The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity
STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE Victoria E. Bonnell and Lyn...
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The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity
STUDIES ON THE HISTORY OF SOCIETY AND CULTURE Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt, Editors
The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity England, 1550 –1850
David Kuchta
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley . Los Angeles . London
University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England © 2002 by the Regents of the University of California
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Kuchta, David, 1960 – The three-piece suit and modern masculinity : England, 1550 –1850 / David Kuchta. p. cm. — (Studies on the history of society and culture ; 47) Revision of the author’s thesis (doctoral). Includes bibliographical references and index. isbn 0-520-21493-5 (cloth : alk. paper) 1. Men’s clothing—England—History. 2. Masculinity—History. I. Title. II. Series. gt733 .k83 2002 391.10942 — dc21 2001003099
Manufactured in the United States of America 11 10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of ansi/niso z39.48 –1992 (r 1997) (Permanence of Paper).
Contents
List of Illustrations
vii
Acknowledgments
ix
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
Conspicuous Constructions The Old Sartorial Regime, 1550 –1688 The Seventeenth-Century Fashion Crisis The Three-Piece Suit Masculinity in the “Age of Chivalry,” 1688 –1832 The Making of the Self-Made Man, 1750 –1850 Inconspicuous Consumption
1 17 51 77 91 133 173
Notes
179
Bibliography
253
Index
295
Illustrations
1. Robert Greene, “A Quip for an Upstart Courtier,” 1592 2. George Perfect Harding, George Clifford, earl of Cumberland, 1590s 3. Isaac Oliver, Richard, earl of Dorset, 1616 4. After Isaac Oliver, Henry, Prince of Wales, c. 1610 5. Daniel Mytens, Charles I, 1631 6. Roundhead and Cavalier, 1640s 7. Benjamin Keach, War with the Devil, 1676 8. Earl of Sandwich, Charles II’s Vest, 1666 9. Samuel Sturmy, The Mariner’s Magazine, 1669 10. John Ogilby, Brittania, 1675 11. David Loggan, Cantabrigia Illustrata, 1676 12. The Courtier’s Calling, 1675 13. Studio of Joshua Reynolds, Edmund Burke, 1771 14. Sir Godfrey Kneller, Robert Walpole, no date 15. L. P. Boitard, The Imports of Great Britain from France, 1757 16. The Compleat Beau, 1696 17. The Beau Monde in St. James’s Park, c. 1750 18. Arthur Devis, Robert Gwillym and his family, c. 1745 – 47 19. L. P. Boitard, Taste-a-la-mode, 1745
18 22 23 30 32 55 60 83 86 87 88 89 92 98 108 119 120 125 127
viii
20. Bartholomew Dandrige, Rudiments of Genteel Behavior, 1737, men 21. Bartholomew Dandrige, Rudiments of Genteel Behavior, 1737, women 22. Unknown, possibly George Cooke, William Cobbett, c. 1831 23. Auguste Millière, Thomas Paine, after an engraving of 1793 by William Sharp, after George Romney, inscribed c. 1880 24. The Young Politician, c. 1772 25. Richard Earlom, John Wilkes, no date 26. Sir George Reed, Samuel Smiles, no date 27. Sir Daniel Macnee, John Ramsey McCulloch, before 1840 28. Lowes Cato Dickinson, Richard Cobden, 1870 29. Adam Buck, Thomas Hope and his family, 1813
Illustrations
128 129 134
140 145 146 150 152 159 176
Acknowledgments
Research for this work was conducted at the British Library, Harvard University’s Houghton Library, the Kress Library of Business and Economics at the Harvard Graduate School of Business, the Library of Congress, the New York Public Library, the University of London’s Goldsmith’s Library, the Bancroft Library of the University of California, Berkeley, and the Geisel Library of the University of California, San Diego. I thank the librarians of each of these institutions for their help. Financial support for research came from the Department of History of the University of California, Berkeley. The Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis was very generous in providing me with a postdoctoral fellowship to begin turning a dissertation into a book. Without this support, this project would have been impossible. Portions of this work have been read at academic gatherings since 1990, and I am grateful for much constructive criticism. Thanks go to my friends and colleagues in Berkeley, Rutgers, and San Diego for their emotional and intellectual support, whether in the form of criticism of earlier versions of this work or general advice on fashion. I especially appreciate the dissertation supervision and academic support of Thomas Laqueur and Randolph Starn. My UCSD research assistant Saleem Waraich aided in selecting and analyzing the images for this work. Thanks for help at different stages of this work go to Ben Bertram, Lige Gould, Victoria de Grazia, Sue Grayzel, Nicky Gullace, Doug Haynes, Tim Hitchcock, Jennifer Jones, John Marino, Kathy Peiss, Michael ix
x
Acknowledgments
Roper, Martha Stacklin, John Styles, and John Tosh. I also thank my editors, Eileen McWilliam, Laura Driussi, and Sheila Levine, and anonymous readers at the University of California Press. Great appreciation goes to Kathy Steuer, whose continual support preceded my entering graduate school. I’d finally like to thank my partner, Jennifer Tuttle, whose role as colleague and companion have made my life so rewarding. Her advice and encouragement have helped me negotiate academia, while her own talents and accomplishments have been an inspiration. This work is dedicated to my parents, Adeline and Edward Kuchta, and to my brothers and sisters, Bob, Nan, Jan, Lynn, and Mike, who have provided me with a lifetime of warmth, support, and friendship. Portions of chapter 2 appeared in my essay, “The Semiotics of Masculinity in Renaissance England,” in James Turner, ed., Sexuality and Gender in Early Modern Europe: Institutions, Texts, Images (Cambridge University Press, 1993). An early version of chapter 4 appeared as “‘Graceful, Virile, and Useful:’ The Origins of the Three-Piece Suit,” in Dress: The Journal of the Costume Society of America 17 (1990). I am grateful to the Costume Society of America for permission to reprint this material. Portions of chapter 6 appeared as “The Making of the SelfMade Man: Class, Clothing, and English Masculinity, 1688 –1832,” in Victoria de Grazia, ed., The Sex of Things: Gender and Consumption in Historical Perspective (1996). Reprinted by permission of the Regents of the University of California Press.
chapter 1
Conspicuous Constructions
As history records it, October 7, 1666 marks the beginning of the threepiece suit, for it was on this day, according to Samuel Pepys’s Diary, that England’s King Charles II declared “his resolution of setting a fashion for clothes, which he will never alter. It will be a vest, I know not well how; but it is to teach the nobility thrift, and will do good.”1 Donned with a mixture of solemnity and fanfare, the vest marked a new beginning to Englishmen’s fashion, ending a long era of doublets and hose. The court diarist John Evelyn witnessed the king “changing doublet, stiff collar, and cloak, etc: into a comely vest, . . . resolving never to alter it, and to leave the French mode, which had hitherto obtained to our great expense and reproach.”2 King Charles’s court, not known for its frugality, initially resisted this attempt to teach the nobility thrift, yet Charles never abandoned his resolution, the court soon fell in line, and in modified form, Charles II’s vest is still with us today. We thus have a solemn royal gesture made in the seventeenth century to thank for the style of modern men’s clothes. This book seeks to explain why Charles II would concern himself with introducing the three-piece suit, and, equally importantly, why men still wear three-piece suits. Why, only six years after the English monarchy’s restoration, when the crown was still rather insecure about its legitimacy, would a king of England spend time and fanfare setting a new sartorial standard? What seventeenth-century values gave political and economic urgency to a change in fashion? What made the “comely 1
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The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity
vest” comelier than the doublet, worth resolving never to alter? And equally, why did the three-piece suit continue to appeal to eighteenthand nineteenth-century English gentlemen, despite changes in culture, politics, economics, and social relations? Certainly since 1666 the three-piece suit has gone through many alterations: at no discernible rhythm, colors have darkened, styles have become less varied, vests have lost their sleeves, lapels have widened and narrowed, ties have expanded and contracted. What has never altered, however, along with the basic structure, is the underlying definition of masculinity that propelled the initial adoption of the suit. If the threepiece suit is still with us, it is because the values of masculinity that it embodies today are more or less the same as those that ushered it in: since 1666, male gentility has been associated with modesty and plainness in dress. Eschewing fashion as an increasingly feminized realm, Charles II’s vest inaugurated a new and essentially modern era of masculine aesthetics, one that reversed a long-held association between elaborate display and high social status. Manly thrift now displayed elite status. Along with the three-piece suit, the view that elaborate clothing consumption is incompatible with masculinity is still a part of modern culture. In the Anglo-American tradition, “conspicuous consumption” has become a phrase of denigration, used to distinguish illegitimate consumer practices from a more inconspicuous consumption practiced by elites.3 The birth of the three-piece suit, then, meant not only the donning of a new wardrobe: it meant the fashioning of a new masculinity, a new ideology about the morality, politics, and economics of elite men’s consumer practices, an ideology still prevalent today. In a sense, then, this work is nothing more than a history of the obvious: since the late seventeenth century, the three-piece suit has been the unofficial uniform of English upper- and middle-class masculinity. Arguably, however, the values of modern masculinity that it embodies have become all too obvious, so obvious as to be unnoticed, unquestioned, second nature, practically synonymous with manliness itself. If the original donning of the three-piece suit was an explicitly political statement—made by a king in a time of great political instability— today wearing a suit is no longer a self-consciously political act. Over the course of three centuries, the personal has been depoliticized. Thus, a history of the obvious is precisely what is needed in order to repoliticize, denaturalize, and destabilize these values of masculinity. This work, then, will be an attempt to raise the reader’s fashion consciousness, to show how what is by now second nature is the result of a process of his-
Conspicuous Constructions
3
torical invention, and thus to return the anxiety and instability to that invention.4 To understand the origins and long durée of the suit, then, we must reconsider the importance of this forgetting of history, this process by which explicitly political decisions and values become internalized, personalized, and naturalized into everyday manners and habits—a process, to use Edmund Burke’s eighteenth-century terms, that “renders a man’s virtue his habit” so that “his duty becomes a part of his nature.”5 Modern English masculinity is nothing if not a conspicuous construction, a self-consciously political and conspicuously public creation, precisely because contemporaries like Burke saw the inculcation and naturalization of virtuous masculine habits as central to England’s political order. As Burke wrote: “manners are of more importance than laws . . . they aid morals, they supply them, or they totally destroy them,” and elsewhere, “they become a sort of nature both to the governors and the governed.”6 “Manners precede principles,” agreed the Anglican divine John Brown in a famous 1757 diatribe against presumably “effeminate” manners.7 It was good manners, or “principles, early and deeply ingrafted in the mind,” as Rev. Brown understood it, that would prevent England from falling into ruin.8 For contemporaries, it was manners upon which rested the power of the governors and the consent of the governed, as Burke realized—and feared, since it was a critique of the “general corruption of manners” among England’s governors that political reformers would use to undermine aristocratic power.9 Since at least the mid-sixteenth century, both radicals and conservatives of all stripes saw the inculcation of virtues, manners, and manliness as a central form of power. Understanding the importance of ideals of masculinity to notions of politics, economics, and the social order, then, allows us to understand the basis for the birth and continued relevance of Charles II’s three-piece suit. This study will analyze one aspect of this fashioning of English masculinity, this rendering of virtue into habit, by studying the habits of men’s clothing consumption from 1550 to 1850, under three different political and cultural regimes: Tudor-Stuart court culture, eighteenthcentury aristocratic society, and early Victorian middle-class culture. Because consumer habits are everyday statements about class and gender, markers of taste, and actions that involve moral, economic, and often political decisions, they take place at the intersection of the personal and the political, the cultural and the economic, the social and the sexual, the religious and the aesthetic. Thus we will see how men’s habits of con-
4
The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity
sumption took shape through the combined influence of political, economic, religious, social, and aesthetic ideologies. We will witness the construction of masculine ideals compatible with changing political, economic, and social orders from 1550 to 1850. This work will examine the ideologies of consumption that influenced the creation of a new aesthetics of masculinity in the late seventeenth century, those ideologies that maintained it throughout the eighteenth century, and those forces that attached it to middle-class identity in the nineteenth century. Introduced in 1666 to teach the nobility thrift, the three-piece suit went through various transformations in Restoration England, finally settling on an image of refined simplicity soon after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. With the post-revolutionary modesty of the three-piece suit, a new aesthetics of masculinity, a new image of the gentleman, came to dominate upper-class fashions: sartorial renunciation was opposed to the presumed luxury and extravagant dress of decadent courtiers and middle-class social climbers. This sartorial revolution shifted elite masculinity from a regime that valued sumptuous display as the privilege of nobility to one that rejected fashion as the concern of debauched upstarts; from a world that reserved fine fabrics for honorable aristocrats to one that abandoned them to those considered effeminate fops. In the main, proper male gentility was signified before 1688 by noble magnificence, and after 1688 by refined simplicity. The end of the seventeenth century thus witnessed the triumph of a strategy among gentlemen of repudiating rather than trying to exceed the lavishness of their presumed social inferiors. Sartorial renunciation was embraced as manly refinement, extravagance renounced as base effeminacy. Since 1666, there of course have been numerous exceptions and visible resistance to this general trend toward simplicity. It is these gallants and fops who received all the scandalized condemnation from contemporaries, as well as much attention from historians, who have come all too easily to identify sartorial splendor with aristocratic behavior.10 But court chroniclers and social observers noticed a new modesty in male dress after 1688, a modesty that conformed to Charles II’s original resolution, and to the prescriptions of courtesy manuals, economic tracts, religious writings, political treatises, and social criticism. They witnessed the beginnings of what fashion historians have called the “great masculine renunciation,” the adoption of a more modest and sober image of masculinity that began with Charles II’s vest and took full shape in the eighteenth century. It is in the nineteenth century that this great masculine renunciation became recognizably modern in its uniformity, and it
Conspicuous Constructions
5
is during this same period that sobriety and thrift came to be seen as quintessentially bourgeois values. Yet we must look earlier, to the aristocratic culture of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, to understand the origins of this middle-class masculinity, since it is then that these values first took root in English political and economic culture. With this new masculine image came a new relationship between clothing and status, material fabric and social fabric. After 1688, the good repute of the gentleman rested not on conspicuous consumption, but on inconspicuous consumption, on the display of public virtue, while virtue itself was defined as the absence of display. Thus the sartorial revolution can also be called a semiotic revolution, for it was a revolution that altered English status symbols, signs of English male gentility, and signs of Englishness itself. The sartorial revolution of the late seventeenth century was an important change in dress that declared changes in dress to be unimportant. It was a form of masculine display that disdained display, a fashion that denied its fashionableness. It gave birth to a new semiotic regime, a modern signifying system that declared fashion itself to be insignificant, with all the instability that this implied, since the display of modesty was still a form of display. And as a form of display, even modesty itself was susceptible to calls for further renunciation of display. Inconspicuous consumption was still a form of consumer behavior, subject to the same condemnations that conspicuous consumption was. It is the fact that even modest display was still a form of display that in large part motivated men’s fashion change from 1666 to 1850. Since Thorstein Veblen’s 1899 Theory of the Leisure Class, the idea of conspicuous consumption has dominated historical and sociological analyses of consumer behavior, and is now a part of our everyday vocabulary.11 Veblenite theories of consumer behavior argue that fashion changes are motivated by social emulation, conspicuous consumption, and invidious distinction—“the stimulus of an invidious comparison which prompts us to outdo those with whom we are in the habit of classing ourselves.”12 This book, however, will show how men’s fashion changes from the late seventeenth century to the mid-nineteenth century were driven by an increasingly inconspicuous form of consumption, a form of consumption— equally invidious, to be sure—that balanced class demands for social distinction with a gender ideology of masculine renunciation. Conspicuous consumption is merely one social dynamic that motivates fashion change: understanding the variety of systems of consumer behavior means identifying how social and gender groups at
6
The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity
different historical moments used consumer objects in a number of ways to define themselves in the midst of political, economic, and social change.13 Thus King Charles II changed men’s fashion by instituting a modest anti-fashion that he promised he would never change, while eighteenth-century aristocrats instituted an even more modest fashion for men in opposition to what they saw as Restoration and middle-class luxury. In turn, in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, aristocratic and middle-class men furthered the great masculine renunciation by attempting to demonstrate their own modesty in contrast to the presumed luxury and effeminacy of their political opponents. Since 1666, men’s fashion change has been motivated by a masculinist antipathy to fashion, itself driven by attempts to legitimize elite men’s social, economic, or political power. This is a history of the obvious in a second sense as well. Clothing is nothing if not an obvious, all-too-apparent sign of class and gender. It was in part the ideological dismissal of fashion as superficial, insignificant, frivolous, as mere fashion—an ideology that triumphed in the seventeenth century—that allowed (and allows) men’s fashion to remain as an unmarked category, inconspicuous and unexamined. And it is as an unmarked category that this ideology of masculinity has escaped critical analysis, and thus has retained its power to reproduce elite male status. This is thus an in-depth history of the superficial, or rather a superficial history of masculinity—but not as opposed to the real, the deep, or the true history of masculinity. Rather, this is a history of the power of appearances, of the way in which attitudes toward men in the public eye were shaped by, and in turn helped shape, political, economic, and cultural change. “The public cannot be too curious concerning the characters of public men,” the political reformer James Burgh asserted.14 This book will study those characters—men of the public sphere, men at their most superficial, men in the process of conspicuously constructing their own images.15 By studying the most obvious signs of English culture, this work nonetheless does not argue that the study of clothing merely provides a lens through which to study the more important political, social, and economic transformations of England. Were that the case, this work would instead be concerned with those more important changes, instead of worrying about all the superficial trappings of power, “all the pleasing illusions which made power gentle and obedience liberal,” as Edmund Burke well understood them, “. . . all the superadded ideas, fur-
Conspicuous Constructions
7
nished from the wardrobe of a moral imagination, which the heart owns and the understanding ratifies as necessary to cover the defects of our naked, shivering nature.”16 Rather than dismissing this wardrobe as a pleasing illusion, this book seeks to understand the power of that illusion, its ability to command liberal obedience and clothe the naked defects of English society. Because contemporaries—both radical and conservative—invested public images with great power, these images must be studied as in part constitutive of, and not merely supplementary to, the structure of power. Power was rarely naked in early modern England. The wardrobe of power was itself a form of power, and thus important to political culture precisely because it embodied social, sexual, political, religious, and economic relations; it gave them shape, materiality, and visibility. By doing so, clothing put power in plain view; it shaped the way in which power was thought, enacted, and reformulated. Clothing display was not merely an inert political symbol—some static afterthought of power that manifested preformulated ideologies. Rather, clothing display was a form of power, enacting the articulation, negotiation, and personalization of power.17 Manners and material culture gave shape to ideological processes; material signs formed and informed systems of power, rather than standing outside them in some exterior symbolic realm.18 Thus while ideas of masculine character were constructed by changing political ideologies, political ideologies in turn were constructed around changing notions of character. For contemporaries, the personal was politicized precisely because the political was personalized. The personal and the political were not separate spheres, and thus one cannot be understood as a mere sign through which to analyze the other, presumably nonsymbolic, realm. Rather, it is necessary to reconsider the epistemology that sees cultural artifacts as merely symbolic of changes in other, more real realms. We must rethink the relationship between symbol and substance, between cultural practices and the social, political, and economic realities that presumably stand behind them. As contemporaries saw it, transformations in personal habits were integral to the great transformations that shook England from 1550 to 1850. The present work thus seeks to understand this investment in appearances, by showing how political, economic, and social history can be read as a history of appearances, as a history of relationships between clothing and status, appearance and reality, beauty and truth, image and substance, signifier and signified. In effect, this is
8
The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity
a history of ideas about signs, display, and appearance in England, and a history of those signs themselves. Yet this is a semiotic history, not a semiotic interpretation, of men’s clothing—not an interpretation, that is, that would ahistorically take the language of contemporary semiotics and impose it on an earlier period of history that did not share its notion of signs.19 This work will not attempt to explain the truth about what clothing signs actually meant, but instead to explain what writers in the past thought they meant, how they thought fashion should have worked. Using contemporaries’ own understanding of the importance of appearances, this work will analyze English power at its most “superficial” level—the level of material culture. To give a materialist reading of power, then, is to rethink the epistemological priority of abstract thought over material artifact. This is neither purely a history of ideologies nor purely a history of material culture. Rather it is an intellectual history from the neck down, a materialist history of ideas and an intellectual history of material culture. It seeks to understand the dialectic between intellectual practice and everyday life: both how changing ideas of manners and material culture influenced everyday habits, and how personal habits influenced the history of political, economic, and social thought. This work thus weaves its way somewhere in the middle between high theory and material practice, the grand and the trivial, the sublime and the ridiculous, political culture and personal identity. For a political thinker like Edmund Burke, eighteenth-century men’s dress was sublime, not ridiculous, because it conformed not only to his masculine aesthetics but also to his masculinist sense of politics. In this intersection of personal taste and political culture, then, studying the changing values that informed men’s consumer habits should help us better understand the importance of manners to the political transformations in England from 1550 to 1850. If, as Burke believed, “the most important of all revolutions” is “a revolution in sentiments, manners, and moral opinions,” then we should investigate the ways in which political regimes were legitimated, undermined, and reorganized by changing ideologies of gender, public display, and manners, including clothing.20 We need to look at the intersection of ideals of masculinity and English political culture, to determine not only the cultural underpinnings of political regimes, but the political nature of revolutions in everyday life. A growing body of scholarship has focused on the role played by gender ideology in European political culture. Emphasizing not only the political nature of gender distinctions, but the gendered nature of polit-
Conspicuous Constructions
9
ical debates, this new wave of feminist scholarship has profited both from an understanding of the importance of gender as a category of historical analysis and from a shift away from political philosophy studied in isolation and toward a growing interest in “political culture”—which includes works of political thought but also extends to everyday rituals, political symbolism, and what had in an earlier era been considered private or merely civic life.21 Historians of eighteenth-century France have been in the forefront of this shift, demonstrating how ideals of masculinity and femininity were important in defining a new political culture in the revolutionary era.22 Historians of England, however, have only begun to profit from this convergence of gender analysis and the study of political culture.23 Political theorists have analyzed the role of masculinity in early modern political theory, arguing that patriarchal justifications for kingship were replaced by the “fraternal patriarchy” of contract theory.24 Yet this study of patriarchalism is confined to the classics of political philosophy, especially Filmer, Hobbes, and Locke, while Susan Amussen’s more sociological study focuses on the impact of patriarchalism on ideals of the family.25 And although nearly two decades of scholarship have revised our understanding of English political culture and ideology,26 demonstrating how “politics were integrated into the tissue of everyday life,”27 gender has been a conspicuously absent category of analysis.28 “Those are but shallow politics, which do not comprehend sound morals,” wrote James Burgh, who worried that “a people enervated by luxury are but a nation of women and children.”29 Studying masculinity in political culture should thus offer us a key to better understanding the rise and fall of political regimes whose ideological defenses were often gendered ones: patriarchalism and chivalry. It means looking at the ways in which political legitimacy was defined in part by issues of character—by the personal integrity and manliness of those claiming a place in the political arena. “Men are qualified for civil liberty,” wrote Edmund Burke, “in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites; . . . in proportion as their soundness and sobriety of understanding is above their vanity and presumption.”30 The great masculine renunciation was nothing if not a moral chain upon the appetites—part of “the renunciation and restraint of impulses” that Norbert Elias has seen as central to “the civilizing process.”31 Without embracing Burke’s vision of the social order, this work nonetheless adopts his critique of the Enlightenment notion of politics as a disembodied and dispassionate discussion of law, rights, and sovereignty,
10
The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity
a rational public sphere separate from private life. By studying a form of power whose code is “not that of law but that of normalization,”32 I offer what might be called a feminist Burkean reading of English political culture from 1550 to 1850, one where the politics of style is central to the style of politics. By analyzing the ways in which masculine sobriety qualified men for civil liberty, we will better comprehend the masculinist political morality by which women’s access to the formal institutions of power was so limited. If masculinity was a prerequisite to power, then femininity itself, as eighteenth-century feminists well understood, was reason enough to disqualify women from political participation. Cultural definitions of femininity went hand in hand with the political exclusion of women from power. This book is thus a history of the obvious in a final sense: men held political power from 1550 to 1850. This is a fact that continually needs explaining. As this book argues, since contemporaries placed great emphasis on the importance of masculine character, one of the ways in which men maintained power was by creating a public image of manliness. Thus this work seeks to understand the political exclusion of women from formal politics by exploring the ways in which displaying masculinity was a prerequisite to political authority in England. By studying the persistent preoccupation with masculinity in political culture, then, we will better understand that the exclusion of women from power was a persistent and pervasive act in England, something that needed to be constantly reproduced, something not taken for granted by the men who were perennially anxious about England’s decline into effeminacy. If women gained equal access to power, “manliness” would no longer be a yardstick by which to measure political leaders, and denunciations of “effeminacy” would hold no political weight. What was obvious to contemporaries was not that only men held political power, but that, like femininity, masculinity was a conspicuous construction, one that needed constant reinforcement against the threats posed by women and “effeminate” men.33 From 1550 to 1850, effeminacy and luxury were seen as being among the chief “political vices,”34 along with corruption, anarchy, and tyranny. For the late Tudor and Stuart courts, sumptuous dress was part of its prerogative and cultural leadership, while for court critics, male sartorial splendor was the most visible sign of the court’s corruption. Conflict over royal expenditures, which often focused on what was considered the court’s excessive consumption, was the immediate cause of
Conspicuous Constructions
11
the outbreak of the English Civil War, and the Restoration introduction of the three-piece suit was a direct response to this seventeenth-century crisis. In the eighteenth century, the political discourse that legitimated Whig aristocratic rule associated luxury with effeminacy, tyranny, corruption, anarchy, and middle-class upstarts, while it associated refined simplicity with aristocratic moral example, social superiority, and political stability. From 1750 to 1850, however, middle-class men gained political power in great part by undermining the moral authority that legitimated aristocratic rule, portraying aristocrats as effeminate and prodigal parasites living off a virtuous and industrious nation. In middleclass political discourse, masculine character remained a means for determining political legitimacy, but this character was now an attribute not of aristocrats but of middle-class men. In the male homosocial world of England’s political elite, then, accusations of effeminacy were means of excluding not only women, but other men, from power. Both by making masculinity a prerequisite to political legitimacy and by claiming masculinity as their own, men in power used the label of effeminacy to directly exclude from power all other men—men of other classes, as well as men with alternative sexual practices. The use of the label “effeminacy” demonstrates that gender ideals were both socially and sexually constructed in early modern England: politically legitimate masculinity was defined in opposition to three “others”—the other gender, other sexual practices, and other classes.35 From the patriarchal king to the chivalrous aristocrat to the self-made man, then, manly virtue was a crucial ideological trope in English political culture. If studying “those inbred sentiments which are . . . the true supporters of all liberal and manly morals”36 should help us better understand English political culture, then studying the role of gender ideology and cultural values in English economic ideology should help us better understand transformations in English political economy. Economic historians have begun to look at the moral ideas that influenced the development of English economic concepts, policies, and practices, though gender has rarely been a part of this cultural analysis of capitalism. Joyce Appleby has analyzed the ways in which seventeenth-century economic policy emerged out of a struggle with older definitions of moral economy.37 Albert Hirschman has articulated the ways in which economic theory in the eighteenth century was influenced by a new, positive evaluation of passions, interests, and virtue.38 And Michael Ignatieff, Donald Winch, and others have taken a renewed interest in the so-called
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The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity
“Adam Smith problem” by attempting to understand the connection between Adam Smith the moral philosopher, Adam Smith the political philosopher, and Adam Smith the political economist.39 By connecting political economy with moral economy, historians have sought to understand the mutually defining relationship between culture and capitalism, a relationship where economic relations influenced cultural habits, and cultural values in turn influenced the formulation and acceptance of economic theories and practices.40 Historians are thus returning to the study of political economy in the classical sense of the term: “political economy,” wrote the nineteenthcentury economist Robert Torrens, “has a connection more or less intimate with almost every question of politics and morals; . . . whether with respect to the conduct of private life, or to the administration of public affairs.”41 Or as the seventeenth-century mercantilist Edward Misselden rhetorically asked: “Is not the public involved in the private, and the private in the public?”42 In classical and preclassical political economy, public and private were not separate spheres, and thus political economists saw English moral values and consumer habits as the basis of economic growth. The mercantilist Thomas Mun wrote in 1621: “by the corruption of men’s conditions and manners, many rich countries are exceedingly poor, whilst the people thereof, too much affecting their own enormities, do lay the fault in something else. Wherefore, industry to increase, and frugality to maintain, are the true watchmen of a kingdom’s treasury.”43 Industry and frugality were as much cultural values as they were economic terms, synonyms for production and consumption. Since the birth of political economy in the sixteenth century, consumption has been a central category of economic analysis, and from the Middle Ages through the Industrial Revolution clothing had been the backbone of the English economy. Studying cultural attitudes toward clothing consumption should help us better understand changing conceptions of the function of consumption in an economy whose central industry was textile production, whose industrial revolution first began in the clothing trade. In their attempts to decrease the consumption of foreign luxuries, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century mercantilists often drew upon gendered definitions of manners and consumption. Imported silk and calico were superfluous, luxurious, and effeminate, while English wool was useful, sober, and manly. It was thus men’s conditions and manners that would maintain a positive balance of trade. In calling upon gentlemen to reform their luxurious ways, mercantilists merged nationalist
Conspicuous Constructions
13
ideology with gender ideology, creating an image of masculinity compatible with English commodities and English values. In the nineteenth century, however, free-trade advocates transformed this economic language by turning it against mercantilist protectionism. The argument for free trade was nothing if not an attack on aristocratic control of the means of consumption: free traders portrayed aristocrats as effeminate fops living in luxury, monopolizing consumption. From the birth of mercantilism to the triumph of laissez-faire ideology, then, political economists drew on cultural attitudes and gender ideology to define and redefine relations between production and consumption. Understanding moral attitudes to manly sobriety thus means broadening our definition of political economy, to the point where we will be able to comprehend why Edmund Burke could claim that a nation “destitute of religion, honor, or manly pride” is a nation where “commerce and the arts should be lost.”44 If we need to broaden our definition of political economy, we also need to broaden our definition of class. Class is not only the social relation to the means of production, but also the social relation to the means of consumption. By looking at changing social definitions of consumption, we will be able to better understand how class was constructed (and not merely reflected) through cultural forms, how social identities were created through material culture and consumer behavior. Throughout the period under study, consumption was a socially defined category. As a concept used in political, economic, and moral literature, luxury was more a social and cultural term than a stable economic concept. Luxury was the evil twin of consumption, the debased, debauched, and debilitating form of consumption that effeminated and impoverished England. As such, accusations of luxury and effeminacy were insults aimed at one’s social or political enemies. How one defined consumption, how one distinguished between productive consumption and destructive luxury, depended on one’s social, political, moral, and economic attitudes. Luxury was variably defined as living beyond one’s means, as anything beyond necessity, or as the attribute of certain consumer products. Hence mercantilists tended to define luxury as characteristic of imported goods. Puritans generally defined luxury as anything beyond necessity, since superfluity distracted one from godliness. Defenders of aristocracy often defined luxury as the vice of upstarts ambitiously living above their social station, while critics of aristocracy defined luxury as the essential attribute of an unproductive land-owning class. Cultural attitudes toward consumption thus helped define the identities of various social groups,
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as a social hierarchy was defined according to a healthy or unhealthy relation to the means of consumption. How one defined consumption was also determined by changing consumer practices. In an expanding field of study, Joan Thirsk, Neil McKendrick, Carole Shammas, and Lorna Weatherill have documented the growing market for consumer goods in seventeenth- and eighteenthcentury England, where what had once been presumably the private possessions of the aristocracy were increasingly diffused to a wider social audience.45 Analyzing the anxieties that this so-called democratization of luxury (certainly an overstatement) created for cultural elites involves looking at the new theories of taste that emerged after 1700 to redefine aristocratic status. As goods became more widely available, status was redefined less as the possession of luxury goods and more as the possession of refined sensibility, noble simplicity, or simply “politeness.” Lawrence Klein, John Barrell, Terry Eagleton, and Iain Pears, among others, have analyzed the new theories of taste, sensibility, and politeness that emerged in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to create what Pierre Bourdieu has called a new “aristocracy of culture.”46 Thus studying the development of new standards of taste should offer us a key to better understanding the cultural construction of class in an age that saw a greater variety and availability of consumer goods. To be sure, dress was only one among the many objects consumed in early modern England, and each has its own history.47 Contemporary discussion of many of these consumer products, however, often ran parallel to discussions of clothing (simplicity versus ornament, for example), often carried similar gender connotations (especially in items of food, as we will see), and were often grouped together under the general rubric of “luxury” or “taste.” Nonetheless, each consumer item came with its own set of values, connotations, economic weights, and political significance, and thus it would take a much larger project than this one to outline an entire regime of consumption across the spectrum of goods. This study focuses on clothing, not only because it is “the body of the body,” as Erasmus called it, and thus so immediately related to questions of identity, but because clothing throughout the period under study was a primary focus of discussions of consumption, a prime object of derision by critics and satirists of luxury, and usually the first example chosen by contemporaries to illustrate the decadence, disorder, and corruption of the day. For contemporaries, clothing seemed to be the quintessential consumer object.
Conspicuous Constructions
15
As a primary mode of social distinction, clothing consumption led trends in the new social dynamics of taste. In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, courtesy manuals and aesthetic treatises expressed a new means of displaying social distinction: English gentlemen should lead society by their refined taste and moral example rather than their sumptuary expense. As a result, displaying wealth was no longer equated with displaying worth. Manliness and sobriety were thus means of claiming social as well as political authority. Social leadership for men was determined by renouncing the effeminating world of fashion, by not following the crowds, by what James Burgh called “superior example.”48 And it is precisely this social ideology that middle-class reformers turned against the aristocracy itself, by claiming public virtue as the private property of middle-class men. The great masculine renunciation was thus driven by this struggle for “superior example,” as aristocratic and middle-class men engaged in what we might call invidious indistinction, driving the three-piece suit into more somber colors and increased simplicity. Who controlled the meanings of consumption, and how social groups defined their relation to the means of consumption, were thus central to the dynamics of a male fashion system in England. Habits of consumption helped define class, and class rivalries helped define habits of consumption. In the chapters that follow, this book will try to explain how politics, class, culture, and economics intersected around attitudes toward men’s clothing consumption. Chapter 2 will discuss the attitudes toward clothing and ideals of masculinity created by the Tudor-Stuart court, as well as the royalist, Anglican, and mercantile ideologies that defended aristocratic conspicuous consumption. Chapter 3 covers the republican, Whig, mercantilist, and Puritan ideologies that opposed and undermined Stuart court culture and constructed a new political culture of masculinity, one that influenced the introduction of the three-piece suit, as chapter 4 demonstrates. Chapter 5 outlines the ways in which eighteenth-century aristocrats appropriated those oppositional ideologies in order to legitimate their own position atop the social, political, and economic hierarchy, while chapter 6 examines how middle-class reformers in turn reappropriated these ideals of masculinity for their own political and economic ends. Together, these chapters outline the ways in which revolutions in politics, economics, and society were constructed as revolutions of everyday life, in the process fashioning a modern definition of masculine consumer attitudes and practices.
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In trying to explain why King Charles II would choose to make a political statement by making a fashion statement, this work hopes to demonstrate the influence of political, social, moral, and economic ideologies on the construction of modern masculinity. If contemporaries were concerned with clothing consumption, it is precisely because contemporary notions of politics, society, morality, and the economy revolved around masculinist ideas about manners, habits, and sentiments—precisely because contemporaries saw revolutions in the means and meaning of consumption as the most important revolutions in early modern England.
chapter 2
The Old Sartorial Regime, 1550 –1688
“There is such a confused mingle mangle of apparel,” lamented Phillip Stubbes in 1583, and such preposterous excess thereof, as every one is permitted to flaunt it out, in what apparel he lust himself, or can get by any kind of means. So that it is very hard to know who is noble, who is worshipful, who is a gentleman, who is not: for you shall have those, which are neither of the nobility, gentility, nor yeomanry, no, not yet any magistrate or officer in the commonwealth, go daily in silks, velvets, satins, damasks, taffetas, and such like, notwithstanding that they be both base by birth, mean by estate, and servile by calling. This is a great confusion and a general disorder. God be merciful unto us.1
God was apparently not merciful unto England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as the nation felt the impact of great social change. With the rise of a new gentry, the dissolution of medieval estates and monasteries, the continued growth of enclosures and rural industries, and the increasing wealth of an urban merchant class, new elites created great confusion and general disorder by threatening the cultural superiority of an older aristocracy.2 The social structure of Elizabethan and Jacobean England was sufficiently fluid to challenge any aristocratic monopoly on silks, velvets, satins, and such like. Thus Phillip Stubbes was not the only writer confused by this general disorder in apparel. The dramatist and pamphleteer Robert Greene worried that base and servile men were abandoning their cloth breeches for the velvet breeches 17
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Figure 1. Robert Greene, “A Quip for an Upstart Courtier: Or, A Quaint Dispute between Velvet Breeches and Cloth Breeches,” 1592. While the more humbly dressed “cloth breeches” figure on the right is associated with labor, the “velvet breeches” courtier on the left stands in a traditional pose of authority, his right arm akimbo and his left pointing, as if giving orders. By permission of The British Library. 95.b.19(1).
of the nobility (figure 1). Denouncing “proud and unmannerly upstarts,” Greene longed for a return to the good old days when “the farmer was content his son should hold the plough, and live as he had done before: . . . [now] those dunghill drudges wax so proud that they will presume to wear on their feet what kings have worn on their heads.”3 Concerns about men dressing according to their sex and condition neither began in 1550 nor ended in 1688, nor was the social mobility of unmannerly upstarts specific to this period.4 What was specific was the language in which these concerns were expressed, and the way in which elites attempted to resolve this apparent general disorder: defenders of the social order associated aristocratic masculinity with conspicuous consumption, and appealed to the crown to govern the availability and meaning of consumer goods. In this chapter, we will see the functioning of what I have termed “the old sartorial regime”—a political regime that
The Old Sartorial Regime
19
defended aristocratic conspicuous consumption in order to support its definition of social and economic order. From the Tudor commonwealth to the Glorious Revolution, supporters of this old sartorial regime called upon the crown to regulate the consumption of apparel so that Englishmen would “content themselves with that sort of clothing which agrees to their sex and condition, not striving to exceed and equal that of a higher rank,” the royalist divine Richard Allestree sermonized in 1659.5 In their response to the presumed loss of an obvious social hierarchy, social commentators called for the maintenance of a sartorial order whereby consumption would make the social order perfectly conspicuous, thereby reasserting monarchical power. This assertion of monarchy and aristocracy was not without opposition in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, of course. As chapter 3 discusses, Whigs, republicans, Puritans, mercantilists, and country gentlemen often opposed the import of continental politics, along with the court culture and fashions that accompanied them. Aristocratic gentlemen thus stood uneasily between challenge from upstarts and criticism from opponents. The desire for a visible social order did not mesh easily with claims to a visible moral order: while the display of a social hierarchy required aristocrats to outspend upstarts, the court’s conspicuous consumption was a key object of criticism by political adversaries. Faced with a dual task, defenders of the crown and court constructed a definition of masculinity that argued for the morality of sumptuous display yet made it theoretically inaccessible to all but the nobility. This defense of aristocratic men’s consumption drew on a hierarchical social theory, royalist propaganda, Anglican theology, and mercantile economic policy to argue that men’s conspicuous consumption was properly masculine, politically necessary, socially useful, ethically neutral, economically beneficial, and consistent with aristocratic definitions of manliness. “APPAREL OFT PROCLAIMS THE MAN” Throughout Tudor-Stuart England, Phillip Stubbes and Robert Greene were joined by a chorus of voices who complained that social distinctions in male dress needed to be more apparent, more obvious, more conspicuous.6 In calling for conspicuous consumption,7 defenders of the old sartorial regime—from sermonizers to satirists, poets to playwrights—marshaled a whole array of revealing platitudes: “The outward carriage should promise what’s within a man”; 8 “clothes . . . are but like
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the sign over the door, which tell all men what kind of shop and mind there is within”; 9 “the body is the shell of the soul; apparel is the husk of that shell; the husk often tells you what the kernel is.”10 First impressions should be the truest. One should be able to judge a man by his clothes. The most famous of these sartorial clichés is Polonius’s advice to his son Laertes in Hamlet: Costly thy habit as thy purse can buy, But not expressed in fancy; rich, not gaudy, For the apparel oft proclaims the man.11
No statement better articulates the ideology of the old sartorial regime, for “rich, not gaudy” clothing marked the status of a gentleman living within his means, as costly as his purse could buy. In calling for “apparel comely to every estate and degree,”12 old regime social critics worried that elite prerogatives to sumptuous dress were undercut by new wealth, destabilizing an ability to equate the display of wealth with a claim to elite status. While the royalist Henry Peacham argued in 1622 that gentlemen “may eat the best and daintiest meat that the place affordeth; they wear at their pleasure gold, jewels, the best apparel, and of what fashion they please,” he cautioned: “neither must we honor or esteem those ennobled, or made gentle in blood, who by mechanic and base means, have raked up a mass of wealth, or because they follow some great man, wear the cloth of a noble personage.”13 By destabilizing the social order, upstarts also disrupted the gender order. Like aristocratic men, aristocratic women were expected to live in sumptuary splendor, while upstart women were accused of mannishness.14 “Since the days of Adam women were never so masculine,” complained the author of Hic Mulier: Or, The Man-Woman, especially in “the monstrousness of deformity in apparel.”15 Emulation of higher status effeminated men and made women masculine: “How are our women (as it were) transformed into men,” bemoaned William Parkes in 1612, “by degenerating from their sex, and from the virtue, modesty, and civility thereof, by their mannish complements, and ruffianly attire: and how are our men (as it were) transformed into women, by their lascivious, effeminate, and wanton imitations, none being content with their own estates and conditions.”16 As Parkes here articulates, mannishness and effeminacy were created when women and men became discontented with their own estate. Both masculinity and femininity were socially defined: social emulation of aristocratic splendor created mannishness in upstart women and effeminacy in upstart men.
The Old Sartorial Regime
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In the old sartorial regime, then, effeminacy was defined as dressing out of place, as the affected misuse of sartorial signs by those who did not merit their noble significance. As Henry Peacham put it: “gold and silver, worn by martial men, addeth . . . courage and spirit unto them; but in others effeminacy, or a kind of womanish vanity.”17 By adopting dress unfit for their station, upstart men were engaging in effeminacy. Gold, silver, and other forms of “bravery” were only manly when worn by martial men. Thus aristocratic consumption, and aristocratic masculinity, relied on the trappings of war—armor, pikes, swords, and codpieces (figure 2). In figure 3, the earl of Dorset places his right hand not on the sumptuous tapestries and carpets surrounding him, nor on the delicate embroideries and lace adorning him, but on his helmet, with the remainder of his armor nonchalantly lying beside him.18 The court aristocracy justified its high levels of consumption by appealing to its role as an arms-bearing order: military bravery legitimated sartorial bravery. In effect, the old sartorial regime worked by a “hierarchy of analogies,” by the resemblance between one’s social standing and one’s level of expenditure.19 The Elizabethan poet Barnabe Barnes opined that “all garments should be . . . in worth and fashion correspondent to the state, substance, age, place, time, birth, and honest custom of those persons which use them.”20 In this hierarchy, dress was meant to make one’s social position visible by a one-to-one correspondence between one’s rank and one’s purse, by the analogy between one’s internal worth and external wealth.21 “Oh, how comely are good clothes to a good soul, when the grace within, shall beautify the attire without,” Thomas Adams wrote in 1614.22 In the old sartorial regime, good clothes corresponded with a good soul. Garment proclaimed status. Judging the soul by the attire was a key to social stability. Defenders of the old sartorial regime thus advocated “conspicuous consumption” in the most literal sense of the phrase: consumption that would make the social order conspicuous. This entailed an ideology that stated that the higher the status, the richer the fabric: silk and satin were noble, flannel and fustian humble. Thus “it would be as ridiculous for a wealthy noble man to draw on course cloth, as for the poorest of his tenants to swagger up and down in scarlet.”23 By purchasing the fine apparel of their superiors, then, wealthy upstarts were threatening the semiotic stability between fabric and rank, between material signifier and social signified. It was prideful upstarts, the playwright William Rankins complained, who “have no firmer virtue than a name. / But who so thinks the sign the substance is. / Errs, and his wit doth wander much amiss.”24
Figure 2. George Perfect Harding, George Clifford, earl of Cumberland, 1590s. George Clifford was made a Knight of the Garter in 1592. This portrait demonstrates his loyalty to the queen, since he wears her glove. While Clifford was known to be a spendthrift and gambler who wasted the income from his estates, he chose to have himself portrayed not as a domestic wastrel but as a knight abroad in armor, equipped with pike and helmet. Standing with arm akimbo, a standard gesture of command, his military posture went hand in hand with his sartorial display of plume, embroidery, and silk hose. Courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery, London.
The Old Sartorial Regime
23
Figure 3. Isaac Oliver, Richard, earl of Dorset, 1616. Richard Sackville, the third earl of Dorset, was unabashed about his sartorial splendor, and visually linked that splendor with the military function of the aristocracy. V&A Picture Library.
Thus the correspondence between sign and substance, between material fabric and social fabric, was a one-way correspondence: apparel “proclaimed” the man, not “made” him, as it is often incorrectly quoted. In the old sartorial regime, rich clothing proclaimed gentility, represented it, manifested it, and made it conspicuous. “Proclaiming” is an act of attribution, representation, signification, ascription, while “making” is an act of creation, achievement, production. Sartorial proclamations thus
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The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity
did not make or create gentility, as unmannerly upstarts desired. Defenders of the old regime argued that high status merited fine fabrics, while they accused upstarts of believing that fine fabrics could create high status. Count Annibale Romei’s The Courtiers Academie, translated into English in 1598, praised “costly garments, precious jewels, sumptuous palaces, magnificent furniture” for aristocrats, yet warned that “neither riches, nor sumptuous vestments make a man noble.”25 The clothes did not make the man in the old sartorial regime.26 In this inegalitarian morality, modesty and sobriety were determined along a sliding scale rather than being absolute and universal standards of behavior. “To each according to his means” was the morality of the old sartorial regime: “Let every man clothe himself in such sober attire, as befits his place and calling,” the Anglican Richard Allestree advised.27 Sobriety meant living according to one’s station, rather than being the inherent attribute of any specific style, as it did for critics of the old regime. Though Philip Stubbes condemned “preposterous excess,” he qualified: “I would not be so understood, as though my speeches extended to any either noble, honorable, or worshipful: for, I am so far from once thinking that any kind of sumptuous or gorgeous attire is not to be worn of any of them, as I suppose them rather ornaments in them, than otherwise.”28 Similarly, Robert Greene criticized “not the weed but the vice, not the apparel when ‘tis worthily worn, but the unworthy person that wears it.”29 Sumptuous and gorgeous attire was an innocent ornament to nobility, meant to confirm the honor of the station. Old regime authors thus justified the liberal expenditures of England’s elite, considering them both a prerogative and an obligation. This justification applied not only to clothing but also to other goods. The privy councillor Thomas Wilson considered a gentleman’s “liberal using of his wealth” as a sign of “fortitude or manhood.”30 For defenders of aristocratic splendor, conspicuous consumption was not the aberrant behavior of nobles “usually unostentatious in their spending,” as Lawrence Stone has asserted,31 but rather was essential to aristocratic men’s social and gender identity, “perhaps the most vital component of this cultural definition” of the aristocracy in Tudor-Stuart England.32 Nor was this ethic of ostentation anything new, which is why defenders of the old sartorial regime condemned only the conspicuous consumption of nouveaux riches, not the long-standing ostentation of the aristocracy.33 They were less concerned that old-established families return to their “usually unostentatious” ways, than that upstarts return to their unostentatious ways. “To be vainly ostentative, then,” warned the author of
The Old Sartorial Regime
25
The Gentleman’s Companion, “is greatly to be abominated, and shunned by a gentleman. But yet we must not here mistake; for in some cases ’tis of great use, nay, and is great discretion. As in all noble and high undertakings, the hope of glory and praise adds life to the enterprise . . . . A little vanity, and opinion (therefore) may be allowed.”34 Thus liberality and display were not part of a decline of true aristocratic values: conspicuous consumption among the English nobility did not signify a crisis of the aristocracy, a shift from truth to falsity, reality to appearance, substance to show, status to display.35 Rather, it was defenders of the old sartorial regime who sought to maintain a correspondence between sign and substance, precisely because high (and highly conspicuous) consumption was central to the “fortitude or manhood” of aristocratic men.36 Imported from Italian and French models of courtesy theory, like the very fabrics worn by English gentlemen, this courtly ideology considered apparel to be a manifestation of the internal worth of a gentleman. Since noble dress and noble status were naturally affiliated with each other, the noble courtier had to fashion a natural, unaffected attitude to dress. “Go as thou wouldst be met,” Lord Burleigh advised, “sit as thou wouldst be found, wear thy apparel in a careless, yet a decent seeming: for affectedness in any thing, is commendable in nothing.”37 In his decent seeming, then, the courtier needed to feel at ease with the sumptuous trappings of his station. Courtesy writers thus counseled unaffected moderation: “Men’s behavior,” Francis Bacon advised, “should be like their apparel, not too strait or point device [precise], but free for exercise or motion.”38 Distinguishing between sumptuousness and artificiality was a difficult task, especially since old regime courtesy literature argued that rules of apparel should not be too precise, but should conform to custom. In his advice manual, James I counseled his son Prince Henry to wear his clothes “according to the common form of the time, sometimes richlier, sometimes meanlier clothed as the occasion serveth, without keeping any precise rule therein.”39 The aristocratic gentleman could act nonchalantly, even carelessly, in his sartorial splendor precisely because such seemly apparel was natural to him. Such was the difference between a true aristocrat and an over-reaching upstart. Moderation was a “golden mediocrity,”40 the via media between covetousness and lavishness, the moral and economic virtue of living within one’s means. Moderation meant sumptuary stability: “Virtue is never extravagant and undetermined,” wrote the author of The Courtier’s Calling; “as being perfect, it derives its rules from mediocrity, and to
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take it rightly, it is mediocrity itself. Avarice and prodigality are two vicious extremes, liberality the medium is a virtue.”41 Moderation, of course, was a relative term, one that stood uneasily between modesty and prodigality, simplicity and extravagance. Effeminacy was found not in display and adornment, but in excess, in expenditure and display beyond one’s means. Properly used, the material sign should bring grace and dignity; improperly used, materiality might lead to debauchery and sensuality. There was thus a fine and invisible line—termed moderation—between the proper and improper use of signs. The difference between virtuous magnificence and vicious prodigality existed neither in the garment nor in the eye of the beholder, but in the station and attitude of the wearer. Thus moderation meant an ease with one’s social status, the unaffected, graceful correspondence between clothing and rank, a cultivated naturalness and careless nonchalance. Since the end of the old sartorial regime, this calculated appearance of unaffected nonchalance has often been seen as deceit and deception, extravagance and effeminacy. Outside of this regime, courtly display seems incompatible with masculinity. As Joan Kelly has written of the Renaissance courtier in general: “To be attractive, accomplished, and seem not to care; to charm and do so coolly—how concerned with impression, how masked the true self. And how manipulative . . . . In short, how like a woman— or a dependent, for that is the root of the simile.”42 For critics of the old sartorial regime, conspicuous consumption meant following the crown, and thus signified an aristocratic dependence incompatible with republican and Whig notions of masculinity (as the next chapter will demonstrate). But while anti-royalists argued for the “simile” between display, dependence, and debilitating femininity, royalists asserted that the ethics of attraction and the aesthetics of display were not inherently effeminate. Gender was certainly displayed in the old sartorial regime, but the act of self-display was not itself given a gender. “I hate an effeminate spruceness, as much as a fantastic disorder,” complained the Anglican and royalist Owen Felltham, yet added: “a neglective comeliness is a man’s best ornament.”43 To be sure, “neglective” nonchalance was self-consciously created, but it was a created naturalness—with all the instability and ambivalence that this implied for a relatively fluid social order.44 Affectation and artificiality were condemned in the old sartorial regime because they drew attention to the theatricality, the self-fashioning, the created image—not because the image was false, but because the immediacy of signification, the transparent affiliation between display and status, the
The Old Sartorial Regime
27
one-to-one correspondence between signifier and signified, was lost. Artificiality was the misuse and dissemination of signs, the loss of their proper, noble significations. When upstarts purchased the trappings of nobility, signifiers lost their graceful relationship with what they signified. The signifier was worshiped for itself rather than for its reference. For old regime ideologists, clothes in themselves were innocent, insignificant, meaningless, arbitrary signs: it was only their connection with nobility that made them noble. “Let his attire be conformable to custom, and change with company,” wrote the M.P. Sir William Cornwallis. “In many things (as in this) custom is a thing indifferent, and things indifferent receiving their life from light grounds; every country hath some peculiar to itself by which when we are there, we ought to be ruled.”45 Clothing was a “thing indifferent,” arbitrary not in the sense of being random, but in the sense of being conventional, relative to contextual determination, relative to the wearer. To be sure, fine fabrics had intrinsic material qualities—softness, rarity, color, craftsmanship—but in the old sartorial regime these properties took on their social and gendered meanings only through convention. Clothes were arbitrary in the sense that there was nothing ahistorically or naturally fixed in their meaning.46 Worn by martial men, gold and silver were manly, but in others, effeminate. Effeminacy thus meant semiotic instability: signs lost their grace and moderation, the unaffected affiliation between clothing and status. If “rich, not gaudy” apparel proclaimed the man—proclaimed aristocratic masculinity, that is—then it did so according to historically specific definitions of masculinity, display, and the social order, ones that made masculinity compatible with aristocratic conspicuous consumption. THE CROWN PROCLAIMS THE APPAREL In the old sartorial regime, the aristocratic aesthetic of conspicuous consumption went hand in hand with the growth of English monarchical power, precisely because a central aspect of the growth of monarchy in Tudor-Stuart England was the emergence of the court as a patron of culture and arbiter of style.47 With the rise of court cultures throughout Europe, the “courtier” became a central ideal for defining aristocratic masculinity.48 If defenders of court culture considered conspicuous consumption as a rightful and manly honor bestowed upon aristocratic men by their noble status and position at court, they looked to the cultural and magisterial authority of the crown to regulate consumption and prevent “general disorder.” In royalist ideology, the crown was the source
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of social stability, the cultural center for the meaning and social circulation of signs: the crown determined what clothing meant, who was allowed to wear what, and how it could be purchased. Through the use of either sumptuary law or its own example, the crown attempted to determine how aristocratic masculinity would be displayed. If apparel proclaimed the man in the old sartorial regime, the crown proclaimed the apparel. “A king is as one set on a stage,” the future James I advised his son Henry in 1599, “whose smallest actions and gestures, all the people gazingly do behold: and therefore although a king be never so precise in the discharging of his office, the people, who seeth but the outward part, will ever judge of the substance by the circumstances, and according to the outward appearance.”49 Repeating a “true old saying,”50 James warned his son that royalty was inseparable from spectacle: in his eyes, managing the crown’s public image was central to governing the nation as a whole. Good government meant attending to the circumstances as well as the substance of power, for, as James saw it, the stability of the king’s rule lay in the negotiation of outward appearance: “if his behavior be light or dissolute, [the people] will conceive pre-occupied conceits of the king’s inward intention: . . . [and] prejudged conceits will, in the mean time, breed contempt, the mother of rebellion and disorder.”51 In James I’s eyes, then, contempt for the king’s outward appearance was the mother of rebellion—a concern not to be taken lightly in TudorStuart England, precisely because critics of increased monarchical power phrased their opposition in cultural terms.52 To maintain its cultural and political authority, then, the crown needed to control the means of consumption—the meaning and circulation of aesthetic codes, styles, and fashions. By regulating the symbolic practices of court life through patronage of the arts, pageantry, a system of manners, sumptuary law, and religious ceremony, the monarchy solidified its place atop a political, economic, religious, and social hierarchy. We must take seriously the trappings of power, precisely because political leaders like James I saw them as a central element in their rule.53 Studying the public symbols that clothed the naked facts of power, then, should help us better understand the assertion of royal authority in Tudor-Stuart England—as well as the rebellion and disorder that James rightly feared would undermine it. As contemporaries saw it, the construction and elaboration of a courtly aesthetic was not merely peripheral to the English monarchy: power was never undressed, the king never offstage. Rather, royalists
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saw the maintenance of the crown’s power as involving as much a control of the codes of civility as the control of arms and legislation.54 “Princes,” wrote Gerrard de Malynes, “do not only give laws unto their subjects, but also (as Plato hath noted) they do change by their example the manners of man.”55 Or as James I himself wrote to Prince Henry, “it is not enough to a good king, by the scepter of good laws well execute to govern, and by force of arms to protect his people; if he join not herewith his virtuous life in his own person, and in the person of his court and company; by good example alluring his subjects to the love of virtue, and hatred of vice.”56 To allure England’s subjects to the love of virtue, then, the monarchy needed to assert the cultural authority that underpinned its power, by tending to the “smallest actions and gestures.” Given this concern for outward appearances, it makes sense that the king of England would give fashion advice to his son. In his “fatherly love” for both son and country,57 James advised Prince Henry on how to “frame all your indifferent actions and outward behavior.” “In your clothes,” he counseled, “keep a proportion, as well with the seasons of the year as of your age: . . . But specially eschew to be effeminate in your clothes, in perfuming, preening, or such like: and fail never in time of wars to be galliardest and bravest, both in clothes and countenance” (figure 4).58 In everything from clothing to facial expression, James I understood that eschewing effeminacy was vital to the crown’s legitimacy, precisely because displaying bravery was so important to its cultural authority. Avoiding “the mother of rebellion” meant sustaining a fatherly image of the crown as manly and moderate. Masculine bravery was central to this patriarchal vision of political culture, where fathers brought order and mothers disorder. For royalists, an image of masculinity was a necessary element of monarchy and court culture.59 The crown, then, had to prevent two types of disorder, one that stemmed from upstarts’ undue emulation of aristocratic court culture, and another that stemmed from contempt for that same court culture. The crown needed to simultaneously reinforce the hierarchy of analogies that justified aristocratic consumption in the face of social emulators, and reassert the masculinity and legitimacy of that consumption in the face of political criticism. For royalists, the court’s splendor was “a part of majesty,”60 necessary to create reverence and awe, but its expenses had to remain moderate in order to avoid “the mother of rebellion.” Like the rest of society, the monarchy needed to live moderately, within its means—but no lower, since the court’s magnificence was seen
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Figure 4. After Isaac Oliver, Henry Frederick, Prince of Wales, c. 1610. In his lace ruff and embroidery, Prince Henry lives up to his father James I’s advice to be “galliardest and bravest, both in clothes and countenance.” Courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery, London.
as essential to instilling political allegiance and social deference. Disputes over the court’s expenditures were of no small account in TudorStuart England, and the crown needed to balance its liberality with its exemplary moderation. As Francis Bacon had written, “bounty and magnificence are virtues, verae Regiae, but a prodigal king is nearer a tyrant, than a parsimonious [one].”61 Good government thus meant set-
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ting a sartorial example for the nation—not in the style of dress to be followed, but in the principle of moderation. The monarch was to be emulated not in fashion, but in the principle of dressing according to one’s station. George Puttenham put it bluntly: “a king and prince may use rich and gorgeous apparel decently, so cannot a mean person do.”62 “What is requisite and necessary for the service of a Prince,” wrote the author of The Uses and Abuses of Money, “is pride and lasciviousness in a Duke.”63 This is why English monarchs sought to balance temperance and magnificence in negotiating their “smallest actions and gestures.” Elizabeth I balanced a reputation for personal frugality with the ability to manipulate the chivalric codes that turned her into a “faerie queene.”64 James I was aware of the same need for balance, as he told Parliament in 1609: “a king’s expense must always be honorable, though not wasteful . . . in maintaining those ancient honorable forms of living that the former kings of England my predecessors have done, and his living [ought] to be ruled according to the proportion of his greatness.”65 Charles I sought to create an image of virtue and moderation at the same time that he emphasized courtly ceremony and splendor.66 Repeating the platitude that “the best pulse to discover the inward temper is by his outward actions,” the anonymous author “W. P.” portrayed his beloved martyr Charles I as “temperate and moderate in all things, as did ever appear in his recreations, expenses, apparel, diet, and the like.”67 Thus Sir Henry Wotton considered the moderate Charles I to be the perfect courtier: “in your gestures free from affectation; in your whole aspect no swelling, no rigidity, but an alluring and pleasing suavity” (figure 5).68 The public image of the court was thus of central concern to the English monarchy. A “pleasing suavity” brought deference but, if seen as affected, threatened insubordination. Moderation and the cultivation of nonchalance were essential to the crown’s outward appearance: “For if your mind be found occupied upon [clothes], it will be thought idle,” warned James I. An indifference to (though not adjuration of) fashion was essential to political authority: thus “be also moderate in your raiment,” James I advised Prince Henry, neither over superfluous, like a debauched waster; nor yet over base, like a miserable wretch; not artificially trimmed and decked, like a courtesan; nor yet over-sluggishly clothed, like a country-clown, not over lightly, like a candysoldier, or a vain young courtier; nor yet over gravely, like a minister. But in your garments be proper, cleanly, comely and honest: wearing your clothes in a careless, yet comely form: keeping in them a middle form.69
Figure 5. Daniel Mytens, Charles I, 1631. In this and other royal portraits, Charles displays the grace and nonchalance of a courtier while standing in a pose of authority. Courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery, London.
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For James I, then, as for old regime courtesy writers in general, the morality of masculine bravery lay in the middle between simplicity and artificiality, between deprivation and sensuality, between gravity and indulgence. Such were the sins of prodigal debauchees and upstart courtesans, country clowns and miserable wretches, Puritans and Catholics. In royalist political culture, then, sartorial splendor was merely a court uniform to be donned without affectation, an “outward garment, whether it were gown, cloak, or mantle of estate, which they might be said to bear only,” as the Rev. John Williams, later archbishop of York, preached before the king in 1619.70 An arbitrary custom conferred upon nobles “by the favor of their Prince and their own deserts,”71 this court uniform should fit with ease and gracefully correspond to one’s station. The scarlet robes of the courtier, opined the author of England’s Vanity, “are rather hung upon them, than girt to them . . . that is so far from making its impression on his heart, that he knows it may be commanded away to another, and is perfectly at the pleasure of his prince.”72 Worn at the pleasure of the prince, clothes should not make an impression on a man’s heart, for that was affectation and vanity. Conformity to fashion signified nothing more than a man’s position at court, and his fidelity to the crown, which in turn legitimated his conspicuous consumption: “’Tis fit his dress should be gay, because embroideries are for the palaces of kings.”73 Properly used, gay dress was noble and manly; improperly used, it was affected, vain, and effeminate. For the courtier, donning sumptuous dress was, in theory at least, merely an act of political allegiance. In this equation between political and sartorial loyalty, ruling by example had its dangers: being followed in the wrong way. Allegiance to the court’s example was always threatened by upstart emulators who dressed the part in order to obtain the power, who mistook the one-way correspondence between sign and substance. For royalists, following the court’s exemplary virtue did not entail adopting its fashions, but living according to its principle, within one’s means. For ideologues of the old sartorial regime, then, the cultural authority of the crown needed to be enforced by its magisterial power. If culture could not sustain the social hierarchy, then the law courts would. To avoid the “general confusion” of estates, the crown needed to legally stabilize the equation between displaying wealth and displaying worth. It thus issued sumptuary laws regulating who could wear what, in order to legislate the correspondence between cultural and legal definitions of rank. The law stepped in when manners failed.
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Defining aristocratic men’s consumption by royal fiat was fraught with ambivalence. Maintaining a hierarchy of resemblances was complicated by the difficult maintenance of legal and cultural definitions of status and gender in an age of social and cultural change. It meant establishing a correspondence between two terms whose meanings were themselves highly fluid: aristocracy and masculinity. After all, what and who was a gentleman? Classical and medieval courtesy theory defined a gentleman by both culture and birth, a definition that continued into the eighteenth century.74 In this tradition, John Ferne defined the gentlemen by “a certain excellence as well of gentle blood, as of virtues and proper merits, shining in one and the self-same man.”75 With the growth of monarchy in England, however, courtesy writers looked to the crown to regulate the correspondence between cultural attributes and social status.76 As a legal status defined by the crown, gentility could not be purchased or affected. And as a cultural status also defined by the crown, gentility needed to be legitimately displayed. Sumptuary laws performed both tasks of definition, regulating a social hierarchy and its correspondent cultural attributes. They had the function of turning social station into legal status, defusing great confusion by incorporating new wealth into a politically regulated social order.77 Sumptuary laws thus were aimed not at ending social mobility, but at ending illegitimate social emulation. By constantly remapping the social order and selectively legitimating new wealth, the crown attempted to maintain control of social and cultural change. Like court culture, then, sumptuary laws were part and parcel of the growth of monarchy, part of its claims to be able to regulate the social order by controlling the means and meanings of consumption. Laws regulating crimes of fashion date from 1327 in England, part of the Tudor revolution in government; they were “under statutory control continuously between 1463 and 1604,” and reached their zenith under Elizabeth I.78 They were attempts to institute a hierarchy in dress that would, once and for all, end the new-fangling of styles and the intermingling of status symbols. A 1532-33 act “for the better repressing of the inordinate excess of apparel by some moderation, and for a reasonable order like to be observed, and performed in the wearing thereof,” was passed under Henry VIII, and was frequently renewed throughout the sixteenth century.79 Itself a great hierarchy of analogies, the Act proclaimed, for example, that no one under the rank of duke was permitted to wear imported wool. Summarized below,80 this Act provided the gen-
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eral framework for Elizabethan sumptuary policy and was praised throughout the old sartorial regime.
1532 –33 sumptuary law No one under the degree of:
Shall be permitted to wear:
king, queen, king’s mother, king’s brothers and sisters, king’s uncles and aunts
silk of purple; cloth of gold tissue
dukes and marquises
cloth of gold costing more than 50£ per yard
Order of the Garter
silk of purple
earl
cloth of gold, silver, or tinsled satin; silk of cloth mixed or embroidered with gold or silver
earl, viscount, baron, and Prior of St. Johns Jerusalem
fur of sable; cloth of gold, silver or tinsel in doublets
duke, marquise, earl and earl’s children, baron, or knight of the Company of the Garter
imported wool; velvet of crimson, scarlet or blue; fur of black genets or lusern
baron’s son or knight’s son, “except he [who] may expend yearly in lands or tenements, rents, fees, or annuities, to his own use for term of his life, or for term of another man’s life, or in the right of his wife, 202£ over all charges”
chain of gold, bracelet, onch, or other ornament of gold, except rings; velvet in gowns; “furs of libards”; gold, silver or silk embroidery, pricking or painting
knight no man expending under 100£ per year
“any color of gold named color S.” satin, damask, silk chamlet, or taffeta in gown; velvet
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except in sleeveless jackets and doublets; imported fur, except foines, genets, and bogy son and heir apparent of a knight, or of a man of charges of 200£ per annum
chamlet or silk in their gowns; any silk other than satin, damask, taffeta, or sarcenet in their doublets, and sarcenet, chamlet, or taffeta in the linings of their gowns; none of the above silks, or velvet in their coats, jackets, jerkins, caps, or purses; the color of scarlet, crimson or blue; fur of foins or genets; imported fur; buttons or chain of gold or silver
gentlemen as may dispend in land and tenements, fees, or annuities, as is aforesaid 200£ per year
silk, except satin, taffeta, sarcenet, or damask in his doublet; chamlet in his sleeved jacket; lace of silk in his points, or in girdles and garters made in England or Wales; furs of black cony or bogy
gentlemen as may dispend . . . 50£ per year
cloth of the colors of scarlet, crimson, or violet engrained; silk in doublets or jackets; nor any cloth above the price of 6s. 8d. per broad yard; imports other than chamlet in doublets and jackets
servingmen, yeomen taking wages, “or such other as may not dispend of freehold 120s. by year”
cloth in hose above 2s. the yard; any embroidery; embroidery; cloth in garments costing more than
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3s. 4d. per broad yard, except if it be his master’s livery; fur except gray cony fur, or fur of black or white lamb of English, Welsh, or Irish growth; silk, gold, or in his shirt, cap, collar, or hat; any of these things imported husbandmen
hose of cloth costing more than 2s. per yard; garments of cloth costing more than 4s. per broad yard; fur; imports other than fustian canvas
servingmen in husbandry; or journeymen in handicrafts, attendants of the king, queen, prince, or princess
garments of cloth costing more than 2s. 8d. per broad yard; in his doublet any thing but fustian, canvas, leather, or woollen cloth; fur
Sumptuary laws and proclamations were often issued, though poorly enforced.81 Since the frequency of their issuance and the lack of cases prosecuting infringements strongly suggest that the laws were futile, they should be seen as a testimony more to political and social thought about dress rather than to any actual sartorial practice. The increased frequency of royal proclamations against excessive dress under Elizabeth testifies both to the increase of new wealth during her reign, as is often suggested, and to the monarchy’s increasing role as the guardian of sartorial stability. As social mobility increased, so did the crown’s power to legitimate and regulate it as part of a legally defined social order. Royal sumptuary proclamations, then, bear witness to the increased royal attention to the “smallest actions and gestures.” As Wilfrid Hooper has written, the increase of sumptuary proclamations under Elizabeth can be attributed to “the queen’s passion for outward uniformity. . . . Politically and constitutionally also, her sumptuary policy is important as marking her dislike of parliamentary interference and her preference for personal rule.”82 The political regulation of the display of social distinctions, then, was primary in Elizabethan sumptuary policy. Sumptuary
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proclamations, in theory if not in practice, were the legal guarantee of the hierarchy of analogies, the royal arbiters of the social economy of signs. Sumptuary law ended in England in 1604, for reasons that will be discussed in the next chapter. One surely cannot argue, then, that Elizabethan sumptuary policy was characteristic of the entire old sartorial regime. Nonetheless, a significant body of opinion existed in seventeenthcentury England that supported the use of sumptuary law to maintain social distinctions. James I issued a proclamation in 1610 calling for “some politic order against excessive apparel.”83 Sumptuary laws with the explicit aim of maintaining social distinctions were introduced into the Commons in 1604, 1614, 1621, 1656, and 1662.84 Calls outside Parliament for the preservation of a sumptuary hierarchy by legal means were made throughout the seventeenth century.85 The royalist Edward Chamberlayne proposed in 1667 that “some sumptuary laws may be made, whereby the great excess, especially in the inferior sort of English, may be restrained, and most degrees and orders may be discerned by their habit.”86 “This fond humor” for fashion, Richard Head complained in 1684, “is a disease of the body politic; that deserves . . . a nipping penal statute to eat away this proud flesh, [so] that persons may suit their dresses to their qualities.”87 Throughout the entire old sartorial regime, royalists looked to the crown to control the means of consumption. As the product of an inegalitarian social ideology, sumptuary law helped define aristocratic status by a rather simple formula: “the finer and more expensive the fabric, the more restricted its use.”88 Without these royal restrictions, without the crown as an arbiter of signs, “womanish vanity” might lead to general confusion. For ideologues of the old sartorial regime, nothing was greater feared than polysemy: arbitrary signifiers, improperly regulated, might be misused arbitrarily; arbitrary signifiers thus needed a royal arbiter to regulate the relation between material fabric and social fabric. Through the declarative power of sumptuary proclamations, the crown attempted to legislate the nation’s habits of consumption and thereby regulate the general economy of signs, assuring a direct traffic between signifier and signified. Using a variant of Gresham’s law, the crown guaranteed that the noble value of signs would not be diluted by their overuse. Through both sumptuary law and an attention to its own “actions and gestures,” the crown sought to limit “bravery” to aristocratic men, preventing an outbreak of rebellion and disorder by instilling a reverence for and deference to courtly splendor. For defenders of the old sartorial regime, the maintenance of social order depended on the maintenance of a court of conspicuous consumers.
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COURT CAPITALISM The rise of royal power and court culture in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was in large part based on a rapid growth in world trade: like their European counterparts, English monarchs sponsored global competition for bullion, rare commodities, and export markets, while bullion from overseas enriched the crown’s coffers, and imported goods proclaimed the crown’s power. Seeing foreign trade as “a main pillar of this kingdom,”89 monarchs found it in their interest to incorporate great trading companies in order to regularize the customs from international commerce that financed their expanding governments, creating a mercantile elite with close connections to the crown.90 Aristocratic gentlemen acted as liaisons between traders and the crown, and merchants catered to the growing demands of the aristocracy. While foreign trade was the main source of the crown’s income, courtly consumption was the main stimulus to foreign trade: merchant capitalism meshed well with aristocratic court culture. This policy of court capitalism (more ad hoc pragmatism than coherent philosophy 91) was not without its critics, especially among English manufacturers who opposed imports and argued that England’s wealth derived from capital accumulation and sumptuary restraint. A debate between merchants and manufacturers about the role of luxury and consumption ran the course of the old sartorial regime.92 In the face of complaints that imported luxury had “disfashioned and effeminated the English nation,”93 merchant capitalists argued that imports brought continental civility to England. For English manufacturers critical of court capitalism, domestic trade was the source of manly sobriety and exemplary virtue, while for merchant capitalists, foreign trade brought gentility and the “pleasing suavity” necessary for political authority. Two ideals of culture, then, were used to contrast two economic theories. What both supporters and critics of court capitalism shared was the assumption that the state should regulate trade—an assumption that governed economic thinking and practice until the early years of the Industrial Revolution, when Adam Smith roundly condemned it at the same time that he gave it its modern name, “the mercantile system,” or mercantilism. Since Adam Smith, mercantilism often has frequently been defined— as a conception of the economy that saw government regulation of the balance of trade as the primary means of fostering economic well-being— in order to contrast it to the laissez-faire economic theory that Smith
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himself helped formulate.94 There is certainly merit to the contrast, but this definition of mercantilism glosses over the early modern debate between the bullionist (or monetarist) defenders of the old sartorial regime, who favored price controls as the solution to the balance of trade, and the manufacturing protectionists critical of that regime, who favored the promotion of export production and the limitation of import consumption. Much confusion has resulted when historians of economic thought—from Adam Smith to the present—have conflated the two camps, or used primarily one camp to describe the entirety of mercantilism.95 What I term mercantilism, or the ideology of “spokesmen [sic] of industrial rather than merchant capital,”96 will be discussed in the next chapter. Here, I will show the ways in which merchant capitalists promoted an ideology of conspicuous consumption compatible with the political and social goals of the old sartorial regime. The period from 1550 to 1688, England’s old sartorial regime, was the heyday of merchant capitalism, a period in which traders (rather than producers) dominated English commerce in both policy and practice. In court capitalism, the fortunes of aristocrats and traders were intermingled. Aristocratic expenditures rose (along with income) in the century preceding the Civil War,97 and this increased purchasing power of the aristocracy promoted the growth of overseas trade, as the demand for imported fabrics expanded dramatically. (Silk imports doubled in the 1590s alone, while demand for French and Flemish lace grew at an enormous rate.98) Prompted by influential courtiers, England’s gentry and nobility invested their wealth in colonial enterprises, especially the newly chartered joint-stock companies,99 while overseas traders were “the chief beneficiaries of the commercial policies of the Elizabethan government.”100 The crown thus protected this merger of aristocratic and mercantile interests. Fearing the harmful effects of over-competition, the crown restricted foreign trade to joint-stock corporations, and protected English trading companies from foreign competition. This process led to the “very great enrichment of the native mercantile elite,” with strong ties to the court aristocracy and crown.101 Merchants were knighted, and, despite some aristocratic disdain for commerce, trade itself became an honorable profession. “The estate is honorable,” gloated John Wheeler, secretary of the Merchant Adventurers; “it may be exercised not only by those of the third estate (as we term them) but also by the nobles, and chiefest men of this realm with commendable profit, without any derogation to their nobilities, high degrees, and conditions.”102 Ennobling and protecting merchants, the crown simulta-
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neously fostered and sought to control social change. English commerce thus owed its great expansion in large part to the social and political growth of the crown and aristocracy in Tudor-Stuart England. Yet the court was not only a protector of foreign trade; it was as well a consumer of foreign goods. In English court capitalism, the crown supported foreign trade over domestic industry (including England’s largest industry, wool), favoring the circulation rather than production of goods.103 The crown considered the source of national (and royal) wealth to be the high profit margins of international merchant monopolies trading in rare goods, rather than a high volume trade in lower quality, domestically produced goods. Court capitalists therefore justified imports—used with moderation by those whose status merited them—as beneficial: foreign imports provided employment and wealth for London merchants (who in turn lent money to the crown), and allowed the English court to demonstrate its power and continental civility. As its secretary Henry Parker argued, the Merchant Adventurers saw their imports as “ornaments of peace, as well as instruments of defense.”104 Just as courtesy writers favored the import of continental gentility, crown policy and mercantile interests favored the import of the fine fabrics that proclaimed that gentility. Thus economic policy came to the defense of conspicuous consumption in the old sartorial regime: as Lewes Roberts, a director of the East India Company, formulated it, “foreign commodities . . . benefit the merchant, the people, and the Prince.”105 Simply put, the court’s consumption promoted wealth. For merchant capitalists, then, defending court culture was tantamount to defending their own interests. As men of “experience, use and knowledge of foreign people, and their fashions, orders, and kind of dealing,” elite merchants could bring not only wealth to England, but culture as well, as John Wheeler argued. Culture brokers for their aristocratic clients, and discreet discerners of continental customs, merchants brought “great good to their states, honor, and enriching of themselves and their countries.”106 By importing fashions from abroad, foreign trade was the great civilizer, fostering domestic civility and international peace. Commerce brought friendly interactions between nations. Such, conveniently, was God’s design, argued the Company of Merchant Adventurers: God hath not blessed any nation with that universal product of its own country, as that it should not stand in need of something, whereof another may furnish it, and hath either given a superfluity to every nation, by commutation, to supply one another reciprocally, or else the quickness and industry
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The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity of spirit, invention and labor, to furnish their several wants and necessities otherwise.107
This “pacific vision” of international commerce was as old as the old sartorial regime.108 In 1586, John Ferne praised the civilizing function of international trade: by commerce and navigation, he wrote, “we communicate the benefits of other countries, we preserve civility, renew familiarity and league with foreign nations.”109 Promoting civility at home and among a league of nations, court capitalism would make the world safe for aristocracy. As mercantilist arguments emerged in the seventeenth century calling for restrictions on imports, English merchants were often accused of a lack of patriotism for importing foreign cultures: “finding us fantastical and voluptuous, they tempt us with all sorts of French toys, Indy and Japan trifles, stain’d calicoes, silks and such pleasant things, and fetch away our many and solid wealth,” complained Carew Reynell.110 Merchants defended themselves against this criticism by demonstrating their loyalty to the crown and country, portraying themselves as overcoming “great hazards both of person and estate” to serve England.111 Lewes Roberts boasted that the heroic merchant “refused not pain or toil with foreign trade to enrich their native soil, and (like discreet chameleons) can comply with each man’s humor for commodity.”112 Thomas Violet trumpeted his ardent support for Charles I in the Civil War, arguing that foreign trade served in “strengthening and enriching the kingdom, the increase of trade, his majesty’s honor, safety, and profit, and the enriching of the kingdom in general.”113 Threatening if excessive in either price or amount, the “importation of exotic commodities, if subtly managed, may become as great an improvement, as exportation is to others,” Henry Parker argued.114 If “subtly managed” by loyal merchants and wisely regulated by the crown, the merchant’s private profit was synonymous with the public’s gain. The merchant and the prince thus worked hand in hand: both the kingdom and the loyal merchant would profit from foreign trade. To subtly manage this trade and prevent it from ruining England, merchant capitalists called for controls on prices rather than restrictions on imports. In the “bullionist” theories of merchant capitalism, a shrewd monetary policy was the source of national wealth, and royal trade policies focused on controlling prices in order to preserve bullion and maintain the customs revenue.115 The Elizabethan Sir Thomas Smith considered bad monetary policy “to be the chief cause of all this dearth of
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things and of the manifest impoverishment of this realm.”116 The dearness of prices, not the consumption of imports, was threatening England’s social fabric. “Money doth rule the cause of commodities,” argued the influential merchant Gerrard de Malynes, whose views were supported in high circles.117 “We do not find so great an inconvenience in the wearing of foreign commodities,” Malynes wrote, “as we do in the price of them, being within this fifty years risen far otherwise than our home commodities are.”118 Measuring the balance of trade “in price, and not so much in the quantity,”119 merchant capitalists blamed the undervaluing of English money for the low price of exports and the high price of imports.120 In itself, then, the wearing of foreign goods was not inherently harmful to England’s economy, merely its misuse. For merchant capitalists, as for old regime political, social, and religious writers, sumptuous apparel was a thing indifferent, as Gerrard de Malynes wrote: Concerning the immoderate use of foreign commodities in wearing and wasting, by cutting and putting into several strange new-fangled fashions, we do refer the examination thereof unto those that have authority to reprehend men of their actions, wishing reformation where things are amiss. And albeit that gay and sumptuous apparel is a demonstration of pride, yet a country clown may be as proud in a frieze coat, as a gentleman in a velvet gown. For pride harboreth in the mind, and the difference is only in the giving of example unto others.121
With immoderation reformed by the proper authorities, foreign goods were compatible with, indeed necessary to, a healthy commercial society. Merchant capitalists thus legitimated aristocratic consumption by arguing that fine fashions and foreign commodities were arbitrary signifiers, with nothing inherently prideful about them: pride harbored in the mind, not in the clothes. For economic defenders of court culture, then, elite consumption of foreign fashions brought strength and civility to England. And if foreign fashions could civilize England and pacify the world, they might also provide employment.122 As English merchant companies took control of the import and export trades from foreign competition, overseas commerce became an increasing source of English employment. In the economic ideology of court capitalism, high demand for imported fashions drove the economy, whereas the demand for English cloth was held to be inelastic.123 From the sixteenth century on, defenders of the old sartorial regime argued that the economy was driven by aristocratic
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consumption, and that noble expenditures were a form of liberality to the poor.124 As early as 1592, Robert Greene believed that it was aristocrats wearing imported velvet, not yeomen wearing English cloth, who spurred trade: What drives the merchants to seek foreign marts, to vend their goods and hazard their lives? Not, if still the end of their travel were a pair of cloth breeches; no, velvet, costly attire, curious and quaint apparel is the spur that pricks them forward to attempt such danger.125
The economic doctrine of beneficial consumption went hand in hand with aristocratic political culture. The court was as beneficial to merchants as merchants were loyal to the crown. Thus many of the clearest proponents of this doctrine were royalists or Tories defending the “liberal supply of the occasions and expenses of the crown” and criticizing republicans and Whigs for seeking to impoverish the nation by limiting the court’s expenditures: “it will never be found that a poor exchequer made a rich country,” the Tory John Nalson argued.126 “He that thinks the wardrobe too fine, must traitorously fear the exchequer too full,” wrote the author of England’s Vanity, a self-proclaimed “compassionate conformist.”127 Though William Petty claimed to “profess no politics,”128 he supported the court’s “entertainments, magnificent shows, triumphal arches, etc. . . . The people often complain, that the king bestows the money he raises from the people upon his favorites: to which we answer, that what is given to favorites, may at the next step or transmigration, come into our own hands.”129 The reverence and deference created by “magnificent shows” was central to good government and social order in the ideology of the old sartorial regime. It was also good business. In court capitalism, then, merchants were “beholden to the nobility and gentry of the nation,”130 and thus understood that their own interests involved supporting a strong and splendid crown. It makes sense, then, that these Tory economic writers drew on the old sartorial regime’s old saws about dress in defense of their own economic interests. At the end of the old sartorial regime, the Tory economic writer Nicholas Barbon condemned “many grave and sober people” for misunderstanding what he saw as the nature of fashion: The following of the fashion is a respect paid to the Prince and his court, by approving his choice in the shape of the dress. . . . Those that exclaim against the vanity of the new fashion, and at the same time, commend the decency of the old one, forget that every old fashion was once new, and . . . it’s only use
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and custom by which habits become grave and decent, and not any particular convenience in the shape . . . and therefore since all habits are equally handsome, and hard to know which is most convenient: the promoting of new fashions, ought to be encouraged, because it provides a livelihood for a great part of mankind.131
Determined by a custom regulated by the prince, merchant capitalists saw “gay and sumptuous apparel” as essential to the livelihood of the English economy. Properly regulated by the state’s ability to balance income and expenditures, bullion and imports, the honor, glory, and splendor of the crown and court would advance and improve the interest of the country. For the defenders of merchant capitalism, noble liberality was both politically honorable and economically useful: aristocratic conspicuous consumption could bring civility, gentility, and economic well-being to England.
RELIGIOUS CONFORMITY TO FASHION The English Reformation was in large part a political Reformation, initiated and organized by the crown,132 and thus it is no surprise that the Church of England came to the defense of royal court culture in the old sartorial regime. As a compromise between Catholicism and Puritanism, the Anglican doctrines and practices established by Elizabeth I retained much of Catholic ceremony, yet gave control over those practices to the crown. Religious conformity to Anglican ceremony was thus tantamount to political loyalty, and membership in the Church of England was part and parcel of being a loyal English subject. Instruction in moral behavior, then, was instruction in good citizenship. Thus the argument that aristocratic conformity to court fashion was a sign of political allegiance was well grounded in the teachings of the Church of England. Like political writers, Anglican preachers defended the crown’s regulation of ceremonial conformity on the grounds that fine dress was merely a state-instituted uniform. In the face of Puritan fears that ceremonial splendor would “effeminate us all at home,” reducing England to Romish servility, as John Milton saw it,133 Anglicans writers justified ceremonial conformity by arguing that clothes were adiaphora, things indifferent to salvation, matters of theological insignificance, and thus properly under the purview of the crown.134 As the “corner-stone of Anglicanism,”135 this theory of things indifferent was used to defend church and crown from accusations of luxury and effeminacy. At once a theory of society,
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sacrality, and signs, the Anglican justification of ceremonial conformity went hand in hand with monarchical power and aristocratic society in the old sartorial regime. A dispute about the semiotic and political status of religious vestments was “the first unmistakable expression of what later were known as Puritan-Anglican tensions in the Church of England.”136 Begun in 1550, quarrels over “what some of the bishops held to be trivia, ‘that comical dress’, ‘these ridiculous trifles’”137 went to the heart of religious struggles in Tudor-Stuart England. At stake was the crown’s ability to regulate the “smallest actions and gestures” in religious affairs. As “the chief bone of contention” between Anglicans and Puritans, this vestments controversy spanned the course of the old sartorial regime.138 It is thus no overstatement to argue that the religious meaning of clothing signs was central to English church history throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Puritans and Anglicans debated the semiotic meaning of vestments, surplices, altarpieces, and church ceremonies in general. As contemporaries well understood, bringing a “uniformity of order” to “external, decent, and lawful rites and ceremonies” was a central concern of the Elizabethan settlement of religion.139 In the 1620s, Archbishop Laud’s revival of “the beauty of holiness”140 offended Puritan sensibilities and was “the most important single contributor to the cause of Puritanism in the early seventeenth century.”141 In the 1640 Root and Branch Petition, opponents of the crown’s High Church policies complained to the House of Commons of “the great conformity and likeness both continued and increased of our Church to the Church of Rome, in vestures, postures, ceremonies and administrations.”142 The Long Parliament removed surplices in May 1644, though the Restoration church restored them. Passed by a conservative Parliament in 1661, the “Clarendon Code” declared conformity to Church of England practices to be the basis for political office, since it was synonymous with membership in the commonwealth. Finally, fears of “popery” and its ceremonies were a large element in the ideology that opposed and ultimately expelled James II in the Glorious Revolution.143 At the intersection of the religious, the political, and the personal, the debate about the meaning of sartorial signs was more than a merely symbolic debate about power: it went to the heart of English political and religious history. The vestments controversy, to be sure, began as a debate only about religious dress, and historians have warned against confusing debates about clerical vestments with those about apparel in general.144 Cer-
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tainly the religious nature of clerical dress gave the vestments debate special significance, but this dispute did spill over into general discussions of clothing, morality, and social distinction. The debate about clerical vestments was not confined to some purportedly autonomous field of religion, especially since the same terms of debate—indifference, moderation, royal authority, reverence, and hierarchy—were used to discuss clothing consumption in general. The struggle between Anglican and Puritan definitions of clothing was thus a key component in defining the morality of consumption in the old sartorial regime. For Anglicans, conformity to fashion was as commendable as conformity in other forms of worship: majesty and distinction in dress helped maintain England’s moral and social order. The Tory Rev. John Evans defended conformity to church ceremony and decried those who, in the name of gravity and modesty, “set up against the King and State.”145 Vestments were allowable supplements to religious practice, aimed at edifying the laity and elevating the clergy. Though not seen as inherently holy, distinctive ecclesiastical garments were argued to be necessary to instill reverence for the clergy. In response to Puritan challenges, Elizabeth I’s proclamation of 1559 most clearly stated this policy of ceremonial splendor: Her majesty being desirous to have the prelacy and clergy of this realm to be had as well in outward reverence as otherwise regarded for the worthiness of their ministries, . . . willeth and commandeth that all archbishops and bishops, and all other that be called or admitted to preaching or ministry of the sacraments, . . . shall use and wear such seemly habits, garments, and such square caps as were most commonly and orderly received in the latter year of the reign of King Edward VI, not thereby meaning to attribute any holiness or special worthiness to the said garments.146
As things indifferent, church vestments were in themselves without any “holiness or special worthiness”—their worth and significance were established only by the royal proclamation itself, rather than by any intrinsic qualities of the garments. Likewise, Anglicans considered courtly splendor to be an innocent practice, necessary for instilling “outward reverence.” As the Rev. John Williams preached before King James, “soft clothing . . . are in their own nature, merely . . . things indifferent, without the least sin of excess or deficiency within themselves.”147 Like defenders of the old sartorial regime in general, Anglicans supported the notion that “soft clothing” was required by the conventions of court culture, and was thus an arbitrary, conventional sign, without any special worthiness to the garments them-
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selves. Though clothing distinctions were seen as essential to the moral order, the clothing itself was neither inherently good nor intrinsically evil. Fundamentally a theory of signs, then, the Church of England’s defense of ceremony as a thing indifferent had political as well as religious significance. The arbitrary relationship between signifier and signified was to be regulated by the state: “All ceremonies are in themselves indifferent,” wrote the Tory Thomas Sheridan, “but when commanded, are necessary in their use and practice.”148 The Erastian Heinrich Bullinger wrote in support of the English crown’s position in the vestments controversy: Neither do I see any cause, why we may not go as the papists do in apparel, which is not superstitious, but of policy, and for comeliness’s sake . . . The matter of apparel was never taken away at the beginning of reformation and is yet retained, not by the Pope’s law, but by the king’s commandment, as an indifferent thing of mere policy, . . . a mere civil thing, appointed for decency, seemliness, and for order, wherein is put no religion.149
Vestments were “mere civil things,” uniforms used for the decent serving of monarchs, and for the serving of God. Properly used as “a sign of some moral signification,” as Bishop Thomas Morton argued in 1618, they maintained their referentiality, they were used “without any superstition in a sign, and for an admonishment . . . of an honest life.”150 As long as they were not misused, they were neither ungodly nor unmannerly, and thus could be properly regulated by the crown. Anglican writers thus justified religious conformity to fashion precisely because it was a thing indifferent, variable with the times, “necessitated by the circumstances of time and place.”151 To dissent from customary fashion would be a sign of disloyalty, incompatible with Tudor-Stuart notions of masculinity. Calling on gentlemen to be “manly, moderate, seasonable, [and] lawful,” the Anglican and royalist Francis Quarles gave fashion advice typical of the old sartorial regime: “In thy apparel avoid singularity, profuseness and gaudiness; be not too early in the fashion, nor too late: decency is the half way between affectation and neglect.”152 In their sermons and writings, Anglicans preached against the host of vices that threatened the social and political order with great confusion: pride, envy, ambition, idolatry, affectation, immoderation, luxury, and effeminacy. The Anglican divine and courtesy writer Samuel Crossman counseled that the virtuous man “troubles not himself with a restless affectation and niceness about trifles.”153 Since clothing was a thing indifferent, too much attention to it was merely a sign of immod-
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eration and affectation, while conformity to it was a sign of moderation and manliness. Like affectation for courtesy writers, pride and vanity were for Anglicans found in the improper dissemination of signs, in their use by those who did not deserve them. Pride had simultaneously created gender confusion and semiotic confusion: “Garments are set down for signs distinctive between sex and sex, to take unto us these garments that are manifest signs of another sex, is to falsify, forge, and adulterate, contrary to the express rule of the word of God,” intoned the Anglican divine Stephen Gosson in 1596.154 The royalist divine Richard Allestree complained in 1673 of the “degenerate age we do now live in, that every thing seems inverted, even sexes; whilst men fall to the effeminacy and niceness of women, and women take up the confidence, the boldness of men, and this too under the notion of good breeding.”155 Pride had also disrupted the political order. In 1642, the Anglican preacher and royalist Thomas Fuller bewailed “the riot of our age, wherein (as peacocks are more gay than the eagle himself) subjects are grown braver than their sovereign.”156 Pride and envy in dress undermined the authority of the sovereign, which only piety and the long arm of the law might aright. In the religious arguments of the old sartorial regime, then, fashion sins were determined according to one’s social position, not by any inherent relation to material things. Pride was a sin of social climbers whose ambition and disobedience would create great disorder. “The seat of pride is in the heart, and only there; and if it be not there, it is neither in the looks, nor in the clothes,” argued the Restoration Lord Chancellor, the earl of Clarendon. Condemning “not the weed but the vice” (to use Robert Greene’s words), Clarendon’s dress code is the clearest Anglican defense of the old sartorial regime: The outward preservation of men’s dignity, according to their several qualities and stations they hold in the world, by their birth or office, or other qualification, is not pride. The peace and quiet of nations cannot be preserved without order and government; and order and government cannot be maintained and supported, without distinction and degrees of men, which must be subordinate one to the other: where all are equal, there can be no superiority; and where there is no superiority, there can be no obedience; and where there is no obedience, there must be great confusion. . . . The particular quality and condition of men may oblige them to some cost and curiosity in their clothes; and then the very affecting a neatness and expense of decent habit, (if it does not exceed the limits of one’s fortunes) is not only very lawful, and an innocent delight, but very commendable; and men, who most affect a gal-
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Like James I, the earl of Clarendon understood the importance of outward appearances to the old sartorial regime. Religious teaching about such trifling things indifferent as dress was a central element both in defining the practices of the Church of England and in defining the moral authority of court culture. For contemporary defenders of court culture, the “innocent delight” of “neatness and expense of decent habit” was necessary for preserving “the peace and quiet of nations”: controlling the means of consumption was central to preventing the great confusion that so vexed Tudor-Stuart England. In Anglican as well as royalist ideology, then, the court’s “cost and curiosity” not only symbolized, but helped maintain, a social, religious, economic, and political order. In this chapter, then, we have seen the interconnection between a social doctrine of aristocratic sartorial splendor, a political doctrine of royal bravery, an economic doctrine of beneficial consumption, and a religious doctrine of ceremonial conformity—an entire regime of masculine conspicuous consumption. Faced with accusations of effeminacy, old regime writers argued that display itself was neither inherently masculine nor inherently feminine: apparel merely proclaimed the man, not made him, while pride harbored in the mind, not in the clothes. Thus aristocratic conspicuous consumption in the old sartorial regime was defended as socially, politically, economically, and religiously necessary. Controlling the means and meanings of consumption meant preventing “rebellion and disorder”—a rebellion threatened by the critics of crown and aristocracy, and a disorder created by their upstart admirers. In the course of the seventeenth century, however, the crown and aristocracy lost control of the meanings of consumption, as Whigs and republicans, Puritans and mercantilists criticized the Stuart court’s consumer habits as luxurious, effeminate, tyrannical, popish, and uneconomical. As the next chapter will demonstrate, a new definition of aristocratic masculinity emerged to make the rebellion of court critics more of an immediate threat than the disorder of upstarts.
chapter 3
The Seventeenth-Century Fashion Crisis
Many crises shook seventeenth-century England. Its most politically turbulent century in the modern era saw Civil War, the execution of one king, the establishment of a republic, the restoration of another king, and the expulsion of a third, as various groups undermined the crown’s legitimacy. This political turmoil was mixed with a social crisis, as the rising political voice of country gentry, and the rising economic power of manufacturers, challenged the hegemony of the aristocracy. A religious feud between Puritans and the Church of England continued from the sixteenth century, fueling both the political and social crises. Repeated economic convulsions jolted England like surface tremors during its slow tectonic shift from a commodity-trading to a commodityproducing nation. Together these disturbances combined to challenge the basis of power, a crisis of political legitimacy that historians have called the general crisis of the seventeenth century. Perhaps the most visually obvious aspect of that general crisis was the crisis of fashion in the seventeenth century, which was informed by political, social, religious, and economic events, and in turn helped give them shape. Contemporaries saw the crown’s conspicuous consumption as a threat to the moral, economic, and political well-being of the nation. A crisis in the public image of monarchy helped precipitate its fall in the English Civil War, helped redefine its meaning during the Restoration, and helped expel James II in the Glorious Revolution. The crisis in courtly display—a primary aspect of the court’s public image—was 51
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thus more than a mere symbol of the seventeenth-century crisis: undermining the moral authority of the crown by attacks on its character and appearance was one of the central ideological tools of seventeenthcentury critics. The seventeenth-century fashion crisis was one of the means by which English elites lost their cultural hegemony, lost control of the meanings of consumption, lost their ability to command respect and deference—and thus it was a key component in the outbreak of the Civil War. Portraying conspicuous consumption as inherently feminine undermined the old sartorial regime’s public image: there was no better assault on patriarchal authority than an attack on its masculinity. In attacking the court’s conspicuous consumption, political, social, religious, and economic critics undermined the cultural foundations of monarchy in seventeenth-century England, subverting the crown’s ability to pose as the arbiter of culture, the guarantor of a visible social order, the center of trade, and the moral regulator of ceremonial conformity. An attack on symbols went to the heart of the attack on the Stuart monarchy, since in the iconoclastic ideology of court critics, the use of symbolism itself was politically suspect.1 The fashion crisis thus not only symbolized the general crisis of the seventeenth century: the court’s public image was a focal point of criticism precisely because it was a focal point of contemporaries’ understanding of the political, social, economic, and moral order. If in the old sartorial regime monarchs had attempted to control the means and meanings of consumption, it was a control they lost throughout the course of the seventeenth-century crisis. “THE MODE IS A TYRANT” The language of clothes is a political language (we speak of fashion dictators and slaves to fashion), and in the seventeenth century that language took on its modern form. Seventeenth-century political history was dominated by a long struggle between two groups— or rather two sets of ideas—that at various times went by the labels crown and parliament, court and country, royalist and republican, or Tory and Whig. The ideological positions evolved over time, by no means remaining constant on all issues. They nonetheless carried with them two distinct attitudes to court culture, display, luxury, and consumption, attitudes that divided these groups as much as did issues of royal authority, the role of Parliament, or the right of resistance. Like defenders of the old sartorial regime, its critics linked fashion with royal authority, yet used republican and Whig ideas to condemn the “tyranny” of fashion. Op-
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ponents of the court and crown created an alternative political culture based on new ideals of upper-class masculinity, arguing that conspicuous consumption was a product of political corruption, aimed at debilitating and domesticating the manly independence of English aristocrats. “A king must be adored like a demigod,” warned John Milton, “with a dissolute and haughty court about him, of vast expense and luxury, masks and revels, to the debauching of our prime gentry.”2 For court critics, a vicious circle of vices threatened to debauch the commonwealth of England: tyranny fostered luxury, luxury fostered effeminacy, and effeminacy made men too weak to resist any increase of tyranny. “The mode is a tyrant,” as one anonymous author warned, “and too often ruins her best servants by engaging them into many other kind of expenses and inconveniences.”3 Oppositional ideology was not a systematic political theory, and opponents of the crown often differed on their preferred model of government.4 Precisely because opponents of the crown shared little more than an oppositional stance, the critique of the crown depended more on rhetorical strategies than on a alternative political program.5 Oppositional groups shared one thing above all: opposition. It was this shared rhetoric, this rhetorical debasement of monarchical culture, more than the appeal of any other form of government, that united opponents of the crown. For defenders as well as opponents of the Stuart monarchy, the court’s manners were central to its legitimacy. As the Whig John Philips warned in 1681: “Princes are to know, that at that time that they begin to break the laws and those ancient manners and customs under which the people have been long governed, they begin to lose their sovereignty.”6 Oppositional ideology was as much a moral critique of manners as it was a political ideology about rights and sovereignty: there was no “political science” in seventeenth-century England, no sense of the autonomy of politics.7 The critique of Stuart political culture thus operated as a critique of character, where “virtue was the principle of republics,”8 while luxury and effeminacy were the vices of tyrants.9 For contemporaries, the crown’s conspicuous consumption was therefore more than political symbolism: it was part and parcel of the public role that the court played in promoting or harming the moral well-being of the body politic. As Daniel Defoe put it in celebrating the Glorious Revolution: “to reward virtue, or discourage vice, . . . are the great ends for which civil government was at first instituted.”10 Like defenders of the old sartorial regime, crown opponents defined political legitimacy by the practices of everyday life, by the encouragement of virtue and the avoidance
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of vice, as much by the character of the prince as by the crown’s adherence to constitutional principles. “A nation is composed of private men, all brought up very near in the same customs, and instructed much by the same sort of teachers: the Prince must take them as he finds them,” wrote the author of The Character of a Prince.11 In betraying the ancient customs of private men, then, public men lost their political legitimacy. Throughout the seventeenth century, the court and its opponents struggled for control over definitions of luxury, consumption, and display. Even under Elizabeth, Parliament resisted royal attempts to control consumption through sumptuary laws, and sumptuary regulations had been the product of royal proclamation rather than parliamentary legislation. Most Elizabethan sumptuary bills after 1565 were introduced in the Lords but rejected by the Commons.12 Though crown and Parliament agreed about the need for sumptuary regulation, they disagreed over who should be empowered to carry it out.13 At the outset of James I’s reign, Parliament rejected attempts by the king to regulate apparel, fearing that sumptuary laws would increase royal authority.14 Increasingly throughout James I’s reign, however, sumptuary bills were introduced in 1610, 1614, 1621, and 1626, attacking aristocratic consumption of gold, silver, and imported luxuries, rather than being “penned after the old style” of attacking the luxury of upstarts, as the M.P. Christopher Brooke noted in 1614.15 Advocates of these bills saw court-sponsored conspicuous consumption “as a principle means” for the decline in aristocratic fortunes,16 though the bills were resisted by members of both houses, who saw them as an affront to their rightful privileges.17 Sumptuary stability was impossible amid the political instability of early Stuart England, as both crown and Parliament struggled for control of the means of consumption. Within and without Parliament, James I’s court became increasingly seen as a site of both financial and moral corruption.18 And in attacking James I’s sexual “favorites or minions” Buckingham and Somerset for “the effeminateness of their dressings,”19 court critics linked effeminacy with homosocial and homosexual practices in new and specifically modern ways. Critics of the presumed prodigality of James’s court contributed to the assumption that homosexual practices were incompatible with masculinity (and thus with political virtue),20 an assumption that, as chapter 5 will discuss more fully, the Glorious Revolution would legitimate. Under Charles I, royal expenditures were a key bone of contention between crown and Parliament: critics of taxes “vainly wasted” by the crown argued that “a prince that will not oppress his people, and yet be
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Figure 6. Roundhead and Cavalier, 1640s. The long-haired Cavalier is about to be executed by the short-haired and more modestly dressed Roundhead. By permission of The British Library. TT E.238 (21).
able to maintain his estate, and defend his right . . . must lay up treasure, and be thrifty,” living within the means provided by Parliament, as Thomas Mun warned in the late 1620s.21 In the eyes of court opponents, the crown’s venal practices were linked with its moral corruption, as Linda Levy Peck has noted.22 Thus criticism of the court’s conspicuous consumption was crucial to the “temporary but severe decline of aristocratic prestige,” the central social cause of the English Civil War, according to Lawrence Stone.23 As one defense of aristocracy saw it, the “gallantry” of courtiers had led to “the utter undoing of many good families,” as well as their loss of good reputation among “the basest Commons.”24 Sumptuous dress was not only a sign that the crown was living beyond its means: for contemporaries it actually eroded the authority of monarchy. Throughout the English Civil War, political allegiances were defined by cultural styles. “Cavalier” and “Roundhead” were as much ways of life as they were political positions (figure 6).25 Republicans argued that the Commonwealth had rid England not only of monarchy, but of the “toys and trifles” by which the nation had grown “effeminate by ease
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and vice.”26 As the royalist Sir John Reresby lamented in his memoirs, the Civil War had delegitimated aristocratic conspicuous consumption: “The citizens and common people of London had then so far imbibed the customs and manners of the Commonwealth, that they could scarce endure the sight of a gentleman, so that the common salutation to a man well dressed was ‘French dog.’” 27 If the Tudor-Stuart monarchy had clothed power in conspicuous consumption, then it was stripped of that power in the Civil War. With the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, Charles II attempted to redress accusations of luxury and effeminacy by instituting a more modest garb for men, an act that led to the birth of the three-piece suit, as the next chapter will show. In the 1680s, Whigs continued to condemn the presumed luxury and moral corruption of the court, undermining the legitimacy of James II.28 Finally, after a decade of debates about the “character” of political leadership,29 contemporaries understood the Glorious Revolution as having wrought a reformation of manners, as chapter 5 will demonstrate. Throughout the seventeenth-century crisis, then, defining masculine character was part of defining sovereignty, as defenders and opponents of courtly splendor struggled to control the means and meanings of consumption. Given the centrality of ideas of masculine character and manners to the views of seventeenth-century political writers, we can better understand their preoccupation with luxury and effeminacy. While defenders of the old sartorial regime had argued that the court’s conspicuous consumption was merely an innocent pleasure, opponents saw it as “a civil kind of idolatry,” to use John Milton’s words.30 For political iconoclasts, all fashion was luxury, an inherently unstable, capricious, and feminine vice. Following “Madame la Mode”31 was like submitting to a woman: it was unnatural, unmanly, and unruly. Fashion was an arbitrary ruler, a “supreme legislative . . . Laws, examples, rewards, punishments cannot enforce a uniformity in any other medium; while she [fashion] alone translates and alters the world at pleasure, making it solicitous to obey her.”32 If defenders of court culture had made conspicuous consumption compatible with aristocratic masculinity, critics saw it as inherently effeminating, tyrannical, and idolatrous. For both defenders and opponents of the old sartorial regime, the courtier’s observance of fashion was equivalent to his service to the prince. But what defenders saw as conformity, critics saw as servility: arbitrary signs were merely the visible face of arbitrary rule. “They are vain heads,” opined the Puritan bishop of Norwich Joseph Hall, “that think it an honor to be the founders of fashion: they are servile fools that seek only to follow the fashion once
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devised.”33 Like ancient Rome, England threatened to decline from a manly republic into the “sloth and effeminacy” of its despotic period.34 In oppositional political culture, then, an increase in royal power was concomitant with a decline in masculine virtue: “What madness is it,” asked John Milton, “for them who might manage nobly their own affairs themselves, sluggishly and weakly to devolve all on a single person; and more like boys under age than men, to commit all to his patronage and disposal, . . . how unmanly must it needs be . . . to hang all our felicity on him.”35 By defining court splendor as inherently feminine, then, critics undermined the Stuart crown’s patriarchalist claims to power, transforming father into fop. In oppositional ideology, nothing more corrupted English political culture than French modes of politics and fashion.36 Luxury and tyranny were seen as French vices contaminating English virtues. “Trust to virtue, not to a French doublet,” William Cornwallis warned English gentlemen.37 English emulation of French manners worried court critics, who feared that in following French modes, the English court was importing not only luxury goods but tyranny, viciousness, and effeminacy. The poet Sir Thomas Overbury worried that “vainglory, new fashions and the French disease are upon terms of quitting their country’s allegiance, to be made free denizens of England.”38 The French worshiped false idols in religion, fashion, and politics, effeminately following the whims and fads of a tyrannical monarch. In linking politics with fashion, then, court critics argued that introducing French modes was the first step toward introducing French rule: “it is a natural introduction, first to make the world their apes, that they may be afterwards their slaves,” lamented the influential court opponent Lord Halifax.39 As the source of absolutism and luxury fabrics, France was the great political and cultural rival to English definitions of masculinity. Historians have usually looked to the eighteenth century to understand the origins of English nationalism,40 yet seventeenth-century opponents of the seemingly continental manners of the court had already helped shape a specifically English identity around xenophobic fears of French culture. In contrast to manly English consumption, the French ate “dainty dishes” that were “foments to wanton affections,”41 suspicious delicacies like “gills, pallets, frogs, mushrooms, and such-like French kickshaws.”42 The French wore soft fabrics like silk and lace, and imbibed debilitating drinks like wine—all effronteries to English political culture: “wholesome and substantial food,” wrote the author of A Character of Popery and Arbitrary Government, was “unknown to any in an absolute monarchy.”43 A political defini-
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tion of consumption thus merged with a national definition. As the Whig Edmund Hickeringill put it, “men throw away wholesome food and physic agreeable to their constitutions, to browse upon French quelquechose, and venomous French mushrooms (mere toad-stools), dress them how you will.”44 French civility was disagreeable to English personal and political constitutions, as absolute monarchy deprived English gentlemen of their liberty, masculinity, and uncorrupted cuisine. Through this critique of conspicuous consumption, then, a new political culture took shape around a rhetorical denunciation of tyranny and idolatry, luxury and effeminacy. This ritual debasement of the crown helped create an image of the English monarchy as dissolute, corrupt, effeminate, subservient to France, and willing to impose slavery on its own people. Until the Glorious Revolution installed a new political culture based on this oppositional ideology, English monarchs were accused of “that hellish design of debauching the nation, in order to the promoting [of] popery and arbitrary government in the land, making the generality of the people effeminate and brutish, regardless of the knowledge and fear of God, and of the state of their immortal souls.”45 England’s seventeenth-century political crisis thus cannot be understood without taking into account this new political culture of masculinity. In calling for a reformation of manners and the restoration of “ancient virtue,”46 court opponents called for a new polity based on modesty and liberty rather than splendor and liberality. In oppositional political culture, maintaining a specifically English public image of sartorial sobriety would prevent “a frugal and self-governing democracy or Commonwealth”47 from succumbing to the temptations of foreign tyrannies and luxuries. Subservient to no one, freeborn Englishmen dressed soberly, spurning Madame la Mode: their personal self-control, demonstrated by sumptuary sobriety, was equivalent to their political self-control. Frugality went hand in hand with self-governance, manly simplicity signified freedom—freedom, that is, from both tyrants and femininity. It was into this new political culture of masculinity, as we will see, that the three-piece suit was born. “A TAILOR MADE THEE” In redefining political culture, opponents of the court also redefined the aristocratic gentleman, as the fate of the aristocracy was intimately linked with that of the crown. In condemning old regime political culture, critics undermined the social authority of the aristocracy: the crisis of the
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old regime was simultaneously a crisis of the aristocracy. Moreover, if England’s old regime was in crisis, critics saw aristocratic culture itself as the source of that crisis. It was the aristocracy whose recent supineness before the crown had led to the political and moral decline of the nation. “The signs of great personages do always make great noise in the world,” wrote the author of Counsel and Directions Divine and Moral, “and it is true are more heinous in the sight of God, because the greatest men have the greatest obligation to be good; and consequently the evil example of a court and courtiers (who are more than others exposed to public view) may above any other thing contribute to the corrupting and debauching of a nation, bringing vice into vogue.”48 To the critics of the old sartorial regime, court luxury was responsible for the rise of debauchery and the decline of the aristocracy’s political and economic fortunes. Critics waxed nostalgic for a mythical period when gentlemen defended the ancient constitution, lived on their estates, were hospitable to their tenants, and deserved the respect of the nation. Instead, the seductive attractions of court life had brought vice into vogue, causing aristocrats to abandon their traditional social functions and become dependent on the crown’s patronage and power: armsbearing gentlemen living on their country estates had been transformed into a society of gilded gallants invidiously out-consuming each other in London. In the eyes of critics, moral failure had led to social failure, a cultural transformation had brought on a social transformation of the aristocracy. Critics emphasized the importance of changing cultural habits in the formation of new social identities. “Monstrous prodigality in apparel,” Walter Cary lamented, was one of the three sources of the decline of the aristocracy (the others being the perennial favorites, drunkenness and lawyers).49 For contemporaries, cultural change did not merely reflect social change: it created it. The crisis of the aristocracy began as a cultural crisis. For defenders of the old sartorial regime, luxury was a threat from below, the vice of malapert upstarts. Critics of the old sartorial regime turned that language around, identifying aristocrats with luxury, ungodliness, corruption, and effeminacy.50 The hierarchy of analogies was replaced with a hierarchy of vice: “The more adorned, the more wicked,” was Thomas Adams’s simple formulation.51 Luxury was the inherently effeminate vice of a debauched nobility that lacked political courage, moral virtue, and public spirit. Luxury was associated with royal promotion of libidinous activities: blood sports, idleness, gambling, drinking, and courting fair ladies. In his War with the Devil, Benjamin Keach
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Figure 7. Benjamin Keach, War with the Devil, 1676. By permission of The British Library. PBMic 21756.
compared the God-fearing “youth in his converted state” to the “youth in his natural state” (figure 7). The latter Keach associated with women, the city, and all their vices: No sorrow shall, whilst I do live, come near me; Nor shall the preacher with his fancies fear me: At cards and dice, and such grave games I’ll play, And like a courtier, deck my self most gay; With periwig, and muff, and such fine things, With sword and belt, galoshes, and gold rings, Where bulls and bears they bait, and cocks do fight I do resort with speed, there’s my delight.52
Living in luxury, living in sin, and living at court, the evil example of courtiers had exposed English aristocrats to public derision. Whereas defenders of the old sartorial regime linked bravery in dress with bravery in battle, critics saw adornment as antithetical to martial virtue. And
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whereas defenders of conspicuous consumption argued that there was nothing inherent in luxury goods that conferred masculinity upon their bearer, critics turned this argument around: luxury goods were inherently effeminating. In giving in to the material temptations of the court, the warrior class had abandoned the armigerous ways that had originally defined its social position. The nobility had been pacified, effeminated, softened by luxury, as Sir T. L. warned: “Those who debauch and effeminate nations, may be pleasing, but they can never be wise and generous directors [in battle]. Nothing can be more the security and renown of just and excellent princes, than the manliness and gallantry of their subjects.”53 If the security of the prince rested upon the manliness of his subjects, then by returning to “the ancient virtue of the English,”54 aristocratic men could prevent the commonwealth from falling into tyranny or democracy.55 The moderate path of a balanced constitution depended upon the moderation of aristocrats. While the country was “the symbol of simplicity and wholesome pleasures based on religion and respect for tradition,”56 the court was a recent intrusion of vice. Critics called on courtiers to return to that vaguely defined “blessed age” so central to country ideology, when grandeur and riches were forsaken, when the aristocracy “chose and embraced a religion that stripped and divested them of the world,” as Richard Hawkins wrote in 1658.57 The golden age of unostentatious nobles was an inexhaustible trope for court critics, an invented tradition that was safely enough in the past to be frequently mourned. For a century and a half, the simple country gentleman always seemed to be just beyond the memories of all but those with a good sense of history. For Walter Cary, the plainly attired noble was but a generation older than the current cohort of conspicuous consumers. “Our fathers in apparel were very plain,” he claimed in 1626. “They did not ambitiously strive to get that which they could not compass . . . but [lived] quietly and neighborly with that they had.”58 Cary’s father must have been quite old, since already in 1555 the author of The Institucion of a Gentleman was complaining that her or his generation was filled with prodigality, as opposed to “times past”: “Then flourished the laudable simplicity of England, then we were conquerors, and not scholars applying our minds to learn every new trifle in wearing our apparel.”59 Serious scholars—those who understood history—understood the timeless truth of modesty, while trifling scholars merely followed fashions. The author of Essayes or Moral Discourses had to search even
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earlier for the golden age of laudable simplicity: “how much less were our ancient predecessors the Britons and Saxons given to excess in diet and apparel, than we appear to be in this age, which could not but be advantageous to their strength of mind and body.”60 In country ideology, the tyranny of fashion was ultimately part of the Norman Yoke, designed to weaken ancient constitutions and introduce imported hierarchy.61 When aristocrats had lived on their estates, they had earned the respect and deference of their tenants by offering them protection and hospitality. Long associated with liberality and generosity, hospitality was redefined in country ideology by “rejecting the artifice of self-fashioning, which was a part of the milieu of the court, in favour of natural patterns of behaviour that best suited the country.”62 Hospitality merged with presumably natural social relations, honest country living, and economic stability. “The right rule of economy,” suggested Thomas Manley, would allow gentlemen to “maintain a just hospitality and bid defiance to the usurer.” The social order was maintained by simple customs, and ruined by “ill conduct, excess, supineness, . . . and sure I am, nothing more argues a nation ripe for destruction, than intemperance, corruption of manners, and exorbitance of expense.”63 A hearty country of gentlemen had declined into a haughty city of fops. While Walter Cary’s forefathers “seldom or never went to London,”64 his contemporaries never left it. The country had been abandoned for London, the center of conspicuous consumption,65 the locus of the import trade, the place where vice came into vogue. The anonymous author “Sir T. L.” worried that by emulating the urban culture of France, England had become “the more trifling and effeminate nation of the two.” London’s Europeanization threatened the sovereignty of English masculinity. In London, “the life of a young gentleman led there is for the greater part vicious, sottish, and profane, and not only degenerated below the precepts of ancient gallantry and generosity; but beneath that prudence, sobriety, and discretion, which ought to be found in all who pretend to manhood.”66 England may have been part of an island, but foppish London was dangerously part of the continent. In the eyes of its proponents, country living offered inequality without disdain, hierarchy without arrogance. In the country, nobles lived peaceably with their tenants, while court culture had introduced divisiveness into the nation. Idolatrous fashion was merely elite contempt for the common and the humble, as Joseph Hall argued.67 George Eliott urged the nobility:
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O that the rich were pleas’d to lay aside Their scorning others, and their haughty pride! And condescend to men of low degree, And ’stead of silks, put on humility!68
In country ideology, what was dangerous to the social order was not inequality, but a too conspicuous inequality. Elite understatement was a much more effective means of maintaining deference. Modesty and hierarchy were not only compatible: indeed, modesty was necessary for hierarchy, since “bravery in apparel, rich attire, and fantastical fashions” among the elite threatened to provoke resentment and rebellion among the people, “when as so many poor creatures at the same time had not a good rag to cover them.”69 The visible trappings of aristocratic culture threatened to undermine aristocratic society itself. While country ways were “every day alike, one, and the same,”70 city and court were centers of inconstancy. The protean courtier who changed his clothes in order to conform to court custom was now seen as a spineless chameleon: constantly changing one’s fashion was a sign of superficiality and lack of strong character. “Every month he’s in a new mode,” complained one anonymous critic, “and instead of true gallantry (which once dwelt in the breasts of Englishmen) he is made up of complements, cringes, knots, fancies, perfumes, and a thousand French apish tricks, which render him only fit to be set on a farmer’s hovel to scare away crows. He placeth his very essence in his outside.”71 All that was solid had melted into air: by placing his essence in his outside, the aristocratic courtier (not the upstart) had broken down the correspondence between signifier and signified. The courtier was all signifier, no signified: a courtier to all men’s thinking is a man, and to most men the finest: all things else are defined by the understanding, but this by the senses; but his surest mark is that he is to be found only about princes. He smells; and putteth away much of his judgment about the situation of his clothes . . . He follows nothing but inconstancy, admires nothing but beauty, honors nothing but fortune.72
In losing their internal correspondence between material fabric and social fabric, signs became meaningless materiality. And by losing their reference, signs lost their innocence. No longer innocent delights, the very signs of great personages came under criticism. The old sartorial regime had called for aristocrats to place their essence in their appearance, to show a resemblance between
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internal worth and external wealth. Critics, however, called into question the signs of wealth themselves. And, despite its nostalgic tone, the critique of aristocratic culture was not a call for the restoration of the old sartorial regime, a call for a return to a social hierarchy in the display of wealth. Court criticism was an iconoclastic criticism, a critique of display itself, which was seen as inherently effeminating and luxurious. In this iconoclastic critique, all signs were politically suspect, which left only an anti-semiotic. Noble simplicity was, in essence, the absence of display, the absence of pomp and ceremony. Nobility did not correspond with appearance. It was independent of them, and therefore did not require them. The new political culture envisioned by court critics thus articulated a new definition of masculine nobility: gentlemen would lead the nation by their modest example rather than by their magnificence. In this ideology, as in the old sartorial regime, it was the aristocracy that was most on public view, that was considered most essential to the moral order, and that should most display the virtue of non-display. By their display of public virtue, gentlemen would maintain unity, wisdom, liberty, and industry in England: “surely,” opined Roger Ascham, “the misorder of apparel in mean men abroad shall never be amended, except the greatest in court will order and mend themselves first . . . Beside apparel, in all other things too, not so much good laws and strait commandments as the example and manner of living of great men doth carry all mean men everywhere to like and love and do as they do.”73 A new regime would be held together not by “good laws” and political proclamations, but by the moral example of “great men.” In Shakespeare’s King Lear, one of those “great men,” the earl of Kent, hurls a series of insults at the “glass-gazing” and “lily-livered” sycophant Oswald, among them the gibe: “A tailor made thee.”74 Like his ally Edgar, heroic Kent speaks the truth, remains loyal to Lear, and dresses in simple country clothes, a perfect contrast to Oswald, steward to Goneril, the villainous female co-usurper of patriarchal authority. Oswald supinely serves a corrupt and unmanly court, while Kent embodies the masculine virtues which ultimately lead to the restoration of legitimate order—a prophetic though dark foreshadowing of the crisis of legitimacy in seventeenth-century England. Yet given Shakespeare’s understanding of the theatrical nature of power,75 this simple contrast between the “base, proud, shallow” Oswald and the plain aristocrat Kent is never quite so simple, since Kent’s image of manly simplicity is a disguise strategically adopted to help restore political order. Banished
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from the court and thus from his traditional identity as an aristocrat, Kent wears a “garb quite from his nature,” as Cornwall points out: “these kind of knaves I know, which in this plainness / harbor more craft and more corrupter ends / than twenty silly-ducking observants / that stretch their duties nicely.”76 As Shakespeare seems to have understood, aristocratic simplicity was no more natural than foppishness, no less theatrical a costume donned on a very public stage, tailor made to fit the needs of aristocratic political culture. “POPERY AND FOPPERY” Like political opposition to the crown, Puritan criticism of the Church of England was based less on theological differences, and more on a moral critique of the church’s authority and use of ceremony—a critique which had its origins in a dispute about the meaning of “things indifferent.”77 Puritanism was nothing if not an oppositional doctrine of signs. In Anglican practice, things indifferent remained under the purview of the crown, which retained the right to regulate church rituals by fiat. For Anglicans, the Reformation ended with things indifferent. For Puritans, however, the Reformation began with a reformation of things indifferent, with a moral vigilance over the use of vestments, ceremonies, and rituals, and extended this vigilance beyond the church door to the habits and practices of everyday life. Puritans thus shared with Anglicans worries about idolatry, luxury, effeminacy, libertinism, and the general diffusion of vice. Yet Puritans added tyranny and popery to this list of evils, expanding their critique to include the habits and manners of the crown and church. Luxury and idolatry were impositions from above rather than threats from below. Puritanism thus undermined royal claims to moral authority and contributed to the creation of an alternative political culture. Like Anglicans, Puritans generally looked to the crown for moral leadership. Anglicans, as we have seen, expected the crown to defend elite prerogatives and sartorial conformity through sumptuary proclamations and its own example. Puritans saw the crown’s role differently.78 Puritans generally resisted the use of sumptuary law, arguing that sartorial reform should come from within the individual conscience rather than from the state magistrate.79 The crown would inspire rather than compel individual consciences to greater piety. For Puritans, the internalization of godly manners was preferable to the external imposition of sumptuary law. And while Puritans thus agreed with Anglicans that the crown should
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lead the nation through its moral example, they believed that the example should be one of modesty, not conspicuous consumption. At stake, then, was the public image of England’s elite: what began as a religious debate about vestments ended up challenging the moral legitimacy of the entire old sartorial regime. On theological grounds, Puritans agreed with Anglicans that clerical dress should be a thing indifferent to salvation. They differed, however, over the application of that theology. In order to institute truly indifferent dress, Puritans argued that formerly Catholic vestments needed to be eliminated, that they were no longer indifferent but instead had become inherently idolatrous. At the beginning of the vestments controversy, John Hooper refused the bishopric of Gloucester in 1550 because its “peculiar vestments . . . do not enjoy the sanction of God’s word; nor are they things indifferent in themselves. Therefore, they are not to be used.”80 While Anglicans saw vestments as arbitrary signifiers without any special holiness or worthiness, Puritan iconoclasts saw them as icons with fixed meanings, intrinsically associated with Catholicism. They were no longer innocent, but had been corrupted through evil historical use. By their long-standing association with the Church of Rome, vestments had become “polluted openly with popish superstition and idolatry,” as Anthony Gilby put it in his critique of “popish apparel.”81 Once abused by idolatry, indifferent ceremonies became “wicked significations,”82 with visible remnants of popery intrinsically attached to them: “these vestments be such remnants and call popery into remembrance, which is idolatry.”83 The ill use of vestments had made them semiotically overdetermined, wicked icons to be rooted out by iconoclasm. The clothes made the man. Historians since Max Weber have long characterized Puritan iconoclasm as a disenchantment of the lived world, but precisely the opposite was true. In order to purge the world of idolatry and luxury, Puritans invested objects with all the evil associations that their rhetoric could muster. Luxuries had an intense negative charisma for Puritans: “the contempt of pleasure was the greatest pleasure,” as Richard Hawkins pleasurably stated.84 It was iconoclasts who believed in icons, who denied the arbitrary nature of signs, who “enchanted” everyday objects with intrinsic meanings. The world of goods was animated with meanings, though ultimately, a godly society would live in a more disenchanted world. To rid the world of idolatry, an ever-vigilant semiotic purification would be necessary. It was this anxious doctrine of semiotic vigilance that Anglicans considered hypocritical. How could so much at-
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tention be paid to signs that were ultimately indifferent? For Anglicans, this was a zeal misplaced upon the “rites and appendages,” with little attention to “the soul and substance” of religion: “How highly they are concerned, and with what eagerness do they contend for mint, cumin, meats, drinks, times, pastures, habits, and such external forms and modes of worship,” complained the Anglican John Evans.85 Caught up in a debate about ceremony, Anglicans and Puritans traded accusations that their opponents were concerned more with superfice than with substance. Theologically in agreement, each side accused the other of lacking indifference to material signs. For Puritans, the use of symbols themselves was dangerous, since they were historical remnants of the Church of Rome, and seemed to inevitably lead to idolatry. Church of England ceremony, then, was by definition linked with the Church of Rome, since for Puritans Catholicism was a religion of ceremony and outward sensibilities, meant to attract “vulgar veneration”86 by “the false allurements of sense, . . . superinduced new fangles, diabolical inventions, unreasonable whimsies, and childish fopperies.”87 Religious ceremony was “the bastard-brood [that] popery and foppery begot in our Protestant Church; and which neither the laws of God, nor the King, does legitimate,” as the Whig Edmund Hickeringill put it. Popery and foppery were practically synonymous, both prizing ceremony over substance: “that man has neither worth nor honor in him, that does not truly love and honor a person of honor, and true virtue and worth; and so much the more, for the grandeur; but to idolize a mere image, because a great and golden image, and because the King set it up, what is it but popery, idolatry, or flattery or foppery?”88 In arguing that conformity to fashion was not an indifferent and innocent pleasure but was the idolatrous worship of inherently evil icons, Puritans undercut the old sartorial regime’s hierarchy of analogies, especially as they broadened their critique of religious ceremony to a general critique of conspicuous consumption. Whereas Anglicans approved of a due correspondence between signifier and signified, Puritan otherworldliness condemned the signifier itself: it was the clothes themselves that were the object of condemnation: “Good clothes are the embroidered trappings of pride,” warned Thomas Dekker.89 Richard Brathwait condemned silk as “this attire of sin, these rags of shame, these wormworks, which withdraw your eyes from contemplating that supreme bounty and beauty, purposely to fix them upon the base objects of earth.”90 In itself, rich attire led to all forms of “moral rickets:”91 luxury, sin, whoring, drinking, gluttony, libertinism and envy.92
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Above all, prideful dress led to effeminacy, that loss of manly virtue that so threatened to destroy England’s moral order. “Nice array” betrayed “an unmanly mind,” warned the Puritan Lawrence Humphrey.93 Richard Brathwait was influenced by this Puritan critique of idolatry when he condemned “this delicacy and effeminacy in apparel . . . wherein we idolatrize our own forms.”94 Harbottle Grimston linked luxury in dress with other unmanly consumer habits: “Pamper not thy flesh,” he commanded in truly biblical fashion, “soft raiment, drinking and dainty meat effeminate both mind and body.”95 It was the raiment itself which brought on effeminacy, undermining manliness. John Milton believed that Archbishop Laud’s promotion of High Church ceremony was meant “to effeminate us all at home. Well knows every wise nation that their liberty consists in manly and honest labors, in sobriety and vigorous honor to the marriage bed, which in both sexes should be bred up from chaste hopes . . . and when the people slacken, and fall to looseness and riot, then do they as much as if they laid down their necks for some wily tyrant to get up and ride.”96 Soft raiment and popish ceremonies were thus instruments of tyranny, inherently leading to effeminacy and political passivity. “Soft clothes introduce soft minds. Delicacy in the habit begets an effeminacy in the heart,” warned Richard Brathwait.97 How different this argument was from the earl of Clarendon’s defense of the “innocent delights” of fine clothing. In iconoclastic discourse, pride originated in the clothes, not in the heart. The clothes unmade the man. While vice could be found in the clothes themselves, virtue was for Puritans self-reliant, incompatible with display: “He has much better thoughts of virtue, than to hope his fine clothes may gain him a respect where that could not; nay on the other side, he knows that goodness is enough of itself.”98 Virtue was “enough of itself,” it existed independent of the dangerous supplement of dress, and thus transcended it. Whereas the old sartorial regime required that outward fashion correspond to inward virtue, in this Puritan “counter-aesthetic”99 modest clothing would call attention to the fact that inward virtue did not require outward display. For Clement Ellis, the godly gentleman “chooses rather to have his distinction from other men founded in his virtues than in his clothes,” which is (inexplicably) why “it is most certain (and the gentleman knows it as well) that the temper and disposition of the soul is no way better discernable than through the habit and garb of the body.”100 Puritans were thus as concerned about dress as defenders of the old sartorial regime—both repeated the clichés about discerning the soul through the clothes. And certainly the display of gentility was as impor-
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tant for Puritans as for any of the defenders of the old sartorial regime: throughout the seventeenth-century fashion crisis, Puritan writers aimed their addresses and sermons at the nobility and gentry, as they looked to traditional elites for sartorial reform.101 Yet Puritans turned the old sartorial regime’s aesthetic on its head: it was important for virtuous dress to be the negation of fashion, demonstrating that virtue did not need to be displayed. In defining virtuous clothing as the negation of fashion, Puritans sought to define a universal function of clothing that would escape a fashion system, a clothing style that would never change, since virtue was a habit that “can never be worn out of fashion.”102 While in the old sartorial regime indifference to arbitrary fashions was to be displayed by following them in a nonchalant manner, for Puritans, indifference was displayed by adopting a permanent fashion: “daily new fashion and changing of apparel betokeneth inconstancy,” wrote the anonymous author of The Institucion of a Gentleman, who prescribed that gentlemen “leaveth costly array, and useth comely apparel, well fashioned.”103 Puritans sought to define a new “institution” of a gentleman, one in which modesty and gentility were compatible. A gentleman should wear garments that were “well-fashioned” but were neither costly nor inconstant. Clement Ellis called simultaneously for “such a gravity as beseems a Christian,” and for “such a decency as becomes a gentleman.”104 In launching their critique of the ceremonies of church and court, then, Puritans were not levelers, but rather definers of a new image of upperclass masculinity, one which made comeliness compatible with antifashion. Modesty, not magnificence, was to be the new public image of England’s elite. THE MORAL ECONOMY OF MERCANTILISM The English clothing industry was in crisis in the seventeenth century. The 1617 failure of the Cockayne project (an import substitution scheme) disrupted the continental market for undyed cloth, England’s staple export.105 In the early 1620s, the Thirty Years War further damaged cloth exports to Germany and the Netherlands, England’s main markets.106 Domestic demand had grown steadily in the first three decades of the century, yet in the 1640s the Civil War diminished the purchasing power of traditional elites, as aristocratic families lost estates, fled to the Continent, or spent money on armaments. Throughout the first half of the century, demand steadily shifted away from traditional,
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heavier broadcloths toward imported fabrics and lighter, cheaper “new draperies.”107 In the process, traditional production and distribution networks were disrupted, as production increasingly shifted away from urban guilds to networks of rural cottage industries controlled by merchant clothiers. As these clothiers grew in number and increased their control over the rural economy, they gained a louder voice in discussions of economic policy, competing with traditional trading monopolies for the public ear. Beginning in the 1620s, clothiers added their voice to the debate about the causes of and potential solutions to the seventeenthcentury clothing crisis. In the 1670s and 1680s, “a flood of clothiers’ pamphlets” gave coherence and strength to these arguments.108 Although an oppositional ideology throughout most of the seventeenth century,109 the voice of these manufacturers would come to dominate economic thought and policy after 1688, creating a new political climate for discussions of the economy. By the mid- to late seventeenth century, then, a new conceptualization of the economy had emerged to promote new forces that might lead England out of crisis—a new understanding that we call mercantilism.110 The versatile writer Henry Peacham neatly captured the essence of mercantilist ideology: “Industry is fortune’s right hand, and frugality her left.”111 The nation’s fortune had two new visible hands: for mercantilists, the promotion of industry and frugality was more important than the regulation of bullion and prices for maintaining a healthy economy. Mercantilists tried to refocus economic theory and policy away from monetary regulation and toward the promotion of export production and the restriction of import consumption. Yet mercantilists promoted industry and frugality not only as economic factors of production and consumption, but as moral imperatives, virtues which would help rescue England from its economic woes.112 As much a moral critique as an economic critique of the court’s trade and consumer practices, mercantilism brought with it a new “spirit” of capitalism in its analysis of England’s economic crisis.113 This new moral economy of mercantilism thus undermined the old sartorial regime’s doctrine of the benefits of conspicuous consumption. While merchant monetarists called on the crown to regulate the price of gold and silver, in order to assure that England’s balance of trade remained positive, mercantilists argued that “industry, not money, is the life of . . . trade,”114 and therefore called for decreasing imports and increasing the export of British products to create a positive balance of trade. The mode of production replaced the means of exchange as the
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central focus for discussions of the balance of trade. Rather than regulating bullion, the goal of this new economic policy was “to sell more to strangers yearly than we consume of theirs,” as Thomas Mun simply put it.115 Mercantilists thus turned the monetarists’ argument on its head: a bad balance of trade caused a lack of bullion, not vice versa. It was “the vain and excessive wasting of the inhabitants, especially upon foreign growths and manufactures,” as John Hodges complained, that were “the true causes of the great want of money in these kingdoms.”116 Industry had taken over from bullion as the source of the wealth of nations. In seeking to abate what Sir Robert Cotton termed “the mighty indraught of foreign manufactures and unnecessary wares,”117 mercantilists shared with Puritans a disdain for luxury, ceremony, superfluity, and display, promoting modesty and sumptuary sobriety in order to reduce the level of imports. As the dissenting mercantilist Sir Peter Pett observed in 1688: “the greater part of persons engaged in trade . . . hate ceremonies in general, and what does unnecessarily take up time, and . . . persons who nauseate ceremonies in civil things, will loath them likewise in religious.”118 Puritanism was good for the balance of trade. The Whig author of A Discourse of the Necessity of Encouraging Mechanick Industry argued that “we are not ignorant, that Christianity in general, and more especially as profess’d in its ancient purity in this nation, does indispensably oblige all its votaries and adherents to a sober and laborious course of life.”119 The republican and dissenting trader Slinsby Bethel offered the stereotype that “there is a kind of natural inaptness in the popish religion to business, whereas, on the contrary, among the reformed, the greater their zeal, the greater is their inclinations to trade and industry, as holding idleness unlawful.”120 The ideological link between Puritanism, mercantilism, and anti-royalism was especially strong among clothiers, as various authors have noted.121 As Francis Brewster noted toward the end of the century, “no society of men in the kingdom are so generally affected with the strictest injunctions of our religion, as our people bred up in the woollen manufactories.”122 In their shared critique of luxury and graven images, both mercantilists and Puritans criticized what they saw as the false idols of the old sartorial regime. Sharing Puritan attitudes to consumption, mercantilism entailed a new conception of the link between morality and economics, one clearly at odds with merchants’ praise of conspicuous consumption in the old sartorial regime. “Virtue and industry [are] the true road to wealth and plenty,” as one anonymous author plainly stated.123
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Mercantilists saw frugality (the privileging of production over consumption) as the promotion of virtue, and virtue as the basis of economic well-being. They thus blamed the seventeenth-century economic crisis not on bad fiscal policy, but on bad manners: “The ruin of estates,” argued Thomas Manley, “is not (as is insinuated) primarily to be charg’d upon encumbrances of estates [taxes] . . . but to ill conduct, excess, supineness, and these other practices whereof we may justly be ashamed; to these we truly owe our debts.”124 The dissenting author of Omnia Comesta a Bello was more specific in linking economy and religion, blaming the “ruin of trade, and general consumption of comfort, settlement, and content,” on “the pomp, pride, luxury, exaction and oppressions of the prelates.”125 Moral economy was the basis of political economy. In linking economic decline to moral corruption, mercantilists understood the economy not as an autonomous sphere of activity, but as part of the larger political and social order. Here mercantilists were influenced by sixteenth-century “commonwealth” political and economic writers, with their humanist demands “not so much for a reformation of institutions, but rather for a change of heart.”126 Thus mercantilists understood economic practices as embedded in moral practices which had political implications: good manners were not only good for business, but vital to a healthy state. “Idle expenses,” wrote the author of The Uses and Abuses of Money, “are not only [the] cause of certain ruin to the parties themselves, who give themselves leave to gratify their pride, ambition, and other lusts, by misemploying their estates to such idle ends, but likewise of as certain destruction to their native country.”127 Like political opponents of the crown, then, mercantilists attributed the national malaise to luxury and corruption. “Nothing more argues a nation ripe for destruction,” wrote Thomas Manley, “than intemperance, corruption of manners, and exorbitance of expense in all degrees of men.”128 Like Whigs and republicans, mercantilists looked to a reformed crown, and to the crown’s ability to reform manners, as the source of economic and political recovery. In linking economic decline to political and moral corruption, mercantilism offered a political critique of seventeenth-century political culture, and it is in part for this reason that mercantilism did not become economic orthodoxy in England until after the Glorious Revolution had given legitimacy to a new political culture. In the patriarchal language that dominated seventeenth-century political culture, mercantilists argued that the crown should be like a re-
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sponsible father, assuring the proper balance between the family’s income and expenses. “A commonwealth is like unto a family,” wrote the merchant Edward Misselden, “the father or master whereof ought to sell more than he buyeth.”129 The king was “the royal merchant, the regal father of that great family of a kingdom,”130 and it was his duty not only to regulate the coinage but to watch over the manners and consumer habits of his people. In drawing on the gender ideology of English political culture, mercantilists accused the crown of a lack of masculine authority: in abandoning itself to effeminating expenses, the crown was failing to live up to its patriarchal duty. The foreign goods it imported “have suffered our nation to be invaded with foreign softnesses,” as one anonymous author wrote.131 Foreign luxuries were not only exotic and excessive, they were enervating and effeminate, bringing in idleness, supineness, and corruption. Thomas Mun complained that “the general leprosy in idleness and pleasure (contrary to the law of God, and the use of other nations) hath made us effeminate in our bodies, weak in our knowledge, poor in our treasure, declined in our valor, unfortunate in our enterprises, and condemned by our enemies.” Concerned to reinforce the link between morality and the economy, Mun continued: “I write the more of these excesses, because they do so greatly waste our wealth, which is the main subject of this whole book’s discourse.”132 The dissenter and economist Slinsby Bethel called for a renewal of earlier centuries’ sumptuary laws “to prevent riot and excess (the hectic fever of a state) both for apparel and diet, . . . whereby foreign superfluities were shut out, and home commodities only used. By this means these spreading evils, which have since disfashioned and effeminated the English nation, were prohibited.”133 In linking masculine manners with the balance of trade, mercantilists in effect gendered the national economy. In the abstract, of course, arguments about the balance of trade are not necessarily gendered. But political economy in the seventeenth century was argued not in the abstract, but at the level of everyday life, at the level of manners, sentiments, and consumer practices. “So visibly is this kingdom degenerated from the great achievements of virtue and industry,” worried the author of A Discourse of the Necessity of Encouraging Mechanick Industry, “into all the soft indulgences of sloth, and of an effeminate and luxurious course of life (the former the dignity and preservation, the latter the reproach and ruin of a state).”134 Luxury and effeminacy threatened the economic backbone of the nation, since the “natural disposition to industry is thereby emasculated,” as Sir Peter Pett argued.135 The Whig
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mercantilist William Petyt worried that while “we continue rolling in foreign silks and linens . . . like the blind sodomites groping after our filthy pleasures,” we will “grow generally more vicious, soft, effeminate, debauched, dispeopled, and undisciplined than before.”136 For mercantilists, recovering from an economic crisis meant recovering from a crisis of masculinity. If, as the economist William James suggested, “the great obstruction to the consumption of wool hath been our wearing great quantities of silks and other commodities from foreign parts,”137 nothing could better restore the balance of trade than the manly consumption of English wool. If imported silk and calico were superfluous, luxurious, and effeminate, English wool was useful, sober, and manly—England’s moral fiber. In calling on “the true-bred Englishman” to consume more wool and beef, George Clarke considered the 1670s decline in rents to be brought on by “many squeamish and outlandish stomachs, that cannot digest our English food; and many others that must wear finer cloth than can be made of their own wool.”138 Another author complained “how little did [the prideful fop] merit the happiness of our good cloth and beef, of our good laws and religion, of our native immunities and happy liberties, who declared he had rather be served by a French dog than by an English-man.”139 These moral arguments extended to a wide variety of consumer products: English beef and mutton were opposed to “dainty dishes”140 like imported sauces, while English beer and cider were opposed to imported wine.141 “And now we have a new sauce called Catchup, from East India,” complained William Petyt, worried that silks, spices, and sauces from the exotic East would undermine English masculinity.142 Mercantilism was not an abstract, amoral discussion of the balance of trade, but a gendered polemic about material practices, about the cultural and economic meanings of beer and wine, wool and silk, the virtues and vices of sauces and spices. In the increasingly protectionist atmosphere of the seventeenth century, and especially of the Restoration period,143 clothiers were able to link national identity with the promotion of English wool. For clothiers and mercantilists, wool was England’s “golden fleece,” the backbone of the textile industry, and of the economy as a whole. Wool was “the richest treasure in his majesty’s dominions, the flower, strength, and sinews of this nation; . . . the milk and honey to the grazier and country farmer; the gold and spices of the East and West Indies to the merchant and citizens, the continued supply of bread to the poor: and in a word, the exchequer of wealth,” as the not indifferent wool clothier William Carter
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wrote.144 Clothiers and mercantilists argued that wool was “the dowry of the kingdom,”145 providing the crown with more revenue than from any other source, more than from import customs, more “than all the Spaniard’s gold and silver mines in America.”146 Wearing English wool was not only manly, it was patriotic. Mercantilism thus contributed to the creation of a new image of male Englishness, as national identity was formed around the ethics of frugality, industry, and antipathy to things continental, especially French. Only the Dutch, whose “apparel is plain and manlike, always of one fashion,”147 were excluded from this xenophobia, as mercantilists called on the English to emulate the Dutch, not only in their “natural frugality, and indefatigable industry” but in their political freedom and religious tolerance.148 This merging of mercantilist discourse with national identity allowed manufacturers to link their interests with those of the state as a whole, and with those of landed gentlemen in particular. In England, the “capitalist spirit” was not the specific property of middle-class manufacturers, merchants, or artisans. Throughout the century, mercantilist ideas were advocated by landlords, especially those who espoused country and Whig ideology. The promotion of industry and frugality, they argued, was in their interests as well as the interests of manufacturers. As landlords paid more attention to improving their estates, and as rents on those estates began to decline (especially in the late seventeenth century), landlords cried “tax now our superfluous trade, and therein our luxury,” as the monetarist Thomas Culpeper noted with chagrin.149 Especially in the late seventeenth century, “the nation’s propertied classes were quick to close ranks around a strong mercantilist program.”150 Rather than creating a class-specific ideology that set land against capital, mercantilist discourse attempted to merge the concerns of the nobility and gentry with those of the manufacturer. William Carter argued that “the commerce of this nation doth for the value and bulk of it entirely depend upon the woollen manufacture, consequently it must be the interest of the nobility, gentry and farmer to uphold the woollen manufacture.”151 The “industrial spirit” triumphed in England much earlier than the triumph of the bourgeoisie: rather, it triumphed through assimilation, by grafting mercantilist discourse onto aristocratic interest. As estates were “improved,” industry and frugality were gentrified. As a consequence, then, mercantilists crafted a new image of the aristocratic gentleman, one of an improving landlord wearing English wool, eating English food, and drinking English ales. Nothing could be a more obvious sign of the moral values of the freeborn English gentleman than
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the consumption of English products. Edward Waterhouse considered “all exotic trifles as pestilent to the religion, gravity, veracity, hospitality, and common good of England: let other nations habit, live, and do as they think good; nothing is in my apprehension so commendable in an Englishman, as to love and prefer English laws, usages, customs, and fashions above foreign ones.”152 In sum, a new and gendered political economy was created throughout the course of the seventeenth-century crisis, one that relied as much on moral and political critique as on economic analysis. Mercantilist discourse mixed country and Whig ideas about the politics of virtue and corruption, with Puritan ideas about the morality of industry and frugality, and grafted them onto an economic analysis of production and consumption. As King Charles II himself would hear from many quarters in the years leading up to his introduction of the vest, the manly consumption of wool was good for England, good for the economy, good for liberty, and good for God.
chapter 4
The Three-Piece Suit
As we have seen, a cultural crisis shook seventeenth-century England’s political, economic, social, and moral fabric. The meanings of consumption were debated by Whig and Tory, country and court, Puritan and Anglican, mercantilist and bullionist. Through the course of this debate, a new ideology emerged to oppose and undermine the cultural and political authority of the Stuart court. Political critics of court luxury saw conformity to fashion as incompatible with traditional English liberties. Religious critics condemned the idolatry of “soft clothes” and called for the display of modesty. Economic critics promoted the consumption of manly English wool over presumably immoral and effeminate imports. Following fashion meant conceding to the absolutist claims of the crown, to the seductive attractions of the material world, and to the enervating lure of foreign luxuries. Together these critiques combined to create a new public image for England’s rulers, a new aesthetics of upper-class masculinity, a new image of the English gentleman centered around purportedly productive and virtuous consumer habits: the hardy beef-eater, the temperate ale-drinker, the wearer of wool. In oppositional ideology, England would be rescued by aristocratic gentlemen changing their consumer practices, changing their image from one of luxury and effeminacy to one of industry and frugality. The good example of the court would stop England from declining into tyranny, luxury, popery, and foppery. “Most of these evils would be easily prevented,” Privy Councillor Samuel Fortrey advised the restored Charles II in 1663, 77
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The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity if only his Majesty would be pleased to commend to his people, by his own example, the esteem and value he hath of his own commodities, . . . besides it seems to be more honorable for a King of England, rather to become a pattern to his own people, than to conform to the humors and fancies of other nations, especially when it is so much to his prejudice.1
Charles I had found the seventeenth-century crisis much to his prejudice. Samuel Fortrey hoped that Charles II, by his good example, would not share the same fate. Samuel Fortrey was not the only adviser of Charles II who warned him of the dangers of living in sartorial splendor. Like Fortrey, John Evelyn counseled that, rather than a new royal proclamation, a new, modest, and manly example should be the course of sartorial reform: when his Majesty shall fix a standard at Court, there will need no sumptuary laws to repress and reform the lux which men so much condemn in our apparel . . . . Doubtless, would the great persons of England but own their nation, and assert themselves as they do, by making choice of some virile and comely fashion, which should incline to neither extreme, and be constant to it, ’twould prove of infinite more reputation to us, than now that there is nothing fixed, and the liberty so exorbitant.2
Though the monarchy was restored in 1660, certainly nothing was fixed, as Charles II had inherited the instabilities and criticisms of his father’s reign, including criticisms of the lux which men so much condemned in the court’s apparel. In the eyes of contemporaries like Evelyn, sartorial stability was a first step toward political stability. “Let it be considered,” Evelyn advised the king in 1661, “that those who seldom change the mode of their country, have as seldom altered their affections to the Prince”—words not to be taken lightly one year after the Restoration.3 Six years after his restoration, Charles II did attempt to become a pattern to his own people, an attempt that led to the introduction of the modern three-piece suit. If, as we have seen, masculinist ideas about manners were a central ideological component of the seventeenth-century crisis, equally the seventeenth-century crisis was a central cause of the birth of modern men’s fashion. The three-piece suit has its origins in the political, economic, religious, and social crises that shook seventeenth-century England, as Charles II attempted to restore the Stuart crown to its role as arbiter of taste in the face of criticism of its arbitrary rule. Unlike the early Stuart court, however, after the Restoration the crown’s role as arbiter of taste would be defined in terms of inculcating new yet purportedly timeless virtues: thrift, modesty, economy, mixed with gentility, nobility, and
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politeness. Though, as we will see, the early modesty of the three-piece suit would be short-lived, and it would take the Glorious Revolution of 1688 to permanently install modesty as a marker of elite masculinity, the introduction of the three-piece suit was an attempt both to present a new masculine image of virtuous consumption and to reaffirm a monarchical political culture based on aristocratic cultural hegemony. In introducing the three-piece suit, Charles II attempted to appropriate an iconoclastic, oppositional ideology and use it to redefine court culture, thereby restoring the crown’s moral authority and political legitimacy. A style that he promised never to alter, the three-piece suit was to be Charles II’s permanent fashion statement, a style that attempted to teach the nobility thrift and put a stop to the seemingly constant alteration of styles, so disruptive of political stability, as John Evelyn believed. Whereas old regime sartorial policy had attempted to regulate fashion by limiting its diffusion, Evelyn counseled Charles to foster the diffusion of a fashion that would end all fashion change. As such the three-piece suit would be a new mode of sartorial sovereignty: cultural authority would be expressed by elite opposition to luxury, not by making conspicuous consumption the exclusive prerogative of the court. As a response to the seventeenth-century crisis, then, Charles II’s introduction of the three-piece suit turned political, religious, and economic criticisms of court culture into a new means of legitimating monarchical power. By redefining his cultural authority using the terms of the opponents of court luxury, Charles II made a fashion of anti-fashion. Charles II’s claim to sartorial sovereignty was thus part of his reassertion of political legitimacy. “’Tis not a trivial remark (which I have somewhere met with),” John Evelyn had written to the king in 1661 “that when a nation is able to impose and give laws to the habit of another, (as the late Tartars in China) it has (like that of language) prov’d a forerunner of the spreading of their conquests there.”4 ’Twas not a trivial remark that Evelyn had heard, but an oft-repeated trope about the tyranny of fashion, as we have seen throughout the previous chapter. Evelyn agreed with this oppositional critique of fashion, and yet remained loyal to the crown: “The mode is a tyrant,” Evelyn opined in a familiar refrain, yet qualified, “and we may cast off his government, without impeachment to our loyalty.”5 Opposition to the tyranny of fashion need not entail opposition to monarchy. The three-piece suit, which embodied the republican virtue of simplicity, thus marks a royalist appropriation of republican opposition to fashion. With a virile and
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comely monarchy, subservience to the effeminating tyranny of fashion could be eliminated without eliminating loyalty to the crown. Modesty just might be compatible with monarchy. The issue of crown expenditures had been the immediate cause of the outbreak of the Civil War, and when Charles II received his annual dispensation from Parliament in 1662, he made it clear that the court would no longer be a center of conspicuous consumption. In language that he would echo four years later, Charles expressed his desire to assert his sartorial leadership while simultaneously living within his means: I do assure you, and I pray assure your friends in the country, that I will apply all you have given me to the utmost improvement of the peace and happiness of the kingdom; and will, with the best advice and good husbandry I can, bring my expenses within a narrower compass. Now I am speaking to you of my own good husbandry, I must tell you that will not be enough: I cannot but observe to you, that the whole nation seems to me a little corrupted in their excess of living. Sure all men spend much more in their clothes, in their diet, in all their expenses, than they have used to do. . . . I do believe I have been faulty that way myself: I promise you I will reform; and if you will join with me in your several capacities, we shall, by our examples, do more good, both in city and country, than any new laws would do.6
For King Charles, a reformation of the court’s example would do more good than any sumptuary laws to reestablish “the peace and happiness of the kingdom,” and thus assure the political stability of the new regime. Royal and aristocratic example was economically and politically advantageous, more effective than any new laws in bringing about the happiness of the kingdom. On October 7, 1666, four years later, Charles II announced his intention to introduce a “vest” into court fashion, thereby inaugurating the era of the three-piece suit. The adoption of the vest has received deserved attention from costume historians, who have attributed its introduction to anti-French sentiment, Puritan concerns about modesty, and the theatrical uses of vests.7 The origins of the style itself are confusing: John Evelyn claims to have first seen a vest worn in Bologna by a Hungarian man, and suggested its adoption to the king.8 Andrew Marvell considered the vest Turkish, putting the following verse into Charles’s mouth: I will have a fine Tunick a sash and a vest, Tho’ not rule like the Turk yet I will be so drest, And who knows but the mode may soon bring in the rest? 9
John Evelyn and others also referred to the vest as “oriental” or “Persian clothing.”10 Whatever its stylistic origins, however, contemporaries
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also considered the vest as a distinctly English mode, one made of English wool, as we will see.11 The connections between the 1666 vest and the modern three-piece suit are equally cloudy, since various contemporaries noted a return to French modes in the 1670s (as will be discussed shortly), thus possibly breaking any link between the vest and the modern waistcoat. Yet by the 1670s the French court had apparently adopted a vest of its own, perhaps in imitation of the English.12 In an unconfirmed report, Samuel Pepys wrote that on November 2, 1666, Louis XIV “hath, in defiance to the King of England, caused all his footmen to be put into vests, and that the noblemen of France will do the like; which, if true, is the greatest indignity ever done by one prince to another.”13 It is these vague origins, and confusing lineage, that led one costume historian to consider the 1666 vest as a novelty item, “an ephemeral mode [with] little or no lasting influence.”14 Despite this lack of clarity, however, most historians agree with Penelope Byrde’s assessment that by 1670, “a three-piece suit, in the modern sense, had emerged.”15 Thus although the 1666 vest regained much of its sartorial splendor in the later Restoration period, we can nonetheless consider the introduction of the three-piece suit as a founding moment in the development of a new aesthetics of masculinity. The vest’s introduction was widely reported by contemporaries, precisely because it was not only a fashion statement but a political and economic policy statement as well. In October 1666, calls for fashion reform were being debated in the Commons, discussed in the Privy Council, disgorged by the pulpit, and demanded from the street. Panic, outrage, and paranoia over September’s Great Fire in London had prompted a roundup of the usual suspects: God, the French, and conspicuous consumers. On October 3, 1666, the M.P. John Milward recorded in his diary that two sermons had been preached before the Commons calling for a national reformation after the fire, and a parliamentary committee was formed to draft legislation “for the suppression of atheism, swearing, cursing, lying, profaneness and luxury.”16 On October 10, the Rev. William Sancroft, later archbishop of Canterbury, preached before the king, interpreting the Great Fire as a warning from God against English emulation of “French pride and vanity.”17 The fire was “a scourge from that nation or nations whose fashions they follow,” God’s “stinging and flaming check against all fashion-mongers,” as the Puritan divine Thomas Brooks later bellowed.18 If not the hand of God, a French agent was seen to be behind the great conflagration, and the fire spurred a wave of anti-French sentiment. On
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October 7, 1666, the Venetian ambassador to France reported a popular clamor for the removal of French fashions from the English court. In the wake of the fire, the ambassador wrote to the Doge, “the people shouted that they . . . desired that all commerce with France should be prohibited; that no one should dress after the fashion of this nation [France], but that Parliament should select some to devise a new form of clothes which should be peculiar to that country.”19 The populace may have appealed to Parliament, but the king was quicker to respond, declaring that same monumental day in world history, “his resolution of setting a fashion for clothes, which he will never alter,” as Samuel Pepys recorded in words worth repeating: “It will be a vest, I know not well how; but it is to teach the nobility thrift, and will do good.”20 The king had moved rapidly to assert his cultural leadership, introducing a modest, anti-French fashion before Parliament did, and teaching the nobility thrift before Parliament or “the people” taught him the same lesson. According to M.P. Milward, Parliament began a movement toward restraining the importation of French commodities on October 8, but, according to the Calendar of State Papers, it did not discuss sartorial reform until Thursday, October 11, when the Commons proposed a bill “prohibiting the import of all French manufactures, and requesting a proclamation to that effect. The nation having for several years aped the French too much in their fashions, especially at this season, the King, to avoid the like vanity, has specified that he will wear a vest not after that mode, but will not put it on till Monday, the Duke of York’s birthday.”21 Pepys witnessed the Duke of York try on his new birthday outfit on Saturday the 13th (“it is a fashion the King says he will never change”), while the next day Anthony Wood saw the king “put on his vest, which he intends to keep in the same fashion.”22 After a week of primping and preparing, then, the three-piece suit made its grand entry onto the world historical stage on Monday, October 15, 1666, as Pepys noted in his diary: this day the King begins to put on his vest, and I did see several persons of the House of Lords, and Commons too, great courtiers, who are in it—being a long cassock close to the body, of black cloth and pinked with white silk under it, and a coat over it, and the legs ruffled with black ribbon like a pigeon’s leg—and upon the whole, I wish the King may keep it, for it is a very fine and handsome garment.23
The earl of Sandwich was at court in late 1666, though apparently confused his dates, for he sketched in his journal “the habit taken up by the
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Figure 8. The 1666 vest as drawn by the earl of Sandwich. “The habit taken up by the King and Court of England November 1666 which they call a vest.” By permission of The British Library. 10807.e.9.
King and Court of England November 1666 which they call a vest” (figure 8).24 Writing his diary years later, John Evelyn takes some deserved credit for the new fashion, but records that October 18 was the first time of his Majesty’s putting himself solemnly into the Eastern fashion of vest, changing doublet, stiff collar, and cloak, etc: into a comely vest, after the Persian mode, . . . resolving never to alter it, and to leave the French
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The Three-Piece Suit and Modern Masculinity mode, which had hitherto obtained to our great expense and reproach: upon which diverse courtiers and gentlemen gave his majesty gold, by way of wager, that he would not persist in this resolution: I had some time before indeed presented an invectique against that inconstancy, and our so much affecting the French fashion, to his Majesty in which [I] took occasion to describe the comeliness and usefulness of the Persian clothing in the very same manner his Majesty clad himself; this pamphlet I entitled Tyrannus, or the Mode, and gave it his Majesty to read; I do not impute the change which soon happen’d to this discourse, but it was an identity, that I could not but take notice of.25
The earl of Danby also noted the king’s new clothes, as well as his wager that he would persist in this new habit, “which is intended for good husbandry.”26 As Pepys, Wood, Evelyn, and Danby made clear, the king believed he had found a fashion that would never change—a sartorial stability that would signify the restoration of political stability. Equally important, however, were economic considerations: good husbandry, as Charles himself understood, was a key to the peace and happiness of the kingdom. Economic as well as political rivalry with France was clearly central to the introduction of the three-piece suit: the abandonment of French styles, as Lord Halifax wrote, was an attempt to “throw off their fashion, and put on vests, that we might look more like a distinct people, and not be under the servility of imitation.”27 In his 1669 edition of Anglia Notitia, Edward Chamberlayne recorded that since the Restoration of the King now reigning, England never saw, for matter of wearing apparel, less prodigality, and more modesty in clothes, more plainness and comeliness, than amongst her nobility, gentry, superior clergy; only the citizens, and country people, and the servants, appear clothed for the most part above and beyond their qualities, estates or conditions; since our last breach with France, the English men (though not the women) quitted the French mode, and took a grave wear, much according to the oriental nations.28
In the Restoration atmosphere of protectionism and “muscular patriotism,”29 good husbandry was equivalent to promoting a positive balance of trade with France. Good husbandry thus meant wearing English wool. Samuel Newton noted in May 1669 that “the then English mode” was “an ordinary stuff vest and tunic of a saddish color,”30 or made of “black cloth,” as Pepys reported—“cloth” in the seventeenth century being synonymous with wool. As the author of The Ancient Trades Decayed noted, “no person can be offended at [the wearing of wool], because his majesty, (for the encouragement of the trade of his own people)
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is graciously pleased to wear nothing but what is of the English make.”31 As we have seen, Privy Councillor Samuel Fortrey was among the mercantilists who urged the king to wear English cloth. Like Fortrey, John Evelyn looked to Charles II to restore the balance of trade through his own example: how glorious be to our Prince, when he should behold all his subjects clad with the production of his own country, and the people universally enrich’d, whilst the species that we now consume in lace, or export for foreign silks, and more unserviceable stuffs, would by this means be all sav’d, and the whole nation knit as one to the heart of their sovereign, as to a provident and indulgent father? 32
In the eyes of royalist reformers like Evelyn, the moral example of patriarchal authority would remove from the court “insignificant triflers, whose brains are as transparent as their clothes,” while simultaneously restoring the “nerves of the state,” enriching the nation and securing allegiance to the crown.33 To this extent, the king’s adoption of the vest paralleled his mercantilist-inspired Act for Burial in Woollen of the same year: if the nation’s consumers had not worn English wool while alive, they would at least be buried in it.34 Charles II thus inaugurated a reign in which England would be led by the modest example of crown and court, “without much show and with little ceremony,” as Jorevin de Rocheford described the Duke of York’s three-piece suit.35 The Restoration court at least temporarily reversed the relation between power and display: by renouncing show and ceremony, the crown could reclaim its moral and masculine authority in the face of political and economic opposition to royal splendor. Through the introduction of the three-piece suit, the Restoration court turned the anti-royalist critique of aristocratic culture to its own advantage to redefine and relegitimate aristocracy and monarchy. Modesty had become a claim to power. With the three-piece suit, a counterculture became court culture. Although it is difficult to trace the use and transformation of the vest throughout England, anecdotal and visual evidence hint at a relatively rapid diffusion beginning in 1666. John Evelyn notes that he first wore a vest on October 30, 1666, when “his majesty had brought the whole court to it.”36 Samuel Pepys was in his new three-piece suit by early November,37 while Anthony Wood was wearing a vest by the end of the year.38 Samuel Sturmy is pictured in the frontispiece of his Mariner’s Magazine wearing a vest in 1669 (figure 9). Vests were worn by some of those attending the funeral of the duke of Albemarle in 1670, the
Figure 9. Samuel Sturmy, The Mariner’s Magazine (London: G. Hurlock, W. Fisher, E. Thomas and D. Page, 1669), frontispiece. By permission of The British Library. C.13.m.17.
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Figure 10. John Ogilby, Brittania (London: John Ogilby, 1675), plate following p. 174. By permission of The British Library. 192.f.1.
vests often covered with mantles rather than overcoats, due to the formality of the occasion.39 In 1675, John Ogilby pictured men in vests in his Brittania, a cartographic guide to the island (figure 10). By 1676, vests were apparently worn at Cambridge, as David Loggan depicts in his illustrated guide to the university (figure 11). By the 1670s, then, it appears that England’s male elite had followed the king’s example. Yet the new modest masculinity established by Charles II was shortlived, as the crown abandoned its effort to “teach the nobility thrift” in the 1670s and 1680s. Introduced as part of the Restoration crown’s attempt to restore its legitimacy, the three-piece suit was intrinsically linked with the political state of the nation. In the face of revolutionary criticism of the court’s presumed luxury and effeminacy, a politically unsure crown had stabilized itself in part by instituting a fashion that Charles literally wagered he would never alter. Three centuries’ hindsight tells us that the modest three-piece suit was a safe bet, but in the short run, given the status of the Restoration court, it was quite a gamble: as the Restoration crown gained stability and renewed its links with France, the male modesty of 1666 was gradually left behind. By the 1670s, the political state of the nation was changing. A more confident court began to adopt the aesthetics that had dominated the old sartorial regime, gaining its still current image as a site of sexual intrigue and private vice, rakes and masquerades, luxury and debauchery. The three-piece suit participated in this restoration of splendor. Various authors noted that at some point in
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Figure 11. David Loggan, Cantabrigia Illustrata (1676) (London: David Loggan, 1690), plate 7, “Habitus Academici in Universitate.” By permission of The British Library. 129.h.3.
the 1670s the English court returned to the mode of France, itself adopting a more ornate version of the three-piece suit. The marquis of Halifax linked a return of French fashions to the 1670 Treaty of Dover, which secretly restored religious and political ties between England and France. The return to French splendor, Halifax regretted, “gave a very critical advantage to France, since it looked like an evidence of our returning to their interest, as well as to their fashion.”40 Edward Chamberlayne’s 1672 edition of Anglia Notitia repeated his lines about “the grave mode” introduced since the Restoration, but added: “but that is now left.”41 In his 1674 edition, Chamberlayne added that “the French mode again [was] taken up.”42 In 1677, Elkanah Settle wrote that “vests, your seven years love, grew out of fashion,” thus dating the return to splendor to 1673.43 Though these authors disagree on dates, they agree in their portrayal of a Restoration court returning to the conspicuous consumption of the
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Figure 12. The Courtier’s Calling (London: Richard Tonson, 1675), frontispiece. The frontispiece displays an elaborate and ornate three-piece suit. By permission of The British Library. S410.b.24.
pre-Civil War court. The old sartorial regime was not dead, as Restoration courtiers returned to their cavalier fashion of defending elite prerogatives to be finely dressed. The author of The Courtier’s Calling of 1675 counseled against too much gravity and seriousness, since “comeliness has great charms to bewitch hearts . . . To know how to dress himself advantageously is not an unprofitable science”44 (figure 12). Conspicuous consumption was merely an “innocent delight,” as Charles’s
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chief minister the earl of Clarendon had put it in the late 1660s. Throughout the 1670s and 1680s, the aesthetic of conspicuous consumption, with its positive associations of magnificence and liberality, and its negative connotations of luxury and effeminacy, dominated court culture. In the history of the Restoration court, then, the modest vest of 1666 may have been merely a brief act of contrition and humility by an unstable crown worried about its cultural authority. Its memory, however, was kept alive by reforming royalists who regretted the return to regal splendor. The royalist author of England’s Vanity struck a note of nostalgia in 1683, praising the incomparable tunic and vest, so very comely in itself, so very advantageous to the drapers of the kingdom, perhaps the most grave and manlike dress that ever England saw, which had the unhappiness to be brought in too late, and the hard fate to be sent out again too soon . . . But we can never hold when it is well, such an influence hath the French pipe to make us caper after them, in all their follies, to our own dishonor and ruin.45
Late in life, John Evelyn lamented that the vest was “a comely and manly habit: too good to hold, it being impossible for us to leave the monsieurs’ vanities in good earnest long.”46 For Evelyn, the vest had been “the most graceful, virile and useful mode that ever appeared at court.”47 Despite its decline, then, the 1666 vest remained as a symbol of a new model of court culture, one which redefined upper-class men as graceful, virile, and useful: graceful, because their new social identity was formed around a practice of refined simplicity rather than sartorial splendor; virile, because they were able to deflect criticism of being effeminate fops; and useful, because they were wearing garments which were “advantageous to the drapers of the kingdom.” Ultimately, dressing in the innocent delights of the old sartorial regime brought only dishonor and ruin to the Restoration court, and, as the next chapter will explore, the Glorious Revolution of 1688 would return the three-piece suit to the modest form that Charles II had originally vowed he would never change.
chapter 5
Masculinity in the “Age of Chivalry,” 1688 –1832
A century after the Glorious Revolution, in 1790 Edmund Burke reflected on the French Revolution, writing from the perspective of an “Old Whig” defender of the revolution principles of 1688 (figure 13). Like seventeenth-century Whigs, Burke placed manners and morals at the center of his conception of political order, and so bewailed the subversion of aristocratic moral authority by the “New Whigs,” who opposed France’s old regime and aristocratic rule at home. What the Glorious Revolution had established, the French Revolution threatened to tear asunder. It is no wonder, then, that Burke turned to ideas about manners, manliness, and womanliness to defend upper-class society during its greatest crisis of the eighteenth century. Burke considered the “manly sentiment” of aristocratic men, and the “delightful vision” of elite women, to be the keys to maintaining aristocratic cultural and political authority. His “most memorable passage,”1 the one that received the greatest attention from his contemporaries, was his lament for the tragic, fallen beauty of Marie Antoinette: surely never lighted on this orb, which she hardly seemed to touch, a more delightful vision. I saw her just above the horizon, decorating and cheering the elevated sphere she just began to move in, glittering like the morning-star, full of life, and splendor, and joy. Oh! what a revolution! . . . But the age of chivalry is gone. That of sophisters, economists, and calculators has succeeded, and the glory of Europe is extinguished forever. Never, never more, shall we behold that generous loyalty to rank and sex, that proud submission,
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Figure 13. Studio of Joshua Reynolds, Edmund Burke, 1771. Wearing a plain, uniform three-piece suit, Burke embodies the aesthetic values he outlined in his Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and the Beautiful, as well as the “manly sentiments” outlined in his Reflections on the Revolution in France. By Courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery, London.
that dignified obedience, that subordination of the heart, which kept alive, even in servitude itself, the spirit of an exalted freedom. The unbought grace of life, the cheap defence of nations, the nurse of manly sentiment and heroic enterprize is gone! 2
Given the centrality of gender ideals to aristocratic political culture, it should come as no surprise that the “centrepiece of the Reflections” 3 revolved around notions of “loyalty to rank and sex.” In Burke’s Whig ideology, the “manly sentiment” nursed by the delight and splendor of the queen “kept alive” aristocratic hegemony in eighteenth-century political culture. In celebrating the delightful splendor of women, then, Edmund Burke trumpeted the masculinist aristocratic political culture that triumphed
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in 1688 and reigned until the extension of suffrage to middle-class men in 1832. In expelling James II for his Catholicism, absolutism, and court culture, the Glorious Revolution made oppositional culture the dominant culture, establishing a new and more limited monarchy according to the terms used by court opponents throughout the seventeenth century. In the long eighteenth century, masculine modesty helped symbolize and define this new political culture: the more limited crown no longer played a role as leader of fashion, or even as arbiter of English culture.4 New definitions of masculinity were thus part of the consolidation of power by the English aristocracy, one means by which it asserted its political authority against the claims of the crown, and reestablished its cultural hegemony against opponents of aristocratic culture. A newly triumphant Whig political culture thus made the moral and aesthetic tastes of aristocratic gentlemen central to sustaining aristocratic hegemony in the age of chivalry. For Old Whigs like Burke, then, the maintenance of the “spirit of a gentleman”5 was necessary to defend a political order created in 1688 against what he saw as the rationalist leveling tendencies of 1789. Masculinity was central to the age of chivalry. “THE MANNERS OF A REPUBLIC” As we have seen in chapter 3, seventeenth-century opponents of absolutism resisted not only a system of government—they criticized an entire way of life. When the Glorious Revolution transferred power from James II to William and Mary, then, it expelled a political culture of conspicuous consumption and installed a new regime which embraced the opposition principles of modest masculinity. At his inauguration, King William “probably wore a simple cinnamon-colored suit” for the reading of the Declaration of Rights, and “presented a rather modest, certainly civilian, surely benign picture” of royalty.6 Contemporaries thus credited William and Mary with encouraging “a disuse of exotic modes,”7 and “discouraging that course of trade which exhausted our bullion to support our pride and luxury,”8 thereby creating a more distinctly English style. In 1691 the admittedly partisan author of The Character of a Bigotted Prince (a reference to James II) welcomed the attempt by William and Mary “to rescue the glory of the English nation from that stupidity, that luxury, and effeminacy of the late reigns.”9 The Glorious Revolution was more than a revolution in the balance of power between crown and Parliament: it was a revolution in character. The age of luxury and effeminacy was gone.
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As contemporaries saw it, then, the Glorious Revolution had spawned a revolution in manners, sentiments, and gender ideals, replacing the presumed effeminacy of absolutism with a masculinist culture of aristocratic simplicity.10 In the post-revolutionary climate, defenders of the Revolution castigated Restoration monarchs for their excessive refinement of manners, and praised the Revolution for expelling a court where “all thoughts of military glory and extension of dominions seemed wholly to be laid aside, and all the severity of the preceding times, daily degenerate[d] to the luxuries of an effeminate reign,” as the Whig historian David Jones put it in 1697.11 This was not a specifically Whig interpretation of recent history: in 1699 the Tory Charles Davenant agreed that the Revolution had “wrought a general reformation in our manners,” having “banish’d flattery and corruption from the court.”12 The Glorious Revolution took place through the combined opposition of Whigs and Tories to the reign of James II, and though they disagreed over how the Revolution happened, over why William and Mary replaced James II, and over the terms of that replacement, they shared a “general tendency to conflate personal and political corruption,”13 and thus shared a common cultural analysis of the Revolution itself. In the new political stability achieved by the Revolution,14 parties and factions certainly flourished, but all sides agreed that the Revolution had wrought a general reformation of manners. To its defenders, the Glorious Revolution was glorious precisely because it was “a conservative revolution . . . carried out under the auspices of the aristocracy,”15 a political revolution without a social revolution, a revolution that preserved monarchy and aristocracy by relegitimating its cultural and constitutional foundations. In expelling popery and foppery, tyranny and luxury, and all the degeneracies of “an effeminate reign,” the Revolution of 1688 instituted a political culture that contemporaries felt could defend itself against attacks on its masculinity. English aristocratic men felt they could maintain their political power by donning an everyday image of manly modesty and noble simplicity. Monarchy and aristocracy could be preserved by shifting the terms of political debate, co-opting oppositional ideology and presenting the modest male aristocrat as the moral and political backbone of the nation. Long the language of opposition, modest masculinity had become the language of the status quo. Republicanism thus preserved monarchy, as Bishop Berkeley suggested in 1721: “it might be no ill policy in a kingdom, to form itself
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upon the manners of a republic.”16 Great Britain in 1721 was a kingdom, not a republic, and Bishop Berkeley was no republican. As an Anglican supporter of passive obedience to the crown, Berkeley helped restore a conservative political, social, economic, and cultural order after the crises of the seventeenth century. Yet like Whigs and dissenters, Berkeley gave great political weight to the symbols of everyday life— “of how great consequence therefore are fashions to the public . . . of so great influence” that they should not be left “to the management of women and fops and tailors”—and thus recognized in republican, masculine manners the new source of the kingdom’s political legitimacy.17 Writing after the collapse of runaway stock speculation during the South Sea Bubble, Berkeley looked to simplicity and manly virtue as a way to prevent the artificial desires, speculations, and luxuries that could potentially “enervate and dispirit the bravest people.”18 Berkeley’s fear that luxury would enervate England was a recurrent theme throughout the eighteenth century. Along with tyranny, corruption, rebellion, and anarchy, luxury was one of the central concepts of eighteenth-century political culture,19 precisely because English liberties were defined in characterological terms: “moral depravity,” asserted the anti-Jacobin John Bowles, created a people “disqualified for freedom.”20 After the Revolution of 1688, embodying public virtue was of prime concern to England’s political elite, who feared that encouraging luxury would lead to England’s moral and political decline. In an age when the crown could no longer claim the political prerogative to dictate English style,21 aristocratic men’s public virtue signified independence from the presumably effeminating effects of both royal pomp and middle-class luxury.22 Ritualized denunciation of enervating luxury was thus a prominent refrain in the ideology that attempted to legitimate aristocratic rule from 1688 to 1832, serving to define politics as a masculine sphere controlled by virtuous aristocrats rather than by royal fiat. Modest dress proclaimed the new political principle of limited monarchy established by the Revolution settlement: though a kingdom, England had the manners of a republic. In the Burkean ideology that dominated eighteenth-century political culture, then, manners were given more importance than laws in sustaining national unity and aristocratic rule.23 “Our nobles,” as one anonymous author put it, maintain their authority “not by force, but by respect; not by fear, but by attachment; not by necessity, but by inclination.”24 An elite example of sumptuary restraint would reduce the pop-
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ular discontent and envy that came from conspicuous class distinctions, thus making the populace “orderly, tractable, and easily governed,” as John Bowles none-too-subtly put it, especially given the relative weakness of a limited monarchy and a quiescent Church. Manners were seen as more important, because more effective, than laws: “having such powerful restraints within, they will require fewer restraints from without.”25 In an age when sumptuary laws were seen as improper for “a free people, tenacious of our liberty in every particular,”26 and “at best but bad instruments for the reformation of manners,”27 political authority was based not on royal prerogative or magisterial authority but on cultural hegemony.28 Political governance and social solidarity were thus maintained by a shared set of moral attitudes and practices—practices that were informed by political ideologies, but were articulated at the level of personal behavior. It is precisely because the Anglican divine and ardent Whig Rev. John Brown believed that “the manners and principles of those who lead, not of those who are led . . . will ever determine the strength or weakness, and therefore the continuance or dissolution, of a state,” that he identified aristocratic effeminacy as the prime threat to national security.29 Political legitimacy was based on aristocratic disinterest, the independent judgment and rational sensibilities created by the permanent wealth of a landed estate, the ability to stand above the world of private vices. Thus fashionability was incompatible with manly independence. With the decline of court culture, the world of luxury was no longer compatible with the world of politics. “The fashionable world,” wrote an anonymous defender of England’s oligarchy, is “so much in love with their own stupidity, that, though they were capable, they could not command time for disinterested reflection,” and thus they were incapable of governance.30 Aristocratic men’s modesty was thus more than a mere symbol of the reconsolidation of aristocratic patriarchy: for contemporaries, “corruption of manners” led to “the ruin of states,”31 while the masculine renunciation of luxury would “secure this kingdom from ruin,” as Brittania Expirans argued.32 If England was to avoid a fate similar to Rome’s fall from the “manly pride” of its republican era to the “effeminacy” and “vanity of the East” under its emperors, as Edward Gibbon narrated it, then it needed to abandon “that feeble, sumptuous and licentious effeminacy of royalty by which the eastern nations have been degraded in almost every age,” as the anti-Jacobin John Tinney argued.33 After the Glorious Revolution, a new relationship be-
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tween masculinity and consumption enacted and performed the triumph of the aristocracy: it was a means by which men of the landed nobility recognized themselves, defined their boundaries, and legitimated their rule. If, in the newly dominant Whig ideology, “an effeminate and luxurious course of life [was] . . . the reproach and ruin of a state,” virtue and industry were its “dignity and preservation.”34 But in the post-revolutionary consensus over political culture, Whigs had no monopoly on virtue, as Tories like Charles Davenant argued that “observing the rules and dictates of virtue . . . is the best way of securing to a people in general prosperity, peace, safety, power, and happiness in this present world.”35 The Tory John Dennis considered that “the restoration of public spirit” must begin with “the refraining of luxury,” since “removing the moral and the natural causes” of political decline was more important than any “immediate political occasions.”36 Writers across the political spectrum argued that refraining from luxury was a key to political stability, which is why accusations of luxury and effeminacy were so freely launched at one’s social or political enemies. Whigs, Tories, and Jacobites used a language of manly simplicity and public spiritedness in their pursuit of political and moral high ground, accusing each other of encouraging luxury and effeminacy through political corruption and despotic rule.37 In a political language that crossed party lines, luxury and effeminacy were linked with both tyranny and anarchy—the threat from above and the threat from below. There may have been no shared consensus about the basis of government or who should lead it, but there was a shared consensus that decrying effeminacy and luxury was an effective political strategy in a culture that equated political virtue with masculine simplicity. What before the Glorious Revolution was clearly associated with Whig, republican, and country ideology was now a shared language used by all parties for their own ends. And as the aristocracy gained a “growing stake in the countryside,”38 country ideology moved closer and closer to aristocratic ideology. Among the many variants of argument in eighteenth-century political culture— country Tory, country Whig, independent Whig, country Jacobite, Whig Jacobite, court Whig, court Tory, to name a few— one consensus stood out: masculinity was a prerequisite to political legitimacy. As we have seen, in the 1670s and 1680s Whigs and Tories were divided over the cultural role of the court and crown: Tories saw sumptuous court dress as an arbitrary prerogative that promoted trade, while Whigs saw it as the visible face of tyranny that only promoted lux-
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Figure 14. Sir Godfrey Kneller, Robert Walpole (no date). As leader of the court Whigs, Sir Robert Walpole—a Norfolk country gentleman in origin—was a central figure in England’s commercial expansion, devising mercantilist trade policies to promote English industries. Despite his “big wig” and a reputation for promoting luxury and tyranny—at least as his opponents charged—Walpole had himself portrayed in the modest style of the country gentleman. Courtesy of the National Portrait Gallery, London.
ury. Even in power, and even alongside their promotion of economic growth, court Whigs continued to denounce luxury, associating Tories with Jacobitism, popery, French fashions, and French absolutism—all incompatible with Whig ideals of industry and frugality, liberty and property (figure 14).39 “Trade is the great supporter of liberty, and liberty is as inconsistent with Torism, as moderation is with popery, or vice with virtue,” wrote the anonymous author of Torism and Trade Can Never Agree.40 Likewise, Whigs associated Jacobites with all the vices of the old regime, since Jacobites “aim at nothing but affectation, and smart repartees, and value themselves chiefly upon their clothes.”41 Like
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Tories, Jacobites had made “the badness of trade a party cause,” as Claudius Rey charged.42 In the post-revolutionary era, however, all sides made the denunciation of luxury a party cause: what had been a Whig ideology in the seventeenth century was now a general trope within aristocratic culture. Antipathy to conspicuous consumption knew no political boundaries in the eighteenth century. Tories thus used the same rhetoric of manly simplicity for their own political promotion.43 Tories could accuse the “senseless, upstart, Whig country gentleman” of dressing in a “a fine silk waistcoat and breeches.”44 Luxury, “the chief source of our present parties and divisions,” as John Dennis put it, remained the bugbear of the Tory opposition.45 The Tory leader Lord Bolingbroke called for sumptuary laws to combat the luxury and corruption which he thought would ensue from Walpole’s economic policies,46 while Charles Davenant complained that Whig courtiers had “laid aside all their former sobriety and gravity of manners, and are become as expensive and vicious as we are, who never so much as made any professions of godliness.”47 To Tories, Whigs were “Tom Doubles,” hypocrites who preached masculine virtue yet practiced effeminate vice. In this political struggle for the breeches, Tories could return the insult of luxury. Even Jacobites, especially Whiggish Jacobites like Jeremy Collier, adopted country rhetoric.48 The Scottish Jacobite Sir George MacKenzie shared the Whig and Tory emphasis on the importance of masculinity to political stability. Still loyal to James II, he nonetheless wrote in 1691 that under those monarchies, which have degenerated into tyrannies, care is taken to have those who get the public pay, spend it luxuriously. . . . The luxurious are not only useless, but enemies to the commonwealth wherein they live, useless because they become effeminate and soft, unable to defend and improve their native country.49
Faced with accusations of treason, Jacobites sought to demonstrate their patriotism by asserting their masculinism: in 1746, one year after the Jacobite rebellion, the Jacobite National Journal warned that “luxury and effeminacy have ever been the daughters of extravagance and profusion, those in their nature make way for corruption, which will . . . determine in downright slavery and the overturning of the Constitution.” 50 In this shared consensus over the dangers of luxury and effeminacy, modest masculinity became synonymous with the English national character. Throughout the eighteenth century, both an English nationalism
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and a more inclusive British nationalism developed primarily in opposition to the politics, religion, economy, and culture of its great other, France.51 Thus eighteenth-century political ideology linked manly modesty with national identity: “temperance and patriotism go hand in hand,” reflected Nathaniel Lancaster, writing in response to the 1745 Jacobite rebellion: What is so pernicious to the common weal as vice? And what vice, so much as luxury? . . . We think no lot so vile as that of subjection to a despotic Lord; and yet we crouch under the most abject of all servitude, the servitude of weak and effeminate passions . . . We can, without a blush, squander away immense sums upon foreigners, and barter . . . the sinews of war for an effeminating delicacy, which would ill become us even in times of peace, and is perhaps as unsuitable to our genius and climate, as it is inconsistent with the care and solicitude which danger awakens in the patriot’s breast.52
In the growing nationalism of English political ideology, then, the purportedly gender-free national character was defined in masculinist terms: throughout the eighteenth century, gender and nation were mutually defined. “Never did the masculine spirit of England display itself with more energy,” Edmund Burke blustered in 1796, “nor ever did its genius soar with a prouder pre-eminence over France, than at the time when frivolity and effeminacy had been at least tacitly acknowledged as their national character, by the good people of this kingdom.”53 From the beginning to the end of the long eighteenth century, France was the great political and cultural foil to English definitions of masculinity. “For a very long time,” declared the anti-Jacobin John Bowles, “French principles and French manners have been the bane of English religion and English morals,” thus threatening England with “luxurious habits and dissolute manners.”54 “All Europe to their fashions bends the knee,” regretted the anonymous author of A Satyr against the French; “In that they’ve gain’d the universal monarchy.”55 France was the source of tyranny, anarchy, and luxury, despotic Lords and effeminating delicacies, “frogs fricasseed and coxcomb-pies.”56 Precisely because of the masculinism of this political culture, political relations between men were solidified in homosocial and sometimes homoerotic terms. Yet the “homocentrism”57 of this masculinist culture in turn amplified anxieties about effeminacy, precisely because the Glorious Revolution had legitimated an oppositional political culture that considered homoeroticism and homosexual practices to be inherently effeminate, and thus a danger to the state.58 Unlike in TudorStuart England, in “the modern relationship between sexual behavior
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and gender”59 which emerged in the eighteenth century, homosexual practices were incompatible with masculinist political culture, which led to increased state repression of “mollies” in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.60 Instigated by the crown-sponsored Societies for the Reformation of Manners, prosecutions of homosexual practices (and executions of men committing them) doubled after 1688, since homosexual practices were seen as inherently associated with effeminacy, and since effeminacy was seen as such a danger to the welfare of the state.61 Ned Ward, a key promoter of the Societies for the Reformation of Manners, felt that mollies “imitat[e] all the little vanities that custom has reconciled to the female sex, affecting to speak, walk, tattle, curtsy, cry, scold, and to mimic all manner of effeminacy.”62 The new masculinist political culture which associated homosexual practices with effeminacy thus made these practices a new political threat.63 It is this new—and essentially modern—political homophobia, as much as the growth of a permanent homosexual subculture, that explains the “pogroms of the eighteenth century.”64 In creating modern political anxieties about homosexual practices, the new political culture extended the liberties of true-born Englishmen only to those it considered true-born men. At the heart of English political culture, then, guarding the boundaries of the aristocratic polity meant donning the image of noble simplicity, presenting the landed gentlemen as true-born Englishmen and the moral backbone of the nation. In the political culture of the long eighteenth century, contemporaries saw the manners of a republic as essential to defending the rule of aristocratic men, and thus to the national welfare as a whole. “It behooves all,” intoned the author of Enquiry into the Melancholy Circumstances of Great Britain, “even in private as well as public stations, to be frugal, upon which depends the liberties of their country.”65 Aristocratic political rule was legitimated by an ideology of masculine disinterest from the fashionable world, and in turn, a polity limited to aristocratic men would help maintain England’s masculinity: There are a variety of causes which operate in forming the disposition of the people, and perhaps none more than the Constitution and form of Government under which they live. Thus the English Character has acquired a vigor and manliness from the Constitution.66
It is only an understanding of the mutually defined relationship between gender construction and political ideology that allows us to comprehend John Bowles’s enigmatic statement that English manliness derived from
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the Constitution, since men of the eighteenth century saw their own manliness as a political construct. GENTLEMANLY CAPITALISM Throughout the eighteenth century and until the triumph of free-trade ideology in the mid-nineteenth century, English economic thought and policy were dominated by mercantilist attempts to protect English industry from the apparent luxury that threatened to be imported from abroad. The Glorious Revolution turned a seventeenth-century economic ideology from opposition into orthodoxy, as industry and frugality became for economic writers what liberty and property were for political writers. In legitimizing the seventeenth-century mercantilism of Mun and Manley, Carter and Culpeper, eighteenth-century economists also retained its moral economy. Rejecting arguments that private vices were public benefits, the mercantilists who dominated economic debate and policy argued that England’s profit was based on personal virtue: “Moral virtue promotes trade, and aggrandizes a nation,” Archibald Campbell believed, while luxury led to effeminacy, dissipation, idleness, and the ultimate ruin of political society.67 It was in part this cultural resonance of mercantilist rhetoric that made protectionism so appealing in the eighteenth century: if the long eighteenth century was the heyday of English protectionism, it was because mercantilism made as much political and cultural sense as it made economic sense to England’s economic policymakers. Mercantilism appealed not only to the administrative and financial requirements of a rapidly growing fiscal-military state,68 but to the political, social, cultural, and gender sensibilities of the aristocratic gentlemen who determined eighteenth-century economic policy. Mercantilism made the economic values of industry and frugality compatible with the moral hegemony of aristocratic men. Capitalist ideology was thus not necessarily bourgeois ideology: rather, eighteenth-century economic theory and policy created a “gentlemanly capitalism” that set the stage for an industrial society dominated by the manners and morality of aristocratic gentlemen. From 1688 to the repeal of the protectionist Corn Laws in 1846, mercantilists saw moral order as the basis of the wealth of the nation: “secure but the virtue of a nation and you make it rich,” Matthew Heynes preached in 1700.69 Of course, making a nation rich made it susceptible to luxury and effeminacy, as England’s increasing wealth posed a threat to the political
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elite’s notions of virtue. Eighteenth-century mercantilists and economic policymakers thus tried to make aristocratic political culture compatible with economic growth: “How can the military spirit of a people, and the spirit of trade, be preserved at the same time?” asked the anonymous author of Of Commerce and Luxury, who worried that it was “impossible for courage and the military spirit to be allied with effeminacy.”70 As in eighteenth-century political culture, eighteenth-century mercantilists saw history as operating on a Polybian cycle, moving from necessity to convenience to luxury, from want to health to degeneracy, from idleness to industry to effeminacy. As late as 1845, the protectionist Albert Williams argued in his defense of the Corn Laws that the business cycle could easily become a Polybian one: in its first stages [commerce] supplies mutual necessities, prevents mutual wants, extends mutual knowledge, eradicates mutual prejudices, and spreads mutual humanity. In its middle and more advanced period, it provides conveniences, increases numbers, coins money, gives birth to arts and sciences, creates equal laws, diffuses general plenty, and general happiness. If we view it in its third and highest stage, we shall see it change its nature and effects. It brings in superfluity and vast wealth, and begets avarice, gross luxury, or effeminate refinement, together with general loss of principle.71
Throughout mercantilist ideology, effeminacy was the highest stage of capitalism, and government intervention was therefore necessary to protect trade from this general loss of principle. Maintaining a healthy economy meant maintaining the kingdom’s “military spirit” as well as its “general happiness.” In the heyday of both mercantilism and aristocracy, aristocratic virtue was seen as central to the maintenance of England’s industrial growth, while “wealth, population and power” were only valuable if they simultaneously improved “virtue and happiness.”72 Trade and virtue were mutually necessary, and thus effeminacy was a threat to both wealth and nation. Fears of effeminacy, then, were stimulated less by a growing consumer capitalism,73 and more by the triumph of the economic and political ideologies that accompanied the Glorious Revolution. Fears of the luxury of upstarts were not unique to the eighteenth century; what was new was the mercantilist political economy that achieved a new legitimacy after 1688. Eighteenth-century political economy merged with Whig political culture, founding economic and political well-being on the manly manners of an aristocratic republic. “Even commerce and trade and manufactures” depended on aristocratic morality, wrote the Old Whig
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Edmund Burke, for a nation “destitute of religion, honor, or manly pride” was a nation where “commerce and the arts should be lost.”74 It is one of the “peculiarities of the English” that eighteenth-century aristocratic men “made up a superbly successful and self-confident capitalist class,”75 having expelled an old regime driven by court-sponsored conspicuous consumption and replaced it with an economic culture based on masculinist conceptions of industry and frugality. Historians have often portrayed eighteenth-century England as a period of struggle between a conservative, quasi-feudal aristocracy hostile to bourgeois capitalism and an insurgent consumer economy undermining aristocratic moral authority.76 For eighteenth-century conservatives, however, capitalism did not undermine aristocratic culture: rather, capitalism and aristocracy went hand in hand. While economic growth depended upon aristocratic cultural hegemony, landed aristocrats profited from industrial development.77 Economic expansion certainly challenged aristocratic ideals, on two different fronts: productive, refined consumption might easily degenerate into effeminating luxury, as many authors feared, and a growing middle-class political consciousness would challenge aristocratic hegemony, as the next chapter will discuss. In eighteenth-century England, however, industrial capitalism and the inculcation of aristocratic manners were not necessarily separate spheres or competing interests: “good taste,” as Bishop George Berkeley considered, would “greatly conduce” to the economic well-being of the nation.78 England’s aristocracy played as revolutionary a role as its bourgeoisie in fostering the culture of modern capitalism, by making economic growth compatible with aristocratic political culture. Mercantilist moral economy did not go unchallenged in the eighteenth century, to be sure. From a variety of ideological perspectives, an often vocal minority of political economists opposed the hegemony of industry and frugality. Disenchanted with the new Whig supremacy, “predominantly Tory economic writers” kept alive the old sartorial regime’s defense of conspicuous consumption.79 Early promoters of free-trade ideology,80 these Tories perpetuated the doctrine of beneficial luxury, arguing that “the stock of a nation [is] infinite, and can never be consumed; for what is infinite, can neither receive addition by parsimony, nor suffer diminution, by prodigality,” as the Tory free-trader Nicholas Barbon put it.81 Dudley North, a Tory M.P. and merchant in the Turkey Company, argued in 1691 that “the main spur to trade, or rather to industry and ingenuity, is the exorbitant appetites of men.”82 For these
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and other writers, “imaginary wants and the consumption of exotics” were the main stimulants to industry, without which “universal sloth and insolence . . . might end in barbarism.”83 Rather than promoting disorder, luxury might be a guardian against barbarism. Even effeminacy, argued the anonymous author of The Prosperity of Britain, was a source of economic and political well-being. This author agreed with the Rev. John Brown’s analysis that England was infected with effeminacy, yet saw in this infection the spread of economic growth: “That the English are effeminate I take from you . . . but far from drawing your conclusion, I shall prove that the kingdom is therefore prosperous.”84 Later in the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth, some defenders of aristocracy made the argument that luxury promoted trade, “so long as the prevalence of luxury is confined to a few of elevated rank,” as the early Utilitarian William Paley believed. Middle- and lower-class luxury, however, “checks the formation of families, in a degree that ought to alarm the public fears.”85 Though no supporter of free trade, Thomas Malthus took up Paley’s population theory, arguing that without “a body of unproductive consumers,” overproduction and unemployment would occur.86 Reversing the Whig language of manly virtue, this minority voice of Tory economists constructed an alternative political economy, one that saw luxury rather than frugality as the source of prosperity. A more serious threat to Whig political economy came from within, from independent Whigs skeptical of the ability to balance trade and virtue. The most famous—then and now— of these independent Whigs was Bernard Mandeville, whose Fable of the Bees directly challenged post-revolutionary ideology by arguing that private vices were public benefits.87 Though less an economic theory than a moral polemic, The Fable of the Bees nonetheless challenged the economic assumptions of the new political culture. Turning mercantilist morality on its head, Mandeville denied the possibility of “enjoying all the most elegant comforts of life that are to be met with in an industrious, wealthy and powerful nation, and at the same time be bless’d with all the virtue and innocence that can be wish’d for in a Golden Age.”88 Reformulating the old sartorial regime’s defense of “the economic role of the old aristocracy,”89 Mandeville rejected as “a mean starving virtue” the new aristocratic simplicity promulgated by writers such as Shaftesbury, Addison, and Steele.90 Rather than seeing Mandeville as a percipient prophet who understood “the values implicit in the new socioeconomic order” and
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its emerging consumer capitalism, as many have been wont to do,91 we should understand Mandeville’s Fable as an independent Whig’s political argument for the “incompatibility or discordance of national wealth and virtue,” as Richard Whately understood him in 1832.92 It was Mandeville, not his opponents, who was the cultural reactionary against the new political economy. As an independent Whig, Mandeville clearly comprehended the link between the ideology of public virtue and the claim to political legitimacy, but saw this ideology as the product of “the skillful management of wary politicians” who separated the vicious governed, “wholly incapable of self-denial,” from the virtuous governors, “free from sordid selfishness.”93 As Mandeville properly understood Whig ideology, men were qualified for political leadership by their ability to put moral chains upon their appetites, to paraphrase Burke’s formulation. Mandeville asserted, however, that as a claim to power, self-denial was merely an inverted form of self-interest: “it is possible that [a man] only sacrifices the insipid outward part of his pride, which none but silly ignorant people take delight in, to that part we all feel within, and which the men of the highest spirit and most exalted genius feed on with so much ecstasy in silence.”94 For Mandeville, Whig public virtue was nothing but private vanity properly dressed. Equally hypocritical to Mandeville, however, was the old sartorial regime argument that rich apparel was merely a “thing indifferent” or an “innocent delight.” Though Mandeville defended the aristocracy’s conspicuous consumption, he agreed with iconoclasts that fashion was inherently vicious vanity, not an arbitrary custom. Clearly rejecting the old sartorial regime’s defense of conspicuous consumption, Mandeville believed that pride was in the clothes as well as in the heart: It may be objected, that many people of good fashion, who have been us’d to be well dress’d, out of custom wear rich clothes with all the indifference imaginable, and that the benefit to trade accruing from them cannot be ascribed to emulation or pride. To this I answer, that it is impossible, that those who trouble their heads so little with their dress, could ever have wore those rich clothes, if both the stuffs and fashions had not been first invented to gratify the vanity of others, who took greater delight in fine apparel than they.95
Though beneficial, luxury was still a vice. Mandeville thus took the strict iconoclastic morality of Whig opponents of the old sartorial regime, and combined it with the old sartorial regime’s economic defense of luxury to devise his formula of “private vices, public benefits.”96
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Rather than marshaling a Tory free-trade defense of the innocence of beneficial luxury, or promoting a broader definition of healthy consumption, this “unusually austere moralist”97 and “thoroughgoing mercantilist”98 merely reversed the iconoclastic language of public virtue, turning the moral condemnation of luxury into mock praise. Mandeville agreed that luxury “effeminates and enervates the people,” yet denied that it led to political decline: “what is put to the account of luxury belongs to mal-administration, and is the fault of bad politics.”99 Breaking the link between moral economy and political culture, then, Mandeville took an extremely austere version of the political discourse of luxury and turned it on its head. It was this reversal that so outraged English political culture and political economists, precisely because Mandeville took the strictest, most stoic definition of luxury and turned it against the proponents of industry and frugality. And it was exactly this reversal that led Mandeville to become “a silent reference point for much of the social thought of the eighteenth century,”100 stimulating further articulation of the relationship between political culture and political economy. “Private abuses, public grievances,” grumbled Daniel Defoe in dismissing Mandeville.101 Mandeville was the perfect foil for eighteenth-century mercantilists, as a majority of Whigs and Tories defended aristocratic culture by arguing that “no prince ever enlarged his territories by effeminacy, luxury and ease,” as George Blewitt put it.102 The Tory John Dennis agreed with Mandeville’s assertion that mal-administration was the source of national decline, but countered that luxury was the source of Whig mal-administration.103 Asserting that “private vices cannot be public benefits,” the mercantilist author of An Enquiry into the Melancholy Circumstances of Great Britain condemned gentlemen who, “in bare compliance to the fair sex, imitate their taste.” “Virtue is the support of every state”; 104 “it is virtue alone, which can make a nation flourish,” ran the constant refrain of defenses against the “absurdity” of The Fable of the Bees.105 Mandeville’s opponents have often been portrayed as merely anticapitalists blind to the prophetic insights of The Fable of the Bees, reactionaries who produced “a re-vindication of the traditional, moralist—whether humanist or Christian—view.”106 Yet Mandeville not only provoked self-righteous condemnation of his “scandalous libertinism.”107 In rejecting Mandeville, his critics developed a greater theoretical elaboration of the relation between production and consumption. If there was a new, positive evaluation of consumer spending in eighteenth-
Figure 15. L. P. Boitard, The Imports of Great Britain from France, 1757. Great Britain eagerly welcomes a shipment of French cheeses, wines, cambricks, gloves, muffs, ribbons, flowers for hair, “and other such material bagatelles,” accompanied by “swarms of milliners, tailors, mantua-makers, frisers, tutoresses for boarding schools, disguised Jesuits, quacks, valet de chambre, etc. etc.” By permission of The British Library. F. C. Stephens and M. D. George, eds., British Museum Catalogue of Political and Personal Satires. 2083.e.
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century political economy, it was of the mercantilist, not Mandevillian, variety, as political economists developed a distinction between the productive consumption that facilitated “honest commerce,” and the enervating luxury that fostered effeminacy and ruin, as Bishop Berkeley wrote.108 Though no advocate of modesty, even the skeptical Whig David Hume sought to correct Mandeville’s “libertine principles [that] bestow praises even on vicious luxury” by arguing that “wherever luxury ceases to be innocent, it also ceases to be beneficial; and when carried a degree too far, is a quality pernicious, though perhaps not the most pernicious, to political society.”109 Accusing Mandeville of sophistry,110 political economists from Berkeley to Malthus disagreed with his definition of luxury as all consumption above the level of necessity. “He has confounded the notions of luxury and wealth, and defined the one for the other,” argued George Blewitt.111 Claiming that Mandeville’s definition of luxury was “too rigorous,”112 moral and economic writers attempted to situate “temperance, as a virtue,”113 between luxury and want, relying on a gentleman’s aesthetic refinement and economic education to help him find the balance between too much and too little consumption. Throughout the eighteenth century, then, political economists sought to counter Mandeville’s skepticism by more clearly defining the boundary between hurtful luxury and productive consumption. Often, that boundary was the cliffs of Dover (figure 15). In legitimating seventeenth-century mercantilism, political economy in the long eighteenth century made the balance of trade of central concern to economic policy. Distinguishing between harmful luxury and productive consumption meant defining luxury as the inherent attribute of foreign imports that could be substituted by English manufactures. As in the oppositional ideology of seventeenth-century mercantilists, eighteenthcentury economic writers drew on the moral rhetoric of manly industry and frugality to prevent or at least lessen the importation of French and Italian silks, Indian calicoes, continental velvets, and all other rivals to English wool, the “Golden Fleece,” “the flower and hopes of the Nation,” and the backbone of the economy.114 In all trades, protectionist legislation would maintain England’s “moral character and material welfare,” wrote Archibald Alison, precisely because in contrast free trade would make England dependent on foreign luxuries.115 Since national wealth came “from an internal source,” “evanescent” luxuries from abroad tended “only to impoverish, debase and debilitate the consumers of them,” John Almack argued in his defense of the
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Corn Laws.116 In an age when England’s economy was held to be selfsufficient in its needs, nationalist arguments for protective legislation merged easily with economic and moral ones: “the consumers of French manufactures in Great Britain,” wrote Thomas Mortimer, should be considered as petty traitors, and punished severely; for they enrich our natural rivals, who can make us no returns of the money sent out of the kingdom for this needless article of luxury, in compliance with the vitiated taste of our people, whom the demon of fashion tempts to injure their country in so tender a point as her commerce.117
Whereas the old sartorial regime had defined luxury primarily according to one’s social station, in the long eighteenth century the balance of trade became the main measure for differentiating between needless luxury and productive consumption. “If our importations in such commodities, thro’ our luxury, should exceed our exportations,” argued the author of An Enquiry into the Melancholy Circumstances of Great Britain, “foreigners will over-balance us in trade.”118 In mercantilist political economy, it was the protective system, not free trade, that would defend the interests of “the productive classes” against the “idle consumers who buy labour and its products so cheaply as free trade now enables them to do,” the Tory John Bell argued in 1839.119 Since free trade was “sapping the moral character of our people,”120 mercantilist protectionism was necessary to guard productive masculinity from “the luxuries and effeminacies” that an unregulated economy might create.121 As mercantilism merged with aristocratic political culture, it made its way into the commonsense platitudes of courtesy manuals: “a good economist,” counseled The Young Gentleman and Lady Instructed in . . . Politeness, “will often recommend our own manufactures.”122 These good economists thus appealed to the good taste of aristocratic culture, calling upon the aristocratic elite to support the nation’s moral fiber: “as the balance of England lies in land, so the balancing of trade lies in landed men,” wrote board of trade member John Pollexfen, who warned that “modes and fashions, . . . hath proved the ruin of many ancient families.”123 As Bishop Berkeley understood it, precisely because “the current of industry and commerce” was determined by the “prevailing will” of fashion, fashion needed to be regulated by aristocratic politeness, since “good taste in a people . . . greatly conduce[s] to their thriving.”124 With a new, positive form of consumption compatible with the anti-luxury discourse of aristocratic political culture, mercantilists in the eighteenth century felt confident encouraging emulation of aristocratic
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consumer habits. By adopting English modes, aristocrats could simultaneously continue in their role as fashion leaders, and yet not be accused of undermining English industry and frugality. Aristocrats could bring “the sober and frugal living of their ancestors . . . in fashion again among us; and this alone wou’d contribute to keep and increase our wealth, and greatly to enrich our land.”125 Without resorting to Mandevillian cynicism, then, mercantilists had come to their own understanding of the positive e