The United States, China and Southeast Asian Security: A Changing of the Guard?

The United States, China and Southeast Asian Security A Changing of the Guard?

Wayne Bert

The United States, China and Southeast Asian Security

Also by Wayne Bert THE RELUCTANT SUPERPOWER: United States Policy in Bosnia, 1991–95

The United States, China and Southeast Asian Security A Changing of the Guard?

Wayne Bert

© Wayne Bert 2003 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2003 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 0–333–99565–1 This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Bert, Wayne, 1939– The United States, China and Southeast Asian Security: a changing of the guard?/Wayne Bert. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–333–99565–1 1. United States – Foreign relations – China. 2. China – Foreign relations – United States. 3. National security – Asia, Southeastern. I. Title. JZ1480.A57 C6 2003 355’.033059—dc21 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 12 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham and Eastbourne

2002029403

For Katrina

We understand that a rising country, especially a big country, usually can’t be fully understood in a short period of time, and may sometimes arouse suspicions and fears. Zhou Enlai The question is not whether China will become the most powerful nation on earth, but rather how long it will take her to achieve this status … the position will eventually pass to China. A. F. K. Organski The conventional wisdom that China will be the next global power is breeding paranoia outside China while fostering megalomania in China. Zbigniew Brzezinski Engagement, when successful, is the most efficient and sensible solution to the rise of a dissatisfied power … For the policy to succeed, the rising power must have only limited revisionist aims and there can be no irreconcilable conflicts of vital interests among the powers. Randall Schweller The insular and defensive character of Chinese politics and nationalism suggests that China will be reluctant and difficult to engage and to integrate in the existing international order. David Shambaugh Sooner or later, if present trends continue without change, war is probable in Asia. Arthur Waldron

Contents List of Tables and Figures Map of Southeast Asia Preface

ix x xi

Part I The Great Powers in Southeast Asia 1 Introduction

3

2 The United States: Primary Global Power

14

3 China: Challenging Regional Power

58

4 China: Historical and Contemporary Policies in Southeast Asia

107

Part II Perspectives from Southeast Asia 5 Southeast Asia: Autonomous Subregion or Penetrated Area?

143

6 The Southeast Asian Nations: Views of China and the US

175

Part III The Twenty-First Century: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers 7 Future Security in Southeast Asia: Preparing for a Changing of the Guard

213

Notes

218

Bibliography

232

Index

257

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List of Tables and Figures Map of Southeast Asia

x

Tables 2.1 GDP, population, trade and millitary spending of major countries militarily involved in Asia 2.2 Policy ‘Schools’ on US–China policy 3.1 Varieties of Chinese behavior 3.2 Trade between US and China as percent of total trade 4.1 ASEAN countries’ export–import flow to China 4.2 ASEAN countries’ trade with China as percent of total trade 4.3 Southeast Asian trade with ASEAN, Japan, EU, US and China 5.1 Population and GDP of Southeast Asian countries 5.2 Ethnic and religious composition of Southeast Asian nations 5.3 Sovereignty, legitimacy and territorial conflicts in Southeast Asia 5.4 Strong/weak states and democracy 5.5 Defense expenditures for selected countries 6.1 Orientation of Southeast Asian countries to US and China

20 41 91 105 136 137 138 144 147 149 152 164 176

Figures 3.1 China/US GDP projections (1) 3.2 China/US GDP projections (2) 3.3 Projected GNI per capita growth for China

ix

69 69 70

Map of Southeast Asia Source: Strategic Asia 2001–02: Power and Purpose. By permission of National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, 2001.

Preface One of the most important debates over the foreign relations of the United States concerns relations with China. Although temporarily eclipsed in the public arena by the events of September 11, 2001 and the resulting new priorities, at some point the contention over China’s growing strength and the best US response will likely resume in full force. Developments in China and the US approach to China may well be the most intensely debated foreign policy issue for the next 50 years if China continues to develop economically and to be perceived as presenting a challenge to the dominant US role in international relations. My hope is that this book may make a small contribution to making that debate less raucous and more rational. I focus on the interaction between the United States and China in Southeast Asia because of a long-term interest in the area, but also because it has been and will be of vital interest to the United States. The US debacle in Vietnam was a turning point in US foreign policy, and the end of the war was the beginning of a period of winding down of nationalist conflict, ideological division and great power contention that had plagued the area since countries of the subregion first began to obtain independence in the late 1940s. Today Southeast Asia as a whole is less polarized, more focused on development and less prone to largescale violence than at any time since that process began. But it is a crucial arena for Sino-US interaction, and there exists a major controversy between China and the states of Southeast Asia: the dispute over territorial jurisdiction of the islands in the South China Sea, and potentially, of the sea lanes themselves. In addition, the controversies and problems of Northeast Asia, including the large power contention there, could easily spill over into Southeast Asia. Moreover, the problems in Southeast Asia, poverty, ethnic and religious conflict, political instability and the absence of a dynamic leading power, could well contribute to a disruption of economic development and interrupt the process of creating stable, progressive and civil societies. Southeast Asia is an area for either Sino-US cooperation to solve problems, or contention that will exacerbate them. It is therefore crucial that as China’s power and interest in Southeast Asia increases, a way be found to deal with China’s challenge and to create opportunities for it to join the present order, and eventually perhaps, to dominate it. Those associated with the present dominant xi

xii

Preface

order both feel an obligation to and have an interest in mitigating and diffusing any violent challenge, and in protecting the current opportunities for economic and political development. Accordingly, this book focuses on the issues that are likely to arise from China’s challenge to the US-dominated subregion. An earlier version of Chapter 3 was presented at the International Studies Association in Los Angeles in the spring of 2000. I wish to thank the people who helped make this book possible. Steven Levine, Willard Elsbree, Bernard Cole, Clark Neher and Sheldon Simon, read all or part of earlier versions of the manuscript and provided extremely helpful feedback. I also benefitted from very helpful comments of anonymous reviewers, and from David Denny who advised on questions about quantitative data. Although this assistance improved the analysis and saved me from many an embarrassing gaffe, naturally the sole responsibility for the present version rests with me. Alison Howson, Ted Gough and Guy Edwards at Palgrave Macmillan and editor Anne Rafique helped make the entire publication process easier. My wife, Kerstin Jagerbo, in addition to showing extreme patience given the demands that completing the book made on my time, read the manuscript, provided assistance with graphs and offered moral support. WAYNE BERT Arlington, Va.

Part I The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

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1 Introduction

Speaking in 1991, a United States (US) official reflecting on how dramatically the East Asia region had changed in the 20 years since he had arrived in Washington noted that ‘In the early 1970s, the region was engulfed in war and great power confrontation, burned by millennial poverty, and challenged by aggressive communist movements. The list of our aid recipients in Asia was a long one … ’ He went on to suggest that the ‘transforming developments’ in the region – the tremendous economic progress combined with the end of the cold war, which had made the region one of the ‘engines of global growth,’ leading people to speak of a coming Pacific century – were indicative of the success of American policy in East Asia. Opinions vary on how much of the success can be attributed to US policy, but there is little disagreement on the extent of the success. Both China and the subregion of Southeast Asia have been major beneficiaries of the changes (Solomon, 1991). The major changes Richard Solomon discussed have made the topics addressed here relevant. This book has as its theme the potential for a rising China to challenge a dominant United States, with the focus on the interaction in Southeast Asia. I examine the role of the US as the global superpower in the area and the increasing power and expanding role of China as it challenges the US for dominance in Southeast (and East) Asia, and perhaps eventually for global leadership. This book is therefore about Sino-US relations at a general level, the relations of both these powers with Southeast Asian countries and the area as a whole, and especially the interaction of the US and China in Southeast Asia. The potential transition from US to Chinese dominance in East Asia is epochal and of great importance not only to Asia, but to the rest of the world, since the outcome of the contest for primacy in Asia may well determine the shape of the global power structure as well. 3

4

The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

Regions have been defined in many different ways. Criteria that combine indicators of geography, interaction and perspective seem most appropriate. A region or subregion can therefore be assumed to the degree it meets these criteria (Morgan, 1997: 26): 1. Self-consciousness of members that they constitute a region, and perceptions by others that one exists 2. Geographical propinquity of members 3. Evidence of some autonomy and distinctiveness from the global system, so that it ‘refracts’ the power of that system 4. Regular and intense interactions among members – notably interdependence 5. A high level of political, economic and cultural affinities Southeast Asia easily passes the first three criteria. Southeast Asians clearly see the area as one with a viable identity, and one they believe can become a more autonomous area. Southeast Asians continue their interest and purpose in invigorating ASEAN and expanding its importance, this being the defining organization within the area and on which Southeast Asia is in many ways dependent for its identity. However limited the progress toward developing area-wide institutions that play a decisive role in the subregion, there is widespread consensus that the progress along these lines in Southeast Asia exceeds that in all other regions of the world except for industrialized Europe. Much progress has been made in recent years at including within ASEAN all of the countries in the geographical area that has historically been known as Southeast Asia. There is little ambiguity about the boundaries of this area, extending from Myanmar in the west to the Philippines and Indonesia in the east, and including all countries south of China and Taiwan and north of Australia except Papua New Guinea, which is oriented toward Australia.1 With the admission of Vietnam to ASEAN in 1995, one of the militarily most powerful and previously most feared of potential aggressors by other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries has become a willing participant in area-wide efforts at strengthening regional ties.2 Myanmar, long arrogant and isolated from the rest of Southeast Asia, was admitted in 1997 in the interests of furthering subregional solidarity and in the hope that engagement with Myanmar would coax it toward a more legitimate model of governance and development. Laos was admitted to ASEAN in the same year. Finally, Cambodia, after a delay in admission because of the 1997 coup by Hun Sen that threatened the UN-mandated democratic model for governance in the reconstituted

Introduction

5

Cambodia, became the tenth and final member of the traditional Southeast Asian area to join ASEAN (1999). Underscoring the fluidity of the region and the problems that will continue to emerge on ASEAN’s agenda, was the birth of yet another eventual candidate for membership as East Timor gained independence from Indonesia after a United Nations (UN)-conducted referendum in August 1999 ended the military occupation under which it had existed for over 24 years. The expanded and nearly comprehensive membership of the Southeast Asian countries in ASEAN speaks to the success of the effort to make Southeast Asia a distinctive and dynamic group of countries that can manage its own affairs. On the other hand, the arguments diminishing Southeast Asia’s claim to status as a separate area include the fact that it contains only one midlevel power, Indonesia, which was badly weakened by the 1997 economic crisis. In many ways Southeast Asia is at the mercy of powers from outside the area, the identity of which is increasingly defined by Northeast Asia where major powers dominate. Scholars have pointed to the growing bifurcation of Southeast Asia between maritime and continental lines, and the increasing encroachment of China and Northeast Asia as important factors in Southeast Asia.3 The potential for absorption of Southeast Asia in broader or globally based economic groupings such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grows as economic issues become more important. On the fourth criterion, through ASEAN there are certainly regular meetings and interaction among the ten ASEAN members, but whether these encounters are intense depends on one’s perspective. Certainly they are well-established and taken seriously. The diminished prospects for consensus within ASEAN following the admission of new members with very different histories, and the difficulties and slow pace characterizing attempts to transform ASEAN and other area-wide organizations into institutions that are serious forces providing area-wide coherence and governance distract from the likelihood of an autonomous Southeast Asia.4 And as Chapter 5 shows, the fifth criterion is certainly not fully met, since Southeast Asia abounds with political, economic and cultural diversity and discrepancies. It is true, however, that with the end of the cold war a consensus on the priority of economic development has emerged which increases its potential for subregional autonomy in the future. Simultaneously, the cold war political divisions have given way to new cooperation aimed at preserving autonomy and self-governance free from outside pressures. I refer to Southeast Asia in this book as a subregion, precisely because its lack of both economic and security autonomy makes it more difficult

6

The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

to justify the use of the term region when referring to this conglomeration of countries with low and mid-level military capabilities, which with the exception of Singapore and Malaysia, and possibly Thailand, can still best be described as developing nations. But the area’s current stability and future potential justifies continuing the historical treatment of Southeast Asia as a distinct area. One can distinguish between the ‘cosmopolitan’ states of Southeast Asia and the ‘insular’ states. This distinction is useful since it summarizes two groups of states with different characteristics that are likely to display attitudes and behavior that varies according to the group to which they belong. Not surprisingly, the group of insular states corresponds with those states most recently admitted to ASEAN membership. What I refer to as the cosmopolitan states are those that have been and are regionally and globally aware and more likely to be engaged in and cooperating with their neighbors and the rest of the world. These states, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and the Philippines are characterized by the fact that: (1) they were the five states that were charter members of ASEAN and thus early on in favor of regional institution building, (2) they tend to be, by Southeast Asian standards, prosperous and stable, and (3) they enjoy a relatively free flow of culture, ideas and people over their borders which ensures a relatively cosmopolitan outlook and awareness of the outside world and their country’s role and place in it. And the cosmopolitan countries have substantially more trade with the US, the EU and Japan than do the insular countries which trade more within the region or with China or Russia (see Table 4.3).5 The Philippines and Indonesia, when measured by the criteria of stability and prosperity, are questionable candidates for this group, but when contrasted with the insular states, still fit best in the first group. These cosmopolitan states can be contrasted with the insular states, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, all latecomers to ASEAN, showing a belated and somewhat shaky commitment to subregional cooperation and Southeast Asian institutions, especially in Myanmar. All four of these states are either governed by authoritarian, somewhat insular governments or they have been in the recent past. Their domestic economies lack a free market base, and their international trade, with the possible exception of Vietnam, is only with a few countries, or of a very low volume, or both. Their cultural life also tends to be insular and isolated. They are uniformly poor, potentially unstable. This book contains several themes and assumptions which are developed in later chapters. One theme concerns the role that major outside

Introduction

7

powers will likely play in Southeast Asia. The US is the globally dominant power which also has long-standing interests in Southeast Asia and has historically dominated the subregion. The US presence in the Philippines dates back to the nineteenth century. While Southeast Asian leaders have doubts about the longevity of the American presence in Southeast Asia, there is little doubt that the US will play a vital role for at least several decades to come. The US presence had diminished, and would likely have continued to diminish, were it not for the events of September 11, 2001. Now there is renewed US activity in Southeast Asia as the efforts against terrorism are pursued, especially in the Philippines. But even before the recent events, Goh Chok Tong, Singapore’s Prime Minister, and one of the strongest advocates of a US presence in Southeast Asia, pointed to the ‘grudging acceptance that the US continues to be a stabilising factor in [Southeast Asia],’ and reminded us of the mutual benefits to both sides of continuing that relationship, even in a ‘unipolar world where US dominance is often resented.’ In the end, he says, ‘… both sides stand to lose if ties between the US and ASEAN are weakened’ (Goh, 2000). The US can influence decisively the nature of the transition from a US-dominated Asia and a world in which the US plays a dominant role, to one in which China’s role is increasingly important. The US is still clearly the dominant military player in Asia, but the changing balance of forces centering on the future of Taiwan, which can be seen as symbolic of US involvement in Asia, indicates the fluidity of the situation. The US is the only power that currently has the intention of militarily countering or tempering the rise of Chinese power. The extent to which it plays that role will undoubtedly depend heavily on developments in East and Southeast Asia, the US domestic climate and the amount of risk the US is willing to assume. A second theme of the book is that continuation of China’s economic growth and an increase in the importance of the political and military role it is likely to play in Asia is, if not inevitable, then at least highly probable, thus leading to conflict with the US. I argue there is little evidence at this time that either Japan or India will develop both the capabilities and the will to leadership that China is displaying, for either a regional or global role. It is always possible that the economic problems facing the Chinese, that is, continued privatization and the resulting unemployment, inequality of development as dynamic sectors of the economy outperform more sluggish sectors, centrifugal forces which weaken the control of the center, failure to undertake adequate political reforms, and so on, will lead to failure and stagnation or even the disintegration of China. But it seems more likely that after a century and

8

The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

a half of searching for the right combination of measures to develop and strengthen Chinese state and society, the Chinese have finally hit on a developmental solution that will allow them to become the dominant power in East Asia. China’s leadership has one asset that is often lacking in the developing world, a strong sense that the Chinese must ‘rely mainly on [their] own efforts.’ China’s cooperation with the Soviets was not an encouraging experience, and the leadership realizes that it can only carry out successful development while closely connected to the world economy. From Mao Zedong through Deng Xiaoping to the present leadership, Deng asserts, ‘the primary thing that we’ve learned from our experience … is self-reliance’ (Deng, 1984: 384). It is hard to overestimate the value of such an attitude, especially when it is supplemented by strong nationalism, as in the case of China. Like Prime Minister Mahathir in Malaysia, the Chinese have perfected the art of blaming others for their problems, but, also like Mahathir, they know that they must conform to the demands of the international system or they will fail. That the Chinese will use their economic productivity to attempt to restore some version of their historically exalted view of their place in the world seems a certainty. The only question is exactly what shape that vision will take; that it will have a major impact on Southeast Asia is certain. The rise of China and the challenge to American interests is a major problem for American foreign policy, but this study argues that the US will have opportunities to assist China in meeting some objectives while thwarting or at least discouraging others which run counter to US interests. It is one of the ironies of the Sino-US competition in Southeast Asia that these two great powers have several things in common. The most important is that both the US and China come from a tradition of imperial power giving them (they believe) the skills and credentials legitimizing their right or duty to lead and keep order in Southeast Asia. It is either the fortune or the misfortune of the Southeast Asians, depending on one’s perspective, that they are the ones to which both of these powers are offering their services. The Chinese have the advantage of location, and that they are Asian and thus more familiar to the citizens of Southeast Asia. On the other hand, the cultures of Asia are so diverse that this tie is a questionable advantage. In their competition in Southeast Asia, the Chinese have the disadvantage that Southeast Asians are not enamored of the Chinese traditions of authoritarian and imperial rule. The US, on the other hand, has the advantage of being from outside the area. Small countries feel they have less to lose if their ‘protector’ is based thousands of miles away. The US has the additional advantage of a tradition of

Introduction

9

democracy and limited government, which is reassuring to Southeast Asians. It is reassuring, but they also tire of the continuous American promotion of that tradition as a solution to Asian ills. Third, the assumption is made that Southeast Asia, despite its relative success at creating subregional organizations and institutions, is a ‘soft’ and easily penetrable area that is vulnerable to outside intervention. As former Philippine president Fidel Ramos put it: Historically, conflict and stability in East Asia have depended on the impact of foreign intervention. East Asia’s strategic location and its accessibility to Sea-Power have always made it permeable – and vulnerable – to the currents of great-power competition. East Asia has always been a tempting prize for which powerful outsiders have contended. (Ramos, 2000b) While Southeast Asians are reluctantly in favor of a continued US presence, they are more apprehensive about Chinese intervention. At many times, however, they are more willing to criticize US actions than China’s because they judge the possible adverse consequences to be greater in the latter instance than in the former. Given the intimate Southeast Asian experience with the US presence over the last four decades, the Southeast Asian view on the relative desirability of having US versus Chinese power in close proximity may be best summed up in the phrase ‘Better the devil you know than the one you don’t know.’ While progress will likely continue on strengthening what is still very inadequate subregional institutionalization, there is no prospect that the subregion will be able to solve its problems without involvement by the great powers. Indonesia is the one power in Southeast Asia with the potential to exert leadership in a way that will maximize autonomy and minimize outside intervention. But the failure of the Suharto regime to carry out political development along with the economic development during the last three decades has ensured that Indonesia’s potential for leadership will not be realized for some time to come. Its capabilities will be stretched simply to maintain its territorial integrity and a reasonably stable and representative political system in the next few years. There is little prospect that Southeast Asia will achieve the kind of subregional autonomy and self-sufficiency envisioned in the Malaysian-promoted Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), just as there was little prospect of that when ZOPFAN was proclaimed in 1971. While little attention is given in this book to explicit discussion of theoretical schools in international politics, the reader will recognize

10 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

that the discussion relies, heavily but by no means exclusively, on the assumptions of realism. Realism assumes a system of rational state actors, each country pursuing its national interest. Interests are given and more or less permanent, with survival or the expansion of a nation’s existing power base the main objective of every state. Existing in a state of anarchy, each state is dependent on its own efforts through self-help to preserve its interests and ensure its survival in a threatening environment. Constant competition with other states and latent conflict gives little credence to nations’ ability to construct liberal supranational institutions that can moderate the conflict and antagonism between nations. The Southeast Asian environment still displays state-centered foreign policy thinking among governments in the region, it is still very susceptible to great power intervention from outside, and regional and subregional institutions are weak. The success in developing ASEAN and related institutions may be changing this structure, but it is a long-term process. The development of liberal institutions is weak, and redefinitions of interests, norms and structures and the proper uses of power can have an impact only over the long term.6 Constructivists stress the importance of shared ideas in determining interests, and view interests as chosen and constructed rather than given. Interests and objectives that have been in conflict are subject to change and can be reconstructed on the basis of consensus and cooperation. Global or regional institutions can be constructed to promote cooperation rather than conflict. The constructivists are correct in criticizing realists for assuming the permanence of interests, structures and norms that can be altered and developed. But the problem for realists is that the constructivists provide no timetable. It may be true that new definitions of interests, structures, norms and identities are needed. And progress is being made to develop multilateral norms, institutions and identities in Southeast Asia. What the constructivists do not provide, however, is information on how long this will take, and what policies we should follow while these phenomena are being developed. The growing presence of China alone, with its Realpolitik bias in international affairs, ensures that we will be preoccupied with realist questions in Asia, even as progress continues on constructing the institutions of interdependence and multilateralism. Discussions of the distribution of power and the structure of the statecentered regional and subregional system will continue to be the focus for serious studies of Southeast Asia for some time to come. This is not to say that questions of economic interdependence and subregional institution building cannot simultaneously be debated and redefined. The central role played by an Asian power like Japan, so far with priorities tilted

Introduction

11

more toward economic rather than conventional security assets, is only one important illustration of the need to look beyond traditional realist categories to understand international politics in the region. Clearly, the realist approach must continue to do the heavy lifting if we are to make sense of Asia, but competing frameworks will become more important as the area continues to modernize. My approach in this volume will reflect the assumptions of other authors who found the realist framework valuable, but also draw on the insights of other approaches to develop better explanations of the dynamics of Southeast Asia and the powers involved there (Mastanduno and Kapstein, 1997: 4). Fourth, this study suggests that while the US and China are competing for power and influence in Southeast Asia, major war is not inevitable. Working out a modus vivendi between the two powers depends on the efforts made by both sides, as well as those such as the Southeast Asians who are caught in the middle. The realist pressures of great power competition are potent, but they are tempered by various factors that have become important in the modern world: the deterrence effect from the awful destruction of modern war; the relatively limited scope of the ‘reforms’ to the structure of the international system demanded by the Chinese, that is, primarily limited to specific territorial changes; the increased importance of economic development and the interdependence and peaceful world necessary for that development to take place; the focus the Chinese have put on domestic problems and their use of reform strategies to achieve successful economic growth; the democratic and compromise-oriented base of US political power; and the expanding tradition of both the US and China in discussing and negotiating a solution to their differences. On the other hand, there are pressures pushing toward a military conflict: the US tendency toward arrogance, unilateralism and lack of consultation in a unipolar world;7 strong Chinese nationalism which has become more salient since the Tiananmen events in 1989 and the temptation for the leadership to tap that nationalism and use foreign affairs to divert attention from domestic events; the Chinese impatience to resolve the Taiwan issues, and irredentist claims in the South China Sea; and the reluctance to carry out political reform in the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The goal of both US and Chinese decision makers should be to gain insights into the expected power transition that will make it less disruptive and the post-transition period more beneficial to the citizens of Southeast Asia as well as the world. The book is organized as follows. Part I analyzes the policy of the US and China and their relationship to the Southeast Asian subregion. Chapter 2

12 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

introduces a power transition theory as an organizing model for the book. The strengths and shortcomings of this theory are examined and its applicability to the US–China competition is evaluated. The theory is treated as a necessary framework for organizing and examining the specifics of a potential transition from US to Chinese dominance in Asia, not as a sufficient explanation of what is likely to occur. The chapter continues with a focus on the US as the primary global power or ‘open’ hegemon, and an important regional East Asian power. The US historical experience in Asia and various commentators’ views on the nature of US foreign policy behavior, the implications for US policy in Asia and the preservation of the unipolar system, are all examined. Finally, I discuss the crucial issues in US policy toward China and Southeast Asia, including security issues, economic issues and human rights concerns. Discussion focuses on the pros and cons of different policy approaches and recommendations are made on what a preferred US policy would look like. Chapter 3 analyzes China as a challenger to the US and the prevailing international system, its prospects as a developing society, and its chances of developing the economic and military power to become a competitor to the US. The bipolar nature of the power structure in East Asia (not to be confused with the unipolar global system), and definition of the poles occupied by the US and China is discussed, as well as the potential but improbable challenges from India and Japan. Particular attention is also given to various factors that will intensify or mitigate the competition between the two powers and increase or decrease the chances for war, including intense Chinese nationalism, a non-democratic political system, and the growing interdependence in the international system. Chapter 4 focuses on decisions and foreign policies specific to China, including its concern with Taiwan and Japan and other interests it considers vital, its current political and economic objectives and interests in Southeast Asia, the role of the overseas Chinese, and China’s attitudes toward and participation in and experience of multilateralism. Part II provides analysis of the structure of the subregion and the international orientation of the various Southeast Asian countries, especially toward the US and China. Chapter 5 focuses on the subregion of Southeast Asia. This chapter analyzes the state–society interaction in Southeast Asian countries and the factors that contribute to the stability in the subregion, opportunities for intervention in the region by outside powers and the impact on relations with China and the US. I examine the centrifugal factors that threaten the region, ethnic, religious and geographic fragmentation, as well as the extent to which institutions and cooperation have been

Introduction

13

developed to give identity to the region and allow it to cooperate on security and economic issues. Southeast Asian states are evaluated on how ‘strong’ the state is, essentially defined as the degree of congruence and strength of the connection between state and society. The assumption is made that both strong and democratic states are necessary if the subregion is to be stable and autonomous. In the short run, nondemocratic features may be tolerated and may even serve states well if they help to preserve stability, but, as Indonesia demonstrates, democratization must take place as economic development progresses, or instability will threaten. I examine the various countries’ strength and stability, and the success at building institutions such as ASEAN and ARF that can increase autonomy for the subregion. In Chapter 6, Southeast Asian attitudes toward China, generally favoring engagement, and toward the US, almost all favoring a US presence in Asia and in one form or another in the subregion, are examined. The predisposition of each major country toward contributing space or facilities toward the US military effort in Asia, and the other defense ties and commitments of the various countries are also examined. Finally, Part III summarizes the findings of the book and makes recommendations for US policy. Throughout the book, I use the name of Myanmar to refer to the country many know as Burma, and Yangon to refer to its capital. Myanmar is used consistently, even when referring to Burma before the name was adopted by the military junta. The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) is used to describe the government until 1997, when it became the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). The name Myanmar is used for convenience and to conform with the regime’s own identification of the country. The use of that name in no way implies approval of the regime.

2 The United States: Primary Global Power

The theme of a rising China is encountered with increasing frequency in the literature on China and the international system.1 China, growing economically, has a larger diplomatic presence in international relations, and, it is assumed, will gradually transform these economic capabilities into military strength that will make China a power to be reckoned with, probably one capable of challenging the US position in Asia, and eventually perhaps, even in the world. The US leadership is attempting to channel Chinese ambitions and to encourage China to conform to the status quo of the dominant system. ‘An established power,’ writes Andrew Nathan, ‘is attempting to induce a rising power to comply with preferred norms’ (Gurtov and Hwang, 1998: 311). More alarmist analysts report that China is an ‘unsatisfied and ambitious power’ whose goal is to dominate Asia, and that US and Chinese interests are bound to collide (Bernstein and Munro, 1998: 4–5).2 Others, more sympathetic to China’s view of its position in the international system, suggest that China’s posture is defensive, but that it is at the center of the Asian continent, crowded on all sides by powerful rivals and potential foes. China therefore sees danger in the new world order (Nathan and Ross, 1997: xi–xii). Whatever the approach, the increasing power of China as a challenger to the US has become a popular subject, and one of which the Chinese are certainly aware. Chinese analysts writing in People’s Daily maintain that Southeast Asians are aware that their biggest neighbor ‘is a rising regional big power’ and conclude with a less than subtle threat: ‘Participation in any alliance designed to oppose China will make them pay a high price’ (Yang and Wang, 2001). Also highlighting the growing Sino-American competition, Yan Xuetong writes that ‘In the configuration of one super power and several major powers, [the] Sino-American contradiction is most serious’ (Yan, 1999). But the pattern of challenges 14

The United States: Primary Global Power 15

to the dominant power is historical and not unique to the US–China relationship. Violent conflict accompanied the rise of numerous powers in the international system. In this chapter, I discuss the concept of a power transition, the structure of the international system, the dominant or primary role played by the United States, and US foreign policy in Southeast Asia. The next chapter discusses the other half of the dyad, concentrating on the challenging powers, especially China, and some possible outcomes of China’s increasing capability and propensity to assert its influence.

The concept of a power transition A power transition involves the transference of power from one nation or group of nations to another, and the creation of a new international order. Industrialization is the dominant force for changes in national capabilities, as new powers become powerful (defined broadly as GDP) through industrialization. The advent of the industrial revolution has fundamentally changed the dynamics of the distribution of power, since the difference between those nations successfully industrializing and those which are not leads to substantial differences in power. Since the world is industrializing at an uneven pace, some nations quickly, some slowly, a dominant power may be subject to challenge by another nation. These differentials in social, economic and political modernization among nations causes important shifts in the distribution of world power among states. These changes lead to conflict between those in positions of dominance in the international system and those who challenge the dominant nations and their prerogatives. I assume that a dominant nation (the United States) heads an international order that includes other major powers of secondary importance and some minor nations as well. The US became dominant after overtaking Britain during WWII. The British in turn had displaced France, dominant until Napoleon’s defeat in the early years of the nineteenth century. The dominant power, in a stage of power maturity, is subject to challenge by a new rapidly industrializing power in the stage of transitional growth, which may catch up with and overtake the dominant power. Just as Britain was challenged by Germany and the US, so the US was challenged by both Japan and the Soviet Union, and will likely be challenged by China. If an undivided China becomes the dominant power, however, because of its large population it is hard to imagine another nation challenging it for a long time to come.3

16 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

The greatest likelihood of war occurs when the military power of the dissatisfied challenger begins to approach that of the dominant power within the system, for the challenger will usually initiate a war to gain benefits, privileges and influence commensurate with its newly acquired military power. The key condition for war is neither the equality of capabilities per se nor the changes in those capabilities, but the interaction between these two variables (Levy, 1989: 252). The likelihood of war increases when a dissatisfied nation makes gains toward acquiring the same or greater capabilities as the dominant nation. An international order has striking similarities to a national society. It is ‘legitimized by an ideology and rooted in the power differential of the groups that compose it.’4 Peace is possible only when those with preponderant power control the system and are satisfied with the path of the system’s development. Peace is threatened whenever a nation dissatisfied with the status quo attains the capabilities to provide a challenge to the nation controlling the dominant order (Organski, 1968: 364). The likelihood of war depends, among other things, on the nature and intention of the challenging power. If the power is dissatisfied and a revisionist power, it will challenge the dominant power for leadership, likely leading to war. If on the other hand, the challenging power is content to live within the current system, the transition from challenger to dominant power may be peaceful, as was the transition from British leadership to US dominance. Some research on the power transition has found that the relationship between a power transition and war is weak to moderate. Half of the time when a power transition has occurred, war has not taken place (Vasquez, 1996: 48–9).5 But since China has historically been a dissatisfied power, and supported major revisions in the current system, its ascendancy suggests a greater chance of war.6 Historical patterns confirm that the power transition is usually more complex than the simple dyadic transfer of power suggested by some models. The transfer of systemic dominance is indeed usually accompanied by war, but often the war is precipitated not by a direct attack by the challenger on the hegemon, but because of ‘catalytic interventions’ by the hegemon on behalf of some other victim. The power transition occurs, not because a challenger directly supplants a prevailing hegemony through war, but rather because the hegemonic power is weakened and the strongest remaining power in the winning coalition becomes the new hegemon. The war often begins because one challenging state attacks another and the existing hegemon goes to the assistance of the victim. Both Great Britain and the United States became hegemons in this manner (Swaine and Tellis, 2000: 197–229).7

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The likelihood of avoiding war with China as it continues to industrialize is aided by the fact that it is recognized early on as a country with a large population that will inevitably become a powerful nation and possibly the globally dominant nation. Consequently, the US and other nations have been given a long period to adjust to this future, and given the probability of China’s increasing power, may be more willing to accept that reality and grant China its coveted place in the system without going to war. A rapid increase in the power of the challenger, however, may create overconfidence and contribute to a willingness on the challenger’s part to start a war which they cannot win. Japan and Germany followed that pattern when they initiated war before they had the power to win a war against the dominant powers. Organski argues that war is therefore most likely prior to the time that challengers are equal in capabilities with the dominant power, rather than when they are equal or even more powerful than the dominant country. Others disagree, pointing out that the most likely point for initiation of war by the challenger is after it reaches the power level of the dominant power. Why would the challenger not wait until its increasing power gives it a decisive advantage over the dominant power? One answer is that a power that feels trapped or strangled, as Japan did after the imposition of an oil embargo by the US in 1941, may consequently strike out in a mood of desperation. Left unanswered as well, is why the challenged power would not initiate preventive war to protect its position from the challenger threatening to replace it as the ruling power while that opportunity is still available. While there have been occasional cases of established powers waging preventive war against rising challengers, in the modern era there is not a single convincing case of such an occurrence (Levy, 1989: 253).8 It is highly unlikely that the US would make a preventive strike against China. It is difficult to justify such a strike in a democracy and democracies are less likely to make preventive strikes against other great powers. In addition, US behavior toward other members of the international system (discussed below) was relatively restrained after World War II. Moreover, when the Soviet Union was America’s enemy, locked in a struggle in a bipolar structure, the US refrained from a preventive strike even when it had a monopoly of nuclear weapons. The controversial US national security strategy recently released by the White House limits preemptive strikes to ‘rogue’ states making weapons of mass destruction the ‘weapon of choice’, and explicitly supports development of a ‘strong’ China (US White House, 2002:15, 27–8). One Chinese analyst is not so sanguine, however, and ‘warns about the dangerous decade from 2020 to 2030, when the US leadership will finally

18 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

realize that China’s power is about to surpass America’s … the hegemon will form a coalition to strangle to death … a rising power when he fears he is to be replaced.’ On the other hand, the Chinese find it hard to appreciate the Western insight that miscalculation, misunderstanding and misperception are leading causes of war. They focus on economic factors, and see ‘scrambling for resources’ as the ‘most fundamental cause triggering war’ (Pillsbury, 2000: xxxix, xxxii–xxxiii). It would be well for Western statesmen to remember that in times of crisis. Another question that is relevant to a pending power transition from the US to China is the probable effect of nuclear weapons, something that was only an indirect factor in the Britain–US power transition since there was no question of the US using those weapons against Britain. China currently has a minuscule nuclear arsenal compared to the US, but its approximately 20 ICBMs capable of reaching the United States presumably give it a second strike capability. Will this situation have a unique restraining effect on the relationship as China’s power grows? Since both China and the US have nuclear weapons capable of providing a second strike capability against the other, some theorists assume that in the event of a Chinese probe against Taiwan or adventurism in the South China Sea, for instance, nuclear weapons will diminish the likelihood of war between the two powers in the future, since once a ‘risk-laden military engagement becomes a serious possibility,’ both powers would be subject to pressures to find negotiated settlements, just as Washington and Moscow were during the cold war. Others point out that nuclear weapons have not revolutionized international politics by making nuclear war impossible, and that if a sufficiently dissatisfied power acquires a nuclear arsenal it considers sufficient to accomplish its goals, then it may be willing to risk using them (Goldstein, 1997: 70–1; Brody, 1973).9 This latter logic would appear unlikely to apply to China, since it has long experience in exercising restraint with nuclear weapons, and its emphasis on the priority of economic development ensures it has far too much to lose from a nuclear exchange to contemplate recklessness in the use of nuclear weapons. Obviously, factors other than the relative power of the countries are important in determining the likelihood of war. Domestic factors, choice of leadership, and bureaucratic infighting all affect foreign policy. This chapter portrays the US as a ‘benign hegemon’ that has historically emphasized flexibility and cooperation in dealing with its allies, since there is a causal link between domestic political arrangements in the US and the way it views the world and formulates foreign policy. If the US takes a similar stance toward China, the chances of war can be decreased. A flexible stance on the part of the dominant power and a tradition of friendship with the challenger are both a deterrent to the eventual

The United States: Primary Global Power 19

outbreak of war. The way in which the system evolves in China will also affect foreign policy. Long-term liberalization should eventually result in a less assertive foreign policy, although this may not be true in the short run. Intense nationalism may be decisive in determining China’s policy toward the US, just as interdependence, also discussed below, may have a dampening effect on the chances of war. Some analysts believe that modern states are moving into an age in which war and the traditional state aspirations to acquire land will no longer motivate economically developed states. This phenomenon merits discussion as one factor that may suggest the possibility of a peaceful transition. Finally, one must differentiate clearly between regional power transitions and global transition. Some have suggested that the nature of technological development is such that countries like China will never catch up with the US in military technology. In any case it is much easier to envision China becoming the dominant power in Asia than to envision it as the dominant global power. It follows that this may also reduce the possibility of war since the US would be more likely to live with the loss of dominance in Asia than with the loss of its role on a global level. The most difficult task for US policy makers may be accurately determining what China’s motives and intentions are in order to formulate policy that is an appropriate response. Certainly the absence of ideological conflict and sharply etched differences in world views between the two countries, in contrast to the US relationship with the Soviet Union, will help to decrease the intensity of conflict (Tammen, 2000: 146). Finally, I am not suggesting here that preserving the status quo in the international system indefinitely is the best guarantee of peace and that erosion of American predominance should be resisted indefinitely. On the contrary, my argument recognizes the inevitability of power transitions and suggests ways that the US can prepare for China’s probable challenge. The US should be interested in postponing the changing of the guard, in softening the severity of any clash, and in using diplomacy and co-optation to prevent war if possible, but this is not preservation of the status quo (Goldstein, 1988: 120). One of the measures of US statesmanship will be knowing when the time has come to concede the leadership role to China if Chinese power continues to develop.

The United States as the primary power The real international order, created under US leadership after World War II and dominated by the US ever since, is the commitment to the open world economy, multilateral management of the Western political– economic order, and the stabilization of economic welfare. That system was put in place before the cold war and remains in place even after the

20 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

cold war; it is the core of world order. G. John Ikenberry takes issue with former Secretary of State James A. Baker III’s observation that ‘In three and a half years [from the late 1980s to the early 1990s] … the very nature of the international system as we know it was transformed’ (Ikenberry, 1996: 79–80).10 This post-World War II liberal democratic order was designed to solve the problems of Western industrial capitalism, a strategy to build Western solidarity through economic openness and creation of a predictable and institutionalized system. American thinkers in the 1930s and 1940s realized that the US needed secure markets and supplies of raw materials in Europe and Asia. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill forged agreement on the outlines of the system and the post-war Bretton Woods agreement was the first concrete economic institution to emerge. The importance and persistence of this system is evidenced by the intensity with which the Chinese have pursued membership in the order’s newest manifestation, the World Trade Organization (WTO), created in 1995 as the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). From Latin America to Europe and Asia, those countries that wish to be part of the modern industrialized world and the emerging global order must be integrated into it. Countries remaining outside the system are sharply disadvantaged in their economic well being. By far the largest economy in the system is the US (Table 2.1), which has a disproportionate influence even in the multilateral institutions that are part of the system, as

Table 2.1 GDP, population, trade and military spending of major countries militarily involved in Asia Country

USA China Japan India Russia Indonesia

GDP GNI per Population Foreign Defense Defense $ billions capita millions trade expenditures expenditures 2000 (ppp) average 2000 turnover $ billions % of GDP annual $ billions 2000 2000 real 2000 growth % 1990–9 9645.9 5023.2 3317.8 2443.2 1222.0 642.0

2.0 9.5 1.1 4.1 (5.9) 3.0

281.6 1262.5 126.9 1015.9 145.6 210.4

2010.2 474.3 854.5 94.0 136.9 95.6

294.7 41.2 44.4 14.5 58.8 1.5

Source: World Bank, 2001a; World Bank, 2001b; IMF, 2001; IISS, 2001a.

3.0 3.0 1.0 3.1 5.0 1.0

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well as trade turnover and military spending far in excess of the second largest economy, China (using purchasing power parity (ppp) figures). The present economic system basically resembles the original postwar system, although substantial changes occurred in 1971–3 when the world went off the gold-exchange standard and currency values were allowed to float. It was argued in the late 1980s and early 1990s by a group that came to be known as the ‘declinists’ that the US was in decline and an earlier era of alleged American hegemony was over. The answer to this assertion, made by the ‘revivalists,’ took various forms. I argue here not only that the US never really lost its position of leadership in the world, but that it never exercised the hegemony that many on the other side of the argument attributed to the US, especially in the military realm. While the US could change the rules of the game to suit its needs, indicating its considerable influence, the main change from pre-1971 times was that it no longer had the resources to behave as generously as it had in the immediate post-war period. The validity of Joseph Nye’s argument (writing in 1990) that the qualitative nature of American leadership in the international system had not changed has been borne out by the strength of the American economy in the last decade and the commonly accepted continuation, indeed strengthening, of America’s dominant position in both the economic and military spheres of a unimultipolar world.11 It is widely accepted that the US is the primary power in a unipolar system.12 The vast advantage in GDP enjoyed by the US is matched by its military advantage. But designating the system as unipolar oversimplifies. More exactly the US has moved from a brief unipolar moment at the end of the cold war into a uni-multipolar configuration, where on one level the US has preeminence in every domain of power. On a second level, however, are major regional powers, which are the influential if not dominant powers in their specific areas of the world. In this relationship between the superpower and the major regional powers, the superpower would prefer a unipolar world, and the regional powers would prefer a multipolar world, but each makes the compromises it must make given the current configuration of power (Huntington, 1998; Nye, 1999: 24). Exactly how dominant the US is and whether it is desirable to maintain that position is controversial. The US is a unipolar power, a ‘superpower capable of conducting or organizing politico-military action anywhere in the world system,’ but it is a unipolarity without hegemony. Hegemony is present in a system when there is a unipolar structure of influence to match the unipolar structure of capabilities (Wilkinson, 1999: 142–3).13 Surveying 11 relationships that connote hegemony, Wilkinson concludes

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that almost all the evidence that might show the existence of US hegemony is found in America’s relationship with small and middle powers – the great powers are less malleable. Furthermore, it appears that ‘those who complain most [about hegemony], comply least,’ thus undermining their own case (Wilkinson, 1999: 143–5).14 Attempting to explain what he calls US open hegemony, Ikenberry notes that the system the US led the way in creating after World War II has fared well because the connecting and restraining aspects of democracy and institutions reduce the incentives for Western nations to engage in strategic rivalry or balance against US hegemony. Neorealism, stressing the constant preoccupation of nations with increasing power and balance against dominant nations cannot explain this state of affairs. The strength of this order is attested to by the longevity of its institutions, alliances and arrangements, based on their legitimacy in the eyes of the participants. Reacting against the closed autarchic regions that had contributed to the world depression and split the globe into competing blocs before the war, the US led the way in constructing a post-war order that was based on (1) economic openness, (2) joint management of the Western political–economic order – a natural extension of the policies being tried in individual Western industrial societies, and (3) rules and institutions that were organized to support domestic economic stability and social security.15 This order in turn was built around a basic bargain: the hegemonic state obtains commitments from secondary states to participate in the international order, and the hegemon in return places limits on the exercise of its power. Weak states accept the bargain because otherwise they would bargain without an institutional agreement, and would be forced to bargain solely on the basis of their (weaker) capabilities, and they also hope to buy some protection against the threat of domination or abandonment. The strong state does better to accept the bargain because it wants to lock in the momentary advantage and reduce enforcement costs. It is these restraints on both sides and the willingness to participate in this mutual accord that explains the longevity of the system, even after the end of the cold war, an event which realists expected to end the cooperation and close ties among the Western nations and Japan (Ikenberry, 1998–9). And this legitimate international order can be expected to persist, since it still attracts adherents (including China) and although there are potential challengers, there is no competing world order for the challengers to promote as their alternative contribution to the economic well-being and structure of the international order. But as the founder and defender of this international

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order, the US, far from being a domineering hegemon, was a reluctant superpower. A top Singapore official attests to the attraction of the system when he asserts that ‘the current geopolitical order [in East Asia] should be frozen in place … no better order can be achieved … the present order serves everyone well’ (Mahbubani, 1997). There is no effective movement to change the basic system, nor a blueprint of how it could be changed. If the above is an accurate description of the US approach to the world, it suggests that the prospect of a transition from the US to China has a better than expected chance of avoiding war if the US is willing to build a relationship on the basis of restraint, flexibility and cooperation. A power transition may not result in war if the dominant power is flexible, willing to accommodate the challenging power, and makes early preparations for the transition. There seems no compelling reason why the Chinese cannot be accommodated in the US-dominated system, just as the Europeans were. Eventually, of course, the dominant role is likely to shift from the US to China. The US is often accused of devaluing historical knowledge (Hunt, 1987: xi; Hoffmann, 1968), but the argument here illustrates that the US has drawn on its values and historical experience with democracy, openness, institutions and free trade to lead in constructing a world order that reflects that experience, a use of the domestic historical experience that has served the longevity of the post-war economic order well. The West has created a political order manifesting patterns that lie between traditional images of international and domestic politics, in essence a distinctive subsystem in world politics (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1999: 128). Does the history of the US experience in Europe over the last half-century hold lessons for the probable future in East Asia? US behavior in the non-Western world suggests that the US does not always behave with so much sensitivity and restraint. The brutal acquisition of the Philippines in 1898 was from another era, but during the cold war the US supported the overthrow of numerous regimes that appeared pro-communist or anti-capitalist but were basically democratic, for example, Iran – 1953, Guatemala – 1954, the Dominican Republic – 1964, and Chile – 1968 and ruthlessly pursued the war in Vietnam and Cambodia, resulting in a total of three million deaths with limited accomplishments to show for it. The pressures to use all means to prevent Soviet gains during the cold war can explain but not absolve the US of using ruthless means against countries with which it was not comfortable. Post-cold war military actions have been more defensible since democratic and human rights values have usually been supported, for example, in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, but the imperial flavor of these actions has upset other nations,

24 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

including China. Certainly China is different from the small countries with which the US warred during the cold war – it is stronger and has much economic potential, but there are also many aspects of its political culture that Washington leaders find irritating, most notably its stance on Taiwan. The new burst of activist foreign policy under President George W. Bush following the terrorist attacks in New York ironically has confronted the Chinese, normally hypersensitive about being ‘encircled,’ with a substantial US presence in Central Asia which the Chinese for the moment seem to accept. The new US concern complements their own obsession with terrorism and opposition, especially within China (AFP, 2001; He, 2001). But there are parallels between the US post-World War II experience in Europe and the coming experience with China. The foremost is that just as economic issues have been important in Europe, so will they be in East Asia. Those nations that become players in the Southeast Asian subregion will be economic powers first and military powers second. The prerequisite to national security for all countries will be thriving economies that allow political institutions to develop and efforts to be expended on some combination of subregional arrangements and national defense that contribute to stability in the area. The US is more likely to show restraint with those nations such as China that take economics seriously and give it priority, just as such countries will be more likely to deal reasonably with the US. Second, a US military presence is conducive to the kind of developments that need to take place in Southeast Asia to encourage continued stability and continued economic development. While the threat of an assertive China or a rearmed Japan is a more subtle and more diffuse threat than was the Soviet presence, it is still of great concern to Southeast Asians. Hence the value of the US presence. For these reasons, the US style of leadership, ‘open hegemony’ or leadership based on cooperative bargaining, is likely to be continued. Granted, the perception is often different in Southeast Asia, and while many have raised questions about America’s ability to exercise the requisite restraint in a uni-multipolar system, the American historical experience is not something that is easily shed. The projection of US domestic values, while irritating when presented to others as a model for them, also marks the US presence, aside from being geographically distant, as an experience that is quite different from that of dealing with Russia or China. This difference is one reason for the current Southeast Asian receptivity to the American presence.16 Michael Hunt’s charge that the ideological nature of American policy has been a liability, is turned on its head. Emphasizing the more admirable ideological themes of consultation and openness, ideological

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influence in American policy can be seen as an asset when it influences the creation of the post-war alliance and economic system, while Hunt’s emphasis on racism, ethnocentrism and abhorrence of revolution and spheres of influence can be shown to lead to less laudable results, such as the massive involvement in the war in Vietnam (Hunt, 1987: chapter 6). Likewise, Robert Dallek’s assertion that it is the US ‘impulse to invest foreign issues with domestic meanings or to make external actions symbolic extensions of internal concerns’ may well have been true, when the post-war system was formed in the early years of the cold war, but that domestic–foreign connection, a ‘craving for a unified America leading a harmonious world’ as Dallek would have it, fit the requirements for and contributed to a stable order in the industrialized world. Certainly, the Marshall Plan and the whole effort to bolster democracy in Europe and Japan, drew heavily on American domestic experience and ideology to preserve and build cooperative alliance and market institutions, and fit well with what was required to preserve a strong and unified West in the face of potential Soviet expansion and mischief making after 1945 (Dallek, 1983: chapter 6).17 US foreign policy has been liberal, with a strong realpolitik foundation, resulting in a world-wide US-sponsored international economic system, assisted by the military strength of the US and its allies. That until September 11, 2001 the US was still searching for a template for future policy, over a decade after the close of the cold war, indicates not a lack of available models, but a surfeit of them. One analyst has presented eight ‘recurrent patterns’ or clusters of values and behavior that appear and reappear over the decades.18 Historically, US foreign policy oscillated between displaying assertiveness or passivity, between defending spheres of influence or promoting universal values (including ‘Christian’ and democratic values), and between responding to domestic pressures or the pressures from the international system. US policy will continue to display just such an untidy mix.

US objectives and policies in East and Southeast Asia America’s initial involvement in mainland East Asia was halting and limited, a minor role in the Western trade along the Chinese coast. But even in the 19th century, one can see the outlines of a principle that was to become a mainstay of US objectives in Asia, that the US would not permit dominance of Asia by a single nation. As Bernard Gordon puts it: ‘Opposition to any single-nation dominance had been the guiding principle for American policy in East Asia since Teddy Roosevelt’s time’

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(Gordon, 1990: 5–8; Gordon, 1969). The US sponsorship of the ‘open door’ policy in China was based on the idea that all Europeans should have equal access to China, in essence equal opportunity in the exploitation of China. The US did not have the military power to enforce its principle, but was still able to use it to gain a place in China. The US involvement with the Philippines and Southeast Asia began in 1898 during the Spanish–American war. After defeating the Philippines in a bloody and atrocity-littered battle, the US acquired its only major foreign possession, where it ruled another people which had little hope of becoming citizens of the mother country. As early as 1916, however, the Philippines was promised independence. The US commitment to preventing domination of East Asia by an antagonistic nation was illustrated in its opposition to Japanese forays into China and Southeast Asia in the 1930s and 1940s. Following World War II, the US opposed the return of the colonial powers to East Asia, much to the chagrin of its European friends (Hess, 1987; Fall, 1972; Van Der Post, 1996). With the outbreak of the Korean War (1950–3), the US once again intervened on the assumption that the North Koreans were backed by the Soviet Union and the Chinese and that gains on the Korean peninsula by the communist bloc would threaten the rest of East Asia. This same assumption, alas, was carried into the conflict in Vietnam (1961–73) although by this time the fissures between the Chinese, the Soviets and the North Vietnamese were obvious to all who cared to look for them. Having never clarified the strategic rationale for the war, having misjudged the nature of the war and being perplexed by what was required to win, the US squandered its support at home and the resulting defeat is still felt in US attitudes and behavior in East Asia. The resulting Nixon doctrine, which advocated allowing the South Vietnamese to fight the war with US support, symbolized the new US reluctance to be drawn into limited conflicts around the world, but especially in East Asia. Nixon and Kissinger restored the US focus on power, initiating an opening to China sacrificing the idealistic US objectives in Vietnam. But even the exit was at great cost in human lives as the Vietnam war was prolonged in an attempt to save US prestige. Under Jimmy Carter’s presidency, especially, US interest in promoting democracy and human rights assumed new importance, at least partially resurrecting the more idealistic Wilsonian branch of American diplomacy. President Reagan continued that tradition. While US interests continued to be more carefully defined, a more activist stance was taken against small countries deemed hostile to the US and friendly to the Soviets in an effort to overthrow unfriendly governments, provided

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it could be done at low cost. The countries most affected by these policies were outside of East Asia. As the cold war ended and a settlement in Cambodia was negotiated, Southeast Asia ceased to be characterized by ideological and security issues and economic issues came to the fore. Interdependence became more important than alliances and the US role as the economic engine of the world became at least as important as being a military superpower. Much effort has been expended in defining the nature of American foreign policy over the years, especially on the debate over whether it is realist, traced by some to the legacy of Theodore Roosevelt, or idealistic (Wilsonian). US policy almost always embodies a complicated mixture of the elements of both. A foremost proponent of the realist approach, Henry Kissinger suggests that ‘For three generations, critics have savaged Wilson’s analysis and conclusions; and yet, in all this time, Wilson’s principles have remained the bedrock of American foreign-policy thinking.’ Kissinger is right that liberal idealism is an inextricable part of American culture, world view, and foreign policy (Kissinger, 1994: 52). As we have seen, the post-war system, constructed with US leadership, reflects the liberal domestic values of cooperative behavior and restraint of American power vis-à-vis its allies. Nonetheless, in East Asia, the historical realist objective of preventing dominance of the region by a single power remained the key objective of US policy. The test of a policy is not the elusive abstractions describing the policy, but the specific results the policy produces. Augmented realism, or ‘realism plus’ are the catch phrases that best define what American policy mostly has been and usually will be. This is a policy that first concerns itself with the larger powers in the international system and the immediate problems of US security, but extends US influence beyond those issues to foster economic cooperation, multilateral institution building, and humanitarian concerns, including human rights (Haas, 1995; Nye, 1992).19 Any successful policy must encompass all of these aspects.

US commitment to Asia The foreign policy debate in the United States is between those who believe that America should exercise its influence by perfecting its domestic institutions and serving as an example for the rest of the world, the ‘exemplarists,’ and others who argue that since ‘evil goes armed … so must good,’ and favor a more direct approach to defending US interests and attacking the world’s injustices. One historian concluded that ‘Americans are profoundly and … incurably ambivalent regarding their

28 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

international obligations.’ After 200 years of debate, neither side has yet won the argument over what particular blend of force and diplomacy should prevail in a given foreign policy decision. The question continues to vex both citizens and policy makers (Brands, 1998: 49). It is this ambivalence on the part of both policy makers and public, especially in the post-cold war period, that creates anxiety in Southeast Asians about the consistency and longevity of the American presence in their subregion. In a reevaluation of American interests and commitments in the early 1990s, the decision was made to cut the number of troops in Asia to 100,000 to reflect the new situation after the end of the cold war, but the basic military commitment to East Asia remained. There is much disagreement and ambiguity over both whether the US will continue to have the capabilities and the will to play a dominant role in the world, and whether it should continue to play such a role. In 1990, when the Department of Defense under President George H. W. Bush announced the East Asian Security Initiative (EASI) to modestly and gradually reduce US forces in the region, the reduced troop presence was to be compensated for by ‘regional access, mutual training arrangements, periodic ship visits, intelligence exchanges, and professional military educational programs rather than permanently stationed forces.’ While there was no doubt that the end of the cold war meant a smaller US presence in East Asia, the sensitivity of the issue was obvious when Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Peter Tarnoff was rebuked by the Clinton administration in 1993 for remarks that the US, with limited means, must limit its objectives. While his pronouncements conflicted with administration rhetoric, they were generally in line with administration deeds (Emmerson, 1996b). Notwithstanding the cutbacks, however, the Bush administration recognized the existence of a broad consensus in East Asia that a continuing US security presence is an essential ingredient of regional stability … given the increasingly multi-polar balance of power in Asia, a diminution in the US security commitment to the region would likely create uncertainty and ‘empty spaces’ that other major powers would be tempted or compelled to fill. The fact is that no power other than the United States is now able or welcome to play the role of regional balancer. (Solomon, 1990) Prior to the events of September 11, 2001, a range of opinion existed, on the likelihood of the United States remaining the primary military and economic power in the world (whether a unipolar structure will persist),

The United States: Primary Global Power 29

and whether it is desirable if it does so remain. Some argued that it is inevitable that other powers will rise to challenge the US position, that they will balance against the US and eventually equal or exceed its capabilities. The realists believe that following the patterns of the last three hundred years, great powers will continue to rise and fall. The US position is temporary, and will inevitably be successfully challenged (Waltz, 1993; Layne, 1993; Posen and Ross, 1997). Interestingly, this school has much in common with the Chinese belief in the inevitability of multipolarity. A second school of analysts argues that the cold war is over and while the US still seeks peace and prosperity, now this preferred state is best obtained by restraining America’s great power. Rather than ‘lead a new crusade,’ America should turn its attention to addressing imperfections in its own society. The military should be structured to defend against one major regional contingency, not two as had been the case;20 the US should give up its alliances and encourage its allies to take the initiative in protecting themselves (Gholz, Press and Sapolsky, 1997).21 Another group of commentators occupied a more middle point on a spectrum ranging from advocacy of continued full commitments to other regions of the international system to predicting or desiring major cutbacks in the US commitment. The US can and should (1) coordinate economic and security policies so that economic conflict does not erode security relationships, (2) maintain support at home for the chosen policies of engagement and reassurance, and (3) guard against dictatorial or domineering policies reflecting an arrogance of power. In order to remain a primary power, the US must refrain from acting like one (Mastanduno, 1997; Art, 1991 and 1998–9; Jervis, 1993; Nye, 1992; and Haas, 1995). Finally, one school believed that a position of primacy can easily be maintained. No country in history has ever held such overwhelming power across so many dimensions. The American century has ‘just begun’ (Kapstein, 1999; Huntington, 1993).22 Coral Bell is prepared to argue that American primacy will last at least another four decades. America’s allies, Europe and Japan, loyally support the head of the alliance they belong to because they would lose too much if they ventured out on their own. China is decades away from being militarily competitive, and there are few nations willing to augment its strength by forming an alliance with it. In this view, a US-dominated globe is more likely to be peaceful than is a bipolar or multipolar world, and can best be maintained if American actions are legitimized by the world community through the proper regional or UN resolutions (Bell, 1999). The events of September 11, 2001 have altered both the likelihood of implementing these views and, probably, the arguments of the proponents.

30 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

The definitive nature of the catastrophic attacks on the US were such that a new period in US foreign policy may well be beginning, with as of now only a dimly perceived outline. There is little doubt that the case for a strong international presence has been strengthened, since both elite and public opinion will favor an enhanced US presence abroad to find and destroy the individuals engaged in international terrorism and the sources of its support. The Bush administration has moved quickly to emphasize the importance it attaches to the anti-terrorist fight and the active role it will take. But the degree to which the fight against terrorism will dominate the previously more important Asian concerns remains to be seen, and it is still unclear what the balance will be between the high priority given to anti-terrorist policies and what now appear to form the second tier of priority, the regional issues and relations which are the subject of this discussion. A formal US objective of maintaining military defenses ‘beyond challenge’ to ‘dissuade future military competition’ indicates the changing perspective (US White House, 2002: 29).23 Prior to September 11 events, public opinion polls continued to show generally strong support for an assertive foreign policy, although much depends on how the question is asked and what issues are involved. To the questions of whether the US should play an active role in world affairs, a majority ranging from 54 percent to 66 percent has remained remarkably stable since 1974, while elites consistently answer yes in the high 90 percent range. But the American public also believed that we are now playing a more prominent role in the world than we did during the cold war, and it believed overwhelmingly that the US role in settling international disputes and promoting democracy should be reduced. The number of Americans who believed that the US should ‘go its own way’ had risen gradually from 19 percent in 1964 to 34 percent in 1995, while at the same time there was a strong majority that favored the US contributing military troops to enforce peace plans in trouble spots around the world when asked by the UN (Morris, 1998; Rielly, 1999; Kissinger, 2001: 10). In 1998, majorities of both leaders and the public saw China as a critical threat, and 74 percent of the public and 95 percent of the leaders saw a US vital interest in China. At the same time, the public appeared to believe that Europe was more important to the US than was Asia (Rielly, 1999: 30 and chapter 5; Gallup, 1999: 80, 180). Much of the criticism of the US role in the world is as much about style and manner as about specific instances of involvement or intervention. Ronald Steel, deploring the ‘internationalist temptation,’ concludes an article by saying that the US ‘must stop assuming that we must either run the world or submit meekly to it.’ Leaving aside the question

The United States: Primary Global Power 31

of whether the US is now running the world, a formulation many would quarrel with, there are no concrete examples of what the author proposes specifically, or what decisions he would have made differently. Samuel Huntington, in an intriguing article that probably exaggerates the historical trends toward fragmentation and diversity in the way American foreign policy is made, calls for a policy of ‘restraint and reconstitution’ aimed at limiting the diversion of American resources to the service of particularistic interests, and for the devotion of energies to ‘designing plans for lowering American involvement in the world in ways that will safeguard possible future national interests.’ But there is precious little guidance on where American involvement should be lowered and what those future interests will be. William Pfaff, arguing that the US is overcommitted in East Asia and deploring their continued commitment to a permanent American military presence in East Asia, argues that the US has friendly relations with China. But he ignores the concern of almost every East Asian country with the potential of a rearmed Japan, absent an American role in the area, not to mention the strong desire that most analysts see among Southeast Asians for an American presence. Recently, remarks made by North Korea’s Kim Jong-Il suggested they were also receptive to a US presence (Steel, 1998; Huntington, 1997). Arrogance, arbitrariness and megalomania too often characterize US behavior. The US is the ‘bully of the free world,’ a nation whose citizens find little in their newspapers about the rest of the world, who pay little attention to the world in their election campaigns. Such a nation should have leaders who more carefully consult with their own people and people around the world before presuming to tell everybody else what their priorities should be and what they should do. In short, the US has become a ‘rogue superpower’ (Wills, 1999; Huntington, 1999). The US also alienates other countries by its insistence on going it alone and refraining from participation in many international regimes. Actions such as failure to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, to accede to the Convention on the Law of the Sea, to sign the prohibition on land mines or the Kyoto accord on global warming, and most recently the declaration of intent to conduct missile tests on an anti-ballistic missile system which will violate the provisions of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, alienate many nations. Other areas where the US has been out of step with most of the rest of the world include UN dues, sanctions against Cuba, Iran, Iraq and Libya, withdrawal from participation in an international war crimes court, the Middle East, the use of force against Iraq and Yugoslavia, and the targeting of 35 countries with new economic sanctions between 1993 and 1996. We claim to aspire to lead the international

32 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

community, but we seem to have very different values from most of the countries in that community (Huntington, 1999: 41). US domestic policies such as capital punishment, tolerance of guns and pornography, wasteful consumption and life styles also alienate many countries. Many Southeast Asians condemn the US for many of these policies, even while preferring a continued US presence in their area. Historically troubled, East Asia may now be seen as a relatively troublefree area. Compared to Europe, East Asia is poorly integrated, lacking regional institutions to deal with conflict and linkages between states, still burdened with intense nationalism and leaders defending sovereign prerogatives, and still lacking in democratic institutions and a reliance on a free market (Friedberg, 1993–4). The trouble spots of Taiwan and the Korean peninsula continue to threaten stability and even major war. Still, these problems so far have been kept under control, and the prospects for a settlement in Korea have slightly improved. When compared to the Middle East, with its intense and ongoing conflict, both between states in the region and between Middle Eastern countries and the United States, East Asia appears stable. Compared with Africa, East Asia has been successful at development. Most countries are committed to development, it has more stable governments, and lacks chaotic areas such as the Congo. The Vietnam involvement aside, none of the recent American military interventions have been in East Asia, but rather in Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. East Asia is a relatively tractable area where a US presence can be decisive in maintaining stability and providing an environment for economic growth, with the US role as a balancer ensuring restraint by all powers. To the extent the public shares this perspective, they will be more willing to continue a presence in the region. To the extent they perceive East Asia as characterized by potential conflict, between China and Taiwan, for example, the more wary they may be about US involvement. According to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations poll in 1998, 68 percent of the public opposes the use of US troops if China invades Taiwan. The comparable figure for leaders was 48 percent (Rielly, 1999: 38). Support for US involvement in Asia is likely to be strong in the US Congress, even though there may be substantial differences on what that involvement should look like.

US priorities and alliances in Asia Present US policy in East Asia relies on an alliance with Japan, the ‘linchpin of our security strategy in Asia,’ which was originally signed in 1951 as an Asian bulwark against the communist world, and reaffirmed by the

The United States: Primary Global Power 33

two parties in 1996 as a crucial part of the post-cold war world. New guidelines delineating Japan’s roles in the event of conflict were issued in 1997 (US Department of Defense, 1998a: 19; Japan–US Joint Declaration, 1996). While that alliance is strong, and the relative priority that should be given to relations with China and Japan is debated, the continued need for the Japanese alliance and US support for it is not debated. That is not to say that the alliance’s health and vitality do not fluctuate. Questions on the specific roles for each country, questions on how much financial burden each should bear, trade and other economic concerns often provoke controversy. Economic issues, especially disputes over trade, often roil US–Japanese relations, while negotiations on security issues are usually characterized by a sense of shared objectives. So far, common security concerns have prevailed over economic controversies and the alliance has survived (Mastanduno, 1997). There is no reason to believe that the Japanese and the US will diverge on their basically common strategic vision. The fiftyyear history of abiding by the letter if not the spirit of Article 9 of the constitution, which prohibits rearmament, the shared US–Japanese values, the stagnant Japanese economy and the Japanese preference for letting the US take initiatives all argue for continuity in the present arrangements. There are four other alliance partners in the East Asia region: Australia, South Korea, Thailand and the Philippines, all relationships forged during the cold war. These alliances are supplemented with working relationships with other countries in the region. Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei provide logistics, refueling or servicing facilities, and they and Thailand often participate in joint exercises and there are the beginnings of military cooperation with the former Indochina states. The potential conflict which these alliances and other cooperation among friendly states are intended to deal with includes outbreaks of violence on the Korean peninsula resulting from a crisis along the border, or deliberate aggression by the North; a potentially aggressive and reviving China, feared primarily because of its interest in absorbing Taiwan and its irredentist claims in the South China Sea. In addition, the US presence in Asia is directed at reassuring East Asia that Japan will not radically increase its rate of rearmament, become a nuclear power, or be cut loose from the US–Japan alliance and move toward becoming a full-blown military power without the restraining bonds of the alliance. The US presence thus has a soothing effect on the acute anxieties with which Asians still view that country, over a half-century after World War II ended. Commitments to alliances and the high priority of security interests are clear, but other priorities complicate policy making. The US often

34 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

reduces the effectiveness of its policies by ambivalence about or ignorance of its priorities among different policy objectives. Early 1990s policy in Indonesia provides an interesting example, since some of our most difficult decisions on Southeast Asian policy priorities may hinge on future issues concerning Indonesia. Which of the ‘three good things,’ security, prosperity or human rights, will the US be most interested in conveying to Indonesia if there is a conflict between the three, and we must give up one or two? The Clinton administration seemed to assume that all three were mutually interlinked, that ‘security is necessary for economic growth, security and growth make it more likely that human rights will be honoured and democracy will emerge, and democratization makes international conflict less likely because democracies are unlikely to fight one another’ (Emmerson, 1996b; Clinton, 1994: 33; Simon, 1996: 391). The problem is that these statements, if they are true at all, are true over the long run. They give little guidance to people who make policy decisions and will have to choose among conflicting priorities in the short term. Questions will arise. Given the widespread violence across the archipelago in Indonesia, and the weakness of the government, will the US prefer to sacrifice some democratic standards, human rights and its preference for civilian government in favor of immediate stability and perhaps a larger military role and more arms for the government? Should military training and aid programs be conducted, even though a government is not meeting US expectations on economic liberalization and lowering of trade barriers? And what about giving priority to stability and economic predictability on the theory that sustained development and a growing middle class are the best way to develop democratic habits, even if the current government is cutting corners on civil liberties?

Policy toward China How China should be treated, how much of a threat it will be in coming years to the status quo in Asia, and what kind of status and treatment should be accorded Taiwan are the subjects of a continuous, ongoing and acrimonious debate. One observer wrote: At the beginning of the twenty-first century, America still seems incapable of a sober debate about China. The Clinton administration clings to the illusory rhetoric of a Sino-American ‘constructive strategic partnership’ while administration critics point to an equally exaggerated picture of a hostile challenge from a dangerous adversary. Both of these models had some salience during periods of the Cold

The United States: Primary Global Power 35

War. Now, however, common Chinese–American interests are too meagre, and their differences too deep to sustain any kind of ‘strategic partnership’. Nor does China have the strategic reach or implacable hostility that would make a long-term confrontation inevitable or even likely. China and America are strategic competitors (albeit of vastly unequal power) locked in an ambiguous relationship with elements of conflict, coexistence and cooperation.24 (Shambaugh, 2000: 97) One of the constant points of contention in US East Asian policy that relates to engagement is what relative priority US policy should give to China and Japan. This in turn relates to how the US views China, specifically is it a ‘friend’ or partner similar to Japan, or does the Japanese relationship have priority? While there is a consensus on the value of and the need to maintain the alliance with Japan, the nature of the US relationship with China directly affects how Japan is viewed. Under the Clinton administration, much focus was on China, particularly the granting of permanent trade status and the creation of a ‘constructive strategic partnership’ with China. If China is viewed through this prism, it certainly has the effect of downgrading somewhat the importance of the Sino-Japanese alliance, since classification of China as a partner, essentially a country on our side, implies there is less need for the alliance. The Bush administration originally came to power promising during the campaign to focus on Japan and spend less time on issues with China, which it referred to as a ‘strategic competitor.’ While campaigning Bush said that ‘China is not our “strategic partner.” But neither is it our enemy … . China is a competitor, to be faced without ill will and without illusions’ (Bush, 2000).25 Ironically, the Bush administration’s pledge to put more stress on relations with Japan rather than China was immediately derailed with the emergency landing of a US reconnaissance plane in China after a collision with a Chinese fighter jet, a collision that appeared to the American side to have been caused by the Chinese pilot. The incident, which happened a few months after the Bush administration took office, led to acrimonious exchanges over who was at fault, who should apologize for what, when and how the crew and plane would be returned. Independently of this incident, the Bush administration had undertaken other policy initiatives that would affect Beijing’s perspective on the US, including curtailment of permissive rules on travel by Chinese officials in the US, proposals for a new emphasis on military missions in Asia and development of long-range weapons in Asia, at least temporary curtailment of military-to-military contacts, and a strengthened commitment of US policy toward the defense of Taiwan.

36 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

In the half-year in office the new administration appeared to be setting a tone on policy toward China that was considerably more antagonistic than the Clinton administration, especially in regard to Taiwan. The events of September 11, however, appear to have altered the relationship considerably. Given the new emphasis and priority on fighting terrorism, both nations seem to have found a new common interest, which may lead to some improvement in relations. Almost certainly, it will lead to a decreased focus on some of the traditional disputes such as human rights and economic disputes that the US often emphasized. Indeed, it is possible that the focus of the US on the war against terrorism could momentarily distract it from its usual watchfulness on Chinese actions regarding Taiwan or the South China Sea, possibly leading to new problems there if the Chinese feel they have a free hand to take initiatives from which they had previously felt restrained (Lewis, 2001).26 But if the US becomes entrenched in Central Asia or attacks other countries it considers to be harboring terrorists, the Chinese may have second thoughts about their support for US anti-terrorist policy. One important direction of US policy toward China is engagement, or interacting with China with the objective of inducing it to become integrated with the international system and adopt the behavior of a responsible and involved state. There are many aspects of such behavior, one of which is the question of China’s interaction with the US in East Asia. There is considerable discussion of whether or not China prefers a US presence in East Asia to a US withdrawal which would eliminate any influence or control the US has over Japanese foreign policy and the use of its armaments. Thomas Christensen did an extensive set of interviews with Chinese policy makers and analysts. He concluded from these that the Chinese do prefer to have a US presence in East Asia to having the increased uncertainty and unpredictable consequences of Japanese behavior resulting from a US withdrawal. This enmity and paranoia toward the Japanese, rooted in historical legacy between the two countries but especially the legacy of World War II, puts the Japanese in a category apart from other East Asian countries, in the Chinese view. Obviously the answer to the question of Chinese attitudes toward the US presence, the precise answer to which we cannot know, is a crucial one for US strategy (Christensen, 1999: 61, n. 36). Chinese military and civilian officials and experts recognize that at the present Beijing has neither the intention nor the capabilities to force the US out of Asia, and some officials predict that over the next few decades a new security regime based on multilateral security cooperation and non-allied bilateral ties among regional states will gradually reduce the role of the US–Japan alliance, with Beijing playing a key role – along with

The United States: Primary Global Power 37

the US and Japan – in organizing and maintaining regional security. This objective, if realized, would enhance China’s stature, as it would decrease the US role, putting Sino-American relations on a similar footing with US–Japan relations, while Japan’s power and regional role would continue to be under the constraints of a multilateral security regime. China would accomplish all of this by playing by the rules of the game and proposing multilateral security fora, as they have been encouraged to do by the US and other regional powers (Garret and Glaser, 1997, 1994; Whiting, 1989). It is also probable that if such arrangements are put in place and if the Chinese and others refrain from using nationalist demagoguery which would fan the flames of nationalism and fear, by that time those with direct or second-hand memory of Japan’s role in the 1930s and 1940s will be gone and intense fear of Japanese militarism will have diminished considerably.27 This outcome is certainly on the optimistic end of a range of possible futures of the Sino-US relationship. Still, in Southeast Asia, the US presence is an additional deterrent to any local response to subregional conflicts, however unlikely, or any additional threats from outside the region. The US role is one of supporting peaceful change and discouraging violence, reaffirming to small countries and large alike its support for the stability of the system. The Clinton administration’s approach to China was constructive engagement, or engagement of China through trade and diplomacy so as to allow it to develop, to become engaged in and committed to the international system, moderate international behavior, and the development of a stable domestic polity. President Clinton, here speaking at the Voice of America, was an articulate spokesman for this position when confronting his critics I know there are those who … insist that China’s interests and America’s are inexorably in conflict. They do not believe the Chinese system will continue to evolve in a way that elevates not only human material condition, but the human spirit. They, therefore, believe we should be working harder to contain or even to confront China before it becomes even stronger. I believe this view is wrong. Isolation of China is unworkable, counterproductive, and potentially dangerous … Isolation would encourage the Chinese to become hostile and to adopt policies of conflict with our own interests and values … It would hinder, not help, our efforts to foster stability in Asia … It would make China less, not more likely to play by the rules of international conduct and be a part of an emerging international consensus. (Clinton, 1997: 40)

38 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

The purpose of the engagement policy is multifaceted. In addition to enhancing America’s economic well-being through increased trade, it also contributes to shaping the kind of China that the US would like to see. The more Chinese involvement in the international economy, the better for the West since interdependence will tend to restrain China’s aggressive tendencies by increasing the economic stake it has in avoiding conflict and adhering to peaceful means of making changes in East Asia. Moreover, there is little doubt that the introduction of democracy into China will also be enhanced by greater participation in the liberal international economic system and the regional and international institutions. Democratic states are found in much higher proportions among developed countries, and the most successful democracies have attained their most democratic form as the standard of living of their people has increased (Lipset, 1960). Isolating China economically would strengthen the hardline elements in Beijing, decrease Western leverage for change in China, and decrease the pressure on Beijing to facilitate new technologies and processes for liberalizing information exchange in China. While China becoming a democracy would not guarantee a peaceful outcome as Chinese power increases and China challenges the US role and position in Asia, there is considerable evidence that mature democracies are less likely to fight each other than to fight authoritarian governments. But China is not democratic, and in spite of the progress that has been made, it is not likely to become a democracy in the near future. Democratization under the best of circumstances will be a lengthy process.28 More relevant to China is the evidence that during the time that countries are democratizing they may be more dangerous and more likely to go to war than autocracies. Using the same databases that are typically used to research the ‘democratic peace,’ Jack Snyder and Edward Mansfield found that ‘democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than are mature democracies or stable autocracies.’ The problem typically is that the elites displaced by democratization find themselves in fierce competition with the new elites, both sides mobilize their followers for the competition for office, and find that once their mass followers have been mobilized they are difficult to disband. The result is often the outbreak of war as a new cause is sought on which to focus hostility and keep the coalition together. It is in these democratizing countries that democratic institutions for restraining and channeling nationalist sentiments are weakest and a leader finds it difficult to maintain support without external objects on which to focus intense nationalism. This particular view of states in transition to democracy is very controversial, but recent

The United States: Primary Global Power 39

incidents such as the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia certainly suggest that nationalist sentiment has been mobilized that may in certain circumstances be hard to control.29 Commentators in the West, especially critics of current China policy, often display impatience with the pace of liberalization by pointing out that after 25 years of economic reform, China is still not democratic nor does it respect human rights. Of course they are right, but the historical legacy of centuries of authoritarian tradition in China suggests the critics will have to learn to live with their impatience. When we talk about whether China can or will become a democracy, one that is accepted as such by the US or Western Europe, it makes most sense to talk about a long period of gradual change, including setbacks and reverses, which may eventually approach the standards of a liberal society. If one needs timetables, 75–100 years would be more appropriate than 25 years. And just as there are still significant differences between the French system and the US, certainly major differences with China’s system will persist indefinitely even if it has the basic indicators of a representative democracy (Segal, 1995).30 The other face of US policy recognizes that while not provoking China, the US should be prepared to deal with behavior that threatens peaceful change and US interests. Much attention has been given to military sales from China to Pakistan, Iran, Iraq and other states that involve nuclear technology, and munitions or technology that facilitate building or fielding weapons of mass destruction, and considerable progress has been made in curtailing this trade. Fortunately, those issues have not risen in Southeast Asia, and could only conceivably arise in Myanmar, although that is unlikely to happen. Southeast Asia has also escaped the controversy over deployment of TMD systems in Japan or Taiwan, since there is, so far at least, no discussion of deployment in the subregion. The US also seeks to maintain and enhance the military capabilities of itself and its friends in Asia by procuring basing, maintenance and logistical facilities that the US can use to maintain its position in Asia. Doing what it can to encourage both economic and military cooperation among other Asian states, the US might discreetly encourage military cooperation among ASEAN states, foster resolution of the Russian–Japanese territorial dispute, and encourage continued military cooperation between Japan and South Korea (Khalilzad, 1999).31 Stating that China ‘is the most important international challenge the US faces as we enter the 21st century,’ Robert Dole, the Republican challenger to President Clinton in the 1996 presidential race, advised that the US should ‘let this generation and future generations of Chinese leaders know they

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face a clear choice between the rewards of full membership in the international community and the heavy burden of political and military rivalry.’ Considerable attention was given to President George W. Bush’s unambiguous and unqualified assertion that the US would defend Taiwan if it were attacked, reversing the previous policy of strategic ambiguity. But Bush’s backing and filling on the issue, which left people wondering if the statement was a gaffe or intentional, disguised the fact that it was not new as Republican policy. Dole also stated that Clinton’s ‘policy of [strategic] ambiguity only sends a signal of uncertainty … Our policy should be unmistakably resolute: if force is used against Taiwan, America will respond.’ Dole and Bush clearly favor economic engagement and provision of enticements to encourage China to ‘play by the rules of the international system,’ but their party is differentiated from the Clinton policy by its stronger emphasis on the defense of Taiwan (Dole, 1996). Still further to the right, a conservative favoring a more hardline policy against China is Jesse Helms, former chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In a speech on ‘A Compassionate Conservative Foreign Policy,’ Jesse Helms advocated promoting democracy in nondemocratic countries and increasing the pressure on China. He advocated giving Taiwan ‘the means to defend itself against Beijing’s rapid military buildup,’ and supporting the Taiwan Security Enforcement Act. He also favored employing a national missile defense system, and abandoning the ‘puzzling fiction’ of the ‘one-China’ policy and the Clinton administration’s ‘appeasement’ policy (AEI, 2001; Helms, 1999). An internationalist group, supporting both economic and military commitment to East Asia, including support for both the Japanese security treaty and a commitment to peaceful change on Taiwan, is likely to be allied with some conservative Republicans supporting a strong US military presence on some issues (Table 2.2). The durability of the present economic approach to Beijing is suggested by the margin by which the bill to grant permanent normal trade status to China passed, 237–197 in the House in May 2000, 83–15 in the Senate in September. The vote of both parties in the Senate was similar, but in the house three out of four Republicans voted for the bill, while Democrats voted against it three to two (Schmitt and Kahn, 2000; Sanger, 2000). The hawkish conservatives are more inclined than the mainstream internationalists are to supply advanced arms to Taiwan, and to be demanding of China on human rights, the institution of democratic practices, prohibition of the use of prison labor, eliminating religious persecution and banning the export of sensitive technology to rogue states. They are also against promoting trade and investment in China that may assist China’s development as

The United States: Primary Global Power 41 Table 2.2

Policy ‘schools’ on US–China policy

School

Policy

Advocates

Leftist critics

Favor use of trade as weapon to get compliance on human rights and democracy issues; trade, labor and environmental issues

Liberal wing of Democratic party Labour unions; human rights organizations; some Chinese dissidents

Pro-engagement – a

Favor ‘normal’ trade and diplomatic policies toward China Critical of China on human rights and democracy issues Favor support for Taiwan against attempted military take-over

All presidential administrations since Richard Nixon; majority of both houses of Congress from both political parties, but especially Republicans Business community; some Chinese dissidents

Pro-engagement – b

Favor ‘normal’ trade and diplomatic policies toward China Favor US non-involvement on human rights and democracy issues

Some business circles; libertarians

Rightist critics

Avoid assisting economic development that will enhance China’s military potential Favor strong support for Taiwan and criticize Chinese human rights policies, especially religious repression as well as trade and labor policies

Primarily conservative wing of Republican party Some church groups

a great power. The left wing of the Democratic party joins with the rightist conservatives in criticism of China’s failure to implement democratic reforms and respect human rights. They also try to use economic questions such as trade privileges as a lever on these issues, and therefore downplay the impact of unfettered economic intercourse on liberalization in China. Primary contention in the Congress has been over the use of economic carrots and sticks such as permanent normal trade relations

42 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

for influencing China’s internal development and international behavior, as well as concern about China’s military threat to the rest of Asia and the transfer of American technology (both legal and illegal) that might contribute to that threat. The commitment of the Bush administration to US involvement in both Europe and Asia seems strong. It seems committed to remaining in the Balkans, and has increased the US commitment to the defense of Taiwan. There seems to be little influence from those interested in decreased US obligations in East Asia. But taking actions that suggest any attempt at ‘containment’ of China or ganging up on it are likely to have adverse consequences. As some analysts point out, even when the policy toward China is one of engagement, China is still hostile toward the United States. The US now puts some pressure on China to liberalize both its political and economic systems. But sustained and systematic attempts to condition China’s behavior, using aggressive tactics to turn it into a democracy, or taking tit-fortat actions to make a point, are likely to stimulate a nationalist reaction. Rather than develop a pattern of action–reaction in response to policies based on China’s short-term behavior, it is better to follow policies that focus on long-term goals of a modest nature, or those measures necessary to allow the US to accomplish those objectives that are essential to defending US interests. Using this standard, moving the US carrier groups in response to the Chinese missile firings in the direction of Taiwan in 1996 is defensible because it is in support of a basic US objective, represents continuity with past policy, and was necessary to make an essential point about US resolve. Revising the US–Japan defense treaty or continuing the present pressure in multilateral fora regarding human rights also qualify because they are consistent with past policy and represent longterm US goals. But if the US were to openly advocate the overthrow of the communist party, or take tit-for-tat policy action in response to each arms transfer or human rights violation it is unhappy with, emphasizing the attempt to mold Chinese behavior, the reaction from Beijing is likely to be extreme. US actions obviously aimed at pressuring China or changing its behavior, especially in the security arena, would strengthen hardline leaders and could lead to increased military spending. Another result would be the strengthening of hyper-nationalist feelings among the Chinese public that would complicate our dealings with a government buffeted by a public reaction hostile toward the US. As China democratizes, the impact of this would be particularly detrimental to Sino-US relations (Byman et al., 1999). Even routine oversights in meeting business contract conditions in China today can lead to nationalistic charges – if the investor is foreign – of purposeful cheating. The potential for antagonism

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in the national security arena is even greater. As the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade illustrated, nationalism, not to say paranoia, is a potent force in China today. Joseph Nye lists four alternatives to the present policy toward China: (1) withdraw and pursue an Atlantic (and/or hemispheric) only policy, (2) create a local balance of power, including abrogating the current defense treaties and consciously playing a role as a balancer within the region, (3) create regional security institutions (ASEAN, ARF and a new Northeast Asian Security Forum), and (4) create a coalition to contain China (Nye, 1997–8; Byman et al., 1999). It seems unlikely that alternatives one or two would be adopted, since both policy makers and the public show more commitment to direct involvement than is consistent with those choices. As analysis in Chapter 4 will suggest, the state of regional and subregional institutions is not adequate to compensate for a US withdrawal, nor are there bright prospects for creating new institutions effective enough to do so. And there is no agreement among our allies on a policy of simply containing China, nor is there such a consensus domestically in the US. A fifth alternative policy suggested by some could be accommodating China while still retaining an American presence in Asia. Many of China’s aspirations in Asia are not incompatible with those of the US. Japan has a minimal role to play in Asia, and the US should refrain from connecting Japan with our defense commitments there. However, advocates of this approach believe the US should remain committed to the defense of Taiwan should China attempt to forcibly reintegrate it into the mainland. This is far from full accommodation of China’s objectives (Brzezinski, 1997a: 188–9, 1997b: 62–3; Silver, 2000: 37–41). Given the public and Congressional attitudes we have discussed, the chance that the status quo of constructive engagement would be stretched far enough to metamorphose into one of Nye’s alternative approaches is unlikely at this time. One reason for this is that the current policy gives each of the US domestic groups a little bit of what they want. The policy of maximum economic engagement gives a lot to business and those who believe that over the long term engagement will lead to liberalization in China. The pressure on China to move forward on human rights and democracy issues gives something to the left and right ends of the political spectrum. A firm stance on Taiwan and maintenance of relationships with Japan and Southeast Asia that strengthen the US militarily in the event of Chinese military action pleases those who believe there should be a continued American balancing role in East Asia. The result is a policy that provides something for everybody, whereas the alternatives would all leave important groups dissatisfied. The strength

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of the current policy toward Beijing is that it is a policy that our allies can live with, and in the US not only is it supported by the internationalists and groups near the ideological center, and the business community, but it also picks up right-wing supporters such as Republican House Majority Leader Dick Armey. As he stated: In my heart, I would like to oppose most-favored-nation status for China as a way of expressing the deep repugnance I feel toward the tyranny of Beijing, but intellectually I believe that continued normal trade relations are best for the people of China today and offer the best prospect for liberating them in years to come. (Byman et al., 1999: 428)

Interaction in Southeast Asia Compared to Northeast Asia with its flashpoints such as Taiwan and the Korean peninsula, Southeast Asia seems placid. Although there are no obvious hot spots over which the US and China are likely to tangle, beneath the surface the potential exists. There are no obvious fault lines behind which outside powers can line up as during the cold war. Likely US actions in Southeast Asia can be summarized by viewing probable actions in Asia as forming three categories: (1) direct military intervention, (2) indirect support for peacekeeping or humanitarian objectives, and (3) economic and diplomatic involvement. Support for military pressure to counter Chinese adventurism vis-à-vis Taiwan rests on a firm rhetorical consensus across both branches of government, and in a crisis there probably would be bipartisan support from both branches of government for a strong response. Taiwan is not in Southeast Asia, but a conflict there would have a substantial effect on the subregion. Direct military intervention is most easily imagined in a crisis involving Taiwan if the Chinese were willing to risk a confrontation with the US to bring Taiwan to heel. There is a precedent in the action of sending two carrier groups toward Taiwan in March 1996 in response to Chinese missile firings and military exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan in late 1995 and the spring of 1996. While the US will make every effort to avoid getting drawn into a confrontation in the Strait, it likely will do what has to be done to preserve Taiwan’s physical independence, although no public commitment to that objective had been given until late April 2001, when President Bush committed the US to such a defense. Later attempts by the administration to suggest that no new commitments beyond

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those of past administrations had been made only confused the issue. US policy is based on the assumption that continuing talks on crossStrait relations, Taiwan’s military capabilities, enhanced by US arms sales, and the deterrence value of the possibility of US involvement, will avoid such a contingency. If military actions were to be contemplated, it would not necessarily involve a direct confrontation with China. US threats of retaliation following Chinese threats toward or a blockade of Taiwan might suffice.32 Such a conflict would be of enormous concern to Southeast Asia, and would likely have momentous consequences for the future of Sino-Southeast Asian relations, possibly pushing individual countries toward either explicit security cooperation with Beijing, or opposition to Beijing and greater cooperation with the US. Southeast Asians would view Taiwan as a special case, since the Chinese consider it part of China and therefore annexation of Taiwan is seen as no business of the international community. Nonetheless, there would be plenty of apprehension among Southeast Asia nations about the implications of the action for them. While the reaction of individual countries would depend on the nature of the conflict and the nature of the environment at the time, especially the US stance, mainland Southeast Asian countries would be likely to gravitate toward Beijing, with Vietnam being unpredictable, while Indonesia, assuming it still retains its current boundaries, would be more likely to attempt to form an opposition bloc, including the US, Australia, Singapore and possibly Malaysia and Vietnam as allies. Direct US intervention to discourage or roll back Chinese gains in the South China Sea and the Spratly Islands is also possible but unlikely. Whereas there is a general assumption that the US would intervene if Taiwan were threatened, the US has taken a more detached attitude toward the Spratly Island problem, stating that it takes no position on the various claims and counter-claims to the islands. Indicating the importance Southeast Asians attach to the South Sea islands, Filipino Jose Almonte has written that ‘The South China Sea is South-east Asia’s strategic heartland. Any power that controls the Sea will ultimately control the region and consequently play a decisive role in the future of the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, and their sea-lanes to and from the Middle East. It is in the global community’s interest that the South China Sea should remain an international thoroughfare.’ Intervention there is conceivable if Chinese action was massive or if Chinese intervention had consequences for keeping open the sea lanes, but there was no US reaction to the Mischief Reef incident in 1995, where the Chinese constructed structures on an island claimed by the Philippines (Almonte, 1997–8: 83).33

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Another recent example of US direct involvement was the use of US air power to discourage a coup against Corazon Aquino’s government in the Philippines in 1989. It is difficult to imagine such action being taken today, since the US no longer has, anywhere in Asia, both the close relationship with an ally and the nearby air bases that made such a quick response feasible (Neher, 1999: 80–2). Most crises will fall into the second category and lead to a search for a solution allowing a US friend or ally to take the lead. Aside from possible threats from outside the subregion (China), there are few signs of aggressive foreign policies that would lead to destabilizing incidents in the subregion. Southeast Asia consists of countries that for the most part have little interest in international aggression, and are emphasizing the need for a stable environment conducive to development. Even the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul D. Wolfowitz, sees little threat from terrorism there that cannot be dealt with as a law enforcement problem, with the exception of some areas of the Philippines that require a military solution (Wolfowitz, 2002). Two exceptions to this optimistic forecast are Myanmar and Indonesia. While the generals in Myanmar have not conducted an expansionist policy, a weakening of the regime resulting from the continued economic failures could lead to civil war, offering a tempting setting for outside intervention. The economic conditions in Indonesia, the weakness of the government, the widespread ethnic and religious strife, and the independence aspirations in Aceh and Irian Jaya could well lead to further instability if not civil war. Such a development in that large country, spread over a sprawling archipelago, would have very serious consequences and could well stimulate calls for intervention by national, subregional or UN organizations. It is unlikely that the US would intervene directly in either of these hypothetical situations. One example of indirect involvement where proxies acted for the US was the reaction to the breakdown of law and order in East Timor, which resulted in Australia leading a UN-sponsored force to restore order, with transitional administration by the UN. Whether such an operation would be workable, especially in an Indonesian crisis, is an open question (Chopra, 2000). On the third level, economic and diplomatic activity, the US will obviously be actively engaged in diverse activities maintaining, negotiating and promoting its interests and views. The US role in Southeast Asia is crucial in reassuring ASEAN that Chinese influence is countered and dampened and that Japan continues to operate within the framework of the mutual security treaty rather than independent of US influence; to remind all parties that it is a US objective to maintain open sea lanes and freedom of passage through choke

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points such as the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok and through the South China Sea; to promote free-trade economic objectives and the development of regional and subregional institutions; and lastly, in the nuanced promotion of democracy and human rights. This is an impressive list worthy of effort, but a look at some of the more noteworthy events that occurred in Southeast Asia during the last decade indicates that the control the US exercises over what transpires there is very limited. The US was in a position to have substantial influence and help shape a positive outcome on the 1991 Cambodian settlement, and it could have and should have made more effort to be effective in the 1997 economic crisis by increasing its involvement and providing more assistance to the affected countries.34 US Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs has noted the threat to Southeast Asia from terrorism, narcotics, human trafficking, piracy, HIV/AIDs, and environmental degradation (Kelly, 2002b). Beyond these issues, however, there is a substantial number of issues about which the US either could or should have done very little, because it had no means to bring about change or because any action would likely have provoked a backlash. This category probably includes a response to Chinese actions at Mischief Reef in 1995 and after. Participation in the creation of ARF, shaping of the post-Suharto order in Indonesia and the ousting of the Estrada government in the Philippines were all events best handled by Southeast Asians, and a prominent US role would have been counterproductive. Other issues on which the US has sought to exert influence and failed include the Philippine decision requesting US withdrawal from the Philippines, although a willingness to provide more compensation might have allowed the US presence to continue.35 The US lobbied against the expansion of ASEAN but failed to halt it, and it has not been successful in bringing about regime change in Myanmar. After the referendum in favor of independence in East Timor in 1999 and the breakdown of law and order there, the course of limiting direct US involvement to logistical help and allowing Australia to take the lead in heading the UN force was the preferred one, since it relieved the US of a task that was peripheral to Southeast Asian security. The lesson from this survey of key events is not that the US is powerless to affect events, but that it must realize the limitations to action within the post-cold war environment where local sensitivities are more intense, and superpower prerogatives to meddle in domestic and regional affairs have contracted. Because of the demise of the Soviet threat, increased nationalist sensitivities in Southeast Asia, increased military capabilities among some Southeast Asian countries, a diminished

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US presence, and the enhanced role of regional and subregional institutions, the US is no longer able to justify regional intrusions in the manner of yesteryear (CIA support for the 1958 rebellion against the Indonesian government on Sumatra, or support for the Aquino government against the military in the Philippines).

Economic and trade issues When the cold war ended, in Southeast Asia security interests took a lower priority and economic interests became more salient. While a military threat from outside or violent conflict inside the subregion is still a threat, as the level of industrial and high tech production has risen and the standard of living has improved, especially in the more affluent and cosmopolitan states of the subregion, the relative importance of economic growth and the emphasis on economic competition has tended to displace the importance of military and national security issues. While this process is still not as advanced as in North America or in Europe, Southeast Asia has become one of the most economically successful areas of the world outside of the older industrialized countries. The early Southeast Asian economic success, especially in Singapore, was hampered by the tension of the cold war and local conflicts such as Konfrontasi, 1961–5, the war in Vietnam, 1963–75, and the conflict in Cambodia, 1975–91. Now the ASEAN countries are for the most part following a path that allows them to take advantage of the benefits of globalization, but this also gives maximum exposure to the perils of international capital flows and the unpredictability of the international market. This downside of globalization was demonstrated, especially for Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, in the economic crisis of 1997. In the mid-1980s, the ASEAN countries opened themselves up to foreign investment and generally provided favorable conditions to such investment. In 1990, the ASEAN-9 accounted for 35.1 percent of the foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to the developing world. This number was halved by 1994 with the decreased share reflecting the emergence of China as a major recipient of foreign investment (Yue, 1999: 259–62).36 This trend has continued. In January 2002 Singapore Minister of Trade and Industry George Yeo said that in 1990 China received less than 20 percent of total foreign investments in developing Asia. Southeast Asia got 60 percent. But today the numbers are reversed (Borsuk, 2002). The effect of this change is to move the subregion to the ranks of those countries where economic progress and GDP become an increasingly important measure of prestige, relative to military competition, territorial

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conquest, ethnic purity or religious millennialism. To the extent that the subregion focuses on economic competition rather than ethnic, religious or ideological conflict, it will increase the chances of maintaining a peaceful environment for economic development and excluding outside powers which may use disruptions to justify intervention. Despite the 1997 economic downturn, the region still has good prospects of recovering and resuming its economic ascent. The worst problems exist in Indonesia, the poorest of the hard-hit countries, and the one facing the worst noneconomic problems, a fledgling democratic system dealing with ethnic and religious conflict without the established institutions or personnel experienced in democratic processes necessary to an effectively functioning democracy. In 1997 the percentage change in real GDP in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand was 4.7, 7.7, and (1.3) respectively. In 1998, as a result of the crisis, the percentage decline in the economy was 13.7 percent in Indonesia, 6.7 percent in Malaysia, and 9.4 percent in Thailand (Kim, 2000: 23).37 Nonetheless, Southeast Asia’s history and the orientation among the ruling elites, particularly in the more developed and cosmopolitan countries, is conducive to continued economic progress and the development of the necessary institutions, processes and public attitudes that contribute to the momentum required for making successful development the primary objective of the system. Here, Southeast Asia is in a different league from many African and Middle Eastern (or even European) countries, where the elites are or have recently been primarily oriented toward looting the country for their own benefit (Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra Leone), achieving military dominance and weapons of mass destruction (Iraq), giving primacy to religious revolution under theocratic auspices (Iran and formerly Afghanistan), or pursuing ethnically irredentist policies (Serbia). If the recovery from the economic crisis continues across the subregion, existing contact between the various countries in Southeast Asia and the rudiments of existing subregional institutions will encourage those countries until now giving low priority to economic growth (Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) to join the trend toward globalization and the creation of middle-class societies. To the extent that this occurs, and economic might supplants military strength as the primary currency of national power and prestige, trade talks will also replace territorial conflict, military ambition and ethnic demagoguery as the most contentious form of diplomacy within the subregion (Schweller, 1999).38 It is manifestly in the US interest to encourage such a trend. Both American interests and Southeast Asian security will be enhanced by an economically prosperous Southeast Asia that has multiple ties to the

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industrial world and develops the institutions appropriate to economic development, now best exemplified by Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. Sheldon Simon, conducting interviews in 1995 in four Southeast Asian countries with research staff who were specialists in their countries’ foreign and security policies, found that there is a strong commitment to economic development and the role of the market and the global economy in that development in countries, regardless of regime type. All respondents favored the US playing a strong role as a trade partner and investor. All feared the possibility of American protectionism playing an inhibiting role on trade with Asia (Ellings and Simon, 1996: 225). A consistent theme in comments from Southeast Asians is doubt about the future US role there. The end of the cold war and the withdrawal from the Philippines, the economic hardball played by the Clinton administration to improve trade terms for the United States, the passive role of the US in the 1997 economic crisis, basically leaving aid and assistance up to the IMF and other countries, and the rancorous debate in the US about the desirability of involvement abroad, all have raised doubts about the staying power of the US and its future economic and military commitments to East Asia. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Kurt Campbell stated in 1996 that ‘ … as we travel the region, there is not a meeting I go to that someone does not raise [the issue of US commitment to Southeast Asia] … You are here now; you were there 15 years ago; will you be here 15 years in the future?’ (Congressional H., 1996: 25). The US is seen as a ‘power in retreat’ when, as during the last decade, it downsizes the military, closes consulates, reduces the number of foreign service officers and personnel providing information and aid to Asia, and dismisses local staff. Contributing to the impression of reduced US interest was the closing of facilities in Medan, Indonesia and Cebu in the Philippines, important economic centers, and in Kyoto, Japan, an important cultural center. At the same time that the US seems to be leaving, European countries and Australia are increasing their presence in the region. ‘How long,’ Southeast Asians ask, ‘will the United States retain the American military presence in the Western Pacific that Asians regard as essential to stability?’ (Ellings and Simon, 1996: 221; Denoon and Colbert, 1998–9: 512). Another American commentator asserts that the US seems unable to seriously evaluate its strategic interests in Asia. Its primary interests there, he continues, are economic and commercial, not military (Pfaff, 2001: 227–9). But the assumption underlying US policy is that the economic and commercial interests are dependent on an environment of security and stability that requires a US military presence to reassure Southeast Asians that there is

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a deterrent to a resurgent China, a buffer against a potentially militarized and nuclear-armed Japan – if the US were to withdraw, and insurance against instability on the Korean peninsula. The most recent convert to this view of the situation is North Korea, which recently suggested a US presence may be required even after reunification of Korea. According to South Korean President Kim Dae Jung, he was told by North Korean Kim Jong-Il that he views it as desirable that US troops stay on the Korean peninsula and that he dispatched a high-level envoy to the US several years ago to convey that message to the US. In response to remarks by Kim Dae Jung that a US troop withdrawal after reunification would ‘create a huge vacuum that would draw … [China and Japan] into a fight over hegemony,’ North Korean leader Kim Jong-Il is reported to have replied: ‘Yes, we are surrounded by big powers – Russia, China and Japan – so therefore it is desirable that the American troops continue to stay.’ Only China officially dissents from this view, although, as indicated above, unofficial views are probably more favorable to a US presence (Struck, 2000: A1; Chanda, 2000: 20). No doubt the public’s view of the American position on trade vis-à-vis Asia has been helped by the strong stand the Clinton administration took on negotiating trade deals with Asia, especially Japan.39 But the obverse side of hard bargaining by the US is resentment on the part of Southeast Asians who may feel that the US is a ‘trade bully’ that is trying to impose its particular philosophy, backed by staggering economic might, on smaller and less affluent countries with another cultural perspective. This perspective seems little affected by the fact that the US has consistently run negative trade balances with every ASEAN country since 1998 and with the major trading countries even before that. There was considerable resentment of the economic nationalism displayed by the Clinton administration, which threatened unilateral sanctions unless its interpretation of open markets was accepted by its trade partners. A feeling also existed that bilateral trade negotiations were a violation of the multilateral commitments that the US was promoting with the creation of the WTO. And while Asia welcomed Clinton’s emphasis on upgrading APEC by hosting a meeting of informal economic leaders at the conference in Seattle in 1993, there was displeasure with the US insistence on formalizing and setting specific timetables and sector-specific commitments in negotiations in APEC. A better approach would have been to make trade liberalization a long-term objective and ‘place equal emphasis in the shorter run on the programs of cooperative infrastructural development, exchange of trade and investment data, harmonization of customs standards, and other forms of trade promotion advocated by

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Asians’ (Ellings and Simon, 1996: 225; Harding, 1994: 61). Attitudes toward APEC represent the classic dilemma that the US faces in dealing with economic issues and institution building in Southeast Asia. A distinctive ‘Asian perspective’ on regional and international issues has emerged. Whereas the Western countries want to use APEC to lobby for greater liberalization in trade within the context of the GATT (now WTO), they believe that there must be greater institutionalization of the organization, with designated processes, rules, timetables and decisions that require binding commitments on the part of the members. The Asian perspective, most interested in ensuring that Western markets stay open to their exports, favors more flexible and voluntary targets for liberalization, more flexible schedules, and decisions that rely more on consensus than coercion. These conflicting perspectives even extend to separate positions on the type of new members admitted and the pace at which they should be admitted to the organization. What can be expected from a given annual meeting depends on whether it is being hosted by a member of the ‘Western’ group, especially Australia, the United States, South Korea, New Zealand and Canada, or by members of the ‘Asian’ group, of which China and Malaysia are leaders (Gallant and Stubbs, 1997). The US must balance its promotion of trade liberalization, domestic benefits and constructing an APEC that is effective, against sensitivity to its Southeast Asian trading partners and the need to avoid stirring nationalist resentment in those societies. On both sides, in short, there are domestic constituencies that resist the concessions and agreements that are necessary to have policies and settlements that can benefit both sides. Obstacles to effective cooperation are American parochialism and reluctance to take risks on international issues that do not appear to have immediate payoffs, these issues often being exploited by politicians for their own short-term ends, on the American side. These factors, combined with anti-American feeling in Southeast Asia that is partly the result of the historical legacy of colonialism, partly the resentment often felt against a dominant power, and partly the result of political demagoguery for short-term gain, discourage the cooperation that is in the long-term interest of both parties (Ahn, 1996: 210–14; Sheridan, 1999: 12–13). The US need not oppose a growing and inevitable Chinese economic involvement in Southeast Asia. It should work to encourage US–Southeast Asian economic collaboration and the political conditions that make it possible. More than one observer has pointed out that there has been no real assistance or remedy from the ASEAN, APEC, AFTA or any other regional

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or subregional institutions aimed at assisting Southeast Asian countries in dealing with the 1997 crisis. Neither as a group nor individually were ASEAN countries able to supply the resources and the leadership to restore financial stability. Thus, ASEAN states in trouble were basically ‘left on their own to deal with the IMF and their creditors.’ Two minor exceptions to this were: a Singapore pledge of $5 billion to Indonesia, which was dependent on meeting IMF terms; and the Asian Fund proposal, originating with the ASEAN finance ministers, with Hong Kong and Japanese encouragement. This was opposed by the United States, and it and a follow-up proposal have never come to fruition (Acharya, 1999; Denoon and Colbert, 1998–9: 521–3). Assistance and funds for dealing with the crisis have come primarily from the IMF, with some contributions from the US, China and other countries. There was a meager level of economic cooperation within the subregion or sponsored by subregional organizations (Mattli, 1999). The main objective of the US, regarding institutional development, should be, when possible, to stay out of the way and to avoid actions that may lead to resentment and reactions contrary to US interests. Southeast Asian reaction can be stimulated as much by symbols and images as by real incidents. The picture, distributed by Western media of IMF President Camdessus standing over President Suharto at the signing of the agreement on the IMF package with Indonesia was widely credited with making it harder for the deal to be implemented because of the image, suggested by the picture, that the deal was imposed and illegitimate. Obviously, in spite of the best efforts, there are limits to what can be done to prevent this sort of occurrence, but it illustrates the kinds of issues and questions that need to be raised in policy making. It is in the long-term interest of the US to see the development of strong, autonomous regional and subregional institutions in Asia and Southeast Asia, and these have obviously been weakened by the recent downturn. Despite the criticism the IMF has received from the US Congress and other parties, the IMF itself has admitted it made mistakes in its prescriptions for Asia after the economic downturn. Its role was complicated by the difficulty of prescribing remedies when many of the problems were in the private sector. But it played a positive role, imposing many overdue microeconomic reforms on the Indonesian government, and its actions may have saved Korea, Thailand and Indonesia from an even worse fate, debt defaults that would have cut them off from global capital markets for several years. And it is worth noting that in Korea the IMF was able to stabilize the currency because the US Treasury and Federal Reserve lobbied the commercial banks to roll over existing loans.

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Lawrence Summers stated in 1998 that ‘The IMF has done more to promote America’s trade and investment in Korea than thirty years of bilateral trade talks’ (in Hale, 2000: 23).

Promoting democracy and human rights The Western objective of encouraging democratization and respect for human rights in Asian societies has been met by some Asians with the plea that they have constructed a special brand of democracy, ‘Asian democracy,’ that is superior to the Western model and more appropriate given the cultural heritage of East Asia. These ‘Asian values’ and the claims of Asian leaders are discussed further in chapter 4. One definition of Asian democracy is: (1) the family is the focal point of social organization within the society, (2) the interests of the community or the group take precedence over those of individuals, and individual obligations to the community are emphasized over individual rights, (3) political decision making is done by consensus rather than confrontation through representative political systems, (4) social cohesion and social harmony are priorities, achieved through moral principles and strong government, and (5) economic growth and development accompany social cohesion and strong government and they are the right of every citizen and country (Robison, 1996: 310–11). The appropriateness and superiority of this model for meeting Asian needs and the superiority of Asian values are used as arguments to resist Western pressure for democratization and liberalization. In spite of this moral relativist agenda, however, many Southeast Asian countries do feel the need to counter Western arguments in favor of democracy, and they often temper their attacks on universalist values in international fora. Indonesia and other Southeast Asian states have emphasized that they accept the universality of human rights standards, but argue that in the implementation consideration should be given to cultural and historical differences among states, as well as the particular stage of development of a state and the special needs for stability that this may engender. The former deputy prime minister of Malaysia, Anwar Ibrahim, deplored the fact that Asians allow themselves to be ‘lectured and hectored’ on freedom and human rights by those who ‘participated in our subjugation’ during colonial times (Robinson, 1996: 86–7; Mauzy, 1997: 211–13). It would be interesting to know, now that he himself has been locked up on what are probably trumped up charges brought against him by the government, whether his position on this issue has changed. The Chinese in particular like to juxtapose human rights with sovereignty, which they see the US as routinely violating to promote its view

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of human rights. The war in Kosovo is a prime example of this, and the Chinese perceive here a tendency which can be used to loosen their hold on Tibet or Xinjiang and postpone a ‘settlement’ of Taiwan. The gap between the positions of the two countries can be seen in an article entitled ‘US Theory of “Human Rights Being Superior to Sovereignty” Ridiculous.’ Arguing that globalization has become an excuse for infringing on a country’s sovereignty, it quotes Deng Xiaoping to the effect that ‘national sovereignty is far more important than human rights’ (Zhu, 2000: 28). To this argument of Asian uniqueness, one can juxtapose an argument that the rights commonly associated with democracy and industrialized countries (including non-Western Japan) have their origins not so much in Western history, as in the common needs, lifestyle and high education level conducive to the high economic production levels commonly found in modern well integrated nations. They were brought about by the ‘changes occurring, at different rates, everywhere: universal education, industrialization, urbanization, the rise of a middle class, advances in transportation and communications, and the spread of new information technology. These changes were driven by scientific developments capable of affecting equally any society’ (Franck, 2001: 200). Or as former US Secretary of State Warren Christopher put it in Singapore at an ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference, ‘The yearnings for freedom are not a Western export; they are a human instinct’ (Christopher, 1993). Moreover, third world and authoritarian countries participated in drafting the documents that defined the post-war international human rights regime, and many of them (including China) have subscribed to these covenants. China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in February 2001, something that the US has not yet done. The internationally sanctioned human rights conventions, in other words, have been de-linked from their Western historical connection. Diane Mauzy cites numerous studies showing that there were substantial and significant differences between these groups. As she put it, ‘there are Asian values and Western values, and important differences between them’ (Mauzy, 1997: 215–19). Growing up Asian also biases an individual toward certain values. But the evidence also seems inescapable that certain values are the values of modern society. In the more developed Asian countries, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, South Korea, and Taiwan, the move toward formal democracy has ebbed and flowed and varies from country to country, but on balance the direction is unmistakable. And the open global economy and economic progress is having an effect on many others, especially

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Indonesia and the Philippines. In spite of over thirty years during which the Suharto regime offered remarkable economic growth as a substitute for political reform and broad participation, in the end the populace didn’t buy it. Suharto’s rule served only to dam up the pro-participation sentiments which cascaded out as soon as there was a break in the economic good luck. There is abundant evidence that information and communication will continue to be instrumental in decentralizing and democratizing the modern state; that without constantly increasing information, a country cannot modernize. And it cannot provide that information without the requisite decentralization and recognition of individual rights (Nathan, 1999: 136).40 This is the thrust of the argument the West should make when discussing human rights. It is futile to engage in endless arguments about what is Western and what is Asian and therefore suited for Asian adoption. As Aung San Suu Kyi has pointed out, in pursuing industrialization, East Asians have already adopted many Western ways (Aung San Suu Kyi, 1998). Those who inveigh against ‘Western values’ need to be reminded that they have already adopted many Western scientific and economic ideas, not only without protest, but enthusiastically. And while one can admit that the stage of development may be a factor in the level of commitment to these universal rights, this is very different from suggesting that some countries have a waiver that allows them to ignore human rights issues indefinitely. Asian countries may pick which aspects of modernity they will accept, but arguments that values are relative can be countered. It is one thing to make the theoretical argument, however, and quite something else to fashion policies that will lead to significant progress on human rights. There is evidence that much of American human rights promotion in China has been ineffective. Bringing different perspectives to the issue, Americans and foreigners often interpret the same facts differently. The US has often succeeded only in creating resentment and stoking nationalist fervor instead of providing a boost to real reform, even among those Asians who were initially receptive to US pressure for progress in human rights. To take one example, Americans tend to have expectations of a much shorter timetable than do Asians, and they tend to focus on narrow issues of judicial rights and procedures rather than the broader picture of what is happening in the whole society. Many Chinese, viewing what seems to be American preoccupation with focusing on the negative aspects of human rights issues rather than the progress being made, come to believe that the whole issue is one the West is using to undermine and weaken China rather than to assist it (Harding, 1997).

The United States: Primary Global Power 57

Agitation for democracy and human rights has a place in US foreign policy and it is an asset in the US attempt to smooth the likely transition to a Chinese-dominated regional order. But the US case needs to be made in a manner that will be effective, in the context of the nationalist sensitivity that it always threatens to provoke. The rules for raising these subjects should be, generally, that it be done in non-public formats, and that the US rely primarily on multilateral fora for putting pressure on Asian governments. The argument for non-public discussions is that it facilitates discussions of complexity and nuance, whereas public pronouncements tend toward simplistic and flamboyant pronouncements. The advantage of multilateral statements is that they provide a sense of a consensus among a group of countries, and they ensure that the statements are coordinated and agreed upon, rendering it more difficult to play the position of one country off against another. Europeans, Canadians and Australians are ‘more pragmatic and less confrontational’ in making some of the same points that Americans make. They make use of ‘quiet diplomacy.’ The US would do well to follow that practice focusing more on changing the ostensible foreign behavior, rather than appealing to US domestic public opinion (Robinson, 1996: 83–4; Mauzy, 1997: 213–15).41 Finally, the US should work with the target country to develop some goals on which both countries can agree and for which the US can provide some positive incentives. Economic assistance, technical advice or moral support to programs providing long-term progress to expand academic and cultural exchange, augmented international broadcasting, encouragement of nongovernmental organizations, and support for market oriented reforms will do more for progressive political change over the long term than threatening pronouncements and counterproductive economic sanctions (Harding, 1994). Cooperative projects would allow the US to play the role of facilitator instead of its usual role of scold. In the competition with China, American values will benefit the US, but the message needs to be honed for maximum tact and effectiveness.

3 China: Challenging Regional Power

China is the most likely candidate as the challenger to the US role in East Asia, but both India and Japan also have the potential to be challengers. Few doubt the intentions of the Chinese to take advantage of China’s growing economic might to elevate its status as a world power. The Chinese in the past routinely and repeatedly stated that they would never become a superpower. That formulation has disappeared in recent years and the Chinese now openly discuss China’s future as a world power. In a recent Beijing Review article entitled ‘Will the 21st Century Belong to China or the United States?’, the well-known Chinese scholar Yan Xuetong asserted that ‘The [US’] status as the world center cannot last forever’ (Li, 2000). The Chinese have not departed from their call, following the collapse of the bipolar cold war structure, for a ‘new order’ based on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which is conducive to the maintenance of world peace and peaceful development. They also deplore alliances, power politics and ‘hegemonism,’ and continue to give lip service to the ‘multipolar trend’ in the international system (Qian, 1992; Xing, 1992; Liu, 1992; Zhao, 2001; Zhang, 2001). Those speculating on a much more important role for China in international politics thus include not only the Americans, but the Chinese themselves as well as most of the rest of the world. A recent study explores China’s ‘grand strategy’ to ‘engineer the country’s rise to the status of a true great power that shapes rather than responds to … the international system.’ It suggests that China has two main objectives: to maintain conditions that will allow China to realize its relative capabilities, and to prevent situations where the US or associated countries will be able to ‘abort China’s ascent and frustrate its international aspirations’ (Goldstein, 2001: 836). What sort of challenger will China be and how does it seek to realize these objectives? After examining the structure of 58

China: Challenging Regional Power 59

the East Asian system and the role of potential challengers, I will discuss Chinese economic and military capabilities, the degree to which it is a dissatisfied power, the domestic structure of authority and democratization, and the likely impact of complex interdependence on China’s behavior. This chapter is concerned with China’s potential as a challenger to the United States and the current international system.

The East Asia regional system As argued above, the US dominates a unipolar global system, but in the East Asian regional system, the structure of power fits more closely a bipolar division of power within the region, with power and influence shared between the US and China. Some analysts have argued that the system structure in East Asia is tripolar, with the US, China and Japan each representing a pole. But the bipolar structure more accurately describes East Asia since at this point Japan is a power with a unique history and political culture, and unlike China and the US, it does not now and is unlikely to become a conventional political and military power playing a normal active military role in the world anytime soon. Great powers, worthy of being poles in an international structure, attain polar status because a combination of economic, military and leadership achievements make them a great power. Japan has excelled mainly in one sphere: economics. But there are signs that Japan is moving gradually toward a broader international role and its economic capabilities would allow a rapid transformation of its role if it could be managed politically.1 While China may eventually compete with the US for global influence, at present its power is largely limited to the region. And it is no longer the case, as during the cold war, that the worldwide structure of power governs the regional structure of power. Although the US is in a military class by itself, it needs allies to provide bases, and its military resources are well below cold war levels (Betts, 1993–4: 39; Friedberg, 1993–4: 3). But the only power able to compete with the US at this time in East Asia is China, an established power on the Asian mainland. The US has fought one full-scale war with China (Korean War), has fought North Vietnam with China in a supporting role in the Vietnam War, and has been involved more than once in sparring between China and Taiwan over the relationship that is to pertain between them, going back to the civil war in the 1940s. The US had a de facto alliance with China against the Soviet Union from 1972 until the early to mid-1980s when the Chinese began to reassess the relative balance of forces and their position vis-à-vis both countries (Harding, 1992: 119–25). Absent the Soviet threat China will have some interests identical to those

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of the US (a peaceful and stable Asia, stability on the Korean peninsula, vigorous trade, investment and cultural exchanges between the two countries, common concerns with terrorism), but on balance it will be a strategic competitor with the US, not a strategic partner. After the events of September 11, 2001, China and the US are emphasizing their common interests in countering terrorism, but this euphoria may wear thin as other issues intrude, especially if the US efforts in Afghanistan appear to be leading to a permanent presence in Central Asia. In many ways, the two countries have a mirror image of each other, as an article in Liberation Army Daily makes clear. The author argues that the US policy of ‘seeking peace with strength’ is a policy for practicing hegemony under the pretext of seeking peace . … The United States should face reality squarely, go with the trend of the world, change its course, abandon its policy of strength, pursue a foreign policy of peace and cooperation, and really try to become a responsible big country in the international system. (Zhao, 2001) If the country name were changed, such a statement could be a comfortable description of China for many American analysts, particularly those of a conservative or hardline orientation. Most would agree that China should face reality and focus on cooperation rather than a military build-up. The mirror images held by both sides illustrate the perils that lie ahead as China becomes more powerful and the competition between the two countries becomes intense. Both countries have an interest in avoiding the rapid emergence of Japan as a major military or nuclear power that would incite fears throughout Asia about its intentions and strategy. China deplores the 1996 changes to the US–Japan mutual defense treaty because it appears from the Chinese vantage point to be aimed at creating an anti-China Asian system, and China will undoubtedly continue to take advantage of this argument to influence Asian countries where the historical fear of Japan is still real.2 But the Chinese leadership certainly also takes comfort from the resulting influence which the US exercises over Japan as a result of the treaty (Betts, 1993–4: 58). China already has a substantial role in decisions, policies and organizations that are important in determining the future of East Asia. And at this point, China is more concerned with regional influence than with a decisive global presence. The potential of challengers other than China cannot be fully discussed here. Japan’s potential as a challenger to the US in Asia is limited

China: Challenging Regional Power 61

by its population of less than half that of the US, it narrow island base, its dependence on outside sources of energy and resources, handicaps in becoming a regional power; but these are not prohibitive. It is very unlikely, given its status as a developed country, that Japan will ever challenge the US globally. The more immediate reason Japan will not become a conventional power and challenge the US in the next generation is the legacy of World War II, the constitutional prohibitions and the anti-military culture, norms and processes that continue to dominate Japanese politics and inhibit development of a Japanese garrison state and a normal military role in the region. In spite of the relative ease with which Japan’s wealth could be translated into military might, working within the framework of the US–Japanese alliance is much more probable than a challenge to the dominant power. Japan is, by and large, a satisfied state, although there has been a slow but steady movement in Japan toward a larger and more ‘normal’ military. That trend seemed likely to continue at a very measured pace under elected Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi who has called for constitutional revision, abolition of war-renouncing article 9, and an end to the ‘lie’ that the ‘self-defense forces aren’t an army.’ But he has not followed through on these changes.3 Until Japan undertakes to play a more conventional military role, it must be considered a special case, and an ally rather than a challenger or a pole in a balance-of-power system. Other potential challengers include Russia and India. Russia is preoccupied with domestic political unrest and grave economic problems. Now shorn of a fifth of the territory of the Soviet Union, it retains only slightly over half of the population and its economy has diminished to that of a mid-sized Western European country. In 2000, its GDP was smaller than that of Italy and Brazil, but nearly twice that of Indonesia (Betts, 1993–4: 48; World Bank, 2001b). Russia is still a major nuclear power and plays key roles on the UN Security Council and in international economic institutions such as the G8. Cooperation between China and Russia to thwart US objectives in Asia is possible and in July 2001 they signed a treaty of friendship and cooperation. But the deep historical antagonism and suspicion between the two countries, and Russia’s shift toward closer alignment with the US since the events of September 11 and the growing pro-democracy and pro-Western orientation of the Russian people suggest Russia can be persuaded to limit its embrace of China and attempt to maintain an amicable relationship with the US (Sino-Russian treaty, 2001; Colton and McFaul, 2001; Kaiser, 2001; Lipman, 2001). In any case, it is unlikely to have the economic capacity to mount an effective comeback in the next couple of decades.

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India will be able to act as a challenger to the dominant order only in the distant future, but by then may well be outpaced by China. If it can match China’s pace of development, it could eventually be situated to compete for global leadership. Already the dominant power in South Asia, recent nuclear tests gave it the status of a nuclear power and thus potential as a global power. It is assuming an increased role in Southeast Asia with its ‘look East’ policy that has expanded economic ties, cultural contacts, diplomatic engagement and military activities including exercises with Vietnam. India has begun reforms that are opening up its longrestricted economic system, and encouraging innovation and foreign investment. Projections of its economic growth and military power into the first 15 years of the 21st century are impressive, one study suggesting that in 2015 India will have a GNP 82 percent that of Japan, and military capital that is 72.4 percent of China’s. These are hopeful figures, and although India currently lags behind China in total numbers of tanks and fighter planes, it exceeds it considerably in the number of advanced systems. India also lags behind both China and Japan in per capita GDP and in literacy. Tammen is particularly optimistic about India’s chances of emerging as a successful challenger (Manor and Segal, 1998; Council on Foreign Relations, 2001: 19; Wolf, 1995: 17, 52, 11; Brzezinski, 1997a: 156; Menon and Enders, 2000; Tammen, 2000: 176–81). Geography is a limiting factor for India’s role in Asia. Blocked from Northeast Asia by the Himalayas, and, except for Myanmar, bordering on no Southeast Asian country, India’s role in East Asia will be limited unless it attains overwhelming military power in the Asian theater, an unlikely possibility. Some have argued the potential for Japan making common cause with India and possibly Russia and Vietnam, to oppose and challenge China. India and Japan did agree to form a ‘global partnership’ in 2000 in New Delhi (IISS, 2001b: 184). While such a grouping has potential, India continues to be preoccupied with Pakistan, a focus that is not conducive to involvement in East Asia nor to enhancing global influence. It should be noted that the Chinese analysts also view both Japan and India as potential challengers, Japan especially being viewed by many as likely to surpass the US (Pillsbury, 2000).

China as a challenger Political/economic capabilities China is threatening to regain its former preeminent economic position. From the tenth to the fifteenth century it had the largest per capita income

China: Challenging Regional Power 63

in the world. But outside agriculture, the dominance of China’s bureaucratic system prevented the emergence of an independent entrepreneurial bourgeoisie such as emerged in Europe (Maddison, 1998: 13–14). China’s potential as an emerging power, however, is undisputed. From the beginning of reform in 1978 through 1993, real GNP expanded at an average rate of over 9 percent per year so that real output almost quadrupled … this was the fastest growth of any country in the world … [it was] more than twice as great as the average of all developing economies and even exceeded that of all of the other newly industrializing economies in East Asia. (Lardy, 1994: 3) The official figure for economic growth, from 1978–96 is 9.9 percent. Many believe these figures are too high and that the actual rate for this period may be as low as 7.9 percent. Regardless, during the period of reform there has been a drastic reduction in the percentage of the population living in poverty, from 28 percent in 1978 to less than 10 percent in 1985 (Lardy, 1998: 9, 1). If one assumes that China can maintain a reasonable economic growth rate and that it is able to maintain domestic stability, in the size of its economy it will overtake the United States in the not-too-distant future, as discussed below. This is not an unreasonable assumption since Chinese per capita income has grown at a rate of 10.7 percent over the last decade, and by 6 percent from 1978–95, faster than any other Asian country except South Korea. A Chinese growth rate in GDP of 5.5 percent, or 4.5 percent GNI per capita would be considerably less than the per capita growth achieved by Hong Kong (5.0), Japan (7.2), Korea (6.8), Singapore (7.2), and Taiwan (7.0) after they reached China’s 1995 level of income (Maddison, 1998: 59, 17). Some analysts have even more optimistic projections. But even assuming China surpasses the US in the size of the economy, it will still lag behind in both per capita income and military power (Tammen, 2000: chapter 7; Swaine and Tellis, 2000: chapter 1). China’s success in maintaining economic growth, curtailing population growth and maintaining stability certainly provide ground for optimism for future development, but here conclusions depend heavily on one’s assumptions. In the debate over China’s political and economic prospects, an observer could be pardoned for believing that the protagonists are talking about two different countries (Goldstone, 1995; Huang, 1995; Waldron, 1995). China is an inviting target for such a debate. The present system has its origins in a popular takeover by the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1949,

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the Chinese equivalent of the 1868 Meiji Restoration in Japan, and it has forever after followed a highly unorthodox path toward the development and establishment of a strong Chinese state (Maddison, 1998: 15). Departing from Stalinist central planning and development of heavy industry, it embarked on Mao’s own developmental great leap forward involving mobilization of rural citizens, their organization into communes and wild claims of the victory of motivation over technology. The result was widespread famine and the deaths of 30 million people. A second mass mobilization, the cultural revolution, this time aimed at purging Mao’s opposition and reeducating the rest of the population, resulted in massive disruption and ultimately the growth of cynicism among the populace. After Mao’s death, Deng Xiaoping softened the dictatorial role of the party and began extensive economic reforms using economic incentive to encourage entrepreneurship. China is now faced with carrying out economic reforms and continuing its record of rapid growth, with an outmoded political system which falls short of meeting China’s needs, but impedes the development of alternatives. Some argue that the only way the government can compensate for the shortcomings of the compromised and undemocratic ruling communist party and leadership in order to prevent massive civil unrest, is to sustain a rapid growth rate in order to gain a substitute legitimacy. There is reason to doubt the conventional wisdom that the government otherwise lacks support and legitimacy. Yasheng Huang cites survey findings which suggest the system has considerable support. Surveys conducted in 1990 found that 57 percent of respondents considered their government fair, slightly lower than the corresponding number for Germany (65 percent), but higher than Italy (53 percent). Chen Ziming, later sentenced to jail for 13 years by the government, found in 1987 that 50 percent of the respondents gave positive answers to six out of ten questions assessing various aspects of communist rule. Sixty-nine percent of respondents expressed confidence in the central government. Later studies have produced similar results (Chen, 2002). Huang castigates foreign journalists for pessimistic reporting on widespread dissatisfaction with the government without providing solid evidence (Huang, 1995: 56). But what if it is legitimate? Will economic growth be sufficient to sustain the regime? Some economists believe that extrapolation of past growth into the indefinite future is ‘highly problematic.’ Observers put too much emphasis on factors showing success, and ignore deep structural problems. Reform will need to accelerate significantly for China to maintain moderately rapid economic growth. China’s growth rate in the early 1980s reflected the boost it got from the one-time agriculture reforms

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restoring household farming and markets, and from the creation of nonstate owned enterprises in the mid-1980s. But the latter slowed because of competition among the enterprises and the lack of a process to obtain credit, which was diverted to the state owned sector, and decreased demand. Increased benefits from the foreign sector kicked in from 1985–97, with exports growing at an average annual rate of 27.7 percent and foreign direct investment (FDI) at the rate of more than 30 percent. This growth was coming to an end by the mid-1990s, the state owned sector was dragging down efficiency and the growth in domestic consumption was stagnating as well. In addition to bank liabilities and increasing corruption, it also highlights the government’s budgetary problems, resulting from the decentralization of control over economic activities and the rapid growth of the non-state sector. As a result, the budget revenue of the central government had declined to only 10.7 percent of GDP by 1995. The process of creating a stable ‘socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics’ on a self-sustaining path of economic growth is ‘not only incomplete but problematic.’ Two of the most pressing problems are the large liabilities of banks and economic enterprises relative to their assets. It will be difficult to find the required capitalization to deal with this debt (most of it generated in the 1990s). Added to this are other problems, such as environmental deterioration, infrastructure needs, especially roads, and the problem of sustaining agriculture growth. The World Bank estimates the cost of environmental degradation in China to be 3.5 to 7.7 percent of GNI, a cost that will double by the year 2020 if present policies are maintained. Air pollution in China is among the worst in the world, and two-fifths of the monitored river sections flowing by cities do not even meet the standards for irrigation water (Dernberger, 1999; Lardy, 1998: especially chapter 5). Lardy accepts the prediction of the World Bank that the rate of economic growth will fall to five percent by the year 2020. Questions have long been raised about the accuracy of Chinese economic statistics. One analyst is particularly sceptical of figures for economic growth since the late 1990s. Focusing primarily on political pressures to inflate data, he questions how China’s growth experience could so far exceed that of other Asian countries and how high growth statistics mesh with energy use, and falling prices and unemployment and other anecdotal evidence since 1997. He suggests the real growth rate may be more like half of the 7.6 percent claimed for 1998–2001 (Rawski, 1999, 2002,). Others find such pessimism unjustified. China has been much more careful in management of foreign debt than many developing countries, and it has been very successful in taking advantage of World Bank

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assistance for the biggest multi-national development effort in history. The quality of leadership is excellent, and the elite’s technical competence is on par with the best in the developing world. Zhu Rongji has assembled a great team and China should get high marks for its forthright dealing with domestic crises (Bouttellie, 1999). Others decry the ‘common and rather condescending mistake’ made by some foreign analysts of China, which is to offer a long list of problems faced by Beijing and then forget to mention that China’s elites are ‘smart enough to do something about them’ (Betts and Christensen, 2000–1: 21). One future-oriented analysis of the new fourth generation of leadership, the generation following Jiang Zemin, justifies more optimistic expectations. The most remarkable change among the ruling elite in China has been the rising education level. In terms of a college education, the proportion of the Politburo leadership having college degrees jumped from 23 percent in 1978 to 92 percent in 1998. Comparable figures for the party Central Committee were 26 percent and 92 percent. Lower level positions showed similar change. Among provincial leaders, 20 percent had college degrees in 1982 compared to 95 percent in 1998. A ‘technocracy’ dominates the decision making, with the leadership having an impressive array of advanced degrees. The experts’ ‘takeover’ is particularly noticeable in banking and finance. The new fourth generation of leaders, some of whom are even now the top staff of the men currently in power, are more diverse and more heterogeneous in terms of ideology, educational background, career path and policy preferences. They will take power in a system that is led by a communist party but one that bears only partial resemblance to the system of thirty years ago and is beset with problems that have accompanied the rapid change and development within the country. Compared to past generations of leaders, they will be more aware of their own limitations, and ‘more inclined to assess costs versus benefits when they make decisions.’ They will likely govern with greater emphasis on collective leadership, operate in a more representative and democratic system and project a better international image for China (Li, 2001). But pessimists argue that the small amount of cultivatable land available for China’s large population, the contradictions between the growing population and the need for flexibility in meeting economic needs on the one hand, and the communist party dictated economic and political control on the other, will lead to collapse in China in 10–15 years. Citing the growing experience of freedom and the consequent rising expectations, the necessity for tens of millions to migrate from the countryside, the growing incidence of peasant uprisings and the demise

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in central authority in favor of the regions, and continued harassment of the business community, a replay of 1911 (when the Qing dynasty collapsed) is predicted (Goldstone, 1995). To this list of problems can be added a growing dependence on imported oil, with a fivefold increase in the oil deficit likely (Calder, 1997: viii and chapter 3; Downs, 2000: 1). Supporting this line of reasoning, a recent study done by the party central committee found a spreading pattern of ‘collective protests and group incidents’ arising from economic, ethnic and religious conflicts. It paints a picture of mounting public anger over inequality, corruption and official aloofness manifest by large protests sometimes involving groups as large as ten thousand people. The report says the income gap is approaching ‘alarm level’ with the gap widening between coast and interior, city and countryside, and it suggests that when changes required for admission to the WTO are implemented, many of these tendencies will be exacerbated. It points to corruption as the ‘main fuse exacerbating conflict between officials and the masses.’ Interestingly, the report was made available to the press (Eckholm, 2001). Different measures of inequality between regions suggest different conclusions on whether inequality is increasing, but it seems clear that by world standards it is very high.4 And while there is devolution of economic authority to the regions, some intentional on the part of the center, some not, no such thing has happened in foreign or security policy. While some provinces or regions may conduct trade and other international transactions, since 1989 control of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been significantly recentralized. Restrictions on troop movements and access to weapons and munitions ensures that there is ‘no such thing as a Xinjiang or Shandong foreign policy.’ Nonetheless, a key issue in assessing China’s ability to aggregate economic production for development and defense purposes is the central government’s ability to make national allocation decisions. To the extent that the central government does not control these resources, its ability to increase military power will be jeopardized. Tax revenues as a percentage of GDP have dropped from 30 percent in 1989 to 12 percent in 1998 (Shambaugh, 1996: 195–6; Tammen, 2000: 156, 164–5).5 But the counter argument to these catastrophic predictions is convincing. Present day China has made big gains in providing a more open and responsive system for its citizens. Elections for village-level officials have now been held in 80 percent of the Chinese villages in the countryside, some apparently competitive with substantial turnover of officials. The average tenure for provincial officials (appointed at the center) has declined with the progressive introduction of reforms, and the number of

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provinces represented on the Politburo has increased. The government is able to collect the revenue required to govern, inflation is low compared, for example, to Eastern Europe, and critics of the present system overestimate the kind of control pre-reform governments had. Furthermore, it is wrong to argue that local independence and autonomy are signs of political disintegration when they are granted by the central government to begin with. A recent book, devoted to the question of China’s continuing stability, concluded that ‘stable unrest’ may be the most likely state, with a ‘variety of kinds of popular turmoil repeatedly testing but not necessarily defeating the leadership’s ability to maintain control,’ and no particular group or grievance appears likely to successfully challenge the leadership in the near term (Huang, 1995; Shambaugh, 2000b; Whyte, 2000: 160). The argument for stability and continuity is more convincing than the one for disintegration and collapse. While the present regime in Beijing certainly has its shortcomings, the continued willingness to promote economic reform and a degree of political liberalization have allowed it to buy time, and probably will continue to dampen the threat of revolt. China has its problems, but they are not of a magnitude that is likely to lead to severe disruptions or the collapse of the system, although this cannot be ruled out. The pessimists, who are harshly critical of the regime’s chances, perhaps fail to put China’s accomplishments in the context of the other developing countries. The regime has come a long way in two decades of reform. Assuming that China will continue to be stable and to perform economically, we can posit three scenarios in the growth of its GDP. I have projected GDP growth for both the United States and China, using three different projections for China, 7.5 percent, 5.5 percent and 3.5 percent annual growth, and two for the US, 2.5 percent and 1.5 percent. I have used ppp methodology for all these projections. This method is considered by several analysts to be a more accurate indicator of the economic reality in China than exchange rate calculations, but it also has its critics and the two methods are far apart on their estimates of Chinese output (Wolf, 1995: 28; Maddison, 1998: 154; Studwell, 2002: chapters 4 and 7).6 Allowing for some inflation in official figures but assuming a continued robust economic performance, a 7.5 percent rate of growth for China and 1.5 percent for the US would allow China to surpass the US as early as 2011 or by 2014 assuming a 2.5 percent US growth rate (Figures 3.1 and 3.2). Assuming a 5.5 percent growth rate for Chinese GDP, a general slowing from the current commonly accepted growth rate as the economy matures, would postpone matching American output until 2016, or 2023 if one relies on the faster US growth rate. Using a 3.5 percent rate of growth,

50,000

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China 7.5% 30,000

20,000

China 5.5% US 1.5%

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0

China 3.5%

2010 2020 2000 Projections based on constant 2000 US$ Year

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Figure 3.1 China/US GDP projections (1) Source: World Bank, 2001b.

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Figure 3.2 China/US GDP projections (2) Source: World Bank, 2001b.

2030

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approximating Rawski’s more pessimistic assumption of the Chinese economic performance, would postpone a Chinese overtaking until approximately 2033, and paired with the faster US rate would, at best, postpone an overtaking far into the future. It should be noted that data based on exchange rate methodology would be much more conservative. Using the exchange rate methodology, even assuming the highest Chinese growth rate (7.5 percent) and the lowest US rate (1.5 percent), China would not surpass the US until after 2040. It is clear from the discrepancies in these figures that we not only cannot agree on a methodology for measuring the economic output of China, but there is also a wide range of estimates of the rate at which that output (whatever it might be) is growing. Moreover, total GDP is at best an approximate measure of China’s power and potential. The standard of living affects the resources that can be put into defense, and the reserves which allow a long-term commitment to high defense expenditures. We can posit fast, moderate and slow growth projections in GNI per capita (6.5, 4.5, and 2.5 percent) in China to match the varied projections of total GDP. Assuming growth at the rate of 6.5 percent, China would attain GNI per capita of $15,800 by 2022 (Figure 3.3), approximating that of Portugal, Greece or South Korea 35,000 30,000

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Figure 3.3 Projected GNI per capita growth for China Source: World Bank, 2001a.

2030

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in 1999. The attainment date would be postponed until 2033 using the 4.5 percent growth scenario, and using the slow growth scenario would be many decades in the future. China’s total GDP is impressive and according to more optimistic estimates will soon surpass the US, but its GNI per capita still lags far behind that of the US. All these economic indicators, however approximately suggesting the economic potential of China, are even more tenuous as indicators of the potential for military power. That capability is discussed below. Domestic authority and democratization ‘All states are not the same; and their internal characteristics … affect international politics importantly’ (Milner, 1993: 161). Foreign Minister Qian Qichen explained in 1990 that ‘[f]oreign policy is the extension of China’s domestic policies’ (Kim, 1998: 11). China’s domestic structure is not the same as the United States’, and just as we have in an earlier chapter drawn some conclusions on the impact of US domestic arrangements on its foreign policy and its reaction to a power transition, so we can with China. The Chinese leadership, while it realizes the need to ‘strengthen’ democracy and the rule of law if China is to continue to develop, is equally convinced that the introduction of ‘democracy as practiced in the Western world’ will lead to ‘great chaos’ and threaten peace and stability. President Jiang Zemin forcefully expresses this sentiment: ‘I can tell you with certainty: should China apply the parliamentary democracy of the Western world, the only result will be that 1.2 billion Chinese people will not have enough food to eat’ ( Jiang, 2001). China’s behavior as a challenger to the US as the primary power will be affected by the nature of authority and the level of democracy. Awareness of this fact in Southeast Asia is reflected in the remarks of Fidel Ramos, former president of the Philippines. How China exercises its potential political and military power must concern all the countries of the Asia-Pacific – and none more so than us in East Asia … That is why we all have a vested interest in the success of China’s market experiment. We want the market system to succeed in China. We want it to complete the process of inducing the spontaneous democratization already going on in the Chinese mainland: in village governments; in the mass media; in the internet; and even in the people’s congress – because a pluralistic China will not likely spring any surprises on its neighbors. (Ramos, 2000b)

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How has China’s domestic authority structure evolved and how is it likely to affect its foreign policy behavior? In early studies of the People’s Republic, ideology and organization frequently provided the themes for dissecting the direction and nature of the Chinese polity. And rightly so, since a rigidly organized party and government based on the principles of democratic-centralism, and a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology that inspired the leadership, provided solid information on the dynamics of Chinese politics (Schurmann, 1968). Today’s China displays only a pale shadow of yesterday’s institutions and ideology. Marxism-Leninism-Maoism provided a coherent if vague roadmap for the development of the revolutionary state, and when combined with a polity organized on the basis of democratic centralism, a formula for implementing socialism. The Chinese use terminology that suggests fidelity to the original ideological base, but also suggests something that might meet the modern criteria of a society based on law and democracy. According to Li Peng, the Chinese want to ‘institutionalize and legalize the democratic system, to give such a system law and stability.’ All this is part of the enterprise of ‘building socialism with Chinese characteristics …,’ which has been going on since 1978 (Li, 1998; Jiang, 1998). The credibility of the ideology has been stretched beyond the limit, after decades of alternate interpretations of an ideology that was supposed to provide omniscient and infallible guidance for everything from the personal life to national domestic and foreign policy. But over the years, the ideology has been used to justify blatantly contradictory foreign policies including: close alliance with the Soviet Union against the US in the 1950s, a split with the Soviets and standing alone against both superpowers in the mid- and late 1960s, de facto alliance with the US against the Soviet threat in the 1970s, and emphasis on creating a peaceful environment conducive to development in the 1980s and 1990s. Even more corrosive of the ideology were the equally contradictory efforts in domestic policy to justify virtual elimination of the private sector and Stalinist industrialization in the 1950s, both the great leap forward (1958–60) and the incredibly destructive party-wrecking cultural revolution (1966–76), and finally the introduction of free market methods and priority on rapid economic development that has characterized the post-Mao period (1976–). The intellectual gymnastics involved in just trying to fit the current economic system into a Marxist-Leninist framework of legitimacy suggest the enormity of the challenge. This is a system characterized by many of the attributes of capitalism, including the motivations of greed, selfishness, and getting rich. Yet, according to the Chinese, the present system is compatible

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with the same basic ideology that was used to justify the earlier systems. Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko counted 17 different terms scholars have contrived to attempt to explain this capitalist–socialist hybrid, a representative sample of which includes: ‘bureaucratic capitalism,’ ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics,’ ‘capital socialism,’ ‘local market socialism,’ ‘socialist corporatism,’ and ‘Confucian Leninism’ (Baum and Shevchenko, 1999: 333–4). In addition, the relaxation of party controls and the introduction of a partial market economy freed up part of the economy, but failed to introduce sufficient legal and institutional restraints to control the resulting corruption and self-seeking behavior, mechanisms that exist in successful capitalist societies. This too contributed to the collapse of ideological legitimacy, which has progressed to the point that, in the words of one observer The erosion of ideology has transformed it from a manual to something more like a catalogue from which the leadership can ‘order’ those items which suit its present purposes … ideology continues to have both prescriptive and proscriptive functions in Chinese foreign policy, but the entire system of thought is so broad and adaptive that no foreign policy behavior is excluded by it. (Levine, 1994: 45–6)7 The completely vacuous state of ideology today is beautifully captured by Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 statement that ‘[w]hatever is conducive to the development of productive forces, to the expansion of the aggregate national power and to the improvement of people’s living standards is socialist’ (Beijing Review, 1996: 21). By this inclusive criterion, any thriving economy can be called socialist. With the reforms begun in 1976, the private sector has been encouraged, state enterprises are being slowly disbanded and China is slowly being transformed into a society where capitalist and free enterprise features are more prominent. Considerable economic decentralization has taken place, but in his survey of the literature on the changes, Richard Baum found that the local state has also grown, attaining new resources and taking on new responsibilities. At the same time, the role of the party has declined, with reports of organizational demoralization and decay, lack of new recruits and even the disbanding of village party branches. While more local elections are being held, observers found that ‘[e]ven without meaningful democratization, structural changes … appear to be enabling villagers to say “no” more often and with greater effect,’ and the central government has also encouraged farmers to

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‘assert their rights and voice their grievances against despotic or corrupt local officials.’ While there are cases aplenty of local officials engaging in predatory behavior by local state agents, Baum concludes that ‘[w]hat has emerged, therefore, is a hybrid form of state–societal interdependence that is less firmly state-driven and state-dominated than the “organized dependency” model of the Maoist era, but more highly regulated and regimented than the civil society model’ (Baum and Shevchenko, 1996). The mix of remnant authoritarian structures and processes with democratic tendencies parallels wide variation in the composition of the mix across China. While some provinces have seen vast changes and rank high on various measures of domestic and foreign openness, others have changed little. For instance, as of 1994, in Heilongjiang, a total of 13.4 percent of gross value of industrial output (GVIO) came from the private and foreign-funded sector combined, with the balance from the state sector (69.3 percent) and the collective sector. In Guangdong, by contrast, the drastic changes during the reforms resulted in a total of 45 percent of GVIO from the private and foreign-funded sector combined, and 55.1 percent from the state and collective sectors combined. Zhejiang Province showcases some of the most dramatic changes in the political arena. There, in 1989 the provincial government introduced the practice of holding press conferences, and the provincial press has regularly reported contested votes, opinions and comments at the sessions of the Zhejiang Provincial People’s Congress. In 1993, the governor of the province was voted out of office and a new government was elected by the delegates to the provincial people’s congress without the approval of the communist party either at the local or the central level. Further, the results of the election were accepted by the central authorities. In response to social-economic changes of the reform era, new social organizations in the province have proliferated to mobilize their members, represent their interests to the government and look after welfare issues. While these organizations are not entirely independent of the state, they do represent a ‘social space’ between state and society. Zhejiang possesses a well-educated population with rapidly rising incomes, which are likely both cause and consequence of the relative openness to political and social changes (Goodman, 1997; Segal, 1997). In terms of ideology and organization, there would appear to be more autonomy and opportunity for the individual developing as China carries out its reforms. Henry Rowen provides data in 1996 on the burgeoning news business in China. Between 1980 and 1985, he counted 1008 newly founded newspapers, of which only 103 were controlled by

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the communist party. The mounting financial losses of government owned television stations and newspapers have resulted in some being sold to private operators. State owned channels are compelled by competition to alter their programming to increase competitiveness. Call-in programs increasingly feature celebrity interviews with liberal intellectuals. Access to foreign originated news programs has fluctuated since initial introduction in the 1980s, and seems to be determined by a mix of the government’s reluctance to allow some political content, particularly on Taiwan related subjects, and the reluctance of Chinese stations to face foreign competition. China’s internet users now number an estimated 22 million, and the government tries to juggle, on the one hand, the development and use of the World Wide Web required for the economy and communication within the society and the attempt to suppress and control what the regime considers illicit content on the other. While pessimists worry about the ability of authority to coopt individuals and the continued dominance of the collective sector, there seems little doubt that, on balance, China has ‘become much more open during the reform era’ (Goodman, 1997: 44; Almonte, 1997–8: 88; Editorial, 2001a; McDonald, 2001; Pomfret, 2001; Hachigian, 2001). Some local elections have been held, freedom of expression is greater and more information is available, there is greater freedom of movement, many more Chinese go abroad and information from abroad is much more available. And while legal safeguards and opportunities to prosecute cases through the courts is still in an embryonic stage, there is no doubt that China has made progress. Moreover, Chinese are now spared the relentless campaigns, and the self-criticism and criticism of colleagues that characterized the Maoist era. While Tiananmen represented raw repression through violence, the regime did allow the assembly of a more or less liberal group, a group with champions such as Zhao Ziyang and Hu Yaobang present in the highest circles of the leadership. While many aspects of Chinese political life are not very appealing from the perspective of citizens of established democracies, it is necessary to measure the progress that has been made as well as the distance still separating China from a functioning democracy. From the budding of local elections, the demise of ideology as a guide to behavior, the development of a market economy to the prevalence of new communication technologies, the diversity in lifestyle and clothes, the influx of tourists and foreign culture, China is being, slowly but surely, transformed.8 While China has so far made little progress toward real democratization, it is likely that the degree of democratization will increase in coming years, albeit probably slowly. Many analysts have commented on the

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growing nationalism in China (discussed below), and the need to channel that nationalist feeling will increasingly be a problem for the elite, even without further progress on democratization. Such problems would be exacerbated by an economic slowdown which would increase dissatisfaction and unrest. The high level of inequality in China, the hard lot of the peasants and the increasing unrest and frequency of rioting among them, the high level of corruption and increasing level of crime, and a major epidemic of kidnaping, prostitution and drug abuse noted in the mid-1990s suggest the regime may well have occasion to stir up nationalist fervor to distract attention from the failure of the present system to deal with discontent and the grievances of numerous groups in Chinese society (Baum, 1994; Eckholm, 2000). Certainly the Tiananmen experience has sensitized the leadership to the danger of threats to the regime. The leadership also appears to have learned that the preferred way of dealing with unrest is to use a foreign adventure to divert attention, rather than the costly method of repressing the protest. Both government and popular reaction to the accidental bombing by the US of the Chinese embassy in Serbia, the threats made over Taiwan, and the US surveillance plane incident suggest the potential in such an approach. The defense and foreign policy elite in China diverge in their opinions on international issues. As former president Clinton has reminded us, just as there are differences among US policy makers about China policy, so the Chinese elite diverge in their views of America, with tinges of paranoia visible among certain factions on both sides (Clinton, 1999). What particular configuration of leadership is dominant determines China’s policies. One general division that is visible is that between ‘internationalists,’ typified by Deng Xiaoping and focused on his redefinition of the objectives of socialist modernization as ‘peace and development,’ and the ‘nationalists,’ more closely associated with traditional realpolitik and the military. These are general tendencies among the elite, and it is difficult to identify specific groups and individuals that fit neatly in these categories. The internationalists include those with a more internationalist perspective focusing on ‘comprehensive security’ or ‘comprehensive national strength,’ who emphasize the non-military aspects of national power. Internationalists favor full engagement with the capitalist world economy, and membership in and support for international economic and political organizations. This entails, of course, the willingness to make China more receptive and inviting to foreign participation by upholding international copyright laws and other investment protections and engaging in an international human rights dialogue. These individuals, often located in the Ministry of Foreign

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Affairs (MFA), the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) and the foreign policy think tanks under the State Council, tend to downplay international competition and believe prestige can be obtained as much by economic achievements as by military preparedness. This perspective is receptive to the lessons of international interdependence and stresses the importance of scientific and technological achievements in providing the capabilities that represent international power and prestige.9 The nationalists, on the other hand, see themselves as the guardians of Chinese patriotism, ‘protecting China’s national identity and upholding its patriotism.’ They exude pessimism and mistrust, and adhere more closely than the internationalists to traditional realism: [N]ationalists are more likely to rely on the use of force when internationalists would prefer to negotiate; to prefer tactical (bilateral) partnerships to China’s participation in multilateral organizations; to exaggerate external dangers (and accuse internationalists of softpedaling them); and to exploit the contradictions of opening to overcome hegemonic forces that stand in China’s way. They are reluctant to give up or expose to foreign oversight national security assets such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. They are less concerned with the symbolic aspects of China becoming a great power and more concerned with the ability of the Chinese government to deal with threats and the benefits this may bring to specific constituencies. These individuals are concentrated especially in the defense organizations in the bureaucracy and in the military (Gurtov and Hwang, 1998: 4–9). A related question is the relative influence of the PLA in decision making. While some analysts stress the attempts to professionalize and control the military, the relatively elevated stature of Jiang Zemin compared to the undistinguished military leaders who may not be able to stand up to him, and the growing power of the economic bureaucracies, others point to evidence that the military has substantial influence on policy making, especially in foreign affairs ( Joffe, 1999). In the 1990s it is alleged that the PLA has sought to exert influence on relations with the US, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Britain, the South China Sea, nuclear testing and non-proliferation, arms sales, technology transfer and multilateral security, and has had an impact on bilateral security dialogues with Japan. The PLA has frequently been at odds with Qian Qichen and the foreign ministry, especially regarding the PLA’s caution on ‘multilateral security

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initiatives in Asia and calls for improved transparency in Chinese defense budgets, doctrine and force structure,’ these issues having been a ‘bureaucratic battleground between the PLA and the foreign ministry.’ Reportedly, many in the military perceived Qian Qichen and the foreign ministry as too prone to compromise, particularly with the US on issues such as trade, human rights, security and Taiwan (Shambaugh, 1997). It is also argued that this influence is facilitated since Jiang lacks the ‘implicit carte blanche’ from the military that Mao and Deng possessed. The increased professionalization of the military works two ways: on the one hand it limits the PLA’s influence to military matters and diminishes its impact on political affairs. On the other hand, while this more circumscribed role may suffice in ordinary times, if times become extraordinary and absent the constraints that existed under Mao and Deng, professionalism may make intervention more likely ( Joffe, 1999). It appears that the influence of the PLA in the foreign policy decision making process is substantial. Most analysts conclude that China still adheres primarily to traditional, nationalistic and Realpolitik approaches to international relations. While the West and to some degree other Asian countries are moving toward cooperative relations, interdependence, regional and international institution building and security transparency, China promotes more traditional approaches, including especially the defense of strict definitions of national sovereignty, based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, economic mercantilism, defense of territory and space and the development of military strength, especially promotion of the ability to project air and sea power in its sphere of influence. As Gerald Segal puts it, ‘China’s nineteenth-century attitude to sovereignty is particularly unsuited to the post-modernism of the twenty-first century.’ The Chinese often blame the US for abridging sovereignty around the world in the name of democracy, human rights, and so on, failing to admit that much of the rest of the world, including Southeast Asia and the Secretary General of the UN, also adhere in varying degrees to that philosophy (Deng, 1998; Wortzel, 1994; Segal, 1995: 72; Hoagland, 2001).10 Some of the inconsistency in Chinese demands and behavior can be attributed to the interplay between warring bureaucratic groups in Beijing, just as much of American policy reflects compromise and interplay arising from the divergent views within an administration or between the executive and the congress or pressure groups. These splits in the leadership of the challenging nation, little remarked on in the literature on power transitions, make it all the more important that the US be attuned to the impact of its policies on the ability of one perspective

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to become dominant. But for some years to come, while change is now visible in Chinese policy, it is likely that policy will continue to tilt toward a more traditional style and substance. Domestically, China is ruled by an authoritarian one-party state that has moved in the direction of liberalization and has allowed islands of diversity to proliferate, but the focus is still on control and allegiance to the collective. This domestic predilection is projected to the international realm where power politics triumphs over community and international preferences and subordinates both the rights of the individual and reliance on a free market. Nowhere is this tendency more obvious than in the position on Taiwan that the Chinese have held in recent years. Beijing in essence lays claim to Taiwan, seemingly oblivious to the international triumph in the twentieth century of the principle of self-determination for deciding the fate of peoples. The Chinese attitude is tempered only by the fact that, as Hong Kong suggests, the elites appear to think primarily in terms of symbolic incorporation of territory, rather than actual control. Changes will come only as China’s polity develops, and as it is socialized into the international community.

Nationalism Contemporary Chinese nationalism, defined as a sense of belonging to a group, an ‘imagined community’ that conveys to members a sense of solidarity, attachment, and purpose is a powerful motivator for an assertive China. The community is imagined because ‘the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’ (Anderson, 1983: 15). Chinese nationalism draws heavily on the sense of grievance and humiliation from over a hundred years of Western intrusion into and manipulation of China. Since the Opium War (1830–42), which allowed an aggressive West to expand its trading activities in China, including the export of opium and treaties that provided for extraterritorial privileges for foreigners, China has been seemingly incapable of repulsing a continually expanding foreign presence in China. This foreign intrusion, and the ineffective response of the Chinese in dealing with it remains an intense irritant and reminder of the inequality between China and the West. The twentieth century only intensified the mortification as Japan joined the game, defeating China in the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, making demands and gaining territorial concessions after World War I. The Nationalists’ attempt in the twentieth century to unify a divided China

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ruled by warlords was overtaken by the Japanese invasion in the 1930s and the communists’ successful effort to displace them in the civil war. This history of reaction and humiliation provides a cornucopia of opportunities on which to base nationalistic appeals in a time when China has achieved some economic success and appears to be a candidate for a prominent, and eventually perhaps, a dominant role in the world. The hallowed May 4 nationalist movement of 1919 provides a historical memory on which new affirmations of the greatness of China and one’s devotion to the decimation of its enemies can be built, especially among the educated younger generation. One writer asserts that ‘[if ] one thing is certain about China, it is that nationalism is on the rise. The military and political hardliners are riding this wave, advocating tougher policies toward the United States. More noteworthy, however, is that the traditionally pro-Western intellectuals are becoming more and more disillusioned with American policy, and their indignation is echoed by ordinary people …’ (Wang, 1996: 139; Whiting, 1995). Greg Sheridan reports that his experience with Chinese officials is that the younger and more internationally savvy they are, the more nationalistic they tend to be (Sheridan, 1999: 121). If democratization and interdependence are forces slowly pushing China toward being a responsible member of the international community, then nationalism is the most likely motivation for expansionist tendencies. One analyst opined, after reviewing the Chinese military threat perceptions, that ‘[it] may seem to outside observers that China’s only fear is fear itself’ (Whiting, 1997b: 351). But to many Chinese, there are numerous real threats in the international environment, especially threats generated by the US. The US dominates the western Pacific Ocean and the seas around China. It is conspiring to prevent China from incorporating Taiwan into the PRC, finally terminating the Chinese civil war. It is also taking advantage of China’s need for technology and economic growth to exploit and humiliate China, and is forcing its values of human rights and liberalization on China, promoting ‘peaceful evolution’ as a strategy for undermining the sovereign Chinese government. The South China Sea area, including the Spratly and Paracel Islands, is viewed as an area over which China has jurisdiction and legitimate interests, but China is frustrated in fulfilling these aspirations by the US and a plethora of Southeast Asian countries with which it contests for jurisdiction. Japan has never properly atoned for its historical role in World War II, is in alliance with the US and is increasing its military build-up which threatens Asian stability and China’s proper role in Asia. More minor threats or irritants to China include separatist sentiment in the north and west of China, especially

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pan-Islamic and pan-Turkic subversion; separatist tendencies in Tibet encouraged by outside elements such as the Dalai Lama and the US, and border or territorial problems or disputes with Myanmar, Russia, Vietnam, Japan, and India (Whiting, 1997b; Swaine and Tellis, 2000: 129–33). No matter the nature or seriousness of these concerns in the eyes of outsiders, an intense nationalism affects both mass and elite Chinese perceptions of existing threats. Historically, particularly in the modern era, a deep-seated tension has existed in China between those who favor self-reliance and avoidance of interaction with outside parties and those who believe openness and cooperation with foreigners is a preferable strategy. China’s vulnerability to attack from a variety of surrounding and distant states, the belief that domestic instability invites foreign aggression, a Chinese sense of cultural superiority, and the historical self-sufficiency of the Chinese state have all contributed to a preference for avoiding dependence on foreign powers and resources. This preference has contributed to an ‘undercurrent of extreme xenophobia’ in China that continues today (Swaine and Tellis, 2000: 79–86). And while some in China do advocate alteration and adaptation of core Chinese values to provide a better fit with the realities of the modern world, others justify contact and interaction with the rest of the world primarily as a temporary measure to build China’s strength and independence, an attempt to use foreign values for the immediate goals of increasing China’s economic and military competitiveness. Illustrative of the latter case is the comment of a young Chinese scholar that ‘I want to learn English so that I can help create a society in which my children will not have to learn that language’ (Madsen, 1995: 198). Chinese nationalism is fueled by a sense of grievance for the way China has been treated through history and its inability to realize its legitimate aspirations and the prerogatives to which it is entitled, but has been denied. Specifically, some of the ideas that have popular acceptance among Chinese can be summarized as follows: 1. The Chinese are a great people, and China is a great nation. 2. The Chinese nation deserves a much better fate than that which it has experienced in the modern world. 3. China should be accorded compensatory treatment from those powers which have insulted or injured it in the past. 4. As a great nation, China naturally occupies a central position in world affairs and must be treated as a Great Power. 5. China’s national sovereignty must be respected absolutely, and such respect precludes any foreign criticism of China’s internal politics.

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6. China’s special virtue in international affairs consists in the fact that its foreign policy is based not on expediency but on immutable principles that express universal value such as truth and equity. These Sino-centric ideas can be characterized as a request for a sort of international affirmative action, and are based on the idea that China, in a special category as an especially put-upon nation, should be held to a different standard than other countries (Levine, 1994: 43–5).11 Chinese nationalism does reflect the breakdown of community and solidarity, beginning, certainly with the injustices and invasion by the West of a century and a half ago, but it also reflects the intensification of the interaction with the world that began with the establishment of normalized relations with the US. Nationalist feelings follow the long period of China’s slide downward in the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century, the disruptions of the great leap forward and the cultural revolution, and finally, the post-Mao opening of the country to the rest of the world. The Chinese were suddenly forced to grapple with the questions of values and the optimal mode of development, in a way that they had previously avoided. Great numbers of Chinese were ‘now suddenly forced to question the moral superiority of their familistic particularism, their respect for authority, their concern for social order, their quest even for a politically unified national society.’ When horizons expand, people ‘within a culture start to think what before was unthinkable’ (Madsen, 1995: 214–15). In addition, since the Tiananmen incidents in 1989, many Chinese have questioned their understanding of US values and democracy. Democracy in the Soviet Union and some of the Eastern European countries has not lived up to expectations, and for many Chinese in the post-cold war order, which they believe the US dominates, China is frozen out of its proper role and influence in spite of the economic gains it has made. In the 1970s and 1980s, China was courted by US leaders who valued China for its strategic importance in the cold war. But in the 1990s, China had little role in major events, including the Gulf War and the NATO action against Yugoslavia (Miles, 2000–1: 54). This nationalism is psychologically defensive, but it can be a motivator for aggressive action. In 1987, Michel Oksenberg described China’s ‘confident nationalism,’ a patient and moderate nationalism based on the belief that ‘China can obtain wealth and power while preserving its national essence … [and that] the international setting permits a concentration on domestic development’ allowing China, in time, to regain its former greatness. While these beliefs still play an important role in China’s politics and outlook, the sharper and more xenophobic nationalism of the

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1990s reflects the aftermath of Tiananmen, the traumas of continuing modernization, and the concern over what the Chinese perceive as unchecked American power (Oksenberg, 1987; Yi, 1994). Today’s nationalism is dark and pessimistic, portraying a megalomaniacal United States bent on taking over the world at China’s expense. The hegemonic United States forces China into a conundrum where it can choose to have relations with the US to improve its economic situation, but in return it is forced to cede its political independence and subject itself to the threat that US values pose to its world view and society. It is the goal of ‘hostile forces at home and abroad to subvert the socialist system in China, to turn China into a vassal state dependent on the Western superpowers.’ Relatively minor issues such as hosting the year 2000 Olympics become important grievances for which the US is responsible, and which indicate US perfidy. The Chinese refer back to June 3, 1840, the first day of the burning of drugs, denoting resistance to the opium trade along the China coast (Wang, 1997; Whiting, 1995; Yi, 1994; Miles, 2000–1). It connotes a state unsure of its identity which is obsessed with dates far back in history. China faces the problem of a communist state that must face a new post-cold war world where rapid change is the norm. One way to deal with that change is to make use of the old collectivist culture, institutions, parties and personnel, but to christen the mixture with nationalism instead of the Marx-Leninist canon. This formula allows an aggressive leadership to enlist the old institutions and actors under the banner of ‘new’ anti-foreign nationalist ideas for nefarious purposes. Fortunately, China so far has been cautious and restrained in exploiting this mixture. For the most part the leadership has chosen to focus the nation’s energy on economic development, but in the event of economic failure or foreign policy crisis, the temptation to use this volatile nationalist brew for diversionary purposes will be strong. One indication of the potential for using nationalist sentiments was evident in the aftermath of the May 8, 1999 US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, which was almost universally described in China as a purposeful act with the aim of humiliating China. Stating that ‘the US tendency to use force or the threat of force has strengthened instead of weakening since the cold war,’ a People’s Daily Observer in a harsh article said that the US war of aggression against Yugoslavia marks the start of its new strategy of world hegemony. NATO has changed from a collectivist defense organization into an adventurist, expansionist and aggressive military bloc. A second article saw the ‘raid on the embassy’ as a signal that NATO is ‘speeding up the pace of its containing China.’

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The government’s normal practice of trying to control and limit public demonstrations was jettisoned in this case and signals were sent that protests would be tolerated. The leadership knows the danger of using such incidents as escape valves for pent-up frustration, and it walked a fine line both with actions that encouraged the demonstrations (busing demonstrators to demonstration sites) and three or four days later taking actions to discourage the public outbursts (public statements asking for restraint and asking university officials to discourage protest) (Observer, 1999; Editorial, 1999; Miles, 2000–1). Public outrage over foreign events can be used to finesse crackdowns in the domestic arena. One piece of evidence for this is the events following the unveiling by Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui of his ‘two state theory’ on July 9, 1999, suggesting that Taiwan be treated as a state rather than as a part of a greater China. Beijing followed the announcement with furious rhetoric and stepped up activity by the Chinese air force in the Taiwan Strait, but in two weeks’ time Beijing’s attention shifted suddenly to the suppression of the Falun Gong. Even though the government had done almost nothing to curb the movement, even after a provocative demonstration of 10,000 cult members outside the party headquarters in Beijing, an area off-limits to demonstrations, on July 22 it initiated a crackdown on the organization. It is tempting to conclude that the suddenness and severity of the crackdown was for the purpose of ‘drawing attention away from the Taiwan issue and onto the “threat” posed by the cult instead.’ As China begins to meet its obligations to move its economy to more closely resemble a market economy, the increased dislocation and disruption of state owned and inefficient areas of the economy will increase the potential for domestic unrest. The pressure to distract public attention by highlighting the grievances China has against the rest of the world will increase (Miles, 2000–1).12 The high level of nationalist sentiment, and the already discussed potential for the intensification of those trends as China continues liberalization of its economy, and probably of its polity, mean that in the years to come tapping this sentiment can be a potent tool for Beijing. It can be used as a means of putting pressure on foreign governments, but also as a means of diffusing protest at home. Jiang Zemin told Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary General, that China has no plan to seek outward expansion, and will not practice ‘hegemonism’ (Beijing Review, 1997a). But the expression of nationalist sentiment and the temptation to mobilize it for the purposes of maintaining political support and position will be a major temptation for China’s leaders. Whether they succumb to the temptation will be influenced, but not determined, by the military capabilities available to them.

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Military capabilities The pace and timing of China’s emergence as a military power capable of forcing changes in the status quo in East Asia is difficult to pinpoint. On the one hand, if one speaks of China’s emergence as a global power, it is hard to envision how such a China would evolve from the presentday country. A global power would not only have military, technological and economic capabilities that would give it influence on a global level, it would also have political and social appeal that gave it some legitimacy and appeal as a world leader (Brzezinski, 2000: 8). Even if China’s polity remains stable and the economy continues to perform, it is not clear how the current China could metamorphose into an attractive political/social/cultural model. In interviews conducted in China, Avery Goldstein noted that his interlocutors often noted the lack of any universal appeal to China’s ‘pragmatic, eclectic socio-economic programme’ (Goldstein, 2001: 862). But China is already an important power in Asia. The test of a Chinese sphere of influence ‘can be defined as one in which the first question in the various capitals is, “What is Beijing’s view on this?” ’ (Brzezinski, 1997b: 60). But thanks to the US presence and China’s military weakness, there are still important checks on its ability to exercise military power. Even if China continues its current economic growth rate, there are many questions about how quickly it will be able to modernize its military and how fast, if at all, it will be able to narrow the gap between its capabilities and those of other powers. Estimates on when China will be a dominant power in the region or a ‘serious threat’, vary from the year 2004 to the years 2030 to 2050.13 The Chinese, in the process of building a modern industrial base and training a skilled workforce, face the task of modernizing a backward and ground-based military into one that can project power at sea and in the air. But making their military competitive with other countries means they are dealing with a moving target, since the competitors already ahead of them are also modernizing with the technologies of the revolution in military affairs (RMA), displayed most effectively by the US in the Gulf War and the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan. The Chinese are faced with finding ways to close this technological chasm by either developing the skills, technologies and plants to produce their weapons and equipment, or by purchasing them. Purchasing has the drawback that the developed producer countries will be reluctant to sell their most advanced technology, and if they are willing to sell, the Chinese will then become dependent on the vagaries of a foreign source of supply (You, 1999: 13). China is not alone in having a less than modern military, but several Southeast Asian

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countries are more technologically advanced. Nonetheless, there is no country in East Asia that ‘now or foreseeably – possesses true power projection forces,’ much less the advanced technologies and information management capabilities that will continue to be developed in the 21st century. In assessing military potential, ‘too many commentators dwell on the detailed technical elements of arms acquisitions without probing the doctrinal and logistics aspects that are vital to an understanding of combat potential …’ (Dibb, 1997: 348, 351). The gap between the Chinese military and the US is obviously the largest, and China’s view of the future battlefield was fundamentally affected by its observation of the new technology in the Gulf War, as it certainly will be by American operations in Afghanistan. But since the Gulf War, technology has moved on to another dimension of using communications and information-processing technologies together, and to integrate complex military information systems in real time. Crucial to this phase of development is technology, something that depends on innovative education systems, flexible organizational cultures, and the generation of which is certainly assisted by a reasonably open society where the military and civilian sectors can both contribute and share with each other their technical innovations and insights. It goes without saying that China has a long way to go on all of these dimensions. A systematic comparative assessment among countries of the 84 technology areas critical to the development and production of advanced military weapons found China substantially behind the US, Russia, Japan, Germany, the UK and France in almost all technologies. As the PLA’s own analyst put it, ‘The strong momentum of the world’s military development undoubtedly represents a grim challenge for our units’ quality building and military preparations against war’ (Cole and Godwin, 1999: 207). China does not have long-range bombers, has no aircraft carriers – it would need three carrier groups to maintain one on constant duty – lacks airborne warning and control systems (AWACS), is still perfecting its refueling capabilities and its fighter planes lack sufficient range to operate in the southern reaches of the South China Sea. Its submarine and surface fleet are inadequate and lack defenses against precision guided munitions, and its amphibious assault capability is improving for smallscale assaults in distant areas such as the South Sea islands, but larger-scale amphibious assault forces are still limited in capability against strong opposition forces (such as Taiwan).14 In-flight fueling capability has reportedly been obtained, and China has upgraded its fighter force with 50 Su-27s (a 1970-vintage aircraft) and Su-30s purchased from Russia, and

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reportedly will co-produce 200 additional Su-27s in China. Pursuant to extending the Navy’s combat capabilities beyond coastal defense, it has been upgrading its surface fleet, most notably with two Sovremennyclass guided missile destroyers purchased from Russia, equipped with Sunburn anti-ship missile capabilities. It is also adding approximately 20 principal surface combatants, including Luhu-class guided missile destroyers and Jiangwei-class guided missile frigates, to its navy. It has also purchased four Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines (which are quieter and therefore harder to detect) from Russia and will buy an additional 10 subs, and China is also producing the somewhat less quiet Song-class submarine (Goldstein, 1997–8; Pomfret, 2000; Dreyer, 1999). A recent study of the PLA Navy (PLAN) concluded that China still sees itself as a continental power and gives low priority to developing naval power. It shows little sign of being serious about building a navy capable of ‘extended large-scale assault operations,’ as opposed to ‘expanded coastal defense.’ If present trends continue, China will continue modernization of a regional rather than a global navy, and even then will not be able to compete with American power within the East Asian region (Cole, 2001: conclusion). After a decade of priorities focusing on domestic development needs and slighting defense, beginning in 1989 defense budgets began going up rapidly. How much China spends on defense is subject to a wide range of estimates, from a low of the official report of $17 billion to much higher figures. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) estimates Chinese defense spending at more than $41 billion, almost the same as Japan’s. Almost all agree that the official figures drastically under-report the actual expenditures (Bitzinger, 1995). China’s real military expenditures grew 40 percent during the first half of the 1990s, and the official figure increased nearly 18 percent for 2001 (Goldstein, 1997–8: 42; Kim, 1999: 44; Foreign Ministry, 2001a; IISS, 2000: 200). China currently spends less than a quarter of what the US spends on defense, while supporting forces twice as large, and would have to spend $22–39 billion more annually for ten years to wield a force capable of significant power projection. China accounts for only 4.5 percent of global defense spending, while the US spends 33.9 percent of the total. China accounts for 25.8 percent of defense spending in East Asia and Australasia. By 2010, the US Defense Intelligence Agency reported, 10 percent of China’s military will have late cold war equivalent equipment, and be reasonably proficient at employing it. Gerald Segal suggests that the military gap in hightechnology arms may even be growing wider rather than narrowing (Gill and O’Hanlon, 1999: 56–8; Segal, 1999a: 29, 36).15 A RAND study of the

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Chinese air force reports that this large but antiquated force is mostly based on 1950s and 1960s technology and has little possibility of ‘emerging as a serious global offensive threat in the early 21st century,’ given current and expected political, economic and military conditions. Leadership and strategy, budgets, manpower and technology are all factors delaying modernization. Whether China attempts to buy aircraft, spares and equipment from abroad or to create an indigenous manufacturing capability, the expense will be tremendous (Allen et al., 1995). Some analysts, however, are more optimistic (US Department of Defense, 2002: 18). Japan’s production of the F2 fighter, armed with sophisticated airto-air missiles and with advanced AWACS support, ensures that it will dominate the East China sea. China’s most advanced domestically produced aircraft, the F8-11 is the equivalent of a 1960s US warplane and is not yet fully in operation. Japan’s large fleet of advanced surface ships, its superior technological base, and its low level of defense spending all add to its advantage. China also lacks the air and naval resources to defend the southern Spratlys. Indonesia, through large military exercises held near its Natuna Islands, has signaled China not to contest its claim to the economic zone around the island. In the northern Spratlys China can take destabilizing actions, as the 1988 action in the Paracels and the 1995 assault on Mischief Reef suggest, since this area is in reach of Chinese land-based aircraft (Ross, 1997; Caldwell, 1994: 15). The Chinese have many military liabilities. We need to remember, however, that they do have the capability to create extensive havoc and confusion which they may see as advancing their objectives, and their future emphasis may be on developing precisely those strengths that will allow them to act effectively as spoilers. They are following Deng’s view that ‘pockets of excellence’ should be developed in various technological areas which may be most useful in allowing China to disrupt and disable the advanced technology weapons on which the US relies heavily. Electronic warfare and other coordinated attacks, for instance, could be used to disrupt Taiwan’s command and control structures, or a variety of means could be used to counter the effectiveness of US aircraft carriers (Stokes, 1999). Given the American commitment to Taiwan, the US needs to be prepared for operations that may be unexpected, given overall Chinese capabilities. It is safe to predict that China will be unprepared for some time to take ‘effective action in those areas where it currently seems most prone to use military force, Taiwan and the Spratlys, and this even without the threat of US intervention … but this does not mean it could not create havoc near its borders (in Vietnam) or against a foe with a weak and poorly prepared military (the Philippines), or even

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against Taiwan if it were prepared to pay the costs – economic, political, and in international public opinion’ (Caldwell, 1994: 15).16 Elaborating on this point, Thomas Christensen maintains that it is clear that the Chinese will not catch up with the United States in military capabilities for many years. But to focus on this issue misses the point. With the right weapons, mining strategies that take advantage of the very weak US anti-mine capabilities, electronic warfare to disable or interfere with US capabilities, China is developing strategies to pose problems for the US, even though it cannot ‘win’ an engagement. This strategy could be particularly effective against Taiwan, if China were to carry out a blockade, for instance. And if Taiwan receives the military aid package offered by the Bush administration in April 2001, including eight SSK submarines, four Kidd-class destroyers and 12 P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft, it will narrow the gap between the Taiwanese and Chinese navies (IISS, 2001a: 173). The Korean war and the attack on Pearl Harbor both represent examples of cases where the US engaged in conflict with inferior powers, but suffered horrendous losses in the process. The Chinese pinpoint what they consider American weak points, the inability to sustain casualties, a weak sense of loyalty among allies and America’s commitment to various theatres, which spreads its forces thin. The Chinese may well underestimate American will and determination, as past enemies have done in previous wars. Nonetheless, Christensen’s point is an important one. The Chinese don’t have to win to cause their foes a lot of grief and damage to their interests. It would be unfortunate to underestimate the rate of increase of Chinese power, but it is equally unwise to exaggerate China’s capabilities and the extent of hostility in its intentions. Several factors have contributed to and may exaggerate the sense that China is a rapidly rising power. These include the high expectations for China stemming from its role in World War II and as a ‘great power,’ the low level from which China’s economic and military development began, the lack of transparency in its military development and the focus on strategic weapons and power projection, its lack of reluctance to use military force, and most recently its willingness to confront the US by harassing the surveillance plane flying along the China coast (Christensen, 2001; Goldstein, 1997–8). While its potential is clear and Asia acknowledges that, the political, economic and military shortcomings also impose real limitations on its strength for decades to come. Based on both the progress made and the prospects for China’s military development, there is certainly ample reason to doubt Organski’s optimistic prediction

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that China will become the globally dominant nation. Only by looking at China’s intentions and foreign policy objectives can we get a balanced picture of its likely impact on the US and the international system.

Is China a dissatisfied power? In addition to growing capabilities, the second crucial determinant of the behavior of a rising power, according to Organski and others, is whether or not it is a dissatisfied power. To this question, most analysts answer in the affirmative (Khalilzad et al., 1999: 4–16), but very little has been done to make this concept operational. A measure of when a state is dissatisfied is not well established in the literature on power transitions. Similarity of alliance portfolios has been proposed as one measure of satisfaction/dissatisfaction (Vasquez, 1996; Siverson and Miller, 1996), but it is not a very useful one in the case of China. Evidence of dissatisfaction presumably would include declared complaints about the current system, evidence of some alternative version of the system it envisions sketched out by the dissatisfied power, evidence of concrete steps being taken to right the perceived wrongs or to realize an alternative system. China has displayed various types of behavior, on a continuum from preserving the status quo to favoring radical change. Such behavior can be categorized as system maintaining, system reforming and system transforming. A possible reaction to the present system is to implement reforms and realize objectives by adapting itself to existing institutions and processes, pursuing its objectives and interests within the framework of existing rules. One example of such system reforming behavior on the part of China was its battle to bring about the replacement of the Republic of China by the PRC as the international representative of China in the UN.17 It worked within the context of the existing system to engineer a change it desired and which satisfied its interests. As a dissatisfied power, a second alternative would be to seek a transformed international system with law, rules processes, distribution of power or territorial changes more favorable to its objectives, interests and philosophical world view. It would labor to transform the system to one fitting its preconceived model, but would do so outside the designated rules and processes and without an international consensus. If China were to forcibly take over Taiwan without major provocative behavior on Taiwan’s part, such a reaction could certainly be considered system transforming, since no international consensus justifies such action, nor do rules or procedures exist to facilitate such behavior. A second example of (unsuccessful) system transforming behavior was China’s support during the Maoist period in the

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late 1950s and the 1960s for the proposal by Indonesia under Sukarno for a New Emerging Forces alternative to the UN. Finally, China’s behavior in opposing the addition of or changes in the make-up of the permanent members of the UN Security Council, that is, adding India, Indonesia or Brazil as new permanent members, can be taken as representative of system maintaining behavior. Contrary to what one might expect of China, given its rhetorical championing of the third world countries and other ‘have not’ elements in international politics, here it favors the present arrangement. This is because it perceives it as promoting its national interest since it is one of the few powers, and the only developing power, possessing the veto power in the Security Council.18

Table 3.1

Varieties of Chinese behavior System maintaining

UN system

Security system

System reforming

Objectives

Support China’s Supported immediate changing UN national interests rules to represent PRC

Policies

Against Security Council Reform (adding permanent members)

Supported changing UN rules to represent PRC

Objectives

Oppose terrorism contain US/Japanese/ Indian influence

Change balance of forces, especially in Asia Unite Taiwan with mainland (peacefully) Usher in multipolar system of equals under Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (peacefully)

System transforming

Unite Taiwan with mainland by force and incorporate contested islands (Spratlys, Diaoyutai/ Senkaku, Paracels) Usher in multipolar system of equals under Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (through war)

92 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia Table 3.1

Continued System maintaining

System reforming

System transforming

Support principle of sovereignty; oppose transnational intervention

Increase Chinese influence in Asia and maximize economic presence Creating new system is of secondary importance

Ambiguous stance on takeover of territories – mix of threats/ reassurances So far satisfied with peaceful change

Maximize China’s economic benefits; pragmatic approach

Maximize China’s economic benefits

Policies

Join WTO Maximize inflow of investment; qualify as developing country

Practice some mercantilist policies

Objectives

Contain Maximize international economic arms flow, benefit from especially WMD arms trade to other countries Conform to arms control regime to enhance international reputation

Policies

Conform to Conform to restrictive restrictive regimes regimes unless unless conflict conflict with with overriding overriding goal goal of arms sales of arms sales

Objectives

Minimize restrictions on China

Give China respectability

Policies

Support regimes and covenants when possible

Re-define human rights debate to mean economic well-being, ‘Asian values,’ etc.

Policies

Economic Objectives system

Arms control

Human rights

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China’s view of an alternate system Although the tone of China’s complaints cast China as a dissatisfied or revisionist power, any coherent view of an alternative system is sketchy. Michael Pillsbury, in an impressive survey of the views of analysts at government-funded Chinese research institutes on the future Chinese security environment did find a consensus that the future international system will be multipolar, the major nations will have relatively equal power, the system will be governed by the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and the ‘world will no longer be dominated by power politics and hegemonic superpower.’ The concept and analysis of the dawning system draws on the Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology espousing a system with equality and amity, with traditional Chinese history, especially the warring states period particularly useful in elucidating the perils of the transition period. As this system is defined, the power and prestige of the US will inevitably decline: whether absolutely or in relative terms is being debated, and how long the process will take or whether it has begun or is still awaited is also controversial. Will the US still be a superpower 30 years from now, or will the multipolar system be realized by 2020? Similarly, how many poles there will be in the multipolar system, which countries will be the poles and exactly how they will compare in power is subject to variation according to the analyst (will the US or Japan be more powerful? how will Russia and India behave?). This image of the coming system is remarkably similar to the multipolar world that Mao and Zhou expounded to Kissinger and Nixon in the 1970s during the cold war (Pillsbury, 2000). Many questions are left unanswered, especially for those trained in a Western international relations tradition. Most intriguing is how a multipolar system will be transformed into one without power politics or countries attempting to exercise hegemony. Most Western analysts perceive a multipolar system as the epitome of rough-and-tumble power politics and constantly changing alliances and allegiances, a far cry from the apparently harmonious system the Chinese envision. Especially given current Chinese biases toward Realpolitik, national interests and an extreme emphasis on sovereignty, the transition appears difficult. Perhaps it is for this reason that the transition from the current world to the future one is a subject on which the analysts have little to say. The analysts see an inevitable decline in the US international standing and role, but have major disagreements on how China will stand in relation to the United States in 20–30 years – will it still be inferior in power or will it have obtained equality by 2020? Some analysts believe China

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should follow Deng’s dictum – bide our time and build our capabilities – to elude conflict during the period the US is in decline. Others believe more proactive strategies are in order (Pillsbury, 2000). Clues to the probable nature of China’s behavior during the transition must be deduced from current declarations, policies and actions. China has three basic objectives in Asia. The first is to reduce the US presence in East Asia. Second, China needs to prevent Japan from becoming a full-fledged great power rival in East Asia, and third, it needs to prevent lesser regional actors (ASEAN states, Russia or India) from siding with the United States or Japan and thwarting Chinese interests (Goldstein, 1997–8: 60). True to the nature of the system sketched above, the Chinese constantly complain about the ‘hegemony’ of the United States, and that it practices ‘power politics.’ The US is ‘further strengthening its military presence and bilateral military alliances’ in the Asia-Pacific region. It sells advanced weapons to Taiwan. The newly revised US–Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines have failed to exclude Taiwan from the scope of the areas surrounding Taiwan and from Japan’s military responsibilities under the guidelines. The Chinese call for a ‘fair and reasonable new international order,’ abandonment of the ‘Cold War mentality’ and the ‘old, unfair and irrational international political and economic order.’ The Chinese are in favor of peace and development, the two major themes in today’s world, and the ‘trend toward multi-polarity and economic globalization, which are gaining momentum’ (State Council, 2000a; Tang, 1998a). It is clear there is a considerable gap between the present system and the system as the Chinese would like it. At the same time, the revolutionary fervor for realizing this system has subsided when compared to Maoist times. The analysts differ on the extent to which China should actively contribute the use of force to bringing about this future system. In Beijing’s putative world one could speculate that there would be less priority given to self-determination, the use of force would sometimes be sanctioned to settle territorial questions, and there would be less concern with the practice of democracy, protection of human rights, and various attributes of capitalism including the standard of free trade. It is prudent to remember, however, that Chinese behavior after they become an equal or dominant regional or global power, might well differ on many of these issues from their proclamations and behavior before they attained such prominence. That is, they might end up accepting most of the norms of the present system. Naturally it is in the United States’ interest to promote such an outcome.

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Chinese actions: changing the system or joining it? It is clear the US is not leaving East Asia, at least for some time. The most obvious source of frustration and dissatisfaction in the present environment is China’s claim on Taiwan as an integral part of the PRC. While the Spratly and Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands (and other boundary) disputes are certainly problems, it is quite possible China will pursue them through a combination of bilateral and multilateral negotiation and minor and low-risk military actions with no urgent timetable. But Taiwan, which involves a claim for ‘the great cause of national unification’ in which the Chinese see no ambiguity and for which public pronouncements in principle suggest no hint of a willingness to compromise, is a different matter. Undoubtedly Taiwan is one of China’s highest priorities, but it is not clear how soon and in exactly what form they expect to translate the abstract One China formula, to which most of the world subscribes, into a more concrete form that China can consider an appropriate solution. Mao told Henry Kissinger in 1971 that China could wait for 100 years for Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland. More recently various leaders have displayed more impatience with the issue. The most specific formulation was by President Jiang Zemin in October 1999 when he said that by the middle of this century China will follow the precedent of Hong Kong and Macau and ‘resolve the question of Taiwan’ (Ching, 2000: 30).19 Beyond these two disputes, most of the situations that have led to major conflict since 1949, disputes in Korea, India, Russia and Vietnam, seem to be dormant and under control, even if not finally settled. In East Asia, China is already accorded ‘a place at the table’ on important regional issues. It is viewed as either the one power or one of several powers that must be considered in any regional decision that affects China. China’s regional importance is widely recognized and the probable rapid increase in its influence is assumed (Ross, 1999: 108). Its global influence is much less, and its potential increase more limited, but that also is increasing rapidly. This reinforces China’s tendency to forgo system-transforming behavior in favor of less disruptive behavior. Since it is ‘upwardly mobile’ and is fast moving beyond the humiliations of the past and gradually but surely attaining the status of a respected member of the international community, it has much to lose from radical and system challenging action. The international and regional environment in which China finds itself is more benign than has been the case for many years. As one Chinese military analyst put it, ‘With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar structure, it is possible that the threat of all-out invasion to China has been eliminated’ (Zheng, 1998: 105).

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The cold war has ended, and Russia, in spite of its proximity and long border with China, is currently no threat to China. On the contrary, it is being relied upon as an arms supplier, and there is increasing talk of a ‘strategic cooperative partnership’ between the two countries. Settlement of border issues, increased trade and economic interaction, and a common suspicion and criticism of a dominant US role suggest that Russia can be counted on China’s side on many international issues (Garver, 1998; Sino-Russian, 1999, 2001; Menon, 1997, 2001).20 This is a momentous change in the nature of the relationship, creating an environment where China can concentrate on domestic matters and international economic issues. China has no major conflicts or quarrels with other nations in the region. One jarring exception to the increasingly quiet neighborhood that China lives in is India’s going nuclear, even though that particular threat is aimed at least partly at Pakistan. China’s border problems and quarrels with India have receded in the past decades, but this development cannot help but be unsettling for Beijing. China’s increased cooperation with the US since September 11 may suggest its concern with terrorism, especially in Xinjiang or Tibet, but the ‘new’ relationship with the US also reflects Beijing’s ability to grasp an opportunity to improve relations with the US and gain greater leverage in the relationship (Xinhua, 2001a; Guo, 2001). China and Vietnam have for now decided to subordinate their differences to their mutual need for peace and economic development and there are no other particularly threatening problems in Southeast Asia. It is this otherwise sanguine situation that has allowed the Chinese to focus on the US as the ‘hegemonic’ power in the international system, the only power that, in alliance with the Japanese, can frustrate China’s designs in Asia by supporting Taiwan or the ASEAN countries. US options in Asia are limited and it is not likely to become militarily involved in a way directly contradictory to Chinese interests unless China makes direct assaults on the status quo. The Chinese, therefore, have the luxury of determining the degree of risk that they wish to introduce into the Asian environment. A bellicose stance toward Taiwan, or even the South Sea islands, will lead to a vigilant and suspicious US stance, a greater willingness to sell arms to Taiwan, more emphasis on military connections and planning with Asian countries and obtaining logistical facilities. A ‘peace and development’ emphasis by the Chinese will allow the US to put more emphasis on economic issues and de-emphasize military concerns. The 1995–6 actions by the Chinese in the Taiwan Strait are illustrative of the kind of incident that can make a big difference in the atmosphere existing between the two countries.

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But the Chinese leadership, having lost the diplomatic maneuverability and the strategic value provided by the cold war, having seen Taiwan achieve new confidence and international respect as it has developed and democratized, having witnessed the demise of Marxism-Leninism in Russia and Eastern Europe, and having seen the demonstration of US capabilities in the Gulf War, does not fully appreciate the benign nature of the environment in which it exists. This cognitive dissonance can be attributed to the fact that the threat is now primarily political, not military. The military threat of the bipolar era has turned into the current political threat (Yahuda, 1997: 18). If the US presence in Asia is a threat to China’s physical security, it is little different from the one that has existed for the last 50 years. Rather it is the status of the leadership and the legitimacy of government that is threatened, but not primarily by outside powers. A declaration of independence by Taiwan would threaten the current regime, and even a ‘successful’ military action against Taiwan might also result in the end of the regime since the economic fallout would be so disastrous, leaving aside the political problem of a defeated or partially destroyed Taiwan (Chang, 2001: 39). Ultimately, it is the communist party that is threatened, and the leadership’s loyalty to the party’s vision makes imagined threats real in the current Asian environment. China would make more progress in bringing about a unified China that included Taiwan if it would democratize and the Taiwanese were assured of adequate autonomy. But the leadership insists on maintaining the present system, since democratization would threaten the party and the present elite. The Soviet Union had much less contact and interaction with the US and the rest of the world and participated less in global institutions than does China. The Chinese are members of, or interested in becoming members of, many international and regional forums that involve countries of varying world views and with various economic and social systems. In addition, post-Mao China is actively striving to reform its economy to match more closely the organizing principles of the capitalist world and is attempting to reform its society so as to attain the technological advantage it requires to become an international competitor. Ironically, it was precisely because the Soviet Union was not willing to make these kinds of ideological concessions that its economy plummeted and it failed as a superpower. One can therefore suggest that this Chinese willingness to compromise will make it easier to pull China into the contemporary system, channel its competitiveness to conform with the rules and processes of the system and therefore increase the possibility of a peaceful transition at some time in the future. The multipolar system which China foresees replacing the present system is one that

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China can wait for. There seems to be no list of actions it must take to prepare the way for the multipolar system. Some may advocate hastening its arrival, but Deng favored letting history take its course. It is hard to find much radicalism, or ‘structured dissatisfaction’ in China’s approach to international politics, but there is broad agreement that nationalism, as discussed above, is on the rise both among the elite and the general populace. The Chinese leadership tends to think in terms more compatible with the balance-of-power/Realpolitik/sovereigntyoriented world of a half-century ago and to be uncomfortable with the new language of interdependence, multinational organizations and jurisdictions and international regimes (Deng, 1998; Robinson, 1998). The Chinese are anxious to join the WTO, but that appears to many to be in their narrow national interest. Nor is the world familiar with other proposals for major change in the international order except regarding issues that affect China narrowly and often are of only indirect interest to the rest of the world, for example, Taiwan. One study found that in China domestic bureaucratic rigidities tend to produce conservative Chinese behavior on the international scene. According to this analysis, China’s behavior in the UN is not only lacking any revolutionary quality, it is not even actively involved in many issue areas. China responds more favorably to impersonal and market regimes, where the rules of the game apply equally to all countries … On the whole, it has been passive in most regimes it has joined. Only in the environmental and human rights sphere has China actively sought to shape the norms of the international regime; even in those important areas, China has made its case within the regime rather than outside it. Neither the worst fears of a disruptive China in the UN system nor the best hopes of a constructively and extensively involved China have been realized. (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999: 22–3) Given its growing participation in the international financial markets, China has increasingly conformed to the implicit norms of the international financial system. Moreover, this adaptation has also begun to affect its domestic banking system. In general, China has developed a whole web of relationships with the US and various international organizations that make it a current or prospective player in the full gamut of international activities (Lardy, 1999; Shambaugh, 2001). In short, China gives every indication of wanting to intensify its integration and involvement into the

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current system of international bureaucracies and organizations, notwithstanding a tendency for interaction with China to be prickly, and the existence of problems of enforcement and implementation. These sometimes stem from deliberate foot-dragging, at other times from inability to control the situation. The former may characterize implementation of integration into the WTO, the latter enforcement of international copyright laws. Clearly, China’s priority is not so much changing the current order as joining it. And it has made rapid progress when one considers that less than three decades ago the Maoist agenda of economic autarchy and cultural isolation, support for insurgency in other Asian countries, and support for third world dominated regional and global organizations was prevailing policy. It is clear that the Chinese would like to have the benefits of international independence without paying the political price of a penetrated political system. In the realist tradition, they are on an ‘unprincipled quest to make the best of all possible worlds’ (Samuel Kim quoted in Yahuda, 1997: 15). But this reluctance to become a fullfledged and fully committed player in a relatively short period of time should not be interpreted as a refusal to play the game. To an even greater degree than during the Maoist era, the Chinese are in quest of symbolic gratification; they are concerned with the nature of their international image. Indeed, one study concluded that the Chinese since the mid-1990s ‘have finally become more aware of the counterproductive security dilemma its behaviour can exacerbate’ and have fashioned policies to mitigate this effect (Goldstein, 2001: 863). First, China should be considered an important power, and second it should be viewed as a cooperative and responsible actor (Economy and Oksenberg, 1999: 21). Third, they want the opportunity of full participation in the international system and to be assured that their potential influence on decision making matches their estimate of China’s importance in the international order. Exactly what concrete form those expectations will take can be only dimly perceived at the present, and probably, excepting the Taiwan issue, the expectations are disjointed, unformed and very much dependent on the results of bargaining and negotiation. Even the Taiwan issue is susceptible to various forms of resolution, since a great deal of the difference separating the two sides has to do with the formal status of Taiwan, not the actual conditions of governance on the island.

Interdependence and war It is a popular argument that there is a link between an unwillingness to use force and a liberal international economic system, that a liberal system

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‘substantially discourages the use of force among states, while a mercantilist economic structure stimulates it.’ A related proposition is that as economic interdependence grows among states the use of military force becomes less important as the focus shifts to economic factors and a rising standard of living. Political symbolism and military objectives become relatively less important (Buzan, 1984: 597; Keohane and Nye, 1977: 27–9; Rosecrance, 1986, 1999). Indeed, with the rise of the virtual state, based on mobile capital, labor and information, the historical tie between land and wealth is severed, as the nation specializes in highervalued, intangible goods, the products of the mind, and a new era of peaceful competition among nations, a zone of peace, is created. Rather than jealously guarding its sovereignty and rights against others, the virtual state ‘prospers from dependence on others’ (Rosecrance, 1999: preface and 22, 82). Expressing the hope he has in these changes in motivation, objectives and organization brought by modernization, Fidel Ramos of the Philippines deplores the fact that History, cultural diversity, ethnic differences, territorial conflict and economic rivalries continue to fragment East Asia. But events in the world make it clear that there are no alternatives to closer economic integration and political solidarity for East Asia. Our object should be to replace ‘the balance of power’ as the organizer of state relationship in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific with ‘the balance of mutual benefit.’ (Ramos, 2000b) The limited development of institutions and community in East Asia has been much remarked upon. While international economic organizations with many East Asian members such as APEC exist, the ASEAN has been an organization of growing economic and political integration since its founding in 1967, and the ARF is now focused on military and regional security problems, the area still being only loosely tied to these institutions. Trade within the region is still limited compared to the economic ties with outsiders, and the 1997 economic crisis has exposed the region’s dependence on foreign capital and its vulnerability to global markets and political forces (Acharya, 1999b). Moreover, prior to 1997 arms expenditures were increasing rapidly, although opinion is divided over the significance of that. Further contributing to instability is the growing importance of weapons of mass destruction, as the new technology that makes more effective weapons possible becomes disseminated among Asian and other non-Western areas. This trend, coupled with rising Asian nationalism, will make it harder for the US to maintain its forces in Asia

China: Challenging Regional Power 101

and the means for basing weapons and troops in or near the area (Bracken, 1999). This will restrict US influence and provide more leverage to regional powers. Although North Korea is the only candidate in the area to become explicitly nuclear in the near future, the recent nuclear ‘coming out’ of India and Pakistan suggests the potential for East Asia. Moreover, the region is made up of many powers that are primarily nondemocratic or semi-democratic. While Japan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and most recently Indonesia, can be considered democratic, other countries are authoritarian in varying degrees, and some such as China, Vietnam, Myanmar and North Korea lack even nominally competitive elections at the national level. Malaysia, Cambodia and Singapore host elections, but many illiberal and undemocratic aspects of the postcolonial systems remain. Given these conditions, however, East Asia, including Southeast Asia is an economically growing area with steadily increasing levels of interdependence. Commentary on China has speculated on the importance of the interdependence arguments to China’s behavior. A common belief is that tying China in with the international economic system will help to tame its behavior (Segal, 1995; Nathan and Ross, 1997: 175–7, 231–6). There is no doubt that China needs an environment conducive to economic development. Even if one assumes that the Chinese priority is to become a military competitor, the fastest way to accomplish that is to foster economic growth. It is those countries whose leaders and citizens know how to run an economy that prosper in the modern world. China shows many signs of learning those skills and it has already assembled the resources to run a prospering economy, but it needs a lot of time to achieve a high level of income and an environment where defense expenditures are relatively low as a percentage of GDP even as the military is modernized, where it can attract foreign technology, trade and investment, and where it can concentrate on development rather than nationalistic mobilization to face military threats or offensives. China’s commitment to interdependence is often questioned, but Deng Xiaoping announced his view in 1984. Discussing the rationale for promising that Hong Kong would remain capitalist for 50 years, he stated that ‘if the open policy remains unchanged in the first half of the next century, it will be even less likely to change in the 50 years after that, because then China will have more economic exchanges with other countries and all countries will be more mutually dependent and inseparable’ (Deng, 1987: 95–6). China’s interdependence with the rest of the world, measured by total trade as a percentage of GNP, has been steadily rising. Starting out at less

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than 10 percent in 1978 when the country began to open up, the figure has risen to an average of nearly 40 percent for the years 1994–6, and dropped to slightly under 37 percent in 1999, measured by the exchange rate method. Measured by the ppp method, however, the percentage for the year 2000 drops to 9.4 percent, according to one analyst more accurately reflecting the degree of dependence on trade (Robinson, 1998: 205; Maddison, 1998). Before 1984, annual FDI in China amounted to less than $1 billion per year, or less than one percent of GDP. After the US, China became the largest recipient of FDI in the world by 1993. By 1996, new FDI in China totaled almost $42 billion, or six percent of GDP. Moreover, China’s exports have had a high dependence on foreigninvested firms, which produced 41 percent of exports by 1996. This rate of dependence on FDI is considerably higher than it was in Japan and South Korea at a time of comparable development, where foreign-invested firms never produced more than 11 percent of total exports in Japan, Taiwan or Korea (Cai, 1999: 856; Papayoanou and Kastner, 1999–2000: 174). During the 1990s, the annual growth rates of US merchandise exports to China averaged 16.1 percent, while China’s exports to the US have risen annually by 22 percent. While slowing economic growth in China and the likely effect on trade may offset the positive effects of China’s pending membership in the WTO, nonetheless a healthy growth rate in the volume of trade with the US is likely to continue (Frazier, 1999). Clearly China’s continued enmeshment in the international economic system will have an impact on its behavior. Some have argued that the historical record, recording the high degree of interdependence among the European community before World War I, shows that a high level of interdependence does not prevent conflict. But as Richard Rosecrance points out, that interdependence was very different from the kind we have today. During the nineteenth century, there existed a ‘territorial fetish’ and productive investment was concentrated in colonies, not in neighboring European countries. Direct foreign investment was low, and investment abroad tended to be in highly liquid stocks and bonds. Britain’s productive investments were located not in Germany, but in the colonies. Interdependence was high within empires; less so between them. By contrast, today the great powers forge links that are highly profitable and not easily dissolved. China is heavily dependent on the US and Japan for technology and trade, and they on China for trade and investment opportunities. Just as in the case of Japan, China’s increasing energy shortfall means that, ‘China is becoming inescapably vulnerable to a long thin line of oil tankers streaming eastward from the Persian Gulf’ (Rosecrance, 1999: 77–9; Shinn, 1996: 37).

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The past record and present realities suggest that China is aware of these vulnerabilities, which continue to grow as the interconnectedness with the industrialized world increases. It is hard to imagine that the detrimental effect on the Chinese economy of any Chinese-initiated conflict would not be considered by Chinese foreign policy makers. A serious conflict would likely lead to an international uproar in the short run, sanctions, an economic boycott, and disruption of other ties with the US and possibly other countries. China is well aware of its dependence on outside technology and economic interaction, especially with the US. It is well to remember, however, that this kind of leverage cuts both ways, something that often seems to be forgotten by those who believe that interdependence will restrain China. Suggestions of the influence economic ties can give China over the US can already be cited. Maryland Governor Paris Glendening and the mayors of Seattle, Baltimore and San Francisco all apologized for issuing proclamations honoring Li Hongzhi, the leader of the Falun Gong organization, after the Chinese Ambassador protested the proclamations ‘in no uncertain terms.’ Mayor Schell of Seattle rescinded the proclamation, and the letter of apology to the Chinese from Governor Glendening’s office was reviewed by the US State Department. The Chinese Embassy trumpeted the reversals on its world wide web site, and quoted Mayor Schell as saying he was embarrassed by making such a careless proclamation. Following the downing of the US surveillance plane and the standoff over returning the plane and crew to the US, one US senior official pointed out that threatening economic sanctions against a country that supplies American industry with critical components for everything from phones to computers would be ‘counterproductive at best, stupid at worst’ (Mufson, 1999; Sanger, 1991).21 Paul Papayoanou and Scott Kastner argue that what determines whether increased interdependence between a democracy and a nondemocracy will decrease the probability of conflict behavior by the nondemocracy is ‘how much influence internationalist economic interests in the nondemocratic state have in the polity.’ After examining the Chinese case, they conclude that Because a substantial portion of the Chinese selectorate benefits from integration into the world economy and the Chinese leadership has made a strong commitment to internationalist economic policies, we conclude that China is unlikely to pursue highly conflictual foreign policies that could put its ties at risk.

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This conclusion is supported by evidence that many interest groups in China have a strong stake in the economic activity that has been generated by trade and foreign investment. These groups and the leadership which is dependent on their support are unlikely to take steps that will disturb this activity. On the other hand, there are important groups in China that tend to be hurt by foreign competition, including heavy industry (primarily state owned enterprises) and central government officials whose ministry or bureau depends on those noncompetitive sectors. Interior provinces have benefited from the opening of the economy, but not as much as other sectors of the society (Papayoanou and Kastner, 1999). The implementation of policies consistent with WTO membership will create more groups with a stake in openness, but it will also present a threat to some in the agricultural sector. Papayoanou and Kastner also warn that the intensity of Chinese feeling on Taiwan is such that they might risk economic ties to reintegrate the island into China. A severe shake-up in the leadership or the outbreak of widespread domestic unrest might also cause a reversal of policy priorities. Increased interdependence also means that the Chinese have increased influence over US actions. Political/military and economic interests often coincide in relations with other countries. Countries that have close economic ties tend to have security ties as well. The economic connections foster security relations, and security ties encourage economic intercourse (Papayoanou, 1999). But close economic ties with an authoritarian country may lead to situations where economic and security interests are in conflict. As economic ties with China grow, the US leadership may be restrained from vigorous pursuit of its political/military goals in Asia since they could threaten economic interests. The Sino-US economic relationship is asymmetric, since China is more dependent on the United States for trade than the US is on China, but the volume of US trade which is over $100 billion is enough to put substantial pressure on US policy makers to ensure that it continues. In 1999, China’s trade with the US was 17.1 percent of total trade or 6.3 percent of GNP, while US trade with China was 5.7 percent of total trade and 1.1 percent of GNP. In 1996, Chinese trade with the United States was 14.8 percent of total Chinese trade, and 4.8 percent of GNP. Trade with China was 4.6 percent of total US trade, and 0.9 percent of GNP. Calculating Chinese trade as a percentage of GNP using ppp methodology, however, lowers the number to 1.5 percent for the year 2000 (Table 3.2). As the China trade increases in value proportionate to the rest of the US economy, US policy makers need to be aware of the possible restraining effects it could have on policy and plan for the required flexibility to deal with potential crises.

China: Challenging Regional Power 105 Table 3.2

Trade between US and China as percent of total trade 1993

1996

1999

2000

US trade with China as % of total trade

4.0

4.6

5.7

6.1

As % of GNP

0.7

0.9

1.1

–

14.1

14.8

17.1

15.7

4.8

4.8

6.3

–

China trade with US as % of total trade As % of GNP

Sources: IMF, 2001; World Bank, 2001. Based on exchange rate calculations.

As the US–China relationship plays out, economic interdependence will have an impact on and may dampen conflict below a certain threshold, but beyond that threshold it may well turn out that a liberal economic system is of ‘relatively minor importance as a mover of events.’ It is unlikely that the interconnections of economic ties will be the dike holding back conflict over what both countries consider a vital interest (Buzan, 1984: 615). More likely, a lack of agreement and divergent approaches on major security interests will dampen and limit economic activity, thus limiting the potential for interdependence. If China continues to grow economically – a development that is itself dependent on integration into the international economy – and to develop more democratic means of governance, a time may come when economics, not security, is the determining factor in Sino-US relations. But there is little evidence it will be in the next few decades. China is far from behaving as Rosecrance’s virtual state, as the stickiness of the Taiwan and Spratly issues indicate. Relations in the near future will certainly continue to reflect the very different security outlooks of the two countries, and the difference in capabilities between them.22

Conclusion China’s growing economic and military power suggests it will increasingly be able to challenge the US in East Asia as a bipolar distribution of power develops. As a dissatisfied power, China has grievances it wants to redress, but still its international objectives tend to be territorial and immediate, rather than visionary and transforming. China’s progress in development suggests it may have finally found a development strategy that works. Its ambitious military aspirations match its challenging economic goals, as it

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seeks to develop its power projection capabilities in Asia. Developing and implementing the technology to allow it to challenge the US in Asia over the next 20–50 years will not be easy, but the Chinese are highly motivated to redress what they see as several centuries of humiliation in the international system. China is a developing country with an authoritarian political system, a poorly developed civil society and lacking a consensus on future direction, especially on the domestic front. Internationalists favor an interdependence-directed foreign policy that would emphasize peace and development and de-emphasize military solutions. More traditional nationalists favor more direct military solutions, even though they may hinder China’s access to and integration into the international system and the accompanying assistance in developing technology. China has made much progress liberalizing its society. If this trend continues, in the long run democracy will undoubtedly make China easier to live with and less threatening. In the short or medium term, however, greater responsiveness by the elites to strong nationalist sentiments among the population may increase the militancy of China’s foreign policy. Some stress the pacifying effect of China’s growing economic interdependence on its foreign policy as it comes increasingly to value the environment needed for development. This effect is offset, however, by the fact that interdependence is a two-way street and tends to tie the hands of the US as well. Furthermore, the possibility exists that responding to what the Chinese consider an important national security issue, however costly in economic terms, will take precedence over maintaining a tranquil environment for economic development.

4 China: Historical and Contemporary Policies in Southeast Asia

The previous chapter examined, in the context of a possible power transition, whether China’s attitudes and behavior are those of a dissatisfied power, along with domestic determinants of behavior and the likely impact of increasing interdependence in the international system. This chapter will examine in more detail Chinese historical and contemporary policies and the factors that have determined them, with emphasis on applicability to Southeast Asia. The current China differs from traditional China, and the current international environment is far different from the environment in which China existed for most of its history. Neo-realists would argue that the system in which a state exists is allimportant in determining its behavior, but the assumption here is that the history of a state shapes its culture and attitudes as well as aspects of its (unique) international behavior. China’s history will have an impact on its role as a challenger to the international status quo.

Traditional policies The environment of traditional China was radically different from the current international system. Commonly referred to as the tributary system, today there is substantial research showing that that system existed only intermittently and applied only to China’s relations with some countries. But except for one century in the Ming Dynasty (1425–1550), there did not exist a uniform system for the management of all foreign relations (Wills, 2000). There are certain characteristics of the Chinese environment, however, that have been persistent in its history and undoubtedly affect present day attitudes and expectations. China was 107

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a powerful empire that historically exerted disproportionate influence in Asia. China’s size and power, its economic self-sufficiency, its cultural advancement and its economic, cultural and political influence over the smaller states, tribes and kingdoms along its periphery produced a ‘myth of superiority,’ an expectation among many Chinese that China has a rightful place as a central and leading power in Asia, which it is overdue to assume. This belief, prevalent among both foreign policy elites and educated Chinese since the early 20th century, is that China will recover from the decline which began in the waning years of the Qing dynasty and will once again attain the ‘status, respect, and influence of a major power contending with other major powers in the global arena.’ China had an advanced culture that heavily influenced surrounding countries, especially Japan, Korea and Vietnam, and it had substantial influence and substantial contact throughout Southeast Asia, although the nature, frequency and intensity of that varied from country to country and according to the historical period (Wang, 1968; Swaine and Tellis, 2000: chapter 2). What is today Southeast Asia could not escape its power and influence, especially the so-called inner ring of tribute bearers, which included Myanmar in Southeast Asia. Vietnam was for a while an integral part of the Chinese administrative system until it broke away about AD 900. Vietnam was subsequently invaded by the Chinese, at some times presented a security threat to them, and even aspired to be an imperial court competing with the Chinese and demanding tribute from its neighbors (Yahuda, 1983: 221). China occasionally outfitted seafaring expeditions, and in the 15th century sailed ships and fleets far larger than the early Western explorers to Indonesia and as far away as Africa. These few decades of promising sea voyages, which showed China quite as capable as the West of establishing empires around the world, were stopped as suddenly as they had begun. They were victims of the xenophobia that in modern times has so often thwarted Chinese efforts to join the world. Although China did not always dominate its environment militarily, and indeed was twice conquered by ‘barbarians’ from the North, its military capabilities were impressive, and China did not hesitate to use them. The conventional wisdom in China and the results of early research in the West suggested that historically the teachings of Confucius and Mencius and some of the Daoist tradition, preferred a nonviolent, accommodationist ‘grand strategy’ over violent defensive or offensive ones which predominated in China. The Confucian-Mencius stress on proper government – involving benevolence, righteousness, virtue – as the proper vehicle for keeping order, meant that the use of violence was inauspicious and to be used only as a last resort. More recent

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research suggests that historically, a ‘parabellum’ paradigm that assumes conflict is a constant in human affairs and the corollary that the use of force is frequently necessary, predominates in Chinese strategic thought. Thus traditional Chinese culture reflects realist assumptions and contemporary policy indicates a high degree of continuity (Johnston, 1995).1

Policies since 1949 China has consistently defended what it defined as its national security interests in the more than half a century since the Chinese Communist Party came to power, even if this entailed going to war. China has been involved in conflicts involving the use of force at an above-average rate when compared to other great powers, that is, the US, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and India. For the period of the cold war, China was second in the frequency of the use of force only to the United States, and for the period from the founding of the state (1815 for Western countries), China was second only to the Soviet Union. Data also show that China on balance attained the highest level of hostility in the various disputes. While China was not the most dispute-prone of the major powers, it was the most violence-prone. The largest proportion of disputes, however, involved territorial issues, and as China’s power has increased, the frequency of disputes has declined (Johnston, 1998).2 Major actions against the current threat from outside China’s borders were carried out regardless of the current foreign policy line or rhetoric. It intervened in a major conflict in Korea in 1950 as the US approached its border in the drive up the Korean Peninsula. It went to war with India in 1962, in a conflict over border demarcation. In 1969 it clashed with the Soviet Union over territorial questions and a Soviet troop build-up along the border with the Soviet Union.3 In Southeast Asia, China supplied troops to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) to provide support and to serve as a deterrent against air attacks or ground invasion during the US war with North Vietnam. PLA troops shot down at least nine US planes over Vietnam from 1965–8, and China had approximately 50,000 PLA troops stationed in the DRV during that period. Chinese troops built a massive military complex and airfield near Hanoi, and strengthened and repaired transportation routes and bridges attacked by American planes (Whiting, 1975: chapter 6; Chen, 1995).4 China also attacked Vietnam in 1979 over an accumulation of grievances against Vietnam and its Soviet ties, but the precipitating event was Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia (Lawson, 1984; Jencks, 1979). Beijing has also been involved in numerous minor conflicts over islands, with Vietnam

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over both the Paracel and Spratly Islands in 1974, 1988 and 1994, and with the Philippines over Mischief Reef in 1995 until the present. A key turning point in Beijing’s policies toward Southeast Asia came in the mid-1970s when, following rapprochement with the United States in 1972, it began to mend relations with the ASEAN countries. As late as 1969 Beijing was still attacking the governments of the five member states of ASEAN (Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia) as ‘Asian lackeys’ of America and treated them as essentially allies of the United States which benefited from security and economic cooperation with the US (Yahuda, 1983: 220). Chinese policy toward these countries – Indonesia excepted – had been pretty consistently hostile since the PRC was founded in 1949. China in the initial years based its foreign policy on the ‘lean to one side’ principle (alliance with the Soviets) and condemned all non-communist countries as enemies of China. During this period it attacked the countries of Southeast Asia – not excluding Myanmar – as well as supporting insurgency movements in most of them. This policy was replaced with the Bandung policy in 1954, resulting in a reduction in rhetoric toward all ‘reactionary’ and capitalist countries including the United States. During this remarkable period, ideological content was virtually drained from the PRC’s foreign policy announcements as it tried a new tactic of constructing a united front among third world countries. The Bandung policy temporarily gave Chinese foreign policy a new face, but in the Southeast Asian countries, Chinese support for guerrilla movements continued. At the Bandung Conference in Indonesia in 1955, Zhou Enlai outlined principles, originally formulated by China and India as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, that would govern China’s relations with Afro-American countries. The five principles still form a centerpiece of Chinese foreign policy. They are: (1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) mutual non-aggression, (3) noninterference in internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence (Camilleri, 1980: 79–83). During this period, China tried to have it both ways. On the one hand it appealed to a broad range of Afro-Asian and third world countries on the basis of the Bandung principles and the softer line it promoted during this period, which included a settlement in Vietnam at Geneva in 1954, and the ending of the 1954 crisis over the offshore islands of Jinmen and Mazu. On the other hand, China quietly continued its support for insurgencies in Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines. The failure of the Bandung line to bring any significant successes against the American policy of containment, the growing rupture in Sino-Indian relations and the steady deterioration in relations with the

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Soviet Union led to introduction of a new more militant line in foreign policy, characterized by the slogan ‘the East wind prevails over the West wind.’ This coincided with the reintroduction of a hard line against all countries that were aligned with the West, or were so perceived. This included most of the ASEAN countries, plus South Vietnam, the newly minted creation of the 1954 Geneva settlement. Cambodia under King Sihanouk, Myanmar and Laos were considered neutrals with which China established good relations. The developments in Indonesia coincidentally fit well with the new more militant Chinese position. Sukarno’s growing radicalism and the establishment in Indonesia of ‘guided democracy’ in 1958 complemented China’s growing radicalism. The relationship between the two governments and the cooperation of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) allowed Sukarno to construct leftist nonaligned foreign policy aimed at developing a New Emerging Forces movement. Sino-Indonesian relations continued to develop until the situation was radically altered by the coup against Sukarno in 1965 (Bert, 1974). Coincident with the decision to improve relations with the United States in 1972, China began to revive again a friendly policy toward the ASEAN and Western-aligned countries in Southeast Asia. ASEAN had been founded in 1967 as an organization for confidence building and preventive diplomacy in reaction to the Vietnam conflict and the end of Indonesia’s policy of confrontation. The original members included Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. By 1971, China had begun to support the claims of Malaysia and Indonesia to administer the Strait of Malacca against the internationalization demands of the major powers – focusing particularly on the objections raised by the Soviet Union. By 1973 China had endorsed the Malaysian plan for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality in (ZOPFAN) Southeast Asia. Malaysia established diplomatic relations with China in 1974, Thailand and the Philippines did so in 1975, and Singapore’s prime minister visited China in 1976, but indicated to the Chinese that Singapore would hold off on establishing relations until Indonesia reestablished relations with China, broken after the 1965 coup that brought Suharto to power (Yahuda, 1983: 220–34).5 That did not occur until 1990. While China’s identification with and aid to some insurgents and guerrilla movements continued to be a problem into the 1980s, the Chinese eventually ceased to be identified with these efforts.

Current policy A Chinese policy friendly to all countries in Southeast Asia continues today. The reforms begun after the death of Mao in 1976 have solidified

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a policy of relative openness toward the outside world and one aimed at creating a stable and secure situation in which China can carry out rapid economic development. China’s policy in general can be described as a pragmatic one that aims at internal economic growth and stability and the peaceful environment needed to make that possible (Swaine and Tellis, 2000: 97–8).6 The nurturing of amicable international relations, restraint in the use of force, an attempt to create a modern military, and the pursuit of asymmetric gains internationally all represent facets of this strategy and represent the formula that Chinese leaders believe will develop China into an important and perhaps dominant power in the international system. China believes it will eventually gain its rightful place in the sun, but for now it realizes it must work within the US-dominated system and bide its time while it builds its economy and its military. China not only wants a peaceful international environment in which to improve its economy, but it professes the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the basis of its foreign policy. The principles, with their emphasis on respect for sovereignty and non-interference, would seem to bind China to a nineteenth-century outlook that is the epitome of the status quo, assuming no power genuinely threatens China. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan in 1998 stated that ‘China has a foreign policy of peace and independence. Its image as a major responsible power in safeguarding peace and promoting [sic] has been widely hailed by the international community’ (Tang, 1998a). The US and many other countries in the world hope that China will continue to show restraint in the use of force. But it cannot be assumed that China will always abide by the strict respect for sovereignty to which it gives lip service. A Chinese analyst told Phillip Saunders that once the diplomatic emphasis on sovereignty begins to restrain China’s freedom of action, ‘we will simply drop it’ (Saunders, 1999). The 1998 white paper accurately sums up the Chinese desire for ‘an environment of long-term international peace, especially a favorable peripheral environment,’ and China’s leaders have many times expressed their desire for long-term, stable and good relations with ASEAN. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated in July 1995 that ‘The top priority of China’s foreign policy is to maintain a stable peripheral environment so as to safeguard normal economic circumstances at home. China regards the establishment of long-standing and stable good relations with ASEAN as an important factor in attaining this goal’ (State Council, 1998; Leifer, 1997: 156). In the Chinese view, the ‘structure of multipolarization is … unbalanced,’ and ‘Western countries, headed by the United States are trying hard to dominate the world.’ In the aftermath of the cold war, a ‘new global structure’ has not yet been

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established. This vacuum ‘provides a favorable external environment for small nations with flourishing economies to play an active role in the emerging new security structure.’ ASEAN, one of the most successful regional organizations, has been vocal in ‘maintaining an independent voice,’ and is reluctant to allow the US to ‘take the reins.’ The result of its initiatives and independent approach was the birth of the ASEAN Regional Forum (Ban, 1999; Hou, 1997). An important ally in the Chinese effort to maximize their involvement and minimize US influence, in the Chinese view, is Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, who has promoted excluding the US from economic decision making in Southeast Asia through promotion of its East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), a proposal opposed by the US and Japan. One of the themes of this book is that the future of Sino-US relations, as well as SinoSoutheast Asian relations, will hinge on the degree that the US and the Southeast Asian countries can persuade the Chinese that they are better off focusing on economic competition in Southeast Asia and showing restraint on territorial issues. They need to ensure they respect not just their concept of sovereignty, but the claims and preferences of their neighbors as well.

Territorial issues The two issues most likely to be problems which might trigger the use of force by the Chinese are the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan, and disputes over jurisdictions in the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea. In addition, there are other less salient sovereignty and territorial issues about which China is very concerned, including challenges to its jurisdiction over Tibet, separatist movements linked to ethnic counterparts in Central Asia, disputes with Japan over the Diaoyutai (Senkaku) Islands and with Vietnam over the Paracel Islands. China has already had several clashes with Southeast Asian countries over the Spratly Islands and Taiwan has been the source of much vocal vituperation and instances of military feinting by both sides, most recently in the spring of 1996 (the Spratly Island controversy is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6). China has already reached border settlements with many of its neighbors, and will likely adhere to the terms of these settlements.7 The US presence in Asia is closely tied to the major issues of Chinese contention, Taiwan and the Spratlys. The US has avoided promises of support for Southeast Asian countries’ claims to the Spratly Islands, although former Secretary of Defense William Cohen did suggest that the US–Philippine mutual defense treaty might apply to Philippine

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forces in the Spratlys. China’s interests in the Spratly Islands include strategic interests: a desire to control the sea lanes and the various straits in the region which become increasingly important to China as its trade increases, especially its dependence on imported oil and gas. The US Energy Information Administration estimates that by 2020 China will need to import 70 percent of its oil and 50 percent of its gas. Four straits (the Strait of Malacca, Sunda Strait and the Straits of Lombok and Makassar) are crucial to shipping routes that can be used to supply China and the rest of East Asia with energy from the Persian Gulf. In addition, over 40 percent of trade from Japan, Australia and ASEAN transits these choke points.8 China also has an interest in the energy deposits in the Spratlys. But estimates of the production potential in the South China Sea vary widely, and at this point are primarily a matter of speculation (DOE, 2002). Finally, the Chinese feel that their prestige is at stake in their claims to the islands since it is at least partially based on historical claims. As one Chinese academic put it, ‘The Spratly issue is about what is China, and what is China’s space.’ Given the position the Chinese have taken regarding the contested islands in the Spratlys, they will not find it easy to make compromises necessary to reduce the tension in the area (Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu, 2000: 22). Unfortunately there is substantial evidence that while China takes its own claims of sovereignty over this area seriously, it is less willing to consider the claims of the other claimants. At the 1999 ASEAN summit held in Manila, China agreed in principle, but with some reservations, to an ASEAN draft code of conduct to prevent further conflict in the South China Sea. Reportedly the ASEAN countries want a Regional Code of Conduct that prohibits any new occupation of ‘reefs, shoals and islets in the disputed area,’ but Beijing supports language that prohibits any actions that further ‘complicate’ the situation, language already contained in the existing agreement (Leong, 2001: 688). An incident in 2001 off Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Island), not part of the Spratlys but claimed by both China and the Philippines, indicates the agreement has not solved the problems. On January 6 the Philippine navy was engaged in a tense standoff with Chinese vessels, and the crew of a Philippine patrol craft saw six Chinese boats loaded with coral off Scarborough Shoal. Later, four Chinese vessels were seen anchored on the contested shoal. A Philippine boat was dispatched to ask them to leave, but three refused to do so (AFP, 2001). China has thus far refused to negotiate any of these disputed claims. It has on principle declined to address them in a multilateral forum, although it has participated in unofficial workshops sponsored by Indonesia and began in 1990 to address

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the general question of managing potential conflict in the South China Sea. China indicated the strength of its resolve on the South China Sea claims in 1992 when the National People’s Congress approved a law on territorial waters and contiguous area. This law not only reaffirmed China’s claims to all of the islands in the South China Sea, but also appeared to claim all the interjacent waters following a map drawn in 1947 by the ousted regime of Chiang Kai-shek (Leifer, 1996: 16–20).9 If past behavior is any guide, one would expect the Chinese to maintain pressure on the Southeast Asian countries that also have claims on the Spratlys, but to avoid significant military action that would disrupt their relations with either Southeast Asia or the rest of the world. In three separate actions, the Chinese have occupied islands when other events occupied the world’s attention or when the other contesting state is in a weakened position, that is, it seized islands from Saigon in 1974 as the war between North and South Vietnam was ending, seized islands from Vietnam in 1988 as the conflict between the two countries was winding down, and seized Mischief Reef in 1995 after the US had withdrawn from the Philippines. China may continue to rely on this low-key acquisition method to acquire islands it claims, slowly making good its claims, but not moving precipitously enough to set off alarm bells (Paal, 1999). Taiwan is an even more emotive issue in Chinese politics. Given China’s Westphalian view of the world, Taiwan is assumed by Beijing to be part of China based on the historical evidence that this has been the case, that the cultures are the same, and because of a paper trail of statements to this effect by the great powers beginning with the 1943 wartime Cairo Declaration and including the normalization agreements with the United States. The Chinese explicitly reject the idea that the status of Taiwan should be determined by referendum or based on the principle that ‘sovereignty belongs to the people’ (State Council, 2000b). The West, on the other hand, believes that the people of Taiwan, following Woodrow Wilson’s ideas of self-determination, should have some say in their fate.10 And while the PRC has shown some appreciation of the fact that a belligerent attitude and the threat of military action aimed at Taiwan is detrimental to their goal of unification, they tend to panic and revert back to threatening rhetoric if the Taiwanese leadership shows signs of opting for independence, thereby postponing any chance they have of bringing about a peaceful reunion (Zhao, 1999–2000). It is generally assumed that the US will not stand idly by in the event of military action by the PRC against Taiwan, even more so since the latest pronouncement of President Bush seems to have removed some of the previous ambiguity about US intentions. Evidence for this perspective can

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be found in the movement of US carrier groups to either end of the Taiwan Strait during the 1996 confrontation, begun by the Chinese firing missiles in close proximity to Taiwan. But it is definitely in the interests of both the US and China to avoid a military confrontation over Taiwan and continue progress toward a settlement that both sides can live with. A military confrontation which the US won would entail an open-ended commitment to Taiwan’s security, a return to overt hostility with Beijing, and the re-polarization of East Asia. A confrontation which the US lost would destroy America’s credibility with its regional allies, opening up the possibility of a nuclear Japan, and evoke a sense of abandonment among Southeast Asians. A third possibility, a political settlement between Beijing and Taipei, perhaps with US brokering or a guarantee, is undoubtedly the best outcome for all parties (Zhao, 1999–2000: 10–1). Although Taiwan is not part of Southeast Asia, any major confrontation over the fate of the island will have an impact on Southeast Asia. A conflict over Taiwan would shatter the surface complaisance that now attends ASEAN relations with China. Lee Kuan Yew, reflecting Singapore’s hypersensitivity to threatening scenarios, states that [A]ny fallout from problems [of instability and disintegration] in Indonesia is minor compared with the consequences of a clash of arms across the Taiwan Strait. That could change the course of developments in the whole of the East Asian region. In Taiwan, with a new president whose party stands for independence, the danger has increased. (Lee, 2000) First, some Southeast Asian countries, Singapore, Malaysia and the Philippines, have trade and investment interests in Taiwan. Conflict would disrupt those. In February 1996, Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Tony Tan identified the Taiwan Strait as a worrisome source of instability. He warned that conflict could alter the strategic balance and ‘if countries in the region are at odds with one another, investments will shun the whole region.’ Second, a conflict over Taiwan is bound to raise apprehensions regarding what that means about China’s intention vis-à-vis the Spratly Islands. While some Southeast Asian countries may identify to some degree with China and its obsession with recovering Taiwan, since some of them have their own irredentist agenda as well as separatist groups within their societies that may identify with the Taiwan predicament (Leifer, 2001: 182), the South Sea controversy directly

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threatens territory also claimed by Malaysia, Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines. Third, any conflict over Taiwan is bound to have a generally unsettling effect on an area that has tended to disavow its fears of China. ASEAN countries would be forced to admit their fears and anxieties about China, and might be pressured, both domestically and internationally, to declare their strategy for dealing with a similar threat from China. Meeting with Li Peng and Jiang Zemin in March 1996, Thai Prime Minister Banhan warned that the Taiwan issue has ‘created tension and caused concern to countries in the region’ and he pressed for Chinese caution and prudence in solving the problem (Whiting, 1997a: 309, 315). If the Chinese ended up with military gains that increased their influence over Taiwan, it would be harmful to the credibility of US influence over any future confrontation in Southeast Asia. Such a scenario might well see some Southeast Asian states decide to throw their lot in with China and bandwagon with what they perceived to be the hegemonic state in the subregion for years to come. On the other hand, if the conflict went against China, it would strengthen the US hand and possibly induce at least some Southeast Asian states to side with the US and balance against China. The Chinese view the Taiwan issue as a domestic one, but the Southeast Asians would impute much broader consequences to conflict there. In the event of conflict, Chinese ambivalence about the US proximity in East Asia, discussed in Chapter 2, would harden to determined opposition to a US presence and result in a long-term effort to build the military might to expel the US. Whichever way an armed conflict came out, the consequences would be long-term, with either dire prospects for those states opposing China if China gained the upper hand, or a very polarized East Asia if the US prevailed. Organski’s contention that a rising challenger often initiates a war against the dominant power prematurely before attaining the power to prevail is relevant here. It is the Taiwan issue that is most likely to induce the Chinese to take such a self-defeating risk and initiate conflict. Any conflict over Taiwan would also have an important effect on Japan. China’s view of Japan draws even more heavily on the combination of traditional xenophobia, nationalist outrage over past humiliations and suspicion of future behavior, than is the case in Sino-US relations. The Chinese are particularly incensed at and suspicious of the Japanese reluctance to acknowledge guilt and to take responsibility and apologize for atrocities and criminal behavior during the World War II period. The Chinese therefore often seem to base their estimates of Japan’s intentions, not on evidence from what Japanese foreign and defense policy has been over the last few decades, but rather to project behavior from the World War II era as the likely predictor of future actions. One Chinese analyst

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writes, ‘If Japan fails to devote efforts to “reducing trouble, avoiding conflict, and developing friendship,” but instead refuses to accept a strong China, treats China as a real threat and shapes its foreign policy around the idea of guarding against China, antagonism will increase.’ Ironically, if the words ‘China’ and ‘Japan’ were substituted for each other in these sentences, the statement could well represent the Japanese view of China. Allen Whiting points out that as of 1987, the Chinese had not made any attempt to analyze and understand Japanese politics and policies on an objective level and to educate the government and the public comparable to what they have done regarding the US, although they had done better on economic and military issues (Zhang, 1997: 455; Whiting, 1989: 186–7).11 Instead of noting the restrained Japanese defense spending, sensitivity to charges of military activity, and extreme reluctance to use troops outside of Japan, the Chinese prefer to dwell on the misdeeds of 50 years ago. The major instances when Japan has deployed personnel or equipment outside its borders since the end of World War II are: the covert use Japanese ship pilots during the Korean war, the dispatch of a small number of peacekeepers to Cambodia and Mozambique, and the deployment twice of either minesweeping vessels or warships to the Persian Gulf (McVadon, 1999; Lefever, 2001). Chinese elites put little credence in the culture, constitutional restrictions, and low levels of military spending as a percentage of GDP that have characterized Japan’s foreign and defense policy for the last half-century as predictors of future behavior. They realize that the US presence in East Asia and the US alliance with Japan does serve as a potential restraint on Japanese behavior and that this is in China’s interest. But they are suspicious as to what use the alliance between the two countries may be put, and they are especially concerned about Japan’s likely role in a crisis over Taiwan (Yang, 1999). One analyst maintains that the only truly critical factor in Sino-Japanese relations is the problem of Taiwan. As long as China remains the outsider in ‘the framework of East Asian security,’ relations with both Japan and the US will be strained, with the effect clearly felt in Southeast Asia (McVadon, 1999). Southeast Asian countries share some of the Chinese paranoia regarding Japan’s actions, but they also have important economic ties with the Japanese that far surpass those with China, and a less emotionally charged fear of Japan (Johnstone, 1999a).

The ASEAN countries Outside of the South China Sea context, actual Chinese military activity in Southeast Asia is highly unlikely at the present time. The Chinese are

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primarily interested in the economic dimensions of relations there, with strategic issues being of secondary interest. The intense Chinese economic interest and its growing diplomatic activity is illustrated by the fact that Jiang Zemin within the last three years has paid a major state visit to every one of the ten ASEAN countries (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001: 18). In 1993, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said that changes in the international situation provide opportunities for the countries in the Asia-Pacific region to improve cooperation and to raise the people’s living standards. All countries in the region should seize the opportunity provided by the political stability in the region and the dynamic economies to expand cooperation and speed up development. China frequently repeats some version of this mantra. Beijing wants to further develop economic activities and maintain quiet and peaceful relations with the entire subregion. Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji said at the China–ASEAN summit in Singapore in November 2000 that ‘We would like to see a unified, stable and prosperous ASEAN and support the important role played by ASEAN in regional affairs’ (Xinhua, 1993a; Zhu, 2000). Echoing this general orientation, a Chinese analyst writes that China ‘relinquishes the right to seek hegemony in Southeast Asia or anywhere else and respects the sovereignty and development of Southeast Asian nations’ (Shi, 1997: 10). The Chinese have shown they are well aware of the economic advantages of opening up to the world and integrating the Chinese economy with the global economy (Jingji Ribao, 1993). Although the top Chinese leadership is careful to present a positive face in all public meetings with ASEAN leadership and comment on the countries, there are signs that the Chinese (not surprisingly) are not happy about the activities of those countries that cooperate militarily with the US. Writing in People’s Daily, two analysts complain that the US has turned Australia and ASEAN members into ‘components of the containment chain against China … the US has reached agreements with Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Indonesia and Thailand, which allow entry of US warships to the bases and ports of [these] countries for maintenance and supply’ (Yang and Wang, 2001). Criticizing ASEAN countries by name is unusual in the Chinese press, but the sentiments expressed ring true. And China privately complained to the ASEAN foreign ministers about joint military exercises held involving both ASEAN countries and the US (Leong, 2001: 689). Southeast Asia does have the potential for becoming a power vacuum, but as long as the current US commitment continues this possibility is not likely. Even without US forces and a US commitment to remain in the area, it is difficult to imagine Chinese intervention, aside from

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opportunistic forays into the Spratlys. But there are some possibilities that cannot be ruled out. High on that list would be the disintegration of Indonesia if regional, ethnic and religious strife escalates and the Jakarta government proves incapable of bolstering its legitimacy, broadening its base of support and devising a solution that will allow the restoration of law and order and the reassurance of outlying territories about their future within the Indonesian polity. One of the early steps of former President Abdurrahman Wahid’s government was to improve relations with the People’s Republic of China, as well as with Russia and India. Notwithstanding the rather inchoate state of current Indonesian foreign policy, the Wahid government appeared to be equally open to good relations with the US, and it went so far as to attempt to establish ties with Israel (Smith, 2000). President Megawati Sukarnoputri appears to want and certainly needs good relations with the US, notwithstanding her refusal to embrace the US-led anti-terrorist coalition. An argument can be made that the Chinese have an interest in the disintegration of the Indonesian state, since it would eliminate the most likely potential competitor in Southeast Asia. Such an argument is undermined, however, by evidence that China is concerned about disruptions of the embryonic democratic process in Indonesia. In July 2001, the Foreign Ministry expressed concern about Wahid’s attempt to dismiss the parliament to avoid impeachment, stating that ‘As a friendly neighbor, China is very concerned with the development of the situation in Indonesia’ (Foreign Ministry, 2001b). If Indonesia were to disintegrate, China’s reaction would likely be very cautious, unless intervention by the US or Japan that would be detrimental to China’s interests was imminent. Aside from maintaining a ‘peace and development’ environment suitable for economic activity, China’s main interest is to prohibit a diminution of its own influence in favor of that of another major power. Persecution of the Chinese minority in Indonesia could also serve as a rationale for intervention under extreme circumstances. It would have to balance it need to maintain the stability and peace required for continued economic progress within the region against any gains that would accrue to it from the elimination of the nation most likely to lead Southeast Asia to maintain its independence vis-à-vis China. In reality there would probably be little the Chinese could do to influence the situation one way or the other and still maintain their priority of peace and development. Under Sukarno’s ‘guided democracy’ (1958–65), China cast Indonesia as a friend; under Suharto (1965–98) it was the ASEAN state coolest toward China. China is not likely to do anything overt to hasten the break-up of Indonesia, but it might not be enthusiastic about

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international attempts to prevent a break-up. On balance, Vice Premier Tang Jiaxuan probably had it about right in 1996 when he said that China and Indonesia are both developing countries in Asia and the shared interests between China and ASEAN and Indonesia far exceed their differences. It is interesting, however, that during Indonesian President Wahid’s visit to China in December 1999, Jiang Zemin did feel it necessary to reassure Wahid that China would not support any effort to split the unstable Aceh region from Indonesia (Xinhua, 1996c; Straits Times, 1999).12 In any regional or international peacekeeping operation, Australian leadership such as it exercised in the East Timor conflict, is likely to be more acceptable to most Southeast Asian countries than direct leadership by the United States. Even better would be initiatives undertaken by ASEAN members, but based on past experience, ASEAN may not be ready to shoulder such responsibilities.13 But the likelihood of anyone successfully organizing and implementing a peacemaking or peacekeeping operation in an Indonesia where civil war had broken out is not high. China’s main objective is to maintain the status quo in Southeast Asia, freeing up China’s defense resources to allow it to concentrate on the more volatile and threatening Northeast Asian environment. At present the prospects of being able to do that are fairly high. Another potential opportunity for Chinese intervention in the subregion would be conflicts between individual Southeast Asian nations. Any number of conflicts are possible, given the outstanding disputes between various nations outlined in Chapter 5. The most likely places for this kind of intervention would be on those areas bordering on China or involving countries bordering China. Border skirmishes have occurred on the Myanmar–Thai border over the years, and given China’s deep involvement in Myanmar it is possible that a serious conflict in that area could tempt the Chinese to intervene. This is a temptation to which they are unlikely to yield, however, for several reasons. Thailand and Myanmar have always in the past managed to control any violence, even when involving minority groups located on either side of the border. There is no reason to suppose they will not be able to do this in the future, especially given the additional incentive now that Myanmar belongs to ASEAN, and the need to respond to ASEAN attempts to buffer the crisis. Second, if China intervenes in Myanmar, it would more likely intervene to prevent Myanmar from leaving its sphere of influence than to settle a border conflict. It is unlikely Myanmar would become simultaneously involved in disputes with both China and Thailand. China’s centuries-old animosity with Vietnam can always flare up again, but China’s is now taking a conciliatory direction, as recent border

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agreements indicate. In Malaysia, a succession crisis seems much less likely now that Mahathir has declared Abdullah Ahmad Badawi his successor, as of October 2003. Even more than in Indonesia, China would be playing a risky game to intervene. The large Chinese minority (28 percent) and the certainty that even indirect intervention would lead to accusations of intervention to help one ethnic group will certainly deter China from involvement. The harm to China’s reputation would be incalculable, and the complications resulting from intervention not something the Chinese would want to deal with. China’s role in Cambodia has been positive as it supported the UN effort to end the civil war and set up a coalition government that excluded its Khmer Rouge ally once it was convinced Vietnamese influence could be minimized (Bert, 1993). It has continued to support the Cambodian government in spite of second Prime Minister Hun Sen’s bloody coup against first Prime Minister Norodom Ranariddh in Cambodia in early July 1997, and the Chinese avoided making any accusations of Vietnamese influence motivating Hun Sen. President Jiang Zemin paid a visit to Cambodia in November 2000, and China funded a National Assembly office building, reflecting its growing role there. At that time, several agreements on economic cooperation were signed (Paal, 2000: 88; Langran, 2001). The Chinese role in Cambodia, beginning with the decision to support the UN peacekeeping effort and the Paris Treaty is one of the clearest examples of how China’s behavior in the 1990s has shifted to accommodating existing governments and avoiding conflict and confrontation in Southeast Asia. More recently, China has been competing with the US in Cambodia, especially over international participation in a Khmer Rouge war crimes tribunal. Intervention in Southeast Asia by the US, however, could alter this calculus. It is somewhat surprising to read that following the Cambodian coup in early July 1997, the US moved 530 special operations forces and nine aircraft to Utapo, Thailand to be positioned nearby and ‘keep a lid on the situation.’ This action was characterized by Admiral J. W. Prueher, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command, as a ‘crisis response.’ The action was undoubtedly intended to send a signal to Hun Sen and was unlikely to lead to actual intervention in Cambodia. It is also possible there had been communication with the Chinese and they would not have been averse to intervention to restore the integrity of the government. Nonetheless, direct intervention by the US, especially in an area such as Cambodia falling within an area of intense Chinese influence, would be very unsettling to the Chinese and could provoke strong protests (Congressional Hearing, 1998: 15; Peou, 1999: 20–6). Such action by the US could also tempt Chinese military action in a Southeast Asian country under the right circumstances.

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The overseas Chinese The ethnic Chinese living in Southeast Asia are a small proportion of the total population. Numbers vary widely, but suggest that ethnic Chinese account for approximately 2 percent in the Philippines, 3 percent in Indonesia, 10 percent in Thailand, 3 percent in Myanmar and 28 percent in Malaysia. Singapore, split off from Malaysia primarily because of its predominantly Chinese population, has 77 percent ethnic Chinese. But these ethnic groups control disproportionate amounts of the wealth in these societies. To take just two measures of their affluence, comprising less than 10 percent of the population, they are estimated to control two-thirds of the retail trade in Southeast Asia, and own a large share of the stock market capitalization: 60 percent owned by 2 percent of the population in the Philippines, 70 percent owned by 5 percent in Cambodia, and 73 percent owned by 3.5 percent in Indonesia. Eightysix percent of Southeast Asia’s dollar billionaires are ethnic Chinese (Goodman, 1997–8). Not surprisingly, there has historically been considerable animosity toward the ethnic Chinese in these countries, and there are often suspicions that they are to one degree or another being used as a tool of Beijing to accomplish some of its foreign policy purposes. This perception has been assisted by identification of ethnic Chinese with communist movements or causes, especially in Malaysia and to some degree in Indonesia. The relative absence of anti-Chinese discrimination, even in Thailand and the Philippines, two countries where Chinese integration is considered to have been most successful, is fairly new. In general, antiChinese sentiment and discrimination have been prevalent, and even today in Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia, the Chinese are not permitted full access to public goods, civil rights and freedom of communal expression, that is, the use of language or Chinese-language newspapers. Racial tensions have led to large-scale riots in Myanmar (1967), Indonesia (1960s and 1998), and Malaysia (1969); and to genocide and ethnic cleansing in Indonesia (1960s) and Cambodia (1970s). Chinese communities have tried to escape from these conditions in large numbers from Indonesia (1965–6 and 1998), Vietnam (1975) and Laos (1975). Despite the interest that has been shown toward the ethnic Chinese groups in Southeast Asia, however, there is little evidence that they have been a significant part of Beijing’s foreign policy in the area, and there is even more reason to think they will not be important in the future. Under the 1954 constitution, Chinese abroad were regarded as citizens and eligible to participate in the Chinese political process. But in 1955 Beijing indicated its willingness to renounce its claim to overseas

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Chinese who became citizens of the country in which they resided. Beijing has repudiated the jus sanguinis principle (citizenship by blood) although Beijing is still eager to use the skill and capital of overseas Chinese, as well as their influence in its competition with Taiwan. The 1980 Nationality Law recognizes that citizens living abroad automatically lose Chinese citizenship when they become naturalized citizens in the country in which they reside (Zhuang, 1999). As is often the case in less than democratic societies, the role and importance of minorities in activities deemed to be less than helpful to the nation has been exaggerated. The evidence that these groups have not been very important in furthering the goals of the PRC lies in two facts. The extent to which they can be categorized as a homogeneous group, with a well-defined identity, is exaggerated. In addition, the evidence that Beijing has been active in directing or influencing the ethnic Chinese is lacking, and equally important, they are encouraging the integration of the Chinese minority groups into their Southeast Asian societies, thus further blurring their identity. Encouraging assimilation is preferable to the alternative, which is to periodically be faced with foreign policy dilemmas where pressures will grow to defend ethnic Chinese abroad against discrimination or cruelty. But this is always at a cost to Beijing’s other foreign policy goals, since the host country will likely view Beijing’s protests as interference in its domestic affairs. Finally, the importance of these ethnic Chinese minorities is likely to diminish even more in the future as Southeast Asian societies gradually become more democratic and are increasingly under pressure to afford the full rights of citizenship to all individuals. It has been argued that ‘global tribes,’ emerging from an interpenetrated global economy, are rendering the nation state more and more marginal. The Chinese global tribe, comprising a greater China, is identified as a ‘driving force’ in this trend. This argument is made primarily on economic grounds, and fails to account for the intense political divisions, still intensely felt in that greater China, especially between Taiwan and the PRC (Chang, 1995).14 No matter the impressiveness of the economic statistics – estimates are that from 1973 to 1993 total ethnic Chinese investment in China from Hong Kong, Southeast Asia and Taiwan made up 84.6 percent of total outside investment in the PRC (Goodman, 1997–8: 143).15 The case for attributing the investment to a well-defined community, much less to purposeful behavior cannot be made. As David Goodman notes, the concept of a community of ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia ‘all but disappears on closer examination.’ They speak different languages, eat different food, have different customs

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and standards of behavior, and sometimes even different myths of origins. Their business and business practices are diverse, and often different groups are identified with specific types of businesses, for example, the Hokkien-speakers of southern Fujian are associated with coffee shops, the Taipu Hakka with pawnshops. This diversity and segmentation is such that it is almost inconceivable that ‘those identified as part of the Chinese Commonwealth would be likely to act together any more closely than they do at present.’ Many have been well assimilated, and in many cases location and opportunity may predict investment behavior better than ethnicity. Some ASEAN officials are concerned about the relatively greater investment flowing from ASEAN to China as opposed to that going in the other direction. The former is many times greater than the latter. Some non-ethnic Chinese observers in Malaysia and Indonesia have argued that the imbalances reflect the PRC’s efforts to mobilize investment from the overseas Chinese community which takes place at the expense of local development. The Malaysian Deputy Finance Minister said that it was Malaysia’s view that ‘overzealousness on the part of Malaysian businessmen of Chinese origin could have adverse repercussions racially in their own country’ (Goodman, 1997–8: 141, 144).16 An additional reason that the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian countries are unlikely to be mobilized for Beijing’s purposes is that China, given its present foreign policy priorities, will likely subjugate any temptations to play the ‘ethnic card’ to other foreign policy objectives. This general shift in emphasis away from any propensity to use Chinese ethnic minorities for its purposes was formalized in 1980 when the Beijing government passed a Nationality Law, which encouraged Chinese citizens abroad to respect local laws and appeared to end Chinese government claims over Chinese who were citizens of the countries in which they resided (Sutter, 1997: 7). In both 1994 and 1998, in response to mistreatment and atrocities directed toward the Chinese in Indonesia during the disturbances related to leadership changes there, China did protest the incidents in Indonesia. This was the first time since the 1960s that China had applied diplomatic pressure to a friendly country over the mistreatment of Chinese. A protest in April 1994 provoked an angry protest from Jakarta. Beijing refrained from protests during the recurrent incidents of racial violence in Indonesia in the last half of 1996 and in the early months of 1997. And in 1998 for nearly three months, Beijing refused to make the riots an object of diplomatic concern. When Chinese Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan was in Jakarta in April, he categorized the anti-Chinese incidents throughout Indonesia as Jakarta’s ‘internal affair,’ and pledged a $3 million loan to

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Jakarta, which was facing the pressures of a worsening financial crisis. The Chinese media focused on Suharto’s efforts to cope with the deteriorating economic situation and to restore order, and made no mention of the burning, looting, torture and rapes that were affecting many ethnic Chinese in Jakarta. At this point, China was not willing to directly criticize Jakarta’s failure to control the anti-Chinese incidents as a failure to protect Chinese interests, nor did it take the less risky option of simply criticizing Jakarta for a general failure to protect the human rights of the Indonesian people (Zha, 2000; Leifer, 1999b). China did eventually raise the issue of abuses toward its nationals in Indonesia, probably because Taiwan’s continuing concern with the issue meant that China would be discredited, both at home and abroad, as not being able to defend the interests of the ethnic Chinese if it did not speak out. China was therefore faced with pressures domestically and from the ethnic Chinese abroad to act to protect the interests of the ethnic Chinese, and beginning in August through November, China did make some public pronouncements to express its displeasure with the Indonesian government over the handling of riots occurring in May (Tang, 1998). But it was clear that the criticisms were made with care and with a view to minimizing the impact on Sino-Indonesian relations. Articles in the Chinese press pertaining to the abuses occurring in Indonesia carefully refrained from using racially suggestive terminology, rather portraying the victims as productive members of the Indonesian community who were victims of ‘misfortune’ and incidents to be prevented in the future. Meanwhile, economic relations between the two countries were unaffected and Jakarta did not respond aggressively as in 1994. China continued to give Indonesia economic assistance during this period as well. China’s remonstrances to Indonesia over the May riots ended completely in November, after President Jiang Zemin raised the issue with Indonesian President B. J. Habibie at the China–ASEAN dialogue meeting in Kuala Lumpur. Jiang, speaking to a group of Indonesian businessmen, repeated the pledge that China would ‘never try to use people of Chinese origin living in Indonesia to seek political or economic gain there.’ When President Abdurrahman Wahid visited Beijing in December 1999 on his first state visit just a few months after he became president, the treatment of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia was again discussed. Wahid maintained that ethnic Chinese in Indonesia enjoyed equal rights with other Indonesian citizens, and Jiang said that the issue should not be allowed to jeopardize relations between the countries. One purpose of the visit was seen as an attempt to persuade ethnic Chinese to return to invest in Indonesia. In March 2002 Jiang told

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President Megawati when she visited China that she and the Indonesian government had made efforts to improve conditions for the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, and China was appreciative. Li Peng also mentioned the issue. Although the 1998 controversy ended amicably, there is no doubt the controversy made a deep impression in both capitals and has not been forgotten (Zha, 2000; Straits Times, 1999; Leifer, 1999b; Jiang, 2002; Li, 2002). This episode in China’s handling of real grievances involving abuse of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia can be viewed as an attempt by Beijing to meet demands coming from many quarters, and still avoid harm to its relations with Indonesia. The Taiwanese had early raised concerns about the events in Indonesia. Beijing refrained from responding to the provocations until pressure, domestically and abroad, became impossible to ignore. But in making diplomatic remonstrances to Indonesia, it showed an awareness of the importance of its relations with the biggest power in Southeast Asia, a power whose role in the sensitive Spratly Island dispute has been useful to Beijing, and whose goodwill Beijing was certainly anxious to retain. Given Beijing’s orientation toward maintaining positive relations with Southeast Asian countries in order to maintain an external environment conducive to its economic development, there is every reason to believe it will continue to minimize disruptions to external relations stemming from mistreatment of ethnic Chinese on future occasions. Efforts in the 1990s to increase financial assistance to China from the ethnic Chinese do not appear to carry any of the old political liabilities of appearing to interfere in other societies’ affairs (Thuno, 2001). China’s ability to finesse its relations with Southeast Asian countries regarding their treatment of the ethnic Chinese has improved, but any future Beijing protests on these issues will not be well received in Southeast Asia. Finally, continued successful development and increased affluence in Southeast Asia will encourage democratization, the increased assimilation of ethnic Chinese and the elimination of discriminatory laws and policies. It is no accident that the two countries most favorably disposed toward democracy, Thailand and the Philippines, also have two of the best records on assimilation of the ethnic Chinese. Furthermore, the terminology used by then President Habibie to describe ethnic Chinese indicates increased sensitivity on the issue of the ethnic Chinese living in Indonesia (Zha, 2000: 571). And while exploitation of social opposition to ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asian countries for domestic political purposes continues, at the same time David Goodman reports that even in countries where assimilation has not been official or semi-official policy, as ethnic Chinese business

128 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

people have become wealthier, their ‘business practices changed and they became both local nationals and multinational South-east Asian capitalists’ (Goodman, 1997–8: 152). Such trends will continue.

Approaches to multilateral security The emphasis in the earlier parts of this chapter, indeed in much of this book, has been on the close fit between realist assumptions and Chinese behavior in the international environment. The Chinese conceptualize their interests in traditional geopolitical terms and operate on the belief that China’s interests and threat protection can best be realized by effectively managing the use of growing GNP and military power to resist US ‘hegemony’ and Japanese power and improve China’s relative position in the Asian hierarchy, eventually realizing a dominant position in East Asia. China nurses a sense of entitlement to the realization of its legitimate place in the world as a great power, an aspiration which frustrated and humiliated Chinese governments have attempted to realize over a long period of time. As we have seen, much debate about China’s intentions and likely behavior hinges on assumptions about the degree to which this traditional set of images of China’s deserved status in the system and the most appropriate way to reach that position will prevail. The alternative is a view that recognizes the interdependent nature of the modern world, the increasing absurdity and danger of war with weapons of mass destruction, and the potential role of cooperative institutions, norms and identities in allowing nations to negotiate differences and make decisions on both the domestic and international level. Nobody expects China, or any other large power, to suddenly abandon the assumptions and practices of realism for a new world of shared values, security cooperation and the pursuit of absolute rather than relative gains. Rather, the hope of the West is that China will ‘go beyond Realism, not discard it’ (Keohane, 1984: 16). In this section, I will examine several examples of the steps China has taken toward acceptance of and participation in multilateral processes and institutions and assess its predilection to continue to expand its interest and activities in those areas. Based primarily on interviews with the Chinese foreign policy elite in 1993, Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser outlined Chinese views on multilateral security. The interviews took place in the context of a previous statement by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that As for security co-operation, in our view, we may start off with bilateral and regional security dialogues of various forms, at different levels and

China: Historical and Contemporary Policies 129

through various channels in response to the diversity of the [AsiaPacific] region. Through such dialogues and consultation, we may improve our communication and confidence in one another. China will actively participate in these dialogues and consultations. Qian also elaborated on the general principles on which multilateral security should be based. These included treating all countries equally on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence: no country should seek hegemony, spheres of influence, nor organize or join military blocs; no country should interfere in the internal affairs of another; disarmament and arms control should be carried out in a fair and reasonable manner; efforts should be made to end arms races and nuclear proliferation; and territorial and border disputes and other differences among states should be settled peacefully without the use of force. The Chinese had only recently undertaken a comprehensive effort to study multilateralism, with many military and civilian think-tanks tasked to study the subject of multilateral security and make recommendations to the top leaders. Views commonly held in 1993 by Chinese policy makers and researchers regarding multilateralism, as reflected in the interviews with the foreign policy elite, included: ●

●

●

●

●

Bilateral relations and the balance of power among the major powers will continue to be the primary factor affecting stability in the AsiaPacific, not a multilateral security structure. Building regional multilateral cooperation will not be possible without first developing cooperative relations between and among the major powers in the region. Multilateralism is viewed as largely irrelevant – or potentially damaging – to efforts aimed at solving or managing most of the key disputes in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese experts do not completely reject multilateral approaches to security, however, and are exploring the implications of other countries’ proposals for regional stability. Most Chinese officials and researchers see subregional multilateralism as a more realistic and desirable approach than efforts to establish a region-wide security dialogue or structure.

In short, the Chinese had a very cautious attitude toward multilateral security approaches in the Asia-Pacific. Jiang Zemin, in an interview two weeks after Qian Qichen’s statement, indicated scepticism about a comprehensive region-wide security system. He noted that establishment of

130 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

a security mechanism ‘should proceed from the actual conditions of the region which are diversified.’ The Chinese are inclined to wait for others to take the initiative in creating multilateral mechanisms, they are leery that multilateral processes could be damaging to Chinese interests, and they seek to avoid or minimize restrictions on China’s behavior that might be imposed as a result of multilateral security cooperation. They are likely to be cautious about the construction of region-wide or subregional multilateral security structures.17 As international and regional norms and institutions are becoming increasingly important in a globalizing world, China in 1996 made a conscious decision to participate in multilateral organizations and institutions that would allow it to cooperate with and obtain the technological advantages that come from interaction with the developed world in a peaceful international environment while also improving its image and reassuring other nations on its behavior and intentions (Goldstein, 2001: 843). It became an invited guest to the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in 1991, a consultative partner of the newly established ARF in 1994, a dialogue partner in ASEAN’s Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) in 1996, and a participant in the ASEAN informal summit from 1997 (Lee Lai To, 2001). It is worth looking at how China has fared in its involvement in this new world, the norms and practices of which have until recently been at odds with Beijing’s view of its proper role in the international system. I first examine Chinese attitudes toward and behavior in the ARF, since it is an organization concerned with the objective of ‘managing security problems through cooperative security measures against the background of a more powerful Chinese presence in the region,’ a concern of the members both within and outside of the area (Foot, 1998: 439). The ARF was created in 1994, and China has been involved with the ARF from the beginning. The ARF was created with China in mind, since there is a widespread belief that China is becoming an increasingly important power in the region and some means is required to assess and deal with any problems this may foretell for the ASEAN region. In spite of the negative cast of the Chinese foreign policy establishment’s view of multilateralism, there is considerable evidence that China is willing to participate in the multilateral process, that it is finding it useful for obtaining information and increasing its preparedness on various topics, and that it is finding useful ways to use the process to protect its interests. And while there is not a lot of evidence that the Chinese are becoming committed to multilateral institutions and processes as a standard or norm in its own right, it is probable that movement in this direction may come about as a result of participation in the process.

China: Historical and Contemporary Policies 131

When discussion of starting a group such as the ARF in Asia began, China ‘reacted with considerable disquiet.’ Chinese leaders argued publicly that the region was too diverse and that it was premature to establish such an organization. Underlying this apprehension was a fear that the ARF would be used to deliberate the status of Taiwan and the South China Sea islands. There was a fear that the US would dominate the organization and would use it as yet another forum from which to criticize Beijing’s foreign and domestic behavior. But three years after the first meeting, Beijing was an active participant in the ARF and the track two or unofficial dialogue process which complements those official deliberations. In March 1997, Beijing co-chaired with the Philippines an intersessional support group (ISG) meeting of the ARF on confidence building measures (CBM) in Beijing. This was the first time for China to host an official multilateral conference on security issues (Foot, 1998: 426). In the late 1980s, multilateral meetings on security in East Asia were rare; by the early 1990s there were more than forty ongoing channels for regional discussion; and by the late 1990s there were about two meetings a week, with an increasing percentage being held at the formal governmental level. Chinese diplomats, officers, or academics participate in most of these. The Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP), founded in 1993, and the ARF, are especially significant because they are the most ambitious and highest-profile organizations aimed at promoting dialogue, confidence building and transparency. China has not missed a meeting of either organization in the time since they were founded. It is significant that neither of these organizations is viewed by the Chinese or other participants as a forum for negotiation, policy coordination or collective action, and Chinese officials have frequently observed that China is a participant in the ARF rather than a member of the ARF. And since ASEAN took the lead in setting up the organization, it is not viewed as a tool of another great power. Furthermore, both organizations were created with China in mind, and China had considerable influence in shaping the terms of its entry into the regional process and the operations of these institutions. In the case of the ARF, there was an ‘understanding’ that certain issues, including cross-Strait relations, would not be discussed. In the case of the CSCAP, the conditions were more explicit and the discussions required for clarification delayed China’s entry into the organization for two years (Johnston and Evans, 1999: 256–7). There are a number of indicators that show China’s increasing comfort with participation in the ARF and the impact of that participation on China. First, at the second meeting of the ARF in Brunei in 1995, the

132 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

Chinese foreign minister explicitly adopted cooperative security language, recommending that Asia-Pacific states should replace ‘the resort to force and threat to use force with peaceful negotiations, dialogues, and consultations.’ Second, at the 1995 meeting, Beijing promised that it would produce a white paper as a contribution to confidence building. It produced such a white paper in November of that year and has also produced one in 1998, and one in 2000 on the issue of Taiwan. The topic of defense white papers became part of the agenda of the ISG that deals with CBMs, and was discussed at the March 1997 discussions in Beijing, increasing pressure on all to produce a statement of defense doctrine and be more transparent about military matters (Foot, 1998: 429–31).18 Other CBM measures were also discussed at the March meeting. As Rosemary Foot states, there is no longer a debate in Beijing about ‘whether to be transparent or not.’ Rather there is acceptance of the fact that some level of transparency does contribute to security and the question of debate has become how much transparency is required to build confidence in the benign intentions of a country’s neighbors. It is unlikely that the debate would have taken place at all in Chinese official circles in the absence of the ARF. Finally, the Chinese approach within the ARF to the topic of the ownership of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea also suggests both the increasing acceptance of the ARF process by the Chinese and the positive impact of the process on this sensitive topic. The Spratly Island issue attained new prominence in February 1995 when Chinese started military construction on Mischief Reef, a part of the Spratlys also claimed by the Philippines. This action came as a shock to ASEAN, since it was the first direct action against a contested claim of an ASEAN member. It led to ‘the first consultative meeting’ between senior officials of ASEAN and China. It was characterized by one participant as ‘hectic, direct, and quite unsettling to the Chinese.’19 China has been discussing the Spratly Island issue since 1995 on an informal basis at ARF meetings, but it was agreed in April 1997 to put the South China Sea issue on the agenda of the meetings’ annual consultations. The fact that the Chinese have agreed to discuss the issue at all within the confines of the ARF is a retreat from the initial Chinese contention that they would settle the Spratly Island jurisdiction problems only on a bilateral basis. The Chinese now routinely concede, after making clear their ‘indisputable sovereignty’ over the area, that there are overlapping claims and that non-claimant states have a concern about freedom of navigation. They then inevitably accompany this admission with a statement that the disputes should not be resolved by force (Foot, 1998: 429–31). At the same time, however, as late as 1999 Beijing vociferously asserted that the dispute should be

China: Historical and Contemporary Policies 133

resolved peacefully, but ‘between the relevant parties sitting together and having bilateral talks … [and] China opposes the discussion of this issue in international forums and China is not in favor of the intervention of other countries. The internationalization of this dispute will only further complicate the matter’ (AFP, 1999). An examination of Chinese participation in the ARF indicates both that participation in multilateral fora has increased, and that China has seemingly come to be more committed to the process, or at least convinced it is in its interest to participate. Analysis of participation in another multilateral institution, UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), yields a similar conclusion. Bates Gill and James Reilly examined Beijing’s attitudes toward peacekeeping and their participation in UN peacekeeping operations and found that even though much of the philosophy of such operations seemed to contradict Beijing’s emphasis on respect for each nation’s sovereign prerogatives, the Chinese have shown an appreciation of the value of peacekeeping operations. They seem willing to accept individual UN commitments to peacekeeping operations provided both Security Council approval is obtained and the host nation acquiesces. Beijing’s ascent to and participation in the East Timor UN operations is one example of this. While Beijing is not likely to become an important player in most peacekeeping operations, Gill and Reilly believe that Beijing now has a ‘looser definition of ‘sovereignty’ than ever before,’ and that we should expect a ‘slow but steady rise in Chinese support for UN peacekeeping operations’ (Gill and Reilly, 2000). This suggests that in spite of Beijing’s general adherence to a world view that emphasizes the priority of protecting sovereignty and the fact that it has displayed an intense suspicion of regional multilateral arrangements that might compromise its national autonomy or limit pursuit of its traditional national interests, Beijing is also becoming aware of the interdependent nature of the international system and will slowly adapt its behavior to that reality. But those changes are likely to be slow and gradual. In the process of becoming more involved in regional multilateral processes, Beijing has stressed the need to move forward ‘at a pace comfortable for all participants,’ the need to make decisions only on the basis of consensus, to avoid too much institutionalization, and to stress unofficial processes rather than official procedures. These preferences, for loosely structured deliberations focusing on discussion and consensus, rather than on binding decisions based on timetables and strict rules of procedures, are not unlike the attitudes and positions displayed by ASEAN members themselves, discussed below in Chapter 5. The ASEAN process is, however, less cautious than that of the Chinese.

134 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

There is also evidence that China has found another use for its ‘newfound commitment to multilateral security cooperation,’ as a diplomatic weapon in its contention with the US. Singling out the US–Japan security alliance as a bilateral arrangement, the Chinese argue that bilateral alliances are exclusive in nature, emphasize military threats, sharpen the divisions among those in dispute, and thus do little to contribute to any reduction in tension’ (Foot, 1998: 434–5). Doubtless, most of Asia would be delighted to believe that this seeming conversion to the virtues of multilateral diplomacy and the sudden aversion to power politics and bilateral alliances is something that will persist as a new and cooperative feature in China’s relations with its neighbors. The evidence is, however, that this approach will be used when convenient to bludgeon the US and its alliance with Japan, but will only very gradually replace China’s more typical Realpolitik approach to the world. While China’s world outlook may still be realist, more inclined toward a sovereignty-oriented world than is the case with some other nations, China has shown an affinity for participation in both global and regional multilateral processes. Analysis of China’s behavior in the UN shows that while China has unfailingly continued to pursue its narrow national interests, it has also found a way to reconcile those with the requirements of cooperating with and becoming a ‘respectable’ member of the international community (Kim, 1999).20 Doubtless there are those elites who favor greater participation in and promotion of multilateral processes and China’s further integration into the international system, but they are constrained by those conservatives who oppose it and must plan their strategy to maximize their effectiveness. China’s participation in the multilateral processes has an effect, both on the way the process operates and on the norms and practices in the broader regional or international community. But such participation also has an impact on China. Evidence from study of China’s participation in arms control fora shows that the requirements of participation led to China recruiting experts and the creation of organizations that provided the Chinese representatives with the arms control information they needed to participate internationally, but in the process it also naturally contributed to the education of numerous Chinese experts and participants and the establishment of bureaucratic processes that took on a life of their own (Johnston and Evans, 1999). The results so far, given the small amount of time China has been engaged in multilateral institutions, especially regional ones, may seem meager. But as the rate of participation increases and China’s familiarity with the process and the norms connected with the process increases, departures from the more

China: Historical and Contemporary Policies 135

sovereignty-oriented outlook will become more frequent and more impressive to the rest of the international community. Such involvement in multilateral diplomacy can only have a positive effect on further entangling China in the mesh of international institutions, a development that bodes well for lessening the difficulties of a power transition.

Economic policy Beijing’s economic interests in Southeast Asia include fostering trade and investment in the subregion as well as soliciting foreign investment inside China. As the 1997 economic crisis showed, what affects one nation in the region affects the rest, and it is therefore in China’s interest to create an area-wide environment that facilitates economic progress. China’s awareness of this fact partially explains its refusal to devalue its currency during the crisis, a decision that prevented further instability and also earned it substantial political capital in Southeast Asia for putting the interests of the region first. Further, Southeast Asian leaders realize the economic progress China has made and its potential in their economic future (Macapagal-Arroyo 2001; Mahathir, 2000b; Lee, 2000). The ASEAN-5 (Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei), after three decades of sustained economic growth, have been placed in the World Bank’s middle income and high income economies, alternately classified as either NIEs (newly industrialized economies) or near-NIEs. Economic growth in the ASEAN-5 has been accompanied by rapidly falling unemployment rates and incidence of poverty. Measures of health such as life expectancy or infant mortality rate in the most advanced ASEAN countries such as Malaysia now approach those of the United States and the figures on Singapore exceed US statistics. Perusal of economic health and educational statistics compiled by ASEAN comparing 1980 and 1993 suggests the tremendous progress these countries have made (ASEAN, 1997; Yue, 1999: 250). Sino-ASEAN trade grew steadily in the 1980s and grew even more rapidly in the 1990s. From 1975 to 1989, ASEAN imports from China increased at an average annual compounded rate of 12.8 percent, while exports to China grew at 13.4 percent. The growth rate for imports from 1981–9 was 9.8 percent, and 23 percent for ASEAN exports. All during this period, ASEAN ran a positive balance of trade. In 2000, China’s total trade with ASEAN was $39.5 billion, or 8.3 percent of Beijing’s total trade, an increase from a 1993 figure of 5.4 percent of China’s total trade and up from 7.5 percent in 1999. In 2000, Chinese imports from ASEAN made up 9.9 percent of China’s total imports, while exports to ASEAN comprised

136 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia

7.0 percent of China’s exports. China’s combined trade with the ASEAN countries in 2000 was more than Sino-South Korean trade ($34,500 m) or trade with Taiwan ($30,534 m). China had trade with Singapore, the largest ASEAN trade partner, totaling $10,821 million. ASEAN figures now include the countries of Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, none of which were members prior to 1995. The trade volume of these four countries with China, however, is low and it has little impact on the total trade figures between China and ASEAN. Table 4.1 shows the trade volume of individual ASEAN countries with China (Herschede, 1991; IMF, 2001). As Table 4.2 shows, the importance of the China trade to most ASEAN countries is significant but still limited. With the exception of Myanmar and Vietnam, each with a unique historical relationship with China, trade with China for any individual country has seldom been over 4 percent, Table 4.1 ASEAN countries’ export–import flow to China (millions of US dollars)

Exports: Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Total ASEAN exports Imports: Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Total ASEAN imports Source: IMF, 2001.

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

–

–

–

1 1,322 8 1,933 130 164 2,098 930 296

5 1,742 9 1,889 136 209 2,759 1,642 362

6 2,057 1 1,882 125 328 3,395 1,868 340

– 46 2,229 – 1,852 67 244 4,053 1,744 474

– 42 1,832 7 1,994 56 344 4,065 1,769 440

11 9 2,009 9 2,318 92 575 3,920 2,208 322

56 24 2,768 6 3,028 113 663 5,377 2,805 845

6,882

8,753

10,002

10,709

10,549

11,473

15,685

49 39 1,369 20 1,363 406 320 2,885 1,388 144

89 57 1,495 22 1,709 680 660 4,042 2,096 330

92 70 1,598 23 1,876 573 653 4,439 1,953 329

78 57 1,518 5 2,232 627 972 5,668 2,260 404

10 96 906 20 1,849 586 1,326 4,851 1,822 515

19 86 1,242 24 2,139 447 1,040 5,697 2,409 1,060

17 113 2,022 38 3,237 546 768 7,116 1,759 1,691

7,983

11,180

11,606

13,821

11,981

14,163

17,307

China: Historical and Contemporary Policies 137 Table 4.2

ASEAN countries’ trade with China as percent of total trade

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar* Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

0.8 2.9 3.7 3.2 2.8 31.8 1.3 2.5 2.3 4.5

1.4 3.2 3.8 3.4 2.4 37.3 1.9 2.8 2.9 5.1

1.3 3.9 3.9 2.3 2.4 33.2 1.8 3.1 3.0 3.6

1.1 5.9 3.9 0.5 2.6 23.9 1.9 3.8 3.3 4.1

0.2 7.4 3.6 2.9 2.9 17.2 2.7 4.2 3.7 4.6

0.8 3.7 4.5 3.9 3.0 15.7 2.3 4.3 4.2 6.1

1.6 4.9 5.0 3.8 3.5 16.5 2.0 4.6 3.7 9.1

* Figures on the percentage of Myanmar’s total trade that the trade with China accounts for varies considerably depending if IFS or DOTS totals are used. I have used the higher percentages. Source: Calculated from data in IMF, 2001.

although several of the largest ASEAN trading partners appear to be reaching that level. Singapore, Indonesia and Cambodia all had at least two years of trade with China exceeding 4 percent of total trade from 1998 to 2000. In spite of the steady growth in the volume of Sino-ASEAN trade over the last several decades, there are inherent problems limiting the development of that trade. Even though both the Chinese and ASEAN economies have seen very rapid growth rates and although the ASEAN region is said to ‘contain some of the most trade-oriented economies in the world’ (Yue, 1967: 252) trade between the two areas remains relatively low in volume, and is dwarfed by ASEAN’s trade with Japan, the US, and Europe (see Table 4.3) which remain the bedrock of both ASEAN’s and China’s trading base. Japan, the EU, and the US account for over 40 percent of trade for seven of the ten ASEAN countries, with the amount reaching almost 55 percent in the case of the Philippines. In 1991, this phenomenon could be explained by the fact that as latecomers to industrialization, China and ASEAN tended to specialize in the same products, such as textiles and electrical goods. Often they competed with each other in slowly expanding export markets. Their economies were too much alike, their ‘respective comparative advantages [were] in products that are substitutes for one another, rather than complements to one another’ (Herschede, 1991: 192). Even as Chinese and ASEAN export structures have increasingly shifted away from traditional primary products toward more dynamic manufactures, the shift being greatest in the case of ASEAN, the similarity in the composition of their exports remains (Zhao, 2000: 85).21 This generalization is less true

138 The Great Powers in Southeast Asia Table 4.3

Southeast Asian trade with ASEAN, Japan, EU, US and China (percent) ASEAN

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

Japan

EU

US

China

1996

2000 1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000 1996 2000

39.3 67.9 15.0 70.2 23.1 38.9 11.0 28.5 16.3 19.2

33.8 22.3 18.2 67.5 25.4 23.1 15.6 27.5 20.4 23.1

20.1 3.4 23.6 6.7 19.0 9.9 20.2 13.3 23.1 15.0

29.5 2.1 20.7 3.8 16.7 7.4 16.6 12.3 20.5 16.3

25.0 11.9 19.3 12.8 14.1 8.4 12.0 13.8 15.2 16.8

7.4 14.3 13.4 12.3 12.4 10.1 14.0 12.3 14.0 16.6

6.5 1.4 13.1 2.1 16.9 3.8 25.3 17.4 14.9 4.8

11.6 1.3 1.6 27.8 3.9 4.9 12.4 3.9 5.0 1.2 2.4 3.8 18.8 2.4 3.5 10.6 33.3* 15.1* 23.9 1.8 2.0 16.2 3.1 4.6 17.5 3.0 3.7 4.1 3.6 9.1

* Figures on the percentage of Myanmar’s total trade for which the trade with China accounts vary considerably depending on whether IFS or DOTS totals are used. I have used the higher percentages. Source: Adapted from Yue, 1999; and IMF, 2001.

of states like Singapore and Malaysia, while at the other extreme, Myanmar and the three former Indochina states have few manufactured exports. It is reported that of $69.3 billion in foreign investment flowing into the area in 1996, about 60 percent went to China, and about 40 percent to ASEAN, a distinct shift in allocation from five years earlier when China’s low wages and abundant labor provided less competition. This increasing competition has pressured ASEAN countries to further liberalize their economies and trade, even to the point of establishing special economic zones similar to those existing in China (ASEAN, 2001: 22; Yue, 1999; Sutter, 1997: 7). Investment by ASEAN countries in China has grown considerably, and Chinese investment in ASEAN is increasing, but from a very low base amount. By the end of 1991, the ASEAN states had committed investment worth $1.41 billion to 1042 projects approved by Beijing. By early 1996, ASEAN had agreed to investment worth $26.4 billion to be used at 10,926 projects, and had paid $6.2 billion. By 1994, Singapore had become China’s fifth largest overseas investor after Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan and the US. Singapore had invested in 3834 projects in China and had promised investment funds worth $6.8 billion. The largest of these was the agreement to jointly develop a multi-billion dollar project at the Suzhou Industrial Park in Jiangsu Province (Sutter, 1997: 3). Thailand has also been a large investor. In 1999, Southeast Asia was responsible for 8.2 percent of total foreign investment in China, or $3.3 billion

China: Historical and Contemporary Policies 139

(PRC, 2000: 606). Going the other way, China is reportedly also rapidly increasing investment and economic activity in ASEAN. Still, a recent China–ASEAN joint economic report shows China providing less than one percent of the FDI going into ASEAN as late as 1999, or a paltry $136 million. Increased trade, tourism, and investment in oil and gas indicate the belated warming of China’s relationship with Indonesia. The opening of Bank of China branches in Jakarta and Manila gives the bank a presence in every major ASEAN country (Acharya, 1999: 134–8; ASEAN, 2001: 13; Dhume and Lawrence, 2002). China’s new economic activism in Southeast Asia has not gone unnoticed by the US. James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, noted that this activism signals China’s confidence in the region’s future (Kelly, 2002b). China’s commitment to economic interaction with ASEAN and extension of its influence in the subregion is indicated by its offer of a free trade agreement in November, 2000. And while Singapore is seeking a free trade area with the United States, ASEAN as a whole has rejected the idea and instead is considering China’s offer (Hartcher, 2001: 78; Council on Foreign Relations, 2001: 38). China’s economic relations with the ASEAN countries continue to grow and are an important part of China’s international economic strategy. Beijing hopes to benefit from both trade and investment in Southeast Asia, but it also faces economic competition with the ASEAN countries for both foreign investment and for trade. Beijing’s strategy is one of being friends with all the ASEAN countries and seeking to maintain stable and peaceful relations, avoid any major political or military disruptions in Southeast Asia, including disputes over jurisdiction in the South China Sea. But the rationale for this policy is not so much the specific value of its economic relations with ASEAN – these could always be replaced elsewhere. Rather, China’s concern with preserving a ‘stable peripheral environment,’ to use Qian Qichen’s term, is to use this accomplishment to enhance China’s reputation as a great power giving top priority to development and the creation of a tranquil atmosphere in which commercial activity can flourish without threat or anxiety. Southeast Asia is ideally suited for a mutual endeavor with China to preserve such an environment. The nature of China’s challenge to the US will, therefore, depend heavily on its ability to restrain any impulses to ‘solve’ the South China Sea disputes quickly and by force, and instead to maintain an environment in which the competition will be economic. This is certainly the preference of US leaders and the ideal environment to accommodate China’s rising power.

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Part II Perspectives from Southeast Asia

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5 Southeast Asia: Autonomous Subregion or Penetrated Area?

Southeast Asia’s vulnerability to and dependence on outside powers ensures that it is an area that is of particular interest to outside powers and an area in which they compete for influence. It is therefore an area in which China is likely to challenge, in fact already is challenging, the role of the United States and its prominent position. This chapter investigates why the subregion is an inviting area for great power competition, and evaluates steps being taken to increase Southeast Asian autonomy. During the modern period, Southeast Asia has been a ‘soft’ subregion in the international system, one that is easily and frequently penetrated by larger powers from outside, a diverse and not well-integrated region that lacks the institutions to defend itself and maintain autonomy against outside influences. Although historically both indigenous continental and maritime empires have ruled in Southeast Asia, during the colonial period, only Thailand escaped the ignominy of colonization as Dutch, Portuguese, British and French authority was prominent throughout the region. During World War II, the region was again subject to outside authority after invasion by the Japanese, and the Southeast Asian colonies as well as Thailand were subjected to Japanese authority or influence. US intervention in both the Korean and Vietnam wars, the establishment of a US-backed SEATO and the Soviet presence in Vietnam continued the involvement of outside powers after World War II. Now the cold war is over, the concern with rising Chinese power and the implications for Southeast Asia illustrate that the problem of Southeast Asia’s relations with outside powers is ongoing.

Diversity and fragmentation in Southeast Asia From a realist perspective, Southeast Asia is hampered in its efforts to maintain autonomy as a region and to resist outside intervention by the 143

144 Perspectives from Southeast Asia

fact that there is no subregional power that dominates the subregion or can match the capabilities, either economic or military, of the great powers that have a presence in Southeast Asia or its environs. As Table 5.1 shows, Indonesia has more than twice the population of Vietnam, the second most populous of the ten Southeast Asian countries. Indonesia, however, is a relatively poor country and lacks the economic capacity to match its population numbers. It also has not shown the required leadership capabilities. The perilous nature of the transition to democracy after the political demise of Suharto vividly illustrates the precarious dilemma it faces in holding the country together, much less uniting the subregion. Neither Indonesia nor Thailand, with the second largest GDP, has the economic or military capacity to compete with the major outside powers, while many countries in the region have very small GDPs. Due to the differences in development level, there is also an extreme variation in the GNI per capita within Southeast Asia. The gap between the Singapore GNI per capita of $24,910 and Indonesia at $2830 or Cambodia at $1440 is large (Table 5.1). The limited economic and military potential of all countries in the region when compared to the strength of outside powers, therefore, makes the region a potential power vacuum and vulnerable to outside intervention. Resistance to outside influence requires vigilance in peaceful times, and such resistance is subject to failure in tumultuous times, as recent history attests. The decade of the 1990s, with the emphasis on development, has been Table 5.1

Population and GDP of Southeast Asian countries Population (millions) 2000

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

0.3 12.0 210.4 5.3 23.3 47.7 75.6 4.0 60.7 78.5

GDP ($ billions) 2000 (ppp)

5.4 17.2 641.9 8.3 212.4 – 302.6 113.4 389.0 159.1

Source: World Bank, 2001a, 2001b, 2002.

GNI per capita ($) (ppp) 2000

GNI per capita average annual real growth (%) 1990–99

24,910 1,440 2,830 1,540 8,330 – 4,220 24,910 6,320 2,000

0.5 1.9 3.0 3.8 4.7 5.1 0.9 4.7 3.8 6.2

Autonomous Subregion or Penetrated Area?

145

the most autonomous and peaceful the subregion has experienced in the modern era. It contrasts with the turbulent decades of independence following World War II into the 1960s, the domestic insurgencies supported from outside, Konfrontasi, the tensions of the cold war and the war in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and the conflict over Cambodia in the 1980s. While the subregion’s vulnerability is not likely to diminish much in the near future, over the long term Indonesia has the potential to develop into a middle power that can provide effective leadership in defining and defending the subregion. Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore already constitute a ‘provisional and fragile core’ inside ASEAN’s subregional security regime, with Thailand also a potential leader with a core of mainland states (Emmerson, 1996a). However that may stand after the devastating effect of the 1997 crisis on the Indonesian economy, the collective potential of ASEAN to offset China’s economic and military strength is significant. The combined population of Southeast Asia is 518 million, less than half of China’s 1263 million, and its GDP at $1849 billion, without Myanmar, is less than half of China’s $5023 billion. Southeast Asia’s economic growth rate over the last decade, moreover, has been slower than that of China. Thailand, already a competitor of Indonesia in GDP, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore all have substantial economies and Malaysia and Singapore a more modern military than China. But for the present, Southeast Asia lacks the economic, industrial and educational infrastructure to keep abreast of the RMA, as well as the automated support systems and advanced maintenance skills required for maintaining advanced fighting forces (World Bank, 2000; Dibb, 1997).1 The previously rosy picture of Southeast Asian economies was obliterated by the financial crisis which hit Asia in mid-1997. A financial meltdown originating in Thailand in July spread quickly to Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines and affected the stronger currencies of Hong Kong and Singapore. By the end of the year, currency depreciation averaged 50 percent against the US dollar and the crisis had extended to South Korea and Japan. Rapid influx to the subregion of large amounts of capital, inefficient and corrupt financial institutions and sheer panic all contributed to the debacle. Drastic drops in GDP and increased unemployment contributed to political instability and the fall of governments in Thailand, Indonesia and South Korea. IMF-imposed stabilization requirements, economic reforms and the rebound of the economies, with Indonesia having the weakest recovery, have returned a degree of normalcy to the area, but the economic, political and psychological effect will be felt for some time. The crisis has contributed to greater interdependence in that the IMF has

146 Perspectives from Southeast Asia

required coordination of ASEAN macroeconomic policies, but it has also resulted in the forced return of temporary workers to their home countries and a consequent rise in political tensions. The crisis has also seen, with the exception of Singapore, a reduction in the rate of defense modernization as weapons orders were cancelled and acquisitions drastically slowed. The crisis has forced more attention on pooling procurement funds and cooperative purchasing of avionic upgrades of common aircraft such as the F-5. ASEAN’s ‘unstated concern’ is that China’s arms build-up continues unabated (Simon, 1998; Kim, 2000). Southeast Asia is a culturally diverse region. As Lucian Pye has pointed out, there are common attitudes and behavior that Asians share, but while the West shares the legacies of Greece, Rome and Christendom, Asia has various ‘root civilizations,’ the Sinic, Hindu, Islamic and Buddhist traditions (Pye, 1985: 1). These diverse values and loyalties mean that the people of different countries, or as is usually the case, different groups within countries, therefore have different priorities, objectives and behavior. But it also means that groups with different cultures lack a sense of solidarity and common values that can reinforce and buttress loyalty to either a nation or a region. Furthermore, the mosaic of religions/cultures in Southeast Asia – Confucian, Hindu, Islamic, Christian, two varieties of Buddhism and animistic religions – is further complicated by the diverse ethnic origins of populations. As with religion, the differences within nations are sometimes almost as great as within the region. Malaysia, for instance, is divided among three major ethnic groups, 61 percent Malay and other indigenous, 28 percent Chinese, and 8 percent Indian. In Myanmar, a large percentage of the population is made up of non-Burman minorities (Neher, 1999: 120; Smith, 1991). Typically, Southeast Asian nations do contain a dominant ethnic and dominant religious group, the two groups often overlapping and reinforcing each other. But even small minorities can produce robust separatist movements and prolonged problems for the government, as the Philippine unrest in the southern islands illustrates.2 The arbitrary borders drawn by or resulting from the colonial occupations and the struggle for independence have contributed to these complications by sometimes randomly and seemingly nonsensically excluding or including territories with ethnic or cultural differences. In Indonesia, for instance, Aceh on the island of Sumatra was included as part of the territory to which the Dutch granted independence, although it, like other areas, has a history of autonomy. West Papua (Irian Jaya) was not part of the original independent Indonesia, but was eventually ceded to Indonesia by the Dutch. East Timor was under Portuguese rule, but was eventually taken over by the Indonesian military. Now, East Timor is on the road to independence, and the fate of the

Table 5.2

Ethnic and religious composition of Southeast Asian nations Ethnic breakdown (%)

Religious loyalty (%)

Brunei

Malay Chinese

64 20

Sunni Muslim Buddhist Christian

66 14 10

Cambodia

Khmer Viet Chinese

90 5 5

Theravada Buddhist Muslim Catholic

90

Indonesia

Laos

Malaysia

Myanmar

More than 300 ethnic groups; majority of Malay stock, including Javanese Sundanese Madurese Malay Others include Chinese Indians Melanesians Micronesians Arabs

45 14 8 8 25 (3)

Lao Loum Other Lowland Lao Lao Theung (midslope) Lao Soung (highland) Viet/Chinese

53 13

Malay/other indigenous Chinese Indian

61

Burman Shan Karen Rakhine Chinese Kachin Chin Mon Indian

22 9

Muslim (predominantly Sunni) Protestant Catholic Hindu Buddhist Tribal religion

86

Theravada Buddhist Tribal (predominantly animist) Catholic

58

3

28 8

69 8 7 4 3 2 3 2 2

1.4 (14,000 prior to 1975)

5 3 2

35

(35,000 prior to communist take over)

Sunni Muslim Buddhist Confucianist/ Daoist Christian Animist

54 19 12

Theravada Buddhist Christian Sunni Muslim Animist Hindu

87

7

5 4 3 1

continued

148 Perspectives from Southeast Asia Table 5.2

Continued Ethnic breakdown (%)

Religious loyalty (%)

Philippines

Filipinos: Indo-Polynesian ethnic grouping composed of 50 ethnic groups. A sense of national unity imbues these groups Chinese

95

Singapore

Chinese Malay Indian

77 15 7

Buddhist or Daoist Sunni Muslim Hindu Christian

15 4 13

Thai Chinese Malay Khmer hill tribes

80 10 4 3

Theravada Buddhist Sunni Muslim Christian

95 4 0.5

Viet Chinese Khmer 50 minority nationalities

88 2 2 8

Buddhist Confucianist and Daoist Christian Caodaist Hoa Hao

Thailand

Vietnam

Christian (Catholic) Muslim

94 (84) 5

2 54

55

8 3 2

Sources: J. Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire, Encyclopedia of World Political Systems (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2000); Neher, 1999; Smith, 1991; Goodwin, 1997; Europa World Yearbook: 2001; The Statesman’s Yearbook: The Politics, Culture and Economics of the World, 2002 (London: Palgrave – now Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Freedom House, 2000, 1996; US State Department; Steinberg, 2001. Data on religion and ethnicity vary greatly. Figures are suggestive rather than definitive.

other two areas remains in question. The recent flare-up of ethnic and religious violence in Indonesia during and after the period of regime change is indicative of the problems inherent in the ethnic/cultural diversity and the failure of the old regime to deal with the problems effectively. Perhaps the most complicated jurisdictional dispute, seemingly impervious to resolution, is that involving sovereignty over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, involving overlapping and often conflicting claims to various islands by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. A summary of some of the more visible territorial and jurisdictional disputes in Southeast Asia is in Table 5.3.

Autonomous Subregion or Penetrated Area? Table 5.3

149

Sovereignty, legitimacy and territorial conflicts in Southeast Asia

Conflicting state claims on territory • Continuing claim of the Philippines to the Malaysian state of Sabah and its adjacent waters • Competing claims to the Paracel Islands (Xisha Quandao or Quan Doa Hoang Sa) in the South China Sea, contested by China and Vietnam • Competing claims to the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, contested by China, Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia, Taiwan and the Philippines • Dispute between Malaysia and Singapore over ownership of the island of Pulau Batu Putih (Pedra Branca), some 55 km east of Singapore in the Straits of Johore • Competing claims of Malaysia and Indonesia to the islands of Sipadan, Sebatik, and Ligitan, in the Celebes Sea, some 35 km from Semporna in Sabah Insurgency, independence and separatist movements • Armed communist and Muslim insurgencies in the Philippines • Strong separatist movement in Sabah • Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) resistance movement in West Papua • Aceh independence movement in northern Sumatra • Residual communist guerrilla operations along the Thai–Lao border in northeast Thailand • The Shan, Kachin, Karen secessionist and pro-democracy rebellions in Myanmar • Hostilities along the Myanmar–Bangladesh border Boundary disputes • Boundary disputes between Indonesia and Vietnam on their demarcation line on the continental shelf in the South China Sea, near Natuna Island • Border disputes between Vietnam and Cambodia • Boundary disputes between Vietnam and Malaysia on their off-shore demarcation line • Border dispute between Malaysia and Thailand • Border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand (now being demarcated) (a) • Border dispute between Cambodia and Laos (a) • Dispute over Borneo border between Malaysia and Indonesia (b) • Border dispute between Laos and Myanmar (c) • Border conflicts between Thailand and Myanmar Aftermath of successful independence movement • Continuing conflict over return of refugees and challenges to newly independent nature of East Timor Adapted from Desmond Ball, ‘Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region,’ in Michael Brown, International Security, 18 (Winter, 1993) 78–112, and other sources. (a) South China Morning Post (Internet), June 15, 2000. (b) The Straits Times (Internet), June 15, 2000. (c) Thayer, 2000, 43–98.

150 Perspectives from Southeast Asia

Conflicting claims on territory, such as the Philippines’ claim to Sabah, the Spratly Islands and numerous conflicting island claims among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, all have the potential to escalate. Separatist and insurgency movements, especially in Myanmar, the Philippines and Indonesia are a constant irritation to the governments and erode legitimacy and absorb resources that should be going to development. Boundary disputes are probably more tractable, and East Timor appears to have survived its traumatic birth pains, but adding in the level of poverty and scarcity of resources there, there is plenty of time for a revival of conflict as the country strives to become a legitimate state, even of military conflict. There is little doubt that one measure of Southeast Asian success in dealing with these problems will be the governments’ ability to eliminate corruption and to provide economic growth and a sense of legitimate rule.

Stability and domestic authority Stable communities in Southeast Asia must be based in the first instance on nation states. But the correspondence between nation and state is often imprecise, although the states are the primary organizers and building blocks of subregional supranational community. But nationhood is not determined by culture, language or ethnicity, although all of these can strengthen and buttress national ties. A nation is the result of a sense of belonging to a certain group, by ‘imagined communities’ that convey to members a sense of solidarity and attachment. Southeast Asia still falls short of the stable and integrated communities that can become the building blocks of an integrated and cohesive subregional community because some people’s identification loyalty is divided or given primarily to a locality, or religious community or ethnic group rather than to the national government. There is wide variation, since Singapore and Thailand provide both a unified populace and legitimate government, but apprehension about the potential break-up of Indonesia, the strength of Muslim groups in the southern Philippines, and the continuing strife between the government and various ethnic groups in Myanmar are illustrative of the more acute problems in the subregion. The arbitrary nature of state boundaries and the complex and diverse loyalties of specific populations contribute to the phenomenon of weak states that, in turn, impede the development of subregional organization. Until more states in the subregion are strong and legitimate governments that are capable of speaking for their constituents and negotiating the creation of a Southeast Asian community, that effort will be hobbled. Weak

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151

states contribute to a weak international order. Weak states should be distinguished from weak powers. Weak powers refer to those states that have limited military power. Weak states are those with low levels of social–political cohesion or a poor fit between society and polity, or both. Weak states make the construction of long-term relationships between states impossible. Many states in the subregion lack an independently existing cultural entity which can define the relationship between state and society. Instead, [w]here weak states exist, leaderships and ideologies are unstable, domestic turbulence spreads beyond their own borders, insecurity is endemic, and no state can rely on consistent patterns of attitude and alignment.3 (Buzan and Segal, 1994: 16; Buzan 1991: 96–107) Such turbulence and instability is reflected in the role, orientation and self-image of the military in weak states. Chronically insecure, unless external threats are immediate and overwhelming and sometimes even when they are, the military will be obsessed with internal threats to order and stability, some real and some imagined. Seeing only a blurred distinction between internal and external enemies, the military tends in varying degrees to be involved in what in strong states would be considered civilian affairs. Framing the problem in this way justifies avoidance of a healthy debate about the best way to handle a threat, a debate that could be held more easily if the threat were clearly external rather than of domestic origins. The allocation of resources associated with giving a high priority to military objectives, whether those objectives are held by democratic or military governments, is unlikely to be favorable to the goals of development, and in many cases will be detrimental to them (Ayoob, 1991). A strong and secure state, then, is one with a strong, cohesive, consensual civil society led by a legitimate government attuned to the values and aspirations of the society. A strong state that is able to devote a substantial amount of revenue and resources to development and has no immediate or overwhelming external threat will be in the best position to make its contribution to both its own and to a region-wide defense. There must be ideological unity between ruler and ruled, and a government that translates the society’s shared norms and values into acceptable institutions, procedures and practices (Alagappa, 1995: 293). Lack of a sense of community and institutionalized legitimacy, weak states and an exaggerated role for the military are all reflected in the political instability so prevalent in the subregion. Changes of government by

152 Perspectives from Southeast Asia

violent means, rapid and unexpected shifts in the type of government in power, and the continuing risk of civil war reflect the lack of legitimacy and the instability which has plagued Southeast Asia since independence. Legitimacy, defined as acceptance of the right to rule, can be an important component of non-democratic systems (Putzel, 1997: 241). But these systems all face a key problem that cannot be resolved without the sort of mechanism supplied by a liberal democracy. Except through a system allowing political freedom and debate with fair elections, there is no way to ensure congruence between the populace and those who lead them. Systems that do not use this mechanism are thus faced with the problem of, first, discerning what public opinion is, and second, finding ways to placate it. Some Asian leaders and intellectuals have made eloquent critiques of the contradictions and shortcomings of Western liberal democracy, many of which have substance. But their own recommendations are ultimately self-serving, since they posit that the leadership knows better than the populace what is good for the country and they are therefore justified in repressing free expression or avoiding elections, or both, when necessary for the good of the country. Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad of Malaysia has criticized ‘democracies where political leaders are afraid to do what they know is right … [where] the people and their leaders live in fear … of the free media which they so loudly proclaim as inviolable’ (Putzel, 1997: 253).4 In Table 5.4 I have categorized Southeast Asian nations according to the strength of the state, on the one hand, and according to the degree of democratization, on the other. To make the concept of strong state operational, I have used indicators for the: (1) absence of coups d’état or the threat of coups, and military involvement in politics, (2) the ability of a the government to control the countryside and keep order, and (3) the degree of democratization and openness that indicates a fit between the rulers and the ruled. Clearly the subregion exhibits a Table 5.4

Strong/weak states and democracy Strong state

Intermediate state

Democratic

Thailand

Semi-democratic

Singapore Malaysia

Weak state Indonesia Philippines Cambodia

Non-democratic

Vietnam Myanmar Laos

Autonomous Subregion or Penetrated Area?

153

dichotomy between those states that are strong and those that are weak, with only Vietnam falling in the middle category. Clearly also, there is little correspondence between the strength of a state and the degree of democratization. While one democratic state is classified as strong (Thailand), the other two (Philippines and Indonesia) are in the weak category. Malaysia’s status, however, is severely compromised by the restraints on freedom of expression and activity, calling into question the legitimacy of the government and making it a borderline strong state. The heavy cultural emphasis in Southeast Asia on stability and order have made justification of authoritarian rule as a means of preventing the disorder and chaos Asian rulers often perceive in democracies a common means of staying in office. (See the previous discussion of this issue in Chapter 2.) And it may be that most of the authoritarian rulers believe they are popular. Samuel P. Huntington points out that time and time again when autocrats have attempted to verify their popularity by holding regime-sponsored elections, they have been surprised. He lists 14 examples of ‘surprising’ election results around the world after authoritarian rulers decided to take a risk and hold elections. This certainly undercuts claims by any dictator that a regime enjoys legitimacy and popularity unless sufficient freedom exists in the society to test the proposition. The 1990 vote sponsored by State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) in Myanmar where the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) won overwhelmingly is a recent Southeast Asian example of Huntington’s assertion. Although the elections were held in different circumstances, Golkar’s loss in Indonesia in 1999 also illustrates the desire to end the Suharto era (Huntington, 1991: 174–92). That desire probably existed for some time, even as President Suharto was assuring us of the validity of his mandate to lead. Arguing that democracy is ultimately essential to legitimacy does not suggest that it should come about overnight. It may be that there is a specific East Asian model of democracy, a ‘dominant party democracy’ or ‘democracy without turnover.’ The most democratic version of this model would be Japan, where the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has promoted elections and generally observed the prerequisites of political and civil liberties, but until the 1990s had managed to rule continuously. At the other end of the spectrum would be Indonesia before 1998, where formal elections were held but with heavy violations of the necessary competition and evenhandedness required for liberal democracy (Huntington, 1991: 304–11). This model, if it has been typical of East Asia, is certainly in decline in the 1990s, as the cases of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the Philippines illustrate. In all cases, there

154 Perspectives from Southeast Asia

have been instances of a turnover from one government to a popularly elected government of another party. These trends illustrate that Southeast Asia is moving toward a liberal democratic model, however slowly that movement may be. The pace at which democracies are established is dependent on the economic development of the society, the occurrence of crisis (as Indonesia and Thailand show) and the willingness of the leadership to accept democratic limits on their power. The twin requirements for long-term stability, a means of ‘testing’ and strengthening legitimacy, or the fit between government and people, and the predictability of the succession process, are representative democracy’s major contribution to Asian government. Authoritarian leaders will be pushed toward liberalization since that is ultimately the only way to solve a major source of instability, the problem of succession. There is no way to ensure regular and smooth transitions from one government and leader to another government without the legitimized procedures that accompany democracy. Whether the desired result is a country attractive to foreign investors, governments capable of establishing an effective security community through ASEAN, or acceptance by the international community as a whole, any country that cannot predict the succession process through established and agreed-upon procedures will suffer in reaching such objectives. Ensuring such stability may be the strongest short-term and instrumental argument in favor of democracy, since so much of a country’s welfare rests on assuring both friend and foe that a stable polity has been established. While Singapore would seem to be the exception, an affluent semi-democracy that has an image of greater stability than the rest of the subregion, it is both an exceptional city-state, and one that will likely be pushed toward greater democratization in the years ahead, especially once Lee Kuan Yew disappears from the scene. As Huntington showed long ago, in the initial stages of development, non-democratic, dominant party regimes may be the preferred mode of governance since they best provide the institutions that can contain the increasing rate of citizen participation. The discussion of China in Chapter 3 highlighted the dangers in the transition to democracy (Huntington, 1968; Snyder, 2000). Dogmatic promotion of liberal democracy, especially in the early stages of development, is short sighted and counter productive. But it appears that the most developed states of Southeast Asia, especially the ASEAN-4, have reached a stage where substantial progress toward representative government must be shown if they are to avoid disruptive upheavals. These countries will fare best if the leadership makes a gradual and calculated move toward more liberal and participatory institutions, rather than attempting to preserve the

Autonomous Subregion or Penetrated Area?

155

status quo intact. In the current Southeast Asia, both the US and China are more interested in stability than in disruption, but weak states are always a tempting opportunity for them to pursue their own agendas to the detriment of the subregion’s states.

Indonesia There seems little doubt that democracy becomes easier to build as the standard of living goes up. But delaying political changes too long can be perilous. Asian democracies, with their dominant one-party systems, ‘have relied on the remarkable economic dynamism of their societies to keep their citizens’ support’ (Neher, 1994: 959). Indonesia, however, suggests the dangers of that kind of strategy as it emerges from 30 years of strongman rule. A valuable 30-year period of opportunity was missed to gradually expand citizen participation in a controlled manner and develop the rule of law and institutions to distribute wealth and power. Instead, its insulated elite, especially Suharto’s family, engaged in monopolistic and corrupt economic practices, all the time intensifying society’s resentment against the regime. Instead of working his way out of business by gradually democratizing and turning power over to a progressively more institutionalized political structure, devising ways to meet the grievances of ethnic and religious groups and gradually bring their leaders into positions of responsibility, Suharto insisted on maintaining control. Once the economic slowdown began, the basis of his legitimacy collapsed. Fed up with the paternalistic governing style of Golkar, the large role of the military and the corruption, Indonesian citizens sensed the opportunity and demanded modernization, leading to the collapse of the regime. Unfortunately, little preparation had been made for that event, even though it was inevitable. In many ways, Indonesia is a prototype of the kinds of problems we have been discussing related to weak states and the functioning of democracy. Elections for parliament were held in June 1999, and President Wahid was elected in October for a five-year term by the People’s Consultative Assembly, only to be impeached and replaced by former Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri on July 23, 2001. Especially given the dearth of trained and prepared national leadership, the progress Indonesia has made in forging a tentative public consensus, implementing democratic government on the basis of that consensus, and searching for solutions to long-festering regional and minority problems that had either been ignored, for example, Aceh and West Papua, or decided by force (East Timor), must be considered an important achievement. Now Indonesia, emerging from its ‘Asian democracy’

156 Perspectives from Southeast Asia

phase, faces both promise and peril as it tries to assemble the leadership, the institutions, and the regional, religious and ethnic unity required to govern and integrate the sprawling archipelago. The ethnic, religious and regional diversity of the country is phenomenal, but the divisions within society were aggravated by forcible settlement and migration policies during the Suharto years which increased ethnic and religious resentment. Although Islam in Indonesia has been of a moderate variety, the tension and infighting between Muslim organizations and elites, including former president Wahid, and secularists, especially the President Megawati Sukarnoputri, have contributed to increased tension between Muslims and the rest of society. At mid-year 2000, one estimate of the number of deaths from violence in the Moluccan Islands was 4000 individuals in the previous 18 months. Much of that violence was viewed as part of an attempt to weaken the new president by either disgruntled Suhartoists, or Muslim extremists. Another estimate is that Indonesia now has a million and a half internally displaced people. The central government seems lackadaisical in its attempts to deal with the problem, and the local governments equally inept. Furthermore, both spontaneous vigilantism against even petty criminals and organized paramilitarism are problems across Indonesia. Granting independence to East Timor has resolved that situation, and parliament has passed laws giving substantial autonomy to Aceh and West Papua, somewhat compensating for the increased tension fostered by the erratic leadership of Wahid. The role of the military in resisting the processes leading to the overwhelming referendum in favor of independence for East Timor was also a big factor in dividing the society and impeding a peaceful transition. The military is obviously responding to the changing situation and the new attitudes in society and the government, but it is also dragging its feet on reform, especially on bringing to account those responsible for the violence in East Timor. The military is reportedly crippled by a lack of spare parts and dwindling budgets that eat into training and operations and impede its ability to deal with both domestic and foreign problems. It is now subject to the Leahy amendment which prohibits military assistance going to Indonesia until the military brings to justice those responsible for the violence revolving around East Timor. Moreover, Indonesia has suffered from delays in carrying out IMF-mandated reforms and the receipt of money from the IMF and net capital outflows, as well as miscalculations by the IMF itself. A weak rupiah and a decimated Jakarta stock exchange have contributed to the worsening of an already lethargic economy set back severely by the 1997 crisis. Recalling the lack of experience in conducting democratic processes, erratic and inept leadership by Wahid was matched

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by impatience and an insistence on moving forward with impeachment proceedings against the president rather than attempting to work with him and devise a solution that would have allowed his fate to be decided by facing an election, thus strengthening rather than weakening the new democratic institutions. Meanwhile, demonstrations and riots involving the pro- and anti-administration forces became frequent and often violent. All of this indicates the deleterious effects of a combination of the overwhelming number of issues and challenges faced by the new leadership, the lack of consensus and unity within the society and distrust of authority, and the lack of experience and practice in democratic processes and a spirit of compromise among both leaders and followers. Under President Sukarnoputri, however, the situation has stabilized somewhat and reforms have progressed. Indonesia is certainly a classic weak state, and the outcome of the current drama could have one of various possible endings. Many gamblers, placing bets on the success of the project, would give only modest odds for a stable and democratic solution.5

Philippines The other major states in the region reflect many of the same problems as Indonesia. The Philippines has not yet achieved an effective ‘monopoly on the means of coercion’ within its borders and is still involved in a process of nation-building. The limited coercive and administrative reach of the Philippine state is evident in the continued prevalence of private armed forces, including rebel guerrillas, armed retainers of oligarchic politicians and paramilitary groups. The enemy, at least until recent confrontations with China over islands in the South China Sea, has been within rather than without, and [The Philippines] has yet to demonstrate many of the hallmarks of a modern state, such as a clear distinction between the internal and the external or the public and the private, or a high degree of specification and administrative reach. (Morada and Collier, 1998: 575) The Philippines is still recovering from the long period of authoritarian rule under Ferdinand Marcos and the damage it did to the country’s nascent democratic institutions. A series of governments and leaders have had a mixed record in implementing reforms, fighting off military coups, and providing real economic results for the least well off segments of the population. The still bleak economic record, an atrocious record on land

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reform and the failure of the government to deal with the internal communist and Muslim insurgencies have left Philippines politics in a very uncertain condition. After the relatively stable period of the Ramos presidency, the ignominious ending of the Estrada presidency, in which the withdrawal of military support gave the coup de grâce to the regime, is the latest manifestation of the uncertain direction of Philippine politics. The Philippines shows clearly that democracy alone is not enough to make a state strong. While the Philippines has logged more years as a formally democratic country than any other in Southeast Asia, its reputation and self-image were harmed by the period of martial law imposed by Ferdinand Marcos from 1972 through 1986. While the economy was hurt less than others by the 1997 downturn, and democratic governance seems likely to continue, the Philippines is plagued with problems. Land reform and a means to curtail the power of the dominant families in the Philippines are needed to provide more egalitarian property holdings as a base on which to build a democracy, and are long overdue. About 40 percent of the country’s workforce is involved in agriculture. More and better roads, improved irrigation systems, and facilities to dry crops are needed in rural areas. A third of what is supposed to be a highway system is still packed dirt. As in Thailand, Philippine politics suffers from an absence of a competition of ideas, since elections are fought between parties with few substantive differences, even though economic inequality is extreme. But in Thailand between 1975 and 1995, the number living in poverty was cut from 3.4 million to 500,000. In the Philippines the number rose from 15 million to 17 million in the same period. The Philippines may be the only country in Southeast Asia where it has proven easier to construct the formal process of democracy than it has been to create favorable social conditions and a thriving civil society, recruit responsible and skilled leadership, and sustain the economic growth needed to support the formal democratic institutions (Morada and Collier, 1998; Bolongaita, 2000; Sheehan, 2001). In this sense, the situation is the opposite of the situation in Malaysia and Singapore. It might be the best argument for the superiority of ‘Asian democracy,’ except that the attempt that Ferdinand Marcos made with authoritarian rule in the Philippines was even more disastrous in its consequences than the democratic periods of Philippine politics.

Thailand Thailand, never colonized, lacking deep social divisions and more sure of its identity than many other states, has in recent years completed

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reforms that ensure a closer fit between its governors and the governed. Now a functioning democracy, and economically successful, it qualifies as a strong state. With an emphasis on development since the 1960s, Thailand’s momentum in economic development has allowed it to achieve one of the most successful recoveries from the 1997 downturn, although this success has been slower to affect the average consumer. The 1990s have seen a new emphasis on decreasing the power of the military even as democratization picked up speed. Political reforms in 1992 and 1997 increased the chances for continued democratization, although corruption and elections driven more by patronage than principle still detract from the progress. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who came to power in February 2001, epitomizes the contradictory Thai tendencies, with a proclaimed commitment to democracy combined with a heavy reliance on patronage and an authoritarian style. Still, Thailand is no longer a ‘weak state’ and thus is in a position to direct its future development in a way that is unusual for the subregion (Wattanayagorn, 1998; Bowornwathana, 2000).

Singapore and Malaysia Singapore qualifies as a strong state because of its economic vitality, its homogeneous population, and the amazing success of the ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) since 1965. This success is due to the imaginative vitality of its founder, Lee Kuan Yew, and the incorruptibility of the technocrats that have governed this unique city state and the quality of the services they have provided. While there are restrictions on freedom of speech and organization in Singapore, all indications are that the population is generally satisfied with the government and supportive of it. The significant number of Singaporeans emigrating annually from the country does suggest some are dissatisfied with the amount of regulation and number of restrictions that render life there very predictable and homogeneous. Malaysia also has had substantial economic success, provided reasonably clean government and political stability and regularly held fairly free elections that at least partially verify the government’s mandate. Prime Minister Mahathir bin Mohamad has been a strong advocate of Asian values and a severe critic of Western values, but also very critical of communist dogma. He often attributes the problems and shortcomings of various Asian countries to their attempt to emulate Western ways, epitomized by his criticism of Japan, which, ‘trying to Westernize its way of doing business and to adopt Western values … has become totally disoriented’ (Neher, 1999: chapters 6 and 7; Mahathir, 2000b).

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In both countries, a key theme is the maintenance of domestic stability in the face of racial heterogeneity. President Mahathir, in power in Malaysia since 1981 and supported by his United Malay Nationalist Organization (UMNO), has at least until recently, followed a consistent policy of promoting racial harmony and avoiding discord, partially by providing economic advantages to the Malay majority population. The party has effectively monopolized power since independence, although elections are held regularly. In spite of the reliance on one-party rule and the attendant uncertainties in the future, Mahathir has established a good record in running the Malay economy, making Malaysia the second most affluent country in ASEAN. Singapore is by far the most affluent, with Singapore GNI per capita equal to that of developed countries. Both states have also followed a consistent and pragmatic course in the international realm, modernizing their militaries, and using the US presence in Southeast Asia to promote Malaysian/Singaporean interests while guarding against excessive US influence. Mahathir has no qualms about pragmatic cooperation with the US on defense issues while simultaneously excoriating the West for ‘ganging up to dominate the developing world’ through ‘uncontrolled globalization’ (Straits Times, 2000). They have both placated China, and generally strongly promote ASEAN and regional cooperation. Malaysia is transforming its armed forces from the counter insurgency force used against the Malaysian Communist Party to the conventional force required today and Singapore has the most advanced armed forces in the area. Singapore is squeaky clean in the absence of corruption, and Mahathir has allowed an opposition to function in Malaysia and the economy is much freer of corruption than Indonesia. Nonetheless, recent economic problems and growing cynicism stemming from the government’s handling of the accusations against and trial of former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim have weakened the government’s support and legitimacy and raise questions about Mahathir’s effectiveness. There is also some suspicion that, contrary to its long record in power, the ruling party has begun using racially divisive appeals to maintain itself in power. On June 22, 2000, a conference convened by the US intelligence community on ‘Prospects for a Post-Mahathir Malaysia’ with presentations by academics, journalists and former diplomats reached a rather pessimistic conclusion about the likelihood of political uncertainty and turmoil in Malaysia in the next 3–5 years (Nathan, 1998; Neher, 1999: chapters 6 and 7; Elegant and Jayasankaran, 2000; Intelligence, 2000; Jayasankaran, 2001). The chances for an orderly and stable transition were considerably increased with the announcement by Mahathir in late June 2002 that he would step

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down from power in October 2003 and the appointment of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, Mahathir’s number two in both party and government as his successor ( Jayasankaran and Vatikiotis, 2002: 12). Myanmar Myanmar is an obvious candidate for the category of weak state. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), although it has from time to time held discussions with Aung San Suu Kyi, the head of the opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) has shown little serious interest in setting up any formal mechanisms to test the fit between the exercise of authority and popular sentiment. In this case we have decisive evidence that fit is not good. In the 1990 election, the NLD polled 59.9 percent of the votes cast, and won 82 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. This result was obtained even though the election was held in far from optimum conditions for the NLD, since there were constraints on both organizing and their use of the media. The evidence of how out of touch the military is with the people they govern, however, lies in the fact that their refusal to abide by the results indicates they believed they could win. It is hard to say how accurate this indication of pro-NLD (or anti-military) sentiment is a decade later, but there no evidence to suggest the military has improved its position. Additional evidence of the weak state status of Myanmar is the preoccupation of the government with the minority problem. Although some progress has been made in the 1990s in establishing ceasefires with the insurgents, there has been little movement toward finding long-term solutions that would integrate the minority groups into the larger society. Finally, the dismal record on development suggests there is really little the government can offer to suggest it has established a legitimate connection with the populace or made progress in healing the deep divisions in society. Talks initiated in October 2000 between the government and the NLD have so far produced no breakthroughs or exit from the impasse between the two sides, although Aung San Suu Kyi was freed from house arrest and some prisoners have been released. No formula has been found to introduce enough democratization to satisfy the NLD, while simultaneously allowing the military to protect its interest in retaining power. Vietnam and Cambodia Vietnam and Cambodia also qualify as weak states. Cambodia, suffering from deep divisions in the society, an abysmal social and economic

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situation, and recent violent disruption of the fragile democratic process by Hun Sen’s coup d’état in 1997, is a classic specimen of the weak state. Vietnam is more interesting, in that the strong nationalist movement, the dense web of Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) developed institutions and the governing experience of the ruling party do provide at least a façade of support and legitimacy to the regime. In spite of the limited economic reforms that have taken place, however, there is little evidence of genuine support or enthusiasm for the regime, and little indication that the party is willing to risk finding out whether such sentiment exists. Divisions between the north and south sections of the country further add to its difficulties. Vietnam, after the loss of Soviet support following the cold war, has repaired relations with the US, including with a recent trade agreement ratified in late 2001, has begun some economic reforms, and joined ASEAN in 1995. After the end of the war with the South in 1975, the Vietnamese economy ‘declined for a full fifteen years,’ and war damage and the legacy of the war slowed recovery. Economic reform (doi moi) shifting the economy toward the private sector and away from party management stimulated growth and the average annual growth rate for the 1990s was an impressive 6.2 percent (Table 5.1). But after record growth in 1995–6, Vietnam’s economic progress since 1997 has been hindered by its reluctance to continue the necessary reforms to attract foreign investment and stimulate the economy (Neher, 1999: 192–6). The 1997 growth rate of 8.8 percent fell to 5.7 percent in 1998 and to less than 5 percent in 1999. Foreign investors reacted to the failure to promote reform and one authoritative source described the withdrawal of foreign investment as a mass exodus. The reform effort has been revived with the previously mentioned recent trade agreement with the US, but whether Vietnam will carry out the reforms necessary to make that agreement meaningful remains to be seen (Hung, 2000).6 Xenophobia appears to play no small role in this reluctance, attitudes that no doubt hark back to the long years of military struggle that Vietnam had with the French, the US, China and Cambodia, and the tradition of self-reliance those long years of struggle developed. The problem was summed up by remarks by Prime Minister Khai in October 1999 when he stated that while integration of Vietnam in the international economy was important, it must not come at the expense of ‘national independence and sovereignty.’ Significant democratization appears to be many years away, but signs of serious instability are not yet apparent (Ninh, 1998; Chandrasekaran, 2000a; Hung, 2000; Thayer, 2000).

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Of particular concern regarding future stability is the newly begun progress toward democratic procedures in Cambodia as a result of the effort by the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) to restore domestic stability and a democratic process after several decades of invasion and civil war following the downfall of the legendary prince Norodom Sihanouk in 1970. Cambodia lost over a million people to the Khmer Rouge, in power for the years from 1975 to 1978. The UNTAC attempt to restore civility holds a reasonable chance for success, in spite of the mid-1997 coup which prime minister Hun Sen used to consolidate power. Cambodia also joined ASEAN as its tenth member in April of 1999. Cambodia faces a broad range of serious problems left over from the war years, including questions about how to deal with its past, a decimated judicial system, corruption and deplorable socioeconomic conditions including poverty, the absence of health care, and illiteracy. The prospects for stability and democracy are a matter of concern, but substantial progress toward political stability and economic growth has been made in the last several years (Mydans, 2000; Langran, 2000; Neher, 1999: chapter 11). In Southeast Asia, there appears to be little relationship (Table 5.3) between democracy and strong states, except that it is difficult to have a strong stable state without democracy, thus ensuring a reasonably close fit between the society and the government. At least a partial exception to this seems to be Singapore, but the pressures for increasing participation and regularization there will likely grow. The Philippines is lucky to have democratic procedures functioning fairly well, but unless it is able to solve more basic problems it may face both authoritarianism and instability. The other major weak states have barely begun to deal with problems of legitimacy and development of a political base. Thailand has the best of both worlds, being both a strong state and doing a passable job of following democratic procedures.

Military capabilities and defense Southeast Asia is set apart from Northeast Asia by the almost total absence of major military powers indigenous to the region. The total defense expenditures of all ten Southeast Asian countries in 2000 ($16.4 billion) exceed that of South Korea ($12.5 billion), but are less than the defense spending of Australia and Korea combined ($19.5 billion). Singapore, with $4.7 billion in spending easily outpaces all other Southeast Asian countries, with Malaysia ($2.7 billion) and Thailand ($2.5 billion) having the next largest expenditures on defense (Table 5.5).

164 Perspectives from Southeast Asia Table 5.5

Defense expenditures for selected countries 1985 billions $ 1999 billions $ 2000 billions $ % GDP 2000

Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam Myanmar South Korea Australia

3.5 2.6 0.7 1.8 2.8 3.6 1.3 9.3 8.1

1.5 3.2 1.6 4.7 2.6 0.9 2.0 12.1 7.8

1.5 2.7 1.5 4.7 2.5 0.9 2.1 12.5 7.0

1.0 3.1 1.9 4.9 2.0 3.0 6.9* 2.8 1.9

* 1999. Source: IISS, 2001a. Values are 1999 constant US dollars.

Vietnam, which in the early 1990s was the only significant military power in the subregion has seen its military expenditures drop almost fivefold between 1985 and 1998, and military spending as a percent of GDP decreased from 19.4 percent to 2.8 percent during that period (IISS, 2001a; Betts, 1993–4: 46; Huxley and Willett, 1999: 16–17). Singapore and Myanmar continue to have the highest percent of GDP spent on defense, 4.9 and 6.9 percent respectively, while Indonesia spent at a very low rate of 1.0 percent in 2000. Singapore has a significant technical edge, since it is the only Southeast Asian state to have moved significantly toward ‘developing RMA-type forces,’ even if unable to fully exploit the RMA. Its personnel are well trained and well educated, and Singapore has increasingly invested in high technology systems, including sophisticated C4 (command, control, communications and computer-processing) and ISR (intelligence-collection, surveillance and reconnaissance) assets such as E-2C AEW aircraft, Fokker 50s equipped for electronic intelligence and maritime patrol, RF-5S reconnaissance fighters, Searcher UAVs, and mobile air-defense radar. Singapore is well equipped with advanced communications and data processing equipment, and is positioned to use commercial satellite imagery. Singapore has also implemented important organizational, doctrinal and logistical improvements, improvements that overall will reinforce Singapore’s existing military advantage over its Southeast Asian neighbors (Huxley and Willett, 1999: 16–17). When Singapore’s capabilities are put in perspective, however, the military weakness of Southeast Asia is easily perceived. Huxley and Willett report that although Malaysia and Thailand made attempts to improve their C4 and ISR capabilities during the 1990s, Southeast Asian

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armed forces have generally ‘not begun the doctrinal, organizational and logistical revolutions required to take advantage of the RMA.’ While East Asia as a whole has increased spending on defense and its share of global defense purchases have almost tripled between 1990 and 1997 (11.4 percent to 31.7 percent), much of that increase, including both quantitative and qualitative improvements, has gone to Northeast Asia. Many Southeast Asian countries, with the exception of Singapore, were also forced to cut defense spending in the wake of the 1997 economic crisis. Numerous items were cut from planned budgets or purchases postponed in Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, including major items such as fighter planes, submarines, airborne early-warning aircraft, armored vehicles and air-defense missiles. Indonesia also rescheduled payments on equipment already purchased. Malaysia is now reported to have put its modernization program back on track with substantial arms purchases around the world ( Jayasankaran, 2002). But Southeast Asian countries have not realized potential benefits from cooperation on defense purchases and production. Economic rivalry and political suspicion between governments has generally ruled out such cooperation (Huxley and Willett, 1999: 15–18, 22–3, 38, 71). At which potential ‘enemies’ are these forces aimed? More detailed information on this is given in the next chapter. Interestingly, the only ‘enemy’ on everyone’s list is China, but with varying degrees of urgency, and in the case of Myanmar from a special perspective, since one could say that the Chinese are already there and unlikely to be taken on. Although many states are beyond China’s air and sea power range, given its technological superiority a (purely hypothetical) united and militarily cooperative Southeast Asia could provide strong competition for China in a conflict, but no single state could hope to defeat China. Regarding immediate neighborhood threats, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia continue to harbor suspicions about each other, with the Malaysian–Indonesian dyad most free of apprehension. Malaysia, however, is reportedly concerned about a disintegrating Indonesia leading to ethnic and religious strife with resulting refugee flows, as well as Muslim insurgencies in the southern Philippines and southern Thailand ( Jayasankaran, 2002). The Philippines is concerned almost solely with China, but has a dispute over Sabah with Malaysia. On the mainland, Thailand and Myanmar continue an almost constant low level of conflict, but the likelihood of escalation is low, while Thailand worries less than other states about China, but is historically apprehensive about Vietnam. Vietnam views China as its main threat, while Cambodia and Laos worry about both China and Vietnam. Piracy is a problem throughout the area.

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From a military perspective there is substance to the Southeast Asian apprehension about military intervention from outside the area. The 1990s were quiet and with the exception of the Sino-Philippine dispute in the Spratlys and East Timor, uneventful. In these circumstances, can the subregion construct institutions and subregional solidarity to provide autonomy and independence, if and when a crisis does occur?

Institution building and Southeast Asian autonomy Political integration The survey of Southeast Asia so far undertaken has pinpointed numerous sources of conflict and dissension. Cultural, religious, ethnic differences combine with pungent nationalism and state units that are often weak, unstable and lacking institutionalized leadership roles and a procedure for changing leadership. Democracy is also absent or underdeveloped, thus discouraging the development of civil society and establishment of a bond between the leaders and the led. Liberal institutionalists assume that one alternative to military conflict between nations is the building of institutions that will encourage cooperation, provide information, build confidence in regional organization and facilitate political and economic solutions rather than military options.7 Second, the building and strengthening of regional institutions is a frequently discussed way to increase the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the subregion. A central question is whether an institutional framework and the concomitant norms of cooperation can be created, given the powerful centrifugal forces and the disadvantage in power when paired with power from outside the subregion. Given the findings thus far in this chapter, it is not surprising that Southeast Asia is judged substantially lacking the economic and political institutions, procedures and organizations that have given Europe its identity as a region. Only a half-century ago, Europe was just emerging from a long war that had engulfed the continent and offered few grounds for believing that it would be successful in achieving the present state of affairs. But it can also be argued that the debris and demoralization that World War II left behind constituted was one of the factors that inspired and motivated the building of a united Europe. By the same logic, the vulnerability of Southeast Asia can be a spur to building institutions in Asia (Mozingo, 1976). Various arguments reinforce scepticism regarding the prospects for creating and maintaining subregional institutions in Southeast Asia. Realist assumptions suggest that assertion of divergent national interests

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impedes building international regimes and that only under the hegemony of a power or group of powers bound together by common interests could such common institutions be created. But more straightforward explanations exist for the lag in the creation of Asian institutions, when compared to Europe during the early post-World War II years. Apart from the lack of a threat comparable to the obvious threat from the Soviet Union, the economic boycott of China by the West put off-limits the center of what might have developed into a vital regional trading system and Asian trade was diverted out of the region and toward the United States. Furthermore, the US sought to limit the economic and military commitments that would have encouraged multinational organization. Other factors were also important: historical resentment of America’s ally, Japan, continuing resentment toward the colonial powers and fear of great power domination (Kahler, 1995). Another argument purporting to explain the Asian lag in developing regional institutions is that Asian cultural institutions are not compatible with the kind of centralized, legally specific contractual organizations with public decision making based on universal principles and the mandated enforcement found in Western Europe (Kahler, 1995: 18–19). In contrast, Southeast Asians are said to rely more on consensus decision making than on majority votes, to avoid enforcing conformity on an organization’s members, relying instead on voluntary compliance, and to avoid issues likely to provoke controversy. In ASEAN, for instance, decisions are based on the principle of sovereign equality. This means, if the principle is strictly adhered to, that nothing can be done without unanimous consent from all participants. ASEAN normally avoids public discussion of any internal differences that separate the membership, even if these issues have major implications for the organizations and the peace of Southeast Asia, and avoids criticism of members’ domestic affairs. It does appear that this prohibition is being eroded, partly as a result of the departure of Suharto, and Indonesia’s diminished leadership role as a result of its preoccupation with domestic issues. Thailand and the Philippines have both advocated more open discussion of those domestic issues that affect the region and ASEAN’s policies. As evidence of change, one can cite explicitly expressed concern by ASEAN members over the treatment of Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia, an ASEAN request for UN help in dealing with the forest fires in Indonesia, attention by the Singapore media to discrimination against ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, and resistance to the appointment of Habibie as Suharto’s vice-president by several leaders. As Smith asserts, open comment on neighboring countries’ affairs is now commonplace (Bangkok Post, 1998; Smith, 1999).

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It is indicative of the problem under discussion that an ‘ASEAN model’ has never been articulated in any document issued by the Association. Instead, its ‘operating premises have to be inferred from nearly three decades of regional cooperation’ (Leifer, 1996: 31). One suspects that the vagueness and the obvious drawbacks of ASEAN procedures in dealing with major problems of conflict may be the reason they have not been committed to paper. Textual discussion of the inviolability of members’ sovereignty, reliance on unanimous decision making and the need to refrain from explicit criticism of member states’ domestic affairs would baldly reveal the passive and voluntary nature of the organization, which does not even approach the decision making and enforcement abilities of the UN. It is hard to argue that Southeast Asian culture is responsible for the lag in institution building because of the wide diversity of cultures present in Southeast Asia and the difficulty of defining Southeast Asian culture. As Prime Minister Mahathir points out, the diversity in Asia is an obstacle to unity and common effort, making it a ‘divided continent.’ Which of the many cultures in Southeast Asia is conducive to or incompatible with effective institution building? (Mahathir, 2000b; Kahler, 1995: 18–19) Asia’s experience with democracy should temper our cultural explanations of behavior. Both Taiwan and India have become established democracies, both emerging from cultures limited in their adherence to democratic process. But however important the problems discussed above, the real locus of ASEAN’s weakness lies in the discrepancy between the military strength of the members of the subregion, and those outside the subregion. By far the most successful and effective Southeast Asian regional organization has been ASEAN. Originally founded in 1967 with a vague mandate, ASEAN has increasingly played a role in the conflicts and disputes of the region. Primarily an instrument for cooperative security (refraining from the use of economic or military sanctions) ASEAN has made little progress in building any kind of economic unity or institutions. It is not surprising that it has made the most progress in security issues, since it was born in the midst of the Vietnam War, an East–West confrontation that threatened to engulf the area (Leifer, 1996: 31; Lim, 1996).8 In order to solve subregional problems, some accommodation must be made with the outside powers, which have the capacity to disrupt the best-laid plans of ASEAN. The constructivists are right that interests and identities can be recast, and the post-cold war environment is more conducive to those kinds of changes and to re-socialization of agents than the environment before the 1990s. But such reshaping of

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identities and interests is a long-term process. It will be many years, if ever, before the subregion will develop the collective cooperative mechanisms to make a difference against outside power. ASEAN has many accomplishments to its credit, and the achievement of ASEAN in building a regional identity and a community capable of shaping its future is obvious when the present is compared to the state of the subregion in the 1950s and 1960s (Dosch and Mols, 1998: 172). ASEAN has developed a continual process of coordination and adjustment, including more than 300 summits, ministerial meetings and committee discussion that guarantee effective communication and discussion of problems. This process has worked effectively for some conflict prevention and management. It seems unlikely that any of the original five members would use force against each other, although rancorous disputes certainly persist, especially between Singapore and Malaysia, and Singapore and Indonesia. There is a growing ethos of seeking peaceful solutions to Southeast Asian problems. The question is: can this ethos be extended and imparted to the new members? Within the region, ASEAN has had several notable successes with more specific outcomes. It contributed to the settlement of the Cambodian problem, helping to lay the groundwork for the UN enforced settlement that ended the civil war, set up a coalition government, and brought about nationwide elections. In 1999, ASEAN tentatively agreed on an ASEAN code of conduct for the South China Seas, a possible step toward settlement of this problem. And at the ASEAN Bangkok summit in December 1995, a treaty was signed which bans the development, acquisition, use, testing and stationing of nuclear arms in Southeast Asia (Dosch and Mols, 1998: 169–72). ASEAN’s successes in the economic sphere have been limited, but the slow-paced progress in formal state-led negotiations involving all members has largely been superseded by private sector-led and marketdriven investment decisions involving only selected members (Lim, 1996: 32–4). But it may be that by focusing beyond the subregion on the dialogue with the greater East Asian region and interested great powers ASEAN has had its greatest success. Aware that peace and stability in Southeast Asia is crucially dependent on the behavior of powers outside of the subregion, ASEAN has realistically begun to apply the model which they have used within ASEAN to problems involving outside powers. Like Willy Sutton, who asserted that he robbed banks because that’s ‘where the money is,’ ASEAN has elected to focus its emphasis on conflict management and peaceful resolution by going outside the subregion, because that’s ‘where the power is.’ Recognizing ASEAN’s potential isolation if it

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continued to operate insulated from the new distribution of power emerging in the post-cold war period, ASEAN took actions to connect to the great power arena, or Northeast Asia. Lacking a specific dispute mechanism for resolution of conflict, not to mention any procedures for mobilizing military or economic resources to affect change, the ASEAN model was at a substantial disadvantage in an environment populated by China, Japan and the United States. But even though ASEAN provided the basic model for the expansion of the dialogue arena to the entire region, the expansion of the model was an admission of its inadequacies and an attempt to come to terms with ASEAN’s limitations as a security organization (Leifer, 1999a: 33–4). ASEAN built on its modest successes in Southeast Asia, but also recognized the limits that process would meet if it did not incorporate those actors outside the subregion that were most likely to present a challenge to ASEAN’s objectives. ASEAN therefore expanded what by its own admission was an inadequate process of consultation and negotiation, to encompass also those powers most likely under crisis circumstances to ignore or disregard ASEAN’s wishes. ASEAN at once made a concession to the outside world of Realpolitik, while attempting through extension of its subregional procedures to control or influence interactions with the world outside the subregion of Southeast Asia. The case being made here is that ASEAN processes and the institutionalization that has made the organization viable are both significant. They contribute toward peace and stability in the area, and the solidarity necessary if the region is to enjoy a measure of autonomy and control of its future. But measured against some of the explicit claims and objectives of member countries and statesmen, there is still a very long way to go, and the old world of Realpolitik is still very much alive in the area. The concept of ZOPFAN, provide an interesting illustration of this conundrum. ZOPFAN might be seen as the ‘ideal type,’ to use Max Weber’s concept, of ASEAN aspirations. It embodies a vision that comments on both the causes of Southeast Asian problems (interference by outside powers) and the solution (exclusion of outside powers and insulation of Southeast Asia from the rest of the international system). As summarized by Muthiah Alagappa, ZOPFAN is based on three assumptions: (1) major power rivalry and intervention create insecurity and instability, (2) regional states have a common interest in the exclusion of big powers, and (3) Southeast Asia can be isolated from the broader international system (Alagappa, 1991). The ZOPFAN idea is partially motivated by the sense of powerlessness often articulated by Mahathir, a belief that ‘[ASEAN] is an association of largely weak countries with little clout,

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helpless to influence the affairs of the world.’ They were being ‘forced to accept international policies formulated elsewhere, many of which are actually detrimental to their interests’ (Mahathir, 2002). ASEAN members often pay lip-service to and would like to see ASEAN move toward such an environment. But a careful examination of the idea quickly shows that such a vision is not likely to be realized anytime in the near future, and many ASEAN members are extremely sceptical of the utility of moving toward it at all. Unlike Malaysia, an advocate of ZOPFAN and similar schemes for bolstering subregional autonomy, these members believe the short-term obstacles to the vision of ZOPFAN are more substantive than the long-term prospects. The concept continues to be touted, however, even as practice diverges in the opposite direction (Alatas, 1998a). The belief that great power intervention is responsible for Southeast Asian problems is one for which evidence to the contrary is readily available. As we have seen earlier, there are many internal problems that contribute to disputes and polarization within ASEAN that are unrelated to great power intervention. One can turn the proposition on its head and argue that in many cases outside intervention has been welcomed as a way to deal with internal instability. British intervention in Malaysia against the Indonesian confrontation was at Malaysia’s request under the Anglo-Malaysia Defense Agreement. American intervention in Vietnam evoked very mixed reactions, with Thailand welcoming American assistance to thwart what it perceived as a threat from China and Vietnam. Singapore and Malaysia supported the effort, and Singapore leaders are on record stating that the American intervention provided valuable time for the non-communist countries to promote economic and political development. ASEAN states similarly took different positions on Soviet influence in Vietnam, with Vietnam welcoming it and other countries soliciting US and Chinese assistance to counter it. Bringing the situation up to date, there is considerable support today for a continuing American presence as a counter to perceived Chinese ambitions, especially in the Spratly Islands, and support for a continued US–Japanese alliance to dampen any tendencies toward accelerated rearmament and independence of Japan. Both Singapore and Thailand have been strong supporters of an American presence, with Singapore making military facilities available to the United States naval vessels and aircraft in 1990, and permitting a US military logistics unit to relocate from the Philippines to Singapore as the agreement with the Philippines came to an end in November 1992. Similar agreements with Indonesia and Malaysia giving limited US naval access to their ports were also concluded. Subsequently, Malaysia and

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Indonesia approved and Thailand rejected a US plan to preposition military supply ships in the Gulf of Thailand. Discussion in the next chapter provides evidence of the need of individual states for out-of-region defense links, and the commitment of ASEAN countries to these links is a firmly entrenched part of the operating ethos, in spite of frequent ASEAN rhetoric to the contrary. The evidence is incontrovertible. A network of bilateral security cooperation beyond ASEAN has grown over the years, culminating in an unprecedented security agreement between Indonesia and Australia in December 1995. Australia engages in bilateral military cooperation with every ASEAN state, including Vietnam, whose armed forces receive English-language training to enable them to participate in confidence-building operations. Other examples of bilateral defense cooperation beyond ASEAN include a UK battalion of Gurkha Rifles in Brunei whose tenure was renewed in 1994, the United States’ annual Cobra Gold military exercises in Thailand, and the continued US commitment to its 1951 mutual security agreement with the Philippines, which it demonstrated with bilateral military exercises in April and May 1996 [and more recently in the year 2000]. Singapore provides perhaps the most striking examples of bilateral defense cooperation beyond ASEAN, and has used military training facilities in Australia, Israel, Taiwan and the United States. (Leifer, 1996: 15) Since the very creation of the ARF is a compromise of ASEAN process, procedures and culture, pragmatic compromise is necessary if progress is to be made toward the long-term objectives of the ASEAN membership. Including great powers in deliberations because they are great powers, but out of area, is inconsistent with the ASEAN principle that all powers should be given equal say and, in effect exercise a veto over any result they disagree with. The powers out of the area are being included precisely because they are more equal than others in the exercise of influence. Nor is it consistent with the ASEAN modus operandi of not taking specific decisions, to be enforced with economic or military sanctions, since the outside powers are being brought in precisely because they excel at making those decisions and exercising those sanctions, if they so choose. These compromises do not mean that the ARF cannot function using many of the assumptions and procedures of ASEAN, and the ASEAN members of the ARF have endeavored to carry over the operating assumptions from ASEAN. Furthermore, the result has been worthwhile.

Autonomous Subregion or Penetrated Area?

173

Whatever the compromises with the original ideals of consensus decision making, equality of standing and non-coercive approaches, the influence of the relatively minor powers that make up ASEAN has been impressive. As Leifer puts it, within the Asia-Pacific, there is no previous example of a group of ‘lesser states’ assuming such a central role as a catalyst for a security arrangement that involved ‘all major regional powers’ (Leifer, 1996: 29).9 ASEAN has achieved its objective of setting up a forum and opening channels where it has taken the initiative and has more influence than could be expected on historical grounds. Whether the ARF in the future will reflect more the objectives and value of its founders or those of the ‘interlopers’ from outside remains to be determined.10

Economic integration ASEAN has made limited progress in fostering economic cooperation. Intra-ASEAN exports as a percentage of ASEAN total exports, for example, were at virtually the same level in 1994 as at the time of the organizations founding in 1967 and there has been little change to date (Ravenhill, 1995: 850–1; Mattli, 1999). Several reasons account for this. The degree of complementarity among ASEAN economies is mixed. The demand by market actors for integration is therefore weak. Second, there is no country which can serve as an undisputed leader in furthering integration. Indonesia, which has by far the largest economy, has been one of the most protectionist economies in the Association. Until a stable liberal government that has the security necessary to take some risks is in place in Indonesia, this is unlikely to change. Singapore is the most pro-free trade, but it is not in a position to compensate the losers for the losses incurred during the shift to free trade nor to provide the leadership. There is no obvious ‘paymaster’ to distribute gains from the winners to the losers. Finally, ASEAN lacks the standards, tax structure, regulations and policies to facilitate integration. ‘Commitment institutions,’ such as central monitoring or third-party enforcement are also lacking. At the ASEAN Bali summit in 1976, the members agreed to settle disputes through ‘friendly negotiations.’ They proposed that dispute resolution be assisted by a ‘High Council,’ which would issue non-binding recommendations. However, no such High Council was ever established.11 In other words, we are back to many of the same obstacles we met in the discussion of cooperation on security. Whether the cause be culture, or more likely the will and the awareness to promote cooperation, the attitudes and institutions necessary to further cooperation, whether of an economic or security nature, are not being constructed.12

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The key incentives for regional cooperation and integration today appear to be a fear of being left behind as international trade continues to increase in importance and other regional free trade associations threaten to siphon off trade and investment from Southeast Asia. Hoping to counter any potential losses from the trend toward greater regionalization of trade, and to head off any attempt by APEC to seize the initiative on trade liberalization, in 1992 ASEAN founded the Asian Free Trade Association (AFTA). The founding of AFTA was largely a defensive move, and in retrospect, as much a ‘political gesture as an economic instrument whose ramifications had been thoroughly explored prior to signature’ (Ravenhill, 1995).13 The competing Asia-Pacific organization in which ASEAN countries participate, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, faces the same dilemma as ASEAN and the ARF, namely strains between the ASEAN or Asian members and the Western members, as discussed in Chapter 2.14 The Asian countries are under pressure to realize progress in moves toward greater integration unless they are to lose out economically. Just as the security agenda of ASEAN requires outside actors to compromise with the ‘ASEAN way,’ with the ASEAN style of informal and consensual progress, so do the economic needs of APEC require cooperation with outside actors implementing measures that will expand trade opportunities and reduce barriers to greater trade.

6 The Southeast Asian Nations: Views of China and the US

The soft and permeable nature of the subregion provides the setting for this chapter. A China challenging the status quo of a Southeast Asia with the US as the primary power will naturally be drawn to compete in an area where the US presence is very real, but where there are no indigenous powers to compete with it. Given the dynamics of international politics, it is not a question of whether an outside power will have a presence in Southeast Asia, but rather how important that presence will be and with which power, if any, it must share. The purpose of this chapter is to discuss Southeast Asian attitudes and policies toward China and the US, and to explore the dynamics of the interaction between them. The cosmopolitan states of Southeast Asia tend to have larger economies and both economic and security policies relatively compatible with US policy in Southeast Asia. The insular states, on the other hand, tend to attract US attention primarily as problem areas. This is true because these countries historically have been either communist or allied with communist powers, and they represent for the Chinese, more than other states in Southeast Asia, either opportunities (Myanmar) or potential problems (Vietnam). All are mainland states, are heavily influenced by China and all but Cambodia have long borders with China. If present trends toward reform, interdependence and regional and subregional institution building continue, the differences with some of the cosmopolitan states will soon start to blur (Ganesan, 1994: 457). The cosmopolitan countries all have concerns about China, but they are discreet in expressing these concerns. With some variation between countries, they welcome a US presence in Southeast Asia. Singapore receives 80–90 US Navy visits a year and periodically stations US Air Force contingents. Malaysia and Indonesia make available commercial repair facilities. A US defense official stated in 1996, ‘we are satisfied 175

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with the [military logistical] support we receive from Southeast Asia.’ The availability of facilities in the subregion increased after the US departure from the Philippines (Congressional Hearing, 1996: 22–3). These countries therefore complement US objectives of maintaining a presence in Asia and a counter to Chinese power. While some of them resist and resent US preachments on human rights and democracy, they nonetheless support the present international system and processes, and they have a stake in preserving the status quo. Their perspective is particularly acceptable to the US. These countries generally do not feel immediately threatened or alarmed by the rise of Chinese power, but they are uneasy about the long term. They much prefer not to be forced to declare themselves on China and their future with China as a neighbor. A noted exception to this is the Singapore leadership, especially Lee Kuan Yew, who seems to enjoy making philosophical statements on the realities of power in Southeast Asia. If China exercises restraint, most of Southeast Asia will be model economic and diplomatic neighbors. While these countries are cautiously sympathetic to increasing cooperation with Japan, they prefer continuation of the US–Japan alliance agreement to ensure that Japan does not go nuclear and that its activities remain subject to a US-directed agenda. In short, these states are ideal partners for the US. Moreover, the Southeast Asian contacts and facilities provided are important in facilitating the US ability to project force globally, particularly in the vital Persian Gulf. The US can bring Table 6.1

Orientation of Southeast Asian countries to US and China

China and Southeast Asia Alliance

Arms sales

Bases, logistics or common exercises

Past military conflict

Myanmar Thailand

Myanmar

Vietnam Philippines

United States and Southeast Asia Alliance

Military aid

Cooperate with bases, logistics or common exercises

Past military conflict

Philippines Thailand

Thailand Philippines Indonesia Cambodia

Thailand Philippines Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Brunei

Vietnam Cambodia Philippines

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units from Japan and Korea into Southeast Asia for exercises, training and crisis response (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001: 22). Thanks to this friendly reception for the US, conditions in Southeast Asia are thus very favorable to the US interest in maintaining a presence in support of its historical concern of ensuring that no one power dominates Asia.

Singapore Of all the Southeast Asian countries, Singapore in many ways is America’s most natural partner. At the same time it has shown that friendship with the US and an outspoken leadership does not necessarily alienate China. Singapore is a pro at working both sides of the fence. As a small city state, it is at once a staunch defender of the classical principal of sovereignty, and at the same time an advocate and participant in the ASEAN and ARF efforts to organize East and Southeast Asia. Its preoccupation with survival and ‘self-help’ is often referred to as a ‘siege mentality.’ Singapore is not alone among Southeast Asian countries in advocating contradictory paths to peace, scrupulously meeting the immediate demands of Realpolitik but craving the solidarity of robust regional institutions, but it may experience those contradictions more acutely than others. Its independent existence was the result of its 1965 expulsion from the Federation of Malaysia, in which framework it originally gained its independence in 1963. This traumatic start, and ongoing tensions stemming from the failure of Malaysian and Indonesian leadership to recognize its legitimacy are at the root of its intense interest in sovereignty and independence. Moreover, Singapore derives three-fourths of its GDP from trade and recognizes its vulnerability as a small trading state among neighbors with vastly greater populations. Its small size, dependence on trade, and challenges to its legitimacy as a state with a majority Chinese population surrounded by Malays, have all sensitized its talented and creative leadership to its fragility, even in the relatively benign environment in Southeast Asia. The seriousness with which Singapore takes the principle of sovereignty can be discerned from remarks by Singapore’s permanent representative to the UN before the Security Council, opposing the US invasion of Grenada. Singapore did bow to expediency, however, when after initially abstaining on a vote to condemn Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975, it later voted with the other ASEAN nations to support Indonesia’s position. According to Donald Emmerson, the abstention sent two messages to Indonesia: we are not just another enclave to be absorbed at will, but we will not oppose outright what you have done (Ganesan, 1998a: 586–7; Emmerson, 1996a: 68).

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Devoting nearly five percent of its GDP to defense, the highest percentage in the subregion, Singapore has the most modern navy and air force in Southeast Asia and has been the most ardent advocate of a US presence there. But this advocacy is not something new. From the time of its independence in 1965 during the Vietnam War, Singapore, under the leadership of the then prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, has been a supporter of the US presence in Asia. In 1976, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam, then Singapore’s foreign minister, expressed his country’s vision: ‘the only rational course for Southeast Asian nations is not to work for the liquidation of [a] great power presence in the region but rather to ensure a multi-power presence as a more agreeable alternative to a single-power dominance.’1 Today it views the US as a benign superpower. Singapore’s receptivity to an American presence is aimed at accomplishing multiple objectives. During the cold war, it balanced against Soviet power. Now it is a counter to Chinese and perhaps Japanese interests, but also against any attempts by Malaysia or Indonesia to push Singapore around. As Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar stated in a lecture at Georgetown University in 1996: [T]he United States remains an indispensable factor of any new configuration for peace, security and economic growth in the AsiaPacific. Only the United States has the strategic weight, economic strength and political clout to hold the ring in the Asia-Pacific. (Congressional Hearing, 1996: 76) The city state’s interest in keeping the US in Southeast Asia as a potent force was well symbolized by the memorandum of understanding (MOU) it signed with the United States in July 1989 (formalized in November 1990) to host the Logistics Command of the US Seventh Fleet. The US deploys 200 personnel and dependents to staff the command. The agreement was a direct reaction to the US decision, under Philippine pressure, to vacate its bases in the Philippines in 1991. In addition to its US defense ties, Singapore is a participant, along with Britain, Australia, New Zealand and Malaysia, in the Five Power Defense Agreement (FPDA), which began in 1971 as the successor to the Anglo-Malaysian Defense Agreement (1957–71). And while Singapore maintains these defense ties without publicizing that they are undertaken with China in mind, they are equally discreet in citing the insurance they provide against rash moves by Malaysia or Indonesia (Ganesan, 1998a: 598–600). Singapore’s emphasis on surviving and preserving its independence, and the strategy it follows of balancing all involved forces so as to maximize Singapore’s interests and independence of action, call to mind

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a similar strategy followed by Cambodia under Norodom Sihanouk vis-à-vis the great powers during the 1960s. To maintain the independence and territorial integrity of his tiny state, he made any required adjustments and tilted toward any power that he thought could help him at the time (Brown, 1965). Singapore has been equally pragmatic in forging a survival strategy. But fortunately for its leaders and its people, Singapore inhabits a more benign neighborhood, and its high standard of living and military preparedness combine to make its objective more attainable than in the case of the hapless Sihanouk. The insight of Lee and other officials into China, their direct involvement with China and the innovative international leadership Singapore has displayed also contribute to the leverage that it can use to obtain its objectives. Singapore has no illusions about the shadow China will cast in the East Asia to come. Lee Kuan Yew stated in 1994 that ‘The size of China’s displacement in the world is such that the world must find a new balance in 30 or 40 years. It’s not possible to pretend that this is just another player. The is the biggest player in the history of man’ (Mosher, 2000: 97). Singapore’s relations with Beijing have been characterized, along with Thailand’s, as the best among all the ASEAN states. Although the last of the Southeast Asian countries to establish diplomatic relations with China in 1990, Singapore is one of the largest investors in China. Singapore’s relationship with Taiwan, particularly in the defense area, is the one issue that may rankle China (Da Cunha, 1998: 116).2 Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Singapore in 1978 was a key event in inaugurating good relations. Deng was impressed with Singapore’s economic strategy. He believed it was applicable to China in that it showed that robust economic growth was not incompatible with tight governmental control. Since that time, then Prime Minister and now Senior Minister, Lee Kuan Yew has been granted access to China’s leaders available to few foreign leaders, and there have been regular exchanges of visits between officials, culminating in Premier Li Peng’s visit to Singapore in August 1997, the first official visit by a Chinese leader since diplomatic ties were established (Ganesan, 1998b; Khong, 1999). Lee has given much thought to the situation in Asia and China’s likely role. He believes that in the triangular relationship between the US, Japan and China, the US–China leg is the most important factor for stability in East Asia. US–China bilateral relations will set the tone, structure, and context for all other relationships in East Asia (Lee, 1996). Singaporean officials fear that a resumption of the cold war in Asia could totally destabilize foreign trade and investment (Whiting, 1997a: 308). They are not anxious to have Southeast Asia’s preoccupation with China

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develop into confrontation and Singapore’s leaders believe that the dominant strategy toward China should be engagement. Nonetheless, they count on the US supporting if not underwriting the trading economy, a system of military alliances, and a credible forward military presence in the Asia-Pacific. As Lee puts it, China will be a formidable player in the region. No combination of other East Asian economies – Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, ASEAN – will be able to balance it … Therefore the role of the United States as a balancer is crucial if Asian countries are to have elbow room for themselves. This need for America as a balancer is clear to South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore and Indonesia. (Lee, 2000) The thread that runs through the pronouncements of the leadership is that China is important and it is essential to accommodate its entrance into the Asian system of power. In reacting to China, Singapore is looking not to the immediate future, but to twenty to thirty years down the road (Khong, 1999). During the intervening period, the US should use the time available to help China ‘integrate itself into the world community, and to play a part in shaping the international order.’ Both politically and economically, the international community should do its best to coopt China. China should be given ‘every incentive’ to choose international cooperation, which will absorb its energies constructively over the next 50 to 100 years, over becoming a hegemon (Lee, 1996: 4–5). Singapore’s preeminent role in trading with and investing in China fits well with Lee’s belief that continued economic growth at the current rate will lessen China’s concern over ‘losing’ Taiwan. By 2008, the two economies will have ‘become so intertwined that independence – and with it conflict – will not be a viable option for Taiwan. China will see no need for force when gradual and inexorable economic integration brings two societies together’ (Lee, 2001). Singapore’s leaders, particularly Lee, are clearly aware of the seriousness with which their pronouncements on China are taken and they spare no effort to shape a consensus on China policy among the powers that count, but especially the US. They believe in engaging China and they believe it will work. But, Lee, like the Nixon he admires, is a pragmatist and has a fall-back policy. In the event that engagement does not work, should China not ‘play according to the rules as a good global citizen,’ Singapore will likely move closer to the US and to the countries

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aligned with the US in Asia: Japan, Australia, New Zealand and other similarly disposed ASEAN countries (Lee, 1996; Khong, 1999; Whiting, 1997a). Singapore is a strong advocate for engagement, but above all, it wants to survive. If engagement fails and China has not been pacified, it is not averse to relying on the only available power to ensure that survival.

Indonesia Indonesia is, in the Southeast Asian context, ‘Singapore-in-reverse’ (Emmerson, 1996a). Singapore is tiny and welcomes involvement of outside powers in the subregion as insurance to maintain its sovereign prerogatives; Indonesia is large and seeks to preserve its own primary role in the subregion by excluding outside powers. Easily the largest of the Southeast Asian states and the most likely to dominate ASEAN, Indonesia in the past has often stood with Malaysia in opposing outside involvement that would challenge Southeast Asian autonomy. The behavior of both Singapore and Indonesia is grounded in their historical experience, and there is ample precedent in recent Indonesian history to verify its view of itself as playing a special role in Southeast Asia. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Indonesia under President Sukarno practiced a flamboyant foreign policy that estranged the West, worried its neighbors and fascinated the third world. Practicing ‘guided democracy’ and walking a tightrope between the organizational bases of the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI) and the anti-communist Indonesian army, Sukarno charted a radical pro-third world policy in cooperation with the Chinese. Forming a Hanoi–Beijing–Pyongyang axis, Sukarno alarmed his neighbors with his confrontation policy against newly independent Malaysia. But his recklessness resulted in a coup against him in 1965 and a subsequent complete break with China. Under the Suharto-led New Order, relations with China remained strained until the establishment of some economic activity with the Chinese in the 1980s, and finally the reestablishment of diplomatic relations in 1990.3 The need to live down this legacy and reassure his neighbors led Suharto to follow a more subdued foreign policy that underplayed Indonesia’s importance in the region as much as Sukarno had overplayed it. In a reversal of the Sukarno policy of close cooperation with an outside power, Suharto steadfastly refused to join alliances and became one of the most outspoken of those countries (Malaysia being the other) determined to minimize influence from outside of the region. Suharto made a virtue of necessity, by concentrating on the critical economic situation and keeping defense spending low. Through most of the 1990s it hovered in the

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range of 1.5–1.6 percent of GNP, the lowest percentage of GNP among the larger states in Southeast Asia (Whiting, 1997a: 303–4; Anwar, 1998: 506–7).4 This low figure can be at least partially explained by the emphasis in Jakarta on protection against internal threats, since external threats were virtually non-existent. This ranking of priorities allowed a diminished emphasis on sophisticated military equipment when compared to the previous era. An assertive policy would have been a strain on its resources, just as it was in the Sukarno years. Still, Indonesia has sought to occupy the role of ‘prime manager of regional order’ in the subregion. It shares a ‘mirror image with China’ of its proper place in its subregional environment. Both may be described as ‘middle kingdoms’ and therefore potentially natural geopolitical rivals, at least to the extent that Northeast and Southeast Asia can be viewed as part of one East Asian region in the post-cold war era (Leifer, 1999b: 99). Given the current condition of Indonesia, however, any equation of the two countries is premature. Many within the Indonesian political elite were dissatisfied with their country’s role and believed that the government was too timid in formulating a foreign policy in line with third world interests, reflecting a nostalgia for a higher profile Sukarno-type policy in both style and content. New Order foreign policy has been widely criticized for having deviated from the bebar aktiv (independent and active) doctrine, for lacking in ideals, and for being too self-serving, too timid, and too boring. (Anwar, 1994: 284) A call for a more assertive foreign policy was endorsed by members of Indonesia’s foreign policy establishment at a seminar in 1988. The establishment of diplomatic relations with China in 1990 was one expression of a more assertive policy, but it did not fully solve the question of how China would relate to Indonesia in the Southeast Asian context (Leifer, 1999b: 99). While Indonesia was sympathetic to other ASEAN governments, which believed the most expedient way to handle China was to try to integrate it into the regional order based on shared norms of interstate conduct, this was not fully compatible with Indonesia’s perception of its own prominent place in a post-cold war Southeast Asia. The reservations that the Indonesians hold about China’s future role, to some extent match the reservations that the rest of ASEAN has about Indonesia. The confrontation with Malaysia and other lingering memories of the Sukarno period, the way West Papua and East Timor were integrated into the country, and the violence accompanying the referendum

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and the restoration of East Timor’s independence invite doubts about Indonesia’s future behavior. Membership in ASEAN, where given its size and potential Indonesia has behaved in a restrained manner, helps to preserve Indonesia’s credibility as a peaceful regional member in the eyes of other members. As we have seen above, Indonesia went along with the rest of ASEAN in sanctioning Vietnam for its occupation of Cambodia, even though it had reservations about the policy.5 But there is no counterpart institution to give China’s peaceful intentions credibility. Indonesia has consistently attempted to influence events in Southeast Asia in order to work toward an area that is as much as possible free of influence by outside powers, as proposed in the ZOPFAN proposal. While Indonesia has lacked the zeal with which Malaysia has pushed this concept, it fits well with its overall vision of the area’s future. As a potential middle power, however, Indonesia has to deal with the day-to-day realities of the area, and it has realized that intrusion by great powers, beginning with the United States, is inevitable. Throughout the New Order, it has retained its non-aligned identity, but still kept its close but correct relationship with the United States.6 Conceding the inevitability of outside influence, Indonesia cooperated with the rest of ASEAN to bring China into the ARF as a dialogue member. Believing that containment of China is not a realistic policy, but not enthusiastic about engagement, the Indonesian elite conceded that involvement of China, along with the United States in the ARF, was unavoidable. But what exactly the nature of that involvement should be is not an easy question to answer. The image of China originating in the Sukarno era is still salient, and ‘stereotypes of China die hard in Jakarta.’ The Indonesian elites’ attempt to move toward engaging China and building a normal relationship with it is approached with something less than enthusiasm (Leifer, 1999b: 105). But there is little alternative. Because of the seeming inevitability of China’s increasing power, Indonesia, caught between its distaste for close ties with the United States and the inadequacies of subregional defense, has little choice but to engage China and muddle through with what other help it can find to rely on if things go awry. The official line is that Indonesia and ASEAN stand as one in promoting common foreign policies. According to Alwi Shihab, Wahid’s foreign minister, Indonesia’s participation in the work of ASEAN will … continue to be the linchpin of Indonesia’s foreign policy … we cannot solve our problems in a vacuum … Everything that Indonesia is trying to do as

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an individual country can be matched with and reinforced by a parallel activity in ASEAN. (Alwi, 2000) Of course reality is more complex than that, but Indonesia’s restraint has stood it in good stead with ASEAN. During the crisis in Cambodia, for instance, it believed that the Thai view of the Vietnamese threat was unduly alarmist and that by going along with the ASEAN condemnation of the Vietnamese invasion it was in effect cooperating with China and weakening Vietnamese resolve in Indochina, in spite of the shared political interests it had with Hanoi (Leifer, 1999b: 94). It did this in deference to solidarity in ASEAN, and consequently that organization remains a working institution which will support Indonesia’s causes, at least to a point. Indonesia generally gets good marks for providing leadership but with a light hand, refraining from domineering behavior that would alienate the rest of ASEAN. But ASEAN will find the China problem in the South China Sea less easy to resolve than the invasion of Cambodia. Without claims in the dispute over the Spratlys, nevertheless Indonesia in 1990 began sponsoring a series of annual workshops involving China and the ASEAN claimants, discussing the problem and hoping to contribute to a procedure for dealing with the conflicting claims and objectives. The workshops began with technical issues, with the hope that they could serve as confidence building exercises that would evolve into a forum for addressing the more controversial competing claims. But adamant Chinese opposition to discussion of the claims prevented this (Whiting, 1997a: 305). Indonesia has earned accolades for this disinterested involvement in the resolution of the conflict, but the process has not produced any breakthroughs on the issues. Jakarta has been concerned about China’s potential claims on Natuna Island, where Chinese maps have suggested Chinese jurisdiction extending all across the South China Sea, conflicting with Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone extending out from the Island. Chinese maps implied their ownership of a major natural gas field 180 km northeast of Natuna Island. Indonesia queried China on these claims and further discussion produced varying explanations of the claims but no substantive concessions. China has denied such expansive claims, but the Indonesian government was sufficiently concerned to send Foreign Minister Ali Alatas to Beijing in July 1995 to clarify the extent of China’s assertions, following an inadequate response to a diplomatic note sent to the Chinese through its embassy in Jakarta the previous September. After his trip to

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Beijing, Ali Alatas pronounced himself satisfied with the Chinese response, but the Indonesian military was not and the issue remains unresolved. The extent of Jakarta’s concern about China’s behavior in the South China Sea could also be discerned from the note of protest sent to Beijing in July 1996. This concerned the publication of a volume by a retired PLA officer suggesting that China would likely use the archipelagic principle in the Spratly Islands for defining its maritime baselines. The suggestion was all the more believable since China had used the archipelagic principle to define its baselines in the case of the Paracel Islands, contested with Vietnam, when it declared its baselines at the time of ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention in May 1996. At that time, China reserved the publication of its maritime baselines for the Spratlys. Jakarta also stepped up surveillance and protection of the Natuna islands, complete with an ostentatious military exercise around the islands in the autumn of 1996. One well informed analyst, Rizal Summa, suggested that this largest-ever Indonesian exercise was part of a reappraisal of the policy of engagement – which Indonesia had adopted from its neighbors – because of the growing evidence that China was ‘not going to be deterred’ from its regional territorial ambitions. While denying that Indonesia was giving up on constructive engagement of China, he asserted that Indonesia’s new wariness revealed a ‘growing assertiveness in shaping security arrangements in the Asia-Pacific region’ (Leifer, 1999b: 96–7, 101–4).7 In addition to the founding of the ARF, Indonesia’s other major concession to the need for the involvement of outside powers was the signing of a security treaty with Australia in 1995. Although some of the traditional rivalry in the relationship between the two countries reappeared after Australia took the lead role, under UN auspices, in restoring stability in East Timor after the referendum on independence there – at which time Indonesia terminated the agreement – there is little doubt that the security agreement was aimed at China and that cooperation with Australia is likely to continue. The agreement pledged both parties to consult in the case of threats to either party or their common security interests and to consider what measures, either together or separately, might be taken. The terms of the treaty violated Indonesia’s traditional aversion to alliances, and the bilateral agreement surprised the rest of the ASEAN membership. Michael Leifer has called it ‘the most significant break in continuity in Indonesia’s foreign policy since the late President Sukarno embarked on his ill-fated axis with China in the mid1960s’ (Leifer, 1999b: 101–2).8 In any case, the tensions between the two

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countries following the Australian involvement in restoring order in East Timor indicate foresight on the part of the majority of Australians, who believed that Indonesia was likely to pose a threat to Australian security in the next ten years (Thakur, 1998: 11). Roaming bands of militia on East Timor were a relatively minor threat, but the attitude of Jakarta to the peacemaking role was hardly reassuring to Canberra. The fact that the Indonesia–Australia treaty was signed suggests an opportunity for the United States both to repair an increasingly neglected relationship with Australia and, through that link, take advantage of an opportunity to improve its indirect ties with Indonesia (MacIntyre, 1996). Indonesia’s example, given its past aversion to ties with outside powers, could encourage other smaller Southeast Asian countries to expand their defense ties with powers outside of ASEAN. A further complicating factor in Indonesia’s ties with the US is the antiAmericanism that has been unleashed in the country, both by the instability and uncertainty due to the domestic situation in recent years, and the emotions raised by the Habibie government’s decision to hold a referendum on the fate of East Timor. The resistance by elements of the military and the Timor militias to the implications of the overwhelming vote for independence elicited criticism by the West and accompanying charges of interference by the US and other outside powers in Indonesian affairs (Leifer, 1999: chapters 10–11; Chandrasekaran, 2000d). A constant bone of contention in relations with the US has been the periodic cut-off of military aid to pressure Indonesia on human rights issues. This happened first in 1991, following the Dili massacre in East Timor, a second time in 1996 after Megawati Sukarnoputri was ousted from the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and the headquarters raided, and most recently in 1999, with restoration of military aid contingent on punishment of the senior military officers responsible for atrocities in East Timor and the return of refugees. The British also have debated whether to sell Hawk jet aircraft to Indonesia. The Wahid administration talked about diversifying military acquisitions to reduce dependence on the West, probably with purchases from Russia or China (Smith, 2000: 513–15). The Wahid administration provided some hint of what post-Suharto foreign policy may look like. In the first four months of his administration, President Wahid visited 26 countries. While it was definitely closer to the West than either Sukarno or Suharto in governing philosophy, and it rejected the tenets of Asian democracy, it showed signs of greater independence of the West in foreign policy than its predecessors did, partly because the more open government must now respond to nationalistic and Islamic civil society. Relations with the PRC were improved,

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seemingly moving them to a plane more in line with ‘normal’ relations, easing some of the paranoia that characterized Indonesian attitudes since 1965. There appears to be some prospect of military-to-military relations, trade has increased, and Indonesia is an important supplier of oil to China. Wahid talked about Indonesian cooperation with China and India to counter the ‘lopsided power’ of the West, but this idea seemed to be more an expression of pan-Asian sentiment than any concrete suggestion for specific policy or organizational arrangements. On balance, one observer noted, Indonesian policy under Wahid was ‘far more orthodox, or in keeping with past themes, than would be suggested … by [the] rhetoric …’ One bonus for ASEAN is that Indonesian policy toward Singapore appears to have improved substantially (Smith, 2000; Storey, 2000; Downs, 2000: 33).9 President Megawati’s administration has been if anything even more cool to the US, and is viewed as less than responsive by the US to its anti-terrorist concerns. The Indonesians plead that they are adhering to democratic procedures, but the record on military reform is mixed. The US faces in Indonesia precisely the dilemma of choosing among the foreign policy priorities discussed earlier. It is concerned with stability in both Indonesia and Southeast Asia and for both the country requires a functioning military with access to training in democracy and human rights. But the US also knows that for Indonesia to be stable, it must develop civilian democratic procedures, which may be threatened by military ascendancy. The US must fashion a policy that contains the best trade-off between these objectives. A strong and democratic Indonesia will be a tremendous asset in smoothing a power transition in Southeast Asia.

Malaysia Malaysia’s relations with the PRC are perhaps the most interesting of all the cosmopolitan countries, because they are the most subtle and complex. Malaysian officials have been very reluctant to speak out about the China problem, more so than their counterparts in Singapore and Indonesia. Prime Minister Mahathir has been quoted as saying that ‘The US is saying we are threatened by China, but I don’t see the threat from China as being any worse than the threat from the US’ (Leong, 2001: 689). But there is plenty of evidence that China is a concern and a problem that is factored into the defense planning of the nation. The Chinese problem in Malaysia is not entirely one of relations with the PRC. The focus of both Malaysian political and security concerns has

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been on the internal situation as much as or more than on external events. The delicate balance between the Malay and Chinese ethnic make-up of the country has been discussed earlier, and is an issue not only in relations with China but with Singapore. It was one factor leading to Singapore’s expulsion from the federation in 1965. From the beginning there has been concern that the Malaysian Chinese minority might act as agents of the PRC or the Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM). Closely related to that was the insurgency aimed at overthrowing the established government conducted from 1948–60 and which was led by the CPM, garnered support primarily among the Chinese minority and was ultimately put down by the British. Ethnicity thus combined with ideology to produce a unique security orientation (Nathan, 1998: 515–16). Malaysia has been acutely aware of the problems presented by an assertive China. One former defense official argued that while India is constrained by domestic problems, and Japan by constitutional constraints, China continues to increase its defense spending and military modernization and threatens the use of force. The decision to build a major naval base in Sandarac on the northern coast of Sabah was at least partly based on the potential need to deal with Chinese assertiveness. And a 1995 Malay–ASEAN report indicated that the Spratlys dispute was the single most important threat to regional stability (Acharya, 1999a; Nathan, 1998: 539). Malaysia was the first of the original members of ASEAN to normalize relations with China in 1974, made possible by the fact that Chinese backing of the insurgency there had been terminated much earlier than in Thailand and the Philippines. And there was no legacy of ill will such as still remains after the alleged Chinese involvement in the 1965 coup d’état in Indonesia. Malaysia, the primary proponent of ZOPFAN and a Southeast Asia free of outside powers, has pursued a foreign policy with a heavy emphasis on the complementary priorities of South–South cooperation, a positive role for the United Nations, ‘where small and large countries alike can speak with an equal voice,’ and Islamic solidarity (Nathan, 1998: 543–5). Part and parcel of this approach has been an attempt to maintain good relations with Beijing. Malaysia speaks for many in ASEAN arguing that balancing against Beijing is risky and counterproductive since that would be, in the words of former Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi, an ‘invitation to the establishment of a counter-bloc’ (Busse, 1999). Beijing is particularly happy to support Malaysia’s enthusiastic promotion of ZOPFAN, since its implementation would exclude a US military presence in the subregion but leave China

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close by. Any reservations about China’s potential behavior have been kept out of the public dialogue in Malaysia. The overall Malaysian emphasis on national independence, Southeast Asian autonomy and the interests of small and developing countries has fit well with the tenor of Chinese rhetoric of Asia for the Asians and the exclusion of outside powers from the region. Publicly, Mahathir has downplayed any Chinese designs on Southeast Asia. In 1994 Defense Minister Datuk Sri Najib Tun Razak echoed the tone set by Mahathir when he stated: ‘We are not alarmed. Looking at the nature of China’s military buildup in the short and medium term it is very much defensive in nature and not moving in the realm of power projection’ (Whiting, 1997a: 311). A good example of putting the best face on Malaysia’s position vis-à-vis China was the statement by the Defense Minister, Syed Hamid Albar in 1996 on China. China’s claims in the South China Sea have been looked upon by extra-regional powers as the greatest destabilizing factor in Southeast Asia and have provided seemingly irrefutable evidence for their China threat theory. But we in Southeast Asia generally feel that China has so far been a sober and responsible regional player. Its advocacy of joint exploration of South China Sea resources with other regional states and its recent indication of readiness to abide by the international law in resolving the Spratlys issues have made us feel that it wants to coexist in peace with its neighbors. (Liow, 2000: 681) On a visit to Japan in May of 1996, Prime Minister Mahathir criticized the whole concept of balance-of-power and reliance on arms and alliances, saying that approach is obsolete with the end of the cold war. While careful to point out that he was not opposed to the US–Japan alliance, he stated that it ‘seems to assume that those not in the alliance are potential enemies.’ This reference to China also included the assertion that ‘if we treat nations as if they are the enemy of tomorrow, they will rapidly be the enemy of today …’ (AFP, 1996). The Chinese have repaid this sort of attitude toward their foreign policy with friendly gestures of their own. Mahathir has been a strong supporter of the EAEC, originally known as the East Asian Economic Grouping. The EAEC was Mahathir’s response to the APEC initiative, which Mahathir feared would be dominated by the US. Significantly, Mahathir’s EAEC initiative was originally announced in Kuala Lumpur during a visit by Premier Li Peng in 1990. The Chinese, after some initial reservations, extended full

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support to the idea. An additional reason for the support of both countries for EAEC was the fact that APEC, the alternative regional economic organization, would promote liberalization of the regions’ economies, something neither country was enthusiastic about (Liow, 2000: 676–7).10 Increasingly frequent visits of high officials between the two countries took place in the 1990s. Prime Minister Mahathir visited China four times, in 1993, 1994, 1996 and 1999, and Deputy Prime Minister Anwar visited in 1994. The Chinese leadership reciprocated with two visits by Premier Li Peng, two by Zhu Rongji (first as vice-premier and then as premier) and one each by Presidents Yang Shangkun and Jiang Zemin. Progress in defense cooperation took place in 1992 when the then Malaysian Defense Minister Najib Tun Razak went to Beijing to meet his counterpart, General Chi Haotian. The visit was reciprocated in 1993 when they discussed the situation in the South China Sea and bilateral military cooperation. An agreement in 1995 further expanded defense cooperation, and in 1999, a comprehensive Framework on MultiDimensional Cooperation was agreed to, covering a variety of agreements. Since 1990, China and Malaysia have accommodated and supported each other’s positions on a variety of issues, especially in multilateral fora. Malaysia’s leaders refused to condemn China for either the Tiananmen incident or China’s aggressive action in 1996 in the Taiwan Strait, and China expressed its gratitude for this support in both instances (Liow, 2001: 679–80; Acharya, 1999a: 135). On the other hand, the Malaysian Prime Minister’s sometimes prickly relations with the United States do not endear him to the US, nor do they hurt his case with China. As Douglas Paal put it: ‘US politicians … are reluctant to extend the hand of friendship toward Malaysia … for fear of having it slapped back over issues that are not even on our scope here in Washington. Dr. Mahathir’s ethnic slights against American groups compound this problem’ (Congressional Hearing, 1999; The Nation, 1997). But it is also argued that Mahathir is not as hostile to the West as the stereotype suggests. Although his authority is often exercised somewhat capriciously and Malaysia is far from governed by liberal norms, Mahathir has emphasized the infrastructure of rationality needed for economic growth and the development of modernity, and Malaysia has made a lot of progress in fostering racial and religious tolerance under his regime. The caricature of him in the West stems primarily from Mahathir’s tendency to speak his mind and to ‘talk back’ to the West, especially regarding those aspects of Western culture that he least admires. This frankness has sometimes been reciprocated by politicians in the West, a singular occasion being at the APEC Business Summit dinner

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in November of 1998. At that time, speaking on behalf of the US, VicePresident Al Gore, with Mahathir present, vehemently criticized the government and spoke in support of the demonstrations then going on in support of reform. In so doing, in the view of many people he very unfairly equated Malaysia to Indonesia where elections under Suharto had been notoriously corrupt. The heavy-handedness of the criticism incensed many Malaysians (Sheridan, 1999: chapter 5). Mahathir has been particularly sensitive to what he considers lectures by Westerners on how Malaysia should liberalize and democratize. At the same time, notwithstanding the rhetoric and formal adherence to the principles of ZOPFAN, Malaysia has maintained defense ties with the West that originated before the end of the cold war. US access to Malaysian facilities include: (1) port calls to Malaysian ports since the 1980s, (2) the offer of ship repair facilities on a commercial basis, (3) occasional use by US forces of jungle warfare facilities in Malaysia, and (4) low-visibility exercises since the mid-1980s between the US navy and Malaysian naval and air forces, including naval passing exercises in the Strait of Malacca and South China Sea. Malaysia has also continued to participate in the FPDA. Mahathir has expressed doubts about the staying power of the US in Southeast Asia. He stated that he doesn’t believe that the US military presence in Asia guarantees security, and that it is not certain that the US would ‘extend a helping hand’ in the face of an invasion, suggesting that ‘the US would only help us when its own position is threatened’ (Acharya, 1999a: 139–40). The foreign ministry, along with Mahathir, tends to be more optimistic about China than the defense sector. Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi in 1995 deprecated the ‘cold war mind sets’ which look at others ‘in terms of their threatening capabilities rather than at their potential for cooperation.’ He denied that stability requires a balance of power among nations. In 1996, the Defense Minister, Syed Hamid Albar, expressed an optimistic view on China’s stance in the Spratlys (Whiting, 1997a: 312; Liow, 2000: 681). Malaysia’s defense planners, however, express more forthrightly both the need for a US presence and their reservations about China’s future intentions. Malaysia’s director of Armed Forces Intelligence forthrightly assessed the danger for which US help is required, and explicitly suggested that the need to maintain a balance of power has not been superseded by regional institutions or any other collective arrangement. He stated that America’s presence is certainly needed, at least to balance other powers with contrasting ideology in this region. America’s presence is also

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needed to ensure that shipping lanes are always safe and not disturbed by suspicious powers. The power balance is needed in this region to ensure that other powers that have far-reaching ambitions in Southeast Asia will not find it easy to act against countries in the region. (Acharya, 1999a: 140) In addition to welcoming both a British and American presence, Malaysia has been more receptive than China and some other ASEAN states to an increased Japanese security role in Southeast Asia. In addition, the 1995 Australian–Indonesian defense agreement was welcomed in Kuala Lumpur, with interesting implications for Malaysia’s relations with both of those governments, evidence that Malaysia is interested in security relations with a variety of powers (Acharya, 1999a: 143; Whiting, 1997a: 313). One senses a certain detachment from reality in Kuala Lumpur. In spite of critical views expressed about ASEAN neighbors in interviews, there was confidence in ASEAN’s ability to unite to resist Beijing if and when the occasion arose. But the news of the Chinese actions on Mischief Reef did produce a shock in Malaysia. What before had been a long-term problem that would need to have attention sometime in the future, now had more immediate implications. Officials were resigned to clashes between China and Vietnam, but surprised that China would move against an ASEAN member. The missile firings in the Taiwan Strait also were a surprise. But publicly, Malaysia voiced no change after Mischief Reef (Whiting, 1997a: 311–13; Liow, 2000: 686). Since 1995, Kuala Lumpur has in effect supported Beijing’s view on the Spratlys, departing from the ASEAN demand that conflicts in the South China Sea be dealt with on a multilateral basis, an approach that spawned the series of multilateral meetings hosted by Indonesia. Malaysia’s agreement to Beijing’s position that bilateral approaches to solving the disputes are preferable is a significant departure from past positions and a threat to ASEAN solidarity. It is hard to explain this turnaround on such a momentous issue. One explanation is that Malaysia’s claims to the 12 reefs and atolls are weak, and that since they are on the southern extremity of the South China Sea and the furthest from China, overt conflict is less likely to break out (Liow, 2000: 685–9). There is no doubt that many in Malaysia harbor doubts and reservations about Beijing’s behavior, in spite of the public stance of good relations and relaxed engagement with China. There is reason to be uncertain about the direction Malaysia’s China policy might take if Prime Minister Mahathir were to depart the scene. As suggested in Chapter 4,

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the potential for instability is substantial in Kuala Lumpur, and without Mahathir, significant change in policy is a real possibility. Malaysia has retained its defense ties with the West, and its foreign policy orientation could easily be shifted to a position more overtly favorable to cooperation with out-of-area Western powers. On the other hand, in Malaysia, where reservations about Chinese behavior and policy are muted, absent leadership changes, it is possible to imagine a future with Malaysia in essence bandwagoning with China. Certainly it would not endear it to its neighbors, and the impact on the delicate domestic racial balance might be detrimental, but such a stance is easier to imagine in Malaysia than anywhere else in Southeast Asia, with the obvious exception of Myanmar, and possibly Cambodia.

Thailand Thailand played a key role in ASEAN during the 1980s and in the settlement in Cambodia. As a ‘front line’ state facing the expansion of Vietnamese power, it made common cause with the PRC and was a leader in involving ASEAN in working toward a settlement of the problem that would lessen the threat from their traditional enemy in Hanoi. There is a ‘deep conviction’ among Thai leaders and foreign policy analysts that the 1980s represented a golden age, now past, when the rest of ASEAN followed its lead in dealing with the Cambodian problem (Funston, 1999: 292). Once the Vietnamese had withdrawn from Cambodia and the situation there had stabilized, the focus of concerns about irredentism in Southeast Asia shifted to the South China Sea where Thailand has no claims in the Spratlys and is less directly threatened by Chinese actions there. Thailand has a varied record of relations with the PRC, having been during the Vietnam conflict one of the most loyal of US allies and no friend of China, which supported an insurgency in upper Thailand. It has maintained good relations with the US in later years, but is commonly seen as the ASEAN country least concerned about Chinese behavior. In the late 1970s, reacting to the Vietnamese presence in Cambodia, it moved toward Beijing to counter Vietnamese and Soviet influence. In the late 1980s it purchased a significant amount of weapons from the Chinese, and served as a conduit for Chinese arms going to the anti-Hun Sen armies in Cambodia. And along with extensive economic cooperation and agreements with the PRC, the military relationship expanded in the 1980s. As late as 1997 Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh and a military delegation made visits to China where the Chinese reportedly

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offered arms on good terms and the Thai military leaders were lavish in their praise for their reception. Although little has come of that, the Chinese continue to promote measures to ‘facilitate’ Thai arms purchases, and in August 2001 the Thais were said to be negotiating the purchase of patrol vehicles and a frigate for US$120 million (The Nation, 2001b). The Prime Minister played down the possibility of arms purchases, however, maintaining that they would make some other countries in the region feel ‘ill at ease.’ The Chinese clearly recognize the potential of their relationship with Thailand, and the possibilities for influencing the rest of the subregion. Chavalit was asked specifically by Chinese defense minister Chi Haotian to help clear up the ‘misunderstanding’ about China’s intentions in Southeast Asia. Specifically, he stated that China has no expansionist plans, would not send its forces to fight on foreign soil, and has no hegemony policy. He also stated that the Chinese People’s Congress had just passed a defense law which stated that China would adhere to ‘peace and unity’ and he hoped Thailand would ‘create understanding with neighbouring countries.’ China’s attempt to use Thailand as a ‘bridge’ to good relations and influence with the rest of Southeast Asia thus casts it in a role similar to that of Myanmar, but with more subtle nuances (Bangkok Post, 1997c).11 Thailand remained on guard vis-à-vis the Chinese, however, and was especially concerned about Chinese influence in and arms exports to Myanmar (Bangkok Post, 1997a,b; Whiting, 1997a: 313–15; Gill, 1991). Thailand has had an erratic relationship with Myanmar, but during the 1990s has tried to improve relations and engage it in more cooperative policies. The Thai government currently emphasizes the importance of economic issues and getting along with its neighbors, including China, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. In the past, the Thai military promoted the idea of ‘Suwanaphum’ or golden land, which implied an imperialistic attitude toward Indochina. Today’s emphasis on economic interaction with neighbors, including Vietnam, started with the policy of the Chatichai Choonhaven government to resolve the situation with Vietnam in Cambodia and ‘turn battlefields into marketplaces’ when he came to power in 1988. It has resulted in efforts to solve pending border disputes. But in spite of substantial progress toward rule by democratically elected majorities and lessening influence of the military in policy making, Thailand still lacks a durable consensus on the specifics of foreign policy. One reason for this is the rapid turnover in the post of foreign minister. Siddhi Sawetsila in a stretch as foreign minister of more than a decade earned a great deal of respect, but in the period since the

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Chatichai government in 1991 there have been eight foreign ministers. Publication in 1994 of a White Paper did outline very general definitions of Thailand’s security (Wattanayagorn, 1998; Funston, 1999: 293–4; Thai Ministry of Defense, 1994). Nonetheless, the security complement to the new growing stature of Thailand as an economic power and the resolution of the Cambodia problem has been increased self-reliance and an attempt to put some distance between itself and larger powers. The Thais’ source for weapons purchases shifted back to the US in the early 1990s, and one indication of Bangkok’s decreased dependence on Beijing after resolution of the Cambodian issue was its willingness to invite the Dalai Lama to visit after repeated refusals to do so previously. Similarly, it was not concerned about the US withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992, but it did allow the US to use Thai facilities during the Gulf War. Thailand can be viewed as being in transition from a ‘middle-ranking state dependent upon external allies for its security to a regional power in its own right’ (Buszynski, 1994). In the post-cold war period, Thailand’s relationship with the US has changed. Although it still maintains its bilateral security agreement with the US, the relationship has become less important due to Thailand’s, until the 1997 economic downturn, growing economic clout and its increased emphasis on economic issues. Its improved relations with its neighbors has also served to lower the importance of relations with the US. As a consequence, relations with the US have come to resemble relations between equals more than between a patron and a client. While Thailand still prefers to see the US as a balancer in Southeast Asia, the lack of any immediate threats and a view that the US presence in Asia is declining inevitably result in giving less priority to relations with the US. Prime Minister Thaksin Chinnawat appears to be seeking closer relations with China, especially in the economic sphere (IISS, 2001b). Conflict with Washington over human rights issues, and especially Thai treatment of Karen refugees, has detracted from the relationship. In October 1995, the Chuan government rejected a US request to pre-position military supplies on ships anchored off the Thai coast. And a short visit by US President Clinton in 1996 was not much help in improving the relationship. Nonetheless, these changes should not be interpreted to mean that the Thais do not consider the relationship with the US important. In the 1994 White Paper section on deterrence, the Thais recognize a ‘power vacuum’ has developed in the subregion as a result of the reduction of the US role in the region following the end of the cold war, leading China and Japan to enlarge their roles. The paper states that Thailand

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must cooperate with nations that ‘play important roles in maintaining world peace’ such as Australia, a ‘regional country’ that has close relations with Europe and the United States (Neher, 1999: 59–62; Funston, 1999; Thai Ministry of Defense, 1994: 30–7). The 1997 economic crisis hit Thailand particularly hard and forced defense cut-backs. China’s role in that crisis, providing aid and refusing to devalue the yuan, was positive in Thai eyes, while the US failure to contribute aid to Thailand outside the IMF, was viewed with resentment. But in sum, despite the problems in relations with the US in the last decade, Thailand continues to maintain its security ties with the US and other Western countries. And while it is now less concerned than some other ASEAN countries about Chinese behavior, it continues to back insurance policies. As noted, Thailand has no ties with Taiwan, thus diminishing its concern with events in the Taiwan Strait, and while Thai officials felt that Ramos had exaggerated the crisis on Mischief Reef for domestic reasons, the Thais are willing to stick by the ASEAN consensus on China reached in 1995. This willingness to support ASEAN on a position with which it does not wholly agree indicates Thai gratefulness for the support it received on the Cambodian issue – at a time when Indonesia rather than Thailand played the doubting Thomas. But it also reflects the growing institutionalization of ASEAN that generates solidarity even in the face of differences of opinion on specific issues (Whiting, 1997a: 313–15).

The Philippines All through the cold war the Philippines was an ally of the United States, a continuation of a ‘special relationship’ that goes back to colonial times. While the country and people absorbed substantial American influence, the close relationship also generated a strong Philippine nationalism. The country that is the United States’ closest ally in Southeast Asia has America as its biggest foreign policy problem. Controversy over the American presence at Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay led to a Filipino request in 1991 that the US leave the islands. This move was fueled by concerns on the Philippine side over issues of nationalism, constitutional principles, compensation and the social problems presented by the bases and their personnel. Proponents of going it alone believed that there were no longer threats to Philippine security. On the US side, the end of the cold war and the eruption of Mount Pinatubo reduced its willingness to provide large amounts of compensation, and the US was asked to leave in 1991 (Neher, 1999: 92–6).12

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From the US perspective, the bases played a major role in the Pacific. Subic was the largest naval supply depot outside the US, and Clark was the center of all air operations from Hawaii to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. Troops could be airlifted from Clark to the US base at Diego Garcia in case of emergencies in the Persian Gulf. They also provided the Seventh Fleet with maximum flexibility for operations throughout Southeast Asia, in the Indian Ocean, and in Northeast Asia. As discussed earlier, other Southeast Asian nations provided air and sea facilities and services to compensate for the Philippine pull-out, as did Australia, South Korea, Japan and Micronesia. Guam became a primary repair base. American forces are now less vulnerable since they are more dispersed. The status of the Mutual Defense Treaty became more ambiguous, but the Philippines did grant the US continued access to facilities in the Philippines for American troops, ships and aircraft (Neher, 1999: 92–6). Following the Mischief Reef incident, the Philippines immediately sought to extend their defense network. In January 1996, they signed Memorandums of Understanding with the British and the Germans. These encompassed joint military exercises in the Pacific and a British defense advisory team in Manila that spring, exchanges of information on future defense requirements, defense doctrine, technology transfer and defense industry-related matters. The British also pledged to continue naval deployments in the region after 1997. While this move was a small contribution to the defense problems of the Philippines, it provided some solace in Manila in the face of the Mischief Reef surprise (Whiting, 1997a: 315–17).13 Following discoveries that both China and Malaysia had carried out additional construction on islands they contested with the Philippines in the Spratlys and the sinking of a Chinese fishing vessel in a contested area, the Philippine Senate, with the backdrop of a shift in popular sentiment on a pending Visiting Forces Agreement with the United States, overwhelmingly passed the agreement in 1999 (Bolongaita, 2000: 76–7). The sense of security that allowed the Philippines to give up the American presence on the islands was challenged in 1995. Relations between the PRC and the Philippines had been good since 1975 when diplomatic relations were established. The Philippines, like Thailand, had been an ally of the United States and a constant target of Chinese vitriol through virtually the entire period since Mao and the communist party had come to power in 1949. They had lived under ‘China’s menacing shadow’ until the mid-1970s when Vietnam’s expanding presence and Soviet power became the main threat (Israeli, 1987: 339; Maranan, 1988; Bert, 1990). The 1972 understanding between the US and China

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and the resulting security cooperation between the two countries for the remainder of the cold war had a direct impact on the Philippines and they were, like many other Southeast Asian countries, actively courted by the Chinese. The Chinese had several interests in maintaining good relations with the Philippines. In addition to the changed correlation of forces in Asia following the 1972 breakthrough which made old enemies friends and potential allies against Soviet influence, the Chinese in the post-Mao era were soon giving priority to economic development. They needed a quiet periphery in Southeast Asia which would allow them to avoid diverting resources to deal with potential problems there. Beyond that, they were interested in developing economic relations with the Philippines, which ran a substantial negative trade balance with the PRC. The Philippines was a faithful adherent to the one China doctrine which the PRC championed, although they have economic ties with Taiwan, as well as quiet exchanges of military personnel, intelligence, and various delegations. The geographic and economic proximity to Taiwan requires the Philippines to ‘walk a tightrope’ in accommodating both Taiwan and the PRC (Whiting, 1997a: 315–17). In the 1980s, the PRC was also more favorable to the US presence in Asia than it has since become, and the American bases in the Philippines were not an obstacle to good relations. During the transition from the Marcos dictatorship to the popular ‘people power’ uprising that brought Corazon Aquino to power in 1986, the Chinese commitment to good relations could be seen to transcend the specific regime in power. As has been their practice regarding changes of power in other Southeast Asian countries, the Chinese were careful to stay neutral on a choice of regime until it was clear that a change would be made to a new government. Beijing gave lip-service to the Marcos regime until its collapse was probable, at which time it gradually switched loyalty to Aquino and changed its rhetoric accordingly (Bert, 1990). Given this background, when the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) discovered a Chinese military build-up on Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef (Panganiban Reef) in February 1995, it was greeted in Manila with ‘genuine surprise and dismay.’ In 1994, a brief dispute over an oil exploration permit for an American firm in the disputed area of the Spratlys had appeared resolved when both countries agreed to joint efforts in developing South China Sea resources. Adding to the shock of the incident was the deplorable state of the Philippine defense posture. Long reliant on the American presence to relieve anxiety about external threats, and with the armed forces focused on internal rebellions, Mischief Reef was a jarring wake-up call reminding the Philippine elite that the post-cold war Asian environment was not entirely benign.

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Filipino navy vessels reportedly averaged 41 years of age, and its air force, with only two operating 25-year-old F-5 jet fighters, was the smallest in ASEAN. In response to the Mischief Reef incident, a long-proposed defense modernization act was passed, but the $2 billion appropriation over 5 years reportedly was subject to annual interruption by the legislature. The developments led to some candid discussion and assessment of China’s likely future behavior. Speaking in Honolulu in October 1995, President Ramos warned that ‘China will be East Asia’s most serious concern … [it] will unavoidably press – politically and militarily … How China exercises its political and military clout must concern us all.’14 Since in the prelude to the Pacific War the Kalayaans in the Spratlys had served as a staging ground for the Japanese invasion of not only the Philippines but of Malaysia and Indonesia as well, the incident on Mischief Reef, the first major move by any claimant to occupy new territory in the Spratlys since 1988, had ominous implications and was particularly significant for Filipinos (San Pablo-Baviera, 1998: 219–22). Philippine efforts to focus international attention on the events on Mischief Reef led to a statement of concern by the ASEAN foreign ministers. Meeting in Hangzhou in April, it was the first time ASEAN collectively confronted China directly on any of the South China Sea disputes. A first ever consultative meeting between senior officials of ASEAN and China was described by one participant as ‘hectic, direct, and quite unsettling to the Chinese.’15 Ramos also put forward a proposal for the demilitarization of the South China Sea, and a string of events then pointed toward progress on resolving or at least papering over the dispute. In August, the PRC and the Philippines agreed on eight principles for a code of conduct with regard to disputes in the area. In 1996, Philippine Defense Secretary Renato de Villa visited China and an MOU on an exchange of defense attachés was signed. In November, at the APEC summit President Jiang Zemin and Ramos agreed to shelve their dispute and draw up joint development plans. President Jiang Zemin also paid a state visit, marking a milestone in confidence building. In February 1997, PRC defense minister Chi Haotian visited Manila, and in March a Chinese frigate and destroyer and their escort ships paid unprecedented port calls in Manila, after visiting Thailand and Malaysia. In March, the PRC and the Philippines co-chaired an ARF meeting on confidence building measures. But there were also indicators that the problem had only receded, not disappeared. In December of 1996, the Philippines revealed plans to upgrade an air strip on Pag-asa Island (Kalayaan Islands) for C-130 transports to service troops there. This led to a Chinese inquiry and a Philippine

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response that no further troops would be sent to the Spratlys. Similar remarks were made regarding Scarborough Shoal, a completely submerged shoal claimed by China. In April 1997 a group of Chinese amateur radio buffs visited the shoal and were asked to leave by Philippine navy personnel. Other sightings of Chinese civilian and military vessels were made, and a group of Chinese ‘fishermen’ apprehended (San Pablo-Baviera, 1998; Whiting, 1997a). The Philippines appears to have become a second ‘front-line’ state (after Vietnam) confronting China in the Spratlys, as the disputes have continued. In two separate incidents in 1999 near Scarborough Shoal, two Chinese fishing boats allegedly sank, one after a collision with a Philippine vessel, and one after having been fired upon by a Philippine boat. In January 2000, six Chinese boats were sighted off Scarborough and three defied a Philippine attempt to drive them off, and in March of the following year in what President Arroyo described as a ‘mere incident’ in the broader relations between the two countries, the Philippine navy boarded ten Chinese boats and confiscated fish and equipment. She pledged that ‘we intend to protect our territories’ and to continue military modernization in spite of budget difficulties. US officials suspected that the Chinese were seeking to build permanent military structures on Scarborough Shoal similar to those on Mischief Reef, amid reports that the Chinese were stepping up naval activity in the Spratlys, where more than a dozen warships were deployed (Political Chronology of South-East Asia and Oceania, 2001; AFP, 2000, 2001; Quezon City Television, 2001; Reuters, 2001). Clearly, the departure of the US forces, which had become an institution in the Philippines, and the ensuing arrival of the Chinese on Mischief Reef, have combined to create a new security situation. No longer able to rely on the US, Manila will have to build up its minuscule air and sea power if it is to have an even minimally credible defense capability. Manila has demonstrated already that it is aware that vigorous diplomatic efforts must accompany a new military readiness. And the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee called for joint US–Philippine naval exercises to send a signal to Beijing (Manila, 1999). The increased US concern about terrorism following the September 11 events will increase US–Philippine cooperation, especially given the concern about the links between the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines and international terrorist movements. The Bush administration promised President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo over $90 million for military equipment in November, 2001. The same concerns about groups in Indonesia may do as much to complicate the relationship there with the US as to strengthen it, given the intensity of anti-US feeling in Indonesia.

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Vietnam Vietnam’s relationship to China is unique in Southeast Asia. Contiguous to China which is easily accessible both by land and by water, strongly influenced by Chinese civilization, the histories of the two countries are inextricably intertwined, and their common experience continues. Those histories include struggle and competition stretching over centuries, as well as invasion and occupation by China. The cold war is over, but Vietnam is still Southeast Asia’s main ‘front line’ against the assertiveness of a larger and more powerful China. The retreat of ideology in the international politics of Southeast Asia has not diminished Hanoi’s need to somehow accommodate China without threatening the rest of Southeast Asia, and to solicit the assistance of other major powers without antagonizing China (Turley, 1996: 175–6). Disputes, unresolved issues and resentments between China and Vietnam have an immediate and concrete essence that cannot even be approximated elsewhere in Southeast Asia, although both Indonesia and Myanmar have some such experience. The war with China over the Vietnamese excursion into Cambodia is only two decades in the past, but that was only one segment of a long series of struggles that began in 1940 and lasted until the 1990s. The Vietnamese fought first against the Japanese, then the French, the Americans, the Khmer Rouge and the Chinese. During most of this period they struggled against high odds and far larger adversaries and enemies. This experience has not been conducive to development of ‘standard balance-of-power logic’ so much as to sustained emotional involvement and total commitment to ends that in practice replace the normal routines of everyday life. Without such an extreme commitment, they would have quit fighting sooner and resigned themselves to their fate (Betts, 1995). But the problems Vietnam faces today, economic development and cautious defense against China, are more akin to ‘normal’ balance-of-power concerns than to the methods of all-out struggle it practiced for so long. As Southeast Asia, and much of the rest of the world, moves from the cold war era concerned with balance of power politics into the twentyfirst century, now concerned with developing economies and building interdependence, Vietnam is still immobilized, with one foot stuck in each world. Hanoi is officially committed to reform (doi moi), but translating that into results has been a slow and tedious effort. It has not been helped by the slow response of the United States. As Richard Betts points out, in light of Vietnam’s geopolitical concerns, the US should have been encouraging closer relations with Vietnam. After exaggerating the

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importance of Vietnam during the 1960s, the United States compounded the error by denying it had a stake there in the 1990s, even in the face of the growing importance and power of China (Betts, 1995: 64). But the US was distracted by the continuing concerns of getting information and a full accounting of prisoners of war and those missing in action, and both sides were still reacting to the lingering distrust and suspicion that followed the protracted conflict between them and the conflicts of interest in Cambodia. Vietnam, or at least the party conservatives, were concerned about the effect that US proselytizing for democracy and human rights might have on stability and survival of the communist system. In addition, they did not want to risk antagonizing China by moving too quickly. The United States lifted its trade embargo in 1994 and normalized relations in 1995. Hanoi joined ASEAN in 1995, and a trade agreement with the US was finally signed in July 2000, after being delayed by the Vietnamese for nine months to allow more time for study. The delay was in addition to the three years that had passed since the negotiations were begun in 1996. These delays in signing the agreement recalled similar Vietnamese insistence on conditions in 1977–8 during negotiations on normalization. In both cases, US negotiations with China were concluded first, focusing attention on China and diminishing the importance of Vietnam in US eyes. The agreement went into effect in December 2001. The US has an important interest in promoting reform and strengthening its relationship with Vietnam. The Russian lease on the Cam Ranh Bay deep-water port and facilities will expire in 2004. It has been suggested that the US might try to attain rights there, but unlike China, the US has not expressed an interest. While this is something that would need to be done with utmost consideration of both Vietnamese and Chinese reactions, solidifying the trade relationship with Vietnam is an obvious and necessary first step to the strengthening of US–Vietnamese relations, something that benefits both countries (Hung, 2000; Council on Foreign Relations, 2001: 45). Vietnam has faced the same basic dilemmas as China in making a decision to open its borders and reform the economy to be more responsive to market (and foreign) influences. Taking those steps threatens oneparty rule and the ability to control ideas and political activity, but where the Chinese have taken the plunge and moved decisively to carry out reform and reap the rewards of rapid economic growth, the Vietnamese have hesitated and have consequently been stuck with the disappointing economic results. The national security trends that are the effects of this economic failure are easily demonstrated by a few rough statistics

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regarding Vietnam’s security relationship to its nemesis, China. Consider first that in 1992, Vietnam’s defense expenditures were estimated to be approximately three percent of those of China. Considering the statistics on the falling economic growth rate previously cited, the trend is ominous when one compares population trends. Vietnam’s population growth rate has increased relative to China in the period 1978 to 1994. In the same period the ratio of Chinese GDP to that of Vietnam has roughly doubled, and the ratio of Chinese GNI per capita compared to Vietnam has tripled in the same period (Betts, 1995: 68–9). No country in the subregion has undergone the transformation in its international orientation in the last two decades that Vietnam has. Previously disdainful of ASEAN, it relied on Soviet help to prosecute its own war in Cambodia, and threatened the rest of Southeast Asia. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the withdrawal from Cambodia, and with cool relations with the US, Vietnam was alone, and with little protection against China. China has a thriving border trade with Vietnam that has transformed the areas on both sides of the border, but Vietnam runs a substantial deficit and some Vietnamese believe that China is purposely overwhelming the Vietnamese with goods to destabilize its domestic market and damage its industries (Ninh, 1998: 460–3). Considerable progress has been made in settling conflicting land and sea claims between the two sides, but much remains to be done, especially in the South China Sea. An agreement on the ‘basic principles for the settlement of border territory issues’ was signed in 1993 and joint work groups were set up, one to deal with land issues and one to divide up the Gulf of Tonkin. This approach bore fruit when at the end of Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to Vietnam in December 1999 an agreement on a new framework for relations between the two countries was signed with Vietnamese Prime Minister Khai. Further, an agreement on a common land border was signed on December 30, and consequently ratified by both sides. A large group of high-ranking Vietnamese officials travelled to China in the year 2000 and in December the Vietnamese president, Tran Duc Luong travelled to Beijing to preside over the signing of an agreement demarcating the maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Tonkin (Xinhua, 1993b; Hung, 2000: 106–7; Thayer, 2001: 187). Disagreements in the South China Sea go back to 1974 when Beijing seized islands from Saigon, thus completing its acquisition of the Paracel Islands. In 1988, China seized seven Spratly Islands and sank three Vietnamese supply ships, killing 72 Vietnamese seamen. In 1992, China’s National People’s Congress passed a law reaffirming China’s jurisdiction over the Spratlys and at the same time landed troops on another Spratly Island, in the Vietnamese view

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violating an agreement with Hanoi to take no further actions that would ‘complicate’ the situation in the Spratlys. Beijing appeared to be taking advantage of the US withdrawal from the Philippines to increase its own presence in the area. In May, Hanoi’s ministry of defense installed satellite relay stations on three Spratly Islands to serve troops already stationed there. Days later, a PRC oil company signed an agreement with Crestone Energy Corporation to explore for oil in contested waters, and both Beijing and Hanoi took possession of other territory without reaching any accord on settling the issues between them. Controversy over Chinese drilling in territory claimed by Vietnam continued in 1993, and another military clash occurred in 1994. In 1996, Vietnam leased contested areas to Conoco, and in 1997 a Chinese drilling rig was drilling for gas 65 miles off the coast of Vietnam, an area over which Vietnam clearly considered it had jurisdiction. China insisted on settlement of all disputes on a bilateral basis and rebuffed several Vietnamese and ASEAN suggestions for multilateral approaches, including one involving out-of-area countries. Beijing also warned ASEAN not to take Vietnam’s side. And while one senior ASEAN official was quoted as essentially supporting the Vietnamese side and expressing solidarity with Vietnam, ASEAN’s position was not clear (Turley, 1996: 187–90; Ninh, 1998: 460–3). At the 1999 ASEAN summit in Manila, China agreed in principle – but with some reservations – to the ASEAN draft code of conduct to prevent further conflict over the Spratly Islands, but rejected Vietnam’s demand that it be applied to the Paracel Islands as well (Hung, 2000: 105).

Myanmar Some of the sharpest differences in US and Chinese policy occur in their policies toward Myanmar, which is the closest to an ally China has in Southeast Asia. The Chinese have had good relations with Myanmar for a longer period of time than with any other country. For a variety of reasons, geopolitical, similar domestic systems, and the inertia of years, the intensity the Chinese have maintained in their relationship with Myanmar exceeds that with any other relationship in Southeast Asia, especially over the last decade. For the US, on the other hand, Myanmar and its military dictatorship has increasingly become a pariah which US foreign policy has targeted with sanctions against investment, because of its dismal record on democracy and human rights and the pressures and vagaries of US domestic politics, but strangely enough with seemingly little concern over its

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increasing usefulness to Chinese objectives and actions in Asia. The relations of the two powers with Myanmar represent the structural antagonism that separates the US and China in Asia. Myanmar is both the state with which Beijing is most closely linked in Southeast Asia and the one with which the US has the fewest links, and indeed which it actively boycotts economically and opposes politically. Myanmar’s historical good relations with China date back to the establishment of the People’s Republic, but particularly from the implementation of Beijing’s Bandung policy in the early 1950s. Myanmar’s policy of nonalignment facilitated good relations with Beijing, and the partnership survived China’s continual support for the Communist Party of Burma (CPB – White Flag Communists) insurgency movement until 1989, as one among many groups at war with the Yangon government. The relationship also survived Beijing-inspired anti-government demonstrations during the cultural revolution, and intensified after the Yangon government put down the anti-government demonstrations in Myanmar in 1988. The Beijing–Yangon relationship has thrived on a constant stream of delegations and officials crossing the border for visits. Typical, but very significant was Chinese Premier Li Peng’s visit to Myanmar in December 1994. This visit was reciprocated by senior General Than Shwe, of the ruling SLORC, when he signed with President Jiang Zemin, economic, technical, and cultural cooperation agreements, and agreed on Chinese loans to Myanmar. Jiang noted that the Sino-Myanmar friendship was based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, which have made great contributions to safeguarding peace and stability in the world, and he expressed the hope that the visit by Than Shwe would push the bilateral friendly ties to a still higher level. Jiang also praised Myanmar’s ‘positive and independent foreign policy,’ and its one China policy, and the two sides agreed to continue and develop the paukphaw (brotherly) relationship between the Chinese and Myanmar people (Than, 1998: 402; Xinhua, 1996a and 1996b). Common diplomatic goals and cooperation have been supplemented with military assistance as well. The first shipment of a reputed US$1.2 billion dollar arms deal arrived in Yangon in December 1990. The package included two dozen fighter planes, 60 medium-size tanks, anti-aircraft guns and howitzers, patrol boats and armored personnel carriers. This purchase was followed with a second deal in late 1994, a package worth US$ 400 million, bringing the grand total to US$ 1.6 billion. There have been complaints that some of the equipment is too old or already obsolete, but the purchase has nonetheless increased Myanmar’s military

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capabilities significantly. This purchase apparently included naval vessels and armored vehicles procured as part of a general modernization effort, while helicopters, artillery and small arms appeared to be aimed at assisting the government’s efforts against rebellious minorities (Kan, 1991; Lintner, 1994).16 The expenditures that Myanmar has made on arms in the 1990s plus the high percentage of population under arms make it one of the most militarized states in Southeast Asia. With less than a quarter of Indonesia’s population, Myanmar was reported to have had a larger army than Suharto’s Indonesia, a much larger country where the military has played a large role and one which the Myanmar generals were using as a model for a military role before the overthrow of Suharto (Sundhaussen, 1995: 779). There has been increasing apprehension in India and the West about Sino-Myanmar intelligence cooperation and cooperative military training and the Chinese use of Myanmar islands in southern Myanmar and the Sea of Andaman for listening and intelligence-gathering posts. China’s development and purchase of advanced weapons, discussed in Chapter 3, seem to complement its apparent strategy in Myanmar. It views India as aspiring to dominate South Asia and the Indian Ocean, if not all of Asia, and aims to check India’s growing power and to become a strategic player in the Indian ocean (Shao, 2001). Increased military cooperation with Myanmar, increased presence in the ocean areas south of Myanmar and Chinese support for and development of enhanced road and transport facilities from the Chinese border through Myanmar and to the ocean areas are part of an effort to increase its power projection capabilities in an area in which it has previously not had a presence. Less overtly strategic, but still related to such objectives is the growing Chinese economic presence in Myanmar. Chinese trade, investment and aid to Myanmar make that country extremely dependent on China. Statistics on Sino-Myanmar trade are not reliable, but it is clear Myanmar has a much larger percentage of its trade with China than other Southeast Asian countries. Using one set of IMF figures, China’s trade with Myanmar amounted to 33 percent of Myanmar’s total trade in 1996, and 15 percent in 2000. This figure apparently does not count the border trade, estimated as being as high as US$1.5 billion, and apparently much greater than all of the IMF-reported trade (IMF, 2001; Steinberg, 1990: 587–601; Maung, 1994: 448–9; Xinhua, 1997 and 1998). An influx of Chinese goods and people into northern Myanmar has, according to some sources, resulted in the Chinese colonization of Mandalay and upper Myanmar, and the SLORC in 1989–90 allegedly forced massive relocations from central Mandalay to reduce the impact

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of political dissidence, and attacked monks and religious orders, further contributing to the emptying of a city already ravaged by inflated prices because of the influx of Chinese goods and people. The Myanmar leadership alluded openly in 1998 to growing Chinese influence in Mandalay (Maung, 1998; AFP, 1998; Dreifus, 1996). Joining ASEAN in 1997, an invitation opposed by the Western countries, has helped to alleviate the isolation of the regime, if not to temper its authoritarian nature. Nor has it halted the controversies with neighboring Thailand over minority groups from Myanmar that take refuge on the Thai side of the border. One of the purposes of membership was to ameliorate these two problems. India seems most worried about the extension of Chinese influence through Myanmar, as neither the US nor ASEAN perceives this to be an immediate and urgent issue. The Southeast Asians are interested in integrating the regime into the rest of the subregion and alleviating the regime’s pariah status. The US also seems oddly unconcerned with the Chinese influence, and the US embargo on new investment in the country has contributed to growing Chinese influence as they fill the vacuum left by the lack of US economic activity (Preeg, 1999: 16). The regime’s spectacular economic failures, and its pervasive authoritarianism, antiquated even by Chinese standards, are perpetrated by a leadership that seems to have no particular goal except to hang on to power. Its current effort to write an acceptable constitution envisions a ‘military-controlled, multiparty electoral system,’ a phrase certainly qualifying as an oxymoron (Than, 1998: 406). Willing to tolerate a Chinese presence no Southeast Asian democracy could countenance, the regime has survived opposition from the West and disapproval in Southeast Asia. The US has put forward an offer of a high level visit if progress continues to be made in the current negotiations. This appears to be a new gesture of engagement in response to small gestures by the regime that could bolster the current talks. US policy toward China rightly recognizes the long-term positive effect of liberalization, the steady deterioration of authoritarian regimes that liberal economic activity yields, and the advantage that economic changes provide to the more liberal elites. Policy toward Myanmar seems to assume the opposite, that the more isolated the regime, the better chance the prospects for change. The release of political prisoners and the May 6, 2002 release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest after talks between the NLD and the government that had gone on for over a year have raised hopes for a substantive breakthrough, but there is little evidence or prospect of one.

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Cambodia and Laos Because of their size and location, both Cambodia and Laos have been victims more often than independent actors in international politics during the last 50 years. The prognosis for future peace and stability for them may depend on avoiding conflict between China and Vietnam. The decades of conflict in Cambodia have involved all the major powers plus Vietnam, first as an offshoot of the struggle in Vietnam, then in the battles to oust the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese and set up an internationally approved and legitimate government. It was the ability of all the powers involved to agree on an international settlement for ending the violence that allowed the UN (UNTAC) to impose a settlement, bring a modicum of stability to Cambodia and remove it from the maelstrom which it had endured for decades. In 1998 Cambodian political parties began to cooperate in a recently formed coalition government, donors resumed aid that had been interrupted by the coup by Hun Sen in 1997, and Cambodia joined ASEAN. King Norodom Sihanouk signed into law on August 10, 2001 a framework for a tribunal to try former leaders of the Khmer Rouge, but the Chinese doggedly opposed the final signing of the bill and did their best to counter the US efforts in support of it. The struggle developed into what the US ambassador called a ‘test of wills’ and a demonstration of who had more clout in Phnom Penh. The UN later announced it would not cooperate in the trial because of unhappiness over the legal basis of the proceedings. China has increased its influence in the country with financial assistance and greater business participation. Cambodia is reported to have received $40 million in Chinese aid since 1997, including a $3 million military package delivered by Defense Minister Chi Haotian in February 2001. Chinese President Jiang Zemin also visited the country in November 2000. There is reportedly a surge in the number of Chinese language newspapers and schools. All this activity has fueled speculation by one US army officer that the Chinese may be aiming at acquiring the use of a port such as Sihanoukville as an aid in projecting power into the Gulf of Thailand and the Strait of Malacca. Although the socioeconomic problems facing the country, which has already suffered such devastating losses, are stupendous – it ranks 137 out of 174 countries on the Human Development index – Cambodia seems at least tentatively on the road to recovery (Langram, 2000; Stern, 1996; Chanda, 2001; FEER, 2001b). Cambodia’s task now is to take advantage of a peaceful environment, revive its economy and join the international economy. Laos, extremely poor and dependent on Thailand for trade and the good will of all its neighbors for security, was hurt by the devaluation of

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the Thai baht in 1997. Its fellow communist powers China and Vietnam continue to compete for influence, with both powers providing economic aid and Vietnam also assisting the government against a Hmong rebellion in the northeast province of Xian Khouang. Laos also has good relations with North Korea. The three states of former Indochina decided at an informal summit to forge a development triangle, which could be the beginning of a grouping of these economically developing and politically insular states. Laos for centuries has been at the mercy of its neighbors. Completely landlocked, of its 16 provinces, each borders a foreign country. Both Cambodia and Laos need to move from the old world of war and revolution and adapt to the new world of interdependence, modernization and regional integration, none of which has yet had much of an impact on either country. While there seems to be new hope for Cambodia, Laos still is ruled by a communist party government that has shown little creativity or innovation in adapting to the new world, and was beset by factionalism and even violent resistance in 2000. The meager results at the communist party congress held in March were disappointing to the foreign donors of aid to Laos, on which it is very dependent. The conference, which is held every five years, did nothing to strengthen reform or the private sector. For both countries, the necessary but not sufficient condition for progress will be a peaceful environment and neighbors that set an example of peaceful coexistence and economic growth (Carpenter, 1996; Thayer, 2000; Bourdet, 2001; FEER, 2001a).

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Part III The Twenty-First Century: Southeast Asia and the Great Powers

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7 Future Security in Southeast Asia: Preparing for a Changing of the Guard

China will likely challenge the dominant US role in East Asia, and possibly its global role. This depends on many variables, but especially on continued economic growth and political stability in China. A Chinese challenge in not inevitable but likely. For that power transition to be peaceful, both nations must anticipate the future and attempt to influence it to minimize conflict. The US must accept the transition, avoid unilateralism, and do its best to moderate China’s behavior toward cooperation. China in turn must be patient, accept the system rules of peaceful change and avoid provoking conflicts before its leadership is accepted. In Southeast Asia, partly because of the size of the countries in the area, partly because of the level of development, no country in the subregion can compete in economic capacity or military power with outside powers such as China and the US. Southeast Asia today appears relatively tranquil and lacking in obvious conflicts that generate extremist ideas and threaten to escalate disputes. This is a welcome change from times prior to the decade of the 1990s when Southeast Asia was host to a major power conflict involving the US, China and the Soviet Union (Vietnam War), a conflict between the two Southeast Asian Malay powers, Indonesia and Malaysia (Konfrontasi) and the SinoVietnamese war. The first two conflicts provided motivation for the creation of ASEAN. Southeast Asia today seems mostly concerned with resuming its role as an economic developmental model for other developing countries and with maintaining the stable environment to make that possible. China and the US, as well as Japan, seem eager to cooperate in that endeavor. For Southeast Asia, a major question is will the competition between the US and China remain peaceful and economic, or will it involve them in military conflict? 213

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Beneath the relatively peaceful surface, there are many problems in the subregion that could become serious. Internally, there are numerous border disputes, ethnic and religious conflicts, problems of weak states and delayed democratization as well as piracy, smuggling, excessive rates of population growth, disease, poverty and terrorism. Most can be dealt with and the factors creating friction adjusted enough to prevent development into full-scale crises. Others are more dangerous. Clearly success in Indonesia’s attempt to democratize and restart its economic engine is an important prerequisite to the area’s stability. Concern about stability and regime change or continuity is justified in the case of Malaysia, Myanmar, and Vietnam to name the most obvious cases. East Timor is a new nation whose future is unclear. What is the likely impact of China’s challenge to the US on Southeast Asia, and what impact will the subregion have on US–Chinese relations’? If China draws on extremist nationalism to placate the public and explicitly challenges the US to distract attention from domestic problems, for instance in forcibly taking over South Sea islands, it will have a deleterious effect on Sino-US relations. The US policy of giving secondary importance to the controversy over the Spratly Islands, and thus no direct commitment to preserve the status quo, is probably wise. It is an issue which can most effectively be solved regionally, and is also one of those issues where symbolic content may exceed the substantive. This does not mean that the US should refrain from a diplomatic protest if and when one is suitable, only that it is not necessary to articulate a military commitment to assisting ASEAN countries there. In this case, it would be difficult to define what should be defended, much less how the defense should be conducted. This is one area where it is appropriate for the US to expect the Southeast Asians to explicitly assert their claims and defend them. If they take the declared claims seriously, there is no better place for them to stand firm. But since most of the individual national claims are questionable and the continued garrisoning of the South China Sea area is not a sensible alternative, common efforts to find a cooperative solution should be expedited. Meanwhile, the US should give attention to the arms needs of the ASEAN countries, and do what can be done to enhance their military credibility, especially in light of the shortage of defense funds resulting from the economic downturn. It should also give more attention to the methods of alleviating poverty and inequality, the security implications of which have been demonstrated by the events of September 11. This book has alluded to other Southeast Asian possible hot spots where China and the US could clash. It has also discussed the possibilities for

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spillover from crises in Northeast Asia. Taiwan, events on the Korean peninsula, and elsewhere could adversely affect the subregion. On balance, however, it is preferable to stress the possibilities for peace and development and harmony in Southeast Asia between the US and China. Outside of Europe and the Americas, Southeast Asia has the most potential for development and the creation of stable middle class societies coexisting in a tranquil environment of any region in the world. China can profit economically from dealing with the subregion, and by continuing restrained behavior it can ensure that its Southeast flank is stable and non-threatening. Southeast Asia seems the ideal place for China and the US to practice accommodation and implement cooperative objectives during a potential power transition. The US should encourage China to behave with more caution and responsibility in its sphere of influence than the US did in its own neighborhood in the last century (Betts and Christensen, 2000–1: 23). In this region, outside of the Spratlys and assuming that mistreatment of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia does not assume major proportions as an issue, there are no issues with the Southeast Asians in which China has a vital or emotional state. Nor are there issues on which Southeast Asian states or the United States seek or demand immediate change. If China restrains itself regarding its preferences in the South China Sea, and with Vietnam and Myanmar, there is little likelihood it will have any reason to clash with the US in this area. The area is uniquely positioned, in other words, to make development a priority and to suppress those potential conflicts that would retard or halt development. It will be up to all three actors, China, the US and Southeast Asian countries as a group, to agree on and promote this priority. The US should be sensitive to the concerns of its friends in ASEAN that they not be put in a position that forces them to choose between China and the US. By seeking out opportunities for three-way cooperation with China and Southeast Asia, the US could simultaneously assist Southeast Asia and assist in socializing Beijing into the system (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001: 56–7). Past success at developing institutions in the subregion is a valuable legacy, and both the two powers and all the countries of the region can enhance the prospects of development if they continue to focus on institutional development that can reinforce the existing trends toward developing the conditions for stability and economic growth. The US can contribute to a peaceful transition by encouraging the inclusion of China as either an observer or participant in subregional and regional efforts at institution building, the ARF, ASEAN, ASEAN 3, and APEC, and by promoting when possible its inclusion in efforts to decrease tension by

216 The Twenty-First Century

negotiation, whether over the issue of Taiwan, the Spratly Islands or issues with the overseas Chinese. China stands on a point from whence it can follow a path of development and integration in the international system, one of nationalistic and military attempts at territorial acquisition, or some combination of the two. It should be the mission of those countries and individuals who are concerned about China’s future behavior to seek ways to encourage it to develop behavior and policy conducive to good citizenship and responsible behavior in the international system. This is a difficult and complex undertaking. It is incompatible with pandering to China and absolving it of responsibility for authoritarian and aggressive behavior. Nor is it compatible with ‘China bashing’ and impulsive demands that China reform itself overnight to fit the culture-bound precepts of other systems, however admirable those may be. The latter attitude toward China is a bigger problem than the former in the US. The US and its allies can best influence Chinese behavior in a desirable direction in Asia by viewing China in its historical context, and by accurately gauging its potential and making the necessary adjustments to accommodate its emergence as an increasingly powerful nation. As one observer explained, Asians ‘look to the United States to balance but not to antagonize the Chinese.’ They welcome the balancing role of the United States, but they do not want to be put in a position where they must declare their apprehensions about China.1 It will take some adjustment for the Americans to accommodate to a China that appears a likely candidate to replace them, at least in Asia, maybe globally. One can only hope this power transition can be accomplished with as little trauma as the US replacement of the British. Attitudes toward globalization and other cultures have changed much in the last 50 years in the United States, but adapting to the rise of an Asian power will undoubtedly engender much frustration and anxiety. Historically US attitudes toward China have swung from one extreme to another, from a belief that China was in the process of becoming a mirror image likeness of America, to the conviction that it is a threatening enemy. The US needs more consistent and realistic expectations of China. In the words of one veteran China watcher, Americans need to strive for a normal relationship, not a special one. American policy should be ‘more balanced and less euphoric than it was before Tiananmen and more nuanced and less moralistic that it has been since then’ (Harding, 1992: 360–1). It needs to avoid isolating China and denying it the choice of fully joining the international system, thus repeating the pre-World War II mistake of isolating Japan (Bartley, 2001). So far, indications are

Preparing for a Changing of the Guard 217

that mainstream views will prevail in the United States and those who insist on a harsh contra-China policy will continue to occupy the fringes of a policy consensus. It is also important that the West beware the tendency to move the goalposts. When Japan softened its position during the negotiations with the US prior to Pearl Harbor, the US rather than reciprocating, stiffened its position and enlarged its objectives ( Jervis, 1997: 129). The West is probably most vulnerable to this tendency on a subject like human rights. After President Richard M. Nixon’s opening to China, while Mao was still in power and shortly following the horrendous loss of life during the cultural revolution, the treatment of human beings in China has steadily improved. Ironically, the criticism from the US, or at least certain political groups in the US, has steadily become more shrill in criticism of China. We need perspective on such issues if the power transition from the US to China is to be smooth and peaceful. The people and nations of the world, awaiting China’s rise, should take the long view and plan for a transition which may or may not happen. The preparation should include a psychological readiness to accept China’s new importance, as well as serious consideration of how best to accommodate it and encourage it to reach agreement with the current superpower on a set of assumptions that will make the transition less costly and conflict less likely. Southeast Asia is an area in which both China and the US are already comfortable with the aspirations and priorities of the countries in that area. It is ideally suited as an area in which China and the US, by forging cooperation and consensus, could provide a model for a future transition to an East Asia in which China is the primary power.

Notes 1 Introduction 1. The eleven countries included are Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Brunei Darussalam and East Timor. 2. As Leifer puts it: ‘Vietnam had changed from a triumphalist revolutionary state to a diplomatic supplicant as its domestic and regional circumstances declined after its ill-fated Cambodia intervention’ (Leifer, 1996: 23). 3. Michael Leifer concisely sums up this kind of argument. Discussing the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) he states that ‘In the event, ASEAN had little option but to widen the multilateral dialogue to the rest of the AsiaPacific because it had become impossible in security terms to conceive of South-east Asia as a separate entity’ (Leifer, 1996: 26). 4. A nice summary of these views as attributed to their defenders is in Huxley (1996). 5. The percentage of each country’s total trade with the US, the EU and Japan combined in 2000 was: Brunei – 48.5 percent; Indonesia – 46.5 percent; Malaysia – 47.9 percent; Philippines – 54.5 percent; Singapore – 40.8 percent; Thailand – 52.0 percent; Cambodia – 44.2 percent; Laos – 17.3 percent; Myanmar – 28.1 percent; and Vietnam – 37.0 percent. 6. As David A. Lake and Patrick M. Morgan point out, a theory of international relations may be useful in understanding one regional system but would not be applicable to another. Certainly realism is more relevant to Southeast Asia than to Europe, where substantial progress has been made in community building (Lake and Morgan, 1997). 7. I stipulate that on the global level the US dominates a unipolar world. In Chapter 2, however, following Samuel P. Huntington I concede that on the regional level the US often shares power with regional powers, thus making the international system ‘uni-multipolar.’ For simplicity of expression I will continue to use the more convenient unipolar to describe the global system.

2 The United States: Primary Global Power 1. A selective sample of the literature includes: Goodman and Segal, 1997; Nathan and Ross, 1997; Kristof, 1993; Wang, 1996; Roy, 1994; Segal, 1999; Goldstein, 1997/8 and 2001; Conable and Lampton, 1992/3; Kim, 1998; Byman, Cliff and Saunders, 1999; and Shambaugh, 1996. 2. Other works extremely critical of China’s behavior and military potential are Timberlake and Triplett (1999) and Gertz (2000). Both of these works are simplistic and sensational and neither has systematic analysis of strategic issues. More judicious, but very critical is Mosher (2000). 3. A. F. K. Organski originally presented a power transition theory in the 1958 edition of his text book. A later edition (Organski, 1968), Chapter 14 and p. vii, 218

Notes 219

4.

5. 6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

is cited here. In this book, I have relied on GDP figures to indicate relative capabilities, even though they are rather crude indicators. According to Henry Kissinger, ‘[Legitimacy] implies the acceptance of the framework of the international order by all major powers, at least to the extent that no state is so dissatisfied that … it expresses its dissatisfaction in a revolutionary foreign policy. A legitimate order does not make conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope. Wars may occur, but they will be fought in the name of the existing structure and the peace which follows will be justified as a better expression of the “legitimate,” general consensus. Diplomacy in the classic sense, the adjustment of differences through negotiations, is possible only in “legitimate” international orders’ (emphasis in the original). Quoted in Gilpin (1981: 12). Other contributors to the volume are more positive about the correlation. See especially Lemke (1996); Thompson (1996). To put it another way, Robert Gilpin, in his book dealing with themes similar to Organski, but in a more general context, argues that a state will seek to change the system only if it is believed that ‘such change will be profitable.’ Governments make calculations, which in turn hinge on many factors, including capabilities and values such as the degree of satisfaction with the existing system (Gilpin, 1981: 50–1). This interpretation assumes that the US did not supplant Great Britain as hegemon until the Second World War. The Japanese attack on the US certainly indicated that it viewed the US as the main obstacle to its goals in Asia. As Bruce Bueno de Mesquita points out, strictly speaking the key point at which war breaks out is not necessarily when the challenger’s capabilities approach those of the dominant power, but when they are perceived to reach that point (Bueno de Mesquita, 1996: 276–81). Useful insights on the motivation for preventive war by the challenged power are in Levy (1987), while Schweller discusses the historical evidence that it is usually the challenger who initiates war (Schweller, 1999a: 8–9). On the role of nuclear weapons in the Cuban missile crisis, see Kennedy (1971). For the opposing view, see Organski (1968: chapter 13); and Tammen (2000: chapter 4). The Bush administration has indicated it wants to build both a National Missile Defense (NMD) system, and a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system in Asia. If these systems are built, it will undoubtedly affect the military balance between the US and China, since the Chinese will view either system, but especially NMD, as diminishing their capabilities. China believes that NMD, deployed in the US would diminish or destroy the deterrence value of China’s ICBMs, while deployment of TMD in Japan or Taiwan would counter the potential value of China’s missiles directed toward them. But Beijing is particularly sensitive about deployment in Taiwan. It is too early to say what the impact of these developments will be on Sino-US relations. There are as of yet no discussions of missile defense deployments that would directly affect Southeast Asia (Green and Dalton, 2000; Silver, 2000: 54–6). John Lewis Gaddis supports Ikenberry’s contention that American preponderance preceded the cold war: ‘Few historians would deny today, that the United States did expect to dominate the international scene after World War II, and that it did so well before the Soviet Union emerged as a clear and present antagonist.’ Quoted in Layne (1997: 247).

220 Notes 11. The argument for decline is in Gilpin (1987: chapter 9) and Kennedy (1987: chapter 8). On the persistence of American dominance see Nye (1990) and Kapstein and Mastanduno (1999), especially Kapstein (1999). 12. As Organski himself recently said, ‘[p]resently, the United States holds massive power advantages over other nations, leaving no room for ambiguity about who and what guarantees the peace in the post-cold war era’ (Organski and Tammen, 1996: 331). (See also: Layne, 1993; Mastanduno, 1997; Jervis, 1993; Waltz, 1993; Huntington, 1993; and Wilkinson, 1999.) In spite of its military dominance, the US currently devotes only 3 percent of its GNP to the military, less than anytime since Pearl Harbor. 13. Contrast this with Robert O. Keohane’s definition of economic hegemony, which focuses more on capabilities. ‘To be considered hegemonic in the world political economy … a country must have access to crucial raw materials, control major sources of capital, maintain a large market for imports, and hold comparative advantages in goods with high value added, yielding relatively high wages and profits. It must also be stronger, on these dimensions taken as a whole, than any other country’ (Keohane, 1984: 34–5). 14. Wilkinson probes these relationships by asking 11 questions such as: 1) Are local governments selected or given legitimacy by the hegemon? 2) Are local wars suppressed by hegemonic intervention? 3) Does the hegemon have and monopolize the right to forbid, or the power to prevent collective action by states? 4) Does the hegemon monopolize the high command of the collective actions of the armed forces of the states? 5) Does the hegemon deliberately export preferred ideology, religion, language, ethics, laws or customs which the other states import and imitate? Joseph Nye indicates that the United States is a ‘preponderant but not a dominant, power’ (Nye, 1999: 24). 15. Kenneth Waltz, from his realist premise, denies both the restraint and the longevity. On restraint he writes that ‘Balance-of-power theory leads one to predict that other countries, alone or in concert, will try to bring American power into balance.’ Waltz believes that ‘a country wielding overwhelming power could not for long be expected to behave with moderation.’ On longevity, he wrote in 1993 that ‘Peace is sometimes linked to the presence of a hegemonic power, sometimes to a balance among powers … the response of other countries to one among them seeking or gaining preponderant power is to try to balance against it. Hegemony leads to balance … That is now happening, but haltingly so because the United States still has benefits to offer and many other countries have become accustomed to their easy lives with the United States bearing many of their burdens’ (Waltz, 1993: 53, 77). 16. Randall Schweller, in a review of Ikenberry’s most recent book, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), maintains that the US was restrained during the cold war because of competition with the Soviets rather than because of multilateral international institutions binding it to its allies and imposing restraint. But this does not explain why the US treated its NATO allies better than the Soviets did their Warsaw Pact allies. He later answers this question, and he is certainly partially correct when he suggests that in a unipolar world the American people, and we should add, democratic institutions, will ‘effectively restrain current US power and aspirations’ (Schweller, 2001: 161–86).

Notes 221 17. Henry Kissinger, tracing the tradition of American exceptionalism and its emphasis on liberal values, rejection of balance-of-power politics and faith in collective action to Woodrow Wilson, notes the staying power of these ideas. 18. They are: Liberty, or Exceptionalism; Unilateralism, or Isolationism; the Monroe Doctrine; Expansionism, or Manifest Destiny; Progressive Imperialism; Wilsonianism, or Liberal Internationalism; Containment and Global Meliorism. Commenting on this abundance of foreign policy models, McDougall comments that ‘[c]onfusion and discord have been the norm in American foreign relations not because we lack principles to guide us, but because we have canonized so many diplomatic principles since 1776 that we are pulled every which way at once.’ Summing up US policy, McDougall borrows imagery of the three characters in Sergio Leone’s spaghetti western, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly as an analogy for the nature of US policy. American behavior occasionally has been wise and decent beyond hope. At other times it has been foolish or brutal. But much of the time, we have simply been human, ‘pursuing our short-term self-interest more or less skillfully, and the rest of the world be damned.’ Arnold Toynbee likened America to ‘a large friendly dog in a very small room – every time it wags its tail, it knocks over a chair’ (McDougall, 1997: 2–4, 6). 19. Definitions of US foreign policy objectives in East Asia are in: US Department of Defense (1998a: 9–18) and Gordon (1990: chapter 1). Takuma Takahashi defines America’s interests in East Asia as ranging from ‘preventing the emergence of a regional hegemony or a hostile coalition to promoting commercial interests to protecting human rights’ (Takahashi, 1997: 124). 20. US force planning for conflicts in two particular regions has been dropped, in favor of ‘building a portfolio of capabilities that is robust across the spectrum of possible force requirements, both functional and geographical’ (US Department of Defense, 2001). 21. A similar perspective, sharing some of the pessimism of the previous school on the possibility of maintaining the status quo, is offered by Ravenal (1990–1) and Layne (1997). Specifically advocating cutbacks in Asia, Chalmers Johnson (2000) argues convincingly that the US troops stationed on Okinawa and other bases have often had deleterious effects on the local population. 22. Huntington’s spirited defense of primacy in his earlier article can be compared with the much more restrained view in Huntington (1999). 23. An indicator of the impact of the events of September 11 on US policy toward Thailand can be gained from the remarks of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly in Kelly (2002a). 24. Robert Zoellick states that ‘[China and Russia] are “works in progress”; they are not yet friends and are certainly not partners, but they need not be enemies’ (Zoellick, 2000: 75). In a strong statement on the value of the Japan alliance for the US, G. John Ikenberry states that ‘No “strategic partnership” with China could make up for the arms race and security dilemmas that would follow from a nuclear Japan cut loose from the US’ (Ikenberry, 1998: 231). 25. Some of the debate over whether the US–China relationship can or should be a ‘constructive strategic partnership’ is clarified by going back to the documents where this phrase was first used. Presidents Clinton and Jiang, at summits in Washington in October 1997 and in Beijing in 1998 indicated in communiques and statements that the partnership ‘was a goal worth building

222 Notes

26. 27. 28.

29.

30.

31.

32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

toward, not a statement of present fact’ (Silver, 2000: 10). Background on the Bush administration’s policies can be found in Rice (2000) and Zoellick (2000). The authors are President Bush’s National Security Advisor, and US Trade Representative, respectively. See also Scobell (2002). A discussion of the new direction is in Lewis (2001). I am indebted to Steven Levine for this point. Personal communication. There is still considerable controversy over the extent to which democracies abstain from war with each other, and why, if they do, that is the case. See Layne (1994); Spiro (1994); Owen (1994); and the critiques and responses in Russett (1995). In a review of the literature on the democratic peace, Jack S. Levy states: ‘This absence of war between democratic states comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations’ ( Jack S. Levy, 1989). Mansfield and Snyder (1995); Snyder (2000); Goldstein (1997–8); Thompson and Tucker (1997). See also Ward and Gleditsch (1998). The latter authors argue that in general the ‘effect of democratization is to promote peace,’ but reversals in the process of democratization ‘increase the likelihood of war.’ It is surprising to find someone as sophisticated as Andrew Nathan using a short time span standard for measuring China’s progress toward democratization. He seems to accept the critics’ argument that because China has not become democratic after its nearly 25 years of reform, policies from outside that supposedly favor democratization are not working (Nathan, 2001: 9). See also the discussion in Chapter 3. ASEAN has made no official pronouncement on either Theater Missile Defense or National Missile Defense. Within ARF, however, many ASEAN nations attacked US missile defense plans (Green and Dalton, 2000: 38). For more on past policies and recent statements see Simon (1999: 335); Biden (2001). The US and Japan have both refused to exclude Taiwan from the scope of the US–Japan alliance (Christensen, 1999: 74–5). The US has avoided making explicit statements of support for the Spratly Island claims of Southeast Asian countries, but former Defense Secretary William Cohen recently suggested that the US–Philippines mutual defense treaty might apply to Philippine forces in the Spratly Islands (Saunders, 1999: 249). Chia Siow Yue writes that ‘One reason Mexico bounced back quickly from its 1994 financial crisis was because the US quickly mobilized massive bilateral and international support and NAFTA provided a ready export market. For Southeast Asia, neither the US nor the EU found it in their strategic interests to provide rescue packages beyond those provided by the IMF, despite the considerable exposure of American and European banks. Japan failed in its role as a regional locomotive, as its own economy and banking sector are in serious trouble’ (Yue, 1999: 267). Bernard D. Cole argues that the US did not make the maximum effort to negotiate retention of the Philippine bases and was not willing to pay the amount of compensation asked by the Philippines. The incentives to do so were limited by the end of the cold war and the eruption of Mount Pinatubo and the damage it left. Personal communication. Yue attributes ASEAN’s success in attracting FDI to: ‘political, social and economic stability; buoyant economies with rapidly growing domestic markets; favorable factor endowments, particularly natural resources and labor supply

Notes 223

37. 38.

39. 40. 41.

in ASEAN-4 and human resources and infrastructure in Singapore; and development-oriented governments with sound macroeconomic and proFDI policies.’ The ASEAN-9 are the present day members of ASEAN except for Cambodia. They are: Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Kim (2000) contains a nice summary of the causes and effects of the 1997 crisis. On the changes in priorities between traditional ‘high’ politics of diplomacy and military issues compared to the ‘low’ politics of economic issues as a country modernizes and interdependence changes the nature of conflict, see also (Keohane and Nye, 1977; Rosecrance, 1986 and 1999). An account of the American negotiating strategy with Japan is in Vogel (1997). For an early and prophetic treatment of the relationship between modernization and information, see Apter (1965) and also Cairncross (1997). Nationalist demonstrations in Jakarta during the Wahid administration, at least partially sparked by the outspoken US ambassador to Indonesia, Robert Gelbard, also illustrate the perils of a high-profile and a culturally insensitive style. Many agree that Gelbard’s statements condemning corruption, and his failure to bring the military under civilian control and to disarm militia gangs that killed three UN workers in West Timor, carried the right message, but it appears that the style in which the message was delivered diluted its effectiveness (Sims, 2000).

3 China: Challenging Regional Power 1. Robert Ross argues that China and the US form a bipolar system in East Asia (Ross, 1999). For the tripolarity argument see (Zhang and Montaperto, 1999). Useful discussions of the relationship between economic and military power and the definition of a great power are in Schweller (1998: 198–201); Gilpin (1981: 129–31); Waltz (1993). On the nature of civilian powers, see Maull (1990–1). 2. In a 1996 meeting with top Chinese national security and defense officials, Brzezinski identified eight areas of common strategic interest between the US and China: (1) a peaceful Southeast Asia, (2) non-use of force in the resolution of offshore issues, (3) peaceful reunification of China, (4) stability in Korea, (5) independence for Central Asia, (6) a balance between India and Pakistan, (7) an economically dynamic and internationally benign Japan, and (8) a stable but not too strong Russia (Brzezinski, 1997a: 171–3, 187, n. 10). 3. On Japan’s unique national security culture see Katzenstein and Okawara (1993). On Prime Minister Koizumi’s positions, and the strength of the rightwing culture and related groups in Japan, see French (2001); Kattoulas (2001); Bix (2001); Nathan (2001). On Japan’s failed attempt to expand and normalize its role through multilateral security so as not to disturb its neighbors, see Midford (2000); Johnstone (1999a). 4. On inequality, see Denny (1991) and Huang (1995: 66). Between 1985 and 1992, income in innermost regions grew at a real annual average rate of 7.66 percent, while the rate of growth in coastal regions was 5.86 percent. But measuring regional disparities of GDP per capita, other analysts found increasing inequality, with China showing inequality exceeding that of

224 Notes

5.

6.

7.

8.

9. 10.

11.

Indonesia, India and Yugoslavia before disintegration (Wang and Hu, 1999: chapters 3 and 7). Protests in March 2002 in Liaoyang against corruption, with a surprisingly political edge, were said to involve 20,000 people, the fifth time in two years that large protests have erupted there. One estimate of unemployment in the city was 60 percent (Pomfret, 2002a, 2002b). A recent work predicts the collapse of the current system, based primarily on the weaknesses of the banking and financial systems, growing discontent and distaste for corruption, or the aftermath of bungled foreign adventures such as the recovery of Taiwan (Chang, 2001). Vast differences in GDP/GNI figures result from alternate methods of calculation, depending on which method of currency conversion is used. The purchasing-power-parity (ppp) method tends to inflate the value of GDP in developing countries. The alternative, using the prevailing nominal bilateral exchange rate between a currency and the dollar, favors the value of developed countries GDP relative to developing countries (Wolf, 1995: 27–9). Using the ppp method, the Chinese economy is already the second largest in the world. Wolf et al. projected that China will pass the US after 2006, assuming a stable Chinese growth rate. Lucian Pye sees disregard of the content of ideology as a quintessential Chinese practice: ‘The Chinese have a great need for ideology, yet in practice they seem to ignore the content of ideology; they do what advances their selfinterest without amending the substance of their ideology’ (Pye, 1985: 206). Andrew Nathan argues that economic development in and of itself does not bring human rights improvements, that it requires a long political struggle (Nathan, 1999: 156–9). This may be true, but the argument usually made is that economic development provides the conditions that make development of democracy more likely, not that democracy springs fully-formed from the brow of economic progress. See for instance Lipset (1960: especially chapter 2). A defense of many of the ‘internationalist’ perspectives is in Yan (1999). Anyone believing that Southeast Asians support the traditional Chinese view of sovereignty would do well to read the address by Singapore’s Foreign Minister, S. Jayakumar to an international law seminar in Singapore in July 2000: ‘Today, more than ever … the Westphalian concept of a state with virtually absolute sovereignty within its borders is fast changing … countries have to interact in a web of complex relationships with not only other countries but also with a variety of other non-state entities. This process has brought about constraints on their freedom of action over a broad and expanding range of activities … Indeed, over the recent decades, various developments have inexorably been transforming the concept of state sovereignty’ (Jayakumar, 2000). This from Singapore, that bastion of Realpolitik! A more traditional Southeast Asian view is that of Indonesia’s former Foreign Minister (in Alatas, 1999). For the Chinese, their past suffering ensures future virtue. When asked about the ‘China threat,’ Foreign Minister Qian Qichen responded this way in 1993: ‘The modern history of China was written in blood and tears as the nation was subjected to untold sufferings under the aggression, suppression, bullying and humiliation of imperialism and colonialism … . As a country having regained its independence and sovereignty, China does not, and will not, impose hegemony and power politics on others and will not threaten or bully any one’ (Qian, 1993: 9).

Notes 225 12. An illustration of the proposition that foreign crises can be used to domestic advantage is Mao’s comment during the 1958 Taiwan Strait crisis that developed at the same time as the great leap forward was under way. Mao said in a speech to the Supreme State Council that ‘besides its disadvantageous side, a tensed [international] situation could mobilize the population, could particularly mobilize the backward people, could mobilize people in the middle, and could therefore promote the great leap forward in economic construction’ (quoted in Chen (1995: 361). 13. ‘Several military advances have made the task of conquering Taiwan, impossible to carry out as recently as 1999, feasible in 2004, the country’s army leaders are saying’ (Bernstein and Munro, 1998: 188). ‘It will be a decade or more before the PLA can project enough power to seriously threaten the rest of Asia, much less the United States’ (Shinn, 1996: 7). ‘China is 30–50 years away from the type of comprehensive, across-the-board technological modernization of its naval and air forces that could directly challenge American power or the status quo in the Asian Pacific region’ (Feigenbaum, 1999: 83). Bates Gill and Michael O’Hanlon suggest it will be at least twenty years before China can significantly challenge the US and its allies in East Asia (Gill and O’Hanlon, 1999: 56). Hans W. Maull assumes that China’s emergence as a superpower, and eventual parity with the United States is a foregone conclusion. China will become ‘too big to be contained or balanced.’ It is a question of when, not if (Maull, 1997: 468). 14. The US Defense Department states that in 2001 multiservice exercises which reportedly emphasized amphibious warfare were conducted (US Department of Defense, 2002). The Military Balance, 1998/99 states categorically that ‘China does not have the resources to carry out an opposed landing, on Taiwan or anywhere else …’ (IISS, 1998: 165). According to Eric Grove, ‘It will take a very long time, especially at present funding levels, for China to live up to its reputation as the coming maritime power of the Asia-Pacific region … China can threaten to drive its neighbors out of the South China Sea and try to intimidate Taiwan, but has little prospect of doing either if its bluff is called’ (Grove, 1997: 315). 15. A particularly interesting analysis of a hypothetical military contest between China and the combined forces of Singapore and Malaysia in the South China Sea is Chang (1996). 16. Only the latest fighter acquisitions, the Su-27 and Su-30, are able to provide air cover for naval task forces, and then because of refueling limitations and the lack of carrier support, only for a short period. On China’s ability to create havoc today, see Lilly and Ford (1999). 17. I have adapted the concepts of system transforming, system reforming, and system maintaining from Samuel Kim, who originally applied them to behavior in the UN. Their application here to analysis of behavior in the international system is solely my own adaption (Kim, 1999). 18. China does favor expansion of the membership of the Security Council and reform of the UN, which should follow the principle ‘that all countries are equal,’ but no expansion of the number of permanent members (Guo, 1995). Contrast that position with Indonesia, which favors more developing countries among both permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council (Alatas, 1998b).

226 Notes 19. Alastair Iain Johnston found the Chinese more ready than most major powers to use substantial violence to settle disputes. But he also found that most instances of the use of violence had involved territorial claims, which have declined in number as they have been settled, suggesting that the bulk of China’s complaints against the system are limited rather than unlimited or ideological. See the discussion in Chapter 4. Interestingly, the Chinese white paper put out in July 1998 is contradictory on the question of the probable use of force against Taiwan. Discussing the issue of Taiwan, the paper states that ‘The issue of Taiwan is entirely an internal affair of China … The Chinese Government seeks to achieve the reunification of the country by peaceful means, but it will not commit itself not to resort to force … In deciding which way to deal with the issue of Taiwan, the Chinese Government has no obligation to make a commitment to any country or any person attempting to split China.’ But two pages later, we are told that ‘Strategically China pursues the [sic] defensive policy featuring self-defense and gaining mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck, and adheres to the principle: “We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack.” ’ Doubtless the Chinese leadership would explain this discrepancy on the grounds that Taiwan is an internal Chinese affair and not subject to the rules of international military issues. This is confirmed by Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang who said in 1996 that China’s no first use of nuclear weapons does not apply in the case of Taiwan since it is a province of China. That argument, of course, is precisely what bothers the West (State Council, 1998; Betts and Christensen, 2000–1: 19). On the use of force against Taiwan, see also Zhao (1999–2000). 20. The joint statement issued by China and Russia, December 1999 in Beijing, nicely illustrates that while Beijing’s positions on international issues differ from those of the US, they are mostly cautious and orthodox. The statement first states that the two countries will work for the establishment of a multipolar world on the basis of the UN charter, to strengthen the UN’s dominant role in international affairs and peacefully resolve international conflicts by political means, and is followed by a restatement of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The statement opposes violation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and opposes ‘forces in the way of equitable international decision making.’ The two countries believe the World Trade Organization (WTO) should have more universal representation and take into consideration differing levels of socioeconomic development. They favor observing the UN resolutions on Iraq, resolving problems there by peaceful means, and lifting the economic embargo. The statement also provides the obligatory pronouncements on national unification with Taiwan, in favor of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia and reiteration that the matter of Chechnya is an internal affair (Sino-Russian, 1999: 10). 21. Interestingly, Beijing also put pressure on the Thai government to force cancellation of an international Falun Gong meeting to be held in Thailand. This was one of the few instances where ethnic Chinese businessmen appear to have been recruited to pressure a government (The Nation, 2001a). 22. Regarding the future of Sino-US relations, Kenneth Waltz’s contention that ‘The uneven distribution of capabilities continues to be the key to understanding international politics,’ perhaps goes too far, but it suggests a good place to start any analysis (Waltz, 1999).

Notes 227

4 China: Historical and Contemporary Policies in Southeast Asia 1. Swaine and Tellis support Johnston’s conclusions on the prevalence of violence in Chinese history, arguing that ‘the use of force has been endemic in Chinese history’ (Swaine and Tellis, 2000: chapter 3). A fascinating account of the Chinese voyages to South and Southeast Asia and Africa is Levathes (1994). 2. Johnston does emphasize that once China is in a military dispute, it tends to escalate the dispute, and this tendency may be exacerbated by recently adopted Chinese doctrines that stress the offensive, preemptive use of force without alternative forms of crisis management. Especially when interacting with the offensive preferences of the US military, there would be a tendency to escalate quickly, and both countries could profitably study ways to avoid such situations. 3. Relevant works on major conflicts include Whiting (1960 and 1975) and Robinson (1972). 4. Beijing claimed to have sent as many as 320,000 personnel to Vietnam during the war (Yahuda, 1983: 219). 5. Background on the genesis of ASEAN can be found in Leifer (1996). 6. Background and context for the ‘four modernizations,’ the policy that makes current policy possible, are in Baum (1980). 7. China concluded border settlements during the 1960s with Myanmar, Mongolia, Bhutan, Sikkim (now part of India), Nepal, Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the 1990s, it concluded boundary treaties with Laos, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia (Nathan and Ross, 1997: 9). China still has unresolved border questions with Russia, India, Vietnam, Japan, Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries over the Spratly Islands (Swaine and Tellis, 2000: 131). 8. For a longer discussion of the importance of control of the sea-lanes for trade and shipping, see Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu (2000: chapters 2 and 3). 9. In 1981, Allen Whiting was told by a specialist in the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘we do not claim all the water in the South China Sea, only all the islands, reefs and shoals’ (Whiting, 1997b: 337). 10. Highlighting the basic differences between American and Chinese perspectives on Taiwan, Richard Madsen relates this exchange with a Chinese general in Beijing: ‘ “Americans who support Taiwan’s independence have no sense of history,” he said. “The people on Taiwan speak Chinese, their culture is Chinese, their ancestors came from mainland China. Therefore they are Chinese, and Taiwan should be part of China.” To which my rejoinder is: “Although there may be good geopolitical reasons for considering Taiwan part of the PRC, your argument doesn’t correspond to basic American understandings of moral value. If our founding fathers truly agreed with such an argument, we would still be part of England” ’ (Madsen, 1995: x). 11. For an analysis emphasizing Japan’s commitment to ‘national security policies that de-emphasize military instruments as a means of achieving national objectives,’ see Berger (1996). 12. Indonesia’s role as a power in Southeast Asia has been hurt badly by the economic downturn. World Bank figures show a 39 percent drop in GNP between 1997 and 1998 (World Bank, 1999 and 2000).

228 Notes 13. For arguments on the need for close Australian–Southeast Asian and US–Australian relations, and Australia’s growing role in Asia, see MacIntyre (1996) and Thakur (1998). Stanley O. Roth, former US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, praised the close cooperative relations between the US and Australia when he said in February 2000 congressional testimony that ‘Australia has been by our side in every battlefield from Korea to Desert Storm’ (Congressional, 2000). On the Chinese view on the US–Australian link, see Li (1996). 14. According to Chang, the Chinese are one of five global tribes identified by Joel Kotkin. Samuel P. Huntington’s book also has the theme that ‘culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the postCold War world’ (Huntington, 1996: 20). 15. But as Jusuf Wanandi points out, the Southeast Asia ethnic Chinese contribution to investment in the PRC is paltry (Wanandi, 1996: 127). 16. See also Wanandi, who states that ‘The “overseas Chinese” network is a myth,’ and that ‘[Beijing] consciously refrained from promoting the idea of a greater China’ (Wanandi, 1996: 126–7). On the issue of investment flow, see Sutter (1997: 8). 17. This section on Chinese attitudes and policies toward multilateralism is based on Garrett and Glaser (1994). The quote from Qian Qichen is on their page 15. 18. China has produced white papers in 1995, 1998 and 2000, plus one on the Taiwan issue in 2000. All of them are generally perceived as general and vague, but not that different from the white papers produced by Southeast Asian countries (State Council, 1995, 1998, 2000a, 2000b). 19. Allen Whiting quotes Jusuf Wanandi (in Whiting, 1997a: 319). China had previously seized islands claimed by Vietnam, but at that time Vietnam was not a member of ASEAN. For details see the section on Vietnam in Chapter 6. 20. Regarding regional multilateral institutions, Johnston and Evans suggest that: ‘If we ask whether China has been more or less willing than the United States to offer fresh ideas and to compromise and make high-level sacrifices, even at the rhetorical level, the answer is flattering to China. The issue is not whether Chinese leaders are sacrificing national interests in favor of promoting multilateralism. Rather, the issue is whether multilateralism is now seen as consistent with national interests’ (Johnston and Evans, 1999: 264). 21. A more optimistic assessment of the potential for Sino-ASEAN economic relations can be found in Wong (1995).

5 Southeast Asia: Autonomous Subregion or Penetrated Area? 1. On the concept of a power vacuum in all of East Asia, see Roy (1995). 2. A summary of the historical relation between religion and security can be found in von der Mehden (1996) and an account of religion’s role in Indonesia in Hefner (1999). 3. Buzan’s weak states are ‘arbitrarily defined populations occupying postcolonial states possessing no firm political foundations of their own other than the fact of their existence, and their recognition by the international

Notes 229

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

community.’ He suggests that the existence of any one of the following characteristics should lead one to query whether a state is weak: (1) high level of political violence, (2) conspicuous role for political police in lives of citizens, (3) major political conflict over ideology used to organize the state, (4) lack of a coherent national identity or contending national identities within the state, (5) lack of a clear and observed hierarchy of political authority, and (6) high degree of state control over the media. For divergent views on Asian and Western democracies, see Mahbubani, 1995; Hood, 1998; Robison, 1996; Neher, 1994; Mauzy, 1997. It is disturbing that Mahbubani, arguing the relative peacefulness of Asia vis-à-vis Europe, asserts that ‘more lives are lost daily on the periphery of Europe [Georgia and the Balkans] than in the entire Asia-Pacific region,’ and neglects even to mention the carnage in Cambodia which started in the mid1970s, continued into the 1990s and led to over a million deaths just in the three-and-a-half years the Khmer Rouge were in power, or one out of seven Cambodian citizens. While it can be argued that Western policies were partially responsible for the Khmer Rouge coming to power, there is no doubt it was a homegrown movement that systematically implemented a dark and sinister philosophy amounting to a Cambodian holocaust (Jackson, 1989). Reforms fell short of expectation that the military would be excluded from politics. The military was exempted from prosecution for past abuses under new human rights laws, the assembly passed a measure allowing the armed forces to retain their 38 seats in the 700-member legislative body until 2009, and President Wahid was also forced to retreat from initial appointments of reformers in the military (Chandrasekaran, 2000b, 2000c, 2001; Liddle, 2000; McBeth and Murphy, 2000; Djalal, 2000; McBeth, 2001; Dhume and Hiebert, 2001; Council on Foreign Relations, 2001: 32; Editorial, 2001b; IISS, 2001b). Under Sukarnoputri, the Assembly reversed itself and phased out the military representation, and took the momentous step of approving new direct elections for the presidency. Some prosecution of military officers implicated in the East Timor events is still ongoing. Foreign investment is reported to have fallen from a peak of US$8.6 billion in 1996 to US$1.4 billion in 1999 (Chandrasekaran, 2000a). The Janus-like attitude toward change and reform in Vietnam is described nicely in Pierre (2000). As Keohane suggests, ‘Regimes provide information and reduce the costs of transactions that are consistent with their injunctions, thus facilitating interstate agreements and their decentralized enforcement’ (Keohane, 1984: 246; Stein, 1990). For a dissenting view, see Mearsheimer (1994–5). George Yeo, Singapore’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs has been quoted as saying that ‘without the Vietnamese threat, it is doubtful that ASEAN would have become the regional grouping it is today’ (Buszynski, 1997–8; Dosch and Mols, 1998: 169–70). Leifer has also stressed the role of the Indonesian–Malaysian confrontation in the mid-1960s in jump-starting ASEAN (Leifer, 1999a: 26–7). Leifer states that the ARF, relying on the ASEAN model, represents both the strengths and the weaknesses of the ASEAN model: ‘The strength rests on the culture of constraint that comes from a collective commitment to dialogue, while the weaknesses rest on placing the institution’s viability before

230 Notes

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

addressing the practical problems of regional security’ (Leifer, 1996: 29, 45–6). The members of the ARF are: the ten ASEAN states plus Australia, Canada, China, the EU, India, Japan, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. Setting up redundant and superfluous organizations not only will not strengthen Southeast Asia’s influence, but will actually weaken it. For example, Indonesia President Wahid attempted in November 2000 to establish a West Pacific Forum to include Indonesia, Papua New Guinea, Australia, New Zealand, East Timor and the Philippines (IISS, 2001b: 209). On the impact of the liberalization in Indonesia on trade and AFTA, see Smith (1999). On commitment institutions, see Mattli (1999). One report does suggest that the ASEAN countries may largely meet their tariff reduction targets by 2002 (Council on Foreign Relations, 2001: 36). Ravenhill points out that ASEAN has a long tradition of preferring political to administrative or juridical arrangements for the settlement of disputes (Ravenhill, 1995: 860). As C. Oman points out, during the period from the 1950s to the 1970s, countries in Latin America and Africa, concerned about their dependency on the developed countries, sought to reduce that dependency through regional integration. Today in contrast, the logic of regional integration in developing countries is one of strengthening their participation in that trade. Quoted in Bowles (1997: 225). The members of APEC are Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and the United States.

6 The Southeast Asian Nations: Views of China and the US 1. In 1996, Lee said that ‘By fighting and negotiating with the North Vietnamese, Nixon bought time for South Vietnam to build up and fight on its own. The South Vietnamese did not succeed, but that extra time Nixon bought, enabled Southeast Asia to get its act together, and to lay the foundations for ASEAN’s growth’ (Lee, 1996: 4). The Foreign Minister is quoted in Emmerson (1996a: 67). 2. A Chinese analyst’s complaint about ASEAN countries that adhere to a ‘one China’ policy but ‘cater’ to Taiwan’s ‘practical diplomacy,’ the result of Taiwan’s attempt to develop ‘substantial relations’ with ASEAN countries, is in He (1998). 3. Chinese sensitivity over the treatment of the overseas Chinese in Indonesia is a perennial issue that transcends Indonesian foreign policy regimes dating back to 1959 when China actually sent ships to transport its nationals back to China. 4. Indonesia’s total defense spending is likely higher than these figures indicate because of frequent off-budget expenditures, but for the most part this spending does not directly affect its defense capabilities. 5. Many Indonesians themselves believed that ASEAN served to restrain the government’s foreign policy, and that absent ASEAN the area would revert to the pre-1967 tension and conflict (Anwar, 1994: 282, 297). 6. Indonesia was one of only three Southeast Asian countries, the other two being Thailand and the Philippines, which received direct military aid from the United States (Anwar, 1994: 283).

Notes 231 7. Allen Whiting has an illuminating and detailed account of the discussions over the Natuna Island claims in Whiting (1997a: 305–8). 8. On the significance of the treaty, one analyst stated that ‘The defense treaty … is particularly remarkable, for although in substantive terms the level of defense cooperation between the two countries is still very modest, in formal terms the commitment to consult each other in the event of external threats to either party comes close to the agreement between Canberra and Washington under the ANZUS agreement’ (MacIntyre, 1996: 617). Allen Whiting makes a convincing case that the agreement was motivated by Indonesia’s concern about China’s activities and growing influence in the South China Sea (Whiting, 1997a: 303–11). 9. Wahid visited Beijing in May 2000 and signed a joint statement on bilateral cooperation. This statement included a defense of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. This may be the first official Southeast Asian comment on TMD, presumably put in at Chinese request (PRC-Indonesia, 2000). 10. Joseph Chin Yong Liow writes that ‘Curiously enough, even though Mahathir had always held the view that Japan would be the leader of the EAEC, he had chosen a meeting with a Chinese, not Japanese, leader as the platform on which to announce his initiative (Liow, 2000)’. 11. It may illustrate Chinese awareness of Thailand’s feeling of ease with the dichotomous nature of Chinese policy that Defense Minister Chi Haotian, meeting with Thai armed forces’ supreme commander Watthanachai Wutthisire in 1995, was able to both refute the ‘China threat’ argument and still assert that China’s sovereignty over the Spratlys was ‘indisputable’ (Li, 1995). 12. (Neher, 1999: 92–6). Neher suggests that Philippine ambivalence toward the US is occasionally symbolically illustrated by the number of Filipinos demonstrating against US policy in front of the US embassy and the equal number waiting there in line for an immigrant visa. 13. I am indebted to Bernard Cole for the information on the MOU with the Germans. Personal communication. 14. This paragraph relies heavily on Whiting’s account in (Whiting, 1997a: 315–17). According to Whiting, some ASEAN members believed that Marcos overreacted to Mischief Reef for domestic reasons. On the general security situation see also Morada and Collier (1998). 15. Jusuf Wanandi, quoted in Whiting (1997a: 319). 16. Reportedly, much of the weaponry, including anti-aircraft missiles, were deployed on the India–Myanmar border (Malik, 1997: 55). Since the Myanmar national accounts do not reflect the armaments money spent in China, Stephen McCarthy suggests that much of this expenditure has been financed with drug money. His estimate of the money spent on Chinese arms is $3 billion. (McCarthy, 2000: 250).

7 Further Security in Southeast Asia: Preparing for a Changing of the Guard 1. The testimony of Ralph A. Cossa at a congressional hearing (Congressional Hearing, 1996: 41).

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Index Abdullah Ahmad Badawi balancing against Beijing is risky, 188 chosen successor to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir, 122 deprecates ‘cold war mindsets’, 191 Abu Sayyaf group, 200 Aceh aspirations for independence, 46 festering regional problem, 155–6 Afghanistan war, effect on Chinese view of future battlefield, 86 Africa, comparison with Southeast Asia, 32 AFTA, founding largely a defensive move, 174 Alagappa, Muthiah, 170 Alamonte, Jose, and importance of South China Sea area, 45 Alatas, Ali, trip to Beijing, 184–5 alliance commitments in East Asia, 33–4, 94 Alwi Shihab, 183–4 Annan, Kofi Jiang told China will not practice ‘hegemonism’, 84 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty ASEAN position on US missile defense plans, 222 (n31) China-Indonesia signed defense of, 231 (n9) APEC, 100, 174, 215 as alternative to EAEC, 189–90 becomes more important, 5 Clinton emphasis on upgrading, 51 members of, 230 (n14) US parochialism and reluctance to take risks, 52 Western and Asian perspectives on, 52, 174 Aquino, Corazon 1989 potential coup against her government, 46

ARF, 100, 113, 183, 185, 215 ASEAN use of ARF to increase influence, 169–73 Chinese participation, 130 lack of US role in creation, 47 members of, 229–30 (n9) strengths and weaknesses, 229–30 (n9) Armey, Dick, view on US China policy, 44 ASEAN, 94, 96, 100, 113, 114, 116, 215 and economic cooperation, 173–4 China offered free trade agreement to, 139 ‘commitment institutions’, 173, 230 (n11) decision making in, 167–8 diminished prospects for consensus, 5 economic status of ASEAN-5, 135 evidence of welcome of outside intervention, 171–3 failure of US to halt expansion of, 47 founding of, 111, 229 (n8) investment flows between China–ASEAN, 138–9 lack of leadership for peacekeeping missions, 121 Ministerial Meeting, Chinese participation, 130 ‘operating premises’ of ASEAN can only be inferred, 168 position on US missile defense plans, 222 (n31) Post Ministerial Conference, Chinese participation, 130 success in attracting foreign investment, 222–3 (n36) successes of, 169 trade with China compared to industrial countries, 135–8 257

258 Index ASEAN  3, 215 Asian democracy definition of, 54 divergent views of, 229 (n4) implementation in Southeast Asia, 151–5 Asian Fund proposal, 53 Aung San Suu Kyi, on Western values, 56 Australia, 4, 114, 195–6 acceptable as leader of peacekeeping missions, 121 and UN operation to restore order in East Timor, 46, 185–6 as human rights advocate, 57 essential to Southeast Asian security, 228 (n13) turning ASEAN countries against China, 119 Baker, James A., nature of international system, 20 Bandung Conference and policy, 110, 205 bandwagoning, 117, 193 Banham, Thai Prime Minister, 117 Bank of China, opens branches in Jakarta and Manila, 138 Baum, Richard, effect of reforms on structure of governance, 73 Bell, Coral, and future of US dominance, 29 Betts, Richard, 201 bipolar system in East Asia, 59 bombing of Chinese embassy by US, impact on Chinese behavior, 43 Britain, 77, 86, 109 colonial investments, 102 overtaken by US, 15, 219 (n7) Brunei, 117, 131 Chinese criticism of cooperation with US, 119 trade with industrialized countries, 218 (n5) Brzezinski, Zbigniew common US-China security interests, 223 (n2) test of China sphere of influence, 85 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, 219 (n8)

Bush, George H. W., 28 Bush, George W. administration promised military aid to Philippines, 200 and activist foreign policy, 24 Buzan, Barry definition of weak state, 151 indicators of weak states, 228–9 (n3) Cairo Declaration, 115 Cambodia, 101, 109, 118, 122, 183–4, 193 admission to ASEAN, 4–5 and Cambodian holocaust, 229 (n4) and Human Development Index, 208 and low priority to economic growth, 49 as insular state, 6; small amount of high-level manufactured exports, 137–8 as neutral state, 111 Chinese aid to, 208 Chinese visit to November 2000, 122 civil conflict, 1975–91, 48, 145 Hun Sen’s 1997 coup d’état, 162, 208 international settlement and follow on, 208 losses in human life to Khmer Rouge, 163 struggle between US and China over tribunal for Khmer Rouge, 122, 208 trade with industrialized countries, 218 (n5) UNTAC authority in, 163 US role in 1991 settlement, 47 withdrawal of Vietnam, 203 Campbell, Kurt, and US commitment to Southeast Asia, 50 Canada, as human rights advocate, 57 Carter foreign policy in East Asia, 26 Cebu, Philippines, closing of consulate there, 50 Chatichai Choonhaven, emphasis on economy, 194 Chavalit Yongchaiyudh, as Prime Minister offered arms, 193

Index Chen Ziming, 64 Chi Haotian, 230 (n11) asked Thai Prime Minister to serve as bridge to Southeast Asia, 194 delivered $3 million military aid to Cambodia, 208 met Malaysian counterpart, 190 visits Manila, 199 Chiang Kai-shek, and South Sea map, 115 Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, support for involvement in East Asia, 32 Chile, overthrow of government, 23 China ability to govern: corruption of ideology, 72–3, 224 (n7); devolution of authority to regions, 67; effect of democratization, 71, 80; Islamic separatists, 81, 113; media and communication changes, 74–5; political reform, 67–8; political support, 64; separatist tendencies, 82; tax revenues as percent of income, 67 and Asian culture, 8 and authoritarian rule, 8; and human rights, 54–5; diminution of, 72–5; extent of support for government, 64 and meeting demands of system, 8 and US – mirror images of each other, 59 as a rising power, 7–8, 14–15, 17 aspiration to be superpower, 58 as ‘strategic partner’, 221 (n24, 25), 34; common strategic interests, 223 (n2); view of George W. Bush, 35; views of Jiang and Clinton, 221 (n25) at war with US, 59 contribution in Southeast Asian 1997 economic crisis, 53 de facto alliance with US, 59 economic situation: decline in central government revenue, 65; dependence on imported energy, 102; economic

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strengths and liabilities, 63–8; energy needs, 114; environmental degradation, 65; ‘four modernizations’, 227 (n6); growth of exports and FDI, 65, 102; growth rate, 63; inequality, 67, 223–4 (n4); priority on economic development, 18; projected GDP and comparison to US, 68–71, methodology for, 68, 224 (n6); scepticism of official economic figures, 65; stability and prognosis for, 64 elites: education and capability of, 65–6; ‘nationalists’ and ‘internationalists’, 76–7; PLA attitudes, 77–8 foreign policy attitudes/policies: and effect on Chinese behavior, 38–9, 71; as dissatisfied power, 16; Bandung policy, 110; blaming others, 8; border settlements and problems, 81, 227 (n7); complaint about ASEAN ties to Taiwan, 230 (n2); factors tempering conflict with US, 11; five principles of peaceful coexistence, 58, 110, 112; importance of Spratlys to China, 113–15, 227 (n9); insurgency (support for), 110; ‘lean to one side’ policy, 110; missile defense, 219 (n9); multilateral institutions, 128–35, 228 (n20); ‘myth of superiority,’ 108; nationalism, 11; objectives in East Asia, 94; peacekeeping, 133; policy of peace and independence, 112; preferred international system, 93–4; sovereignty, 78–9; territorial ambitions, 11; ‘the east wind prevails over the west wind,’ 111; toward Japan, 37; toward multilateral institutions, 36–7; toward Taiwan, 79, 88; views on causes of war, 17–18; willingness to use violence abroad, 109–10; xenophobia, 81, 108, 117

260 Index China – continued interests in common with US, 8 military capabilities, 85–90: ability to provide air cover, 225 (n15); air force modernization, 87–8; lack of priority on naval development, 87; military spending, 87–8; nuclear arsenal, 18; ‘pockets of excellence’ in defense development, 88; ‘strategies to pose problems’ as defense tactic, 89; tendency to over estimate China’s capabilities, 89 reform on UN Security Council, 225 (n18) threat to Taiwan and South China Sea Islands, 36; capability to takeover, see Taiwan threats to the international system, 39–43 white papers, 132, 228 (n18) worries about US attack, 17 Chinese Embassy, 103 Christensen, Thomas Chinese strategies to pose problems, 89 on Chinese views of US presence, 36 Christopher, Warren, human rights as universal, 55 Churchill, Winston S., 10 Clinton administration and economic hardball in negotiations, 50–1 Clinton visit to Thailand, 195 on Chinese opinion of, 76 resentment of economic nationalism of, 51 Cohen, William, 113–14 cold war, 145 Cole, Bernard D., 222 (n35), 230 (13) constructivism, 10, 168–9 cosmopolitan states, 6, 175–7 Cossa, Ralph A., 230 (n1) CPB (Communist Party of Burma), 205 CPM (Communist Party of Malaysia), 188 critical military technology areas, 86

CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific), 131 Dallek, Robert US Marshall Plan, 25 Deng Xiaoping and military, 78 and ‘pockets of excellence’, 88 and self-reliance, 8 as internationalist, 76 ‘bide our time and build our capabilities’, 93 economic strategy, 64 future of interdependence for China, 101 impressed with Singapore’s economic strategy, 179 on ideology in China, 73 sovereignty more important than human rights, 55 de Villa, Renato, 199 Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, 95, 113 Dili massacre, 186 dissatisfied power, indicators of, 90 Dole, Robert, views on China, 39–40 domestic factors in power transition, 18–19 dominant party democracy decline of, 153–5 suitability of for developing states, 153–5 Dominican Republic, overthrow of government, 23 EAEC (East Asian Economic Caucus), 113 Chinese support for, 189–90 EASI (East Asian Security Initiative), reduction of troops in Asia, 28–9 East Timor, 121, 181 abstention of US from direct role in 1999 crisis, 47 and Australia led UN force, 46, 133 and UN referendum in, 5 and weakening of Southeast Asia, 5 dependent on trade, 177 festering regional problem, 155–6 Singapore vote to condemn 1975 Indonesian invasion of, 177

Index Eastern Europe, 68 EP-3 incident, 89 Estrada government, 158 lack of US role in ouster, 47 Falun Gong, 103 crackdown on, 84 Federation of Malaysia, Singapore expelled in 1965, 177 five principles of peaceful coexistence, see China Foot, Rosemary, 132 FPDA (Five Power Defense Agreement), 178 France, 86, 109 displaced by Britain, 15 Gaddis, John Lewis, 219 (n10) Garrett, Banning, 128 GDP, and power, 218–19 (n3) Gelbard, Robert, and nationalist demonstrations, 223 (n41) Geneva Conference (1954), 110–11 Germany, 86, 102 challenger to England, 15 Gill, Bates, 225 (n13), 133 Gilpin, Robert, 219 (n6) Glaser, Bonnie, 128 Glendening, Paris, issued honorary proclamation to Falun Gong – apologized, 103 Goh Chok Tong and US presence in Asia, 7 on US in unipolar world, 7 Goldstein, Avery, China lacks appeal as overall model for world, 85 Golkar (Indonesia), 155 Goodman, David, 124, 127 Gordon, Bernard, US opposition to dominant power in East Asia, 25 Gore, Al, criticism of Malaysia, 190–1 great leap forward, 225 (n12) Grove, Eric, 225 (n14) Guangdong Province, and reform, 74 Guatemala, overthrow of government, 23 Gulf of Thailand, 208 Gulf War deployment of Japanese ships, 118

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effect on Chinese view of future battlefield, 86 small Chinese role in, 82 Habibe, B.J., 126–7, 167, 186 hegemony, 94 and US, 21–2 definition of, 220 (n14) Heilongjiang Province, effect of reform, 74 Helms, Jesse, policy toward China, 40 Hong Kong, 77 China’s attitude toward, 79 economic growth rate, 63 Huang, Yasheng, 64 human rights as universal, 55–7 how US should advocate for, 56–7 Hun Sen 1997 coup by, 4, 122 Hunt, Michael, and US racism, 24–5 Huntington, Samuel P. and unipolar world, 218 (n7) changes in viewpoint of US policy, 221 (n21) leaders miscalculating legitimacy, 153 need for US restraint, 31 Huxley, Tim, 218, (n4) Ibrahim, Anwar jailing sparked concern over principle of non-interference, 167 on human rights, 54 visit to China in 1994, 190 Ikenberry, G. John, 20, 220 (n16) and open hegemony, 22 China as a strategic partner, 221 (n24) IMF reforms delayed in Indonesia, 156 role in 1997 economic crisis, 53–4 India, 94–5, 96, 101, 109–10, 120 as challenging power, 7, 61 increasing apprehension of Sino-Myanmar cooperation, 206

262 Index Indonesia, 101, 110, 121, 200 and ‘guided democracy’, 111, 181 as cosmopolitan state, 6 as mid-level power, 5, 9, 145, 181 as part of ASEAN, 4 China’s support for Indonesian alternative to UN, 90–1 Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), 111, 181 coup against Sukarno (1965), 111, 181 defense policy: and China’s interest in Natuna Island (s), 88, 184, 230 (n7); and South China Sea problem, 184–5; low percent of GDP spent on defense, 181–2, 230 (n4); potential for outside intervention, 46 effect of 1997 crisis, 49, 227 (n12) foreign policy: and IMF President Camadessus, 53; and reform of UN Security Council, 225 (n18); and three time cut-off of US military aid, 186, 230 (n6); ASEAN foreign policy as Indonesian policy, 184–5, 230 (n5); attitude toward Australian peacekeeping mission in East Timor, 186; Chinese criticism of cooperation with US, 119; shares ‘mirror image’ with China of proper place in subregion, 182; New Order foreign policy, 181–3; Wahid foreign policy, 186–7 human rights in, 55 nationalism in, 223 (n41), 186; anti-Americanism in, 186; attitudes on and reaction to East Timor independence, 186 public desire to end Suharto era, 153 reforms after fall of Suharto, 156–7, 229 (n5) security treaty with Australia (1995); almost certainly aimed at China, 185–6, 230 (n8); as example for other ASEAN countries to broaden defense ties, 186

separatist areas, 147 trade with industrialized countries, 218 (n5) insular states, 6, 175–7 interdependence, 10, 80, 224 (n10), 98, 101–7 and China’s dependence on international economy, 101–2 and the virtual state, 100 International Covenant on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, Chinese ratified, 55 Iran, overthrow of government, 23 Irian Jaya, see West Papua Japan, 55, 86, 94, 101–2, 114, 116–17, 120 alliance with US, 32–3 and economic priorities, 10–11 and multipolar international system, 93 and 1941 oil embargo, 17 as challenging power, 7, 15, 219 (n7), 61 Chinese and US interest in limiting power of, 60 deployment of military abroad since World War II, 118 domination of East China Sea, 88 economic growth rate, 63 has not atoned for behavior in World War II, 81 impact of Chinese attack on Taiwan on Japan, 117–18 unique history and culture, 59, 223 (n3), 227 (n11) Jayakumar, S. lecture (1996) at Georgetown University, 178 views on international law, 224 (n10) Jiang Zemin, 66 China will not practice ‘hegemonism’, 84 compliments Sukarnoputri on handling OC issue, 127 meeting with Ramos after Mischief Reef, 199 meeting with Thai PM, 117

Index Jiang Zemin – continued on the effect of democracy on China, 71 raised issue of overseas Chinese in Indonesia, 126 reassurance to Indonesia on Aceh, 121 sceptical about potential for multilateralism, 129–30 signed cooperation agreements with Myanmar, 205 timetable for takeover of Taiwan, 95 visit to Cambodia, 208 visits to Southeast Asia, 119 Johnston, Alastair Iain, and Chinese use of violence, 226 (n19), 227 (nn1, 2) Johnson, Chalmers, effect of US troops on local population, 221 (n21) Kastner, Scott, 103 Kelly, James A. China’s high confidence in Southeast Asia economies, 139 on impact of September 11, 221 (n23) Keohane, Robert O., 220 (n113), 229 (n7) Khai, Vietnam Prime Minister, 162, 203 Kim Dae Jung, and US presence in East Asia, 51 Kim Jong-Il, receptive to US presence in East Asia, 31, 51 Kim, Samuel S., 225 (n17) Kissinger, Henry, 93, 95 and legitimacy, 219 (n4) and Wilsonianism, 221 (n17), 27 Koizumi, Junichiro 61, 223 (n3) Konfrontasi, 48, 111, 145, 181 Korea (North), 101, 109 good relations with Laos, 209 US at war with, 59 use of Japanese ship pilots during Korean War, 118 Korea (South), 95, 101–2 and Korean war, 89 as trouble spot, 32, 33

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democracy and human rights, 55 economic growth rate IMF role in 1997, 53–4 Kosovo (war in), 83 Chinese criticism of, 55 little Chinese role in, 82 Lake, David A., and comparison of regions, 218 (n6) Laos admission to ASEAN, 4 and low priority to reform and economic growth, 49, 209 as insular state, 6; small amount of high-level manufactured exports, 137–8 as neutral, 111 Chinese-Vietnamese competition for influence, 209 landlocked and dependent on outside assistance, 208–9 part of former Indochina development triangle, 209 trade with industrialized countries, 218 (n5) Law of the Sea Convention, 185 Lee Kuan Yew as effective leader of Singapore, 159 enjoys commenting on Asian situation, 176 granted access to China available to few others, 179 long-time supporter of US presence in Southeast Asia, 177, 230 (n1) on necessity of integrating China into international system, 180 on seriousness of Taiwan conflict, 116 says China is the biggest player in history of man, 179 triangular relationship with US, Japan and China is most important, 179 US bought time (with Vietnam War) for Southeast Asia, 230 (n1) US is key player in East Asia, 180 Lee Teng-hui, ‘two state theory’, 84 legitimacy (domestic), definition of, 152

264 Index legitimacy in the international system, 16, 219 (n4) Leifer, Michael, 218 (nn2, 3) lesser states using influence with great powers to effect security arrangements, 173 on Australian–Indonesian security treaty, 185–6 strengths and weaknesses of ARF, 229 (n9) Levine, Steve, corruption of ideology in China, 73 Levy, Jack S., war between democratic states, 222 (n28) Li Hongzhi, 103 Li Peng, 127, 189 on democracy in China, 72 meeting with Thai PM, 117 visit to Myanmar in 1994, 205 visited Singapore in 1997, 179 Liow, Joseph Chin Yong, 230 (n10) Macapagal-Arroyo, Gloria, 200 Madsen, Richard, 227 (n10) Mahathir, Mohamad and blaming others, 8, 159 and diversity of Asia, 168 as friend of China, 113 ASEAN is helpless to influence affairs of the world, 170–1 critical of alliances, 189 critique of democracy, 152 meeting demands of system, 8 US viewed as threatening as China, 187 visits to China, 190 Mahbubani, Kishore, no mention of Khmer Rouge massacres, 229 (n4) Malaysia, 101, 110, 117, 181 see also Mahathir as cosmopolitan state, 6 as developed nation, 6; high percentage of high-level exports, 137–8 as large economy, 145 China as security risk, 188–9; balancing against Beijing is risky, 188; Mischief Reef incident a shock, 191;

more modern military than China has, 145; normalization of relations with China, 188; refused to condemn China’s action toward Taiwan (1995–6), 190 Chinese criticism of cooperation with US, 119 Chinese endorsement of ZOPFAN, 111, 188–9 development of institutions conducive to economic success, 49–50 effect of 1997 crisis, 49 foreign policy orientation, 188 Framework on MultiDimensional Cooperation with China (1999), 190 human rights in, 55 importance of ethnic issue in, 188 possible succession crisis, 122, 161 primary proponent of ZOPFAN, 188; Australian–Indonesia defense agreement welcomed in spite of, 192; maintenance of ties with West in spite of, 191–2 recognized by China, 111 Spratly problem, concern about, 188–9; reversal on issue of solving by bilateral negotiations, 192 trade interests in Taiwan, 116 trade with industrialized countries, 218 (n5) Mao Zedong and PLA, 78 and preferred international system, 93 strategies of economic development, 64 Taiwan Strait crisis, 225 (n12) timetable for takeover of Taiwan, 95 Maull, Hans W., 225 (n13) Mauzy, Diane, difference in Western and Asian values, 55 May 4, 1919, 80 McCarthy, Stephen, Myanmar arms purchases depend on drug money, 230 (n16)

Index McDougall, Walter A. and patterns in foreign policy, 221 (n18) Medan, Indonesia, closing of consulate, 50 Meiji Restoration, equivalent to PRC takeover, 63–4 Middle East, comparison with Southeast Asia, 32 Mischief Reef, 88, 132, 197–8 and US role, 47 conflict with China, 109–10, 115 Morgan, Patrick M., see Lake, David A. Mosher, Steven, 218 (n2) multipolar system, 93 Myanmar, 4, 101, 110 and low priority to economic growth, 49 as insular state, 6; small amount of high-level manufactured exports, 137–8 as neutral, 111 as weak state, 161 border disputes with Thailand, 121, 207 China’s use of Myanmar to check India, 206 Chinese economic impact in Myanmar, 206–7 Chinese use of Myanmar for intelligence gathering, 206 early relations with China, 204–5 elections (1990) as miscalculation, 153, 161 joined ASEAN in 1997, 207 lack of US concern over closeness to China, 204–5, 207 military size and arms purchases, 205–6, 230 (n16) policy of nonalignment, 205 potential for outside intervention, 46 problems with ethnic minorities, 161, 207 prospects for change, 207 State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 161 talks between military and NLD, 161

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trade with industrialized countries, 218 (n5) US failure to bring regime change, 47 visits between Myanmar and Chinese officials, 205 Najib Tun Razak, 189–90 Napoleon, defeated, 15 Nathan, Andrew China as rising power, 14 relationship between development and democratization, 224 (n8) views on democratization in China, 222 (n30) nationalism Chinese, 79–84 defined, 79, 150 genesis of Chinese nationalism, 82 rising East Asian nationalism, 100–1 Nationalists (Guomindang), 79 National People’s Congress (China), 115 passed law affirming China’s jurisdiction over Spratlys, 203 NATO, as aggressive military bloc, 83 Natuna Island(s), Indonesian concern with China’s claims, 184 Neher, Clark, 230 (12) neorealism, 22 Nixon, Richard M., 93 Norodom Ranariddh, 122 Norodom Sihanouk, 111, 179, 208 signed into law framework for Khmer Rouge trial, 208 Northeast Asia, 5, 48, 50, 62, 79, 153, 204, 206, 212, 247 nuclear weapons, and power transition, 18 Nye, Joseph S., 21 alternative China policies, 43 offshore islands (China), 110 O’Hanlon, Michael, 225 (n13) Oksenberg, Michel, ‘confident nationalism’, 82 Olympics, rejection of China’s bid to host, 83

266 Index Oman, C, regional integration strengthens integration in international system, 230 (n13) open door policy, 26 Opium War, 79, 83 Organski, A.F.K., 90, 117 American dominance, 220 (n12) and power transition theory, 16, 218–19 (n3) over-optimistic prediction of China as dominant global power, 89–90 overseas Chinese, 120, 122–8 community not well defined, 124–5 little evidence of PRC manipulation of OC, 123 1980 Nationalities Law, 124–5 occurrence of riots and exodus of country, 123 own disproportionate share of wealth in Southeast Asia, 123 protests over Indonesian discrimination, 125–7, 230 (n3) Pakistan, 96, 101 PAP (People’s Action Party–Singapore), 159 Papayoanou, Paul, 103 Papua New Guinea, 4 Paracel Islands, 81, 88, 109–10, 113, 185 seizure by China, 203 Pearl Harbor, 89 People’s Daily China as rising power, 14 complaints about ASEAN countries cooperation with US, 119 war in Kosovo as new hegemony by US, 83 permanent normal US trade status with China, 40–2 Pfaff, William, US over commitment in East Asia, 31 Philippines, 4, 101, 110, 117 acquired by US, 26 as cosmopolitan state, 6 as large economy, 145 as weak state, 157–8 deplorable state of armed forces and new appropriations, 198–9

growing poverty and inequality, 158 human rights in, 55 impact of Marcos period, 158 inclined most (with Thailand) against non-interference in ASEAN, 167 measures taken to compensate for US withdrawal, 197 relations with China and Spratly Islands: as second ‘front line’ state, 200; ASEAN draft code of conduct over South Sea Islands, 114, 199; China could create havoc in military action, 88; Chinese criticism of cooperation with US, 119; concern over Spratlys and passing of US Visiting Forces Agreement, 197; disputes with China over South China Sea Islands, 114–15; establishment of diplomatic relations with China, 111; good relations until 1995, 197–8 relations with US: Bush administration promises $90 million military aid, 200; failure by US in base negotiations, 47, 222 (n35); US mutual defense treaty might apply to Philippine forces in Spratlys, 113; withdrawal by US and role of bases, 50, 178, 196–7 trade interests in Taiwan, 116 trade with industrialized countries, 218 (n5) Pillsbury, Michael, 93 PLA control recentralized, 84 technological challenge, 86 point at which international challenger attacks, 17 power transition, 11, 15–19, 213–14, 217 definition of, 15 preventive military strike, 17–18 Prueher, J.W., Commander in Chief, 122 public opinion on US foreign policy, 30

Index Pye, Lucian Asia has diversity of root civilizations and religions, 146 China’s failure to follow ideological tenets, 224 (n7) Qian Qichen and PLA, 77–8 China’s past suffering ensures future virtue, 224 (n11) foreign policy as extension of domestic, 71 maintenance of stable peripheral environment, 112, 139 on multilateralism, 128–9 opportunities for East Asian countries, 119 Rajaratnam, Sinnathamby, multi-power presence in Southeast Asia is desirable, 178 Ramos, Fidel and vulnerability of East Asia, 9 meeting with Jiang Zemin, 199 on a pluralistic China, 71 replace ‘balance of power’ with ‘balance of mutual benefit’, 100 Thais believe he exaggerated Mischief Reef issue, 196 Ravenhill, John, 230 (n12) Rawski, Thomas G., rate of economic growth, 65, 69–70 Reagan foreign policy in East Asia, 26–7 realism, 22 applicability to subregion, 10–11 definition of, 10 ‘realism plus’, 27 Realpolitik, 93 China’s bias toward, 10 deemphasis on by Singapore, 224 (n10) still very much alive in Southeast Asia, 170 region (subregion) Southeast Asia as, 4 Reilly, James, 133 revolution in military affairs (RMA), 85 Rice, Condoleezza National Security Advisor for Bush administration, 222 (n25)

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Roosevelt, Franklin D., 20 Roosevelt, Theodore, legacy of, 27 Rosecrance, Richard kinds of interdependence, 102 virtual state, 100, 105 Roth, Stanley O., praise for Australia, 228 (n14) Rowen, Henry, 74 Russia, 86, 94–5, 120 agreement with China (1999), 226 (n20) as challenging power, 61 no threat to China, 96 Sandarac, Malaysian naval base at, 188 Saunders, Phillip, 112 Scarborough Shoal, 114, 199 clashes over, 200 Schell, Paul, apology to China for honoring Falun Gong, 103 Schevechenko, Alexei, see Baum, Richard Schweller, Randall challenger usually initiates war, 219 (n8) US restraint during cold war, 220 (n16) Segal, Gerald, China’s promotion of sovereignty, 78 September 11 events and debate on Asia, xi and US presence in Southeast Asia, 7 impact on US policy, 29–30, 221 (n23) Sha Zukang, 226 (n19) Sheridan, Greg, nationalism among young Chinese, 80 Siddhi Sawetsila, 194 Sihanoukville, 208 Simon, Sheldon, interviews done in Southeast Asia, 50 Singapore, 23, 101, 110, see also Lee Kuan Yew as cosmopolitan state, 6 as developed nation, 6; high percentage of high-level manufactured exports, 137–8 as large economy, 145 democracy and human rights, 55

268 Index Singapore – continued economic success, 48; development of institutions conducive to economic success, 49–50; growth rate, 63 establishment of diplomatic relations with China, 111 has most investment in China of all ASEAN countries, 139 more modern military than China, 145, 160 MOU to host Logistics Command of US Seventh Fleet, 178 opposed US invasion of Grenada, 177 pledge of $5 billion to Indonesia during 1997 crisis, 53 restrictions on speech and political activity, 159 seeks free trade agreement with US, 139 takes sovereignty very seriously, 177 trade interests in Taiwan, 116 trade with industrialized countries, 218 (n5) US viewed as benign superpower, 178 Sino-Japanese War, 79 Solomon, Richard, 3 South China Sea, 77, 45, 81, 86, 113, 118, 191, 193 Chinese discuss situation with Malaysia, 190 Ramos proposes demilitarization, 199 workshops on conflicting claim in, 184 Southeast Asia and cold war, xi and military vulnerability, 9 as subregion, 5, 6 Asia has diversity of root civilizations and religions, 146 bifurcation of, 5 change from political-military to economic priorities, 49 China most likely enemy of Southeast Asian countries, 165 comparison with other world regions, 32, 49

conflict in, xi cosmopolitan and insular states, 175 defense expenditures compared within ASEAN and to Korea, Australia, 163–4 discontent with US policies, 32; doubts about future US role, 50–1 diversity in, 5; ethnic and religious diversity, 146–50 economy of: and development, xi; and foreign investment, 48; and thriving economies, 24, 27; economic crisis (1997), 100, 135, as downside of globalization, 48–9, curtailment of defense modernization as result of, 145–6, 165, lack of effective response from subregion, 52–3, passive role by US in, 50, three governments fell as result of, 145; increased priority to, 48–9 lag in creation of Southeast Asian institutions, 167–8 limitations on military capabilities of Southeast Asian countries, 165–6 nation states in, 150–3 rivalries within subregion, 165 Singapore most advanced militarily, 164 South Vietnam, 111, 115 Soviet Union, 24, 100, 193, 197 challenger to US, 15 collapse of, 203 de facto alliance with China against, 59 participated less than China in international organizations, 97 Spratly Islands, 81, 95–6, 105, 109–10, 120, 131 China lacks resources to defend southern part, 88 China unlikely to take major action against now, 88 discussion with China in ARF, 132

Index Spratly Islands – continued dispute could trigger use of force by China, 113–15 energy resources potential, 114 strategic value of, 45–6 US policy on, 222 (n33) Steel, Ronald, ‘internationalist temptation’, 30–1 Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok, 114, 191 Chinese support for Malay/Indonesian administration of, 111 speculation Chinese interest in access to through Sihanoukville, 208 US role in keeping open, 46–7 ‘strong’ states, 150–5 definition of, 13 distribution in Southeast Asia, 152–3 subregional institutionalization, 9, 166–73 Suharto regime and democracy, 55 ASEAN decision making more flexible after departure of, 167 relations with China, 120 Sukarno, President, 111, 182 and New Emerging Forces movement, 111 relations with China, 120 Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 120 policies after gaining power, 157, 229 (n5) replaced Wahid as president, 155 Summa, Rizal, 185 Summers, Lawrence, praise for IMF role in Korea, 53 Sutton, Willy, 169 Swaine, Michael D., 227 (n1) Syed Hamid Albar, view of China in Spratlys, 191 Taiwan, 7, 59, 77, 86, 89, 95–8, 102, 104–5, 131 and ASEAN, 4 and overseas Chinese, 127 and US–Japan alliance, 222 (n30)

269

as diversion from PRC domestic problems, 225 (n12) as province of PRC, 226 (n19) as trouble spot, 32 attempt by US to postpone settlement on, 55 capability of PRC to militarily takeover, 225 (nn13, 14) China’s attitude toward, 79, 81 China’s timetable for taking over, 95 Chinese first use of force and nuclear weapons over Taiwan, 226 (n19) crisis of 1995–96, 96 democracy and human rights, 55 dispute over could trigger use of force by China, 113, 115–18 economic growth rate, 63 effect of confrontation with China on Southeast Asia, 44–4 US weapons sales to, 91, 94 Takahashi, Takuma, definition of US interests, 221 (n19) Tan, Tony, impact of conflict over Taiwan, 116 Tang Jiaxuan, 121, reluctance to protest Indonesian treatment of Chinese minority, 125–6 Tarnoff, Peter, 28 Tellis, Ashley J., 227 (n1) Thailand, 101, 110 as cosmopolitan state, 6 as developed nation, 6 as ‘front line’ state, 193 changing relations with US, 195–6 economic issues: and declining poverty, 158; as large economy, 145; development of institutions conducive to economic success, 49–50; effect of 1997 crisis, 49; success of political and economic reforms in, 158–9; trade with industrialized countries, 218 (n5) golden age of 1980s, 193 human rights in, 55

270 Index Thailand – continued inclined most (with Phillipines) toward criticizing non-interference principle in ASEAN, 167 rapid turnover of foreign ministers, 194–5 relations with China: and arms sales from China, 193–4; Chavalit asked by Chinese to act as bridge with Southeast Asia, 194; criticism of Thai cooperation with US, 119; establishment of diplomatic relations with China, 111; pressure on Thai government to cancel Falon Gong meeting, 226 (n21); support for insurgency in northern Thailand, 193 relations with Myanmar, 194 Vietnam as traditional enemy, 193 Thaksin, Chinnawat, 195 Than Shwe, 205 Theater Missile Defense, 222 (n17) Tian Jiaxuan, 112 Tibet, 96, 113 separatist tendencies, 81 US attempt to loosen Chinese hold on, 55 Tiananmen growth of nationalism in aftermath of, 83 Timberlake, Edward, 218 (n2) Toynbee, Arnold, and US foreign policy, 221 (n18) Tran Duc Luong, 203 tributary system (China), 107 Triplett, William, 218 (n2) ‘two state theory’, 84 UMNO (United Malay Nationalist Organization), 160 uni-multipolar, see unipolar unipolar, and US, 21, 218 (n7) United States and development of institutions in East Asia, 53 and distance from Southeast Asia, 8 and humanitarian issues in Southeast Asia, 47

and multipolar international system, 93 and Philippines, 7 and unipolarity, 21 commitment to East Asia during World War II, 26 comparison of response to Mexico and Southeast Asia crises, 222 (n34) contribution in 1997 economic crisis, 53 countering Chinese power, 7 defense policy: categories of involvement in Southeast Asia, 44–8; commitment to East Asia, 27–9; commitment to two regions of the world, 221 (n20); ‘schools’ on US role abroad, 28–30; ‘three good things’ and policy priorities, 34; US presence as reassurance for East Asians, 33 dominance and decline, 21 effectiveness in influencing events in Southeast Asia, 47–8 global dominance, 3, 7, 15–16, 19–25 historical experience of, 24, 220 (n16) in common with China, 8 nature of US policy: and ‘open hegemony’, 24; and tradition of democracy, 8; and unilateralism, 11, 31; arrogance of US, 11, 31; as ‘benign hegemon’, 18; potential intervention in Cambodia in 1997, 122; receives basing and logistical support from cosmopolitan countries, 175–7 policy toward China, 34–44: Bush, George W., policy, 35–6, on Taiwan, 40; Clinton policy, 37–8; policy of engagement, 36–9; rapprochement with China in 1972, 110–11; US–Japan mutual defense treaty, 60

Index US Department of Defense, Chinese capability to take over Taiwan, 225 (n14) US Department of State, reviewed apology to Falun Gong, 103 US Energy Information Administration, 114 US–Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines, 94, 134 Vietnam, 95, 101, 109–10, 117, 183–4, 193, 197 admission to ASEAN, 4 agreements on land borders and Gulf of Tonkin, 203 and low priority to economic growth, 49 and unique history with China, 201 as insular state, 6; low amount of high-level manufactured exports, 137–8 assistance from China in war with US, 109, 227 (n4) China could create havoc in military action, 88 comparison of Chinese and Vietnamese response to reform, 202–3 conflicts over South China Sea and Spratlys, 203–4 expiration of Russian rights in Cam Ranh Bay, 202 has subordinated quarrels with China, 96, 121–2 joined ASEAN in 1995, 162, 202 lifting of US embargo and new trade agreement, 202 reluctant reforms and declining growth rate, 162, 229 (n6) slow pace of normalization with US, 201–2 trade agreement with US, 162 trade with industrialized countries, 218 (n5), 138 use by China of archipelagic principle to define baselines of Paracel Islands, 185

271

US interest in Vietnam, 202 war with US, 25, 32, 48, 59, 111, 145 xenophobia, 162 Wahid, Abdurrahman and nationalist demonstrations, 223 (n41) discussion of overseas Chinese issue in Beijing, 126 elected for 5-year term, 155 erratic leadership and impeachment, 155–6 improved Indonesia’s relations with China and Russia, 120 set up West Pacific Forum, 230 (n10) signed statement on bilateral cooperation with Beijing, 230 (n9) Waltz, Kenneth, 226 (n22) and lack of US restraint, 220 (n15) Wanandi, Jusuf, 230 (n15) overseas Chinese network is myth, 228 (nn15, 6) Watthanachai Wutthisire, 230 (n11) West Papua, 182 aspirations for independence, 46 festering regional problem, 155–6 Whiting, Allen lack of Chinese attempt to understand Japan, 118 Mischief Reef and domestic considerations, 230 (n14) Wilkinson, David, 21–2 Wilsonian, Woodrow ideas of self-determination, 115 legacy, 221 (n17), 27 Wolfowitz, Paul D., on terrorism in Southeast Asia, 46 World War I, 79 World War II, 89, 145 WTO and US multilateral commitments, 51 China membership in, 20 effect of China’s admission to, 67

272 Index Xinjiang, 96 attempt to loosen Chinese hold on, 55 Yan Xuetong China as rising power, 14, 58 Yang Shangkun, 190 Yeo, George foreign investment in subregion, 48 on founding of ASEAN, 229 (n8) Yue, Chia Siow, US role in international financial crises, 222 (n34) Zhejiang Province, and reform, 74 Zhou Enlai

and Bandung Conference, 110 and preferred international system, 93 Zhu Rongji, 66 China’s hope for stable and prosperous ASEAN, 119 visited China, 190 ZOPFAN and subregional autonomy, 9 as ‘ideal type’ of ASEAN’s aspirations, 170–1 Indonesia’s conception of, 183 Zoellick, Robert US Trade Representative for Bush administration, 222 (n25) views on China and Japan, 221 (n24)