THE STUDIA PHILONICA ANNUAL Studies in Hellenistic Judaism
THE STUDIA PHILONICA ANNUAL Studies in Hellenistic Judaism
Editors David T. Runia Gregory E. Sterling
THE STUDIA PHILONICA ANNUAL Studies in Hellenistic Judaism
Volume XVIII
2006
Editors: David T. Runia Gregory E. Sterling
Associate Editor David Winston Book Review Editor Hindy Najman
Society of Biblical Literature Atlanta
THE STUDIA PHILONICA ANNUAL Studies in Hellenistic Judaism The financial support of C. J. de Vogel Foundation, Utrecht Queen’s College, University of Melbourne University of Notre Dame University of Toronto is gratefully acknowledged
Copyright © 2006 by the Society of Biblical Literature All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or by means of any information storage or retrieval system, except as may be expressly permitted by the 1976 Copyright Act or in writing from the publisher. Requests for permission should be addressed in writing to the Rights and Permissions Office, Society of Biblical Literature, 825 Houston Mill Road, Atlanta, GA 30329, USA ISBN: 1-58983-253-1 ISSN : 1052-4533
The cover photo, Ezra Reads the Law, is from a wall painting in the Dura Europos synagogue and used with permission from Zev Radovan (www.BibleLandPictures.com).
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
THE STUDIA PHILONICA ANNUAL STUDIES IN HELLENISTIC JUDAISM Editorial Board Editors: David T. Runia, Queen’s College, University of Melbourne Gregory E. Sterling, University of Notre Dame Associate editor: David Winston, Berkeley Book review editor: Hindy Najman, University of Toronto Advisory board † David M. Hay (chair)
Harold Attridge (Yale University) Katell Berthelot (CNRS, Aix-en-Provence) Ellen Birnbaum (Boston University) Peder Borgen (Oslo) Annewies van den Hoek (Harvard Divinity School) Pieter van der Horst (Zeist, The Netherlands) Adam Kamesar (Hebrew Union College) Jutta Leonhardt-Balzer (University of Munich) Carlos Levy (University of Paris IV-Sorbonne) Maren Niehoff (Hebrew University, Jerusalem) Robert Radice (Sacred Heart University, Milan) Jean Riaud (Catholic University, Angers) James R. Royse (San Francisco State University) Torrey Seland ( School of Mission and Theology, Stavanger, Norway) Folker Siegert (University of Münster) Abraham Terian (St. Nersess Armenian Seminary) Thomas H. Tobin S.J., Loyola University, Chicago The Studia Philonica Annual accepts articles for publication in the area of Hellenistic Judaism, with special emphasis on Philo and his Umwelt. Contributions should be sent to the Editor, Prof. G. E. Sterling, Associate Dean of the Faculty, College of Arts and Letters, 100 O’Shaughnessy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA; email:
[email protected]. Please send books for review to the Book Review Editor-elect, Dr. Ronald Cox, Religion Division, Pepperdine University, 24255 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, CA 902634352, email
[email protected]. Contributors are requested to observe the “Instructions to Contributors” located at the end of the volume. These can also be consulted on the Annual’s website: http://www.nd.edu/~philojud. Articles which do not conform to these instructions cannot be accepted for inclusion. The Studia Philonica Monograph series accepts monographs in the area of Hellenistic Judaism, with special emphasis on Philo and his Umwelt. Proposals for books in this series should be sent to Prof. Gregory E. Sterling, Department of Theology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame IN 46556, USA; email
[email protected].
CONTENTS* Announcements .........................................................................................
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ARTICLES Steven Di Mattei, Moses’ Physiologia and the Meaning and Use of Physikôs in Philo of Alexandria’s Exegetical Method ......................... Philip R. Bosman, Conscience and Free Speech in Philo .......................... Pieter W. van der Horst, Two Short Notes on Philo...............................
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SPECIAL SECTION: PHILO’S DE VIRTUTIBUS David T. Runia, Introduction...................................................................... 57 David Konstan, Philo’s De virtutibus in the Perspective of Classical Greek Philosophy ..................................................................................... 59 James R. Royse, The Text of Philo’s De virtutibus ...................................... 73 Gregory E. Sterling, “The Queen of the Virtues”: Piety in Philo of Alexandria................................................................................................. 103 REVIEW ARTICLE Julia Annas, Recent Work on Plato’s Timaeus ........................................... 125 BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION D. T. Runia, E. Birnbaum, K. A. Fox, A. C. Geljon, H. M. Keizer, J. P. Martín, R. Radice, J. Riaud, D. Satran, G. Schimanowski, T. Seland, Philo of Alexandria: An Annotated Bibliography 2003..... 143 Supplement: A Provisional Bibliography 2004–2006................................ 189 BOOK REVIEW SECTION Jennifer M. Dines, The Septuagint Reviewed by Cameron Boyd-Taylor..................................................... 205 Gilbert Dahan et Richard Goulet (sous la direction de), Allégorie des poètes. Allégorie des philosophes. Études sur la poétique de l’herméneutique de l’allégorie de l’Antiquité à la Réforme, Textes et Traditions Reviewed by Jean Riaud ......................................................................... 209
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John J. Collins, Jewish Cult and Hellenistic Culture: Essays on the Jewish Encounter with Hellenism and Roman Rule Reviewed by Erich S. Gruen................................................................... Hindy Najman, Seconding Sinai: The Development of Mosaic Discourse in Second Temple Judaism Reviewed by Andrei A. Orlov ............................................................... Judith Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World Reviewed by John W. Marshall ........................................................... Andrei A. Orlov, The Enoch-Metatron Tradition Reviewed by Michael E. Stone ............................................................... Gerard P. Luttikhuizen, Gnostic Revisions of Genesis Stories and Early Jesus Traditions Reviewed by Ronald R. Cox.................................................................... Arkady Kovelman, Between Alexandria and Jerusalem. The Dynamic of Jewish and Hellenistic Culture Reviewed by Maren Niehoff.................................................................. Annelie Volgers and Claudio Zamagni (editors), Erotapokriseis. Early Christian Question–and–Answer Literature in Context Reviewed by David T. Runia..................................................................
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News and Notes .......................................................................................... 231 Notes on Contributors............................................................................. 235 Instructions to Contributors................................................................. 239
* The editors wish to thank the typesetter Gonni Runia once again for her tireless and
meticulous work on this volume. They also wish to thank Eva Mroczek (Toronto) for her assistance with the book reviews, Michael Champion (Melbourne) for his assistance with the bibliography, and Kindalee DeLong for the outstanding work she has done in the Philo of Alexandria office at the University of Notre Dame.
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 1–2
ANNOUNCEMENTS The editors of The Studia Philonica Annual wish to inform its readers that from this year onwards the Annual will be a publication of the Society of Biblical Literature. Likewise future volumes in the Studia Philonica Monograph Series will be published by the Society of Biblical Literature. The first seventeen volumes of The Studia Philonica Annual were published by the Program in Judaic Studies of Brown University, as part of the Brown Judaic Studies Series. The first volume in 1989 was number 185 in the series, the last in 2005 was number 344. Through the generosity of Prof. Jacob Neusner it was possible to relaunch the Annual in the BJS series, after its predecessor the Studia Philonica ceased publication in 1980. The editors extend their most heartfelt thanks to Prof. Neusner and the three other editors with whom we have worked closely, Prof. Jonathan Z. Smith, Prof. Shaye Cohen, and Prof. Ross Kraemer. We are grateful for the encouragement they gave our work and for the logistic and financial support which made the publication of the Annual and the Monograph volumes possible for nearly two decades. Since the Studia Philonica Annual and the Philo of Alexandria Group, which meets annually at the Society of Biblical Literature North American meetings, have such close ties, the editors and members of the editorial board thought that it would be advantageous to form a direct alliance with the Society of Biblical Literature. The editors wish to express their thanks to the Society’s Research and Publications committee and its chair, Prof. James C. VanderKam, for accepting the Annual and the Monograph Series in its publishing program. They look forward to a close and productive relationship. It is envisaged that the aims and main features of the journal will remain unchanged. There will be some minor alterations in the scholarly conventions used. Prospective authors are asked to consult the Instructions to Contributors at the end of the volume. In close consultation with the chair of the Studia Philonica Advisory Board, Prof. David Hay, it was decided that this would also be a good time to make some changes in the composition of the board. The editors wish to express our warm gratitude to members of the board, especially to the retiring board members, for their contributions over the years. From 2007 the Annual will have a new book review editor, Prof. Ronald Cox (Pepperdine University). The retiring book
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review editor, Prof. Hindy Najman, is warmly thanked for her untiring efforts in putting together this section during the past four years. David T. Runia Gregory E. Sterling It is with the deepest regret that we announce the sudden passing of David Hay, the chairperson of Τhe Studia Philonica Annual editorial board and the general editor of the Studia Philonica Monograph Series. David died unexpectedly in his home on Friday morning, August 25th. A blood clot appears to have entered his lungs. There was a burial service for him on Tuesday, August 29th, in McDonough, Georgia, and a memorial service that afternoon in Atlanta. There will also be a memorial service at Coe College in Cedar Rapids, Iowa, where David taught for thirty years, sometime this fall. We will miss David for both professional and personal reasons. David was a fine scholar who made significant contributions to the study of Philo. He was a founding member of the Philo Institute, a contributor to Studia Philonica, the chairperson of the SNTS seminar on Philo, and a key figure in the launching and success of The Studia Philionica Annual and the monograph series. He was, however, more than a productive scholar; he was a friend. Those of us who were privileged to work with him knew him as a generous and sensitive human being. The last time that the SBL met in Atlanta, many of the members of the Philo of Alexandria Group went to David and Mary's home for dinner. It was a memorable evening. The last scholarly contribution that David made was to proofread this edition of The Studia Philonica Annual, a task that he had executed faithfully for many years. He was not able to complete his commentary on The Contemplative Life. The treatise was near to his heart. We should remember the final words: "This will suffice for the Therapeutae who welcomed the contemplation of nature and what it contains and who lived their lives in the soul alone, citizens of both heaven and earth. They were sincerely commended to the Father and Maker of the cosmos by virtue who introduced them to God's friendship and added the most appropriate gift of true goodness, a gift better than all good fortune, a gift that reaches to the very summit of full happiness." We are confident that virtue has commended David as well. We will miss him immensely. We extend our deepest sympathy to Mary, the children, and the grandchildren. David T. Runia Gregory E. Sterling
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 3–32
MOSES’ PHYSIOLOGIA AND THE MEANING AND USE OF PHYSIKÔS IN PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA’S EXEGETICAL METHOD
STEVEN DI MATTEI
I. Introduction Scholars have long recognized both the importance and significance which fuvsi" occupies in Philo of Alexandria’s exegetical method.1 One need merely recall Philo’s own repeated references to, and use of, the term and its many compounds (fusikoiv, fusikw'", fusikwvtata, fusikwvteron, fusiologiva, fusiologei'n, fusiognwmonei'n) in order to grasp this significance within his exegetical reflection. Yet the precise meaning of many of these terms and the expressions which Philo forms from them still elude us. What exactly does Philo wish to convey when he claims, for example, that Moses allegorizes fusikw'" (Leg. 2.5), or that, in commenting on Genesis 27:30, he asserts that Moses represents fusikwvtata the exiting of Jacob as the entrance of Esau (Ebr. 9)? Equally enigmatic is his use of Heraclitus’ maxim fuvsi" kruvptesqai filei' or the term fusiologiva itself to apparently denote some kind of mystical hermeneutic in which the reader must be initiated in order to comprehend the hidden meaning of Moses’ words.2 In trying to 1
In particular see: Edmund Stein, Die Allegorische Exegese des Philo aus Alexandreia (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1929), 26–32; Hans Leisegang, “Philon aus Alexandreia,” Real-Encyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft 20 (ed. Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll: Stuttgart: Metzler, 1941), col. 1–50; Jean Pépin, Mythe et allégorie. Les origines grecques et les contestations judéochrétiennes (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 19762), 235–42, and “Remarques sur la théorie de l’exégèse allégorique chez Philon,” in Philon d’Alexandrie: Lyon 11–15 Septembre 1966 (ed. R. Arnaldez, C. Mondésert, and J. Pouilloux: Paris: Éditions du CNRS, 1967), 131–67; Valentin Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire de l’Écriture chez Philon d’Alexandrie (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), 6, 97–116, 131, 177–82, 206–09, 238–39; Richard Goulet, La philosophie de Moïse. Essai de reconstruction d’un commentaire philosophique préphilonien du Pentateuque (Paris: J. Vrin, 1987), 33–45, 542–46; and Paula Graffigna, “fusikw'" ajl lhgorei`n. Osservazioni lessicali sulla teoria allegorica filoniana,” Koinonia 20 (1996): 107–13. 2 Leg. 1.60 and Cher. 122: oJ ªmh;º fusiologiva" aj muvh to". For the use of Heraclitus (= DielsKranz, fr. 123) see: Mut. 60; Somn. 1.6; Contempl. 28; and most significantly Fug. 179: oiJ ajllhgoriva" kai; fuvsew" th'" kruvptesqai filouvsh" ajmuvhtoi.
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ascertain the meaning behind Philo’s use of these terms commentators have sought to compare his terminology with the same or similar terminology in Stoic allegorical procedures. This methodology, however, seems only to have complicated things further. For instance, in resorting to notions of Stoic physical allegory in an attempt to understand Philo’s use of the adverb fusikw'", we have been forced to conclude, as it were, that Philo adopts the term, but not to designate “physical allegory” as we find in Stoic exegesis, but ironically and inexplicably to designate content which seems ethical or spiritual in nature.3 The rationale behind this line of argumentation has been that the “physical” in Philo’s “physical allegory” must be something other than the material world of Stoic physical allegory, such as, what has been proposed, Scripture’s hidden “nature” (fuvsi").4 Or the adverb fusikw'" is simply to be understood as a technical term indicating allegory tout court.5 In a similar fashion scholars have also reasoned that the term fusiologiva is to be understood as a technical term synonymous with “allegorical interpretation,”6 and again, that although Philo’s physiologia would appear to reveal something more likened to theology rather than the physical doctrines we find in Stoic allegorists’ physiologiae, it nevertheless
3
See, for example, the conclusions drawn by: Émile Bréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie (Paris: J. Vrin, 19252), 59; Pépin, Mythe et allégorie, 240; John Dillon, “The Formal Structure of Philo’s Allegorical Exegesis,” in Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria. A Commentary on De Gigantibus and Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis (ed. J. Dillon and D. Winston; Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1983), 77– 87; and Goulet, La philosophie de Moïse, 36. 4 The passages normally cited in support of this thesis are: Contempl. 28; Somn. 1.172; Abr. 52, 200 (see below). This view is most recently defended by Goulet, La philosophie de Moïse, 36–8, 544–45; and Graffigna, “fusikw'" ajllhgorei`n.” 5 Pépin, “Remarques,” 132n. 1, following Leisegang, “Philon,” col. 37: “Das Adverb fusikw'" bedeutet bei Philon fast immer ‘im allegorischen Sinne.’” The same has likewise been argued with respect to Aristobulus’ use of fusikw'" (fr. 2). See Nikolaus Walter, Der Thoraausleger Aristobulos: Untersuchungen zu seinen Fragmenten und zu pseudepigraphischen Resten der jüdisch-hellenistischen Literatur (Berlin: Akademie, 1964), 59–60. 6 First formulated by Leisegang in his articles of 1941 (Real-Encyclopädie): “Philon aus Alexandreia,” col. 37, and “Physis,” col. 1164. This is then taken up by Pépin, Mythe et allégorie, 411, and then further by: Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire, 103, 131, 206; Marguerite Harl, “Introduction,” in Quis rerum divinarum heres sit, PAPM 15 (ed. R. Arnaldez, J. Pouilloux, and C. Mondésert; Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1966), 13–14; Goulet, La philosophie de Moïse, 34; Graffigna, «fusikw'" ajllhgorei`n,» 110; and Laura Rizzerio, Clemente di Alessandria e la “fusiologiva veramente gnostica.” Saggio sulle origini e le implicazioni di un’epistemologia e di un’ontologia (Leuven: Peeters, 1996), 114–27.
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discloses, so the claim goes, Scripture’s hidden physis and as such would seem to indicate, as the term does, the contemplation of Physis.7 Methodological considerations Two preliminary objections must be raised at this point. First, the idea that the terms fusikw'" and fusiologiva passed into some sort of technical usage, either with Stoic allegorists themselves or with Philo, is, to a large degree, a modern construct. The terms themselves are not even present in any of the Stoic fragments that have come down to us;8 and furthermore, when used by later doxographers and philosophers these terms almost always indicate a field of philosophical study or the rationale proper to that field of study.9 Additionally, of those authors who engaged in Stoic exegesis—Chrysippus,10 Pseudo-Heraclitus, Cornutus, Chaeremon, and Pseudo-Plutarch—the number of cases where these terms are actually used is relatively small,11 and their usage certainly does not justify the view that they were employed as technical terms synonymous with allegorical interpretation. On the contrary, as our forthcoming analysis will yield, their usage most always indicated a particular philosophical thought or rationale proper to natural 7
This thesis was largely advanced by the late Valentin Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire, 103–9, 131, 206. See also his De Decalogo, trans. & notes, in PAPM 23 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1965), 150–52. 8 Except the one mention of, allegedly, Chrysippus’ fusiologiva (SVF 3.301), preserved in Philo, Ebr. 91, and a non-exegetical usage of the adverb: fusikw'" de; noei'tai divkaiovn ti kai; ajgaqovn (SVF 2.29 = Diogenes Laertius, 7.53). 9 A mute point but one which nevertheless needs to be stressed is that when Chrysippus, Posidonius, Diodorus, Strabo, Arius Didymus, Plutarch, and Diogenes Laertius employ the adverb fusikw`", it is almost always used to refer to the branch of philosophy entitled physics, or a rationale which is reflective of this science. In light of this, the thesis advanced herein hardly seems innovative: that Pseudo-Heraclitus, Aristobulus, and Philo of Alexandria employed the term in the same manner. 10 I am here thinking of his lost treatise Peri; tw` n ajrcaiv wn fusiolov gwn (Diogenes Laertius 7.187). 11 Contra the table produced by John Leopold, “Rhetoric and Allegory,” in Two Treatises, 165–67. The author’s count is very misleading and apparently includes adjectives as well as adverbs used in non-exegetical contexts. Instead of the twenty-three occurrences of physikos in Heraclitus’ Homeric Allegories there are properly only eight occurrences of fusikw'" (8.5; 13.3; 15.2; 26.3; 43.7; 46.1; 57.4; 66.10) and only one mention of fusiologiva (70.1). Likewise the ten noted for Philo in books 1 and 2 of his Legum Allegoriae, are correctly only five; and ethikos as an adverb is never used exegetically in Heraclitus nor in Plutarch, and only twice in Philo (Leg. 1.39, 2.12). Likewise, psychikos is never found in any of our authors as an adverb or adjective used in an exegetical context. Moreover, neither fusikw'" nor fusiologiva appears in Cornutus’ De natura deorum, and only once in PseudoPlutarch’s De vita et poesi Homeri (2.1176).
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philosophy or physics. So much for the claim that these terms were coined as exegetical terms by Stoics themselves, but what about by Philo or Plutarch? Two later sources are generally cited in support of seeing the term fusiologiva as synonymous with allegorical interpretation: Philo’s De providentia 2.40, and an excerpt from Plutarch which is conserved in Eusebius’ Praeparatio evangelica 3.3.1, two passages wherein the term physiologia is used to denote a physical doctrine which is hidden in the myths of the Greek gods (theologia), and which the allegorical method then discloses.12 Without ignoring the obvious interplay between exegesis and philosophy (physiologia), I nevertheless find little justification in these citations to conclude that these authors viewed physiologia as synonymous with allegorical interpretation. We shall furthermore see that this was not the case. Moreover, what Plutarch specifically says is that their nature study, physiologia, was a physical doctrine (fusiko;" lovgo") hidden in the myths of the Greek gods.13 This is still quite a measurable difference from the conclusions drawn by modern scholars. In addition to these two texts, an array of passages from the Philonic corpus are also cited as good enough evidence to suppose that Philo himself used the term to designate allegorical interpretation. In this regard, the De somniis 1.120 is the most significant.14 After citing Genesis 28:11 Philo comments: “One may admire not only his hidden teaching and physiologia (th;n ejn uJponoivai" pragmateivan kai; fusiologivan aujtou'), but also the literal instruction concerning the practice of endurance and fatigue.” The structure of the phrase has led commentators to regard fusiologiva as synonymous with hJ ejn uJponoivai" pragmateiva, and
12
Here are the passages: Plutarch, fr. 157 (= Eusebius, Praep. evang. 3.3.1): “Among the Greeks as well as the Barbarians, the venerable physiologia was a physical doctrine veiled in the myths (lovgo" h\n fusiko;" ejgkekalummevno" muvqoi"), a theologia in the manner of the mysteries more than often concealed by enigmas and hidden meanings”; and Philo, Prov. 2.40: “Neither do the passages which you mentioned awhile ago contain blasphemies against the gods, but they indicate hidden physiologiae (inclusae physiologiae), whose mystery it is forbidden to reveal to those whose heads are not anointed.” Cf. Chaeremon, fr. 12 (= Tzetzes, Exegesis in Illiadem 1.97): “For since the more ancient of the sacred scribes wanted to conceal their physical doctrine concerning the nature of the gods (to;n peri; qew`n fusiko;n lovgon kruvptein), they handed down these things to their own children through allegorical symbols and characters (dji j ajllhgorikw`n [kai;] sumbovl wn).” Cited in Pieter W. Van der Horst, Chaeremon. Egyptian Priest and Stoic Philosopher (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984), 24. 13 Cf. Isis and Osiris 354c, where Plutarch informs us that the philosophy of the Egyptians is most often veiled in myths (th`" filosofiva" ejpikekrummevnh" ta; polla; muvqoi"). 14 The other passages usually cited are: Leg. 1.60; Cher. 87 and 121. See our analysis below.
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thus with (the activity of) allegorical interpretation.15 Yet as we shall see, there is in every sense of the word a physiologia present, according to Philo, in Genesis 28:10–19, which Philo furthermore labels as Moses’ physiologia (fusiologivα aujtou`). This brings me to my second observation. Scholars have additionally maintained that Philo’s concept of Nature is not the same as his Greek predecessors,16 or that his conception of physiologia is not to be assimilated to that of the Greek philosophical tradition seeing that “contemplation of Nature” for Philo meant the contemplation of Scripture’s hidden “nature.”17 There are, however, several objections to be raised against this line of reasoning. First and foremost is the idea that Philo understood physiologia as the contemplation of Scripture’s hidden physis; this not only contradicts the definition of this science within the Greek philosophical tradition, but moreover how Philo himself defined physiologia: “the contemplation of the cosmos and all that it contains.”18 Second, and perhaps the most weighty of my critiques, is that the idea that Philo 15
In particular: Leisegang, “Philon,” col. 37; Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire, 103; Graffigna, “fusikw`" ajllhgorei`n,” 110; and Rizzerio, Clemente di Alessandria e la “fusiologiva veramente gnostica” 122. 16 In particular see Goulet, La philosophie de Moïse, 36: “Tout se passe comme si la physique et la physiologie . . . avaient comme objet une Nature nullement restreinte au principe d’explication des réalités du monde matériel” (see also 544). Cf. Nikiprowetzky, De decalogo, 150; and Pépin, Mythe et allégorie, 240. On the contrary, Philo’s concept of Nature is every bit attached to the reality of the sensible world as will be demonstrated below. The conclusion drawn by Goulet is the result of a methodology which has attempted to differentiate Philo’s use of fusikw`" from Stoic physical allegory, and in so doing has comprehended the adverb fusikw`" as signifying “naturally” or that which pertains to “nature” albeit, as Goulet stresses, a nature vastly different than that found in Stoic physical allegory. Yet the adverb may very well signify “physically,” that is having a rationale proper to physics or natural science, and as such have nothing to do with “Nature” per se. I shall have more to say about this further below. 17 See especially Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire, 97–108, 131. In short, Nikiprowetzky argues that Philo’s use of the term physiologia cannot be understood in its proper and technical sense as having Nature as its object of study such as we find within the Greek philosophical tradition (102). This position, however, is not tenable and seems to be the result of an unfortunate misunderstanding of Greek physiologia. In our ancient sources, the contemplation of Nature, or more precisely the cosmos, does not necessarily define or specify its ajrchv or First cause as being physical or metaphysical (see below). Nikiprowetzky assumes the former as Greek physiologia, with minor exceptions in some Platonic passages, and the latter he attributes to Philo. This, together with the fact that Philo mentions physiologia in connection with, or in the context of, allegorical interpretation leads this author to the conclusion above. 18 Ebr. 91: ta; de; peri; oujranou` kai; tw` n kat j aujto; n fusiologiva. Cf. Cher. 4, and the innumerable passages where Philo speaks of the contemplation of the cosmos, hJ peri; to;n kovsmon qewriva: Mut. 76, Abr. 165; cf. Somn. 2.173; Spec. 1.269, 2.64, 2.52, 3.1; and Opif. 77: hJ qewriva tw`n kat j oujr anovn.
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understood physiologia as the contemplation of Scripture’s hidden physis actually negates Philo’s whole apologetic, namely that Moses also wrote on the topic of physiologia. I will spend a considerable amount of time below justifying this claim, but it should readily be apparent nonetheless that Philo’s exegetical and philosophical project was guided by the apologetic that Genesis teaches philosophical doctrine, one of which is physiologia, the study of the cosmos. If Philo’s physiologia is something other than Greek physiologia, as certain scholars maintain, then this whole apologetic is rendered invalid. Finally, the notion that the contemplation of Scripture’s hidden physis is equivalent to the contemplation of Nature is in itself misleading. Philo’s use of the term fuvsi" in those passages in question19 hardly merits that we equate it with Physis or Nature, the object of physiological study. That the allegorical sense of Scripture is of a “nature” less perceptible and hidden to the many is quite apparent. But physiologia is properly the contemplation of the cosmos and the heavenly bodies, or Nature, through which means the observer arrives at the knowledge of intelligible realities (nohtai; fuvsei"),20 or the nature of God (qeou` fuvsew").21 To comprehend this fuvsi" as Nature, the object of physiologia, is simply incorrect.22 In short, the particular danger in resorting to Stoic physical allegory, either as a means to shed light on Philo’s use of the terms fusikw`" and fusiologiva, or to draw incompatible differences between the “natures“ represented in these two exegetical procedures, is that we risk measuring, and thus comprehending, the meaning of these terms against the background of an earlier exegetical procedure, rather than in light of their 19
The passages usually cited in this context are: Contempl. 28: “In reading their holy Scriptures they pursue, by means of allegorical interpretation, their ancient philosophy, since they consider the literal meaning of the words as symbols of a hidden nature (ajpokekrummevnh" fuvsew"), which is only revealed in the inner meanings.” Somn. 1.172: “Do you not already realize that the discourse which is before us is not about mortal men, but, as stated earlier, about the nature of things (peri; fuvsew" pragmavtwn).” Abr. 200: “But what has just been recounted is not attributed to the literal and visible explanation, but seems to manifest a nature which is less apparent (fuvsin ajdhlotevran) to the multitude.” 20 See: Leg. 1.1; Cher. 97; Post. 99; Deus 55. 21 See: Leg. 1.38; 3.206. 22 Plato also uses the term fuv si" in a similar fashion when speaking about the “reality” of the Forms: e.g. Rep. 493c, 537c, 597b; Prot. 337d; Tim. 47a, 68d; Crit. 121a; Soph. 257d; Parm. 158c. This fuvsi" is obviously to be distinguished from Physis, capital P. Likewise, this is the background against which Philo’s use of Heraclitus’ maxim fuvsi" kruvptesqai filei` must be understood; fuvsi" here designates a hidden “reality.” See also: Goulet, La philosophie de Moïse, 36; and Pierre Hadot, “Remarques sur les notions de phusis et de nature,” in Herméneutique et ontologie: Mélanges en l’honneur de P. Aubenque à l’occasion de son 60e anniversaire (ed. R. Brague and J.-F. Courtine: Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1990), 1–15; repr. in Hadot, Études de philosophie ancienne (Paris: J. Vrin, 1998), 77–92.
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meaning and usage within the Greek philosophical tradition. It is my impression that in conceptualizing these terms as exegetical terms, we have as a result not only misunderstood their role in Philo’s exegetical and philosophical reflection but also divorced them from their philosophical meanings. The methodology adopted herein, therefore, is not to resort to how these terms were employed in pre-Philonic allegorical exegesis, although we shall not neglect this either, but rather how they were employed and understood in the discourse to which they properly belong, philosophy. We shall start by reassessing the meaning and use of fusikw`" within the philosophical tradition, and then secondly the term fusiologiva.
II. Fusikw`": Its Meaning and Usage as a Philosophical Term The adverb fusikw`" first appears in the works of Aristotle wherein the particularities governing its meaning and usage are first laid out. For the most part, its usage will remain consistent in later writers and the variations in its meaning will be reflective of the changes in the branch of philosophy which the term denotes, namely physics or natural science, the most significant of which is its transition from designating a pre-Socratic physical study, as we find in Aristotle, and similarly Heraclitus, to designating a physics which assimilates as part of its field of inquiry metaphysical and theological speculation23 as well as the study of the soul, such as will be the case for Philo. In the Aristotelean corpus, however, the adverb indicates a particular way of reasoning proper to the study of physics or natural science indicative of the manner in which the preSocratic philosophers investigated the physical world, and against which Aristotle introduces his own rationale in pursuing the investigation of the cosmos’ primary cause. Thus, Aristotle can speak of the difference “between those who conduct their investigations with a rationale proper to the study of nature and those who conduct their investigations with a rationale proper to the study of logic (diafevrousin oiJ fusikw`" kai; logikw`" skopou`nte").”24 In other places Aristotle will reproach the partisans of Melissus and Parmenides for affirming that “nothing which exists is either born or 23
Concerning this expanding sense of physics, Hadot writes: “La dialectique platonicienne, comme science des Formes, étant supprimée, toute l’activité théorique se concentre dans la physique. Elle absorbe la théologie, ce qui correspond à un élargissement de la notion de phusis, qui ne désigne plus comme chez Aristote un domaine particulier, mais la totalité du cosmos et la force qui l’anime” (“Les divisions des parties de la philosophie dans l’Antiquité,” Études de philosophie ancienne, 138, my emphasis). 24 De generatione 1.2, 316a11.
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perishes,” to which Aristotle retorts: “they, however, being unaware of the existence of anything beyond the substance of sensible objects . . . do not speak with a rationale proper to physics or the study of natural phenomena (ouj fusikw'" . . . levgein); for the existence of unborn and absolutely immovable beings rather concerns a science different than and superior to physical inquiry.”25 As in the passage just cited, the adverb fusikw'" is often coupled with the verb levgein26 or qewrei`n27 to convey the idea that the physikoi28 express themselves and speculate about the cosmos and its primary cause(s) with a reasoning proper to their physical inquiry of causation. Even “when they compose their cosmogonies (kosmopoiou`si),” Aristotle declares, “they want to speak in physical terms (fusikw'" bouvlontai levgein).”29 This verb-adverb combination would therefore seem to convey the same meaning as the verb fusiologei`n: “The physikoi speak about everything physically, or with a rationale appropriate to their physical inquiry (peri; pavntwn fusiologou`nte").”30 And elsewhere Aristotle remarks that Plato’s Timaeus “speaks in physical terms (fusiologei`) of how the soul moves the body.”31 In other words, Aristotle contends that in speaking about the world soul and how it moves the heavenly spheres, Plato is in fact speaking of the soul in cosmological or physiological terms.32 As with Aristotle’s use of this verb-adverb combination, fusikw`" levgein, later exegetes such as Heraclitus and Philo will also make use of it in order to designate the philosophical rationale behind Homer’s or Moses’ words.
25
De caelo 3.1, 298b18. Again, this science which is superior to physics (qeologikhv) will nevertheless be labeled as physics by its later generation. 26 Ibid 4.1, 307b32 (cf. 1.10, 280a32: fusikw`" . . . ei[rhtai); Metaph. 14.3, 1091a18; fr. 175; fr. 275. Cf. the same formula in Plutarch, fr. 75, 105, 111 (cited in n. 37); and Philo: Leg. 3.185; Ebr. 118; Fug. 19, 194; Abr. 241. 27 Ibid 3.5, 304a25; Ph. 3.5, 204b10. Cf. Ph. 2.7, 198a23: ajpodwv sei fusikw`". 28 The designations fusikoiv and fusiolovgoi were used by Aristotle to speak of the preSocratics and the manner in which they inquired into the causes of the physical universe. See in particular: Ph. 1.2, 184b17; 1.3, 186a20; 1.4, 187a12; 1.4, 187a28, etc.; Metaph. 1.5, 986b14; 1.8, 990a3; 1.9, 992b4; 3.3, 1005a31, etc. Cf. oiJ peri; fuvsew" (Metaph. 2.4, 1001a12; 3.4, 1006a2; 9.8, 1050b24). 29 Metaph. 14.3, 1091a18. Cf. Eusebius, Praep. evang. 1.8.13. This is significant seeing that Moses also wrote a kosmopoiiva wherein, according to Philo, he speaks fusikw`". See below. 30 Metaph. 1.8, 988b27. Cf. Philo, Mut. 62; Aet. 94; Diodorus, Bibl. 3.20.3; 3.62.3; Eusebius, Praep. evang. 2.6.24; and Clement of Alexandria, Strom. 4.2.1: ta; peri; ajr cw`n fusiologhqevnta. 31 De anima 1.3, 406b26. 32 Cf. Josephus, A.J. 34: “After the seventh day, Moses begins to speak physiologically (fusiologei`n) about the constitution of man,” that is using concepts such as “earth” and “pneuma”; Justin, Apol. 60.1: “Plato speaks physiologically about the Son of God when he engraves a C in the universe”; and Origen, Contra Cel. 4.40.13: fusiologei` Mwush`" ta; peri; th`" tou` ajnqrwvpou fuvsew".
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Fusikw`" in Heraclitus: Homer Reasons Like a Philosopher (i.e., a fusikov") Heraclitus is the only Stoic allegorist to have employed the adverb fusikw'" in exegetical contexts.33 Furthermore, the author’s eight uses of the term34 do not particularly designate physical allegories per se, but rather a rationale proper to pre-Socratic natural science. Thus, given that the sun and Apollo are one, Heraclitus can assert, “Homer attributed fusikw'" the plague to Apollo,”35 that is to say in a manner proper to natural science or physical causation. And elsewhere: “There [Iliad 1.50], Homer depicts in a manner proper to physical investigation (fusikw'") the occurrence of the symptoms of illness concerning the plague.”36 As was apparent in Aristotle’s usage of the term, here also the adverb expresses a certain manner of reasoning proper to physical inquiry or the manner in which the physikoi reasoned through to physical causes. The adverb justifies the manner in which Homer speaks about the gods or presents them in particular situations; it does not disclose the allegorical interpretation, but the philosophical rationale behind Homer’s presentation of the gods. That Apollo becomes the sun through the allegorical procedure of etymology is one thing; that Homer attributes the plague to Apollo is done fusikw'", that is to say according to a rationale proper to natural science.37 “The poet, speaking allegorically, appends the goddess Hera to Achilles the healer with a reasoning proper to natural science.”38 In a certain sense, then, the adverb substantiates the philosophical rationale of the poet which is clothed beneath the narrative of the battle of the gods. “Who therefore,” Heraclitus concludes, “would be that foolish to think that these scenes represent the gods at battle, when Homer, on the contrary, speaks about the gods with a rationale proper to natural philosophy through the use of allegory ( JOmhvrou fusikw'" tau`ta di j ajllhgoriva" qeologhvsanto").”39 The apologetic establishes 33
See n. 11 above. Homeric Allegories 8.5; 13.3; 15.2; 26.3; 43.7; 46.1; 57.4; 66.10. 35 Ibid 8.5: fusikw`" ejp evsthse tw`≥ loimw≥` to;n j Apovllwna. 36 Ibid 14.3: {Omhro" de; kai; sfov dra fusikw`" th;n peri; ta; loimika; tw` n paqhmavtwn suntucivan dia; touvtou parivsthsin. 37 Cf. Plutarch on Hesiod’s Works and Days: fr. 75 (= Scholia on Hesiod’s Works and Days 548–53): “These verses are recounted in a manner proper to natural investigations (levgetai fusikw`") on the exhalations which are carried into the air from wet places on the earth”; fr. 105 (= Ibid 782–84): “Thus it is said in accord with physical science (fusikw`" ei[rhtai) that the sixteenth day is excellent for begetting males”; and fr. 111 (= Ibid 814–16): “And concerning the opening of the wine jar, what the poet says is in accord with natural science (fusikw`" ei[rhke).” Cf. Philo: Leg. 3.185; Ebr. 118; Fug. 19, 194; Abr. 241. 38 Ibid 15.3: Prosevqhke d j jAcillei` qerapeuvonti fusikw`" ajllhgorhvsa" qea; n {Hran. Cf. Fug. 128. 39 Ibid 58.4. 34
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itself upon the principle that Homer’s rationale in composing his qeologiva already reveals that he was thinking and composing a hidden fusiologiva.40 It is the philosophical rationale behind the allegory which the term designates, and not the actual allegory. This holds true for Jewish exegetes as well, who will also use the adverb to indicate the philosophical rationale behind Moses’ words, the primary difference being, however, that the field of physics has expanded to incorporate investigations of a metaphysical God and the nature of the soul. Aristobulus’ Appeal for Interpreting Moses’ God fusikw`", and the Jewish ai{resi" Not only were Stoic exegetes eager to demonstrate that the venerable poets of their past spoke, behind allegories and metaphors, philosophical truths, but Jewish exegetes also sought to demonstrate that the cherished and sacred writings of their forefathers, written down and preserved by Moses, but now relevant for the entire Hellenistic world, also contained behind figurative language and allegories philosophical doctrines. In this respect, Aristobulus encourages his audience to comprehend “the power of God” (hJ duvnami" tou` qeou`) inherent in Moses’ words “the hands of God” in a manner proper to that branch of philosophy which inquires into the nature of God. “I want to urge you to accept the interpretations in a philosophical manner (fusikw'")41 and to judge them in accord with a conception proper to God without falling into a mythical and anthropomorphic way of thinking.”42 Scholars have sought to explain Aristobulus’ use of fusikw'" by making appeals to the notion of a “technical usage” whereby the term simply denoted “in an allegorical sense.”43 Yet as noted above, no such technical sense existed among our ancient writers; and furthermore, “in a philosophical manner” makes perfect sense of Aristobulus’ exhortation, wherein 40
Note how this apologetic is aided by principles fundamental to Stoicism: the equivalency between qeov" and fuvsi" (SVF 2.1077 = Cicero, De natorum deorum 1.39) and oiJ qeoiv and ta; stoicei`a fusikav both etymologically and cosmologically. 41 Literally of course we understand “physically” or with a rational proper to physics. “In a philosophical manner” makes for a better understanding even though it is less restrictive in its immediate connection to physics. Cf. David Winston, “Philo and the Hellenistic Jewish Encounter,” The Studia Philonica (1995): 124–42, 135: “philosophically.” 42 Fr. 2 (= Eusebius, Praep. evang. 8.10.2): parakalev sai de; se bouvlomai pro;" to; fusikw`" lambavnein ta;" ejkdoca;" kai; th;n aJr movzousan e[nnoian peri; qeou` kratei`n, kai; mh; ejkpivptein eij" to; muqw`de" kai; ajnqrwvpinon katavsthma. 43 Walter, Der Thoraausleger Aristobulos, 59 n. 3; A. Yarbro Collins, intro. & trans., in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha (2 vols., ed. J. Charlesworth: New York: Doubleday, 1985), 2.838; and Carl Holladay, Fragments from Hellenistic Jewish Authors. Volume III: Aristobulus (Atlanta: SBL, 1995), 207.
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the interpretation which is to be taken fusikw'" is opposed to a mythical and anthropomorphic understanding.44 This same exegetical principle is equally visible in Stoic exegesis. Plutarch informs us that “Homer arranged Hephaestus against the river, and Apollo on the side opposing Poseidon in the battle according to physical speculation rather than mythical (fusikw`" ma`llon h] muqikw`").”45 And elsewhere Plutarch speaks of those who interpret the myth of Hera and Leto with a rationale proper to physics and in a manner more decent (oiJ de; fusikw`" kai; ma`llon prepovntw" uJpolambavnonte" to;n mu`qon).46 Certainly we must bear in mind the changing or expanding domain of physical inquiry: Hera and Leto are to be understood as physical elements in accord with a pre-Socratic investigation of physical causes; whereas the hands of God are to be understood as the power of God according to another domain of physics, namely that which concerns itself with the nature of God. The interpretation opted for above, “in a philosophical manner,” is also harmonious with the larger philosophic and apologetic agenda of Jewish exegetes such as Aristobulus, Aristeas, and Philo of Alexandria. If the term fusikw'" and those analogous to it are employed by Jewish authors as they engage in an interpretation of the Mosaic law,47 it must be borne in mind that confronted with the reality of Jewish persecution in Alexandria, these authors sought to demonstrate that their ancient religion was actually a sacred and venerable philosophy. “For all philosophers,” Aristobulus writes, “agree that it is necessary to hold devout convictions about God, something which our school (ai{resi") recommends quite well. For all the ordinances of our law are founded on piety, justice, temperance, and the other virtues which are truly good.”48 The expression “fusikw`" lambavnein ta;" ejkdocav"” can only be understood against the background of this larger philosophic program: to present the God of the Septuagint in harmony with Greek philosophical conceptions of God. In fact, this philosophical apologetic does not just stop here; rather, it insists that the God of Moses, the one 44
Cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 226– 232, who notes that the opposition between mythic and philosophical concepts of God was already well in place in such writers as Xenophanes, Plato, Euripides, etc. Cf. Plutarch, Moralia 950e; Eusebius, Praep. evang. 2.7.8; 3.1.4; and Epicurus, Epistula ad Pythoclem 87. 45 Moralia 950e. 46 Fr. 157 (= Eusebius, Praep. evang. 3.1.4). Cf. Moralia 658b: “With reference to this [sc. the heat of the sun’s rays] Archilochus has asserted in accord with physics (eijrhkevnai fusikw`"): ‘I hope the Dog star will wither lots of them with his keen rays.’” 47 With the exception of Philo, see: Aristeas, Epistle to Philocrates: pro;" to; n fusiko; n lovgon (143); th;n fusikh;n diavnoian tou` novmou (171; cf. 222); Aristobulus, fr. 2 and fr. 5: fusikw`"; Josephus, J. A. 1.18.4: fusiologiva"; and 1.34.1: fusiologei`n Mwush`". 48 The end of fragment 4 (= Eusebius, Praep. evang. 13.12.8).
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and only God, is manifest throughout the Greek poetic tradition as well. For example, having substituted qeov" for Div" and Zeuv" in the Orphic poem conserved in fragment 4, Aristobulus affirms: “I think I have clearly shown that the power of God runs through all things (dia; pavntwn ejsti;n hJ duvnami" tou` qeou`).” What is striking here in Aristobulus’ assessment is that even Greek poetry bears witness to the power of the God of Moses!49 The accent placed on philosophical inquiry, and particularly in the area of physics, is unmistakable. It is Philo of Alexandria, however, who will advance this philosophic and exegetical project to its fullest. Fusikw`" in Philo: Disclosing Moses’ Philosophical Rationale Philo’s apologetic is nowhere more apparent than in his numerous uses of the adverb fusikw'" and its superlative fusikwvtata, which, when taken together, occur a total of thirty-one times throughout his corpus.50 It is not surprising, therefore, that Philo does not employ the term in his philosophical works, nor in his books on the Decalogue and the Special Laws. Fusikw'" is only employed in his Allegorical Commentary—a commentary which is predominantly on the book of Genesis,51 the title of which, hJ Gevnesi" kovsmou,52 would have already suggested to its Hellenistic readers 49
Cf. the same hermeneutic which is adopted by Philo with regard to Homer’s and Hesiod’s physiologiae (Prov. 2.40–41). See below. 50 Leg. 1.25 (Gen 2:5); Leg. 1.39 (Gen 2:7); Leg. 1.100 (Gen 2:17); Leg. 2.5 (Gen 2:18); Leg. 2.12 (Gen 1:24 and 2:19); Leg. 3.177 (Gen 48:15); Leg. 3.185 (Gen 3:15); Cher. 57 (Gen 3:20); Sacr. 102 (Exod 13:12); Post. 85 (Deut 30:14); Post. 130 (Gen 21:19); Post. 135 (Gen 29:31); Deus 11 (1 Sam 2:5); Ebr. 9 (Gen 27:30); Ebr. 99 (Exod 32:17); Ebr. 118 (Num 31:50); Sobr. 48 (Gen 9:25); Conf. 60 (Gen 11:2); Her. 254 (Gen 27:33); Fug. 19 (Exod 8:22); Fug. 128 (Gen 25:8); Fug. 149 (Gen 38:20–23); Fug. 194 (Gen 24:16); Mut. 92 (Gen 35:18); Mut. 97 (Gen 48:5); Mut. 147 (Gen 17:16); Mut. 156 (Gen 17:17); Somn. 1.221 (Gen 37:31); Abr. 241 (Gen 14:10); QG 4.30 (Gen 19:1); QG 4.100 (Gen 24:16). With respect to the Quæstiones et solutiones in Genesin and in Exodum the count only takes into consideration what has come down to us in the Greek fragments. It is quite realistic to suppose that Philo employed the adverb and its superlative quite regularly throughout this work, the trace of which is still visible in the Latin text, such as in the words naturaliter, naturale, etc. The superlative-adjective naturalissimam (QG 4.30), for example, was originally the superlative-adverb fusikwvtata. I suspect there are other cases of this as well. 51 Exactly twenty-one out of the total thirty-one occurrences are used in connection with the allegorical exegesis of Genesis: seven of these are used in connection with Adam and Eve and their descendants; two for the sons of Noah; eight for the narrative of Abraham, including the events connected to Lot, Hagar, and Ishmael; four to speak of the antagonism between Jacob and Esau; and four for the descendants of Jacob. 52 The title is attested in various manuscripts (see: John W. Wevers, ed., Septuaginta. Vetus Testamentum Graecum, Vol. 1: Genesis (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1974)). Even if the title of Philo’s Septuagint was simply Gevnesi" (Post. 127), hJ Gevnesi" kovsmou of Moses is
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that the text in question belongs to the domain of physics.53 Accordingly, whether accompanied by a verb whose subject is almost always Moses, or unaccompanied by a verb, Philo employs fusikw'" in order to justify the philosophical rationale behind Moses’ words. “For,” he says, “God had not rained upon the earth, and there was no man to work the earth” (Gen 2:5). fusikwvtata! For (gavr), if God does not rain upon the senses the means of receiving the objects which are presented to it, then neither will the intellect have anything to work nor elaborate upon with respect to sense-perception. (Leg. 1.25)
In this particular passage, the superlative, which is unaccompanied, directly follows the biblical citation and apparently introduces the allegorical interpretation.54 Yet its role in the allegorical procedure is in fact quite minimal. The gavr, for instance, which explains why what has just been said by Moses in Genesis 2:5 is fusikwvtata, does not justify the allegorical interpretation, namely that a[nqrwpo" is an allegory for nou`" and gh` an allegory for ai[sqhsi", but rather the philosophical rationale inherent in the allegory: the nous is incapable of “working” because no objects of sense have been presented to the faculty of sense perception. This, Philo assures his readers, has been said “very philosophically.” For if God has not rained upon the faculty of sense perception the objects of sense perception, then neither would the intellect have anything with which to work. We see the same allegorical procedure followed by a philosophical explanation in other passages. “But of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil you shall not eat” (Gen 2:17). Therefore, this tree is not in the garden. For if he bids them to eat of every tree in the garden, but not to eat from this one, then it is clear that it is not in the garden; kai; fusikw'"! For, as I said, it is there in essence (oujsiva≥) but it is not there potentially (dunavmei). For just as all the impressions are potentially in the wax but only one has been stamped, thus also in the soul which is waxlike, all the representations are potentially contained, but only one in execution. (Leg. 1.100) For the second man a helper is introduced. First, it is created; for he says “let us make a helper for him”; and second, it is later to him who is to be helped. For he formed the intellect before and now is about to form its helper. But even
implied. See for example Abr. 1: Tw`n iJerw`n novmwn ejn pevnte bivbloi" ajnagrafevntwn hJ prwvth kalei`tai kai; ejpigravf etai Gevnesi" ajpo; th`" tou` kovsmou genevsew". 53 In this regard, I suspect that the reason why Philo never employs the term fusikw`", nor fusiologiva, in his De opificio is because it hardly would have been necessary for him to argue that the opening chapter of Genesis, Moses’ cosmogony, discusses a theme relative to physics; its physical doctrine, like that of the Timaeus, is overt. 54 Cf. Leg. 1.25, 1.100, 3.177, 3.185; Sacr. 102; Conf. 60; Ebr. 99; Her. 254; Fug. 149.
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These passages display a reasoning which is more or less uniform, and whose formula is discernable in a number of passages: a biblical verse, the adverb or superlative form of fusikw'", and a gavr. It is the gavr in fact which explains why the biblical verse was said fusikw'". For what Moses has just declared reveals a philosophical veracity about the soul, its organization, and its operations. Furthermore, as we saw with Heraclitus, the adverb does not substantiate the allegorical substitution: namely, that man is allegorically the intellect of the soul and the earth sense perception; that the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is allegorically the impressions, good and bad, which the intellect is able to receive; and, that Adam is allegorically the ruling principle of the soul and Eve, Adam’s helper, the faculty of sensation. More precisely the adverb indicates the philosophical rationale inherent in the manner in which Moses has expressed himself in introducing these biblical elements: namely, that Adam is unable to work without it having rained on the earth because the intellect of the soul is unable to function without there being objects of sense perception; that the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is both in the garden and not in it because potentially all the impressions already exist in the soul, yet not in essence; and finally, that Eve is created after Adam and is his helper because philosophically speaking the faculty of sensation, the helper of the intellect, is posterior to the creation of the intellect. Fusikw'" indicates that what Moses has conveyed under the cloak of allegory had been expressed in accord with a philosophical rationale, the explanation of which is given through the use of gavr. The adverb has nothing to do with disclosing a hidden “nature” equivalent to the verse’s allegorical sense,56 but rather with disclosing the philosophical rationale behind Moses’ allegorical presentation of biblical characters and events. Why the adverb fusikw'"? Because at least from the examples thus far examined, what Philo has revealed in Moses’ words is a philosophical doctrine on the soul, its ruling principle, and its various operations. These doctrines are not only Stoic in
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The passage continues with this philosophical justification by noting that even according to the leading physicians and natural philosophers (kata; tou;" ajrivstou" tw`n ijatrw`n kai; fusikw`n) “the hegemonic part of the soul is older than the soul as a whole, and the irrational part younger” (6). 56 Contra Goulet, La philosophie de Moïse, 36–8, 544–45; and Graffigna, “fusikw`" ajllhgorei`n,” 110–13.
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nature,57 but properly speaking they belong to the domain of physics— thus, the reason behind Philo’s use of fusikw'". The examples above, except for the one in Legum allegoriae 2.5, present the adverb or superlative without a verbal accompaniment. In general, however, Philo employs the adverb with a verb whose subject is, quite obviously, Moses. Throughout Philo’s commentary, it is Moses himself who introduces (eijsavgei) persons or events fusikw'",58 who speaks (levgei) of them fusikwvtata,59 who presents (parivsthsi) them fusikwvtata,60 who names (prosagoreuvei) them,61 writes (ajnagravfetai) about them,62 assimilates (ejxwmoiou`nto) them,63 adds to (prostivqetai) them,64 and divides (diairei`) them fusikw'".65 In all of these passages the adverb or superlative is used to disclose the philosophical rationale inherent in Moses’ allegory. Thus, The ever-virgin virtue is, as Moses claims, absolutely not known by a man. For in truth no mortal has been permitted to defile its incorruptible nature, nor to know distinctly its essence. If, however, one is able to know it, he never ceases to hate it and to be on his guard against it. For this reason Moses introduces fusikw`" Leah as hated. For those who are lead by the spells of pleasures with respect to Rachel, who is sense-perception, these ones Leah, who is above the passions, cannot tolerate; wherefore, finding themselves treated with contempt by her, they hate her (Post. 135).
In this commentary, fusikw'" denotes the philosophical rationale behind Moses’ presentation of Leah as hated. This is accomplished in two steps: first, Leah is an allegory for the ever-virgin virtue; second, that this evervirgin virtue is absolutely unknown among humans, and if one comes in contact with it he hates it, is the philosophical rationale behind why (diov)
57
This doctrine is scattered throughout the length of the Allegorical Commentary. See, for example: the hegemonic as the ruling part of the soul: Opif. 117, 154; Leg. 1.59; Spec. 4.69; Mos. 2.239; Virt. 85 (cf. SVF 2.826, 2.827, 2.836, 2.879); the ruling principle which receives impressions like wax: Opif. 18, 150; Leg. 1.61, 3.183; Sacr. 137; Ebr. 8; Agr. 16, 167; Spec. 4.137 (cf. SVF 1.83); as the source (phghv) which extends through the body: Leg. 1.29, 3.185; Post. 127, 138; Deus 83; Fug. 182; Mos. 2.127 (cf. SVF 2.879), or as canals which extend through the organs of sense: Opif. 166; Post. 126–7, 137; Deus 84; Plant. 31; Fug. 182; Mos. 2.82. 58 Post. 130, 135; Somn. 1.221; QG 4.30. 59 Leg. 3.185; Ebr. 118; Fug. 19, 194; Abr. 241. Cf. fusikw`" levgein in Aristotle and Heraclitus. 60 Ebr. 9. 61 Mut. 92. 62 Sobr. 48 63 Mut. 97. 64 Fug. 128. 65 Post. 85.
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Moses presents Leah fusikw'".66 We could pursue the rest of Philo’s uses of fusikw'" and fusikwvtata in like manner and we would find the same principle. Nevertheless, a particular objection has been raised with respect to the passage above, as with others, concerning the usage of the adverb fusikw'" to disclose a philosophical doctrine which explains why virtue is hated among humans.67 Contrary to the doctrine on the ruling principle of the soul and its operations, which is clearly in the domain of physics, would not a doctrine on virtue be more appropriately represented through the use of another adverb, say hjqikw`"? Apparently Philo did not think so and there are good reasons for justifying why “virtue is hated among humans” is a doctrine appropriate to the physics of Philo’s milieu. First, it is quite possible that Philo actually understood virtue as part of physical inquiry as was common in Hellenistic philosophy. In the De mutatione nominum 73, for example, virtue is viewed, in the manner of a Stoic physico-ethical doctrine, as the goal of physics, and along similar lines Plutarch remarks that Stoic physical speculation (hJ fusikh; qewriva) is pursued for no other purpose than for the discrimination of good and evil (pro;" th;n peri; ajgaqw`n h] kakw`n diavstasin).68 Good and evil, virtue and vice, are thus conceived of within the scope of physical doctrine in the sense that physics concerns itself with what produces good and what produces evil in the nature of man.69 Second, it must be borne in mind that Philo’s allegory is properly an allegory of the soul; it is the soul which abhors the ever-virgin virtue here, and as such the proper philosophical domain in which the nature of the soul and its spiritual well being are discussed is physics.70 Thus instead of seeing Philo as changing, transforming, or even extending the signification of Stoic physical allegory to include “theology” or “psychical allegory,” 66
Cf. Fug. 49 wherein the invincible virtue, Tamar, is not found because this conforms with philosophical truth. 67 Cf. Fug. 49, 128, and 194. This problem is particularly noted by Goulet, La philosophie de Moïse, 36, and on account of the ethical doctrine that these exegeses apparently disclose Goulet is led to conclude that what fusikw`" must therefore designate is the hidden “nature” of Scripture rather than a physical doctrine on the soul. See however my critique of this position in n. 16, and the tenable solution offered above for why Philo nevertheless employs fusikw`" . 68 De stoicorum repugnantiis 1035d. Cf. Eusebius, Praep. evang. 1.8.9. 69 This ethical or spiritual component inherent in the physics of Hellenistic philosophy has largely been explored by Pierre Hadot. The spiritual/ethical exercise of bringing into harmony one’s nous and the cosmos cannot be separated out from Hellenistic physics. See particularly, Qu’est-ce que la philosophie antique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1995), 200–11, 316–21; and “La philosophie antique: une éthique ou une pratique?,” Étude de philosophie ancienne, 207–32. 70 See Diogenes Laertius, 7.40: th`≥ de; yuch`≥ to; fusikovn. Cf. 9.22; and Eusebius, Praep. evang. 15.20.2.
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what has changed is more accurately the domain of physics, here incorporating its ethical goal.71 Finally, we might conclude by noting that the topics treated in Moses’ Gevnesi" kovsmou—God, cosmos, the nature of man, and allegorically the nature of the soul—are all subjects proper to physics. Philo’s apologetic use of fusikw'" attempts to present Moses’ text as a philosophical treatise which treats those subjects appropriate to physics. The reading or studying of such a text, therefore, must ultimately lead, like all philosophical pursuits, to a virtuous and pious lifestyle in the worship of the cosmos’ Creator. This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in the physiological doctrine which Philo also claims Moses taught.
III. Fusiologiva: A Brief History of the Term, Its Meaning, and Its Object of Study The term fusiologiva seems to make its first appearance in the testimonials of later philosophers and doxographers as they were apt to discuss their pre-Socratic forerunners. As such we are informed that Thales,72 Archelaus,73 Parmenides,74 and Anaxagoras75 each wrote a physiologia, and we may rightly conjecture that the grand majority of physikoi wrote treatises on Physis, the so-called Peri; fuvsew",76 whose object of inquiry was the material world, its genesis, the genesis and corruption of each of its physical phenomena, and their causes or cause (ajrchv). In this respect, Anaxagoras’
71
“Physical allegory,” a modern construct, is properly an exegesis which discloses a philosophical doctrine belonging to the branch of philosophy called physics; as such Philo’s exegeses are correctly, if we wish to keep the term, physical allegories. However, Philo’s exegesis has often been labeled as “psychical allegory” seeing that it discloses a doctrine on the soul. But this is incorrect; there is no part of philosophy called “psychics” and therefore no such thing as “psychical allegory” in a strict sense. The branch of philosophy which dealt with the soul in Philo’s milieu was of course physics. 72 Strabo, Geog. 14.1.7. 73 Suda, s.v. jArcevlao": sunev taxe de; Fusiologivan. 74 Suda, s.v. Parmeniv dh": e[ graye de; fusiologiva n. See also Plutarch, Moralia, 1114c, from which we actually have a brief list of the subjects discussed by Parmenides: kai; ga;r peri; gh`" ei[rhke polla; kai; peri; oujranou` kai; hJl ivou kai; selhvnh" kai; a[strwn kai; gevnesin ajnqrwvpwn ajfhvghtai: kai; oujde;n a[rrhton, wJ" ajnh;r ajr cai`" ejn fusiologiva≥ . 75 Plutarch, Pericles 4.6; and Origen, Contra Celsum 4.77: fusiologiva th`" jAnaxagovrou. Cf. Diogenes Laertius, 8.56. 76 A title more than likely assigned by later doxographers than by the pre-Socratics themselves. See Hadot, “Remarques sur les notions de phusis et de nature,” Études de philosophie ancienne, 78.
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physiologia, or as Aristotle labeled it kosmopoiiva,77 is of particular interest since it posits Nous as the ajrchv of its cosmological arrangement. This is significant as we move ahead in our understanding of physiologia since its ajrchv is not necessarily defined as being physical and of the physical world. This will create a certain amount of confusion, as it has,78 seeing that both the observation of Physis which leads to a physical ajrchv and the observation of Physis which leads to a metaphysical ajrchv are both designated by the same term, physiologia.79 Pressing forward, we are also informed that Zeno wrote a physiologia, 80 Chrysippus engaged in physiological inquiry,81 Aristotle wrote a physiologia on plants which is apparently lost,82 and Plato’s Timaeus was venerated by later readers on account of its physiological doctrine.83 Additionally, we learn that Epicurus dabbled in physiological studies, particularly with respect to mythological interpretations;84 and this brings us to the Stoic physikoi, who likewise claimed to have found hidden physiologiae in the 77
Metaph. 1.4, 985a19. Cf. the kosmopoiiva of Empedocles (Ph. 2.4, 196a22). This is significant of course considering that Moses also wrote a kosmopoiiva, which Philo adopts as the title of his treatise: PERI THS KATA MWUSEA KOSMOPOIIAS. See David T. Runia, intro. & trans., On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001), 96–7. Cf. the other 20 occurrences of the term: Opif. 3, 4, 6, 129, 170; Post. 64; Gig. 22; Plant. 86; Fug. 68, 178; Abr. 2, 258; Mos. 2.37; Decal. 97; Spec. 4.123; Praem. 1 (x2); QG 1.1 (x3). 78 Various authors have misunderstood either Philo’s physiologia (e.g., Rizzerio, Clemente di Alessandria e la “fusiologiva veramente gnostica,” 127) or that of his predecessors (e.g., Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire, 97–102) due to the fact that the contemplation of Nature can posit either a physical or a metaphysical ajrchv / ai[tion. 79 Thus, Eusebius’ distinction between hJ tw` n aij sqhtw`n fusiologiva and hJ tw` n nohtw` n fusiologiva (Praep. evang. 7.3.2); the distinction made by Clement of Alexandria between ta; peri; ajr cw`n fusiologhqevnta of the Greeks and the Christian hJ tw`≥ o[nti gnwstikh;n fusiologiva (Strom. 4.1.3). In Philo, as we will see, this distinction is noted as the difference between astrology and physiologia (specifically, Congr. 49; Her. 98; Abr. 77). Aristotle, as we have seen, spoke of this difference as that between pre-Socratic physical inquiry and his theological inquiry (qeologikhv) . And Plato simply prefers to speak of astrology, differentiating between those who contemplate the stars with the eyes of sense-perception and those who contemplate them with the eyes of the intellect (Rep. 7.529b; cf. Tim. 47a). 80 Diogenes Laertius, 7.174: Peri; th`" tou` Zhv nwno" fusiologiva". Cf. Posidonius’ Fusiko;" lovgo" (7.140ff.). 81 See Diogenes Laertius, 7.187, and Philo, Ebr. 91 (= SVF 3.301). 82 De sensu 4, 442b26: th`≥ fusiologiva≥ th`≥ peri; tw`n futw`n. 83 See particularly the commentaries of Proclus (In Tim. 1.1; In Parm. 641.15–18); Proclus also uses the term kosmopoiiva when speaking about Plato’s Timaeus (cf. Anon., De philosophia platonica 22.30; Eusebius, Praep. evang. 2.6.24). It seems that as early as Galen the Timaeus was regarded as a physiologia, contrasted in fact with that of Hippocrates (De methodo medendi 14.10.17; De placitis Hipp. et Plat. 8.5.13). See also David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (PhilAnt 44; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), 45–57. 84 Diogenes Laertius, 10.78, 87, 132, 143 (= Ratae sententiae 12.3).
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works of Homer and Hesiod.85 Furthermore, both Plutarch and Chaeremon affirm that the Egyptians passed their ancient physiologia down to their children through allegories and symbols.86 And Strabo tells us that even the Druids practiced physiologia.87 Apparently anybody who was anyone in the ancient world pursued the contemplation of the cosmos. In this context, it is hardly surprising that Philo should have also declared what would have only been too obvious: namely that a certain Hebrew by the name of Moses also wrote a physiologia which proclaimed as its ajrchv the one and only God.88 Before looking at Moses’ physiologia,89 however, it will be useful to specify the precise nature and content of this science, especially since Philonic scholars have sought to distinguish Philo’s physiologia from those of his Hellenistic predecessors. Plato informs us that what the pre-Socratics call natural science (peri; fuvsew" iJstoriva) consists in “knowing the causes of everything (in heaven and on earth), why it comes to be, why it perishes, and why it exists.”90 Aristotle equally informs us that the physiologoi investigate “the phenomena of the moon, the sun, and the stars, and finally the genesis of the universe.”91 And Plutarch seems to provide us with the subjects treated in Parmenides’ physiologia: “things concerning the earth, the heavens, the sun, the moon, the stars, and even the genesis of man.”92 Whereas Diogenes Laertius simply states that “natural science concerns itself with the cosmos and everything in it.”93 And Eusebius notes that Plato’s physiologia treats the same subjects found in Stoic allegorists’ physiologiae: namely, “the heavens, the sun, the moon, the stars, and all the phenomena concerning the totality of the cosmos and its parts.”94 It is quite evident just from this preliminary 85
Particularly Chrysippus, Peri; tw`n ajrcaivwn fusiolovgwn (Diogenes Laertius, 7.187), and Pseudo-Heraclitus, Homeric Allegories. See also: Plutarch, fr. 157 (= Eusebius, Praep. evang. 3.3.1); Philo, Prov. 2.40–41; and Cicero, De natura deorum 2.24–27. 86 Chaeremon, fr. 12 (= Tzetzes, Exegesis in Illiadem 1.97); Plutarch, Isis and Osiris, passim. Cf. Eusebius, Praep. evang. 3.4.1. 87 Geog. 4.4.4. 88 To foreshadow a bit of my argument, Moses’ Genesis opens: jEn ajrch`≥ . . . and posits God as that beginning/cause. This opening along with the title of the text, Gevnesi" kovsmou, already presents the text as a physiologia, a study on the cosmos. 89 According to Philo’s apologetic. See especially Somn. 1.120: fusiologivan auj tou`. 90 Phaed. 96a: eij dev nai ta;" aij tiv a" eJ kavstou, dia; tiv giv gnetai e{kaston kai; dia; tiv ajpovllutai kai; dia; tiv e[sti . . . kai; ta; peri; to;n oujr anovn te kai; th;n gh`n pavq h. 91 Metaph. 1.2, 982b15: periv te tw` n th`" selhvnh" paqhmavtwn kai; tw` n peri; to; n h{l ion kai; a[ stra kai; peri; th`" tou` panto;" genevsew". 92 Moralia 1114c, cited above n. 74. 93 Diogenes Laertius, 1.18: fusiko;n me; n to; peri; kov smou kai; tw`n ej n aujtw`.≥ 94 Praep. evang. 2.6.24: periv te oujranou` kai; hJlivou kai; selhvnh" kai; a[strwn kai; e[ ti peri; tou` suvmpanto" kovsmou kai; tw`n touvtou merw`n kecwrismevnw" fusiologhvsa".
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survey what subjects are treated in physiologia. We should therefore not be surprised to find the same definition in Philo: physiologia “concerns itself with the heavens and everything in it.”95 Or put otherwise: physiologia is “the philosophy of the super-terrestrial, which treats the phenomena of air, and the sublimer philosophy of the heavens and the beings existing therein.”96 There can be no doubt about it, Philo’s concept of physiologia is every bit the same as his Greek predecessors. We are also informed that Stoic allegorists have claimed that such physiologiae were hidden in the poems of Homer and Hesiod. Thus Plutarch’s celebrated passage: Among the Greeks as well as the Barbarians, the venerable physiologia was a physical discourse veiled in the myths (lovgo" h\n fusiko;" ejgkeklummevno" muvqoi"), a theologia in the manner of the mysteries more than often concealed by enigmas and hidden meanings. (fr. 157)
Not surprisingly, this physical doctrine which is hidden in the myths of the Greek gods also discusses such subjects as the sun, the moon, the stars, the air, etc. Likewise, Posidonius’ Fusiko;" lovgo" discusses these same subjects, for example: the lovgo" qeov" which animates the physical world (Diogenes Laertius 7.134), the kovsmo" which is spherical (140), the moon (145), providence (149), hail and snow (153), and climatic zones (155). The physiologia disclosed by Stoic exegetes is in fact no different. According to Heraclitus’ Homeric Allegories, the physical doctrine of Homer97 discusses many of the same subjects: epidemics which are caused by atmospheric circumstances (11.1), the movement of the spheres (12.3), the primary elements of physis (22.1), the creation of the world (40.2), the demonstration that the world is spherical (46.1), the size of the sun with respect to the earth (46.6), and climatic zones (50.1). In like fashion, Philo also lists these very subjects as the content of Homer’s and Hesiod’s physiologiae: the contemplation of the nature of the heavens, the cycle of the sun, the waxing of the moon, the tides, the rising of the rivers, the changes of the atmosphere, the changing of the seasons, the generation of animals, the properties of planets, the production of fruits, and many other phenomena which are innumerable . . . these passages indicate hidden physiologiae (inclusae physiologiae),
95
Ebr. 91: ta; de; peri; oujranou` kai; tw`n kat j aujto;n fusiologiva. Cher. 4: th;n metavrsion tw`n kata; to;n ajevr a sumbainovntwn kai; th;n metevwron tw`n kata; to;n oujrano;n uJparcovntwn filosofivan metiwvn. 97 In place of such terms as fusiko;" lovgo", which one never finds in Heraclitus, and fusiologiva which is only employed once (72.1), Heraclitus prefers to speak of a fusikh; qewriva which Homer wished to express through the use of allegories (12.1; 16.5; 25.12; 36.1; 49.3; 68.8; 75.2). Cf. 24.5: o{lon te to; peri; fuvsew" aijnigmatw`de" ajllhgorei`. 96
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whose mystery it is forbidden to reveal to those whose heads are not anointed. (Prov. 2.40)
Philo’s reading has in store for us a bit of a surprise as we shall see. But the point to stress at present is that in all of these examples the subjects which physiologia investigates are the same, and, as we shall presently see, Moses’ physiologia is no different. Fusiologiva in the Philonic Corpus Philo employs the term fusiologiva a total of fifteen times, which in itself is quite significant given that no other writer in antiquity uses the term more often, until Galen’s appropriation of the term a century and a half later.98 By way of crude summary, these fifteen occurrences can be divided as follows: the definition of physiologia as the contemplation of the heavens and the heavenly bodies (Cher. 4; Ebr. 91, 92), which is, on the one end, opposed to astrology (Her. 98), and on the other end, leads to the study of ethical philosophy (Agr. 16; Mut. 76, 220), or the acquisition of virtue in particular (Mut. 73); the search of the causes of physical phenomena in general (Aet. 138); the observation of Nature or its phenomena which leads to the recognition of its Creator (Cher. 87, 121; Prov. 2.40); and finally the contemplation of a physical place (Leg. 1.60; Somn. 1.120, 1.184). The reader may be surprised to see that I’ve included in this count those passages which have traditionally been understood as hermeneutical in nature. Yet as we shall see, physiologia, in all of its occurrences, is understood by Philo as the observation of Nature or the cosmos which ultimately leads to the comprehension and recognition of its transcendent metaphysical Architect 98
Philo is by far an important link in the transmission and use, notably apologetic, of this term. To provide some statistics: Plutarch uses the term eleven times (counting his fragments), and then Galen thirty times, which is also very significant. Like Philo on occasion, physiologia deals with the investigation of the ruling principle of the soul. Origen employs the term seven times; Iamblicus seven times; and both Sextus Empiricus and Diogenes Laertius employ the term eight times each, mostly in the context of doxography. Then in the fourth century we have a huge elevation in the term’s usage by Christian “philosophers”: Gregory of Nyssa eighteen times, and Eusebius an astonishing fifty times, which is largely to be accounted for by the simple fact that “history” as mapped out in his Praeparatio evangelica is nothing but a long development of physiological speculation preparing the way for its crowning moment, Christian physiologia! Nevertheless, Neoplatonic commentators firmly hold their own ground in claiming this philosophical tradition as their rightful heritage: Proclus employs the term forty-one times, Simplicius twenty-four, and John Philoponus twenty-seven times. Noteworthy also is that in both of these traditions, Christian and Neoplatonic, the term is often used in conjunction with a particular text: Genesis and the Timaeus. The count was done with the aid of the TLG.
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and Creator, including, according to Philo, the physiologiae of Homer and Hesiod. We have already seen that Philo defines physiologia no differently than the definitions given within the Greek philosophical tradition.99 We would be wrong, however, to deduce from Philo’s definition that physiologia is a physical (i.e., non-metaphysical) science, little more than the astrological observation of the sensible cosmos. The contemplation of the cosmos for Philo can only lead from the sensible world to the intelligible world. This is a characteristic inherent in his Platonism, and furthermore stressed throughout his corpus.100 Any observation of the cosmos within this Platonic framework should ultimately and unequivocally lead the observer to the recognition of its Demiurge. On the contrary, the observation of the heavens which confines itself to the physical realm of Physis, and thus mistakes the created for its Creator Philo labels as astrology. This distinction is readily discernable in Philo’s commentary on Abraham’s migration from Chaldea to Haran, which is allegorically the soul’s migration from astrology to physiologia (metanistamevnh" th`" yuch`" ajpo; ajstronomiva" ejpi; fusiologivan), in other words, “from insecure conjecture to firm apprehension, from the created to the uncreated, from the cosmos to its Maker and Father” (Her. 98).101 In other passages Philo mentions that the Chaldeans,102 celebrate visible beings and have no idea of those which are invisible and intelligible; they examine the numeric order which regulates the revolutions of the sun, the moon, the stars, planets, fixed stars according to the changes of the yearly seasons and the sympathy which exists between the things of the heavens and those of the earth and think that the cosmos itself is God; not without impiety, they assimilate the creation to its Author. (Abr. 69)
The portrait which Philo paints here is revealing. There is no difference between what is contemplated by the astrologer and the physiologue; for the subjects mentioned above belong to both sciences. Rather, the difference is how they are contemplated, or to what conclusions the observer is led. The astrologer “admires the created more than he who created it, and the cosmos more than God, or rather he considers the cosmos itself as a god, the absolute master, and thus not as the work of God” (Congr. 49). The
99
Ebr. 91 and Cher. 4. Cited above n. 95 and 96. Most significantly: Opif. 8, 71; Deus 31; Her. 279; Somn. 1.184; Decal. 100; Spec. 1.49, 3.1; Praem. 45; Virt. 65; QG 1.6, 3.3, etc. 101 See also Congr. 48; Abr. 69–77; Migr. 178. 102 Cf. Jubilees 12:16–18, where the same critique seems to be already present in the Judaism of Philo’s milieu, and specifically in connection with Abraham’s departure from Chaldea. 100
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physiologue, on the other hand, in observing these same phenomena arrives at the knowledge of their Creator and Cause.103 Given Philo’s rather stern critique of astrology, we might be tempted to conclude that Philo’s critique of Stoic allegorists’ physiologiae would have been similar since it also equates God with physis. Yet it is significant to note that this was not the case from Philo’s perspective. Homeric and Hesiodic physiologia also bear witness to the divine art of God, and not to a material cosmos as Stoic doctrine would have attested. This is why, in a treatise which argues for the providence of the one and only God by means of, primarily, demonstrating that the causes of physical phenomena lead us to conclude and affirm the providence of God, Philo defends with zeal the physiologia of the poets. Are you ignoring, O lover of wisdom, that by these words you have just accused the whole human race of folly; but that’s not really how things are. For if the glory of Homer and Hesiod has reached as far as the whole earth it is on account of the hidden meanings of their words (sententiae sub rebus comprehensae), whose numerous commentators are filled with admiration, and which, from their own epoch until our days, have been admired. But if they have appeared delinquent in certain things, it is not necessary to blame them; but rather to honor them with praises for all the just things they’ve accomplished and for what they have shown to be useful in life. For it is suitable to celebrate the world itself, not to give attention to what is vile on this earth such as scarabs, ants, lice, and other such things, but to contemplate the nature of the heavens, the cycle of the sun, the waxing of the moon, the tides, the rising of the rivers, the changes of the atmosphere, the changing of the seasons, the generation of animals, the properties of planets, the production of fruits, and many other phenomena which are innumerable, and which being made by the divine art (divina factum arte) are very beautiful to admire. Neither do these passages contain blasphemies against the gods, but they contain hidden physiologiae (inclusae physiologiae), whose mystery it is forbidden to reveal to those whose heads are not anointed. (Prov. 2.40) 103
Cf. Eusebius’ critique of Stoic physiologia vis-à-vis Hebraic physiologia: “For the Hebrews were, among all humans since the origin of life, the first and the only . . . to have applied themselves piously to the physiologia of the cosmos (th`≥ peri; tou` panto;" fusiolofiva)≥ ; it is as such that they have reasoned that the primary elements of corporeal things, earth, water, air, fire, of which they have perceived this cosmos to be composed, and the sun, the moon, and the stars, were not gods but the works of God” (Praep. evang. 7.3.2). Despite the polemic which is visible throughout his commentary, Eusebius nevertheless notes a certain distinction that merits our attention, and which he later labels as the difference between a physiologia of sensible bodies (hJ tw`n aijsqhtw`n fusiologiva) and a physiologia of intelligibles (hJ tw`n nohtw`n fusiologiva). Again, the difference is between a physiologia which terminates in postulating physical elements as its ajrchv, and a physiologia which ascends through the physical to intelligible and incorporeal bodies or God himself. Cf. the same difference drawn by Clement of Alexandria between ta; peri; ajrcw`n fusiologhqevnta and hJ tw`≥ o[nti gnwstikh; fusiologiva (Strom. 4.1–2).
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Philo’s point is that even Homeric and Hesiodic physiologia, and Philo specifies what he means by this—the contemplation of the heavens, the cycle of the sun, the waxing of the moon, the tides, the rising of the rivers, the changes of the atmosphere, etc.104—celebrate and bear witness to the divine art. This could be none other than the divine art of the God of Moses! We should not be too startled by this reading since we have already seen that Aristobulus employs a similar hermeneutic when he reads the Orphic hymn of Zeus as also bearing witness to the God of Moses (fr. 4). Philo is thus able to see the physiologiae of Stoic allegorists as yet another proof of the providence of God because there is in fact no difference between their physiologia, and the Nature it depicts, and Moses’ physiologia. Nature and the contemplation of its cosmological phenomena attest to the existence of God and his divine providence. The remaining passages shall highlight this further. The texts De cherubim 87 and 121 further our understanding of physiologia in the Philonic corpus by providing us with yet other examples of the investigation of natural or cosmological phenomena through which means the knowledge of the cosmos’ creator is discerned. De cherubim 87 revolves around the allegorical meaning of “Sabbath.” Philo comments: “And therefore in his laws, Moses often calls the Sabbath, which means “rest,” God’s Sabbath not man’s, having here attached an essential physiological point (aJptovmeno" fusiologiva" ajnagkaiva"). For, of all the things which exist there is only one which truly rests; this is God.” Commentators not being able to make heads or tails out of Philo’s elusive use of the term here— which in fact seems quite clear to me—have concluded that it must convey a meaning synonymous with “speaking allegorically.” Yet as elsewhere, Philo is here referring to the physiological doctrine taught by Moses which only becomes visible through, first, the allegorical substitution “Sabbathrest,” then second, the realization that Moses is speaking of God’s rest. The physiological doctrine is simply that upon observing Nature, wherein each and every one of its phenomena is coming into being or perishing, what is discerned is the knowledge of its Creator which is the only being at rest. This is why, according to Philo, Moses reveals an essential physiological point when he speaks of God’s Sabbath. Likewise, Philo attests that Leviticus 25:23 discloses a physiological doctrine: “The earth shall not be sold; ‘for all the earth is mine seeing that you are strangers and sojourners before me.’” Philo’s commentary on this verse, which extends through several paragraphs and which in fact ends 104
The term is thus not to be equated with “allegorical interpretation,” but with the contemplation of the cosmos.
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the treatise (Cher. 104–129) is itself quite remarkable on several points. The first is its physiological doctrine, which we shall presently take a look at, and the second is the fact that Philo offers no allegorical interpretation to this verse: there is no hidden meaning other than the physiologia which Philo discloses through other means than an allegorical exegesis.105 What is this physiologia? It is none other than the recognition of the Creator and Cause of the cosmos through the observation that the earth is, so to speak, on loan. By whom? Moses, Philo remarks, does not say so that “he who is not uninitiated in physiologia may be aided toward this knowledge” (121). The episteme which Philo speaks of here is not some hidden allegorical sense, but God the epistemological goal of physiologia. For instance, Philo contends that we are all strangers and sojourners on this earth, and that we are only called citizens by an abuse of language. “Only God,” Philo affirms, “is, with a proper usage of the term, a citizen” (121). This has been explained, more or less, in the preceding paragraph where Philo had asserted that “the cosmos and all that is contained in it (to;n kovsmon kai; ta; ejn kovsmw≥) is both the work and the property of its Creator” (119). Is this not the definition of physiologia that we have been encountering throughout this study? Any observation of the earth, the cosmos, and all it contains, must ultimately lead to the conclusion that it is on loan from God, its Creator and Cause. This is the physiological doctrine inherent in Leviticus 25:23. The paragraphs which follow argue this point further. In paragraph 125 Philo even mentions those questions inherent to physiologia when inquiring about the existence of something, such as the earth: it is created “by whom,” “from what,” “with what,” and “for what purpose.” He who is therefore conversant in physiologia will arrive at the knowledge that it is God who is the Cause, who loans out the earth, since Moses had been silent on this point. The texts De somniis 1.120, 1.184, and the Legum allegoriae 1.60 all have as their subject of physiological inquiry a physical place (tovpo"). Of these three the De somniis 1.120 is of particular interest. After citing Genesis 28:11 Philo comments: “One may admire not only his hidden teaching and physiologia (th;n ejn uJponoivai" pragmateivan kai; fusiologivan aujtou`), but also the literal instruction concerning the practice of endurance and fatigue.” What is this physiological doctrine which Philo labels as Moses’ physiologia (fusiologivan aujtou`), and which may even be synonymous with the hidden philosophical teaching (th;n ejn uJponoivai" pragmateivan)? Again, we must look at the larger context of Philo’s commentary which has as its subject Jacob’s vision 105
The same may be said of the previous example, Cher. 87. The physiological doctrine, God is immovable, at rest, is not to be equated with the allegory, “Sabbath-rest.”
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(Genesis 28:10–19). After the explication of the literal sense and its allegorical sense in reference to the soul, Philo begins (133) with its physiological content, which deals with such things as: the air (an allegory of Jacob’s ladder) which extends from the earth to the sphere of the moon (134), which is the last element of the cosmos, and which contains living souls, such as the stars (135), which is furthermore the principle of life for living beings (136), and which is full of daimones (an allegory of the angels) (140), some of which are more earthbound than others (descending on the ladder) (142); the composition of the moon as ethereal and aerial (145); and above all the contemplation of these very phenomena which ultimately leads to a vision of the First Cause by Jacob, “he who sees God” in this very place, the “House of God” (158, 161, 171,184). De somniis 1.184 continues with this same physiological commentary: “Jacob awoke from his sleep and said, ‘The Lord is in this place, yet I knew it not.’ And he was afraid and said, ‘How fearful is this place. This is none other than the House of God and this is the gate of heaven’” (Gen 28:17). Philo comments: “For the most formidable place in physiologia is that wherein one searches where the Existent dwells” (184). This is none other than Moses’ physiological doctrine, exemplified by the patriarch Jacob, who, in contemplating the heavens, arrived at a vision of the Existent. In addition to this physiological interpretation, Philo proceeds to add an additional interpretive layer; for this place (tovpo"), is also the soul, wherein the divine logoi descend and ascend. The soul, and particularly its ruling principle, is also a subject investigated in physiologia, and it is perhaps in this context that we are to understand the physiological doctrine in Legum allegoriae 1.60. Concerning the location of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, we are told that Moses is silent on the subject. Philo suggests that this silence on Moses’ behalf is on purpose “so that he who is uninitiated in physiologia does not regard the place of knowledge with admiration (i{na mh; oJ fusiologiva" ajmuvhto" to;n tovpon th`" ejpisthvmh" qaumavzh≥).” Moses’ silence might therefore be to prevent those uninitiated in physiologia to think, and thus admire, a physical place as its location, such as we find in the De fuga et inventione 179, where “those uninitiated in allegory and the nature which loves to hide itself” (oiJ ajllhgoriva" kai; fuvsew" th`" kruvptesqai filouvsh" ajmuvhtoi) mistook the source in question as a physical source, the river Euphrates. Or again, Philo might have the investigation of the ruling principle of the soul and its location in mind, since indeed the larger context of this passage (56–60) discusses the opinions of both the natural philosopher (fusikov") and the physician (ijatrikov") both of whom partake in
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that division of physiologia which investigates the soul and its ruling principle.106 Those initiated in physiologia, therefore, know that the place of which Moses speaks is the ruling principle of the soul, and not some physical place. Our survey of the meaning and use of the term physiologia in the Philonic corpus yields the following conclusions. First, in no case are we permitted to say that Philo understood physiologia as synonymous with allegorical interpretation or “to speak allegorically.”107 On the contrary, we have seen time and time again that Philo’s understanding of physiologia is every bit the same as that of his Greek predecessors: the contemplation of the cosmos and its phenomena. Philo’s apologetic hinges on this being the case. Second, the Nature revealed through Moses’ physiologia is therefore not some hermeneutical “nature” hidden in Scripture; rather it is the same Nature, the one and only Nature, which is also revealed through Stoic physical allegory. According to the Jewish Platonist, Nature and its cosmological phenomena ultimately bear witness to the existence and providence of God, the Creator of the cosmos. But where is this apologetic leading, and what is at stake? A couple of concluding observations are in line. Philosophy, Physiologia, and the Reading of Scripture in the Synagogues on the Sabbath “Dans chaque école les écrits du fondateur servent de base à l’enseignement.” The words of Pierre Hadot,108 writing on the subject of les grandes écoles philosophiques, equally serve our purpose here with regard to the philosophic and apologetic program of the Jewish ai{resi". Only here it is Moses’ text, and perhaps particularly his Genesis, which serves as the foundational text for the instruction of the most noble branch of philosophical inquiry, the contemplation of the cosmos. This apologetic is perhaps nowhere more vividly portrayed by Philo than through his descriptions of the Sabbath festivals which took place in the synagogues of the Diaspora. 106
See Diogenes Laertius, 7.133. The affinity between anatomy and physiologia is well attested in Philo, who almost mechanically assimilates the physikoi and their methodology with the physicians and their own methodology. See: Cher. 4; Agr. 16; Ebr. 91,92; Her. 98; Mut. 73, 76, 220; Somn. 1.184, Aet. 138; cf. Opif. 132; Leg. 1.59; Spec. 3.117. See also the corpus of Galen in general, and the article “Anatomy and Physiology” in The Oxford Classical Dictionary (ed. S. Hornblower and A. Spawforth: Oxford: Oxford University Press, 19963), 82–85. 107 I suspect that this would equally hold true with Origen’s use of the term fusiologiva (e.g., Contra Celsum 5.36; 8.21; Comm. in Math. 17.7), which is also often taken as synonymous with “speaking allegorically.” 108 “Philosophie, exégèse et contresens,” Études de philosophie ancienne, 4.
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Steven Di Mattei Even now this practice is retained, and the Jews every seventh day occupy themselves with the philosophy of their forefathers, dedicating that time to the acquiring of knowledge and the contemplation of the things of nature (qewriva tw`n peri; fuvsin). For what are our places of prayer throughout the cities but schools of prudence and courage and temperance and justice and also of piety, holiness, and every virtue by which duties to God and humans are discerned and rightly performed. (Mos. 2.216)
What is this ancestral philosophy which Philo claims is still practiced in the synagogues of his day?109 It can be none other than the physiologia practiced by the ancient Hebrews themselves, as recorded by Moses. Thus, we are informed about Abraham’s migration from astrology to physiologia (Her. 98) and of his philosophical activity in general concerning the contemplation of the cosmos.110 Jacob, as we have already seen, is also presented as a physiologue, he, who in contemplating the cosmos arrived at a vision of the Existent (Somn. 1.184). Moses, “the interpreter of Nature’s facts,”111 who, being schooled in the things of nature like Jacob and Abraham, is no novice to physiologia either.112 Eleazer and Ithamar are also presented as the watchers and ministers of the things of nature.113 And last but not least the Israelites themselves are referred to on many occasions as the observers and contemplators of the things of nature,114 or the mind which contemplates God and the cosmos115 seeing that Israel means oJ oJrw`n qeovn.116 Additionally, Philo informs us that humanity in general was created for the sole purpose of contemplating the cosmos, 117 and this is furthermore said in reference to the
109
See also: Prob. 80; Contempl. 30–2; Somn. 2.127; Decal. 100; Spec. 2.61–2. Cf. Aristobulus, fr. 4 (cited above). 110 Mut. 76; Abr. 165: hJ peri; to; n kov smon qewriva. Cf. Lot’s inability to use his faculties for th; n tw`n fuvsew" pragmavtwn ejpivkrisin (Fug. 122). 111 Her. 213: oJ tw` n th`" fuv sew" eJr mhneu;" pragmavtwn. 112 Opif. 8; Her. 213. With respect to his settling in Midian (Exod 2:15) see Leg. 3.1: th`≥ krivsei tw`n fuvsew" pragmavtwn. 113 In regard to Exodus 28:1: oiJ ejpiv skopoi kai; e[foroi tw`n th`" fuv sew" pragmavtwn (Somn. 2.186). 114 Her. 279; Decal. 98; Spec. 1.176; cf. Mos. 2.216. 115 Somn. 2.173: oJ j Israhvl ej sti nou`" qewrhtiko;" qeou` te kai; kov smou. 116 For example: Congr. 51; Mut. 81; Post. 92; Conf. 56. 117 See Philo’s commentary in Spec. 2.45 (cf. Spec. 1.269; 3.202) where he speaks of Greek, Barbarian, and Hebrew as qewroi; th`" fuvsew" kai; tw`n ejn aujth`≥ pavntwn (i.e, “the earth, sea, air and heaven and the various forms of being which inhabit them . . . sun, moon,” etc.). The passage is quite remarkable; those who contemplate such things, i.e., philosophers, become in a sense cosmopolitans (cf. Contempl. 90), who have recognized the world to be a city created by one God, which has for its citizens philosophers. In this context I wonder if we can really speak of the subordination of Greek philosophy to Jewish Scripture (e.g., David Dawson, Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revisions in Ancient Alexandria (Berkeley:
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first man himself, Adam.118 We should likewise not forget that Philo tells us that he also contemplated the cosmos and the heavenly bodies in pursuit of the knowledge of God.119 In all these passages, what Philo seems to be establishing, especially through the examples of Moses, Abraham, and Jacob in particular, is that the ancient Hebrews themselves, like true philosophers, contemplated the cosmos. Why? Because philosophically speaking the contemplation of the cosmos, physiologia, is the sole means through which humanity arrives at the knowledge and thus worship of the Creator and First Cause of the cosmos. The Hebrews were merely the first philosophers to have done so.120 Are we therefore to imagine that the Jews of Philo’s day were still contemplating the cosmos like their forefathers did?121 Or rather, were they not pursuing the contemplation of the cosmos, physiologia, through their reading of Moses on the Sabbath, the study of which leads its practitioners to the recognition and worship of the cosmos’ First Cause?122 The apologetic attempts to establish Moses’ text as the University of California Press, 1992)). It seems quite the reverse: all cultures are subordinated to philosophy. 118 Opif. 77. 119 Spec. 3.1: qewriv a tou` kovsmou kai; tw` n ejn aujtw`≥. 120 Cf. Eusebius, Praep. evang. 7.3.2 where this apologetic is unmistakably present (cited in n. 103). 121 At least in one particular case Philo would have us believe so. The Therapeutae are portrayed in many instances as looking up into the heavens and contemplating the Existent (Contempl. 11, 64–66, 90). 122 This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the reading of Moses’ cosmogony (see Decal. 100). Furthermore, this certainly seems to be how Clement of Alexandria also understood the opening chapter of Genesis—a physiologia which leads to the recognition of the “true” First Cause. The general study on Clement’s hJ tw`≥ o[nti gnwstikh;n fusiologiva (Strom. 4.1.3) is L. Rizzerio, Clemente di Alessandria e la “fusiologiva veramente gnostica.” Yet the author’s conclusion—that Clement’s “truly gnostic physiologia” is “una scienza che interpreta la fuvsi" . . . capace di ritrovare il nohtovn dietro l’aijsqhtovn, e soprattutto il Principio dietro ogni nohtav” (301)—leaves much untreated, notably this element which Clement has labeled as gnwstikhv, the relationship to Moses’ cosmogony which is mentioned in the immediate context, and the fact that the above definition equally defines Philo’s physiologia, even though Rizzerio argues contrariwise: Jacob-Israel as oJ qeo;n oJr w`n certainly seems to imply an epopteia. The difference between Philo’s physiologia and Clement’s is rather this element which Clement labels as gnwstikhv. Clements’ argument, therefore, seems to run as follows: After refuting the principles of the cosmos exposed through Greek physiologia (ta; peri; ajr cw`n fusiologhqevnta (4.2.1), he then proceeds to outline his hJ tw`≥ o[nti gnwstikh;n fusiologiva, the goal of which is to demonstrate that there is only one unique God (4.2.2). This is in itself accomplished through an exposition of Moses’ cosmogony (ejk tou` peri; kosmogoniva" h[rthtai lovgou (3, 2)), which unfortunately Clement never elaborates on. Nevertheless what Clement seems to be saying is that from the reading of Moses’ cosmogony the ajr chv which discloses itself is none other than Christ himself, the Lovgo"—and in this sense Clement’s physiologia is truly gnostic, i.e., truly Christian.
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preeminent philosophical text of the Jewish ai{resi". Just as a student in another philosophical school might study physiologia, not necessarily by sitting outside for long hours contemplating the heavens, but by studying a text which purports to be a contemplation of the cosmos, such as the Timaeus, likewise the Jews, through their reading and studying of Moses’ Scripture are also studying physiologia,123 the goal of which is the recognition and worship of the cosmos’ Creator, the one and only God to which all philosophical schools adhere. The reading of Moses in the synagogues on the Sabbath, then, is merely a continuation of the most venerable and pious of all the philosophical traditions to date, that one which was inaugurated by the ancient Hebrews themselves. Cornell University
123
It is thus Moses’ text, and not the allegorical reading of it, which Philo designates as physiologia (contra Nikiprowetzky, Le commentaire, 103–109; De Decalogo, 150–52). Nevertheless, our conclusions are similar: In reading Scripture on the Sabbath, the Jews are practicing philosophy; but, I would stress, not because Philo has deemed the reading hermeneutic as philosophy/physiologia, but rather the text itself, i.e., its content.
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 33–47
CONSCIENCE AND FREE SPEECH IN PHILO
PHILIP R. BOSMAN
The combined use of the two notions of “conscience” (suneidÒw) and “free speech” (parrhs¤a) in Philo has drawn some scholarly attention. At first glance, the combination seems peculiar, causing Peterson in his seminal survey on parrhs¤a to mark their association in Philo and Josephus as a novelty, the origin of which has not yet been established.1 Subsequent studies followed suit, assuming that the association occurred for the first time—and uniquely—in Hellenistic Judaism of the early imperial age.2 On closer scrutiny, however, it appears that the relationship of frank speaking (and its inverse, inhibition) with the verb sÊnoida and its cognates has a long history which goes back to the earliest phases in the development of both concepts. Viewing these two conceptual frameworks together highlights aspects of their meanings which are neglected in current research.
Studying the Ancient Concept of “Conscience”: Some Observations on Method Conceptual histories are particularly susceptible to eisegesis. Research on the history of conscience has been no exception, with its modern counterpart looming largely, and sometimes even eclipsing the ancient concept. 3 1
E. Peterson, “Zur Bedeutungsgeschichte von parrhs¤a,” in W. Koepp (Hrsg.), Reinhold-Seeberg-Festschrift, 1.Band: Zur Theorie des Christentums (Leipzig: Werner Scholl, 1929), 289–90. 2 A. Momigliano, “Freedom of Speech in Antiquity” in P. P. Wiener (ed.), Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas, Vol. 2 (New York: Scribner, 1974), 262; S. Marrow, “Parrhesia and the New Testament,” CBQ 44 (1982): 431–46. 3 The modern conscience, by no means a fixed entity, is typically defined as both a disposition and a consciousness of moral rectitude with regard to past and future actions; cf. A. Donagan, “Conscience,” Encyclopedia of Ethics, 1:2005; N. Dent, “Conscience,” Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2:579-81,identifies four elements: (1) a person’s moral convictions; (2) the faculty by which a person comes to know and apply moral truths; (3) examination of one’s own morality; (4) guilt. In the ancient conception, the retrospective awareness of having done something wrong predominates; cf. P. R. Bosman, Conscience in Philo and Paul (Tübingen 2003), 16–48.
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Various approaches to the conundrum have been advanced. Blühdorn distinguishes between two main groups of studies: those trying to isolate the essence of the phenomenon behind its historical appearances, and those wishing to elucidate the concept by investigating its historical origins and evolution.4 Within the latter group a further two opposing presuppositions can be distinguished: some scholars regard the notion as coming into being at a particular moment in history; another group regards conscience as a universal human property which at the decisive historical moment found an appropriate linguistic expression.5 All these scholars share the common assumption of conscience as an objective reality more or less independent from its linguistic expression. This assumption has the detrimental effect of allowing the modern concept to slip into the world of the ancient texts. It is consequently either found to be totally absent, partially present, or present in a complete form from a specific point in history.6 How can the meaning of the ancient “conscience” be established? One way would be to approach the ancient concept for what it essentially is, namely, a concept. Cognitive semantics has driven home the fact that information can only be transmitted in the form in which the specific language user has conceptually structured his or her reality.7 Accordingly, a concept such as “conscience” should not be seen as an objectively existing entity, of which a fixed set of properties can be listed. Instead, all concepts are the products of cultural-specific orderings of experience and reality. The researcher of the history of a concept should therefore not only be aware of
4 J.-G. Blühdorn, “Gewissen. I. Philosophisch.” TRE (1984): 193ff. Typical of the former approach may be mentioned H. G. Stoker, Das Gewissen: Erscheinungsformen und Theorien (Bonn: Cohen, 1925). 5 The first group may be represented by B. Snell, Die Entdeckung des Geistes: Studien zur Entstehung des europäischen Denkens bei den Griechen, (3Aufl.; Hamburg: Claasen, 1955), 7–8, 229; see also U. Stebler, Entstehung und Entwicklung des Gewissens im Spiegel der griechischen Tragödie (Bern: Herbert Lang, 1971), 11ff. For the latter group, cf. O. Seel, “Zur Vorgeschichte des Gewissens-Begriffes im altgriechischen Denken,” in H. Kusch (Hrsg.), Festschrift Franz Dornseiff zum 65. Geburtstag (Leipzig: VEB, 1953), 291–319; M. Class, Gewissensregungen in der griechischen Tragödie (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964). 6 Cf. the criticism already levelled in different terms by J. Stelzenberger, Syneidesis im Neuen Testament (Paderborn: Schöningh, 1961), 42–4. Stelzenberger’s own solution, to offer various translational equivalents for the term, has not met with approval either; cf. R. Jewett, Paul’s Anthropological Terms: A Study of their Use in Conflict Settings (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 415; H. J. Eckstein, Der Begriff Syneidesis bei Paulus: Eine neutestamentlich-exegetische Untersuchung zum Gewissensbegriff (Tübingen: Mohr, 1983), 31. 7 Cf. G. Fauconnier, “Quantification, roles and domains,” in U. Eco, M. Santambrogio and P. Violo (eds.), Meaning and Mental Representations (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 62.
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the role his or her own conceptual ordering of reality plays, but should positively try to deconstruct his or her own presuppositions as far as possible. With regard to studying the ancient conscience, the route yielding the most reliable results would be to trace the evolution of the group of words derived from the Greek verb sÊnoida, from which the word for conscience in western languages originated.8 Secondly, the meaning of the sÊnoida group of words should be determined by means of the conceptual framework in which the ancients used it.9 Only when determined by its own socio-historical matrices, is the true form of the ancient concept allowed to emerge.10
Conscience in Philo The concept of conscience experiences a remarkable flowering in the works of Philo. Of the sÊnoida cognates, Philo prefers the neuter participle sunei8 The words for conscience in western languages are all morphologically dependent upon the Latin conscientia, which is later than and in all probability derived from the Greek forms; cf. however, P. Schönlein, “Zur Entstehung eines Gewissensbegriffes bei Griechen und Römern,” RMP 112 (1969): 289–305, in which Latin primacy is argued. 9 Various terms have been proposed to describe context in the cognitive semantics sense, among others “schemas,” “frames,” “mental spaces,” “folk theories,” cf. Bosman op. cit. (n. 3), 3 n. 8; more recently, “linkage groups,” cf. J. T. Fitzgerald, “Paul and Friendship,” in J. P. Sampley (ed.), Paul in the Greco-Roman World (Harrisburg: Trinity, 2003), 319– 20. 10 For the intricate evolution of the sÊnoida word group from its earliest occurrences in classical Greek literature, cf. Bosman, op. cit. (n. 3), 49–75. Stated simplistically, the evolution may have followed the following lines: the reflexive verbal phrase, “knowing with yourself of having done something wrong” (cf. Eur. Or. 396) becomes a fixed expression in popular speech, until it can be abbreviated to simply “knowing with yourself” without loss of semantic transfer (cf. Isocr. Or. 1.16). In a parallel history, the substantive sune¤dhsiw develops along similar lines, though probably lagging behind the development of the verbal phrases. Apart from a Democritus fragment (fr. 297 Diels Vorsokr.), our earliest indisputable evidence of sune¤dhsiw comes from the first century b.c.e. The (hypothetical) initial construction, “the awareness (shared knowledge) of something bad that I have done,” which assumes that the knowledge is shared by the person with himself, is abbreviated to “the consciousness of something bad” (e.g., Diod. 4.65.7). Sometimes the content of the knowledge is described with an adjective rather than with a genitive of the object, with the result that judgment of the content of consciousness is transferred to the nature of consciousness itself: “the bad consciousness” (e.g., Dion. Hal. Ant. 8.48.5). Finally, all forms of description may be dropped altogether, leaving only the “consciousness/shared knowledge” (e.g., Dion. Hal. Ant. 8.1.3) but assuming the whole phrase. When this last phase in the development has taken place, the possibility arises for the substantive to refer to some specific form of consciousness, some independent, almost personified inner entity or component of the soul. “Consciousness” becomes an inner monitor, the so-called retrospective conscience.
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dÒw, which occurs 32 times in his writings.11 His predilection is significant, considering that the only previous occurrence of the form in extant literature dates back to the fourth century.12 The verbal substantive sune¤dhsiw— more common in Christian literature—occurs four times in Philo’s writings, consistently accompanied by a genitivus objectivus, and the reflexive sÊnoida-phrase three times.13 Philo’s favourite term reveals a concept in flux. Its meaning remains close to that of the verbal phrases from which it originated, as can be gleaned from their close proximity in use.14 This explains why the notion has a predominantly negative connotation in Philo: having a “conscience,” in the majority of instances means having a “guilty awareness”; its presence by itself is a sure sign that one has committed some transgression.15 Consequently, the suneidÒw is often an incidental phenomenon which only appears in reaction to transgression. But Philo also uses the term as referring to a neutral entity. As a permanent component of the soul, the suneidÒw acts as an inner monitor which can either react vehemently after a transgression has taken place, or acquit or even applaud when the subject is unaware of any moral blemishes.16 Philo never deliberately develops a doctrine on the conscience.17 The term suneidÒw is scattered throughout his corpus, either in the occasional 11 Most scholars take this substantive form as Philo’s “conscience,” cf. M. Kähler, Das Gewissen: Ethische Untersuchung. Die Entwicklung seiner Namen und seines Begriffes. Erster, geschichtlicher Teil: Geschichtliche Untersuchung zur Lehre von der Begründung der sittlichen Erkenntnis. Erste Hälfte: Altertum und Neues Testament (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, [1878] 1967), 171–214; C. Maurer, “sÊnoida ktl.,” ThWNT (1964); A. Pelletier, “Deux expressions de la notion de conscience dans le judaïsme hellénistique et le christianisme naissant,” REG 80 (1967): 363–71; Eckstein, op. cit. (n. 5), 121–9; J. Pigeaud, “Le probleme de la conscience chez Philon d’Alexandrie.” StPatr 15 (1984): 15–41; D. Winston, “Philo’s Ethical Theory,” ANRW 2.21.1 (1984): 389–91; H.-J. Klauck, “Ein Richter im eigenen Innern,” in: Alte Welt und neuer Glaube: Beiträge zur Religionsgeschichte, Forschungsgeschichte und Theologie des Neuen Testaments (Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag, 1994). 12 Demosth. Or. 18.110. 13 Det. 146; Spec. 2.49; Virt. 124. Considering the consistency of Philo’s use of sune¤dhsiw, its occurrence in QE fr. 32 should probably be seen as a later substitution for suneidÒw. Reflexive verbal phrases are found in Prob. 124, Legat. 341 and Her. 6. 14 Cf. Her. 6–7, where the negated reflexive construction (•aut“ mhd¢n suneidª) occurs as direct parallel to suneidÒw. 15 Flacc. 145; Deus 128; Ebr. 125; Conf. 121; Fug. 159; Ios. 47; 197; 215; 262; Spec. 1.235; 3.54; 4.6; 4.40; cf. Klauck, art. cit. (n. 9), 50. 16 Prob. 99; Legat. 165; Ios. 67–8; 265; Decal. 91; Spec. 1.203; Praem. 84; 163 17 Contrary to some rather misleading references in scholarship, cf. Maurer, art. cit. (n. 9), 910; Schönlein, art. cit. (n. 7), 300; Blühdorn, art. cit. (n. 3), 201; R. T. Wallis, The Idea of Conscience in Philo of Alexandria (Berkeley: The Centre for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture, 1975).
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authorial comment on a narrative situation, or as part of an exegetical elaboration. The fact that he does not engage in systematic conceptual development neither implies that suneidÒw does not belong to Philo’s philosophical terminology, nor does it render impossible a systematic presentation of the evidence.18 Ever since Kähler’s pioneering study on conscience in antiquity, it has been recognised that the evolution of the concept reaches a decisive moment in Philo’s writings.19 What his distinctive use precisely entails has been variously described, among others as God’s instrument for the acknowledgement of sin, as an inner high priest, prosecutor and judge.20 The various descriptions, all capturing some aspect of the concept in Philo, reflect the polysemic nature of the concept, that is, consisting of various intersecting circles of meaning. Three prominent circles or topoi in the conceptual framework may be distinguished.21 The predominant topos, as correctly noted by Pelletier and Klauck, is the metaphor of the inner court of law. Within this complex the conscience assumes various roles, acting as prosecutor, admonisher, witness, judge, and combinations of these.22 Most strikingly, Philo joins suneidÒw to the two words ¶legxow and §l°gxein, thereby introducing into the semantic field of the former, the positive associations of the latter: to teach and exhort, and to bring about reconciliation and healing.23 A second, related aspect of Philo’s suneidÒw, is its 18 Klauck, art. cit. (n. 9), 33–5 regards it as philosophical language because Philo offers reflection upon and analytical description of these terms; cf. Bosman, op. cit. (n. 8), 175–90. 19 Kähler, op. cit. (n. 9), 200; cf. also M. Kähler, “Gewissen,” RE 3.Aufl. (1899): 648. 20 Cf. W. Völker, Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien: Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Frömmigkeit (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1938), 97; Wallis op. cit. (n. 15), 1–2; Maurer, art. cit. (n. 9), 911; Pelletier, art. cit. (n. 9), 367; Klauck, art. cit. (n. 9), 33–58. 21 Differentiating between the topoi is in a sense artificial, since they are interrelated and overlapping. In terms of the polysemic theory, certain semes come into prominence within a particular conceptual field while the rest are not totally absent, but remain latent within that context. 22 Cf. Det. 23, 147; Post. 59; Deus 128; H. Box, Philonis Alexandrini In Flaccum: Edited with an Introduction, Translation and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 76. 23 Klauck art. cit. (n. 9), 40. Studying the word ¶legxow as Philo’s concept of conscience (e.g., Nikiprowetzky; cf. Klauck art. cit. (n. 9), 40 n. 27), is disallowed by the fact that the word “conscience” derives from the sÊnoida word group: by using ¶legxow a concept of conscience independent from its linguistic expression is presupposed. Some scholars regard ¶legxow and suneidÒw as interchangable; cf. Caspary in Wallis op. cit. (n. 15), 34; Klauck art. cit. (n. 9), 46–7. The two words indeed have much in common: they share verbs like titr≈skein, kente›n, and kathgore›n; both can be dikastÆw and both can be qualified by the adjective kayarÒw/Òn. However, verbs with a positive purport only occur with the ¶legxow, e.g., didãskein, nouyete›n, paraine›n, §piplÆttein, and katallãttesyai; cf. Opif. 128; Decal. 86ff.; Det. 146. In the Philonic reception, the wider range of connotations to ¶legxow/§l°gxein impacts on the meaning of suneidÒw as well. In Philo, ¶legxow/§l°gxein do not appear to have an association with parrhs¤a independent from suneidÒw.
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introduction into the typical Hellenistic cuxÆ-analysis, and particularly its association with the terminology of reason and the various components of the rational soul.24 As component of the soul, the suneidÒw is brought to bear on the philosophical ideals of inner harmony and imperturbability: the (bad) conscience threatens these ideal mental states, as it reminds the transgressor of his or her own moral impurity, and torments the perpetrator of the wrongful deed from within.25 The third complex, in its turn closely related to the workings of the bad conscience, concerns the inhibiting effect such an awareness has on the individual, and may be referred to as the (lack of) parrhs¤a topos.26 This complex is not only the oldest remnant of the conceptual framework inherited by Philo, it also provides the essential backdrop to understanding occurrences of the term where the other two topoi feature prominently.
Parrhs¤a and the suneidÒw in Philo The last two decades experienced a renewed interest in the notion of parrhs¤a. Two important studies explored its use in mainly contexts of friendship and instruction.27 Within these contexts, its meaning ranges from broadly defining a manner of speaking, to an attitude of openness, freedom and confidence, to frank criticism. From its original political use signifying interaction among equals, the term increasingly comes to refer to personal candour and truthful criticism, either towards society at large, within asymmetrical relationships, or among friends. More wide-ranging are the essays in a recent collection on free speech in classical antiquity, which investigate the notion (including other terms as well) in authors from archaic Greece to imperial Rome.28 While the notion was from early on linked to notions of political equality, and parrhs¤a specifically to democratic Athens, its
24
Cf. Maurer art. cit. (n. 9), 911. Prob. 99; Decal. 86–7; Praem. 84; 163; cf. Plut. Tranq. an. 19. 26 Cf. Bosman op. cit. (n. 3), 90–5; 177–9. 27 Cf. J. T Fitzgerald (ed.), Friendship, Flattery, and Frankness of Speech: Studies on Friendship in the New Testament World (Leiden: Brill, 1996); D. Konstan, D. Clay, C. E. Glad, J. C. Thom and J. Ware, Philodemus On Frank Criticism: Introduction, Translation, and Notes (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1998); see also J. P. Sampley, “Paul and Frank Speech,” in Sampley op. cit. (n. 9), 293–318 and “Paul’s Frank Speech with the Galatians and the Corinthians,” in J. T. Fitzgerald, D. Obbink, and G. Holland (eds.), Philodemus and the New Testament World (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 295–333. 28 I. Sluiter and R. M. Rosen (eds.), Free Speech in Classical Antiquity (Leiden 2004). Neither conscience nor the sÊnoida phrases occur in the volume’s indices. 25
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various contexts of use (political, social, literary, philosophical, military) defy simplistic attempts at definition.29 Any broad definition during its early history should have two components: the term’s association with an inner disposition, and its outward manifestations. When parrhs¤a appears for the first time in literature of the fifth century b.c.e., it denotes an attribute of the pÒliw citizen who performs his status by means of a recognisable style of interaction.30 Parrhs¤a flows from a particular sense of equality and freedom, which also entails attributes of personal dignity and moral rectitude.31 Outwardly, parrhs¤a manifests itself as verbal activity of a particular kind, revealing a direct relationship between what the person “knows” or “feels,” and what he or she says. In its positive use, it connotes bold openness, fearless brokerage of truth, driven by integrity, critical honesty, duty, and even love. In using parrhs¤a, the speaker spurns any veiling of the truth by stating what he really thinks, regardless of what the consequences may be. In Philo, a substantial part of the term’s occurrences describes a manner of speaking. The stock prepositional phrase metå parrhs¤aw has various connotations, such as stating the truth plainly, speaking openly, boldly, and with confidence, and not being afraid to criticise.32 The speaker shows him or herself to be uninhibited and unintimidated while speaking.33 The settings for displays of free speech show equal variety, but very often have to do with asymmetrical relationships, of which the friendship between God and the heroes of faith (Moses, Abraham) is perhaps the most striking.34 Parrhs¤a is typically contrasted with an inability to speak, and with various forms of speech not to be confused with true parrhs¤a: rashness, arrogance, presumption, incaution, untimely parrhs¤a, empty rhetoric and 29
Sluiter and Rosen op. cit. (n. 28), 13–14. I agree with the finding of D. M. Carter, “Citizen Attribute, Negative Right: A Conceptual Difference between Ancient and Modern Ideas of Freedom of Speech,” in Sluiter and Rosen op. cit. (n. 28), 197–220, that parrhs¤a is more the result of confidence flowing from democratic citizenship, than a political right; cf. Bosman op. cit. (n. 3), 90–5. 31 Cf. W. S. Barrett, Euripides Hippolytus (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), 236. 32 Connotations obviously overlap to some extent; the following references may serve as pointers: “truthfully”: Sacr. 12; “openly”: Sacr. 35; Plant. 8; “with confidence,” “boldly”: Agr. 64; Congr. 151; Prob. 152; Prov. 1.1; “criticising frankly”: Conf. 165. 33 E.g., Conf. 165; Congr. 151. It is unclear to what extent society allowed women to show parrhs¤a; cf. W. Klassen, “Parrhs¤a in the Johannine Corpus,” in Fitzgerald, op. cit. (n. 24), 227–54, at 236, with regard to Jewish traditions. Philo only allows the feminine personified Philosophy to speak metå parrhs¤aw, Congr. 151. 34 Other relationships include those between teacher and pupil (Her. 14; Migr. 116; a special case in Legat. 41), master and slave, accuser and (falsely) accused (Ios. 222), and asymmetrical friendship (Her. 21). 30
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deceitful flattery.35 Finally, the connotation of freedom features strongly. Parrhs¤a belongs to those with nobility of soul and inner freedom: those born with high status, but also those in possession of wisdom, courage and virtue, regardless of status, appearance, and circumstances resulting from fate.36 In studying the combined use of parrhs¤a and suneidÒw in Philo, the task is to establish which aspects of their respective meanings overlap in order for the combination to make sense. How can having an awareness of transgressing the moral code be related to free speech, or rather, as it emerges, to a lack of free speech? Which circumstances cause a person to feel inhibited, thereby losing the ability to exhibit parrhs¤a? What is the nature of the pressures, social, psychological, or otherwise, which either promote spontaneous interaction or render a person tongue-tied? These questions may be answered by looking at some examples from the Philonic corpus. (i) Her. 1–29 Philo’s most extensive discussion of parrhs¤a is found at the start of the treatise Who is the Heir of Divine Things. Consisting of associative commentary on Gen. 15:2–18, the treatment of parrhs¤a comes in connection with verse 2, in which Abraham inquires from God what he will be given. In his exegesis of the verse, Philo expresses mock surprise that Abraham is not struck speechless in the presence of God, since it is natural that under such circumstances the “organ of speech should be held in check” (efikÚw tÚ m¢n fvnhtÆrion ˆrganon §p°xesyai).37 But, Philo continues, courage (eÈtolm¤a) and well-timed parrhs¤a in the presence of superiors may indeed be considered virtuous. The social context of Philo’s remark relates to the asymmetrical relationship between God and Abraham, the unstated assumption being that asymmetry in status has an inhibiting effect on the person of lower rank. The assumption goes back to a root connotation of parrhs¤a as a function of social equality. Originally an attribute of the noble and the freeborn,38 parrhs¤a sprang into prominence in democratic Athens as the mode of
35
Prob. 127; Ios. 222; Her. 21; 29; Som. 2.83; 85; Sacr. 12; Ios. 74. Prob. 125; 152; Ebr. 149; Her. 5; 14; 19; Ios. 107; Praem. 124. 37 Philo provides three conditions for a person to become tongue-tied: fear, exceeding pains, and joy; the former two traditionally belong to the parrhs¤a topos, while the latter is surely Philo’s own psychological insight. 38 Cf. Hom. Il. 2.212–77; Soph. Aj. 1253–63. 36
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interaction between citizens.39 Persons of lower status—women, children, slaves, metics, and exiles—were, at least in theory, excluded from the privilege, and, indeed, from the ability of displaying the characteristic boldness. The latter indicates that the notion had from the start a psychological aspect connected to the political.40 The association with political status started to erode after the fifth century, such that Diogenes of Sinope, a metic and an exile, considered freedom of speech to be “the most beautiful thing among humans” (D.L. 6.54) and made startling use of the notion in speech and gesture. The Cynic saw his calling in the uncompromising enactment of the dictates of nature, and in the frank criticism of societal follies, regardless of its possible repercussions.41 In Isocrates, the personal sphere becomes prominent, and the term gets associated with friendship, but—interestingly—can still be conferred on somebody as an objective privilege.42 During the Hellenistic era, parrhs¤a as manifested among unequals gains considerable importance. The fate of two figures from Alexander’s company has paradigmatic value: the outspokenness of Cleitus and Callisthenes the nephew of Aristotle cost both of them their lives; afterwards the relationship between the king and his companions was not characterised by openness anymore, but by the servility typical for interaction with a tyrant.43 The fearless brokerage of truth to a superior now becomes a delicate issue, as it has to be carefully delineated from audacity and rash arrogance on the one hand, and self-serving flattery on the other.44 When Philo, in Her. 1, uses the term in the context of the relationship between Abraham and God, he does not think in terms of friendship.45 Rather, the operating metaphor is the relationship between master and 39 Cf. Eur. Ion 668–75; Demosth. fr. 21 Sauppe; G. Scarpat, Parrhesia: Storia del termine e delle sue traduzioni in Latino (Brescia 1964), 11–61; Foucault op. cit. (n. 25), 7. 40 Eur. Hip. 419–42; Phoen. 390–2. 41 Diogenes’ parrhs¤a has been interpreted as the symbolical moment in history in which the political notion of freedom of speech is applied to the moral demands of the cosmopolis; cf. Peterson op. cit. (n. 1), 288; K. Kennedy, “Cynic Rhetoric: The Ethics and Tactics of Resistance,” Rhetoric Review 18.1 (1999): 33–7. In authors of the imperial age, parrhs¤a came to be the hallmark of the true Cynic; cf. Plut. Brut. 34.5; Epict. 3.22.96; Lucian Demon. 50.10. 42 Isocr. Nic. 3.2; 28.3; Areop. 20; cf. also the Menander quotation in Her. 5. 43 Curt. Ruf. 8.4.30. 44 In situations of asymmetrical relationships, parrhs¤a is promoted as a way of countering “the possibility that a person motivated by narrow self-interest would insinuate himself into the coterie of a superior and, by a pretense of friendship, achieve his own gain at the expense of his master”; Konstan op. cit. (n. 24), 9–10. 45 The relationship between Moses and God is further on (Her. 21) described in terms of a friendship that allows free speaking; for friendship in Philo, cf. G. E. Sterling, “The Bond of Humanity: Friendship in Philo of Alexandria,” in J. T. Fitzgerald (ed.), GrecoRoman Perspectives on Friendship (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 203–23.
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slave, and the accompanying connotations are those of the slave unable to display the freedom associated with higher ranks. Consequently, he stresses the feeling of afid≈w, of being overwhelmed and tongue-tied by the mere presence of the superior. Under which circumstances, asks Philo, will the servant be able to display parrhs¤a towards his master? Only when he is unaware of any injustice he has done in word and deed towards the one who owns him. In the next parallel sentence Philo applies the principle to humankind’s relationship with God: only when a person is pure from sin and when he can judge from his conscience about his loyalty towards his master ( tÚ filod°spoton §k toË suneidÒtow kr¤n˙), can he have the boldness to speak freely to God. The prerequisites for parrhs¤a emerging from this passage are loyalty, having acted to the benefit of the superior party, and not being aware of any transgression. Knowledge of goodwill towards the master unties the slavish tongue.46 (ii) Prob. 99, 121–125, 148–152 Other passages further elucidate the relationship between freedom, free speech, and conscience. In the treatise dealing with the Stoic paradox Why every good man is free, Philo explores the phenomenon that some persons have the ability to display parrhs¤a even though they do not possess the required external marks of freedom and nobility. Among these are figures famous for their unconventional displays of freedom, and their disregard for the trappings of success: the gymnosophist Calanus, the Cynic Diogenes, Chaereas, and even Theodorus the atheist. The Cynic philosopher, for instance, is described as maintaining “freedom, nobility, and natural kingliness” even under the most adverse conditions (Prob. 121–125). What allows the wise man to act with parrhs¤a in circumstances where custom would expect inhibition? In an elaborate metaphor (Prob. 148–152), Philo likens the virtue (éretÆ) of the wise to a sanctuary (ésul¤a) in which confines everybody is set on an equal social footing. In such circumstances, slaves often not only show equality to men of noble birth, but even superiority to their owners who, however highly born, find themselves enslaved by being convicted by their consciences (oÏw m¢n går ı toË suneidÒtow ¶legxow, kín Œsin eÈpatr¤dai, p°fuke douloËsyai). Like the sanctuary, the wise man’s virtue, his pure ethical life, enables him to discard those social impediments on his inner freedom which would usually have prescribed inhibition. 46 While not stated explicitly, Philo’s opposites imply that an awareness of disloyalty and sin would strip the slave of his frank speaking.
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Two observations follow from the combined use of parrhs¤a and suneidÒw in this instance. Philo identifies doing good, acting within the limits established by éretÆ, as the most important prerequisite for having parrhs¤a. In order to stress his point, he plays down the traditional link between social status and parrhs¤a. Reversing roles, the slaves in the sanctuary display parrhs¤a, while the noblemen are lacking it because of being convicted by their awareness of past iniquities. From the extended metaphor, Philo’s point follows: the true requirement for displaying parrhs¤a is the freedom gained from staying within the boundaries of virtue. Having a “bad conscience,” that is, knowing that one has violated those boundaries, inevitably leads to lack of parrhs¤a. The two concepts are so closely linked that a clear conscience appears as almost identical to having parrhs¤a. The same thought occurs in Prob. 99, where the categories of slavery and nobility form the matrix against which parrhs¤a and its opposites are set: fawning, flattery and hypocrisy belong to the enslaved, and frank speaking to the noble. Here Philo provides a clue why this is so: flattery and the like contain an inherent lack of honesty and integrity, as “words are in conflict with thoughts”(lÒgoi gn≈maiw diamãxontai). Because of fear or lack of social standing, the slave thinks one thing but says another, presumably in order not to upset the person of higher rank. In contrast, the highborn is typically free to speak his mind; no conflict exists between inner thought and outward expression, so that the communication flows from a “pure conscience.” Note again that while the opposition slaveryfreedom is not completely divorced from social realities, Philo really thinks in moral terms. Freedom and a clear conscience stem essentially from personal integrity. (iii) Spec. 1.203 In a passage from the Special Laws Philo again asserts that parrhs¤a and a pure conscience are the results of living an ethical life. In this passage, he discusses the burnt-offerings and their allegorical significance, in particular the ritual of the sacrificer placing his washed hand on the head of the sacrificial animal (Lev. 1:3–9). While neither the Hebrew text nor the Septuagint version mentions a washing of hands, to Philo this part of the ritual denotes irreproachable conduct and a life in harmony with the laws and the rules of nature. The law desires, first, that the mind of the worshipper should be sanctified by exercise in good and profitable thoughts; secondly, that his life should be a consistent course of the best actions, so that as he lays his hands on the
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The ability to speak with parrhs¤a derives from having a pure conscience, which in its turn is dependent upon a sanctified mind and virtuous actions. But Philo, tapping into popular Stoic ideas, does not provide insight into how and why the notion of free speech came to be attached to the sanctified mind and the ethical life. In order to clarify the matter, one has to turn to earlier histories of the terms involved.
The Combination’s Origins The roots of the parrhs¤a topos and its association with the sÊnoida word group lie in the value system of archaic and classical Greece.48 The mutual exclusion of having an “awareness that you have done something bad” (what we would call a “bad conscience”) and displaying parrhs¤a, goes back to times when a strongly externalised ethic predominated. In such an environment, much less thought is spent on the intra-psychical processes following transgression, than on the outward effect such actions might have, that is, how one is regarded by one’s fellows.49 The ancient Greeks appear to have conceptualised this inner state analogous to the situation in the pÒliw subject to stãsiw. Everyone knew that a city divided against itself was extremely vulnerable; “ımÒnoia (unanimity) in cities is the best of all goods” was a common slogan in the arsenal of many authors.50 Likewise, inner disharmony was regarded as resulting in weak, shameful conduct. Significantly, the word taraxÆ (disturbance, turmoil) is frequently associated with the sÊnoida word group.51 The Greeks instinctively perceived that the inner turmoil experienced after transgressing the moral code, inevitably leads to a person feeling and becoming vulnerable. This outward vulnerability causes one to exhibit 47
Translation adapted from PLCL Vol. 7.215. Cf. Bosman op. cit. (n. 3), 80–90. In what follows, the complexities of ancient Greek morality are, for the sake of brevity, stated in grossly simplified terms. 49 Cf. K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974), 226–42; H. Chadwick, Betrachtungen über das Gewissen in der griechischen, jüdischen und christlichen Tradition (Düsseldorf: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1974), 9; G. A. Kennedy, Aristotle on Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse. Newly Translated with Introduction, Notes, and Appendices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 143. 50 Antiphon fr. 44a; Xen. Mem. 4.4.16; Lys. Or. 18.17, Aristid. Conc. Rhod. 558. 51 Democr. fr. 297 Diels Vorsokr.; Isoc. Or. 18.379.43–4; Dion. Hal. Ant. Rom. 8.1.3. 48
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afid≈w (shame/shyness) inappropriate to a free male citizen. He starts to act like a slave, with all the weakness and shame attached to this social position.52 In the Hippolytus, Euripides brings together parrhs¤a and an “awareness of something bad” in a speech by Phaedra: This matter will kill me, friends, before I will bring shame over my husband, or the sons I have given birth to; but as free men, thriving with parrhs¤a they will live in glorious Athens, on account of their mother’s good repute. Because a man becomes a slave, regardless of how bold-hearted he might be, whenever he is aware (juneidῇ) of bad things about his mother or father.53
Philo constantly reflects the association between slavery/freedom and parrhs¤a,54 and still regards shame as causing a lack of parrhs¤a, as the following extract (Spec. 1.321) illustrates: Let those who do harmful things be ashamed and, seeking hiding-places and corners of the earth, let them hide in deep darkness, concealing their many iniquities so that no-one can see them. But let those who serve the common good have parrhs¤a, and let them walk during daytime through the marketplace, conversing in crowded gatherings, exposing their own lives to the pure sun. . .
Piling up words of concealment on the one hand, and features indicating openness on the other, Philo’s point is clear: Being aware of mischief leaves you feeling fearful and inferior, unable to look other people straight in the eyes, avoiding all interaction, unable to defend yourself.55 On the other hand, the morally upright have nothing to hide; their interaction is characterised by openness, pride, and freedom. These assumptions were beginning to be articulated and subjected to rational scrutiny from the late fifth century, when literature displays a growing interest in the inner workings of the soul.56 During the fourth century, the life and person of Socrates serves as a catalyst for subsequent philosophy to theoretically develop “technologies of the self.”57 The driving problematic may be formulated as follows: how could a life of self-mastery (§gkrãteia) be lived, in which the various components of the soul could be 52
Eur. Phoen. 390–2. Eur. Hip. 419–42. 54 Prob. 95; 100; 125; Praem. 124; Her. 5. 55 The extensive description of the tormented Flaccus in Flacc. 153–80 may be regarded as typical of the topos; cf. Völker op. cit. (n. 18), 95; Klauck art. cit. (n. 9), 39 n. 25. 56 C. W. Willink, Euripides Orestes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 150–1. 57 A. A. Long, “Hellenistic Εthics and Philosophy of Power” (with response by Paul Woodruff and discussion),” in P. Green (ed.), Hellenistic History and Culture (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1988), 138–67. 53
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kept in harmony and the individual’s freedom be safe-guarded? The various ideal mental states of Hellenistic philosophy all bear witness to the common search, not for external recognition, but for a well-ordered, harmonious and unperturbed inner self.58 The Hellenistic schools were concerned with both external and internal threats to mental equilibrium. From within oneself, the main threat comes from the passions; these have to be kept in check by reason. While the person striving for tranquility may have less difficulty in avoiding external threats, he may become his own worst enemy by subjecting to moral error. In this case, there is no escape from the inner turmoil created; his own awareness of what he has done, his own sune¤dhsiw t«n èmarthmãtvn, or, simply, his own suneidÒw, wreaks havoc in his soul. The negative conscience, still dominating Philo’s use of the terms, is like a mole infiltrating and affecting the noËw, the rational capacity of humankind that ought to be the wise man’s refuge. Once the conscience raises its tormenting head, it cannot be avoided even in the sanctuary of reason, and becomes a devastating menace to the inner life. The conceptual framework retained remarkable consistency over many centuries. Epictetus has the two terms featuring together in his description of the true Cynic: To the Cynic, not weapons or bodyguards, but his suneidÒw affords him this authority. Whenever he would see that he has watched over men, and has toiled, and has slept a pure person, that the sleep has left him an even purer person than he was. . .why would he not have the courage to speak freely? (diå t¤ mØ yarrÆs˙ parrhsiãzesyai;)59
And Philostratus still refers to the inhibiting effect of the jÊnesiw, which by now has become a synonym for the sÊnoida derivatives: jÊnesiw does not allow the sinner to look people in the face, nor to address them with a free tongue.60
Once the dreaded suneidÒw has made its appearance, your inner freedom is shattered, and your bondage is made visible for all to see by your inability to act metå parrhs¤aw. The moment the inner court of law is in session, it can by your inhibited interaction with your fellows not be concealed. In the treatise Why the worse attacks the better 23ff., Philo brings together the various elements of rationality, forensic metaphor, conscience and free speech. Speaking of reason, he says: 58
E.g., étaraj¤a (opposite of taraxÆ), épãyeia, eÈyum¤a, aÈtãrkeia, and aÈtoprag¤a. Epict. 3.22.94–6. 60 Philost. Vit. Ap. 7.14. 59
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This “human” (i.e. the élhyinÚw ênyrvpow/logikØ diãnoia), dwelling in the soul of everybody, is sometimes encountered as king and ruler, at other times as judge and umpire of life’s contests. Sometimes it assumes the part of a witness or accuser, and invisibly reproves us from within, while not allowing us so much as to open our mouth, but, by holding in and curbing the tongue with the reins of conscience, it checks its presumptuous course.
Rationality, says Philo, has many functions: at times it commands and steers the actions of humans, at other times it judges behaviour, or bears witness and accuses. When the latter function is at work, it shows that an awareness of transgression is present in the soul. Not being able to speak freely is the result of reason’s reproving activity, strikingly described as the horseman holding in and steering the unruly animal by means of “the reins of conscience.” Conclusion Philo’s combined use of conscience and free speech mines the rich deposit of connotations and associations accumulated over many centuries. Especially pertinent are social realities from the classical world transferred and modified to the moral interests of the Hellenistic age. New in Philo is the prominence of the emerging concept, the suneidÒw. It evolved from the verbal sÊnoida phrases and has in Philo become a component of the soul and the monitoring aspect of reason. The concept’s link to parrhs¤a must be understood in terms of the earlier associations of being aware of transgression, and the resulting inner turmoil and outer weakness. Weakness in social interaction is seen as characteristic of the unfree, those unable to display parrhs¤a. Philo uses the terms within a matrix of freedom and slavery, or the master-slave relationship, in which social and moral categories intermingle. Real nobility and freedom is defined in terms of inner integrity; to remain within the limits set by virtue means that “conscience” is not given the opportunity to get activated. Even slaves can possess that inner freedom and the resultant ability to say what is on their minds. When, however, an iniquity is knowingly committed, the inner monitor inevitably picks it up and starts its terrible tormenting from within. Its accusing and judging capacity destroys inner harmony and causes pain, the soul is divided against itself, and all inner strength is lost. Whatever the outward circumstances of such a person, inwardly he has become a slave. He is denied the privilege, indeed, the ability, to speak freely. University of South Africa Pretoria
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 49–55
TWO SHORT NOTES ON PHILO
PIETER W. VAN DER HORST
In these short notes I will react to two articles in the 2005 issue of the Studia Philonica Annual. The first one is Frank Shaw’s study of Caligula’s employment of the name of the God of the Jews,1 the second is Allen Kerkeslager’s long contribution on the question of the (according to him non-existing) role of three influential Greeks in the violent events of 38 c.e. in Alexandria.2
I In his fine study, Shaw discusses the meaning of the at first sight puzzling sentence in the Legatio 353, where Philo has Caligula address the Jews as haters of the gods, oiJ qeo;n mh; nomivzonte" ei\naiv me, to;n h[dh para; pa'si toi'" a[lloi" ajnwmologhmevnon, ajlla; to;n ajkatonovmaston uJmi'n. He wonders what is the right translation of these words since the existing modern translations disagree. Colson, for instance, renders: “ . . . you who do not believe me to be a god, a god acknowledged among all the other nations but not to be named by you.” But, e.g., Pelletier has: “vous . . ., les gens qui ne veulent pas reconnaître que je suis dieu, moi qui suis déjà qualifié ainsi auprès de tous les autres hommes, mais qui croyez en celui que vous ne pouvez nommer.” Shaw states the problem as follows: “Are the two phrases beginning with tovn . . . to be understood as modifying the me just before them? Do both grammatical units simply refer to Gaius in an instance of the sort of parallelism of which English speakers are so fond?3 (. . .) However, there is another possibility, that of understanding the second tovn . . . clause 1
33–48.
F. Shaw, “The Emperor’s Gaius’ Employment of the Divine Name,” SPhA 17 (2005):
2 A. Kerkeslager, “The Absence of Dionysios, Lampo, and Isidorus from the Violence in Alexandria in 38 c.e.,” SPhA 17 (2005): 49–94. 3 This is the position of Colson, and also of Smallwood, who has: “I, who am acknowledged as a god among all other nations by this time but am denied this title by you.”
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as not parallel to the first, but as speaking of the Jewish God”4 (34–5). Shaw then goes on to demonstrate at length on the basis of a host of literary material that the second option is the most probable and that Gaius here referred to the God of the Jews. His is a convincing case. What Shaw fails to do, however, is simply to have a look at the grammatical side of the problem. If Philo had wanted to have the emperor say that he is “a god acknowledged among all the other nations but not to be named by you,” he would have written: . . . oiJ qeo;n mh; nomivzonte" ei\naiv me, to;n me;n h[dh para; pa'si toi'" a[lloi" ajnwmologhmevnon, ajkatonovmaston de; uJmi'n. If both parts of the sentence after me would refer to the same person, usually the mevn . . . dev construction would be employed.5 Since Philo here does not use this construction but employs ajllav after a negation (mhv) instead, he certainly has the two parts of the sentence refer to two mutually exclusive entities.6 So the opposition is here between mhv ktl. and ajllav ktl.: . . . qeo;n mh; nomivzonte" ei\naiv me (. . .) ajlla; to;n ajkatonovmaston uJmi'n (“you who do not recognize me as a god . . . but (only) the one that is not to be named among you”). So I fully agree with Shaw’s conclusion, which he reaches along a completely different path, but he could have underpinned and strengthened his case by this grammatical observation.
II Allen Kerkeslager’s article is a very acute attempt to prove that the three Greeks who play such an important role in In Flaccum, Dionysius, Lampo, and Isidorus, were not at all involved in the violence of 38 c.e. for the simple reason that none of them were in Alexandria in that year. This is certainly contrary to the current opinion7 and it must be said that Kerkeslager has a good case here. Even so, there is much to be criticized in his argument. In this short contribution I will point out some of the weaknesses I see in his position. 4
This is the position of Pelletier. See, e.g., R. Kühner & B. Gerth, Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache II: Satzlehre, (Darmstadt: Wissenschafliche Buchgesellschaft, 1966, = Hannover 1904), 266. See, e.g., Lycurgus, Contra Leocratem 5 eijdw;" Lewkravthn fugovnta me;n tou;" uJpe;r th'" patrivdo" kinduvnou", ejgkatalipovnta de; tou;" auJtou' polivta". 6 See Kühner-Gerth, ibid. 282, who say this construction is used when “das eine neben dem andern nicht zu gleicher Zeit bestehen kann. Dies geschieht wenn eine Negation vorangeht und wir übersetzen dann ajllav durch “sondern,”als: oujc oiJ plouvsioi eujdaivmonev" eijsin ajll∆ oiJ ajgaqoiv.” 7 Including mine in my Philo’s Flaccus. The First Pogrom (PACS 2; Leiden: Brill 2003). 5
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To begin with, Kerkeslager claims that “Philo never says that our trio had a role in plotting the violence” (53). And he is right in observing that in §20 Philo “invokes the names of our trio only in the plural in a type of grammatical construction used to refer to three categories of people, not three individuals” (53),8 but he overlooks that in §18 Philo says that Flaccus recruited as his advisers “those who had been his declared enemies from the beginning.” This is clearly echoed in §128, where he certainly does speak about the three persons concerned and says that they were “people who had been his [Flaccus’] most bitter enemies for the greatest part of the period that he had been the governor of the country.” So it would seem that Philo does say, however implicitly, that Isidorus, Dionysius, and Lampo were (among) his advisers. Kerkeslager says that “[t]his inclusio suggests that Philo inserted the[se] names . . . into Flacc. 18–21 to dramatically foreshadow the denouement of Flaccus” (54). And so “[o]ne must conclude that Philo’s allusion to our trio in Flacc. 18–21 was purely rhetorical and dramatic in design; the actual enemies of Flaccus described here are unnamed and unknown” (55). But it has to be kept in mind here that it is unlikely that Philo would make up a situation in the recent past that most people in his environment could immediately unmask as unhistorical. Philo wrote In Flaccum in 39 or 40 c.e., that is, so shortly after the events of 38 that they were still fresh in the minds of most of his readers. As I have argued, Philo would have made a fool of himself if he had too drastically distorted the facts, or invented them, because he would never have got away with a complete invention of “events” that most people knew had never taken place.9 It is like the case of the community of the Therapeutae in De vita contemplativa, often thought to be no more than “a philosopher’s dream,” but where Joan Taylor has rightly stressed that, if Philo would have wished to picture a Jewish utopia, he would not have situated it in a place (at Lake Mareotis) where every fellow citizen could check his veracity, so Philo could not possibly be making up this community out of thin air.10 So it is not just gullibility when scholars believe that Dionysios cum suis played a role behind the riots of 38. But the question is: how? 8 In my translation, “popularity hunters such as Dionysius, document tamperers such as Lampo, and sedition leaders such as Isidorus” (Philo’s Flaccus 58). For the phenomenon of using a personal name in the plural to designate a class of people (Dionuvsioi for “people such as Dionysius”) see B. Gildersleeve, Syntax of Classical Greek (Groningen: Bouma’s Boekhuis 1980), 23 (§46: Plural of proper nouns). 9 Philo’s Flaccus 12. 10 J. E. Taylor, Jewish Women Philosophers of First-Century Alexandria. Philo’s “Therapeutae” Reconsidered (Oxford: Clarendon 2003) 3–20. See my review in Gnomon 76 (2004) 634– 635.
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The great problem here is that Kerkeslager has proved beyond reasonable doubt that in 38 this trio was not in the city: Dionysius was probably dead already, and the other two were in Rome. Time and again he emphasizes that for that reason they could neither have been Flaccus’ advisers nor played a leading role in the violence. “Our trio is completely absent from Philo’s major descriptions of the violence against the Judaeans” (57). That is true, but how relevant is it? Two things should be kept in mind here. First, regarding their advisory role as depicted in Flacc. 18–21, most probably Philo has telescoped some events here. The three persons concerned had indeed tried to incite Flaccus to take measures against the Jews (to demote them in their social status) or at least not to interfere when others would take anti-Jewish actions. They did so already before Dionysius’ death and Isidorus’ and Lampo’s move to Rome, that is, before Gaius’ ascension to the throne in 37. They had many followers in Alexandria who cherished the same anti-Jewish sentiments. It was these followers—”popularity hunters such as Dionysus, document tamperers such as Lampo, and sedition leaders such as Isidorus”—who most probably were Flaccus’ real advisers after Caligula’s rise to power. So the trio was in an indirect sense still advising Flaccus via their followers. That would explain why Philo does not mention them directly in §§18–21 but only in a way that suggests their lasting influence upon Flaccus. It was this lasting influence that made him mention them at this point.11 Secondly, Kerkeslager suggests by means of expressions such as “leading the violence” or “directing the violence” that the trio should have been present in the city if they are to be regarded as the masterminds behind the pogrom, whereas they were demonstrably absent. That is a misunderstanding. The leading figures among their followers could easily have “led the violence,” if “leading the violence” is an appropriate expression at all. In a pogrom, once the violence has been triggered by whatever cause (here the appearance of Agrippa I with his bodyguard), “leading” or “directing” by highly placed intellectuals is no longer necessary. The mobs usually know where to go and what to do; the aristocrats remain in the background and do not meddle in the actual fighting and killing. If, as Kerkeslager himself argues, it was Flaccus who was “directing the” violence—which, in his opinion, is confirmed by the 11 Kerkeslager, too, is aware of the limits imposed upon Philo’s freedom to invent non-historical situations; see his remark on Flacc. 6–7 in “Absence” 56: “But it seems unlikely that Philo would have conceded any praise to Flaccus at all if there were no grounds for it.” Cf. also ibid. 59: “Philo’s effort to transform the role reversal during the trial of Flaccus into a fitting retribution for the attacks on the Judaeans in 38 would have been more persuasive if he could have cited the action of Judaean accusers during this trial.”
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outrages against the Jews on the emperor’s birthday—this governor may have implemented what his advisers suggested to him. But, says Kerkeslager, neither Dionysius nor Isidorus or Lampo were anti-Semites or Jew-haters,12 which makes it improbable that they would give such anti-Jewish advice. This is special pleading. Anti-Jewish leaders of the Greek Alexandrians do not fit into Kerkeslager’s picture. But what does the evidence tell us? It is not only Philo’s remark in §§21–23 that Flaccus’ advisers were outspokenly anti-Jewish; there is more. In Legat. 354– 6, immediately after the remark by Caligula mentioned above in the discussion of Shaw’s article, Philo has Isidorus say: “My lord, you will hate these Jews here, and the rest of their compatriots too, even more when you learn of their ill-will and disloyalty towards you. When everyone else was offering sacrifices of thanksgiving for your recovery, these people alone could not bring themselves to sacrifice. When I say “these,” I include the other Jews as well” (355; transl. Smallwood). It is important to see that Philo’s picture of an anti-Jewish Isidorus is confirmed by a pagan source, CPJ 156 (the so-called Acta Isidori et Lamponis),13 a papyrus that deals with a lawsuit that Isidorus launched in 41 c.e. against the Jewish king Agrippa I (not in itself an anti-Jewish act). Here we read that Isidorus says to the emperor Claudius: “My lord Caesar, what do you care for a twopennyhalfpenny Jew like Agrippa?”(356b I 16–7). And further on he adds: “I wish to retort in connection with the points you bring up about the Jews. I accuse them of wishing to stir up the entire world . . . We must consider every detail in order to judge the whole people. They are not of the same nature as the Alexandrians, but live rather after the fashion of the Egyptians” (356c II 21–6). The remark about living after the fashion of the Egyptians is, in the mouth of an Alexandrian Greek, an utterly negative qualification.14 Much could be said of this passage, but it suffices here to notice that Philo’s two remarks about the anti-Jewish sentiments of Isidorus cum suis, are here corroborated on unimpeachable authority by one of the non-Jewish (or rather: anti-Jewish) Acta Alexandrinorum. So there can hardly be any doubt that the trio cherished anti-Jewish sentiments and favoured anti-Jewish activities. Isidorus and Lampo could certainly have exercised their influence on the events in Alexandria by means of their figureheads. The
12 “Absence” 61: “[T]he sources dealing with our trio did not attribute them with this role [sc. of anti-Semitic gangsters] because they never had such a role.” 13 See the edition with translation and commentary in V. A. Tcherikover & A. Fuks, Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum, (3 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 1960), 2:66–81. 14 See M. R. Niehoff, Philo on Jewish Identity and Culture (TSAJ 86; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck 2001), 45–74.
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“absence” in Kerkeslager’s title was only an absence in corpore, but there was almost certainly a strong presence in mente. Let me finally deal with some less important details in Kerkeslager’s study which are debatable.15 He tries to corroborate his argument that Dionysius was executed before 37 by means of an identification of Dionysius with a certain Theon who is said to have been executed as were Isidorus and Lampo (CPJ 159b IV 5–7), but this is very speculative. Kerkeslager speaks of “texts suggesting that Dionysios and Theon may have been names repeatedly used by one particular family among the Alexandrian elite. These texts might suggest that Dionysius can be identified with an executed Theon from this family” (65). But this cannot be regarded in any sense as evidence that the two were identical and certainly does not confirm Dionysius’ “absence” from Alexandria in 38. To be sure, I do grant Kerkeslager that Dionysius may well have been dead by 38, but this specific argument is weak. In his long paragraph on the chronology of Lampo’s career, Kerkeslager notes the efforts at restriction of the offices of Alexandrian magistrates to a period of one year, and it is clear from the evidence that there were repeated attempts to impose such a one-year limit. In reality, however, many magistrates managed to retain their official positions for a much longer time. Even so, in his chronological calculations Kerkeslager takes it for granted that the shorter term applied in the case of Lampo, but without adducing any supporting evidence. Another more serious flaw in his chronological musings is his calculation of the duration of Lampo’s trip to Rome: “[A] trip from Alexandria to Rome typically required as much as two months or more” (71), but this is simply not true. It would usually take two to four weeks, depending upon the weather and other circumstances.16 Again, this does not reflect much credit on the outcome of this chronological exercise as a whole. But I repeat that I do agree with my learned colleague that Lampo most probably was not in Alexandria in 38. In the long section on Isidorus (74–92), Kerkeslager at a certain point comes to the following conclusion: “One point that now appears certain is that the seditious activities of Isidorus and his consequent departure from Alexandria date to well before 38. They had nothing to do with the violence in 38” (78). One cannot but agree with the first sentence, but hardly with 15 That many of his statements are debatable is indicated clearly by Kerkeslager himself in his frequent use of the verb “might” and of phrases such as “This would suggest . . .” 16 See my Philo’s Flaccus 116 and the literature cited there. The time span of two to four weeks is confirmed by the expert opinion of Prof. Fik Meijer from Amsterdam.
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the final one, at least not with the word “nothing.” Isidorus’ giving of advice to Flaccus, which, as I argued above, did take place and was antiSemitic, had everything to do with the pogrom of 38. It is for that very same reason that I cannot agree with another speculative conclusion: “His [i.e., Isidorus’] wrangling against Judaeans in imperial hearings was driven more by greed and simple patriotism than by anti-Semitism” (92). This having been said, I want to emphasize again that, despite the above criticisms, I think Allen Kerkeslager’s study17 is a very learned, original, and impressive piece of scholarship, and I want to thank him for this opportunity for debate.18 Zeist, The Netherlands
17 Soon to be followed by its companion piece “Agrippa and the Mourning Rites for Drusilla in Alexandria,” forthcoming in JSJ. 18 I thank David Runia for his comments on the first draft of this paper.
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 57–58
SPECIAL SECTION PHILO’S DE VIRTUTIBUS INTRODUCTION
DAVID T. RUNIA
It may seem hardly surprising that Philo bequeathed to posterity a treatise entitled On virtues. Ethical theory with its focus on how we should live is at the very heart of his concerns. But when the treatise is actually examined, there are in fact lots of surprises. First there is its location in the corpus. It is not an independent moral treatise, but comes towards the end of Philo’s grand exposition of the Mosaic Law in twelve books. How does the treatise relate to the whole enterprise, and in particular to the exposition of the Decalogue and the more specific laws which precedes it? Then there is the matter of the virtues which he chooses to expound. Why these virtues in particular? And how does his exposition relate to philosophical treatments of the same subjects? In addition, we should not forget that there are serious foundational issues relating to the treatise’s text and structure that have puzzled Philonic scholars for centuries. The conference held in Philadelphia in 2005 was not the first time that the Philo of Alexandria Seminar and Group has focused on this intriguing work. In 1991, when the meeting was held in Kansas City, a session was devoted to it. Papers were presented by Earle Hilgert, David T. Runia, and Jon N. Bailey (see SPhA 4 [1992]: 179, 13 [2001]: 29), but they were not published in this journal. In the meantime the initiative has been taken to start the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series. Recently Walter T. Wilson has been designated to produce a commentary on De virtutibus. A preliminary study that he wrote in preparation for his work was published in the Annual last year; see “Pious Soldiers, Gender Deviants, and the Ideology of Actium: Courage and Warfare in Philo’s De fortitudine,” SPhA 17 (2005): 1–32. The Philo of Alexandria Group decided to offer Walter additional assistance for his undertaking by devoting another session of the Philo of Alexandria Group to this treatise when it met last year in Philadelphia. For a report on the sessions see further p. 229 below. It has been the practice of the Annual to publish selected papers presented at such sessions. Two papers presented at the session, by James R. Royse and David Konstan
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respectively, are published in this Special Section. A third paper is added to these. It is a paper that Gregory E. Sterling had prepared for another occasion, focusing on one of the chief virtues dealt with in De virtutibus, namely the aretê of piety (eusebeia). The editors were of the view that this paper would neatly dovetail with the others, and so help the reader obtain a broader perspective on this important Philonic treatise. We present these three contributions with the hope that they will advance our understanding of an intriguing and important Philonic treatise.
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 59–72
PHILO’S DE VIRTUTIBUS IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF CLASSICAL GREEK PHILOSOPHY1
DAVID KONSTAN
Upon reading, in a Greek work entitled On Virtues, that a person must go “from ignorance to knowledge of those things that it is shameful not to know: from foolishness to prudence, from lack of self-control to selfcontrol, from injustice to justice, and from lack of confidence to confidence,”2 someone familiar with classical Greek ethical thought may well feel on familiar ground. First, virtue is closely associated with knowledge or epistêmê, as Plato had held (e.g., in the Protagoras 361B, etc.); and second, though the terms are slightly different, it is not difficult to recognize what, at least since Plato, came to be seen as the four principal virtues that constitute virtue as a whole, namely wisdom or sophia, here labelled phronêsis or practical wisdom; sôphrosunê or temperance, for which Philo appropriates the Aristotelian term enkrateia (in Plato, enkrateia typically takes an object and means “control over” desires or the like); justice or dikaiosunê; and finally, courage, usually called andreia but here identified by the postclassical term tharraleotês, “boldness.”3 Nor do I doubt that Philo is alluding to this fourfold list of virtues. But he is doing so in the context of a discussion, not of these qualities as such, but rather of the virtue of “repentance” or metanoia, more precisely, a “change of heart” or “mind.” This was not 1 This paper is a revised version of the talk, entitled “Philo’s De virtutibus in the Perspective of Greco-Roman Philosophical Literature,” presented on 22 November 2005 to the Philo of Alexandria group at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature; I am grateful to the participants in that session for helpful comments, and to David Runia and Ilaria Ramelli for their kind observations on an earlier draft. By “classical,” I refer principally to the period of Plato and Aristotle; there are of course many parallels with Stoic thought in Philo, particularly as reflected in later writers such as Dio Chrysostom and Epictetus or Cicero and Seneca, but they are beyond the scope of the present investigation. 2 toËto d' §st‹n §j émay¤aw efiw §pistÆmhn œn ≤ êgnoia afisxrÒn, §j éfrosÊnhw efiw frÒnhsin, §j ékrate¤aw efiw §gkrãteian, §j édik¤aw efiw dikaiosÊnhn, §j étolm¤aw efiw yarraleÒthta (180). 3 For the view that these four were first identified as the cardinal virtues by Plato, see Helen North, Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Culture (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966), 151.
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among the canonical virtues of the classical thinkers, and the reason why is obvious: the meaning of the word aretê was “excellence,” an outstanding ability. Transferred to the moral realm, it signified achieved virtue. Regret or a change of mind not only presupposes an earlier state of error, but is active as a virtue only in respect to such a state. Once you have abandoned foolishness, injustice and the rest and, as Philo puts it, “left vice behind as a treacherous mistress” (kak¤an, §p¤boulon d°spoinan, épolipόntaw, 181), there is no longer need for metanoia.4 Now, Philo himself recognizes this secondary status of metanoia: just as health is the greatest good for the body, and recovery next best, so too the recollection of what has been forgotten, to which a change of mind is most closely related, “is not ranked in the first and highest class of goods, but as winning second prize in the next class” (176). So Philo evidently does not intend metanoia to compete with the classical virtues on their own ground— an additional indication that he has those virtues in mind.5 What is more, metanoia or a change of heart is concerned only secondarily, according to Philo, with the necessities of life (per‹ b¤on énagka›a, 180), under which he includes the above-named virtues; its principal concern is the error of venerating created things before the uncreated God the Creator (tå genhtå prÚ toË égenÆtou ka‹ poihtoË yaumãzaw). And, Philo adds, all the other virtues follow upon reverence for the true God as a shadow follows a body (181). In fact, Philo is not proposing metanoia as a universal virtue, along the lines of the classical ideals, nor is he urging unbelievers in general to abandon their false beliefs and profess allegiance to the true God. He is dealing rather with the return to the fold on the part of Jews who have lapsed; this is why he speaks of being restored to health or achieving remembrance after forgetfulness. Again, Philo declares that those who revere God become temperate, self-controlled, and the rest, whereas those who abandon the sacred laws (toÁw t«n fler«n nÒmvn épostãntaw, 182) exhibit all the worst 4 David Winston, “Judaism and Hellenism: Hidden Tensions in Philo’s Thought” SPhA 2 [1990] 4, observes that metanoia was “a Jewish religious idea that seems to have been virtually non-existent or at best only marginal in the Greek world”; cf. also Laurel Fulkerson, “Metameleia: Remorse and Repentance in fifth and fourth century Athenian Oratory,” Phoenix 58: [2004] 241–59. Robert Kaster, Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 66–83, argues that the Latin paenitentia in the pre-Christian period reflects primarily a displeasure at not having measured up to one’s expectations or standards; this “egoistic regret” is radically different from the Christian idea of remorse (pp. 80–83), as Tertullian too observed (De paenitentia 1.4–5). 5 Cf. Winston (above, n. 4) 6: “although Philo has not succeeded completely in assimilating the concept of repentance to his philosophical thought, he does nevertheless emphasize its secondary rank in the hierarchy of virtue.”
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vices: the focus remains on the Jewish community. The reason for this emphasis has to do with the larger context of Philo’s remarks, which is his praise of Moses’ wisdom and leadership. In order to follow Philo’s train of thought here, it is necessary, as usual, to take account of his exegetical and apologetic project in respect to the Pentateuch.6 Here, his theme is Moses’ generosity, which is put in evidence by his manner of assuring the people that metanoia is not a heavy chore, nor remote and hard to reach, but near at hand.7 The whole passage may be taken as illustrating not just the importance of metanoia itself but also Moses’ own virtue: the section on metanoia begins, after all, with the words: “Most holy Moses, lover of virtue, lover of nobleness, lover of mankind (philanthrôpos), encourages everyone everywhere to be zealous for piety and justice” (175). With this, we encounter the well-known problem of just what virtues Philo meant to count as such in De virtutibus—assuming that this was its title and that it formed a single treatise. In his great edition, Leopold Cohn divided the work into four parts, each with a subtitle representing a virtue: courage (andreia), humanity (philanthrôpia), repentance (metanoia), and good birth (eugeneia). But, as we have seen, the very brief section on metanoia (175–86) is introduced as though it were one more illustration of Moses’ humanity or philanthrôpia, the virtue examined at greatest length in the treatise as we have it. Cohn affirmed that “everyone can see that the snippet entitled ‘On Repentance’ is closely connected to the chapter ‘On Humanity,’ and that metanoia is not properly a virtue”8 (so too the section on good birth is a codicil of that same chapter, according to Cohn, and is annexed to it in manuscript S and others). Cohn argued as well that the original treatise dealt with only three virtues—courage, humanity, and, given that neither repentance nor good birth formed independent parts, a third virtue (cf. Eusebius Hist. eccl. 2.18.2), which Cohn suggested was piety or eusebeia, originally located between courage and humanity and lost at an early date, though references to it survive in the titles preserved in certain
6 This is uppermost in works such as On Abraham, On the Decalogue, On Joseph, The Life of Moses, On the Creation of the World, On Rewards and Punishments, On the Special Laws, and On the Virtues, which may be collectively identified as “The Exposition of the Law”; see David T. Runia, ed. and trans., On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses (PACS 1, Leiden: Brill, 2001), 1–8. 7 oÈx Íp°rogkÒn §stin oÈd¢ makrån . . . …w édunat∞sai labe›n, éll' ¶stin §ggutãtv (183). Philo is here adapting Deut 30:11–14 to a Greek-style discourse on the virtues. 8 ”nam particulam illam quae per‹ metano¤aw inscribitur artissime cum capite per‹ filanyrvp¤aw cohaerere nec metano¤an proprie virtutem esse nemo est quin videat” (p. xxvii).
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manuscripts. The others were added after its loss to bring the number of virtues up to three. Cohn’s reconstruction has been challenged on various grounds, and this is not the place to discuss the matter in detail, which in any case is beyond my competence.9 I take the liberty of commenting on just one point, since it touches on the question of the classical virtues. In locating the treatment of piety between courage and humanity, Cohn adduced the opening sentence of the section “On Humanity”: “We must next consider the virtue that is most closely kin to piety and truly twin sister to it, humanity, which the prophet loved like no one else I know, for he understood that it leads like a highway to holiness.”10 To be sure, this statement may be nothing more than a way of indicating the high value placed on philanthrôpia,11 or else may refer to an earlier discussion in some other work.12 But there is perhaps
9
For a review of the entire question, with relevant bibliography, see James S. Royse, “The Text of Philo’s De virtutibus,” presented at the above-mentioned session at the SBL, and published elsewhere in this volume. 10 tØn d' eÈsebe¤aw suggenestãthn ka‹ édelfØn ka‹ d¤dumon ˆntvw •j∞w §piskept°on filanyrvp¤an, ∏w §rasye‹w …w oÈk o‰d' e‡ tiw ßterow ı profÆthw t«n nÒmvn^ıdÚn går oÂa levfÒron êgousan §f' ısiÒthta taÊthn ±p¤stato (51). Walther Völker, Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien: Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Frömmigkeit (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs Verlag, 1938), 225, observes that the close connection between humanity and piety is foreign to classical Greek thought: “trozt aller Einflüsse von Seiten der griechischen Ethik die jüdische Frömmigkeit siegreich das Feld behaupt”; cf. Eduard Schwartz, “Aporien im vierten Evangelium,” Nachrichten von der Kgl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, philol.-hist. Klasse (1908): 541. On the biblical background to philanthrôpia, cf. Lev 19:17–18, Deut 6:5 (for the connection between humaneness and piety in the NT, cf. Luke 10:27). However, Esther Starobinski-Safran, Philon: La fuite et la décourverte (Paris: Cerf, 1970), 269–279 (note complémentaire 3 to sec. 38), noting that “Dans Virt. 95 la piété (eusebeia) et la vertu d’humanité (philanthrôpia) sont designées comme vertus maîtresses,” compares (in addition to Philo Mos. 2.215–216 and Special Laws 2.61–63), Marcus Aurelius 5.33: t¤ d¢ êllo µ yeoÁw m¢n s°bein ka‹ eÈfhme›n, ényr≈pouw d¢ eÔ poie›n, and 6.30.1: afidoË yeoÊw, s”ze ényr≈pouw. 11 So Emil Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi (4th ed., Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1901–1909), 3.671 n. 101. 12 August Ferdinand Dähne, “Einige Bemerkungen über die Schriften des Juden Philo, angeknüpft an eine Untersuchung über deren ursprüngliche Anordnung,” TSK 6 (1822) 1033–34. I owe this and the reference in the preceding note to Royse’s paper, cited in n. 9; Royse himself proposes that the original treatise consisted of five sections, covering courage, humanity, repentance, good birth, and, in last place, piety. David Runia, in turn, maintains that the original treatise in fact dealt with just three virtues, namely courage, humanity, and repentance, and that the putative section on piety is due to “a false inference from Philo’s formulation at §51” (“Underneath Cohn and Colson: The Text of Philo’s De virtutibus,” in Philo and the Church Fathers [Leiden: Brill, 1995 (originally 1991)] 97). Finally, Gregory E. Sterling, “’The Queen of the Virtues’: Eὐs°beia in Philo of Alexandria” (this volume), holds that Philo wrote four more or less independent treatises
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one other piece of evidence that courage and piety may have begun the sequence of virtues discussed in On Virtues. Philo introduces the treatise as follows: “Since I said earlier what was relevant concerning justice and its characteristics, I shall now proceed, in what follows, to courage, but not that which the masses believe in—the warlike madness that makes use of anger as its counsellor—but rather knowledge.”13 It is universally accepted that the reference to the earlier treatment of justice is to the final section of Book 4 of On the Special Laws (beginning at 4.136), given the subtitle “On Justice” in some manuscripts. Philo introduces this segment by observing: “We have spoken, then, about the queen of the virtues, piety and holiness, and also about practical wisdom and moderation, and now we must speak about justice, which practices those things that are sister and kin to these virtues”14 (we recognize the formula “sister and kin” from the opening paragraph of “On Humanity,” perhaps a sign that Philo is referring in both passages to an immediately preceding discussion). Here again, Philo provides a list of four principal virtues: piety or holiness (the kai is epexegetical), followed by prudence or wisdom, moderation, and justice. Holiness was commonly recognized as a fifth primary virtue (e.g. in Plato’s Protagoras),15 and there is nothing unusual in its keeping company with the other virtues here, although of course piety will have a special meaning in the context of a treatise on the Hebrew laws. Philo takes the Mosaic requirement “not to add or subtract anything, but to keep unaltered and in the same and like condition the laws that were defined at the beginning,”16 as an occasion to explain that justice itself, and indeed all virtues, are subject to distortion by addition and subtraction. As Philo says, Moses here intimates in a symbolic way (ainittetai) the extremes also in the case of the other virtues, “for each of them is lacking in nothing and is full, having its perfection in itself; thus, if there were to be some addition or subtraction,
on the topics of justice, piety, courage, and humanity, with repentance and good birth included in the last. 13 Per‹ dikaiosÊnhw ka‹ t«n kat' aÈtØn ˜sa ka¤ria prÒteron efip∆n m°teimi t«n •j∞w §p' éndre¤an, oÈx ∂n ofl pollo‹ nom¤zousi tØn éreimãnion lÊttan Ùrgª sumboÊlƒ xrvm°nhn, éllå tØn §pistÆmhn (1). 14 per‹ m¢n oÔn t∞w ≤gemon¤dow t«n éret«n, eÈsebe¤aw ka‹ ısiÒthtow, ¶ti d¢ ka‹ fronÆsevw ka‹ svfrosÊnhw e‡rhtai prÒteron, nun‹ d¢ per‹ t∞w §pithdeuoÊshw édelfå ka‹ suggen∞ taÊtaiw dikaiosÊnhw lekt°on (4.135). 15 Cf. 324E, where justice, moderation and holiness (to hosion) are associated; 329C, for the same trio (here hosiotês); 330B, for these three plus courage; 349B for the full set of five, including sophia. 16 tÚ mhd¢n prostiy°nai ka‹ éfaire›n, éll' §n ‡sƒ ka‹ ımo¤ƒ diafulãttein ék¤nhta tå §j érx∞w ırisy°nta nÒmima (4.143); cf. Deuteronomy 4:2, 12:32.
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the whole of it would be wholly converted and changed into the opposite state.”17 It is not hard to recognize here a version of Aristotle’s doctrine of virtues as a mean between excess and deficiency, and Philo proceeds to illustrate it by way of two specific examples. The first is courage, which Philo defines, here as again in De virtutibus, as a kind of knowledge or science of what is to be endured (t«n Ípomenet°vn oÔsan §pistÆmhn, 4.145). Any addition yields rashness (thrasutês), whereas subtraction results in cowardice (deilia, 4.146), and leaves behind not even the bare name of courage;18 these are just the extremes that Aristotle identifies in the Nicomachean Ethics (1109a2–3). Philo next offers the case of piety or eusebeia, which he again calls the queen of the virtues. Here, however, he is in uncharted territory, at least so far as Aristotle’s own treatment is concerned, for Aristotle nowhere mentions eusebeia or hosiotês in the Ethics. Philo argues, however, that an increment in piety results in superstition (deisidaimonia), whereas a diminishment produces impiety (asebeia, 4.147). Philo goes on to say that one could discuss each of the other virtues in the same way, without indicating which he might have treated next, or how he would have done so. But it is perhaps possible—I make no stronger claim— that he is here intimating the order in which he intends to examine them in On Virtues, in which case it would appear that courage was originally followed there by piety, and piety in turn by humanity. Philo does not explain here just how justice is a mean, but he returns to this question a little later, where he takes the Royal Highway mentioned in Numbers 20:17 and 21:22 to represent the middle way between excess and deficiency.19 Here, indeed, Philo employs Aristotle’s own terminology (huperbolê, elleipsis) for the extremes, though he goes on to suggest a more harmonious relationship between them and the mean, in which “the mean occupies the ruling position in a triad, harmonizing in unity by an indissoluble bond the elements on either side, by which it is guarded in the manner of a king.”20 Philo does not further specify the extremes, but in this too he follows Aristotle, who treats justice differently from the other virtues. Like 17 afin¤ttetai m°ntoi ka‹ ta›w êllaiw éreta›w ékrÒthtaw: •kãsth går aÈt«n énellipÆw §sti ka‹ plÆrhw, tÚ §ntel¢w ¶xousa §j aÍt∞w, …w, efi g°noito prosyÆkh tiw ka‹ éfa¤resiw, ˜lhn di' ˜lvn tr°pesyai ka‹ metabãllesyai prÚw tØn §nant¤an ßjin (4.144). 18 Cf. Aristotle EN 1104a25–27: fye¤retai dØ svfrosÊnh ka‹ ≤ éndre¤a ÍpÚ t∞w Íperbol∞w ka‹ t∞w §lle¤cevw, ÍpÚ d¢ t∞w mesÒthtow s–zetai. 19 basilikØn d' e‡vye Mvus∞w Ùnomãzein ıdÚn tØn m°shn, Íperbol∞w ka‹ §lle¤cevw oÔsan meyÒrion (4.168). 20 tÚ m°son §n triãdi tØn ≤gemon¤da tãjin e‡lhxen, èrmozÒmenon tå par' •kãtera efiw ßnvsin édialÊtƒ desm”, Íf' œn ka‹ dorufore›tai trÒpon basil°vw (168).
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Aristotle (EN 5.3, 1131a10–20), Philo puts the emphasis rather on the idea of equality (isotês, 166, 169), which produces light and stability (≤ gennò f«w ka‹ eÈstãyeian, 166). And indeed, Philo ends the treatise On the Special Laws with a paean to equality (4.230–38), which he denominates the “mother of justice” (231). So too, Aristotle treats justice in the general sense as equivalent to perfect virtue, understood not in itself but in respect to others.21 Returning now to On Virtues, I omit further consideration of metanoia and eugeneia, save to note that Philo, like other Hellenistic writers,22 rescues the latter as a moral quality by transforming it into a kind of nobility of character: “since, then, good birth of a mind that has been purified by perfect purifications is the proper inheritance, one must call only those well born who are temperate and just, even if they happen to have been born from household slaves or from those bought with money.”23 But the idea has good classical antecedents. In Euripides’ Electra, Orestes, struck by the decency of the poor farmer whom his sister has been forced to wed, exclaims: “Nothing is certain in regard to manly worth (euandrian), for mortal natures have perturbations. I’ve seen a man of noble father who was worthless, and decent children come from bad parents . . . Do not be foolish, you who go astray, full of empty opinions, but among mortals judge who are noble (tous eugeneis) by their conversation and their characters” (cf. Aristotle, Politics 1255a39–b1, although Aristotle typically employs the term in the sense of aristocratic status). Philo, however, treats this kind of nobility less as a virtue in itself than as a blanket term for anyone who possesses virtue in general. As Philo says, “It is obvious from many things that what is noble resides in the possession of virtue and that she [i.e., the personified Eugeneia, who has just ceased speaking] has assumed that only a person who has virtue is noble, and not just anyone who happens to be born of parents of high status.”24 I turn now to the two principal virtues that Philo discusses in De virtutibus as we have it, andreia and, at still greater length, philanthrôpia. I 21 aÏth m¢n oÔn ≤ dikaiosÊnh éretØ m°n §sti tele¤a, éll' oÈx èpl«w éllå prÚw ßteron (NE 5.1, 1129b25–27). 22 Cf., e.g., Dionysius of Halicarnassus Ant. Rom. 3.11.5: oÈ går §n êllƒ tin‹ tØn ényrvp¤nhn eÈg°neian Ípãrxein nom¤zomen, éll' §n éretª; Dio Chrysostom 15.29, 29.2–3. 23 §peidØ to¤nun ≤ eÈg°neia kekayarm°nhw diano¤aw kayars¤oiw tele¤oiw kl∞row ofike›ow, xrØ mÒnouw l°gein eÈgene›w toÁw s≈fronaw ka‹ dika¤ouw, kín tÊxvsin §j ofikotr¤bvn µ érgurvnÆtvn gegonÒtew (189); the contrast is between purchased and domestically reared slaves. 24 ÜOti d¢ §n éret∞w ktÆsei t¤yetai tÚ eÈgen¢w ka‹ tÚn ¶xonta taÊthn eÈgen∞ mÒnon Ípe¤lhfen, éll' oÈx ˜stiw ín kal«n ka‹ égay«n g°nhtai gon°vn, d∞lon §k poll«n (198); kaloi kai agathoi is a classical Athenian expression identifying the particular quality of the aristocratic class.
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begin with philanthrôpia, a newcomer to the classical list of virtues. Aristotle himself uses the term in the literal sense of “liking human beings,”25 applying it, for example, to friendly animals (History of Animals 617b26, 630a9). In the Constitution of the Athenians (16.2), Aristotle, or a disciple, connects it with gentleness and a disposition to forgive (praos and sungnômikos). In the Rhetoric (1390a18–20), Aristotle states that young people are given to feeling pity on account of philanthrôpia; here, philanthrôpia evidently represents an instinctive sensitivity to the suffering of others. Later, the word philanthrôpia comes into its own, signifying, like the Latin humanitas, a humane disposition toward others; it is frequently synonymous with epieikeia, “decency” or “kindness.” In Demosthenes philanthrôpia is associated with justice,26 as well as with gentleness or kindness: it is often paired with praos, for example,27 as well as with hêmeros or “tame” (21.49); it is contrasted, in turn, with the quality of being frightening (phoberos, 13.17) and with savagery (ômotês, 18.231). Philanthrôpia is also associated with eusebeia or “piety” (21.12), eunoia or “good will” (18.5), and epieikeia (36.59); it is the quality that restrains a free man from behaving hubristically—that is, with arrogant abuse—toward his own slaves (21.48). Finally, philanthrôpia also occurs in connection with pity.28 At a somewhat later period, Polybius employs philanthrôpia and related terms such as the adjective philanthrôpos and the adverb philanthrôpôs some 130 or 140 times in the surviving books of his History, and it is one of his principal terms of praise. Diodorus Siculus, in turn, uses it still more often, frequently in association with such words as praotês or “gentleness,” epieikeia, “kindness,” and eleos, “pity.” Clearly, this is an established virtue term in Hellenistic literature (although I do not know of a passage in which it is explicitly included in a list of virtues), and it is no wonder that Philo gives it a special place in his treatise, and seeks to show that Moses was exemplary in his humanity. Philo too connects philanthrôpia with gentlesness and mildness,29 which Moses extends not only to human beings but also to animals and even plants, as Philo proceeds to illustrate on the basis of the laws laid down in the Pentateuch. Pity also falls within the sphere of humanity (cf. 114). In particular, in discussing the prohibition, repeated three times in the Pentateuch, against boiling a lamb in its mother’s milk (Exod 23:19, 34:26; Deut 14:20), Philo observes: “If someone thinks it right to boil meat in milk, 25
It was already employed this way of Prometheus in the tragedy Prometheus Bound. Cf. Philippics 2.12, logous dikaious kai philanthrôpous; also 7.31, 20.109, 36.55, 44.8. 27 Cf. Dem. 8.31, 24.51, 24.196, 41.2, Eroticus 13. 28 25.76, 25.81; cf. 21.185, 24.196. 29 tÚ §pieik¢w ka‹ ¥meron (81); cf. 125, 134; also on mildness alone, 109. 26
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let him boil it without savagery and impiety. There are thousands of herds of animals, that are milked everywhere, every day by cowherds, goatherds, and shepherds, and their largest source of income as they raise their cattle is milk . . . Thus, since there is an unlimited supply, anyone who boils the flesh of lambs or kids or some other animal in the milk of its mother betrays a cruel depravity of character, which has amputated that passion [pathos] that is most related and akin to the rational soul, namely pity” (144). Pity remains, for Philo as for Aristotle, an emotion, but he assigns it a place of privilege in relation to reason. The opposite of such humaneness is a “slavish and illiberal smallness of soul,”30 which Philo illustrates by way of men who gather a harvest of grapes or olives twice in a season. Philo affirms, in fact, that Moses “transcended the boundaries of kindness [epieikeia] itself and held that one must not harbor a grudge even against those among one’s hosts [xenodokhoi] who have treated one badly, for though they have not humane deeds, they have at least a humane name [ˆnoma filãnyrvpon],” that is, that of host; Philo cites in evidence the injunction not to revile the Egyptians (Deut 23:7). And he entertains a utopian vision of the fruits of humanity that would seem to derive its inspiration more from the prophets than from the particularistic laws of Moses: “The most holy prophet desired to establish this above all in all his laws: concord, fellowship, like-mindedness, and the mixture of characters, from which households and cities and peoples and countries and the whole race of mankind [tÚ sÊmpan ényr≈pvn g°now] might advance to the highest happiness. But up to the present these are but prayers; yet they will be, as I believe, the most true facts, if God grants fruitfulness to our virtues like yearly harvests.” Not even Stoic cosmopolitanism, at least according to its founders, Zeno and Chrysippus, seems to have aspired to this degree of universality. If the treatment of enemy peoples enjoined by the Hebrew God is not always so benevolent (one scholar has observed that, while the “Greek and Roman gods could be cruel enough . . ., at least their devotees did not seek to represent them as prescribing genocide”),31 the Mosaic laws that Philo holds up as examples of humanity and other virtues do appear enlightened in comparison with prevailing attitudes and practices in the Greek and Roman world.32 I take one example among many of the compassionate 30
tØn douloprep∞ ka‹ éneleÊyeron mikrocux¤an, 92; the terms are Aristotelian. G. E. M. de Ste Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 332. 32 For a recent treatment of philanthropia in Jewish authors see K. Berthelot, Philanthropia Judaica: Le dèbat autour de la “misanthropie” des lois juives dan l’Antiquité (JSJSup 76; Leiden: Brill, 2003). 31
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quality of Jewish law, because of what it reveals not only about early Hebrew society but also about Philo’s own. Philo is celebrating the humanity of the regulation concerning a beautiful woman who has been captured and enslaved in war: if the man who owns her falls in love with her, he must allow thirty days to pass before approaching her sexually, during which time she may mourn her parents and family; and after that he must treat her not as a hetaera but as a legitimate wife (110–12). Philo explains that she will be in shock after being reduced to slavery and having lost her family and country; imposing a thirty–day waiting period will both give the man’s lust (epithumia) time to dissipate and put his own love (erôs) to the test (113). In addition, the month’s delay is a sign of pity for the captive, whether she is a virgin or a widow, who must now be fearful of the power of a master (114). A mere thirty days—and doubtless Philo sincerely believed that this provision would seem the height of mercy and humanity to his contemporaries. I have cited above Philo’s Socratic equation of courage, at the beginning of De virtutibus, with a kind of scientific reasoning or epistêmê, a view that he had already expressed, as we have seen, in On the Special Laws (4.145).33 Philo goes on to note that some people are carried away by rashness (thrasos), as Aristotle too remarked, denying this sort the name of courage (EN 3.7, 1115b24–35), although Philo gives the point a special twist by characterizing such types as “thirsting for human blood” (2). He thus throws the emphasis not on the elation that makes men unaware of danger, but on the savagery of the behavior. But Philo exploits the equation of courage with knowledge itself to a different effect than Plato or Aristotle. He writes: “there are those who, though they spend their time at home, their bodies withered by long disease or toilsome old age, are healthy and young in the better part, that of the soul. They are full of proud thoughts and bursting with the boldest daring, and though they would not touch defensive arms even in their dreams, yet by the advice of their good counsel, beneficial to the community, they have often restored the private affairs of individuals and the common affairs of their countries when they had fallen, making use of unyielding and inflexible arguments concerning what is advantageous. These, then, exercise true courage, for they are practisers of wisdom, while the others have the false kind (since they live in 33 For discussion of the problematic equation of courage with knowledge in Plato’s Protagoras, see C. W. Taylor, Plato: Protagoras (rev. ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 150–61; Rosalyn Weiss, “Courage, Confidence, and Wisdom in the Protagoras,” Ancient Philosophy 5 (1985), 11–24; David Wolfsdorf, “Courage and Knowledge at Protagoras 349E1–351B2,” Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter (2005–06), 41–47.
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ignorance, a disease difficult to cure)—a kind that one might properly call rashness [yrasÊthta]” (1–2). The connection between this kind of wisdom and courage as it is usually understood is far from clear, and different, I believe, from any of the examples of courage that earlier Greek philosophers offered. Rather than claim how courage is predicated on the knowledge what should be endured, as Plato and Aristotle held and as Philo himself had affirmed in On the Special Laws (4.145), Philo appears here simply to reduce courage to wisdom, eliminating the element of danger that gives courage its specific quality. As will become clear, moreover, this account of courage is not casual or accidental. Philo next observes that there are “many other things that are agreed to be difficult to endure in a human life, such as poverty, loss of reputation, mutilation, and the many forms of illness, with respect to which smallspirited people are made soft, unable to rouse themselves through want of boldness.”34 Now, Aristotle had asserted that genuine courage concerned the fear of death, and not just any kind of death, for example as a result of a storm at sea or disease, but specifically death in war (EN 3.6, 1115a28–30); as for a bad reputation, poverty, or friendlessness, Aristotle held that people should be afraid of such evils, and that they were not pertinent to the virtue of courage (1115a10–12). Philo would seem to be reverting to the earlier, more latitudinous conception of courage proposed by Plato, for example in the Laches (191C-E), where he states that courage pertains not only to hoplite or infantry combat, but also to cavalry and every kind of military activity, and not just war, but also to dangers at sea, and those involved in illness, poverty, and politics. Furthermore, people can be courageous not just with regard to pains or fears, but also in fighting desires and pleasures.35 Philo argues that the wise are in need of little, since 34 OÈk Ùl¤ga m°ntoi ka‹ êlla dusupomÒnhta t«n katå tÚn ényr≈pinon b¤on …molÒghtai, pen¤a ka‹ édoj¤a ka‹ pÆrvsiw ka‹ nÒsvn fid°ai polÊtropoi, prÚw ìw ofl m¢n ÙligÒfronew malak¤zontai, mhd' ˜son Íp' étolm¤aw §gery∞nai dunãmenoi (5). 35 Contrast Cicero’s report of the Stoic definition of courage (fortitudo) as “fighting foremost in defense of fairness” (propugnantem pro aequitate, De officiis 1.62). Cicero allows that there is a type of civic courage, in addition to military (sunt igitur domesticae fortitudines non inferiores militaribus, in quibus plus etiam quam in his operae studiique ponendum est, 1.78), but his examples, which include his own activities while consul, show that he is referring to maintaining a firm posture in respect to armed enemies of the state. Later, Cicero defines fortitudo as “contempt for pain and toil” (dolorum laborumque contemptio, 3.117). Cf. also Seneca De beneficiis 2.34, Epistles 85.28–29. Walter T. Wilson, “Pious Soldiers, Gender Deviants, and the Ideology of Actium: Courage and Warfare in Philo’s De Fortitudine,” SPhA 17 (2005) 10–23, sees a substantial similarity between Cicero’s and Philo’s accounts of courage, though he allows (p. 20) that Philo does not privilege military over civic courage to the same extent that Cicero does. But Philo does, according to Wilson, assume that
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their minds are fixed on immortality, and in this they resemble God (8–9); borrowing an image from Plato’s Phaedrus (246–47, 253–54), Philo describes the healthy soul as one in which there is a proper mixture of reason, appetite, and temper (thumos), “with reason in control and reining in both the others like horses resisting the bridle.”36 Philo adds that the proper name of this state of health is moderation or sôphrosunê, which he derives, following Plato’s Cratylus (411E), from sôtêria and phronein, that is, salvation in thinking (14). Philo would appear to have lost the thread of his argument, having moved from courage to moderation, but he brings the argument back round by a certain sleight of hand, asserting that those who have read carefully his other treatises will know that “everything that has been said about the absence of pride is pretty much the case concerning courage” (17). For Philo, courage easily blends into the other virtues, including humility, which here seems to be equated more or less with sôphrosunê (Plato, of course, had argued for the unity of the virtues in the Protagoras). Philo returns at this point to the laws laid down in the Pentateuch, beginning with the prohibition against men wearing women’s clothing and the reverse (Deuteronomy 22:5), which Philo interprets as a means of maintaining manly courage (18–20). From this, passing over the important role of peacetime courage, Philo turns to a consideration of bravery in war (22), but not before introducing by way of preface (§ke›no proeipÒntew) a commentary on Moses’ wisdom in exempting the faint-hearted from going into battle (23–26; cf. Deut 20:8), along with any who have not yet reaped the first fruits of a new endeavor, and who must leave behind a house not yet dwelt in, a vineyard never before harvested, or a bride who is still a virgin (27–31; cf. Deut 20:5–7): Philo takes this as evidence of Moses’ humanity as much as of his strategic skill (28). A picked force that is sound in body and soul, and undistracted by extraneous preoccupations, Philo concludes, will be invincible (33). To illustrate the truth of this claim, Philo adduces, as the finale to the section on courage, the biblical account of the war against the Midianites (cf. Numbers 25, 31:1–21). As Philo tells it, the Midianites had long sought to corrupt the faith and solidarity of the Hebrews so as to conquer them, and finally, despairing of success in argument or in arms, contrived the strategem of sending their marriageable and married women to seduce them and lead them into apostasy (34–40); for “mankind is susceptible to “courage not only belongs to men rather than women, it also entails recognizing and resisting womanly threats to one’s manhood” (21). 36 §pikratoÊshw t∞w logik∞w ka‹ Àsper éfhniaståw ·ppouw ≤nioxoÊshw •kat°raw (13).
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pleasure, and above all via intercourse with a woman.”37 The device, moreover, was proving successful, when God, out of pity (oiktos, 41) for His people, prompted Moses to order the hanging of those who had strayed, amounting in number to 24,000 men (cf. Num 25:9). Moses then selected a picked force of 12,000 men38 to avenge the Midianites’ treachery, and by means of their skill and daring they mowed down the enemy fighters and then slew also the women who had consented to the plot, sparing only the virgins among them out of pity for their innocence (43)—all this without suffering the loss of a single man (44). We may note that Philo has to some degree sanitized the biblical story, according to which Moses angrily ordered the extermination of all male children among the Midianites as well as any women who had lain with men, and distributed the virgins as booty to the officers (Num 31:14–18). What lesson does Philo draw from this episode? That the reason for the Hebrews’ victory was that they fought in behalf of piety (Íp¢r eÈsebe¤aw), and God led them (45); only in this way could they have triumphed so onesidedly against all odds (46).39 Philo expands upon Moses’ exhortation to the people in Deut 28:7, in which he says that “if you cultivate justice and holiness [dikaiosÊnhn ka‹ ısiÒthta] and the other virtues, you will live a life without war and in complete peace, or if war arises you will easily overcome your enemies, with God invisibly leading your army” (47). And he concludes: “From this is it clear that one must cleave to what is just and holy [tÚ d¤kaion ka‹ ˜sion]; for those who have the divine as their ally are consummately happy, but those to whom it is inimical are unfortunate to the last degree. Let this much, then, suffice concerning courage for the time being” (50). Although Philo is perfectly well acquainted with the Greek philosophical tradition concerning the virtues, and courage in particular, he chooses as his prime case study in courage a biblical incident that centers on the theme of faithfulness to God and the seductive danger of apostasy. Like 37 ≤donª d' èlvtÚn ênyrvpow, ka‹ mãlista sunous¤& tª prÚw guna¤ka (36); in the biblical version, the danger derives rather from intermarriage between the two peoples (Num 25:1–2). 38 The figure is given in Numbers 31:4–5; Philo just says that they were few (oligos arithmos, 43). 39 Wilson (above, n. 35), 26–27 compares Philo’s emphasis on piety with official Roman ideology under Augustus, as illustrated, for example, by Virgil’s pius Aeneas, and sees Philo’s account of the Hebrews’ victory over the Midianites as a deliberate analogue of Rome’s defeat of the Arabians in 26–22 b.c.e. Wilson notes (32) that, according to Strabo (16.4.22–24), “in one engagement the Arab army lost 10,000 men, the invasionary force only two. . . In Philo’s reimagining of the Israelite vitory over the Arabs/Midianites, soldiers schooled in the Mosaic law . . . are able to do the Romans one, or two, better.”
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Socrates in Plato’s Charmides, Philo suggests, first of all, that courage resides in an ability to master pleasure and desire—a virtue that Aristotle would label moderation or sôphrosunê (NE 3.10, 1117b23–1118b8). The failure of the 24,000 young men to resist the Midianite women is treated implicitly as a lack of courage; true, Philo mentions rather the lack of sense (oligophrôn, 40) that is characteristic of the young, but he began this section of his treatise by identifying courage as a species of knowledge (1). This, then, is courage in the personal realm: the ability to overcome the temptations of sex and other such appetites. Courage in war, in turn, resides in a single–minded dedication to defending piety, undistracted by any other concern (this is why Philo dwells on the provision that those who have newly undertaken projects not be drafted into battle). Aristotle had already argued that courage, like all virtues, must be motivated by a commitment to what is noble or kalon, and it is “for the sake of what is noble that the courageous person endures and acts in accord with courage” (EN 3.7, 1115b23–25; cf. 12–13).40 It is possible to understand Philo as adapting this view to the religious context of the Hebrew Bible, in which piety is substituted for to kalon. But he also means something more, namely that God allies himself with those who are faithful to him, and it is thanks to His intervention and support that the Hebrews are triumphant. In Greek popular belief, if not in philosophical thought, gods and heroes were sometimes imagined as lending a hand in battle to those who showed proper reverence to their cult (e.g. Achilles Tatius 8.18.1); no doubt the Hebrew Bible reflects a similar idea, transposed into the idiom of monotheism. Moreover, the conviction that one has a god on one’s side may shore up one’s resolution and diminish fear; thus, Diomedes, in the Iliad, declares that he and his henchman Sthenelus will stay on to fight and conquer Troy, even if the rest of the Achaeans abandon the campaign, because he knows that they have come “with god” (9.49).41 But nowhere, I think, is confidence in God’s aid as a result of piety simply identified with courage. This is Philo’s own contribution, and it constitutes a transvaluation of the classical conception. Brown University Providence, R.I.
40 Stoicizing thinkers, as we have seen (above, n. 35), argued rather that courage must be in the service of justice or the public good. 41 Cf. Sophocles, Ajax 764–65; Euripides Suppliant Women 1226; Xenophon, Cyropaedia 1.5.14; also Nicias’ attempt to reassure his bedraggled troops that they are more deserving of the gods’ pity than their spite (Thucydides 7.77.4).
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 73–101
THE TEXT OF PHILO’S DE VIRTUTIBUS1
JAMES R. ROYSE
The problems associated with the text of Philo’s De virtutibus (“On the Virtues”) have been admirably discussed in two papers given by Earle Hilgert and David T. Runia to the Philo of Alexandria Group at the Society of Biblical Literature’s meeting of 1991.2 Any discussion of this topic will inevitably overlap at many places with those two excellent papers, and to avoid undue repetition I will from time to time simply refer to these earlier papers as I discuss what is admittedly a challenging topic.
The Place of De virtutibus within Philo’s Works The general lines of the transmission of Philo’s works have been frequently discussed, and I will give only a very brief summary here.3 The CohnWendland critical edition of Philo (PCW) rests (with the exception of the Coptos papyrus) on medieval manuscripts, which date from the ninth to the fifteenth century, and which (at least for the most part) appear to derive from exemplars in Caesarea, prepared as it seems under the direction of Euzoius in the latter half of the fourth century. But not all our evidence is so derived. For example, there are some further writings of Philo that apparently were unknown to Eusebius, and therefore had a different history.
1 This is a slightly revised version of a paper presented to the Philo of Alexandria Group at the meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in Philadelphia, November 22, 2005. 2 Earle Hilgert, “A Review of Previous Research on Philo’s De Virtutibus,” SBLSP 1991 (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991) 103–15, and David T. Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson: The Text of Philo’s De virtutibus,” ibid., 116–34, reprinted in his Philo and the Church Fathers (Leiden: Brill, 1995) 77–101, with additional notes at 252–54. I shall cite Runia’s article according to the pagination of the reprint, which includes the page numbers of the original. Perhaps I can note here also that the discussion by Jenny Morris in the new Schürer (SHJP 3.850–53) provides an excellent overview of the evidence and issues regarding Virt. 3 For further details and references, often to the stimulating research of David T. Runia, see my “The Text of Philo’s Legum allegoriae,” SPhA 12 (2000) 1–2.
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And there are a few early papyri that provide evidence that is, presumably, independent of the Caesarean exemplars. These include the third century Coptos papyrus, which was utilized by Cohn and Wendland, contains Sacr. and Her., and likely did not derive from the edition of Euzoius. And we now have material from another third century papyrus, found at Oxyrhynchus (to be discussed further below). Among the discoveries made since the Cohn-Wendland edition is a palimpsest, Atheniensis Bibl. Nat. gr. 880, which contains: Det., Post., Gig., Deus, Ebr., Sobr., Conf., Virt. 175–86, Virt. 187–227, Sacr., Agr., Somn. 1, and perhaps others. Its discoverer, Paul J. Alexander, states that the text of the manuscript agrees closely with that of the Philonic mss. U and F and contains some new readings of interest.4 For our present purposes we note the presence of the last two sections of Virt. (these sections will be discussed below). And, most recently, Harrauer has published a papyrus, now in Vienna, that preserves some material from Virt. This is P.Vindob. inv. G 60584, of the fifth century, which contains portions of Virt. 64–65 and 69– 70.5 This is by some 500 years the oldest witness to this part of Virt., and even though what survives is very meager, it is of great interest and will be discussed in more detail below. We shall return to the manuscripts, but let us now review briefly the place of Virt. within the Philonic corpus. The classification of many (but not all) of Philo’s works into the three major series of the Allegorical Commentary, the Exposition of the Law, and the Quaestiones et solutiones, is commonly accepted. The work De virtutibus falls clearly within the Exposition of the Law,6 and it seems now to be generally held that Virt. forms a kind of appendix to the four books De specialibus legibus.7 After his extensive discussion of the legal material of the Pentateuch as arranged 4 “A Neglected Palimpsest of Philo Judaeus: Preliminary Remarks editorum in usum,” in Studia Codicologica (ed. Kurt Treu; TU 124; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1977) 1–14. See my abstract in SPh 5 (1978) 121, and the comments by Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 86–87. 5 Hermann Harrauer, “Ein neuer Philo-Papyrus mit peri; filanqrwpiva",” Analecta Papyrologica 14–15 (2002–2003) 111–15. I owe this reference and a copy of the article to Professor David T. Runia. 6 David T. Runia, trans., Philo: On the Creation of the Cosmos according to Moses (Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series 1; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 6, holds that the Exposition of the Law contained twelve treatises: Opif., Abr., lost De Isaaco, lost De Iacobo, Ios., Decal., Spec. 1, Spec. 2, Spec. 3, Spec. 4, Virt., Praem. 7 See, for example, Jenny Morris in SJHP 3.851; Roger Arnaldez in PAPM 26, 11; Ludwig Früchtel, Review of PAPM 26, 19, and 11–12, Gnomon 34 (1962) 771; Runia, Philo: On the Creation, 6, summarizes Virt. as an “additional systematic treatment of the excellences or virtues described and illustrated by Moses.”
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under the headings of the Ten Commandments (Spec. 4.132), Philo turns to the “virtues of universal value” (Spec. 4.134, Colson’s translation of aiJ koinwfelei`" ajretaiv), mentioning wisdom (frovnhsi"), justice (dikaiosuvnh), and godliness (qeosevbeia). Philo then notes that he has already discussed “the queen of the virtues, piety or holiness” (Spec. 4.135, hJ hJgemoni;" tw'n ajretw'n, eujsevbeia kai; oJsiovth"), as well as wisdom (frovnhsi") and temperance (swfrosuvnh), and then turns to justice (dikaiosuvnh). There follows (Spec. 4.136–238 [the end]) what is, in effect, a sub-treatise on justice, and in fact Cohn inserts before §136 the heading Peri; dikaiosuvnh", as found in two codices.8 The opening words of Virt. echo such a heading, and are the sort of backward look at the preceding book or books that one often finds at the beginning of Philonic treatises.9 In fact, there seem to be further such backward looks that position Virt. firmly within this sequence:10 Virt. 16: the “earlier writings” appear to be Spec. 1–4. Virt. 17: “the books which precede these” seem to be Spec. 1–4. Virt. 101: “my former treatises” are apparently Spec. 1–4. Praem. 3: “the preceding treatises” seem to be Dec., Spec. 1–4, and Virt. The opening words of Virt. also present a statement of the topic to be addressed in the treatise at hand, namely courage (ajndreiva). But courage is far from the sole topic of De virtutibus, and in fact the transitional statement more accurately introduces another sub-treatise, this time on courage, than an entire Philonic “book.” Indeed, the “book” itself appears to consist of a set of sub-treatises, each independent of the other, and without the thread of Biblical exegesis as we find in the treatises of the Allegorical Commentary or the close tracking of the Biblical text as we find in the Quaestiones. 8 The structure even here is complicated by the fact that many manuscripts insert a further heading before §151 and two of those add yet another before §158. Cohn follows the first set by editing a section title Katavstasi" ajrcovntwn (as found in S alone), although one would think that if a title is needed Peri; katastavsew" ajrcovntwn (as found in the other manuscripts that have a title) would be more consistent with these section titles as found elsewhere in Spec. 4 and Virt. But Cohn does not edit the second section title Peri; a[r conto" (as found in S and M). However, as Wendland (“Philo und Clemens Alexandrinus,” Hermes 31 [1896] 435–36) had already observed, the first sub-heading only applies to §§151–57. Cohn’s editing here is inconsistent (why the first but not the second?) and appears not to respect Philo’s own words at Virt. 1, which seem to show (as Wendland notes) that the entire Spec. 4 from §136 through the end is the sub-treatise Peri; dikaiosuvnh". 9 See my “Philo’s Division of his Works into Books,” SPhA 13 (2001) 62–65. 10 Ibid., 64.
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Thus, we have no internal indications of what Philo’s own ordering of the sub-treatises might have been.11 The same arrangement is, as it seems, found in the book Praem., which consists, according to Cohn, of three subtreatises, each with its own title.12 And the four books De specialibus legibus similarly consist of more or less independent sub-treatises, which have varying textual histories.13 We thus appear to have the consequences of Philo’s original manner of publishing these books.14 And we may further suppose that the division into books reflects Philo’s desire to have his separate works be of approximately the same length.15 Unfortunately, for Virt. in particular the external indications of the original ordering are complex, confused, and inconsistent.
11 As an example of independent transmission of a section of the Allegorical Commentary I may note the fragment Deo, which exists solely in Armenian. This was first published by Aucher in 1826, and was made the subject of an extensive and enlightening investigation by Folker Siegert, Philon von Alexandrien: Über die Gottesbezeichnung “wohltätig verzehrendes Feuer” (“De Deo”): Rückübersetzung des Fragments aus dem Armenischen, deutsche Übersetzung und Kommentar, (WUNT 46; Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1988). (I reviewed this in SPhA 5 [1993] 209–19.) But I would not suppose that there is any reason to think that Philo himself in any way distinguished this section by publishing it separately or giving it its own section title. Rather, some excerptor (either in Greek or Armenian) simply decided that this portion of the wider work was of sufficient interest to justify copying or translating it alone. In a similar way, the survival of the Greek text of QE 2.62– 68 in Vaticanus gr. 379 is simply the result of the intrinsic interest of these seven sections of the second book of Philo’s QE. See further on this latter section Runia, “A Neglected Text of Philo of Alexandria: First Translation into a Modern Language,” in Things Revealed (ed. Esther G. Chazon, etal.; Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 89; Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2004) 199–207. 12 See PCW 5.xxviii–xxix. 13 See PCW 5.xix–xxvi. A striking example of how pieces of Philo’s books could be transmitted in curious ways is the “work” De mercede meretricis (Peri; tou' mivsqwma povr nh" eij" to; iJero;n mh; prosdevcesqai), which consists of Sacr. 21–32 conjoined with Spec. 1.280–84, as was discovered (or perhaps reconstructed) by Wendland, Neu entdeckte Fragmente Philos (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1891) 125–45. See further PCW 1.lxxxvii–lxxxviii and 5.xx, and my The Spurious Texts of Philo of Alexandria: A Study of Textual Transmission and Corruption with Indexes to the Major Collections of Greek Fragments (ALGHJ 22; Leiden: Brill, 1991) 144. 14 Samuel Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria: An Introduction (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) 69–72, surveys Virt., and (69) discusses the “disarray” found there, and suggests: “But perhaps the explanation is that Philo was guilty of not providing what scholars have unreasonably expected: pure consistency.” 15 See Morris in SHJP 3.851, and Runia, Philo: On the Creation, 6 n. 22: “The distinction between Spec. and Virt. is in fact less tidy than this. Philo already begins with justice at Spec. 4.135. Presumably he wanted his books to be not too dissimilar in length.” I believe that such a desire is evident throughout the Philonic corpus; see my “Philo’s Division of his Works into Books.”
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The Title and Structure of the Work Even before we reach the first words of De virtutibus we encounter a problem: What is the title of the work? Cohn’s title and the manuscripts present the following:16 Cohn:
S: BEK: M:
VO: F: HP: A: G: Eusebius:17
Fivlwno" peri; ajretw'n a}" su;n a[llai" ajnevgraye Mwush'" h[toi peri; ajndreiva" kai; eujsebeiva" kai; filanqrwpiva" kai; metanoiva" Fivlwno" peri; g v ajretw'n a}" su;n a[llai" ajnevgraye Mwush'" peri; ajndreiva" kai; filanqrwpiva" kai; metanoiva" peri; ajretw'n h[toi peri; ajndreiva" kai; eujsebeiva" kai; filanqrwpiva" kai; metanoiva": — peri; ajndreiva" tou' aujtou' Fivlwno" tou' eJbraivou peri; ajretw'n h[toi peri; ajndreiva" kai; eujsebeiva" kai; filanqrwpiva" kai; metanoiva": peri; ajndreiva" Fivlwno" peri; ajretw'n h[toi ajndreiva" kai; eujsebeiva" kai; filanqrwpiva" kai; metanoiva" tou' aujtou' peri; ajretw'n, ajndreiva" kai; eujsebeiva" kai; metanoiva" kai; filanqrwpiva" peri; ajretw'n h[toi peri; ajndreiva" kai; eujsebeiva" tou' aujtou' Fivlwno" peri; ajndriva" peri; ajndreiva" peri; tw'n triw'n ajretw'n a}" su;n a[llai" ajnevgraye Mwush'"
The title printed in PCW is thus a construct. Cohn relies primarily on S,18 but inserts h[toi as is found in most of the other manuscripts and as would seem plausible in any case, in order to form a two-part title.19 Cohn also inserts a reference to piety, as is also found in most of the other manuscripts, in accordance with his view that this virtue was also granted its own section, which will be discussed below. 16 The sigla for the manuscripts and, indeed, all textual references are taken, unless indicated otherwise, from the standard critical edition by Leopold Cohn, as found in PCW 5. 17 Found in Hist. eccl. 2.18.2. 18 In fact, Jenny Morris adopts as the title of Virt. the precise wording of S (without the inserted h[toi); see SHJP 3.850 and n. 156 (– 851). 19 Maximilian Adler, Studien zu Philon von Alexandreia (Breslau: M. and H. Marcus, 1929) 30 n. 1, and 41 n. 1, calls attention to the fact that quite a few of Philo’s titles show a “Zweiteilung,” although with kaiv more often than with h[. See, for example JO jAlevxandro" h] peri; tou' lovgon e[cein ta; a[loga zw/'a as the title of Anim. given by Eusebius, Hist. eccl. 2.18.6.
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Incidentally, the title peri; ajretw'n recurs within other Philonic contexts. For the title of the work generally called Legatio ad Gaium contains in some manuscripts the words peri; ajretw'n.20 Moreover, from the comments of Eusebius it appears that Legat. and perhaps also Flacc. were separate books within a series of five books with the general title peri; ajretw'n.21 And in some manuscripts Contempl. is described as the fourth book of the ajretw'n or even of the peri; ajretw'n.22 In fact, of course, the title peri; ajretw'n in Greek corresponds more closely to the usual Latin title De virtutibus than do the Greek titles of the latter book. Now I do not suppose that our Virt. is really associated somehow with Legat. or Flacc. or Contempl., but it seems very curious that Philo would use the same title, or portion of a title, for more than one book. However, I have no explanation for the recurrence of these words in such disparate places. Beyond this general title for Virt., several manuscripts insert section titles at various places: before §51: SCG2: F: HP: AG1:
Peri; filanqrwpiva" Peri; eujsebeiva" Peri; eujsebeiva" kai; filanqrwpiva" no title
before §175: SCG2 mg: AG1HPF:
Peri; metanoiva" no title
before §187: SCG2HP: F: AG1:
Peri; eujgeneiva" tou' aujtou' peri; eujgeneiva" no title
Now, this variety of titles in itself is not all that unusual for Philo’s works. But what is most unusual is that the “work” itself exists in a variety of forms in the manuscripts.23 In order to exhibit these varying forms it is 20 See PCW 6.lviii–lx, and 155 app., and, e.g., Colson, PLCL 10.xiv–xvi, and André Pelletier, PAPM 32.18. 21 On this very complex issue see the overview by Morris in SHJP 3.859–64. 22 See PCW 6.ix–x, and 46 app. 23 As discussed by Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 79–80, in the editio princeps of Philo (published in 1552) Turnebus printed the sections as, in effect, bc/a/d, following three manuscripts in Paris.
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convenient to follow Goodhart and Goodenough in designating the various sections of the work by the following symbols:24 a b c d
Peri; ajndreiva" (De fortitudine, “On Courage”) = Virt. 1–50 Peri; filanqrwpiva" (De humanitate, “On Humanity”) = Virt. 51– 174 Peri; metanoiva" (De paenitentia, “On Repentance”) = Virt. 175–86 Peri; eujgeneiva" (De nobilitate, “On Nobility”) = Virt. 187–227
We then find that the sections of De virtutibus exist as follows, where I have adapted Hilgert’s perspicuous mode of presentation by citing the letters without separation to show that the treatises follow each other immediately, using a slash between letters to show that one or more other Philonic works occur between the sections, and using an asterisk to note that only a portion of the section is present.25 Manuscripts (all four sections) S F G Cantabrigiensis Coll. S. Trin. B 9,6 HL and 8 other mss. (three sections) Leeuwardensis gr. 40 A and 2 other mss. Matritensis Est. 11, gr. 2a, 40 Escurialensis Y,I,5 P Oxoniensis Coll. Novi 143 C 24
Contents abcd26 abc/bc*/d* bc*/abd bc/a/d bc*/a/d
bc*/abc/abc a/bc a/bc* bc*/a b/a/d b/d/a bcd
See G-G, 136. Hilgert, “A Review,” 107–8. However, he omits reference to E, as cited by G-G, 145, #76. And he cites Oxoniensis Coll. Novi 143 as “142.” See also Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 83, for another presentation of the diversity of the evidence. 26 It is puzzling that G-G (151, #108) cite S as containing only abc, and that Hilgert follows them. A glance at the apparatus in PCW 5 shows that S is cited many times on every page of the apparatus from beginning to end (i.e., throughout abcd). Presumably GG were misled by the fact that the title of the work in S does not mention d, although Cohn’s description of S at PCW 5.viii explicitly mentions the presence of d. 25
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James R. Royse (two sections) Vaticanus gr. 379 and 2 other mss.
bc*
(one section) BEMOV and 6 other mss. K Parisinus gr. 1630 N
a a* c* d
In fact, the structure of the work as printed in PCW (i.e., as abcd) is found in one manuscript only, the Bodleian manuscript Seldenianus Supra 12. This tenth-century manuscript, cited as “S” in PCW, was first utilized by Mangey in his great edition of 1742, and occupies a secure place as one of the best and oldest (apart from the papyri) of the Philonic manuscripts.27 And one can see some indications of its arrangement of the sections in the other manuscripts as well, where we find the sequences abc and bcd, as well as (very frequently) bc. However, Mangey, despite recognizing the value of S, printed the sections as, in effect, abc/d; that is, he printed abc in order, but then placed d later, after Praem.28 But one might still wonder whether the structure of Virt. in S is anything more than an accidental arrangement of the various sections. Indeed Runia correctly calls it “primarily a scholarly construct, based on a reasoned reconstruction of Philo’s intentions in composing his exegetical series which we know as the Exposition of the Law.”29 Fortunately the witness of Clement of Alexandria confirms the sequence of these sections, for in book 2 of the Stromateis he makes extensive use of Virt., and cites abcd in that order.30 That Clement thus agrees with S in the order of these four sections 27 Cohn (“Die Philo-Handschriften in Oxford und Paris,” Phil 51 [1892] 267) even puts it forward as perhaps the oldest, although he subsequently dated Vaticanus gr. 316 (PCW’s R, which does not contain Virt.) as probably older than S; see PCW 5.v and viii. See Runia’s comment (“Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 84 n. 28). Plate 2 at the end of PCW 5 is of the page of S that contains Spec. 4.10–12 (see PCW 5.viii). 28 See PCW 5.xxviii on the departure from Mangey’s order of the works at this point, and the remarks by Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 80. 29 “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 79. 30 This was the argument of Wendland, “Philo und Clemens,” 443–56 (see the summary statement at 456), as noted by Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 81. One can follow Clement’s citations throughout the four sections of Virt. by looking at the lower apparatus (the testimonia) in PCW 5; see also the detailed discussion by Annewies van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and His Use of Philo in the Stromateis, (VCSup 3; Leiden: Brill, 1988) 69–115. In “The Text of Philo’s Legum allegoriae,” 2 n. 6, I raised the possibility “that some of Philo’s autographs (written one book per roll) could have been in Origen’s possession.” It is, of course, even more possible that Clement had access to the autographs.
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can hardly be coincidence. And so we are entitled to conclude that S has here preserved the order of the sections as found some eight centuries earlier in the roll or codex that Clement was using. But one may still well wonder about the multiform attestations of these sections in the manuscript tradition, and what this says about how (or even whether) Philo supposed that these sections went together to form one “book.”
The Lost De pietate I said above that Cohn and Wendland print Virt. as abcd. But this is not quite the entire story. For they postulate a lacuna between Virt. 50 and Virt. 51 (i.e., between a and b) wherein stood a work Peri; eujsebeiva" (De pietate, “On Piety”).31 Mangey had already been struck by what appears to be the implication of the opening words of §51 (Th;n d j eujsebeiva" ktl.) that eujsevbeia had just been discussed, and had suggested that one should either emend eujsebeiva" there to ajndreiva" or suppose that De pietate stood between a and b.32 Here we enter a murky area of the manuscript evidence for Philo’s works. Cohn and Wendland were confident that Philo wrote a work entitled Peri; eujsebeiva", but other scholars have rejected such a hypothesis.33 There are several sorts of evidence, of varying weight, that are typically adduced in this connection.34 31 Cohn marks the lacuna with asterisks, and says in the apparatus: “periit sectio peri; eujsebeiva".” Earlier Wendland (“Philo und Clemens,” 437) had explicitly argued for this same location for De pietate. 32 Thomas Mangey, Fivl wno" tou' jIoudaivou ta; euJriskov mena a{panta. Philonis Judaei opera quae reperiri potuerunt omnia (2 vols.; London: william Bowyer, 1742) 2.383 n. a on eujsebeiva": “Si ferrent Codices, mallem reponere ajndreiva", de quâ, non de pietate, in libello praecedente egit Philo. Vel saltem dicendum, quae Autor de pietate dixerit jam periisse.” Wendland, “Philo und Clemens,” 437 n. 4, says that “Mangey setzt mit einem Gewaltstreiche dafür [i.e., for eujsebeiva"] ajndreiva" ein,” ignoring Mangey’s own consideration of a lacuna. 33 The strongest arguments against the existence of such a work seem to have been presented by Emil Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi (4th ed.; Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs, 1909) 3.671 n. 101 (–672), and are summarized by Jenny Morris in SHJP 3.851 n. 160 (–852). Schürer’s arguments are of varying weight, and some of his points count only against the placement of the work after Virt. 51. See also Colson, PLCL 7.xiii–xiv, and Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 98–100. By the way, as far as I can tell, there is no mention of even the possibility of such a work in PAPM 26. 34 Here, of course, we are on different ground, and doubtless less secure ground, than we are when dealing with lost works that are referred to by Philo himself or that are catalogued by Eusebius.
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First, as seen above, the manuscripts that contain one or another section of Virt. often include in their titles a discussion of the virtue of piety. More precisely, we see that of those manuscripts whose evidence is cited by Cohn, BEKMVOFHP explicitly mention a section peri; eujsebeiva", while SAG do not. Although these titles bear witness to a tradition that is unusually confused, one may well think that it is unlikely that several scribes would (presumably independently) create a reference to a work, and especially to a work that is missing from the manuscript.35 Second, there are several Greek fragments that are assigned to Philo’s De pietate by the lemmata found in the manuscripts of the Sacra parallela.36 First, let us look at the evidence.37 In his still useful collection Harris printed three fragments as “from the lost book of Philo peri; eujsebeiva".”38 Since these are not all that readily available, I reproduce them here. 1. tou' mh; proqύmw" wjfelei'n a[meinon to; mhde; uJpiscnei'sqai. tw/' me;n ga;r oujdemiva mevmyi" e{petai, tw/' de; para; me;n tw'n ajsqenestevrwn a[cqo", para; de; tw'n dunatwtevrwn mevga mi'so" kai; kovlasi" aijwvnio". Mangey 667.7; Harris 10.3.39
35 This argument does not quite have the same force for FHP, where the section heading before §51 indicates that those scribes followed a tradition that the work De pietate began at that point. I believe that these titles provide the best reply to the suggestion of Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 98, that “Philo may have written a work on piety which has nothing to do with our treatise [i.e., Virt.] at all.” This is, of course, theoretically possible, but the manuscript titles do give us evidence (fallible though they are) of the location of that work on piety. But see note 81 below for yet another possiblity. 36 On the manuscripts involved here, see my discussion in Spurious Texts, 26–28. 37 By the way, the existence of these lemmata was not, I believe, known to Mangey. Only with the publication of the third fragment by Pitra in 1884 was such a lemma known. Accordingly, it was possible for August Ferdinand Dähne (“Einige Bemerkungen über die Schriften des Juden Philo, angeknüpft an eine Untersuchung über deren ursprüngliche Anordnung,” TSK 6 [1833] 1033) to say: “Dass aber das Buch [De pietate] selbst aus dem Kataloge der verlornen zu streichen sei, scheint gewiss.” But once the existence of three separate lemmata referring to the work became known, the existence of the work seems to have been generally, although not universally, accepted. 38 J. Rendel Harris, Fragments of Philo Judaeus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1886) 10–11. 39 C. D. Yonge (The Works of Philo Judaeus [4 vols.; London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854–1855] 4.267 = The Works of Philo [New Updated Edition; Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1993] 890) translates: “It is better absolutely never to make any promise at all than not to assist another willingly, for no blame attaches to the one, but great dislike on the part of those who are less powerful, and intense hatred and long enduring punishment from those who are more powerful, is the result of the other line of conduct.”
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2. wJ" a]n e[cousin oiJ quvonte" aujtoi'" to;n misqo;n oJ meivzonov" ejsti. Harris 10.4.40 3. tivna" ga;r ma'llon eijko;" eujqumiva" a[gein kai; cavrita" h] tou;" prosiovnta" ajgaqw/' kai; wjfevleian ejlpivzonta" ajgaqw'n: e[stin de; oJ qeo;" to; presbuvtaton, a[rdwn, kaqavper ejk phgh'" th'" eJautou' fuvsew", ajnqrwvpwn gevnei ta; swthvria. suggene;" ga;r oujde;n a[llo wJ" ejlpi;" eujch/': kai; ga;r ta; ajmeivnw prosdokw'nte" eujcovmeqa: kai; eujxavmenoi crhsta; pavntw" ejlpivzomen. Pitra 310.XXI; Harris 11.1. It is to these fragments that scholars typically refer when they cite the evidence for the existence of De pietate.41 Thus, we have the question: How good is this evidence? Now, it is clear that these lemmata are fallible, and that in particular the lemmata that assign texts to Philo of Alexandria have suffered many vagaries.42 Certainly one should not be completely confident about anything on the sole basis of something that one finds in such a lemma. Nevertheless, the evidence of these lemmata (i.e., of these three fragments printed by Harris) has, I believe, considerable weight, as can be seen from the following facts. First, the errors in the lemmata occur chiefly in the later florilegia, where only the alleged name of the author is cited, rather than author and work as are found in the manuscripts of the Sacra parallela. Indeed, among the now sixty-four examples of spurious fragments that I have collected, there are only four instances (Fragmenta spuria 6, 25, 30, and 31) where we have a lemma from the Sacra parallela that mentions both Philo as author and the name of a work (once the fourth book of the Allegory of the Laws, and three times the book concerning the giants).43 Turning this point around, we may say that of all the hundreds of texts cited as from Philo and one of his works in the Sacra parallela, almost all either certainly or possibly derive from Philo. 40 Harris adds: “a passage which I confess I do not understand.” Of course, I suppose that the deterioration of the passage itself is independent of the transmission of the lemma. 41 See Colson, PLCL 8.xiii n. b (–xiv): “I suppose this is sufficient to show that a treatise existed under that name, and perhaps in combination with the MSS. titles noted above there may be a presumption that it formed part of the De Virt.” 42 See the discussion in Spurious Texts, 9, 14–15, 32. 43 See Spurious Texts, 36–37. Of course, it is likely that in fact Philo did write a “fourth book of the Allegory of the Laws,” which has been lost; see my “The Text of Philo’s Legum allegoriae,” 2–3.
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However, they do not all derive from the work that they are said to derive from. I have no comprehensive figures here, but a cursory examination of the evidence reveals that misidentification of the work occasionally occurs. For example, a citation of QG 2.12 is attributed to Peri; th'" kosmopoiiva" or eij" th;n kosmopoiivan (i.e., Opif.), a citation of QG 2.54 is attributed to Peri; tw'n metonomazomevnwn (i.e., Mut.), and a citation of QE 1.21 is attributed to Peri; mevqh" (i.e., Ebr.).44 But much more often the lemmata will be seen to be perfectly correct.45 Finally, we may note that the works of Philo that are cited are almost always genuine works of Philo. In fact there are, I believe, only a handful of lemmata that refer texts to works that are fairly certainly non-genuine. In this group I would place the three lemmata in Vaticanus gr. 1553 that read: Fivlwno" ejk tw'n ejn tw/' Leuitikw'/ zhthmavtwn'.46 These three texts remain unidentified, and may or may not come from Philo. But I have argued that the Quaestiones did not extend beyond Exod 30:10, and so here we have, I believe, attributions to a non-existent work.47 However, these are a handful of citations among hundreds (or, perhaps, thousands, if one separately counts the lemmata in the individual manuscripts) of references to works of Philo. Thus, one should suppose that the compilers and scribes of the manuscripts of the Sacra parallela only rarely became so confused that they created for Philo a work that he did not in fact write.48 In summary we have the following evidence. First, the lemmata are, in the considerable majority of instances, correct, both as to attribution to Philo and as to the work involved. Second, the lemmata rarely invent for Philo a work that he did not write; when there is an error, it typically involves citing one work of Philo for another. Putting these points together, I think that a reasonable conclusion to draw simply from the evidence of the lemmata is that Philo did write a work De pietate. And on this point we have the supporting evidence of the titles as found in several manuscripts of works of Philo. Here too, while confusions of one sort or another occur all too often, the scribes do not seem in general to have created new works for Philo.49 44
I cited these examples in “Philo’s Divisions of His Works into Books,” 82 n. 142. For the lemmata of the fragments of the Quaestiones, see ibid., 82–83. 46 See my “The Original Structure of Philo’s Quaestiones,” SPh 4 (1976–1977) 42. 47 Ibid., 61–62. 48 Even the four fragmenta spuria noted above refer to genuine works (it seems). 49 One interesting exception is the work published by Angelo Mai in 1816 under the title Fivlwno" tou' jIoudaivou peri; ajreth'" kai; tw'n tauvth" morivwn, Philonis Iudaei de virtute eiusque partibus (Milan: Regiis Typis, 1816), following the attribution to Philo in one 45
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Further, given the general (but not complete) reliability of the lemmata of the Sacra parallela, another reasonable conclusion is that the three fragments printed by Harris come from that work.50 It would be uncritical to accept this evidence unhesitatingly, but it seems to me that it would be overly skeptical to dismiss it, especially in the absence of some evidence that shows that an error has occurred.
The Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of Philo There is some further evidence concerning a work De pietate. This involves the Philonic works as found in the Oxyrhychus papyrus of Philo. Pieces of this papyrus, dating from the third century, have been published in five separate places, and these pieces range from more or less well-preserved texts of more or less considerable length to mere scraps of a few words.51 The texts preserve portions of Sacr., Leg. 1, Leg. 2, Ebr., Post., and Det., as well as portions of at least one work that is clearly not found among the existing works of Philo (in Greek or in Armenian). Fortunately there is some codicological evidence that permits an approximate reconstruction of the structure of this papyrus.52 The identified material may then be placed as follows:53
manuscript. But, as it turned out, the work is in fact from Georgius Gemistus (Pletho). Runia (“Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 81) briefly describes the incident; at nearly the same time I gave a more detailed account to the same effect in Spurious Texts, 136–38. Other examples of misattribution of entire works to Philo may be found there in chapter 5, “The Spurious Works,” ibid., 134–47. 50 Of course, if only one of these lemmata is correct, Philo did write a book De pietate. Comparing abstract possibilities we can assert that whatever the odds are that a lemma is incorrect in some way, it is less likely that three independent lemmata are incorrect in that way. 51 See my “The Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of Philo,” BASP 17 (1980) 155–65, which discusses the texts published as P.Oxy. 9.1173, P.Oxy. 11.1356, PSI 11.1207, P.Oxy. 18.2158, and P.Haun. 8. Let me note that on p. 164 “De ebriatate” should of course be “De ebrietate.” 52 There are three parts to this evidence. First, the codex was actually paginated, and some of these page numbers are preserved. Second, some of the surviving pieces consist of double folios; that is, the papyrus was fashioned by folding double sheets of papyrus over to form quires, and in a few instances we have the connected double sheet. This is important because if we can identify the sequence of the text on one of the folios of such a double sheet, then the sequence on the other folio is determined. Third, the codex was the work of three scribes, and I assume that each copied a discrete portion of the entire contents with no alternation. 53 I cite here the page numbers of the codex according to my reconstruction in “The Oxyrhynchus Papyrus,” 164.
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Sacr. Leg. 1 (Leg. 1.56–60 is at pp. 71–72) Leg. 2 (but probably not separated from Leg. 1)54 unknown work(s) (fragments at pp. 192–95) Ebr. Post. Det.
The unidentified material, which I assign to pp. 131–211, is found at P.Oxy. 11.1356 f. 10, P.Oxy. 11.1356 f. 4, and P.Haun. 8 f. 1; these texts are extensive enough that there can be no doubt that they do not exist in the Greek or Armenian corpus of Philo.55 Where does this material come from? First, I assume that it is from one or more genuine works of Philo, rather than from some spurious work or a work from some other author that has intruded into this collection of Philonic works. Second, there are, as I wrote earlier, “two distinct clues to the identity of the works of Philo from which this material comes.”56 The first is that on p. 212 (as found in the codex at P.Haun. 8 f. 2r), immediately before the beginning of our known work De ebrietate (of which the opening sections 1–18 are found in fragmentary form), we find what seems to be the title of that work: [. . . . . . . .] · B ·. It appears, therefore, that our book De ebrietate was called the “second” in the codex. The editor of P.Haun. 8, Tage Larsen, conjectured from this evidence that what preceded this book in the codex was the first book De ebrietate.57 Now, of course, there is considerable evidence that Philo wrote two books De ebrietate, of which one has been lost, although there are nine Greek fragments quoted in the Sacra parallela as from Philo’s book Peri; mevqh" that cannot be placed within our Ebr.58 Wendland concluded that these fragments are from the lost book of this title, although he and Cohn argued 54 See my “The Text of Philo’s Legum allegoriae,” 2–3, for the evidence that our present Leg. 1–2 formed the original first book, our present Leg. 3 formed the original third book, and that the original second and fourth books have been lost. 55 There are three other very brief fragments (P.Oxy. 11.1356 Fr. 1, P.Oxy. 18.2158 Fr. 1, and P.Oxy. 18.2158 Fr. 2) which have eluded identification or placement. I have attempted to place them, but without success. Here one has to reckon not only with the possibility of textual variants but also with quite a few letters whose readings are uncertain. 56 “The Oxyrhynchus Papyrus,” 160. 57 See P.Haun., p. 50. 58 Wendland (Neu entdeckte Fragmente Philos, 20–22) cites nine fragments that come from Ebr., and then (22–25) cites eleven more as “Citate aus dem verlorenen Buche peri; mevqh".” However, one of these comes from Ebr. 32 and another from QE 2.64. We are thus left with nine fragments that are more or less reasonably assigned to the lost book De ebrietate. (See the listing in Spurious Texts, 211–12.)
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that the extant book was the first, and the lost book was the second.59 Which book has survived is a much-disputed question. Nevertheless, in my earlier article I followed Larsen’s reasoning in holding that the codex identified our Ebr. as the second book Peri; mevqh" and that the first book Peri; mevqh" preceded, that is, it ended on p. 211 of the codex. We can now do some calculation. Another fortunate piece of evidence is that the end of Ebr. occurs on p. 280 of the codex, and so we know that this one book occupied sixty-nine pages (i.e., pp. 212–80) of the original codex. And although three scribes contributed to the codex, the three larger pieces of material (noted above) were all written by the same scribe (“scribe B”) as was Ebr. Further, it seems reasonable to suppose that the book preceding Ebr. on pp. 212–80 was about the same length as Ebr. is, and thus that it would occupy pp. 143–211. Postulating that this lost book, whatever it might have been, began on p. 143 does not fit all that badly with my figure of p. 130 for the end of Leg. 2. Indeed, that page number is itself a reconstruction based on the lengths of the works involved (and the fixed point of the position of Leg. 1.56–60). So, certainly one possibility is simply that this unknown book (whether it be De ebrietate 1 or some other work) began immediately after Leg. 2, somewhere around pp. 131–43, and extended through p. 211. The fragments found on pp. 192–95 would then clearly come from this work, and we could suppose that the further larger fragment at P.Oxy. 11.1356 f. 10 also derives from this work. This is all plausible. But now we come to the second clue, which involves the fragment found at P.Oxy. 11.1356 f. 10. Grenfell and Hunt (writing in 1915) edited ll. 25–30 of the verso of this folio as: 25
30
ªsi
]zonte" parathrhteon de ]lesterwn mhd osa dunatoi ºen eucesqai dei gar ta~ q–u– (= qeou) ] didonto~ mallon h adxi mºe≥t≥r≥eisqai par o kai dhmo º ton uper j th– (= thn)
This is not all that intelligible, although enough survives that we can be certain that this fragment is not found in the texts covered by the usual indexes for Philo. But we are not yet finished with fortunate discoveries. In 1932 Lewy published a fragment which he found in two manuscripts of the Sacra parallela, Hierosolymitanus S. Sepulcri 15 and Atheniensis (olim 59
PCW 2.xxvi–xxviii.
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Constantinpolitanus) Metochion 274.60 In those two sources the fragment has the simple lemma Fivlwno" (“of Philo”), with no book mentioned. The fragment as edited by Lewy reads:61 Parathrhtevon mhde;n tw'n eujtelestevrwn mhd j o{sa dunatoi; parevcein
aujtoi'" uJpolambavnomen aijtei'n para; qeou': ajei; ga;r ta;" qeou' cavrita" ajxivwma ti tou' didovnto" ma'llon h] ajdoxiva tou' lambavnonto" metrei'tai. ejpitimhtevon ou\n toi'" ajnepisthvmosin, oi} tolmw'sin eu[cesqai taujta; poiei'n, ejn oi|" oiJ pantecni'tai katorqou'sin. ei[poi ga;r a]n dikaivw" oJ qeov": tiv mh; maqovnte" ta; tw'n memaqhkovtwn ejpizhtei'te karpou'sqai; tiv de; novmon fuvsew" oujk ejruqria'te parabaivnonte", o}" oujde; toi'" ajpeivroi" ta; tw'n ejmpeirotavtwn e[rga ceiriei'tai ou[t j ajstrateuvtw/ ta; strathgw'n ou[t j ajpeivrw/ qalavtth" oijavkwn ejpisthvmhn; Lewy adds: “Vielleicht stammt das wertvolle Fragment aus der Lücke in der Schrift peri; eujcw'n kai; eujlogiw'n,” as found at PCW 5.353. At that point (between Praem. 78 and 79) Cohn had followed Mangey in postulating a lacuna.62 Presumably the mention of eu[cesqai was taken as the chief indication that the text came from the section that Cohn entitled Peri; eujcw'n kai; eujlogiw'n, following the citation of a fragment of Praem. 104–5 in the Sacra parallela under that title.63 Of course, seeing these two sources together makes evident that the excerpt edited by Lewy overlaps with the remains of P.Oxy. 11.1356 f. 10v. This startling coincidence was noted shortly after Lewy’s publication by Ludwig Früchtel, who was then evidently at the beginning of his life-long study of the Greek fragments of Philo.64 Früchtel reports that already before noting this coincidence, he thought that Lewy should not have altered eJautoi'" into hJmi'n aujtoi'", and that writing ajxiwvmati (for ajxivwma ti) and 60 Hans Lewy, “Neue Philontexte in der Überarbeitung des Ambrosius. Mit einem Anhang: Neu gefundene griechische Philonfragmente,” SPAW, Philosophisch-Historische Klasse (1932) 82–83, no. 27. 61 Lewy notes that (at line 2) he has corrected the reading eJautoi'" of the codices, and he glosses metrei'tai at line 3 with “masst sich an.” 62 Cohn notes: “post ajlogei'n [Praem. 78] multa deesse videri recte animadvertit Mangey.” 63 See PCW 5.xxix. 64 “Zum Oxyrhynchos-Papyrus des Philo,” Philologische Wochenschrift 58 (1938) 1437– 39. Useful comments on the text of P.Oxy. 11.1356 had been made already by Karl F. W. Schmidt in his review of The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, vol. 11, in Göttingische Gelehrte Anzeigen 180 (1918) 81–83. But Schmidt did not connect the papyrus to the fragment published by Lewy (as seems to be suggested by Hilgert, “A Review,” 106 n. 13), since Schmidt was writing before Lewy’s publication.
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ajdoxiva/ fits better with metrei'tai;65 and Früchtel makes the further suggestion that writing metrei'sqai would give an even better construction. But with the aid of the overlapping words from the papyrus, we can do much better. Früchtel suggests: 25
]zonte". parathrhtevon de; mhde;n tw'n eujtelestevrwn mhd j o{sa dunatoi; parevcein eJautoi'" ejsmen eu[cesqai: dei' ga;r ta;" qeou' cavrita" ajxiwvmati tou' didovnto" ma'llon h] ajdoxiva/ tou' lambavnonto" metrei'sqai.
It is to be observed that the overlapping texts do not match perfectly. Früchtel has, quite reasonably, taken the third-century papyrus codex as more reliable than the two medieval copies of the Sacra parallela, which transmit a text that may well have suffered distortions when the initial excerpting was made as well as in the course of subsequent transmission.66 And, of course, even the original compiler of the Sacra parallela may well not have had a source as old as the Oxyrhynchus papyrus. We may thus grant it primary authority, and then use the reconstructed text to evaluate the sorts of changes that have occurred in the secondary tradition. But it may be noted that the above reconstruction is supported by one or both of our sources throughout except at ejsmen. Here Früchtel has had to choose between uJpolambavnomen aijtei'n para; qeou' and some phrase ending with en eu[cesqai, and has (no doubt wisely) chosen to preserve the letters of the papyrus and complete the construction in a straightforward way.67 However, as Früchtel further notes, it is clear even from the few remains after metrei'sqai in the papyrus that the text there did not continue with ejpitimhtevon ou\n ktl., as in the text published by Lewy. And in fact Früchtel has a very interesting suggestion for how the text in the papyrus continued. Instead of Grenfell and Hunt’s idea that Philo continued with a form of 65 Grenfell and Hunt had thought that for adxi one should read axi, supposing that the scribe made a simple slip based on pronunciation. Indeed, the slip is simple, but involves rather the omission of o between consonants. 66 As an obvious point, the connective dev in the Philonic context has been dropped as otiose in the excerpt. But I would suppose that the degeneration from dei' to ajei; occurred early in copying (DEI misread as AEI in uncial script). 67 I note that the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae shows that the phrase dunatoi; parevcein occurs only in the Lewy fragment (the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus is not cited) and in Pindar, Nemea 6.33. Philo cites Pindar at least three times (Virt. 172, Aet. 121, Prov. 2.80, and Prov. 2.113 [which may not really be from Pindar; see Früchtel in PCH 7.382 n. 1, who identifies the quotation as from Simonides]), and so was familiar with his work. (At Prov. 2.100 we have a reference to the citation in 2.80.)
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dhmovsio", Früchtel conjectures that Philo cited a saying of Democritus, and even finds an apposite one in Diels-Kranz B234. Früchtel accordingly completes the line thus: par j o} kai; Dhmov to;n uJpe;r th;n . Let us now return to the Lewy fragment. Früchtel, taking (correctly) the papyrus as the primary authority, concludes merely that the further lines in Lewy’s excerpt in fact derive from some other “context.”68 Now it is a very common phenomenon in the florilegia that two or more texts from diverse sources coalesce under the earlier one through the loss of the lemma(ta) on the later text(s).69 When this happens, the later text(s) may derive from an entirely different work or even a different author than the first one. But it also happens that the excerptor may include in one fragment lines that are not quite contiguous in the source. For example, Harris prints one excerpt that cites tw/' o[nti — oujranw/' of Abr. 272, and then skips ahead five lines of PCW and continues with presbuvtero" — metiwvn of Abr. 274.70 A more unusual excerpting occurs with another text that cites ejavn ti" — crhvsasqai of Somn. 1.177, and then goes back six lines to include oJ ga;r ajstei'o" — wjfevleian of Somn. 1.176.71 I conjecture that a similar practice has occurred here. The excerptor copied the sentence parathrhtevon — metrei'sqai from Philo’s original work (whatever it was), altering ejsmen eu[cesqai into uJpolambavnomen aijtei'n para; qeou' at the same time. Then, he omitted the reference to and quotation from Democritus, judging that a pagan comment was inappropriate in the Sacra parallela, where indeed the contents do not (normally, at least) utilize such sources.72 The excerptor then continued with his copying from Philo’s work, and copied the sentences ejpitimhtevon — ejpisthvmhn, which seem to me to follow very naturally after the citation of Democritus. One may compare what Eusebius did when he excerpted Philo’s De providentia. Eusebius cites 68 “Zum Oxyrhynchos-Papyrus,” 1438: “Der Papyrus zeigt, dass die in den Hss folgenden Sätze einem anderen Zusammenhang entnommen sind, was auch ihr Inhalt bestätigt.” 69 See Spurious Texts, 32. Several examples of such loss of lemmata may be seen among the “fragmenta spuria” that I have discussed. 70 See Harris, Fragments, 80 (fragment 80.3), and the third apparatus in PCW 4.59–60. 71 See Harris, Fragments, 69 (fragment 69.6), and the third apparatus in PCW 3.242–43. 72 See Spurious Texts, 28. We thus have a distinction from the later (“sacro-profane”) florilegia, such as Maximus and Antonius, which freely cite classical Greek writers. Indeed, fragments of Democritus are found in those later collections; see ibid., 61, 62, and 74.
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Philo’s words very literally throughout the excerpts, but the longest deviation (judging by the Armenian) occurs when Philo cites Homer in Prov. 2.15. Obviously, such a thought was not an appropriate preparation for the Gospel, and so Eusebius simply skips the phrase: o{qen kai; para; tw/' dokimwtavtw/ poihtw'n JOmhvrw/ “path;r ajndrw'n te qew'n te kevklhtai Zeuv".”73 Subsequently, in the course of the transmission of the Sacra parallela, a scribe miscopied dei' as ajeiv, and then either the same scribe or a later one altered metrei'sqai to metrei'tai in order to try to make some sense of the resulting text. Lewy’s fragment would thus preserve the remains of one excerpt from Philo’s work, where there was a deletion after the first sentence. While this seems to me the most likely scenario, it is also possible that the similarity in thought between the first sentence and the remaining portion is the result of the excerptor’s careful choice of passages. And then the remaining portion could indeed come from any work of Philo or of any other writer. Thus, that further portion of Lewy’s fragment simply remains as one of more than 100 unidentified fragments assigned to Philo.74 I have discussed these few lines of Greek at a length that will perhaps seem excessive, especially in the context of Philo’s De virtutibus. I would justify this treatment first of all by the intrinsic interest of this text, at least the first sentence of which (in view of its diverse external attestation, if nothing else) is certainly from one of Philo’s lost works, and is also certainly one of the more neglected passages of Philo, even if it is only twenty-six words long in Früchtel’s reconstruction. And second—finally to connect up this text with the topic of this article—in my earlier article on 73 This is my retroversion from the Armenian. By the way, this phrase (or anything similar) will not be found in any editions of this material, since they all depend solely on editions of Eusebius, and of course editors of Eusebius are editing what Eusebius wrote, not what Philo wrote. Mireille Hadas-Lebel (De Providentia I et II, PAPM 35.228 [Paris 1973]) even goes so far as to place in brackets Aucher’s Latin words that render the Armenian translation of Philo’s words. But that Eusebius omitted the phrase is noted by her (229 n. 1 [from 228]) and also by Colson (PLCL 9.461 n. b). In his German translation of Aucher’s Latin (PCH 7.330), Früchtel duly translates the phrase, and notes the omission by Eusebius. Aucher already, of course, noted the omission (1822, 53) and accordingly noted a lacuna in the Greek. If one is not prepared to restore Philo’s Greek from the Armenian, noting a lacuna seems the correct editorial practice. 74 The Thesaurus Linguae Graecae furnished some limited information concerning this further text. The word ejpitimhtevo n is cited only eighteen times, including this text and Virt. 187. This is perhaps some slight evidence that the text is Philonic (and even from the original De virtutibus?). Some other words are comparatively rare: e.g., the form ajnepisthvmosin occurs only sixteen times, including this text. And this text is the only place where any word that begins pantecnit- occurs; for what it is worth, it certainly seems as though Philo is capable of coining pantecnivth". By the way, pantecnivth" remains unlisted in even the revised supplement to LSJ.
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the papyrus I argued that this fragment may well come from the lost section De pietate. Let me present briefly this final piece of the puzzle. As noted, Lewy edited his excerpt from two manuscripts of the Sacra parallela that cite the text with the lemma Fivlwno". But it turns out that this same excerpt is found in another manuscript of the Sacra parallela, Thessalonicensis Blatevvwn Monasterii 9, with the fuller lemma: Fivlwno" ejk tou' peri; eujsebeiva" kefalaivou. Rather than supposing that the longer lemma has been expanded (unjustifiably and arbitrarily) from the shorter one, I take it to be much more likely that this longer one is more original, especially since excerpts in the Sacra parallela regularly occur with the names of both authors and works.75 I thus concluded (or, we might say, conjectured) that the text found at P.Oxy. 11.1356 f. 10v in fact derived from Philo’s lost De pietate.76 As already noted, if we suppose that the book occurring before Ebr. was of the same length as Ebr., it would occupy pp. 143–211. We then would have pp. 131–142 to account for, and that space, while inadequate for one of Philo’s complete books, is not unreasonable for a section. I estimated (a bit arbitrarily) that the lost De pietate would occupy about 14 pages, and thus postulated: pp. 131–44 pp. 145–211 pp. 212–280
De pietate (P.Oxy. 11.1356 f. 10 at pp. ??) De ebrietate 1 (P.Oxy. 11.1356 f. 4 and P.Haun. 8 f. 1 at pp. 192–95) De ebrietate 2 (= Ebr.)
With this we have accounted for the complete contents of the codex. And we can now return to our earlier issue of the placement of De pietate within the treatise, or perhaps more accurately the collection of sub-treatises, that we know as De virtutibus. Cohn’s postulation of a lacuna between Virt. 50 and Virt. 51 is an unnecessarily drastic reaction to the mere mention of eujsevbeia at Virt. 51.77 And it requires that both S and the source used by Clement were defective at exactly the same point. Indeed, what seems to follow from Clement’s citations is that, wherever De pietate might have 75 See, for example, Spurious Texts, 33. Often the lemmata even give the numbers of the books of QG and QE. (On the accuracy of these numbers see “Philo’s Division of his Works into Books,” 82–84.) 76 And, although I would not put much weight at all on this point, the thought in this portion would seem at least appropriate to a discussion of piety. 77 I accept this point made by Schürer, Geschichte 3.671 n. 101: “Das Prädikat th; n eujsebeiva" suggenestavthn soll hier nur dazu dienen, den hohen Wert der filanqrwpiva zu charakterisieren, und setzt nicht einen vorhergehenden Traktat peri; eujsebeiva" voraus.”
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existed in the Philonic corpus as known to Clement, it did not exist where Cohn conjectured it to be, namely between Virt. 50 and Virt. 51. Thus, if De pietate existed at all in that corpus as known to Clement, it existed at some other place.78 Indeed, Cohn’s rationale for his placement of De pietate is very precarious. He takes the allusion to eujsevbeia at Virt. 51 as a reference to the virtue that had been just discussed in the immediately preceding lines. But Philo’s words hardly have that force. Dähne long ago stated that Virt. 51 implied an earlier discussion of piety, but that the earlier discussion was in Mos., referring specifically to Mos. 2.66.79 In contrast, Runia comments that the “role of eujsevbeia is in fact prominent in the entire treatise such as we have it.”80 Of course, what Philo says at Virt. 51 does not preclude that he has just discussed eujsevbeia. But surely something stronger than that is required to postulate a lacuna of some considerable extent. In fact, even if we choose to believe that De pietate once existed, it would make more sense to place it outside the sequence as found in Clement and S. It is easier to imagine the loss of some folios at the beginning or end of a work than in the middle (assuming that originally De pietate did form one part of a larger book). Now, Virt. 1 seems, as noted above, to follow immediately after Spec. 4. So, the place that probably causes the least disruption to the evidence would be at the end, after Peri; eujgeneiva".81 In conclusion, then, I propose that the original arrangement of the subtreatises of Virt. was: De fortitudine (Virt. 1–50), De humanitate (Virt. 51–174), De paenitentia (Virt. 175–186), De nobilitate (Virt. 187–227), and De pietate (lost). Of the lost final sub-treatise perhaps four fragments are extant, i.e., the three printed by Harris and the one preserved jointly in the Oxyrhynchus papyrus and the Sacra parallela fragment as discussed above.82 I would 78 Thus, it seems to me that Colson (PLCL 8.xiv n. b [from xiii]) goes beyond the evidence when he says: “But this presumption [that De pietate existed] has to meet the undoubted fact that Clement did not find it in his copy.” 79 “Einige Bemerkungen,” 1033–34. 80 “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 97. 81 In contrast, Runia, ibid., 97, argues that the existence of De pietate in the titles “was most likely caused by a false inference from Philo’s formulation at §51. And this means that there is much to be said for the title printed by Mangey in his edition: Peri; triw'n ajretw'n h[toi peri; ajndreiva" kai; filanqrwpiva" kai; metanoiva".” As Runia notes, this view was also held by Schürer, Geschichte, 3.671 n. 101 (–672), and Colson, PLCL 8.xiv. 82 I note also that the final sentence of Harris’s third fragment relates to prayer (“For nothing else is so akin as hope is to prayer; for indeed we pray expecting better things, and having prayed, we always hope for good things.”), and we can thus imagine that both this fragment and the Oxyrhynchus Papyrus fragment were part of an extended discussion of prayer in De pietate.
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add that all this does assume that Philo is repetitious and in particular treats eujsevbeia in more than one place.
The Evidence of S (Seldenianus Supra 12) Let us turn now to the oldest of the medieval manuscripts of Philo that preserve portions of Virt. Cohn devotes considerable attention to S, and Runia adds many judicious observations on the nature of its readings. I was able to make a partial examination of the codex itself, and can add a few further comments. First, I looked fairly carefully at S in Virt. 1–51, and can commend Cohn’s apparatus as a meticulous report of the readings of S. Probably nothing from S that could possibly aid in the restoration of the original text has been omitted or misreported. Judging from this material alone, one would have to say that the textual criticism of Philo can proceed confidently from the apparatus in PCW, with respect to the manuscripts available to Cohn and Wendland. Cohn is even careful about reporting corrections that are present in S. Indeed, the only place that I noticed where Cohn neglects to report a reading of S that has been corrected by a later hand is at Virt. 30. Here the scribe wrote tw kreitton merei, and what is definitely a later hand has squeezed in an i to form kreittoni. But much more often Cohn, while reporting both the original reading and the later reading, does not distinguish between corrections made by the scribe of S and those made by later correctors. Cohn also neglects to cite a few corrections that were made by the scribe in scribendo. That is, the scribe made an error but caught and corrected his own mistake immediately. Two of these involve the common scribal error of a leap from the same to the same.83 The clearest example of this is at Virt. 6; here the scribe wrote katepeson and then leapt backward to apeirhkotwn, since both these words end in -n. Then the scribe wrote for the second time up anandreia", but at that point noticed his error, marked up anandreia" for omission by placing a row of dots both above and below those words, and then continued on with malakisqente" ktl. An example of a correction in scribendo of a forward leap occurs at Virt. 19; here the scribe wrote the first e of ekrine, but then lost his place and began with the text following the second e, and so started to write diataxasqai. But here he 83 Such errors are aptly described by Ernest C. Colwell as “the case of the misplaced scribe” (“Method in Evaluating Scribal Habits,” Studies in Methodology in Textual Criticism of the New Testament, [NTTS 9: Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1969]) 112.
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noticed his error immediately after writing d, erased that letter, and then continued correctly by writing krine diataxasqai ktl. Such information may shed some light on the value of S itself. For instance, it is striking that, at least in Virt. 1–51, there are no corrections of either forward or backward leaps that appear to have been made after the writing was completed. Then, of course, the only way that such corrections could be made would be by inserting the omitted words between the lines or by making long deletions by dots or strokes through the letters. But there are no examples of this. So, either the two examples of such errors noted above are the only such errors that the scribe made, or the scribe (or a corrector) made no further check of the manuscript after the copying was done. I suspect that the latter is the correct explanation: for first, such errors are very common in manuscripts generally, and the scribe of S makes enough errors that he is unlikely to be an exception; and second, it seems unlikely that the scribe would have caught all such errors during the initial phase of copying. And one doesn’t have to look too hard to find some other possible examples, e.g., Virt. 180 (omits kai; poihtou' after ajgenhvtou), which may be one of the “evident mistakes” noted by Runia.84 Runia presents what is, I believe, the most insightful evaluation of the readings of S and Cohn’s use of them.85 Runia characterizes S as “remarkable” and “erratic,” sometimes presenting superior readings and at other times having clear blunders. And Runia’s conclusion is that “we may have to do here with that dangerous phenomenon, an independent and semiintelligent scribe.” That is, instead of mechanically copying the text in front of him, the scribe of S brings thought to his work, and indeed enough thought to corrupt the text over and over. Let me refer at this point to Runia’s incisive examples and discussion. But I would add a few words on two of the readings. Virt. 69: filoeqne;" : filovqeon ej" S. Runia comments that S’s reading “of course misses the point altogether.” Here S seems to have thought that a nomen sacrum was involved, and expanded qn into qeon, omitting the prior e in order to have a known word. Virt. 145: bou'n ajlow'nta mh; fimou'n : bou'n ajlow'nta mh; khmou'n S.86 Cohn adds for S “fort. [= fortasse] recte,” but Runia says that this is “most unlikely” since fimou'n occurs at Deut 25:4 (ouj fimwvsei" bou'n ajlow'nta).87 84
“Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 94. Ibid., 92–96. 86 The other reading here, H’s fhmou'n, is merely an orthographic variation. 87 The only reported variants in the LXX mss. for the second word are feimwsei" in B*, and fhmw|ei" in minuscule 54. 85
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However, there is more to be said here. As noted by editors of the LXX, Deut 25:4 is quoted in the New Testament at 1 Cor 9:9 and 1 Tim 5:18, where there is textual variation: 1 Cor 9:9: ouj khmwvsei" bou'n ajlow'nta khmwvsei" B* D* F G 1739 fimwvsei" ∏46 a A B2 C D1 Y 33 1881 rell Or Epiph 1 Tim 5:18 : bou'n ajlow'nta ouj fimwvsei" fimwvsei" D2 rell khmwvsei" D* At 1 Cor 9:9 von Soden edits fimwvsei", but Tischendorf, Westcott and Hort, and Nestle-Aland print khmwvsei". And surely khmwvsei" is correct, precisely because it disagrees with the LXX; scribes would have altered it to the word found uniformly in the LXX, rather than create a discrepancy.88 However, at 1 Tim 5:18 no one, it seems, follows D*, and presumably its singular reading is to be explained as assimilation to the reading of 1 Cor 9:9 (as found earlier in D itself). On the other hand, Philo was evidently following the LXX, and so wrote fimou'n. But now the reading of S is explained: the scribe was influenced by 1 Cor 9:9.89
The Vienna Papyrus As noted earlier, the manuscript evidence for Virt. has recently been enriched by the discovery of a papyrus with portions of Virt. 64–65 and 69– 70. More precisely, one side begins with e]paggelomen[ at the end of §64 and ends with aphrhme[no" at the end of §65; and the other side begins with te]leioun kai at §69 and ends with para[deigma at §70. But much of the text is missing; in fact, of any one line of the papyrus less than one half is extant.
88 See Bruce M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (2d ed.; Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft and United Bible Societies, 1994) 492. 89 The scribes of the manuscripts of Philo were, of course, Christians, and influence from the New Testament is always possible. A good example is found at Somn. 1.219, where GFHP have a reading reflecting the text of Heb 3:1; see my “Philo, Kuvrio", and the Tetragrammaton,” SPhA 3 (1991) 173. If the reading of S at Virt. 58 in fact reflects 1 Kgs 22:17 (see Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 95), then we would have further evidence that the scribe of S (or an ancestor) knew the Bible well.
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Nevertheless, what remains shows that the papyrus agrees virtually completely with the text printed by Cohn-Wendland. Apart from a few minutiae (the use of a nomen sacrum for pathr, the itacism perigeinetai, and a diaeresis in i>oudaioi"), the only discrepancy from PCW in the transcription published by Harrauer is the writing te]leioun for teleiounta, and even there Harrauer supposes that some mark of abbreviation is no longer legible.90 We may thus take the papyrus as confirming the integrity of the manuscript tradition and the textual judgments of Cohn. But another way to look at what the papyrus preserves is to note that it may agree virtually completely with the readings of manuscript S. Since S was judged by Cohn and Wendland to be the best witness to De virtutibus, their text is often in agreement with S. But this is not always so, and the following are the differences within the material covered by the papyrus:91 PCW
S
ejpaggellomevnw/ iJkesivan ejqw'n filoeqne;" a{pasin hJgemovsi
ejpaggellomevnou omit hjqw'n filovqeon ej" a{pasi toi'" hJgemovsi
Regrettably, the lacunose state of the papyrus leaves it unclear which reading it had at the above places; but it does seem as though the omission of iJkesivan would fit the space better. Moreover, there are four other places where PCW print the reading as found (at that time) only in S. Of these, one is definitely supported by the papyrus (in §65, S alone has aitiou, which the other manuscripts omit, and the papyrus reads a[i]tiou), and one seems to be supported (in §70, S alone has arcetupon, which the other manuscripts omit, and the space in the papyrus seems to require it). At the other two (in §65, S alone has touto, where the other manuscripts have touto kai, and in §70, S alone has diadocon kai, where the other manuscripts have merely diadocon), the space seems to leave open which reading the papyrus had. The result of all this is that this papyrus may agree virtually completely with S (the only certain differences are afhrhme[ at §65, where S1 has 90 If the papyrus did have simply teleioun it would have agreed with G2, the witness of the second occurence of the section De humanitate within the codex G (see PCW 1.xxxiv– xxxv, and 5.xi–xii. (It is not the second hand of G, as stated by Harrauer, 114.) 91 At the end of §65, the original ajfairhmevno" (S1) has been corrected to ajfh/rhmev no" (S2). PCW prints the latter, and the papyrus has afhrhme[.
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afairhmeno", corrected by S2, and teleioun at §69, if that is what the papyrus actually had). So this papyrus may have contained more or less precisely the text now found in S half a millennium earlier. Unfortunately what the papyrus preserves is too limited to shed any light on the wider issue of the structure of Virt.
Barthélemy and the Retouching of Philo’s Works Runia discusses the insightful and provocative thesis of Barthélemy concerning the “revised text” of Philo’s works.92 This revision is alleged to connect with Virt. at Virt. 66 and 69, where G2 (the second copy of this work in manuscript G) writes ijwsouva" and ijwsou'a for jIhsou'" and jIhsou'n respectively.93 Philo is writing, of course, of Joshua, but Barthélemy wonders whether a Christian would have replaced this name “dans le passage où Philon le présente le plus nettement comme l’excellent successeur choisi à Moïse par Dieu lui-même?”94 But I have expressed some hesitation about the cogency of Barthélemy’s reasoning here.95 However, I think that there can be little doubt that we can see the influence of Aquila in the manuscript tradition of Virt. 184, where Philo is quoting Deut 26:17–18. This passage is discussed at some length by Peter
92 Dominique Barthélemy, “Est-ce Hoshaya Rabba qui censura le «Commentaire Allégorique»? À partir des retouches faites aux citations bibliques, étude sur la tradition textuelle du Commentaire Allégorique de Philon,” PAL, 45–78. See the summary of Barthélemy’s argument by Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 85–86 and 90–91. 93 At the other occurrences of jIhsou'" in Philo (Ebr. 96, Mut. 121 bis, Mos. 1.216, and Virt. 55) there are no manuscript variations; of course we should not suppose that the reviser would have worked systematically. 94 Barthélemy, “Hoshaya Rabba,” 57. 95 See “The Text of Philo’s Legum allegoriae,” 21–22. As Barthélemy notes, this spelling seems to be that of Aquila. (Barthélemy, “Hoshaya Rabba,” 47.) He refers to the citation at Deut 1:38 in Brooke and McLean. However, Frederick Field, ed., Origenis Hexaplorum quae supersunt (2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1875) ad loc., quotes another manuscript as having jIhsouav. And Joseph Reider and Nigel Turner, An Index to Aquila (VTSup 12; Leiden: Brill, 1966) 117, cite jIhsou'" as Aquila’s rendering of o['Wv/hy], where all the texts cited are found in Field; but one might suppose that the (Christian) scribes who transmitted these notices about Aquila were motivated to use jIhsou'". In fact, Reider himself provides another explanation of the citations in Field. See his Prolegomena to a Greek-Hebrew and Hebrew-Greek Index to Aquila (Philadelphia: Dropsie College, 1916) 14, where it is asserted in connection with the citation at Josh 1:1 (“a v s v pro;" jIhsou'n uiJo;n Nauhv”) that “a v at least cannot be credited with the graecized jIhsou'n, for well-understood reasons,” and that the point of the citation was that Aquila and Symmachus wrote ei\pen with prov" and the accusative rather than with the dative, as did the LXX.
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Katz96 and by Runia.97 At this point in Virt. the manuscript basis has narrowed to SCG2 and the testimony of Clement.98 The relevant texts are: MT a b c d e f g h i j k l
hwhyAta trmah µwyh twyhl ˚l µyhlal ... hwhyw ˚rymah µwyh twyhl µ[l wl
LXX to;n qeo;n ei{lou shvmeron ei\naiv sou qeo;n ... kai; kuvrio" ei{latov se shvmeron genevsqai aujtw/' lao;n
m
hlgs
periouvsion.
Philo - S Clem. to;n qeo;n ei{lou shvmeron ei\naiv soi (sou Clem.) qeovn,
Philo - PCW to;n qeo;n ei{lou shvmeron ei\naiv soi qeovn,
Philo - CG2 to;n kuvrion ajnthllavxw (-xavtw G2) shvmeron ei\naiv soi eij" qeovn,
kai; kuvrio" ei{latov se shvmeron genevsqai lao;n aujtou'. (aujtw/' Clem.)
kai; kuvrio" ei{latov se shvmeron genevsqai lao;n aujtw/'.
kai; kuvrio" ajnthllavx atov se shvmeron genevsqai lao;n aujtw/'.
Here are some comments on the relevant lines: a:
For the MT’s hwhy, for which the LXX (followed by Philo - S Clem.) has to;n qeovn, CG2 read to;n kuvrion.99 Katz (70) calls to;n qeovn a “blemish” in the LXX, since one would expect the LXX to translate with (to;n) kuvrion as well (as at h); and doubtless Aquila translated with kuvrion. 100 Wevers explains the LXX’s choice by noting that the MT has “an odd text with . . . hwhy ta as [the
96 Philo’s Bible: The Aberrant Text of Bible Quotations in Some Philonic Writings and Its Place in the Textual History of the Greek Bible (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950) 68–70. 97 “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 90–91. 98 See PCW 5.322, app. ad l. 22, and 5.xxviii. 99 The Ethiopic (which I have not seen) is cited as having “Dominum” for to;n qeov n, and the minuscule 58 (k) has kuvr ion to;n qeovn, with which the Armenian agrees. 100 See also Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 91 n. 54: “The variant has not been recorded for Aquila, but he may have had a vested interest in giving a literal rendering of the MT because similar otiose repetitions of the divine name were exploited by Christian apologists such as Justin Martyr.” It is true that at this verse Aquila’s choice is not recorded, but his general practice is well established; see Reider and Turner, An Index to Aquila, 143.
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101 John William Wevers, Notes on the Greek Text of Deuteronomy (SBLSCS 39; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995) 412. That is, one would rather expect anarthrous kuvr io" as the rendering of the Tetragrammaton. 102 See Reider and Turner, An Index to Aquila, 22. 103 Philo’s Bible, 69. That phrase was viewed as corrupt by Mangey, Cohn, and Wendland, but see Colson, PLCL 8.276 n. 3 (–277). 104 Brooke and McLean, on the other hand, cite merely the Armenian and Philo for soi. I wonder how much of this versional “support” is genuine, as opposed to merely translation idiosyncrasy. 105 Philo’s Bible, 69. 106 Reider and Turner, An Index to Aquila, 70.
The Text of Philo’s De virtutibus
m:
101
aujtw/'.107 Perhaps then this one word of the “aberrant text” has found its way into PCW. Katz comments that Philo’s decision to omit periouvsion reflects his general practice of not mentioning “the peculiar people,” which “was not suited to his apologetic purposes, especially in the treatises written for non-Jewish readers, such as spec. leg. and its appendage virt.”108
After his discussion of this Biblical citation, Runia goes a couple of lines further in Philo (Virt. 185), and observes that to; o[n (as in S and Clement, and printed by Cohn) “has been changed to qeovn in the same manuscripts that contain the Aquilan variants.”109 And Runia continues: “The change is most likely motivated by unease at Philo’s blatantly philosophical description of God in terms of Platonic being, a discomfort that Clement does not share.” And Runia sees this as supporting “Barthélemy’s theory of a Jewish-Rabbinic tamperer.”110 Inspired by this observation I looked around a little and noticed that at Virt. 179 Cohn prints to;n ktivsthn kai; patevra tou' pantov" with CG2H2, where we find in the apparatus that for patevra most manuscripts have to;n patevra but S has dhmiourgovn. A scribe who was uneasy with Platonic descriptions would be very tempted to change dhmiourgovn, and so I am inclined to think that Philo’s text is preserved here in S alone,111 and that the revision has affected a broader range of manuscripts than simply CG2. If this is so, we have one more reason to avoid any “complacency” (as Runia puts it) concerning the state of our text.112 San Francisco State University
107 108 109 110 111 112
See ibid., 36. Philo’s Bible, 69. “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 91. Actually C has qeovn, while G2 has qew/'. Ibid. See Somn. 1.76 for the conjunction of ktivsth" and dhmiourgov". “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 100.
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 103–123
“THE QUEEN OF THE VIRTUES”: PIETY IN PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA
GREGORY E. STERLING
Our most holy Moses who was a lover of virtue, a lover of good, and especially a lover of humanity urged people in every place to be zealots of piety and justice. Philo, On the Virtues 175
When Greeks began recording their impressions of Jews, they compared them to philosophers. In his work On Piety, Theophrastus said: “In all this time, since they are philosophers by race, they speak about the deity to one another.”1 Aristotle’s successor based this identification on the similarities between the philosophical conceptions of the divine and Jewish monotheism.2 Megasthenes, Seleucus Nicator’s philosopher-ambassador,3 and Clearchus of Soli, the polymath from Cyprus, made similar comparisons by associating the metaphysics of the Jews and the Brahmans or Calani in India with Hellenistic philosophy.4 Clearchus reported that Aristotle thought that the Jews were descendents from the Indians. According to legend, he had once met a Jew in Asia who “was a Hellene not only in speech but in his soul.” This was evident not only from his culture but from 1 Theophrastus, De pietate in GLAJJ no. 4 (1:10). All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 2 W. Jaeger, “Greeks and Jews: The First Greek Records of Jewish Religion and Civilization,” JR 18 (1938): 133, thought that Theophrastus was intrigued by Jewish aniconic monotheism. He argued that Theophrastus knew the work of Hecataeus of Abdera (see pp. 134–43) who discussed the Jewish concept of God (Diodorus Siculus 40.3.4 [GLAJJ no. 11 {1:26–35}]). 3 Megasthenes, Indica in GLAJJ no. 14 (1:45). 4 Jaeger, “Greeks and Jews,” 132 n. 14, suggested that Clearchus was dependent on Megasthenes. Stern, GLAJJ 1:45, pointed out that Megasthenes mentioned the Brahmans while Clearchus discussed the Calani. He is probably correct in rejecting Jaeger’s source analysis. The two represent Peripatetic interest in Eastern theology.
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the cardinal virtues that he displayed: “endurance” (karteriva) and “moderation” (swfrosuvnh).5 Jews, especially during the late Hellenistic and early Roman periods, made the most of the identification between Hellenistic philosophy and Jewish religion. Philo of Alexandria, the author of 4 Maccabees, and Josephus all presented Judaism as a form of philosophy.6 For example, Philo of Alexandria explained Jewish observance of the Sabbath as moral training: “. . . Jews practice their ancestral philosophy (filosofou`si . . . th;n pavtrion filosfivan) every seventh day by devoting that time to the study and contemplation of the principles of nature.” Why? “For what else are our places of prayer than schools of prudence, courage, moderation, justice, piety, holiness, and every virtue by which obligations to humans and God are understood and successfully practiced?”7 Philo’s comparison of Judaism to Hellenistic philosophy on the basis of ethics was both natural and, at the same time, problematic. It was natural because Judaism and Hellenistic philosophy were both serious about ethics. Further, his understanding of Judaism was profoundly influenced by Hellenistic philosophy.8 It was therefore natural for him to think of Judaism in philosophical terms. On the other hand, it was problematic because it led him to use categories that were foreign to Judaism as a means to reflect on it and articulate it as a system of thought. The result was a creative tension that, at times, forced him to modify both traditions. A good example of this is his presentation of eujsevbeia. The word and its cognates were rare in Philo’s scriptures, the LXX.9 Jewish authors who used the terms—such as Pseudo-Aristeas,10 the poet of the fourth Sibylline Oracle,11 and the rhetorician of 4 Maccabees12—were, like Philo, influenced by Hellenistic thought. The specific language was therefore foreign to Judaism. At the same time, 5
Clearchus of Soli, De somno in GLAJJ no. 15 (1:49–50). For details see G. E. Sterling, ed., The Ancestral Philosophy: Hellenistic Philosophy in Second Temple Judaism (Essays of David Winston) (BJS 331; SPhM 4; Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2001), 2. 7 Philo, Mos. 2.216. I have used the edition of PCW. Philo referred to sabbath services in similar terms in Opif. 128; Mos. 2.211–12; Decal. 91–101; Spec. 2.60–64; Contempl. 30–31 (for the Therapeutae). Cf. also Josephus, Ag. Apion 2.171. 8 See G. E. Sterling, “Platonizing Moses: Philo and Middle Platonism,” SPhA 5 (1993): 96–111. 9 Eujsev beia only appears 3t. in the parts of the LXX that are translated from Hebrew: Prov 13:11 (where it has no equivalent in MT); Isa 11:2 and 33:6 (where it translates hwhy tary). It appears a number of times in texts composed in Greek: 2t. in 2 Macc (3:1; 12:43), 2t. in 3 Macc (1:9 [as a variant in A]; 2:31), and 45t. in 4 Macc. 10 Let. Aristeas uses the noun (euj sevbeia) 8t. and the adjective (euj sebhv~) 3t. 11 The poet uses the noun 5t., the verb (euj sebevw) 1t. and the adjective 5t. 12 4 Macc employs the noun 45t., the verb 5t., and the adjective 11t. 6
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Philo assigned an importance to eujsevbeia that it did not have in Hellenistic philosophy. He tended to use it more frequently than many of the philosophers: he employed the eujsevbeia word group 196 times and the ajsevbeia word group 195 times.13 More importantly, he made eujsevbeia the source of all other virtues. This pride of place was unique in the philosophical tradition. What factors led to his emphasis on and transformation of eujsevbeia?14
Peri; eujsebeiva~ We must begin with a word about sources. We have four fragments that are attributed to a Philonic work entitled Peri; eujsebeiva~.15 Since almost a third 13 The numbers break down as follows: euj sev beia (162t.), eujsebevw (16t.), euj sebhv~ (18t.), ajsevbeia (93t.), ajsebevw (17t.), ajsevbhma (16t.), and ajsebhv~ (69t.). I have used the concordance of P. Borgen, K. Fuglseth, and R. Skarsten, The Philo Index: A Complete Greek Word Index to the Writings of Philo of Alexandria Lemmatised and Computer Generated (Unitrel Studieserie 25; Trondheim: University of Trondheim, 1997; reprint ed., Leiden: Brill/Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000). 14 There is not a great deal of literature on Philo’s understanding of eujsev beia. The most important recent treatments include: H. A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (2 vols.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1947), 2:213–15; H. J. Schoeps, Paul: The Theology of the Apostle in the Light of Jewish Religious History (trans. H. Knight; Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961), 32–33; D. KaufmannBühler, “Eusebeia,” RAC 6:985–1052, especially 1020–23; B. Lohse, Askese und Münchtum in der Antike und in der alten Kirche (Religion und Kultur der alten Mittelmeerwelt in Parallelforschungen 1; Munich–Wien: R. Oldenbourg, 1969), 95–110; W. Foerster, “eujsebhv~, eujsevbeia, eujsebevw,” TDNT 7:175–85, especially 180–81; idem, “ajsebhv~, ajsevbeia, ajsebevw,” TDNT 7:185–91, especially 189; and D. Winston, “Philo’s Ethical Theory,” ANRW 2.21.2:372–416, especially 394–96. 15 J. Rendall Harris, Fragments of Philo Judaeus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1886), 10–11, published three of these taken from manuscripts of the Sacra parallela. The history of the fourth fragment is more complex. H. Lewy, “Neue Philontexte in der Überarbeitung des Ambrosius. Mit einem Anhang: neu gefundene griechische Philonfragmente,” SPAW 4 (1932): 82–83 fr. no. 27., published the fragment which he thought might have come from Praem. L. Früchtel, “Zum Oxyrhynchus-Papyrus des Philon,” Philologische Wochenschrift 58 (1938): 1437–39, pointed out that the fragment overlapped the contents of P. Oxy. XI 1356 fol. 10 which was one of the unidentified fragments that belonged to the Oxyrhynchus codex of Philo. J. R. Royse, “The Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of Philo,” Bulletin of the American Society of Papyrologists 17 (108): 162, pointed out that Lewy had taken his version of the fragment from two manuscripts that are witnesses to the Florilegium Hierosolymitanum (a recension of the Sacra parallela) which is in part dependent on Thessaloniciensis blavtewn Monasterii 9. This manuscript has the same fragment as Lewy’s, but with the fuller lemma: Fivl wno~ ejk tou` peri; eujsebeiva~ kefalaivou. This suggests that P. Oxy. XI 1356 fol. 10 is also a fragment from the lost work, Peri; eujsebeiva~. See the discussion of Royse, “The Text of Philo’s De virtutibus,” elsewhere in this volume. He
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of Philo’s original library has been lost, this could be another example of a lost treatise.16 There were certainly other treatises with this title. We know of at least four: Theophrastus,17 Daimachus,18 Zeno of Sidon,19 and Philodemus20 all wrote works entitled Peri; eujsebeiva~.21 There is, however, another possibility: it might be a lost section of a known work. There are a number of manuscripts that have the following title for the work that we know as De virtutibus: Peri; ajretw`n h[toi peri; ajndreiva~ kai; eujsebeiva~ kai; filanqrwpiva~ kai; metanoiva~.22 A significant number of other manuscripts have Peri; triw`n ajretw`n a}~ su;n a[llai~ ajnevgraye Mwüsh;~ peri; ajndreiva~ kai; filanqrwpiva~ kai; metanoiva~ or something similar.23 The threefold title has the advantage of aligning with the material that has come down to us. The combination of the fragments and the various titles for De virtutibus lead us to ask whether the fragments were part of an independent work or a section of De virtutibus?24 In order to answer this question, we must set prints the first three fragments and provides a full discussion of the fourth as well. We have independently arrived at the same basic conclusions concerning the nature and place of the section on piety. 16 On Philo’s library see D. T. Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature: A Survey (CRINT 3.3; Assen: Van Gorcum–Minneapolis: Fortress, 1993), 16–31. 17 On Theophrastus see W. Pötscher, Theophrastos, Peri; eujsebeiva~ (PhilAnt 11; Leiden: Brill, 1964) and W. Fortenbaugh, et al., Theophrastus of Eresus: Sources for his Life, Writings, Thought and Influence (2 vols.; PhilAnt 54; Leiden–New York: Brill, 1992), no. 580.3 (2:400–01) and nos. 584–88 (2:404–37). I have used the edition of Fortenbaugh. 18 Plutarch, Lys. 12.1–2. This could be either Daimachus the elder (FGrH 65 fr. 8) who lived before 350 b.c.e. or Daimachus who lived after 300 b.c.e. (FGrH 716). 19 P. Herc. 1005 10.20. 20 On Philodemus see D. Obbink, Philodemus, On Piety; Part 1: Critical Text with Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996). Cicero, Nat. d. 1.25–41, 42, used this treatise. 21 It is possible that Epicurus wrote a work with this title (Cicero, Nat. d. 1.115); however, this probably refers to his work De sanctitate (Philodemus, Piet. 8.207–19; 13.350– 64; 44.1263–75; D. 3 fr. 6.4; P. Herc. 111 fr. 441–15; Cicero, Nat. d. 1.115, 123; Plutarch, Suav. viv. 1102C). For details see Obbink, Philodemus, On Piety, 298–301. 22 B E K. There are several variations of this title: tou` auj tou` Fivlwno~ tou` eJ braivou peri; ajretw`n h[toi peri; ajndreiva~ kai; eujsebeiva~ kai; filanqrwpiva~ kai; metanoiva~ V O; tou` aujtou` peri; ajretw`n, ajndreiva~ kai; eujsebeiva~ kai; metanoiva~ kai; filanqrwpiva~ F; peri; ajretw`n h[toi peri; ajndreiva~ kai; eujsebeiva~ H P. There are other variations. See the aparatus criticus in PCW, 5:266. 23 S. The threefold structure is also attested by Eusebius, HE 2.18.2; Jerome, De vir. Ill. 11; and Sacra Parallela, Codes Rupefuc. Fol. 212v; Codex Vaticanus 1533 fol. 73r (the reading here is problematic). 24 The most important treatments of the debate are E. Schürer, Die Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi (4th edition; 3 vols.; Leipzig: Hinrich, 1909), 3.671– 72 n. 101, who argued against the existence of a separate work; F. H. Colson, PLCL, 8:xiii– xiv, who is inclined to place them fragments with Virt.; Royse, “The Oxyrhynchus Papyrus of Philo,” 161–65, who argued that the fragments were part of a lost section in Virt.; J. Morris in E. Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ (3 vols.; revised
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out the evidence as we know it. It is important to begin with the larger contextual issue and to situate De virtutibus in the Exposition of the Law. As is well known, Philo used the ten commandments as headings for specific laws in the Mosaic legislation.25 He completed his coverage of the laws that he could subsume under the ten in the middle of De specialibus legibus 4 where he said: “Enough of these matters. It is imperative to know that just as for each one of the ten there are some individual laws related to it that have nothing in common with any other (of the ten), so there are some that are common to all . . . These are the universally-valid virtues.”26 He then proceeded to organize the laws that spanned more than one of the ten commandments under the headings of specific virtues. It would be fair to say that his use of virtues is a direct bow to ethical thought in Hellenistic philosophy. Unfortunately Philo’s handling of the virtues has come down to us in a problematic textual tradition.27 We can use the subheadings and title in the tradition as a way to summarize the evidence. The treatises as we know them today contain the following subheadings:28 Peri; dikaiosuvnh~, Spec. 4.136–238 Peri; ajndreiva~, Virt. 1–50 Peri; filanqrwpiva~, Virt. 51–174 Peri; metanoiva~, Virt. 175–86 Peri; eujgeneiva~, Virt. 187–227 and edited by G. Vermes, F. Millar, and M. Goodman; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1973–86), 3:850–53, who argued that they were part of Virt.; E. Hilkert, “A Review of Previous Research on Philo’s De Virtutibus,” SBL Seminar Papers, 1991 (SBLSP 30; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), 103–15, especially. 104–07, who thought that there was a treatise De pietate, but left its place in the Philonic corpus an open question; D. T. Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson: The Text of Philo’s De Virtutibus,” SBL Seminar Papers, 1991, 116–34; reprinted in D. T. Runia, Philo & the Church Fathers: A Collection of Papers (VCSup 32; Leiden: Brill, 1995), 77–101, who argued that the fragments were independent of De virtutibus; and Royse, “The Text of Philo’s De virtutibus,” who argued that they comprised a lost final section of De virtutibus. M. Alexandre, Jr., “A Rhetorical Analysis of Philo’s De Virtutibus,” Euphrosyne 21 (1993): 9–28, treated De virtutibus as a unit with four parts and does not address the possibility of a lost section . 25 Philo, Her. 173; Decal. 18–20, 154–75; Spec. 1.1; 3.7; 4.132, 133; Praem. 2. 26 Philo, Spec. 4.132. 27 The most important treatments of the text include three of the works mentioned above: Hilgert, “A Review of Previous Research on Philo’s De Virtutibus,” 103–15; Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 116–34; and Royse, “The Text of Philo’s De virtutibus.” 28 Cohn also printed Katav stasi~ ajr covntwn at Spec. 4.151 (PCW 5:243), but this is certainly wrong. Colson pointed out that the appointment of rulers only extends to §159 and their duties to §192 (PLCL, 8:102 n. 1).
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De specialibus legibus 4 is only fully extant in two manuscripts (S and M) and De virtutibus in only one (S).29 The extent to which other manuscripts preserve the treatments of the virtues and the order in which they preserve them varies. There are two major arrangements among the manuscripts of De virtutibus that preserve a significant portion of the treatise: ajndreiva, filanqrwpiva, metavnoia, eujgevneia30 filanqrwpiva, ajndreiva, eujgevneia31 Our current arrangement is thus that of S which Cohn used as the major exemplar for his reconstruction of the text. The wisdom of Cohn’s choice is confirmed by a second source: Clement of Alexandria used the treatise extensively in Stromateis 2.78–100 and drew from all four sections of the treatise in the same sequence as we find them in S.32 This suggests that the treatise had reached the form preserved in S within a hundred and fifty years of the autograph. Does this, however, reflect the autograph form? We may narrow the question to whether a section has been lost. The bases for the subheadings are the presence of thematic units in the text and authorial editorial frames embedded in the text. The Jewish exegete set the first three virtues off with framing comments: dikaiosuvnh in De specialibus legibus 4.135–238 is set off by 132–35 and 238 and Virt. 1; ajndreiva in De virtutibus 1–50 is set off by 1 and 50; and filanqrwpiva in De virtutibus 51–174 is set off by 51. There are two main problems with the interlocking frames. First, the initial frames for both dikaiosuvnh and filanqrwpiva refer back to eujsevbeia. Philo set up his treatment of dikaiosuvnh with these words: “Concerning the queen of the virtues, piety or holiness, as well as prudence and moderation, we have already spoken; now it is necessary to speak of justice that practices similar and closely related ways.”33 He introduced 29 S or Codex Seldenianus XII is a tenth or eleventh century manuscript that contains part of Spec. 3, all of 4, and all of Virt. M or Codex Laurentianus plut. X 20 is a thirteenth century manuscript that contains twenty-eight treatises of Philo including all of Spec. 4 and the first virtue of Virt. For the textual tradition of the treatises see PCW, 5:xxv–xxviii. 30 This is the order of S and F (a fifteenth-sixteenth century manuscript) which lack §§ 182-86 and 226-27. A (thirteenth century) has 1–50, 51–181. 31 This is the order of P (thirteenth-fourteenth century), H (fourteenth century [it also has 175–81 in sequence]), G (fourteenth-fifteenth centuries [which has two hands: 51–181, 1–50 and 51–174, 187–227]), and L (sixteenth century [which has 51–181, 1–50, 187–227]). 32 On Clement’s use of Virt. see A. van den Hoek, Clement of Alexandria and his use of Philo in the Stromateis: An Early Christian reshaping of a Jewish model (VCSup 3; Leiden: Brill, 1988), 69–115. On the value of the Stromateis as a textual witness for Virt. see P. Wendland, “Philo und Clemens Alexandrinus,” Hermes 31 (1896): 435–56. 33 Philo, Spec. 4.135. N. G. Cohen, “The Greek Virtues and the Mosaic Laws in Philo: An Elucidation of De specialibus Legibus IV 133–135,” SPhA 5 (1993): 9–23 and idem, Philo
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filanqrwpiva as follows: “It is next necessary to investigate love of humanity, the closest relative to eujsevbeia, both its sister and twin.”34 The latter statement led some scribes to insert a subtitle containing peri; eujsebeiva~ at this point in their manuscripts.35 Others placed it at §34.36 Interestingly, no one placed it at De specialibus legibus 4.135. I suggest that the two statements are designed to relate each of these virtues to the one queen virtue, piety, rather than to set up a sequence. Piety is for Philo, the virtue par excellence in which the other virtues are subsumed.37 Second, there is no concluding frame for filanqrwpiva. Instead, we find two additional virtues without any editorial frames: metavnoia (175–86) and eujgevneia (187–227). We will return to these momentarily. The title for the work was based on these subheadings. The earliest title had three major virtues as Eusebius and Jerome attest.38 Like the subheadings, the title was a scribal invention based on the explicit frames in the treatise: ajndreiva (1–50), filanqrwpiva (51–227), and a third that has been lost. Later scribes filled in the specific virtues based on the text at their disposal. The appearance of eujsevbeia as one of the virtues in the title of a number of manuscripts suggests that there was once a section devoted to it.39 The recovery of four fragments attributed to a work on piety confirms the existence of this now lost section. It was lost at an early date, prior to Clement who did not know the section peri; eujsebeiva~. This means that within a century and a half, the sections peri; dikaiosuvnh~ (Spec. 4.135–238) and peri; eujsebeiva~ were distinct from the treatise. The scribal practice of creating subheadings from the content led to the creation of numerous subheadings which may or may not reflect the original structure of the work. Certainly some of the subheadings in S and the margin of G are excessive.40 This forces us to ask whether we should consider the final two sections in our current editions (peri; metanoiva~ and Judaeus: His Universe of Discourse (BEATAJ 24; Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1995), 72– 105, has analyses of this text. 34 Philo, Virt. 51. 35 Tou` auj tou` lov go~ peri; euj sebeiva~ F, peri; eujsebeiva~ kai; filanqrwpiv a~ HP. 36 G. 37 So also Runia, “Underneath Cohn and Colson,” 97. Cohen, “The Greek Virtues and the Mosaic Laws in Philo,” 17 and idem, Philo Judaeus: His World of Discourse, 95–99, considered wisdom, justice, and piety to be the three super-virtues in Philo. 38 Eusebius, HE 2.18.2 and Jerome, De vir. ill. 11. See above (n. 23) for other witnesses. 39 It appears in the titles of the following manuscripts (listed chronologically): V B E M P O K H F. 40 S and the margin in G2 have additional subheadings at §§ 82, 88, 90, 95, 97, 102 (S only), 105, 109, 116, 121 (S only), 125 (S only), 134 (title for a new work!), 145 (S only), 148 (S only).
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peri; eujgeneiva~) as independent units or subsections of the treatment of peri; filanqrwpiva~. A number of factors suggest that they are part of the larger discussion of peri; filanqrwpiva~.41 As we noted above, there is no concluding frame for the section on filanqrwpiva as there is for diakaiosuvnh and ajndreiva. The introductions to metavnoia and eujgevneia lack the formality of editorial frames. The brevity of the treatment of metavnoia also makes one wonder whether it can stand alone. Finally, the two make sense as part of the discussion of filanqrwpiva: proselytes who repent are fully welcome; Israel can not count on birthright, but must live on the basis of virtue. In this way both downplay a unique status based on ethnicity and demonstrate Israel’s filanqrwpiva to all who practice virtue. For these reasons I think that the final two units of the modern text were part of the discussion of filanqrwpiva and not separate virtues. We thus have four units: a treatment of justice in De specialibus legibus 4, a treatment of courage and a treatment of humanity in De virtutibus, and a lost section on piety. Were these four units originally part of a single treatise or separate works that have been collected together? The first thing that strikes any reader is that they are spread out over two treatises. Why? Certainly this has something to do with length. The following list indicates the number of pages in the Cohn-Wendland edition for each of the treatises in the Exposition of the Law. Treatise
Pages
Mos. 1 Mos. 2 Opif. Abr Ios. Decal. Spec.1 Spec. 2 Spec. 3 Spec. 4 Virt. Praem.
81 69 60 60 58 39 84 65 59 57 71 41
A quick glance suggests that if we included the two sections that currently comprise De virtutibus (71 pp.), the material devoted to dikaiosuvnh in De 41
For a defense of this position see Colson, PLCL, 8:xv–xviii.
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specialibus legibus 4.135–238 (27 pp.), and a lost section on eujsevbeia, we would have too much material for a single papyrus scroll (more than 98 pp. in Cohn-Wendland). Could each virtue have stood independently? Here are the page numbers for the treatments of the individual virtues: Virtue
Pages
dikaiosuvnh ajndreiva filanqrwpiva
27 14 57
It is worth noting that the treatment of filanqrwpiva is roughly the equivalent of many treatises in the Philonic corpus. I suggest that Philo wrote treatments of the virtues in much the same way that he organized the legal material in De specialibus legibus, i.e., just as each of the ten commandments served as a heading for miscellaneous laws, so each virtue served as a heading for various laws. As it would be possible to isolate his treatment of any of the ten commandments, so it was possible to isolate his treatment of any individual virtue. He probably placed them on several papyrus scrolls. Some treatments might have even filled an entire scroll, e.g., filanqrwpiva. The treatments were independent in the sense that they could stand alone, yet they did have some larger structure. Philo indicated this through intertextual connections (e.g., dikaiosuvnh and ajndreiva) as he did in some of the other treatises in his corpus; however, he was not consistent in providing intertextual connections just as elsewhere in his corpus he often juxtaposed treatises without any explicit rationale apart from the sequence of the biblical text. The connections were not designed to provide a sequence as much as they indicated the relationship among the virtues. It might be fair to think of the treatments of virtues as appendices to the laws in De specialibus legibus. The semi-independent character of these appendices invited chaos in the later tradition. At a very early date, the treatments of individual virtues circulated in isolation—at least in some instances. The result was some were preserved, some were lost.42 This might have been avoided if Philo had restricted his analysis of the virtues to the Platonic or Stoic schemes. He did not. Later scribes were undoubtedly puzzled by the Philo’s selections vis-à-vis the philosophical tradition. This is probably why his treatment
42 It is possible that the lost work on the Passions was somehow related to this as well (Leg. 3.139; cf. also Det. 119).
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peri; eujsebeiva~ was lost: it did not have the same place in the philosophical tradition that it did in Philo. Does this attempt to reconstruct the place of Philo’s now largely lost peri; eujsebeiva~ help us understand Philo’s presentation of eujsevbeia? I think that it does in three important ways. First, Philo considered piety significant enough that he accorded it separate treatment: it was a virtue. Second, it was more than a virtue: it was the virtue. As we have already seen, in his interlocking frames Philo repeatedly insisted on the priority of eujsevbeia. He echoed the last frame later when he called eujsevbeia and filanqrwpiva “the queens of the virtues.”43 His point was that all other virtues took their point d’appui from these two virtues. Third, Philo treated the virtues in his Exposition of the Law. Piety and all other virtues are linked to the law. We now need to turn to the numerous references in the extant works. Do they confirm the conclusions that we have reached about his understanding of piety?
“God by God, Light by Light” Philo used the language of piety and impiety principally in association with his understanding of theism and anthropology. We begin with the former in keeping with its central place in his thought. Philo knew the standard definition of eujsevbeia. In a text in which he argued that religion did not supply what God needs, he wrote: “it is not right to say that piety, the service of God (qeou` qerapeiva), is a means of providing what will profit God.”44 Plato had offered the same definition in Euthyphro.45 In fact, Plato’s Euthyphro is probably Philo’s source.46 The Stoics had a similar definition. They consistently defined piety as “the knowledge of the service of the gods.”47 Like most other philosophers, Philo often linked eujsevbeia with related terms, in particular with “holiness” (oJsiovth~).48 This is a typical 43
Philo, Virt. 95. See n. 105 below for details. Philo, Det. 55. Cf. also Abr. 129. For another example of a Middle Platonist who repeated this definition see Plutarch, Aem. 3.3. 45 Plato, Euthyphr. 12E. 46 J. Glucker, “Piety, Dogs and a Platonic Reminiscence: Philo, Quod deterius 54–56 and Plato, Euthyphro 12e–15a,” Illinois Classical Studies 18 (1993): 131–38, who suggested that Philo drew from notes that he had made on the Platonic dialogue. 47 SVF, 2.304.18–19; 3.67.11; 3.157.11–12; 3.157.25–26. The Stoics defined ajsev beia as a[gnoia qew`n qerapeiva~ (SVF 3.157.10–11). 48 Philo used the term oJsiovth~ 72t., 28t. in association with eujsev beia: Opif. 155, 172; Sacr. 37; Det. 21; Plant. 35; Ebr. 91, 92; Migr. 194; Her. 123; Congr. 98; Somn. 2.186; Abr. 198; Mos. 1.198, 307; 2.136, 142, 192, 270; Decal. 119; Spec. 1.30, 54, 186; 2.63, 224, ; 3.127; 4.135; 44
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association in the philosophical tradition that goes back at least to Plato’s discussion in the Euthyphro.49 Philo used the two terms as virtual synonyms to refer to the human response to and perception of God. The Alexandrian Jew emphasized the former in a number of statements: “For I see that all of the commands to piety in the law lead either to love or to fear the Self-Existent.” He explained: “For those who do not think that any human aspect or emotion relate to God but who appropriately honor him for his own sake, it is most fitting to love; for the rest, to fear.”50 This led him to argue for the necessity of the cult—even though he accepted the philosophical critique of sacrifices: “the individual who does not make use of the sacred rites and whatever else leads to piety is disobedient to the commands which the law customarily commands concerning these matters. Rather this leader of godlessness makes trouble since he has inclined to the opposite, impiety.”51 Although this statement does not represent Philo’s typical comment on sacrifices,52 it does point to his firm commitment to Judaism as a distinct social entity. It also fits with the emphasis on the importance of sacrificing to the gods in the Greek philosophical tradition. While Theophrastus inveighed against animal sacrifice, he insisted on the validity and importance of sacrifices.53 Philodemus also made it quite clear that Epicureans considered it important to maintain religious rites.54 More importantly, Philo used the term to suggest the human understanding of God, thus giving it an intellectual quality. We get a sense of its importance in his explanation of the meaning of the change of Abraham’s name: “he converted from the study of nature to ethical philosophy; he migrated from the study of the kosmos to the knowledge of its creator. From this he acquired piety, the most prized of all possessions.”55 The Torah commentator explained what the knowledge of the creator was in Virt. 201; Legat. 242. Cf. also Virt. 51. Philo associated the adjectives eujsebhv~ and o{sio~ in Legat. 279. 49 Plato, Euthyphr. 13B and 5C–D, 12E for the adjectives. 50 Philo, Deus 69. 51 Philo, Ebr. 18. Cf. also Migr. 97–98; Congr. 98; Mos. 2.108; Spec. 1.67–68. He used eujsevbeia for rites in a number of texts: Det. 143; Praem. 40; Legat. 280, 316. Cf. also Spec. 1.57; Hypoth. 6.6. 52 On Philo’s view of sacrifices see V. Nikiprowetsky, “La spiritualisation des sacrifices et le culte sacrificiel au temple de Jérusalem chez Philon d’Alexandrie,” Semitica 17 (1967): 97–116; reprinted in J. Riaud, ed., Études philoniennes (I Patrimoines Judaïsme; Paris: Cerf, 1996), 79–96. He associated piety with specific cultic acts in Mos 1.254, 317; Spec. 1.78, 132, 248; 2.183. Cf. also Abr. 177, 190; Spec. 1.312. 53 Theophrastus’ treatise is a polemic against animal sacrifice. It does, however, enjoin other forms of sacrifice. 54 Philodemus, Piet. 26.730–51. 55 Philo, Mut. 76.
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several contexts. The most famous is the repeated series of five statements at the end of De opificio mundi. In the fuller of the two formulations, Philo listed the essential affirmations and their rationale. He presented the latter by contrasting the confessional statements with their opposite perspective. According to Philo, it is imperative to affirm that God exists to rebut the atheists, to hold that God is one to counter polytheists, to maintain that the kosmos is created to refute those who believe it is eternal, to asseverate that there is only one world in order to reject the notion that there are many worlds, and to confess that God exercises providence over creation just as a parent cares for a child.56 For Philo, these affirmations represented the intellectual sine qua non for anyone who wants to read and understand the laws of Moses or share in the intellectual position that he held.57 The formulation of these statements as counters to different postures towards theism points to Philo’s awareness and use of classificatory schemes of theism. Like the Epicurean Philodemus,58 the Academic Cicero,59 the Stoic Epictetus,60 and the Pyrrhonist sceptic Sextus Empiricus,61 Philo categorized the groups who professed disbelief or belief in the existence of God. In De praemiis he expanded a standard threefold classification of 56 Philo, Opif. 170–72. He offered the fuller statement first and then a brief summary in 172. He argued that beliefs were a prerequisite of piety in Plant. 77; Mut. 155; Mos. 2.270; Decal. 58; Spec. 1.30, 51–52; 2.224; Virt. 221; Praem. 40–41; QE 2.26. Cf. also Ebr. 91, 92; Migr. 194. On providence see Opif. 9. 57 E. R. Goodenough, An Introduction to Philo Judaeus (2nd edition; Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), 37, called the statements “the first creed in history.” A. Mendelson, Philo’s Jewish Identity (BJS161; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), 29–49, thought that the statements represented the sine qua non of Philo’s understanding of orthodoxy. D. T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria, On the Creation of the Cosmos (PACS 1; Leiden: Brill, 2001), 391–94, argued that they are the preliminary beliefs that one must hold to read the Mosaic legislation. I agree with Runia that the statements have a specific function in the Philonic corpus. At the same time, Goodenough and Mendelson were not wrong in recognizing the summary nature of the statements as requisites for Philo’s intellectual position. 58 Philodemus, P. Herc. 1428 cols. 14.32–15.8 cited by Obbink, Philodemus, On Piety, 1– 2, who gave three categories: one, those who hold that the existence of the gods and their nature are unknowable; two, those who openly deny the existence of the gods; and three, those who make their views evident (without explicit statements). 59 Cicero, Nat. d. 1.2, who divided humanity into three categories much like Philodemus. 60 Epictetus 1.12.1–8, who thought in terms of five classes: one, those who deny the existence of the gods; two, those who affirm that the gods are inactive and indifferent; three, those who affirm the existence of the gods but limit providence to celestial objects; four, those who believe in the existence of the gods and providence for both celestial and terrestrial beings but only in a general way; and fifth, those who believe in the gods and providence for individuals. 61 Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 9.50–51, who offered only two groups of atheists: those who deny the existence of the gods and those who suspend judgment.
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atheists, agnostics, and theists. The Jewish commentator qualified his discussion of theism by pointing out that it was possible to perceive “that he is” but not “what he is.”62 This distinction runs throughout the Philonic corpus: humans can perceive God’s existence (u{parxi~) but not his essence (oujsiva).63 With this stipulation, Philo grouped atheists and theists into five classes: those who deny that God exists; agnostics; those who believe but are superstitious; those who perceive the existence of God through reason; and finally, the few who perceive “God through God, light through light.”64 He made observations about these groups in statements scattered throughout his treatises. Atheists comprised the first group. Philo knew many of the standard topoi. Like many others, he accused the Epicureans65 and Egyptians of atheism.66 He also associated atheism with impiety.67 On one occasion he developed a comprehensive classification of atheists: those who deny the Platonic ideas, atheists proper, polytheists, those who honor the human mind over God, and those who honor sense perception over God.68 On other occasions, he followed the Stoics and reduced the issue to two concerns: belief in God and providence. To argue that the kosmos was without beginning and was influenced by random causes was impiety and godlessness.69 These statements indicate that the Alexandrian conceived of atheism in broad rather than narrow terms. It included a number of concerns. Some of these were obvious; others were not as immediately evident. Any direct speech against God was impious.70 Idolatry was, of course, considered an act of impiety.71 Interestingly, Philo sometimes considered other less obvious practices to be a greater affront to God. More specifically, he said that anthropomorphic perceptions of God were the greatest form of impiety: “For what greater impiety could there be than to suppose that the 62
Philo, Praem. 39–40, 44. Philo, Post. 167–69; Deus 62; Fug. 141, 165; Mut. 7–10; Spec. 1.41–50; Virt. 215. For a recent explanation of Philo’s view see P. Frick, Divine Providence in Philo of Alexandria (TSAJ 77; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 26–52. 64 Philo, Praem. 40–46. 65 Philo, Post. 2. 66 Philo, Mos. 2.193, 196–97. Cf. Legat. 163. 67 He regularly associated euj sev beia and ajqeov th~: Post. 2, 52; Deus 21; Ebr. 18. 78, 109– 11; Conf. 114, 196; Congr. 159; Mos. 2.193; Legat. 163. He also linked the adjectives a[q eo~ and ajsebhv~ : Det. 103; Post. 42; Congr. 87; Mut. 61. Cf. also Conf. 121 and Congr. 57. He also associated the similar pair of adjectives, ajsebhv~ and qeosebhv~: Mut. 197. For another example see Plutarch, Superst. 169F. 68 Philo, Spec. 1.327–45. 69 Philo, Conf. 114. Cf. Epictetus 2.14.11. On the issue of providence see Migr. 179. 70 E.g., Philo, Decal. 63; Mos. 1.90; 2.200, 201, 204, 217. 71 Philo, Ebr. 41, 109–11; Mos. 2.161, 274; Decal. 75; Spec. 1.20; 3.125–26; QE 2.26. 63
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unchangeable changes?”72 Philo’s anti-anthropomorphic criticisms were part of a Stoically influenced exegetical tradition that he inherited.73 He not only accepted it, but developed a polemic against the converse position: it was impious to attribute to humans or to lower creatures what should be reserved for God.74 Perhaps the hyperbolic nature of his rhetoric in this regard reflects his sensitivity to statements within the biblical text. Whatever his specific motive was, it appears that Philo construed any significant misapprehension of the Deity maximally as an atheistic stance or minimally as an act of impiety or both. The second group consisted of agnostics. The identity of this group is left vague, perhaps Philo had the skeptics in mind. In De praemiis Philo considered them to be separate from the atheists, just as Philodemus and Cicero had. In his earlier treatise De opificio mundi he lumped both groups together. He did so in his elaboration of the rationale for the first confessional statement at the end of the treatise. He maintained that the first affirmation that God exists is necessary “because of the godless. Some of them doubt and are torn about his existence, while the more brazen boldly assert that he does not exist at all but is only affirmed to exist by people who cloud the truth with mythic fabrications.”75 David Runia has suggested that Philo’s Judaism led him to collapse the threefold scheme into a twofold pattern of atheists and theists.76 While this is possible, we should remember that Sextus Empiricus associated atheists and skeptics.77 Theists comprised the final three groups. The practitioners of superstition (deisidaimoniva) formed the third group. There were different understandings of deisidaimoniva in antiquity: the term was popularly used in a neutral vein to designate religion,78 whereas philosophers often used it negatively to mean “superstition.” They generally gave it one of two 72 Philo, Deus 22. Cf. also Leg. 1.43; Sacr. 95; Post. 38; Deus 59; Conf. 134; QE 2.45, 47. He regularly castigates those who attribute improper qualities to God: Det. 122; Post. 34–35, 42, 53; Conf. 125; Migr. 92; Fug. 199; Mut. 136; Ios. 198; Spec. 1.327, 345; Aet. 73. Cf. also QG 1.60. In Mos. 1.294 he said that the ajsevbhma . . . mevgiston was to oppose God’s oracles by human counsels. 73 For details see T. J. Tobin, The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation (CBQMS 14; Washington, D.C.: The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983), 36–55. 74 Philo, Leg. 1.49; Cher. 65; Sacr. 71; Decal. 62; Spec. 1.20, 62; Somn. 2.119, 182.; Spec. 3.180; Legat. 118. 75 Philo, Opif. 170. 76 D. T. Runia, “Atheists in Aëtius: Text, Tranlsation and Comments on De placitis 1.7.1–10,” Mnemosyne 49 (1996): 542–76, especially 550–53, and idem, Philo of Alexandria, On the Creation of the Cosmos, 395–96. 77 Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. 9.50–51 (see n. 60). 78 E.g., Acts 25:19. Cf. also Acts 17:22 where the adjective deisidaiv mwn means “religious.”
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nuances. Plutarch developed the etymological meaning of the first half of the term (deivdw) and emphasized the element of fear: “The atheist thinks that the gods do not exist, the superstitious person hopes they don’t. He believes unwillingly since he is afraid not to believe.”79 Philo, on the other hand, emphasized the unreflective posture of those who engage in the cult solely on the basis of custom: “the advice and proposals of habits and customs drive out piety and set up superstition, the relative of impiety.”80 Such statements demonstrate the intellectual quality of piety that Philo cultivated: eujsevbeia is oJsiovth~ not qrhskeiva.81 The Jewish author argued that one can not add to or diminish from eujsevbeia without transforming its character: “Addition will produce deisidaimoniva, subtraction ajsevbeia.”82 Like Plutarch, he knew the Peripatetic tradition that situated eujsevbeia as the means between deisidaimoniva and ajsevbeia or atheism.83 In short, for Philo deisidaimoniva was an antonym of eujsevbeia.84 Those who believe in God’s existence on satisfactory grounds constitute the fourth and fifth groups.85 The difference between the two lies in how they come to know God. The fourth group arrives by means of the cosmological argument. Here Philo followed Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoa in arguing that reason’s encounter with the kosmos should lead us to believe in the existence of God.86 The fifth group is different: they experience God’s existence by encountering God. Philo said: “if some were able to perceive God by God without the assistance of any reasoning process to lead them to the vision, let them be enrolled among the holy, among the genuine worshippers, among the friends of God.” He proceeded to explain this by using the now famous Platonic formula: “Those who pursue truth have envisioned God by God, light by light.”87 How did Philo understand this formula? We must recognize at the outset that we are hampered by the epistemological 79
Plutarch, Supert. 170F. Philo, Sacr. 15. 81 Philo, Det. 21. Cf. also 20. 82 Philo, Spec. 4.147. 83 Philo, Deus 163–64 and Plutarch, Superstition 171F. This is based on Aristotle, Eth. nic. 2.6–7. 84 Philo, Cher. 42, 94, 96; Sacr. 15, 130; Det. 18, 21, 24; Deus 102; Plant. 70, 107–08; Ebr. 41; Abr. 179; Mos. 1.303; 2.165, 170; Spec. 1.51, 52, 79, 309, 313–14; 2.26; 3.29; 4.147; Virt. 221; Praem. 40, 162; QE 2.26. 85 Philo offered the same classification of those who understand God’s existence in Leg. 3.97–103. 86 Philo gave the cosmological argument in several texts: Leg. 3.97–99; Spec. 1.33–35; Praem. 41–42. For other statements see Plato, Leg. 886E; Phileb. 28E; Aristotle fr. 12a; Cicero, Nat. d. 2.15–19; 3.26. 87 Philo, Praem. 46. Cf. the same formula in Plotinus 5.3.17.34–37. 80
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break that he has introduced: the mystical experience transcends the limits of rational thought. It may be that Philo understood light by light to mean the ascent of the soul above the multiplicity of the sense-perceptible and discursive world to the unity of the Logos where God could be perceived intuitively.88 This was the highest religious experience a human being could hope to enjoy. While most would never achieve it, it was an ideal that a few actually experienced. The majority should be preoccupied with the rational side. It is for this reason that Philo has attempted to articulate his theism through the medium of philosophical categories. He could even equate philosophy and piety. He wrote: “for one who has made up his mind to practice a pure philosophy and who has laid claim to an honest and pure piety, Moses has laid down the most splendid and holy command that he should not suppose that any of the parts of the universe are the sovereign God.”89 Piety produces clear thought capable of overturning the specious arguments of impiety.90 While this is not the experience of “light by light,” it is an essential aspect of piety.
“The Queen of the Dance” Philo’s acceptance of philosophy leads us to ask what the tevlo~ of his system was. As is typical of his thought, we do not find a single formulation; on the contrary, we discover that he drew from Platonic, Stoic, and Neopythagorean traditions. He quoted the famous passage from Plato’s Theaetetus that Eudorus used to define the telos in Middle Platonic circles: “flight is likeness to God (oJmoivwsi~ qew/)` as far as that is possible. To be like God is to be just and holy with prudence.”91 He also adapted the famous Cynic-Stoic tag kata; fuvsin. He alluded to it in a text that incorporates his own spin on it: “The hope of happiness urges the zealots of virtue to 88 So D. T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (PhilAnt 44; Leiden: Brill, 1986), 437. D. Winston, Logos and Mystical Theology in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1985), 43–59, argued that this vision is connected to the ontological argument. On Israel as the “one who sees God” see E. Birnbaum, The Place of Judaism in Philo’s Thought: Israel, Jews, and Proselytes (BJS 290; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996), especially 77–90. 89 Philo, Decal. 58. Cf. also Legat. 245. 90 Philo, Conf. 132; Spec. 2.197; 4.129; QE 2.15. Philo associated euj sevbeia with ejpisthvmh (Contempl. 25) and pivsti~ (Migr. 132; Abr. 68; Mos. 2.259). He associates impiety with fallacious argumentation: Sacr. 95; Post. 52; Conf. 114, 125, 131, 132. For a similar emphasis see Epictetus, Ench. 31.1–5. 91 Philo, Fug. 63.
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practice philosophy so that by means of virtue they will be able to see the nature of what exists (th;n tw`n o[ntwn fuvsin) and to do the things that are appropriate for the perfection of the best lives, both the contemplative and the practical which make the one who acquires them happy.”92 Finally, Philo knew and used the Pythagorean formulation of following God: “He (Abraham) who was a zealot for piety, the highest and greatest virtue, made every effort to follow God (e{pesqai qew/)` and to be obedient to the things that he commanded.”93 What these three formulations share in common in their Philonic settings is the necessity of imitating God. Philo thought that human beings were intimately connected with God through the divine eijkwvn, i.e., the nou`~ in the soul. The connection between God and nou`~ should lead humans to seek and imitate God.94 How was the imitation accomplished? It was relatively common for Greek thinkers to pair eujsevbeia and dikaiosuvnh as a shorthand way to summarize human obligations to the gods and to other humans.95 This practice may have come from the fact that the gods were traditionally identified with the povli~. Religious and civic duties were thus inextricably bound together. Plato had Euthyphro make the point: “This is what I think, Socrates, one part of justice is piety and holiness, namely the part concerning service to the gods; the remaining part of justice is the part concerning service to humans.”96 Diogenes Laertius later expanded this scheme indicating that Plato thought dikaiosuvnh assumed three different relations: one to the gods, another to other humans, and yet another to the dead.97 The coupling of responsibilities under the heading of justice meant that piety was a secondary virtue. Justice took precedence. Aristotle called dikaiosuvnh “perfect virtue,” “the chief of virtues,” and “the whole of virtue.”98 Piety was a secondary virtue for Theophrastus99 and the Peripatetic
92 Philo, Praem. 11. Philo’s understanding of natural law is indebted to the Stoa, e.g., Opif. 3; Abr. 2–6. 93 Philo, Abr. 60. Philo elsewhere speaks of being a zealot for piety (Spec. 1.30; Virt. 175), zeal for piety (Ebr. 84; Somn. 2.106; Spec. 1.186), or a lover of piety (Spec 1.316; Virt. 218). The use of “following God” is not exclusively Pythagorean, e.g., Seneca, Ep. 90.34. 94 Compare Seneca, Ep. 95.47, 50; Epictetus 2.14.11–13. Philo frequently presented piety as acting for God: Leg. 3.209; Sacr. 37; Somn. 1.194; Spec. 1.299; Virt. 42, 45; Hypoth. 7.13. 95 E.g., Isocrates, Nic. 2; De pace 34; Poseidonius fr. 59 (FGrH 87); Cicero, Nat. d. 2.153; Diodorus Siculus 1.92.5; Marcus Aurelius 7.54; 11.20. Cf. also Xenophon, Mem. 4.8.11. 96 Plato, Euthyphr. 12E. 97 Diogenes Laertius 3.83. 98 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5.1 (1129b26–1130a10). 99 Theophrastus, in Stobaeus 3.3.42 (Fortenbaugh, Theophrastus of Eresus, no. 523).
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tradition100 as well as for the Stoa. 101 Zeno, the founder of the Stoa made frovnhsi~ the central virtue.102 Philo was aware of these discussions. He used the twofold division of duties to God and to humans as a means of setting out the requirements of the law. He said: “There are—to put it in a word—two principal headings that stand above the unspeakably great doctrines and teachings: that of piety and holiness toward God and that of love of humanity and justice to human beings.”103 He broke the decalogue down into these two headings.104 This was a matter of using the structure of one system to organize the ethics of another system. Philo did not, however, leave it at that. Like others, he organized the virtues into a hierarchy. Unlike his Hellenistic counterparts, he subsumed all of them under eujsevbeia. This is not only evident from the interlocking editorial frames that we have already examined, but from statements throughout his corpus. He called eujsevbeia “the queen of the virtues,”105 “the queen of the dance,”106 “the greatest,”107 “the leading and greatest virtue,”108 “the finest and most profitable,”109 and “the source of the virtues.”110 Similarly, he labeled qeosevbeia “the greatest virtue”111 and “the perfect good.”112 Conversely, he called ajsevbeia “the greatest evil”113 and “the endless evil.”114 What led Philo to give eujsevbeia such prominence? Was it the concept of the fear of God in the LXX,115 the Middle Platonic telos of oJmoivwsi~ qew/`,116 or 100
Cf. Pseudo-Aristotle, On Virt. vit. 1250b 20–24 (5.2–3). SVF 3.64.14–25. Sometimes the Stoics simply listed eujsevbeia in a list of virtues, e.g., SVF 2.304 16–31. 102 Plutarch, Virt. mor. 440E–441D; Stoic rep. 1034C–E. 103 Philo, Spec. 2.63. Cf. also Ebr. 78, 84; Her. 172; Mut. 39; Abr. 208; Decal. 108–10; Spec. 1.250; Virt. 51; Legat. 213. He often linked eujsevbeia and dikaiosuvnh: Virt. 175; Praem. 162; Hypoth. 6.8. He interpreted the two trees in the garden as qeosevbeia and frovnhsi~: Opif. 154–55. Conversely, he thought that a human could commit impiety against both God and humanity: Conf. 15; Decal. 120; Hypoth. 7.2. In Leg. 3.10, he exclaimed that it was easier to find a just person than a pious one. 104 Decal. 50–51, 121. 105 He used two different terms: hJ gemoniv~ (Decal. 119 [with oJ siov th~]; Spec. 4.135 [with oJsiovth~]; Virt. 95 [with filanqrwpiva]; and QG 2.38) and basiliv~ (Spec. 4.147). 106 Philo, Praem. 53. 107 Philo, Spec. 4.97. 108 Philo, Abr. 60. 109 Philo, Mos. 1.146. 110 Philo, Decal. 52. 111 Philo, Opif. 154 (qeosevbeia is parallel to euj sevbeia in 155); Abr. 114. 112 Philo, Congr. 130. 113 Philo, Congr. 160. 114 Philo, Fug. 61. 115 So Wolfson, Philo, 2:215; Lohse, Religion und Kultur, 105. 101
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his theism? I am inclined to think that it was the last. Philo does not appear to have drawn from Prov 1:7 or from the specific formulation of oJmoivwsi~ qew/` for his understanding of piety. The issue is broader. It was a question of the ultimate source: “The supreme source of all that exists is God; just as piety is (the supreme source) of the virtues.”117 The rationale for the analogy between God as source and piety as source is more than the fact that they share a common function: they are inextricably related in Philo’s thought. The physical and moral worlds are both the creations of God: piety towards God governs both our concept of the creation and the ordering of our lives. Everything, including ethics, begins with a proper belief in the existence of God and the divine governance of the kosmos. These beliefs are held in the mind, the image of God. Vices may affect the body, but impiety afflicts the soul. Purity of the soul will result in purity of the body.118 Our actions are therefore actions for God. Philo interpreted Abraham’s willingness to offer Isaac for the sake of God (Gen 22:16) along these lines: this was a sign of Abraham’s eujsevbeia, “for it is pious to do everything on behalf of God alone.”119 Virtues develop from such a posture. It is for this reason that Philo regularly included eujsevbeia in lists of virtues. While the Jewish author knew the standard Stoic list,120 he frequently modified it to include his own concerns, including eujsevbeia.121 On other occasions he often paired it with another virtue.122 Similarly, he associated ajsevbeia with ajdikiva.123 Just as he included eujsevbeia in virtue lists, so he included ajsevbeia in vice lists124 and with individual vices.125 The placement of eujsevbeia and ajsevbeia within the lists is not particularly 116
Kaufmann-Büchler, “Eusebeia,” 994. Philo, Decal. 52. Cf. also Abr. 114. 118 See especially Philo, Mos. 1.305. 119 Philo, Leg. 3.209. 120 Philo, Leg. 1.63–65. 121 Philo, Cher. 96; Sacr. 27; Det. 72, 73, 114, 143; Deus 164; Sobr. 40; Abr. 24; Ios. 143, 246; Mos. 2.216; Spec. 2.63; 4.97, 170, 135; Praem. 160; Prob. 83. On the verb see Congr. 6. 122 With ajrethv (Somn. 1.251); ej gkrateiv a (Spec. 1.193); ej krav teia (Somn. 2.106; Mos. 1.303 [qeosevbeia]); kalokajgaqiva (Abr. 98); swfrosuvnh (Somn. 2.182); and filanqrwpiva (Virt. 51, 95). 123 Philo, Sacr. 15, 22; Det. 72; Post. 52; Deus 112; Conf. 117, 152, 155; Spec. 1.215; Praem. 105; Prov. 2.39. For the cognate verbs see Spec. 2.170; Prov. 2.24. For the cognate adjectives see Her. 90; Spec. 3.209. Marcus Aurelius 9.1.1–4 makes a similar connection between the two concepts. In other contexts, Philo distinguished between the two. On the verbs see Conf. 153; Mut. 226. On the adjectives see Leg. 3.9, 10; Prob. 79. 124 He incorporated aj sevbeia or one of its cognates in vice lists in Sacr. 22, 32; Det. 72; Post. 52; Deus 112; Sobr. 42; Conf. 117; Abr. 24; Ios. 143; Prov. 2.39. 125 He set it beside ajkolasiva (Sacr. 15, 22; Det. 72; Deus 112; Mos. 1.295, 305, 311), misanqrwpiva (Decal. 111; Virt. 94; Prob. 90), and ajpanqrwpiva (Mos. 1.95). 117
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noteworthy. We might expect them to stand first. While they do in some lists, there is no preferred order.126 In most cases Philo took over basic lists and modified them without arranging them in a hierarchical order. For Philo all behavior should be pious. Impiety represents all wicked behavior.127 The law—whether natural or Mosaic—set the standard for what was pious and what was impious. Impiety was a violation of the law.128 Some actions were particularly tied to impiety. Among those that directly assaulted God were taking a false oath or perjury since God was a witness,129 violation of the sabbath since it was a sacred day,130 and using the holy for the profane.131 Other violations were directed against human beings: murder since it involves slaying the image of God,132 mistreatment of humans,133 and intercourse with an infertile woman.134 Conversely, Philo encouraged piety toward human beings.135 He recognized the difficulty in practicing piety.136 In order to promote piety, he held out numerous figures of Hebrew history as models.137 Like many philosophers, he also presented the rewards and penalties for piety.138 We can summarize his view of the requirements of piety by citing one of his statements: “Let there be one 126 Eujsev beia stands first in Sacr. 27, where Philo lists 34 virtues (his longest virtue list); Prob. 83, where he is describing the Essenes. Cf. also Spec. 2.63. ∆Asevbeia stands first in Post. 52. 127 Philo, Deus 21; Mos. 1.6, 237, 295, 301, 305; Spec. 2.191; Legat. 206; QG 2.13, 15, 17. He makes the same point with ajsevbhma in Flacc. 125 and ajsebhv~ in Praem. 157 On the incompatibility of the pious and the wicked see Fug. 131. 128 On aj sev beia as a violation of the law see Philo, Ebr. 18; Conf. 117; Spec. 1.120; 3.90; Virt. 144; Praem. 129, 142. On ajsevbhma see QG 1.66. On ajsebevw see Somn. 1.95; Spec. 2.27; QG 1.66. 129 Philo, Leg. 3.207; Decal. 91, 92, 94, 141; Spec. 2.8, 11 (9–11); 2.27, 253. PseudoIsocrates makes the same point (Demonicus 13). 130 Philo, Spec. 2.251. 131 Philo, Spec. 2.249. 132 Philo, Spec. 3.84; QG 1.66. Philo also discusses fratricide (Spec. 3.19), exposure of infants (Spec. 3.10) and child sacrifice (Spec. 1.312). 133 Philo, Ios. 174; Mos. 1.33, 39. 134 Philo, Spec. 3.36. 135 To parents (Ios. 240; Decal. 117, 120; Spec. 2.237; QG 4.202), to benefactors (Flacc. 48, 103), and to rulers (Flacc. 98; Legat. 280, 335; cf. also the negative in Flacc. 128; Legat. 355). 136 Philo, Agr. 177–78. Cf. also Abr. 171; Mos. 2.260; Spec. 2.28. 137 Noah (Virt. 201), Abraham (Abr. 60, 61, 98, 198, 199, 208), Moses (Mos. 1.187; 2.66, 284; Praem. 53), the twelve tribes (Mos. 1.159, 189), the Levites (Spec. 1.79), Nadab and Abihu (Somn. 2.67). He also provided some more contemporary examples among both Jews (Contempl. 3, 88; Legat. 297) and non-Jews (Aet. 10; Legat. 319). 138 For the rewards see Philo, Post. 39; Ios. 122; Virt. 218; Praem. 93. He discussed punishment in Cher. 2, 12, 39; Ebr. 223; Conf. 121, 182, 188; Congr. 57; Mut. 61–62, 169, 265; Somn. 1.22; 2.133; Mos. 1.96; 2.47, 56, 57, 221, 282, 285; Spec. 1.55; Praem. 69; Legat. 293; Prov. 2.33.
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bond of affinity and one symbol of friendship: the eagerness to serve God and that everything that we say or do is on behalf of piety.”139
Conclusion How did Philo understand piety? Although his thematic section on the topic has been lost in the transmission of De virtutibus, he has said enough to give us a good idea. It is clear that his treatment would have been very different from that of Theophrastus’ critique of animal sacrifice or Philodemus’ defense of the Epicurean concept of the gods and the cult against Stoic interlocutors. It is also clear that he has advanced well beyond Plato’s Euthyphro. The aporia that concludes Plato’s treatise has been resolved, with a surprising twist. Eujsevbeia has become the cardinal virtue. Unlike the thinkers in the Hellenistic philosophical traditions who subordinated eujsevbeia to dikaiosuvnh or to another virtue, Philo thought that it served as a source for all other virtues. The reason for this appears to lie in the theocentric nature of his thought. The aspiration of Philo was to encounter God directly. Even though a human cannot experience the being of God, it is possible to experience God’s presence directly. This experience, even the desire for the experience, affected the moral life. It is not that we imitate God to experience God, but that our understanding and experience of God shape our virtue or impiety. The creative impulse that led to Philo’s understanding sprang from his effort to think through his native religion in philosophical categories. The attempt forced him to present his ancestral religion as a form of philosophy and to move Hellenistic philosophy in the direction of religion. The result was a complex solution that was neither recognizable as pure Middle Platonism nor as unadulterated Judaism. Although this has frustrated the efforts of modern scholars to analyze his position within these larger movements, it had great appeal to his more immediate heirs in the Early Church who found his understanding of piety to be full of promise. 140 It is for this reason not unfair to call him the first theologian.141 University of Notre Dame 139
Philo, Spec. 1.317. Cf. also Post. 181. This was especially true of Aristides, Theophilus, and Ambrose. For details see Runia, Philo in Early Christian Literature, 96, 114, 307 respectively. 141 Philo’s status as a theologian has recently been emphasized by D. T. Runia, “Philo the Theologian,” Dictionary of Historical Theology (2000): 424–26 and in my forthcoming, “The First Theologian: The Originality of Philo of Alexandria.” 140
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 125–142
REVIEW ARTICLE RECENT WORK ON PLATO’S TIMAEUS JULIA ANNAS
Thomas K. Johansen, Plato’s Natural Philosophy: a study of the Timaeus–Critias. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. vi + 218 pages. ISBN 0-521-79067-0. Price £45, $75. Carlo Natali and Stefano Maso (eds.), Plato Physicus: cosmologia e antropologia nel Timeo. Amsterdam: Adolf Hakkert, 2003. 344 pages. ISBN 90-256-1173-7. Price €85.00. Gretchen Reydams-Schils (ed.), Plato’s Timaeus as Cultural Icon. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003. xiv + 334 pages. ISBN 0-268-03871-6. Price $59.95. Robert W. Sharples and Anne Sheppard (eds.), Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Timaeus. Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 78. London: Institute of Classical Studies, School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2003. 228 pages. ISBN 0-900587-89-X. Price £45, $90. M. R. Wright (ed.), Reason and Necessity: Essays on Plato’s Timaeus. London: Duckworth and The Classical Press of Wales, 2000. xvi + 191 pages. ISBN 0-7156-3057-1. Price , £40, $59.50. The Timaeus used to be, if not the Cinderella of Platonic dialogues among ancient philosophers, at any rate far from the favourite child. When attention in ancient philosophy was focused, in the 60s and 70s, on the so-called later dialogues and the interesting moves made there in what is now called philosophy of language, the Timaeus was even seen as something of a nuisance; it embodied a commitment to ideas about the world and language that Plato was taken to be challenging in other dialogues, and for some time it figured mainly in controversies as to whether it preceded those dialogues or not. The Timaeus’ embrace of a teleological approach to studying nature
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also made it appear an unpromising subject for philosophical study, as long as modern debates about teleology in science were taken as central. And its resolutely and stately monologue was seen as making an unattractive contrast to Plato’s emphasis elsewhere on the need for dialogue and mutual interaction and argument in philosophical discussion. The Timaeus has never wholly lacked students among ancient philosophers, but for some time it held most interest for people studying the details of the cosmology, Plato’s relation to the Presocratics or other relatively specialized areas. Recently, however, the Timaeus has moved into the mainstream of Platonic scholarship. This indicates that Platonic scholars have expanded their interests, and also that they are more and more recognizing that the dialogue has always been directly relevant to central Platonic concerns. Along with renewed interest in the Timaeus itself, this expansion of concern has brought with it increased interest in the dialogue’s reception and influence in the ancient world, where it was generally seen as far more central to Platonic thought than it has been for the last fifty years of Platonic scholarship. In this review I will focus on one new book and four collections of articles dedicated to the Timaeus. I will of course not be able to do justice to the material surveyed here, and I will be brief and selective, but I hope to give some indication of the new state of lively discussion of one of Plato’s most difficult works. Readers of The Studia Philonica Annual will not find many direct references to or connections with Philo himself. But I think that these books will indicate that contemporary Plato scholarship is increasingly sensitive to those aspects of the dialogue, and its place in Plato’s thought, which engaged Philo, and which Plato scholarship has tended to sideline until quite recently. There may now be more for the Philo scholar to engage with in Platonic scholarship on the Timaeus. I will begin with Johansen’s book, which announces in its sub-title something that distinguishes much of the recent work on the dialogue: a recognition that the Timaeus is not a work on the natural world in the selfcontained modern way of science, but also a work with specific implications for Plato’s ethics, something which appears more salient when we read the whole dialogue together with the incomplete Critias, rather than restricting our focus to the cosmology of Timaeus’ own speech alone. Johansen’s book, a fairly slim 218 pages, deals in an admirably clear, precise and compact way with issues on which much ink has been spilt; as he says on p. 4, “the Timaeus-Critias is a work that invites prolixity.” Johansen explicitly passes over many topics—the dating issue, the dialogue’s place in Plato’s political thought, Plato’s use of mathematics, his relation to the Presocratics and the dialogue’s influence on later thought—in order to
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focus on Plato’s teleology of the cosmos, presented as part of an overall teleology into which we humans also fit. A correct understanding of nature, according to Plato, shows us our place in it, and finding the cosmos to be rationally ordered shows us the way that we should order our own souls as parts of it. Coming to understand the nature of rational order shows us why humans fulfill their nature by being just, rather than by being unjust, as Thrasymachus and other sophists would have it.1 This is not a radically new way of reading the Timaeus, but Johansen is free from the older idea that proper science should be “purely factual” and “value-free,” and thus more sympathetic to the view that study of nature might discover natural goodness, and that humans might get clearer about their own values by studying it.2 Plato in the Timaeus, Johansen argues, presents for us a complete view of the universe, with humans as part of it, embodying the same principles that we can find in the universe on a larger scale. The ethical application of those principles is present in the Atlantis story, a narrative which, Johansen argues, meets the Republic’s standards for telling philosophical truth, one which actual historical facts do not determine; it is mimesis informed by expert knowledge of the soul and politics. It continues the Republic’s theme of ideal soul and state by showing the ideal state, embodied in the narrative by ancient Athens, in action against external enemies. We are all here greatly indebted to the pioneering work of Christopher Gill on the Atlantis story.3 Johansen agrees with the earlier against the later Gill that the story can reasonably be characterized as fiction which, unlike most fiction, has a philosophically protreptic message.4
1 This is also the approach of G. R. Carone in Plato’s Cosmology and Its Ethical Dimensions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), a study of four of Plato’s “later” dialogues and the way ethics is in them related to a particular teleological cosmology. Her two chapters on the Timaeus converge with Johansen’s approach, though differing on some specific issues, particularly the nature and role of the Demiurge. 2 Oddly, neither Johansen nor Carone mentions Foot’s and Hursthouse’s work on natural goodness, which is very much in tune with the kind of account they ascribe to Plato (P. Foot, Natural Goodness [Oxford: Clarendon, 2001]; R. Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics [Oxford: Clarendon, 1999]). Indeed, their references to contemporary meta-ethics are strangely outdated; they worry whether this version of naturalism derives “oughts” from “ises,” or commits the “naturalistic fallacy.” This is not of course to underestimate the distance between Plato’s naturalism and the far more Aristotelian naturalism of Foot and Hursthouse. 3 C. Gill, Plato. The Atlantis Story (Bristol: Bristol Classical Press, 1980). 4 Neither Johansen nor Carone seem to pay much attention to the point that in the story both degenerate Atlantis and virtuously resisting ancient Athens are totally destroyed by natural disaster, something which suggests that in the story virtue has to be its own reward.
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Johansen has interesting things to say about the form of Timaeus’ account. The work remains a dialogue between author and reader, he claims, encouraging the reader’s thought by the way it is presented. Timaeus’ own monologue, the contribution of one among a group of experts, is meant to reproduce in its orderly progression the orderliness and proportionate structure of the cosmos he is describing, something to which the give-andtake of discussion within the dialogue would be inappropriate. (Johansen has, however, to allow that Timaeus does have to stop and start, as at 34b, taking this to show that in the cosmos, as in the speech, there are limitations to orderliness given the nature of the materials; this tends to make his claim immune to counterexample.) This is a good example of recent tendency to demand a more subtle account than has been customary of the role of form in Plato’s ‘later’ dialogues, recognizing that Plato’s artistry and ways of directing the reader can still be found even in dialogues which renounce lively dialogue and characterization. Most of the book is a compact but detailed account of Plato’s teleology, with Aristotle’s as a frequent comparison. According to Johansen, the role of the Demiurge is best seen as the result of an inference to the best explanation, the explanandum being the order and beauty of the cosmos. Such an explanation, however, does not demand an external source of order, and Plato’s Demiurge works more like craftsmanship than a separate Craftsman, operating in the world rather like Aristotle’s principles of order internal to the cosmos. Moreover, Johansen finds in Timaean necessity some analogies to Aristotle’s use of necessity. There is a distinction between necessity as “the wandering cause,” independent of teleological employment, and Aristotelian hypothetical necessity which is a contributing cause once the world is ordered. The hardness of our bones, for example, protects the marrow, but the brittleness of hard bone is merely what is necessitated by having a hard cover, and far from itself helping to protect the marrow requires further protection by the flesh. “Plato’s and Aristotle’s teleology shared the insight that properties that are explained teleologically may necessarily give rise to properties that cannot themselves be explained teleologically” (115). Johansen’s comparison of Timaean to Aristotelian teleology is illuminating on many issues, such as the role of the Receptacle as space and/or matter and the role of mathematics. He is careful not to assimilate Plato’s ideas to those of his great follower (and for once the succinctness of the work leaves the reader wishing for a fuller treatment of Aristotle’s own attitude to the Timaeus, and the reasons for his relentless criticisms of it). He has a thorough and sensible discussion of the textual and theoretical arguments for and against taking the Demiurge to be separate from the created cosmos, arguing that while the Demiurge should
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not simply be identified with the intelligence of the world-soul5 or the Forms, it should be taken in a depersonalized way which pre-empts psychological answers to the question of why it created the cosmos when it did. The chapters on soul, body and perception raise issues which have also moved to the forefront of much research in Platonic scholarship, namely whether, and if so how, Plato revised or complicated his view of the soulbody relation in the “later” dialogues. Johansen again lays out lucidly the way the Timaeus account treats soul as extended in space, unlike body in being imperceptible and not three-dimensional. This is far from Cartesian dualism, and also different from the kind of dualism we find in, for example, the Phaedo. Moreover, the rationale for tripartition of the soul is new; it is the result of the teleological ordering of the elements making us up in terms of simple necessity, hypothetical necessity and rationality, and the human soul is seen as a result of the application of the same principles as those ordering the world at large: the combination of different kinds of motion, circular and rectilinear. (It is a mark of recent Timaeus scholarship to take seriously the claim that thinking is literally a form of circular motion, and to find a place for this in Plato’s larger picture of the cosmos, rather than dismissing this as an embarrassing metaphor.) Taking seriously the idea that humans embody the same imposition of reason on potentially disorderly motions as does the cosmos leads Johansen to conclude that earlier Platonic scholars like Cornford were wrong to find in the Timaeus the same sharp contrast that we find in the Phaedo and Republic between perception and reason. In the Timaeus we are not to turn away from the reports of sense-perception, since if we attend properly to these we will register the regularities and order of the cosmos, and thus be led to the mathematical study which is required for us to understand it. After a judicious sifting of evidence on both sides Johansen rejects a stronger interpretation, that sense-perception itself provides the basic mathematical concepts we need, in favour of a weaker one, that sense-perception gives us what we need to stimulate us to mathematical thinking. Even a selective account like the above shows that the Timaeus suggests that Plato has rethought many of the Phaedo and Republic themes. We do not need to get into the dangerous waters of developmentalism to find it plausible that Plato is presenting a more unified picture of the world, in which we get a more nuanced approach to the distinctions of soul and body, reasoning and perceiving. While there are real continuities between the Republic and the Timaeus, which Plato directs our attention towards in 5
As is boldly claimed by Carone.
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the frame dialogue, we also find that human ethical aspiration is now in the context of the cosmos rather than that of the ideal state, and that a proper perspective on human concerns is now to be found in locating us in a teleological universe. It is understandable that the Stoics, opponents of Plato on many metaphysical issues, should have made such rich use of this dialogue; Johansen’s book, while not addressing this point, makes it clear why this should have been an attractive and suggestive work for them. The renewed scholarly energy devoted to this dialogue is clear from the four collections of articles listed. I will discuss each of them briefly and selectively in a way which will, I hope, give some idea of the scope and vigour of contemporary philosophical research centring on this dialogue. The collection Reason and Necessity is an enhanced Proceedings of a conference on the Timaeus at the University of Wales at Lampeter in 1998. There is a useful list of major editions of the Timaeus, which is treated as a whole, though the Critias is somewhat sidelined. The Editor, Rosemary Wright, contributes an introductory outline and opening article on “Myth, Science and Reason in the Timaeus.” Wright takes up the famous and problematic characterization of Timaeus’ discourse as an eikos muthos or “likely story,” and locates it by reference to Plato’s atttitude to traditional myths and his own use of philosophically informed myth. Crucial to Timaeus’ discourse is his need for narrative, something locating what he does in the realm of story as entertainment as well as rendering the account appropriate to its object, something belonging to the realm of becoming and itself merely an eikon or copy of what has unchanging being. Sergio Zedda and Scott Burgess both discuss technical points in the dialogue in ways that emphasise its larger aims. Zedda, in “How to Build a World Soul: A Practical Guide,” goes through the details of the way the Demiurge constructs the world-soul, suggesting that the resulting physical representation is an epistemologically necessary intermediate stage for us in our progress from sense-perception to mathematical understanding of the universe. Burgess focuses on the detail of Plato’s use of neuron for sinew, arguing that Plato takes it to be an elastic intermediate between the hardness of bone and the softness of flesh. This, he claims, illustrates the same triadic structure of the blending of opposites which can be seen on a larger scale in the world soul and the human soul: “the psychological and the physiological are constructed on related principles according to a similar triadic formation, and so suggest a parity of design between the two” (54). Christopher Gill, in “The Body’s Fault? Plato’s Timaeus on Psychic Illness” takes off from modern commentators on the “astonishing” passage
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at 86b–87b, where psychic illnesses and failings result from bodily defects, and people should not be held responsible, and blamed, for them (therapy being the preferred response). Cornford thought that Plato is aware of the impact made on us by the body, but still holds that we are essentially immaterial souls trapped in the physical world but not essentially affected by it. Taylor’s response was to argue that the passage shows Plato reporting (though not endorsing) the view that we are essentially bodies, psychic disorder and defect seen reductively as just the result of impact on the body. Gill argues that neither reading does justice to the passage in the scheme of the Timaeus as a whole, and finds more aid in the ancient reactions of Galen and the Stoics. Gill is sympathetic to Galen’s (admittedly rather vaguely and erratically stated) interpretation of this passage as showing that Plato here takes our nature essentially to include the body. This fits both with other indications in the Timaeus that soul, both on the human and on the cosmic scale, is not distinguished from the body in the sharply dualistic manner of the Phaedo; the Timaean soul is more “integrated” with body, and thus has a more integrated role in the universe. (Thinking as circular motion, stressed by David Sedley in a recent article6 and by Johansen, is significant here.) Gill further argues that there is a second strand of thought in the Timaeus passage, not captured by Galen and more akin to Stoic ideas (reflecting Stoic engagement with the dialogue, though Gill is cautious here). This is the idea that we are essentially psycho-physical unities, unified by well-proportioned structures both of and between body and soul. Physical disharmony is thus plausibly seen as a breakdown of psycho-physical, not just physical, structure, rendering it understandable why psychic disharmony would result, and why therapy, rather than blame, would appear to be the appropriate response to it. Gill’s article brings together compactly a number of ancient and modern interpretative concerns, including the important question of how, when puzzling over a passage, we should balance concern for the integrity of the dialogue with exploration of continuities of Plato’s thought between dialogues. Andrew Barker and Lesley Dean-Jones apply their expertise in Greek music and ancient medicine respectively. Given the integrated picture of the cosmos, in which humans embody the rational structures that the whole displays, we are not surprised to find that mousike enables us to conform our psychic movements to their original ideal “revolutions” by enabling us to take in, through hearing, structured sounds which convey the orderly rationality of the universe. “The principles underlying the mathematical 6 D. Sedley, “The Ideal of Godlikeness,” in G. Fine (ed.), Plato 2 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1999) 309–28.
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structure of the world soul are the same as those governing the structure of a well-formed musical system” (86). Music is thus a way in which we can make ourselves more rational—at least in theory. But, as is familiar, Plato is deeply suspicious of most music because of its representational character; and this persists in the Timaeus’ account of the physics of hearing music. Musical perception involves “an . . . impressionistic and enigmatic realm of imagery and emotional response” by the lower part of the soul (hence Barker’s title, “Timaeus on music and the liver”) which are in need of intelligent interpretation by the higher faculties of the soul for us to reap rational benefit. Dean-Jones’ paper, “Aristotle’s understanding of Plato’s receptacle and its significance for Aristotle’s theory of familial resemblance,” is indeed more about Aristotle than Plato, exploring ways in which Aristotle’s attempt to account for heredity from both parents is influenced by his acceptance of the Timaeus’ casting of the Receptacle as the “female” partner in creation. The final two papers are very different studies of the dialogue’s role in traditions of philosophy. Jan Opsomer gives a thorough study of Proclus’ Neoplatonic reading of the Timaean demiurge, one which inserts so many intermediary stages as to produce nine subdivided levels of demiurgy, listed in an appendix. Gordon Campbell constructs a lively account of the anti-teleological accounts of cosmogony and zoogony against which Plato is reacting. Far from being precursors of Darwin, he points out, they are in fact anti-evolutionary. They aim to account for the perceived regularity of nature by positing an initial random creation followed by extinction of badly adapted forms; there is no inter-species evolution, and such evolution within a species as we find, for example the gradual civilizing of humans, appears to be Lamarckian, the passing on of acquired characteristics. In the Timaeus we find species coming about by evolution from other species—in a highly mythological and anthropocentric way. Campbell argues that the Timaeus is a subversive text, one which “remythologizes” a previously demythologized world view in a way comparable to Vergil’s transformation of Lucretius’ cosmology. The collection Plato Physicus is also an enhanced Proceedings, this time of a research seminar on cosmology and anthropology in the Timaeus held at the University of Venice in 2000–20001, culminating in a final international symposium. The fifteen papers are a selection of those given at the seminar and conference, some showing indications of fruitful discussion and mutual commentary as a result. Some of the papers discuss details of text and interpretation in a way rewarding close reading (and indeed seminar discussion) but not lending
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itself to summary. Such are Denis O’Brien’s “Space and Movement: Two Anomalies in the Text of the Timaeus,” Alberto Peratoner’s discussion of the structure of the cosmos at 29c–34b and 40a–41a, Barbara Botter on 48c–53b, Luc Brisson on 52a–61c, Cristina Viano on 58c–61c and Monique Dixsaut on 71a–72d. Other papers have broader scope. Christopher Rowe, in “The Status of the ‘Myth’ in Plato’s Timaeus,” takes an interestingly different approach from that of Wright in the Lampeter volume. After pointing out that, while there is a recognizable distinction in Plato between the mythical and the non-mythical, it is a distinction which Plato himself does a great deal to blur or undermine, Rowe makes three positive claims. Firstly, the emphasis in the phrase eikos muthos should be on eikos, not on muthos; Timaeus refers to his discourse far more frequently as a logos than as a muthos, and eikoswords qualify logos far more frequently. Secondly, muthos does not here operate in opposition to logos, but merely as an alternative to it. Thirdly, that what makes the account eikos is that it is merely likely as an account of the truth, not that it is merely likely because of the changing, eikon-nature of its immediate object, the realm of becoming. All three claims are clearly important for our overall interpretation of the dialogue, and show that some standard views need to be rethought or have their basis further investigated. Both Wright and Rowe show that our treatment of muthos and logos in Plato needs to study the variety of his concerns with narrative. There are four papers on the topic of causality in the Timaeus. Thomas Johansen’s paper on the place of the Demiurge in Plato’s teleology covers the same ground as one of the chapters in his book. Franco Ferrari, in a paper on the role of the Forms, gives a strikingly different view. Insisting on the metaphorical nature of the account of cosmogony, accepted by the Academy with the exception of Aristotle, and thus taking himself to be returning to the ancient intepretation of the dialogue, Ferrari takes the Demiurge’s function to be that of metaphorically representing the active causality exercised by the Forms. He notes that this interpretation requires supplementation by study of other dialogues where “efficient” causation is in question, notably the Phaedo and Philebus. Giovanni Castertano, in ‘Cause e concause,’ explores the dialogue’s view of necessity and its roles both as opposed to, and as working with, intellect, in humans and, in parallel ways, in the cosmos as a whole. Maurizio Migliori, in “Il problema della generazione nel Timeo,” offers to show both the complexity and the mutual integration of Plato’s various schemata for representing coming into being. A detailed articulation of the dialogue’s two main sections supports his claim that the accounts of the works of intellect and of necessity form a closely articulate whole.
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Carlo Natali, in “Antropologia, Politica e la struttura del Timeo,” addresses the issue of the relation of the cosmology to the frame dialogue and the Critias. In exploring this his interests converge with those of Johansen, though he is unable to take the latter’s book into account. Natali considers the way that commentators and interpreters have taken the cosmology to relate to the prologue; on the one hand, many have simply ignored the prologue, treating the Timaeus as simply a “physical” dialogue, while others have taken the point of the cosmology to be that of providing foundations for the Republic’s political and ethical programme. Natali claims, reasonably, that while the cosmology is not best regarded as selfstanding, it is not limited to supporting a political programme, but contributes to Platonic anthropology, the account of human nature which is an important factor in Plato’s account of the physical universe, and also underlies his account of the ideal state. Like Johansen, Natali sees the Timaeus as showing us how justice, rather than injustice, is the way that humans can best fulfill their nature as parts of a larger whole. Natali proposes a division of the Timaeus’ argument and a discussion of alternatives, and he also stresses the point, surprisingly understated in many discussions, that there is an obvious conflict between what Socrates says about the nature and position of women in the ideal state at 18c and what Timaeus notoriously says about women’s nature at 42b–c and 90e–91a. Natali takes this conflict to indicate Timaeus’ independence from Socrates as an exponent of Plato’s views; as he stresses, developmentalism cannot ease this problem. The ethical and political frame of the dialogue continue as themes in the articles by Stefano Maso and Marta Cristiani. Maso, in “Dal disordine all’ordine,” examines the way that the Demiurge’s imposition of order on disorder takes the form of producing harmony and equilibrium, a living dynamic tension rather than achieved stasis, a tension which he relates to the myth of the Politicus. Cristiani has interesting remarks on the way in which the ideal state of the Republic, in which the family is abolished, is brought to the reader in the Critias’ Atlantis story in a way relying on stable family structures passing the story down. The Timaeus-Critias, in which we famously have an account of the generation of time, regards historical time differently from the Republic. Marina Da Ponte Orvieto explores the fascinating (and under-studied) topic of the role of the Timaeus in Sextus Empiricus. Sextus is, of course, well aware of the tradition of the sceptical Academy, with its claim to be both sceptical and in the true tradition of Plato, and he feels the need to combat it at length. While he grants that the Socratic aspect of Plato encourages the idea that Plato argues against the ideas of others rather than
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propounding his own, Sextus regards the Timaeus as his prime piece of evidence that Plato should not be classified as a sceptic, since we find him putting forward views about the world, Forms and other matters in what is for Sextus a clearly dogmatic way. As Da Ponte Orvieto points out, Sextus in making this claim is led to take an unsubtle view about the dialogue’s own epistemological reservations and Plato’s insistence that the account is only a “likely” one. Sextus can well be seen, in fact, as an example of Platonic interpreters who see in him some Socratic, but predominantly Pythagorean aspects. Sextus is only too happy to conflate Platonic with Pythagorean ideas for the purposes of his criticism of theories of number, and rather than deal with the theory of Forms he pushes Plato into the familiar mould of his demand for a “criterion” to be found in either the senses or the intellect. In fact Sextus’ treatment of the Timaeus illustrates rather well some of his more general characteristics as a philosophical critic. He knows the work well, and can quote from it at length, but his criticisms are unsubtle and fail to take the particular nature of the work into account, merely quarrying it for indications that Plato fails in the ways that all dogmatists are set up to fail. The extent of Sextus’ references show the importance of the work for studying Platonic thought in Sextus’ day; it would be nice if we had a better idea of just when that was. The collection Plato’s Timaeus as Cultural Icon, edited by Gretchen ReydamsSchils, has its origin in a Notre Dame conference in 2000. As its title indicates, its focus is on the dialogue’s influence in a wide range of intellectual traditions. Increased attention to the dialogue itself has led to greatly increased interest in its post-antiquity afterlife, as its influence has increasingly come to be seen not merely in terms of borrowing of ideas but of intellectual engagement. This engagement is thus not very different from the kind that we bring to our own interpretations of the dialogue, but it takes some startlingly different forms in different intellectual and cultural traditions. The collection begins with two papers which raise the issue of how the Timaeus can be taken to fit where it has for over a century been located, among the so-called “late” dialogues. Mitchell Miller argues that the dialogue is meant for two audiences, a more general one and one attuned to the problems prominent in the other “late” dialogues. Kenneth Sayre argues that the Receptable is a failed solution to problems raised in the Parmenides and given a more satisfactory solution in the Philebus. These papers raise rather sharply the need to think about our own approaches to Plato, whether developmental or otherwise, when we try to locate a dialogue in any kind of development in Plato’s thought.
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John Dillon has a brief but rich paper on the Timaeus in the Old Academy. Our interest here tends to focus on Crantor, later picked out as Plato’s “first exegete,” and his interpretation of the Timaeus’ cosmogony. Dillon reminds us, however, that we are talking about a period when “the tradition of straightforward commentary on a source work had not yet become a recognized mode of doing philosophy” (80). He claims that the Timaeus was a central work in the thinking of the entire Old Academy, all of whom agree that the central creation story is not to be taken literally, and who thus see it as a metaphysical system of thought which forms the background to their own metaphysical systems. Dillon is very illuminating in the way in which he presents Speusippus and Xenocrates as neither “exegetes” of Plato nor striking out in an entirely new path. As he points out, in taking the Timaeus cosmogony this way the Old Academy were closing ranks against Aristotle, and this points up an interesting absence in this book, namely study of Aristotle’s engagement with the dialogue, one to which he returns, with fascination but also irritation, again and again.7 Carlos Levy, in “Cicero and the Timaeus,” studies the translation that we have from Cicero and some of the puzzles it confronts us with, such as the unresolvable issue of whether Cicero ever finished it. Levy goes beyond the usual scholarly concerns with this work (usually the adequacy or otherwise of Latin to convey what is in the Greek) and focuses on small points in the translation, which he takes to indicate that it was made relatively late in Cicero’s career as a philosophical writer. He also speculates that the translation as we have it may have been intended as the groundwork for a dialogue intended to do for physics what Levy has argued extensively the ethical works do in ethics: to use Academic arguments to point up systematic disagreements among the Hellenistic schools, and then to reject Epicureanism and Stoicism, indicating, though with Academic caution, a return to “classical” thought, particularly that of Plato, with his insistence on entities transcending our experience. Levy’s argument, obviously speculative and relying on his own work on Cicero, directs even those unconvinced of its conclusions to some fascinating passages where Cicero’s decisions as a translator stand out as noteworthy. Luc Brisson relates the Timaeus to the Chaldean Oracles, unfamiliar ground to all but specialists in later antiquity. The material here is fascinating, underlining the often very different groupings of intellectual interest and focus in ancient interpretations from modern ones. While twentieth 7 Johansen points out several ways in which Plato’s thought in the dialogue converges with Aristotle’s, but, as noted above, does not explore Aristotle’s own complex engagement with its thought.
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century interpreters have often seen the dialogue as a kind of proto-science, interpreters in late antiquity were ready to see it in a very different context, one of religious and more generally spiritual ideas, for which oracular poetry seemed a suitable vehicle. David Runia starts from what he presents as a “paradox” in the Timaeus. Plato makes his speaker explicitly eschew discussion of archai, first principles, yet for most of the following period of ancient thought the dialogue formed a major source of different schools’ discussion of first principles, especially in the context of the choice, in cosmogony, between a single ultimate principle and two. Runia focuses on this issue in the area in which he has done pathbreaking work, Philo of Alexandria and the development of thought among early Christian thinkers who shared with Philo the desire to interpret the beginning of Genesis in a way compatible with pagan philosophical thinking. Philo in particular is influenced by both Platonism and by the Stoic doctrine of two ultimate principles, and Runia has called his position “monarchic dualism,” the result of reading Plato in a Stoicized way, but with a greater emphasis on God’s role as creator. Runia points out that this interpretation of Philo is shared by Gretchen ReydamsSchils in her own work on Stoic and Platonist readings of the Timaeus, something which points out another noteworthy absence from the book, namely Stoic reactions to and interpretations of the dialogue; this is a pity, in view of Reydams-Schils’ own extensive work in this area.8 Richard Sorabji contributes a paper on the mind-body relation in the wake of the Timaeus. His work converges with that of Johansen and Gill in pointing out ways in which we find a different view of the relation of soul and body from that of the Phaedo, a view in which bodily factors can actually help to determine psychological ones. Like Gill, Sorabji discusses Galen’s approach to the Timaeus and finds it suggestive but ultimately too crude. He agrees that Plato now thinks of soul as more integrated in the overall account of the cosmos than hitherto, and thus puts less stress on a sharp set of distinctions between body and soul. Sorabji also goes on to discuss the Neoplatonic backlash to readings of a Galenic kind, a backlash which (like Cornford later) seeks to maintain a consistent pronounced dualism throughout the corpus. The remaining papers go far beyond my competence as a reviewer to discuss, though I greatly enjoyed reading them and following through a wide range of the Timaeus’ influence. Stephen Gersh discusses Platonic 8 G. Reydams-Schils, Demiurge and Providence: Stoic and Platonist readings of Plato’s Timaeus (Turnhout: Brepols, 1999). Runia suggests this interpretation in his Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato, Philosophia Antiqua 44 (Leiden: Brill, 1986).
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influence on the music theory to be found in Aristides Quintilianus and Martianus Capella. Paul Edward Dutton, in “Mediaeval Approaches to Calcidius,” looks at the text which for a period of Western European thought was the only way into Plato. He shows the extent of the mystery surrounding issues such as who Calcidius was, how the name was spelled, and whether he could himself have been a Greek. He also underlines the way that mediaeval thinkers would take the translation and commentary together, to the point of fusing Plato and Calcidius at some points. Cristina d’Ancona traces continuity and adaptation of the Timaeus’ model of creation and providence in early Arabic philosophy, a complex matter where we find layers of influence from not only the Timaeus itself but also from Neoplatonism and Aristotle. Michael J. B. Allen discusses Ficino’s translation of the work and his development of the mathematical ideas in it and their application to science. Allen concludes that while Ficino was not one of the “founders, the necessary causes” of modern science, we can fruitfully discuss the extent to which he and his translation “acted in any way as a contributory cause” (247). Rhonda Martens examines Kepler’s attitude to the Timaeus, which he valued for its mathematical approach to physics, while rejecting its theory of the “Platonic solids.” Finally, Werner Beierwaltes contributes a paper on Schelling’s understanding of the Timaeus, one greatly influenced by the Philebus. Schelling’s doubts as to whether the Timaeus was actually by Plato enable us to find in him not only a figure in German idealism but a precursor of much of the fierce battles over authenticity marking German Plato scholarship later in the century. The collection edited by Robert Sharples and Anne Sheppard has its origins in a series of research seminars held at the Institute of Classical Studies in the University of London; beginning in October 2000 it was successfully extended to December 2001, another of the many signs we have noticed of a raised level of interest in this dialogue and of ancient reactions to it, since the seminars’ focus was the Timaeus and the ancient commentary tradition relating to it. The editors explain that the “catalyst” for the seminars was the appointment to a Warburg Institute Fellowship of Anna Somfai, who was working on Calcidius’ commentary. Somfai’s work bridged the ancient and mediaeval periods, but a paper on early mediaeval readings of Calcidius and the Timaeus was committed elsewhere, perhaps a pity, as it would have complemented Dutton’s piece in the Reydams-Schils volume. In this collection Somfai has a paper on Timaeus 40d–41a and Calcidius’ use of this passage to explore the nature and functions of daemons; she points out that it illustrates Calcidius’ use of mathematical thinking (here, the use of geometrical ratios) in a non-mathematical context, something she takes
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to be an example of extending Platonic thinking beyond the areas in which Plato himself applies it. Several contributors discuss issues arising in Proclus’ commentary on the dialogue. Stephen Gersh (who also contributes to the Reydams-Schils volume) explores the neo-platonic assumptions present in the prefatory material in Proclus’ commentary, where he examines the implications of the way in which the ideal state, the Atlantis story and the cosmology are presented. Lucas Siorvanes, in a fascinating and wide-ranging article, begins from Proclus’ summary of prevailing opinions about its authorship and content. It is particularly challenging for the modern reader to work through the changing perceptions of the work’s authorship (Pythagorean or Platonic) and its nature as a “physical” work, as Proclus read it, or one that blends physics with ethics. Here Siorvanes’ interests converge with those of Natali in examining changing perceptions of the relation of the Timaeus’ cosmology to its preface and to the Critias’ Atlantis story. Carlos Steel takes off from the Proclan reading as a work whose skopos is physical, explicating Proclus’ defence of Plato’s approach to natural science; far from being superseded by Aristotle’s account of causality, Proclus claims, Plato in the Timaeus gives an account which is far superior. The difference here of course traces to widely differing assumptions about the nature and scope of the causality in question, which Steel clearly lays out. Robbert van den Berg discusses a topic which after a long period of complete neglect has recently come to the forefront in discussion of Plato’s ethics, namely the idea that for us humans our final end is to “become like god.” Recent work has focused on this idea in the Theaetetus and related passages in the Laws as well as the Timaeus, and contemporary interpreters tend to relate it to the Phaedo’s idea of the philosopher as dying to the body and identifying with the pure intellectual activity of philosophical thinking.9 The Timaeus passage puts more emphasis on the study of astronomy as needed preliminary to this, something emphasized by the idea of the circular orbits of thinking in the head, which as we have seen has recently been taken more seriously by philosophers interested in Plato’s psychology in this dialogue.10 This is another area in which contemporary revival of interest in the Timaeus has enriched Platonic scholarship overall. Van den Berg follows up Proclus’ development of the idea; in a striking and fascinating contrast to modern interpretations, he takes transformation into 9 I have discussed the idea, and its revival from neglect, in “Becoming like God: Ethics, Human Nature and the Divine,” ch. 3 of Platonic Ethics Old and New (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999). See also J. Armstrong, “After the Ascent: Plato on Becoming like God,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 26 (2004) 171–83. 10 See David Sedley, art. cit (n. 5).
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the divine to proceed through purifying mysteries, leading to attempts to harmonize the dialogue’s contents with mystery religions and the Chaldean Oracles. In a footnote van den Berg notes that his article forms a companion to Luc Brisson’s in the Reydams-Schils volume; both examine the religious contexts in which mystical purification, rather than study of astronomy, was seen as the way to separate soul from body, and both introduce contemporary readers to the unfamiliar world of the Chaldean Oracles. Anne Sheppard’s paper follows up the influence of Plato’s famous comparison of the liver to a mirror, and the way in which later Platonists describe the imagination as a mirror. As she points out, the link in this passage between imagination, dreams and inspired prophecy enabled them to value the imagination more than would seem likely given Plato’s relentless distrust of images elsewhere. She discusses passages from Philo, Plotinus, Porphyry and Proclus which she argues all owe something to the famous passage at 70e ff., even though they are not commenting it directly. As she points out, they are not only using the passage to think about the imagination, but also responding to it more imaginatively themselves than in a scholastic way. It is interesting here to compare Andrew Barker’s paper in the Wright collection. The papers in the first half of the collection address the period before the commentary tradition had become established, in much the same way as John Dillon in his paper in the Reydams-Schils collection (a paper which was indeed presented as part of the London seminar series). Yet a further area of renewed interest in the Timaeus is to be found here, in the dialogue’s reception before a settled tradition of Platonist commentary had been established. Andrew Gregory contributes a fascinating illustrated article on the response of Eudoxus and Callippus to the Timaeus’ astronomy. He follows this with an article on Aristotle and some of his commentators on the Timaeus’ Receptacle. Aristotle famously criticizes the Receptacle as a confusion between space and matter. Gregory argues that we should go beyond Aristotle’s critical comments, and those of his commentators, on 48e–53b. We can find useful material in both Aristotle and his commentators for understanding Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato’s striking and peculiar geometrical atomism. Taking this into account produces a richer view of a critical engagement with the dialogue. Gregory’s article is particularly welcome given the understandable tendency, in studying ancient reception of the Timaeus, to focus on the Platonist tradition and find in Aristotle merely an unsympathetic critic. Han Baltussen also examines critical responses to the dialogue, this time by Theophrastus and Epicurus. Again, he enriches our own understanding of them by examining them carefully as a stage in “the emergence of
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exegesis and (formal) commentary.” Like Dillon, he stresses that the emergence of commentary is not an easily understood phenomenon, and he examines the ways in which these critics can be said to be engaging in interpretation and analysis of what they are criticizing. Andrew Barker follows up his contribution to the Wright volume with a paper here on Hellenistic musicology and early commentaries on the Timaeus. Here the sources are exceptionally frustrating, and Barker engages in the “historical detective-work” of tracing certain confusions in the discussion of musical terms back to Eratosthenes in his studies of Plato. Eratosthenes appears to have tried to bridge mathematical and empirical harmonics, a program carried on only through writers dealing with “the exegesis of musicological matters relevant to a study of the Timaeus.” Tracing the history of error has its down side, of course, but as an attempt to sort out a confusing area Barker’s paper is satisfying. Barker finds this Platonist-carried tradition in Aristides Quintilianus, the text discussed in a different respect by Stephen Gersh in the Reydams-Schils volume. David Runia, who also contributed to the Reydams-Schils volume, here contributes a paper on the well-known image of the founding of a city in Philo’s account of the creation in his On the Creation of the Cosmos. He points out the interesting and significant detail that Philo gives the architect, rather than the king, the main role in the actual founding of the city, thus removing the king from the actual execution of the plan (as in the tradition making the architect Dinocrates, rather than Alexander, the actual founder of Alexandria). Philo’s theology demands that creation not exhaust God’s essence. Runia develops ways in which Philo’s place in the Jewish tradition affects the use he is clearly making of the Timaeus and possibly its commentary tradition; as in other articles, he marks the striking differences between Philo and the pagan philosophical theology he is engaging with and using for his own purposes. R. W. Sharples, in a rich paper, explores three texts in which we find a distinctive classification of providence into three levels: Apuleius’ De Platone, pseudo-Plutarch’s De Fato and Nemesius’ De Natura Hominis. He begins from the point that all three texts are clearly derivative from the Timaeus, especially 41c and 42e. The texts differ in ways which reflect, as Sharples says, “not so much distinct positions arrived at as a result of philosophical debate, but rather the borrowing of ideas from debates in and between other schools concerning providence, or, putting it another way, an attempt to read the Timaeus in the light of contemporary concerns and doctrines” (110). The paper gives a wide-ranging and learned but accessible background to Platonist ideas about providence, in a way which focuses on the three texts’ relation to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ work on providence.
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It reminds us of the central place the Timaeus’ ideas held in a variety of ancient debates and controversies, something which once more stresses the strangeness of the way these have been neglected or sidelined for much of the progress of Platonic studies in the last half of the twentieth century. This review has necessarily been superficial and has revealed the author’s limitations at every turn, but by the same token has, I hope, indicated to the reader of this Annual that the Timaeus is a subject of renewed interest on a huge variety of fronts. It is not an accident, I think, that all four of the collections mentioned here are the products of conferences and seminars; the Timaeus is the centre of discussion and debate in a way which, while it will probably never rival the appeal of the Republic, does bid fair to join it in the centre of Plato’s studies of the soul, Forms, causes, necessity, the ideal state, teleology, astronomy, science, history, the nature of the cosmos, myth and argument. Students of the later period of antiquity cannot but benefit from this development. University of Arizona
The Studia Philonica Annual XVIII (2006) 143–187
BIBLIOGRAPHY SECTION PHILO OF ALEXANDRIA AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 2003 D. T. Runia, E. Birnbaum, K. A. Fox, A. C. Geljon, H. M. Keizer, J. P. Martín, R. Radice, J. Riaud, D. Satran, G. Schimanowski, T. Seland
2003* F. Alesse, ‘Il tema dell’emanazione (aporroia) nella letteratura astrologica e non astrologica tra I sec. a.C. e II d.C.’ MHNH (Revista Internacional de Investigación sobre Magia y Astrología Antiguas) 3 (2003) 117–134. The concept of aporroia (emanation) enjoyed a wide distribution in the first century of the Imperial era, especially in eschatological and astrological texts. It generally indicates the emanation or effusion of the divine substance, while sometimes the human soul is regarded as a direct effect of such emanation. Among the authors who apply the term in
*
This bibliography has been prepared by the members of the International Philo Bibliography Project, under the leadership of D. T. Runia (Melbourne). The principles on which the annotated bibliography is based have been outlined in SPhA 2 (1990) 141–142, and are largely based on those used to compile the ‘mother works,’ R-R and RRS. The division of the work this year has been as follows: material in English (and Dutch) by D. T. Runia (DTR), E. Birnbaum (EB), K. A. Fox (KAF), A. C. Geljon (ACG) and H. M. Keizer (HMK); in French by J. Riaud (JR); in Italian by R. Radice (RR); in German by G. Schimanowski (GS); in Spanish and Portuguese by J. P. Martín (JPM); in Scandinavian languages (and by Scandinavian scholars) by T. Seland (TS), in Hebrew (and by Israel scholars) by David Satran (DS). Once again this year there has been close co-operation with L. Perrone (Bologna/Pisa), indefatigable editor of Adamantius (Origen studies). I am also grateful both to authors who have helped me in gaining access to items not easily available to me in Australia and to colleagues who have drawn my attention to bibliographical material which I missed or who have helped me locate obscure items. They include this year Sandra Gambetti, Pieter van der Horst, Alan Kerkeslager, Kleman Klun, and N. Dax Moraes. My research assistant in Melbourne, Michael Champion, helped me greatly in gaining access to bibliographical items. I am extremely grateful to my former Leiden colleague M. R. J. Hofstede for once again laying a foundation for the bibliography through his extremely thorough electronic searches. The bibliography, however, remains inevitably incomplete, because much work on Philo is tucked away in monographs and articles, the titles of which do not mention his name. Scholars are encouraged to get in touch with members of the team if they spot omissions (addresses below in “Notes on Contributors”). In order to preserve continuity with previous years, the bibliography retains its customary stylistic conventions and has not changed to those of the Society of Biblical Literature.
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this sense is Philo, who in Migr. 70–71 and Congr. 33 undertakes an interpretation of logos as speech, the emanation of thought, and thought as the origin of emanation. (RR)
M. Alesso, ‘Cosmopolitismo alejandrino en la obra de Filón,’ Revista de Historia Universal 13 (2003) 17–30. The article applies to Philo’s works the concepts of utopia and uchronia (i.e. not locating a story in a particular time). The positive aspects of Judaism are not located in their historical setting, e.g. the period of biblical monarchies. Instead the ideal Jewish communities are represented by two groups which worship God: the Essenes (Prob. 75-91) and the Therapeutae (Contempl.). In order to develop these concepts, Philo established an uchronia based on the philosophical tradition of Hellenism. (JPM)
M. Alesso, ‘No es bueno que el hombre esté solo,’ Circe 8 (2003) 17–30. Explaining the term ‘alone’ of Gen. 2:18 at the beginning of Leg. 2, Philo confirms that monotheism is the theological axis of his thought. His interpretation does not respond completely to the ‘creationistic’ pattern of Plato’s Timaeus, because the One—unchanging and eternal—only becomes related to the material order through the Logos, the creative agent conceived as the mediator Word. The human intellect is related to the body like the divine Logos to the cosmos. The nous needs the mediation of powers (dynameis) which, activated, connect it with the world through senses. (JPM)
W. Ameling, ‘”Market-place” und Gewalt. Die Juden in Alexandrien,’ Würzburger Jahrbücher für die Altertumswissenschaft 27 (2003) 71–123. The theme of this article focuses on the background of the anti-Jewish Pogrom of 38 b.c.e. in Alexandria. All important texts are discussed (especially Philo’s In Flaccum), the essential literature is worked through, and in particular the role of the masses is analyzed in relation to the key-word ‘market-place.’ The author underlines Jewish pluralism. Judaism is not a uniform block; different groups have different interests. He shows that exchange of religious ideas occurs not only in the intellectual upper class of Alexandria. On the other hand it is argued that, in contrast to the situation in Asia Minor, the political background fosters the outbreak of the riots. The social order had been disturbed from the beginning of the Roman era, allowing the ‘market-place’ to become a theatre of war. (GS)
H. Amirav, Rhetoric and Tradition: John Chrysostom on Noah and the Flood, Traditio Exegetica Graeca 12 (Leuven–Dudley MA 2003) passim. In the analysis of John Chrysostom’s homilies on Noah and the flood (nrs. 22–24), the author makes frequent brief references to Philo’s exegesis. (ACG)
A. E. Arterbury, ‘Abraham’s Hospitality among Jewish and Early Christian Writers: a Tradition History of Gen 18:1–16 and its Relevance for the Study of the New Testament,’ Perspectives in Religious Studies 30 (2003) 359– 376. The story of Abraham’s hospitality to the three visitors in Gen. 18:1-16 was retold and interpreted by later exegetes to reflect their own interests, values, and customs. The author
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examines how traditions connected with this passage developed in such Hellenistic Jewish sources as the Septuagint, Jubilees, Philo, Josephus, and the Testament of Abraham; Christian sources such as 1 Clement, Apocalypse of Paul, Origen, John Chrysostum, and Augustine; and rabbinic sources such as The Fathers according to R. Nathan, Genesis Rabbah, and Sotah (Babylonian Talmud). Most of these writings view Abraham as a paradigm of hospitality to be imitated. Common concerns in some works include identifying the three visitors as men, angels, or God; addressing how the visitors could be described as eating, since it was commonly assumed that angels do not eat; and viewing Isaac’s birth as a reward for Abraham’s hospitality. Philo saw Abraham as a living law, whose example of hospitality was to be emulated. Philo also contrasted Abraham’s hospitality with the inhospitality of the Egyptians rather than that of the Sodomites, which the Bible and other interpreters emphasized. It is also shown how these various traditions can illuminate passages in the New Testament, especially Hebrews 13:2. (EB)
D. E. Aune, T. Seland and J. H. Ulrichsen, Neotestamentica et Philonica: Studies in Honor of Peder Borgen, Supplements to Novum Testamentum 106 (Leiden–Boston 2003). Festschrift in honour of the 75th birthday of the distinguished Norwegian New Testament and Philo scholar, Peder Borgen. It contains 18 scholarly contributions followed by a Select Bibliography of his writings in 1987–2001. The frontispiece of the volume shows the honorand wearing the presidential chain of The Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and Letters and the medal of a Knight of the Norwegian Royal Order of St. Olav. The Preface gives a brief account of his life and career (so far). Five of the contributions focus on aspects of Philo’s thought and writings. They are separately summarized under the names of their authors. On this volume see also the book review by T. H. Tobin SJ in SPhA 17 (2005) 215–217. (DTR)
S. Badilita, ‘La communauté des Thérapeutes: une Philonopolis?’ Adamantius 9 (2003) 67–77. The author, though not wishing to identify the Therapeutae with any group other than themselves and also not wishing to make ‘utopian ascetics’ out of them, makes a comparison of the Philonic description of this community with Plato’s texts on the city, especially as they are presented in the Republic. In order to illustrate her reading of Contempl. seen as a replica of the Platonic model of the city, she has focused on the following themes : the location of the community, its regimen of food and clothing, the presence of women in the community, and the description of the banquet. (JR)
R. Bergmeier, ‘Zum historischen Wert der Essenerberichte von Philo und Josephus,’ in J. Frey and H. Stegemann (eds.), Qumrankontrovers. Beiträge zu den Textfunden vom Toten Meer, Einblicke. Ergebnisse — Berichte — Reflexionen aus Tagungen der Katholischen Akademie Schwerte 6 (Paderborn 2003) 11–22. In this article Bergmeier summarizes his study from 1993, Die Essener-Berichte des Flavius Josephus (on which see RRS 9309). He distinguishes between Josephus’ own comments and those of his sources. The author argues that these comments are similar to those of Philo and Pliny. The differences between the accounts are explained though the dissimi-
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larity of the three sources in the background: a Stoic-orientated one (‘doxographische DreiSchulen-Quelle’), a Hellenistic-Jewish Essene-Source (see Prob. 75-91 and Hypoth. 1-18) and a Pythagorean Essene-Source. There is no connection with the texts from Qumran. Nevertheless the traditional reports of the Essenes have historical value of their own. On this volume see also the book review by M. Henze in SPhA 16 (2004) 304–306. (GS)
K. Berthelot, Philanthropia judaica: Le debat autour de la ‘misanthropie’ des lois juives dans l’antiquite, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 76 (Leiden–Boston 2003). This significant study in the context of Philonic and Jewish studies, consists of three parts. In the first part, entitled ‘The discourses of ancient authors on Jewish misanthropy’ there is a first chapter which traces the history of the word philanthrôpos and its derivatives in Greek literature. A second chapter is devoted to the history of the accusation of misanthrôpia brought against the Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. In the second part entitled ‘Reactions and responses,’ the third chapter sets out ‘the first echoes’ which are found in the Hellenistic-Jewish literature, especially from Alexandria, in response to these accusations. The next chapter is particularly important because it brings together the texts in Philo of Alexandria in defence of Jewish philanthrôpia. After first setting out the ‘context of the Philonic discourse,’ the author examines how the philanthrôpia of the Law is manifested in the case of the ‘living laws,’ i.e. the Patriarchs, and presents the example of Moses as well as the universal scope of the philanthrôpia of the Law as set out in Virt. Finally she draws attention to the apology for Judaism which is developed in Hypoth. The third part, which is chapter five, is dedicated to Josephus, who in contrast to Philo almost never described the Law as ‘humane.’ He hesitates to use the term in relation to Judaism, but instead uses it in giving favourable descriptions of main political, military and religious figures, whether they are Jews or non-Jews. In Contra Apionem, however, he alters his general practice and speaks about the philanthrôpia of Judaism, drawing his inspiration from Philo’s Hypoth. (JR)
E. Birnbaum, ‘Allegorical Interpretation and Jewish Identity among Alexandrian Jewish Writers,’ in D. E. Aune, T. Seland and J. H. Ulrichsen (eds.), Neotestamentica et Philonica: Studies in Honor of Peder Borgen, Supplements to Novum Testamentum 106 (Leiden–Boston 2003) 307–329. According to D. Dawson, Alexandrian Jewish writers use allegorical interpretation to present the best of Greek culture as originally Jewish and thus to portray the Jews as more learned than the Greeks. Testing this claim in a study of the Letter of Aristeas, the fragments of Aristobulus, and the works of Philo, the author concludes that Dawson is only partially correct. The allegorical and non-allegorical parts of these works reflect a variety of stances: not all allegorizations that depict the Jews as superior—especially those in Aristeas and Philo—necessarily draw upon originally Greek meanings. Many allegorical interpretations—particularly those of Aristobulus and Philo—are simply neutral about the Jews, while the non-allegorical parts of these works may express Jewish superiority. By contrast, Philo sometimes uses allegorical interpretations to imply equality between Jews and all wise and virtuous peoples, regardless of ancestry. Such equality is suggested as well in non-allegorical parts of both Aristeas and Philo. Birnbaum also considers whether allegorical interpretations in Aristeas and Philo may reflect contemporary Alexandrian society, and she focuses on Mos. 1.65-70 and Congr. 118 as specific Philonic examples.
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While often suggestive, such correlations between exegesis and social reality must remain speculative. (EB)
L. Boff and J.-Y. Leloup, I terapeuti del deserto. Da Filone di Alessandria e Francesco d’Assisi a Graf Dürckheim (Milan 2003). Italian translation of the Portuguese original Terapeutas do deserto: de Fílon de Alexandria e Francisco de Assis a Graf Durckheim (Petrópolis 1998); also published in Spanish: Terapeutas del desierto: de Filón de Alejandría y Francisco de Asís a Graf Dürckheim (Santander 1999). See further SPhA 17 (2005) 195–196. (HMK)
G. Bohak, ‘The Ibis and the Jewish Question: Ancient ‘Anti-Semitism’ in Historical Perspective,’ in M. Mor and A. Oppenheimer (eds.), JewishGentile Relations in the Periods of the Second Temple, the Mishna and the Talmud (Jerusalem 2003) 27–43. This article argues the desideratum of ‘a comprehensive study of ethnic stereotypes in the ancient world’ (p. 41); the lack of such research has fostered errant views and judgments of ancient ‘anti-Semitism’ due to insufficient contextualization within the range of Greek and Roman attitudes toward barbarian nations in general. The bulk of the discussion is devoted to a survey of a complex of Greco-Roman attitudes toward Egyptian culture and worship. Though there are few direct references to Philo’s writings (pp. 34, 36, 39), the issue discussed is of immediate import to all students of Hellenistic Judaism. (DS)
P. Borgen, ‘The Gospel of John and Philo of Alexandria,’ in J. H. Charlesworth and M. A. Daise (eds.), Light in a Spotless Mirror: Reflections on Wisdom Traditions in Judaism and Early Christianity (Harrisburg, Pa 2003) 45–76. In this study the author describes his task as to show how aspects of Philo’s writings can illuminate aspects of the Gospel of John. His main thesis is that Philo not only can throw light upon several of the exegetical methods and exegetical traditions found in John, but that he also provides comparative material to the way exegesis of the laws of Moses was a factor in controversies both within the synagogue and between the synagogue and the emerging Christian community. He argues this thesis by drawing on several of his former studies, highlighting in this particular essay especially issues as the use of Scripture, controversies over the Sabbath, dangers at the boundary, birth from above, the Temple, and ascent and descent. (TS)
P. Borgen, ‘Philo of Alexandria as Exegete,’ in A. J. Hauser and D. F. Watson (eds.), A History of Biblical Interpretation, Vol 1: The Ancient Period (Grand Rapids 2003) 114–143. The chapter by Borgen in this volume on Biblical Interpretation is a condensed presentation of Philo as an exegete. The author presents the various aspects of Philo’s exegesis under the following main headings: Philo’s expository writings, Hermeneutical presuppositions, Aspects of Philo’s exegesis, Philo as an exegete in context, Some exegetical approaches and forms, and The Laws of Moses in the Alexandrian conflict. Each of these
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sections is divided into subsections providing characterizations and examples of the various exegetical procedures to be found in the works of Philo. He is on the one hand to be seen against the background of tendencies present in earlier literature preserved from Alexandrian Judaism; on the other hand, he in return also influenced the theologians and exegetes of the Early church, especially in making the connection between the biblical sources and philosophical ideas and categories. (TS)
A. P. Bos, ‘God as “Father” and “Maker” in Philo of Alexandria and Its Background in Aristotelian Thought,’ Elenchos 24 (2003) 311–332. At the beginning of Opif. Philo criticizes those who consider the cosmos as ungenerated and imperishable and show more admiration for the cosmos than its maker. According to Bos Philo refers here to those philosophers who do not recognize any transcendent reality, whom he calls Chaldeans. They have a cosmic theology, whereas Philo supports a metacosmic theology. Bos argues that Philo is influenced by Aristotle, and especially by the Aristotelian work De Mundo, which Bos, in contrast to the opinio communis, regards as written by Aristotle himself. In the final part Bos deals with Aristotle’s theory about the generation of living creatures, which he, according to Bos, also applies to the cosmos as the most perfect living creature. Three issues: are discussed (a) the father is regarded by Aristotle not as the maker but only the first mover, (b) the proliferation of movement, (c) the movement in semen as the vehicle of logos. Aristotle’s theory of a rational principle which is active in the physical world is the background of Philo’s notion of an immanent Logos. (ACG)
P. Bosman, Conscience in Philo and Paul: A Conceptual History of the Synoida Word Group, Wissenschaflichte Untersuchungen zum Neuem Testament 2.166 (Tübingen 2003). This impressive monograph is a revised version of a doctoral dissertation submitted to the University of Pretoria in 1996 (see SPhA 13 (1999) 126). In spite of the impression given by the title, the subject of the study is narrower than the broad concept of conscience. It studies the crucial terms related to the verb sÊnoida, especially the nouns suneidÒw and sune¤dhsiw, the former being more common in Philo, the latter in Paul. The study falls into five main parts. In the first the interpretation of the word-group from Patristic times to modern scholarship is presented. The second part studies the lexical history of the wordgroup. The third part is more theoretical and attempts to reconstruct the terms’ historical meaning through use of the stimulus-response scheme. But the main part of the book is formed by the two long sections on Philo and Paul. Philo’s usage is thoroughly examined. Analysis of suneidÒw should be separated from his use of ¶legxow, because the former usually has a negative role, i.e. it rebukes and chastises, whereas the latter can be positive in bringing about reconciliation and healing. Philo connects suneidÒw with outspokenness (parrhs¤a) and places much emphasis on the role of rationality. To some degree Philo moderates the negative role of the term, because the ultimate aim is reconciliation with God. In the final part the study moves to Paul’s writings. Here sune¤dhsiw acts as a monitor which registers the inner states of the person, i.e. loses the negative force it has in Philo and virtually becomes part of the soul. Paul places greater emphasis on the sovereignty of God’s judgement. See further the article by the author in this volume and the review by G. E. Sterling in SPhA 17 (2005) 246–251. (DTR)
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J. Bowin, ‘Chrysippus’ Puzzle about Identity,’ Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2003) 239–251. Further discussion of the Stoic argument on separate individuals recorded by Philo in Aet. 48, building on and partially improving the interpretation given by David Sedley in his article ‘The Stoic Criterion of Identity’ in Phronesis 27 (1982) 255–275. Chrysippus ironically convicts the Academic philosophers of the very absurdity that they claimed the Stoic doctrine of peculiarly qualified individuals implies. (DTR)
D. Boyarin, ‘On the History of the Early Phallus,’ in S. Farmer and C. Braun Pasternak (eds.), Gender and Difference in the Middle Ages (Minneapolis 2003) 3–44. Boyarin identifies two stances in ancient and modern discussions about gender and sex, both of which have negative implications for the female. According to one stance, sexual differences between men and women are transcended in an idealistic universal representation, which despite the transcendence of differences is expressed as male. A second stance emphasizes sexual differentiation, whereby the two sexes remain distinct and are defined by their biological roles. The first stance is reflected in the observation of Jacques Lacan that the Phallus is not the penis—i.e., the universal, male signifier is different from the physical male organ. Boyarin sees an ancient expression of the two stances in the different treatments by Philo and the Rabbis of the two stories of the creation of humanity. For Philo, the first story tells of the creation of an ideal human androgyne, referred to as male, while the second tells of the creation of a real, physical male from whom a physical female was produced. By contrast, the Rabbis see in the first story the creation of a real, physical human with both male and female genitals, and in the second story, the sexual separation of this human into two bodies. Boyarin traces the first stance in the myth of Isis, Osiris, and Typhon (which introduces the Phallic symbolism) and in Christian and philosophical writers; he also discusses various interpretations of Lacan’s ideas, and explores implications of the two stances in both ancient thought and modern feminist discourse on the Phallus. (EB)
L. Brottier, ‘Joseph le politique; de l’anonymat du héros dans le traité philonien “De Josepho” à sa mise en scène à l’époque moderne,’ Revue des Etudes Juives 162 (2003) 43–68. This study seeks to understand the paradox of Joseph’s anonymity in Ios. It is striking that Philo avoids naming the chief personage of his treatise as much as he possibly can. Instead he presents him as the type of the politician. This representation was set aside by the Church Fathers and medieval authors, who basically see in Joseph a prefiguration of Christ. From the renaissance onwards Joseph again takes on the role of the political person, but the ambiguity which this role possessed for Philo is now lost. He becomes the type of the good politician, or indeed of the ideal prince. (JR)
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A. Cacciari, ‘Philo and the Nazirite,’ in F. Calabi (ed.), Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria, Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 1 (Boston-Leiden 2003) 147–166. In this article the author discusses several passages in which Philo deals with the vow of the Nazirite (Num. 6:2). Important issues in Philo’s presentation are: (1) the significance of the person of the Nazirite, whom Philo never calls by the calque from the Hebrew; (2) the comparison with the (High) priest: both abstain from wine and strong drink; (3) the notion of defilement within the contrast between ‘purity’ and ‘impurity’; (4) the distinction between voluntary and involuntary sins. The main reason for involuntary failure is ignorance. Cacciari argues that Platonic and Stoic ideas play an important role in Philo’s treatment of this theme. (ACG)
F. Calabi, ‘Il serpente e il cavaliere: piacere e “sophrosyne,”’ Annali di Scienze Religiose 8 (2003) 199–215. Depending on the differing biblical contexts, Philo gives the snake two meanings. It may represent alternatively pleasure or self-control. From the ethical perspective of controlling the passions, these meanings represent two contrasting poles. If, however, the discourse is concerned with the formation of knowledge, i.e. the apprehension of the sensible realm by the intellect, then pleasure, far from representing wicked cunning which is to be tamed or even eliminated, in fact constitutes the instrument of knowledge that guarantees the union of Adam and Eve, symbols of intellect and sensation. The ambivalence which characterizes the snake is the same as that which characterizes pleasure. It can bring on death, but in other situations it is the source of knowledge and procreation, and therefore of life, and also of ethical and historical determination for the human being who was uncertain and incapable of making a choice before meeting the snake. (RR)
F. Calabi, Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria, Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 1 (Boston-Leiden 2003). The aim of the collection of essays is to give English-speaking scholars an impression of research on Philo carried out by Italian scholars. As the editor notes in her introduction, there has been a significant increase in Philonic scholarship in Italy during the past ten to fifteen years, but it has had less impact than it might have on account of the language in which it is written. Interest in Philo is growing and his work is being studied from different points of view and from different perspectives by scholars working in different disciplines. The present study contains nine separate articles which are written with various approaches: historical, linguistic, philological and philosophical. All nine articles are cited under their authors’ names in the present bibliography. The study concludes with an index of Philonic passages and an index of modern scholars. See also the book review by L. Baynes in SPhA 17 (2005) 229–235. (DTR)
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F. Calabi, ‘La luce che abbaglia: una metafora sulla inconoscibilità di Dio in Filone di Alessandria,’ in L. Perrone (ed.), Origeniana Octava. Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 164 (Leuven 2003) 223–232. Some of Origen’s statements about the unknowability and unattainability of God are derived from the Platonic analogy between the Good and the sun in the image of the Cave. Taking its starting point an article by John Dillon on Origen’s use of the imagery of light in the Peri archôn, the paper attempts to discover whether any aspects of his reading can be traced back to Philo. The theme of the brightness of the Good which makes the objects of knowledge knowable and consequently dazzles whoever wishes to achieve the contemplation of the source of knowability is derived from the Platonist tradition which emphasizes the impossibility of obtaining knowledge of the first Principle. The interpretation of the sun analogy and the dimming of sight through the brightness of the incorporeal rays is present in Philo when he affirms that the ‘One who is’ is unknowable. From Him, like from the sun, blinding rays of light stream forth which make vision impossible. Just as He is arrêtos, akatalêptos and aperinoêtos, so he is also aoratos. His essence cannot be known. He can only be seen ‘from a distance’ (cf. Somn. 1.67). But at the same time God is the creator of intelligible light which gives sensible objects their power of illumination. Unlike Plato Philo makes a distinction between the source of light and the rays that shine forth. The latter are equated with the divine Powers, but even they blind the viewer. Origen also accepts the distinction, but the rays are associated with the Son, who deprives himself of equality with the Father in order to show humankind the path of knowledge. (RR)
F. Calabi, ‘Theatrical Language in Philo’s In Flaccum,’ in F. Calabi (ed.), Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria, Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 1 (Boston-Leiden 2003) 91–116. Translation and elaboration of an article that originally appeared in Italian; see the summary in SPhA 17 (2005) 166. The present article includes a brief examination of theatrical metaphors in the Legatio ad Gaium. This treatise, when compared with the In Flaccum, stresses the moral reprobation of simulation, deceit and giving in to emotions. (HMK)
A. Carriker, The Library of Eusebius, Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae 67 (Leiden–Boston 2003), esp. 164–177. Published version of the author’s Columbia Ph.D., which was summarized in this bibliography in SPhA 14 (2002) 144–145. The passage specifically on Philo first discussed the catalogue of his works which Eusebius gives in HE 2.18. Further discussion is devoted to two works that are missing, Opif. and Mos. The former was definitely present in his library, the latter was most likely present as well. It is unclear why they are not mentioned. The section finishes with some general comments on Philo’s presence in the library, namely that it is incomplete, that it contains quite a few works which Eusebius never cites, that is was organized in rolls (about which no clear conclusions can be reached), and that the books reached Caesarea via Origen. The final chapter of the book gives a summary list of Eusebius’ library. The Philonic works present are listed on pp. 303–304. (DTR)
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C. M. Conway, ‘Gender and Divine Relativity in Philo of Alexandria,’ Journal for the Study of Judaism 34 (2003) 471–491. Philo has true deification in mind in his portrayal of Moses when the problem is considered from the perspective of ancient and Philonic conceptions of gender. When Moses is mapped against the integrally related but fluid, shifting, and relative categories of gender and divinity, his perfect masculinity becomes commensurate with his divinity. Philo shares with the Roman world the idea of a divine continuum. As Moses climbs up the gender hierarchy, he simultaneously draws nearer to divinity, relative to the asexual masculinity of God (Mos. 1.158). (KAF)
N. Dax Moraes, ‘Fílon de Alexandria e a tradição filosófica,’ Metanoia. Primeiros escritos em filosofia 5 (2003) 55–88. This article corresponds to the first chapter of the thesis summarized below. After a biographical presentation of Philo, it deals with the problem of eclecticism in Philo’s use of Greek philosophical traditions. The author proposes to read the Philonic text in terms of a ‘relative decontextualization’ (59) of the philosophical material that is incorporated, in order to understand the function of philosophoumena as preparatory level for a superior understanding that occurs in wisdom. Finally, he decides to investigate one of the main questions on Philo, that of the Logos, in the terms proposed by H. A. Wolfson. (JPM)
N. Dax Moraes, O Logos em Fílon de Alexandria: Principais Interpretações (Master’s thesis, Pontificial Catholic University, Rio de Janeiro 2003). The author’s thesis contains five chapters. The first contains a general presentation of the Philo’s life in its philosophical context, and an introduction to Logos philosophy (see above); the second compares the relation of Nous and Logos in Philo and Stoics; the third studies the relation of the noetic cosmos with the Platonic theory of ideas (see below); the fourth studies the terminology of divine dynameis, with additional reflections on its adoption by Christian thinkers; and the last deals with diverse aspects on the language in relation to Philo’s theory of Logos. (JPM)
N. Dax Moraes, ‘O Logos filoniano e o mundo platatônico das Idéais,’ Anais de Filosofia. Revista de Pós-Graduação da Universidade Federal de São João del-Rei 10 (2003) 169–190. It is the printed version of the third chapter of the thesis summarized above. On the basis of texts of Philo, taken mainly from the Allegorical Commentary on the Law, and from previous studies by E. Bréhier and H. A. Wolfson, the author illustrates the double function of the Logos as image of God and paradigm of the cosmos. He concludes that there are three levels in the status of ideas according to Philo: (1) before creation, as infinite power of God; (2) as created ideas, immanent in the divine Mind, which form the intelligible world; (3) as emanated ideas, reflected in the sensible world. (JPM)
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B. Decharneux, ‘Entre le pouvoir et sacré: Philon d’Alexandrie, ambassadeur près du “divin” Caius,’ Problèmes d’Histoire des Religions 13 (2003) 21–27. The treatises Flacc. and Legat. are often typified as historical, but according to the author they are to be viewed as writings on political philosophy and not as works which attempt to establish some kind of ‘historical truth.’ As a participant in the events he records, Philo is too engaged a witness to be a reliable informant. Legat. 359 illustrates his philosophical point of view when he is confronted with the absolute power of Caligula. Philo’s personages develop in the course of his political writings (Ios., Mos. 1-2) like puppets which symbolize differing postures. They play the terrible game of sacral power, constantly mixing up their human identity with that of the gods. Flaccus is a pretender. Caligula is an imitator of the divine. In contrast, Philo’s heroes—Joseph, Moses or even Agrippa—represent unity in the face of worldly diversity; rejecting power games, they take up the mission of being intermediaries in the bosom of a universe of which God is the sole monarch. (JR)
D. S. Dodson, ‘Philo’s De Somniis in the Context of Ancient Dream Theories and Classifications,’ Perspectives in Religious Studies 30 (2003) 299–312. Dodson surveys Greco-Roman dream theories and classifications and considers Philo’s discussion in De Somniis within this context. Homer and Plato distinguish between dreams that come true and those that do not, but neither writer classifies dreams more formally. Other ancient thinkers who do classify dreams are Herophilus, Artemidorus, Macrobius and Posidonius. Questions behind the classifications of the first three thinkers pertain to whether or not a dream is predictive, and Artemidorus and Macrobius are also interested in whether a predictive dream requires interpretation or is straightforward. Underlying Posidonius’ approach is the issue of how humans can, with divine help, gain knowledge of the future through their dreams. Philo shows familiarity with these contemporary ideas about dreams, and his dream classification in De Somniis ‘has a practical correlation with the dream theory of Artemidorus/Macrobius and a formal one with the dream classification of Posidonius’ (311). (EB)
W. Eisele, Ein unerschütterliches Reich. Die mittelplatonische Umformung des Parusiegedankens im Hebräerbrief, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 116 (Berlin–New York 2003), esp. 160–240. The author is above all interested in Philo’s understanding of reality (‘Wirklichkeitsverständnis’). Philo is regarded as a Middle Platonic source, parallel to Plutarch, Seneca or Alcinous, especially with regard to the themes of eschatology, protology and angelology (which also covers the questions of theodicy and the problem of evil). The relevant texts are cited in full, translated into German, analyzed with due awareness of the context, and discussed. He concludes that it is only possible to speak of eschatology in Philo to a limited extent; it is better to speak of human destiny in terms of aretalogy. Protology is intended only in a religious sense, i.e. in the acknowledgement of the transcendence of God, preventing the error of deifying the world. Philo’s has a greater interest is in angelology, which connects transcendence and immanence and mediates between them (see the text Somn. 1.133-158). The angels are compared with demons or identified with God’s dynameis or his logoi. (GS)
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G. Ellia, La sensation chez Philon d’Alexandrie: spiritualité des sens (DEA Université de Caen 2003). In the first part of the study the author presents the divisions of the soul adopted by Philo and determines the place that sense-perception occupies in the soul. He then establishes the status which the Alexandrian gives sense-perception. It is regarded as the privileged locus of spirituality and of the spiritual quest. In the second part an examination is made of the different senses. It emerges that it is the confrontation between hearing and sight which reveals the importance of sense-perception in the spiritual life. (JR)
J. E. Ellis, ‘Philo’s View of Homosexuality,’ Perspectives in Religious Studies 30 (2003) 313–323. Philo speaks disapprovingly of homosexual activities between men and boys, in which the boys may or may not participate voluntarily, and homosexual activities between men and men, in which participation may or may not be voluntary. The basis of Philo’s objection to male homosexual behavior is that it does not accord with nature because (1) it involves unnatural indulgence in pleasure; (2) its purpose is not to procreate, and procreation is the only acceptable reason for sexual relations; and (3) it places a male in a female role, which is not only unnatural for a man but also demeaning and debilitating. (EB)
M. Endo, Creation and Christ, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuem Testament 2.144 (Tübingen 2003), esp. 166–179. A description of Philo’s treatment of the idea of the Logos in Platonic or Middle Platonic creation accounts shows how dissimilar his ideas are from the development of biblical and early Jewish exegetical traditions used in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel. (KAF)
T. Engberg-Pedersen, ‘Paraenesis Terminology in Philo,’ in D. E. Aune, T. Seland and J. H. Ulrichsen (eds.), Neotestamentica et Philonica: Studies in Honor of Peder Borgen, Supplements to Novum Testamentum 106 (Leiden– Boston 2003) 371–392. This study is part of a larger Scandinavian research project on paraenesis in antiquity, now published in a separate volume as J. Starr & T. Engberg-Pedersen (eds.), Early Christian Paraenesis in Context (Berlin 2004). The author’s main thesis is that the common modern translation of the Greek terms parainein and parainesis as ‘exhort’ and ‘exhortation’ is wrong. Parainein basically means ‘advise’ or ‘enjoin’ and parainesis, ‘advice’ or ‘injunction.’ ‘Exhort’ and ‘exhortation’ should be kept as translations for parakalein and paraklêsis, both of which may also be translated ‘appeal.’ Finally, the author states, the third member of the relevant triad of terms, protrepein/protrepesthai and protropê, should be translated as ‘urge’ or ‘incite’ and ‘urging’ and ‘incitement’ respectively. In the present study EngbergPedersen argues that these translations hold for Philo too. (TS)
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L. H. Feldman, ‘The Command, According to Philo, Pseudo-Philo, and Josephus, to Annihilate the Seven Nations of Canaan,’ Andrews University Seminary Studies 41 (2003) 13–29. In Deut. 7:1-2 Moses commands the Israelites to destroy utterly the seven Canaanite nations, apparently to prevent intermarriage between Israelites and Canaanites, which would lead the Israelite partner to apostasy. This commandment is similar to others in the Bible that call for destruction of the Amalekites and the nations of the kings Sihon and Og. Philo does not mention any of these commandments. Instead he allegorizes Amalek as passion and a pleasure-hungry character. For Philo, the worst punishment, that of being killed, is reserved for apostates. Pseudo-Philo mentions in passing the commandment about the Amalekites, but without a rationale; he also omits the commandment about the seven nations and several details about the episodes related to Sihon and Og. A possible explanation is that this writer lived in the land of Israel and recognized that it was necessary to get along with its non-Jewish inhabitants. In the longest section of the article, devoted to Josephus, Feldman discusses Josephus’ treatment of various biblical intermarriages and of the commandment to destroy Amalek and the seven nations. Josephus’ explanation that such a commandment was ‘necessary for the survival of the Israelites as a people, since the Canaanites would destroy the ancestral constitution’ (29) would have appealed to his Roman readers and displayed his loyalty before his Jewish readers. (EB)
L. H. Feldman, ‘Moses in Midian, according to Philo,’ Shofar 21 (2003) 1– 20, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/shofar/v021/21.2Feldman.html. The author reviews the account of the early career of Moses (Ex 2:11–4:31) as represented in the Philonic corpus, and principally Mos. 1.40–86, under the following topical rubrics: (1) Moses’ escape from Egypt; (2) Moses in Midian; (3) the Burning Bush; (4) Moses’ return to Egypt. Particular attention is given to those themes central to Philo’s thought (e.g., Moses’ lack of human eloquence), as well as to those elements which are the subject of special emphasis (or conspicuous silence). Feldman argues that departures from the order of the biblical narrative, expanded treatments of certain episodes and the curtailment (or omission) of others is most often the result of apologetic sensitivities; this is demonstrated in several cases through comparison with Josephus’ account (esp. at AJ 2.254-280). Note that this Journal is only published electronically. (DS)
L. H. Feldman, ‘Philo’s Interpretation of Jethro,’ Australian Biblical Review 51 (2003) 37–46. In the exegetical tradition Jethro is controversial figure. Philo, together with the Rabbis, belongs to those whose attitude towards him is divided. The article analyzes Philo’s treatment in Mos. and elsewhere of the two main episodes in which Jethro occurs in Bible, his treatment of Moses on arriving in Midian and his advice to Moses on improving his administration. It proves very difficult to explain the inconsistencies in Philo’s attitude to Jethro. Feldman concludes that most likely his general attitude is negative, coming particularly to the fore when he is taken as a symbol of the preference of the human above the divine and the seemingly wise above the truly wise, but that he is willing to concede that Jethro was able give Moses good technical advice. (DTR)
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L. H. Feldman, ‘Philo’s interpretation of Korah,’ Revue des Etudes Juives 162 (2003) 1–15. In Mos. Philo describes the rebellion of the Levite Korah against Moses, but he does not mention Korah’s name (2.174-179, 275-287). In contrast to Josephus, Philo does not mention Korah’s descent, wealth or ability as speaker. His main concern is theological: Korah resists the divine commands by which Moses was appointed as leader. It is a conflict between belief and disbelief. In the biblical account Dathan and Abiram are also mentioned as leaders in the revolt, but Philo omits their names. In contrast to the biblical narrative, Philo tells us that the Levites try to persuade the tribe of Reuben to join the revolt. (ACG)
L. H. Feldman, ‘Philo’s Version of Balaam,’ Henoch 25 (2003) 301–319. The fascination that the figure of Balaam exercised on Philo may be seen from the sheer amount of space that he devotes to him, both because of his interest in the phenomenon of prophecy and because he sought to elevate the figure of Moses, the true prophet, through contrasting him with Balaam, the greatest of pagan prophets but actually a mere technician (mantis). Philo is consistent in disparaging him, notably in his most extended treatment of the Balaam episode, Mos. 1.263-99, where he does not even mention Balaam by name. He is careful in his treatment of Balaam’s messianic-like prediction that a man will come forth from the Israelites who will rule over many nations (including the Edomites, from whom according to later tradition the Romans were descended). Philo reduces Balaam’s prophetic claims to absurdity by stating that his donkey proved to have superior sight; he omits, however, to say that the donkey spoke, presumably because sophisticated readers would find this hard to believe. Finally, Philo, perhaps indirectly referring to what he saw in the Alexandrian Jewish community of his own days, adds that it is Balaam who suggests to Balak the means by which he may overcome the Israelites, namely by illicit sexual allurements coming from Moabite women. (HMK, based on the author’s summary)
L. H. Feldman, ‘Questions about the Great Flood, as Viewed by Philo, Pseudo-Philo, Josephus, and the Rabbis,’ Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 115 (2003) 401–422. The author discusses several questions relating to the interpretation of Noah and the flood by Philo, Josephus, Pseudo-Philo, and the rabbis. On the question of the historicity of Noah and the flood, Philo has no doubts and does not regard the story as a myth. An important theological issue in his reading is that God is perfectly just and that people suffer because they deserve it. As a philosopher Philo is also concerned with the question why animals, who do not have free will, are also destroyed by God. Philo emphasizes the fact that God lengthened the lives of those living at the time of the flood in order that they may repent. Noah is saved because of his justice. When dealing with Noah’s drunkenness, Philo explains that he drank a portion of the wine rather than all of it. Noah cursed Canaan because he publicized Noah’s shame. (ACG)
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E. Ferguson, ‘The Art of Praise: Philo and Philodemus on Music,’ in J. T. Fitzgerald, T. H. Olbricht and L. H. White (eds.), Early Christianity and Classical Culture. Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe, Novum Testamentum Supplements 110 (Leiden-Boston 2003) 391–426. Philo reflects solid awareness of the technical and practical discussions of music in Greek philosophical thought represented by the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics. His frequent statements about instrumental and vocal music demonstrate his high regard for music. It positively results in harmony of soul and of whole person, while musical ratios and harmonies illustrate number symbolism and cosmic harmony. The principal function of music was for praising God. Philo provides the fullest and most informative account of the musical activities of the Jews in Alexandria and among the Therapeutae. The other tradition in Greek philosophy concerning music, that of the Sophists, Sceptics, and Epicureans, is also examined as it comes to expression in Philodemus, who attacks the philosophical tradition about music reflected in Philo. (KAF)
F. Frazier, ‘Les Anciens chez Philon d’Alexandrie. L’archéologie de Moïse et l’espérance d’Enos,’ in B. Bakhouche (ed.), L’Ancienneté chez les Anciens, vol. II, Mythologie et religion (Montpellier 2003) 385–410. The author first explains the process of ‘de-historicizing’ the biblical narrative, which forms the basis of the allegorical interpretation of the first human beings. When analyzed in terms of genealogy and bioi, the historical part of the Pentateuch is read as an archaeology of the legislative part, but conversely the laws too are an ‘archaeology,’ i.e. a discourse which transcribes the virtues embodied by the biblical ancestors. One of these ancestors, Enos, embodies Hope, an essential component of Jewish piety which the Greek language conceptualizes through the single term §lp¤w. It enables Philo to give a sketch of the contours of the virtue of Hope, unknown to the Greeks, through a remodelling of the Stoic system of the passions. (JR)
J. Frey, ‘Zur historischen Auswertung der antiken Essenerberichte. Ein Beitrag zum Gespräch mit Roland Bergmeier,’ in J. Frey and H. Stegemann (eds.), Qumrankontrovers. Beiträge zu den Textfunden vom Toten Meer, Einblicke. Berichte — Reflexionen aus Tagungen der Katholischen Akademie Schwerte 6 (Paderborn 2003) 23–56. This article responds the views of Bergmeier (see the summary above). The first part is an outline of previous research and oultines the basic problems associated with the ancient descriptions of the Essenes. The second part in a more positive vein gives a subtle and critical interpretation of the Essene texts, as well as discussing the sources of the Qumran library. Frey rejects the classical paradigm of a monastic community and the opinion, still held by some, of a Pythagorean community of philosophers. He argues for an extremely conservative, halakhic community which is interested in the same questions of cultic pureness and eschatological interpretation of scripture which is also present in other places in Palestine at this time. This group by no means represents the main direction of contemporary Judaism, but at the same time they should not be characterized as a sect. On this volume see also the book review by M. Henze in SPhA 16 (2004) 304–306. (GS)
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K. Fuglseth, ‘Common Words in the New Testament and Philo: Some Results from a Complete Vocabulary,’ in D. E. Aune, T. Seland and J. H. Ulrichsen (eds.), Neotestamentica et Philonica: Studies in Honor of Peder Borgen, Supplements to Novum Testamentum 106 (Leiden–Boston 2003) 393–414. The author here summarizes the main ideas behind his book A Comparison of Greek Words in Philo and the New Testament (2003; see SPhA 17 (2005), pp. 235-237). In the present essay the author also presents the results of a statistical enumeration and registration of common words in the New Testament and the writings of Philo and a comparison of the results with a similar analysis of the vocabulary relationship between Philo and Hebrews alone. Apart from presenting common themes of the two text corpora, the results, according to the author, strengthen theories that maintain that there are unique ties between some of the New Testament writings and Philo, and that the connection to the Letter to the Hebrews is particularly significant. (TS)
K. Fuglseth, A Comparison of Words in Philo and the New Testament (Lewiston NY: Mellon Press 2003). This volume presents a complete computer-generated comparison of the Greek New Testament and the extant Greek writings of Philo of Alexandria. It is a statistical counting and registration of all common words in these writings, based upon the database gathered in connection with the Norwegian Philo Concordance Project, headed by Professor Peder Borgen. Its content comprises Foreword; Preface; Introduction; 1. All Common Words Sorted Alphabetically; 2. All Common Words Sorted by Frequency; 3. Philo and the Gospel of John; 4. Philo and the Letter to the Hebrews; and Bibliography. This list will be useful for all New Testament scholars interested in the Jewish and Greco-Roman background of the New Testament. See further the review by K.-W. Niebuhr in SPhA 17 (2005) 235–237. (TS)
K. Fuglseth, ‘”Satans synagoge?” Mogelege historiske og sosiologiske tolkingar av Op 2,9 og 3,9,’ Tidsskrift for kirke, religion og samfunn 2 (2003) 135–150. This article explores possible historical and sociological interpretations of the unique expression sunagogê tou satana, to be found in Rev. 2:9 and 3:9. The three main historical solutions prevalent in recent research are that the expression reflects a fictitious situation where the entire book was meant for internal encouragement. The second is that the expression refers to other Christians since there are several other internal Christians conflicts reported in Revelation. The third one suggests that the expression refers to non-Christians, and the Fuglseth prefers this solution, particularly since he finds traces of similar conflicts in Philo, making it more probable to see the Christian expression as part of an extra-mural conflict. The author also draws on sect-theories to understand the social issues at stake and suggests translations that avoid using words like ‘Jew’ and ‘synagogue.’ (TS)
K. L. Gaca, The Making of Fornication: Eros, Ethics and Political Reform in Greek Philosophy and Early Christianity (Berkeley 2003), esp. 190–217. In this impressive and wide-ranging study the author investigates the origins of the restrictive code of sexual morality in Christianity. She rejects the view that it is in part
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based on views developed in the Greek philosophical ethics of the Platonic tradition and the Stoa. Instead she places at the centre of her study the concept of ‘fornication’ (porneia), which she takes to mean ‘sexual behavior opposed to God’s law.’ The term has a biblical background and embodies an entire way of thinking that aims to regulate sexual behaviour for purposes of religious and social control. The study is structured in three parts: the first discusses the sexual reforms advocated by Greek philosophers; the second concentrates on the watershed period of the 1st century c.e., analyzing first the Septuagint, and then the crucial contributions of Philo and Paul; the third moves to the Patristic period, where Philonic and Pauline ideas are taken up and further developed by Tatian, Clement and Epiphanes. Chapter seven, entitled ‘Philo’s reproductive city of God,’ focuses on Philo. The author argues that Philo wishes to establish a city of God based on a philosophical interpretation of the Law of Moses. His agenda in sexual matters is innovative in that he wishes to combine the restrictive laws of the Pentateuch and the ideology of fornication with the reformist and procreationist ideas of the Pythagorean philosophers. The key to his interpretation is his reading of the 10th commandment of the Decalogue, in which he argues that sexual activity must be seen in religious terms and for that reason must be strictly controlled. Philo lays the ground for a paradigm shift in biblical sexual norms, but himself remains conservative and resists the conclusion that transgressing procreationism is tantamount to apostasy. His was taken a decisive step further by Clement, who regards any deviation from God’s procreationist law as rebellion. See further the review by D. T. Runia in SPhA 17 (2005) 237–243. (DTR)
S. Gambetti, The Alexandrian Riots of 38 c.e. and their Implications for the Experience of the Jews of the Diaspora: A Historical Assessment (diss. Berkeley 2003). In the summer of 38 c.e. the Jewish community of Alexandria in Egypt was brutally persecuted. An edict issued by the Roman prefect Flaccus by declaring the Jews foreigners cancelled their politeia containing all their privileges. The Alexandrian citizens, after having destroyed the Jews’ homes, shops and synagogues, pushed them into a small part the city. Punishment and torture were reserved to those who would try to cross the limits of that quarter. This event was the explosion of a situation which had existed in Alexandria for very long time, and which had ripened over the last year. In 37 the emperor Gaius had endorsed the position of the Alexandrian citizens against the rights of residence of the Jews, and had adjudicated in that sense. In 38 Gaius sent Flaccus his mandate, also containing orders about the transformation of the previous adjudication into policy. By issuing the edict Flaccus executed imperial orders. The social situation of Alexandria proved to be the proper environment for the riots. The translation of old anti-Jewish Egyptian traditions into Greek first (making those stories available to a Hellenic audience) first, and, later, the advancement of a part of the Hellenized Egyptian population into the body politic, transformed the Alexandrian civic institutions, especially the gymnasium, into a hot-bed for anti-Jewish sentiments. In 37 these people were successful in turning their bias into a judicial case, which the emperor endorsed. An embassy to Gaius in 39 was not enough for the Jews to re-establish their privileges. The emperor did not withdraw from his decision taken two years earlier. Only Claudius in 41 would make some efforts to bring the life of the Alexandrian Jews back to an acceptable situation. In the analysis of these events constant use is made of source material provided by Philo. The study will be published as a monograph in the near future. (DTR; summary provided by the author).
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J. Gebara, Le Dieu créateur, Histoire de la doctrine de la création. De Philon d’Alexandrie à Théophile d’Antioche (diss. Paris-Sorbonne, Paris IV 2003). The first part of the thesis includes two chapters devoted to Philo. The first describes Philo’s life and presents his works and his theology. In his treatment of the latter, the author touches on the themes of the existence of God, his transcendence, the Powers and the Philonic Logos. He then studies the chief titles of God the Creator : Creator, Author/ Founder, Demiurge, Father, Cause, Craftsman, Begetter. The second chapter is a Commentary on Opif. (JR)
D. M. Goldenberg, The Curse of Ham: Race and Slavery in Early Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Princeton 2003). Goldenberg investigates how the so-called Curse of Ham, based on Gen. 9:18-25, came to be understood as a justification for Black slavery. The book is organized into four parts: (1) a chronological study of early Jewish views of the Black African, (2) an examination of Jewish attitudes toward dark skin color, (3) a history of Black slavery, and (4) a study of the effect of the historical identification of Blacks with slavery upon Jewish, Christian, and Islamic biblical interpretation. While the Bible itself does not link Blacks with slavery, ‘the increasing association of Black with slave in the Near East’ and the incorrect but recognized etymology of Ham as ‘dark, brown, or black’ influenced later interpretation of the biblical passage (197). Because Philo understands the blackness of the Ethiopians to represent evil, some writers considered him to be ‘the only exception to a lack of racism and prejudice in the ancient Greek world’ (48). Goldenberg defends him against this charge, however, by noting that Philo was drawing upon commonly accepted color symbolism. (EB)
L. Grabbe, ‘Did all Jews think alike? “Covenant” in Philo and Josephus in the Context of Second Temple Judaic Religion,’ in S. E. Porter and J. C. R. d. Roo (eds.), The Concept of the Covenant in the Second Temple Period, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 71 (Leiden–Boston 2003) 251–266. Modern biblical scholars continue to debate how central the covenant is to the Hebrew Bible. Grabbe surveys Second Temple literature (both biblical and non-biblical) and concludes that while the notion is important in some sources, ‘a significant number of writers and writings do not mention ‘covenant’ or show no interest in the concept’ (264). Philo and Josephus must be classified among this latter group. Without knowing Hebrew, Philo uses the term diathêkê, the Septuagint translation of the Hebrew b’rit. His understanding is thus conditioned by the primary sense of the Greek word as a will or testament rather than of the Hebrew word as a mutual agreement between God and humans, and he emphasizes the covenant as a freely given divine gift. After discussing several Philonic passages which mention diathêkê, Grabbe observes that Philo uses the word with a range of associations that include the wise man as God’s heir, God’s gift of grace, God’s law, God’s word, divine justice, the intelligible world, and God’s gift of himself. Josephus never uses ‘covenant’ in a theological sense, probably because the notion did not serve his aims in addressing his Greco-Roman readers. (EB)
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P. Graffigna, ‘The Stability of Perfection: the Image of the Scales in Philo of Alexandria,’ in F. Calabi (ed.), Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria, Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 1 (BostonLeiden 2003) 131–146. A revised version of the article published by the author in Italian and summarized at SPhA 17 (2005) 176. The sections of the article are: The wavering of the scales and of the ship, Uncertainty: Lot, The King’s way, Stability, Portrayal of lack of stability: Cain, Closing remarks. (DTR)
L. Gusella, Esperienze di comunità nel giudaismo antico: esseni, terapeuti, Qumran (Florence 2003). As part of an extended comparison between the three groups of Essenes, Therapeutae and the Qumran community, a long section is devoted to Philo’s description of the Therapeutae (pp. 79–200), emphasizing the real nature of the locality, the composition of the community and, in particular, the role of women in it. (DTR; based on the book review by S. Castelli in SPhA 17 (2005) 223–224)
M. Hadas-Lebel, Philon d’Alexandrie: un penseur en diaspora (Paris 2003). The author recognizes that Philo’s silence about himself does not allow us to put together a biographical narrative. If we want to get to know him, it is necessary in her view to ‘read his works tirelessly.’ This is exactly what she has done, as the gripping spiritual portrait which she offers us bears witness. After a guided tour of Alexandria, the city where Philo was born and lives, she describes his cultural universe, which also includes a description of the terrible anti-Jewish riots which marked his final years. Chapters five to eight deal with Philo’s view of Judaism, his biblical commentaries, his method of philosophizing, and his thought. A final chapter entitled ‘Philo, Church Father honoris causa’ (the phrase is taken from David Runia’s study on the subject) rounds off this excellent introduction to the man whom Edouard Herriot called ‘the glory of the Jewish school of Alexandria.’ See further the book review by J. Riaud at SPhA 16 (2004) 281–286. (JR)
H. Harrauer, ‘Ein neuer Philo-Papyrus mit per‹ filanyrvp¤aw,’ Analecta Papyrologica 14–15 (2002–03) 111–115. Publication of P. Vindob. G 60584 (5.3 x 6.2 cm), part of a 5th cent. codex page containing a fragmentary text of Philo’s De virtutibus 64.7–65.5 (on the recto side, line numbering according to C-W) and 69.4–70.4 (on the verso), i.e. of the section Peri; filanqrwpiva” (De humanitate). Cohn’s translation of the two passages is included (but note the mistakes in the quotation of the first passage in translation: wrong link with previous passage and one line skipped). The article lists the four papyri with Philonic fragments hitherto available until the present fifth one was found. Each papyrus concerns a different treatise. The paper concludes with a discussion of some variant readings presented with the papyrus as compared with the manuscript tradition. Despite the Journal’s published date, the article was not published until 2005. (HMK)
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J. R. Harrison, Paul’s Language of Grace in its Graeco-Roman Context, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuem Testament 2.172 (Tübingen 2003), esp. 114–133. This revision of a 1996 Ph.D. dissertation prepared at Macquarie University, Sydney, investigates the extent to which Paul interacts with the Greco-Roman benefaction ideology of cavri~. To explore how Greek-speaking Judaism was affected by Greco-Roman benefaction ideology, Philo and Josephus are examined. Harrison surveys modern scholarship on Philonic cavri~ and concludes that scholars have abstracted the terminology of cavr i~ from its historical context. He then examines Philo’s use of cavri~ in contexts of divine benefaction to show that Philo’s readers would have understood him against the backdrop of honorific inscriptions. Turning to the motif of reciprocity, Harrison shows that Philo’s treatment distorts the focus of the Mosaic Law on God’s redemptive love as incentive to generosity by substituting it with reciprocity. Finally, he examines Cher. 122-123 to show how Philo unabashedly criticizes the institution of beneficence. (KAF)
D. M. Hay, ‘Foils for the Therapeutae: References to Other Texts and Persons in Philo’s De vita contemplativa,’ in D. E. Aune, T. Seland and J. H. Ulrichsen (eds.), Neotestamentica et Philonica: Studies in Honor of Peder Borgen, Supplements to Novum Testamentum 106 (Leiden–Boston 2003) 330–348. This study explores the literary structure and rhetorical devices of Philo’s treatise, De vita contemplativa. Primary attention is given to its references to Greek, Egyptian, and Jewish texts, groups such as the Essences, and individuals other than the Therapeutae. The author discusses Philo’s harsh criticism of Xenophon and Plato, and the descriptions of contemplative life, pagan worship, and banquets. All this raises the questions as to how Philo himself was connected with the Therapeutae and who the intended audiences of the treatise were. (KAF)
A. Hilhorst, ‘Poésie hébraïque et métrique grecque. Les témoignages des Anciens, de Philon d’Alexandrie à Boniface de Mayence,’ in D. Accorinti and P. Chuvin (eds.), Des Géants à Dionysos. Mélanges de mythologie et de poésie grecques offerts à Francis Vian (Alessandria 2003) 305–329. The article lists and analyzes all those passages in Greek and Latin texts which attribute metrical method and style to Hebrew poetry. Philo is the first author to be discussed (306– 307). Only two passages are relevant. In Mos. 1.23 Moses is described as having mastered metrical theory, knowledge which he presumably made use of later. In Contempl. 80 the Therapeutae are said to chant metrical hymns. One might assume them to be in Greek, but Hebrew poems cannot be excluded. When Jerome cites Philo as a witness for metrical poetry on the part of the Hebrews he is probably thinking of this passage (317, cf. 307). (DTR)
P. W. van der Horst, ‘Common Prayer in Philo’s In Flaccum 121–124,’ in J. Tabory (ed), Kenishta: Studies of the Synagogue World, vol. 2 (Ramat-Gan 2003) 21–28 (English section). The article presents a thumbnail analysis of Flacc. 121-124, Philo’s account of the public prayer(s) of the Alexandrian Jewish community following the announcement of the arrest
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of Flaccus. Following his observation of a certain parallelism with the subsequent confession of Flaccus himself (170-175), the author discusses the oft-remarked tone of Schadenfreude in the prayers. With reference to biblical and Jewish liturgical sources, Van der Horst argues the character of the passage should be understood within the context of prayers of thanksgiving, acknowledging divine sovereignty and providence. (DS)
P. W. van der Horst, Philo’s Flaccus: The First Pogrom, Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series 2 (Leiden–Boston 2003). The second volume in the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series focuses on the important historical/apologetic treatise In Flaccum. It follows the same format as the first volume (on which see SPhA 16 (2004) 253), differing only when the nature of the treatise and its reception dictate (cf. p. 52). The Introduction first discusses the place of the treatise in Philonic corpus, and then outlines its contents and structure (with some remarks on its sequel). In a discussion of its genre, it is noted that it is not a piece of pure historiography, but also contains an admixture of pastoral theology, apologetics and theodicy. The main themes in the author’s view are two: (a) Providence and justice, and (b) loyalty to Rome and the baseness of the Egyptians. There follows an extensive discussion of the historical background (with an excursus on Flaccus). The introduction continues with a detailed but deliberately not exhaustive survey of previous scholarship on the treatise. Van der Horst concludes that Box’s 1939 Commentary is still fundamental but has in several respects become outdated. Two final sections discuss the treatise’s Greek text and the method followed in the present work. In the second part of the work a new English translation is presented, which makes good use of previous versions by Box and Colson, but attempts to avoid the archaizing language (from a present-day viewpoint) that they use. The major part of the work is taken up by the commentary, based on the English translation. The treatise is divided into two parts, the first (§§1–96) is then further divided into eight chapters, the second (§§97–191) into another seven and an Epilogue. The commentary explicitly does not aim to be exhaustive (p. 51), but aims to help the reader obtain a better understanding of Philo’s text by presenting the essential information required for that purpose. It contains a multitude of important historical, literary and philological observations. The book ends with a full bibliography and indices. See further the review by S. Gambetti in SPhA 16 (2004) 286–289. (DTR)
W. Houston, ‘Towards an Integrated Reading of the Dietary Laws of Leviticus,’ in R. Rendtorff and R. A. Kugler (eds.), The Book of Leviticus, Vetus Testamentum Supplements 93 (Leiden–Boston 2003) 142–161. The author examines the interpretation of the dietary laws in Leviticus by Philo of Alexandria and the modern interpreters Jacob Milgrom and Mary Douglas. All three see the ritual and moral teaching of Leviticus as a unified whole. In Spec. Philo treats the particular laws under the heading of one of the Ten Commandments. The dietary laws fall under the tenth commandment, oÈk §piyumÆseiw. Houston briefly discusses Philo’s reading of the precepts, and concludes that Philo regards them as teaching the important virtues of temperance, self-control, and humanity. In his general conclusion Houston states that ‘in their broad contentions, Philo, Milgrom and Douglas may be accounted correct.’ (p. 161). Philo’s interpretation teaches us to discipline our appetites and to moderate our desires in order to preserve the ‘integrity of creation.’ (ACG)
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S. Hultgren, ‘The Origin of Paul’s Doctrine of the two Adams in 1 Corinthians 15:45–49,’ Journal for the Study of the New Testament 89 (2003) 343–370, esp. 344–357. This study argues, by means of a careful analysis and summarization of Philo’s interpretations of the creation of ‘man’ in Gen. 1:26-27 and 2:7, that the closest parallels to Paul’s doctrine of the two Adams in 1 Cor. 15:45-49, are not to be found in Philo, a misreading of Philo, or Gnosticism, but in rabbinic literature. (KAF)
P. Ibek, ‘Naród zydowski jako Logos w ujeciu Filona z Aleksandrii [Polish],’ in K. Pilarczyk (ed.), Zydzi i judaizm we wspólczesnych badaniach polskich (Kraków 2003) 291-301. It has not proved possible so far to gain access to this work or to procure a summary of its contents. (DTR)
S. Inowlocki, La citation comme méthode apologétique: les auteurs juifs dans l’Apodeixis d’Eusébe de Césarée (diss. Free University Brussels 2003). This doctoral dissertation prepared at the University of Brussels forms the main body of research on which the author’s monograph published by Brill in English in 2006 is based. The study deals with Eusebius of Caesarea’s use of the Jewish authors’ quotations in the Praeparatio evangelica and the Demonstratio evangelica. These authors include Philo of Alexandria, Flavius Josephus, Aristobulus, and the so-called ‘minor’ Jewish authors (Eupolemus, Ezekiel the Tragedian, Artapanus etc.). The study aims to shed new light on the quotation process as exploited by the bishop of Caesarea through the particular case of the Jewish authors. Eusebius’ treatment of Philo occupies an important part of this study because of the abundance of Philonic testimonies cited by Eusebius, especially in the Praeparatio (PE). Each Jewish author is not treated separately. Instead, the viewpoint from which Eusebius sees them is adopted. In most cases, Philo is presented by the latter as a ‘Hebrew.’ The author argues that this appellation constitutes a crucial rhetorical device in order to appropriate Philo’s texts. According to the author’s analysis, Eusebius’ insistence on Philo’s ‘Hebrew-ness’ in the PE enables him to turn the philosopher into a most useful predecessor, the pre-Christian theologian par excellence. The passages in which he deals with the Logos are especially useful in this respect, since he identifies Philo’s Logos as Christ. However, Eusebius’ endeavour is not only a theological one, but also, and more importantly, an apologetic one : his re-interpretation of Philo enables him to demonstrate that Christianity is a unified theological system more ancient, hence better, than that of the Greeks. At the same time, the synthesis made by Philo between the Jewish Scripture and Greek philosophy enables Eusebius to compare Christian and Greek philosophy. Therefore, Philo becomes a most important link between Christianity and Hellenism. In the Demonstratio (DE), on the other hand, Philo is mentioned only once, in a historical-apologetic context. It is argued that this passage accurately illustrates the manner in which Eusebius occasionally distorts quotations of Jewish authors for apologetic purposes in the DE. With regard to the text of Eusebius’ citations in the PE, he generally proves to cite Philo faithfully, although certain differences between Philo’s and Eusebius’ manuscripts seem to indicate that Eusebius occasionally modified Philo’s text in theologically significant passages. The author also argues that if Eusebius certainly knew Philo first hand, he may have collected excerpts in the form of florilegia for his own use. Finally, the author insists on Eusebius’ originality in dealing with Philo: not only did he use theological and
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historical passages that were rarely quoted by the Church Fathers, but he also explicitly acknowledged, as it were, the debt of Christianity to Philo. Yet one should bear in mind that Eusebius’ use of Philo in the PE and the DE was above all apologetic. (DTR, based on the author’s summary)
H. Jacobson, ‘faran or barad in Philo’s QG,’ Journal of Theological Studies 54 (2003) 158–159. In the Armenian translation of QG 3.36 Philo is reported as explaining the place name faran at Gen. 16:14, but the actual biblical text in both the MT and the LXX reads barad. In a brief note the author argues that it is very unlikely that this reflects a variation of readings in the LXX. Translation of the Armenian text, if properly understood, indicates that Philo must have given two explanations of the name barad. But at some stage this was corrupted into faran in the Armenian tradition. (DTR)
P. Jeffery, ‘Philo’s Impact on Christian Psalmody,’ in H. W. Attridge and M. E. Fassler (eds.), Psalms in Community. Jewish and Christian Textual, Liturgical, and Artistic Traditions, Society of Biblical Literature. Symposium Series 25 (Atlanta 2003) 147–187. Although Psalms were probably sung during the Jewish worship service in the Second Temple and in the synagogue, we do not have sufficient evidence to conclude that Jewish singing of psalms, or psalmody, in either of these locales had a direct influence on Christian psalmody. The group banquet, however, was a form of worship shared by both Jews and Christians, and it is likely that Philo’s account of the singing at the banquet of the Therapeutae has a direct bearing upon psalm singing by later Christians. Philo’s account in Contempl. displays a sophisticated understanding of music and reflects much in common with musical practices at Greek symposia. Early Christians such as Clement, Tertullian, Hippolytus and Eusebius describe similar kinds of singing after meals, and the last-named author refers to Philo’s account explicitly. It is often thought that Philo’s use of the word ‘antiphon’ denotes singing in alternation, but Jeffery argues that Philo is instead referring to ‘two concurrent renditions [by men and women] an octave apart’ (171). Later Christians, however, were unaware of Philo’s technical sense of the word and instead used ‘antiphon’ to refer to alternating choirs. (EB)
F. Kayser, ‘Les Ambassades Alexandrines à Rome (Ier-IIe Siecle),’ Revue des Etudes Anciennes 105 (2003) 435-68. A careful reading of accounts of embassies, of Philo’s narrative in Legat., of the Letter of Claudius to the Alexandrians and the polemical literature known as the Acts of the Alexandrian martyrs, allows the author to sketch a rich tableau of diplomatic relations between Rome and Alexandria in the first two centuries of the Roman Empire. Precious information is furnished on the personalities of the ambassadors and the purpose of the embassies, on the organization of the Imperial cult, on protests relating to daily life and civic institutions, and on the adjudication between communities. The profound gulf that existed between the Greeks and Jews of Alexandria and the insolent behaviour of certain Alexandrian citizens sometimes led to the transformation of imperial audiences into veritable legal trials which resulted in the condemnation to death of a notable citizen of the city. (JR)
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H.-J. Klauck, Religion und Gesellschaft im frühen Christentum. Neutestamentliche Studien, Wissenschaflichte Untersuchungen zum Neuem Testament 152 (Tübingen 2003), esp. 37–41. For this collection of essays on the New Testament, the author has written a lengthy introductory chapter entitled ‘„Pantheisten, Polytheisten, Monotheisten“ — ein Reflexion zur grichisch-römischen und biblischen Theologie,’ which has Philo’s statement at Legat. 118 that it is easier for a god to become human than a human to become god as its epitaph. In a section on Hellenistic Judaism Philo is closely linked with the Wisdom of Solomon. Brief remarks are devoted to the doctrine of the Logos, concluding with the assertion that ‘Philo has considerably increased the dynamism of the conception of God’ (p. 40). With respect to the relation between God and humanity, Philo has introduced movement in two directions, through personification and hypostatization of the divine powers and through the transformation of the charismatic person to a Logos-like status (the theory of Sellin). (DTR)
K. Klun, The Decalogue in Jewish and Christian Philosophy [Slovenian] (diss. Ljubljana 2003). The thesis considers the main differences between Jewish and Christian understanding (‘philosophy’) of the Ten Commandments. Its first section gives background on the origin and the role of the Decalogue with the entire Mosaic legal code. The main part of the thesis deal with Philo, whose treatment of the Decalogue can be viewed under three headings: as a summary of the Torah; as a collection of the most important legal and religious principles; and as the nucleus of the Sinaitic revelation. Through an extensive treatment of the Mosaic law in his Greek exegetical opus, Philo tries to show to a philosophical audience within the Greco-Roman world that the ten God-given principles (heads) embrace a complete legislation given in the Sinai desert. He even goes on to meet the expectations of his Greek contemporaries in Alexandria by an extended legal and moralistic analysis of each commandment, using a contemporary Greek philosophical and religious terminology. Philo’s opinion was in fact quite revolutionary when he argues that the state (polis) based on a divine law is not a Platonic idealistic illusion, but a historical fact, as proven in the Biblical ‘Mosaic Constitution,’ and by the Jewish homeland and the diaspora reality. The creation story in Genesis serves him as a preamble to the Constitution, and he also considers the Ten Commandments preambles to different groups of laws, as well as being a code of the principles of natural law, a popular term among first-century philosophers. Another important feature of Philo’s treatment is Neopythagorean approach to the number ten and to arithmology in general, as well as the allegorical method of the interpretation of the Bible in general, probably the most important contribution of Philo to the Western (Christian) method of reading the Old Testament. Philo is thus the first sage in the history of Greek philosophy to fuse the Biblical (Jewish) and Greek language, religion, morality and thought into a unique system of universal religious philosophy. For this reason he, though a Jew, was even given the title church father honoris causa. The final part of the thesis presents an analysis of some of the most important Early Christian documents on the Decalogue and on Jewish law (The New Testament, the Gnostic Letter of Ptolemaeus to Flora, the Didascalia apostolorum, Irenaeus of Lyon (Adversos haereses) and some other Church fathers). The Decalogue is part of the Christian faith and morality, not because it is part of Mosaic law (Torah), but because it embraces the principles of (Stoic) natural law. (DTR; based on author’s summary)
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K. Klun, ‘Filon Aleksandrijski med svetim pismom in filozofijo [Slovenian: Philo of Alexandria: Between the Bible and Philosophy],’ Phainomena (Ljubljana) 43–44 (2003) 173–231. The article is a modified version of the central chapter of the author’s Ph.D. Dissertation. See the summary below. (DTR)
J. Liebart and J. Bernard, ‘Dieu et le Prochain dans le judaïsme ancien,’ Mélanges de Sciences Religieuses 60 (2003) 7–21. In this article devoted to the thesis of A. Nissen, God und der Nächste im antiken Judentum, WUNT 15 (Tûbingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1974) (= RR 7429). The authors note the important role that Philo plays in this study, but do not examine it in detail. (JR)
J. W. Martens, One God, One Law. Philo of Alexandria on the Mosaic and Greco-Roman Law, Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 2 (Boston-Leiden 2003). This monograph, based on a McMaster Ph.D. completed in 1991 (cf. RRS 9145), examines Philo’s indebtedness to Greek philosophical notions of higher law and how Philo mapped the connection between the higher law and the Law of Moses. The Mosaic law is discussed only in terms of its external relationship to Greek notions of higher law. Martens sets out to explore whether Philo’s use of three concepts of higher law—the law of nature, the unwritten law, and the living law—which Philo alone of all ancient writers discusses, renders the Mosaic law superfluous for some people. More than anyone else in antiquity, Philo attempts to make explicit the wide-ranging content of the law of nature. Martens gives a descriptive overview of four major strands of Greek thought on ‘nature’ as they come to expression in Philo: as the power of life and growth, as the inherent character of any thing or being, as the order of the cosmos, and as God. For Philo there is a transcendent God who stands over nature and creation, and so nature can act as a bridge through which humanity can come to know God because it bears God’s ethical imprint. Hence there is for Philo a intimate relationship between law and nature. Philo’s distinctive contribution lies in his accounts of wise men who actually fulfilled the law of nature, his overlapping of the unwritten law with the law of nature, and in his assertion that certain people are themselves unwritten laws. See further the book review by A. Yadin in SPhA 16 (2004) 295–297. (KAF)
J. P. Martín, ‘De la Septuaginta a Bizancio: transiciones en la historia de una lengua,’ Circe 8 (2003) 189–202, esp. 191–193, 197. The article deals with different cultural and political roles which the Greek language has played during its long history. An assumption of the Library of Alexandria was that the Greek language could represent the universal culture. Within this historical framework the version of the Bibel or Septuagint represented for Philo and other Alexandrian Jews the universal diffusion of a particular ‘text’: the Law of Moses. When the Greco-Roman culture converted to Christianity and wanted to spread this text as a part of its Christian faith, it found that some of the surrounding nations lacked a written language. The Greek alphabet and morphology, then, acted as a basis for producing new writing methods and linguistic
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developments. Philo’s texts acquired a new role in this political context, especially in Armenian language. (JPM)
J. P. Martín, ‘Filone di Alessandria e la letteratura cristiana antica,’ Adamantius 9 (2003) 188–192. An exposition of and commentary on D. T. Runia’s study, Filone di Alessandria nella prima letteratura cristiana, (cf. SPhA 14 (2002) 158), Italian version of the original English book (RRS 9373). The translation is complete and accurate. It contains in addition a useful Appendix which amplifies the original, namely the text and Italian translation of Testimonia de Philone from the first century to 1000 C.E. With respect to the original book, the commentary observes that the German encyclopedia TRE vol. 26 (1996) 523-531 (esp. § 5) mentions it in the bibliography, but ignores its content. In addition, it suggests an addition to the contents, namely the text In Sanctum Pascha of Ps.Hippolytus. The article welcomes the translation, which will extend the reading circle of this fundamental work. (JPM)
J. P. Martín, ‘Proyecto de una traduccdión al castellano de Filón de Alejandría,’ Revista Biblica 65 (2003) 235–239. The article represents the first proposal for a Spanish translation of the Complete Works of Philo of Alexandria, a project which is now in course. The proposal was made by scholars from universities in Spain, Argentina, Chile and Mexico, and was accepted by the Madilene publishing house of Trotta. See further SPhA 15 (2003) 186-187. (JPM)
J. P. Martín, ‘Ricerche sulla tradizione alessandrina in Argentina (1983– 2000),’ Adamantius 9 (2003) 230–250, esp. 234f. In this bibliographical resumé of Argentinian studies on the Alexandrian tradition produced in the last 18 years of the 20th century, 15 titles are mentioned, all of them already commented in R-R, RRS and SPhA vols. 12–15. Occasionally Philo is named in the remaining titles on the Jewish, Christian and Neoplatonic Alexandrian tradition. (JPM)
M. Martin, ‘Philo’s Use of Syncrisis: an Examination of Philonic Composition in the Light of Progymnasmata,’ Perspectives in Religious Studies 30 (2003) 271–297. In contrast to earlier studies on Philo’s use of rhetoric, which have generally referred to rhetorical handbooks for training in ‘the more narrow art of [oral] declamation’ (271), Martin considers Philo in relation to progymnasmata, preliminary exercises for training in written composition. Though only one of the four extant progymnasmata dates from the first century c.e., the later ones (third through fifth centuries c.e.) preserve traditional curricula and are thus relevant. Martin focuses specifically upon the technique of syncrisis, or comparison. The progymnasmata curricula address kinds of comparisons (good with good, bad with bad, good with bad), topics for comparison (goods of the mind, goods of the body, and external goods), representative and numerical comparisons (individual examples or a genus of exemplary members), and ways of organizing larger works (through separate or combined comparisons). Martin provides several Philonic examples of syncrisis to show that Philo, a master of rhetorical skill, reflects familiarity with the range of
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comparisons described in the progymnasmata, particularly in the curriculum represented by Pseudo-Hermogenes (third/fourth century c.e.). (EB)
A. M. Mazzanti, ‘Il dialogo fra l’uomo e Dio in Filone di Alessandria: a proposito di Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 3–33,’ in L. Perrone (ed.), Origeniana Octava. Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 164 (Leuven 2003) 233–244. Extended and heavily annotated reflections on Her. 3–33, concentrating on the anthropological themes of ‘knowing oneself’ (the Delphic oracle), human nothingness and the dialogic relationship with God. Frequent reference is made to other Philonic texts with similar themes, as well as to philosophical and Qumranic texts. The bond that links humans to God can only be expressed in terms of the soul or mind, yet the quest for human salvation through momentary or continual contact with God is not exclusively spiritual. Here lies the heart of the problematics of Philo’s mysticism. (DTR)
A. M. Mazzanti, ‘The “Mysteries” in Philo of Alexandria,’ in F. Calabi (ed.), Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria, Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 1 (Boston-Leiden 2003) 117–129. The author deals with various Philonic passages in which a terminology typical of the mysteries is used. Scholars widely differ in their views, ranging from the claim that Jewish mysteries did exist in the Hellenistic world to the consideration of the use of certain terms only as literary formulae. Philo expresses a negative evaluation of pagan mysteries. The mysteries of God, on the other hand, acquire their value in that they lead to knowledge of the divine. An ethical perfection emerges, determined by the formation of a harmonious ordering of the components of human nature; the perspective is that of a happiness open to all those that seek it. A study of Philo’s ‘mystical’ terminology thus turns out to touch upon fundamental theses of Philonic thought. (HMK, based in part on the editor’s introductory summary)
M. Merino Rodriguez, Clemente de Alejandría: Stromata IV-V; Martirio cristiano e investigación sobre Dios, Introducción, traducción y notas, Fuentes Patrísticas 15 (Madrid 2003). This volume is a continuation of the bilingual edition of Clement of Alexandria (cf. RRS 9657 and SPhA 13 (2001) 269). Taking into account of the research of A. van den Hoek (RRS 8834) it mentions more than hundred Philonic passages as antecedents of Clement’s text. The author emphasizes the influence of Philo in the description of the figure of Abraham in Str. V 8. It is noteworthy that the author identifies Philo with the author whom Clement has in mind when he speaks about hê barbaros philosophia, in Str. V 93.4, (p. 482), although Clement does not name Philo here nor anywhere else in the rest of this volume. It is also pointed out that it is common for Clement to present Philonic ideas as belonging to Plato, e.g. at Str. V 73.3 (p. 447). (JPM)
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S. M. Nadler, ‘Spinoza and Philo; the Alleged Mysticism in the Ethics,’ in J. Miller and B. Inwood (eds.), Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge 2003) 232–250. The author, who is Spinoza’s biographer and a leading exponent of his thought, is strongly opposed to the view that the Dutch–Jewish philosopher’s metaphysics can be seen as a mystically inclined pantheism (or pan-entheism) which was ultimately, if unconsciously, derived from the Kabbalah. One way of illustrating the issues involved is to make a comparison between Spinoza and his distant Jewish predecessor Philo. The main body of the article consists of insightful analyses of the main lines of theological thought espoused by the two thinkers. Philo is a mystic in Nadler’s use of the term for three reasons. The human being requires either divine revelation or an act of divine grace to obtain a true knowledge of God’s existence, but even so the full knowledge of God’s essence simply remains beyond reach. Spinoza on the other hand sees the intellectual love of God as central to the human quest for happiness, but unlike Philo he is supremely confident in the ability of the human being to achieve full understanding of God’s nature without receiving any kind of divine aid. No other philosopher had such optimism in the cognitive powers of the human being. Thus the approaches that the two thinkers develop on the subject of human knowledge of God are diametrically opposed. (DTR)
H. Najman, ‘Cain and Abel as Character Traits: A Study in Allegorical Typology of Philo of Alexandria,’ in G. P. Luttikhuizen (ed.), Eve’s Children. The Biblical Stories Retold and Interpreted in Jewish and Christian Traditions, Themes in Biblical Narrative 5 (Leiden–Boston 2003) 107–118. Najman argues that Philo’s interpretation of Cain and Abel is typological, with Cain representing the type of wickedness, and Abel exemplifying the type of holiness. They are the archetypes of good and evil and their conflict is the conflict between good and evil in every human soul. Cain is a self-lover. He becomes a farmer and is called a tiller of the soil because he refers all things to his own mind, not realising that the land belongs to God. Due to his self-love he does not bring a offer to God immediately. By way of contrast, Abel is a lover of God, as his name signifies (it means ‘one who refers all things to God’). He becomes a shepherd, which is a good preparation for rulership. According to Najman ‘the story of Cain and Able is important because they exemplify the ways in which the archetypes of virtue and vice may come to leave their copies upon the human soul’ (p. 117). (ACG)
H. Najman, Seconding Sinai. The Development of Mosaic Discourse in Second Temple Judaism, Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 77 (Leiden–Boston 2003), esp. 70–107, 126–137. In biblical and para-biblical texts of the Second Temple period, the significance of Moses expands as authoritative laws are amplified and attributed to him and as Moses himself is idealized as an authority figure with several roles. The Book of Deuteronomy is a model for these trends, which characterize what Najman terms ‘Mosaic discourse.’ Four features of this discourse are that the new text that reworks older traditions (1) claims for itself the authority of the earlier traditions; (2) portrays itself as having the status of Torah; (3) re-presents the Sinaitic revelation; and (4) claims a link to or authorship by Moses. Najman examines the Mosaic discourse in Deuteronomy, Jubilees, the Temple Scroll, and
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Philo. The political situation in Alexandria requires Philo to authorize Jewish law for both Jews and non-Jews, which he does in several ways. He presents Mosaic law as superior to laws of all other peoples and claims that it is a copy of the law of nature. In associating Mosaic law with universal concepts like the law of nature, Philo achieves ‘a strikingly original fusion’ (p. 78), in which Mosaic law is not subordinate to the universal ideas. Mosaic law is also not reducible to a written code of rules, because the lives of the patriarchs and of Moses are copies of the law of nature too (p. 99). Philo elevates Moses to a god-like but human figure. Two features that distinguish Philo’s Mosaic discourse from that in other works are that the law of Moses becomes subordinate to the figure of Moses, instead of the other way around, and Philo distinguishes between Mosaic writings and his own interpretations, even though he attributes these interpretations to Moses. Exploring continuities between Second Temple and rabbinic literature, Najman finds, among other things, that it is ‘misleading’ to identify Philo’s notion of ‘unwritten law’ with what came to be known as rabbinic oral law, or Torah she-b’al peh (p. 130). (EB)
H. Najman, ‘A Written Copy of the Law of Nature: an Unthinkable Paradox?,’ in D. T. Runia, G. E. Sterling and H. Najman (eds.), Laws Stamped with the Seals of Nature. Law and Nature in Hellenistic Philosophy and Philo of Alexandria, = The Studia Philonica Annual 15, Brown Judaic Series 337 (Providence RI 2003) 54–63. As with the early Stoics and Cicero, if the superior law of nature is unwritten and transcends the written law of any community, then to link it intimately with the written law revealed by God, as Philo does, can be seen as incoherent and paradoxical. An exploration of Philo’s thinking does not entirely remove the paradox, but it does illuminate an inner logic. To begin, the law of nature and the Law of Moses have the same source and legislator, God. But more to the point both have a similar structure. Just as the law of nature is exemplified, not by a code of actions but by the rational disposition of the sage that enables the sage to act in accordance with the law of nature, so too, the written law of Moses, when read within the context of an interpretive community, is a reminder and expression of the lives of the patriarchs and Moses. (KAF)
M. R. Niehoff, ‘Circumcision as a Marker of Identity: Philo, Origen and Genesis Rabbah on Gen. 17:1–14,’ Jewish Studies Quarterly 10 (2003) 89–123. This article examines the nature of the considerable change in attitude among Jews toward circumcision from the time of Philo to the composition of Genesis Rabbah. Special attention is given to the questions whether and to what extent Christianity played a role and whether rabbinic exegetes knew ecclesiastical positions and responded to them. Tracing exegetical trajectories from Philo through Paul, Justin Martyr and Origen, to the rabbis shows that the parting of the ways between Judaism and Christianity was rather more prolonged and gradual. A detailed exegetical study of Philo’s interpretation of Abraham’s circumcision shows how Philo divorced circumcision from covenant, and yet did not disregard the practice altogether because the practice ultimately restores man’s original virility and his Adamic likeness to the image of God. (KAF)
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J. N. Novoa, ‘The Appropriation of Jewish Thought by Christianity. The Cases of Philo of Alexandria and Leone Ebreo,’ Science et Esprit 55 (2003) 285–296. Philo and Leone Ebreo (ca. 1460-1530) are two examples of Jewish thinkers whose works were embraced primarily by Christians rather than Jews. Although both writers were committed Jews, they believed in ‘the concept of allegory and the layered reading for sacred and profane texts’ (285), and they drew upon non-Jewish ways of thinking in order to make Judaism more intelligible to outsiders and, in Philo’s case, to seek proselytes among them. Philo incorporated Neoplatonic and Stoic ideas, while Ebreo used Patristic thought and the writings of G. Boccaccio on pagan gods. Paradoxically, for this very reason, while not officially banned by their co-religionists these Jewish writers were ‘consigned to irrelevance’ by them (288). Both writers were instead taken up by Christians who were more sympathetic to the outside elements in these Jewish works and who overlooked the original motivations behind these works. Philo was embraced by early Church Fathers and Ebreo by ‘the courtly society of Renaissance Europe’ (285). It was centuries before Jews showed interest in either of these thinkers. (EB)
J. S. O’Leary, ‘Logos and Koinônia in Philo’s De confusione linguarum,’ in L. Perrone (ed.), Origeniana Octava. Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 164 (Leuven 2003) 245–273. The article starts with a discussion of the Logos philosophy existent in Philo’s time and Philo’s ‘triple inflection’ of it: Philo gives the Logos (the intermediary realm between God and his creatures) a personal quality; he inserts Logos-thinking in a context of grace; and he develops the social aspect of Logos, represented by the Law of Moses which enables people to practise philanthrôpia and its synonym koinônia towards one another. O’Leary then offers an profound and detailed analysis of Philo’s De confusione linguarum, starting with of the treatise’s guiding concern (the quest for authentic koinônia and the role of the logos/Logos, and the demonstration that Israel has realized this koinônia more fully than other groups), then exploring Philo’s discussion with his allegorical predecessors regarding the meaning of the Babel story, and finally (the most extensive part of the article) giving an insightful presentation of the line of argument of the treatise. He concludes that, having confounded the false language of false koinônia, God creates a new koinônia. At the end his paper the author poses to the question ‘Can the connection between Logos and koinônia in Philo be seen as a background to the Johannine writings?’ His answer is that the differences between the Philonic and Johannine worlds make direct influence seem implausible; ‘the tried and tested paths of Hellenistic reason, so familiar to Philo, seem unknown to John, whose writings are the utterances of a contemplative community bearing witness to an event of revelation, and contain no metaphysical discussion’ (270). (HMK)
A. Paddle, ‘The Logos as the Food of Life in the Alexandrian Tradition,’ in L. Perrone (ed.), Origeniana Octava. Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 164 (Leuven 2003) 195–200. Although the idea of the Logos as a form of nourishment plays only a relatively minor role in Philo’s thought (especially in the passage Leg. 3.162–178), it nevertheless appears to
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have had a great and long-lasting impact on the Christian theologians. The article traces this impact, commencing with Origen and ending with Cyril of Alexandria. (DTR)
A. Passoni dell’Acqua, ‘Upon Philo’s Biblical Text and the Septuagint,’ in F. Calabi (ed.), Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria, Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 1 (Boston-Leiden 2003) 25–52. The article gives a detailed survey of scholarly work done on Philo’s use of scripture, and in particular on the text he uses when he quotes from scripture. Very few studies have been carried in recent years and it is noted that a number of questions should be revisited, because there are now newer critical editions of the Septuagint available. The author is attracted to the view that scripture and commentary should not be rigorously separated because Philo regards them as intertwined. This view permits him to engage in a free rendering of the biblical text in the course of his commentaries. In an excursus at the end of the article a comparison is made between the Septuagint text in the Göttingen critical edition and the version quoted by Philo in Legum allegoriae I in the texts printed by Colson and the French edition. Some valuable textual observations are made and the following conclusion is reached (p. 52): ‘The fact that the text chosen by Philo largely conforms to the Septuagint leads us to reaffirm, even in a limited study like this, that Philo freely chose which biblical text to follow (either the Septuagint or the Hebrew). (DTR)
Z. Pavic, ‘“Die Archonten des Seins”: Gnostische Weltarchaeologie des “blinden Gottes,”’ Synthesis–Philosophica 18 (2003) 33–62. This paper investigates questions relating to the deprivation of God in the thought of Hans Jonas based on Gnostic writings, in particular on those of Philo Judaeus and those in Nag-Hammadi, and the nihilistic and existentialistic-philosophical implications of the same. In relation to Gnosticism Jonas points to humanity having conceived of itself in late ancient Gnostic teachings as a being based upon oneself, in relation to which God in the universe and in His own creation became excessive. Therefore, such Gnosticism opens the door to a nihilism, which, in its tyrannical reign, poses itself as its own ‘moral law,’ and which at the same time, abolishes any responsibility. Something similar is also valid of an existence that imposes itself, and that, in this self-imposition, rejects all norms and responsibility. (DTR, based on author’s summary)
B. A. Pearson, ‘Cracking a Conundrum: Christian Origins in Egypt,’ Studia Theologica 57 (2003) 61–75. Due to the silence of our sources on the origins of Christianity in Egypt until the early 2nd century, historians have been forced to argue backwards from 2nd century sources. The author, in addition to acknowledging this procedure and thus focusing on the Epistle of Barnabas and the Teachings of Silvanus in this article, also suggests that the first Christians of Egypt were members of the Jewish communities there. Hence he draws on Jewish sources in order to be able to say something on the kind of Jewish religiosity influencing the first Christians in Alexandria. For this purpose Philo is an important source. Accordingly, before commenting of the Epistle of Barnabas and the Teachings of Silvanus, Pearson sketches some issues of Alexandrian Judaism as evidenced in Philo’s works, especially his messianism. Philo is considered a proponent of ‘realized eschatology.’ Finally, when recognizing that we do not know what Philo thought about the Jesus-believing Jews he might have encountered, Pearson suggests that some of them may even have been his pupils. (TS)
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T. Portera, ‘I giganti del Genesi nella lettura ebracia: dall’Apocalittica ad Abravanel,’ Pan 21 (2003) 255–272, esp. 264–267. The author focuses on the interpretation of the Giants in Gen. 6:1-7 and makes reference to Philo’s De gigantibus, and in particular to the theoretical and philosophical aspects of their allegorical interpretation. Philo does not divide the angels into categories (cf. p. 265) and so does not distinguish between fallen and undefiled angels, and so does also not postulate substantial differences between angels, demons and souls. He limits himself to interpreting the biblical passage in an allegorical sense by interpreting the giants as symbols of pleasure. According to Philo, those who carry the title of angels know the daughters of right reason (virtue) but go beyond it to the mortal descendants of human beings, i.e. pleasures. In a word, the Giants represent the hedonists, and for this reason there is not a single trace of superstition or mythology (referring to the myth of the Titans, p. 266) in the Bible. (RR)
H. M. Post, Metaforen van de Ziel. Vrouw en man in de Genesis-exegese van Philo Judaeus en Augustinus (diss. Leiden 2003). This study examines the interpretations of the creation account in Genesis by Philo and Augustine, who both assign a noteworthy role to the soul in creation. In dealing with Philo, Post offers first an introductory section about Philo’s life, writings, and exegetical methods. In Opif. Philo interprets the creation of the world in Platonic terms: God first created the noetic world and afterwards the visible world. The noetic world is placed in God’s Logos. Philo regards the creation of man and woman as the creation of nous (mind) and aisthesis (senses): Man is nous, God’s image, and woman is aisthesis, which belongs the world of becoming. Senses and mind need each other, the nous is made as a help for the mind. According to Post we find here Pythagoras’ Table of opposites: Nous, i.e. man, belongs the realm of the noetic, the good, and the divine. Woman, i.e. the senses, belongs to the earthly and changeable world. As the senses are subordinate to the mind, so woman is subordinate to man. According to Philo, the purpose in life is to become like God. Because God’s image in man is his nous and the senses do not have part in God’s image, woman is left out. Augustine follows Philo in his reading of the creation account. (ACG)
R. Radice, ‘La figura del legislatore in Filone e i suoi precedenti filosofici,’ in S. Barbaglia (ed.), Deuteronismo e sapienza: la riscrittura dell’identità culturale e religiosa di Israele. Atti del XII Convegno di Studi Veterotestamentari (Napoli, 10-12 Settembre 2001) [= Ricerche Storico-bibliche vol. 15] (Bologna 2003) 153–162. The figure of the lawgiver in Philo is studied here especially from the philosophical point of view, comparing it with the similar conceptions found in Plato (both in his ‘idealistic’ phase of the Republic and in his realistic phase in the Laws) and the Stoics. In Plato the idea that the author of the Laws is also the creator of the cosmos is missing, but it would seem to be implicit in the Stoic system (positive law is based on natural law and both depend on the Logos which creates, or rather structures, the cosmos). This correspondence becomes explicit and central in Philo, as indeed it is in Aristobulus. (RR)
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R. Radice, ‘The “Nameless Principle” from Philo to Plotinus: an Outline of Research,’ in F. Calabi (ed.), Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria, Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 1 (Boston-Leiden 2003) 167–182. In this study the author offers a ‘short sketch of one approach to linking Philo to Plotinus on the question of God’s unnameableness, ineffability and unknowableness’ (167). It emerges that the theme of ineffability is rich in meaning. It is connected to two central questions, the (positive) infinity of the Principle and the value and representativeness of a ‘name.’ In relation to the former Philo marks the moment of change within Platonism, while Numenius represents an intermediate position. In relation to the latter Plotinus continues the Platonic tradition, whereas Philo and the Gnostics take a different route based on a strong conception of a name. (DTR)
E. Reinmuth, ‘Wunderbare Geburten. Allegorese biblischer Erzählinhalten bei Philon von Alexandrien,’ in W. Kraus and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Frühjudentum und Neues Testament im Horizont Biblischer Theologie. Mit einem Anhang zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti, WUNT 2.162 (Tübingen 2003) 80–95. The theme of the article is the connection between the biblical story and its allegorical interpretation and the hermeneutical presuppositions used to establish it, i.e. in general terms a discussion of how Scripture should be understood. Reinmuth starts with the examination of Mut. 130-147 (esp. 130-140), the exegesis of Gen 17:6. The Philonic context is the presumed analogy between visible and invisible things, here the topos of the divine creation and miraculous births. Similar structures are found in his Logos-theology. Finally Reinmuth discusses Philo’s views on the authorship of the biblical stories. On the one hand Moses is regarded as author of these texts, on the other hand God himself is the one who reveals them all. This is all connected to the distinction between myth and history, not so much in relation to facts as to the meaning of what happens. Divine activity in history is thus constantly addressed. (GS)
J. N. Rhodes, ‘Diet and Desire; the Logic of the Dietary Laws according to Philo,’ Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses 79 (2003) 122–133. This article deals with Philo’s reading of the dietary laws regarding clean and unclean creatures, and especially the exegetical techniques he uses (Spec. 4.100-118). The author compares Philo’s explanation with the treatment in the Letter of Aristeas. For Philo the overall aim of the dietary prescriptions is the extinction of desire and other passions. The clean aquatic animals, for instance, symbolize freedom from passions, whereas the unclean animals represent a life of pleasure. It is forbidden to eat carnivores because they are wild and agressive, and therefore not suitable for a gentle soul. (ACG)
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C. Ritter, Rachels Klage im antiken Judentum und frühen Christentum: Eine auslegungsgeschichtliche Studie, Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums 52 (Leiden–Boston 2003). This study presents the developmental history (‘Wirkungsgeschichte’) of the story of Rachel (Gen 29-35) and includes a section in Philo’s contribution. Besides a summary of the relevant texts (especially Congr. 24-33 and Ebr. 54) the symbolic allegory of Rachel (a‡syhsiw) is discussed in an excursus. In addition the author reflects on the role and status of women in Philo’s texts. (GS)
L. H. Rivas, ‘La cristología de la Carta a los Hebreos,’ Revista Bíblica 65 (2003) 81–114, esp. 89–98. The author mentions more than thirty Philonic passages to illustrate the context of the Christology of Hebrews, without affirming literary dependency. His particular interest is to show affinities between the figure of Melchidzedek in the Christian text and in Leg. 3, 79 and Fug. 108-110. It is noted that both authors elevate the veneration of the Logos over that of the angels. (JPM)
L. Rosso Ubigli, ‘The Image of Israel in the Writings of Philo of Alexandria,’ in F. Calabi (ed.), Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria, Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 1 (Boston-Leiden 2003) 53–73. Translation and updated version of the article on Philo’s historial and religious conception of Israel was originally published in Italian in 1989; see the summary in RRS 8950. (HMK)
D. T. Runia, ‘The King, the Architect, and the Craftsman: a Philosophical Image in Philo of Alexandria,’ in R. W. Sharples and A. Sheppard (eds.), Ancient Approaches to Plato’s Timaeus, Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement 78 (London 2003) 89–106. There are two traditions on the founding of Alexandria, one that it was planned and built by Alexander himself, the other that he made use of the famous architect Dinocrates of Rhodes. This background is relevant to Philo’s interpretation of the Genesis creation account, in which he makes extensive use of the commentary tradition of Plato’s Timaeus, and in particular to the image that he uses at Opif. 17–18 to illustrate how God created the cosmos. The article gives a translation and detailed analysis of Opif. 15–24, discussing in sequence the interpretation of ‘day one’ in the Genesis account, the noetic cosmos, the role of the noetic cosmos in creation, the contents of ‘day one’ according to Moses, the location of the noetic cosmos, the image itself, the application of the image to the creation of the cosmos, the general interpretation of the passage, and finally a brief treatment of some other related themes. It is argued that Philo in his image tries to have it both ways. In the image the functions of king, architect and builder are kept separate, in its application the persons involved are coalesced, the reason being that Philo refuses to accept a split-level theology in the manner of Middle Platonism. The article concludes with some reflections on Philo’s relation to the development of the Platonist tradition up to his time, and a brief epilogue on the use of Philo’s image in later Christian tradition and by Rabbi Hoshai’a of Caesarea, the friend of Origen (who was no doubt his source). (DTR)
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D. T. Runia, ‘Philo of Alexandria, Legatio ad Gaium 1–7,’ in D. E. Aune, T. Seland and J. H. Ulrichsen (eds.), Neotestamentica et Philonica: Studies in Honor of Peder Borgen, Supplements to Novum Testamentum 106 (Leiden– Boston 2003) 349–370. The prologue of Philo’s Legatio ad Gaium is a remarkable passage which has given rise to a number of interpretative difficulties. The article first outlines various scholarly discussions that have been held about the passage, including whether there is a lacuna between it and the rest of the treatise. The author advocates a contextual reading, in which an attempt is made to relate the theological contents of the passage to the historical/apologetic contents of the rest of the work. This contextual reading takes up the largest part of the paper. It is concluded (p. 369) that the contents of the passage are closely related to the subject matter of the whole work, with as chief theme the role of divine providence. The theological section §§4–7 has a triple purpose: to explain the special relationship between God and Israel; to locate the role of providence within the divine nature; to anticipate the theme of the purported rivalry between God and the megalomaniac emperor Gaius. The text is difficult because Philo does not make all the connections in his train of thought clear, but it is not necessary to conclude that it is incomplete. (DTR)
D. T. Runia, ‘Plato’s Timaeus, First Principle(s) and Creation in Philo and Early Christian Thought,’ in G. Reydams-Schils (ed.), Plato’s Timaeus as Cultural Icon (Notre Dame 2003) 133–151. The aim of the article is to examine the role that Plato’s Timaeus and the tradition of its interpretation played in the questions of first principles and the relation between God and creation in Philo and early Christian thought. First background issues are sketched, including a summary of schemes of first principles in Platonist thought, based on the research of Matthias Baltes. The article then first analyzes a number of Philonic texts, notably Opif. 8, Prov. 1.20–22, 2.50–51. Philo’s thought is continued by Justin and Clement. Characteristic of their views is that matter is not really regarded as a principle in the full sense. God is the sole creator and first principle of reality, but for a philosophical account of created reality something beside God is required. The author uses the term ‘monarchic dualism’ to represent this position. Next the thought of Tatian, Theophilus and Irenaeus is discussed. In their case too there can be no question that matter is not a principle beside God. In their view matter is created by God, i.e. the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, but it is difficult for them to avoid the derivationist language of Platonism when they try to explain how this occurs. The final part of the article gives a brief survey of later treatment of the same question in Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine. It concludes with a question: is it a coincidence that both Platonism and Christian thought give up the basic creational model of the Timaeus involving multiple principles at the same time? (DTR)
D. T. Runia, ‘Theodicy in Philo of Alexandria,’ in A. Laato and J. C. de Moor (eds.), Theodicy in the World of the Bible (Leiden–Boston 2003) 576–604. The chapter forms part of a substantial volume devoted to the theme of theodicy in ancient Near Eastern, biblical and Jewish texts (Greek philosophical texts are conspicuous by their absence). The first part of the article gives background material on Philo and the main features of his Judaism, followed by similar material on theodicy in the Greek philosophical tradition. In the main body of the article texts on the theme in Philo’s writings are analyzed, beginning with his two treatises on Providence, which focus heavily
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on the theme and are strongly indebted to Greek philosophical models, followed by passages from the exegetical works (esp. Opif. 21–23, 72–75, Abr. 143, Praem. 32–34, Det. 47– 49, Post. 8–9, QG 1.76). The final section treats the theme in relation to the contemporary situation of the Jews, as depicted especially in Flacc. and Legat. The author concludes that Philo uses four main strategies in confronting the theological problem of God’s responsibility for evil. Firstly God is consistently dissociated from the causation of any kind of evil. Secondly Philo argues that apparent evils contribute to the good of the whole. Thirdly he is convinced that God in his concern for the world always has positive intentions. Fourthly, when all else fails, he resorts to the argument that God’s ways are inscrutable and only known to Himself. Of these it is the third that has his preference. The emphasis on the pedagogic nature of God’s providential concern for the world was to have a bright future in the Patristic period. (DTR)
D. T. Runia, E. Birnbaum, K. A. Fox, A. C. Geljon, H. M. Keizer, J. P. Martín, R. Radice, J. Riaud, D. Satran, T. Seland, and D. Zeller, ‘Philo of Alexandria: an Annotated Bibliography 2000,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 15 (2003) 109–148. This year’s installment of the yearly annotated bibliography of Philonic studies prepared by the International Philo Bibliography Project primarily covers the year 2000 (84 items), with addenda for the years 1994-99 (5 items), and provisional lists for the years 2000–03. (DTR)
D. T. Runia, G. E. Sterling, and H. Najman, Laws Stamped with the Seals of Nature. Law and Nature in Hellenistic Philosophy and Philo of Alexandria, = The Studia Philonica Annual 15, Brown Judaic Series 337 (Providence RI 2003). This volume, the fifteenth in the continuing series differs a little from the usual format, because its main section consists of six papers presented at a conference at the University of Notre Dame in 2001. As the separate title indicates, the main theme of the Conference was the theory of natural law in Hellenistic philosophy and Philo. The volume also contains a review article on the ancient synagogue, 10 book reviews, and the usual Bibliography section, News and Notes and Notes on Contributors. See summaries under the author’s names elsewhere in this bibliography. (DTR)
M. Salcedo Parrondo, ‘Aplaneis asteres: Las estrellas fijas en Filón de Alejandría,’ Magia y Astrología Antiguas 3 (2003) 217–228. This article is focuses on one section of Plato’s Timaeus of (36c-d) and on Philo’s description of the fixed stars. Its main point is to stress those features on the fixed and everlasting circle in Plato’s account which are used and slightly modified in the Philonic conception of the fixed stars. (JPM)
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E. Salvaneschi, ‘Between Philo and Pindar: the Delos Quotation (Aet. 120–122),’ in F. Calabi (ed.), Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria, Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 1 (Boston-Leiden 2003) 75–89. This paper examines in detail one of the three Philonic quotations of Pindar: Aet. 120122, quoting Pindar’s fr. 33c Snell-Maehler, which is about the transformation of Delos from a wandering to a steady island. After a survey of the Pindaric and extra-Pindaric sources of the myth and a discussion of Philo’s peculiar interpretation of the fragment, the author investigates the Philonic occurrences of the verb ainittesthai (and cognate words): they appear to be a key to an interpretative theory of textual meaning, in which gentile poetical tradition and biblical authority sometimes merge. (HMK, partly based on the editor’s introductory summary)
T. Seland, ‘(Re)Presentations of Violence in Philo,’ in SBL Seminar Papers vol. 42 (Atlanta 2003) 117–140. After some introductory comments on models and perspectives for understanding violence, and a brief presentation of Philo, this essay deals with Philo’s representations of violence under the following headings: ‘Philo as a witness/victim of anti-Jewish violence’ (123-125), and ‘Philo as a witness of intra-Jewish violence,’ the latter including his presentations of ‘some cases of violence in the Hebrew Bible,’ and possible ‘cases of establishment violence’ in his expositions of Spec. (126-140). (TS)
R. Sgarbi, ‘Contributi dalla versione armena al testo filoneo Peri biou theoretikou,’ Aevum 77 (2003) 131–136. The high degree of faithfulness of the Armenian translation of Contempl. to the original Greek text allows the author to reconstruct three passages of the treatise (46.1-8; 46.11-47.5; 47.16-18 CW), both correcting and consolidating the editions of Conybeare, Cohn and Colson. (RR)
F. Siegert, Register zur „Einführung in die Septuagina”: Mit einem Kapital zur Wirkungsgeschichte, Münsteraner Judaistische Studien 13 (Münster 2003). This volume forms a supplement to the author’s Introduction to the Septuagint (on which see SPhA 16 (2004) 256). He first corrects some mistakes and makes some additions to the previous volume. A new chapter deals with the reception of the Septuagint. Philo is one of the first witnesses for the circulation and central role of the Septuagint in Hellenistic Judaism. His knowledge of the Hebrew language is limited to the use of onomastica. It is well known that the Greek Torah, i.e. the Nomos, is at the centre of his exegesis with 1120 citations (against 41 of other Septuagint texts). Siegert notes that Philo’s exegesis of the Psalms tends to a psychological approach. Moreover there are also some first indications of fixed sequences of citations. Philo is characterized as teacher of the laws (cf. 4 Macc. 5:4, Matt. 22:35). See further the review by J. R. Royse, SPhA 15 (2003) 165-169. (GS)
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F. Siegert, ‘“Und er hob seine Augen auf, und siehe”: Abrahams Gottesvision (Gen 18) im hellenistischen Judentum,’ in R. G. Kratz and T. Nagel (eds.), Abraham, unser Vater (Göttingen 2003) 67–85. Philo marks the end of genealogical thinking (see Abr. 31, Congr. 44). His portrait of Abraham reveals him as a symbol of faith. He is the symbol of obedience to the law, indeed he is typified as a ‘living law’ (Abr. 5). Ultimately he is the symbol of knowledge of God (‘Gotteserkenntnis’). The fragments of the treatise De Deo show this through the exegesis of the vision of God in Gen. 18 (especially in §9, 12). It is emphasized that Philo’s Logos-doctrine is the pre-eminent background of Christian Logos-theology (see QE 2.62). All this has value as a good common basis for Christian-Jewish dialogue. (GS)
D. Smith, From Symposium to Eucharist: the Banquet in the Early Christian World (Minneapolis 2003). The author’s explicit hypothesis in this work is that in order to understand any individual instance of formalized meals in the Greco-Roman world, one must first understand the larger phenomenon of the banquet as a social institution. The banquet was namely, according to the author, a social institution that cut across ethnic, religious, and social lines. The study thus intends to define the banquet as a social institution and thereby provide a common model that can be utilized for the study of all data on formal meals from the Greco-Roman world. Having thus defined the banquet, Smith proceeds by investigating and describing the Greco-Roman banquet; the philosophical banquet; the club banquet; the Jewish banquet; the banquet in the churches of Paul; the banquet in the Gospels; and the Banquet and Christian theology. In the chapter on The Jewish Banquet (pp. 133-172), Smith deals with Therapeutae on p. 158–159, providing a quote and some rephrasing comments on the gatherings of the Therapeutae. (TS)
G. E. Sterling, ‘”Philo has not been used half enough”: the Significance of Philo of Alexandria for the Study of the New Testament,’ Perspectives in Religious Studies 30 (2003) 251–269. The title of this article is a quotation from a letter by Samuel Coleridge about the relevance of Philo for understanding the New Testament. The author agrees with Coleridge, affirming that ‘the Philonic corpus is the single most important body of material from Second Temple Judaism for our understanding of the development of Christianity in the first and second centuries’ (252). Following an overview of Philo’s life and works, Sterling argues that Philo was part of ‘a long-standing exegetical tradition’ (263)—as attested by Philo’s own awareness of Jewish exegetical predecessors and by awareness of his works shown in Jewish, pagan, and Christian sources. Sterling then provides specific examples of how Philo can inform understanding of the New Testament: he proposes that Philonic works can shed light on the tension between ontology and eschatology as reflected in 1 Cor. 15:44–49 and Hebrews 8:1–5 and 10:1, on the concept of repentance as discussed in Acts 26:20, and on various aspects of the prologue to the Gospel of John. (EB)
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G. E. Sterling, ‘Universalizing the Particular: Natural Law in Second Temple Jewish Ethics,’ in D. T. Runia, G. E. Sterling and H. Najman (eds.), Laws Stamped with the Seals of Nature. Law and Nature in Hellenistic Philosophy and Philo of Alexandria, = The Studia Philonica Annual 15, Brown Judaic Series 337 (Providence RI 2003) 64–80. The clusters of common ethical laws in Philo’s Hypothetica §7, Josephus’ Contra Apionem §2, and Pseudo-Phocylides point to a common ethical tradition among Diaspora Jews of the Second Temple period. Most likely, the ethical instruction was oral and associated with instruction in the synagogue. As representative of Second Temple Jews, Philo, Josephus and Pseudo-Phocylides knew how to make the hermeneutical move that identified the immutable law of Moses with the immutable law of nature, a move that may have led Philo and Josephus to increase in severity the penalties for violation of the Mosaic law and to use natural law to prohibit homosexual relations. This hermeneutical move gave Jews the opportunity to counter charges of misanthropy and particularism levelled against them. Jews did not practice ridiculous and vulgar customs but the law of God. (KAF)
J. E. Taylor, Jewish Women Philosophers of First-Century Alexandria— Philo’s ‘Therapeutae’ Reconsidered (Oxford 2003). Recognizing the ‘highly rhetorical’ nature of Philo’s idealized presentation of the Therapeutae, Taylor nonetheless believes that he wrote about a real rather than a fictive group, and she aims to establish what can be known about them. In the first part of the book, she explores the historical context of Contempl. (Philo’s primary intended audience, according to her, was the Emperor Claudius and other officials in Rome), the term ‘Therapeutae,’ the Essenes, the geographic and social locations of the group (including maps and photographs of Lake Mareotis and environs), the philosophy of Judaism adhered to by this group, the group’s allegorical and ascetic practices (she identifies the community as extreme allegorizers), and the solar calendar most likely followed by this group. The second part of the book focuses on women and gender in Contempl. Here Taylor considers paradigms of other women philosophers in antiquity (and includes photographs of artistic representations of these figures); Philo’s presentation of the female Therapeutae, or Therapeutrides; his descriptions of communal, personal, and sacred space (with illustrations); and his account of the group’s ‘spiritual and musical/mystical enterprise’ (339). Throughout the book Taylor draws upon other relevant evidence in order to place Philo’s discussions in a larger social, political, and philosophical context. See further the book review by D. M. Hay at SPhA 16 (2004) 290-294. (EB)
J. W. Thompson, ‘Creation, Shame and Nature in 1 Cor 11:2-16: the Background and Coherence of Paul’s Argument.,’ in J. T. Fitzgerald, T. H. Olbricht and L. H. White (eds.), Early Christianity and Classical Culture. Comparative Studies in Honor of Abraham J. Malherbe, Novum Testamentum Supplements 110 (Leiden–Boston 2003) 237–257. This study explores how Paul’s argument in 1 Corinthians 11:2–16 would have been persuasive in its Hellenistic-Jewish context, particularly as it sought to combine appeals to Scripture, shame, and nature. Philo’s perspective offers helpful comparisons to how Paul argues. Both appeal to the created order and its hierarchy of being as the basis for conduct.
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An examination of Philo’s use of kefalhv shows how it signifies both source and sovereignty in a hierarchical relationship that is grounded in creation. (KAF)
H. G. Thümmel, ‘Philon und Origenes,’ in L. Perrone (ed.), Origeniana Octava. Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 164 (Leuven 2003) 275–286. In a brief article the author compares the two Alexandrian scholars and attempts to distinguish their interpretation of the scripture. This is illustrated by their understanding of creation. Philo emphasizes that the cosmos is created by God and that the human beings that live in it can tend to either good or evil. Their life is regulated by the Torah. For Origen creation results in the fall of humanity. Redemption is a ‘returning’ to the vision of God and the relationship with Him. Origen is focused on mission, whereas Philo is focused on tradition and the conviction that God is guides his people. (GS)
P. J. Tomson, ‘When Paul met Peter: Factual Observations about a Fictional Conversation in Alexandria,’ Analecta Bruxellensia 8 (2003) 179–192. In his introduction the author offers some information about North African Jews in the New Testament. It appears that the New Testament is mostly interested in Jews from Cyrenaica. Tomson also briefly deals with Philo’s influence on Christian interpretation of the Bible. Thereafter the author presents a fictional dialogue between Philo and Paul in Alexandria, in which they speak about Jesus’ message and his crucifixion. Philo regards the view that Jesus is the embodiment of the divine Logos as foolish. (ACG)
S. Torallas Tovar, ‘Philo of Alexandria on Sleep,’ in T. Wiedemann and K. Dowden (eds.), Sleep, Nottingham Classical Studies 8 (Bari 2003) 41– 52. The author seeks to find the text in Genesis that Philo commented on in the lost treatise of De somniis. In a well documented analysis she proposes to consider Gen. 26:24 as the object of the commentary of the lost treatise. In this, first of the original trilogy on dreams, the Patriarch Isaac would represent the figure of a man wise by nature, who attains the vita contemplativa. Isaac need neither learning nor exercise, the particular traits of Abraham and Jacob (= extant De somniis 1). He also does not belong to the sensible world of the politician as Joseph does (= extant De somniis 2). The author acknowledges a possible objection for this thesis: Gen. 26:24 is not a dream. But for Philo ekstasis, i.e. direct encounter with God, belongs to typology of dreams. (JPM)
K. J. Torjesen, ‘The Alexandrian Tradition of the Inspired Interpreter,’ in L. Perrone (ed.), Origeniana Octava. Origen and the Alexandrian Tradition, Bibliotheca Ephemeridum Theologicarum Lovaniensium 164 (Leuven 2003) 287–299. The author focuses on the cultural identity and role of the interpreter in the Alexandrian tradition, and aims to demonstrate that the Alexandrian notion of the interpreter unites the roles of prophet, teacher and exegete. Speaking about Philo she discusses Mos. 2.188–191 where he distinguishes three types of oracles to be found in the Holy Scriptures:
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the three types regard different levels of inspiration of the prophet (who as the recipient of revelation can be passive or active to various degrees). In her discussion Torjesen refers to the solutions of Esther Starobinski-Safran, John Levison and David Winston for the difficulties raised by Philo’s view on prophecy and inspiration. She concludes that in the case of Philo the accent falls on the interpreter as prophet: there is a parallel (noted by Levison) between the way Philo presents Moses as prophetic interpreter of the divine will and the way Philo sees himself as prophetic exegete of the Mosaic Law. Origen too sees the interpreter functioning as a prophet, but he identifies prophesying with correct biblical exegesis, so that in his case the accent falls on the interpreter as teacher. (HMK)
L. Troiani, ‘ Il greco degli autori guideo-ellenisti,’ Materia Giudaica 8 (2003) 27–33. Greek is the given language of Hellenistic-Jewish authors, but there were in fact contacts between the Greek-speaking and Hebrew-speaking cultures, even if these have been largely obscured by historians. But this background does not enable us to understand the figure of Philo, who appears to be quite isolated and without roots, like ‘an absolutely anomalous phenomenon.’ At the end of the article the author also devotes some lines to Flacc. and Legat. in order to emphasize their links with the genre of classical oratory. (RR)
L. Troiani, ‘Philo of Alexandria and Christianity at its Origins,’ in F. Calabi (ed.), Italian Studies on Philo of Alexandria, Studies in Philo of Alexandria and Mediterranean Antiquity 1 (Boston-Leiden 2003) 9–24. Translation of an article that originally appeared in Italian; see the summary at SPhA 16 (2004) 261 (where originie in the title should be corrected to origini). (HMK)
J. R. Van Cleave, Plato and Jesus (Philo of Alexandria) (diss. Claremont Graduate School 2003). This thesis examines the theology of the New Testament Gospels, especially that inherent within the parables of Jesus, in light of the soul-based theology of Plato and his followers. It is shown that Jesus’ notion of the Kingdom of God is consistent with Greek philosophy, and is not incompatible with an allegorical notion of Jewish salvation history. The theology of Plato is reconstructed and followed through the Middle Platonic Jewish scholars in Alexandria; in particular, to Philo, and on to Hellenistic Jews in Galilee. The gospel as preached by Jesus can be interpreted using Platonic, as modified by Philonic, theology to understand the Kingdom of God. The interpretation of the New Testament Kingdom of God as being the kingdom of the lovers of wisdom, the philosophers, who emphasize the nourishment of individual human souls by the practice of virtue and the seeking of divine knowledge, is shown to be valid. An exegesis of the Kingdom parables using Hellenistic philosophical doctrine is included. (DTR; based on DAI-A 64-03, p. 944)
G. Veltri, ‘Art. ‘Philon’,’ in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 4. Auflage, Band 6 (Tübingen 2003) 1286–1288. In this newly written article in the recently revised German encyclopedia the author declares Philo as the ‘well-known and influential philosopher and exegete of Judaism.’ His treatises are distinguished in three groups: the historic-apologetical works (Legat. and
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Flacc., the fragments of Hypoth., but not Contempl.); the large number of biblical-exegetical treatises, and finally the philosophical books (Prov. 1-2, Prob., Aet., Anim.). His philosophical influence on Christian thought is emphasized. Especially his views on eudaimonia and the use of the allegoric method are extensively taken over. Philo is declared to be a representative of a successful synthesis of biblical revelation and philosophical tradition. (GS)
H. Weiss, A Day of Gladness: the Sabbath among Jews and Christians in Antiquity (Columbia SC 2003), esp. 32–51. The monograph surveys the ways in which Jews and Christians in antiquity viewed the Sabbath, focusing especially on the religious concerns of the texts which he examines. After discussing the Sabbath in Second Temple synagogue practice and in Qumran, the author turns to Philo. The presentation is essentially the same as the contribution published in the Hilgert Festschrift in 1991 (see summary at RRS 9191). Weiss concludes (p. 51): ‘Philo does not argue the Sabbath. On the basis of the Sabbath he argues for the Jew’s love of wisdom, peace, revelation, prophecy, etc. Philo’s elaboration of the nature of the number seven makes clear that he thinks comprehension is not dependent on ecstatic experience but is within the realm of reason. Thus, while in essence it belongs to the uncreated world, as part of the created world the Sabbath makes possible the contemplative life and fosters peace, freedom, equality, faith, and hope.’ (DTR)
J. Whitlark, ‘Enabling Charis: Transformation of the Convention of Reciprocity by Philo and in Ephesians,’ Perspectives in Religious Studies 30 (2003) 325–357. With an interest in how the first-century audience of the letter to the Ephesians would have understood charis, Whitlark surveys understandings of the term in classical Greek literature and religion, Greco-Roman benefaction, Philo, and Ephesians itself. Classical Greek literature and Greco-Roman benefaction are marked by the convention of reciprocity among humans and—in Greek literature and religion—between humans and gods. Bestowal of charis, which was often merited, led to indebtedness, and the recipient’s gratitude would eventually bring about some kind of reciprocation; lack of reciprocity would incur retribution and dissolve relationships. Augustus was ‘the chief patron and benefactor of the Roman Empire’ and his reign was largely supported through the system of benefaction or patronage (340). Covenantal nomism and a synergistic semi-Pelagianism are two salvational systems based on reciprocity between God and humans. In contrast to all these understandings, Philo’s notion of charis is not based on reciprocity. According to him, God freely gives the universe to all people and virtues to only some; God further enables these latter individuals to maintain a life of virtue. Similarly in Ephesians charis is not based upon reciprocity between God and the saints. Instead God gives them charis ‘both ‘to get in’ and ‘to stay in’ the eschatologically saved community’ (346). (EB)
J. M. Zamora Calvo, ‘La prudencia en el tratado Sobre José de Filón de Alejandría,’ Revista Agustiniana 44 (2003) 623–642. The author analyzes the Philonic treaty De Josepho, especially his last part, and displays considerations about its relative chronology. It studies the figure of politician as oneirocritic, and analyzes the concept of phronêsis as the politician’s virtue—with Aristotelian and Stoic resonances—in opposition to sophia that corresponds at superior level. (JPM)
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D. Zeller, ‘Gott bei Philo von Alexandrien,’ in U. Busse (ed.), Der Gott Israels im Zeugnis des Neuen Testaments, Quaestiones Disputatae 201 (Freiburg–Basel–Wien 2003) 32–57. Starting point for this thematic study is the history of philosophy. Philo depends on Aristotle and the Stoa. In his view the theological vision of God is possible for everyone. To this extent the monotheistic faith of the Jews is a possibility for the non-Jews too (Virt. 65). This means that the idea of God is sown in all people, but some special persons such as Moses can look at God in their own light (see Leg. 1.37, Det. 83-90). The proper knowledge of God comes through abstraction. But Philo needs to transform the literal sense in terms of the fundamental sense, e.g. in the themes of God’s regret or anger in Deus 21-32, 52-69). At first sight Philo’s approach seems to bypass the historical role of Israel. But in other texts (especially in the treatises on the Pentateuch) the importance of Israel and the role of the covenant is emphasized. The Jewish people are in this sense the first-fruits of the whole of humanity offered to God (see Spec. 4.180). Finally some modern theological questions are raised. (GS)
Extra items from before 2003 M. Alexandre Jr, ‘La elaboración retórica en el tratado De vita contemplativa de Filón de Alejandría,’ in H. Beristáin (ed.), El horizonte interdisciplinario de la retórica, Bitácora de Retórica 14 (Mexico City 2001) 79–99. After an introductory section on patterns of argumentation in ancient rhetorical theory and practice, the author presents a rhetorical analysis of the treatise De vita contemplativa. It is shown to have a A B C D E D’ C’ B’ A’ structure, i.e. forming a symmetrically organized whole. A further more detailed analysis is given of §§2–19 and §§40–44. Rather than a philosophical dream (Engberg-Pedersen), the author concludes (p. 96), the treatise is ‘a narrative of something real, a pedagogic and apologetic narrative, with form and content of an epideictic nature.’ Philo uses the techniques of rhetoric in order to offer a spirited defence of a philosophical way of life embodies by these ‘citizens of the heaven and the world’ (§90). The article covers some of the same ground as the English article summarized in SPhA 14 (2004) 236. (DTR)
V. Alfaro Bech, and V. E. Rodríguez Martín, ‘Precedentes de las doctrinas antiastrológicas y antifatalistas de Tertuliano,’ MHNH 2 (2002) 203–220. The writings of Philo and Josephus are among the sources studied in this survey of Jewish and Christian opposition to the doctrines of astrology and fatalism prior to Tertullian. (DTR, based on APh 73-06107)
G. Bolognesi, Studi e ricerche sulle antiche traduzione armene di testi greci (Alessandria 2000). The ancient Armenian translations of Greek texts not only have much to offer for students of inter-linguistic relations, but, as a result of their accuracy, also allow textual critics
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to improve existing Greek texts. In the present collection of articles by the distinguished Italian Armenologist, two studies are reprinted which focus on Philo’s writings: ‘Note al testo armeno del ‘De providentia’ di Filone’ and ‘Frammenti greci di testi filonei e pseudoepicurei in comparazione con le antiche traduzioni armene.’ For summaries see RR 6901 and SPhA 13 (2001) 256. (RR)
M. Idel, ‘On Binary ‘Beginnings’ in Kabbalah Scholarship,’ in G. W. Most (ed.), Historicization – Historisierung, Aporemata 5 (Göttingen 2001) 313–337, esp. 317–318, 334–335. Interesting observations on Wolfson’s theory on the beginnings of Western religious philosophy in which Philo played a central role. Since the American scholar regarded the biblical elements as dominant and the role of Greek philosophy as subordinate, it should be seen as a non-symmetric binary synthesis. Comparison are also made with Scholem’s theory, which attributed a dominant role to Jewish gnosticism. In both cases biographical factors may explain why they sought for beginnings. (DTR)
C. Markschies, ‘Origenes und die Kommentare des paulinischen Römerbriefs – einige Bemerkungen zur Rezeption von antiken Kommentartechniken im Christentum des dritten Jahrhunderts und ihrer Vorgeschichte,’ in G. W. Most (ed.), Commentaries — Kommentare, Aporemata 4 (Göttingen 1999) 66–94, esp. 70–73. Brief remarks on Philo’s role as predecessor of the Patristic biblical commentators. The first real Christian commentator is Origen, but he is more a mystagogue than a philologist. (DTR).
D. Sänger, ‘Torah für die Völker—Weisungen der Liebe: Zur Rezeption des Dekalogs im frühen Judentum und Neuen Testament,’ in H. G. Reventlow (ed.), Weisheit, Ethos und Gebot: Weisheits- und Dekalogtraditionenen in der Bibel und in frühen Judnetum (Neukirchen-Vluyn 2001) 97–146, esp. 104–106. Philo’s exegesis of the Decalogue emphasizes two aspects: first its importance in relation to the other legal regulations; second its role as an abbreviation of the whole Torah, since the other legal injunctions are linked to it (see also the article of U. Kellermann in this same collection, summarized at SPhA 16 (2004) 245). The second—ethical—tablet seems to be more important for him than the first. Nevertheless these systematics do not diminish the Decalogue’s authority. Sänger emphasizes this Jewish background also in the New Testament understanding of the Decalogue. Even if the Decalogue itself is not cited often, it remains the fundamental orientation for ethics. In particular the second tablet was the basis for the dialogue with non-Jews, as is shown by the majority of New Testament texts, in which the Decalogue is cited. (GS)
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A. Vdovichenko, E. D. Matusova et al., Philon Aleksandrijskij. Tolkovanija vetkhogo zaveta [Russian = Philo of Alexandria. Commentaries on the Old Testament], Museum Greaco-Romanum (Moscow 2000). This is a very important publication, since it constitutes the first volume of a planned complete Russian translation of the works of Philo (see announcement in SPhA 10 (1998) 201-202). It first contains a lengthy introduction on ‘Philo as exegete of the Old Testament by E. D. Matusova. Then seven of Philo’s treatises are translated, summarized and commented on. They are De opificio mundi (by A. Vdovichenko), De cherubim (by E. D. Matusova), De sacrificiis (also by E. D. Matusova), Quod deterius (by I. A. Makarov), De posteritate (by I. A. Makarov), De confusione (by O. L.Levinskaja), De congressu (by M. G. Vitkovskaja and V. E. Vitkovsky. The volume is completed with full indices of names, important terms, Greek words, and biblical references. The volume is dated 2000, but in fact did not appear until a few years later. See also the report by V. Zatepin in SPhA 15 (2002) 139-140). (DTR, based on information supplied by the editor)
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 189–204
SUPPLEMENT A Provisional Bibliography 2004–2006 The user of this supplementary Bibliography of very recent articles on Philo is once again reminded that it will doubtless contain inaccuracies and red herrings, because it is not in all cases based on autopsy. It is merely meant as a service to the reader. Scholars who are disappointed by omissions or are keen to have their own work on Philo listed are strongly encouraged to contact the Bibliography’s compilers (addresses in the section Notes on Contributors).
2004 F. Alesse, ‘Il luogo del nous: alcuni aspetti dell’antropologia di Filone Alessandria,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 105–122. M. Alesso, ‘La alegoría de la serpiente en Filón de Alejandría: Legum Allegoriae II, 71–105,’ Nova Tellus 22 (2004) 97–119. —— , ‘La génesis del tiempo en Filón de Alejandría,’ Circe 9 (2004) 16–30. J. A. Antón-Pacheco, ‘El universalismo judeo-helenistico en Filón de Alejandría y Pablo de Tarso,’ Convivium 17 (2004) 167–177. F. Avemarie, ‘Juden vor den Richterstühlen Roms. In Flaccum und die Apostelgeschichte im Vergleich,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 107–126. C. Batsch, ‘Le “pacifisme des Esséniens,” un mythe historiographique,’ Revue de Qumran 21 (2004) 457–468. M. A. Beavis, ‘Philo’s Therapeutai: Philosopher’s Dream or Utopian Construction,’ Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha 14 (2004) 30–42. R. Bees, Die Oikeiosislehre der Stoa. I Rekonstruktion ihres Inhalts, Epistemata: Würzburger Wissenschaftliche Schriften 258 (Würzburg 2004), esp. 77– 84. K. Berthelot, L’«humanité» de l‘autre homme dans la pensée juive ancienne, JSJSup 87 (Leiden–Boston 2004). E. Birnbaum, ‘A Leader with Vision in the Ancient Jewish Diapora: Philo of Alexandria,’ in J. Wertheimer (ed.), Jewish Religious Leadership: Image and Reality (New York 2004) 57–90.
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E. Birnbaum, ‘Portrayals of the Wise and Virtuous in Alexandrian Jewish Works: Jews’ Perceptions of Themselves and Others,’ in W. V. Harris and G. Ruffini (eds.), Ancient Alexandria between Egypt and Greece, Columbia Studies in the Classical Tradition 26 (Leiden–Boston 2004) 125–160. M. Böhm, ‘Abraham und die Erzväter bei Philo: Hermeneutische Überlegungen zur Konzeption der Arbeit am CJHNT,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 377–395. D. Boyarin, ‘By Way of Apology: Dawson, Edwards, Origen,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 16 (2004) 188–217. M. H. Burer, The Historical and Cultural Background of Divine Sabbath Work and its Relationship to Key Controversy Passages in the Gospels (diss. Dallas Theological Seminary 2004). A. Cacciari, ‘Presenze filoniane nelle Omelie su Numeri di Origene,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 217–230. F. Calabi, ‘Les sacrifices et leur signification symbolique chez Philon d’Alexandrie,’ in E. Bons (ed.), «Car c’est l’amour qui me plait, non le sacrifice…» Recherches sur Osée 6:6 et son interprétation juive et chrétienne, JSJSup 88 (Leiden–Boston 2004) 97–117. —— , ‘Ordine delle città e ordine del mondo nel De Decalogo di Filone alessandrino,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29– 30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 139– 158. —— , ‘Ruoli e figure di mediazione in Filone di Alessandria,’ Adamantius 10 (2004) 89–99. —— , ‘Tra Platone e la bibbia: ontologia e teologia in Filone d’Alessandria,’ Oltrecorrente No. 9, October 2004, 47–59. J. Carleton Paget, ‘Jews and Christians in Ancient Alexandria from the Ptolemies to Caracalla,’ in A. Hirst and M. Silk (eds.), Alexandria, Real and Imagined, The Centre for Hellenic Studies, King’s College London, Publications 5 (Aldershot-Burlington 2004) 143-166. N. G. Cohen, ‘The Mystery-Terminology in Philo,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum
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Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 173–187. A. Y. Collins, ‘The Charge of Blasphemy in Mark 14:64,’ Journal for the Study of the New Testament 26 (2004) 379–401. C. P. Cosaert, ‘The Use of “agios” for the Sanctuary in the Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, Philo, and Josephus,’ Andrews University Seminary Studies 42 (2004) 91–103. N. Dax Moraes, ‘Tradição e transformação: a Torah como fundamento do mundo em Fílon de Alexandria,’ Metanoia. Primeiros escritos em filosofia 6 (2004) 7–30. R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr, Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 172 (Tübingen 2004). W. Deming, Paul on Marriage and Celibacy: the Hellenistic Background of 1 Corinthians 7, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids 2004), esp. 87–93. J. M. Dines, The Septuagint, Understanding the Bible and its World (London-New York 2004). G. Dorival, ‘Polysémie et contrarieté de sens chez Philon d’Alexandrie: le cas de kairos et de logos,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 289–294. L. H. Feldman, ‘Philo, Pseudo-Philo, Josephus and Theodotus on the Rape of Dinah,’ Jewish Quarterly Review 94 (2004) 253–277. L. H. Feldman, “Remember Amelek!” Vengeance, Zealotry, and Group Destruction in the Bible, according to Philo, Pseudo-Philo, and Josephus, Monographs of the Hebrew Union College 31 (Cincinnati 2004). L. E. Galloway, Freedom in the Gospel. Paul’s Exemplum in 1 Cor 9 in Conversation with the Discourses of Epictetus and Philo, Contributions to Biblical Exegesis & Theology 38 (Leuven–Paris–Dudley, MA 2004), esp. 103-148. A. C. Geljon, ‘Philo van Alexandrië over de jeugd van Mozes,’ Hermeneus 76 (2004) 182–191. R. Goldenberg, ‘Religious Formation in Ancient Judaism,’ in J. van Engen (ed.), Educating People of Faith (Grand Rapids 2004) 29–47. P. Graffigna, ‘Modelli di vita felice. Felicità e stabilità in Filone d’Alessandria,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 193–215.
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J. Hammerstaedt, ‘Textkritische und exegetische Anmerkungen zu Philo, De Specialibus Legibus II 39-70,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 359–373. D. M. Hay, ‘Philo’s Anthropology, the Spiritual Regimen of the Therapeutae, and a possible Connection with Corinth,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 127-142. B. Heininger, ‘Paulus und Philo als Mystiker? Himmelsreisen im Vergleich (2Kor 12,2–4; SpecLeg 3,1–6),’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 197–204. J. Herzer, ‘Die Inspiration der Schrift nach 2Tim 3,16 und bei Philo von Alexandrien,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 223–240. I. Himbaza, Le Décalogue et l‘histoire due text. Études des formes textuelles du Décalogue et leurs implications dans l‘histoire du texte de l‘Ancient Testament, Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 207 (Fribourg–Tübingen 2004), esp. 98, 167– 171. R. Hoppe, ‘Gerechtigkeit bei Matthäus und Philo,’ in R. Kampling (ed.), “Dies ist das Buch . . .”. Das Matthäusevangelium. Interpretation–Rezeption– Rezeptionsgeschichte. Für Hubert Frankemölle. FS Frankemölle (Paderborn 2004) 141–155. P. W. van der Horst, ‘Philo and the Rabbis on Genesis: Similar Questions, Different Answers,’ in A. Volgers and C. Zamagni (eds.), Eratapokriseis. Early Christian Question-and-Answer Literature in Context, Biblical Exegesis and Theology 37 (Leuven 2004) 55–70. —— , ‘Philo’s In Flaccum and the Book of Acts,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 95–105. L. W. Hurtado, ‘Does Philo Help Explain Christianity?,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 73–92.
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S. Inowlocki, ‘Eusebius of Caesarea’s Interpretatio Christiana of Philo’s De vita contemplativa,’ Harvard Theological Review 97 (2004) 305–328. —— , ‘The Reception of Philo’s Legatio ad Gaium in Eusebius of Caesarea’s works,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 16 (2004) 30–49. H. Jacobson, ‘Philo, Lucretius, and Anima,’ Classical Quarterly 54 (2004) 635–636. —— , ‘A Philonic Rejection of Plato,’ Mnemosyne 57 (2004) 488. A. Kamesar, ‘The Logos Endiathetos and the Logos Prophorikos in Allegorical Interpretation: Philo and the D-Scholia to the Iliad,’ Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies 44 (2004) 163–181. C. Kannengiesser, Handbook of Patristic Exegesis. 2 vols., Handbook of Patristic Exegesis 1 (Leiden–Boston 2004), esp. 176–183. G. Korting, Das Vaterunser und die Unheilabwehr. Ein Beitrag zur §pioÊsionDebatte (Mt 6,11/Lk 11,3), Neutestamentliche Abhandlungen NF 48 (Münster 2004), esp. 248–256, 637–694. A. Kovelman, ‘Continuity and Change in Hellenistic Jewish Exegesis and in Early Rabbinic Literature,’ Review of Rabbinic Judaism 7 (2004) 123–145. C. Kraus Reggiani, ‘La presenza di Dio nella storia secondo Filone di Alessandria,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29– 30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 9– 13. S. Krauter, Bürgerrecht und Kitteilnahme. Politische und kultische Rechte und Pflichten in griechischen Poleis, Rom und antikem Judentum, BZNW 127 (Berlin 2004). G. Lacerenza, ‘Fra Roma e Gerusalemme: l’immagine di Puteoli e dei Campi Flegrei in Filone Alessandrino e in Flavio Giuseppe,’ in L. Cirillo and G. Rinaldi (eds.), Roma, la Campania e l‘Oriente cristiano antico. Atti del Convegno di Studi, Napoli 9–11 ottobre 2000 (Naples 2004) 97–128. R. A. Layton, Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria (Urbana Ill. 2004). J. Leonhardt-Balzer, ‘Creation, the Logos and the Foundation of a City: a Few Comments on Opif. 15-25,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 323–344. J. Leonhardt-Balzer, ‘Der Logos und die Schöpfung: Streiflichter bei Philo (Opif. 20–25) und im Johannesprolog (Joh 1,1–18),’ in J. Frey and U.
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Schelle (eds.), Kontexte des Johannesevangeliums, WUNT 175 (Tübingen 2004) 295–315. C. Lévy, ‘«Mais que faisait donc Philon en Égypte?» À propos de l’identité diasporique de Philon,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 295–312. J. Lierman, The New Testament Moses, WUNT 2.173 (Tübingen 2004). W. Loader, The Septuagint, Sexuality and the New Testament. Case studies on the Impact of the LXX on Philo and the New Testament (Grand Rapids 2004). S. Mancini Lombardi, ‘La traduzione dei composti greci nella versione armena del Legum allegoriae di Filone Alessandrino,’ in V. Calzolari, A. Sirinian and B. L. Zekiyan (eds.), Dall‘Italia e dall‘Armenia. Studi in onre di Gabriella Uluhogian (Bologna 2004) 285–295. —— ,, ‘La versione armena del Legum Allegoriae: osservazioni su alcune particolarità lessicali,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 253–265. J. P. Martín, Teófilo de Antioquía. A Autólico, Introducción, texto griego, traducción y notas, Fuentes Patrísticas 16 (Madrid 2004). E. F. Mason, The Concept of the Priestly Messiah in Hebrews and Second Temple Judaism (diss. Notre Dame 2004). A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi, La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004). A. M. Mazzanti, ‘Creazione dell’homo e rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 75–103. I. Miller, ‘Idolatry and the Polemics of World-Formation from Philo to Augustine,’ Journal of Religious History 28 (2004) 126–145. L. Miralles Macia, ‘La figura del mesías según los historiadores judeohelenísticos Filón de Alejandría y Flavio Josefo,’ Sefarad 64 (2004) 363– 395. B. Motta, La mediazione estrema. L‘antropologia di Nemesio di Emesa fra platonismo e aristotelismo (Padua 2004).
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H. Najman, ‘Early Nonrabbinic Interpretation,’ in A. Berlin and M. Zvi Brettler (eds.), The Jewish Study Bible (New York 2004) 1835–1844. M. Neher, Wesen und Wirken der Weisheit in der Sapientia Salomonis, BZAW 333 (Berlin–New York 2004), esp. 155–163. G. W. E. Nickelsburg, ‘Philo among Greeks, Jews and Christians,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus JudaeoHellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 53–72. M. R. Niehoff, ‘Mother and Maiden, Sister and Spouse: Sarah in Philonic Midrash,’ Harvard Theological Review 97 (2004) 413–444. C. Noack, ‘Haben oder Empfangen: Antithetische Charakterisierungen von Torheit und Weisheit bei Philo und Paulus,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 283–307. K.-H. Ostmeyer, ‘Das Verständnis des Leidens bei Philo und im ersten Petrusbrief,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 265–281. P. Pavone, ‘TÚ pahytÒn, materia preesistente o intero creato?,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 123–136. S. Pearce, ‘Jerusalem as ‘Mother-city’ in the Writings of Philo of Alexandria,’ in J. M. G. Barclay (ed.), Negotiating Diaspora. Jewish Strategies in the Roman Empire, Library of Second Temple Studies 45 (London 2004) 19–36. R. M. Piccione, ‘De Vita Mosis I 60-62: Philon und die griechische paide¤a,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 345–357. P. Pontani, ‘Incontro di lingue e culture: le vicende di alcuni lessemi greci nelle traduzioni armene da Filone,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 267–287.
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U. Poplutz, Athlet des Evangeliums. Eine motivgeschichtliche Studie zur Wettkampfmetaphorik bei Paulus, Herders Biblische Studien 43 (Freiburg 2004), esp. 174–202. R. Radice, ‘Considerazioni sulle origini greche dell’allegoria filoniana,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 15–32. I. Ramelli , G. Lucchetta and R. Radice, Allegoria. Vol. 1, L’età classica, Temi metafisici e problemi del pensiero antico. Studi e testi 98 (Milan 2004). P. Richardson, Building Jewish in the East, JSJSup 92 (Waco TX–Leiden 2004), esp. 151–185. E. Roberts, Philo, Paul, Stoic Paradox (diss. Brown University 2004). G. Roskam, ‘An Unknown Light Enlightened: on an Enigmatic Passage in Philo of Alexandria (QG 3.18),’ Rheinisches Museum 147 (2004) 428–430. J. Rowlandson and A. Harker, ‘Roman Alexandria from the Perspective of the Papyri,’ in A. Hirst and M. Silk (eds.), Alexandria, Real and Imagined, Centre for Hellenic Studies 5 (Burlington, VT 2004) 79-111. J. R. Royse, ‘Jeremiah Markland’s Contribution to the Textual Criticism of Philo,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 16 (2004) 50–60. D. T. Runia, ‘Clement of Alexandria and the Philonic Doctrine of the Divine Power(s),’ Vigiliae Christianae 58 (2004) 256–276. —— , ‘Etymology as an Exegetical Technique in Philo of Alexandria,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 16 (2004) 101–121. —— , ‘A Neglected Text of Philo of Alexandria: First Translation into a Modern Language,’ in E. G. Chazon, D. Satran and R. A. Clements (eds.), Things Revealed: Studies in Early Jewish and Christian Literature in Honor of Michael E. Stone, JSJSup 89 (Leiden 2004) 199–207. —— , ‘Philo of Alexandria,’ in G. R. Evans (ed.), The First Christian Theologians: an Introduction to Theology in the Early Church, The Great Theologians (Malden MA–Oxford–Carlton 2004) 77–84. —— , ‘Quaestiones in Exodum 2.62–68. Supplement to the Philo Index,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 16 (2004) 229–234. D. T. Runia, E. Birnbaum, K. A. Fox, A. C. Geljon, H. M. Keizer, J. P. Martín, R. Radice, J. Riaud, D. Satran, G. Schimanowski and T. Seland, ‘Philo of Alexandria: an Annotated Bibliography 2001,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 16 (2004) 235–280. D. T. Runia and G. E. Sterling, The Studia Philonica Annual, Vol. 16, Brown Judaic Studies 339 (Providence RI 2004). H. Savon, ‘Remploi et transformation de thèmes philoniens dans la
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première lettre d’Ambroise à Just.,’ in B. Gain, P. Jay and G. Nauroy (eds.), Chartae caritatis: Études de patristique et d’Antiquité tardove offertes à Yves-Marie Duval (Paris 2004). B. Schaller, ‘Adam und Christus bei Paulus. Oder: Über Brauch und Fehlbrauch von Philo in der neutestamentlichen Forschung,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus JudaeoHellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 143–153. C. Schiano, ‘Dal dialogo al trattato nella polemica antigiudaica. Il Dialogo di Papisco e Filone e la Disputa contro i giudei di Anastasio abate,’ Vetera Christianorum 41 (2004) 121–150. G. Schöllgen (ed.), Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum (Stuttgart 2004) Band 20. H. Ohme, art. Kanon I (Begriff), 1–28, esp. 7–8 (Canon I, as concept); K. S. Frank, art. Klausur, 1233–57, esp. 1239 (seclusion).
D. S. Schwartz, ‘Did the Jews Practice Infant Exposure and Infanticide in Antiquity?’ The Studia Philonica Annual 16 (2004) 61–95. A. F. Segal, Life after Death: a History of the Afterlife in Western Religion (New York 2004), esp. 368–375. T. Seland, ‘The Moderate life of the Christian paroikoi: A Philonic reading of 1 Pet 2:11,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 241–264. G. Sellin, ‘Einflüsse philonischer Logos-Theologie in Korinth: Weisheit und Apostelparteien (1Kor 1–4),’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 165–172. J. Sfarmeni Gasparro, ‘Mosè e Balaam, Propheteia e Mantiké. Modalità e segni della rivelazione nel De Vita Mosis,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 33–75. F. Siegert, ‘Der Logos, «älterer Sohn» des Schöpfers und «zweiter Gott». Ein Erinnerung an Philon,’ in J. Frey and U. Schelle (eds.), Kontexte des Johannesevangeliums, WUNT 175 (Tübingen 2004) 277–294. —— , ‘Die Inspiration der Heiligen Schriften: Ein philonisches Votum zu 2Tim 3,16,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue
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Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 205–222. —— , ‘Sara als vollkommene Frau bei Philon,’ in R. Kampling (ed.), Sara lacht. . . Eine Erzmutter und ihre Geschichte. Zur Interpretation und Rezeption der Sara-Erzählung (Paderborn 2004) 109–129. H. J. Spierenburg, ‘Philo Judaeus over filosofie, wijsheid en intelligentie,’ Prana: Tijdschrift voor spiritualiteit en randgebieden der wetenschappen 142 (2004) 82–85. J. Starr and T. Engberg-Pedersen, Early Christian Paraenesis in Context, BZNW 125 (Berlin–New York 2004). G. E. Sterling, ‘The Place of Philo of Alexandria in the Study of Christian Origins,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 21–52. —— , ‘Was there a Common Ethic in Second Temple Judaism?,’ in J. J. Collins, G. E. Sterling and R. A. Clements (eds.), Sapiential Perspectives: Wisdom Literature in Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls. Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium of the Orion Center, 20–22 May 2001 (Leiden etc. 2004) 171–194. G. A. G. Stroumsa, ‘Christ’s Laughter: Docetic Origins Reconsidered,’ Journal of Early Christian Studies 12 (2004) 267–288. K. P. Sullivan, Wrestling with Angels: A Study of the Relationship between Angels and Humans in Ancient Jewish Literature and the New Testament, AGAJA 55 (Leiden-Boston 2004), esp. 216–219. J. Taylor, Pythagoreans and Essenes: Structural Parallels, Collection de la Revue des Etudes Juives 32 (Paris 2004), esp. 89–91. J. E. Taylor, ‘The Women “Priests’ of Philo’s De Vita Contemplativa. Reconstructing the Therapeutae,’ in J. Schaberg, A. Bach and E. Fuchs (eds.), On the Cutting Edge. The Study of Women in Biblical Worlds. Essays in Honor of Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (London 2004) 102–122. C. Termini, ‘Dal Sinai alla creazione: il rapporto tra legge naturale e legge rivelata in Filone di Alessandria,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 159–191. C. Termini, ‘Taxonomy of Biblical Laws and filotexn¤a in Philo of Alexandria: A Comparison with Josephus and Cicero,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 16 (2004) 1–29.
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F. Thome, Historia contra Mythos. Die Schriftauslegung Diodors von Tarsus und Theodors von Mopsuestia im Widerstreit zu Kaiser Julians und Salustius‘ allegorischem Mythenverständnis, Hereditas. Studien zur Alten Kirchengeschichte 24 (Bonn 2004), esp. 142–148. M. A. Tolbert, ‘Philo and Paul: The circumcision debates in Early Judaism,’ in F. Crüsemann (ed.), Dem Tod nicht glauben. Sozialgeschichte der Bibel. Festschrift für Luise Schottroff zum 70. Geburtstag (Gütersloh 2004) 394–407. L. Troiani, ‘Natura e storia politica in Filone d'Alessandria,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 1–8. G. Uluhogian, ‘Un testo medievale armeno su Filone,’ in A. M. Mazzanti and F. Calabi (eds.), La rivelazione in Filone di Alessandria: natura, legge, storia. Atti del VII convegno di studi del Gruppo Italiano di Ricerca su Origene e la traditione alessandrina (Bologna 29–30 settembre 2003), Biblioteca di Adamantius 2 (Villa Verruchio 2004) 249–253. J. A. Waddell, ‘Will the Real Judaism Please Stand up? Ritual Self-definition as Ideological Discourse from Qumran to Jerusalem,’ Henoch 26 (2004) 3–23. K. L. Waters, ‘Saved through Childbearing: Virtues as Children in 1 Timothy 2:11–15,’ Journal of Biblical Literature 123 (2004) 703–735. C. Werman, ‘God's House: Temple and Universe,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 309–320. J. Wyrick, The Ascension of Authorship: Attribution and Canon Formation in Jewish, Hellenistic, and Christian Traditions, Harvard Studies in Comparative Literature 49 (Cambridge–London 2004), esp. 257ff. D. Zeller, ‘Philonische Logos-Theologie im Hintergrund des Konflikts von 1Kor 1–4?,’ in R. Deines and K.-W. Niebuhr (eds.), Philo und das Neue Testament: Wechselseitige Wahrnehmungen. 1. Internationales Symposium zum Corpus Judaeo-Hellenisticum Novi Testamenti (Eisenach/Jena, Mai 2003), WUNT 172 (Tübingen 2004) 155–164.
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2005 J. Arieti, Philosophy in the Ancient World: an Introduction (Lanham MD 2005), esp. 299–310. H. Attridge, ‘Philo and John: Two Riffs on One Logos,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 17 (2005) 103–117. M. Böhm, Rezeption und Funktion der Vätererzählungen bei Philo von Alexandria. Zum Zusammenhang von Kontext, Hermeneutik und Exegese im frühen Judentum, Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche 128 (Berlin–New York 2005). L. Brisson, Introduction à la philosophie du mythe. I Sauver les mythes (Paris 2005), esp. 86–89. F. Calabi, Filone di Alessandria De Decalogo, Philosophica 24 (Pisa 2005). N. Calvert-Koyzis, Paul, Monotheism and the People of God: The Significance of Abraham Traditions for Early Judaism and Christianity, JSNTSup 272 (London 2005). L. Carlsson, Round Trips to Heaven. Otherworldly Travelers in Early Judaism & Christianity, Lund Studies in History of Religions 19 (Stockholm 2005). J. Dillon, ‘Cosmic Gods and Primordial Chaos in Hellenistic and Roman Philosophy: the Context of Philo’s Interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus and the Book of Genesis,’ in G. H. van Kooten (ed.), The Creation of Heaven and Earth: Re-interpretations of Genesis 1 in the Context of Judaism, Ancient Philosophy, Christianity, and Modern Physics, Themes in Biblical Narrative: Jewish and Christian Traditions 8 (Leiden–Boston 2005) 97–108. A. C. Dinan, Fragments in Context: Clement of Alexandria’s Use of Quotations from Heraclitus (Philo of Alexandria, Plutarch, Greece) (diss. Catholic University of Washington 2005). A. C. Fellows, Growth of Religion as Affected by Culture: how the Greek and Jewish Diaspora Cultures Preserved in Philo of Alexandria's Writings have Influenced the Development of Christianity (diss. Boston University 2005). K. Fuglseth, Johannine Sectarianism in Perspective : a Sociological, Historical, and Comparative Analysis of Temple and Social Relationships in the Gospel of John, Philo, and Qumran, NTSup 119 (Leiden–Boston 2005). A. C. Geljon, ‘Divine Infinity in Gregory of Nyssa and Philo of Alexandria,’ Vigiliae Christianae 59 (2005) 152–178. R. Goulet, ‘Allégorisme et anti-allégorisme chez Philon d’Alexandrie,’ in G. Dahan and R. Goulet (eds.), Allégorie des poètes allégorie des philosophes: études sur la poétique et l’herméneutique de l’allégorie de l’Antiquité à la Réforme (Paris 2005) 59–87.
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S. Grindheim, The Crux of Election: Paul's Critique of the Jewish Confidence in the Election of Israel, WUNT 2.202 (Tübingen 2005), esp. 69–75. C. T. R. Hayward, Interpretations of the Name Israel in Ancient Judaism and Some Early Christian Writings: From Victorious Athlete to Heavenly Champion (Oxford 2005). A. Hilhorst, ‘‘And Moses Was Instructed in All the Wisdom of the Egyptians’ (Acts 7.22),’ in A. Hilhorst and G. H. van Kooten (eds.), The Wisdom of Egypt: Jewish, Early Christian, and Gnostic Essays in Honour of Gerard P. Luttikhuizen, Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity 59 (Leiden–Boston 2005) 153–176. M. Himmelfarb, ‘The Torah between Athens and Jerusalem: Jewish Difference in Antiquity,’ in C. Bakhos (ed.), Ancient Judaism in its Hellenistic Context (Leiden–Boston 2005) 113–129. R. Hirsch-Luipold, ‘Der eine Gott bei Philon von Alexandrien und Plutarch,’ in R. Hirsch-Luipold (ed.), Gott und die Götter bei Plutarch. Götterbilder—Gottesbilder—Weltbilder (Berlin 2005) 141–168. A. Kerkeslager, ‘The Absence of Dionysios, Lampo, and Isidoros from the Violence in Alexandria in 38 c.e.,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 17 (2005) 49–94. J. Klawans, Purity, Sacrifice, and the Temple: Symbolism and Supersessionism in the Study of Ancient Judaism (Oxford 2005). G. H. van Kooten, ‘The ‘True Light which enlightens everyone’ (John 1:9): John, Genesis, the Platonic Notion of the ‘True, Noetic Light,’ and the Allegory of the Cave in Plato’s Republic,’ in G. H. van Kooten (ed.), The Creation of Heaven and Earth: Re-interpretations of Genesis 1 in the Context of Judaism, Ancient Philosophy, Christianity, and Modern Physics, Themes in Biblical Narrative: Jewish and Christian Traditions 8 (Leiden–Boston 2005) 149–194, esp. 153–155. A. Kovelman, Between Alexandria and Jerusalem: the Dynamic of Jewish and Hellenistic Culture, The Brill Reference Library of Judaism 21 (Leiden– Boston 2005). C. Lévy, ‘Deux problèmes doxographiques chez Philon d’Alexandrie: Posidonius et Enésidème,’ in A. Brancacci (ed.), Philosophy and Doxography in the Imperial Age, Accademia Toscana di Scienze e Lettere «La Colombaria» Studi 228 (Florence 2005) 79–102. J. P. Martín, ‘Corrientes hermenéuticas de la época patrística,’ in A. J. Levoratti (ed.), Comentario Bíblico Latinoamericano, Antiguo Testamento I (Estella 2005) 105–127. —— , ‘Teoría, técnica y práctica de la hermenéutica en Filón,’ in A. J. Levoratti (ed.), Comentario Bíblico Latinoamericano, Antiguo Testamento I (Estella 2005) 95–104.
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H. Morowitz, ‘The Debate between Science and Religion: Exploring Roads less well Traveled,’ Zygon 40 (2005) 51–56. M. R. Niehoff, ‘Response to Daniel S. Schwartz,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 17 (2005) 99–101. E. F. Osborn, Clement of Alexandria (Cambridge 2005), esp. 81–105. M. Pesthy, ‘’Mulier est instrumentum diaboli’: Women and the Desert Fathers,’ in A. Hilhorst and G. H. van Kooten (eds.), The Wisdom of Egypt: Jewish, Early Christian, and Gnostic Essays in Honour of Gerard P. Luttikhuizen, Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity 59 (Leiden–Boston 2005) 351–362. F. Philip, The Origins of Pauline Pneumatology: The Eschatological Bestowal of the Spirit upon Gentiles in Judaism and the Early Development of Paul’s Theology, WUNT 2.194 (Tübingen 2005), esp. 100–119. I. Rosen–Zwi, ‘Joining the Club: Tannaitic Legal Midrash and Ancient Jewish Hermeneutics,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 17 (2005) 153–160. J. R. Royse, ‘Three More Spurious Fragments of Philo,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 17 (2005) 95–98. D. T. Runia, ‘A Conference on Philo in Germany,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 17 (2005) 141–152. D. T. Runia, E. Birnbaum, K. A. Fox, A. C. Geljon, H. M. Keizer, J. P. Martín, R. Radice, J. Riaud, D. Satran, G. Schimanowski and T. Seland, ‘Philo of Alexandria: an Annotated Bibliography 2002,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 17 (2005) 161–214. D. T. Runia and G. E. Sterling, The Studia Philonica Annual, vol. 17, Brown Judaic Studies 344 (Providence RI 2005). K. Schenck, A Brief Guide to Philo (Louisville 2005). T. Seland, Strangers in the Light: Philonic Perspectives on Christian Identity in 1 Peter, Biblical Interpretation Series 76 (Boston–Leiden 2005). F. Shaw, ‘The Emperor Gaius’ Employment of the Divine Name,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 17 (2005) 33–48. R. Skarsten, P. Borgen and K. Fuglseth, The Complete Works of Philo of Alexandria: A Key-Word-In-Context Concordance (Piscataway NJ 2005). G. E. Sterling, ‘‘Day One’: Platonizing Exegetical Traditions of Genesis 1:15 in John and Jewish Authors,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 17 (2005) 118– 140. —— , ‘“The Jewish Philosophy”: the Presence of Hellenistic Philosophy in Jewish Exegesis in the Second Temple Period,’ in C. Bakhos (ed.), Ancient Judaism in its Hellenistic Context (Leiden–Boston 2005) 131–153. C. Termini, ‘Tipologías de filiación en Filón de Alejandría,’ in J. J. A. Calvo, P. de N. Benlloch and M. A. Esnaola (eds.), Filiación: Cultura pagana, religión de Israel, orígenes del cristianismo. Actas de las I y II Jornadas
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de Estudio «La filiación en lo inicios de la reflexión cristiana», Colección Estructuras y Procesos: Serie Religión (Madrid 2005) 73–88. S. Vidal, Filón de Alejandría, Los terapeutas, De vita contemplativa, Texto griego con introducción, traducción y notas (Salamanca 2005). S. Weitzman, Surviving Sacrilege: Cultural Persistence in Jewish Antiquity (Cambridge Mass. 2005), esp. 58–75. W. T. Wilson, ‘Pious Soldiers, Gender Deviants, and the Ideology of Actium: Courage and Warfare in Philo’s De Fortitudine,’ The Studia Philonica Annual 17 (2005) 1–32. A. T. Wright, The Origin of Evil Spirits: The Reception of Genesis 6.1–4 in Early Jewish Literature, WUNT 2.198 (Tübingen 2005), esp. 191–219. B. G. Wright, ‘Translation as Scripture: The Septuagint in Aristeas and Philo,’ in W. Kraus and R. G. Wooden (eds.), Septuagint Research: Issues and Challenges in the Study of the Greek Jewish Scriptures (Atlanta 2005) 45– 59.
2006 A. Birkan-Shear, ‘“Does a Serpent Give Life?” Understanding The Brazen Serpent According to Philo and Early Rabbinic Literature,’ in I. H. Henderson and G. S. Oegema (eds.), The Changing Face of Judaism, Christianity, and Other Greco-Roman Religions in Antiquity (= FS Charlesworth), Studien zu den Jüdischen Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit Band 2 (Gütersloh 2006) 416–426. E. Birnbaum, ‘Two Millennia Later: General Resources and Particular Perspectives on Philo the Jew,’ Currents in Biblical Research 4 (2006) 241– 276. S. Dimattei, ‘Paul’s Allegory of Two Covenants (Gal. 4.21-31) in Light of First-Century Hellenistic Rhetoric and Jewish Hermeneutic,’ New Testament Studies 52 (2006) 102–122. A. C. Geljon, ‘Philo en de kerkvaders,’ Schrift no. 223 (2006) 26–30. S. Inowlocki, Eusebius and the Jewish Authors: His Citation Technique in an Apologetic Context, Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity 64 (Leiden– Boston 2006). H. M. Keizer, ‘Philo en het Nieuwe Testament,’ Schrift no. 223 (2006) 21–25. A. Kerkeslager, ‘Agrippa and the Mourning Rites for Drusilla in Alexandria,’ Journal for the Study of Judaism 37 (2006) 367–400. C. Lévy, ‘Philon et les passions,’ in L. Ciccolini (ed.), Receptions antiques: Etudes de littérature anciennes, Etudes de litterature ancienne 16 (Paris 2006) 27–41.
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G. P. Luttikhuizen, Gnostic Revisions of Genesis Stories and Early Jesus Traditions, Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies 58 (Leiden–Boston 2006). D. T. Runia, ‘Philo – een introductie,’ Schrift no. 223 (2006) 3–11. G. Veltri, Libraries, Translations, and 'Canonic' Texts: The Septuagint, Aquila and Ben Sira in the Jewish and Christian Traditions, JSJSup 109 (LeidenBoston 2006).
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BOOK REVIEW SECTION
Jennifer M. Dines, The Septuagint. London: T&T Clark, 2004. xvii + 196 pages. ISBN 0-567-08464. Price $25.95. If one of the hallmarks of an academic discipline is the steady appearance of introductions, then Septuagint Studies has indeed come of age. The last two decades have seen a handful of publications in this genre.1 With Jennifer Dines’ The Septuagint, however, we now have an introduction that might not unfairly be termed popular.2 To call it such is not to diminish the achievement of the author. On the contrary, Dines proves herself a capable guide to current developments in the field. But for this compact survey she set herself the task of writing not so much for the specialist as for the common reader. Knowledge of Greek and Hebrew is not presupposed. There is little detailed textual analysis. Conversely, much attention is given to the historical origins of the text and attitudes towards it in antiquity, topics calculated to arrest the attention of newcomers to the discipline. But while the book is accessible, it does not popularize; few will feel intellectually short-changed. Dines draws us into the thick of contemporary scholarly debate and shows why it matters. As such, her book is a fitting addition to the T&T Clark series, Understanding the Bible and its World, edited by Michael Knibb, which aims to meet the needs of both introductory level students as well as a more general readership. To my mind, Dines has done this admirably well. So too, she has made an important contribution to the field by opening it up to non-specialists. Dines starts by posing the question, “What is the Septuagint?,” which leads into a discussion of the primary sources: manuscripts and editions 1 M. Harl, G. Dorival and O. Munnich, La Bible Grecque des Septante: Du judaïsme hellénistique au christianisme ancien (Paris: Cerf, 1988); M. Cimosa, Guida allo studio della bibbia greca (LXX). Storia–lingua–testi (Roma: Società Biblica Britannica & Forestiera, 1995); N. Fernández Marcos, Introducción a las Versiones griegas de la Biblia (2nd ed.; Madrid: Instituto de Filología del CSIC, 1998); K. H. Jobes and M. Silva, Invitation to the Septuagint (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000); F. Siegert, Zwischen hebräischer Bibel und Altem Testament: eine Einführung in die Septuaginta, Münsteraner Judaistische Studien, 9 (Münster: LIT 2001). 2 This is only to say that it is has a wider appeal than the standard works. Here we may distinguish the recent introductions by their target markets: 1) biblical specialists (e.g. Fernández Marcos), 2) students with some degree of formal training in biblical studies (e.g. Jobes and Silva), and 3) students of biblical literature at various levels (Dines).
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(ch. 1). Beginning thus allows her to introduce a key emphasis within her overall presentation, the heterogeneity of the textual evidence.3 This not only raises early on the key topics of revision and recension but also the thorny question of whether there existed rival translations for some of the books. A brief survey of the earliest Jewish witnesses is welcome, although the suggestion that P. Bodmer XXIV (Ra 2110) is Jewish comes as a surprise and cries out for citation (5).4 As a general criticism, I found Dines’ citation of the secondary literature to be a little uneven. While at times she is very generous, elsewhere she holds back unexpectedly.5 The opening chapter ends with an overview of the contents of the Septuagint, in which a thumbnail characterization is provided for each book. The question of origins is next taken up. Following a deft treatment of Pseudo-Aristeas and Aristobulus (ch. 2), whose fictions offer us insight into the early reception of the Septuagint, Dines turns to more recent myths of origin—those of contemporary scholarship (ch. 3). The relatively large amount of space devoted to this topic (27–62) is entirely warranted. How one conceptualizes the historical relationship between a translation and its parent has immense implications for what one makes of the text, and, as it happens, there is today profound disagreement within Septuagint Studies on this very point. As Dines observes, scholars are drawing opposite conclusions from the same translations (57). One might well speak of rival theoretical frameworks: on the one hand, the so-called interlinear paradigm, which views a relationship of formal dependence between the target and its source to be typical of the Septuagint corpus; on the other, those who see the Greek text as an independent literary product.6 Dines offers a
3 The issue of textual complexity is revisited in ch. 4, 58ff, where the rival positions of P. de Lagarde and P. Kahle are treated, and then again in ch. 5, where it is discussed against the background of the textual history of the Greek versions. 4 Dines refers to the work of R. Kraft, but I could not find Ra 2110 on his list of putative Jewish manuscripts. See http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/rs/rak/earlylxx/jewishpap. html. 5 E.g. her discussion of E. Tov’s theory of partial revision in LXX-Jer lacks a citation (23). 6 The existence of incommensurable views on fundamental issues was especially evident in the proceedings of the Panel on Modern Translations of the Septuagint, held at the Tenth Congress of the IOSCS in Oslo, 31 July 1998, where the principles underlying two major translation projects, the New English Translation of the Septuagint and La Bible d’Alexandrie were discussed by prominent members of the field. See B. A. Taylor, ed., Tenth Congress of the International Organization for Septuagint and Cognate Studies, Oslo, 1988, (SBLSCS 51; Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2001). For the interlinear paradigm, see A. Pietersma and B. Wright, “To the Reader of NETS,” in A. Pietersma, A New English Translation of the Septuagint: The Psalms (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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relatively balanced introduction to the debate; while inclining in favour of those who see a conscious literary development in the texts, she attempts to give interlinearity its due. Her discussion of style is altogether apropos (54ff.). Here she draws upon her own work, analyses of Amos 1:3–2:6 and Genesis 1:2 which would suggest that literary features were introduced into the Greek text; to the extent that this is so, it might count against the assumption of interlinearity.7 Yet while ad hoc studies of this sort point to an important line of research, they are hardly decisive. As Dines is undoubtedly aware (cf. ch. 6), what is required is detailed textual linguistic analysis coupled with the study of translation technique. A principled theory of origins will then attempt to account for the interrelationship of the two. It will need to accommodate both the sort of deliberate literary development evident in passages such as the ones discussed by Dines, as well as the high tolerance for unintelligibility attested elsewhere in the corpus—what Martin Flashar long ago called Verlegenheitsübersetzungen.8 In chapter four, Dines looks at the status of the Septuagint in antiquity, in effect resuming the narrative begun with her discussion of PseudoAristeas. The lesson here is that the value (or function) of a text is by no means the same for all times and places; a point worth stressing, especially for those who remain under the spell of Aristeas. This section goes some way towards providing an historical context for the reception history of the text. Next is a survey of textual developments up to the fifth century c.e. (ch. 5). The complexity of the evidence is rightly stressed, in particular the existence of antecedents to the so-called Hexaplaric Versions, which receive a surprisingly full discussion. The topics of language and style (by which Dines means translation technique) are taken up in the penultimate chapter (ch. 6). As the two are inextricably bound up with one another, it is right that they be treated together. Dines focuses on the all important question of linguistic interference from the source texts. To what extent is it tolerated by the translators and to what end? This leads nicely into a treatment of translation technique, where it is emphasized that the statistical analysis of linguistic features forms only part of the picture; a priori assumptions regarding the
7 For Amos 1:3–2:6, Dines draws on her 1992 University of London dissertation, “The Septuagint of Amos: A Study in Interpretation.” For Gen 1:2, see J. Dines, “Imaging Creation: The Septuagint Translation of Genesis 1:2,’ HeyJ 36 (1995): 439–50. 8 See M. Flashar, “Exegetische Studien zum Septuagintapsalter,’ ZAW 32 (1912): 81– 116, 161–89, 241–68.
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relationship between the target and its source play a constitutive role in scholarly characterization of the texts. In this regard, Dines adverts to the increasing polarization within the field between the maximalists and the minimalists, i.e. those who view a given translation as exegetically engaged with its parent and those who demur (126).9 Dines’ final chapter looks at the use of the Septuagint, ancient and modern. When she turns to the topic of interpretative elements, it receives a very brief treatment, which is bound to disappoint some (131–35). While a good sense of the methodological problems inherent in this sort of undertaking is conveyed, more attention might have been given to the substantive claims made by recent exegetes and the question of how they are to be evaluated. Here too the debate between the maximalists and minimalists could have been revisited. To conclude, this book is a highly readable foray into what is still in some respects a frontier region within biblical studies. Dines writes in a pleasing and unaffected style. The selected bibliographies will be of great assistance to students, as will the indices. Given the small size of the book, it is not surprising to find gaps in the presentation.10 Thus relatively little is said about textual criticism (still the backbone of the discipline). Dines very seldom walks the reader through an analysis of the text. Yet one can hardly fault her there; space was no doubt at a premium. She has written a compact and engaging first-introduction to Septuagint Studies, one which will no doubt become a popular choice for instructors.
Cameron Boyd-Taylor University of Toronto
9 This polarization is seen in the debate occasioned by M. Rösel’s article, “The TextCritical Value of Septuagint-Genesis,” BIOSCS 31 (1998): 62–70. Rösel views the text as documenting an early stage of exposition. R. Hendel, ”On the Text-Critical Value of Septuagint Genesis: A Reply to Rösel,” BIOSCS 32 (1999): 31–34, argues in turn that such a position is falsified by the translation technique and verbal makeup of the Greek text. See also W. P. Brown, “Reassessing the Text-Critical Value of Septuagint-Genesis 1: A Response to Martin Rösel,” ibid., 35–39. It should be noted that the terms “maximalist” and “minimalist” are not used by Dines as such. 10 This is compensated for by the many references to other introductory works, in particular that of Karen Jobes and Moises Silva; students with some background in Greek and Hebrew will want to follow up on them.
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Gilbert Dahan et Richard Goulet (sous la direction de), Allégorie des poètes. Allégorie des philosophes. Études sur la poétique de l’herméneutique de l’allégorie de l’Antiquité à la Réforme, Textes et Traditions. Paris : Librairie philosophique J. Vrin, 2005. 346 pages. ISBN 2-7116-1762-9. Price €28. Les treize études regroupées dans ce beau volume sont issues d’une table ronde internationale organisée par l’Institut des traditions textuelles (FR 33 du CNRS) sous la direction de Marie-Odile Goulet-Cazé. Cette table ronde avait été précédée par plusieurs journées d’étude destinées à clarifier sa problématique qui était, précisent les éditeurs (Introduction, 5), non de « dresser une histoire de l‘allégorie, mais plutôt de clarifier le concept d’allégorie ou de méthode allégorique de façon à le distinguer de phénomènes littéraires voisins et à mieux en retracer l’évolution, en identifiant toutes les déformations que l’allégorie philosophique des Grecs a connues en passant dans des univers culturels différents. » Cet objectif est atteint. Les treize contributions concernent les étapes les plus importantes de l’histoire de l’allégorie, de l’Antiquité à la Réforme : la première, « Explicatio fabularum : la place de l’allégorie dans l’interprétation stoïcienne de la mythologie », due à J.-B. Gourinat, montre excellemment que, dans l’interprétation des mythes théologiques traditionnels, Chrysippe et les stoïciens ont recouru à deux méthodes distinctes : l’étymologie des noms des dieux, et l’interprétation allégorique de certaines fables, récits ou représentations picturales. Dans la dernière, Ph. Büttgen fournit, dans sa contribution, « Doctrine et allégorie au début de la Réforme. Mélanchthon », une riche information sur la critique de l’allégorie par les auteurs de la Réforme, tout particulièrement par Mélanchthon. Entre ces deux époques, nous avons des contributions sur les commentateurs d’Homère, les exégètes judéo-chrétiens, de Philon aux Pères Cappadociens en passant par Paul, Tertullien et Origène, les traditions juive et musulmane, les commentateurs médiévaux de la Bible, les alchimistes, et les poètes anglais du XIVe siècle. Passons en revue ces contributions dont l’importance ne saurait échapper aux philoniens qui ne manqueront pas de s’intéresser aux « Aspects rhétoriques et grammaticaux de l’interprétation allégorique d’Homère », que met en relief P. Chiron tout en se limitant à l’exégèse homérique et à un auteur principal, le Ps.-Héraclite dont il complète l’analyse par quelques éléments tirés de Cornutus et du Ps.-Plutarque. C’est bien évidemment à la stimulante contribution de R. Goulet, « Allégorisme et anti-allégorisme chez Philon d’Alexandrie », qu’une attention toute particulière sera accordée aussi bien par les lecteurs de l’Alexandrin que par les historiens de l’exégèse de la Bible. À juste titre, car, comme le rappelle d’entrée R. Goulet, « la méthode allégorique d’interprétation de la
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Bible est irrémédiablement liée au nom de Philon d’Alexandrie, et la tradition chrétienne, depuis Clément et Origène, lui est largement redevable d’un mode d’interprétation qui, au terme d’une longue évolution, a donné au Moyen Age la théorie des sens multiples de l’Écriture. » Père et modèle de l’exégèse de l’allégorèse judéo-chrétienne, Philon l’est, et ce titre ne doit pas lui être refusé. Mais, nous avertit R. Goulet, on se gardera d’oublier que « Philon n’acceptait qu’une espèce particulière d’allégorie et qu’il pouvait se montrer franchement hostile à l’égard de certaines exégèses allégoriques qu’il rapporte parfois » : une allégorie trop radicale qui rejetterait totalement et systématiquement le sens littéral, qui nierait l’historicité des personnages et des faits rapportés dans la Bible, ne saurait être acceptable pour un juif fidèle, comme l’était Philon qui, précise R. Goulet, avait adopté une « allégorie modérée », conçue comme « une réaction piétiste à l’égard d’une entreprise allégorique beaucoup plus audacieuse ». De cette entreprise allégorique, R. Goulet retrouve les vestiges dans le propre commentaire de l’Alexandrin. Aussi convient-il de ne pas le lire de façon naïve « comme s’il avait appliqué dans son Commentaire une méthode personnelle pour exposer une philosophie originale. Si, comme nous y invite notre auteur qui l’a fait, on déconstruit le commentaire philonien pour en retrouver « les composantes traditionnelles, c’est-à-dire héritées d’entreprises exégétiques antérieures et identifier ainsi les apports, les gauchissements, les corrections propres à Philon », on découvre, au terme de ce travail, un Commentaire allégorique bien identifiable, qui fascinait Philon et l’agaçait et le retouchait, « tantôt en s’y opposant, tantôt en le remettant en perspective, tantôt en s’appropriant purement et simplement ses matériaux exégétiques. » C’est l’Écriture qui est la source première du judaïsme, et la vérité est censée résider dans ses témoignages textuels. « C’est pourquoi, estime M. Fishbane, le décodage allégorique de l’Écriture a joué un rôle primordial dans la pensée et la culture juives ». Ce qu’il montre dans les pages où il présente « L’allégorie dans la pensée, la littérature et la mentalité juives. » Le rôle fondateur de Paul et Origène dans l’histoire de l’allégorie chrétienne est présenté par A. Le Boulluec qui s’interroge : « De Paul à Origène : continuité ou divergence ? ». Il répond à cette question en comparant l’usage de Paul à celui d’Origène. Le premier a introduit le terme (cf. Gal 4, 24) et a fourni un exemple, sans le théoriser explicitement. Le second inaugure un système d’interprétation dans lequel l’allégorie a une fonction majeure, et, à la différence de Paul, il conceptualise sa propre pratique, la dote d’une structure méthodique et la justifie par la foi et par la raison. Tertullien ne passe pas habituellement pour avoir été un grand exégète et « souffre de la comparaison implicite ou explicite avec Origène, son cadet
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d’une vingtaine d’années », rappelle J.-C. Fredouille qui nous livre sa réflexion sur les « Réflexions de Tertullien sur l’allégorie », réflexions que le premier Père de l’Église d’Occident a été conduit à faire sur l’allégorie. Tertullien dont la terminologie allégorique n’est pas fixée, s’est montré particulièrement sensible aux dangers ou aux risques de l’allégorisme pour deux raisons. La première est le contexte historique, l’allégorisme gnostique lui paraissant plus difficile à réfuter que le littéralisme de Marcion. La seconde raison de sa défiance serait à chercher dans l’héritage de sa propre culture marquée par la pensée stoïcienne. Sous le titre « Entre Muses et Logos : Invention de l’Allégorie et naissance de l’icône (Sophistes et Pères à la fin de l’Antiquité) », Anca Vasilu propose une analyse de la relation parole-image circonscrite au territoire du discours. Sont particulièrement bien signalées dans ces pages les deux étapes que l’on repère dans le processus de basculement de l’eikôn ancienne en icône chrétienne. Le Coran est une parole divine au sens strict pour les musulmans. Il est intégralement une « dictée surnaturelle ». Il est incréé, il existe de toute éternité auprès de Dieu. Aussi l’attitude première du croyant sera-t-elle de le prendre tel quel, note P. Lory qui présente « Les refus d’une exégèse allégorique du Coran », et souligne que les grands courants de l’exégèse sunnite se sont montrés très réservés, voire franchement hostiles face à l’exégèse allégorique du Texte sacré. Au moyen âge, l’allégorie ne constitue-t-elle pas le propre de l’exégèse chrétienne de la Bible ? C’est à cette question que répond magistralement G. Dahan dans sa contribution qui a pour titre « L’allégorie dans l’exégèse chrétienne de la Bible au moyen âge ». Après avoir déterminé de quoi l’on parle quand il est question d’allégorie au moyen âge, il nous conduit à faire le constat d’une grande complexité et d’une richesse considérable dans le matériau que nous offrent les auteurs du moyen âge à propos de l’allégorie, et nous propose de voir comment ces auteurs eux-mêmes ont abordé les problèmes nés de cette richesse et de cette complexité. Pour illustrer quelques conceptions médiévales de l’allégorie, P. Dronke a choisi deux auteurs, Jean Scot Érigène au IXe siècle et Hildegarde de Bingen au XIIe dont il présent dans « Les conceptions de l’allégorie chez Jean Scot Érigène et Hildegarde de Bingen » leurs procédés respectifs lors de leur lecture allégorique et dans leur création de nouvelles allégories. L’allégorie est, selon lui, « la salle polyvalente » de ces deux auteurs, une salle « qui héberge leurs contes platonisants ou bibliques, et leurs jeux d’allégorèse, qui peuvent aller jusqu’à l’extravagance . . . » Dans « Alchimie et allégorie scripturaire au moyen âge », Barbara Obrist montre que « le recours à l’expression figurée par les auteurs de
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textes alchimiques pose le problème des pratiques de transfert de sens dans la science de l’Antiquité, du Moyen Âge et de la Renaissance du XVIe siècle. » Au terme d’un tour d’horizon des diverses techniques de transfert de sens dans les textes alchimiques du Moyen Âge, il apparaît que loin de se réduire à « un simple procédé rhétorique destiné à illustrer tel ou tel procédé artisanal ou telle ou telle théorie relative à la production artificielle de substances corporelles », l’introduction dans l’alchimie médiévale de thèmes christiques marque un tournant dans le rapport entre art et nature, « le modèle aristotélicien et scolastique étant sinon supplanté, du moins complété ou subverti par le recours à un modèle cosmologique christocentrique ». Dans « Pratiques de l’allégorie dans la poésie anglaise du XIVe siècle », Aude Mairey propose « quelques hypothèses de travail sur la manière dont les auteurs qui écrivent dans une langue vernaculaire, en l’occurrence l’anglais, conçoivent leurs pratiques allégoriques ». Elle replace ces auteurs à la fois « dans leur contexte littéraire et dans une perspective historiographique », et fait apparaître que « les auteurs anglais des poésies allégoriques sont marqués par les différents modes d’interprétation de la Bible ». Ils les interrogent, les réutilisent afin de produire un discours adapté à leur public. Et l’opposition souvent mise en avant « entre allégorie des poètes et allégorie des théologiens » peut être dépassée si l’étude des œuvres est replacée dans le cadre des transformations culturelles et sociales, avec lesquelles ces œuvres sont en interaction. Cette revue des treize contributions rend bien imparfaitement compte de leur richesse. Chaque lecteur les lira en fonction de ses centres d’intérêt. Il pourra utiliser les Tables (Index locorum ; index nominum ; index thématique et terminologique) qui complètent ce volume soigneusement édité. Jean Riaud Université Catholique de l’Ouest Angers
John J. Collins, Jewish Cult and Hellenistic Culture: Essays on the Jewish Encounter with Hellenism and Roman Rule. Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 100. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2005. viii + 231 pages. ISBN 90-04-14438-2. Price $113. The prolific Professor Collins here provides another sample of his prodigious productivity. From what other scholar could we expect a collection of twelve representative and important essays, all of them published since 2000? Not to mention the fact that Collins has composed four other books in
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the interim! This volume is a welcome addition to his vast output. It possesses both variety and coherence. The subjects of the articles range from wisdom literature to the rewritings of the Exodus story, from the implications of Antiochus IV’s persecution to the origins of the Great Jewish Revolt. Some deal with broad and sweeping topics like the nature of anti-Semitism in antiquity and the distinction between cult and culture in Judaea during the Hellenistic period, others explore more detailed matters like chronological questions in the Third Sibyl or in Joseph and Asenath. But all touch, in one form or other, on the larger issue of Judaism’s relation to Greek culture and to the classical world. John Collins’ long labors in this field assure that every paper is deeply informed, thoughtful, and penetrating. One will not always agree with the conclusions. The volume contains considerable polemic, but no rancor. In certain pieces Collins defends standard views against recent criticisms, in others he advances new interpretations and provocative positions. The opinions, however, are in every case acute, well-argued, and worthy of serious consideration. A brief review cannot, of course, engage with the argumentation in detail. But a few examples might give a sense of the diverse character and significance of the contributions. Collins’ chapter five on the Third Sibyl, for instance, revives the thesis that this work possesses a core component dating from the second century b.c.e., a thesis based on three references to a seventh king of Egypt. The consensus on this topic owes much to Collins’ own earlier and very influential writings, but he does more than reiterate them here. The article takes on challenges to the reconstruction with new arguments. Not everyone will find plausible Collins’ notion that all three passages were composed in or shortly before the reign of Ptolemy VII, forecasting (as a body) the termination of Roman dominance and the emergence of Jewish glory after considerable turbulence in that very reign. A prediction wholly at variance with facts on the ground might be acceptable for an indefinitely distant eschatological time, but far less likely as pinpointing a date in the immediate future. Collins’ case (ch. 7) against the recent effort to make Joseph and Asenath a Christian work of late antiquity is more compelling. The issue of intermarriage resonates with Jewish rather than with Christian concerns, and allusions to conversion that omit baptism would point to an earlier date. Collins here successfully vindicates the communis opinio. Elsewhere he delivers more arresting views. Chapter four explores the question of how far the Septuagint provides evidence for the currency of messianic beliefs in Second Temple Judaism, a subject of wide importance
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not only for the thinking of Hellenistic Jews but also for early Christianity. Collins’ careful analysis of texts like Gen 49 and Balaam’s oracles in Num 23–24, with translations in the LXX, makes a cogent argument that revival of the Davidic monarchy through a messianic figure played little role in the Second Temple period before the first century b.c.e. in Judaea and even later in the diaspora. In chapter six, Collins offers a highly controversial analysis of a reference in Philo, the Jewish-Hellenistic epic poet (not the philosopher), to the Aqedah. In Collins’ view, Philo’s inflated and obscure language associates the binding with magic spells. As he concedes, however, the transference of spells to sacrifice would be highly unusual and without parallel. The interpretation pushes the limits of plausibility. Collins does not shrink from controversy. That makes this volume, like many of his others, especially engrossing. But it can at times lead to tensions and strains even within his own discussions. The first two essays in the collection (the opening chapter is the only one not previously published) deserve particular commendation, on several counts. Collins properly complicates the concept of “apologetic literature” and provides a nuanced interpretation that sees texts like the Letter of Aristeas as steering a course between Jewish self-confidence and desire to solicit approval from gentiles. In Collins’ assessment, Jewish intellectuals, however steeped in Hellenic culture and whether in Judaea or the diaspora, drew a line on crucial issues, notably on idolatry and on cultic separatism. He argues quite rightly that “Hellenistic reform” (e.g. the institution of the gymnasium) created no deep fissures among Jews and that the Maccabaean revolt resisted persecution, not Hellenism, a prime instance of the distinction he draws between “cult” and “culture.” One can quarrel with particulars (like the notion that Antiochus Epiphanes attacked the Jews because he perceived them as misoxenic and anti-social), but the general picture is entirely reasonable. Collins, however, oddly undercuts that picture in chapter three by interpreting Artapanus’ eccentric version of the Exodus story, which includes having Moses invent Egyptian animal cults, as an authentic variety of Jewish belief. What then happened to the sharp contrast of cult and culture? Collins’ eleventh essay demonstrates the inapplicability of “anti-Semitism” to pagan attitudes toward Judaism in antiquity. He correctly observes that the presumed exemplary instance of it, the “pogrom” in Alexandria in 38 c.e., was exceptional and dependent upon peculiar circumstances. Yet he nonetheless leans to the traditional view that Jews strove, at least in Alexandria, for civic privileges without having to participate in civic cults, a source of underlying animosity. If so, why would this not apply also to
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Jewish communities in other Greco-Roman cities? And why would that not count as anti-Semitism? The interpretation runs into some strain here. A comparable tension holds in Collins’ final paper on “The Jewish World and the Coming of Rome.” This broad survey affirms the important point that Roman policy in general upheld the rights of subordinate peoples to pursue their own ancestral laws, a policy that applied, with very few exceptions, to Jews as well. Collins points out quite significantly that even the hostile references to Rome (as Kittim) in the Dead Sea Scrolls are few and rare. Yet, in explaining the Jewish Revolt, he places emphasis on Roman oppression, setting Jews in the category of Gauls, Germans, and Britons, and citing Tacitus’ notorious remark “they make a desert and call it peace.” The inconsistency is left unresolved. Failure to iron out a few rough spots detracts not at all from the value of the volume. Any publication by John Collins is a welcome event for scholars and students of Hellenistic Judaism. May we anticipate that five years or so from now we will see yet another collection of essays to ponder and profit from? Erich S. Gruen University of California, Berkeley
Hindy Najman, Seconding Sinai: The Development of Mosaic Discourse in Second Temple Judaism. Supplements to the Journal for the Study of Judaism 77. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2003. xiv + 178 pages. ISBN 90-0411542-0. Price €60, $82. Najman’s study can be seen as a valuable contribution in both a methodological and a practical dimension since it represents not only a pioneering attempt at the formulation of a new approach to Second Temple pseudepigrapha, but more importantly a successful application of this new methodological vision to a cluster of important text associated with a significant theological development—Mosaic discourse. In the methodological dimension, Najman’s research is an attempt to challenge the still prevailing methodological consensus that Second Temple Jewish pseudepigraphy is a combination of practices “plagiarizing and tampering” with earlier texts and traditions. The first chapter of the monograph explores the methodological roots of this perspective, which is dominated by the modern conception of fraudulence and piety toward tradition. Scholars operating on these conceptual premises envision the writers of the pseudepigraphical materials as committing what we would call forgery, an activity that is not only unhistorical but also morally tainted. Najman warns
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about the danger of anachronism when reading ancient texts with contemporary assumptions about authorship. In her attempt to construct a methodological alternative, she rightly points to the historical limits of the modern notion of authorship which often pays little attention to practices of construction and legitimization in the ancient world, when the written materials were often accepted, valorized, and put into circulation without any questions about the identity of their author. Scholars are becoming increasingly aware that the various concepts of authority and authorship have long and complex histories in the Second Temple period which demonstrate various models of anonymity and pseudonimity in the Bible as well as in extra-biblical texts. Najman is aware that it is not sufficient merely to point to the anachronism of previous studies of Second Temple pseudepigraphic traditions that have often approached ancient Jewish texts with a post-Enlightenment concept of authorship. The task is more complex and challenging; that is, to demonstrate through the scarcity of the available textual witness that a different concept of authorship was indeed operative at the time of the texts’ production and/or reception. Najman’s research represents an attempt at such reconstruction which focuses on late Second Temple participants in Mosaic discourse, which, she argues, originated with the gradual production of Deuteronomy. The large bulk of the study deals with this reconstruction, which includes several important steps. In the second part of the first chapter of the book, Najman offers a schematic discussion about the origination of Mosaic discourse in the Book of Deuteronomy. She sees Deuteronomy as a paradigmatic text for later instances of Mosaic discourse since the Deuteronomists have established a model for the authoritative interpretation of tradition and for its authoritative application to new circumstances. Najman shows that the scribes behind the production of Deuteronomy operated with a conception of textual authority strikingly different from our own. The second chapter of the monograph deals with second century b.c.e. post-Deuteronomic participants in Mosaic discourse: the Book of Jubilees and 11QTemple, texts typically classified as pseudepigrapha. The study shows that both Jubilees and 11QTemple seek to provide an interpretive context within which scriptural traditions already acknowledged as authoritative can be properly understood. The analysis demonstrates that this is neither a fraudulent attempt at replacement nor an act of impiety, but rather a pious effort to convey what is taken to be the essence of earlier traditions, an essence that the rewriters think is in danger of being missed. In other words, post-Deuteronomic participants in Mosaic discourse, such
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as Jubilees and 11QTemple, are trying to provide an interpretive context for received revealed literature, a context whose absence might engender dangerous misinterpretations. The third chapter of the study analyses the writings of Philo of Alexandria and his participation in Mosaic discourse. In this section of her study, Najman tries to answer an important question: under what conditions was Mosaic discourse possible? Or in other words: of what transformations was Mosaic discourse capable under varying conditions? She envisions the works of Philo as a test-case for the exploration of these questions. Najman demonstrates that, despite Philo’s participation in the discourse of Moses, there are two significant contrasts between him and his Palestinian counterparts. First, while Jubilees and 11QTemple subordinate the figure of Moses to the law of Moses, Philo subordinates the law of Moses to the figure of Moses. Second, whereas Jubilees and 11QTemple, following the lead of Deuteronomy, seek to weave existing traditions and their own interpretations into a single seamless whole attributed to Moses, Philo distinguishes explicitly between Mosaic scripture and his own interpretation. The study demonstrates that Philo conceives the independence of an author in a way that was new to Judaism. Najman’s reconstruction of Second Temple participants in Mosaic discourse is convincing since it allows her to demonstrate how within a family of approaches to the question of authorization, there could be both continuity and variation. Thus, the study illustrates that Mosaic discourse was sufficiently compelling and robust to survive in Hellenistic Alexandria, under conditions, and in the presence of a conception of textuality and authorship, quite different from those in Palestine. One of the important avenues of the study is that the monograph pays special attention to a less explored connection between the Deuteronomic elaboration of the Torah and the figure of Moses, investigating further elaboration of those dimensions of Mosaic authority in the late Second Temple period. The study thus sees Mosaic discourse as a discourse tied to a founder. Another important feature of the book is that it underlines the importance of the progressive idealization of the figure of Moses, who becomes envisioned not only as the ultimate prophet and lawgiver, but also as the exemplary human being—serving in many ways as the representative of true humanity. On the whole, Najman’s study represents an important methodological breakthrough in Second Temple studies, a field, as she has remarkably demonstrated, still in many ways dominated by antiquated notions of authorship and authority. Najman’s research challenges the very vocabulary of the field of Second Temple studies, which still operates with such
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ambiguous terms as “Rewritten Bible,” showing the problematic nature of such classifications which perpetuate an anachronistic conception of the text as a fixed set of claims embodied in specific language, such that tampering with that language is tantamount to interfering with an author’s property. Najman suggests that, if one is to speak of “rewriting the Bible,” one must be clear about the status of the Bible in the period in question, and also about the motivation and significance of the act of rewriting in its historical context. Najman’s study has lasting methodological value not only for the study of the Mosaic tradition, but also for investigations of other pseudepigraphical traditions of exalted patriarchs and prophets that were flourishing in the late Second Temple period, since the pseudepigraphic reworking found in the Book of Deuteronomy and other participants in Mosaic discourse have paradigmatic value in providing models for practices of pseudonymous attribution and rewriting developed by late Second Temple authors and editors. Andrei A. Orlov Marquette University
Judith Lieu, Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. x + 369 pages. ISBN 0-19-926289-6. Price £61, $99. Lieu’s Christian Identity in the Jewish and Graeco-Roman World is a work of daunting erudition and impeccable judgment. Rather than presenting a strong and linear argument, Lieu employs a series of models or lenses to see as many facets of the issue of Christian identity formation as possible. The basic thrust of Lieu’s analysis is that the construction of Christian identity was based on Jewish and Greco-Roman cultural phenomena, multifaceted and inconsistent, robust and self-deconstructing, and almost invariably agonistic. Individual chapters on “Text and Identity,” “History, Memory and the Invention of Tradition,” “Boundaries,” “The Grammar of Practice,” “Embodiment and Gender,” “Space and Place,” “The Christian Race,” and “The Other” treat particular arenas in which Christians, pre-Christians, or protoChristians constructed identity. Lieu’s strategy in these chapters is resolutely constructivist and within each of the arenas under examination, she provides a sure-handed guide to the conflicting pressures of integration and difference with Greco-Roman society that emerging Christianity faced
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and the tension between continuity and distinction that it faced in relation to Judaism. Lieu’s work is strong in its wide attention and in its integration of discussions of identity from beyond the study of Christianity and Judaism. Her reading of primary sources is wide and her judgment sober. Her reading of scholarship on the primary sources she treats is unpredictable and occasionally crucially out of date (e.g. nothing on Revelation since Ronald Reagan was president). In spite of her best constructivist principles and her programmatic efforts to avoid teleologically assuming the Christian identity of which she is tracking the development, Lieu retains a disproportionate, though by no means exclusive, focus on those movements that are integrated in the trajectory of orthodoxy. So elements of devotion to Christ from the demiurgical literature and the quest for gnosis, to movements like Montanism and Marcionism get the short shrift. Lieu’s interpretation of Paul displays a nascent, but critically incomplete, sense of the instability of Paul as a foundation for later Christianity, and of the inappropriateness of the category “Christian” as a simple characterization of Pauline communities. Paul’s letter to Thessalonians is thus evidence of the literary productivity of “Christianity” (48). More importantly this is seen in the lack of interaction with the work of Gaston, Gager, Stowers and others who do not see Paul making a radical criticism and revision of Judaism, especially in the early chapters of Romans. Lieu’s generative question, “in what form can a cohesive Christian identity be articulated and how does that identity subsist in relation to other structural identities?” (7) is answered mainly in her treatment of the panoply of arenas in which Christianity was asserted as an identity, but she does not return in detail to the second half of the question to address the relation of structural identities such as Christian/soldier, Christian/ slaveholder, Christian/civic councilor, Christian/guild member, Christian/ patron of non-Christians, Christian/client of non-Christians, etc. These are effectively mere quibbles in comparison to the larger question that Lieu’s work raises for the writing of history. In taking her critical distance from the insider narratives, and in her well-founded attention to variety and conflict as well as coherence within emergent Christianity, Lieu has left herself without an easily available and simply shaped story to tell. The time has passed when one could write a stirring conclusion that tilts at old verities and proclaims “variety!” with a self-conscious radicalism. Lieu does not give into these temptations, but the challenge of making her writing a compelling whole is a deep one. In concert with her attention to the individuality of specific Christian acts of identity building, the successes of her work are largely atomistic—moments of fine judgment,
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insights into particular relations, and most importantly a credible, critical, and constructivist viewpoint on the materials. Judith Lieu’s work is of enduring value even without a simple metanarrative and in this its value corresponds to its method. John W. Marshall University of Toronto
Andrei A. Orlov, The Enoch-Metatron Tradition. Texts and Studies in Ancient Judaism 107. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005. xvii + 383 pages. ISBN 3-16-148544-0. Price €99, $175. In recent years, we have seen the first volume of G. W. E. Nickelsburg’s major commentary on 1 Enoch (1 Enoch 1: A Commentary on the Book of 1 Enoch Chapters 1–36; 81–108. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2001). In addition, the figure of Enoch has received a considerable, some might even say a disproportionate amount of attention. In the book being reviewed, Andrei Orlov has broached the issues raised by a later stage of the development of the tradition of Enoch than 1 Enoch, focusing on 2 Enoch and on the figure of Metatron. Metatron is found prominently in the Merkabah mystical work commonly known as 3 Enoch as well as throughout the Merkabah mystical tradition and in some midrashim. In 3 Enoch, Metatron is said to be Enoch who has been transformed into the chief being of the heavenly world, becoming God’s right-hand angel, as it were. By a study of the Enoch figure going as far back as Enoch’s possible origin in the Mesopotamian ante-diluvian Enmeduranki, Orlov analyses Enoch’s titles and functions and their contribution to the Metatron tradition. He readily admits the complexity of Metatron’s origins, yet perceives Enoch to have played a major role in them. His interest in and access to Slavonic texts makes his work especially enlightening for those of us to whom that world is available only in translation. His results also bear on the active debate among students of early Jewish mysticism about its continuity or discontinuity with preceding speculative traditions, especially prominent (as Scholem maintained) in some Qumran texts, such as the Songs of the Sabbath Sacrifice, and some Pseudepigrapha, such as Apocalypse of Abraham, Ladder of Jacob, and 2 Enoch. It is intriguing that such speculative traditions survive in Slavonic, whose Greek originals have been lost, and whose original context in the spectrum of the Jewish pseudepigrapha of the Second Temple Period is far from self-evident.
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Dr. Orlov is to be congratulated on venturing into this difficult territory and in succeeding in casting distinctive light into a number of rather tenebrous corners. Michael E. Stone Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Gerard P. Luttikhuizen, Gnostic Revisions of Genesis Stories and Early Jesus Traditions. Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies 58. LeidenBoston: Brill, 2006. xviii + 210 pages. ISBN 90-04-14510-9. Price €88, $119. In Gnostic Revisions, Gerard Luttikhuizen provides what were originally several separate essays on “Gnostic hermeneutics” (spanning almost twenty years) that he has revised and refashioned in order “to form a coherent monographic study” (xi). The result is a bifurcated series of case studies in how the Gnostics read biblical and Christian traditions, with the first part (chs. 2–9) focused on the interpretation of Genesis in the Apocryphon of John and related writings and a second part (chs. 10–13) focusing on the interpretation of early Jesus traditions, especially his passion. (Luttikhuizen also provides a disjointed appendix examining whether the baptists of Mani’s youth were Elchasaites.) An introduction prepares the reader for the case studies by describing two of the more important texts (Apoc. John for the first part and The Letter of Peter to Philip for the second). The introduction then attempts to identify the unifying aspect of the two parts, namely a common “Gnostic mythical thought pattern” wherein “the creator God of Genesis was transmuted into an incompetent and ignorant demiurge, and the suffering and vulnerable Jesus of the early passion accounts into the purely spiritual and therefore impassible revealer of the true God” (5–6). Luttikhuizen objects to the claim that this “mythical thought pattern” originated in a Jewish environment (specifically disagreeing with B. Pearson) on the basis that the repudiation of the creator god is a fundamentally un-Jewish move. He argues instead that it is “more plausible that we are dealing with non-Jewish intellectuals with a background in Hellenistic schools of thought who evaluated biblical and other non-Gnostic traditions in the light of their own religiophilosophical world view” (10). This world view is largely a product of Middle Platonism, especially interpretations of Plato’s creation myth in the Timaeus. He claims that the reworking of both the biblical creation myth and the Jesus traditions according to this world view share the same impetus, namely intra-Christian debates. Luttikhuizen avers that the Gnostic
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authors “under discussion were guided by Greek-Hellenistic ways of thinking before and after they came to believe in Jesus (as a messenger of the fully transcendent God of their philosophical tradition)” and that they argued from this perspective against other (e.g., Pauline and Johannine) Christian groups who ignorantly continued to worship the demiurgical God and value the Hebrew scriptures (12, emphasis his). In short, Luttikhuizen claims that the philosophical lens by which the “demiurgical Gnostics” (as he calls them) read the Genesis and Jesus traditions came from an originally non-Christian and a consistently non-Jewish Hellenistic religiointellectual milieu. For the purposes of this journal, I focus only on chapters 2–9, the first part of Luttikhuizen’s book that deals with re-reading Genesis traditions. Furthermore, most of these chapters (especially chs. 4–8) may be summarized succinctly as they consist of careful if at times pedestrian analyses of how the Apoc. John and other treatises re-read the Genesis account. For a few of the chapters, I provide a more detailed synopsis with my own observations. Chapter two examines the relationship between the narrative frame and the body of the Apoc. John. The narrative frame describes how a resurrected Jesus provides a special revelation to the apostle John, while the body of the treatise relates the content of that revelation, a myth of creation and redemption that reworks the Genesis account in the light of the demiurgical Gnostic myth. Luttikhuizen disagrees with those (Pearson and Michael Waldstein especially) who deduce from the absence of Christian references in the body of Apoc. John that it must have a Jewish origin distinct from the Christian frame. He suggests instead that the more likely origin for the body is the debates going on among Christians about the authority of the Hebrew Scriptures and that the frame did not Christianize the body but rather “added the authority of Christ” to an already Gnostic-Christian text (20). He then traces the contours of this debate from sources outside the Apoc. John (briefly contrasting the positive readings of the Hebrew Bible in Paul’s letters, Justin Martyr, and the Epistle of Barnabas with the negative ones in Marcion and Ptolemy’s Letter to Flora). While Luttikhuizen is certainly correct that the Apoc. John makes sense in this type of debate, his analysis does not take into account the mechanics of Apoc. John’s reworking of Genesis. Pearson, Waldstein and others contend that it is not just the absence of explicit Christian content in the body of the treatise that suggests its Jewish origins, but the close affinity between the Apoc. John’s exegetical moves and those made by Hellenistic Jewish authors. In particular, the Apoc. John shares with Philo a number of similar Platonizing interpretations of Genesis that when viewed in the aggregate suggest some type of shared
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perspective (though not necessarily any direct relationship). Furthermore, the first treatise of the Corpus Hermeticum (“The Poimandres”), which is clearly not a Christian text, provides a reworking of the Genesis myth that is very similar to Apoc. John, suggesting that pagans could employ Jewish exegetical traditions outside of a Christian context. Chapter three provides a helpful examination of the nature of philosophical influence on the Apoc. John, with Luttikhuizen arguing the treatise’s theology and anthropology reflect a Platonism of a decidedly Aristotelian bent. He first canvases the reception of Aristotle’s teachings in the Hellenistic period, especially among Middle Platonists, and (relying explicitly on H. Dörrie) draws a division between Platonists who were more negatively disposed toward the Stagerite and those positively disposed toward him. The former perceived a more immanent First Principle that could be known via analogiae while the latter perceived a more transcendent First Principle that could be known only per abstractionem (as such, these were also more prone to mystical experiences). Luttikhuizen argues the pro-Stagerite Platonism shaped Gnostic theology, contending “Aristotle’s disconnection of the supramundane God from the rule over the world provided the condition under which Gnostic myth-makers (or their pre-Gnostic forerunners in Hellenistic schools of philosophy) could contrast God with the cosmic rulers; this alteration of Plato’s cosmology enabled them to speak highly of their true God, the Invisible Spirit, while at the same time uttering negative thoughts about the demiurgical God and his powers” (36). In terms of anthropology, Luttikhuizen focuses on Aristotle’s distinction between the soul and the mind. He suggests that the soul-body the archontic rulers provide the human being in Apoc. John reflects pre-Platonized Aristotelian doctrine, since this soul appears to be the most rarefied part of the cosmic world (though Apoc. John does not explicitly refer to it as ether or the fifth element). Luttikhuizen draws a parallel between Aristotle’s view that the mind (nous) alone is the divine element that comes into man from outside and the Apoc. John’s claim that humanity is ultimately of divine descent. He adds that the Apoc. John’s soteriology gives “mythical expression” to the Aristotelian belief that humanity’s “nous-potential . . . is ‘actualized’ through contact with the always actual divine Nous” (41–42). Throughout this chapter Luttikhuizen asserts there is a tension between this Aristotelian form of Platonism that devalues the demiurgical god in favor of the transcendent First Principle and biblical and other Jewish traditions which (he says) could have no part in such radical dualism or in the notion that part of the human is divine essence. He provides no support for this claim and ignores any evidence to the contrary. One thinks in particular of Philo, to whom Luttikhuizen only makes references in notes
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where the Alexandrian appears as one of several witnesses to Middle Platonic doctrine. However, Philo’s Logos functions as a demiurgical agent that provides (albeit positively) a buffer between God and the physical universe (see Leg. 3.96; Cher. 125–127; Her. 230–236). On the close relationship between the human nous and the Divine Nous, see Opif. 146, Spec. 4.123 and (again) Her. 230–236. To be sure, Philo’s ideas may not be as “radical” as those found in Apoc. John, but they represent manifestly similar philosophical tendencies and do so in the context of, we note, non-Christian biblical interpretation. Chapter four is a re-capitulation of the mythical narrative in Apoc. John, concisely and clearly demonstrating how the Genesis stories are “adapted and subordinated” to the Gnostic myth. Chapter five provides a more detailed analysis of Apoc. John’s re-writing of the creation of Adam and Eve and chapter six does the same for the retelling of the “Paradise story” (Gen 3), adding data from The Testimony of Truth (Testim. Truth). In the latter part of chapter six, Luttikhuizen again takes issue with Pearson for claiming the Genesis revision in Testim. Truth occurs as a result of “alleged inner-Jewish rebellion.” He claims (again) that the reworking comes from Gnostic Christians that are akin to Pagan detractors who argued for the inferiority of Judaism (and Christianity) from the apparent philosophical foibles of the Hebrew Bible. He also claims Pearson errs when he refers to Testim. Truth as a “Gnostic midrash,” claiming this uniquely Jewish literary form could not serve to undermine Jewish scripture. Perhaps he is correct in both instances; however, a perusal of the exegetical concerns and multiple perspectives preserved in Philo’s writings (e.g., in QG and QE) would suggest that Pearson may not be as far off as Luttikhuizen suggests. In chapter seven Luttikhuizen deals with the issue of the scope of salvation for Gnostics by considering how Apoc. John and Hypostasis of the Archons treat Eve’s Children (Gen 4 and 5). In chapter eight, these two treatises as well as the Apocalypse of Adam receive consideration for how they retell the story of Noah and the Flood (Gen 6). As with all of his examinations of the Gnostic texts, here Luttikhuizen is careful in his analysis and conversant with other scholars in the field. However, he does not frequently draw attention to possible similarities or differences with nonGnostic authors (Jewish or Christian) also engaged in rewriting the biblical stories at the same time. Whereas the previous chapters considered how Gnostics revised Genesis traditions to cast light on the evil demiurge, chapter nine focuses the supreme, ineffable God. Luttikhuizen holds that, like Philo, the Gnostics likely saw the correspondence between the appellation “The-One-Who-Is” (used frequently in Gnostic writings for the supreme god and apparently
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echoing to; o[n ajeiv, “that which always is” in Plato, Timaeus 27d–28a) and the claim by God in LXX Exod 3:14, jEgwv eijmi oJ w[n. In the second half of the chapter, after showing how the Gnostic supreme god expresses the ineffable qualities of the Middle Platonic First Principle, Luttikhuizen draws upon Apoc. John and the Trimorphic Protennoia to show how that transcendent Deity revealed itself to humankind. Luttikhuizen’s goal in Gnostic Revisions, which he reiterates in the epilogue, is to show that the Gnostics privileged their esoteric Gnostic mythology over the biblical and non-Gnostic Christian traditions. As such, they had little compunction in criticizing and revising those traditions. He believes that when non-Gnostic readers (from Irenaeus to the present) engage the Gnostic texts, they do the reverse: they privilege the biblical traditions and devalue the Gnostic traditions. Inasmuch as he is a careful reader of the Gnostic material, Luttikhuizen succeeds in illuminating the Gnostic myth that controls the re-writing of the biblical material. He also provides a service in explicating some of the Hellenistic philosophical influences, especially from Middle Platonism, at work on that mythology. Where Luttikhuizen comes up short is in his inchoate arguments for the non-Jewish origin of Gnostic exegesis and his unwillingness to consider abundant evidence for the opposing view. A more careful engagement of Philo and Philonic scholarship would have strengthened this insightful yet flawed work. Ronald R. Cox Pepperdine University
Arkady Kovelman, Between Alexandria and Jerusalem. The Dynamic of Jewish and Hellenistic Culture. The Brill Reference Library of Judaism 21. Leiden: Brill, 2005. 177 pages. ISBN 90-04-14402-1. Price €116, $156. This is one of the most original studies in the field of comparative Jewish exegesis that has been published in recent years. Equipped with a rare expertise in Classics, Alexandrian Judaism as well as rabbinic literature, Kovelman offers fascinating insights into the emergence and mechanism of Midrash. Since Jacob Freudenthal’s monumental Hellenistische Studien (1874–75) Kovelman is one of the very few scholars investigating the relationship between the Diaspora and the homeland from a distinctly Alexandrian perspective. While it is still common to regard Alexandrian Midrash as an appendix to Palestinian exegesis, which is often considered as normative even before the rabbinic period, Kovelman regularly begins his studies with a look to Egypt. Stressing the earlier date of the Alexandrian
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sources and their more intimate contact with Hellenistic culture, which subsequently permeated also Palestine, Kovelman uncovers trajectories of exegesis leading from Alexandrian to rabbinic interpreters. He does not, however, simply argue for the continuity or resurfacing of particular motifs. Assuming a somewhat Hegelian dialectic, he rather points to innovations and even revolutionary changes that informed both rabbinic and Hellenistic culture. His main argument is two-fold: 1) 2)
Jewish literature is characterized by the same kind of literary as well as social developments as Greco-Roman culture in general. The Alexandrian and Palestinian types of Judaism were intricately connected with each other.
Kovelman's book teems with new and interesting ideas on virtually every page. Especially central to his overall argument are chapters two and three, where he discusses the development from the genre of Scripture or epic to rabbinic literature. In chapter two he does so with regard to the interpretation of the Esther Scroll, while in chapter three he has selected various motifs, following their exegetical trajectory from Alexandria to rabbinic literature. In both chapters Kovelman stresses the revolutionary change from epic narrative to the fantastic, often somewhat frivolous stories that the rabbis associated with the Biblical material. For this reason he describes rabbinic literature by the term spoudogeloion, i.e. serious-comical literature. Kovelman explains this momentous change in two different ways. In chapter two he argues that it is part of a general trend in Greco-Roman literature. He suggests that the rabbinic image of Haman as a buffoon, accusing the Jews of engaging in excessive feasting, shares the rhetoric of Horace when blaming the Greeks for precisely the same vice (48–50). Similarly, the rabbinic motif of Esther's sexual affair with Mordechai is interpreted in light of a general interest in the erotic (56–58). Rabbinic spoudogeloion is thus explained as part of the contemporary Greco-Roman ambience. In chapter three, on the other hand, Kovelman identifies Alexandrian Midrash as the trigger of these crucial developments in rabbinic literature. “The transition,” he says, “from biblical epic to Talmudic spoudogeloion cannot be understood unless we recognize the place of Alexandrian exegesis in the process” (98). Kovelman suggests that Alexandrian Judaism introduced a dialectics of change. The very fact that the Alexandrians read Scripture with a view to philosophical gravity and religious seriousness suggested that without an appropriate allegorical reading the epic may be seen as a dubious, potentially ridiculous myth. Rabbinic exegetes reacted by stressing that comic dimension rather than interpreting it away.
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Undoubtedly, Kovelman has identified important characteristics of rabbinic as well as Alexandrian exegesis. Taking as an example one of my favourite Biblical figures, one may summarize by saying that Philo would never have produced the kind of scandalous image of Joseph that appears in Genesis Rabbah. Kovelman's overall argument is thus convincing and should inspire further research in this direction. I have some queries, however, regarding the degree of generalization that is possible and the dialectical explanation provided to account for the rabbinic tendency to spoudogeloion. Initially, I would like to stress that not all Alexandrians were as serious as Philo. Kovelman, of course, knows that. Highly aware of the great loss of Ancient literature, he himself reconstructs a lost Alexandrian interpretation, which shares “rabbinic” frivolity (79–80). The importance of those Jewish voices that are no longer extant has to be stressed further. There was a whole school of Alexandrian Jewish exegesis that followed Aristotle and appreciated the literary as well as mythological quality of Scripture. Their interpretations were far more playful than those of Philo, who adopted Platonic gravity. It is no surprise, therefore, that Philo had very little sympathy for these fellow Jews. He reports that they in turn were unhappy with his gravity: Can you still speak gravely of the ordinances as containing the canons of absolute truth? For you see the so-called holy books contain also myths which you regularly deride when you hear them related by others (Conf. 2).
The dialectical model that Kovelman has constructed is therefore too rigid. We cannot assume a homogeneous Alexandrian Judaism characterized by solemnity, which was then replaced by a “frivolous” rabbinic literature. There was more continuity between the two than appears at first sight from the extant sources, which have survived precisely because they suited the solemn tastes of the Church Fathers. It remains to be investigated whether this continuity is phenomenological only or relies on historical connections. Three remaining chapters of the book deal with topics that are more or less related to the main argument. The last one is most relevant as it investigates the notion of spoudogeloion in the context of “preaching scholarly communities,” which emerged in Judaism as well as the surrounding cultures during the first centuries c.e. The semi-comic character of much of rabbinic exegesis is now appreciated as a sign of blurred boundaries between popular and elitist culture. Chapters one and four are less relevant to the main theme of the book, one dealing with typology and Pesher in the Letter of Aristeas, the other with the rhetoric of petitions in Egyptian papyri. Regarding the Letter of Aristeas, Kovelman suggests an exegetical dimension of the text, which has thus far not been noticed and
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which I find difficult to see even after a careful reading of the chapter. The first chapter deals with Egyptian papyri and it is only in the last paragraph that Kovelman draws a connection to rabbinic literature without, however, fully arguing the point (36–38). The last matter brings me to my major criticism of the book: it is very poorly edited. The articles on which it is based are still visible in their original form. On p. 32, for example, Kovelman still refers to something “discussed in the first part of this article.” The whole manuscript should have been submitted to serious language editing, which would also have taken care of the numerous typing mistakes that now impede upon the reading. A few examples taken at random from three consecutive pages may illustrate this point: “at list” = at least (113), “these exegesis” = this exegesis (114), “Philo’s respond” = Philo's response (116). Kovelman’s ideas are too precious to be presented in such negligent form. Maren Niehoff Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Annelie Volgers and Claudio Zamagni (eds.), Erotapokriseis. Early Christian Question–and–Answer Literature in Context. Biblical Exegesis and Theology 37. Leuven-Paris-Dudley, Mass.: Peeters, 2004. iv + 197 pages. ISBN 90-429-1480-7. Price €30. This modest volume contains the proceedings of a conference held in Utrecht, The Netherlands, on 13–14 October 2003. Its aim was to further the scholarly study of a form of literature that was intensively practised in the Christian tradition up to the Byzantine period, but has been relatively little studied. It was recognized that progress could only be made through a multi-disciplinary approach. So a small number of specialists were invited to make contributions based on their diverse areas of expertise. The volume contains the following ten papers: Claudio Zamagni, “Une introduction méthodologique à la littérature patristique des Questions et Réponses: le cas d’Eusèbe de Césarée” (7–24); Christian Jacob, “Questions sur les Questions: archéologie d’une pratique intellectuelle et d’une forme discursive” (25–54); Pieter van der Horst, “Philo and the rabbis on Genesis: similar questions, different answers” (55–70); Camillo Neri, “Le dialogue entre les Athéniens et les Méliens chez Thucydide: une Ur-Form du genre des questions et réponses?” (71–79); Claudio Zamagni, “Existe-t-il une terminologie technique dans les Questions d’Eusèbe de Césarée?” (81–98); Annelie Volgers, “Ambrosiaster: persuasive powers in progress” (99–125); Roland J. Teske S.J., “Augustine of Hippo and the Quaestiones et Responsiones literature” (127–144); Bas ter Haar Romeny, “Question-and-answer collections
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in Syriac literature” (145–163); André-Louis Rey, “Les Erotapokriseis dans le monde Byzantin: tradition manuscrite des textes anciens et production de nouveaux textes” (165–180); Marie-Pierre Bussières, “Conclusions: questions (encore) sans réponses” (181–189).
Taken as a whole, the papers make a solid contribution (only the contribution of Neri seems out of place). As the title of the final paper indicates, much of the research presented has a tentative and piecemeal character, because there still remains so much to do in the vast field of Patristic literature. The opening introductory paper is a little disappointing. The distinction it makes between the literary genre (i.e. works with only questions and answers) and the literary procedure (i.e. works using the rhetorical framework of the method, but without the formal characteristics) is certainly helpful. But the procedure of analysing one work and then hoping that the description of that work might supply a general definition for the literary genre seems somewhat jejune (a subsequent paper by the same author also concentrates on the same work, but gives a very solid analysis of the technical terminology used in asking questions). The second paper by Christian Jacob is more valuable because it places the procedure of question and answer in the widest possible context, showing that are three variables involved: (1) a form of discursive organization (catalogue, dialogue); (2) implied procedures of thought (memorization, interpretation); and (3) contexts of social interaction (teaching, learned conversation, research programmes). Strictly speaking, Philo falls outside the scope of the book, but is of course the most important predecessor of this kind of literature in the Jewish tradition. One paper is largely devoted to him. Pieter van der Horst engages in a comparative exercise involving Philo and the fifth century rabbis recorded in Genesis Rabbah. He notes that, although the rabbis do not use the formal method of question-and-answer, the questions they ask of scripture are the same ones that Philo poses in his Quaestiones. The shared assumption is that scripture is a cryptic document, the deeper meaning of which has to be teased out. We note further that Claudio Zamagni in his opening paper assumes that Eusebius stood under the influence of Philo when he, as first in the Christian tradition (as far as we know), adopted the genre of the question-and-answer (7–8). This is contested by Bas ter Haar Romeny in his excellent survey of question-and-answer collections in Syriac literature arguing that, although Eusebius certainly knows about Philo’s two works (they were present in the library at Caesarea), he did not need Philo’s example to develop his own work, since the genre was well-known in the schools and had recently been used by Eusebius’ chief opponent Porphyry (153).
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The study under review will not serve well as an introduction to the genre and method of the question-and-answer. For that purpose the focus is too specialized, with most of the contributors assuming quite a bit of knowledge on the subject. But it is useful for scholars who wish to take stock of the latest developments in this area. It also gives copious references to recent scholarly literature, which on this topic is rather scattered (see especially the lengthy notes of Zamagni’s introductory essay). It is perhaps a pity that this literature is not assembled in a separate bibliography, but it is certainly there for the reader who is prepared to do some spade work. David T. Runia Queen’s College The University of Melbourne
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 231–234
NEWS AND NOTES1 Philo of Alexandria Group of the Society of Biblical Literature The Philo of Alexandria Group of the Society of Biblical Literature convened for two sessions on November 21st and 22nd 2005 in Philadelphia, during the Annual Meetings of the Society of Biblical Literature and the American Academy of Religion. The first session continued a series in which Philo’s thought was compared with other systems of thought in his near environment. It was devoted to “Linguistic Boarder Crossing: Philo of Alexandria and the Dead Sea Scrolls,” with John J. Collins (Yale University) presiding. The first speaker was Florentino Garcia Martinez (Catholic University Louvain), who spoke on the subject of “Divine Sonship at Qumran and in Philo.” He was followed by Hindy Najman (University of Toronto), who gave a paper entitled “Revelation in the Desert: The Case of the Therapeutae and the Essenes.” Finally Loren T. Stuckenbruck (University of Durham) spoke on “To what Extent Did Philo’s Treatment of Enoch and the Giants Presuppose a Knowledge of the Enoch-related Sources Preserved in the Dead Sea Scrolls?.” A lively plenary discussion ensued. It is to be hoped that these papers will be published in the near future. The next day the second session took place. It was devoted to the theme of “Interpreting Philo’s De virtutibus.” Its purpose was to assist Walter Wilson (Emory University) in his preparation of a commentary on this treatise for the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series. The session was presided over by David T. Runia (The University of Melbourne). The first paper was presented by Walter Wilson himself, speaking on “Issues on Interpretation in Philo’s De virtutibus.” The respondent to this paper was Gregory E. Sterling, General Editor of the Series. The next speaker was James R. Royse (San Francisco State University), who gave a paper on “The Text of Philo’s De virtutibus.” The final paper in the session was presented by David Konstan (Brown University), who spoke on “Philo’s De virtutibus in the Perspective of Greco-Roman Philosophical Literature.” After the papers had been presented a plenary discussion was held, followed by an Editorial Board meeting of the Philo of Alexandria Commentary Series. It 1 Items of general interest to Philo scholars to be included in this section can be sent to the editor, David Runia (contact details in Notes on Contributors below).
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was decided that next year, at the meeting in Washington, a session will be devoted to the Legum Allegoriae, on which Thomas Tobin SJ (Loyola University) is preparing a commentary. The papers by James R. Royse and David Konstan, which were presented in the second session, are published in a Special Section of this Annual. See above pages 59–101. The next meeting of the Philo of Alexandria group will be at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Biblical Literature in Washington D.C. on November 18–21, 2006. One session will be devoted to the theme of the Reception of Philo of Alexandria in Rabbinic Judaism and Early Christianity, the other to the interpretation of Philo’s Legum allegoriae. David T. Runia Queen’s College University of Melbourne, Australia
In Memoriam Roger Arnaldez Roger Arnaldez, born in 1911, departed from us on 7 April 2006. In the community of Philonic scholars, he is above all known through his edition and translation of De opificio mundi, which appeared in 1961 and was the first volume of series of the French edition of Philo’s works, Les Œuvres de Philon d’Alexandrie published by the Editions du CERF, of De Mutatione Nominum (1964), De Vita Mosis (1967) and De Aeternitate mundi (1969). He also wrote the introduction and notes of De Virtutibus (1962). His Philonic studies, however, were only one aspect of an intense research activity in the areas of ancient philosophy and Arabic thought, into which he had been initiated by famous teachers such as Massignon and Levi-Provençal. After teaching philosophy at the Lyceum of Mont-de-Marsan (1937–38), and then in Cairo (1938–39), he became cultural attaché of the French Embassy in Egypt (1948–50), before obtaining the chair of philosophy at the University of Heliopolis, where he taught from 1950 to 1955. After this followed Professorships in the Faculty of Letters in Bordeaux (1955–57) and Lyon (1956–68). He ended his career at the University of Paris IV–Sorbonne, where he taught Muslim philosophy and Islamology from 1969 to 1978. Author of a large number of studies on the great names of Muslim philosophy, he embodied the French orientalist tradition with his constant attempts to establish a better understanding between the three monotheistic religions. When teaching in Lyon he was President of the Jewish-Christian friendship group in that city and also consultant for the Secretariat of non-
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Christians (Islam) in Rome. It was in this period that, together with Father Mondésert and Jean Pouilloux, he directed the project that all Philonists know as OPA (or PAPM). Please allow me, in conclusion, to evoke a personal reminiscence. When we organized the international conference “Philo of Alexandria and the Language of Philosophy” at Créteil in October 1995, Roger Arnaldez, although for many years far removed from Philonic studies, agreed to participate. On the day of his paper, however, he slipped and fell, became unwell and had to stay at home. Even though he could not be present at the Conference, he nevertheless prepared and allowed us to publish his fine article “De quelques mots-clés dans la pensée de Philon d’Alexandrie, et de l’origine de leur contenu de signification” (On some key terms in the thought of Philo of Alexandria and the background of their content and meaning), revealing that his exploration of other fields had not caused him to forget what had been for him a great intellectual and human adventure. Elected to the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques in 1986, Roger Arnaldez will live on in the memory of specialists in very different areas as a great savant and humanist. Carlos Lévy University of Paris IV–Sorbonne
A New Research Project on Philo and Plutarch Rainer Hirsch-Luipold, New Testament scholar and classicist at the University of Göttingen, has put together a Junior Research Group entitled “Ratio Religionis: Religiöse Philosophie und philosophische Religion in der frühen Kaiserzeit” (Religious Philosophy and Philosophical Religion in the Early Imperial Period). The project involves one post-doc and two Ph.D. students from different fields (theology/history of religion, classics, philosophy). The research project, which is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) for a period of five years, focuses on a development in the religious strand of Platonist thinking in the Early Imperial Period. After a time of scepticism and agnosticism Platonic thinkers from different religious backgrounds (Jewish, Christian and pagan) turn again to the religious tradition and are united in their goal to reconcile religious heritage with philosophical reasoning. In their writings different aspects of traditional religion— religious law, symbols, myths or religious narratives—are interpreted as phenomenal expressions of the Divine truth. The research group plans to
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trace this phenomenon through the work of Philo and Plutarch, together with texts from the Early Christian tradition (Gospel of John; Clement of Alexandria’s Stromateis). The larger framework for this development will be brought in through four international symposia: 1. History of literature; 2. Alexandria; 3. Cosmology, cosmogony, creation; 4. Philosophical theology: God—the One and a person. The first symposium “Aspekte einer Literaturgeschichte der religiösen Philosophie und philosophischen Religion der Kaiserzeit“ will be held in Göttingen on February 13–15, 2007. The overall aim is a literary history of the religious philosophy and philosophical religion of the Early Imperial period. Further information can be obtained at the following web site: http://www. ratioreligionis.uni-goettingen.de. Rainer Hirsch-Luipold Göttingen
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 235–238
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS Julia Annas is Regents Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona. Her postal address is Department of Philosophy, P.O. Box 210027, 213 Social Sciences Building, University of Arizona, Tucson, Arizona 85721, USA; her electronic address is [email protected]. Ellen Birnbaum has taught at several Boston-area institutions, including Boston University, Brandeis, and Harvard. Her postal address is 78 Porter Road, Cambridge, MA 02140, USA; her electronic address is [email protected]. Philip R. Bosman is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Classics and Modern European Languages, University of South Africa. His postal address is Department of Classics and Modern European Languages, P.O. Box 392, 0003 UNISA, Republic of South Africa; his electronic address is [email protected]. Cameron Boyd-Taylor is a Research Associate in the Faculty of Divinity at the University of Cambridge. His postal address is Faculty of Divinity, West Road, Cambridge CB3 9BS, UK; his electronic address is [email protected]. Ronald R. Cox is Assistant Professor and Seaver Fellow in the Religion Division, Pepperdine University. His postal address is Religion Division, Pepperdine University, Malibu, California, 90263-4352, USA; his electronic address is [email protected]. Pieter W. van der Horst is Emeritus Professor of the Interpretation of the New Testament, Early Christian Literature, and the Jewish and Hellenistic Milieu of the New Testament at the University of Utrecht. His postal address is Comeniuslaan 51, 3706 XB Zeist, The Netherlands; his electronic address is [email protected]. Steven Di Mattei is Visiting Assistant Professor in New Testament/Early Christianity, Department of Near Eastern Studies, Religious Studies Program, Cornell University. His postal address is Cornell University,
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Department of Near Eastern Studies, 409 White Hall, Ithaca, NY 14850, USA; his electronic address is [email protected]. Kenneth A. Fox is Associate Professor of New Testament at the Canadian Theological Seminary in Toronto. His postal address is Canadian Theological Seminary, 30 Carrier Drive, Toronto ON M9W 5T7, Canada; his electronic address is [email protected]. Albert C. Geljon teaches classical languages at the Christelijke Gymnasium in Utrecht. His postal address is Gazellestraat 138, 3523 SZ Utrecht, The Netherlands; his electronic address is [email protected]. Erich S. Gruen is Gladys Rehard Wood Professor of History and Classics at the University of California, Berkeley. His postal address is Department of History, University of California, Berkeley, CA 94720; his electronic address is [email protected].
† David M. Hay is McCabe Professor of Religion Emeritus, Coe College, Cedar Rapids, Iowa. His postal address is 1428 Airline Road, McDonough, GA 30252, USA; his electronic address is [email protected]. Heleen M. Keizer is Dean of Academic Affairs at the Istituto Superiore di Osteopatia in Milan, Italy. Her postal address is Via Guerrazzi 3, 20052 Monza (Mi), Italy; her electronic address is [email protected]. David Konstan is the John Rowe Workman Distinguished Professor of Classics and the Humanistic Tradition, and Professor of Comparative Literature, at Brown Univirsity. His postal address is Department of Classics, Brown University, Box 1856, Providence RI 02912, USA; his electronic address is [email protected]. John W. Marshall is an assistant professor in the Department and Centre for the Study of Religion at the University of Toronto. His postal address is University College, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON M5S 3H7, Canada; his electronic address is [email protected]. José Pablo Martín is Director of Studies at the Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, San Miguel, Argentina, and Senior Research fellow of the Argentinian Research Organization (CONICET). His postal address is Azcuenaga 1090, 1663 San Miguel, Argentina; his electronic address is [email protected].
Notes on Contributors
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Hindy Najman is Associate Professor in the Department of Near and Middle Eastern Civilizations, University of Toronto. Her postal address is 4 Bancroft Ave, Toronto, Ontario M5S 1C1, Canada; her electronic address is [email protected]. Maren Niehoff is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Jewish Thought at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. Her postal address is Department of Jewish Thought, Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel; her electronic address is [email protected]. Andrei Orlov is Asistant Professor in the Department of Theology at Marquette University. His postal address is Department of Theology, Marquette University, Coughlin Hall, 217, P.O. Box 1881, Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881, USA; his electronic address is: [email protected]. Roberto Radice is Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the Sacred Heart University, Milan. His postal address is Via XXV Aprile 4, 21016 Luino, Italy; his electronic address is [email protected]. Jean Riaud is Professor in the Institut de Lettres et Histoire, Université Catholique de l’Ouest, Angers. His postal address is 24, rue du 8 mai 1945, Saint Barthélemy d’Anjou, France; his electronic address is [email protected]. James R. Royse is Professor of Philosophy at San Francisco State University. His postal address is P. O. Box 16700, San Francisco CA 94116-0700, USA; his electronic address is [email protected]. David T. Runia is Master of Queen’s College and Professorial Fellow in the School of Fine Arts, Classics and Archaeology at the University of Melbourne. His postal address is Queen’s College, College Crescent, Parkville 3052, Australia; his electronic address is [email protected]. David Satran is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Comparative Religion, Hebrew University, Jerusalem. His postal address is Department of Comparative Religion, Hebrew University, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem 91905, Israel; his electronic address is [email protected]. Gottfried Schimanowski is Research Fellow at the Institutum Judaicum Delitzschianum in Münster, Germany. He also works as Schulreferent in the Saarland region of Germany. His postal address is Mittelstaedter
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Strasse 19, 72124 Pliezhausen, Germany; his electronic address is gschimanow@ gmx.de. Torrey Seland is Professor of New Testament, School of Missions and Theology, Stavanger, Norway. His postal adress is School of Missions and Theology, Misjonsveien 34, 4024 Stavanger, Norway; his electronic address is [email protected]. Gregory E. Sterling is Senior Associate Dean of the Faculty, College of Arts and Letters and Professor in New Testament, Department of Theology, University of Notre Dame. His postal address is Department of Theology, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame IN 46556, USA; his electronic address is [email protected]. Michael E. Stone is Gail Levin de Nur Professor of Comparative Religion and Professor of Armenian Studies in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His postal address is Institute of Asian and African Studies, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Mt. Scopus, Jerusalem Israel; his electronic address is: [email protected]. David Winston is Emeritus Professor of Hellenistic and Jewish Studies, Graduate Theological Union, Berkeley. His postal address is 1220 Grizzly Peak, Berkeley CA 94708, USA; his electronic address is davidswinston@ comcast.net.
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) 239–245
INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS
Articles and Book reviews can only be considered for publication in The Studia Philonica Annual if they rigorously conform to the guidelines established by the editorial board. For further information see also the website of the Annual: http://www.nd.edu/~philojud 1. The Studia Philonica Annual accepts articles for publication in the area of Hellenistic Judaism, with special emphasis on Philo and his Umwelt. Articles on Josephus will be given consideration if they focus on his relation to Judaism and classical culture (and not on primarily historical subjects). The languages in which the articles may be published are English, French and German. Translations from Italian or Dutch into English can be arranged at a modest cost to the author. 2. Articles and reviews are to be sent to the editors as email attachments. For the formatting of submitted material the following formats can be accepted: (a) Apple Macintosh, formatted in Word. (b) Microsoft Windows formatted in Word. (c) Users of Nota Bene or Word Perfect are requested to submit a copy exported in a format compatible with Word.
Manuscripts should be double-spaced, including the notes. Words should be italicized when required, not underlined. Quotes five lines or longer should be indented and may be single-spaced. Preferred Greek and Hebrew fonts are the GreekKeys system (American Philological Association), Linguists Software fonts (Greek and Hebrew), or the fonts developed by SBL. Unicode systems are to be encouraged for ease of conversion. In all cases it is imperative that authors give full details about the word processor and foreign language fonts used. Moreover, if the manuscript contains Greek or Hebrew material, a pdf version of the document must be sent together with the word processing file. If this proves difficult, a hard copy can be sent by mail or by fax. No handwritten Greek or Hebrew can be accepted. Authors are requested not to vocalize their Hebrew (except when necessary) and to keep their use of this language to a reasonable minimum. It should always be borne in mind that not all readers of the Annual can be
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expected to read Greek or Hebrew. Transliteration is encouraged for incidental terms. 3. Authors are encouraged to use inclusive language wherever possible, avoiding terms such as “man” and “mankind” when referring to humanity in general. 4. For the preparation of articles and book reviews the Annual follows the guidelines of The SBL Handbook of Style for Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical, and Early Christian Studies, Hendrickson: Peabody Mass., 1999. A downloadable pdf version of this guide is available on the SBL website, www.sbl-site.org. Here are examples of how a monograph, a monograph in a series, an edited volume, an article in an edited volume and a journal article are to be cited in notes (different conventions apply for bibliographies): Joan E. Taylor, Jewish Women Philosophers of First-Century Alexandria—Philo’s ‘Therapeutae’ Reconsidered (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 123. Ellen Birnbaum, The Place of Judaism in Philo’s Thought: Israel, Jews, and Proselytes (BJS 290; SPhM 2; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996), 134. Gerard P. Luttikhuizen, ed., Eve’s Children. The Biblical Stories Retold and Interpreted in Jewish and Christian Traditions (Themes in Biblical Narrative 5; Leiden–Boston: Brill, 2003), 145. Gregory E. Sterling, “The Bond of Humanity: Friendship in Philo of Alexandria,” in Greco-Roman Perspectives on Friendship, (ed. John T. Fitzgerald; SBLRBS 34; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997), 203–223. James R. Royse, “Jeremiah Markland’s Contribution to the Textual Criticism of Philo.” SPhA 16 (2004): 50–60. (Note that abbreviations are used in the notes, but not in a bibliography.)
Submissions which do not conform to these guidelines will be returned to the authors. 5. The following abbreviations are to be used in both articles and book reviews. (a) Philonic treatises are to be abbreviated according to the following list. Numbering follows the edition of Cohn and Wendland, using Arabic numbers only (e.g. Spec. 4.123). Note that De Providentia should be cited according to Aucher’s edition, and not the LCL translation of the fragments by F. H. Colson. Abr. Aet. Agr. Anim. Cher. Contempl. Conf. Congr. Decal.
De Abrahamo De aeternitate mundi De agricultura De animalibus De Cherubim De vita contemplativa De confusione linguarum De congressu eruditionis gratia De Decalogo
Instructions to Contributors Deo Det. Deus Ebr. Flacc. Fug. Gig. Her. Hypoth. Ios. Leg. 1–3 Legat. Migr. Mos. 1–2 Mut. Opif. Plant. Post. Praem. Prob. Prov. 1–2 QE 1–2 QG 1–4 Sacr. Sobr. Somn. 1–2 Spec. 1–4 Virt.
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De Deo Quod deterius potiori insidiari soleat Quod Deus sit immutabilis De ebrietate In Flaccum De fuga et inventione De gigantibus Quis rerum divinarum heres sit Hypothetica De Iosepho Legum allegoriae I, II, III Legatio ad Gaium De migratione Abrahami De vita Moysis I, II De mutatione nominum De opificio mundi De plantatione De posteritate Caini De praemiis et poenis, De exsecrationibus Quod omnis probus liber sit De Providentia I, II Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum I, II Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim I, II, III, IV De sacrificiis Abelis et Caini De sobrietate De somniis I, II De specialibus legibus I, II, III, IV De virtutibus
(b) Standard works of Philonic scholarship are abbreviated as follows: G-G
PCH
P CW
PLCL
PAPM
Howard L. Goodhart and Erwin R. Goodenough, “A General Bibliography of Philo Judaeus.” In The Politics of Philo Judaeus: Practice and Theory (ed. Erwin R. Goodenough; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938; repr. Georg Olms: Hildesheim, 1967), 125–321. Philo von Alexandria: die Werke in deutscher Übersetzung, ed. Leopold Cohn, Isaac Heinemann et al., 7 vols. (Breslau: M & H Marcus Verlag, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1909–64). Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt, ed. Leopoldus Cohn, Paulus Wendland et Sigismundus Reiter, 6 vols. (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1896–1915). Philo in Ten Volumes (and Two Supplementary Volumes), English translation by F. H. Colson, G. H. Whitaker (and R. Marcus), 12 vols. (Loeb Classical Library; London: William Heinemann, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1929–62). Les œuvres de Philon d’Alexandrie, French translation under the general editorship of Roger Arnaldez, Jean Pouilloux, and Claude Mondésert (Paris: Cerf, 1961–92).
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RRS SPh SPhA SPhM
Roberto Radice and David T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria: an Annotated Bibliography 1937–1986 (VCSup 8; Leiden etc.: Brill 1988). D. T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria: an Annotated Bibliography 1987– 1996 (VCSup 57; Leiden etc.: Brill 2000). Studia Philonica The Studia Philonica Annual Studia Philonica Monographs
(c) References to biblical authors and texts and to ancient authors and writings are to be abbreviated as recommended in the SBL Handbook of Style §8.2–3. Note that biblical books are not italicized and that between chapter and verse a colon is placed. Abbreviations should be used for biblical books when they are followed by chapter or chapter and verse unless the book is the first word in a sentence. Authors writing in German or French should follow their own conventions for biblical citations. (d) Journals, monograph series, source collections and standard reference works are to be be abbreviated in accordance with the recommendations listed in The SBL Handbook of Style §8.4. The following list contains a selection of the more important abbreviations, along with a few abbreviations of classical and philosophical journals and standard reference books not furnished in the list. ABD AC ACW AGJU AJPh AJSL ALGHJ ANRW APh BDAG B ib O r BJRL BJS BMCR BZAW BZNW BZRGG CBQ CBQMS
The Anchor Bible Dictionary, 6 vols. New York etc. 1992. L’Antiquité Classique Ancient Christian Writers Arbeiten zur Geschichte des antiken Judentums und des Urchristentums American Journal of Philology American Journal of Semitic Languages Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt L’Année Philologique Bauer, W., F. W. Danker, W. F. Arndt, and F. W. Gingrich. A GreekEnglish Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian literature. 3d ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Bibliotheca Orientalis Bulletin of the John Rylands Library Brown Judaic Studies Bryn Mawr Classical Review (electronic) Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte The Catholic Biblical Quarterly The Catholic Biblical Quarterly. Monograph Series
Instructions to Contributors CC CIG
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Corpus Christianorum, Turnhout Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum. Edited by A. Boeckh, 4 vols. in 8. Berlin 1828–77. CIJ Corpus Inscriptionum Judaicarum. Edited by J. B. Frey, 2 vols. Rome 1936– 52. CIL Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum. Berlin 1862–. CIS Corpus Inscriptionum Semiticarum. Paris 1881–1962. C Ph Classical Philology C PJ Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum. Edited by V. Tcherikover and A. Fuks, 3 vols. Cambrige Mass. 1957–64. CQ The Classical Quarterly CR The Classical Review CRINT Compendia Rerum Iudaicarum ad Novum Testamentum CPG Clavis Patrum Graecorum. Edited by M. Geerard, 5 vols. and suppl. vol. Turnhout 1974–98. CPL Clavis Patrum Latinorum. Edited by E. Dekkers. 3rd ed. Turnhout 1995. CSCO Corpus Scriptorum Christianorum Orientalium DA Dissertation Abstracts DBSup Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément. Paris 1928–. DSpir Dictionnaire de Spiritualité, 17 vols. Paris 1932–95. EncJud Encyclopaedia Judaica, 16 vols. Jerusalem 1972. EPRO Études préliminaires aux religions orientales dans l’Empire romain FrGH Fragmente der Griechische Historiker, Edited by F. Jacoby et al. Leiden 1954–. GCS Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller, Leipzig GLAJJ M. Stern, Greek and Latin authors on Jews and Judaism, 3 vols. Jerusalem 1974–84. GRBS Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies HKNT Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament, Tübingen HNT Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, Tübingen HR History of Religions HThR Harvard Theological Review HUCA Hebrew Union College Annual JAAR Journal of the American Academy of Religion JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society JAC Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum JBL Journal of Biblical Literature JHI Journal of the History of Ideas JHS The Journal of Hellenic Studies JJS The Journal of Jewish Studies JQR The Jewish Quarterly Review JR The Journal of Religion JRS The Journal of Roman Studies JSHRZ Jüdische Schriften aus hellenistisch-römischer Zeit JSJ Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Periods JSNT Journal for the Study of the New Testament JSNTSup Journal for the Study of the New Testament. Supplement Series JSOT Journal for the Study of the Old Testament JSOTSup Journal for the Study of the Old Testament. Supplement Series
244 JSP JSSt JThS KBL KJ LCL LS J MGWJ Mnem NCE NHS NT NTSup NTA NTOA NTS OL D OTP PAAJR PAL PG PGL PhilAnt PL PW PWSup RAC RB REA REArm REAug REG REJ REL RGG RhM RQ RSR Str-B SBLDS SBLMS
The Studia Philonica Annual 18 (2006) Journal for the Study of the Pseudepigrapha and Related Literature Journal of Semitic Studies The Journal of Theological Studies L. Koehler and W. Baumgartner, Lexicon in Veteris Testamenti libros, 3 vols. 3rd ed. Leiden 1967–83. Kirjath Sepher Loeb Classical Library A Greek-English Lexicon. Edited by H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones. 9th ed. with revised suppl. Oxford, 1996. Monatsschrift für Geschichte und Wissenschaft des Judentums Mnemosyne New Catholic Encyclopedia, 15 vols. New York 1967. Nag Hammadi Studies Novum Testamentum Supplements to Novum Testamentum New Testament Abstracts Novum Testamentum et Orbis Antiquus New Testament Studies The Oxford Latin Dictionary. Edited by P. G. W. Glare. Oxford, 1982. The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha. Edited by J. H. Charlesworth. 2 vols. New York–London, 1983–85. Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research Philon d’Alexandrie: Lyon 11–15 Septembre 1966. Éditions du CNRS, Paris 1967. Patrologiae cursus completus: series Graeca. Edited by J. P. Migne. 162 vols. Paris, 1857–1912. A Patristic Greek Lexicon. Edited by G. W. H. Lampe. Oxford 1961. Philosophia Antiqua Patrologiae cursus completus: series Latina. Edited by J. P. Migne. 221 vols. Paris, 1844–64. Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, Real-Encyclopaedie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. 49 vols. Munich, 1980. Supplement to PW Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum Revue Biblique Revue des Études Anciennes Revue des Études Arméniennes Revue des Études Augustiniennes Revue des Études Grecques Revue des Études Juives Revue des Études Latines Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, 7 vols. 3rd edition Tübingen, 1957–65. Rheinisches Museum für Philologie Revue de Qumran Revue des Sciences Religieuses H. L. Strack and P. Billerbeck, Kommentar zum Neuen Testament aus Talmud und Midrasch, 6 vols. Munich 1922–61. Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series
Instructions to Contributors SBLSPS SC Sem SHJP SJLA SNTSMS SR SUNT SVF TDNT THKNT TRE TSAJ TU TWNT VC VCSup VT WUNT ZAW ZKG ZKTh ZNW ZRGG
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Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers Series Sources Chrétiennes Semitica E. Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ. Revised edition, 3 vols. in 4. Edinburgh 1973–87. Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity Society for New Testament Studies. Monograph Series Studies in Religion Studien zur Umwelt des Neuen Testaments Stoicorum veterum fragmenta. Edited by J. von Arnim. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1903–24. Theological Dictionary of the New Testament. 10 vols. Grand Rapids 1964– 76. Theologischer Handkommentar zum Neuen Testament, Berlin Theologische Realenzyklopädie, Berlin Texte und Studien zum Antike Judentum Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur, Berlin Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 10 vols. Stuttgart 1933– 79. Vigiliae Christianae Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae Vetus Testamentum Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte Zeitschrift für Katholische Theologie Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft Zeitschrift für Religions- und Geistesgeschichte
