The Split in Stalin's Secretariat, 1939-1948

HISTORY • RUSSIAN STUDIES

detailed insight into the workings of the highest echelons of the Soviet regime under Stalin. This book convincingly charts how personal rivalries among Stalin’s favorites

HARRIS

“Jonathan Harris renders in The Split in Stalin’s Secretariat, 1939–1948 a highly

were reflected in the USSR’s political course during World War II and in the opening moves of the Cold War.”

—KEES BOTERBLOEM, University of South Florida

Jonathan Harris shows that the leaders of Stalin’s Secretariat clashed sharply over the nature of the Communist Party’s “leadership” of the Soviet state in the period between 1939 and 1948. The term “party leadership” is generally misunderstood; it does not refer to the activities of the party as a whole but to the efforts of its full-time officials (the “inner party”) to direct the activities of the members of the Andrei Zhdanov and Georgii Malenkov, the two junior secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) who directed the two major bureaucratic divisions of the Secretariat for most of the period under review, supported diametrically opposed conceptions of the leadership to be provided by the party’s officials. Zhdanov argued that they should give priority to the ideological education of all members of the party and should allow the Communists who manned the state considerable autonomy in their administration of the five-year plans. In direct contrast, Malenkov, who directed the cadres’ directorate for most of the period under review, had little sympathy for ideological education and urged party officials to engage in close and detailed direction of the Communists who directly administered the five-year plans. Through a careful examination of the public discussion of this issue in the various publications controlled by the major divisions of the Secretariat in conjunction with recently published archival materials, it is possible to pinpoint the linkages between the leadership conflict within the Secretariat, the shifts in the ongoing public discussion, and Stalin’s role as the final arbiter in the dispute.

JONATHAN HARRIS is professor of political science at the University of Pittsburgh. For orders and information please contact the publisher LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200 Lanham, Maryland 20706 1-800-462-6420 • www.lexingtonbooks.com Cover images originally printed in the Cominform journal For A Lasting Peace, For a People’s Democracy.

SplitStalin'sSecretariatLITHO.in1 1

THE SPLIT IN STALIN’S SECRETARIAT, 1939–1948

party who manned the Soviet state (the “outer party”). This study argues that

THE SPLIT IN STALIN’S SECRETARIAT, 1939–1948

ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-2605-9 ISBN-10: 0-7391-2605-9 90000 9 7 80739 1 26059

Jonathan

HARRIS 6/24/08 4:07:25 PM

The Split in Stalin’s Secretariat, 1939–1948

The Split in Stalin’s Secretariat, 1939–1948 Jonathan Harris

LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of ROWMAN & LITTLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.

Lanham • Boulder • New York • Toronto • Plymouth, UK

LEXINGTON BOOKS A division of Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. A wholly owned subsidiary of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc. 4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200 Lanham, MD 20706 Estover Road Plymouth PL6 7PY United Kingdom Copyright © 2008 by Lexington Books All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Harris, Jonathan, 1935The split in Stalin's Secretariat, 1939–1948 / Jonathan Harris. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-2605-9 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7391-2605-9 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Soviet Union—Politics and government—1936–1953. 2. Political leadership— Soviet Union—History. I. Title. DK268.4.H37 2008 320.94709'043—dc22 2008022020 eISBN-13: 978-0-7391-3014-8 eISBN-10: 0-7391-3014-5 Printed in the United States of America

⬁ ™ The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI/NISO Z39.48-1992.

Contents

Preface

vii

1

The Split in the Secretariat

2

Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939

15

3

Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941

31

4

The War and the Apparatus, 1941–1943

47

5

The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945

61

6

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

77

7

Zhdanov’s Uneasy Ascendancy, 1946

103

8

Confusion and Compromise at the Top, 1947

121

9

Zhdanov’s Last Months: January–July 1948

141

Conclusion

153

10

1

Bibliography

163

Index

177

About the Author

183

v

Preface

This study attempts to identify the ideological and political differences between the leading full time officials of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (VKP(B) in the years between 1939 and 1948. It focuses on the conflict between A. Zhdanov and G. Malenkov, Stalin’s junior lieutenants in the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) over the definition of party officials’ priorities and responsibilities. This study conceptualizes the relationship between “the party” and “the state” in the political system differently from much Western scholarship on the USSR. Many Western scholars, following the terminological usage of the leaders of the VKP(B), refer to these institutions as if they were separate bureaucratic agencies. In fact, the overwhelming majority of the members of the VKP(B) were simultaneously employees of the immense Soviet state and were subject to the orders of the full time officials of the party subordinate to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the VKP(B). These officials, who were responsible for the management of the party as a whole, usually did not simultaneously hold positions in the state. (There were important exceptions to be discussed below.) To underline this fundamental characteristic of the political system, this study refers to the full time officials as the “inner party” and uses the term “outer party” to refer to those members of the party who held positions in the state. The leaders of the VKP(B) used the term “party leadership” of the Soviet state to refer to the officials’ ongoing efforts to lead the party’s rank and file. This study also attempts to demonstrate that public sources provide ample evidence of ongoing conflict over party officials’ role and responsibilities. Local party officials responded swiftly to the reports and speeches made by Stalin and his lieutenants, to the numerous decrees issued in the name of the vii

viii

Preface

Central Committee, and the perennial discussion of “party leadership” in publications that appeared under its aegis. This study builds on the existing Western, Soviet, and more recent postCommunist Russian scholarship on the period from 1939 until 1948, and I am deeply indebted to the authors of the monographs listed in the bibliography. While they do not refer directly to the discussion of the conflict over officials’ priorities, their analysis of the political context surrounding this issue has proved to be invaluable. Most important, I would like to thank Professor William Chase of the department of history at the University of Pittsburgh for his extensive and intelligent review of an earlier and more primitive version of this study.

Chapter One

The Split in the Secretariat

This study attempts to demonstrate that the leading members of Stalin’s Secretariat, the executive organ of the Central Committee of the All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) (CC/VKP(B), clashed sharply and continuously over the nature of “party leadership” of the Soviet state between 1939 and 1948. Western scholars have generally regarded the term “party leadership” as referring to the activities of the VKP(B) as a whole. Our analysis of Soviet leaders’ discourse reveals that they used this term to refer to the efforts of the party’s full-time officials, who generally held no position in the state, to provide leadership to the thousands of Communists who manned the state. To dramatize this distinction, this study refers to the former as the “inner party” and the latter as the “outer party.”1 This study argues that A. Zhdanov and G. Malenkov, the two junior Secretaries of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) during most of the period under review, supported diametrically opposed conceptions of the nature of the leadership to be provided by the party’s full time officials. Zhdanov, who directed the agitprop directorate of the CC/VKP(B) subordinate to the Secretariat during most of this period, insisted that they give highest priority to their “party political work”—the selection, appointment, ideological education, and supervision (kontrol) of party members activity. (Party officials often referred to this cluster of activities as “internal party work.”) Zhdanov consistently stressed the overriding importance of party members’ ideological education and urged party officials to allow the Communists who manned the state considerable autonomy in their administration of the five-year plans. In direct contrast, G. M. Malenkov, who headed the cadres directorate of the CC/VKP(B) for most of the period under review, urged party officials to give priority to their “economic work”—the detailed direction of the Communists 1

2

Chapter One

in the state who administered the five-year plans. Malenkov had little sympathy for the ideological education of party members and he gave far greater emphasis to the inculcation of Soviet patriotism.

THE PUBLIC DISCUSSION: 1930–1941 This study seeks to demonstrate that evidence of this conflict can be found in the public discourse of the party’s leaders and subordinate officials. Stalin and his lieutenants publicly discussed the relative importance of these two spheres of party work in some detail during the 1930s and until the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941. During the 1930s, Stalin adopted contradictory positions on the subject; sometimes he implied that the Secretariat’s leaders and their subordinates should shift their emphasis from one sphere to the other and sometimes he warned them that the two spheres were “inseparable” and neither could be neglected. During this period, Stalin explicitly linked his definition of officials’ priorities with his conception of the proper organization of the various departments and directorates subordinate to the Secretariat. In 1930 his stress on the importance of officials’ “party political work” had led to the formation of “functional” divisions of the CC/VKP(B) to deal with personnel management, ideological education, and the supervision of party organizations’ fulfillment of previous decrees. This structure had been designed to prevent party officials from becoming “preoccupied” with industrial and agricultural production and to permit the Sovnarkom and its subordinate commissariats to administer the five-year plans without undue “interference” from party officials at the center and at the regional and city level. However, in 1934 Stalin evidently became concerned with the pace of industrial growth under the leadership of the Sovnarkom, concluded that party officials’ “economic work” had been neglected. He called for the dissolution of the “functional” departments and the establishment of “production branch departments” in the central and local apparatus to allow party officials to give more immediate attention to economic development. But soon after the assassination of Kirov in late l934, Stalin evidently became dissatisfied with this system and launched a campaign to restore the primacy of ideological education and personnel management that culminated in his report on behalf of the CC/VKP(B) to the 18th Congress in March 1939. Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress established the organizational and ideological basis for the subsequent dispute over officials’ priorities. Stalin implied that the Sovnarkom and its subordinates should enjoy direct responsibility for the administration of the five-year plans and that the Secretariat and its subordinates should give greater stress to all aspects of their party politi-

The Split in the Secretariat

3

cal work. Stalin dramatized the Sovnarkom’s industrial responsibilities with a vigorous defense of the state’s role in economic development and he emphasized the centrality of party political work by his massive attention to the ideological education of party members and “work with cadres.” Most important, he called for the establishment of two new “functional” directorates for agitprop and cadres to replace the “production branch” departments for industry and transport. Zhdanov was named the director of the directorate of agitprop at the 18th Congress and he presented his views in his report on the party’s rules at the Congress. In 1937 he had explicitly declared that party officials should give primacy to “party work” and he elaborated his views in his report to the 18th Congress. He regarded all elements of party political work as important, but he clearly regarded the ideological education of party members as of paramount importance. Following Stalin’s lead, Zhdanov insisted that all members of the party were obliged to “master Marxism-Leninism” in order to develop the proper perspective on both their own activities and external events and defined this study as the basis for all practical success. He also sought to limit party officials’ capacity to “interfere” in the administration of industry by calling for the abolition of the industrial and transport departments established in 1934. Zhdanov evidently believed that the Secretariat and its subordinate officials could lead the members of the “outer party” who manned the state by concentrating on their recruitment, assignment, ideological education, and supervision of their activities. If the party’s officials dealt with these matters effectively, Zhdanov argued, party members would be assigned in accord with their own capacities and the system’s overall needs, would develop a proper understanding of their own responsibilities and therefore implement the fiveyear plans without “petty tutelage” by the party’s officials. Party officials themselves would be free from the immediate details of administration to focus on the development of what was defined as “political leadership.” This included the coordination and supervision of a wide range of economic and non-economic activities. Zhdanov clearly feared that party officials’ “preoccupation” with the immediate tasks of the five-year plans could blur the vital distinction between themselves and the Communists who staffed the state and would undermine their own capacity for leadership of a far wider range of activities. Zhdanov worried that party officials’ undue concentration on the search for supplies of raw materials, labor, and an excessive focus on immediate administrative problems would make them neglect their own and others’ ideological education, ignore the recruitment of new members, and the assignment and supervision of party members essential to the continued dynamism of the party.

4

Chapter One

“Preoccupation with economic work” would make officials into “narrow minded practicalists” indistinguishable from the Communists in the state structure. Focus on party political work would assure the proper division of labor deemed essential to retain the sense of direction and purpose essential to the party officials’ leadership of the VKP(B) as a whole. Stalin named Malenkov director of the cadres directorate at the 18th Congress in 1939 but his report to the 18th Conference of the VKP(B) in February 1941 indicated that Stalin had made him responsible for the supervision of industrial production. In his report Malenkov sought to extend party officials’ responsibility for the implementation of the five-year plans; he explicitly called for the appointment of specialized secretaries for industry and transport who would “share” authority for industrial development with the appropriate state agencies. In his report and in some of his rare subsequent public statements Malenkov also implied that party members learned more from practical and direct experience than from the formal study of Marxist-Leninist texts. Malenkov could hardly declare that ideological education was useless, but circumstantial evidence suggests that he periodically attempted to shift agitprop workers’ attention to “mass work” in support of production. Malenkov clearly regarded party political work as an inadequate basis for party officials’ leadership of the party members in the Soviet state, and he insisted that officials could provide “real” leadership only through active participation in the solution of problems of production. Malenkov had no qualms about blurring the lines of responsibility between party officials and the Communists in state agencies and evidently believed that party officials had to intervene on a regular basis to assure the fulfillment of the five-year plan. What Zhdanov criticized as party officials’ “petty tutelage” and “substitution” for state officials, Malenkov regarded as “operative management.”

THE PUBLIC DISCUSSION IN THE 1940s (1941–1948) During the period from 1941 until 1948, Stalin and his junior Secretaries did not refer to these issues in their rare public statements. However, the formulations and definitions presented in the leaders’ prewar reports were repeated ad infinitum and without change in the publications of the CC/VKP(B) and incorporated into the various decrees issued in its name. This study attempts to demonstrate that this public discussion reflected the continued conflict between Zhdanov and Malenkov and their allies and subordinates over the nature of “party leadership.”

The Split in the Secretariat

5

The analysis of these materials presents some problems. On the one hand, many important party officials did express their views on this subject and thus identified with one or the other junior Secretary. On the other hand, most of the materials published in the organs of the CC/VKP(B) remained anonymous or were written by authors whose bureaucratic position was not identified. In attempting to cope with this secrecy, this study attempts to identify the alternative “tendencies of articulation” dealing with the definition of officials’ priorities and the nature and content of ideological education that appeared in the decrees and publications of the CC/VKP(B). Is it possible to identify these tendencies with the position of the two junior Secretaries? Since Malenkov and Zhdanov rarely addressed these issues publicly we sought to determine whether or not there was an association between their relative standing in the leadership as shown in the press coverage of their public appearances, on the one hand, and the shifts in the “tendencies of articulation” on the other.2 Public sources often, but not always provided evidence of this association, while archival materials published in the collection Politbiuro TsK VKP(B) I sovet ministrov SSSR, 1945–1953 often provided evidence of such linkage. For example, they reveal that Zhdanov’s perennial ill health often forced him to take extensive leaves of absence from the capital and that these absences from Moscow had an impact on the ongoing debate over officials’ role and the nature of ideological education. When he was away from Moscow, public support for his views in the publications of the CC/VKP(B) was sharply reduced. The most dramatic example of this occurred near the end of his life. In the summer of 1948 Zhdanov became ill once again. On July 1, 1948, Stalin restored Malenkov to his position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) (he had fired Malenkov from this position in the spring of 1946) and Zhdanov’s doctors recommended that he be given a twomonth vacation on July 5, 1948. These events were not reported at the time, but the issue of Bol’shevik that was approved for publication on July 5, 1948, sharply criticized Zhdanov’s orientation in its lead editorial, and on July 10, 1948, the Secretariat and its subordinate agencies were reformed in keeping with the definitions presented by Malenkov in his report to the 18th Conference of the VKP(B) in 1941. Archival materials also indicate that Stalin’s extended absences from the capital in the fall of the first years after World War II sometimes, but not always, had a dramatic impact on the ongoing debates. During the 1940s, both of Stalin’s junior Secretaries were relatively young. Zhdanov had been born in 1896. In 1934 he was named to the Orgbureau and replaced the murdered Kirov as first secretary of the Leningrad obkom and gorkom. In 1939 he was named a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) and member of the Politburo of the CC/VKP(B). From early 1939 until September 1940 he was the director of the agitprop directorate established in 1939 to provide

6

Chapter One

ideological education to the members of the party, to control the party’s media, and to direct the cultural and intellectual life of the country. He lost direct control of the directorate in September 1940 to his deputy G. F. Aleksandrov for reasons that remain obscure. After the Nazi attack on the USSR in June 1941 Zhdanov remained in Leningrad and did not seem to play a central role in the activities of agitprop, which fell under the supervision of A. S. Shcherbakov, who served as Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) from 1941 until his death in 1945. Zhdanov gave up his leadership of the Leningrad party in 1945 and gradually regained full responsibility for the agitprop directorate after World War II. Stalin granted him full responsibility for agitprop only in the spring of 1946. G. M. Malenkov had been born in 1902 and served as a member of the Orgbureau, a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B), and director of the cadres directorate from 1939 until the spring of 1946 when Stalin removed him from the last two positions. He was named a full member of the Politburo in 1946 and regained his position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) in the summer of 1948. He had served as a member of the State Defense Committee from 1941 until 1945 and a deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR from 1946 until 1953. Malenkov was one of the few leaders of the USSR other than Stalin who sometimes simultaneously held the position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) along with a post in the Council of Ministers. During the 1940s, Stalin remained silent on officials’ responsibilities but his public comments on other matters seemed to influence the ongoing public discussion of officials’ priorities and ideological education. In his wartime comments on such holidays as Red Army Day (February) and the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution (November), Stalin adopted two distinct positions. At times Stalin seemed to stress the importance of various elements of Soviet patriotism and at other times he implied that Marxism-Leninism was more significant. While it is obviously impossible to determine whether or not Stalin actually sought to influence the dispute in these comments, the subsequent published reaction to them suggests that they were regarded as significant political cues by the subordinate party officials. In particular, Stalin’s periodic references to the “leading role” of the VKP(B) and its “inspirational” activities was invariably followed by an increase in published support for Zhdanov’s definitions in the CC’s various publications and the incorporation of these formulations in the Central Committee’s decrees. Conversely, Stalin’s periodic endorsement of Soviet patriotism as a “driving force” of Soviet society was followed by increased public support for Malenkov’s formulations and a reduction of support for Zhdanov’s views in the CC’s publications and decrees.

The Split in the Secretariat

7

After the war, Stalin spoke rarely in public but his statements continued to have an impact on the published debate, whatever his intent. His address during the election campaign for the Supreme Soviet of the USSR in February 1946 made no reference to officials’ priorities, but his reversion to a MarxistLeninist analysis of the nature of “imperialism”(however qualified) may well have been interpreted by at least some officials as an endorsement of Zhdanov’s formulations. His subsequent interviews with foreign dignitaries and journalists sometimes seemed to have had the opposite effect. In particular, his declaration that he was “not a propagandist but a man of practical affairs” in his interview with Harold Stassen in 1947 was followed by a sharp reduction of published support for Zhdanov’s orientation. The apparent impact of these statements on the public debate raises a difficult question—were the shifts linked to the junior Secretaries’ orientations on foreign policy as well as or instead of their views of party officials’ priorities? The author initially hoped to explore this relationship, inspired at least in part by Professor William McCagg’s intriguing conclusion that Stalin’s decisions on foreign policy during this period often reflected his efforts to rein in the aspirations of “party revivalists.” But this effort was abandoned for a number of reasons. First of all, our reexamination of the materials cited by Professor McCagg as evidence of a “party revival” led us to the conclusion that they were actually reflections of the sharp debate over the ideological education of party members. Secondly, recent Russian scholarship dealing with the postwar period reveals that despite bouts of ill health and extensive absences from the capital, Stalin was very much in command of the USSR’s foreign and domestic policy. This scholarship also reveals that his lieutenants, who were responsible for directing different divisions of the bureaucracy, were not independent actors but loyally followed Stalin’s lead. Finally, the junior Secretaries’ discussion of foreign policy was far too sporadic to provide a coherent view of their orientations. In the late 1930s Zhdanov had made a number of explicit comments on foreign affairs that may have influenced his position in the leadership. But his statements on foreign policy in the years 1946–1947 shifted ground considerably and simply seemed to follow Stalin’s lead. Initially conciliatory, in 1946 he became increasingly hostile toward the USA and UK, culminating in his well-known discussion of the emergence of two hostile camps in his report to the first meeting of the Communist Information Bureau in September 1947. It is even more difficult to infer Malenkov’s views from his brief remarks. He was more belligerent towards the USSR’s wartime allies than Zhdanov in his own election speech of February 1946, but his remarks to the founding conference of the Communist Information Bureau in September 1947 seemed to follow Zhdanov’s lead.

8

Chapter One

This study reconstructs the dispute over officials’ priorities and ideological education by analyzing the formulations that appeared in the binding decrees issued by the Politburo and in the name of the CC/VKP(B) and by a comparative analysis of the major publications of the CC/VKP(B). These include Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, Partiinaia Zhizn’, Bol’shevik, Propagandist, Kultura I Zhizn’, and Pravda. The decrees issued in the name of the CC/VKP(B), which was rarely convened during this period, not only reflected the leadership’s priorities but were binding orders for subordinate party officials. The decrees were identical in format; the first section outlined the “shortcomings” in the activities of local party officials that had been identified by an investigation of local practices. The second section explicitly outlined the measures deemed necessary to eliminate these errors and identified those officials responsible for implementing them. The final section often included specific deadlines for implementation and reporting to higher authorities. Archival materials indicate that these decrees were drafted and redrafted in the various departments of the CC/VKP(B) subordinate to the Secretariat and the Orgbureau. Produced at the highest level of the VKP(B), they invariably reflected the balance of influence between the supporters and opponents of alternative positions at a particular time. Sometimes the decrees reflected the preferences of a particular group of officials in the leadership while in other instances the decrees balanced the formulations supported by the rival factions in a variety of ways. These orders not only provided specific directions at a particular time, but served as benchmarks for the subsequent discussion of officials’ priorities in the publications of the Central Committee. The proponents of the priorities and definitions embodied in the decree invariably launched a campaign in their defense in at least one of the major publications of the CC/VKP(B) while those who questioned or had doubts about these definitions expressed their resistance in a variety of ways in other publications of the CC/VKP(B). It is possible to reconstruct the various phases of the debate over officials’ priorities and the ideological education of Communists by comparative analysis of these articulations. The various publications of the Central Committee seemed to play different roles in the debate over officials’ priorities in the period from 1939 until 1948. Initially they seemed to serve as the “house organs” of the two major directorates of the Central Committee but subsequently became major arenas for political conflict. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo was the house organ of the cadres directorate. It was edited by Malenkov until September 1940 (and possibly later as well) and generally endorsed his position in the years between 1939 and 1941. Although it ceased publication during the first six months after the

The Split in the Secretariat

9

German attack on the USSR in June 1941, it resumed publication in early 1942 and continued to endorse his position until he was dispatched to Stalingrad in the second half of 1942. When Malenkov was in Stalingrad and after a major reform of the apparatus in mid-1943, the journal gave increased but sometimes grudging support to party political work but it shifted back to endorse Malenkov’s views whenever Zhdanov seemed to suffer a loss of political status. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo ceased publication in mid-1946 shortly after Malenkov temporarily lost his position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B). In November 1946 a new CC journal entitled Partiinaia Zhizn’ began publication to replace Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo and Propagandist. While its editorial board initially remained secret, the lead editorial in its first issue implied that it was the house organ for the cadres directorate and possibly the new directorate for verification of party organs. Its first issue supported much, but not all, of Zhdanov’s orientation but the journal adopted a more ambiguous and contradictory stance in the winter of 1946–1947. In June of 1947 it simultaneously revealed that its editorial board included a number of officials identified as allies of Malenkov and endorsed his orientation, but it soon became a battleground for the alternative definitions until the first meeting of the Cominform in the fall of 1947. Both Zhdanov and Malenkov attended the conference as representatives of the leadership of the VKP(B) and Malenkov surprisingly endorsed much of Zhdanov’s position in his own report on the activities of the CC/VKP(B). In the following months Partiinaia Zhizn’ endorsed Zhdanov’s position, wavered, and then ceased publication in April 1948 without explanation. Bol’shevik, officially defined as the theoretical and political journal of the VKP(B), initially served as the house organ for the agitprop directorate and championed Zhdanov’s orientation during most of the period between 1939 and 1941. But once Stalin made an overt appeal to Soviet patriotism in the face of the German invasion in June 1941 Bol’shevik followed suit and generally ignored the need for the Marxist-Leninist education of party members until the last months of the war. While Bol’shevik’s conversion to Soviet patriotism temporarily deprived Zhdanov’s allies of a media outlet, in 1942 they were evidently given control over Propagandist, the journal of the Moscow party organization. It generally endorsed Zhdanov’s position and clashed sharply with Bol’shevik over ideological education until its unexplained demise in mid-1946. Immediately after Propagandist ceased publication, the agitprop directorate began to publish Kultura I Zhizn’ as its official journal. It generally endorsed Zhdanov’s position during most of the period under review, but sometimes was far less supportive of his priorities when his authority in the leadership seemed to weaken.With the emergence of Kultura I Zhizn’as the

10

Chapter One

house organ of the agitprop directorate, Bol’shevik’s role became unclear. It often seemed to avoid the debate over officials’ priorities, but with the demise of Partiinaia Zhizn’ in the spring of 1948 it seemed to assume a more authoritative position in the last months before Zhdanov’s incapacitation. In contrast to the journals discussed above, Pravda was always an arena for the ongoing conflict over officials’ priorities. Its lead editorials and signed features on the affairs of the party shifted dramatically and frequently in the period under review. In addition, Pravda consistently published the pictorial and other evidence of the frequent changes in the political status of Zhdanov and Malenkov in Stalin’s ruling group. The comparative analysis of these materials is made possible by the extraordinary rigidity and repetitiousness of the public discussion of party officials’ priorities and ideological education. The decrees and publications of the Central Committee repeatedly used a limited number of formulations drawn from Stalin’s reports to the Congresses of the VKP(B) in the 1930s, from the reports by Malenkov and Zhdanov to the 18th Conference and 18th Congress, and from the decrees and resolutions adopted at these two meetings and on specific issues such as the proper use of the Kratkii kurs istorii Vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (Bol’shevikov), henceforth cited as the Kratkii kurs. This short history of the VKP(B) published in the fall of 1938, was essentially the “bible” for the program of ideological education of party members throughout the period under review. It incorporated a Stalinist version of party history up until 1937 and his own summary of the basics of dialectical materialism. The proponents of ideological education insisted that the study of this text would provide a guide to action for all Communists whatever their sphere of activity. This claim was obviously spurious but it could not be overtly challenged. The incorporation, modification, or exclusion of these formulations in the public discussion expressed the degree of support or opposition to the alternative definition of priorities. Unqualified and prolonged support for one or the other contending “tendencies of articulation” in the publications of the CC/VKP(B) was rare. When it did occur, the formulations identified with one of the rival orientations were incorporated into the decrees of the CC/VKP(B), in more than one of the publications of the CC, by the simultaneous disappearance of the formulations identified with the rival tendency from the same sources, and sometimes by pictorial or other indicators of one or the other Secretary’s significant improvement in status. For example, in the first months after the German attack on the USSR, Malenkov was named to the State Defense Committee and Zhdanov was not, the Central Committee’s journals endorsed party officials’ role in the development of industry, lauded the decisions of the 18th Conference of the VKP(B) in 1941 and ignored those made by the 18th Congress, expressed enthusiasm for Soviet patriotism,

The Split in the Secretariat

11

and ignored both the ideological education of party members and other elements of “party political work.” In direct contrast, in early 1948 the CC journals endorsed Zhdanov’s views on the centrality of ideological education, ignored the importance of Soviet patriotism, and repeatedly denounced party officials’ excessive interference in the state officials’ administration of the economy. At the same time Pravda’s pictures and references to Stalin’s inner circle portrayed Zhdanov as closest to Stalin and Molotov. But these periods of unambiguous support were not the norm. The CCs journals and decrees indicated that the conflict between the proponents of the two rival tendencies continued unabated from 1939 until 1948. This disagreement was expressed in a variety of ways: (1) Overt disagreement between the journals over party officials’ priorities. For example, in many instances when Bol’shevik defined the ideological education of party members as of paramount importance, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo would not only ignore it but insist that officials should focus on the more practical economic issues. (2) Direct challenges and direct criticism of the rival definition of priorities. For example, Propagandist expressed its opposition to Malenkov’s definitions by urging secretaries responsible for industry to give more attention to noneconomic questions. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo challenged Zhdanov’s definitions by urging agitprop officials to give more attention to “mass work” or the cultivation of patriotism. The major journals often criticized the allegedly baneful effects of the decisions associated with one of the junior Secretaries. Bol’shevik and Propagandist sometimes charged that the decisions of the 18th Conference in 1941 led officials to neglect ideological education and lapse into “practicalism.” Partiinoe Stroitel’svto sometimes assailed the decisions of the 18th Congress of 1939 for limiting party officials’ capacity to work effectively with industry. (3) Failure to endorse a particular position or principle identified with the rival tendencies. For example, an editorial or feature published in Pravda on industrial administration that ignored the Soviet state’s critical role in the construction of socialism was an indirect assault on Zhdanov’s position. A decree of the CC/VKP(B) or article in a journal of the CC/VKP(B) on the same subject that ignored the role of officials’ industrial responsibilities was a slap at Malenkov. (4) A balanced discussion of officials’ priorities in the same editorial or feature article or decree. This seemed to reflect a temporary deadlock between the the supporters of the rival tendencies and was expressed by lumping together formulations identified with each tendency in the same text. (5) Open conflict within the same journal reflected by simultaneous publication of materials supporting rival tendencies in the same issue of a journal.

12

Chapter One

All of the materials published in the organs of the CC/VKP(B) contained extraordinarily slavish praise for Stalin as the “leader” of the country who ostensibly transcended his official positions as General Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (after 1941). He was repeatedly portrayed as a genius in every field, the major source of “creative Marxism-Leninism,” as the author of the programs of industrialization and collectivization, the Stalin Constitution, of the victories of the USSR in World War II, as an inspiration for every citizen of the country, and so forth. These formulations have been excluded from the following discussion. In addition to these primary sources, this study builds on the existing scholarly literature on conflicts within the leadership of the VKP(B) during the period from the 18th Congress of 1939 to Zhdanov’s death in 1948. Merle Fainsod’s analysis of the organization of the Secretariat in his classic study of Stalinism, How Russia Is Ruled provides the starting point for the discussion. Fainsod demonstrated that the two junior Secretaries differed sharply over the proper organization of the apparatus of the Secretariat, but he made no attempt to explore the ongoing debate over party officials, priorities after the 18th Congress of the VKP(B). Subsequent monographs on politics in the USSR during the postwar period have dealt with the various elements of the conflict between the two junior Secretaries, but they did not examine the dispute over the proper relationship between the members of the “inner party” and the “outer party.” William McCagg’s extraordinary study Stalin Embattled: 1943–1948, which sought to explain Stalin’s foreign policy as an outgrowth of internal political discord, examined their alleged role in this process. Werner Hahn’s excellent Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–1953, provided an extremely detailed study of Zhdanov’s relationship with other members of the leadership, their disagreements over the proper allocation of resources, over proper agrarian, industrial, cultural, and foreign policies and an invaluable directory of party officials and their responsibilities. Ra’anan’s International Policy Formation in the USSR: Factional Disputes during the Zhdanovshchina provided a similarly nuanced discussion of differences over foreign policy. The most recent study of Stalin’s ruling group, Cold Peace:Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953 by Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk provides a detailed picture of the relationship between Stalin and his closest lieutenants based on archival materials. The most recently published work on this period, Kees Boterbloem’s excellent The Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov, 1896–1948, provides an extraordinarily comprehensive discussion of all of Zhdanov’s activities and of his exact position at various points in his career. Boterbloem concludes that the disagree-

The Split in the Secretariat

13

ments between Zhdanov and Malenkov did not begin until after World War II and that it is incorrect to trace their differences to the period before the war. However, his study, which is based largely on archival sources, does not examine the sharply contrasting definitions of officials’ responsibilities that the two junior Secretaries presented in their respective reports to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in 1939 and the 18th Conference in 1941.

NOTES 1. Martin Malia reports that George Orwell made this distinction. See Martin Malia, The Soviet Tragedy (New York: The Free Press, 1994), 389. 2. Gordon Skilling and Franklyn Griffiths, Interest Groups in Soviet Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), Chapter X.

Chapter Two

Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939

Stalin’s own views on the proper role of the Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B) in the political system not only established the setting for the disagreements between Malenkov and Zhdanov and their respective supporters but also provided them with the ideological formulations to support their own definitions. During the 1930s and 1940s, Stalin’s Politburo (and the various sub-groups that Stalin established after World War II) was composed of two major sets of officials: (1) the Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B) who directed the bureaucratic divisions subordinate to the Secretariat and subordinate party officials (the Politburo/Secretaries); (2) the leading people’s commissars in the Sovnarkom (the Politburo/Commissars—Politburo/Ministers after 1946). Some of the Politburo/Secretaries also simultaneously held positions as people’s commissars (Ministers after 1946) but this was rare. Kaganovich had this distinction in the 1930s and Malenkov and Shcherbakov in the 1940s. Stalin’s public statements reveal that he changed his conception of the proper division of labor between these two groups during the 1930s. In 1930 Stalin seemed to assign the Politburo/Commissars direct responsibility for the development of the new five-year plans and urged the Politburo/Secretaries and their subordinates to focus on the various components of party political work. In 1934, evidently concerned with lagging production, he decided to extend the capacity of the Politburo/Secretaries and their subordinate party officials to intervene more directly in the Sovnarkom’s administration of the economy. But he reversed himself during the purges in the late 1930s, and urged them to give more attention to party political work. This led to a return to his original stress on its overriding importance for the Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B) and their subordinates in 1939.

15

16

Chapter Two

In early 1930 Stalin established “functional” departments of the CC/VKP(B) subordinate to the Secretariat for cadres, political education, and verification of fulfillment to assure that the Secretariat and its subordinate officials focused on these internal questions1 and he stressed the importance of this reform in his report to the 16th Congress of the VKP(B).2 At the same time, he also stressed the importance of the Soviet state in the construction of socialism. First of all, he called for a massive extension of state power on the ideological grounds that the dictatorship of the proletariat, which was the “mightiest and strongest state that has ever existed” had to be strengthened before it could even begin to “wither away” as Engels had predicted.3 Secondly, he vigorously defended the authority of the factory directors over their respective enterprises (edinonachalie) against the incursions of both trade unions and primary party organizations.4 Later that year Stalin emphasized the Sovnarkom’s direct responsibility for production by intervening personally at its meetings to demand higher targets5 and by increasing the number of members of the Politburo with responsibilities in the Sovnarkom. V. M. Molotov gave up his position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) to assume Rykov’s position as the chairman of the Sovnarkom; V. I. Kuibyshev, a member of the Politburo who had reportedly endorsed Stalin’s targets for industry as the Chairman of the Supreme Economic Council was named chairman of Gosplan and vice chairman of the Sovnarkom; S. Ordzhonikidje, who assumed Kuibyshev’s place, also joined the Politburo at this juncture.6 Immediately after these changes in personnel, Stalin gave even more attention to the responsibility of the Sovnarkom for industrial production. Early in 1931 he stressed the government’s responsibility for the allocation of resources, reaffirmed his support for the principle of edinonachalie as essential to industrial growth, and urged the directors of factories to “master technique” to accelerate industrialization and to assure the effective direction of their enterprises.7 In mid-1931 Stalin explicitly stressed the responsibilities of the people’s commissariats for technical education, for the supply of goods and services to the population, and for improvements in labor productivity.8 At the same time, he seemed to imply that at least some full-time officials in the party had not fully grasped the role of the state in industrial production; he attacked their alleged failure to give sufficient weight to technical skills in the assignment of personnel.9 From 1931 onward, the Sovnarkom seemed to enjoy immense authority over the development of industry; it issued hundreds of binding decrees in its own name on questions of planning, governmental reorganization, and the allocation of resources between branches of the economy and between the various regions of the USSR.10 Although many of these decrees may have orig-

Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939

17

inated in the Politburo, the Sovnarkom apparently had far more direct control over the economy than even the most powerful regional officials. A biography of S. Kirov, the ill-fated leader of the Leningrad party organization, a member of the Politburo and briefly a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) reveals that he was always obliged to appeal directly to the Sovnarkom or to individual Politburo/Commissars in his periodic efforts to increase Leningrad’s share of resources.11 Stalin reaffirmed the Sovnarkom’s responsibilities in his report on the progress of the five-year plan in January 1933.12 But by early 1934 Stalin evidently had become dissatisfied with the pace of industrial growth under its leadership and he decided to broaden party officials’ responsibility for economic development. In his report to the 17th Congress of the VKP(B) in 1934 Stalin charged that the “functional” departments of the apparatus had hampered industrial progress and he explicitly ordered party officials to give more attention to industrial problems.13 The Congress reacted quickly to Stalin’s criticism; its resolution on organizational questions charged that “functionalism” had made “operative leadership of the economy” virtually impossible and called for the establishment of “production branch” departments for industry, transport, and agriculture in the central and local apparatus. The “functional” departments were eliminated and new production branch departments, which included numerous specialized subdivisions for various sectors of industry and transport, were made responsible for organizational work, personnel management, and verification within their sectors. A new department for culture and the propagation of Leninism was made responsible for the theoretical education of members of the VKP(B). The resolution adopted by the Congress explicitly declared that the reform of the apparatus would allow local officials to give proper attention to problems of production.14 Merle Fainsod’s excellent study of the Secretariat and its subordinate agencies in the l930s concludes that the establishment of these new departments at the center and in local party organizations did permit party officials to intervene more directly and effectively in the Sovnarkom’s administration of the economy.15 Stalin had also discussed ideological education in his report to the 17th Congress in 1934. He warned that “capitalist encirclement” threatened to foster the revival of anti-Leninist views because party members’ concern with practical problems had led them to neglect their theoretical study.16 Stalin urged the members of the party to give more attention to the study of Marxist-Leninist theory,17 but the 17th Congress evidently did not pass any decree on the subject. Whatever the reason for the Congress’ silence on this issue,18 the assassination of S. Kirov provided the rationale for the ruthless elimination of all those who ostensibly held “anti-Leninist views.”19

18

Chapter Two

It is not generally recognized that the massive purge of the VKP(B) in the second half of the 1930s was accompanied by a concerted campaign to shift its officials’ attention away from economic work and toward the ideological education of party members and other components of party political work. Almost immediately after Kirov’s assassination in December 1934, Bol’shevik urged members of the party to study the history of the VKP(B) and its earlier response to “anti-Leninist elements” in order to improve their vigilance against its enemies.20 Bol’shevik was evidently responding to a secret circular of January 1935 that had called for the study of the history of the party in just these terms. As the campaign gained momentum, Bol‘shevik cited Stalin’s comments at the 17th Congress on the importance of ideological education as mandating this new emphasis on correct consciousness.21 In early 1935, as the purges broadened their scope, the leadership of the VKP(B) gave increasing attention to “work with cadres”—the other major component of party political work. A decree of the CC/VKP(B) issued in February 1935 established new departments for cadres in sixty-three gorkom in order to “enliven organizational and propaganda work” within the party.22 Bol’shevik’s comment on the decree declared that the new departments would help local officials to become “effective political leaders” focusing on the management of personnel and on political education.23 A. Zhdanov, who had succeeded Kirov as the head of the party organization in Leningrad, clearly endorsed this campaign. In late March 1935, the gorkom in Leningrad issued a decree asserting that the assassination of Kirov had dramatized the glaring inadequacies in the ideological training of members of the party. It explicitly charged that officials’ preoccupation with immediate economic problems had not only undermined their organizational and educational work but also had sapped their vigilance against the “enemies” of the party.24 In May 1935 Stalin underlined the overriding importance of “work with people” with his famous declaration that “cadres are decisive.”25 His pronouncement evidently accelerated the campaign to assure greater attention to personnel management and the study of Marxism-Leninism. A new department of the Central Committee for cadres headed by N. I. Yezhov, with G. M. Malenkov as his deputy was probably established at this time.26 In June 1935 the kultprop department was divided into separate departments for party agitprop, press, schools, cultural and mass educational work, and science in order to improve the “level of ideological educational work.”27 In the same month, the CC/VKP(B) issued a decree designed to improve the ideological education of members of the party by creating more specialized study circles, improving the education of agitprop workers, and commanding party officials to directly supervise the ideological-educational pro-

Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939

19

grams.28 In October 1935 the CC/VKP(B) sharply assailed the obkom in Sverdlovsk for ostensibly neglecting the ideological education of members of the party.29 In November 1935 the CC established a new central educational institution for the training of propagandists.30 The political standing of both Zhdanov and Malenkov improved dramatically during this campaign. First of all, Zhdanov was increasingly represented as Stalin’s leading specialist on ideological matters. In early 1936 all of the Central Committee’s journals simultaneously published a critique of existing history texts that had ostensibly been prepared in the summer of 1934 by Stalin, Kirov, and Zhdanov. At this juncture Zhdanov was named the director of a new commission to assure the implementation of this critique.31 Secondly, at approximately the same time, G. M. Malenkov, who had been named the director of the Central Committee’s department for leading party organs sometime in 1934 replaced Yezhov as the editor of Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo.32 At this juncture, it fully supported the campaign for the resumption of ideological education and did not provide any indication of disagreement between Malenkov and Zhdanov over party officials’ responsibilities and priorities.33 During the second half of 1936 there was a lull in the campaign for ideological education as all national media focused on the introduction of the new Constitution of the USSR that had been published in draft form in the middle of the year and ratified by the Supreme Soviet at the end of the year.34 The new Constitution’s explicit endorsement of the economic responsibilities of the Sovnarkom complemented the campaign to shift party officials away from “excessive” concern with the details of the economy. The Constitution explicitly defined the Sovnarkom as the “highest executive and administrative body of the state” responsible for the direction of the people’s commissariats, the administration of the five-year plans, and for the establishment of new economic organs whenever necessary.35 Shortly afterwards, the campaign to give priority to officials’ political work was resumed. In early 1937, Zhdanov publicly adopted this position in an address to the bureau of the Leningrad obkom. Zhdanov explicitly stated that “the gorkom was forced to take on a number of economic questions which we consider wrong and abnormal, especially now when it is demanded from us that the party organization in earnest turn to party issues, to issues of political leadership.” In the process, he noted that the CC had removed the leader of the Rostov party organization for dulling political vigilance and “prioritizing economic issues to the detriment of party-political ones.”36 When the Central Committee was convened in February/March 1937, both Zhdanov and Stalin explicitly insisted on the primacy of party officials’ party political work. Zhdanov declared that officials’ “passion for economic detail”

20

Chapter Two

had produced a disastrous “loss of taste for party work, a weakening of party work,” insisted that the “major function of party workers is party work” and implied that the Sovnarkom and its subordinate agencies could deal with production effectively without party officials’ constant interference.37 Stalin’s discussion of the priorities of party officials was far more ominous— he implied that their preoccupation with problems of production had undermined their vigilance against the enemies of the VKP(B): “The problem was that our party comrades were totally absorbed in economic activity during the past few years, were carried away by economic success, were so carried away by these matters that they forgot about everything else. Carried away with economic successes, they regarded them as the beginning and end of everything and such problems as the international position of the USSR, capitalist encirclement, strengthened political work of the party, sabotage, were ignored or regarded as secondary or tertiary questions.”38 Stalin urged party officials to give far more attention to “internal” work on the grounds that the “stability and duration of economic success is utterly and completely dependent on the success of party organizational and partypolitical work, that without these conditions, economic success may prove to be built on sand.”39 Stalin also dramatized the importance of ideological education by ordering the Central Committee to adopt the slogan “master Bolshevism” to replace the slogan “master technique,”40 and by insisting that the study of Marxism-Leninism by members of the party was the very key to its success. “I think that if we could prepare our cadres (from top to bottom) ideologically and thus steel them politically so that they would be able to orient themselves freely to the internal and international situation, i.e. if we could make them into really mature Leninists, Marxists able to solve problems of leadership of the country without serious error, then we should have solved ninetenths of our problems.”41 In his concluding remarks to the CC, Stalin added that he had not meant to imply that party officials’ should ever “neglect” economic questions, insisted that it was not really possible to “separate economic and political questions” and dangerous to give exclusive attention to either sphere of activity. But he explicitly ordered party officials to “stop substituting for economic organs and depriving them of their responsibilities (particularly in regard to land organizations),42 insisting that “party leadership” of the economy was conducted through the state structure. Finally, he called for the assignment of more qualified personnel to state institutions to free party officials from their preoccupation with economic details.43 The CC did not issue any decree on officials’ priorities, but its major journals clearly regarded Stalin’s remarks as demanding a limitation on party of-

Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939

21

ficials’ intervention in the state’s administration of the economy, despite his caveat about the dangers of “ignoring” economic work. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo now explicitly urged party officials to focus on “party work”44 and charged that their “substitution” (podmena) for the state’s economic administrators had undermined both the latter’s responsibility for the fulfillment of the plan and the party’s vigilance.45 Bol’shevik declared that the meeting of the Central Committee would encourage officials to eliminate their “narrow minded concerns” with production.46 In May 1937, Stalin’s critique of existing histories of the VKP(B) was published, prompting Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo to give more attention to ideological questions.47 It published the new interim guide for ideological education published by the agitprop department and in October 1937 launched a concerted campaign to improve the training of agitprop personnel.48 Stalin’s apparent effort to limit party officials’ intervention in economic administration and to broaden the authority of state agencies was also reflected in his own public statements and in subsequent decrees of both the Central Committee and the Sovnarkom. In late October 1937 Stalin explicitly praised the role of state administrators in industrial management49 and in January 1938 the Central Committee limited the capacity of party officials to intervene by explicitly prohibiting officials at the gorkom level from hiring and firing enterprise directors subordinate to all-union commissariats.50 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo’s comment on the decree charged that local party officials had ignored Stalin’s strong endorsement of the principle of one-man management in 1929.51 The leadership’s effort to broaden the Sovnarkom’s responsibility for the fulfillment of the five-year plans was reflected in the sharp decline in the number of Central Committee decrees on industrial matters,52 by the publication the Sovnarkom’s decrees as those of the “government of the USSR,”53 and Chairman Molotov’s special praise for the people’s commissariats at a meeting of the Supreme Soviet in 1938.54 At the same time the number of decrees urging attention to various elements of party political work increased. The notorious decree of the Central Committee of January 1938 that condemned the “unwarranted expulsion” of members of the party during the previous three years implied that greater stress on “internal work” would prevent the possibility of injustices in the future.55 During the second half of 1938, the leadership’s stress on the improvement of the ideological education of members of the party became particularly pronounced. The journals of the Central Committee gave massive attention to the subject in the spring and summer56 and the long-awaited revision of the official history of the VKP(B), the so-called Kratkii kurs, produced by a commission headed by Zhdanov,57 was published with immense fanfare in the fall

22

Chapter Two

of 1938. The new text contained the following formulations on the importance of the study of Marxism-Leninism that were repeatedly cited (often without attribution) in the subsequent debate over the relative significance of ideological education. “The history of the party reveals that the party of the working class is unable to fulfill its role as the leader of its own class, to fulfill its role as the organizer and leader of the proletarian revolution, unless it has mastered the advanced theory of the workers’ movement, if it does not master Marxist-Leninist theory. “Only a party that masters Marxist-Leninist theory is able to confidently advance and lead the working class forward. And conversely, a party that does not master Marxist-Leninist theory is forced to grope its way, loses confidence in its own actions and is unable to lead the working class forward. “The power of Marxist-Leninist theory gives the party the capacity to orient itself in any given situation to understand the internal links of unfolding events, predict the course of events and to perceive not only how they are unfolding at present, but also how they will develop in the future.”58 But the text also contained formulations that were cited repeatedly by those who subsequently challenged the priority given to the study of MarxismLeninism. The Kratkiii kurs denounced the crude “memorization of slogans” insisting that Marxists were not “pedants and dogmatists” who regarded theory as a “collection of dogmas,” that Marxism-Leninism was “not a dogma but a guide to action” that had to be modified in the course of developing events. Lenin was praised for his “creative development” of MarxismLeninism. Two examples were cited: (1) his conclusion that the system of soviets established in 1905 and 1917, rather than a system of parliamentary democracy provided the best form for the development of the “dictatorship of the proletariat”; (2) his conclusion that socialism could be constructed “in a single country” rather than simultaneously in a number of countries.59 The decree of the Central Committee of November 1938 on the proper use of the new text provided the ideological and organizational basis for the agitprop directorate established by the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in March 1939 and the basic rationale for the advocates of ideological education. The decree declared that “mastery of Marxism-Leninism” was the absolute prerequisite for success in every field of “socialist construction” and insisted that members of the party could acquire such mastery by the “independent study” of the Kratkii kurs supplemented by lectures provided by agitprop and by periodic consultations with specialists in ideology working in the so-called partkabinet.60 The decree also made the agitprop department responsible for the wide variety of publications and demanded that Bol’shevik be made into a “real theoretical journal” providing Marxist-Leninist analysis of current events.61

Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939

23

The decree also provided additional ideological support for the primacy of party officials’ internal work by stressing the responsibility of the state for the direction of the economy. It explicitly declared that careful study of the Kratkii kurs would help members of the party to overcome their continued “underestimation” of the state’s role as the “major weapon of the workers and peasants in the construction of socialism and the defense of capitalist encirclement.”62 The campaign to foster party officials’ concern with the various elements of party political work which had begun shortly after Kirov’s assassination in 1934, culminated in Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in March 1939. In his report Stalin explicitly called for a reform of the Central Committee’s apparatus to force the Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B) and their subordinates to focus on the ideological education of members of the party and on personnel management. At the same time, Stalin now provided an elaborate ideological rational for extending the state’s economic role. Stalin charged that many members of the party had a “negative orientation” toward state power that had hampered the development of a coherent definition of the state’s positive role in socialist construction. In outlining his own view of the state’s vast authority, Stalin engaged in some striking revision of classical Marxism. He dismissed Engels’ conclusion that the state would “wither away” as inappropriate for the USSR on the grounds that the USSR, as the first socialist state, was faced with the dangers of capitalist encirclement! Stalin declared that the Soviet state would not only retain its punitive and defensive functions well into the future but would also become increasingly concerned with “economic organizational and cultural-educational work.”63 Stalin’s formulations on the state implied that the Sovnarkom would enjoy increased responsibility for management of the economy and his discussion of the means to “strengthen the party” emphasized the overriding importance of the ideological education of members of the party and personnel management. He insisted that the proper selection, promotion, and assignment of personnel was essential for effective implementation of policy and called for the establishment of a new directorate for cadres in the apparatus of the CC/VKP(B) with subordinate departments at the republic, krai, and oblast level.64 At the same time, Stalin declared that the ideological education of members of the party was the absolute prerequisite for its success and called for the establishment of a central directorate for agitprop to implement the Central Committee’s decree of November 1938 on the proper use of the new Kratkii kurs.65Although Stalin had also called on the party to “develop and cultivate Soviet patriotism” in his discussion of internal developments in the

24

Chapter Two

USSR, this formulation (which was to receive particular stress during World War II) was overshadowed by his vigorous defense of the study of MarxismLeninism. Stalin’s formulation on this subject was to be cited repeatedly during the subsequent conflict over officials’ priorities. “If the Marxist-Leninist training of our cadres begins to languish, if our work of raising the political and theoretical level of these cadres lags, and the cadres themselves stop showing interest in the prospect of our future progress, cease understanding the truth of our cause and are transformed into narrow minded plodders with no outlook, blindly and mechanically carrying out instructions from above, then our entire party and state work must inevitably languish. It must be accepted as an axiom that the higher the political level of Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the workers in any branch of state and party work, the better the work and its results. And vice versa: the lower the political knowledge of the workers and the less they are imbued with a knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the greater will be the likelihood of disruption and failure, of the workers becoming shallow and degenerating into narrow plodders, of their complete degeneration.”66 In response to Stalin’s report, the 18th Congress abolished the production branch departments of the Central Committee’s apparatus and established two new directorates for personnel and agitprop. This structural reorganization provided the bureaucratic foundation for the subsequent disagreements between Zhdanov, the director of the directorate of agitprop, and Malenkov, the director of the directorate for cadres, which evidently absorbed the personnel departments that had been dispersed among the production departments. Malenkov reported to the Congress on behalf of the Credentials Commission but he did not discuss the new directorates or their responsibilities.67 In direct contrast, Zhdanov outlined his definition of officials’ priorities in his report to the Congress on changes in the rules of the VKP(B). Zhdanov clearly regarded the agitprop directorate’s educational activities as the key to the VKP(B)s success in every field: “In order to cope successfully with the principal task of the five-year plan, namely the communist education of the people and the elimination of the survivals of capitalism in the minds of men, in order to cope with the practical problems of socialist construction and in order to be equipped for the struggle against the surrounding capitalist world and its agents, our cadres must be armed with theory, with a knowledge of the laws of social development and of political struggle.68 “Our whole work of building socialism, our entire educational work is designed to remold the minds of men. That is what our party exists for, that is why we strove for and achieved the victory of socialism. That is why we are

Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939

25

undertaking the tasks of communist development, namely to remold people, their egos.”69 Zhdanov clearly regarded Stalin’s report as sanctioning the elimination of the departments for industry and transport throughout the apparat. As Zhdanov declared: “Nowadays the production branch departments do not know what they should be concerned with, they allow the responsibility of the economic organs to be undermined, they compete with them and this leads to a loss of responsibility and irresponsibility in work.”70 Furthermore, in keeping with Stalin’s emphasis on the Sovnarkom’s economic responsibilities, Zhdanov sought to limit the role of the primary party organizations (PPOs) that had been formed in each people’s commissariat. He insisted that the PPOs would have the right to “signal” higher bodies about shortcomings in the commissariat’s administration, but would not enjoy pravo kontrolia, i.e., the right to closely monitor and to provide explicit suggestions for improvement to the commissariats themselves. But while Zhdanov sought to limit party officials’ capacity to control the activities of the peoples’ commissariats, it would be a mistake to conclude that he wanted to eliminate completely party officials’ capacity to intervene on economic issues. In fact, he sought to bolster their authority in individual enterprises by stressing the primary party organizations’ pravo kontrolia visà-vis the administration and defining the PPOs’ responsibilities in very broad and ambiguous terms. “Experience has shown that the PPOs have worked well whenever they have been able to combine party-political work with the struggle for the fulfillment of production plans, for the improvement of the work of the state apparatus, for the mastery of new technique, for strict labor discipline, for the development of the Stakhanovite movement, for the promotion of new cadres to party and economic-administrative positions. And vice versa, where the PPOs have held themselves aloof from production problems, confining their activity to agitation and propaganda, or wherever the PPOs have taken upon themselves the unwarranted function of direction (rukovodstvo) of economic affairs, assuming the duties of economic-administrative bodies and detracting from their responsibilities, there the work has inevitably suffered.”71 The 18th Congress proved to be a triumph for Zhdanov—his definition of party officials’ responsibilities was incorporated into the party rules adopted by the Congress; the formulation that “the party is guided in its work by the theory of Marxism-Leninism” was added to its preamble; the study of theory was made a primary obligation for all members of the party and the previous reference to technical education was dropped, and his definition of pravo kontrolia was included in the rules governing PPOs.72

26

Chapter Two

The 18th Congress’s reorganization of the apparatus seemed to bolster the authority of the Sovnarkom in the administration of industry. The Politburo Commissars enthusiastically endorsed Stalin’s comments on the economic role of the state in their speeches to the Congress.73 Moreover, the weight of the people’s commissars in the Politburo was increased when L. Kaganovich gave up his position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) to serve as Deputy Chairman of the Sovnarkom.74 But Zhdanov’s triumph proved to be short lived. The limitations imposed on party officials’ capacity to intervene in economic administration evidently proved to be unsatisfactory to Malenkov and other leaders of the VKP(B). As a result, within a month after the 18th Congress had endorsed Zhdanov’s orientation, Malenkov and his associates began to charge that its stress on internal party work was “one sided” and sought to broaden party officials’ economic responsibilities.

NOTES 1. Istoriia KPSS, Vol. 4, Book 2 (1971), 34; Merle Fainsod, How Russia Is Ruled (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953), 168. 2. I. V. Stalin, Works (Moscow: 1952–1954), Vol. 12, 336–38. L. Kaganovich, who was a Secretary of the Central Committee at this time, told the Congress that the reform of the Secretariat and apparat in January of 1930 had already begun to solve the problems of personnel management. XVI s’ezd VKP(B) Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow:1930), Tom 1, 155. 3. Stalin, 342. 4. Stalin, 338. The 16th Congress also approved the CC decree of September 5, 1929, on edinonachalie. This was the first of many efforts to define the division of labor between the party’s primary party organization and the factory’s administration. For the text see KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh I resheniiakh s’ezdov,konferentsii I plenumov TsK (Moscow: 1971–1972), Vol. 4, 310–17. 5. Roy Medvedev, Let History Judge (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1971), 103. 6. Bol’shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia (vtoroe izdanie), Tom. 26, 620–21, Tom. 31, 171–72. 7. Stalin, Vol. 13, 34–43. 8. Stalin, 46–52. 9. Stalin, 70. 10. Only a minority of these decrees appeared as joint decrees of the Central Committee and the Sovnarkom. See Julian Towster, Political Power in the USSR: 1917–1947 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1948), 182. 11. S. Krasnikov, Sergei Kirov: Zhizn’ I deitel’nost (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1964), 182–84.

Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939

27

12. Stalin referred to the “firm leadership of party and government” as responsible for industrial growth. Stalin, Vol. 13, 218. 13. Stalin, 375. 14. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 5 (1971), 154–56. 15. Fainsod, 171. 16. Stalin, Vol. 13, 356. 17. Stalin, 371–73. 18. Krasnikov’s biography of Kirov implied that there was serious opposition to Stalin at the Congress and that his critics had hoped to transfer him to another position. Krasnikov, 194. 19. For N. S. Khrushchev’s account of Stalin’s reaction to Kirov’s assassination see Current Soviet Policies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1956), Vol. 2, 176 20. “Bol’she revoliutsionnoi bditel’nost,” Bol’shevik, no. 1 (1935). Approved for publication January 19, 1935. “Znat istoriiu partii lenina-stalina,” Bol’shevik, no. 2 (1935), 9–12. Approved for publication January 31, 1935. 21. E. M. Iaroslavskii, “O dvurshnichestve I o bor’be partii s vsemi ego proiavleniami,” Bol’shevik, no. 5 (1935), 66–74. Approved for publication March 15, 1935; “O vazhnosti izucheniia posle oktiabr’skogo perioda istorii nashei partii,” Bol’shevik, no. 6 (1935), 56–69. Approved for publication April 3, 1935. 22. “Postanovlenie TsK VKP(B),” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 7 (1935), 47. 23. “Partinuiu rabotu-na pervyim plan,” Bol’shevik, no. 7 (1935), 3. Approved for publication April 15, 1935. 24. “Postanovlenia leningradskogo gorkoma Mart. 29, 1935,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 8 (1935), 7–13. 25. I. Stalin, Sochineniia (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), Vol. 1 (XIV), 62. 26. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1971), 407. 27. “O reorganizatsii kultprop TsK VKP(B). Iiun 8, 1935,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1935), 47. The director of the new agitprop department was A. Stetskii, who became the editor of Bol’shevik at this juncture and held that position until April 1938. A.S. Shcherbakov, who later became a Secretary of the Central Committee and supervised agitprop work during World War II was named director of the department for mass work. For commentary on the reorganization stressing the improvement of ideological work see “Vyshe ideinuiu voorozhennosti,” Bol’shevik, no. 11 (1935), 11–14. Approved for publication June 8, 1935; “K realizatsii direkhtivy TsK o propagandistskoi rabote,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13 (1935), 1–7. Approved for publication July 7, 1935. 28. The decree was not dated. See “O propagandistskoi rabote v blizhaishee vremiia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13 (1935), 43. 29. “O sostoianii partiinoi propagandy v sverdlovskoi oblaste, Oktiabr 13, 1935,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 19/20, (1935), 70. 30. “O organizatsii vyshei shkoly propagandistov pri TsK VKP(B), Noiabr’ 21, 1935,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 21 (1935), 56.

28

Chapter Two

31. See Bol’shevik, no. 3 (1936) for all of these materials. 32. See Politicheskii slovar (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1940), 326. Compare Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 5 (1936). Approved for publication March 4, 1936 with no. 6 (1935). Approved for publication March 17, 1936 33. Both major journals gave massive attention to the improvement of ideological education. M. Rubinshtein, “Nedostatki v prepodavanii istorii VKP (B),” Bol’shevik, no. 8 (1936), 32–42. Approved for publication April 13, 1936, with G. Gak, “Vyshe kachestvo propagandistskoi raboty,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 10 (1936), 47–51. Approved for publication May 16, 1936. 34. For the comment of the Central Committee’s journals, see A. Stetskii, “Stalinskaia konstitutsiia sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13 (1936), 56–68. Approved for publication June 16. 1936. “Konstitutsiia sotsialisticheskogo gosudarstva rabochikh I krestian,” Bol’shevik, no. 11 (1936), 1–7. Approved for publication June 4, 1936. 35. Source Book on European Governments (New York: 1937), V-107-130. 36. Quoted in Kees Boterbloem, The Life and Times of Andrei Zhdanov, 1896–1948 (Montreal: McGill Queens University Press, 2004), 148. 37. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 5 (1937), 16–17. 38. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 1 (XIV), 193–94, 205. 39. Stalin, 209. 40. Stalin, 211–12. 41. Stalin, 220. 42. Stalin, 227. 43. Stalin, 227. 44. “Istoricheskii povorot I zadachi partii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 6 (1937), 5–12. Approved for publication March 25, 1937. 45. A. Skokin, “Vrednaia podmena khoziaistvennykh organov,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 6 (1937), 25. 46. “Podniat politicheskii uroven partiinykh mass,” Bol’shevik, no. 8 (1937), 1–12. Approved for publication April 28, 1937. 47. For Stalin’s comments see Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 1 (XIV), 248–52. For typically slavish comments on Stalin’s remarks see “Gluboko izuchat istoriiu bol’shevizma,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 10 (1937), 16–21. Approved for publication May 20, 1937; A. Kuznetsov, “Razoblachat vragov na ideologicheskom fronte,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13 (1937), 23–26. Approved for publication July 2, 1937; D. Bulamov, “Za ovladenie bol’shevizmom,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 14 (1937). Approved for publication July 15, 1937. 48. For the new guide see Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 17 (1937), 49–63. For an editorial on the subject see “Neustanno ovladevat’ bolshevizmom,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 19 (1937), 12–17. Approved for publication October 4, 1937. 49. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol 1 (XIV), 253–55. 50. “O nepravil’nom postanovlenii Iaroslavskogo gorkoma VKP (B), Ian 3, 1938,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 2 (1938), 62. 51. M. Alekseev, “Sochetat partinuiu rabotu s khoziaistvennoi,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 2 (1938), 53–58.

Stalin, the Secretariat, and the Sovnarkom, 1930–1939

29

52. Towster, 182. 53. Towster, 277. 54. Doklady I rechi na pervoi sessii verkhovnogo soveta (Moscow: 1938), 71. 55. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 5 (1971), 303–12. 56. L. Tandit, “Bolshevistskoe vospitanie molodykh kommunistov,” Bol’shevik, no. 10/11 (1938), 62–79. Approved for publication May 31, 1938; M. Rylskii, “Vybory partiinykh organov I voprosy propagandii I agitatsii,” Bol’shevik, no. 12(1938), 73–82. Approved for publication June 18, 1938; V. Kudriavtsev, “Za uspeshnoe ovladeniia bol’shevizmom,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 15 (1938), 25–28. Approved for publication July 28, 1938. 57. Istoriia KPSS, Vol. 5, Book 1, 28. 58. Istoriia vsesoiuznoi kommunisticheskoi partii (Bol’shevikov) Kratkii kurs (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1950), 339. 59. Istoriia, 341. 60. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 3 (1954), 316. 61. KPSS, 324–25. 62. KPSS, 318. 63. XVIII s’ezd VKP(B) Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gospolitazdat), 1939, 35. 64. XVIII s’ezd, 30. 65. XVIII s’ezd, 30–31. 66. XVIII s’ezd, 31. 67. XVIII s’ezd, 146–50. 68. XVIII s’ezd, 531. 69. XVIII s’ezd, 523. 70. XVIII s’ezd, 532. 71. XVIII s’ezd, 533 72. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh . . . Vol 5, (1971), 160–61, 381–82, 394. 73. XVIII s’ezd, 144–45; 212; 268; 397; 500. 74. Politicheskii slovar, 236, 506.

Chapter Three

Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941

Stalin and his two junior Secretaries did not discuss party officials’ roles in public during the period between the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in March 1939 and the 18th Conference of the VKP(B) in February 1941. However, the publications of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) provided indirect evidence of the growing disagreement over this issue between Malenkov and Zhdanov and their respective supporters. During this period, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo (which was edited by Malenkov until September 1940), emerged as the leading critic of the definition of officials’ priorities adopted by the 18th Congress, while Bol’shevik, edited by Zhdanov’s deputies in the agitprop directorate, generally defended the definitions of the 18th Congress. Pravda’s lead editorials, its pictorial coverage of the leaders’ public appearances, and the decrees issued by both Politburo and Central Committee provided indications of the relative political support for the two major orientations. Stalin’s silence from the 18th Congress until the German attack on the USSR in June 1941 obviously makes it impossible to determine directly his views on this issue. However, if we assume that the shifts in the public discussion of officials’ priorities and in the relative standing of Malenkov and Zhdanov in the leadership were not opposed by Stalin, then it seems plausible that he supported Zhdanov’s orientation until the outbreak of World War II in September 1939 and then shifted his support to Malenkov’s position shortly afterwards. This pattern suggests that Stalin’s preferences were linked to his anxieties about an increasingly threatening international situation. But in the immediate aftermath of the 18th Congress, the Central Committee’s publications indicated both substantial support for Zhdanov’s position and provided the first evidence of serious disagreement between the leaders of the two new directorates. On the one hand, Pravda’s editorials gave first 31

32

Chapter Three

priority to the ideological education of party members,1 explicitly cited Stalin’s own formulations on the significance of study of Marxism-Leninism in support of this position, and G. F. Aleksandrov, Zhdanov’s deputy director at agitprop, lauded the study of theory in an article published in Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo.2 On the other hand, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo did not endorse this position editorially, which may have been one of the first public indications that Secretary Malenkov was skeptical of the utility of such study. Furthermore, the discussion of the transition from socialism to communism, which had ostensibly begun at the 18th Congress, may well have reflected differences between the leaders of the new directorates. Bol’shevik’s discussion of the prerequisites for this transition gave highest priority to the study of Marxist-Leninist theory while Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo’ ignored Marxism-Leninism completely. Bol’shevik declared, in keeping with Zhdanov’s report to the 18th Congress, that the “center of gravity of all of our work in internal affairs can be reduced to an educational character.”3 In contrast, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo insisted that improved work with cadres and the party officials’ direction (rukovodstvo) of the economy were the vital prerequisites for the transition to communism.4 This reference to the “direction” of the economy by party officials may be the first published indication that Malenkov sought to broaden their responsibilities for “economic work.” It is more than likely that Malenkov and his supporters were able to take advantage of Zhdanov’s absence from the capital during his extended tour of the Far East 5 to directly challenge the definition of priorities that had been adopted by the 18th Congress in March. In early May a decree of the Central Committee sharply castigated local party officials for ostensibly neglecting their industrial responsibilities.6 In addition, materials published in Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo suggest that the leaders of the cadre directorate had sought to encroach on the authority of the orginstruction department of the CC/VKP(B) over the verification of fulfillment of previous decisions.7 But upon Zhdanov’s return to the Kremlin, this assault on his priorities was evidently beaten back. When Zhdanov reappeared in public in mid-May 1939,8 both Pravda and Bol’shevik reaffirmed their support for his definition of priorities. Pravda published a series of essays that repeatedly stressed the importance of the study of the Kratkii kurs for all members of the party and insisted that the PPOs pravo kontrolia should not be allowed to undermine the ultimate responsibility of factory directors.9 Bol’shevik urged members of the party to “master theory” in particularly strong terms.10 The meeting of the Central Committee later that month provided additional evidence of Zhdanov’s status in the leadership. It seemed to block the efforts of the cadre directorate to encroach on the org-instruction department by bol-

Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941

33

stering the authority of the Commission of Party Control to supervise the fulfillment of decisions by both party and soviet economic organizations, to verify the activities of local party organs, and to discipline all those who had broken the rules of the party.11 Whatever the exact role of the commission, Zhdanov emerged from the meeting of the CC/VKP(B) with renewed stature. In early June Pravda endorsed his views on ideological education and the significance of pravo kontrolia and gave front-page coverage to his report to the Leningrad party organization on the decisions of the Central Committee on agriculture.12 On June 29, 1939, in the midst of negotiations between representatives of the USSR and the British and French governments,13 Pravda published an article by Zhdanov who was the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which openly questioned the sincerity of the British and French negotiators. Zhdanov explicitly recognized that other leading officials in the USSR did not share his skepticism toward the British and French, and charged that the Western delegations were not really interested in an agreement with the USSR. He cited Stalin’s warning (in his report to the 18th Congress) that the USSR would not do the “dirty work” for others, and accused the British and French of seeking an agreement with Nazi Germany at the expense of the USSR. Zhdanov’s public assault on the British and French seemed to bolster his standing in the leadership. In July Pravda gave particularly forceful support to his views on officials’ priorities14 and repeatedly gave him front-page coverage at a time when Malenkov did not appear in public with other leading officials.15 In this context, the leaders of the agitprop directorate seemed to become more aggressive in pressing their campaign for the study of Marxism-Leninism. In early August Bol’shevik assailed members of the party and officials who had ostensibly neglected their study of theory because of their preoccupation with “practical work.”16 Most important, on August 16, 1939, the CC/VKP(B) issued a decree that sharply condemned the leadership of the Communist party in the Belorussian republic and the leaders of the obkom in Kursk and Orlovsk for their alleged neglect of both their own and their subordinates’ study of Marxism-Leninism.17 At the same time, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo seemed to mute its enthusiasm for the industrial responsibilities of party officials.18 On August 23, 1939, the leaders of the USSR and Nazi Germany signed their notorious non-aggression pact. While the Soviet leaders probably had hoped that this agreement would keep the USSR free from entanglement in a future “inter-imperialist” war, they were clearly anxious about the USSR’s national security. On the same day that the pact was signed, the Politburo acted to bolster the loyalty and morale of the USSR’s armed forces that had

34

Chapter Three

been seriously weakened by the purge of its officer corps; it ordered the immediate selection of four thousand members of the party to be transferred into the military as “political workers.”19 The actual outbreak of the war on September 1, 1939, and the dramatic advance of Germany’s armed forces obviously made the leaders of the USSR even more anxious. Whatever their exact assessment of the international situation had been on the eve of the war, they now became increasingly concerned with defense production. In this context, published support for Malenkov’s definition of party officials’ priorities increased dramatically. Although Pravda continued to endorse Zhdanov’s views in early September,20 Pravda’s lead editorial of October 17, 1939, entitled “Party organizations and the direction of the economy” ordered local party organizations and primary party organizations to intervene directly in the details of production to improve enterprise performance and declared that “non-intervention” was inimical to Bolshevism! Pravda now assailed those local party officials who ostensibly had “not understood” that the decisions of the 18th Congress had significantly “increased the responsibility of party organizations” for the fulfillment of the plan. It explicitly attacked the party officials in the obkom in the Stalinskii and Dnenpropetrovsk regions for their ignorance of the actual conditions in the major metallurgical enterprises, their alleged failure to link “mass political work” with immediate problems of production, or to mobilize the PPOs to use their pravo kontrolia to good effect. Pravda insisted that pravo kontrolia was the most effective way to “combine party-political and economic work” and now cited Stalin’s insistence on the “inseparability” of the two spheres of party work in support of this position. Failure to “penetrate deeply” into all of the details of production was represented as akin to wrecking, and Pravda gave the PPOs in Leningrad high marks for their direct intervention to deal with problems of production. The following week Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo revived its campaign to broaden local officials’ responsibility for industrial production,21 and in early November the CC issued a series of decrees mandating such a shift in orientation. The first decree (November 4, 1939) assailed party officials at all levels (the obkom, gorkom, raikom, and PPOs) in the Donbas coal mining region for their “superficial” approach to economic questions, for their failure to deal with the shortfalls in production and productivity, with the ineffectiveness of existing wage norms, with the miners’ alleged hostility to the introduction of new technology, and to help the PPOs use their pravo kontrolia effectively. The decree also attacked the officials for their failure to provide adequate information to higher authorities on the deterioration of local living conditions, to develop an effective system of recruitment into the party, and a program of mass political work to improve production.

Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941

35

The CC ordered the Stalinskii and Voroshilovgrad obkom to end the “breach” between mass political work and production problems, to assure that the PPOs used their pravo kontrolia vis-à-vis the mine administration, to replace the “formal and declaratory approach” to production with a focus on immediate problems, and to assure that the mines were ready for winter. Most important, the CC ordered the obkom to establish new coal departments led by second secretaries to assure the direct supervision and intervention in production and to report back on their progress to the CC within two months.22 On November 9, 1939, the CC issued an almost identical decree dealing with the failures of obkom officials in Dnetropetrovsk, Stalinskii, and Cheliabinsk, the major centers of metallurgical production in the USSR. The Central Committee ordered the leaders of obkom, gorkom and raikom, and PPOs to provide “daily” concrete leadership for every factory in their respective regions and demanded that the local secretaries report on the situation in the lime quarries (which provided essential raw materials to the mills) every five days.23 Pravda’s coverage of the leadership of the VKP(B) in November 1939 suggests that Malenkov’s status in the leadership had improved with the promulgation of these decrees on party officials’ industrial responsibilities. Malenkov’s standing in the leadership was probably also helped by Zhdanov’s growing preoccupation with the planning and execution of the war against Finland in the winter of 1939–1940 that demanded his frequent presence in Leningrad. Although Zhdanov had been shown with Malenkov greeting various delegations to Moscow in early November, Zhdanov did not appear at the ceremonies marking the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution although he reportedly was in the capital at the time.24 In contrast, Malenkov appeared in a prominent position; he was shown at the center of a group of officials reviewing the traditional parade, and walking to Red Square with Stalin and others.25 Malenkov’s orientation now enjoyed very positive coverage in the press. On the same day that he was pictured as a member of Stalin’s inner circle, (November 10, 1939) Pravda implied that “practice” was more significant than the study of theory in the education of cadres and that the VKP(B)’s “vanguard role in production” was more important than its inspirational role. On November 12, 1939, Pravda’s editorial lauded the Central Committee’s decree of November 9th on party officials’ role in the coal industry, and on November 16, 1939, the Central Committee issued a decree on the education of new members of the VKP(B) that implied that their “practical” education was as significant as their ideological education.26 Malenkov’s most important victory came on November 29, 1939, when the Politburo secretly reestablished industrial and transport departments in the

36

Chapter Three

Central Committees of the republican parties, in kriakom, obkom, and gorkom in order to “strengthen the party’s direction of industry and transport.” The new departments were made responsible for assuring the implementation of party directives, the supervision of the fulfillment of the five-year plans by enterprises and the system of socialist competition and the Stakhanovite movement, and to help the PPOs implement their pravo kontrolia.27 This restoration of the industrial departments was a major victory for those who evidently believed that the PPOs’ pravo kontrolia vis-à-vis the administration of individual enterprises had not provided party officials with sufficient control over the administration of industry. On November 30, 1939, the Red Army attacked Finland. Zhdanov, as the leader of the Leningrad party organization, was deeply involved in the conduct of the war over the next few months. Zhdanov and others probably expected an easy victory over the Finns, but in the initial phase of the war, the USSR’s armed forces, sapped by the purges of its military command in the late 1930s, were unable to overcome fierce Finnish resistance. Zhdanov’s absence from the capital during the winter war also seemed to diminish his role as the leadership’s authority on questions of theory and ideological education. Two weeks before the war, on November 14, 1939, Pravda had explicitly praised him in its editorial on the first anniversary of the Central Committee’s decree on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs. But Zhdanov seemed to be eclipsed with the publication of a collection of essays by Stalin’s “closest comrades in arms” published to mark his birthday in early December. The collection included an article by Malenkov on Stalin’s “brilliant contributions to cadre management” but did not include any contribution by Zhdanov. A. S. Shcherbakov, the head of the Moscow party organization, contributed an article on the role of the VKP(B) that made no reference to the importance of Marxism-Leninism for the activity of the VKP(B).28 Although Zhdanov was described as “one of the closest disciples and comrades in arms of Stalin” in the authoritative political dictionary issued at the very end of the year,29 Shcherbakov was selected to give the report marking the anniversary of Lenin’s death in January 1940, an honor traditionally given to the official responsible for ideological issues. His report ignored the question of study of theory and instead urged agitprop workers to focus on “mass work” to foster strict labor discipline and respect for socialist property.30 In this context, Bol’shevik muted its usual enthusiasm for the study of MarxismLeninism as the key to Communists’ every success.31 But the USSR’s success against the Finns in February 1940 apparently prompted a restoration of Zhdanov’s previous influence. In mid-February Pravda insisted once again that the “mastery of Bolshevism” was essential for practical success and assailed those members of the party whose concen-

Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941

37

tration on “immediate problems” had made them neglect their study of theory and become “insensitive” to the demands of the VKP(B).32 Later that month Pravda seemed to criticize Malenkov and his allies by condemning “party leaders who imagined that organizational work was possible without theoretical knowledge” and who had allegedly forgotten that the VKP(B) had long since repudiated such “narrow-minded practicality.”33 Furthermore, Pravda ignored the newly restored departments of industry and transport in local party organs, and stressed the importance of the PPOs’ pravo kontrolia in supporting the factory administration’s immediate priorities and strengthening the state’s economic institutions.34 With the defeat of Finland, Zhdanov evidently regained his prominence in the leadership. He participated in the negotiations that ended hostilities on March 20, 1940,35 Pravda warmly endorsed his views on the importance of studying theory,36 and the meeting of the Central Committee of March 26–28, 1940, indirectly lauded Zhdanov by its overt approval of the conduct of the war.37 Moreover, Zhdanov was not only selected to present the report to the Supreme Soviet in late March on the Finnish lands incorporated into the USSR, but was shown sitting between Stalin and Malenkov at its session.38 Circumstantial evidence suggests that Zhdanov’s efforts to limit party officials’ intervention in the administration of the economy was supported by at least some of the Politburo/Commissars who sought to bolster the government’s control over administration to counterbalance the newly restored industrial departments in the local party organs. In March the Central Committee had strengthened the authority of the Ekonomsovet (composed of the chairman and the deputy chairman of the Sovnarkom), over the administration of industry. In particular, the Central Committee had approved the formation of specialized councils headed by the deputy chairmen to coordinate the activities of the various peoples’ commissariats in various sectors (metallurgy, construction, defense, energy, consumer goods, and reserves.)39 Pravda praised this reform for strengthening the Sovnarkom’s capacity to develop a “real economic plan,” to coordinate the activities of the various peoples’ commissariats more effectively, and to assure the introduction of new technology more quickly.40 Pravda also seemed to imply that Zhdanov was associated with these changes. On the eve of the publication of the decree establishing the specialized councils, Pravda cited Zhdanov’s warning in 1939 that PPOs’ pravo kontrolia did not allow them to “direct” the economy, endorsed the principle of one-man management and stressed the authority of the state over both industry and industrial personnel.41 This emphasis on the Sovnarkom’s prerogatives was accompanied by a vigorous revival of the campaign in support of study of Marxism-Leninism that had been stalled during the war with Finland. Shortly after the reform of the

38

Chapter Three

Ekonomsovet, Bol’shevik resumed its campaign for the study of theory in particularly vigorous terms.42 But in the summer of 1940 this campaign came to a dramatic halt. In June and July 1940 the leadership of the USSR, evidently distressed by the rapid collapse of French resistance to Germany, imposed a system of draconic state control over both labor and management. In late June the working day was lengthened, job transfers prohibited without the express permission of the director of the factory, and the directors were themselves threatened with harsh reprisals for any violation of the new statute. In July a new people’s commissariat for state control was established to enforce “state discipline” and to assure the implementation of these decrees.43 In the face of these decrees, the ongoing discussion of officials’ priorities was muted at least temporarily. In July 1940 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo narrowed its previously broad definition of the PPOs’ responsibilities44 and endorsed the principle of edinonachalie and the need for both “state” as well as Party discipline45 while Bol’shevik muted its support for the study of theory to focus on the need for mass mobilization in support of the entire system of stateimposed discipline.46 By the end of the month, Pravda explicitly urged agitprop workers to focus on “mass work” in support of labor discipline and productivity,47 and Bol’shevik dropped its usual claims for Marxism-Leninism’s magical property for a number of months.48 Finally, on August 20, the Central Committee issued a decree that criticized local party officials for failing to assure that the local press gave sufficient attention to immediate economic problems.49 In early September 1940 Zhdanov gave up his position as director of the agitprop directorate to his deputy, G. F. Aleksandrov. Although Pravda declared that Zhdanov continued to “supervise” the directorate,50 Aleksandrov’s promotion was accompanied by a serious weakening of support for Zhdanov’s orientation in the Central Committee’s daily. Pravda seemed reluctant to endorse his views even on the anniversary of the publication of the Kratkii kurs in serial form,51 and it implied that the study of MarxismLeninism was a matter of high priority primarily for the new citizens of the USSR from what had been eastern Poland and the Baltic states.52 Pravda cited M. Kalinin, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and an enthusiastic supporter of “mass educational work” rather than Zhdanov as the major authority on political education.53 Pravda’s editorial on the anniversary of the publication of the Kratkii kurs insisted that agitprop work should not be “academic” but related to practical matters.54 While Bo’lshevik made a particularly vigorous defense of the study of Marxism-Leninism as essential for all practical success,55 M. Kalinin gave an address to the Moscow party organization that indirectly challenged Zhdanov’s orientation.

Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941

39

Kalinin explicitly declared that the increase in labor productivity was the overriding goal of Communist educational activities. At the same time he implied that agitprop workers should shift their attention from training members of the party in Marxism-Leninism to the cultivation of respect for socialist property, the development of Soviet patriotism, and a sense of collective responsibility among the masses.56 In the last months of 1940, the press’s coverage of the leadership’s public appearance seemed to indicate that Zhdanov had suffered a decline in status. Pravda’s reports on the ceremonies marking the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution showed him in Leningrad while Malenkov remained in Moscow as a member of Stalin’s inner circle.57 This pictorial evidence of Malenkov’s authority coincided with increased published support for his orientation. In early November 1940, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo called for an extension of party officials’ industrial responsibilities. G. Popov, the second secretary of the Moscow gorkom denounced the leaders of PPOs for their “superficial and general approach to industry,” their passivity toward the shortcomings of factory directors, and their alleged indifference to technological backwardness.58 The journal now gave belated public recognition to the secretaries for industry and transport that had been appointed in 1939. It emphasized their capacity to supervise enterprises effectively through their corps of trained inspectors and to make recommendations to both party officials and the people’s commissariats.59 The revival of support for an extension of party officials’ responsibilities in industry also seemed to influence the discussion of the study of MarxismLeninism. Pravda and Bol’shevik marked the anniversary of the Central Committee decree on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs by complaining about the neglect of the study of theory, but did not attribute these failings to the party officials’ “preoccupation with practical affairs.”60 Support for an extension of party officials, role in industrial administration seemed to intensify as the USSR’s relations with Germany deteriorated sharply in the winter of 1940. On December 8, 1940, Pravda sharply criticized party officials at the level of both obkom and gorkom for their ostensible failure to provide “concrete guidance” to enterprises and attributed all success in industrial development to a combination of leadership by the gorkom and effective use of PPOs’ pravo kontrolia. Pravda did not refer to one-man management, an omission that seemed to imply that state discipline under the direction of the Sovnarkom was not that important for successful industrial production. On December 20, 1940, Pravda announced that the oft-postponed 18th Conference of the VKP(B) would be convened in order to discuss the “tasks of Communist party organizations in industry and transport.” The response of

40

Chapter Three

the major journals of the CC to the forthcoming conference reflected the deep division between the leaders of the two major directorates. While Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo gave extensive coverage to local party organizations’ enthusiastic discussion of the forthcoming conference,61 Bol’shevik ignored the event, which probably indicated that Zhdanov and his allies were not particularly enthusiastic about the agenda. Moreover, in the last month before the conference, the leadership of the agitprop directorate gave more attention to the inculcation of Soviet patriotism. In January 1941 A. S. Shcherbakov adopted this position in his report marking the anniversary of the death of Lenin,62 and Bol’shevik dutifully followed suit.63 The 18th Conference of the VKP(B) in February 1941 proved to be a major triumph for G. M. Malenkov in the same way that the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in March 1939 had been a major victory for Zhdanov. Malenkov’s report coupled a sharp critique of the Sovnarkom’s administration of the fiveyear plan with a brief for broadening party officials’ responsibilities for industrial production and for transport. Malenkov charged that the people’s commissariats’ bureaucratic methods, their ignorance of local economic conditions and administrative personnel, their failure to introduce new technology, and their waste of raw materials and misuse of existing equipment had produced massive shortfalls in production that threatened both the pace of economic development and the defense capacity of the USSR’s armed forces. Most important, Malenkov claimed that party officials at all levels of the system had ignored these problems because they “incorrectly thought that they did not bear responsibility for the work of industry and transport.”64 He clearly implied that the dismantling of the industrial and transport departments of the apparatus by the 18th Congress and its stress on the primacy of party political work were the major sources of the shortfalls of production in vital areas. To rectify the situation, he called for the appointment of “several” secretaries for industry and transport at the gorkom, obkom, kraikom, and republican level to permit them to “share” responsibility with the people’s commissariats. Malenkov’s outline of the new secretaries’ broad prerogatives indicated that the restored departments for industry and transport were to become the major instrument for the supervision of production by party officials. The discussion of Malenkov’s report at the Conference revealed considerable resistance to his proposals among leading officials in the Sovnarkom and of the VKP(B). First of all, the agenda of the Conference was changed at the last minute to include a report by N. A. Voznesenskii, a vice chairman of Sovnarkom, the director of Gosplan and generally regarded as one of Zhdanov’s most important allies. Voznesenski challenged Malenkov’s critique of the

Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941

41

Sovnarkom’s administration of industry by repeatedly dramatizing its various successes. While he agreed rather vaguely that party organizations should give “more attention” to the problems in industry and transport, he did not endorse Malenkov’s recommendation to appoint “several” specialized secretaries at each level of the apparatus.65 Zhdanov may not have approved of Malenkov’s recommendations either; although he appeared on the rostrum at the Conference with Stalin and Molotov, he did not address the Conference and his silence may have reflected his opposition to Malenkov’s proposal. Furthermore, A Kuznetsov, the second secretary of the Leningrad gorkom, and generally regarded as an ally of Zhdanov, implied that the Politburo had not given unanimous support to Malenkov’s recommendations.66 But whatever the extent of opposition from Zhdanov and his supporters, Malenkov’s suggestions were incorporated into the resolution adopted by the Conference that held both party and state agencies responsible for shortfalls and charged that party organizations had failed to assure the fulfillment of orders either because they were preoccupied with the procurement of agricultural products or because they did not “understand” their responsibilities for industry and transport.67 The resolution insisted that gorkom and obkom could no longer “stand aside” from industrial questions and ordered them and the newly appointed secretaries to become concerned with all the details of enterprise activity including plan fulfillment, effective use of resources, labor discipline, the introduction of new technology, and the struggle against absenteeism. Secretaries were told to foster personal ties with the leaders in each enterprise, to visit them on a regular basis, to become sufficiently knowledgeable to assure the promotion of qualified personnel, and to make recommendations about hiring and firing.68 The resolution did not refer at all to the PPOs’ pravo kontrolia vis-à-vis the administration, an omission that seemed to imply that the new secretaries for industry and transport were now to be regarded as the most important level of authority for party organizations. Zhdanov’s effort to focus party officials’ control on the enterprise per se was thus at least temporarily cast aside in favor of the authority for the local specialized secretaries. Immediately after the Conference, Malenkov’s status in the leadership improved; he was made a candidate member of the Politburo along with Voznesenskii and Shcherbakov.68 In the months between the 19th Conference and the German attack on the USSR in June 1941, the Central Committee’s publications continued to endorse Malenkov’s definitions of officials’ priorities as essential for accelerating the defense production of the USSR.70 Although Pravda marked the anniversary of Lenin’s birth by attacking the new industrial secretaries’ tendency to override the decisions of factory directors,71 and

42

Chapter Three

Bol’shevik stressed the authority of Sovnarkom at about the same time,72 the Central Committee’s publications did not provide any sustained support for Zhdanov’s conception of priorities in the last months before the German assault on the USSR. In the subsequent debate over party officials’ priorities and responsibilities Malenkov and Zhdanov made very few public statements. However, their allies and spokesmen repeatedly cited both Stalin’s pronouncements and the reports and resolutions made in the years from 1937 until 1941 to provide legitimization for their respective positions. Zhdanov’s supporters repeatedly cited Stalin’s assertions about the importance of the study of MarxismLeninism, his declaration that economic success was ultimately dependent on successful “internal” party work, and his injunction against party officials “replacement” of governmental authorities under their supervision to bolster their periodic efforts to limit party officials’ industrial responsibilities. Zhdanov’s supporters also repeatedly cited the Central Committee’s decree of November 1938 on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs and the decree of August 1939 condemning local officials’ neglect of the study of theory in their efforts to assure continued stress on party members’ mastery of MarxismLeninism. Zhdanov’s supporters and spokesmen never referred positively to the decisions of the 18th Conference in 1941 and sometimes directly assailed them for leading to the neglect of knowledge of theory and fostering a tendency toward “practicality.” In direct contrast, Malenkov and his spokesmen and supporters ignored Stalin’s comment that the success of economic work was ultimately dependent on “internal” party work and instead cited his statements about the interdependence of the two spheres of party work. Malenkov’s supporters also consistently ignored Stalin’s admonitions about the importance of the study of theory for practical success and instead repeatedly cited his formulations on the importance of Soviet patriotism. Finally, particularly during the first years of the war, they referred repeatedly to the decisions of the 18th Conference as essential to the war effort, and sometimes assailed the decisions of the 18th Congress for undermining officials’ capacity to cope with problems of industry.

NOTES 1. Pravda, March 30, 1939, 1; April 3, 1939, 1; April 11, 1939, 1. For a particularly strong endorsement of Zhdanov’s views see the editorial marking the anniversary of Lenin’s birth. Pravda, April 22, 1939, 1. 2. G. F. Aleksandrov, “Bolsheviki obiazany znat zakony razvitiia obshchestva,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9 (1939), 24–30. Approved for publication April 27, 1939.

Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941

43

3. “Velichestvennaia programma bor’by za kommunizmu,” Bol’shevik, no. 8 (1939), 5. Approved for publication April 29, 1939. 4. “Vpered ko kommunizmu,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9 (1939), 6–9. Approved for publication April 27, 1939. 5. Pravda, May 3, 1939, 1. Boterbloem, 191. 6. “V tsentral’nom komitete VKP(B),” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 10 (1939), 50–53. The decree was not dated and was summarized. Approved for publication May 13, 1939. 7. The evidence is indirect. See the claims in “Bol’she konkretnosti I operativnost v rukovodiaishchei rabote,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 10 (1939); Pravda, May 15, 1939, 1–2. 8. Pravda, May 15, 1939, 1–2. 9. Pravda, May 15, 1939, 4; May 17, 1939, 2; May 18, 1939, 4; May 19, 1939, 2; May 21, 1939, 1. 10. “Osnova ekonomicheskaia zadach SSSR,” Bol’shevik, no. 9 (1939), 10–11. Approved for publication May 21, 1939. 11. Politicheskii Slovar’, 268. The Central Control Commission was evidently renamed the Commission of Party Control in May 1939. See KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 109. 12. Pravda, June 3, 1939, 1; June 6, 1939, 2; June 10, 1939, 2. 13. Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia (London: Oxford University Press, 1949), Vol. 2, 255. 14. Pravda, July 20, 1939, 1; July 21, 1939, 1. 15. Malenkov did not appear for the traditional review of the participants in physical culture day. Pravda, July 19, 1939, 1. Zhdanov appeared by himself on the following days. Pravda, July 20, 1939; July 26, 1939. 16. “Bolshe organizovannosti v propagandistskoi rabote,” Bol’shevik, no.11/12 (1939), 1–8. Approved for publication August 7, 1939. 17. “Postanovlenie TsK VKP(B), Avgt.16, 1939,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 15 (1939), 47–50. 18. N. Patolichev, “O sochetanii partiino-politicheskoi I khoziaistvennoe,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 14 (1939), 33–36. Approved for publication August 5, 1939. 19. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 134. 20. Pravda, September 7, 1939, 1; September 9, 1939, 1. 21. “Za usilenie partiinogo rukovodstva promyshlennosti,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 19 (1939), 1–7. Approved for publication October 23, 1939. 22. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 135–38. 23. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 139–41. 24. Boterbloem, 200; Pravda, November 7, 1939, 1. 25. Pravda, November 9, 1939; November 10, 1939, 1. 26. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 142–44. 27. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol 7 (1985), 145. 28. G. M. Malenkov, “Stalin on Cadres,” Stalin (New York: International Publishers, 1940), 117–18. A. S. Shcherbakov, “The VKP(B)-An Impregnable Fortress,” Stalin, 167–68.

44

Chapter Three

29. G. F. Aleksandrov, V. Gal’ianov, N. Rubinshtein, Politicheskii Slovar (Moscow:1940), 189–90. 30. Pravda, January 22, 1940, 2. 31. “Leninsko-stalinskoi put k kommunizmu,” Bol’shevik, no. 2 (1940), 2–6. Approved for publication January 19, 1940. 32. Pravda, February 11, 1940, 1; February 13, 1940, 1. 33. Pravda, February 24, 1940, 1. 34. Pravda, March 2, 1904, 1. 35. Max Jakobson, The Diplomacy of the Winter War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961), 250. 36. Pravda, March 19, 1940, 1. 37. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 5 (1971), 426. 38. Pravda, March 30, 1940, 1; April 1, 1940, 1. 39. Towster, 282–83. 40. Pravda, April 18, 1940, 1. 41. Pravda, April 16, 1940, 1. 42. “Velikii prodolzhatel’ dela Marksa-Engelsa,” Bol’shevik, no. 7 (1940), 26–29. Approved for publication April 20, 1940; F. Konstantinov, “Lenin o kommunisticheskom vospitanii trudiashchikhsiia,” Bol’shevik, no. 7 (1940), 80–81; “Bol’shevistskuiu propaganda na vyshuiu stupen,” Bol’shevik, no. 10 (1940), 3–9. Approved for publication June 9, 1940. 43. James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera, eds. Materials for the Study of the Soviet System (Ann Arbor, Mich., Wahr Publishing Company, 1953), 356–63. 44. “Vozglavit trudovoi pod’em mass dobitsiia zheleznoi distipliny trudy,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 11/12 (1940). Approved for publication July 4, 1940; A. Tsegolov, “V tsentr vnimaniia -voprosy ekonomiki,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no.11/12 (1940), 37–39; F. Limno and B. Fridland, “Vyshe uroven khoziaistvennogo rukovodstva,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13 (1940), 40–43. Approved for publication July 29, 1940. 45. I. Kapustin, “Vsemerno ukrepliat edinonachalie,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 15/16 (1940), 27–30; A. Liapon, “Lenin I Stalin o edinonachalie,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 17 (1940), 7–10. Approved for publication October 1, 1940; “Edinonachalie I pravo kontrolia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 18 (1940), 34–36. Approved for publication October 21, 1940; “Gosudarstvennaia I partiinaia ditsiplina,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 17 (1940), 3–5. 46. “Strana sotsializma dol’zhna stat vo mnogo raz sil’nee I moguchestvennee,” Bol’shevik, no.11/12 (1940), 14–17. Approved for publication July 9, 1940. 47. Pravda, July 30, 1940, 1. 48. Bol’shevik, no.11/12–15/16 (1940). 49. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh,Vol. 7 (1985), 175–77. 50. Pravda, September 7, 1940, 1. 51. Pravda, September 9, 1940, 1. 52. Pravda, September 20, 1940, 1. 53. Pravda, September 24, 1940, 1. 54. Pravda, October 1, 1940, 1.

Zhdanov and Malenkov, 1939–1941

45

55. “O krugozore partiinogo I gosudarstvennogo rabotnika,” Bol’shevik, no. 17 (1940), 8–14. Approved for publication October 10, 1940. 56. M. Kalinin, O kommunisticheskom vospitanii. Zbrannye rechi I statii (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1946), 74–91. 57. Pravda, November 9, 1940, 5; Pravda, November 11, 1940, 1. 58. G. Popov, “Partiinyi organizatsii I tekhnologicheskaia ditsiplina na proizvodstve,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 19/20 (1940), 34–39. Approved for publication November 4, 1940. 59. G. Shitarev, “ O stile rukovodsta gorkom partii promyshlennosti,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no.19/20, 52–55; A. Rozhkov, “Promyshlennyi otdel obkoma,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 21 (1940) 53–56. Approved for publication November 20, 1940. 60. Pravda, November 14, 1940, 1; “Rashiriat I uglubliat propaganda marksizmaleninizma,” Bol’shevik, no. 21 (1940), 7–13. Approved for publication November 29, 1940. 61. “Za dal’neishii pod’em sotsialisticheskoi promyshlennosti,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1940), 9–13. Approved for publication December 30, 1940. 62. Pravda, January 22, 1941, 1. 63. “Pod znamenem leninizma,” Bol’shevik, no. 1 (1941), 2–5. Approved for publication January 30, 1941. 64. G. M. Malenkov, “O zadachakh partiinykh organizatsii v oblaste promyshlennosti I transporta,” Bol’shevik, no. 3/4 (1941), 15. 65. N.A.Voznesenskii, “Khoziaistvennyi itog 1940 I plan razvitiia narodnogo khoziaistva,” Bol’shevik, no. 3/4 (1941), 36–55. 66. Pravda, February 18, 1941. 67. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 5 (1971), 460–63. 68. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 5 (1971), 460–63. 69. Pravda, February 22, 1941, 1. 70. Pravda, February 28, 1941, 1; March 7, 1941, 1; “Povernut vnimanie partiinykh organizatsii v storonu promyshlennosti I transport,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 4/5 (1941), 3–8. Approved for publication February 26, 1941. 71. Pravda, April 22, 1941, 1. 72. “Prevratit vse predpriiatiia v peredovie-boevaia zadacha partiinykh organizatsii,” Bol’s shevik, no. 7/8 (1941), 12–20. Approved for publication April 29, 1941.

Chapter Four

The War and the Apparatus, 1941–1943

In May 194l Stalin became the Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars without giving up his position as General Secretary of the CC/VKP(B). As a result, he became the leader of both the “inner party” of full-time officials and the “outer party” composed of the Communists who manned the Soviet state. At the same time, he named Zhdanov to be the “second secretary” and shifted his responsibility for the agitprop directorate to Shcherbakov, the head of the Moscow party organization.1 The sudden and successful German assault on the USSR in June 1941 had a devastating impact on the political system of the USSR. Stalin’s frantic efforts to save it from collapse influenced the relative standing and political authority of the two junior Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B). In July 194l Stalin established the so-called emergency state defense committee (GOKO) to coordinate the activities of the armed forces, the political police, the governmental structure, and the party’s apparatus. The GOKO was composed of Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, and Malenkov.2 Stalin’s failure to name Zhdanov to the GOKO clearly reduced his direct influence in the leadership of the USSR while the appointment of Malenkov as the only Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) besides Stalin in GOKO clearly bolstered his authority in Stalin’s inner circle. Furthermore, the rapidity of the German advance against Leningrad threatened Zhdanov’s political future. Stalin reportedly held Zhdanov and Voroshilov responsible for the initial failure of the USSR’s armed forces to stem the German advance, for their allegedly unauthorized establishment of a local defense council and local defense units in Leningrad, and their alleged failure to report military setbacks.3 In August 1941 Stalin sent a special commission headed by Molotov and Malenkov to Leningrad to consider the possibility of a full evacuation of the 47

48

Chapter Four

city, replaced Voroshilov with Zhukov, and may have reduced Zhdanov’s authority in the military council in Leningrad.4 Henceforth, Zhdanov was clearly preoccupied with the defense of Leningrad; although he did play some advisory role in agitprop work in the armed forces, he was apparently unable to give much attention to the agitprop directorate and its activities until sometime after the end of the siege of Leningrad in early 1944. The rapid German advance not only seriously threatened Zhdanov’s position within the leadership but also produced major changes in the structure and ideological stance of the agitprop directorate. Stalin’s first public pronouncement during the war in July 1941 had prompted a major shift in official ideology. Stalin charged that Hitler’s regime sought to destroy the “national culture and national statehood” of both the Russian and non-Russian peoples in the USSR, and he did not mention either the VKP(B) or MarxismLeninism as a source of inspiration or orientation.5 Shortly after Stalin’s speech, the leaders of the agitprop directorate gave increased attention to Stalin’s prewar definition of the “driving forces” of Soviet society, i.e., the “moral-political unity of Soviet society, the friendship of peoples of the USSR, and Soviet patriotism.” This formulation had not been given much attention since the 18th Congress, but it became the central theme of the agitprop directorate in the first nine months of the war. The leaders of agitprop elaborated on Stalin’s definitions in a series of essays published in the first issue of Bol’shevik that was published after Stalin’s address. G. F. Aleksandrov, the director of agitprop, declared that the “friendship between the peoples of the USSR” was the basis for the unity of the USSR and the dynamism of its war effort; M. Iovchuk, a deputy director of agitprop praised the “progressive nature” of Russian patriotism, and E. M. Iaroslavskii, a veteran Stalinist historian who specialized in the history of the VKP(B), praised the Slavic peoples’ struggle against fascism.6 While Stalin’s pronouncements set the tone for wartime propaganda, the initial collapse of resistance and the demands of the war effort led to a total transformation of the agitprop structure. Agitprop personnel were directly mobilized into the armed forces in order to counter the rapid deterioration of morale, and the various institutions established in 1938 and 1939 to foster the study of Marxism-Leninism by all members of the party were either eliminated or modified. Leading personnel from the directorate were assigned directly to the Main Political Directorate of the Armed Forces, which was responsible for all the “political work” within military units, the local party schools were transformed into political schools for the military, the numerous seminars and lectures on ideological questions came to a halt. The partkabinet that had been designed to help party members engaged in the “independent study” of Marxism-Leninism were transformed into agitpunkt for “mass

The War and the Apparatus, 1941–1943

49

work” in support of the war effort,7 and the rank-and-file propagandists who had not been mobilized into the armed forces were assigned to “mass work” to accelerate defense production.8 While the institutions designed to support party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism were either dismantled or modified, the party officials subordinate to the cadres directorate were given vast new responsibilities for the administration of industry. Stalin seems to have attempted initially to extend the Sovnarkom’s control over defense production,9 but the rapidity and depth of the advance of the German armed forces evidently made it increasingly difficult for the Sovnarkom to assert its authority. The German occupation of major centers of industrial production in the Western regions of the USSR and the rapid evacuation of industrial plants to the east disrupted the links between the individual commissariats and “their” subordinate enterprises and placed a premium on the regional coordination of industrial activity and the effective use of local raw materials and labor. In response to these pressing needs, the network of specialized secretaries for particular sectors of industrial production that had been established by the decisions of the 18th Conference expanded tremendously. The history of the Cheliabinsk obkom reveals that there were eighteen specialized secretaries responsible for various critical areas of industrial production and transport established between July 1941 and December 1942 in accordance with the decrees of the CC/VKP(B), GOKO, and the Sovnarkhom.10 While the details of this expansion are shrouded in secrecy, it undoubtedly occurred in every oblast. While it is impossible to determine Malenkov’s role in this extraordinary expansion of the apparatus, during the following year the Central Committee’s publications repeatedly endorsed the position he had outlined in his report to the 18th Conference of the VKP(B) in February 1941. In September 1941 Pravda praised local party officials’ successful coordination of industrial production and hailed the decisions of the 18th Conference of the VKP(B) for preparing them for these responsibilities.11 In December 194l Pravda declared that the officials in both obkom and gorkom were more attuned to local economic needs than the people’s commissariats and should therefore work directly with Gosplan,12 and by early 1942 Pravda explicitly praised local officials’ effective coordination of production and the solution of manpower problems.13 The Central Committee’s publications continued to extol local party officials’ intervention in the details of industrial administration throughout the first half of 1942. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo (which resumed publication sometime in early 1942) lauded party officials who had solved problems in industrial production, criticized those who had not yet shown sufficient operativnost toward

50

Chapter Four

lagging enterprises, and had failed to follow the 18th Conference’s admonitions to “penetrate deeply” into the activities of every industrial enterprise.14 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo declared that the decisions made by the 18th Conference were the key to the successful war effort; they had not only prepared officials to cope with the immense problems of production created by the war, but had also enabled them to deal effectively with the alleged “narrow departmentalism” and the “technological conservativism” of the Sovnarkom’s officials.15 Partiinoe Stroitel’svto now not only provided extremely detailed and positive coverage of the activities of the secretaries for industry, but also sharply criticized those who merely “signalled” shortcomings to the higher authorities without taking remedial action themselves.16 Furthermore in May and June, Pravda applauded the decisions of the 18th Conference,17 and explicitly cited Malenkov’s report to the Conference as a source of inspiration and direction for the officials of the VKP(B).18 While praising the formulations of the 18th Conference, the publications of the Central Committee almost totally ignored the decisions and definitions adopted by the 18th Congress of the VKP(B). In the desperate atmosphere of the first months of the war, Pravda virtually ignored local officials partypolitical work19 and made no reference to Marxism-Leninism as a source of inspiration or a “guide to action” or to the party members’ study of theory. Stalin reiterated his patriotic stance in the winter of 1941; his report in November 1941 on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, which was presented in the midst of the desperate battle for the control of Moscow, was particularly chauvinistic in tone.20 Pravda dutifully represented Soviet patriotism rather than Marxism-Leninism as the basis for Soviet citizens’ actions at the front and in the rear.21 But in February 1942, soon after the Red Army had thrown back the German assault on Moscow, Stalin changed his characterization of the VKP(B). In February 1942 he publicly recognized that the VKP(B) played a “leading role” in his address on Red Army Day and he concluded his address with the slogan “Long live the Bolshevik party, leading us to victory.”22 Stalin’s reference to the Bolshevik party in these terms was accompanied by a serious effort to rebuild the apparatus of full-time officials of the VKP(B), which had been badly disrupted by the outbreak of the war.23 Shortly after his address, the journal Propagandist, the organ of the party organization in Moscow, was evidently assigned to the agitprop directorate and it launched a concerted campaign to restore party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism. From 1942 until its abrupt demise in mid-1946 Propagandist consistently endorsed the restoration of the study of Marxism-Leninism in accordance with the Central Committee’s decree of November 1938 on the

The War and the Apparatus, 1941–1943

51

proper use of the Kratkii kurs and other resolutions on agitprop work adopted before the war. The first issue of Propagandist to appear as an “organ of the CC/VKP(B)” (March 13, 1942) included Stalin’s address on Red Army Day, and an essay by Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) A. S. Shcherbakov that implied that Stalin had now sanctioned a revival of party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism. Shcherbakov explicitly argued that it was the source of party members’ orientation and defined Propagandist as a “militant organ of Marxist-Leninist interpretation” that would help the workers of agitprop enlighten both members of the party and all Soviet citizens.24 A few weeks later, G. F. Aleksandrov, the director of agitprop, spelled out the implications of this campaign for the party’s officials. He now held them directly responsible for improving their own and their subordinates’ knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, sharply attacked those whose alleged “preoccupation with practical work” had made them neglect their own study of theory, and supported his critique by citing Stalin’s assertion that all practical success was dependent on a Marxist-Leninist consciousness.25 Following Aleksandrov’s lead, other spokesmen for the agitprop directorate insisted that the decrees of the CC/VKP(B) adopted before the war, which were clearly identified with Zhdanov’s leadership of the directorate, were still binding. M. Makhanov, a member of the editorial board of Propagandist, declared that the Central Committee’s decree of November 1938 on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs, the rules of the party adopted by the 18th Congress in March 1939, which had held party members responsible for the “independent study” of Marxist-Leninist theory, and the Central Committee’s decree of August 1939, which had criticized local party officials for their neglect of the study of theory, remained the basis for agitprop work. Makhanov urged members of the party to resume their “independent study” of the Kraktii kurs, and of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and called for the immediate restoration of lectures and the activities of the partkabinet.26 The campaign for the study of theory received a major impetus from the massive influx of new members into the VKP(B) during the first year of the war.27 In the spring and summer of 1942 the agitprop directorate began to rebuild its war-torn internal educational program28 and Propagandist urged the thousands of new members of the party to study the Kratkii kurs.29 Zhdanov may have played some role in the decision to give renewed attention to party members’ ideological education; Propagandist’s advocacy coincided with a brief burst of positive coverage of his activities. In June 1942 he appeared in public with other leading officials at a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and he was named to a new council on agitprop in the armed forces

52

Chapter Four

that was established in the Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces.30 Whatever Zhdanov’s exact role, the formation of this council seemed to give greater impetus to the campaign for the restoration of the agitprop directorate’s prewar status. In late June 1942 E. M. Iaroslavskii, a leading Stalinist historian and a member of the new council, made a particularly vigorous appeal for the immediate revival of lectures on Marxism-Leninism, supporting his position with repeated references to the Central Committee’s decree of November 1938 on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs and to Stalin’s warnings about the dire results produced by neglect of the study of theory.31 Most important, a decree of the CC/VKP(B) of July 14, 1942 explicitly endorsed this campaign. The decree sharply attacked the obkom in Penza for allegedly permitting its agitprop workers to serve as “agents in economic campaigns” rather than providing the necessary lectures on the history of the VKP(B)and Marxist-Leninist theory for new members of the party.32 But in the second half of 1942, this campaign came to an abrupt halt and both Bol’shevik and Propagandist rather suddenly gave more attention to Soviet patriotism.33 The timing of this shift suggests that the leadership sought to appeal to Soviet citizens’ patriotism during the military crisis caused by the massive German offensive against the city of Stalingrad in the latter half of 1942. In fact, the campaign to restore the study of theory did not resume until shortly after the defeat of the German forces and Stalin’s remarks marking Red Army Day in February 1943. The battle for Stalingrad may also have influenced the relative standing of the two junior secretaries of the Central Committee and the public discussion of the relative importance of party officials’ economic and party political work. In mid-July 1942, Malenkov was dispatched to the Stalingrad front where he reportedly remained until December 20, l942.34 On July 15, 1942, the day after the decision to send Malenkov to Stalingrad, Pravda suddenly gave far more attention to party officials’ “internal work” than it had since the beginning of the war. In the following weeks it also gave more stress to their “educational work” and to the industrial role of the Sovnarkom.35 Most important, in mid-September 1942, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo openly criticized party officials for their “excessive” concern with the details of production and charged that “the narrow economic orientation” of some of the specialized secretaries responsible for industry and transport had made them “lose their taste” for, or “underestimate” the significance of “internal party work.” The journal now declared that Stalin’s assertion that “party-political and organizational work” was the basis for economic success was particularly important in wartime, and assailed local officials for assigning workers from agitprop and the org-instructional department to act

The War and the Apparatus, 1941–1943

53

as agents in economic campaigns (particularly in rural areas) rather than allowing them to carry out their own responsibilities. The editorial urged local officials to focus on the cultivation of socialist competition, the improvement of workers’ living and working conditions, the recruitment of the “best people” into the party, and the mobilization of the local members of the aktiv to engage in mass political work to inspire the workers. But Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo did not challenge the primacy given production or criticize Malenkov’s definitions. In fact, it claimed (rather inaccurately) that the decisions of the 18th Conference embodied the “correct combination of economic and party political work.”36 This shift in emphasis was also expressed in decrees passed by both local party organizations and the Central Committee. Local party organizations reportedly passed a series of resolutions urging greater concern with “internal” work in September,37 and a decree of the Central Committee (September 24, 1942) on the status of “party work” in the Kuzbass coal regions also urged a more balanced approach to the question of officials’ priorities. On the one hand, it assailed obkom and gorkom officials for their alleged failures to avert the decline in coal production allegedly caused by the “drift” of the local economic administrators and it ordered the appointment of secretaries for the coal industry in both the Novosibirsk obkom and its subordinate gorkom to deal with production problems and to restore the needed discipline. On the other hand, the CC decree sharply attacked local officials for their neglect of the basic elements of party political work, i.e., the recruitment of new members of the party from among both the workers and intelligentsia, the development of local agitprop activities, and the proper concern with the substandard working and living conditions of the miners. The Central Committee dispatched a delegation that included representatives of all three major divisions of the apparatus to the scene to improve local officials’ activities.38 The campaign in support of party political work received a major stimulus from two decrees that were issued in October and November 1942. In October 1942 a decree of the CC/VKP(B) granted the professional military officers in the armed forces complete authority (pol’noe edinonachalie) over their units and demoted the political commissars to deputy commanders for political affairs (zampolit).39 Pravda praised the decrees for distinguishing between the commanders’ “operational” responsibilities and the zampolit’s “political” role and declared that it would improve the level of political work in the armed forces.40 The Politburo adopted the same position in its decree of November 1, 1942, on the politotdel assigned to the Kuibishev and Southern-Ural railroads. The Politburo charged that they had interfered in administrative and economic matters and that their neglect of party political work had weakened the party

54

Chapter Four

bodies on the railroads, undermined agitprop work among the key workers, and had made the meetings of the primary party organizations both “superficial and bureaucratic.” The Politburo not only ordered the directors of politotdel to improve party political work but also sharply attacked the transport secretaries and their departments at the obkom level, who had been given responsibility for the politotdel by the 18th Conference of the VKP(B), for their failure to monitor and supervise their activities.41 The following week Stalin presented his report on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. He emphasized the “operational” responsibilities of the agencies of the Soviet government by praising the Sovnarkom and its commissariats for their effective administration of industry, their successful evacuation of industrial sites to the east, and the establishment of new centers of industrial development.42 Stalin’s positive references to the Sovnarkom’s administrative capacity seemed to imply that it enjoyed direct and primary responsibility for the management of industry and that party officials had a more limited role. In the aftermath of Stalin’s speech, the publications of the Central Committee gave ever more stress to party political work. On November 22, 1942, Pravda’s lead editorial called for a “decisive strengthening of party political work” in the mining regions around Moscow, urging party officials to improve agitprop work, to show greater concern for workers’ living conditions and to help educate new workers, as well as continue to deal with the various shortcomings in mining operations. On December 11, 1942, Pravda declared that many party officials in coal regions had not yet understood that effective party political work was the key to the solution of economic problems. Most significant, in mid-December Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo reversed its position on party officials’ economic responsibilities; it now characterized them as “extraordinary” developments caused by the war rather than as the logical outgrowth of the decisions adopted by the 18th Conference! Furthermore, it now explicitly recognized that party officials’ “preoccupation” with industrial production had sapped their capacity to act as “political leaders” responsible for the mobilization and education of members of the party43 and it sharply condemned the “narrow economic approach” of the secretaries for transport.44 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo’s support for party political work became even more explicit at the end of the year. The lead editorial in its last issue of 1942 ordered party officials in the Urals to teach their subordinates how to combine economic and party political work, to play a more direct role in the “ideological” life of party organizations, and not merely delegate these questions to the departments for propaganda and for organizational-instructional work.45 A survey of meetings with PPO secretaries published in the same issue urged them to follow suit.46

The War and the Apparatus, 1941–1943

55

In early 1943, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo intensified its campaign against party officials’ “preoccupation” with the details of industrial management. In midJanuary it chided their alleged willingness to act as “pushers” who sought to help hard-pressed enterprises seeking scarce labor and material resources.47 Later that month, it called for a major shift (povorot) toward party political work and branded those who gave exclusive attention to industry as apolitical “deliagi.”48 In February 1943, the siege of Stalingrad was lifted and the USSR’s armed forces launched a massive counterattack. In his remarks on Red Army Day, Stalin once again defined the VKP(B) as the “inspirer and organizer of the Red Army’s victories.”49 Stalin’s overt reference to the “inspirational” role of the VKP(B) was evidently interpreted as permitting the resumption of the campaign to restore party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism. The day after Stalin’s address, G. F. Aleksandrov (who had stressed the overriding importance of “mass work” in November 1942)50 declared that the study of Marxism-Leninism was more important in time of war than during peacetime! In support of this position, Aleksandrov cited Stalin’s statement of 1939 that the mastery of Marxism-Leninism was essential for progress in every field of activity, sharply criticized those technically trained personnel who ostensibly had ignored such study, and reminded members of the party that its rules had defined Marxism-Leninism as the basis for all activity.51 The revival of the agitprop campaign to foster the study of MarxismLeninism was accompanied by Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo’s growing attention to party political work in the primary party organizations (PPOs). In March 1943 it published materials that criticized both the secretaries of the primary party organizations (and the party organizers assigned to major industrial enterprises) for their reluctance to provide personal leadership of both organizational and agitprop work and their delegation of these activities to their subordinates.52 The leaders of the PPOs were told to improve their capacity to mobilize the workers by extending their personal contacts with them and learning about their actual standard of living.53 The PPOs’ party political work was also discussed at a conference of the directors of the local org-instruction departments held in Moscow sometime in March 1943. One of the reports presented to the conference defined party political work as the “main content” of the activities of primary party organizations and urged their secretaries to act as “political leaders” who “worked with people.”54 A second report ordered local party officials to make full use of the local org-instruction departments that were responsible for the supervision of the leaders of subordinate party organizations, for the verification of their fulfillment of previous decrees, and the provision of instruction on problems of party political work.55

56

Chapter Four

The importance of party political work was also stressed in a series of decrees issued by the CC/VKP(B) on May 31, 1943, abolishing the politotdel in transport agencies, state farms, and Machine Tractor Stations (MTS). The decree on the transport agencies charged that the politotdel had not only “duplicated” the work of government officials but also had undermined local party organs’ supervision of primary party organizations. It asserted that the abolition of the politotdel would help to “strengthen edinonachalie in transport, to raise the responsibility of economic-administrative leaders and to improve party-political work.” The decrees on politotdel in state farms and MTS adopted the same position.56 Immediately after the appearance of these decrees, important party officials joined the campaign in support of party political work. In early June Secretary Shcherbakov urged the Moscow party organization to improve the ideological-political level of all of its members.57 Pravda’s comment on his meeting with the Moscow aktiv (June 4, 1943) charged that the neglect of party political work had produced shortcoming in the “leadership of the economy.” This campaign evidently eased the way for those who sought the restoration of ideological education. In the summer of 1943, Stalin’s wartime pronouncements were published in the form of a pamphlet, and Propagandist took the lead in portraying their study as essential for all members of the VKP(B).58 Both Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo and Bol’shevik quickly followed suit.59 This campaign also provided excellent opportunities for those who sought to improve the living and working conditions of the industrial workers. These issues had been given sporadic attention during the previous months, but in July 1943 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo defined them as an extremely important component of party political work.60 It now reported that obkom meetings had been convened throughout the USSR to discuss the issue and that PPO secretaries, secretaries for industry, and officials of the organizational instruction department had been ordered to give it far more attention.61 In the midst of this campaign the Politburo acted to limit local party officials’ capacity to “interfere” in the details of industrial management. The official history of the VKP(B) reports that in August the Politburo reduced the authority of specialized secretaries for industry in order to prevent their “extraordinary methods” from “taking root,” to limit their involvement with “economic-administrative” questions, to increase their concern with “internal” work and to broaden the Sovnarkom’s responsibilities for the administration of industry.62 The official history of the Cheliabinsk obkom reports that its industrial department was eliminated and that the secretaries for various sectors of the economy were demoted to deputy secretaries.63 Simultaneously, the economic responsibilities of the Sovnarkom were extended. In August 1943 a joint decree of the Central Committee and Sovnarkom

The War and the Apparatus, 1941–1943

57

established a special governmental committee to supervise the reconstruction of the newly liberated territories of the USSR. The decree implied that the people’s commissariats enjoyed direct responsibility for reconstruction and that local party officials were obliged to monitor the state officials’ implementation rather than direct the recovery efforts themselves. G. M. Malenkov was named to chair this committee.64 There is no way to determine whether or not Malenkov continued to endorse an assertive role for local party officials at this juncture. NOTES 1. O.V. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro: mekhanizmy politicheskoi vlasti v 1930 gody (Moscow: Rosspen, 1996), 254. 2. Pravda, July 1, 1941, 1. 3. Harrison Salisbury, The 900 Days (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), 255–59. 4. Istoriia KPSS, 219–20. 5. I. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 5–6. 6. Bol’shevik, no. 13 (1941). 7. G. D. Komkov, Ideino-politicheskaia rabota KPSS v 1941–1945 (Moscow: Nauka, 1965), 110–16; I. Petrov, Stroitel’stvo politorganov partiinykh I komsomol’skikh organizatsii armii I flota (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1968), 276–77. 8. Pravda, July 17, 1941, 1; “Partiinyi organizatsii v usloviiakh otechestvennoi voiny” Bol’shevik, no. 14 (1941), pp.1–6. Approved for publication August 11, 1941. Kommunisticheskaia partiia v periode velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow: 1961), 445–46. 9. SSSR v velikoi otechestvennoi voine 1941–1945: Khronika (Moscow: 1970), 16–27. 10. Partiinaia organizatsiia cheliabinskoi oblasti v velikoi otechestvennoi voine 1941–1945 (Cheliabinsk: 1967), 12–13. 11. Pravda, September 15, 1941; September 27, 1941. 12. Pravda, December 3, 1941, 1. 13. Pravda, February 26, 1942, 1. 14. “Obespeschivat front vsem neobkhodimym-glavnaia zadacha partiinykh organizatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 2 (1942), 3–8. Approved for publication February 3, 1942. 15. L. Gershberg, “Zhiznennaia sila reshenii XVIII svesoiuznoi partkonferentsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 6 (1942), 7–13. Approved for publication April 8, 1942. 16. M. Zelikson, “Rabota sekretarii gorkom po promyshlennosti,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no.8 (1942), 21–25. Approved for publication May 11, 1942. 17. Pravda, May 25, May 28, June 18, 1942. 18. Pravda, June 17, 1942, 1. 19. Pravda’s editorial of November 19, 1941, was the only one published in the first six months of the war that criticized the “obliviousness” (zabvenie) to “party political work.”

58

Chapter Four

20. I. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 11–31. 21. Pravda, January 1, 1942, 1. 22. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 44. 23. On January 4, 1942, the Central Committee had ordered the restoration of the Advanced Party School for party organizers, which had been placed at the disposal of the people’s commissariat for defense at the beginning of the war. The school was to train younger party officials (under forty years of age) for more responsible positions. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 276. 24. A. S. Shcherbakov, “O nekotorye zadachakh propagandistskoi raboty,” Propagandist, no. 1 (1942), 8–11. Approved for publication March 13, 1942. The editorial board included G. F. Aleksandrov, P. Fedoseev, L. Kuzmin, A. Makhanov, P. Pozdeev, and G. Vastskii. The journal included a section “In the agitprop directorate” that published decisions and circulars. It was never officially defined as an agitprop journal but was labeled as the organ of the Moscow party organization and the CC/VKP(B). 25. G. F. Aleksandrov, “Velikaia sila bol’shevistskikh idei,” Propagandist, no. 2 (1942), 13–14. Approved for publication April 3, 1942. 26. M. Makhanov, “Ustnaia propaganda v dni otechestvennoi voiny,” Propagandist, no. 3 (1942), 1–6. Approved for publication April 20, 1942. 27. For the official figures on the growth of the party during the war see Istoriia KPSS, Vol. 5, book 1, 370–72. 28. “Programma po kursu propaganda I agitatsiia v usloviakh voennogo vremeni,” Propagandist, no. 4 (1942), 52–59. 29. P. Fedoseev, “Ob izuchenii kratkogo kurs istorii VKP(B) v usloviiakh otechestvennoi voiny,” Propagandist, no. 5/6 (1942), 14–21. Approved for publication June 16, 1942. 30. For his address to the Supreme Soviet, see Pravda, June 19, 1942, p. 3. For the composition of the new council see Petrov, 364–65. 31. E. M. Iaroslavskii, “Lektsionnaia rabota v usloviakh voiny,” Propagandist, no. 7/8 (1942), 50–52. Approved for publication June 29, 1942. 32. The text of this decree has never been made public. For comment on its importance see K. Kuznetsov, “V chem prichiny slaboi raboty lektorskoi penzenskogo obkoma VKP(B),” Propagandist, no. 9 (1942), 49–50. Approved for publication July 28, 1942. 33. E. M. Iaroslavskii, “O tekyshchem momente,” Propagandist, No. 9 (1942), 3–9. Approved for Publication July 28, 1942; G. F. Aleksandrov, “Tekushchi moment otechestvennoi voiny I zadachy agitatorov,” Bol’shevik, no. 13 (1942), 23–40; N. An’iev, “Velikaia sila nerushimoi druzhby narodov SSSR,” Propagandist, no. 11/12 (1942), 16–21. Approved for publication September 3, 1942; G. F. Aleksandrov, “Sovetskii narod otstoit velikie zavovevaniia oktiabriia,” Propagandist, no. 15/16 (1942), 10–16. Approved for publication November 4, 1942; E. M. Iarosvaksii, “Vsemirnoe istoricheskoe znacheniia bor’by narodov SSSR protiv gitlerovskikh razboinikov, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 15/16 (1942), 20–25. 34. The official history of the party reports a decision to this effect on July 14, 1942. See Istoriia KPSS, Vol. 5, book 1, 334. Aleksander Werth reports that Malenkov

The War and the Apparatus, 1941–1943

59

was in Stalingrad most of the time from September 12, 1942 until late December. See Aleksander Werth, The Stalingrad Year (London: A. A. Knopf, 1947), 462. 35. Pravda July 19, 24, 1942, 1; August 6, 7, 8, 1942, 1. 36. “Umelo sochetat rabotu khoziaistvennuiu I partiino-politicheskuiu,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 16 (1942), 1–6. Approved for publication September 14, 1942. 37. See an excerpt from a resolution of the Cheliabinsk obkom in Istoriia KPSS, Vol. 5, book 1, 439. 38. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 6 (1971), 43–48. 39. See KPSS v velikoi otechestvennoi voine. Dokumeny I materialy (Moscow:1970), 85–86. 40. Pravda, October 11, 1942, 1. 41. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 6 (1971), 50–54. 42. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 60. 43. “My mozhem I dol’zhny ochistit sovetskuiu zamliiu ot gitlerovskoi nechestiu,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 22 (1942), 1–6. Approved for publication December 15, 1942. 44. “O partiino-politicheskoi rabote na zheleznodorozhnom transporte,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 22 (1942), 12–17. 45. “Zadachi bol’shevikov Urala,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1942), 3–8. Approved for publication December 28, 1942. 46. “Kak dol’zhen rabotat sekretar zavodskoi partorganizatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1942), 14–19. 47. “Pod znamenem lenina:za nashu sovetskuiu rodinu,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 1 (1943), 5–6. Approved for publication January 19, 1943. 48. “Vpered za razgrom nemetskikh okkupantov,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 2 (1943), 6–8. Approved for publication January 30, 1943. 49. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 94. 50. G. F. Aleksandrov, “O nekotorykh zadachakh propagandistskoi I agitatsionnoi raboty,” Propagandist, no. 19/20 (November 27, 1942), 3–10. 51. G. F. Aleksandrov, “Ob izuchenii marksistko-leninskoi nauki v usloviiakh otechestvennoi voiny,” Propagandist, no. 5 (February 23, 1943), 2–15. 52. G. Shitarev, “Nekotorye voprosy partiinoi raboty na predpriiatiiakh,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 3 (1943), 7–10. Approved for publication March 13, 1943. 53. Shitarev, 13–14. 54. B. Borisov, “Voprosy partiino-politicheskoi raboty na predpriiatii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 7 (1943), 13–14. Approved for publication April 21, 1943. 55. Ia. Storozhev, “Voprosy raboty organizatsionno-instruktorskikh otdelov partiinykh komitetov,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 8 (1943), 19. Approved for publication April 29, 1943. 56. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 412–17. 57. Pravda, June 4, 1943, 1. 58. “O nekotorykh ocherednykh zadachakh agitatsiono-propagandistksoi raboty,” Propagandist, no. 11/12 (1943), 9–10. Approved for publication July 2, 1943. 59. “Vospitanie partiinykh kadrov,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 12(1943), 10–11. Approved for publication July 7, 1943; M. Medvedev, “Partiinost’ v rabote

60

Chapter Four

khoziaistvennika,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 12 (1943), 13–17; “Kniga tovarishcha Stalina, ‘O velikoi otechestvennoi voine sovetskogo soiuza,” Bol’shevik, no.13 (1943), 3–15. Approved for publication August 3, 1943. 60. “Partorganizatsii I voprosy byta trudiiaishchikhsiia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13/14 (1943), 3–8. Approved for publication July 27, 1943; V. Andrianov, “Zadachi nashei raboty v massakh,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13/14 (1943), 9–13. 61. “Voprosy material’no bytovogo obsluzhivaniia naseleniia na plenumakh obkomov I gorkomov partii,” 23–25. 62. Istoriia KPSS, Vol. 5, book 1, 363–64. 63. Partiinaia organizatsiia cheliabinsk oblast, 47. 64. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 6 (1971), 65–104.

Chapter Five

The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945

The reform of the apparatus in August 1943 clearly obliged the officials of the VKP(B) to give more attention to their party political work but it did not end the dispute over the range and scope of their responsibilities. In fact, the Red Army’s liberation of German, occupied territory in the years between 1943 and 1945 provided both the supporters and opponents of more emphasis on party political work with excellent opportunities to press their own respective definitions. The opponents argued that party officials should retain the extensive authority over the administration of industry that they had gained at the beginning of the war in order to accelerate the country’s reconstruction. They therefore opposed the view that officials’ direct intervention in the details of industrial administration was an “extraordinary” development demanded by the exigencies of wartime. At the same time, they expressed little or no enthusiasm for the immediate restoration of the ideological education of party members and tended to portray Soviet patriotism as the basis for Soviet citizens’ actions. In contrast, those who sought to restore the study of Marxism-Leninism were emboldened by the growing stress on the significance of party political work. They insisted that all members, but particularly the new members of the VKP(B), were obliged to study Marxism-Leninism to assure that they developed the sense of vision and purpose essential to the vitality of the party as a whole. These officials could hardly attack the emphasis on Soviet patriotism in the midst of the war but they repeatedly insisted that the neglect of the study of Marxism-Leninism had baleful consequences. During this period, Stalin’s own brief comments on the role of the VKP(B) and the “driving forces of Soviet society” seemed to have a direct impact on the public discussion of party officials’ priorities and official ideology. At first 61

62

Chapter Five

glance, this linkage seems to be preposterous, but the materials published in the organs of the CC/VKP(B) in the wake of his comments suggest that his subordinates regarded his every word as politically significant. Whenever he publicly stressed the “inspirational” role of the VKP(B), the organs of the Central Committee quickly gave attention to the study of Marxism-Leninism. But when he muted or discarded this formulation and referred instead to the importance of the “moral-political unity of soviet society, the friendship of peoples of the USSR, and Soviet patriotism” as the “driving forces of Soviet society” the campaign for the restoration of ideological education invariably stalled and party officials’ responsibilities for industrial production were given greater attention. Stalin’s shifts produced frequent and confusing zigzags in the public discussion of ideology in 1943–1944. In his address in November 1943 marking the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Stalin defined the “leadership of the VKP(B)” as but one of the sources of the USSR’s strength. Shortly afterwards, the publications of the Central Committee gave more attention to Soviet patriotism, reduced their support for the study of Marxist-Leninist theory, and gave renewed support to party officials’ responsibilities for industry. In February 1944 Stalin reversed field to once again stress the “inspirational” role of the VKP(B). Immediately afterward, published support for the study of theory revived and a series of decrees lambasted particular organizations of the party for their ostensible neglect of such study. But this was not to last—in November 1944 Stalin once again stressed the importance of Soviet patriotism and the campaign in support of the study of Marxism-Leninism came to a temporary halt. As noted above, the publication of Stalin’s wartime speeches in the summer of 1943 had been followed by increased support for the restoration of party members’ ideological education. After the reform of the apparatus in August 1943, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo followed suit. In early September 1943, it published an essay by S. Zadionchenko, the secretary of the Kemerovskii obkom, charging that “theoretically backward” members of the party who had joined during the war had undermined the principle of one-man management by incorrectly encouraging the leaders of PPOs in industrial enterprises to interfere in the details of production beyond their authority. Zadionchenko insisted that members of the party should study Marxism-Leninism in order to end such “practicalism.”1 In the fall of 1943 the campaign to restore ideological education and other elements of party political work was reflected in both the decrees and publications of the Central Committee. In early September, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo not only acknowledged that internal work had been neglected but also recognized that it was the basis for economic success.2 A decree of the CC/VKP(B)

The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945

63

(September 13, 1943) established a new crash program under the agitprop directorate to train editors and other officials for the newspapers being reestablished in the republics, regions, and cities in all of the newly liberated territories of the USSR.3 A decree of the CC/VKP(B) of September 21, 1943, stressed the responsibility of the organizational-instruction department for the verification of the fulfillment of the decrees of the CC/VKP(B) by local party units and reemphasized the power of its local representatives to investigate and to recommend remedial action when necessary.4 In the wake of this decree, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo called on party officials to act as “political leaders” who should “work with people,” improve their own ideological level, and foster the local aktiv’s “taste for theory.”5 In this context, Propagandist resumed its campaign to restore the study of Marxism-Leninism. In September 1943 it published an essay by S. Ignatiev, the secretary of the Bashkir obkom, charging that many local officials were ideologically ignorant and that raikom secretaries had completely ignored their responsibilities for agitprop work. He supported his call for a restoration of rigorous study of Marxism-Leninism with direct references to Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in 1939.6 The following month Propagandist pressed on by singling out particular party organizations for direct criticism. It charged that the indifference of the obkom in Kuibyshev and the Bashkir oblast to the study of theory had allowed many members of the party to lapse into “practicalism” and urged the agitprop officials to restore the proper concern with political consciousness.7 Moreover, Propagandist seemed to identify Zhdanov with this campaign by linking its praise for Marxism-Leninism with a particularly positive portrayal of his role in the defense of Leningrad.8 The campaign evidently led to improvements in the institutional basis for the teaching and study of Marxism-Leninism. A decree of the CC/VKP(B) (November 4, 1943) ordered the Advanced Party School to establish a program to reeducate instructors of Marxism-Leninism and political economy for the country’s institutions of higher education. The curriculum for all instructors included courses in the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, the history of the VKP(B), the history of the war, dialectical and historical materialism, political economy, and international relations. The instructors in political economy were to take additional courses on the political economy of socialism and the basic elements of industry, transport, and agriculture. The agitprop directorate and local party officials were held responsible for selecting the participants in the program.9 But in the winter of 1943–1944, the campaign to restore the study of Marxism-Leninism came to a temporary halt. The timing of this shift suggests that it was prompted by Stalin’s brief comments on the role of the VKP(B) in his

64

Chapter Five

address in November 1943. Stalin did refer to the VKP(B)’s leadership of the USSR, but only as one of the many sources of the strength of the Soviet Union, gave particular stress to the ideology of “friendship of peoples,” and failed to refer to the VKP(B)’s leadership role in the closing set of slogans. Moreover, the printed text of his address capitalized the references to the contributions made by the working class, the peasantry, the intelligentsia, and the transport agencies but did not capitalize the reference to party leadership.10 Stalin’s address was followed by renewed emphasis on Soviet patriotism. Propagandist lauded Stalin’s analysis of the “sources of Soviet strength,”11 and marked the introduction of a new patriotic national anthem in December with a barrage of praise for the Soviet state and the Russian people’s “leadership” of other nationalities in the USSR.12 In this context, those who championed the primacy of party officials’ economic work and “mass work” resumed their own campaign. The day after the publication of the USSR’s new national anthem in December 1943, Bol’shevik praised local party officials as the “main instruments” of GOKO in the administration of industry, criticized those who ostensibly remained indifferent to these questions,13 and highlighted the success in the aviation industry. (Since this sector of the defense industry was under Malenkov’s supervision, this reference may have been an indication of support for his orientation.)14 In January 1944 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo sponsored a conference on political education that repeatedly stressed the overriding importance of “mass work” in support of war production where M. Kalinin, who had acted as a counter spokesman to Zhdanov before the war, presented the case for “mass work” in his address.15 Patriotic themes were particularly evident in January 1944 during the commemoration of the anniversary of Lenin’s death. Pravda’s editorial on the occasion stressed Lenin’s and Stalin’s personal leadership of Velikii Rus16 (sic) rather than their contributions to Marxism-Leninism and Secretary Shcherbakov’s address represented Soviet patriotism as the ideological basis for action.17 Later that month, the Central Committee of the VKP(B) met for the first time during the war to approve the new national anthem for the USSR. (“The International” was retained as the anthem of the CC/VKP(B.)18 But this campaign of patriotic sloganizing collapsed shortly after Stalin’s comments on the VKP(B) in his address on Red Army Day in February 1944. Stalin now returned to a more orthodox definition of the role of the VKP(B); he ignored Soviet patriotism, implied that the intelligentsia deserved special attention because of its effective leadership of the workers and peasants during the war, and he ended his address with the slogan, “Long live the VKP(B), the inspirer and organizer of the Red Army’s great victories.”19

The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945

65

The agitprop campaign for the restoration of study of Marxism-Leninism revived shortly after Stalin’s speech. In mid-March, Bol’shevik published an essay that attributed the intelligentsia’s leadership of the workers and peasants to its “mastery of Marxism-Leninism,” and declared that the agitprop directorate’s activities were based on Stalin’s address to the CC/VKP(B) in 1937, the decree on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs in November 1938, and Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B).20 In early April 1944 the Central Committee restored its “Lenin courses” to train the secretaries of gorkom and raikom for positions of higher authority and to raise their theoretical level.21 In April Bol’shevik editorially endorsed the ideological education of new members of the party,22 and at the end of the month Propagandist resumed its campaign to restore the study of Marxism-Leninism with a vengeance. It charged that party members’ “preoccupation” with immediate practical matters had produced widespread “theoretical backwardness” and reminded officials that the Central Committee’s decree of August 1939 had held them responsible for their subordinates’ political knowledge. It also called for the immediate restoration of lectures on questions of theory, of all of the activities of the partkabinet, and urged those who had completed the Kratkii kurs to begin “independent study” of the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, political economy, and the history of the USSR.23 At this juncture, Zhdanov once again began to play a more important role in the national leadership. In January 1944 the German blockade of Leningrad had been lifted, and in April 1944 the Leningrad gorkom and obkom convened for the first time since the beginning of the war. In his report to the meeting, Zhdanov criticized the extension of party officials’ responsibility for industry that had developed during the first years of the war. The resolution on his report declared that the gorkom could now give up its “extraordinary” responsibilities for industry and restore the “normal forms and methods of party guidance of industry.” It also recognized the responsibility of the people’s commissariats for the administration of industrial production.24 The growth of Zhdanov’s authority may help to explain the assault on the alleged ideological errors of G. F. Aleksandrov, who has often been regarded as an ally of Malenkov,25 and his closest colleagues in May 1944. In May 1944 a decree of the Central Committee (reportedly composed with Zhdanov’s help)26 sharply attacked a new text on Western philosophy edited by Aleksandrov, Iudin, and Mitin for a wide range of ideological sins. The decree charged that the editors had underestimated the differences between Hegelian and Marxist dialectics, between Hegel’s “progressive dialectical method” and his political conservatism, had failed to cite Stalin’s own work on dialectical and historical materialism, and to explicitly recognize the contradictions between “proletarian”

66

Chapter Five

and “bourgeois” world views. The CC decree also claimed that the editors were not sufficiently patriotic—they had allegedly failed to show that German philosophy reflected the “reactionary” character of the Prussian monarchical system, to denounce Hegel’s views on war, his chauvinist views on the German people, his support for colonialism, and his hostility to Slavs. The decree ordered the editors to produce a new text that could provide a “correct Marxist-Leninist analysis of the role and nature of German philosophy.”27 Aleksandrov reportedly was able to deflect this assault by shifting the blame for these errors onto Iudin and Mitin,28 but the official condemnation of his text seemed to give new impetus to the campaign to restore the study of Marxism-Leninism. A decree of the Central Committee (May 20, 1944) established an educational program to train new instructors in MarxismLeninism and political economy for institutions of higher education,29 Bol’shevik now acknowledged that these errors had been produced by the general neglect of ideological education during the war30 and admitted that party members “mastery of Marxism-Leninism” was the basis for the success of the VKP(B)’s leadership of society.31 In June 1944 Secretary A. S. Shcherbakov followed suit; he called for the restoration of the evening “universities of Marxism-Leninism,” the establishment of special courses on the history of the VKP(B) for full-time officials and secretaries of the PPOs and the restoration of the full range of support programs for all those engaged in “independent study.”32 Propagandist adopted the same position with enthusiasm. 33 But while Zhdanov’s views on ideological education were given wide support, his views on the primacy of party political work were not. The publications of the Central Committee ignored his call for a return to “normal methods” of party leadership of the economy in his report to the Leningrad party in the spring of 1944, and during the summer of 1944 Pravda urged party officials to focus on their “practical work,” to cultivate a “taste for economics” in order to overcome the alleged “technological conservatism” of state officials, and once again praised the decisions of the 18th Conference of the VKP(B).34 Furthermore, Zhdanov and his opponents continued to clash over the relative importance of “mass work” and the study of Marxism-Leninism. These differences were particularly apparent in the decrees of the Central Committee dealing with agitprop work in the newly liberated territories of the USSR that were issued in the summer of 1944. The content of these decrees seemed to be linked with the relative influence of Zhdanov at a particular time. When he was away from Moscow the CC issued decrees that did not endorse his views. For example, in June when Zhdanov was in Leningrad, the CC issued a decree on agitprop work in the Moldovan republic that gave priority to “mass work,” stressed patriotic themes, and did not even discuss the ideological education of party members.35

The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945

67

In July Zhdanov returned to Moscow for a few months36 where he was actively engaged in ideological and cultural matters. He reportedly criticized Bol’shevik for its excessively patriotic tone and recommended changes in its editorial board,37 and sponsored an official discussion of the ideological orientation of Soviet literary journals sometime in August 1944.38 At this juncture, his views were directly incorporated into the decrees of the CC/VKP(B) (August 9, 1944) on the activities of agitprop in the Belorussian republic and the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Republic. The first decree repeated verbatim many of the formulations that had appeared in the decree on the Moldovan republic, but it also ordered local officials to revive cadres’ “independent study” of Marxism-Leninism, to provide lectures and consultations on the history of the party, political economy, the history of the USSR and of the Belorussian republic, philosophy, and literature.39 The decree also ordered the appointment of a secretary for propaganda to the gorkom in Minsk and the establishment of new educational programs for the gorkom and the secretaries of primary party organizations in order to eliminate the “capitalist attitudes toward work and property” ostensibly fostered by the German occupation authorities.40 The decree of the CC/VKP(B) on the obkom in the Tatar ASSR also reflected Zhdanov’s views. It sharply criticized local Communist officials for undermining “political work” by assigning propagandists and newspaper workers to act as special representatives on missions to the collective and state farms. It also declared that the careful study of the Kratkii kurs was the only means to counter the local party officials’ wide range of ideological errors, including the “belittling” of the role of the Red Army in the struggle against fascism, “undue admiration” for the USSR’s bourgeois allies, and “serious shortcomings and mistakes of a nationalist character” such as the glorification of the Golden Horde and the “misrepresentation” of Tatar-Russian relations in historical and literary works. The decree ordered party members to study the Kratkii kurs section by section and told the agitprop directorate to send a delegation to help the Tatar obkom to overcome these dangerous “nationalist” tendencies.41 During Zhdanov’s stay in Moscow, the advocates of the study of MarxismLeninism attacked their opponents with particular vigor. In September 1944 Propagandist sharply criticized those party officials who had allegedly ignored the Central Committee’s decree of November 1938 on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs.42 At the same time, those skeptical of the need for ideological education modified their position. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo belatedly recognized that Aleksandrov’s text on philosophy had blurred the vital distinction between the proletarian and bourgeois “world view” and had thus opened the way for the penetration of hostile ideology into the USSR! Partiinoe

68

Chapter Five

Stroitel’stvo condemned the “loss of taste for ideological work,” and urged party officials to give far more attention to all aspects of local cultural production (publishing, the press, theatre and films, secondary and higher education, the local unit of the writers union, scientific institutions) and to the Marxist-Leninist education of the entire intelligentsia.43 In September 1944 Stalin assigned Zhdanov the responsibility for conducting the negotiations with representatives of the Finnish government over the end of the war.44 This assignment seems to have reduced Zhdanov’s influence on the decrees of the CC on agitprop issued later that month. In particular, two decrees of the CC/VKP(B) of September 27, 1944, on agitprop work in the Ukraine gave far less attention to the restoration of party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism than the decrees on the Belorussian republic and Tatar obkom discussed above. The first decree restored the local agitprop structures and the appointment of secretaries for propaganda in the gorkom in Lvov and Odessa, but did not directly order the study of Marxism-Leninism.45 The second decree, which dealt with the serious “shortcomings” of existing political work in the Western Ukraine, was based on reports provided by G. F. Aleksandrov and by local officials in the Ukraine. Its discussion of agitprop work gave equal weight to the provision of basic information about the Soviet order, the USSR’s constitution, the obligation and responsibilities of citizens, and the ideological education of party members and the intelligentsia.46 On October 5, 1944, Zhdanov was dispatched to Helsinki to head the USSR’s Allied Control Commission in Finland. With Zhdanov away from the capital, sharp differences reappeared in the discussion of ideology and officials’ priorities. Bol’shevik now declared that the decree of the CC/VKP(B) on the proper use of the Kratkii kurs of November 1938 was the only basis for agitprop activity,47 but Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo published essays by party officials that were less enthusiastic. For example, an essay on “work with the intelligentsia” by N. Gusarov, the secretary of the Molotov obkom, combined support for ideological education with a Great Russian position on cultural matters. On the one hand, he cited Stalin’s reference to the intelligentsia’s leadership of workers and peasants as the basis for the obkom’s efforts to raise the intelligentsia’s ideological level, chided those officials who had mistakenly believed that this objective had lost its force during the war, and cited Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress to support his conclusion. On the other hand, he also claimed that the neglect of the Marxism-Leninism had led teachers of both literature and history to underestimate the importance of Russian culture and overestimate the significance of Western European culture! He reported that the CC/VKP(B) had condemned the publishing house in his region for publishing works with insufficiently patriotic portrayals of Ivan the Terrible and General Kutuzov.48

The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945

69

With Zhdanov in Helsinki, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo’s discussion of party officials’ priorities became confused. For example, its lead editorial on the “party spirit” of economic managers was completely contradictory. On the one hand, it charged that their failure to engage in “independent study” had led to undesignated “shortcomings” in their work, called on all obkom, gorkom, and raikom to assure that factory directors, chief engineers, and other leading personnel engaged in independent study, urged the obkom to conduct periodic seminars for the directors of factories on theoretical questions, and quoted Stalin’s warning about the need to combine practical work and the study of theory. On the other hand, the same editorial urged both local party officials and the PPOs to play a larger role in economic affairs, criticized factory directors for ignoring the suggestions of the PPOs in their enterprises, and attacked obkom and gorkom officials for their failure to provide more effective supervision of the factory directors.49 To add to the confusion, the same issue of Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo included a report by an agitprop official charging that officials’ obsession with production had led to their neglect of their “political leadership,” their “work with people,” and of “theoretical issues” and demanded discussion of these issues in the newspapers’ sections on “party life.”50 At this juncture, Stalin reverted to a more patriotic stance. In his address in November 1944 marking the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution, Stalin made no reference to the “inspirational role” of the VKP(B), declared that Soviet patriotism had united all classes and nationalities in the USSR against the enemy and therefore was to be regarded as the basis for the country’s wartime success.51 Stalin’s renewed enthusiasm for Soviet patriotism had an immediate impact on the discussion of ideology in all of the publications of the CC/VKP(B). Pravda’s editorials on ideological questions suddenly became hopelessly garbled,52 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo quoted repeatedly from Stalin’s address, urged agitprop officials to cultivate Soviet patriotism and the friendship of peoples, and did not mention the study of Marxism-Leninism in its discussion of party organizations’ educational activities.53 Both Bol’shevik and Propagandist once again gave renewed attention to patriotic themes.54 This shift was accompanied by a revival of positive coverage of the activities of industrial and transport departments of the local party organs. Leading party officials now explicitly called for increased cooperation between the PPOs and the local industrial departments on the pages of Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo. V. Zimin, the director of the Central Committee’s department of transportation, criticized those party secretaries of primary party organizations who “incorrectly” concluded that the war had eliminated their pravo kontrolia vis-à-vis the factory’s administration and therefore had reduced their legitimate criticism of the factory administration. Zimin insisted that PPOs should

70

Chapter Five

address all problems of production at their meetings and work closely with the local departments of transportation.55 M. Malakhov, the deputy secretary of the department of defense production of the Moscow party organization, praised the extensive cooperation between primary party organizations and the industrial departments in the capital and urged them both to become more involved in the most important questions of production.56 Pravda joined in by balancing its support for “work with people” with explicit praise for the 18th Conference’s decisions on officials’ industrial role.57 During this period Zhdanov’s responsibilities as the head of the USSR’s Allied Control Commission in Finland seemed to limit his authority at the apex of the political system. He was the only member of the Politburo who did not attend Stalin’s dinner for the visiting Charles de Gaulle on December 9, 1944,58 in mid-January 1945 he gave up his position as the leader of the party organization in Leningrad to his wartime deputy A. A. Kuznetsov, without explanation,59 and he did not attend the ceremonies in Moscow in January 1945 marking the anniversary of Lenin’s death. Moreover, the report on the anniversary by G. F. Aleksandrov, the director of agitprop, gave short shrift to the study of Marxism-Leninism. Following the lead of Stalin’s remarks of November 1944, Aleksandrov emphasized the power of the Soviet state, the importance of “friendship of peoples” and declared that the VKP(B) “included the most conscious and steadfast patriots,” who had educated the people of the USSR “in the spirit of love for their motherland,” and made no reference to the ideological education of party members.60 But the major organs of the Central Committee did not automatically follow Aleksandrov’s lead. Bol’shevik published his report, but its editorial on the anniversary in the same issue concluded with a vigorous appeal to party and Soviet cadres to study Marxism-Leninism.61 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo adopted much the same position. It also published Aleksandrov’s address, but its lead editorial stressed the importance of studying particular works of Lenin and Stalin and explicitly insisted on the continued relevance of the Central Committee decree of November 14, 1938, on the proper study of the Kratkii kurs. While it did seem to qualify its enthusiasm for the study of texts by references to Kirov’s assertion that the entire life and activity of the party was a “huge Marxist-Leninist school” it did not refer to the importance of patriotism, friendship of peoples, etc.62 Continued differences over ideological education were also expressed in two decrees of the CC/VKP(B) on the party’s “political work” issued in January 1945. A decree of the CC/VKP(B) on January 20, 1945, on the shortcomings of political work in the Western oblasts of the Belorussian republic gave more emphasis to patriotic themes than to the study of MarxismLeninism.63 In direct contrast, a decree of the CC/VKP(B) of January 27, 1945,

The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945

71

on the Bashkir obkom explicitly endorsed the study of Marxism-Leninism in no uncertain terms.64 Important party officials were equally divided. M. Bagirov, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaidzhan, carefully straddled the issue. On the one hand, he called for improved ideological training for those new members of the party who had already achieved positions of authority despite their inadequate education in Marxism-Leninism. On the other hand, he also argued that it was essential to support the ideology of “friendship of peoples” against the threats posed by both “great power nationalism and local nationalism” and gave particularly fawning praise to the superiority of the culture created by the “great Russian people” and its leadership in the construction of socialism in his republic.65 N. Patolichev, the Secretary of Cheliabinsk obkom who had given vigorous support to the role of local industrial departments in 1942, recognized the growing importance of organizational party and party political work, but shied away from overt support for the study of particular texts.66 G. Fedotov, the director of the org-instruction department of the Moscow gorkom was even more resistant. He did recognize the need to improve the primary party organizations’ organizational and ideological work and that party officials had sometimes “duplicated” the work of the directors of enterprises. But he refused to admit that party officials’ preoccupation with economic questions had hampered their party political work and insisted that the two areas were “inseparable.”67 The disagreements over ideological education seemed to intensify during the last two months of the war in Europe. In early April Propagandist indirectly criticized Malenkov’s orientation by charging that the educational programs for factory directors established at the 18th Conference in 1941 had ignored basic Marxist-Leninist teachings on political economy!68 The following issue of Propagandist published a report by M. Iovchuk to the Advanced Party School charging that the Tatar officials’ “preoccupation with economic affairs” had led to their neglect of Marxism-Leninism. He explicitly demanded the full restoration of agitprop activities outlined in the CC decree on the Kratkii kurs of November 1938.69 In contrast, both Bol’shevik and Pravda straddled the issue by bracketing their support for the study of Marxism-Leninism with greater attention to the importance of Soviet patriotism. Bol’shevik quoted directly from the Kratkii kurs and from Stalin’s report to the 18th Congress to stress the importance of Marxism-Leninism, and defined the VKP(B) as the “inspirer of all of our successes.” But it also defined Lenin as a “great patriot of our homeland,” and gave equal weight to Stalin’s view on the centrality of the state, the importance of “friendship of peoples,” and the “moral unity” of the people.70

72

Chapter Five

Pravda followed a similar path. On April 22nd and 23rd it published a survey of Lenin’s legacy by P. Pospelov, the editor in chief of Pravda since September 1940. The first installment declared that the VKP(B)’s success had been based on the “sure compass of the advanced theory of Marxism-Leninism”71 but the second part gave similar stress to the importance of friendship of peoples and Soviet patriotism! 72 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo followed suit. In an editorial marking the last weeks of the war, it described Leninism as the “highest accomplishment of Russian culture” and argued that the major objective of party organizations was the strengthening of the Soviet state.73 But Stalin’s own brief comments in May 1945 may have once again encouraged the proponents of the study of Marxism-Leninism to press their case. In his May Day decree Stalin noted that the restoration of the areas liberated by the Red Army was the result of the heroic efforts of workers and peasants, intelligentsia, women, and youth “inspired and led by the great Bolshevik party.”74 Shortly after Stalin’s address, Propagandist made a particularly vigorous plea for the restoration of party members’ “independent study” of Marxism-Leninism.75

NOTES 1. S. Zadionchenko, “Zadachi partiinoe rabote v ugol’nom kuzbasse,” PartiinoeStroitel’stvo, no. 16 (1943), 12–13. Approved for publication September 9, 1943. 2. “Zadachi partiino-organizatsionnoi raboty,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 16 (1943), pp. 4–10. Approved for publication September 9, 1943. 3. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 474. 4. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 17/18 (1943), p. 36. 5. “Partiinyi rabotnik-politicheskii rukovoditel,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, No. 17/18 (1943), 5–9. Approved for publication October 2, 1943. 6. S. Ignatiev, “Ob ideinom vospitanii kadrov I massogo politicheskoi rabote sredi trudiiashchikhsiia v bashkirskoi SSSR,” Propagandist, no. 15/16 (1943), 9–14. Approved for publication August 31, 1943. 7. “Kniga millionov sovetskikh patriotov,” Propagandist, no. 18 (1943), 3–7. Approved for publication October 12, 1943. 8. M. Mitin, “Partiia lenina-stalina: vdokhnovitel’ I organizator bor’by za pobedu nad nemetsko-fashistskimi zakhvatchikami,” Propagandist, no.19/20 (1953), 7–15. Approved for publication October 28, 1943. 9. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 480–81. 10. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 127. 11. Propagandist initially had characterized Stalin’s address as a contribution to Marxism-Leninism but shifted quickly. Compare “Doklad I prikaz Stalina-programma nashei bor’by pobedu nad vragom,” Propagandist, no. 21 (1943), 30–34. Approved for publication November 30, 1943, with “Istochniki sily I nezyblemosti

The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945

73

sovetskogo gosudarstva,” Propagandist, no. 22 (1943), 17. Approved for publication December 16, 1943. 12. “Pod znamenem lenina, pod rukovoditel’stvom Stalina’ vpered na pol’nyi ragrom nemetskikh zakhvatchikov,” Propagandist, no. 1 (1944), pp.1–7. Approved for publication January 15, 1944; A. Gorkin, “Ukreplenie leninsko-stalinskoi druzhby narodov SSSR v khode otechestvennoi voiny,” Propagandist, no. 1 (1944). 13. “Partiia leninina-stalina:vdokhnovitel’ I organizator vsenarodnoi bor’by protiv fashistskikh zakhvatchikov,” Bol’shevik, No. 22 (1943), 8–9. Approved for Publication December 23, 1943. 14. “Nashei boevyi zadachi v tylu,” Bol’shevik, no. 23/24 (1943), 1–9. Approved for publication January 10, 1944. 15. M. Kalinin, “Neskol’ko slov o propaganda I agitatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, No. 1 (1944). 16. Pravda, January 21, 1944, 1. 17. Pravda, January 22, 1944, 1. Zhdanov did not appear in Pravda’s pictures of the assembled officials, but the blockade of Leningrad was not lifted until January 27, 1944. 18. KPSS v rezoliutsiikah., Vol. 6 (1971), 105. 19. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 142. 20. Kaftanov, “Sovetskaia intelligentsia v velikoi otechesvennoi voine,” Bol’shevik, no. 5 (1944), 19–20. Approved for publication March 17, 1944. 21. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 491. 22. “Vospitanie molodykh kommunistov-odna iz osnovnykh zadach partiinykh organizatsii,” Bol’shevik, no. 6 (1944), 3–5. Approved for publication April 11, 1944. 23. “O samostoiatel’nom izuchenii kadrami marksistsko-leninskoi teorii,” Propagandist, no. 7/8(1944), 6–12. Approved for publication April 28, 1944. 24. Ocherki istorii leningradskoi organizatsii KPSS (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968), 655. Istoriia KPSS (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), Vol. 5, Book 1, 364. 25. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (New York: Random House, 1971), 508; G.V. Kostyrchenko, Tiana politika Stalina: vlast I anti-semitism (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 2001), 212. 26. Kostrychenko, 257. 27. The decree was not published in full but summarized in Bol’shevik’s editorial commentary. “O nedostatkakh I oshibkakh v osveshchenii istorii nemetskoi filosofii kontsa xviii I nachal xix veka,” Bol’shevik, no. 7/8 (1944), 14–19. Approved for publication May 14, 1944. 28. Kostrychenko, 254–55. 29. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 499. 30. N. Fedoseev, “Protivpolozhnost’ idealisticheskoi deialektiki gegeliia I marksistskogo dialekticheskogo metoda,” Bol’shevik, no. 9 (1944), .8–9. Approved for publication June 5, 1944. 31. “O marksistsko-leninskoi vospitanii kadrov sovetskoi intelligentsia,” Bol’shevik, no. 9 (1944), 3–7. Approved for publication June 5, 1944. 32. A. S. Shcherbakov, “Ocherednyi zadachi moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 10 (1944), 11–18. Approved for publication June 17, 1944.

74

Chapter Five

33. “Lektsii-vazhny metod propagandy marksizma-leninizma,” Propagandist, no. 10 (1944), 2–6. Approved for publication June 20, 1944; “Pomoshch samostoiatel’no izuchiushchim marksizma-leninizma: glavnaia zadacha partiinykh kabinet,” Propagandist, no. 11/12 (1944), 7–13. Approved for publication July 11, 1944. 34. Pravda, June 15, 1944, 1; June 17, 1944, 1; July 6, 1944, 1. 35. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), pp. 501–3. 36. Kostrychenko, 257. 37. Boterbloem, 248. 38. D. L. Babichenko, Literaturnyi front: Istoriia politicheskoi tsenzury, 1932–1946: Sbornik dokumentov (Moscow: Entsiklopediia rossiiskikh dereven, 1994), 153. 39. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh. Vol. 7 (1985), Vol. 7 (1985), 506–8. 40. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, 506–8. 41. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 513–20. 42. “Vyshe uroven ideino-politicheskoi raboty,” Propagandist, no. 15/16 (1944), 3–5. Approved for publication September 13, 1944. 43. “Ob ideologicheskoi rabote partorganizatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 15/16 (1944), 1–5. Approved for publication September 14, 1944. 44. Boterbloem, 249. 45. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 524–25. 46. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 526–31. 47. “Usilit ideino-politicheskuiu rabotu partiinykh organizatsii,” Bol’shevik, No. 17/18 (1944), 1–8. Approved for publication October 11, 1944. 48. N. Gusarov, “O rabote s intelligentsia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 17 (1944), 7–11. Approved for publication October 7, 1944. 49. “Partiinost’ v rabote khoziaistvennogo rukovoditeliia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 18 (1944), 1–7. Approved for publication October 23, 1944. 50. B. Borisov, “O nedostatkakh osveshcheniia voprosov partiinoi zhizne v pechati,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 18 (1944), 22–27. 51. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 160–70. 52. Compare Pravda’s lead editorials of November 17, 1944, November 23, 1944, December 3, 1944. 53. “Zhivotornaia sila sovetskogo patriotizma,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 21 (1944), 14–17. Approved for publication December 6, 1944. “Kniga I vospitanie nashikh kadrov,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 22 (1944), 1–6. Approved for publication December 20, 1944; “Vospityvat kadry v dukhe bol’shevistoskoi printsipal’nost,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1944), 1–5. Approved for publication January 13, 1945. 54. “Doklad I prikaz stalina: boevaia programma bor’by okonchatel’nym razgrom vraga,” Propagandist, no. 21 (1944), 15–17. Approved for publication November 27, 1944; “Neistanno povyshat ideino-teoreticheskoi uroven partiinykh I sovetskikh kadrov,” Bol’shevik, no. 22 (1944), 1–5. Approved for publication December 12, 1944; “Plenum MGK VKP(B) o propagandistskoi rabote,” Propagandist, no. 22 (1944), 32–33. Approved for publication December 28, 1944. 55. V. Zimin, “Nekotorye osobonnosti partiinoi raboty na transport,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1944), 24–28.

The War and the Apparat, 1943–1945

75

56. M. Malakhov, “Promyshlennyi otdel obkom I partiino-politicheskaia rabota na predpriiatii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1944), 29–32. 57. Pravda, December 13, 1944; December 30, 1944, 1. 58. Pravda, December 10, 1944, 1. 59. Ocherkii istorii leningradskoi partii KPSS, 657–58. 60. Pravda, January 22, 1945, 2. Aleksandrov had adopted a more positive view of ideological education in Marxism-Leninism in an address to students at Moscow State University the previous month. Pravda, December 10, 1944, 2. 61. “Velichie leninsko-stalinskikh idei,” Bol’shevik, no. 1 (1945), 1–7. Approved for publication January 24, 1945. 62. “Vesti neistannuiiu propagandy leninizma v riadakh partii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 1 (1945), 1–5. Approved for publication February 1, 1945. 63. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh., Vol. 7 (1985), 534. 64. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh., Vol. 7 (1985), 540–41. 65. M. Bagirov, “Nekotorye voprosy rukovodstva khoziastvom I partiino-politicheskoi raboty,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 3/4 (1945), 23. Approved for publication March 3, 1945. 66. S. N. Patolichev, “Nekotorye voprosy partiinoi raboty v oblasti promyshlennosti,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 6 (1945), 25. Approved for publication April 30, 1945. 67. G. Fedotov, “Zametki o partiinoi rabote na predpriiatiiakh,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 6 (1945), 27–31. 68. “O propagande ekonomicheskoi znanii,” Propagandist, no. 6 (1945), 1–6. Approved for publication April 9, 1945. 69. M. Iovchuk, “Propaganda marksizma-leninzma:vazhneishee sredstvo ideinopoliticheskogo vospitaniia kadrov I intelligentsia,” Propagandist, no. 7/8 (1945), 12–25. Approved for publication April 16, 1945. 70. “Torzhestvo idei leninizma v nashe strane,” Bol’shevik, no. 6 (1945), 1–8 Approved for publication April 16, 1945. 71. Pravda, April 22, 1945, 2. 72. Pravda, April 23, 1945, 1–2. 73. “Znamia lenina-stalina vedet nas k okonchatel’noi pobede,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 7/8 (1945), 11–13. 74. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol 2 (XV), 192. 75. “Ob organizatsii samostoiatel’noi raboy kadrov po izucheniiu marksistskoleninskoi teorii,” Propagandist, no. 9 (1945), 11–14. Approved for publication May 14, 1945.

Chapter Six

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

SUMMARY The year between the end of the European war and Stalin’s decision to fire Malenkov as Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) in May 1946 was particularly eventful. The death of Secretary Shcherbakov in May 1945, the need to restore the ideological health of those who had lived under German occupation and to educate the new members of the party provided an excellent context for the restoration of Zhdanov’s influence. Nonetheless, criticism of his views and support for Malenkov’s definitions continued to appear particularly during Stalin’s extensive absence from the capital in the fall of 1945. His return in December seemed to restore support for Zhdanov’s views. In March/April 1946 Stalin strengthened the authority of the Council of Ministers over the administration of the economy and reformed the apparat to assure that party officials gave primacy to party political work. On May 6, 1946, Stalin removed Malenkov from his position. This change initially produced immense confusion in the discussion of officials’ priorities, but by mid-July Zhdanov and his supporters had regained their ascendancy. In early May 1945 the war in Europe came to an end; during the next few weeks Stalin adopted a particularly chauvinistic tone in his public comments. On May 9, 1945, he extolled the Slavic peoples’ contribution to the defeat of fascism and a few weeks later he lauded the leadership role of the Russian people in the multi-national USSR in the war against Germany.1 Stalin’s chauvinism led to a temporary halt in the campaign to restore the study of Marxism-Leninism. Propagandist muted its emphasis on the study of theory and both Pravda and Bol’shevik adopted a particularly chauvinistic tone.2 77

78

Chapter Six

At this point Stalin lapsed into almost complete silence; while he did issue various orders of the day and letters of congratulation over the next eight months, he did not discuss the USSR’s internal development and international position until his well-known “election speech” in February 1946. This silence presented problems for his subordinates. Up until this time, they had evidently regarded his pronouncements as guidance on a wide range of issues including the definition of ideology and party officials’ priorities. Circumstantial evidence suggests that when Stalin fell silent, the decrees of the Central Committee became the major source of guidance for his subordinates and seemed to set the tone and direction of the discussion in the journals of the Central Committee. As noted above, Stalin’s chauvinism in May 1945 had led to a temporary halt in the campaign to restore the study of Marxism-Leninism. This lull coincided with an important change in the leadership of the VKP(B) prompted by the death of A. S. Shcherbakov who had been responsible for agitprop since May 1941. During the war, he had held a number of important posts simultaneously; he had served as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B), first secretary of the Moscow obkom and gorkom, the head of the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and of the Soviet Information Bureau, and a deputy people’s commissar for defense.3 The ceremonies marking the celebration of May Day and Shcherbakov’s funeral in mid-May indicated that Malenkov clearly outranked Zhdanov in the leadership. While Zhdanov had appeared at the May Day celebrations,4 Malenkov had been shown as a member of Stalin’s inner circle and a major participant in the funeral ceremonies for A. S. Shcherbakov held later that month. Malenkov was ranked far above Zhdanov in the Politburo’s tribute to Shcherbakov and guarded his coffin along with Stalin and Voroshilov while Zhdanov was not shown at the ceremonies.5 Most striking, Shcherbakov’s successor seemed to endorse Malenkov’s conception of party officials’ priorities. G. Popov, who had served as second secretary of the Moscow gorkom, replaced Shcherbakov as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) and the first secretary of the Moscow obkom and gorkom. Popov’s eulogy clearly implied that party officials should always be concerned with problems of production and gave short shrift to MarxistLeninist theory.6 But in the end, Shcherbakov’s death allowed Zhdanov to regain his role in the direction of the agitprop directorate. In June he reappeared in public with other leading officials7 and Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo demonstrated greater support for his views by balancing its praise for “friendship of peoples” with the recognition that the party’s policy flowed from its knowledge of MarxistLeninist theory.8

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

79

Zhdanov’s views were also reflected in a series of decrees of the Central Committee issued later that month. The first, which ordered the establishment of a series of new periodicals for the non-Russian republics and a number of oblasts and krai within the RSFSR, reminded party officials that these “militant organs of political education” were essential for party leadership of the masses.9 The second decree called for more intensive agitprop work with repatriated citizens of the USSR.10 The third decree was the most explicit; it charged that the instructors of Marxism-Leninism at Saratov University had failed to emphasize the fundamental differences between “proletarian” and “bourgeois” world views and demanded an immediate improvement in the level of ideological education.11 This decree obviously made it impossible for party officials to ignore the subject. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo now gave equal weight to the importance of “theory” and “practice” in the education of Communists in primary party organizations,12 and G. F. Aleksandrov gave equal weight to the cultivation of Soviet patriotism and ideological education in Marxism-Leninism. In a major address to the leaders of university faculties in social and economic science (August 1, 1945) he quoted at length from the decree of the CC/VKP(B) on Saratov, cited the centrality of the Kratkii Kurs for ideological education, and endorsed the decree of the CC/VKP(B) in May 1944 exposing the errors in the history of philosophy!13 But he also adopted a Great Russian position by chastising Russian historians for underestimating the unique nature of the Russian historical experience and attacking non-Russian historians for the excessive glorification of their own national heroes.14 Despite Aleksandrov’s equivocations, a decree of the CC/VKP(B) on the agitrop activities of the Kuibyshev obkom (August 22, 1945) fully endorsed Zhdanov’s position on party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism. It charged that the obkom and its subordinate gorkom and raikom had not provided adequate lectures for those Communists and members of the intelligentsia engaged in the “independent study” of Marxism-Leninism, that the lecturers’ preoccupation with current problems and international affairs had led them to neglect the history of the party, philosophy, and political economy.15 In addition, the decree claimed that the party’s officials had failed to effectively utilize those party workers and members of the intelligentsia who were sufficiently trained in Marxism-Leninism to extend the scope of agitprop work. The decree ordered the officials in Kuibyshev to establish groups of specialized lecturers to work with different audiences and to appoint an obkom secretary to supervise their activities. It also called on the agitprop directorate to prepare a series of model lectures that could be presented by local officials throughout the country, and to send a delegation to Kuibyshev to help to establish the local program.16

80

Chapter Six

But this decree did not end expressions of opposition to Zhdanov’s views on party officials’ role in industrial management. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo seemed to shift away from Zhdanov’s position; in early July it had urged party officials to stop “usurping” the responsibilities of soviet and economic agencies and to return to “normal” leadership based on the “verification of fulfillment” of previous orders and decrees by these bodies.17 But in August 1945 it published essays that not only praised their economic work but also insisted that their wartime experience was essential to the needs for postwar reconstruction. O. Kozlova, the secretary of the Moskvoretskii raikom in Moscow, insisted that its detailed knowledge of the productive capacities and the management of individual enterprises gave it expertise that was essential to guide the process of reconstruction. Kozlova insisted that the raikom should play a central role in decisions about product mix, the shift to an eight-hour day, the level and type of wages, the technical education of personnel, and virtually all other aspects of the transition to peacetime industrial activity.18 Kozlova’s position may have reflected the relative authority of the two junior Secretaries in the leadership. During the summer of 1945 Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) Malenkov continued to wield vast authority in all areas including those that were ostensibly under Zhdanov’s supervision. In early August, Malenkov ordered A. M. Egolin, a deputy director of agitprop, to provide Malenkov with a detailed survey of the Soviet literary scene. (Egolin’s report proved to be highly critical of individual authors.)19 Pravda’s coverage of the assembled leadership of the VKP(B) on August 13, 1945, suggested that Malenkov retained his predominance over Zhdanov. Moreover, in the second half of August 1945, Pravda endorsed Malenkov’s definitions by urging party officials to provide “concrete aid” to “floundering” industrial enterprises. Its editorial on the preparation of the rail system for winter conditions (August 23, 1945) charged that the local party organizations’ failure to deal with immediate problems had led to serious disruption of rail traffic. It insisted that the officials at obkom, gorkom, and kraikom level had to move beyond mere “supervision” (kontrol) to assure the supply of spare parts, to improve workers’ living conditions, and to assure that the system as a whole worked “smoothly.”Pravda adopted the same position in its discussion of problems in the coal and machine tools sectors on August 26 and 29, 1945. At approximately the same time, the leadership began to the restore the prewar system of state planning. On August 19, 1945, Pravda had published a joint decree of the CC/VKP(B) and the Sovnarkom calling on Gosplan, the peoples commissariats, and the republics of the USSR to work out a five-year plan for the reconstruction of the economy and submit it to the Central Committee and Sovnarkom for approval. With the end of the war with Japan, the

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

81

GOKO was disbanded on September 4, 1945, and its powers transferred to the Sovnarkom.20 Two days later, Stalin issued a decree as Chairman of the Sovnarkom that bolstered the control of the leading Politburo/Commissars over its specialized divisions. The decree established one bureau headed by Molotov to supervise the commissariats responsible for military development, agriculture, and financial agencies and a second bureau to supervise those agencies responsible for industry and transport headed by Beria as Chair and Malenkov as his deputy.21 This bolstering of the Politburo/Commissars’ control over the administration of the economy raised a critical question for the party’s full-time officials. Would they retain the extraordinary authority they had acquired during the war or should they return to the “normal methods” of leadership supported by Zhdanov and his allies? The joint decree of August 19, 1945, had not referred to party officials’ role in the process of planning, an omission that seemed to hint that their role would be limited. Whatever the case, articles published in both Pravda and Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo suggests that some leaders of the party sought to assure that party officials would not be excluded from the planning process. On September 15, 1945, Pravda insisted that locals party officials’ vast knowledge about the capacity of various enterprises and the proper use of local resources that had been acquired during the war had immense significance for the entire process of planning. In the same spirit, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo reported that those obkom that had included their own departments of industry and transport in the planning process had already made significant contributions to the country’s overall plans. The editorial claimed that the regional economic plans formulated with the aid of party officials would be forwarded to Gosplan and coordinated with the sectorial plans worked out by the commissariats.22 While Pravda and Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo endorsed a larger role for officials in planning, Propagandist pressed on with its campaign to restore the study of Marxism-Leninism with particular vigor. In September 1945 it argued that the ideological errors at Saratov University, which had been sharply condemned in June 1945, had cropped up at other institutions of higher education, and urged local officials to make sure that the courses in MarxismLeninism did not “underestimate” the differences between “proletarian” and “bourgeois” world views.23 At this juncture, Propagandist published the Central Committee’s decree on the shortcomings of lectures provided by the Kuibyshev obkom24 and attributed its errors to the misuse of lecturers for “economic work.”25 This formulation was probably an indirect assault on Malenkov and his allies. With the publication of this decree the director of the agitprop directorate and Pravda supported Zhdanov’s views on the study of theory. On September 24,

82

Chapter Six

1945, G. F. Aleksandrov acknowledged the importance of Marxism-Leninism in an essay marking the anniversary of the publication of Pravda. 26 On September 26, 1945, Pravda insisted that the decree provided guidance for all other local party organs and quoted from Stalin on the importance of the study of Marxism-Leninism for Communists in all spheres of work. (But Pravda was unwilling to endorse Propagandist’s swipe at Malenkov. While it did condemn the use of lecturers for “inappropriate” functions it did not report their alleged use for “economic work.”) But these endorsements did not end resistance to Zhdanov’s views on the content of official ideology. On October 1, 1945, Pravda published a lengthy essay by L. Kuzmin, the director of a department of agitprop27 that balanced its praise for study of the Kratkii kurs and Stalin’s essay on dialectical and historical materialism with the insistence that Stalin’s discussion of the Soviet state in his report to the 18th Congress, his wartime comments, his assertion that the “friendship of peoples” was the basis for the state’s strength, and his designation of the Russian people as the leader of the USSR, were in themselves major contributions to Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, at this juncture Bol’shevik remained oddly silent on ideological issues. It had not appeared in print since mid-August and when it resumed publication in early October its editorial board had been enlarged and modified to include some of Zhdanov’s major allies and to remove some of his opponents. (P. N. Fedoseev was the new editor in chief. Iovchuk joined the editorial board and Iudin and Mitin were excluded.)28 But despite this shakeup, Bol’shevik did not participate in the debate over ideological issues until the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution the following month. The ongoing debate may have been influenced by Stalin’s departure for a prolonged vacation in the fall of 1945. On October 10, 1945, Pravda announced that Stalin had left the capital and on October 11, 1945, it published two essays that directly challenged Zhdanov’s definitions. The first, a lengthy discussion of official ideology by B. Leontiev (whose position was not identified) stressed the “patriotic” nature of the party and its appeal. Leontiev characterized the Bolsheviks of October 1917 as “real patriots,” represented the revolution itself as serving the “national interests” of Russia, and lauded the Communist party for cultivating Soviet patriotism, loyalty to the socialist fatherland, and the desire to work for the homeland. While he made a brief reference to Marxism-Leninism, he did not discuss the need for the ideological training of members of the party and the intelligentsia. The second essay by V. Klimenko, secretary of the Stalinsk gorkom in the Ukrainian republic, provided a thinly veiled critique of Zhdanov’s views on party officials’ role in the administration of industry. Klimenko’s detailed report on his gorkom’s vigorous and effective response to shortfalls in coal min-

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

83

ing forcefully endorsed direct intervention by specialized party officials in the solution of problems of industrial production. He revealed that the gorkom’s officials had organized meetings to mobilize both miners and technical staff, had set specific targets for production that were then monitored and verified by the heads of departments and instructors in both the raikom and gorkom, and highlighted the role of the gorkom’s specialized secretaries in the solution of immediate problems of production. He reported that the gorkom’s deputy secretary for the coal industry had directly investigated the shortfalls of production in a particularly important mine, and that his findings had allowed the gorkom to make specific recommendations for technological improvements and to locate and assign the most appropriate enterprise to produce the needed modern equipment. In October 1945 the campaign for elections to the soviets at all levels of the political system in early 1946 began in earnest. In this context, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo ignored Zhdanov’s definitions and urged agitprop workers to engage in “mass work” with Soviet voters to explain the principles of the USSR’s constitution as well as the advantages of the socialist system and its superiority to the “bourgeois democracy” of the capitalist world.29 Furthermore, support for Zhdanov’s views was meager during the celebrations of the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. The slogans issued to mark the anniversary did not refer to ideological education30 and Bol’shevik did not fully support his views despite the recent reorganization of its editorial board in his favor. Its lead editorial on ideological work carefully balanced its support for the study of the Kratkii kurs and a list of essential works by Lenin and Stalin with equal praise for “mass work” designed to cultivate Soviet patriotism and in support of the five-year plan.31 In addition, the same issue of Bol’shevik also published two essays that marked a retreat from Zhdanov’s priorities. P. Pospelov, the editor of Pravda and a member of Bol’shevik’s editorial board, who had defended the primacy of Marxism-Leninism with vigor in April 1945, now produced a paean to Soviet patriotism.32 N. Nauvoma (whose position remains unknown) claimed that practice and experience were the only sure basis for the development of theory and criticized unnamed “dogmatists” who used “dead abstractions” and had lapsed into “schematicism.”33 Finally, Pravda’s coverage of the anniversary celebrations seemed to indicate that Zhdanov was not in particularly high standing. He did not appear on the rostrum with other members of the Politburo (he evidently remained in Helsinki),34 and the leaders who did appear seemed to cluster around a nucleus of Mikoyan, Molotov, Malenkov, and Beria, the veterans of the wartime State Defense Committee.35 Moreover, V. M. Molotov’s report on the anniversary was hardly encouraging to those who favored the restoration of

84

Chapter Six

party members’ ideological education. Molotov made no reference to Marxism-Leninism, implied that agitprop officials should give priority to mass work rather than the ideological education of the intelligentsia, and defined Soviet patriotism as the basis for the Soviet peoples’ heroic exploits.36 Pravda followed Molotov’s lead; its discussion of the intelligentsia in late November focused exclusively on mass work in support of the forthcoming elections to the Soviets.37 In December Pravda simply repeated the slogans about the superiority of the USSR’s brand of democracy over the “bourgeois democracy” in the West.38 But published sources suggest that Stalin may have come to Zhdanov’s rescue. His return to Moscow on December 17, 1945,39 was followed by a burst of support for Zhdanov and his definitions. On December 21, 1945, Pravda declared that the Bolshevik party’s leadership of the state was based on the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin and Zhdanov attended the first postwar meeting of the Politburo on December 29, 1945.40 On the following day Pravda explicitly recognized the vital importance of the ideological education of the intelligentsia,41 and on December 31, 1945, Propagandist resumed its enthusiastic support for the ideological education of party members and intelligentsia.42 Most important, Zhdanov’s views were incorporated into a decree of the Central Committee on the ideological education of local party officials that was issued sometime at the end of the year. It ordered the obkom, kraikom, and Central Committees of republican parties to establish separate educational programs for party workers and for propagandists to train and retrain secretaries of primary party organizations and workers for the raikom and gorkom over a term of one year and ordered the agitprop directorate to prepare the appropriate programs of study. Admissions were to be controlled by the directorates for cadres and agitprop and local party organs.43 By early 1946, support for Zhdanov’s priorities had evidently increased. He was ranked slightly before Malenkov in Pravda’s reference to the leadership on January 3, 1946, and the first issue of Bol’shevik published in 1946 abandoned its eclecticism to insist that “mastery of the Kratkii kurs” was essential for all new members of the party and that the Central Committee’s prewar decree on its proper use was the basis for agitprop activity.44 The same issue published an essay by Pospelov on the “leading role” of the VKP{B) that retreated from his fulsome praise for the cultivation of Soviet patriotism to argue that the study of Marxism-Leninism was appropriate for the intelligentsia and that “mass work” should be based on patriotic themes.45 Nonetheless, resistance to Zhdanov’s views continued in the first months of 1946. First of all, G. F. Aleksandrov’s report on the anniversary of Lenin’s death was laced with patriotic references. It stressed the overriding impor-

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

85

tance of the Russian people’s leadership of the USSR and provided particularly slavish praise for Stalin’s views on socialism in one country, his “brilliant” contributions to Soviet military thought, and his conception of the Soviet state. Aleksandrov concluded that Stalin’s stress on the strengthening of the state’s power and authority was a major theoretical contribution to Leninism that assured the continued development of a powerful modern army.46 Secondly, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo now seemed bent on avoiding support for Zhdanov’s definitions. Its first issue for 1946 included a series of essays by party officials that sidestepped the dispute over the relative importance of party political and economic work in various ways. N. Gusarov, the secretary of the Molotov obkom, argued that it should play a key role in regional planning,47 and officials in the org-instruction department ignored the dispute in their assault on the failure of various obkom to respond to the needs of the local population. A. Kozlov, the head of a sector in the department, charged that the departments for construction, communal economy, industry, trade, and community catering of the Briansk obkom had ignored serious shortages of bread and fuel because they had uncritically accepted the “inaccurate” information provided by people’s commissariats and factory directors on local conditions. Kozlov urged party officials to visit enterprises and institutions to determine the actual state of affairs, rather than rely on the information provided by state agencies.48 V. Liatnikov, identified as a “responsible organizer” of the org-instruction department, ordered the Saratov obkom to give as much attention to shortages of bread as it had given defense production during the war. He also sharply criticized the gorkom in Saratov for its failure to improve the trolley system and urged both obkom and gorkom to provide more vigorous “verification of fulfillment” of previous orders rather than to simply discuss the issue at party meetings.49 F. Serzhantov, a “responsible organizer” in the org-instruction department, criticized the obkom in Gorky for similar lack of attention to the problems encountered in housing and the provision of basic necessities.50 In early February 1946, all of the members of the Politburo, who had been nominated as candidates for election as deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, spoke briefly to their constituents. While Malenkov and Zhdanov did not directly discuss their responsibilities as Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B) they did seem to clash over the importance of ideological education. Zhdanov did not refer openly to Marxism-Leninism or to ideological education of party members, but he did stress the overriding importance of “consciousness” for the development of the USSR. In contrast, Malenkov indirectly criticized both Zhdanov’s enthusiasm for the restoration of ideological education and his belief that party officials’ wartime experience was inappropriate for the

86

Chapter Six

solution of postwar problems. Malenkov criticized unnamed “pedants” who lived by old formulations instead of acting on the basis of contemporary experience, insisted that practice was the only legitimate basis for correct action, and suggested that personnel with wartime experience should be promoted to positions of greater authority.51 Pravda’s coverage of these two addresses suggested that Malenkov’s standing in the leadership was higher than Zhdanov’s. Pravda reported that Zhdanov’s address was allegedly met with “stormy applause,” and Malenkov’s address was reportedly greeted by “ a stormy prolonged ovation” and cries of “long live Comrade Malenkov—the loyal comrade-in-arms of the great Stalin.”52 At the same time, there was considerable official support for Zhdanov’s definitions. On February 8, 1946, the Institute of Marxism-Leninism of the CC/VKP(B) announced that Stalin’s entire works, which were to be published over the next few years, were essential reading for all those party members who sought to “master” Marxism-Leninism.53 The following day Stalin gave his own “election” speech but it provided little coherent guidance for those seeking a definition of officials’ priorities. In his analysis of the international situation, Stalin seemed to revert to orthodoxy by declaring that “Marxists” had long maintained that both World War I and World War II were the outgrowth of the inherent contradictions of “contemporary monopolist capitalism.”54 In his discussion of domestic politics, he defined the VKP(B) as the “driving force” of the society and insisted that its prewar policy of industrialization and collectivization had been responsible for the USSR’s victory in World War II and would therefore be restored without change. His discussion of the party’s plans for the future focused almost exclusively on the five-year plans to reconstruct the country’s economy. Stalin promised that rationing would be ended soon and that the production of consumer goods, reduction of prices, the establishment of a wide range of research institutes to bolster scientists’ contribution to the economy deserved the highest priority. Stalin claimed that the party hoped to double prewar outputs of iron, steel, and oil during the next three or more five-year plans in order to protect the homeland from “any eventuality.”55 While Stalin’s address indicated that he regarded the institutions established before the war as sacrosanct, it did not seem to provide officials with clear guidance beyond the obvious need to assure the fulfillment of the fiveyear plan. Nonetheless, the published response to his address suggested that party officials interpreted his remarks in different ways. Some leading officials seemed to interpret Stalin’s reversion to orthodoxy in the analysis of imperialism (however qualified) and his praise for the Soviet state’s economic role as an endorsement of Zhdanov’s views on the study of Marxism-Leninism and the proper division of labor between party officials and the state’s ad-

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

87

ministrators. L. Slepov, the head of Pravda’s department of party life, lauded Stalin’s statements in 1937 about the need to “master Bolshevism,” praised the 18th Congress’ decision to foster party political work, and concluded that “the Soviet state organizes and directs the economy while party officials provided “political leadership.” Furthermore, Slepov challenged Malenkov’s assertion that war-trained cadres should be quickly promoted by insisting that many party members were still “insufficiently armed” with the “theoretical, organizational, and political experience of the party.”56 But other officials refused to adopt this position. The lead editorial in Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 4 (1946) provided but half-hearted editorial support for Zhdanov’s views on officials’ priorities. It did recognize a “certain weakening” of internal work during the war and generally acknowledged its importance for economic success. But it did not cite Stalin in support of this position or criticize party officials for excessive interference in the administration of the economy.57 The same issue included reports by important party officials that adopted much the same position. Most striking, A. Kuznetsov, Zhdanov’s successor as the head of the Leningrad party organization, totally ignored ideological education in his report to the aktiv of the Leningrad party organization (February 25, 1946). Instead, he paraphrased Stalin’s remarks on the importance of reconstruction, focused almost exclusively on Leningrad’s role in the coming five-year plan, and on the electoral activities of agitprop.58 M. Shamberg, the director of the org-instruction department of the Central Committee (who has been identified by Western scholars as an ally of Malenkov),59 qualified his support for Zhdanov’s views by giving equal weight to the importance of “theory” and “practice” in the education of new members of the party. Shamberg made a strong case for the study of Marxism-Leninism, but declared that party members’ direct participation in party meetings, social political work, and production was the most important element in their education.60 In the midst of this debate, the growing tension between the leaders of the USA, UK, and USSR broke into the open. On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill, the wartime prime minister of Great Britain, assailed the USSR’s domination of Eastern Europe in his address in Fulton, Missouri. On March 14, 1946, Stalin denounced Churchill’s speech as a direct threat to continued allied cooperation and to world peace, as an attempt of Anglo-American “reactionaries” to dominate the world, and indirectly threatened to meet any Western assault on Eastern Europe with force.61 Faced with this growing sense of threat, the Politburo decided to strengthen the authority of the central government and to reform the composition of the leading bodies of the CC/VKP(B). In the following weeks, the Politburo

88

Chapter Six

bolstered the authority of the Politburo/Ministers over the administration of industry and restored the prewar division of labor between them and the Politburo/Secretaries responsible for internal party matters. The extension of the authority of the Politburo/Ministers was reflected in a change in the name of the government to the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the appointment of a new Politburo dominated by the Politburo/Ministers. In mid-March the Supreme Soviet of the USSR approved the change in the name of the government62 and Stalin and others had made it clear that this was not simply a cosmetic change; Stalin had told the Central Committee meeting (March 14, 1946) that it reflected the maturation of the political system 63 and N. M. Shvernik, a candidate member of the Politburo and chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, told the Supreme Soviet of the USSR that the new title dramatized the government’s increased responsibility for industrial administration.64 The Central Committee had been convened at the same time and on March 19, 1946, it approved Stalin’s nominations for membership in the party’s leading bodies. The Politburo/Ministers dominated the new Politburo. Stalin remained as Chairman of the Council of Ministers while Molotov, Beria, Andreev, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich were all deputy chairmen of the Council. The Politburo also included three Politburo/Secretaries (Stalin, Malenkov, and Zhdanov) one regional party and republican leader (N. S. Khrushchev was at this time both first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian Republic) and Kalinin, the chairman of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Stalin now enlarged the existing Secretariat (Stalin, Malenkov, Zhdanov) to include A. A. Kuznetsov, the leader of the Leningrad party, who proved to be an ally of Zhdanov and G. M. Popov, the leader of the Moscow party organization who had replaced Shcherbakov in May 1945, and proved to be an ally of Malenkov. Stalin also announced that the Orgbureau would be enlarged by the inclusion of regional party officials with considerable experience. The Orgbureau was officially responsible for the “overall leadership of organizational work” of the party,65 and it was probably the major source of the decrees subsequently issued in the name of the Central Committee.66 While the Politburo/Ministers dominated the Politburo, the leaders of the apparat of the Central Committee dominated the Orgbureau. It included Stalin, the General Secretary, the four Secretaries of the Central Committee of the VKP(B) (Malenkov, Zhdanov, Kuznetsov, and Popov), G. F. Aleksandrov, the director of agitprop, and Shatalin, the deputy director of the cadres directorate. Stalin also named regional secretaries to the Orgbureau in midMarch but did not assign them responsibilities until the following month. They included N. S. Patolichev, the secretary of the Cheliabinsk obkom, V. M.

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

89

Andrianov, secretary of the Sverdlovsk obkom, M. I. Rodionov, secretary of the Gorkii obkom, and M. A. Suslov, the chairman of the Central Committee’s bureau for Latvia. The Orgbureau also included two government officials— N. A. Bulganin, the deputy minister of defense, L. I. Mekhis, the minister of state control, and two leaders of “public” agencies, N. A. Mikhailov, the leader of the Komsomol, and V. V. Kuznetsov, the secretary and chairman of the central trade union federation.67 In the last week of March 1946 Stalin bolstered the control of the Politburo/Ministers over the Council of Ministers’ specialized ministries. The two bureaus of the Council of People’s Commissars that had been established in late 1945 were replaced by a single bureau of the new Sovministrov chaired by Beria with Voznesenski and Kosygin as his deputies and including the deputy prime ministers, each of whom was held directly responsible for a cluster of related branch ministries.68 The bureau was convened immediately (March 27, 1946) and henceforth played a central role in the administration of the first postwar five-year plan.69 The first postwar five-year plan, which was published in late March with immense fanfare, had an immediate impact on the activities of agitprop and on the characterization of the Sovministrov in the Central Committee’s publications. First of all, Stalin and Zhdanov70 composed a decree of the Central Committee (March 27, 1946) that portrayed “mass political work” in support of the five-year plan as the equivalent of party members’ study of the Kratkii kurs! It ordered agitprop personnel to organize socialist competition in industrial enterprises, to sponsor lectures and discussion of the new five-year plan, and to establish study circles and “independent study” of the plan’s details.71 Propagandist and Pravda immediately followed suit.72 Secondly, both Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo and Bol’shevik explicitly recognized that the Sovministrov enjoyed primary responsibility for the administration of the economy. The lead editorial in Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 5/6 (1946) lauded the new five-year plan for its capacity to strengthen the Soviet state,73 explicitly recognized that the newly formed Sovministrov enjoyed far greater responsibility and competence than its predecessor, and implied that it had equal status with the “party” under the direction of the “leader and teacher of the party and people, comrade Stalin.”74 The editorial demanded that party officials improve their organizational and propaganda work to assure the fulfillment of the plan, and to cultivate socialist competition.75 The same issue also included a detailed outline of the new five-year plan by N. Voznesensky, the Chairman of Gosplan, and the full version of the law on the state plan itself. Bol’shevik also portrayed the Sovministrov as the embodiment of the Soviet state, stressed its immense prerogatives in the administration of industry, and asserted that its broadened

90

Chapter Six

authority was a direct outgrowth of Stalin’s definition of the role of the state in his report to the 18th Congress.76 With the Sovministrov restored to its prewar position, the Politburo turned to the reorganization of the leading organs of the party’s apparat. On April 13, 1946, the Politburo issued a decree defining the division of responsibilities between the Secretaries of the CC/VKP(B) and between the Secretariat and Orgbureau. The decree named Malenkov chairman of the meetings of the Orgbureau and responsible for preparation of its agenda, and for supervising the activities of the Central Committees of the Communist parties of the republics in the USSR. It must be emphasized that this particular assignment of responsibility actually limited the scope of his authority. Since the RSFSR did not have its own Communist party organization, Malenkov’s supervisory authority did not include the Russian republic. The decree granted Secretary Zhdanov full responsibility (rukovodstvo) for the agitprop directorate and all agitprop work of party and soviet organizations (press, publishing, film, radio, art, oral propaganda) and named him the chairman of the new department of the CC/VKP(B) on foreign policy. The decree ordered Zhdanov and Aleksandrov to improve the work of the agitprop directorate, to establish a newspaper to provide guidance for the country’s cultural life, and to improve Pravda by establishing more specialized departments and by hiring specialists in foreign affairs. The newly appointed Secretary A. A. Kuznetsov, (who is generally regarded as Zhdanov’s ally by Western scholars), was given the most extensive assignment. He replaced Malenkov as the director of the cadre directorate, was ordered to improve its operation, and to establish a new system of educational institutions to train and retrain both party and soviet officials. He was named chairman of the meetings of the Secretariat and made responsible for the preparation of its agenda, and for the leadership of the obkom in the RSFSR that had been excluded from Malenkov’s purview. Popov was not given any specific assignment in light of his role as leader of the Moscow party organization. The decree made the Orgbureau responsible for the verification of the work of subordinate party committees and the adoption of measures to improve their performance and made the Secretariat responsible for the assignment of personnel. The Orgbureau would meet once a week, and the Secretariat when necessary. Patolichev was named director of the org-instruction department, and the agricultural and transport departments of the Central Committee were abolished.77 These arrangements were a setback for those who favored a more direct role for party officials in the administration of the economy. The elimination of the departments for transport and agriculture in the Central Committee lim-

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

91

ited the authority of their local counterparts in the republican and lower party bodies throughout the USSR and bolstered the authority of the deputy prime ministers responsible for these sectors (Andreyev for agriculture and Voroshilov and Beria for transportation). Furthermore, the decree probably undercut Malenkov’s role in the management of personnel. While he retained some ill-defined supervisory responsibility for this sector as the chairman of the Orgbureau and member of the Secretariat, his replacement by Kuznetsov as the director of the cadres directorate undercut his more direct hold on subordinate personnel. Moreover, the assignment of Patolichev (who later clearly identified himself with Zhdanov in his own memoirs dealing with this period) to replace Shamberg as the head of the org-instruction department also threatened Malenkov’s capacity to control personnel. In the first days after the Politburo’s decree, Zhdanov moved swiftly to improve the level of agitprop work. On April 18, 1946, he convened his subordinates to report that Stalin had become deeply dissatisfied with many of the country’s leading “thick journals,” with the level of criticism in literature and other cultural fields, and wanted the agitprop directorate to lead and control this sphere of activity.78 The restoration of Zhdanov’s full authority over the agitprop directorate clearly bolstered the campaign to improve the ideological education of party members, but it did not eliminate the public expression of resistance to his views. While Propagandist quickly resumed its campaign for the restoration of party members’ “independent study” of Marxism-Leninism,79 Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo followed the lead of the Central Committee decree of March 27, 1946. It focused on the importance of “mass work” in support of the five-year plan, urged party organizations to foster socialist competition, and to cultivate soviet patriotism to improve workers’ attitudes toward labor.80 While Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo did not endorse Zhdanov’s view on ideological education, it could not ignore the extension of the authority of the Sovministrov. It now explicitly recognized that the extension of its role demanded that the party officials end their “duplication” and instead provide “political leadership” based on a “principled party position.” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo defined political leadership to include the mobilization of people to solve economic questions, the broadening of the responsibilities of soviet and economic organs for economic questions, the verification of the fulfillment of previous decrees, the correction of errors, and “work with people.” To achieve these objectives, “internal” work had to be vastly improved—party meetings had to be convened on a regular basis, raikom had to give more attention to primary party organizations, and the PPOs had to use their pravo kontrolia

92

Chapter Six

more effectively. The editorial cited Stalin’s formulation that party political work was the basis of economic success in support of this position.81 In this context, Secretary Popov, who had endorsed party officials’ active intervention in economic administration in the spring of 1945, now moved closer to Zhdanov’s orientation. In a report to the Moscow party organization, he portrayed party organs and “economic leaders” as sharing the responsibility for the fulfillment of the plan, and explicitly recognized the critical role played by state ministries in vital sectors such as construction.82 Popov also emphasized the centrality of internal and party political work, explicitly criticized meetings of the party aktiv for their failure to engage in real discussions of these matters, and warned that party officials who sought to squash legitimate criticism could be dismissed. But Popov did not fully endorse Zhdanov’s views on the significance of the study of Marxism-Leninism; he gave equal weight to the ideological education of party members based on study of the Kratkii Kurs and Stalin’s works and to mass political work in support of the five-year plan.83 In early May 1946 Stalin suddenly shook up the Secretariat in dramatic fashion. On May 6, 1946, he fired Malenkov from his position as a Secretary of the Central Committee on the grounds that as the “shef” of the airplane industry, he had been “morally responsible” for its production of defective planes.84 Malenkov reportedly did not participate in the meetings of the Orgbureau until July 16, 1946,85 and Stalin named Patolichev to take Malenkov’s position as Secretary. He ordered the remaining Secretaries (Zhdanov, Kuznetsov, Patolichev, and Popov) to work out a new division of responsibilities for his approval. In the process of preparing this proposal, Zhdanov composed a memo on the baneful effects of party officials’ excessive involvement in economic administration. His formulations were repeatedly incorporated, without attribution, into the subsequent public discussion of officials’ priorities. Zhdanov charged that party officials’ acceptance of “material rewards” from the economic administrators under their supervision had blurred the lines between the party apparat and the state administration, had undermined party officials’ independence, and had reduced them to the playthings of economic administrators. He also claimed that party officials’ neglect of “party work” had fostered a “one-sided enthusiasm for economic problems at the expense of party issues” and undermined the local party officials’ capacity for verification and instruction. He assailed the “serious lag” in ideological and educational work, the widespread neglect of “independent study” of Marxism-Leninism, the inadequate circulation of Pravda and other papers, and their failure to become “militant organs” of political and organizational education.

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

93

Zhdanov urged both Orgbureau and Secretariat to improve “party organizational and party educational work” to help local party organs to play the “leading role” in relation to state and economic organs. He also called on the Orgbureau to improve cadres’ theoretical knowledge through both formal schools and independent study, and to establish clubs of leading party workers in various areas to discuss the theoretical issues of the day. Finally, Zhdanov recommended that G. F. Aleksandrov be demoted to the position of director of the department of schools of the Central Committee.86 On May 9, 1946, Zhdanov and the other Secretaries prepared a draft decree for Stalin on the proper division of responsibilities between the Orgbureau and Secretariat and among the Secretaries but he did not act upon it until August. This prolonged delay may help to explain the extraordinary confusion in the discussion of ideology and officials’ responsibilities in both Bol’shevik and Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo in the spring and summer of 1946. First of all, the lead editorial in Bol’shevik (no. 9, 1946) on ideological work totally ignored the ideological education of members of the party and focused exclusively on cultural policy.87 Secondly, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo simply did not appear for the entire month of May and the first week of June. When it resumed publication with a double issue (No. 9/10) approved for publication on June 10, 1946, it proved either unwilling or unable to present a coherent definition of officials’ priorities. The lead editorial sidestepped the issue to focus on the significance of “criticism and self-criticism” as a “driving force” in all spheres of party life,88 and it published reports by regional party officials and a “consultation” on the subject that were completely contradictory. The report by N. S. Khrushchev, the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party, gave qualified support to Zhdanov’s views on the relative importance of party-political and economic work but did not endorse his views on ideological education. Khrushchev acknowledged party leaders had underestimated the importance of “party-organizational and party political work” during the war, insisted that these errors could be easily overcome by restoring regular party meetings, improving the links between raikom, gorkom, and the primary party organizations. But he clearly implied that the ideological education of new party members was no more important than their active participation in the life of the PPOs.89 In contrast, P. S. Popkov, who had replaced Kuznetsov as the leader of the obkom and gorkom in Leningrad, fully endorsed Zhdanov’s views on the proper division of labor between the Sovministrov and party officials. Popkov sharply criticized those officials who had evidently claimed that the change in the name of the government was merely “cosmetic,” underlined the Sovministrov’s vast authority and spelled out its implications for the party officials. Popkov insisted that party officials should now provide “political

94

Chapter Six

leadership” and supervise the state’s economic administrators without interfering in their “operational economic activity” and condemned those industrial departments at the obkom and gorkom that continued to do so.90 But other regional officials generally sidestepped the issue of officials’ priorities. C. M. Tikhomirov, the first secretary of the Gorky obkom, insisted that the propaganda in support of the five-year plan was a long-term effort and urged the leaders of party, soviet, and economic organizations to play a more active role in the process. The Secretary of the Stalingrad gorkom, Piksin, called for greater attention to socialist competition. Secretary N. I. Gusarov of the Molotov gorkom urged greater attention to the workers’ need for housing and cultural amenities and argued that party officials should hold economic administrators accountable for their failure to provide housing. The Secretary of the Cheliabinsk obkom Beloborodov claimed that his own party organization had already shown greater concern for such matters.91 In this context, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo could hardly provide officials with coherent guidance. The same issue published an anonymous “consultation” on the decisions of the VKP(B) on party organizations’ “leadership of economic work” that was completely contradictory. On the one hand, it declared that party officials should not take on operational responsibilities of economic organizations, should strengthen the authority of economic organs and focus on their supervision, acting as “political leaders” rather than as “narrow economic officials.” On the other hand, it stressed the need to “combine economic and political work” and cited Stalin’s conclusion in 1937 that the two spheres were “intertwined” in support of its position. Its discussion of the decisions of the 18th Conference in 1941 was particularly confusing. It reported its decisions to extend party organizations’ responsibility for industry and transport but did not mention the departments for industry and transport that had been created by the Conference to assure the implementation of these decisions.92 While the editors of Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo were evidently confused by Malenkov’s demotion, the leaders of agitprop were not. In late June 1946 the directorate, in accord with the Politburo’s earlier decree, began to publish its own newspaper, Kultura I Zhizn’. The lead editorial in its first issue reiterated the Politburo’s injunction to improve the party press, to provide direction of the cultural life of the country, sharply attacked local party organizations for their failure to provide adequate ideological education to their members, called for the development of new texts and resources to support this activity, and made no reference to the cultivation of Soviet patriotism.93 This first issue also announced the publication of a huge new edition of the Kratkii kurs and of Stalin’s work and other “classics of Marxism-Leninism.”94

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

95

The publication of the first volume of Stalin’s collected works in July 1946 evidently helped to bolster the agitprop campaign for ideological education. Indeed, Stalin’s own brief preface to the first volume provided the classic rationale for this effort. Stalin recalled that he and other “practical workers” had been so ill-informed on theoretical issues that they had not fully understood some of Lenin’s most important generalizations about the nature of the Russian revolution.95 Pravda’s own editorial (July 7, 1946) on Stalin’s first volume followed suit. It insisted that the study of this text would help Communists to solve practical problems, raise their ideological consciousness, overcome the intrusion of hostile ideology, and cited Stalin’s comments on the study of theory to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in support of this position. Pravda now agreed that party organizational and party political work provided the basis for economic success. From this point onward until the winter of 1946, the journals of the CC/VKP(B) lined up behind Zhdanov’s definitions without equivocation. On July 10, 1946, Kultura I Zhizn’ assailed the leaders of three obkom for allowing their local papers to ignore the ideological education of new members, or to provide materials essential for those members of the party engaged in “independent study” of Marxism-Leninism.96 In mid-July 1946, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo overcame its earlier confusion and endorsed Zhdanov’s views in its lead editorial, in essays by party officials, and its commentary on Stalin’s first volume. The editorial charged that the widespread neglect of party members’ ideological education had allowed the formation of insidious “family circles” of governmental officials that sought to avoid party officials’ supervision and demanded the restoration of more effective supervision and concern with individual members’ ideological education to overcome this problem. It also reiterated Zhdanov’s charge (in his unpublished memo) that party officials’ acceptance of bribes had made them subordinate to economic administrators and indifferent to their corrupt practices, assailed gorkom and raikom for their failure to eliminate these activities, and urged them to restore “verification of fulfillment” and the PPOs’ “supervision” of economic administrators.97 The same issue included an essay by A. Larionov, the first secretary of the Iaroslav obkom that repeated this argument in much sharper form. He condemned those party officials who had allowed themselves to become transformed into “deputy directors” of industrial enterprises and insisted that the Sovministrov’s ministries and their subordinate enterprises had the capacity and trained staff to solve questions of supply, transport, the distribution of the workforce, technology, and technique on their own. Larionov also argued that the primary party organizations, rather than the local departments for indus-

96

Chapter Six

try and transport, were responsible for providing the necessary “political leadership” and supervision of the administrative personnel. Larionov also charged that the organizational instruction departments (headed by M. Shamberg generally identified as an ally of Malenkov) had been responsible for obkom officials’ undue stress on economic questions and persistent neglect of the various elements of internal work, including the ideological education of party members. He concluded that it was the very “heart” of internal work and urged party officials to provide more effective supervision of party members’ education in Marxism-Leninism.98 The same issue also included a “consultation” by S. Abalin on the “leading role of the party of Lenin and Stalin in the Soviet state” that endorsed Zhdanov’s views. Abalin condemned the widespread confusion of the function of the “party apparatus” with the function of state and soviet organs, insisting that party officials had to retain their “independence” from state agencies in order to provide the appropriate verification of fulfillment and supervision. He reiterated Larionov’s position on ideological education.99 Finally, the same issue also included a detailed survey of the first volume of Stalin’s writings that insisted that they were as important as Lenin’s, an essential primary source for the study of theory and history of the party, and a “massive contribution to the Marxism-Leninism” essential for Soviet people in the struggle for communism.100 At this point Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo ceased publication without explanation. Shortly afterwards, Zhdanov’s views on internal party work and ideological education were incorporated into the decrees of the Central Committee. The decree of July 26, 1946, on the “growth of the party and measures to improve party-organizational and party political work with new members of the VKP(B)” charged that the ideological education of new party members was inadequate and that the continued indiscriminate admission of new members threatened to swamp the party with ill-prepared personnel. The decree demanded a temporary halt to new admissions, the application of more rigorous standards, the recruitment of more industrial workers and technical personnel in the country’s major industrial centers, and a massive improvement of the various elements of internal party work including the ideological education of members of the party. The decree ordered the restoration of regular meetings of the party organizations at all levels, insisted that they focus on the education of the new party members, and outlined the shortcomings of the existing system of ideological education and the means to improve it in some detail. The decree charged that local party officials had failed to establish coherent systems to supervise those engaged in independent study of Marxism-Leninism, to develop an effective network of party schools and study circles for those without sufficient

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

97

background to engage in independent study of the Kratkii kurs and other materials, or to train sufficient number of teachers to lead these programs. The decree ordered the agitprop directorate to establish and to staff a network of local political schools, to prepare new texts for those engaged in independent study (including new editions of Marxist-Leninist classics), and to develop a set of lectures that could be used by local officials by the fall of 1946. The decree urged local party officials to organize discussions and meetings with all members of the party engaged in independent study, to establish political schools in the primary party organizations in all enterprises, collective farms, institutions, and military units for those Communists with insufficient background to study theory independently and to assign propagandists from raikom and gorkom to direct them. The decree also ordered Pravda and other journals to publish more materials dealing with questions of MarxismLeninism.101 A second decree (July 30, 1946) dealt with the shortcomings found in the three oblast party newspapers (Rostov, Kuibyshev, and Kursk) that had been sharply criticized by Kultura I Zhizn’ three weeks earlier. It charged that obkom officials’ ideological laxity had allowed the editors of local papers to ignore local party and soviet organs, to give inadequate coverage of basic questions of party political work, economic, and cultural construction, and to avoid effective criticism of local party organizations. The decree also charged that the editors had failed to publish materials to help those engaged in the study of theory and the history of the party, did not provide effective propaganda about the five-year plan, or to publicize the experience of advanced workers to bolster and publicize socialist competition. Finally, the decree sharply attacked the obkom in Rostov for allowing a state agency to finance the paper, a policy that allowed state officials to avoid appropriate criticism. It ordered the agitprop directorate to work with the local officials in changing the structure of the editorial boards of the papers and provide instruction for their editors to assure the elimination of these errors as soon as possible. The decree was distributed to all obkom in the USSR.102

NOTES 1. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 2 (XV), 203–4. 2. Propagandist muted its enthusiasm for Marxism-Leninism the day of Stalin’s address. “Velikaia pobeda krasnoi armii I sovetskogo naroda nad germanskim imperializmam,” Propagandist, no. 10 (1945), 1–5. Approved for publication, May 24, 1945; B. Ponomarev, “Partiia lenina-stalina: vdokhnovitel’ I organizator naroda,” Propagandist no. 10 (1945), 14–23. Approved for publication May 24, 1945. On May 16, 1945, Pravda had stressed the importance of theory, but moved away from this

98

Chapter Six

position in its editorials of May 25, June 4, and June 16, 1945; Bol’shevik was the most explicitly chauvinist. “Russkii narod-rukovodiashchaia sila sredi narodov nashei strany,” Bol’shevik, no. 10 (1945), 3–12. Approved for publication June 9, 1945. 3. O. V. Khlevniiuk, Politburo: Mekhanizmy politicheskoi vlasti v 1930-gody (Moscow: Rosspen, 1996), 254 4. Pravda, May 2, 1945, 1. 5. Pravda, May 12, 13, 1945, 1–2 6. Pravda, May 12, 1945, 2. 7. Pravda, June 6, 23, 25, 1945, 1. 8. “Partiia lenina-stalina-organizator nashei velikoi pobedy,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9/10 (1945), 7–14. Approved for publication June 4, 1945. 9. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 6 (1971), 135–37. 10. See Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 16 (1945), 39–40. 11. “O nedostatkakh v prepodavanii osnov marksizma-leninizma v saratovskom universitite” Propagandist, no. 14 (1945), 10–11. Approved for publication July 31, 1945. 12. B. Borisov, “Pervichnaia partorganizatsiia I voprosy vospitaniia kommunistov,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 12 (1945), 16–22. Approved for publication July 21, 1945. 13. G. F. Aleksandrov, “O nekotorykh zadachakh obshchestvennykh nauk v sovremennykh usloviiakh,” Bol’shevik, no. 14 (1945), 22–23. 14. Bol’shevik, no. 14 (1945), 13–14. 15. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 555. 16. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 7 (1985), 558. 17. M. Domrachev, “Zametki o proverke ispolneniia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1945), 40–41. Approved for publication July 3, 1945; I. Boitsov (first secretary of the Kalinin obkom), “Vydviizhenie I rost kadrov v gody voiny,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1945), 37. 18. O. Kozlova, “Zametki o rabote raikoma v novykh usloviiakh,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 13/14 (1945), 6–8. Approved for publication August 7, 1945. 19. Vlast I khudozhestvennaia intelligentsia, (Moscow: Mezhdunarodni fond demokratiia, 1999), 535–45. 20. For the decree see O.V. Khlevniiuk and others (ed.) Politbiuro TsK VKP(B) I sovet ministrov SSSR, 1945–1953 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2002), 21. 21. Khlevniuk, 22–23. The decree had been proposed by a group including Molotov, Beria, Malenkov, Mikoyan, and Voznesenskii. 22. “Pered novoi piatiletkoi,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 16 (1945), 4–7. Approved for publication September 19, 1945. 23. “Uluchshit kachestvo prepodavaniia osnov marksizma-leninizma v vuzakh,” Propagandist, no. 16 (1945), 2–3. Approved for publication September 10, 1945. 24. “O sostoianii I merakh uluchsheniia lektsionnoi raboty v kuibyshevskom oblaste,” Propagandist, no. 17 (1945), 18–19. Approved for publication September 24, 1945. 25. “Vyshe uroven lektsionnoi propagandy,” Propagandist, no. 17 (1945), 5–9. Approved for publication September 24, 1945. 26. Pravda, September 24, 1945, 3. 27. Werner G. Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–1953 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 212.

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

99

28. Bol’shevik, no. 16 (1945). Approved for publication October 9, 1945. 29. “Vybory v verkhovnyi soviet SSSR I zadachi partorganizatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 19 (1945), 1–5. Approved for publication October 24, 1945. 30. Pravda, October 29, 1945, 1. 31. “Ob ideino-politicheskoi rabote partiinykh organizatsii v sovremennyi usloviiakh,” Bol’shevik, no.17/18 (1945), 1–10. Approved for publication November 4, 1945. Bol’shevik adopted this balanced position even though it reported that a decree of the CC had condemned its ostensible neglect of Marxism-Leninism. 32. P. Pospelov, “O sovetskom patriotizme,” Bol’shevik, no.17/18(1945). 33. M. Naumova, “Rol’ praktiki v razvitii teorii,” Bol’shevik, no. 17/18 (1945), 46–48. 34. Boterbloem, 264. 35. Yoram Gorlizki, “Stalin’s Cabinet, the Politburo and Decision Making in the Post War Years,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 53, no. 2 (2001), 293. 36. Pravda, November 7, 1945, 2–3; November 8, 1945, 1. 37. Pravda, November 24, 1945, 1. 38. Pravda, December 12, 1945, 1. 39. Pravda, December 19, 1945, 1. 40. Boterbloem, 264. 41. Pravda, December 30, 1945, 1. 42. “O rabote seminarov propagandistov,” Propagandist, no. 23 (1945), 2–3. Approved for publication December 31, 1945. 43. The decree was published undated in Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 23/24 (1945), 31–33. 44. “Deistvennaia sila marksistsko-leninskoi teorii,” Bol’shevik, no. 23/24 (1945), 2–6. Approved for publication January 5, 1946. 45. P. Pospelov, “Partiia Lenina-Stalina-politicheskii rukovoditel’ I vospitatel’ naroda,” Bol’shevik, no. 23/24 (1945), 23. 46. G. F. Aleksandrov, “Pod velikim znamenem Lenina-Stalina,” Bol’ shevik, no. 1 (1946), 6–10. 47. N. Gusarov, “Ob izuchenii proizvoditel’nykh sil oblasti,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 1 (1946), 16–23. Approved for publication January 19, 1946. Gusarov claimed that local officials had developed immense expertise as a result of its conference on the region with members of the USSR Academy of Sciences. 48. A. Kozlov, “Neispol’zovannye mestnye vozmozhnosti,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 1 (1946), 25–27. 49. V. Liatnikov, “Operativnyi kontrol’ I proverka ispolneniia,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 1 (1946), 27–29. 50. F. Serzhantov, “O vnimanii k melocham byta,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 1 (1946), 29–31. 51. Pravda, February 8, 1946, 2. 52. Pravda, February 8, 1946, 2. 53. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 2 (1946), 45–48. Approved for publication February 8, 1946. 54. Stalin qualified his characterization of World War II by portraying his wartime allies in a more positive light. See Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 3 (XVI), 2–4.

100

Chapter Six

55. Stalin, Vol. 3 (XVI), 19–20. 56. L. Slepov, “Lenin I Stalin o bol’shevistskikh kadrakh,” Propagandist, no. 3/4 (1946), 38–48. Approved for publication February 26, 1946. 57. “Rabotat tak kak uchit tovarishch Stalin,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 4 (1946), 5. Approved for publication March 12, 1946. 58. A. Kuznetsov, “Rech tovarishcha Stalina I zadachi leningradskoi partorganizatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 4 (1946), 14–16. 59. Hahn, 41–42. 60. M. Shamberg, “Nekotorye voprosy vnutripartiinoi raboty,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 4 (1946), 31–33. 61. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 3 (XVI), 35–53. 62. Politbiuro TsK VKP(B) I Sovet Ministrov SSSR: 1945–1953 (Moscow: Rosspen, 2002), 25. 63. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 25–26. 64. Zasedaniia verkhovnogo soveta, pervaia sessiia, 12–19 marta 1946 (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1946). The government’s control of economic administration was recognized many years ago by Timothy Dunmore in his The Stalinist Command Economy: The Soviet State Apparatus and Economic Policy 1945–1953 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1980), 1–2. For a more recent recognition of the importance of this change in the government’s name see Yoram Gorlizki, “Ordinary Stalinism: the Council of Ministers and the Soviet Neopatrimonial State, 1946–1953,” The Journal of Modern History, 74 (December 2002), 700. 65. Politicheskii Slovar’, 393 66. This clearly was the case in regard to cultural policy. See the documents in Vlast I khudozhestvennaia intelligentsiia, 587–604. 67. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 26–27. 68. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 29–30. 69. For the details of the agenda of each meeting in the period under review, see Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 464–526. 70. Boterbloem, 268–69. 71. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 6 (1971), 150–52. 72. “Boevaia zadacha propagandistov I agitatorov,” Propagandist, no. 6 (1946), 3–8. Approved for publication April 5, 1946; Pravda, April 10, 1946, 1. 73. It claimed that it was based on the “granite base” of Marxist-Leninist science about the development of human society, on the laws of the development of socialist society, and the capacity of Lenin and Stalin to use these laws for the good of the Soviet people. “Programma novogo pod’ema sil sovetskogo gosudarstva,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 5/6 (1946), 8–9. Approved for publication March 31, 1946. 74. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 5/6 (1946), 13. 75. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 5/6 (1946), 11. 76. “Istoricheskii resheniia verkhovnogo soveta SSSR,” Bol’shevik, no. 6 (1946), 4–10. Approved for publication April 9, 1946. 77. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 32–34. 78. For an excerpt from his report see Vlast I khudozhestvennaia intelligentsia, 549–50.

The Turbulent Restoration, 1945–1946

101

79. “O samostoiatel’nom izuchenii marksiststsko-leninskoi teorii,”Propagandist, no. 7/8 (1946), 6–12. Approved for publication April 27, 1946. 80. “Novaia piatiletka I voprosy politicheskoi raboty partorganizatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 7/8 (1946), 9. Approved for publication April 30, 1946. 81. Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 7/8 (1946), 6–8. 82. G. Popov, “Zadachi Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii v sviazi s novym piatletnim planom,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 7/8 (1946), 12–13. Approved for publication April 30, 1946. 83. Popov, 20–21. 84. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 205–6. 85. A. A. Danilov, “Stalinskoe Politburo v poslevoennye gody,” Politicheskie partii Rossii: stranitsy istorii (Moscow: 2000), 202. 86. Politbiuro I sovet ministrov, 37. 87. “Znachenie ideologicheskoi raboty v sovremennykh usloviiakh,” Bol’shevik, no. 9 (1946), 5–11. Approved for publication May 28, 1946. 88. “Samokritika-vazhneishaia sila dvigiushchaia vpered nashe razvitie,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9/10 (1946), 9–10. Approved for publication June 10, 1946. 89. N. Khrushchev, “O nekotoryh voprosakh vnuterpartiinoi raboty,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9/10 (1946), 13–18 90. P. S. Popkov, “Novaia piatiletka I zadachi partorganizatsii. Sobranii aktiva gorodoskikh partorga nizatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9/10 (1946), 19–20. 91. P. S. Popkov, 21–23. 92. “Resheniia o rukovodstve partiinykh organizatsii khoziaistvennoi raboty, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 9/10 (1946), 38–43. Approved for publication June 10, 1946. 93. “Vyshe uroven’ ideologicheskoi raboty,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 1 (June 28, 1946), 1. 94. “10 millionov eksempliarov kratkogo kursa istorii VKP(B)”; “Izdanie proizvedenii klassikov marksizma-leninizma v 1946 gody.” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 1. 95. Stalin, Sochineniia, Vol. 1, xiii–xiv. 96. “Gazety dol’zhny stat’ podlinnymi tsentrami politicheskoi raboty,” Kultura I Zhizn’, no. 2 (July 10, 1946), 1. 97. “Za vysokuiu printstipal’nost v rabote partiinykh organizatsii,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1946), 1–4. Approved for publication July 16, 1946. 98. A. Larionov, “O nedostatkakh partiinoi raboty na predpriiatiiakh,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1946), 20–21. 99. S. Abalin, “Rukovodiashchaia rol’ partii Lenina-Stalina v sovetskom gosudarstve,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1946), 37–40. 100. “Pervyi tom Sochinenii I. V. Stalin,” Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo, no. 11 (1946), 6–19. 101. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 24–30. 102. KPSS v rezoliutsiiakh, Vol. 8 (1985), 31–38.

Chapter Seven

Zhdanov’s Uneasy Ascendancy, 1946

SUMMARY Zhdanov’s influence seemed to be immense during the second half of 1946. In August 1946, he was named the chairman of the Orgbureau,1 his views on the overriding importance of the ideological education of party members were embodied in a major reform of internal party education, his report on the alleged ideological errors of Leningrad’s leading literary journals set the tone for the massive campaign to restore the agitprop directorate’s control over the cultural life of the country. In the fall of 1946 he was indirectly identified as Stalin’s right-hand man in the Secretariat, his definition of priorities were incorporated into decrees of the Central Committee dealing with both industry and agriculture, and in November 1946 he presented the report on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. However, the first issue of Partiinaia Zhizn’, the new Central Committee journal that began publication in mid-November, did not endorse all of his views. In the last month of the year, Zhdanov left the capital for an extended vacation and he reportedly did not return until just before January 24, 1947.2 In his absence, public support for his definitions began to wane. On August 2, 1946, the leadership made three decisions that influenced the conflict over officials’ priorities. First of all, the Politburo approved the decree on the responsibilities of the Orgbureau and Secretariat that the Secretaries of the Central Committee had proposed to Stalin in May 1946 after Malenkov had lost his position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B). Second, a decree of the Central Committee introduced a new system of internal political and ideological education for party and soviet officials. Finally, the Politburo named Malenkov a deputy chairman of the Sovministrov responsible for 103

104

Chapter Seven

the supervision of the Ministry of Electric Industry, the Ministry of Communication Production and the Ministry for Communications.3 As a result, on August 8, 1946, he became a member of the Bureau of the Council of Ministers that dealt with immediate problems of economic development at its periodic meetings.4 In sum, although Malenkov had been fired from his position as a Secretary of the CC/VKP(B) he became a Politburo/Minister with a powerful position in the inner circle of the government of the USSR with responsibilities in keeping with his priorities. The Politburo’s decree on the responsibilities of the Orgbureau and Secretariat (August 2, 1946) bolstered Zhdanov’s authority. He was named Chairman of the Orgbureau, which was now defined as the “directing organ of the Central Committee dealing with party and party-organizational work” and held responsible for the verification of the activities of all subordinate party organizations, for improving their performance, and for the review and approval of all orders dealing with party organization and party educational work. The Politburo’s decree explicitly subordinated the Secretariat to the Orgbureau and made the Secretariat responsible for working out the Orgbureau’s agenda, for the verification of the fulfillment of the decrees of both Orgbureau and Politburo, and the assignment of leading cadres in party, soviet, and economic agencies. The Politburo decree declared that both Orgbureau and Secretariat should improve local organs’ capacity to provide “real supervision” of local state and economic agencies, and the work of the press. The Politburo decree also upgraded the org-instruction department into a directorate for the verification of party organs headed by Secretary Patolichev and staffed by a group of “inspectors” with sufficient experience to provide real guidance to subordinate party organs. Finally, the Politburo decree reemphasized the division of labor between the Secretaries by reaffirming Zhdanov’s leadership of the agitprop directorate and the department of foreign affairs of the Central Committee, Kuznetsov’s leadership of the cadre administration, and Patolichev’s leadership of the new directorate for verification.5 On August 2, 1946, a decree of the CC/VKP(B) established an elaborate system of educational institutions to provide ideological-political training for both party and soviet officials. It charged that the existing training programs had shown greater concern for the quantity rather than the quality of their graduates, that many unqualified students had been admitted into the existing schools, that the instruction was well below par, and that many party and soviet workers had stopped their own independent study of Marxism-Leninism and needed to be retrained.6 The decree also claimed that the existing program had not trained a sufficient number of specialists in Marxism-Leninism, law, international relations,

Zhdanov’s Uneasy Ascendancy, 1946

105

and philosophy to staff the local departments of propaganda, the institutions of higher and technical education, and journals. In order to meet this objective, the existing Advanced Party School was renamed the Academy of Social Science, placed under the direct control of the agitprop directorate and charged with the training of specialists in the fields of political economy, foreign economic institutions, theory of state and law, international relations, history of the USSR, history of the VKP(B), dialectical materialism, philosophy and literary criticism. Graduates would be placed in the directorate, local party organizations, journals, and higher educational institutions. The CC decree also called for the establishment of a wide network of schools under the direct control of the cadre directorate that would attempt to retrain all leading cadres over the next three to four years.7 This program was headed by the newly formed Advanced Party School and included subordinate schools for party officials at every level of the party’s hierarchy. The Advanced Party School included sections for organizational party work, propaganda work, and for editors of newspapers. Candidates for the party school had to be under forty years old, have completed secondary school education, and have experience as secretaries and heads and deputy heads of departments at the gorkom, obkom, kraikom, or Central Committee of union republics. Similar programs were established at the republican, krai, and oblast levels for long-term study and retraining with sectors for the fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, history, economic science, Russian language and literature.8 A parallel system of education was established for workers in soviet agencies. While the agitprop and cadres directorate raced to establish this program, the agitprop directorate enjoyed a temporary but significant advantage in publicizing its views. As noted above, Partiinoe Stroitel’stvo had ceased publication in mid-1946, the agitprop directorate had begun to publish its own journal Kultura I Zhizn’, and the CC/VKP(B) had announced the forthcoming publication of Partiinaia Zhizn’. But Partiinaia Zhizn’ did not appear until mid-November 1946, and in the interim Kultura I Zhizn’ pressed vigorously for the restoration of ideological education at all levels of the VKP(B). Its lead editorial of August 10, 1946, provided a vigorous defense of new members’ ideological education, paraphrased the Central Committee decree of July 26, 1946, and gave particular stress to the supervision of party members’ “independent study” of Marxism-Leninism.9 Pravda adopted the same position. It cited Stalin’s warning in his report to the 18th Congress that those who remained indifferent to the study of theory could become mere “mechanical implementers” of party decisions,10 and urged technically trained personnel to study theory to avoid the danger of lapsing into practicalism (deliachestvo).11 In contrast, Bol’shevik remained silent on the issue until mid-September 1946.

106

Chapter Seven

In the midst of this campaign, the decree of the CC/VKP(B) on the ideological errors of the Leningrad literary journals Zvezda and Leningrad (August 14, 1946) was made public on August 21, 1946. The decree was the outgrowth of the Orgbureau’s discussion of Soviet literature held on August 9, 1946, and it had been composed by a large commission including all the members of the Orgbureau.12 Stalin reportedly helped to produce the final version of this decree and two others decrees highly critical of alleged shortcomings and errors in Soviet film and theatre. The terminology of the decree suggests that it was not an outgrowth of the agitprop campaign to restore party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism. The decree did not refer to it as a source of direction or inspiration, made no reference to the VKP(B)’s educational role, to the prewar decree of the CC/VKP(B) on the use of the Kratkii kurs, or to the leadership’s formulations on the study of theory at the 18th Congress. The decree reflected the leadership’s concerted effort to eliminate ostensible “bourgeois” influence from Soviet culture, to bolster Soviet citizens’ pride, and to assure agitprop control over the cultural life of the entire society. The decree attacked the journals Zvezda and Leningrad for publishing a variety of “ideologically hostile works” including the work of Zoshchenko and Akhmatova. It portrayed Zoshchenko as “anti-Soviet” for allegedly characterizing the people of the USSR as primitive, uncultured, and stupid,13 and criticized the editors of Zvezda for publishing these materials and also ignoring the criticism of his work in the journal Bol’shevik in 1944. The decree assailed Akhmatova for her pessimism, her support for the “bourgeois-aristocratic aesthetic and decadent concept of art for arts sake” and charged that the publication of such works had “cultivated a spirit of servility before Western contemporary culture” and had seriously disoriented Leningrad’s writers. The decree assailed the journal Leningrad in much the same terms, accusing it of fostering a “servility toward everything foreign” and insulting the city that bore its name. In explaining these errors, the decree did not refer to the VKP(B) and its ideology but adopted a strikingly statist stance; it complained that the editors of the offending journals had forgotten that “our journals are an important instrument of the Soviet state in the task of educating the Soviet people and particularly its youth” and that Soviet literature should fulfill this objective. The editors were charged with a loss of their sense of responsibility “before the people, before the state, and before the party.” The decree held three officials responsible for these mistakes. While it attacked the head of the union of writers (Tikhonov) for fostering these developments, the brunt of criticism fell on Kapustin, the second secretary of the Leningrad gorkom, and Shirokov, the secretary for propaganda and head of

Zhdanov’s Uneasy Ascendancy, 1946

107

this department for allowing Zoshchenko to join Zvezda’s editorial board and to publish positive reviews of his work. The CC decree also criticized the agitprop directorate for inadequate supervision of the journals. The decree closed down the journal Leningrad, named the deputy director of agitprop Egolin the new editor in chief of Zvezvda, assigned the Secretariat the task of appointing a new board under his leadership, reprimanded Kapustin for his errors, and fired Shirokov. The leadership of the journal was shifted to the obkom, whose Secretary (Popkov) was held responsible for taking measures to improve “ideological political work” among Leningrad’s writers, and Aleksandrov was held responsible for assuring that appropriate measures were taken. Stalin added one last point to the decree dispatching Zhdanov to Leningrad to explain the decisions.14 The published version of his report (an edited version of two different reports given in Leningrad in mid-August) did not deviate from the decree. Zhdanov’s report was extraordinarily eclectic—he not only savagely attacked Akhmatova and Zoshchenko for depicting Soviet life in negative terms, but also combined patriotic slogans, a plea for greater partiinost in literature with the characteristic charge that party officials’ preoccupation with industrial production had made them neglect ideological questions. Zhdanov insisted that the USSR’s cultural life was superior to that in the West, reiterated the decree’s assault on any manifestation of “servility” to bourgeois culture, referred to himself and his audience as “Soviet patriots,” stressed the importance of the “interests of the motherland,” and endorsed Russian dominace of the USSR’s cultural life. Zhdanov explicitly attributed the ideological errors of the journals to the Leningrad party leaders’ preoccupation with production: “How could it happen that the Leningrad gorkom adopted such a policy on the ideological front? Obviously, it was carried away with the immediate problems of the city’s reconstruction, with an upsurge in its industrial development, and forgot about the significance of ideological work. This obliviousness cost the Leningrad party organization dearly; we must not forget ideological work; the spiritual richness of our people is no less important than the material. It is impossible to live blindly, ignoring the future either in the realm of material production or in the ideological sphere.”15 The published version of his report did not refer explicitly to the restoration of ideological education as an antidote, but the resolution of the Leningrad aktiv on his report in August 1946 suggests that he had called on writers to study Marxism-Leninism to prevent a repetition of these mistakes.16 Zhdanov’s authority in the leadership was so extensive at this juncture that his definition of officials’ priorities was incorporated into a decree of the Central Committee on agriculture. The decree on the agricultural policy of the

108

Chapter Seven

Sal’skii raikom (August 17, 1946) charged that its “substitution” (podmena) for the local executive committee and land organs had made it ignore the economic weakness of the collective farms, the flagrant violation of the charter on collective farms, the excessive turnover among their chairmen and had encouraged the leaders of the collective and state farms and MTS to appeal to the raikom for direct orders rather than attempt to solve their own problems.17 As a result, the raikom had avoided its responsibility for the overall leadership and supervision of local soviet, economic, and land organs as well as serious shortcomings in its party organizational and party political work. In particular, the decree charged that the leaders of the raikom had not given sufficient attention to the role and development of the PPOs in the collective and state farms and MTS, had ignored the local aktiv, carried out pro forma inspection visits, mismanaged the assignment of personnel, failed to recruit new members of the party from among the workers and intelligentsia, neglected both their own and other party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism, and “political work” with the masses. The decree also charged that the raikom had failed to dispatch local leaders to visit the farms to explain the importance of their work for the five-year plan, and had neglected the development of local clubs, libraries, reading rooms, and movie houses. Finally, the decree charged that the obkom in Rostov had simply ignored these errors because the farms had been relatively successful in fulfilling their production targets. The decree ordered the raikom to end its excessive supervision of soviet and economic agencies and to grant them greater responsibility for the fulfillment of the plan, to give more attention to “party organizational and party political work” by working more closely with the PPOs and their secretaries, informing them of leadership decisions, and demanding accounting from them before the raikom bureau. The decree gave particular attention to the improvement of the study of Marxism-Leninism. It ordered the raikom to survey party members to determine the level of their knowledge of theory, to establish more schools and study circles led by well-trained propagandists, and improve its own newspapers. The decree also made demands on higher party organs; it ordered the Rostov obkom to help to provide lectures and to dispatch a group of consultants to the raikom’s department of propaganda to help those engaged in the study of theory; it ordered the agitprop directorate to send a delegation of specialists in propaganda to the region and ordered the raikom to improve its newspapers. Finally, the decree urged the raikom to appeal to the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR to provide funds for the construction of local cultural institutions, ordered the ministry of cinematography, the state committee on radio, and OGIZ to provide films, radios and books to the region.18

Zhdanov’s Uneasy Ascendancy, 1946

109

At this juncture, Zhdanov’s views on ideological education were warmly endorsed by Kultura I Zhizn’ and Pravda. On August 20, 1946, Kultura I Zhizn’ published excerpts from the Central Committee decree on Zvezda and Leningrad and from the Central Committee decree announcing the end of Propagandist and the forthcoming publication of Partiinaia Zhizn’. It also provided surveys of party meetings held in Belorussia, Georgia, and the Ukraine that “exposed” the various shortcomings in the ideological education of party members under the watchful eyes of officials from the agitprop directorate. The same issue included an essay by N. Mitronov, the rector of the Advanced Party School established earlier that month, that endorsed the study of Marxism-Leninism, and cited the appropriate sections of Stalin’s address to the 18th Congress in support of his position. (Mitronov also made it clear that party officials in the new educational program would be trained to understand industry, transport, agriculture, trade, and finance.)19 In late August and early September Pravda endorsed Zhdanov’s orientation in every respect. Its editorial of August 23, 1946, lauded the new system of internal party education, on August 24, 1946, it paraphrased Zhdanov’s assault on the baneful effects of party officials’ acceptance of “material” awards from those under their supervision, and on August 29, 1946, it lashed out at those party officials whose preoccupation with economic detail had undermined their capacity to act as effective “political leaders.” On September 7, 1946, it attacked the party organization in Moscow, generally regarded as one of Malenkov’s strongholds, for neglecting the ideological education of its members. But for reasons that are obscure, Bol’shevik remained reluctant to support Zhdanov’s views. It did not comment on the Central Committee’s decree of July 26, 1946, until September 13, 1946, and its editorial on the subject balanced its endorsement of party members’ study of Marxism-Leninism with almost equal attention to the educational value of actual practice, active participation in party meetings, and the cultivation the personal characteristics necessary to be a member of the VKP(B).20 But these reservations had no impact on Zhdanov’s high standing in the leadership. On September 19, 1946, Stalin complimented him on his report on the ideological errors in literature and suggested that it be published as a pamphlet,21 and on September 22, 1946, Pravda defined it as of “immense significance for all workers on the ideological front” and insisted that MarxismLeninism was the basis of the entire activity of the VKP(B).22 On the same day, Pravda published a joint decree of the Council of Ministers and Central Committee of the VKP(B) on violations of the collective farms’ charter that was signed by Stalin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and by Zhdanov as Secretary of the Central Committee of the VKP(B).This clearly implied that

110

Chapter Seven

he was to be regarded as the leading Secretary of the Central Committee and Stalin’s virtual second in command. But this decree was a Pyrrhic victory for Zhdanov; it implicitly repudiated the Central Committee decree of August 17, 1946, that had condemned party officials’ “substitution” for state and soviet agencies as the major source of shortcomings in the agricultural sector and had called for a clear division of labor between party and state officials as an antidote. The decree of September 19, 1946, failed to make this distinction and instead lumped them together as “party-soviet workers” who had ostensibly ignored the widespread overstaffing of the administration of the collective farms, the peasant families’ encroachment on the collectives’ land, the local officials’ outright theft of collective farm property, and the violation of the norms of “internal democracy” on the farms. The decree established a Council on Collective Farm Affairs under the Council of Ministers to assure the implementation of the decree. While Zhdanov’s views on officials’ responsibilities in agriculture were disregarded, his views on the role of PPOs in industrial enterprises were incorporated into a decree of the Central Committee (September 30, 1946) on the errors of primary party organizations in the textile industry. This decree charged that the PPOs in three major textile combines had made “serious mistakes and shortcomings” in their party political and party organizational work. Its recommendations for remedial action echoed Zhdanov’s outline of the primary party organizations’ pravo kontrolia in his report to the 18th Congress of the VKP(B) in 1939 and totally ignored the industrial departments of local party organs.23 The CC decree charged that the “duplication” of the work of the factory administration of the Ivanovskii combine by the PPO had made it ignore the major difficulties in the factory (the low level of productivity of the factory’s equipment, inadequate labor discipline, the high labor turnover, and the inadequate provision of food and other services to the workforce) and the pressing need for more effective party political work. According to the CC decree, the PPO had failed to develop the workers’ awareness of the significance of the five-year plan, had ignored the shift-level party units, had conducted party meetings at very low level, and had ignored the ideological education of Communists so badly that one-third of them remained politically illiterate! Similar accusations were leveled against the PPOs in two other textile combines, and all three were ordered to “combine party political and economic work,” to retain their independence from the factory administration, and warned that the acceptance of any material rewards from the directors was tantamount to bribery. The decree ordered local party officials to strengthen the primary party organizations, improve living conditions, recruit agitators from among the more educated segments of the population to im-

Zhdanov’s Uneasy Ascendancy, 1946

111

prove mass work, and to provide better support for those engaged in the independent study of Marxism-Leninism as spelled out in the Central Committee decree of July 26, 1946. The decree held the appropriate obkom responsible for monitoring the party organs’ success.24 Pravda’s editorial comment on the decree (October 7, 1946) stressed the PPOs obligation to provide “political leadership” and to supervise the administration without duplicating its activities or undermining the economic apparatus. In the fall of 1946 the regime was faced with massive shortfalls in agricultural production and it adopted increasingly stringent measures to avoid a complete collapse. On October 9, 1946, Pravda ordered party and soviet officials into the field, to help collect, store, and transport the grain in order to assure deliveries to the state. On the same day, it announced the appointment of the Council on Collective Farm Affairs. Its hybrid composition suggests that the leadership of the party had little sympathy for Zhdanov’s views on the proper division of labor between party and state officials. The chairman of the Council was A. A. Andreev, a deputy chairman of the Sovministrov and his deputies were N. S. Patolichev, the director of the newly formed directorate for the verification of party organs and his own deputy, V. M. Andrianov. The majority of its members were chairmen of collective farms, but it also included important state planning officials, regional leaders such as N. S. Khrushchev, and leaders of republican and regional party organizations. The Council had its own networks of agents independent of local party and state organs.25 As the collection of grain lagged, the leadership turned to more draconic measures. A joint decree of the Sovministrov and the Central Committee (October 25, 1946) accused local party and soviet officials of failing to prevent widespread theft and embezzlement of grain and demanded stringent measures by the judiciary and local police organs to deal with it.26 Stalin dispatched his closest colleagues to the provinces to assure compliance. Malenkov was dispatched to Siberia, Mikoyan to Kazakhstan, Beria and Mekhlis to Krasnodar krai, Kaganovich to Kurgan oblast and then with Patolichev to the Ukraine.27 But the apparent rejection of Zhdanov’s approach to agriculture did not slow the agitprop directorate’s campaign to improve the ideological education of party members. On October 10, 1946, Kultura I Zhizn’ published the curriculum of the evening raion party schools that included heavy doses of the Kratkii kurs along with courses on the five-year plan, geography, and a survey of all major spheres of party and soviet work.28 On October 20, 1946, it directly cited Zhdanov in its call for an improvement in the work of lecturers. It now complained that they had not provided sufficient attention to MarxistLeninist theory, had been reluctant to discuss historical developments after

112

Chapter Seven

the October revolution, and blamed local party officials for failing to recruit effective lecturers.29 But in November 1946 support for Zhdanov’s stress on ideological education began to weaken. First of all, serious disagreements over this issue emerged among the leading officials at the opening ceremonies for the new Advanced Party School and the Academy of Social Sciences on November 1, 1946. Secretary A. A. Kuznetsov defended Zhdanov’s view that the study of theory was more important than either technical or general education, and that the VKP(B)’s effectiveness was totally dependent on its members’ knowledge of the “laws of social development.”30 In direct contrast, G. F. Aleksandrov, the director of agitprop, repeatedly stressed the importance of practice as the basis for cadres’ education, emphasizing the overriding need to “translate the theoretical propositions of Marxism into daily organization and practical work,” and reiterated his earlier critique of unidentified “dogmatists.”31 Secondly, Bol’shevik proved reluctant to endorse the need for ideological education. Its editorial on the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution portrayed Stalin’s formulation on the “moral political unity of the USSR, the friendship of peoples and Soviet patriotism” in his report to the 18th Congress as “a brilliant contribution in the theory of scientific socialism” and ignored his comments on the importance of Marxism-Leninism in the same address.32 While the editorial concluded by citing the importance of “educating the masses of the population in the spirit of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism,”33 this was hardly a ringing endorsement of the ideological education of members of the VKP(B). Finally, the ceremony marking the anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution seemed to indicate that Zhdanov had little support in the leadership. While his selection to give the report on the anniversary was an immense honor, he was the only full member of the Politburo to appear with other officials to review the traditional parade.34 In Stalin’s absence, the failure of the other full members of the Politburo to appear surely created the impression that Zhdanov did not have much support. Zhdanov’s address on the anniversary suggests that he was “back-pedaling.” He concentrated on the role of the state and its five-year plan, the various obstacles that had to be overcome in both industry and agriculture, and made few references to the role of the VKP(B). He did stress the importance of political consciousness for the society as a whole and young people in particular, and underlined the significance of the decrees on literature, theatre, and film of August 1946, but he did not refer to Marxism-Leninism as the basis for action and as an object of study. He also singled out the decree on agriculture that he had signed with Stalin as of particular significance and lauded the activities of the new Council on Collective Farm Affairs.35

Zhdanov’s Uneasy Ascendancy, 1946

113

A week after Zhdanov’s address, the first issue of Partiinaia Zhizn’ was approved for publication.36 At first glance it seemed to endorse Zhdanov’s orientation, but a closer examination revealed that it rejected some of his views. On the one hand, it published the decrees of the Central Committee that had incorporated his definitions of officials’ priorities and his views on ideological education, its lead editorial implied that the new journal would concentrate on the improvement of the various elements of “internal” party work, and it included essays by leading officials endorsing Zhdanov’s position. On the other hand, a second editorial (unusual in itself) on the agricultural sector rejected his views. The lead editorial lashed out against those party officials who had accepted awards from economic agencies, who “duplicated” their work, or had allowed themselves to become their “supply agents” and insisted that the Central Committee decree on the Sal’skii raikom (August 17, 1946) provided a guide to correct these errors. The editorial also charged that party officials’ “underestimation” of ideological work (Leningrad and Ukraine were cited as examples) had been responsible for the errors exposed by the decrees of the Central Committee in literature, film, and theatre, and that these decrees had made political consciousness a major source of energy for the society as a whole. The editorial urged party officials to provide “constant and concrete leadership” to the local publishing houses and the media to help overcome and eliminate the “vestiges of capitalist consciousness” within the society as a whole. The editorial concluded that party officials’ excessive focus on economic and administrative matters had seriously damaged internal party work and called for the regular convocation of party meetings and the revival of criticism and self-criticism to overcome these errors. It urged party members to study Marxism-Leninism in accord with the Central Committee decree of July 26, 1946, and ordered officials to monitor those engaged in independent study of Marxism-Leninism.37 But a second editorial on the crisis in agriculture directly challenged the lead editorial’s insistence that the decree on the Sal’skii raikom, which had stressed the need for a coherent division of labor between party officials and soviet and land organizations, was a “guide to action.” The editorial held party organs at all levels fully responsible for the fulfillment of the government’s planned targets; it blamed the obkom directly for the lags in collecting the harvest, criticized the kraikom for issuing orders without assuring their implementation, and urged the primary party organizations to become more deeply engaged in the processes of harvesting, collecting, and storing the grain.38 In contrast, the same issue of Partiinaia Zhizn’ also published two articles by party officials that vigorously endorsed Zhdanov’s orientation. N. Gusarov,

114

Chapter Seven

a newly appointed inspector for the new directorate for verification of party organs, charged that the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (headed by N. S. Khrushchev) had committed serious errors in both personnel management and ideological work. He claimed that its “formal” approach to “work