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CI{AP'IER XIII The UnitY of the Mind I s lr et - l beg i n b y m e n ti o n i n g th o s e facts about the m ind r v hic h e v e ry o n e a d mi ts a n d w h i ch every theory has t o t ak e in to a c c o u n t. ( r ) I t is ad m i tte d th a t th e to ta l s ta te of a man' s mi nd aL any m om e n t ma y b e , a n d g e n e ra l l y i s, di fferenti ated. This differentiation takes trvo different forms' (ri) My t ot al s t at e o f m i n d a t a n y m o m e n t nray consi st of mental events of various kirtds. I may be feeling tired, utdutittg tea, thinhing 0f rny book, and so on. (/) There m ay be in my to ta l m e n ta l s ta te a t any moment a num ber o[ m e n ta l e v e n ts rv h i c h a re o f the same ki nd but lrave different epistemological oly'ects. I may be t hink ing of my te a , o f m y b o o k , o f th e mul ti pl i cati ont able, and s o o n . We ma y s u m th i s u p by sayi ng that the tc-rtalstate of a mind at any time may be differentiated qualit at iv ely o r o b j e c ti v e l y o r i n b o th l vays. A s w e hav e s een, id e n ti ty o f q u a l i ty i s c o m p a ti bl e rvi th di versi ty of objec t s . S i mi l a rl y , i d e n ti ty o f o b j e ct i s compati bl e f u a l i ty . 8 .g ., I mi g h t at the same ti me wit lr div er s ity < .' q te a , l o rrg i n g fo r mv tea, and so on. my o f t hink ing be to ta l s ta te o f m i n d i s di versi fi ed both ev e r.y P r obably o b j e c ti v e l y I a n d n o doubt there are a n d qualit at iv ely c o n n e x i o n s b e trv e e n th e tw o ki nds of int im at e c au s a l c lif f er ent iat i o n . S ti l l , th e y a re d i s ti n c t fo rms of di fferenti at ion ev en if th e y n e v e r o c c u r i n i s o l a ti o n from each other. ( z ) O n t h e ' fa c e o f i t th e re a re tl vo fr' rndamental l y c lif f er er r tk in d s o f me n ta l e v e n ts ' v i z ., those w hi ch do and t hos e r v h i c h d o n o t h a v e e p i s te mol ogi cal obj ects. Com par c , r . g ., th e tw o s ta te m e n ts " l feel ti red" or " I

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feel cross" w i th t he t wo st at em ent s t 'l see a chair " or " I want my tea ". The former seem to express /tozu, and not zultat, I am feeling. The latter seem to express zahat, and not hoza, I am perceiving or desiring. I will cal l them resp ect ively t 'non- r ef er ent ial" and , . r ef er enti al " mental event s. ( Cf . Chap. VI . ) Som e people have argued that all mental events are really referential. Thi s may possibly be t r ue; but t heir ar gum ent s do not convi nce me, and t heir conciusion seem s t o m e paradoxi cal . I t hink it ver y likely t hat m y t ot al m ent al state at any mo m ent is never wholly non- r ef er ent ial and never w holly r ef er ent ial ; but t his is as f ar as I am w i l l i ng to go. I t her ef or e assum e t hat t her e ar e these tw o di ffer ent kinds of m ent al event , however closely they may always be connected rvith each other i n real l i fe. (S ) A t the sam e t im e t her e exist a num ber of dif f er ent total mental states, u'hich we say ', belong to different mi nds " . It i s p ossible f or t her e t o be t wo cont em por ar y mental events which have exact ly t he sam e det er m inat e qual i ti es and the sam e epist em ological object ; but t hese tw o mental eve nt s cannot belong t o t he sam e m ind. (To thi s i t w ould gener ally be added t hat no m ent al event can bel ong t o m or e t han one m ind, and t hat ever y mental event mu st belong t o som e m ind. But , in view of the facts of abnormal and supernormal psychology, i t w oul d perhaps be unwise t o insist on t his as st r ongly as on the other p oint s which have been m ent ioned. ) (4) Certain series of successive total mental states are sai d to " bel ong t o a single m ind". And t he event s rvhich are differentiations of a pair of total states belongi ng to the same m ind t hem selves belong t o t hat m ind. (It w oul d commonly be held t hat ever y t ot al m ent al state is part of the history of some mind which endures for some time and has other earlier or later total states.) These are the n.rain facts rvhich every theory has to take into consideration. I now propose to state various theoretically possible analyses of them.

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Alternative Theoriesabout the Unity of the Mind.We may begin by dividing all theoriesinto two great and (B) Non-centregroups,viz. (A) Centre-Theories, Theories. By a centre-theory I mean a theory which ascribes the unity of the mind to the fact that there is a stands in Centre-which certain particular existent-a to all the mental events relation a common asymmetrical a mind, and of certain which would be said to be states does not stand in this relation to any mental events which would not be said to be states of this mind. By a non-centre theory I mean one which denies the existence of any such particular Centre, and ascribes the unity of the mind to the fact that certain mental events are directly inter-related in certain characteristic ways, and that other mental events are not related to these in the peculiar way in which these are related to each other. Now centre-theories may be sub'divided into (a) Pure Ego Theories, and (D) Theories that do not assume a Pure Ego. By a Pure Ego I understand a particular existent which is of a different kind from any event; it owns various events, but it is not itself an event. No doubt the commonest form of the Centre theory has inBut it seems conceivable that the volved a Pure Ego. u n it y of t he m i n d m i g h t b e d u e to th e e xi stence of a Centre, and yet that this centre might itself be an event. It is possible that this is what William fames had in mind when he talked of the " passing thought " as being the " thinker ". So we had better teave room for theories of this type. (A, Pure Ego Theories. Theories which assume a ") special kind of existent Centre-a Pure Ego-may be divided according to the view rvhich they take about mental eveirts. A mental event is certainly a Substantive; i.e., it is the kind of entity which can be a logical subject of a proposition, but cannot play any other part in a proposition. But there are two different kinds of substantives, viz., those which exist and those which

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only subsist. A Pure Ego, if there be such a thing, is an existent substantive. A fact or a proposition is a substantive, in the sense defined above. We can say that " The execution of Charles I was a political mistake " or that " It is probable that Edwin will marry Angelina ". Here rve have factsor propositionsfunctioning as subjectsof other propositions. And they cannot play any other part in a proposition. They are therefore substantives. But they do not exist (though they may contain existents as constituents); they merely subsist. Now, granted that mental events are substautives, it might be held (i) that they are merely subsistent, or (ii) that they are existent substantives. Non-centre theoriesabout the mind are obliged to hold that mental eventsare existent substantives; but Pure Ego theories have already got an existentsubstantive,viz., the Pure Ego. They can thereforetake their choice about mental events. They can regard mental events either as facts about Pure Egos, or as existentsof a pecuiiarkind rvhich stand in specially intimate connexion with existents of another kind, viz., Pure Egos. We will now consider thesetwo forms of Pure Ego theory in turn. (i) On this view there is a plurality of different Pure Egos. All these Pure Egos have certain causal characteristicsor t'faculties", e.g., the power of remembering, the powerof reasoningand so on. Besidethis, each Pure Ego at each moment has somedeterminateform of some determinable non-causalquality; and each Pure Ego at each moment has some determinateform of some determinablerelation to some object or other. A mental event is the fact that a certain Pure Ego has a certain determinateform of a certain determinable non-causal quality at a certain moment ; or it is the fact that a certain Pure Ego standsat a certainmoment in a certain determinateform of some determinable non.causalrelation to a certain object. The first kind of fact is what rve have called a " non-referential" mental event ; the secondkind of fact is what we have called a ,'referential"

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m ent al ev en t. E.g ., w e mi g h t ta k e ,. ti redness" as one determinable quality, and " crossness" as another. Then the mental event of feeling tired is the fact that a certain Pure Ego has a certain determinate form of the quality of tiredness at a certain moment. Again, perceiving and desiring would be two determinable relations; and the mental event of seeing.a chair would be the fact that a certain Pure Ego has this determinate form of the relation of perceivin g at a certain moment to a certain chair. Now a Pure Ego can have determinate forms of several different determinable qualities at the same time i eB.t it can at the same time have the quality of tiredness in a certain degree and the quality of crossness in a certain degree. Similarly, it may have the same determinate relation to several different objects at the same time, or it may have at the same time different kinds of relation to the same object. A total mental state would then be the fact that a certain Pure Ego at a certain moment has several different non-causal qualities, stands in noncausal relations of several different kinds, and stands in the same kind of non-causal relation to several different objects. To say that all these contemporary mental events are differentiations of a single total state of a certain mind is just to say that each of them is a fact about the same Pure Ego and the same moment of time and about different qualities or relations or the same relation and different objects. S o m uc h f o r w h a t w e m i g h t c a l l th e ' (transverse uni ty of a cross-section of the history of a mind " on this view. T he " longit u d i n a l u n i ty " o f a m i n d , as w e mi ght cal l it , c ould be e x p l a i n e d o n th i s v i e w i n tw o al ternati ve rvays. (a) The simplest theory would be that the same Pure Ego persists ; and that it has different determinate qualities, or stands in different determinate relations, or stands in the same determinate relations to different objects, at different times. To say that two successive total states are states of the same mind is just to say that both of them are facts about the same Pure Ego,

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about different moments of time, and about the same or different qualities or relations or objects. (B) It rvould, however, be possible to hold a vierv which is a kind of compromise betrveen a Central and a non-Central Theory. It might be held that the unity of each total state requires a Pure Ego. But it might be held that the longitudinal unity of a mind does not require that one and the same Pur e Ego should be a com m on constituent of a series of successive total states. It might be held that there is a different Pure Ego for each different total state of the same mind, and that two successive total states are assigned to the same mind because of certain characteristic relations which they have to each other and which they do not have to other total states which would not be assigned to this mind. This second Theory is a Central Theory for the transverse unity, and a non-Central Theory for the longitudi nal uni ty of the m ind. Whichever form of this theory we may take it follorvs that every mental event m ust be t 'or vned " by som e Pure Ego. For every mental event is a fact about some Pure Ego, and it may be said to be " owned " by the Pure Ego rvhich it is about. I think that it would also follow from either form of the theory that no mental event cou ld be owned by m or e t han one Pur e Ego. For a mental event is the fact that a certain Pure Ego has a certain quality or stands in a certain relation to a certain object at a certain moment. Now, although two Pure Egos might have precisely the same quality and stand in precisely the same relation to the same object at the same time, yet it would be one fact that Pure Ego A had this quality or stood in this relation to this object, and it would be another fact that Pure Ego B did so. Hence there would be two mental events and not one. Finally, although on either form of the theory every mental event would be orvned by some Pure Ego and no mental event would be orvned by more than one, it would be possible on the second

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form of the theory that there might be mental eventg which were not states of any mind. For there might be certain mental events which did not stand in such relations to any mental event of earlier or later date that the two could be regarded as successive slices of the history of a mind. (ii) We will now consider the second great division of Pure Ego theories, viz., those which regard mental events as existent substantives and not merely as sub. sistent facts about the qualities and relations of Pure Egos. On this type of theory rve must suppose that non-causal qualities, such as tiredness or crossness, belong, not to Pure Egos, but to mental events. We must further assume a peculiar asymmetric relation of 'ro wner s hip" bet w e e n a P u re E g o a n d c e r tai n mental events. On the first form of Pure Ego theory .(owner. ship " was not a peculiar material relation ; a Pure Ego owned a state when the state was the fact that this Pure Ego had such and such a quality or stood in such and such a relation at a certain time. Ownership was thus the fonnal relation of a subject to a fact about that subject. On the present form of the theory mental events are not facts about Pure Egos, and the ownership of a mental event by a Pure Ego cannot be dealt with in this simple way. Let us consider the analysis of a typical mental state on the two forms of the Pure Ego theory. We will begin rvith the kind of state which is expressed by the phrase " I feel tired ". On the first form of the theory this can be analysed into: .. A certain Pure Ego has a certain determinate form of the determinable quality of tiredness now.'l On the second form of the theory it w o u ld be analy s e d i n to : .,T h e re i s a mental event characterised by a certain determinate form of the determinable quality of tiredness, and this event is owned by a certain Pure Ego." Next let us consider a refer. ential mental event, such as that which would be e xp res s edby t he p h ra s e : ,,I a m th i n k i n g o f t he number

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2." On the first form of the theory this could be anal ysed i nto: " A c er t ain Pur e Ego st ands nor v in a certain determinate form of the determinable relation the num ber 2. " O n t he second f or m of ' cogni si ng' to of the theory it could be analysed into : " There is a mental event rvhich stands in a certain determinate form of the determinable relation of ' cognising' to the number z, and this event is owned by a certain Pure E go." There are several points to be noticed about these alternative analyses. In the first place, on both theories there is a relation of the Pure Ego to the mental event, and also a relation of the Pure Ego to the determinate quality, in the case of a non-referential state of mind. On the first theory, the Pure Ego is characterised directly by tiredness ; on the second theory, the Pure Ego has to the quality of tiredness a compound relation which is the l ogi cal product o f t he t wo r elat ions of "owning" and " being characterised by ". For, on the second theory, the Pure Ego ozans something which is characterisedd7 tiredness. The difference is that, on the first theory, the relation between the Pure Ego and the quality is direct, like that of father to son ; whilst, on the second theory, it is indirect, like that of uncle to nephew. Again, on the first theory, the relation of Pure Ego to mental event is the formal relation of a subject to a tbct about that subject ; whilst, on the second theory, it is the non-formal relation of " ownership " between one existent substantive of a certain kind and another existent substantive of a different kind. Similar remarks apply to referential mental states on the two theories. On the first theory, the Pure Ego stands directly in a cognitive relation to an object. On the second theory, it stands in a compound relation to this object ; this relation is the logical product of the tw o rel ati ons of " owning " and , . cognising " ; f or t he Ptrre Ego ozuns something which cognises the object. It must, therefore, be admitted that both theories are

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able to deal u'ith all the various relations which any theory has to recognise ; they differ here only in the fact that a relation rvhich is direct and simple on one theory is indirect and complex on the other. Secondly, on the present form of the Pure Ego theory it is not logically impossible that there-should be mental events which are not owned by any Pure Ego at all ; nor is it l o g i c ally im pos s i b l e th a t s o me me n ta l e v ents shoul d be orvned at once by several Pure Egos. On the first form of the theory it follorved logically from the nature of mental events that there could not be unowned or co mm on m ent al e v e n ts ; i f th i s i s to b e ma i ntai ned on the present form of the theory it rvill be necessary to add certain synthetic propositions about the relation o f tt or v ner s hip " . Th er e is one o th e r p o i n t w h i c h h a d b e tt er be mentioned at this stage. As stated by us, both forms of tbe l)ure Ego theory have presupposed a plurality of d i ffe r ent det er m in a b l e m e n ta l q u a l i ti e s a n d a pl ural i ty of different determinable relations to an epistemological On the first theory these qualities directly object. characterise the Pure Ego, and these relations directly connect the Pure Ego with epistemological objects; on the second theory the qualities directly characterise me nt al ev ent s , and th e re l a ti o n s d i re c tl y c o n nect mental Norv I do not events with epistemological objects. th i n k t hat eit her t h e o ry c o u l d d i s p e n s e w i th a pl ural i ty of different.determinable mental qualities. For there are certainly different kinds of feeling, such as " feeling c ro s s " , e tc ., a n d i t s e e ms i mpossi bl e ti re d " , t t f eeling to regard the difference between feeling tired and feeling cross as simply a difference of relation to some object or as a difference in the objects to which something is related. It rvould seem then as if " tiredness " and ti crossness" were so many different non - relational d e ter m inables . B u t, i f w e o n c e g ra n t a p l ural i ty of d i ffer ent det er m in a b l e me n ta l q u a l i ti e s , i t mi ght be suggested that rve could do without a plurality of

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different determinable mental rclations to objects. We have counted cogni sing as one kind of det er m inable relation to an object, and desiring as another kind of determinable relation to an object. But could rve not manage w i th onl y a single det er m inable r elat ion t o an object, rvhich rve might call " objective reference" ? M ight not the di fferencebetrv eencognising and desir ing sim ply be a difference in the qualities of the term which stands at the moment in the relation of reference to an object? On the first form of the Pure Ego theory this su$gestion u'ould work out as follorvs. Suppose I think of my tea first, and then desire my tea. There would, on both occasions, be simply some determinate form of the general relation of reference between my Pure Ego and my tea. But on the second occasion, i.e,, vhen I desired my tea i n addi ti on to thinking of it , m y Pur e Ego would have a certai n charac t er ist ic qualit y which it did not have on the first occasion. A thing rvould be " desired " rvhen it stood in the relation of being " referred to " by a Pure Ego rvhich had at the time a certain specific quality. On the second form of the Pure Ego theory the suggestion rvould rvork out as follorvs. A desire for my tea would be a mental event rvhich (a) has a certain characteristic quality, and (/) has the relation of objective reference to my tea. A mere thought of my tea rvould be a mental event rvhich (a) lacks this characteristic quality, and (d) has the relation of objective reference to my tea. It may be remarked that all other mental attitudes torvards objects presuppose the cognitive ai ti tude; rve cannot de sir e, f ear , hat e, or love anyt hing, rvithout having an idea of the object torvards rvhich rve take thi s atti tude. Hence it would be plausible t o i denti fy the cogni ti ve r elat ion r vit h t he gener al r elat ion of objective reference; and to suppose that all other mental atti tudes consist of t he holding of t his r elat ion betw een a P rrre E go or a m ent al event and an epist em ological object, together rvith the fact that this Pure U :: ,. mental event ha s at t he t im e a cer t ain char act er -

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is t ic qualit v rv h i c h d e te rm i n e s w h e th er the atti tude i s c alled t ' des i re " , o f t' l o v e " , c l r ' ( h a te " or rvhat not. 'fhus rve get a cross-division of Pure Ego theories .according to rvltether they do or do nol assume a plur alit y of d i ffe re n t k i n d s o f re l a ti o n of reference to objec t s . I rv i l l n o rv l e a v e th c e x p o s i ti on of the vari ous possible forms of Pr.rre Ego theory, and rvill pass to the t heor y of a C e n tre rv h i c h i s a n e v e n t a n d not a P ure E go. (A, b) C-en/t'a/-Euen/Tluories. It is evident that thcse form a kind of half - rvay h<>use betrveen Pure Ego t heor ies and N o n -C e n tre T h e o ri e s o f the mi nd. They r es em ble P u re Eg o th e o ri e s i n th e fact that the unit y of a to ta l me n ta l s ta te a t a n y moment depends on a c om mo n re l a ti o n i n w h i c h a l l i ts di fferenti ati ons s t and t o a c o m m o n C e n tre . T h e y re s embl e N on-C entre T heor ies in th e fa c t th a t th i s C e n tre i s i tsel f an event and not a pec ul i a r k i n d o f e x i s te n t s u b s ta nti ve; i t i s of the s am e nat ur e a s th e e v e n ts rv h i c h i t u n i f i es. I thi nk that t he m os t p l a u s i b l e fo rm o f th i s th e ory w oul d be to ident iiy t he C e n tra l E v e n t a t a n y m o ment w i th a mass T h e l o n g i tu d i n a l uni ty of a sel f of bodily f e e l i n g . t hr ough a p e ri o d o f ti m e rv o u l d th e n depend on the f ac t t hat t h e re i s a ma s s o f b o d i l y fe e l i ng w hi ch goes on c ont inuous l y th ro u g h o u t th i s p e ri o d and vari es i n qualit y not a t a l l o r v e ry s l o rv l y . At any moment there ar e m any s u c h m a s s e s o f b o d i l y fe el i ng, w hi ch are num er ic ally d i ffe re n t h o rv e v e r mu c h t hey may be al i ke in qualit y . ' fh e s e fo rm th e C e n tre s of a nurnber of different contemporary total states of mind. Each of t hem is a t h i n s l i c e o f a l o n g a n d h i g h l y uni form strand of bodily f e e l i n g ; a n d e a c h o f th e s e strands of bodi l y f eeling ac c o u n ts fo r th e l o n g i tu d i n a l u n i ty of onc mi nd. T he t r an s v e rs c u n i ty o f a to ta l m e n tal statc nri ght be accounted for in two different ways on this theory, r v hic h ar e si rn i l a r to fo rms (i ) a n d (i i ) of the P ure E go t heor y . ( i) We m i g h t s u p p o s e tl .ra t each cross-secti < l n of one o[ t h e s e s tra trd s h a s v :rri o trso ther qual i ti es besi de t hat qualit y i n w h i c tr a l l a d j a c e n t c ro ss-secti onsof the

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same strand closely resemble each other. These other qualities may vary sharply betrveen adjacent crosssections of the same strand. .E.g., suppose we take t$,o adjacent sections of a certain strand, each of which lasts for a minute. There may be a predominant resemblance in quality between the two ; but the first may have i n ad dit ion a ( , t oot hachy" qualit y, and t he second may have in addition a ,, headachy " quality. The transverse unity of the total mental state will consist in the fact that the same Central Event has a pl ural i ty of di ffe r ent det er m inat e qualit ies in addit ion to that quality in which it resembles adjacent Central Events of the same strand. So far we have considered only non-objective mental events. Objective mental events could be dealt with as follorvs. We might suppose that the same Central Event, which has these vari ous qual i ti es, also st ands in var ious det er m inat e forms of various determinable relations to vari<_lus objects. The fact that a Central Event stands in strch and such a deter m inat e f or m of such and such a r elat ion to such and such an object rvill be, on this vierv, rvhat is meant by saying that such and such a referential mental state i s occur r ing in such and such a m ind. (i i ) The other at t er nat ive would be t o assum e a pl ural i ty of exi st ent m ent al event s beside t hose which feelings and constitute Central Events. are bodily Tbese other events would then have characteristic mental qual i ti es and st and in char act er ist ic m ent al relations to objects of various kinds. And the transverse uni ty of a total m ent al st at e would consist in t he f act that a si ngl e cent r al bodily f eeling st ands in a cer t ain common rel ati on t o a num ber of ot ber m ent al event s, each of w hi ch has it s or vn char act er ist ic qualit ies, and some of which stand in characteristic relations to clbjects, As in the case of the Pure Ego theory, rve might try to do w i thout a plur alit y of dif f er ent det er m inable m ent al rel ati ons to obj e ct s, pr ovided we accept a plur alit y of nrental qual i ti es. We m ight post ulat e a single det er -

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m inable me n ta l rc l a ti o n o f ,, o b j e c ti ve reference" . A nd we m ight d i s ti n g u i s h th e a p p a re n tl y di fferent ki nds of objective reference, such as desire, love, fear, etc., by characteristic differences in the quality of the term which stands in the relation of objective reference to an object. (B) Non-Cenlral T/teories. These Theories try to dispense rvith the assumption of an etistent centre, whet her i t b e a P u re Eg o o r a C e n tr al E vent. The uni ty of a total mental state consists in the fact that a number of contemporary mental events, each with its own charac t er is t ic q u a l i ti e s , a re d i re c tl y i n terrel ated i n certai n characteristic ways. There are other contemporary mental events which are not related in these rvavs to a giv en s et o f i n te rre l a te d me n ta l e vents of thi s ki nO. T hes e eit h e r b e l o n g to n o mi n d a t al l , or to a contemporary total state of some other mind. The longitudinal unit y of a mi n d i s d u e to th e fa ct that certai n noncontemporary total mental states, of the kind iust described, are related to each other in characteristic way s . I t i s o b v i o u s l y l o g i c a l l y possi bl e on such a theory that there should be mental events which do not belong to any total mental state, and total mental states whic h do n o t b e l o n g to a n y m i n d . There are several remarks of a general logical character to be made on the relation between Central and Non_ Cent r al T h e o ri e s . (i ) If a n u m b e r of terms stand i n a common relation to a certain other term it necessarily follorvs that they u'ill stand in a symmetricat relation tt each other. E.g., if A and B be both children of X. thev necessarily stand in the relation of ,, brother-or-sister " tL eac h ot her. T h i s c o n s e q u e n c e m a y be cal l ed merel y " analy t ic " , s i n c e th e re l a ti o n o f ,,brother_or_si steri ' between A and B just ,neansthat A is a child of someone who is a pa re n t o f B. Bu t (i i ) th e fa ct that a number of terms stand in a common relation to a certain other term ttay entail a consequence about the relation of these terms to each other rvhich is not merely analytic. Suppose, e.g., that four points A, B, C, and D are all

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at the same di s t ance f r om a point X. Then it necessar ily fol l ow s that the angle ABD is equal t o t he angle ACD. Thi s conseque nceabout t he r elat ions of t he point s cannot be cal l ed merely analyt ic ; f or it is cer t ainly not a m er e restatement or r veakening of t he st at em ent t hat A, B, C, I t m ight and D are al l at t he sam e dist ance f r om X. have been recognised by a person who had never suspected that there rvas a point X from rvhich these four poi nts w ere equidist ant . We m ust , t her ef or e, adm it that the direct relations rvhich we discover betrveen a number of t er m s m ay in f act be ent ailed by t heir standi ng i n a com m on r elat ion t o som e ot her t er m . (i i i ) If a numb er of t er m s be int er r elat ed dir ect ly in a characteristic rvay it follorvs analytically that there is sontetltingto which they all stand in a common asymmetri cal rel ation, even t hough t her e be no Exist ent C entre i n the s yst em . For each of t hem is a const it uent in thefact that they are all related to each other in this parti cul ar rvay; and so t his f act st ands in a com m on asymmetri cal relat ion t o all t hese t er m s. Thus, even if a number of i nt er r elat ed t er m s have no Exist ent Cent r e, there i s al w ays a cer t ain subst ant ive, which subsist s though i t does not exist , which st ands in a com m on asymmetri cal relat ion t o all of t hem and m ight be called thei r " subsi st ent Cent r e ". ( iv) What has just been asserted is merely an analytic consequence of the fact that the terms in quest ion ar e int er r elat ed. But t he f act that a number of terms are directly interrelated nny entai l the synthet ic consequencet hat t her e is an Exist ent C entre w hi ch s t ands in a com m on asym m et r ical r elat ion to them al l . If t he f our point s A, B, C, and D be so rel ated to each ot her t hat t he angle ABD is equal t o the angl e A C D it f ollows t hat t hese point s ar e concyclic, i.e., that there is a certain point X from which they arc al l equi di stant. And t his is not a m er e r est at em ent or rveakeni ng of the or iginal st at em ent about t he equalit y of the trvo angles. I t m ust , t her ef or e, bc adm it t ed t hat the di rect rel at ions which r ve discover am ong a set of

57O UNITY OF MIND AND OF NATURE terms ,na! in fact entail that there is a certain Existent Centre which stands in a common asymmetric relation to all of them. Lastly (v) we must notice that theories of the Non-Central Type are not obliged to hold that the relations which bind certain contemporary mental events into a total mental state, or the relations which bind

personal pronouns, like .. I " and .. you ", presupposes that we recognise the existence of Centres ; and that Non_ Central Theories are necessarily incapable of accounting for this fact. We see that this preliminary objectioi is baseless. Even on Non-Central Theories there is necessarily something rvhich can be called .. f " or " Y ou " . T his s o me th i n g i s a s u b s ta n ti v e, and i t stands in a common asymmetrical relation to .. my " state or to " your " states respectively. The only difference between Central and Non-Central Theories is about the logical nature of this substantive. On Central Theories iiis a particular existent, either a Pure Ego or a Central Event. On Non-Central Theories this substantive is a Fact about certain mental events and their interretations, and so its mode of being is subsistence and not existence. What the opponents of Non-Central Theories have to prove is, therefore, not simply that the unity of the mindlnvolves an entity other than its states, rvhich stands in a common asymmetrical relation to all these states ; but that this entity is an e.ristenland not merely a subsistentsubstantive. On the other hand, it is often objected in lhnine to Central Theories (and, in particular, to pure Ego Theories) that all that rve can observe is mental .,,r"nt. and their direct relations to each other. We cannot observe Pure Egos and their relations to mental events or to objects. As against this preliminary objection it rvas

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worth while to remark that, if there rvere an Existent Centre, this fact might entail synthetically the subsistence of certain direct relations between the mental events which it unifies. And conversely that the subsistence of certain observable relations between a set of mental events might entail that there was an Existent Centre to which they all stood in a certain common relation. In this connexion the follorving remark may be of interest by way of analogy. The existence of conic sections was recognised' and many of their properties rvere worked out, long before it was knorvn that to each conic section there is a peculiar point (the Focus) and a peculiar straight line (the Directrix) and that all the other properties of any conic entail and are entailed by the fact that every point on it is such that its distance from the focus bears a fixed ratio to its distance from the directrix. It remains to be noticed that Non-Central Theories, like Central Theories, may take two different forms according to rvhether we assume a plurality of different determinabte relations of objective reference, such as cogni si ng, desi ri ng, loving, et c. ' or cont ent our selves with a single determinable relation of objective reference and a pl ural i ty of dif f er ent det er m inable qualit ies in t he terms which stand in this relation to objects. We must remark here, however, that a still further degree of simplification has been attempted by certain philosophers, such as W i l l i am Jam es and Ber t r and Russell. All forms of all theories rvhich we have so far mentioned have distinguished shar.ply between the constituents of. a mind and its objects. The objects of the mind were' never supposed to be also constituents of it, except possibly in the very special case where the mind is introspecting and making one of its own states into an object.' On the first form of the Pure Ego theory the mind can hardly be said to have constituents at all. The Pure Ego es a constitttent of a number of facts, and the objects of the mind are constituents of some of these facts. But this does not make the objects constituents

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of t he m ind . On th e s e c o n d fo rm of the P ure E go theory the constituents of the mind are the Pure Ego and the mental events which it orvns. Some of these mental events are constituents of certain facts of which the objects of the mind are also constituents. But this again does not make the objects constituents of the m ind. O n th e th e o ri e s w h i c h re j e c t the P ure E go, which rve have so far considered, the constituents of the m ind ar e m e n ta l e v e n ts . So me o f th e se mental events are constituents of facts of which the objects of the mind are also constituents ; but this does not make the objects of t he m ind c o n s ti tu e n ts o f i t. T h e fo rm of N on-C entral theory which we have norv to mention holds that the mind is cotrtposedo/ its objects interrelated in certain characteristic rvays. A total state of mind just is the fact that a certain set of objects are related to each other at a c er t ain m o m e n t i n a c e rta i n rv a y I and a parti cul ar m ent al ev en t j u s t i s th e fa c t th a t a t a certai n moment a certain object stands in certain relations to certain other interrelated objects. DiEcussion of the Alternative Theories. I have norv stated and tried to explain all the alternative theories about t he un i ty o f th e m i n d w i th w h i c h I am acquai nted. I t will be s e e n th a t th e y a re v e ry n u m erous; and that none of them, with the possible exception of the third form of Non-Central Theory, is so obviously silly that it c an s af ely be d i s m i s s e d rv i th o u t d i s c u ssi on. A nd even this third form of Non-Central Theory has been held by s uc h emi n e n t m e n th a t i t w o u l d be i mperti nent to ignor e it . Pluntlity of Relations of Reference. I will begin by cons ider ing a qu e s ti o n w h i c h a ri s e s o n a l l the al ternati ves, v iz . , whet he r i t i s n e c e s s a ry to a s s u me a pl ural i ty of different determinable relaticlns of refcrence to an object as well as a p l u ra l i ty o f d i ffe re n t d e termi nabl e mental qualit ies . I t s e e m s to me th a t i t rv o u l d not be possi bl e t o dis pens e w i th a p l u ra l i ty o f d i l l e re nt determi nabl e

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relations of reference on the first form of the Pure Ego theory. Let us consider, e.g., the two attitudes of loving and hati ng. It is im possible f or t he sam e m ind t o love and to hate the same object at the same time. If then we suppose that the statement " X loves A " means t'X has the quality l, and stands in the relation of reference to A " , and that the st at em ent t t X hat es A" m eans t t X has the quality h, and stands in the same relation of reference to A ", rve shall have to suppose that the qual i ti es t and h ar e incom pat ible r vit h each ot her . But it is quite certain that X can love A and hate B at the same ti me. A nd , on t he pr esent analysis, t his would seem to require X to have at the same time the trvo inconsi stent qual i ties / and h. Now, if X be a Pur e Ego, we cannot avoid this by supposing that one parl of X has the qual i ty h and anot her par t has t he qualit y / ; for X rvi l l not have par t s. Hence it seem s im possible to accept this analysis on the first form of the Pure Ego theory. The sa m e r esult m av be br ought out in a different way. It is certain that I may cognise both A and B , and desi r e A and not desir e B at t he sam e t im e. N ow , i f tt X desir es A " m eans " X cognises A and has the qual i ty rl " , it r vould seem t o f ollow t hat , r vhen X cogni ses both A and B and desir es only A, X m ust bot h have and not have t he qualit y d. And t his seem s t o be i mpossi bl e i f X be a Pur e Ego. Thus I t hink r ve m ay conclude that the first form of the Pure Ego theory requi res a pl ura lit y of dif f er ent det er m inable r elat ions of reference as well as a plur alit y of dif f er ent m ent al qual i ti es. Thi s ki nd of d if f icult y does not ar ise on any t heor y that admi ts of a plur alit y of exist ent m ent al event s in the same total mental state. Take, e.g., the second Here the statement form of the Pure Ego theory. that " X cogni ses A and B, desir es A, and does not desire B " may be reduced to " X orvns the events e.. and e,,; e., and e,,both stand in the sanre relation of reference to the objects A and B respectively ; and e., has, rvhilst

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e lacks, the quality /." There is no inconsistency in this. Omitting for the present the third form of the Non-Central Theory, I think we may say that it is logically possible for all the other theories to account for the facts without assuming a plurality of different determinable relations of reference. Can we go any further than this ? When I try to analyse introspectively such referential situations as seeing a chair, wanting my tea, loving my friend, and hating nationalism, and when I compare them with each other and rvith other situations which I can introspect, I seem to be pretty certain of the following pr opo s i ti o n s . (r) T h a t i n a l l these si tuati ons an object is being cognised by me. (z) That in each of them something is present beside this object, and that there is an asymmetrical relation between this something and the object. (3) That there is a qualitative difference between the four situations which does not consist in the fact that the objects differ in quality. For I find that desiring my tea and merely thinking of my tea differ in this way, although their objects are the sa m e. A nd I fi n d th a t th i n k i n g o f m y te a and thi nki ng of my chair do not differ in this way, although their But I do not objects differ very greatly in quality. find that introspection tells me with any certainty whether this qualitative difference is (a) simply a difference in the quality of the non-objective constituents of the situations, or (d) simply a difference in the asymmetrical relations betrveen the two constituents, or (c) a difference in both. Still (a) there are some facts which make the alternative (a) somervhat plausible. There are states which I can introspect, rvhich are called " emotional moods ", such as crossness, restlessness, etc. These seem to be non-referential mental states. And it seems that certain emotional moods bear a strong qualitative resemblance to certain emotions, E,9., there which are referential mental situations. the emotional mood betu'een is an obvious connexion

of crossness and the enrotion of anger at sonre definite object. And it rvould be plausible to express this relation by saying that anger is a state of crossness " directed at" a certain cognised object, that desire is a state of restlessness t'directed at" a certain cognised object, and so on. It seems plain to me that the relation of " cognising " is not the same as the relation of " being directed at " I but it does seem plausible to suggest that no relations are involved in the various kinds of referential situation except the two relations of ttcogni si ng " and tt being dir ect ed at " an object and ; that the characteristic differences between various kinds of referential situation are wholly due to differences of quality in that which cognises and is directed at the object. I do not suppose for a moment that this argument is conclusive. In the first place, emotional moods rnay really be emotions rvith highly indeterminate objects. E.9., being cross may consist of being angry rvith " things-in-general ". In that case the suggestion that the various kinds of emotion are just so many different kinds of emotional mood " directed at " objects breaks down. Secondly, it is perfectly possible that the relation which the emotional mood of crossness bears to an object in the emotion of anger is a different relation from that which the emotional mood of restlessness bears to an object in the state known as tt desire ". I do not think that introspection is capable of refuting either of these possibilities. So the upshot of the matter is this. Except on the first form of the Pure Ego theory there is no logical impossibility in the attempt to d
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this is only a guide for our procedrrre ; it is not a larv wh i c h is binding u p o n N a tu re . Re.ferential and Non-Referenlial Situations and t/te T/tird Fonn o1fNon-Central Theory. I must now remind the re ader of a dis t i n c ti o n w h i c h w e d re w i n Chapter V I, which I have so far kept in the background in this chapter in order to avoid excessive complication. It w i l l be r em em b e re d th a t w e d i s ti n g u i s h ed si tuati ons into (a) those which do and those which do not refer to epistemological objects, and (b) those which do and those which do not contain objective constituents. These two distinctions rve expressed respectively by the phrases ttre [ er ent ial " and (( n o n -re fe re n ti a l " a n d b y the phrases t'o b jec t iv e" and It w i l l be remem" n o n -o b j e c ti v e " . bered that we said that there are probably mental events rvhich are non-objective and non-referential, e.g.) vague feelings ; that probably all mental situations which are referential are also objective ; and that possibly there a re m ent al s it uat i o n s , s u c h a s p u re s e n s a ti o nsof sounds, co l our ed pat c hes , e tc ., w h i c h a re o b j e c ti ve but nonre fe r ent ial. F ina l l y , w e m u s t re m e m b e r that, i n perce pt ion, m €m or / r e tc ., th e o b j e c ti v e c o n s tituent of the situation cannot be identified with the epistemological object of the situation or with the ontological object (i f t her e happens to b e o n e ) w h i c h c o rre s p onds to thi s epistemological object. The position is that to " refer to such and such an epistemological object" is a property of any situation which has such and such a structure a n d s uc h and s uch a n o b j e c ti v e c o n s ti tu e n t. There may be no ontological object corresponding to this : and, e ven if t her e s hou l d b e o n e , i t c a n n o t a s a ru l e be i denti fi e d r v it h t he obje c ti v e c o n s ti tu e n t o f th e s i tu ati on. A nd rve have seen grave reason to doubt rvhether, even in th e c as e of v er idica l p e rc e p tu a l a n d me mo ry-si tuati ons, th e objec t iv e c on s ti tu e n t i s e v e r l i te ra l l y a part of the o n tologic al objec t rv h i c h c o rre s p o n d s to th e s i tuati on. Bear ing t hes e fa c ts i n mi n d , w e c a n s ee that the va rious alt er nat iv e th e o ri e s h a v e b e e n s ta te d too si mpl y

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as regards referential situations. Such an event as .,I am seeing a chair " cannot really consist in the fact that a certain Pure Ego is norv standing in a certain relation to a certai n chai r; at best it can only consist in t he f act that a certain Pure Ego is standing in a certain relation to a certain sensum. If the perceptual situation be veridical this sensum also stands in a certain peculiar relation to a certain chair ; but at that stage we have left the pqrchological analysis of minds and mental events, and are entering the region of epistemology and ontology. Similar remarks applI, mutatis mutandis, to referential situations on all the alternative theories. Suppose we hold that a referential situation consists in the fact that a certain euent, and not a certain Pure Ego, stands in a certain relation to a certain objecl We must still recognise that the object to which the event stands i n thi s rel ati on is not t he chair , or t able, or what not, rvhich corresponds to the epistemological object of the situation ; even if there be such a thing, as there often is not. The object to which the event stands i n thi s rel ati on i s a cer t ain sensum or im age ; and t he further question whether there is an ontological object corresponding to the epistemological object of the situati on, and, i f so, how the sensum or im age is r elat ed t o this ontological object, does not arise in the psychological anal ysi s of the si tuati on . Since these remarks apply equally to all theories about the structure of the mind they do not directly help us to decide between the various alternatives. But they enable us to say something further about the third f
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When a drunkard perceives a pink rat it is impossible th at one of t he c o n s ti tu e n ts o f h i s m i n d c an be the pi nk rat that he is perceiving; for there are no pink rats to And in general we may be constituents of anything. say that, even rvhen there is an ontological object corresponding to a referential state of mind, tltis object is not a constituent of the state and, a fortiori, is not a c ons t it uent of th e mi n d . T h u s th e th eory that the c ons t it uent s of th e m i n d a re w h a t rv o u l d commonl y be c alled it s ( ' obje c ts " h a s n o p l a u s i b i l i ty whatever i f by " its objects " you mean the things to which it refers in its referential states of mind. The theory is worth discussing only on the assumption that by " its objects " we mean the objectiue constituents of its objective states of mind. The difference between the two alternatives is roughly this. On the first interpretation the theory asserts that the constituents of the mind are the things that it perceives, the eaentsthat it remembers, and so on. This, as I have said, may be rejected at once as absurd. On the second interpretation the theory asserts that the constituents of the mind are the appearancesto it of the things that it perceives, of the events that it remembers, and so on. This, so far as I can understand, is the form of the theory which Mr Russell defends in his Analysis of Mind; and it is certainly the only form of it which is capable of defence. Now, such a theory makes certain assertions and certain denials. (t) It asserts th at s ens a and i ma g e s a re c o n s ti tu e n ts o f mi nds. (z) It denies that they have any other constituents. (S) Mr Russell further asserts that sensa are constituents of physical objects, though he is not bold enough to assert that images are constituents of past events. We may leave this third assertion, which is not strictly relevant to our present discr-rssion, and confine ourselves to (I ) and ( z ) . The assertion (r) would not commonly be regarded as particularly startling. Probably most philosophers in the past have regarded sensa and images as constituents

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of mi nds. The di ffe r ence bet ween t hem and M r Russell here is simply that he regards sensa as being consti tuents of physi cal object s as well as being const it uent s of mi nds, w hi l st they would alm ost cer t ainly have held that w hat i s a const it uent of a m ind cannot also be a consti tuent of a physical object . I t is in t he denial (z) that Mr R ussel l ' s t heor y would com m only be held t o be paradoxi cal . It would com m only be held t hat any mi nd contai ns other const it uent s besidesensaand im ages. In so far as Mr R ussell denies t hat a m ind cont ains a perfectl y uni que con st it uent - a Pur e Ego- in addit ion to sensa and images a great many psychologists and phi l osophers u 'ould agr ee wit h him . But m ost peopl e w oul d say t hat , if t he m ind had no const it uents except sensa and im ages, it would be im possible to account for the distinction between non-objective mental events, such as feeling cross or tired, and objecti ve mental events, such as sensing a f lash or seeing a gun. I am not at all clear what answer M r Russell rvoul d make to thi s object ion. At cer t ain point s in his Analysis of Mitzd he makes great play with ,, feelings " of various specific kinds, €.{., " belief-feelings ", ,, feeli ngs of fami l i ari ty" , . . f eeling of r ealit y ", and so on. But he does not seem to make it very clear what he supposes these " feelings " to be. Are they supposed to be sensa or i mag es of a peculiar kind? I f so, t he w ords tt sensum " an d . , im age " ar e being used wit h so wide a meaning that the statement that the only consti tuents of the mi n d ar e sensa and im ages is har dly w orth maki ng. For it am ount s t o lit t le m or e t han a deni al of the P ure Ego t heor y; and M r Russell pr e_ sumabl y i ntended to do m or e t han f log what m osi of his contemporaries rightly or wrongly regard as a dead horse. I noti ce that whenever M r Russell is dealing rvi th a pl ai nl y obj ect ive m ent al st at e, such . " . or a bel i ef, he i ntrod uces a . . f eeling" in addit ion - "- o.tr.,, . group of ordi nary sensa and im ages. M or eover , it is crf no use to say simply that a belief, e.g., is such and

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such a group of sensa or images {'accompanied by " such and such a feeling. This phrase " accompanied by " must stand for some more specific relation than mere coexistence within the same total mental state. For, at a given moment I may believe one proposition and merely suppose another proposition. If a belieffeeling " accompanies " the first set of images and sensa, it must equally " accompany " the second set, unless " td accompany " means something more specific than to " coexist with in the same total mental state ". And it is evident that Mr Russell tnast mean something more specific by " accompaniment " I for the belief is to be distinguished from the contemporary supposition by the fact that a certain feeling " accompanies " the one tta c c o m p a n y " the other and s et of im ages a n d d o e s n o t coexistent set of images. Now, I un d e rs ta n d Mr R u s s e l l ' s p rogramme i n the I think Analysis of Mind to be roughly the following. he wants to show (a) that the ultimate constituents of a mind have no qualities rvhich are not also possessedby c ons t it uent s o f th i n g s w h i c h a re n o t mi n ds. In support of t his he as s e rts th a t th e o n l y c o n s tituents of a mi nd are sensa (which he believes to be also constituents of physical objects) and images (rvhich, though not constituents of physical objects, are supposed to differ from sensa only in their causal characteristics and their spatio-temporal relations and not in their qualities). (D) That the characteristically " mental " property of reference to such and such an epistemological object is c om plet ely a n a l y s a b l e i n to c a u s a l a n d other rel ati ons, which occur separately or in other combinations among physical things. (r) That the characteristic qualities of c er t ain gr oup s o f s e n s a a n d i ma g e s w i t hi n a mi nd, and the characteristic relations of such groups to each other, ar e c om plet e l y a n a l y s a b l e i n to q u a l i ties and rel ati ons whic h oc c ur s e p a ra te l y o r i n o th e r c o mbi nati ons among gr oups of se n s a rv h i c h a re n o t c o n ta i ned i n mi nds. And (d) that, consequently, even if introspection be

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possible, it has nothing special to teach us. I hope that thi s i s a fai r a ccount of what M r Russell is t r ying to do. Now it seems to me that, so long as such a cloud of darkness hangs over the nature of " feelings " and the nature of the relation of " accompaniment ", it is doubtful whether Mr Russell has even begun to fulfil this programme. If a " belief-feeling", e.g., be neither a sensum nor an i mage, t hen pr esum ably som e of t he ul ti mate consti tuen t s of t he m ind do possess qualit ies rvhich are not possessed by the constituents of physical objects, and section (a) of the programme is abandoned. Nor is the case very much better if rve suppose that a feeling is either (a) a single sensum or image, or (B) a certain group of sensa or images, which possesses a peculiar " feeling-quality" in addition to the ordinary qual i ti es of sensa a nd im ages. I t is ext r em ely har d t o bclieve that a sensum could possess the quality of " fami l i ari tl " e e.{ ., when it r vas only a const it uent of a physi cal obj ect and not a const it uent of a m ind. And, i f (' fami l i ari ty " or " convict ion " be qualit ies of cer t ain groups of sensa or images, it is extremely hard to believe that they can be anything but etttergentqualities of such groups; i.e,, qualities which are possessedb1, groups havi ng such and such a st r uct ur e and such and srrch constituents br.rt are not dcducibleifrolt a knowledge of the structure of t he gr oup and t he qualit ies of it s consti tuents. On eit her alt er nat ive t her e will be specif ic and unanalysable tuntol qualities. And this directly w recks secti on (c) of M r Russell's pr ogr am m e, and i ndi rectl y w recks sect ion ( d) . For , if " f am iliar it y ", e.{., be a quality which attaches to a sensum 'only w hen i t becomesa const it uent of a m ind, or if it be an e,ttergentquality of groups of sensa or images which occvr onl y w i thi n minds, int r ospect ion will have som ething to teach us rvhich we can learn from no other source. Introspection will not indeed disclose any ul ti mate exi stent co nst it uent r vhich we m ight not have

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m et wit h i n o rd i n a ry p e rc e p ti o n ; b u t i t rvi l l di scl ose certain qualities rvhich rve could never have met rvith otherrvise, and it tvill disclose the fact that these qualities belong to groups which have such and such a structure and s uc h an d s u c h c o n s ti tu e n ts . F inally , I th i n k i t' i s e x tre me l y l i k el y that there are c har ac t er is ti c a l l y ttm e n ta l " fo rm s o f structure, w hi ch cannot be analysed in terms of relations which hold betrveen sensa that are not constituents of minds. At an,\' rate I cannot see that Mr Russell has produced any ground for doubting this proposition. Let us take an e.xample. We are told that the difference betlveen a m er e t ' s en s a ti o n " a n d a .r p e rc e p ti on " consi sts i n the fact that in one case a sensum occurs rvithout, and in t hc ot her c a s e rv i th , c e rta i n .,a c c o m p ani ments" i n the way of other sensa, bodily feelings, images, etc. And we ar e t old th a t th e s e tta c c o m p a n i me nts " are expl i cabl e by m nem ic c a u s a ti o n , rv h i c h i s n o t pecul i ar to mi nds but occurs in purely physiological and biological phenomena also. To this I answer that the blessed word " ac c om pan i m e n t" te l l s u s n o th i n g . The essenti al poi nt is, that in the perceptual situation these various factors do not merely coexist, but are related in a perfectly unique way to form that perfectly unique kind of whole rvhich rve call a "perception of so-and-so". The uniquenes s of t his k i n d o f w h o l e i s i n n o w a y i mpugned by the statement that it is due to mnemic causation and that m nem ic c a u s a ti o n o c c u rs a l s o o u ts i d e the mi nd. It i s no doubt true that the other factors in a perceptual situation rvould not be added to the sensum which is its objective constituent unless the mind had the powers of r et ent iv ene s s , re p ro d u c ti o n , a n d s o o n. A nd i t i s no doubt true that we find porvers of retentiveness, reproduc t ion, an d s o o n , i n l i v i n g b o d i e s a s w el l as i n mi nds. This does not alter the fact that, in the perceptual s it uat ion, t h e s e v a ri o u s fa c to rs w h i c h a re due to mnemi c causation are fused with each other and rvith the objective constituent in a perfectly unique and character-

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istic way, to which (so far as we knorv) there is no anal ogy outsi de the m ind. Thus it seem s t o m e t hat IlIr Russell has failed to show that there are not specific and unanal ysabl e tt m ent al " r elat ions bet ween dif f er ent consti tuents of the s am e m ind. I may now sum up my remarks on the third form of the N on-C entral theor y as f ollows. ( r ) I t is, of cour se, open to any general objections which there may be to Non-Central theories as such. (z) lt it be taken to assert that the constituents of the mind are the objects that it perceives, the events that it remembers, and so on, it is certainly false. For in many cases there is no ontological object which corresponds to a perceptual si tuati on, and no ev ent which cor r esponds t o a m em or ysi tuati on. A nd, ev en r vhen such sit uat ions ar e ver idical and have ontological objects which correspond to their epistemological objects, these ontological objects are not constituents of the situatious, and, a fortit,ri, are not consti tuents of the m ind r vhich or vns t he sit uat ions. ( S) The theory must, therefore, be accepted, if at all, in something like Mr Russell's form of it, rvhich makes the constituents of the mind to be the sensa and images which are appearances to it of the objects that it percei ves and the event s which it r em em ber s. But , even i n thi s form, i t requir es " f eelings " in addit ion t o ordinary sensa and images ; and specific relations between certain feelings and certain groups of sensa and images. And at that stage it differs very little from the other forms of Non-Central theory. The difference consists mainly in the fact that Mr Russell regards sensa as constituents of physical objects, whilst most philosophers w ho w oul d admi t th at sensa ar e const it uent s of t he m ind would deny that they are also constituents of physical objects. But this is a difference about the nature of physical objects, and not a difference about the contents and structure of the mind. (4) I have also tried, incidentally, to show that Mr Russell has accomplished little, if anything, of his attempt to get rid of the uniqueness

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of mind. .The fact is, that the more one insists on the community of stuf between mind and its objects, the more one will have to insist on the radical differences of structure between the two, and on the emergence of nerv qualities in those structures which are peculiar to mind as contrasted with matter. Central and Non-Central Theoies. We can norv consider the great division of theories.about the unity of the mind into Central and Non-Central theories. I will b e g i n wit h t wo pr e l i mi n a ry re m a rk s : n e i th er of them is conclusive, and they bear in opposite directions. (r) The prina facie presumption in favour of Central theories and against Non-Central theories is the common usage of language, rvhich strongly suggests the existence of a Centre. We say : " f am thinking of this book, and wanting my tea, and feeling tired, and remembering the tie that my friend wore yesterday." This certainly suggests that " I " is the proper name of a certain existent which stands in a common asymmetric relation to all those contemporary mental events. We say further: ".I, rvho am now doing and feeling these things, lvas yesterday doing, thinking, wanting, and fe e l i ng s uc h and s u c h o th e r th i n g s ." A n d th i s certai nl y su g g e s t s t hat ( ' I " i s th e p ro p e r n a m e o f somethi ng which existed and was a centre yesterday as well as to-day. Now, as I have said before, it is unwise either to follow blindly the guidance of language or to ignore it altogether. Supporters of Non-Central theories can reply that they too admit that there is something which can be called " I ". It is not indeed a constituent of my empirical self ; it is the rvhole complex of interrelated mental events rvhich are said to be " mine ". To this I think that the following answer must be made. N o d o ubt t he or din a ry m a n w o u l d fi n d i t d iffi cul t or impossible to tell us rvhat he is referring to when he u se s th e wor d " I " ; b u t i t i s e x tre me l y d o u b tfu l rvhether he means to refer simply to the fact that the mental events rvhich he calls " his " are interrelated in certain

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characteristic ways. I doubt whether anyone except a philosopher engaged in philosophising believes for a moment that the relation of ,, himself " to .. his toothache " is the same relation as that of the British Army to Private John Smith. Now, I am not suggesting that we should accepta theory because it seems to be implied by the statements of plain men. God forbid ! But I do suggest that any'satisfactory theory must account for the fact that plain men and philosophers in ordinary life express themselves in language which strongly favours one alternative. Now, as I have said in Chapter IV, I can quite understand that a unity of centre might appear to be a pure unity of system if the Centre were such that it could not be directly inspected. But I cannot imagine any reason why what is in fact a pure unity of system should appear to be a unity of centre. That the mind does a??ear to be of the latter kind seems pretty certain. And I think that this fact must be regarded, pro tanto, as favouring Central Theories. (z) The main preliminary argument against Central theories and in favour of Non-Central theories is the alle'ged fact that no Existent Centre can be directly observed ; that the Centre is in fact postulated ad hoc to explain 'the observed unity, and, if the unity can be explained without it, so much the better. This kind of argument has been used at two different stages in the history of the subject. (a) It has been used in favour of Non-Central theories asagainst Central theories. (b) In these latter days it has been carried further, and used in favour of the third form of Non-Central theory. For, it has been said that we cannot directly observe relations between the mind and its objects. When we try to introspect, it is alleged, we find ourselves merely easpecting rvhat I have called the r. objective constituents " of mental situations, r'.a., sensa and images. Hence it is more prudent to take the view that the mind consists of nothing but such objective constituents interrelated in certain characteristic ways. I have dealt incidentallv

.586 UNITY OF MIND AND OF NATURE with both these arguments in the chapter on Introspection. The fact that the Centre never becomes an object of introspection is no objection to the existence of a Centre unless a Centre be the sort of thing which we might reasonably hope to be able to introspect if it existed. r Now, if there were a Centre which is a non-objective constituent of all our mental states, it seems unreasonable to expect that it could also be an objective constituent of some of our states. To put the matter generally : - The relation of acquaintance is essentially asymmetrical, and this implies that the term which has acquaintance cannot be identical with the term with which it is acquainted. Thus, if there were a Centre, it could not be acquainted with itself as a whole. Now, if the Centre were a Pure Ego, it would have no parts ; hence, if it could not be acquainted with itself as a rvhole, it could not be acquainted with itself at all. On the other hand, it might be acquainted with facts of rvhich it is a constituent I and, by comparing and reflecting on these facts, it might come to a discursive knowledge of its own existence and nature. If the Centre were not a Pure Ego, but were a Central Event of long duration and very uniform quality, there is no reason why situations should not arise, in which the non-objective constituent is a later slice of this long event and the objective constituent is an earlier slice of this same long event. But then it is by no means certain that such situations do not arise. If the centre be a continuous strand of very uniform bodily feeling it is by no means certain that I cannot now remember the particular slice of this strand which formed the Centre of my total mental state some time ago. It seems to mc theref
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situations consisted of an objective and a non-objective constituent related in a certain way' the relati
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In order to deal with this question it will be wise to consider the partly (but only partly) analogous question of material events and material substances. It seems e as ier t o t ak e th e n o ti o n o f ..m a te ri a l e vent t' as fundamental and the notion of ,, material substance " as derivative than to do likervise with the notions of ,.mental event " and .. mental substance". But I believe that this is due to the fact that most of us tacitly assume something like the Newtonian theory of Absolute Space. I s hall ( i) s how w h y th i s i s s o ; (i i ) s h o w that, ori thi s view, we have not really got rid of a plurality of existent substances as a fundamental notion ; and (iii) show that, on this view of material events, there is no very close analogy between them and mental events so that, even I if rve could take the notion of ., material event " as fundam ent al a n d th e n o ti o n o f r.m a te ri al substance" as derivative by this means, we should have no reason to suppose that rve could do likewise with the notions o f { ( m ent al ev e n t " a n d .. me n ta l s u b s ta n ce.tt (i) If we think of Space as a kind of pre-existing substance, we can of course think of a material event as the fact that a certain region of .Space is character_ ised throughout at a certain moment by a certain determinate form of a certain determinable quality (e.g., by a certain shade of a certain colour). Now the same region of Space can be characterised throughout at the same moment by determinate forms of a number of

stance at a certain moment consists in the fact that at this moment a certain region of Space is characterised throughout by determinate forms of certain determin_ a b le qualit ies . Ag a i n , a t a g i v e n m o m e n t, a number of separated regions of Space may each be characterised throughout by the same (or different) determinate forms o f t he s am e det e rm i n a b l e q u a l i ti e s ; a n d th e i nterveni ng

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regions, which surround and separate these, may not be characterised by these determinable qualities at all. We can thus suggest with some plausibility that a plurality of contemporary total states of different coexisting material substances consists in the facts just mentioned. Finally, a certain region of Space may continue for some time to be characterised throughout by the same (or by continuously varying) determinate forms of the same determinables; and may continue to be surrounded by regions which are not characterised by these determinables. It is plausible to suggest that this is what we mean by saying that a certain material substance has persisted and has rested for so long in a certain place. Or, alternatively, the same (or continuously varying) forms of the same determinable qualities may successively characterise a set of regions which together make up a continuous region of Space, which is surrounded by regions that are not characterised throughout this period by these determinables. It is plausible to suggest that this is rvhat rve mean by saying that a certain material substance has persisted and has moved about during this period. No doubt every one would admit that something more than this is needed to complete the notion of persistent material substances. But it might be suggested that the " something more " is merely a causal unity between those successive events rvhich are counted as successive total states of the same material substance. This causal unity would consist in the fact that the variations in the determinate forms of these determinable qualities which characterise successive total states of a single material substance follow certain laws. (ii) There are considerable difficulties in this view, as I pointed out in Chapter I, when we remember that some material substances are homogeneous fluids and not solid particles with definite boundaries separated by regions of empty Space. But the point on which I want to insist here is a different one. Even if it be granted

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that by this means rve make the notion of particutar ma te r ial s ubs t anc e s (l i k e " th i s p e n n y " o r ' ( that el ectron ") derivative as compared rvith the notion of ma ter ial ev ent s . w e m u s t a d mi t i n tu rn th a t the noti on o f a m at er ial ev e n t i s n o t s i rn p l e a n d th a t i t i nvol ves th e not ion of s o m e th i n g w h i c h c a n o n l y be cal l ed a tt substance." For what is a material event, on this theory, but the fact that such and such a region of Space is characterised throughout by such and such determi n a t e f or m s of s u c h a n d s u c h d e te rmi n a b l e qual i ti es? And rvhat is a region
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A n anal ogous theory about m ent al event s and nr inds rvould be a peculiar case of the first form of Pure Eg
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and relations to make a similar theory about mental events and substances plausible. (i) We must of course begin by admittingthe facts which have already been described on the assumption of Absolute Space in Newton's sense; and we must then try to reinterpret them without this assumption. Probably there are several alternative ways of doing this ; but the following seems to me to be the easiest to state briefly, and to be theoretically possible. (a) I begin by distinguishing two fundamentally different, though intimately connected, kinds of determinable quality, viz., Positional and Non-Positional Bualities. There are two generally recognised determinable Positional Bualities, viz., Temporal and Spatial Position. A Non-Positional determinable quality can only be defined negatively as any determinable quality, such as colour or temperature, which is not positional like " being in such and such a place " or " being at such and such a date ". (d) A completely determinate form of any Non-Positional Buality can characterise a number of numerically diverse particular existents. Any particular existent which is characterised by some determinate form of some Non-Positional Buality will be called " an instance of that quality ". It will also be called an instance of that determinate form of this quality which characterises it. (r) Every particular existent is characterised by some determinate form of the determinable quality of Temporal Position. (d) All the instances of certain Non-Positional Bualities must also be characterised by some determinate form of the determinable quality of Spatial Position. Such NonPositional Bualities will be called " Material Bualities ". There are other Non-Positional Qualities whose instances are not necessarily characterised by any determinate form of the quality of Spatial Position. These will be called " Immaterial Qualities ". (e) The same particular existent cannot be characterised by different determinate forms of the quality of Temporal Position ;

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i.e., every particular existent is instantaneous. ("f) It a particular existent is characterised by the quality of Spatial Position it cannot be characterised by two different determinate forms of this quality ; i.e., all particular existents rvhich are instances of Material Bualities are punctiform as well as instantaneous. We (g) There can may therefore call them 'Point-Instants". be a plurality of particular existents having the same determinate quality of Temporal Position and the same determinate form of the same Non-Positional Quality. If they be instances of a Material Quality they rvill of course have to have different determinate forms of the quality of Spatial Position. (h) There can be a plurality of particular existents having the same determinate form of the quality of Spatial Position and the same determinate form of some Non-Positional Buality. They will of course have to have different determinate forms of the qual i ty of Tem por al Posit ion. ( i) The same particular existent may be characterised by determinate forms of a number of different Non-Positional we have Qualities. It is to be noted that nothing that said precludes the possibility that the same particular exi stent may be an i nstance bot h of M at er ial and of Immateri al Qual i ti es. It is t r ue t hat , if it be char acterised by a Material Quality it trtttst be also characterised by the quality of Spatial Position ; and that, if it be characterised by an Immaterial Quality, it need not be characterised by the quality of Spatial Position. But rve have not said that what is characterised by an Immaterial Quality cannotbe characterised by the quality of Spatiat Position. (7) Every particular existent is an i nstance of some N on-P os it ional Q ualit y in addit ion t o being characterised by some determinate form of the determi nabl e qual i ty of Te m por al Posit ion. So far we have considered only the instantaneous and the punctiform. We take the fundamental constituents of the material rvorld to be instantaneous punctiform particulars, each of which has a determinate quality of

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Temporal Position, a determinate quality of Spatial Po si t ion, and det e rm i n a te fo rms o f o n e o r more N onPositional Bualities. Paulo ntalbta canatxus. (a) The va ri ous det er m inat e q u a l i ti e s u n d e r th e d e te rmi nabl e of Te mpor al P os it ion fo rm a c o n ti n u o u s o n e -di mensi onal order, as, e.g., do the determinate qualities under the d e te r m inable of T e mp e ra tu re . (l t u s e d to b e assumed th a t all point - ins t a n ts fa l l i n to a s i n g l e te mp oral seri es. The facts on which the Special Theory of Relativity is based suggest that this is probably not true. They suggest that, while every point-event falls into soue series of this kind, they do not all fall into the sane series. But we need not bother about these complications for the present purpose.) (/) The various determi n a t e qualit ies u n d e r th e d e te rm i n a b l e o f S pati al Position form a continuous three-dimensional order, as, e .g ., do t he det er mi n a te q u a l i ti e s u n d e r th e d e termi nabl e o f C olour . P oint -i n s ta n ts a re th u s o rd e re d i n vari ous rvays, and stand in various ternporal, spatial and spatiote mpor al r elat ions to e a c h o th e r i n v i rtu e o f the determi n a t e qualit ies of T e mp o ra l a n d S p a ti a l P o s i ti on w hi ch characterise each point-event. (r) Now there are certain d e te r m inable qualiti e s w h i c h c a n n o t c h a ra c te ri se an i nd i vi d ual point - ins t a n t, b u t w h i c h c a n a n d d o c h aracteri se certain complex wholes composed of point-instants rel a te d t o eac h ot he r i n c e rta i n rv a y s i n v i rtu e of thei r va ri ous P os it ional Qu a l i ti e s . I rv i tl c a l l th e se rrE xtensi o n a l Q ualit ies " . (r/) T h e o n l y Ex te n s i o n a l eual i ty connected with Temporal Position and the relations w h i ch it gener at es i s D u ra ti o n . If a s e t o f p o i nt-i nstants va ry c ont inuous ly i n th e i r q u a l i ti e s o f T e mp o ral posi ti on, the whole composed of them has a certain determinate d u ra tion, r v hic h de p e n d s u p o n th e d e te rmi n a te rel ati on betrveen the determinate qualities of Temporal position w h i ch c har ac t er is e th e fi rs t a n d th e l a s t p o i n t-i nstant of th e set . ( e) T he E x te n s i o n a l Bu a l i ti e s c o n n ected rvi th th e qualit y ' of S pa ti a l Po s i ti o n a re m o re c o mpl i cated, b e ca us e t he det er m i n a te s u n d e r th e d e te rmi nabl e of

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S pati al P osi ti on form a thr ee- dim ensional or der . We have here the two interconnected determinable Extensi onal Qual i ti es of S hape and Size. Ther e is no need to go into elaborate details. If a rvhole composed of point-instants is to have shape and size the first condi ti on i s that al l the poi nt - inst ant s shall have t he sam e determi nate Temporal P osit ion. The ot her condit ion is that the determi nate qua lit ies of Spat ial Posit ion possessed by the various point-instants of the set shall vary conti nuousl y. The determ inat e shape and size possessed by thi s compl ex w hol e will t hen depend on t he det er minate relations bettveen the determinate qualities of Spatial Position which characterise the various point' instants which form the boundary of the set. We mi ght sum the matter up by saying t hat Ext ensional Qualities are emergent from the relations between different determinate forms of a determinable Positional P osi ti onal an d Ext ensional Bualit ies m ight B ual i ty. be classedtogether under the general name of " Structural f r om Qual i ti es " I and they mi g ht t hen be dist inguished each other by the names of " Pr im it ive" and " Em er gent " Structural Bualities respectively. (.f) W e must now draw som e r at her sim ilar dist incti ons among N on-structu r al Q ualit ies. We m ay divide them fi rst i nto those w hich can char act er ise individual poi nt-i nstants and thos e which cannot . The f or m er may be cal l ed " P ri mit ive " and t he lat t er " Nonpri mi ti ve " . The P ri mi tive Non- st r t t ct ur al Q ualit ies can be subdi vi ded i nto (l ) those r vhich can char act er ise only point-instants ; and (z) those which can characterise both poi nt-i nstants and ext ensional r vholes com posed of sui tabl y i nterrel ated p oint - inst ant s. These m ight be di sti ngui shed as t' N on- ext ensible " and " Ext ensible " Non-structural Qualities respectively. The Non-primiti ve N on-structurat Qua lit ies m ight be subdivided int o (r) those rvhich can characterise any extensional whole, no matter rvltat may be its determinate duration, shape, or size ; and (z) those which can characterise only

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e xtens ional whole s w h i c h h a v e a c e rta i n m i ni mum si ze, or duration, or a certain determinate shape, etc. The former might be called ,. Homogeneous " and the latter " Non-Homogeneous " Non-structural Qualities. Granted all this, we can see how the notion of a material substance can be defined. We will begin with the simplest possible case, and gradually complicate it. (a ) I m agine a s e t o f p o i n t-i n s ta n ts w h i c h ful fi l the fo l l or v ing c ondit io n s : (l ) T h e y a l l h a v e the same d e ter m inat e quali ty o f S p a ti a l P o s i ti o n . (z) Thei r determinate qualities of Temporal Position form a continuous series, so that the rvhole composed of these p o i n t - ins t ant s ha s a c e rta i n d e te rm i n a te durati on. (3) Each of them is an instance of several determinable Material Qualities, the same in each case. And each of them is an instance of the same determinate form of any given one of these Material Bualities. A whole of this kind is a material particle rvhich endures for a period, stays in one place for that period, remains unaltered in quality throughout the period, and at each moment has a plurality of different states. (/) We can now keep all the conditions as before, except that the various point-instants are to have different determi n a t e v alues of s o m e o f th e d e te rm i n a b l e Materi al Bualities which characterise them all. We norv have a ma t er ial par t ic le w h i c h e n d u re s , s ta y s i n one pl ace, and has a plurality of state.s at each instant, but changes in some respects during the period. (r) Now a l te r c ondit ion ( r ). L e t th e v a ri o u s p o i n t-i nstants of the series no longer all have the same determinate q u a l i t y of S pat ia l P o s i ti o n . In s te a d l e t the derermi n a te qualit ies of Sp a ti a l Po s i ti o n o f th e successi ve point-instants vary continuously from one to another. The whole composed of these point-instants is now a material particle rvhich endures, has at each instant a p l ur alit y of dif f e re n t s ta te s , c h a n g e s q u al i tati vel y as time goes on, and also moves about. (z/) We can now further complicate matters by considering suc-

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cessi ve sets of contel npor ar y point - inst ant s. Suppose that each set consists of point-events rvhich are exactly alike in all respects except that they have diflerent determi nate qual i ti es of Spat ial Posit ion. And suppose that these determi nate qualit ies of Spat ial Posit ion var y conti nuousl y from one point - inst ant of t he set t o anot her . 'fhen the set as a rvhole rvill have some determinate size and some determi nate shape; it r vill f or m a line, or an S u ppose now t hat ever y point area, or a vol ume. i nstant i n thi s set i s a mem ber of a ser ies of successive poi nt-i nstants of the ki nd which r ve have called a " material particle " and have described in (a) to (c). Suppose further that every set of contemporary pointi nstants, such that one point - inst ant of t he set belongs to each of these material particles, is a rvhole of the kind rvhich has Shape and Size. Then we have got a persi stent body of fi ni te spat ial dim ensions. And we coul d qui te easi l y defi ne the condit ions under r vhich we shoul d say (r) that thi s b ody r est s and keeps it s shape and size constant, or (z) that it rests and alters in shape and si ze, or (3) that i t m oves and keeps it s shape and si ze constant, or (4) that i t m oves and alt er s it s shape and si te. Lastl y (e), havi ng g ot our f init e per sist ent bodies, rvecan i ntroduce N on -pri m it ive Non- st r uct ur al Q ual i t ies ; st-rmeof them might be Homogeneous, as perhaps mass i s; others mi ght be spati a lly Het er ogeneous, i. e. r equir i ng a w hol e of a certai n nr inim r r m size t o inher e in. as is probably the case rvith electric charge ; and others rnight be temporally Heterogeneous, i.e., requiring a w l ' rol e of a certai n mi mi mum dur at ion t o inher e in, as i s probabl y the case rvi th m agnet ic pr oper t ies. I have now tried to shorv in detail horv it rvould be possible to take the notion of a material event as ftrndarnental . and to construc t t he not ion of m at er ial substances out of it, u,itltout assumirrg Absolr.rte Space in N ew ton' s sense, It i s to be not ed t hat , in anot her sense, rve have assumed both Absolut e Space and Absolut e 'l'irne. \f,/e have assumed that there are spatial and ao

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temporal positional qualities, and that spatial and temporal relations depend on them. Thus our theory of Space and Time is absolute, in the sense that it is not purely relational. But it is not absolute, in the sense that it makes the points of Space and the moments of Time to be existent substantives of a peculiar kind, as Newton's theory does. The only existent substantives which we assume are instantaneous punctiform particulars, which have determinate qualities of Spatial and Temporal Position and determinate forms of determinable Non-positional Certain sets eualities. of these form wholes which have the qualities of shape, size, and duration, in virtue of the relations between their Positional Bualities. Adopting a distinction of Mr Johnson's, we may say that we have assumed an "a d jec t iv al" an d n o t a ,,s u b s ta n ti v a l " f orm of the Absolute Theory. (ii) I can now pass to the second part of my argument. Granted that it is possible to take the notion of a material event as fundamental and to derive the notion of a material substance, without smuggling back the notion of substance under the guise of Absolute Space in Newton's sense, is it possible to do likewise with me nt al ev ent s an d me n ta l s u b s ta n c e s ? First of all, what are the relevant differences betrveen the facts in the two cases? The fundamental difference seems to be this. Meutal qualities are rvhat I have called " Immaterial" 1 i.e., although any existent particular which is an instance of a mental quality must have some determinate quality of Temporal Position, it need not (and, so far as we know, does not) have any f
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positional Buality, we know that they must have different determinate forms of the quality of Spatial It is logically possible for there to be two Position. contemporary tnental events which have the same determinate form of the same Mental Quality (e.9., it is logicatly possible that there might be two precisely similar contemporary thoughts of the same object' even if there is reason to think that this is causally improbable or impossible). Now there seem to be only two alternative ways of explaining this fact. The two precisely similar thoughts must either belong to different Pure Egos, or there must be some non-spatio - temporal Positional Quality of which they possess different determinate forms. I said that there are only two conruonllt recogttised determinable Positional Qualities, viz., Temporal and Spatial Position. We now see that, if we want to make up a theory of mental events and substances analogous to that which we have suggested for material events and substances, we must assume a third determinable Positional Mental Quality which we might call the quality of " mental event that every Position ". We must suppose deterhas a certain is an instantaneous particular which rninate Temporal Position and a certain determinate Mental Position. Two mental events may agree in every other respect, provided that they differ in Temporal Position ; and two mental events may agree in every other respect, provided they differ in Mental Position ; but they must have different determinate forms of one or other of these Positional Qualities. With this assumption it would, I think, be possible to take the notion of " a mind " as definable. A total state of mind would be an instantaneous particular existent, which (a) has a determinate quality of Temporal Position, (D) has a determinate quality of Mental Position, and (a) is an irrstance of several differenf Mental Qualities. Suppose nrlrv that there were a set of instantaneous eventsr having thc follorving characteristics. (a) They all have the

6oo

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same determinate quality of Mental Position. (b) They all dif f er in t he i r T e m p o ra l Po s i ti o n ,a n d th ei rdetermi nate qualities of Temporal Position form a continuous series, so that they form a whole rvhich has a certain determinate duration. (r) They all have the same determinable Mental Bualities. (d) They all have the same determinate form of some of these Mental Bualities. (a) Some of them have different forms of some of these Mental Bualities, but these different determinate forms of t he s am e det e rm i n a b l e M e n ta l B u a l i ty v a ry conti nuousl y from one instantaneous event of the set to another. Then the rvhole thus formed might fairly be called a ,, mind ", which endures, has a number of different mental ,, states " at each moment, changes its states as time goes on, and so on. I t will be n o ti c e d th a t th e k i n d o f enduri ng w hol e whic h I hav e ju s t b e e n d e s c ri b i n g a s a .. m i nd " i s anal ogous, not to a body, but to a material particle. And, for r eas ons r v hic h rv i l l a p p e a r i n a mo me n t, i t w i l l be better n ot t o c all t h i s v e ry s i mp l e k i n d o f mental w hol e a tt m ind " . W e tv i l l c a l l i t a (,m e n ta l p arti cl e" i nstead. I will nor v ex p l a i n w h y I m a k e th i s s u g gesti on. W e know t hai t he d e te rm i n a te q u a l i ti e s u n der the determ inable of S p a ti a l Po s i ti o n fo rm a c o n ti n uous mani f< rl d o f t hr ee dim en s i o n s , l i k e th e d e te rmi n a te qual i ti es under t he det er nr ina b l e o f C o l o u r. N o rv I s u ggest that the det er m inat e qu a l i ti e s u n d e r th e d e te rmi n abl e of l \,Iental P os it ion m ay fo rm a m a n i fo l d o f m o re th an one di mension ; and that, if this be so, we can form a conception of t he pheno me n a o f th e U n c o n s c i o us, of Mtrl ti pl e P er s onalit y , o f ' fe l e p a th y , a n d s o o n , i n terms of the pr es ent t heor y . A b o d y c o n s i s ts o f a n u m ber of materi al particles, such that any set of contemporary poin t-instan ts chosen fror.n each of these material particles forrns a w hole r v hic h h a s a c e rta i n s i z e a n d s h ape. A nd the condit ion f or th i s i s th a t th e d e te rrn i n a te qtral i ti es of Spat ial P os it io n o f th e s e p o i n t-i n s ta n ts v a r y conti nuousl y from one point -i n s ta n t o f th e s e t to a n o th er. N orn,sub-

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stitute mental particles, as defined above, for material parti cl es; and substit ut e M ent al Posit ion f or Spat ial P osi ti on. Then, i f the det er m inat e qualit ies under t he determinable of Mental Position form a manifold of more than one di men sion, a m ind m ay be analogous t o a body and may have something analogous to size and shape. ' fw o enti rel y dif f er ent m inds m ight t hen be analogous to two entirely separate bodies. Norv two bodies may come into contact at certain times, and they rnay touch each other at a point , or along a line, or over an area. S i mi l arl y, if t he det er m inat es under t he det er mi nabl e of Mental Posit ion f or m a m anif old of m or e than one di mensi on it will be possible f or t her e t o be ' r mental contact " of var ious kinds bet r veen m inds, if a mi nd be rvhat I am now suggest ing t hat it is. This mi ght be rvhat happens r vhen t elepat hic com m unicat ion takes pl ace betw een two r ninds. I will norv consider horv the facts of Multiple Persr-rnal i ty mi ght be expl ained in t er m s of such a t heor y of rni nd as I am now suggest ing. I t is not unr easonable to suppose that al l th e r nent al event s connect ed r vit h a r;ertai nl i vi ng brai n and ner vous syst em have det er r ninat e rl tral i ti es of Mental Posit ion which f all wit hin cer t ain l i nri ts or are i nterrel a t ed in som e special way. Let us suppose, e.g., that th e r elat ive m ent al posit ions of all the mental events connect ed r vit h a br ain and ner vous s),stenrat a gi ven mom ent ar e such t hat t hese m ent al cvents may be represent ed by point s on t he sur f ace of a r;ertain sphere. It rvould be reasonable to suppose that the determi nate ment al posit ions of all t he m ent al event s tl tat bel ong t< l a si n gle per sonalit y ar e int er r elat ed in srrrnt,still more special rvay. Let us supposer e.g., that the rel ati ve mental p osit ions of all t he m ent al event s tl rat bel ong to a si ngle per sonalit y at a given m om ent i rrc such that these m ent al event s m ay be r epr esent ed ltS' a conlinuots series of points forming a grrdt citde on rl re strrface of the sp her e. Nor v it m ight happen t hat tl re nrerrtal events connect ed r vit h a single br ain and

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UNITY OF MIND AND oF NATURE

nervous system at a certain moment can be divided into three sub-groups, as follows. (A) Those w-hoserepresentative points form a continuous great circle A on the sphere. (B) Those whose representative points form another continuous great circle B on the ,ph"r". (C) Those whose representative points are isolated dots on the sphere. The diagram below will make this plain. Then the great circles A and B will represent two contemporary total states of two personalities A and B connected with the same body. The points r B and t in which these two great circles intersect will represent mental events which are common to the two personalities at this moment. And the isolated dots, such as ?, will represent mental events which are connected at the moment with this brain and nervous system but do not belong to any personality. It woulcl of course be possible to represent any number of different personalities connected rvith the same body by introducing other great circles continuously filled with mental events. On this representation the relations between the personalities are symmetrical ; but it would be easy to devise a representation of the case in which A shares all B's mental events and has other mental events which are not shared by B. E.g., B might be represented by the same great circle as before ; A might norv be represented by the upper henrisphere rvhich stands upon this, supposed to be continuously occupied by mental events ; rvhilst events that belong to neither might be represented by isolated dots on the lower henrisphere. It is needless to go into further detail. The essential point to notice is that it would be difficult to deal with the facts of abnormal and supernormal psychology if we ident if ied a mi n d rv i th a s i n g l e m e n ta l parti cl e, w hi l st it is easy to deal rvith them on the following rwoassump-

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tions. (a) That the determinates under the determinable of Mental P osi ti on for m a m anif old of sever al dim ensions; and (D) that a mind consists of a number of mental particles, such that the mental positions of contemporary mental events from each particle vary continuously from one mental event to another, so that a mind has something analogous to size and shape. There is one other point to notice. It is almost certai n that the Immat er ial Non- Posit ional Q ualit ies w hi ch w e are fami l i ar wit h in t he case of m inds ar e nonhomogeneous in respect to time. By this I mean that they cannot characterise single instantaneous mental events, but only wholes which are composed of certain continuous series of mental events and have a certain mi ni mum durati on. I t hink it ver y likely t oo t hat t he I\{ental Qualities with which we are familiar can characteri se onl y w hol es which have a cer t ain m inim um of " Mental E xtensi on ". Conclusion. So far as I can see then, there is no a friori objection to the vierv that the notion of " mental event " can be taken a s f undam ent al and t hat t he not ion of t' mi nd " or tt men t al subst ance" can be der ived f r om i t. It remai ns to be seen whet her t her e ar e any special empirical facts rvhich make for or against this view. (r) I thi nk that i t rvo uld have no par t icular advant age over the Pure Ego ttreory if rve rvere confined to the psychol ogy of normal hum an m inds. But it does seem to have great advantages over the Pure Ego theory when we are concerned with the facts of abnormal and supernormal psychology ; just as the r;orresponding theory about material substances has very great advantages rvhen rve are concerned rvith abnormal physi cal f act s, such as m ir r or - im ages. I f then it be equally capable of explaining the facts of normal mental l i fe, it is on t he r vhole t o be slight ly preferred to the Pure Ego theory. (z) If one of these far:ts be the appearancc of a Centre to each total mental

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sta t e, t he pr es e n t th e o ry i s q u i te c a p a b l e of deal i ng rvith it. For it can allorv of a Central Event in every total state of mind, though it cannot allorv that the C e n t r e is a P ur e Eg o . (3 ) I th i n k th a t o ne empi ri cal fact on which supporters of the Pure Ego theory have relied is the fact of Personal Memory. Now this fact h a s t r v o s ides t o i t, v i z ., a c a u s a l a n d a n e p istemol ogi cal si d e . ( a) Caus a l l y c o n s i d e re d , i t i s j u s t a parti cul ar case of the fact that an event which has happened to a substance in the remote past may partially determine a pr es ent ev ent i n th e s a m e s u b s ta n c e , a l th ough there h a s been not hing to s h o rv fo r i t i n th e i n te rval . Thi s ki n d of c aus at i o n i s n o t p e c u l i a r to mi n ds. A nd, g ra n t ed t hat it i n v o l v e s th e p e rs i s te n c e o f somethi ng rvhich rve call a ,,trace", I have tried to show in Chapter X that it is quite easy to conceive the persi stenc e of a t r a c e a s th e h a n d i n g o n of a certai n structural or qualitative modification from one total event to the next total event in a successive series of specially interconnected total events. It does n o t inv olv e of n e c e s s i ty th e p e rs i s te n c e of a certai n su bs t ant ial c ons t i tu e n t. H e n c e th e P u re E go i s not required to account for memory on its causal side. (lr) Ep i s t em ologic ally th e p e c u l i a ri ty o f me mory i s that th e r nem or y - s it ua ti o n c l a i ms to g i v e u s n o n -i nferenti al a n d int uit iv e k no rv l e d g e o f a n e v e n t i n o ur ow n past h i stor y . Nat ur all y , m e m o ry d i ffe rs fro m a l l non-mental mnemic effects in the fact that it consists of a togttiliz,e event ; for the power to cognise is characteristic of mi n d s . B ut t his p e c u l i a ri ty b y i ts e l f d o e s n ot necessi ta te t he as s um pti o n o f a P u re Eg o , u n l e ss cogni ti on a s s uc h is im pos s i b l e w i th o u t a Pu re E g o ; and I do n o t t hink t hat t h i s h a s b e e n m a i n ta i n e d . Thus. i f Pe rs onal M em or y re q u i re s a P u re E g o , i t must do so, n o t b ec aus eit is c a u s a l l y d e p e n d e n t o n p e rs i stent traces, a n d not bec aus eit i s a fo rm o f c o g n i ti o n , but because i t cl a im s t < -be r a n o n -i n fe re n ti a l a n d i n tu i ti v e cogni ti on of an event iu otte's ozL,npast /tistot;t,. Norv there are

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trvo di sti nct poi nts to b e consider ed her e, viz. ( i) t hat I claim to have present acquaintance with a y'ast event ; and (i i ) that I cl ai m to knor v t hat t his past event was a state of ury mind. (i ) I do not see that th e hypot hesis of a Pur e Ego is rel evant to the fi rst cl ai m. This claim is t hat t her e ar e cogrri ti ve si tuati ons rvhich, as r vholes, ar e pr esent , and w hi ch contai n as thei r object ive const it uent s evet lt s * ' hi ch are past. S uppos ing t his t o be possible at all, I do not see that the hypot hesis of a Pur e Ego helps us to understand the possibilit y of such sit uat ions. I f a si tuati on can be present in spit e of t he f act t hat one of its constituents is past, it does not seem to matter rvhether the other consti tuent be a t im eless Pur e Ego or a present event. In fac t it is slight ly'easier t o under stand the posi ti on on th e lat t er hypot hesis t han on t he For, on the lat t er hypot hesis, t he sit t r at ion former. rvhi ch i s present contai ns a const it uent which is pr esent ; rvhi l st, on the former, i t cont ains no const it uent r vhich rs present. (i i ) l f P ersonal Memo r y r equir es a Pur e Ego t his cannot then be because in Per sonal M em or y I claim t o have present acquai ntanc e r vit h a past event ; it m ust be because I claim to recognise this past event as having been a state of rnysal1r- Now, on the Pure Ego theory to recognise that a past evellt was a state of myself is t osi ti on,w i th my presen t act of r em em ber ing and r vit h I other i ntermedi ate states which I can r em em ber . cannot see that there i s a ny m or e dif f icult y in supposing that rve could recognise the one kind of fact than the other I and I cannot see t hat t he power of r ecognising the second kind of fact requires the presence of a

6c,6 UNITY OF MIND AND OF NATURE numerically identical substantial constituent common to all our successive total states. Hence I do not think that the facts of memory require the hypothesis of a Pu r e E go. The upshot of the matter is that I can see no conclusive reasoning for rejecting or accepting the Pure Ego t heor y ; and th a t I th i n k th a t i r i s p e rfectl y possi bl e to state a theory of the unity of the mind which does not involve a Pure Ego. And, as the latter theory seems better adapted to deal with the facts of abnormal and supernormal psychology than the former, I am inclined slightly to prefer it.

CHAPTER XIV Status and Prospects of Mind

in Nature

Ir is now time to gather together the various threads of the earlier chapters, and to see whether we can come to any conclusions about the probable position and probable prospects of Mind in the IJniverse. It appears to me that seucnteendifferent types of metaphysical theory are possible theoretically on the relation between Mind I rvill first proceed to justify this very and Matter. startling statement, and to enumerate, ctassify, and Afterrvards I shall consider the name the theories. points weak of each, and see whether we strong and can come to any tentative decision between them. In order to underThe Seventeen Types of Theory. reader should the stand the discussion that follows and M onism in Plur alism refer back to the section on of Chapter I, where I defined the notion " Differentiati ng A ttri butes " and dist inguished t hem f r om ot her kinds of attribute. He should also refer to Chapter II, where I distinguished between those non-differentiating attributes which are " Emergent " and those which I propose here to call non-differentiating are not. :rttribtrtes which actually apply to certain things in the world, but are not emergent, " Reducible Attributes ". It will be necessary to introduce one further clistinction rvhich we have not so far made use of. Some attributes have application' i.c., there are things in the U ni verse w hi ch have t hese at t r ibut es in som e det er Other at t r ibut es have no applicat ion. nri nate form. 'l'he characteristic of being a fire-breathing serpent' or