The Syntax-discourse Interface: Representing And Interpreting Dependency (Linguistik Aktuell Linguistics Today, LA 80)

The Syntax–Discourse Interface

Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics Today Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics Today (LA) provides a platform for original monograph studies into synchronic and diachronic linguistics. Studies in LA confront empirical and theoretical problems as these are currently discussed in syntax, semantics, morphology, phonology, and systematic pragmatics with the aim to establish robust empirical generalizations within a universalistic perspective.

Series Editors Werner Abraham

Elly van Gelderen

University of Vienna

Arizona State University

Advisory Editorial Board Cedric Boeckx

Ian Roberts

Harvard University

Cambridge University

Guglielmo Cinque

Ken Safir

University of Venice

Rutgers University, New Brunswick NJ

Günther Grewendorf

Lisa deMena Travis

J.W. Goethe-University, Frankfurt

McGill University

Liliane Haegeman

Sten Vikner

University of Lille, France

University of Aarhus

Hubert Haider

C. Jan-Wouter Zwart

University of Salzburg

University of Groningen

Christer Platzack University of Lund

Volume 80 The Syntax–Discourse Interface: Representing and interpreting dependency by Petra Burkhardt

The Syntax–Discourse Interface Representing and interpreting dependency

Petra Burkhardt Philipps-University, Marburg

John Benjamins Publishing Company Amsterdam
/
Philadelphia

8

TM

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences – Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ansi z39.48-1984.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Petra Burkhardt The Syntax–Discourse Interface : Representing and interpreting dependency / Petra Burkhardt. p. cm. (Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics Today, issn 0166–0829 ; v. 80) Revision of the author’s thesis (doctoral). Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Grammar, Comparative and general--Syntax. 2. Discourse analysis. 3. Realization (Linguistics) 4. Dependency grammar. I. Title. II. Linguistik aktuell ; Bd. 80. P291.B874 2005 415--dc22 isbn 90 272 2804 3 (Hb; alk. paper)

2005048236

© 2005 – John Benjamins B.V. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publisher. John Benjamins Publishing Co. · P.O. Box 36224 · 1020 me Amsterdam · The Netherlands John Benjamins North America · P.O. Box 27519 · Philadelphia pa 19118-0519 · usa

To my parents, Annemarie and Otto Burkhardt

Contents Preface

xi

Chapter 1 Introduction 1.1. General assumptions 1.2. Establishing coreference: representational background 1.3. Establishing coreference: processing 1.4. The outline

1 2 4 11 13

Chapter 2 Coreference: representational background 2.1. Pronominal interpretation in the literature 2.1.1. Structural accounts 2.1.2. Discourse-based accounts 2.1.3. The case of logophors 2.2. Economy considerations 2.3. Synthesis

15 19 19 31 41 49 55

Chapter 3 Syntax–discourse correspondences: The model 3.1. Interpretive mechanisms 3.1.1. Computational system 3.1.2. Discourse representation 3.2. Pronominals and their representations 3.2.1. The representation of a pronoun 2.2.2. The representation of a self-anaphor 3.2.3. The representation of a se-anaphor 3.3. Antecedents and their file cards 3.4. The syntax–discourse model 3.5. Economy considerations and the syntax–discourse model

59 60 60 67 75 76 78 83 90 94 96

viii

Contents

Chapter 4 Evidence from processing: CMLD interference paradigm 4.1. Experimental paradigm 4.1.1. Experimental task 4.1.2. Rationale 4.2. Reflexive interpretation in English: coargument reflexives vs. ­logophors 4.2.1. English reflexivity: representational considerations 4.2.2. English reflexivity: a CMLD experiment 4.3. Reflexive interpretation in Dutch: coargument reflexives vs. ­ logophors 4.3.1. Dutch reflexivity: representational considerations 4.3.2. Dutch reflexivity: a CMLD experiment 4.4. Real-time sentence comprehension: quantified expressions vs. referential pronouns 4.4.1. Quantified expressions vs. referential pronouns: representational considerations 4.4.2. Quantified expressions vs. referential pronouns: processing ­considerations 4.4.3. Quantified expressions vs. referential pronouns in Dutch: a CMLD experiment 4.4.4. Quantification revisited 4.4.5. Conclusion 4.5. General discussion: CMLD findings Chapter 5 Evidence from processing: Aphasia research 5.1. Clinical background 5.2. Slow-Syntax Hypothesis 5.3. Pronominal interpretation: previous offline and online studies 5.4. Reflexive interpretation: coargument reflexives vs. logophors 5.4.1. Method 5.4.2. Participants 5.4.3. Materials 5.4.4. Predictions 5.4.5. Results 5.5. General discussion: aphasia findings

103 104 104 105 111 112 114 120 120 123 129 130 133 135 142 147 149 153 153 155 156 160 161 161 162 163 164 167

Contents

Chapter 6 Evidence from processing: Event-related potentials 6.1. Experimental paradigm 6.1.1. Experimental task 6.1.2. ERP and sentence processing 6.1.3. The time-course in the Syntax–Discourse Model 6.2. Reflexive interpretation: syntax vs. discourse 6.2.1. Method 6.2.2. Participants 6.2.3. Materials and design 6.2.4. Predictions 6.2.5. Results 6.2.6. Discussion 6.3. Pronominal interpretation: discourse-internal processes 6.3.1. Method 6.3.2. Participants 6.3.3. Materials and design 6.3.4. Predictions 6.3.5. Results 6.3.6. Discussion 6.4. General discussion: ERP recordings

171 171 171 173 180 182 184 186 186 188 189 194 196 198 198 199 200 202 209 212

Chapter 7 The syntax–discourse interface: Representation and processing

215

Notes

221

References

239

Index

257

ix

Preface This book, which represents a revised version of my Ph.D. dissertation, is concerned with the representation and interpretation of pronominal elements and focuses on issues at the syntax–discourse interface. So much has been said about anaphoric expressions and pronouns that it is impossible to provide a comprehensive overview and discussion of past research. In the first part of this monograph, my discussion therefore focuses on selected theoretical accounts that are relevant to the formulation of the model I advocate: the Syntax–Discourse Model. This model in connection with economy considerations is further used to make predictions for sentence processing, which are tested in the second part of this book using reaction time measures and recordings of electrical brain activity during sentence comprehension, as well as online studies with Broca’s aphasia patients. Since the approach of connecting considerations of representation and processing through experimental investigation might be less familiar for some of the readers, I introduce in a detailed manner the three different methodologies that I utilized (or the patient group investigated), the motivation for selecting a particular methodology/population, and previous related findings, before presenting the novel findings in chapters 4 through 6. I hope that this fosters an appreciation of the approach adopted herein where psycho- and neurolinguistic evidence is taken to support a theoretical model of the representation and interpretation of dependency. This research has benefited greatly from comments and discussion of the ideas developed here by Sergey Avrutin, Ina Bornkessel, Larry Horn, Maria M. Piñango, Eric Reuland, Esther Ruigendijk, Matthias Schlesewsky, Shalom Zuckerman, and the audiences at numerous conferences in the past years. I am also grateful for helpful comments from the editors of the series, Elly van Gelderen and Werner Abraham. Kees Vaes at John Benjamins also deserves many thanks.

Chapter 1

Introduction The language system appears to be an intricate system, yet language comprehension takes place in the most rapid and instantaneous fashion. This research addresses one aspect of language comprehension — namely the interpretation of pronominal elements — that serves to illustrate how the human language system operates. Pronominal entities (e.g. she, you, her, our, himself, themselves) are referentially dependent elements, as their interpretation is not sufficiently determined by their lexical content (i.e. their morphological feature specifications), and as a consequence, pronominals must rely on a dependency with another entity (i.e. antecedent) to obtain referential content (e.g. Evans 1980; Gernsbacher 1989), or as is the case of indexicals (e.g. I, you), they select a discourse referent from the context of utterance.1 For instance, the pronominal herself in (1) carries person, number, and gender features, and these features do not suffice to identify a unique referent by themselves. The pronominal therefore needs to enter into a dependency relation with the antecedent Suzy to obtain referential content and be fully interpretable: 2

(1) Suzy­­i cooked a nice meal for herselfi.

This dependency between a pronominal and its antecedent is also referred to as ‘coreference’, as the two linguistic entities forming a dependency relation signify the same referent in the real world. Pronominal entities differ in terms of the kind of antecedent they allow, as illustrated in (2), where himself must refer to Ken, and (3), where him must not refer to Ken,

(2) Roni said that Kenj hurt himself*i/j. (3) Roni said that Kenj hurt himi/*j.

and there is a large body of literature that addresses the conditions under which specific pronominals enter into a dependency relationship with an antecedent (see for instance Bosch 1983 for an extensive overview). Some of the issues of pronominal–antecedent dependencies are still discussed controversially in the literature (see Huang 2000, Barss 2003a, and Reuland 2003 for a survey of the different positions), and I seek to address a few of them in the following chapters.



The syntax–discourse interface

In particular, I address the following questions: (i) How can we account for the differences in pronominal–antecedent dependencies, i.e. what kind of mechanisms are available to the interpretation of the different types of pronominals? (ii) What are the processing correlates of the different pronominal– antecedent dependencies, and how do they inform a model of pronominal interpretation? The first issue — the encoding of different pronominal–antecedent dependencies — is addressed in the next two chapters. Chapter 2 reviews some of the major accounts found in the literature on pronominal interpretation (see also section 1.2 below), and chapter 3 introduces a model to account for the differences between pronominal elements: The Syntax–Discourse Model. This ­model is understood to be reflective of both representation and processing of pronominal–antecedent relations, as it describes the information units available to the languages system and utilizes an economy-based hierarchy in connection with the different dependency relations. The model then serves as a descriptive machinery to make predictions for sentence processing. In chapter 4 through 6, a series of psycho- and neurolinguistic studies is presented that investigate the online properties of the establishment of pronominal–antecedent dependencies with the aim of addressing the second issue — the actual processing patterns of different kinds of dependencies. The findings from sentence processing serve as a yardstick to assess the validity and adequacy of the model presented in chapter 3 and come from three sources of experimentation: cross-modal lexical decision reaction time measures, event-related brain potential recordings, and online measures with patients who suffered with Broca’s aphasia.

1.1.  General assumptions Before elaborating on the implications for pronominal interpretation and the specific approach adopted herein with respect to the establishment of dependencies, I briefly outline my understanding of a model of the language faculty and its connection to the mind and the brain. The overarching goal of this research is to present a model of pronominal interpretation that reflects the underlying mental processes of the language faculty. In this respect, I conceive of the model as an actual reflection of how the human language system represents and interprets dependency. This view also assumes that language processing is guided by a set of innate principles (Chomsky 1965, et

Introduction

seq.) and furthermore that different subsystems (i.e. ‘modules’) contribute to the overall success of language comprehension (Chomsky 1965, 1981, 1995; Fodor 1983; Jackendoff 1997, 1999) — such as the lexicon, the phonological system (i.e. sound structure), the syntactic system (i.e. the system that governs the organization and the properties of phrase structure), and the conceptual system (i.e. the system that controls intentions and reasoning).3 The different modules, which are viewed as independent and encapsulated systems, make up the architecture of the language faculty, and they are further connected by ‘interface’ modules (e.g. Chomsky 1995: 168; Jackendoff 1997: 21ff.), which relate information of two modules to each other. Pronominal entities are referentially deficient, yet language users across languages can determine the relevant pronominal–antecedent pairing in a precise and mostly unambiguous manner.4 This suggests that universal principles must apply that facilitate interpretive processes and the formation of a dependency between a pronominal and its antecedent. As with all aspects of sentence comprehension and production, the fascinating observation about pronominal entities is that their interpretation is resolved by applying a limited set of principles. And linguistic research is interested in what the exact nature of these principles is. Assuming that these principles are innate and that a ‘language organ’ (e.g. Chomsky 1975; Anderson and Lightfoot 1999) exists in the brain, it is a natural consequence to ask for the neural correlates of this language faculty. Here, the term ‘organ’ must be understood as a metaphor that denotes the functional reality of the underlying processes and modules, rather than depicting a unique anatomical entity, such as the liver or the heart (cf. Amunts et al. 1999). In this respect, the term ‘language organ’ suggests that there are cortical areas and brain tissue that serve a specific purpose during language processing and that provide and hold the tools and mechanisms (i.e. principles) that are needed to succeed in language processing. In recent years, investigations utilizing neuro­imaging techniques and studies with neurologically impaired patients have started to provide remarkable insights into language-brain relations (for an overview see Zurif 1998; Friederici 1999, 2002; Hickok and Poeppel 2000; Friederici and Kotz 2003), but more research needs to be done before the exact impact and contribution of specific areas of the brain during language processing can be determined. However, from what is known so far, a language-brain connection is warranted and can serve to inform the architecture of the language faculty. As far as the connection between the model (i.e. principles governing the language faculty) and the mind (i.e. processes involved in language compre-





The syntax–discourse interface

hension and production) is concerned, the hypothesis adopted herein is one of correspondence (cf. Jackendoff 1997; Reuland 2003). In particular, the view that the architecture of the language system is modular lends itself to such a hypothesis, where “[d]ifferences between (major) modules of the grammatical system correspond with differences in processes at the neural level and vice versa” (Reuland 2003: 4). Evidence for such a correspondence comes for instance from neuroimaging and reaction time studies. Previous research has revealed that differences between modules correspond to distinct patterns of magnetic or electrical brain activity (e.g. Neville et al. 1991; Kutas and van Petten 1994; Friederici 1999, 2002; Ni et al. 2000). Furthermore, online reaction time studies have shown that differences between modules correspond to distinct processing patterns, as for instance evidenced by the fact that extra-syntactic mechanisms consume more processing resources than syntactic mechanisms (cf. Shapiro et al. 1987, 1989; de Vincenzi 1996; Piñango et al. 1999; Shapiro 2000; Traxler et al. 2002). The aim of the present research is hence to formulate a model that corresponds to the underlying mental processes. In sum, this research seeks to integrate representational, processing-related and neurological properties. In this respect, the evidence from sentence comprehension reported in chapters 4–6 supports the model and the principles formulated in chapter 3. This is in most general terms driven by the view that by postulating conditions that govern the language faculty, we also assume a reflex of this in the brain, i.e. cortical distribution (language-brain connection), and in the mind, i.e. in the processing patterns (language–mind connection) (Jackendoff 1997, 1999; Reuland 2003). In the remainder of this chapter, I briefly outline the core issues pertaining to the study of the establishment of coreference, since coreference represents the main dependency relation addressed herein.

1.2.  Establishing coreference: representational background There has been a significant body of literature addressing the establishment of coreference and the representation of different kinds of pronominal elements — for overviews see for instance Bosch (1983), Kuno (1987), Huang (1994b, 2000), Reuland (2003), and Safir (2004). Among the many theories proposed, Chomsky’s (1981) influential Binding Theory set the ground for much discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the establishment of coreference. Principles A and B provide a basis to distinguish between ­anaphors (i.e.

Introduction

reflexives and reciprocals) and free pronouns respectively, and crucially claim complementary distribution of these elements. However, as early as in the original proposal of Chomsky (1981), it was observed that certain constructions, such as pronominal elements in locative PPs (4) or in picture-NPs (5) cannot be explained within this standard Government and Binding framework, as non-complementarity of reflexives and (ordinary) pronouns is found in these constructions:

(4) Ethani put a radio next to himselfi / himi.



(5) Brendai said that there was a picture of herselfi / heri at the library.

This shortfall has been investigated through two major approaches. On the one hand, there is the ‘syntax-only’ camp, which explains the observed noncomplementarity in terms of purely syntactic operations, i.e. based on principles governed by a single module alone (e.g. Huang 1983; Lebeaux 1983; Chomsky 1986, 1995; Pica 1987, 1991; Manzini and Wexler 1987; Hestvik 1991, 1992; Lasnik 1989, 2003). On the other hand, there are accounts that discuss these phenomena in terms of operations applying to different levels of linguistic representation (e.g. Levinson 1987b, 1991, 2000; Huang 1991, et seq.; Pollard and Sag 1992; Reinhart and Reuland 1993; Avrutin 1999, et seq.; Reuland 2001). The different levels that most of these latter theories utilize are ‘syntax’ and ‘discourse’, where syntax is concerned with structural properties, which describe particular phrase-structural configurations between two entities, such as c-command relations (Reinhart 1983) and coargumenthood5 (Reinhart and Reuland 1993), and discourse is an (interface) module that is concerned with information pertaining to individuals and events and the relations between them (e.g. Heim 1982; Kamp and Reyle 1993; Avrutin 1999, et seq.).6 The debate between these two camps has sparked a lot of controversy in the literature. In this context, some of the most widely discussed linguistic phenomena involve ‘logophors’ and ‘long-distance reflexives’, as their distribution presents some puzzling facts for the study of pronominal entities at large and the formulation of a unified theory of the establishment of dependency. A logophor is a reflexive entity such as himself in (4) and herself in (5 — repeated below) that fails to be in complementary distribution with a pronoun — in contrast to a ‘regular’ reflexive as in (6), where complementarity is preserved. (For reasons that will become apparent in chapter 2, I refer to these ‘regular’, non-logophoric reflexives as ‘coargument reflexives’ (Reinhart and Reuland 1993).)





The syntax–discourse interface



(5) Brendai said that there was a picture of herselfi / heri at the library. (6) Brendai­ saw herselfi / *heri in the mirror.

In addition to the complementarity condition that applies to coargument reflexives — but fails to take effect in the case of logophors — these entities are also generally subject to a ‘locality’ condition, such that they are required to form a dependency with a local, i.e. minimally distant, antecedent. This observation has been made regardless of the particular framework adopted. For example, Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981) postulates that reflexives are bound in their governing domain, which is the most minimal phrase-structural domain containing the reflexive element; Reinhart (1976, 1983) uses the notion of c‑command — i.e. a particular phrase-structural relation between the reflexive and its antecedent — to capture the requirement of locality; and Reinhart and Reuland (1993) formulate the requirement with respect to the predicate, such that only arguments that share the same predicate satisfy the locality restriction. What all these frameworks have in common is that they provide principles that govern and constrain the distribution of coargument reflexives as in (6), while these principles do not apply to instances such as the logophor myself in (7) — which lacks a local antecedent in the sentence altogether — or the long-distance reflexive sig (‘himself ’) in Icelandic in (8) (from Anderson 1986: 66). In this latter example, sig selects an antecedent outside the domain in which it is contained (i.e. María elski sig), and it selects Jón as its antecedent rather than the more local antecedent María, whose morphological properties could potentially license a dependency:

(7) There were three linguists at the party apart from myself.



(8) Jóni segir að María elski sigi /hanni. ‘Jón says that María loves himself/him.’

Crucially, these examples do not represent rare exceptions. Rather, logophors as in (4), (5), and (7) are found cross-linguistically, and many languages also provide evidence for the existence of long-distance reflexives as in (8) (for an extensive survey see Koster and Reuland 1991 and Cole, Hermon, and Huang 2001 and references therein). The existence of this vast amount of data on logophors and long-distance reflexives makes it all the more necessary to formulate a model that can account for the principles governing their interpretation; and this should be done in a unified manner with other entities that are referentially dependent.

Introduction

The proponents of the single-level syntax-only frameworks have proposed solutions motivated by movement operations (e.g. Chomsky 1986, 1995; Pica 1987; Hornstein 2001) or redefinitions of the local domain (e.g. Huang 1983; Manzini and Wexler 1987; Hestvik 1991, 1992) to account for the distributional facts of logophors and long-distance reflexives. In contrast to these approaches, the frameworks that advocate the need of different levels of linguistic information (such as syntax and discourse) to account for logophor and long-distance reflexive interpretation, have argued on the basis of the observation that these entities share certain properties that yield subtle differences in interpretation between the two non-complementary pronominal entities and which can be attributed to discourse-based information, such as conveying a specific ‘perspective’ (e.g. camera angle, point of view, or empathy) or mental state of the referent in the case of logophor interpretation (e.g. Kuno 1972, 1987; Hagège 1974; Cantrall 1974; Clements 1975; Sells 1987; Zribi-Hertz 1989; Huang 1991, et seq.; Avrutin 1999, 2004; Levinson 2000). To illustrate such an interpretive difference, consider (9) (from Kuno 1987), which shows non-complementary distribution between the logophor himself and the pronoun him:

(9) a. Johni heard some strange gossip about himselfi on the radio. b. Johni heard some strange gossip about himi on the radio.

On syntactic grounds, there is no difference between the two versions of the sentence. However, there is a difference in meaning, which Kuno (1987: 174– 5) describes as follows: The reflexive version, as predicted, gives the impression that the description is from the point of view of the referent of the reflexive, while the pronominal version gives the impression that it is from the point of view of the speaker. Thus, in [(9a)], the primary interpretation is that John heard what he felt to be strange gossip about himself on the radio, while that of [(9b)] is that John heard what the speaker thinks is strange gossip about John.

The additional interpretive information conveyed by the use of the logophor in this example is the sort of supporting evidence presented by the frameworks that argue for an involvement of the level of discourse in the establishment of coreference, in order to encode information beyond syntax. In fact, logophors obtained their name from the fact that they refer back to the source/author of a discourse or to the person whose thoughts are reported (literally: “renvoyant au discours”, French: ‘referring back to the discourse’) (Hagège 1974: 290).





The syntax–discourse interface

On the basis of the literature, it seems therefore necessary to postulate a model that is capable of incorporating both syntactic and extra-syntactic (discourse) information to accomplish the establishment of a dependency associated with logophors, as well as with pronominal interpretation in general. In my view, this is further motivated by a number of characteristics of pronominal elements that suggest a particular division (in particular, the grouping of logophors with ordinary pronouns, as discussed immediately below), which is not supported by the majority of the single-level accounts, as well as by the subtle difference in interpretation between logophors and pronouns, and by independent evidence from language acquisition. Logophors seem to pattern with pronouns (and not with reflexives), which suggests the implementation of a theory that reflects such a division. First, this division is substantiated by the distributional similarity of logophors and pronouns, as evidenced by the non-complementarity. Second, logophors and pronouns carry the ability to introduce a new discourse referent in the form of a ‘guise’ (cf. e.g. Jackendoff 1992; Heim 1998; Thornton and Wexler 1999), while reflexives generally denote an identity relation. Consider the following example, where the second him in (10b) represents a ‘guise’, as it does not refer to the discourse referent Bill per se but rather to the discourse unit the person Mary adores (from Reinhart 1983): (10) a. I know what Mary and Billi have in common. b. Mary adores himi and Billi adores himi too. It has also been observed in the literature that without introducing a guise, coindexing of the pronoun with Bill would yield an ungrammatical interpretation, as the proper proform should be a reflexive in this construction. The availability of guises indicates to me an involvement of the level of discourse representation (see also Zuckerman et al. 2002 for an extensive discussion of this distinguishing characteristic within a typology of anaphoric entities). Third, independent evidence for this division comes from the acquisition literature that reveals that children’s performance of reflexives differs from that of pronouns and logophors (e.g. Avrutin and Cunningham 1997; Avrutin 1999; Thornton and Wexler 1999). In contrast to these observations, logophors pattern with reflexives in the syntax-only accounts (i.e. post-Binding Theory accounts, such as Chomsky 1986, 1995; Pica 1987; Hestvik 1991, 1992), as both entities are considered to be subject to the same movement operations. One particular account, however, captures the similarities of logophors and pronouns (vs. reflexives): Reinhart and Reuland’s (1993) Reflexivity Theory,

Introduction

which plays a critical role in the model proposed in chapter 3 (see Safir 2004 for a recent account).7 Furthermore, significant discourse-based information (e.g. the notion of point of view) is communicated during logophor interpretation — that is a particular property of logophors — and is therefore expected to affect interpretation. The interpretive differences of a minimal pair like (9) call for an encoding of the particular properties in the language system. This does not seem to be achievable within the syntactic system (in particular if logophors and reflexives are associated with the same movement operation). The need for an extra-syntactic level of representation is further supported by the availability of first and second person pronominals (e.g. (7)) and deictically used pronominals, which often do not have a pronounced antecedent in the phrase structure, yet need to enter into a pronominal–antecedent dependency to obtain referential content. This dependency must be established at the discourse level, where a discourse referent is provided by the situation of a particular speech act. This linkage between a discourse referent and the situation applies in particular to the participants in a speech act and the surrounding context, which might be referred to deictically (e.g. Heim 1982; Avrutin 1999). Finally, general support for the postulation of the discourse level is provided by the acquisition research even beyond the investigation of pronominal interpretation. A significant body of literature has characterized the performance errors that are observable during certain stages of language acquisition in terms of the division between syntax and discourse (e.g. Maratsos 1973; Abdul-Kareem and Roeper 1997; Avrutin 1999, 2000, 2001; Thornton and Wexler 1999; Avrutin et al. 2001; de Roo 2001; Baauw 2002; de Roo et al. 2002). In general, children’s performance of syntactic operations is adult-like, while they exhibit difficulties with discourse-related operations (as for instance observed with respect to bridging relations, d-linked wh-phrases, omission of determiners, root infinitives, and specificity8). One way to look at this split in behavior is to argue for a limitation of processing resources in the child’s system, which impacts the performance on extra-syntactic operations in such a way that children cannot form discourse connections in an adult-like manner (cf. Avrutin 1999, 2004; Baauw 2002). Pronominal interpretation of children can also be viewed within the syntax– discourse division. Preschool children show adult-like behavior with respect to reflexives, but make a significant number of errors with respect to pronouns.9 This error pattern has become known as the ‘Delay of Principle B Effect’ in the literature (e.g. Jakubowicz 1984; Chien and Wexler 1990; Sigurjónsdóttir 1992;



10

The syntax–discourse interface

Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993; Avrutin 1999; Thornton and Wexler 1999; Baauw 2002). In terms of syntax–discourse correspondences, it can be argued that the difficulties with pronouns can be attributed to the unavailability of proper discourse connections, which crucially does not impact syntax-based reflexive interpretation (cf. Zuckerman et al. 2002). Overall, these observations suggest that a model of pronominal interpretation should incorporate two levels of representation. However, in the literature on the establishment of coreference, the accounts that allow for two levels of representation usually do not explicitly spell out the contribution of each of the two levels and largely discuss the syntax or the discourse side. Many of the syntactic accounts reviewed in chapter 2 strongly disagree with the need for different levels of representation, while the discourse-based accounts tend to be primarily concerned with discourse notions. Exceptions to this separation between syntactic and discourse accounts are the ‘pragmatic accounts’, which do not deny the interaction of syntactic and pragmatic levels (cf. e.g. Horn 1984; Levinson 1987; Huang 1991, et seq.). These accounts adopt a neo-Gricean view, where principles of conversational implicature are applied during pronominal interpretation. However, a detailed elaboration on these particular accounts is beyond the present discussion, which focuses on issues at the syntax–discourse interface employing a different terminology. Here, I attempt to bring together the former accounts in order to propose an interpretive model that integrates syntactic and discourse mechanisms: the Syntax–Discourse Model. In this model, syntax (e.g. c-command, conditions of coargumenthood) and discourse (cf. Heim 1982; Avrutin 1999) collaborate to establish coreference via distinct antecedent-pronominal dependencies. This Syntax–Discourse Model thus attempts to explain how different pronominal elements receive their interpretation through distinct mechanisms at the syntax–discourse interface. It distinguishes between syntactic and discourse dependencies, where the latter mechanisms can further be differentiated on the basis of the nature of both the pronominal and the antecedent. This results in the formulation of a hierarchy of interpretive dependencies, which is driven by a general principle of ‘economy’, as discussed in terms of representation (e.g. in Chomsky 1986, 1995, 1998; Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993; Fox 2000; Reuland 2001; Safir 2004) and also assumed for processing (cf. e.g. Frazier 1978; de Vincenzi 1991; Weinberg 1999). For present purposes, the economy principle states that the language system chooses the most economical dependency available to a given pronominal–antecedent pairing. Assuming that a syntactic dependency is the most economical dependency available for the establishment of corefer-

Introduction

ence, this means that the language system — driven by economy considerations — forms a syntactic dependency whenever one is licensed by the particular pronominal–antecedent relation (see also Reinhart 1983).10 In its absence, the system attempts to form the most economical discourse dependency available. Economy hence implies that the language system establishes the dependency that requires the smallest number of interpretive mechanisms. In the second part of this monograph, the empirical validity of the model is examined on the basis of experimental findings from online sentence comprehension. To preview, the results substantiate the claim that distinct levels of representation are involved in the establishment of pronominal–antecedent dependencies. To this end, the contrast between syntax-based reflexive elements (i.e. coargument reflexives) and logophors signifies a crucial test case, as it serves to answer the controversy of how many levels of representation are required for logophor interpretation. In addition, a number of other pronominal–antecedent relations are also investigated that inform aspects of the dependency hierarchy proposed by the present model of pronominal interpretation.

1.3.  Establishing coreference: processing The innovative aspect of the present work is that the establishment of dependency is approached from two angles, which have not been discussed comprehensively in relation to each other: representation and processing. As pointed out above, the general goal of this line of research is to provide a model of pronominal interpretation that corresponds to the underlying neural processes. Concerning the establishment of coreference, the discussion of how many levels of representation are required to form a particular pronominal–antecedent dependency can then be put to the test by investigating sentence processing, as presence or absence of distinct levels of representation during the formation of a dependency yield distinct predictions for processing: namely, if two pronominal entities are subject to the same dependency relation (e.g. syntactic dependency), they are predicted not to differ in terms of processing; in contrast, if the two entities rely on distinct pronominal–antecedent dependencies (e.g. syntactic dependency vs. discourse dependency), a difference in the processing patterns is expected. Such a difference is for instance measurable as processing ‘cost’, as previous research using reaction time measures has shown that extra-syntactic mechanisms consume more processing resourc-

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The syntax–discourse interface

es than syntactic mechanisms (e.g. Shapiro et al. 1987, 1989; McElree and Griffith 1995; de Vincenzi 1996; Piñango et al. 1999; Shapiro 2000; McElree et al. 2001) — and crucially, that different syntactic mechanisms do not elicit a difference in processing patterns (e.g. Shapiro et al. 1987, 1989; McElree and Griffith 1995). In addition, modular differences can elicit distinct patterns of electrical and magnetic brain activity (cf. Neville et al. 1991; Kutas and van Petten 1994; Friederici 1999, 2002; Ni et al. 2000). In terms of language–mind correspondences, the following predictions are therefore tested: hypothesizing that two levels of representation are involved in the formation of pronominal–antecedent dependencies, the Syntax–Discourse Model predicts that the formation of a discourse dependency is more costly than that of a syntactic dependency. In addition, it is predicted that cost is further divided as a function of the hierarchy of dependencies. However, if no differences in processing cost are observable, the data support the uni-modular accounts. This is investigated for a number of pronominal–antecedent contrasts, using online reaction time measures. Another source of information utilized here to inform the language–mind connection are event-related brain potentials (ERP), which are measurements of electrical activity during sentence comprehension. These effects are combinations of various factors (such as latency, polarity, amplitude, and topography), and processes associated with distinct modules have been reported to elicit distinct combinations of these factors (for an overview see Kutas and van Petten 1994; Friederici 1999; Hagoort et al. 1999). As a consequence, presence or absence of distinct levels of representation can generally be examined on the basis of whether different pronominal–antecedent combinations elicit distinct ERP effects. Moreover, ERPs are an excellent source of the temporal dimension of processing (i.e. the factor ‘latency’) and dependencies associated with different linguistic modules can potentially be attributed to differences in the time-course of processing. Hence, ERPs can supply evidence for or against a division of labor between syntax and discourse during the interpretation of distinct dependencies. In terms of language-brain relations, the question of how many modules are involved in the establishment of dependency can be approached on the basis of the hypothesis that distinct levels of representation correspond to distinct neural subsystems. To this end, the investigation of patients who suffered lesions in Broca’s area (i.e. in the left anterior hemisphere) has revealed that these patients have a specific language deficit, which can be described as a limitation of processing resources that are associated with syntactic mechan-

Introduction

isms (cf. Piñango 2000). For the present purposes, an investigation of Broca’s patients’ comprehension thus provides insights into the involvement of Broca’s area — and hence syntactic processing — during the establishment of dependencies. More specifically, if these patients elicit the same patterns of processing for logophor and coargument reflexive interpretation, this behavior could be interpreted as evidence for the uni-modular accounts. However, if these patients show processing differences in response to distinct pronominal–antecedent pairings, this would be support for a model that distinguishes between levels of representation. The investigation of this patient group furthermore allows us to investigate the impact of syntax-based operations during pronominal interpretation. In sum, this monograph presents psycho- and neurolinguistic evidence to test the claims put forth by the Syntax–Discourse Model. The evidence comes from three sources of experimentation: online reaction time studies with neurologically intact participants, as well as with neurologically impaired participants (Broca’s aphasia patients), and the investigation of electrical brain activity by means of ERP recordings.

1.4.  The outline As mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, the following two main issues are addressed throughout this monograph: (i) How can we account for the differences in pronominal elements and what mechanisms are required for the interpretation of these different types of pronominals? (ii) What are the processing correlates of the different pronominal–antecedent dependencies? Considerations regarding the formal framework are addressed in chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 2 sets the stage for the Syntax–Discourse Model of pronominal interpretation by reviewing some of the major contributions on the side of both primarily syntax-based accounts and discourse-based accounts. In addition, the phenomenon of logophoricity is discussed in more detail, as it functions herein as the core issue in determining an answer to the debate of how many levels of representation are required for pronominal interpretation. As already pointed out above, the observations from logophor interpretation appear to support an integration of syntactic and discourse mechanisms into a model of pronominal interpretation. In chapter 3, I present a model of ­syntax–discourse correspondences to account for different kinds of ­pronominal–­antecedent dependencies. This means that the model assumes

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two levels of representation — syntax and discourse — that are required for the establishment of dependency. The issue of processing correlates is addressed in chapters 4–6, where the Syntax–Discourse Model is evaluated by investigating sentence comprehension. On the basis of the hypothesis that a language–mind connection exists, real-time sentence comprehension is investigated utilizing cross-modal lexical decision reaction time data (chapter 4) and event-related brain potential recordings (chapter 6). In chapter 4, a number of pronominal–antecedent contrasts are reported, tested in English and Dutch, which assess the processing cost associated with the interpretation of different kinds of pronominals. Chapter 6 explores the temporal dimension of the establishment of dependency in more detail by means of ERPs. To forecast, the findings are interpreted as evidence for the availability of two distinct levels of representation, both in terms of processing cost elicited and the temporal and distributional dimensions of the ERP signals. The model is further assessed in terms of the language-brain connection by examining sentence comprehension in the neurologically impaired system of Broca’s aphasia patients (chapter 5). To preview, these findings also support a dissociation in terms of levels of representation during the establishment of coreference. The data from this investigation further provide evidence for the processing of syntactic information prior to discourse information. Overall, the findings from the three sources of online sentence comprehension support a model of the establishment of dependency that postulates the need of distinct levels of representation, as the experimental results clearly point towards an involvement of different components of the language system in dependency formation. The data therefore substantiate a model that takes different levels of representation into account, such as the Syntax–Discourse Model.

Chapter 2

Coreference:   representational background

Issues relating to pronominal elements and the establishment of coreference have been addressed from several angles in the linguistic literature and it is impossible to review and discuss all of them in a single book. One of the core questions is how an element like her receives its interpretation, i.e. how it selects its referent, since in and of itself, it does not carry referential content (unlike determiner phrases (DPs) such as a stewardess or Henrietta). Taken in isolation, the interpretation of her is only constrained by morphological feature specifications, such as number, gender, person, and case; for example, the information provided by the sentence in (1) only conveys that her refers to ‘a single female individual’, but it fails to identify a specific, unique referent. In contrast, in (2), her can be linked to the referent Henrietta (and presented in isolation this is the preferred interpretation of the utterance):

(1) A stewardess had embarrassed her. (2) Henriettai said that a stewardessj had embarrassed heri/*j.

The available linkage between her and Henrietta in (2) suggests first, that there is a strong tendency to identify a pronominal with a specific referent, and second, that a pronominal cannot just pick any antecedent available in the mental representation or in the immediate context of a given discourse, as critically, her cannot be linked to a stewardess, which could function as a potential referent on the basis of its morphological and referential properties (i.e. the system disallows this linkage). In contrast, in (3) herself cannot refer to Henrietta, but must refer to a stewardess:

(3) Henriettai said that a stewardessj had embarrassed herself*i/j.

This latter observation indicates that pronominal–antecedent relations are dependent on specific linguistic principles in the course of the establishment of a dependency between a pronominal and an antecedent. The exact nature of these principles is a major concern of the research presented herein, as the different proposals formulated in the linguistic literature

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The syntax–discourse interface

do not agree on the characteristics and the basis of the conditions governing the establishment of pronominal–antecedent dependencies. In this respect, the question that divides the linguistic literature on pronominal interpretation is whether dependencies are formed on the basis of purely syntactic considerations (cf. Huang 1983; Chomsky 1986, 1995; Pica 1987, 1991; Manzini and Wexler 1987; Hestvik 1991, 1992; Hornstein 2001; Lasnik 2003) or whether the system draws on information from distinct levels of representation, such as syntax and discourse (cf. Pollard and Sag 1992; Reinhart and Reuland 1993; Avrutin 1999, 2000, 2004; Reuland 2001). Here, the terms ‘syntax’ and ‘discourse’ are used in the following way: ‘syntax’ is used in its narrow sense and refers only to the internal structure of a phrase and its constituents and the principles operating on these phrasestructural symbols (vs. the broad definition of syntax that denotes a general structural principle of any sort) (e.g. Chomsky 1957, and subsequent work). Syntactic structure is formed by the merge-operation (Chomsky 1995), which takes two elements from the numeration (i.e. roughly, the lexicon) and joins them to form a new constituent. A syntactic mechanism is then one that makes use of the relations between constituents and phrase structure nodes. Due to the importance of phrase-structural relations for the syntax module — also referred to as the ‘computational system of human language CHL’ (Chomsky 1995) — I use the terms syntactic and structural synonymously. ‘Discourse’ refers to an interface module that connects syntactic representation with conceptual structure (i.e. the system of thought, where for instance reasoning, and formation of inferences and intentions occur) (e.g. Jackendoff 1983, et seq.), i.e. it translates syntactic symbols into symbols interpretable by the conceptual structure.1 Discourse signifies a level of representation at which information about referents (e.g. individuals, objects, etc.) and events is encoded, and where relations between these discourse units are formed and maintained (such as prominence of an entity, cognitive status, focus, etc.) (e.g. Heim 1982; Kamp and Reyle 1993; Avrutin 1999). In the literature, different terms are found for what is here called ‘discourse’, such as information structure, pragmatics, information packaging, informatics, or the C–I interface (see Lambrecht 1994). In light of the debate of how many and which levels of representation are involved in the establishment of coreference, I review some of the major approaches to pronominal–antecedent relations, which can roughly be separated into structural and discourse-based accounts. These two fields of research have addressed issues of pronominal–antecedent relations from two very different

Coreference

angles, while the questions are largely the same. For instance, how can we capture the facts in (1)–(6) in a unified model of coreference establishment:

(4) a. She*i said that Triciai likes cookies. b. Triciai said that shei likes cookies.



(5) a. Andyi said that Billj defended himself*i/j. b. Andyi said that Billj defended himi/*j.



(6) *We admire himself.

What are the mechanisms that allow for a coreferential interpretation (she=Tricia) in (4b), but inhibit the coreferential reading (i.e. she≠Tricia) in (4a)? What is the basis of the observation that (5a) requires a coreferential reading with Bill (himself=Bill) and that (5b) disallows it (him≠Bill), while permitting coreference with Andy? Similarly, what constrains the reflexive in (6) in a way that we cannot function as its antecedent? These examples illustrate that there are a series of restrictions on pronominal–antecedent relations. In the following, I review some of the major theories that have attempted to capture the restrictions governing these dependencies. Section 2.1.1 focuses on structural accounts that view pronominal–antecedent relations as an immediate reflection of constraints imposed by the syntactic configuration (e.g. Lees and Klima 1963; Ross 1968; Chomsky 1981, 1995; Reinhart 1976, 1983; Reinhart and Reuland 1993). Section 2.1.2 assesses theories that argue for discourse-based reasons for the choice of antecedent-pronominal relations. Such discourse-motivated theories have been formulated as unimodular accounts of the establishment of coreference and pronominal interpretation (e.g. Karttunen 1971, 1976; Webber 1979; Prince 1981a; Grosz et al. 1983, 1995; Givón 1983; Ariel 1990; Gundel et al. 1993) or they can be viewed as extensions to a structural account (e.g. Bosch 1983; Sells 1987; Kuno 1987; Kamp and Reyle 1993). In the discussion of these accounts, I show that both the phrase-structural and the discourse-based frameworks have their advantages and limitations, and that individually, they fail to succeed in capturing the distribution of certain kinds of pronominals. In particular, the discourse-based approaches cannot account for the distribution of reflexives vs. pronouns (e.g. (5)), and the structural approaches fail to account for the noncomplementarity of (logophoric) reflexives and pronouns. However, if the two approaches are united in a model that includes two levels of representation (syntax and discourse), the advantages of the respective accounts might be employed to form a comprehensive model of pronominal interpretation.

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As an example of how syntax and discourse might collaborate to succeed in the formation of antecedent-pronominal dependencies, section 2.1.3 takes a closer look at a specific dependency — that involving logophors. As pointed out in the introduction, these elements are particularly interesting as their distributional properties seem to violate structural constraints (in particular with respect to their non-complementary distribution with pronouns), regardless of the formal framework adopted, while at the same time, they incorporate discourse features that yield an interpretation tightly linked to notions of ‘perspective’ (i.e. the interpretation adopts the point of view of the referent). To illustrate this, consider again the following example (discussed in chapter 1), where the use of the logophor himself supports an interpretation from the point of view of the referent John and the use of the pronoun him implies the speaker’s point of view (that the gossip is strange):

(7) Johni heard some strange gossip about himselfi / himi on the radio.

As will be shown, the discussion of logophoricity strongly suggests that logophor interpretation requires a combination of both structural and discourse properties, and logophoricity therefore embodies a good starting point to investigate the properties that govern the formation of pronominal dependencies and it appears to be a firm advocate for a model of syntax–discourse correspondences. The availability of two levels of representation that emerges from this discussion — and therefore the availability of distinct pronominal–antecedent dependencies — is then considered in terms of ‘economy’ requirements, which state that the language system attempts to form the most economical dependency available (e.g. Chomsky 1986, 1995; Fox 2000; Reuland 2001). Section 2.2 presents how, on the basis of economy considerations, pronominal–antecedent dependencies can be hierarchically related to each other (as in e.g. Reinhart 1983; Horn 1984; Reuland 2001; Safir 2004). Such a hierarchy can then form a critical link between the model and the experimental data used to evaluate the model, assuming that there is a correspondence between representation and processing. Section 2.3 summarizes the basic building blocks on which the Syntax–Discourse Model proposed in chapter 3 is based. Finally, I want to clarify some terminological issues. I use the term ‘pronominals’ (contra Chomsky 1981 and related work) to refer to both (ordinary) pronouns and reflexive pronouns. When I use the term ‘anaphor’ or ‘anaphoric relations’, I intend the narrow interpretation of this term, which refers to reflexive pronouns (and reciprocals, which are not discussed in here).2 I further

Coreference

refer to reflexives that disobey strict binding principles as ‘logophors’ (as introduced by Hagège 1974). In the literature, the term logophor is sometimes also used interchangeably with ‘exempt anaphor’, as these elements appear to be exempt from condition A (e.g. Pollard and Sag 1992; Kiss 2003). And finally, ‘coreference’ encompasses the relationship in which a pronominal element and its antecedent refer to the same entity in the mental representation (i.e. coreference in its broad sense). As mentioned in the introduction, this coreference is generally indicated by subscripts. In the literature, a distinction is sometimes made between ‘coindexation’ and coreference (e.g. Reinhart 1976, 1983; Chomsky 1981, 1986), where the former describes only those processes involving syntactic binding (e.g. a structurally determined c-command relationship). However, I use ‘establishment of coreference’ to describe the selection of the same referent as a general term to indicate a pronominal–antecedent dependency.

2.1.  Pronominal interpretation in the literature 2.1.1.  Structural accounts In this section, I review a number of landmark accounts on the interpretation of pronominal elements, which all have in common that they are firmly founded on phrase-structural relations between pronominals and their antecedents. Lees and Klima (1963) formulated rules for pronominalization in English that were largely based on transformation operations that relate the pronominal to its antecedent under an identity relation. They also observed that reflexive elements are subject to particular constraints applying to clause-internal relations (what they refer to as “simplex sentences”, such as Johni­protects himselfi), while pronoun–antecedent relations are established across “complex” or “component sentences” (e.g. The meni found a smokescreen around themi could be derived from a ‘component sentence’ like The meni found a smokescreen to be around themi or The meni found a smokescreen which was around themi) (Lees and Klima 1963: 19). They proposed a reflexive rule (applying if two (identical) nominals occurred within the same simplex sentence) and a pronoun rule (applying if one nominal occurred in a matrix sentence and the other in an embedded sentence) and stated that the reflexive rule had to apply prior to the pronoun rule. Their analysis of English pronominalization thus hints at the notion of complementary distribution of pronouns and reflexives, and

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The syntax–discourse interface

their rule ordering suggests that reflexivization must be checked prior to pronominalization, in other words, if reflexivization is a possible means to express an identity relation, it must be used. In sum, Lees and Klima describe some core characteristics of pronominal–antecedent relations. However, even though their observations bear some relevance for the current view of pronominal–antecedent dependencies, their transformational approach received critical responses as it yields incorrect identity relations and fails to account for a significant number of counterexamples. For instance, according to Lees and Klima’s pronominalization transformation, he in (8a) would be derived from (8b), which crucially does not represent the correct source of the pronoun (i.e. he≠ each of the men) (from Dougherty 1969).

(8) a. Each of the men thought that he was the tallest. b. Each of the men thought that each of the men was the tallest.

Likewise, the phenomenon known as the ‘Bach-Peters paradox’ (Bach 1970) poses problems to a transformational account à la Lees and Klima. Consider the example in (9a), where it is identical with the prize he wants and he is in turn identical with the boy who deserves it. Since each of the two pronominals in this sentence is contained in the description that identifies the other pronominal, a pronominalization transformation would result in a derivation that requires an infinite number of clauses, as the pronouns are always replaced with referents that themselves contain pronouns (9b):

(9) a. The boy who deserves it will get the prize he wants. b. The boy who deserves the prize he wants will get the prize the boy who deserves it wants.

These examples illustrate some of the empirical evidence for the invalidity of the formulation of Lees and Klima’s transformational account; for additional arguments and counterexamples, see for instance Dougherty (1969), Bach (1970), Bresnan (1970), and Wasow (1973). The most influential account that imposes purely structural restrictions on pronominal–antecedent relations has been Chomsky’s (1981) Binding Theory.3 In its original formulation, Binding Theory is concerned with A-binding as it only describes pronominal–antecedent relations where the antecedent is in an A-position (i.e. in an argument position, which is a position that is assigned a theta role by its predicate). It divides referential relations into three principles linked to the following subgroups: anaphor-antecedent relations, pronoun–antecedent relations, and R-expressions:

Coreference

(A) An anaphor is bound in its governing category (B) A pronominal is free in its governing category (C) An R-expression is free (Chomsky 1981: 188) So there are crucially two factors determining the distribution of pronominal elements: the contrast between the configurations bound and free, and the locality restriction involving the notion of governing domain. The relationships expressed by being bound and free are mutually exclusive and are characterized in terms of purely structural relations between phrase structure nodes, such that α is bound by β if and only if α and β are coindexed and β ‘c-commands’ α. The notion of c-command follows a series of rule formulations that largely concentrated on the serial ordering of pronominal entities and their antecedents, such as the precede-command constraint, but ultimately these proposals were too restrictive in their definitions of pronominal–antecedent dependencies (e.g. Ross 1968; Lakoff 1968/76; Langacker 1969). C-command signifies the following structural configuration: Node A c(onstituent)-commands node B iff the branching node α1 most immediately dominating A either dominates B or is immediately dominated by a node α2 which dominates B, and α2 is of the same category type as α1.  (Reinhart 1983: 23)

Thus, anaphors are considered to receive (co)reference via coindexation (i.e. sharing of the same referential index) with their antecedent and the Binding Theory further defines the domain in which coindexation is allowed, where domain denotes the governing category. It is thus stated that if β is the governing category for α, then (A) If α is an anaphor, it is bound in β (B) If α is a pronominal, it is free in β (C) If α is an R-expression, it is free (Chomsky 1981: 188) The governing domain β is further viewed as the smallest XP containing α, such that β is a governing category of α if and only if β is the minimal category containing α, a governor of α, and a subject accessible to α (Chomsky 1981: 211)

The notion of subject implies the prominence of subjecthood in Binding relations, where a subject-NP or I˚ that assigns nominative case to α must be contained in a governing category to qualify as binder. Within the Binding Theory, a governing category is then either an Inflectional Phrase (IP) or Noun Phrase (NP) with a subject. This, however, cannot explain the availability of

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a pronoun in (10) where her=Sarah, since the pronoun is in a position that is considered to be bound in the governing category IP (as already noted in Chomsky 1981). (10) a. Sarahi put a bowl in front of heri. b. Sarahi saw a hermit crab behind heri. This shortfall of the Binding Theory is closely linked to a discrepancy stemming from the formulation of Principle A and B, which assumes complementary distribution of reflexives and pronouns. As a consequence, pronominalization is predicted to be impossible in reflexive environments and reflexivization should be impossible in pronominal environments. Hence, Binding Theory would rule out (11a) and (12a): (11) a. The girli moved the chair next to heri. b. The girli moved the chair next to herselfi. (12) a. The artistsi admire theiri sculptures. b. The artistsi admire each otheri’s sculptures. Another problematic observation is linked to the existence of long-distance anaphors found in e.g. Icelandic (13) (from Thráinsson 1991: 51) and Mandarin Chinese (14) (from Huang and Tang 1991: 263) among many other languages: Þig hafa svikið sigi. (13) Annai telur Anna believes you to-have betrayed self lit., ‘Anna believes you to have betrayed herself.’4 (14) Zhangsani renwei Lisij hai-le zijii/j. Zhangsan(m.) think Lisi(f.) hurt self ‘Zhangsan thinks that Lisi hurt him/herself.’ Long-distance reflexives as sig in (13) or ziji in (14) allow for an antecedent outside their binding domain, which is expected to yield an ungrammatical construction by Principle A of the Binding Theory. Similarly, first and second person reflexives may occur in the absence of a sentential antecedent (as observed by Ross 1970; Zribi-Hertz 1989; among many others): (15) Physicists like yourself are a godsend. (16) There were five linguists at the party apart from myself.

Coreference

And yet, the opposite pattern can also be found — and represents another puzzle for Binding Theory: these are (rare) cases of (exempt) pronouns that show up in structurally local dependencies, which according to the domain restrictions would be predicted to surface as a (bound) reflexive. Such examples for Principle B violations are found in certain US-English dialects (Southern/Appalachian English) with first and second person pronouns (e.g. (17)), but also with third person pronouns (18) (cf. Horn 2002a, b and references therein): (17) a. I bought me a good book yesterday. (cited in Horn 2002b [57a]) b. I love me some him/Jude Law/Coon and Cheese/etc. (ibid. [70/71]) c. Get you a copper kettle, get you a copper coil (ibid. [56a]) (18) a. Johni won himi a prize. (ibid. [52]) b. Shei baked heri a cake (cooked heri up a mess o’ chitlins, etc.) (ibid. [58a]) It is thus the case that Binding Theory can account for many pronominal facts across languages (e.g. the ones mentioned in (1)–(6) above), however, some pronominal–antecedent constellations cannot be explained within this framework (cf. Safir 2004 for further examples). These latter observations have resulted in a series of proposals trying to modify the Binding Theory in order to come to terms with the cross-linguistic properties as well as with distributional facts that deviate from the standard view. For instance, the issue of non-complementarity between pronouns and reflexives has resulted in reformulations and extensions of the Binding Theory, which often maintained a strictly structural position (but see 2.1.2 for accounts that go beyond structural mechanism to explain the non-complementarity). One of these accounts approached the challenge by redefining the domain restriction and introducing subjectless binding domains (Hestvik 1991, 1992). As outlined above, Binding Theory considers the binding domain of α to be the smallest XP containing α and a subject (or I˚ that assigns nominative case to α); thus, the governing category must always contain a subject, narrowing it down to being an IP or NP with a subject. Modifying these requirements, Hestvik’s proposal removes the reference to subject from the governing category. As a consequence, Prepositional Phrases (PPs) — as well as DPs and VPs — can represent subjectless binding domains5, and this then serves to account for the non-complementarity of the reflexive and the pronoun in the PP

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next to her/herself in (11a, b) (repeated in (19)) in the following way: the theory allows both the PP (next to her(self)) and the IP (The girl moved the chair next to her(self)) to function as binding domains. In the case where the PP serves as binding domain, the account predicts that if α is a pronoun, it is free in this (subjectless) binding domain. This is crucial for the non-complementarity, since the pronoun in (19a) can be coindexed with its antecedent only due to the fact that the girl is not within the pronoun’s binding domain. (19) a. The girli moved the chair {next to heri­}. b. {The girli moved the chair next to herselfi}. In contrast, if α is a reflexive as in (19b), it must be bound within its binding domain — and the binding domain for the reflexive is the smallest binding domain that contains the reflexive and its governor, which is IP. According to this framework, the reflexive in (19b) must extend its domain to IP, because there is no potential binder in the PP. So two domains are available in the sentence in (19), and the pronoun meets its binding requirements in the PP, while the reflexive meets its binding requirements in the IP. In addition, the difference between the domains is connected to the availability of a binder, and a subjectorientation of reflexives (and an anti-subject-orientation for pronouns) must be specified to account for the different patterns between pronouns and reflexives in English.6 Thus, this proposal crucially requires that the interpretation of the reflexive in (19b) involves movement at LF, such that the reflexive forms a dependency with its antecedent (binder) at LF. The reflexive moves to I˚ (or AgrS˚)7 and adjoins to it, thus entering into a specifier-head relation with its antecedent, yielding the following LF structure: (19) c. The girli herselfi moved the chair next to ti. Notice that this LF-movement account of reflexives parallels the operations involved in overt clitic movement (Kayne 1975); for instance, in French, the reflexive clitic se (20a) moves overtly from its postverbal position: (20) a. Jeani sei déteste ti. ‘Jean hates himself.’ b. Johni himselfi-hates ti. Analogous to this analysis, Chomsky (1986: 175) has suggested a covert movement for the reflexive for English (20b). Note that taken together with Hestvik’s LF-account, reflexives as in (20b) and (logophoric) reflexives as in (19b, c) do not differ in terms of their representation (see also Pica 1987 for a similar

Coreference

a­ ccount of LF-movement distinguishing between XP-reflexives and X°-reflexives, where the internal structure of the pronominal determines its landing site under LF-movement).8 Huang (1983) points out similar difficulties with the assumed non-complementarity between Principle A and Principle B on the basis of Mandarin Chinese. He modifies the Binding Theory by suggesting that the prerequisite of an accessible subject within the governing category is only a requirement of Principle A and does not bear relevance to pronoun resolution under Principle B. This serves for instance to explain the so-called picture-NP in (21), where the embedded clause contains a subject (Agr) that is not accessible to the anaphor due to the fact that the anaphor is embedded under the NP (i.e. i-within-i provision, which regulates that an NP blocks movement of elements contained in a lower NP (Chomsky 1981)). The embedded clause is thus assumed to count as a governing category only for the pronoun (hence, the pronoun in (21b) is free in this domain), but not for the anaphor (hence it can be bound in the matrix clause in (21a)): (21) a. Henriettai thought that pictures of herselfi were hideous. b. Henriettai thought that pictures of heri were hideous. This approach comes at the expense of postulating different domain characteristics for pronouns and anaphors respectively. In light of this emerging drawback, Chomsky (1986) proposes a modification by revising the definition of governing category as A governing category for α is a maximal projection containing both a subject and a lexical category governing α (hence containing α).  (Chomsky 1986: 169)

However, this reformulation imposes new demands on the indexing system, as an anaphor must be coindexed with its potential binder to satisfy the principle of ‘BT-compatibility’, which replaces Principles A and B of the Binding Theory.9 Furthermore, it still cannot account for the non-complementarity found with certain locative and directional PPs (e.g. (19)).10 Manzini and Wexler (1987) propose a parameterized Binding Theory, mainly to allow for the cross-linguistic differences with regard to the nature of the binding domain, as well as to explain the variability of anaphors within one given language (i.e. the availability of simple and long-distance reflexives). Within this extension, the exact characteristics of the governing category are language-specific. Kiss (2001, 2003) advocates a similar idea, where parameterization of binding domain, binding distance, and type of potential ­binder

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restrict Principle A. Another proposal addresses the unresolved issues by generalizing the Binding Theory to A- and A’-binding (Aoun 1985). However, these accounts also struggle to resolve some of the mysteries of pronominal– antecedent dependencies pointed out above, in particular the non-complementarity of logophors and pronouns in certain constructions. Finally, within the Minimalist Program proper, the conditions governing pronominal–antecedent relations are considered to apply at the LF interface, as S-structure no longer exists in this framework (Chomsky 1995). This has also spurred a series of investigations. Hornstein (2001), for instance, proposes that binding facts (i.e. Principle A in particular) can be derived from the more general Move operation and hence eliminates Principle A and B altogether. Safir (2004) maintains a version of Principle A only and derives complementarity from the appliciation of competition between forms. Lasnik (2003) points out a potential problem of an LF-based approach with respect to the observation that pronominals are not just sets of formal features (which are manipulated at LF), but also come with additional (possibly referential or semantic) properties, which are subject to S-structure relationships (in the absence of a level of S-structure, this means subject to overt movement).11 Lasnik’s solution is to view binding relations in terms of covert (i.e. relating to formal features) and overt movement operations. The Minimalist accounts, however, also do not explain why non-complementarity is possible and what the availability of two distinct outputs can contribute to the interpretation. In addition, the Minimalist view that binding conditions hold exclusively at LF challenges the observation that pronominals appear to be subject to locality conditions (see Reuland 2001: 430ff. for a discussion of this). Another series of proposals to capture pronominal–antecedent phenomena is based on the idea that reflexivity is a consequence of conditions on predicates (Reinhart and Reuland 1993). This view emerges from Reinhart’s (1976) approach that essentially focuses on the c-commanding relation between two elements and provides an even more reduced rule system compared to the Binding Theory. Within this framework, the domain of a node A consists solely of all and only the nodes c-commanded by A and pronominal–antecedent dependencies are viewed in terms of the relations with their predicates. It should be noted that this family of approaches to pronominal resolution also arises out of structural considerations and attempts to account for sentencelevel dependencies on structural grounds exclusively. However, these accounts acknowledge that some dependencies cannot be captured within the syntactic system and allow for discourse-based mechanisms in these cases as well.12

Coreference

Reinhart (1976, 1983) introduced the notions of c-command and domain restriction to capture the structural relations that can be established between pronominals and antecedents (among other, broader linguistic phenomena that also adhere to these structural configurations, such as scope), which facilitate the separation of purely syntactic dependencies from discourse dependencies, such that “[s]entence-level semantic interpretation rules may operate on two given nodes A and B only if one of these nodes is in the domain of the other” (Reinhart 1983: 25). If such a dependency is available, i.e. if a pronominal is c-commanded by a given DP, the pronominal is translated into a variable bound by the DP that provides the domain. All other dependencies are subject to processes outside of the syntactic module. As a consequence, if two DPs do not share the same domain, sentence-level interpretive restrictions do not apply to these two DPs and their interpretation depends on discourse-level mechanisms. (Reinhart views the latter as pragmatic mechanisms that reflect speaker intentions in expressing referential relations.) A further development of this approach is the Reflexivity Theory (Reinhart and Reuland 1993), which was motivated by the observation that Binding Theory cannot capture all the phenomena involving pronominal–antecedent dependencies. Within this framework, pronominal elements are not commonly defined on the basis of binding conditions, but in terms of conditions on predicates (see also Keenan 1988; Chierchia 1989; Williams 1994, 2003).13 The following definitions and conditions are postulated by Reinhart and Reuland (1993: 678): Definitions a. The syntactic predicate formed of (a head) P[redicate] is P, all its syntactic arguments, and an external argument of P (subject). The syntactic arguments of P are the projections assigned θ-role or Case by P. b. The semantic predicate formed of P is P and all its arguments at the relevant semantic level. c. A predicate is reflexive iff two of its arguments are coindexed. d. A predicate (formed of P) is reflexive-marked iff either P is lexically reflexive or one of P’s arguments is a self anaphor. Conditions A: A reflexive-marked syntactic predicate is reflexive. B: A reflexive semantic predicate is reflexive-marked. These conditions account for the distributional distinctions found in (22):

27

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(22) a.   *Maxi criticized himi. b.   *Maxi criticized Maxi. c. Maxi criticized himselfi. In all three examples, the predicate (i.e. criticized) is reflexive because two of its arguments are coindexed [definition (c)]. However, only the predicate in (22c) is reflexive-marked, as one of its arguments is a self anaphor [definition (d)]. The predicates in (22a) and (22b) are not reflexive-marked, because him and Max do not represent self anaphors, nor does the predicate embody a lexically reflexive predicate. Since both definitions must be satisfied, only (22c) yields a grammatically acceptable sentence, and (22a, b) are ruled out. Everaert (2003) lists further means that are used cross-linguistically to encode reflexive-marking, such as clitics (e.g. French), derivational affixes (e.g. Kannada), auxiliary verbs (e.g. Tamil), or pronoun doubling (e.g. Tsaxur). In addition, the German example in (23) illustrates an instance of a lexically reflexive predicate (sich schämen ‘to be ashamed’): (23) Stefani schämt sichi. Stefan shamed self(se) ’Stefan is ashamed.’ This predicate is reflexive since its two arguments are coindexed, and it is further reflexive-marked as it represents an intrinsically reflexive predicate. So the conditions of Reflexivity are met.14 These conditions on predicates are capable of handling the observed differences between reflexives and logophors and the related non-complementarity with pronouns. Compare (22c) to (24): (24) a. The girli put a blanket next to herselfi. b. The girli put a blanket next to her­i. In (24), the predicate put has three arguments: the girl, a blanket, and next to herself. The reflexive herself by itself is therefore not considered an argument of the predicate put, but the locative PP it is contained in is (and the reflexive is an argument of the preposition next to). Thus even though the reflexive represents a self anaphor and it is properly coindexed with its antecedent, the construction fails to satisfy the requirement that two arguments of the predicate must be coindexed in order for it to be reflexive [definition (c)]. The non-complementarity is explained by this account in the following way: since the reflexive is an argument of the locative preposition, which does not have a syntactically realized external argument, the preposition does not form a ­syntactic predicate,

Coreference

and thus Condition A does not apply [see definition (a)]. The same reasoning applies to (24a) with regard to Condition B, and Reflexivity Theory must stipulate that the reflexive has logophoric properties. Finally, the pronoun in (24b) is not reflexive and therefore this sentence represents a well-formed structure, as this approach is only concerned with reflexivity and does not impose limitation on pronoun use. The representational distinction that can be inferred from this is that reflexives and logophors differ in terms of the coargumenthood criterion. On the one hand, a pronominal that stands in a coargument relationship with its antecedent is expressed as a (true) reflexive. On the other hand, a pronominal that is not an argument of the main predicate, but rather is an argument of an argument of the main predicate (as in the case of a PP like next to herself or a complex DP Tim and herself) represents a logophor. Reflexivity Theory does not provide an implicit account of the distribution of logophors, but it suggests that discourse factors play a crucial role in establishing proper coreference (Reinhart and Reuland 1993: 689). It is at this point, where Reflexivity Theory allows for the possibility of two distinct modules to form pronominal dependencies: a syntactic mechanism that controls coargumenthood considerations and a discourse mechanism that is in charge of coreference beyond phrase-structural considerations. As noticed with regard to the example pair in (24), Reflexivity Theory does not provide an implicit explication of the conditions governing pronouns, except for the potential reverse inference that they should occur in a non-­coargumenthood configuration (since reflexives correlate with the presence of a coargumenthood relations). However, pronouns do not behave uniformly and they have been distinguished in terms of bound variable pronouns and coreferential pronouns (e.g. Postal 1971; Keenan 1971; Partee 1978; Evans 1980; Reinhart 1976, 1983; Heim 1982; inter alia). Reinhart (1983, 2000) formally outlines the distinction between bound variables and coreference, where the former fall under a c-commanding relationship and are thus subject to binding conditions (which then extends to pronouns in c-commanding relations). The relevant contrasts are exemplified in (25) for a bound variable dependency and coreference respectively, and the structural differences underlying these dependencies are further illustrated by the unavailability of (26a) (from Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993: 72): (25) a. Every hostessi thinks shei is a great entertainer. b. The hostessi thinks shei is a great entertainer.

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(26) a.  *A party without every actress­i annoys heri. b. A party without Lucie­i annoys heri. In order to account for these differences, binding and coreference dependencies are assumed to be linked to distinct modules. The core generalization then is that pronouns establish coreference outside of the local binding configuration if their antecedent is referential as with the hostess in (25b) and Lucie in (26b) — whereas in cases where a bound variable interpretation can be obtained, e.g. where the antecedent represents a quantified (non-referential) entity as in (25a, 26a), binding conditions apply. Yet, it turns out that sentences like (25b) are not unambiguously coreferential, as illustrated in the following example (from Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993: 74). In the bound variable reading (27a), Alfred is attributed the property of thinking of oneself as a great cook, whereas in the coreference reading (27b), Alfred is attributed the property of thinking of Alfred as a great cook: (27) a. Alfredi­ thinks hei is a great cook. b. bound variable reading: Alfred (λx (x thinks x is a great cook)) c. coreference reading: Alfredi (λx (x thinks hei is a great cook)) To allow for the available ambiguity between a bound variable reading and a coreference reading in a sentence like (27a) and (28a), Grodzinsky and Reinhart (1993) formulated Rule I (see below). The motivation for this is that even though the two options in (27) yield essentially the same interpretation, if they occur in certain linguistic environments (e.g. ellipsis in (28)), they can generate distinct interpretations, namely sloppy (28b) and strict (28c): (28) a. Alfredi­ thinks hei is a great cook, and Felix thinks so too. b. Alfredi thinks hei is a great cook, and Felixj thinks that hej is a great cook too. c. Alfredi thinks hei is a great cook, and Felixj thinks that Alfredi is a great cook too. The sloppy reading is based on the underlying bound variable relation, while the strict reading arises out of the coreference relation formalized in (27c) by means of indices.15 To restrict the availability of the two readings, Rule I was introduced (Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993: 79): Rule I: Intrasentential Coreference NP A cannot corefer with NP B if replacing A with C, C a variable A-bound by B, yields an indistinguishable interpretation.16

Coreference

It suggests that a bound variable reading is preferred over a coreference reading, unless the broader context provides a well-motivated rationale to opt for the coreference reading (as potentially conceivable for (28)). In the case of (27), where the two mechanisms generate indistinguishable interpretations, only the bound variable reading is expected to hold. Looking at this proposal from an economy-based point of view, it suggests that bound variable interpretation is more economical than coreference (in section 2.2, I will come back to this economy argument).17 To conclude this section, what all these accounts have in common is that they address pronominal–antecedent relations from a point of view where phrase-structural configurations, such as governing domains, c-command, or transformations in early accounts, correlate with pronominal types. In particular, reflexive–antecedent dependencies generally emerge in the most local configurations. In the next section, pronominal–antecedent relations are viewed from a different angle.

2.1.2.  Discourse-based accounts In this section, I review a number of accounts that have dealt with the referential properties of pronominal–antecedent relations as well as more general discourse factors that may influence pronominal interpretation. Within these frameworks, discourse is largely seen as a level of representation at which information about referents and events is accessed, and information structural considerations are implemented (such as prominence, topic, focus, etc.) (e.g. Heim 1982; Kamp and Reyle 1993; Lambrecht 1994; Avrutin 1999, 2004). The label ‘discourse-based accounts’ therefore refers to theories that address issues of storage, maintenance, and retrieval of referential entities, such as information management pertaining to individual referents, locations, events, etc. and the dependencies performed on these entities. For current purposes, the common denominator of these accounts is that they view pronominal–antecedent relations in terms of discourse-motivated considerations and limitations, such as focus, topic, cognitive status, accessibility, general conversational implicature, etc. — and crucially not in terms of the strictly phrase-structural properties associated with a particular pronominal element. Accordingly, I refer to ‘discourse mechanisms’, ‘discourse principles’, etc. where the original theories might have used ‘pragmatic mechanism’ or ‘information structural principle’, and I also use these terms interchangeably.

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The overarching notion is that the use of pronominals usually requires prior introduction of a full-fledged referent. On the one hand, this requirement of referent availability prior to encountering a pronominal element is an important pragmatic principle (Frege, 1892 [English translation: 1966]; Strawson 1950; Searle 1969; inter alia), where referents must be introduced by their label/name or description to guarantee successful and felicitous communication. On the other hand, discourse constraints demand that a referent be introduced into the system before it is referred to as a definite entity or any kind of pronominal (e.g. Chafe 1972; Clark and Marshall 1981; Heim 1982). An exception to these constraints is the phenomenon of backward anaphora, as in (29a), where him=Peter, and (30a), where him=McIntosh: (29) a. The teacher was upset with himi, after Peteri had forgotten to hand in the assignment again. b. The teacher was upset with Peteri, after hei had forgotten to hand in the assignment again. (30) a. We’ll just have to fire himi, whether McIntoshi likes it or not. (from Reinhart 1983: 34) b. We’ll just have to fire McIntoshi, whether hei likes it or not. The acceptability ratings of constructions containing backward anaphora are partially dependent on individual speaker judgments and the discourse functions used within a particular context provided. In general, backward anaphora — the (a)-cases above — are dispreferred over forward anaphora — the (b)cases (e.g. Lakoff 1968/1976; van Hoek 1997 and references therein). However, presentation of pronominal entities prior to the introduction of their referents is possible in some instances where information-structural considerations override phrase-structural requirements. Such considerations, which have independently been established for preposing and other discourse-motivated constructions (e.g. Birner and Ward 1998), may involve notions of focus and topichood or the particular role of the referent in discourse, such as its discourse prominence. An example for this is given in (31), where the antecedent Garrison Keillor is the most prominent entity (but see the general discussion below for issues relating to other discourse-structural considerations). (31) In his­i Prairie Home Companion radio series, Garrison Keillori brought a remote part of Minnesota to life.  (from van Hoek 1997: 112)

Coreference

In contrast to the syntactic accounts presented in the previous section, some theories have attempted to define pronominal–antecedent relations in purely discourse-related terms, and a few of them are discussed next. More general accounts of discourse representation have been formulated by Kamp and Reyle (1993), whose Discourse Representation Theory derives discourse representation structures from the syntactic structures of sentences. A similar proposal originated in Heim’s (1982) work on File Change Semantics. Chapter 3 addresses these accounts, as the Syntax–Discourse Model builds partly on Heim’s framework. Theories that make use of the level of discourse representation have made the following three major contributions to the study of coreference: first, they have provided a formal framework for the representation of (discourse) referents (e.g. Karttunen 1971, 1976; Webber 1979; Heim 1982; Kamp and Reyle 1993; Avrutin 1999, 2004). Second, they introduce mechanisms for antecedent selection, that are for instance related to the activatedness or accessibility of an antecedent (e.g. Grosz et al. 1983, 1995; Givón 1983; Sidner 1983a, b; Ariel 1990); this is an important feature, as the phrase-structural accounts have only limited means to determine the best pronominal–antecedent match, especially in the case of pronoun–antecedent relations.18 Third, they can account for coreference beyond the sentential level — which is not a concern within this work, but a theory of pronominal–antecedent relations should be capable of determining these kind of referential dependencies. As far as the establishment of pronominal–antecedent relations is concerned, discourse-based theories have for instance concentrated on the notion of the focus of a discourse referent or its degree of activatedness (Sidner 1983a, b; Grosz and Sidner 1986), the notion of referential prominence in terms of aboutness (Bosch 1983), or the notion of the ‘center’ of a discourse (Grosz et al. 1983, 1995; Walker et al. 1998; inter alia). These theories make predictions about the prominence of entities as a conversational discourse unfolds and posit restrictions on pronominal–antecedent relations. An assumption of the theories of pronominal interpretation that are based on the notions of ‘centering’ and ‘prominence’ (i.e. the availability of a salient entity) is that communicative acts are generally centered around a core topic (at least temporarily, i.e. even though topics can quickly change, the availability of a particular topic at a given point in the discourse is a basic assumption in these accounts). In addition, it has been suggested that the topic, once introduced, is most likely referred to in a pronominalized form and that the referent’s activeness correlates with pronominalization (e.g. Chafe 1976; Givón 1983; Grosz et al. 1983, 1995;

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Gundel et al. 1993). This further indicates that it is reasonable to encode information about topichood and pronominal dependencies in a unified way. For example, Centering Theory (Grosz et al. 1983, 1995; Walker et al. 1998) states that each sentence contains a most salient entity, which is called the ‘center’ of the utterance. This center represents the topic of a communicative event, and Centering Theory is therefore primarily concerned with topic maintenance and topic shift in the course of a larger (i.e. multi-utterance) discourse segment. Furthermore, centers are often associated with prominent structural positions, e.g. subject positions are preferred locations of centers over object positions. An utterance that carries on with the topic of the previous utterance is considered most ‘coherent’, and Centering Theory predicts that the ‘continuation’ of a (most highly ranked) center is to be preferred over ‘retaining’ a (lower-ranked) center, which is preferred over ‘shifting’ centers. In terms of pronominal–antecedent relations, these preferences allow for the conjectures that a pronominal should first seek to enter into a dependency with an antecedent that is the most highly ranked center (i.e. center continuation) to achieve the highest level of coherence. However, the specifics of Centering Theory are beyond the scope of the present discussion, as Centering Theory is concerned with intersentential processes, whereas the research presented in the following chapters does not look at a multi-sentence discourse, but focuses on pronominal interpretation in intrasentential environments. Even though this gap has been addressed by Kameyama (1998), who proposes an extension to Centering Theory to capture intrasentential dependencies by segmenting a sentence into ‘center-updating units’, this approach only looks at complex intrasentential structures (e.g. conjunction, complement structures, reported speech), and it therefore does not appear to be able to account for pronominal interpretation in simple sentences like Lizi put the stroller next to heri/herselfi or Nicki shaved himselfi. Therefore, Centering Theory is not discussed any further. Nonetheless, it should be mentioned that Centering Theory includes a rule pertaining directly to pronominal elements. It is stated that if a given element in utterance1 is realized as a pronoun in utterance2, the pronoun represents the center of utterance2. As such Centering Theory claims that discourse structure influences antecedent selection. Furthermore, it is suggested within this framework that it is most likely for a pronoun to be referred to by another pronominal expression in subsequent utterances. Experimental evidence from processing supports these postulations (e.g. Gordon et al. 1993; HudsonD’Zmura and Tanenhaus 1998).19 The evidence shows that pronouns are a sali-

Coreference

ent, highly preferred way to maintain the center of an utterance, and these observations should be transferable to intrasentential environments, such that a pronominal element should also be preferred over a nominal anaphor within a sentence. The motivation to use pronominal expressions is further most likely related to a constraint dealing with redundancy, as the utilization of pronominal elements reduces the repetition of lexical information. Another set of accounts has largely focused on the discourse prominence and status of referential entities, and within these accounts, the concepts of ‘givenness’ and ‘accessibility’ have received a lot of attention. Both concepts deal with the cognitive statuses of referential entities, where ‘givenness’ refers to an entity representing new or old (i.e. given) information and ‘accessibility’ indicates different degrees of referent accessibility as a function of the source of information (e.g. encyclopedic, physical, linguistic), degree of activation (e.g. in focus, familiar, unfamiliar), distance, number of competitors, among others. At least some of this work has been primarily influenced by Karttunen’s (1971) early elaboration on issues concerning the syntax–discourse interface as well as Webber’s (1979) model for discourse representation. Inspired by the (syntactic) notion of referential indices as markers of identity (Chomsky 1965), Karttunen developed a system for assigning discourse referents to indefinite NPs that is closely linked to truth value consideration. For instance, a nonspecific indefinite NP in an affirmative sentence establishes a discourse referent only if the proposition is true; in a negated sentence, on the other hand, a non-specific indefinite establishes a referent only if the proposition is implied to be false. This correlation with semantic truth conditions is problematic for a model of discourse representation, as only entities with true propositions would receive a referential unit in discourse. The motivation for the creation of a discourse referent in Karttunen’s theory is strictly based on truth conditions, and as a result, not all syntactic entities project a discourse referent, but only those in a true proposition. However, an account that models the establishment of coreference and that assumes a level of discourse representation as an interface between the syntactic and the conceptual system, should be capable of introducing discourse referents independent from their respective truth values. (For example, in the Syntax–Discourse Model proposed in chapter 3, the syntactic structure alone (i.e. the formation of a DP or TP) triggers the establishment of a discourse referent. This allows for a more automatic correspondence between syntax and discourse.) Yet, an important development, that is shared by Karttunen’s and Webber’s accounts, is that they attempt to establish a formal framework for discourse

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representation. As Webber (1979: 2–1) put it, a discourse model “contains a collection of entities, recording their properties and the relations they participate in” in accordance with speaker/hearer assumptions. Furthermore, the notion of ‘discourse referent’ has been introduced by Webber as a label for an (abstract) mental representation, rather than a real-world entity, which helps to delimit the concept of discourse referents from the semantic-based discussion with respect to referentiality and truth value considerations (cf. e.g. Russell 1905; Karttunen 1971). The Syntax–Discourse Model that is introduced in chapter 3 makes use of these formal assumptions for discourse representation. Departing further from truth conditional considerations, Prince (1981a) proposes a taxonomy of assumed familiarity, which categorizes discourse referents in accordance with the amount of previous (given) knowledge assumed by a speaker/hearer and links it to a linguistic entity. She distinguishes between the following three main discourse entities: (discourse-)new entities; entities that are inferable from common knowledge and already established entities or via logical reasoning; and evoked entities (which correspond largely to discourse-old entities).20 Her taxonomy postulates seven discourse entity types, which are set out in Figure 1. Ultimately, the seven categories that are introduced might be reducible to just two or three — as e.g. proposed in Prince’s (1992) two-dimensional model, where she distinguishes discourse referents solely on the basis of discoursenew/-old and hearer-new/-old information: on the one hand, the new entities and the inferrables correspond to discourse-new information (in the sense that they introduce a novel entity to the discourse21), while the evoked entities correspond to discourse-old information22 (see also Chafe 1976 for a given– new distinction). On the other hand, the taxonomy can be divided in terms of definiteness, where the new discourse entities are associated with indefinite Assumed familiarity New Brand new Unused Brand new

Inferrable (Noncontaining) Containing inferrable inferrable

Evoked (Textually) Situationally evoked evoked

Brand new anchored

Figure 1.  Prince’s seven discourse entity types (from Prince 1981a: 237)

Coreference

NPs and the evoked and inferable entities are connected to definite NPs. The contribution of this account is that discourse referents come in different flavors and it might therefore be conjectured that different types of discourse referents correlate with distinct operations and dependencies and that this can impact the establishment of coreference (see also Heim 1982, Avrutin 1999, and discussions in chapter 3, for a distinction between new and old discourse referents and the formation of a ‘bridging’ dependency imposed by a definite, but discourse-new entity). In lieu of hierarchies strictly related to the notion of givenness, which classify discourse referents according to the origin of their mental representations, a number of theories have attempted to capture referring expressions with respect to the degree of activation of their associated mental representations (e.g. Givón 1983; Ariel 1990). What is interesting about these accounts with respect to the establishment of coreference is that they make predictions for different kinds of pronominals and that they distinguish between antecedent types on the basis of a number of different criteria. Givón (1983) investigates referring expressions in terms of topic continuity and accessibility, where topic continuity is defined by measures of distance, interference from potential competitor referents, and weight of speaker intention (‘persistence’). He proposes the hierarchy in Figure 2, which incorporates elements of information-structural concern (e.g. focus constructions), as well as word-order variations (e.g. dislocation) and phonological distinctions (e.g. stress). This hierarchy distinguishes between pronominal types, however the differences are mainly seen in terms of phonological size (i.e. zero, clitic, unstressed, stressed element). This account then proposes a division of pronominal elements as a function of stress. For example, in (32) (from Ariel 1990: 65), the Most discontinuous

Most continuous

Referential indefinite NPs Cleft/focus constructions Y-moved NPs (‘contrastive topicalization’) L-dislocated DEF-NPs Neutral-ordered DEF-NPs R-dislocated DEF-NPs Stressed/independent pronouns Unstressed/bound pronouns or grammatical agreement Zero anaphora

Figure 2.  Topic continuity and accessibilty (Givón 1983)

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unstressed pronoun she (32a) selects the most continuous, highest accessible antecedent, which is the topic Jane; the use of stress in (32b), results in a pronominal–antecedent dependency with an antecedent that ranks lower in the hierarchy (i.e. Mary). (32) a. Janei kissed Maryj, and then shei kissed Harry. b. Janei kissed Maryj, and then shej kissed Harry. A similar distinction between pronominals is implemented in the discourse model proposed by Zuckerman et al. (2002), who identify two kinds of pronominal types: those that can be stressed and topicalized (among other characteristics) and those that cannot. Crucially, in their model, this distinction has consequences for the nature of the discourse representation of a pronominal. Ariel (1990) proposes an accessibility hierarchy for discourse referents on the basis of Sperber and Wilson’s (1986) Relevance Theory. Discourse entities are understood to differ with respect to their degree of availability by the speaker/hearer (i.e. the accessibility of mental representations to the speaker/hearer), and speakers utilize discourse-referential properties and accessibilities to evaluate which referring expression they can choose to achieve the most successful speech act as well as to enforce their communicative intentions. Ariel therefore suggests that the best predictor for referent selection is the degree of accessibility, where accessibility is primarily determined by the following factors: the distance between a referring expression and its antecedent, the salience of an antecedent (which is mainly related to topichood), the unity of the frame (i.e. do the referring expression and the antecedent occur within the same frame/segment/event), and the number of competitors for the role of an antecedent. She introduces a scale of Accessibility for referential expressions, which implies that accessibility markers function relative to each other and that, universally, there is a strong form-function correlation — for instance, the lower a referent on the Accessibility hierarchy, the more lexical information it carries. For English, she proposes the scale depicted in Figure 3 (1990: 73).23 For our purposes, the Accessibility Hierarchy predicts — along with other discourse-based theories — that pronominal expressions are chosen over other referring expressions in those situations where the antecedent is highly activated, i.e. where the speaker/hearer has immediate access to the antecedent. Particular pronominals are correlated with antecedent accessibility as a function of phonological properties (cliticized pronoun > unstressed pronoun >

Coreference Low accessibility

High accessibility

Full name + modifier Full name Long definite description Short definite description Last name First name Distal demonstrative + modifier Proximal demonstrative + modifier Distal demonstrative (+ NP) Proximal demonstrative (+ NP) Stressed pronoun + gesture Stressed pronoun Unstressed pronoun Cliticized pronoun Extremely high accessibility markers (gaps, including pro, PRO and wh trace, reflexives, and Agreement)

Figure 3.  Accessibility hierarchy for discourse referents (Ariel 1990)

stressed pronoun — similar to Givón 1983) and as a function of deictic properties (no gesture > gesture). However, by zooming in on the different types of pronominal–antecedent relations, it is uncertain that the Accessibility Theory (or any of the other accessibility accounts) can predict the fine-grained distinctions that are required to construct the pronominal system of a language. For example, even if the hierarchy can predict that reflexives have precedence over pronouns, it does not have the potential to explain why reflexives can only occur in certain structural positions, i.e. what determines that the highest accessible referent (e.g. Tom in (33) below) is referred to with an ordinary pronoun (33a) vs. with a reflexive (33b): (33) a. Tomi is happy. Hei sings. b. Tomi enjoys himselfi. Ariel (1990: 97) attempts to show that structural conditions (e.g. Binding Theory) are to a large degree directly motivated by Accessibility conditions, as Principles A, B, and C of Binding Theory map onto the hierarchy as for example reflexives, pronouns, and full names; but this still cannot provide an explanation for the distributional difference in (33). For issues like these, an account that considers phrase-structural relations seems therefore essential to explain the presence of distinct pronominal elements. In fact, Ariel notes that high Accessibility elements can be subject to additional grammatical constraints and that in these cases, the degree of Accessibility is a ­necessary, but not sufficient

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condition (1990: 56). Another potential problem of the Accessibility Hierarchy emerges by considering long-distance reflexives, as for instance found in Icelandic or Chinese (see examples (13) and (14) above). These reflexives can refer to more than one antecedent in a sentence, and again, the Accessibility hierarchy — at least as it is formulated for English above — cannot always (in particular in isolated sentences where discourse salience might not be determinable) provide an explanation for the pronominal–antecedent match.24 Huang (2000: 256ff.) points out another shortcoming of the Accessibility hierarchy with respect to languages that have se- and self-anaphors (e.g. Dutch) and require a self-anaphor to express an identity relation in combination with verbs that are not intrinsically reflexive (e.g. Rinti veracht *zichi /zichzelfi  — ‘Rint despises self(se)/self(self).’). In these cases, the Accessibility theory would (erroneously) predict the use of the zich, which is a higher accessibility marker, as it carries less phonological information than zichzelf. In spite of these observations, Ariel’s account does have an answer to a potential problem of phrase-structural accounts highlighted above, which is the issue of non-complementarity between pronouns and (logophoric) reflexives. Ariel considers this non-complementary distribution in light of the notion of point of view and empathy (1990: 203), such that point of view generates a more salient antecedent, which by the Accessibility hierarchy then favors the use of a reflexive over a pronoun in English. In sum, it then seems to be feasible to make use of a hierarchy of accessibility in its weakest rendering (Ariel 1990: 98), where structural considerations apply and accessibility or givenness considerations operate optionally or rather additionally. In particular, a minimal structural requirement appears to be needed to account for the distribution of coargument reflexives (e.g. coargumenthood or a constraint modeling Principle A), as none of the discourse-based accounts seems to be capable of capturing the conditions that differentiate coargument reflexives from pronouns (for example, why is the high accessibility marker sich (‘himself ’) disallowed in the German version of (33a): Tomi ist glücklich. Eri /*Sichi singt.—‘Tom is happy. He sings.’). In the cases where such a structural constraint does not hold, discourse considerations may affect pronominal–antecedent relations (as for instance, in the case of the non-complementary distribution of pronouns and logophors). These latter factors facilitate the formation of a discourse dependency, in that they provide preferences for antecedent selection on the basis of degrees of accessibility. In general, what all these discourse-based approaches have in common is that they supply a feature of salience or prominence to mechanisms of coref-

Coreference

erence assignment, but the implementation of such a feature into a more general model of pronominal–antecedent relations is still needed to account for all occurrences of pronominals in a more unified way. Looking at the sections on the structural and the discourse-based accounts, it then appears that while the structural accounts struggle to provide a descriptive generalization for the non-complementarity observed with respect to logophors, the discourse-based accounts have a basis to distinguish between logophors and pronouns. Since this non-complementarity and logophor interpretation play an important role in the present discussion and must be accounted for by a theory that successfully models coreference dependencies, the characteristics of logophors are discussed in the next sections.

2.1.3.  The case of logophors Logophoricity is one of the most widely discussed phenomena in which the structural accounts struggle to provide an explanation for the presence of this particular pronominal form. Furthermore, as pointed out above, discourse-based accounts by themselves have not generated a solid distinction between all pronominal types that could account for distributional aspects either. The underlying observation is that logophoric elements (herself/himself in (34)–(36)) — pronominals that (may) have the form of a reflexive, but behave more like a pronoun in terms of their distributional properties, as they violate the structural constraints imposed on reflexives (e.g. Principle A, coargumenthood) — are not subject to the same constraints that reflexives are (e.g. Postal 1971; Kuno 1972; Cantrall 1974; inter alia). (34) Henriettai bragged that the neighbors invited Sean and herselfi to a cruise. (35) Henriettai noticed that there was a picture of herselfi in the catalogue. (36) Hei [Zapp] sat down at the desk and opened the drawers. In the top right-hand one was an envelope addressed to himself­i. (Lodge 1975: 62 [cited in Zribi-Hertz 1989]) One of the most commonly discussed properties of logophors is that they are associated with particular mental states and select as their antecedents the sources of these mental states, namely those entities “whose speech, thoughts, feelings, or general state of consciousness are reported” (Clements 1975: 130). In English, logophors have the same shape as reflexives (e.g. himself, them-

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The syntax–discourse interface

selves), as is the case in many other languages (e.g. Dutch zich, Icelandic sig, Japanese zibun); yet further languages, particularly reported from the Chadic and Niger-Congo language families, have a three-way distinction in their pronominal inventory and have separate lexical entries to express logophoricity (e.g. Ewe yè (37a) (examples taken from Hagège 1974: 302) or Gokana suffix -ε` (38a) (from Hyman and Comrie 1981: 21)): (37) a. b.

kofi be yè dzo Kofi said log left ‘Kofi said he left.’ (he = Kofi) kofi­ be e dzo Kofi said he left ‘Kofi said he left.’ (he = somebody else)

(38) a. b.

à kyε˜ lébàrè­­ kɔ aè d-ε` it angers Lebare that he fell-log ‘It angers Lebare that he fell.’ (he = Lebare) à kyε˜ lébàrè­­ kɔ aè d it angers Lebare that he fell ‘It angers Lebare that he fell.’ (he = somebody else)

In these examples, the logophor (yè/-ε`) always corresponds to the source of the utterance (Kofi and Lebare); to refer to another referent in the larger discourse, i.e. a disjoint referent, the alternative pronoun form (e/aè) must be used (37b, 38b). The term logophoric was introduced by Hagège (1974) as a term to identify a particular type of pronominal in a number of West African languages that refer to an individual whose thoughts are reported or as he describes it the “author” of a discourse (cf. Clements 1975; Sells 1987). As it turns out, this concept can be extended to other languages as well. Logophors surface across languages in constructions with verbs of saying — e.g. (37) — which is a direct consequence of having a pronominal that is dependent on a referent whose thoughts are conveyed. However, languages differ with respect to what kind of referents they allow for a logophor-antecedent dependency. Some languages appear to require the source of the mental state to also be in subject position — e.g. Icelandic, but not Ewe (37). Other languages constrain the exact nature of the source — e.g. pivot vs. self/source in Mandarin vs. Teochew (Cole, Hermon, and Lee 2001). Yet other languages restrict the set of permissible event frames — e.g. verbs of communication in Igbo (Hagège 1974) vs.

Coreference

verbs of perception and mental states in general in Ewe (Hagège 1974); this led Stirling (1993: 259) to propose a hierarchy of logocentric verbs — which are claimed to be implicationally related — along the following continuum: communication > thought > psychological state > perception Another parameter identified with logophoricity is related to actual distance between the logophor and the antecedent — e.g. cases like first and second person logophors in English which do not have a pronounced antecedent (as in (39) and (40), repeated from (15) and (16) above), (39) Physicists like yourself are a godsend. (40) There were five linguists at the party apart from myself. or third person logophors with an extra-sentential antecedent as provided in (36). Hagège (1974: 298) reports an instance from Tuburi where the logophoric antecedent had not been mentioned for a long sequence within a story-telling passage — in fact, for thirteen minutes after the introductory My elders taught me that . . . sō (41) sā:rā dús log scattered thus ‘They thus scattered.’ (they = my elders) Moreover, many languages allow for non-complementary distribution of logophors with pronouns. This generally takes place at the expense of interpretive nuances: the antecedent of a logophor is conceived with particular reference to its mental state and it is this additional information about the antecedent’s perspective and/or internal state that licenses the logophor-antecedent dependency. In contrast, in an otherwise parallel pronoun–antecedent relation, this additional information incorporating the internal state of the antecedent is not communicated and the speaker is less involved in the stated proposition (e.g. Cantrall 1974; Kuno 1987; Zribi-Hertz 1989; Levinson 1991, 2000; Huang 2000). Resulting from this difference in perspective, the sentences in (42) yield two slightly distinct interpretations: (42) a. Johni hid a book behind himselfi. b. Johni hid a book behind himi. The logophor himself in (42a) is interpreted with respect to the antecedent John’s perspective and spatio-temporal location. The predicate hid depicts a motion of the antecedent whose perspective in relation to the entity under-

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going change (the book) is required for complete interpretation. Crucially, it has been suggested that the book is considered physically closer to John in the logophor-antecedent relation, and native speakers share this intuition (see Cantrall 1974; Banfield 1982; Kuno 1987; Zribi-Hertz 1989; among others). Kuno (1987: 66) points out that an example like (42a) implies that John held the book with his hand and put it behind his back. The book was directly touching him. On the other hand, [. . . (42b)] implies that perhaps the book was on a chair, and he was standing in front of the chair so that the book could not be seen. In other words, it is most likely that there was no physical contact between John and the book. It might be possible to use [. . . (42b)] to describe the first situation, in which John held the book in his hand behind his back, but the sentence would not be asserting this physical contact at all.

This indicates that there is a subtle interpretive contrast underlying the use of a logophor or a pronoun in a given context, which hence should correspond to distinct encoding mechanisms that utilize notions of perspective. It further shows that logophor interpretation is more restricted than pronoun interpretation. In particular, the use of the logophor in a construction as in (42) serves to provide additional interpretive information, in this case about the physical and spatial connection between the antecedent and the entity undergoing change, which suggests that the essential aspect associated with logophoricity is more intimately connected to the interpretive system (i.e. discourse) than to the computational system (i.e. syntax). A phenomenon that is also discussed in connection with logophoricity is long-distance reflexivity. This is another instance where elements that resemble the ‘regular’ reflexive of a language in form do not obey the distributional restrictions otherwise found with reflexives, as they do not select the closest antecedent (e.g. (13) and (14) above). A large body of literature has dealt with the phenomenon of long-distance reflexives across languages (e.g. Huang 2000; Koster and Reuland 1991; Cole, Hermon, and Huang 2001; and contributions therein). For example, the investigation of Icelandic (e.g. Thráinsson 1976, 1991; Maling 1984; Anderson 1986; Hellan 1991; Reuland and Sigurjónsdóttir 1997) has revealed that the reflexive sig does not obey binding principles uniformly, and an association of the long-distance reflexive sig with discourse factors related to point of view has largely been championed. Although some of these accounts still maintain a structural stance and propose modifications to Binding Theory to account for the long-distance dependencies of sig, it is apparent that the notion of perspective plays a crucial role and that long-distance reflexives are not subject to structural locality

Coreference

restrictions as imposed on reflexives by Binding Theory. Thráinsson (1991), among others, states explicitly that pragmatic/discourse restrictions come into effect during long-distance reflexive interpretation. Long-distance reflexives generally carry the following properties: They enter into a dependency with an antecedent outside their governing category (thus violating Principle A of the Binding Theory or the coargumenthood requirement). They may further obey restrictive conditions for antecedent selection, such as a subject-requirement for the antecedent (e.g. Chechen (Nichols 2001), Icelandic) or other discourse prominence and perspective restrictions (e.g. Italian (Chierchia 1989)). This latter condition on long-distance reflexives has in particular contributed to connecting these entities with the logophors discussed above, as the discourse restrictions are logophoric in the sense that they mark the most prominent referent or source.25 As observed with (point of view) logophors, long-distance reflexives surface in the same environments as pronouns, i.e. they provide another instance of the violation of complementary distribution assumed by the Binding Theory. Moreover, long-distance reflexives are se-anaphors, i.e. they are morphologically ‘simplex’ (e.g. Pica 1985, 1987) — which does not imply that all instantiations of se-anaphors are involved in long-distance dependencies (e.g. Dutch zich or French se in (20a) Jeani sei déteste ti.(‘Jean hates himself.’), where se represents a regular reflexive). Finally, while reflexives and reciprocals are subject to the same binding conditions in local contexts, long-distance dependencies are only formed by reflexive elements (e.g. Yang 1984). As far as the discourse functions of long-distance reflexives are concerned, Chierchia (1989) proposes a ‘de se’ restriction for Italian (but the application of this restriction has also been validated for other languages (see for instance Cole, Hermon, and Lee 2001), i.e. the referent of the long-distance reflexive must be aware that s/he is the protagonist of the event described. To support this claim, he presents sentences like (43) — from Chierchia (1989: 24) — where the long-distance reflexive propri elicits an anomalous interpretation, while the pronoun suoi (‘his’) yields an acceptable interpretation: (43) Pavarotti crede che i (?)propri/suoi pantaloni siano in fiamme. Pavarotti believes that the self/his pants are in flame Ma non si e’accorto che i pantaloni sono i propri. but not realize that the pants are the own ‘Pavarotti believes that self ’s/his pants are on fire, but he hasn’t realized that the pants are his own.’

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The syntax–discourse interface

The long-distance reflexive propri therefore appears to demand that the protagonist Pavarotti be aware of the situation as one that he ascribes to himself and recognize his immediate involvement in it, i.e. he must recognize that the pants that are burning are his own (vs. seeing a man in a mirror whose pants are burning, not realizing that he himself is that man in the mirror). Other proposals concerning the discourse nature of long-distance reflexives and logophors have also been put forth, where the two phenomena are mostly treated in a unified manner.26 As pointed out above, logophoricity is characterized as a form of pronominalization with particular focus on the perspective and internal state of the referent. The interpretive implications of this have been discussed in the literature by Hagège (1974), Clements (1975), Banfield (1982), Kuno (1987), Zribi-Hertz (1989), Stirling (1993), Huang (1991, 1994a, b, 2000, 2004), among others. One particular framework that focuses on the interpretation of logophoric elements has been formulated by Sells (1987) within Discourse Representation Theory. He suggests that at the level of discourse representation, certain discourse functions are accessed for interpretation, specifically the functions of source, self, and pivot/point of view. These functions are encoded in the discourse representation and are characterized as follows (Sells 1987: 457): source: one who is the intentional agent of the communication self: one whose mental state or attitude the content of the proposition describes pivot: one with respect to whose (space-time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated A logophor thus establishes a link to a particular antecedent in order to associate with a specific internal perspective of this referent (or subjective ‘cameraangle’ as formulated by Kuno and Kaburaki 1977 — cf. also the discussion of shifts in point of view and deixis by Fillmore 1975, 1982). In addition to conveying salient information about the referent’s thoughts or attitudes, access to these discourse functions serves for instance to emphasize the referent’s point of view (or contrast it with that of another entity in the discourse), or to express empathy, which describes the speaker’s level of identification with the referent (Kuno 1987). These additional discourse functions ultimately allow for the non-complementarity with a pronoun, such that a logophor may surface in an otherwise pronoun-restricted environment. The following examples from Icelandic and English serve to spell out Sells’ discourse functions in more detail (cf. also Huang 1994b: 187ff.). In Icelandic,

Coreference

logophoric use is restricted to antecedents representing the source of an utterance (examples (a and b) from Sells 1987: 450): (44) a. Hanni sagði að sigi vantaði hæfileika. he said that self lacked ability. ‘Hei said that hei lacked ability.’ b.   *Honumi var sagt að sigi vantaði hæfileika. he was told that self lacked ability. ‘Hei was told that hei lacked ability.’ c.  *Hanni . . . sigi . . . ‘Hei heard that hei lacked ability.’ The logophoric element sig therefore must refer to the entity that is marked as source at the level of discourse. The semantics of the verb in (44a, b) strictly prescribes the subject (hann) to be represented in the discourse as source, i.e. the one who intentionally says something. Hence, logophoricity is permitted. However, in the passive construction (44b), honum is not marked as source of the communication, and the establishment of a dependency between the logophor sig and the referent honum thus yields an ungrammatical interpretation. In addition, the semantics of heard does not assign source to its subject, which consequently prohibits the use of a logophor in a sentence like (44c). The next example represents an instance of the discourse notion self from English: (45) a. Maxi boasted that the queen invited Lucie and himselfi to the tea. b. Maxi ?heard that the queen invited Lucie and himselfi to the tea. For the interpretation of the logophoric reflexive himself as signifying Max, it has been suggested that reference to the mental state of Max is needed. This is facilitated by boasted in (45a), but in connection with heard (45b), the emergence of the logophor appears less acceptable. In addition, the logophor is used emphatically (Kuno 1987). Hence, the presence of the discourse function of self — signifying an entity whose attitude is described — permits the emergence of a logophor in (45a). Finally, the notion of pivot can be exemplified with the construction in (42) above, where information of the spatio-temporal dimension associated with the referent in relation to the propositional content (John — the book) yield a logophoric reading. An interesting treatment of these different discourse functions is outlined by Cole, Hermon, and Lee (2001) who investigate two languages spoken in Singapore — Mandarin and Teochew. As it turns out, the long-distance reflex-

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ives found in these two languages differ from each other with respect to the discourse functions that must be met to form a proper pronominal–antecedent dependency: in Mandarin, it is sufficient for a long-distance reflexive to have an antecedent that represents the pivot. But in Teochew, the antecedent must correspond to the pivot and the self or source. Huang and Liu (2001) further propose a hierarchy of these discourse functions to account for cross-linguistic variation. They hypothesize that the minimal requirement to license logophoricity is that of source; some languages also allow self (in addition to source) and others have long-distance reflexives referring to source, self, and pivot. In summary, logophors appear to correlate strongly with the need to express discourse notions — such as source, self, and pivot — in addition to violating purely structural constraints associated with reflexive interpretation. This then suggests that a model that seeks to capture pronominal–antecedent relations must incorporate a discourse component (e.g. to motivate the noncomplementarity of logophors and pronouns) as well as a syntactic component (e.g. to represent the contrast between logophors and (coargument) reflexives). The discourse component must have means to encode the discourse notion of ‘point of view’, as e.g. the motivation for choosing a logophor over a pronoun in constructions like (42) is entirely based on this discourse notion. And in certain situations, the logophor is the only possibly pronominal to yield an acceptable interpretation (e.g. the de se situation in Italian), which indicates that the notion of point of view must be encoded to render pronoun use unacceptable in these instances. How exactly these necessary discourse features are encoded is not well understood,27 but for now, it may be sufficient to assume that the discourse functions that express notions of point of view and perspective are not encoded in the syntactic representation, but must be represented at the level of discourse. These functions are marked on an antecedent with which a logophor enters into a dependency. This indicates that the available interpretations associated with a logophor-antecedent dependency are more constrained than those obtainable for a pronoun–antecedent dependency, as for instance evidenced by data from English (42) and Italian (43). And finally, as cross-linguistic data strongly indicate, discourse-based considerations distinguish logophor interpretation from the interpretation of (regular) reflexives, as phrase-structure based operations suffice for their interpretation. Overall, logophoricity then seems to strongly support a model that takes into consideration both syntactic and discourse operations for the establishment of coreference. Having established the need for two levels of representa-

Coreference

tion (i.e. syntax and discourse), the question is how this claim can be tested. One way to look at it is on the basis of economy considerations that postulate that the language system always seeks to establish the most economical dependency or representation (cf. Zipf 1949; Chomsky 1986, et seq.; Fox 2000; Reuland 2001). Although the notion of economy has emerged as a representational concept in the literature, assuming a correspondence between representation and processing allows for the hypothesis that effects of economy are observable in sentence processing (cf. Jackendoff 1997, 1999; Reuland 2001, 2003; Avrutin 2004),28 and the processing literature also argues for language processing being subject to economy principles (e.g. Frazier 1978; de Vincenzi 1991; Gibson 1998; Weinberg 1999). In particular, it has been proposed that a syntactic dependency is the most economical dependency available, and evidence for this comes from online comprehension studies that have shown that a difference between levels of representation is observable as ‘processing cost’ and that syntactic operations (compared to semantic or discourse operations) elicit the least cost, in other words are the most economical (cf. Shapiro et al. 1987, 1989; de Vincenzi 1996; Piñango et al. 1999; Shapiro 2000; McElree et al. 2001). For the establishment of coreference this suggests that if syntactic and discourse dependencies are available, the language system establishes a syntactic dependency whenever one is licensed by the given pronominal–antecedent relation. And only in the absence of a syntactic dependency does the system attempt to form a discourse dependency. In the following section, I discuss this concept of economy with respect to pronominal interpretation, as it plays a crucial role for a model that postulates distinct dependencies on the basis of the level of representation at which they are formed. Economy thus functions as a link in bringing together the representational model proposed in chapter 3 and the psycholinguistic evidence in chapters 4–6.

2.2.  Economy considerations Economy considerations play a major role in the selection of pronominal–antecedent relations, as is the case with any kind of linguistic operation. On the one hand, this can be argued in terms of purely architectural considerations, since the main goal of any theory of linguistic representation should be to minimize conditions and constraints that operate on linguistic symbols (cf. Chomsky 1995; Fox 2000; Reuland 2001; among others). This is certainly in the spirit of the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995: 161):

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The syntax–discourse interface There is varied evidence suggesting that both derivations and representations are subject to a certain form of “least effort” condition and are required to be minimal in a fairly well defined sense, with no superfluous steps in derivations and no superfluous symbols in representation.

On the other hand, economy considerations can be derived from general conversational implicature and principles that have the objective of a successful speaker-hearer interaction by satisfying maxims of conversation, such as being as informative as necessary, yet not more informative than necessary (cf. Zipf 1949; Martinet 1962; Grice 1975, 1978, 1989; McCawley 1978; Reinhart 1983; Horn 1978, 1984, 1989; Levinson 1987a, b, et seq.; Huang 1991, et seq.). The two views of economy (i.e. Chomsky inter alia vs. Zipf inter alia) are qualitatively different. Chomsky considers economy as a general principle governing representation and derivation of linguistic symbols. Zipf ’s “Principle of Least Effort”, with which he explains all of human behavior (including language), is reflected in the literature on implicature in that economy is considered a principle governing speaker/hearer intentions (see McCawley 1978; Horn 1978, et seq.; Dowty 1980; Reinhart 1983; inter alia). The view on economy adopted herein sides with the former, in as far as the model proposed in the next chapter develops a formal framework of syntax–discourse correspondences. But the latter accounts are noteworthy as they provide some interesting insights into pronominal–antecedent relations (for example, with respect to the notion of point of view), which can and should be incorporated into a model of pronominal interpretation. For instance, in the logophor/pronoun minimal pairs, the use of a logophor signals the intent to convey a very specific dependency, i.e. one that includes an additional notion of point of view. If point of view does not matter for a given communicative exchange, the speaker should opt for the pronoun version to satisfy the Gricean maxims of quantity and/or manner (or to pick a neo-Gricean account, to satisfy Horn’s Q and R Principle). The general conversational principle underlying these maxims is known as the co-operative principle (Grice 1989: 26): Make your contribution such as is required, at the state at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

With respect to pronominal–antecedent relations, Reinhart (1983), among others, shows how these general principles of communication impact pronominal selection and interpretation. She posits the following general strategies that speakers and hearers rely on during pronominal (in particular bound anaphora) interpretation (i.e. their referential intentions), which are

Coreference

based on Grice’s maxim of manner and the requirement to be as specific and explicit as possible: Speaker’s strategy: Where a syntactic structure you are using allows bound-anaphora interpretation, then use it if you intend your expressions to corefer, unless you have some reasons to avoid bound anaphora. Hearer’s strategy: If the speaker avoids the bound-anaphora options provided by the structure he is using, then, unless he has reasons to avoid bound anaphora, he did not intend his expressions to corefer.  (Reinhart 1983: 167)

For a model of pronominal interpretation this means that if bound variable interpretation is available (by the syntactic configuration) to express a given pronominal–antecedent relation, it must be used; and if coreferential interpretation is desired, a coreferential pronoun must be used; and finally, non-coreferential interpretation can only be obtained by using a non-pronoun. Consider for instance (46); if the speaker intends a coreferential reading (he=Felix), s/he must use the structure in (46a), where the syntactic configuration (i.e. c-command) allows identity of Felix and he. If s/he does not intend a coreferential reading (he≠Felix), s/he must use (46b): (46) a. Felixi thinks that hei is a genius. b. He thinks that Felix is a genius. These speaker/hearer-oriented economy principles then imply that if a speaker wants to establish a pronominal–antecedent relation that can be expressed through a bound variable dependency, s/he chooses the bound variable pronominal in order to achieve the highest level of clarity and accuracy of expression. A bound variable interpretation is then the most restrictive dependency between a pronominal and an antecedent, but it is also the most economical way to express this dependency, as it rules out all remaining interpretations (i.e. coreference or non-coreference) by the speaker/hearer strategies.29 As far as pronouns are concerned, which can be either interpreted as bound variables or coreferential entities, this kind of model states that a bound variable dependency is the best and most immediately available option to express a pronoun–antecedent relation; thus if a bound variable reading is available, it is to be preferred over the establishment of a coreferential dependency. By couching these observations within the maxim of optimizing explicitness, the issue of pronouns being ambiguous between a bound variable and a coreference reading — illustrated by Alfred thinks he is a great cook in (27), in connection with the discussion of Rule I — is resolved, as the bound variable option, if available, is the better/more explicit means to express the pronoun–­antecedent

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relation. Moreover, Reinhart shows how pronoun ambiguity cannot be solved by just invoking the maxim of ‘avoiding ambiguity’ (as for example suggested by Dowty 1980), as this does not provide a mechanism for choosing between the two available readings of a referentially ambiguous pronoun like her in (47a): (47) a. Zelda­i bores heri/j neighbors. b. She bores Zelda’s neighbors. In this example, her can either refer to Zelda or to ‘somebody else’ (possibly mentioned in previous discourse). If the speaker wants to indicate coreference (her=Zelda), a principle of ‘avoid ambiguity’ does not provide a strategy to choose between the two available sentences in (47). However, a principle of explicitness prefers (47a) when intending coreference (her=Zelda). Notice that the hierarchical discourse-based approaches (e.g. Ariel’s Accessibility hierarchy) also use the idea of economy, in that the speaker selects the referring expression that requires the least processing effort from the hearer. In other words, the common goal of speaker/hearer interactions is to minimize processing and retrieval efforts, as well as conforming to (neo-)Gricean principles of conversational implicature (cf. also Horn 1978, 1984; Levinson 1987a, b, 1991, 2000; Huang 1991, et seq.). Speakers and hearers must thus have access to the same hierarchy and can infer the same status of a discourse referent. Since both representational and conversational considerations advocate an economy-based hierarchy of pronominal dependencies, the question that remains is how this principle is expressed in the language system and where the different pronominal entities fall within an interpretative hierarchy. Reuland (2001) as well as Safir (2004) present an answer to this. Safir (2004) introduces principles that govern the establishment of pronominal dependency and critically act in competition with each other to identify the best pronominal–antecedent matching. In particular, he proposes an interpretive principle — the Form to Interpretation Principle — that is sensitive to a (language-specific) dependency scale and facilitates selection of the best pronominal candidate, however he must also postulate additional principles — i.e. “scalar intervention factors” — to support the process of eliminating those forms that do not represent the best fit. In the following, I elaborate in more detail on Reuland’s (2001) account. Reuland proposes an economy-based model for pronominal interpretation, where mechanisms within the computational system CHL (i.e. narrow syntax), interpretive procedures at the C–I interface (i.e. operations

Coreference

on variables), and discourse storage (i.e. storage of discourse values) serve to distinguish between pronominal types. The hierarchy, on the one hand, correlates these distinct levels of interpretation with economy, which yields the following continuum: processes that take place at the level of CHL are considered the most economical ones; processes linking syntactic representations to C–I interface representation are less economical; processes that apply at the C–I interface are even less economical; and processes requiring access to the discourse storage are the least economical. On the other hand, the model predicts increasing cost to the system (i.e. a decrease in economy) by counting the number of cross-modular operations. Reuland attributes specific mechanisms and configurations to the different levels (i.e. Chain formation occurs within CHL, bound variable interpretation is obtained at the C–I interface, and values are assigned at the level of discourse). The combination of a hierarchy of levels of interpretation and the bearing of the amount of cross-modular operations generate specific cost-based predictions for pronominal interpretation. This is illustrated in the following ranking associated with the establishment of coreference, as proposed by Reuland (2001: 473): a. Discourse storage (values) a a ↑ ↑ C-I objects (variables) x­1 x2 ↑ ↑ Syntactic objects (Chains) C1 C2 Basic expressions α   . . . β b. Discourse storage (values) a ↑ C-I objects (variables) x­1 ← x1 ↑ ↑ Syntactic objects (Chains) C1 C2 ↑ ↑ Basic expressions α   . . . β c. Discourse storage (values) a C-I objects (variables) x­1 Syntactic objects (Chains) C1 ← C1 Basic expressions α   . . . β How can this model distinguish between interpretive processes during pronominal interpretation? In scenario (a), the two entities α and β correspond to the same referent a. As a consequence, they form a dependency at the ­discourse

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level, for which four cross-modular operations (indicated by upward arrows) are required within Reuland’s model. As far as pronominals are concerned, this corresponds to strictly coreferential interpretation of pronouns, as well as to logophors (assuming that logophor interpretation depends on discourse mechanisms, as suggested in 2.1.3 above). Note that this model does not address the issue that in case (a) it appears as if there are two identical discourse representations of a, one emerging from α and the other emerging form β. The way these two representations may be connected with each other, adds additional operations at the level of discourse. However, since Reuland’s proposal holds only cross-modular operations as relevant for economy considerations, the moduleinternal operations are not counted at this point. Nonetheless, the operations needed to establish the antecedent referent α (if β is seen as a pronominal) are taken into account and add two cross-modular operations to the model. The dependency represented in (b) illustrates the case where the two entities α and β match onto the same variable x1 at the C–I interface, which then only produces one referential entity a at the discourse level. Such a relationship requires three cross-modular operations and is exhibited in bound variable interpretations in general. Finally, two entities enter into an identity relation within the computational system proper in scenario (c) (here assumed to be the formation of a syntactic Chain). Such a dependency corresponds to only two cross-modular operations and is for instance applicable to se-­anaphors. Regardless of whether one wants to commit to the particular intra-modular mechanisms assumed in Reuland (2001), the model nicely lays out the interplay of economy and interpretation across levels of representation. The three scenarios illustrated above can be directly translated into an economy hierarchy, where (c) is the most economical process with only two cross-modular operations, followed by (b) requiring three operations, and finally (a), which imposes most cost to the system with four cross-modular operations. How do these economy considerations figure with the interpretative distinctions of for instance bound variable vs. coreferential pronouns or logophors vs. reflexives discussed above? As Reinhart (1983) points out, the most economical way to express a pronominal–antecedent dependency should be used — within permissible structural configurations — unless there is a sound motivation to opt for the more costly dependency. And this is exactly predicted by Reuland’s model of economy. So with regard to the first contrast (bound variable interpretation vs. coreferential interpretation), the model predicts that a bound variable interpretation is preferred as it is the more ­economical ­dependency (represented by the (b)-case vs. the coreference case

Coreference

in (a)). This, by the way, provides an economy-based explanation for Rule I (Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993), which then does not need to be stipulated anymore, but can stem directly from economy considerations. Furthermore, Hornstein’s (2001) minimalist account to pronominal–antecedent dependencies is consistent with this view as well; coreferential pronouns are considered more costly therein and should only be used if absolutely required for a derivation. Concerning the second contrast (logophors vs. reflexives), all things being equal, the model predicts that if a reflexive can be interpreted on the basis of a structural dependency (c) or a dependency at the C–I interface (b), such an interpretation should take precedence over a logophor interpretation which requires access to the discourse level (a) and thus represents the most costly process. This reasoning then licenses the availability of logophors in configurations otherwise structurally unacceptable for reflexives. In sum, an economy hierarchy helps us to understand the different dependencies available for pronominal interpretation and can serve to relate them to each other along a cost-based continuum. Assuming a connection between representation and processing, such a hierarchy can then also generate predictions for the processing of distinct pronominal–antecedent dependencies.

2.3.  Synthesis In this chapter, I have reviewed some of the milestones of representational accounts for pronominal interpretation and pointed out advantages and shortcomings alike. However, this review is by no means comprehensive and I have focused on some of the most basic configurations involving pronominal–antecedent relations. I have for example largely ignored issues of E-type anaphora (e.g. Evans 1980), the Bach-Peters paradox (e.g. Bach 1970), paycheck sentences (e.g. Karttunen 1968), donkey sentences (e.g. Geach 1962), and other interesting phenomena. In addition, there are many more issues and questions relating to pronominal interpretation and the broader picture of anaphoric relations, but answering these is beyond the scope of this book, whose goal is to propose a fundamental model for the establishment of coreference, which can then be extended to other related phenomena in future research. To summarize, some general disparities between the different accounts discussed in this chapter are apparent. These are related to the nature of the information needed for the establishment of a pronominal–antecedent dependency and are reflected in the following questions:

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1. Does a model of pronominal interpretation require syntactic and/or discourse constraints? 2. Does a model of pronominal interpretation require distinct levels of representation? 3. If discourse information is needed, is it a linguistic or a general cognitive property? The accounts and issues discussed in this chapter provide an answer to these questions in the following way. First, what kind of constraints does a model of interpretation need? As the outline of this chapter already suggests, there is quite a divide between the phrase-structural accounts and the discourse-based accounts. The question then is whether one or the other provides sufficient evidence in favor of their respective position. Considering the different approaches that have dealt with pronominal–antecedent dependencies, it appears that neither the structural accounts nor the discourse accounts are able to capture all possible instances of pronominal–antecedent dependencies. On the one hand, there are cases, such as pronouns with sentence-external antecedents, which a structural account clearly has nothing to say about (cf. also van Hoek 1997). Yet, these pronominal elements enter into a dependency with a referent, so a theory of pronominal interpretation should be able to account for such cases. Another issue is related to the interpretation of logophors, which as pointed out above pose a lot of difficulties for an entirely structure-based account, and as some theories suggest cannot be accounted for within a purely structural framework (e.g. Levinson 1987b, 1991, 2000; Huang 1991, et seq.; Pollard and Sag 1992; Reinhart and Reuland 1993; Avrutin 1999, 2004; Reuland 2001). On the other hand, the discourse approaches discussed above largely fail to explicitly incorporate principles for the strict locality requirements associated with reflexives, which is a significant generalization that should be captured in a theory of pronominal interpretation in order to limit possible combinations of reflexive–antecedent relations.30 I therefore want to suggest that both structural and discourse constraints are required for the establishment of pronominal–antecedent relations, as structural considerations appear to contribute important generalizations, in particular with regard to the local domain of pronominal– antecedent dependencies, and in addition, discourse considerations provide the linkage to the actual referent and further aid to form and restrict dependencies beyond the local domain.

Coreference

This conclusion already gives away the answer to the second division ­between the accounts, which arises from the modularity debate. The core issue in this debate is whether dependencies involving pronominal elements can be captured within a single level of representation (cf. Chomsky 1981, 1995; Hestvik 1991, 1992) or whether multiple levels play a role in establishing coreference (cf. Pollard and Sag 1992; Reinhart and Reuland 1993). A compelling example in favor of more than one representational level is cited in Reuland (2003: 8), which illustrates how structurally identical occurrences of a reflexive can yield distinct interpretations and acceptability ratings when discourse factors are manipulated (in particular the discourse prominence of the antecedent): 31 (48) a. Johni was going to get even with Mary. That picture of himselfi in the paper would really annoy her, as would the other stunts he had planned. *Mary was quite taken aback by the publicity Johni was receiving. b.   That picture of himselfi in the paper had really annoyed her, and there was not much she could do about it. Furthermore, many otherwise strongly phrase-structure-oriented theories have suggested that discourse factors must be involved in the interpretation of logophoricity, which then provides a test case for further investigations of syntax–discourse correspondences during pronominal interpretation. The third question addresses the encoding of the discourse information, i.e. is this information purely linguistic in nature or is it part of the general cognitive capacity. Evidence for the former position comes from the distribution of the long-distance reflexive in two languages spoken in Singapore (mentioned above) that suggest that there are language-specific constraints on the discourse properties of the antecedent (Cole, Hermon, and Lee 2001). This indicates that the observed variation is governed by language-specific principles. In Mandarin, the antecedent must represent a pivot (in Sells’s terms) to form a proper dependency with a logophor, whereas in Teochew, the antecedent must correspond to pivot and self or source. This contrast implies that the information required for the interpretation of these elements is linguistic in nature. On the basis of these conclusions, the model presented in the next chapter assumes that both syntax and discourse representation are essential for the establishment of dependency (see also Reuland 2003) and further that the information is linguistic in nature and is encoded at different levels of representation. The questions that are addressed in the following chapter are:

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 – What are the mechanisms that are required for pronominal interpretation?  –  How are the different levels of representation formalized?  –  How do these levels connect with each other and exchange information? I propose a model that, on the structural side, is largely based on the notion of coargumenthood, and on the discourse side, further develops the framework of File Change Semantics (Heim 1982; Avrutin 1999, 2004). The model does not follow the hierarchical accounts discussed above, as they do not appear to succeed in incorporating the fine-grained distinctions that are found with regard to different pronominal types, in particular with respect to reflexives. However, theories of accessibility lend support to predictions about the role of the antecedent during the establishment of a dependency with a pronominal (e.g. Grosz et al. 1983, 1995; Ariel 1990). These theories point out that potential antecedents can be ranked on the basis of saliency and prominence and that a pronominal strives to form a dependency with the most salient entity available. Therefore, a model of pronominal interpretation should have some means of encoding these discourse features in order to signal the pronominal element which entity represents the best referent. The Syntax–Discourse Model therefore draws on certain discourse functions, such as point of view, to account for instance for the logophor facts. In particular, the following conditions are assumed to govern pronominal– antecedent relations: (i) the structural notion of coargumenthood; (ii) the fact that pronominals must agree with their antecedent in person, gender, and number;32 and (iii) the availability of certain discourse functions. The underlying principle governing the different mechanisms required to form dependencies is the principle of economy, and the processes are therefore also discussed in terms of the cost they impose on the system. In the following chapter, I present this Syntax–Discourse Model in detail.

Chapter 3

Syntax–discourse correspondences:   The model1 Pronominal elements are referentially deficient. This means that in and of themselves they are not able to introduce a meaningful discourse referent, which represents an individual in the mental representation or is linked to a quantified expression (e.g. himself in (1) and (2) respectively).

(1) The singeri listened to himselfi on tape. (2) Everyonei enjoys himselfi during the holidays.

Pronominals only carry abstract information (such as number, gender, person, structural Case), but do not signify a concrete individual per se. In order to be interpreted, referentially dependent pronominals therefore must enter into a dependency relation with an antecedent (contra deictic or indexical expressions that obtain reference from the context of utterance). In the following, I present a model of how different pronominals enter into distinct dependency relations with their antecedents. These dependencies are associated with distinct levels of representation: syntax (or the computational system C­HL) and discourse. At the level of discourse, so-called ‘file cards’ — the information units of the discourse representation (cf. Heim 1982; Avrutin 1999) — are maintained and operations are performed on them. These file cards symbolize events and discourse referents, i.e. every time a referent or an event is mentioned (corresponding to a DP and a TP in the syntactic representation respectively), a file card is created in the discourse representation and packaged for future linking operations, such as coreference. The availability of different dependency relations suggests a division of labor between the two levels for pronominal interpretation. On the one hand, the syntactic representation deals with notions like c-command relations and coargumenthood. At this level, presence or absence of a coargument relation between the pronominal and a potential antecedent is determined. Presence of coargumenthood makes a syntactic interpretation of the pronominal possible (in the case of reflexives); absence of it signals that interpretation must take place at another level. On the other hand, the discourse representation manages information about discourse referents and keeps track of ­ information

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structure, event structure, specificity, referentiality, topichood, etc. At this level, values are assigned to pronominals through different mechanisms (e.g. the creation of a new file card or updating information on an existing file card), discourse functions become available (e.g. prominence, point of view, focus), and variables are maintained. In this chapter, I first present the general framework of the Syntax–Discourse Model and postulate both syntactic and discourse factors that are required for the establishment of coreference (3.1). This essentially yields a distinction between the establishment of a syntactic dependency and that of a discourse dependency. Section 3.2 looks in more detail at the interpretive processes associated with the interpretation of different pronominal elements (se-anaphors, self-anaphors, and ordinary pronouns) and discusses potential ways of how the system might try to achieve well-formedness and thus resolve the interpretation of these pronominals. This section shows that the inherent structure of a pronominal element determines how the element is projected at the level of discourse representation and what kind of discourse processes it can be or must be subjected to. In section 3.3, the impact of the nature of the antecedent and its discourse representation on the formation of a dependency with a pronominal is discussed. Just as in the case of pronominal elements, the discourse representations of antecedent-DPs depend on their internal structure, which allows for distinct mechanisms during the establishment of a pronominal–antecedent relation. Finally, the different processes available for the formation of dependency relations are examined in terms of economy considerations (3.4). The resulting hierarchy of dependencies makes specific predictions for the processing demands exerted during the establishment of dependency in direct connection to the nature of both the pronominal and the antecedent. This provides the basis for a series of experiments investigating pronominal– antecedent relations that seek to validate the predictions for sentence processing derivable from the Syntax–Discourse Model (chapters 4–6).

3.1.  Interpretive mechanisms 3.1.1.  Computational system The notion of coargumenthood (Reinhart and Reuland 1993; cf. also Pollard and Sag 1992) is taken as the core principle that governs the interpretation of pronominals in the syntactic representation. Although coargumenthood is a condition on predicates, which is not a syntactic condition, I consider the

Syntax–discourse correspondences

checking of coargumenthood as a process that takes place within the computational system, as it represents a relation that is based on the formation of phrase structure. In particular, the concept of reflexive-marked predicates plays a central role within the model presented here. The phrase structure of a sentence is formed by joining two elements and forming a new constituent (i.e. ‘merge’ operation in the spirit of Chomsky 1995) and is evaluated with respect to coargumenthood, where only those pronominals that form a coargumenthood relation with an antecedent enter into a syntactic dependency with this particular antecedent.2 This is indicated by the reflexive-marking of the predicate. Coargumenthood is therefore the key factor for the determination of the level at which the pronominal–antecedent dependency is formed. I chose this particular framework to account for the structural aspects of the establishment of coreference within the Syntax–Discourse Model, as it seems to account for the distribution of reflexives, pronouns, and logophors in the most consistent manner (compared to the other accounts discussed in section 2.1.1). This is based on the following observations: First, as argued for in section 1.2, logophors seem to pattern with pronouns — not with reflexives — and the concept of coargumenthood reflects this pattern. The empirical evidence from logophoricity presented in chapter 2 strongly implies that the discourse notion of point of view is a crucial factor in logophor interpretation, and that it is this factor that distinguishes logophors from pronouns (as indicated by the structural non-complementarity). At the same time, as previously mentioned, logophors and pronouns share the ability to introduce a guise (cf. discussion in sections 1.2 and 3.2.2.1 below). Absence of coargumenthood can then be invoked to group these two pronominal elements together, and the distinction between them is resolved in discourse (as stipulated in Reinhart and Reuland 1993). Second, the structural accounts discussed in chapter 2 agree that reflexives carry the special property of requiring a local antecedent (as for instance evidenced by the formulation of Principle A or coargumenthood). This indicates that a model of pronominal dependency should distinguish between local and non-local relations (cf. also Everaert 2003; Safir 2004). A formal account of pronominal interpretation should therefore be capable of singling out reflexives compared to pronouns and logophors. However, the Binding Theory and its movement-oriented extensions (e.g. Huang 1983; Chomsky 1986, 1995; Hestvik 1991; Hornstein 2001) group reflexives and logophors together, as they are both subjected to movement operations (cf. also Huang 1994b — especially chapter 4 on Chinese long-distance reflexives — for a discussion of the inadequacy of purely movement-based accounts). In

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c­ ontrast, Reflexivity Theory treats reflexives separately, as they are the only entities that allow presence of coargumenthood with an antecedent. The notion of coargumenthood thus serves to reflect the contrast between reflexives on the one hand and logophors and pronouns on the other hand. Third, the availability of se- and self-anaphors in languages like Dutch yields the following patterns, which cannot be explained by the Binding Theory accounts (as for instance discussed in Baauw 2002: 156ff.):

(3) Jani waste zichi. Jan washed se



*Jani wees naar zichi. (4) a.   b. Jani wees naar zichzelfi. Jan pointed at se/self

The fact that (4a) is unacceptable cannot be captured by the locality restriction of Principle A, but the patterns in (3) and (4) follow from Reflexivity Theory, since reflexive-marking is a result of either an intrinsically reflexive predicate (e.g. (3)) or the presence of a self-anaphor (e.g. (4b)) and thus (4a) is ruled out. Reflexivity Theory therefore appears to have advantages over the other accounts, and in what follows, I present how the operations in the computational system are viewed in the Syntax–Discourse Model. I assume that lexical items are merged within the computational system, and as soon as the merge operation is completed, the predicate and its arguments are identified on the basis of the structural configuration. If this configuration satisfies the following reflexivity conditions — as stated in Reinhart and Reuland (1993) and illustrated in section 2.1.1 — the predicate is reflexive-marked: Definitions a. The syntactic predicate formed of (a head) P[redicate] is P, all its syntactic arguments, and an external argument of P (subject). The syntactic arguments of P are the projections assigned θ-role or Case by P. b. The semantic predicate formed of P is P and all its arguments at the relevant semantic level. c. A predicate is reflexive iff two of its arguments are coindexed. d. A predicate (formed of P) is reflexive-marked iff either P is lexically reflexive or one of P’s arguments is a self anaphor.

Syntax–discourse correspondences

Conditions A: A reflexive-marked syntactic predicate is reflexive. B: A reflexive semantic predicate is reflexive-marked. In general, the concept of predicates and their arguments is central to the definitions and conditions on reflexivity in Reinhart and Reuland (1993). Reflexivity can then be satisfied via the following mechanisms: first of all, a predicate is regarded reflexive if two of its arguments are coindexed (definition (c)). This means that only coarguments of a predicate can meet this requirement and the notion of coargumenthood is therefore considered sufficient to indicate the potential for a dependency relation between two arguments. Consider the following two examples:

(5) The joggeri timed himselfi.



(6) Johni said to Mary that physicists like himselfi were a godsend. (from Kuno 1987: 123, which is a variation of Ross’s 1970: 230 original observation)

In (5), the jogger and himself are arguments of the predicate timed, i.e. the two DPs are considered coarguments of the predicate. In contrast to this, in (6), John and himself do not represent coarguments of the same predicate, since the predicate said has the following three arguments: the DP John, the PP to Mary, and the that-CP. Himself alone is therefore not an argument of the main predicate, and the predicate cannot be reflexive under the assumed definition. Hence, coargumenthood between two entities is one crucial factor in determining reflexivity. Secondly, a predicate is by definition reflexive-marked if it is lexically reflexive or one of its arguments is a self-anaphor (definition (d)). This distinction between lexically reflexive predicates and self-anaphors as arguments is necessary as languages differ in terms of the kinds of lexical items they have to denote pronominal elements; English, for instance, only has a two-way contrast between self-anaphors (e.g. herself, ourselves) and pronouns (e.g. her, we); German or Dutch have a three-way contrast between se-anaphors, self-anaphors, and pronouns. For example, the pronominal himself in (5) depicts an instance of a self-anaphor, hence its predicate is reflexive-marked. Similarly, schämt (‘ashamed’) in German is a lexically reflexive predicate, which also licenses reflexive-marking:

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(7) Stefani schämt sichi. Stefan shamed self(se) ’Stefan is ashamed.’

Therefore, if either of the conditions of reflexive-marking is met, this condition is satisfied. As with the first criterion, the underlying notion is that of coargumenthood. So even though a self-anaphor is available in (6), it cannot endorse reflexive-marking of the predicate said, as himself is not an argument of this predicate (but is an argument of like). In addition to these conditions on reflexivity, Reinhart and Reuland (1993: 698) postulate the Chain condition, which is for instance required to account for the ungrammaticality of a coreferential pronoun in an argument position of an inherently reflexive predicate and for anaphors in ECM constructions: A maximal A-Chain (α1, . . . , αn) has a. exactly one link — α1, which is both +R and marked for structural Case — and b. exactly one θ–marked link. The property [+R] indicates the referentiality of an entity. In particular, a DP that is [+R] must be fully specified for Φ-features (number, person, gender, category) and structural Case. Examples of [+R] entities are full DPs. In contrast, sich (‘self ’) in (7) is only marked for third-person features (and D‑feature) and is therefore considered [−R]. It can thus establish an A-Chain with the full DP Stefan, since then there is exactly one link that is [+R] and it can further be assumed that there is only one θ–role expressed by the two entities forming the Chain. Hence, Chains can be directly relevant for lexically reflexive predicates and capture the fact that arity reduction is highly associated with them (see also Reinhart 2000, 2002). For instance, for (8) the conditions on reflexive-marking are met, since the predicate represents a lexically reflexive predicate and its arguments are coarguments; therefore, in order to rule out a coreferential reading of ihn (=Stefan), the Chain condition is needed. Since the pronoun carries full feature specification, it is [+R] and hence cannot form a Chain with the antecedent. So the German example in (8) is ruled out by the Chain condition:

(8) *Stefani schämt ihni. Stefan shamed him ’Stefan is ashamed.’

Syntax–discourse correspondences

Furthermore, the A-Chain condition was introduced to account for ECM constructions, which only allow a coreferential se-anaphor (in German (9)) or a self-anaphor in English (10), but not a pronoun: 3

(9) a. Jani hörte sichi singen. Jan heard self(se) sing *Jani hörte ihni singen. b.   Jan heard him sing ‘Jan heard himself sing.’

(10) Johni heard himself­i/*himi sing. Reinhart and Reuland (1993) consider the conditions on reflexivity and the Chain condition to be two distinct and independent operations that join forces to account for the different patterns of dependencies observed in pronominal–antecedent relations, and they can thus account for the distributional differences of pronouns, se-anaphors and self-anaphors. Reuland (2001) shows how these conditions can be derived from general mechanisms within the Minimalist Program (Chomsky 1995, 1998). Within this view, the Chain condition can be derived from ‘move’ operation and ‘feature checking’, since Chain formation can be redefined as feature checking of interpretable features of the pronominal.4 The underlying notion is that all lexical items come with a set of grammatical features; the antecedent (e.g. Stefan in (7)) has full feature specification, while the pronominal (e.g. sich) does not carry full feature specification. These two elements can then enter into a checking relationship, as the third-person feature associated with the antecedent DP can check the third-person feature of sich, as well as its D-feature, which results in the formation of a formal dependency. This syntactic dependency is thus driven by the general need to execute feature checking. This accounts for the distribution of se-anaphors. The distribution of the other pronominal entities is explained by general economy consideration, where dependencies are established at different levels of interpretation (see section 2.2). On the basis of these proposals, I suggest that the mechanisms that are relevant for pronominal interpretation and that are established within the computational system are two-fold. On the one hand, coargumenthood is assessed and it is determined whether a predicate is reflexive-marked. This accounts for both se- and self-anaphors that are in a coargument relation with their antecedent, while it rules out coreference between a pronoun and a coargument antecedent. On the other hand, a Chain operation is needed, for example to

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rule out the use of a pronoun as an argument of an inherently reflexive predicate; but as noted above, this condition can be derived from general feature checking mechanisms. Hence, once the lexical elements are merged into the syntactic structure, it is determined whether reflexive-marking is available via the criteria discussed above. Crucially, these criteria are closely tied to coargumenthood, and thus only apply to two arguments that are codependent on the same predicate (which ultimately carries the property [+Refl]). This relation between arguments and their predicate is what makes the dependency a syntactic one: once a maximal projection is formed, reflexive-marking of the predicate is checked (which might be viewed as a process similar to the checking of subcategorial information). A predicate can be [+Refl] when it carries this property internally or when one of its arguments represents a self-anaphor. One way to look at self-anaphors is then that they also carry an internal [+Refl] property. For example, Fox (1993) suggests that the self-part of the reflexive undergoes head movement to the predicate, which then yields a new [+Refl] head. The view that self carries a [+Refl] feature could further be supported by the observation that a significant number of reflexive markers across languages have their origin in e.g. body parts or the self and are considered to ‘stand for’ these entities (cf. Schladt 1999; section 3.2.2.2). Consequently, in the presence of coargumenthood, the following mechanisms apply: if the predicate is inherently reflexive or it has a self-anaphor as one of its arguments, then the predicate is reflexive-marked [+Refl]. This means that the two arguments form an identity relation. If none of these conditions are met, the predicate is not reflexive-marked [−Refl], and identity cannot be established via syntactic mechanisms. The examples in (11a) from German and (11b) from English illustrate these mechanisms:6 (11) a. Tomi wäscht sichi/sich selbsti­­/*ihni. Tom washes self(se)/self(self)/him b. Tomi washes himselfi/*himi. As soon as the lexical items are merged in (11a), wäscht emerges as the predicate which has two arguments. The question then is whether the predicate is reflexive-marked, and since it represents a lexically reflexive element, it suits the condition on reflexive-marking. Therefore the predicate is marked [+Refl]. Note also that ihn cannot enter into a syntactic dependency with its coargument Tom, as both arguments are [+R] and Chain-formation is thus ruled out. Along the same lines, Chain-formation does take place in the cases of both

Syntax–discourse correspondences

sich and sich selbst. In the English example in (11b), merge takes place, washes is the predicate, and one of its arguments — himself — is a self-anaphor. This yields another [+Refl] marking due to the availability of a self-anaphor. In contrast, the pronoun him is not a self-anaphor and furthermore it cannot form a Chain with the antecedent (as is the case in the German equivalent), therefore a coreferential interpretation with Tom is impossible. Finally, in the absence of coargumenthood, the reflexivity conditions on predicates are not met, and the predicate can only be marked [−Refl]. This means that syntactic mechanisms do not operate on merged elements to form a pronominal–antecedent dependency in this configuration. In sum, the role of the computational system in forming pronominal–antecedent dependencies is limited to coargumenthood relations between the pronominal and its antecedent. If this relation is reflexive-marked, the pronominal–antecedent dependency is entirely determined within the computational system (i.e. a discourse dependency does not need to be formed, as the link between the antecedent and the pronominal is established at CHL). In all other cases, the interpretive burden lies beyond the scope of the C­HL. This means that in the absence of a coargumenthood relation, the dependency must be established at the C–I interface (i.e. discourse). This is discussed in the next section.

3.1.2.  Discourse representation For the level of discourse representation, I follow Heim’s (1982) model of File Change Semantics and its extension by Avrutin (1999, 2000, 2004);7 some of the observations made in other discourse theories presented above are also implemented directly within the Syntax–Discourse Model proposed herein (such as the division between given and new information, or notions of point of view). In this model, the immediate connection between syntax and discourse is such that the formation of a functional category in the syntactic representation triggers the formation of a file card in the discourse representation: once a DP (or TP) has been formed via merge operations, a DP triggers the creation of an individual file card and a TP triggers the creation of an event file card.8 In its original formulation, the representational framework of File Change Semantics (Heim 1982) presents a particular view of the level of discourse, where the smallest unit of representation is a file card that signifies a discourse referent. It is assumed that each DP in a syntactic structure is required to be linked to a file card in the discourse representation. A new file card is created in the discourse structure whenever the syntactic input requires the introduc-

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tion of a new discourse referent. Different mechanisms — roughly correlated with definiteness — are engaged in the formation of file cards. The most obvious is the creation of a new file card; this is generally hypothesized to coincide with the presence of an indefinite DP in the syntactic structure. Once a discourse referent has been established, there are two other mechanisms that connect an entity with its discourse referent (i.e. establishment of a dependency). The first one is ‘incorporation’, which updates the information associated with a prior established file card. Examples of this process are the repetition of a DP (which generally is marked for definiteness), such as the book in (12b), or the use of a pronominal to refer to an already introduced referent, as illustrated in (12c): (12) a. Henrietta wrote a booki. b. The booki received a lot of attention from the media. c. Iti quickly made the bestseller list. In (12a), a book is introduced as a new discourse referent. Subsequent utterances can then refer to this particular discourse referent by using the definite descriptor the book (12b), or the pronoun it (12c). During the establishment of coreference, the information linked to the discourse referent book is updated, i.e. the following information is successively added to characterize the referent book: was written by Henrietta, received a lot of attention, made the bestseller list. The second mechanism is known as ‘accommodation’ (e.g. Lewis 1979) or ‘inferential bridging’ (e.g. Clark 1975; Clark and Haviland 1977). In this case, a definite DP occurs that does not have a unique file card in the present discourse representation yet (e.g. the bride in (13b)), but a dependency can be established to an existing file card on the basis of information that is inferable from the previous exchange and/or mutual knowledge of the speaker and listener. In the case of (13), such a dependency can be established between the bride and a wedding: (13) a. Suzy went to a wedding over the weekend. b. The bride had bright red hair. This connection is warranted on the basis of the inferences that there are brides at weddings and that the bride mentioned in (13b) is the bride of the wedding previously mentioned. As a consequence, the presence of this particular definite DP results in the creation of a new file card that crucially must enter into what is called a ‘bridging’ relationship with an existing file card.

Syntax–discourse correspondences

In addition to these different mechanisms, Avrutin (2000) proposes that a file card consists of a ‘frame’ and a ‘heading’. A frame is introduced by a functional category (D° or T°) and a heading is introduced by a lexical category (the complement of D° or T°). Looking at individual file cards more closely, the following mechanisms are hypothesized to take place during the creation of a new file card, as for instance required by the indefinite DP in (12a): The syntactic structure is built. As soon as a DP is formed in the syntactic representation (e.g. a book), the creation of an individual file card is initiated in the discourse representation, where D­° (e.g. the features [third person, singular, indefinite] associated with a) provides the frame for this file card and the complement (e.g. book) supplies the heading: (14)

...

DP 0

D

NP

a

book

book

frame: a

Now, a book is considered to correspond to a unique referent in the discourse representation, and succeeding utterances can refer to this particular referent by using for instance a definite descriptor. One example for this is given in (12b), where the DP the book can corefer with the discourse referent introduced by a book, which was established in the previous utterance (12a). As before, the elements are merged in the computational system, and as soon as a DP is formed, a file card is created in discourse: (15) DP D0

NP

the

book

book

frame: the

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This time, the file card has a frame corresponding to the definite marker the (i.e. the features [third person, singular, definite]) and the heading book. Given the nature of definiteness (cf. Heim 1982 on the familiarity condition), a definite DP implies that it relates to discourse-old information, i.e. to an already established discourse referent.8 As a consequence, once a file card with a definite-marked frame is established, it seeks a discourse referent that matches its description (i.e. its heading) and information is updated (i.e. the referent book that previously has been characterized as being written by Henrietta is now additionally characterized as receiving a lot of attention from the media). In the original work by Heim (1982), it is suggested that the new information is added to the old file card in a process referred to as incorporation. However, I follow Avrutin (2004) by suggesting that the actual updating of information takes place via a ‘cut-and-paste’ operation unto the most recently established file card. The motivation for this is that in order to preserve the event structure, the newly established file card should be maintained, while the representation of the event containing the old file card (e.g. a book) can be considered completed at this point and transferring given information from that unit consequently does not violate the structure of the previous event and further facilitates the maintenance of a level of discourse prominence and recency. Avrutin’s (2004) original argument for a ‘cut-and-paste’ operation (vs. a ‘copy-and-paste’ operation) is also related to event structure considerations. He points out that in the case of pronoun interpretation as in (16), the availability of a ‘copy-and-paste’ operation would yield an ungrammatical coreference relation (him=the boy), while a ‘cut-and-paste’ operation would be disallowed by constraints on the particular event structure of tickle, which requires two arguments. (16) The boy tickled him. (17) a. *

tickle

boy

—

the

him

+pst Leaving aside the particular issues relating to pronominal interpretation for now, the discourse representation of the event tickle is triggered by the forma-

Syntax–discourse correspondences

tion of the TP in the syntactic representation, which results in the creation of an event file card with the frame provided by T 0 (+pst) and the heading provided by the verb tickle. This event requires two arguments, which are represented by the individual file cards associated with the boy and him in (17a). However, as will become apparent further below, the file card of him is ill-formed, as it lacks a heading. Therefore, a dependency must be established with an antecedent that can supply a heading for the pronoun’s file card. Crucial for Avrutin’s claim against ‘copy and paste’ is the following: if the boy served as a potential referent, a ‘copy-and-paste’ operation would produce a legitimate discourse representation, as the information associated with the file card for boy would be copied and added into the pronoun’s file card, thus providing it with a sufficient heading. As a result, both of the individual file cards would be wellformed and the event file card would also be well-formed. However, this would yield the interpretation of the boyi tickled the boyi , which is incorrect. In contrast, a ‘cut-and-paste’ operation would generate an ill-formed event representation and (correctly) disallow coreference between the boy and the pronoun. Cutting the information out off the file card of the boy would accomplish creating a well-formed file card for the pronoun (17b), but it would leave the file card associated with the boy empty, which in turn would create an illicit representation of the event tickle, which requires two individual file cards: (17) b. *

tickle

—

boy

the

him

+pst In sum, I have presented arguments based on general information structural and argument structural considerations in support of the view that definite DPs are subject to information updating by a cut-and-paste operation that joins information on the most recently introduced file card. Another discourse mechanism that has been identified in the past, in addition to the introduction of a discourse-new referent and information updating associated with a discourse-old referent, is that of inferential bridging or accommodation by bridging (e.g. Clark 1975; Clark and Haviland 1977; Lewis 1979; Heim 1982).9 An example for this phenomenon was provided in

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(13) above. The core assumption guiding this mechanism is that definite DPs can only refer to discourse-old information. In (13b) however, the definite DP the bride represents a discourse-new entity, so the definite marking should be disallowed on the basis of the given–new distinction. Nevertheless, the two utterances in (13) are generally considered to be felicitous. How can this be explained? The standard explanation is that common knowledge creates the foundation to make inferences about a possible connection between the bride and a wedding, such that the definite DP is understood as the bride of the wedding, i.e. an event mentioned in the previous utterance (13a). In terms of the Syntax–Discourse Model, the DP the bride triggers the introduction of a file card with the frame provided by D° and the heading provided by the noun complement. Since the frame is marked for definiteness, and updating is not possible due to the unavailability of a coreferring discourse-old entity, the file card representing bride enters into a ‘bridging’ relationship with the existing, discourse-old file card wedding. In other words, in the absence of a unique discourse-old referent, a file card that stands in an inferential relationship with the newly formed definite file card can function as an anchor for this definite file card to form its own discourse referent. Crucially, in contrast to the process of updating of a definite DP, there is no cut-and-paste operation involved in bridging, as the two referents (wedding/bride) do not refer to the same entity; rather, the bridging dependency licenses the validity of the establishment of a unique referent for bride by sharing some information (such as the bride of the wedding).10 The problem arising from the creation of a file card representing a definite DP that does not have a previously established referent can thus be circumvented, if world knowledge or mutual knowledge between the speaker and the hearer (including deictically invoked entities) can generate an inferential linkage to a discourse-old referent.11 However, it has also been noticed extensively that the inferential power is restricted and cannot be extended beyond limits (e.g. Chafe 1972; Clark 1975). For instance, Clark (1975: 189) discusses the use of epithets like (18a) and notes their limitations (e.g. the bastard could not be replaced with the rancher and still enter into a valid bridging relation with a man). Similarly, the successful use of the homerun king or the left-fielder of the Giants in (18b)12 depends on the knowledge of the speaker/hearer (i.e. hearer-old information in the sense of Prince 1992): (18) a. I met a man yesterday. The bastard stole all my money. b. Barry Bonds won his fourth MVP award last year. {The homerun king/The left-fielder of the Giants} has been implicated in the burgeoning steroids controversy.

Syntax–discourse correspondences

The availability of two information units that refer to the same referent (man/ bastard; Barry Bonds/home-run king) might be viewed in terms of guises, a concept that is central to the interpretation of self-anaphors as well (e.g. Heim 1998; Thornton and Wexler 1999; see also section 3.2.2.1). Important for the present discussion is that the introduction of new information coupled with definiteness can yield a dependency relation, which is referred to as bridging, under specific circumstances. To conclude, the three discourse mechanisms reviewed here — creation of a new discourse entity, cut-and-paste, and bridging — are largely related to the status of definiteness and the availability of a unique discourse-old referent. These notions and operations are also important for pronominal–antecedent relations. But before turning to the actual processes available for the interpretation of different pronominal elements, a number of conditions on the wellformedness of discourse referents need to be discussed. Avrutin (2004) proposes that a well-formed file card must consist of both a frame (introduced by a functional category) and a heading (introduced by a lexical category). He further states the following discourse rules: (19) a. There can be no Frame without a Heading. b. There can be no Heading without a Frame. The frame is the immediate connector between the computational system and the discourse representation, as it signals the system that the discourse unit has a corresponding syntactic representation. The frame carries all the features of its corresponding functional category and conveys information about the type of the discourse unit. Individual file cards can be subdivided into indefinite, definite and quantified file cards (e.g. in English these are introduced by a, the, every/some/etc. respectively). Similarly, the frame of an event file card indicates the temporal dimensions of the event (e.g. present, future, past). The heading supplies the referential content of the information unit (e.g. a person, object, place, event, etc.). Taken together, the frame and the heading serve to mark discourse-relevant properties, such as old vs. new information (e.g. definite vs. indefinite). Furthermore, discourse units can be ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ depending on the information provided by the frame and the heading. This is mainly related to the property of referentiality [±R], where entities with full feature specification [+R] project a file card with a strong frame (e.g. himself, which is marked for person, number, gender), and entities that are [−R] trigger the creation of a file card with a weak frame (e.g. the Dutch reflexive zich, which is only marked for

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person, and crucially not for number or gender).13 Moreover, it is suggested that the presence of a heading (e.g. book, self) always yields a strong file card representation. The specifics of this distinction are discussed further below in connection with the syntax–discourse correspondence of particular pronominal entities. These general properties and mechanisms that connect the computational system and discourse representation apply to pronominal interpretation as well: first, the syntactic structure containing the pronominal is built, where the pronominal forms a DP — as depicted in (20) below. Here, it has long been agreed upon that pronouns (and se-anaphors) occur in the head of a DP and that self projects as the NP complement of D (e.g. Postal 1970; Vergnaud 1987; Reinhart and Reuland 1993; Grewendorf 2003). (20) Syntactic representation of a pronominal form: DP D0

NP

her

(self)

Then the formation of the DP results in the creation of a file card in the discourse representation. However, this file card might not be well-formed (e.g. it might violate the rules in (19) above); this becomes apparent by looking for instance at the syntax–discourse correspondence of a pronoun (e.g. her), as illustrated in (21): provided that the head of a functional projection supplies the frame for a file card and the complement the heading, the file card representation of her lacks a heading, which violates the rule in (19a) (no frame without a heading). (21) DP D0

NP

her

0

—

frame: her

In order to satisfy general constraints on discourse representation, a heading must be supplied to the pronoun’s file card. This heading must be rich in con-

Syntax–discourse correspondences

tent, as pronominals are referentially deficient by nature, and in fact, even a well-formed pronominal file card would not be fully interpretable. Hence, pronominal elements differ from full DPs discussed above in (i) that they cannot be interpreted by themselves, i.e. in isolation, but must establish a connection to their antecedent for full interpretation and (ii) that they might not be able to project a well-formed file card representation. In the next section, I look at the different instantiations of pronominals and their syntax–discourse correspondences in more detail.

3.2.  Pronominals and their representations A characteristic property of pronominal entities is that they are referentially deficient and must therefore enter into a dependency relation with an antecedent — or an element in the context of utterance (cf. the discussion of the ‘Situation Card’ in n. 11) — to receive referential content. The way such a dependency is formed depends on the nature of both the pronominal and the antecedent. In this section, I illustrate how various pronominal elements differ with respect to their file card representations. These differences can be attributed to the nature of the frame (i.e. weak or strong) and that of the heading (i.e. present or absent), which differ as a consequence of the information that is provided by the syntactic representation. This makes available the taxonomy of file card representations set out in Table 1. Since all file cards are required to have a frame and a heading by general discourse constraints, the system cannot treat all types of pronominals in the same manner, but must accommodate the specific characteristics and needs to produce a well-formed discourse representation. In the following sections, I outline how the requirements of general well-formedness and referential content are achieved during the interpretation of different types of pronominals. Table 1.  Taxonomy of file card representations Frame

Heading

Examples

strong strong weak weak

absent present absent present

him, her himself, herself Dutch zich Dutch zichzelf

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3.2.1.  The representation of a pronoun In the case of a pronoun as in (22), a DP is formed and triggers the creation of a file card. However, this file card is not well-formed, as it lacks a heading. The frame is supplied by the functional category D0, but since the complement is empty, no heading can be provided during the information transfer from syntax to discourse in the course of the creation of the file card: (22) The teacher­i walked into the room. The students watched heri. (23) DP D0

NP

her

0

—

frame: her

Yet, a heading-less file card is disallowed, since one discourse rule states that there cannot be a frame without a heading ((19a) above). The system therefore strives for providing a heading for this file card. How may this be accomplished? It has been an uncontroversial issue in the literature that pronouns can never enter into a syntactic dependency with their antecedents, and I have presented above how the computational system (in particular Chain formation under feature checking) rules out this possibility. Instead, the present proposal suggests that a discourse dependency is established, during which the pronoun’s file card is linked to the file card of its antecedent. At the level of discourse representation, first, the candidate set of available antecedents is searched for the best match, and then the pronominal enters into a dependency relation with it. How is the antecedent selected? First of all, the creation of a pronoun’s file card in the discourse representation triggers a search operation for the best antecedent candidate. The system looks for an antecedent that matches the feature specifications supplied by the frame (e.g. person, number, gender information). These features are inherent properties of the pronoun, and it is just in the nature of the language system to use this interpretable information in order to minimize the candidate set of potential antecedents and to aim to preserve this information and map it onto congruent entities. Evidence for this comes from processing studies that have investigated morphological feature matching during pronominal interpretation (cf. Shillcock 1982; Garnham and

Syntax–discourse correspondences

Oakhill 1985; McDonald and MacWhinney 1995; Arnold et al. 2000; Garnham 2001; Badecker and Straub 2002; Yang et al. 2003). Second, discourse-based information such as discourse prominence and cognitive status (cf. Ariel 1990; Gundel et al. 1993; Grosz et al. 1995) influence the selection of the antecedent.14 This is also supported by evidence from processing and corpus studies (cf. Ariel 1990; Gundel et al. 1993; Gordon et al. 1993; Hudson-D’Zmura and Tanenhaus 1998). Once a potential antecedent has been identified based on considerations of morphological feature matching and discourse prominence, the referential content specified in the heading of the antecedent’s file card can be pasted into the pronoun’s file card to transform it into a well-formed and referentially meaningful information unit. The empty heading of the pronoun’s file card can be filled in via a cut-and-paste operation from the information in the heading of the antecedent’s file card, as the pronoun is similar to a definite DP in that it refers to a discourse-old entity. Since the link between a recurring DP and a previously established discourse referent is formed via a cut-and-paste operation onto the most recent DP, this kind of updating should also be available for pronouns. It solves both problems identified above: first, the heading is supplied to establish a well-formed information unit, and as a consequence, the pronoun now carries referential meaning. A discourse dependency has then been successfully established. As I pointed out above with respect to example (17), the motivation to implement a cut-and-paste operation is to maintain the most immediate event structure. This is also critical for the selection of an antecedent candidate. For instance, in a sentence like (24), morphological feature matching allows both Lisa and Sarah to function as potential antecedents. (24) Lisai mentioned that Sarah irritated heri . However, if information is transferred from the file card of Sarah to the pronoun’s file card, this yields an unacceptable event structure, as the last activated predicate irritated requires two arguments (i.e. two individual file card representations) and a cut-and-paste operation only sustains one referent.15 In sum, the mechanism proposed here for the establishment of a dependency between a pronoun and its antecedent is a cut-and-paste operation.16 This is closely linked to the absence of a heading on the pronoun’s file card. The next question is then what happens when a heading is present, as is the case for self-anaphors.

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3.2.2.  The representation of a self-anaphor How do reflexives, as for instance herself in (25) and (26), obtain their interpretation? Again, a DP is formed in syntax, which causes the creation of a file card in discourse. This time, the file card is well-formed, as it has both a frame (her) and a heading (self ): (25) The cellisti defended herselfi. (26) The ballerinai put a towel next to herselfi. (27) DP D0

NP

her

self

self

frame: her

Note that there is a substantial difference between the reflexive in (25) and (26). According to the reflexivity operation established in 3.1.1, the predicate in (25) is identified as reflexive-marked [+Refl], while the predicate put in (26) does not satisfy the requirements for reflexive-marking and is thus [−Refl]. As a consequence, a syntactic dependency is formed between the reflexive and the antecedent in (25), whereas (26) yields a discourse dependency. Let’s look at these processes separately. In the case of (25), the fact that one of the arguments of defended is a self‑anaphor yields reflexive-marking of the predicate. This in turn allows for the formation of a syntactic dependency between the cellist and herself, which establishes an identity relation between the two arguments. Nonetheless, it has also been stated that the interface operation between the computational system and discourse automatically triggers the creation of information units: Tº creates an event file for defended and the two Dºs create individual file cards for the cellist and himself. The reflexive’s file card is well-formed in that it has a strong frame and a heading, but the heading does not represent a unique value, but functions as a kind of variable. However, since the dependency has been formed within the computational system, the file card of the reflexive does not need to be uniquely interpretable in the discourse representation. The predicate that provides the event structure is marked [+Refl], which implies that the activity expressed by it is performed on the individual discourse unit that is

Syntax–discourse correspondences

i­ nterpretable (i.e. the antecedent). This yields an acceptable interpretation on the basis of the dependency determined in the computational system. The reflexive in (26), in contrast to this, is not in a coargument relation with the antecedent the ballerina. Therefore the predicate cannot be reflexivemarked by it, and the dependency must be established outside of syntax — as here suggested, at the discourse level: Even though the file card of herself is a well-formed information unit (with a frame and a heading), the heading self is not interpretable in itself, as it is still undetermined to which unique entity self refers. In other words, self is considered a variable that expresses a kind of an identity relation and must establish a link with the entity with which it is identical (i.e. ‘stands-for’) or which it represents a ‘guise’ of. Before illustrating how the dependency between an antecedent and a self-anaphor is established within the Syntax–Discourse Model, the next two subsections review the reasoning underlying the concept of ‘stand-for’ (section 3.2.2.2) and the notion of ‘guise’ (section 3.2.2.1).

3.2.2.1.  Guises The notion of ‘guises’ (as discussed in Jackendoff 1992; Heim 1998; Thornton and Wexler 1999; Baauw and Delfitto 1999; inter alia) can be illustrated using the Madame Tussaud context, where a famous person visits Madame Tussaud’s and encounters a wax statue of himself: (28) Clinton saw himself next to Madonna. In this case, himself does not stand in a true identity relation with the realworld person Clinton (i.e. he does not see an actual mirror image of himself or have an out-of-body experience), but refers to a ‘guise’ (here, a wax statue). In this example then, self does not refer to the genuine person represented by the antecedent Clinton, but to an object that resembles and shares many characteristics with this antecedent. In this sense self takes on a special meaning, that of a guise.17 The fact that two entities are available — Clinton as a person and Clinton as a wax statue — is provided by the discourse context — in the current scenario, it can be inferred from the world knowledge that Mme Tussaud’s represents a collection of wax figures. The distinction between real person and statue must thus be identifiable within the discourse representation. Hence, even though the configuration reflects a coargument relationship, which yields a syntactic dependency, world knowledge of Mme Tussaud’s wax cabinet prompts further discourse mechanisms to apply.18 A similar example can be found in a scence from Harry Potter and the prisoner

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The syntax–discourse interface

of Azkaban (Rowling 1999), where the two protagonists Harry and Hermione used a ‘Time-Turner’, which allowed them to go back in time by three hours. As a consequence, the two protagonists were able to watch themselves in the situation three hours earlier, which requires access to two guises or instantiations of the characters. Hence, in the following example, subscript 1 marks the referents at the time of having the Time-Turner and subscript 2 marks the referents three hours earlier: (29) a. ‘This is three hours ago, and we are walking down to Hagrid’s,’ said Hermione. ‘We1 just heard ourselves2 leaving . . .’ [from Rowling 1999: 290] b. ‘Don’t you understand? We1’re breaking one of the most important wizarding laws! Nobody’s supposed to change time, nobody! You heard Dumbledore, if we1’re seen –‘ ‘We1’d only be seen by ourselves2 and Hagrid!’ ‘Harry1, what do you1 think you1/2’d do if you2 saw yourself1 bursting into Hagrid’s house?’ said Hermione. [. . .] [Y]ou2 might even attack yourself1! Don’t you see? Professor McGonagall told me what awful things have happened when wizards have meddled with time . . . loads of them ended up killing their past or future selves by mistake!’ [from Rowling 1999: 291–2] c. ‘We2’re about to come out!’ Hermione1 breathed. And sure enough, moments later, Hagrid’s back door opened, and Harry1 saw himself2 , Ron and Hermione walking out of it with Hagrid. It was, without a doubt, the strangest sensation of his1 life, standing behind the tree, and watching himself2 in the pumpkin patch. [from Rowling 1999: 292] What these examples illustrate is that only with the help of contextual know­ ledge — about the availability of two time-dependent guises — can the intended interpretation be accomplished, and critically, a purely syntactic analysis yields the wrong interpretation, just as in the Clinton-example in (28) above. This indicates that discourse-based processing must take place. Finally, an interesting variation reported from Dutch supports the view that self bears a special interpretive function (from Reuland 2001: 493): “Consider the following discourse in Dutch: [. . .] Marie is famous and walked into Madame Tussaud’s.”

Syntax–discourse correspondences

(30) Ze keek in een spiegel en she looked in a mirror and a. ze zag zich in een griezelige hoek staan. she saw se in a creepy corner stand b. ze zag zichzelf in een griezelige hoek staan. she saw self in a creepy corner stand ‘She looked in a mirror and she saw herself standing in a creepy corner.’ The interpretation of (30a) with zich suggests a true identity relation (i.e. Marie saw herself in the mirror — i.e. a direct reflection of herself in the mirror). In contrast, the use of zichzelf in (30b) implies a guise-like reading, such that Marie saw a statue of herself. This minimal pair indicates that self-anaphors are closely tied to discourse processes such as needed for the representation of guises.19

3.2.2.2.  Stand-for relations Another way of characterizing self is presented in Reuland (2001) where the identity relation between self and its antecedent is discussed in terms of a ‘stand for’ relation: self  ‘stands for’ a particular entity present in the discourse. Apart from the special scenarios such as Mme Tussaud’s contexts or Münchhausen contexts, looking at the lexical origin of reflexives across languages provides insights into the kind of relationship that is expressed by such a ‘stand for’ dependency. A typological survey of reflexives in 149 languages20 (Schladt 1999) suggests that a substantive number of reflexive markers have emerged from a limited set of salient body parts (e.g. body, bone, head, face, skin).21 Hence conceptually, reflexivity is often tied to this notion of body parts, arguably implying a special kind of guise or denoting a particular property of the antecedent. Other lexical sources refer to terms for the self (e.g. self, person), terms denoting the soul/spirit, expressions of reflection22, and a few others. What all these cases support is that reflexives represent variables that ‘stand for’ a salient feature of the discourse entities associated with them. These brief excursions reveal that the notion of guise and the more general notion of stand-for relations highlight that the variable self does not necessarily express an identity relation, but can be associated with the introduction of a new discourse referent (such as a wax statue or a body part). This then suggests a parallel to the bridging operation discussed above (Avrutin 2004). The

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crucial parallel is that the discourse representation of a self-anaphor can be a discourse-new entity (like the bridged entity the bride in (13)), which must be linked to an entity already present in the discourse, as it does not qualify as an independent discourse-new entity. A discourse-new definite DP like the bride does not represent a valid new file card, as only indefinite DPs are allowed to create a new discourse referent; the solution is to establish a dependency with a discourse-old entity (e.g. wedding) via inferential bridging. Likewise, a selfanaphor does not qualify as a well-formed discourse referent due to its inherent nature of being referentially dependent (which is also reflected in having a variable as heading). But similar to the definite DP, it has a heading, so a cutand-paste operation is ruled out (unless another discourse referent was available with the matching heading self, as this operation can only be performed between cards with identical headings or in the absence of a heading). In a configuration like (26) (repeated below), the reflexive’s discourse representation is thus linked to the antecedent by a process similar to inferential bridging: (26) The ballerinai put a towel next to herselfi. The file card of the reflexive is established in the discourse representation and it then seeks to enter into a dependency with a potential antecedent to assign a discourse value to the stand-for variable self. Similar to the bridging mechanism observed with definite DPs, some inference is required in order to establish the connection between the self-anaphor and its referent, which is the notion that there is an entity available that self stands for and can be referenced to. This inference might be related to the conceptual origin underlying reflexive elements, in a way that the occurrence of self triggers the establishment of inferences concerning the functional origin related to body parts, the self, the soul, etc. The search for a potential antecedent is thus limited by this special function of self. In addition, as the review of the literature in chapter 2 has highlighted, reflexive elements that appear in non-coargumenthood environments can be associated with notions of point of view, self, source, or pivot (e.g. Hagège 1974; Kuno and Kaburaki 1977; Sells 1987; Kuno 1987; etc.), and it has been suggested that these notions can be encoded as discourse functions (henceforth point-of-view function) (e.g. Sells 1987). However, invoking an independent point-of-view function as an interpretive function governing self-anaphors has the same effect as the stand-for function. The point-of-view function might therefore be considered a subcomponent of the stand-for function (i.e. a self-anaphor can stand for the internal state or point of view of the

Syntax–discourse correspondences

antecedent). Finally, the presence of the heading self (and thus the application of the stand-for function) narrows down the antecedent candidate set; this models the behavior of logophors with respect to their non-complementary pronouns. For instance, Zribi-Hertz (1989) points out that logophoric reflexive entities occur in more limited constellations than pronouns; for example, she indicates that (third person) reflexives cannot be used deictically (while pronouns can). To conclude, the file card of the self-anaphor is connected to its antecedent’s file card via a bridging dependency that is determined on the basis of the inherent property of the heading of the reflexive’s file card (i.e. stand-for function). Interestingly, in many languages, a se-anaphor is chosen in logophoric contexts like (26) above. These reflexive entities then behave differently as far as file card formation is concerned — since they lack a heading — and consequently the stand-for function is unavailable (as it is tied to the heading self). The question is then how interpretation is obtained in these cases and how it differs from the processes just described with respect to self-anaphors. This will be discussed in the next section.

3.2.3.  The representation of a se-anaphor Dutch, for example, distinguishes between se- and self-anaphor, but a se-anaphor is found in the presence of coargumenthood and crucially also in the absence of it (i.e. in environments supporting logophoric interpretation).23 This indicates that the stand-for function cannot be invoked in these latter cases, as a self-heading is not available. The question is then how the Syntax–Discourse Model can account for the cross-linguistic variation in these environments between se-anaphors (as for instance found in Dutch) and self-anaphors (as found in English and Dutch). Here, I discuss the interpretation of se-anaphors in coargumenthood and non-coargumenthood environments, as experimental evidence for this contrast is discussed in chapter 4. For the establishment of a dependency in the computational system (i.e. presence of coargumenthood), the presence of a se-anaphor means that the predicate is solely responsible for reflexive-marking, as the alternative means to accomplish reflexive-marking requires a self-anaphor. For the establishment of a discourse dependency (i.e. absence of coargumenthood), two mechanisms have been identified above, but the stand-for function cannot be appealed to, as it is closely connected to the variable heading self, which is absent from se-anaphors. This leaves us with the point-of-view function. In the

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f­ ollowing, I look at examples from Dutch to illustrate the interpretation of se­anaphors. se-anaphors are phrase structurally identical to pronouns, as both elements are projected as heads of a DP. However, they may be distinguished in terms of their file card representations. Avrutin (2004) proposes that the respective file card of zich is a weak file card, as it does not provide a full morphological feature specification (i.e. it is [−R], as it is only specified for (third) person features). This violates the well-formedness conditions on file card representation. I propose that in order to achieve a well-formed representation, a weak file card can be elevated to a strong file card through a dependency relation with its antecedent. But first, I briefly consider the case of a syntactic dependency as required in (31) (parallel to (25) from English): (31) De jongeni verkleedde zichi. the boy dressed se ‘The boy dressed himself.’ (32) DP D0

NP

zich

0

—

(weak) frame: zich

In this case, the phrase structure is formed, and since the predicate verkleedde is lexically reflexive, it is properly reflexive-marked (see definition (d) of Reinhart and Reuland 1993). This licenses a syntactic dependency. In addition, arity reduction via Chain formation can take place, as zich is not fully specified for Φ-features and is thus [−R], which makes it a legitimate link in a Chain with the [+R]-element de jongen (‘the boy’). However, the creation of a DP in the syntactic configuration still triggers the establishment of a corresponding information unit in discourse (32). Yet, as is the case in the English equivalent, the syntactic dependency suffices to complete interpretation. Hence, even though the reflexive’s file card is ill-formed — as it lacks a heading and has a weak frame — the discourse representation does not care, as the predicate is marked [+Refl] and therefore only needs one unique discourse referent (de jongen) to succeed in interpretation. When looking at coargument reflex-

Syntax–discourse correspondences

ives, the system therefore does not distinguish between se- and self-anaphors within this Syntax–Discourse Model (i.e. the Dutch vs. English variants), as the crucial feature to satisfy interpretation is establishing a syntactic dependency via the reflexive-marking of the predicate.

3.2.3.1.  A note on se- vs. self-anaphors At this point, a potential puzzle, or rather redundancy, should be addressed that is found in the Dutch reflexivity patterns. Dutch has a limited class of verbs that allow for both zich and zichzelf (e.g. drogen — ‘dry’, bezeren — ‘hurt’, trainen — ‘train’, krabben — ‘scratch’). Depending on which anaphor is used, the interpretations differ slightly. Everaert (1991) suggests that these verbs permit the addition of zelf as an emphatic marker, which fits the view advocated here that self is a variable that performs a discourse function. Therefore, the use of zichzelf is determined by discourse considerations; e.g. in (33), it adds information about the (in)voluntary nature of the action: zich implies that the hurting occurred by accident, whereas zichzelf implies that the hurting was done on purpose. (33) Hiji bezeerde zichi/zichzelf­i he hurt se/self ’He hurt himself.’ How can the Syntax–Discourse Model explain the two distinct interpretations? There are two possible approaches. The first approach assumes that these verbs have two distinct lexical entries, where one is inherently reflexive (zich-cases) and the other is not (zichzelf-cases). Reflexive-marking of the former is then achieved via the lexical properties of the predicate and reflexivemarking of the latter is licensed by the presence of self. Such an account, however, is somewhat undesirable, as first, we do not want to inflate the lexicon, and there appears to be a generalization underlying the alterations between zich and zichzelf (but see Reinhart 2000 for a solution to this on the basis of lexicon-operations on θ-roles). Second, the availability of two lexical entries cannot account for the additional interpretive distinctions described above. Contrary to this, the second approach, which is centered around the Syntax– Discourse Model, can explain the subtle distinctions. The issue here is that the model assumes that if a dependency can be formed within the computational system, no further interpretive mechanisms are required. Therefore, both versions should yield the same interpretation, as the predicate is reflexive-marked and a syntactic dependency is formed. However, if we look at a structure like

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(33) with zichzelf, it turns out that reflexive-marking is doubled, as both subconditions of reflexive-marking are met: the predicate is lexically reflexive and a self-anaphor is present. What might happen is that the predicate receives two [+Refl] markings, and due to this redundancy, an extra discourse function takes effect and generates the interpretive emphasis attributed to zichzelf in these constructions. Critcially, English self-anaphors in coargumenthood relations do not represent a counterexample to this: the predicates are generally not intrinsically reflexive, and consequently, English only yields one [+Refl] marker. Finally, the claim then is that the presence of a self-anaphor in these (Dutch) constructions triggers an extra discourse operation. Further evidence for the discourse function of self-anaphors is provided by Zuckerman et al. (2002) who present a classification of se- and self-anaphors on the basis of five different properties: They show that self-anaphors can be stressed and topicalized, can stand alone, can refer to a guise, and can refer non-locally — which are all discourse-related characteristics. In contrast, seanaphors do not have these properties. Returning to the discussion of se-anaphors, a difference is expected for the interpretation of se-anaphors in non-coargument environments, as they do not have a heading, which could otherwise prompt a stand-for function to establish a discourse dependency. Moreover, se-anaphors are assigned a weak file card due to their lack of full feature specification, which distinguishes them from the file card representation of pronouns. Consider (34) (parallel to (26) from English): (34) Een cellisti verschoof een stoel naast zichi . a cellist moved a chair next-to zich ‘A cellist moved a chair next to himself.’ (35)

verschuiven cellist

stoel

een

een

naast – zich

+pst There is no coargumenthood relation between een cellist and zich, since the antecedent is an argument of verschuiven and the reflexive is an argument of

Syntax–discourse correspondences

the preposition naast. So a syntactic dependency is excluded. However, the discourse representation of zich is ill-formed and if this cannot be resolved, the interpretation is determined to crash. A bridging dependency cannot be established, as the file card is lacking a heading that could stimulate the generation of inferences. The other discourse mechanism that makes use of discourse-old information to update an incoming file card is the cut-and-paste operation that incorporates given information into the most recent definite DP. I suggest that this kind of operation takes place during the interpretation of logophoric se-anaphors as in (34). There are two concerns related to this proposal: how does zich find its antecedent? And is the information transfer via cut-and-paste valid? As for the first issue, the candidate set of potential antecedents is restricted by discourse considerations. Notice that the cut-and-paste operation is also utilized in the case of pronouns, whose file cards lack a heading as well. But in contrast to se-anaphors, pronouns come with a strong frame, which facilitates antecedent selection on the basis of morphological information. This information is (at most partially) missing from the file card representation of a seanaphor, and given its weak frame, I propose that it lacks intrinsic power and that only a strong factor can attract it to enter into a dependency. The point-ofview function can be seen as such a factor. This implies that zich cannot enter into a dependency with any available referent in the discourse representation, but requires the presence of a discourse function that supports the formation of a dependency. Hence, a possibility for determining the referent of zich is to identify the most prominent discourse referent and if it carries a point-of-view feature or qualifies to carry one, a dependency can be established. As a consequence, zich has a more limited antecedent candidate set than a pronoun, even though the two entities are both subject to a cut-and-paste operation. This observation is supported by cross-linguistic data from long-distance reflexives and logophors (cf. e.g. Koster and Reuland (1991) and contributions therein). Second, if a referent has been identified, does information transfer via cutand-paste conform to general discourse constraints? I argue here that it is a legitimate operation and that such a transfer of information does not harm the discourse structure. As discussed above, one of the reasons to favour a cut-andpaste operation over a copy-and-paste operation was the preservation of event structure. I apply a similar reasoning to motivate cut-and-paste for se-anaphors. Looking at the discourse representation in (35), the predicate verschuiven (‘move’) requires three arguments — two individual file cards and a location information unit. These are all well-formed, so the event unit is well-formed

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as well. The ill-formed information unit for zich is embedded under the predicate naast (‘next to’), so subsequent pasting in of information from the higherlevel event structure should be allowed and would create a well-formed representation, as the cut-and-paste operation is generally only blocked within a given information unit and here transfer occurs from an event unit into a location unit. The most conservative implementation of this view would be that there is a particular property associated with location information units that allows such a transfer from the higher event into the location unit. A more general approach would be to allow this kind of transfer for all kinds of predicates (i.e. verbs, prepositions, nouns, and adjectives). Therefore, if a predicate forms its own information unit, information transfer via a cut-and-paste operation should be possible from one unit into the other, even if one of them is embedded in the other. This latter approach however is not supported by the data — at least not in Dutch. The example in (36) is an instance of a picture-NP in Dutch, where a dependency out off the individual file card een foto (‘a picture’) is not available in connection with a se-anaphor. Likewise, Dutch does not have a dependency involving a se-anaphor out off a complex DP such as in (37): (36) Briti nam een foto van *zichi/zichzelfi . Brit took a picture of herself ‘Brit took a picture of herself.’ (37) Jani claimde dat de koningin Marie en *zichi/hemzelfi had Jan claimed that the queen Marie and himself has uitgenodigd. invited ‘Jan claimed that the queen invited Mary and himself.’ The reason for the unacceptability of (36) (zich=Brit) and (37) (zich=Jan) might be that the information unit containing zich differs from the location unit in (34).24 So the conservative approach must be taken for now, where prepositional predicates might carry a particular property that allows for the kind of cut-and-paste operation required for the interpretation of zich.25 To conclude, in this section, I have illustrated how different pronominals enter into a dependency with their antecedents. First, the distinction between a syntactic and a discourse dependency is accounted for by presence or absence of coargumenthood and reflexive-marking. In the case of a syntactic

Syntax–discourse correspondences

­ ependency, the discourse representation of a given pronominal does not have d a bearing on interpretation, as only one referent is required as a reflection of the reflexive-marking of the predicate. In the present discussion, I have suggested that the discourse representation is ‘blind’ to the file card representation of the reflexive if a syntactic dependency has been formed. This is based on the notion that [+Refl] (established in syntax) conveys the reflexive nature of the event to the discourse structure (where interpretation ultimately takes place). Another possibility is that in the presence of a syntactic dependency, a link has been established between the two arguments by virtue of [+Refl], which carries over an identity relation into the discourse representation, and the reflexive’s file card can thus be related to the antecedent’s file card. This is similar to Avrutin’s (p.c.) principle of ‘don’t break the dependency’, which proposes that a dependency that has been formed at a certain level, must also hold at a higher level. In other words, a reflexive that has entered into a dependency in syntax maintains this dependency in discourse; crucially, within the current framework, this implies that the stand-for function comes for free, as the linkage between the reflexive and the antecedent has already been established at a lower level. Second, the type of discourse dependency formed is a function of the internal structure of the pronominal entity, which yields either a cut-and-paste or a bridging dependency.26 A bridging relation is formed in those instances where a (discourse-new) heading is available, which is the case for self-anaphors, and has been independently motivated for discourse-new definite DPs. The presence of self as a heading triggers the stand-for discourse function, which supports a dependency with an entity that is inferentially related to the self or the pivot. A cut-and-paste relation is available to file cards that lack a heading (e.g. pronouns, se-anaphors) or otherwise represent a discourse-old entity (as independently proposed for updating of definite DPs). Having a strong frame, a pronoun’s file card seeks to enter into a dependency with an antecedent to achieve a well-formed discourse representation and obtain referential content. In the absence of a strong frame, as is the case for se-anaphors, a discourse function is needed to support the dependency formation (here, the point-ofview function), narrowing down the available antecedent set. In sum, the discourse dependencies set out in Table 2 are associated with the different file card representations. An important question that is investigated in subsequent chapters is how these different dependencies are reflected in online processing. In terms of sentence comprehension, there is evidence from priming that the formation

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The syntax–discourse interface Table 2.  Discourse dependencies associated with the different file card representations Frame

Heading

Example

Discourse function

strong strong

absent present

him, her himself, herself

weak

absent

Dutch zich

weak

present

Dutch zichzelf

cut-and-paste bridging (stand-for) cut-and-paste (point-of-view) bridging (stand-for)

of a bridging dependency demands more processing resources than a cut-andpaste dependency (see the discussion of Acker and Boland 1993 in section 4.1.2.2). But before this issue can be addressed in more detail, the role of the antecedent must be considered, as a pronominal–antecedent dependency always involves two entities. In the next section, I therefore discuss different kinds of antecedents and their impact on interpretation. In this respect, the nature of the functional category and consequently the frame are of particular interest.

3.3.  Antecedents and their file cards We have already seen that individual file cards can be distinguished in terms of definiteness and that this has consequences for the way these file cards are handled in discourse. In English, indefinite DPs have the functional head a, which projects an indefinite frame, and they are considered to introduce discourse-new entities. Definite DPs have the functional head the, which projects a definite frame that is considered to refer to a discourse-old entity via a cutand-paste operation — but under certain circumstances a bridging relationship is permissible as well. However, indefinite and definite DPs are not the only entities that qualify as antecedents. What other functional heads are there besides a and the? There are for instance numerals (as in two bugs, five paintings, etc.) or general quantifiers (which are sometimes defined as determiners) (as in some bugs, every painting, any song, etc.) that occupy D°. These elements differ from definite and indefinite entities as they contribute (together with the common noun expression) to the representation of a set (quantifiers) or at least infer a set (numerals). As far as numerals are concerned, there is still a lot of debate about

Syntax–discourse correspondences

their nature and internal properties (e.g. do they represent functional or lexical categories or are they hybrids), and a detailed discussion is beyond the scope of the present proposal. But what happens with quantified DPs as in (38) to (41)? (38) Every motheri hopes that the kids like heri. (39) Some teachersi hope that the kids like themi. (40) Everyonei hopes that the kids like heri /himi /themi. (41) Someonei hopes that the kids like heri /himi /(?)themi. The quantified DPs in (38)–(39) are considered ‘referential quantifier expression’, as they contain a nominal referential entity (i.e. restrictor) over which they quantify (e.g. mother, teacher). In contrast to this, the quantified DPs in (40)–(41) are known as ‘light quantifier expression’ (Warren 2003). This difference has consequences for the current view of syntax–discourse correspondences. Referential quantifier expressions are ‘discourse-linked’ entities as they have an identifiable, contentful referent; and light quantifier expressions are ‘non-discourse-linked’ as they do not have such a meaningful restrictor associated with them. This distinction bears on Pesetsky’s (1987) division of whphrases into discourse-linked and non-discourse-linked wh-phrases: (42) Which writer received last year’s Nobel Peace Prize? (43) Who received last year’s Nobel Peace Prize? Which writer in (42) is discourse-linked due to the presence of the restrictor set writer, whereas who in (43) is non-discourse-linked. This distinction is further directly related to referentiality [±R] and the phi-features associated with the entities. D-linked entities are fully specified for phi-features [+R], and nond-linked entities lack full feature specification [−R], which is hypothesized to yield a weak frame in the discourse representation. This difference can be illustrated by looking at which pronouns are acceptable coreferents for the quantified expressions introduced above: (44) Every motheri hopes that the kids like *mei /*youi /heri /*himi /*iti / *usi /*youi /*themi. (45) Some teachersi hope that the kids like *mei /*youi /*heri /*himi /*iti / *usi /*youi /themi.

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The syntax–discourse interface

(46) Everyonei hopes that the kids like *mei /*youi /heri /himi /*iti /*usi / *youi /themi. (47) Someonei hopes that the kids like *mei /*youi /heri /himi /*iti /*usi / *youi /(?)themi. The referential quantifiers in (44/45) have a full feature specification, as they only allow coreference with a pronoun specified for person, number, and gender. They are therefore [+R] and their discourse representations obtain a strong frame. The light quantifiers in (46/47) are not fully specified for phi-features. Everyone and someone are not specified for gender features as they allow both feminine and masculine pronouns to corefer with them, and at least everyone is also not specified for number features as it takes both singular and plural coreferring pronouns. It is therefore predicted that light quantifiers, which are [−R] (at least in English), project a weak frame in the discourse representation. This suggests that quantified DPs have different discourse representations depending on their referential status. This has consequences for pronominal interpretation within the current model. A referential quantifier unit introduces a strong file card with a specific heading, and the quantification marked on the frame (e.g. every) must be performed on the heading when accessed by another entity for the establishment of coreference. The entity is therefore ‘d-linked’ according to Pesetsky’s classification, and its heading is accessible just as that of a definite or indefinite DP (i.e. it is identifiable as a unique referent), but it differs from the latter entities in that it has a quantificational frame. This frame specifies a set and the restrictor in the heading must be interpreted with respect to this set; in other words, the file card holds information of the set and the individuals in the set. As a consequence, the establishment of a pronominal–antecedent dependency involving a referential quantifier — compared to for instance a definite DP — is predicted to be more demanding, as the set and the individual must be accessed during interpretation. Contrary to this, a light quantifier unit is less specified, as it has a weak frame (due to being [−R]). This means that light and referential quantifiers differ with respect to the referential nature of their frames, even though they share the same information in their frame as far as the lexical content (e.g. every, some, no) is concerned. The distinction between weak and strong frames thus emerges from the referential properties, which are connected to the common noun part (e.g. one vs. mother) as the differences in (44)–(47) indicate. And I propose that this difference between a [−R]- and [+R]-frame has conse-

Syntax–discourse correspondences

quences for pronominal interpretation. The heading of a light quantifier (e.g. one) further has a lot of similarity with a variable, as it does not carry any meaningful attributes. As a consequence, the corresponding information unit might only represent a set, and not an individual — but in any case, the individual is not further restricted and uniquely identifiable. This suggests that the representation of light (non-referential) quantifiers differs from that of referential quantifiers in terms of denoting at most a set, but not an individual from the set, and that the access of the former should thus be less demanding. Finally, some general remarks about quantification within the Syntax– Discourse Model seem to be appropriate. As outlined above, quantification is a property of the frame, which might contribute the following mechanism to interpretation: The quantifier (e.g. every) supplies the frame of the discourse referent’s file card, as this is the interface function of D0. Quantification is then computed within the discourse module. This could, for instance, be accomplished in a way that the file card representing a set is further split up into the individuals comprising this set. As a consequence, a pronoun’s file card could access its (distinctive) referent in discourse to form a dependency. If quantification is an operation on a file card’s heading, it is predicted to take place at a later time in the case of light quantifiers, as their heading only represents a placeholder. Initially, the quantificational information in the frame might be sufficient, but in connection with the establishment of a dependency with a pronoun, an individual from the set might need to be retrieved and then the pronoun–antecedent dependency is formed which activates the quantification operation. To conclude, these observations suggest that the formation of a dependency is also dependent on the nature of the antecedent. Table 3 indicates the distinctions that can be discerned. The most important contrasts are based on referentiality and quantification (which are both encoded in the frame). Referential (i.e. d-linked) quantified entities require the most processing, as Table 3.  Taxonomy of antecedent file card representations Antecedent

Frame

Heading

Example

Indefinite Definite Referential quantified Non-referential quantified

strong strong strong — quantified weak — quantified

present — value present — value present — value present — variable

an engineer the engineer every engineer everyone

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The syntax–discourse interface

information about the set and the restrictor must be accessed; definite and indefinite entities only convey information pertaining to a unique individual referent, so accessing these entities is expected to be less demanding; and nonreferential (non-d-linked) quantified entities only pass on information about a set.27 Experimental evidence for some of these predictions is presented in section 4.4 below, but see also for example Carminati, Frazier, and Rayner (2002), who show that the interpretation of referential quantifiers is more costly than that involving a unique referent, or Warren (2003), who demonstrates that the interpretation of referential quantifiers is more costly than that of non-referential quantifiers.

3.4.  The Syntax–Discourse Model In this chapter, I have identified a number of different mechanisms required for the establishment of pronominal–antecedent dependencies. These dependencies can be distinguished in terms of the level of representation at which they take place and in terms of differing intra-modular discourse operations. Within the computational system, coargumenthood and reflexivity are checked, and in the presence of a reflexive-marked predicate a syntactic dependency can be established. This dependency always expresses a pure identity relation, and as a result, the coargument reflexive does not have its own independent representation in discourse. In the absence of coargumenthood, the dependency must be formed at the discourse level, where DPs are translated into different file card representations on the basis of their internal structure. First, the head of a DP provides the information that goes in the frame of the file card. Depending on the phi-feature specifications, the frame can be weak (i.e. non-referential) or strong (i.e. referential). Second, the system distinguishes between quantificational and non-quantificational frames. Third, the lexical category supplies the content that goes in the heading of the file card. This can be a uniquely identifiable referent (value) or a variable. Pronominal elements come in a number of different combinations of these properties as illustrated in section 3.2. Regardless of their specific file card representation, they need to enter into a dependency with an antecedent, as they are by nature referentially dependent. This dependency at the discourse level can be established through a cut-and-paste operation or a bridging operation. The cut-and-paste operation has been proposed in the absence of a heading on the pronominal’s file card (e.g. pronoun, se-anaphor) and independently un-

Syntax–discourse correspondences

der identical headings (e.g. updating of information on a definite, discourseold file card). The bridging operation has been postulated for cases where inferential knowledge must be utilized to link a new heading or a variable heading (e.g. self-anaphor) with a discourse-old file card. The point-of-view operation and the stand-for operation have been further identified as potential triggers to initiate the formation of discourse dependencies. The establishment of a dependency therefore takes place at the CHL or the discourse level. In the first step, reflexive-marking [±Refl] is determined in the computational system. Under [+Refl]-marking, the pronominal–antecedent dependency is established in the computational system, which is sufficient for interpretation. Due to the automatic nature of the syntax–discourse interface operation, the dependency link (formed in the computational system) is

zelf

book

—

crab

zich

een

her

a

one

—

self

every

zich

him

Discourse (i.e. C–I interface)

TP

Computational system (i.e. narrow syntax)

Figure 1.

[±Refl]

DP D0

NP

a

book

95

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The syntax–discourse interface

transmitted to the discourse level. Under [−Refl]-marking, various discourse operations can be employed to form a dependency. Here, a dependency can be formed with all kinds of file cards and the system strives for creating wellformed discourse representations. This view of the Syntax–Discourse Model is illustrated in Figure 1. In the next section, I look at the different dependencies from an economy perspective and discuss the predictions for processing, which are then tested in subsequent chapters.

3.5.  Economy considerations and the Syntax–Discourse Model The Syntax–Discourse Model as presented so far accounts for the interpretive dependencies available to different kinds of pronominal–antecedent relations. The different dependencies can be correlated with economy considerations, which here are understood in terms of representation and processing, and as such the model is capable of making predictions for sentence processing. These predictions are tested in the following chapters by investigating sentence comprehension. The economy-based hierarchy of interpretive processes associated with the Syntax–Discourse Model is similar to the one suggested by Reuland (2001) (see section 2.2), but within the Syntax–Discourse Model, variables and values are accessible in discourse. In addition, the Syntax–Discourse Model makes predictions for discourse-internal operations, which are not discussed in Reuland’s model, as it is concerned with cross-modular operations as a predictor for processing cost. The first prediction the Syntax–Discourse Model makes is entirely compatible with Reuland’s hierarchy of interpretive processes: the most economical dependency available is one that is established in the computational system — this is the case of a coargumenthood relationship between a reflexive and its antecedent that yields reflexive-marking of the relevant predicate. At the discourse level, a number of different processes are available that are expected to exert different degrees of cost on the interpretation. The predictions for the establishment of pronominal–antecedent dependencies in discourse are then dependent on two factors: first, on the kind of operation required by the pronominal’s file card (and here I have identified the cut-and-paste operation and the bridging operation for information transfer) and second, on the nature of the antecedent.

Syntax–discourse correspondences

First, there is independent evidence that a dependency requiring access to a discourse-old referent is less costly than a dependency that is established via a bridging relationship (e.g. Acker and Boland 1993 [reported in Avrutin 1999]). This suggests that a cut-and-paste operation should be less costly than a bridging operation. This difference arises either from the inherent nature of the dependency operations per se (and the fact that an independent discourse representation must be maintained during a bridging operation) or alternatively from the distinctive properties associated with the file card representation (which is addressed experimentally in chapter 6). Second, I have suggested that the level of discourse contains referential and non-referential entities (values and variables respectively). This contrast becomes most apparent when looking at quantified and non-quantified referents. The prediction is then that access to a referential entity should be more demanding, as information with respect to a unique referent must be retrieved and transferred, while in the case of a non-referential entity, there is no specific referent available.28 Moreover, studies on the interpretation of referential quantifiers suggest that access to these entities is more demanding than to non-quantified entities (or fully referential entities) (e.g. Carminati et al. 2002; Warren 2003); therefore, dependencies involving referential antecedents might need to be further partitioned into quantified and non-quantified, where the former is expected to be more costly. In sum, I propose in (48) a cost-based hierarchy for pronominal–antecedent relations, which is represented as a two-dimensional space that reflects processing cost as a factor of the file card representation of the pronominal and of the antecedent:

Antecedent’s file card

(48) Cost-based hierarchy of pronominal–antecedent dependencies Referential, Quantified Referential Non-Referential

[+Refl]

Cut and Paste

Bridging

Pronominal’s file card

97

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A syntactic dependency ([+Refl]) is established independent of the nature of the antecedent; this means cost is not predicted to rise along the antecedent-axis for coargument reflexives. (Therefore [+Refl] is represented in an isolated box.) However, it is generally predicted to be less costly than a discourse dependency. The pronominal-axis reflects the two discourse processes that have been identified here, where bridging is predicted to be more costly than cut-and-paste. Moreover, the antecedent-axis indicates increased cost from non-referential antecedents to referential antecedents to quantified referential ­antecedents. The present hierarchy differs from Reuland’s (2001) hierarchy in a few aspects. The first difference is that the establishment of a dependency with a nonreferential entity (i.e. variable interpretation) is situated in the discourse module (antecedent-axis), along with dependencies with referential entities (i.e. value interpretation). One of the reasons for this copresence of variables and values in discourse is that the Syntax–Discourse Model has an integral mapping rule between syntax and discourse, where a DP triggers the creation of a file card (and a TP the creation of an event card). Since a pronominal’s file card thus automatically emerges in discourse, it seems coherent to allow for a module-internal dependency, rather than postulating a separate level of interpretation for variable interpretation. The second difference is that the current hierarchy distinguishes between discourse-internal processes in terms of processing cost. This is necessary since pronominal elements require information transfer, as they cannot be referentially independent. They also have various file card representations, which correspond to different mechanisms of information transfer, and as is independently known dependencies that involve for instance inferential bridging are more costly. The cross-linguistic facts surrounding self‑anaphors and stand-for or point-of-view notions further support an approach where specific discourse operations are identified. Furthermore, discourse processes may depend on more controlled mechanisms. While the operations in the computational system and the creation of a file card can be considered automatic processes, intra-modular operations such as bridging require more processing resources because of the retrieval of non-automatic information such as inferences. A distinction on the basis of discourse-internal operations is therefore desirable for a model of the establishment of coreference. To illustrate this, consider the contrast between the interpretation of coargument reflexives and logophors, which both have referential (non-quantified) DPs as their antecedents. For English, the former has been described to enter into a syntactic dependency ([+Refl]), and the latter to yield a bridging

Syntax–discourse correspondences

dependency (due to the stand-for operation connected with the heading self). The model then predicts an increase in cost on the side of logophor interpretation; see (49).

Antecedent’s file card

(49) Cost-based hierarchy: Predictions for (English) coargument ­reflexives vs. logophors

Referential, Quantified Referential Non-Referential

[+Refl]

Cut and Paste

Bridging

Pronominal’s file card Or consider the interpretation of a pronoun with a non-referential antecedent compared to that with a referential antecedent. A pronoun requires a cutand-paste operation, regardless of the nature of its antecedent. The model thus predicts increased cost (resulting from the antecedent’s file card) for the dependency with a referential antecedent; see (50).

Antecedent’s file card

(50) Cost-based hierarchy: Predictions for non-referential vs. referential antecedents

Referential, Quantified Referential Non-Referential

[+Refl]

Cut and Paste

Bridging

Pronominal’s file card

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In the following chapters, I examine the predictions of the Syntax–Discourse Model by investigating the comprehension of different kinds of pronominal– antecedent relations. The core questions to be addressed are (1) Are there processing correlates that support the cost-based hierarchy of dependencies proposed in the Syntax–Discourse Model? (2) If so, what are the temporal and architectural properties of these dependencies? In chapter 4, I present data from a series of cross-modal lexical decision interference studies to address the question of whether processing cost results from the establishment of different kinds of pronominal–antecedent relations along the lines of the dependency hierarchy. Here, I first investigate the contrast between a syntactic dependency (coargument reflexives) and a discourse dependency (logophors). This contrast was tested for English and Dutch, which utilize pronominals with different internal structures — and hence file card representations — to express coargument reflexives or logophors (e.g. herself vs. zich). Given our model, the prediction is that in spite of the distinct pronominal types used, English and Dutch should elicit the same pattern of processing, such that a syntactic dependency emerges as the most economical process. Second, I discuss experimental data for the contrast between a dependency with a quantified antecedent and a referential antecedent, for which the Syntax–Discourse Model also makes specific cost-based predictions. In chapter 5, I present online comprehension data from Broca’s aphasia patients, which can provide insights into the cortical distribution of pronominal interpretation. These patients have a language deficit that can be characterized in terms of a limitation of resources used for syntactic processing (the ‘SlowSyntax Hypothesis’ (Piñango 2000)). If the Syntax–Discourse Model is correct in that the assessment of coargumenthood is the initial step in any kind of pronominal interpretation, and under the description of the Broca’s deficit as affecting syntactic operations, this should also be reflected in the Broca’s patients’ comprehension of pronominal elements. In chapter 6, the temporal properties associated with the Syntax–Discourse Model are explored using event-related brain potential measures. This series of experiments first compares syntactic dependencies to discourse dependencies. The Syntax–Discourse Model predicts that the latter should occur later in the time-course of processing, as they rely on the establishment of a file card representation and the linkage with an antecedent file card at the level of discourse. Second, discourse-internal processes are investigated. As far as the different dependencies within the discourse representation are concerned, it is predicted that cost is observable as an increase in the amplitude or possibly

Syntax–discourse correspondences

also along the temporal dimension, where a later effect might be associated with more cost. The experiments to be discussed in the following chapters therefore serve to shed light onto the processes underlying the establishment of different kinds of pronominal–antecedent relations by providing evidence from sentence comprehension. The findings are examined on the basis of whether or not they support the predictions made by the dependency hierarchy. Furthermore, the interpretation of logophors (vs. coargument reflexives) is investigated in all three paradigms to provide additional evidence for the debate concerning logophor interpretation. In the next chapter, three reaction time experiments are reported that assess processing cost as a measure of the dependency hierarchy. These studies test the validity of the Syntax–Discourse Model with respect to the processing cost elicited by the contrasts illustrated in (49) and (50) above.

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Evidence from processing:   CMLD interference paradigm This chapter presents a series of experiments on the establishment of dependency during pronominal interpretation using the cross-modal lexical decision (CMLD) interference paradigm. This paradigm has previously been used to measure processing cost resulting from extra-syntactic interpretive operations (e.g. Shapiro et al. 1987, 1989; Piñango et al. 1999), and it is therefore suitable for an assessment of the predictions made by the Syntax–Discourse Model with regard to the contrast of syntactic and discourse dependencies. The first question that will be addressed is whether a processing difference is observable between pronominal elements that are claimed to be subject to a syntactic dependency compared to those that require a discourse dependency. The relevant experimental contrast is based on the status of reflexivemarking [±Refl] and investigates comprehension of coargument reflexives to logophors. This contrast is tested in two languages — English (4.2) and Dutch (4.3) — that within the Syntax–Discourse Model have different file card representations for the reflexive entities. English has a self-anaphor for both conditions, and Dutch uses a se-anaphor for both conditions. Crucially, however, the reflexives are still predicted to be subject to the syntax–discourse distinction, as reflexive-marking is determined regardless of the nature of the file card; i.e. interpretation is blind to the file card representation of a pronominal if the dependency has been formed in the computational system. The second question investigates discourse-internal dependencies and attends to the issue of whether the economy-based hierarchy derived from the Syntax–Discourse Model also results in processing cost from different dependencies within the level of discourse. The minimal pairs examined for this contrast are pronouns with quantified antecedents compared to pronouns with referential antecedents (4.4). Here, the pronouns under investigation have the same discourse representation and do not differ with regard to their structural properties. The predicted difference is entirely due to the nature of the antecedent (quantified vs. referential), which the Syntax–Discourse Model also distinguishes on economical grounds. As in the previous contrast, results are reported from English and Dutch comprehension.

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4.1.  Experimental paradigm In section 4.1, a number of experiments on pronominal interpretation are presented that utilized the CMLD interference paradigm. This paradigm has been developed to measure processing cost during real-time sentence comprehension via a secondary task (e.g. Shapiro et al. 1987, 1989, 1991; Piñango et al. 1999). In the following, the task is presented and the logic of the paradigm is discussed. Then, a number of studies that employed the CMLD interference paradigm are briefly outlined in order to show how the paradigm serves the present purposes of investigating pronominal interpretation at the syntax–discourse interface.

4.1.1.  Experimental task The CMLD interference paradigm is a dual-task paradigm, where a subject is asked to perform two tasks: a comprehension task (primary task) and a lexical decision task (secondary task). The sentence material is presented auditorily, and the primary task of the subject is to listen carefully and understand each sentence. To assure that the task is performed properly, the subject has to respond to comprehension questions at quasi-random points in the course of the experiment. The presentation is stopped after about every twenty sentences to check for accuracy in the comprehension task. At this point, the subject is asked to paraphrase the last sentence (e.g. “What was the last sentence about?”).1 If the subject’s performance on the comprehension check is poor, s/he is reminded that the primary task is to listen to each sentence and understand it. If multiple answers to the comprehension check are erroneous, the subject must be excluded from further analysis. If performance is close to flawless, it can be assumed that the subject is fully listening to the sentences for meaning and is thus executing the primary task thoroughly. As for the secondary task, at a certain point during the presentation of a given sentence, a letter string (probe) is presented visually on a computer monitor in front of the subject, upon which the subject has to decide (i.e. make a lexical decision for the probe) whether or not the letter string represents a word of English (or whichever language the experiment investigates). The subject is instructed to perform this lexical decision as quickly and as accurately as possible, and the decision is indicated by pressing a “yes” or “no” button on a response box. Crucially, the probe that is presented visually in the interfer-

Evidence from processing

ence paradigm is entirely unrelated to the sentence. This means that probes are constructed in such a way that any kind of priming is avoided, i.e. probes are neither semantically nor phonologically related to the content of the auditorily presented material. Probes further should not represent a continuation of the sentence or any of its elements in any meaningful way. Finally, probe selection is subject to specific acoustic and phonological constraints (for details see the discussion in Shapiro et al. 1991). All probes that are presented with the experimental sentences are real word probes; additional non-word probes are constructed for filler sentences. Finally, the reaction time (RT) to the lexical decision task is recorded using a specifically designed software for measuring RTs. Tempo (Motta et al. 2000– 3) was used for all of the experiments presented below, except for the investigation of logophoricity in English (4.2), where RTLab (Swinney 1979) was used.

4.1.2.  Rationale The underlying rationale of the dual-task interference paradigm is the following: the two tasks –comprehending a sentence and performing a lexical decision — are assumed to compete for the same processing resources. According to this resource-based model, the RT to the lexical decision task is an indicator for the processing resources that are required during the primary task of sentence comprehension (e.g. Moray 1967, 1969; Swinney 1979; Marslen-Wilson and Tyler 1980; Shapiro et al. 1987, 1989).2 The more resources are allocated to the primary task, the fewer are available for the execution of the secondary task. An increase of processing demands for the primary (comprehension) task results in a decrease of available processing resources for the secondary (lexical decision) task, which is reflected in a higher RT to the lexical decision task. In general, various dual-task paradigms have been used for decades now using this notion of resource capacity limitations, and different secondary tasks have served to assess primary task demands, such as phoneme monitoring (e.g. Foss and Jenkins 1973; Swinney and Hakes 1976),3 word monitoring (e.g. Marslen-Wilson and Tyler 1980), light monitoring (e.g. Johnston and Heinz 1974, 1978) or lexical decision (e.g. Clifton et al. 1984). The crossmodal lexical decision task was first used as a secondary task in priming paradigms (e.g. Swinney et al. 1979), where facilitation is measured via the lexical decision to a related word, and as Swinney (1979) points out, the data from

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the cross-modal lexical decision studies were as robust as the data from single visual mode lexical decision priming paradigms. These observations demonstrate that lexical decision is an effective secondary task and a valid indicator for questions addressing resource allocation during sentence processing. The CMLD paradigm was then further modified to measure interference by means of lexical decisions to unrelated probes.

4.1.2.1.  CMLD interference and processing cost The first series of studies using the CMLD interference paradigm are reported in Shapiro et al. (1987, 1989). They investigated real-time processing of verbs with argument structure and syntactic subcategorization as the dependent variables. RTs to the lexical decision task showed that access of lexico-semantic information (i.e. the number of different argument structures available for a verb) is costlier than access of lexico-syntactic information (i.e. the number of available subcategorization options for a verb). Specifically, their data demonstrate that the processing of a verb depends on its argument structure: a verb that has the potential to take for instance four different argument structures (e.g. remember in (1)) exerts more processing demands on the computational system than a transitive verb that allows two different argument structure entries (e.g. accept in (2)):4

(1) remember [four argument structures]: a. (x, y): [Ethel]x remembered [the phone call]y b. (x, P): [Ethel]x remembered [that the phone call was obscene]P c. (x, Q): [Ethel]x remembered [whether or not the phone call was made]Q D. (x, E): [Ethel]x remembered [what a sick phone call it was]E !



(2) accept [two argument structures]: a. (x, y): [Joe]x accepted [the decision]y b. (x, P): [Joe]x accepted [that the decision was correct]P

In (1), remember can be followed by a theme y, a proposition P, an interrogative Q, or an exclamation E. In contrast in (2), accept can only take a theme y or a proposition P. However, both verbs share the same subcategorization frames, i.e. they allow for an NP-complement ((1a), (2a)) or a CP-complement ((1b– d), (2b)). Comparisons of these two types of verbs indicated that processing of four-complement verbs required more resources than processing of two-complement verbs (i.e. the former elicited a higher RT to the lexical decision task).

Evidence from processing

This difference between the two verbs provides evidence that information pertaining to argument structure increases processing demands. In more general terms, Shapiro et al. showed that processing of extra-syntactic information results in more cost to the language system. Their data also indicate that differences based on syntactic information (i.e. a varying number of subcategorization frames) do not result in an increase in processing demands. In another CMLD interference study, Piñango et al. (1999) report data from real-time processing of aspectual coercion. They examined sentence comprehension of events that receive their interpretation directly from the syntactic representation, such as (3), and compared them to events that require additional semantic operations for interpretation (“enriched condition”), such as (4):

(3) Transparent condition: The baby sang for an hour.



(4) Enriched condition: The baby yawned for an hour.

In (4), the verb yawned represents an event with an inherent beginning and end — this is not the case for sang in (3). Thus, to yawn for an hour requires the introduction of a repetition function to achieve successful interpretation (i.e. the baby yawned repeatedly for an hour). This repetition function is an extrasyntactic mechanism, and the comparison of constructions such as (3) and (4) should hence result in increased processing demands for the extra-syntactic, enriched condition. The results reported from the CMLD interference study confirm this prediction. Additional evidence from eye-tracking experiments and self-paced reading (McElree et al. 2001; Traxler et al. 2002) provide further support for the claim that the enriched condition, which requires extrasyntactic processing during the interpretation of coercion, is more costly and that a contrast between syntactic and extra-syntactic interpretation is observable in real-time. To summarize, the studies reviewed above have shown that the CMLD interference paradigm can successfully measure different processing demands as interpretation unfolds. In these studies, processing cost has been observed in cases where cross-modular operations are required (e.g. syntactic vs. extrasyntactic processes) and where extra-syntactic information must be accessed for interpretation. In the study by Shapiro et al. processing cost coincided with the increase in predicate-argument structure options, thus substantiating that

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the processing of semantic information exerts cost. Importantly, they found no increase in processing cost in their second manipulation (number of subcategorization frames), which provides evidence that the availability of different syntactic frames does not result in cost observable through the CMLD interference paradigm. The study by Piñango et al. provides further corroborating support that interference measures processing cost resulting from the need to perform extra-syntactic operations — in their experimental setup accomplishing the fit between a given verb and the temporal frame via a repetition function. These studies thus support the view that language processing is a combined effort of subprocesses at distinct levels of representation and that the CMLD interference paradigm can measure these cross-modular operations. Finally, a number of advantages and benefits of the CMLD paradigm should be highlighted. One is that it has proven to tap the language system as it unfolds (vs. paradigms that measure post-perceptual processes via questionnaires or post-stimulus word recognition tasks) and as such has shown to be sensitive to fine-grained distinctions during online processing. In particular, it is sensitive to cross-modular interpretive mechanisms (e.g. syntactic vs. extrasyntactic mechanisms in Shapiro et al. 1987, 1989; Shapiro 2000). In addition, the CMLD paradigm is a non-intrusive technique for the following three reasons (see Swinney 1979 and Shapiro et al. 1987 for a more detailed discussion). First of all, the lexical decision task does not involve responding to or acting on the auditory stimulus, as the subject is only required to make a lexical decision, independent from the auditory input — i.e. the subject does not relate the probe to the auditory input. Secondly, the CMLD paradigm measures interference at a point following the critical stimulus item (e.g. in our case after the pronominal). This means that up to the point of the pronominal, processing takes place without interruption and can thus be assumed to occur fairly naturally. And thirdly, by situating the secondary task in a different modality (i.e. visual vs. auditory modality of primary task), sentence processing is also kept relatively uninterrupted. Within the scope of the present research, the CMLD interference paradigm then serves as a measure for cross-modular processing activity between the levels of syntax and discourse. In the remainder of this section, I discuss two further areas of psycholinguistic research that relate directly to the questions addressed by the experiments on pronominal interpretation presented in the following sections. First, recent research on discourse-based processing is presented showing that discourse-based mechanisms fall within the pattern

Evidence from processing

of extra-syntactic processing. And second, previous studies on pronominal interpretation in real-time will be reviewed that demonstrate that pronominal interpretation takes place instantaneously thus validating the selection of the point of interest for the presentation of the secondary task at the offset of the pronominal.

4.1.2.2.  Discourse processing A number of sentence comprehension studies provide support for discourse operations exerting increased processing demands on the parser in the same way that semantic processes have proven to affect processing resources in the studies discussed above. Shapiro (2000), for instance, investigated real-time processing of sentences with non-discourse-linked (i.e. non-referential) (5a) and discourse-linked (i.e. referential) wh-phrases (5b) using a CMLD priming paradigm.

(5) The soldier is pushing the unruly student violently into the street. a. Whoi is the soldier pushing ti violently into the street? b. Which studenti is the soldier pushing ti violently into the street?

The results of the study illustrate that reactivation of related targets (compared to unrelated targets) was delayed for the discourse-linked which-phrase in (5b), which is taken to be a reflection of increased processing demands in the case of discourse-based interpretation required for the d-linked wh-phrase. In particular, reactivation of the non-discourse-linked wh-phrase (5a) was statistically significant at the position of the trace (t­i), while reactivation of the discourse-linked wh-phrase (5b) was significant at a later point downstream (after violently in the example above). Corroborating support for the processing cost exerted by discourse-based mechanisms comes from a series of selfpaced reading studies in Italian that also elicited a delayed effect for d-linked wh-phrases (de Vincenzi 1996). Exploring a different phenomenon at the syntax–discourse interface, Acker and Boland (1993) present evidence for increased discourse-based processing demands from inferential bridging (as in (6)):

(6) The famous actress­­i was interviewed by the white anchorman, but the stari ­was not cooperative.



(7) The famous actress­­i was interviewed by the white anchorman, but shei was not cooperative.

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Utilizing a priming reaction time study, they showed that the interpretation of the star (as a nominal anaphor of the famous actress) resulted in increased processing cost immediately after the anaphor as compared to the interpretation of the pronoun she in (7). These findings can be explained within a model of discourse representation, as the DP the star introduces a new discourse representation (even though it is definite), yet it must be linked to the antecedent the famous actress via an inferential bridging operation, which causes cost. The results thus indicate that processing demands rise as more discourse mechanisms are required for interpretation. Further support for the increase in processing resources during discoursebased interpretation comes from the acquisition and aphasia literature. Children and Broca’s aphasia patients have been found to have difficulties with interpretations that depend on discourse information, such as d-linked wh-phrases (e.g. Hickok and Avrutin 1995, 1996; Avrutin 2000), contrastive stress5 (e.g. Maratsos 1973; Arvutin et al. 1999), or referents requiring inferential bridging (e.g. Avrutin and Coopmans 2000). One explanation of this deficit in the two populations is a resource limitation that blocks operations that are more resource-dependent from being performed properly (see for instance Avrutin 2000).

4.1.2.3.  Antecedent reactivation Finally, since we seek to measure processing cost during the establishment of pronominal–antecedent relations, we must ask at what point such a cost might be detectable. Sentence processing studies have shown that antecedents are activated during the interpretation of pronominals and traces in real-time comprehension (e.g. Bever and McElree 1988; Nicol and Swinney 1989, 2003; MacDonald and MacWhinney 1990; Badecker and Straub 2002). In particular, antecedent reactivation occurs immediately at the position of the pronominal/ trace. Consider the following examples:

(8) The boxeri told the skierj that the doctork for the team would blame himi/j/*k for the recent injury.



(9) The boxeri told the skierj that the doctork for the team would blame himself*i/*j/k for the recent injury.

In a CMLD priming experiment, Nicol and Swinney (1989) found that priming takes place only for the structurally adequate antecedent, i.e. boxer and skier for the pronoun in (8) and doctor for the reflexive in (9). This is an essen-

Evidence from processing

tial finding as it suggests that pronominal interpretation is resolved instantaneously (i.e. the pronominal enters into a dependency with its referent as soon as the pronominal is heard/read). It thus serves as a prerequisite for the present studies in allowing us to measure the processing load required for the establishment of the antecedent-pronominal relation immediately after the pronominal element. To conclude, I have presented the methodology and rationale of the CMLD interference paradigm, which centers on resource capacity and processing demands, in this section. I have provided evidence, based on a number of recent studies, for the fact that processing cost, as measured via the CMLD paradigm, results from cross-modular operations during sentence comprehension. At this point in psycholinguistic research, these cross-modular operations can be divided into syntactic and extra-syntactic processes, where the latter have resulted in increased cost to the interpretive system. Following from this, the general prediction for the experiments on pronominal interpretation is that pronominal elements that enter into an extra-syntactic discourse dependency with their antecedents (e.g. logophors, referential pronouns) should exert more processing demands on the system than pronominal elements that establish a syntactic dependency with their antecedents (e.g. coargument reflexives). Moreover, the results reported for discourse-based processing — particularly for referential vs. non-referential interpretation — further indicate that the CMLD paradigm is also sensitive to discrete discourse-internal operations.

4.2.  Reflexive interpretation in English:  coargument reflexives vs. logophors 6 This section investigates the dependencies involved in the interpretation of two types of reflexives in English, namely coargument reflexives and logophors. These pronominal elements are identical on the surface (i.e. they emerge as the same lexical item, e.g. herself), but as has been argued in chapter 3, they differ in terms of how they establish a dependency with their antecedents. Coargument reflexives satisfy the condition on reflexive-marking and thus enter into a dependency in the computational system. Logophors occur in environments that do not qualify for reflexive-marking and a dependency with their antecedents therefore must be established in discourse. The specific question pursued with this experiment is hence whether the distinction between

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a syntactic and a discourse dependency can be supported by data from realtime sentence comprehension. In what follows, I revisit the different dependency relations that the Syntax–Discourse Model hypothesizes for coargument reflexives and logophors in English (section 4.2.1). Then I present an online reaction time experiment, which investigated how the two types of reflexives establish coreference (4.2.2).

4.2.1.  English reflexivity: representational considerations In chapter 2, I reviewed the relevant literature on the representation of reflexivity. Linguistic frameworks agree that coargument reflexives as in (10) and logophors as in (11) do not pattern alike (in terms of their distribution, complementarity with pronouns, etc.): (10) The gymnasti applauded himselfi. (11) The swimmeri wrapped a blanket around herselfi. However, the literature disagrees on the nature of this difference. On the one hand, there is the structural position that tries to capture the differences in terms of purely syntactic conditions (e.g. Chomsky 1981, subsequently; Huang 1983; Hestvik 1991, 1992). On the other hand, there is the position that distinguishes between the two reflexives on cross-modular representational grounds (e.g. Pollard and Sag 1992; Reinhart and Reuland 1993). The Syntax– Discourse Model sides with the latter position (for reasons discussed above) and postulates one crucial difference between these two types of reflexives: the presence or absence of coargumenthood and directly associated with it the reflexive-marking of the event predicate. In (10) the reflexive himself selects the gymnast as its antecedent; both reflexive and antecedent are arguments of the predicate applauded, i.e. they are coarguments of the same predicate. Since the reflexive is a self-anaphor, this licenses reflexive-marking of the predicate, and the Syntax–Discourse Model therefore hypothesizes that the reflexive–antecedent dependency is established in the computational system C­HL. Further discourse operations on the reflexive’s file card are not expected to be required, as the reflexive-marking on the predicate suffices for interpretation. In contrast, in (11) the reflexive herself selects the swimmer as its antecedent, but the reflexive is an argument of the predicate around, while the antecedent is an argument of the predicate wrapped. The reflexive and its antecedent are hence not coarguments of

Evidence from processing

the same predicate and reflexive-marking cannot take place. The dependency between the reflexive and the antecedent must therefore be established at discourse. In chapter 3, it has been proposed that this dependency is a bridging relationship that is triggered by the stand-for function associated with the heading of the reflexive’s file card. This operation assists in supplying additional interpretive nuances of a particular guise of the antecedent, and is connected to notions of perspective and point of view exerted by the antecedent (e.g. Hagège 1974; Cantrall 1974; Clements 1975; Kuno and Kaburaki 1977; Sells 1987; Kuno 1987; Zribi-Hertz 1989). In order to test the empirical validity of these claims, the following experiment investigates the interpretation of reflexive elements in locative PPs as an instance of logophoricity. These constructions have been discussed by Cantrall (1974), Kuno (1987), Sells (1987), and Zribi-Hertz (1989), among others, for English with respect to the non-complementary distribution with pronouns and in particular with regard to the extra information that the logophor — i.e. in terms of the Syntax–Discourse Model, the self-part of the file card — contributes to the interpretation. The authors agree that logophors supply a specific perspective of interpretation to the reflexive–antecedent dependency. Cantrall (1974), for instance, points out that the use of a logophor adds a narrative component of point of view to the interpretation, where the antecedent’s internal viewpoint is emphasized, while pronoun use (in the same construction) implies the speaker’s (external) perspective. Similarly, Kuno (1987) presents evidence for the logophor supplying notions of empathy and an internal viewpoint of the antecedent. As discussed in chapter 2, he provides data showing that logophors in locative PPs convey a close association with the antecedent and communicate physical contact or involvement, so that John hid a book behind himself implies that John was most likely physically holding on to the book, while John hid a book behind him allows for the book being covered by John, while not necessarily touching him. Such a contrast can also be viewed in terms of guises, where John and the person doing the hiding become available as possible antecedents, such that the guise represents some attributes (here spatial) of or thoughts and feelings of the antecedent (see also Sells 1987 for a similar view of the spatial properties associated with logophors in locative PPs). Zribi-Hertz (1989) distinguishes between two domains of point of view, which are marked on an event (or clausal category, as she phrases it): an objective point of view, which ideally is detached from any center of consciousness and represents an impartial, neutral perspective, and a subjective point of view, which expresses the particular view of a subject of consciousness. Logophor

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interpretation ­involves this latter point of view. Previous discussions of reflexives in locative PPs (and logophors in general) therefore strongly suggest that logophor interpretation carries information about the internal perspective of the antecedent. Within the Syntax–Discourse Model, this can be tied to the heading of the file card (self), which seeks to stand for a prominent entity in the discourse. As suggested above, the logophor’s file card must enter into a discourse dependency to obtain referential content and the presence of self in the heading leads to inferences on the basis of the functional origin of self (i.e. concepts of body parts, the self, etc.), which are directly related to the internal point of view or subject of consciousness. The selection of a potential antecedent is therefore confined to these properties and only an antecedent that qualifies as carrying a point of view can enter into a dependency with the logophor. In summary, the Syntax–Discourse Model distinguishes between the two reflexive elements on the basis of reflexive-marking — the predicate in the coargument reflexive condition is [+Refl] and the predicate in the logophor condition is [−Refl]. This yields a syntactic dependency in the case of coargument reflexive interpretation. The logophor enters into a bridging relation with its antecedent at the discourse level and contributes extra information about the point of view of the antecedent. The following experiment investigates this difference between dependencies involving coargument reflexives and logophors, assuming that differences between levels of representation have direct consequences for sentence processing.

4.2.2.  English reflexivity: a CMLD experiment This experiment investigates the online processing of coargument reflexives and logophors in English. In particular, it explores whether these two elements form dependencies at distinct levels of representation. To this end, the CMLD interference paradigm was applied to measure the processing cost exerted by the interpretation of the different reflexive entities, and the dependency hierarchy predicts an increase in processing cost for the logophor (as illustrated in (49) of chapter 3). As I outlined in section 4.1, the CMLD interference paradigm has been successfully used to reveal differences in processing of syntactic vs. extra-syntactic mechanisms, and the language system has proven to be extraordinarily sensitive to different kinds of linguistic representations. It is therefore expected that a difference between a syntactic and a discourse dependency will be observable in the present contrast of interest.

Evidence from processing

4.2.2.1.  Method The cross-modal lexical decision interference paradigm was used. As described above, participants perform two tasks in this paradigm: a comprehension task (primary task on basis of auditory input) and a lexical decision task (secondary task to visual stimulus). Comprehension questions were asked at quasi-random times in the course of the experiment to assure that the sentences were attended to properly. The dependent variable was the reaction time to the lexical decision task, which was recorded using Rtlab 11x (Swinney 1979). 4.2.2.2.  Participants Forty-five students (21 female) recruited at Yale University participated in this study (eighteen subjects for the control position and twenty-seven subjects for the experimental position). Their ages ranged from 18 to 24 years (mean age: 19.6; SE = 0.29). All participants were native speakers of English with normal (or corrected-to-normal) visual and auditory acuity (by their own report) and had no history of neurological disorder. They were reimbursed for their participation. 4.2.2.3.  Materials Twenty-five pairs of experimental sentences were designed for this study. Each pair consisted of a sentence with a coargument reflexive (12a) and one with a logophoric reflexive (12b). The latter included verbs that require an object and a locative prepositional phrase introduced by behind or around. For each pair, the verbs were matched for frequency (Francis and Kucera 1982). In the rare cases where the frequency ratings could not be matched precisely, the frequency for the verb in the logophor condition was chosen to be larger than that for the coargument reflexive condition. This selection was guided by the idea that if verb frequency has a facilitating effect, such a processing advantage should then favor the logophor condition, which would work against the prediction that the discourse dependency required for the interpretation of logophors exerts more cost. In addition, the sentences were matched for total length, as well as for the distance between the antecedent and the reflexive. As an example, consider the following pair: (12) a. The womani who was arrogant praised herselfi because the network had called about negotiations for a leading role. b. The girli sprayed bug repellent around herselfi because there were many mosquitoes in the Everglades in Florida.

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Before the sentences were recorded by a native speaker, they were checked for acceptability and plausibility by native speakers who were naïve to the conditions governing pronominal interpretation. The material was then recorded and digitized. Two positions of the visual probe were tested (in two separate runs of the experiment). In the control position (experiment 1A), the probe appeared before the reflexive; this position was tested to assure that no difference was observed up to the reflexive in the two conditions of the experimental sentence pair, since due to the experimental manipulation of presence or absence of coargumenthood, the two conditions differed structurally. In the experimental position (experiment 1B), the probe was presented immediately after the reflexive, at the point where interpretive processes are expected to take place (see e.g. Nicol and Swinney 1989, 2003). Twenty-five pairs of probes were constructed for the experimental sentence pairs. A probe was chosen so that it was not semantically related to the content of the sentence, nor generated a continuation of the sentence in any meaningful way. For each experimental sentence pair, the probe pair was matched for length (all probes consisted of two syllables and agreed in number of letters) as well as frequency to avoid any unpredictable interference from the lexical decision task. All probes were of the category noun. And furthermore, probes exhibited diverse phonological properties across experimental pairs (Shapiro et al. 1991). The presentation of probe and sentence within a pair was counterbalanced over all subjects. For instance, for the pair in (13) and (14) the probe pair was session and teacher; half of the subjects were presented with session in the coargument condition and teacher in the logophor condition and vice versa. Furthermore, (13) presents the experimental sentences with the control position (*), and (14) presents them with the experimental position (^): (13) Probe positions for Experiment 1A: a. The womani who was arrogant praised * herselfi because . . . session b. The girli sprayed bug repellent around * herselfi because . . . teacher (14) Probe positions for Experiment 1B: a. The womani who was arrogant praised herself i ^ because . . . session b. The girli sprayed bug repellent around herself i ^ because . . . teacher

Evidence from processing

In addition to the fifty experimental sentences, one hundred and nineteen sentences and probes were created as fillers for the final version of the script. The filler sentences matched the experimental sentences in length. Forty-four of these sentences were assigned word probes, and seventy-five were assigned non-word probes. The non-word probes were constructed to adhere to phonotactics and orthographic constraints of English (such as purship, fesson, dirling). Probe positions were randomly varied in these sentences to reduce the possibility that participants might develop a strategy for the lexical decision task. A script was then created with a total of 169 sentences. The experimental sentences were put in a quasi-random order, and the sequencing of the sentences within a pair was controlled in such a way that for half of the pairs, the coargument condition preceded the logophor condition (12 pairs) and for the other half it followed the logophor condition (13 pairs). In addition, at least two filler sentences appeared between experimental sentences as well as at the beginning of the script and after pauses that were made for random comprehension questions.

4.2.2.4.  Predictions Under the assumption that the two tasks (understanding a sentence and performing a lexical decision) compete for the same processing resources, the reaction time to the lexical decision task is taken as an indicator for the amount of processing resources required for the primary comprehension task. Specifically, the more resources are needed to perform the primary task, the fewer resources are available for the performance of the secondary task and as a result the higher is the RT to the secondary task (i.e. lexical decision). Additionally, extrasyntactic processes have shown to demand more processing resources than syntactic processes (as evidenced by a higher RT to the former). As a consequence, the comparison of the RTs to the lexical decision in the two conditions (coargument reflexive vs. logophor) can be employed to investigate the nature of the dependency involved in the processing of the reflexive elements. The Syntax–Discourse Model predicts that coargument reflexives enter into a syntactic dependency and logophors enter into a discourse dependency with their antecedents. If a significant difference in RTs between the two conditions is found immediately after the reflexive (experiment 1B), and if this difference reveals a higher RT for the logophor over the coargument reflexive condition, the hypothesis that logophors form a discourse dependency with their antecedent and coargument reflexives enter into a syntactic dependency can be supported.

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For the control position, which measures interference before the reflexive is presented (experiment 1A), no interference effect is predicted to be observable between the two conditions. For the purposes of reflexive interpretation, the sentences in the two conditions should not differ significantly at this point, as the reflexive is not available yet. Since the sentences in an experimental pair could not be matched to perfect minimal pairs due to the nature of the locality restrictions on coargument reflexives and logophors, it is important to show that no difference obtains prior to the reflexive, so that any difference that might emerge after the reflexive can be attributed exclusively to the establishment of the reflexive–antecedent dependency.

4.2.2.5.  Results All subjects performed at ceiling level in the comprehension task, and none of the subjects therefore needed to be discarded due to inattentiveness or task-related difficulties. For the statistical analysis only data pairs that elicited a correct response entered the final computation. Data discarded included incorrect response (saying “no” to a letter string representing a word of English), timed-out response (responding after the limit of 2000 msecs), and falling outside three standard deviations from the mean. The final analysis included pairs of data only, so if one item of a pair had to be rejected, the entire pair was discarded. For experiment 1A (control position), 9.75% of the total data pairs had to be discarded due to these criteria (with a mean error rate of 2.44 per subject). Results show that there was no difference in RT for subject analysis (t(17)= −0.46, p=.32) and item analysis (t(49)= −0.38, p=.36) between the two conditions right before the reflexive elements (see Table 1 for mean RTs). This is taken as evidence that up to the point of the reflexive no difference in processing is observed. In addition, an ANOVA with factor run (relating to the combination of sentence with probe, which was counterbalanced across subjects) showed no main effect and no interaction (F(1,34) = 0.37, p = NS) due to sentence-probe combinations. For experiment 1B (experimental position), 7.85% of all data points were excluded from statistical analysis on the basis of the criteria for data rejection (mean error rate of 1.96 per subject). Statistical analysis at the experimental position (right after the reflexive) revealed a significantly higher RT to the logophor condition than to the coargument reflexive condition for both a subject analysis (t(26)= 2.71, p=.005) and an item analysis (t(49)=2.11, p=.01). This indicates that the interpretation of logophors is costlier to the processor than that of coargument reflexives.7

Evidence from processing Table 1.  Mean RT and SD by condition (in msecs). (Subject analysis)

Coargument reflexives Logophors Significance

Experiment 1A (control position)

Experiment 1B (experimental position)

729.04 (SD 100.98) 722.72 (SD 98.03) p = .32

675.84 (SD 70.76) 701.52 (SD 94.76) *p =.005

Furthermore, no sequence effects were found in additional statistical analyses. An ANOVA with factor run revealed no main effect or interaction (F (1,52) = 0.21, p = NS) due to sentence-probe pairings. This implies that the statistically significant difference found in the experimental position can be entirely ascribed to the nature of the reflexive–antecedent dependency.

4.2.2.6.  Discussion The significant difference observed at the experimental position suggests that the interpretation of logophors poses a higher burden on the language system than that of coargument reflexives. This burden can be viewed in terms of the syntax–discourse divide. Cost results from the establishment of a discourse dependency during the interpretation of a logophor, while a coargument reflexive forms a dependency in syntax, which has been proposed to be the most economical mechanism available for pronominal interpretation. Since the CMLD task serves to attribute processing cost to extra-syntactic operations, the findings from this experiment are consistent with previous comprehension studies using this paradigm. Accordingly, increased RT corresponds to higher processing effort, which in this experiment was found for the logophor condition compared to the coargument condition. The results therefore support the predictions made by the Syntax–Discourse Model. First, they substantiate the claim that the dependency required for coargument reflexive interpretation is the most economical process and that coargument reflexives are subject to a syntactic dependency on the basis of the structural configuration that licenses reflexive-marking of the predicate. Second, the findings provide evidence that logophor interpretation requires the establishment of a discourse dependency, which exerts more cost. Overall, the data therefore validate a model that assumes the involvement of two distinct levels of representation during the establishment of coreference and they confirm the predictions of the dependency hierarchy. In the next section,

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I present a study from Dutch that looks at a slightly different contrast between reflexive entities in terms of the Syntax–Discourse Model.

4.3.  Reflexive interpretation in Dutch:   coargument reflexives vs. logophors In this section, I present a study from Dutch sentence comprehension to provide further evidence for the distinction between syntactic dependencies and discourse dependencies during the establishment of coreference. This study sought to replicate the general findings from the previous experiment of English coargument reflexives vs. logophors concerning the distinction between syntactic and discourse dependencies. Dutch presents an interesting test case in this respect, as it uses a different kind of entity — a se-anaphor — to express both coargument reflexives and logophors. According to the Syntax– Discourse Model, the reflexives in Dutch and English therefore differ with regard to their file card representation (a se-anaphor projects a weak file card, while a self-anaphor projects a strong file card), but crucially, their interpretation is predicted to follow the same pattern: coargument reflexives establish a syntactic dependency — regardless of the internal structure of the reflexive — and logophors form a discourse dependency with their antecedent. Hence, this experiment investigates whether the distinction between a syntactic and a discourse dependency can be observed in real-time sentence processing, regardless of the form of the anaphor and its corresponding file card representation. A confirmation of this question would provide additional support for the postulation of two distinct levels for the establishment of dependencies by the Syntax–Discourse Model and for the notion of reflexivemarking as a core property. In what follows, I first outline some facts about reflexivity in Dutch, as well as the representational distinctions between coargument reflexive zich and logophoric zich and review these differences within the model of pronominal interpretation advocated in this book (section 4.3.1). Next I discuss an online CMLD experiment, which investigated the comprehension of the two types of reflexives (section 4.3.2).

4.3.1.  Dutch reflexivity: representational considerations Reflexivity in Dutch can be expressed with two distinct forms: as se-anaphor or as self-anaphor. In the majority of cases, these forms are not mutually inter­

Evidence from processing

changeable and the lexical properties of a predicate largely determine which anaphor can be used (e.g. Everaert 1986).8 For the purposes of this experiment, only se-anaphors are investigated, and I therefore refrain from further discussing the particular properties of self-anaphors. se-anaphors are considered simplex anaphors. In Dutch, zich (‘himself/herself/themselves’) lacks gender and number features. This lack of feature specification makes se-anaphors [-Referential], which yields a weak frame in the discourse representation. Structurally, se-anaphors occur as determiners (e.g. Postal 1970; Vergnaud 1987; Reinhart and Reuland 1993), and as a consequence the corresponding file card lacks a heading. As far as the contrast between coargument reflexives and logophors is concerned, the discussion in the literature does not differ from that mentioned above with respect to English, and the Syntax–Discourse Model makes the same fundamental predictions, distinguishing between dependencies in the computational system and in discourse. There are however two differences from English: first, reflexive-marking is determined by the presence of an inherently reflexive predicate, as the lack of a self-component eliminates the second option for reflexive-marking. And second, a se-anaphor triggers a weak file card and the corresponding process with which a (discourse) dependency is established has been identified as a cut-and-paste operation in chapter 3. This yields a different pattern within the dependency hierarchy for coargument reflexives and logophors in Dutch, but the latter are still predicted to be more costly; see (15).

Antecedent’s file card

(15) Cost-based hierarchy: Predictions for (Dutch) coargument reflexives vs. logophors

Referential, Quantified Referential Non-Referential

[+Refl]

Cut and Paste

Bridging

Pronominal’s file card

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Examples (16) and (17) illustrate the mechanisms involved in the interpretation of zich (‘himself ’) as a coargument reflexive and a logophor respectively: verraadde zichi (16) De logopedisti the speech therapist betrayed zich ‘The speech therapist betrayed himself.’ verschoof een stoel naast zichi (17) De logopedisti the speech therapist moved a chair next-to zich ‘The speech therapist moved a chair next to himself.’ In (16) zich and its antecedent de logopedist (‘speech therapist’) are coarguments of the predicate verraadde (‘betrayed’). In (17), this is not the case; the arguments of verschoof (‘moved’) are the DP de logopedist (‘the speech therapist’), the DP een stoel (‘a chair’) and the PP naast zich (‘next to himself ’). Therefore zich, which is an argument of the preposition naast (‘next to’), and its antecedent are not arguments of the same predicate. This difference has consequences for the representation and interpretation of the reflexive elements within the current model. The presence of coargumenthood between the reflexive and its antecedent in (16), in addition to the fact that the predicate is lexically reflexive, allows reflexive-marking of the predicate, which leads to the establishment of an identity dependency in the computational system.9 The fact that the file card of zich is weak does not bear on this dependency. In the absence of coargumenthood and reflexivemarking, however, as is the case in (17), the insufficient file card representation associated with zich matters, since a dependency is yet to be established. I argue above that zich in locative PPs has to become a referential entity, as the location information unit cannot be empty. Hence in order to satisfy the discourse representation of a location unit, the pronominal’s file card must be interpretable, i.e. it must stand in a dependency with another discourse entity. The file card of zich lacks a heading, because the NP complement is empty, and it has a weak frame, due to the insufficient morphological feature specification. It thus does not represent a well-formed file card. Moreover, pronominal elements are by nature referentially dependent. These two aspects team up to force the reflexive’s file card to enter into a dependency at the discourse level. To this end the system must try to initiate an information transfer to promote the file card associated with zich to a well-formed one, and I suggest above that this happens via a cut-and-paste operation, similar to the updating of information on file cards of definite DPs that refer to discourse-old entities.

Evidence from processing

For this purpose, the system searches the discourse representation for potential referents for the deficient file card and finds two candidates, the speech therapist and a chair. On the basis of its feature specification (third person), zich could match up with both referents. Therefore pure feature matching does not suffice to obtain an unambiguous interpretation via a discourse operation.10 Another possibility for determining the referent of zich is to identify the most prominent referent in the discourse. Here, the point-of-view function becomes relevant. In this respect, the speech therapist is more prominent than the chair, as it is animate and can be conceived of as taking on a point of view function. Information transfer can thus take place between the file card of the speech therapist and that of zich, and the pasting in of information facilitates the elevation to a strong file card and makes it fully interpretable through this discourse dependency. In general terms, this indicates that the dependencies involving coargument reflexives and logophors in Dutch can first and foremost be distinguished on the basis of the level of representation at which they are formed. Coargument reflexives enter into a syntactic dependency with their antecedents and logophors into a discourse dependency. The experiment below examines these predictions of the Syntax–Discourse Model.

4.3.2.  Dutch reflexivity: a CMLD experiment This study investigates the real-time processing of coargument reflexives and logophors in Dutch with the aim of determining whether the corresponding reflexive–antecedent dependencies are formed at distinct levels of representation. As in the previous study, the CMLD interference paradigm was utilized to measure the amount of processing resources required for interpretation.

4.3.2.1.  Method Experimental parameters were kept alike between this and the previous study. Just as in the experiment on the comprehension of English reflexives, the CMLD interference paradigm was used, where participants perform two tasks simultaneously and the reaction time to the secondary lexical decision task serves as a measure of processing demands. Reaction times were recorded using Tempo 1.3.1 (Motta et al. 2000–3). 4.3.2.2.  Participants Forty-two students (33 female) recruited at Utrecht University participated in

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this study (twenty-two subjects for the control position and twenty for the experimental position). They were between 18 and 32 years old (mean age: 22.95; SD=6.29). All were native speakers of Dutch with normal (or corrected-tonormal) visual and auditory acuity (by their own report) and had no history of neurological disorder. Thirty-seven participants were right-handed and five were left-handed, and all participants used their non-dominant hand for the lexical decision task. They were paid for their participation.

4.3.2.3.  Materials Twenty-five pairs of experimental sentences were constructed. Each pair consisted of a sentence with a logophor and one with a coargument reflexive. Sentences that contained a logophor were constructed in the following way: the main verbs were two-complement verbs that required a direct object and a locative complement (e.g. plaatste (‘placed’), zette (‘put’), verstopte (‘hid’), verschoof (‘moved’)). The direct object noun phrases were indefinite and, where possible, inanimate. The locative complements evenly consisted of prepositional phrases introduced by achter (‘behind’), naast (‘next to’), and voor (‘in front of ’) and contained the reflexive zich (‘him-/herself ’). After the reflexive (the point where interference was measured), all sentences continued with a subordinate clause in order to avoid end-of-sentence wrap-up effects. No additional reference to the antecedent was made in the immediate vicinity of the reflexive and the beginning of the subordinate clause was designed in a way that prevented a semantic continuation relation with the main clause to avoid priming and facilitation effects that could potentially be attributed to anything but the antecedent-reflexive relationship. The sentences in the logophor condition followed the schema in (18) and an example is given in (19): (18) [CP . . . DP . . . [VP V DP PP(P zich)] [­CP . . .]] (19) De logopedist verschoof een kleine stoel naast zich zodat the speech therapist moved a little chair next-to zich so de volwassen cliënt kon gaan zitten. the grown-up client could sit-down ‘The speech therapist moved a little chair next to himself so that the grown-up client could sit down.’ The sentences that contained a coargument reflexive included transitive verbs (e.g. verkleedde (‘dressed’), verdedigde (‘defended’), bezeerde (‘injured’), veraadde (‘betrayed’)). The first (antecedent) noun phrase was followed by a

Evidence from processing

relative clause to match the distance between the antecedent and the reflexive within experimental pairs (for both number of syllables and words). The sentence in (20) represents an example sentence from the coargument reflexive condition and forms a pair with (19): die serieus was verraadde zich zodat (20) De logopedist the speech therapist who serious was betrayed zich so-that de cliënt geen hoop meer zag in de behandeling. the client no hope more saw in the treatment “The speech therapist who was serious betrayed himself so that the client did not have any hope for the treatment.” Moreover, within experimental sentence pairs, the same antecedent noun phrase was chosen (e.g. de logopedist (‘the speech therapist’)), as well as the same subordinate clause connective (e.g. zodat (‘so that’)). Furthermore, the total number of words across all experimental sentences was kept equal. The verbs used in the two conditions of a sentence pair were controlled for frequency using CELEX11. If within a pair verbs did not have the same frequency, a frequency advantage (i.e. higher frequency) was given to the verb in the logophor condition. This choice arose from the view that if verb frequency has a facilitating effect, it favors the logophor condition (i.e. faster response), which would work against the prediction that logophoric reflexives exert more cost. Finally, prior to recording, the sentences were checked for naturalness, acceptability, and plausibility by native speakers of Dutch. The sentences were then recorded by a native speaker and digitized at a sample rate of 22,000/sample. Further, two positions were determined in each sentence, at which the visual probe was to be presented (in separate experiments). In experiment 2A (control position), the probe appeared 400ms before the onset of the reflexive. This position was tested to assure that no difference is observed up to the reflexive for both conditions in the sentence pair. In experiment 2B (experimental position), the probe was presented 100ms after the offset of the reflexive, which is the point where interpretive processes are expected to take place. Twenty-five probes were created for the experimental sentence pairs, and each stimulus of a given pair was presented with the same probe. The decision to use identical probes was motivated by the need to limit potential frequency effects. However, since participants saw the same probe for the coargument reflexive and the logophor condition, sentences were meticulously counterbalanced both within subjects and across subjects to minimize a recognition

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effect due to seeing a given probe twice. Furthermore, low frequency probes were selected based on the notion that frequency and processing cost can add up to create a stronger effect, as evidenced by previous findings (Zurif, personal communication).12 Criteria for probe selection were first of all that the probe was not semantically or phonetically related to the content of the sentence. Second, it did not represent a continuation of the sentence in any meaningful way. Third, probes were matched for length and all probes consisted of one or two syllables and agreed in the number of letters (5–6). Fourth, probes exhibited diverse phonological and acoustical properties (see Shapiro et al. 1991). And finally, all probes represented nouns. In addition to the fifty experimental sentences, one hundred and fifty additional sentences and probes were created, which served as fillers for the final version of the script. The filler sentences matched the experimental sentences in length and type of complexity. Fifty filler sentences were assigned real-word probes, and one hundred were assigned non-word probes. The nonword probes were constructed to comply with Dutch phonotactic and orthographic rules (e.g. bezer, vrout, snoeg13). Probe positions were randomly selected in the filler sentences to inhibit the development of a strategy of guessing the probe position by the participants. One third of the non-word filler sentences contained reflexive elements other than zich in diverse environments to divert attention from the experimental items. A script was created with a total of two hundred sentences. The experimental sentences were put in a quasirandom order, and the sequencing of the sentences within a pair was controlled in such a way that for half of the pairs the coargument condition preceded the logophor condition and for the other half it followed the logophor condition. Moreover, at least two filler sentences had to appear at the beginning of the script and between experimental sentences.

4.3.2.4.  Predictions For experiment 2A (control position), where interference was probed 400ms before the reflexive element zich, no difference is expected to be found between the two conditions, because sentence processing should not differ up to this point. Despite the fact that the sentences do not form optimal minimal pairs, an increase in processing cost at the pre-reflexive position is not expected. In contrast, the dependency hierarchy predicts a difference between the two conditions when measuring interference at the experimental position immediately after zich (experiment 2B). Specifically, I hypothesize that the logophor condition should elicit a higher RT compared to the coargument reflex-

Evidence from processing

ive condition, which would reflect the additional processing effort involved in the establishment of a discourse dependency — here, via a cut-and-paste operation to strengthen the file card of the logophoric zich — as compared to the coargument reflexive zich, whose integration is predicted to be resolved through a syntactic dependency.

4.3.2.5.  Results Statistical analyses were performed on experimental pairs; if one item within a pair had to be rejected, the entire pair was discarded from the final computation. Data discarded included incorrect responses (saying “no” to a letter string representing a real word of Dutch), timed-out responses (responding after the limit of 1500 msecs), and those falling outside three standard deviations from the mean. Furthermore, data from individual subjects were discarded entirely from the final analyses if a subject failed to perform correctly in at least 75% of the experimental pairs. For the control position (experiment 2A), the data from two subjects had to be excluded completely due to the large number of errors. From the twenty subjects who entered the final analysis, 43 data pairs (8.6%) had to be discarded (with a mean error rate of 2.15 pairs/subject). In the experimental position (experiment 2B), all twenty subjects entered the final calculations and 29 data pairs (5.8%) had to be taken out due to some kind of error (mean error rate: 1.45). Results for experiment 2A (control position, where interference was probed 400 msecs before the reflexive) show that there was no difference in RT between the coargument reflexive and the logophor condition (subject analysis: t(19)=−0.92, p=.18; item analysis: t(24)=−0.87, p=.19)). This indicates that the sentences in the two conditions do not differ from each other during comprehension right before the reflexive and that any difference that may be observed at the post-reflexive experimental position can be attributed to the interpretive processes needed for the establishment of the reflexive–antecedent relation. Experiment 2B (experimental position, where probe appeared 100 msecs after the reflexive) revealed a significantly higher RT for the logophor condition over the coargument reflexive condition for both subject analysis (t(19)= −2.05, p=.02) and item analysis (t(24)=−2.20, p=.01). This suggests that the selection of a referent is more costly for the sentence processor in the case of logophor interpretation than in the case of coargument reflexive interpretation. Table 2 summarizes the results for experiment 2A and 2B.

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Coargument reflexives Logophors Significance

Experiment 2A (control position)

Experiment 2B (experimental position)

685.32 (SD 122.61) 693.43 (SD 111.97) p = .18

763.49 (SD 140.30) 789.12 (SD 135.99) *p =.02

Moreover, in further statistical analyses, no sequence effects or other sources of interference were found. This is important as it indicates that the difference observed in the experimental position can be fully credited to the nature of the interpretation of the reflexive.

4.3.2.6.  Discussion The results indicate that logophor interpretation is more costly compared to coargument reflexive interpretation in Dutch, and they therefore replicate the findings from English reported in the previous experiment. In light of previous interference studies that investigated syntax–discourse interface phenomena, the increased RT after the logophoric zich can be taken as a reflection of the need for discourse-based processing to achieve pronominal interpretation, while the coargument zich does not require discourse processes for interpretation. In terms of the dependency hierarchy, this study provides further evidence that coargument reflexives are subject to relatively inexpensive processing mechanisms and their interpretation is less costly than logophor interpretation. It suggests that coargument reflexives generally establish a dependency with their antecedent in the computational system, and that this is the most economical mechanism of pronominal interpretation. In contrast, logophor interpretation cannot be resolved in the least costly fashion. The Syntax–Discourse Model proposes that the reason for this lies in the absence of coargumenthood with the antecedent on the one hand and the embedding in a location information unit on the other hand. As a result, the corresponding file card must establish a dependency at the discourse level and the system must find means to elevate the file card into a well-formed one. This can only be achieved within the discourse representation through information transfer with the antecedent’s file card. The findings from real-time processing of Dutch reflexive elements therefore substantiate the claims established in the Syntax–Discourse Model. On

Evidence from processing

the one hand, they show that a division of labor between syntax and discourse is valid for different kinds of reflexive–antecedent dependencies, and that a syntactic dependency is the most economical one. On the other hand, they indicate that the notion of coargumenthood and reflexive-marking is the most fundamental consideration during pronominal interpretation, as a contrast between simplex and complex reflexives does not seem to have an impact on the overall comparison between coargument reflexive and logophor interpretation. Taken together, the results from experiment 1 on reflexivity in English and experiment 2 on reflexivity in Dutch support a model of the establishment of coreference that distinguishes between dependencies in the syntactic representation and in the discourse representation. Up to this point, I have investigated the predictions for pronominal–antecedent dependencies as a function of the pronominal’s representation. However, the dependency hierarchy also makes cost-based claims on the basis of differences between the antecedent’s file cards. In the next section, I therefore examine the interpretation of pronouns with different kinds of antecedents.

4.4.  Real-time sentence comprehension:   quantified expressions vs. referential pronouns After providing support for a modular difference during the establishment of pronominal–antecedent relations during the interpretation of reflexive elements, the next step is to investigate the discourse-internal dependencies that the Syntax–Discourse Model puts forth. This section focuses on the issue of whether the economy-based hierarchy derived from the Syntax–Discourse Model also correlates with processing cost from different dependencies within the discourse level. The minimal pairs examined for this contrast are pronouns with quantified antecedents compared to pronouns with referential antecedents. Here, the pronouns under investigation have the same discourse representation and do not differ with regard to their structural properties. The predicted difference is entirely due to the nature of the antecedent (quantified vs. referential), which the Syntax–Discourse Model also distinguishes on economical grounds. I report results from a CMLD study that examined this contrast in English (Brun 2001; Piñango et al. 2001) and present an experiment that was conducted on Dutch. In the following (section 4.4.1), I discuss the status of pronouns in both quantified and referential environments. The Syntax–Discourse Model predicts a

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difference on the basis of the nature of the antecedent, where a ­dependency with a referential antecedent is expected to be more costly than a dependency with a non-referential antecedent (quantified expression) during the initial linkage. This representational contrast has been shown to have consequences for sentence processing. In section 4.4.2, first, the predictions for this contrast of non-referential vs. referential dependencies are outlined. Second, I summarize a number of psycholinguistic studies that have focused on the contrast between quantified and referential interpretation; among these studies is a crossmodal lexical decision interference study with native speakers of English (Brun 2001; Piñango et al. 2001) that served as a starting point for a similar study with native speakers of Dutch, which forms the core of this chapter and is presented in section 4.4.3. This section concludes with a more detailed discussion of the role of quantified expressions in the Syntax–Discourse Model.

4.4.1.  Quantified expressions vs. referential pronouns: representational considerations Pronouns can refer to a quantified expression (21&22), where they are interpreted as bound variables, or select a purely referential antecedent from discourse storage (23): (21) Everyonei thinks that the audience admires heri. (22) Every actressi thinks that the audience admires heri. (23) The actressi thinks that the audience admires heri. In (21), the interpretation of the pronoun is bound to the antecedent everyone, and in (22) to every actress, which quantifies over the pronoun and introduces the notion of a set (provided that the parser does not select the extra-sentential reading of her=some other person in the discourse, which would result in a coreferential interpretation). In (23), pronoun interpretation is linked to a uniquely identifiable discourse referent. Generally, the interpretation of pronouns as in (21) through (23) has been captured within the canonical Binding view, where Principle B states that a pronoun must be free in its governing category (Chomsky 1981). This is true for quantified and referential conditions. However, it has also been observed that there is a difference between the sentences above, which Reinhart (1983, et seq.) has formulated in terms of ‘bound variable interpretation’ and ­‘covaluation’. In this view, the pronoun in (21/22) is a variable and refers to a

Evidence from processing

set, while it refers to an individual in (23). Following from this, the pronoun with a quantified antecedent is subject to a variable dependency. The crucial structural condition that Reinhart has identified for bound variable interpretation is that of c-command, where “[q]uantified NPs and wh-traces can have anaphoric relations only with pronouns in their c-command syntactic domain” (Reinhart 1983: 122). In contrast to this, pronouns with R-expression antecedents are considered to form a discourse dependency, during which they pick a specific value, for interpretation. The Syntax–Discourse Model diverges from this view in that it places the burden of both quantified and referential interpretation on the discourse representation.14 The difference between the two conditions within the present framework is that a quantified antecedent as in (21) represents a non-referential entity and the antecedent in (23) corresponds to a referential file card representation. In addition, the Syntax–Discourse Model formally distinguishes between light (i.e. non-referential) (21) and referential quantifiers (22), where the latter are viewed as referential entities due to the availability of a restrictor in the heading of the file card (and the referential properties associated with the DP that yield a strong frame). The contrast between non-referential and referential is therefore immediately related to the morphological feature specification of the entities and hence their referentiality [±R] and to the nature of the heading. The referentiality of a quantified DP appears to be strongly tied to the presence and the characteristics of the nominal restrictor, which forces a full feature specification. The model assumes that feature specification is a property that is carried by the head D°, but there seems to be a strong connection between head and complement, as the head has the same lexical appearance for light and referential quantifiers (e.g. every in everyone vs. every bear), but yields a [−R] specification in the former and a [+R] specification in the latter case (for a discussion of this, see section 3.3). As far as the non-referential quantifier everyone is concerned, I assume that one merges as the nominal complement (and thus appears as the file card’s heading); however, an alternative view might be that everyone merges into D° in its entirety and makes up the frame, leaving the heading empty. Yet, from a diachronic perspective the former analysis seems to be supported for English. In addition, a light quantifier foremost denotes a set, while the presence of a restrictor in referential quantifiers provides information about the set and its individuals. For the establishment of a dependency of a pronoun, the model makes distinct predictions depending on the discourse status of the ­antecedent:

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Cost-based hierarchy: predictions for pronoun–antecedent relations Antecedent’s file card

132

Referential, Quantified Referential Non-Referential

[+Refl]

(a) (c) (b)

Cut and Paste

Bridging

Pronominal’s file card

A dependency with a non-referential antecedent is predicted to be less costly than that with a referential antecedent (e.g. (b), (c)), as it only allows for transfer of variable-like information pertaining to the general set. In contrast, a dependency with a referential antecedent initiates information transfer relating to a specific discourse referent (identified in the heading of the antecedent file card); this is expected to hold for both quantified referential entities and non-quantified referential entities. In addition, the Syntax–Discourse Model assumes that quantification with referential quantifiers increases processing load (compared to non-quantified referential entities (e.g. (a))), as additional information about the set must be maintained and transferred to the pronominal’s file card.15 Within the Syntax–Discourse Model, interpretation of pronouns is then achieved in the following manner: Regardless of the nature of the antecedent, the merging of a pronoun into the syntactic structure triggers the creation of a file card in the discourse representation. This file card lacks a heading (as a reflection of the empty DP-complement) and is therefore not well-formed. As a consequence, it must search for a proper antecedent that can supply a heading (via a cut-and-paste operation). Given the economy considerations mentioned above, the following operations appear to be suitable: if a non-referential interpretation is available, the pronoun establishes a dependency with the corresponding entity. If a referential antecedent is present in the discourse representation, a cut-and-paste operation transfers information into the pronominal’s file card. In both scenarios, the pronoun projects an insufficient file

Evidence from processing

card representation, but it achieves well-formedness through a linkage with another file card.

4.4.2.  Quantified expressions vs. referential pronouns: processing considerations Given the dependency hierarchy, it is therefore expected that the establishment of coreference with a referential or a non-referential quantified antecedent has consequences for sentence processing. In the following section, a number of findings from comprehension experiments in English are reviewed that support the claims of the dependency hierarchy at least partially, as only a few studies have investigated the processing of non-referential quantifiers.

4.4.2.1.  Quantified expression vs. referential pronoun in English The contrast of the processing of quantified pronouns and coreferential pronouns has been investigated by means of different psycholinguistic paradigms. However, most studies have focused on pronoun interpretation with quantified antecedents that contain a referential restrictor (e.g. every ballerina, each player). Within our model, the presence of a referential restrictor, such as ballerina or player, results in the formation of a discourse referent. The antecedent still represents a set (as is the case for so-called light quantifiers, such as everyone, nobody, etc.), but it is now encoded in the discourse with a well-formed file card representation — whereas the non-referential quantifier has a weak frame and carries a variable in its heading. This indicates that a distinction must be drawn between referential quantifiers and non-referential quantifiers. Warren (2003) reports a series of experiments that directly address this contrast between referential and non-referential quantifiers (which she refers to as contentful and light respectively). Utilizing a self-paced reading paradigm, she showed that contentful quantifiers were read more slowly than light quantifiers.16 These findings support the view that quantifiers fall in two groups: referential and non-referential. And they further substantiate the general claim that processes associated with referential entities are more costly than with non-referential entities. Looking at the processing literature on bound variable interpretation, we then must carefully distinguish between referential and non-referential quantifiers. Evidence for referential quantifiers comes for instance from Carminati et al. (2002) who present a series of eye-tracking experiments, in which they compare reading times to pronouns with a quantified (referential!) ­antecedent

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(e.g. every British soldier) and coreferential pronouns (e.g. the old British soldier or a proper name antecedent). They found an increased (second pass) rereading time for the referential quantified pronoun compared to the coreferential one for both intra- and intersentential interpretation. This suggests to me that the prediction that coreferential interpretation is easier to process than referential quantifier interpretation is borne out.17 In a CMLD interference study, Brun (2001; see also Piñango et al. 2001) investigated the cost of processing of pronouns with a quantified antecedent (24a) and those with a referential antecedent (24b): (24) a. Everyonei fears that the dentist will hurt himi/k while . . . b. The childi fears that the dentist will hurt himi/k while . . . She tested twenty college-aged subjects in the control position (before the pronoun) and twenty subjects in the experimental position (immediately preceding the pronoun). Each subject listened to 25 experimental sentence pairs — similar in structure to the pair in (24) — which were quasi-randomized and counterbalanced within a script containing a total of 230 sentences. In addition to the listening comprehension task, lexical decisions had to be made to words and non-words of English, which were constructed similarly to those described in the reflexivity experiment. The reaction times to these lexical decisions were recorded using RTLab. The primary prediction for this study was that interpretation involving a referential antecedent should elicit a higher RT (at the point of the experimental position) compared to variable interpretation of non-referential quantifiers as a reflection of increased processing demands related to the establishment of a discourse dependency required for the interpretation with a referential antecedent. At the point of the pre-pronominal control position, no difference was expected to obtain, since the sentence pairs are structurally identical up to this point and differ only in the realization of the antecedent DP. The predictions were borne out by the results (see Table 3). At the control position, no statistical difference was observed between the two conditions. At the experimental position, where interference was probed immediately after the pronoun, the coreferential condition elicited a significantly higher RT compared to the (non-referential) quantifier condition. These results were found for both subject and item analyses. The results provide further evidence that referential interpretation is computationally more costly than non-referential interpretation. They thus support a model of pronominal interpretation

Evidence from processing Table 3.  Mean RT by condition (in msecs). (Subject analysis) Experiment A (control position) Non-ref. quantifier interpretation Coreferential interpretation Significance

694.15 685.9 p = .16

Experiment B (experimental position) 653.85 714.2 *p = .001

that allows for different kinds of dependencies. In addition, the results from this experiment emphasize that the different dependencies that are needed for pronominal interpretation rely not only on the nature of the pronominal and its structural relation to its antecedent (as this might have been concluded from the discussion of the reflexivity experiments), but also on the nature of the antecedent. On the basis of these findings, an experiment was designed probing Dutch comprehension of quantified and coreferential pronouns. The same difference as in the Brun (2001) study was expected to emerge between non-referential and referential dependencies.

4.4.3.  Quantified expressions vs. referential pronouns in Dutch: a CMLD experiment 4.4.3.1.  Method The method for this experiment was the same as in previously discussed studies of the cross-modal lexical decision interference paradigm. Native speakers of Dutch performed two tasks simultaneously: a listening comprehension task and a lexical decision task to an unrelated probe item. The reaction time to the lexical decision was recorded using Tempo 1.3.1 (Motta et al. 2000–3). 4.4.3.2.  Participants Sixty-two subjects (47 female) out of the Utrecht University student population participated in this study (twenty-two for the control position and forty subjects for the experimental position). All were native speakers of Dutch with normal (or corrected-to-normal) visual and auditory acuity (by their own report) and without a history of neurological disorder. Their ages ranged from 18 to 47 years (mean age: 22.6; SD = 4.8). They received monetary compensation for their participation.

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4.4.3.3.  Materials Initially, twenty-five minimal pairs were constructed, which only differed in having a quantified expression (25a) or a proper noun (25b) as antecedent: (25) a. Iedereeni beweert dat de klanten hemi haten omdat het brood everyone claims that the clients him hate because the bread te zout was. too salty was ‘Everyone claims that the clients hate him, because the bread was too salty.’ b. De bakkeri beweert dat de klanten hemi haten omdat het the baker claims that the clients him hate because the brood te zout was. bread too salty was ‘The baker claims that the clients hate him, because the bread was too salty.’ All experimental items were constructed using the same structural frame: (26) [IP DP [VP V [­CP dat [IP DPpl [VP hem V ]] [CP . . .]]] The antecedent DP was followed by a verb of speech or thought (e.g. bewerrt (‘claims’), zegt (‘says’), hoopt (‘hopes”)) which introduced a dat-(‘that’-)CP that contained a plural, [+human] definite DP followed by the pronoun under investigation and a transitive verb. The sentence was concluded with a subordinate clause to avoid end-of-sentence wrap-up effects on the pronoun. Since all sentences were matched in length, two-syllable nouns were chosen for the R-expression in the referential condition, to match the length of the quantified expression iedereen. In addition, the R-expression always represented a masculine noun. Therefore, hem (‘him’) was chosen for the critical pronoun in all experimental items. Finally, the intervening DP immediately preceding the pronoun was subject to the constraint that it be marked for plural to block any attempt of the pronoun to enter into a (false) dependency with it. It was also assured that no reactivation or continuity relation was available for the pronoun at any point in the sentence up to the pronoun, which could have created additional facilitation or priming effects. The sentences were checked for acceptability and plausibility by native speakers of Dutch. Then they were recorded by a native speaker and digitized at a sample rate of 22,000/sample. Two positions had to be determine

Evidence from processing

for the presentation of the visual probes. In experiment 3A (control position), the probe appeared 400 msecs before the onset of the pronoun hem. As mentioned previously, the control position is tested to guarantee that the two conditions (here, quantified interpretation and referential interpretation) do not show a processing difference prior to the appearance of the pronoun. Given the minimal pair character of our experimental items, any difference observed at the control position would have to be attributed to the nature of the antecedent or to sentence-external criteria (such as probe selection). In experiment 3B (experimental position), the visual probe was presented 100 msecs after the offset of hem. Based on evidence from priming studies (e.g. Nicol and Swinney 1989), this is the point where interpretive processes are expected to take place. Twenty-five probes were created for the experimental sentence pairs as described in the Dutch reflexivity experiment — e.g. hagel (‘hail’) and vezel (‘fiber’). One probe was presented with both the quantified condition and the referential condition of a given sentence pair. Each pair was matched with a probe that was entirely unrelated to the antecedent and the content of the sentence. Moreover, probes across pairs unambiguously represented nouns, were low-frequency items (Mean frequency = 182; [range: 8 — 460]), were controlled for length (one or two syllables and up to seven letters), and displayed diverse acoustical and phonological properties. Since probes were presented twice within an experimental run, sentence-probe pairs were counterbalanced both within and across subjects, in order to control for a potential effect due to recognizing a probe at the second presentation. A script was created containing the 50 experimental sentences and an additional 150 filler sentences, which matched the sentences in length and were combined with fifty word probes and one hundred non-word probes. The experimental sentences were quasi-randomized within the script: first, the order of the sentences within a pair was controlled in such a way that for half the pairs, the quantified condition preceded the referential condition, and for the other half, the referential condition preceded the quantified condition (within subject counterbalancing). Second, two scripts were created to reverse the overall sequencing; as a consequence, 50% of the subjects were first presented with the quantified condition of a specific pair and 50% were first presented with the referential condition of that same pair (between subject counterbalancing). In addition, at least two filler sentences had to appear at the beginning of the script and between experimental sentences.

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4.4.3.4.  Predictions Since the processing of a pronoun with a referential antecedent has been proven to be computationally more expensive than that of a pronoun with a quantified antecedent in English (as reported in Brun 2001), I expected to find the same pattern for this contrast in Dutch. Consequently, the predictions for Dutch were the same as for English: First, it was predicted that there would be no interference effect at the pre-pronoun control position. Second, it was predicted that a significantly higher RT would be found for the coreferential condition over the quantified condition at the experimental position, which probed interference after the pronoun. This again is based on the idea that the two tasks compete for the same processing resources; therefore, if more computational resources are required to perform pronoun interpretation in one of the conditions, this should result in a higher RT in the lexical decision task, as fewer resources are available for the latter task. Note also that the pronoun in (25) is ambiguous between a sentence-internal and a sentence-external reading. Since pronouns are free in their binding domains, the pronoun in (25) can enter into a pronoun–antecedent relation with either a sentence-internal antecedent (i.e. iedereen ‘everyone’ in (a) or de bakker ‘the baker’ in (b)) or a sentence-external antecedent (i.e. some other referent made available by the context through previous or future mention, deixis, etc.). However, since this ambiguity is available for both the quantified and the coreferential interpretation, any effect should be cancelled out. Moreover, there is independent experimental evidence that sentence-internal antecedents are preferably selected over sentence-external antecedents if such an antecedent is available (cf. e.g. Burkhardt and Piñango 2003; Sekerina et al. 2004). 4.4.3.5.  Results Statistical analyses were carried out on the basis of experimental pairs, which means that if one item in an experimental pair had to be discarded due to an incorrect or timed-out response to the lexical decision task, the entire pair was removed from further calculations. Since the experimental items were always paired with a real word probe, data were marked as incorrect responses whenever a subject clicked the “no”-button on the response box. Timed-out responses were items to which no response was given within a window of 1500 msecs after probe presentation. Finally, if the RT to an item did not fall within three standard deviations from the mean RT in its condition, the data pair was also discarded from the final analysis. In addition, if a subject did not perform

Evidence from processing

correctly in at least 75% of the experimental pairs, the subject did not enter the final computation at all. A total of twenty-two subjects were tested in the control position, where interference was measured 400 msecs before the pronominal (experiment 3A). Out of these, two subjects had to be discarded due to the small number of correct responses they elicited. For the remaining twenty subjects, 47 data pairs (9.4% of the total data pairs in the final analysis) had to be excluded due to the criteria outlined above; the mean error rate amounted to 2.35 pairs per subject. A comparison of the mean RTs for the two conditions at the control position reveals no difference between the sentences with a quantified antecedent and those with a referential antecedent, which is exactly what had been expected. Paired t-tests based on subjects (t(19)= 0.94, p=.17) do not show an interference effect, and the mean RT for the quantified condition was 738.77 msecs and that for the referential condition 722.90 msecs (see also Table 4). This indicates that the experimental sentences in the quantified and the referential conditions are processed similarly up to the point of the control position and are not subject to distinct processing mechanisms prior to the appearance of the pronoun. At the control position, the results thus replicate the findings form the English study. In the experimental position (experiment 3B), a total of forty subjects were tested. The reason for testing forty subjects will become apparent in the discussion directly below. As it turned out, the experimental items were not constructed entirely uniformly across pairs. The sentences were designed in such a way that the subordinate clause that contained the crucial pronoun consisted of a transitive verb and its arguments. This was true for all sentences. However, some sentences included additional material that modified the verb, such as adverbials (e.g. lief (‘sweetly’) in (27)) or negation (e.g. nooit (‘never’) (28)). In addition, some sentences contained an extra element to mark tense, such as zal (‘will’) in (28). Table 4.  Mean RT by condition (in msecs). (Control Position) Experiment 3A (subject analysis) Quantified interpretation Coreferential interpretation Significance

738.77 (SD=135.20) 722.90 (SD=122.34) p=.17

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(27) . . . dat de serveerster hem lief aankijkt . . . that the waitress him sweetly looks-at ‘. . . that the waitress looks at him sweetly’ (28) . . . dat de butler hem nooit zal verlaten . . . that the butler him never will desert ‘. . . that the butler will never desert him’ The additional material could have an impact on the processing of the pronoun, as they occur exactly at the position where interference is measured, because in the experimental position, the probe appears 100 msecs after the pronoun. Ideally, this is synchronized with hearing the main verb in Dutch. (Note that Dutch has SOV order in subordinate clauses, so the verb always has to be presented after the object pronoun in the experimental sentences.18) However, if an adverbial or a negative particle is heard at the point at which the probe is presented, this might lead to an overall increase in processing load, as the system must hold all of this information for integration purposes. As a result, the RTs measured at this point cannot be exclusively attributed to pronoun resolution, but might very well reflect a number of different comprehension processes, and for the statistical analysis, this could result in a large variance. So in the case of (28), for example, the parser wants to maintain the arguments de butler and hem for integration into the verb’s event representation, and additionally, it wants to update the event structure with respect to negation and tense marking. Within our model of discourse representation, this then suggests that multiple discourse-related processes co-occur, which have the potential to obscure and conceal the processes involved in pronoun interpretation. On the basis of these considerations, the experimental sentences were reassessed and nine sentence pairs were excluded from the analysis because they contained interfering material between the pronoun and the verb, which would have required additional processing and updating of discourse information in the immediate vicinity of the pronoun.19 As a consequence, the following analyses are based on sixteen experimental sentence pairs, and to balance out any effect from a small sample size, the number of participants was increased to a total of forty. Out of the forty participants in experiment 3B, four had to be excluded because the variances of the means deviated by more than three times from each other. From the 36 subjects who comprised the final data set, 49 experimental pairs (8.5% of the total set) were discarded due to incorrect or timed-

Evidence from processing

out ­response or failure to be within three standard deviations from the mean (mean error rate per subject: 1.36). Results reveal a statistically significant difference between the two conditions. Our prediction was that the coreferential condition should elicit a higher RT compared to the quantified condition. Surprisingly, however, the data show a significant difference in the opposite direction: for Dutch, pronouns with the quantified expression iedereen as their antecedent elicit a higher RT than pronouns that have a referential antecedent. Statistical analyses based on subjects (t(35)= −1.75, p=.04) and items (t(15)= −2.05, p=.02) confirm this as shown in Table 5. These results suggest that pronoun interpretation that depends on a quantified antecedent differs in English and Dutch in such a way that a more economical mechanism for pronoun resolution is available in the English quantificational constructions. How could such a cross-linguistic difference be explained? As pointed out above, the Syntax–Discourse Model differentiates between referential and nonreferential quantifiers, and this difference has correlates in sentence processing, as for instance shown in Warren (2003). Following from this, I propose that pronominal interpretation depending on iedereen as antecedent patterns with the processing of referential quantifiers such as every philanthropist in English. The findings from Dutch in Experiment 3 might thus be taken as an indication that the Dutch quantifier iedereen requires a referential representation, which then would explain the results in Table 5. In the next section, I elaborate on this view and demonstrate how iedereen and everyone differ with respect to their referential properties. I propose that this distinction ultimately leads to a referential representation in the case of iedereen and to a non-referential representation in the case of everyone.

Table 5.  Mean RT by condition (in msecs). (Experimental Position) Experiment 3B (subject analysis) Quantified interpretation

765.41 (SD=144.57) Coreferential interpretation 746.44 (SD=136.98) Significance

*p=.04

Experiment 3B (item analysis) 781.02 (SD=54.21) 759.60 (SD=31.33) *p=.02

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4.4.4.  Quantification revisited One of the reasons for choosing everyone as the antecedent in the quantified condition in the study reported in Brun (2001)/Piñango et al. (2001) was our understanding that quantified DPs differ with respect to their referential encoding. In the design of that study, we purposefully avoided using referential quantifiers such as every instructor (29b), because as discussed above the interpretation of such a DP cannot be achieved through a variable interpretation alone, but requires access to discourse-based information concerning the nominal restrictor of the set (i.e. instructor in (29b)). (29) a. Everyonei hopes that the students like himi. b. Every instructori hopes that the students like himi. c. The instructori hopes that the students like himi. Since the goal of the Brun (2001) study was to identify a contrast between (nonreferential) variable interpretation and referential interpretation and their implications for the architecture of the language system, we chose everyone as uniform antecedent for the quantified condition. This is also what motivated the choice of iedereen (over e.g. ieder meisje (‘every girl’)) in the Dutch experiment. However, as I show below iedereen and everyone do not share the exact same properties, and I hence suggest that iedereen falls in the category of referential quantifiers, unlike its translated counterpart in English. This would then explain the difference between the English and Dutch CMLD studies. Below, I present evidence based on the morphological feature specification, the distribution, and the interpretation of everyone and iedereen to substantiate this claim.

4.4.4.1.  Phi-features In chapter 3, it was observed that referentiality [±R] is closely tied to the availability of phi-features in a given nominal. Elements that are specified for all phifeatures are [+R]; they are referentially independent and have the potential to form their own file card in discourse representation. Elements that are [−R] are not fully specified for all their phi-features. An immediate consequence of this within the Syntax–Discourse Model is that [−R] elements project a weak frame in the discourse representation. The question is then how morphological features are realized in everyone and iedereen. To address this matter, I look at what kind of pronouns the quantifiers allow as their antecedees (i.e. do they allow singular and/or plural ante-

Evidence from processing

cedees, what person marking(s) do they agree with, do they match onto masculine, feminine, or neuter antecedees?). For English everyone, the following can be observed: (30) Person agreement? a.   *Everyonei hopes that the children like mei. b.   *Everyonei hopes that the children like youi. c. Everyonei hopes that the children like himi. (31) Number agreement? a. Everyonei hopes that the children like himi. b. Everyonei hopes that the children like themi. (32) Gender agreement? a. Everyonei hopes that the children like himi. b. Everyonei hopes that the children like heri. c.   *Everyonei hopes that the children like iti. As far as person agreement with a pronominal is concerned, everyone takes only a third person antecedee (30c).20 This means that it has a strong morphological person feature [third person]. This can also be seen from the agreement with the verb, which is marked for third person singular. However, even though the verb is marked for singular, everyone allows for both a singular or a plural antecedee (31). This reflects a trend in English, where the generic pronoun them (or they) is preferably used to conform to a more gender-neutral and politically correct language over the gender-marked him (cf. also Bodine 1998 and references therein for a discussion of the fact that the use of singular they predated the political correctness debate by several centuries). Even though some prescriptivists reject such a free use of the generic plural pronoun, both singular and plural are nevertheless generally acceptable in a sentence like (31). A large body of literature exists that provides evidence for the acceptability of epicene pronouns. Meyers (1990), Mitchell (1994), Ivy et al. (1995), Newman (1997) and others have for instance surveyed pronoun usage during sentence production. MacKay and Fulkerson (1979), or more recently, Foertsch and Gernsbacher (1997) have looked at comprehension of pronouns, to name just a few. Evidence for the disappearance of number features in English quantifier-pronoun relations is reported in Foertsch and Gernsbacher (1997), who in a self-paced reading time experiment show that both singular and plural pronouns are acceptable antecedes for everyone, everybody, anyone, anybody, someone, and somebody (and that plural them was read even faster than him

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and her as measured in mean per-character reading times). Additional evidence comes from a survey conducted for the current investigation, where 32 participants had to indicate whether (33) and (34) were grammatically acceptable, and if not how the sentences could be improved: (33) Everyone received a letter when he passed the final exam. (34) Everyone­ bought a sandwich before they attended the meeting. For (33), where everyone was followed by he, the ratings were almost evenly split between ‘good’ and ‘bad’; 14 participants (43.75%) rejected he as an acceptable continuation for everyone and 18 participants (56.25%) judged it as adequate. Out of those who considered the sentence ungrammatical, eleven participants corrected it towards the use of they instead of he. One person suggested he or she and another used a gerund to avoid pronoun use altogether.21 In the responses to (34), twenty subjects (62.5%) accepted the use of they and twelve subjects (37.5%) did not. Corrections of they included seven he, three he or she, one she, and one gerund paraphrase. These data suggest that both singular and plural pronouns can refer to everyone and that the quantifier thus lacks inherent number features. Pronoun preference differs across speakers, but it should also be noted that participants indicated after the survey that they accepted both singular and plural pronouns in more casual or spoken conversations, but felt more restricted in written contexts (e.g. survey), largely driven by prescriptive knowledge (i.e. what they learned in school) or considerations of gender-neutrality. Finally, with regard to gender features, the survey presented above also provides evidence that everyone does not have a full gender feature specification. In the survey, participants supplied either she or he or she as possible continuations after everyone. Together with the judgments from (32), this shows that everyone allows for both masculine (32a) and feminine (32b) pronominal antecedees, but not for neuter it (32c). In sum, everyone comes with person features (but cf. note 20), but lacks morphological feature specification of number and gender. As a result of this lack of full feature specification, everyone cannot be referentially independent and is therefore [−R]. Within the present model, this strengthens the claim that quantified interpretation of the sort needed to process a pronoun with everyone as its antecedent, involves a non-referential representation (and should therefore be more economical compared to a dependency with a referential interpretation — which is consistent with the findings from Brun 2001).

Evidence from processing

The next step is then to look at the same features for Dutch iedereen. The examples in (35–7) are direct translations of (30–2): (35) Person agreement? a.   *Iedereeni hoopt dat de kinderen miji-1st mogen. b.   *Iedereeni hoopt dat de kinderen jei-2nd mogen. c. Iedereeni hoopt dat de kinderen hemi-3rd mogen. (36) Number agreement? a. Iedereeni hoopt dat de kinderen hemi-3rd.sg mogen. b.   *Iedereeni hoopt dat de kinderen heni-3rd,.pl mogen. (37) Gender agreement? a. Iedereeni hoopt dat de kinderen hemi-3rd.sg.masc mogen. b.   *Iedereeni hoopt dat de kinderen haari-3rd.sg.fem mogen. c.   *Iedereeni hoopt dat de kinderen heti-3rd.sg.neu mogen. As far as person features are concerned, Dutch iedereen patterns with everyone in that it only allows for a third person pronoun as antecedee (35). With regard to number and gender features, however, iedereen is more restrictive than everyone. It can only refer to a masculine singular pronoun (36/37), and plural hen (‘them’) and singular haar (‘her’) and het (‘it’) are impossible coreferential extensions.22 Following from this, it can be concluded that iedereen is fully specified for all phi-features and should therefore be marked as [+R]. As a consequence, it should then be capable of forming its own discourse representation, which comes with a strong frame, as within the Syntax–Discourse Model, the property [±R] determines the nature of the frame, and [+R] translates directly into a strong frame. The table in (38) summarizes the feature specifications of everyone and iedereen: (38) Features of everyone and iedereen: everyone ✓ Person Feature Number Feature Gender Feature

− −

iedereen ✓ ✓ ✓

The implications of this for pronoun interpretation in the Syntax–Discourse Model are that if iedereen is [+R] and thus projects a well-formed file card,

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interpretation that depends on the integration of a pronominal with this quantifier is referential. In contrast, interpretation involving everyone is non-referential as it has a weak frame.

4.4.4.2.  Distribution The phi-feature distribution has consequences for the overall distribution of the two quantifiers, which provides further evidence for the proposed distinction. In particular, the referentiality associated with the phi-feature specification maps onto d-linking (in the case of [+R]) and non-d-linking (in the case of [−R]), as outlined by Pesetsky (1987) with respect to d-linked (i.e. referential) and non-d-linked (i.e. non-referential) wh-phrases. (39) Which singer has a sore throat? (40) Who has a sore throat? Which singer in (39) is d-linked via the restrictor singer, and who in (40) is non-d-linked and non-referential. This distinction has for instance consequences in terms of scope assignment (see Pesetsky 1987), yet, this particular property does not inform the current comparison with everyone and iedereen. However, one way to look at the distributional consequence of a [±R] distinction is via the partitive construction, which requires the identification of individual members of a set for interpretation — which can be characterized as a discourse-linked (referential) process. In English, only which is able to take a partitive (41a), but who, being [−R], cannot (41b)23: (41) a. Which of the boys has read the book? b. (?)*Who of the boys has read the book? Looking at the quantifiers ieder and every in (42), it appears that English every patterns with (41b) in that it is ungrammatical: (42) a. Ieder van de jongens heft het boek gelezen. b.   *Every of the boys has read the book. This suggests that every — like who — is non-referential and does therefore not allow a partitive construction as a restrictor which requires access to a set at the level of discourse representation. (Every does allow for a restrictor that represents an individual referent (e.g. every neighbor), but it cannot be combined with a restrictor specifically selecting a set, as in (42b).) In contrast, ieder in (42a) parallels the which-phrase in (41a). Its acceptability provides add-

Evidence from processing

itional support for the observation that ieder carries referential features, as it is capable of combining with a partitive construction and thus selecting individual members out of a group.24 Another distributional consequence of the referentiality of iedereen is found in cataphoric environments (see also discussion in Reuland and Avrutin 2005):25 (43) a. Voordat hiji TV kijkt, eet iedereeni een appel. b.  *Before hei watches TV, everyonei eats an apple. In English (43b), coindexation between he and everyone does not yield an acceptable reading. However, Dutch (43a) allows for this cataphoric use. This can be related to the observation that iedereen is [+R]. The pronoun needs an individual referent, and if iedereen has a referential representation, the pronoun can enter into a dependency with it and select an individual member of the referential set of iedereen for interpretation. In this respect, it is noteworthy to mention that (44) in English is more acceptable than (43b), with (44a) being better than (44b): 26 (44) a. Before hei watches TV, the boyi eats an apple. b. ?Before hei watches TV, every boyi eats an apple. This suggests that even in English cataphoric uses are possible, but only in those instances where the pronoun can be linked to a referential DP that has a strong file card representation. This then further strengthens the claim that iedereen carries referential content and is [+R] (like the boy in (44)) and that everyone is [−R]. In general, the data in this section indicate that there is a distinction between everyone and iedereen based on the morphological feature specification, and that this has consequences for the distribution and interpretation of the quantified DP. Furthermore, the difference between the two quantified DPs can be viewed in terms of the contrast between referential and non-referential entities. This then fits the present model of pronominal interpretation and explains the findings from the Dutch experiment.

4.4.5.  Conclusion This section discussed real-time comprehension of pronouns with quantified and referential antecedents. The CMLD interference study from Dutch reveals that the interpretation of a pronoun with the Dutch quantifier ­iedereen

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as ante­cedent is more costly than that of a pronoun with a referential antecedent. These findings are in contrast to English, where referential interpretation is more costly than quantified interpretation with everyone as antecedent. A closer look at the quantifiers everyone and iedereen indicates that this difference can be attributed to a distinction in terms of referential properties as evidenced by distinct morphological feature specifications and distributional characteristics, which in turn has consequences for the nature of the ­interpretation. Within the Syntax–Discourse Model, the findings first support the notion that pronoun interpretation is dependent on the nature of both the antecedent and the pronominal. Second, the data show how the model makes different processing-related predictions for pronominal interpretation. On the side of the antecedent, feature specification determines whether the file card created at the level of discourse representation has a weak or a strong frame; insufficient feature specification corresponds to a weak frame formation and full feature specification corresponds to a strong frame formation. Antecedents with a strong frame can be fully accessed at the discourse level (referential antecedents). Antecedents with a weak frame correspond to a non-referential representation, which resembles a variable. As such, accessing these entities is cheap, as they do not carry a lot of informational content. On the side of the pronoun, a file card is formed with a strong frame, but no heading. In order to become a full-fledged file card, the pronoun seeks to enter into a dependency relation with a referent. In the case of referential antecedents, this dependency can be established via a cut-and-paste operation, and the referential DP or the referential quantifier iedereen provide the heading (een) for the pronoun’s file card. The dependency between a pronoun and iedereen requires further a process of quantification resolution, i.e. recognizing the members of the set. A pronoun can also enter into a dependency with a non-referential antecedent (here everyone); initially, this dependency is the least costly as the heading of the antecedent’s file card does not carry referential content that could be ­transferred. Taking the data from Dutch and English, the cost-based hierarchy posited by the Syntax–Discourse Model can be further supported. The English data provide evidence that the establishment of a dependency with a non-referential antecedent (i.e. everyone — pronoun) is more economical than with a referential antecedent (i.e. the baker — pronoun). And the Dutch experiment suggests that dependencies with referential antecedents can be further divided into purely referential (i.e. de bakker — pronoun) and quantified ones (i.e. ied-

Evidence from processing

ereen — pronoun), where the latter are the most resource-consuming dependencies during pronoun interpretation, since the antecedent has a discourse representation, but also requires exchanging information for quantificational purposes. As far as further investigations are concerned, there are two immediate test cases for the claims regarding the difference between iedereen and everyone. First, a CMLD interference paradigm could investigate the comprehension of pronouns with referential quantifier phrases like every dancer as their antecedents. In English, the prediction is that processing of pronouns with referential quantifier antecedents is more costly than that of pronouns with R-expression antecedents. Thus, a complete picture of real-time properties of pronoun resolution using CMLD could be established, in addition to results using other experimental paradigms (e.g. Frazier and Clifton 2000; Carminati et al. 2002). The same experiment could be performed for Dutch, where the prediction is identical (i.e. referential quantifier more costly than referring expression antecedent), except that Dutch referential quantifiers are expected to pattern with iedereen, since it is also [+R]. A second test case would be to find a quantified antecedent in Dutch that is not fully specified for phi-features and as a consequence is non-referential, which should elicit the pattern observed for pronoun interpretation with English everyone compared to that with a referential DP. And finally, there are also open questions with respect to the online processing of quantification. In this respect, it would be particularly interesting to investigate whether an effect of quantification emerges further downstream from the pronoun, as quantification is predicted to take place after the initial establishment of a dependency.

4.5.  General discussion: CMLD findings In this chapter, I have investigated a number of specific predictions that the Syntax–Discourse Model makes for the establishment of coreference utilizing the cross-modal lexical decision interference paradigm, an experimental technique that assesses processing cost as comprehension unfolds. In particular, I have looked at the formation of pronominal–antecedent dependencies on the basis of structural differences between reflexive elements (experiment 1 and 2) and on the basis of the properties of the antecedents (experiment 3). The last experiment focused on the representation of different kinds of antecedents and their consequences for the establishment of pronoun–anteced-

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ent dependencies. The Syntax–Discourse Model predicts increased processing load for non-referential, referential, and referential quantified entities, which are all subject to discourse-internal mechanisms. Results from previous studies suggested that this hierarchy has processing consequences during the establishment of a discourse referent, and experiment 3 sought to investigate these distinctions on the basis of pronoun–antecedent dependencies in Dutch. This was addressed by examining the processing of pronouns with quantified and referential antecedents. The results from this study were at first rather unexpected (when compared to English), but a closer look at the nature of the antecedent iedereen (‘everyone’) revealed that the results can be explained on the basis of the predictions made by the Syntax–Discourse Model. Specifically, the quantified expression iedereen in Dutch appears to carry referential properties, as it is [+R] and therefore requires the introduction of a referential unit in the discourse representation. In contrast, everyone in English lacks such a referential capacity and is interpreted as a non-referential variable. The investigation of dependencies in Dutch revealed that referential quantified antecedents elicited more processing cost than referential antecedents, which confirmed the hierarchy established by the Syntax–Discourse Model. The findings therefore support the Syntax–Discourse Model and its hierarchy of dependencies. As far as structural properties of pronominal–antecedent relations are concerned, the Syntax–Discourse Model predicts a correlation between the nature of a pronominal’s predicate and the level at which the corresponding dependency is formed. In the presence of coargumenthood between a pronominal and its antecedent and of a reflexive-marked predicate, the model postulates a syntactic dependency. In the absence of coargumenthood (and hence also the lack of reflexive-marking), the model proposes a discourse dependency. Furthermore, the cost-based hierarchy predicts that syntactic dependencies are more economical than discourse dependencies. These predictions were investigated by measuring reaction times to coargument reflexives (which are predicted to require a syntactic dependency) and logophors (which are predicted to be subject to a discourse dependency). This contrast was examined for English and Dutch reflexives, which share the general structural distinction between coargument reflexive and logophor interpretation, but have distinct file card representations corresponding to self- and se-anaphors respectively. The results from experiments 1 and 2 indicate that logophor interpretation is generally more costly than coargument reflexive interpretation — independent of the language-specific internal structure of the reflexive. These results confirm a division of labor during the establishment of pronominal–

Evidence from processing

antecedent dependencies between the two distinct modules (cf. Shapiro et al. 1987, 1989; McElree and Griffith 1995; de Vincenzi 1996; Piñango et al. 1999; Shapiro 2000; McElree et al. 2001) and they support the predictions made by the Syntax–Discourse Model. Moreover, beyond the model-specific claims, the data provide evidence for the discourse-based nature of logophors, which as mentioned above, is still an issue of debate in the ‘syntax-only’ frameworks. One question that has not been addressed directly in this series of experiments is whether the notion of coargumenthood represents a core property of pronominal interpretation. As the Syntax–Discourse Model is formulated so far, coargumenthood must be checked first, and presence of a coargumenthood relation and reflexive-marking yields a syntactic dependency (which is only predicted for coargument reflexives), while absence of it determines the establishment of a discourse dependency. In contrast to this, the majority of the discourse-based accounts discussed in section 2.1.2 provide non-syntactic explanations for pronominal–antecedent relations. Therefore, how essential is the notion of coargumenthood for pronominal interpretation? Chapter 5 addresses this question by examining real-time comprehension of coargument reflexives and logophors in Broca’s aphasia patients. Here, I capitalize on the observation that this patient group shows a slow-down in syntactic structure formation. As a consequence, if coargumenthood is a core property for the establishment of coreference, such a slowdown should be observable in both conditions.

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Chapter 5

Evidence from processing:   Aphasia research In this chapter, I present data from online interpretation from Broca’s aphasia patients. Through this investigation, I address the following questions: (a) Are Broca’s aphasia patients capable of forming pronominal–antecedent dependencies? (b) How does the Broca’s patients’ performance pattern with reflexive interpretation in the intact system, and how can this inform the Syntax– Discourse Model? (c) What are the implications for brain-language relations? The investigation of Broca’s aphasia patients’ real time comprehension provides further data to evaluate the model proposed herein, as this particular patient group exhibits specific performance patterns with regard to syntactic structure building: Broca’s patients have been described as not being able to form syntactic structure on time, but in a protracted manner (cf. e.g. Piñango 1999, 2002; Love et al. 2001; Burkhardt et al. 2003). As a consequence, Broca’s patients’ comprehension can shed light on the contribution of coargumenthood to interpretation, as presence or absence of coargumenthood can only be determined on the basis of a properly formed phrase structure. In addition, the Broca’s aphasia syndrome helps us to investigate brain-language relations and to understand the function of Broca’s area during sentence processing. In this chapter, I first provide a clinical description of Broca’s aphasia (section 5.1) and then introduce a hypothesis that captures the linguistic deficit observed in these patients — the Slow-Syntax Hypothesis (5.2) — on which I draw in the analysis and interpretation of the data, and which bears directly on the predictions of the Syntax–Discourse Model. Next, I review previous research on pronominal interpretation and Broca’s aphasia (5.3), before I turn to the presentation of a study of real-time comprehension of logophors and coargument reflexives in Broca’s aphasia patients.

5.1.  Clinical background Broca’s aphasia is associated with lesions to the left anterior hemisphere, particularly to the region referred to as Broca’s area and its surroundings, and

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these lesions generally affect both cortex and white matter (e.g. Benson 1993; Goodglass 1993). The Broca’s aphasia syndrome (also referred to as ‘agrammatism’) is generally characterized as nonfluent, telegraphic speech, in other words, patients with this syndrome exhibit effortful speech and omit for instance determiners and function words. This patient group also performs poorly on repetition tasks. Yet, their comprehension has been described as relatively intact (see Goodglass and Kaplan 1972, Goodglass et al. 2001 for a discussion of the clinical test battery — the Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Examination (BDAE) — which is used to identify Broca’s aphasia in native speakers of English). From a linguistic perspective, the Broca’s aphasia syndrome has been characterized as syntactic in nature.1 One often described deficiency (across many different languages) is Broca’s aphasia patients’ comprehension of non-canonical sentence structures, such as agentive passives, object relatives, and object clefts, where the patients show chance-level performance in off-line tasks (see e.g. Caramazza and Zurif 1976; Schwartz et al. 1980; Ansell and Flowers 1982; Linebarger et al. 1983; Caplan and Futter 1986; Grodzinsky 1989, 1990, 1995, 2000a, b; Hagiwara and Caplan 1990; Hagiwara 1993; Hickok et al. 1993; Beretta et al. 1996, 1999; Grodzinsky et al. 1999). In contrast to this, they perform above chance level in the off-line comprehension of (agentive) canonical structures, such as agentive active sentences, subject relatives, and subject clefts. It has therefore been argued that Broca’s aphasia patients’ deficit can be characterized in terms of the distinction between canonical and noncanonical structure. However, research focusing on online comprehension of these structures suggests that Broca’s aphasia patients also encounter processing difficulties during the interpretation of canonical structures. For instance, neurologically intact control subjects (and Wernicke’s aphasia patients) show reactivation of an antecedent at the position of a trace (‘gap-filling’) for both canonical and non-canonical structures, whereas Broca’s patients do not exhibit this pattern at the gap position (cf. Zurif et al. 1993; Swinney et al. 1996). This difference between offline and online comprehension can be resolved if the Broca’s deficit is viewed as a restriction on processing resources that slows down syntactic structure formation. In online tasks, the slowing-down is discernible, as for instance reflected in the absence of gap-filling, which requires a fully formed structure. In offline tasks, alternative non-syntactic mechanisms may become available, which can potentially compete with the syntactic mechanism that emerges in a delayed manner; and this competition explains the

Aphasia research

chance performance in non-canonical structures. This hypothesis is supported by studies with Broca’s aphasia patients that investigated the time-course of processing (e.g. Haarmann and Kolk 1991, 1994; Piñango 1999, 2000, 2002; Love et al. 2001; Burkhardt et al. 2003). These studies show that while Broca’s patients fail to perform like neurologically intact controls, a normal-like pattern of comprehension is found in Broca’s aphasia patients at a delayed point in time. The studies conclude that Broca’s patients’ comprehension patterns are due to an inability to process linguistic information in the same temporal course that neurologically intact participants do. The deficit is thus characterized in terms of restrictions on processing resources.2 One hypothesis that captures the Broca’s deficit along these lines — the Slow-Syntax Hypothesis (Piñango 1999, et seq.) — is discussed in more detail in the next section.

5.2.  Slow-Syntax Hypothesis The Slow-Syntax Hypothesis (SSH) (Piñango 1999 and subsequently) states that the Broca’s patients’ comprehension deficit is caused by a limitation on processing resources that prevents the processing system from forming syntactic structure on time. This implies that syntactic structure is fully formed in the Broca’s system, but in a protracted manner; hence, a well-formed syntactic representation is available in the Broca’s system, but at a delayed point in time compared to unimpaired comprehension. In particular, it is argued that it is the merge operation that is executed in a delayed fashion. Broca’s and neurologically intact comprehension thus differ with respect to the temporal dimension of syntactic structure resolution. Evidence for this slowed down formation of syntactic structure comes from online cross-modal priming studies that show activation of traces at a delayed point in time relative to the point where unimpaired subjects show gap-filling (e.g. Love et al. 2001; Burkhardt et al. 2003). In addition, the SSH also provides an explanation for the differences in offline performance relative to canonicity. As pointed out above, Broca’s patients perform above chance on canonical structures and at chance-level on sentences involving non-canonical structures. This latter behavior is justified by the SSH in the following way: As a result of the slowed-down syntactic structure formation, an extra-syntactic operation can take effect. This leads to a competition during offline comprehension between an interpretation based on the extra-syntactic information and one based on the syntactic information, which

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becomes available in a delayed fashion. As a result, chance level performance is expected. To illustrate this, in a non-canonical passive sentence (e.g. The girl was kicked by the boy), slowed-down syntax delays the structural licensing of thematic relations by the predicate. To accommodate the lack of thematic role assignment, non-syntactic information emerges that takes the thematic role information from the verb’s argument structure and assigns the available roles to their canonical (i.e. most prominent) position; this role assignment takes place in agreement with the thematic hierarchy (cf. Grimshaw 1990; Primus 1999; inter alia) and assigns roles by their prominence ranking within the hierarchy. In the example given above, the verb kick licenses an agent and a patient, and this non-syntactic information assigns the agent role to the first DP and the patient role to the second DP. At the point where syntactic structure is fully formed in the Broca’s system, the existence of the non-syntactic role assignment yields a conflict in interpretation. This conflict is not resolved, which results in chance-level performance. Canonical structures do not generate two conflicting interpretations, as the non-syntactic information, which is based on the thematic hierarchy, and the (delayed) syntactic mechanism produce identical role assignments, yielding above-chance performance. The findings from canonicity and long-distance dependencies in Broca’s aphasia patients taken together with the results from studies on pronominal interpretation, which are discussed in the next section, show that the SSH can capture all the patterns observed. It is therefore a valuable generalization for the deficit observed in Broca’s aphasia patients. For present purposes, we can then capitalize on the slow-down of syntactic structure formation observed in this patient group to explore the involvement of syntactic structure formation in the establishment of dependency.

5.3.  Pronominal interpretation: previous offline and online studies In this section, I review the literature on Broca’s aphasia patients’ comprehension of pronominal elements. To forecast, the studies illustrate that Broca’s patients’ comprehension patterns of pronominals diverge between offline and online investigations. However, this effect of the task is not a new observation in aphasia research, as pointed out above for studies on long-distance dependencies and gap-filling. Also, as I have pointed out in the previous section, such a difference in performance can be explained if a processing-restricted hypothesis like the SSH is adopted. In what follows, I discuss the relevant litera-

Aphasia research

ture and demonstrate how the observed difference can be interpreted within the SSH (as argued for in Piñango 2002). This sets the stage for the experiment presented in section 5.4, which investigated the time-course of reflexive interpretation in Broca’s aphasia patients. In two offline studies, Broca’s aphasia patients’ comprehension of reflexives and pronouns was tested (Grodzinsky et al. 1993; Piñango 2002). Utilizing a truth-value judgment task, Broca’s patients performed above chance in the reflexive condition, but poorly in the pronoun condition. In the Grodzinsky et al. study, pictures were used to introduce the context and the action; in the Piñango study, dolls were used to act out the situation. For instance, two samegender referents were always present (e.g. Mama Bear and Goldilocks). In the reflexive situation condition, Mama Bear touched herself; in the pronoun situation condition, Mama Bear touched Goldilocks. Then the patient was asked to respond to a question about the situation (e.g. (1) or (2)) by saying “yes” (i.e. the question corresponds to the interpretation of the situation) or “no” (when the question does not match the interpretation).

(1) Is Mama Bear touching herself?



(2) Is Mama Bear touching her?

Pronominal condition (reflexive/pronoun) and situation type (match/mismatch) were counterbalanced in a 2x2 design. Therefore, for half of the sentences, a “yes” response was correct (match of question and interpretation) and for half of the sentences a “no” response was correct (mismatch). The results were the following: neurologically intact control subjects performed at ceiling level in all conditions, indicating that the materials produced an unambiguous interpretation in the intact system. Broca’s patients performed above chance level in the reflexive condition, independent from the situation type. This suggests that reflexive interpretation is relatively intact in the Broca’s system, at least when patients are provided with enough time to form the required antecedent-reflexive dependency, which is the case in offline tasks (but see below for findings form online studies). In the pronoun condition, Broca’s patients performed above chance to a matching question, but at chance level to a mismatch question. How can these different patterns of performance in the pronoun condition be understood? Similar to the approach of competing interpretations available for long-distance dependencies (passives, object relatives, object clefts) that have a major impact on the level of performance (as pointed out above),

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a parallel can be drawn to the findings from pronoun interpretation. Piñango (2002) posits the following subcomponents that come together in the Broca’s system: (a) As a consequence of slowed-down syntax, syntactic structure is not available to rule out an initial coreferential interpretation (Mama Bear is touching her; her = Mama Bear), which then is (erroneously) allowed to surface. (b) At the point where syntactic structure is fully formed, the correct coreferential interpretation emerges (her = Goldilocks). This generates a discrepancy between the initially determined antecedent (Mama Bear) and the syntactically determined antecedent (Goldilocks). (c) The interpretation available from the picture/act-out task serves as an additional source of information in choosing between the competing interpretations from (a) and (b). And this last component ultimately decides between the two patterns of performance: In the case of the match condition (Mama Bear touching Goldilocks — Is Mama Bear touching her?), the interpretation obtained once the syntactic tree has been formed (b) and the interpretation supported by the task (c) corroborate, which results in above chance selection of the correct antecedent. In the mismatch condition, (Mama Bear touching herself — Is Mama Bear touching her?), the interpretation obtained from the syntactic structure (b) is not consistent with the interpretation provided by the task (c). As a consequence of this mismatch, there is not enough force to bias the interpretation towards the structurally correct or incorrect antecedent, as evidenced by chance performance. In general, the findings from the pronoun condition indicate that the trigger for the interpretation difficulties observed in the Broca’s patients lies in the absence of timely formation of syntactic structure. It is the lack of immediate structural information that forces the emergence of (structurally invalid) antecedents and that can ultimately produce a wrong interpretation of the pronoun. In the case of reflexive interpretation, a coargument relation with the antecedent is required, which prevents the emergence of an alternative antecedent. The next question then is how these different kinds of pronominals are computed in real-time in the Broca’s system, when participants are subject to time restrictions, as they are asked to perform a secondary task as quickly as possible immediately after the presentation of the critical element. Love et al. (1998) report a CMLD priming paradigm that investigated antecedent reactivation immediately after the pronoun/reflexive. They used auditorily presented sentences like (3) and measured priming via a visually presented probe that was semantically related to the structurally determined antecedent of the reflexive (in (3) skier) compared to a probe that was unrelated to the entire

Aphasia research

content of the sentence. The probe was presented right after the pronominal element.

(3) a. The boxeri said that the skierj in the hospital had blamed himself*i/j for the recent injury. b. The boxeri said that the skierj in the hospital had blamed himi/*j for the recent injury.

Neurologically intact control subjects showed a significant priming effect for the reflexive (3a) and no effect for the pronoun (3b). At this point it is essential to note that Love et al. only tested facilitation for the reflexive’s antecedent, i.e. they did not report a condition where the structurally correct antecedent for the pronoun (in (3) boxer) was paired with a related probe. Thus no effect is expected in the pronoun condition of their experiment. This is consistent with previous findings from young neurologically intact subjects, who also displayed reactivation of the structurally licensed antecedent as mentioned in section 4.1 (cf. also Nicol and Swinney 1989). The results from Broca’s aphasia patients reveal no priming effect for the reflexive, but a statistically significant effect for the pronoun, even though the visually presented target did not represent a related word to the pronoun’s antecedent (boxer), but to the reflexive’s antecedent (skier). Love et al. therefore label this priming pattern ’aberrant’, because it links the pronoun with a structurally unacceptable antecedent. These findings are predicted by the SSH. In the case of reflexive interpretation, a fully formed syntactic structure is needed to establish a coargument relationship between the reflexive and its antecedent and to reflexive-mark the predicate. Thus if syntactic structure formation is slowed down, the formation of the coargument relation and determination of [±Refl] is slowed down, and hence priming (i.e. reactivation of the antecedent) is not expected to occur immediately after the reflexive. In the case of pronoun interpretation, a fully formed syntactic representation is also needed to establish the correct pronoun–antecedent relation. However, since a coreferential interpretation is always expected for a pronoun (on the basis of its internal properties), access to the aberrant antecedent becomes available during online priming right after the pronoun, as this process does not depend on the formation of syntactic structure.3 To summarize, previous studies with Broca’s aphasia patients have illustrated that reflexive interpretation in real-time is not realized in the same way as it occurs in the intact system, but that it is relatively successfully resolved offline. Since reflexive interpretation is dependent on a coargumenthood relation, the findings suggest that syntactic structure is formed in a protracted manner,

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as the correct dependency is only available in offline tasks, where sufficient time is granted. Therefore, syntactic structure formation relevant for pronominal interpretation must occur at some point after the offset of the pronominal. For future processing experiments, this allows for the prediction that if the point of visual target presentation is moved further downstream, a significant priming effect should be observable for the reflexive at a delayed point in time — similar to findings from studies on the reactivation of traces in the Broca’s system (e.g. Love et al. 2001; Burkhardt et al. 2003). In contrast to this, pronoun interpretation, which is not exclusively reliant on a syntactic dependency, elicits processing difficulties online and is only partly resolved offline in the Broca’s system. This pattern can be understood in terms of the availability of non-syntactic information (i.e. discourse-based coreference) that emerges in the absence of full syntactic representation (online) and is ultimately sustained at the expense of proper interpretation (offline). To conclude, recent aphasia research advocates that Broca’s area and its immediate surroundings are responsible for the formation of syntactic structure. This however impacts not only the interpretation of purely syntactic pronominal elements (e.g. reflexives), but all kinds of pronominals, as syntactic structure, i.e. the merge operation, is required to decide upon the type of structural dependency (such as presence or absence of coargumenthood). This view allows for specific predictions with regard to logophoricity in Broca’s aphasia, which will be discussed in the next section.

5.4.  Reflexive interpretation: coargument reflexives vs. logophors On the basis of the findings from the CMLD interference studies with young neurologically intact subjects (section 4.2), the present experiment investigated real-time reflexive interpretation of Broca’s aphasia patients.4 A study with this patient group is particularly fruitful for the present purposes as Broca’s patients are expected to elicit a distinct pattern of performance relative to the amount of processing resources required for the formation of syntactic structure, and this in turn can show what role syntactic structure plays in reflexive interpretation (in particular the checking of coargumenthood and [±Refl]marking). This can then provide further evidence for the current formulation of the Syntax–Discourse Model. Moreover, the neurological localization of the lesion informs brain-language relations in a way in which representational distinctions map onto cortical distinctions.

Aphasia research

5.4.1.  Method The CMLD interference paradigm, as elaborated on in chapter 4, was used for this investigation. Just as with young subjects, the participants in this study were asked to perform two tasks, a listening comprehension task and a lexical decision task. The RT to the lexical decision was recorded using Tempo (Motta et al. 2000–3). The only difference from the procedure with college-aged subjects was that a longer response time to the secondary task was allowed by raising the cut-off point for RT registering to 2500 msecs, thus allowing sufficient time for aging- or syndrome-related slowing. Furthermore, the Broca’s aphasia patients, as well as age-matched control subjects, did not exhibit any difficulties related to the nature of the task.

5.4.2.  Participants Two Broca’s aphasia patients (JB and RD) participated in this experiment. Both patients had suffered lesions to the left anterior region involving Broca’s area, while sparing the anterior superior temporal cortex as well as the entire right hemisphere. They had previously been diagnosed as Broca’s patients on the basis of the BDAE test battery and radiological information (CT scans). The clinical profiles of these two patients are summarized in Table 1. At the time of testing, both patients were medically stable and exhibited the typical symptoms of Broca’s aphasia, such as telegraphic speech. In addition, sixteen control participants were tested altogether, who matched the Broca’s aphasia patients in age (range: 46–77) and level of education. The Table 1.  Clinical profiles of Broca’s aphasia patients. Broca’s patient Lesion site information JB

JB is a female who suffered a left CVA in 1996. A CT scan taken at that time shows a large left fronto-parietal lesion involving all of the inferior frontal gyrus including all of Broca’s area and the white matter underlying it. The lesion is also described as involving insular cortex and the lateral putamen with posterior extension across the anterior temporal isthmus. The temporal lobe however is spared.

RD

RD is a male who suffered two left CVAs — one in 1976 and a second in 1977. A CT taken in 1978 indicates two lesions, one in Broca’s area with deep extension to the left frontal horn and involving lower motor cortex (face and lip regions) and the other in the left temporal lobe sparing Wernicke’s area but encompassing the anterior portion of BA22.

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control participants were native speakers of English, right-handed, and without known neurological disorder. They had normal or corrected-to-normal visual acuity as well as normal auditory acuity (by their own report). All participants received monetary compensation.

5.4.3.  Materials An experimental script as described for the CMLD interference study with college-aged subjects (in section 4.2) was created with twenty-five pairs of experimental sentences and 250 filler sentences. An experimental pair consisted of a sentence with a coargument reflexive (4a) and a frequency- and distancematching sentence with a logophor (4b).

(4) a. The detectivei who was famed disguised himselfi before the undercover investigation started at dawn. b. The climberi buckled a belt around himselfi before the group set out for the strenuous ascent.

All fifty experimental sentences were matched with word probes, one hundred filler sentences were also matched with word probes and one hundred and fifty with non-word probes. Criteria for sentence and probe selection and creation were exactly as described in the previous chapter. Three probe positions were tested in this study: 400 msecs prior to the onset of the reflexive (control position — experiment A), 100 msecs after the reflexive (experiment B), and 600 msecs after the reflexive (experiment C). The latter probe position represents the point in time where the delay of syntactic structure formation is expected to be resolved in the Broca’s patients’ system; the calculation of this latter probe position was guided by independent findings with Broca’s aphasia patients from lexical activation (Prather et al. 1997) and the implementation of long-distance dependencies (Love et al. 2001; Burkhardt et al. 2003). Prather et al. conducted a list-priming paradigm to investigate the time course of automatic lexical activation in the Broca’s system. Their data indicate that priming effects emerge in the Broca’s system during word pair presentations only with significantly longer interstimulus intervals compared to the intact system (around 1000 msecs later than in the intact system). Love et al. and Burkhardt et al. tested gap-filling effects in a number of different constructions that require movement and the establishment of a long-distance dependency between a trace and its antecedent. They found evidence for antecedent reactivation in the Broca’s system in a window ranging

Aphasia research

from 500 to 800 msecs after the trace. On the basis of these findings, the point 600 msecs after the reflexive was chosen as the point in time where syntactic structure should be fully implemented in the Broca’s system to allow further operations to take place — here, the formation of a dependency to satisfy the reflexive’s need for referential content. The control subjects were tested in one session of about one hour duration (per position). The patients were tested on one script in two 30-minute sessions, with a break of at least one hour in between. Since patients were tested on three different probe positions each, at least three weeks passed between testing sessions to avoid an effect from item recognition. In addition, patients were tested on the control position first, then on the 600 msecs position and at last on the 100 msecs position; as a consequence, if a recognition effect emerged due to multiple exposures to the materials — which should then be the most pronounced during the last testing (i.e. 100 msecs) — this would work against the prediction that interference in Broca’s patients is not observable at the ‘normal’ 100 msecs position. Finally, each testing began with a practice session to familiarize the participants with the task.

5.4.4.  Predictions The Syntax–Discourse Model predicts that reflexive interpretation first requires the system to determine the presence or absence of a coargumenthood relation. Upon resolving this, coargument reflexives enter into a syntactic dependency and logophors must establish a dependency with their antecedent in discourse. On the basis of the SSH — the generalization that describes the Broca’s aphasia syndrome as a delay in syntactic structure formation — the predictions are the following: Broca’s aphasia patients should show the same interference pattern as unimpaired subjects, but at a later point in time than observed in the neurologically intact system — as syntactic structure must be formed prior to determining the nature of the dependency (i.e. syntactic or discourse-based). Consequently, processing cost that arises out of the establishment of a discourse-based dependency in the case of logophor interpretation is expected to surface, but only some time after the representation has been licensed in the intact system. In other words, a fully formed syntactic structure is required for the interpretation of both the coargument reflexive and the logophor. In both cases, the merge operation must be completed to determine presence or absence of coargumenthood, which then results in the establishment of distinct dependency relations between the antecedent and the

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reflexive. In the case of a coargument reflexive, the completion of the merge operation makes available the reflexive and its antecedent as two arguments of the same predicate, which yields a syntactic dependency. In the case of logophor interpretation, the fully implemented merge operation signals the absence of a coargument relation between the reflexive and its antecedent, which then forces the establishment of a discourse dependency. The formation of this discourse dependency can be observed as cost, as discussed in chapter 4. Hence, if Broca’s patients’ formation of the merge operation is slowed down, cost should arise at a point downstream relative to the intact system. Broca’s patients are therefore not expected to show an interference effect at 100 msecs after the reflexive (where unimpaired control subjects are expected to show a significant difference). However, it is hypothesized that Broca’s patients exhibit an interference effect at 600 msecs after the reflexive, which is the point in time at which the merge operation is predicted to have been accomplished in the Broca’s system, which then allows the establishment of a dependency. The formation of this dependency (at 600 msecs) should then yield a higher RT to the logophor condition, which draws on a discourse process for interpretation. In sum, Broca’s patients are predicted to show no effect at the control position (experiment 2A) as well as no effect at the 100 msecs position (experiment 2B), while their comprehension should yield a significant effect with a higher RT for the logophor condition at the 600 msecs position (experiment 2C). Matching control subjects are expected to pattern with the young subjects reported on in section 4.2: no effect at the control position (experiment 1A) and a significantly higher RT for the logophor condition over the coargument condition at the 100 msecs position (experiment 1B). In addition, control subjects are not predicted to show an interference effect at the 600 msecs position (experiment 1C), since at this point, interpretation has already been resolved in the intact system.

5.4.5.  Results Statistical analyses were performed on experimental pairs; if one item had to be discarded from a pair, the other item from the experimental pair was also discarded. Data discarded included incorrect responses (answering “no” to a letter string representing a real word), timed-out responses (responding after the limit of 2500 msecs), and items falling outside three standard deviations from the mean.

Aphasia research

5.4.5.1.  Intact system For the control group, one subject had to be excluded entirely because of the low number of correct responses. From the fifteen control subjects who entered the final analysis, 46 data pairs (12.26%) had to be discarded. Experiment 1 confirmed that age-matched neurologically intact subjects show the same performance pattern as young neurologically intact subjects (see Table 2). Experiment 1A probed interference 400 msecs before the reflexive, and it validated that the two conditions (coargument reflexive vs. logophor) do not differ in terms of processing load prior to the occurrence of the reflexive. Experiment 1B measured interference 100 msecs after the reflexive, and the data show a significantly higher RT for the logophor condition (t(24)=2.55, *p=.008). This finding indicates that the establishment of a dependency between a logophor and its antecedent (Mean RT=922.57 msecs) is more resource-consuming than the formation of a dependency between a coargument reflexive and its antecedent (Mean RT=866.68 msecs), and that processing cost is observable immediately after the presentation of the reflexive in the neurologically intact system. Furthermore, experiment 1C probed interference 600 msecs after the reflexive, and no difference was maintained between the two conditions. This suggests that, in the intact system, the reflexive–antecedent relation has been resolved at 600 msecs after the reflexive and no longer imposes cost onto the processing system. Reflexive interpretation has been completed prior to this point in the intact system. 5.4.5.2.  Broca’s system In experiment 2, interference was measured at the same three positions during the comprehension of two Broca’s aphasia patients. Due to the small sample Table 2.  Mean RT and SD by condition (in msecs). Control subjects.5

Coargument reflexives Logophors Significance

Experiment 1A (control position)

Experiment 1B (100 msecs)

Experiment 1C (600 msecs)

846.78 (SD 192.00)

866.68 (SD 96.12)

993.96 (SD 130.49)

859.33 (SD 168.91)

922.57 (SD 105.04)

983.42 (SD 111.55)

t(47)=.40, p=.34

t(24)=2.55, *p=.008

t(24)=−0.37, p=.35

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size, each patient was tested twice on the 100 msecs and 600 msecs position to assure that the data represent stable measures of processing in the impaired system, and the data from the two sessions were averaged. On the basis of the criteria outlined above, 33 data pairs (22%) were excluded from further analysis for the two patients together. Table 3 reports the results for patient JB, Table 4 for patient RD. Both patients show the same pattern of performance and the results reveal that the predictions are borne out. No significant difference was observed between the two conditions at the pre-reflexive control position (experiment 2A). In experiment 2B, where interference was probed 100 msecs after the reflexive, the Broca’s patients — in contrast to the neurologically intact control subjects — did not show an interference effect.6 This suggests that reflexive interpretation has not yet taken place at this point in the Broca’s system. Experiment 2C measured interference at 600 msecs after the reflexive, and it is at this point where a statistically significant interference effect was found for both Broca’s patients, in the expected direction with a higher RT for the logophor condition over the coargument condition. At this point, patient JB elicited a mean RT of 1023.58 msecs to the logophor condition and a mean RT of 929.73 msecs to the coargument reflexive condition (t(18)=1.97, *p=.03); patient RD showed a mean RT of 1591.67 msecs to the logophor condition and a mean RT of 1326.49 msecs to the coargument reflexive condition (t(22)=1.97, *p=.03). These findings indicate that Broca’s aphasia patients are able to form reflexive–antecedent relations, as the increased RT can be taken as a reflection of discourse-based interpretation, which is only required for dependencies involving logophors in this experimental contrast. Broca’s patients’ reflexTable 3.  Mean RT and SD by condition (in msecs). Broca’s patient JB.

Coargument reflexives Logophors Significance

Experiment 2A (control position)

Experiment 2B (100 msecs)

Experiment 2C (600 msecs)

991.70 (SD 243.10)

833.25 (SD 169.51)

929.73 (SD 131.94)

980.88 (SD 179.06)

880.27 (SD 127.85)

1023.58 (SD 186.27)

t(16)=−.14, p=.44

t (19)=1.04, p=.15

t (18)=1.97, *p=.03

Aphasia research Table 4.  Mean RT and SD by condition (in msecs). Broca’s patient RD.

Coargument reflexives Logophors Significance

Experiment 2A (control position)

Experiment 2B (100 msecs)

Experiment 2C (600 msecs)

1180.07 (SD 362.90)

1352.87 (SD 477.86)

1326.49 (SD 414.39)

1146.92 (SD 467.53)

1572.41 (SD 625.49)

1591.67 (SD 634.73)

t(13)=−.20, p=.41

t(23)=1.24, p=.11

t (22)=1.97, *p=.03

ive comprehension however differs from the intact system in the time course of interpretation, which does not show evidence for the establishment of a dependency at the point where unimpaired controls show an effect of reflexive resolution (i.e. 100 msecs), but happens at a later point (i.e. 600 msecs), where unimpaired controls no longer demonstrate an effect.

5.5.  General discussion: aphasia findings The online comprehension experiment presented here provides new data on reflexive interpretation in the Broca’s aphasia system (and in the age-matched intact system), which complements previous studies with Broca’s patients as well as the investigation of syntax–discourse relations in the intact system. Experiment 1 revealed that age-matching control participants exhibit the same pattern of performance as college-aged participants, with a higher RT to the logophor condition immediately after the reflexive. This supports the claims made by the Syntax–Discourse Model that the interpretation of coargument reflexives and logophors is subject to dependency relations in distinct linguistic modules. The data hence provide further evidence for logophor interpretation being more resource-consuming than coargument reflexive interpretation, which substantiates a distinction between discourse-based and syntax-based interpretive mechanisms during reflexive interpretation. Moreover, the data from the age-matched control ­subjects show that processing cost for the logophor is no longer observable at 600 msecs after the pronominal has been heard, which represents evidence that the establishment of a reflexive–antecedent dependency is a fast process, and that, once reflexive

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resolution has happened, processing resources are again available to the same extent for both sentence types. Experiment 2 investigated real-time comprehension in the Broca’s system. The results indicate that Broca’s aphasia patients do not pattern with neurologically intact subjects during the online interpretation of reflexives. Critically, however, the study reveals that Broca’s patients show the ‘normal’ interference pattern further downstream, which indicates that Broca’s patients are able to form reflexive–antecedent relations, but not in the regular time course. While Broca’s patients do not demonstrate an interference effect immediately after the reflexive (100 msecs position), a significant interference effect emerges at 600 msecs after the reflexive. This suggests that Broca’s patients form reflexive–antecedent dependencies in a protracted manner, as the increase in RT at 600 msecs is interpreted as resulting from the discourse process required for the interpretation of the logophor. Crucially, the Syntax–Discourse Model hypothesizes that this discourse process is not initiated before the elements have been merged and reflexive-marking has been determined. The data therefore present evidence that the syntactic structure that is required to achieve reflexive resolution has been formed in the Broca’s system at 600 msecs. These findings are consistent with the studies on the integration of long-distance dependencies in the Broca’s system (e.g. Love et al. 2001; Burkhardt et al. 2003) and the predictions made by the SSH. To summarize, this experiment was designed to address issues relating to (a) Broca’s aphasia comprehension, (b) the Syntax–Discourse Model, and (c) brainlanguage relations. The first issue of interest raised the question whether Broca’s aphasia patients are capable of forming dependencies. To recapitulate, in previous offline and online investigations, Broca’s patients showed good performance on reflexive interpretation offline and no priming effect on reflexive interpretation in real time. The current study addressed these seemingly paradoxical results and found that Broca’s patients are not able to interpret reflexives in the same time course as intact control participants during online comprehension, but that the interference pattern detected in the intact system is observable at a delayed point in time. These findings suggest that at this delayed point in time, coargument reflexive interpretation is resolved and the absence of coargumenthood in the case of logophor interpretation licenses the establishment of a discourse dependency (as evidence by the interference effect). The results are taken to reflect that Broca’s patients are able to establish reflexive–antecedent dependencies, but in a protracted manner. The data from this study therefore provide the missing link between previous online and offline studies.7

Aphasia research

Second, the experiment was designed to inform the Syntax–Discourse Model, and the specific question was how much impact the notion of coargumenthood has on the establishment of coreference, as the model proposes that presence or absence of coargumenthood must be determined initially, which then results in the formation of a syntactic or discourse dependency respectively. In addition, syntactic structure must be in place to build discourse representation, since the presence of a D°/T° triggers the creation of a file card. The results suggest that syntactic structure formation is an important aspect for the interpretation of both types of reflexives, as coargument reflexives and logophors are equally affected by the delay and an interference effect is not observed immediately after the reflexive. This indicates that logophor interpretation is not exclusively subject to discourse operations, but is also dependent on syntactic integration prior to the establishment of a discourse dependency, as otherwise a rise in processing cost should have been observable at the 100 msecs position. The fact that an increase in RT occurs at 600 msecs suggests therefore that syntactic structure formation must be in place to determine absence of coargumenthood prior to the establishment of a discourse dependency. Overall, this indicates that the notion of coargumenthood and reflexivemarking is an essential principle of reflexive interpretation, as a fully formed syntactic structure is needed to decide upon the presence or absence of a coargument relation between the reflexive and its potential antecedent.8 The findings also provide additional support for the general claims of the Syntax–Discourse Model. In the previous chapter, it was shown that an increase in processing load is observable in the case of discourse-based logophor interpretation over coargument reflexive interpretation. Regarding Broca’s comprehension, evidence for the different processing demands was expected to emerge, but in a delayed manner, as Broca’s patients have been shown to exhibit slowed syntactic structure formation. This was confirmed by the data, where a significant interference effect was only observed at 600 msecs after the reflexive. These findings thus provide further evidence that referent selection is more resource-consuming in the case of logophor interpretation than in the case of coargument reflexive interpretation. Third, the data serve as a window into the architecture of the language system, as Broca’s aphasia has localizing value. The current findings support the claim that the Broca’s aphasia deficit correlates with slowed-down structure formation. This has consequences not only for the establishment of long-distance dependencies (as previously observed), but for all kinds of operations that require the proper formation of syntactic structure — in particular the

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implementation of the merge operation. The delayed interference effect observed in the Broca’s system is an additional example for slowed-down structure formation, which puts the formation of a reflexive–antecedent dependency on hold (at 100 msecs) and is released in an untimely fashion at 600 msecs after the reflexive. These results are consistent with previous observations of processing delays in the Broca’s system that suggest that Broca’s area is responsible for automatic activation of syntactic information and implementation of syntactic dependencies (e.g. Haarmann and Kolk 1991; Piñango 1999, 2000, 2002; Love et al. 2001; Burkhardt et al. 2003). For brain-language relations, the current findings therefore substantiate the claim that the left anterior cortex is generally responsible for the formation of syntactic structure. So far, the experimental evidence provided in chapter 4 and 5 strongly indicates that logophor interpretation is more costly than coargument reflexive interpretation, which here is taken to support a division of labor between syntax and discourse. The findings from chapter 5 further reveal that the implementation of syntactic structure and the determination of the (un)availability of coargumenthood is a core property of dependency formation. This suggests that syntactic operations take place before discourse operations during the establishment of coreference, as also implied by the Syntax–Discourse Model. To further test this hypothesis of the time-course of pronominal interpretation, ERPs were measured to coargument reflexives and logophors. The findings are discussed in the next chapter, and they provide new information with respect to the temporal resolution of the underlying processes and reveal distinct subprocesses of interpretation. In a second study, logophors are compared to pronouns to investigate discourse-internal processes in view of the dependency hierarchy. The ERP recordings discussed in the next chapter therefore serve an integrative function for the present investigation, as they can shed further light onto the division of labor between syntax and discourse processes, as well as on the time-course of pronominal resolution.

Chapter 6

Evidence from processing:   Event-related potentials In the two studies discussed in this chapter, I further investigate the temporal properties associated with the establishment of dependency. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) are online measures that provide a good resolution of the time-course of the underlying cognitive processes, which makes it possible to connect the effects from the electrical brain activity with the effects from other online techniques, such as the cross-modal lexical interference studies presented in chapters 4 and 5. The use of ERPs has been adopted for the study of language-related processes based on the assumption that different cognitive processes correlate with distinct patterns of electrical brain activity. This renders the hypothesis that distinct ERP patterns are expected to emerge for the different dependencies posited by the Syntax–Discourse Model. The recording of ERPs is thus used to provide a finer-grained and more extensive description of the processes underlying the formation of pronominal–antecedent dependencies and their temporal properties and to supply further support for the Syntax–Discourse Model.

6.1.  Experimental paradigm 6.1.1.  Experimental task Event-related potentials represent recordings of electrical brain activity, which are measured by placing electrodes on a participant’s scalp. These electrodes conduct the electrical currents generated by neuronal activity. The electroencephalogram (EEG) assesses voltage fluctuations at electrode sites and reflects synaptic activity in the brain. The electrical potentials are time-locked to specific stimulus events (in the current case, the presentation of pronominals) and can thus be used to further determine comprehension processes in real time. The magnitude of the voltage alterations is relatively small compared to the overall ‘noise’ of the recording (i.e. the general electrical activity), and in order to retrieve the signal of an event to which the ERP measurements are

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time‑locked, the signal is generally averaged from approximately thirty to forty trials of the same condition and evaluated with respect to a reference electrode (which is for instance placed on the mastoid, ear lobe, or nose). The most prominent benefit of computing ERPs is that they provide an excellent temporal resolution of the underlying synaptic processes, as they are time-locked to the onset of a stimulus and can thus inform our understanding of how electrical activity changes in real time, as information is processed and interpretation is achieved. Furthermore, the resolution of the ERP recordings occurs in milliseconds, which makes this technique an extremely accurate measure of processing in real time. Additionally, ERPs represent a continuous measure of electrical activity and can therefore extend our understanding of the time-course of sentence processing beyond the present findings from reaction time studies. There are further reasons that champion the use of the ERP technique as a means to the investigation of language comprehension. First, ERPs are online measures of processing-related electrical activity that are not mediated by a secondary task and can thus be considered unintrusive with respect to the comprehension task. As such, ERP has an advantage over for instance the crossmodal lexical decision paradigm — which draws conclusions for processing on the basis of a secondary lexical decision task — as it makes available direct measurements of processing activity. Second, ERP recordings are the combination of several dissociable factors of the signal — latency, amplitude, polarity, and topography (cf. e.g. Donchin et al. 1978). ‘Latency’ refers to the temporal properties of a signal in relation to the (time-locked) onset of a stimulus; it reflects the time elapsed between the onset of the cognitive activity and the point of peak divergence between conditions. ‘Amplitude’ is an indicator of the magnitude of a signal. ‘Polarity’ signifies the direction of a potential in relation to a baseline or another condition’s potential; this is indicated as negativity or positivity. It should however be noted that it is currently not known what it implies to have a negative or a positive potential; interpretation of the data therefore focuses largely on the availability of a difference between two or more conditions and not on their polarity. ‘Topography’ refers to the scalp site at which a signal has been registered. Yet, the spatial resolution of ERPs is of limited informativity, as the activity is measured on the scalp, which only provides a rough approximation of the source of a signal, as electrical activity is conducted to this site and does not originate exactly from the tissue beneath it. The fact that ERPs carry these different properties makes them a powerful measurement of linguistic processing and can potentially provide ­various

Event-related potentials

a­ spects regarding the functional dissociation of sentence comprehension. This of course is of interest for the predictions made by the Syntax–Discourse Model. If the comparison of two minimally different conditions reveals distinct ERP patterns, this suggests that the underlying processes differ in terms of one or more of the described properties of the signal, which can then inform a model of sentence processing. This view builds on the strong assumption of correspondence between functional and neuronal patterns. Taken together, these properties of the ERP recordings make it a highly informative technique to assess the functions and the architecture of the language system.

6.1.2.  ERP and sentence processing In this section, I give an overview of the major ERP signals observed in connection with the processing of linguistic information, as they will become relevant for the discussion of the establishment of coreference. Furthermore, I briefly discuss a neurocognitive model of language comprehension that brings the different ERP components into a temporal (and spatial) relation with each other (Friederici 1999, 2002). Since the following experiments are concerned with the time course of pronominal interpretation, these previous findings can then assist in formulating the predictions. ERP measures have been demonstrated to be sensitive to language processes in an array of linguistic conditions and manipulations (cf. Kutas and Hillyard 1980; Picton and Stuss 1984; Kutas and van Petten 1988; Osterhout and Holcomb 1992, 1993; Hagoort et al. 1999). The research of the past twenty years has revealed that ERP effects from linguistic processing can be divided along at least two dimensions: lexical vs. sentential and syntactic vs. extra-syntactic.

6.1.2.1.  LAN A left anterior negativity (LAN) between 300 msecs and 500 msecs has been registered for cases of morphosyntactic violations and feature mismatches (cf. e.g. Kutas and Hillyard 1983; Osterhout and Holcomb 1992; Rösler et al. 1993; Kluender and Kutas 1993a; Münte et al. 1993; Friederici et al. 1996; Friederici 1999). This component — which sometimes has been found in combination with a late positivity — has been further described as an instance of automatic syntactic processing (cf. e.g. Friederici et al. 1996; Canseco-Gonzalez et al. 1997; Friederici 1999). But the LAN has also been argued for in terms of a more general account related to verbal working memory, as it has for ­instance

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been elicited in connection with lexical and referential ambiguities, and in filler-gap and non-canonical constructions (cf. Kluender and Kutas 1993b; Hagoort and Brown 1994; King and Kutas 1995; Coulson et al. 1998; Rösler et al. 1998; Fiebach et al. 2001, 2002).1 Crucially for the present purposes, referential ambiguities and other processes that have elicited a LAN have also been interpreted as discourse-based processes (e.g. in Streb et al. 1999; van Berkum et al. 1999; Streb 2000). For example, in a study that investigated the processing of pronouns, Streb et al. (1999) compared pronoun and proper name interpretation in structures manipulating the grammatical roles of the antecedent and the pronoun/proper name (i.e. parallel (1a, b) and non-parallel structures (1c/d)). Two-sentence passages were created in German, where the first introduced an antecedent (1) and the second referred back to it by either using a pronoun (1a/c) or a repetition of the proper name (1b/d). Each passage was followed by a comprehension question.

(1) Peter besucht Julia in der Klinik. Peter visits Julia in the hospital ‘Peter visits Julia in the hospital. . .’ a. Dort hat er dem Arzt eine Frage gestellt. there has he the doctor a question asked ‘. . .There, he asked the doctor a question.’ b. Dort hat Peter dem Arzt eine Frage gestellt. there has Peter the doctor a question asked ‘. . . There, Peter asked the doctor a question.’ c. Dort hat die Schwester ihm das Zimmer gezeigt. there has the nurse him the room showed ‘. . . There, the nurse showed him the room.’ d. Dort hat die Schwester Peter das Zimmer gezeigt. there has the nurse Peter the room showed ‘. . . There, the nurse showed Peter the room.’

The authors report two negative potentials to the pronoun condition (1a/c) over the repetition condition (1b/d): an early negativity between 270 msecs and 420 msecs post onset of the pronominal/proper name and a later negativity between 510 msecs and 600 msecs (which is discussed in detail in 6.1.2.2). The early negativity was largest over anterior sites (LAN) and it is interpreted as an increase in working memory load by Streb et al. since a pronoun–antecedent dependency, which requires searching of the discourse representa-

Event-related potentials

tion for a proper antecedent, is considered to be more resource-consuming than a repetition-antecedent dependency, which requires only the matching of the (unique) proper name onto its antecedent. Within the Syntax–Discourse Model, this difference between pronouns and repetition of proper names can be related to two factors: the nature of the file cards and their referential quality. First, such a difference is a function of the corresponding file cards, where a proper name comes with a well-formed file card, while a pronoun introduces a file card with a frame, but no heading, which results in increased processing demands in order to provide a proper heading and achieve well-formedness. Second, pronominal elements are generally characterized as referentially dependent and require by definition a dependency with an antecedent; as a consequence, pronouns are expected to elicit more processing load than repeated proper names, which are not referentially deficient. In another ERP study that investigated discourse properties, van Berkum et al. (1999) presented native speakers of Dutch with sentences that contained a definite DP with a unique referent or an ambiguous referent, depending on the context previously set up. One context provided a uniquely identifiable referent (the girl in (2a)); the other context introduced two referents (two girls in (2b)).2

(2) a. David had told the boy and the girl to clean up their room before lunch time. But the boy had stayed in bed all morning, and the girl had been on the phone all the time. b. David had told the two girls to clean up their room before lunch time. But one of the girls had stayed in bed all morning, and the other had been on the phone all the time. c. David vertelde het meisje dat er visite kwam. the girl that there visitors would-come David told ‘David told the girl that there would be some visitors.’ d. David vertelde het meisje dat had zitten bellen op te hangen. David told the girl that had been phoning to hang up ‘David told the girl that had been phoning to hang up.’

For the factor referential ambiguity, the study found a negativity to the ambiguous two-referent context with an onset latency of 250–300 msecs immediately after the definite DP (e.g. het meisje), that had a left anterior center. These results suggest that a definite DP has a file card representation around 300 msecs after its presentation, as otherwise its attempts to identify with a discourse-old entity (as evidenced by the negativity) would not be registered. As in the Streb

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et al. study, the early negativity seems to support the view that the interface operation between syntax and discourse has taken place and that a file card is already available in the discourse representation. Furthermore, the availability of two competing antecedents results in processing effort during referential resolution, as reflected in a more pronounced negativity (a LAN-like effect).3 This then suggests that discourse integration processes can take place in this time window — at least partially, as Streb et al. also observed a later posterior negativity (see directly below). In sum, these studies suggest that the LAN is associated with discourse-related effects, which within the Syntax–Discourse Model may be viewed as correlates of the establishment of a file card and its evaluation in terms of wellformedness constraints, and may possibly reflect initial discourse resolution processes.

6.1.2.2.  N400 and N280 The most widely documented lexico-semantic effect is the N400 effect, which represents a posterior negativity around 300 msecs to 600 msecs after the onset of a content word that is semantically or pragmatically anomalous within the given context and has a peak around 400 msecs (cf. e.g. Kutas and Hillyard 1980, 1983; Bentin et al. 1985; Holcomb and Neville 1990; Kutas and van Petten 1994; Osterhout and Holcomb 1995; Kutas and Federmeier 2000).4 In general terms, the N400 is viewed as an effect of lexical and semantic integration, and it has been evoked regardless of the linguistic environment in which an item occurs, i.e. in isolation (i.e. in a word list paradigm), as well as in intra- and inter-sentential environments. This is an important finding for present purposes as it indicates that around 400 msecs integration processes have taken place and it hence suggests that processes operating on referential properties can occur around this time as well. Of particular relevance for the present research question is a series of studies conducted by Streb and colleagues (Streb et al. 1999, 2004) who report an N400-like component during the interpretation of pronouns (in addition to an earlier left anterior negativity, which was discussed in 6.1.2.1). The interpretation of pronouns (cf. (1) above) yielded an additional negativity that was most prominent between 510 msecs and 600 msecs and registered a posterior maximum, which is congruent with the general topographical characterization of the N400 component. This posterior negativity is interpreted by Streb et al. as a process of integration with previously established information, which possibly translates into the formation of a pronoun–antecedent dependency within the

Event-related potentials

present framework. The late negative potential might therefore be viewed as a more general process of integration, during which the pronoun completes the formation of a link with its antecedent (i.e. discourse-old information). The late negativity would then indicate the actual dependency operation and the final transfer of information between the pronoun and its antecedent. Finally, no such effect is reported by van Berkum et al. (1999). However, the studies investigate referentially distinct elements (i.e. pronouns or referential expressions). The N400 component might hence either be a discourse effect specific to the establishment of pronoun–antecedent dependencies, or the absence of it reflects the fact that the two referential entities compared in the van Berkum et al. study are not distinct from each other in terms of dependency formation (i.e. a dependency must be established regardless of the ambiguity factor). A different lexical effect has been observed in relation to function words, which are reported to elicit a late negativity between 400–700 msecs over frontal areas (cf. Brown et al. 1999), as well as a left anterior negativity between 200msescs and 300 msecs (known as N280) (cf. Neville et al. 1992; Nobre and McCarthy 1994; Pulvermüller et al. 1995; King and Kutas 1998; Brown et al. 1999). It must be noted that some studies investigating the difference between function words and content words elicited an N280-like component only for function words, while other studies also found an anterior negativity for content words, but in that case with a somewhat later latency. This has spurred some discussion about whether these two classes of words can be attributed to processes in distinct neural systems. Regardless of this debate, what the evidence reveals — and what is important for the present investigation — is that at least some information is available early in the time-course of processing (i.e. around 280 msecs post stimulus) and that this information is related to categorical information, which within the Syntax–Discourse Model affects the formation of a file card.

6.1.2.3.  P600 Finally, syntactic processes have evoked a late positivity (the so-called P600 or SPS — ‘syntactic positive shift’). The literature indicates that a left anterior negativity reflects early (first pass) automatic structure building processes and that a P600 reflects a secondary mechanism probably linked to interpretive demands and generally viewed in terms of reanalysis. Crucially, previous research has shown that the P600 cannot exclusively be connected to syntactic operations alone, but is more likely reflective of general integration and revision processes on the one hand and possibly distinguishable into various

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subcomponents on the other hand (cf. Friederici et al. 2001; Friederici 1999, 2002). The P600 has been observed around 600 msecs after stimulus onset and further downstream. It has been suggested that its topographical distribution is related to the nature of the underlying sentential structure, where syntactically dispreferred structures emerge largely at anterior sites and syntactic violations of all sorts at posterior sites (Hagoort et al. 1999), which has also added to the speculations about whether the P600 might be an umbrella term for numerous subcomponents. It has been reported for the processing of syntactically anomalous or infrequent sentence configurations and in garden-path sentences, as well as in response to feature mismatches, as for instance subject-verb disagreement (e.g. Neville et al. 1991; Osterhout and Holcomb 1992, 1993; Osterhout and Mobley 1995). In more general terms, it has been suggested that this effect reflects a controlled process of revision and repair motivated by an ill-formed representation or the availability of competing representations from prior analysis (cf. e.g. Friederici and Mecklinger 1996; CansecoGonzalez et al. 1997). In terms of the Syntax–Discourse Model, the P600 — as observed in the absence of an agreeing antecedent — appears to be a marker for the integration of an entity into the discourse representation and following from this final interpretation of referential information. Crucial for the present investigation, one ERP study has previously looked at the processing of coargument reflexives and logophors, albeit in an indirect way, as the experimental items were not designed for an immediate comparison of the two reflexive types. Harris et al. (2000) investigated agreement violations in sentences involving logophors and coargument reflexives. They tested sentences as in (3), where on the one hand, (3a) represents a proper coargumenthood relationship between the reflexive and its antecedent and (3b) involves a number violation. On the other hand, (3c, d) contain logophors in non-coargument environments, and the authors point out that this contrast does not involve a syntactic violation (due to the absence of coargumenthood), but possibly a semantic (or in the present terms discourse) violation due to the fact that the logophor in (3d) does not refer to the most prominent antecedent (i.e. mechanics):

(3) a. The pilot’s mechanics browbeat themselves after the race. b.   *The pilot’s mechanics browbeat himself after the race. c. The pilot’s mechanics browbeat Paxton and themselves after the race. #The pilot’s mechanics browbeat Paxton and himself after the race. d.  

Event-related potentials

They report a P600 component for violations involving coargument reflexives, which has generally been attributed to the detection of syntactic violations and more specifically has been observed for agreement violations (e.g. Osterhout and Mobley 1995). Crucially, such an effect was not present in the anomaly involving logophors in (3d). In addition, Harris et al. compared between pronominal types, even though they argue that the effect may be confounded by the fact that the conditions do not represent perfect minimal pairs. In the comparison of the two grammatical conditions (3a vs. 3c), they report a positive effect between 550–750 msecs at a left posterior site (Wernicke’s area) for the logophor condition, and they argue that this effect is not a P600 due to its early onset latency and its restricted distribution. However, they do not make any further claims with respect to this particular contrast.5 Overall this study supports the view of the Syntax–Discourse Model that coargument reflexives and logophors are subject to distinct dependency relations, as the two violations did not elicit the same ERP component. The study then represents a significant finding, as it substantiates the claim that only coargument reflexives are subject to a syntactic dependency. The results therefore provide the basis for further investigation of pronominal–antecedent relations.

6.1.2.4.  ERPs and the time course of processing Integrating these distinct components, Friederici (1999, 2002) proposes a comprehensive neurocognitive model of language comprehension — on the basis of a large body of findings from ERP measures and other neuroimaging techniques — which incorporates temporal and spatial properties of language processing. The model consists of three core phases along the time-course of processing. The first phase (100–300 msecs) corresponds to initial syntactic structure building, based on word category information. The second phase (300–500 msecs) reflects processes associated with semantic relations and thematic role assignment, in particular lexico-semantic processes, as well as morphosyntactic mechanisms. And the third phase (500–1000 msecs) represents processes of integration, including reanalysis and repair.6 In terms of ERP correlates, the first phase of Friederici’s model is evidenced by an early left anterior negativity (ELAN) between 100 msecs and 200 msecs, which indicates highly automatic structure formation, namely phrase structure violations and word category violations (cf. Neville et al. 1991; Friederici et al. 1993, 1998; Gunter et al. 1997; Hahne and Friederici 1999, 2002; Hahne and Jescheniak 2001). In the second phase, structural information pertaining

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to inflectional and agreement properties is processed largely in left anterior areas (LAN), and around the same time, lexico-semantic information is processed in posterior regions (eliciting an N400). These two mechanisms of the second phase are understood to operate in parallel, while involving distinct neural networks. Finally, the third phase is concerned with the integration of information established in prior phases. If the information established in the first and second phase is consistent, interpretation has been accomplished; if there is a mismatch between the information retrieved in the two earlier phases, processes of repair and reanalysis take effect in the third phase, as evidenced by a P600.

6.1.3.  The time-course in the Syntax–Discourse Model In the following, I discuss how the temporal properties of ERP can inform the Syntax–Discourse Model and which specific hypotheses arise for the establishment of dependency. The Syntax–Discourse Model first distinguishes between syntactic and discourse dependencies. It posits that as soon as the lexical items are merged, the system assesses the structural relations of the merged entities and, for the purposes of pronominal interpretation, the relation of coargumenthood, which determines whether a predicate receives reflexive-marking. In the presence of coargumenthood, a syntactic dependency is licensed, which suffices for the interpretation of the reflexive to be completed. In the absence of coargumenthood, a pronominal enters into a discourse dependency. The study by Harris et al. (2000) indicates that the processing of coargument reflexives and logophors differs in that only the (violation of the) former elicit an ERP effect that has been associated with syntax-based processing. The exact nature of logophor interpretation remains an open question in this particular study. However, logophors and ordinary pronouns are expected to show an effect in response to the establishment of a discourse dependency with their antecedents. Such a discourse dependency is most likely observable in the second phase of Friederici’s neurocognitive model. In general terms, Friederici (1999) suggests that lexical access and integration are completed around 400 msecs after stimulus onset, as evidenced by previous results from N280 and N400 (in combination with data from PET studies and aphasia research). The creation of a file card representation and the establishment of a discourse dependency are therefore expected to occur around this time as well. More specifically, converging evidence for discourse-related processing in the second phase comes from studies that investigated discourse-based

Event-related potentials

ambiguities and pronoun resolution and observed a LAN and/or an N400 (e.g. van Berkum et al. 1999; Streb et al. 1999, 2004; Streb 2000). I therefore predict that the LAN is an index for file card creation and that the N400 is a marker for dependency. It is further conceivable that discourse-related processes may also occur in the third phase of Friederici’s model, where structural and discourse-based information cooperate in reanalysis and repair mechanisms. In this phase, the system seeks to correct incongruities or recheck information, which were established in the first and second phase, to achieve an interpretable output. Moreover, as I suggest above, final integration into the mental model might take place within this phase, such that discourse referents are stored and maintained for future coreference. Concerning the fine-grained distinction drawn by the Syntax–Discourse Model between logophors and ordinary pronouns, and if ERP signals can detect it, this difference is most likely expected to emerge in terms of amplitudinal properties on the condition reflecting the most costly discourse integration, as both dependencies are viewed in terms of the connection between two file cards in the discourse representation. Alternatively, there might be a difference due to the internal structure of the file cards, as pronouns project an ill-formed file card (without a heading). Finally, I want to comment on the nature of the LAN effect. As pointed out in section 6.1.2.1, the LAN effect has also been reported for certain syntactic processes (such as morphosyntactic and phrase structure violations or the processing of non-canonical and filler-gap constructions), and it has been associated with working memory load. These observations can be integrated in a model that predicts a LAN for discourse-based operation in the following ways. First, the Syntax–Discourse Model postulates a strong connection between syntax and discourse via a functional category triggering the creation of a file card in the discourse representation. The timing of discourse processes is therefore closely connected to the point in time where detection of morphosyntactic violations occur, as these are also dependent on functional information. Second, as the discourse representation is viewed as a level where salient information is stored and maintained, this yields an apparent connection to working memory demands, but I suggest below that the effects can be derived directly from the internal structure of the different file card representations. For the purposes of the Syntax–Discourse Model, these observations then allow us to investigate syntactic vs. discourse dependencies through the window of event-related brain potentials. Specifically, syntactic dependencies are

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viewed as early processes, while discourse dependencies can be subject to more controlled considerations further downstream. From a temporal dimension, discourse operations required for the establishment of pronominal–antecedent dependencies are therefore expected to evoke an electrical potential in phase 2. Experiment 1 (section 6.2) investigates this hypothesis by comparing logophors to coargument reflexives. With regard to discourse-internal operations, the Syntax–Discourse Model groups logophors and pronouns together insofar as they both require a discourse dependency, but they differ with respect to the underlying mechanism. Experiment 2 (section 6.3) therefore investigates the properties underlying the processing of logophors and pronouns, which the Syntax–Discourse Model postulates are subject to a bridging dependency and a cut-and-paste dependency respectively, as well as the introduction of a discourse-new proper name. The corresponding discourse processes are hypothesized to emerge in phase 2 and possibly also phase 3 if additional integration is required.

6.2.  Reflexive interpretation: syntax vs. discourse The Syntax–Discourse Model postulates that the formation of a discourse dependency is more costly than the formation of a syntactic dependency. In this section, I present an ERP study that investigates the time course of the processing of coargument reflexives and logophors with the aim of addressing the question of the temporal dimension of the establishment of a reflexive–antecedent relation as a function of the level at which the relation is formed. In particular, logophor interpretation is expected to yield an effect in the second phase, and on the basis of previous evidence that has identified the LAN as a discourse-related effect, this effect is predicted to emerge in response to the logophor condition, and crucially not to the coargument reflexive condition. In contrast to the Harris et al. (2000) study discussed above, I present an ERP experiment that addresses the processing properties of coargument reflexives and logophors in more detail by making a direct comparison between the two reflexives. A different kind of construction was used than in the reaction time studies presented in chapters 4 and 5, as the locative PPs provide an environment too dissimilar from the coargument reflexive environment and I wanted to avoid a confounding effect due to baseline differences, which ERP recordings can be sensitive to. The present ERP study used a construction that has also been extensively discussed in connection with logophoricity: it con-

Event-related potentials

tains a complex DP of the sort X and pronominal as in (4) (from Reinhart and Reuland 1993: 675), which puts the pronominal in a non-coargument relationship with its antecedent:

(4) a. Maxi said that the queen invited both Lucie and himselfi for tea. b. Maxi said that the queen invited both Lucie and himi for tea.

The example in (4a) represents an instance of logophoricity, as himself and its antecedent Max do not share the same predicate; the predicate said takes Max and the CP as an argument. As a consequence, the reflexive and its antecedent do not form a coargument relationship and reflexive-marking of the predicate can therefore not take place. In the absence of coargumenthood, the reflexive must then establish a discourse dependency to receive referential content; and the Syntax–Discourse Model suggests that this takes place via a bridging relationship. It is further noteworthy that this construction makes available another logophoric dependency as demonstrated by (4c). The logophor in this construction — in contrast to (4a) — occurs in complementary distribution with the pronoun:

(4) c. The queen said that Maxi invited both Lucie and himselfi for tea.

In this example, the pronominal himself and its antecedent Max also do not share the same predicate, however for slightly different reasons. The reflexive in (4c) is contained in the DP both Lucie and himself, which represents an argument of the predicate invited. The fact that the reflexive is embedded in the larger DP resembles the cases of reflexives in locative PPs, which also do not qualify as arguments of the verbal predicate. In the absence of coargumenthood then, the predicate cannot be reflexive-marked and a syntactic dependency thus fails to be established. Instead, the interpretation of the reflexive takes place via a discourse dependency. In experiment 1, sentences similar to (4c) were used to investigate the time course of the establishment of a discourse dependency associated with a logophor. These sentences were compared to constructions containing a coargument reflexive as in (5), which are described as forming a syntactic dependency:

(5) Henrietta said that the king­i invited himselfi for tea.

In this sentence, the reflexive himself and its antecedent the king clearly stand in a coargument relationship. Both entities are arguments of the predicate

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i­ nvited and since the reflexive represents a self-anaphor, it licenses reflexivemarking of the predicate. Therefore, a syntactic dependency is established to satisfy interpretation. The following study investigates the time-course of the establishment of syntactic and discourse dependencies through the window of coargument reflexive and logophor interpretation respectively.

6.2.1.  Method Electroencephalogram (EEG) data were collected from 19 Ag/AgCl scalp electrodes mounted in a standard electrode cap (QuikCap, Neuroscan, Inc.), a system that adheres to the standard international 10–20 system for electrode positioning (Jasper 1958). ERPs were recorded form the following positions: FZ, CZ, and PZ for the midline electrodes and FP1, FP2, F3, F4, F7, F8, C3, C4,

Figure 1.  Electrode positions (according to the standard 10–20 system) recorded for the following experiments.

Event-related potentials

T7, T8, P3, P4, P7, P8, O1, and O2 for the lateral sites. Figure 1 illustrates these positions. Furthermore, horizontal and vertical eye movements and blinks were monitored by means of two sets of additional electrode pairs, which were placed above and below the left eye (EOGV) and at the outer canthi of the left and right eye (EOGH). The signals from these electrode pairs are important measures as artifacts from ocular movement must be detected and discarded prior to data analysis. ERP data were referenced to the left mastoid. Reference electrodes are generally required for ERP recordings, as ERPs represent changes in electrical activity that are determined in relation to a baseline voltage measure. This baseline helps to filter out general activity of the system, as well as other artifacts picked up from for instance equipment in the room, as these signals are most likely detected by the reference electrode and the scalp electrodes alike and are thus canceled out via referencing. The left mastoid was chosen as reference point as it represent a relatively inactive site and can thus serve to filter out activity at the electrode sites on the scalp. EEG and EOG recordings were amplified with a SynAmps amplifier (NeuroScan, Inc.). The signals were recorded continuously with a digitization rate of 250Hz. The resistance of the electrodes was kept below 5 kΩ. Input files for the experimental stimuli and the trigger timing were programmed using Tempo (Motta et al. 2000–3). Subjects were seated comfortable in front of a computer monitor, on which the sentences were presented visually. They were instructed that their primary task was (quietly and carefully) to read for comprehension the sentences which were presented word by word on the computer screen in front of them. In addition, after each sentence was presented word by word, a second sentence appeared (this time with the entire sentence presented at once), upon which subjects had to decide whether this second sentence matched the first sentence or parts of the first sentence (verification task). They had a response box for this verification task, which had a “yes” and a “no” button, and they were instructed to use their left hand to indicate their verification decision. The verification task was utilized to assure that subjects were attending to the sentences. Sentences were presented in blocks of approximately 30 items at a time. Participants were asked not to blink or move around during the presentation of the stimulus items (i.e. the sentences presented word by word), as trials with excessive artifacts cannot be used for the final analysis. However, the subjects were allowed to blink during the sentence verification task and between blocks, where they were given short breaks.

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Sentences were presented word after word in the center of the computer screen. Stimuli were displayed in yellow letters on a blue background. At the beginning of each experimental sentence, a fixation cross appeared in the center of the screen for 500 msecs, which served as a reminder for the participants to stop blinking. Words were then presented at a rate of 450 msecs each. 500 msecs after each item, a verification sentence appeared on the screen in its entirety. Participants were given maximally 4000 msecs to respond to the verification task. The next stimulus item was presented a total of 5000 msecs after the verification sentence. The entire session lasted approximately 2 hours, including electrode application and removal, as well as a practice trial.

6.2.2.  Participants Twenty-three students (15 female) at Yale University participated in this study. Their ages ranged from 18 to 23 years (mean age: 19.6; SE = 0.26). All participants were right-handed monolingual native speakers of English. They had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological disorder (by their own account). They were paid for their participation or received subject hour credit.

6.2.3.  Materials and design The experimental sentences were constructed in a 2 x 2 design with the factors protype (reflexive vs. proper name) and structure (coargument position vs. non-coargument position). The primary contrast was represented by sentences containing either a coargument reflexive (refl) or a logophor (logo). These sentences were tested together with two conditions that contained a proper name in place of the reflexive, but were otherwise identical in structure to the refl and logo sentences (pnr and pnl respectively). The purpose of these conditions for the present research question was to assure that if differences obtained between the two reflexivity conditions, these would not result from a structural difference, since due to the restriction of presence or absence of coargumenthood, coargument reflexives occur immediately after the predicate, but logophors must be embedded in an argument of the predicate. The experimental items were constructed in 40 quadruplets, which differed with respect to the factors protype x structure (refl/pnr/logo/pnl), where the former two occurred as direct arguments of the predicate and the latter types were contained within a both-and phrase:

Event-related potentials



(6) Experimental sentences — Experiment 1 refl: Three participants said that Jamesi had painted himself i during the class on charcoal drawing. logo: Three participants said that Jamesi had painted both ­himself i and Erin during the class on charcoal drawing. pnr: Three participants said that James had painted Linda during the class on charcoal drawing. pnl: James said that three participants had painted both Linda and Erin during the class on charcoal drawing.7

Twenty sentences of each condition requiring a reflexive (refl or logo) used himself, the other twenty used herself as the critical element. The sentences were further designed in such a way that number and gender marking of the pronominal element unambiguously led to the selection of one and only one sentential referent. This meant that for the sentences containing a reflexive, the matrix DP (e.g. three participants) was marked for plural. I additionally chose to use a numeral determiner in this matrix DP to support and force the plural marking even further. For the antecedent DP gender-biased proper names were chosen. Moreover, the matrix verb always represented a verb of speech or thought (e.g. said, mentioned, boasted) and the embedded verbal predicate had to be optionally reflexive or transitive to allow for the variation of coargument and logophor continuation. Furthermore, past perfect was used for the embedded event, as this is viewed as a natural continuation of the simple past marked matrix verb in indirect speech, and elicited the highest acceptability ratings in a pre-recording screening. In the case of the coargument reflexive condition and its corresponding proper name condition (pnr), the reflexive/proper name immediately succeeded the verbal predicate. In the case of the other conditions, the crucial pronominal/proper name was contained in a both-and-DP, where the first DP represented the critical element and the second another proper name. This order was chosen for several reasons. First of all, pre-testing of the stimuli material (by native speakers via a questionnaire) suggested that a phrase like (both) himself and Henrietta was considered more natural and acceptable than a phrase like (both) Henrietta and himself in the present constructions. Second, this facilitates the comparison between logo and refl, as the conditions only differ by the addition of both at the point of the pronominal.8 Finally, the inclusion of both in the constructions was necessary in order to avoid a garden-path effect, during which subjects might have initially (i.e. immediately at the reflexive) analyzed the logophor

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as a ­coargument reflexive in a sentence like Three participants said that Jamesi had painted himself i (and Erin . . .), which would have represented an effect expected by the Syntax–Discourse Model, as coargumenthood is checked as soon as the elements are merged (and before the rest of the higher level DP and Erin is processed). Hence the presence of both is critical to allow for an immediate establishment of a discourse dependency in response to the logophor, as it signals the existence of a complex conjoined DP, of which the logophor is one constituent. Finally, continuations of the stimuli were constructed with a complex PP to avoid end-of-sentence wrap-up effects in the immediate vicinity of the critical element. Sentences across items were matched for total length. In addition to the 160 experiment sentences, 120 filler items were constructed that contained pronominal elements at different structural positions. These were pseudo-randomized and two lists were created with different orders to avoid any processing effect that would be caused by the particular order of the stimuli items. The final script, which amounted to a total of 280 items, presented the stimuli in 9 blocks of 30–32 items. After each experimental sentence, a verification sentence was presented. The verification sentences were designed and counterbalanced on the basis of the factors voice (active/passive) and antecedent (correct/wrong). They had a DP-V-DP structure in the active variation and a DP-V structure in the passive variation. None of the verification items contained pronominal elements. Behavioral data for the verification task were first and foremost used to assure that the participants had read and processed the experimental items attentively. Second, the behavioral data might shed light on processing difficulties associated with the particular constructions that were tested.

6.2.4.  Predictions The Syntax–Discourse Model proposes that the most economical way to establish a reflexive–antecedent dependency is syntactic in nature. As soon as a reflexive is merged in the syntactic representation, its status with respect to its predicate is determined and if coargumenthood with an antecedent is obtainable and reflexive-marking is licensed (in the case of English by a self-anaphor), a dependency is formed in the computational system. This is the case for coargument reflexives. If a syntactic dependency is not available to a reflexive-antecedent pair, the interpretation goes to the discourse representation, where the file card of the pronominal connects with the file card of its

Event-related potentials

antecedent to satisfy its referential dependency. This is the case for logophors. The main prediction for contrasting coargument reflexives and logophors in this experiment is therefore that logophor interpretation should elicit an effect in the LAN window, which has been associated with discourse operations (cf. Streb et al. 1999; van Berkum et al. 1999), and more specifically with the creation of a file card. Coargument reflexives are not predicted to yield an effect in this temporal window, as their interpretation is resolved syntactically. To test these predictions, analyses of variance are performed on the LAN window. Moreover, analyses are carried out for the N400 effect, which has been associated with the formation of a dependency, as well as for the P600 window (550–800 msecs), as this effect has been attributed to syntactic processes (among other more general integration processes). However, I do not expect to find a difference in this late window, for two reasons. First of all, the P600 is associated with controlled reanalysis and revision processes, whereas the process required for the establishment of a syntactic dependency is considered an automatic process within the Syntax–Discourse Model. And secondly, the (syntactic) interpretation of coargument reflexives does not require reanalysis. Furthermore, it might be conceivable (e.g. within Binding Theory accounts) that the logophor condition elicits a P600 effect, as this element might be viewed as a reflexive that fails to undergo a syntactic dependency. In this case, the logophor and coargument condition should not diverge early in the time course (as they both attempt to form a syntactic dependency), but show a positivity to the logophor condition in the later time window. However, in light of the findings from Harris et al. (2000), who showed an association of the coargument reflexive with a syntactic effect and the absence of such an effect in the case of logophors, such a difference is also not expected.

6.2.5.  Results 6.2.5.1.  Behavioral data The behavioral results are based on the responses to the verification sentences, which served the function to assess whether the participants attended to the experimental sentences and understood them accurately. The error percentages on this task are averaged over false responses and timed-out responses (i.e. responses that failed to be registered 4000 msecs after the verification sentences were presented). Table 1 shows the average error rates per subject (N=23) for each condition (N=40).

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Error Rate in percent (and mean number of errors)

refl logo pnr pnl

5.33% (M=2.13, SE=0.60) 10.32% (M=4.13, SE=0.87) 5.76% (M=2.30, SE=0.52) 27.60% (M=11.04, SE=0.87)

An ANOVA for error rate by condition provided a significant effect of condition (F (3, 88)= 32.318, p < .000) and subsequent post hoc tests demonstrated a clear effect of proper name (pnl) on all other conditions. refl, logo, and pnr on the other hand did not differ significantly from each other. A closer look at the responses to the pnl proper name condition revealed that the high error rate in this condition arose largely from the incorrect verification sentences. The majority of errors were made on verification sentences that manipulated the available discourse referents as in (7b):

(7) a. James said that three participants had painted both Linda and Erin during the class on charcoal drawing. b. Three participants had painted James.

These erroneous data might result from two factors. First, this particular construction can be considered the most difficult to verify as it attempted to mislead the subjects (who respond under time pressure) by using two discourseold referents, while other incorrect verification sentences introduced a new discourse referent. Second, the data might be reflective of a higher working memory load, as the participants needed to maintain four different discourse referents and their respective roles in the events described, whereas the other conditions only contained two (refl) or three (logo, pnr) unique referents. (This would also explain the overall higher error rate to the pnl condition.) In general, however, the behavioral data suggest that participants were attending to the sentences accurately — with a total error rate of 10.59% over all conditions, including filler items, (M=29.65, SE=3.32). For further analyses of the ERP data, all trials that received an incorrect response to the verification task were excluded. In addition, subjects with more than 15 incorrect responses to a condition were discarded from the analysis in their entirety, in order to allow at least 25 items per condition for the averaging of the ERP signals (see Kutas and van Petten 1994). This criterion resulted in the exclusion of two subjects prior to the analysis of the ERP measurements.

Event-related potentials

6.2.5.2.  ERP recordings EEG and EOG signals were filtered to minimize noise artifacts (12 Hz low pass filter, 1 Hz high pass filter) and screened offline for blinks and eye movements, muscle artifacts, and electrode drifting. A total of 32.74% trials had to be rejected due to ocular or other artifact contaminations. Data from two additional subjects had to be excluded from further analysis, as their total number of items per condition was below the cutoff margin of at least 25 analyzable items per condition after artifact screening. The waveforms from all the trials of 19 subjects were then averaged per condition and plotted together. The ERPs were time-locked to the onset of the reflexive/proper name. Averages were aligned to each other at the onset of the critical word. The decision not to utilize a baseline correction was guided by the structural differences between the conditions. As can be seen in figure 2 (pnl vs. pnr), there is a difference between the two conditions in the window before the critical word, and in order to avoid prestimulus influences, which could have an impact on the analysis in the critical region, I chose to correct the baseline to the onset of the critical word. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed with the factors protype and structure. All statistical analyses were based on the mean ERP amplitude in predetermined time windows. To control for potential type I errors due to violations of sphericity in the ANOVAs, the data reported are corrected using the Huynh-Feldt procedure whenever there is more than one degree of freedom in the numerator (Huynh and Feldt 1970). Data were analyzed separately for lateral and midline sites. The three channels comprising the midline electrodes were FZ, CZ, and PZ. This analysis included the factor electrode with the three midline electrodes as levels. The lateral sites were grouped into four quadrants on the basis of their topographical distribution (i.e. factor ­region of interest [roi]): left anterior (F3, F7), right anterior (F4, F8), left posterior (P3, P7), and right posterior (P4, P8).9 These analyses contained the factors hemisphere (left/right) and region (anterior/posterior). Whenever there were significant effects or interactions, planned comparisons were performed on the contrast coargument reflexive vs. logophor, as well as on the two proper name conditions (pnl vs. pnr). If a difference was obtained between the two proper name conditions, this would be interpreted as a reflection of the structural differences, namely that the time-locked proper name in the pnl condition was preceded by both, while the proper name in the pnr condition was immediately preceded by the verbal predicate. If no difference was obtained between these two proper name conditions, a direct comparison between coargument reflexives and logophors was justified.

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The waveforms to the two proper name conditions (pnl and pnr) did not reveal a significant difference (see figure 2), which suggests that the two structures produce similar ERP patterns to the proper name, and consequently to the reflexive. Furthermore, pairwise comparisons of pnl and pnr revealed no significant effects in the 300–450 msecs, the 400–600 msecs, and the 550–800 msecs windows. This then suggests that the structural differences between pnl and pnr do not result in differences in ERP signals during integration. A direct comparison between refl and logo is therefore granted. ERPs recorded to the onset of the reflexive element (zero on x-axis) are shown in Figure 3 for the coargument reflexive condition (dotted line) and the logophor condition (solid line). After visual inspection, the temporal window from 300–450 msecs was determined to examine whether a LAN ­effect

Figure 2.  Grand average ERPs (n=19) measured to the onset of the proper name: PNR (dotted line) and PNL (solid line). Negative voltage is plotted up. Window presentation spans from 100 msecs pre-stimulus to 1000 msecs. Stimulus onset is at 0 msecs (x-axis). No significant ERP differences emerged between the two pronoun conditions.

Event-related potentials

Figure 3.  Grand average ERPs (n=19) measured to the onset of the critical coargument reflexive (dotted line) and logophor (solid line). Window presentation spans from 100 msecs pre-stimulus till 1000 msecs post stimulus onset. Negative voltage is plotted up. Logophors elicited a negativity over anterior electrode sites (as exemplified at F3).

was observable. An ANOVA for this window yielded an effect of structure (F(1, 18)=25.408, p< .000, MSE=2.66) over midline sites. For the lateral analyses by ROI, a main effect of roi (F (3, 54)=10.584, p < .000, MSE=1.96) and structure (F(1, 18)=13.689, p< .002, MSE=1.91) was observed, and for the analyses by hemisphere, main effects of hemisphere (F (1, 18)=7.047, p<.016, MSE=0.51) and structure (F (1, 18)=13.201, p< .002, MSE=0.98), as well as a marginal interaction of structure x protype x hemisphere (F(1, 18)=3.957, p< .062, MSE=0.36). Finally, the analyses by region revealed main effects of region (F(1, 18)=12.829, p < .002, MSE=1.20) and structure (F (1, 18)=13.591, p < .002, MSE=0.96) and an interaction of structure x region (F(1, 18)=4.973, p < .039, MSE=0.92). These effects are reflected in a more pronounced negativity to the logophor condition, with an anterior maximum. This is supported by planned comparisons in the rois that reveal a ­ significant difference between refl and logo over left anterior sites

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(t(18)=2.589, p< .019) as well as over right anterior sites (t(18)=3.67, p < .002). This difference is interpreted as a correlate of discourse processing. The effect only differs from the LAN effect discussed above with respect to its bilateral activation, but otherwise shares critical properties with the standard LAN. An ANOVA for the N400 window (calculated over the mean amplitude between 400 and 600 msecs) elicited main effects of roi (p < .000) and region (p <.001) over lateral sites, and a main effect of electrode (p < .024) over midline sites, but no significant interactions, so further comparisons were not justified on the basis of a hierarchical analysis. This indicates that no electrophysiological differences are observed between the critical conditions in this window. An ANOVA for the 550–800 msecs time window (corresponding to the P600) provided no significant effects or interactions in the separate analyses for midline and lateral sites. This confirmed our predictions.

6.2.6.  Discussion The goal of this experiment was to address the issue of the establishment of a syntactic vs. a discourse dependency, as predicted by the Syntax–Discourse Model for coargument reflexives and logophors respectively. In particular, I was interested to see to what degree these two processes could be dissociated in terms of ERP correlates, and what their temporal properties were, since the findings from the reaction time studies with Broca’s aphasia patients and unimpaired participants showed that the processing of logophors resulted in more cost. Such an increase in processing cost might translate into a difference in the amplitude of the ERP signal or a latency shift. Previous research has demonstrated that discourse processes elicit a LAN effect, which I predicted to emerge in response to a reflexive element that is subject to a discourse dependency. Such a dependency is proposed for logophors by the Syntax–Discourse Model, and a comparison with coargument reflexives, which are hypothesized to be subject to a syntactic dependency, was therefore expected to shed light on the presence of discourse-based processing. The results from the ERP experiment support the predictions of the timecourse of reflexive interpretation. The data yielded a negativity with an anterior maximum between 300–450 msecs to the logophor condition. This difference could not be exclusively attributed to the left anterior region, but the present effect critically represents a negativity over anterior sites and can thus be associated with other LAN effects reported in the literature. This LAN-like effect indicates first and foremost that logophor interpretation is subject to processes

Event-related potentials

of discourse integration (cf. Streb et al. 1999; van Berkum et al. 1999) — in contrast to coargument reflexive interpretation — and therefore substantiates the claims made by the Syntax–Discourse Model for the contrast between logophors and coargument reflexives. This finding thus shows that file card information is accessible as early as 300 msecs after the onset of the critical word, and that logophors enter into a discourse dependency at this point. The data also converge with the findings from Harris et al. (2000) that indicated that logophor interpretation is not subject to syntactic principles. In this respect, I further speculated on the presence of a late positivity as a reflex of syntaxbased processing and predicted that no P600 effect would be observed, as reanalysis is not required for the structures under investigation. This was also borne out by the data. Regarding the claim that the N400 represents an effect associated with the formation of dependency (cf. also Streb et al. 1999, 2004), the data provide no support for a difference between coargument reflexive and logophor interpretation. To elaborate on this, I want to emphasize that what distinguishes the two types of dependencies within the model advocated here is the level at which the dependency is formed. The syntactic dependency established over the coargument reflexive is formed in the computational system. This is hypothesized to be the most economical process, but the Syntax–Discourse Model also states that the linkage between the reflexive and its antecedent is carried over into the discourse representation (for free). In contrast, the logophor enters into a dependency with its antecedent at the level of discourse for the first time and therefore exerts cost when it is introduced into discourse representation (as evidenced by the LAN effect, and supported by the findings from the reaction time studies reported in chapters 4 and 5). This means that for both types of reflexives, a dependency is accessible at the level of discourse. The absence of a difference in the N400 window then suggests to me that if dependencies are interpreted within this temporal window — as concluded from the findings by Streb et al. 1999, 2004 — both reflexives might exert processing demands due to their referentially deficient nature. Critically, however, the two reflexive types differ in the earlier LAN window, signaling the discourse integration of the logophor. To conclude, the investigation has identified a distinct ERP component associated with discourse-based processing of logophors. In the next experiment, I continue exploring the processing of logophors to further investigate the role of the LAN during discourse-based processing. To this end, logophors are compared to pronouns and discourse-new proper names. Logophors pattern

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with pronouns in that they both require the establishment of a discourse dependency in the current framework (while proper names are referentially independent). Contrasting logophors and pronouns with proper names should then elicit a signal reflecting of the formation of the discourse dependency. In addition, comparing logophors to pronouns can potentially reveal a dissociation between a bridging and a cut-and-paste dependency respectively.

6.3.  Pronominal interpretation: discourse-internal processes The Syntax–Discourse Model postulates a number of different discourse-internal processes that serve to accomplish referential transfer and interpretation. The first distinction can be made between discourse-new and discourse-old entities (cf. e.g. Clark and Haviland 1977; Prince 1992). An entity that is newly introduced in the discourse receives a new file card representation and can as such serve as reference for subsequent mention. Once an entity is introduced into the discourse, any subsequent mention of it is considered discourse-old information. Since in the connection between syntax and discourse, every instantiation of a DP projects a file card, the (discourse-old) file card must establish a linkage with the corresponding referent already available in the discourse representation. This is motivated by general economy considerations, as the system would want to maintain one active representation of a discourse referent, rather than carrying along a file card for every mention. The second distinction can be made in terms of the connection established between two file cards, which is achieved through either a cut-and-paste operation, which merges information pertaining to the same referent onto the most recent file card, or through a bridging operation, which applies to cases where the headings of two file cards are not compatible (and thus prevent a cut-andpaste operation) but share salient information licensing a bridging dependency (e.g. inferences, stand-for function associated with self) (cf. section 3.2.2). Pronominal elements are generally considered as referring to discourse-old entities, as in and of themselves they are referentially deficient and therefore do not qualify as discourse-new entities.10 And pronominal–antecedent dependencies have been characterized above as a function of the pronominal’s file card representations: pronouns, which lack a heading, receive referential substance via a cut-and-paste relation; and logophors, which contain a selfheading, enter into a bridging relation to obtain referential content. Essentially, the question addressed in the second ERP experiment is to what degree effects

Event-related potentials

of the two discourse-internal contrasts — discourse-new vs. discourse-old and cut-and-paste vs. bridging — are dissociable in the ERP patterns. The experiment studies the ERP patterns associated with the interpretation of proper names, logophors, and pronouns, using similar structures to those in experiment 1, from which they differ with respect to the distance between the antecedent and the pronominal:

(8) a. Henrietta said that the in-laws invited both Kristen and Sean. b. Henriettai said that the in-laws invited both herself i and Sean. c. Henriettai said that the in-laws invited both her i and Sean.

Crucially, the entities to which the ERP signals are time-locked (underlined DPs in (8)) surface in positions that do not license a coargument relation with their antecedent, and the Syntax–Discourse Model therefore predicts that the pronominals require the establishment of a discourse dependency to receive referentiality. Experiment 2 first addresses the contrast between discoursenew (i.e. proper name) and discourse-old information (i.e. pronoun/logophor). In contrast to the Streb et al. (1999, 2004) studies, which used repetition of proper names in comparison to coreferential pronouns, the present study employed proper names not made available by the previous context. In this way, it sought to isolate a component for the integration of a pronominal with a discourse-old referent in comparison to the introduction of an entirely new discourse referent. The second issue concerned the possibility of distinct mechanisms during the formation of a discourse dependency, namely cut-andpaste (in connection with pronoun interpretation) and bridging (in connection with logophor interpretation), where the dependency hierarchy makes the prediction that the latter operation is more costly; see (9). (9) Cost-based hierarchy: predictions for pronouns vs. logophors Antecedent’s file card



Referential, Quantified Referential Non-Referential [+Refl]

Cut and Paste

Bridging

Pronominal’s file card

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On the basis of previous ERP evidence, it is hypothesized that distinctions between these processes are reflected in terms of temporal and/or amplitudinal properties of the corresponding ERP waveforms. And based on the findings in experiment 1, the LAN figures most prominently in the predictions formulated below.

6.3.1.  Method The same method and experimental setup as in experiment 1 was used for this investigation. EEG signals were recorded from 19 tin electrodes form the following positions (in accordance with the standard 10–20 system): FZ, CZ, and PZ for the midline electrode sites and FP1, FP2, F3, F4, F7, F8, C3, C4, T7, T8, P3, P4, P7, P8, O1, and O2 for the lateral sites. Ocular artifacts and blinks were monitored via two pairs of additional electrodes, which were placed above and below the left eye of the subjects (EOGV) and at the outer canthi of the left and right eye (EOGH). ERPs were referenced to an electrode placed at the left mastoid. EEG and EOG signals were amplified with a SynAmps amplifier (NeuroScan, Inc.) and recorded continuously with a sampling rate of 250Hz. The impedance levels of the scalp electrodes were kept below 5 kΩ. Experimental items were presented visually, identical in presentation and timing to experiment 1, and followed by a verification sentence. A total of 240 sentences were tested in eight blocks of 30 items each. Participants were fitted with the electrode cap and seated in front of a computer monitor. They were instructed about the reading and verification task and were asked not to blink and to move as little as possible from the onset of the fixation cross to the beginning of the verification task to minimize recording artifacts. The session lasted approximately 2 hours, including electrode application and removal, and a post-recording questionnaire that assessed acceptability ratings of the constructions tested.

6.3.2.  Participants Twenty-two students (14 female) at Yale University were recruited to participate in this study. Their ages ranged from 18 to 23 years (mean age: 19.45; SE = 0.28), and all were right-handed native speakers of English. They reported to have normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological disorder. They received monetary compensations or participant hour credit.

Event-related potentials

Data of three subjects had to be discarded from the final analysis due to extensive EEG recording artifacts.

6.3.3.  Materials and design In experiment 2, three conditions were tested: proper name (pn), logophor (logo) and pronoun (pro). The experimental items were designed as minimal pairs and varied only with respect to the pronominal/proper name. 40 triplets were therefore constructed, which differed in the factor pronominal type (pn/logo/pro): (10) Experimental sentences — Experiment 2 pn: Colleen explained that four judges had evaluated both Isaac and Noah at the end of the three-hour training period. logo: Colleeni explained that four judges had evaluated both herself iand Noah at the end of the three-hour training period. pro: Colleeni explained that four judges had evaluated both her i and Noah at the end of the three-hour training period. Half the sentences of the pronominal conditions (logo/pro) included her(self) in the critical position, the other half contained him(self). The proper names (pn) with which these two pronominal elements were contrasted consisted of equally distributed mono- and bisyllabic proper names (50% female) to account for the difference in syllable length between the pronoun and the logophor. All pronominal–antecedent combinations were created in a way that first, the antecedent unambiguously represented a male or female name consistent with the gender feature of the pronominal (e.g. Colleen), and second, number-agreement between the pronominal and the antecedent allowed only one particular referent in the sentential context to emerge, which resulted in the intervening DP being plural (e.g. four judges). As in experiment 1, a numeral was utilized to provide an additional cue to plurality. The matrix verb always represented a verb of speech (e.g. explained, mentioned), and the internal argument to the subordinate verb represented a complex both-and-DP, where the first embedded DP represented the pronominal/proper name to which the ERPs were time-locked and the second DP was a new proper name referent (see experiment 1 for the motivation to use these parameters for the critical DP). The both-and-DP was followed by a PP to prevent end-of-sentence effects to the time-locked stimuli.

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Each sentence was matched with a verification sentence that was presented immediately following it. Verification sentences were constructed in a 2 x 2 design with the factors voice (active/passive) and antecedent (correct/wrong) equally distributed across each condition. None of the verification items included pronominal elements. In addition to the 120 experimental items, 120 filler sentences and verification items were constructed. All sentences were matched for total length. A script of 240 sentences was then created, where the ordering between conditions was counterbalanced and pseudo-randomized, and two versions with distinct sequences were prepared to avoid processing confounds on the basis of sequencing effects. The final script was presented in 8 blocks of 30 items each, with brief breaks between blocks.

6.3.4.  Predictions The study of the different discourse mechanisms was approached from two different angles. First, the processes required for the formation of pronominal dependency were compared to the introduction of a new discourse entity. This contrast served to identify effects particular to the establishment of a discourse dependency and the integration with discourse-old information. Second, the two dependency mechanisms were contrasted with each other. As for the first comparisons (proper name vs. pronoun and proper name vs. logophor), the proper name condition introduces a discourse-new referent. The economy hierarchy associated with the Syntax–Discourse Model as presented in chapter 3 does not address this particular discourse process, as it does not represent a dependency. However, on the basis of previous studies that report an advantage of given over new information (cf. e.g. Haviland and Clark 1974; Carpenter and Just 1977; Yekovich and Walker 1978; Yekovich et al. 1979), the introduction of a new referent is generally expected to be more expensive, due to the need to introduce and hold an additional discourse referent in the discourse space. Crucially, however, new proper names represent a uniquely identifiable referent, are not referentially deficient, and do not depend on a relationship with a previously given entity. Comparing these entities with logophors or pronouns should then shed light onto the process exclusively associated with the formation of a pronominal–antecedent dependency — here postulated to emerge as an N400-effect. This does not mean that the introduction of a new discourse referent comes for free. Rather, the creation of a file card for a new discourse entity is expected to be resolved earlier in

Event-related potentials

the time course than the formation of a dependency. Hence the prediction for the discourse-new proper name condition compared to the discourse-old pronoun and logophor conditions is that the proper name condition should elicit a more pronounced, earlier ERP component. In particular, a LAN effect is predicted to the proper name condition, in light of previous research that has identified this effect as an early correlate of discourse processing (cf. Streb et al. 1999; van Berkum et al. 1999).11 The introduction of new information can be considered more resource-demanding at this point, as a novel referent must be established and stored for further access. A more pronounced effect to a discourse-new entity is therefore hypothesized in the LAN window, which then can be taken to reflect mechanisms associated with initial file card creation. It is further conceivable that a later process might take effect, during which interpretation is completed and the new discourse referent is put in storage to make it available for subsequent coreference processes. Such a mechanism might then surface within the P600 window. As pointed out, a pronounced effect is also expected on the side of the pronominal–antecedent dependencies that require the integration of discourseold information in the contrast with discourse-new proper names. This effect is predicted to emerge after the creation of the file card. On the basis of the findings form Streb et al. (1999, 2004), I conjecture that the logophor and the pronoun conditions compared to the proper name condition elicit a later negativity (N400), which appears to be reflective of final discourse integration with the antecedent. It is hypothesized that at this point in the time-course of processing, the system completes the formation of the dependency, while the earlier LAN effect represents the initial connection with the discourse representation. The second comparison (pronoun vs. logophor) focuses on the entities requiring a discourse dependency, but which differ in terms of the nature of their file card representations and consequently of the available dependencies. The general hypothesis for this contrast is that if a difference obtains between these two conditions, it is associated with the distinct file card representations that the pronoun and the logophor carry. This distinction may result in processing difference associated with file card creation (i.e. in the LAN window) or dependency formation (i.e. in the N400 window), and it is most likely expected to emerge as a difference in the amplitude of the signal. More specifically, since experiment 1 revealed an effect of a discourse dependency in the LAN window, file card representations are predicted to be accessible at this point, and a difference between pronoun and logophor interpretation might already

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emerge around this time, reflecting distinct file card characteristics. Pronouns lack a heading in their file cards and are therefore ill-formed, which might cause a difference in the signal in response to the more demanding pronoun condition. If file card properties represent the critical contrast, an effect in the late window is not expected on the side of the pronoun, as the ill-formedness of the file card should be detected early in the time-course. In contrast, logophors and pronouns are subject to different dependency relations. Here, independent evidence from a reaction time study has shown that bridging of referential DPs is more costly than updating of discourse information via a cutand-paste operation (Acker and Boland 1993), which is also predicted by the Syntax–Discourse Model. Such a difference in the dependency process should then be most pronounced to the logophor and might further be observable as an amplitudinal difference in the N400, or possibly already in the LAN window, as an indicator of the more costly bridging operation. For these contrasts, the statistical analyses therefore focused on the temporal windows of 350–500 msecs (LAN window) and 400–600 msecs (N400 window). Since the P600 has been hypothesized as a general index of the interpretation of referentiality and storage cost, analyses are also carried out for the window from 550–800 mscecs.

6.3.5.  Results 6.3.5.1.  Behavioral data The behavioral data reflect the responses to the verification task, which served the primary purpose of assuring that the participants were reading and comprehending the experimental items properly. Table 2 below presents the error percentages on the verification task, where error was defined in terms of giving a false response or failing to respond within 4000 msecs of the presentation of the verification sentence. Average error rates were obtained from 22 participants on the basis of 40 items per condition (See Table 2). Table 2.  Mean error rates on the verification task of experiment 2. Condition

Error Rate in percentage (and mean number of errors)

pn logo pro

4.51% (M=10.82, SE=1.04) 3.03% (M=7.27, SE=1.09) 3.29% (M=7.91, SE=0.89)

Event-related potentials 203

As in experiment 1, the proper name condition elicited the most errors to the verification task, and error rates were again higher on the incorrect verification sentences. An ANOVA for error rate by the three experimental conditions provided a main effect of condition (F (2, 63)= 3.469, p< .038). Paired comparisons revealed a significant difference between the proper name and logophor condition only (p=.049). The higher error rate on the pronoun condition suggests that these sentences were more resource-consuming, which indicates that the introduction of yet another referent in the sentence is costly. Overall, the behavioral data confirm that the participants were carrying out the comprehension task accurately. All trials that elicited a false or time-out response were excluded from the analysis of the ERP recordings.

6.3.5.2.  ERP recordings EEG and EOG recordings were filtered (30 Hz low pass filter) to reduce noise artifacts; they were screened offline for blinks and other ocular artifacts, electrode drifting, and muscle artifacts. A total of 19.74% trials had to be rejected due to excessive artifacts. Data from three participants had to be excluded entirely from further analysis, as their total number of analyzable items were below 25 items per condition, which was predetermined as the cutoff point for inclusion in the data analysis. ERPs were time-locked to the onset of the pronominal/proper name. ERP signals from 19 subjects were averaged, using a 200 msecs-prestimulus baseline. Repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed on the mean ERP amplitudes in previously determined temporal windows with the factor pronominal type (pn/logo/pro). ERPs were analyzed separately for midline and lateral sites. The analysis of the midline electrodes included the factor electrode with the three midline electrodes as separate levels (FZ, CZ, PZ). The lateral analysis was carried out on four quadrants with the factor roi: left anterior (FP1, F3, F7), right anterior (FP2, F4, F8), left posterior (P3, P7, O1), and right posterior (P4, P8, O2), and these comparisons further included the factors region (anterior/posterior) and hemisphere (left/right). Huynh-Feldt corrected p-values are reported to control for type I errors whenever there was more than one degree of freedom in the numerator (Huynh and Feldt 1970). Additional planned comparisons were only carried out to resolve the ANOVAs whenever they elicited a main effect or interaction. 6.3.5.2.1.  Discourse-new vs. discourse-old ERPs for the contrast between proper names that symbolize discourse-new

204 The syntax–discourse interface

Figure 4.  Grand average ERPs (n=19) measured to the onset of the critical logophor (solid line) and proper name (dotted line). Window presentation spans from a 100 msecs prestimulus baseline to 1000 msecs. Negative voltage is plotted up. Logophors registered an N400 (e.g. exemplified at P4), while new proper names elicited a LAN (e.g. at F3) followed by a P600.

e­ ntities and pronouns and logophors that require a dependency with a discourse-old antecedent are illustrated below. Figure 4 shows ERPs recorded to the onset of the proper name condition (dotted line) and the logophor condition (solid line); figure 5 represents the contrast proper name condition (dotted line) and pronoun condition (solid line). The figures indicate a dissociation of ERP effects between discourse-new and discourse-old entities, regardless of the nature of the pronominal, which is confirmed by statistical analyses. Upon visual inspection and on the basis of previous findings, the window between 350–500 msecs was determined for the investigation of the LAN effect.12 There was an interaction of pronominal type x electrode for the midline ANOVA (F (4, 72)=3.741, p< .02, MSE=2.87) in this time window. Planned comparisons revealed a marginal difference between the proper name con-

Event-related potentials

dition and the logophor condition at FZ (t(18)=−1.915, p=.072). For the lateral ANOVA, an interaction of pronominal type x region (F (2, 36)=7.155, p<.003, MSE=1.79) and pronominal type x roi (F(6, 108)=4.769, p < .001, MSE=2.46) emerged. Planned comparisons revealed a statistically significant difference in the left anterior region reflecting a negativity to the discoursenew proper name condition in both contrasts: proper name vs. pronoun (t(18)=−2.567, p< .02) and proper name vs. logophor (t(18)=−2.231, p < .04). This indicates that there is a difference between the introduction of a discoursenew referent and the integration of discourse-old information, which is reflected in a negative amplitude peaking around 350 msecs that is further subject to processes associated with the left anterior region.

Figure 5.  Grand average ERPs (n=19) measured to the onset of the critical pronoun (solid line) and proper name (dotted line). Window presentation spans from 100 msecs prestimulus until 1000 msecs post-stimulus. Negative voltage is plotted up. Pronouns show an N400 (e.g. illustrated at P4), while new proper names show an enhanced LAN (e.g. at F7) followed by a P600 (e.g. at P3).

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A midline ANOVA for the 400–600 msecs time window (N400) — showed a significant interaction of pronominal type x electrode (F (4, 72)=5.945, p <.002, MSE=2.85). This was resolved in pairwise comparisons, which elicited a significant difference at PZ between the discourse-old conditions and the discourse-new proper name condition, which is reflected in a more pronounced negativity in the pronoun condition compared to the proper name condition (t(18)=2.428, p< .026) and the logophor condition compared to the proper name condition (t(18)=2.787, p< .012). The lateral analyses revealed significant interactions of pronominal type x region (F (2, 36)=9.429, p <.001, MSE=2.14) and pronominal type x roi (F(6, 108)=5.886, p < .000, MSE=3.52), which also indicate that the two discourse-old conditions evoke a significant negative potential over the discourse-new condition in this time window. Planned comparisons support this and show a significant difference for the two posterior rois separately and for all posterior sites: proper name vs. pronoun (posterior: t(18)=2.604, p < .02) and proper name vs. logophor (posterior: t(18)=3.661, p < .002). These differences indicate that in the later time window with an onset latency of approximately 400 msecs, an effect is observable that can be attributed to the pronominal entities demanding the establishment of a discourse dependency and hence requiring access to discourse-old information. Finally, an ANOVA for the P600 window (550–800 msecs) over midline electrodes revealed a protype x electrode interaction (F (4, 72)=3.777, p <.019, MSE=3.10). This was resolved by main effects between proper name vs. pronoun at CZ (t(18)=2.60, p=.018) and at PZ (t(18)=3.15, p=.005). Statistical analyses over lateral sites showed main effects of region (p< .031) and roi (p<.008), as well as interactions of protype x region (F(2, 36)=5.839, p <.008, MSE=2.25) and protype x roi (F (6, 108)=3.310, p< .021, MSE=4.84). Pairwise comparisons revealed significant differences over posterior sites for proper name vs. pronoun (left-posterior: t(18)=2.77, p< .012, right-posterior: t(18)=3.14, p < .006) and proper name vs. logophor (left-posterior: t(18)=2.11, p < .049, right-posterior: t(18)=2.26, p< .036), which reflect pronounced positivities to the proper name condition. This experiment has identified three distinct ERP components relating to discourse processing as a function of the old-new distinction: a left anterior negativity proceeded by a posterior positivity associated with the establishment of a discourse-new referent and a bilateral posterior negativity around 400 msecs connected to the processing of pronominals that must enter into a discourse dependency with their antecedents. The general difference between

Event-related potentials 207

Figure 6.  Grand average ERPs (n=19) measured to the onset of the critical logophor (solid line) and proper name (dotted line) in experiment 1. Window presentation spans from 100 msecs pre-stimulus to 1000 msecs. Negative voltage is plotted up. Logophors show an N400 (at P3); new proper names registered a significant anterior negativity (as exemplified at F3) and a P600 (e.g. at P3).

discourse-new and discourse-old entities was also replicated in the immediate contrast between proper name and logophor condition recorded for experiment 1. Planned comparisons between these two conditions in the LAN window confirmed this effect and yielded a statistically significant effect at left anterior sites (p < .022) as well as at right anterior sites (p< .046). Furthermore, the N400 effect to the logophor was registered very locally at electrode P3, which appears to overlap with the P600 to the new proper name. Figure 6 illustrates this contrast. 6.3.5.2.2.  Cut-and-paste vs. bridging Event-related potentials for the direct comparison of logophors (dotted line) and pronouns (solid line) are shown in figure 7. Pairwise analyses in the three

208 The syntax–discourse interface

time windows of interest (for ANOVAs see 6.3.5.2.1) revealed a significant effect at FZ in the 350–500 msecs window (t(18)=−2.174, p < .043), reflecting a negativity to the pronoun condition over the logophor condition, but no difference in the lateral analysis. No statistically significant difference was registered in the N400 window, nor in the P600 window. These effects suggest that the crucial factor distinguishing the pronouns from logophors is their file card representation, which was predicted to be formed in the LAN window, while they appear to be subject to the same processes in the other windows of interest. The negativity to the pronoun might further be a reflection of the lack of a heading on the pronoun’s file card. In passing, I want to point out that figure 7 reveals another difference between these two conditions: an anterior positivity between 200 and 300 msecs

Figure 7.  Grand average ERPs (n=19) measured to the onset of the critical logophor (dotted line) and pronoun (solid line). Window presentation spans from 100 msecs before the logophor/pronoun to 1000 msecs after. Negative voltage is plotted up. Pronouns registered a significantly more pronounced negativity compared to logophors (at FZ), and logophors show an earlier positivity between 200 and 300 msecs.

Event-related potentials 209

to the logophor condition. Next, I briefly speculate on the possible source of this effect. An ANOVA in the 200–300 msecs window showed a significant effect of electrode (p < .007), which was resolved with a significantly more pronounced positivity to the logophor condition at FZ (t(18)=−2.47, p < .024). The lateral analysis registered a main effect of region (p < .000) and roi (p< .000). Pairwise comparisons revealed a significant difference in the left anterior region (t(18)= −2.231, p < .04). There are two possible explanations for this effect, but more research is definitely required to reach a conclusive answer. The more interesting explanation might be that the early positivity is linked to the bridging dependency due to the presence of the self-heading. However, it is also possible that the effect reflects a P200-like component, which has been observed in response to visual feature encoding, but also with respect to more general processes relating to attentional resources (cf. e.g. Hackley et al. 1990; Luck and Hillyard 1994; Dunn et al. 1998, and references therein). In this respect, the positivity might just reflect the length difference between the critical items in these two conditions. For future research, variation of the presentation rate might therefore yield insights into the contribution of a P200-like effect.

6.3.6.  Discussion The objectives of experiment 2 were to investigate the temporal properties of discourse-internal processes and to further explore the nature of the LAN effect. Across time, three core mechanisms were proposed: first, the creation of a file card in the discourse representation, second, the establishment of a dependency (if required by the system), and third, the interpretation of referentiality and storage. The first effect is expected to emerge shortly after the syntactic representation has been checked, as the merging of a DP immediately triggers the creation of a file card. An effect of file card creation was therefore predicted in the second phase of Friederici’s (1999) model, similar to the LAN observed around approximately 300–500 msecs. The second effect was hypothesized to occur subsequently, possibly as an N400, which has previsouly been connected with dependency formation. The third effect was postulated to resemble the P600, which is associated with processes of final integration, during which prior information is checked for consistency. Previous research has identified the LAN as a correlate of early discourse processing (in e.g. van Berkum et al. 1999; Streb et al 1999; Streb 2000), and the evidence suggests that at this point, file card representations are available

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and discourse integration is initiated — as evidenced by a more pronounced LAN to entities for which more than one discourse referent is available, as well as for pronouns (compared to repeated proper names) whose file cards do not conform to general discourse constraints. For the present comparison, a more pronounced LAN was predicted first and foremost for the proper name condition, given that the introduction of a new discourse referent is predicted to be resolved early in the time course, since the proper name provides sufficient information for referring and no dependency relation need be established. This prediction was borne out by the ERP recordings. A left anterior negativity was observed between 350 and 500 msecs for the proper name condition in both contrasts, suggesting that discourse integration required for the establishment of a new discourse referent already takes place within this time window. In addition, a posterior positivity (P600) was observed for the proper name condition with an onset latency around 550 msecs, indicating that interpretive mechanisms pertaining to the new referent have been completely resolved at this point. This second component to the proper name condition indicates that the discourse-new entity requires additional processing resources, which could be viewed as additional integration and storage cost elicited by the introduction of a new discourse referent. The behavioral data that revealed more difficulties in the proper name condition support this view, as well as ERP findings from the interpretation of pronouns that lack a proper antecedent in the immediate sentential context (11a), which elicited a late positivity compared to pronouns with a licensing local antecedent (11b) (see Burkhardt and Piñango 2003). The positivity in this contrast is interpreted as a marker for the failure to establish a dependency with a discourse-old entity: (11) a. Nathani mentioned that a tall boy had introduced her*i/j b. Marthai mentioned that a tall boy had introduced heri/j Generally, the LAN-P600 pattern of the interpretation of new proper names provides new evidence for the claim that the integration of new information is more resource-consuming than that of given information (cf. Haviland and Clark 1974; Yekovich and Walker 1978; inter alia). In contrast, interpretation of pronominals does not appear to be completed in the early LAN window, as both logophors and pronouns elicited a posterior negativity, which resembles the N400 component. I interpret this effect as a finalizing step in the formation of the dependency between the pronominal and its antecedent. So while the discourse operation observed as a LAN might be more closely associated with the structure of the file card and its

Event-related potentials

well-formedness and the (preliminary) search for a discourse referent, the discourse operation associated with the N400 completes the formation of a dependency between the pronominal and its antecedent and the associated transfer of information. In addition, this later negativity — observed in experiment 2, as well as in Streb et al. (1999, 2004) — might be an electrical potential specific to pronominal–antecedent dependencies; but at this point, this is just a speculation, and future research should address whether this component is for instance also observable in other dependency relationships (e.g. full DPs that require bridging). I do not claim however that pronominals are not subject to processes in the LAN window, rather, the claim is that within this window, discourse-new proper name resolution exerts overall more processing cost than pronouns or logophors. Crucially, Streb et al. (1999) report an anterior negativity to the pronoun condition over the repetition of a proper name; this indicates that in this contrast, pronouns do exert more cost in this phase than repetitions, which can be explained on the basis of the observation that a repeated proper name carries a file card with a uniquely identifiable discourse referent as its heading (at least in the study by Streb et al. (1999), which used unambiguous referents); discourse integration difficulties are therefore not expected — in contrast to the ill-formed file card of the pronoun. In addition, the contrast between pronouns and logophors in experiment 2 registered a significantly more pronounced negativity to the pronoun condition (at FZ only), and experiment 1 elicited a LAN to the logophor condition over the coargument condition. The findings with respect to the LAN therefore suggest that in this window, a new discourse referent must establish its discourse status, which can take place as soon as the corresponding file card is created, and furthermore, that the LAN effect appears to reflect at least partially processes of the integration with discourse-old information, as the findings from the pronoun condition suggest that the ill-formed file card representation imposes additional effort unto the system during the search for a potential referent (cf. ambiguous referents in van Berkum et al. 1999). The observed difference between the pronoun and the logophor condition thus seems to reflect the structural difference of the different file card representations. The prediction of the dependency hierarchy that a bridging relation is more costly than a cut-and-paste relation could not be supported on the basis of the current ERP data. However, more research is needed to investigate this question in more detail, also with respect to the early positivity to the logophor condition discussed above, which gives rise to additional questions for future research.

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6.4.  General discussion: ERP recordings The ERP data presented in this chapter addressed a number of predictions posited by the Syntax–Discourse Model for the time course of processing during the establishment of coreference. Specifically, correlates in different phases of the neurocognitive model of comprehension (Friederici 1999, 2002) have been identified to be relevant to processes at the syntax–discourse interface. In phase 1, which is associated with initial structure building, no effect is observed. In phase 2, which is related to extra-syntactic processes, a pronounced left anterior negativity (roughly between 300–500 msecs) is found most pronouncedly for discourse-new entities, which establish their discourse representation within this temporal window, as well as for discourse-old entities indicative of the search of the discourse space. Moreover, this effect is generally interpreted as an indication of the creation of a file card (i.e. the establishment of a discourse referent). In contrast, file cards that must enter into a dependency with another referent are subject to additional processing, which is associated with processes of integration. A posterior negativity (400–600 msecs) is observed for the pronoun and logophor condition, which suggests that at this point the dependency between the antecedent and the pronominal is completed. New proper names further elicit additional processing cost in the third phase, as evidenced by a posterior positivity between 550–800 msecs, indicating integration of a new discourse referent. This time course of processing confirms the general predictions made by the Syntax–Discourse Model, if cost is interpreted in terms of a combination of both difference in amplitude and difference across time. The findings support the claim that syntactic dependencies are the most economical as the coargument reflexives do not elicit a pronounced effect, while all the processes associated with the formation of a discourse dependencies take effect further downstream. The ERP evidence also speaks to the contrast between forming a dependency via a cut-and-paste operation or via a bridging operation. The comparison of pronouns and logophors requires the introduction of two dissimilar file card representations, where the former is ill-formed and the latter is wellformed according to general discourse rules. The results therefore cannot definitely be attributed to the functional difference. The anterior negativity to the pronoun is viewed as a reflection of the ill-formedness of the corresponding file card, which makes discourse integration more difficult. Final discourse

Event-related potentials

integration of both entities occurs in the N400 window. However, further research seems to be required to gain more information about the distinction between the two discourse operations. Overall, the findings from the two ERP experiments support the distinction between syntactic and discourse-based dependencies formulated by the Syntax–Discourse Model for the establishment of coreference. They further provide evidence for a dissociation of discourse-internal processes on the basis of discourse-new vs. discourse-old information.

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Chapter 7

The syntax–discourse interface: Representation and processing

The goal of this monograph was to propose a model for the establishment of pronominal–antecedent dependencies that accounts for the mechanisms available to different pronominal entities and at the same time finds its correspondence in language processing. To this end, I formulated the Syntax– Discourse Model, from which an economy-based dependency hierarchy follows, and carried out a series of psycho- and neurolinguistic experiments to test the economy-based predictions made by the Model. The Syntax–Discourse Model attempts to capture various mechanisms that appear to be required for the establishment of dependency by postulating a division of labor between processes in the computational system C­HL on the one hand, and processes at the level of discourse representation on the other (cf. also Avrutin 1999, 2004; Reuland 2001). This collaboration between two distinct levels of representation during interpretation was motivated by the observation that previous unimodular approaches have not been able to account for the various distributional properties of referentially dependent elements. As pointed out in chapter 2, the syntax-only approaches generally formulate powerful constraints on the interpretation of reflexive elements, but they face difficulties in explaining the phenomenon of logophoricity or referent selection in the case of pronoun interpretation with an extra-sentential antecedent. In particular, the observation that logophors pattern with pronouns in a number of aspects is not captured by most of these approaches. In contrast, some of the discourse-only approaches appear to lack power when it comes to justifying the distribution of reflexives or even distinguishing between pronominal types, while they make stronger predictions for other kinds of coreferential relations. These observations suggest that an approach to the establishment of pronominal–antecedent dependencies that postulates two distinct levels of representation is desirable. The Syntax–Discourse Model was therefore proposed in response to the first main concern addressed in the present research: how to formally characterize the differences between pronominal elements and the processes underly-

The syntax–discourse interface

ing their interpretation. Essentially, the model distinguishes between syntactic and discourse dependencies. The former are licensed by the structural presence of a coargument relation and the conditions on reflexive-marking, which capture the locality requirements ascribed to coargument reflexive interpretation. In the absence of these properties, discourse dependencies are required to satisfy the pronominal’s need for a referent. Syntax and discourse representation connect with each other as soon as a DP is formed, which triggers the creation of a file card. The possible discourse operations that are available are a function of the file card representation of the pronominal (i.e. the status of its heading, where absence of a heading yields a cut-and-paste operation and presence of a (self-)heading requires a bridging operation). Discourse processes are further claimed to be dependent on the file card representation of the antecedent (i.e. the status of referentiality as well as quantification). The possible combinations of pronominal–antecedent dependencies were then assessed with respect to the processing cost they might exert and an economy-based hierarchy of dependencies was proposed, where the establishment of a syntactic dependency is considered the most economical resolution process and the different mechanisms to form a discourse dependency have been proposed in accordance with the two-dimensional space depicted in Figure 1. The second main concern of this work was to test this dependency hierarchy on the basis of data from real time processing of coargument reflexives, logophors, and ordinary pronouns and to determine the temporal and architec-

Antecedent’s file card

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Referential, Quantified Referential Non-Referential

[+Refl]

Cut and Paste

Bridging

Pronominal’s file card

Figure 1.  Cost-based hierarchy of pronominal–antecedent dependencies

Representation and processing

tural correlates of pronominal–antecedent relations. This was done primarily through the investigation of logophoricity, as it represents a special test case for the Syntax–Discourse Model. Firstly, it symbolizes a phenomenon of reflexive–antecedent relations that has been an unresolved issue for the syntaxonly approaches for a long time, and this investigation was therefore also motivated by the desire to contribute to this ongoing debate. Logophoricity has secondly been argued to require extra-syntactic information during interpretation. Third, as the internal structure of a logophor is identical with that of a (coargument) reflexive (at least in the languages tested here), which is considered to require only syntactic information for interpretation, this pair presented a sound contrast for present purposes. Logophor interpretation therefore represented a crucial starting point for the investigation of pronominal–antecedent dependencies at the syntax–discourse interface. The contrast between logophors and reflexives was tested in all three paradigms discussed in the previous chapters. The CMLD interference experiments in English and Dutch revealed a significantly higher reaction time to the logophor condition (measured immediately after the reflexive), which is interpreted as an indicator of increased processing demands. In addition, the two languages differ with respect to the internal structure and hence the file card representation of the respective pronominal (self-anaphor vs. se-anaphor), but crucially this did not impact the overall finding that the discourse dependency required for the logophor is less economical than the syntactic dependency for the coargument reflexive. The increase in processing demands is taken as evidence for the extra-syntactic nature of logophor interpretation. The reaction time results hence strengthen the argument for a division of labor between syntax and discourse. Next I explored the role of syntactic structure during reflexive interpretation by investigating the comprehension of Broca’s aphasia patients, whose deficit can be characterized as one of slowed-down syntactic structure formation. In a CMLD interference study, these patients showed a higher reaction time to the logophor condition at a delayed point of 600 msecs after the reflexive. This delay was predicted on the basis of the Slow-Syntax Hypothesis and under the assumption that syntactic structure must be fully formed to determine the presence or absence of coargumenthood during the interpretation of coargument reflexives and logophors respectively. The findings from Broca’s aphasia comprehension therefore also support the dependency hierarchy, and further substantiate the claim that syntactic structure must be in place before a dependency (whether syntax- or discourse-based) can be formed.

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The syntax–discourse interface

Finally, I was interested in a finer-grained representation of the temporal properties of dependency formation. To this end, ERP measures were recorded, which are known for their excellent temporal resolution. The ERP results reveal a LAN effect to the logophor condition, which has previously been interpreted as a correlate of discourse processing. The emergence of a LAN is here interpreted as an index of the process of file card creation. In addition, the ERP findings demonstrate that logophors pattern with pronouns, which is another indication that the observed effect to the logophors is a correlate of discourse processing. No specific effect was observed to the coargument reflexive condition, which provides further support for a syntactic dependency to be less costly. Together with the findings from Harris et al. (2000) that indicate that coargument reflexives — and critically not logophors — are subject to syntactic processes, the LAN to the logophor condition presents new evidence for the discourse nature of logophor interpretation. As far as the coargument reflexive — logophor contrast is concerned, the ERP results along with the Broca’s aphasia evidence suggest that syntactic structure formation represents a prerequisite to any kind of (pronominal) dependency and that discourse processing takes place subsequently. Overall, the results from all three paradigms converge and support a view where logophor interpretation is more costly than coargument reflexive interpretation. The data also speak to the claim that these two entities are subject to operations at separate levels of the language faculty (cf. also Harris et al. 2000): first, the fact that logophors elicit a LAN component and crucially also elicit a later N400 (tested in ERP experiment 2), which is interpreted as discourse integration and dependency formation, support the discourse-basis of this dependency, as pronouns — which pattern with logophors — register the same negativities. Second, the CMLD paradigm has been shown to be revealing of extra-syntactic cost, and hence serves to distinguish between syntactic and discourse dependencies. The following additional mechanisms have been investigated to shed further light onto dependencies that take place at the discourse level proper. First, pronominal interpretation is not only dependent on the phrase-structural configuration (i.e. presence or absence of coargumenthood) but is also a function of the file card representation of the pronominal and of the antecedent alike. As for the effect of the antecedent, evidence was presented from the processing of pronouns with a referential and a quantified antecedent. The Syntax–Discourse Model predicts increasing processing cost for non-referential, referential, and referential quantified antecedents. A CMLD study of English (non-referential

Representation and processing

everyone vs. referential DP) revealed significantly more processing demands for the referential antecedent. In addition, the CMLD experiment discussed here for Dutch (referential DP vs. referential quantified iedereen) showed a higher reaction time to the referential quantifier. These findings proved to be consistent with the claims made by the dependency hierarchy. Second, pronominal interpretation — or discourse processing, for that matter — is also hypothesized to be a function of the file card representation of the element to be integrated. ERP data from the processing of pronouns, logophors, and discourse-new proper names support this. The file card corresponding to a discourse-new proper name is well-formed in and of itself. The file card of a logophor is well-formed in terms of having a frame and a heading, but the heading is a variable that requires a bridging dependency. Finally, the pronoun’s file card is ill-formed as it lacks a heading and requires the establishment of a cut-and-paste dependency. ERP correlates suggest that well-formed entities that do not require a dependency are initially integrated before entities that require a dependency (as evidenced by a more pronounced LAN to the proper name vs. an N400 to the pronominal conditions), and exert further cost during final interpretation of referentiality (indicated by the P600 to the new proper names). The ERPs further demonstrate that in the case of referentially dependent file cards, a (temporarily) ill-formed file card evokes a more pronounced potential (LAN) over a well-formed file card during the process hypothesized to reflect file card creation. To conclude, in my view, this work has made three major contributions to the study of pronominal dependencies. First, following the model proposed by Avrutin (1999, et seq.), I have presented a model of pronominal–antecedent relations that attempts to match representational properties with processing patterns. Second, the results have contributed to the debate over the nature of pronominal relations by providing support from processing for a model that incorporates both syntax and discourse correspondences. The findings therefore converge with the claims made in the acquisition literature (see chapter 1) and support those frameworks that call for the involvement of (at least) two levels of representation during the establishment of dependencies. And third, I have investigated the processes underlying pronominal–antecedent relations through the window of different experimental techniques that inform different aspects of processing, but critically converge. Overall, the experimental evidence seems to suggest a dissociation of three stages (or processes) during the establishment of dependencies: an initial stage, during which coargumenthood considerations are checked, that either yields

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220 The syntax–discourse interface

the establishment of a syntactic dependency or licenses a discourse dependency; a second stage, which reflects the formation of a file card representation and the checking of its well-formedness; and a third stage, during which the pronominal–antecedent dependency is finalized. In the case of the interpretation of discourse-new information, a fourth stage comes in effect, which marks the completion of integration and storage of a discourse entity for possible subsequent access. Evidence for the first stage (coargumenthood) is provided most prominently by the comprehension data from Broca’s aphasia patients that indicate the predominance of syntactic structure information, but also by the overall finding that coargument reflexive interpretation is the most economical dependency. The second stage (formation of a file card) is supported by the ERP responses in the LAN window. The pronounced effect to the proper name condition further suggests that discourse integration and file card interpretation takes place in this stage. Converging evidence also comes from the cost observed in the CMLD studies. Finally, the N400 to the logophor and pronoun conditions speaks to a third phase (dependency). The CMLD findings from age-matched control subjects at 600 msecs, which demonstrated no significant effect, further indicate that the dependency is no longer activated at this point and has been interpreted at an earlier point in time (i.e. in the third phase). In terms of the fourth stage (referentiality and storage), the P600 to the new proper name condition suggests that integration (of new discourse referents) is finalized at this point. The Syntax–Discourse Model together with the multifaceted supporting evidence from sentence processing represent a new approach to the study of dependency. Up to this point, the level at which dependency is established, the internal structure of dependent elements and their antecedents, and the ensuing discourse operations have been shown to impact the interpretation of different kinds of pronominal–antecedent relations. The distinct processes and the proposed dependency hierarchy can therefore guide further research to deepen our understanding of dependency and to look beyond the dependency relations investigated here.

Notes Chapter 1 1.  The term ‘pronominals’ is here used in a non-restrictive sense (contra Chomsky 1981 and related work), and includes anaphors (i.e. reflexives and reciprocals) and non-reflexive pronouns. 2.  Here and in the following, I indicate coreference between two entities by subscripts. This is intended as a notational marker only and does not specify indexation in its technical sense — such as in e.g. Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981, 1986), where it was proposed that each DP is inserted into the phrase structure with a subscript (i.e. an index). 3.  The conceptual system is not well understood, but it is an area that receives growing consideration in both linguistic and psychological research. It is generally viewed as a non-linguistic encoding system that is responsible for the formation of intentions and reasoning, and serves to facilitate interpretation in context by making available pragmatic and world knowledge (cf. e.g. Jackendoff 1997; Avrutin 1999, et seq.) 4.  I say ‘mostly unambiguous’ as — in contrast to reflexive interpretation as in Henrietta­i adores herselfi — certain uses of pronouns can be ambiguous between two or more potential referents (e.g. Keni said that Ronj believed that Ruthk liked himi/j/*k/l [him=Ken or Ron or any potential extra-sentential male referent]). But even in those cases, language users exhibit strong preferences towards one or the other reading guided by principles like the ‘parallel function strategy’ (e.g. Sheldon 1974), the ‘first mention strategy’ (e.g. Gernsbacher 1990), or the ‘prominence strategy’ (e.g. Sidner 1983a, b; Grosz et al. 1983). 5.  ‘Coargumenthood’ is generally understood as a condition on predicates where two arguments that share the same predicate are in a co-argument relation. Nevertheless, coargument­ hood is here viewed as a syntax-based principle, as it operates on phrase-structural relations between two entities. 6.  The terms ‘Conceptual–Intentional (C-I) interface’ (e.g. Chomsky 1995; Jackendoff 1997), ‘information structure’ (e.g. Lambrecht 1994), ‘information packaging’ (e.g. Chafe 1976; Prince 1981a), or ‘informatics’ (e.g. Vallduví 1992) have also been used in the literature to signify processes associated with maintaining information about discourse referents, event structure, etc. Here, I refer to this level of representation as ‘discourse’. Furthermore, discourse is understood as an interface module that connects the syntactic system and the conceptual system. 7.  There are additional advantages of implementing Reinhart and Reuland’s (1993) account, which are discussed in section 3.1.1. 8.  These phenomena are considered discourse-based as they relate to the representation of discourse referents and event structure: Bridging (cf. Clark 1975) is a process where a newly introduced, definite DP (the brakes) must be linked (‘bridged’) to an already existing referent (an old bike) by invoking inferential knowledge (here, of the relation between whole and part):

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Notes

(i)

Geoff rode an old bike. The brakes were horrible.

So-called d(isCourse)-linked wh-phrases (cf. Pesetsky 1987) also require the availability of presuppositions (e.g. presupposing a set of bikes):

(ii) Which bike did you ride?

determiners (which can be omitted in child language) and tense nodes (which are absent in so-called root infinitives) are understood as the linkage between syntax and discourse, as determiners introduce discourse referents and tense markers introduce events. Similarly, while the ellipsis in (iii) allows a ‘sloppy’ (the janitor touched a different lion) and a ‘strict’ reading (the janitor touched the same lion), (iv) only allows a strict reading:

(iii) The vet touched a lion, and the janitor did, too. (iv) The vet touched the lion, and the janitor did, too.

However, children prefer a sloppy reading for both constructions. This suggests that children do not interpret the definite article in (iv) and the associated specificity properly, as they accept a non-specific reading, which also indicates difficulties with respect to the discourse representation. 9.  In particular, children allow a coreferential interpretation of pronouns with a local (i.e. ccommanding or coargument) antecedent, such as him=Ben in (i):

(i)

Ben is washing him.

10.  The work presented here concentrates on syntactic and discourse dependencies. However, a dependency can also be established in the lexicon — for instance via a lexicon operation of internal role reduction (e.g. Reinhart 2000, 2002) — and dependencies formed in the lexicon are considered more economical than dependencies established in syntax (cf. Reuland 2003).

Chapter 2 1.  Conceptual structure is viewed as a system of mental representation that is not languagespecific, but represents a general module of the human mind (e.g. Jackendoff 1983). 2.  In the literature, the term ‘anaphoric relations’ is also used in a broader sense, signifying the general relationship between two elements, where the interpretation of one element (i.e. the anaphor) depends on another element (i.e. the antecedent). Within this broader definition, anaphors can be instantiated as any kind of pronominal element, as nominals (e.g. the book in (i)), or as wh-elements (e.g. who in (ii)):

(i) Kristen was reading ‘The Lord of the Ringsi’. The booki was mesmerizing. (ii) Will met a former roommatei at a coffee shop. Whoi did Will meet?

3.  The formulation of Chomsky’s Binding Theory framework as presented herein was preceded by a series of publications on pronominal–antecedent relations. For instance, Chomsky (1980) introduced a complex indexing system to account for differences in pronominal types (where the indices were also seen as links to the referring discourse entities). However, these accounts were modified and refined and the Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981) has received most recognition. 4.  There is quite some speaker variation when it comes to the interpretation of sig in this ex-

Notes ample. In general, native speakers always allow a coreferential interpretation with the higher subject Anna (which is the crucial counterexample to principle A of the Binding Theory). Note, however, that for some speakers, Þig (‘you’) serves as an additional possible antecedent of sig (e.g. Roberts 1997: 160). 5.  In those cases where DPs and VPs function as subjectless domains, the following variations are allowed (see Hestvik 1991 for a discussion of these facts): (i) Johni likes most stories about himselfi (ii) Johni likes most stories about himi (iii) Johni sendte *segi/seg selvi en katalog John sent refl/himself a catalogue (iv) Johni fikk sendt segi/seg selvi en katalog John got sent refl/himself a catalogue 6.  See Hestvik (1992) and Pica (1987, 1991) for an explanation of subject- and anti-subject-orientation across languages on the basis of the internal structure of pronominals (i.e. X°- vs. XP-elements). 7.  Under frameworks adopting the split-Infl hypothesis (e.g. Pollock 1989; Kayne 1989), the reflexive moves to AgrS°; see for instance, Hestvik and Philip (2001). 8.  As will be seen later, treating the representation of these two reflexive entities (i.e. reflexives and logophors) alike, forms a disparity to findings from sentence processing and acquisition that report significant differences between the interpretation of reflexives and logophors (e.g. Avrutin and Cunningham 1997; Harris et al. 2000; chapters 4–6 here). 9.  BT-compatibility is defined along the following terms: “An indexing I is BT-compatible for an anaphor if the anaphor is bound under I, and BT-compatible for a pronoun if the pronoun is free under I.” (Chomsky 1986: 170) 10.  Note that the proposal by Hestvik (1991, 1992) responds to both of these problems. However, as alluded to in footnote 9, the solution that both reflexive and logophor interpretation are subject to LF-movement is incompatible with findings from psycholinguistic studies. 11.  Lasnik’s observations are based on a distinction between overt and covert movement, where covert (LF) operations involve formal features alone, but “[t]hese feature movement operations ‘leave behind’ the semantic aspects of nominal expressions crucial to anaphora. Thus, anaphoric connection is determined at LF, but it is as if it is determined at ‘S-structure.’ ” (Lasnik 2003: 42) 12.  So in contrast to the previous (phrase-)structural accounts that largely deny the need for a discourse module, the accounts associated with Reinhart’s theory recognize the availability of discourse mechanisms for pronominal interpretation (at least to a certain degree). However, I chose to treat these approaches under the heading of structural accounts, as they are still largely couched within strictly (phrase-)structural considerations (i.e. c-command) and stand in stark contrast to the accounts outlined under discourse-based accounts in the next section, which do not incorporate phrase-structural dependencies. 13.  Reflexivity Theory is not the only account focusing on the role of the predicate and argument structure in the establishment of coreference. For instance Williams (1994, 2003), among others, develops a framework, where θ-roles are distinguished on the basis of the type of the element they are assigned to (i.e. reflexive, pronoun, or R-expression) and binding is essentially a matter of thematic role assignment.

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224 Notes 14.  Reinhart (2000, 2002) considers the cases of intrinsically reflexive predicates and analyzes them in terms of arity reduction (so-called self-function). An intrinsically reflexive predicate as in (23) is subject to an operation (which is either lexical or LF-syntactic, depending on language-specific requirements), where the internal argument is reduced. This results in the emergence of an intransitive predicate. In the example from German (23), sich remains overtly pronounced as a structural Case residue; but in English, for instance, purely intransitive predicates can be found, as in Max shaved. 15.  Note that here ‘coreference’ is used in its narrow sense as “the assignment of identical values to NPs with distinct syntactic indices” (Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993: 77). This diverges from the general definition of ‘coreference’ assumed throughout this book, where coreference indicates that two entities have the same referent (without invoking an indexing system). 16.  Reinhart (2000) revises this rule somewhat, but the essential observation that a bound variable interpretation is more economical than a coreference (covaluation) interpretation maintains. 17.  Another perspective on the availability of the two readings is discussed in Heim (1998) and Thornton and Wexler (1999) (and references therein). These authors interpret the (narrow) coreference interpretation as an instantiation of a guise, such that in (28) the pronoun does not directly refer to Alfred, but to the person Alfred considers to be a great cook. 18.  Accounts like the Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981) or Reflexivity Theory (Reinhart and Reuland 1991) that are based on phrase-structural relations have no means to predict who him in (i) refers to:

(i)

Billi mentioned that Johnj had heard that Megank was going to invite himi/j/l.

In contrast, the conditions proposed by the discourse-based theories can make predictions about the preferred antecedent, for example on the basis of its salience in the speech event (e.g. Sidner 1983a, b; Grosz et al. 1983) or on the basis of its referential weight (e.g. Givón 1983; Ariel 1990). 19.  For instance, Gordon et al. (1993) found in a self-paced reading task that referring to a center with a pronoun in a subsequent utterance resulted in faster reading times compared to repeating the name or description of a center. Likewise, Hudson-D’Zmura and Tanenhaus (1998) report that using a pronoun to refer to a previously established center elicits a faster reading time — i.e. is more preferred — than using a repeated name. In addition, they provide evidence for the prominence of antecedents in subject position over object position, which is also predicted by Centering Theory. 20.  The following examples illustrate the different kinds of familiarities (from Prince 1981a: 237):

(i) I bought a beautiful dress. [brand new] (ii) A rich guy I know bought a Cadillac. [anchored brand new] (iii) I went to the post office and the stupid clerk couldn’t find a stamp. [inferrable] (iv) Have you heard the incredible claim that the devil speaks English backwards? [containing inferrable] (v) Susie went to visit her grandmother and the sweet lady was making Peking Duck. [evoked] (vi) Lucky me just stepped in something. [situationally evoked]

Notes 21.  Inferrables like the stupid clerk in (iii) of n. 20 differ from Prince’s ‘new’ entities in that they are subject to a ‘bridging’ relation (see below) for proper integration into the discourse representation, e.g. the stupid clerk must be identified as being affiliated with the previously established entity the post office to yield a felicitous interpretation. This indicates that inferrables behave to a certain degree like discourse-old information (cf. definiteness), but they crucially represent newly introduced discourse referents and therefore pattern with Prince’s ‘new’ entities in this given–new distinction. 22.  This is certainly a correct assumption for the textually evoked entities, which, by definition, correspond to discourse-old entities. The case of the situationally evoked entities is less clear. These entities match up with first and second person reference, which are presupposed in a given situation and could thus be viewed as discourse-old information. The case of deictically introduced entities seems a little more intricate, as they could fall under evoked entities or possibly non-containing inferrables. Since deixis can relate to a discoursenew as well as a discourse-old entity, this ambiguity might need to be resolved on a case by case basis. Overall, a distinction between discourse-new and discourse-old information can then still be maintained. 23.  Ariel suggests that the Accessibility Hierarchy is available across languages, but that the ranking of the individual referring expression differs as a result of linguistic as well as social and cultural factors. Furthermore, memory and processing demands are viewed as a function of the degree of accessibility, which provide clear predictions for processing studies to verify the claims put forth in this theory. 24.  Note that structural accounts face the same problem, in that they also might not be able to exclusively identify a single acceptable antecedent. So in the end, a combination of syntactic and discourse-based theories seems to be the best approach to capture these phenomena. 25.  Languages — and even dialects and individuals — differ with respect to the exact nature of these discourse restrictions (e.g. Cole, Hermon, and Lee 2001). But in general, dependencies involving long-distance reflexives can be viewed in terms of perspective or prominence features. (An exception to this claim is discussed in Nichols (2001) with regard to long-distance reflexives in Chechen and Ingush. But these languages in turn satisfy the subject-requirement of the antecedent. In addition, the descriptive account presented there suggests that logophoric reflexives exist in addition to long-distance reflexives, which might explain the exceptional nature with regard to discourse functions.) 26.  In the following, the discussion focuses on logophors. But the proposals to capture logophor interpretation can be extended to long-distance reflexives. 27.  One proposal for formally encoding discourse functions is given in Sells (1987), using the model of Discourse Representation Theory, in which discourse structure includes reference markers and conditions on these markers. The latter symbolize the discourse functions. 28.  These authors do not explicitly formulate the claim that representational economy has reflexes in processing patterns, but they argue for a correspondence between representation (modules) and processing, and since economy is a core concept within representation its extension to processing appears feasible. In particular, the discussion in Reuland (2001, 2003) and the introduction of an economy hierarchy of dependencies seems to make this connection.

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226 Notes 29.  In the next chapter, I present a model of discourse representation that distinguishes between different types of antecedents on the basis of their referential properties (i.e. [+R] or [−R]). Within this framework, the bound variable dependency discussed with immediate relevance to Reinhart’s observations is limited to antecedents (quantifiers) that are non-referential [−R]. 30.  I do not claim that all discourse-based approaches reject the existence of syntactic principles — e.g. my discussion of Ariel (1990) above (cf. also Levinson 1987, et seq.; Huang 1991, et seq.) — but the accounts reviewed here largely focus on notions of accessibility or the given–new contrast, and furthermore are not primarily concerned with intrasentential dependencies. 31.  A similar structural minimal pair is given in Kuno (1987: 279, n. 18):

(i) My cousin Mabeli is absolutely eccentric. Shei has the craziest belief in herselfi. (about her self, her abilities and so forth.) (ii) My cousin Mabeli is absolutely eccentric. Shei has the wildest belief in heri. (about the world, people, etc.)

Here, interpretation depends on the status of the antecedent (Mabel), whose mental state is in focus in (i) where the reflexive is used, but not in (ii). Although Kuno mentions that a structural explanation has been provided for these examples on grounds of different constituent structures, such a justification is not generalizable to other occurrences of reflexives and pronouns. For instance, belief in herself in (i) forms a constituent, but in (iii), the letter to himself does not:

(iii) Johni addressed the letter to himselfi.

Hence, a discourse-based explanation appears to be justified for these examples. 32.  Agreement has not been mentioned so far in this discussion, but it is apparent that agreement between pronominal and antecedent is a crucial factor influencing antecedent selection (consider example (6) above). Notice however that this condition is not always met. Counterexamples are the generic use of they or she in contemporary English (see (i)) or the availability of a split antecedent (as in (ii)):

(i) Every politiciani hopes that theyi will win the election. (ii) The womani told the manj that theyij should leave.

Chapter 3 1.  Earlier versions of this model have been presented in Piñango et al. (2001) and subsequent work. 2.  What I label ‘syntactic dependency’ refers to an automatic process that is carried out within the computational system. 3.  The subject of an ECM construction (sich in (9a)) is considered an argument of the predicate (hörte), as the latter functions as Case assigner. Accordingly, the pronominal and the antecedent are in a coargument relationship. In German, the Chain condition then allows for a se-anaphor (and even the self-anaphor sich selbst), but crucially not for a pronoun. In English (10), the presence of a self-anaphor reflexive-marks the predicate and thus licenses an identity interpretation.

Notes 4.  Reuland (2001: 467) reformulates the Chain condition to adhere to minimalist terminology, but the underlying notions from A-Chains remain the same: (α, β) form a Chain if (a) β’s features have been (deleted by and) recovered from α, and (b) (α, β) meets standard conditions on chains such as uniformity, c-command, and locality. 5.  The self-anaphor sich selbst in (11a) is normally used in contrastive contexts or under focus considerations. A more detailed discussion of the role of self-anaphors follows below. But see also Reuland (2001) for a similar discussion with regard to Dutch zichzelf, where he considers zich to be subject to Chain formation, leaving behind the self-part. 6.  Note however that other models of discourse representation, such as Kamp and Reyle’s (1993) Discourse Representation Theory, could be employed to yield comparable dependency relations. 7.  As far as the temporal dimension of processing is concerned, this suggests that as early as a pronominal DP is merged, it seeks to enter into a dependency relation with its potential antecedent (cf. minimalist assumptions that all binding relations apply at LF (Chomsky 1995)). Findings from priming studies, where antecedent reactivation is observed immediately at the position of the pronominal, may be taken as supporting evidence for this (e.g. Nicol and Swinney 1989). Additional theoretical support for the claim that there is an immediate connection between syntax and discourse is provided by Barss’s (2003b) “Earliness of anaphoric relations” principle, which suggests that anaphoric dependencies are formed and filtered as early as possible in a derivation. He provides evidence form weak crossover cases and scope assignment to substantiate his claims that dependencies are established as early as possible, and crucially prior to LF. His principle is motivated by Pesetsky’s (1989) “Earliness Principle”, which imposes a hierarchy of levels of representation at which principles are successively formed. 8.  Concerning the distinction between definite and indefinite DPs, I follow Heim (1982) for the present illustration of syntax–discourse correspondences, where indefinite DPs (e.g. a book) introduce discourse-new entities and definite DPs (e.g. the book) corefer with discourse-old entities. This is not an entirely uncontroversial characterization of definiteness, which Heim acknowledges by including mechanisms to deal with ‘exceptional’ cases such as discourse-new definites (but see Abbott 2004 for a survey of other linguistic approaches to (in)definiteness and a series of further properties that have been employed in the literature to formally describe this distinction). Among others, it has been observed that indefinite DPs can have a specific or a non-specific reading (e.g. Fodor and Sag 1982). This distinction, however, does not have a bearing on the present approach, as the function of an indefinite DP is to introduce a new discourse referent, and information about the specificity of this entity comes from semantics or discourse-pragmatic considerations (e.g. speaker intention). In addition, there are definite DPs that act like indefinite DPs (i.e. introduce a new referent), and the system permits this if a process of inferential bridging is available (for a discussion of this process see above; consider also Prince’s (1981b) discussion of indefinite this). 9.  Here, I focus exclusively on accommodation by bridging, as this mechanism plays an important role in the model of pronominal interpretation. Cf. also Lewis (1979) and Lambrecht (1994) for a general account of accommodation for presuppositions that extends beyond bridging, as well as Poesio and Vieira (1998) for a corpus study of accommodation in English. 10.  Recent psycholinguistic evidence shows that inferential bridging of DPs follows discrete neural mechanisms, distinguishing between the actual bridging operation and the establish-

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Notes ment of an independent file card representation. Specifically, the availability of an inferentially licensed dependency facilitates interpretation prior to the required establishment of a new discourse referent — as evidenced by an attenuated N400 — indexing the formation of inferential, as well as coreferential dependency —followed by a P600 —indexing the establishment of a new discourse referent — during the recording of event-related brain potentials (Burkhardt 2005). 11.  Ultimately, this means that a discourse-old entity that qualifies for a bridging dependency does not have to be established verbally. It can be assumed that the actual situation in which a communicative exchange takes place has a discourse representation, which Avrutin (1999) refers to as ‘Situation Card’ (cf. Heim 1982: 384). The underlying notion is that an exchange never starts with an empty discourse representation, as speakers/hearers bring certain information with them — based on knowledge about the world, a particular community, the actual venue, etc. — which can be represented as a discourse-initial Situation Card. The postulation of such a card can then account for the definiteness of the weather in (i), the colloquium talk in (ii) (e.g. between two graduate students), occurrences of so-called reference transfer as the tonsillitis in (iii) (e.g. in a hospital setting — referring to a patient), or the puppy in (iv) if accompanied by pointing:

(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

The weather is so nice. Are you going to the colloquium talk? The tonsillitis wants some more ice cream. The puppy is adorable.

In addition, the file cards of the referents of first and second person pronominals (as well as deictically used third person pronominals) are also introduced through the Situation Card. 12.  Example from Larry Horn (personal communication). 13.  Similarly, there are event file cards where T° is not fully specified, as for instance in special registers like headline style in English (e.g. Grand jury to review bombing). One possible analysis of these events is that they have a weak frame. However more research is needed to understand the exact nature of these cases and their discourse representation. 14.  The research reported here focuses only on intrasentential pronominal–antecedent dependencies where the antecedent is unambiguously determinable on the basis of morphological feature matching. Therefore I am not committing to a particular framework of how an antecedent is chosen out of a large candidate set. The question how discourse prominence is encoded within the Syntax–Discourse Model is subject to future research. 15.  As will become apparent from the discussion in section 3.2.2, the reflexive structure in (i) does not present a counterexample to this, as in this latter case, a syntactic dependency is formed, which reflexive-marks the predicate and thus allows — or rather requires — the presence of only one uniquely identifiable referent in the event structure:

(i)

Lisa mentioned that Sarahi irritated herselfi.

16.  Another mechanism to supply a heading to the pronoun’s file card might be the introduction of a default heading, i.e. “some person X” that concurs with the feature specifications carried by the frame. This mechanism must for instance be available as a pronoun is potentially ambiguous between referring to a previously established discourse referent and referring to somebody else (not available in the present discourse structure yet). This latter option is an instance of backward anaphora, which requires the option of deferring

Notes 229 interpretation until a unique discourse referent is made available, and for the sake of economy and memory constraints, the system might insert a default heading until the referent is established in the discourse representation. What I want to suggest for these cases of backward coreference is that the pronoun’s file card, upon failing to select an appropriate antecedent from previous discourse, receives a default heading. The system chooses to insert such a generic placeholder until a more specific referent becomes available. The interpretation, however, is not fully accomplished until a specific discourse referent is identified, whose information can be pasted into the heading of the pronoun’s file card, as the system wants to establish a dependency with a true discourse referent. I consider this introduction of a default heading a last resort strategy that takes effect after the system has attempted to find a suitable antecedent in the discourse representation (and has failed to do so). This means that the system tries to establish a dependency initially (as for instance evidenced by priming studies), and only if this is impossible, a default placeholder is temporarily inserted (until a proper discourse referent can be linked to the pronominal). Reuland and Avrutin (2005) and Avrutin and Reuland (2001) suggest that such a default placeholder (what they refer to as putting the pronoun into storage for future reference assignment) is not available cross-linguistically and might be dependent on other conditions imposed by the discourse structure. They further highlight an interesting difference between backward anaphora in Russian vs. English, Dutch, German, such that the latter allow backward anaphora (i.e. a subject pronoun can be put in storage temporarily), but Russian does not. 17.  In languages that have a two-way contrast between se-anaphors and self-anaphors, regular coargument dependencies are expressed using a se-anaphor and the special function associated with guises (e.g. Mme Tussaud’s contexts, Münchhausen contexts) exploits self-anaphors. — See for instance the Dutch Mme Tussaud’s example in (29) that makes use of the notion of guise in form of the availability of a wax figure. Similarly, Baron von Münchhausen became famous for the exaggerated stories of his adventures, which often attribute such unusual strength and skill to Münchhausen that they suggest the presence of a guise-like agent (for an example see Reuland 2001: 493). 18.  This is independent evidence for the perseverance of a reflexive’s file card in the discourse representation (vs. e.g. elimination) in spite of a certain redundancy due to the fact that the dependency has been established prior within the computational system. The fact that certain discourse factors can operate on the self-anaphor to obtain a guise interpretation support the presence of the reflexive’s representation at the discourse level. 19.  Note however, that the notion of guise is not exclusively linked to self-anaphors. In the following example dialogue (from Heim 1998), the pronoun her refers to Zelda (and so does she), which violates the principles governing pronoun interpretation (e.g. in the presence of coargumenthood, the predicate would need to be reflexive-marked to yield an acceptable coreferential interpretation of she and her):

(i) Speaker A: Is this speaker Zelda­i? (ii) Speaker B: How can you doubt it? Shei praises heri to the sky. No competing candidate would do that.

Nonetheless, this violation of structural restrictions can be explained by the availability of two slightly different referents: on the one hand, the person Zelda who is currently giving a talk, and on the other hand, the person Zelda who the speakers have a particular impression about from a previous encounter. These two representations stand for two guises associ-

230 Notes ated with Zelda, and each guise enters into a (separate) dependency with the referent Zelda. Another examples of this kind can be found in the scence from Harry Potter described above (again, subscript 1 indicates referents at the time of having the Time-Turner, subscript 2 indicates the referents three hours earlier.):

(iii) ‘OK, but we1’ll go round by the greenhouses!’ said Hermione breathlessly. ‘We1 need to keep out of sight of Hagrid’s front door, or we2’ll see us1! We2 must be nearly at Hagrid’s by now!’  (Rowling 1999: 290)

Similar examples have been discussed under the labels of ‘intended coreference’ vs. ‘accidental coreference’, where the latter may indicate presupposition failure (cf. e.g. Fiengo and May 1994). Overall, this shows that the concept of guise is not solely associated with selfanaphors, but gives way to a general discourse operation in order to depict dependencies linked to guises. (See also Haiman 1998 on the ‘devided self ’.) 20.  Schadt’s typology includes only a few Indo-European reflexive forms, as these elements have generally undergone a significant process of grammaticalization, and as a result it has become difficult to retrace the source of them. The English reflexive is considered an emphatic pronoun (rather than an instantiation of ‘self ’), as Schladt (1999) argues that a lexical source with nominal features of the reflexive in English is not identifiable and that the English entity stands in contrast to reflexives with a clear nominal origin that show for instance morphological markings of a typical noun. See also van Gelderen (2000) and König and Siemund (2000) on an explanation of the diachronic development of the reflexive in English. 21.  The majority of reflexive elements (over 60% of the languages surveyed) originate from body part labels (e.g. head, body, bone, skin, face). In fact, 79.8 percent of these body part labels denote body and 14.6 percent derive from head. The following examples from Bari (i) and Basque (ii) employing body (‘mugun’) and head (‘buru’) as reflexive markers respectively illustrate this: (i)

Nye rerem mugun. he kill body ‘He kills himself.’ (from Spagnolo 1933: 140ff.)

(ii) Aita-k bere buru-a hil d-u. father-erg his head-abs kill 3sg-have ‘The father killed himself.’ (from Saltarelli 1988: 104) 22.  For example, in Finnish itse (‘reflection on water’) can be combined with any predicate to mark reflexivity: (i)

Jussi näki itse-nsä. Jussi saw reflection:on:water-3:sg:poss ‘Jussi saw himself.’ (from Schladt 1999: 105)

23.  The self-anaphor variant in Dutch (zichzelf) differs from English (e.g. herself) in that it projects a file card with a weak frame. It therefore shares features of both se- and self-anaphors. Zichzelf is used to achieve reflexive-marking with verbs that are not lexically reflexive (e.g. verrassen — ‘surprise’, gehoorzamen — ‘obey’, haten — ‘hate’) (see Everaert 1986) or to support interpretation of a stand-for function. The implications for interpretation are considered further below in this section.

Notes 24.  Yet, the self-anaphors zichzelf/hemzelf are available to express coreference with Brit/Jan, which is predicted to be fuelled by the stand-for operation. 25.  Avrutin (2004) suggests an alternative operation available for se-anaphors: fusion of the anaphor’s weak file card with the antecedent’s file card. The motivation for this proposal is that weak file cards are considered not to be strong enough to maintain an independent discourse status. This view might be problematic as it leaves an empty location information unit behind in a sentence like (34), while it appears as if PPs share a particular property that requires them to have an internal file card. In this respect, location information units act like event representations, which also need to contain file cards for all their arguments. Consider the event representation of write — it always needs a referent who does the writing; or consider the event lift — it always needs a referent signifying the lifter and one signifying the lifted entity. Similarly, the location unit behind requires an entity to relate its spatial dimension to. This might be a special property of locative PPs, but conceptually it seems plausible to evoke such a requirement on the well-formedness of all PPs. Since a file card associated with a pronominal element is referentially dependent, it must then enter into a discourse dependency to be a well-formed entity within the PP. However, what is important for present purposes is that both a cut-and-paste operation (which I advocate here) and a fusion operation take place at the level of discourse. 26.  A similar stance is taken in Safir (2004) where the notion that an entity’s internal structure (i.e. phi-features and lexical properties) determines interpretation also represents an integral part of his model. 27.  Note that in the case of non-referential quantifiers, it is expected that quantification over an individual of the set can take place at a later point. This is connected with the attempt of the file card to raise to referential status. 28.  However, it is possible that this contrast only maintains at the initial linkage between a pronominal and a referential or non-referential entity, and that later in the time-course of interpretation, a dependency involving a non-referential antecedent exerts extra cost relating to the execution of quantification. But initially, the dependency between a non-referential entity and a pronominal is predicted to be less costly.

Chapter 4 1.  Sentence verification questions are also possible for this comprehension check. But in order to avoid responses based on memory retrieval alone, the paraphrase task was chosen for the experiments reported below, which requires more linguistic processing. We specifically instructed subjects to not merely reiterate the sentence word by word, but rephrase it. Additionally, when the CMLD interference paradigm is used with Broca’s aphasia patients (as discussed in chapter 5), we generally provide them with a choice of answers to avoid incorrect responses due to their articulatory difficulties (e.g. “Did the woman put a book on the table or on the chair?”). 2.  An early resource-based model was proposed by Moray (1967, 1969), where he discussed resource capacity using the analogy with a modern computer. He suggested that there is a single pool of processing resources, just as there is a single CPU (‘space’) in a computer. The more operations to be carried out, the less space there is left for other operations. By ana-

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Notes logy then, the more resources/space required for the performance of the comprehension task in the current paradigm, the fewer resources there are available for the lexical decision task. 3.  The phoneme monitoring task has been widely used to measure ambiguity effects during lexical access. In the late 1970s, it was observed that this particular task can have a number of confounds related to length and phonological properties (see Swinney 1979 for a discussion of this debate). These observations, on the one hand, have shown that dual-task paradigms are highly sensitive to language processes, and, on the other hand, they have led to the development of more fine-grained techniques (such as the CMLD interference paradigm). 4.  Examples are taken from Shapiro et al. (1987); subscripts correspond to semantic arguments. The authors tested five different types of verbs alltogether: transitives, alternating datives, non-alternating datives, two-complement verbs, four-complement verbs. 5.  The interpretation of contrastive stress falls within this distinction of syntactic vs. extrasyntactic processing, as it requires the identification of a structural position (i.e. subject vs. object position) along with the integration of discourse-based or pragmatic knowledge for the selection of the default referent. The prediction is then that contrastive stress requires more resources and is more difficult to process for children and Broca’s aphasia patients, similarly to d-linked wh‑phrases, as it represents another example involving access to distinct linguistic modules. 6.  This study has been discussed in Piñango et al. 2001, Burkhardt 2002, and Piñango and Burkhardt 2005. 7.  Since the number of subjects differed between the control (18) and the experiment position (27), statistical analyses were also performed after 18 subjects in the experimental position to allow for direct comparison between the two positions. The pattern found after 18 subjects in the experimental position is fully compatible with that observed after 27 subjects. A statistically significant difference in RT was found (t(17)= 2.08, p=.02), with a higher mean-RT for the logophor condition (M=708.58, SD=97.712) over the coargument reflexive condition (M= 680.95, SD=60.48). 8.  There is a small class of verbs that allow for both se- and self-anaphors in object position, such as scheren (‘shave’), wassen (‘wash’), verwonden (‘injure’), etc. See also chapter 3 for some examples. Moreover, it has been observed that the use of zichzelf in these constructions adds a certain discourse property, such as contrastive stress, focus, etc. (e.g. Everaert 1986). 9.  Note that zich and its antecedent also form a proper Chain. 10.  It is an issue of whether discourse can interpret features at all, since they are generally interpreted and checked in the computational system. The fact that features are responsible for the weak/strong frame distinction within the Syntax–Discourse Model does not force the discourse representation to be able to read features; in the narrowest view, it might only indicate that general information about features are transmitted at the syntax–discourse interface, such as “(not) fully specified” without further identification of the number or the nature of these features. However, there is evidence that features are accessible in the discourse representation. Results from sentence processing studies (Burkhardt and Piñango 2003) that force a sentence-external reading of a pronoun (as in (i)) show that the system has more difficulties interpreting him in (i), where the sentence does not provide a featurematching antecedent, than him in (ii), where Jason can be selected as potential antecedent

Notes (even though a sentence-external reading would be felicitous on the basis of structural constraints).

(i) Mary mentioned that Suzy had invited himk. (ii) Jasoni mentioned that Suzy had invited himi/k.

Moreover, if morphological feature information was not present in discourse, her in (iii) could select Tom as its potential antecedent, as the system would only need to find a discourse referent with an active file card to achieve pronoun resolution and then Mary and Tom would be in competition with each other:

(iii) Maryi mentioned that Tom had invited both Lucy and heri.

This suggests that features must be encoded in discourse. 11.  For determining the frequency ratings of the verbs, the CELEX online database was used (http://www.mpi.nl/world/celex/). The INL ratings were selected, which provide the plain INL (Instituut voor Nederlandse Lexicologie) frequency count for each lemma or word form out of the 42,380,000 words in the CELEX corpus. Then the sum of the INL frequency ratings was calculated from the infinitive, the present tense, the past tense, the present participle and the past participle of each verb, as these forms might be simultaneously activated during sentence processing. 12.  Note however that due to the fact that both conditions are presented with the same low frequency probe and since there are multiple levels of counterbalancing of sequence-condition pairings (within and across subjects), this decision does not influence the predictions in any significant way and only represents a conservative approach to probe selection. 13.  The non-word probes were created by taking a real word of Dutch and changing a letter or a phoneme in a way that the word was still pronounceable in Dutch and looked like acceptable orthography: e.g. bezem (‘broom’) — bezer, vrouw (‘woman’) — vrout, snoer (‘rope’) — snoeg. 14.  Reuland (2001) considers the process required for a bound variable dependency to be part of broad syntax — i.e. these dependencies occur at the C–I interface. He distinguishes between three levels of representation — narrow syntax, broad syntax/C–I interface, discourse — while the present Syntax–Discourse Model postulates two levels of representation. 15.  Other frameworks have made similar economy-based predictions (e.g. Reinhart 1983; Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993). It has been noted that coreferential interpretation is only chosen in the absence of a less economical way of interpretation. This has been formulated in Rule I (Grodzinsky and Reinhart 1993), which states that whenever interpretive mechanisms are available via a bound variable dependency, this dependency is chosen over the creation of a (more costly) discourse dependency. 16.  Note however that the light quantifiers included also an element like many people, which arguable could be grouped with the contentful quantifiers. Furthermore, both groups contained elements of negation (no one, no nurse), which potentially add extra processing load. 17.  In addition, Carminati et al. point out that their data from telescoping and binding across conjoined clauses suggest that the c-command constraint on bound variable interpretation is too restrictive, as the contrast between pronouns with quantified and coreferential antecedents maintained even across sentential boundaries. They propose that c-command might be just one way to satisfy a prominence requirement of the binder (à la Williams 1997) or

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Notes that multiple sources contribute to bound variable interpretation. Regardless, c-command is an important criterion for bound variable interpretation as it has been described above, and Carminati et al. also mention a number of questionnaire studies (e.g. Hirschberg and Ward 1991; Gordon and Hendrick 1998), which provide evidence that quantified pronouns with a c-commanding antecedent are more acceptable than those without one. 18.  This of course is different from English, which has an SVO structure. In sentences used in the Brun study, therefore, verb integration happens instantaneously as the pronoun occurs, since the verb’s event representation has already been established and the pronoun’s file card can find its place in the verb’s event file card. In Dutch, the pronoun’s file card is established prior to the verb’s file card and must therefore be maintained in discourse storage for proper integration. However, if the verb immediately follows the pronoun, integration happens almost instantaneously as well (which is another reason why we want to avoid intervening material between the pronoun and the verb in the present study). 19.  It could be argued that this move is not necessary, as the intervening material is present in both conditions, and an effect could therefore be cancelled out. However, first, if pronoun resolution is halted by intervening material such as a negative or adverbial element, this should show an effect on both conditions, and thus suppress and prolong the processes required for pronoun interpretation. Second, we do not know yet whether certain discourse processes can override others in such a way that they become so prominent that any other process cannot be observed anymore. Therefore, the decision to discard certain experimental items puts us on the safe side. 20.  Consider the availability of (i) (brought to my attention by Larry Horn), which indicates that everyone might be underspecified for person features after all:

(i)

Everyone herei hopes that the children like usi.

Such a finding, however, would not oppose the analysis proposed herein for everyone being [−R]. 21.  The last of the 14 subjects who evaluated the sentence as ‘ungrammatical’, corrected it in such a way that s/he got rid of the quantified antecedent (i.e. He received a letter when he passed the final exam.). This does not inform the current question of quantifier-pronoun relations. 22.  In cases where iedereen refers to an all-female group (e.g. via prior introduction of a set of female referents), the weak third person female pronoun d’r is preferred over the strong form haar (i); and similarly in the example in (ii) with a subject pronoun, only the weak form ze appears to be accepted. (i)

Iedereeni hoopt dat de kinderen d’ri — 3rd.sg.fem/??haari — 3rd.sg.fem mogen. ‘Everyone hopes that the children like her.’

(ii) Iedereeni hoopt dat zei/*ziji van een gezonde baby zal bevallen. ‘Everyone hopes that she will give birth to a healthy baby.’ Further investigation of these facts and the difference between weak (reduced) and strong pronouns is needed. But in isolation, only a third person masculine singular pronoun can bind iedereen. 23.  After consulting with native speakers, the majority considered (41b) ungrammatical. However, 5 (out of 20) speakers rated it marginally acceptable or even fully acceptable. Crucially, none of my consultants accepted (42b).

Notes 24.  It must be noted that ieder is restricted in that it can only be combined with a [+human] restrictor set. Thus (i) is not acceptable in Dutch (as discussed in Hamans 1980: 145): (i)   *Ieder van de sigaren was even duur. ‘Every of the cigars was equally expensive.’ The preference for a [+human] continuation might be related to the fact that ieder can occur in isolation as in (ii), where it is used synonymously with iedereen, which refers to every member of a [+human] group. (This usage of ieder is rated by some native speakers as archaic, but nonetheless acceptable.) (ii) Ieder zingt. ’Everyone sings.’ The additional specification for [+human] adds to the observations made above that iedereen has a strong feature specification that makes it [+R]. 25.  Thanks to Eric Reuland for bringing this example to my attention. However, it must be noted that acceptability ratings of this construction are subject to speaker variability. 26. There is also a contrast between every and each in English, such that each yields acceptable readings in the environments of (42)–(44) above, which suggests that the facts discussed above are closely linked to the referential properties of every(one) and are not a general function of quantification in English:

(i) Each of the boys has read the book. (ii) Before hei watches TV, each boyi eats an apple.

Moreover, according to native speaker assessments, Dutch elk (‘each’) patterns with ieder, and it further extends to [-human] restrictor sets (cf. Hamans 1980).

Chapter 5 1.  This syntactic deficit has been described for both comprehension and production in Broca’s aphasia patients. Here, I am only concerned with the comprehension aspect of the syndrome, but see for instance Friedmann and Grodzinsky (1997) and de Roo (1999, 2002) for investigations of Broca’s speech production. 2.  The studies cited here do not agree on the exact nature of this processing limitation. Some authors argue for a fast-decay hypothesis and some argue for a slow-activation hypothesis. However, what is relevant for our purposes is that there is a consensus based on processing data in these investigations that the Broca’s aphasia syndrome is connected with a resource limitation closely linked to syntactic structure, rather than reflecting a lack of knowledge of certain structural constraints. 3.  As pointed out, the study by Love et al. does not provide data for priming of the correct antecedent of the pronoun (as they only compared unrelated targets to related targets of the reflexive’s antecedent). In my view, the SSH allows for two possible outcomes with regard to priming of the correct antecedent in the pronoun condition. On the one hand, priming of both the correct and the incorrect antecedent could take place, as coreference without access to the syntactic representation should be extendable to all available DPs. Thus priming for the correct antecedent would also be expected, but for the wrong reason (i.e. not as a reflection of syntax-based principles, but as a result of non-syntactic coreference). On the other

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Notes hand, if a strict view of limitations of processing resources is adopted, the Broca’s system might not be capable of accessing all DPs present and might only allow coreference with the most local antecedent. In this case, only aberrant priming is expected to emerge. 4.  This study has been discussed in Piñango and Burkhardt 2001, 2003, 2005. 5.  The following tables report mean reaction times from item analysis. Since only two patients, who are reported as case studies, were tested, I chose to present the results from the control subjects based on items as well, in order to make the results more comparable with each other. 6.  Both patients show a trend towards the predicted difference (i.e. logophor with a higher RT compared to coargument reflexive), but this trend does not reach significance at 100 msecs after the pronominal. Since we are looking at a temporal window, during which interpretation takes place, it is possible that we are tapping into the beginnings of reflexive resolution in the Broca’s system. Crucially, however, this experiment reveals that reflexive interpretation can be observed via interference at 600 msecs after the reflexive for the Broca’s patients, which strongly indicates that interpretation is delayed. In addition, unimpaired control subjects clearly show an interference effect at 100 msecs and absence of the expected interference pattern at 600 msecs. This implies that for this population, the window occurs earlier. 7.  Crucially, this study highlights the fact that the formation of syntactic structure is a core property of reflexive interpretation. Note however that in order to obtain a complete picture of Broca’s aphasia comprehension of pronominals (especially concerning logophor and pronoun interpretation), additional questions need to be addressed in the future, such as how Broca’s patients perform offline with respect to logophor interpretation and which priming patterns are observable in the time-course of processing (see also note 3 of this chapter). 8.  Additional evidence for the primacy of the merge operation and the lack of timely syntactic structure formation in the Broca’s system comes from a study that investigated the processing of coargument reflexives compared to pronouns, where Broca’s aphasia patients also failed to show a significant difference at 100 msecs, but revealed a main effect at 600 msecs after the pronoun (Piñango and Burkhardt 2002).

Chapter 6 1.  Even though the Syntax–Discourse Model does not make any direct claims about memory capacity, this ties in with dependency formation in very general terms, in that it has been proposed that the establishment of a pronominal–antecedent relationship is connected to working memory resources, as the pronominal searches the discourse representation for potential referents with which it can enter into a dependency. Crucially, the LAN has been reported in response to other dependency relations as well, such as long-distance dependencies involving wh-movement, where both the moved constituent and its gap position recorded an anterior negative potential (cf. e.g. Kluender and Kutas 1993b). This negativity has been taken as a reflection of holding the antecedent in memory space (at the antecedent position) and reaccessing it at the gap position. Overall these studies have associated the LAN with storage and retrieval processes required during the formation of dependencies, and such an approach can conceivably be extended to pronominal–antecedent dependencies. In terms of the Syntax–Discourse Model, however, these effects might be viewed more

Notes generally as processes associated with the creation of file cards that are not sufficiently wellformed, which then would trigger a process of repair via a dependency relation. It should further be noted that the discussion of the LAN as a correlate of working memory resources is divided between a language-based effect and a more general capacity effect. This debate is based on the observation that the LAN has been recorded elsewhere in connection with more general working memory demands (e.g. involving visuospatial tasks or arithmetics) (cf. e.g. Ruchkin et al. 1990), and it has been suggested that the LAN might not represent the actual formation of a dependency, but a broad correlate of general storage and maintenance (see Kluender and Kutas 1993b for a discussion of this). Nevertheless, it has also been observed that non-linguistic LAN components have slightly different properties (e.g. slower shift, different distribution) than linguistic LAN effects, so support for a more language-specific anterior negativity seems to be supported (cf. Münte et al. 1998; Fiebach et al. 2002). 2.  Context sentences were presented in Dutch, but for reasons of space, they are only repeated in English here. Moreover, the experiment reported in van Berkum et al. (1999) also investigated structural properties associated with the disambiguating region immediately following the definite DP, which could potentially be resolved as a relative or complement clause. The details of this research question are not discussed here. 3.  Van Berkum et al. elaborate on the relation of the anterior negative potential to working memory, as the two-referent context might require holding two antecedent candidates in memory until resolved by subsequent information, or it might reflect more extensive searching of the discourse representation for the proper antecedent. Since they also report that referential bias determines the preference in the processing of the structural ambiguity between a relative and a complement clause continuation available for dat (‘that’) (which I have not discussed here), it can be concluded that at least some sort of referential selection has taken place prior to the presentation of subsequent information (e.g. the ambiguous dat). This is further evidence that the anterior negativity reflects a discourse process linked to antecedent selection and updating of information. 4.  In addition to semantic and pragmatic anomalies, the N400 has been reported for violations of selectional restrictions on verbs (see Friederici et al. 1993). Its amplitude further correlates with the cloze probability of the target item, i.e. its semantic fit, as well as with general concerns of plausibility and with the frequency of a lexical item (cf. e.g. Kutas and Hillyard 1983; Kutas et al. 1984; van Petten and Kutas 1990; Hagoort and Brown 1994). 5.  It must be noted that as a result of their primary predictions for the effects to the violation conditions, they only report analyses for two time windows — 350–450 msecs and 550–750 msecs — but the visual presentations of the ERP waveforms suggest a broader distributed early effect, which might be supported by additional analyses on different time windows. (In addition the 350–450 msecs window revealed a significant effect for the condition by site interaction, which is not discussed by the authors any further). 6.  Initial acoustic and phonological processing of the input is expected to occur around 100– 150 msecs post stimulus onset (cf. e.g. Hickok and Poeppel 2000; Friederici 2002). 7.  In the proper name condition pnl, the first and second DP were reversed. This was done to allow for a possible comparison between experiment 1 and experiment 2 (which used the same material in the proper name condition). 8.  In this way, the design tried to improve what Harris et al. (2000) considered problematic in their construction of experimental items, which prevented them from focusing in more

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Notes detail on a direct comparison between (correct) coargument reflexives and logophors. (They used constructions of the type Henrietta and himself in the logophor condition.) 9.  Due to unforeseen circumstances, the data had to be recorded with two different cap systems, which did not match in the available electrode sites. As a consequence, only 11 electrodes entered the final computation and averaging. 10.  An exception to this is the case of backward anaphora (Before shei went to bed, Henriettai took a shower), where the pronominal introduces a new referent that is resolved downstream via the connection with a succeeding referential file card. Moreover, first and second person pronominals differ from third person pronominals in that they are not referentially dependent in the sense that a pronounced antecedent DP is available; rather, their referent is introduced by the Situation Card (cf. chapter 3). These phenomena open up new avenues for future research. 11.  This effect is predicted in spite of the findings from Streb et al. who report a LAN for pronouns over proper names. As pointed out above, Streb et al. used repetitions of previously introduced proper names, while the present experiment used newly introduced proper names. Repetitions should be less costly as they identify a unique referent that is already present in the discourse (i.e. discourse-old information), and accessing currently active information can then take place in a fast manner. Repeated proper names and pronouns are both subject to the cut-and-paste operation. But the repetition is predicted to be less costly, as its file card contains a heading, while the pronoun’s file card does not (i.e. is ill-formed). The presence of the heading furthermore significantly narrows down the antecedent candidate set, which facilitates speedy integration. 12.  Planned comparisons for the discourse-new vs. discourse-old contrasts are presented in this section. The comparisons of pronoun and logophor condition are discussed in section 6.3.5.2.2, so that the distinct predictions and results can be examined separately.

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Index [+R]  64, 66, 73, 84, 91, 92, 131, 142, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 226, 235 [−R]  64, 73, 84, 91, 92, 142–7 [±R]  73, 91, 131, 142, 145, 146 [+Refl]  66, 67, 78, 84, 86, 89, 95, 98, 114 [−Refl]  66, 67, 78, 96, 114 accessibility  31, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 58, 225, 226 Accessibility Theory  39 see also Ariel accommodation  68, 71, 227 acquisition  8, 9, 110, 143, 219, 222–4 see also Delay of Principle B Effect agrammatism see Broca’s aphasia Ariel, Mira  17, 33, 37–40, 52, 58, 77, 224–6 Avrutin, Sergey  5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 31, 33, 37, 49, 56, 58, 59, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 81, 84, 89, 97, 110, 147, 215, 219, 221, 223, 228, 229, 231 backward anaphora  32, 228, 229, 238 Binding Theory  4, 6, 8, 20–7, 39, 44, 45, 61, 62, 189, 221–4 bound variable interpretation  29–31, 51, 53, 54, 130, 131, 133, 224, 226, 233, 234 sloppy reading  30, 222 strict reading  30, 222 see also quantifiers bridging  9, 37, 68, 71–3, 81–3, 87–90, 94–8, 109, 110, 113, 114, 182, 183, 196, 197, 202, 207, 209–12, 216, 219, 225, 227, 228 Broca’s aphasia  2, 12–14, 100, 110, 151, 153–70, 194, 217, 218, 220, 231, 232, 235, 236 c-command  5, 10, 19, 21, 27, 31, 51, 59 131, 223, 227, 233, 234 center  33, 34, 35, 113, 175, 186, 224 see also Centering Theory Centering Theory  34, 224 Chafe, Wallace  32, 33, 36, 72, 221 Chain  53, 54, 64–7, 76, 84, 226, 227, 232 Chinese  22, 25, 40, 61 Chomsky, Noam  2–8, 10, 16–26, 35, 49, 50, 57, 61, 65, 112, 130, 221–4, 227 coargument reflexive  5, 6, 11, 13, 29, 40, 48, 59, 65, 66, 79, 84, 86, 94, 98, 100–3, 111–29, 150–3, 158–70, 178–95, 197, 211, 212, 216– 22, 226, 229, 232, 236, 238 coargumenthood  10, 29, 40, 41, 45, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 82, 83, 86, 88, 94, 96, 100, 112, 116, 122, 128, 129, 150–3, 159,

160, 163, 168–70, 178, 180, 183, 186, 188, 217–21, 229 complementarity  5–8, 17, 23–6, 28, 40, 43, 45, 113, 183 Comrie, Bernard  42 conceptual system  3, 35, 221 copy-and-paste  70, 71, 87 coreference  1, 4, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 29, 30, 31, 33, 35, 37, 40, 41, 48, 49, 51–5, 57, 59, 60, 61, 65, 68, 70, 71, 92, 98, 112, 119, 120, 129, 133, 149, 151, 160, 169, 170, 173, 181, 201, 212, 213, 221–4, 229–31, 235, 236 accidental coreference  230 intended coreference  230 cross-modular operations  53, 54, 96, 107, 108, 111 cut-and-paste  70–3, 77, 78, 87, 88, 90, 94–9 Delay of Principle B Effect  9 discourse-linking see d-linking discourse mechanisms see accommodation; bridging; copy-and-paste; cut-and-paste; incorporation; point-of-view function; stand-for function discourse-new information  36, 37, 71, 72, 82, 89, 90, 182, 195–7, 200–7, 210–13, 219, 220, 225, 227, 238 discourse-old information  70, 72, 87, 177, 196, 197, 200–6, 211, 213, 225, 238 hearer-old information  72 d-linking  9, 91–4, 109, 110, 146, 232 Dutch  14, 40, 42, 45, 62, 63, 73, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 100, 103, 120–30, 135–50, 175, 217, 219, 227–30, 233–7 economy  2, 10, 11, 18, 31, 49–55, 58, 60, 65, 96, 103, 129, 132, 196, 200, 215, 216, 225, 229, 233 empathy  7, 40, 46, 113 English  14, 19, 23, 24, 32, 38, 40, 41, 43, 46–8, 63, 65, 66, 67, 73, 83–6, 90, 92, 98, 100, 103–19, 120, 121, 123, 128, 129–34, 138, 139, 141–50, 154, 162, 186, 188, 198, 217, 218, 224–30, 234–7 Everaert, Martin  28, 61, 85, 121, 230, 232 Ewe  42, 43 File Card Semantics  33, 58, 67 file card  59, 60, 67–100, 103, 112–14, 120–3, 127, 129, 128, 131, 132, 133, 142, 145, 147–50,

258

Index file card (cont.) 169, 175–7, 180, 181, 188, 189, 195, 196, 200–2, 208–12, 216, 217–20, 228–31, 233, 234, 237, 238 well-formedness  60, 73, 75, 84, 133, 175, 176, 211, 220, 231 frame  38, 69–79, 84, 87–94, 108, 121, 122, 131, 133, 136, 142, 145, 146, 148, 175, 219, 228, 230, 232 heading  69–89, 92–5, 99, 113, 114, 121, 122, 131–3, 148, 175, 181, 196, 202, 208–11, 216, 219, 223, 228, 229, 238 strong  15, 38, 73–5, 78, 84, 87, 89, 92, 94, 120, 123, 131, 143, 145–8, 173, 181, 221, 231–5 weak  73, 75, 84, 86, 87, 91–4, 120–2, 133, 142, 146, 148, 227, 228, 230–4 see also Situation Card frame see file card French  7, 24, 28, 45 Friederici, Angela  3, 4, 12, 173, 178–81, 209, 212, 237 German  28, 40, 63–6 given–new distinction  36, 72, 225 see also discourse-new and discourse-old information given information see discourse-old information givenness  35, 37, 40 Gokana  42 Grice, Paul  50, 51 see also Gricean principles, neo-Gricean principles Gricean principles  10, 50, 52 Grodzinsky, Yosef  10, 29, 30, 55, 154, 157, 224, 233, 235 guise  8, 61, 73, 79–81, 86, 113, 224, 229, 230 Harris, Tony  178–82, 189, 195, 218, 223, 237 heading see file card Heim, Irene  5, 8–10, 16, 29, 31–3, 37, 58, 59, 67, 70–3, 79, 224, 227–9 Hestvik, Arild  5, 7, 8, 16, 23, 24, 57, 61, 112, 223 Holcomb, Phillip  173, 176, 178 Horn, Laurence  10, 18, 23, 50, 52, 228, 234 Huang, C.T. James  5, 7, 16, 22, 48, 61, 112 Huang, Yan  1, 4, 5, 6, 10, 25, 40, 43, 44, 46, 50, 52, 56, 61, 226 Icelandic  6, 22, 40, 42, 44–6 incorporation  68, 70 information structure  16, 59, 221 informatics  16, 221 information packaging  16, 221 interference  37, 100, 103–40, 147, 149, 160–71, 217, 231, 232, 236 Italian  45, 48, 109

Jackendoff, Ray  3, 4, 8, 16, 49, 79, 221, 222 Karttunen, Lauri  17, 33, 35, 36, 55 Klima, Edward  17, 19, 20 Kuno, Susumu  4, 7, 17, 41, 43, 44, 46, 47, 63, 82, 113, 226 LAN  173, 174, 176, 180–2, 189, 192, 194, 195, 198, 201–4, 207–11, 218–20, 236–8 Lees, Robert  17, 19, 20 Levinson, Steven  5, 7, 10, 43, 50, 52, 56, 226 LF-movement  24, 25, 223 locality  6, 21, 26, 44, 56, 62, 118, 216, 227 logophors locative PPs  5, 28, 113, 114, 122, 182, 183, 231 picture-NPs  5, 25, 88 stand-for  79, 81–3, 86, 89, 113, 196, 230, 231 see also guise long-distance reflexives  5–7, 22, 25, 40, 44–8, 57, 61, 87, 156, 157, 162, 168, 169, 225, 236 Mandarin  22, 25, 42, 47, 48, 57 Merge operation  16, 61,62, 67,155, 160, 163, 164, 170, 236 Minimalist Program  26, 49, 65 see also Chomsky modularity  57 modules  3–5, 12, 16, 27–30, 54, 93, 98, 151, 167, 221–5, 232 morphological features  1,6, 15, 76,77, 84, 87, 122, 131,142–4, 147, 148,228, 230, 233 movement  7, 8, 9, 24, 25, 26, 61, 66, 162, 185, 223, 236 see also LF-movement N280  176, 177, 180 N400  176, 177, 180, 181, 189, 194, 195, 200–2, 206–13, 218–20, 237 neo-Gricean principles  10, 50 non-d-linking  91, 94, 146 non-referential  30, 93, 94, 97–9, 109, 111, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 141–50, 218, 226, 231 see also [−R] Osterhout, Lee  173, 176, 178, 179 P600 177–80, 189, 194, 195, 201, 202, 206–10, 219, 220, 228 perspective  7, 18, 42–8, 57, 82, 89, 96, 113, 114, 131, 154, 224, 225 point-of-view  7, 9, 18, 31, 40, 44–6, 48, 50, 58, 60, 61, 67, 82, 113, 114, 123 Pesetsky, David  91, 92, 146, 222, 227 phi-features  91, 92, 142, 145, 149, 231 Pica, Pierre  5, 7, 8, 16, 24, 45, 223 Piñango, Maria M.  4, 12, 13, 49, 100, 103, 104,

Index 107, 108, 129, 130, 134, 138, 142, 151, 153, 155–8, 170, 210, 226, 232, 236 pivot see perspective point-of-view function  82, 83, 87, 89, 123 pragmatic accounts  10 principle of explicitness  52 see also Grice, Horn, Huang Y., Levinson priming  89, 105, 106, 109, 110, 134, 136, 137, 155, 158–60, 162, 168, 227, 229, 235, 236 Prince, Ellen  17, 36, 72, 196, 221, 224, 225, 227 processing resources  4, 9, 11, 12, 90, 98, 105, 109, 110, 117, 123, 138, 154, 155, 160, 168, 210, 231, 236 pronouns epicene pronouns  143 exempt anaphors  19 exempt pronouns  23 pronominalization transformation  20 proper names  134, 174, 175, 182, 186, 187, 190– 2, 197, 199–207, 210, 211, 219, 220, 237 quantifiers  91–3, 131–4, 141–9, 219, 234 light quantifiers  91–3, 131, 133, 233 referential quantifiers  91–4, 97, 131–4, 141, 142, 148, 149, 219, 231 reactiviation see priming referentiality  36, 60, 64, 73, 91, 93, 131, 142, 146, 147, 197, 202, 209, 216, 219, 220 see also [±R] referential  94, 98, 148, 226 see quantifiers, referential reflexive-marking  27, 28, 61–7, 78, 79, 83–6, 88, 89, 94–6, 103, 111–14, 119–22, 129, 150, 151, 168, 169, 180, 183, 184, 188, 216, 229, 230 see also [+Refl], [−Refl] Reflexivity Theory  8, 27, 29, 62, 223, 224

Reinhart, Tanya  5, 6, 8, 10, 11, 16–21, 26–32, 50–65, 74, 84, 85, 112, 121, 130, 131, 183, 221–6, 233 Reuland, Eric  1, 4–6, 8, 10, 16–18, 26–9, 44, 49, 52–65, 74, 80, 81, 84, 87, 96, 98, 112, 121, 147, 183, 215, 221–9, 233, 235 Rösler, Frank  173, 174 Ross, John  17, 21, 22, 63 Rule I  30, 51, 55, 233 Russian  229 Safir, Ken  4, 9, 10, 18, 23, 26, 52, 61, 231 Sells, Peter  7, 17, 42, 46, 47, 57, 82, 113, 225 Situation Card  75, 228, 238 Slow-Syntax Hypothesis  100, 153, 155–7, 159, 163, 168, 217, 235 stand-for function  79, 81–3, 86, 89, 95, 98, 99, 113, 196, 230, 231 Streb, Judith  174–6, 181, 189, 195, 197, 201, 209, 211, 238 Swinney, David  105, 108, 110, 115, 116, 137, 154, 159, 227, 232 Teochew  42, 47, 48, 57 Tuburi  43 van Berkum, Jos  174–7, 181, 189, 195, 201, 209, 211, 237 variable  27, 29–31, 51, 53, 54, 78–85, 93–5, 98, 115, 130–4, 142, 148, 150, 219, 224, 226, 233, 234 Webber, Bonnie  17, 33, 35, 36 well-formedness see file card, well-formedness Wexler, Kenneth  5, 7–10, 16, 25, 73, 79, 224 Zribi-Hertz, Anne  7, 22, 41, 43, 44, 46, 83, 113

259

In the series Linguistik Aktuell/Linguistics Today the following titles have been published thus far or are scheduled for publication: 90 DALMI, Gréte: The Role of Agreement in Non-Finite Predication. xv, 221 pp. Expected November 2005 89 VELDE, John R. te: Deriving Coordinate Symmetries. A phase-based approach integrating Select, Merge, Copy and Match. Expected December 2005 88 MOHR, Sabine: Clausal Architecture and Subject Positions. Impersonal constructions in the Germanic languages. viii, 207 pp. Expected October 2005 87 JULIEN, Marit: Nominal Phrases from a Scandinavian Perspective. 2005. xvi, 348 pp. 86 COSTA, João and Maria Cristina FIGUEIREDO SILVA (eds.): Studies on Agreement. vi, 281 pp. + index. Expected December 2005 85 MIKKELSEN, Line: Copular Clauses. Specification, predication and equation. viii, 212 pp. Expected October 2005 84 PAFEL, Jürgen: Quantifier Scope in German. xvi, 309 pp. + index. Expected December 2005 83 SCHWEIKERT, Walter: The Order of Prepositional Phrases in the Structure of the Clause. 2005. xii, 338 pp. 82 QUINN, Heidi: The Distribution of Pronoun Case Forms in English. 2005. xii, 409 pp. 81 FUSS, Eric: The Rise of Agreement. A formal approach to the syntax and grammaticalization of verbal inflection. xii, 323 pp. + index. Expected October 2005 80 BURKHARDT, Petra: The Syntax–Discourse Interface. Representing and interpreting dependency. 2005. xii, 259 pp. 79 SCHMID, Tanja: Infinitival Syntax. Infinitivus Pro Participio as a repair strategy. 2005. xiv, 251 pp. 78 DIKKEN, Marcel den and Christina M. TORTORA (eds.): The Function of Function Words and Functional Categories. 2005. vii, 292 pp. 77 ÖZTÜRK, Balkız: Case, Referentiality and Phrase Structure. 2005. x, 268 pp. 76 STAVROU, Melita and Arhonto TERZI (eds.): Advances in Greek Generative Syntax. In honor of Dimitra Theophanopoulou-Kontou. 2005. viii, 366 pp. 75 DI SCIULLO, Anna Maria (ed.): UG and External Systems. Language, brain and computation. 2005. xviii, 398 pp. 74 HEGGIE, Lorie and Francisco ORDÓÑEZ (eds.): Clitic and Affix Combinations. Theoretical perspectives. 2005. viii, 390 pp. 73 CARNIE, Andrew, Heidi HARLEY and Sheila Ann DOOLEY (eds.): Verb First. On the syntax of verb-initial languages. 2005. xiv, 434 pp. 72 FUSS, Eric and Carola TRIPS (eds.): Diachronic Clues to Synchronic Grammar. 2004. viii, 228 pp. 71 GELDEREN, Elly van: Grammaticalization as Economy. 2004. xvi, 320 pp. 70 AUSTIN, Jennifer R., Stefan ENGELBERG and Gisa RAUH (eds.): Adverbials. The interplay between meaning, context, and syntactic structure. 2004. x, 346 pp. 69 KISS, Katalin É. and Henk van RIEMSDIJK (eds.): Verb Clusters. A study of Hungarian, German and Dutch. 2004. vi, 514 pp. 68 BREUL, Carsten: Focus Structure in Generative Grammar. An integrated syntactic, semantic and intonational approach. 2004. x, 432 pp. 67 MIŠESKA TOMIĆ, Olga (ed.): Balkan Syntax and Semantics. 2004. xvi, 499 pp. 66 GROHMANN, Kleanthes K.: Prolific Domains. On the Anti-Locality of movement dependencies. 2003. xvi, 372 pp. 65 MANNINEN, Satu Helena: Small Phrase Layers. A study of Finnish Manner Adverbials. 2003. xii, 275 pp. 64 BOECKX, Cedric and Kleanthes K. GROHMANN (eds.): Multiple Wh-Fronting. 2003. x, 292 pp. 63 BOECKX, Cedric: Islands and Chains. Resumption as stranding. 2003. xii, 224 pp. 62 CARNIE, Andrew, Heidi HARLEY and MaryAnn WILLIE (eds.): Formal Approaches to Function in Grammar. In honor of Eloise Jelinek. 2003. xii, 378 pp. 61 SCHWABE, Kerstin and Susanne WINKLER (eds.): The Interfaces. Deriving and interpreting omitted structures. 2003. vi, 403 pp. 60 TRIPS, Carola: From OV to VO in Early Middle English. 2002. xiv, 359 pp. 59 DEHÉ, Nicole: Particle Verbs in English. Syntax, information structure and intonation. 2002. xii, 305 pp. 58 DI SCIULLO, Anna Maria (ed.): Asymmetry in Grammar. Volume 2: Morphology, phonology, acquisition. 2003. vi, 309 pp. 57 DI SCIULLO, Anna Maria (ed.): Asymmetry in Grammar. Volume 1: Syntax and semantics. 2003. vi, 405 pp.

56 COENE, Martine and Yves D’HULST (eds.): From NP to DP. Volume 2: The expression of possession in noun phrases. 2003. x, 295 pp. 55 COENE, Martine and Yves D’HULST (eds.): From NP to DP. Volume 1: The syntax and semantics of noun phrases. 2003. vi, 362 pp. 54 BAPTISTA, Marlyse: The Syntax of Cape Verdean Creole. The Sotavento varieties. 2003. xxii, 294 pp. (incl. CDrom). 53 ZWART, C. Jan-Wouter and Werner ABRAHAM (eds.): Studies in Comparative Germanic Syntax. Proceedings from the 15th Workshop on Comparative Germanic Syntax (Groningen, May 26–27, 2000). 2002. xiv, 407 pp. 52 SIMON, Horst J. and Heike WIESE (eds.): Pronouns – Grammar and Representation. 2002. xii, 294 pp. 51 GERLACH, Birgit: Clitics between Syntax and Lexicon. 2002. xii, 282 pp. 50 STEINBACH, Markus: Middle Voice. A comparative study in the syntax-semantics interface of German. 2002. xii, 340 pp. 49 ALEXIADOU, Artemis (ed.): Theoretical Approaches to Universals. 2002. viii, 319 pp. 48 ALEXIADOU, Artemis, Elena ANAGNOSTOPOULOU, Sjef BARBIERS and Hans-Martin GÄRTNER (eds.): Dimensions of Movement. From features to remnants. 2002. vi, 345 pp. 47 BARBIERS, Sjef, Frits BEUKEMA and Wim van der WURFF (eds.): Modality and its Interaction with the Verbal System. 2002. x, 290 pp. 46 PANAGIOTIDIS, Phoevos: Pronouns, Clitics and Empty Nouns. ‘Pronominality’ and licensing in syntax. 2002. x, 214 pp. 45 ABRAHAM, Werner and C. Jan-Wouter ZWART (eds.): Issues in Formal German(ic) Typology. 2002. xviii, 336 pp. 44 TAYLAN, Eser Erguvanlı (ed.): The Verb in Turkish. 2002. xviii, 267 pp. 43 FEATHERSTON, Sam: Empty Categories in Sentence Processing. 2001. xvi, 279 pp. 42 ALEXIADOU, Artemis: Functional Structure in Nominals. Nominalization and ergativity. 2001. x, 233 pp. 41 ZELLER, Jochen: Particle Verbs and Local Domains. 2001. xii, 325 pp. 40 HOEKSEMA, Jack, Hotze RULLMANN, Víctor SÁNCHEZ-VALENCIA and Ton van der WOUDEN (eds.): Perspectives on Negation and Polarity Items. 2001. xii, 368 pp. 39 GELDEREN, Elly van: A History of English Reflexive Pronouns. Person, Self, and Interpretability. 2000. xiv, 279 pp. 38 MEINUNGER, Andre: Syntactic Aspects of Topic and Comment. 2000. xii, 247 pp. 37 LUTZ, Uli, Gereon MÜLLER and Arnim von STECHOW (eds.): Wh-Scope Marking. 2000. vi, 483 pp. 36 GERLACH, Birgit and Janet GRIJZENHOUT (eds.): Clitics in Phonology, Morphology and Syntax. 2001. xii, 441 pp. 35 HRÓARSDÓTTIR, Thorbjörg: Word Order Change in Icelandic. From OV to VO. 2001. xiv, 385 pp. 34 REULAND, Eric (ed.): Arguments and Case. Explaining Burzio’s Generalization. 2000. xii, 255 pp. 33 PUSKÁS, Genoveva: Word Order in Hungarian. The syntax of Ā-positions. 2000. xvi, 398 pp. 32 ALEXIADOU, Artemis, Paul LAW, Andre MEINUNGER and Chris WILDER (eds.): The Syntax of Relative Clauses. 2000. vi, 397 pp. 31 SVENONIUS, Peter (ed.): The Derivation of VO and OV. 2000. vi, 372 pp. 30 BEUKEMA, Frits and Marcel den DIKKEN (eds.): Clitic Phenomena in European Languages. 2000. x, 324 pp. 29 MIYAMOTO, Tadao: The Light Verb Construction in Japanese. The role of the verbal noun. 2000. xiv, 232 pp. 28 HERMANS, Ben and Marc van OOSTENDORP (eds.): The Derivational Residue in Phonological Optimality Theory. 2000. viii, 322 pp. 27 RŮŽIČKA, Rudolf: Control in Grammar and Pragmatics. A cross-linguistic study. 1999. x, 206 pp. 26 ACKEMA, Peter: Issues in Morphosyntax. 1999. viii, 310 pp. 25 FELSER, Claudia: Verbal Complement Clauses. A minimalist study of direct perception constructions. 1999. xiv, 278 pp. 24 REBUSCHI, Georges and Laurice TULLER (eds.): The Grammar of Focus. 1999. vi, 366 pp. 23 GIANNAKIDOU, Anastasia: Polarity Sensitivity as (Non)Veridical Dependency. 1998. xvi, 282 pp. 22 ALEXIADOU, Artemis and Chris WILDER (eds.): Possessors, Predicates and Movement in the Determiner Phrase. 1998. vi, 388 pp. 21 KLEIN, Henny: Adverbs of Degree in Dutch and Related Languages. 1998. x, 232 pp. 20 LAENZLINGER, Christopher: Comparative Studies in Word Order Variation. Adverbs, pronouns, and clause structure in Romance and Germanic. 1998. x, 371 pp. 19 JOSEFSSON, Gunlög: Minimal Words in a Minimal Syntax. Word formation in Swedish. 1998. ix, 199 pp.

A complete list of titles in this series can be found on the publishers website, www.benjamins.com