n g , and the object of her o w n gaze and consciousness. W h i l e this splitting of the ego is considered an i m p o r t a n t step in the infant's d e v e l o p m e n t to a conscious person, w e may w o n d e r w h a t is the significance of the d e v e l o p m e n t in the m o d e r n therapeutic subject towards p e r c e i v i n g itself exclusively as an object. For the patient describes her history as victim of the events w i t h o u t apparently any consciousness of h e r role as subject. H e r focus, like that of her therapist, remains fixed o n the stage of the narrated drama, w h e r e she figures as the principal object, while her role as narrating subject, as interpreter of the events and as a u t h o r of her o w n understanding, never b e c o m e s a topic of the therapeutic discussion. W h i l e this may i n d e e d be a p r o d u c t of the therapy relationship and the collusive roles of therapist and patient, such an understanding of the self and such a m e t h o d of representing one's history are by n o means exclusive to the therapy context. R e p r e s e n t i n g oneself as the object of circumstances and the victim of events — that is, describing oneself as if f r o m the perspective of one's o w n therapist — is, as w e have seen, a technique of w i d e r application. It generally serves to hide the subject's p o w e r and to suppress its role as agent. Yet psychological t h e o r y and psyc h o t h e r a p e u t i c practice have had their share b o t h in propagating and legitimating it as a c o m m o n s e n s e m e t h o d of self-perception. In her brief o v e r v i e w over the different psychological and psychoanalytic theories, N a n c y C h o d o r o w writes: ' T h e interpretation of psychic structure that stresses the mental personality as object rather than subject is f u n d a m e n t a l to the d e v e l o p m e n t of psychoanalytic ego psychology, the school that has c o m e to d o m i n a t e the American psychoanalytic tradition.' 2 She criticizes the determinism inherent in psychoanalysis w h i c h , in postulating drives and psychic 'apparatuses', reduces the 'acting agent' to a 'behaving organism'. 3 W h i l e the 'cultural school' of psychoanalysis has also criticized this determinism, it only replaces, C h o d o r o w argues, a biological d e t e r m i n i s m by a cultural determinism: although it is culture and social life that are seen
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i
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111
to d e t e r m i n e the d e v e l o p m e n t of the child, ' t h e person in this v i e w ' , too, 'is n o longer an agent, has n o way to w o r k o n or create that w h i c h is internalized.' 4 In C h o d o r o w ' s view, object relations theory remedies all these shortcomings, postulating that while the child is indeed being influenced by culture, she in t u r n works o n the 'culture' she internalizes by means of her fantasy. N o t entering the psychic system u n m e d i a t e d , culture thus loses its d e t e r m i n i n g role: 'Cultural school psychoanalysts are right that the outside w o r l d affects the inside. But this influence is mediated t h r o u g h fantasy, introjection and p r o j e c t i o n , ambivalence, conflict, substitution, reversal, distortion, splitting, association, c o m p r o m i s e , denial, and repression.' 5 N o t e the array of means by w h i c h this input f r o m the w o r l d outside is ' w o r k e d ' o n , and w h i c h constitute the self's most impressive p r o o f of s u b j e c t h o o d . A l t h o u g h in this theory, too, people have innate drives, these too are n o t as absolutely d e t e r m i n i n g as they are for Freudians, n o r does the pleasure principle rule supreme: 'People have innate erotic and aggressive energies. Infants, as psychoanalysis shows, are sexual. B u t people d o not naturally seek release of tension f r o m physiological drives or use their object-relations in the search for this release. R a t h e r , they manipulate and transform drives in the course of attaining and retaining relationships.' 6 T h a t is to say, people (or infants) are n o t exclusively b e i n g m a n i p u l ated by drives; they in t u r n manipulate their drives, m a k i n g them the objects of their action. W h e t h e r this also solves the p r o b l e m of regarding p e o p l e as objects and as (products o f ) psychic systems remains t o be seen. W h a t matters to C h o d o r o w is that the emphasis on object relations necessarily postulates the subject, the 'agentic subject' 7 - a subject constituting itself t h r o u g h objectification. T h e fact that it is this subject w h i c h in the course of its objectifications also makes itself into an object — regarding in particular its o w n subjectivity, its actions and feelings, as products i n d e p e n d e n t of itself — to h e r remains o u t shone by its role as an 'active self'. O n e of the most i m p o r t a n t 'objects' w h i c h , in creating its object world, the active subject calls into b e i n g is the discursive object ' t h e relationship'. As w e have seen already in the case of Katie's relationship, it takes three to m a k e a couple: myself, the other, and the relationship. As object relations t h e o r y m o r e o v e r makes abundantly clear, the relationship is of considerably greater i m p o r t a n c e than is the
partner. This corresponds to the c o m m o n s e n s e understanding of relationships, that is, the 'personal' or 'private' relationship of t w o : Katie does n o t so m u c h b e c o m e d e p e n d e n t o n Pete, as o n the relationship. A n o t h e r person, b y contrast, constitutes a f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m for the subject and for its relationship: y o u cannot do a n y t h i n g w i t h a real man or w o m a n , c a n n o t change t h e m , c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e their b e h a viour — unless it be b y force; that is to say, y o u are simply at the mercy of their self-determination, possibly even their o w n aspiration to the status of subject. H e n c e it is best to accept the other as a given object in the object w o r l d , and set to w o r k instead o n the relationship. As m a n y c o m m e n t a t o r s o n social life have observed, w e are in love usually w i t h love. T h u s o u r desire for a relationship is usually a desire for relation, w h i l e o u r passionate i n v o l v e m e n t is an i n v o l v e m e n t with the relationship: it is the relationship w e w a n t . It is the relationship that w e m a k e d e m a n d s o n and have expectations of, w h i c h 'it' does not always m e e t ; it is the relationship that w e fight for, that we are trying to keep, that w e do n o t wish to give up. It is for the relationship, t o o , that w e seek a partner. A l t h o u g h a n o t h e r person is a necessary prerequisite for a relationship, that person is often its principal i m p e d i m e n t , the obstacle in our w a y of m a k i n g it a happy relationship and realizing its true potential. If only the other w e r e as w e imagine t h e m in o u r dreams, if only the other c o n f o r m e d to our happiest fantasies, if only the other w e r e truly an object w h i c h does not periodically fall out of its role, t h e n o u r happiness w o u l d be c o m p l e t e , and the relationship w o u l d n o longer b e a p r o b l e m : it w o u l d fulfil all m y needs, taking its gentle yet passionate course, its safe a n d yet spontaneous d e v e l o p m e n t , its c o n t i n u o u s yet alternating path full of u n f o r e s e e n (only positive) surprises. T h e waves of my needs continually r e f o r m i n g themselves w o u l d ensure that the relationship is never b o r i n g , lacking, or full of emptiness, 8 for w e — my relationship and I — w o u l d b e having a perfect partnership, a h a r m o n i ous c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y : b e t w e e n m y needs and it fulfilling t h e m . It is the same partnership, by the way, w h i c h I always w a n t e d to have with m y m o t h e r , b u t w h i c h never succeeded because of her. T h e p r o b l e m is that w e m a k e o u r fantasies and object worlds w i t h the material of reality — that w e use people for t h e m and shape events w i t h t h e m . If o u r p o w e r and violence are n o t sufficient to do so, it m a y lead to a great deal of unhappiness, discontent and frustration w i t h life w h i c h never properly submits to fantasy. H e n c e there exists
a large therapy industry today w h i c h deals with this misery of relationships. T h e therapy, h o w e v e r , has the same theory w h i c h originally created the p r o b l e m , its empirical survey of the facts n o t only reflecting the p r o b l e m , but decisively helping to construct and maintain it. This may be aggravated in the case of some feminist therapy, w h i c h o n account of the gender identity of therapist and client rests o n a veritable symbiosis of p r o b l e m and therapy. W h i l e Margrit B r u c k n e r , for instance, identifies as a m a j o r p r o b l e m of w o m e n ' s attitude t o relationships their 'powerfulfantasy to change others w i t h o u t a concept of self-change' 9 (my emphasis), that is, exactly what feminists have criticized in m e n ' s desire to control w o m e n , 1 0 this insight, even if q u o t e d by therapists or psychologists tends to disappear again as s o o n we get to the female patient and her relationship. W h a t tends to stay, rather, is the axiomatic rule that the client's relation to h e r relationship is primary, while any consequences it may have for o t h e r people (that is, the partners in question) are hardly w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g , all the less so if the therapy's f e m i n i s m rests o n the assumption that these 'others' in any case are m e n w h o for centuries have b e e n oppressing w o m e n in relationships. H e n c e the trademark of a great deal of feminist therapy is that it psychologizes a political analysis. T h u s it tends to attribute to w o m e n a centuries-old tradition of self-restriction, selflessness and self-sacrifice, as well as a special ability to take on relationship w o r k - w i t h o u t a w o r r y , it seems, that this exactly reproduces the patriarchal definition of the f e m i n i n e sex-role. Far f r o m seeing it as the construction of ideal 'femininity', the theory p r o n o u n c e s it historical fact. W h i l e patriarchal ideologues at least did and do have a n o t i o n of w o m e n ' s actual inadequacy in fulfilling this ideal - w h e n c e the countless measures f r o m social control to medical i n t e r v e n t i o n to coerce t h e m to a p p r o x i m a t e to it m o r e closely — m a n y w o m e n and feminist therapists today seem to believe in the total c o n g r u i t y of attribution and reality. T h e y d o so despite the fact that w o m e n freely report their o w n acts of coercion, speaking openly of their o w n claims to p o w e r — h o w they want to ' " w i n " the old struggle to be loved', 1 1 'to change a n o t h e r person t h r o u g h the p o w e r of her will', 1 2 or m a k e other people d o things: '1 made h i m tell m e that he loved me, and I made h i m give m e a h u g . . . It never w o u l d have h a p p e n e d if I h a d n ' t forced h i m . Yet despite this remarkable manifestation of the female self, pursuing its
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interests with d e t e r m i n a t i o n and tenacity, w i t h w i l l - p o w e r and persistence — p o w e r f u l l y w o r k i n g on its fantasy of its 'relationship' while instrumentalizing others in the process — therapists and their clients unwaveringly stick to their theory of the n o n - e x i s t e n t female self. ' W o m e n . . . sacrifice themselves for others in their jobs, they are eager to give u p their o w n interests in the service of their m a n and children', they are ' c o e r c e d to be selfless', all leading to 'self-sacrifice, self-devaluation and m a r t y r d o m ' . 1 4 T h e general misery of relationships is seen as the 'result of a pathological [social] g e n d e r a r r a n g e m e n t ' , in w h i c h 'activity and passivity, d e v o t i o n to others and self-assertion, d e p e n d e n c e and indep e n d e n c e , satisfaction of instincts and caring for others have b e e n torn asunder and attributed respectively to the t w o sexes.' 1 5 T h a t is to say, it is taken for a fact that w o m e n devote themselves to others while m e n indulge in b e i n g and asserting themselves, that w o m e n are d e p e n d e n t while m e n are i n d e p e n d e n t , that w o m e n care for others while m e n indulge their instincts and drives. W o m e n are attributed even a ' n e e d to submit', 1 6 and an inability to act 'self-protectively'. 1 7 A n d if the female self has n o t .been totally destroyed, w h a t is left of it is exceedingly fragile: ' Y o u r self-esteem is critically l o w ' , 1 8 every little event in the relationship may suffice to '[deal] a serious b l o w to her fragile self-image', 1 9 or even to '[shatter] her self-confidence'. 2 0 As ' m e m b e r s of the oppressed g r o u p ' w o m e n have 'internalized and accepted t h e prejudices of the d o m i n a n t g r o u p against themselves', as a c o n s e q u e n c e suffering f r o m actual ' s e l f - c o n t e m p t ' and 'self-denial', 2 1 if not i n d e e d f r o m a total 'loss of self'. 2 2 T h e feminist analysis of social p o w e r relations and w o m e n ' s collective oppression by m e n is applied o n the basis of gender identity to individual w o m e n and m e n , so that w o m e n by definition are victims, m e n by definition, culprits — m e m b e r s of the group of the oppressed and m e m b e r s of the group of the oppressors. A n analysis of the specific situation in terms of its agents and their actions thus becomes superfluous, g e n d e r identity giving us the necessary i n f o r m a t i o n . T h e political reality of structural oppression is t u r n e d into a sociobiological disease, w h i l e the real and varying consequences of oppression for w o m e n in their different situations are dissolved into the shared damage of a g e n d e r 'character'. H e n c e there is n o longer any need to change or even just to recognize p o w e r relations, since these seem to exist above all. in people's psychic structure rather than in reality.
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Starting f r o m the u n q u e s t i o n e d t r u t h that w o m e n are selfless a n d loving, therapists and their clients set about to heal t h e m of this illness, teaching t h e m and learning ' h o w w e can change and get well'. 2 3 T h e symbiosis b e t w e e n therapist and client considered to be particularly feminist shows itself in the readiness of the f o r m e r not to exempt herself f r o m the problems of the latter: o n account of her o w n experience as a w o m a n she has a particular understanding of her client. This means less that the feminist m e t h o d of collective consciousness-raising is applied to the therapeutic context. R a t h e r , the therapeutic m e t h o d is in the process of i n f o r m i n g also the personal politics of the w o m e n ' s liberation m o v e m e n t , what Janice R a y m o n d calls 'therapism', 2 4 replacing the political understanding of collective consciousness-raising. R e f e r r i n g to one's o w n experience as a w o m a n thus tends to signal a special authority to 'understand' and legitimate a n o t h e r w o m a n ' s experience — 'understanding' usually m e a n i n g the unreflected recognition that the o t h e r has the experience, rather than a particular analysis of that experience. T h a t is to say, it seems to suffice to have 'had' the experience; its interpretation n o longer matters. O n the contrary, the sheer congruity of having had the 'same' experience tends to c o n f i r m the other w o m a n in her understanding of her experience — c o n f i r m , in other words, that there is n o t h i n g else to understand or c o m p r e h e n d . W h i c h is w h y the experience of the o n e tends n o t particularly to help the o t h e r c o m e to terms w i t h her experience. Y e t it is increasingly this u n c o n d i t i o n a l 'understanding' that w o m e n are l o o k i n g for in t u r n i n g to o t h e r w o m e n , as opposed to any support in gaining a better understanding, or changing their initial understanding, of their experiences. T h e question remains h o w the relatively accessible insight into w o m e n ' s desire for p o w e r and their c o r r e s p o n d i n g b e h a v i o u r — their desire to change o t h e r people, to manipulate and instrumentalize t h e m in the interest of their o w n c o n c e p t i o n s — can be squared w i t h the u n w a v e r i n g belief in w o m e n ' s selflessness. It can b e squared, it turns out, by means of discursive reconstruction, by radically reformulating the situation and its actual relations. This means in the first instance to reformulate what in reality is a relation as instead a thing, a matter, an object. H e n c e a relationship n o longer is t w o people relating to each other, a constantly changing process d e p e n d i n g o n the actions of the people involved. It b e c o m e s a thing of w h i c h I can have certain expectations that I k n o w it w o u l d be illegitimate to
have of a n o t h e r person. T h u s I can want to have a relationship, whereas w a n t i n g to have a person w o u l d be suspiciously close to w a n t i n g to o w n and rule that person. I can make the relationship m y need, whereas n e e d i n g a n o t h e r person m i g h t m a k e it clear that this means using that person for m y need. As ' o u r c o m m o n cause', the relationship b e c o m e s the screen that hides m y self-interest: it is n o t in my n a m e I am m a k i n g demands, but in the n a m e o f ' o u r relationship'. N o t only does this look unselfish, but in b e i n g 'willing to take m o r e responsibility than [the partner] for initiating the relationship and k e e p i n g it going', 2 5 w e t h i n k m o r e o v e r that w e are taking the sacrificial part, carrying the greater share of the ' w o r k ' . A b o v e all, it allows m e to shift the identification of any problems away f r o m the politics of personal b e h a v i o u r - my o w n as well as m y partner's — and towards the c o m m o n undertaking, as problems 'in o u r relationship' if talking to the partner, or problems 'in m y relationship' if talking to the therapist. S o m e therapists t o o recognize in this shift an attempt, h o w e v e r inappropriate, to gain control or indeed 'mastery over the problems': 2 6 It is true for all of us that when an emotionally painful event occurs, and we tell ourselves that it is our fault, we are actually saying that we have control of it: if we change, the pain will stop . . . By blaming ourselves, we hold on to the hope that we will be able to figure out what we are doing wrong and correct it, thereby controlling the situation and stopping the pain. 27 Since f r o m the b e g i n n i n g neither m y o w n b e h a v i o u r n o r that of m y partner is up for discussion, b u t o n the contrary, an 'event occurs' in the relationship w h i c h emotionally hurts m e , this will lead n o t to an analysis of b e h a v i o u r but to a diagnosis of the relationship. And since w e also start f r o m the axiomatic assumption of w o m e n ' s selflessness especially in relationships, this does n o t lead to a clarification of the w o m a n ' s o w n illegitimate claims to p o w e r or her o w n problematical b e h a v i o u r , b u t simply to a m e t h o d of giving u p fruitless or ineffective 'patterns' of b e h a v i o u r as ' u n h e a l t h y ' . R o b i n N o r w o o d explains the goal of her therapeutic b o o k as follows: 'Its purpose is specific: to help w o m e n w i t h destructive patterns of relating to m e n recognize that fact, understand the origin of those patterns [in c h i l d h o o d , w h e r e else?], and gain the tools for changing their lives.' 2 8 H e r o w n experience convinced N o r w o o d h o w unhealthy these patterns are:
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I know this only too well, having been a woman who loved too much most of my life until the toll to my physical and emotional health was so severe that I was forced to take a hard look at my pattern of relating to men. I have spent the last several years working hard to change that pattern. They have been the most rewarding years of my life.29 O n n o a c c o u n t must w e question o u r o w n wish f o r p o w e r or recognize our o w n interest in controlling others, say, so as to give t h e m up for political reasons. R a t h e r , a 'pattern's' use is being c o m pared to its price (toll) and f o u n d n o t to be at all cost-effective; or the use of a n e w pattern c o m p a r e d to the use of an old pattern and f o u n d to be considerably m o r e 'rewarding'. W h e r e a s changing y o u r pattern of relating means 'redirecting y o u r loving attention away f r o m y o u r obsession w i t h a m a n and t o w a r d y o u r o w n recovery and your o w n life'. 3 0 N o m o r e wasting of loving attention, in other words, w h i c h is not spent o n y o u r o w n account. T h e practical t h i n g about a pattern of relating is that it, too, is a thing, and in fact s o m e t h i n g w h i c h w e have o n c e surreptitiously b e e n given like smuggled goods slipped into y o u r bag. In n o way is it a personal b e h a v i o u r w h i c h , if I want to change it, I can change by behaving differently. For my b e h a v i o u r is n o t really m y b e h a v i o u r , but the p r o d u c t of a pattern of b e h a v i o u r . It turns out according to the pattern as knitting does according to the knitting pattern. E x c h a n g i n g one pattern for a n o t h e r does n o t require a change in m y behaviour, but a therapy that enlightens m e about the origins of the pattern and h o w it came to be in m y baggage. W e already k n o w , m o t h e r has packed it in there: 'Typically, y o u c o m e f r o m a dysfunctional h o m e in w h i c h y o u r e m o t i o n a l needs w e r e n o t met. H a v i n g received little real n u r t u r i n g yourself, y o u try to fdl this u n m e t n e e d vicariously . . .' 3 1 ' T o g r o w u p as female in this society and in such a family can generate some predictable patterns.' 3 2 T h e fact alone of b e i n g a person in this society, having been b o r n and g r o w n up in a family (for w h e r e is the n o n - d y s f u n c t i o n a l one?) is reason e n o u g h to develop a pathology. B e i n g a w o m a n and the daughter of a m o t h e r , h o w e v e r , makes e v e r y t h i n g twice as bad. W h i l e the conditions of life and socialization of girls and w o m e n and the p o w e r relations in the patriarchal family w o u l d i n d e e d be issues for a political critique, this is neither about politics n o r political change: it is about pathologizing yourself in the first instance, so as to ' m a k e y o u r recovery y o u r first priority' 3 3 in the second instance.
O n e reason f o r this is that o u r critique of m e n ' s b e h a v i o u r and generally of the relationship b e t w e e n m e n and w o m e n in patriarchy must not go too far, so as n o t f u n d a m e n t a l l y to threaten that relationship. As an individual w o m a n m a y n o t w a n t to separate f r o m a violent m a n because she does n o t want to give u p 'the relationship', so m a n y w o m e n and therapists d o not wish to part w i t h a c o n c e p t i o n of ' t h e relationship' w h i c h is based o n t h e pleasure and p o w e r of the subject, because they w a n t that relationship too m u c h . This means that neither our partners' coercive or violent b e h a v i o u r — even w h e r e they are m e n and thus certified 'oppressors' — n o r o u r o w n b e h a v i o u r must be seriously p u t into question, n e i t h e r their understanding of relationships be analysed, n o r o u r o w n . H e n c e , rather than questioning the relationship in its c o n c e p t i o n , w e diagnose its state: it is g o o d or n o longer so g o o d , it is or 'is n o t m e e t i n g o u r needs', 3 4 it is lacking in love, 'unstable', 3 5 or 'isn't w o r k i n g ' , a n d sometimes it breaks apart or 'dissolves' 3 6 or 'fails'. 37 T h u s we may e v e n b e c o m e afraid of relationships, 'afraid to get involved — I m e a n , it's n o t h i n g b u t pain every time'. 3 8 This saves us f r o m asking w h e t h e r w e w o u l d n o t i n d e e d b e right to be afraid of a particular partner, o n e w h o causes us pain and behaves violently, or conversely, w h e t h e r m y pain and my h u r t are the result of the partner's violent action or w h e t h e r they are in fact, as in Katie's case, feelings of m y o w n , originating in m y claims to p o w e r . By explaining instead that it is 'the relationship' w h i c h causes us pain and the ' e v e n t ' w h i c h is h u r t i n g us, w e exonerate all possible suspects, thus k e e p i n g t h e m available for the role of partner in the relationship. T h e r a p y may help us e x c h a n g e either a b e h a v i o u r pattern or possibly the o d d partner, to keep the relationship healthy. T h u s therapists as well as their clients stick w i t h the assumption that o n account of patriarchy w o m e n ' s selves have b e e n mutilated and damaged — that w o m e n really have denied, given up or lost their selves. This means n o t only claiming the collective and cumulative historical suffering of the gender of w o m e n on behalf of individual w o m e n — so to speak as an advance credit in suffering or an a c c u m u l ated capital of personal i n n o c e n c e . It also means o v e r l o o k i n g the fact that even an internalized self-contempt meets with the emphatic resistance of the self, and that it is this contradiction, rather than the 'loss' of self, w h i c h creates the psychological p r o b l e m . Yet it seems m o r e i m p o r t a n t to d e n y w o m e n ' s resistance than to regard it as a sign
of their still existing selves - so that w e may c o n t i n u e to consider t h e m r e d u c e d to half-people, w h o first have to find their o t h e r halves or heal and restore their damaged selves. This may appear advantageous to w o m e n , since n o t having a self they automatically are b e y o n d any suspicion of having any selfinterest, let alone any claims to p o w e r . Yet it necessarily means d e n y i n g w o m e n ' s political will, collectively as well as individually n o t taking w o m e n seriously. Like Alice W a l k e r and o t h e r feminists, w e shall instead start f r o m the radical proposition that w o m e n are and always have b e e n full h u m a n beings, that o u r b e h a v i o u r shows o u r c o m p e t e n c e in surviving: o u r ability to m a k e the best of limited possibilities and to act responsibly even w i t h i n restricted conditions. T h a t this is n o t all w e wish for w o m e n , or h o w things should stay for w o m e n , should n o t n e e d emphasizing, and is reason for feminist critique and political w o r k . T h e p o i n t here is that w e should take w o m e n seriously, and despite oppression attribute ourselves a self as well as a will, c o m p e t e n c e as well as ability. This w o u l d m e a n , as Jessica B e n j a m i n emphasizes, n o t to 'idealize the oppressed', 3 9 or in o t h e r words, to give up mistaking patriarchal attribution for reality, and to recognize w o m e n ' s selves as well as their self-interest. It means a c k n o w l e d g i n g w o m e n ' s responsibility for their o w n decisions and actions, even if they choose to realize their selves according to the principle of self-interest, even if they decide not t o refuse and fight p o w e r b u t to claim it. A n d it w o u l d m e a n taking a political perspective n o t only o n w o m e n ' s b e h a v i o u r , b u t also o n a psychological t h e o r y w h i c h propagates the irresponsibility of the 'mental personality', b y seeing it as t h e p r o d u c t of a psychological apparatus rather than as the responsibility of the person. A n d it w o u l d m e a n questioning a feminist therapy that takes g e n d e r identity as its basis and mistakes 'great understanding' of clients for m o t h e r l y love. If w o m e n and feminist therapists, despite everything, c o n t i n u e t o disguise the self as well as the self-interest of the female subject, w e must consider it political i n t e n t i o n . T o speak o f ' s e l f - n e g a t i o n ' m i g h t i n d e e d be appropriate - n o t because w o m e n actually dismiss their o w n needs, b u t in as m u c h as the therapeutic discourse negates n o t just the subject's claims to p o w e r , b u t the self as such. T h e 'great u n d e r standing' w h i c h Birgit R o m m e l s p a c h e r sees w o m e n ' e x t e n d towards m e n and their psychological situation', 4 0 thus e x o n e r a t i n g t h e m f r o m
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responsibility, is even exceeded by the great understanding w h i c h w o m e n e x t e n d towards themselves and their o w n psychological situation, and w h i c h ' m o t h e r l y ' therapists s h o w towards their clients. T h u s we may replace ' h e ' by 'she' to describe the latter: ' T h e internal v i e w extinguishes the responsibility of the perpetrator. Y e t the p e r p e t rator must be called to account, in so far as w h a t [she] did was "in [ her] p o w e r " , in so far as [she] had alternative ways of b e h a v i n g at [ h e r ] disposal.' 4 1 Since w o m e n ' s b e h a v i o u r is rarely analysed, m u c h less the alternatives of b e h a v i n g differently, w o m e n are rarely called to account. R a t h e r , their b e h a v i o u r is v i e w e d w i t h such 'generous e m p a t h y ' as R o m m e l s p a c h e r sees w o m e n s h o w i n g to m e n ' s behaviour: ' T h e v i e w of the individual f r o m a ' m o t h e r l y ' perspective tends to m i n i m i z e personal responsibility . . . the ' m o t h e r l y ' v i e w leads to the psychic d i s e m p o w e r m e n t , emasculation [Depotenzierung] and infantilization of the [ w o m a n ] . She understands [her] completely and forgives [her]. [She] c o u l d n ' t help it. All [her] misdeeds are only expressions of [her] problems.' 4 2 This ' m o t h e r l y ' v i e w is p r o d u c e d also in the therapizing a c c o u n t of oneself in w h i c h the self figures as the victim of c i r c u m stances and the o b j e c t of o t h e r people's agency — w h e r e the disemp o w e r m e n t and infantilization of the w o m a n (in the object status) goes along w i t h the e m p o w e r m e n t of discursive objects to the status of agents, and w h e r e b o t h t o g e t h e r constitute the subject's supreme s e l f - e m p o w e r m e n t . T h e p u r p o s e of this ' m o t h e r l y ' v i e w of oneself, as w i t h the ' m o t h e r l y ' v i e w of m e n , is to exonerate f r o m responsibility for their actions those w h o t h e r e f o r e must clearly have b e e n perceived to have responsibility and to have b e e n acting. E v e n in the case of Jessica B e n j a m i n , w h o in her b o o k The Bonds of Love has so clearly analysed the relation of d o m i n a n c e b e t w e e n subject and object, w e may see h o w ' p o w e r ' , ' d o m i n a t i o n ' or 'gender polarity' ultimately b e c o m e a u t o n o m o u s things - n o t just a 'system involving the participation of those w h o submit to p o w e r as well as those w h o exercise it', 4 3 b u t also the ultimate agents or dramatis personae: ' D o m i n a t i o n ultimately deprives b o t h subjugator and subj u g a t e d of r e c o g n i t i o n . G e n d e r polarity deprives w o m e n of their subjectivity a n d m e n of a n o t h e r to recognize t h e m . ' 4 4 T u r n i n g a process a n d a relation into a thing — a relation w h o s e asymmetry had been the m a j o r t h e m e of the b o o k — makes
d o m i n a t i o n and p o w e r (like 'the relationship') into a 'system' w i t h t w o 'participants'. As the superordination of the state over the citizens establishes 'equality' a m o n g t h e m , so the construction of a discursive object such as the 'relationship' or ' d o m i n a t i o n ' establishes an abstract meta-level superordinated to the process or relation in question, representing the 'participants' as 'equals' in their subordination to it. T h u s it is n o l o n g e r the subjugator w h o subjugates, or m e n w h o subjugate w o m e n , there is 'subjugation' and 'submission'. This may t h e n as easily be represented linguistically as the action of the one or the o t h e r 'participant': h e subjugates her, or she submits. A l t h o u g h the sudden multiplying of possibilities may make o n e lose one's orientation in the w h o l e ladder of levels, so that the w o m a n submits (assuming she does) n o longer even to the m a n or her subjugator, but to ' p o w e r ' or ' d o m i n a n c e ' . W h i l e an analysis w h i c h includes w o m e n ' s agency w o u l d indeed be desirable — as it w o u l d for instance allow us to distinguish b e t w e e n their resistance to p o w e r and d o m i n a t i o n o n the o n e hand and their entering into a p o w e r struggle, h o w e v e r u n e q u a l it may be, o n the o t h e r — this is n o t w h a t B e n j a m i n achieves simply by linguistically m a k i n g w o m e n into agents. R a t h e r , it seems that B e n j a m i n , t o o , ultimately feels the need to exonerate dominators collectively as well as individually b y t u r n i n g ' d o m i n a t i o n ' discursively into a thing, a given even if possibly changeable p h e n o m e n o n f r o m w h i c h b o t h dominators and the d o m i n a t e d in their respective ways have to suffer. As w h i t e moralists of the past tried to persuade white slave traders and o w n e r s that slavery ultimately was damaging to the w h i t e soul, and as some feminists today try to persuade m e n that oppressing w o m e n is ultimately dissatisfying f o r their o w n sexuality, so B e n j a m i n argues that the subjugator deprives himself of a w o r t h y other to recognize h i m . In fact she says that ' d o m i n a t i o n ' deprives h i m of this possibility of b e i n g recognized by t h e other, and that ' g e n d e r polarity' deprives m e n of w o r t h y others w h o s e r e c o g n i t i o n m i g h t m e a n s o m e t h i n g to t h e m . B u t the p o i n t is that h e r c o n c e r n is w i t h the p o w e r f u l and d o m i n a n t . H e n c e they must first of all be exonerated, so that w e may t h e n try to talk t h e m out of practising slavery, d o m i n a n c e a n d oppression, and talk t h e m out of it w i t h their interests in m i n d : it is ultimately better for t h e m t o o , ultimately they only have to gain — a p u r e soul, a m o r e satisfying sexuality, or a w o r t h y o t h e r w h o will recognize t h e m .
T h u s if violence or d o m i n a t i o n are to be given up at all, it is n o t because of any insight into w h a t they mean for those d o m i n a t e d and oppressed — any a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t of injustice or c o m m i t m e n t to justice. It is because it ultimately does n o t benefit the subjects of d o m i n a t i o n , because according to the criteria of the analysis it is n o t in their self-interest. F o r the analysis assumes that a p u r e soul is ultimately of greater benefit than is the exploitation of slaves, that a satisfying sexuality is a greater pleasure than the pleasure of p o w e r over a 'sex object', and that r e c o g n i t i o n f r o m a w o m a n is m o r e desirable t h a n subjugating her. T h u s it does n o t lead to any greater clarity if w e talk about p o w e r and d o m i n a n c e as if they w e r e p h e n o m e n a in w h i c h s o m e b o d y vaguely participates - if that participation is n o t analysed in terms of the p o w e r of agency and agents and in terms of actions and their consequences. If a change of perspective f r o m the agent to the victim - 'he dominates h e r ' — can equally yield a sentence 'she is d o m i n a t e d by h i m ' or 'she submits to h i m ' , w e have a linguistics in w h i c h ' h e steals h e r h a n d b a g ' is equivalent to 'she gives h i m her handbag.' W e are already familiar w i t h this logic f r o m a general public discourse in w h i c h the observation that ' m e n oppress w o m e n ' has led to the conclusion that ' w o m e n allow m e n to oppress t h e m . ' T h u s it n e i t h e r contributes to o u r understanding of sexual violence, even less shows any, to talk of the m a n and w o m a n 'involved' or even 'affected' b y it, 45 as it c a n n o t c o m e o u t of a serious concern about racism to speak of w h i t e p e o p l e (presumably as well as Black people) being ' c o n f r o n t e d ' b y it. B u t since t h e r e is n o shortage of publicly available insight, w e have to see such discursive strategies for w h a t they are, n a m e l y obscurantist m a n o e u v r e s in o u r o w n interest. O n c e again the discursive institution of a level of abstraction superordinated to the actual agents — the ' m o t h e r l y ' v i e w f r o m above — serves at the crucial m o m e n t to m a k e even the 'agentic s e l f ' into an object and p r o d u c t of systemic mechanisms. T h u s B e n j a m i n , too, leads her active agents into the hurricane of superior powers: the 'interplay b e t w e e n love and d o m i n a t i o n ' . 4 6 She explores ' h o w d o m i n a t i o n is a n c h o r e d in the hearts of the d o m i n ated', 4 7 and h o w d o m i n a t i o n c o m e s into being: ' d o m i n a t i o n and submission result f r o m a b r e a k d o w n of the necessary tension b e t w e e n self-assertion and m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n that allows self and o t h e r to m e e t as sovereign equals.' 4 8 N o b o d y dominates, n o b o d y subjugates,
above all n o b o d y makes any decision to d o so: d o m i n a t i o n 'results', and it results f r o m a b r e a k d o w n in the necessary tension b e t w e e n selfassertion and m u t u a l recognition. N o b o d y unbalances this balance of a tense mutuality, n o b o d y decides to be self-assertive and to d e n y recognition to the other. For n o b o d y exists o t h e r than in the s y m m e trical equal participation, the equality of b e i n g subordinated to tension and balance. ' M u t u a l regulation breaks d o w n ' , ' a t t u n e m e n t fails', ' t h e fine balance of m u t u a l recognition goes awry.' 4 9 N o b o d y makes possible an e n c o u n t e r b e t w e e n self and other as sovereign equals, say by m e e t i n g and recognizing the o t h e r as an equal; the necessary tension 'allows' self and other to m e e t . H e n c e B e n j a m i n ' s analysis, despite her embrace of theories w h i c h favour the active self, does n o t ultimately lead to an understanding, that is, an analysis of agency, of the will and decisions of persons. N o r does her attempt to break t h r o u g h the confines of a s u b j e c t - o b j e c t relationship, her sketch of a possible 'intersubjectivity', succeed in leading o u t of the 'vicious cycle' 5 0 of d o m i n a t i o n and the s u b j e c t object relationship. For her concepts o f ' m u t u a l i t y ' and 'being w i t h ' also k n o w n as 'togetherness' and 'sharing' - are based o n the f u n damental presupposition of the subject's self-interest and the resulting opposition and struggle of relationship. T h e possible space for an e n c o u n t e r b e t w e e n subjects consequently is the precariously balanced equilibrium b e t w e e n t w o opposed and c o m p e t i n g self-interests. A n d even if m u t u a l ' r e c o g n i t i o n ' is the central factor in her construction of 'intersubjectivity', the recognition I receive f r o m the other remains m y gain, while m y recognizing of the o t h e r is the price I have to pay f o r it. W e are o n familiar territory, the way to the O t h e r . T h e starting point for B e n j a m i n is Hegel's c o n c e p t i o n of the self: ' I n order to exist f o r oneself, o n e has to exist f o r another. It w o u l d seem there is n o way o u t of this d e p e n d e n c y . ' 5 1 W h i l e it is obvious w h y this m i g h t be so in the case of an infant, it is not quite so obvious w h y it should also be true of adults - w h y in particular, it should b e c o m e the chief p r o b l e m of existence to exist 'for o n e s e l f ' . All the m o r e so since w i t h ego and super-ego, unconscious and consciousness and c o n sciousness about consciousness, the self seems to have b e e n attributed e n o u g h instances so that o n e of t h e m could take o n the useful f u n c t i o n of reassuring the self of its existence. M y point, h o w e v e r , is not t o argue for the self's self-sufficiency so as to liberate it f r o m its ' d e p e n d ency' as a social being; m y p o i n t is, rather, that the c o n c e p t i o n of a self
w h i c h needs to exist 'for itself', and w h i c h experiences its sociality as a d e p e n d e n c y o n others, is already based o n the c o n c e p t i o n of the subject and the subject—object relationship. Admittedly, B e n j a m i n as ever is c o n c e r n e d about the i n d e p e n d e n c e of the 'active s e l f ' in relationship, a self w h i c h in her view even as an infant neither needs first to extract itself f r o m a postulated total symbiosis of b e i n g one (with the m o t h e r ) so as to enter into individuated isolation, n o r first to c o m e o u t of the c o c o o n of an original total internal subjectivity in order to enter gradually into relationship. 5 2 Y e t w e are less t h a n c o n v i n c e d w h e n she c o m m e n t s as follows o n W i n n i c o t t ' s considerations of h o w the active self establishes its objects in the object w o r l d : Winnicott presents the idea that in order to be able to 'use' the object we first have to 'destroy' it. He distinguishes between two dimensions of experience: relating to the object and using the object. (These terms can be troublesome, for Winnicott uses them quite in the opposite sense that we might in ordinary speech: 'using' here does not mean instrumentalizing or demeaning, but being able to creatively benefit from another person . . . 'Relating' refers to the experience of the 'subject as an isolate', in which the object is merely a 'phenomenon of the subject'.) 53 T h e terms may i n d e e d b e t r o u b l e s o m e if w e wish t h e m to m e a n the opposite of w h a t they usually m e a n , b u t they are quite u n t r o u b l e s o m e in revealing w h a t is at issue, namely the subject's exploitation of the object. W h i l e 'using' i n d e e d does not as such m e a n ' d e m e a n i n g ' , it does m e a n 'instrumentalizing', since it is b y n o means the case that w e instrumentalize only w h a t w e have already mentally d e m e a n e d : usually w e instrumentalize precisely w h a t w e recognize as b e i n g of value and use. T h u s the subject, far f r o m ' d e m e a n i n g ' the object, precisely perceives it in its richness, f r o m w h i c h it wants to 'creatively profit'. R a t h e r , it is d e m e a n i n g for a person to be t u r n e d into an object and, creatively or otherwise, to be used. A n d if the vital shift f r o m 'relating' to 'using' in this transition of the infant's learning means to separate 'the object' out of its internal fantasy relation to itself and to c o m p r e h e n d it as existing in reality, 5 4 this nevertheless does m e a n , in W i n n i c o t t ' s representation, to regard ' t h e o b j e c t ' as an object in the object w o r l d , all the better to be able
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to use it: ' [ T h e subject] can only "use" the object w h e n he perceives it "as an external p h e n o m e n o n , not as a projective entity".' 5 5 A n d let us n o t forget that these 'objects' principally are people. B e n j a m i n f u r t h e r explains: ' W i n n i c o t t is saying that the object must be destroyed inside in order that w e k n o w it to have survived outside; thus w e can recognize it as n o t subject to o u r mental control.' 5 6 M a n y i n d e e d seem to manage this step in early infancy, recognizing that it takes m o r e t h a n mental control, namely active violence in 'external' reality, to keep the 'object' u n d e r control. H e n c e B e n j a m i n , too, recognizes that any 'mutuality' and 'sharing' of equal subjects can b e achieved only t h r o u g h a balanced struggle for p o w e r , a struggle in w h i c h neither achieves victory, and w h i c h hovers, so to speak, in a draw: ' T h e paradox of recognition, the n e e d for a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t that turns us back to d e p e n d e n c e o n the' other, brings about a struggle for control.' 5 7 T h e e n c o u n t e r is a m e e t i n g of adversaries, a match b e t w e e n t w o approximately 'equal' contestants: ' T o transcend the experience of duality [of subject and object], so that b o t h partners are equal, requires a n o t i o n of mutuality and sharing. In the intersubjective interaction, b o t h partners are active; it is not a reversible u n i o n of opposites (a doer and a d o n e - t o ) . ' 5 8 It almost looks as if B e n j a m i n here is arguing against her o w n (earlier?) understanding of w o m e n as non-subjects and passive recipients of w h a t others do to t h e m , trying to convince herself of w o m e n ' s subjectivity. Yet, while a struggle is indeed an e n c o u n t e r in w h i c h b o t h partners are active, that is, b o t h are 'doers', this does n o t m e a n that therefore the doing of the o n e is n o longer d o i n g anything to the other. R a t h e r , it seems that here the consequences of any d o i n g (the d o n e - t o ) disappear f r o m view, are neutralized and made to disappear in the 'mutuality' of doing. The identification with the other person occurs through the sharing of similar states, rather than through reversal. 'Being with' breaks down the opposition between powerful and helpless, active and passive; i t counteracts the tendency to objectify and deny recognition to those weaker or different - to the other. It forms the basis of compassion, what Milan Kundera calls 'co-feeling', the ability to share feelings and intentions without demanding control, to experience sameness without obliterating difference. 59 W e may ask f r o m whose perspective shared states are j u d g e d to be shared and similar, and w h e t h e r the experience of a state can be shared
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at all; w h e t h e r to draw the fallacious inference that states are 'shared' is n o t precisely to obliterate difference, namely the difference that the o t h e r is i n d e e d a n o t h e r and not the 'same' as m e . N o r is it the case that w e objectify only w h a t is 'weaker' and 'different', for objectification says n o t h i n g about the positive or negative quality of the 'object'. It is n o less an objectification if w e value a person highly, that is, as similar to or even the same as ourselves. N o r does it m e a n to d e n y 'recognition' if I j u d g e the other to be weak and different: rather it is m y 'recognition' of the other as weak and different. As w e have seen already elsewhere, the obligatory coupling into 'sharing' and ' b e i n g w i t h ' only serves to obfuscate the real relations so as to p r e v e n t an analysis of the actions of the individual partners. 'Sharing' and 'togetherness' n o t only linguistically o v e r c o m e the o p positions ' b e t w e e n p o w e r f u l and helpless, active and passive', they force the experiences of t w o p e o p l e to be subsumed u n d e r a 'shared' experience, their variedness as people to be subsumed u n d e r the sameness of shared states. And even if h e r e it is the eye of the t h e o r y and the theoretical discourse w h i c h construct this 'sharing' f r o m ' a b o v e ' , it is n o less a p r o b l e m w h e n it is the o n e or the other partner or b o t h w h o construct(s) it. In that case, it is n o t only a m a t t e r of the violence of a discourse of p o w e r , b u t of the violence of one partner towards the other. H e n c e it is neither a surprise that this fictitious 'sharing' produces n o m o r e than the old and n o t o r i o u s one-sided efforts of the subject, 'compassion' and 'co-feeling' — g o o d deeds towards the other: As the c o n c e p t i o n of self and the o t h e r produces a 'humaneness' w h e r e ' h u m a n s ' are e v e r y b o d y apart f r o m myself, so compassion is the classic p h e n o m e n o n of b e n e v o l e n c e and charity. N o t only are these forms of patronization and condescension - and an insult to the reality of the suffering (or 'passion') of a n o t h e r person - it is also a m a j o r selfd e c e p t i o n if w e believe that w e really can co-feel the experience of others, and that this w o u l d in any way be helping t h e m . A virtue in the eyes of the compassionate and detested by those w h o b e c o m e its target, compassion satisfies the moral needs of the compassionate co-feelers rather than the needs of those ' w i t h ' w h o m they are feeling. Instead, it w o u l d suffice to understand the other's suffering; there is n o necessity to 'feel' it. For understanding the suffering of others, w h a t has caused it and w h a t the consequences are for t h e m , w o u l d enable m e to s u p p o r t t h e m in their struggle to deal w i t h the
consequences and to liberate themselves f r o m their cause. If o n the o t h e r hand I am suffering and feeling ' w i t h ' t h e m , I usually suffer so m u c h myself in the process that n o energy remains for any f u r t h e r support. In particular, h o w e v e r , it is a f o r m of violence and an exploitation of the other's suffering and experience to reclaim it metaphorically as m y o w n . T h u s it borders o n cynicism, for instance, w h e n W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n w o m e n claim that the rapes of w o m e n i n f o r m e r Yugoslavia 'are rapes of ourselves', 6 0 that they constitute 'an international crisis for W o m e n - n o t only M u s l i m w o m e n victims . . . but all women'.61 [ . H o w e v e r , this linguistically e n f o r c e d 'sharing' of experience a n d this rhetorical assertion of co-feeling are n o t the only forms of violence in B e n j a m i n ' s scenario o f ' m u t u a l i t y ' . For a struggle b e t w e e n t w o o p p o n e n t s b y definition is violence and c o u n t e r - v i o l e n c e . T h e 'struggle for r e c o g n i t i o n ' 6 2 is n o t so m u c h a struggle for this discursive object ' r e c o g n i t i o n ' , b u t a struggle to be recognized by the other; the struggle for love a struggle to b e loved, the struggle of relationship a struggle to get the o t h e r to relate to m e . T h a t is to say, it is a struggle to d e t e r m i n e another's actions towards m e - n o t to leave it to the o t h e r to decide h o w to act. In this struggle I am. using all available means of coercion, manipulation and blackmail: 'I was d e t e r m i n e d t o m a k e h i m love m e back', 6 3 'I made h i m tell m e that h e loved m e , and I m a d e h i m give m e a h u g . . . It n e v e r w o u l d have h a p p e n e d if I h a d n ' t forced h i m . ' T o attempt to involve the o t h e r in a 'system of m u t u a l d e p e n d e n c y ' means to instrumentalize the other's self-interest in m y o w n , to use the other's desire f o r m y r e c o g n i t i o n to fulfil m y o w n desire for their recognition. It presupposes the self-interest of the o t h e r and imputes to the o t h e r the same political will to 'creatively profit' f r o m others. This explains w h y even in its most explicitly negative f o r m of a quarrel and a fight the struggle fulfils its main purpose, namely t o direct the other's actions towards myself. It explains w h y the subject perceives even in violence against itself a f o r m of r e c o g n i t i o n , albeit a negative one; the other's r e c o g n i t i o n of the self as the other's o p p o n ent in struggle, and t h e r e b y the r e c o g n i t i o n of a relationship. A n d so w e arrive at the most astounding revelation, namely that even an e n e m y is an adequate o p p o n e n t , even an adversary a suitable a n t a g o n ist, that even hostility and e n m i t y enable a struggle, that is, the competitive partnership w e call relationship. W h e t h e r the other's
i^go-pyyuiuwgy, or my relationship ana 1 r e c o g n i t i o n of m e is 'negative' or 'positive', it is a r e c o g n i t i o n of m e as the other's opposite in a (still) c o n t i n u i n g and above all 'shared' struggle. H e n c e w e also begin to understand w h y for the subject, the other's decision n o t to enter the struggle and to refuse c o u n t e r - v i o l e n c e constitutes the greatest catastrophe of all, and is u n d e r s t o o d as the most deeply h u r t f u l 'attack'. For the other's refusal to recognize the subject as an o p p o n e n t means the rejection of relationship as struggle. A n d since the subject perceives a relationship by definition as an antagonism, its o w n enterprise of establishing 'togetherness', it cannot recognize the o t h e r ' s refusal to fight as an action in the c o n t i n u o u s process of interaction b e t w e e n t w o people, understanding it instead as the ' e n d of the relationship'. In fact, a relation b e t w e e n t w o people can n e i t h e r be e n d e d n o r dissolved, b u t merely changed; yet the subj e c t only k n o w s 'its relationship', and h e n c e puts its o w n ' e n d ' to i
Ego-philosophy,
or the battle with
reality
W e often hear it said — as for instance in the context of racism in G e r m a n y — that 'the opposite of love is n o t hatred, b u t indifference. F r o m the point of v i e w of the subject, indifference may indeed be worse than hatred, for w i t h a c o n c e p t i o n of relationship based o n opposition and a struggle for m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n , 'indifference' signifies the refusal of any 'relationship' at all. B u t to rate hatred ' o b j e c t ively' — f r o m a standpoint apparently above and b e y o n d those involved — as at least a relation and t h e r e f o r e as s o m e h o w preferable to indifference, is most cynically to underestimate what hatred and e n m i t y m e a n for those w h o b e c o m e their objects. It w o u l d be cynical b e y o n d measure to see in the Holocaust a sign that G e r m a n Nazis at least w e r e n o t 'indifferent' to the Jews, or in the Serbian onslaught on Bosnian Muslims a special, albeit negative, interest in the latter. W h i l e w e mostly refrain f r o m such crass statements in these cases, it is b y n o means unusual to view m e n ' s hatred of w o m e n in this m a n n e r , to consider their brutality and sexual violence as a sign that at least they are n o t indifferent to w o m e n — a helpless and perverted expression of their interest, to b e sure, b u t a f o r m of interest n o n e the less. This is generally the case w i t h p s y c h o analytic approaches — w h e t h e r political, philosophical or historical — w h i c h in exploring ' w h y ' the subjects of violence may have b e e n violent, seek the answer in some qualities of those w h o have b e c o m e the objects of violence — qualities w h i c h are t h e n said to 'have roused' the subject's negative interest, w h e t h e r envy, fear or anger. Like rating indifference as 'worse' than hatred, it betrays a p r e o c c u p a t i o n exclusively with the feelings of the subject, including the subject of violence and hatred.
Such a v i e w of hatred, m o r e o v e r , seems to correspond to a c o m monsense u n d e r s t a n d i n g of 'the relationship', w h e r e the crucial distinction seems i n d e e d t o be b e t w e e n 'a relationship' and ' i n d i f f e r e n c e ' — a relationship w h i c h means struggle and antagonism, and an indifference w h i c h means ' n o relationship'. W h a t kind of a relationship it is, w h e t h e r of hatred or o f l o v e , is therefore of s e c o n d ary significance: love and hatred are n o longer opposites, they b o t h are passions of the subject and thus the opposite of indifference. H e n c e p o p u l a r w i s d o m assures us that a g o o d fight or quarrel is a natural part of any love relationship. Conversely love, as w e have seen, is a f o r m of struggle, a fight w i t h the other: a struggle for love, a battle for r e c o g n i t i o n , a c o m p e t i t i o n of p o w e r that means violence. 'By means of physical contact I want to b r e a k the wall of glass w h i c h o f t e n stands b e t w e e n m e and these w o m e n ' ; 'I as the o n e i n t r u d i n g f r o m outside must make the effort to take d o w n barriers . . . and the fear of c o n tact.' As Jessica B e n j a m i n writes: ' T h e underlying t h e m e of sadism is the attempt to break t h r o u g h to the o t h e r . ' 2 O r conversely, this a t t e m p t to break t h r o u g h to the other, in the n a m e o f ' l o v e ' to intrude and to penetrate, to break d o w n the wall of glass b e t w e e n m e and the o t h e r , is the sadism of violence. T h e discovery that a struggle m o t i vated by hatred is a struggle t o o , that a quarrel is a fight too, and e n m i t y a viable f o r m of antagonism and violence t o o , is not really w h a t w e should marvel at the most regarding such a v i e w of relationship and love. In his b o o k La Sagesse de I'amour ( T h e W i s d o m of Love) the F r e n c h critic and p h i l o s o p h e r Alain Finkielkraut is c o n c e r n e d about a c o n c e p t i o n o f l o v e w h i c h is n e i t h e r unrealistically idealist, n o r simply the k i n d of ubiquitous egoism w h i c h passes for love in o u r culture. T h e realism of m o d e r n i t y , so h e argues, has m e a n t such an absolute division b e t w e e n the ideal and the real - w h a t o u g h t to be and w h a t is — that it has also split the n o t i o n o f l o v e right t h r o u g h the middle: ' I n n u m e r o u s languages there exists a w o r d w h i c h at the same time designates the act of giving and the act of taking, charity and greed, b e n e f i c e n c e and avid desire: the w o r d " l o v e " . ' 3 E x t r e m e self-love and u n c o n d i t i o n a l self-sacrifice or c o n c e r n for others 'paradoxically c o n verge in this same w o r d ' . 4 B u t since realism - or perhaps w e should say, empiricism — has long w o n the day, disinterestedness is b u t a n o r m a t i v e ideal in w h o s e feasibility n o o n e still seriously believes. Love of others belongs to the sphere of Utopian idealism — h o w h u m a n
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beings will b e once their history of oppression has b e e n overcome. T h e h u m a n being as it really exists is the h u m a n being w h o does not give. 5 Since the beginning of modernity, all genealogies of morality have derived the generosity of love from greed, and noble deeds from, the desire for acquisition: there is no self-sacrifice which does not eventually pay off for the self. . . no generosity which does not underhand and symbolically gratify the self, no sacrificial offering, in short, which does not betray the imperialist desire to affect the-Other and own him . . . Astuteness to us means uncovering beneath the apparent sacrifice the ubiquity of egocentrism/' Finkielkraut doubts, h o w e v e r , w h e t h e r this neat division of labour b e t w e e n idealism and realism, in particular the relegation of any love of y o u r neighbours to the realm of p u r e idealism, helps us to u n d e r stand the real any better. R a t h e r , h e suspects that to understand the original relationship to others and h e n c e the relationship of love as well as of hatred, w e m i g h t n o t only require some old-fashioned concepts b u t in particular a c o n c e p t i o n of an ' i n v o l v e m e n t ' w h i c h differs f r o m possession. 7 For such a c o n c e p t i o n h e turns to the w o r k of the F r e n c h p h i l o sopher E m m a n u e l Levinas, w h o m a d e the relationship to the O t h e r one of his principal concerns. As Finkielkraut explains, Levinas, like Hegel and other m o d e r n philosophers, anchors his c o n c e p t i o n of the relationship to the O t h e r in existence: ' H u m a n existence is defined t h r o u g h t w o crucial implications: the e n c o u n t e r w i t h the O t h e r and the relationship to Being.' 8 Like so m a n y o t h e r W e s t e r n philosophers he derives the f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m of (adult) existence f r o m the experience of the infant: 'the fear e x p e r i e n c e d by the child w h e n he is alone in the dark.' 9 This leads to a definition of existence w h i c h , while it has n o t h i n g to d o w i t h the attitude of children to existence, betrays all the m o r e clearly the origins of W e s t e r n philosophy in the p o w e r and privilege of the philosophical subject — w h i t e supremacy, male supremacy, class privilege and educational privilege. For besides the infant, Ivan G o n c h a r o v ' s legendary literary antih e r o O b l o m o v , w h o s e wealth, and leisure as a l a n d o w n e r lead h i m to despair of w a k i n g existence and a nearly insurmountable desire to sleep, also serves to illustrate the difficulty of the experience of existence. Yet this is explicitly declared n o t to be a p r o b l e m of class
xjgv-priuohopriy, or me oatue witn reality and leisure, but an 'ontological', that is, a universal and existential p r o b l e m . 1 0 As Finkielkraut explicates, 'Existing, says Levinas . . . is a b u r d e n rather than a mercy. It means being chained to oneself, the fact that the self is constantly o v e r b u r d e n e d w i t h itself, is implicated in itself. Existence imposes itself w i t h the full w e i g h t of a non-dissolvable contract. O n e is n o t simply, o n e is oneself.'11 This is the 'fundamental tragedy' of Being: 'Tired or listless one recoils f r o m existence, one drags one's feet, w o u l d sometimes like to shout "stop", but breaking out is impossible: man is wedged into Being.' 1 2 W h a t counts as the p r o f o u n d e s t philosophical exploration of the ' h u m a n c o n d i t i o n ' in fact is the reflection of m e m b e r s of the ruling class w h o are b e g i n n i n g to be b o t h e r e d by the conditions of their existence as rulers. For the struggle for p o w e r and d o m i n a t i o n e n g e n ders a self w h i c h ends u p in the splendid isolation of the subject, a subject s u r r o u n d e d only by objects. In this loneliness the e m p o w e r e d subject reflects u p o n its 'existence', representing it, by means of the n o w familiar reformulations, a n e w and completely f r o m scratch: h a v ing put others in chains in the process of e m p o w e r i n g itself, the subject sees itself as ' c h a i n e d to itself', victim of an 'existence' that 'imposes' itself w i t h the stone w e i g h t of an indissoluble contract. ' O n e is chained to oneself, trapped like a bird in the lime of existence.' 1 3 A subject w h o w i t h its o w n ruling p o w e r i n d e e d threatens the lives of o t h e r people, trapping t h e m in e c o n o m i c and political d e p e n d e n c e , experiences its o w n existence n o t only as a b u r d e n , b u t as a trap. 'Existence, says Sartre very similarly to Levinas, means massive walls, f r o m w h i c h m a n cannot escape.' 1 4 Just as the objectifying subject c a n n o t escape f r o m its 'prison of images', so the ruling subject cannot escape f r o m its 'existence': it is ' w e d g e d ' into Being, caught in the trap o f existence — in m e t a p h o r s of violence w h i c h reflect, albeit w i t h inverted signs, the very violence the subject exercised in the process of its s e l f - e m p o w e r m e n t . T h e subject, m a k i n g the w o r l d it lives in into an object w o r l d , in t h e course of its objectification and the m i r r o r stage of its self-splitting also makes itself into an object: the privileged object of its subjective reflection. T h u s it happens that, c o m p a r i n g its state as object w i t h that of other objects, it arrives at the most absurd question of t h e m all, namely w h e t h e r it w o u l d like in fact to b e 'itself' or perhaps rather s o m e t h i n g different. Just as the subject thinks it has a choice whether to enter into relation to others (the objects) at all, it calls its relationship
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to itself into question: does it even wish to b e chained to 'itself'? A n d in d o i n g so discovers a b o u n d a r y to its f r e e d o m , a f r e e d o m w h i c h in its position of p o w e r it believed to be unlimited: the relationship to itself/oneself is an 'indissoluble contract'. A subject w h o s e relations are characterized precisely by the fact that the subject can call t h e m off at any m o m e n t of its choice — w h o s e cancellability is the very p o i n t of a c o n c e p t i o n of self as subject - n o w sees its project of p o w e r and d o m i n a t i o n reach a 'natural' limit, at least o n the level of its o w n discourse: the split ego cannot think itself as p u r e and absolute subject, w i t h o u t its object c o m p l e m e n t . In the face of such 'superior p o w e r ' , the p o w e r of (its) logic and the grammar of being, the p o w e r f u l subject makes itself into the victim of that ' p o w e r ' : the victim of a discursively thingified 'existence', an abstracted and a u t o n o m o u s 'Being'. H e n c e the elites of the ruling classes of the w o r l d - the elites of w h i t e , W e s t e r n , educated m e n - c o n c e r n themselves not w i t h the b u r n i n g problems of the world — say the p r o b l e m of d o m i n a t i o n a n d the massive subjection created by it, the exploitation of the majority of h u m a n i t y and their c o n s e q u e n t p o v e r t y and destruction, or the destruction and exploitation of their place of residence, the planet they c o n c e r n themselves w i t h themselves and their problem of n o t really having any problems. T h u s they create the most i m p o r t a n t and f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m — most i m p o r t a n t in as m u c h as it concerns themselves — by philosophically pathologizing their o w n existence as rulers in near-total supremacy. W h a t for o t h e r people are the real consequences of the actions of the d o m i n a n t and the ruling — captivity, chains, servitude, the b u r d e n of an existence f r o m w h i c h there is n o escaping, to w h i c h there is n o shouting 'stop', a social contract of p o w e r and d o m i n a t i o n w h i c h o n the part of the d o m i n a t e d and oppressed c a n n o t be called off or terminated — is t u r n e d , by means of rhetorical reformulation and m e t a p h o r i c appropriation, into the grandiose p r o b l e m of existence in f r e e d o m : ' M o r e p r o f o u n d and perhaps m o r e crucial than the wish to b e oneself, to find oneself, to purify oneself f r o m foreign dross, is the d r e a m of b e i n g released f r o m one's self. . .' I 5 Such a dream, rather than b e i n g the p r o f o u n d e s t d r e a m of universal ' h u m a n i t y ' , is the d r e a m of a subject living in the leisure and b o r e d o m of o v e r a b u n d a n c e and superfluity, a subject w h i c h has depopulated the w o r l d a r o u n d it, thus r o b b i n g its existence of any m e a n i n g and
purpose b e y o n d p o w e r . H e n c e there may i n d e e d be 'ennui of b e i n g o n e s e l f ' , 1 6 a n d satiety always to find b u t oneself. U n d e r different conditions of being, the d r e a m of liberating oneself f r o m foreign dross and foreign chains may indeed be m o r e p r o f o u n d and above all m o r e urgent. As the colleagues f r o m psychology have recourse to 'original' needs and experiences of children in order to justify the claims to p o w e r of adults and to legitimate t h e m as 'natural', so it is part of the stock repertory of W e s t e r n p h i l o s o p h y to have recourse b o t h to the childh o o d of the subject and to a ' c h i l d h o o d ' of h u m a n i t y in order to legitimate the boundless, transgressive and exploitative aspirations of the adult philosophical subject as 'existential', 'universal' and ' o n t o logical': When the child cannot find sleep, when all the lights are extinguished and he begins to listen to the impalpable murmur of the night, what he hears and feais is existence in its purity without the existing, the anonymous form of Being . . . there is nothing but Being as such, the inevitable murmer of there is. There is always, even if there is no particular thing - and this' is precisely what the child grasps. Terror rises in him, because he feels as if sucked up into this amorphous existence . . ,' 7 For ' t h e child' is a little existential philosopher, w h o even in the b e d of his infancy is afraid of thingified abstractions, of the a n o n y m o u s shape of shapeless B e i n g or the vacant 'event of Being' — in short, w h o has a ' H e i d e g g e r i a n experience'. 1 8 A b o v e all, h e is a child w h o m his child's life has had n o social experiences at all w h i c h m i g h t give him reason to be terrified of the dark - not of the 'shapes of monsters' and o t h e r 'fantastic images', 1 9 but of the experience of powerlessness and violation, or in o t h e r w o r d s the actions and the b e h a v i o u r of p o w e r f u l adults. T h u s d e n u d e d of the social c o n d i t i o n of his very b e i n g as a child, he m a y t h e n serve as the tabula rasa of a h u m a n b e i n g in a state o f ' n a t u r e ' , the philosophical subject in post-natal e m b r y o . Fear and terror, t h e n , for Levinas are the mark of the subject's e n c o u n t e r w i t h the superior p o w e r of 'existence'. W h a t in Finkielkraut's v i e w distinguishes Levinas f r o m other great W e s t e r n p h i l o sophers such as Hegel, H e i d e g g e r and Sartre, is that his analysis of social relations, of the e n c o u n t e r w i t h the O t h e r , is a matter n e i t h e r
of fear and terror, n o r ' p r e d o m i n a n t l y of struggle'. 2 0 W h i l e for H e g e l the relationship b e t w e e n t w o subjects is d e t e r m i n e d by the dialectic of Master and Slave, the war b e t w e e n consciousnesses, 2 1 for Sartre the m e r e 'fact of the O t h e r ' , that is, the m e r e existence of a n o t h e r , constitutes a challenge to the subject w h i c h Sartre calls 'violence'. 2 2 For the sheer recognition or consciousness that a n o t h e r exists suffices to catapult the subject out of the paradise of his singular existence — a p e r c e p t i o n of the other w h i c h according to Finkielkraut does n o t yet constitute a 'relation': ' N o relation links m e to this stranger.' 2 3 \ ^ T h e Sartrean subject's ability to reflect leads it to the alarming insight that this ' o b j e c t ' , the O t h e r , is himself a subject w h o in t u r n may r e d u c e ' m e ' to the object of his sight: 'I am b e i n g seen, this is e n o u g h to transport m e into a different world.' 2 4 T o be precise, into the O t h e r ' s object w o r l d . L o o k i n g , eyeing me, observing and appraising m e , the O t h e r is m a k i n g m e into his O t h e r , fixing m e in a m o d e of being, a ' n a t u r e ' , w h i c h I cannot reject, imposing on m e , as w e might say, an identity w h i c h is not of m y making: 'the O t h e r is for m e at o n c e he w h o stole m y b e i n g and he w h o effects that there is a b e i n g w h i c h is m y being.' 2 5 W h i l e for H e g e l the p r o b l e m was that in order to exist, I n e e d a n o t h e r for w h o m I exist, the m o d e r n existential subject has p r o gressed so far as n o t to k n o w any m o r e if it e v e n wants to exist, if it wants to have a 'being', d r e a m i n g indeed of detaching itself f r o m its self and its 'being'. . H e n c e the e n c o u n t e r w i t h the O t h e r n o longer means, as it did for Hegel's subject, the t r o u b l e s o m e yet necessary (and thus nevertheless w a n t e d and 'needed') c o n d i t i o n for existence: it b e c o m e s the violent aggression of an u n w a n t e d c o n f i r m a t i o n of one's existence and 'being'. This 'being', d e t e r m i n e d not b y the self but by the O t h e r , at the same time means the destruction of the subject's o w n (object) w o r l d , in w h i c h it was the sole and supreme ruling subject^] Sartre here is exploring the experience of b e i n g m a d e into an object b y another, facing the outrageous possibility that this m i g h t not just h a p p e n to the O t h e r b u t to the subject itself. A n d as Finkielkraut c o m m e n t s , Sartre thereafter describes 'all forms of desire - f r o m sadistic violence to the tenderness of sentimental love - as so m a n y ruses or w a r stratagems deployed by the subject in order to free itself f r o m such seizure'. 2 6 T h e most effective o n e is obviously for the subject to m a k e the O t h e r into an object instead, to enter into c o m b a t w i t h the O t h e r over w h o wins out as subject and w h o is vanquished
into b e i n g the object: 'Caressing the O t h e r , I make his flesh c o m e into b e i n g u n d e r m y caressing fingers. T h e caress is the s u m total of the ceremonies w h i c h incarnate the other.' 2 7 As Finkielkraut explicates: ' A n ambush for the o t h e r , so that, r e n o u n c i n g his o w n gaze and his o w n f r e e d o m , he m a y m a k e himself an offered presence. A n invitation to passivity, an attempt to stuff the desired b e i n g into its flesh so that it may n o t escape again, and I m a y cease to live u n d e r its gaze.' 2 8 It is an attempt, in o t h e r words, to l o c k the other into the status of object — the part f r o m w h i c h the subject in its o w n case wishes to u n c h a i n itself — and to d e n y the o t h e r the status of subject, the role the subject aspires to in its purity. Sight — the gaze, l o o k i n g — for Sartre (as for so m a n y others) is the d e t e r m i n i n g structure of the e n c o u n t e r w i t h the O t h e r , w h a t necessarily imposes the subject—object relation and the c o n s e q u e n t battle b e t w e e n subjects for t h e d o m i n a n t role of subject. Consciousness, in the sphere of the social (that is, w h e r e the subject does n o t simply reflect about itself) is thus identical with, is r e d u c e d to seeing: 'At the base of self-consciousness, there is n o t reflection, b u t the relation to the O t h e r . H u m a n reality is social b e f o r e it is reasonable. Social and belligerent.' 2 9 B e i n g social thus means (besides war) b e i n g r e d u c e d to the optics of o u r privileged sense organ, the lens, and its s u b j e c t object perspective. T h e sphere of the social, b e g i n n i n g w i t h the singular O t h e r — w h o at the caressing hands of the Sartrean subject is rapidly, and despite Finkielkraut's c o n t i n u i n g male p r o n o u n , t u r n ing into the prototypical other, 'the f e m i n i n e ' — never so m u c h as enters (the subject's) reason or reflection: it is banished to the subconscious, the pre-reasonable of a subject for w h o m reflection means self-reflection. Far from, b e i n g 'prior' to consciousness, h o w e v e r — m o r e 'basic', m o r e i m m e d i a t e or 'instinctual' than the subject's m a t u r e selfreflection — the social is, as the philosophers' o w n deliberations make abundantly clear, nevertheless secondary to the subject's selfc o n c e p t i o n : it is the subject's k n o w l e d g e of its o w n structure (conceived in self-reflection), its o w n division of itself into subjectivity and an o b j e c t - c o m p l e m e n t of w h o s e desirability it is less than c o n v i n c e d , w h i c h moves, say, the Sartrean subject to perceive a like structure (and attitude to it) in the O t h e r . It is the subject's p r o j e c t i o n of its o w n self-reflection into the O t h e r w h i c h makes the O t h e r such a fearful threat: a Subject w h o , like the subject itself, will attempt to constitute
itself as p u r e subjectivity, devolving the role of object o n to the subject. It is a division of self, a splitting of the ego, w h i c h we may see as lying at the r o o t of the W e s t e r n subject's divisions into all its dualisms: the dualism of m i n d and b o d y - the b o d y the visual part of itself constituted as object, the object in the O t h e r ' s sight and in its o w n as well as of all its c o n s e q u e n t divisions of labour w h i c h constitute the attempt to devolve the status of object o n to the manifold definitions o f ' o t h e r s ' : the 'others' are bodies w h i c h can b e c o m e p r o p e r t y , bodies w h i c h p r o d u c e labour, bodies w h i c h r e p r o d u c e . H e n c e the social is r e d u c e d to and identical w i t h the optics of the visual n o t because it precedes reflection, b u t because the subject's reflection has c o n v i n c e d it of the advantages of admitting n o reflection b e y o n d the optics of its self-reflection. Levinas's c o n c e p t i o n of the relation to the O t h e r is said to stand in stark contrast to this belligerent tradition: 'it neither sets up a conflict, n o r o n the other h a n d an idyll. For in describing the e n c o u n t e r with the O t h e r , Levinas contests b o t h the m o d e l of r o m a n c e and that of a combat, rejecting b o t h the silliness of an u n t r o u b l e d reciprocity and the merciless battle for recognition.' 3 0 T h e O t h e r is n o t , or n o t in the first instance, that 'hostile p o w e r w h i c h threatens, w h i c h aggresses and enthrals the self'. 3 1 R a t h e r , it provides the w e l c o m e chance for the subject to ' c o m e out of itself' and to have its b o r e d o m and ennui, the b u r d e n of its exclusive p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h itself, dispelled. 3 2 'Before b e c o m i n g a gaze, the O t h e r is a face.' 3 3 T h a t is, before the O t h e r assumes his t h r e a t e n i n g role as a seeing subject w h o objectifies m e , he is (to me) a 'face' - a kind of incarnation of the O t h e r ' s p e r s o n h o o d . For in Levinas's t e r m i n o l o g y the face is very m u c h m o r e than ' w h a t my gaze m i g h t obtain f r o m it'. 3 4 T h a t is to say, Levinas is c o n c e r n e d first of all to relativize the subject's o w n perception, to d r a w a distinction b e t w e e n its habit o f ' i m a g i n g ' the objects of its sight and t h i n k i n g it has seen what there is, and w h a t he means by facing the face: w h a t I see w h e n I look, w h a t I m a k e myself a picture of, is b u t the 'aspect' of the face, w h i c h the 'face' always exceeds - the face 'is the o n e prey the i m a g e - h u n t e r may never catch'. 3 5 For, in Levinas's o w n words, the manner in which the Other presents himself, exceeding the idea I have of the Other, we call the face. This manner does not consist of
figuring as a theme under my look, of displaying itself like an ensemble of qualities that form an image. The face of the Other at every moment destroys and exceeds the plastic image which he leaves me, this idea of my measure . . . that inadequate idea.36 P u t differently, for Levinas's subject the O t h e r , or m o r e precisely, the face of the O t h e r , constitutes the a d m o n i t i o n that there is a reality e x c e e d i n g the object w o r l d of the subject's perception. As Finkielkraut c o m m e n t s , 'there is in the O t h e r a constant surplus or a deviation in relation to w h a t I k n o w of him.' 3 7 W h i l e w e m i g h t have taken this to be the p o i n t of departure rather than the p r o f o u n d discovery at the e n d of philosophizing — the basic assumption underlying o u r relation to reality - w e must r e m e m b e r that w e are dealing w i t h the advanced d e v e l o p m e n t of the philosophical subject of p o w e r . A subj e c t to w h o m this fact of a 'surplus' in the real, its 'deviation' f r o m the subject's o w n image of it, appears as inordinate: 'This inordinacy, this constant excess of the b e i n g focused u p o n over and above the i n t e n tion [mine] w h i c h focuses o n it, is called the face.' 3 8 W h i l e the Sartrean subject considers this inordinacy of the real, of the O t h e r ' s reality, to be' a veritable aggression towards the subject, Levinas's subject, by contrast, considers it an e n t e r t a i n m e n t , a kind of sport h e l p i n g to dispel its tiredness: ' " T o e n c o u n t e r a man means b e i n g k e p t awake by an e n i g m a . " ' 3 9 Finkielkraut's assertion, h o w e v e r , that this sportive e n g a g e m e n t w i t h the O t h e r is n o t based o n antagonism and struggle disproves itself even in his o w n explications. For it is the very language of p o w e r and of struggle w h i c h is used to intimate the alleged n o n - c o n f l i c t u a l nature of this e n g a g e m e n t . T h u s t h e r e is talk of the O t h e r ' s 'disobedie n c e ' and 'resistance', the fact that he 'absolves himself f r o m his,image, and imposes himself b e y o n d that shape, leaving b u t an e m p t y shell in m y hands w h e n I t h o u g h t I was h o l d i n g his t r u t h ' . 4 0 T h e subject is so c o n v i n c e d of the reality of its o w n image w o r l d as to believe the 'image' to be the O t h e r ' s , the e m p t y shell to have b e e n left by the O t h e r , failing to recognize that they are of its o w n making. Just so the alleged ' i n o r d i n a c y ' , the so-called 'surplus' of reality is j u d g e d and measured — that is, c o n c e i v e d of — f r o m the subject's perspective: n o t as the fact of reality, b u t as its apparent resistance to m y sight, an excess b e y o n d it. T h u s even if Levinas posits the 'face' in the fullness of its reality, h e does n o t succeed in m a k i n g it precede the gaze, that is,
cgo-pnuosopny, or the battle with reality
139
precede and escape the subject's r e d u c i n g it to its o w n objectification (image plus surplus). T h e face may b e 'face' b e f o r e it is 'gaze', that is, b e f o r e the O t h e r assumes the role of gazing subject, b u t it never precedes the subject's visual subjectivity, that is, the subject's subjective appraisal of it. Philosophical analysis, in o t h e r words, has interposed a ' m o m e n t ' b e t w e e n the O t h e r as a reality, and his transformation (by the subject) into e n e m y - a distinction b e t w e e n the O t h e r as h e 'is' and the O t h e r as (projected) hostile subject w h o m a y objectify m e . B u t the analysis is apparently unable to interpose such a m o m e n t b e t w e e n reality a n d the self - a m o m e n t w h e r e the self does n o t (yet) constitute itself as objectifying and h e n c e inimical subject. T h u s Levinas's analysis succeeds i n d e e d in u n - d e m o n i z i n g the O t h e r for a m o m e n t , suspending the subject's presupposition that the O t h e r is an e n e m y for the brief space of t i m e w h e n it recognizes h i m simply as being - before the O t h e r begins to act (gaze, objectify) or, m o r e importantly, is t h o u g h t to d o so by the subject. B u t the analysis does n o t u n - d e m o n i z e the self, does n o t , even for an abstract m o m e n t , suspend the subject's p r e s u p position of itself as an e n e m y , e n e m y of the w o r l d and the O t h e r . T h u s the difference b e t w e e n Sartre's and Levinas's respective c o n ceptions of the relationship is n o t that the latter's is n o t based o n antagonism and combat: the difference is that for Sartre, it is a hostile, hate-driven belligerent c o m b a t w h i c h the subject conceives of e a r n estly, even hysterically, as self-defence, w h i l e f o r Levinas it is playful and impassive, a game entered by t h e subject as a w e l c o m e distraction. N o t b e i n g a certain e n e m y the O t h e r is enigma, and for the sake of the enigma w h i c h may dispel its b o r e d o m , the subject affords itself this risk: an e x p e r i m e n t w i t h possible 'powerlessness', even 'defeat'. A n d lo and b e h o l d , this nonchalance, this unruffled philosophicalness (or is it self-possession?) in the face of an i m p e n d i n g p o w e r struggle does i n d e e d pay off: This disappointment [to hold in my hands but the empty husk of the Other, rather than his truth] is positive, the defeat salutary. For in order to be able to go out of oneself, it is necessary to lose power . . . There is nothing in the world but the face of the Other that can really cut me loose from myself, introducing me to adventures which are not just Odysseys. I approach the face, but I do not devour it: marvellous impotence, without which even the most extravagant life would be monotonous, a journey of the self to the self.41
jL^GV-JJNUUSVJJRIY,
UT INT
UULUZ
wim rcainy
T h e point of the exercise, w e are left in n o d o u b t , is the value of a d v e n t u r e to a subject tired of its o w n c o m p a n y , w h o finds its o w n even extravagant life b o r i n g and so accepts an e n c o u n t e r w i t h the O t h e r as if for sport. Since the m e e t i n g is strictly voluntary, agreed to by the subject for its o w n reasons and hence could be called off by it at any m o m e n t , it reminds us of so many powerful men's visits to the prostitute, there to experience, f o r the short term of a contract, the ' m a r vellous i m p o t e n c e ' of o n e ' d o m i n a t e d ' , the salutary 'defeat' at the hands of a ' d o m i n a t r i x ' , w i t h o u t w h i c h even the most extravagant life of a j u d g e or a manager, a politician or an industrialist or any m e m b e r o f the ruling classes of this society, w o u l d be m o n o t o n o u s indeed. O n n o account, h o w e v e r , will the subject v e n t u r e out of itself so far as to desist f r o m a p o w e r struggle altogether, to give up its c o n c e p t i o n o f the subject—object p o w e r relation: it comes o u t o f ' i t s e l f ' only o n the level of its o b j e c t - c o m p l e m e n t — the part it w a n t e d to b e u n chained f r o m anyway — n e v e r o u t of its role as subject. In other words, there simply is a controlled play w i t h p o w e r , a t e m p o r a r y exchange of roles (under the subject's direction): there is n o abolition of p o w e r , let alone a conception of a relation other than in terms of p o w e r . T h u s t h e subject's voluntary reticence of n o t d e v o u r i n g the face of the O t h e r , of n o t objectifying, d o m i n a t i n g and appropriating it i m m e d i ately, strikes it as positive and marvellous ' i m p o t e n c e ' , its decision n o t to exercise its p o w e r in the usual violent m a n n e r as veritable 'powerlessness'. Far f r o m g o i n g b e y o n d conceptions of struggle and p o w e r , the subject enters into a p o w e r struggle even w i t h its o w n face, all the better to be e q u i p p e d for the battle w i t h the O t h e r : ' E v e r y o n e wants to t a m e his o w n face, to b e able to use it like a w e a p o n , like a magic i n s t r u m e n t , or to make it into an impenetrable surface.' 4 2 For like the Sartrean subject, this subject too is still h a u n t e d by the f o r m e r ' s startled reflection that the O t h e r may, after the m a n n e r of the subject, in turn w a n t to penetrate the subject. rr-i e n c e the face of the O t h e r is recognized as equally vulnerable as one's o w n — ' t h e most inaccessible part of the b o d y and the most vulnerable'. 4 3 Like an e x p e r i e n c e d warrior, the subject sizes up its o p p o n e n t ' s advantages a n d weaknesses: 'Being far above myself, the face escapes m e . . . and very w e a k , it inhibits m e as I gaze 'into its u n a r m e d eyes. Separate f r o m myself, it exceeds m y p o w e r . Disarmed, defenceless, it exposes itself. . . It resists m e and it requires m e ; I am n o t first of all its spectator, b u t its debtor.' 4 4 Seeing the O t h e r ' s
Ego-philosophy, or the battle with reality
141.
'vulnerability' in the full k n o w l e d g e of its o w n p o w e r , the subject is m o v e d to a kind of consternation, as if unexpectedly seeing itself faced n o t b y an equal or a superior, but b y a potential victim: 'At m y mercy, delivered into m y hands, infinitely fragile, h e a r t - r e n d i n g like suppressed crying, the face calls m e to its aid.' 4 5 T h e O t h e r ' s fragility seems to appeal to a f o r g o t t o n sense of chivalry, alien to the subject as such, w h i c h deems fighting a weaker o p p o n e n t dishonourable. Still, the subject does n o t wish to let go of its p o w e r and its p o w e r thinking. So that even this defencelessness, this h e a r t - r e n d i n g appeal for help, this p e r c e p t i o n that the O t h e r is at m y mercy, has ' s o m e t h i n g imperious' about it: 'His misery does n o t awaken m y pity; in o r d e r i n g m e to c o m e to his aid, it exerts violence against me.' 4 6 U n w i l l i n g t o recognize that this p e r c e p t i o n - even this p e r c e p t i o n of the face supposedly prior to imaging it - is not the O t h e r , b u t the subject's p e r c e p t i o n of the O t h e r , that his alleged 'qualities' are n o t 'objective' 1 ( or i n h e r e n t qualities of the 'object', b u t aspects of the subject's appraisal of the O t h e r , the subject is unwilling also to understand that the O t h e r is neither inherently 'fragile', b u t fragile in relation to the subject's potential violence; that he is neither 'exposed' as such nor generally 'at mercy', but exposed to and at the mercy of a subject w h o is still deciding w h e t h e r or not to use its o w n power, w h e t h e r or not to exercise violence. Just so it also is the subject w h o imputes to the Other's vulnerability a capacity to exert violence, to 'order' and ' c o m m a n d ' the subject to desist f r o m its violence, w h e n in fact it is the subject's o w n recognition of the damage it may cause — an intimation of its o w n p o w e r and violence - w h i c h seems to m o v e it temporarily to desist. Y e t the subject clearly does not wish to take responsibility for such u n w o n t e d self-restraint, preferring to m a k e itself, at the level of discourse, into the victim of another's p o w e r and c o m m a n d : the p o w e r of fragility and the c o m m a n d of defencelessness. Just as adults reformulate a baby's crying as its ' p o w e r f u l d e m a n d i n g ' , in the face of w h i c h they are 'powerless', so the subject h e r e redefines its o w n p o w e r and potential violence as the violence of its victim: the object's 'ordering' the subject to desist f r o m violence. ' T h e h u m b l e nudity of the face demands, as if it w e r e its due, m y solicitude and, one m i g h t say . . . m y charity.' 4 7 T h e r e could b e n o clearer indication of the subject's basic unwillingness to s h o w any such consideration towards the O t h e r ' s reality t h a n this representation o f ' e n f o r c e d ' solicitude and charity ' i m p o s e d ' or ' c o m m a n d e d ' , i
-
F VI
INC
UUILLZ
wiiri reality
So w e are hardly surprised at the r e n e w e d insistence that 'it is thus n o t I w h o am b e i n g egoistical or selfless: it is the face in its nakedness w h i c h makes m e forget m y interest in myself.' 4 8 It is n o t I, in o t h e r words, that am responsible for deciding h o w I act, even if only to perceive the O t h e r ' s vulnerability at my hands, for it happens to m e as t h e case may be: ' T h e G o o d comes to m e f r o m outside, ethics falls o n t o p of m e , and it is in spite of myself that m y " b e i n g goes out to a n o t h e r . " ' 4 9 F r o m this it follows, presumably, that it neither is m e if I t u r n o u t to be egoistical after all, if I fail to lose interest in myself — if the G o o d f r o m the outside does not arrive and ethics fails to c o m e all over m e . In any case, it is despite myself if m y self, m y being, goes o u t to another, if I d o recognize the other's reality. H e n c e it c a n n o t exactly h e because of myself if m y self does n o t so go out and I c o n t i n u e to deny the other's reality. For m y self is clearly outside m y c o m m a n d and w h e r e m y b e i n g goes is directed f r o m outside myself. ' T h e O t h e r ' s face orders m e to love, or at the least forbids m e to be indifferent to it.' 5 0 Since there continues to be a p o w e r struggle (albeit n o w w i t h inverted p o w e r relations), there c o n t i n u e to be possibilities of self-defence: 'I can, of course, t u r n away, I can disobey or revolt against its prescription, yet it is n o t in m y p o w e r n o t to perceive it.' 51 . T h e ethics w h i c h drops o n m y head, it turns out, does n o t go so far as to direct or dictate m y b e h a v i o u r : I still m a y refuse to obey, I can yet c h o o s e to b e violent or cancel the relation with the O t h e r altogether. T h e authority of the 'prescription' to love turns o u t simply to be the authority of the real, a reality w h i c h I c a n n o t o v e r l o o k , w h i c h I c a n n o t indifferently p r e t e n d n o t to have noticed. B u t o n c e I have p e r c e i v e d it in its i n o r d i n a t e excessiveness and thus t u r n e d it into a f o r m i d a b l e o p p o n e n t again, I may c o n t i n u e to fight against it, d e f e n d ing m y sovereignty as subject. The face harasses me, it draws me into making common cause with it, subordinates me to its weakness, in short, orders me by law to love it. And without a doubt it both is superior to me by refusing to be identified, and inferior to me because it is at my mercy. But humility and arrogance are the two sides of its supremacy, its ascendancy over my being. 52 *
j
Since the face declares w a r o n m e , since I am at the m e r c y of its supremacy and ascendancy, n o o n e will blame m e for retaliating in
^gv-ynuvzuyrty, vi inc uuiue wun rtauiy self-defence. M o r e o v e r , rebelling against the arrogance of p o w e r and refusing o b e d i e n c e to supremacy appeals to o u r sense of justice and liberty, while escaping a face w h i c h harasses and subordinates m e is b u t justifiable self-protection. So it comes about that the subject, despite strict orders, cannot love every face w h i c h by law orders it t o love it, and that 'hatred is [also] one of the possible reactions to this order'. 5 3 M o r e o v e r , there is not just o n e such O t h e r , and the subject may be harassed by a w h o l e host of Others, their faces ordering it t o love t h e m . H e n c e it must needs choose w h i c h ones to love and w h i c h n o t to love — especially as those Others are also fighting amongst each other, thus obliging the subject to 'compare, measure, j u d g e , reflect'. 5 4 T h e p o i n t remains, h o w e v e r , to conceive of the subject as a victim of, and subordinate to, the reality constituted in. the face — chained n o t only, it turns out, to its o w n self b u t also to the O t h e r : ' F r o m this O t h e r , f r o m w h o m I am separate and w h o escapes m y p o w e r , I n o n e the less c a n n o t extract myself.' 5 5 I am as trapped b y the bird-lime of this reality of the O t h e r as I am trapped b y the reality of m y existence. H e n c e I do n o t really have any responsibility at all, excepting any I may w i t h i n this basic non-responsibility decide to take o n for one or a n o t h e r O t h e r of m y choice, for
I live without my doing. To live may mean to develop or to remain the same, to strive for the useful or to desire power, to control one's impulses or on the contrary to give them free rein. Never, however, is opening to an other a basic given, like an instinct of my spontaneous existence. Morality, in other words, is a transformation whose origin lies outside myself. . . Something foreign - the face of the Other comes to me and forces me to give up my indifference. I am being disturbed, sobered up from the delirium of my living, woken from my dogmatic sleep, expelled from my kingdom of innocence - called by the intrusion of the Other to assume a responsibility which I have neither chosen nor wanted. 56 Despite all this intrusive reality, this merciless fact of the existence of O t h e r s , the 'reality' of the subject's subjectivity remains in place, unshaken and u n m o d i f i e d : it is the 'original' state of being, the 'natural' c o n d i t i o n of existence, in w h i c h the unitary subject is b e i n g 'disturbed'. First of all I am: this is the k i n g d o m w h e r e as subject I rule s u p r e m e , the paradise of m y intact indifference and perfect
unrelatedness. O n l y thereafter does the O t h e r 'arrive', disturbing m e in m y peace, i n t r u d i n g into m y realm, forcing m e to recognize a reality b e y o n d myself. Because of the Other, I cannot continue to exist naturally . . . He makes it impossible for me to exist naively, fully, be it as a hedonist self living in ecstasy, as a heroic self displaying his power, or as a bourgeois self devoted to the pursuit of his interests. The Other: the spoilsport of being . . . It is not I who naturally love the Other, it is the Other who falls to me, becoming my burden, who haunts me and overruns me in short, who does violence to my nature by ordering me to love him. 57
r ' /
T h e ' a d v e n t ' of the O t h e r and (his) reality may indeed have dist u r b e d if n o t destroyed the subject's indifference, its solitary a u t o n o m y . Y e t this reality continues to be 'unnatural', against nature, a violation of m y nature. In particular, it turns o u t to have b e e n an illusion to think that this e n c o u n t e r w i t h the O t h e r might be s o m e - : t h i n g o t h e r than a p o w e r struggle, based o n a relation other than conflict and antagonism. For if i t is n o t conceived as the subject's relation of possession of the O t h e r , it is conceived as the Other's, violent a t t e m p t to take possession of m e . T h e self, conceived of as the subject familiar f r o m o t h e r philosophers, remains in struggle w i t h its o w n existence and in struggle w i t h t h e O t h e r - that is, in struggle w i t h a reality failing to c o n f o r m to its subjective w o r l d of objects. A 'deposed k i n g ' 5 8 remains a k i n g at variance w i t h his lot, c o n v i n c e d of his righteous identity as king and of the inordinacy of his deposition. A subject steamrollered into assuming responsibility for a vulnerable O t h e r , a responsibility it has n e i t h e r sought nor w a n t e d , continues to perceive itself as o n e violated, o n e d o n e to against his will. T h e face of the O t h e r , just like the sight of a stranger in the perception of Sartre's subject, continues to be felt to do violence to the subject — t h r o u g h its insistent and o b t r u d i n g reality, its sheer existence. T h e question w h e t h e r some other relation m i g h t be conceivable n e i t h e r the subject's violent aggression in taking possession of the O t h e r , n o r the O t h e r ' s violent aggression in subordinating the 'subject' — does n o t present itself, n o w that the possible permutations b e t w e e n subject and object, this 'radical' role-play w i t h p o w e r and 'powerlessness', have b e e n exhausted
\
Sex and the intimate
relationship
T h e subject's relationship to the O t h e r , as represented and analysed in philosophical and psychological discourse, is o f t e n tacitly — or as w i t h Levinas, explicitly — assumed to be a p r o t o t y p e also of the subject's relationship to others in general, exemplifying in the singular a possible relation in the plural, the minimal unit, as it w e r e , of the subject's sociality - or, as Levinas calls it, 'pluralist existing'. 1 Y e t this relationship to the O t h e r , in particular the 'personal' or 'intimate' relationship, is also usually seen as e m i n e n t l y b e l o n g i n g to the private sphere, w h e r e any 'sociality' appears if at all in the f o r m of a personal n e e d or desire — a desire for 'closeness' or 'intimacy', a need for 'security' or for ' n o t b e i n g alone'. R a r e l y is the personal relationship considered to b e part of the 'public sphere', or as Andrea D w o r k i n has called it, 'a society of at least t w o ' , 2 that is, as the political arena in w h i c h social life takes place. This suggests that the relationship to the O t h e r , rather than b e i n g a m i n i a t u r e of sociality, in fact derives its structure and f o r m f r o m the p r o t o t y p e of the private, sexual and u n i q u e relationship: marriage. E v e n w h e r e this is n o t explicitly stated, the analysis of the relationship to the O t h e r invariably revolves m o r e or less directly a r o u n d the sexual relationship. T h u s Finkielkraut explains h o w Sartre's reflections about the threat constituted by the existence of the O t h e r led h i m ' t o describe all forms of desire — f r o m sadistic violence to sentimental love — as so m a n y ruses a n d stratagems of war, w h i c h the subject deploys in order to liberate itself f r o m this seizure' b y the other. 3 T h e relation to the O t h e r , then, is a n o t h e r n a m e for desire, desire the dynamic of the relationship to the O t h e r . Similarly Levinas, in his consideration of the relationship to the O t h e r , m o v e s as if naturally t o
ito
i>ex and the intimate relationship
the erotic relationship, the relationship ' w i t h the alterity of f e m i ninity'. For it is this relationship, together with the 'relation of paternity' — that is, the relations of a husband in the family — w h i c h he considers prototypical of 'relations to Otherness w h i c h distinguish themselves f r o m those w h e r e sameness dominates or absorbs or e n gulfs the O t h e r ' 4 — prototypical, in other words, of the relation to the O t h e r w h i c h he is trying to define and w h i c h is to distinguish itself f r o m the usual struggle for p o w e r and d o m i n a n c e . This only confirms explicitly w h a t had already b e e n implicit, namely that the philosophical subject, like the liberal 'individual', far f r o m being a universal h u m a n subject, is f u n d a m e n t a l l y male in its c o n c e p t i o n : ' T h e f e m i n i n e is other for a masculine b e i n g n o t only because of a different nature b u t also inasmuch as alterity [Otherness] is in some way its n a t u r e . ' 5 T h u s Levinas joins the g o o d old patriarchal philosophical tradition w h i c h S i m o n e de Beauvoir has so t h o r o u g h l y analysed, in w h i c h ' W o m a n ' is the prototypical O t h e r w h o s e very ' n a t u r e ' is ' O t h e r n e s s ' . Y e t if Levinas finally names the subject explicitly as male, this does n o t m e a n that his analysis could simply and w i t h inverse gender signs b e applied also to a female subject. Male or masculine and feminine 'are n o t t h o u g h t in the neutral reciprocity w h i c h c o m m a n d s their interpersonal c o m m e r c e ' . 6 R a t h e r , it means that this 'erotic relationship' in its very c o n c e p t i o n is a sexual and a gendered relationship: n o t just a relation attributed to a subject w h i c h is male, but in b e i n g his relation to the ' f e m i n i n e ' (and not, nota bene, to a f e m i n i n e being, let alone a w o m a n ) it is a relation w h i c h necessitates a male subject, is c o n d i t i o n e d by and conditional u p o n a subjectivity w h i c h is male and an alterity w h i c h is femininity. In the erotic relation it is not a matter of another [different] attribute in the Other, but of an attribute of alterity [Otherness] in the Other. In Time and the Other [the relevant work by Levinas], where . . . the subject's ego is posited in its virility, and also where the ontological structure proper to femininity is studied . . . the feminine is described as that which is of itself other, as the origin of the very concept of alterity [Otherness]. 7 W h a t is r e q u i r e d for an erotic relationship is thus not simply a 'neutral' subject a n d an attribute of difference in the O t h e r , b u t a virile subject and a n o t h e r w h o by her very nature is Otherness.
T h e r e could h ardly b e a m o r e explicit example of the androcentrism of W e s t e r n philosophy, its definition of the subject as generically male and its definition of the feminine as the 'alterity' of 'virility' or subjectivity: n o t only is the subject male, it/its masculinity is the n o r m in relation to w h i c h everything is measured and c o m p a r e d . Even if the f e m i n i n e is, in the English translation, 'of itself o t h e r ' , ' o t h e r ' contains its relation o f ' o t h e r than the male: it is that w h i c h neither exists n o r has significance in and of itself but only in relation to the male (subject), as the alterity of the male, as that w h i c h is its relation to the male. In particular, h o w e v e r , this means that the c o n c e p t i o n of 'the subject', like the c o n c e p t i o n o f ' t h e individual', contains the feminine as an implicit attribute of the subject; the relationship of the subject to femininity is n o t a relationship b e t w e e n persons, b u t constitutive of subjectivity, constitutive of masculinity, the t w o b e i n g interchangeable. T h u s the c o n c e p t i o n of 'the subject' subsumes the 'sexual', that is, the political relation b e t w e e n persons of male gender and persons o f f c m a l e gender, as a dimension of the (singular) subject. / A l t h o u g h Levinas describes the eroticism of the male subject w i t h out a t h o u g h t about w o m en, this comes closer to the crux of sexuality and the erotic relationship than does the attempt, fashionable and widespread today, to treat t h e m rhetorically as a matter of 'equal opportunities' and conjugate t h e m simply w i t h a 'female subject'. N o t only is the c o n c e p t of a 'female subject' philosophically a contradiction in terms: to consider sexuality as a g e n d e r - n e u t r a l p h e n o m e n o n w h i c h could as easily take a 'female subject' as a male o n e corresponds to the logic of a verbal construction such as 'the pregnant m a n ' : it is a poetic possibility, like 'the river is f l o w i n g uphill', w h e r e a verbal 'equality' is created b e t w e e n ' u p ' and ' d o w n ' and gravity is declared a neutral p h e n o m e n o n . It is a rhetorical possibility only o n the level of vacuous grammar w h e r e n o u n s are c o m b i n e d w i t h verbs and adverbs w i t h o u t regard to the reality of things, their meaning. Y e t this is exactly the level at w h i c h the attempt is b e i n g made today to democratize sexuality, as w e m i g h t attempt to democratize gravity. Feminist analysis apparently has failed to lead to a general u n d e r standing of sexuality as f u n d a m e n t a l l y gender-specific, as a crucial dynamic in the oppression of w o m e n w h i c h not only takes place within a patriarchal social order of inequality, b u t w h i c h constitutes and maintains that order. R a t h e r , it is b e g i n n i n g to emerge that for many w o m e n too, 'sexuality', like p o w e r or p o r n o g r a p h y , far f r o m
being the object of critique, is increasingly b e c o m i n g the object of desire. Because m e n have t h e m , (some) w o m e n w a n t to have t h e m too. Because they are the privileges of m e n , (some) w o m e n w a n t to obtain them also for themselves. Little does it seem to matter w h a t it is w e thus desire, that w e k n o w that a privilege is n o t a right but an advantage predicated o n another's lack of rights. T h a t in particular the privileges of m e n d e p e n d o n the oppression of w o m e n , and that gaining similar privileges means designating 'others' to take the role of the ' O t h e r ' , to be d o m i n a t e d as w o m e n traditionally are d o m i n a t e d . N o r does it seem to matter w h a t feminist analysis has s h o w n sexuality to m e a n for w o m e n : that it is the m e d i u m of w o m e n ' s mistreatment, violation and exploitation in the 'private' sphere of m e m j As feminist analysis has p o i n t e d o u t , the oppression of w o m e n and the division of h u m a n i t y into t w o sexes differs f r o m other forms of oppression precisely t h r o u g h the fact that the p o w e r relation at the same time defines sexuality: 8 m e n n o t only have p o w e r over w o m e n , they also desire t h e m . O r to p u t it differently, the gender relationship is characterized by the fact that sexuality determines the p o w e r relation and defines the sexes: w o m e n are the group of p e o p l e required for male sexuality to realize itself — they are the collective sex object of m e n ' s collective sexual subjectivity. As Catharine M a c K i n n o n emphasizes, feminist critique 'identifies not just a sexuality that is shaped u n d e r conditions of g e n d e r inequality but reveals this sexuality itself to be the dynamic of the inequality of the sexes.' 9 H e n c e the very c o n c e p t o f ' w o m e n ' or the n o t i o n of w o m e n as an identity is n o t only a sexist c o n s t r u c t i o n , it is d e t e r m i n e d by sexuality itself, w h i c h defines w o m e n as a 'sex', the ' o t h e r sex', and thus specifically as the h e t e r o - s e x o b j e c t o f m e n . U n d e r the perspective of patriarchy, or as A d r i e n n e R i c h has t e r m e d it, compulsory heterosexuality, 1 0 'sexuality' equals male sexuality equals male h e t e r o sexuality. Since the n o r m n e v e r requires special qualification, it is superfluous f r o m the point of v i e w of the h e t e r o c e n t r i c n o r m to specify the sexuality as ' h e t e r o ' , as it is superfluous f r o m the a n d r o c e n :ric n o r m to specify it as ' m a l e ' , t h e lack of qualification as usual m p l y i n g the norm(s). A terminological distinction between heterosexuality and lomosexuality m o r e o v e r appears — t o g e t h e r w i t h the t e r m 'sexuality' t s e l f - only towards the end of the n i n e t e e n t h century, w h e n a newly
e m e r g i n g discourse of sexology sets about scientifically classifying types of sexuality. ( W h e r e a scientific discourse arises, so does an 'object' to satisfy it.) W h i l e previously the sexual was organized a r o u n d a multitude of sexual practices and acts — sexual acts, sexual crimes, r e p r o d u c t i o n - the sexologists' radical reconceptualization of 'sexuality' relegates sexual actions, as is well k n o w n , to the realm of m e r e effects caused by a sexuality i n h e r e n t in the subject: 'Sexuality b e c o m e s a property of the individual', 1 1 part of his personal identity. H e n c e f o r t h the individual 'has' a sexuality (after it has evolved, as Freud has it, f r o m 'bisexuality'): either a heterosexual o n e if all w e n t well, and sometimes also a h o m o s e x u a l o n e if t h e r e w e r e disturbances like, say, an absent father in the child's d e v e l o p m e n t (the child being, in the first instance, a male child, although the story is later adapted also to the female child). T h e sexuality o n e has leads to the corresp o n d i n g sexual actions (if all goes well), although it may h a p p e n also that o n e acts against one's sexuality — as in t h e case of the relatively high p r o p o r t i o n of heterosexual m e n w h o also engage in h o m o s e x u a l activities (and vice versa), or the large n u m b e r s of w o m e n w h o today identify as lesbians but w h o previously ' w e r e ' heterosexual. A l t h o u g h there has b e e n considerable critique of Freud and other sexologists, and although the options have since multiplied to a wide s p e c t r u m of 'sexualities', this n o t i o n of an i n h e r e n t sexuality has solidified in the c o n c e p t of a 'sexual identity'. T h i s 'sexual identity' is of a consistence similar to a pattern of b e h a v i o u r : sexual behaviour turns out according to the pattern or identity. In particular, one can recognize a person's sexual identity o n the basis of their behaviour: the b e h a v i o u r allows us to infer the identity. E v e n in the case of contradictory b e h a v i o u r (see above) t h e r e nevertheless usually is a pattern w h i c h represents the ' t r u e ' sexual identity — at the very least a bisexual identity, if it c a n n o t be decided. T h e n as n o w the d e v e l o p m e n t of a discourse of sexology has b e e n hailed as a first phase of the 'sexual r e v o l u t i o n ' , and n o d o u b t , as Sheila Jeffreys has argued, it has had its share i n presaging the second 'sexual r e v o l u t i o n ' of the 1960s.' 2 As radical feminists b o t h at the b e g i n n i n g of the t w e n t i e t h century and at the end of the sixties and the b e g i n n i n g of the seventies have analysed, h o w e v e r , this so-called sexual r e v o l u t i o n has neither b e e n propagated b y political revolutionaries n o r has it had revolutionary consequences — o n the contrary and especially for w o m e n has m e a n t a n e w w a v e of sexual oppression. For
-despite a scientifically 'frank' (even if mostly Latin or Greek) language about a multiplicity of lived sexual practices, conservative sexologists like Freud w e r e m o r e c o n c e r n e d about d e f e n d i n g and scientifically reaffirming the old primacy of heterosexuality. W i t h the influence of religion already o n the w a n e , b u t above all w i t h the n e w rights w o m e n had gained in struggles t h r o u g h o u t the n i n e t e e n t h century, w h i c h m a d e marriage as a state-protected compulsory institution c r u m b l e a little a r o u n d the edges, there was a need for n e w popes to d e f e n d c o m p u l s o r y heterosexuality. T h e popes of sexology have fulfilled their task m o r e than admirably, building a c h u r c h o n the rock of Sigmund: sexological ideas have taken over the role of religion in p r o v i d i n g guidelines for moral, personal and sexual c o n d u c t , creating a pansexual society that is truly ecumenical. G r a n t i n g indeed that homosexuality and other sexual practices exist in reality, the sexological perspective has nevertheless consolidated the hierarchy b e t w e e n heterosexuality and homosexuality (the a n d r o c e n tric hierarchy never having b e e n in doubt): heterosexuality is the n o r m , h o m o s e x u a l i t y is the deviance. T h e ideology of the sexes has n o t b e e n rocked. O n the contrary, if it is a matter of sex and sexuality, the genders or sexes are already so firmly presupposed as to be s u b s u m e d in the prefixes - ' h e t e r o ' , according to the dictionary, m e a n i n g ' t h e o t h e r of t w o , other, different' ( O E D ) : heterosexuality is sex w i t h the ' o t h e r ' sex (that is, sex w i t h the Otherness, or w o m e n ) , while h o m o s e x u a l i t y is sex w i t h the same sex or those w h o are the same (that is, m e n ) . A l t h o u g h the c o n s e q u e n c e is here t u r n e d on its head: instead of seeing sex(uality) as the dynamic w h i c h creates the so-called sexes, the sexes are p r e s u m e d to pre-exist — according to empirical tradition are ' f o u n d ' to exist and h e n c e declared to be n a t u r e - so as t h e n to define a sexuality b e t w e e n t h e m , or else within each of t h e m . T h u s sexology presupposes b o t h the duality of the sexes and t w o participants in a sex act - an idea w h i c h according to its o w n standards has l o n g b e e n o u t m o d e d — f r o m w h i c h the first p e r m u t a t i o n s can then be derived: m a n w i t h w o m a n , m a n w i t h m a n , and reluctantly, b u t for s y m m e t r y ' s sake, w o m a n w i t h w o m a n . E v e n a m o n g m a n y feminists this (mis)conception of sexuality as s o m e t h i n g w h i c h only follows o n an already given (God-given or natural) differentiation of the sexes is o f t e n u n q u e s t i o n e d . W i t h the relative revaluation of the t e r m ' w o m e n ' in recent years, and as a c o n s e q u e n c e of feminist struggle, w e have apparently b e c o m e t o o
Sex and the intimate relationship
1b1
attached to o u r ' g e n d e r identity', let alone 'sexuality' as a desirable good, to c o n t i n u e to question t h e m . T h u s w e speak of sexuality and gender as if they could b e separated f r o m patriarchal p o w e r relations, filled w i t h n e w and 'positive' m e a n i n g and put to n e w and positive uses. It leads into the dead e n d of an 'equal opportunities' politics as it is practised in m a n y places today, w h i c h aims to m a k e the rights and opportunities of w o m e n the 'same' as t h e y are f o r m e n . Such a politics n o t only presupposes the sexes as given; it ignores the p o w e r relations b e t w e e n t h e m w h i c h d e t e r m i n e not only the rights and non-rights of the respective sexes, but the sexes themselves. Based o n a sexist rather than a feminist analysis it posits the fallacious possibility of a society of t w o 'equal' sexes. T h e ultimate c o n s e q u e n c e of a Marxist critique and class analysis is a society w i t h o u t classes, n o t 'equality' b e t w e e n the 'classes'. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e of a critique of racism likewise is n o t a society o f ' e q u a l races', b u t a society w h i c h has o v e r c o m e and abolished racism and race ideology. T h e c o n s e q u e n c e of a feminist critique of g e n d e r is n o t an equality of the sexes, b u t the abolition of the political construction of sex and gender. This is n o t to say that existing differences are to be simply i g n o r e d , n o r to postulate androgyny — the m i x t u r e of the t w o sexes — as an ideal. It is to say that the respective interests of the t w o sexes are n o t just different - that this is n o t a question of sexual difference - b u t diametrically o p p o s e d and mutually conflicting. W h i l e the interest of m e n is to maintain their p o w e r over w o m e n , it is w o m e n ' s interest to free themselves f r o m this subjection. T h e way there necessarily means a political struggle b e t w e e n the sexes w h o s e aim is the abolition of patriarchal p o w e r and privilege and thus the abolition of the sexes^_J N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , m a n y w o m e n , t o o , take over f r o m sexological science n o t only the c o n c e p t i o n of sexuality as a 'personal property' of the subject, but also the concepts of heterosexuality and h o m o s e x u a l ity as the t w o main 'types' of sexuality, aiming to adapt t h e m for the female subject. E v e n t h o u g h w e really k n o w that there is no such t h i n g as 'heterosexuality', that the heterosexuality of m e n and of w o m e n respectively is n o t only f u n d a m e n t a l l y different, b u t above all diametrically opposed. Since its beginnings sexology in its o w n way has taught us the c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y of the t w o heterosexualities - has theorized the empirical findings of h o w sexuality is lived and exercised in practice and declared it to be the ' n a t u r e ' of the said sexualities, or
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rather of the respective o w n e r s of these sexualities, the sexes t h e m selves: male sexuality is active, aggressive, initiative and penetrative, c o n q u e s t experienced as pleasure; female sexuality is passive, r e c e p t ive, yielding and suffering. H a v e l o c k Ellis has already defined t h e m respectively as sadism and masochism: While in men it is possible to trace a tendency to inflict pain, or a simulacrum of pain, on the women they love, it is still easier to trace in women a delight in experiencing physical pain when inflicted by a lover, and an eagerness to accept subjection to his will. Such a tendency is certainly normal. 13 ' N o r m a l ' for Ellis means in particular that this t e n d e n c y persists ' e v e n a m o n g the most n o r m a l civilized m e n and w o m e n possessing w e l l - d e v e l o p e d sexual impulses' 1 4 ( r e m e m b e r the W e s t e r n therapists). T o d a y , in W e s t e r n societies at the end of the t w e n t i e t h century, w e are reaping the full harvest of this theory: sadism, in h e t e r o - as well as h o m o s e x u a l culture is legitimated and normalized, the latest fashion in 'liberated sexuality'. A l t h o u g h male sexuality, quite in accordance w i t h its status as n o r m , still is the measure and m o d e l of h o w female sexuality is to b e 'liberated' — if m e n want p o r n , the liberated female sexuality manifests itself in a similar desire for p o r n , if m e n w a n t particular sexual practices, the liberated female sexuality proves its liberation by a c o r r e s p o n d i n g interest in the same sexual practices — that is, although male heterosexuality continues to be the m o d e l of sexuality as such, the sexual role of w o m e n is b e c o m i n g ever m o r e clearly differentiated f r o m the sexual role of m e n : t h r o u g h the differential b e t w e e n sadism and masochism, b e t w e e n His g r o w i n g pleasure in exercising brutality and H e r g r o w i n g pleasure in pain and subjection. T h e t w o roles are strictly c o m p l e m e n t a r y , w h a t is equal is b u t the pleasure to b e taken in t h e m . P r o m the sexual practice lived in reality scientific empiricism derives the 'essence' of the respective 'sexualities', and f r o m these the ' n a t u r e ' of the c o r r e s p o n d i n g 'sex'. If w e follow this construction in the opposite direction, w e may begin to grasp its purpose: male sexuality 'is' c o n q u e r i n g , initiative, penetrative and pain-inflicting, because m e n do c o n q u e r w o m e n , initiate this war, penetrate the c o n q u e r e d , intrude into her and occupy her; it 'is' pain-inflicting because m e n d o inflict pain on w o m e n . Male sexuality 'is' all these
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things, because m e n do all these things. Female sexuality 'is' passive, receptive, submissive a n d pain-loving, because w o m e n are the victims of m e n ' s sexual w a r campaigns, because they 'receive' m e n ' s deeds as a c o u n t r y being b o m b e d 'receives' the b o m b s . Women's sexuality 'is' all these things, because men do all these things. W o m a n moreover 'is' pain-loving, because the mere description of states of affairs and facts of the matter, w i t h o u t an analysis of w h o is acting and h o w they are acting - w i t h o u t an analysis, for example, of a transitive action - allows the empirical scientist not only to describe the facts of the matter 'neutrally', but to impute to the matter even 'pleasure' in the 'facts' of what is being done to it. Because animals are slaughtered by humans, it is possible not only to trace in humans a tendency to engage in slaughter or a simulacrum of slaughter; it is still easier to trace in animals a delight in experiencing slaughter at the hands of their slaughterers, a desire to submit to the slaughterers' will. Such tendencies are certainly normal: they are exhibited by millions of humans and animals daily in the most advanced and well-developed societies today. N o t e that the action of the man inflicting pain is simply an empirically observable tendency, that is to say, a most c o m m o n o c c u r r e n c e . W h e n it comes to the research object ' w o m a n ' , h o w e v e r , y o u may observe n o t only a c o m p l e m e n t a r y t e n d e n c y w h i c h statistically corresponds amazingly precisely to the male action tendency: in the object ' w o m a n ' you can m o r e o v e r clearly discern a 'delight' in the experience of pain and a veritable desire to submit to the will of the m a n . T h a t is to say, in her case you can objectively trace a subjective motive. Y o u could almost think that the m a n is simply and like a m a n fulfilling his duty to oblige the w o m a n ' s desire and delight. T h e active agency of the m a n w h o initiates his u n d e r t a k i n g 'sex', w h o pursues it aggressively, w h o penetrates, conquers and inflicts pain, is not, so it appears, in his case an expression of his desire and his decision to act. R a t h e r , his delight and his interest are b e i n g projected o n to the passive, receptive, suffering w o m a n — are rhetorically simply i m p u t e d to her by the active, initiative, penetrating and violence-inflicting subject of a scientific sexological discourse. This 'neutral', 'objective' scientific subject, observing facts and stating matters as they really are, penetrating objects w i t h his sharp sight to see their very subjectivity, shows a remarkable likeness to the sexual subject of the described sex scenario, just as his u n d e r t a k i n g 'science' exhibits remarkable structural similarities to the u n d e r t a k i n g called 'sex'.
^^^ unu i.rtc UU.IHIUIC Iciuuunsrtiy This scientific empiricism, w h i c h infers f r o m states of affairs and 'things as they are' n o t only their legitimacy, b u t m o r e o v e r the will of the things and their consent to the state they find themselves in (never, h o w e v e r , the will of agents), is familiar also f r o m o t h e r contexts, in particular the context of political a r g u m e n t a t i o n . It is frequently argued, for example, that the fact that millions of w o m e n w o r k in the sex industry (or rather, serve as the industry's raw material), clearly shows that these w o m e n like to do this w o r k - else they w o u l d n ' t be there d o i n g it. R a r e l y is it argued, h o w e v e r , at least in the sphere of paid e m p l o y m e n t , that the m a n y w o m e n cleaning toilets are d o i n g this w o r k because they love it (although in the private sphere such a g e n d e r division of l a b o u r is probably d e t e r m i n e d by a similar opinion). Generally it is rare that it is t h o u g h t that workers w o r k i n g o n m o n o t o n o u s p r o d u c t i o n lines or migrant workers d o i n g the worst-paid, worst-status j o b s allows us to infer their particular liking of such w o r k , t h o u g h we m a y i n d e e d hear the old racist a r g u m e n t that the facts of such divisions of l a b o u r let us infer the particular aptitude of the people d o i n g the w o r k , that it corresponds to s o m e t h i n g in their ' n a t u r e ' . If the area of w o r k .is sex w o r k , h o w e v e r , it is not only w o m e n ' s ' n a t u r e ' w h i c h is t h o u g h t to m a k e t h e m particularly apt f o r it: the male subject's o w n pleasure in sex so infects his logic that h e transfers this pleasure o n to the sex w o r k e r — i g n o r i n g the fact of work. A l t h o u g h heterosexuality defines t w o gender-specific sex roles, there is only o n e sex: male sex. Just as there is only one pain, the one' the m a n inflicts o n the w o m a n he loves and the one the w o m a n experiences. Male sexuality provides the dynamic (he is 'active'), w o m a n is the m e d i u m (she is 'passive'). H e is the sexual subject, she is object and means. Sex does not require t w o sexualities, it requires a sexual subject and his object. If a m a n rapes a w o m a n , this is sex f r o m his point of view. As M a c K i n n o n c o m m e n t s , ' T h e male sexual role . . . centers o n aggressive intrusion o n those w i t h less p o w e r . Such acts of d o m i n a n c e are experienced as sexually arousing, as sex itself. T h e y therefore are.' 1 3 M o r e o v e r , contrary to the assumption that the kind of sexual object determines the kind of sexuality w h i c h is the 'property' of the subject — if the object is a w o m a n , the male sexual subject is 'heterosexual', if the object is a m a n , the sexual subject is 'homosexual', if the object is a boy, the sexual subject is a 'paedophile' etc. — it is sexual agency w h i c h determines the 'sex' or sexual identity, in the subject as well as in the
object. T h e r e are consequently only t w o sexual identities, that of sexual subject or agent, and that of sexual object. As the t e r m 'heterosexuality' suggests that 'heterosexual' m e n and w o m e n have the same sexuality, so the sexological division into t w o kinds of sexuality, h e t e r o - and homosexuality, suggests that h o m o sexuality or 'same-sex love' is one kind of sexuality. Y e t even a cursory glance at male homosexuality and lesbianism reveals that they cannot have m u c h in c o m m o n besides the permutative grammar of 'same w i t h same' and the heterosexist stigmatization as a perversion. W h i l e the male and the female sex roles of heterosexuality at least have in c o m m o n that together t h e y make u p a ' c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y ' , h o m o sexuality and lesbianism are b y sexology's o w n standards at opposite extremes, having a fundamentally different relationship, each to heterosexuality. Male homosexuality shares b o t h with (the postulated) female heterosexuality the desire for the male and his p o w e r , and w i t h male heterosexuality male sexual agency as well as the c o n t e m p t for w o m e n and the homosociality of patriarchal male b o n d i n g . Lesbianism shares neither the o n e n o r t h e other, structurally has n o t h i n g in c o m m o n either w i t h male or w i t h female heterosexuality. Indeed, as w e shall see, it does not really b e l o n g to the realm of sexuality at all. As political reality, for example, shows, the persecution of h o m o sexuality and the repression of lesbianism in the E u r o p e a n context have different histories and very different reasons: while male h o m o sexuality in m a n y E u r o p e a n states has l o n g b e e n an object of legislative criminalization - as such, h o w e v e r , like for instance rape, in the realm of reality — lesbianism since the F r e n c h R e v o l u t i o n has often escaped legislative regulation altogether. As A n n a b e l Farraday and others have s h o w n , it seemed m o r e i m p o r t a n t to make it invisible and n o n existent t h r o u g h n o n - r e g u l a t i o n . 1 6 In earlier centuries p r o s e c u t i o n o f ' l e s b i a n i s m ' h a d focused either o n cross-dressing and d e c e p t i o n (passing as a man), or on the use of 'instruments' to imitate penetration, b o t h being severely punished. 1 7 W h i l e w o m e n ' s cross-dressing r e m a i n e d an offence in m a n y countries well into the t w e n t i e t h century, it was n o t necessarily t h o u g h t to have sexual motivations — e x e m p t i o n s r e q u i r e d (and often w e r e granted) police permission, in G e r m a n y for instance as recently as 1923. 1!i T h u s w h a t is t h r e a t e n i n g to W e s t e r n patriarchy in lesbianism is above all w o m e n ' s usurpation of male social privilege and escape f r o m male control, in particular the crucial sexual control t h r o u g h individual
m e n . By contrast, the e n o r m o u s significance of male homosexuality for the regime of c o m p u l s o r y heterosexuality lies, as Andrea 1) w o r k in has s h o w n , in the fact that here m e n are treated by other m e n like women.. Y e t ' T h o u shalt n o t lie w i t h m a n k i n d , as w i t h w o m a n k i n d . ' 1 9 (Just t h i n k of y o u r o w n sons, w h o might experience w h a t y o u r daughters routinely experience.) This asymmetry in the patriarchal m e a n i n g of homosexuality and lesbianism respectively also shows that sexuality equals male sexuality (that is, sexual agency). For it appears that f r o m the perspective of patriarchy the p r o b l e m of lesbianism is less o n e of sexuality than o n e of the social control of w o m e n , in that it constitutes a breach in. the otherwise n e a r - h e r m e t i c (hetero)sexual control of w o m e n by m e n . M o r e o v e r , it seems seriously to tax the patriarchal imagination even to conceive of lesbianism in sexual terms, since the absent penis, the p o w e r symbol of sexuality and the active factor and instrument of p e n e t r a t i o n , looms large. T h u s a letter f r o m the Association for M o r a l and Social H y g i e n e to the Law Lords in 1921, c o n c e r n i n g the question of w h e t h e r or n o t 'acts of gross i n d e c e n c y b e t w e e n w o m e n ' should b e m a d e punishable, speaks of these as n o t only 'repulsive' b u t as ' i n d e e d unintelligible to m a n y people'. 2 0 Since the constitutive e l e m e n t in the . definition of sex is penile p e n e t r a t i o n ( c o n s u m m a t i o n of marriage as well as rape being defined o n its basis, everything else c o u n t i n g n o t really as 'sex' but at the most as 'sexual'), and since ' w o m a n ' is equivalent to 'female sex role', there c a n n o t b e any sex taking place b e t w e e n t w o w o m e n : t w o passive, receptive, yielding and submissive sexualities together do n o t make sex; n o t h i n g at all is taking place. O n l y w i t h H a v e l o c k Ellis and other sexologists of the early t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y does this p r o b l e m finally receive a solution: w i t h the i n v e n t i o n of the 'masculine w o m a n ' , the 'invert', w h o s e sexuality is like male sexuality and w h o treats her sexual p a r t n e r as a m a n treats his - as a sexual object subjected, as o n e w h o is d o n e to. O n l y t h e n does lesbianism have a sexuality - a sexuality c o r r e s p o n d i n g to heterosexuality. C o n v e r s e l y there is b y the same a c c o u n t i n g s o m e w h a t too m u c h penis and active masculinity present in male homosexuality; for sex to b e able to take place, therefore, o n e male sexuality must c'oerce the o t h e r i n t o b e i n g a female, passive and receptive sexuality. T h e d o m i n ance of t h e o n e male sexuality defines the partner as ' w o m a n ' and sexual object. As w e k n o w , male sexuality, that is to say, d o m i n a n c e ,
uc-A urm Lfic iniimuic 1 C[U livilHI IJJ can m a k e anything, not just w o m e n , into w o m e n : every hole, every receptacle, every animal, and every child, w h e t h e r male or female. And h e n c e , theoretically, also every m a n . It suffices that there be male sexual d o m i n a n c e for another to be m a d e into a ' w o m a n ' . A n d as we also k n o w , it takes a m a n to m a k e a girl ' i n t o a w o m a n ' . E v e n if u n d e r the normative auspices of c o m p u l s o r y heterosexuality the pre-existence of the sexes seems so 'natural' that w e n o longer perceive their construction t h r o u g h sexuality, the examples of male homosexuality and of lesbian sexuality clearly demonstrate h o w sex actually creates gender, that is, the sexes: it is the aggressive d o m i n a n c e of the 'active' sexual subject w h i c h makes the ' m a n ' , and w h i c h makes the victim of his activity a ' w o m a n ' and an object. T h e sexual action determines the sexual gender, w h i c h overwrites and replaces social g e n d e r identity: lesbian sex features the 'masculine w o m a n ' as sexual subject, while her victim simply remains (becomes) a ' w o m a n ' . This is manifest in the sexological literature, w h i c h regards only the 'masculine w o m a n ' and active sexual subject as the true lesbian or 'invert', considering the o t h e r w o m a n a ' n o r m a l ' w o m a n to w h o m it could equally well be d o n e by a man. T h a t is to say, the desire w h i c h is decisive is the active-male desire of the sexual subject; the so-called female desire of the sexual object does n o t really matter — else in the case of lesbians it w o u l d have to be considered equally 'inverted'. Y e t it does n o t appear to be inverted since, assuming the desire of an ' o b j e c t ' exists at all, it is directed at sexual subjectivity, that is, as is p r o p e r in a heterosexual w o m a n , at active-male aggressive and initiative agency. T h e social gender of the active sexual subject obviously is of secondary i m p o r t a n c e . Conversely, the 'invert' is less inverted in the sense that as a w o m a n she has the w r o n g sexual object: she is 'inverted' in as m u c h as she exhibits a b e h a v i o u r w h i c h does n o t correspond to her social gender: sexually, she is a m a n . Similarly, in male homosexuality the passive and penetrated partner b e c o m e s a ' w o m a n ' , as can b e seen also from, the fact that a m a n raping a m a n constitutes a degradation f o r the m a n raped — his degradation to the sexual g e n d e r of w o m a n — w i t h o u t his social gender, h o w e v e r , reflecting in the least back o n to his rapist: the latter remains a heterosexual man, even if he rapes a n o t h e r m a n . T h a t is, h e is exercising his ' n o r m a l ' sexual role, n o matter w h o m he rapes. Similarly, m e n and society in general t e n d not to regard m e n w h o rape little girls as having an unusual sexuality like, say, a 'paedophile', n o r
d o they necessarily regard m e n w h o rape little boys as ' h o m o s e x u a l ' . Society's fear, rather, is precisely that the b o y w h o has b e e n raped m i g h t thereby b e c o m e a ' h o m o s e x u a l ' . ' H o m o s e x u a l ' , like ' w o m a n ' , thus tends t o signify a g e n d e r of sexual object, a gender constituted by male sexual agency. This implicit recognition that it is sex (malesexual agency) which determines gender can also b e discerned in the different reactions of patriarchal experts to the sexual assault on boys and girls respectively. M a i n s t r e a m therapeutic efforts vis-a-vis girls w h o have b e e n sexually assaulted by m e n aim at so-called 'heterosexual adjustment', 2 1 that is, healing t h e m of their possible 'fear of m e n ' . T h e fear of therapists is that girls m i g h t o n c e and for all turn away f r o m any ' n o r m a l ' h e t e r o sexual aggression by m e n . H e n c e the empirical fact that m a n y girls and w o m e n w h o w e r e raped d o i n d e e d choose n o t to have any voluntary sexual relations w i t h m e n , is regarded as one of the most deplorable 'damages' resulting f r o m rape. Q u i t e on the contrary in the case of boys, w h e r e it is h o p e d that they may have precisely this reaction and will in f u t u r e eschew the sexual c o m p a n y of m e n . In the boy's case this is n o t a sign of damage and u n d u e fear, but a sign that he has successfully o v e r c o m e the experience. T h e fear of the sexperts is, rather, that the boy m i g h t - quite contrary to the t e n d e n c y observable in girls - find pleasure in b e i n g raped and c o n t i n u e to look to m e n for the experience - w h i c h is a direct transference of their o w n sexological theory w h i c h imputes just such a pleasure in pain, and delight in b e i n g d o m i n a t e d , to the traditional sexual object, w o m e n . If a girl, after b e i n g sexually assaulted by a m a n , w e r e still l o o k i n g forward to sex w i t h m e n , it w o u l d prove in the eyes of sexologists that after all she had, albeit precociously, b e c o m e a true w o m a n . All this shows that sexologists despite everything seem vaguely to k n o w that sex or gender, far f r o m being a personal identity, is constructed t h r o u g h sex. In the case of girls, their fear is that girls may rebel against b e i n g so constructed as ' w o m e n ' , in the case of boys their fear is that their o w n theory - that y o u just love b e i n g raped o n c e y o u experience it - m i g h t be true. It clearly shows, too, that sexuality means male sexual activity, and m o r e o v e r , that there is n o conspicuous difference b e t w e e n so-called normal sex and rape. F r o m the perspective of the sexual subject it is the same activity in b o t h cases - the will or unwillingness of the object n o t affecting the nature of the act. It is the (for a man) ' n o r m a l ' and
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'natural' act of constituting another as object, a belligerent expedition of conquest f r o m w h i c h the subject necessarily must emerge victorious. T h e act itself says n o t h i n g a b o u t w h e t h e r it is c o m m i t t e d in love or in hatred: the male sexual subject does it equally to 'the w o m a n he loves' and to his e n e m y . M o r e o v e r , he always emerges victorious: it is the w o m a n w h o has b e e n c o n q u e r e d , laid, had, possessed, and not the other way r o u n d . Similarly, it is the m a n w h o has b e e n raped by a n o t h e r m a n w h o has thus b e e n punished, m a d e into a ' w o m a n ' or a ' h o m o s e x u a l ' . T h e rapist himself was n o t involved in a h o m o s e x u a l act, the act does n o t m a k e h i m a ' h o m o s e x u a l ' . It is n o t the sexual object w h i c h determines the sexual identity of the subject, n o r is it the sexual object's will or unwillingness w h i c h determines the nature of the ^ct: it is the sexual subject's agency w h i c h determines everything, i Just so the identity of the sexual subject is in n o way affected if, in the consciousness of his o w n racist ideology, he rapes a w o m a n of a 'race' he despises, or if in war he rapes ' e n e m y ' w o m e n : t h o u g h the sexual subject 'defiles' these w o m e n , he himself is not so defiled by the association. It is n o t the 'association' w h i c h is defiling, it is the willed and initiative sexual aggression of the subject w h i c h defiles the object. N o r does it seem to contradict his racist and sexist ideology and hatred to engage in so-called ' n o r m a l ' sexual relations with w o m e n of his ' o w n ' or of any o t h e r 'race', since sex does not signify love for the class of objects. N o r does the fact that he may experience pleasure make violence into love or sex into an association. W h e n m e n go to war they often also experience pleasure c o n q u e r i n g and destroying the e n e m y , as the orgasmic descriptions of their military p e n e t r a t i o n acts impressively demonstrate. 2 2 \ N o r does a m a n appear to humiliate himself if h e rapes animals w h o m he rates ' s u b - h u m a n ' : h e does n o t thereby b e c o m e 'animalistic' or ' s u b - h u m a n ' himself. Q u i t e differently w h e n h e rapes w o m e n and animals in such a m a n n e r as to force t h e m sexually to engage w i t h each other: his understanding is that he thereby humiliates the w o m a n even f u r t h e r than if h e personally raped her, that thus he degrades her to the status o f ' a n i m a l ' . T h e postcards w h i c h by n o w are freely available o n postcard racks for tourists, s h o w i n g w o m e n w i t h a pig or a d o g b e t w e e n their legs, are n o t m e a n t to imply an analogy b e t w e e n the absent sexual subject and the animal w h o has b e e n made to take his place, it is m e a n t to suggest an analogy b e t w e e n the w o m a n and the animal. Y e t it is less the status of the animal w h i c h degrades the
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w o m a n than the (male) sexual agency w h i c h makes her a double sexual object: she is degraded in either case, w h e t h e r she is raped by the m a n t h r o u g h an animal or by the man himself w i t h his 'high status' of a h u m a n . All in all it is the self-initiated aggressive penetrative act w h i c h makes the sexual subject in every case a man, w i t h the u n i m paired status and dignity of a 'subject', the recipient of his action into the victim of degradation to the status of object — be it w o m a n , h o m o s e x u a l , animal, child or e n e m y . T o consider sex a 'shared' act, a f o r m of association in w h i c h t w o 'participate' and s o m e t h i n g ' m u t u a l ' is happening, or if it is not, s o m e t h i n g w h i c h could be ' d e m o c r a t i z e d ' , thus seems to be considerably at odds w i t h reality. R a t h e r , the structure of 'sexuality' as of 'desire' seems to correspond to a transitive act of aggression, the subject—object structure of d o m i n a t i o n — a war campaign to c o n q u e r and occupy the living space of another. As Andrea D w o r k i n c o m ments o n this n o t i o n of h u n t and conquest, ' T h e e x c i t e m e n t is precisely in the nonconsensual character of the event.' 2 3 N o r can w e v i e w sexuality simply as a natural and existential physical activity like, say, eating, inflected only superficially by culture. R a t h e r , sexuality (that is, male 'universal' sexuality) is deeply r o o t e d in the history of the g e n d e r relationship, a political p o w e r relation of oppression, violence and exploitation. This means n o t only that it is a fundamentally antagonistic and hostile f o r m of behaviour, but that the sexual 'object' by definition is a d i s e m p o w e r e d and disenfranchised o p p o n e n t : only t h e n is the subject guaranteed to emerge victorious. This also explains w h y vulnerability is such a highly prized and 'stimulating' quality in the sexual ' o b j e c t ' , to w h i c h the subject ' r e sponds' w i t h desire - w h y m e n love to assault children and child p o r n o g r a p h y b o o m s , w h y childlike i n n o c e n c e , weakness and v u l n e r ability are sexual ideals of femininity, and w h y w o m e n w i t h disabilities are particularly at risk. Just so Levinas's subject feels properly challenged only by the vulnerability of the face — its unprotectedness, its defencelessness, its b e i n g at the subject's mercy, its fragility, its h e l p lessness and its crying, in short, its nakedness — feeling 'challenged' in a m i x t u r e of recognizing the other's 'misery' and a r e d o u b l e d aggression towards that other. T o stand powerless b e f o r e the subject, so the philosophers insist, means to d o 'violence' to the subject, ' o r d e r i n g it to love'. Since the other's naked and defenceless face is d o i n g n o t h i n g
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of the sort, it is m o r e likely that this 'love' indeed originates i n violence - n o t the violence of the powerless object, b u t the violence of the desiring subject seeing an easy victory close at hand. Sexuality, in o t h e r words, is r o o t e d in and determines the p o w e r inequality b e t w e e n the sexes, w h o s e institutionalized and 'official' sphere is marriage. T h e historical significance and d e v e l o p m e n t of marriage, therefore, is decisive also for the d e v e l o p m e n t of the c o n ception of sexuality and of I he 'personal relationship'. In civil society - the blueprint of W e s t e r n societies - m e n ' s marriage is the p r o t o t y p e of a relationship in the 'private' sphere w h i c h , unlike relations i n the public sphere, is neither entered into by contract n o r dissolvable simply by cancellation. W h a t is nevertheless called the marriage contract is not a contract b e t w e e n the marriage partners; at most it is a contract b e t w e e n the m a n and another man, the w o m a n ' s previous o w n e r , or else refers to marriage law. 2 4 For contracts may be entered into only by equals, by legal subjects. M a n ' s marriage, t h e r e fore, is originally uncancellable (by the other), and will be t e r m i n a t e d t h r o u g h n o t h i n g b u t the death of the wife - it is guaranteed in its non-terminability. As such it is less a f o r m of association than a possession. T h e man's ownership rights are constituted in his sexually taking possession of the w o m a n - still reflected in the e u p h e m i s m s for genital intercourse such as 'he possessed her', 'lie t o o k her' or 'she became his'. As Andrea D w o r k i n c o m m e n t s : 'he takes, h e keeps; o n c e he has had, it is his.' 2 5 T h u s in the history of W e s t e r n democracy, and since the abolition of slavery and serfdom, m e n ' s marriage represents the u n i q u e m o d e l of a social relation w h i c h fundamentally and legitimately is defined as the possession of a n o t h e r h u m a n b e i n g (and w h i c h today has a parallel only in the relation of h u m a n s to animals as a relation of complete possession and control over a n o t h e r living being). A l t h o u g h a m a n ' s children are also his possession, it is in their case t e m p o r a r y and limited - until sons c o m e of age and daughters are married off to b e c o m e a n o t h e r m a n ' s possession. And it is an ownership w h i c h at least de jure does n o t anticipate his taking possession of the interiority of their bodies, t h o u g h the history of legislation c o n c e r n i n g incest shows that the law only reluctantly interferes in the private sphere of fathers to prohibit their sexual exploitation of their children. 2 6 T h u s the crucial difference b e t w e e n m e n ' s relations to wife and children respectively lies less in m e n ' s actual practice than in the de jure proscription that in
the case of his wife a m a n must take sexual possession of her. Marriage is c o n s u m m a t e d only w i t h the first successful genital intercourse; w i t h o u t this the marriage can be 'annulled', that is to say, it was not a marriage w i t h o u t sexual intercourse, it was ' n o marriage'. Marriage w i t h o u t sexual intercourse is a contradiction in terms: it does not exist (conceptually or legally). In m o d e r n times, things have changed a little c o n c e r n i n g the legal guarantee of m e n ' s private relations — besides the political emancipation of w o m e n perhaps most crucially o n a c c o u n t of w o m e n having gained the right themselves to sue for divorce. T h a t is to say, the legal and material f r a m e w o r k of marriage may have considerably changed, so that m e n ' s marriage as a relation of possession at least theoretically is less absolutely secured. Y e t in many W e s t e r n states — w h e r e v e r rape in marriage is n o t recognized as a crime - m e n ' s marriage relation, even in its t e m p o r a r y limitation until a divorce, basically remains a relation of possession, since he retains the right to decide over 'his' wife's b o d y . A n d if the wife is of foreign nationality and w i t h o u t i n d e p e n d e n t right to stay in the country, the marriage de facto remains safe f r o m b e i n g terminated by her at least during the first f e w years, thus constituting an oasis of the old m o d e l of marriage in the midst of ' w o m e n ' s equality', w h i c h W e s t e r n m e n increasingly take advantage of. 27 Y e t the original m o d e l of m e n ' s marriage survives in m o d e r n W e s t e r n societies even w i t h o u t its legal f r a m e w o r k — in the generalized ideal of and aspiration to a 'private relationship'. While it may less b e the legal status of marriage w h i c h continues to b e desired, it is the very conditions and structure of relation w h i c h marriage created for the man and subject of the marriage: above all the security and durability of the relation (the fact that it c a n n o t be terminated by the wife yet can be left by the h u s b a n d at any time), the intimacy of the relation, that is, u n c o n d i t i o n a l access to the other, in particular the free availability of the b o d y of the o t h e r for one's o w n sexual use, w h i c h o f t e n also means the uniqueness and exclusiveness of the relation. A n d it is the significance of marriage as a right, n o w of the partners to each other, originally the right of the husband to his wife w i t h o u t reciprocal right of the wife. T h a t is to say, w h a t constitutes the 'positive' values of the relationship ideal are precisely those aspects of the marital relationship w h i c h originate in a m a n ' s individual ownership rights over a w o m a n within the institutionalized oppression of w o m e n .
sex ana the intimate relationship
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M o r e o v e r , as recent campaigns for the institution of ' h o m o s e x ual marriage' have s h o w n , it is n o t only the essence of the marital relationship w h i c h is reclaimed for homosexual relations, b u t also w h a t remains of its state protection and juridical f r a m e work. W h i l e theoretically the subject might have several such 'private' relationships (even if the W e s t e r n Christian state permits only one legal marriage at a time), it nevertheless must be obvious that this relationship cannot serve as the m o d e l for h u m a n sociality, let alone an egalitarian relation of h u m a n s to h u m a n i t y . For the 'private' or 'personal' relationship defines individuals in their singularity rather than their sociality. N o t only does it constitute - even in its m o d e r n variant - their 'private' and individual sphere, in w h i c h neither the state n o r other individuals have a right to intervene. In the language of m o d e r n i t y it is m o r e o v e r claimed as an aspect of individual identity. T h e right of the individual to privacy is not only the right 'to b e let alone', 2 8 b u t guarantees, in the language of m o d e r n i t y , ' a u t o n o m y of control over the intimacies of personal identity' (my emphasis). 2 9 This transformation of a social relation into a dimension of the singular 'individual' is indebted to the fact that the prototypical 'privacy' of the male citizen's marriage in reality harbours a surviving f o r m of slavery or serfdom. All the m o r e remarkable that today w o m e n also increasingly wish to define 'personal identity' precisely t h r o u g h such 'intimacies'. For, to construct such 'intimacy', a n o t h e r person is required, as a wife ( w h o is there for n o t h i n g else) is required for a man's marriage. T h e y are required to constitute a 'sexual relationship', that socially d e t e r m i n e d gender relationship w h i c h , in its individual f o r m as marriage, makes the relation b e t w e e n a m a n and a w o m a n a 'sexual' relation in every respect, even outside sexual activity. T h e y are required as the ' o b j e c t ' of the 'sexual activities' of the subject, as a wife is required by a husband for sexual intercourse and r e p r o d u c t i o n , that is to say, as a b o d y to w h i c h h e has u n i q u e and exclusive access - that is 'his' body. Such 'intimacy' w i t h one's ' o w n ' wife or one's personal ' o t h e r ' is what constitutes a 'feeling of selfhood' and 'identity'. All in all, such 'personal' identity is constructed by means of a n o t h e r person, w h o is necessary to it and to w h o m the subject tries to establish a 'right' o n a c c o u n t of 'the relationship' as a h u s b a n d has a right to his wife o n account of marriage. This most personal individual identity,
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in other words, is two-personal. O r , to put it differently, the c o n c e p tion of ' t h e relationship' as the core of 'the intimacies of personal identity' p r o g r a m m e s the control over and use of another person, that is, the subject's designed exploitation, abuse and violation of the other. H o w e v e r absurd it m a y b e to construct the 'private individual' as o n e person plus that person's intimacies w i t h others, it is all the m o r e naturalized in the m o d e r n relationship ideology. T h u s c o n t e m p o r a r y feminist sexologists as a m a t t e r of course speak of the subject and its sexual object, of the subject's desire for the o t h e r and for control over the o t h e r . Far f r o m q u e s t i o n i n g this concept of sexuality, this sexuality o n the contrary is seen to be 'in n e e d of reassurance t h r o u g h fantasies of c o n t r o l over others'. 3 0 B u t this claim to possession of and control over t h e - o t h e r , this heritage f r o m patriarchal male marriage, also looms large in the general relationship ideology. T h u s it is n o t unusual to find that individuals consider themselves c o m p l e t e only if they are 'in a relationship', w h i l e a time w i t h o u t a partner is t h o u g h t of as a t e m p o r a r y state of lack and an i n t e r i m only b e t w e e n t w o relationships. Alternatively, individuals aspire to 'a relationship' w i t h o u t k n o w i n g of a specific candidate f o r the vacant post of partner. This in no way differs f r o m the traditional search f o r a wife except in the formality of a c h u r c h or registry w e d d i n g u p o n success. T h e ancestry of marriage in the pedigree of 'the relationship' is perhaps n o w h e r e m o r e visible than in the h o m o l o g o u s social, that is, 'public' role of this 'private relationship' and the attendant customs and expressions w h i c h have b e e n seamlessly transferred to it f r o m the f o r m e r . T h u s w e speak of ' m y partner' or ' m y lover' as o n e used to speak o f ' m y wife', publicly characterizing a person as m y possession and as lacking an identity of their o w n . If o n c e this was a p r o b l e m specifically with married m e n w h o , i n t r o d u c i n g 'their' wives as ' m y w i f e ' , left us in the dark about the w o m a n ' s n a m e , it since has multiplied across the w h o l e spectrum of relationships and p a r t n e r ships. W h a t is apparent is that t h r o u g h this statement of possession this 'private' relationship is m a d e k n o w n to the public, w h o in turn are to give it 'public r e c o g n i t i o n ' , as a marriage entered in the c h u r c h or state register has a claim to b e i n g publicly recognized. Such r e c o g n i t i o n includes that the declared ownership is generally, that is, collectively and ideologically, respected (even if n o t necessarily in individual practice), in as m u c h as any additional sexual partner is in principle a c k n o w l e d g e d to constitute a violation of the rights of the
other partner, akin to traditional adultery ( b y the wife). Even if this n o longer entails the same severe social sanctions as in the past, the partner w h o s e rights are felt to b e violated may nevertheless c o u n t on the full understanding and sympathy of friends and acquaintances. In other words, the public declaration of the 'private' relationship, and its c o n c o m i t a n t recognition by society, imply and realize the principle of m o n o g a m y peculiar to institutional ( W e s t e r n ) marriage (which as sexual m o n o g a m y was e n f o r c e d only in relation to the wife). T o d a y , w h e n sexual m o n o g a m y in m a n y circles is n o longer a moral ideal and multiple sexual relations may indeed be the aspiration, even this aspiration is expressed w i t h reference to m o n o g a m y , i.e. marriage, namely as ' n o n - m o n o g a m y ' . Marriage, in other words, remains the uncontested reference p o i n t b o t h for relationships and for sexual relations, even in the attempt to escape its official f o r m and to transgress its traditional structures. Public recognition o f ' t h e relationship' also means that society n o longer treats the individual as an individual, b u t as a 'personal identity' w h o s e 'intimacy' is a c k n o w l e d g e d in the shape of the partner. C o n sequently, the individual is addressed as a relationship, in the plural of their intimacy, as a couple. O n e cultivates a social relation with this individual usually by cultivating a relation w i t h the w h o l e couple, addressing and inviting t h e m together or at the very least asking after the other half. Similarly o n e identifies those participating in this relationship each as the other's partner or 'intimacy'. T h u s if w e ask ' W h o is this w o m a n Anna?', the response o f t e n consists in the disclosure of w h o s e partner she is, as if w e t h e r e b y k n e w m o r e about w h o Anna is. H e r personal identity obviously lies in Iter personal 'intimacy'. N o r is there any d o u b t that the person w h o is n a m e d as another's partner is thereby designated as that person's sexual partner — w h e t h e r or n o t there are sexual activities in the privacy of this relationship. Just so marriage signifies a sexual relation, w h e t h e r or n o t the partners (any longer) engage in sexual relations w i t h each other. Sexuality thus is constitutive of the relationship, w h e t h e r or n o t the partners remain sexually active w i t h i n it: it is w h a t m a d e the relationship (even if in the past) a 'relationship', as c o n s u m m a t i o n of the marriage makes the marriage. Conversely w e may hear that the partners of a relationship have separated even t h o u g h they c o n t i n u e to live t o g e t h e r . T h a t is to say,
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the public are i n f o r m e d that the relationship is n o longer a sexual o n e (since it continues at the very least to be a flat-sharing relationship, the partners n o t b e i n g 'separated' in this respect). In other words, w e are told that the partners are 'free' again and back o n the relationship m a r k e t , for w h a t else could b e the reason for m a k i n g this private intimacy public? A c c o r d i n g to general relationship practice, society, in r e t u r n for recognizing relationships, has a 'right' to k n o w w h o is sexually tied and w h o is available, just as patriarchal society insists on k n o w i n g about everyone's marital or civil status. Sexuality thus remains a reference p o i n t also for non-sexual relations, even if only in that these are so defined, that is, t h r o u g h the absence of sexuality. A f u r t h e r sign that the relationship derives f r o m marriage is the c o m m o n understanding of it as a ' b o n d ' . W e probably associate ' b o n d ' in the first instance w i t h s o m e t h i n g like an ' e m o t i o n a l b o n d ' , w h i c h is usually valued positively (although we may v i e w it as an illness and specifically an addiction if w e d o n o t value it so positively). 3 1 Y e t the terms ' b o n d ' , 'tie' and 'liaison' still betray a m e a n i n g w h i c h for most w o m e n f o r a very l o n g t i m e has b e e n the reality of marriage and for m a n y c o n t i n u e s t o be so today, namely that they are b o u n d by this b o n d , as y o u r hands may be b o u n d by a rope, and as there is ' b o n d a g e ' and chaining in the g r o w i n g sexual culture of sadomasochism. ' B o n d a g e ' , apart f r o m having b e c o m e a specialized t e r m in the technical vocabulary of an international S / M culture, still means servitude, slavery, u n f r e e d o m . W h a t marriage and c o m p u l s o r y heterosexuality used to achieve as an institution, namely to bind w o m e n indissolubly to m e n and to a specific man, today other 'bonds' have to achieve, first and foremost t h e e m o t i o n a l and romantic b o n d . As Shulamith Firestone pointed out years ago, ' r o m a n t i c i s m is a cultural tool of male p o w e r to keep w o m e n f r o m k n o w i n g their conditions. It is especially n e e d e d - and t h e r e f o r e strongest - in W e s t e r n countries w i t h the highest rate of industrialisation.' 3 2 T h e industry of r o m a n c e literature, w h i c h in the last h u n d r e d years has g r o w n to p h e n o m e n a l p r o p o r t i o n s , has successfully - and in a m a n n e r adjusted to Women's e c o n o m i c situation — b r o u g h t the r o m a n t i c b o n d truly h o m e to w o m e n . At a time w h e n the institutional and legal b o n d s of marriage are slackening, it aims to persuade w o m e n h e n c e f o r t h to bind themselves f o r e m o t i o n a l reasons. As the parallel b o o m industry of p o r n o g r a p h y is c o n f i r m i n g m e n in their sadistic sexual role, e n c o u r a g i n g t h e m literally to b i n d w o m e n ,
so r o m a n c e literature defines and affirms w o m e n in their masochistic role, encouraging t h e m to b i n d 'themselves' to m e n : to subject t h e m selves to their will, to take over their will as (and instead o f ) their o w n , and to give u p their o w n identity in favour of an 'identity' as a couple. In o t h e r words, it propagates w o m e n ' s voluntary mental bondage and servitude. W i t h all the c o n t e m p t w h i c h cultural a n d political progressives usually have for cheap r o m a n c e , H o l l y w o o d sentimentality and Mills & B o o n m e l o d r a m a , there nevertheless is even in such circles a considerable reverence for romantic ideals w h e n it comes to relationships: uniqueness or exclusiveness, durability, and l o n g - t e r m security of the relationship are the u n c o n t e s t e d positive values to w h i c h a 'relationship' aspires, as is accountability, a k i n d of voluntary m u t u a l guarantee of the o t h e r person's right to oneself. T h a t this is not just a matter of ordinary accountability as, say, in relation to other people generally or to one's principles, is evidenced in the fact that it has b e c o m e a technical t e r m of the relationship j a r g o n . Similarly, the desire to a c c o m m o d a t e the relationship in the domesticity of a shared h o m e must b e seen as a romantic ideal i n d e b t e d to marriage. G e n e r ally, the g r o w i n g 'intensity' and progressive 'intimacy' of a relationship follows the precise timetable of courtship for the purpose of marriage: f r o m spatial as well as t e m p o r a l distance d u r i n g courtship and the t i m e of uncertainty, t h r o u g h m u t u a l avowal and the sense of security, to a temporal as well as a spacial m a x i m u m togetherness w h i c h finds its highest symbolic expression in the (prototypically marital) shared h o m e — even if actual togetherness thereafter n e e d n o t stay at the feasible m a x i m u m level. T h e s e r o m a n t i c ideals, not to m e n t i o n marriage itself, are highly valued also in m a n y h o m o s e x u a l and lesbian relationships — partly perhaps because marriage, b e i n g (as yet) unattainable, gains in attraction, partly because of a widespread assumption that a 'same-sex' relationship could never r e p r o d u c e all the reprehensible aspects of marriage. T h u s if t w o m e n or t w o w o m e n behave like a married couple, this is considered to b e s o m e t h i n g completely different f r o m a m a n and a w o m a n d o i n g so, and as having n o t h i n g to d o w i t h an ideology of compulsory heterosexuality. Alternatively, r o m a n t i c ideals also c o u n t as progressive a m o n g some heterosexual m e n on the left or in green and peace circles, since they are d e e m e d to be typically f e m i n i n e and thus typically u n - m a c h o . For c o m p l e m e n t a r y reasons,
p o r n o g r a p h i c ideals are attractive to w o m e n critical of femininity, because they are d e e m e d to be particularly male and h e n c e u n f e m inine. B u t p o r n o g r a p h i c ideals generally c o u n t as progressive in relation to sexuality, indeed, as the avant-garde p r o g r a m m e of sexual liberation. T h u s , if the issue is sexuality, p o r n o g r a p h y is the authority; if the issue is 'the relationship', r o m a n c e is the standard. 3 3 B o t h r o m a n c e and p o r n o g r a p h y are p r o d u c e d by the same capitalist film, music and publishing empires, w h i c h net some of the highest profits a m o n g multinational industries. Finally, it appears that relationship r o m a n c e feeds o n the n o t i o n that the worst thing m e n ever did in patriarchy (in the long distant past) was to leave or a b a n d o n w o m e n . H e n c e the roving Casanova (though simultaneously admired) b e c o m e s the archetypal patriarchal culprit, while the faithful husband w h o keeps his wife ascends to the status of the progressive post-patriarchal hero. W o m e n w h o , w i t h or w i t h o u t children, w e r e and are being a b a n d o n e d — left in particular w i t h o u t m o n e y and opportunities to m a k e a living — d o indeed face formidable difficulties in a society based o n the double standard and gender-specific discrimination regarding paid e m p l o y m e n t . Yet it does n o t follow that the absence of a m a n is the worst a m o n g their difficulties. N o r does it follow that a w o m a n w h o s e husband rules and abuses her in the sanctioned privacy of his h o m e for a lifetime necessarily has the better lot. R a t h e r , it shows that such a v i e w remains indebted to the contradictory patriarchal double standard w h i c h for m e n simultaneously envisages marriage and roving Casanoving, r e p r o ductive m o n o g a m y and sexual promiscuity, thus instituting a division of labour b e t w e e n sex and relationship: 'sexual variety' 3 4 in the public private sector and relation of possession in marriage. I f ' t h e relationship', t h e n , in its p r o v e n a n c e as well as its structure, is a close relative of patriarchal marriage — the u n i q u e and exclusive relationship of a husband in his private sphere, for w h i c h sexuality m o r e o v e r is constitutive — it should also be obvious that it c a n n o t be ' d e m o c r a t i z e d ' . If there is a need for 'democratization', it means that the status q u o is u n d e m o c r a t i c and that u n d e m o c r a t i c structures and practices need abolishing. H o w e v e r , the t e r m 'democratizing' increasingly is used n o t in a political but rather a consumerist sense, m e a n i n g that a ' g o o d ' should be made available to the largest n u m b e r of possible consumers. B u t even in this sense w e w o u l d presume that
something is to be democratized because it is desirable and positive a privilege or a right or good w h i c h everybody ought to be able equally to enjoy. Yet the marital relationship, just like sexuality, is neither 'positive', n o r 'desirable', nor a privilege - f r o m the perspective of a wife w h o is required for and used in it. An analysis of this relationship and of sexuality w h i c h includes w o m e n ' s experience of t h e m , reveals these not to be desirable goods w h i c h need democratizing, but structures of domination w h i c h need abolishing. T h a t th ere is nevertheless talk of it, that it is even considered a desirable goal, is due to the fact that this relationship - be it to the wife, the partner or the philosophical ' O t h e r ' - continues to b e considered with unshakeable tenacity as a form o f ' l o v e ' , a good d e e d f r o m w h i c h an optimal n u m b e r of others should benefit. N o matter that history teaches us otherwise, that experience shows the horrific reverse: both history and experience seem ineffectual in the face of t h e cultural onslaught of this ideology of love. A relationship to the 'other' which is based on the uniqueness of the marital relation - a uniqueness w h i c h continues to be constitutive f o r the m o d e r n partnership in contradistinction to a multitude of sexual contacts — cannot be democratized in the sense of being multiplied to render a so-called sociality, quite apart f r o m the question of its desirability. Universality cannot be m a d e out of uniqueness. R a t h e r the unique (even if multiplied) relationship of a man to a w o m a n w h i c h is usually called love, far f r o m being universalizable, stands in reciprocal relation to his general relations to w o m e n : his universal misogyny, not to say hatred of w o m e n , which is constituted in the social oppression of w o m e n by m e n . T h e romance of looking for a wife consists precisely in selecting f r o m a m o n g the mass of despised and despisable w o m e n one unique o n e for private purposes, w h o will correspondingly feel flattered to have been chosen. As Firestone and other feminists have shown, what w o m e n consider to be positive i n romantic love derives its value precisely f r o m the comparison with the same man's negative relation to all other w o m e n . 3 5 This at the same time institutes the mechanism of 'divide and rule', since the w o m a n chosen will not only not take her man's general misogyny personally, she will need it to assure herself of her position as the one and only 'exception'. T h e 'personal relation', w h e t h e r sexual or not, reproduces this structure of a positive choice before the foil of general negative
relations: w h e t h e r it is a partnership or friendship, its significance is that here w e will n o t b e h a v e as w e normally behave towards people, that the partner has a claim, if n o t a right, to be treated 'better' than, w e generally treat people. Such a relationship, therefore (even leaving aside the serious question w h e t h e r 'better' really is better), is the worst possible m o d e l for a generalized relation b e t w e e n people, since it implies its o w n negative standard, and by the practice of exception fortifies the general rule. Just as little can t h e fundamentally asymmetrical, transitive structure of sexuality, w h i c h is the d e f i n i n g dynamic of this relationship, be ' d e m o c r a t i z e d ' w i t h i n the relationship or m a d e symmetrical as a ' d e m o c r a c y of t w o ' . T h e relation of s e r f d o m cannot be democratized; if there is a critique of it, it can only be abolished. N e i t h e r can marriage, the relation of h u s b a n d and wife, be t u r n e d into a pair of equal husbands, n o r the sexual subject and his sexual object be transf o r m e d into t w o sexual subjects. It is n o t possible to turn a society of masters and slaves into a society of masters only, or a master—slave pair into a pair of masters. If they b o t h b e c o m e masters, they n o longer are a pair, and others have b e e n m a d e to take the role of slaves s o m e where.
Female desire, or the democratization violence
of
T h e contradiction involved in w a n t i n g to democratize sexuality b e c o m e s most evident w h e n w o m e n are trying to d o just that: to b e c o m e sexual subjects as m e n are sexual subjects, advocating w o m e n ' s personal sexual liberation after the m o d e l of the sexual revolution, and m o r e o v e r mistaking it for a p r o g r a m m e o f ' w o m e n ' s e m a n c i p a t i o n ' . This betrays a serious m i s c o n c e p t i o n not only of democracy, b u t also of the ideology of the 'sexual r e v o l u t i o n ' . For the aim of the latter is n o t to liberate w o m e n , b u t to liberate sexuality, w h i c h h i t h e r t o has b e e n heinously oppressed. T h e characteristic o p pressors are the personal as well as the cultural s u p e r - e g o - an amalgam of external and internalized moral authorities like parents, c h u r c h , education and the state, manifested in the average h e g e m o n i a l m o r a lity and p r u d e r y , society's as well as one's o w n . It is f r o m these repressive instances that 'sexuality' is to b e liberated — there is n o m e n t i o n of sexuality itself n e e d i n g to b e revolutionized or even just democratized. T h e sexuality in question of course is male sexuality, w h i c h as usual goes w i t h o u t saying. Feminists have extensively analysed the impact w h i c h this unleashing of male sexuality has had and continues to have o n w o m e n : that the g r o w i n g 'liberty' of the male sexual subject necessitates the g r o w ing 'availability' of w o m e n . It is the very reason w h y sexual politics has b e e n at the centre of feminist politics: since the sexual constitutes the d o m a i n of the specific oppression of w o m e n as w o m e n , this so 'personal' and 'private' m a t t e r is political. H e n c e the political liberation of w o m e n f r o m oppression necessarily also requires their personal liberation f r o m the intimate oppression in sexual relationship:
e m a n c i p a t i o n f r o m their status as ' o t h e r ' , 'otherness' and the ' o t h e r sex' to p e r s o n h o o d . Since it was m o r e o v e r to be expected that the beneficiaries of sex and the sexual revolution w o u l d n o t be enthusiastic a b o u t a liberation p r o j e c t on the part of their sexual m e d i u m , feminists have emphasized f r o m the b e g i n n i n g that the liberation of w o m e n , like, say, the liberation of workers, will require political struggle. T h e ideologues of the sexual revolution k n o w this too, and have b e e n at war w i t h f e m i n i s m ever since. It is only o n e of their m a n y strategies to use the political vocabulary of w o m e n ' s liberation to camouflage their plans f o r w o m e n as a belated 'liberation' o f ' f e m a l e sexuality'. As w e have seen, such liberation consists of w o m e n m o r e freely indulging the sex role of masochist victim, to match the male role of sadist victor, as o r d a i n e d b y the sexologists of old and m o d e r n i z e d only t h r o u g h an increased factor of brutality. Since its e r u p t i o n in the sixties the sexual revolution has gained substantial g r o u n d , sadomasochism rapidly b e c o m i n g the n o r m of sexuality. T h u s w e may observe h o w a practice of so-called ' r o u g h sex', to w h i c h a g r o w i n g n u m b e r of w o m e n are falling victim, is b e i n g c o n f i r m e d as the n e w social standard of heterosexuality, w i t h lawyers and courts h e l p i n g to adjust the juridical standards of 'acceptable' brutality to an alleged n o r m in social practice. W h e n in the U S A R o b e r t C h a m b e r s stood accused of m u r d e r i n g his sexual partner J e n n i f e r Levin, his defence lawyer, Barry Slotnick, argued that this was less a case of m u r d e r than a mishap in the course of ' r o u g h sex'. 'Sexual asphyxiation', so h e explained, 'is a great h i d d e n secret of this society.' 1 Asphyxiation, in case w e are n o t so familiar w i t h clinical G r e e k and Latin, means the transitive action of suffocating s o m e o n e — in the w o r d s of the dictionary, to ' c h o k e or kill by stopping respiration (of person . . .)' ( O E D ) . T o call it 'a great h i d d e n secret of this society' is to suggest that this practice forms a c o m m o n part of the repertoire o f ' n o r m a l ' heterosexual activity. It b e c o m e s an o p e n secret only if the p a r t n e r happens actually to suffocate, i.e. w h e n the secret leaves an u n f o r t u n a t e trace in the shape of a dead body. This may be a regrettable piece of evidence, leading to the lover b e i n g tried in court, b u t it is a happy circumstance in so far as such evidence is n o l o n g e r in a position to give evidence. Q u i t e o n the contrary, authoritative experts m a y n o w i m p u t e to the evidence 'consent' to the very practice w h i c h t u r n e d h e r into evidence, that is to say, i m p u t e to the w o m a n w h o
cannot say otherwise that she consented to her 'lover' practising the ' r o u g h sex' w h i c h killed her. A n d i n d e e d a n o t h e r client of the same lawyer and well-versed expert in matters of n o r m a l sexual practice, the n i n e t e e n - y e a r - o l d Joseph P o r t o , accused of m u r d e r i n g Katherine Holland, is f o u n d guilty only of negligent homicide. 2 His lawyer apparently successfully argued that 'the y o u n g couple' w e r e 'a pair w h o fell victim to a tragic accident that could easily have h a p p e n e d to a n y o n e ' . 3 As his client explained, retracting his earlier confession to have strangled Katherine Holland, he had b e e n engaged in playful sex w i t h her, and 'to increase her sexual pleasure', had ' p u t a rope a r o u n d her neck' and 'inadvertently y a n k e d it t o o hard'. 4 T o have shifted the issue f r o m m u r d e r to sex means to have shifted it f r o m an analysis of criminal action to the perspective of sexology, w h i c h conceives w h a t e v e r ' h a p p e n e d ' as by definition a shared event w h i c h allows us to infer the equal consent and shared experience of b o t h partners - if anything, it is the 'pair' falling victim to the brutality of the 'sex'. B u t while P o r t o , like Havelock. Ellis's loving pain-inflicting lover, is seen merely to oblige his partner's sexual pleasure, the sheer presence of the w o m a n apparently allows us to infer her consent as well as h e r desire to submit to her partner's will - the presence of her corpse allowing the sexological jurist to infer her consent and h e r desire to be strangulated by P o r t o in a practice o f ' r o u g h sex'. If thus the alleged social 'normality' of ' r o u g h sex' has helped to change juridical standards, the titillating court cases and their newly set p r e cedents in turn help to normalize the 'great h i d d e n secret of this society', that is, to legitimize the increasingly m u r d e r o u s sex practice o f ' n o r m a l ' m e n . T h e 'world's press' is in attendance at the C h a m b e r s trial at M a n h a t t a n ' s S u p r e m e C o u r t , to i n f o r m the ' w o r l d ' of this m o m e n t o u s r e v o l u t i o n in c o n t e m p o r a r y mores. 5 W h a t the sexual r e v o l u t i o n thus has in store for w o m e n is not their accession to male sexual subjectivity, but the 'liberated' role of m a s o chist and victim. T h e political vocabulary of w o m e n ' s liberation is h u m o u r e d in so far as w o m e n are e n c o u r a g e d indeed to b e c o m e m o r e 'active' and 'assertive' - m o r e active in seeking and m o r e assertive in voluntarily assuming their p r e o r d a i n e d role. A n d if w o m e n perchance should fall for it and see no p r o b l e m w i t h such a n o t i o n of g e n d e r e d 'liberty' - the liberty of voluntary subjection - the advocates of the sexual r e v o l u t i o n certainly k n o w that this c o m p l e m e n t a r y ' d e m o -
cracy' presents n o threat to male subjectivity and n o danger of a redistribution of p o w e r . R a t h e r , if w o m e n n o w aspire to sexual subjectivity as m e n do, this simply promises a m o r e sportive battle of the sexes, o n the individual as well as the collective level. O n the individual level, since as a n o w o p e n battle m e n will fight it w i t h increased tenacity to ensure their c o n t i n u i n g victory - a fact w h i c h has already seduced m a n y a social c o m m e n t a t o r to blame the g r o w i n g sexual violence of m e n in W e s t ern societies o n feminism and the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t , as 'causing' or ' p r o v o k i n g ' it; 6 and o n the collective level, since the n u m b e r of institutionalized 'victims' is objectively decreasing and 'victims' are t h e r e f o r e at a p r e m i u m . T h u s the p h e n o m e n a l increase in prostitution, in a society boasting apparently liberalized sexual relations a m o n g its members, is a sign that male sexual subjectivity is shifting to a context w h e r e b o t h (male) subjectivity and (female) objectivity remain intact, f r a m e d and secured by contract. W h a t ' w o m a n ' used to signify, today only 'prostitute' c o n t i n u e s to signify w i t h certainty (even if only on strictly limited and circumscribed terms). Similarly, the prevalence of child sexual assault confirms m e n ' s c o n t i n u i n g predilection for persons of still disenfran-. chised status. W h i l e the g r o w i n g interest of W e s t e r n m e n in marriages w i t h w o m e n f r o m i m p o v e r i s h e d T h i r d W o r l d countries (and the a c c o m p a n y i n g juridical f r a m e w o r k facilitating the w o m e n ' s i m p o r t a tion and ensuring their lack of i n d e p e n d e n t rights) shows a strategic e n t r e n c h m e n t of traditional male sexual subjectivity and privilege. T h a t the attraction of such marriages is precisely the increased differential of p o w e r b e t w e e n a male citizen and a 'foreign' w o m a n is f u r t h e r evidenced by t h e fact that m e n pay an unusually high price for a 'mail order bride' w h o is also m u t e (the m o n e y of course going to h e r dealer, rather than the w o m a n herself): ' N o r m a l l y , a w o m a n f r o m Asia costs a r o u n d D M 5,000 [approx. £ 2 , 0 0 0 ] . For m u t e w o m e n the d e m a n d far exceeds t h e supply. I have b e e n offered m u t e w o m e n at D M 25,000 [£10,000]. ! ' 7 Y e t t h e w o m a n ' s lack of political rights, plus, as the case m a y be, her speaking a different language f r o m her W e s t e r n husband, already effectively guarantees her virtual 'deaf-muteness' - at least for the i m m e d i a t e f u t u r e , and if she is carefully secluded, also in the l o n g term. H e r chances of self-determination, of articulating and asserting her o w n interests vis-a-vis h e r husband, are thus seriously impaired. W h e r e a s the latter, as experience shows, may make himself
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sufficiently u n d e r s t o o d even w i t h o u t linguistic skills, that is, by the traditional means of battering and physical violence. 8 So if female co-citizens — w o m e n w i t h equal political rights w h o could at last challenge male subjectivity - n o t only do not do so, b u t instead aspire to such subjectivity themselves, it certainly constitutes n o threat to male subjectivity. O n the contrary, 'subjectivity' is thus 'democratically' ratified, ' w o m e n ' and ' m e n ' (that is, citizens of b o t h sexes) n o w b e i n g united in a social consensus, sharing a c o m m o n purpose, a c o m m o n value, a c o m m o n sense. For those c o n t i n u i n g to be l o c k e d into social object status — 'mail order brides', migrants male and female, prostitutes indigenous and foreign, children and old people — d o n o t c o u n t as part of the d e m o c r a t i c 'society' w h i c h constitutes its consensus. T h e ' n e w w o m a n ' w h o co-determines the n e w social consensus of the n e w d e m o c r a c y is the w o m a n citizen of (re)productive age in her capacity as 'private individual' - the e m b o d i m e n t of the 'emancipation of female pleasure'. 9 As Ariane Barth informs us in an article in the G e r m a n weekly, Der Spiegel, female emancipation, 'steadily as c l o c k w o r k ' , is w o r k i n g its transformations, 'As the figure of p o s t - f e m i n i s m there appears the desiring w o m a n , in theory and in practice. She is the completion of that cultural revolutionary w h o , in a process lasting over a century, has b r o k e n into the w o r l d of m e n and claimed her part.' 1 0 N o longer satisfied merely to be desired, she also wants to have in h e r sexuality ' w h a t used to be the epitome of the male role' 1 1 — although w e m i g h t say that, it is less a matter of s o m e t h i n g w h i c h m a y be had than of s o m e t h i n g o n e may do, and w h i c h so far mostly m e n have b e e n doing. As a shrewd social observer, h o w e v e r , Barth hasn't failed to notice that the first w o m a n to do as m e n do has b e e n the 'masculine w o m a n ' , alias the 'invert' - even if Barth attributes her appearance to the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t (probably o n a c c o u n t of the central role of lesbians in that m o v e m e n t ) rather than to the sexologists at the turn of the century w h o i n v e n t e d her. For t w o decades there had b e e n 'ideological s h o o t i n g at the phallocrats' f r o m the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t , and 'as a sign of the t u r n i n g away f r o m m e n ' a totally different topic e m e r g e d ' f r o m the depths of social repression': 'the female desire for the w o m a n ' . 1 2 Q u i t e in line w i t h the patriarchal and sexological perspective, w o m e n ' s struggle for i n d e p e n d e n c e — their political and ideological ' t u r n i n g away f r o m m e n ' — is here equated with, a sexual perversion or inversion: feminists are m a n - h a t i n g lesbians w h o turn
away f r o m m e n , n o t because of their critique of patriarchy and male b e h a v i o u r b u t because really they are driven b y a sexual desire for w o m e n . Yet this is ultimately of less interest to o u r social historian than is the 'gigantic de-eroticization' w h i c h by contrast has beset the relations b e t w e e n the sexes, at the same time as the cultural industry is signalling a 'hyper-sexualization' - p r o d u c i n g a flood of lively 'sexuality' o n dead paper and celluloid w h i c h , h o w e v e r , in Margrit B r u c k n e r ' s w o r d s , 'has left hearts and groins as living Eros'. 1 3 H e n c e , Barth claims, there is 'a y e a r n i n g stirring in the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t ' f o r the relationship b e t w e e n the sexes to b e 're-eroticized'. 1 4 T h e p r o o f of such stirrings in t h e w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t Barth finds in the texts of a sizeable collection of highly accredited female academics, professors f r o m b o t h sides of the Atlantic, all 'radical analysts of psychological and social p h e n o m e n a , literature, art and cinema': ' A m e r i c a n avant-gardists are feeling the "Desire to Desire" ', in the w o r d s of 'cinema theorist M a r y A n n D o a n e , B r o w n University, P r o v i d e n c e ' , while ' t h e psychoanalyst Jessica B e n j a m i n , N e w Y o r k University, student of A d o r n o , admirer of Marcuse and f e m i n i s m ' , speaks of a 'feeling of sexual subjectivity'. ' T h e sociologist B r u c k n e r ' , already previously identified as 'Professor of Sociology at Frankfurt', speaks of ' t h e social birth of female desire', 1 5 and all in all w e m a y rest assured that these are n o t the usual plebs of the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t stirring, b u t a radical scientific discourse of r e n o w n e d provenance. ' N e v e r b e f o r e in the history of the w o r l d has the female sex b e e n as free as it is in o u r times', 1 6 the a u t h o r continues, w i t h a remarkably encompassing v i e w of the w o r l d in our times, f r o m w h i c h the millions of w o m e n victims and refugees of war, of w o m e n and girls living in abject p o v e r t y and famine, of w o m e n and girls enslaved in prostitution and the sex trade the w o r l d over seem to be wholly absent. T h e author's gaze is fixed o n the free w o m e n w h o n o w are in search of their ' e l e m e n t a r y wishes'. 1 7 O n e such elementary wish apparently is the wish to c o m m i t violence towards others, starting w i t h the violence of objectification. For, as w o m e n have truly learnt f r o m m e n , ' t o desire means to objectify, means it even in a radical w a y ' , as Barbara S i c h t e r m a n n elaborates in a collection of essays aptly n a m e d Weiblichkeit — Zur Politik des Privaten (Femininity — the Politics of the Private): ' H o w should w o m e n , b u r d e n e d by their oppressing, c e n turies-old disadvantage, be capable of it overnight?' 1 8 A good
question, t h o u g h it is to be feared that p o w e r and practice will m a k e perfect in the case of w o m e n as they did w i t h m e n . In the m e a n t i m e an empirical survey of the state of the art may get us further: ' F o r the rising era of the erotic p o w e r of the female sex a certain look is symptomatic: direct, even aggressive, as if the w o m e n w e r e penetrating.' 1 9 W h i l e 'the c o u n t e r - i m a g e of the female transgressor/harasser has also b e e n developing, although she [sic] is m u c h rarer.' 2 0 ' C a n a m a n b e raped?' is the next question facing the serious student, and b e i n g rather difficult to answer, a male expert, the novelist A n t h o n y Burgess, is consulted. C i t i n g his fictional depiction of such a rape scene, Barth c o m m e n t s : 'Everything has b e c o m e possible in this game of the sexes: promise as well as threat.' 2 1 W h a t w e therefore may learn above all f r o m this male expert pleasurably imagining a m a n b e i n g raped by f o u r 'unleashed' w o m e n w h o k n e w 'every trick of the b r o t h e l ' , is that rape is a jolly ' g a m e ' of the sexes as full of promise as it is of threat. Promise to w h o m and threat to w h o m remains unspecified, h e n c e b o t h remain 'qualities' of the thing itself, the ' g a m e ' of rape. A n y o n e claiming the contrary is b u t a spoilsport. T h e first t w o lessons o n the topic of desire are thus: (1) aggressive objectifying and penetrating look, if possible a c c o m p a n i e d by a bit of transgressive harassment; (2) rape. T h e r e are complications, h o w e v e r , in the curriculum. For while the first t w o lessons p r o c e e d e d on the basic principle of ' h e t e r o ' and its simple inversion - the inversion of the male subject to a female subject entailing a correspondingly inverted male object (even t h o u g h the raping subject b e y o n d inversion also requiring multiplication to f o u r female subjects, plus the advanced c o m p e t e n c y of prostitutes) — the next step is a decided return to the ' n o r m a l ' relationship b e t w e e n the sexes. After this brief practical field trip w e r e t u r n to the lecture theatre and the study of the great master — patriarchal culture. Since there is 'so little orientation' for the n e w w o m e n , w e rifle the w o r k s of great m e n , in the h o p e that they may already have applied t h e m selves to the p r o b l e m , creating some 'images and role models' for the n e w w o m a n to follow. 2 2 T h u s the Frankfurt literary critic Carola Hilmes investigated w h e t h e r at least the femme fatale — f r o m her biblical beginnings to her adaptation by great E u r o p e a n writers as Penthesilea or J u d i t h , Salome or perhaps W e d e k i n d ' s Lulu — could not serve for the 'reconstruction of sensuality as female p o w e r ' . 2 3 She could, b u t not sufficiently so. For although w e find plenty of female
figures o f ' d e m o n i c p o w e r ' w h o w o u l d do nicely, the p r o b l e m apparently is that these are also invariably punished and ultimately destroyed f o r their p o w e r . T h a t the aspiring female subject as a first step of her e m a n c i p a t i o n proposes to subject herself to the role m o d e l of a male fantasy does n o t in itself seem to pose any p r o b l e m . Because of this deplorable lack of pre-existing role models w o m e n resort to constructing their o w n cultural blueprint, b e it Jessica B e n j a m i n ' s ' p s y c h o - u t o p i a ' , M a r y A n n D o a n e ' s 'artificial m y t h ' , or even 'female p o r n ' or, m o r e h i g h b r o w , the 'presentation of female bodies by female artists'. 24 N o w the study of the art of desire n o longer proceeds o n the ' h e t e r o ' principle, b u t via the traditional object of desire, the female b o d y . ' W o m e n are thus demonstrating that they can define their o w n eroticism and oppose it to phallic desire.' 2 5 W h e t h e r it be their o w n or the phallic eroticism of m e n , its object remains a female b o d y . Margrit B r u c k n e r explains: 'So l o n g as the female b o d y c a n n o t be appropriated by w o m e n and w o m e n refrain f r o m o c c u p y i n g their b o d y positively, female desire will be stunted.' 2 6 So long as w o m e n d o not appropriate the female b o d y as m e n routinely appropriate it, that is, in an act of taking possession, w o m e n will n o t experience (male) desire. W o m e n may have a female b o d y , yet to learn to desire it in male fashion they will need to appropriate it like a foreign b o d y , taking possession of it as b o o t y in a crusade of conquest. This means, in the case of their o w n body, less an act of appropriation than the already widely c u r r e n t and culturally well inculcated alienation f r o m their o w n b o d y : not just the psychological splitting of the self into subject and object, b u t the radical splitting of the self into male subjectivity and a female b o d y . It is a process w h o s e harmful consequences for w o m e n are well k n o w n , as the manifold manifestations of a disturbed relationship to their o w n body. If the b o d y in question, h o w e v e r , is n o t the w o m a n ' s o w n b o d y , b u t , as in the case of the female artists' presentation of w o m e n ' s bodies, other w o m e n ' s bodies, male desire is at last b e g i n n i n g to realize itself, predicated o n a female subject: in the objectification of, that is the violence d o n e to, other w o m e n ' s bodies and thus to other w o m e n . W h a t w e are witnessing, t h e n , is by n o means a specifically female desire, b u t o n the contrary, the sheer imitation of the old and familiar male desire for the object 'female b o d y ' . Similarly Lynne Segal's search for female e m p o w e r m e n t , for ' w o m e n as e m p o w e r e d agents of heterosexual desire', 2 7 yields as its greatest success so far 'many y o u n g
w o m e n presenting themselves . . . as sexual agents in ways not so different f r o m m e n ' . 2 8 T h e suspicion is g r o w i n g that 'sex' means male sex, 'desire' means male desire, 'sexual agency' means male sexual agency; that the m o r e closely any eroticism resembles male eroticism and the m o r e closely any desire resembles male desire, the m o r e certain they are to be 'real' eroticism and desire. A n d the m o r e closely a female subject's b e h a v i o u r resembles the b e h a v i o u r of a male subject, the m o r e likely the female subject is to be a sexual subject. I n other words, w e are dealing n o t w i t h any democratization of sexuality and desire, b u t the simple attempt at a role change within the most u n d e m o c r a t i c structure of traditional male sex. Just as the e x p e r i m e n t i n g sexual pioneers do not concern t h e m selves w i t h the existing problems of female self-alienation, so they d o n o t seem to object to the traditional subject—object structure of sex and desire, n o r to the fact that the role of object continues to be occupied by w o m e n . W h a t seems of interest, rather, is the possibility of the pioneers themselves o c c u p y i n g the role of desiring subject — with a spectrum of diverse objects. T h u s Jane Gallop's experiment first of all leads to auto-eroticism, that is, a relationship of the subject to its o w n art, the object 'desire': 'I animate it, and it animates me' 2 9 — in w o n d e r f u l mutuality and reciprocity. By contrast, Gisela Breitling returns to the object ' m a n ' and her attempt to utilize it for female desire: 'But can m e n stand up to such w o m e n ' s gaze? C a n the sex, w h i c h for thousands of years has b e e n holding the p o w e r of voyeurism, really bear to be l o o k e d at?' 30 N o d o u b t they can, but d o they want to? W h i l e m e n , f r o m the ideologues of the sexual revolution to the individual practitioner, seem to understand rather better that desire is a question of p o w e r and the will to p o w e r — that they neither w a n t to give up p o w e r , n o r aspire to being d i s e m p o w e r e d by w o m e n — these female ideologues seem to prefer to psychologize and sociologize m e n ' s behaviour, representing their n o t w a n t i n g to as n o t (yet) being able to, thus k e e p i n g t h e m available for f u t u r e experiments. An empirical survey apparently yields 'armies of m e n ' avoiding w o m e n ' s penetrating look in 'deepest c o n f u s i o n ' , or leaving their place at the bar 'in flight'. 3 1 T h e conclusion: 'Fear remains an accompanying factor of desire.' 3 2 W h o s e fear and w h o s e desire once again remains scientifically unspecified. U n d e r this psychologizing perspective, m e n are 'deeply c o n f u s e d ' while the m o t i v e of their flight is fear. And while there is a certain
sympathy e x t e n d e d to t h e m , a sensitive understanding o f their 'fear' of female aggression, it nevertheless is the aggressive w o m e n , and h e n c e aggressors in general, w h o appear as the ultimate victims. For as it turns out, this p e n e t r a t i n g gaze and this initiation of a transgression towards a n o t h e r do n o t constitute a danger to the other, b u t an ' e n d a n g e r m e n t of the self \ 3 3 T h e aggressor 'exposes' herself t h r o u g h her aggression: 'In the free play of forces this desirous exposure of the needs of one's o w n b o d y — its drivenness — seems to cause b o t h sexes equal anxiety', B r u c k n e r argues. 3 4 In other words, it is n o longer only traditional rapists, sexual harassers, molesters and abusers w h o thus p u t themselves at risk and in danger; w e n o w may c o u n t o n w o m e n aggressors similarly exposing themselves. Y e t as the relevant science also reports, m e n are still facing this danger in m o r e manly fashion than w o m e n , w h o 'fend off their o w n desire in p a n i c and fright, d e v e l o p i n g instead a hysteria of avoidance'. 3 5 T r u e female boldness is thus required to learn the art of violence: ' w e n e e d courage in order to desire' ( B r u c k n e r ) ; and ' w e only gain (or win) b y objectifying' (Sichtermann). 3 6 For gain is the goal and victory the purpose: gaining p o w e r over the other i n order to profit f r o m t h e m , to instrumentalize t h e m for one's pleasure and use t h e m after one's will. ' T h e fact that the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t has d e v o l v e d the aggressive part exclusively o n to m e n n o w takes its toll', Ariane Barth exhorts. N o w w e have to w i n it back. 3 7 In fact, the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t did n o t so m u c h devolve t h e aggressive part on to the male sex as f i n d it there, that is, criticize that m e n freely c h o o s e it. B u t that too, Barth argues, n o w takes its toll, since some m e n , taking the critique to heart, apparently distanced themselves f r o m the 'habitual rapist' — ' a n d lo!, at the same stroke the force w h i c h o n c e propelled the c o n q u e r o r was g o n e . ' 3 8 T h a t is, at the same stroke the violence was g o n e and thus the sex was g o n e . W h a t r e m a i n e d was 'infantile snuggle-sex' (Ulrike Heider) and ' t e n d e r servicing', 3 9 w h i c h , the scientists and pioneers are agreed, is n o adult sex at all. W h i l e mainstream ideologues still hesitate to equate sex w i t h violence, trying instead to differentiate b e t w e e n sex ' w i t h ' or ' w i t h o u t ' violence, these radical analysts of psychological and social p h e n o m e n a , literature, art and cinema are stating w i t h u n p r e c e d e n t e d clarity w h a t b e f o r e could b e heard only f r o m t h e radical feminist u n d e r g r o u n d , and then only amidst a c l a m o u r of o p p o s i t i o n . Y e t w h a t n o w comes as scientific truth even goes b e y o n d w h a t radical feminists
jscsile uiiu violence
J 81
claim. N o t only is the 'habitual rapist' clearly to be preferred over critical anti-sexist m e n , the unmistakable message is: no sex w i t h o u t violence, n o desire w i t h o u t the lust for b o o t y , n o excitement w i t h o u t conquest. For w i t h o u t its goal of d o m i n a n c e and submission there is n o m o t o r and n o dynamic for sex. Since feminists, h o w e v e r , have b e e n c o n c e r n e d w i t h a critique of violence rather than w i t h a search for sex, the emphasis, despite similar insight, has b e e n s o m e w h a t different: if experience shows that sex i n d e e d means violence and sexual e x c i t e m e n t the pleasure of p o w e r — that sex minus the violence does n o t leave y o u w i t h n o n - v i o l e n t sex b u t simply w i t h ' n o sex' at all - it does n o t f o l l o w that we therefore must accept violence; it follows that 'sex' as such is unacceptable. It means to recognize the violence of sex, n o t filling the concept o f ' s e x ' w i t h ' n e w m e a n i n g ' and rehabilitating violence. W e neither attempt to give n e w and positive meanings to the concepts of 'war' or 'anti-Semitism' to rehabilitate t h e m discursively. (Although w i t h the n o t i o n of 'just wars', 'humanitarian interventions' and military alliances as 'partnerships for peace', a process of rehabilitating 'war' has clearly begun.) T h e critique of violence, of anti-Semitism, of m i s o g yny, of sexuality does not call for a correction of these terms o n the level of discourse, b u t for political consequences o n the level of reality. If y o u r aim, h o w e v e r , is to rescue 'sex' — after this sobering lapse into insight, to render Eros 'living' again - it means, in the w o r d s of o n e of its rescuers, 'a game of "destruction and survival" ' (Jessica B e n j a m i n ) . 4 0 T h e distinction of this n e w eroticism, so B e n j a m i n argues, lies 'in the survival of the o t h e r in and despite the destruction'. 4 1 In other words, it lies in avoiding the mishaps of a R o b e r t C h a m b e r s or a Joseph Porto, w h o s e partners transformed into corpses d u r i n g destruction, failing to assert the crucial difference by surviving. For according to B e n j a m i n , survival is 'the difference w h i c h the o t h e r asserts', that is, the o n e in the process of being destroyed; it is not the difference w h i c h rests in the hands of h i m w h o does the destroying. Such survival does n o t look so very different f r o m w o m e n ' s survival in sexual slavery and sexual violence, w h e r e the w o m a n physically survives (if she does) in and despite her destruction as a person. R a r e l y d o w e hear it said in good c o m p a n y , h o w e v e r , that the small difference does indeed he b e t w e e n sex and m u r d e r , w i t h sex just this side of absolute destruction. ' T h e concept of destruction reminds us',
B e n j a m i n continues, 'that a measure of aggression is necessary for any love life.' 4 2 Necessary certainly for saving this love life and for rescuing this sex. H o w large, t h o u g h , is a measure of aggression? B u t this is precisely the thrill of the matter: the difficulty (or is it the danger?) of measuring t h e right dose. It promises most surely to remain b u t a 'measure', if w e c o n t i n u e to regard it carefully detached f r o m its consequence. At w h a t point a measure of aggression is a full measure b e c o m e s evident in those examples f r o m literature, art and cinema that furnish the cultural ideals of o u r times, such as the Spanish cult film ' M a t a d o r ' , w h e r e the bull fighter D i e g o and the lawyer Maria 'kill themselves in the act' and 'Eros and aggression are o n e and the same.' 4 3 'But in real life', the a u t h o r deplores, w e usually experience only a 'small death' and, w e m i g h t add, m o r e o f t e n than the death of b o t h probably the 'small death' of the partner. H o w e v e r , this must n o t be j u d g e d as a l a y w o m a n m i g h t do, for in sexuality, Sichtermann explains, 'aggression directly serves the peace (of satisfaction).' 4 4 Since the subject and the object of aggression as usual remain undifferentiated, there is only abstract 'aggression' and h e n c e general 'satisfaction', spreading over the land like peace. Wars, too, have b e e n f o u g h t for the same end of 'peace': the satisfaction of the c o n q u e r o r s ' desires, their pleasure in expansion and d o m i n a t i o n , and for the deep 'peace' that comes over a c o u n t r y v a n q u i s h e d and o c c u p i e d . ' T h e r e is a peace y o u can find after b e i n g h a n d c u f f e d to the b e d and w h i p p e d and t h e n held, free and tenderly in y o u r lover's arms that surpass [sic] all u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' , o n e advocate of sadomasochism writes a b o u t such peace f r o m the perspective of the c o n q u e r e d . 4 5 'Pain is so w o n d e r f u l w h e n it ceases', goes a bad j o k e about a m a n w h o hit his finger w i t h a h a m m e r to experience it. As pain is relative w h e n it wanes so t h e r e is relative peace d u r i n g a ceasefire. A n d f r e e d o m is apparently relative too, if after b e i n g h a n d c u f f e d and w h i p p e d you are only b e i n g held, 'free and tenderly', in y o u r torturer's arms. Y e t even a small pain remains a pain, a little captivity captivity, and a ceasefire certainly is n o peace. O c c u p a t i o n f o l l o w i n g a w a r may b r i n g 'law and o r d e r ' , b u t it means d o m i n a t i o n established. Peace w o u l d require m o r e than the relative semantics of war - b u t then, peace is not really the issue for o u r advocates of sexual warfare. R a t h e r , aggression, war and deadly intent are - even if it is n o longer u n d e r the traditional circumstances w h e r e the (male) sexual
subject's victory over an already designated sexual 'object' was e n sured. In the democratic scenario of equal opportunities — w h e r e the roles of the d o m i n a n t and the d o m i n a t e d are n o longer given and the 'desiring (heterosexual) w o m a n ' has entered the scene — w e have a 'battle b e t w e e n t w o desires'. 4 0 Male strategies to o v e r p o w e r m e e t 'female strategies to o v e r p o w e r ' , and 'male aggressor meets female aggressor.' 4 7 As Ariane Barth sarcastically c o m m e n t s , 'it is so beautiful y o u could die.' 4 8 A n d as w e are obliged to add, n o longer just for one: the chance of dying, too, has b e e n (theoretically) democratized. T h e theoreticians of the battle of t w o desires, h o w e v e r , remain silent about the o u t c o m e of the battle - h o w victorious, h o w satisfied or h o w surviving in the destruction b o t h partners will be. Jessica B e n j a m i n , as w e k n o w f r o m the battle for recognition, is a passionate advocate of the suspended balance, the even match of t w o equal o p p o n e n t s . Y e t even supposing that there was such a match, this w o u l d lead to a wrestling on e n d or the detente of a cold war, rather than the sought-after h o t e x c i t e m e n t , let alone the satisfaction w h i c h comes w i t h victory. In other words, there n o m o r e w o u l d b e any sex taking place b e t w e e n t w o equally balanced desiring sexual subjects than there was in the case of t w o passive and submissive sexual objects w h i c h so taxed the earlier sexologists' imaginations. W h i l e the theoreticians nevertheless remain convinced that this is the way f o r w a r d for the desiring w o m a n , the practitioner with her eye o n social reality remains sceptical. ' T h e artist [Gisela Breitling] doubts that she will find her " o p p o s i t e " ', 49 doubts in o t h e r words that in reality m e n are going to play. T h e enterprise m a y b e in the interest of the entrepreneuse, b u t apparently not in the interest of her 'opposite'. For even if the active desiring w o m a n has long been playing h e r frolicking part in male p o r n o g r a p h i c fantasy, the p o r n o g r a p h i c moral of the story is n o different f r o m the high-cultural moral of t h e f e m m e fatale stories: male victory is (must be) certain, the strong w o m a n will (must) b e subdued. Else it isn't the game w e t h o u g h t it was. If thus the way to an actively desiring sexual subjectivity seems after all to b e barred to w o m e n , there still remains a chance for t h e m to realize their desire - as active, initiating and penetrating subjects of a scientific discourse. For o n the level of discourse and theory there always will b e a.suitable 'opposite' w h o m a y easily be t u r n e d into an 'object', w h o will 'submit' to scientific subjectivity w i t h o u t resistance.
T h a t it will turn out to be a n o t h e r scientific discourse about women the traditional 'opposites', patients and objects of so m a n y a scientific discourse - will hardly be a surprise. N o r is the fact that, o n this level of discourse, lesbian sadomasochism is being mobilized to the f r o n t line of battle, as a sexual sadism of w o m e n also having w o m e n as its object. F o r the science, like t h e art of desire, is b e i n g learnt at the school of patriarchy, w h e r e it is taught on the traditional material, the object w o m a n . As the. literature of lesbian sadomasochism itself laments, w o m e n a b o u n d in their traditional role as w o m e n , that is, as masochists and victims, there being a p r o n o u n c e d lack (still) of candidates for the role of sadist. 50 T h a t is to say, the pioneers, be it of lesbian sadomasochism or of female scientific discourse, r e m a i n a small - even if g r o w i n g — minority; t h e y are a m i n o r i t y w h o themselves are ascending to male subjectivity, while for their enterprise they require other w o m e n ' s object status, r e q u i r i n g and thus c e m e n t i n g it in the very advocacy of a 'female', that is, their o w n , subjectivity. T h a t lesbian sadomasochism, like the theory of,female desire, fits well into the p r o g r a m m e o f , the sexual revolution and the battle against feminist politics, may b e seen f r o m the fact that pornographers s u p p o r t it and h i g h b r o w social scientists cite it. If we t h o u g h t that male academics and o p i n i o n - m a k e r s rarely read books by w o m e n , it n o w appears that they do i n d e e d rifle t h r o u g h t h e m . O n c e w o m e n say w h a t they themselves have b e e n saying, equality of the sexes m a y at last be practised and a f e w w o m e n be given an o p p o r t u n i t y : they shall fulfil the promise of a democratized sexual revolution, the legitimation of sexual desire, of the principle of d o m i n a n c e and submission, out of the m o u t h s and f r o m the pens of biological w o m e n . T h e r e is n o danger that w o m e n will thereby usurp or even just decrease m e n ' s p o w e r : there are plenty of p o w e r structures all r o u n d ensuring that they will not. In particular, it w o u l d require m o r e than the simple desire of a m i n o r i t y for equal opportunities, m o r e than the p i o n e e r i n g efforts of some w o m e n breaking into the hierarchy of p o w e r , stabilizing it by taking their place in it. It w o u l d require a political struggle for the liberation of all w o m e n , a struggle against oppression of any kind, and h e n c e against the pleasure of p o w e r and d o m i n a t i o n , that is, against desire.
Relationship
as trade, or the free market of bodies and services
If in practice there nevertheless exist relationships and sexual e n counters w h i c h appear to be 'democratic' internally (even if they c o n t r i b u t e n o t h i n g to the democratization of society as a w h o l e ) , this does not m e a n that they are n o t based o n opposition and the conflict of interests; it means, rather, that these relations, like the conflicting relations of the citizens in the state, are regulated ' f r o m above' and by means of contracts. As w e have seen, 'sex' or a 'relationship' as the u n d e r t a k i n g of t w o partners of equal rights is realized o n the basis of a higher entrepreneurial interest, the interest in 'togetherness'. This interest is superordinated to the partners' individual self-interests, k e e p i n g their basic opposition in check. U n l i k e the citizen-husband of traditional marriage, the democratic subject does n o t require a disenfranchised ' o b j e c t ' (a wife), but a partner w i t h an equal interest. T h e primaryinterest is in the relationship, for w h i c h a suitable p a r t n e r is sought. O n c e the partner is f o u n d and the partnership f o u n d e d , the business proceeds by and large like any other business relations - w h e t h e r the habitual relations b e t w e e n firms or those of established business partnerships - o n the basis of m o r e or less fixed contracts. C o n s e q u e n t l y , the individual partner's actions relate n o t so m u c h to the other partner as to the s m o o t h operation and m a i n t e n a n c e of the relation. T h u s the therapist R o b i n N o r w o o d interprets the 'particularly good sex after a fight' as a ' t r e m e n d o u s investment . . . in making sex " w o r k " ', a gesture 'to validate the relationship as a w h o l e ' . 1 Apart f r o m the fact that 'the c o u p l e ' is said to share an identical and c o m m o n intention, this i n t e n t i o n obviously has n o t h i n g to do with the inter-
personal actions in question, neither w i t h a decision to approach the p a r t n e r sexually, n o r w i t h the satisfaction of sexual desire, be it one's o w n or one's partner's. R a t h e r , the i n t e n t i o n or desire is to validate ' t h e relationship' and to invest in making 'sex' w o r k . It is a gesture, in o t h e r words, towards the protagonist, 'the relationship'. In fact the fight already validates the relationship, b u t being validation of negative content, the partners n o w m a k e a special offering to the relationship - t h r o u g h mutual surrender. O r to p u t it differently, t h r o u g h a sex act (by means of the partner), w h i c h is less a sign o f l o v e towards the partner than an affirmation to the self that the partner is still available for the relationship and willing to make it a c o m m o n sacrifice. H e n c e it is not just individual transactions w h i c h are accounted in partnerships, b u t also the capital investments and the r u n n i n g costs of the enterprise, w i t h any profits shared out quid pro quo. W h i l e investm e n t in the j o i n t venture is thus characteristic of partnerships, social relations in general resemble simple exchange trade. T h i s has all the m o r e chance of success as in capitalist society n o t only e c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n is organized along capitalist principles, b u t also the p r o d u c t i o n of every expression of life o n the part of individuals. H e n c e social relations structure themselves o n the m o d e l of the relations b e t w e e n producers of goods. 'Private' individuals c o n ceive of themselves as the private producers of their o w n lives, w h o s e partial products acquire value f r o m the w o r k invested and may b e e x c h a n g e d w i t h similar private products. W h a t e v e r w e do, every ' p r o d u c t i v e activity' of daily life, does not just remain use-value as lived experience, b u t b e c o m e s 'useful w o r k ' and a p r o d u c t of labour w h i c h acquires the fetish character of the c o m m o d i t y . T h e daily products of living b e c o m e c o m m o d i t i e s 'because they are the products of the labour of private individuals w h o w o r k i n d e p e n d e n t l y of each o t h e r ' 2 and are exchanged w i t h similar products of private labour. As M a r x writes with regard to commodities: I n o r d e r t h a t t h e s e o b j e c t s m a y e n t e r i n t o r e l a t i o n w i t h e a c h o t h e r as c o m m o d i t i e s , their guardians m u s t place themselves in relation to o n e a n o t h e r as p e r s o n s w h o s e w i l l r e s i d e s i n t h o s e o b j e c t s , a n d m u s t b e h a v e in such a w a y that each does n o t appropriate the c o m m o d i t y of the o t h e r , a n d a l i e n a t e his o w n , e x c e p t t h r o u g h a n a c t t o w h i c h
both
p a r t i e s c o n s e n t . T h e g u a r d i a n s m u s t t h e r e f o r e r e c o g n i z e e a c h o t h e r as owners of private property.3
i\.iiuu\jnstlty to HUUt
10/
Interestingly, Marx literally speaks of a 'shared act of will' ('ein b e i d e n gemeinsamer Willensakt'), 4 rather than of t w o possible actions (and wills) — appropriating and alienating — to w h i c h each respectively consents. T h e j o i n t act of will consists in appropriating the c o m m o d i t y of the o t h e r by alienating one's o w n ('indent er die eigene verauBert'). N o t h i n g seems m o r e natural to us today than to v i e w social i n t e r actions in this light and to regard ourselves as the private owners of the p r o p e r t y of o u r selves and all o u r 'products', and to behave towards others correspondingly, i.e. recognizing t h e m as just such owners of private p r o p e r t y . A n e n c o u n t e r is seen as an act of exchange, the 'shared act of will' to exchange presupposed. T h e p o i n t of the e n c o u n t e r is exchange trade, the acquisition of foreign goods by alienating one's o w n . For M a r x , 'useful labour' is the 'eternal natural necessity w h i c h mediates the metabolism b e t w e e n m a n and nature, and t h e r e f o r e h u m a n life itself'. 5 It transpires that the useful and usable labour of living one's life has b e c o m e the m o d e r n social c o n d i t i o n w h i c h mediates the 'metabolism' b e t w e e n ' m a n ' and ' m a n ' , and t h e r e f o r e social life itself. As producers w e c o m e into social contact w i t h o t h e r producers only t h r o u g h the exchange of products and in order to trade. This is evidenced in the thousands of little calculations of costs and benefits by w h i c h w e assess w h e t h e r a contact is w o r t h o u r while, h o w profitable it m i g h t b e and h o w m u c h w e are prepared to invest. T h a t is to say, the c o m m o d i t y another person alienates and w h i c h w e regard as having b e e n p u t on offer is assessed in terms of one's o w n d e m a n d and use. Conversely, it is o n the basis of our o w n d e m a n d — o u r needs and wants - that w e set out in search of a possible supplier of the desired goods. ' T h e persons exist for o n e another merely as representatives and h e n c e owners, of c o m m o d i t i e s . ' 6 As w e have seen already, in our advanced capitalist culture all and anything may be t u r n e d into a thing, a conceptual object, w h i c h o n e may 'have', that is, w h i c h offers the chance of acquisition, a c c u m u l a tion and private ownership. This starts w i t h one's o w n 'being', w h i c h apparently is less a c o n t i n u o u s process of living, experiencing and acting, a p e r m a n e n t l y changing personal history of present, past and f u t u r e , than a thing o n e 'has', o w n s and hoards, b u t w h i c h may also, as philosophers have s h o w n us, b e c o m e a b u r d e n one m i g h t wish to get rid of. M o r e o v e r , o n e 'has' n u m e r o u s qualities, even properties, w h i c h o n e holds o n to as to o t h e r property and inheritance. In fact,
such qualities usually are linguistic thingifications derived f r o m actions s and activities - w e may for instance 'be' generous, because w e have m o r e t h a n once b e h a v e d generously, although w e m i g h t change such b e h a v i o u r at any m o m e n t . Y e t it suits our capitalist t h i n k i n g to build a person a personality o u t of a collection of qualities and characteristics, so that clear p r o p e r t y relations obtain. E v e r y o n e t h e n 'has' a personality, so to speak their basic capital of accumulated history. This considerably facilitates social relations, since one instantly k n o w s w h o the o t h e r person 'is', thus b e i n g able to assess the other's b e h a v i o u r in advance. Conversely, w e k n o w that the other 'is' as they b e h a v e at this m o m e n t , since f o l l o w i n g the same logic w e may assume that they w a n t to ' b e ' like this (rather than that they decide to behave like this, at this m o m e n t and in this situation). In other words, w e can h o l d others to their personality and b e h a v i o u r , and expect, if not i n d e e d d e m a n d , similar b e h a v i o u r in f u t u r e . S u c h an understanding of 'personality' as a collection of (timeless and context-free) qualities, m o r e o v e r , facilitates relations w i t h oneself, enabling o n e to draw o n one's stock of past behaviour, solidified into patterns and congealed to characteristics, w i t h o u t the trouble of adjusting one's o w n actions to the p e r m a n e n t changeability of life, reality and people. T h a t is to say, it saves 'useful labour'. It is a sign of this reorganization of social relations that w e can hardly conceive of social b e h a v i o u r , interactions, c o m m u n i c a t i o n o t h e r than in the fetish character of c o m m o d i t i e s . Interpersonal p r o cesses and interactions are split into their (alleged) c o m p o n e n t parts, w h i c h t h e n 'belong' clearly to either o n e or the other social agent (or the subject and its object). T h u s thingified, t h e y b e c o m e measurable and h e n c e permit p r o p e r accounting. For instance, rather than analysing the always restructuring p o w e r relations b e t w e e n people, we tend to attribute to individuals ' p o w e r ' w h i c h they apparently, qua person I or identity, invariably 'have'. Since they 'have' p o w e r , they m a y also share it or give a bit of it away. T h u s p o w e r is t u r n e d into property, if not a p r o p e r t y , ceasing to be a relation b e t w e e n people, groups or factors in specific situations. Similarly, a conversation is split into the c o m m u n i c a t i v e elements of speaking and listening (not to say sender and receiver). Since 1 speaking, as an obvious f o r m of p r o d u c t i o n , enjoys a very m u c h higher status in our culture than does listening, and unlike the latter counts a m o n g the primary social 'needs' of individuals, it is subjected to rigorous
AKt-LUUVIUrilJJ Ui iiuut accounting. This m a y m e a n that speaking, or speaking time, is carefully measured and equally distributed a m o n g the interlocutors, as for instance in g r o u p - d y n a m i c therapy situations, w h e r e care is taken that everyone has the same n u m b e r of turns w i t h equal speaking time. Individual speeches are assessed n o t in terms of their c o n t r i b u t i o n to the j o i n t conversation and its goal of a successful c o m m u n i c a t i o n a m o n g the participants, b u t in terms of quantity and o w n e r s h i p , w h o s e speech and h o w m u c h . D e m o c r a c y and equal o p p o r t u n i t y d e m a n d that w e each have the same a m o u n t : o n e person's right t o speak stands opposite a n o t h e r person's right to speak. Because of its t e n u o u s link to listening, h o w e v e r , speaking is n o t just seen as a right b u t also as a privilege exercised at the expense of the listener(s). Since there are rights, it is possible to establish equal rights. This is most simply achieved, as in the state, by regulation f r o m above, say supervision by a speech u m p i r e recognized by all participants. A relationship of t w o may also manage w i t h o u t an actual u m p i r e — if b o t h partners recognize the law and are prepared continuously to review their relationship and its distribution of speech f r o m ' a b o v e ' , f r o m the point of v i e w , as it w e r e , of an impartial court. W h e r e there are rights as well as clear uses and clear costs, it is also possible to set u p a fair and equal trade, so that the e n j o y m e n t of the privilege of speech incurs an obligation later to listen, and listening in turn entitles o n e later to speak — w h e r e , in o t h e r words, speaking is paid for by listening. Such an arrangement is based o n the assumption that all participants p u t equal value o n the desirability of speaking, have the same urge to speak and to defend their right to speak. H o w e v e r , a relationship may also a c c o m m o d a t e c o m p l e m e n t a r y needs and desires, say a partner w h o loves talking and o n e w h o loves listening, or does not like talking (the difference rarely t r o u b l i n g the account). If these predilections are mutually k n o w n , an u n e q u a l speech relation may precisely constitute an equal satisfaction of unequal needs and f o r m the basis of a stable relationship. N o t only does this c o n f i r m the old adage that opposites attract and suit each other; it also demonstrates the volatile nature of exchange-value, namely that it 'changes constantly w i t h time and place'. 7 T h e exchange-value of a c o m m o d i t y , say m y speech, is thus o n the o n e hand the 'quantitative relation, the p r o p o r t i o n , in w h i c h usevalues of one kind exchange for use-values of a n o t h e r kind — m y
speaking for the o t h e r person's speaking. O n the o t h e r h a n d , the exchange-value is b u t the ' m o d e of expression, the " f o r m of appeara n c e " , of a c o n t e n t distinguishable f r o m it'. 9 T h a t is to say, the exchange-value of m y speaking is another f o r m of appearance, a translation in a different m e d i u m , of the speaking of m y listener, or i n d e e d of her listening. T h e c o m m o n unit w h i c h makes such translation possible is 'value'. T h u s m y speaking has n o value as such, n o r does it have a fixed price; its value is d e p e n d e n t o n the values of the goods up for exchange and h e n c e subject to the fluctuations of the m a r k e t , the current situation of supply and d e m a n d . O n c e c o m m o d i t i e s in the f o r m of such 'things' and 'objects' have b e e n created, their price or exchange-value is negotiated by means of the complicated p r o c e d u r e s of estimation and market research; it results o u t of the balance b e t w e e n m y o w n readiness to invest in the goods of the o t h e r and the i n v e s t m e n t the o t h e r is prepared to make for t h e c o m m o d i t y I am offering. W h i l e in the regulated business life of c o m m e r c i a l trade such negotiations are relatively simple, there b e i n g occasionally fixed and k n o w n prices or else relatively o p e n negotiations about t h e m , the equivalent negotiations in social life rather resemble those of higher diplomacy, the 'black' market or Mafia deals. W h a t one's goods may b e w o r t h to the o t h e r needs to be figured out, as in a game of p o k e r , at one's o w n risk, and may m e a n the possible e x p e n d i t u r e of an unprofitable ante. T h a t is to say, a sample of one's o w n goods m a y be offered in order to discover (or raise) the trade partner's interest. Conversely, the value the other's goods may have to oneself must o n n o a c c o u n t be revealed t o o soon, since this m i g h t immediately lead to a rise in the price. All the m o r e restful, therefore, are so-called private relationships, those partnerships already entered into o n b o t h sides, since here the business interests of b o t h partners are discussed or stated comparatively openly. A b o v e all, their readiness to d o j o i n t business has already b e e n established, a d e m a n d for the goods of the o t h e r having been a c k n o w ledged on b o t h sides in the m u t u a l a g r e e m e n t to the relationship. This constitutes as m u c h as a m u t u a l obligation to c o n t i n u e to do business. An e n g a g e m e n t , or its m o d e r n equivalent, the m u t u a l avowal of the relationship, corresponds as it w e r e to the f o u n d i n g of a c o m p a n y or c o r p o r a t i o n , or the sealing of a stable business association. In c o m p a r i s o n to 'public' social life, the private relationship enables a relatively guaranteed trade and exchange of social c o m m o d i t i e s , that
is, of the b u y i n g and selling of w h a t are considered to be the social subsistence goods. These may include anything a person has to offer, or a n o t h e r may decide to be their need: c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w a r m t h , presence, interest, closeness, b u t also their capacities and skills, their thinking, their body, their social position, and m a n y m o r e . ' T h e c o m m o d i t y is first of all an external object, a thing w h i c h t h r o u g h its qualities satisfies h u m a n needs of w h a t e v e r kind.' 1 0 Since h u m a n needs, in particular h u m a n - ' s o c i a l ' needs or relationship needs - that is, needs relating to another person or person - are infinitely i n v e n t able a n d may take ever n e w forms, every and any aspect of a person may b e c o m e a tradeable c o m m o d i t y . By contrast t o the free trading in 'public' social life - that is, w i t h potential n e w trading partners w h o s e business solidity is as yet u n k n o w n - the 'private' relationship provides added security that a contract may be enforced, and goods delivered or services r e n d e r e d will be adequately compensated. For the risk of chancing u p o n a profiteer w h o disappears b e f o r e b o t h parts of the exchange are c o m pleted, that is, b e f o r e the subject has secured the goods for w h i c h it alienated its o w n , is proportionally higher, the less the stranger is b o u n d into the subject's o w n social n e t w o r k . A stranger may r e m a i n inaccessible to bailiffs or to possible sanctions such as trade boycotts by the subject's entire trading n e t w o r k . Conversely, the m o r e firmly a relationship is established, the m o r e t h o r o u g h l y each partner is involved in the social n e t w o r k of the other, or the m o r e deeply they are jointly a n c h o r e d in a c o m m o n c o m m u n i t y , the greater the possible social control and the greater the chances of enforcing contracts, or e n f o r c i n g sanctions. This shows again the intimate relation b e t w e e n the 'private' relationship and the so-called 'public', that is, the e x t e n d e d social n e t w o r k of the partners in w h i c h the partnership is 'publicly' a c k n o w l e d g e d , and its usefulness for the relationship. N o r m a l l y , then, the relationship is a m u t u a l trade relation, w h e r e u n d e r optimal circumstances the needs of o n e partner are satisfied by the goods supplied by the o t h e r and vice versa. T h e needs may b e similar needs, w h i c h are t h e n satisfied alternately, or they may be c o m p l e m e n t a r y needs. W h a t is i m p o r t a n t for the democratic relationship is that there be a relatively even distribution of needs, that is, that they o c c u r o n b o t h sides, thus guaranteeing a mutual d e p e n d e n c y . H e n c e the emphasis of the m o d e r n feminist relationship philosophy o n dependency (and n o t , say, o n a u t o n o m y ) , its vision of the ideal
relationship of the f u t u r e as the partners' g r o w i n g and evenly balanced ' m u t u a l d e p e n d e n c y ' or ' i n t e r p e n d e n c e ' . 1 ' F o r d e p e n d e n c y is the sine qua non of relationship trade. T h u s it is less one's o w n ' d e p e n d e n c y needs' w h i c h are the p r o b l e m than the necessity of creating a d e p e n d ency in the partner. T h e partner's d e p e n d e n c y is a necessity for the subject, the p r e c o n dition for the trade b y w h i c h it secures the goods to satisfy its o w n needs, whereas a relatively u n d e m a n d i n g or allegedly u n n e e d y partner spells potential disaster. Since in fact there are n o people w i t h o u t needs, the question is, rather, w h e t h e r these are entered into the bargaining, are m a d e over as the partner's c o m p e t e n c y and r e s p o n sibility. W h a t is considered to constitute an alleged unneediness is thus less an actual lack of needs than a person's old-fashioned decision to consider t h e m a personal responsibility. Jessica B e n j a m i n ' s struggle for m u t u a l r e c o g n i t i o n is an example of a successful m u t u a l d e p e n d e n c y structure, as is Luise E i c h e n b a u m ' s and Susie O r b a c h ' s vision of the ideal heterosexual m u t u a l d e p e n d e n c y of the f u t u r e : ' O n e of the tasks in front of m e n at this p o i n t is for t h e m to recognise their d e p e n d e n c y o n w o m e n , to take responsibility for it and for w o m e n to accept it openly.' 1 2 O f course, 'taking responsibility' in this context does n o t so m u c h mean considering such d e p e n d e n c y to be a p r o b l e m of o w n ' s o w n responsibility, w h i c h w o u l d oblige o n e to decrease it; it means a c k n o w l e d g i n g that o n e is ( h o w e v e r unduly) d e p e n d e n t o n s o m e o n e and 'standing by it', that is, k e e p i n g it so. W h a t selling and b u y i n g are to private c o m m e r c e , giving and taking are to the relationship trade. N o t only does it stand to capitalist reason that every giving necessarily means a taking, the inseparable t w i n of g i v e - a n d - t a k e has b e c o m e the very e m b l e m (not to say trademark) of successful mutuality and the m o t t o of the democratic relationship: giving and taking are the staple of a healthy relationship, that is, giving and taking f o r the o n e as for the o t h e r partner. A n d they lived happily ever after, or as the m o d e r n version goes, 'and they w e r e b o t h able to e n j o y the giving and receiving.' 'Each will have the ability to give . . . and the ability to receive.' 1 3 W h e r e o n c e a man's marriage consisted of his taking, that is to say, his ensured exploitation of his wife, the m o d e r n democratic relationship aspires to mutually balanced exploitation. Each shall profit f r o m the other, satisfying their personal needs by means of the other's goods. In the m o d e r n understanding this give-and-take has even
b e c o m e o n e of the many synonyms of love, as Alain Finkielkraut remarks: 'there exists a w o r d w h i c h at the same time designates the act of giving and the act of taking, charity and greed, b e n e f i c e n c e and avid desire: the w o r d " l o v e " . ' 1 4 Giving, therefore, does n o t really m e a n that a person decides to give s o m e o n e something, w h i c h as far as the giver is c o n c e r n e d w o u l d be the end of the matter. R a t h e r , the subject, like a trading subject, enters a complicated process t h r o u g h w h i c h its giving acquires additional significance, to be precise, the significance of the other's taking. Giving and taking are thus the basic metaphors of social relations, structured by the principle of exchange and equivalent to the commercial terms of 'alienation' and 'acquisition' or 'appropriation': c o m m o d i t i e s change their owners. Above all, on account of a c o m m o d i t y b e i n g alienated, 'giving' acquires a value, namely the value the c o m m o d i t y has for the o n e receiving it — w h e n c e 'giving' n o longer means giving, but t h r o u g h the other's gain has b e c o m e the giver's equivalent loss. In other w o r d s , the subject of giving tends to be aware of the capitalist principles of exchange trade, according to w h i c h a thing (for example, 'giving') has n o value in a social sense (even if as m y o w n self-determined action it may have use-value for me), unless it also has use-value for others and is transmitted to another by means of exchange. A n y action t h r o u g h w h i c h a n o t h e r may possibly benefit thereby b e c o m e s the agent's calculable 'loss' and may be a c c o u n t e d in the c o l u m n of his costs. H e n c e o n e does n o t give in order to give, b u t in order t h r o u g h one's o w n loss to r e n d e r the other person a debtor. In o t h e r words, it is n o t giving w h i c h is the primary motive, b u t the second t h o u g h t that giving leads to debt and debt demands compensation. T h e measure of the debt again may b e d e t e r m i n e d by the sacrifice made, the 'price' paid in advance. If this sounds s o m e w h a t abstract, it is all very familiar in the c o n c r e t e f o r m of daily life as w e live it. T h u s a client of R o b i n N o r w o o d ' s explains with what enthusiasm she used to c o o k meals for h e r friend: 'It was great. H e let m e c o o k for h i m and really e n j o y e d b e i n g looked after.' 1 5 W e may assume that the client did n o t just c o o k 'for h i m ' b u t also for herself, that is, that she decided to c o o k so that they could b o t h eat - what w o u l d constitute a use-value. B u t her action apparently acquires its m e a n i n g n o t f r o m her o w n decision and the action's use-value, b u t t h r o u g h the trade exchange of her relationship: she cooks 'for h i m ' , even if she joins h i m at the table. U n d e r this perspective he becomes
the beneficiary (if not i n d e e d the object) of her action, and as b e n e f i ciary simultaneously her debtor. T h a t she does not simply c o o k because she likes c o o k i n g (or even c o o k i n g for him) transpires f r o m her explicit m e n t i o n of the success of her action, the manifestation of the value it has for h i m : he really e n j o y e d b e i n g l o o k e d after. His r e c o g n i t i o n of her labour as a use to himself n o t only valuates her labour; it confirms the measure of his debt to her. T h u s his benefit f r o m her c o o k i n g , as the client chooses to interpret it, is less the g o o d f o o d he is eating than the fact that it had b e e n c o o k e d 'for h i m ' — that is, c o n f i r m a t i o n that she stands in a trading relation w i t h h i m . H e n c e the n e e d w h i c h the client seeks to satisfy in her partner by means of her c o o k i n g is not his n e e d f o r victuals, but a postulated n e e d to be ' l o o k e d after'. H e r n e x t step consequently consists n o t in the f u r t h e r c o o k i n g of meals, but 'I pressed his shirt for h i m b e f o r e he dressed that [s/c| m o r n i n g . ' 1 6 Similarly, in the case of the m o t h e r of another client of N o r w o o d ' s , w h o w o u l d 'start m a k i n g these w o n d e r f u l meals' every t i m e her husband came h o m e early and spent some t i m e w i t h the family. She too, according to the client's account, did not d o so because she liked c o o k i n g w o n d e r f u l meals ( b e it as such or for her w h o l e family, w h i c h also i n c l u d e d t w o children), b u t 'to r e w a r d h i m , I guess, for c o m i n g h o m e to his family'. 1 7 In this case the m o t h e r ' s c o o k i n g is n o t an a t t e m p t to r e n d e r the father a debtor, b u t rather the settlement of a debt of h e r o w n . For the father's c o m i n g h o m e early to his family, t o o , does n o t m e a n that he wants to c o m e h o m e early to be w i t h his family, it means that he is m a k i n g a sacrifice and m a k i n g the m o t h e r a present of it. Fler interpretation of it as i n d e e d a personal present to her in t u r n enables h e r to c o m p e n s a t e h i m for it: her meal is the value-equivalent of his c o m i n g h o m e early. T h e rhetoric of relationships abounds in expressions w h i c h betray the calculation of actions in terms of their cost-benefit w i t h i n the f r a m e of reference of the relationship, that is, its system of mutual debt. A n y t h i n g may be traded, alienated or acquired, so long as accounts are p e n d i n g and balances remain due, constituting a right to settlement. At least, this is w h a t honest traders expect, t h o u g h they may m o r e than o n c e have b e e n d e f r a u d e d by vicious profiteers. As a n o t h e r client of N o r w o o d ' s relates, 'I t h o u g h t I was m a k i n g h i m love m e , by giving myself to him. I gave h i m everything, e v e r y t h i n g I h a d to give.' 1 8 T h e giving, that is, was anything but a gift; rather it was an
x\.ciuiivnsmy to llUUC advance p a y m e n t for w h i c h delivery of goods in return was expected: in this case, b e i n g loved. She gave h i m 'everything' she had to give, and apparently he t o o k w i t h o u t giving back — a case of 'Loving the M a n W h o D o e s n ' t Love Back', as N o r w o o d calls o n e of her chapters. T h e client adds: ' O h , b u t it hurts to k n o w that I could do all that for n o t h i n g . ' 1 9 T h a t is, she did it 'for n o t h i n g ' , gratis — w h i c h usually corresponds to the sense o f ' g i v i n g ' . Y e t this was obviously anything b u t an act of giving; rather, it was a delivery of goods w h i c h , t h r o u g h default o n the part of the receiver, r e m a i n e d 'for n o t h i n g ' , that is, unpaid. 'All I ever cared about was m a k i n g J i m happy and keeping h i m w i t h m e ' , the defrauded client continues. '1 didn't ask for anything except that he spend t i m e with m e . ' 2 0 'All I ever cared about was m a k i n g h i m happy' is a construction akin to 'giving', d e n o t i n g a good deed of a transitive nature, w i t h a clear intention of its effect: that he m a y be happy. Y e t this is contradicted in the same breath, since she did n o t just want h i m to b e happy, but w a n t e d to keep h i m w i t h h e r ( w h e t h e r that w o u l d make h i m happy or not). A l t h o u g h her wish is expressed w i t h o u t reference to anything he m i g h t have to do — she wants to keep h i m — fulfilling that wish requires the presence of his person, that is, requires his person, and that he does as she wills. This wish that a n o t h e r may do as 1 wish is r e n d e r e d i n n o c u o u s , h o w e v e r , by p r e c e d ing it w i t h t h e generous i n t e n t i o n of w a n t i n g to make that person happy. W h i c h m i g h t allow us to infer that its illegitimacy — as a wish f o r possession of and control over a person — may nevertheless b e dimly sensed. For o n c e m o r e it is presented as a m e r e nothing: '1 d i d n ' t ask for a n y t h i n g except' - read 'that trifle' - 'that he spend time w i t h m e . ' Usually, I have w h a t I am k e e p i n g with me, t h o u g h perhaps w i t h o u t the ' w i t h m e ' her m e a n i n g m i g h t be t o o evident: all I cared about was having and k e e p i n g him. T h a t I may ' d e m a n d ' , that I m a y n a m e the price, follows f r o m the delivery of goods in advance, the client's a f o r e m e n t i o n e d 'giving herself to h i m ' — w h e t h e r the goods had b e e n o r d e r e d or sent in advance so as to m a k e the beneficiary a debtor. This may b e o n e of the most p r o n o u n c e d differences b e t w e e n ordinary c o m m e r c i a l transactions and relationship transactions, n a m e ly that goods are delivered unasked to a receiver of one's choice so as to extort a p a y m e n t or return. R a t h e r than a d e m a n d creating a supply to satisfy it, goods are supplied to create a d e m a n d — a d e m a n d f o r
1 7U
Keiationsnip as trade
p a y m e n t . T h u s w e are told of the same client that she had ' v o w e d she w o u l d never, ever b e the kind of angry, d e m a n d i n g w o m a n she saw her m o t h e r to be'; instead she w o u l d - n o , not m a k e her m a n blissfully happy, b u t ' w i n ' h i m ' w i t h love, understanding, and the total gift of h e r s e l f ' . 2 1 T o d e m a n d , as she maintains her m o t h e r did, apparently means to d e m a n d s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t having previously paid for it, whereas the daughter is o p t i n g for serious business relations: she pays i n advance, ' w i t h love, understanding, and the total gift of h e r s e l f ' and w i t h her o w n profit firmly in m i n d , namely to ' w i n ' her m a n , to 'have' and ' k e e p ' h i m o n c e and for all. Loving s o m e o n e , trying to understand a n o t h e r person and 'giving o n e s e l f ' are evidently n o t things o n e does because o n e wants to d o t h e m (and with the consequences' of these actions in mind). N e i t h e r are they actions w h i c h express the agent's 'personality' and manifest subjectivity and intent. Q u i t e o n the contrary, they are a means to an end, and therefore acts o f self-damaging and self-dispossession, sacrifices the subject makes and losses she incurs in the secret or n o t so secret h o p e of later m a k i n g g o o d the damage. O f t e n it w o r k s , and the self-sacrifice pays off, yielding the desired c o m p e n s a t i o n : 'In r e t u r n , J i m gave her a great deal of attention and flattery w h e n they w e r e together.' 2 2 H e did n o t simply pay her a t t e n t i o n , h e gave it to her 'in r e t u r n ' . T h e value of the compensation lies in t h e quantity: h e gave her 'a great deal' of attention. J i m is not just attentive to h e r because she is there and h e is relating to her: he makes h e r a present of a generous measure of attention (which he m i g h t as easily w i t h h o l d ) . N o r does h e flatter her, b u t he gives her flattery and she is given it (leaving aside w h a t k i n d of gift this m i g h t be). M o r e o v e r , 'he m a n a g e d to say exactly w h a t she n e e d e d to hear.' 2 3 Apparently she does n o t wish to hear w h a t he has to say, b u t wishes that he says w h a t she wants to hear. W h e t h e r he says it because he wants to say it or because she wants to hear it, she interprets it in any case n o t as an expression of his will, b u t as the w o n d e r f u l settlement of a d e b t in the currency of her choice. Yet despite such successful transactions, this relationship ends in c o m m e r c i a l fiasco and n e a r - b a n k r u p t c y for the client, although her therapist sees this less as a sign of i n c o m p e t e n t business m a n a g e m e n t than an u n h e a l t h y ' n e e d to give m o r e love than she received, to give and give f r o m an already e m p t y place inside her'. 2 4 W h a t is a fact, h o w e v e r , is that the accounts d o n ' t balance and the expenses by far
exceed die incomings. T h a t one loses by giving, getting poorer and p o o r e r until o n e has n o t h i n g left to give, can be seen f r o m the fact that the client has l o n g emptied the place inside her — had overdrawn her account l o n g ago. T h e cure n o w consists in n o longer entering into business relations w i t h m e n ' w h o have n o t h i n g to offer m e , and d o n ' t even w a n t w h a t I have to offer t h e m ' 2 5 — in other words, checking rather m o r e carefully b o t h the supply and the d e m a n d , and no longer delivering goods w h e r e there is n o d e m a n d for t h e m . Conversely, it also means c h e c k i n g the goods, if any, being offered in exchange. Y e t the p r o b l e m was less that the m e n in question had ' n o t h i n g to offer', than that they w e r e not, or n o longer, or n o t to sufficient measure, willing to offer it. B u t that is already f o r g o t t e n - m o r e o v e r , an analysis w h i c h w o u l d r e c k o n w i t h the agent's will and w i t h partners' f r e e d o m of decision w o u l d be detrimental to maintaining an unregenerate understanding of relationships as a jolly market life in w h i c h persons exist only as representatives and o w n e r s of c o m m o d i t i e s . If w e think that this self-sacrificial profligacy, this habit of paying in advance in the h o p e of returns w h i c h w o m e n report with such c a n d o u r , m i g h t in fact be specific to w o m e n — perhaps the result of a socialization to care and n u r t u r i n g , a f o r m of female self-abnegation or even a masochist t e n d e n c y — w e are mistaken. It is a basic principle of relationship barter w h i c h m e n t o o have b e e n using for some time, especially in relation to w o m e n they d o n o t call their o w n . Every dinner at their expense, every invitation to the cinema, every lift offered in the car and every little favour r e n d e r e d is thus considered, as w e k n o w f r o m experience, as p a y m e n t in advance for desired returns. W o m e n have indeed criticized this practice most sharply, as a m o n g o t h e r things a refusal ever to e n j o y a shared dinner or an invitation as a simple social use-value, regarding it instead u n d e r the perspective of its sexual exchange-value in a structure of debt and credit. Y e t it seems that it was m o r e the crassness of this barely disguised prostitution - the alienation of cash and cash-related goods o n the part of m e n ( w h o have t e n d e d to pay for d i n n e r rather than c o o k it) in exchange for sexual services by w o m e n — w h i c h occasioned the objection, rather than the principle itself. For as it transpires, w o m e n do n o t hesitate to apply the same principle, even if it is less with cash than with everything else a person has to 'give'. W h a t tends to be gender-specific is the m e d i u m of p a y m e n t rather than the principle of paying (in advance): that w o m e n , in accordance
i\-ciuLiiirtynuj uj uuuc w i t h their gender-specific e c o n o m i c situation, p r e d o m i n a n t l y pay in goods of subsistence and substance, rarely w i t h m o n e y . M o r e o v e r , as l o n g as w e d o n o t b u y a partner with cash, b u t try to ' w i n ' t h e m with t h e 'gift' of ourselves, as long as w e do n o t pay for their attention and c o m p a n y w i t h m o n e y b u t w i t h 'understanding' or c o o k e d meals, w e apparently d o n o t consider it to be prostitution but the 'natural' b a r t e r i n g of relationships. This corresponds to mainstream social m o r ality w h i c h considers prostitution — sexual services in r e t u r n for cash p a y m e n t — a reprehensible trade, b u t sees n o t h i n g reprehensible in traditional marriage, w h e r e a wife may n o t b e paid in cash for h e r services, b u t nevertheless in the c o m m o d i t i e s (it is hoped) of subsistence: a h o m e , f o o d , clothes and so-called coverture. This suggests that it is n o t really the trade in people's (women's) p e r s o n h o o d — their b e h a v i o u r , their will, their 'services' — n o r the capitalist principle of d e b t a n d debt collection w h i c h have attracted critique, b u t alone the gender-specific role distribution in capitalist patriarchy w h i c h has privileged m e n as trading citizens. As the (once exclusive) subjects of t h e state and o w n e r s of private property, they have b e e n able to d e t e r m i n e c o m m e r c i a l transactions, b u y i n g 'goods' f r o m w o m e n w h i c h — in the case of the prostitute and the wife alike — are what the m o d e r n age calls ' p r o p e r t y in the p e r s o n ' , while themselves only alienating external p r o p e r t y or m o n e y . T h e m o d e r n d e m o c r a c y of equal opportunities and the e m a n c i pation of w o m e n to the status of trading subjects n o w seems to enable w o m e n , t o o , to b u y such ' p r o p e r t y ' in a partner's person, that is t o say, services r e n d e r e d b y a n o t h e r person that are a servicing of one's o w n person. W o m e n m a y still n o t b e able to m a t c h m e n ' s m o d e of paying in external goods and m o n e y , b u t the aim is less an equal m o d e of p a y m e n t t h a n the acquisition of the same 'goods' and services as m e n traditionally extort f r o m w o m e n . Exceptions of course exist, for instance the experiments in setting up prostitution services for w o m e n punters (with male or female prostitutes), w h e r e w o m e n too may b u y 'sex' f o r m o n e y . H o w e v e r , this constitutes a m i n o r line of business in c o m p a r i s o n to the cash-free relationship e c o n o m y . If w e consider the m o d e of p a y m e n t immaterial, h o w e v e r , focusing instead o n the fact of p a y m e n t and the nature of the 'goods' acquired, w e m i g h t say that the m o d e r n understanding of relationships as trade constitutes a d e v e l o p m e n t of interpersonal relations towards 'universal prostitution'. T h e m o t i v e of traditional as well as universal prosti-
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t u t i o n is the buyer's free access to the acquisition of goods — even if the advocates of prostitution prefer to put the emphasis o n the ' f r e e d o m ' of the prostitute to put her goods o n the market. As Carole P a t e m a n shows, traditional (cash) prostitution is today being d e f e n d e d n o t only by contractarians b u t also b y some feminists, as a f o r m of commercial trade like any other and as a f o r m of labour like any o t h e r — that is, as a supposed progress in w o m e n ' s right to enter contracts and to dispose of the ' p r o p e i t y in their persons' as they wish. ' F r e e d o m of contract and equality of o p p o r t u n i t y ' , so the a r g u m e n t goes, 'require that the prostitution contract should be o p e n to everyone and that any individual should b e able to b u y or sell services in the market.' 2 6 T h e universalization of buyers and sellers to 'individuals' and the presentation of the ' f r e e d o m of contract' as if it w e r e a newly w o n right obscure the fact that the prostitution contract has n e v e r b e e n closed to w o m e n (as sellers) — although m o r e o f t e n than n o t they have t h e n b e e n appropriated by m e n taking over the selling of them. As P a t e m a n explains, the logical c o n s e q u e n c e of this vision of universal f r e e d o m of contract is that 'the final defeat of status and the victory of contract sh ould lead to the elimination of marriage in favour of the e c o n o m i c a l arrangement of universal prostitution, in w h i c h all individuals enter into brief contracts of sexual use w h e n required. T h e only legitimate restriction u p o n these contracts is the willingness of a n o t h e r party voluntarily to make services available.' 2 7 O f course it is n o t just a matter of sex: ' O t h e r services presently p r o v i d e d w i t h i n marriage w o u l d also be contracted for in the market. A universal m a r k e t in bodies and services w o u l d replace marriage.' 2 8 T h e fallacy of this vision lies in t h i n k i n g that such a free and universal m a r k e t w o u l d dissolve the sexual division of labour and c o n s u m p t i o n — w h i c h makes w o m e n p r e d o m i n a n t l y w o r k in services and m e n p r e d o m i nantly appear o n the m a r k e t as consumers. T h e c o n c e p t i o n of relationships discussed here is based o n a similar universalization of the individual and a correspondingly fallacious h o p e for equality of o p p o r t u n i t y . It similarly implies the elimination of marriage in favour of freely entered contracts w h i c h should enable individuals, w o m e n as well as m e n , to acquire the services of ' m a r riage' as required. U n d e r conditions of universal prostitution, P a t e m a n argues, 'the most advantageous arrangement for the individual is an endless series of very s h o r t - t e r m contracts to use another's b o d y as
r — • and when required.' 29 This is a situation which, especially with regard to sex, has already established itself fairly widely, even if the sex is not always paid for in cash. It is a development which is driven by the interest of 'buyers' and an arrangement which is also 'most advantageous' to buyers with potent purchasing power. As we have seen, however, the relative durability of a contract and a long-term bond between partners also remains a widespread ideal. In other words, the advantage of marriage in providing ensured access to sexual and other services 'at home' rather than on the free market also retains its undoubted attraction. In particular, it informs the 'universalized' aspiration of individual women to equal opportunities in this respect: also wanting what men have been getting out of marriage. Moreover, there are sound economic reasons for this, similar phenomena being tried and tested practice in the traditional commercial world. Despite a free market in labour and services, firms are set up which, rather than buying services and activities of a long-term recurring nature, such as secretarial work, on the free market, secure them by integration into the firm's internal hierarchy. 30 The fact remains, however, that the principle of relationship as a trade and the principle of equal opportunities together establish a universal market of bodies and services — whether the contracts be shorter- or longer-term, the services bought and sold on the open market or through fixed contracts within the same firm, and whether, remuneration is paid in cash or in subsistence and substance goods. What is important is the establishment of 'contracts for access to sexual [and other] property' to be found in other people. 31 The private relationship democracy, in contrast to the public prostitution of the market, moreover envisages a mutuality where the latter is one-sided: a mutual or alternating prostitution within the partnership. This, however, is unknown in the realm of traditional enterprise, since there, hierarchical relations are rather more explicitly recognized and it rarely occurs to consider the employer's payment of wages ^'reciprocal service' to the worker. Nor does it often occur that employer and employee engage in 'role-play'. That the core issue is indeed services — sexual and other — which formerly were provided prototypically by wives (but also pfostitutes and servants of all kinds) can be seen from the fact that the relationship 'needs' most frequently articulated almost exclusively concern such servicing of one's own person. One of the most ubiquitous concepts
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in the context of loving relationships is 'care' and. its relatives 'caring', 'care-taking' and 'nurturing': there is talk of 'his need for her caretaking', 32 of 'our own needs for love, attention, nurturing and security', and 'our own yearning to be taken care of'. 3 3 That is to say, we want above all to be loved, to receive attention, recognition, nurturing, to be understood, to be taken care of and to have someone standing behind us. Rarely do we hear needs mentioned that use the active form of these actions — wanting to love someone, to understand someone, to make someone happy, unless it be as a means to an end, namely to be loved, understood, taken care of, or, as the saying also goes, 'to take our turn', 'my turn to be on the receiving end'. 34 That is to say, loving as such, giving as such, or understanding as such do not seem to be an aim in themselves, being a mere step towards the real goal: to be loved. This corresponds, of course, to the basic capitalist principle that paying, that is, giving, cannot be in our interest, except as a means to acquire desired goods; that the driving force of trade on both parts of the trade relationship is acquisition, that is to say, profit. While the term 'exchange' suggests a certain mutuality — both participants giving something the other wants and receiving something they want — we know the capitalist circulation of commodities to be a most asymmetrical affair: we only give in payment what we are willing to part with and what to us seems of lesser value than the goods we thereby acquire, so that the trade may be profitable and the costs worth it. As Carole Pateman reminds us, 'A contract of mutual advantage and reciprocal use will last only as long as it appears advantageous to either party.' 35 Since this assessment of one's own advantage and profit is by no means a 'shared' undertaking, but on the contrary is the subjective and self-interested judgement of each partner, not even a freely entered trading contract will guarantee a 'same' advantage on both sides, let alone a simultaneity of the duration of advantage. Hence, neither the wish to terminate the trade relation need occur at the same time on both sides. Power, of course, is of primary importance also in exchange trade, for the one who succeeds in determining the price from their point of view is the one that wins and profits. This may explain the practice predominant in 'democratic' relationships (although unusual in commercial contexts), of paying in advance, for those who have paid in advance have fixed the price and may now order retroactively the
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desired goods. E v e n t h o u g h this may be a risky trade ( r e m e m b e r the frauds), it is also t h e case that the one w h o demands settlement of debts has the moral advantage, and, in a relationship trade w i t h o u t fixed prices, m o r a l advantage is of primary i m p o r t a n c e . For n o w it is n o l o n g e r the need of the partner w h i c h is at issue — w h e t h e r the o n e supplied with goods even wants or w a n t e d the goods received and w h a t , if anything, t h e y m i g h t b e w o r t h to the recipient - b u t only the fact that they have b e e n received and n o w establish an outstanding debt. In o t h e r w o r d s , the partner's need, t h o u g h necessary to guarantee m u t u a l d e p e n d e n c y , has succesfully - and profitably — been transformed into an obligation instead, in that needs w h i c h m a y or m a y not have existed w e r e prophylactically satisfied. T h u s the ' d e m o cratic' mutuality of equal needs has b e e n replaced b y a structure of i n d e b t i n g and debt collection w h i c h are b o t h u n d e r the c o m m a n d and initiative of the selfsame subject. If the rhetoric of relationships and give-and-take thus also suggests a certain s y m m e t r y , the democratic mutuality an apparently moral balance b e t w e e n gains and losses, benefits and their costs, egoism and altruism, or as Finkielkraut has it, 'charity and greed, b e n e f i c e n c e and avid desire', practice shows that the morality of the relationship is the logic of profit, the ethics of relationship b e h a v i o u r is the principle of 'fair trade', and the rationality of sociality is s e l f - e n r i c h m e n t at the expense of oth ers. If w e take 'being loved' as the passive f o r m of active loving, and h e n c e again suspect that perhaps there is a gender-specific distribution of roles here, m e n preferring to love actively and w o m e n b e i n g particularly c o n c e r n e d to be loved, w e o n c e again fall prey to patriarchal language use. For as t h e history of the relation b e t w e e n the sexes shows, marriage (as well as sex w i t h i n and w i t h o u t marriage) corresponds to a structure of needs and their satisfaction w h i c h is diametrically o p p o s e d to the cliche of male 'activity' and female 'passivity': the w o m a n ' s role consisting of w o r k , of active d o i n g while the m a n is the a c c u m u l a t e d sum of needs w h i c h require satisfying. T h e w o m a n cooks, cleans, cares f o r and feeds the m a n as if he w e r e a cared e p e n d e n t child like the children she really has. This has p r o m p t e d Marilyn Frye to speak of male parasitism, and other feminists of cannibalism. 3 6 T h e p o w e r of a husband does n o t consist primarily in his 'activity', b u t in his p o w e r to d e t e r m i n e the activity of his wife and channel it towards the satisfaction of his needs. T h a t h e may also resort
to active action towards her is a f o r m of enforcing his p o w e r of b e i n g able to c o m m a n d her. W e may think, h o w e v e r , that care-taking is not really the core of love, and that active loving, if n o t care-taking, is n o n e the less the prerogative of m e n , being loved the prerogative of w o m e n , all the m o r e so as the patriarchal representation of sex - w h i c h after all is o n e of the most central c o m p o n e n t s of the t e r m 'love' and often designated b y the latter - w o u l d c o n f i r m this. For in sex, this t r i u m p h of masculinity, the male role is 'active': he 'has', 'lays', 'takes', 'possesses' and 'fucks' a w o m a n , in a multiplicity of linguistic alternatives of explosive hyper-activity, while w o m e n of course endure all this in the passive f o r m , being 'had', 'laid', 'taken' etc. - and o n occasion also 'loved'. H e n c e m e n are often called 'lovers', w o m e n their 'beloved'. Since the feminists critique of male sexual violence has also emphasized the active violence of m e n ' s behaviour, it m i g h t be t h o u g h t to c o n f i r m the generalized ascription of activity to m e n and passivity to w o m e n . Y e t the 'active' part of m e n ' s role is fundamentally constituted t h r o u g h their position in the p o w e r structure, their institutionalized d o m i n a n c e in relation to w o m e n ' s institutionalized subjection, that is, their p o w e r and c o n s e q u e n t f r e e d o m to exercise violence. T h e p r i mary and decisive 'activity' lies in an active decision of will, f o r instance to have 'sex' w i t h a w o m a n against her will and to use her f o r his 'needs'. T h e role of the w o m a n , with or against her will, consists in p r o v i d i n g the service o f ' s e x u a l satisfaction'. W h e t h e r she is 'active' or 'passive' in d o i n g so depends above all on the will and predilection of the m a n being serviced, b u t does n o t alter the fact that h e r role is one of p r o v i d i n g satisfaction of his need. Prostitution also illustrates that the issue is the provision of service, regardless of the particular f o r m in w h i c h the p u n t e r desires it to b e d o n e . It may be most difficult to perceive rape outside marriage as also a f o r m of extortion of service, yet u n d e r the perspective of an analysis of needs and their satisfaction, here t o o the will, desire or ' n e e d ' of the rapist is determining, w h e t h e r it be f o r m u l a t e d as a ' n e e d for sex' or a ' n e e d for violence'. T h e role imposed o n the w o m a n , e v e n in and despite her resistance, turns into a 'service' p r o v i d e d - her being raped serving the satisfaction of his will. B u t above all, w e should r e m e m b e r that 'service' means w o r k exercised in conditions of u n f r e e d o m - slavery, servitude, subjugation. Service means b e i n g at service to a master, while services are extorted f r o m people d o m i n a t e d by people in a position to d o m i n a t e .
H e n c e the distribution of active and passive needs and desires is n o t really gender—specific; rather, w h a t determines w h e t h e r 'passive' or 'active' needs are articulated is w h e t h e r the context is that o f ' r e l a t i o n ship' or o f ' s e x ' . ' R e l a t i o n s h i p ' as the e p i t o m e of everything good and loving b e c o m e s the territory of care and n u r t u r a n c e , charity and b e n e f i c e n c e , of altruistic g o o d deeds and loving-kindness. By contrast, 'sex' is the territory of active desire, avid lust, pleasure and self-seeking sensuality f r o m w h i c h , as popular w i s d o m k n o w s , a measure of aggression must n o t be missing. A l t h o u g h , in public bourgeois morality, sex traditionally constituted the d o m a i n of evil, vice, depravity, and selfindulgence, t h e m o d e r n spirit is busy liberating it f r o m this infamous r e p u t a t i o n , l a u n c h i n g it instead as a requisite f o r m of egoism, a necessary self-seeking, a justified search for self-fulfilment - an i m p e r ative f o r m of self-interest, w h i c h w o m e n in particular are e x h o r t e d to acquire a bit m o r e of. T h u s even in m o d e r n times w e see relationships as f u n d a m e n t a l l y loving and altruistic, and sex as fundamentally selfish and egoistical — only that in this case the egoism is legitimate and therapeutically r e c o m m e n d e d . Since 'giving' is thus constitutive of relationship and 'taking' c o n stitutive of sex, w e may begin to understand w h y in the context of relationship t h e subject prefers the role of the passive recipient — being loved rather than loving — in the context of sex, h o w e v e r , the role of the active agent. If it is a matter of giving, I w o u l d like to be the object of the giving; if it is a matter of taking, I'll b e the subject of the taking. If the issue is altruism and love of neighbours, I'd like to be the n e i g h b o u r ; if egoism is called for, I will gladly be the ego. In this m a n n e r the subject gets the best o u t of b o t h contexts. Since relationship and sex are n o t absolutely separable — and especially in t h e d e m o c r a t i c relationship t e n d to go together, so that sex, n o longer just a matter of taking, is integrated into the care-taking, creating an additional field of sexual care-taking — the crucial difference ultimately comes d o w n to the simple difference b e t w e e n g o o d deeds and hostilities. As L y n n e Segal has illuminated all the 'sorts of o t h e r e m o t i o n a l needs' w i t h w h i c h 'sexual desire is k n o t t e d t h r o u g h ' , the issue is 'to obtain approval and love', b u t to 'express hostility, d e p e n d e n c e a n d d o m i n a t i o n ' , to 'relieve [one's o w n ] anxiety and repair [one's o w n ] d e e p - l y i n g w o u n d s of rejection, humiliation and despair', 3 7 that is to say, to have t h e m relieved and repaired ( b y the other). Approval and love the subject wishes to receive, hostility and
d o m i n a t i o n it is prepared to 'give'. In fact the subject's self-interest is so p r o n o u n c e d that the figure of the other, so central to its undertaking, does not even once appear linguistically, all action p r o cesses are expressed exclusively w i t h a v i e w to the subject. T h e subject wishes to express hostility and d o m i n a t i o n — the other w h o is their recipient needs to be imagined b y her reader. At least w e may note it as progress that d e p e n d e n c e , rather than b e i n g seen as the subject's neediness, is c o u n t e d a m o n g the hostilities towards the other, that is, as s o m e t h i n g , w h i c h , like hostility and d o m i n a t i o n , o n e wishes to d o to or inflict u p o n the other. B e y o n d this, the subject aims to have its anxieties relieved and its old w o u n d s of rejection repaired. T h a t is to say, the partner shall heal m y w o u n d s , w o u n d s w h i c h not she b u t others have dealt m e in the past — shall compensate m e for m y experiences in the past by her care-taking in the present. T h u s even dealing w i t h m y o w n past b e c o m e s the responsibility of the other; the losses I incurred in exchanges with others b e c o m i n g a debt for her to repay. T h e fact that the p a r t n e r so to speak b y definition will have equal ' w o u n d s ' and 'anxieties', w h i c h the subject w o u l d have to repair in t u r n , no m o r e appears as a suggestion than does the partner herself. T h u s , w h e r e g o o d deeds and healing processes are b e i n g m a p p e d out, it is the subject w h o is their exclusive beneficiary; w h e r e it is needs and desires for hostile activity, agency is the subject's privilege. In short: the o t h e r must be nice to m e , I want ('need') to be nasty to her. T h u s it is n o t just that give-and-take, or even l o v e - a n d - h a t e , is a necessary constituent of a relationship (so l o n g as it isn't indifference). R a t h e r , a relationship requires that I a m loved whereas I may hate, that I am given w h i l e I take. T h e m o d e r n relationship needs thus aspire w i t h o u t the slightest deviation to the privilege of the erstwhile husband of traditional marriage, his privilege of ensured exploitation of a disenfranchised wife in the 'private' sphere. In particular, they reflect that mix, so characteristic of marriage and 'love', b e t w e e n the exploitation of the w o m a n ' s labour in terms of reproductive and e m o t i o n a l services o n the o n e hand, and aggressive sexual exploitation of her o n the other. T h e desire to be loved while hating also reflects the apparent contradiction i n h e r e n t in r o m a n c e and sex: b e t w e e n men's' f u n d a mental misogyny on the o n e hand and their heterosexuality o n the other, that is, their 'public' hatred of w o m e n o n the o n e hand and
their private predilection for o n e particular w o m a n ' s i o v e ' on the other, one chosen to service their most intimate needs, especially to r e n d e r the labour o f l o v e , sexual service. Just so the m o d e r n desire for a personal and 'private' relationship reflects the claim - originating in slavery and surviving in the marriage of citizens in liberal d e m o c r a c y — to possession of a n o t h e r person; that is, the desire to o w n a person w h i c h at the same time means the destruction of the o w n e d person as a person. It is the interest in a profitable relationship for so-called private purposes, that is, to satisfy one's personal needs for 'sociality' by means of a chosen, n o w 'equal', single person, in the context of an apparently absolute unrelatedness and 'indifference', b u t i n fact f u n damental hostility, towards p e o p l e in general. It is of course partly due to o u r merciless cultural socialization in the ideology of heterosexual r o m a n c e - n o w stylized as 'universalized' p o l y m o r p h o u s r o m a n c e - that w e c o n t i n u e , against our better j u d g e m e n t and despite all evidence and experience to the contrary, unshakeably to consider such exploitative intents towards a partner as a f o r m o f l o v e . Y e t w e cannot hold socialization alone responsible; if w e ignore insight, j u d g e m e n t , evidence and experience so consistently, there must also be c h o i c e involved: a will to h a n g on, or ascend, to such p o w e r . It is a p o w e r w h i c h previously only m e n exercised over w o m e n in the sanctuary of their 'privacy', b u t w h i c h e m a n c i pated 'individuals' increasingly wish to exercise over other individuals, as their right to equal privacy. In the subject's scenario of its relationship there is n o trace of the famous d e m o c r a t i c 'mutuality'. For contrary to w h a t you might e x pect, it is n o t the subject's responsibility to establish it, say, by considering the partner's interests too. R a t h e r , mutuality is guaranteed t h r o u g h the c o n c e p t i o n of the relationship as a trade, that is, the presupposition of an equally ruthless pursuit of self-interest o n the part of the partner. It is for the p a r t n e r to look after their o w n business, to assert their o w n interests and to maximize their o w n profit, as the subject looks after its o w n business and maximizes its o w n profits. H e n c e mutuality does n o t m e a n an evenly balanced consideration of the interests of b o t h partners, b u t the 'evenly balanced' structure of opposition and c o m p e t i t i o n , the equal conflict of equal self-interests. W h a t is d e m o c r a t i c about it is the f r e e d o m of access to the fight and the f r e e d o m to consent to fighting.
Needs,
or the legitimation
of dominance
C o n c e p t u a l i z i n g social interactions as an exchange of c o m m o d i t i e s also has the advantage, as w e have seen, that the subject's designs o n a n o t h e r person simply appear as a ' n e e d ' . W h a t in fact is an act of violence, a bid for p o w e r and a planned transgression to manipulate another's f r e e d o m of action, is r e f o r m u l a t e d in economist terms as a factual d e m a n d for a particular service. T h r o u g h the dissection of action processes into c o m p o n e n t bits — things and services - b o t h the agents' will and their initiation of the action disappear. W h a t s o m e o n e 'gives' to a n o t h e r b e c o m e s a neutral transfer of the 'contents' of the action — the saying of certain words, the carrying out of certain sexual m o t i o n s - w i t h o u t consideration of w h o s e will they are and on w h o s e initiative they occur. T h u s it was said of J i m that he managed to say exactly w h a t his p a r t n e r w a n t e d to hear. T h e r e is t h e n n o difference b e t w e e n h i m saying w h a t he says as a self-determined action and saying it to fulfil her wish: the same goods change their ' o w n e r ' , the same words are said and heard. This focus o n the desired goods cuts out the most significant aspect of any action — namely its m e a n i n g - reducing agents to suppliers of goods and sayers of words, negating t h e m as persons. This apparent desire for the goods rather than the m e a n i n g of social interaction also explains w h y subjects consider it in their interest t o make the o t h e r do and give w h a t they w a n t — coerce t h e m , as it were, to hand over the goods, even if their m e a n i n g as a 'gift' is thereby destroyed. This abstraction of social interaction to a simple transfer of goods is thus a first m o v e to disguise the real p u r p o s e of relationship trade: p o w e r and control. For w e are interested in the other's 'goods'
\t-owj, vi mc icKuirnuiiuri uj uurmriunLt precisely because the other's 'will resides in these objects', because in obtaining the other's goods w e have made serviceable the other's will. T h e desire f o r 'relationship goods' is the desire for service(s), the pleasure in having one's needs satisfied by the other is the pleasure of t h e p o w e r to have b e n t the other's will. As Carole P a t e m a n reminds us, m e n b u y i n g the services of prostitutes do n o t just w a n t the e m p t y ' g o o d s ' of sexual satisfaction — n e i t h e r the g e n d e r - n o n - s p e c i f i c servicing t h r o u g h a 'person' n o r a depersonalized c o m m o d i f i e d ' r e l i e f ' (which they could supply themselves). T h e y desire the 'use of a woman for in h o m o s e x u a l prostitution, a man] for a given period'. 1 In the same w a y the subject does n o t just w a n t the depersonalized goods, b u t the other's subservience e m b o d i e d in these goods. W h a t m a t t e r e d to J i m ' s partner was less the words h e said than the fact that he said w h a t h e k n e w she w a n t e d h i m to say. R e f o r m u l a t i n g this ' d e m a n d for goods' as a psychological ' n e e d ' n o t only f u r t h e r disguises the p o w e r relations involved, b u t in the n o w familiar m a n n e r even reverses t h e m . T h e subject's claim to p o w e r turns into neediness and vulnerability, w h i c h the other has the ' p o w e r ' to r e m e d y . W h i l e it w o u l d be absurd to claim that servants have p o w e r over their masters, having the ' p o w e r ' to satisfy their needs, it yet seems reasonable to say that w o m e n have p o w e r over m e n since they have the ' p o w e r ' to satisfy their (sexual) 'needs'. P o w e r , h o w ever, lies in the p o w e r to define b o t h the 'needs' and w h a t constitutes their adequate satisfaction. Psychologizing this p o w e r as ' n e e d ' and 'neediness' thus lays the g r o u n d for that staple of 'personal relationships': e m o t i o n a l blackmail. U n l i k e with a gift, w h o s e significance lies in the fact that the giver freely chooses to make it, the value of the satisfaction of needs derives precisely f r o m the fact that it is the subject of the need that wants it and that the o t h e r is d o i n g it because the subject of the need wants it. T h a t is to say, b o t h the need and the action of satisfying it correspond to the will of the selfsame subject. Psychologizing the r e n d e r i n g of this service as possibly also a need or even the free will of the person r e n d e r i n g it disguises the f u n d a m e n t a l , and politically decisive, asymm e t r y b e t w e e n will and so-called consent. W o m e n ' s history in patriarchy is a history o f ' c o n s e n t ' — of disenfranchisement and the lack of f r e e d o m to have any will o t h e r than the pre-given will of a m a n , r e d u c i n g their choice to a choice b e t w e e n 'willing' or 'unwilling' compliance. T h e patriarchal habit of representing w o m e n ' s de facto
obedience as their free will or consent while ignoring the very p o w e r structures w h i c h constrain w o m e n ' s f r e e d o m , serves to disguise n o t only w o m e n ' s servitude, b u t m e n ' s will to d o m i n a t e and c o m m a n d . As feminists have untiringly argued, w h e r e there is n o f r e e d o m , there c a n n o t be any consent, and ' w h e r e t h e r e is no consent, there is only violence.' 2 T h e c o n c e p t of relationship 'needs' thus hides the subject's claim t o p o w e r , its desire for control over the other's actions. In the need to be taken care of - 'little-girlish' as it m i g h t s o u n d thanks to the therapy discourse - lurks the original claim of the private citizen to his private relationship, that is, to his wife. It is the claim to the p o w e r to use a n o t h e r person's actions, and h e n c e another's will, in one's o w n interest and to one's o w n will. It is a ' n e e d ' for obedience and compliance (on the other's part). ' N e e d ' is a n o t h e r w o r d for 'I w a n t ' , w i t h the added c o m p o n e n t of m y e n d a n g e r m e n t if it isn't m e t , m y ' n e e d ' for care-taking, n u r t u r a n c e , sexual servicing etc., an expression of m y blunt will to use the other in m y interest while d e n y i n g any possible interest on the other's part. T h e pleasure of a need satisfied does n o t derive f r o m the service acquired, b u t f r o m the person having successfully b e e n b r o u g h t into service. For 'the delights of mastery, including civil mastery, can be o b t a i n e d only f r o m jurisdiction over a living m a n or w o m a n . ' 3 In the democratic relationship of equal rights and needs, there t h e r e f o r e arises a c o m p e t i t i o n o n the level of needs: about w h o will manage m o r e successfully to assert their o w n needs. T h i s explains, for instance, the specific ways in w h i c h illness is traded in relationships, illness being u n d e r s t o o d less as a p r o b l e m for the sick person to cope w i t h than a particularly useful means - like Lynne Segal's old w o u n d s — to p r o v e a greater need for care-taking vis-a-vis a partner of otherwise equal claim to care-taking. This has led the partner of a w o m a n w h o is H I V - p o s i t i v e one day to declare himself tested and f o u n d positive too - falsely, as it later t u r n e d o u t . It was his attempt to re-establish equality in the relationship, seeing in his partner's t h r e a t e n i n g condition an unfair 'advantage' in the relationship e c o n o m y . B u t even c o m m o n colds, tiredness, o v e r w o r k , and any other challenges of daily life may be used incontrovertibly to prove one's need for care-taking and to secure the other's services. E v e n if the w o r d 'service' has b e c o m e so w o r n that w e tend n o longer to perceive its m e a n i n g of ordered compliance, it n e v e r -
—
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theless is apparent in the c o n t e x t of a desire w h i c h is aimed at the other's labour of love. As Carole P a t e m a n reminds us, Kant still regarded service as a servitude incompatible w i t h the aspiration to f r e e d o m . Yet this did n o t lead h i m to challenge the legitimacy of service; rather, true to his o w n male and class interests he chose to exclude 'servants' f r o m any claim to the political rights of citizenship. 5 A free citizen does ' n o t [allow] others to make use of him; for he must in the true sense of t h e w o r d serve n o - o n e b u t the c o m m o n w e a l t h . ' 6 T h i s is an understanding duly reflected in the f o u n d a t i o n of civil d e m o c r a c y and its axiomatic exclusion of w o m e n , as well as in the citizens' desire to p r o t e c t themselves f r o m b e i n g used by o t h e r citizens. Just as it contravenes a person's f r e e d o m to be coerced to serve, so it contradicts the principle of d e m o c r a c y - that is, a f r e e d o m w h i c h simultaneously implies the f r e e d o m of all others - to demand service and o b e d i e n c e of another. If anything, h o w e v e r , w e d e e m service and servitude incompatible w i t h f r e e d o m , rather than the p o w e r of mastery w h i c h c o m m a n d s that service. T h u s while Kant emphasizes that a free citizen must n o t allow others to use h i m , h e fails to insist that t h e r e f o r e a free citizen must neither use others in service. T h u s the ' f r e e d o m ' w h i c h liberal d e m o c r a c y has aspired to and realized is n o t universal f r e e d o m for all, b u t the c o n t i n u a t i o n of the ' f r e e d o m ' of rulers and masters, n o w e x t e n d e d to a larger n u m b e r of m e n . O r to p u t it differently, the f o u n d a t i o n of liberal d e m o c r a c y has m e a n t a w i d e r g r o u p of m e n b e i n g enfranchised, w i t h o u t disenfranchisement f u n d a m e n t a l l y b e i n g challenged. O n the contrary, mastery remains a constitutive c o n d i t i o n of ' f r e e d o m ' f o r those in a position to exercise it. N e i t h e r d e m o c r a c y n o r the idea of f r e e d o m seemed c o n t r a v e n e d by w o m e n ' s c o n t i n u i n g subjection, m u c h less by m e n ' s c o n t i n u i n g mastery, be it in the 'private' sphere of their family or the 'public' sphere of politics and the e c o n o m y . Kant was equally clear about the fact that the sexual part of a person cannot be separated f r o m the person - that to acquire or use another's sexual p r o p e r t y means to acquire or use that person. B e i n g n o m o r e prepared to f o r g o male sexual 'right' than any other m a n , h o w e v e r , he g r o u n d e d a 'person's' right sexually to use another 'person' in 'the sole c o n d i t i o n ' that he already has a 'right of disposal over the w h o l e person' he is p r o p o s i n g so to use. 7 T h a t is, h e defined marriage as the sole legal c o n d i t i o n u n d e r w h i c h 'persons' may 'reciprocally' dispose
felt to b
separability of externalized action f r o m its agent, of labour and labour p o w e r f r o m the labouring person. A d e m o c r a c y w h i c h officially has abolished slavery (and w h i c h prefers to o v e r l o o k its surviving r e m nants), may find it necessary i n d e e d to speak o f ' f r e e l y entered labour contracts'. Y e t b e h i n d the abstract thingification of labour p o w e r hides the concrete thingification of labouring people. F o r as P a t e m a n insists, y o u c a n n o t hire or b u y their labour w i t h o u t hiring or b u y i n g the w h o l e person; t h e w h o l e person, including that person's will, must f o l l o w the labour p o w e r to the w o r k place. ' T h e fiction "labour p o w e r " c a n n o t b e used; w h a t is required is that the w o r k e r labours as d e m a n d e d ' , 1 4 that is, w o r k s to the employer's will. In other words: ' T h e w o r k e r and his labour, n o t his labour p o w e r , are the subject of c o n t r a c t ' , a contract in w h i c h , 'since he cannot b e separated f r o m his capacities, he sells command over the use of his body and himself' (my emphasis). 1 5 Conversely, employers do n o t just b u y their w o r k e r s ' labour p o w e r , they are b u y i n g their obedience. As H u w B e n y o n sums it u p , ' W o r k e r s are paid to obey.' 1 6 T h e so-called free labour contract's ancestry lies in the contracts of slavery and domestic labour, f r o m w h i c h it was properly differentiated only in the late n i n e t e e n t h century. 1 7 W h a t made possible the translat i o n of service into the language of f r e e d o m and d e m o c r a c y is the c o n c e p t of the 'individual' as ' o w n e r of the property in his person': that most 'political fiction' that 'a w o r k e r does n o t contract o u t himself or even his labour, b u t his labour p o w e r or services, part of the p r o p e r t y in his person.' 1 8 T h e answer to the question of h o w p r o p e r t y in the person can b e contracted out is 'that n o such p r o c e d u r e is possible'. 1 9 W h a t is hired or b o u g h t is a person - even if it is only for a limited time and n o t for a w h o l e lifetime. It is part of the brilliancy of this political fiction that its legitimizing thrust is aimed at submission - the allegedly voluntary submission of the persons contracting o u t their labour - w i t h never a w o r d lost about the legitimacy of mastery — the purchase and use of o t h e r people. It is n o t mastery w h i c h is the issue for the democrats, b u t service, and it is n o t mastery w h i c h needs legitimizing t h r o u g h c o n tract law, b u t self-submission. Just so it is n o t the mastery of punters their purchase of w o m e n — w h i c h is the topic w h e n prostitution is b e i n g d e f e n d e d , b u t the f r e e d o m of the prostitute temporarily to sell herself. N e i t h e r do w e seem to w o r r y about the appropriation of so-called property in a n o t h e r person, but if anything, the 'right' to
dispose of die p r o p e r t y in one's o w n person. Similarly, we speak volubly about care and the labour of love, rarely of th e corresponding mastery of love. In o t h e r words, the ideological legitimation of the r e m a i n i n g forms of civil mastery and subjection pointedly aims at changing consciousness about the m e a n i n g of service — what, because of the c o n t i n u i n g p o w e r relations, is still the necessary reality for the majority of people. T h e aim is to u n d e r m i n e the resistance of those obliged to do service, to change their consciousness about the c o n d i tions of their reality. For o n c e the oppressed cease to protest at their submission - their b e i n g used by others in service — n o one will b e left to challenge mastery. If ' p r o p e r t y in the person' cannot be hired out, n o m o r e can it be given away or exchanged. O r , to p u t it the o t h e r way r o u n d , just as the i n t e n t to hire the 'property in a n o t h e r p e r s o n ' is illegitimate, so is the intent to acquire 'it' free of charge. W h a t is being exchanged, traded and appropriated is neither a service n o r the labour of love, b u t a person w h o has b e e n made to do as I wish, w h o s e will has been b r o u g h t into line w i t h mine. This is not, of course, a critique of those social interactions w e generally consider gestures of love and friendship. T h e p o i n t is p r e cisely n o t to consider actions as truncated external deeds w h i c h are either g o o d or bad deeds, b u t to consider the agent's will and intent an integral part of every action. This means taking into consideration the conditions u n d e r w h i c h actions occur, and also recognizing violence, coercion and e m o t i o n a l pressure as factors of the context of action. T h a t is to say, it should be of c o n c e r n w h e t h e r an action is the agent's free choice or w h e t h e r it corresponds to the will of a n o t h e r person. In the integrity of action as the agent's free choice, as opposed to an action d e t e r m i n e d or c o m m a n d e d by another, lies the difference b e t w e e n f r e e d o m and service, b e t w e e n self-determination and o b e d i ence. A n d in the experience of a gesture of love as another's voluntary action, as o p p o s e d to the designed acquisition of this 'experience', lies the difference b e t w e e n f r e e d o m and mastery. T h e violence of 'needs' and their 'satisfaction' begins with the intention: w i t h a c o n c e p t i o n of relationship w h i c h degrades the o t h e r person to a representative of c o m m o d i t i e s and service, the source of the satisfaction of m y needs, thus denying the other's status as person. As feminist analyses of the sexual enslavement of w o m e n have s h o w n , violence begins w i t h w h a t Marilyn Frye has t e r m e d the 'Arrogant
Eye', the perceiver's arrogating, appropriating vision w h i c h excludes 'the possibility that the O t h e r is i n d e p e n d e n t , indifferent'. 2 0 This p e r c e p t i o n already significantly affects the other's c o n t e x t of action. As Frye describes the arrogant perceiver's action and intent, and the consequences for the o n e perceived, H e tries t o a c c o m p l i s h i n a g l a n c e w h a t t h e slave m a s t e r a n d b a t t e r e r s a c c o m p l i s h b y e x t e n d e d use o f p h y s i c a l f o r c e , a n d t o a g r e a t e x t e n t succeeds. H e manipulates the e n v i r o n m e n t , perception and j u d g e m e n t o f h e r w h o m h e p e r c e i v e s so t h a t h e r r e c o g n i z e d o p t i o n s are l i m i t e d , a n d t h e c o u r s e she c h o o s e s w i l l b e s u c h as c o h e r e s w i t h his p u r p o s e . T h e s e e r h i m s e l f is a n e l e m e n t o f h e r e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e s t r u c t u r e s o f his p e r c e p t i o n a r e as s o l i d a f a c t i n h e r s i t u a t i o n as are t h e s t r u c t u r e s o f a c h a i r w h i c h seats h e r t o o l o w o r o f g e s t u r e s w h i c h t h r e a t e n . 2 1
T h a t is, to ask w h e t h e r the o t h e r consents of her o w n free will to a course of action w h i c h coheres w i t h m y will, is the w r o n g question. M y wish and my expectation that the o t h e r may m e e t it already significantly change the situation in w h i c h the o t h e r has to make her decision. In particular, m y 'wish' constitutes a p e r c e p t i o n of her w h i c h puts her into a specific relation to m e (rather than leaving her free to choose h o w to relate to me): the possibility that she may b e i n d e p e n d e n t , indifferent, is thus p r e c l u d e d , the possibility that she satisfies m y wish and makes m y interest h e r interest pre-given. T h e o t h e r n o longer m a y decide w h a t she wants to do, only w h e t h e r or n o t she wants to do w h a t I want: she m a y assent (or not) to a given course of action, the options p r e - s t r u c t u r e d by m e — 'choosing' here means choosing b e t w e e n t w o options, o n e of w h i c h is strongly favQured by m e , . ^ It is o f t e n argued in the c o n t e x t of democratic relationships that a person w h o is c o e r c e d neither physically n o r t h r o u g h a structural inequality is t h e r e f o r e free to consent. This misses the crucial point, namely the question of the political behaviour of the subject (ourselves), to w h o s e implicit or explicit proposals the o t h e r is invited to consent. If w e are c o n c e r n e d about relations of equality, the question of o u r o w n b e h a v i o u r c a n n o t d e p e n d on h o w the o t h e r responds — w h e t h e r the o t h e r objects to it or lets it pass. T h e question is w h e t h e r I am willing to exercise violence, including the violence of arrogant p e r c e p t i o n , thus to manipulate the other's situation and h e n c e the
other person. Violence does n o t just b e c o m e violence if the other puts u p resistance, n o r does it cease to be violence if the o t h e r fails to object. T h e d e m a n d prevalent in social usage today that the other must stand u p for her rights, that the other must 'draw her boundaries', that is, p u t limits on my behaviour, is an attempt to devolve the responsibility for m y b e h a v i o u r u p o n the potential victim of m y behaviour, and to use the other's lack of resistance as a legitimation of m y violence. As the critics of slavery and colonialism have s h o w n , and Kathleen Barry has analysed in relation to the sexual enslavement of w o m e n , the ultimate goal in the establishment of a relation of violence and slavery is to be able to exercise mastery w i t h o u t n e e d i n g to e m p l o y direct force - to break the will and resistance of the oppressed to such an extent that they obey 'voluntarily'. As Marilyn Frye explicates, A s y s t e m w h i c h relies h e a v i l y o n p h y s i c a l r e s t r i c t i o n b o t h p r e s u p p o s e s a n d g e n e r a t e s r e s i s t a n c e a n d a t t e m p t s t o e s c a p e . T h e s e in t u r n e x a c e r bate the need for b o n d a g e and c o n t a i n m e n t . . . Efficient exploitation of ' h u m a n resources' requires that the structures that refer the other's a c t i o n s t o t h e e x p l o i t e r ' s e n d s m u s t e x t e n d b e n e a t h t h e v i c t i m ' s skin." 2
W h e r e the interest in the profit of exploitation exceeds the interest in violence as such, cost-effectiveness and saving expenses b e c o m e the rationale. W h a t the violent systems of slavery and colonialism e v e n t ually employed in addition to direct military and physical force, namely the ideological subjugation and inculcation of the subjected t h r o u g h the culture of the subjectors, b e c o m e s the primary means in political systems — including democratic relationships - w h i c h are obliged to r e n o u n c e physical force. In either case, the aim is to w e a k e n and ultimately dissolve the resistance of the subjected, so that 'the exploited are oriented . . . to the exploiter's ends rather than, as they w o u l d otherwise be, to ends of their o w n . ' 2 3 Breaking their will — disengaging it ' f r o m the projects of resistance and escape' and effecting an ' a t t a c h m e n t to the interests of the exploiters' — means to transform a relation of conflicting interests into a system w i t h b u t o n e — the d o m i n a n t - interest. O n e m i g h t hesitate in this context to call it a 'shared' interest, for as Frye sums up, 'This radical solution can properly be called enslavement.' 2 4 W e are familiar w i t h this solution in the context of marriage, w h e r e ideologizing interpretations do not
see two parties w i t h interests of their o w n , but unification into a party of one. W h i l e the democratic relationship, of course, f u n d a m e n t a l l y differs f r o m systems of slavery, colonialism or sexual enslavement - physical force in particular having (theoretically) no part in it - w e m i g h t n o n e the less say that it (and d e m o c r a c y in general) constitutes a historically n e w and almost inverse situation: while slavery, conquest and o c c u p a tion begin with violent physical subjection, followed by ideological subjugation, "Western society today presents a situation w h e r e slavery, s e r f d o m and colonialism are theoretically abolished and direct physical violence is officially outlawed, yet w h e r e the ideological subjugation of people, their inculcation w i t h the values of d o m i n a n c e and mastery, seems well-nigh complete. Individuals o f ' e q u a l rights' e n c o u n t e r o n e a n o t h e r w i t h interests and values corresponding to those of slaveholders, conquistadores, colonialists and husbands, w i t h o u t even first n e e d i n g to reorient their potential victims to these values. T h e values o f mastery and the interest in d o m i n a t i o n are n o t in question, only w h o will manage to assert these m o r e successfully or h o w they may be evenly shared. For the culture that constitutes the ideological f r a m e w o r k of o u r 'private' interpersonal relationships is a culture w h i c h celebrates mastery as ' d e m o c r a c y ' , and the individual's claims to p o w e r as universal ' f r e e d o m ' and ' h u m a n rights'. Accordingly, violence in the democratic relationship shifts to a p o w e r struggle of p e r c e p t i o n : the struggle to assert one's o w n p e r c e p tion as the ' c o m m o n ' p e r c e p t i o n , one's o w n interests as the 'shared' interests of the relationship. It begins w i t h the m u t u a l perception of each o t h e r as exploitable and usable for one's o w n needs, that is, as candidate for a 'relationship': supplier of satisfaction, minister of care, and generally as material for realizing m y relationship and my interests. T h e r e is violence in the i n t e n t i o n t o c o m m i t the o t h e r to a frame of guaranteed m u t u a l trade and to design interactions as debit and credit, considering neither one's o w n n o r the other's actions as actions, b u t as sequences in a trade exchange. It is the violence of the arrogant perceiver n o t to see the o t h e r on principle as i n d e p e n d e n t and 'indifferent', b u t as 'interested' in c o m m o n trade and m u t u a l exploitation, that is, m u t u a l prostitution. | R e f u s i n g the 'personal relationship' and all its p o w e r and pleasure strategies might thus be a first step of resisting d o m i n a n c e and
violence — one's o w n as well as one's partner's. It w o u l d mean parting also w i t h that j e w e l of o u r identity, that source o f i n f i n i t e pleasure and satisfaction, our so-called 'needs'. T h e s e have n o m o r e to do with any elementary necessities of the survival of adult p e o p l e than do c o n sumer 'needs' created by p r o d u c t i o n . T h e felt ' n e e d ' for the given c o m m o d i t i e s does n o t represent an elementary w a n t or lack, but a will to have and a decision to w a n t to have. H o w e v e r , representing the acquisition of c o n s u m e r goods as the satisfaction of needs exonerates b o t h the producers f r o m the responsibility for their products - since they are merely supplying a d e m a n d - and the consumers f r o m the responsibility for deciding to c o n s u m e or acquire t h e m . T h e m e r e existence of products and the standard of 'living' they create apparently r e n d e r any desire to have t h e m a natural h u m a n sentiment, and for sentiments and feelings w e cannot be held responsible, for they c o m e and go, as w e k n o w , w i t h o u t o u r asking. T h e i r 'cause' lies, if a n y w h e r e , outside o u r (present) selves. In particular, w e t e n d n o t to differentiate b e t w e e n a feeling o n the o n e hand, and its expression in the f o r m of b e h a v i o u r o n the other: the feeling 'causes' its expression, w i t h o u t apparently any r o o m for a decision w h e t h e r to express it or keep it to oneself. 'I was so angry' is m e a n t to explain w h y I chose to act o u t m y anger in a violent stampede. Similarly, the urge and urgency of a felt need is to imply that w e cannot b u t seeks its satisfaction. As a feeling it requires n o f u r t h e r analysis; it suffices that it has b e e n felt. It is n o different in the case of relationship needs. H u m a n s may be social beings, yet this sociality is denied by every ideological means available, in order to postulate instead the 'individual', the o n e and only (nearly self-sufficient) subject, w h o shapes its sociality - if it decides to ' e n t e r into relation' w i t h others - out of its position of p o w e r and control. W h a t this subject may experience as its need is less its i m m a n e n t h u m a n sociality than what it decides it wants to have. It wants, for instance, to have c o m p a n y , b u t n o t just any c o m p a n y . It does n o t so m u c h w a n t c o m p a n y as particular people. O r it wants to be loved, b u t loved in the way it decides, and b y persons of its o w n choice. As w e saw in Katie's case, her partner's love was not e n o u g h ; she w a n t e d a sign of love w h i c h she, n o t he, had defined. Ideally the subject w o u l d write also its partner's part, the better to satisfy its o w n needs (being the o n e w h o k n o w s t h e m best). And if the subject decides to love, it will do that too only as it wants and w h o m it wants
vc&uj, v! mc icguitriuiiuri uj uvminium: to love. W h y it wants to do that w e have already seen: in order to be loved in r e t u r n . O n n o account will the subject love at its o w n peril, that is, leaving it u p to the other w h a t the other will do. For this w o u l d m e a n r e c k o n i n g with the other's will and the other's f r e e d o m of choice, w h i c h to the subject is as good as acting against its o w n will and sacrificing its o w n interest. Like c o n s u m e r needs, relationship needs derive f r o m the c o n s u m p tion of c o m m o d i t i e s . It is goods that the subject has already experie n c e d - a n o t h e r has already o n c e offered — w h i c h the subject wishes to have delivered again; the taste for c o m m o d i t i e s comes w i t h their c o n s u m p t i o n . T h u s a m a n describes h o w his first e n c o u n t e r w i t h a w o m a n left h i m ' w a n t i n g to see her again, w a n t i n g to feel the way she had made, m e feel: appreciated'.25 H e does n o t so m u c h w a n t to m e e t that w o m a n again as re-experience the way h e had felt w i t h her. His interest is n o t in the w o m a n as a person, b u t as a means to the p r o d u c tion of certain feelings, a supplier of desirable goods. H e n c e the w o m a n must be manipulated in such a way that she may p r o d u c e the same feeling in the subject again. E v e n w h e r e a n e e d is f o r m u l a t e d abstractly, that is, w i t h o u t reference to a specific person — say a n e e d ' n o t to b e alone' or to be taken care of — that need also derives f r o m c o m m o d i t i e s c o n s u m e d b e f o r e , that is, f r o m a c o n c e p t i o n of relation w h i c h is the p r o d u c t of the subject's experience and fantasy, and is i n d e p e n d e n t of a particular person. As w e saw w i t h the psychological justification of needs as allegedly deriving f r o m infancy, such needs in fact reflect the current wish to r e p r o d u c e past experiences (or fantasies) as experience. These are, in particular, experiences of pleasure and profit, of b e i n g given and of taking, of p o w e r and the service of others, and altogether experiences of suspended responsibility towards others. Infants do not, of course, have any experience of irresponsibility or of lack of consideration towards others, since they as yet largely lack any c o n c e p t i o n or means of responsibility and consideration. R a t h e r , their experiences b e c o m e such in the fantasy of adults, w h o s e desire is focused o n precisely this aspect. Alternately, the experiences w h i c h the subject wishes to r e p r o duce may have b e e n g e n u i n e experiences o f l o v e , which the subject h o w e v e r , in deciding to acquire t h e m o n its o w n initiative, transforms into experiences of p o w e r and manipulation. If it seems, t h e r e f o r e , that feelings and 'experiences' f o r m the core of relationship needs, they t o o are conceived as c o n s u m e r goods
w h i c h can be 'had' and w h i c h o n e wishes to 'have' again, satisfactions corresponding to needs. H e n c e an experience is less a historically specific process of actively experiencing, perceiving and u n d e r standing a u n i q u e situation; rather, it is the detachable effect of a situation on the subject, so to speak the service rendered to the subject by the situation. H e n c e the 'same' situation is to be r e p r o d u c e d in order to r e p r o d u c e the desired experience. T h e experiences sought are 'being taken care o f , being loved, receiving attention and flattery — that is to say, actions on other people's part. T h e specific c o ordinates of the situation - including its participants - are as secondary as is the partner in the relationship: they are at best ingredients in the p r o d u c t i o n of the experience. T o the extent that m y 'needs' c o n c e r n the actions of other people, they are a matter of these people's obedience, their degradation to a m e r e f u n c t i o n . This b e c o m e s most obvious w h e r e the experience concerns 'sex', w h i c h apparently is infinitely reproducible, i n d e p e n d e n t l y of time, place and person, and yet is the 'same' e v e r - r e c u r r i n g experience for w h i c h there is an undoubted demand. T h u s a client of N o r w o o d ' s reports: ' W h e n I was drinking I w e n t to b e d w i t h lots of w o m e n , and basically I had the same experience m a n y times.' 21 ' In fact there w e r e different w o m e n involved, o n different occasions and in different places, yet what the subject defines as the relevant ' e x p e r i e n c e ' is the same every time. Even if the n e e d consists in having sex 'again' with the same person, it means i n strumentalizing the person to r e - p r o d u c e the desired effect. T h e question remains w h y it is perceived so readily as a repetition of the same experience. Y e t there is n o d o u b t that it is, since it is its repetition w h i c h makes a relationship a 'relationship', and its absence w h i c h defines a separation. N o w h e r e else perhaps is the expectation that an action be repeated, indeed b e c o m e a 'quality', m o r e p r o n o u n c e d than it is in this case. As a person w h o repeatedly acts generously b e c o m e s a 'generous person', so a relationship through the repeated sexual interaction of its participants b e c o m e s a 'sexual relationship'. Logically, the partner thus also b e c o m e s a sexual partner, in contrast to all other persons w i t h w h o m the subject interacts and w h o - in spite of Freud and p o s t m o d e r n i s m — remain asexual. E v e n w h e r e advocates of the democratic relationship insist that sex must cease its long tradition as c o n s u m p t i o n and self-gratification a n d be structured instead m o r e like c o m m u n i c a t i o n - 'In the realm of
sexuality, e m o t i o n as a means of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , as c o m m i t m e n t to and cooperation w i t h others, is especially important' 2 7 — it helps little if c o m m u n i c a t i o n , too, is already subject to the laws of capitalism and c o n s u m e r i s m . W h i l e w e m i g h t have t h o u g h t that in the context of c o m m u n i c a t i o n , the idea of repeating the 'same' experience — say a conversation — m i g h t still strike us as absurd, it is n o t unusual to e n c o u n t e r the wish to have ' a n o t h e r such talk' w i t h each other. T h e conversation has b e e n experienced as a ' g o o d ' one, an experience w h o s e repetition is not only desirable, b u t apparently viable. W h a t has b e e n ' g o o d ' about it, therefore, is less the conversation itself than the c o m m u n i c a t i v e relationship, that is, the fact that it has o c c u r r e d w i t h the said participants. T h e p o i n t is to repeat the arrangement - the reason f o r and point of the talk being secondary factors. E v e n if the invitation to a repetition of a ' g o o d talk' may appear to s o m e as a c o m p l i m e n t , it is nevertheless a negation of the interlocutor as well as the conversation, and a valuation of the person only in so far as that person is b e i n g ' w a n t e d ' again. Similarly, people increasingly m e e t each other in order to have m e t , and write to each other in order to have written — w i t h o u t apparent awareness that this reduces the actions in question to relationship trade. F o r f r o m this perspective o n e talk is as g o o d as a n o t h e r , o n e action (nearly) as good as another, one letter as g o o d as another, so l o n g as they have occurred or b e e n sent. T h e relationship has b e e n reaffirmed, even if the interactions are thus devalued. H e n c e ' c o m m u n i c a t i v e sex' m a y indeed n o t b e so very different f r o m commercialized c o m m u n i c a t i o n trade: 'Eroticism is the cultivation of feeling, expressed t h r o u g h bodily sensation, in a c o m m u n i c a tive context; an art of giving and receiving pleasure.' 2 8 It corresponds to the cultivation of a comparable feeling, expressed in the context of conversation: an art of listening and speaking, of giving and taking, w h e r e listening is a gift to the o t h e r t h r o u g h w h i c h the other receives pleasure. It n e i t h e r constitutes a dissolution of sex (or talk) as a .form o f self-gratification, n o r the establishment of c o m m u n i c a t i o n . R a t h e r , it seems to represent the familiar democratic solution of evenly alternating pleasure, evenly alternating (self-) gratification. As o p p o s e d to actual c o m m u n i c a t i o n , w h e r e b o t h participants realize their interest b o t h in speaking and in listening, the interest in this so-called c o m m u n i c a t i v e sex is in 'pleasure', while pleasure is the profit resulting f r o m exchange. Pleasure, this highest value of
ivccuj,
ui mc icgiumuiiun vj uuriunuriie
ZZ 1
c o n s u m e r culture, is either given or received, is received because the o t h e r is giving. Pleasure is n o m o r e 'shared' than the need or its satisfaction are shared, or than sensation is a f o r m of expression. As the need remains the subject's need, and its satisfaction the subject's satisfaction, so pleasure is the profit of the subject. T h e profit of o n e is the loss or gift of the other — the structure is c o m p l e m e n t a r y . H e n c e the ever m o r e widely used ' T h a n k y o u for listening' 2 9 (not to m e n t i o n thank y o u for the g o o d sex), indicating an understanding that in listening, another has made a sacrifice f r o m w h i c h the beneficiary profits. H e n c e the language of sex and the c o n c e p t i o n of sexual behaviour remain true to the understanding that o n e receives pleasure while the other at that m o m e n t gives it. So N o r w o o d ' s client, w h o also used to c o o k for her friend, says of herself that she had 'always b e e n very sexually responsive', so m u c h so that in high school she t h o u g h t she m i g h t be a ' n y m p h o m a n i a c ' . ' T h e y say that guys are supposed to be the ones w h o always w a n t sex. I k n o w I w a n t e d it m o r e than he did.' 3 0 Shortly after, she explains that in her later relationship with J i m , she tried hard to 'thrill and delight him'. 3 1 If in her first statement sex was s o m e t h i n g that she w a n t e d to have and was getting s o m e t h i n g o u t of for herself, in her a c c o u n t of her relationship w i t h J i m she emphasizes that this time, she was dedicated to the task of providing thrill and delight for h i m . T h a t this is arduous w o r k indeed transpires f r o m the fact that she b o u g h t special lingerie 'to wear just for h i m ' (where usually one wears it for oneself, as simple use-value), studied books o n lovemaking, and 'tried everything she learned o n him'. 3 2 Despite her p r o n o u n c e d liking for sex and the gratification she derives f r o m it, she here r e n o u n c e s it in favour of servicing her partner. 'It wasn't her sexuality she was expressing', b u t w o r k she c o n t r i b u t e d towards his, as she apparently also was ' m u c h m o r e in touch w i t h his sexuality than w i t h her o w n ' . 3 3 W h y she does it w e already k n o w : in order to ' w i n ' her m a n and keep him. W h a t is i m p o r t a n t in this context is that sex and sexual activity, despite all professions of 'togetherness' and 'sharing', obviously m e a n pleasure for one and w o r k for the other partner, and vice versa if it alternates. For satisfaction is locked indissolubly to its need, and h e n c e may occur only w h e r e there is a p r e c o n c e i v e d need. A c o n c e p t i o n of sex — or indeed of any social behaviour — as n o t divisible into the t w i n constituents of giving and receiving, satisfying
and being satisfied, seems b e y o n d the capitalist imagination. For o n e thing, it w o u l d make it difficult to keep accounts. Especially w h e r e the pleasure of the o t h e r is obvious, the subject w o u l d get suspicious that the other m i g h t b e profiting ' m o r e ' . So w e are hardly surprised that, w h e r e the subject is most acutely aware of its o w n pleasure, its desire for a c c o u n t i n g slackens and the possibility of an automatically 'shared' satisfaction decidedly gains in attraction. This may be seen f r o m the following formulations, w h i c h are a standard in democratic r o m a n c e and the goal of m a n y a therapeutic p r o g r a m m e : D u r i n g l o v e - m a k i n g t h e y w e r e so u t t e r l y e n g r o s s e d w i t h e a c h o t h e r that they r e m e m b e r e d not k n o w i n g whose b o d y was whose; and the i n t i m a c y w h i c h crossed physical b o u n d a r i e s created n e w psychological states i n b o t h o f t h e m a n d b e t w e e n t h e m . T h e y felt p h y s i c a l l y f u s e d a n d totally a b s o r b e d by t h e sensuality t h e y w e r e creating Their
sexual
relationship
became
a means
together.
of c o m m u n i c a t i o n
for
them.34
A b s o r b e d by the experience of sensuality, one's o w n subjectivity is raised to the status of 'the couple's subjectivity', the psychological states in b o t h of t h e m willed and linguistically forced to be a p s y c h o logical state ' b e t w e e n t h e m ' . It is an alleged togetherness and identity of experience, t w o b e i n g ' f u s e d ' to one. N o t just one soul and subjectivity, b u t also o n e m i x t u r e of t w o bodies. T h e appropriation of the other's b o d y , so central to the c o n c e p t i o n of the 'intimacy of one's identity', is at last c o m p l e t e d , as is the invasion of the other's ' m i n d ' — at least in the p e r c e p t i o n of the representing subjectivity. If I n o l o n g e r k n o w w h o s e b o d y is w h o s e , n o r that the sensuality experie n c e d is mine; if the physical intimacy crosses boundaries and so does m y psychological state, I clearly n o longer need to w o r r y about possible transgression, about potential violation of the other. T h e o t h e r is territory I walk, b o d y I o c c u p y and psychological 'state' I inhabit. It is m o r e than d o u b t f u l , h o w e v e r , that such fusion and c o n f u s i o n constitute a 'means of c o m m u n i c a t i o n ' . If I p r e t e n d not to k n o w w h o I a m n o r w h o the o t h e r is, there is n o I and no y o u w h o c'ould be c o m m u n i c a t i n g — n o u n d e r s t a n d i n g of m i n e and n o n e of the other's that w o u l d enable us to c o m e to an understanding between us. T h e entire unison is a willed self-deception, a pleasant representation to
oneself, after the familiar m o d e l of the patriarchal u n i o n of h u s b a n d and wife: the subjection and annihilation of the o t h e r by and in the d o m i n a n t subject's subjectivity. W h i l e the apparent 'gain' of the other raises the spectre of the subject's possible exploitation, thus necessitating accounts and trade agreements, the subject waives accounts in the face of its o w n ecstasy. Just as it is the citizen's sense of d e m o c r a c y to be protected from b e i n g exploited, w i t h no proviso that he will n o t exploit others either, so the subject k n o w s of the fundamentally exploitative nature of the relationship and seeks p r o t e c t i o n f r o m b e i n g exploited - having n o o b j e c t i o n to d o i n g the exploiting w h e r e v e r it may get the chance. T h u s the democratic relationship seems to reflect the d e v e l o p m e n t of patriarchal capitalist democracy f r o m its i n c e p t i o n to ' g e n d e r equality'. N o t only are the aspirations of the emancipated subject inspired by the p o w e r of the erstwhile husband, the ruler over his n o n - e n f r a n c h i s e d wife, b u t self-prostitution and servitude also seem t o have their pride of place a m o n g the newly available liberties: as a means to manipulate and as the price for one's o w n right to mastery. N o t only have w e internalized the values of d o m i n a n c e and exploitation, m a k i n g mastery our o w n aspiration, w e also seem t o have u n d e r s t o o d the f u n c t i o n i n g of d o m i n a n c e and submission, be it t h r o u g h experience or the incessant cultural propagation of the masochism of 'voluntary submission'. Most people's experience of d e m o c r a c y includes experiences of p o w e r as well as subordination. In particular, w e seem to have u n d e r s t o o d that ascending o n the ladder of the p o w e r hierarchy must be 'earned' by accepting subordination. Socialization in the sadism of p o w e r necessarily means socialization in the 'inevitability' of masochism. C h o o s i n g a democratic 'personal relationship' over a u t o n o m o u s and i n d e p e n d e n t social relations means choosing of a democratic m i x t u r e of sadism and masochism - of self-subjugation in the interest of exercising mastery, of masochistic p a y m e n t in the interest of sadistic appropriation.
Identity,
or history turned
biology
In the age of leisure and entertainment, 'topicality' has usurped the place of historicity; m o m e n t s n o longer follow o n e another according to a sensible and recountable order; they succeed one another like meals in an u n e n d i n g cycle. T h e w o r l d having b e c o m e a m u l t i f o r m and p e r m a n e n t object of c o n s u m p t i o n , its destiny is to be continually gobbled up by its consumers. Alain Finkielkraut, Remembering in Vain
T h e reorganization of h u m a n living as the p r o d u c t i o n and circulation o f c o m m o d i t i e s n o t only displaces reality, it also dissolves any sense of t h e historicity of (one's) life. For despite all emphases o n 'experiences' o n e wants to have and events o n e wishes to c o n s u m e 'live', the u n d e r l y i n g urge is less to experience reality and to understand what is h a p p e n i n g , than to get the i m m i n e n t f u t u r e u n d e r control: to shape 'events' after the pattern of previous events and to perceive in n e w experiences w h a t is familiar, thus facilitating the search for profit and pleasure w i t h o u t the c u m b e r s o m e a d j u s t m e n t to the nuances of the ever n e w . T i m e thus loses its reality and significance: if anything, it is a necessary c o m p o n e n t of labour as a p r o d u c t i v e activity ' w i t h i n a given period of t i m e ' . 2 T h a t is to say, it too is carved u p into measurable pieces, a m o u n t s of t i m e w h i c h o n e invests into products. It is part of basic capitalist t h i n k i n g to c o m p a r e things and to measure t h e m against each o t h e r . Since in historical social reality n o t h i n g is like a n y t h i n g else, b u t on the contrary, everything is historically specific and thus u n i q u e , certain mechanisms are required to enable us to c o m p a r e w h a t is actually incomparable. 'Value' is the abstract e l e m e n t by means of w h i c h comparability is established. E x c h a n g i n g c o m m o d i t i e s creates a relation of value b e t w e e n t h e m - a
ZZD
lutruny, i>r rusiury lurneu owiugy
relative value of each, expressed by the other as its equivalent. In o t h e r words, an equation. W e have seen this construction of 'value' play a vital role in social relations, so also for the client of R o b i n N o r w o o d ' s of w h o m it is said that 'She interpreted the time he stole f r o m his o t h e r life to be w i t h her as the validation of her w o r t h . ' 3 T h a t is to say, the client does n o t seem to have any recognizable w o r t h in h e r o w n eyes except for the value w h i c h her lover's stealing time f r o m his other life constitutes for her. As M a r x says of ordinary products, w e may also say of these life products, substituting people for ' m e n ' : [People] do n o t therefore bring these products of their labour
into
r e l a t i o n w i t h e a c h o t h e r as v a l u e s b e c a u s e t h e y see t h e s e o b j e c t s m e r e l y as t h e
material integuments
of h o m o g e n e o u s
human
labour.
The
r e v e r s e is t r u e : b y e q u a t i n g t h e i r d i f f e r e n t p r o d u c t s t o e a c h o t h e r i n exchange
as v a l u e s , t h e y e q u a t e t h e i r d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f l a b o u r
as
h u m a n l a b o u r . T h e y d o this w i t h o u t b e i n g a w a r e o f it. 4
A l t h o u g h the client indeed thinks that her lover's visits b e s t o w value o n her — that she is receiving her w o r t h f r o m h i m — and c o r r e s p o n d ingly will feel devalued if h e fails to c o m e , it is in fact her o w n e q u a t i o n w h i c h equates the value of his brief visits w i t h her entire w o r t h as a person. If w o m e n like h e r , then, suffer f r o m 'low selfesteem', it is less because s o m e o n e has taken it away f r o m t h e m than because they set their o w n value o n the basis of self-chosen equations and exchanges: the o t h e r shall prove m y value. E v e n t h o u g h w o m e n (for instance) have the collective and personal experience of b e i n g d e e m e d by m e n to be of 'lesser value', this is n o reason to give u p responsibility for o u r o w n j u d g e m e n t . T h e p r o b l e m of w o m e n ' s lacking self-esteem (as it is raised in the therapy discourse) is n o t that m e n do n o t value w o m e n highly e n o u g h ; the p r o b l e m is granting m e n in o u r o w n minds t h e authority to p u t any value on us whatsoever. E v e n if they valued us m o r e highly (being able to l o w e r their estimate at any time), this w o u l d lead not to m o r e 'self-esteem' b u t to d e p e n d e n c y . R a t h e r , a sense of oneself derives precisely f r o m taking responsibility for one's o w n j u d g e m e n t . In the k n o w l e d g e of one's o w n j u d g e m e n t and the responsibility for one's o w n thinking, the collective devaluation of w o m e n in patriarchy is a cause for outrage — a political p r o b l e m w h i c h requires a political response: a
—
-
1'
1
feminist critique of sexism and the patriarchal p o w e r structure, and a political liberation struggle aiming to change it. W i t h o u t this c o n sciousness, m o r e o v e r , m e n ' s undervaluing of w o m e n could not even b e perceived as such: w e w o u l d merely 'have' the value w e have (been given). A n d if w e have also internalized o u r cultural valuation as a c o n s e q u e n c e of o u r socialization, this does n o t necessitate a man w h o temporarily bestows a dubious value o n us; it necessitates freeing ourselves of this internalized male j u d g e m e n t , say, by the practice feminists call consciousness raising (whether it be in C R groups or otherwise). If 'validation' in some quarters has b e c o m e the p r o o f of a positive relationship, and the experience of validation, appreciation or r e c o g nition the c o m m o d i t y for the individual subject to strive for, w e should n o t only question the principle of validation by others, b u t equally the construction of this estimation on the basis of 'value'. Similarly, it should make us pause for t h o u g h t w h e n arguments in favour of others' right to life and integrity are based o n the n o t i o n of 'equal value'. N o t only do w e l l - m e a n i n g xenophiles explain to us that o t h e r cultures are 'equally valuable', b u t m a n y animal rights advocates plead for the animals' right to life by attributing comparable 'value' to their lives. This in t u r n allows, for instance, Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer (and a host of enthusiastic followers) to value the (future) life of disabled children (at the stage of the e m b r y o or shortly after birth), or the f u t u r e lives of old people and people w i t h illnesses or lasting injuries, as lives lacking in value and not ' w o r t h living' - and to r e c o m m e n d eugenic 'solutions'. 5 N o r does it help if w e call the value an 'intrinsic value': the p e r c e p t i o n of the object's 'value' remains as subjective and d e p e n d e n t o n the valuer as does its p e r c e p t i o n as 'beautiful' and 'pleasing'. Value is a f u n d a m e n t a l l y relative category, deriving f r o m the e c o n o m i c calculations of the j u d g i n g and valuing subject. It is a subjective j u d g e m e n t w h i c h , t h r o u g h the process of exchange, seems to slip into the object as its ' o b j e c t i v e ' or 'intrinsic' value. T h e ability to enforce a valuation as a value (that is, a price) depends o n one's p o w e r and influence over the exchange. T h e objective is to p u t the 'value' of the other's p r o d u c t as l o w as possible, to keep d o w n its price. M o r e o v e r , 'validation' itself b e c o m e s a c o m m o d i t y , a gift m a d e by the subject to the o t h e r (in exchange). If I 'value' and 'appreciate' another, it n o t only betrays the arrogance of m y position of p o w e r — evaluating n o t
just a person's 'goods' b u t die very person - it simultaneously implies die possibility that 1 may find t h e m of no value. T h e other 'acquires' her w o r t h thanks to m y generous estimation - thus she will need m e if she wants to keep it. T h r o u g h periodic validation I will ratify it (as the case may be), thus k e e p i n g her i n f o r m e d of any fluctuations in the exchange rate. T h e s e mechanisms of evaluation and equation, then, are based on a primary restructuring of the real into a j u d g i n g subject and a j u d g e d object, into I and the ' o t h e r ' . O n l y w i t h the (subjective) category of the ' o t h e r ' does it b e c o m e viable (for the pivotal subject) to m a k e a comparison - to divide into 'same' and ' o t h e r ' , 'like' and 'unlike'. It is a c o n c e p t o f ' d i f f e r e n c e ' that has n o t h i n g to do w i t h the. constitutive uniqueness of everything real (what the subject calls 'variety'), and is incapable of encompassing it. It is 'otherness' and 'difference' c o n structed o n the basis of criteria selected by the subject and constituted o n its implicit n o r m , f r o m w h i c h everything ' o t h e r ' and all the 'others' are first of all j u d g e d the 'same' a m o n g themselves, equally ' o t h e r t h a n ' the n o r m . W e k n o w this to be the case with the ' o t h e r ness' of race, sex, etc. O n c e everything ' o t h e r ' is potentially the sam e, an object of otherness in the subject's sight, comparison b e t w e e n these objects b e c o m e s possible. As w e k n o w , this may even include c o m parison b e t w e e n objects and the self (as object). Just as value is a subjective category deriving f r o m the subject's arrogant p o w e r , so experiencing s o m e t h i n g b e c o m e s an experience o n the basis of a subjective selection of criteria. If sex w i t h m a n y different w o m e n o n different occasions is always the 'same', it is because the w o m e n are n o t a relevant factor. Similarly, o n e experience is 'like' a previous experience because the specificity of the situation, the people involved and the historical time, do n o t play any part. T h u s Katie's therapists explained that the 39-year-old Katie was 'reliving' with h e r partner the very experience w h i c h , aged three or four, she had w i t h her m o t h e r . T h e feelings she felt w e r e n o t just like the feelings t h e n felt, they were the old feelings, r e - e v o k e d f r o m w h e r e repression had stored t h e m . T h e y w e r e not current feelings about a past event, b u t the 35-year-old originals. Similarly, in our self-psychologizing accounts w e may claim a t e n d ency to construct the 'same' situations, to f o r m the 'same' relationships time and again, and generally to display the 'same' behaviour. Yet it is not the same b u t n e w behaviour, o c c u r r i n g in a n e w context
and following a n e w decision to act (even if it is a decision to act 'as' o n e did o n a past occasion). And it is based o n a n e w assessment of the c u r r e n t situation, w h i c h at the very least includes one's k n o w l e d g e of the last situation in w h i c h o n e is said to have d o n e the same. T o speak of the same b e h a v i o u r and the same situation in this context not only degrades the c u r r e n t situation and its participants, r e d u c i n g t h e m to m e r e irrelevancies; it also means regarding one's o w n historical existe n c e and d e v e l o p m e n t , i n c l u d i n g one's consciousness, as immaterial considering oneself instead as t h e timeless and e x p e r i e n c e - c o n s u m i n g subject of a c o n t i n u o u s present. W i t h the subject thus losing its sense of history, time loses its historicity - its relationship to historical reality - t u r n i n g instead into ' t i m e o f f ' , the 'free' or leisure t i m e of the civil individual dedicated to the pursuit of c o n s u m p t i o n and the satisfaction of needs. T h a t is to say, the subject seems to divide its o w n living in its 'private' sphere (that is, its 'social' life apart f r o m e c o n o m i c activity) after the m o d e l of capitalist p r o d u c t i o n into the t i m e of ' p r o d u c t i v e labour' on the one h a n d (the p r o d u c t i o n o f ' p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y ' for exchange), and leisure t i m e d e v o t e d to c o n s u m p t i o n and r e p r o d u c t i o n o n the other hand. T h e latter is less a t i m e in its historical sense than an 'eternal present', 6 the infinite sequence of infinitesimal m o m e n t s of the subjective 'I' r e p r o d u c i n g itself. This also expresses itself in the subject's need to construct itself an 'identity': an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of itself as r e m a i n i n g the 'same' in and despite the c u r r e n t of changing reality and time. N o t in its change — its g r o w i n g and changing understanding of its o w n history and experie n c e - and not in its current b e h a v i o u r as an expression of w h o the subject has b e c o m e today does it see its significant 'personality'. It is in the same, the u n c h a n g i n g or hardly changing that it seeks and anchors its 'identity'. It is a constantly self-reproducing (albeit ageing) b o d y o n the o n e hand, and an (equally self-reproducing) psychological constellation r o o t e d in infancy o n the other w h i c h are the primary loci for self-identification: a biologism on the o n e hand, and a barely de-biologized psychologism o n the other. It is n o t w h a t a person does that constitutes the personality, b u t w h a t a person 'is' that constitutes the identity. It is n o t the person's ( h i s t o r ical) action that w e are interested in, b u t their 'being' r e p r o d u c i n g itself as eternal presence. H e n c e any question c o n c e r n i n g identity tends to be answered w i t h the w o r d s 'I am'. Correspondingly, it is the
p h e n o m e n o n of a person's change in the course of time - a change of m i n d and a change in the course of action d u r i n g a person's lifetime — w h i c h seems to require explanation, whereas treading a fairly straight line o f ' c o n s i s t e n t ' behaviour, u n m a r k e d by any learning and u n r u f f l e d by any insight, generally counts as exemplary strength of character. Such an understanding of identity means n o t only declaring oneself (and people in general) incapable of learning f r o m experience; it also means placing the responsibility for one's decisions and actions not in oneself (or people themselves), but in a conglomerate of self-reproducing behaviour patterns and early childhood influences - facts o f ' n a t u r e ' w h i c h others and other things have caused — that is to say, in a f o r m of history w h i c h , seen f r o m the point of view of the eternal present, takes on a quasi-biological function, the ideological f u n c t i o n o f ' n a t u r e ' . Similarly, the n e w trend in identity politics shows a d e v e l o p m e n t towards forms of newly clad racist, sexist and nationalist biologisms: n o t only a parallel interest in the 'being' of specific groups or their m e m b e r s in preference to their activities, b u t also a biological c o n struction of the relation b e t w e e n the individual and the group. W h a t originally made its appearance o n the political scene as a political consciousness of identity — a consciousness of the specific collective history of oppression, accompanied by a corresponding self-naming, say as Blacks or W o m e n in the Black and W o m e n ' s Liberation M o v e m e n t s — today is t u r n i n g into a pretext to reconstruct identities of race, nation, ethnicity, sex, and their subgroups. Since a political consciousness of 'identity' is eminently historical - deriving f r o m an analysis of the historical past w i t h the aim to intervene politically in the present, thus to create a different f u t u r e - 'political identity' necessarily implies its o w n changeability and eventual supersession. T h e goal is to m a k e such political 'identity' r e d u n d a n t - to create a society (a material reality) in w h i c h it has no m o r e relevance. B u t even in the present, w h e r e it is a necessity, consciousness of the history of oppression is continually g r o w i n g and changing, most of all t h r o u g h the political activity and experience in the present, w h i c h add to the original consciousness of historical oppression the c u r r e n t consciousness of resistance and change. H e n c e 'political identity' means anyt h i n g b u t an u n c h a n g i n g sameness, m u c h less a state of being m a r k e d by past oppression, but, o n the contrary, the collective consciousness and self-confidence of a group in resistance and in the process of historical change.
Y e t political practice increasingly shows the p h e n o m e n o n of an 'infatuation' w i t h one's o w n oppression (or rather, the identity w h i c h bears its name). A u d r e Lorde (back in 1981) refers to it specifically in the context of w h i t e w o m e n ' s reaction to Black w o m e n ' s feminism and critique of racism, yet defines it as a general p r o b l e m of p o w e r relations b e t w e e n w o m e n : ' W h a t w o m a n here is so e n a m o u r e d of her o w n oppression that she c a n n o t see her heelprint u p o n a n o t h e r w o m a n ' s face? W h a t w o m a n ' s terms of oppression have b e c o m e precious and necessary to her as a ticket into the fold of the righteous, away f r o m the cold winds of self-scrutiny?' 7 Similarly, Cherrie Moraga writes in the preface to the second edition of This Bridge Called My Back ( b a c k in 1983): 1 w o r r y a b o u t the t e n d e n c y in the m o v e m e n t w h e r e w o m e n of color activists s e e m t o b e c o m e e n a m o r e d w i t h o u r o w n o p p r e s s i o n . . . I w o r r y about the t e n d e n c y of racial/cultural separatism amongst
us
w h e r e w e d i g in o u r h e e l s a g a i n s t w o r k i n g w i t h g r o u p s o u t s i d e o u r o w n p a r t i c u l a r r a c e / e t h n i c i t y . T h i s is w h a t w e h a v e a c c u s e d
white
p e o p l e of, basically sticking t o t h e i r o w n k i n d - o n l y w o r k i n g politically w h e r e t h e y m a y f e e l ' s a f e ' a n d 'at h o m e ' . B u t t h e m a k i n g o f a p o l i t i c a l m o v e m e n t has n e v e r b e e n a b o u t safety o r f e e l i n g ' a t h o m e ' . . . C u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y — o u r r i g h t t o it — is a l e g i t i m a t e a n d basic c o n c e r n f o r all w o m e n
o f c o l o r . . . B u t t o s t o p t h e r e o n l y results i n t h e
most
l i m i t i n g o f i d e n t i t y p o l i t i c s : ' I f I s u f f e r it, it's real. I f I d o n ' t f e e l it, it d o e s n ' t exist.'8
As Lorde and Moraga b o t h indicate, it is a p h e n o m e n o n of relative privilege: the use of an 'identity' in cultural-political situations w h i c h precisely exclude the danger of the particular experience of victimization that has given the identity its n a m e , situations in w h i c h cultural self-representation m o v e s to the f o r e g r o u n d , ready to b e c o m e an activity and an e n d in itself. T h u s an infatuation w i t h the victim status o f ' w o m e n ' is particularly manifest a m o n g w h i t e w o m e n in situations w i t h other w o m e n , especially Black w o m e n (and also i n situations w i t h relatively gentle and critical men) — rarely in situations with sexually exploitative and violent m e n . Similarly, Moraga sees a problematical attachment to oppression status in t h e t e n d e n c y to cultural separatism vis-a-vis w o m e n e x p e r i e n c i n g different oppressions — that is, n o t in the politically necessary separatism vis-a-vis white people and m e n as a f o r m of
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effective political organizing, but in the voluntary exclusion of w o m e n of different ethnic origin. W e exclude w h e r e w e have the p o w e r to exclude. O p p r e s s i o n identity b e c o m e s problematical, if w e f o l l o w Moraga, w h e n it b e c o m e s a n e w h o m e - a ' h o m e l a n d of the m i n d ' , as J e n n y B o u r n e calls it: 9 a symbolic c o u n t r y w h e r e w e ' b e l o n g ' , w h e r e w e feel safe and at h o m e , b e i n g a m o n g o u r o w n ' k i n d ' . O u r o w n 'kind' are n o t those w i t h the same political aims, b u t w o m e n w i t h the same oppression status. Yet a political m o v e m e n t , M o r a g a insists, cannot be about safety and feeling at h o m e . Feeling at h o m e and safe, w e may equally insist, is n o t about building a political m o v e m e n t . In particular, w e gain this h o m e and its safety by fighting against those less p o w e r f u l than ourselves, those underprivileged in relation to o u r selves, h o w e v e r underprivileged w e may be, over w h o m w e are exercising p o w e r and privilege - it is our heelprint in other w o m e n ' s faces, it is o t h e r w o m e n w e dig in o u r heels against. And w e feel finally 'at h o m e ' w h e r e w e neither are struggling in a political struggle against oppression, n o r are personally in any danger, b u t w h e r e a m o n g o u r 'likes' w e feel ' u n d e r s t o o d ' in our suffering - o u r ticket to the fold of the righteous. By insisting that cultural identity is i n d e e d a legitimate c o n c e r n , while at the same time criticizing the use of oppression status as n e w h o m e c o u n t r y , M o r a g a highlights the i m p o r t a n c e of considering p o w e r relations: 'cultural identity' in the sense of a political consciousness is appropriate as a means of resistance in struggle, n o t as a state of being (far f r o m the struggle). Multicultural oppression identity as n e w h o m e l a n d is a f o r m of exclusion o n the basis of criteria of race, ethnicity, class etc., exercised f r o m a position of p o w e r over those excluded. T h a t is, the identity w h e r e w e feel 'at h o m e ' is constructed o n the d o m i n a n t principles of inclusion and exclusion o n w h i c h h o m e countries and nations are f o r m e d . Kathleen Barry in her analysis of female sexual slavery describes victimism as the practice of treating w o m e n as victims, thereby 'creating the role and status of the victim'. 1 0 This in turn may lead w o m e n to hold on to that 'status', as their only supposed chance of finding understanding and support. 1 1 Victimism 'extends the terrorism of the act of sexual violence [against a w o m a n ] b y c o n t i n u i n g to rob her of her humanness'. 1 2 Since Barry's analysis it has b e c o m e apparent that the practice of victimism is by n o means restricted to patriarchal
institutions (police, social w o r k e r s , medical and psychiatric personnel etc.), b u t is current also amongst w o m e n of the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t . N o t only do m a n y w o m e n treat o t h e r w o m e n as victims, considering it a special f o r m o f ' c a r i n g ' and 'understanding'; they also treat t h e m selves as victims. As bell h o o k s has argued, 'the vision of Sisterhood e v o k e d b y w o m e n ' s liberationists [primarily bourgeois white w o m e n , b o t h liberal and radical in perspective] was based o n the idea of a c o m m o n oppression', a 'shared victimization.'. 1 3 W h i l e thus m a n y w o m e n , rather than rejecting the status of victim, are celebrating it as a source of identity, this may partly be due, Barry argues, to the heritage o f ' t h e political and academic left-liberalism of the late 1960's w h e n the cult of the victim was the liberal's answer to u r b a n racial violence'. 1 4 It is a heritage w h i c h also seems to i n f o r m the 'answer' to the pervasive sexual violence in o u r society, including the answer of parts of the w o m e n ' s m o v e m e n t . It is an 'answer' o n the level of culture to a p r o b l e m of oppression in the real: the offer of a cult as c o m p e n s a t i o n for oppression. A f t e r t w e n t y - f i v e m o r e years of this particular heritage, the cult n o t only continues to b e offered, b u t increasingly is b e i n g accepted, cultural representation of oppression identity b e i n g regarded n o t only as an adequate c o m p e n s a t i o n for, but an adequate response to, oppression. If its 'offer' is made in lieu of political s u p p o r t in the real, its 'acceptance' similarly is in lieu - a r e n u n c i a t i o n of resistance o n the level of oppression, in favour of the cultural construction of elective h o m e countries. Alain Finkielkraut also analyses this infatuation w i t h one's oppression status, subjecting it to probably the most self-critical and u n c o m p r o m i s i n g scrutiny. N o t only is the absence of danger its condition: ' t h r o u g h the p r o x i m i t y to the [Second W o r l d ] W a r I was p r o t e c t e d f r o m any anti-Semitic violence, so that I could identify w i t h the role o f the victim w i t h o u t personal danger to myself.' 1 5 B u t to adopt a collective 'victim identity' is above all to appropriate the suffering of others f o r one's o w n personal identity: 'Being a j e w to m e for a long t i m e had m e a n t a right: the right to appropriate trials I had not suffered . . . This e n o r m o u s suffering, h o w e v e r , w h i c h t h r o u g h p r o claiming m y Jewish identity I had t h o u g h t to be able to acquire, c a n n o t — so m u c h I k n o w today — be appropriated.' 1 6 C l a i m i n g a collective victimization for one's individual identity thus means exploiting the victimization of others, in a situation different f r o m the situation of victimization , w h e r e o n the contrary it b e c o m e s
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an advantage - be it in a political scene w h i c h attributes cult(ural) credit in the f o r m of attention and recognition o n the basis of suffering, 1 7 or as Finkielkraut also describes, in one's o w n consciousness, w h e r e it lends a ' t o u c h of suffering and tragedy as a spice' to the banality of one's everyday life. 1 8 If this sounds hard o n one's o w n psychology as well as one's o w n relative suffering, it has to be r e m e m bered that this insight is due not only to u n c o n d i t i o n a l honesty (the 'cold winds of self-scrutiny'), b u t also to political necessity: 'For, if authenticity today means n o m o r e than not to b e ashamed of one's origins, it is b u t another f o r m of forgetting. If b e i n g a J e w is r e d u c e d to the little bit of courage it takes to call oneself a J e w , Judaism has the choice only b e t w e e n t w o kinds of disappearance.' 1 9 Presenting this 'self-image' to oneself and to the general public means disparaging reality, seeking to gain value in the eyes of the public (or oneself) w h i c h is based o n a reality o t h e r than one's o w n . It means constructing a self-image w i t h the material of the reality of other people's suffering. N o r does this abuse of historical suffering c o n t r i b u t e to preserving its m e m o r y , b u t on the contrary helps to annihilate it. As Finkielkraut says with regard to Judaism, 'I have u n d e r s t o o d that Judaism is not simply a matter of expression of personal sincerity, b u t that it exists outside m y person - indeed that it precludes any definition in the fust person.'20 just so the collective history of the oppression of w o m e n exists outside the person of individual w o m e n , and precludes any definition in the first person, any representative appropriation by individual w o m e n . R a t h e r , the representation of identity w r o u g h t out of collective experience - the so-called personal 'political identity' - is a f o r m of self-posturing: ' T o say " I " already means to pose. B u t the p r o b l e m is that one is continually starting again f r o m this self-satisfied, seductive and voracious " I " w h i c h usurps the history of an entire people, annexing it to its need to be loved.' 2 1 In particular, it is the m e r e (perverse) reversal of the identification underlying the collective p o w e r b o n d i n g , say, of nationality or masculinity, w h e r e individuals appropriate the collective historic and cultural deeds of their 'kind' — w h i c h they have not accomplished themselves - thus to dress their h u m b l e persons in the glory of national or sex pride. W h a t applies to the collective suffering of others also applies to one's o w n suffering in the past, w h i c h can n o m o r e be 'appropriated' for the present, n o m o r e permits a definition in the first person and the present tense.
I;, M o r e o v e r , it is n o longer only the cultural or political 'identities' of resistance (oppression) w h i c h are b e i n g cultivated as collective and personal h o m e countries: t h e r e is a gradually e m e r g i n g 'victim status' of the oppressors similarly serving as material f o r the construction of identity. T h a t even the status of the oppressor may acquire special victim identity w e o w e to an oppositional 'political culture' w h i c h makes oppression into a cult, w h e r e 'oppression' is traded as a c c u m u l ated credit and multiple oppression (as a status, never of course as lived experience) has degenerated to a desirable exchange-value. H e n c e , if the oppressed appear to derive a 'positive identity' f r o m the biologist, racist, sexist, nationalist, eugenicist criteria of their oppression — defining themselves as Blacks, Migrants, Jews, Muslims, Cripples, W o m e n , Lesbians etc. — it must b e possible also to construct an identity o u t of the 'negative' criteria of the status of d o m i n a n c e : a sad and painful identity, to b e sure, yet a h o m e of sorts, a r e f u g e of 'being' (which is n o n e of o u r fault). So it happens that the virtually u n c h a n g i n g and usually u n c h a n g e able data of o u r biological and social b i o g r a p h y — sex, nationality, r a c e / e t h n i c origin, religion and all the o t h e r data w h i c h w e usually find o n forms issued by local and national authorities — are e m p l o y e d n o t only by ruling groups and institutions as a means of discrimination and social control, b u t are chosen by individuals and groups of the m o v e m e n t culture as the defining reference points in the construction of their so-called political identity. In other w o r d s , the ruling criteria of the norm(s) w h i c h define the 'deviance' of all 'otherness' are b e c o m ing fit again for g o o d (political) society, i T h u s w o m e n of the w o m e n ' s moverifent are exploring the significance of their multiple being ( ' W h a t is the relation b e t w e e n o u r b e i n g lesbian and o u r b e i n g white?') 2 2 or i n q u i r i n g into the 'identity c o m p o n e n t s " G e r m a n " (and " w h i t e " ) as well as "socialized as a Christian" '; or p o n d e r i n g the question: ' W h o t h e n is speaking w h e n I say "I am . . . "?' 2 3 W h i t e feminists of anti-racist intent r e c o m m e n d that w e locate o u r identity in the categories of p o w e r and d o m i n a n c e , say as w h i t e Christian heterosexual middle-class w o m e n w i t h o u t disability — t h e r e b y n o t only c o n f i r m i n g and strengthening d o m i n a n t ideology, b u t o n c e m o r e m a k i n g colour, nationality, class, religion and physical s y m m e t r y the factors defining other kinds (also called 'difference'). T h a t is, despite protestations that 'Black' is conceived as apolitical t e r m , it is b e c o m i n g a criterion again of skin colour. 2 4
T h u s Black p e o p l e are n o longer those oppressed by white people's racism, w h o could d o w i t h o u r solidarity in the struggle to abolish racism; they apparently are people w h o are black and thus really are 'different'. N o m a t t e r that it is precisely such an alleged identity of otherness, of being 'different' (from the ' n o r m ' ) — w h e t h e r of w o m e n as a sex or of Africans, Indigenous people, Jews, and m a n y m o r e as 'races' — w h i c h was the basis and legitimation of the historical atrocities of systematic slavery, persecution and m u r d e r (and continues to b e in the present), or that it was, in Finkielkraut's words, the Jews' 'being, not their actions, [which] had led t h e m to Auschwitz or B u c h e n w a l d ' . 2 5 T h e r e seems no recollection, in o t h e r words, that it was and is a racist ideology w h i c h defines the ' b e i n g ' or 'identity' of people, classifying t h e m as kinds of people, to be d o n e with as the definers see fit — to b e m u r d e r e d , enslaved, exploited, persecuted and displaced the w o r l d over. Similarly, it n o l o n g e r seems to b e a collective (even if differential) history of oppression and resistance w h i c h defines ' w o m e n ' as a g r o u p , b u t increasingly (again) a c o m m o n theoretical r e p r o d u c t i v e capacity to give birth. T h e concept of 'identity' is stripped of its historical, political and liberationist significance, to be used o n c e again in its original oppressive racist and sexist sense: to designate multiple 'kinds' of people. T h e t e r m 'race' may, as Finkielkraut c o m m e n t s , b e largely taboo today (at least in French and G e r m a n ) , yet 'typological t h i n k i n g and the fetishism of differences establish themselves u n d e r the aegis of the irreproachable c o n c e p t of culture.' 2 6 Multiculturalism and the multiplicity of 'cultural identities' take over the function of race typology. T h e apparent irony that whites, in response to the political selfn a m i n g of Blacks, Christians in response to the self-naming of Jews or Muslims, nationals in response to the self-naming of migrants, and m e n in response to the political self-naming of w o m e n , today define themselves as ' o t h e r than.' Black, ergo w h i t e , and ' o t h e r than' female, ergo male (etc.), w e o w e to the same cultural scene in w h i c h politics is b u t radical chic, feminism and the critiques of racism and a n t i - S e m i tism n o m o r e than trends on the level of discourse. O n the level of a left-liberal intellectual discourse, the concepts 'Black', 'Jewish', ' m i grant', and ' w o m e n ' etc. are f o u n d simply to b e dominant concepts, political values w h i c h are in fashion, in relation to which whites a n d / o r m e n n o w ' n e e d ' to define their 'identity' — as Black people or w o m e n
—-
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defined theirs at the time of their emerging resistance m o v e m e n t s — in. 'resistance' to the ' d o m i n a n t ' fashion in discourse. H e n c e masculinity studies are b o o m i n g w i t h t h e justification that 'there is a n e e d for a reassessment of masculinity in response to the feminist reinterpretation of w o m e n ' s identity'. 2 7 W e r e it in response to feminist critique rather than an alleged 'reinterpretation of w o m e n ' s identity', students of m e n ' s studies w o u l d realize that f e m i n ism already is a reassessment of masculinity. Y e t by r e d u c i n g feminism to a m e r e reinterpretation of w o m e n ' s identity, the parallel project of 'reassessing m e n ' s identity' acquires a spurious political status, o n a par w i t h the radical project of feminism. Similarly, w o m e n try to reassess their 'national' ' w h i t e ' 'Christian' 'middle-class' identity, thus assessing it as . of old. T h e critiques of racism, of nationalism and E u r o centrism are r e d u c e d to the m e r e r e n a m i n g of 'identities', identities created b y structures of oppression, b u t n o w subject to the volatile valuation of fashion. T h a t such reassessments t u r n out to be like the original 'assessm e n t s ' , in the old and intact categories of d o m i n a n c e , follows f r o m t h e application of the d o u b l e negative, the doubly deployed dualism of the d o m i n a n t culture: w o m e n are those w h o are ' o t h e r ' than m e n . M e n are those w h o are ' o t h e r ' than those w h o are ' o t h e r ' than m e n . D i t t o w h i t e , Christian, G e r m a n , etc. R a t h e r than being due to a political necessity of resistance, h o w e v e r , this 're'-assessment offers yet a n o t h e r chance for self-representation and self-realization, that is, for o c c u p y i n g oneself w i t h oneself, maintaining a position of p o w e r and self-interest, n o w clad in the glamour of a 'political' activity. H o w e v e r , it is n o l o n g e r just m e n of discourse w h o see in feminism n o m o r e than a reinterpretation of femininity. Increasingly, m a n y w o m e n also see ' f e m i n i s m ' if n o t indeed 'post-feminism' as a chance cosmetically to r e v a m p the cultural image of w o m e n and to reclaim biological sex as a factor of personal and collective identity. W h a t the repressive measures of patriarchy have for centuries b e e n forcing o n w o m e n , n a m e l y their identification o n the basis of their reproductive capacity, ideological persuasion seems finally to have b r o u g h t to c o m p l e t i o n : n a m e l y that w o m e n — especially w o m e n w i t h education privilege and thus highly trained in the culture of patriarchy — are n o w claiming it voluntarily and w i t h o u t direct or physical coercion. Such enthusiasm at the reappearance of the reactionary and positivist c o n c e p t o f ' i d e n t i t y ' can be explained only by the profit it promises
the subject. Identity offers, as w e have seen, a refuge o f ' b e i n g ' , f r o m w h i c h historicity and action have b e e n banned. I f ' B l a c k people' have b e c o m e , o n c e again, those w h o are black, t h e n w h i t e people, too, are simply those w h o are w h i t e - and less those responsible for racist oppression, w h o are exercising, profiting f r o m and maintaining it. 'Identity' n o longer refers to historical and political doing, it is a mere statement a b o u t people's being (which they cannot help). Equally ' m e n ' , rather than designating those responsible for exercising and institutionally maintaining the oppression and exploitation of w o m e n , w h o are collectively and individually benefiting f r o m it, increasingly is m e a n t to designate people w h o are biologically (and culturally and socially) male and thus different f r o m w h a t w o m e n are. H e n c e w e may o w n not only a w h i t e , Christian, male etc. identity, b u t o w n u p even to b e i n g 'bearers of a racist identity'. 2 8 'Being racist' thus b e c o m e s s o m e t h i n g w e no m o r e can help than w e can help being w h i t e or male. Generally, the politics of difference offers all of us equally — be w e oppressors or oppressed — the democratic o p p o r t u n i t y to define ourselves f r o m o u r o w n point of view, and in relation to an 'opposite' of o u r choice, as 'different' and ' o t h e r ' — thus to affirm this 'relationship' as an eternal (ahistorical) actuality. M o r e o v e r , this p r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h cultural or 'political' identities p r e - e m p t s any serious discussion about political activity. For w h a t determines political activity is less the political necessities of action than w h o w e want to be d o i n g it with. W h a t the activity is about is discussed, if at all, after the question w i t h w h o m w e are d o i n g it has b e e n resolved. T h e highest priority is the c o m m u n i t y , that is, the social and political elective h o m e country, w i t h political activity its b y - p r o d u c t . T h i s is h o w the w e l l - k n o w n separatist political groups are f o r m e d to w h i c h C h e r r i e Moraga refers, and it is h o w coalitions,-once the groups exist, are to be m a d e b e t w e e n t h e m . W h a t w h i t e 'anti-racist' w o m e n today k n o w for sure is that w h i t e and Black, Christian and Jewish, nationals and migrant w o m e n shall ' c o m e t o g e t h e r ' , the analysis c o n c e n t r a t i n g o n w h y it is 'so difficult'. 2 9 T h e 'lack of contact' and c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n w h i t e w o m e n a n d Black or migrant w o m e n is n o w b e i n g experienced as a lack, to be o v e r c o m e b y increased contact. 3 0 T h e goal is 'togetherness', w h o s e advantages are extolled while the potential disadvantages m u t e d by o t h e r w h i t e w o m e n are systematically denied. 3 1 W h a t is clear is the desire for 'coalitions' and 'bondings' — c o m m u n i t i e s w e w a n t ,
xuiiuuy, ui rusiuty iitnicci OWlOgy e n c o u n t e r s w e seek and associations we regard as desirable — and less the political necessities calling for political solidarity. T h a t is to say, for m a n y w h i t e w o m e n , w o r k i n g together w i t h Black w o m e n has b e c o m e a veritable need — and a condition for any anti-racist c o m m i t m e n t o n their part. W e will even w o r k o n recognizing and o v e r c o m i n g o u r o w n personal racism, 50 that w e m a y successfully w o r k together, rather than the other w a y r o u n d : C o a l i t i o n s d e m a n d t h a t w e i n f o r m o u r s e l v e s a b o u t t h e n e e d s a n d goals o f d i f f e r e n t g r o u p s o f w o m e n a n d o n t h e basis o f t h i s
knowledge
f o r m u l a t e o u r o w n aims. O n l y t h e n can a j o i n t discussion begin . . . Coalitions require even m o r e . . . Successful coalitions presuppose . . . A l b r e c h t a n d B r e w e r see t h e k e y t o v i a b l e c o a l i t i o n s i n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of credible leadership qualities . . . T h i s m e a n s that feminists, in o r d e r to be able successfully to w o r k together, m u s t go b e y o n d the b o u n d a r i e s o f t h e h o r i z o n o f t h e i r o w n e x p e r i e n c e a n d b e a b l e t o deal constructively w i t h differences.32
N o t e that 'feminists' in general n e e d to do all this, that ' w e all' n e e d to explore the others' differences, there b e i n g n o particular p o w e r disequilibrium that w o u l d necessitate a particular effort on d o m i n a n t w o m e n ' s part. T h e p o i n t is, h o w e v e r , that w e take o n this b u r d e n of w o r k i n g o n o u r racism in order to be able to have a viable relationship w i t h Black w o m e n ; w e do n o t enter into political coalitions in order j o i n t l y to fight against racism and sexism — that is, fight racism (and n o t just o u r o w n ) because w e recognize the political necessity of fighting it. R a t h e r , if w e w a n t coalitions — and it is obvious that w e n o w do — w e need to take all this u p o n us. G o i n g b e y o n d the h o r i z o n of one's o w n experience and dealing constructively w i t h differences (whatever that may be) are thus n o t political necessities themselves — a standard w e aspire to even w i t h o u t the promised reward, w h i c h w e might even regard as prerequisite in relation to any p e o p l e and h e n c e does n o t require special m e n t i o n . R a t h e r , they are a necessity in o u r o w n interest, a means to fulfil our wish for successful coalitions w i t h Black, Jewish and migrant w o m e n . T h a t is, w e are really in search of friends, in particular, friends defined qua their particular (racial) identity. A friend, thus, is n o t s o m e b o d y w i t h the same political ends; a friend is s o m e b o d y w h o belongs to the right identity. Similarly,
' e n e m y ' does n o t signify a political adversary but a m e m b e r of an identified collective identity. This saves m u c h political analysis, since to k n o w friend f r o m foe w e do n o t need to analyse their actions and the political implications and consequences; w e only n e e d to consult their identity. W h a t is a m a t t e r of course, say, for nationalists or racists, namely that G e r m a n s love Germans, the English love the English, the F r e n c h love the F r e n c h and so on, is b e c o m i n g a matter of course also for 'political identities' — 'lesbians love lesbians' 3 3 - and w e behave altogether as if identity w e r e the relevant criterion, b e it for political association or for friendship (if any difference is m a d e b e t w e e n t h e m ) . This means that friend and foe, t o o , are categories of identity, n o matter h o w the people in question behave: w e love t h e m or hate t h e m n o t because of w h a t they do, b u t because of w h o they are. W e deposit o u r love or o u r hatred in their persons as a friend or a foe respectively. T h u s w e may c o n t i n u e to love individual people even if they fight us, beat us, degrade us, because w e o n c e designated t h e m as friends, thus because they are friends. W e love t h e m 'despite' their behaviour, for w e do not see people as their behaviour, b u t as identities inscribed in their bodies minus their behaviour. In this way some w o m e n explain that they do n o t leave a violent partner (even if they could) because 'I still love h i m . I want h i m , only I w a n t h i m to b e h a v e differently.' ' H e ' is apparently everything except his c o n t e m p o r a r y behaviour, a fictional identity consisting of his e m b o d i m e n t and the m e m o r y of his having b e h a v e d differently in better days. It is a construction w h i c h is apparently m o r e 'real' than his real b e h a v i o u r today, and w h i c h w e insist constitutes the 'real h i m ' , w i t h w h i c h his current b e h a v i o u r is merely inconsistent. If w e manage this contradiction in relation to friends — loving people w h o are behaving towards us like adversaries — w e succeed even better in relation to foes, w h o m w e hate o n the basis of their identity and at a distance f r o m w h i c h w e do n o t even k n o w of their b e h a v i o u r . T h u s w h a t w e regard as a radical identity politics is an exact replica of national w a r - a n d - p e a c e politics: w e make coalitions and alliances w i t h people wholesale, people about w h o s e b e h a v i o u r individually w e k n o w n o t h i n g , inversely declaring war on people in similar bulk u n d e r the same conditions. This n o t only constitutes an injustice — in the 'positive' as in the 'negative' case - towards the individual people c o n c e r n e d , w h o m w e treat as representatives o f a given identity rather than as persons. It also prevents us f r o m f o r m i n g
political alliances o n the basis of people's politics and behaviour, that is, political conviction expressed through, and p r o v e d by, action. For in the case of 'friends' w e abstain f r o m analysing their b e h a viour, and in the case of supposed 'enemies' do not even get to k n o w it. 'Politics' thus b e c o m e s equivalent to k n o w i n g w h o is our e n e m y or ally respectively — certainties based n o t o n politics b u t o n categories of identity: people's 'being' or b e l o n g i n g to ethnicities, races, nations or sexes and their subgroups, our 'natural' c o m m u n i t y b e i n g o u r 'kind'. T h i s leads to c o n v e n t i o n a l warfare — say, w i t h the tribe of patriarchs or 'fathers' — and to the a c c o m p a n y i n g problems of a militarized c o m m u n i t y : ' O u r efforts to create lesbian c o m m u n i t y w e r e in serious j e o p a r d y b o t h f r o m w i t h o u t and from, w i t h i n . ' 3 4 F r o m outside ' w e faced outright violence . . . penetration and disruption, and all m a n n e r of o t h e r male sabotage', while inside the m e m b e r s of the c o m m u n i t y 'attacked each o t h e r far m o r e v e h e m e n t l y than [they] ever dared attack m e n . . . w e w e r e using o u r survival skills against each other.' 3 5 N o matter, for w e k n o w w h o o u r friends are, h o w e v e r violently they m a y attack us. W h a t are called survival skills clearly are m e t h o d s of fighting or beating a n y o n e threatening o u r interests, if they can be used just as well against each other, that is, regardless of w h e t h e r it is a m a t t e r of survival. T h e y are 'skills' of martial self-defence (attack), learnt in the w a r w i t h the e n e m y : ' W e had most of us learned well t o survive in the patriarchy . . . W e ' d learned to survive o n the street, o n the j o b or t h r o u g h the welfare office, in the b e d r o o m . ' 3 6 T h e aim seems n o longer to change a society w h i c h is patriarchal — to abolish the p o w e r structures and fight sexist oppression. T h e aim is a territorial war with the tribe of the 'fathers', w i t h a view to establishing a nation of o u r o w n . For lesbian identity is a h o m e , a c o u n t r y w h e r e w e are a m o n g o u r o w n 'kind': ' C o m i n g out was, for m e , c o m i n g h o m e . ' 3 7 It is an experience o f ' l a n d i n g ' , 3 8 of t o u c h i n g g r o u n d as m u c h as of e n t e r i n g safe land, and 'lesbian c o m m u n i t y . . . a g r o u n d for b e - i n g ' . 3 9 Just as patriarchy has b e c o m e e m b o d i e d in the tribe of the 'fathers' - identifiable p e o p l e of a kind — so the ideal c o m m u n i t y aspired to (as an alternative to society) is a c o m m u n i t y consisting of people of o n e ' k i n d ' . Flaving declared war o n the tribe of the 'fathers', w h a t can o u r goal - to abolish patriarchy - mean? E v e n w h e r e it seems, at least rhetorically, to be an issue of politics — of racism, sexism or patriarchy, w h a t in relation to people concerns political b e h a v i o u r — w e t e n d to biologize the political, so that w e may
fight against (or avoid or exclude) people - patriarchs, sexists, racists etc. — w h o supposedly personify the politics. T h a t is to say, w e opt for w a r with particular people, in preference to resistance to the political order and to racist and sexist behaviour, whosesoever it may be (though on t h e principle of identity it rarely is one's o w n ) . If the ultimate consequence is not the extermination of sexists and racists, the implication at least is territorial segregation and the creation of 'pure' communities, o n a principle of exclusion (after the m o t t o of'fascists out'), or else a retreat into niches ofseparatist living space. It is a version o f ' e t h n i c cleansing' and the nationalist claim to an exclusive territory of one's o w n , there to realize one's 'national identity'. Lesbian ethicist Sarah Lucia H o a g l a n d writes of the incipient lesbian revolution: During the emergence of the u.s. women's liberation and gay liberation movements . . . we turned our backs on the fathers' categories and began to focus on each other . . . hundreds of lesbian projects began: collectives, newspapers, record companies, bookstores, presses, film companies, schools, lesbian community centres, libraries and archives, credit unions, magazines, healing centres, restaurants, radio stations, food co-ops, alcoholism detox centres, rape crisis centres, bands, womyn's land, music festivals, more bars, and on and on.'10 In o t h e r words, everything y o u need to live - a lesbian republic nearly ready to declare its i n d e p e n d e n c e . As H o a g l a n d also emphasizes: 'I d o n o t believe oppression is going to be lifted f r o m us . . . If oppression is going to e n d , w e need to m o v e o u t of it.' 4 1 A l t h o u g h this must be a m e t a p h o r , the m e t a p h o r bespeaks a conceptual f r a m e w o r k , for w e also 'created conceptual f r a m e w o r k s outside the values of the fathers' (my emphasis). 4 2 Oppression thus is n o longer w h a t in our society w e n e e d to fight against, or patriarchal values what w e oppose w h e r e and w h e n they are realized: they are like an u n t o w a r d climate w e turn our back o n and ' m o v e o u t o f ' , to an 'outside' w e make into o u r o w n space, f r o m w h i c h in t u r n w e exclude and include w h o m and what w e see fit. For territory is the basis on w h i c h political p o w e r rests — the material range of its jurisdiction. H e n c e the attempt in the centres of p o w e r to extend its range - say, to unify ' E u r o p e ' or ultimately create a 'global village'. Conversely, h o w e v e r small (and powerless) a minority may be w i t h i n
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latniuy, or History turned biology
a larger c o m m u n i t y , w i t h a territory of its o w n it will be the majority, with p o w e r and jurisdiction over its space. T h e territorial m e t a p h o r of 'space' w i t h its geographical borders ('within and w i t h o u t ' ) is p a r a m o u n t in identity politics, as is the n o t i o n of a c o m m u n i t y of one's o w n ' k i n d ' . This ' c o m m u n i t y ' needs adequate living space, that is, needs to expand its territory: ' W e w e r e (and still are) b o u n d a r y dwellers. Atravesamos fronteras. And the first task at h a n d was d e v e l o p i n g lesbian space.' 4 3 Like a settler c o m m u n i t y building a f u t u r e state in w h a t it considers to b e a 'void' in the 'wilderness', 'lesbians were, going to forge s o m e t h i n g within a v o i d ' , w a n t i n g to 'create w h a t w e ' d imagined and dreamed'. 4 4 Spirits are correspondingly high and full of the promise of the f u t u r e state: ' W e focused o n ourselves. W e told o u r c o m i n g - o u t stories. W e celebrated lesbianism. W e began m a n y different lesbian projects. W e created space in w h i c h w e could develop a n e w c o n t e x t and build collectivity. This was an e x u b e r a n t t i m e . . .' 45 T h e r e may be setbacks of course — the dangers o f ' s l i d i n g back or being u n d e r m i n e d ' , ' w e have suffered m a n y internal defeats' — b u t ' w e have m a d e lesbian space credible to ourselves', ' o u r w o r k to date has also b e e n successful . . . w e have b e e n g r o w i n g , healing, learning, and changing despite the d o m i n a n t society all a r o u n d us and the wars b e t w e e n us.' 4 6 After the heady days of p i o n e e r i n g and conquest, n o w is a 'time for deep reevaluation'. W i t h the territory (space) staked out and the borders m o r e or less fixed, there is n o n e e d , apart f r o m vigilance towards ever hostile neighbours, for any f u r t h e r political w o r k : the c o m m u n i t y can go on living in the eternal present of its being. 'I want to suggest it is also a time of lesbian celebration', writes Hoagland at the end of her b o o k ; ' w e have accomplished as m u c h as w e have because w e believe in ourselves — w e have believed in ourselves and each other . . . C a n w e take time out, heal, recover, learn to play, and c o m e back?' 4 7 H a v i n g needed 'sufficient t i m e and r o o m to create [something n e w ] ' , space w h e r e ' w e focused on ourselves', 4 8 w e n o w need 'time o u t ' to heal, recover, play. Identity politics thus replicates the very principles o n w h i c h nations are built and n e w - f o u n d land is settled, the racist-nationalist and inter-nationalist principle which organizes supposedly h o m o g e n e o u s peoples - p e o p l e of a 'kind' - w i t h i n their respective o w n countries, each a people of 'friends' surrounded by e n e m y peoples. For even if there are differences w i t h i n the c o m m u n i t y — ' w e have b e e n exploring
o u r differences' 4 9 - there nevertheless is s o m e t h i n g specific w h i c h unites it m a k i n g it into a c o m m u n i t y within society. And it seems that all our political efforts concentrate on n o t referring to people's b e h a viour (or else to excuse it), so as to save ourselves having to respond to it politically. Instead w e distinguish b e t w e e n people o n the basis of their 'being', their i n c o r p o r a t e d identity. E v e n w h e r e w e seemingly approach questions of behaviour, f o r instance our 'treatment of the O t h e r s ' , this t o o is abstracted to a n e w kind o f ' i d e n t i t y ' . T h u s Christina T h i i r m e r - R o h r writes: Subordinates, too, tend to project themselves as masters as soon as they get the chance. This chance occurs most readily and most safely in the treatment of the Others - in and outside one's own country. Our relationship to the Others is the test case which shows in how far white people are bearers of a racist identity. Here it will show [be decided] whether they know their own boundaries and where they know them to be, whether and how they accommodate the Others and whether they accept them as Others, whether they are capable of taking responsibility for their own history and the present and, on the basis of understanding [their] errors, will be able to change themselves.5" T h e test case seems to c o n c e r n people's b e h a v i o u r - accepting and w e l c o m i n g or a c c o m m o d a t i n g others, accepting t h e m as they are, or n o t d o i n g so. Y e t if they do n o t a c c o m m o d a t e these others, and if they d o not accept t h e m as they are, this does n o t s h o w h o w they are acting, it shows in h o w far they are 'bearers of a racist identity'. W h i t e people's relationship 'to the O t h e r s ' is thus, even in the test case of 'their t r e a t m e n t of the O t h e r s ' , not a question of their behaviour, b u t of their 'identity'. In this case it is n o t an identity as whites or Germans or Europeans, it is an identity o f ' b e i n g racist'. N o r of course do they themselves create this identity, b u t as is the case with identities in general, they are 'bearers' of it. In particular, this relationship of w h i t e people towards the ' O t h e r s ' does not c o n c e r n b e h a v i o u r towards others, w i t h consequences w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g for those others: it means that subordinates 'project themselves as masters'. It may be an unpleasing image that they are thus projecting, o n e w h i c h in current political culture is negatively valued, yet it remains the m e r e projection of an identity, b e h a v i o u r on one's o w n behalf w h i c h if anything is damaging to the projectors. H e n c e the ' O t h e r s ' indeed do not suffer f r o m o u r behaviour; they 'are suffering f r o m Western culture'. 5 1
M o r e o v e r , it appears that such 'treatment of the O t h e r s ' refers n o t so m u c h to the personal b e h a v i o u r of individual people as to the collective ' b e h a v i o u r ' of the nation they b e l o n g to. A l t h o u g h there is m e n t i o n of p e o p l e in the plural, they seem less a multiplicity of individuals than the single entity of a collective. It is the 'relationship of w h i t e society to the Others' (emphasis in the original), 5 2 and a question of ' w h i t e w o m e n b e i n g b o u n d into their o w n racist society'. 5 3 T h u s , if it is a question of w h e t h e r they k n o w their ' b o u n d aries' (Grenzen), in the test case of their ' t r e a t m e n t of the O t h e r s w i t h i n and outside their c o u n t r y ' , it seems as m u c h to concern their c o u n t r y ' s national borders as any potential personal boundaries. 'Directly or indirectly, w h i t e people have in the course of their relationship to the O t h e r s developed a consciousness of normality w h i c h includes as a matter of course' a w h o l e n u m b e r o f ' c l a i m s ' a n d 'rights'. 5 4 W h i t e w o m e n are also 'bearers of the p r o b l e m , b e l o n g i n g to the culture w h i c h is and creates the p r o b l e m ' . 5 5 B u t they are bearers of this culture and m e m b e r s of this society t h r o u g h n o personal fault or responsibility of their o w n ; t h e y are bearers of it qua their identity, t h r o u g h an accident of history and birth. So presumably they c a n n o t really b e responsible for b e i n g bearers of their consciousness, a c o n sciousness d e v e l o p e d b y their 'race' over centuries. For they are b o u n d not only into their c o n t e m p o r a r y society; they are bearers of a historical identity, heirs to a E u r o p e a n legacy left n o t only by fathers to their sons b u t also by m o t h e r s to their daughters: ' T h e racism of the Christian-occidental culture is n o t only a question of a 5 0 0 - y e a r - o l d history of individual colonialists, but also of a prehistory of E u r o p e a n m e n and w o m e n . ' 5 6 In any case, h o w e v e r , it is a question of history. A n d if this history is 'full of examples of w o m e n w h o actively supported the hostilities of their m e n ' , 5 7 the present seems p e o p l e d by n o such examples. R a c i s m is thus a p r o b l e m principally of historic events going back u p to 500 years, passed on as the sins of the fathers and mothers to the u m p t e e n t h generation. O u r p r o b l e m as c o n t e m p o r a r y Europeans is simply that w e ' c a n n o t sneak o u t of this history', that 'elements of W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n identity . . . obviously remain effective into the present t i m e . ' 5 8 Just as Katie can see herself in the past as a little girl w h o was an active agent, yet in h e r adult self sees b u t the passively suffering bearer of a personal identity in w h i c h elements of her personal-psychological history are still effective, so Europeans in the
past used to be active agents, participants in the political events (for example, racism) of their time, while c o n t e m p o r a r y W e s t e r n E u r o peans simply suffer the effects of a W e s t e r n E u r o p e a n past, a historical identity. History and the past are thus really a biological inheritance, o n the personal as o n the political level. T h a t is to say, w e psychologize the history of 'nations' and continents (not to m e n t i o n 'races') after the m o d e l of the (biological) theory of the psychology of individuals. T h e p o i n t in the one as in the other case is to banish action and b e h a v i o u r into the r e m o t e and inaccessible past, r e n d e r i n g the present a state of p u r e being, t r o u b l e d b u t by the interference of particles f r o m the past w h i c h refuse to pass, following us into the present. T h u s in an editorial entitled ' T h e Past does n o t Pass', in the r e n o w n e d weekly newspaper, Die Zeit, it is said of G e r m a n y that the past has ' b u r d e n e d our people w i t h a particularly heavy inheritance [Erblast]': What during the time of Hitler the Germans in cold blood brought upon the world in terms of cruelty and pain exceeds every measure of previous mistakes [Verfehlung], It is painfully brought to our minds time after time on ever recurring anniversaries . . . This past does not pass. It will persecute us with biblical force unto the seventh generation. 59 O n c e again an entire people b e c o m e s a victim of persecution, this t i m e the c o n t e m p o r a r y G e r m a n 'people': not just racism and antiSemitism persecute us as our pain and o u r misery; the past is also persecuting us w i t h biblical force. ' T o be sure, the generations w h i c h have followed are free of direct or indirect implication, free also of any personal responsibility or guilt.' 6 0 All the m o r e so are they truly victims, being persecuted for n o fault of their o w n . If we think, h o w e v e r , that the a u t h o r is challenging the law of ' b l o o d and soil' relation, w h i c h alone visits the sins of the fathers u p o n the sons — that is, the racist, nationalist biological construction of an extended national family as a historico-biological organism — w e are mistaken. For t h o u g h responsibility is said to be specific to the context of action, thus absolving c o n t e m p o r a r y Germans f r o m any guilt and responsibility for the Holocaust, their b l o o d relation with those responsible is reaffirmed in the very same breath: ' T h r e e things nevertheless are i m p o s e d o n t h e m . First, the b u r d e n of insight: so l o w may G e r m a n s fall, so l o w may people fall.' 61 T h e tragedy (or 'mistake') of
the N a t i o n a l Socialist past is n o t that millions o f j e w s and o t h e r people w e r e m u r d e r e d and tortured, and m a n y countries b r o u g h t to ruin; the tragedy is that G e r m a n s sank so low. H e n c e it is 'painful' for ' G e r mans' to b e r e m i n d e d of it o n successive anniversaries: this history was and remains a b l o w to G e r m a n national consciousness. For secondly, the editorial continues, it imposes o n Germans 'the c o n t i n u i n g duty to b e ashamed of monstrosities c o m m i t t e d half a century ago in the G e r m a n n a m e and by G e r m a n hands'. 6 2 It may b e a 'painful history', b u t it is n o n e the less the G e r m a n s ' history, their p r o p e r t y and possession. It has b e e n made by G e r m a n hands, h e n c e it is their prerogative — h o w e v e r negative it may be — in all i n n o c e n c e to b e ashamed of it, to b e ashamed of the Germans. This history does not, apparently, impose any obligation to reflect u p o n any c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n this understanding of national identity and the historical understanding of it in that N a t i o n a l Socialist past w h i c h so b u r d e n s us today: an understanding of the national identity of the ' G e r m a n s ' as a transhistorical ' b l o o d and soil' organism - w h i c h n o t only b r o u g h t the N a t i o n a l Socialists to p o w e r , b u t was the basis of a politics o f ' r a c e ' w h i c h culminated in the m u r d e r of millions o f j e w i s h m e n , w o m e n and children as well as of other people considered to be of 'inferior race' — and this understanding of ' G e r m a n s ' today w h o , h o w e v e r painfully, nevertheless identify w i t h this 'master race', w i t h the G e r m a n n a m e as well as G e r m a n hands. T h e principle of identification is the same, w h e t h e r it fills those identifying w i t h pride or shame. Y e t this biologist principle of biologically national origin remains unchallenged — the principle according to w h i c h w e are 'the same' as the generations of p e o p l e of the same 'nationality', the same ' b l o o d ' , w h o lived on the same soil b e f o r e us. T h i r d l y , t h e past imposes o n the Germans ' t h e task of seeking the lessons of history by continuously r e m e m b e r i n g it in the present'. W h y the task specifically of Germans? Because it is the history o f ' t h e G e r m a n s ' , their national heritage, their inheritance? W h a t about the history of the Jews? O f the E u r o p e a n s east and west? O f the Soviet U n i o n and so forth? H a v e they all their o w n little national histories, w h i c h it is their task to c o m e to terms with? D o e s n o o n e else have to t h i n k about race ideology, about national pride, about the n o t i o n of a 'master race', about mass m u r d e r and war, about the Holocaust, and to d r a w lessons f r o m the history of this century — because it was ' G e r m a n hands' that made 'the history' of half a century ago? Just
because w e d o not h o l d a G e r m a n passport, e n j o y i n g citizenship of a different national state (an accident of history and birth), do w e have n o responsibilities c o n c e r n i n g this history o f ' t h e Germans'? N o r for the history of the K h m e r R o u g e , the history of millions of m u r d e r e d C a m b o d i a n s , the history of the Serbs, the Croats, the Bosnians, the Somalis or a n y o n e else? Even less for the history of any multinationals and transnational capital and their exploitation, say, of 200 million children? Because despite f m e - s o u n d i n g w o r d s a b o u t universal h u m a n rights and a b o u t crimes against h u m a n i t y , w e d o not really feel responsible for any h u m a n i t y , but if anything for ' o u r o w n kind'? It appears so. It appears that w e are carriers of history as w e are carriers of bad (or good) hereditary factors, of congenital diseases passed o n t h r o u g h blood relationship to i n n o c e n t victims of f u t u r e generations. T h u s the social philosopher N o r b e r t Elias writes in his Studien iiber die Deutschen (Studies about the Germans): In the German tradition we can quite clearly note both a habituation to strategies of commanding and obeying, often enough also by means of direct or indirect use of physical force - and, until recently, a comparatively low degree of skill in strategies of discussion, as the heritage/inheritance [Erbe] of a long absolutist and near-absolutist rule. Displeasure in relation to the relatively complicated control of emotions required for resolving conflicts exclusively by means of discussion, or conversely, the pleasure [taken] in the simpler command and obedience strategies may still be observed in Germany today/' 3 T h a t is to say, the pleasure taken in giving orders or in obeying t h e m , or the displeasure experienced in controlling one's emotions, and conversely, the pleasure of indulging one's emotions, w h i c h all m a y b e observed in people living in G e r m a n y today, are n o t , as you m i g h t think, a m a t t e r of their personal interests and their personal political will — say, a question of certain advantages they can see in such behaviour, or indeed, the pleasure they are thereby experiencing. R a t h e r , the cause of such b e h a v i o u r is to b e sought in the history of G e r m a n y , the 'blood and soil organism's' collective experience of l o n g absolutist rule. For as a people ' y o u ' get used to absolutist rule as a rat gets used to the systematic manipulation by a laboratory technician. W h e r e a s a skill in discussion strategies can be learnt only 'in the course of a long series of generations' 6 4 — w h o will pass on the
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fragments of their learning in the f o r m of hereditary cultural factors to f u t u r e generations. In particular, t h e r e exists a 'typical' behaviour of Germans, if n o t i n d e e d a 'national habitus of the Germans' 6 5 - a 'character of the p e o p l e ' or a 'national character of the G e r m a n s ' , similar, say, to the 'sexual character' of w o m e n . 6 6 Citizens of the U n i t e d States or of Switzerland, say, have b e e n m u c h luckier in this respect, d e m o c r a c y having b e e n practised a lot l o n g e r by the predecessors on. their soil b e they b l o o d relatives or 'elected relatives' acquired t h r o u g h i m m i gration. It is so also w i t h Britain and the Netherlands: ' M e m b e r s of these states possess as part of their national heritage a choice of behaviours w h i c h allow t h e m and at the same time oblige t h e m to k e e p their feelings - m o r e or less - in check w h e n resolving social conflicts.' 6 7 As Alain Finkielkraut describes his construction of a Jewish identity as an attempt to usurp and claim for himself the history of an entire people, so the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a 'national character' is an attempt to usurp the experiences of previous generations for the benefit of individuals today. A l t h o u g h G e r m a n i s m , like Judaism, precludes any definition in the first person, today's Germans seem to consist of individual Germans w h o s e pleasure and displeasure, w h o s e explosive e m o t i o n a l b e h a v i o u r and w h o s e reluctance to engage in discussions (where they display it) w e explain by a national collective character developed 'on G e r m a n soil' and passed o n t h r o u g h G e r m a n blood. 6 8 E v e n w h e r e it is n o t a m a t t e r of virtues, heroic deeds and cultural achievements, b u t of centuries of absolutist rule, these may be a p p r o priated and a n n e x e d by c o n t e m p o r a r y individuals - as an 'explanation' of unacceptable or reprehensible b e h a v i o u r in the present. For 'in G e r m a n y o n e did have too little time and too little o p p o r t u n i t y to develop the k i n d of self-control, the kind of conscience, w h i c h makes it possible individually, o u t of one's o w n strength, to check hostility against other groups and classes of one's o w n society — even if insight makes o n e see the necessity.' 6 9 O n e hasn't b e e n a r o u n d for the centuries it takes to learn to control one's e m o t i o n s or to develop a sort of conscience individually. A l t h o u g h Elias wants to challenge explanations w h i c h see, say, 'civilized b e h a v i o u r ' as a 'genetically inherited attribute', 7 0 his drawing of an analogy b e t w e e n the psychological individual and the collective 'organism' of a 'people' leads h i m to a theory w h i c h biologizes
'cultural heritage'. 7 1 N o t only d o ' m e m b e r s of [national] states or o t h e r social units' share a c o m m o n 'psyche', they also share a c o m m o n , transhistorical 'life' and 'experience': ' M e m b e r s of a state . . . o f t e n take a l o n g time, sometimes even centuries, to c o m e to terms w i t h [a p r o b l e m like their r e d u c e d sense of self-worth].' 7 2 And they also share a c o m m o n 'feeling' or 'sense': 'People w h o f o r m nationstates w i t h a relatively long tradition usually have a certain sense of b e i n g d e p e n d e n t o n opposing groups w i t h i n their nation, of being j o i n e d as heirs to the same c o m m u n i t y , a c o m m u n i t y sharing a fate and the struggle for survival.' 7 3 W h a t could be discussed precisely as a question of culture — say, h o w a shared sense of n a t i o n h o o d is created n o t only t h r o u g h national literature, art and history, 7 4 b u t also t h r o u g h the constitution of the nation-state itself, together w i t h its civil and military institutions - is t u r n e d into a matter o f ' f e e l i n g ' , a collective psychological heritage. T h u s even culture, w h i c h is consciously p r o d u c e d by people and disseminated w i t h the material support of the state and private industry, turns into a psychological state of nature — an expression, if n o t of h u m a n nature, still of the national people's ' n a t u r e ' . W h a t is to be f o u n d in the cultural products of the nation, including its national institutions, is located instead w i t h i n the emotional h o u s e h o l d of its citizens. H e n c e it is treated as an individual's e m o t i o n s are treated by psychology, for w h i c h there are n o actions in the present, b u t only the effects of actions in the past. Feeling a feeling in the present is t h e r e f o r e n o action in the present - say, an interaction w i t h the c u r r e n t state of reality - b u t the effect of a past stored in the collective national organism. Since a ' p e o p l e ' has a collective 'psyche', 'it' also draws u p o n itself the psychological understanding w h i c h sees the individual primarily as a recipient of traumata, that is to say, as a victim. T h u s Elias 'has for a l o n g time had the c o n v i c t i o n that t h e r e also are collective traumatic experiences in the life [sic] of peoples and i n d e e d m a n y social g r o u p ings, w h i c h sink deeply into the psychological h o u s e h o l d of m e m b e r s of these peoples and there create e n o r m o u s damage'. 7 5 H e n c e w e are hardly surprised that for Elias, t o o , the N a t i o n a l Socialist past b e c o m e s a 'trauma' in the 'life' of the ' G e r m a n p e o p l e ' , w h i c h has damaged the G e r m a n 'soul': 'the traumatic experience of N a t i o n a l Socialist rule and t h e terrible consequences w h i c h it has had for G e r m a n y ' . 7 " W a s it traumatic f o r the ' G e r m a n people' to exercise this rule, or did 'it' itself
MvikMt^j K/i nmury luiricu UlUlUgy have to suffer u n d e r it? If the latter is intended, w h o t h e n was 'the G e r m a n p e o p l e ' w h o elected Hitler to p o w e r and helped t u r n its state into the ' T h i r d R e i c h ' , to separate the 'Jews' out of the ' p e o p l e ' and deport t h e m into the camps, there to be killed? W h i c h part of the 'people' is 'the people', w h i c h experience is 'the people's experience', and w h i c h is the 'damage' that scars 'the people's soul'? Y e t the objective is hardly to analyse the 'people' of the past, w h i c h in the past had still b e e n acting. T h e c o n c e r n is w i t h 'the p e o p l e ' of today w h i c h , despite its transhistorical i n c o r p o r a t i o n as 'a p e o p l e ' w i t h a 'life' of m a n y centuries, has n o t h i n g to d o w i t h those actions in the past, yet has the psychological inheritance of past 'experience' in its bones, and h e n c e is damaged in its soul. T h e r e are t h e r e f o r e n o lessons to be learnt f r o m other people's history; n o r apparently may ideas such as democracy, n o n - v i o l e n t b e h a v i o u r , controlling e m o t i o n s or skill in discussion and the like be learnt or acquired by persons living a n y w h e r e in the w o r l d , o n their o w n initiative and w i t h i n their o w n lifetime - unless these h a p p e n to have b e e n practised o n the same soil by their local predecessors. It appears that w e are anything b u t H a n n a h Arendt's ' n e w arrivals' in this w o r l d w h o m a y ' r e n e w the w o r l d . . . because w e all at some time c o m e as n e w arrivals into this w o r l d , w h i c h was h e r e b e f o r e us and will be here after us' (my emphasis). 7 7 H e n c e w e n e i t h e r can, as she envisaged, temporarily take o n the material estate h a n d e d on to us, cultivate and r e n e w it to the best of our ability and conscience, and pass on, if possible, a better w o r l d . O n the contrary, w e seem to enter the w o r l d genetically afflicted, as people suffering f r o m their respective national diseases. O u r c o n t r i b u t i o n to the w o r l d , if any, will be towards a d e e p e r understanding of the s y m p t o m a t o l o g y and a m o r e differentiated aetiology of these illnesses, c o m p a r i n g o u r national genetic defects (and strengths) w i t h those of other nationalities, the national characters of the British, the Italians etc. 7 8 T h u s it is d o u b t f u l ultimately w h e t h e r w e may learn any lessons even f r o m ' o u r o w n ' national history, or w h e t h e r it is w o r t h our trouble and effort, since an i m p r o v e d national b e h a v i o u r may simply develop in the course of history and centuries of practice. If n o t — ' p o o r self-destructive Germany'.79 As the biological/psychological understanding of identity ultimately declares the person incapable of learning, so this national D a r w i n i s m declares so-called 'peoples' and c o m m u n i t i e s of people collectively
(and individually) incapable of learning, h a n d i n g t h e m over to a behaviourist cure of centuries-long drill-training and conditioning. It constitutes a justification for coercive measures of political and social control — presumably t h r o u g h advanced specimens of the species (or foreign nationals of better disposition) — in order slowly to breed the gradual progress of h u m a n k i n d . At the same time it serves to excuse, explain and exonerate the behaviour of people living today, ascribing their b e h a v i o u r n o t to their o w n willed decisions, but to a 'national character' w h i c h they c a n n o t help. In any case, h o w e v e r , their b e h a viour — be it violent and m u r d e r o u s or controlled and 'civilized' — is a question exclusively of their o w n interest, w i t h consequences w o r t h m e n t i o n i n g only for themselves: p o o r , self-destructive G e r m a n y . ' W h a t is Ideology?' asks Alain Finkielkraut, and answers: According to Hannah Arendt, it is 'the logic of an idea', the claim to explain history as 'one consistent process' whose conclusion is the perfection, the production of humanity itself. . . For what Ideology calls law is the formula of evolution and nothing else. Whether it speaks of the 'law of history' or the 'law of life', whether it refers to Marx or Darwin, Ideology subjects humanity to the same regime as nature - that is, to an order that knows no commandment; the goals people set themselves and the imperatives they impose on themselves dissimulate, in the eyes of Ideology, the causes that make them act. In short, Ideology substitutes necessity for obligation and the scientific law of 'becoming' for the transcendence of judicial or moral law. While using legal terminology, it excludes the law from its vision of the world. 80 T h e scientific perspective o n h u m a n i t y and history sees in these only the law of b e c o m i n g w h i c h ' k n o w s no c o m m a n d m e n t ' , m a k i n g any question of people's moral or indeed political decisions, of the goals they set themselves, or the principles they elect for themselves, superfluous. T h e scientific perspective renders people the mere material t h r o u g h w h i c h the gigantic and s u p r a h u m a n 'force of nature or of history' is realizing itself, racing t h r o u g h them. 8 1 In this i d e o logical sense of a 'law of nature', A r e n d t argues, 'law' is first of all the 'expression of m o t i o n i t s e l f , that is, the m o t i o n of cause and effect. In the interest of mastering, of getting a grip o n this law of b e c o m i n g , w e — the subjects of ideology and the scientific perspective - d e n y
people's will and their responsibility for their o w n actions, 'disclosing' instead the 'real causes' of their b e h a v i o u r - by means of sociobiological, psychoanalytical, ethno-psychoanalytical, national-Darwinist, or as Elias says, ' h u m a n - s c i e n t i f i c ' explanations. 8 2 It was just such a scientific understanding, Finkielkraut argues, w h i c h f o u n d its most totalitarian expression in the ideology of N a t i o n a l Socialism, or the Pol P o t regime, w h e r e ideology was pushed ' t o its ultimate consequences', w h e r e it was ' "science" and n o t nature [which] stifled the voice of conscience', w h e r e it was 'the idea w h i c h c o n q u e r e d the instincts and n o t . . . the instinct w h i c h broke t h r o u g h all barriers'. 8 3 Nevertheless, 'Ideology is b e i n g reinstated in all its honours.'84 It is an ideology w h i c h may p u r p o r t to distinguish radically, that is, d i c h o t o m o u s l y , b e t w e e n 'scientific idea' and 'instinct', b e t w e e n a ' t h o u g h t ' and a 'feeling'. Y e t it is a science in justification qfinstincts, and a science of feeling and e m o t i o n . T h e p r o b l e m of o u r n e w sentimentality w i t h regard to scientific ideology, Finkielkraut argues, is that 'the critique of ideology, despite its v e h e m e n c e and radicalness, has missed the m a i n point, namely that Ideology is paved w i t h the best intentions and the most n o b l e sentiments', promising the c o m i n g of o n e h a r m o n i o u s , happy and perfected humanity. 8 5 A h o m o g e n e o u s s u p e r - n a t i o n of 'friends' o n the territory of the 'global village' - an e n d w h i c h obviously justifies all means, m a k i n g any further critique redundant.
Resistance
and the will to resistance
? W a r — attack, conquest, d o m i n a t i o n — seems to be the guiding p r i n ciple of h u m a n interaction, in our m o d e r n 'cilvilized' times as m u c h as in a p r o j e c t e d 'barbarian' past. Nation-states, o u r chosen (or accepted) f o r m of organization into c o m m u n i t i e s , are built o n their right to wage war, militarism being a central feature of civil society in 'peacetime' a r o u n d w h i c h the civil as m u c h as the military order are built. 1 T h e a c h i e v e m e n t of E u r o p e a n / W e s t e r n 'civilization' seems to consist in the successful exportation of w a r and militarism to the 'rest' of the w o r l d , and in having kept military conflict away f r o m h o m e territory since the m i d - t w e n t i e t h century. Its second m a j o r achievem e n t is the successful naturalization of w a r and martiality as a 'civilized' way of being. This means that W e s t e r n society has b e c o m e t h o r o u g h l y militarized even in its 'civilian' outfit, martiality having b e e n internalized by 'individuals' to such an extent that they 'naturally' constitute t h e m selves as subject - an entity in opposition — each a warrior at w a r w i t h an e n e m y w o r l d . Hostility has b e c o m e the basic constitution of self, not just in relation to recognized e n e m y forces — an oppressive state, systems of oppression, threatening individuals - b u t equally in relation to those w e consider o u r nearest and dearest. H e n c e even resistance tends increasingly to be conceived u n d e r the aegis of martiality — a possibility w i t h i n it rather than a radical refusal of it. T o d a y , if people are against anything they consider themselves to be in resistance to it. T h u s the racist and neo-fascist group of whites in South Africa responsible for m u r d e r i n g Chris H a n i call themselves 'resistance fighters', a t e r m duly repeated by W e s t e r n c o m m e n t a t o r s , w h o merely point out that Black people had given n o cause for this
particular outburst of anger. T h e implication is that there might have b e e n a cause for such a m u r d e r , only in this case, t h e r e h a p p e n e d to b e n o n e . 2 If w h i t e fascists are against the rights of Black people and thus against Black people, w e seem to think it fit to describe t h e m as b e i n g in resistance to t h e m . Resistance is d e m o t e d t o a m e r e s y n o n y m for opposition - aggressive e n m i t y — e n n o b l e d by the positive c o n n o t a t i o n s of a beleaguered fight against oppression. \ A political c o n c e p t of resistance implies a struggle against a force of p o w e r and violence by those w h o suffer u n d e r it, that is, it includes an analysis and r e c o g n i t i o n of the superiority of that p o w e r , and the aim to dismantle that p o w e r . M u c h of what today goes by the name of resistance, h o w e v e r , is retaliation against the e n e m y (if n o t indeed attack, as in the example above), a c o u n t e r - m o v e in w h a t is seen as the chronological sequence of (violent) action and reaction, attack and c o u n t e r - a t t a c k b e t w e e n designated opponents. T h e aim is n o t to dismantle p o w e r , the aim is victory over the e n e m y , that is, gathering e n o u g h p o w e r o n one's o w n side to o v e r p o w e r the other side. H e n c e the crucial question is less w h a t the p o w e r relations are than w h e r e the consideration of history begins, that is, w h i c h is the 'original' action to w h i c h there is re-action, ' w h o began' b y making the first m o v e , to w h i c h the second is b u t a c o u n t e r - m o v e . T h u s it was r e p o r t e d in the n e w s that Palestinians w e r e t h r o w i n g stones and Israeli settlers w e r e shooting, ' b u t it is unclear as yet w h o began'. 3 T h a t is, the concept o f ' r e s i s t a n c e ' b e c o m e s part of the ideologizing structure of justifying one's o w n action (or the actions of those w i t h w h o m the subject identifies), w h e r e the other's action preceding ours is said to be the cause of - or to have given us cause for - violent action o n o u r part. I It is w h y every military force in the w o r l d is called a 'defence' force, g o v e r n e d by a civil ministry of defence that explains w h a t the current military action is a d e f e n c e against. T h u s a British Falklands war is a defensive war, sinking the Argentinian warship General Belgrano a defensive action against its hostile change of course, just as b o m b i n g Iraq is but retaliation in defence of an already attacked K u w a i t and a justified response to Saddam Hussein's failure to respond to the U N ' s u l t i m a t u m . In fact, consulting history w e will find that there never has' b e e n an aggressive m o v e in the w o r l d , since there always was some previous action or event considered by one or the other party to have b e e n the 'cause' for 'retaliation'.
So the question is really w h i c h o p p o n e n t makes this narrative of self, or f r o m w h o s e subjective point of view w e regard an action or sequence of actions (that is, history). Since these selves — be they nations or individuals — by definition are ' o p p o n e n t s ' , each having its 'opposite' and thus its e n e m y , any action t h e n b e c o m e s a f o r m of resistance and self-defence. N a t i o n a l history — w h a t w e also call revisionism — means developing a narrative of the national self u n d e r stood as a national-biographic a c c o u n t i n g w i t h w h i c h the national patient feels emotionally comfortable, in fact, a f o r m of n a t i o n psychoanalysis, 'the creation of a reflexively ordered narrative' e n a b ling nations 'to b r i n g their past " i n t o line" w i t h exigencies of the present, consolidating an emotional story-line w i t h w h i c h they feel relatively c o n t e n t ' . 4 \ For an analysis of violence, the violent agent's self-justification for action - the 'reflexively ordered narrative' u n d e r s t o o d as a 'biographical accounting' w i t h w h i c h that agent feels comfortable — is not the issue, is not what determines w h e t h e r it was violence or not. M o s t violent m e n — like most ministries of defence — provide explanations, that is, rationalizations of w h y they consider their use of violence justified — say, that their wives had b e e n nagging or otherwise getting ;'••••' o n their nerves, or that their victims had p r o v o k e d t h e m b e y o n d e n d u r a n c e ( w h e t h e r t h r o u g h vulnerability or otherwise). In order to y'- understand what violence is and w h a t may b e resistance to violence, w e need to analyse the actions in question, to see t h e m within their action context, w h i c h includes the p o w e r relations of that context. Violence requires a situation w h e r e it can be exerted, a p o w e r . relation that makes its use possible. C o u n t e r - v i o l e n c e , h o w e v e r justifiable w e may feel it to be, requires a corresponding reversal of the p o w e r relations to enable (counter)-violence to take place. Planning an action of c o u n t e r - v i o l e n c e , even if conceived as an act of resistance, requires constructing a situation in w h i c h those carrying out the action will have the necessary p o w e r to succeed, that is, to exert violence. It is therefore an act of violence, carried o u t f r o m a position of p o w e r , i \ A military intervention in Bosnia, as called for by some peace activists and feminists (at least until recently), w o u l d not be an act of resistance to war, but an act of aggression with p o w e r superior to the p o w e r of the Serbian military and paramilitary forces. Similarly, if groups of w o m e n in response to incidents of rape decide to beat u p
m e n in their n e i g h b o u r h o o d , this is less an act of resistance to sexual violence than the construction of a situation in w h i c h this group of w o m e n will have t h e p o w e r to exert violence against individual m e n . T h a t is, it is violence, w h a t e v e r its justification. It is not an act of n o n - v i o l e n c e simply because m e n collectively have p o w e r over w o m e n and because t h e y collectively c o m m i t so m u c h violence against w o m e n and girls. T h a t is to say, there are different questions involved, namely w h e t h e r an action — even what w e consider an act of resistance or self-defence - is violence, and w h e t h e r or in w h a t way it is resistance, a n d resistance to precisely w h a t . T h e g r o w i n g belligerence of identity politics, h o w e v e r , has also b r o u g h t forth a rhetoric that tends to equate radical resistance w i t h violent resistance. Inversely, one's o w n violence tends to be presented as n o n - v i o l e n c e (not really violence) o n a c c o u n t of it being resistance. O n the 'street' level of m o v e m e n t s there is talk of w o m e n n e e d i n g to arm ourselves individually, if n o t i n d e e d to m o u n t a collective armed struggle, while o n the 'respectable' level of national w o m e n ' s politics there are g r o w i n g n u m b e r s advocating that w o m e n j o i n their national military, either to acquire adequate training in the art of war or so as n o t to leave the military exclusively in the hands of m e n . 5 Analysis of violence and discussion of n o n - v i o l e n t means of resistance are b e c o m ing increasingly rare, b e i n g t h o u g h t decidedly 'un-radical'. H a v i n g identified (that is, personified) the e n e m y , victory over t h e m has b e c o m e the 'natural' aim. R a t h e r than analysing the violent action proposed (from personal violence t h r o u g h to war) and its adequacy as a means to a defined political end, w e t e n d instead to adduce examples — say, of armed liberation struggles in the T h i r d W o r l d , the a r m e d uprising of the W a r s a w g h e t t o , or a w o m a n ' s self-defence in a life-threatening situation — to p r o v e the justifiability of violent self-defence. Far f r o m clarifying the question at hand, namely h o w w e propose to act, w h y , and to w h a t e n d , in w h i c h situation, such comparisons suggest the self-evident comparability of o u r o w n situation (oppression) w i t h the situations (oppressions) in these historical precedents. ^ Q u e s t i o n i n g the usefulness of w o m e n arming ourselves here and n o w or of beating up select m e n in the park thus b e c o m e s equivalent to suggesting that the Jews in the W a r s a w ghetto should have n o n violently awaited their destruction. Such comparisons, h o w e v e r , m e a n abusing the suffering (and the resistance) of o t h e r people in the
interests of justifying o u r o w n actions. O u r situation is alleged to be comparable to that in the examples, the analogy having to stand in for an analysis of o u r o w n situation. T h e proposal to use violence is derived n o t f r o m an analysis of o u r situation and a definition of o u r political aims; rather, violence is the chosen means, for w h i c h justification is n o w b e i n g sought. Similarly, the n o t i o n seems to be gaining g r o u n d that, as m e m b e r s of oppressed groups, o u r violence cannot be violence like the violence of the oppressors, just as w h i t e w o m e n ' s p o w e r w i t h i n the system of slavery was said to b e 'false p o w e r ' , n o t p o w e r 'in the sense' that male tyrants and patriarchal despots have it, and w h i t e w o m e n ' s c o n t e m porary racism is considered to be n o t really 'racism' in the sense of 'racism e n d e m i c in patriarchy'. In the same way our o w n violence is t h o u g h t to be ' n o t really' violence, in the sense of the violence of those w e oppose. N o t only does o u r b e i n g — o u r identity - apparently soften any violence w e may exert, it may m a k e us by definition into resisters. Simply by virtue of n o t b e l o n g i n g to the (chief) oppressors, w e seem to constitute some 'kind' of resistance to p o w e r . Resistance, h o w e v e r , like oppression, is n o t a nebulous climate w e vaguely inhabit, m o v e into by c o m i n g ' h o m e ' to our identity. M u c h less is it a quality w h i c h w e have qua our (oppressed) identity, so that anything w e d o by definition b e c o m e s 'resistance'. ' T h e r e is s o m e t h i n g in each lesbian', Sarah H o a g l a n d writes, 'that questions the n o r m at some level . . . T h a t is, there is s o m e t h i n g w i t h i n each lesbian of the spirit I consider crucial to the sort of ethical concepts I am interested in w o r k i n g on. It is a certain ability to resist and refocus, and it is this ability in all lesbians w h i c h draws m e . ' 6 T h e lesbian herself may neither question the norm(s), n o r resist or refocus, yet there 'is s o m e t h i n g w i t h i n h e r ' that questions the n o r m ( w h e t h e r she wants it or not). It is an ability to resist and refocus, regardless of w h e t h e r she uses her ability to do so. A n d there is a spirit crucial to ethical concepts in her — if not like Levinas's ethics falling on top of us f r o m outside, still pushing t h r o u g h f r o m w i t h i n . It is each and every and 'all lesbians' w h o are blessed w i t h such abilities and spirit — w e need n o t m e e t or k n o w t h e m individually t o k n o w w h a t spirit possesses t h e m and w h a t ethical concepts they are living by. For these are qualities and spirits that c o m e with identity, factors of these 'kinds' of people. O t h e r 'kinds' of people, if they have t h e m at all, have t h e m to a lesser degree, even if they d o resist and
refocus or question social norms. Perhaps it is s o m e t h i n g they h a p p e n to do, yet n o t s o m e t h i n g w h i c h they are and have. In the same way it used to be whites or w h i t e m e n w h o w e r e blessed w i t h abilities, w h e t h e r they s h o w e d any b y using t h e m or not, whereas w h a t e v e r ability or spirit Black p e o p l e or w o m e n might have s h o w n , it was never, in the eyes of w h i t e m e n , w h a t they really did and w h a t s h o w e d w h a t Black people or w o m e n could do; it was s o m e t h i n g they h a p p e n e d to d o in spite of w h a t they are.1 Resistance, I w o u l d suggest, does n o t c o m e w i t h any identity. It is a question of political will and action. It requires the political analysis of systems of oppression t h r o u g h to individual acts of oppression and violence — in terms of agency and its consequences, in terms of agents and beneficiaries and victims - and a corresponding analysis of resistance in terms of actions and their consequences. 8 O n l y o n c e w e k n o w w h a t w e are d o i n g , and w h a t o u r actions actually effect, and w h a t w e m e a n t h e m to achieve, can w e begin to act in resistance, k n o w i n g w h a t it is resistance to; and only t h e n will w e b e able to identify and c o - o p e r a t e w i t h those acting for the same political goals.| temm • I Resistance to violence h o w e v e r c a n n o t consist o f v i o l e n c e . Violence ' m a y change t h e direction o f v i o l e n c e , invert the roles of violator and victim, b u t it necessarily affirms the principle of violence, w h a t e v e r else it may achieve. A n d it adds n e w victims to the w o r l d — victims of o u r o w n m a k i n g , n o t to m e n t i o n m o r e violent perpetrators, w h o s e ranks w e have decided to j o i n . W h i l e in extremity and u n d e r the threat of o u r lives w e may n o t have any means other than violence to secure o u r survival, most of us m o s t of the time are n o t in such situations, t h o u g h w e glibly speak of 'survival'. Instead, w e w o u l d have ample o p p o r t u n i t y in situations of n o such threat to challenge the legitimacy of violence and to practise alternatives — above all by deciding n o t to use violence ourselves.
j
Notes
Violence and the will to violence 1. As one example amongst many which could be cited, Birgit R o m m e l spacher, 'Die Sucht, zu sehr zu lieben', in Roswitha Burgard and Birgit Rommelspacher, eds, Leideunlust: Der Mythos vom weiblichen Masochismus (Berlin: Orlanda Verlag, 1989): 'It should be uncontested that those, who as children had especially traumatic experiences and lacked narcissistic confirmation, will later seek to act out their neediness in inadequate ways' (p. 107; my translation). 2. Marc Wadsworth (Anti-Racist Alliance) and Claire Dissington (AntiNazi-League), cited in 'To Ban or Not to Ban', Education Guardian, 28 September 1993, p. 11. 3. Frank Drieschner, 'Glatzenpflege auf Staatskosten', Die Zeit 33 (13 August 1993), p. 50; Gisela Dachs, 'Zur Therapie nach Israel', Die Zeit 45 (5 November 1993), p. 7. 4. Rolf Ltidemann, 'Therapie als Gewaltverhaltnis', in Peter-Alexis Albrecht and Otto Backes, eds, Verdeckte Gewalt (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990), p. 230. 5. Slavenka Drakulic, Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War (London: Hutchinson, 1993), p. 146. 6. Ulrich Beck, Gegengifte: Die organisierte Unverantwortlichkeit (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1988), p. 11. 7. Sarah Lucia Floagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (Palo Alto: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988), p. 39. 8. German television, SAT. 1, 'Einspruch', 12 January 1993; see also Eva Quistorp in Freitag, 15 January 1993. 9. Swiss television DRS, '10 vor 10', 10 December 1992. 10. taz, 3 February 1993, p. 3. 11. Drakulic, Balkan Express, p. 146.
Chapter i Why the personal is political, and where the private comes from 1. Diane Antonio, for instance, argues for an ethic of care that takes the interests of others (including animals and nature) seriously, on the grounds that this ultimately satisfies a 'moral need' of our own: 'At the same time . . . we would be recognising our own moral need to give respect to non-human animals.' Animals provide us, 'as children provide mothers, with the opportunity to satisfy our needs to "act or forbear acting out of benevolent concern" for living creatures, in order to become self-defined moral beings' ('Women and Wolves: Toward an Ethic of Care Respect', in Carol Adams and Josephine Donovan, eds, Animals and Women: Feminist Theoretical Explorations (Durham: Duke University Press, due 1995)). See also Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (Palo Alto, Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988), where it is similarly a question of 'ethical needs' or 'wantfing] to be ethical, want[ing] to act with integrity' (p. 22), and where the reason for adopting ethical or moral behaviour is to 'avoid de-moralisation' and 'claim our moral agency' (p. 214), i.e. consideration of the consequences of behaviour for the agent. 2. Andrea Dworkin, Right-Wing Women (London: The Women's Press, 1983), pp. 21, 11.8. For an analysis of self-interest in relation to apparent selflessness, see also Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Trumansburg, NY: The Crossing Press, 1983), esp. pp. 74-5. 3. Carole Pateman, The Disorder of Women (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989), p. 122. 4. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 10. 5. See Pateman, The Disorder of Women, ch. 2; The Sexual Contract, ch. 4. 6. Pateman, Disorder of Women, p. 122. 7. Pateman, Sexual Contract, p. 223. 8. Ibid. 9. See Andrea Dworkin: 'ultimately the law exists to keep men from getting fucked', Intercourse (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1987), p. 161.
10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15.
Ibid., p. 148. Pateman, Disorder of Women, p. 122. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Pateman, Sexual Contract, p. 216; Lynne Harne, 'Families and Fathers: The Effects of the Children Act 1989', Rights of Women Bulletin (Spring 1993), pp. 5-6.
16. Catharine A. MacKinnon, 'Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward a Feminist Jurisprudence', Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 8, no. 4 (1983), pp. 656-7. 17. Ibid., p. 657. Chapter 2 Love of foreigners and love of the 'other' 1. Slavenka Drakulic, Balkan Express: Fragments from the Other Side of War (London: Hutchinson, 1993), p. 144. 2. Fania Fenelon, The Musicians of Auschwitz, translated from the French by Judith Landry (London: Michael Joseph, 1977), p. 84. 3. Simone de Beauvoir, The Second Sex, translated by H. M. Parshley (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972), pp. 17, 16. 4. Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (London: T h e W o m e n ' s Press, 1981), p. 17. 5. I am thinking in particular of the works of Julia Kristeva, Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous and others, whose concepts o f ' w r i t i n g with the body', of feminine speech and writing defined through the metaphors of the female body, have been particularly influential in re-biologizing women. Of course, the phenomenon o f ' F r e n c h feminism' has long ceased to be an exclusively French affair, but has become a fixed part of Western 'academic feminism'. 6. A. Sivanandan, 'Introduction', Race and Class: A Journal for Black and Third World Liberation, vol. 35, no. 1 (July-September 1993), p. v. See also the discussion about 'multiculturalism' on American university campuses in Tikkun: A Bimonthly Jewish Critique of Politics, Culture & Society, vol. 6, no. 4 (1991), pp. 35-57. 7. There has been an explosion of German books on 'the foreign', the 'strange', 'foreigners' and 'strangers', 'foreign w o m e n ' etc. (Das Fremde, die Fremden, Fremde Frauen), while university syllabuses abound with seminars about 'the known and the u n k n o w n ' , 'the strange and the familiar' (Das Fremde und das Eigene) and the like. 8. See e.g. Liz Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), esp. chs 4 and 5. 9. The following is based on the writings of prominent and influential German feminists; the translations are my own. Christa Wichterich, 'Ganz nah und ganz fern: Bilder-Begegnungcn-Bedenkzeit' (Very Close and Very Far: Images - Encounters - Time for Reflection), in beitrage zurfeministischen theorie und praxis 27 (1990), p. 9. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., p. 10. 12. Ibid., p. 11.
13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31.
32. 33.
Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 14. Ibid., pp. 12-13. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid. 'Die Wurde des Menschen ist unantastbar', first article of the German constitution. Christina T h t i r m e r - R o h r , 'WeiBe Frauen und Rassismus' (White W o m e n and Racism), taz, 8 January 1993, p. 13. Ibid. Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid. Ibid. Dagmar Schultz, 'Kein O r t nur fiir uns allein: WeiBe Frauen auf dem W e g zu Biindnissen' (No Place Just of O u r O w n : W h i t e W o m e n on the Way to Coalitions), in Ika Hiigel et ah, eds, Entfernte Verbindungen: Rassismus, Antisemitismus, Klassemmterdriickung (Berlin: Orlanda Verlag, 1993), pp. 176—7. See also Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (Palo Alto: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988), where the need for 'others' in general is posed in these terms: 'our need for others . . . w h o have the capacity to help us expand' (p. 241). Schultz, 'Kein Ort', p. 177. Ibid.
Chapter 3 Personal communication
behaviour is political
1. bell hooks, Talking Back: Thinking Feminist, Thinking Black (London: Sheba Feminist Publishers, 1989), p. 179. 2. Alice Walker, In Search of Our Mothers' Gardens: Womanist Prose (London: T h e W o m e n ' s Press, 1984), p. xi. 3. T o n i Morrison, cited in bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin to Centre (Boston: South End Press, 1984), p. 50. 4. Combahee River Collective, 'A Black Feminist Statement', in Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua, eds, This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color (New York: Kitchen Table: W o m e n of Color Press, 1981), p. 213.
5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.
Walker, In Search of Our Mothers' Gardens, p. xi. Ibid., p. xii. Ibid. hooks, Talking Back, p. 180. Ibid., p. 182. Madhu Kishwar, 'Why I do not Call Myself a Feminist', Manushi 6 (November—December 1990), p. 7. 11. Catharine A. MacKinnon, 'Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory', Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 7, no. 3 (1982), pp. 537—8; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 97, 121. 12. Maria Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation on a World Scale: Women in the International Division of Labour (London: Zed Press, 1986), p. 11. 13. Dagmar Schultz, 'Unterschiede zwischen Frauen — ein kritischer Blick auf den Umgang mit "den Anderen" in der feministischen Forschung weifier Frauen', beitrage zur feministischen theorie und praxis 27 (1990), p. 46; my translation. 14. Ibid. 15. Chandra Talpade Mohanti, 'Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses', in Chandra Talpade Mohanti, Ann Russo and Lourdes Torres, eds, Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991). 16. Cf. bell hooks, 'to gloria, who is she: on using a pseudonym', in Talking Back, pp. 160-6. 17. hooks, Feminist Theory, p. 14. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid., p. 15. 20. Ibid., p. 15. 21. Ibid., p. 14. 22. Ibid., p. 15. 23. Ibid.
Chapter 4 Is the political
psychological?
1. Deborah Cameron, Feminism and Linguistic Theory (London: Macmillan Press, 1985), p. 117. 2. Cf. also, for instance, the pornography debate in Britain, which similarly suffers from the practice that the anti-pornography feminists' criticisms are merely being paraphrased, as discussed by Joan Scanlon and Liz
Zb4
3.
4.
5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
Notes Kelly, 'Lies About Porn and Feminism', CAP Newsletter: Campaign Against Pornography (Winter 1993), pp. 4-5. Audre Lorde, 'An Open Letter to Mary Daly', in Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua, eds, This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color (New York: Kitchen Table: W o m e n of Color Press, 1981), p. 94. Adrienne R i c h , 'Disloyal to Civilization: Feminism, Racism, Gynephobia', in Adrienne Rich, On Lies, Secrets and Silences: Selected Prose 19661978 (London: Virago Press, 1979), pp. 281-2. Ibid., pp. 282-3. Ibid., p. 289. Ibid., p. 290. Ibid., p. 288. Ibid., p. 290. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 290-1. Ibid., pp. 298-9. Ibid., p. 299. Ibid., p. 300.
Chapter 5 Psychotherapy,
or the legitimation of irresponsibility
1. Nancy C h o d o r o w , The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), p. 52. 2. Luise Eichenbaum and Susie Orbach, Understanding Women (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 11. 3. Ibid., p. 12. 4. Ibid. 5. See Florence Rush, The Best Kept Secret: Sexual Abuse of Children (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1980), esp. ch. 7. 6. Cf. Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice to Women (London: Pluto Press, 1979), pp. 1 - 4 . 7. Ann H . Jackowitz, 'Anna O./Bertha Pappenheim and Me', in Carol Ascher, Louise DeSalvo and Sara Ruddick, eds, Between Women: Biographers, Novelists, Critics, Teachers and Artists Write about Their Work on Women (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), p. 269. 8. Letter of October 1925, cited in ibid., p. 269. 9. Ibid., pp. 259-60. 10. C h o d o r o w , The Reproduction of Mothering, p. 46n. 11. Ibid., ch. 3. For an exception, see Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p. 248, n. 2.
I\OWS
ZOD
12. Susan Griffin, Pornography and Silence: Culture's Revenge against Nature (London: The W o m e n ' s Press, 1981), pp. 60-5, 137-40; Marion Bower, 'Daring to Speak Its Name: The Relationship of W o m e n to Pornography', Feminist Review 24 (Autumn 1.986), pp. 4 0 - 5 3 passim. Generally, this theory is k n o w n under the name of the Good and the Bad Breast, and is largely indebted to Melanie Klein, as Eichenbaum and Orbach explain in Understanding Women, pp. 31—2, n. 13. 13. Cited in Sabeth Buchmann, 'Feminismus und Kunst: Gender Studies', Zitty 2 (1993), p. 216. 14. Swantje Kobsell, 'Humangenetik und pranatale Diagnostik; Instrumcnte der " N e u e n Eugenik" ', in Theresia Degener and Swantje Kobsell, 'Hauptsache, es ist gesund?' Weibliche Selbstbestimmung unter humangenetischer Kontrolle (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 1992), p. 55. 15. Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love, p. 16; Nancy Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering, p. 68. 16. Eichenbaum and Orbach, Understanding Women, pp. 13 and 31, n. 13. 17. Ibid., p. 32. 18. Ibid., p. 14. 19. Ibid., p. 32. 20. Joanna Ryan, 'Psychoanalysis and W o m e n Loving W o m e n ' , in Sue Cartledge and Joanna Ryan, eds, Sex and Love: New Thoughts on Old Contradictions (London: The W o m e n ' s Press, 1983), p. 202. 21. Cited in ibid., p. 201. 22. Ibid. 23. See for example Roswitha Burgard and Birgit Rommelspacher, eds, Leideunlust: Der Mythos vom weiblichen Masochismus (Berlin: Orlanda Frauenverlag, 1989). 24. Cited in Ryan, 'Psychoanalysis and W o m e n Loving W o m e n ' , p. 201. 25. Ibid., p. 202. 26. Eichenbaum and Orbach, Understanding Women, p. 31, n. 13. 27. C h o d o r o w , The Reproduction of Mothering, p. 211. 28. Eichenbaum and Orbach, Understanding Women, p. 34, n. 13; see also p. 14. 29. Lynne Segal, 'Sensual Uncertainty, or W h y the Clitoris is not Enough', in Cartledge and Ryan, Sex and Love, p. 44. 30. Janice R a y m o n d , A Passion for Friends: Toward a Philosophy of Female Affection (London: T h e W o m e n ' s Press, 1986), pp. 161-2. 31. Luise Eichenbaum and Susie Orbach, What Do Women Want?, first published, by Michael Joseph, London, 1983; all page references to the second edition (London: Fontana, 1984), p. 28. 32. Ibid., pp. 28-9. 33. Ibid., p. 29.
34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53.
54. 55.
56.
Ibid. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid., pp. 33-4. Ibid., e.g. pp. 29-30. Ibid., p. 51. R o b i n N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much (London: Arrow Books, 1986), p. 9. Ibid. Eichenbaum and Orbach, What Do Women Want?, p. 34. Ibid., pp. 34-5. Ibid., p. 34. Ibid. Ibid.,.p. 29. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid. Segal, 'Sensual Uncertainty', p. 44. C h o d o r o w , The Reproduction of Mothering, pp. 99ff, 109. Eichenbaum and Orbach, What Do Women Want?, p. 29. Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 108. Lynne Segal, 'Sweet Sorrows, Painful Pleasures: Pornography and the Perils of Heterosexual Desire', in Lynne Segal and Mary Mcintosh, eds, Sex Exposed: Sexuality and the Pornography Debate (London: Virago Press, 1992), p. 79. C h o d o r o w , The Reproduction of Mothering, p. 51. Thomas Kleinspehn, Der fluchtige Blick: Sehen und Identitiit in der Kultur der Neuzeit (Reinbek bei Hamburg: R o w o h l t Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989), p. 309. Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Trumansburg, N Y : T h e Crossing Press, 1983), pp. 66-72.
Chapter 6 Ego-psychology,
or My relationship and I
1. E.g. Nancy C h o d o r o w , The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1978), p. 67; or Thomas Kleinspehn, DerJliichtige Blick: Sehen und Identitat in der Kultur der Neuzeit (Reinbek bei Hamburg: R o w o h l t Taschenbuch Verlag, 1989), p. 310. 2. C h o d o r o w , The Reproduction of Mothering, p. 45. 3. Ibid., pp. 45-6. 4. Ibid., p. 47.
5. 6. 7. 8.
Ibid. Ibid., p. 48. Ibid., p. 45. Monica Streit, ' "Mir geht es schlecht - Du gibst mir nicht genug!" Symbiose, Opfermentalitat und Masochismus in Beziehungen zwischen Frauen', in Roswitha Burgard and Birgit Rommelspacher.jeds, Leideunlust: Der Mythos vom weiblichen Masochismus (Berlin: Orlanda Frauenverlag, 1989), pp. 159, 1.60, 164, 181. 9. Margrit Bruckner, Die Liebe der Frauen: Uber Weiblichkeit und Mifihandlung (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag N e u e Kritik, 1983), p. 44; my translation. 10. E.g. Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Trumansburg, NY: The Crossing Press, 1983), esp. pp. 52-83. 11. R o b i n N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much (London: Arrow Books, 1986), p. 16. 12. Ibid., p. 74. 13. Ibid., p. 13. 14. Burgard and Rommelspacher, Leideunlust, 'Einleitung', pp. 7 - 8 ; my translation. 15. Ibid., p. 8. 16. Ibid., p. 9. 17. N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much, p. 10. 18. Ibid., p. 11. 19. Ibid., p. 12. 20. Luise Eichenbaum and Susie Orbach, What Do Women Want?, first published by Michael Joseph, London, 1983; page reference to the second edn (London: Fontana, 1984), p. 29. 21. Birgit Rommelspacher, 'Der weibliche Masochismus - ein Mythos?', in Burgard and Rommelspacher, Leideunlust, p. 38; my translation. 22. Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 73ff. 23. N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much, p. 3. 24. Janice R a y m o n d , A Passion for Friends: Toward a Philosophy of Female Affection (London: T h e W o m e n ' s Press, 1986), pp. 155-60. 25. N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much, p. 12. 26. Ibid., p. 16. 27. Ibid., p. 14. 28. Ibid., p. 3. 29. Ibid., p. 4. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid., p. 10.
zoo
Notes
32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.
Ibid. Ibid., p. 203. Ibid., p. 1. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid. Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 6. Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), p. 9. 40. Rommelspacher, 'Der weibliche Masochismus', p. 30; my translation. 41. Ibid., p. 31. 42. Ibid., p. 32. 43- Benjamin, The Bonds of Love, p. 5. 44. Ibid., p. 218. 45. Doris Janshen, ed., Sexuelle Gewalt: Die allgegenwartige Menschenrechtsverletzung (Frankfurt a.M.: Zweitausendeins, 1991), p. 16. The expression for 'people affected' is 'betroffene Menschen'. 46. Benjamin, The Bonds of Love, p. 5. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid., p. 12. 49. Ibid., pp. 27-8. 50. Ibid., p. 220. 51. Ibid., p. 53. 52. Ibid., p. 18. 53. Ibid., p. 37. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid., p. 38. 57. Ibid., p. 39. 58. Ibid., p. 48. 59. Ibid. 60. Reutlingen Frauen fiir Frieden/Freie Frauenliste, 'Vergewaltigungen an Frauen und Kindern in Bosnien-Herzegowina', Blattgold (January 1993), p. 7. 61. Letter to The Independent, 8 January 1993. For an extended analysis, see Susanne Kappeler, 'Massenverrat an den Frauen im ehemaligen Jugoslawien', in Susanne Kappeler, Mira Renka and Melanie Bey(er, eds, Vergewaltigung, Krieg, Nationalisms: Eine feministische Kritik (Munich: Frauenoffensive, 1994). 62. Benjamin, The Bonds of Love, p. 49. 63. N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much, p. 15.
Chapter 7 Ego-philosophy,
or the battle with reality
1. Petra Kelly, cited in Blattgold (January 1993), p. 7. 2. Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism, and the Problem of Domination (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), pp. 7 1 - 2 . 3. Alain Finkielkraut, La Sagesse de I'amour (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1984)'> P . 1 1 ; my translation of this and the following quotations. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., P- 12. 6. Ibid., p. 11. 7. Ibid., P- 12. 8. Ibid., P- 16. 9. Ibid., P- 22. 10. Ibid., p. 19. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid.,- P- 20. 13. Ibid., p. 23. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid.,i P- 25. 16. Ibid.,, p. 24. 17. Ibid.,• P- 22. 18. Ibid.,, p. 23. 19. IbicK , p. 22. 20. Ibid.,, p. 25. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid.,, p. 26. 23. Ibid.,, p. 25. 24. Ibid.,, p. 26. 25. Jean- Paul Sartre, L'Etre et le neant, cited in Finkielkraut, La Sagesse de I'amour, p. 26. 26. Ibid. 27. Sartre, cited in ibid., p. 27. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid., p. 28. 31. Ibid.,, p. 29. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Ibid.,i PI>. 29-30. 36. Emmanuel Levinas, cited in Finkielkraut, La Sagesse de I'amour, p. 30.
37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.
Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 30-1. Ibid., p. 31. Ibid., p. 32. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 32-3. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 173. Ibid., pp. 186-7. Ibid., p. 142. Ibid., pp. 141-2. Ibid., pp. 142-3. Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, translated by Richard A. C o h e n (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), p. 52.
Chapter 8 Sex and the intimate
relationship
1. Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, translated by Richard A. C o h e n (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985), p. 72. 2. Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse (London: Seeker & Warburg, 1987), p. 148. 3. Alain Finkielkraut, La Sagesse de I'amour (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1984), p. 26. 4. Levinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 62. 5. Ibid., p. 65. 6. Ibid. 7. Ibid., pp. 65-6. 8. See for instance Catharine A. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), ch. 7; Andrea Dworkin, Pornography: Men Possessing Women (London: The W o m e n ' s Press 1981); Dworkin, Intercourse; Adrienne Rich, ' C o m p u l -
sory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence', Signs: A journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 5, no. 4 (1980); Sheila Jeffreys, The Spinster and Her Enemies (London: Pandora Press, 1985); Sheila Jeffreys, Anticlimax: A Feminist Perspective on the Sexual Revolution (London: T h e W o m e n ' s Press, 1990); Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution (London: The W o m e n ' s Press, 1979), pp. 139-40. 9. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, p. 130. 10. Rich, 'Compulsory Heterosexuality'. 11. Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 175. 12. Sheila Jeffreys, 'Sexology and Antifeminism', in Dorchen Leidholdt and Janice G. R a y m o n d , eds, The Sexual Liberals and the Attack on Feminism (New York and Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1990), p. 15. 13. Q u o t e d in Jeffreys, The Spinster and Her Enemies, p. 131. Havelock Ellis's text 'Love and Pain', from his Studies in the Psychology of Sex, vol. Ill, first published in 1903, is also reprinted in Sheila Jeffreys, ed., The Sexuality Debates (New York and London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1987), pp. 505—33. T h e quotation is from p. 516. 14. Ellis, 'Love and Pain', p. 510. 15. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, p. 127. 16. Annabel Farraday, 'Lesbian Outlaws', Trouble & Strife, 13 (Spring 1988), pp. 11-16. 17. Ibid., pp. 9 - 1 0 . 18. Ibid., p. 10 and n. 3. 19. Dworkin, Intercourse, pp. 152-3, 156. 20. Quoted in Farraday, 'Lesbian Outlaws', p. 15. 21. Liz Kelly, Surviving Sexual Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 187. See also Liz Kelly, 'Bitter Ironies', Trouble & Strife 16 (Summer 1989), p. 17. 22. See for instance Verena Fiegl, Der Krieggegen die Frauen: Zum Zusammenhang von Sexismus und Militarismus (Bielefeld: Tarantel Frauen Verlag, 1990), pp. 139-40, 142 (quotations from Mark Baker, NAM: The Vietnam War in the Words of the Men and Women Who Fought There (New York, 1983); Joan Smith, 'Ghost riders in the sky', New Statesman/So' ciety, 10 June 1988, pp. 16-18. 23. Dworkin, Pornography, p. 30. 24. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), pp. 155, 163-5. 25. Dworkin, Pornography, p. 19. 26. Jane R o n d o t , 'Representations of Child Sexual Abuse, 1860-1910', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of East Anglia (1994).
27. Philippine W o m e n ' s Support Committee, Filipina-British Marriage Bureaux: A Report (GLC, no date; research carried out August 1985-April 1986); Susanne Kappeler, 'The International Slave Trade in W o m e n , or: Procurers, Pimps and Punters', Law and Critique, vol. 1, no. 2 (1990), esp. pp. 231—2; Susanne Lipka, Das kaufliche Gliick in Siidostasien: Heiratshandel und Sextourismus (Miinster: Verlag Westfalisches Dampfboot, revised and extended third edn, 1989), pp. 110—11. 28. S. Warren and L. Brandeis, cited in MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State, p. 194. 29. T o m Gerety, cited in Catharine A. MacKinnon, 'Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence', Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society, vol. 8, no. 4 (1983), p. 656. 30. Lynne Segal, 'Sweet Sorrows, Painful Pleasures: Pornography and the Perils of Heterosexual Desire', in Lynne Segal and Mary Mcintosh, eds, Sex Exposed: Sexuality and the Pornography Debate (London: Virago Press, 1.992), p. 77. 31. Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy, especially ch. 5, 'Love, Sex and Other Addictions'. 32. Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex, pp. 139-40. 33. Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy, p. 2. 34. Ibid., p. 7. 35. Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex, pp. 142-3. Chapter 9 Female desire, or the democratization
of violence
1. Eleanor J. Bader, ' R o u g h Sex', Spare Rib (August 1988), p. 39. 2. Ibid. 3.
Ibid.
4. Ibid. 5. Lisa Sliwa, 'Angel Fleart', Arena (Summer 1988), p. 136. 6. E.g. Barbara Lukesch, 'Schafft Frauenpower Mannerhass?', TagesAnzeiger, 12 June 1991; Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 3. 7. Interview with Klaus-Peter Wolf, taz, 14 September 1989, p. 3. 8. See ch. 8, n. 24. 9. Ariane Barth, 'Schau mir in die Augen, Kleiner', Der Spiegel, 7 January 1991, p. 144. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid., pp. 144-5. 12. Ibid., p. 145. 13. Ibid.
14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27.
28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45.
46. 47. 48. 49. 50.
Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., P- 146. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., P- 147. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 148, 150, 151. Ibid., p. 151. Ibid. Lynne Segal, 'Sweet Sorrows, Painful Pleasures: Pornography and the Perils of Heterosexual Desire', in Lynne Segal and Mary Mcintosh, eds, Sex Exposed: Sexuality and the Pornography Debate (London: Virago Press, 1992), p. 79. Ibid., p. 88. Ariane Barth, 'Schau mir in die Augen, Kleiner', p. 151. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 152. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 153. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Cited in Sally Roesch Wagner, 'Pornography and the Sexual Revolution: T h e Backlash of Sadomasochism', in R o b i n R u t h Lindon et ah, eds, Against Sadomasochism: A Radical Feminist Analysis (East Palo Alto: Frog in the Well, 1982), p. 29. Ariane Barth, 'Schau mir in die Augen, Kleiner', p. 153. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 151. Cited in Wagner, 'Pornography and the Sexual Revolution', p. 30.
Chapter 10 Relationship
as trade, or the free market of bodies and services
1. R o b i n N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much (London, Arrow Books, 1986), p. 41. 2. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. I, translated by Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 165. 3. Ibid., p. 178. 4. Karl Marx, Das Kapital, vol. I (Frankfurt a.M.: Verlag Marxistische Blatter, 1976), copyright Dietz Verlag Berlin 1947, 1962; p. 99. 5. Marx, Capital, p. 133. 6. Ibid., pp. 178-9. 7. Ibid., p. 126. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid., p. 127. 10. Ibid., p. 125. 11. Luise Eichenbaum and Susie Orbach, What Do Women Want?, first published by Michael Joseph, London, 1983; all page references to the second edn (London: Fontana, 1984), pp. 174ff, 203. 12. Ibid., p. 180. 13. Ibid., pp. 183, 203. 14. See ch. 7, n. 3. 15. N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much, p. 7. 16. Ibid. 17. Ibid., p. 30. 18. Ibid., p. 28. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., pp. 31-2. 22. Ibid., p. 33. 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid., p. 36. 25. Ibid., p. 37. 26. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 192. 27. Ibid., p. 193. 28. Ibid., p. 184. 29. Ibid. 30. Ronald Coase, cited in Andreas Hoffmann, 'Der Preis des Marktes', Die Zeit 18 (30 April 1993), p. 26. 31. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, p. 184. 32. N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much, p. 73.
33. 34. 35. 36.
Ibid., p. 63. Ibid., pp. 63, 50. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, p. 183. Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Trumansburg, NY: T h e Crossing Press, 1983), pp. 98ff and n. 5. 37. See ch. 5, n. 29. Chapter ? i Needs, or the legitimation of dominance 1. Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 207. 2. Ibid., p. 224. See also Catharine A. MacKinnon, 'Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence', Signs 8 (1983), p. 650; Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), esp. pp. 168, 238; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Sexual Harassment of Working Women (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 298, n. 8. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13.
14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.
Pateman, The Sexual Contract, p. 230. Personal communication, Charlotte Friedli, Switzerland. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, p. 169. Cited in Pateman, The Sexual Contract, p. 169. Cited in Pateman, The Sexual Contract, p. 170. Ibid. Ibid., p. 173. Ibid., pp. 173-4. Ibid., pp. 231, 200. M. McMurtry, cited in Pateman, The Sexual Contract, p. 154. Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modem Societies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 192. Pateman, The Sexual Contract, p. 151. Ibid. Cited in Pateman, The Sexual Contract, p. 148. Ibid., p. 145. Ibid., pp. 151, 146. Ibid., p. 150. Marilyn Frye, The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory (Trumansburg, NY: T h e Crossing Press, 1983), p. 67. Ibid. Ibid., pp. 59-60. Ibid., p. 23. Ibid., p. 61. R o b i n N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much (London: Arrow Books, 1986), p. 100.
26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34.
Ibid., p. 44. Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy, p. 202. Ibid. E.g. in N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much, p. 69. Ibid., pp. 28-9. Ibid., p. 33. Ibid. Ibid. Luise Eichenbaum and Susie Orbach, What Do Women Want?, first published by Michael Joseph, London, 1983; page reference to the second edn (London: Fontana, 1984), p. 109..
Chapter
12 Identity,
or history turned biology
1. Alain Finkielkraut, Remembering in Vain: The Klaus Barbie Trials and Crimes Against Humanity, translated by R o x a n n e Lapidus with Sima Godfrey ( N e w York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 66. As the, translation does not always follow the original literally but the exact wording is important to my purposes, I have made my own translations based both on the English translation and the French original, Alain Finkielkraut, La Memoire vaine: Du crime contre I'humanite (Paris, Editions Gallimard, 1989), p. 111. 2. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. I, translated by Ben Fowkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976), p. 137. 3. R o b i n N o r w o o d , Women Who Love Too Much (London: Arrow Books, 1986), p. 33. 4. Marx, Capital, pp. 166-7. 5. Swantje Kobsell, 'Humangenetik und priinatale Diagnostik: Instrumente der " N e u e n Eugenik" ', in Theresia Degener and Swantje Kobsell, 'Hauptsache, es ist gesund?' Weibliche Selbstbestimmung unter humangenetischer Kontrolle (Hamburg: Konkret Literatur Verlag, 1992), p. 21. An extended discussion of subjective validation and classification in 'Zoologie und Volkerkunde', in Susanne Kappeler, Mira Renka and Melanie Beyer, eds, Vergewaltigung, Krieg, Nationalisms (Munich: Frauenoffensive, 1994). 6. Finkielkraut, Remembering in Vain, p. 67. 7. Audre Lorde, 'The Uses of Anger: W o m e n Responding to Racism', in Audre Lorde, Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Freedom, CA.: The Crossing Press, 1984), p. 132. 8. Cherrle Moraga, 'Refugees of a World on Fire: Foreword to the Second Edition', in Cherrie Moraga and Gloria Anzaldua, eds, This Bridge Called
My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color (New York: Kitchen Table: W o m e n of Color Press, 1983), unpaginated preface. 9. Jenny Bourne, 'Homelands of the Mind: Jewish Feminism and Identity Polities', Race & Class, vol. 29, no. 1 (Summer 1987); reprinted as Jewish Feminism and Identity Politics, Race & Class Pamphlet no. 11. 10. Kathleen Barry, Female Sexual Slavery (New York and London: N e w York University Press, 1979), p. 44. 11. Ibid., p. 45. 12. Ibid. 13. bell hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin To Center (Boston: South End Press, 1984), pp. 43, 45. 14. Barry, Female Sexual Slavery, p. 45. 15. Alain Finkielkraut, Der eingebildete Jude, translated by Plainer Kober (Frankfurt a.M.: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1984), preface to this edn, p. 7; my translation from the German edn. 16. Ibid., pp. 7 - 8 . 17. Alain Finkielkraut, Le Juif imaginaire (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1980), pp. 207-8. 18. Finkielkraut, Der eingebildete Jude, p. 7. 19. Ibid., p. 8. 20. Finkielkraut, Le Juif imaginaire, p. 208. 21. Ibid. 22. Katalog Bremer Frauenwoche 1991, p. 24; my translation. 23. Sabine Hark, 'Wer spricht, wenn ich: "Ich bin . . ." sage?: Zum Verhaltnis von Identitaten und Bundnispolitik', Ihrsinn 2 (1990), p. 44; my translation. 24. Dagmar Schultz, 'Unterschiede zwischen Frauen — ein kritischer Blick auf den Umgang mit "den Anderen" in der feministischen Forschung weiBer Frauen', beitr'dge zur feministischen theorie und praxis 27 (1990), p. 45; Dagmar Schultz, 'Kein Ort fur uns allein: WeiBe Frauen auf dem W e g zu Bundnissen', in Ika Hiigel et ah, eds, Entfernte Verbindungen: Rassismus, Antisemitismus, Klassenunterdriickung (Berlin: Orlanda Verlag, 1993), p. 177. 25. Finkielkraut, Remembering in Vain, p. 17; La Memoire vaine, p. 38. 26. Alain Finkielkraut, The Undoing of Thought, translated by Dennis O'Keeffe (London and Lexington: The Claridge Press, 1988), p. 79. 27. Stephen Yearly, blurb for the anthology Men, Sex and Relationships: Writings from 'Achilles Heel', ed. Victor J. Seidler (London: Routledge, 1992), in Routledge N e w Books and Backlist 1993, p. 30. 28. Christina Thiirmer-Rohr, 'WeiBe Frauen and Rassismus', taz, 8 January 1993, p. 12; my translation, as of the following quotations.
z/o
29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63.
64.
isiotes Schultz, 'Kein O r t \ p. 161. Ibid., p. 162. Ibid., pp. 161 fF. Ibid., pp. 181-3. Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (Palo Alto: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988), p. 5. Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., pp. 1 - 2 . Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 1. Ibid., p. 3. Ibid., p. 293. Ibid., p. 295. Ibid., p. 293. Ibid., p. 295. Ibid., pp. 295-6. Ibid., p. 293. Ibid., p. 295. T h u r m e r - K o h r , 'WeiGe Frauen und Rassismus', p. 12. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 12. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid., p. 12. Ibid. T h e o Sommer, 'Die Vergangenheit vergeht nicht', Die Zeit 17 (23 April 1993); my translation. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Norbert Elias, cited in Wolf-Dieter Narr, 'Staatsgewalt und friedsame Gesellschaft: Einige Notizen zu ihrem Verhaltnis in der Bundesrepublik', in Peter-Alexis Albrecht and O t t o Backes, eds, Verdeckte Gewalt: 'Pladoyerfiir eine "Innere Abriistung" ' (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1990), p. 71; my translation. Norbert Elias, Studien iiber die Deutschen: Machtkampfe und Habitusentwicklung im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1992; first published 1989), pp. 559-60; my translation.
65. Ibid., p. 7. 66. The notion of a social sexual character of w o m e n (Geschlechtscharakter) is widespread among German feminists. See e.g. Studienschwerpunkt 'Frauenforschung' am Institut fur Sozialpadagogik der T U Berlin, eds, Mittdterschaft und Entdeckungslust (Berlin: Orlanda Verlag, 1989), esp. p. 87. For a critique see Susanne Kappeler, 'Vom Opfer zur Freiheitskampferin: Gedanken zur Mittaterschaftsthese und zum R o u n d - T a b l e Gespriich', in the same book. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71.
Elias, Studien, p. 539. Ibid., p. 540. Ibid. Ibid., p. 401. An extended critique of this analogy and the biologizing o f ' c u l t u r e ' can be found in Susanne Kappeler, 'Die Gemeinschaft "Volk" und die Volkergemeinschaft', and 'Zoologie und Volkerkunde', both in Kappeler, R e n k a and Beyer, eds, Vergewaltigung, Krieg, Nationalismus:
72. Elias, Studien, p. 10. 73. Ibid., p. 539. 74. See e.g. Finkielkraut, The Undoing of Thought, especially part I; Eric Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 102ff. 75. Elias, Studien, pp. 549-50. 76. Ibid., p. 550. 77. Hannah Arendt, 'Personliche Verantwortung in der Diktatur', in H a n nah Arendt, Israel, PaVdstina und der Antisemitismus (Berlin: Verlag Wagenbach, 1991), p. 19; my translation. A much abbreviated version of this essay appeared in English in The Listener, 6 August 1964. 78. Elias, Studien, p. 7. 79. Ibid., p. 552. 80. Finkielkraut, Remembering in Vain, p. 51; La Memoire vaine, pp. 91-2. 81. Hannah Arendt, cited in Finkielkraut, Remembering in Vain, p. 53. 82. Elias, Studien, p. 8. 83. Finkielkraut, Remembering in Vain, p. 52; La Memoire vaine, p. 93. 84. Ibid., p. 56; La Memoire vaine, p. 98. 85. Ibid.
Resistance and the will to resistance 1. Cynthia Enloe, Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives (London: Pandora Press, 1988; first published in 1983).
2. See also Patricia Williams's discussion of the racist murders of H o w a r d Beach and the so-called Bernhard Goetz murders in the N e w York underground and their public media justifications, in Patricia J. Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (London: Virago Press, 1993), pp. 58-79. 3. German television A R D , 'Tagesschau', 16 May 1994. 4. Anthony Giddens, The Transformation of Intimacy: Sexuality, Love and Eroticism in Modern Societies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), p. 31. 5. Discussed e.g. by Cynthia Enloe in 'The R i g h t T o Fight: A Feminist Catch-22', Ms. 4, no. 1 (July/August 1993), pp. 84-7. R u t h Seifert, in an interview in taz, 17 February 1993, argues in favour of w o m e n entering the military, as this could perhaps 'break open the social construction of masculinity and femininity'. 6. Sarah Lucia Hoagland, Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value (Palo Alto: Institute of Lesbian Studies, 1988), p. 6. 7. See e.g. Joanna Russ, How to Suppress Women's Writing (London: The W o m e n ' s Press, 1984); Toni Morrison, Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination (London: Picador, 1993). 8. W o m e n ' s resistance often seems to disappear w h e n the focus remains (exclusively) on oppression. Thus Adrienne Rich's essay 'Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence' (see ch. 8, n. 8), for example, seems to have been received more as a confirmation of the oppression of lesbians than as a brilliant example of how to read, that is, perceive, the resistance of (heterosexual as well as lesbian) w o m e n to compulsory heterosexuality. See also Chandra Talpade Mohanti (cited ch. 3, n. 15).
Index
abstraction, 16, 30, 70, 71, 122, 134, 182, 207, 211-12, 218,224 action, 2, 5-7, 8, 10, 11-12, 13, 16-20, 24, 26, 43, 99-100, 109, 114, 118, 119, 122, 127, 133, 149, 185-90, 193-4, 201, 203, 205, 207-8, 212-16, 219-20, 228-9, 235, 237, 239-40, 244-5, 249-50, 254-8 representation of, 62, 70 see also agency; behaviour active/passive, 12, 62, 101, 114, 125-6, 151-4, 156-7, 163, 173, 183, 201-4, 219, 244-5 activity, 114, 149, 157-60, 163-5, 172, 183, 186, 188, 200, 202-3, 205, 221, 224, 229-30, 237 and passivity, 114, 136, 202 political, 19, 236-7 accounting, 46, 188-9, 193, 196-7, 222-3, 255 acquisition see appropriation adultocentrism, 101-5, 131, 134 agency, 122, 153, 205, 258 agentic self 110-11, 123, 124 dramatis personae, 99, 109, 120 sexual, 154-5, 156-60, 179 aggression, 43, 48, 74, 75, 105, 106, 111, 135, 137, 138, 144, 152-4, 157-60, 180-3, 204, 205, 254, 255 see also attack androcentrism see sexism animals, 8, 9, 30, 31, 105-6, 153, 159-60, 161, 260 n.l antagonism see hostility; opposition anti-Semitism, 49-50, 51, 181, 232, 235, 245 Antonio, Diane, 260 n.l aperspectivity see standpointlessness; scientific discourse appropriation, 33, 36—7, 43, 133, 178,
186-7, 193, 198-200, 201, 212-14, 222, 232 Arendt, Hannah, 250, 251-2 association, 29, 159, 160, 161, 211, 238-9 attack, 74, 99, 128, 240, 253-4 see also aggression autonomy, 35, 42, 64, 65, 144, 191 see also self-determination Barry, Kathleen, 215, 231-2 Barth, Ariane, 175-7, 180, 183 de Beauvoir, Simone, 38, 146 Beck, Ulrich, 10 behaviour, 2-6, 13, 50, 52, 53, 57-60, 62, 66, 71, 73, 76, 78, 100, 103-6, 112, 116-20, 134, 149, 157, 160, 179, 188, 198, 214-15, 217, 227-9, 239-45, 247-52 communicative, 71, 73 pattern of, 116-17, 118 see also action being, 12, 131-4, 144, 187-8, 228-31, 234-7, 240, 242, 243, 244-5, 257-8 being oneself 132-4 see also existence Benjamin, Jessica, 119, 120-8, 130, 176, 178, 181-3, 192 binary opposition, 11, 15, 56, 137, 236, 252 biologism, 228, 229, 245-8 cultural, 249 national, 246 psychological, 228, 250 sociobiology, 105, 252 biologization, 229, 240-1, 248-9, 261 n.5 body, 35, 56, 110, 137, 161-3, 178, 180, 191, 199-200, 212, 222, 228, 239, 261 n.5 dead, 172-3, 181 embodyment, 240 face, 137-43 flesh, 83, 136
bond, 166, 200 bondage, 166, 215 Bourne, Jenny, 231 Breitling, Gisela, 179, 183 Bruckner, Margrit, 113, 176, 178, 180 Burgess, Anthony, 177 Cameron, Deborah, 70 care/care-taking, 26-7, 35, 90, 92, 93, 98, 103-4, 114, 117, 200-6, 209, 213, 216, 218-19, 232, 260 see also mother; nurturance categorization, 41-2, 44, 51, 61, 63, 69, 235 see also otherness cause/causation, 2-4, 12, 16-17, 70, 89, 92, 93, 104, 217, 247, 251-2, 253-4 and effect, 1, 16-17, 149, 219, 249 Chambers, Robert, 172, 181 childhood, 89-92, 96, 100-7, 131, 134, 218, 228-9 ' daughterhood, 103, 161, 175, 202, 218 see also mother-child relationship children, 90-2, 101-2, 105-6, 107, 110-11, 123, 124, 131, 134, 149, 161, 202, 218 adult sexual violence against, 1, 42, 157-8, 160, 161, 174 adult violence against, 102—3 Chodorow, Nancy, 91, 92, 103, 108, 110-11 civil society see democracy class, 3, 9, 20, 30, 37, 47, 54, 63-4, 67-8, 78-9, 131-2, 151, 210, 234, 236, 248 classism, 3, 21, 37, 39, 51, 70 classification see categorization Combahee River Collective, 54-7 command, 141-3, 203, 209-13, 247 communication, 16, 17, 59-63, 69, 71-4, 8 4 , 9 7 , 188-91, 219-23 conversation, 188-9, 220 critique, 72, 73-5, 76 dialogue, 58, 60, 69, 72, 82 speaking and listening, 75, 188-90, 220 conquest, 152, 159, 160, 178, 179, 216, 253 consciousness, 5-6, 89, 123, 135-7, 213, 226, 228, 233, 244 -raising, 12, 13, 93, 94, 96, 97, 122, 233 conscience, 248 unconscious, 94, 100 consent, 154, 172-3, 206, 208-9, 214 contract, 30, 132-3, 140, 161, 174, 185, 191, 199-201,211-12 contractarians, 199 exchange-trade, 18(^206, 207, 209, 213, 216, 220, 223 prostitution, 199 cooking, 193-4, 197, 198, 202 culture, 9, 12, 16, 37, 39, 40, 43, 49-50, 63, 90, 91, 110-11, 166-9, 171, 176, 177-8, 182, 183, 187, 206, 215-16, 223, 226, 230-5, 236, 243, 249
cult, 239, 241 cultural socialization, 22, 37, 206, 223, 226 foreign, 43, 49, 56 Darwin, Charles, 251 Darwinism, 250, 252 decision, 2-3, 105-7, 10, 1.1, 19-20, 68, 119, 140, 141, 193, 197, 203, 213-14, 217, 218, 229, 251, 258 Degener, Theresia, 265 n.14 degradation, 42, 157, 159-60, 213, 219-20, 228 defiling, 159 demand, 102, 104, 116, 187, 195-7, 202, 207, 212 see also need democracy, 29-37, 161, 170, 171, 173-5, 184, 189, 198, 206, 210, 216, 223, 237, 248, 250 democratic relationship see relationship see also equal opportunities democratizing, 147, 161, 168-70, 171-84, 185,216 dependence, 90, 91, 93, 97-8, 100, 114, 123, 124, 125-7, 132, 191-2, 204-5, 225 dependency needs, 98, 192 independence, 175, 214, 216 mutual, 127, 191-2, 202 desire, 9, 42, 48, 49-51, 76, 83-4, 93, 101, 105-6, 130, 134, 145, 148, 153, 155, 157, 160-1, 164, 173, 184, 186, 204-6, 210, 237-8 battle of desires, 183 female, 175-84 for power, 36, 71, 102, 105-6, 107, 113, 115-17, 119, 175, 184, 209; see also discursive power destruction, 1, 9, 20, 42, 114, 116, 124-5, 133, 138, 153, 159, 178, 181-2, 183 self-, 250, 251 see also murder determinism, 89, 110-11 biological, 92, 110 cultural, 110 diagnosis, 64, 66, 70, 86, 93, 116, 118 see also cause difference, 39, 83, 125-6, 146, 227, 234-8, 243 see also otherness disability, 51, 160, 226, 234 ableism, 51 discourse, 6-8, 15-16, 22, 26, 27-9, 38-41, 44-6, 49-50, 52, 53, 57-68, 69-72, 106, 126, 181, 183-4, 235-6 discursive objects, 111, 120, 121, 127 discursive power, 38, 53, 58, 61—2, 69-73, 80,105-6 white-dominant discourse, 52, 58, 68; see also white-woman-centrism
see also scientific discourse disenfranchisement, 208, 210 disenfranchised status, 34, 160, 174, 205, 223 Doane, Mary Ann, 176, 178 doing, 125, 152-3, 195, 196, 202, 203, 228-9, 237, 239,157-8 deed, 43, 126, 153, 213 good deed, 43, 169, 195, 204-5 dominance/domination, 6, 30-2, 34-7, 42, 51, 58, 59, 68, 77, 84, 91, 93, 102, 104, 108, 114, 120-3, 132-3, 136, 140, 146-8, 154, 156-8, 160, 169-70, 182-4, 203, 204-5, 207-22, 234-6, 238, 253 and submission, 6, 30, 59, 91, 122, 140, 142-4, 181,184 see also subjection; subjugation; submission; subordination Douglass, Frederick, 77-8, 81 Drakulic, Slavenka, 9, 11, 19, 24, 38 drive see instinct dualism see binary opposition Dworkin, Andrea, 27, 145, 156, 160, 161 Eichenbaum, Luise and Orbach, Susie, 86-7, 90-1, 92, 93-7, 104, 106, 192 Elias, Norbert, 247-9, 252 Ellis, Havelock, 152, 156, 173 encounter, 46-9, 50-1, 59, 60, 72, 82-4, 123, 125, 131, 134-44, 183, 187 enemy, 127, 139, 159, 239-43, 253, 254, 256 see also opponent Enloe, Cynthia, 280 n.l, n.5 enmity see hostility equality, 6, 31-2, 34-6, 66, 108, 121, 147, 151, 162, 184, 209, 214 equal opportunities, 147, 183, 184, 189, 198-200, 237 see also rights equals, 6, 30, 122-3, 125, 161, 170, 206 ethics, 8, 26, 142-3, 202, 257, 260 n.l Eurocentrism, 22, 40, 53, 64, 69, 86, 152, 236 see also white-woman-centrism exchange trade see contract existence, 123, 131-5, 143-4, 228 existing for oneself, 123-4 experience(s), 8, 42, 50, 54, 66-7, 70, 81, 89, 90, 101, 105, 106, 115, 125-7, 134-5, 169, 186-7, 205, 206, 213, 218-23, 224, 226-30, 232-3, 238, 247-50 traumatic, 89, 249, 258 n.l explanation, 2-4, 7, 70, 76, 77, 80, 86-7, 93, 102-3, 118, 229, 248, 255 see also justification
exploitation, 1,7, 9-10, 33, 34, 35-7, 43, 51, 124, 160, 164, 192, 205-6, 215, 223, 235 sexual see sexual violence family, 30-2, 35, 97, 117, 146 see also marriage; private sphere fantasy, 14-15, 45, 82, 83-4, 87, 90, 92-3, 101, 102, 106-8, 111, 114, 124, 164,218 Farraday, Annabel, 155 feelings, 9, 11, 35, 81, 85, 86-7, 93, 96-7, 99-102, 109, 118, 125-7, 217-20, 227, 247-50,252 co-feeling, 125-7 femininity, 27, 56, 113, 136, 146-7, 160, 167-8, 176, 236 F6nelon, Fania, 38, 39 Finkielkraut, Alain, 130-2, 134-6, 138, 145, 193, 224, 232-3, 235, 248, 251-2 Firestone, Shulamith, 166, 169 freedom, 32, 33-6, 133, 136, 171, 182, 197, 199, 203, 206, 207-13, 216 unfreedom, 14, 166, 203; see also servitude Freud, Sigmund, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 106, 107, 149, 150 friends, 238-43, 252 friendship, 170 Frye, Marilyn, 202, 213-16 Gallop, Jane, 179 Giddens, Anthony, 211 giving, 131, 186-7, 192-8, 201, 204-6, 207, 208, 220-3 give-and-take, 192-3, 202, 205 Goncharov, Ivan, 131 gratification see satisfaction Griffin, Susan, 265 n.12 Harne, Lynne, 260 n.l5 hatred, 42-3, 76, 129-31, 139, 143, 159, 169, 205, 239 of foreigners, 1, 41, 49 Hegel, Friedrich, 123, 131, 134, 135, 211 Heidegger, Martin, 134, 145 Heider, Ulrike, 180 heterosexism see sexism; heterosexuality heterosexuality compulsory, 148-70, 280 n.8 see also sexuality Hilmes, Carola, 177 history, 12, 105, 110, 160, 169, 219, 224-52,254-5 historicity, 223, 228, 237 personal, 3, 187-8, 205 Hoagland, Sarah Lucia, 241-2, 257 Holland, Katherine, 173 homosexuality see sexuality hooks, bell, 52, 56-7, 66, 67-8, 232
hostility, 41-2, 73, 91, 93, 102, 104, 127, 129-30, 137, 138-9, 144, 160, 204-5, 206, 248, 253-4 towards immigrants, 41 identification, 7, 74, 125, 228, 233, 236, 246, 256 identity, 11, 13, 30-1, 38, 50, 51, 57, 66, 78, 79, 83, 113-14, 119, 135, 144, 148, 149, 151, 157, 159, 163-7, 188, 217, 222, 228-52, 257-8 politics, 12-13, 66, 229-52, 256 sexual, 149, 154-5, 157-60 ideology, 6-7, 9, 15-16, 27, 28-9, 162-4, 169, 206, 215, 229, 234, 235, 236, 251-2, 254 imaging, 44-7, 66, 108, 137-8, 142 self-image, 233 indifference, 129-30, 143-4, 205, 214, 216 individual(s), 24, 25-7, 28, 29-37, 70, 146, 149, 163-5, 175, 186, 199-200, 206, 212, 216, 217, 228, 233-4, 248, 249, 255 individualism, 24—37 inequality, 3, 6, 9, 13, 83, 147, 148, 161 infants/infancy see children/childhood infantilism 90 infantilizing, 92-3, 120 initiating, 116, 152, 157, 159-60, 202, 207 initiative, 47-9, 50-1, 207 instinct, 92, 106, 111, 114, 143, 252 intention, 12, 80, 84, 185-6, 195, 206, 207-8,213,216 intimacy, 35, 142, 162-7, 171, 222 intimate relationship see relationship intrusion, 48, 130, 154 invert see sexual perversion Jackowitz, Ann H., 88 Jeffreys, Sheila, 149 justice, 122, 143 injustice, 4, 7, 22, 46, 122, 239 justification, 7,12, 14, 17, 20, 55, 77, 84, 134, 143, 204, 218, 236, 251, 252, 254-7 see also explanation Kant, Immanuel, 210-11 'Katie', 100-8, 103-8, 109, 118, 217, 227, 244 Kelly, Liz, 261 n.8, 263-4 n.2 killing see destruction, murder Kishwar, Madhu, 263 n.15 Klein, Melanie, 90, 106 knowledge, 45-6, 58, 83 Kobsell, Swantje, 265 n.14 Kuhse, Helga, 226 labour, 35, 137, 186, 199, 200, 203, 205, 212, 221, 228 division of, 137, 199
of love, 27, 206, 209-10, 213 power, 30, 211-12 see also service Lacan, Jacques, 110 language, 22, 59, 70, 122, 138, 174-5, 202, 221 see also communication; discourse Uvinas, Emmanuel, 131-2, 134, 137-9, 145-7, 160, 257 Levine, Jennifer, 172 liberalism, 19, 31, 32, 97 left-liberals, 232, 235 liberation, 14, 39, 64, 172-3, 184, 226, 235 sexual, 168, 171-2 liberty see freedom 'little-girl part', 93, 95-7, 101-2, 109 Lorde, Audre, 73-4, 230 love, 41, 51, 56, 76, 83-4, 93, 104, 119, 122, 127, 129-31, 135, 142-4, 159, 160-1, 169, 182, 186, 193-5, 204, 205-6, 2 1 3 , 2 1 7 - 1 8 , 2 3 3 , 2 3 9 see also care; labour MacKinnon, Catharine A., 35, 57, 148, 154 marriage, 35, 77, 103, 145, 150, 161-70, 185, 192, 198, 199, 200, 202, 205, 206, 210-11,215 consummation of, 156, 162, 165 divorce, 162 homosexual, 163, 167 law, 34, 161 'mail order', 162, 174-5 monogamy, 165 see also family Marx, Karl, 186-7, 189-90, 191, 225, 251 masculinity, 146-7, 156, 167, 203, 233, 236 'masculine woman', 156-7 studies, 236 see also subjectivity masochism see sadism master, 30, 54, 77, 170, 203, 208, 210 Master-and-Slave 135, 170 -race, 249 slave mistress 77-8, 79, 81 mastery, 209-13, 215, 216, 223, 251 see also service militarism, 74, 240, 253-4, 256, 280 n.5 military intervention see war misogyny see sexism Mohanti, Chandra Talpade, 263 n.15, 280 n.8 Moraga, Cherrie, 230-1, 237 Morrison, Toni, 54 mother -blaming, 104 -child-relationship, 89, 90, 91, 92-3,' 95, 96, 98, 101, 102-4, 110, 112, 117, 124 -daughter-relationship, 96, 100-1, 103-4
mother's inadequacy, 89, 95, 96-7, 101, 103-5 see also care; nurturance murder, 9, 41, 153, 173, 181, 235, 246-7, 251, 253-4, 280 n.2 see also destruction naming, 38-9, 40-3, 44, 81, 236 self-, 229, 235 nation, 229, 231, 240, 242, 244, 245, 252, 255 nation-state, 10, 21, 29-37, 247-9, 253 national character, 248-51 national consciousness, 246 national history, 245, 255 nationality, 30-1, 162, 174, 224, 233, 236, 240, 246-8, 250-1 nationalism, 21, 51, 236, 239, 241-2 National Socialism, 40, 129, 245-7, 249-50, 252 Neo-Nazi fascism, 1, 4, 254 naturalizing, 42, 105-7, 134, 152, 253 nature, 8, 16, 28, 31, 65-6, 134, 135, 143-4, 146, 150, 151-2, 154, 187, 211, 229, 240, 249, 251-2, 260 n.l need(s), 43, 50-1, 90, 93, 95-8, 100-7, 109, 112, 115, 116, 119, 145, 180, 187, 188-9, 191-2, 194, 196, 200, 201-6, 207-23, 237, 260 n.l neediness, 95, 96, 105, 259 n.l Norwood, Robin, 97, 116, 185-6, 193, 194, 219, 221, 225 nurturance, 89, 92, 103, 201 see also care; cooking; mother obedience, 143, 209-10, 212-13, 219 disobedience, 138, 142—3 object see subject-object relationship object relations, 26, 29, 111 theory, 90-108, 109-28 object world, 25, 108, 109, 112, 124, 135, 138, 144 objectification, 7, 38, 41-51, 62, 65, 69, 71, 106-8, 108-11, 125-6, 132-9, 176-80 opponents, 72, 74, 102, 127, 183, 254-5 opposite(s), 43, 46-7, 128, 183, 184, 189, 255 opposition, 24-37, 38, 43-51, 72-4, 102, 107, 123, 125-6, 185, 206, 253-4, 257 oppression, 3, 6, 9, 13, 18, 22-3, 36, 41, 49-50, 52, 54-6, 60, 64, 66-7, 70, 75, 77-80, 81, 86, 103, 108, 113-14, 119, 121-2, 131, 133, 147-8, 149, 160, 162, 169, 171-2, 184, 213, 215, 229-38, 240-1, 253-4, 256-8, 280 n.8 status, 75, 79, 230-4; see also identity Orbach, Susie see Eichenbaum other/Other, 35, 38-51, 61, 69, 72, 83-4, 106, 123, 131-44, 145-7, 148, 163,
172, 204-5, 215, 226-7, 230-3, 243-4, 262 n. 31 otherness, 39, 146-7, 150, 172, 227, 234-6 Pappenheim, Bertha, 87—8 paraphrase see reformulating paternity, 30, 146 see also family; children partnership see relationship Pateman, Carole, 29-30, 33, 199, 201, 208, 210-12 pathologizing, 76, 114-15, 117, 133 self-, 75-6, 117, 133 penetration, 91, 130, 152, 155, 156, 159, 160, 177 see also intrusion; sex penis, 156 perception, 24, 43, 45, 49, 62, 92, 110, 137-8, 141-2, 214-16, 222 'arrogant perceiver', 108, 213-15 see also imaging; sight Perkins-Oilman, Charlotte, 87 person personhood, 7, 137, 171-2, 198, 206, 211, 213, 231 personality, 89, 90-3, 110-11, 119, 188, 196, 228 personal history see history perversion see sexual perversion philosophy, 26, 129-44, 145-7, 160 philosophical subject, 132-44, 146 pleasure, 56, 106, 107, 152, 154, 158, 159, 173, 175, 180, 204, 208, 220-3, 224, 247-8 of power, 102, 108, 181, 184 principle 111 pornography, 2, 27, 41, 58, 77, 90, 147, 152, 164, 166-8, 176, 178, 183, 184, 263 n.2 child, 160 see also fantasy Porto, Joseph, 173, 181 possession, 30, 131, 144, 159, 161-5, 168, 178, 195, 206, 246 self-, 239 see also property; slavery power, passim (self-)empowerment, 38, 43, 107, 120, 132-3, 178-9 claim to see desire privacy, 35-6, 163, 165, 168, 206 private sphere, 29, 30, 31-2, 34-5, 84, 145, 148, 161, 163, 168, 205-6, 210, 228 public sphere, 32-4, 145, 161 see also family; marriage private individual see individual private property see property private relationship see family; marriage; relationship
IXX^FRK., X / ,
,
*-) ! , T i ,
JU, Ut,
UU,
67,71, 78, 131, 148, 151, 155, 161, 169, 174, 189, 198, 205, 230-1, 236 profit(ting), 9, 37, 180, 112, 124, 127, 196, 101-2, 206, 218, 220-3, 224, 237 property ownership, 30-1, 33, 77, 137, 149, 151, 186-8, 198,246 in the person, 29-30, 187, 198-200, 207-213 production of private, 186, 228 quality, 61, 62, 66, 126, 129, 138, 141, 149, 177, 187-8, 219, 257 prostitution, 41, 66, 88, 140, 174-5, 176, 177, 197-200, 203, 208, 212, 223 mutual, 200, 216 universal, 198-200, 216 psychologizing, 27, 76, 83, 113, 179-80, 208, 227, 245-9 see also explanation psyche, 95, 101, 108 collective, 249 psychoanalysis, 85, 86, 87, 110, 111, 129, 255 psychology, 26, 85-108, 109-28, 134, 145, 245, 249 psychotherapy, 85-108, 152 of women, 86 Women's Therapy Centre, London, 90, 103 see also therapism; therapy relationship quality see property quarrel, 74-5, 84, 127-8, 130, 185-6 Quistorp, Eva, 13 race, 151, 227, 234, 235, 240, 244 racism, 1, 3, 4, 37, 40-1, 49-51, 52, 58, 72, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 137, 159, 234-5, 238, 244-5, 257 critique of, 39-40, 43, 49, 52-7, 71, 75, 76, 79, 80, 151, 230, 235-6 reproach of, 73, 75, 77, 79-81, 84 and sexism, see sexism Raymond, Janice, 93, 115 reality, 1 , 9 , 13-14, 15, 16, 17, 43, 45, 59, 73, 76, 87, 106, 108, 109, 112, 114, 119, 124, 126, 135-44, 150, 152, 155, 160, 166, 181, 183, 188, 213, 224, 227-33, 239,249 realism, 45, 96, 130-1 self-realization, 236 struggle with, 100, 129, 138-44 recognition, 83-4, 121-2, 123, 125, 127, 201 struggle for, 125-8, 129, 130, 183, 192 reformulating, 12, 15, 41, 49, 59, 60-2, 71-4, 77, 79, 83, 105, 115, 132-3, 208, 222 paraphrase, 71-2, 79, 93, 105, 263 n.2
icuciimiig, l*tl
see also representation reflection, 132-4, 135-7 self-, 136-7 relationship to cultural Other, 38-51, 243-5 'private'/intimate (democratic), 111-28, 161-70,183, 185-206, 207-23 to Other, 129-44, 145-7 see also mother-child; therapy relationship representation, 15, 16-17, 45, 49, 59, 96, 109, 132, 208, 222, 232-3 narrative, 109, 115, 255 self-, 230, 236 see also imaging; perception; reformulating reproduction, 34, 35, 137, 163, 205, 228-9, 244, 245 reproductive capacity, 235, 236 reproductive monogamy, 168 resistance, 5, 7, 18, 36, 39, 48, 55-6, 64, 66-8, 70, 101, 105, 118, 121, 138, 213, 215, 216-17, 229, 231, 232, 234, 235-6, 241, 253-8, 280 n.8 responsibility, 3, 8, 10-11, 14-15, 17, 21, 24-6, 28, 54, 62, 67, 75, 82, 102-4, 105, 119-20, 141-4, 192, 205, 206, 215, 217, 225, 229, 237, 244, 245, 247, 252 collective, 8, 10 diminished, 70, 75, 76 irresponsibility, 119, 143, 218 non-responsibility, 10, 14, 218 Rich, Adrienne, 7(^80, 82-3, 103, 148, 280 n.8 rights, 27, 29, 31-6, 151, 162-7, 175, 189, 194, 199, 209, 210-12, 216, 226, 247 equal, 189, 209, 216 roles, 56, 68, 110, 140, 183, 202-3, 258 role-model, 177-8 role-play, 140, 144, 200 sexual, 154-5, 154, 172-3, 175, 179 romance, 137, 166-8, 169, 205-6, 222 Rommelspacher, Birgit, 119 Rush, Florence, 264 n.5 Ryan, Joanna, 91-2 sacrifice, 186, 193, 194, 221 self-, 27, 67, 113-15, 130, 196-7 sadism, 89, 130, 135, 145, 152, 184 sadomasochism, 152, 166-7, 172-3, 182, 184, 223 Sartre, Jean-Paul, 132, 134, 135-6, 139, 140, 144, 145 satisfaction, 91, 98, 103, 104, 112, 114, 182, 183, 186, 189, 191-2, 194, 195, 201-3, 205, 208-9, 213-23, 228 self-gratification, 204, 219-20 Scanlon, Joan, 263 n.2 Schultz, Dagmar, 63, 67
scientific discourse, 16-17, 21, 106—8, 176, 180-1, 183-4, 251-2 empirical evidence, 65, 86, 93, 158, 172, 177, 179 empiricism, 63, 150, 152, 153-5, 177 see also discourse; sexology; standpointlessness Segal, Lynne, 93, 102, 178, 204, 209 self, passim conception of, 24-5, 37, 42-3, 45, 107, 111, 144 female self, 113-14, 118-19 loss of, 114, 118 self-negation, 119 splitting of, 109-10, 111, 132-7, 178 see also other; subject-object relationship self-defence, 139, 142-3, 240, 254-6 self-determination, 45, 64, 112, 174, 207, 213 see also autonomy self-enrichment, 29, 68, 202 see also appropriation self-interest, 24-37, 67, 84, 87, 116, 119, 121-2, 123, 127, 185, 201, 204, 205, 206, 236, 238, 251, 260 n.2. selflessness, 27, 113-14, 260 n.2 self-sacrifice see sacrifice separatism, 54-5, 230, 237 servants, 54, 200, 208, 210, 212 see also masters service, 54, 90, 207, 209-1,0, 212-13 services, 191, 197-206, 209, 212, 213 servicing, 180, 198, 200-1, 208, 221 servitude, 133, 166, 203, 209-13, 223 sex, 35, 91, 93, 150, 153, 154-70, 172, 173, 179, 180-4, 1.85-6, 198-206, 219-23, 227 after a fight, 185-6 industry, 154 'rough sex', 172—3 trade, 176 see also sexual agency sex (gender), 9, 30-1, 34-5, 37, 38-9, 42, 107, 113-14, 118-19, 120-1, 146-8, 150-3, 157-60, 161, 163, 168, 172, 173, 176, 197-8, 202-4, 208, 227, 229, 233, 234, 240 sexism, 3, 6, 9, 22, 38-9, 41-3, 48, 51, 65, 69, 147-8, 150, 159, 169, 181, 205, 226 and racism, 52, 54-7, 72, 159, 238 sexology, 149-54, 156-8, 164, 172, 173, 175, 183 sexual acts/practices, 149, 150, 152, 186 sexual agency, 154-5, 156-60, 179 sexuality, 91-2, 121, 122, 147-70, 171-84 bisexuality, 149 heterosexuality, 148—60 homosexuality, 148-51, 155-60
see also heterosexuality, compulsory sexual object, 148, 154-64 sexual perversion/inversion, 155, 156-7, 175 sexual relationship, 145-7, 163-70, 171, 185 sexual subject, 154-64, 171 see also subject-object relationship (sexual) sexual use, 162, 199,210-11 sexual violence, 1, 3, 9, 12, 18, 58, 66, 88, 89, 122, 129, 174, 175, 180, 181, 203, 231, 232, 256 child sexual assault, 1, 42, 89, 157-8, 160, 161,174 rape, 154, 156, 157-60, 162, 177, 203, 255 sexual harrassment, 42, 177 sexual slavery, 213, 231 Sichtermann, Barbara, 176, 180, 182 sight, 43, 110, 135-9, 144 see also perception Singer, Peter, 226 Sivanandan, A., 39 slavery, 77, 78, 121, 122, 161, 163, 166, 170, 203, 206, 212, 215, 216, 235 enslavement, 1.8, 213, 235 slaves, 27, 30, 55, 90, 170 slave holders/masters, 121, 214, 216 see also masters Slotnik, Barry, 172, 173 social change, 15, 57, 76, 86, 87, 117, 229 social control, 4-5, 13, 155-6, 191, 234, 251 sociality, 28, 124, 145, 163, 169-70, 202, 206, 217 homosociality, 155 sociologizing, 3, 179 sociology, 2, 62-6, 68, 184 Spiegel, Der, 175 standpointlessness, 16, 57-9, 129 see also scientific discourse Stiglmayer, Alexandra, 13 subject, passim becoming a, 34, 37 female, 146-7, 151, 171, 174, 175-84 subjecthood, 124, 136-7, 143 subjectification, 108 see also objectification; otherness subjection 35, 38, 40, 120-2, 133, 151, 152, 203, 210, 213, 215-6, 223 voluntary, 173 see also submission subject-object relationship, 30-2, 35-6, 37, 38-9, 41, 42-3, 46, 59, 63-5, 106-8, 109-12, 120-1, 123-6, 132-44,148, 154-5, 156-9, 179, 182,188,226-7, 253 subjectivity, 26, 27, 30, 32, 45-6, 70, 82, 84, 85, 108, 111, 120, 124, 125, 136-7, 139, 143, 146-7, 178, 183-4, 196, 222-3 intersubjectivity, 123, 125 subjugation see subjection submission, 75, 121, 153, 156, 173, 183, 203,211,212-13,223
voluntary, 211, 212, 223 see also dominance; subjection; subordination subordination, 30, 31-2, 91, 121, 123, 142-4, 203, 211, 223, 243 survival, 18, 181, 240, 258 therapism, 93, 115 relationism, 93 therapy discourse, 209, 225 therapy-relationship, 87, 92-3, 96, 97-8, 102-3, 1 0 4 - 5 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 5 client/patient, 92, 93, 102-5, 110, 113 thingification, 187-90, 212 see also discourse; discursive objects Thiirmer-Rohr, Christina, 243, 262 togetherness, 47-8, 49-51, 97, 123, 126, 167, 185, 206, 221-3, 237-8 see also mutuality uniqueness, 162-3, 167, 168, 169 universality, 21, 169 universalizing, 199—200 unrelatedness, 143-4, 206 validation, 186, 226-7 valuation, 194, 225-7 value, 186, 190, 193-7, 201, 224-7, 233 equal, 226 exchange-, 189-90, 193, 197, 234 use-, 186, 193, 197, 221
victimism, 55-6, 70, 75, 102, 114, 230, 231-2 victim status, 49, 55-6, 75-6, 230-2 see also oppression status victimization, 18, 82, 230, 231, 232 victory, 73, 75, 125, 159, 161, 172, 174, 180, 183, 254, 256 deafeat, 139-40 vulnerability, 140-2, 160, 208 Wagner, Sally Roesch, 273 n.45 Walker, Alice, 53-6, 70, 75, 119 war, 7, 9-11, 13, 74, 99, 102, 135-6, 142, 145, 153, 159-60, 172, 181, 182-3, 239-42, 253-9 Bosnia, Croatia, 1, 9, 10, 13, 130, 255 Gulf (1991), 15, 28, 255 military intervention, 13, 181, 255 war-and-peace politics, 182, 239 Warsaw ghetto, 256 white-woman-centrism, 53—7, 60, 61, 65, 69, 84 Wichterich, Christa, 261 n.9 Williams, PatriciaJ., 280 n.2 Women's Therapy Centre, London, 90, 103 work see labour xenophobia see hatred; hostility; racism Zeit, Die, 245
