THE UNFINISHED WAR: KOREA
THE UNFINISHED WAR: KOREA Bong Lee
Algora Publishing New York
© 2003 by Algora Publishin...
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THE UNFINISHED WAR: KOREA
THE UNFINISHED WAR: KOREA Bong Lee
Algora Publishing New York
© 2003 by Algora Publishing. All Rights Reserved. www.algora.com No portion of this book (beyond what is permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the United States Copyright Act of 1976) may be reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form, or by any means, without the express written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 0-87586-217-9 (softcover) ISBN: 0-87586-218-7 (hardcover) Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Lee, Bong. The unfinished war : Korea / by Bong Lee p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-87586-217-9 (soft : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-87586-218-7 (hard cover : alk. paper) 1. Korean War, 1950-1953. 2. Korea—History—1945- I. Title: Korea. II. Title. DS918.L392 2003 951.904'2—dc21 2003007791
Front Cover:
Courtesy National Archives, photo no. 111-SC-354789 LST takes in a load of North Korean refugees at Hungnam, North Korea on December 12, 1950. — This is how author’s family and some 90,000 other North Koreans, trapped in the Hanhung-Hungnam area, escaped.
Printed in the United States
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface
1
1. THUS I T BEGAN
3
Korea, the Hermit Kingdom
5
Korean Nationalists
7
2 . THE LEE FAMILY UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire — World War II 3. THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING
17 19 23
Kim Il Sung Makes an Entrance
27
4. AMERICANS IN SOUTH KOREA
29
5. NORTH KOREANS DISCOVER COMMUNISM
39
6. CHAOS IN SOUTH KOREA
49
MacArthur in Japan
57
7. PRELUDE TO A HOT WAR
61
8. ON A RAINY SUNDAY ACROSS THE 38TH PARALLEL
73
Reactions of Washington
78
9. THE ROK ARMY ON THE BRINK OF DISINTEGRATION
83
MacArthur in Suwon
86
Tactical Errors All Around
88
10. AN UGLY WAR
91
11. THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS
101
12. MAO’S THOUGHT IN BEIJING
123
13. THE INCHON LANDING AND ITS AFTERMATH
131
14. CHINESE TRAPS
143
15. A BRAND NEW BALL GAME
159
VII
16. REFUGEE STORIES
171
The Plight of Refugees and Massacres of Innocent Civilians 17. AN OLD SOLDIER FADES AWAY, A NEW ONE STEPS IN
180 185
18. THE WAY WE SURVIVED THE WAR
193
19. A TALKING WAR
199
20. THE TORTUOUS PATH TO ARMISTICE AGREEMENT
215
21. SOUTH KOREA AFTER THE CEASEFIRE
233
Two Schoolgirls
239
22. NORTH KOREA NOW
247
23. OLD WAR, NEW CRISIS
257
The Nuclear Weapons Development Program
257
The Sunshine Policy
267
Military Provocations
269
What Next
273
Index
277
VIII
PREFACE I was a teenager in 1950 when one of the most atrocious wars in history started in Korea. Some memories are better forgotten. But in 1997, I had the urge to revisit that bewildering war. I was impressed to see how many new facts have come into the public domain after the declassification of some Korean War-related documents in the U.S., and some formerly classified documents that trickled out of Russia; and there were several new books published in South Korea exposing the dark side of war. When I left South Korea in 1961 to study in New York, censorship was still in force; all the new materials and fresh perspectives piqued my interest. However, most books in English do not provide Korean perspectives. The background to the War usually seems cryptic, and the narrative ends abruptly with the signing of ceasefire documents in 1953. I decided to write a book that fills these gaps and provides a cross-cultural perspective, reflecting the latest available documentary evidence and, at the same time, incorporating the experiences of my own family and other Koreans who lived through the war. Prior to starting my research for the book, I had spent over twenty years in different Asian countries working for the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations, and the Ford Foundation. Most of this time was spent studying countries, and appraising and post evaluating the success and failure of economic development projects — their causes, costs, benefits, and lessons for the future. It did not take me long to realize that even evaluating the successes and failures of the Korean War would not be simple because the allies (South Korea, the U.S., and European allies) had different objectives, and these
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The Unfinished War objectives shifted in the middle of the war from stopping the Communist invasion of South Korea to a total victory by invading North Korea. Furthermore, the Korean War was part of a larger war, the Cold War, in which the objective of the U.S. was to stop the spread of Communism. However, this book is not an academic research work designed to show who won the war or who started it. I have simply tried to present the time, the war, and the people by sharing the concrete, personal realities as I and others in the book experienced them and as I found them in the historical record. I have tried to show human sides of the war as well as the military, diplomatic, and political sides. The book provides extensive accounts of the events leading up to the war and examines the new kind of war that started immediately after the ceasefire agreement was signed. It puts into perspective recent developments such as President Bush’s remark on the “axis of evil,” North Korea’s nuclear weapons development program, and the rise of anti-American sentiments in South Korea. The book might offend some American readers — on the left as well as the right, but it presents the truth as I see it. Although I have ventured to offer my own views and interpretations here and there, in most cases, facts and events speak for themselves. I would like to acknowledge and thank my siblings, relatives, and other Koreans for sharing their stories as soldiers, prisoners of war, and refugees. A particular mention needs to be made to my elder brother, Dr. Simon (Jong Koo) Lee, M.D., who wrote a significant portion of the manuscript on the accounts of the war that he and his classmates experienced as students, soldiers and refugees both in the North and the South. I am also indebted to many historians and veterans who have provided rich accounts of the Korean War.
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1. THUS IT BEGAN On a Sunday morning, June 25, 1950, I was thirteen years old, and was at my school in Hamhung, North Korea, cleaning the schoolyard. I had closecropped black hair like any other Korean schoolboy. People who knew my family told me that I had fair skin just like my mother. Because of my fair skin and soft facial features, a classmate teased me that I looked like the princess in a play that the whole class had seen together several days before. I did not appreciate the comparison, and got into a bit of a scuffle with him. I am not sure why I was cleaning the schoolyard that day in particular, but I was often asked to do it, especially on Sundays. My family was Catholic, and my parents thought that the school wanted to keep me away from church. The North Korean Constitution provided for religious freedom as well as the freedom of speech but, as in so many other things, that seems to have been stated for the benefit of the outside world, not for us. On that morning, the yard was spotlessly clean. I just pretended to pick up some loose gravel. About 10:00 a.m., I noticed several people talking to each other around the bulletin board that stood beside the school gate, to display government announcements. Most times, the school caretaker just pasted newspapers on the board and the people hardly noticed them. The gathering in front of the bulletin board that morning was unusually large, and I had never seen people actually stand there, talking. I decided to take a look, and sidled up beside the adults; I squeezed in and, standing on my toes, read the notice. The news released that morning by the government was indeed something to talk about. “In the early morning of June 25, the South Korean Puppet armies
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The Unfinished War crossed the 38th parallel [separating the two Koreas], penetrating between 1 to 2 km north of the 38th parallel. The People’s Democratic Government of Korea [North Korean Government] ordered the border guards to repulse Rhee’s Puppet armies immediately.” The North Korean official news warned ominously, “The Puppet Government will have to bear the sole responsibility for this unprovoked attack.” Later on the same day, however, another bulletin was posted, indicating, “The Border Guard and the Inmin-gun [the People’s Army] repulsed the invading Puppet armies, and have advanced between 5 and 10 km to the south of the 38th parallel.” This was certainly a quick turn of events. That is how the war started for me. I was confused, and a little alarmed. Could this be true? Only a few days before, I had overheard my father, Dr. Myung Hoon Lee, a professor of medicine at the Hamhung Medical School, talk about a South Korean broadcast in which a South Korean Army general by the name of Kim Suk-won boasted, “If the South Korean Army decided to attack North Korea, we would have breakfast in Sariwon, lunch in Pyongyang [the North Korean capital], and dinner in Sinuiju [northwestern city on the bank of the Yalu River bordering China].” While I was trying to digest all this, my father and elder brother Simon [his Christian name], a young man of seventeen years, were listening to the one and only radio broadcast in North Korea. My “reactionary” father received the first announcement on the war with elation, thinking that the unification of Korea was finally near, but when he heard the second report, he was in disbelief. These announcements heralded the start of a war. At this time Simon was enthusiastically looking forward to college. He was the best student and all-around athlete in his class. His entrance to a good college was assured; the only but significant blemish on his resume was that his father was a member of the intelligentsia, not of the proletariat. The children of proletarian families had the first pick of schools. The bourgeois had no chance, but the children of the intelligentsia had some. In any case, a deadly shooting war had begun in which millions would soon be embroiled. America decided to intervene in the war, and it would eventually result in some 136,937 casualties including 25,801 deaths — over 30,000 according to the casualty-count of the U.S. Department of Defense. South Korea suffered a staggering 257,000 military casualties and 860,000 civilian casualties. Over a half million houses were incinerated or blasted by bombs, and four million refugees abandoned their homes to cross the battle lines with nothing but what they could carry in their hands and on their backs.
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1. Thus It Began Who started such a reckless war between fellow countrymen? Most people have decided that the Communists started the war. However, there is still considerable debate as to who precipitated the conflict; and at least in two countries, inquiries into such a question are hazardous. The Los Angeles Times (February 3, 2002) reported that a Hong Kong-based historian was sentenced to thirteen years in prison for releasing classified papers indicating that the Communist side invaded South Korea first. The world is accustomed to hearing such outrageous stories coming out of the Republic of China (PRC) from time to time; it is still a Communist state and an ally of North Korea. However, it may surprise most people that some Americans and South Koreans believe that the Communists did not start the war. Leftist American journalist I. F. Stone published a book (The Hidden Story of the Korean War) in 1952, speculating that President Syngman Rhee, the first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), deliberately provoked North Korea to a war so that the U.S. would come to the rescue and defeat the Communists. Some South Korean leftists have come up with similar theories. Then there is the familiar accusation that the U.S. government provoked the war deliberately to benefit the “military-industrial complex” and the U.S. economy; and the respected American historian Bruce Cumings has also said that North Korea did not start the war. Why did the war start and why did the U.S. get entangled in it? Obviously, war would not have broken out if Korea had not been divided into North and South by the superpowers. However, the role of superpowers in Korea has deeper roots than most people realize.
KOREA, THE HERMIT KINGDOM The first contact between the U.S. and Korea goes back to the time of gunboat diplomacy in the 19th century when Western warships prowled the coasts of Africa and Asia in search of trade — if not a colony. Korea was known as the Hermit Kingdom because of its stubborn resistance to open the door to foreign trade. China had reluctantly opened her door to the British after the Opium War (1839–42). Commodore Matthew Perry and his “black ship” persuaded Japan to open up in 1853–54. However, Korea managed to keep the foreign powers out for decades longer.
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The Unfinished War The British and French sent gunboats demanding that Korea open its ports, but they withdrew after small skirmishes with Korean defenders. Western historians called Korea’s closed-door policy xenophobic, but Korea had its reasons. Although Korea did not have historical reasons to fear Western warships, it feared the West’s culture as well as its military power. The Confucian scholars who ruled the Chosun Kingdom, also known as the Yi Dynasty, saw nothing good that could come from opening up to the “barbarians” who dug up their sacred ancestral tombs in search of loot and tried to spread the religion of “devil worship,” as Christianity was called at that time. To the Confucians, desecration of ancestral graves was execrable, heinous conduct; and commerce, trade and industry were of little value to them because they were entirely preoccupied with moral issues and the maintenance of the social hierarchy. It was in 1866 that America first attempted to open Korea for trade. The American merchant schooner General Sherman sailed up the Taedong River from the Yellow Sea to the present North Korean capital of Pyongyang. If Korea had opened her arms and signed a treaty with the U.S., as Japan had done twelve years earlier, it is conceivable that Korea — like Japan — might have emerged as a modern nation earlier. However, the Korean court and society were not ready for that. Instead, the Koreans who gathered on the bank of the river were shaking their fists. The crew of the General Sherman, consisting of the British, Chinese, and Americans, opened fire against the crowd on the shore. The Koreans destroyed the schooner and killed all the crew. America was outraged. They took revenge in a raid that took place in 1871. Marines landed on the beaches of the west coast island of Kanghwa, which guarded the waterway to Seoul, and attacked several forts defended by Korean “tiger fighters.” The defenders fought ferociously, even with their outdated weapons, but all 650 died in the end. Commander Low was quoted to have said that the Koreans fought back with a courage “rarely equaled or exceeded by any people.” If the raiding party was meant to take revenge against the killing of the crew on board the General Sherman, the objective was achieved; but if it was meant to open up Korea, the mission failed. The Koreans might have taken a measure of pride in fighting off the Americans, but in hindsight, opening their country at this juncture might have saved Korea from decades of humiliation and oppression under the Japanese. In 1876 (only five years after the U.S. Marines withdrew from the Kanghwa Island), Korea’s ancient antagonist Japan came sailing in with her own warships. Just 22
6
1. Thus It Began years after Admiral Perry’s “black ships” opened Japan, she had already built tall warships and was flexing her muscles. Japan demanded that Korea open its ports for trade. King Kojong’s advisors of the Chosun Dynasty (1392–1910) debated the merits and demerits, and thought that this time it was indeed necessary to create an opening to Japan. A Japanese gunboat anchored menacingly at what is now Inchon. Having risen to the throne at age twelve, the king was accustomed to relying on his wife, Queen Min, to attend to the affairs of the kingdom. She was only a year older than her husband, but took a keen interest in the kingdom’s affairs. She opened two of Korea’s ports to Japan in 1876. Japan moved cautiously toward Korea; China was the Chosun Kingdom’s suzerain. An armed invasion of Korea would bring in the Chinese armies. Suzerainty was a convenient relationship for Korea. Once a year, emissaries of the two countries visited one another’s capitals with wagonloads of local products. Chinese emissaries were not allowed to stray from a designated road while traveling between Beijing and Seoul. Yet, because of this suzerainty, Korea could count on China to come to its defense in case Japan or any other country invaded it. In 1894, Queen Min invited China to send troops to counter Japan’s growing interference in Korea’s internal affairs, but the Chinese fleet was decimated by the Japanese Navy in what is known as the Sino-Japanese War of 1894. Queen Min then decided to play Russia against Japan. Russia coveted Korea’s warm-water ports giving direct access to the Pacific. Russia’s port, Vladivostok, froze over during the winter. Japan then decided to take on Russia. Ito Hirobumi (1841–1909), mastermind of the Japanese strategy, had conceived of a Japanese Pacific empire long ago while he was studying in Europe. Like many of his ancestors, Ito was convinced that the stepping-stone for Japan’s invasion of the Asian continent had to be Korea. He knew that Russia was an obstacle to his master plan, and Queen Min’s diplomatic maneuvering had to be stopped.
KOREAN NATIONALISTS The growing domination of Japan and the assassination of Queen Min gave rise to the Korean nationalists movement. Among those who resisted the Japanese, three persons stand out because of their lasting impact on Korean
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The Unfinished War history including the Korean War. In fact, their thoughts survived the Korean War and their death; and are still in the hearts and minds of the Koreans today. They are Syngman Rhee, Kim Ku, and Kim Il Sung. Rhee was born in 1875, a year before Korea opened its two ports to Japan. Rhee was born in an impoverished yangban family.1 Yangban, which literally translates to “two elite classes,” consisted of the literary and military elites during the Yi dynasty. Anyone could become yangban by passing competitive state examinations that were open to all, but during the latter period of the Yi dynasty, most yangban inherited the status from their ancestors. Rhee was nineteen when he was exposed to Christianity, which had by then made significant inroads in Korea. He entered the Paijai Academy (founded by the American Methodist Mission) to learn English. The principal and teachers were American missionaries. Once there, he was fascinated with democracy and the Western history and within a year, he was editing a student newspaper. Under the influence of the Western teachers, Rhee wrote about the need for political and social changes, reformed monarchy, and even the emancipation of women. In 1895, he was shocked by the assassination of Queen Min. The king’s life was spared but he was placed under virtual arrest, and the Japanese installed a pro-Japanese cabinet. Rhee was outraged and took part in an attempted coup d’etat against the pro-Japanese cabinet, and became a wanted man. The reform of the monarchy became secondary goal to getting rid of the Japanese influence from Korea. Eventually, he was arrested and sent to prison, at the age of 22, and ended up spending seven year in prison. In 1904, Japan mounted a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur (Dalian, China), in what is known as the RussoJapanese War. Japan emerged victorious. A faction of the Korean government realized that Korea could no longer maintain a semblance of independence by playing Russia off Japan. It released Rhee from prison for a mission to the U.S. His mission was to invoke the U.S.-Korea Friendship Treaty signed in 1885 to ward off Japan’s growing domination over Korea. It was a long shot at best but now that China and Russia had both failed to protect Korea, America was the next possible protector for Korea. Rhee was considered a good candidate for the
1. Robert R. Oliver, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth (New York: Dodd Mead and Company, 1955), hereafter “Oliver.”
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1. Thus It Began mission because of his command of English, and connections with U.S. missionaries who might be able to help him in the endeavor. Little funding was available for such a dubious mission, and Rhee was given just enough to travel to Kobe, Japan. Once there, he solicited the Korean community, sympathetic to Korean independence, for funds so that he could travel to San Francisco. He raised more money there, and went on to Washington, D.C. Bruce Cumings provides many revealing insights into the context in which the mission was launched.2 The U.S. had no particular interest in saving Korea from Japanese colonialism. Roosevelt’s main objective in Asia was to maintain U.S. control over the Philippines, which the U.S. took from Spain after the Spanish-American War of 1898. Roosevelt admired the Japanese and accepted his advisers’ judgment that the Koreans were “unfit” for self-government. According to Cumings, most Americans supported Japan’s colonization of Korea. One “progressive” wrote that Japan was a “rising star of human selfcontrol and enlightenment,” and that the Chinese and the Koreans were “horrid” races. Another person called Japan the “enlightened, anointed bearer of white civilization” in the curious guise of a “yellow people.” After defeating Russia, there was nothing to stop Japan from a complete takeover of Korea. On November 17, 1905, Ito forced the Protectorate Treaty on the Korean ministers, at gunpoint. Koreans denounced it bitterly as fraud. The means by which Japan took over Korea created a generation of anti-Japanese Koreans. Several high-ranking officials committed suicide. In the U.S., Rhee managed to see President Theodore Roosevelt at Oyster Bay in the summer of 1905. Roosevelt listened politely, but at the end of the meeting, he said, “I will be glad to do everything I can on behalf of your country, but such a request must come through the official diplomatic channels,” that is, from the Japanese embassy. Rhee’s mission had failed. After all, this was the age of colonialism and the U.S. had her own flirtation with the European invention. In fact, after the Russo-Japanese War, a diplomatic note (the Taft-Katsura Agreement) was exchanged between the U.S. and Japan, in which the U.S. recognized Japanese interests in Korea and southern China in exchange for Japan not challenging the U.S. in the Philippines. Neither the Koreans nor
2. Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997), pp. 141-154, hereafter Cumings.
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The Unfinished War American missionaries who tried to help Rhee’s diplomatic mission had any inkling about this. After Rhee's failed mission, the Methodist Mission Board, which had been helping Rhee to establish contact with government officials, offered to support his education in the U.S. For the following five years, Rhee studied theology at George Washington University, earned a master’s degree in history and political science at Harvard, and received a Ph.D. in political science at Princeton. He thus became the first Korean to receive his doctoral degree in the U.S. In 1910, Korea was formally annexed to Japan. This was the end of the 600year Yi dynasty. After the annexation and the failed nationwide independence movement on March 1, 1919, many Korean patriots left Korea and established the Korean Provisional Government (KPG) in the French Concession of Shanghai. Dr. Rhee was elected president of the KPG in absentia. It was at this time that the Korean nationalists began to be split between those like Rhee, who favored expelling the Japanese through diplomatic efforts, and others who favored the use of force.3 Kim Ku4 was another patriot galvanized by Japanese aggression. Although he ended up in the KPG, his path was entirely different from Rhee’s. Kim was born a commoner. As a youth, he failed in his ambition to pass the examination and become a yangban.5 Then he joined the Tonghakt movement (its religious doctrine combined certain aspects of Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Catholicism) and became one of the rebel leader. The founder wished not only to spread his doctrine but also to establish a nation based on it in the southwestern part of Korea. The government naturally saw this as a seditious movement and squashed it. He then When Japanese soldiers murdered Queen Min in 1896, Kim Ku went on a one-man mission to avenge her death and, at an inn at Inchon, he attacked and killed a Japanese man (whom he suspected was one of the killers), and then drank his blood in full view of a crowd of bystanders. This Japanese spoke 3. Yi Tong Whi, who fled to Manchuria after the disbanding of the Korean Army, became the first defense minister of the KPG and later its premier. He tried to fill the high positions in the KPG with his fellow Communists and favored military action with Soviet backing. 4. His biography was prepared by Do Jin Sul, based on Kim Ku’s diaries: Baikbum Ilji (Seoul: Dolbegae, 1997). 5. His family could not afford to hire a good tutor or to buy brushes and rice paper. Although the yangban class was technically open to all, the system favored those who had money.
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1. Thus It Began Korean with a discernible accent, and he was dressed as a Korean but hid a Japanese long sword under his robe. The victim turned out to be Lieutenant Suchida of the Japanese army. Whether or not he had anything to do with the assassination of Queen Min was never established. The Japanese at that time had extraterritorial rights, and while the Japanese police pretended to make an effort to apprehend the killer(s), they quietly allowed the case to go cold. After the killing, Kim Ku asked the innkeeper to bring him paper and a brush. He wrote down his name and address for the police. He wanted to make a political statement. They showed up about three months later and arrested him. The police interrogated and tortured him; Kim fainted three times but refused to open his mouth. One day, the time to make a statement had arrived. Here was a Korean who was rumored to have killed a Japanese officer with his bare hands, then to have drunk the Japanese blood and eaten a ton of rice after the killing. Many people came out to watch the trial. A police interrogator asked, “Did you kill a Japanese at Chiha-po [the old name for Inchon]?” Kim replied, “I killed a Japanese in retaliation for the murder of the nation’s mother.” This sent a shock wave throughout the entire interrogation room. Kim Ku was being tried as a common murderer rather than as a political assassin. When a Japanese policeman asked his translator what was going on, Kim Ku cursed him, shouting, “You, Japanese bastard! Does the Treaty of Friendship permit the Japanese to kill the Korean queen? I will kill your emperor and every last Japanese. If I am not alive, my ghost will kill your emperor!” In view of the serious political implications, the interrogators stopped the trial and sent a messenger to the commissioner to take over. When the trial resumed, Kim spoke directly to Commissioner Yi Jaechung, saying, “I killed a Japanese because I was ashamed of my shadow in broad daylight. While they killed our mother, I have not heard any Korean talk about killing the Japanese emperor. You are now wearing a mourning costume, but have you not read Confucius’s Chunchu Daeui? If you have not avenged the death of your king, you do not wear a mourning costume. How could you serve the king if you look after your own position, power, and wealth first?” Apparently, Commissioner Yi Jae-chung was taken aback, although he had a job to do. The trial was adjourned. During the investigation period that followed, Kim Ku was treated with deference. Many Inchon citizens brought food and drink to his jail room. One rich and influential Korean went bankrupt
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The Unfinished War after making several appeals to the Korean court on his behalf. However, after full investigation, Kim Ku was sentenced to death; but on the day of his execution, King Kojong’s adviser noted the unusual nature of the case and the king intervened to stay the execution. Contrary to the expectations of some people, however, Kim was not released. After two years, not seeing any change in his legal status, he broke out of the prison and lived under a false name. On March 1, 1919, Kim Ku was asked to join in a nationwide movement declaring the independence of Korea from Japan. Korean nationalists had drafted a Declaration of Independence patterned after the American version. The decision to declare independence was inspired by President Woodrow Wilson’s famous assertion of the right to self-determination for national groups (at the Peace Conference for drafting of the Treaty of Versailles). Around the same time, Lenin also called on the world to support independence movements among the “oppressed peoples” of the world. Koreans believed that the claim to independence would put international pressure on Japan. Nearly two million students, ordinary people and Christians joined in the independence march. Japan took note, firing into a group of Koreans singing Christian hymns. Later, Christian leaders were nailed to wooden crosses and left to die slowly so that they could “go to heaven,” as the Japanese scoffed. Mounted policemen beheaded young schoolchildren. The police burned down churches. The official count of casualties was about 500 killed, 1,400 injured and 13,000 arrested. Korean estimates were much higher: over 7,500 deaths, about 15,000 injured and 45,000 arrested. The world was appalled and foreign nations, including the U.S., withdrew their diplomatic missions from Seoul. However, nobody was willing to go beyond such a diplomatic protest. Korean patriots left Korea and dispersed to different parts of the world. Kim Ku, having few illusions by this time, did not even participate in the march. He went to Shanghai to join the Korean Provisional Government (KPG). His first position in the KPG was as Chief of Police. After the KPG split into proCommunist and non-Communist factions, Kim Ku was approached by General Yi to join his socialist revolutionary group, but Kim refused, not necessarily on ideological ground but because he did not like the idea of receiving directives from Lenin. After the departure of Yi Tong Whi and Rhee, Kim Ku emerged as the leader of the much-diminished KPG. The armed resistance against the Japanese was shifting to the pro-Soviet faction of nationalists in Manchuria and
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1. Thus It Began Siberia. Ironically, Yi Tong Whi was assassinated by a Communist in Vladivostok. Kim Ku, with few men and weapons to fight the Japanese, decided to concentrate on assassinating key Japanese figures. The first major strike was delivered by a patriotic young man by the name of Yi Bong Chan, who was dispatched to Tokyo with a bomb. Yi threw the bomb at a car carrying the Japanese emperor, but the bomb was too weak to blow up the car. Attempts were also made against Baron Tanaka, who had drawn up a blueprint to conquer the world, and the first Japanese Governor-General of Korea. One of the most successful operations involved Yun Bong-Gil. On April 28, 1932, he threw a bomb at a group of Japanese generals and dignitaries in a victory ceremony staged in Hingkew Park. A Chinese munitions factory made the bomb; this time, they made sure it was strong enough to avoid another embarrassment. Several Japanese generals were killed and scores of others were wounded, including the Japanese minister to China, General Shirakawa. (This is where he lost his leg, so that on board the U.S. warship Missouri in 1945, he had to limp as he walked to sign the surrender document. By that time, he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs.) Dr. Rhee disapproved of such tactics and thought they would play into the Japanese propaganda that Koreans needed to be held in strict subjugation. From Honolulu, he sent a confidential message ordering that such activities be discontinued. Rhee received reluctant assurances in response. However, Koreans needed a release from oppression and found terrorism one of the few means at their disposal. The bombing incident inspired the Korean community, and financial support poured in. However, the Japanese reprisal was swift and relentless. Kim Ku became a credible nationalist in the eyes of the Chinese, who fought the Japanese invaders. Chiang Kai-shek welcomed Kim’s group in Nanjing. Kim Ku formed a Korean Liberation Army of several hundred men to fight the Japanese. In 1941, the KPG declared war on Japan. In 1942, he formally asked China, the U.S. and Britain to recognize the KPG. In 1943, Kim Ku formed a special-forces unit of the Liberation Army in conjunction with a detachment of the U.S. Office of Strategic Service in China. While the mission was in the planning stages, Japan surrendered. For all his activities, Kim Ku was called “The Assassin” by the Japanese and later by Americans, although he is known as a nationalist to Koreans. According
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The Unfinished War to young South Koreans today, he is the most respected figure in the history of Korea. Compared to Rhee or Kim Ku, Kim Il Sung, who later became known as the “Great Leader” of North Korea, was relatively unknown. As the American historian Joseph Goulden notes in his excellent book Korea: The Untold Story of the War, the original material had “the inherent credibility of, say, 1930s Hollywood fan magazines.”6 There are many biographies of Kim Il Sung in Korean, of course; the problem is how to find one’s way through the maze of blatant propaganda. This much we know: Kim Il Sung was born in April 1912, in a rural area outside Pyongyang. His original name was Kim Song-joo; he adopted the name of Kim Il Sung, a legendary guerilla leader who was much older than him. The original Kim Il Sung was about 30 years older than Kim Song-joo/Kim Il Sung. The young Kim Il Sung was a relatively minor guerilla leader in the period under discussion.7 According to one account, he was said to have scored his biggest victory in 1940. His force of about 250 men at its peak virtually wiped out a Japanese Special Police unit of 70 men commanded by Lieutenant Maeda Takeshi. Japanese newspapers treated the incident as no more than a skirmish between a small band of outlaws and the police. Most of the “bandits” were captured, and the remainder of them fled north, according to the Japanese source. The Kim Il Sung’s band of guerillas was part of a Chinese and North Korean partisan group known as the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army. In the mid-1930s, there were some 30,000 of them in the Army. By 1941, however, most of the partisan fighters had been destroyed. In March 1941, General Nozoe of the Japanese Army declared the end of the war against the anti-Japanese guerrillas in Manchuria and disbanded his unit. Nozoe claimed to have eliminated some 15,000 Chinese and Korean guerrillas from 1932 to 1941. Kim Il Sung and his remnants were the survivors that fled to Siberia. On March 15, 1941, the Soviets conscripted Kim Il Sung and his men into the 88th Special Independent Guerrilla Brigade of the Soviet Red Army, with the task of gathering military intelligence in Manchuria. Kim Il Sung ended up commanding the 1st Battalion, consisting of about 200 men, mostly Chinese, with about 60 Koreans. 6. Joseph C. Goulden, Korea: The Untold Story of the War (New York: Times Books, 1982), p.11, hereafter Goulden. 7. Robert Scalopino and Chong-Sik Lee, Communism in Korea: The Movement (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1972), p. 228, hereafter Scalopino and Lee.
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1. Thus It Began According to high-ranking North Korean defector Hwang Jang-yop,8 Kim Il Sung used to talk about his battles with the Japanese as a modest effort, “better than doing nothing.”9 Early on, when he spoke of his past in a more humble and credible way, Kim Il Sung acknowledged that he had served under the Soviet Army; but later on, when the cult of Kim Il Sung began to be created, even such a fact was denied. North Korean playwrights wanted to assert a linear, homogeneous evolution of his family from the mythical king Tangun some 5000 years ago10 to the present day. Kim Il Sung considered that his service under the Russian army and the birth of his son Kim Jong Il in Russia were blemishes that had to be erased.
8. Hwang was the former secretary of the North Korean Worker’s Party in charge of international affairs and was ideological secretary to Kim Il Sung before his defection to South Korea in 1997. 9. Hwang Jang-yop, Euduun-ui Pyon-e Dwen Hatbyol-un Euduum-ul Balkil-su Upda (in Korean only, The Sunshine That Became Part of Darkness Cannot Bring Light to The Darkness) (Seoul: Wolgan Chosun Sa, 2001), hereafter Hwang. 10. According to Samguk yusa (Memorabilia of the Three Kingdoms), compiled by 13th century Chinese historian Iryon, the Korean kingdom unfolded when a son of the Emperor in heaven descended on the Korean peninsula and married a woman who turned human from a she-bear and gave birth to Tangun. To Iryon, who was a Buddhist monk, there might not have been anything unnatural in an animal becoming human. His text is the source of most of the legends of ancient Korea.
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2. THE LEE FAMILY UNDER JAPANESE OCCUPATION Korean families can trace their lineages for many generations because most clans maintain books of genealogy (jokbo). My grandfather, 14 generations removed from a king, owned a medium-sized farm in a village called Seosan, in the South Chungchong Province. Kings’ descendants are numerous in Korea, although not all Lees are descendants of Yi dynasty kings. (Yi is another spelling for Lee.) One of his ancestors had converted to Catholicism and moved to this remote countryside to avoid religious persecution.11 Although not all Yi dynasty kings persecuted Christians, one wave of persecution in 1866 killed over eight thousand Catholics who refused to denounce Jesus. This was about half of the Korean Catholics at that time. After primary school, my father wanted to go to Seoul to receive his secondary education, but few families could afford to send a second son away for schooling; and in any case he was needed to attend to the farming. However, he was a top student and had no intention of spending the rest of his life in the paddy fields, so he took some pocket money and made his way to Seoul, by foot, oxcart and train.
11. One highly controversial issue at the time was the chesa ceremony, which involved paying annual visits to ancestral graves to offer food and drinks, and spending time at the grave. Korean Catholics inquired of the Bishop in China whether they could participate in the chesa rites; he considered them to be against the First Commandment: “Thou shalt have no other gods before Me.” Confucian scholars and government officials, often one and the same, perceived this anti-chesa ruling as a threat to the moral foundation of Korean Confucian society.
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The Unfinished War Once in Seoul, he showed up at the dormitory of a Catholic Church. The priest listened to the young man, and opened the door. Apparently, he was talented and determined. After his secondary school, he was one of only ten Korean students to be admitted to the Medical School of the Imperial University. This was the only university at that time. Originally, the university was established for the Japanese living in Korea, but they began to admit a small number of gifted Korean students each year with the advent of the so-called Enlightened Administration.12 Mostly children of rich and privileged families entered the university, but father was neither. He completed the six-year medical school with money he earned by tutoring children of rich Korean families. During the Japanese occupation, farmers were losing ground in every sense. Taxes took an average of half their crops. Many small farmers were forced to abandon their farms; almost half of Korean farmers had to become either tenant farmers or “fire-field people” who burned forest, planted crops, and moved on when the soils are exhausted of nutrients. Japanese became large landlords. Many Korean farmers lost their land when they failed to respond quickly to a nationwide land ownership survey (cadastre) conducted by the Japanese authority. Mother’s maiden name was Oh; her given name was Boon Yong, which translates to “outraged” — a strange name for a woman. Her mother had given birth to daughter after daughter, and she was the fifth in a row. Her father thought that by showing his indignation through his daughter’s name, his luck would change. Boon Yong’s father was a rich landlord in Hwang Gan in South Chungcheong Province and had a large house with three gates in the Kahwaedong district of Seoul, where some of the richest Koreans lived. My father was hired to tutor Boon Yong and her siblings, especially her brother. Boon Yong fell in love. Luckily, her father also had an eye on the young student from the Imperial University. He was not a yangban but had a promising future ahead of him as a doctor. This is how they met. He thought that perhaps the rich father-in-law might help him open a medical practice after his graduation. That did not actually come to pass, as Confucian traditions encourage families to support their sons and send their
12. This “Enlightened” ploy was a result of the strong international condemnation of Japan for the way it brutally suppressed the nonviolent March One Independence Movement.
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2. The Lee Family Under Japanese Occupation daughters away to join other families. Boon Yong had a surprise, too — she discovered, after the wedding, that father had married young, in the village, before, and had children. This was a shock, although for a man to have a second or even a third wife was common at that time. However, father had gone through a civil divorce, which was enough for Boon Yong.
OUT OF THE FRYING PAN, INTO THE FIRE — WORLD WAR II Upon his graduation, Dr. Lee worked as an assistant professor at the Medical College in Daegu, and then took a job as director of the Ear, Nose and Throat (ENT) Department of a new general hospital in Sariwon. That is where we were living in 1941, when Japan bombed Pearl Harbor. My brother Simon was ten years old and I was five. My sister Hyon-ja was seven and our youngest brother, Hyo-ku, was two. In 1942, everyone in town was offered a free pair of rubber shoes; I heard that it was to celebrate the conquest of Malaya by the Japanese Army. In hindsight, it was the high point of the Pacific War, from the Japanese point of view. As the war dragged on, rice and sugar were rationed. During the last years of the Pacific War, Japan was preparing for the fight to the last man, and even Korean school children were being prepared for it. Gradually, it became clear that the war was not going well for Japan. All the classes, including second graders like me, were led to a mountain at the outskirts of the city for several days. This time, it was not a class picnic; they worked to cut down pine trees and extract roots and knots. Oil from pine roots was used to clean airplane engines. During these months, it seems, Japan was running out of fuel and war materials, and there were other signs that Japan might soon lose the war. Some Korean men went looking for work and some others were drafted in the Japanese Army. Young women also left for Japan to work in factories and hospitals, but it later became known that they ended up in what the Japanese called Teishintai (comfort women brigades). It was a long time before this shocking news came out, because the women did not talk about their shameful experiences after they returned home. Not only Koreans but also young girls from Taiwan, China and other parts of Asia (with the exception of Japan) were sent to the front to service Japanese soldiers. Korean-American journalist Connie Kang wrote, “As a colonizer, the Japanese were ingenious, petty, determined, and greedy in pursuing their
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The Unfinished War goals[.] Farmers were forced to sell the best crops — fruits, vegetables, and especially Korean rice . . . at artificially low prices to Japan, . . . [then] were ordered to make their rice go far by mixing it with a substance called daedubak, the residue left over after the oil is squeezed out of soybeans, which tasted like saw dust.”13 She goes on to say, “Venereal disease was rampant among Japanese soldiers, so a decision was made to provide them with virgins.” Some girls in Korea dressed like boys and wore farmers’ straw hats when they went outdoors. Although abductions took place mostly in rural areas, everyone was afraid. Altogether, some 100,000 Korean girls were taken away, according to Kang. On August 12, 1945, the Japanese governor of South Pyongyan Province, where Pyongyang is located, listened to a short-wave radio broadcast from San Francisco, which announced that Japanese surrender was imminent.14 The governor decided to contact Cho Man Shik, who was a prominent nationalist in North Korea. Cho had the reputation of being the Korean Gandhi. He had graduated from Meiji University in Japan and was a Christian elder and a political moderate residing in Pyongyang. The Japanese provincial governor was concerned with the safety of the Japanese after the surrender of Japan, and requested Cho to maintain peace and order in the event that Japan surrendered.15 Cho agreed and later created the Security Maintenance Committee for South Pyongan Province. On August 15, Japan surrendered. Most Koreans (including Simon), who heard the Japanese Emperor’s squeaky voice offering his surrender to the Allies in difficult-to-understand Japanese, could not quite understand its immediate implications. They were rather afraid to show their joy, as Japanese police still seemed to be in charge. It was rumored that Soviet forces were rapidly marching south, but they did not enter Sariwon until August 26 or so. Most of the Japanese left the Sariwon area by train. Koreans pulled down Shinto shrines and danced in the streets. In the jubilation that followed, children saw the Korean flag for the first time.
13. Kang, K. Connie, Home was the land of morning CALM: A Saga of a Korean-American Family (Reading, Mass. and elsewhere: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company) 1995, p.56, hereafter Kang. 14. This account, provided originally by Yoshio Morita in 1964, is cited in Scalopino and Lee (1972), p. 314, hereafter Morita. 15. Morita, pp. 182-183, in Scalopino and Lee (1972), p. 314.
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2. The Lee Family Under Japanese Occupation On August 26, the Soviet Military Command announced that the Soviet occupation army would maintain law and order jointly with South Pyongan Province Preparatory Committee under Cho Man Shick. Only two out of 20 members of the committee were Communists and this composition was a fair reflection of the strength of Communists and non-Communists in North Korea at that time.16 Children found out for the first time that there had been Korean alphabets all along, called Hangul, invented several hundred years ago by King Sae-jong the Great of the Yi dynasty. They did not know about this because its use as well as Korean history and flag had been forbidden by the Japanese. In an attempt to eradicate it, leading scholars in the Korean Language Society were arrested on charges of being nationalists and some of them died in prison after torture. Novelists, poets and other creative writers were ordered to produce their works in Japanese, and in the end, the Japanese language was used in the schools. Japan also began to take metal products out of Korea. Over 50 percent of mining production was in gold. In 1936, gold production reached over 17,000 tons a year. The Japanese needed it to buy oil, metal and machinery for the war. Other valuable mineral products taken out of Korea for the war were iron, tungsten, graphite, magnetite and molybdenum. Moreover, as the fighting grew more intense, the Japanese forcibly conscripted more than 700,000 Koreans to work in coal mines and in munitions factories in Japan, as well as to serve as soldiers in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands.
16. This was the view of one of the two Communist committee members, Han Chaedok, who later defected to South Korea. See Scalopino and Lee, p. 315.
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3. THE RUSSIANS ARE COMING Several days later, Koreans in Sariwon saw columns of Russian soldiers coming down Main Street from the north. This was quite a spectacle. The soldiers were covered in dust. Apparently they hadn’t had a change of clothing for some time. Most were on foot, but there were some green trucks with the mark of GMC (no one knew what that stood for). The trucks were part of the war supply given to Russia by Americans under the Lend Lease Act. They were provided to the U.S.S.R — to fight the Germans and the Japanese. Who could have guessed that these would be used by Inmin-gun later to slaughter American soldiers? The Russian soldiers’ reputations preceded them. They were said to be robbing men on the street and raping Korean women. It has been said that most of the Russian 25th army, which came rushing down the Korean peninsula, consisted of previous prisoners kept in Siberia. Toward the end of World War II, the rank and file of the Russian army had been severely depleted,17 and as a result, prisoners were conscripted. Korean women took to men’s disguises again, to avoid being raped. Some Russian soldiers demanded watches from pedestrians and other things. We learned that watches were particularly rare and valuable in the U.S.S.R. Some of the Russians were well educated. One day, a Russian officer, a medical doctor, called on Dr. Lee because there was no one who spoke Russian in the town. It turns out that both doctors spoke German, so they were able to converse. 17. Musashiya, p. 36.
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The Unfinished War The Russian medical officer visited Dr. Lee regularly and discussed the condition of his hospital. The Russian provided some medical supplies that the hospital sorely lacked. The toughest task that the Russians faced in Korea was not fighting the Japanese but dismantling factories, machinery and power plants built by the Japanese, to transport to Russia as war booty. Some three thousand soldiers, trucks and heavy equipment were used at the Supung Hydroelectric Power Plant alone. They also dismantled a steel plant in Chongjin, mining machinery at Gaechun, a high-frequency equipment factory at Sungjin, etc. However, the Russians were careful not to dismantle all the power generators at Supung. Otherwise, much of Korea would have been left in the dark. Koreans did not understand why the Russians were there. If anybody had the right to be in Korea, it was the Americans who had defeated the Japanese. However, most Koreans expected that the fall of Japan would automatically bring about liberation, and independence, to Korea without any foreign occupation forces. The Russian troops moving south stopped at the 38th parallel and the Americans occupied Korea below this line. Koreans did not know the significance of the 38th parallel until much later. An author compared the absurdity of drawing an arbitrary line such as this to a hypothetical situation of drawing the 36th parallel to divide America in half: “It would separate Nashville from Memphis and Oklahoma City from Tulsa. Raleigh-Durham and Greensboro-Winston-Salem would be turned into opposing border cities in the middle of North Carolina.”18 Even more outrageous was the fact that this artificial line drawn without the knowledge of Koreans (let alone their participation) hardened over time. Millions would die because of it. The decision on the 38th parallel was made on August 10, 1945, five days before the Japanese surrendered. The decision flew out of the Yalta Secret Meeting between the U.S. and USSR, in which the U.S. invited the Soviets to fight the Japanese army in Manchuria and Korea in return for certain concessions. President Franklin Roosevelt and others who negotiated the deal seemed not to have had any idea that their action was about to unleash one of the greatest human tragedies in the 20th century. The agreement was classified for a long period, and few Koreans knew about it. Now, most Koreans consider that 18. Pierre Rigoulot in his Introduction to Kang Chol-Hwan and Pierre Rigoulot, Aquariums of Pyongyang (Basic Books: New York, 2001), p. viii, hereafter Kang and Rigoulot.
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3. The Russians Are Coming Roosevelt’s decision showed a callous disregard for the Korean people and a willingness to sacrifice a small nation in the interest of saving the lives of American soldiers. The irony is the Russian army did not even make a move until after the first atomic bomb was dropped on August 6, 1945, and the Japanese military retreated in panic. At that time, the nearest American soldiers were on Okinawa, about 600 miles from the Korean peninsula. The U.S. wanted to stop the Soviet advance before it reached the southern end of the peninsula. The Yalta Conference did not specify how far south the Soviet army should march, only that there should be a trusteeship government involving the U.S. and the USSR to rule Korea for a period of time. John J. McCloy of the War and Navy Coordinating Committee directed two young colonels, Dean Rusk and Charles H. Bonesteel, to find a place to stop the Soviets. They did not even have a Korean map, let alone any knowledge of Korean geography or history. They had in their possession a Far East map. The 38th parallel appeared to be a fair division in terms of the landmass involved. Rusk and Bonesteel reported to their boss that the Soviets should be told to stop at the 38th parallel, and the Soviets did so. Thus the infamous 38th parallel was drawn. (See Figure 1.) In February, 1945, President Franklin D. Roosevelt did what he thought was in the best interest of the America. The Yalta Conference, where Roosevelt and Stalin met, was held over ten days from February 4–14, 1945. Some historians point out that when Roosevelt sailed to Yalta, he was ill and his brain was partly damaged by a stroke he had suffered the previous summer. According to Frazier Hunt, Roosevelt “was a dying man” and “undependable” with “his already handicapped mind inflamed with grandiose ideas of a World State that he would head.”19 A radical New Dealer, Harry Hopkins, and State Department liberals surrounded him. Even Alger Hiss, a Communist spy skillfully planted in the State Department, was in the party. While Hopkins was not a Communist, he believed in being generous with Stalin so that Stalin would be grateful to the U.S. — all at the expense of other nations, of course.20 In return for the USSR opening a second front against Japan, Roosevelt offered the southern half of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands north of Japan. In addition, it was agreed that Port Arthur (the present Dalian) would be
19. Frazier Hunt, The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur (The Devin-Adair Company: New York, 1954), pp. 379-380. 20. See ibid, pp. 380-81.
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The Unfinished War internationalized and leased to the USSR as a naval base; and the Chinese Eastern Railroad and the South Manchurian Railroad, which provided an outlet to Port Arthur, would be operated by a joint Soviet-Chinese company. The twenty-odd U.S. diplomats gathered at the meeting in 1945 did not question the right of the U.S. to give away parts of China, an ally of the U.S. during the fight against Japan, to the USSR. Whatever American liberalism meant at that time, it was liberal with other countries’ real estate. To give away parts of Japan, which was about to be conquered, would have been a different matter altogether — but why Manchuria?
America’s ally China under Chiang Kai-shek was not even represented at the meeting. Korean nationalists had no idea that such a meeting had been held. It did not concern Korea, on paper; but the involvement of Soviet troops in the
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3. The Russians Are Coming Pacific War turned out to be a matter of life and death for millions of Koreans later on. The meeting was so secret that even General MacArthur, who was in charge of invading Japan, had no idea that such a meeting had taken place.
KIM IL SUNG MAKES AN ENTRANCE Kim Il Sung and his entourage, consisting of about 40 of his former guerrilla fighters, landed at the port of Wonsan onboard the Soviet warship Pugachev a month after the surrender of Japan, on September 19, 1945. About a month later, on October 14, 1945, Kim Il Sung and his Soviet advisers were given a hero’s welcome at the Pyongyang Municipal Stadium. Everyone in the stadium and those who saw the picture of a young Kim Il Sung with senior Russian military officers behind him on the podium understood that he was being anointed as a North Korean leader by the USSR. Rumors were circulating in the town that Kim Il Sung was a major in the Russian Army and was pretending to have been a legendary hero by the name of Kim Il Sung. Such suspicion was natural; most Koreans were expecting a grayhaired man of Syngman Rhee’s age. Instead, here was a young man, about 30 years old, with a Russian military haircut and an ill-fitting Western suit. The natural reaction of the audience was that this was a fake Kim Il Sung. Some people described Kim Il Sung as having a Chinese waiter’s haircut, and others said that he looked like a boxer. Kim first got off a Russian ship wearing a Russian army uniform with the insignia of major or captain. According to a person who wrote several propaganda books for Kim Il Sung before defecting to South Korea, he attached the title of “General” to Kim because he did not know what to call him.21 “Major” was hardly an adequate title for the leader of a nation. The people in the stadium felt cheated, and were angry.22 What Kim Il Sung said on that occasion was also very disappointing to Koreans: He praised the “heroic struggle” of the Red Army for liberating the 30 million Korean people, when everybody knew that it was the Americans who had fought the Japanese island by island and dropped A-bombs on Japan. Kim used extremely servile words in thanking Marshal Stalin. This was not what the people expected to hear from a legendary guerilla fighter against the Japanese army.
21. Han Chae-dok. 22. See O Yong-jinn, Hang-up Jung-un (An Eyewitness) (Posen, 1952), pp. 111-114.
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The Unfinished War Even the Soviets were not sure that Kim could assemble enough supporters to rally North Korea behind the USSR. Given Kim’s limited political experience, they angled to make the veteran Cho Man-sheik the titular head of North Korea. He was not a Communist, but he could be dispensed with in due course just as Leon Trotsky had been. General Romanenko implored Cho to support Moscow and offered him the presidency of North Korea in exchange for his support of Russia. Cho declined. It was no secret that many Korean guerilla fighters, including Kim Il Sung, joined Chinese or Russian armies to fight the Japanese. The enemies of Japan were the friends of Korean nationalists. This was natural gravitation. America was too far away and the Roosevelt Administration was not sympathetic to Korean independence. To the vast majority of the Koreans, however, Communism was a foreign idea. What concerned Koreans most were the Japanese. As the people began to learn about Communism, some four and half million Koreans (about 30 percent of the North Korean population) crossed over the 38th parallel to the south before the Korean War broke out. Contrary to the claims of some liberal historians, this was more than just a handful of landlords who had grudges against the Communists.
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4. AMERICANS IN SOUTH KOREA In South Korea, the 7th Infantry Division of the U.S. 6th Army Corps landed at the port of Inchon on September 8, 1945, and entered Seoul the following day amid what Korean newspapers called a sea of people welcoming the U.S. troops. They celebrated in cities and villages everywhere, shouting, “Mansei!” (“Ten thousand years” or “Long live Korea!”). Maj. General John R. Hodge, the commander of the 6th Army Corps, led the landing party. They were grateful to the Americans for defeating the Japanese and returning Korea to the Koreans. So they thought. On the U.S. Army’s first day in South Korea, however, Koreans received some discouraging news. General Hodge had granted the request of the Japanese Governor General Abe Nobuyuki in Korea to retain his authority over Koreans in order to protect Japanese troops and civilians who had not yet retreated homeward. Goulden said that when dejected Koreans questioned why Hodge was permitting this, he remarked privately that Koreans were “breeds of the same cat as the Japanese.” Historians have said that Hodge was a brilliant battlefield commander, but a tactless man unsuited for delicate diplomacy. Hodge’s claim to his new job in Korea was neither his knowledge of Korea nor his diplomatic skill but that he happened to have been near Korea when Japan fell. From the point of view of Koreans, they were being treated worse than the Japanese, the ones who had been defeated by America. Hodge then quickly set up the U.S. Army Military Government (USAMG). Koreans began to wonder whether they had been liberated or colonized again by a white race with high noses.
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The Unfinished War According to Kang, another of Hodge’s decisions that touched the raw nerves of the Koreans was his orders to his American soldiers not to accept any food from Koreans. Koreans were insulted that Americans refused their hospitality, although Hodge tried to explain that this was because Korea did not have enough food. The Koreans, whose pride was already crippled by the ruthless and insulting Japanese occupation, suspected that the refusal to accept their foods was a reflection of the sanitary conditions in Korea. Dr. Syngman Rhee arrived in Seoul on October 28, 1945, amid enthusiastic crowds of Koreans. Rhee was the symbol of the nation’s struggles against Japan for nearly half a century. He spoke Korean with an American accent. Some Koreans remarked that his tongue had hardened because he spoke English for so many years; yet, his reputation was such that even the South Korean Communist Party leader, Park Hung Yong, offered his party organization to Rhee and the moderate left-wing leader, Yeo Un-hyong, offered his party as well. Rhee declined both offers. Rhee was then 69 years old, but in exceptionally good health. General Hodge welcomed Rhee in a historic ceremony in which he urged all Koreans to accept Rhee as their leader; it seemed that the U.S. was behind him. This reception had more to do with MacArthur than the U.S. government. In Washington, D.C., Rhee had been received by the State Department as anything but a Korean leader. Immediately after Japan’s surrender, Rhee had gone to the State Department asking for recognition as the head of the Korean government, by virtue of his title as High Commissioner of Korea. The State Department, however, did not recognize the KPG and therefore considered that Rhee represented no one. Furthermore, State Department officials considered Rhee to be too old to be taken seriously. Even after Rhee managed to return to Seoul, President Truman made it known that the U.S. would not favor him or any other individual. Kim Ku, who had killed Japanese Lieutenant Suchida, also returned to Korea, from China, but even later than Rhee, on November 23, 1945. He arrived with a group of followers, which an American journalist called “a flotilla of paid gunmen and concubines.” To the Japanese, he was “the Assassin,” and American knowledge of Kim Ku as well as Korea was largely based on information and perceptions from the Japanese. Upon Kim Ku’s arrival, the first thing that Hodge did was to force him to sign a statement promising that he would not install the KPG in Seoul.
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4. Americans in South Korea However, Kim Ku turned out to be a huge headache for Hodge. Neither Hodge nor the other Americans in the USAMG spoke Korean or knew Korean history, and they depended on interpreters. Kim Ku called for the dismissal of all the officials that had been appointed by the interpreters. He insisted that proJapanese individuals and national traitors under the Japanese military government who had gone into hiding had now come out to buy off the interpreters so they could get positions in the U.S. military government, the district government and the police. He said, “We must clean out all these people, and at the same time, stop this spirit of dependence on foreign countries.” This was tantamount to sabotage, as far as Hodge was concerned. Hodge’s immediate mission was to install a trusteeship government over Korea. The idea for an interim government under superpower tutelage was first discussed in November 1943 in the Cairo Conference among President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. The U.S. was the first to propose it. The idea was for Korea to go through a period of tutelage before gaining independence. The British were the least interested in giving independence to Korea or any other former colony.23 Of course, to the British, giving independence to a colony, whether in Asia or Africa, would establish an unwanted precedent for its colonies all over the world. Chiang went along with the U.S. proposal, and Roosevelt’s view prevailed. Another issue was when to grant Korea independence after a period of tutelage. The first U.S. position, drafted by Harry Hopkins of the State Department, suggested “at the earliest possible moment”; Roosevelt corrected it to “in the proper moment”; and Churchill changed it to “in due course.”24 Churchill carried the day. The U.S. Secretary of State Department Cordell Hull thought that the phrase “in due course” was inappropriate, considering that the Koreans wanted immediate freedom. Hull’s concern was well placed. When the text of the Cairo agreement was released, the Koreans who were preparing to celebrate in Chunking, China cancelled the celebration. The embarrassed KPG translated “in due course” into something that suggested “immediately”; this reassured its followers that independence was in the offing. Rhee, in Hawaii, was not sure. He 23. Cho Soon-Sung, Korea in World Politics 1940-1950: An Evolution of American Responsibility (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 17-18. 24. This and other discussions at the Cairo Conference are well documented by Korean historian Kim Gae-dong, in Hanbando-ui Bundan-gwa Cheonjaeng (Division of The Korean Peninsula and The Korean War) (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 2000), pp. 3641, hereafter Kim.
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The Unfinished War wrote to the State Department asking for clarification, but they did not bother to reply. Roosevelt apparently envisaged a few decades of “tutelage”;25 he said that it had taken the Philippines 50 years to gain independence, but that between 20 and 30 years might be enough in the case of Korea. Two years later, February 1945, at Yalta, the trusteeship issue was discussed with Stalin. Roosevelt proposed that the USSR should be a party in the administration of the trusteeship government! Roosevelt had not even read the State Department position paper on the trusteeship, which advocated that the U.S. should take a dominant position in the post-war administration of Korea and that the USSR would not be a good partner. Hodge soon found out that Kim Ku, Rhee and most other nationalists were dead set against trusteeship. To Hodge, the Koreans, who had nothing, were inappropriately full of pride. Initially, the left wing was against the trusteeship also, but suddenly switched its position, apparently seeing trusteeship as an opportunity for the Communists to gain control over Korea. On December 29, 1945, the Big Three foreign ministers of the U.S., USSR and Britain met in Moscow to discuss trusteeship and the establishment of a provisional government. The South Korean people demonstrated relentlessly against trusteeship. To Koreans who prided themselves on their history as a nation with a succession of Korean kingdoms dating back for over 3000 years, the idea of tutelage sounded all too similar to the Japan’s takeover of Korea under the pretext of reform and modernization. Song Chin U, who was the head of the Korean Democratic Party, was the only major non-Communist Korean political party supporting the trusteeship. He was assassinated and Kim Ku was the suspect, although his involvement was not proven. Then Kim Ku called a nationwide strike and ordered all Korean employees of the USAMG to take orders from him. Kim Ku demanded immediate recognition of the KPG. On December 30, 1945, Kim Ku was hauled into Hodge’s office and told that the U.S. would kill him if he “double-crossed” Hodge again. Kim Ku threatened to commit suicide in Hodge’s office. In Seoul, stores and businesses closed and the employees of the USAMG went on strike. Demonstrations then spread throughout the whole country. General Hodge sent his troops into the streets to crush the “mobs.” Some 50 25. Harry S. Truman, Memoir, Vol. II: Years of Trial and Hope (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1956) p. 317, hereafter Truman.
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4. Americans in South Korea years later, U.S. Army historians still do not seem to understand why Koreans did not accept the trusteeship. A U.S. Army historian, James F. Schnabel, who wrote a Korean War history in 1992, said, “The fanatic Korean dislike for trusteeship meanwhile continued to foment resistance…”26 [emphasis added]. As chaos spread in the streets of Seoul, Communist agitation was on the rise. Hodge needed a strong police chief. One of the persons to come to his attention was Chang Taek-sang. Chang was born the son of a very rich and powerful yangban. Hodge had no use for a yangban, but Chang was Westerneducated — the University of Edinburgh — and spoke fluent English. He also had acceptable credentials as a nationalist. In 1992, Chang’s daughter Chang Byung Hae (a former history professor in history and linguistics and the author of several books) wrote his biography. Chang was seventeen and studying in Japan, when Korea was annexed by Japan (1910). He left in anger and went to England. For several years in Europe, he represented the KPG. Upon his return to Korea some twenty years later, Chang refused to collaborate with the Japanese and spent time in the family business, writing poems, practicing Chinese choreography, and collecting Korean antiques — a typical lifestyle of a yangban. At that time, the police were the only armed group in the hands of Koreans. Chang’s friends advised him against taking the job. “What could an English gentleman like you and a yangban scholar do in a police force?” The perception of a policeman at that time was one who tortured and killed suspected criminals. Yet, Chang took the job because he was appalled by the assassination of his close friend and political ally Song Chin U, and the appalling general lawlessness. At that time, the South Korean Communist Party under Park Hun Yong was actively agitating against anti-Communist groups. To make the matter worse, the USAMG recognized the Communist Party (called the South Korean Worker’s Party) as a legitimate political party and gave it equal time on the radio. The Communist Party, therefore, openly propagandized its views and organized Communist guerillas in different parts of South Korea. Chang’s first test as the new Chief of the Capital Police came on January 18, 1946, just eight days after he took office. That evening, he arrived home after a late dinner meeting with the press. The emergency telephone rang near midnight. Fighting had broken out between the Communist and anti26. Policy and Direction: The First Year (Washington D.C.: Center for Military History, United States Army, 1992), p. 26.
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The Unfinished War Communist groups, and the Communists opened fire, killing fifteen antiCommunist youths. Chang Taek-sang went to the scene of the shooting immediately. There were bloodstains on the white snow and several injured female students were still lying on the snow-covered ground. He mobilized the reluctant police, and after a three-hour fire fight, overwhelmed the leftist youth headquarters at dawn and captured 600 students, and confiscated weapons. This was the first time the police had acted decisively and it sent a message to the Communists that Chang’s police force would fight them. Previously, the Capital District Police had avoided getting involved in the struggle between the left and the right. A campaign to eliminate all the “people’s committees” in South Korea went into full swing. By 1946, it succeeded in disbanding most of the People’s Committees in South Korea. An exception was the island province of Cheju. In May 1946, Chang Taek-sang found evidence of large-scale currency counterfeiting at a printing press used by the Communist Party. Finally, the USAMG put out an order for the arrest of leftist leaders. The Communist Party then went underground. By this time, a large amount of counterfeit currency was in circulation. Apparently, the Communist comrades in Moscow and Pyongyang thought they could finance a revolution using several blocks of metal plates. During the counterfeiting trial, some 10,000 Communists surrounded the court and shouted, “Down with Chang Taek-sang! Down with the police!” The police also discovered that nearly 100 of the rifles they confiscated from the leftists were from a Japanese Army division that had surrendered to the Russian Army. This incident exposed yet another lie the Communists had been telling: that the Russians did not assist the South Korean Communist Party. As the Communist threat intensified, Chang began to hire former Japanese policemen for the police force. He knew that this was a controversial tactic, but he saw little chance that his green police force would improve without the infusion of experienced policemen. The downside of this decision was the inheritance of the Japanese police tactics. The ensuing crackdown on the Communists enraged the Russians. One day, Russian Ambassador to North Korea General Terentii Shtykov criticized Chang in a meeting held in Seoul, saying, “The South Korean Police is rehiring Korean policemen who served under the Japanese military government. They killed numerous Korean patriots and independence fighters. These policemen are using the same barbaric means to suppress the masses. Aren’t you the primary person responsible for this?”
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4. Americans in South Korea Chang replied, “Don’t you know that Lenin, whom you respect so much, used the old Imperial Russian policemen after the revolution? Policemen are basically technicians. If you are not an ignorant man, you will know that I am telling the truth.” Shtykov fell speechless. American high officials who were present during these heated debates were impressed. Apparently, the several weeks that he spent in St. Petersburg talking to Korean nationalists on his way to Scotland and reading through the history of the Russian Revolution had not been wasted. Dr. Rhee actively lobbied against trusteeship by writing to influential Americans and government agencies in the U.S. The relationship of General Hodge and Dr. Rhee began to deteriorate over the issue. To Hodge, Rhee was acting as if he were the Korean people’s leader, but Hodge did not think Rhee was anybody’s leader since he had not been elected to any position. Furthermore, Dr. Rhee could not be elected to any position as long as the USAMG was running South Korea. In June 1946, Hodge came up with an idea for establishing an Interim Assembly consisting of 45 elected members — thinking that leftists and Communists would have a fair share of representation in an election. The Assembly was to play only an advisory role in the USAMG. Rhee won an overwhelming majority in the election. Forty three out of 45 turned out to be support the anti-Communist positions of Rhee and Kim Ku. This went contrary to Hodge’s plan for building a broad coalition of left- and right-wing politicians. Hodge then added 45 non-elected members recommended by leftist groups “in order to give a representative character to the Interim Assembly.” In spite of some leftist propaganda to the contrary, this was the true representation of the will of the people. A popular daily newspaper Donga Ilbo commissioned a public opinion poll, which took place on July 23, 1946, asking Seoul citizens, “Who will be the first president of Korea?”27 The result indicated that South Koreans at that time expected Dr. Rhee to be their president: he had 29 percent, while his nearest rival Kim Ku had 11 percent.28 Communist leader Park Hun Yong hardly had any supporters, just one percent. He later went to North Korea and became Vice Premier and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Describing Rhee during this period, a biographer of MacArthur, William 27. It covered 6,671 passers-by on four street corners in different sections of Seoul. 28. See Oliver, p. 370. The result of the poll showed:
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The Unfinished War Manchester, said that both Kim Il Sung and Syngman Rhee were “despots,” and for the U.S. “there was little to choose between them.”29 However, it is important to understand that Syngman Rhee was not a despot at this time. In fact, he had not even been elected to any position and had had little chance to show his colors. Rhee protested to Hodge for including the 45 non-elected leftists in the Assembly. At the end of a bitter session, Rhee said he would appeal to higher authorities. In 1947, he went to Washington and argued that the idea of trusteeship should be dropped and Hodge should be removed. However, the State Department had another plan. On October 16, 1947, the U.S. proposed to hold elections in both “zones of Korea” before March 31, 1948, under U.N. supervision, and the U.N. Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK) was created to carry out the election. In April 1948, Dr. Rhee supported the U.S. proposal for a national election under the supervision of the UNTCOK, but the USSR felt that the U.S. and its allies dominated it. The fact of the matter was that Rhee would have easily won the election if a free and fair election was held. North Korea immediately declared that it would not participate in the election. Kim Ku did not support Dr. Rhee’s willingness to accept a general election even if the North did not participate in it. Kim Ku feared that separate elections by South and North would perpetuate the division of Korea and might lead to war. In hindsight, he was right; but neither Kim’s plan nor Rhee’s would have made much difference as far as the perpetuation of the division was concerned. As pointed out in a top secret CIA report submitted to President Truman on February 20, 1948 (but recently declassified), the Soviet Union had been planning to create a separate state in North Korea patterned after the USSR. North Korea had already drafted and announced the “provisional constitution of Korea” and had been busy staging a Communist-instigated strike in South Korea. During the review of the Inmin-gun at Pyongyang, the CIA noted that North Korea had announced, “this army would be the liberator of the ‘oppressed’ South Koreans.” In the CIA’s opinion, there was little doubt that the Kremlin was preparing for a war. In the meantime, Rhee demanded that the agreements at Yalta and Moscow be nullified, thus doing away with both the 38th parallel and the 29. William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), pp. 539, hereafter Manchester.
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4. Americans in South Korea trusteeship, and that an independent transitional government be established immediately. Kim Ku, however, sought to bring about an accord between the left and the right to achieve unification of the peninsula. Kim Ku went to North Korea to discuss unification with Kim Il Sung. The Communists rejected every proposal made by Kim Ku’s delegation, which included establishing a democratic government, recognizing private property, holding a nationwide election and not allowing any foreign military base within the Korean peninsula. Kim Il Sung did insist on the immediate withdrawal of all foreign troops and called for the differences between the North and the South to be resolved by and among Koreans. Notwithstanding this setback, upon his return to the South, Kim Ku continued to oppose holding a general election without North Korean participation. However, elections took place in South Korea on May 10, 1948. The election brought out 80 percent of South Koreans to elect the members of the National Assembly, which, in turn, elected Rhee as the first president of the Republic of Korea (ROK) on May 31. North Koreans did not recognize the election. General Hodge decided to resign rather than to work with Rhee. This was welcome news for Rhee. In 1949, an assassin, Ahn Tu-hui, killed Kim Ku. Ahn was a lieutenant in the ROK Army at the time. Ahn claimed to have killed Kim Ku because Kim was surrounded by Communists and would have ruined the country. However, later he implicated the ROK army, saying that he had been influenced by the head of their Anti-Espionage Unit. This story had many twists and turns, even implicating Rhee, and the whole truth may never be known.30 Today, few Koreans believe that Kim Ku was a Communist. He was not only anti-Japanese and anti-trusteeship, but also pro-unification at any cost. Traditionally, most South Koreans concluded that such a position was reckless and unrealistic, but recently his thought has gained popularity among the younger generations of South Koreans. The U.S. Military Government in Korea was not an exemplary good model of military occupation, perhaps because American generals and soldiers have 30. Ahn implicated Rhee and Shin on September 23, 1992, but to confuse the matter further, two days later, on September 25, 1992, he repudiated his confession, and said that he alone was responsible for killing Kim Ku. He claimed that his earlier testimony had been made under duress. There is a videotape supporting the assertion that he was under the pressure of the Kim Ku’s followers who kidnapped Ahn. In fact, one of them, Mr. Kwon, was arrested and convicted for kidnapping Ahn.
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The Unfinished War never been trained in such an art. It went on persisting with the trusteeship decision made at the Yalta Conference, over Korean objections. As an occupation force in Korea, the U.S. was naïve and arrogant; however, it was not cruel, cunning and exploitative like the Japanese. For these reasons, most Koreans did not hate Americans (although ultra nationalists such as Kim Ku apparently did).
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5. NORTH KOREANS DISCOVER COMMUNISM After the Soviet occupation of North Korea, the status of the landless and common laborers improved overnight, while the life of the landlords and “Japanese collaborators” turned into a nightmare. What was so remarkable about the North Korean land reform was that threshold level for confiscation was so low. In March, 1946, Kim confiscated land without compensation and distributed it to the landless and to tenant farmers. Any land in excess of five hectares (11 acres) owned by a family was considered ill-gotten, secured through exploitative means. The entire property would be confiscated and the family was required to leave the village for some distant location. Such a low acreage threshold was not typical either in Russia or its satellites.31 For families of the intelligentsia such as the Lee family, the change was not dramatic at first. Initially, Dr. Myong Hoon Lee was promoted from Director of the Ear, Nose and Throat Department to Director General of the Hwanghae Provincial Hospital. The promotion was merit based: he was the most senior Korean doctor with full academic credentials. His first challenge was an attempted Russian take-over of the hospital. This was one of two general hospitals in the province. The Russians had already taken over the other general hospital at Haeju as a military compound for the occupying Russian troops and now ordered the evacuation of the Sariwon general hospital as well.
31. Such a low acreage threshold and confiscation without any compensation was unprecedented. According to Kim, the landowners were bourgeois, enemies of the people, and did not deserve any compensation.
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The Unfinished War The Russians had a reputation for brutality and Koreans believed that they would shoot to death anyone disobeying their orders. In the provincial general hospitals of Pyongyang and Haeju, nurses and other medical staff abandoned their posts immediately when the Russians announced that they were moving in. However, the medical staff of the Sariwon provincial general hospital refused to evacuate the patients, claiming that it was the only remaining general hospital in the province. Finally, after a few tries the Russians decided to avoid a national incident and occupied the local school instead. The school had neither beds nor running water. Perhaps the Russians were not as brutal as many persons had feared. As an occupation force, the Soviets knew what it was doing. In February, 1946, the Russians helped Kim Il Sung create the North Korean Interim People’s Committee. Kim chaired the Committee although neither he nor the other committee members were elected. It was clear that they derived their power from the Soviet occupation army. No one could speak out against these Communist leaders or openly advocate holding an election. Some intellectuals and priests began to disappear; it was assumed that the authorities had sent them off to labor camps or simply executed them. No one could find out their whereabouts. Kim Il Sung then nationalized large industries, banks and railways, most of which had been previously owned by the Japanese, and Communist Party members took over their management. At this time, the private ownership of retail shops, personal and business services still remained in the hands of individuals. There were private practice doctors. In August, two political parties were created: the Worker’s Party and the Democratic Party. The people were given the opportunity to choose a party to join. As the head of the government hospital, Dr. Lee was expected to join the Worker’s Party but he joined the Democratic Party led by Cho Man Shik. His decision proved to be costly and life threatening. What troubled the Soviets most about Cho was that he, like most nationalists, was against the trusteeship form of government. The Soviets tried to change Cho’s position, and when he continued to resist, the Soviets stripped him of all official titles, including the chairmanship of the South Pyongan Province People’s Political Committee. Cho was then arrested and confined to the Koryo Hotel. After a while, he just disappeared. No one has ever found out what happened to him. A Communist replaced Cho as the head of the Korean Democratic Party, and Kim Il Sung allowed the Democratic Party to exist — perhaps just to show
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5. North Koreans Discover Communism the world that North Koreans had the freedom to choose political parties. Yet, he had no more intention of allowing dissent in North Korea than Stalin did in Russia. Political enemies were removed through periodic purges. In fact, some people suspected that the Democratic Party was created to flush out those North Koreans who opposed the Communists. Members of the Democratic Party were placed on a watch list. Dr. Lee’s immediate problem was a cadre officer of the Worker’s Party, Comrade Kim, who was assigned to supervise his hospital. Comrade Kim claimed to be a Chinese herb medicine doctor and had been jailed one time by the Japanese as an independence fighter. At that time, anyone who had been jailed claimed he or she had been an independence fighter against the Japanese; some, of course, were nothing more than common criminals. Dr. Lee and Comrade Kim were in conflict from the outset, ostensibly about the scientific value of herbal medicines. Comrade Kim was not pleased with Lee’s air of superiority. An unpleasant reality for Dr. Lee was that much of his work in hospital administration had to be approved by Kim. The role of party cadres was to ensure that everyone followed the Communist Party’s directives. They could easily ruin one’s life by labeling a person reactionary or antiCommunist. Such accusations could easily send one to a labor camp, imprisonment or even death. In fact, one day Dr. Lee was jailed as a reactionary. Some of the prisoners he met apparently were there for no other reason than failure to show commitment to social issues. There was no appeals process or court that would intervene in political cases. Common criminals had better chances. Political criminals could be pardoned if they denounced someone else as reactionary or anti-Communist. Sometimes, people denounced their own family members and were treated as patriots and received promotions. Perhaps, this was how it was done during the time of Stalin. In jail, Dr. Lee suffered days of interrogation and torture. During this tenuous time, the Russian surgeon in charge of the field hospital heard of Dr. Lee’s predicament and interceded on his behalf, summarily ordering Dr. Lee to be released. His ordeal with the Communists had not ended. Soon, the Russian surgeon who had been his guardian angel left North Korea. He was demoted to the position of director of a small municipal clinic without in-patient facilities. He decided to consult his classmate Dr. Lee Byong Nam, who had become Minister of Health. He had been one of Dr. Lee’s classmates at Imperial University Medical School and was originally from South Korea. Most “domestic”
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The Unfinished War Communists were concentrated in South rather than North Korea when Japan fell. Kim Il Sung had invited prominent Communists to join him in the North; several of those from the South were given cabinet posts. Minister Lee Byong Nam checked Dr. Lee’s personal records and quickly found that he was on a list of reactionaries — people on that list were to be executed without question in case of a national emergency or war, because they would be considered a security risk. Minister Lee Byong Nam belonged to the Park Hun Young’s faction of “domestic” Communists. Park studied theology in China but became an active Communist during the Japanese occupation and had been jailed for his alliance. When Kim Il Sung’s band of guerillas entered North Korea, “domestic” Communists led by Park Hun Yong did not know Kim Il Sung well. Park had run the Korean Communist Party for years before Kim appeared in North Korea. Kim needed Park and his Communist comrades. Park Hun Yong rose to the position of Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister of North Korea. Then there was the Chinese faction, North Korean Communists who had fought along with Mao in Yenan. There was intricate maneuvering to keep the Yenan faction, the main Communist force outside Korea, at bay.32 Mu Chong and Kim Du-bong were prominent leaders under Mao with thousands of troops under their command. In spite of land reform and other measures that pleased the landless, the introduction of Communism into North Korea proved more difficult than Kim had originally assumed. It seemed logical that common laborers and peasants should welcome Communism with open arms, but a substantial proportion of North Koreans did not. Koreans were orthodox Confucians. Over the millennium, Koreans had been taught the virtues of respecting their elders and the learned. Many people did not believe in the Communist version of utopia in which everyone was supposedly “equal.” (Since there was neither an opinion poll nor genuine election, the proportion is difficult to measure.) The atmosphere of coercion and threat did not help. No doubt, there were a number of genuine Communists, but this is also hard to tell because one had to pretend to be an enthusiastic follower of the Great Leader Kim Il Sung in North Korea. For students in North Korea, there were too many ideological meetings. Simon, by this time sixteen years old, was increasingly worried about our 32. For this story, Scalopino and Lee drew extensively from Kim Chang-sun, Bukhan Sip-o-nyon (First Fifteen Years of North Korea), Seoul, 1961.
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5. North Koreans Discover Communism father’s safety. His outspokenness and straightforwardness endangered the whole family. Simon decided that the best he could do for the family was to become a prominent, indispensable scientist and follower of Communism. Unless one was trusted by the Communists, there was no opportunity to go to university and become a scientist. He studied Das Kapital, Leninism, and the history of the Russian Communist Party. Eventually, Simon could discuss the facts and theories of Communism better than most card-carrying Communist members. He made speeches in school meetings praising Communism. He did not discuss his plans with siblings or parents, in order to prevent any hint from ever surfacing that his Communist activities were not sincere. In the summer of 1948, father’s appeal to the Minister of Health for a new job away from Sariwon resulted in an offer to become a professor at Hamhung Medical College. This area is far above the 38th parallel, and according to the minister, Dr. Lee had a lesser chance of getting executed than staying in Sariwon. The 38th parallel became increasingly tightly guarded, and movement of people across the line became more difficult by the day. A weekly train between Seoul and Pyongyang carrying mail was terminated. The U.S. military liaison group in Pyongyang and a Soviet military liaison group in Seoul left for good. Listening to South Korean radio broadcasts became a serious crime, and radios powerful enough to receive broadcasts from the South were confiscated. Nevertheless, listening to the news from the South became Dr. Lee’s passion, and he was convinced that the days of Communism were numbered. Hamhung, the provincial capital of South Hamgyong Province, was the second largest city in North Korea. It was infamous for its harsh living conditions and cold winters. This was where the kings banished criminals and political outcasts during the Koryo and Yi dynasties. Some were high-ranking officials who had displeased the king; few ever came home. During the Japanese occupation, many improvements were brought to the area because the Hungnam port, only 10 km to the east of Hamhung, was close to Japan and was a key strategic piece in her plan for the invasion of China. In fact, under the Japanese occupation the whole province was turned into an industrial complex. Cheap and abundant electricity from the Supung Hydroelectric Power Plant made the area ideal for petrochemical, fertilizer and other heavy industries. Factories were built to manufacture the machinery, munitions, fertilizer and chemicals that Japan needed for the invasion of China as well as for its own consumption. Many Japanese managers, engineers and skilled workers were brought in, new streets were laid and new houses were built. Such
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The Unfinished War modernization, however, made little difference during the harsh winters. Like Hamhung’s weather, the disposition of the Hamhung people was harsh and uncompromising. The minister had done Dr. Lee a great service by giving him the university teaching position in the city. A person with no useful skills and connections would have been sent to hard labor in a remote mine. But medical doctors were in short supply in North Korea. As time went by, my school became increasingly regimented. It was organized in military fashion: the school was a battalion, each grade was a company and each class was a platoon. Everyone wore uniforms and rank insignia shown in stripes and color. A more recent escapee, Kang Chol-hwan, indicated that in the post-war North Korea a student’s rank is shown by the number of stars. Apparently, today young people are taught to be physically tough, too, as if the government is breeding “pit bulls.” Kang says, “I remember a time when students in every class posted numbers representing their relative position in terms of physical strength.”33 In my time, there were meetings practically every other day. Many students were asked to make speeches. We praised the Great Leader Kim Il Sung, Lenin and Stalin, and denounced American Imperialism and puppet Syngman Rhee. These speeches were routine; we could say all the right words in our dreams. There were other class meetings where confessions were demanded of any antisocial acts and thoughts. After the war, praises for Lenin and Stalin were dropped and students were taught “the history of the revolution of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.” Students learn “useful” facts: “On what day and at what hour was Kim Il-sung born? What heroic feats did he perform against the Japanese?”34 Returning to the pre-war days in Hamhung, Dr. Lee bought a large house that required some work. The house once had been a dormitory for an electric company. He had in mind to open a clinic with inpatient facilities one day. During this time, private property was still recognized. Dr. Lee rented one room to a middle-aged woman with a shy boy a little younger than me. The boy’s father, who had managed a division of a factory during the Japanese occupation, was taken away by plainclothesmen one night and was never heard from again. The police denied any knowledge of him. The boy’s mother sold their house and was trying to make their money last by renting 33. Kang and Rigoulot, p. 4. 34. Ibid, p.5.
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5. North Koreans Discover Communism a single room. They were such quiet tenants that we never knew whether they were in or not. To Dr. Lee, Simon had become a real Communist, giving anti-imperialism arguments even to him. Practically every evening, father engaged Simon in a discussion about Communism, hoping he would grow out of it. Simon would occasionally present the Communist viewpoint: “Land is not a commodity that an individual should own. Most Korean landlords obtained land by exploitation of the poor. They collaborated with the Japanese. The practice of land ownership must cease and the land-owning class must be eradicated.” Dr. Lee could not figure out what was going on in the mind of his son. In the spring of 1950, when Simon was in his final year of the First Hamhung High School, there was a province-wide examination to select students to be sent to Moscow for further studies. Simon thought that he did well on the test. Several days later, the leader of the Youth Cadet of the Worker’s Party summoned Simon. The youth leader, in fact, had more power than the principal. The leader asked some routine questions about Simon’s school activities, then asked whether he had any relatives in Pyongyang. When Simon said no, the youth leader asked whether he knew any high-ranking government officials. When Simon said no, the youth leader hastily dismissed him. After several days, a classmate whose father worked for the provincial Department of Education whispered to Simon that he had scored the highest among all the students who took the examination in the province, but was not chosen because of his sungbun, his origin: Simon’s father was neither a Communist nor Communist material. In that society, no one with an undesirable sungbun would advance far, no matter how industrious or talented. During the October Russian Revolution, Lenin said that members of the intelligentsia were not to be trusted because they were all opportunists — they could still make good living if the revolution failed. The school announced that a classmate three years older than the other students had been chosen to go to Moscow. Ironically, he was the worst student in the class. He had been a factory worker before coming to school and a bona fide Party member. Graduation from a Russian university would almost guarantee a promising career as a leader in North Korea. Simon took the rejection well. He understood why the Communists did not try to rehabilitate reactionaries, landlords, capitalists and intelligentsia. In times of crisis, the wrong class cannot be trusted.
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The Unfinished War There were many families with far more serious problems than the Lees’. One of Simon’s classmates in Sariwon (before we moved to Hamhung) was Ahn Taeksoo. Taeksoo’s father was born into a farming family, but he had to leave his village because Taeksoo’s grandfather did not have enough land to divide among several brothers. This was and still is a common practice. Taeksoo’s father went to Sariwon to find a job. Eventually, his father became a small grain merchant. He bought grain from individual farmers and sold it to wine makers. When the Communists took over North Korea, Taeksoo’s elder brother joined the Democratic Party formed by Jo Man Shik. When Cho was purged and the party was taken over by Kim II Sung’s cronies, his membership in the party was exposed. He was a marked man since then. Under the influence of his elder brother and father, Taeksoo became an active anti-Communist. He decided to spread anti-Communist leaflets. He and his friend made leaflets condemning Kim II Sung and praising Syngman Rhee. There was no copy machine at that time. They had made a hole in their pant pockets and dropped the folded leaflets inside the pants when the market was crowded. This went on for a few weeks, and the security police were mobilized to find the saboteurs. One day, when Taeksoo was approaching his home, his sister rushed out and told him to run as fast as he could. The police had discovered the printing tools hidden in their house and were waiting for him. He had a distant uncle living in Haeju, a border town about 60 miles away; he had to hope that his relative would help him to cross the 38th parallel to South Korea. Taeksoo and his friend got on a local train and reached his uncle’s house. His uncle found a guide who led them through the heavily-mined border for a hefty fee. Just before sunrise, Taeksoo and his friend were told that across the stream, only a mile away, was South Korea, and that was as far as the guide was willing to go. From then on, he and his friend were on their own, but they had no way of knowing whether the guide was telling the truth. Shortly after they crossed the stream, they came to a bunker and heard a man’s voice. Unsure whether they were Inmin-gun or ROK soldiers, Taeksoo shouted, “Who are you?” “South Korean soldiers,” someone replied. Having no choice but to believe him, Taeksoo and his friend raised their hands, holding aloft white handkerchiefs, and walked towards the bunker. This was December 24, 1949. The boys were wearing black school uniforms and the distinguishing hats of Sariwon First High School. The officer who was on duty at the border happened to be a defector from Sariwon and recognized their hats.
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5. North Koreans Discover Communism Taeksoo’s friend was lucky enough to have a relative in the South but Taeksoo had neither relative nor friend. He called on a man who used to own a drugstore in Sariwon but now lived in Seoul. He knocked on that man’s door and the man was kind enough to provide Taeksoo food and shelter. Two days later, Taeksoo went out to look for a job. He shined shoes on the streets of Seoul, and applied at the military academy — but was turned down because he was too short. Next, he got a job selling pencils and papers on the street.
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6. CHAOS IN SOUTH KOREA Some leftist historians even in America and South Korea — not in China or North Korea — still believe that Kim Il Sung did not start the Korean War. Some of them trace it to border skirmishes along the 38th parallel prior to June 25, 1950, and the notion that South Korea was as responsible for these as North Korea. In fact, the chief of the U.S. Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), Brigadier General William L. Roberts, suggested as much. No one has accused him of being a leftist, but Roberts was the most enigmatic general who only several days before the war started assured General Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (JCS), not to worry about South Korea because it would be able to defend itself.35 Korean War historians Clair Blair36 and Joseph Goulden have unflattering things to say about Roberts. From the Koreans perspective, he should have been court marshaled for misleading Koreans and inviting a colossal military disaster of South Korean Army. He retired a day before the Korean War started and avoided the question why did he hide the military vulnerability of Republic of Korea (ROK) Army. A secret report by KMAG in South Korea compared the strength of the ROK Army just before American withdrawal to that of America’s Revolutionary War Army in 1775. In March 1949, Roberts passed along this report to Lieutenant General Charles Bolt, aide to the JCS. The report contained information on the number of 35. Omar N. Bradley, A General’s Life (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1983), hereafter Bradley. 36. Clair Blair, The Forgotten War: America In Korea 1950-1953 (New York: Times Book, 1987), hereafter Clair.
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The Unfinished War fighters and bombers North Korea possessed and its elaborate pilot training programs. It must have been clear that South Korea was no match for North Korea. Yet, in Congressional testimony a mere three months later, in June 1949, Bolte — who must have had the report — said that South Korean forces were better equipped than North Korean forces and that the tactical American units could be withdrawn. Roberts went a step further by saying, “South Koreans have the best damn army outside the United States.”37 On surface, such a deception does not make sense until one understands the political situation at that time. The Truman Administration planned to withdraw U.S. troops from South Korea, but some Congressmen as well as Syngman Rhee opposed the withdrawal of American troops. Some people, including an author who claims to have been a former CIA agent in Korea, Harimao T. Musashiya, even suspected that the U.S. deliberately induced the war by tempting North Korea to attack the poorly equipped and trained ROK. He could not find any reason why Washington had ignored all the intelligence reports sent by the CIA field offices in Japan and Korea, warning how strong the Inmin-gun was and how ready it was to attack the South. Roberts was certainly a politician’s general rather than a simple soldier. The CIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. and the like of Roberts were either deceived or wanted to produce only the kind of reports their bosses wanted to hear. Washington wanted to withdraw American troops. This fits into the behavior pattern of the intelligence community. In a book published in 1983, a former CIA agent Ralph MacGhee said that the CIA was “producing only that information wanted by policymakers to support their plans and suppressing information that does not support those plans.”38 Such a culture appeared to have existed even in 1949-50 in the CIA. These generals must have known that they were deceiving Congress. On June 15, 1950, the KMAG warned the Defense Department by cable that ROK combat units possessed only enough supplies for “bare subsistence,” and that with the equipment it had, the ROK Army could not be expected to defend itself for more than 15 days. “Korea is threatened with the same disaster that befell China,” the cable warned. Such reports were not shared with Koreans, and few in the U.S. capital, least of all Congress, had access to this information. 37. The Times (June 5, 1950), quoted in Goulden, p.34. 38. A quote in Young Sik Kim’s website article “Eyewitness: A North Korean Remembers,” from Ralph McGehee’s book, Deadly Deceits: My 25 Years in the CIA (New York: Sheridan Square Publications, 1983).
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6. Chaos in South Korea After America’s withdrawal, its fiscal year 1950 military assistance to South Korea was $11 million (equivalent to $77 million in the year 2000 after adjustment for inflation). As national defense expenditures go, it was not much money, but even this amount was not released on schedule. U.S. federal review processes delayed the actual delivery of supplies and equipment so long that only a small amount of the promised aid eventually trickled into South Korea. Apparently, it did not matter whether Republicans or Democrats held sway. One Republican congressman, it was reported, “fought all appropriations for Seoul.”39 What little equipment that did find its way to South Korea consisted entirely of small arms. Yet, many ROK soldiers (called ROKs by Americans) did not even have rifles. To the conspiracy theorist, this constituted still more evidence that the U.S. wanted North Korea to attack. The United States had not provided the South Korean Army with tanks because Korean terrain was not considered “good tank country.” This opinion came from none other than General Roberts, who had commanded a tank battalion in Europe during World War II before being assigned to Seoul. He certainly had technical expertise, but one could not be sure whether this opinion was based on his professional or political convictions. U.S. tanks were in short supply; in fact, there were practically none in Asia. By this time, North Korea was well supplied by its Moscow sponsor and had enough arms to equip an artillery regiment and an armored brigade complete with 120 Soviet T-34 medium tanks. As for the number of men in uniform, South Korea was outgunned there, as well: it had 95,000 poorly trained soldiers against 135,000 well trained North Korean soldiers. Notwithstanding this disturbing discrepancy, Washington hoped the ROK Army could somehow handle an invasion from the North and thus salvage American prestige around the world. To South Korean authorities, it was obvious that Kim Il Sung was trying to bring down the South Korean government by promoting insurrection within South Korea. A recently declassified CIA top-secret document supports that position. On December 9, 1947, the Central Intelligence Group (the CIA’s predecessor) briefed President Truman that Soviet and North Korean high officials had met at Pyongyang on November 19, 1947 and planned to create chaos in South Korea through a series of measures:40 South Korea had little electricity-generating capacity at that time; before the country was divided, 39. Manchester, p. 541. 40. Ibid.
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The Unfinished War most electricity was generated in North Korea. At the Soviet–North Korea meeting, it was decided to cut electricity transmission to South Korea in order to increase unemployment and create “widespread unrest.” Another decision was to create “a strong fifth column [subversive group] in important South Korean cities.” Finally, the North Koreans and Soviets agreed to maintain the Inmin-gun “in a state of readiness to occupy South Korea with the aid of the fifth column.” Kim Il Sung had almost succeeded in achieving these objectives. The Communist Party penetrated deep inside the South Korean military and government organizations. A number of top military commanders and officers, and even the former South Korean president Park Chung Hee, became members of the Communist Party. The South Korean economy was in shambles. According to Korean historian Ki-baik Lee, the “contours of Korea’s economy” under the Japanese occupation had taken an unusual shape “with emphasis on war related industry and a high degree of reliance on Japan. Accordingly, the severance of all ties with Japan following liberation inevitably dealt a severe blow to the economy.” 41 Even a greater blow was dealt when Korea was divided. The North was abundant in electrical supply, mineral resources and industrial products; the South was relatively well off in the production of consumer goods and agricultural production. Some 90 percent of hydroelectric power, 95 percent of steel, 85 percent of chemicals and 80 percent of coals were produced in North Korea and about 65 percent of food was produced in the South when the country was divided.42 To make matters worse, immediately after liberation the Japanese authorities, still in charge of Korea until the American troops landed, flooded the banking system with a huge supply of currency: a 72 percent increase in a matter of weeks. The Korean people believed that this was done deliberately to create chaos. It succeeded in creating hyperinflation. Even with American assistance in the following few years, the South Korean economy was reeling from dislocation and structural problems. There was serious inflation. The fiscal side of the economy was also mismanaged. The government did not have sufficient revenues to run the government; its tax administration was hampered by corruption; and tax collection efforts were insufficient. The government depended on American
41. Lee Ki-baik, New History of Korea, translated by Edward W. Wagner (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 375. 42. Ibid, p. 376.
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6. Chaos in South Korea aid to meeting a large proportion of the operating budget deficit. Little went for investment in the provision of basic infrastructure such as electricity generation, transportation and irrigation. None of these fiscal and monetary problems was easy to solve when the economy was sinking. The Korean leaders had found their way to the top by being anti-Communist and anti-Japanese, not for being good economic managers. The Soviet strategy of further disrupting the economy by cutting off the electricity supply seems to have worked. Nowhere in South Korea was economic dislocation more evident than on the picturesque volcanic island of Cheju. The fishing industry was the island’s mainstay, but the local people did not have the carbon rods necessary for night fishing. These rods used to come from North Korea. Coal also had come from the North, but North Korea stopped selling it to South Korea. The shortage practically shut down the island’s power plant; this, in turn, shut down the alcohol-production plant, which used local potatoes. Then the farmers had no place to sell their potatoes. The local economy collapsed, and the first rebellion broke out. Leftists claimed that it was spontaneous uprising by local residents dissatisfied with the socioeconomic condition of the island.43 The leftist “people’s committees” blamed all of this on the mainlanders and the USAMG, and the people’s committees armed their members and challenged the national police. The uprising started in April 3, 1948. A national election was scheduled for the following month. The rebel force supported Kim Il Sung’s position, calling for the withdrawal of the U.S. Army, the elimination of Syngman Rhee, and halting the national election. The rebels attacked police stations and killed pro-government civilians, following which the national police and right-wing youths embarked on a bloody and cruel reprisal. The atrocities escalated on both sides. When the police were no longer able to suppress the rebellion, the newly-formed ROK Army was mobilized to put it down. At age 27, Colonel Yu Jae Hung was appointed to the position of commander in charge of pacifying the island. Like many other Korean senior military officers at that time, he had graduated from the Japanese Military Academy; and at the time of Japan’s surrender, he was a battalion commander of the Japanese Army.
43. Park Se Gil, Dasi Ssunun Hangook Hyyondae-sa (In Korean only: Modern History of Korea Rewritten) Seoul: Dolbegae, 1988) Vol. 1, p. 135.
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The Unfinished War After graduating from the military academy, my half-brother, Soon-ku, was a brand new second lieutenant and was assigned to Yu’s regiment sent to suppress the rebellion. He was issued a long sword and a pistol. Killing the islanders was not what he had had in mind while studying at the Academy, but he was prepared to do so if necessary. When the dust settled on Cheju Island, 14,504 combatants and civilians were dead,44 some 20,000 homes had been destroyed and one third of the island population of about 100,000 had fled to protected villages along the coast.45 Colonel Yu pacified the island by promising not to prosecute those who surrendered. The government also promised to support a new life and livelihood for the rebels. But this was not the final chapter in the war of rebellion. The Communist Party decided to show its hand, and called on its “sleepers” in the Army to rise up. In October 1948, rebellion erupted in the port city of Yeosu and spread to Sunchon and other cities. One regiment of the ROK military joined the Communists — half the ROK military at that time. The Communists formed “the people’s courts,” and tried and executed captured policemen, government officials, landlords and rightists. The rebels killed more than 1,000 people in each of the two cities. At this time, Kim Il Sung and Stalin’s strategy of toppling South Korea seemed to be working. These rebellions were suppressed, but more than 1,000 guerillas fled to the Chiri Mountain. Colonel Paik Sun Yup,46 who moved from the position of intelligence chief in the ROK Army Headquarters to become the commander of the ROK 5th Division, took on the job of eradicating the guerrillas in the area. He was born in North Korea. When he was seven years old, his father died, leaving the family destitute. His mother moved them to Pyongyang from their village about 28 km to the west, and was on the brink of committing suicide. Sun Yup later thought that his best chance for a career was to enter the Japanese Military Academy in Manchuria. After graduation, he served in the 44. From the Investigative Report On the April 3 Casualty by the Cheju Provincial Assembly as revised in 1997, cited in Seo Chung Seok, Cho Bong Am-gua 1950 yeondae, Vol. 2 (available only in Korean: Cho Bong Am and the 1950s), (Seoul: Yeoksa Bipyong Sa, 2000), p.571, hereafter Seo. 45.Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1997), p. 221, hereafter Cumings. 46. Paik Sun Yup, the first four-star general and a veteran of many Korean War battles, provides a detailed account of his youth and the battles that he fought in an autobiography in Korean (The Long, Long Summer Day) (Seoul: Ji-Gu-Chon, 1999).
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6. Chaos in South Korea Japanese Army for three years. After the fall of Japan, he and his brother, In Yup, worked for the nationalist and founder of the North Korean Democratic Party, Cho Man Shick. After a few months, the Paik brothers realized that North Korea was no place for anyone who had served the Japanese Military and in December, 1945, they decided to cross the 38th parallel — along with about four and half million Koreans who would eventually come to the South. Suppressing the rebellion in Yeosu fell on Paik’s lap. He said that he obtained the cooperation of the residents as soon as his division convinced them that it could defeat the guerrillas. He learned that civilians always sided with the stronger side. Survival was the name of the game. For his part, what Kim Il Sung learned was that it was not going to be easy to topple the Syngman Rhee government with insurrection alone. Park Chung Hee, who would later succeed Rhee as president of Korea and became the architect of the post-war South Korean economic miracle, was a Communist at that time. Born the second son of a farmer in a small village near Daegu, he graduated from the Manchurian Military School in 1940 and later from the regular four-year Japanese Military Academy in Japan. After his graduation, he served the Japanese Kwangdong Army as a lieutenant, but several days before Japan surrendered, Park and three other fellow Korean officers deserted the Japanese army, trekked across 35 miles of rough mountain roads and surrendered to a unit of Chiang’s Nationalist Army. Though most Korean Kwangdong Army officers defected directly to North or South Korea, Park chose to surrender to the Chinese Nationalist Army in control of much of China at that time. After waiting nine months to see how things settled, they returned to South Korea in May 1946. Park went back to military school.47 Just before the national election in 1948, he held the rank of major in the South Korean Defense Guard and participated in military operations against the Yeosu uprising although by this time Park was a cardcarrying member of the South Korean Worker’s Party. Before his involvement in this operation, Park had been an instructor in the Korean Military Academy.48 The first batch of cadets he taught was the 5th class of the academy, which in 1947 consisted of 420 young men. He was a respected
47. In September 1946, he entered the National Defense Guard Academy. This was only a three-month course. He graduated third among 194 students. 48. This was before the ROK Army was created; at that time the ROK military was called the National Defense Guard, and was an extension of the armed police.
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The Unfinished War teacher, and the cadets never forgot that. They later helped Park to stage a military coup. Returning to 1948 on the heels of a series of Communist rebellions, the ROK realized how deeply the Communists had infiltrated and went on an allout “Red hunt” intended to cleanse the ROK military of Communist infiltrators. Park’s membership in the South Korean Worker’s Party was discovered. Some 10 percent of the ROK’s soldiers and officers were jailed and interrogated. Park was interrogated repeatedly. He finally broke down and confessed his Communist Party connections. In the formal trial, Park received a death sentence; but his sentence was commuted because of the intervention of Lieutenant Colonel Paik Sun Yop, who was the intelligence chief in the ROK Army Headquarters in charge of purging Communists from the army. Although Park was a card-carrying Communist, by this time his faith in Kim Il Sung and in Communism had already waned because he knew that anyone with a past connection to the Japanese Army was being arrested and jailed in North Korea. Paik had been Park’s senior in the Manchurian Military School and the Japanese Military Academy, and knew this. However, it was Captain James Houseman of the KMAG who played the decisive role in this decision. The KMAG controlled the U.S. military aid to the ROK forces. Brigadier General Roberts was not exaggerating when he bragged that the ROK Army would fall within a week if America terminated its military aid. Because of this dependency on the U.S. military supplies, a mere captain of the KMAG had powerful influence over the entire ROK. He advised, and shared the room of, the chief of ROK Army, Major General Chae Byung Duk. Houseman suggested that Paik use Park as chief of the Combat Intelligence Section, whose job was to stop the infiltration of Communists from North Korea. Paik reminded Houseman that Park had Communist connections, and was awaiting sentencing. Houseman replied that Park knew the inner workings of the Communists, which was exactly what was needed to do the job. As predicted, Park did an excellent job of reading enemy plans and interdicting Communist infiltration. Although his life was saved, he was officially discharged from the ROK Army. He, however, returned to his job as a civilian, without pay. At that time, nobody in his right mind would have predicted that Park would one day be reinstated in the ROK Army and become South Korean president.
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6. Chaos in South Korea MACARTHUR IN JAPAN Across the East Sea (better known as the Sea of Japan, outside Korea), the Japanese revered General Douglas MacArthur. Every morning and afternoon, hundreds of Japanese patiently waited to catch a glimpse of their “white emperor.” He had disarmed Japan and brought about sweeping social and political changes including the adoption of a new, democratic constitution. His performance as a prosecutor of war criminals was somewhat mixed, from the point of view of Koreans. He brought a minimal number of war criminals to trial although he purged those suspected of war crimes and military nationalism and aggression.49 This affected less than half of one percent of the Japanese population, compared with 2.5 percent in Germany. “In Japan, no one went to jail, was fined or lost his property.”50 By and large, such a mild treatment of Japanese war criminals and ultra-nationalists did not bother Americans, although some Americans wanted to see Emperor Hirohito dethroned. The consequences of not uprooting ultra-nationalism in Japan was, however, felt by her Asian neighbors, especially Korea and China, for decades to come. They were troubled by Japan’s unwillingness to apologize for the invasions and massacres that her soldiers committed everywhere. The Japanese recently published a textbook that maintains that the Japanese takeover of Korea was not an invasion at all, since it was done with the consent of Korean representatives, and denies that the Japanese perpetrated any crimes during World War II. The issue of 100,000 “comfort women” hardly rates a mention in their textbooks. China also reacted angrily to the Japanese attempt to whitewash Japan’s militaristic past. The Nanjing Massacre, in which Japanese troops killed 150,000 civilians in China, has also been glossed over. The book avoids using the word “invasion” when referring to Asian countries, arguing instead that Japan actually helped those nations to achieve their independence earlier than they would have otherwise! The North Korean press also reacted angrily: “Japan is the gang leader of forging history[.] Imperial Japan’s evil aggression and carnage cannot be erased in a thousand or ten thousand years.” 51 The inflammatory North Korean editorial went on unremittingly, at a feverish pitch. When Prime Minister 49. Geoffrey Perret, Old Soldiers Never Die (New York: Random House, 1996) p. 517, hereafter Perret. 50. Ibid, 518. 51. Hankook Ilbo (Korea Times) July 13, 2001.
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The Unfinished War Koizumi Junichiro of Japan visited the Yasukuni Shinto shrine in Tokyo on August 13, 2001, South Korea and China objected strongly. This shrine, where war criminals have been memorialized, remains a symbol of Japanese militarism. Some Japanese disapproved of Koizumi’s visit, but most remained silent. Koreans have questioned whether the ordinary Japanese people have learned any lessons from their military government’s past so as to prevent its possible repetition. In hindsight, MacArthur could have done a better job at keeping his troops in combat condition. However, this was not his fault alone. The White House, Congress, and the Pentagon were all busy cutting the military budget and the number of soldiers in uniform. None of them suspected that America would have to fight another war sometime soon. Lieutenant General Walton H. Walker, in charge of the Eighth Army in Japan, did not do much to keep his men in shape. When the JCS visited Japan in February, 1950 and inspected Walker’s four divisions under the Eighth Army, they found that they were only 40 percent combat-ready. However, the chiefs claimed to have been impressed. They said, “Excellent troops…. well trained, well led, with good morale.”52 They knew it was not true, but to say otherwise would have brought up the need to upgrade the occupation army. There was no budget for that. In fact, there was intense inter-service rivalry to grab a greater slice of the shrinking budget. It has been said that the young American soldiers who volunteered to come to Japan did so to see the world, for cheap sex (“50 cents short-time, one dollar all night”), cheap beer “fifteen cents a bottle” and enjoy the luxury of living with the help of houseboys and shoeshine boys.53 Neither these American soldiers nor Washington thought that they would actually face a war. MacArthur knew that Hodge was not doing well in Korea. Independence and unification seemed to mean a lot to the Koreans, and they were not accepting trusteeship. Perhaps it was a bad idea. However, neither MacArthur nor Hodge had anything to do with the decision to create the trusteeship government. When the Republic of Korea (ROK) was created in September 1948, Korea was no longer the responsibility of MacArthur’s Far East Command (FEC). The U.S. State Department was in charge, and the controversial General Hodge had packed up his gear and returned home — to the delight of Syngman Rhee, and perhaps even of Hodge himself. Although Korea was outside of his 52. Perret, p. 538. 53. See for example Perret, p. 538.
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6. Chaos in South Korea responsibility, MacArthur asked his intelligence chief, Major General Charles Willoughby, to monitor the military situations both in North and South Korea. Asia, however, inhabited by peoples of completely different heritages and cultures and located some 8,000 miles away, was of little interest to most Washington politicians and military strategists. However, MacArthur and many other concerned Americans were furious about the loss of China to the Communists. One such person was a young congressman from Massachusetts and a veteran of the Pacific War, John F. Kennedy. He spoke out against the Administration’s China policy. He said that continued insistence that American aid would not be forthcoming unless a coalition government was formed was delivering a crippling blow to the Nationalist Government there. He went on to say, “So concerned were our diplomats and their advisors with the imperfections of the diplomatic system in China after 20 years of war and the tales of corruption in high places that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a nonCommunist China.”
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7. PRELUDE TO A HOT WAR In recent years, a lot more definitive information has come to the public domain regarding the roles of Moscow, Beijing and Pyongyang in starting the war. As early as April 1947, Soviets started to train T-34 tank operators at Pyongyang.54 In October 1947, Kim Il Sung requested Mao to return Korean soldiers under him, and received the first contingent of 1,500 Koreans (called Northeast Korean Volunteers). They were the Koreans who joined Mao’s Army to fight against the Japanese. On February 8, 1948, Kim Il Sung established the People’s Army (Inmin-gun). All this happened when South Korea had only a national police force and the South Korean government had not yet been created. On August 23, 1948, an additional 10,000 Northeast Korean Volunteers (Mao’s 164th Division) returned to North Korea. The CIA kept the Washington policy makers informed of these developments. On October 29, 1948, the CIA warned President Truman that an armed invasion of South Korea was likely, although it would not happen until after the U.S. withdrew its troops from South Korea and after the North “attempted to ‘unify’ Korea by some sort of coup.” The reasons given for this conclusion were the “intensified improvement of North Korean roads leading south,” “the Peoples’ Army troop movements to areas near the 38th parallel [and] from Manchuria to North Korea.” The report further indicated that “Communist agents have been directed to intensify disturbances in November [1948], ostensibly to facilitate an invasion early in 1949.” The report said that such an
54. The account of North Korean war preparation is from Harimao Musashiya, pp. 95-105.
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The Unfinished War invasion might not materialize, but an internal insurrection such as Yeosu “would bolster a Soviet claim in the U.N. that the South Korean regime is unpopular and supported only by the police and the U.S. Army.” In hindsight, the CIA report was right on the mark. We now know the insurrection did not work. Against such a background, Stalin, Mao and Kim Il Sung met on December 17–18, 1948, in Moscow to discuss the next move. The North Korean delegation consisted of Kim Il Sung, Park Hun Yong (Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister) and nine other cabinet level officials. The Chinese delegation included Mao and Chou En-lai. The Soviet delegation consisted of Stalin, the first Deputy Prime Minister, Defense Minister and other top brass numbering altogether 20 persons. Who instigated the war has been debated for a long time. Washington’s initial suspicion was that Stalin was behind the invasion, but after that, the world was led to believe that it was really Kim Il Sung. There is now sufficient evidence to answer this question: both Kim Il Sung and Stalin were involved. Kim Il Sung was more eager, but Stalin was ultimately in charge of Kim Il Sung. A ciphered telegram from Ambassador Shtykov to Andrei Y. Vishinsky (the foreign minister of the USSR) on January 19, 1950, which came to the public domain in the mid-1990s, showed the true nature of the relationship that they had. Kim Il Sung said to Shtykov that he “cannot begin an attack, because he is a communist, a disciplined person and for him the order of Comrade Stalin is law.”55 In the 1948 meeting, Stalin said that North Korea was not yet ready to take on South Korea and that the Inmin-gun needed to be strengthened. Upon his return to Pyongyang, Kim started a massive buildup of the Inmingun with Soviet assistance. This involved particularly the buildup of mechanized units. (By May 16, 1949, the 105th Tank Brigade was created. Subsequently, three tank regiments, one mechanized regiment and other special units, e.g., artillery, communications and transportation battalions were created.) On July 25, 1949, another 10,000 Northeast Korean Volunteers (Mao’s 166th Division) entered North Korea and became the 6th Division of the Inmin-gun. Another ciphered telegram from Shtykov to Vishinsky sent on September 3, 1949 confirms Kim Il Sung’s eagerness and Soviet involvement. It said that Mun Il, Kim Il Sung’s personal secretary, had come to see him with Kim’s 55. The source of this and other ciphered telegrams in the following three paragraphs are from Kathryn Weathersby, “Korea, 1949-1950: To Attack or Not to Attack: Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issues 5 (Spring 1995).
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7. Prelude to a Hot War message that the southerners intended to attack that part of the Ongjin peninsula located above the 38th parallel. Shtykov reported that no such attack had taken place on September 2, contrary to the prediction, but still Kim asked “permission [of the USSR] to begin military operations against the south, with the goal of seizing the Ongjin peninsula and part of territory of South Korea to the east of the Ongjin peninsula, approximately to Kaesong, so as to shorten the line of defense.” Then Shtykov reported to Vishinsky that he had discouraged Kim Il Sung from undertaking such operations, but that Kim would “probably raise this question again soon.” The telegram went on to say, “There have not been any serious incidents since August 15[.] The southerners are carrying on defensive work at a faster tempo. I ask your order.” The answer came on September 11 from Andrei Gromyko of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Grigori Tunkin, the chargé d’affaires of the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang: “You must meet with Kim Il Sung as soon as possible and try to elucidate the following additional questions”: the state of the South Korean army, the condition of partisan movements in South Korea, and American troops in South Korea, among other things. In a lengthy and amazingly accurate assessment of the situation at that time in hindsight, Tunkin replied: Kim cannot count on substantial help from the partisans, a rapid victory is unlikely, the limited operation on the Ongjin peninsula might turn into a civil war, and a drawn-out war might bring the Americans to assist South Korea — this time more effectively than they did in China. The Politburo directed Shtykov that the maximum efforts should be directed to “the partisan movement” and further strengthening the Inmin-gun. We now know that the “popular uprisings” were squashed. The attempts to create a partisan uprising never ceased. On April 25, 1950, the Chargé in the U.S. embassy in Seoul, Everett Drumright, reported to the Secretary of State Dean Acheson that the ROK Army finally broke up an “organized resistance of remaining bands of North Korean guerillas, numbering more than 600, who penetrated into Odae Mountain area of Kangwon Province on or about March 25[.] With losses during the past three weeks of about 500 men and several hundred weapons, North Koreans may be loath to commit men and equipment to such adventures.”56 The Soviet hierarchy saw the world as a place full of oppressed proletariats who would rise up against their exploiters, given some 56. Foreign Relations of the United States: 1950, Vol. 7, Korea (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), FRUS Vol. 7 hereafter, pp. 47-48.
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The Unfinished War external help. An internal uprising, whether genuine or not, in South Korea would give Stalin the legitimacy for intervention in a civil war just as it did in China, thus assuring that the U.S. would not intervene in the war. In spite of Moscow’s disapproval of that naked aggression, in mid-October, 1949, Kim Il Sung created a major border incident. It is not clear whether he was trying to grab the Ongjin peninsula or provoke the South to invade the North, providing him the pretext for invading the South. After a fierce battle, the North captured several strategic elevation points along the 38th parallel. Ambassador Shtykov did not report these events to Moscow. However, reports of the border clashes reached the Kremlin via other channels and Shtykov received a curt reprimand on October 22, 1949, from the Central Committee of the Communist Party, noting his “failure to present timely information to the Center on combat actions as well as his failure to implement the directive.” On January 13, 1950, the CIA sent to President Truman a top-secret report. On one hand, the CIA reported a “continuing southward movement of the expanding Korean People’s Army toward the thirty-eighth parallel,” the “influx of Chinese Communist-trained troops from Manchuria,” “the assignment of tanks and heavy field guns to units in the thirty-eighth parallel zone,” and the development of North Korean air capabilities. On the other hand, it concluded that “an invasion of South Korea is unlikely unless North Korean forces can develop a clear-cut superiority over the increasingly efficient South Korean Army.”57 The underlying assumption was that the ROK Army was sufficiently strong to dissuade North Korea from invading the South! For whatever reason, the CIA was singing a different tune than its earlier report in October 1948, which concluded that North Korea would be ready to attack the South when the U.S. left South Korea. Perhaps this report was more in line with what Washington decision-makers wanted to hear. Without doubt, North Korea already had a clear-cut military superiority. The “increasingly efficient South Korean Army” was the line that Brigadier General Roberts and Ambassador Muccio, both under the State Department, were telling everyone at that time. In January 1950, American troops had completed the withdrawn from South Korea. As if this were not reassuring enough to the Communists, on January 12, 1950, Secretary of State Dean Acheson made the now famous gaffe 57. A weekly intelligence summary on the Far East: Soviet Relations; Korea: Troop Buildup.
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7. Prelude to a Hot War before the lunchtime audience of reporters at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C.: “This defensive perimeter [in the Pacific] runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyu Islands,… from the Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands.” This clearly excluded South Korea and was in accord with the Defense Department’s Offtacke Strategy. Yet, when he was accused of having encouraged invasion, Acheson said that he was referring to “internal subversion,” not to “communist aggression.” No matter what he may have intended by saying it, this was the assurance the Communists needed. Perhaps the fate of 20 million Koreans was none of his concern, but that statement may have doomed the lives of tens of thousands of Americans as well. After the Acheson gaffe, the grapevine between Pyongyang and Moscow began to hum again. Another ciphered telegram of January 19, 1950 clearly implicates the USSR. Shtykov said to Vishinsky, “Comrade Stalin…said to him [Kim IL Sung]…in case of an attack on the north of the country by the army of Syngmann [sic], then it is possible to go on the counteroffensive to the south of Korea. But since Rhee Syngmann [sic] is still not instigating an attack…he (Kim Il Sung) thinks that he needs again to visit Comrade Stalin and receive an order and permission for offensive action…” On January 30, Stalin replied to Shtykov, agreeing to meet Kim Il Sung and said that he was “ready to help him in this matter.” However, he had a request for Comrade Kim Il Sung: “The Soviet Union is experiencing a great insufficiency in lead. We would like to receive from Korea a yearly minimum of 25,000 tons of lead[.] I hope that Kim Il Sung would not refuse us. ” Kim Il Sung met Stalin in April 1950. Stalin said, “due to the changing international situation,” he would agree to the Koreans moving towards unification, but that the final agreement would have to be decided together with China. If China did not agree, the decision would be postponed. Kim went to see Mao. Mao voiced his confidence that the Americans would not interfere in such a conflict. If foreign forces intervened, then China would come to the aid of the North. In the opinion of Mao, the Soviet Union could not directly participate in a Korean conflict because it had an agreement with the United States over the 38th parallel, but China had no such obligation. Subsequently, Soviet merchant ships unloaded a large quantity of war materiel at the port of Chongjin.58 Nikita Khrushchev said in his memoir, 58. Roy E. Appleman, South to The Nakdong, North to the Yalu (Washington D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army, 1961), p. 12.
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The Unfinished War “Naturally, Stalin couldn’t oppose this idea [of Kim Il Sung invading the South]. It appealed to his [Stalin’s] convictions as a Communist all the more because the struggle would be an internal matter which Koreans would be settling among themselves.”59 In short, it was not about the Soviet Army invading any country, but an internal matter. There was a series of cable exchanges between the Soviet Ambassador at Pyongyang and Moscow immediately prior to the commencement of hostilities. On June 21, Kim Il Sung informed Stalin via the Soviet embassy that he would begin combat operations precisely on June 25. This is when the North launched a massive invasion of the South. This explains who started the war, but there is still a debate over the motive. Returning to 1949 in Seoul, U.S. Ambassador John J. Muccio called on President Rhee in May, 1949, and informed him that the U.S. intended to pull out its remaining 15,000 troops. Muccio asked Rhee to issue a statement concurring with the plan so that the Communists would not think that there was a rift between the two countries. Rhee asked Muccio, “What is the U.S. policy toward the security of South Korea? If the U.S. considers an attack against South Korea the same as an attack against itself, I see no need for the U.S. troops to be in South Korea.” But no such assurance came from the U.S. On June 24, 1949 Rhee wrote: “Most of our army men are without rifles[.] Our defense minister reports that we have munitions which will last only three days of actual fighting.”60 On September 30, 1949, he wrote a letter to his friends in the U.S., saying that the Soviets were giving Communist agitators money, weapons and propaganda literature to stir up the people. The letter concluded that Americans were losing the Cold War. As he was writing this letter, skirmishes along the 38th parallel were a daily occurrence. In the meantime, Brigadier General Roberts was doing everything he could to avoid military clashes that would hamper the withdrawal of the U.S. troops on schedule. He asked the ROK Army to stay back at least three miles south of the 38th parallel. In the city of Kaesong, this meant that the ROK soldiers had to retreat to the middle of the city streets instead of on a strategic hillside above the city. In March, 1949, a Communist force struck against the ROK position in the city. The ROKs counter attacked and chased the Communist force toward the 59. Strobe Talbott (translated and edited), Khrushchev Remembers (Boston and Toronto: Little Brown and Company), pp. 368. 60. This and other quotes and events confronting Rhee at this time are from Rhee’s biography. Oliver, pp. 295-299.
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7. Prelude to a Hot War 38th parallel, thus entering the three-mile zone. The next day, Ambassador Muccio visited Rhee to lodge a strong protest that the ROK had crossed the three-mile zone that he and Roberts had created. Muccio had nothing to say about the ROK soldiers being hit in the middle of the city streets, and their rights to retaliate. The next attack on the regiment proved fatal. On June 25, a ROK regiment guarding Kaesong (on its streets, rather than digging in on the hill north of Kaesong) was wiped out within hours of a North Korean invasion. Only forty soldiers escaped the attack. In the early fall of 1949, a strong Communist force of about 4,000 men attacked south across the 38th parallel on the Ongjin peninsula, an area surrounded by the Yellow Sea on three sides and the 38th parallel on the remaining side — a virtual island. After the incident, General Roberts advised Rhee to abandon the peninsula and let the Communists have it. Rhee refused. He was not having much luck with American soldiers. General Hodge had treated him as if he were his lieutenant. Now, General Roberts was doing the same. Although Roberts and Muccio were trying to reassure Rhee that the ROK Army was more than a match for the Inmin-gun, Rhee’s sources told him that his army of 100,000 was no match for the North Korean Army. Muccio tried to convince him that the ROK Army was so strong that it did not need the U.S. Army. Then came Secretary of State Dean Acheson’s announcement that Korea lay outside of the U.S. defense perimeter, on January 12, 1950. On March 8, 1950, President Rhee wrote: “The enemy in the north can sweep down on us at any moment with more arms, more planes, more of everything than we can muster against them. We have no antiaircraft guns, no planes…not even ammunition, spare parts and the other things which are necessary to keep the machinery operating[.] We are not after a large army, a large air force, or large anything. We only want to obtain forces in each branch of the military service which will be adequate for our defense.” In this same memorandum he also said, “The State Department must revise its interpretation of the American perimeter so that it includes Korea[.]” Although Rhee was not briefed about this, the CIA collected at great expense detailed data on the Inmin-gun and forwarded this information to Washington. MacArthur’s intelligence chief, Charles Willoughby, collected information on North Korea and filed over 1,000 reports to Washington. All such reports appeared to have gone unheeded. Willoughby even thought that there was a conspiracy in Washington to ignore all such information. Musashiya was
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The Unfinished War also convinced of a conspiracy. There was a disconnect between the CIA field office and the CIA Headquarters in Washington, D.C. By the time Ambassador Muccio testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 6, 1950, he was forthcoming and warned that the North Korean Army had undeniable military superiority, particularly tanks and combat aircraft. North Korea had, among other things, 100 Yak fighter planes, 70 bombers, 10 reconnaissance planes and 150 medium tanks; and by then, the USSR had trained about 10,000 North Korean soldiers in Siberia, some for up to three years. They received sophisticated training, including tank maneuvers. What the American military turned over to the ROK when they left South Korea was adequate to fight guerillas and lightly armed invaders but inadequate for defense against a well-armed military like the Inmin-gun. The Americans left no tanks, no airplanes, no heavy naval craft, and most of all, no anti-tank weapons. The weapons and equipment left by the Americans were in poor condition and there were no spare parts. They began to fall apart rapidly. When Americans actually left South Korea, President Rhee vented his frustration by publicly accusing America of abandoning his country. He insisted that if it were not for the secret American-Russian agreement made behind the back of Koreans, there would be no Communism in Korea, nor a separate North and South Korea. Acheson rebuked the “old man” for such outbursts and said that such statements only endangered the chances of obtaining American military assistance in the future. Rhee had to swallow his pride. South Korea desperately needed American military assistance. The last of the American troops sailed away on schedule. Less than 500 American advisers were left behind. These advisers were anxious to sail away, too, from what they considered a “sorry country.” South Korea was a hardship post. None of the Americans spoke Korean, and few Koreans spoke English. Months prior to the outbreak of the war, Roberts, who was nearing his retirement, entertained entourages of VIPs and journalists who visited South Korea under arrangements made by Ambassador Muccio. “When they [VIPs] began arriving in increasing numbers, General Roberts artfully stage-managed the visits and proselytized unabashedly. The visitors were wined, dined, and briefed in Seoul, then escorted to the ‘field’ to see the ROK Army in ‘action.’ The field maneuvers were executed by handpicked ROKs, who had been carefully rehearsed about what to do and say.”61 All the VIPs and journalists returned home and projected their glowing confidence in the ROK Army.
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7. Prelude to a Hot War Why did Roberts launch such a carefully orchestrated publicity campaign to convince the world that the ROK Army was capable of meeting any test the North Koreans could impose? Some suspected that he was trying to convince everyone what a fine job he had been doing so that he could get another star before his retirement.62 My supposition is that both Muccio and Roberts were trying to facilitate the Truman Administration’s decision to withdraw the U.S. troops from Korea — call it a team play. Perhaps, Roberts did not believe that North Korea would invade South Korea. In that belief, he was not alone. At the end of World War II, the U.S. went through dramatic military cutbacks. The American public demanded, “Bring the boys home!” It was time for the Americans to enjoy peacetime prosperity and pursue great American dreams. Truman reduced 12 million men and women in arms to 2 million, but in the spring of 1946, the Appropriations Committees of both Houses of Congress set a limit of 1,070,000 men. Most Americans did not believe a war with its former ally, the USSR, was likely. Yet, Roberts was the point man for the U.S. on one of the Cold War fronts. It is hard to find a legitimate excuse for his behavior. Ambassador Muccio was no better. In a post-war interview given to the Truman Library in 1971, Muccio admitted that he was aware that North Korea had advanced Soviet military hardware, including fighter planes, bombers and tanks, but admitted to having undertaken the task of convincing Rhee that the ROK Army was in such a good shape that it was safe to withdraw the U.S. troops. Of course, in his case, the rationale is simpler to find. He was a career diplomat and was carrying out a State Department agenda. This is what a diplomat does. The CIA was a young agency at that time. The Office of Strategic Service (OSS), which was the spook agency during World War II, was dismantled just after the War. Its successor, the CIA, was created on September 18, 1947. It started to operate in South Korea in early 1948, although General MacArthur did not welcome an independent intelligence unit operating outside his control. At that time, Korea was still under his control, and MacArthur had his own intelligence unit, G2, under Willoughby doing intelligence collection. The Korean Labor Organization (KLO) was created in 1948. It was a front for Willoughby’s G2 to collect information on North Korea and China. Only a
61. FRUS Vol. 7, 1950, pp. 96-98. 62. Blair, p. 55.
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The Unfinished War handful of American operatives worked in the organization,63 but the agency actually employed about 10,000 Koreans and Chinese.64 The KLO was hidden under the Oceanic Survey Department of the ROK Ministry of Fisheries. MacArthur began to intensify his intelligence gathering as China was falling to the hands of Mao; and when the CIA passed on to him the information that the USSR, Red China and North Korea met in December 1948 for something big, his interest was piqued. In 1949, the U.S. troops were already withdrawing from South Korea, and MacArthur had no official responsibility for South Korea, but G2 and its KLO continued to operate in South Korea. Musashiya claimed that the CIA Headquarters was informed of the precise date that North Korea would invade South Korea. However, exactly when the CIA Headquarters in Washington received such information is not clear. MacArthur’s biographer, William Manchester, said, “On March 10, 1950, the CIA had predicted the PA [North Korean People’s Army] will attack South Korea in June 1950.”65 This corroborates Musashiya’s claim. This prediction was also backed up by Willoughby, in the third week of March, 1950. His report was only one of 1,195 reports sent to Washington, and apparently did not impress the recipients. Maj. John K. Singlaub, who was in charge of the CIA field office in Mukden, Manchuria, infiltrated several spies into the upper echelon of the North Korean military and reported that the North Korean planned to invade the South.66 This, too, appears to have been ignored. Exactly who knew what was investigated later by Congress. In any event, such intelligence did not fit the U.S. plan for the withdrawal of its troops, and therefore might have been an embarrassment to the CIA in Washington. This was also true of the intelligence gathered by the ROK Army sources. Washington considered Korean sources to be “too emotional” and perhaps as having “an ulterior motive.” However, if Washington did not trust the CIA field office, Willoughby’s G2, the KLO, or South Korean sources whom did they trust? They trusted Roberts and Muccio, who had ulterior motives of their own but ones that served the Administration’s agenda. They were both 63. William B. Breuer, Shadow Warriors: the Covert War in Korea (New York, etc.: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.), p. 20, hereafter Breuer. 64. This information is from Harimao Musashiya. His Korean name is said to be Park Sung Uk; he was adopted by a Japanese in Korea when he was child. When he took U.S. citizenship and became a high-ranking CIA agent is not clear. 65. Manchester, p. 543. 66. Breuer, pp. 20-21.
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7. Prelude to a Hot War State Department employees. If there was any ideological bias that doomed Korea, one has to point the finger at the State Department. By this time, the U.S. troops were already out of South Korea, and the State Department had spread the word that South Korea would be able to defend itself and that the U.S. would not defend her — at least according to Acheson. It would have taken a very unusual CIA chief to tell Truman and the State Department that they were all wrong. However, Washington was awash with intelligence reports — which many dismissed as rumors — of an imminent invasion of South Korea. It is also true that there were conflicting intelligence reports circulating in Washington. In early 1950, British intelligence estimated that the Inmin-gun had between 35,000 and 36,000 trained troops. Willoughby estimated that the Inmin-gun had 135,000 troops, which turned out to be more accurate. In view of such widely diverging reports, President Truman asked the CIA to resolve the dispute in early 1950. The CIA sent an agent, Lt. Colonel Jay Vanderpool, to South Korea for fact-finding. Why Washington did so is uncertain because, by this time, there was already a large and active CIA operation in Japan and South Korea. Obviously, Washington distrusted these “rumors.” Vanderpool spent a while in Japan, no doubt talking to Willoughby and others, and in South Korea talking, presumably, with Muccio and Roberts. Although the basis of his intelligence estimate has not been revealed, he sent a report to Washington supporting the British estimate of 36,000 Inmin-gun67 — a conclusion that made the CIA Headquarters and other policymakers in Washington comfortable. On Vanderpool’s way back to the U.S., the Korean War broke out and proved that these estimates were totally out of line. During Congressional investigations of the intelligence failures after the war started, CIA Director Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter testified that the CIA had compiled an intelligence estimate based on field agent reports and sent it to key officials. The report indicated some alarming activities, suggesting that an invasion was imminent.68 The CIA had the signature proof that Truman, Acheson and Louis Johnson had received such reports, although the lead witness, Secretary Acheson, testified that he had not received such reports. The delivery of such reports, even if true, was made only five days before the actual
67. Ben S. Malcom with Ron Martz, White Tigers: My Secret War in North Korea (Washington and London: Brassey’s, 1996), pp. 13-14, hereafter Malcom. 68. See Breuer, p. 40 for details.
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The Unfinished War invasion. While this was not enough time to build up the ROKs, even a few days’ advance warning could have saved thousands of ROKs caught flatfooted. In hindsight, what failed was not intelligence gathering but analysis at the CIA Headquarters and other agencies in Washington. Like many North Koreans at that time, Lim Kun Shick, a classmate of Simon’s on the west coast of North Korea, witnessed an unusual movement of the Inmin-gun troops in mid-June 1950.During the Japanese occupation, Kun Shick’s father had a prosperous medical practice in Sariwon. He had made enough money to buy a big, former bank building for his clinic. Thus, when the Communists marched into town, Kun Shick’s father was labeled as a bourgeois, an enemy of the people, and the big building was proof of his crime. However, he was one of few pediatricians around, and so he was not jailed. Due to his father’s influence, Kun Shick became very critical of the Communists and became proAmerican. Just a couple weeks before June 25, Lim Kun Shick’s distant relative, Captain Yoo Jin Lim, the captain of a tank battalion, stopped by Kun Shick’s boarding house in Namchun to show off his tank. It made a quite a powerful impression on the young man. Kun Shick still remembers that it was painted white inside and that the captain bragged that it was air-conditioned and could travel at a speed of 45 km per hour. Captain Lim said, “I will be the first to capture the South Korean broadcast station in Seoul and make a radio announcement to the South Korean people.” Kun Shick heard later that, in fact, a North Korean tank battalion did capture the South Korean broadcast station first and did make an announcement. He was never sure whether it was Captain Lim or someone else; Kun Shick has not seen Captain Lim since he stopped by Namchun. Kun Shick, now living in Piedmont, California, asked me, “How is it that the CIA did not know about such a big military maneuver?” We now know that the CIA in Korea and Japan knew about this, but Washington policy makers were not convinced by their report.
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8. ON A RAINY SUNDAY ACROSS THE 38TH PARALLEL On the Sunday morning of June 25, 1950, a monsoon rain was falling. It was in the wee hours of that morning when the Inmin-gun launched a massive attack all across the 38th parallel, while its navy landed troops on the east coast. The attack bore the unmistakable mark of the Pearl Harbor surprise attack by the Japanese nine years earlier. At that time, the eldest of my half-brothers, Soon-ku, was a captain in the 9th Regiment of the ROK 7th Division. After the Cheju-do campaign against the leftist insurgency, he was promoted to first lieutenant and commanded a platoon at the front line. On that morning, however, Soon-ku was on a weekend leave and was staying with his paternal aunt in Seoul. He had not been able to take weekend leave for over two months. From May 1 to mid-June of 1950, his unit had been on alert because the government expected border disturbances. On May 1, Labor Day, Communists usually staged demonstrations, and May 30 was Election Day for the National Assembly. During the previous election, the Communists agitated and attempted insurgency. However, on this Labor Day and Election Day, the 38th parallel was unusually quiet. What Soon-ku and 20 million South Koreans did not know was that North Korea was deliberately trying to divert the attention of South Korea away from the coming invasion. By midnight of June 23, the alert was cancelled. Soon-ku and almost half the soldiers of the 7th Division were allowed to take the Sunday off. The ROK 1st Division also guarding the western front above Seoul did the same. On June 25, 1950, when the news broke that a massive invasion was underway, Soon-ku was
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The Unfinished War one of thousands of ROK officers and enlisted men who failed to return to their units. The ROK 1st Division’s commander, Colonel Paik Sun Yup, was in training at what was then the outskirts of Seoul, called Shihung. Paik was tall for Koreans of his generation. He was one of the promising colonels in the two-yearold ROK Army. On June 25, his brother In Yup was the commander of the independent 17th Regiment defending the barren Ongjin peninsula to the west of the 1st Division. About 7 a.m. on June 25, Colonel Paik Sun Yup received a telephone call from his Chief of Operations, with the news of what appeared to be a massive Inmin-gun invasion. He had no car at his disposal and flagged down a passing military jeep and went to American adviser Major Lloyd Rockwell’s house in Seoul. Rockwell was a senior advisor to the ROK 1st Division. Practically all the U.S. military advisors at that time lived in Seoul. Their main job had more to do with rationing ammunition and arms to the ROKs than training them. The U.S. Advisory Group under Roberts was more concerned with the ROK invasion of North Korea than the other way around. Therefore, the advisers maintained a very strict control over the supply of ammunition to the ROK army. Major Rockwell and Colonel Paik drove north together to the division headquarters. Paik’s two regiments, the 12th and 13th, were deployed around Kaesong, practically on the 38th parallel. Its 11th Regiment was kept in reserve near Seoul. They had no idea that the invading army consisted of the elite 5th, 6th, and 7th Divisions, mostly made of the so-called repatriated Korean “volunteers” from China. These were veterans of Mao’s army, who had fought the Japanese and then defeated Chiang’s Nationalist Army. In contrast, the highest level of training the ROK army received under the KMAG was “one show” of a battalionlevel maneuver. They were not prepared for the coming battles. There was not even an overall defense plan. Each ROK army division was encouraged to come up with its own individual plan. At 4 a.m., June 25, some 111,000 Inmin-gun soldiers, including 242 T-34 tanks and 1,610 artillery guns of various types, drove south. The enemy artillery could shoot almost twice the distance of the small number of artillery that the ROK had in its possession. None of the anti-tank bullets or shells in the ROK’s possession was capable of penetrating the armor of T-34 tanks. Paik found out that communication was lost with the 12th Regiment. The reserve 11th Regiment was being brought forward from Seoul. The 13th Regiment
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8. On a Rainy Sunday Across the 38th Parallel was apparently fighting the Inmin-gun well, although it, too, was giving ground according to the previously established plan of retreating to the Imjin River rather than meeting the enemy head on at the 38th parallel. The most disturbing news, however, came from Major Rockwell. At about noon, Rockwell received an order to return to Seoul because the KMAG was pulling out of South Korea. Rockwell and Paik shook hands and parted, but Paik was upset. Complex emotions erupted: Paik remembered that the U.S. had promised to help the ROK in case of war, but now the war upon them and the U.S. seemed to have decided to leave South Korea to its own fate. An immediate question was who would provide ammunitions and supplies now that the Americans were leaving. As Paik’s 13th Regiment retreated to the southern bank of the Imjin River, the Communists were in hot pursuit. The engineers had already wired the charges to blow up the bridge. Paik, however, had to wait for the 12th Regiment. It had been incommunicado for the whole day, but Paik did not believe that his entire regiment had just disappeared into thin air. At 3 p.m., what remained of the 12th Regiment crossed the bridge: no more than 40 men and the regimental commander, Chun, badly wounded and bleeding heavily. Commander Chun had to be transported to Seoul immediately. Paik could not believe it. Meanwhile, the Inmin-gun soldiers on motorcycles were following closely behind. Paik ordered the engineers to detonate the charges. The engineer pushed the detonator; nothing happened. Something had gone terribly wrong. Perhaps the cord was cut, or was defective. Hordes of Inmin-gun rushed and seized the bridge. So much for the carefully laid plan of stopping the enemy at the Imjin River; the bridge fell into enemy hands, intact. The biggest problem among the soldiers was the fear of tanks. They had never seen tanks before. Paik’s officers kept repeating, “Tank, tanks, there is no way to stop the tanks.” Even the word “tank” seemed to terrify them. Yet, Paik’s units fought for three days against overwhelming odds. At Munsan, some soldiers volunteered to strap satchel charges of explosives to their backs and hurled themselves under advancing T-34 tanks. Others charged the oncoming tanks with pole charges. Paik denied the rumor that he had ordered such suicide missions. Even such bravery had a limited effect, however, against mechanized Inmin-gun divisions moving down in force with the protection of infantry. Because of General William L. Roberts’ refusal to see Korea as a potential ground for tank battles, the ROK Army was not supplied with anti-tank mines and
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The Unfinished War rockets capable of destroying T-34s. This and a handful of other key decisions doomed the ROK Army. The ROK 1st Division reeled, recovered and then mounted a surprisingly stout defense. Amid this turmoil, Paik received a message from his younger brother, Colonel Paik In Yup, that his regiment was in a dire situation and that this message might be his last. Apparently, his brother’s independent 17th Regiment on the Ongjin peninsula was not doing as well as the 1st Division. By noon of June 25, Russian-made YAK fighter planes appeared over the Kimpo airport. They returned later in the afternoon and destroyed its communications tower and damaged several South Korean light spotter planes sitting on the tarmac. The Inmin-gun had 180 airplanes (including YAKs) when the war broke out, while South Korea had only 30 reconnaissance planes that were used to spot Communist guerillas in infested areas. The North Korean air attack did more psychological than physical damage to South Korea. The four Yak fighters, which sent bursts of fire into the Blue House, rattled President Rhee and his staff. Rhee’s staff advised him to move south immediately to avoid being captured by the Inmin-gun. According to Ambassador John Muccio, Rhee and Acting Prime Minister Shin Sung Mo, whom he met on the evening of June 25, mentioned to him that the cabinet had met and decided that it would be “disastrous for the Korean cause to have him [Rhee] fall into the hands of the Communists and that their defense capabilities were such that they had better move on out of Seoul.” Muccio tried to reassure Rhee that none of the ROK unit had given in, and said, “His [Rhee’s] military was doing a superb job.” Muccio convinced Rhee to delay his planned evacuation on June 26, but Rhee and his staff left Seoul at 2:00 a.m. on June 27. His Acting Prime Minister and Minister of Defense Shin left Seoul twelve hours later, and Chief of Staff Chae did so at 2:00 a.m., June 28. Seoul fell on June 28. Sixty-two members of the National Assembly were caught behind the lines. Eight of them were killed and 27 were kidnapped or missing. Rhee could certainly have delayed his departure at least by 24 hours, but this was hindsight wisdom. They demanded his apology, which he never gave. Historians and others said that Rhee was disingenuous if not cowardly for abandoning Seoul while leaving behind a recorded radio message urging the people to remain in Seoul and the soldiers to defend the lines to the end. In hindsight, the right thing to have done was to order the ROKs to fall back to the southern bank of the Han River, but Rhee had decided to fight for every inch of real estate. Obviously, he had no idea how outmatched his soldiers were. Muccio
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8. On a Rainy Sunday Across the 38th Parallel was telling him that the ROKs were holding up well, and his Defense Secretary was calling it a disaster. In hindsight, Rhee certainly could have delayed his departure from Seoul by 24 hours. Returning to Paik’s predicament, one encouraging development was that KMAG advisor Major Robert Donovan returned to his regiment, saying that the KMAG had cancelled the previous order to retreat from South Korea. Donovan also brought news that the ROK Army Headquarters was mobilizing six additional regiments to send north to defend the capital. Rhee decided to stand and fight. Headquarters had high hopes that he and his regiment would hold the front — a message that weighed heavily on Paik. The ROK 7th Division, however, retreated rapidly and exposed the right flank of Paik’s division. By this time, telephone lines had been cut and communications had been disrupted. An ambulance sent to Seoul with wounded men returned with them still in the vehicle. A truck sent south to bring ammunitions also returned empty. They reported that the bridge across the Han River had been demolished and that the enemy already occupied Seoul. Major Ro, in charge of supply and logistics, reported that there was very little ammunition left. That evening, bazooka shells and machine gun bullets began to hit his headquarters. Paik decided to retreat and ordered every unit to cross the river with whatever means available. This meant using rowboats and makeshift rafts, at some areas. Everyone was ordered to regroup at the Shihung Infantry School on the other side of the river. All the artillery, vehicles and other heavy equipment had to be abandoned. Ambassador Muccio, recalling the situation on June 25, reflected, “I have been unable to understand why the Communists didn’t get into Seoul the same night, because they had such a preponderance of armor and mobility, and they had control in the air, and the south had no defense against air or any kind.” He answered his own question by adding, “One was the unexpected firmness of the South Koreans. Not a single unit gave up. The second was that there was a torrential rain on that morning[.] I think what the Communists had in mind was to rush into Seoul, capture the government, and then they’d be able to present to the world that Rhee and his government had no support from the people of Korea, and the whole issue would have been settled right then and there before the U.N. or the Free World could do anything.” Col. Paik and his men’s stubborn though futile resistance served a purpose.
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The Unfinished War On June 25, 1950, Park Chung Hee, still a civilian employee at the ROK Army Headquarters, was on leave at his hometown near Gumi, just north of Daegu. About noon that day, he received a telegram from Colonel Chang Do Young, the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, asking him to report to work immediately. Chang was not sure that Park would do so — considering his background as a former Communist. However, Park managed to get on a night train and arrived at the ROK Army Headquarters at Yongsan. A junior officer still at the Headquarters said that practically everyone had already evacuated. Park walked toward the Seoul Railway Station. On his way, he heard the sound of what appeared to be a Caterpillar tractor. Soon, he observed several Russianmade medium tanks rumbling toward the West Gate Prison, where Park had spent about a month in 1948. Apparently, the Inmin-gun were going to free the political prisoners who were being held there. When Park located Colonel Chang Do Young in the Shihung Infantry School, being used temporarily as the ROK Army Headquarters, Colonel Chang could not believe his eyes. Most leftists had joined the Inmin-gun at this time and he had expected Park to do the same. He restored Park’s former rank as major.
REACTIONS OF WASHINGTON In Washington, news of the rout of the ROK Army awoke the members of the National Security Council. On that day, President Truman was on vacation in his home state of Missouri. Secretary of State Acheson, who had proclaimed earlier that South Korea was outside the Pacific defense perimeter, took charge. With the approval of Truman, Acheson called the U.N. Security Council meeting, which promptly declared that North Korea had committed an act of aggression. The Soviet Union had been boycotting the U.N. Security Council in continuing protest that the Nationalist Chinese still represented China and occupied her seat in the Security Council. This ultimately cost the Soviets a chance to veto the resolution against North Korea. On June 25 (June 26 in Korea), the U.N. called for the immediate cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of North Korean forces to the 38th parallel. On the evening of June 25 (June 26 in Korea), President Truman rushed back to the capital. He wrote later, “I felt certain that if South Korea was allowed
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8. On a Rainy Sunday Across the 38th Parallel to fall, Communist leaders would be emboldened to override nations closer to our own shores. If the Communists were permitted to force their way into the Republic of Korea…no small nation would have courage to resist threats and aggression by stronger Communist neighbors.” 69 The NSC meeting at Blair House in Washington D.C. started with a field trip report by Defense Secretary Johnson and Chairman of the JCS Bradley, who had just returned from Tokyo. The first question in everyone’s mind was whether the invasion was part of a larger Communist offensive. They rather suspected that it was. The meeting approved Acheson’s proposal to order the Seventh Fleet to proceed north from the Philippines to prevent a Communist Chinese attack on Taiwan and also to dissuade the Nationalist Chinese from making a move against the mainland. Truman, Acheson, Bradley and, in fact, all of the members of the National Security Council agreed that failure to protect South Korea could lead to a political and military disaster. Taiwan, Indochina, and the Philippines might be next. The NSC authorized MacArthur to send arms and ammunition to South Korea, and to use the U.S. Air Force to help evacuate American women and children. On the following day, June 26 (June 27 in Korea), Truman announced, “The United States will vigorously support the effort of the [U.N. Security] Council to terminate this serious breach of the peace.” If only the U.S. had made such a statement several months earlier, as President Rhee had begged it to do, the war might have been avoided. Why now? For Stalin and Kim Il Sung, it was a mystery why the U.S. made such an abrupt policy change. The answer was in the National Security Council’s policy document NSC-68. Precisely two months before the war broke out on April 25, 1950, Harry Truman asked the National Security Council to approve a policy paper that stated that the U.S. would resist any Communist threat to non-Red nations anywhere in the world. This policy was formulated in the aftermath of the loss of China and amid rising public criticism leveled against the Truman Administration. Truman understood that he and his party could not survive the fall of another Asian country and was “running scared from Republican critics.”70 Even John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson understood and sympathized with the outrage 69. Truman, pp. 332-333. 70. Manchester, pp. 542-543.
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The Unfinished War of the public. Ten thousand miles away in Tokyo, MacArthur was fuming and began to battle against the Truman Administration for its inept handling of China affairs. The policy, however, remained top secret. Truman could not quote from it when he wrote his memoir in 1956, and even Acheson (who wrote his memoir in 1969) could not do so. Still a mystery is why the U.S. kept NSC-68 secret rather than announcing its intent to the world. Had it announced such a policy immediately, the Korean War might have been averted. However, the document also contained sensitive statements about increasing defense spending up to 20 percent of the gross national product, which would have upset not only the pacifists and liberals, but also most Americans who were not ready for another major war. In a matter of a day, it became clear that the supply of ammunitions could not stop the Communists. On June 26, Acheson called for a stronger U.N. resolution requesting U.N. member nations to resist this aggression and contribute forces. A second NSC meeting resolved to provide air and naval support. Bradley said that the U.S. had to draw the line somewhere — and Korea was as good a place as any. He commented that jets flying over South Korea would have a great “morale effect...even if they were unable to spot the North Korean tanks.” A few days earlier, in Tokyo, he had thought North Korea would not dare attack South Korea; and now he grossly underestimated enemy resolve and capability. The speed with which the decision to intervene was made startled the Communists. Some even saw an American conspiracy: after all, America had lured North Korean to invade South Korea by announcing the Acheson Line and the like.After ordering the delivery of mortars, arms and extra ammunition to the ROK Army from the stockpile in Japan, MacArthur sent a survey team headed by Brigadier General John Church to assess the situation in Korea. On June 27, Ambassador John Muccio informed MacArthur that Seoul was about to fall and all Korea might be lost. MacArthur was as dumbfounded as Washington decision-makers. Korea was not his responsibility and he did not think much about her. He simply conveyed the following message to Washington: “Complete collapse is imminent.” By that time, it became clear that the ROK Army had little hope of holding off the Inmin-gun. In the second NSC meeting, Truman authorized the use of air and naval support and was ready to send not only U.S. air and naval support, but also American ground forces. However, Chairman of the JCS Omar Bradley
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8. On a Rainy Sunday Across the 38th Parallel successfully argued for waiting a few more days instead of taking such a “drastic step.” To the Communists, Washington made the decision to intervene with lightning speed, but to the ROK, which lost half of its soldiers in the first few days of the war, it was a few days too late. General Bradley did not help matters by dissuading President Truman from taking the right step. On June 26 (June 27 in Tokyo), Secretary Johnson and General Bradley made a scrambled-voice call to MacArthur, informing him of the NSC’s decision. Washington did not ask MacArthur for his opinion and he offered none. MacArthur was in the teleprompter room when a message arrived from Washington through a state-of-art decoding device called “telecon.” According to his biographer, Geoffrey Perret, MacArthur was shocked and could not believe the message he received: “There it was, scrolling soundlessly down the glowing telecon screen: The United States was going to commit its air and naval forces to defend South Korea.”71 All senior staffers of the Far East Command (FEC) were equally surprised at Truman’s decision. To quote some more colorful phrases from Perret, MacArthur had not in the least expected “that Missouri hayseed accidentally shot into the White House” by the death of President Franklin Roosevelt, and now “surrounded by a bunch of mealy mouthed liberals,” to have “the balls to fight.” MacArthur had no knowledge of NSC-68. He had all along believed that the U.S. would not defend South Korea. The only inkling that the U.S. might come to the defense of South Korea was provided by the staunch antiCommunist John Foster Dulles, who had visited the Far East as a special representative of the Secretary of State only days before the war broke out. He visited the 38th parallel and on the same evening, he addressed the South Korean National Assembly. That was on June 17, 1950. He said that the American people remained “faithful to the cause of human freedom and loyal to those everywhere who honorably support it.” The statement was so out of line with prior statements by U.S. officials such as Acheson, Tom Connelly (chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) and MacArthur that most people did not take it seriously. Back in Washington on June 28, Truman announced to the world his decision to go to the rescue of South Korea. In response to the call of the U.N., 29 member nations would make specific offers of assistance to South Korea. Eventually, 16 nations sent ground, air and naval forces. This included America’s 71. Perret, pp. 541-541.
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The Unfinished War Second World War allies, some Asian countries (Thailand and the Philippines) and others from as far away as Colombia and Ethiopia, which furnished ground combat troops. India, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Italy sent medical units. Air Force support arrived from the U.S. and other countries. Naval forces were sent from the U.S., Great Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. On their way from Japan to Kimpo airfield on June 27, Brigadier General John Church’s fact-finding party received a warning that Kimpo might be in enemy hands. His pilot diverted the plane to an airfield at Suwon, about 20 miles south of Seoul. Church found South Korea in utter chaos. The U.S. Military Advisory Group in South Korea (KMAG) had also disintegrated by this time. Its personnel was evacuating with the civilians or straggling all over South Korea. The road south from Seoul was jammed with fleeing ROK soldiers, refugees, reporters, and photographers. Having earlier been told of the high quality of the ROK Army by Roberts, Church was flabbergasted to find it in total disarray. He later wrote and attributed the collapse to the “lack of leadership.” Many ROK soldiers were eager to stand and fight, but they didn’t know how or where; they were leaderless. The two-year-old army did not have much in the way of experienced military officers. Church came to the conclusion that the only option left was to throw up a strong defense on the southern bank of the Han River. That morning, he conveyed the bad news to MacArthur by radio. He told GHQ that, in order to recapture Seoul and reestablish ROK Army positions at the 38th parallel, “it would be necessary to employ American ground forces.”
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9. THE ROK ARMY ON THE BRINK OF DISINTEGRATION On the battlefront around Seoul, the plan was to blow up all the bridges along the Han River to prevent enemy tanks from crossing them. Accordingly, ROK Army engineers had packed vast quantities of explosives under the vehicular and rail bridges. They were to blow up the bridges after the ROK army escaped but before the enemy tanks approached. The bridges were blown up at 2:30 a.m. or thereabouts. In hindsight, the vehicular bridge was destroyed several hours too early. Enemy troops did not reach the center of Seoul until around noon and the Han River for another several hours. At this time, the ROK 1st Division was desperately resisting the onslaught of two Inmin-gun divisions around Munsan. The ROK 7th Division was disintegrating more rapidly, but one unit was engaged in a desperate battle on the Miari Hill to the north of Seoul; furthermore, a company-sized group of ROK soldiers was dug in on Nam-san (South Mountain) at the heart of Seoul. About 80 of them were lightly wounded ROK soldiers who walked out of the hospital to defend the city. These soldiers would fight the enemy to the last man.72 These ROK soldiers on the Nam-san Mountain witnessed the mid-section of the bridge come crashing down and splashing into the river. Trucks, soldiers, and civilians plunged into the river along with it. Many more vehicles and persons later tried to cross the bridge in the dark, not knowing that the bridge had been blown. Some of them also plunged into the river. The ROK Army engineers, however, failed to destroy one span of the rail bridge. 72. This account of the ROK disaster is from Hanguk Jeonjaeng-sa (Korean War History, in Korean only) (Seoul: Korean Military Academy, August 1996), op cit, pp. 218219.
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The Unfinished War On the vehicular bridge, miles from the rail bridge, Miss Marguerite (Maggie) Higgins of the New York Herald Tribune was on a jeep with KMAG officers. She observed that the streets were so jammed with pedestrians and vehicles that no one was making much progress.73 She reported that the ROK soldiers seemed to be in good spirits, even though they had been routed. However, the civilians on foot with children and heavy burdens were not orderly. They stumbled along by the thousands. Women carried bundles on their heads. Men carried their belongings in their hands. Miss Higgins noted that the thunder of guns behind grew louder. As other journalists tried to see what was blocking traffic, suddenly “the sky was lighted by a huge sheet of sickly orange flame. The journalists suffered minor injuries but the ROK soldiers in the truck ahead of the journalists had been hit and appeared to be dead. Screaming refugees turned around and raced for the northern shore.” Who was responsible for the premature demolition of the bridges has not been answered satisfactorily. Some pointed their fingers at ROK Chief of Staff Major General Chae and others at his civilian boss. In the end, Chief Engineer Choi Chang-sik was blamed for the disaster and was executed for it. There was confusion all around. Tanks had broken into the city, and no one knew for sure how much longer the lines would hold. Telephone lines were cut and the engineers at the bridges had no way of knowing how many more troops were still north of the Han River or how close the Inmin-gun tanks were. Some retreating soldiers of the 7th Division and civilians hobbled over the railway ties to cross the river. The southbound train track was intact. Brigadier General Yu, then the commander of the 7th ROK division after the successful Cheju Island campaign, also crossed the river in this manner with some of his soldiers. They positioned themselves on the southern end of the rail bridge. The Inmin-gun tanks and artillery lobbed shells. Yu and his soldiers had only small arms and could not respond in kind. The Inmin-gun did not try to cross the river. On June 28, twelve B-26s flew out of their Japanese base and pounded lines of supply trains and other targets. Enemy ground fire was heavy. One aircraft crashed and two were badly damaged. The F-80 fighter-bombers, which flew out of a separate base in Japan, found the roads jammed with tanks, trucks, and artillery. They strafed the tanks. On the insistence of MacArthur, even the B-29s designed as “strategic bombers” dropped bombs from high altitudes. They were
73. Miss Higgins’ story is captured in Goulden, pp. 80-83.
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9. The ROK Army on the Brink of Disintegration not designed for close combat support and missed their targets more often than not. It was an attempt at intimidation. As this was happening, Maggie Higgins was crossing a mountain path to Suwon. She heard a steady drone. She looked up to see silvery U.S. fighter planes dive on Seoul. She said, “My heart pounded with excitement — this must be part of the ‘momentous event’ mentioned in MacArthur’s message.” The Koreans around her screamed with joy. Women from a nearby village rushed out to grasp her hand and pointed to the sky with ecstasy.74 At about daybreak on June 29, Col. Paik and his stragglers also crossed the Han River. They had walked all night. They were extremely tired and had not eaten for some time. At the Yongdung-po train station south of the Han River, he saw USMAG Lt. Ray May standing on the station platform. Exhausted and hungry, Paik asked May whether he had food. May had none but managed to find sugar from somewhere. Paik and his stragglers made sugar water and shared it among themselves. It had a miraculous effect on them. Paik was able to organize his thoughts and asked May about the current situation. May said, “It is desperate, but the U.S. Army may come to the rescue of South Korea. You ROKs must hold the Han River until the U.S. army arrives.” Although the major thrust was toward Seoul, there were three other simultaneous thrusts: to the central and eastern parts of the peninsula and to the small land-locked Ongjin peninsula to the extreme west. The loss of the Ongjin peninsula was anticipated and no attempt was made to defend it, but the collapse of the central and eastern fronts would endanger the western front and cut off the retreat route from Seoul. But the ROK 6th Division in the central sector made good account of themselves by holding onto the transportation center of Chunchon in the central sector and pounding the enemy column with artillery until shells ran low. Its special commando unit attacked the enemy’s artillery position with grenades and incendiary bottles. The enemy regiment spearheading the attack incurred heavy losses (40 percent casualties) in their repeated attacks, but failed to capture Chunchon on the date planned. One factor favoring the ROKs in the sector was that its commander had not issued leave passes to his soldiers because he detected suspicious enemy maneuvers north of the 38th parallel. Therefore, the entire division was on duty when the invasion started. 74. John Tolland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953 (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1991), p. 57, Tolland hereafter.
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The Unfinished War The ROK 8th Division on the east coast, however, crumbled early, exposing the 6th Division’s right flank. The ROK 6th Division retreated as instructed to the southern bank of the Han River with minimal loss. They brought the ROK army fighting force to 54,000 men. Nevertheless, the ROK army losses during the first week of the fighting were 44,000 soldiers killed, captured, or missing. This was almost half its total force, and those who remained came out of the first days of the war physically and psychologically battered.75
MACARTHUR IN SUWON Early in the morning on June 29, MacArthur flew from Tokyo to Suwon aboard his private airplane Bataan. The weather was so foul that General George Stratemeyer, the commander of the Far Eastern Air Force (FEAF), almost grounded the plane. Stratemeyer was also concerned with the threat of enemy fighter aircraft and their amazingly effective anti-aircraft guns. In fact, hostile ground fire had riddled twelve of his B-26s near Munsan just south of the 38th parallel. One of them crashed during landing, killing all crew members. On that morning, four fighters escorted the Bataan. A planeload of staff and reporters accompanied the general. The fighter escort saw action. Earlier in the morning, six Yaks had strafed the Suwon airfield (although they failed to disable it). U.S. jet fighters clearing the air for the Bataan shot down two of them. When the American jets left, Yaks returned again. As MacArthur’s party was approaching Suwon, a Yak fighter-bomber was just pulling away after creating craters in the airfield and leaving smoldering wreckage at the end of the runway. Lt. Col. Anthony Story, piloting the Bataan, made an evasive move while one of the Mustang escorts went after the Yak. President Rhee flew into the airfield in a light spotter plane, also dodging North Korean Yak fighter fire. MacArthur had first met Rhee when he was still in the U.S. in exile. They shared similar values as far as Communism was concerned. Ambassador Muccio also flew in on board a separate spotter plane. General Church (who had been Korea only three days) and his subordinates started to brief MacArthur, his chief of staff Major General Edward Almond, Major General Courtney Whitney, and others present, using maps and 75. Goulden, p. 83
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9. The ROK Army on the Brink of Disintegration pointers. General Chae, the chief of staff of the ROK Army, was also present in the room. Harold Noble, a senior embassy staffer in charge of intelligence and the son of Rhee’s first English teacher at Paijai, insisted that Muccio give Chae a chance. Chae hardly spoke English, so he addressed the group through an interpreter. MacArthur asked Chae how he planned to fight the Inmin-gun. Chae replied that he would raise a million-man army. MacArthur was unimpressed. After the briefing, MacArthur, 70 years old then, insisted on going to the front to observe the situation. His advisers were against it, but MacArthur made the trip to the scene of battle — as he had done many times during the Pacific War. His party, excluding by then the entourages of Rhee and Muccio, received another air attack on the way. When his aides were hitting ditches to avoid the air raid, MacArthur sat calmly in the back seat of the car, sucking his pipe and telling his concerned staff, down in a ditch, “Those things aren’t going to hit me.”76 The field visit of this legendary American general provided an immense relief to the desperate ROKs. It was the first indication that America might be seriously considering a dispatch of ground troops to Korea. General Yu wished he had heard such news 24 hours earlier, when his troops had been crossing the river and their morale was so low that some had contemplated suicide rather than being captured alive by the Inmin-gun. The news of possible U.S. ground troop participation would have done wonders for their morale. MacArthur’s party got out of their cars on the southern bank of the Han River, near Yongdung-po. On top of a hill, MacArthur saw the ancient capital of Korea burning red as far as his eyes could see. From there, he conceived a plan. He decided that the ROK army should retreat deep to south. This would lengthen the enemy’s supply line. He would then cut it off at the rear, perhaps near Seoul. Before his return, MacArthur visited his old friend General Kim Chong-kap, commanding one of the divisions attempting to defend the river. Upon his return to Tokyo, MacArthur reported to Washington, “The lightly armed ROKs were designed for keeping law and order and were not prepared to fight against the enemy force armed with tanks and airplanes.” He concluded, as had Church, that the only way to recapture the lost territory was to throw in American ground troops. Army Chief of Staff J. Lawton Collins told 76. Stanley Weinstraub, MacArthur’s War, (New York, London, etc.: Simon & Schuster, 2000) P.52, hereafter Weinstraub.
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The Unfinished War him to send a regimental combat team (roughly 5,000 men) immediately to Busan. MacArthur said that would not be enough. Collins asked how much more he needed. MacArthur replied that two infantry divisions should follow the regimental combat team by restructuring the U.S. occupation army in Japan. He warned that, if necessary action were not taken immediately, America might pay a costly and unnecessary price in terms of human life and prestige worldwide. If the enemy advanced much farther, it would threaten the Republic. MacArthur asked for the immediate approval of President Truman. Collins observed that it was 3:00 a.m. in Washington. MacArthur’s response was, “Wake him up.” At 4:57 a.m., Secretary of Army Frank Pace woke up President Truman with the bad news. Truman authorized MacArthur to use all the forces available to him. Losing the battle was not acceptable to Truman. Ground forces available to MacArthur at the outset of the war included one cavalry division and three infantry divisions under the Eighth U.S. Army in Japan, and the 29th Regimental Combat Team on Okinawa. Their maneuverability and firepower were well below wartime requirements. Some weapons, such as the medium tanks, were not available in the Far East, and ammunition reserves amounted to only a 45-day supply. MacArthur’s Far East Air Force (FEAF) was much better prepared, but it was organized for air defense, not tactical air support. Most FEAF planes were short-range jet interceptors, not meant to fly at low altitudes in support of ground operations. Mustangs in storage in Japan and more in the United States would later prove instrumental in meeting close air support requirements. Naval Forces Far East, MacArthur’s sea arm, controlled only five combat ships and a skeleton amphibious force, although reinforcement was close by from the Seventh Fleet.
TACTICAL ERRORS ALL AROUND The Inmin-gun halted its attack briefly, after capturing Seoul, to celebrate and repair the bridge over the Han River. Festivals were held; and Kim Il Sung gave the Inmin-gun 3rd and 4th Divisions and 10th Tank Regiment, which captured Seoul, the honorary title of the “Seoul Division.” The Inmin-gun then hesitated to make an all out, immediate attack across the Han River, partly because there was a shortage of river-crossing equipment and partly because of the shortage of ammunition and other supplies. In the days that followed,
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9. The ROK Army on the Brink of Disintegration thousands of Seoul citizens were mobilized and forced to repair the bridge and rail crossings. Writing his memoir some 45 years later, General Yu said that in his judgment, as a military tactician, they could have and should have sent tanks over the undamaged track of the rail bridge immediately. The ROK did not have anything with which to repel tanks. General Kim Hong Il was commanding all the ROK forces who were desperately trying to defend the southern bank of the Han River. Kim positioned all available forces along the bank. He had been through challenging assignments in the Chinese Nationalist Army, but this one topped them all. There was much confusion. Soldiers were discouraged, having lost buddies and commanders, and were deserting the army. As this was happening, a group of ROKs tried desperately to hold off Inmin-gun who were landing on the coastal area off Kimpo via fishing boats and rafts. An Inmin-gun reconnaissance team probed the southern bank of the river at several locations, sometimes supported by artillery and tank bombardments from across the river. The ROKs had fought well for several days, engaging the Inmin-gun on a hand-to-hand combat in one encounter. However, the contest was over on July 3, when the Inmin-gun sent the tanks over the rail bridge that they had just repaired. The major airfield at Kimpo and the Yellow Sea port of Inchon fell to enemy hands. General Yu had many years to think about the way the ROK Army fought the Inmin-gun during the first several days of the war. He wrote apologetically that his 7th Division did not make a better account of itself. He had been the commander of the 7th Division only fifteen days when the war broke out. He saw the maneuvering of T-34 tanks on the other side of the 38th parallel, and started to dig defensive trenches in case of invasion. However, before that work could be completed, the war started. And the 2.36-inch bazooka, their principle defense against Russian tanks, had tested successfully against German tanks during World War II but it was not tested against the T-34 — there was no reason to do so against an ally’s tank. In hindsight, the ROKs were badly outmatched in terms of weapons, training, and manpower. The surprise attack further ensured their early defeat. Although a series of miscalculations and intelligence failures in Washington doomed the ROKs even before the war began, the naiveté of Brigadier General Roberts and Ambassador Muccio (if not the game they played) guaranteed the horrendous casualties of the ROKs. Some anti-tank mines if not tanks in the
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The Unfinished War hands of the ROKs would have bought valuable time and saved thousands of lives, but Roberts had declared that Korea was not tank country.
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10. AN UGLY WAR Ambassador Muccio was probably as close to President Syngman Rhee as any American at that time. Muccio described Rhee as having phenomenal stamina for a man of 70, but said that “he had his better spells and less stalwart spells.” He was certainly getting old. His Austrian-born wife, Mary, helped him with his appointments with foreigners and kept in touch with the U.S. embassy. Soon after President Rhee fled Seoul, Muccio left Seoul and drove south in search of him. He found him in a house in Daejon, some 90 miles away. Muccio wanted a promise that the ROK government would remain in existence while tacitly turning the war over to America. As historian Joseph Goulden has pointed out, if the government vanished, so would any U.S. pretense at being in South Korea to defend a democratically elected government.77 The thought of surrender certainly never crossed Rhee’s mind, although Muccio had no way of knowing that. Muccio had one particularly sensitive matter to discuss with Rhee. He asked whether the Cabinet and the National Assembly could stand-down for the time being, so the war could be left to military professionals with minimal interference by politicians. Rhee accepted the U.S. suggestion, which amounted to surrendering his command of the ROK military and ignoring his National Assembly. This “agreement” was called the Daejon Agreement, but it was not approved by the ROK National Assembly.
77. Goulden, pp. 89-90.
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The Unfinished War The ROK was not a U.N. member country, and a means of coordinating with U.S. forces had to be found. The agreement between Rhee and Muccio was not put in writing, but on July 14, 1950, Syngman Rhee simply directed the ROK Army Chief of Staff, General Chung Il Kwon, who by then had replaced Chae, to place himself under the U.N. Command (UNC).78 The ROK Army was neither an integral part of the UNC, nor independent of it. The ROK had little say in the decision-making at the UNC. Subsequent statements made by Rhee indicated that he anticipated that the war would be over soon, once the United States intervened. However, this was not to be, and Rhee erupted into fits of anger when the U.S. all but ignored him. The coordination protocol that evolved included Walker or his chief of staff calling the chief of staff of the ROK Army, upon which the ROK chief of staff would issue orders to his commanders. Later, each U.S. company integrated 100 Korean soldiers, who were known as Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (better known by the acronym “KATUSA”). An American historian wrote that they were green, true, but “brave and willing, and blended into the American outfits in a way that increased the American units’ efficiency and power by a full [one] third.”79 The U.S. 7th Infantry Division had 8,000 Korean recruits within it. In September, 1950, Paik’s ROK 1st Division became part of the U.S. I Corps. Some American writers have described Syngman Rhee as a difficult, obstinate or mercurial person. However, the above action of turning over his command to the U.S. Army suggests that Rhee was an American puppet. For the Communists, he had been a puppet all along. He then tried to ignore the wishes of his National Assembly and proceeded to run the country with an iron grip. Koreans and Americans alike accused him of being a dictator. Ironically, these accusers included Ambassador Muccio, who had led Rhee along this path. It was French statesman Georges Clemenceau (1841–1929) who said, “War is too important a matter to be left to the military.” The U.S. government saw nothing wrong in asking Rhee to abandon democracy and hand over the ROK military to the United Nations Command. “Leave the war to the professionals” had a ring of practicality to it — although America would not think of leaving a real war to military men. The U.S. did not ask the U.K. to transfer its all decision-making to General Eisenhower in
78. Appleman, p. 112. 79. Frazer Hunt, The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur (The Devin-Adair Company: New York, 1954), p. 457.
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10. An Ugly War return for America’s sending its ground troops to England. There was neither a consultative body nor a combined command. Coordination between the UNC and the ROK Army was poor. The supply of weapons and ammunition to the ROK Army was neglected. In July, 1950, MacArthur’s FEC ordered the Eighth U.S. Army (known for its acronym EUSAK) to assume all logistical support of the U.S. and its allied forces in Korea. This included the ROK military, but although the ROKs held half the battle line, they had trouble getting anything approaching a fair share of the ammunition and other war materiel shipped over from Japan. Despite direct orders from General Walker, American quartermasters in the rear hijacked supplies intended for the ROKs. The ROK supplied their troops with foods, uniforms and other such supplies, but Korea had no capacity to supply them with weapons and ammunition. The Communists found it easier to attack and defeat the poorly-equipped ROK Army than they did the American units. However, when the ROK units broke and ran, they exposed the flank of the American units, causing the American units to run — once again proving the old adage that any chain is as strong as its weakest link. After his retreat to Busan, Syngman Rhee lived in a small house and did not have much say in the conduct of the war. Still being president of the ROK, however, he wished to send cables thanking those U.N. member nations that had promised their help in the war and wanted the messages routed through his embassy in Washington, D.C. However, the U.S. Army had taken control of all Korean telegraph and cable facilities, even the commercial cable between Busan and Tokyo. The only way that Rhee could send messages out was through EUSAK. Rhee called Harold Noble of the American embassy, the son of his former teacher at Paijai, and asked him to be so kind as to send the cable to the ROK embassy in Washington. Noble agreed, taking the messages to the 24th Division signal office, where a sergeant informed him that the messages would be dispatched as soon as military traffic had lessened. The next day, Noble returned to verify that the messages had gone out. They had not. The division’s public information officer had refused to send them because some of Rhee’s messages to other chiefs of state criticized the Soviet Union, contrary to command policy and the express orders of the 24th Division.
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The Unfinished War First, Noble argued with the communications officers — to no avail. Then he appealed directly to General William Dean, a long-time acquaintance. General Dean authorized the dispatch of the messages. Ambassador Muccio sympathized with Rhee on the cable incident. He thought the disdain the American military felt toward the ROK was wrong, but he could not change their attitude. Muccio said that the newly-arrived Americans made no attempt to conceal their contempt for the ROKs. Major General Hobart R. Gay, commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, told a press conference that he did not intend to take the ROKs into consideration “at all” in deciding how to deploy his troops. A few days afterward, when a ROK unit saved his right flank from a severe beating, he reconsidered. Gay also forced Korean farmers out of their homes, oblivious to the suffering that his orders caused. He even told the Korean national police to leave his zone of operation — thus undermining his own security. Walker forced Gay to rescind this absurd order.80 In the early days of the war, Kim Il Sung and Moscow had their own worries. They did not anticipate American intervention. The Inmin-gun was losing tanks to American fighter-bombers, and ROK suicide units were destroying tanks as well. He would need more men and tanks. Kim Il Sung drafted not only college students but even high school students to join the war. This decision fell upon the Lee family in a very personal way. Simon was seventeen years old. In the city of Hamhung, in mid-July, 1950, the principal of Simon’s school received a directive from a Party cadre to “volunteer” 50 students from the First High School to the Inmin-gun. Simon and other student leaders were summoned to the principal’s office. The principal, a man in his 50s from a family of landowners, had studied English in Japan. The principal was not a member of the Party but pretended to be a Communist. The person who really controlled the school was the leader of the Youth Cadets of the Worker’s Party. Simon had known the Party would test his loyalty one day, but he had not thought that it would mean going to war before he entered college. At that time, he was waiting eagerly to hear the results of his application to Kum Chuk Engineering University. He wanted to study chemical engineering and become a national hero. 80. Goulden, pp. 144-45.
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10. An Ugly War The next day, the school held a rally. Several speeches followed and a resolution already drafted by the Party was adopted unanimously; everyone in the room knew that the government would not tolerate dissent. Fifty students were selected, and all the students shouted, “Long Live Great Leader Kim Il Sung, Long Live the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.” The rally was an unqualified “success.” Simon tried hard to be seen as a good Communist. Only with a good recommendation of the Party could one advance to a university. To the Communists, the ideology of a student is far more important than academic excellence. After all, why should they educate a student who may turn out to be an enemy of the “people”? It was hard to tell who was the real and who was the fake Communist. Fifty years later, in the year 2000, when President Kim Dae Jung visited Pyongyang, there were a half million citizens lined up in the streets shouting, “Great Leader Kim Jung Il!” Many of them were in tears. How many were true to themselves? A few days later, Simon and other “volunteers” boarded a train heading south. It spewed black smoke from the low-quality coal it burned. The train hid from American planes during the day and could travel only at night. There was heavy traffic along the railway. At each station, trains were loaded with either soldiers or military supplies, moving south. There were several tanks and trucks on one train. Simon and his classmates got off near Pyongyang. He received training as a T-34 tank loader, responsible for loading the shells. There were some truck drivers among the trainees who received training as tank drivers. The machine was simple. Drivers and mechanics sometimes could learn to handle it after only a few days of training. Simon was told that the T-34 was very reliable and was still the best medium tank available then. A Russian engineer by the name of Tsiganov had designed it. Its armor protection, mobility, and firepower were excellent. It had a 76mm gun, with a long barrel length with high muzzle velocity. The Christie suspension system was ideal for a hilly country like Korea. The armor was superior to German medium tanks. Yet, the diesel fuel lent a great operational range — between 200 km to 350 km — and had a low risk of explosion. The speed of 51 km per hour and its maneuverability in rough terrain were a boon. The instructor told them there was nothing in the arsenal of South Korea to stop these tanks. The training lasted only a few weeks. They hid the tanks under thatched huts during the day. American fighter planes were already making sorties over
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The Unfinished War North Korea. The supply of ammunition was low, however, and Simon was given only one chance to shoot the gun. He wasn’t even sure he hit the target. However, that was it. They had to save the ammunition for real battle. In the evenings, they were given political and ideological training. One day in early August, the tanks were loaded onto a train under the supervision of Russian officers, and his unit began to move to the front. The train moved only at night, and the days were spent in tunnels, hiding. After a week, the train could no longer move because bridges had been blown up. After this, the tanks made a slow nocturnal march on their own diesel engines, which generated 500 horsepower. Before daybreak, they had to spend time finding places to hide and camouflage the tanks. Along the way, a few of the tanks broke down, and there were no repair parts. Soon, they realized that the dear comrades in Moscow had sent old tanks to North Korea — tanks that had seen their best days during World War II. Simon did not know where he was going. No one gave such information to a lowly private. He knew that they were going in the direction of Weonju and then toward Andong. From there, Daegu was not far away. Simon was not sure how the Inmin-gun was going to defeat the Americans if all their tanks spent the whole day hiding. One fateful evening as they started their advance, there was a baptism by fire from American Mustangs. A tank in front of his caught fire from napalm, blocking the narrow road. Infantry soldiers who were riding the tank banged the turret, asking to open the hatch — but there was no room in the tank for them. Several soldiers caught fire and began to incinerate with agonizing screams. Bombs exploded, and machine gun fire caught some of the tankers who had decided to come out of the tanks rather than being incinerated within them. Simon’s tank could neither advance nor retreat. Some of the tankers got down and headed straight up a tree-covered hill. His gunner decided to get out and asked Simon to follow. Another machine gun burst broke a nearby pine tree limb. They dashed toward the tree-covered mountain. By the time the two made it up the hill, the other tankers could not be found — they had run even faster! Both of them decided they had had enough war. The idea of becoming a war hero disappeared right then and there. There was no tank to return to. Simon saw that the Inmin-gun could not possibly win this war. They had seen too many of their “indestructible tanks” hunkering down in tunnels and hiding under heavy camouflage. They decided to go home. Simon wasn’t able to fire a single shell toward the ROK side. This was a long way from Hamhung.
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10. An Ugly War Among the first things Kim Il Sung introduced within the so-called “liberated areas” of South Korea were the rapid reconstruction of the Workers Party and the introduction of land reform. The Inmin-gun immediately began to resuscitate the South Korea Worker’s Party and the People’s Committees, which had by that time been all but destroyed. Many previously unheard of organizations were created: youth groups, women’s groups, leagues of writers, etc. Artists were urged to produce ideology-oriented publications and performances. At this time, Soon-ku was hiding from the Communists in his aunt’s house. Communists were actively making rounds. They knocked the door of each house in Seoul. On the streets, Youth Group members simply grabbed pedestrians and “volunteered” them to the Inmin-gun. Soon-ku decided to move south, near Suwon, to another relative’s house. He soon learned that even out in the countryside, the Communists were looking for young people suitable for the Inmin-gun or war labor. The Communists were also looking for pro-Japanese, pro-Syngman Rhee, and pro-American elements. These “reactionaries” were tried in “people’s courts” composed of Party members with no particular legal training or expertise except loyalty to Kim Il Sung and the spirit of proletarian revolution. Few of the accused were released. Most either disappeared or were sent to the firing squad. One of most celebrated such trials involved twelve or so priests, nuns and missionaries. One person on trial was an American Catholic bishop, Patrick Byrne. The people’s court demanded that he confess to being an agent of the CIA. Although the fledgling CIA commanded little respect in Washington, D.C., it did in North Korea. Many reactionaries were sentenced to death as “agents” of the CIA. A judge said to Bishop Byrne, “You shall denounce the United States, the United Nations, and the Vatican on the radio, or you must die.” His surprising reply came without hesitation: “There remains only one course for me — that I die.” A few days later, the bishop and others were sent to a North Korean camp; four months later, die he did.81 Soon-ku was still a ROK officer, and the prospect of being caught and executed by the Party grew increasingly real. He decided that the time had arrived for him to move south and join his unit. He traveled by night and slept in 81. Father Philips Cosbie, Penciling Prisoners (Melbourne: Hawthorn, 1954), pp. 67-81.
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The Unfinished War the hills during the day, slipping across battle lines and finally making it to the ROK Army Headquarters located in Daegu. By this time, some two months had passed since the war started. The reception he got at the ROK Army Headquarters was chilling. He had already been listed as dead or missing in action. There were numerous cases like him at that time, i.e., “failure to report to the unit.” The interrogations dragged on for several days. They demanded to know what had taken Soon-ku so long to reappear: Was he a deserter? Or (even worse), was he a Communist agent now attempting to re-infiltrate the ROK army? They eventually concluded that Soonku was neither, but did note in his file his failure to report to his unit promptly. For one month, he was not allowed to wear his captain’s insignia, and when his classmates from the Academy moved up to the rank of major, he remained a captain. Meanwhile, his aunt’s family in Seoul was facing another kind of problem. There was a shortage of rice among the Inmin-gun. The bombardment was becoming increasingly effective, and supplies were not reaching the occupied area. So the Inmin-gun began to “borrow” rice and other supplies from the civilians. Though they promised to return the rice in a matter of days, several days later the Inmin-gun came to “borrow” even more. As the food situation worsened, all of those whose work did not require them to stay in Seoul were assigned by the People’s Committee to work in the mines and farms in the countryside. Those who received such assignments were ordered to leave their belongings behind for delivery later and were told to leave the city without delay. At that time, my second half-brother Hong-ku was still in Seosan, attending Hong Sung Middle School (a six-year secondary school). He had entered the school late, and he still had one more year to go before graduation. What concerned everyone in Seosan was the land reform system being introduced by the Communists. South Korea had had land reform before the arrival of the Inmin-gun.82 However, its version of land reform model was based on compensation to the landlords to be paid over time by the landless and tenant farmers who received the redistributed land.83 But this time, the Communists sought to impose the North Korean model, in which landowners received no compensation and the landless paid no money for the land. This practice sharply
82. See, for example, Park (1988), pp. 210-212.
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10. An Ugly War split farming communities. All of sudden, some of Hong-ku’s neighbors, mostly tenant farmers, declared themselves to be Communists. It was the endless meetings that bothered Hong-ku most. Day and night, the Communists taught him North Korean songs praising Kim Il Sung and provided political education. He was a practicing Catholic, and Communism did not appeal to him. Some of his fellow middle school students joined left-wing youth organizations and began to finger other students as “reactionaries” and “pro-Japanese lackeys” and to beat them up. Hong-ku was threatened. What was once a quiet rural town had turned into a battleground between the leftand right-wing groups. One day, the so-called “Democratic Youth Organization” ordered all the young men of Samsung-ri Township to gather in front of the Seosan County Office. They were trying to “volunteer” young people to join the Inmin-gun. All of them, including Hong-ku, were lined up and marched to an unrecognized location. Hong-ku thought fast, and told the leader that he had already volunteered to join the Inmin-gun through his middle school in Hong Sung, and in fact, had been on his way to take the school’s medical examination. Hong Sung being in another county, the youth leader had no way to check the accuracy of Hong-ku’s story, and released him. Hong-ku immediately went into hiding, and later went to Daegu and sought out his elder brother, Soon-ku. Soon-ku advised him to enter a ROK training program for artillery officers; its entrance examination was being held soon. That is how, several months later, Hong-ku ended up becoming an ROK officer. Communism was not as popular in South Korea as Kim Il Sung had hoped. When the war started, he did not get the kind of support he expected — partly because of the orthodox Confucian orientation of Koreans and because the South Korean government’s anti-Communism campaign worked, to some extent. Communism did not have indigenous roots in Korea. There were desertions from, and division within, the South Korean Worker’s Party. Kim Il Sung’s radio appeals to South Korean laborers to stage a 83. The government fixed the value of land at 150 percent of the value of average annual crop production. South Korean landlords received this compensation over a fiveyear period. Because of rapid inflation that followed, the actual payment received by the landlord on an inflation-adjusted basis was a fraction of the face value determined by the 150 percent of annual crop production.
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The Unfinished War general strike went unheeded, and his appeals to farmers, small entrepreneurs, merchants, artists, and intellectuals to join in a battle for the Fatherland fared no better. As he complained later to his Deputy Premier Park Hun Yong, who was in charge of organizing popular uprisings in South Korea, there were no uprisings — except by several known guerillas in South Korea.84 Reports of purges, mass killings, hard labor, and other atrocities committed by the Communists85 after their arrival in South Korea did nothing to endear Communism to South Koreans. Thousands of family members of ROK soldiers and policemen and reactionaries were executed. The number of “volunteers” dwindled after several rounds of recruitment, forced labor became increasingly common. The Communists entered the house, checked the amount of food available, designated some portion of it “excessive” and confiscated it The price of rice went up five-fold between June 25th and mid-July, 1950. Starvation was common. The price of used clothes dropped sharply because people sold clothes to buy food. The price of edible oils skyrocketed — because grass soaked in oil before eating was said to lose its toxicity.
84. Seo, pp. 743-744. 85. Ibid, pp. 562-564.
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11. THE FIRST HUNDRED DAYS When President Truman authorized the use of ground troops at General MacArthur’s disposal, the Eighth U.S. Army was in Japan (EUSAK); it had been the principal occupation force of Japan. Lt. General Walton Harris Walker had commanded the Army since 1948. During World War II, he had been a tank commander under Gen. George Patton. This Texan with a stocky build and a lined face looked like an unfriendly bulldog. To his men and to war correspondents, he was just that. He suffered poor press coverage. His first mission, requested by MacArthur, was to deploy a regimental combat team quickly to Korea. The Army Chief of Staff thought that a regimental combat team should be able to slow the advance of the Inmin-gun until more U.S. troops could be fielded. Walker chose a regiment out of the 24th Division, stationed on the Kyushu Island of Japan. Like most U.S. divisions stationed in Japan, it was not combat-ready and was officially and optimistically rated at 65 percent of combat capacity. Walker stripped another two divisions to reinforce it. The budget-cutting in Washington had taken its toll on Walker’s units. The commander of the 24th Division was Maj. General William F. Dean. He had a reputation as a “can do” general and was the only division commander in the Eighth Army who had experience in leading troops in combat. He earned a Distinguished Service Cross (DSC) for personally leading a platoon through a withering German artillery barrage. His only blemish, in the eyes of some, was that he entered the Army career via the ROTC.
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The Unfinished War Walker’s order to Dean on the night of June 30 was to transfer one infantry regiment and his headquarters to Busan immediately, by air. Dean chose the 21st Infantry Regiment, commanded by Colonel Stephans. However, even this modest airlift was not possible because there were simply not enough airplanes to transport the entire regiment.86 Most of them were tied up in evacuating U.S. personnel. The airlift was therefore scaled down to a single “combat team” of about 450 men. This was how Major Brad Smith’s 1st Battalion, now called “Task Force Smith,” ended up being airlifted alone to Korea. Neither Major Smith nor his men knew that they were about to undertake one of the most perilous missions of the Korean War. Smith’s rifle companies were under-strength and poorly equipped.87 After five years of peace, only about 75 of the 440 men had faced an enemy on the battlefield. Dean tried to get to Korea by air, but twice the plane had to turn back — once because of bad weather in Busan and another time because the Daejon airport couldn’t be found in the darkness. Other battalions had problems finding ships to take them to Korea. The 34th Regiment, commanded by Colonel Loveless, managed to find a ship on the night of July 1 and arrived at Busan the following evening. When Smith’s unit arrived in Korea, thousands of Koreans lined the streets, waving American flags, banners, and posters. At the railway station, there was even a band. Obviously, the arrival of the first contingent of American combat troops had been anticipated and well publicized. The Smith battalion made it to Daejon on July 3 and found General Church, the most senior American officer in Korea at that time, fuming over the rout of the ROK Army. One day earlier, General Church had said that he would “trade the entire ROK Army for 100 New York policemen” and that “the presence of a few Caucasian soldiers would reverse the combat disasters” of the past several days. When Smith reported to General Church, the general was brimming with confidence. He put his finger on a map at Osan, a village south of Suwon, and
86. Due to budget cuts, FEAF had only about two dozen C-54s in Japan, employed mostly in transporting emergency ammunition to South Korea and evacuating civilian personnel. 87. A 75-mm recoilless rifle platoon with four guns (of which only two made it to Korea) and four 4.2-inch mortars, two infantry companies with six other recoilless rifles (bazookas) and four 60-mm mortars.
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11. The First Hundred Days told Smith that all that was required to stop the enemy were some American GIs who would not run at the first sight of enemy tanks. A tired and frustrated General Dean arrived at Daejon sometime later and took command of all American forces in South Korea. Dean, too, assured the Task Force that the mission would be “short and easy.” He was certain that the Inmin-gun would run at the first of American uniforms. On this point, the two generals appeared to agree. They were neither the first nor the last American generals to underestimate the Inmin-gun, but this was just the kind of ignorance or arrogance that had led to the war in the first place. Dean then came up with a new and far more complex blocking plan than what Church had suggested. Standing in front of a map of Korea, he put his finger on the village of Pyongtaek, just south of Osan on the Seoul-Busan highway. By this time, two other battalions of the 34th Regiment had arrived. Dean decided to field a battalion commanded by Jay Loveless at Pyongtaek and another at Ansong, a village about eleven miles directly east of Pyongtaek. Loveless suggested that they would be “much more effective” if they fought as a unit rather than splitting the regiment into three parts. Dean dismissed this suggestion as a “negative attitude” and ordered Loveless to follow his plan without offering unwanted advice. Historian Clair Blair would later call Dean’s plan of scattering ill-equipped, under-strength battalions in this manner — especially considering the poor communications between the units, “foolhardy.” Concentrating all available forces at a more defensible site such as the Kum River, about 30 miles farther south, might have been more effective.88 However, to Dean, who suggested that the Inmin-gun would run at the sight of American uniforms, Loveless’ suggestion apparently appeared unnecessarily cautious. At this time, the ROK 17th Regiment (still commanded by Paik In Yup) was near Pyongtaek. After retreating from the Ongjin Peninsula, it fought well against the Inmin-gun 15th Division. For bravery, every soldier of the 17th Regiment was awarded a one-rank promotion. In addition, the ROK Army issued new uniforms and new equipment. The grateful soldiers had their hair buzz-cut and swore to fight the enemy to the last man if necessary, even as guerillas, if the Republic of Korea fell. Ironically, this unit would soon suffer heavy casualties at the hands of the Royal Australian Air Force near Pyongtaek. Distinguishing the ROKs from the Inmin-gun was particularly difficult near 88. See Blair, p. 97.
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The Unfinished War battle lines. The Far East Air Force (FEAF) had a similar problem.89 Making matters worse, Australian fighter-bombers mistook the Kum River for the Han River and shot at everything north of the river. The Air Force blew up a train of nine boxcars full of badly needed ammunition for the ROK Army. The explosion lit up the sky of Pyongtaek for an entire night. Meanwhile, in Pyongtaek, Dean had not made any attempt to include the 17th Regiment in the defense of Osan. He was not the only general to consider the ROKs unworthy soldiers. Syngman Rhee proposed to General Walker that he integrate ROK units into U.S. troops, but Walker did not take up this suggestion. Walker decided to keep the ROK units on the eastern front and the U.S. soldiers on the western front. Major Smith and his men stood and fought well, but they were badly outmatched and outnumbered.90 An effective air support at this critical juncture could have made a difference, but the bad weather prevented the support that Task Force Smith had been counting on. Perry’s six 105-mm howitzers, positioned one mile south of Smith’s position, opened fire when a column of enemy tanks was about a mile in front of Smith’s position. High-explosive shells hit the tanks but did not damage them. The tanks did not even slow down. Tank-busting HEAT shells were found to be effective, but Task Force Smith had only six of them. In all, American infantry and artillerymen knocked out four of the 33 enemy tanks. The remaining 29 tanks hardly seemed to notice the attack and continued south along the highway to Osan. The Inmin-gun did not turn tail at the first sight of American uniforms. One American soldier later wrote: “Instead of a motley horde armed with old muskets, the enemy infantry were well trained, determined soldiers and many of their weapons were at least as modern as ours. Instead of charging wildly into battle, they employed a base of fire, double envelopment, fire blocks on withdrawal routes, and skilled infiltration.” When Major Smith eventually gave an order to withdraw, the untrained American soldiers who thus far had fought bravely did not know how to retreat properly. They broke discipline and “bugged out” for the rear, throwing away not only their heavy Browning automatic rifles and machine guns, but also ammunition, M-1 rifles, carbines, helmets, boots, and even shirts as they plunged 89. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force In Korea 1950-1953 (Washington D.C.: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1983), p. 86, hereafter Futrell. 90. See Blair, Appleman, and Goulden for more detailed accounts of Task Force Smith.
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11. The First Hundred Days wildly toward muddy rice paddies while being chased by enemy soldiers firing sub-machine guns. Under the circumstances, Smith had no alternative but to leave behind his dead and about 30 severely wounded men on litters, who were tended by a brave corpsman who refused to flee. In all, Smith and Perry lost about 185 men killed, wounded, captured, or missing. Although better equipped than the ROKs, the U.S. troops suffered from the same inadequacies that afflicted the ROKs: insufficient troop training, and under-estimation of enemy strength from Washington to Tokyo. The utter arrogance and ignorance of Church and Dean did not help. Dean later reflected that his troops were more accustomed to “the lifestyle of houseboys” and “cheap lays in Japan” than soldiering. The desperate mission of Major Smith was to halt or delay the Inmin-gun advance long enough for MacArthur to move additional soldiers. The task force failed to do that, although it fought bravely until the time of retreat. News of the defeat had a demoralizing effect on the rank and file of the U.S. th 24 Division and on the ROKs. Doubt was raised about the effectiveness of their weapons. Confidence in the quality of their military intelligence was shaken, and the reliability and wisdom of their leaders’ tactics were questioned. However, the Americans were learning valuable lesson. In ensuing battles, other units of the U.S. 24th Division did no better than Task Force Smith. On July 8, Dean climbed a hill overlooking Cheonan city and saw one of his regiments flee without even making contact with the enemy. Dean vented his anger and frustration on the commander of the regiment. In a calmer moment on the same day, he wrote a letter to MacArthur, indicating that the training and quality of equipment of the North Korean Army had been underestimated. Its armored force, in particular, was formidable. Dean’s men could not stop the T-34 tanks with 2.36 bazookas or ordinary high-explosive 105-mm artillery shells. He urgently needed new 3.5-inch bazookas, HEAT shells, 90-mm antitank guns, and tanks. The only force that could destroy the Inmin-gun tanks without too much difficulty was U.S. warplanes. When weather conditions permitted, they scored big. A flight of F-80 jets at Pyongtaek found enemy tanks and trucks lined bumper-to-bumper on the highway. They called in all available B-26s and F-82s. Together, they scored one of most decisive triumphs by the Air Force. The combined air power that afternoon destroyed an estimated 38 tanks, 7 halftracks, and 117 trucks and claimed to have killed a large number of enemy
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The Unfinished War soldiers.91 The warplanes made enemy transportation of food and materiel increasingly difficult. Such successes were, however, limited because air operations during this monsoon season were dictated by the weather, and the enemy simply started moving at night. Most aircraft could not fly at night. The F-82s could, but the FEAF did not have many of them and kept them mainly in Japan for the purpose of interception, for which they were designed. As for the F-80s, the workhorse of the air war, they flew out of Japan and with the limited size of their fuel tanks, they could fly only fifteen minutes over target areas. Even with modified fuel tanks, to which some F-80s switched, they could fly no more than 45 minutes over target areas. The bigger fuel tank also made the F-80s somewhat sluggish. Destroying the sturdy T-34 presented another challenge, as well. The only effective weapon was the 5-inch high-velocity aircraft rocket (HVAR). Although the Fifth Air Force was in top shape during peacetime, compared with the 8th Army, the pilots got little practice with HVAR during peacetime. Yet, the U.S. Air Force represented a severe test for the enemy. The F-51 Mustangs would prove quite effective, especially with their capability with napalm. Mustangs could burn the T-34s and terrorize the Inmin-gun soldiers — who were not afraid of the normal arsenals of fighter-bombers. Mustangs would also use the Daegu K-2 and Pohang K-3 airports, thus providing longer hours of operation. The Air Force was one bright branch of the military in an otherwise humiliating fight against the Inmin-gun. On the ground, Walker and Dean agreed that the city of Daejon must be defended. In 1950, Daejon was a city of 130,000 people and one of six major population centers of South Korea. The railroad and highway branched out from Daejon to the southwestern part of Korea, the Cholla provinces. If Daejon fell, these two grain-rich provinces would be written off, too. Daegu is only some 100 miles south along the Seoul-Busan highway. Another 100 miles or so south is the major port city of Busan. Between July 14 and 18, MacArthur rushed the 25th and 1st Cavalry Divisions to Korea. By then, the battle for Daejon had already started. The natural barrier protecting Daejon was the Kum River, where a modest number of American troops of the 24th Division were deployed. New 3.5-inch rocket launchers, hurriedly airlifted from the U.S., hit two of the T-34 tanks and penetrated their armor. MacArthur ordered maximum air support for the 91. Futrell, p. 91.
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11. The First Hundred Days ground troops. Yet, the U.N. forces could not stop the Inmin-gun advance on the bank of the Kum River. It was too little, too late. The mountainous area to the east of Dean’s 24th Division was the responsibility of the ROK Army. The geography favored the defenders, but all that the ROKs could do was to inflict as many casualties as possible on the enemy as they retreated. As time passed, the ROK units were gaining experience, and many stragglers who failed to cross the Han River on June 28 did get across soon after, and rejoined their respective units. As a result, the ROK Army was slowly regaining its strength. A few episodes provide a good testimony to that fact. In one battle in the sector, Brig. General Kim Suk-won of the Capital Division, another former officer in the Japanese Army, stood in the middle of the city street with the Japanese long sword Nippon-do to discourage his soldiers from retreating. Indeed, his soldiers respected him and were loyal to him. In one battle, his 17th Regiment mounted a counter-offensive against the Inmin-gun and captured a strategic hill where an Inmin-gun machine gunner was chained to a tree so that he could not run away. Such inhumane treatment of a soldier was perhaps unprecedented in the history of human warfare. After a battle lasting about six hours, the 17th Regiment recaptured a strategic hill while killing hundreds of Inmin-gun and capturing others. Kim Suk-won did not change the tide of the war, but he protected the flank of the Daejon sector where Americans were trying to defend the city. Other similar successes have been recorded elsewhere in the sector. An Inmin-gun report later obtained from a POW mentioned that the increasing effectiveness of the ROKs held up its progress. The North Korean Supreme Command relieved and then probably shot three divisional commanders in charge of the central and eastern sectors for failure to push the advance as swiftly as planned. On July 15, the ROK created the II Corps and appointed General Yu as the Corps commander. He was 28 years old, and such a huge responsibility on a man so young is indicative of the desperate situation. General Yu’s first responsibility was to hold the Moongyong-Hamchang sector for at least five days. Otherwise, the entire American sector would be at risk. During this desperate time, one particular battle made a deep impression on him. On July 21, the enemy broke through his defensive lines behind T-34 tanks. Americans rushed 800 M-6 antitank mines to this front — but neither the ROK
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The Unfinished War soldiers nor American military advisers had seen this particular model of antitank mine before. There was not even time for the U.S. advisors to read the instructions and teach the ROK soldiers how to use them. Therefore, to stop oncoming tanks, ROK special operations units simply strapped prepared charges around soldiers’ waists and the “anointed ones” moved to the side of a tank, pulled the fuse lighter on a two-second fuse, and blew themselves up, thus disabling the tank. The 6th Division stopped four enemy tanks that way; the same special ops had destroyed eleven enemy tanks in this manner in earlier battles. General Yu did not order such operations, but he did not stop them, either. With the FEAF air support and fighting men on the ground (including the special ops), the II Corps held onto its sector until July 31, six days beyond the orders from the ROK Army Headquarters. On that day, General Yu received orders to retreat below the Nakdong River. By then, the ROK 6th Division had lost one third of its soldiers in battle. The ROKs on the east coat were less successful in holding the lines. In that sector, North Korean units moved unopposed through some of the roughest country in Korea. Luckily for the ROK and U.N. side, one main Inmin-gun force moved so cautiously that it lost a golden opportunity to outflank the entire ROK and the American lines across the peninsula. A U.S. Army war historian called this delay “one of the enemy’s major tactical mistakes.” All across Korea, from the Yellow Sea to the East Sea, the defensive lines retreated south. Often, the U.S. side disbelieved the ROK reports of enemy kills, but one American historian recorded: On August 1 GHQ [in Tokyo] and the Pentagon estimated NKPA [North Korean People’s Army or Inmin-gun] losses at 31,000 and 37,500, respectively. Later the Army discovered (also to its amazement) that the true figure was closer to 58,000. One reason for the gross underestimate was the tendency in the Eighth Army to disbelieve or discount ROK estimates of casualties inflicted on the NKPA. Because of these heavy losses, by early August the ten combat divisions of the NKPA had been reduced to a total strength of but 70,000 men. The vaunted NKPA armored force had diminished from 150 to 40-odd T-34 tanks. Owing to complete, uncontested American air and sea supremacy and the NKPA’s ever-lengthening and complex lines of communications, it could only barely supply its dwindling forces.92
92. Goulden, p. 136.
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11. The First Hundred Days The ROK side suffered as many casualties as the Inmin-gun. As Inmin-gun casualties mounted, it simply recruited increasingly younger and older persons both in North Korea and the occupied areas of South Korea to make up for the losses. The ROKs did the same. Even before the Task Force Smith saw action, MacArthur knew that he needed more troops. He wired the JCS for one Marine regimental combat team (RCT) and 700 aircraft. No longer was he under the illusion that a couple of American infantry divisions could turn around the war. On July 3, the JCS approved the dispatch of the Marine regiment and half of the warplanes requested. Soon, MacArthur again implored the JCS for the 2nd Infantry Division, the 2nd Engineer Special Brigade, and a regiment of the 82nd Airborne Division for operations he planned between July 20 and August 10. Then, on July 9, he asked for additional divisions. There were only six divisions outside Japan, and now MacArthur was requesting all but two of them. What Washington initially believed to be a “sour little war” was now threatening to suck up all the military assets of the U.S. At least one of the chiefs, General Collins of the U.S. Army, wished he had spoken out more strongly against intervention. General Collins and General Vandenberg (Air Force Chief of Staff) flew to Japan to assess the situation. MacArthur said that his success or failure would depend on how fast and how much reinforcement Washington sent. For Bradley, who was more concerned with the defense of Europe, MacArthur’s view was troubling. However, from MacArthur’s point of view, Bradley’s reluctance and foot-dragging endangered the lives of some American soldiers already in Korea. MacArthur said that he was well aware of the Administration’s concern for Western Europe and elsewhere. However, he was emphatic that success in stopping the Communists here would slow them down elsewhere. Truman used similar reasoning to send American troops to Korea, but the JCS, headed by Bradley, did not share the view. The decision that emerged was to resume the draft and build up the military. On July 20, Defense Secretary Johnson ordered the mobilization of four National Guard divisions and two regimental combat teams. At the onset of the war, Truman’s decision to intervene was wildly popular. According to a Gallup Poll conducted immediately after the invasion, 78 percent of the public supported the intervention. On July 19, Truman sent a request to Congress for a staggering sum of money: an emergency $10 billion defense
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The Unfinished War appropriation. At that time, the entire fiscal 1951 budget was only $14 billion. He wanted removal of the statutory limit of 2,005,882 on military manpower. He also wanted authority to increase military and economic aid to allies, and to raise taxes to finance defense spending, and to give the government tacit control over strategic industries. Democrats and Republicans alike applauded this request and upped the ante to $11 billion. The Pentagon was authorized to raise a force of 3.2 million men and women. Freshman Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas made a stirring floor speech. Korea would go down in history “as a slaughterhouse for democracy or as a graveyard for aggression.” Another congressman proposed permitting MacArthur “to use the atomic bomb at his discretion.” In the end, Truman received power to impose rationing and credit restrictions, direct allocations of strategic materials, and control prices and wages.93 As Truman was to find out later, obtaining the initial support was far easier than maintaining it when the nation’s youth were being drafted and dying by the thousands. In Korea, when the defense of the Kum River north of Daejon fell apart, the battle around Daejon was fought in the streets. There was such confusion that on July 19, General Dean had no idea where his battle lines were. Daejon fell and Dean was captured. Blair provides a good summary of the military casualties of each side at this point in the war:94 By August 1, the American ground forces had incurred a total of 6,003 casualties. “This carnage was nearly three times that incurred in World War II on D-day at bloody Omaha Beach (2,000)[.]” While such numbers of casualties were terrible, “ROK casualties stood at an appalling 70,000.” In short, for every one U.S. military casualty, there were nearly 12 South Korean military casualties. However, American reinforcements (the Army’s 5th RCT, the Marine RCT, and the 2nd Infantry Division) were beginning to arrive at Busan. In spite of the doom and gloom projected by the British press, a brigade of British soldiers was also on the move from Hong Kong. Almost as important as the number of troops moving into South Korea was the arrival of heavy equipment: the first tanks, self-propelled guns, heavy mortars that could actually knock out the North Korean tanks, and radio equipment that actually worked.
93. Goulden, p. 136. 94. Blair, p. 172.
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11. The First Hundred Days General Walker decided to retreat to a more defensible line: on the other side of the Nakdong River. This was a rectangular area roughly 50 miles in width and 100 miles in depth. It was known to the outside world as the Busan Perimeter; it contained Daegu, the third largest city of South Korea, at the northern end and Busan at the southern end. Daegu was where Walker’s Eighth U.S. Army Headquarters was located. The first regiment of the 25th Infantry Division arrived at Busan on July 12 and entered the battle on July 20. Major General William Kean, a West Pointer who was once the chief of staff of Bradley’s 1st Army in Europe, commanded the division. He had not distinguished himself as a student and had not commanded a unit in combat action. His 24th Regiment was an all-black unit commanded by several white officers. Although Truman had ordered the integration of the Army in 1948, the Army had, until then, remained segregated. The 1st Cavalry commanded by Maj. General Robert R. Gay also arrived. Gay was once the chief of staff under General Patton. Walker was disappointed with the initial actions of these divisions. They seemed to retreat in panic when the circumstances did not justify such actions. The 5th Cavalry Regiment faced a special kind of problem. Its forward position was defended by land mines, but the Inmin-gun rounded up several hundred Korean refugees and forced them to go through the minefield, exploding the mines. The wartime atrocities had reached another unprecedented level. On August 7, General Ridgway made an uncommon observation during his